

Democratization of Candidate Selection in Taiwanese Political Parties

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Abstract

This research attempts to tackle two of the principle questions prominent in the literature on candidate selection; namely how to classify candidate selection methods and how to explain change in candidate selection methods adopted. In other words, this is a detailed analysis of how and why Taiwanese candidate selection procedures have been adjusted since the late 1980s. A seven-point scale has been adopted to measure the degree of democratisation in candidate selection, in which 1 equals the most open democratic nomination system, while 7 equals a nomination method dictated by the party leader. The pendulum of Taiwan's inner party democracy has swung sharply in both directions since 1989. Although the KMT and DPP have both reached their most democratic procedures for selecting legislative candidates, there have been instances of a return to authoritarian nomination methods in all major parties, and strong resistance from party leaders to delegating greater nominating power to ordinary party members or supporters.

It is argued that there have been two critical forces governing the direction of change; the internal variable of factional balance of power, and the external variable of election results. Party factions and leaders have not promoted more inclusive nomination methods out of ideological motivations. Instead nomination methods have been democratized or centralized when the dominant leader or faction has viewed such changes as promoting their

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own interests and power. In addition, parties have altered nominations methods either in response to poor election results or with a view to improving future election prospects.

Keywords: Inner-party democracy, political parties, candidate selection, party change, factionalism

1. Introduction

Since the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, Taiwan has moved rapidly towards first democratic transition and then democratic consolidation. Almost simultaneously, inner-party democracy got off the ground, with the first member primaries held by both Taiwan's leading political parties in 1989. However, the development of inner-party democracy has been far less smooth, with parties fluctuating between democratic and authoritarian nomination methods, and strong resistance from party leaders to delegating greater nominating power to ordinary party members or supporters.

Candidate selection is a central aspect of the political process. In the words of Gallagher and Marsh (1988:1), "The quality of candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies elected, of the resultant parliament, often of the members of government and to some extent of a country's politics." The question of candidate selection has become increasingly salient over the last three decades, as there has been a global trend towards greater inclusiveness of the selectorate (Mair, 1994:15).

The literature on candidate selection has tended to focus on three questions: (1) How should candidate selection methods be classified or measured? (2) How can the adoption of different selection procedures be explained? (3) What are the consequences of different selection methods? Although party members and candidate selection has been a growing sub-field in the party literature since the late 1980s, this research has tended to focus on cases in Western Europe and the United States (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Scarrow, 1996). There has been a shortage of work looking at nomination from a cross-national perspective and of cases in the developing world.

Being the only Chinese democracy, Taiwan is an important case for party scholars. Moreover, though Taiwan's multi-party elections are less than two decades old, compared with other Asian or Third Wave cases party politics in Taiwan is relatively institutionalized (Fell, 2005; Stockton, 2001). Taiwanese parties have received increasing attention from political scientists. The bulk of the research on Taiwan's political parties has focused on inter-party electoral competition, and changes in their party platforms (Rigger, 1999; Schafferer, 2003; Fell, 2005). However, few works on inner-party democracy in Taiwan have been published in English over the last decade (Baum and Robinson, 1999; Wu, 2001; Wu and Fell, 2001). In fact, in a recent re-

view of research on Taiwan's domestic politics, Rigger (2003: 78) notes nomination is an under researched field.

This research attempts to fill this gap by examining Taiwanese data to tackle two of the principal questions featuring prominently in the literature on candidate selection; namely how to classify candidate selection methods and how to explain change in candidate selection methods adopted. In other words, this is a detailed analysis of how and why Taiwanese candidate selection procedures have been adjusted since the late 1980s. Although the focus is on Taiwan's largest political parties, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), some attention will be given to the smaller and newly formed parties, such as the New Party (NP), People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The pendulum of inner-party democracy has swung sharply in both directions since 1989. At the time of writing, the KMT and DPP have reached their most democratic procedures for selecting legislative candidates, however, the other parties have retained highly authoritarian nomination practices.

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2. Democratization or decentralization of candidate nomination systems?

The most commonly employed concepts to classify candidate selection systems have been decentralization, and democratization. Although there is often a considerable degree of overlap between decentralization and democratization of candidate selection, the two concepts are not always equivalent. As Rahat and Hazan (2001: 309) point out, "Only if decentralization encompasses a more inclusive electorate can it be considered a democratizing process." If the local party boss alone makes the choice of candidate it could be categorized as highly decentralized, but in reality it would be no more democratic than if a selection committee at the national

party level made the selection. Two studies, one by Rahat and Hazan (2001), another by Bille (2001) have created scales of democratization of candidate selection. The Bille study not only compares cross-nationally, but also shows change over time by comparing parties' selection methods in 1960 with those in effect in 1989.

In contrast to previous studies that have examined the degree of centralization in Taiwanese nomination practices (Wu and Fell, 2001; Cheng, 2004: 346), this study analyzes the democratization of candidate selection. A seven-point scale of inner-party democratization has been created that is similar to the one employed by Rahat and Hazan (2001: 301). However, my scale has finer distinctions between selection methods, and the categories used are meant to be closer reflections of selection methods actually in use in Taiwan. This scale is shown on Table 1. In this scale, one equals the most open democratic nomination system, in which the selection is made by open primaries or opinion surveys. Points two to four incorporate mixed member vote/opinion poll primaries, closed primaries, and mixed member/cadre primaries respectively. As the selection process becomes more exclusive, point five involves negotiated nomination between different party bodies and point six represents nomination by a party center committee. At the most authoritarian end, seven equals a nomination dictated by the party leader. In Table 2 and Table 3 the parties' placement on this scale in the 1990s and since 2000 are displayed.

Table 1 Scale to Measure Democratization of Candidate Selection Procedures in Taiwan

Values	Explanations of categories
1	Electorate: Including primaries in which all eligible voters may participate or selection by opinion surveys in which survey results account for over 100% of the selection weighting.
2	Mixed system of closed member primaries and opinion surveys.
3	Party Members: Closed member primaries.
4	Mixed system of party cadre primary and closed member primary.
5	Local/Center Negotiation: This involves negotiations between three parties: the local party branch, local party factional leaders, and the party center. This normally allows a candidate to be selected by conciliation.
6	Non Selected Party Agency: a selection committee at the national level makes the nomination decision. This may involve candidates from outside the constituency being parachuted in.
7	Party Leader: The national party leader makes the nomination decision.

