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Mucciarelli, Federico M. (2006) 'White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?' European Company Financial Review, 3 (4). pp. 408-425.

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Abstract

According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.

Item Type: Journal Article
Keywords: Takeover bids; defensive measure; competing bids; white knight defense; EU takeover directive
SOAS Departments & Centres: Departments and Subunits > School of Finance & Management
Legacy Departments > Faculty of Law and Social Sciences > School of Finance and Management > Centre for Financial and Management Studies (CeFiMS)
Subjects: K Law > K Law (General)
ISSN: 1613-2556
Copyright Statement: © 2006 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This is the published version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
DOI (Digital Object Identifier): https://doi.org/10.1515/ECFR.2006.018
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2012 08:51
URI: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/14254

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