D'Oro, Giuseppina, Giladi, Paul and Papazoglou, Alexis (2019) 'Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind.' Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy, 62 (5). pp. 477-503.
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Abstract
This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.
Item Type: | Journal Article |
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Keywords: | Naturalism, non-reductivism, post-Kantian idealism, metaphilosophy of mind |
SOAS Departments & Centres: | Departments and Subunits > School of History, Religions & Philosophies > Department of Religions & Philosophies |
ISSN: | 0020174X |
Copyright Statement: | This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy, 62 (5). pp. 477-503 (2019), published by Taylor and Francis. Re-use is subject to the publisher’s terms and conditions |
DOI (Digital Object Identifier): | https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484001 |
Date Deposited: | 08 Sep 2023 16:07 |
URI: | https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/40164 |
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