Power and Insight in Jain Discourse*

PETER FLÜGEL

In contrast to earlier Jainological emphasis on the unchanging and dogmatic nature of doctrinal Jainism, recent historical-philological and anthropological scholarship focuses predominately on historically changing, syncretic and hybrid features of Jain beliefs and practices, and on the role of agency in the construction of socioreligious identity. Contrary to culturalist self-images and academic representations, it is widely recognised that the ‘differences which separate Jainism from Hinduism and Buddhism … are largely differences of emphasis for all are built from common material’ (Williams (1983: xxii)); and that ‘even though Jainism is a distinct religion and not a sect of Hinduism, still it is a fact that in the past [and present] many Jains used to regard themselves as Hindus and were also regarded by others as Hindus’ (Sangave (1980: 3)). This raises questions about the characteris-

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1 It is impossible to define a religious tradition, such as Jainism through a list of unchanging attributes. Lévi-Strauss (1970: 3 ff.) prefers to talk about crystallisation of secondary differences within syncretic fields. Another viable strategy is to analyse contextually changing self-attributions. Foucault (1981: 69) investigates discourse diachronically as a ‘regular and distinct series of events’ rather than positing a ‘tradition’ which might be ‘behind discourse’. See also Luftmann (1982). Carrithers (1990) and Gombrich (1996: 7), similarly, opt for the study of religious tradition as ‘a chain of events’.

2 Because of this common heritage, contemporary Jain ‘orthodoxy’ classifies only originally non-Indian traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as truly heretical. See Jain (1979: 314, n. 63). In the following I will focus on the relationship between ‘Hindu’ religions and Jainism only.

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tic features and the politics of Jain discourse, the principle medium of Jain cultural synthesis.\textsuperscript{3} DUMONT (1980: 210) once stated that the Jains, like any non-Hindu group in India, ‘cannot be regarded as independent of the environment in which it is set, as really constituting a society by itself, however strongly its own values push it in this direction.’ Yet, whether, or to what extent, the Jains ‘derive their raison d’être from their distinctive ways of manoeuvring within a [hierarchical] structure that they share with the whole society’ (MARRIOTT (1976: 131)) needs further research.\textsuperscript{4} LAIDLAW (1985), (1995: 95), in one of the few studies of Jain discourse to date,\textsuperscript{5} argues that ‘Jain cultural distinctiveness does not rest on rituals or practices in which people are marked as different and counted in or out’ but on ‘a range of practices and relationships through which Jains participate in Hindu public culture in India, and do so as Jains.’\textsuperscript{6} Jain culture is defined as a shared ethical life-style, or ‘class psychology’, grounded in ‘a set of processes and practices which cluster around the ownership, management, funding, and use of property’ (LAIDLAW (1985: 147, cf. 349 f.)). Socioreligious group formations beyond the institutions of family, caste and religious trusts are seen as ephemeral and dependent on instrumental processes of strategic mass mobilisation by individual lay leaders. CARRITHERS (1992: 118) studied how in conventional settings Jain public speakers ‘create, manipulate, and transform’ connections between listeners (śrāvaka), in particular through the narration of religious stories in communal rhetoric.\textsuperscript{6} LAIDLAW’s (1985: 55 f.) theory

\textsuperscript{3} The single defining criterion that is universally accepted within the Jain tradition is the reference to the Jinas, especially Mahāvīra. To a lesser extent, the notions of practising ahiñsā and vegetarianism, which is nowadays shared with many ‘Hindus’ and Buddhists, are used as reference points. On problems of Jain identity see FLÜGEL (2005), (2006a), (2006b).

\textsuperscript{4} In spite of their differences, DUMONT and MARRIOTT both rely on the code-model of classical structuralism. However, MARRIOTT (1976) and his followers posit a multiplicity of incongruent cultural codes and/or rule-oriented strategies in order to investigate ‘surface’ phenomena as products of their interaction. The unity of ‘Hindu society’ or ‘culture’ is no longer presupposed, ‘rather it is an empirical observation to be analyzed’ (BURGHART (1978b), (1978a: 38)) in terms of competing groups which ‘regulate their interaction on the basis of their own code of hierarchy’ (BURGHART (1978a: 36)). The essentialism of ‘society’ is thus replaced by the essentialism of competing ‘strategic groups’ or ‘(sub-) cultures’ (within a territorial state). The unity of a system as a whole is then generated through (a) mutual incorporation of elements of other codes, and (b) temporary agreements on the code of interaction (BURGHART (1978a: 37)). BURGHART (1983), (1985), in his outline of the study of intra-cultural ‘arenas of interpretation’, first noted points of transition between the multiple code-model and HABERMAS’ (1980–81) theory of communicative action (which however avoids a priori reification of ‘groups’ altogether by merely presupposing universal interactional competencies).

\textsuperscript{5} LAIDLAW (1985) offers an analysis of the relationship between Jain ‘mokṣa-discourse’ and ‘puṇya-discourse’, on which see CORT (1989) and BAIBB (1996), who do not explicitly use discourse-analytical approaches.
of the Jain ‘language game’ and CARRITHERS’ (1991: 262) work on the ‘rhetoric of samāj’ both successfully move away from essentialist notions of communal identity. But they achieve this only at the price of recurring to instrumentalist definitions of community formation, disregarding the key dimensions of felt togetherness and shared belief and custom.7

In this essay, I propose to avoid both a priori definitions of socio-cultural identity and instrumentalist theories of community formation by analysing the stated principles of Jain religious discourse itself. I will compare and contrast these principles with the categories of Jürgen HABERMAS’ (1980–81), who in his Theory of Communicative Action offers a seemingly non-reductionist interpretation of linguistically mediated processes of socio-cultural synthesis. In contrast to the explicit normative ideals of the Jains, rooted in an ontology of karman, Habermas’ theoretical investigation presents itself as a non-ontological reconstruction of regulative ideals implicitly presupposed by all actual human discourse.8 Some preliminary remarks on the architecture of his theory are necessary.

Habermas’ model seeks to transcend the false alternative of ‘community’ and ‘society’—which still dominates the sociology of Indian religions—by focusing on the relationship between ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ instead, as differentiated in contemporary modern society. ‘Lifeworld’, a term imported from phenomenology, is defined as the horizon or context of linguistically mediated communicative action.9

6 See CARRITHERS (1992: 106) on the importance of the setting for processes of negotiation of Jain identity through the medium of cultural narratives; and FLÜGEL (1993) on the significance of self-referentiality in conversion stories narrated in settings, such as sermons, similar to those described in the narrative itself, thus generating self-verification. BOURDEAU (1991a), in FAUCONNIER (1981: 202 n. 8), demonstrated that self-verification must be distinguished from the success of an intended perlocutionary effect. See also FAUCONNIER’s (1981: 185) analysis of the ‘principle of incorporation’, the description of a rite within the rite.

7 See TÖNNIES’ (1887) classical work on community and society.

8 HABERMAS’ analysis of discourse is influenced by the work of Karl-Otto APEL (1973) and the analysis of the ‘colonisation’ of discourse by generalised media of communication by the neo-Parsonian social systems theory of LUHMANN (1979), etc. ‘Discourse’ is here used in the general sense of a set of verbal or written statements. HABERMAS (1980: 71) / (1984–1987 I: 42), (2005: 20) understands ‘discourse’ in a more restricted (and old-fashioned) sense as ‘reasoning’, i.e. the rational exchange of arguments for or against contested claims. In his terms, ‘discourse’ is the reflective form of ‘communicative action’ which is distinguished from mere ‘communication’. LUHMANN (2002: 42 n. 37) points out that ‘capacity for reasoned elaboration’ is a traditional definition of ‘authority’. See infra 106 f.

9 Following Peirce and Royce, Ape1 and Habermas presuppose the ideal of an ‘infinite community of interpretation’ as the ‘collective subject’. The resulting contrast between the ‘real community of communication’ and an implicitly presupposed ‘ideal community of communication’ has been criticised, for instance by WELLMER (1986: 68 f., 81–102) and ALBERT (2003: 30, 50
It is, in his view, constituted by language and has three components or actor-world relations, in which communications are simultaneously embedded: cultural symbols, social norms, and personal aims. Lifeworlds are conceived as thematic resources for the intersubjective construction of social situations through symbolic or communicative action. In case of disagreement, situations are ideally defined rationally and consensually, through co-operative processes of interpretation based on the rejection or acceptance of claims of objective truth (cognition oriented), normative rightness (action oriented), and subjective sincerity (person oriented). The limited explanatory scope of the lifeworld perspective conceded, HABERMAS (1981: 180) / (1984–1987 II: 118) defines society as a whole ‘simultaneously as a system and a lifeworld’: ‘societies are *systematically stabilised* complexes of action of *socially integrated* groups’ (1980–1981: 228) / (1984–1987 II: 152). This definition acknowledges that society is not constituted through symbolic or communicative action alone, but also—and increasingly so—through systemic processes, i.e. the unintended consequences of action and interaction mediated by ‘steering media’ such as money or power rather than by language. Habermas thus situates the social role of discourse within a theory of differentiation of system and lifeworld. The degree of differentiation determines the extent to which social integration can/must be achieved through symbolic or communicative action alone. Habermas argues that lifeworld and system perspectives are mutually incompatible. His proposed synthesis (chided as ‘eclectic’ by his critics) prescribes a systematic alternation of the two perspectives, thus addressing the problem in a similar way as Jain perspectivism. Within this framework, Habermas’ contribution to discourse analysis results from a single conceptual move: the substitution of the pivotal concept of subjective ‘intentionality’ by a fallibilistic notion of consensus and deny a general interest in infinite discussion (ALBERT (2003: 70)). For a similar conceptual structure see, however, the Buddhist (and Jain) distinction between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ saṅgha, analysed for instance by BECHERT (1961: 23 f., 35). HABERMAS (1991: 133) conceded that the normative content of universal pragmatic presuppositions can not be equated with obligatory norms of interaction. Anticipating presuppositions are normative in ‘a wider sense’, enabling practice, without regulating it. In his recent revision of his epistemic universal pragmatic concept of truth, HABERMAS (2004: 50–55, 256 f.) renounced the concept of a ‘final consensus’, because it is beyond the necessity and problems of discourse, and distinguishes now between truth and legitimation. Communicative action is defined as the reflexive form of symbolic interaction.
(championed by Weberian, Husserlian or Wittgensteinian variants of interpretive sociology)\textsuperscript{12} with the notion of intersubjective ‘communication’ (Verständigung), which in his view is the inherent telos of human language.\textsuperscript{13} The intersubjective alternative to conventional subject-philosophical approaches\textsuperscript{14} enables Habermas to criticise empirical discourses of power, based on ‘instrumental action’, as ‘deviations’ from an ‘original’ mode of unconstrained ‘communicative action’, implicitly presupposed by all interlocutors.

Habermas’ characterisation of the constitutive role of implicit idealisations for linguistically mediated interaction by the term ‘ideal speech situation’ has been widely criticised (in similar ways as Chomsky’s ‘ideal speech community’), since, by definition, ideal situations are rarely, if ever, empirically encountered, and not even consciously contemplated by the majority of interlocutors.\textsuperscript{15} Though it is a truism that ideals can only influence behaviour if they differ from it, a society which relies entirely on explicit consensus is both a modern utopia and a nightmare, since everything can become problematic under the imperative of rational control in an ideal world of unconstrained intersubjectivity. To avoid the ‘cost’ of social reflexivity, social life has to rely on traditions, habits, routines and systemic processes (mediated by institutions or markets) which are taken for granted, until questioned. This is recognised by the model. Habermas insists, however, that the fundamental unspoken expectations underlying all social interaction can be analytically reconstructed. Conflict, for instance over values, can only be peacefully resolved if the normative presuppositions of communicative action, such as common interest in the avoidance of violence, are implicitly observed.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, rather than dismissing Habermas’ ‘utopianism’ outright,\textsuperscript{17} it may be more fruitful to ask whether the prin-

\textsuperscript{12} See Habermas (1984: 35–82, 307–50) on three types of intentionality: fundamental intentionality of consciousness, strategic intentionality, and intentionality of non-deliberate actions. Phenomenological ‘intentionality of consciousness’ (not to be confused with Weber’s ‘strategic intentionality’ or Searle’s concept of subjective ‘meaning intentionality’) can be usefully compared with Jain concepts of consciousness and intentionality. An intentionalist stance alone can, however, not account for social processes of acceptance or definitions of acceptability of actions or arguments. ApeL (1993: 41) stressed, rightly in my view, the ‘reciprocal dependence of a priori of consciousness and linguistic a priori’.

\textsuperscript{13} Habermas (1984: 461). Verständigung is itself an ambiguous word, combining ‘understanding’ (something, someone) and ‘coming to an agreement’ or ‘reaching understanding’.

\textsuperscript{14} See Habermas (1985) for an analysis of the aporias of 20\textsuperscript{th} century philosophy.

\textsuperscript{15} E.g. Alexy (1996: 155 ff., 412 ff.).

\textsuperscript{16} Habermas (1991: 169) derives the normative presuppositions of communicative action from the notion of ‘common interest’. In (neo-)Parsonian sociology, the condition that the interacting units know that both could also act differently is known as ‘double contingency’.

\textsuperscript{17} Albert (1994: 259) chides the analytical projection of such an ideal into ‘pre-theoretical knowledge’ as ‘normative essentialism’.
ciples of discourse identified by Habermas function indeed as universal presuppositions of communicative action or are merely one set of possible idealizations amongst many. The question is pertinent, since ‘communicative action’, according to Habermas, is predicated on the implicit recognition of the values of individual autonomy and equality, and the existence of domination-free social spaces and interactional competencies, which are rarely given in any concrete situation. Does Habermas’ model, then, merely impose modern European ideals or is his theory indeed of universal relevance?18

This question can be explored by comparing Habermas’ dialogical model of the ‘ideal speech situation’ with other models of highly idealised speech situations of a similar level of abstraction, such as the Jain theory of speaking, which, at first sight, seems to be predicated on hierarchical, or subject oriented, rather than egalitarian, or intersubjective, normative presuppositions.19 From Habermas’ perspective, the principles informing hierarchical systems, even if culturally dominant, cannot be universalised, since they themselves are predicated on the principles of communicative action which are (from the perspective of analytical reconstruction) consciously or unconsciously presupposed in all linguistically mediated interaction. Conversely, from a Jain perspective, the ontology of soul, non-soul, karman and the principle of non-violence are implicitly presupposed in all universally acceptable actions. In

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18 KEENAN’s (1976) ethnographic critique of the postulated universality of Grice’s conversational maxims has been extended to Habermas by PRATT (1986: 70). Disregarding criticism of Keenan’s arguments, for instance by PRINCE (1982), she argues that Habermas’ ‘ideal speech act’ merely reflects dominant Western standards of normality used to criticise ‘deviations’ as ‘systemic distortions’. Following Nietzsche,FOUCAULT (1981: 56) had earlier criticised the ‘will to truth’ as a ‘machinery of exclusion’ of ‘false discourses’. See also LINKENBACH’s (1986: 108 n. 43) anthropological critique of Habermas ‘objective hermeneutics’. HABERMAS (1983: 88 ff.) / (1990: 78 ff.) responded to objections to his ‘ethnocentrism’ in his work on discourse ethics, distinguishing ‘moral’ questions of ‘common interest’ or ‘justice’, orienting his own work, from ‘ethical’ questions of ‘the good life’ or ‘self-realisation’ which are culturally specific (HABERMAS (1983: 118).

19 Normative presuppositions in Indian theories of language have been discussed by GANERI (1999: 17), who pointed to differences between the subject-centred epistemological conception of language in Nyāya and information transmission theories which, in contrast to the Nyāya theory of ‘direct, non-inferential assent’, assume that ‘asenting to another’s utterance is never direct, but always depends on the hearer’s awareness of the speaker’s intentions.’ The proposal that the ‘normativity of meaning’ by divine decree in Gadādhara’s (Nyāya-nyāya) semantics can ‘partially’ be defended in terms of the notion of tacitly shared ‘conventional semantic theories’ as ‘the standard of correctness’ within a specific linguistic community, rather than recurring to Matilal’s ‘ideal hearer’ concept (GANERI (1999: 44)), presupposes an intersubjective solution of ‘the co-ordination problem’. For the use of ‘optimal standpoints’ for reconstructing the presuppositions of Jain many-valued logic see also GANERI (2002: 271).
both cases, moments of ‘insight’ can be generated through the acceptance and situational projection of the respective model. It is debatable whether any comparison between contrasting philosophical or religious models implies a dialectical third perspective which will ‘always be more general than the most general postulates of a religion and the most general rules of investigation itself’ (Platigorsky 1985: 210) or is simply an addition without being ‘higher or lower’ (Murti 1955: 127)). Frequently cited examples of overarching perspectives that are not predicated on specific comparisons are the dialectic of the categories of reflection (Hegel), the politics of cultural hegemony (Gramsci), or indeed the Jaina conception of a disjunctive synthesis of differences or alternatives (ānekānta-vāda), which according to Murti (1955: 128) is ‘more a syncretism than a synthesis’. A non-relativistic scenario is plausible if one model is able to reconstruct another on its own terms in a non-reductive way, or if it improves the other model, without losing information, while the reverse is not possible. In such a case, the analytical superiority of one model over the other must be conceded in principle.

A peculiar feature of Habermas’ universal pragmatic theory is that it can only be operationalised by ‘reversing step by step the strong idealisations’ of the concept of

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20 See for instance the extensive literature in analytical theology, following Wittgenstein (1953), on the role of models for religious insight. For example Ramsey’s (1967: 37) analysis of the ‘disclosure situation’, based on religious commitment: ‘So we see religious commitment as a total commitment to the whole universe; something in relation to which argument has only a very odd function; its purpose being to tell such a tale as evokes the “insight”, the “discernment” from which the commitment follows as a response. Further, religious commitment is something bound up with key words whose logic no doubt resembles that of words which characterise personal loyalty as well as that of the axioms of mathematics, and somehow combines the features of both, being what may be called “specially resistant” posts, “final” endpoints of explanation, key-words suited to the whole job of living—“apex” words.’ See further Smart (1965), Hick (1969), and others.