Table 2 Categorization of Taiwan's Parties' Candidate Selection Procedures: 1989-1998.

Year	Elections held	KMT	DPP	NP
1989	Legislative and Local	3	3	N/A
1991	National Assembly	4	3	N/A
1992	Legislative	4	3	N/A
1993	Local Executive	5	3	6
1994	Provincial Governor, Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayor	7	4	6
1995	Legislative	5	4	6
1996	Presidential	7	4 & 1	6
1997	Local Executive	5	2	6
1998	Legislative and Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayor	5	2	1

Source: Wang (2001), *Comparative Electoral Systems*, pp.166-189.

Table 3 Categorization of Taiwan's Parties' Candidate Selection Procedures: 2000-2005.

Year	Elections held	KMT	DPP	NP	PFP	TSU
2000	Presidential	7	6	7	7	N/A
2001	Legislative and Local Executive	2	2	6	6/7	6/7
2002	Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayor	6	6	N/A	N/A	N/A
2004	Presidential	7	7	N/A	7	N/A
2004	Legislative	2	2	6	6/7	6/7
2005	Local executive	2	2	N/A	6/7	6/7

Source: Wang (2001), *Comparative Electoral Systems*, pp. 166-189.

At this point it must be emphasized that placement of parties in the various selection categories can never be an exact science, as the location of the critical selection decision is often not clear. For although the party nomination rules may appear highly democratic on paper, in reality, the selection choice has often been made behind closed doors in a highly authoritarian manner. Other complications include the holding of different level elections simultaneously, the frequency that parties employ different selection methods in different constituencies, and in national parliamentary elections parties have contrasting nomination procedures for constituency and proportional representation candidates. Therefore the categorizations employed for parties are approximate generalizations.

3. Explaining change in candidate nomination procedures

How to explain various parties' choice of candidate selection systems is a much-debated question. The most commonly cited factors in previous works have been legal provisions, governmental organization, electoral system and the nature of parties. In the most comprehensive

cross-national examination of factors affecting centralization of candidate selection methods Lundell (2004) tested nine independent variables. However, the study found there was not a strong relationship between any of explanatory variables and centralization. For the Taiwan case, Wu (2001) identified five principal factors to explain changes in nomination systems for the KMT; these were socio-economic transition, changing party nature, local factionalism, electoral crisis, and elite conflict.

Most party theorists agree that established parties are conservative organizations averse to change. As Harmel and Janda (1994: 261) put it, "decisions to change a party's organization, issue positions or strategy face a wall of resistance common to large organizations." Stability is especially prevalent in candidate nomination methods. For instance, in Bille's (2001) study, 50 of the 70 parties examined showed no significant change in their candidate selection procedures between 1960 and 1990. Harmel and Janda (1994: 261) suggest a framework in which party change comes from two inner-party factors; leadership change, and a change in dominant factions, plus an external stimulus for change, such as electoral defeat. This framework has been used in a number of previous works to analyze party change in Taiwan. While Fell (2005) employed this model to show how changes in party policy positions can be explained by changes in inner-party balance of power and parties' responses to electoral results, Tan (2002) argued that a combination of all three factors contributed to the transformation of the KMT over the last two decades. This approach to examining inner-party democracy is particularly appropriate as candidate selection is a critical arena for intra-party conflict, while the impact of election results must also be considered as Taiwanese parties have shown themselves to be highly responsive to perceived signals from election victories or defeats. This study tests the applicability of this model to explain Taiwan's parties' candidate selection procedures.

4. Candidate selection for the KMT

For most of the forty-year Martial Law period, the KMT allowed very little democracy to creep into its nomination process. The KMT's official nomination system for much of the Martial Law era was party member opinion response. However, in reality, nominations were the results of negotiations between the KMT party center, the local KMT branches and local KMT factions.

It was not until 1989, two years after the end of Martial Law that the KMT first experi-

mented with more inclusive nomination. That year, the KMT held closed party primaries to select candidates for the 1989 legislative and local executive elections. The principal promoter of these member primaries was the head of the KMT Organization Department Kuan Chung. This move created great interest among ordinary party members, who for the first time were given a real say in selecting candidates. Although the KMT claimed a grossly overestimated membership total of almost two million at the time, 45.10% of their members turned out to vote in these primaries (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 10).

Although I have placed the KMT in the category three of closed member primaries, the degree of party democratization should not be exaggerated. The results of the KMT's primaries were only advisory, party leaders still were prepared to dictate nominations when dissatisfied with primary results. In fact, ten percent of primary winners did not receive KMT nomination. Though Ting Shou-chung was second in the Taipei city primary, he was not nominated, as the Taipei city branch party wanted to avoid too many mainlander candidates that would have less appeal to the general electorate¹. Another factor that damaged the democratic credentials of these early primaries was that the KMT party center and party branches often failed to maintain neutrality in the election process by trying to ensure their preferred candidates won selection. As the former KMT legislator Apollo Chen explained, "In the past, we did try primaries, but they were fake primaries.....in the voting process there was cheating. For example, if ten people went to vote, twenty votes were counted." An example of party center bias came in the primary for KMT candidate for Taipei county magistrate. The KMT decided to ignore factional politicians and promote an outsider, the professor Li Hsi-kun. Although local factional figures were able to stand in the primary, the KMT party center was able to use its influence to ensure Li was selected (Rigger, 1999: 145-146).

The KMT claimed that the primaries were a step towards greater inner-party democracy; the true motivations for this reform were more complex. These reforms were designed to reduce the power of the local factions. It was hoped that by forcing candidates to compete in party member primaries, the party would no longer need to negotiate with local factions over nominations and the local factions' members and resources could gradually be taken over by the party (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 6). In other words, the party was using inner-party democratization to as a tool in its inner-party power struggle against local factions. The comments of former Premier Hau Pei-tsun reflect the dilemma this factional alliance had created, "In the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the so called KMT's victories were relying on how many votes factional leaders could bring in

at the local level, then we would nominate their men. Gradually the KMT became reliant on the local factions to win elections rather than vice versa. This made the KMT sink into degradation, as it came under the control of the factional money politics. If you didn't nominate them, they would leave the party and stop the KMT from winning. This was the major factor in the party's decline.³”

