SOAS Research Online

Abstract

In 1865, Aden was an insecure, undervalued, Indian outpost. Non-intervention in Yemeni affairs was official policy. British influence inland was non-existent; and in the Gulf of Aden it was declining. By 1905 Aden was a major Imperial base, an international trading, shipping and telegraphic centre; and its population had doubled, Britain dominated the Gulf of Aden. In 1866-67 Resident W. Merewether disregarded official policy and destroyed Fadhli tribal power. This benefitted Aden and the Abdali chiefs. The Abdalis expanded their territory and influence, as British client Britain purchased the Little Aden peninsula; and, when the Ottoman reoccupation of Yemen threatened the Abdalis, British pressure enforced an Ottoman withdrawals Strategic British requirements dictated the acquisition of more Abdali territory, in 1882, and agreements with Arabian coastal chiefs, between 1876 and 1888. By the acquisition of British Somaliland (1884-88) foreign bases were virtually excluded from the Gulf of Aden. Official British policy in the Yemen interior from 1886 vas to allow the reoccupation of the 'Amiri' area by the Ottomans, but successive Residents supported the Amir against Ottoman pressure. During the Boundary Commission (1902 - 1905), Aden officials circumvented their conciliatory India Office instructions, and with Lord Curzon's support and the Ambassador's co-operation at Constantinople, the Cabinet was bamboozled into an expansionist policy. The Ottomans were bullied into surrendering territory, British expansion, notably between 1865 and 1888, was a triumph of character by the limited Residency staff over adverse circumstances, with occasional timely naval visits. It owed much to three Britons and one Persian-Arab. The acquisition of Somaliland was the personal achievement of Major F. M. Hunter.