21 The concept of ‘insight’ is used somewhat ambiguously in this article, referring both to cognitive insight in the sense of Habermas (Einsicht) and to Jain religious insight (samyaktva or samyag-darśana). This can be justified by pointing to similar ambiguities (a) in Habermas’ use of Einsicht referring both to understanding and acceptance (close to Skt. sanjñā, agreement, understanding, harmony), and (b) in the Jain usage of samyaktva which can refer to cognitive insight and acceptance of the ‘rightness’ of Jain doctrine, but mainly describes the ‘direct experience’ of the soul/self; see Jaini (1979: 80). The understanding of doctrine and self may or may not be linked, for instance in conversion experiences (Flügel (1993)), which can be interpreted as a ‘realization and internalization of important dogmatic subjects’ (Brohun (1997–1998, V.1)), though this conception does not account for the ‘self-reported’ enlightenment experiences of the Jinas. See Schmithausen (1981: 199 n. 3) on similar ambiguities of the term ‘insight’ in early Buddhist scriptures. Generally on the problem of communicating ‘experience’ in Buddhist contexts see Schmithausen (1981: 200 ff.), and for ideological uses Faure (1991) and Sharf (1995). On Buddhist insight meditation, see Griffiths (1981) and Houtman (1999), amongst others. For observations on Buddhist and Jain meditation see Bronkhorst (1993b).
communicative action to approximate the complexity of natural situations. Because most methodological provisions and theoretical assumptions have to be dropped in this process, universal pragmatics becomes, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from empirical pragmatics, except for the additional conceptual sensitivity ‘needed to recognise the rational basis of linguistic communication in the confusing complexity of the everyday observed’ (HABERMAS (1980: 444)/(1984–1987 I: 331)). What is gained is the ability to discover different levels of the linguistically represented reality, and communicative pathologies, such as veiled power relationships or systemic distortions of rational communication through the use of generalised media of communication. For formal pragmatic investigations of South Asian discourse the fundamental empirical question is not whether, for instance, mantras or ritual language can be considered as ‘speech acts’, or in which sense. The question is rather, as Richard BURGHART (1996: 301) put it, ‘how does non-distorted speech communication take place in hierarchical structures’? BURGHART (1983), (1985) was the first South Asianist to tentatively explore the possibilities of the theory of communicative action for an understanding of religious and political discourse in South Asia. Since his premature death, few advances have been made in rendering Habermas’ highly abstract theory fruitful for South Asian studies.

In this essay, I make a fresh attempt in exploring the analytical potential of Habermas’ communication theoretical approach for South Asian Studies by contrasting Habermas’ discourse ethics, the reflective form of communicative action, with Jain discourse ethics, a reflective form of non-violent action. I will focus particularly on their respective theorisation of the subtle role of power in processes of indirect communication. Habermas opened up a new critical perspective by studying the constitutive role of idealisation in discourse and its exploitation. Alternative approaches, such as FOUCAULT’s (1981) and BOURDIEU’s (1991a), by contrast, emphasise the ubiquity and institutionalised nature of power. This view exerts a strong influence on current empirical investigations of Jain processes of social self-

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23 Talcott Parsons was the first to argue that symbolically generalised media of communication, steering media, such as power, money, status and value commitment, are the functional equivalents of sacred symbols in co-ordinating actions in societies not dominated by tradition: ‘Instead of negotiating to consensus … men rely on symbols <promising> the experience of meaning as a statistical probability over many acts. They are freed from the efforts to negotiate basics all the time’ (BAUM (1976) on Parsons, cited by HABERMAS (1981: 393) / (1984–1987 II: 262).

In comparing Habermas’ and Jain theories of discourse, I pursue three main arguments as far as the principles of Jain discourse is concerned:

(a) Despite being differently constructed, the Jain theory of speech plays a similar role within Indian philosophy as Habermas’ theory of communicative action does within Western philosophy. Both aim at the integration of a variety of perspectives, proclaim the primacy of morality over truth and logic, and predicate critical analysis of typical speech acts, especially latent strategic speech acts (perlocutions), on idealised normative presuppositions.26

(b) The orientation towards, and mastery of, the principles of Jainism generates interactional competencies regarding the non-violent resolution of conflicts, and cognitive distancing effects, which enable competent agents to intentionally create ambiguous symbols (utterances and gestures), and to manipulate identities through the re-interpretation of culturally normative or conventional presuppositions. The same can be said of the cognitive functions of modern theories of communication.

(c) The perceived plurivocality or multifunctionality of symbols—one of the main features of syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis in general—is in the Jain case not only a feature of rule-application, or a consequence of external imposition or extrinsic borrowing etc.,27 but also a consequence of religious knowledge, which can generate effects of insight qua (re-) interpretation of any given content. From the conventional point of view of communicative action, the principles of Jain hermeneutics produce systematically distorted communication, albeit one that is ideally oriented to salvific rather than material ends.

My basic contention is that philosophy (and logic), whether preoccupied with questions of universal validity, scepticism or pluralism, is always embedded in socio-cultural milieus which it both reflects and influences in varying degrees. Philosophy is always not ‘merely philosophy’, but a form of social discourse with social functions, manifest or latent. Philosophy does not merely consist in sets of propositions and logical or argumentative procedures but has also, directly or indirectly, pragmatic and expressive dimensions, and presupposes matching lifeforms


27 On extrinsic borrowing see DUMONT (1980: 194). For a Jain example see MISRA (1972: 16) on the merely ‘nominal adoption’ of the local South Indian culture by (Râjasthânî) Śvetâmbara Jain merchants in Bangalore.
and institutions for its social recognition. The comparison between two expressly non-absolutist universalist theories, the theory of communicative action and the Jain theory of language usage, in my view, demonstrates that philosophies are intrinsically connected with a selective range of matching life-forms, while recognising that most socio-cultural milieus are culturally hybrid and contain elements which are universally acceptable. To what extent procedures and contents of ‘rational inquiry’ are influenced by and influence social context is a question for empirical research.

The aim of this essay is to outline a new approach for the analysis of religious discourse in South Asia, and to prepare the ground for future critical sociolinguistic studies of Jain discourse. For this purpose key theoretical issues of philosophical pluralism and cross-cultural comparison are explored in a heuristic way. The essay is in eight parts. First, I am going to review the general problematic of Jain syncretism (I) and the existing academic literature on Jain rhetoric and discourse (II), followed by an overview of Habermas’ theory of communicative action (III) and aspects of the work of Grice and Brown and Levinson, which will prove useful for operationalising Habermas’ theory (IV). To prepare the ground for empirical investigation, I will then propose a typology of characteristic social settings of Jain religious discourse, and discuss their normative implications (V). Thereafter, I analyse the key features of the Jain theory of speech (VI), and of Jain discourse ethics in form of the Jain tetrad of the modes of speech (VII). Finally, I draw some general conclusions by comparing and contrasting the normative presuppositions of the theory of communicative action and the Jain theory of speech, which both in their own way offer critical analytical perspectives on the role of power and violence in human communication (VIII).

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One of the key arguments of this essay is that Jainism, as a meta-philosophy whose social efficacy is predicated on the systematic reinterpretation of conventional perspectives, constitutes a form of discourse which produces syncretic patterns. At present, syncretism is predominantly understood as a transitional phase

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29 Bronkhorst (1999: 23 f.).

30 Readers who are not interested in the discussion of the relevant theoretical context and literature are advised to move straight to section V.
within an overall dialectical process of religio-historical development—syncretisation or acculturation—which often involves parallel processes of linguistic syncretism and/or group formation.  

PYE (1994: 220), for instance, defines the ‘syncretic situation’ as ‘the temporary ambiguous existence of elements from diverse religions and other contexts within a coherent religious pattern.’ He locates syncretism between a ‘mere mixture’ and a ‘coherent mixture’ or ‘synthesis’:

‘If coherent mixture, or synthesis, represents the conclusion to a process which is thereby completed, syncretism by contrast is to be understood as dynamically open and indeed patent of resolutions other than synthesis. These might be, in particular, the outright dominance of one strand of meaning by another (assimilation), or the avoidance of synthesis through the drawing apart of the distinct elements and the consequent collapse of the syncretism (dissolution).’

Earlier, BECHERT (1978: 20–3) had proposed a similar typology of syncretic phenomena, i.e. of ‘the different forms in which religious traditions have influenced each other’, associating them with particular ideological or cultural systems: (1) The marginal acceptance of single elements (e.g. Jains), (2) proper syncretism ‘where elements from different religious traditions gain equal weight’ (e.g. Nepal, Bali, Sri Lanka), (3) full integration (Neo-Hinduism), (4) perfect synthesis (e.g. Sikhs). According to Bechert, Jainism (in general) is an example of type one, because its ‘essential characteristics’ are not touched by the assimilation of new elements. Bechert’s assessment of Jainism was probably influenced by BRUHN’s (1954: 136) remarks on the lacking ‘mixture of traditions’ and the prevalence of a combinatorial coexistence of elements from diverse traditions in Jain literature. BRUHN (1987a: 109) later pointed to the frequent co-occurrence of various syncretic phenomena within a single tradition. He distinguished, for instance, between ‘syncretism’ and ‘import’ in Jain literature. In contrast to Bechert and Pye, in his view ‘syncretism’ denotes the end product of the process of syncretisation, i.e. a ‘real’ synthesis of elements (from the participants point of view), whereas ‘import’ describes a situation of ‘unreal’ synthesis, where new elements are incorporated but not yet properly integrated (danger of disintegration). Bruhn also suggested distinguishing more clearly between different sources and periods, in order to achieve greater realism. In this context belong analytical distinctions between (a) the ‘hinduised’ (WILLIAMS

32 PYE (1994: 220). Structural-functionalist models of acculturation artificially limit the role of ambiguity and change to a ‘liminal’ phase between presumably static extremes (e.g. TURNER (1986: 93)). So called post-modern approaches try to invert this scheme by defining identity itself as a limit case.
(1983: xx)) or ‘pseudo-jainised’ (JAINI (1974: 335), (1979: 291–4)) ritual and literature of (post-) medieval temple-worshipping Jain traditions, (b) the ‘islamicised’ (JAINI (1974: 314 n. 63)) iconoclastic reform movements which emerged in the Mughal period, and (c) contemporary ‘westernised’ developments. Whatever the merit of such typologies, which contrary to WEBER (1988) are often based on the supposition of ‘essential characteristics’, it is apparent that one of the main ambitions of present research is the construction of comprehensive classifications of various forms of syncretisation and their strategic uses.

An important debate between GOMBICH (1971: 49) and BECHERT (1978: 20–4) on the question of the relation between literary syncretism (eclecticism) and the syncretism of popular religious practice in contemporary (Theravâda) Buddhism is also relevant for the understanding of similar phenomena amongst the Jains. Gombrich describes non-monastic forms of Buddhism as ‘accretive’ or corrupted forms. Bechert, on the other hand, criticises his devaluation of popular beliefs and of the political role of religion as ‘elitist’. Instead, he interprets Buddhist ‘cultures’ as ‘systems’ or organic totalities, encompassing both saṅgha and society. TAMBIAH (1977), too, focuses less on Buddhist doctrine and the saṅgha and more on cultural history, emphasising especially the constitutive role of local cosmologies (‘pantheons’) which are implicated in the cults of Buddhist kingship. This approach, which favours a typified ‘common man’s’ view from within and privileges ‘hierarchisation’ (‘hegemony’ or ‘totalisation’) as the most important strategy of acculturation, was pioneered by DUMONT (1980: 427 n. 6, 433 n. 19), who argued that historically the ‘worldly religion’ of ‘Hinduism’ emerged as a product of cumulative interactive processes between the ‘two ideal types’ of Brâhmaõesm and Jainism / Buddhism which superimposed an ‘individual religion … on to the religion of the group [caste]’ (DUMONT (1980: 275)). From the perspective of an individ-

33 See the somewhat different ideal-typical distinction between ‘canonical’, ‘classical’, ‘protestant’ and ‘modern’ types of Jainism in FLÜGEL (2000: 37–40), to which ‘mystical’ Jainism (Digambara Mysticism) needs to be added.

34 The following strategies have been suggested for instance: addition, parallelism, identification, hierarchical subordination (inclusion), re-interpretation. See HACKER (1985: 12), DUMONT (1980: 260), COLPE (1987: 223), PYE (1994: 222), BECHERT (1978: 23), BRUHN (1993: 38). With few exceptions, research on syncretism has been restricted to the comparative study of the semantics of cultural ideologies. This article, by contrast, utilises the analytical tools of rhetorics and pragmatics.

35 The theoretical appropriation of ‘the participant’s point of view’ generated much confusion in South Asian Anthropology because of the ambiguous status of the key Neo-Kantian concept of ‘value-realisation’, which, on the one hand, reifies culture, and, on the other hand, claims to achieve greater empirical adequacy by representing the ‘native’s point of view’ (HABERMAS (1981: 340–3, 351) / (1984–1987 II: 226–8, 234)). DUMONT (1980) oscillates ambiguously between two interpretations: Hinduism (1) as a mixture between two literary ideal types, and (2) as a
ual, Gumperz (1972: 230 f.) pointed out, superposed structures demand a wider socioreligious repertoire, including role compartmentalisation and perspective variation. Dumont’s view that, from a lay participant’s point of view, soteriological cults appear as religions of individual choice which are superimposed upon worldly religion, lends support to both accretionary and syncretistic interpretations. It also highlights the marginal historical role of Jainism in India, which, for want of political support, was nowhere able to achieve a culturally dominant position comparable to Buddhism in the countries of Theravāda Buddhism, and consequently not forced to develop its own (hegemonic) social system. Jainism always remained primarily a monastic religion which relied on the institutions of Hinduism and the state to legislate for society. Jain philosophical syncretism conceives merely of a negative totality based on the disjunctive synthesis of differences within an infinite horizon of plural perspectives. Yet, negative philosophical forms of syncretism are to be distinguished from positive linguistic or socioreligious forms of syncretism, which are less prominent in Jain discourse, but dominant in practice.36

The Jain case shows that it is an empirical question whether a given form of popular religion appears to be predominantly accretic or syncretic. It also underlines the crucial importance of configurations of power for competitive processes of doctrinal syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis. The religious status of ‘popular Jainism’—‘deviation’, ‘cultural bedrock’ or ‘modern political essentialisation’—is the subject of ongoing disputes between rivaling Jain leaders. Epistemologies and religious rituals for Jain laity were constructed intentionally by Jain monks. Yet, the form of popular religious practice, resulting from the hierarchical incorporation of tribal cults, textual Brāhmaṇism, and ‘the great heresies’ (cf. Dumont (1980: 428 f. n. 10)), through (a) Brāhmaṇic mediation, and/or (b) popular extrinsic borrowing of social signs from superiors without functional transformation (Dumont (1980: 194)). The elitist Brāhmaṇa-centredness of this approach has attracted much criticism. Dumont himself indicated that his approach is not much different from the one of the philologist (Dumont (1980: 433 n. 19)). The problem is that the ‘common man’ is usually treated as a literary type—‘the Buddhist king’ (Tambiah) or ‘the Brāhmaṇic householder’ (Dumont)—which mediates between doctrine and practice in a normatively prescribed way. By contrast, Gluckman (1955: 128), for instance, appeals to the universal rationality or ‘reasonableness’ of common sense: ‘The concept of the “reasonable” measures the range of allowed departure from the highest standards of duty and absolute conformity to norm, and the minimum adherence which is insisted on.’ ‘Reasonability’ can be normalised, but, strictly speaking, it refers to empirical conditions.

36 On the Jain philosophical ‘syncretism’ of anekānta-vāda and syād-vāda see for instance Murti (1955: 127 f.) and Ganeri (2001: 147), (2002: 279): ‘In moving from pluralism to syncretism, the Jainas commit themselves to the claim that we are led to a complete account of reality by integrating of all the different points of view’ (ib. Ganeri (2002: 279)). It has to be noted, though, that this approach does not tolerate ‘invalid’ (apramāṇa) points of view. Hence, not every statement is conditionally true.
extent to which social life is regulated by Jain social philosophy varies locally and from sect to sect, and from caste to caste. Iconoclastic Jain sects rely on the Hindu social system alone, whereas temple-worshipping sects accept the ‘hinduised/jainised’ practices of popular Jainism as an integral part of Jain religion,37 while communal reformers demand the ‘eradication of every non-Jain element from the Jaina community’ (SANGAVE (1980: 410)) in order to form entirely new social entities. Present political attempts to ethnicise the ‘Jain community’ by propagating intra-religious, trans-sect and trans-caste marriages are unlikely to succeed, however, because of ongoing internal sectarian rivalries, exclusive caste and class affiliations of the laity, and the continuing existence of mixed religious castes. Effectively, Jain communalism contributes to the strengthening of the cultural self-consciousness of an important faction of the new Indian business class, but does not alter the hierarchical structure of the society itself.

Jain laity usually practises ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ rituals side by side, combining soteriological religion with worldly religion without mixing the two, as described by Dumont.38 Even the lay followers (śrāvaka) of contemporary Jain reformist groups (e.g. ‘Jain communalists’) cannot avoid combining ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ religious practices, because of lacking Jain life-cycle rituals.39 Sometimes popular practices are ‘jainised’ by ascetics, and in this way legitimately incorporated into Jain religion. ‘Jain marriages’ for instance, and similar life-cycle rituals, are created simply by adding a Jain mantra to customary local procedures; and ‘Jain pūjās’ are rendered possible if interpreted as forms of dāna, i.e. without expectation of return etc. (WILLIAMS (1983: xx–xxv, 216)). Re-interpretation and modification through addition etc., are essential techniques for incorporating elements from other traditions and for constructing cosmologies and embryonic Jain social systems along the lines of pre-existing Hindu and Buddhist models. Yet, only few elements of ‘Hindu’ popular religion have been fully integrated, predominantly into the ritual corpus of


38 MAHIAS (1985: 96 f., 287), GOONASEKERE (1986: 185 f.), CORT (1989: 433), and others, talk about the Jain layman’s ‘oscillation’ between ‘alternative’ Jain (or Jain and Hindu) ‘realms of value’. The social function of Jain practices for legitimising status-mobility within Indian society remains to be studied.

39 ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be forms of temporary renunciation which are derived from the code of conduct for individual Jain mendicants, like the six obligatory rites (āvāyaka), asceticism (tapas), meditation (dhyāna), plus, for the laity, the obligatory giving of alms to the ascetics (dāna); whereas all social rituals mediated by the Brāhmaṇas, such as life-cycle rituals (saṅskāras) or the worship (pūjā) of gods other than the Jinas, are regarded as ‘Hindu practices’. Of course, ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be hierarchically superior by Jains, although ‘Hindus’ regard them as ‘heretical’ deviations from standard practice, because they are neither predicated on the authority of the Vedas nor on the mediation of the Brāhmaṇas.
temple-worshipping sects. Aniconic Jain sects do not practice socioreligious rituals to the same degree as image-worshipping sects, and thus have a less clearly defined socioreligious identity. Structure and semantics of the ritual terminology correspond to socioreligious structure. The paradigmatic case of an apparently ‘non-Jain’ popular ritual which was appropriated and re-interpreted by medieval Jain ascetics to build up a Jain system of lay rituals is pûjā.40 Its ambiguous status between soteriological and world-affirming orientations is reflected in the intentional multivocality of the religious terminology employed in this and similar lay rituals, as WILLIAMS (1983), LAIDLAW (1985) and CORT (1989), (1991) demonstrated.41 The socioreligious dimension constituted by a system of jainised lay rituals seems to be predicated on generalised indirectness.