Although Lee Teng-hui had become president and KMT party chair following Chiang Ching-kuo's death, he was widely seen as a stopgap leader. The party was beginning to split into two loosely competing camps. While the Mainstream KMT included Lee Teng-hui and Soong Chu-yu, and mainly comprised of elected Taiwanese politicians, the Non-Mainstream KMT included senior KMT figures such as Li Huan and Hau Pei-tsun and was largely made up of Mainlander politicians. The question of primaries became a divisive issue in the conflict between these two competing camps for two reasons. Firstly, the primaries were the initiative of the Non-Mainstream Premier Li Huan's protegee Kuan Chung, who was the arch rival of KMT Secretary General Soong Chu-yu. Secondly, it soon became apparent that the Non-Mainstream was better at mobilizing its supporters for party primaries. This was particularly true for their military veterans' branch, known as the Huang Fu-xing that was able to gain a disproportionate number of nominations using the closed member primary system. As a former KMT propaganda chief explained, “The Huang Fu-xing controlled about a third of party members in Taipei city, which is already a high proportion. But their mobilization strength was very strong; they had a (primary) turnout rate of 92%. The non-Huang Fu-xing members, this included Taiwanese and Mainlanders, had a turnout rate of less than 20 percent. So this distorted the results.”⁴”

The external factors pushing the KMT's experimentation with closed member primaries were the electoral trends of the 1980s and the rise of the opposition movement. Although the KMT was able to win huge majorities in the 1980s, the party center was deeply concerned by the opposition's gradual increase in vote and seat shares. Therefore the primaries were also designed to unite the party and make it a more effective electoral force (Kuan, 1992: 239-263).

In 1991 and 1992, Taiwan held its first full national parliamentary elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. For these democratic milestones, the KMT actually adopted a less democratic procedure for nominating its candidates. In 1991, the closed party member primaries were replaced by the revised party primaries. These were weighted primaries in which ordinary party members' votes accounted for 60% and party cadres votes accounted for 40%. A year later in 1992, the cadre and ordinary party members' votes were given equal weighting. The

degree that this was a democratic reversal can be seen from the fact that party cadres accounted for only about ten percent of party members (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 15). Naturally party members showed less enthusiasm for the revised party primaries, and the turnout dropped to only 29.55% in 1992 (Wu, 1997: 61). From 1992 the KMT ceased to encourage the party branches to conduct primary elections, as primaries became only an optional method. Unsurprisingly, that year 18 of 29 constituencies cancelled their primaries, as most localities returned to the more traditional nomination method of local faction, party branch and party center negotiations (Wu, 1997: 61).

The movement away from member primaries was again related to a combination of inner-party and external electoral factors. Although the KMT had gained over 70% of seats in the 1989 legislative election, this was viewed as a serious setback. Primaries were widely blamed for the factional backlash, as where factional candidates had failed in primaries they had stood without nomination, refused to assist the campaign of officially nominated KMT candidates or even helped opposition candidates' campaigns (Rigger, 1999: 131-147). Such a factional revolt was blamed for Li Hsi-kun's defeat in the Taipei county magistrate election. Due to the perception that primaries had contributed to the poor election results, the chief promoter of primaries Kuan Chung was forced to resign.

Following the Non-Mainstream KMT Kuan Chung's departure from office, Soong Chu-yu was able to undo his rival's work by reducing the level of inner-party democracy. While the Non-Mainstream had a deep distaste for the local factional alliance, Soong was able to maintain very good relations with the factions, and shared their dislike of member primaries. As a result, the actual proportion of factional candidates nominated for the 1992 legislative elections rose to 59.18% from 50% in 1989 (Chen, 1996: 189). In fact, the KMT performed very well in the 1991 National Assembly elections, winning over three quarters of the assembly seats; therefore there were no calls for a return to closed party primaries.

Nomination matters remained a critical issue in the intense inner-party conflicts within the KMT in the early 1990s. Although the Mainstream Faction was in a stronger position, with Lee Teng-hui having consolidated his power and Soong Chu-yu as KMT Secretary General, the Non-Mainstream was still a significant force. Premier Li Huan had been replaced by another Non-Mainstream figure, the former general Hau Pei-tsun. Hau used his influence to support the retention of party primaries. According to Hau's biographer, he told Soong, "The KMT cannot revoke the party primary system because of strong backlashes from local factions. The party pri-

mary system is an effective means to suppress the clout of factions..." (Wu, 1997: 334). As the Non-Mainstream felt primaries favored their own candidates; they were particularly supportive of primaries. Naturally Taiwanese politicians from the Mainstream took the opposite view, as the senior KMT legislator Huang Chao-shun recalled: "When I first took part in primaries in 1992, I didn't like the system. The problem was the military village members⁵ were very unified and numerous, while my supporters were dispersed, so it's hard to beat them. They are also strong in Kaohsiung, so I was against the system. There are more Mainlander members than us (Taiwanese), so I was lucky to be nominated."⁶

President and KMT chair Lee Teng-hui and Premier Hau Pei-tsun fought hard to ensure the nomination of their supporters for the 1992 election. Lee particularly promoted the nomination of local factional politicians in the hope that this would contribute to his domination of party and national politics. This was seen in a sharply different light by Hau, who recalled: "He (Lee) was nominating mafia or money politics candidates, I didn't approve of this. At the time, there was the New KMT Line⁷, this group of young KMT legislators was the real KMT. They opposed money politics and special privileges...later they became the NP. At the time Lee Teng-hui refused to nominate them, I wanted them nominated."⁸ As a result, though primaries were officially only held as reference for party nomination decisions, Hau insisted that in the eleven constituencies where primaries were held that their results be respected, as these favored his own supporters (Baum, 1992: 14).

By 1992 KMT battles over nomination strategy had the air of international espionage, as Secretary General Soong played the role of a double and at times triple agent. Not only did Soong support his own favored factional candidates, he also conspired with Lee Teng-hui to block the nomination of strong Non-Mainstream politicians such as Chao Shao-kang. However, Soong was also operating against his own patron Lee Teng-hui by blocking the nomination of politicians from the Lee's most supportive Mainstream group, the Wisdom Club, as five of its incumbent legislators failed to get nomination (Baum, 1992: 14). Soong's maneuvering went even further, as he also attempted to damage the election chances of those Wisdom Club politicians that were nominated. As the former KMT legislator Lin Yu-hsiang recalled, "He tried to wipe out the Wisdom Club. In both Taipei North and South, Soong over nominated and as a result many KMT candidates were defeated. Soong was against the Wisdom Club for its Taiwan first stance, though at the time both supported Lee Teng-hui. At the time Soong also secretly maintained close relations with Li Huan and Hau Pei-tsun."⁹

