Mucciarelli, Federico (2006) 'White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?' European Company and Financial Law Review, 3 (4). pp. 408-425.
|
Text
- Published Version
Download (83kB) | Preview |
Abstract
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Takeover bids; defensive measure; competing bids; white knight defense; EU takeover directive |
| SOAS Departments & Centres: | Departments and Subunits > School of Finance & Management Legacy Departments > Faculty of Law and Social Sciences > School of Finance and Management > Centre for Financial and Management Studies (CeFiMS) |
| Subjects: | K Law > K Law (General) |
| ISSN: | 16132556 |
| Copyright Statement: | © 2006 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This is the published version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| DOI (Digital Object Identifier): | https://doi.org/10.1515/ECFR.2006.018 |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2012 08:51 |
| URI: | https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/14254 |
Altmetric Data
Statistics
Accesses by country - last 12 months | Accesses by referrer - last 12 months |
Repository staff only
 |
Edit Item |