Modern writers on Jainism have often noted the abundance of similes and double meanings (śleṣa) in Jain narrative and ritual literature,42 and their strategic use to infuse conventional language and popular stories with different meanings, derived from Jain ethics.43 WILLIAMS (1983: xviii–ix) was the first scholar to highlight the ways in which medieval Jain writers, such as the Digambara ācārya Jinasena (9th CE), instrumentalised aivaite terms (amongst others) as ‘vehicles’ for the indirect communication of their own religious views:

‘Jain writers have shown a remarkable aptitude for the subtle handling of words … The polyvalence of certain expressions even within the limits of the same text is often disconcerting: guṇa in particular is greatly overworked and so are kriyā and karman. Indeed one is led to wonder whether the double meanings given to many words and their

40 It is an open question whether Hindus or indeed Jains or Buddhists first introduced pûjā rituals in Indic religion. Jain pûjā manuals are comparatively late.
41 The fact that the status of pûjā as a ‘Jain ceremony’ is disputed within the Jain tradition diminishes the relevance of HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW’s (1994: 41 f.) ‘cognitive-psychological’ analysis of Jain pûjā, as they point out themselves (LAIDLAW (1994: 137)). See FLÜGEL (2006b) for a review of this issue.
43 E.g. HERTEL (1922: 8), JAIN (1981: 11), MONE (1987: 324 f.) etc. The social implications of the possibility that the multivocality in Jain texts are intentional have, however, only reluctantly been considered by textual scholars to date, not least because of the unclear status of the element of necessary violence it implies (cf. BALBIR (1984: 37), GRANOFF (1992)).
formal identity with Hindu terms may not be voluntary. Examples of such coincidences (with the Jaina meanings noted in parentheses) are: śiva (mokṣa), liṅga (the monks symbols such as the rajo-harana), guṇa-traya (the ratna-traya), paśupati (the Jina) mahā-deva (the Jina) whilst on the other hand the word Digambara itself can be an epithet of Śiva.’

WILLIAMS (1983: xix) sees the reasons for the intentionally multivocal use of terms in the political assertiveness of ‘Hinduism’ in medieval South Indian society which forced the Jains to conceal their ‘heterodox’ beliefs behind a conformist public facade as a way of social self-protection:

‘It may be that such resemblances were intended to render Jaina doctrines attractive to āivas or that āiva persecution made it desirable to give to certain Jaina texts an innocuous aspect. Certainly the Jaina’s concept of asatya44 would make it easy for them to adopt an attitude similar to that of those Shiite sectarians who in the early days of Islam maintained an outward conformity by concealing their real beliefs under forms of words.’

Numerous studies on diglossia, multilingualism/multifaithism and code-switching demonstrated in the meantime that the strategy of ‘outward conformity and inward dissent’, based on the method of differentiating hierarchical levels/media of discourse, is not limited to a certain historical period in South Asia or to the Jains in particular, but a universal feature, especially of dependent subaltern groups, minorities, or elites. DUMONT (1980: 194) analysed the method of ‘extrinsic borrowing’ ‘from superiors of certain features as social signs and not as functional features’ in terms of a theory of acculturation, which distinguishes three contemporary types of cultural interaction:45 ‘rejection, mixture, in which traditional and modern features exist happily side by side, and combination, which unites them intimately in new forms of a hybrid nature and ambiguous orientation’ (DUMONT (1980: 229)).46 Oth-

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44 See infra (p. 194) on satyāsatya: something may be true as well as false (satya-mṛṣā) or neither true nor false (a-satya-mṛṣā).

45 Cf. FERGUSON’s (1972: 244 f.) definition of diglossia: ‘DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standard), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superimposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community; which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation’ [author’s italics].

ers emphasised the political implications of counter-hegemonic adaptive strategies. SEAL (1968), RUDOLPH–RUDOLPH (1984), HAYNES (1991), and JAFFRELOT (1993), for instance, investigated the paradoxical effects of double-strategies employed by political mediators in (colonial) South Asia, which used ‘modern language’ in the public sphere, i.e. institutions of the state and print media, and ‘traditional language’ within their own community. Sociolinguistic theories of discourse and multilingualism will prove useful for the future study of the interaction of different levels within Jain religious language and of Jain discourse being superimposed on different contexts.\(^\text{47}\) In Jain literature, DERRETT (1980: 144) identified ‘double standards’. CARRITHERS (1991: 266 f.) showed how the multivocal ‘political rhetoric’ of the leaders of Jain lay communities (\textit{samājā}) gains persuasive force only if indirectly tapping into a ‘diffuse realm of religious sentiments’. LAIDLAW (1985: 60) and CORT (1989: 449–70) suggested, conversely, that the official renunciatory ‘religious ideology’ of the Jains implicitly relies on a ‘diffuse Jain ideology of wellbeing’, and how ‘symbolically rich’ multivalent concepts, such as \textit{lābha} or \textit{maṅgala} which can mean either ‘profit’ or ‘power’ both in the world and in the religious sphere, ‘bridge the two ideologies’ (CORT (1989: 465)). The merit of Carrithers’, Laidlaw’s and Cort’s approaches lies in the attempt to interpret the implicit links between the Jain religious discourse and the socio-economic sphere in terms of a theory of symbolisation.\(^\text{48}\) But they suffer from an exclusive focus on the

\(^{47}\) GUMPERZ (1972: 225) distinguishes two types of relationships between variants: ‘\textit{dialectal} and \textit{superposed}’. On ‘seemingly intentional processes of distortion’ by argots and on the use of implicit language to claim in-group membership and to maintain group boundaries see GUMPERZ (1961), (1972: 221–3, 227 f.). Most authors in a recent volume on religious discourse edited by OMINIYA and FISMAN (2006) derive their inspiration from the classic papers of FERGUSON (1959/1972: 232 f.) and FISMAN (1967) on diglossia and bilingualism in exploring situational uses of either two varieties of a (religious) language, or of two distinct (related or unrelated) languages side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role. Jain heteroglossia is discussed, with varying success, by PANDHARPANDE (2006), with the additional help of BOURDIEU’s (1991: 107) institutional theory of the power of language. See also DESHPANDE (1979) on Jain claims of Ardhamāgadhī being a prestigious ‘Āryan’ language.

laita and from the artificial treatment of Jain communities as quasi-ethnic groups isolated from the wider context of Indian society, which makes a critical analysis of the contextual relationships between Jainism and society, Jainism and power etc.—masked by the use of multivalent symbols—virtually impossible.49 ‘Clearly’, writes CORT (2001: 11), ‘most scholars of ideology view power as ubiquitous.’ LAIDLAW (1995), following Foucault, shares this view. However, while Williams’ remarks need to be qualified, I think he and his successors posed the crucial question for an understanding of the characteristic ‘syncretic’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘parasitic’ form of much Jain narrative literature and lay ritual, by pointing to the intentional multivocality of basic concepts of popular Jainism, invented by ascetics, and their political-rhetorical function within contexts of competitive religious proselytisation. Williams did not pursue this line of research further, but confined himself to the sociologically less interesting search for the precise entailments of single terms. In order to handle the potentially boundless increase of investigations of such terms, BRUHN (1983: 61) proposed to limit ‘rhetorical studies’ to specific Jain genres, and most of Williams’ successors followed this path.

I chose a different strategy in this article, turning away from the description and analysis of literary genres and doctrinal semantics (a task for the philologist) to the investigation of the pragmatics of Jain discourse. The limited aim of this study is to explore the methodological preconditions for an investigation of contextual implications of intentional multivocal utterances in Jain religious language. To accomplish this, a prior comparative analysis of the constitutive principles of Jain discourse and its typical normative contexts is required. Particularly significant is the question of the ways in which the specific ethical principles of Jain discourse interlink both with contextual norms and with universal moral presuppositions of communication per se, upon which intentional language usage indirectly relies, if Habermas is to be believed. I will seek to demonstrate that critical reflection on language usage on a level of abstraction similar to universal pragmatics is doctrinally prescribed for Jain ascetics, who need to consider the ethical implications of their own religious rhetoric in different contexts.50 Because the social implications

49 See the first principle of FISHMAN’S (2006: 14) decalogue of theoretical perspectives for the sociology of language and religion: ‘The language (or ‘variety’) of religion always functions within a larger multilingual/multivarietal repertoire.’ The notion of ‘religious repertoire’ is derived from GUMPERZ’S (1972: 230) definition of the ‘verbal repertoire’ of a speech community (or individual) as ‘the totality of dialectal and superposed variants regularly employed.’

50 The notion of univocality has to be used with great care, because of its association with positivistic ideal language theories. In practice, perceived univocality is always relative to a his-
of the Jain rules of speech themselves are hardly illuminated in Jain hermeneutical literature.\textsuperscript{51} I will start my investigation with a theoretical analysis of characteristic Jain hermeneutical procedures and discursive strategies in typical situations of linguistically mediated interaction.

The social function of Jain theories of speech, I argue, can be understood from the perspective of a theory of interactional competence. The term interactional competence encompasses cognitive, linguistic and rhetorical ability, and hence the capacity to use language both for the pursuit of power and insight. Interestingly enough, the use of mental and linguistic violence is a necessary requirement for accomplishing both aims. Power and influence are intrinsically connected with violence. It is one of the most intriguing questions how power works through discourse. Power has been defined by Max Weber\textsuperscript{(1972: 28)}, from an intentionalist perspective, as the ‘opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests.’\textsuperscript{52} Rhetoric has similarly been characterised as a competence-based social technique by means of which a minority, or an elite, may gain or exercise social influence, personal prestige or persuasive power, over a majority. Its capacity to influence is often predicated on the measured violation of a conventional structure by means of the manipulation of linguistic and non-linguistic media of communication; i.e. it presupposes a ‘deviance’ from what is culturally felt as being ‘normal’ without threatening the co-operation of the listeners. Influence is further

\textsuperscript{51} See in particular the canonical A\textit{nuogaddārāiīn} (A\textit{qD}).

\textsuperscript{52} Habermas (1981: 400–12) / (1984–1987 II: 267–77) adopts both Weber’s definition of power as ‘instrumental action’ and Parsons’ theory of money and power as ‘codes’ or ‘generalised media of communication’, distinguished from the codes of influence and value commitments. Parsons’ theory of power was further developed by Luhmann (1975)/(1979) and Habermas (1981)/(1984–1987 II). Power as code is explained as follows: ‘The power code schematises alter’s possible responses in a binary fashion: he can either submit to or oppose ego’s demands. A preference for compliance is built into the code through the prospect ego holds out for sanctioning later in case the latter fails to carry out orders. Under those conditions, the person in power can condition the responses of those subordinate to him, without having to depend primarily on the willingness to co-operate. From both sides is expected an objectivating attitude toward the action situation and an orientation to the possible consequences of action’ (Habermas (1981: 401)/(1987: 268)). Habermas thus implicitly operates with two notions of power: power as a code in the sense of Parsons and Luhmann, and as instrumental action in the sense of Max Weber. In this article the instrumental definition of power is predominately referred to. For a discussion of Jain conceptions of power, see Flugel (forthcoming).
strengthened through commitment and dogmatism on the side of the proponent. By such means, a speaker may exert a disproportionate influence on individuals and society at large and stimulate changes in a pre-meditated direction. Social influence is rooted in conflict and striving for a new consensus: ‘Conflict is … at the root of influence, either because it arises from the presence of a difference or because the existence of a disagreement brings it into the open’ (MOSCOVICI (1985: 353)).

Rhetoric has another, ethical-pedagogical, side: it may not only serve as an instrument of power and manipulation, but (from the perspective of the addressee) also as a critical analytical method of truth-finding and insight. Both aspects are often intrinsically related and can only be dissected analytically. The ways in which Jain ascetics play with the two aspects of rhetoric, how they use multivocal language strategically as a means of normative influence and religious conversion, are interesting questions for sociological research. If, as Williams argued, the multivocal categories of popular Jainism are intentionally constructed by proselytising ascetics, and if this is done to generate effects of religious insight (samyag-darñāna) in the audience, for instance through the rhetorical provocation of vairāgya-shocks (aversion leading to renunciation), how then does Jain philosophy account for the element of violence which is necessarily implied in acts of persuasion? In other words, if social influence can only be achieved through strategic acts of violence, how do ascetics conceive of the moral paradox involved in the violent production of non-violent attitudes?

For the analysis of the role of violence in rhetoric, or speech acts in general, a standard of non-violent speech is required. Such a standard is offered in the Jain scriptures. It will be discussed in Chapters V–VII. Comparable paradigms in contemporary Western philosophy are the conversational maxims of GRICE (1975) and the universal pragmatic validity claims of HABERMAS (1980), both echoing Kant rather than Carnap. A comparison with the Jain model promises to elicit key differences and highlight the specific nature of the principles of Jain discourse. In the following discussion of the two models, I adopt HABERMAS’ (1980–1981: 440 ff.)

54 See HABERMAS (1981: 270 ff., 414–18/1984 II: 181 ff., 280) on trust (based on possession of valid knowledge and autonomy), and punishment and reward (based on property and means of inducement and deterrence) as distinct—rational and empirical—sources of generalised acceptability.
55 SONTHEIMER’s (1991: 201) observation that codified ‘Hinduism had [has] only persuasive power and was no law in the western sense’ equally applies to doctrinal Jainism.
The suggestion to treat empirical pragmatic models as if they were conscious operationalisations of universal pragmatics. The latter claims to be a more general than the former since it does not only theorise principles of linguistic exchange but also the morally binding force of rational argument and the socially constitutive function of rationally constituted consensus. Contrasting claims to universality of the models of Habermas and the Jains, the former would claim (on debatable grounds), can be tested through comparative analysis.

In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1980: 384–88) / (1984–1987 I: 284–89) distinguishes between ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic’ types of linguistically mediated interaction to be able to discriminate between consensus-oriented and manipulative forms of language usage. The key variable in his model is the dominant social orientation informing language usage. Communicative action is orientated towards consensus through rational argumentation, understanding and insight, whereas strategic action (success-oriented action) is orientated towards power and the pursuit of self interest through the manipulative use of speech. Despite the ambiguity of his key terms *Verständigung* (‘communicative understanding’) and *Einsicht* (‘insight’), Habermas differentiates clearly between linguistic and normative aspects of communicative action, that is, the understanding of the meaning of a speech act and the acceptance of implicit validity claims. In contrast to speech act theoreticians such as Austin, Grice, and others, Habermas does not privilege the intention of the speaker as determinative of the social meaning of a

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57 This approach goes back to Pierce, Royce and Mead, and was revived by Apel.

58 Habermas (1980: 442 n. 84) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f. n. 84). This formulation is still intentionalist. The artificial segregation of perlocutions from the other components has been criticised, as well as Habermas’ original equation of perlocutions with latent strategic action, his exclusive attribution of teleological goal-oriented behaviour to strategic action, and the logocentric ideal type of rationality. In response to criticism, Habermas (1986: 401 n. 60) later accepted the ‘basic teleological structure of all actions’ and proposed a combination of ‘actor-orientation’ (success vs. understanding) and ‘types of coordination of action plans’ (influence vs. agreement) as a replacement. This formula was necessary to save his definition of ‘proper illocutions’ being dependent not only on subjective conditions of satisfaction of the meaning of a speech act, but also on intersubjective conditions (reasons for the acceptance of validity claims). In reality, strategic action always appears to be intermingled with communicative action (Habermas 1986: 443), and perlocutionary effects are not only consequences of strategic action but also of communicative action. Cf. Habermas (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295 f.) versus Searle (1993: 98 f.).

59 Most critics of Habermas rejected his strict distinction between *poesis* and *praxis*.

60 Habermas (1996: 339): “‘Insight’ signifies that a decision can be justified on the basis of ‘epistemic’ reasons’, that is, when practical reflection ‘extends beyond the subjective world to which the actor has privileged access [‘pragmatic’ reasons] to the [implicitly known] contents of an intersubjectively shared social world.’
speech act, which he sees as negotiable, but focuses on the (contextually varying) conditions of acceptability, that is, the implicit or explicit reasons on which the validity claims of a speech act are based, which can be accepted or rejected in processes of intersubjective communication. The question is: What does it mean to understand a speech act? Not: What does it mean to understand an intention? Habermas expands Austin’s (1962) distinction between ‘locutionary’, ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ speech acts, which he re-labels, partly following Searle’s (1979: 12–20) terminology, as ‘constatives’, ‘regulatives’ and ‘expressives’ in analogy to his three universal validity claims ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and ‘truthfulness’, by focusing not so much on speech acts themselves but on the social function of speech for the co-ordination of action. The advantage of Habermas’ distinction between ‘speech acts’ and ‘linguistically mediated interaction’, prefigured in the work of sociolinguists such as Gumperz (1964), (1972) and Hymes (1972b),61 is that it allows to analyse the contextual moral and legal implications of language usage, i.e. the socially binding force of the validity claims implied in illocutionary speech acts, which cannot be reduced to the ‘power of words’ themselves nor to the underlying intention of the speaker.

‘Communicative action’ is not the same as ‘communication’. It refers to a situation where the intersubjective co-ordination of action-plans is reached by way of rational agreement, that is, where an explicit consensus is constitutive for social integration (Habermas (1998: 396–98)). ‘Strategic action’ (success-/influence-oriented action), on the other hand, refers to a situation of exploitation, because it is not able to generate new normative consensus through rationally motivated acceptance of reasons itself, but only through the force of pre-existing norms and institutional or other configurations, which are external to the communicative process.62

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Gumperz (1972: 381): ‘Verbal interaction is a social process in which utterances are selected in accordance with socially recognized norms and expectations. It follows that linguistic phenomena are analyzable both within the context of language itself and within the broader context of social behavior.’

Habermas (1984: 313–5) distinguishes between cognitive and expressive intentions; arguing that the illocutionary goal of speech acts, that is, consensus, can be reached either through the intersubjective recognition of power claims (perlocutionary effects) or of validity claims (illocutionary effects) (Habermas (1980: 385 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 286 ff.), (1981: 107 ff.) / (1984–1987 II: 69 ff.). Cf. his comparison between imperatives (directives), e.g. commands, and regulatives (commissives), e.g. promises (Habermas (1980: 427 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 319 ff.)); both commissives, and directives (and declaratives) imply normative conditions by referring to situations that ought to be, whereas assertives merely represent situations as they are.

Acts of social self-commitment to do something in the future or to give reasons for a validity claim, by way of promises, oaths and contracts, and acts aiming at committing others through directives (commands, injunctions), by instrumentalising existing obligations, are both focal elements of Jain discourse. The difference between the models of Habermas and the Jains is that the former rely on universal moral justifications, whereas the latter require only socially valid norms.
Hence, by defining communicative action as the original mode of language usage, directly oriented towards normative agreement, Habermas is able to criticise strategic action as a success orientated mode of language usage, which is parasitic on the former, because it is only indirectly orientated towards communicative understanding. The whole purpose of Habermas’ theory lies in the analysis of the conditions of the possibility of a consensual constitution of social order, without grounding the emancipatory potential of discourse either in metaphysical postulates or in institutional configurations of power as suggested by Foucault (1981), Bourdieu (1991a), (1991b), or Bloch (1975). The critical emancipatory interest which informs the theory of communicative action is directed against (illegitimate) power and in favour of consensual (and non-violent) forms of conflict resolution and institution building. Habermas (1998: 449) argues that the emancipatory potential of language is not a metaphysical ideal, but manifest in the ‘unconcealed idealising surpluses of an innerworldly transcendence’ in form of the universal validity claims implicitly presupposed in all processes of communication, as the vanishing points (Fluchtpunkte) of infinite processes of open intersubjective interpretation.63

How can we explain the power of non-institutionally bound illocutionary acts to produce feelings of normative obligation? What motivates a listener freely to submit him/herself to normative constraints if not self-interest or external force? At first sight, Habermas’ (1980) argument that illocutionary binding effects are the product of processes of rational understanding, i.e. of insight into the validity of reasons (e.g. common values and convictions), seems to rely on the pre-existence of an implicit normative consensus and of the rhetorical ability of the speaker (Habermas (1980: 386)). However, like other proponents of formal pragmatics (Apel, Allwood, Grice), Habermas attempts to circumvent both normative reductionism and subjectivism, by not focusing on the local ‘ethical’ context of specific empirical cases, but on the general ‘moral’ presuppositions of communication, that is, the universal normative conditions of intersubjective recognition which must be fulfilled for a speech act to be accepted. He states that ‘we understand a speech act, if we know, what makes him acceptable’ (Habermas (1980: 400)). Crucially, he assumes that every linguistically mediated interaction presupposes a set of idealisations on the side of the interlocutors as conditions for their acceptability. Expressives are a different case altogether. They are not predicated on truth claims nor on claims of rightness, and therefore not redeemable by argument. Legitimacy is entirely based on sincerity and redeemable by practice only (Habermas (1981: 97–100) / (1984–1987 II: 62–4). For differing views on the structure and interrelationship of the various components see Apel (1993: 45–9), Habermas (1993), and Searle (1989), (1993).