Just as in 1989, in 1992 the KMT once again lost seats and votes, as a result the revised primaries were blamed and Secretary General Soong had to resign to take responsibility. Although the KMT still described its candidate selection process as a primary, there had been a clear reversion to less democratic methods. The revised party member primary system was scrapped and in its place came a return to the three way negotiations of local factions, local branches and party center. This was to be the principal means of selection for KMT candidates in the legislative and local executive elections for the rest of the 1990s. On paper the selection method employed for Taipei and Kaohsiung mayor, Provincial Governor, and presidential candidates appeared more democratic, as the official term was primary system for party delegates (Wu, 2001: 106-107). In this process, approximately 2,000 party delegates voted to select KMT candidates. However this party delegate primary was just confirming candidates already handpicked by the party center or KMT party chair Lee Teng-hui. In 1994 incumbents Soong Chu-yu and Huang Ta-chou defeated their delegate primary opponents easily for Provincial Governor and Taipei mayor, while in Kaohsiung incumbent Wu Tun-yi faced no opposition. Huang's opponent for Taipei mayor nomination, Ting Shou-chung recalled how KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui was the critical decision maker, "My general public approval rate was far higher than the Taipei Mayor (Huang), but Lee Teng-hui didn't support me."¹⁰

Similarly, Lee Teng-hui in 1996 and Lien Chan in 1999 were approved as KMT presidential candidate by a vote of delegates at the party's national congress. In reality, the national congress served as no more than a rubber stamp for party chair Lee Teng-hui's decisions. In both cases, there was no challenger in these so-called party delegate primaries. Therefore the most accurate placement would be to locate the selection in category seven.

There were some calls for a return to inner-party democracy in the KMT during the 1990s. However, these were few and far between and came almost exclusively from the weaker Non-Mainstream faction, and unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears. In 1995 Lee's bitter rivals Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun called for an all member primary to select the KMT's presidential candidate. While in 1999 Soong Chu-yu made a similar demand. These two cases reveal that party nomination is not an ideological issue, as both Lin and Soong had opposed closed party primaries in the past; it was only when they perceived primaries as in their personal interests that they switched positions¹¹.

A combination of inner-party factional balance and electoral results can explain the KMT's shift further away from democratic candidate selection between 1993 and 2000. In this period,

Lee Teng-hui and the Mainstream Faction became increasingly dominant in the party, while the pro primary Non-Mainstream either left the party or became marginalized. In 1993 Hau Pei-tsun was forced to resign from the premiership and many of his supporters in the Non-Mainstream split away to form the New Party. In fact according to the KMT Secretary General in 1993 Hsu Shui-teh, the principal reasons for the formation of the NP were the KMT's "Nominations, inability to stop relying on factions and corruption."¹² Lee was able to replace Hau and Soong with more loyal politicians that clearly belonged to his Mainstream faction. While with his ally, the Vice President Li Yuan-tzu, as head of the KMT nomination committee, Lee was able to get his way with nominations (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 29). Lee was highly reliant on his alliance with local factions to maintain his dominant position within the KMT; therefore he showed little interest in challenging their influence on party nominations. Although Lee had gained the title of Mr. Democracy for promoting direct presidential elections, he had a contrasting image among his Non-Mainstream opponents, who viewed him as an increasingly dictatorial party leader. As the Non-Mainstream politician Ting Shou-chung recalled, "Lee Teng-hui led the KMT with authoritarian methods, he didn't create democratic mechanisms. When anyone proposed inner-party democracy he saw it as a Mainlander counter attack, he had double standards."¹³

The KMT's generally positive electoral performance during the 1990s also partially explains its reluctance to return nomination power to party members. Though the KMT's vote share declined, in terms of seat shares the KMT fared quite well in most major elections. In 1993, it increased its proportion of local executive posts, in 1994 it won the first provincial governor race, in 1995 it retained its majority in the Legislative Yuan, in 1996 it won the first direct presidential election, in 1998 it actually increased its legislative majority and regained control of the Taipei mayoral post. Its only serious setback occurred in the 1997 local executive elections, when the DPP won more seats than the KMT for the first time.

It was not until after the KMT's humiliating defeat in the 2000 presidential election that the party was able to carry out radical reforms to its nomination system. There were three principal aspects to the new system. Firstly, there was an anti-black-gold nomination regulation to avoid nominating candidates with corruption records. This reform appears to have had a considerable impact as numerous KMT politicians with less than savory reputations, either ceased to stand or stood for election as independents. Secondly, a new candidate selection system was brought in, modeled on the DPP's procedure in which party members' primary votes account for 50% and public opinion survey accounts for the remaining 50%. Then in 2004, the ratio was altered to

60 % survey and 40% member primary. As a result, the KMT's nomination system has reached its most democratic level to date. Moreover, although party branches may decide to select candidates through the traditional three-way negotiation procedure, the number of districts in which the KMT held primaries for legislative candidates increased in 2004. In interviews with KMT politicians in 2001 and 2004, I found a high degree of satisfaction with the new primaries. Lastly, the KMT introduced regulations to allow for the first all member primary for the party chair. As a result, Lien Chan won election as the first directly elected party chairman in the KMT's history¹⁴. The former KMT Kaohsiung mayor Wu Tun-yi summed up the changed party atmosphere since 2000, "It's more democratic than in the past. Lien Chan is willing to give the power of nomination to the party members. That is progress."¹⁵ On closer examination, the direct election of the KMT party chair was of dubious democratic value, as Lien was the sole candidate¹⁶. Nevertheless, the system was subsequently used in 2005, for a highly competitive party leader election between the Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou and the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Ching-ping¹⁷.

It would, however, be a mistake to believe that the KMT has completely kissed its authoritarian nomination practices goodbye. Since the KMT lost central power it has developed an increasingly close cooperation with the other opposition parties. As these opposition parties have tried to coordinate their nominations, the KMT has found implementing democratic methods a complex matter. In addition, as in the past the KMT's primaries are not binding, as the party center still retains the power to remove primary winners that do not meet its approval.

