SOAS Research Online

Abstract

Turkey's determined attempt after 1954 to improve her relations with the Arab world should be seen in the context of a wider search for security against the perceived Soviet threat to her independence and territorial integrity. It was encouraged by Washington's proposal to set up a Middle East defence organisation based on the countries of the 'Northern Tier,' which paved the way for the creation of the Baghdad Pact with Turkish, Iraqi, British, Iranian and Pakistani membership. The USA, however, ultimately declined all invitations for full pact-membership. Her equivocal attitude encouraged Egypt and Syria not only to resist all attempts to lure them into the pact but also to embark on a determined counter-policy to block the adherence of other non-committed Arab states. The thesis argues that Turkish leaders failed in their' rather high-handed bid to expand the pact's Arab membership and to isolate Egypt because they were ill-informed about the latest political trends in the Arab world and ignored any alternative and differing advice coming from then diplomatic missions and lower echelons in then Foreign Ministry. Moreover, none of Turkey's allies were fully convinced that her proposals were necessarily the best on offer. The thesis also tries to shed light on some of the alternative policies attempted by Turkey after the Suez war to stem the tide of pro-Communist and radical pan-Arab nationalist tendencies in the region. It argues that the toppling of the Iraqi monarchy, despite being a short-term setback for Turkey, proved in the long run to be a panacea to her attempts to retain her alliance with NATO and preserve in the meantime a workable relationship with her Arab neighbours. It also discusses Turkey's changing attitude towards Israel and the Palestine question as well as the changes in the official Turkish evaluation of'Abd al-Nasir's policies.