63 Remarks on religious communication can be found in Habermas (1988: 23, 34, 60, 185), and Habermas (2005). See also Arens (1991: 174–6).

64 On the history of formal pragmatics see Apel (1993: 43) and Habermas (1993: 21–5).
themselves. He explicates these implicit basic conditions of communicative action in terms of a model of three universal pragmatic validity claims underlying all grammatically comprehensible utterances: (1) (propositional) truth, (2) (normative) rightness, and (3) (expressive) sincerity. Habermas argues that the binding power of rea-

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65 Cf. Habermas (1984: 354 ff., 440). With some exceptions (Habermas (1980: 418 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 f.)) his validity claims correspond closely to Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims (see infra) (and more generally to Searle’s conditions of success and non-defective performance). However, one of the great misconceptions of speech act theory is the assumption that almost all social actions are communicative actions, and that communication is more or less identical with conversation. The cooperative principle of speech exchange should not be mixed up with consent to social co-operation (Habermas (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295)). Another mistake is to assume that only intentional communicative actions have communicative effects. Searle (1993: 89) was the first to criticise Grice’s ‘meaning-nominalism’ with counter-examples showing that even non-intentional statements can have an effect, which demonstrates that conventional propositional content of words, i.e. representation, is more fundamental than speaker intention, and that Grice, by concentrating exclusively on the transfer and decoding of information, ultimately ‘confuses meaning with communication.’ In other words, understanding an utterance cannot be regarded as a perlocutionary effect. Critics of Grice denounce the infinite regress involved in the inference of speaker’s intentions, and the vagueness and arbitrariness (incompleteness and incoherence) of the maxims. Habermas (1984: 333–48, 362), (1980: 371, 418) / (1984–1987 I: 274 f.) and Apel (1993: 32) criticise Grice’s (etc.) mentalist ‘intentional semantics’ as treating understanding exclusively in terms of strategic action, à la Weber and economic game theory, by reducing meaning to the perlocutionary effect of the intentions of an isolated individual, not taking into account community context and conventional intersubjectivity and understanding through consensual agreement by condemning the hearer to passivity.

From Habermas’ (1993: 18 f.) perspective, Searle offers an intermediary approach between intentional semantics and universal pragmatics: ‘From my point of view, a speech act, which the speaker uses in order to come to an agreement with the addressee about something, expresses simultaneously (a) a certain speaker intention, (b) a certain state of affairs, and (c) an interpersonal relationship. According to the original intentionalist view [Grice, P.F.], the whole communication process can be explained from the perspective of the speaker and his intentions in such a way that (c) and (b) are derived from (a). … Searle modifies his explanatory strategy to the effect that successful communication now depends on the successful representation of states of affairs, namely that both (c) and (a) are derived from (b).’

66 Habermas’ validity claims are grounded in Popper’s ‘three world’ theory of subject, object, and society. See Albert’s (1994: 240) critique of this ‘ontology’ from a ‘one world’ perspective. Cf. Searle’s five ‘conditions of successful speech’ (essential condition, preparatory condition, propositional content, sincerity), three of which correspond to Habermas’ validity claims (truth = essential condition, rightness = preparatory condition, sincerity = sincerity), whereas one (propositional content) is unique to Searle. On the basis of the idealised ‘standard form’ of rational communicative action, Habermas (1980) generates a complex system of analytical categories, by correlating the validity claims and the two dominant social orientations, consensus and power, with four ‘basic’ types of speech acts (imperatives, constatives, regulatives, expressives). The aim is to discriminate between consensual and latent strategic forms of language usage. The resulting
sons, that is, of rationally motivated validity claims whose acceptance implies weak normative obligations, is not rooted in content but in procedural form, i.e. in the guarantee of the speaker, if necessary, to justify his/her claims in terms of these three types of validity claims and to give reasons which can be criticised and rejected (only) with better reasons (HABERMAS (1980: 406)). Precondition is the principal autonomy of the interlocutors, their ability to say ‘no’. Only under this provision does acceptance imply voluntary agreement. For Habermas, who follows Kant and Durkheim here, the socially constitutive power of discourse is predicated on the independence of interdependent interlocutors, who co-operate on the basis of negotiated agreement. This, critics object, is the logic of the modern market based on functional division of labour.

HABERMAS (1981: 62 f.) / (1984–1987 II: 38 f.), (1991: 25, 44) acknowledges, the readiness to accept the binding power of agreed normative claims, instead of traditional authority, is itself a product of processes of social conditioning and presupposes specific forms of life and socialisation. The development of moral consciousness is predicated on the internalisation of the perspective of the generalised other or threatening or factually exercised sanctions. Moreover, the social manifestation of the ideal-typical ‘standard form’ of rational argumentation presupposes situations or institutions where unconstrained rational argumentation between equals plays a constitutive role for society, such as the public sphere, the parliament, the courts of justice, or the university. According to Habermas, modern social milieus such as these are the product of evolutionary processes of social differentiation generating an increase in both inter-

'pure types of linguistically mediated interaction’ are summarised in Figure 16 of Theory of Communicative Action (HABERMAS (1980: 439) / (1984–1987 I: 329).

67 They concern the present discourse of norm legitimation, not norm application. In updated versions of his theory HABERMAS (1991: 131–42) distinguishes two steps of argumentation: (1) related to moral judgement (legitimation) and (2) to moral action (application); i.e. Begründungsdiskurs and Anwendungsdiskurs.

68 ‘The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironically, through the fact that participants can say ‘no’ to speech-act offers. … A hearer can be “bound” by speech-act offers because he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say “no” to them, that is, to reject them for reasons’ (HABERMAS (1981: 114) / (1984–1987 II: 73 f.), GADAMER (1993) objected that co-operation in communication does not automatically imply submission to the power of the better argument, at least not without considering the relevance of reasons. FOUCAULT (1981), BLOCH (1975: 21) and BOURDIEU (1991a: 107) similarly reject the idealisations of speech act theory in terms of institutional theories of discursive or symbolic power: ‘The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the spokesperson’ (BOURDIEU (1991a: 107)). For HABERMAS (1980: 418) / (1984–1987 I: 311 f.), (1985) these arguments apply only to empirical pragmatics.


70 On the difference between informal and institutionalised ‘ideal speech situations’ see HABERMAS (1991: 132).
dependence and individual autonomy and responsibility through a progressive universalisation of law and acquisition of moral competence. He argues that in cases where communicative action is consciously used for the production of normative consensus and social co-operation, discourse takes over the social function of ritual, and becomes a second order ritual (HABERMAS (1981: 86)). With reference to the apparently increasing importance of explicit negotiation in processes of social self-identification, Habermas defines this process of rationalisation as the ‘linguistification (Versprachlichung) of the sacred’, and argues that it goes hand in hand with the progressive ‘technicisation’ or ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by systemic processes.

How to analyse Jain discourse from the point of view of the theory of communicative action? Generally, religious discourse is depicted by HABERMAS (1980–1981) as a form of communication based on structures of traditional authority in which status rather than argumentation functions as a medium of generalised acceptability. The role of power and insight in Jain discourse could be analysed in these terms. But one has to be aware of the fact that the ‘rational reconstruction’ of the universal normative presuppositions of linguistic exchange projects its own idealisations into human reality. The theory of communicative action itself contains a religious element in its notion of the ‘unconscious innerworldly transcendence’ that is implicitly presupposed in communicative action. A deeper analysis of the differences between the theory of communicative action and the Jain doctrine of speech therefore requires a comparison between the normative ideals underlying Habermas’ theories of communicative action and discourse ethics with those of Jain discourse ethics (to my knowledge there are no Jain attempts to rationally reconstruct implicit rules), supplemented by comparative analyses of rules and discourses of norm application in typical speech situations (See infra section V–VI).

The daily sermon (pravacana) of Jain ascetics is a good example for a transitional ritual, where discourse serves both as an instrument for the reproduction of the traditional authority of the saógha, and for the eventual production of new normative consensus via the evocation of religious insight amongst yet unconverted listeners. A


72 HABERMAS (2005) pointed out that within the public sphere religious arguments function in same way as other arguments, as reasons to be accepted or rejected.

73 HABERMAS (1983: 103, cf. 76) / (1990: 93, cf. 66) defines the basic principle of discourse ethics (D), the reflective form of communicative action, as follows: ‘Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’
Jain discourse of conversion presupposes mutual independence of interlocutors and creates new consensus via the unconstrained acceptance of validity claims. The main difference compared with the ideal situation of communicative action is the institutionalised one-sidedness of a monological discourse and its coded semantic form which does not allow for a negotiated modification of the religious dogma itself, at least not in the short run. Because insight and power go hand in hand in tradition-based religion, conversion discourses always take the form of strategic action, producing insight (psychological and verbal acceptance of the dogma) as a perlocutionary effect predicated on the intentional deconstruction of the pre-existing conventional normative consensus. In this case, latent strategic action serves as the vehicle for both communicative action or even mythopoetic world disclosure, and for the unquestioned reproduction of the hierarchy of power. In practice, the two fundamental ways of interpretation are irreducible to each other. But they can be analytically differentiated. In the following, I analyse the plurivocality of Jain discourse primarily in terms of its social implications—as a form of latent strategic action—though multiple ambiguities can be distinguished in every speech act in a conventional speech situation.

It is an open question to what extent the theory of communicative action falls under this verdict as well. HABERMAS (1986: 383), who after all regards communicative action as the original or constitutive mode of language usage, insists on the empirical inevitability of indirect violence and power in the initial stages of the historical evolution of abstract norms. He distinguishes two developmental phases of communicative co-operation and social integration: Communicative action, he argues, is originally embedded in contexts of latent strategic action, because, initially, situation definitions do not sufficiently overlap. The participants therefore have to use indirect communication ‘following the model of intentional semantic approaches (Grice)’, in order to avoid a breakdown of co-operation. In the opening phases of all processes of co-operation indirect communication plays an important role for the creation of overlapping definitions of the situation, as an alternative of meta-communication: the speaker makes the hearer understand something qua perlocutionary effects, i.e. latent strategic speech acts, whose contextual implications are not directly expressed, and need to be inferred by the hearer. However,

74 This creates paradoxical consequences once communicative action as a value becomes itself topical.
1987 II: 34–9), as for SEARLE (1993: 91, 99), normative authority is originally em-
bedded within imperative authority, and takes the form of context-specific intentions
and speech acts of particular individuals. This fits the case of the Jain sermon. How-
ever, Habermas’ evolutionary theory of the genesis of norms is highly speculative and
certainly the weakest part of his conceptual system. Moreover, he has not elaborated
his theory of latent strategic language usage. But he indicates the systematic role of
latent strategic action within a typology of social actions,78 and shows how shared
convictions may serve as sources of legitimate power. Power enters unnoticeable into
the pores of everyday-life communication via two forms of pseudo-communication
concealing strategic intent under the facade of consensual action: (a) conscious de-
ception or manipulation, and (b) systematically distorted communication (HABERMAS
(1984: 548)).79 In cases of manipulation, at least one actor intentionally deceives oth-
ers by hiding the fact that s/he does not comply with the three universal pragmatic
validity claims. In cases of systematically distorted communication at least one of the
participants deceives him/herself about the fact that s/he acts strategically, while
maintaining the external appearance of communicative action (HABERMAS (1984:
461)). In both cases a deviation from universal pragmatic presuppositions takes place,
through the splitting up or doubling of communication. In the first case, a competent
speaker generates intentionally multivocal expressions for social purposes. In the sec-
ond case, the internal organisation of speech is distorted by way of a privatised use of
language. In psychoanalysis this is regarded as a process of de-symbolisation. Ac-
cording to Habermas it is symptomatic for a loss of interactional competence (which
may or may not be culturally normalised) (HABERMAS (1984: 251–4)). He argues that
distorted forms of communication often occur in situations of social dependency,
where they serve as unconscious defence mechanisms concealing conflict smouldering
beneath surface consensus (HABERMAS (1984: 232, 264–9)).80 A manipulative, inten-
tionally symbolic usage of language, on the other hand, creating conflict artificially for
the sake of influence, is to be expected in situations of social dominance, and requires
cognitive and communicative competencies. We will see that ambiguous language can
be used for religious purposes as well.

79 For Durkheimian criticisms of psychological theories of ‘rationalisation’ see TURNER (1986:
36, 56).
80 Cf. JAIN (1929: 72), GOONASEKERE (1986).
It could be asked whether the structural multivocality generated by Jain discourse, superposed on varying contexts, can from different viewpoints be interpreted either as a form of latent strategic action or of systematically distorted communication. The perceived ambiguity of certain terms or utterances in Jain discourse is a function of processes of religious interpretation. Depending on circumstances, they may involve forms of symbolisation as well as the expression of latent structural conflicts, resulting for instance from the typical position of many Jains as subaltern elites within the hierarchical structure of Indian society. On the one hand, Jain ascetics use the strategy of intentional re-interpretation of dominant forms of discourse and popular rites, thus creating a private language for competent members of their religious community. On the other hand, the propagation of Jainism through proselytising renouncers eventually triggers effects of moral insight amongst some listeners, by providing a language for example for the explanation and expression of diffuse feelings or implicit conflicts, which may explain part of its appeal. It is important to note that the Jain tradition itself provides a yardstick for the critique of self-deceptions and symptoms of alienated modes of life with its ideal of non-violence. The authenticity associated with such a life-project could be understood as a higher-level validity claim, in analogy to the claim to truthfulness in expressive speech acts. However, better analytical categories are required to investigate the empirical diversity of forms of concealed strategic action. As Habermas indicates, some of them are provided by the intentional semantic approaches of Grice and Searle.

IV

One of the most interesting contributions to the theory of linguistic communication and rhetoric is Grice’s (1975) analysis of the communicative function of ‘conversational implicature’. In his article *Logic and Conversation*, Grice provides a pragmatic description of how multiple meanings are purposefully generated. He investigates what he calls ‘implicature’, that is, instances in which ‘a speaker deliberately says something which is not, in fact, what he means’ (Grice (1975: 43 f.)). Grice’s analysis is based on the fundamental pragmatic postulate that there is an assumption by all conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk—a supposition, which can be formally stated in terms of a set of counterfactual principles and maxims concerning the efficient and univocal transmission of information, given that both parties co-operate and are interested to continue the conversation. Against this assumption polite, multivocal ways of speaking appear as deviations, requiring ra-
tional explanation on the part of the recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or inefficiency. Given the speaker’s rationality of expression, and the hearer’s willingness to co-operate, unclear, ambiguous language forces the hearer to work out the implied suppositions of a multivocal statement. The latter must ask her/himself why a speaker, who can express her/himself unambiguously, has chosen not to say directly what s/he means, but rather speaks in a veiled language. In such cases, Grice argues, the hearer (interpreter) will assume that the speaker has deliberately ‘flouted’ the mutually presupposed conversational principles to ‘force an implicature’ onto the hearer, who then has to infer what the speaker intended without saying so openly. Particularly interesting are cases in which someone deliberately violates a maxim, not to mislead, but to influence others by getting another message across. Strategically constructed ‘deviations’ such as these, which are ‘parasitic’ to direct communication, are particularly successful in achieving social influence, because they induce the necessary element of conflict in a manifestly non-violent form, not breaching social norms openly but only indirectly via explicit ‘exploitation’ or ‘flouting’ of presupposed conversational principles. It is precisely this ‘non-violent’ form of social influence which I regard as central to Jain rhetoric.

The construction of implicatures is one of the foremost rhetorical and poetical devices. Yet, only under certain contextual conditions will a conversational act of flouting lead to social consequences. Without the hearer’s willingness and ability to co-operate, and to invest the effort to work out or to grasp intuitively the implications of an ambiguous statement, rhetorical communication with the help of implicature would not be effective. The uses of implicatures presupposes the invocation of contextual knowledge or common experiential ground on the part of the hearer, who is forced to generate a meaningful interpretation in response to the speaker’s deliberate violation of the principles of conversation, which implicitly forces on the hearer a choice between deference to the veiled imperative or discontinuation of the communication. The efficacy of this kind of indirect communication is ultimately based on ego’s exploitation of alter’s willingness to adhere to the general cooperative principle of language exchange under given normative conditions. Accordingly, the principal means of physically ‘non-violent’ resistance is non-cooperation.

Grice’s theory of language usage is, in itself, of limited use in anthropological research. Theories of information processing cannot sufficiently account for the empirical role of conventional meaning and contextual knowledge, as Hyman (1972a), (1972b) convincingly argued. Brown–Levinson’s (1978) theory of politeness,

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83 In his summary critique of Grice’s intentionalist semantics, Davis (1998: 174) notes that ‘common interests sustaining indirect speech act conventions are much deeper than mere politeness.’ However, ‘A common interest need not be universally shared to sustain a common practice.’
which builds upon Grice’s principles, therefore links the theory of conversational implicature with Goffman’s theory of social self-identity or ‘face’ (self-esteem or public self-image). It argues that talk exchange can be related to contextual, that is, institutional, variables by considering the relative social position of speaker and hearer, which decisively influences choices of politeness strategy. ‘Face’ is relationally defined, ‘that is, normally everyone’s face depends on everyone else’s being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others’ faces, it is in general in every participant’s best interest to maintain each other’s face’ (Brown–Levinson (1978: 66)). Two kinds of ‘face wants’ are distinguished: ‘negative face wants’ (to be unimpeded by others)—often achieved by strategies of non-interaction (which Marriott regards as typical for Jains, and vaiśyas in general)—and ‘positive face wants’ (to be desirable to others) (Brown–Levinson (1978: 66)). ‘Face threatening acts’ (FTA’s) are illocutionary acts which might cause a loss of face by way of orders, requests, threats, offers, suggestions etc. They run contrary to particular face wants, and motivate certain strategies of politeness, employed to minimise the threat, and to maintain face in a particular situation (Brown–Levinson (1978: 70–3)).