There is much less willingness to allow for democratic procedures for the nomination of local executive positions, as the party center still fails to maintain neutrality as it tries to promote its favored candidates. Although Huang Pa-yeh won the KMT's primary for Kaohsiung County magistrate in 2001, he was not nominated. Instead, the KMT nominated the politician coming third in the primary Wu Kuang-hsun. It was reported that the KMT party center, along with their Pan Blue allies the PFP and NP preferred Wu as he had a more orthodox KMT party image, compared to Huang's local factional background¹⁸. In other cases, though a KMT politician has won nomination through the party's selection process, their primaries have been cancelled due to inter-party negotiations among the Pan Blue parties. A prime example was for the Taipei county magistrate in 2001, when Lin Chih-chia was initially nominated by the KMT. However, Lin was not a satisfactory candidate for the KMT's allies, thus he was pressured to go through a further round of surveys and eventually withdraw to allow the NP's Wang Chien-hsuan to stand as a

joint Pan Blue candidate¹⁹.

The nomination of KMT presidential candidates since 2000 has been no more democratic than under Lee Teng-hui. As in the past, the KMT presidential candidate choice was rubber stamped by a vote of party delegates, however, the real decision in 2004 was made behind closed-door meetings between the KMT and PFP chairs Lien Chan and Soong Chu-yu.

The KMT nomination reforms can again be explained by election results and inner-party balance of power. The KMT's humiliating defeat in the 2000 presidential election, in which its candidate Lien Chan came third with only 23.1% of the vote led to the party's the most serious bout of soul searching since its defeat on the Chinese mainland in 1949. One of the principal resulting reforms was to be a democratization of its nomination process. Although the KMT's election results were very poor in 2001, the party has not seen them as humiliating as 2000, since the combination of Pan Blue parties retained a majority in the legislature. Moreover, now there is a fairer nomination procedure, there has been a reduction of KMT dissidents running without endorsement.

Equally important has been the change in the KMT's factional balance, with the rise of Lien Chan to party chairman and Lee Teng-hui's departure from the party headquarters in 2000. Lien had not shown any particular support for primaries while Lee's Vice President; however, since becoming party chair he has shown much more sympathy towards the Non-Mainstream's demands for democratic nomination methods. Lien has attempted to stamp his own authority on party affairs and taken quite different policy and personnel decisions from his former patron. While Lee had marginalized the Non-Mainstream, Lien has selected Non-Mainstream politicians as his inner core advisors. As a result, Non-Mainstream politicians such as Ting Shou-chung were able to take an active part in drawing up the KMT's new nomination regulations. The departure of Lee from the party center has also seriously weakened the Mainstream or localized faction within the KMT. As pro Lee Teng-hui politicians have defected to join Lee's creation the TSU, local KMT factions have struggled to resist the introduction of party primaries under Lien.

In order to avoid the appearance of rebel presidential candidates, it will be essential for the KMT to find a fair selection system for the 2008 presidential election. Moreover, the need for an acceptable selection system will be even more urgent if the three Pan Blue parties do merge into one party, as at present they have highly distinct nomination procedures. However, the new party chairman, Ma Ying-jeou's pro primary views and his success in the KMT's party chair election augurs well for the party's continuation of internal democracy.

5. Candidate selection for the DPP

In its first election as a legalized opposition party, the DPP also introduced closed member primaries in 1989. It has adjusted its nomination rules on a number of occasions, as former DPP legislator Chen Chi-mai commented, “Yesterday I was joking that we change the selection method for every election.²⁰” However, from Table 2 it is clear that the DPP has taken the most consistently democratic approach to candidate selection. Moreover, primaries have become more institutionalized within the DPP than any other party, and primary results are generally treated as binding, even if the party center does not always like them. As a result, DPP candidates that have not won selection in party primaries are far less likely to stand unendorsed than their KMT counterparts. While primaries have tended to be viewed as a last resort in the KMT when the negotiated approach fails, primaries have become established as the standard method of candidate selection in the DPP. In the words of the DPP's founding member Chu Kao-cheng, “Apart from the DPP, they (Taiwan's political parties) are all even less democratic than the CCP!²¹”

While the DPP was in opposition, its party leaders had far less power than KMT party chairmen. Therefore changes in party leaders have had minimal impact on the DPP's candidate selection methods. Instead it has tended to alter its nomination strategies as a result of factional compromises and in response to election results. Another key difference has been that while KMT factions adopted a highly antagonistic winner takes all approach to nomination methods, the DPP factions have taken a more consensual approach to nomination reform.

The DPP's introduction of primaries in 1989 was the fruit of factional struggle. The party chair Huang Hsin-chieh of the Formosa faction, hoped to impose his own list of preferred candidates for the local executive election. However, the New Tide faction challenged this authoritarian nomination and the previous practice that incumbents would automatically be nominated. In its place, New Tide promoted the system of closed member primaries that were adopted in January 1989 (Cheng, 2004: 348).

The DPP continued to hold closed member primaries without major changes for the subsequent elections until 1993, locating the party at three on my inner-party democratization scale. It was not until the run up to the 1994 elections that the DPP carried out its first round of revisions to its nomination system. Like the KMT, the DPP opted to revise rather than scrap party

primaries. In the new system, there were initially two equally weighted primary selectorates, party cadres and ordinary party members, and if the winner's two scores averaged less than 5% more than the second place candidate a second phase of voting could be called for in which any registered voter would be eligible to vote (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 30). This party cadre/party member primary was in place for the mid 1990s, however, in the first year of operation there were no cases of the second stage being used, as the losers during stage one were persuaded to concede defeat. In the 1994 contest to represent the DPP in the Provincial Governor race, Chen Ting-nan had a lead of only one percent over Chang Chun-hong, but Chang agreed to withdraw and avoid the open primary (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 20).

The change to a mixed cadre/member primary system came after the replacement of Hsu Hsin-liang by Shih Ming-teh as party chair. However, since there was still a factional balance, this was not the key factor. Instead there was widespread disappointment with the party's poor election performance in 1993, when though the party vote share had increased on the 1989 local executive election, it had actually lost seats. Another election related factor was a concern that the practice of DPP politicians enlisting pocket members would damage the party's reputation for clean governance. This involved politicians paying the membership dues for large numbers of phantom members that could be relied on as block votes in the primaries (Wu, 1998: 20-21). It was hoped that adding a party cadre component would help to dilute the influence of pocket members.

