SOAS Research Online

Abstract

In an era of rising conflicts and democratic backsliding, understanding the limitations of externally driven democratisation in fragile states is imperative. This dissertation examines Afghanistan's post-intervention political order (2001–2021), highlighting the challenges of promoting democracy in a war-torn and deeply divided society. It argues that in a highly centralised system, elite competition for the presidency was shaped by bargaining power derived from state resources, ethno-patronage networks, and external support. These dynamics entrenched power imbalances, weakened institutions, and marginalised non-elite constituencies, ultimately undermining democratic governance. Grounded in a political economy framework and Rational Choice Theory, the study critiques the liberal assumption that elections serve as rites of passage from violence to peace. It demonstrates that in fragile contexts, elections were often symbolic and performative, choreographed for internal and external audiences, yet failed to foster democratic resilience. By analysing Afghanistan’s four presidential elections (2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019), the research captured the evolving dynamics of electoral politics. Through extensive fieldwork in Kabul—including over 50 elite interviews—the study identifies three key domestic elite groups: incumbents, opposition coalitions, and insurgent factions. It reveals how incumbents leveraged state resources and international backing to consolidate power, while opposition elites, hindered by fragmented alliances, used the threat of violence as a bargaining chip. Insurgent groups, particularly the Taliban, strategically alternated between violently rejecting and engaging with electoral processes, further complicating democratisation efforts. Key findings highlight the pivotal yet contradictory role of external actors, particularly the United States. Their interventions often prioritised short-term stability over sustainable democratic development, amplifying elite fragmentation and undermining institutional legitimacy. By illuminating how elite bargaining and external interventions intersected, the dissertation contributes to academic debates on political settlements, democratic resilience, and state fragility. The study calls for a fundamental shift in international democracy promotion. Rather than imposing standardised models, policymakers should prioritise inclusive political settlements that align formal institutions with actual power dynamics. This requires strengthening domestic dispute resolution mechanisms, fostering broad-based coalition-building, and engaging all stakeholders—including insurgent groups and non-elite constituencies—to support sustainable transitions from war to peace.