Brown and Levinson distinguish four main strategies of politeness: (a) ‘bald on record’ (being as clear as possible), (b) ‘positive politeness’ (the expression of solidarity), (c) ‘negative politeness’ (the expression of restraint), and (d) ‘off record’ (the avoidance of unequivocal impositions) (Brown–Levinson (1978: 73–5)). Any of the four strategies may satisfy the opponent’s face wants to avoid conflict and to minimise threat. Yet, politeness is also used in order to stimulate conflict in a calculated way. Positive politeness and negative politeness—the dominant Jain strategy—

‘Speaker meaning’ and the ‘actual linguistic conventions of language communities’ should be studied: ‘Rather than trying to deduce arbitrary practices from some general psychosocial principles, we must look at the social functions that particular conventions serve.’—‘In sum, Gricean theory fails because speaker implicature is a matter of intention, sentence implicature is a matter of convention, and neither is calculable from or generated by psychosocial principles. Conversational rules instead codify social goals motivating intentions and sustaining conventions’ (Davis (1998: 190)).

84 Examples for positive politeness are familiar and joking behaviour. Negative politeness is mainly concerned with self-determination. It is at the heart of respect behaviour and corresponds to Durkheim’s ‘negative rites’, that is, rituals of avoidance, which are typical for Jains. Characteristic examples of negative politeness are: conventional indirectness, question/hedge, be pessimistic (don’t coerce, don’t assume other’s willingness to co-operate), minimise imposition, give deference, apologise (beg forgiveness), impersonalise, state FTA as a general rule, nominalise, go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting the hearer (Brown–Levinson (1978: 134–216)). There are certain similarities between these strategies and Searle’s and Habermas’ illocutionary components, although Brown and Levinson’s categories reflect the inconsistency of Sahlin’s well known scheme of reciprocities, which was obviously influential.
would argue, are primarily strategies of conflict avoidance. The most interesting strategy, also often used in Jain discourse, is to go off-record, that is, to construct intentionally multivocal statements: ‘A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In other words, the actor leaves himself an “out” by providing himself with a number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed himself to just one particular interpretation of this act. Thus if a speaker wants to do a FTA, but wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, he can do it off record and leave it open to the addressee to decide how to interpret it’ (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 216)). The purpose of off-record strategies is to make the addressee responsible for decoding the intentions. An FTA, like any word, rule or symbolic act, gains its meaning through context and becomes threatening only through its realisation via ‘wrong or correct’ interpretation. The near universal usefulness of off-record strategies for purposes of persuasion and social influence is aptly expressed by STRECKER (1988: 114): ‘To go off-record is one of the most pervasive strategies in social interaction whenever actors want to avoid harsh confrontation and the possibility of conflict, and when they want to persuade others, to influence them so that they do what they cannot be openly coerced to do. All this is done by means of indirect message construction.’ Important for my argument is that politeness and symbolisation is used to avoid open conflict. A great deal of politeness and symbolisation is therefore to be expected from the Jains.

BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 254–6) conclude their discussion of politeness phenomena with a typology of characteristic patterns of strategy distribution in speaker/hearer relationships regarding the contextual variables of power (P) and social distance (D) (which could be associated with ‘active’ directive and ‘passive’ commissive orientations respectively). In this way, they try to tie Grice’s concept of conversational implicature into a context-sensitive social theory of linguistically mediated interaction. They predict that in a situation where one of the interlocutors has high social power over another, and where social distance is low, the speaker with high social power will predominately use on-record strategies, and the speaker with low social power will use negative politeness and off-record strategies. STRECKER (1988: 165 f.), however, notes that individuals in an inferior position are generally not allowed to force an implicature upon the socially powerful (only vice versa). He suggests that the dominant pattern of strategy distribution in asymmetri-

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85 Cf. CASSIRER (1923–1929).
87 Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 255) chart of dyadic strategy types.
cal social contexts is the combination of off-record strategies on the part of superiors and on-record strategies and negative politeness on the part of inferiors.

The still unresolved discrepancy between Brown and Levinson’s and Strecker’s interpretation provokes the question whether it makes sense at all to link types of socially-purposeful language usage to certain ‘social positions’, given the wide range of contextually acceptable strategy choices. Off-record strategies, in fact, can be used for many purposes: for purely aesthetic reasons, for the negotiation of unclear social relationships, for the veiling of heavy FTA’s or forms of control, or for the stabilisation of asymmetrical social relationships. More importantly, a statement in itself does not force a reader/listener to adopt a particular type of interpretation (and no particular action follows from it in any structured way). Everything, in fact, depends on the wider social context, particularly on the informal or institutionalised norms and social conventions of a given field of discourse, which sanction the way in which language is used and which interpretations are regarded as feasible. As Habermas shows, it is only in situations where social pressures and normative sanctions are attached to language usage, that normative claims can be enforced through extra-linguistic sanctions. It is impossible to force anybody to comply with pragmatic conditions for the fulfilment of an implication, in the Gricean sense, without implicitly presupposing an institutional context and referring to a set of known social sanctions attached to the specific norms of a particular discursive field.

This point has evaded most linguistic theories of politeness, because—as Habermas points out—they do not clearly distinguish between co-operation in conversation and the role of speech acts for social co-operation. Therefore they cannot explain, for instance, how, in certain situations, superiors may rely on contextual pressures to force inferiors to decode their veiled speech and to fulfil the indirectly communicated demands. It is not the power of the words themselves nor the speaker’s intentions which inform the ‘calling in’ of conversational implicature, but the role of the presupposed norms and sanctions which assure the perpetuation of social systems which, for instance, force inferiors to infer unequivocally the indexical meaning of intentionally ambiguous statements of their superiors, and to practically fulfil their unspoken commands without questioning the normative basis of their social co-operation.

88 Strategies can be conventionalised and ossified into norms of dominance, and compliance can be legitimately enforced. See HABERMAS (1984: 253).

89 In the technical linguistic and philosophical literature the term ‘implication’ is used in different ways and still awaits clarification as BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 216 f.) note. For recent work see HORN (1973), (1985), (2001), DAVIS (1998), LEVINSON (2000), HORN–WARD (2004), ATLAS (2005). In the following I will call the process of fulfilling accepted validity conditions the ‘social implication’ of a speech act, in contrast to the ‘logical’ or semantical implication of a communicative act, and to its psychological ‘conditions of satisfaction’. The social implications of a speech act are the possi-
they accept the unnecessary constraints of Grice’s theory of information processing, even Brown and Levinson and Strecker cannot avoid reductionist interpretations of language usage in terms of pre-existing ‘social positions’ and differential ‘power’. Habermas’ distinction between communicative and success orientated language usage, however, seems to open a path for a non-reductionist understanding, for instance, of the social function of positive politeness, which, in the words of Brown and Levinson, can only ‘express’ but not ‘generate’ solidarity. Reductionism can only be avoided if not merely the reflexive but also the constitutive function of discourse for the construction of social identities is considered. From this perspective, strategies of negative politeness and off-record appear to have greater power than positive politeness or on-record strategies, particularly in social situations where coercion cannot succeed and where co-operation is primarily engendered through indirect communication.

Any empirical analysis of conversational implicatures requires a careful description of the discursive field and conventional ways of speaking in different ‘speech situations’ which form part of the ‘communicative competence’ (Hyman (1972b)) and ‘repertoire’ of the members of a particular ‘speech community’ (Gumperz (1964), (1972)). From an observer’s point of view, there are four formal contexts, actions which may follow from it, if its validity claims are explicated through context-sensitive processes of interpretation of indexical meaning, and accepted. Cf. Weiber (1988: 95, 125) on the social function of ‘noetic’ interpretations of the social motives of ambiguous commands (in contrast to the objective understanding of the meaning of a statement) either (a) in terms of for practical purposes, or (b) in terms of value-relations and for purposes of scientific understanding.

90 See Gumperz’s (1995: 209) definition: ‘Communicative competence can be defined in interactional terms as “the knowledge of linguistic and related communicative conventions that speakers must have to create and sustain conversational cooperation”, and thus involves both grammar and contextualization.’

91 Gumperz (1964: 137) defined ‘speech community’ first as ‘any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction over a significant span of time and set off from other such aggregates by differences in the frequency of interaction.’ Later he added the criterion of compartmentalisation (Gumperz (1972: 231)) and emphasised the role of social norms for the definition of a speech community: ‘any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language usage. … Regardless of the linguistic differences among them, the speech varieties employed within a speech community form a system because they are related to a shared set of social norms’ (Gumperz (1972: 219 f.). See also Gumperz–Hyman (1986) and Habermas (1980: 382 f.) (1984–1987 I: 283). Hyman (1972b: 55) tries to ‘bypass’ the difficulties of defining ‘community’ by stating: ‘The essential thing is that the object of description be an integral social unit.’ The problem of essentialism does not pose itself at all in the more
or ‘speech situations’ and associated ‘speech events’ and ‘genres’, which are relevant in the case of Jain discourse: (a) the religious debate (vivāda or prayoga), for instance at a royal court or modern court of law, (b) the public sermon (pravacana), (c) the interaction between ascetics and non-ascetics in informal settings (bhāṣā), and (d) the interaction between ascetics (vinaya). Each of these settings involves a different set of social and stylistic conventions, norms and expectations. The agonistic debate at a royal court or a court of law for instance is a highly pragmatic affair whose outcome might decide the fate of a particular monastic group. Here, the contextual rules are defined by the king or the state, and classical


‘Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules throughout’ (HYMES (1972b: 56)).


CARRITHERS (1992: 112 f.) singles this setting out as particular significant; while emphasizing the universal principle of free negotiation of situations (CARRITHERS (1992: 105 f.)).


Obviously, this is not an exhaustive taxonomy of all typical situations of language usage in Jain culture. I do not discuss examples of formulaic language, such as mantra or japa, or political oratory, which have already been exhaustively treated in the literature, but concentrate on those types of ritualised interaction where religious discourse is the predominant form of language usage. There are many different classifications of speech situations in the Jain scriptures, which deserve further investigation. For example, the four types of speech appropriate for an ascetic performing bhikṣu-pratimā listed in Thān 237 (4.22): (1) requesting speech, used in the context of the begging round (jāyaṃ bhāṣā <yācanī bhāṣā>), (2) questioning speech, used in the context of the studying the meaning of the scriptures, or path-finding (pucchaṃ bhāṣā <pracchanī bhāṣā>), (3) speech used for seeking permission, for example to stay at a certain place (aṇuṇaṇavāni bhāṣā <aṇuṇhāpāni bhāṣā>), (4) speech used in the context of question-answer dialogues (puṭṭha-vāgarāṇi bhāṣā <praśna-vākarāṇi bhāṣā>). Thān 4.274 specifies also four situations in which it is permitted for monks and nuns to talk to each other.

HYMES (1972b: 55–66) proposed the following useful analytical categories: language field, speech situation, speech event, speech act, speech styles, ways of speaking, components of speech (message form, message content, setting [physical], scene [psychological/cultural], purpose [outcome], purpose [goal], key, channel, forms of speech [varieties], norms of interaction [social structure], norms of interpretation, genres). They roughly correspond to Malinowski’s earlier distinction of dogmatic context, ritual context, and sociological context, as well as structure and mode of recitation (HYMES (1972b: 64)). The interrelation of genres, events and acts and other components in Jain settings is worth studying further (HYMES (1972b: 65)).
philosophical and political rhetorical skills are in demand. The public sermon, on the other hand, is comparatively informal, despite its conventional setting and asymmetric structure. It conveys religious content, inspiration and insight in an entertaining manner, and is often followed by casual discussions at the end. The fundamental norms of comportment are defined by the monastic community itself. The interactions between ascetics and non-ascetics ideally take place within a hierarchical context of worship of ascetic purity, and are sometimes highly ritualised. However, there are also informal interactions, which require greater discriminatory skills on the part of the ascetics for not transgressing the norms of non-violent interaction. The code of polite interaction within the monastic order itself is derived from the principles of ascetic seniority (dikṣā-paryāya) and group leadership, and operates in a similar manner.

I have ordered these four ritualised types of discourse sequentially in terms of their increasing coincidence with Jain ideals, starting with political rituals, then conversion rituals, interaction rituals, and finally monastic rituals. Other forms of classification are possible; for instance in terms of degrees of formality, social setting (assembly or individual contact), or regarding the relative importance of discourse in ritual.

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98 Carrithers (1992: 106) notes that in Jain (Indian) settings, the free negotiation of meaning is constrained by socio-cultural norms: ‘There is a bias towards the authoritative pronouncement, that is, towards a relationship of unquestioning domination of the instructor. … If we subtract the authoritarian flavour, the telling of Siddhasagar’s story [his example, P.F.] still retains an essential element, the creating of a common meaning by working jointly, interactively, to establish which interpretation is to be accepted.’

99 Tambiah (1968: 177 ff.) and Bloch (1975: 19) also distinguish between the ‘primary function of language’, as a vehicle for communication, and certain types of ‘ritual language’ (e.g. mantra or formalised oratory), which violate the communication function by being formal, unintelligible, and/or private (see also Wheelock (1982: 57); and Humphrey–Laidlaw’s (1994: 89) psychological variant). However, both ignore the constitutive function of language, and do not distinguish between speech acts and linguistically mediated interaction. Hence, they are forced to resort to reductionist interpretations of the social function of ritual language either in terms of institutions of power (Bloch (1975: 24)) or paradigmatic cultural ideas (Tambiah (1985: 154)). Bloch’s singular, Bernstein (1964) inspired, emphasis on formality as (a) the decisive and (b) restrictive attribute of political and ritual discourse in contexts of traditional authority, can neither account for the Jain emphasis on content rather than form, nor on their insistence on ethics and the generative power of restraint. Tambiah criticises Bloch for not taking into consideration a number of factors: the intelligibility of ritual language derived from cosmological ideas, the role of ritual functionaries, and social context. Despite emphasising intellectual content of sacred language (in Buddhism), and similarities between sacred and profane language, Tambiah himself only discusses cases of popular ‘magical’ usage of language (e.g. mantra), and accepts emic ‘power of words’ theories as empirical fact, without discussing the role of discourse in ritual and emic theories of language (e.g. Vedic: Renou (1955), Navya-Nyāya: Ganeri (1999); the power of words to signify is also recognised by Jain philosophers).
ever, for our primarily sociological purpose, the crucial variable is ‘interactional competence’, that is, the knowledge and ability to use rules and moral judgement for interaction in specific situations. Interactional competence presupposes ‘cognitive competence’ (PIAGET (1937)), ‘linguistic competence’ (CHOMSKY (1965)), ‘communicative competence’ (HYMES (1972a)), including ‘oratory skill’ (BLOCH (1975)). HABERMAS (1984: 187 ff., 231 f.) defines interactional competence more specifically as the universal pragmatic ability to regulate social conflict consensually through rational agreement, even in situations of severe discord, in accordance with the three universal pragmatic validity claims. He distinguishes further between the intuitive or conscious knowledge of specific grammatical and socio-cultural rules and contexts, and the mastery of the universal pragmatic conditions of the possibility of mutual understanding (Verständigung).102 Because Habermas’ notion of ‘communicative competence’, a composite of cognitive, linguistic and interactional competencies (in a more narrow sense), is more abstract and formal than Hymes’ sociolinguistic notion of ‘communicative competence’, it circumvents the problem of analytical reification of ‘speakers’ or of ‘speech communities’. Building upon HABERMAS’ (1991: 111–3) distinction between two levels of competencies, also reflected in his differentiation between universal ‘moral’ and cultural specific ‘ethical’ principles, and HYMES’ (1972b: 57 ff.) notion that knowledge of grammatical rules and of determinate ways of speaking together form the communicative competence of a particular speech community or individual, I propose to differentiate further between general ‘interactional competence’ and specific ‘Jain interactional competence’, that is, the formal procedural knowledge necessary for constituting discourse in agreement with Jain principles.104

100 TAMIAH (1968: 176) poses the interesting question of the relationship of words to actions in ritual, noting the predominance of words and intelligible language in healing and initiation rites addressing human beings, in contrast to rites of mass participation and rites addressing supernatural beings or forces of nature. He also discusses the problem of alternation between various types of language in ritual, and reformist attempts to destroy the ritual formalism of sacred language in favour of increased accessibility and understanding. Both observations apply to contemporary Jainism.

101 See also DURBIN (1970).

102 HABERMAS (1975: 3).

103 To distinguish the two kindred notions of communicative competence, I privilege the term interactive competence here. The usefulness of HYMES’s (1972a), (1972b) approach for the empirical investigation of ways of speaking has frequently been highlighted by HABERMAS (1975: 5), (1980: 440) / (1984–1987 I: 328). Habermas first used ‘interactional competence’ and later preferred ‘communicative competence’. I use the term interactional competence in the broader sense of social coordination of actions through linguistic and non-linguistic means.

104 This application of the theory of social competence was first outlined in FLÜGEL (1994), (1995–6: 165). For theories of religious competence (often combined with theories of religious socialisation) see SAMARIAN (1969), LUHMANN (1982), WAARDENBURG (1979), and GLADIGOW...
Jain interactional competence is informed by general ‘Jain religious competence’, which can be defined as the sum total of Jain religious knowledge learned by an individual. In addition to general ‘Jain interactional competence’, religious rules and contextual knowledge necessary for navigating specific contexts can be studied, and the ‘Jain religious repertoire’ of a specific population or individual analysed (as part of a particular ‘socio-cultural repertoire’).

General ‘interactional competence’ refers to the ability of a flexible reflective regulation of total conduct in terms of universal moral presuppositions, contrasting with institutionalised settings, which, through their formal properties, relieve the individual to some extent from the task of defining the situation and from difficult moral choices. ‘Jain interactional competence’ varies with the degree of knowledge and the internalisation of general and cultural specific (sectarian etc.) It is necessary to distinguish Jain principles and their contextual rules of use; that is, the cognitive and non-cognitive (motivational, emotional etc.) know how to act in accordance with abstract and specific doctrinal principles in different socio-cultural circumstances. Jain principles and rules of application, of varying degrees of specificity. General Jain principles are characterised by constitutive rules, generative of the field of Jain discourse as a whole. They are exemplified by ideal Jain speech events. Jain interactional competence is context-sensitive. The corresponding rules are deliberately constructed to enable a performer to react flexibly to emergent properties of a specific speech situation, and to shape it in accordance with Jain principles. Since principles and rules only negatively determine the field of pragmatic possibilities, speaking the Jain way, or avoiding interaction altogether, are creative acts, performances, which

(1997). The latter noted that the ability to orient oneself in complex religious contexts, to distinguish between different situations, to develop a ‘religious identity’, and to act appropriately cannot be taken for granted: ‘Die Kompetenz, in einer polytheistischen Religion zu leben, sie angemessen zu benutzen, wird von modernen Interpreten einfach unterstellt’ (GLADIGOW (1997: 105)). Following Luhmann and Waardenburg, he advocates for the semiotic analysis of religious pantheons as ‘languages’ which can be learned and selectively used (GLADIGOW (1997: 106)).