Unsurprisingly concern with factional balance was also a core factor in almost every primary revision of the DPP. The mixed member/cadre primaries gave the DPP's factions a much greater say in nomination matters than under the old system. Each faction hoped to manipulate the nomination process to benefit its own interests. There was a widespread fear that the closed primaries benefited the better-organized but more extremist factions such as New Tide. This was a reason that the party moderates attempted to introduce reforms in the mid 1990s. As Hsu Hsin-liang explained: "DPP party members are basically fundamentalists, that is what kept the DPP together. In the DPP all candidates are nominated by party elections, by member voting, and the members are fundamentalists. So if you don't agree with fundamentalism, you can get away."²²

It was not until the contest to select a DPP presidential candidate in 1995, that the second stage was employed. In the initial stage, four politicians stood for the party member and party cadre votes. As neither of the two frontrunners would withdraw, a second stage in which any eli-

gible voter could vote was conducted. Thus this was an open primary, placing the DPP at the most inclusive point one on my scale. The contest pitted the veteran dissident Peng Ming-min against former DPP chairman Hsu Hsin-liang. The contestants attended almost fifty policy forums throughout the island, in which both made speeches and the audience could cast their votes. A total of more than 307,000 people voted in the process, and Peng won with 58% of the vote (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 25-27). However, Peng's presidential campaign was a disaster, winning only 21%, less than the party had received in its first election in 1986. This meant that the DPP got cold feet about democratizing the selection for presidential candidates in the subsequent two elections.

In 1996 the DPP's nomination regulations were in a state of flux, as candidate selection became the subject of factional struggle. In 1996 alone there were two comprehensive revisions of nomination rules (Baum and Robinson, 1999: 30). Firstly, the cadre voting system was scrapped. Then later in the year, the New Tide faction successfully promoted the replacement of open primaries with opinion polls. After initial trials in 1997, in 1998 the DPP employed this new primary system for the first time on a large scale for selecting legislative candidates. This initially involved an equal weighting for a party member primary and public opinion survey. Later in the 2001 legislative elections, the weighting was further altered to 30% for the party member vote and 70% for the opinion survey.

A combination of internal and election related factors led to the DPP's adoption of the new survey/member primary system. DPP figures have suggested that party chair Hsu Hsin-liang saw the use of surveys as a tool to favor his more centrist Formosa faction and limit the nomination of more extremist candidates. The new system was a compromise solution that though not satisfactory to all groups was at least acceptable. According to the former DPP legislator Chen Chi-mai, "The system we have now is the best so far."²³ It was designed with the objective to produce the candidates that had the greatest chance of winning election, as there was a common perception that leaving selection in the hands of party members or supporters led to nominees that had less appeal to the general public. The classic example was Peng Ming-min's presidential bid in 1996, who though highly popular among hard-core supporters, had little appeal to the general public. Moreover, by keeping members primary, members do not become totally irrelevant as they have in many other parties. However, the reduced weighting given to members since 2001 is related to recent complaints that candidates have been attempting to buy members' votes at the primary stage. The DPP has been very anxious to avoid the image of poli-

tical corruption, particularly in the light of the damage the issue has done to the KMT over the years. Of course some politicians, particularly non-factional affiliated ones, would like to completely remove the members primary. As former DPP legislator Shen Fu-hsiung stated, "I think that even the 70/30 is not enough. Actually I like 8:2 or 9:1. Actually I advocate form of open primaries, open to everyone, not just party members, like the primaries in America. I've already had a proposal in the house, because the KMT doesn't want it, so it's not passed yet. I'd like to see primaries for every party held on the same day and funded by the public. So that everyone can vote for the party he likes, not just the party he belongs to. So that the nominees are not just decided by the party members. There are actually not that many party members. When you have only a few party members to work on then money talks.²⁴"

Another factor in the introduction of the new mixed nomination system has been to remove the impression that selection was controlled in the hands of the party factions. As DPP legislator Pan Meng-an commented, "The problem with cadre evaluation was that it was centered on factions."²⁵ Since the vast majority of the cadres are affiliated to one of the factions, there was a sense in the mid 1990s that despite the democratic veneer, DPP selection was a matter of factional horse-trading. This was clearly damaging to the DPP's party image, for though DPP factions are generally national as opposed to KMT local level factions, the term faction is seen as highly negative among most Taiwanese voters.

The current emphasis on surveys does have its critics. The New Tide's Hong Chi-chang asked, "I think that by using surveys as the primary method, where is the function of the party? I think that we still need the function of the party. If we need surveys, they should not be at such a high proportion. The party elite should have a role in the party decisions. I feel that the decision should rest with party cadres."²⁶ Others note the difficulty in bringing in new blood, as the survey system favors incumbents and those with much media exposure. As Yan Chin-fu notes, "So now everyone must work hard to raise their reputations, so they will just make shows play to the media. They will not care for the people's well being, so long as they get media attention. This will have a major impact on declining quality of our politics."²⁷

Naturally the DPP does at times show less than democratic practices. When selecting the DPP candidate for the 2000 presidential contest, there was a desire to avoid the chaos and infighting associated with the 1996 presidential selection. To pave the way for Chen Shiui-bian's candidacy, nomination rules were ignored, as were the demands from former party chair Hsu Hsin-liang for an open primary. As with the KMT, the DPP's presidential candidate choice was

rubber-stamped by a party delegate vote, but the real selectorate was a small group of party officials, if not by Chen Shui-bian alone.

Since the DPP became the ruling party, there has been a change in the inner-party balance of power. Although Chen Shui-bian was only the party chairman from July 2002 to December 2004, he has been the first DPP party leader to play a more dominant role. This has affected the actual operation of nomination systems, as Chen has the influence to bend nomination rules for the sake of winning elections. This was apparent in the 2001 race to select a DPP candidate for Chiayi County magistrate. Although the DPP politician, Ho Chia-jung won the party primary, he was not nominated. Instead, the party selected Chen Ming-wen, despite the fact that he had a KMT local factional background and was not a DPP member. DPP officials commented later that before Chen Shui-bian, no other DPP leader had ever had the power to be able to cancel the results of a party primary in this manner²⁸. Nevertheless, as Chen's prestige fades in the final two years of his presidency, it is unlikely that he will be as influential over nomination as in his first term. In fact, the highly competitive DPP primary for party chair in January 2006 reflects the return to a more internally democratic party.

Although at times controversial, the DPP's mixed primary/survey system has become institutionalized and is likely to continue in the near future for parliamentary elections. Its greatest test will come in 2007, when the number of legislators is cut in half and the new single member district electoral system comes into force. In addition, like the KMT, the DPP will need to find a more transparent system for selecting its presidential candidate. If the selection again is taken behind closed doors, the possibility of rebel candidates standing cannot be ruled out.

