SOAS Research Online

Abstract

The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 was intended, at least by some of its authors, to end the war and to bring peace to Vietnam and Indochina. Studies on the Agreement have generally focused on the American retreat from Vietnam and the military and political consequences leading to the fall of Saigon in April 1975. This study will seek to explore a number of questions which remain controversial. It addresses itself to considering whether under the circumstances prevailing between 1973 and 1974 the Paris Agreement could have worked. In the light of these circumstances it argues that the Agreement sought to establish a framework for future stability and economic development through multilateral aid and rehabilitation aimed at the eventual survival of South Vietnam. The main thrust of the study is the interraction between the US and the Asian protagonists, considered on their own terms. Special prominence is given to the role of Japan, who endeavoured to contribute, under the Agreement's auspices, the centre of gravity for the economic dimension. From the Indochina perspective the protagonists include the communist power centres of North Vietnam and Cambodia and the government of South Vietnam. The consequences of the accord for East Asia are also examined where it complemented new realities emerging there in the form of the Japan-China dialogue, the assumptions of US strategy and the diplomacy surrounding them. The attempt is made to identify through the day-to-day course of events the different stages in the evolution of the intended design. Especially close attention will be paid to certain periods to identify major turning points when the conjunction of events had a crucial bearing on the final outcome. Equal consideration is given to explain how and why the Paris Agreement lost all credibility and was no longer a possible framework for stability in Vietnam and Indochina.