105 Cf. SINGER’s (1961: 96–138) distinction between principles and rules: ‘I argued that moral principles are to be distinguished from moral rules by the fact that the former hold in all circumstances and do not admit of exceptions; that principles are always relevant whereas rules are not; that principles are invariant and do not vary with changes in circumstances or conditions; and by the fact that it is impossible for moral principles to conflict with each other. … I distinguished between fundamental rules, local rules, and neutral norms. Local rules … depend on local conditions in a way that fundamental rules do not, and hence are peculiar to, and differ with, different groups and communities—that is to say, different circumstances. Neutral norms are local rules that are conventional in a way that other rules are not [‘it would make no moral difference if their opposites were adopted’ (SINGER (1961: 113))], but both neutral norms and local rules depend on social needs or purposes that are advanced by general observance and would be frustrated or defeated by their general violation’ (SINGER (1961: 327 f.)). On levels see also HARE (1981: 35 ff.).
ideally transform any speech event into a Jain discourse. Actual speech performances, or Jain ‘speech styles’ in the terms of HYMES (1972b: 57), I would argue, can not be sufficiently understood in terms of statistical features of overt behaviour, or as deviations from a general norm or ideal, but only as constitutive acts dependent on ‘qualitative judgements of appropriateness’ of selected features in a given situation.106

Theoretically, the required interactional competence of the ideal ‘pure ascetic’ (śuddha-sādhu) increases with the degree of informality of the interactional situation, because ascetic self-control, in accordance with Jain principles, is the price for freedom from external (social and ritual) control. In practice, Jain ascetics try to prevent rule-transgressions due to insufficient procedural knowledge with various methods: for example, by teaching context-sensitive rules not in abstract, but through exemplary cases, or by keeping inexperienced ascetics away from morally overcomplex situations through strict supervision. Similar competencies are outlined for the Jain laity. An ideal lay person is characterised, for instance by Hemacandra (YŚ 1.47–56), as one who is listening (śravana), memorising (dhāraṇā), showing respect (vinaya), being an expert in sacred lore (pravacana-kusala), and also avoiding religiously unprofitable speech (sat-kathā) etc. (WILLIAMS (1983: 265–72)). Thus, it is always the Jain interactional competence, the religious and cultural repertoire of an individual or group, which generates the capacity of defining or judging situations in terms of Jain principles, of imposing or inferring implicatures, and determining the relevant type of rhetoric or hermeneutic procedure.107

Once the settings and the required competencies are considered, the social implications of Jain discourse can be analysed in terms of the conditions and presuppositions of the acceptability of particular validity claims in Jain intersubjective hermeneutics. These can be discovered by negating speech acts as a whole.108 The question is always: What are the social implications of a religious claim in this particular context? ‘What makes a religious statement acceptable?’109 Ultimately, such a question can only be answered by the participants themselves, because only they can determine on which grounds to accept or to reject a particular claim. In other words, the explication of implications can never be achieved objectively, for instance by explaining the ‘cogency of ideas’ through a description of ‘the structure of

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107 Non-literal speech acts can only work if their implications are understood (and accepted).

BRUHN (1987b: 67), for instance, writes: ‘The fact that everybody knew the basic pattern [of Jain soteriological sequences, P.F.] made it rather simple to find suitable words for a lecture or a sermon.’

Cf. GLUCKMAN (1955: 24) on degrees of ‘flexibility or of moral implication’ of legal concepts.


109 Cf. GOMBRICH’S (1988: 10) question: ‘What makes a religious innovation acceptable?’
a problem situation’ alone, as GOMBRICH (1988: 11) suggests, but is always an outcome of specific intersubjective processes of socio-cultural self-interpretation.110

Classical performative approaches to ritual or ritual language, for instance, which made use of Grice’s or Searle’s analysis failed to investigate this (like Grice and Searle themselves). In fact, they neglected the role of discourse in ritual altogether, in favour of either cultural determinism (Tambiah) or mental (Humphrey and Laidlaw) or material reductionism (Bloch). Following Searle’s and Habermas’ interpretation of the dual (illocutionary and propositional) structure of the speech act, TAMBIAH (1985: 153) argues that, because ritual action appears to mediate between (cultural) ideas and (political) practice, it can be interpreted as a performative matrix of ‘indexical symbols (and indexical icons) as duplex structures carrying semantic and pragmatic meanings’:

‘The duality thus points in two directions at once—in the semantic direction of cultural presuppositions and conventional understandings and in the pragmatic direction of the social and interpersonal context of ritual action, the line-up of the participants and the process by which they establish or infer meanings. We note that the sense in which I imagine actors to infer indexical meaning is similar to Grice’s formulation of “conversational implicature”, in that by saying or enacting something a certain meaning is implicated, which can be readily understood (conventional implicature) or is capable of being “worked out” (non-conventional implicature), given certain contextual features and certain common understandings’ (TAMBIAH (1985: 154)).

Although he treats ritual acts as speech acts (thus identifying action and his own action description), speech itself is curiously absent in Tambiah’s conception (and where he talks about it, he returns to the traditional ‘power of words’, śābda-śakti, theory). Moreover, the propositional component of the ritual act, its symbolism, is not treated in terms of specific validity claims whose debatable normative implications may or may not be acceptable, but identified with timeless and incontestable cultural paradigms. Tambiah’s performative analysis is therefore still oriented towards the theological model of textual hermeneutics, that is, the dogmatic explication (phronesis) of contextual implications of mythic paradigms or sacred texts. His approach assumes that the knowledge embodied in texts is superior to the interpreter’s, and has to be accepted.111 Because his performative analysis does not clearly distinguish between ritual acts and ritually mediated forms of social interaction, it must assume socially binding effects emerge automatically from the experi-

ence of ritual acts themselves, and that the authority of traditional ritual form should always be accepted, without question. The underlying notion of ritual enactment, a variation of the Neo-Kantian model of value realisation, cannot account for processes of intersubjective negotiation of conditions of acceptability and for the contextually varying social implications of ritually communicated validity claims. The presumed timelessness of mythical paradigms re-produces the characteristic pseudo-concreteness of Durkheimian functionalist studies of ritual performance, positing social integration both as a presupposition and result of ritual, without investigating the constitutive role of discourse in and about ritual itself.

Tambiah’s theory does not throw light on Jain religious discourse, which appeals to reason and insight, instead of formulaic repetition, and whose contextually specific normative claims are constantly challenged and revised by the Jain ācāryas, under the threat of failure to appeal. In sum, because of the lacking theory of social constitution and cultural change, and the absence of sociolinguistic interest, Tambiah’s approach cannot assist analysing the problem of contextual ambiguity of indexical meaning, which I deal with later in this essay. As an alternative, I suggest investigating Jain ritual discourse through the analysis of the Jain discourse ethics and traditional interpretative procedures for negotiating social meaning; to avoid falling into the same trap as Bloch, who identifies an increase of formality generally with a loss of meaning, which Tambiah rightly criticises.

Even if the idealist limitations of universal pragmatic or culturalist discourse analysis could be overcome, there is still the problem of how to analytically reconstitute implicatures in specific cases in a methodical way. This question is particularly prominent in theological, juridical and moral-philosophical debates concerning the status of rule application, that is, of interpretative processes that are involved in the specification of principles and rules through the explication of the contextual implications of given principles and rules.¹¹² As language in general does,¹¹³ explicit normative principles and rules always entail an anonymous indexical element. That is, they implicitly refer to a range of possible situations as their field of applicability, which we must know and accept, if we wish to act accordingly. To explicate general conditions of applicability, one has to refer to paradigmatic situations. Paradoxically, the range of applicability diminishes with the increasing specification of the conditions, and increases with the diminishing specification.¹¹⁴ In other words, the problem is the principal vagueness and ambiguity of the indexical meaning of symbolic forms, which, as GLUCKMAN (1955: 293) and TURNER (1986: 44) argued,

¹¹⁴ WELLMER (1986: 28, 35 f.).
is in fact a positive functional feature of abstraction, because it secures the adaptability of general principles to changing contexts. An exhaustive characterisation of merely negatively determined situations, therefore, cannot and, indeed, should not be achieved once and for all by participants, even if a principle itself is accepted.

The contextual meanings and social implications of symbolic forms (and the forms themselves) are always underdetermined and hence negotiable. They can only be established temporarily through use and agonistic intersubjective interpretative processes, whose outcome is always open, even if methods of argumentation and discursive procedures are conventional, and predicated on idealised universal pragmatic presuppositions. I therefore suggest supplementing standard descriptions of ritual, or action in general, by an analysis of the discursive procedures which define situations and establish relevance and contextually acceptable social meaning. The discursive field surrounding rituals and other social settings should be the main focus for an investigation of social dimensions of ritual efficacy. Conventional analyses of ritual focus almost exclusively on the given ceremonial setting and on the performative experience itself, and tend to give undue weight to the procedural knowledge of ritual functionaries, textualised cultural ideas, and articulated subjective experience. The resulting meaning reductionism can be avoided by investigating discursive negotiations of validity claims in situ, including possibly the relationship between general, for instance moral, language games and institutionalised forms of reflexivity, such as theology and the social sciences. The analysis of implicit judgements invoked in everyday practices of moral justification, moral utterances and moral disputes, can also demonstrate how cultural resources are used as potential reasons for claims of validity. From this perspective, social solidarity does not only emerge exclusively as a consequence of partaking in ‘effervescent’ rituals, to use Durkheim’s expression, but primarily—and increasingly so—as the result of the participation in socially constitutive discourses of norm legitimation and shared definitions of situations.

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117 General principles or rules are generally combined with more specific rule of application. See Wittgenstein (1953). ‘Keine Norm enthält die Regeln ihrer eigenen Anwendung’ (Habermas (1991: 24)).
118 They may include culturally specific discourse etiquettes and formalised interpretative procedures, such as the (monological) forms of Jain scholastic exegesis (niryukti) described by Balbir (1993: 56).
119 See the pioneering work of Turner (1986: 45). Lately, Habermas (2004: 53) conceded that all discourses are embedded in lifeworld practices, because they have the function to restore partially distorted background consensus (as analysed by Turner).
120 Habermas (1996: 335) used the term ‘critical understanding’ through ‘reconstructive translation’. 
The paradigmatic example of practical hermeneutical explications of implied indexical meaning, are intentionally multivocal forms of communication within ‘master-slave’ relationships; often discussed either in terms of formalisation of discourse, and of understanding implicit directives (e.g. commands), or in terms of the instrumentalisation of interpretation as such by the rhetoric of spiritual power in contexts of traditional authority. Building on the work of Brown and Levinson and Strecker on the influence of social structure on discourse, DRECHSEL (1994: 50), for instance, draws an analogy between the relationship of off-recordness and on-recordness in politeness theory, and the relationship of the ambiguous symbolism of ‘sacred’ kingship and the unequivocal social and material implications of royal pomp, which, he suggests, have to be worked out by the lower strata of society qua unspoken command. Although mere compliance or non-compliance with implicit directives in no way shows that they are legitimate or illegitimate, the explanatory problem of this institutional theory is the same as in Habermas’ analysis of latent strategic action in terms of universal normative presuppositions. The king’s dual socially constitutive role, as a living symbol of society and as an individual with its own specific interests, involves his subjects in a paradoxical double-bind situation. Because the king is the condition of socio-cosmic existence, royal power appears not primarily ‘exploitative’, but ‘attractive’, to the extent that the subjects try to read the king’s mind and, ideally, to fulfil his unsaid wishes. Because the king is the condition of social order everyone is forced to identify with him. In fulfilling his wishes, the subject reproduces the conditions of its own social existence as a social being. A good example is the relationship between the king and his officials in the context of the ‘polite society’ of the court, and their characteristic mutual strategic orientation: the characteristic ambiguity of the king’s role forces the officials to work out the ‘implications’ of royal gestures, and to fulfil his unspeakable material needs in form of service, presents etc. Even a cursory glance at the vast literature on South Asian kingship shows the empirical significance of such phenomena, first theorised by HEGEL.

121 APEL (1993: 49).
122 BURGHART (1996: 306): ‘In a “Government of one”, conventionally called monarchy, everyone else leads double lives. They lead a life as dictated by the will of their lord and master, and they lead a life of their own.’
123 See also ALI (2004). LEBER (1979: 36) argued that the efficacy of power in general is predicated on the mutual desire to avoid anticipated possibilities of open conflict and brute force. Obedience is usually not the result of explicit commands but based on the avoidance of expected sanctions in case of the non-performance of desired behaviour: ‘Der Machthaber braucht gar nicht erst zu befehlen, auch seine unbefohlenen Befehle werden schon befolgt. Sogar die Initiative zum Befehl kann auf den Unterworfenen verlagert werden; er fragt nach, wenn ihm unklar ist, was befördern werden würde. Explizite Kommunikation wird auf eine unvermeidbare Residualfunktion beschränkt. In gewissem Umfange geht mit dieser Form der Machstigerung Macht auf den Machtunterworfenen über...’ A classical European text on this phenomenon is LA BOËTIE (1983: 136).
Peter Flügel (1981: 145–77) in his analysis of the dialectic of recognition, and investigated by Elias (1983) in his sociological study of the French court and Kantorowicz (1957) on the ideology of European kingship. Burghart (1996: 308) found similar mechanisms within the political discourse under the Hindu monarchy in Nepal of the 1980s, combining arguments from Habermas and Bloch: 'The king cannot speak informally to the body politic: rather he must speak formally to everyone, for he represents everyone. Little that he utters, therefore, can be taken at face value, and one treats governmental speech with some suspicion. It is, as a matter of course, something distorted.'

The relationship between a king and his subjects is structurally homologous to the relationship between senior and junior Jain ascetics, and to the relationship between ascetics and laity (śrāvakas, ‘listeners’, or upāsakas, ‘servants’). In Jain scriptures, the junior partners in both relationships are characterised by the combined virtues of politeness (vinaya) and serving the guru (vaivārytya) (Uttar 30.30–7). From the point of view of Jain laity, even the relationship between Jains and Non-Jains should be analogous to the relationship between ascetics and Jain-laity (ascetics : laity :: laity : non-Jains). Similar (on/off record) strategic orientations are therefore to be expected. From an anthropological perspective, the crux of politeness theory is that functional contributions for the maintenance of public self-image are not coerced but received through processes of deliberate ‘fulfilment’ of face-wants of speakers of superior status by ‘hearers’ of inferior status; particularly the ‘faces’ of legitimate public figures, which condense the sense of identity in wider social circles. Social power operates here indirectly through the medium of free will and consent, if only under the implicit threat of social sanctions in the case of non-satisfaction of face-wants. In the words of Turner (1986: 30), ritual in general is a mechanism that ‘converts the obligatory into the desirable.’

It is essential for my argument to investigate Jain conceptions of pragmatic language usage, and to compare them with the theories outlined in the previous sections. The central question concerns the applicability of the theory of communicative action and

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124 On indirectness see for instance Veluthat (1978), Burghart (1983: 297), Balbir (1993: 267–9). In his work on bhakti, Lorenzen (1995: 3) recalls Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’, i.e. ‘that the ideology (or ideologies) of privileged classes may exert, by a combination of persuasion and coercion, a “hegemony” over the ideology (or ideologies) of nonprivileged classes in the same society.’

125 Göhler’s (1995b: 72 f.) discussion of Kumārila’s explanation of the ‘impersonal’ injunctive force of Vedic words whose propositional content can only be realised under certain conditions could be reinterpreted in similar terms.
its forms of operationalisation to the Jain context; particularly the role of the ‘universal’ validity claims and of the Gricean maxims. I have argued that the Jain theory of speech plays a similar role within Indian social philosophy as Habermas’ theory of communicative action does within Western philosophy, because both proclaim the primacy of morality and ethics in language usage. Underlying Habermas’ theory of communicative intent (verständigungsorientierter Sprachgebrauch) is not only the notion that, by definition, in the immediate context of communication all participants must have a common interest in the maintenance of linguistic exchange, and hence implicitly presuppose the ideal of non-violence, at least of the avoidance of physical violence, but also that they are implicitly oriented toward reaching agreement.126 In this regard, Habermas’ notion of infinite consensus represents a functional equivalent of the Jain notion of infinite knowledge leading to salvation (see infra, p. 129 f.). Moreover, universal pragmatic validity claims can be usefully compared and contrasted with the Jain vows of ahimsā and satya. On lower levels of abstraction, the Jain doctrine of the ways of speaking (bhāšā-jāta), as exposed already in the older texts of the Śvetāmbara scriptures, can be usefully compared and contrasted with the conversational maxims of Grice; and conversational implicatures in Jain discourse, theorised in Jain literature, can be analysed as forms of latent strategic action in terms of Brown and Levinson’s typology of FTAs. I do not argue that there is an exact correspondence between these modern and ancient Jain schemes of interpretation. Nor do I believe that there is only one way of reconstructing the social implications of Jain theories of language from the point of view of modern social philosophy and logic. But the comparison generates new perspectives on both Jain and Western philosophy, in particular on the ways in which fundamental ontological distinctions or questions can function as codes for the constitution of different discourses.

The principal difficulty of this enterprise is the apparent incompatibility of dialogical and monological perspectives; of the—quasi-legal—intersubjective and egalitarian normative underpinnings of the theory of communicative action and the self-centred and hierarchical normative foundations of the Jain theory of speech, that is, their different ontological commitments.127 Habermas’ differentiation between universal ‘moral’ and culturally specific ‘ethical’ presuppositions undermines from the outset the claim to universality of any religious ethical system. Since the legitimacy of Jain religious speech is rooted in the traditional authority of the

126 Cf. HABERMAS (1991: 17, 173). HABERMAS (2004: 49) distinguishes four idealised presuppositions of argumentation: (a) public inclusion of all concerned individuals, (b) equal distribution of rights to communicate, (c) non-violence in the discourse situation, (d) truthfulness of all participants.

127 See GERT (1973: Ch. 5–6) on the ways in which ego-centred legitimations of moral rules can be universalised; and critical comments of WELLMER (1986: 41 f.) and HABERMAS (1991: 173 f.) from the point of view of dialogical ethics.
speaker (āpta), that is, his/her Jain religious competence, rather than the procedural form of communicative action (śabdāṇuśāsana),\textsuperscript{128} from the perspective of the theory of communicative action, its claims to universality can only gain acceptability in an open field of discourse to the extent that it articulates phenomena for which no other language is available.\textsuperscript{129} Jain authors have also formulated a principles of discourse intended to transcend cultural boundaries. These principles can, however, only claim universality to the extent that they fulfil the condition of universal acceptability. Yet, this criterion is not foregrounded in Jain texts. A rational defence of the universality of Jain ethics will need to reconstruct the presuppositions of the egological Jain ethical perspective from the point of view of general interest. Conversely, discourse ethics rooted in formal pragmatics has only weak regulative force and needs to be supplemented by obligatory norms of action. The reduction of religion to morality and ethics and the epistemic approach, which Habermas inherited from Kant, are however shared, to some extent, by Jain doctrine. The following comparative study of Jain discourse ethics begins with the question of the status of religious language in Jain philosophy, especially intentionally multivocal language, which, at first sight, appears to violate the fundamental norms of universal pragmatics.

The main difficulty in understanding Jain concepts of religious language derives from the paradoxical, direct and indirect, nature of Jain religious knowledge (āgama). The problem is that, doctrinally, every utterance can be interpreted both from the transcendental or ultimate point of view (niścaya-naya or pāramārthika-naya) (henceforth PN), and from the practical point of view (vyavahāra-naya) (henceforth VN).\textsuperscript{130} For a participant, ultimate and relative points of view are not necessarily absolutely distinct, but complementary, hierarchically related modes of orientation, which mutually implicate one another (like noesis and noema in

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 448).