6. Candidate selection in Taiwan's smaller parties

Since the legalization of opposition political parties in 1989, there have been numerous attempts to create a third force to challenge the dominance of the KMT and DPP. Although most of these have been electoral flops, some have had limited success, and contributed to Taiwan's move towards a multi-party system. As with the large parties, factional balance of power has been a critical variable in determining their selection strategies. Nomination has tended to be highly centralized in the hands of either a charismatic party leader or a core group of party leaders.

In 2003 the NP celebrated its tenth anniversary, making it by far the oldest of the significant

third parties. Perhaps for this reason, the NP has shown the most variation in its nomination methods and electoral factors have had a greater impact. During the NP's initial five years, candidate selection was determined by a small select group of the party's founders, placing the party in category six. The party's founding members had formally been members of the KMT's Non-Mainstream, which had been strongly supportive of primary elections. However, after forming the NP, they were highly reluctant to introduce democracy to their candidate selection procedures.

It was not until 1998 that the NP attempted a radical experiment in democratization of candidate selection. The NP became the first (and last) Taiwanese party to employ an open primary for legislative candidates, in which any registered voter was eligible to vote. As a result the party moved into category one. The primaries were held in August 1998, and a total of over 200,000 voters took part (Wu, 1998: 24-26).

What actually caused this sudden shift away from authoritarian selection? Again we must examine the NP's factional developments and its electoral trends prior to 1998. After the NP's spectacular election results in 1994-1996, the party had performed poorly in 1997's local executive election. The party hoped that open primaries would help to build up a momentum for the 1998 legislative elections. In addition, since 1997 the party had suffered increasingly bitter public feuds among its party elites. For instance, in 1997 party founder Chou Chuan refused to take part in a party primary for Taipei county local executive against Yang Tai-shun. However, after Yang had been officially nominated, Chou demanded she be nominated, and then stood as an independent splitting the NP's vote. As a result of such incidents, it was clear that the NP it needed a fair and acceptable system to replace its tradition of centralized nominations.

Since 1996 there had been a gradual shift in the control structure of the NP, as some of the party's founders left the party center and a new group of politicians that had joined the party later increased in power. However, in 1998 Chao Shao-kang, one of the party founders attempted to employ the introduction of open primaries as a means to retake control of the party. As former NP provincial councilor Yang Tai-shun pointed out: "In reality he was trying to protect the people in his faction to get nomination, but in the one or two years before the election he had not taken part in any NP activities. So if he suddenly announced that I want to nominate my people, no one would accept it. So he said we should allow the people to decide on our candidates, he used this reason to push the primaries. When many people in the party opposed his proposal, he called a press conference and attacked these people as anti democratic."²⁹ Moreover, Chao was

able to pressurize the party leaders to allow him to control the primary process, which led to accusations that he was promoting his handpicked candidates and investigating corruption only for his own opponents.

Unfortunately the NP's radical experiment did not pay off. The party suffered a severe electoral setback, falling from 21 seats to only eleven. In the post election soul searching period, one of the scapegoats for the defeat was the internal fighting caused by the open primaries³⁰. A survey of party cadres found that the controversies of the open primaries were viewed as one of the principal factors leading to the party's defeat³¹. In the words of the current NP chairman Yu Mu-ming, it was "Bold. But we lost and collapsed (hearty laugh)! ³²"

In response to the 1998 election debacle and the changing balance of power in the party, the NP has returned to more familiar nomination practices. With the party under the command of party founders, such as Lee Ching-hua, Hsieh Chi-ta and Yu Mu-ming, the party has followed a centralized nomination procedure³³. Perhaps Lee Ching-hua was the most authoritarian of the three, as he personally selected Li Ao as the party's presidential candidate in 2000 without recourse to debate among other party elders³⁴. In contrast, Hsieh and Yu both reverted to the negotiated approach of a central nomination committee of core party leaders. Although the party continued its electoral decline in 2000 and 2001, the fact that the factional balance has not changed significantly has ensured this centralized nomination system has continued since 2000. Even if the NP does not merge with the KMT, it is highly unlikely that the NP will ever attempt any democratization of the nomination procedure in the future.

Supporters of Lee Teng-hui formed the TSU in 2001. The party tries to promote Lee's Taiwan first political ideals, and act as a supporter of Chen Shui-bian's DPP government. Although Lee does not hold a formal post in the party, he is viewed as the party's spiritual leader. He appointed the party's first chairman Huang Chu-wen and is involved in both campaigning for candidates and takes a decisive role in their selection. This was how the director of the TSU's international department Chang Chen-hsiang described their selection procedure: "Firstly Chairman Huang and Lee Teng-hui have had discussions with potential candidates. Where they have the same ideals and they have local power and the potential to get elected, then we have nominated them."³⁵ In the 2001 legislative election the TSU did very well winning 13 seats in its first contest. For the TSU's first three years there was little change in the internal balance of power, with Lee and his lieutenant Huang dominating the selection process. However, since Huang resigned after the failure of the TSU to increase its seat share in the 2004 legislative election, the party

center's control over nomination has been weakened. Moreover, as Lee ages, it is unlikely he will be able to maintain such an active role in party affairs in the future.

When Soong Chu-yu formed the PFP in 2000, he was able to attract a number of experienced middle-aged politicians from both the KMT and NP. In its first election in 2001, the PFP employed a negotiated approach to nominations between local party branch, local politicians and the party center, with Soong making the final decisions. The local party would send its nomination recommendation list of preferred candidates for Soong and the party center to approve and then go through a further bout of negotiations.

In its first legislative election in 2001, the PFP nominations were highly successful, as the party won an impressive 46 seats. However, there were some instances of poor nomination, for instance in Kaohsiung north district the party refused to nominate its popular incumbent Wang Tien-ching, due to his snubbing of Soong's presidential bid in 2000³⁶. Instead the party branch gave into local factional pressure and nominated three city councilors. As a result of this over nomination all three lost election, though if two had been nominated perhaps both could have won.

Three years later, though the party's legislators have grown in strength Soong remains the party's dominant figure. The Kaohsiung branch chief Huang Peng-hsiao commented, "Within the PFP Soong Chu-yu is strongly supported, so much so that no one in the party has a support level that even reaches half his level, not even a third. Therefore he's the most prominent figure in the party. As a result people call us a one-person party."³⁷ Therefore when Soong made the decision to stand as Lien's vice presidential candidate in the 2004 election, this was a one-man decision made without reference to other party leaders, let alone a party vote.

There has been little change in the centralized nomination in the PFP for the 2004 Legislative Yuan election. If anything the party center has attempted to further centralize the decision-making on candidate selection, as a result even certain incumbents have failed to get through nomination in some constituencies. To avoid local politicians gaining too much influence on the nomination process in Kaohsiung, the party center replaced the local branch chief with a party center cadre, Huang Peng-hsiao. Similarly, it ignored the calls of popular local PFP politicians to be nominated for the Kaohsiung north district; instead it selected another PFP party center figure with no previous ties to the city.

It is possible that some PFP politicians may be able to challenge Soong's control over nominations, especially as he has lost much prestige following his second defeat in the 2004 presidential election. However, even if the PFP does not merge with the KMT and Soong takes a back-

seat role, the party is unlikely to move towards inner-party democracy, as it could easily follow a similar pattern of bitter internal feuding that destroyed the NP.

7. Conclusion

Methodologically, this study has a number of encouraging findings. Firstly, the framework suggested by Harmel and Janda, which explains party change as a response to election results and inner-party factional/leadership change is clearly a useful tool for the Taiwan case. While in previous studies, this author has applied the framework to examine policy change; this article has revealed the importance of election results and inner-party balance of power to explain nomination system choice. Secondly, the direction of change using the Rahat and Hazan scale corresponds closely with the findings of Wang (2001:166-189). However, the Rahat and Hazan scale offers a more simplified and transferable way of measuring democratization of candidate selection in Taiwan. Thus this scale also has the potential to be employed to compare Taiwanese candidate selection practices with cases in both new and mature democracies.

Taiwanese parties have shown a remarkable degree of innovation in their nomination methods. Previous cross-national studies have found most countries have a high degree of stability in their candidate selection systems, with little substantial change over a number of decades. In stark contrast, Taiwan's parties have been willing to experiment with a wide variety of selection systems in the first two decades of multi-party competition. All three major parties of the 1990s attempted to democratize their candidate selection systems; however, there has not been a consistent trend towards inner-party democracy. Instead there have been numerous cases of democratic reversals and resumption of centralized and authoritarian selection processes, even in the DPP.

By 2006 Taiwan's leading parties have reached a highpoint of inner-party democracy, with the institutionalization of the member primary/survey system and direct member primaries for party leaders. However, it cannot be taken for granted that this will be the case in the future. Again much will depend on how this system copes with nomination disputes for the 2007 legislative election under the new single member district system, and of course on the parties' internal balance of power.

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Notes

1. Ting Shou-chung, interview by author, Taipei, 28 September, 2001.
2. Apollo Chen, interview by author, Taipei, September 11, 2001.
3. Hau Pei-tsun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.
4. Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taipei, 19 October, 2001.
5. The reference to the military village members is synonymous with the KMT's Huang Fu-xing Party Branch.
6. Huang Chao-shun, interview by author, Kaohsiung, August 17, 2001.
7. The New KMT Line was a Non-Mainstream KMT group, many of whom later formed the New Party in 1993.
8. Hau Pei-tsun, interview by author, Taipei, November 7, 2001.
9. Lin Yu-hsiang, interview by author, Taipei, April 11, 2000.
10. Ting Shou-chung, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.
11. I am grateful to Wu Chung-li for pointing out Lin Yang-kang's earlier opposition to closed member primaries in 1989.
12. Hsu Shui-teh, interview by author, Taipei, October 11, 2001.
13. Ting Shou-chung, interview by author, Taipei, September 28, 2001.
14. Taipei Times, March 25, 2001, p.1.
15. Wu Tun-yi, interview by author, Nantou, 8 October, 2001.
16. Taipei Times, March 25, 2001, p.1.
17. Taipei Times, July 17, 2005, p.1.
18. Taipei Times, 12, October 2001.
19. Taipei Times, 12, October 2001.
20. Chen Chi-mai, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 20 August, 2001.
21. Chu Kao-cheng, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 8 October, 2001.
22. Hsu Hsin-liang, interview by author, Taipei, 28 September 2001.
23. Chen Chi-mai, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 20 August, 2001.
24. Shen Fu-hsiung, interview by author, Taipei, 19 September, 2001.
25. Pan Meng-an, interview by author, Pingtung, 24, August, 2001.
26. Hong Chi-chang, interview by author, Taipei, 20 September, 2001.

27. Yan Chin-fu, interview by author, Taipei, 28 September, 2001.
28. This point was made by anonymous DPP officials to the author in interviews in December 2004.
29. Yang Tai-shun, interview by author, Taipei, 1 November 2001.
30. China Times, 28 December, 1998.
31. China Times, 28 December, 1998.
32. Yu Mu-ming, interview by author, Taipei, 5 October, 2001.
33. Lee was chairman from 1999-2000, Hsieh from 2000-2001, and Yu from 2002-present.
34. Hsieh Chi-ta, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 7 September, 2001.
35. Chang Chen-hsiang, interview by author, Taipei, 6 November, 2001.
36. This point was made not only by Wang, but also PFP officials at the Kaohsiung branch in 2001.
37. Huang Peng-hsiao, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 2 September, 2004.

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台灣政黨候選人提名方式民主化的研究

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《本文摘要》

本研究將處理文獻中有關候選人選擇的兩個主要問題，分別是如何區分候選人提名方法以及解釋為何不同的候選人提名方式的演變以及被採行。簡言之，本研究詳述在 1980 年代後期台灣的候選人提名程序如何以及為何調整。本研究採用七點的量表分析政黨提名民主化的程度，其中，以 1 代表最開放的候選人提名方法，7 代表直接由政黨領袖提名。台灣政黨的黨內民主自 1989 年以來劇烈擺盪。雖然民進黨與國民黨在立法委員提名上已經達到各自最民主的階段，不過兩個主要政黨也出現重新採用最威權的提名方式，且政黨領袖強烈抗拒將提名權下放給黨員或是支持者。

論者或謂主宰改變有兩個因素：黨內為各派系的權力平衡，黨外則為選舉結果。黨內派系或是政黨領袖不會因為意識型態的動機而推動更具民主的提名方式，不過，卻可能因為政黨內主要領袖與派系的各自利益或是權力，改而推動更為民主或是集權的提名方式。此外，政黨也會因為選舉結果不理想或是改善未來選舉的前景而改變提名方式。

關鍵詞：黨內民主化、政黨、提名制度、政黨變遷、派系

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