\textsuperscript{129} HABERMAS (2005). Christian theologians such as ARENS (1989: 11, 17 ff.) criticised this point already. ARENS (1991: 191) follows PEUKERT’s (1984) views: ‘In einer politisch-theologischen Kritik an Habermas ist Religion selbst als kommunikative Praxis zu begreifen, die “als Praxis, also im kommunikativen Handeln, Gott für die anderen behauptet und im Handeln zu bewähren sucht”.’ ARENS (1995: 150) proposes to see the ‘church as a community of communication’ in a double sense: ‘Jesus Christ is communicated in the church and through the church’s mediation.’

\textsuperscript{130} Although influenced by the Nyāya school and by Nāgārjuna, within Jainism this terminological distinction goes back to Kundakunda, a South Indian Digambara ascetic of the c. 1st–8th century CE, who gives the following definition: ‘From the vyavahāra point of view, conduct, belief and knowledge are attributed (as different characteristics) of the Knower, the Self. But from the real point of view there is no (differentiation of) knowledge, conduct and belief, in Pure Self’ (SSā 1.7). Cf. MATILAL (1981: 43), CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54). The paradoxes generated by the PN/VN distinction gave rise to an extensive commentary literature which cannot be reviewed here.
Husserl’s notion of intentionality). We are thus confronted with a conception of stages of religious insight and corresponding ways of using and interpreting language, measured in terms of degrees of insight (jñāna) and restraint (sañyama), i.e. practice of non-violence (ahimsā).131

The Jain tradition uses the term āgama ambiguously.132 It refers primarily to the ultimate truth, which Mahāvīra, the last Tīrtha(kara), had experienced directly and preached to the world, and in a second sense to ‘canonical’ Jain scriptures, which still form the doctrinal basis for sermons and writings of present day ascetics (Mālvāniyā (1968: 10–13)).133 In classical Jainism, knowledge of ultimate religious truth and reality can only be gained through meditation (bhāvanā). However, in the present ‘unhappy’ time cycle (duśamā avasarpinī) direct insight cannot be achieved anymore. Instruction through the words or testimony (śabda or āgama) of Mahāvīra, handed down by the religious authorities (ācārya), is the only way of gaining religious knowledge at all. The doctrinal primacy of cognition over language explains why Jains (and Buddhists) ‘have tried to preserve the meaning of the words concerned and not (like the Brahmins—P.F.) words themselves’ (Mālvāniyā (1968: 1)). Jainism teaches that, ultimately, all words—and indeed: doctrines—are neutral; it is the attitude of the knower alone that turns them into means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).134 Conversely, for the knower, each word of the Jain scriptures appears to condense the teachings of Mahāvīra in a summary fashion. This is part of its evocative power:

‘The Jainas maintain that the meanings of one single sentence, grasped by different hearers, are innumerable in accordance with their innumerable capacities … a sentence in the āgama has the power to suggest in various ways innumerable meanings’ (Mālvāniyā (1968: 12)).135

It is crucial for any understanding of Jain attitudes to language that, from the ultimate point of view (PN), sensuous cognition (māti) and words (śruta or āgama)136
are both forms of indirect, mediated knowledge (parokša) (TS 1.11). This is why Digambara Jains insist that the sermons of a Jina take the form of a miraculous sound (divya-dhvani), which radiates the meaning (artha) of his teachings instantaneously, not mediated through words. As there is no language for the unspoken (avaktavya) ultimate truth, any language can be used to express it. As a consequence, ‘from the absolute standpoint, the validity of a word or sentence is not intrinsic but extrinsic. That is, it depends on the merit of the speaker as well as of the listener’ (MÄLVAÑYÅ (1996: 2)). The conventional perception that ‘there is no possibility whatsoever of any faults or defects in the content of the Agamas’ thus rests entirely on the dogmatic belief that ‘the speakers of the Jain Agamas were self-realized (i.e. omniscient, P.F.) persons’ (MÄLVAÑYÅ (1968: 3)). The normative basis of traditional hermeneutics euphemistically stated: ‘In substance, this means that the absolute standpoint mainly keeps the listener in view while determining the role of scriptures in Jain discourse see also FOLKERT (1993) and GRÄNOFF (1993). I am less concerned with the problems of textual hermeneutics here than with the pragmatics of religious discourse.

According to TS 1.9–35, valid knowledge (pramâña) is of two types, direct (pratyakša) and indirect (parokša). Direct knowledge (PN) is based on immediate intuition. It includes kevala (omniscience), manah-paryâya (mind reading), and avadhâ (clairvoyance). Indirect knowledge (VN) is based on mediated intuition. It includes maiti (empirical knowledge, acquired through the senses and the mind) and šruta (knowledge acquired through instruction). Maiti is subdivided into four subcategories: smrti (memory), saññâ (recognition), cintâ (reasoning), abhinibodha (perception). Śruta, scripture, is knowledge communicated with the help of material symbols such as words and gestures. There are a variety of views in Jain philosophy how the following four conventional means of knowledge derived from Nyâya philosophy relate to maiti and śruta (mostly they are associated with the latter): paccakkha <pratyakša> (perception), anumâna <anumâna> (inference), ovamâna <upamâña> (analogy), and âgama (verbal testimony of a person of authority, or scripture) (Þhâò 4.504, AòD 436). See NYAVIJAYA (1998: 327 n. 1), TATIA (1951: 27–80), also TULSI (1985: 26 ff., 177–81).

Generally, Jain ascetics use the local vernacular. They reject the idea of the intrinsic sacredness of Sanskrit or other liturgical languages. However, with the canonisation of the scriptures, Ardhamâgadhî gained an equivalent esoteric status. Many later Jain writings were composed in Sanskrit, the language of the Brâhmana élite. The âgamas are in need of interpretation through a person of authority, i.e. an individual who knows the language and who has privileged access to religious insight (darâana). Initially, only the authority of Mahâvîra was accepted, the presumed author of the teachings in most transmitted texts, but later also the authority of the œruta-kevalins, and of the âcâryas, who now interpret the âgamas for their disciples. The Jain doctrine of testimony thus legitimates the institutional hierarchy of religious authority. However, there are numerous problems, because Jains are also realists acknowledging the power of words as sources of valid knowledge, because they are connected with things, as well as with a speaker’s intentions, and linguistic conventions. The logical arguments which were put forward, for instance by the NŚ 5–8 or by MÄLVAÑYÅ (1996: 2), to support the idea that the moral authority of the speaker is always more important than the content of his speech are, however, debatable (cf. SHAH (1966: 226 f.). On the role of normative authority in Nyâya theories of testimony see GÄNERI (1999: 38 ff.).
validity of the scriptures, and the empirical standpoint mainly keeps the speaker in view while determining the same’ (MĀLVAṆĪYĀ (1968: 2)).

Although kevala-jñāna (omniscience), the highest form of pāramārthika knowledge according to Jain doctrine, cannot be achieved in the present age, even today’s ascetics are supposed to have mind reading (manaḥ-paryāya) and clairvoyance (avadhi) capacities. Through their training in non-identification they are expected to be capable of switching perspectives between pāramārthika-naya and vyavahāra-naya, and, thus, to look at the same phenomenon both directly and indirectly (note that from PN, VN appears as a form of indirect cognition). This has significant consequences for the apprehension of verbal utterances. From the religious point of view (PN), language appears merely as a superficial ornament, which disguises the essential truth and beauty of the inner soul, of pure consciousness, which can be experienced through meditation only. In other words, the ambiguity of the concept of āgama is itself understood in terms of the ‘absolute’ and ‘practical’ points of view, which permit distinguishing clearly between ultimate religious meaning and linguistic means. The main consequence of this perspective is the cognitive de-substantialisation of everyday conceptions of language. From the worldly point of view (VN), the propositional content of a word (śabda) depends on convention (and on its power of signification). The semantic, and pragmatic, implications of a grammatically correct verbal utterance vary according to context. Speaker’s intention (abhiprāya) is one of the contextual conditions of meaning. Yet, it is rarely discussed in the context of objectivist Jain (and Nyāya) semantics.

My general argument is that the doctrinal distinction between practical and transcendent orientations, and the learned ability of reversing perspectives, informs both the discernment and the systematic generation of plural, multivocal meanings in Jain discourse. In my view, the cognitive competence of perspective alternation

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140 Examples are discussed by RYAN (1998: 77) and FLÜGEL (1993).
142 Similar relationships between ‘authentic knowledge’ (jñāna) and ‘discursive/reflective knowledge’ (vijñāna) can be found in Buddhism. Cf. LAMOTTE (1992: 21), BHRATI (1975: 169), SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 309–12).
143 In a modified form, the argument also applies to Mādhyamika Buddhism, and can be extended to any context informed by universalistic two truth theories. Cf. KOKOSZYNSKA (1936) on absolute truth (ideal language) and relative truth (everyday language). See ALBERT (1991: 124 ff.), (2003: 128) for Popperian criticism of (a) double truth theories, (b) of Cartesian recourse to ‘god’, and (c) Apel’s and Habermas’ recourse to the ‘hermeneutical god’ of the ‘ideal community of communication’ as guarantors of certainty instead of a real, fallible consensus. Albert argues that all double-truth theories are dogmatic ‘immunisation strategies’: ‘Particular viewpoints are intro-
is a fundamental presupposition of Jain hermeneutics and rhetoric, and can be used both for the pursuit of insight and power. Rooted in Jain ontology, the distinction between empirical and transcendental perspectives was an implicit feature of Jain doctrine even before its philosophical conceptualisation. The fundamental religious problematic of Jainism, framed by the asymmetrical soul/body, non-violence/violence codes, creates paradoxes and pragmatic ambiguities which require interpretation and contextual specification/conditioning with the help of additional coding. How to translate these asymmetrical codes into practice? Many Jain texts address this problem. According to classical Jain philosophy of standpoints (anekāntavāda), the epistemic tension created by the basic soul-body dualism of Jain doctrine, can only be resolved, if at all, by a process of perpetual alternation of PN-VN perspectives. In Kundakunda’s Samaya-sāra (SSā), this epistemic necessity is endowed with a soteriological function. The technical Jain syād-vāda philosophy, the conditionalisation of assertions, by contrast, is based on the conventional point of view (VN). How do these two types of Jain perspectivism deal with the problem of multivocality? The Jain religious point of view (PN) infuses all phenomena with...


145 See Luhmann’s (1982) theory of ‘steering differences’ which tend to have the form of ‘distinctions directrices’, applied to the Jain context in Flügel (1995–6: 164 ff.). Luhmann (1990: 215) argues that binary codes, which define self-referential systems in an unequivocal functional way, and ambiguous semantics are complementary: ‘Durch semantische Ambiguität wird die Willkür in der Schließung des Systems und in der Ausschließung aller weiterer Werte aus dem Code des Systems berücksichtigt. Ambiguität ist gleichsam das kommunikationsinterne Korrelat für das, was im Beobachten und Beschreiben “zwischen” die Pole der Unterscheidung, besonders zwischen “wahr” und “unwahr” fällt. Die Ambiguität entspricht der Stille, die nicht mitspricht, wenn man spricht, oder auch die Weiße des Papiers, auf das man schreibt, und sie vertritt im System all das, was an Stelle dieser Leere eigentlich der Fall ist. Der Widerspruch von Eindeutigkeit und Mehrdeutigkeit kann auf diese Weise durch Differenzierung aufgelöst werden.’

146 Johnson (1995a: 252 ff.) argues that there is ‘a fundamental incompatibility between syād-vāda and the absolute vyavahāra-niscaṣya distinction. The former is essentially an intellectual strategy for evading confrontation ... The latter, on the other hand, has ... a soteriological function.’ For Ganeri (2001: 133) anekānta-vāda and syād-vāda are complementary: the former provides the epistemology and the latter the semantics. On the technical definition of alternation (anyatarvatvādinā) in syād-vāda theory see p. 143 ff.
new meaning by re-coding them in terms of the doctrinal body/soul distinction. I shall designate this type of systematic distortion or appropriation of conventional meaning which at the same time opens up new semantic space, ‘ontological ambiguity’, in contrast to ‘linguistic ambiguity’, in a wider sense, including expressions whose implications are semantically and/or pragmatic underdetermined (vagueness, indexicality, indirectness, presupposition etc.). Ontological ambiguity is not the same as linguistic ambiguity. But it can only be expressed in linguistic form. Therefore, both can be easily confused. Systematically distorted communication qua doctrinal re-coding and latent strategic communication are both predicated on the intentional creation of multiple meanings. Like latent strategic communication, ontological codes imply disguised generalised indexicality in form of the asymmetry of the binary code. Hence, from a practical point of view, both are social practices of symbolisation. Only their purposes, and perspectives, are different. From the point of view of Jain philosophy, the estranged view of the everyday world, which is intentionally created by the transcendental Jain perspective, is a product of discriminating knowledge, not of deliberate deception. This does not mean that it is unambiguous. LUHMANN (1990) argues, in my view convincingly, that every binary distinction creates at the same time clarity on one level, and ambiguity on another, ad infinitum. Different types of ambiguity become visible in the light of different distinctions. For instance, for someone applying the dogmatically prescribed Jain philosophical standpoints (naya) (TS 1.34), and the corresponding procedures for disambiguating contextual meaning, plurivocality becomes problematic in the light of conventional univocality, etymology etc.

More research is required to delineate different types and functions of multivocality in Jain discourse. However, one aspect of the Jain analysis of ambiguity deserves to be mentioned at this point. According to Jain logic, linguistic ambiguity should not be confused with vague or incomplete description, which Jain naya philosophy contrasts with the epistemic ideal of definite description. The problem of definite description has recently been discussed by HARE (1981: 40–3) regarding the media-

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148 Cf. HEIDEGGER (1925) on the difference between ‘ontological’ and ‘ontic’ perspectives; and LUHMANN (1990) on the difference between ‘code’ and ‘semantics’.

149 Analytical philosophers such as DONOVAN (1976: 1) broadly define religious uses of language as ‘oblique’ and ‘evocative’ or ‘expressive’, in contrast to plain ‘informative’ language (DONOVAN (1976: 11)): ‘In very broad terms, what happens in religious interpreting can be described thus: the kinds of things in life found in one way or another to be religiously significant by those who practice religions are taken to have meanings over and above their scientific, historical or every-day meanings. These distinctively religious meanings they attempt to grasp and to communicate through the use of words, concepts, imagery, or stories drawn from the traditions of religious belief’ (DONOVAN (1976: 100)).

tion of general principle and specific situation, e.g. moral conflict. Hare advocates a variant of the two-level theory of ethics. He argues that an exhaustive description of a particular situation from the point of view of intuitive *prima facie* principles is impossible, because they must be very general and simple. To inform moral choices, *prima facie* principles need to be supplemented by exceptions, or by critical principles, which ‘can be of unlimited specificity.’ Both *prima facie* principles and critical principles are universal prescriptions. However, critical principles can only be universalised on condition of unlimited processes of specification by an infinite intelligence, that is, an omniscient being. Because a superhuman ‘ideal observer’ can only serve as a theoretical vanishing point for finite cognition, the need for *prima facie* principles and exceptions arises (HARE (1981: 44 ff.)).

HARE’s (1981: 58) characterisation of the cognitive preconditions of ‘the rigor of pure prescriptive universality’ enables us to recognise the similarities between the Jain ideal of definite description, as a standard against which incomplete or vague propositions can be measured, and Habermas’ ideal consensus of an infinite community of interpretation, against which both systematically distorted and latent strategic communication can be assessed. The subject-philosophical role of ‘omniscience’ and the universal pragmatic role of ‘infinite discourse’ are functionally equivalent. The comparison suggests also that the Jain ideal of omniscience is a logical consequence of Jain epistemology, and not a mere product of fanciful religious speculation.

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151 Cf. supra, the discussion of rule-specification. See the critical discussion by WELLMER (1986: 32–7), who argues that the problem of exceptions can only be solved in concrete situations on the basis of ‘reasons’, not through processes of unlimited norm specification of ‘principles’, in analogy to unlimited processes of specification of causal laws in the natural science. In human history, the idea of a complete description does not even make sense as a regulative idea. Therefore, this attempt to synthesise universal principles and specific situations cannot solve problems of practical ethics. WELLMER (1986: 31)) himself derives secondary moral norms by way of negation of non-universalisable maxims.

152 HARE (1981: 41): ‘Briefly, generality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is compatible with specificity, and means merely the logical property of being governed by a universal quantifier and not containing individual constants. The two principles “Never kill people” and “Never kill people except in self-defence or in cases of adultery or judicial execution” are both equally universal, but the first is more general (less specific) than the second.’

153 The term was introduced by Adam Smith.

154 HARE (1981: 40): ‘Critical thinking consists in making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else.’

155 Infinite discourse also presupposes infinite knowledge (Lafont, in HABERMAS (2004: 256)).

156 This observation applies mainly to the historically later concept of ‘absolute omniscience’ as opposed to ‘complete self-realisation’.
merely semantically underspecified\textsuperscript{157} cannot be rationally determined from a non-
onomniscient perspective. From a participant’s point of view, under given normative conditions, any utterance can be created or perceived as an intentionally plurivocal symbol, even if the implicit indexical meaning or normative command can be inferred unequivocally. Everything depends on the pragmatic context.

A peculiarity of the Jain theory of speech, derived from the Jain karman theory, is that utterances are seen as material substances which stick to the impure soul but not to a pure one. In fact, speech as a technique of social influence is not only an important subject for proselytising ascetics, trying to attract followers (systematic distorted and latent strategic action are identical in this case),\textsuperscript{158} but also an explicit topic of the Jain doctrine of karmic bondage, that is, the mechanism of binding (bandha) the soul of a listener, through the medium of his/her passion (kaśāya) and desire (rāga), via an influx (āsrava) of insight-generating pure matter (śuddha-pudgala) (cf. TS 5.22). It is not necessary to recall the details and history of this doctrine, because SCHUBRING’s (2000: 174, § 84) authoritative depiction of Jain cosmology implicitly operates with a theory of Jain rhetorical influence. Schubring shows, for instance, how processes of possession, which are considered to be the reverse of insight, are explained in certain texts in terms of the sending of inauspicious atoms (aśubha-pudgala) (SCHUBRING (2000: 151, § 69)); and how individuality (which increases with social standing) and thus, ideally, the degree to which karman is felt, generates the power of acting upon others, and to influence and bind people by imprinting (dhāraṇā) certain karmic perceptions onto their soul via the ejection of pudgala (SCHUBRING (2000: 181–7, § 87–91)):

\begin{quote}
‘This process [of speech] is, to put it briefly, the ejaculation (nisarai, nisṛjati) of substances (davva) taken in (genhāi) previously (now being ready either for use or in store). They consist of \(∞\) atoms (ananta-paesiya), occupy the space of \(\frac{1}{2}\) units, last for 1 sam. and own all qualities possible with reference to colour, smell, taste and sensation. Their reception is meant to bring about a close contact (puṭṭha, ogāḍha), i.e. with the units of the soul (ātma-pradesa, Prajn.), and to it both fine and coarse particles (anu and bāyara) are subjected, which is discussed circumstantially. The reception takes place either with or without interruption (antara) in that either reception or ejaculation, or both reception and ejaculation occur within 1 sam., and then, by the way (267a), they will belong to the same content of speech (true, false etc.) for which they were taken in. Their destiny depends on the inten-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{157} A question raised by GANERI (2001: 133 ff.), and answered in the negative

\textsuperscript{158} Cf. SUNAVALA (1922: 26).
sity of speech. As we learn from Prajn. on Pannav. 262b. and from Vy. on Vij. 621b, when speaking [in a] low [voice] the particles of speech leave the mouth in coarse portions (abhinna), but they do not reach far and will perish soon, whereas when speaking loud they are finely divided (bhinna), and in this case speech will increase infinitely and reach the boundaries of the world’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 149, § 68).

The strategic production of religious influence via karmic binding is of course not the primary concern of Jain karman theory, but certainly one of the possible consequences of the application of Jain categories to worldly problems. From the conventional point of view (VN), Jain scriptures describe speech as a potential weapon (duppauttamano-väyä <dusprayukta-mana-vacana>) (Thañ 10.93): ‘Speech, so Pannav. 255b says, originates in the soul, while it becomes manifest in the body in the shape of a thunderbolt … [and] exists only the moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 148 f., § 68).159 Yet, fundamentally (PN) it is described only as an external ornament of the soul without any intrinsic power, except the power of signification:

‘[1] Speech is different from the self (no äyä bhåså, annå bhåså). It is concrete (lit. fashioned, rûviô), devoid of consciousness (acitta) and inanimate (ajîva) though peculiar to living beings (jîvaññ bhåså, no ajîvaññ bh.); [2] Speech exists and is divided’ (bhijjai) neither before nor after but only during actual speaking. … ’ (Viy 621a = 13.7.1ab, summarised by DELEU (1970: 199 f.).160

If the hearer is aware of this s/he cannot be bound. Both interpretations derive from the dualistic doctrinal distinction between soul and body, and their asymmetrical hierarchical relationship.161

We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that, from the point of view of Jain doctrine, both linguistic conventions and intentional language are vyavahåra—worldly oriented—and ultimately of no religious value. Any pragmatic use of language, even for purposes of religious instruction, has only relative value, because the speaker is forced to orientate him/herself toward the external world, and to turn away from the ideal meditative focus on the potentialities of the soul. From this perspective, one can hardly speak of a Jain concept of ‘religious language’ at all. Jains never fully acknowledged the religious significance of mantra and other types of

160 Cf. Äyär 2.4.1.5. JACORI (1884: 150 n. 3) points out that the commentator uses categories of Vaiśeṣika philosophy to explain the meaning of this verse.
mystical utterances, which could be distinguish as ‘religious’ from ‘non-religious’ language. This applies even to Ardhamāgadhī, the liturgical language of the oldest scriptures. The only religious ‘languages’ which Jains clearly recognise are silence and meditative sounds, like Mahāvīra’s legendary divya-dhvani.162

Because Jain (and most Buddhist) philosophers recognise that language is rooted in convention and mainly used for everyday communication, and other practical purposes, discourse theoretical perspectives promise a useful new angle on the neglected question of the socially constitutive function of Jain discourse. Studies of the Jain philosophy of language to date focus almost exclusively on Jain semantics, in particular on the seven nayas and the sapta-bhāgī, that is, pre-defined (but in principle infinite) perspectives for the analysis of the semantics of words or sentences under different contextual conditions. However, Matilal (1981: 60 f.), Johnson (1995a: 253), and Ganeri (2001: 137), (2002: 275, 279 f.), following earlier 20th century authors, interpret the Jain naya-schemes as models of ‘discourse pluralism’, intended to integrate different perspectives in a syncretic and ultimately, that is, from the perspective of unlimited perspectives, ‘complete account’. The underlying theory of ‘intellectual ahiṃsā’ is doubted by Cort (2000: 341) with reference to (a) scriptural examples of the ‘history of Jain struggles with non-Jains’, and (b) criticism of the assumption that omniscience is ‘the sum total of all possible nayas’: ‘The Jains posit that there is an absolutely true perspective’ (Cort (2000: 332)). The argument could be strengthened by a slight modification. Mistaking the ‘partial truth’ of a one-sided (ekānta) statement for the ‘whole truth’ is not the only way of being wrong (durnaya) (Cort (2000: 331)) according to Jain philosophy. Jain perspectivism is only concerned with the relationship between partially and wholly true testimony (pramāṇa), not with entirely false testimony (apramāṇa), which is excluded at the outset.163 Hence, it is not admissible to say that, by definition, ALL statements contain an element of truth. Strictly speaking, Jain naya doctrines are not theories of discourse, since they are focused exclusively on semantics. Yet, the Jain scriptures and commentaries dealing with the practicalities of ascetic life contain a general theory of the pragmatics of language usage, based on Jain discourse ethics, and show how Jain principles applied to worldly problems generate unique analytical possibilities of perceiving and manipulating speech. In contrast to Jain semantics, which privileges the perspective of the listener, Jain pragmatics privileges the perspective of the speaker.

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162 On the systemic function of monastic silence and paradoxical language in general see Fuchs (1989: 37).

163 Cf. Balcerowicz (2003: 46). The negative truth value (f) in the sapta-bhāgī relates only to (underdetermined) existential predicates, not to statements that are doctrinally ‘false’, and exposed as such in the polemical Jain literature.
Although Jain ascetics use the vernacular of their local followers, and reject the Brāhmaṇical idea of the intrinsic sacredness of certain words (MDhŚ 4.256), they do maintain a clear distinction between religious and non-religious ways of using a given language, that is, the intrinsic structural (not metaphysical) features, intentions and functions of an expression. In accordance with their basic religious principles, they emphasise not the religious (dharmika) qualities of a language per se but of speaking (and writing) as a social practice, and of the importance of the underlying rules as well as the intention and function of speech. Already in the early canonical scriptures, Jain ascetics developed a normative doctrine of religious language usage, a discourse ethics supplemented by casuistic context-sensitive rules, which, as I will now show in greater detail, shares certain concerns and features with universal pragmatics.

Normative principles and rules of speech are constitutive for Jain discourse to the extent that they are used by speech communities, both to generate and to interpret speech. The way in which actual communication is informed by these principles is a matter of empirical investigation. Characteristically, Jain norms of speech are presented in the form of hierarchical levels of universality and corresponding competence of judgement and restraint of the speaker. Principles and rules of speech inform practice in varying degrees, according to their level of abstraction. For the following presentation, I distinguish four relevant dimensions of Jain doctrinal reflection on and prescription of ways of speaking:

1. Principles and criteria for religious speech (ahiṁsā and satya);
2. General rules and clauses for language usage (bhāṣā-jāta);

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164 Balcerowicz (2003: 53) observes: ‘No utterance is simply either true or false. In order to ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, that supplies the contextual information that is lacking.’ Similarly, no utterance is simply religious or non-religious.

165 Interestingly, speaker’s intention is not included in the list of Jain philosophical standpoints.

166 The underlying method of specification is akin to Jain methods of progressive specification through fixed standpoints. See Ganeri (2001: 133) for an analysis of the Jain view that linguistic expressions are contextually ‘underspecified’ and contain ‘a hidden indexical element’ which Jain dialecticians seek to systematically expose through the methods of syād-vāda, using actual values or quantifiers such as syāt (Ganeri (2001: 139)). For another example of the ways in which Jain logicians contextualise utterances through a method of ‘progressive indexication’ of formalised conditionally valid viewpoints (naya) or ‘context indicators’ which gradually specify the relevant context in a controlled way see Balcerowicz (2003: 44 ff.). In contrast to the analysis of implications offered by universal pragmatics, Jain scholastic hermeneutics is based on dogmatically fixed viewpoints considered in form of a monological pluralism.
(3) Context-sensitive rules for proper ways of speaking;
(4) Examples (considering karmic and social implications) (dṛṣṭānta).

(Ad 1) The main criteria for identifying ‘religious’ language-usage are (a) non-violence (ahīṁsā), and (b) truth (satya), that is, the first two of the five great and small vows (mahā-vrata and aṇuvrata) of Jainism,167 which have to be accepted by anyone who wants to be formally recognised as a practising Jain.168 ‘Non-religious’ language is characterised by the opposite qualities—violence (hiṁsā) and non-truth or from the point of view of the agent (the two perspectives are not clearly differentiated): non-truthfulness (asatya).169

(Ad a) Ahīṁsā is the most important criterion for religious language usage. Jains, like Buddhists, regard speech as an active force and a potential weapon which, if misused, implies violence and negatively affects the karman of the one who handles it.170 However, they also emphasise the fundamental connection between pure speech and spiritual advancement, which the Buddhist Subhāsita-sutta171 seems to deny.172 In order to minimise violence, Jain ācāryas, like other South Asian legislators (cf. MDhŚ 4.138 f.), laid great emphasis on the rules concerning proper speech, which they systematised probably for the first time in Indian philosophy.173 ‘the Jains insist on the absolute necessity of refraining from directly or indirectly aggressive speech’ (CAILLAT (1984: 67)).

(Ad b) Truthfulness or truth (satya) is the one fundamental Jain principle that is directly related to language use. Its importance for the Jains is indicated by the fact that it is second only to the all-encompassing ahīṁsā-vrata, whereas it is given fourth place in the Buddhist dasa-sīla list. The Āyār II, one of the oldest texts of the Jain tradition, gives the following wording of the satya-vrata (in Jacobi’s translation):

‘I renounce all vices of lying speech (arising from anger or greed or fear or mirth). I shall neither myself speak lies, nor cause others to

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167 ‘All the prohibitions and injunctions included in the two relevant lessons of Āyār and Dasav can be shown to proceed from the above fundamental principles, observance of truth based on sañjāma, and observance of ahīṁsā’ (CAILLAT (1991: 10)).
168 Most laity treats the aṇuvratas only as regulative ideals.
170 CAILLAT (1984: 64).
171 On well spoken language: ‘O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhu speaks well-spoken (language), not ill-spoken; he speaks what is right (dhamma), not what is unrighteous (adhamma); he speaks what is pleasing, not what is unpleasing; he speaks what is true, not what is false. O Bhikkhus, the speech that is provided with these four requisites, is well-spoken, not ill-spoken, both faultless and blameless to the wise’ (SN 3.3).
speak lies, nor consent to the speaking of lies by others. I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice threefold way, in mind, speech, and body’ (Āyār 2.15.3.1–5).  

Noticeable in this statement is, firstly, that lying is ‘renounced’, i.e. the possibility is explicitly recognised, but deliberately excluded. Truth is not defined positively but negatively, through the exclusion of what it is not; which has been a popular approach in South Asian philosophy in general. Secondly, the vow refers to contexts of communication (speech acts such as consenting, causing others to do something). Thirdly, speaking the truth and lying are conceived as effects of the emotions which motivate the speaker’s intentions (as the clauses indicate). Truth is here not primarily perceived in terms of the representational function of language, as a propositional relationship between words and things, but in terms of the expressive and regulative functions of language. After all, the intention of Jain authors was not primarily to produce a sound semantic theory of truth, but a pragmatic method for the liberation of the soul. The expressive aspect of speech, or truthfulness, is related to the character of the speaker, that is, his/her ‘purity’ of insight and sincerity. ‘truth means the state of being true’ (TULŚI (1985: 84)). The ethical and social dimensions of language are addressed in Āyār 2.4 and DVS 7.11 (see infra p. 161 and 162) in terms of the dispositions of the speaker and the effects of language on speaker and hearer. Viy 25.1.4.a (854b) reflects on fifteen kinds of activity (joga) which are affected by the four modes of inner sense (maòa) and of speech (bhâsâ), which are seen as intrinsically connected. In all cases, pivotal importance is given to avoiding violence.

It is worth noting that both the Jain theory of speech and the theory of communicative action privilege pragmatic notions of truth. Habermas’ analysis of validity claims focuses on the interplay of the dimensions of propositional truth, sincerity of expression and intersubjective rightness. Separately, these aspects are also distinguished in Jain texts on ways of speaking. The multi-functional nature of utterances, the context-relativity of truth values cum truth acts, and the relationship between belief and meaning, etc., requires further investigation. In his analysis of intermodal transfer of validity between speech acts, HABERMAS (1981: 442 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f.), (1984: 105–12, 126)) demonstrates that performative and ethical or aesthetic statements also contain propositions, which can be questioned by interlocutors. Vows, for instance, are expressives which also carry a strong normative element; while most

174 Cf. DVS 4.12.
176 DELEU (1970: 267) points to the parallel in Paṇḍ 317a where joga is replaced by paoga.
177 See FAUConnIER (1981: 183) etc.
178 See DAVIDSON (1984: 153) etc.
commissives and declaratives cannot work without emphasising the expressive component. Declarations of sincerity, however, cannot be redeemed by argument but only through behavioural practice. This observation makes us aware that one of the functions of Jain ascetic practice is the public validation of sincerity, which is converted into generalised acceptability *qua* prestige and moral authority.

(Ad 2) The principles of *ahīṃsā* and *satya* are too abstract to be useful for judging actual behaviour. This is why Jains have added further, lower order rules of language usage, which supplement the general principles and facilitate translating them into practice (speaking and writing). Two of the ‘senior’ canonical Jain texts deal with language usage in greater detail—the chapter on modes (‘species’) of speech (*bhāṣā- jāya* < *bhāṣā-jāta*>)*181* in the Āyār 2.4.1–2 and later parallels in the canon,182 and the chapter on pure speech (*vakka-suddhi* < *vākya-suddhi*>) in the *Dasa-veyyāliya* (*Daśa-vaikālika, DVS 7*), which is probably derived from the Āyār, but offers further clarifying statements.183 In addition, there are several passages in the *Viṭāha-pannatti* (*Bhagavati, Viy*),184 and the more systematic but on the whole ‘strikingly ill-assorted’185 explanations of the modes of speech (language) in Chapter 11 of the *Pannavanā* (*Prajñāpanā, Paṇṭ*) which, according to tradition, was composed c. 79–37 BCE by an ascetic called Ārya Śyāma. The relevant passages of the *Pannavanā* and its principal commentary, *Ācārya Malayagiri’s* (c. 1131–1203) *Prajñāpanā-tīkā* (*PaṇṭṬ*), were summarised by *Schubring* (2000: 148 f., § 68; 157 f., § 74), MĀLVAṆIYĀ (1971: 321–26) and, in passing, by *Caillat* (1991: 10 ff.).186 The

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181 Sanskrit *chāyā* of Prakrit words is indicated by the symbols < >.

182 Uttar 24.22, Ṭhān 4.23 (238) [183b;464b].

183 *Schubring*’s (2000: 157 n. 2, § 74) opinion that the DVS version is derivative from the Āyār has been challenged by *Ghatage* (1938: 137), who tried to prove the reverse. *Okuda* (1975: 126) distinguishes between the Uttar (= Āyār which is not mentioned) and DVS variants. Cf. *Caillat* (1991: 2).

184 Viy 1.10 (103b), 10.3 (499b), 13.7 (621a).


186 In addition to these key texts there are many scattered *ślokas* concerning proper speech in the DVS 7–9. These texts are concerned with ‘humility’ and relate to the monastic environment, i.e. the *guru-sāṭya* relationship. Similar passages can be found in the Āyār and other texts which deal with problems of monastic discipline, e.g. Uttar 1. They do not concern speech as such but rather contextual factors, which I will discuss in the next section. *Dixit* (1975: 59) notes, that ‘the problem of employment of speech . . . is conspicuous by its absence in the old *Cheda-sūtras*, and that speaking is rarely mentioned in the later literature (but see *Flügel* 1994: 110–115). There is, however, an extensive *śrāvakācāra* literature, which specifies some of the old monastic rules of the Āyār and the DVS for the Jain laity. See *Williams* (1983: 71–8). I will refer to this literature
categories of speech of the Āyāraṁga (Āyār), and one of the lists of sub-categories of the Pannavānā appear also in Mālācāra (MĀc) 5.110–120 of the Digambara author Vaṭṭakera. This text is generally dated 1st–3rd century CE (OKUDA (1975: 12 f.)), and must have been composed after the Pannavānā.

The situations which are depicted in these texts as problematic invariably show individual ascetics interacting with the wider social environment, coinciding with our paradigmatic speech situation type c. They are distinctly different from situations of monastic politeness (vinaya), formal sermons (pravacana), or public debates (prayoga), which will be briefly discussed later.

The presentation of the bhāśā-rules in the Āyār is hierarchically structured in accordance with Jain principles and ethos. It begins with the satya-mahā-vrata, explaining its various modes: referential truth, grammaticality, clarity of expression, the avoidance of doubt, and of false promises etc. Then, various modalities of the ahiṁsā-mahā-vrata are described, such as the avoidance of harsh words, politeness, and indirect affirmation of violent deeds of others. In addition to the vow of satya, five general clauses are given to the neophyte. They explain how to avoid false speech. That is, to speak with deliberation, and not in anger, fear, or mirth, because these states of mind might move one to ‘utter a falsehood’ (Āyār 2.15.3.1–5). Two further maxims are important for the ascetics: the observance of the bhāśā-samitis, the circumspection regarding all speech acts, and of the bhāśā-guptis, the controls of the four types of speech, which are laid down in the Uttarajjhayaṇa (Uttarādhyayana, Uttar) 24. Like ahiṁsā and satya, they are intended to direct the attention away from violent speech, from the expression of desire, and ultimately away from speech at all. These maxims and rules are not linguistic in any technical sense, and not conventional or customary in a folkloristic sense. They rather resemble the Gricean postulates, and hence, I would argue, function within Jain philosophy in a manner similar to operationalisations of HABERMAS’ (1980: 400) formal pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action. That is, as principles, or general interpretive procedures,

only in footnotes. Because I am interested in the pragmatic aspect of speech, I will not discuss the technicalities of the analytical-pedagogical nikṣepa (transferring epithet) method and similar purely exegetical devices of the Jains, which are used to delineate the true (intended) contextual sense of an utterance through elimination of unwanted multivocality. It is important to note that ‘clear literal meaning’ is an explicit aim in (VN) Jainism.

Ahiṁsā is here not taken as a general principle, but only related to language. One could distinguish these two meanings as ahiṁsā I and ahiṁsā II. Satya takes precedence over ahiṁsā in this context, because it is necessary to spell out rules of truthful speech first if one wants to discuss ways of avoiding their violation. Cf. footnote 305.

which theorise the normative conditions of the acceptability of statements, and hence of the ability of language to avoid violence and to enable, or generate, both non-violence and social co-operation (which is therefore seen as problematic).

In the following, I will analyse and compare these Jain modes of speech, both with Habermas’ validity claims of truth, truthfulness and rightness, which correspond to constative, representative, and regulative aspects of speech acts (which are differently weighted in different contexts), and with the Gricean postulates, which from the perspective of Habermas’ model further specify empirical pragmatic conditions of validity claims. The discussion of some of the implications of the major bhāṣā-rules follows, for purely formal reasons, the sequential order of Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims, though a mode of presentation oriented towards Jain principles could have equally been chosen.

GRICE (1975: 45 f.) defines the ‘cooperative principle’ (CP), and the four main ‘conversational maxims’, which he labelled in analogy to the pure categories of understanding (reine Verstandesbegriffe) in KANT’s (1974: 118 f.) transcendental logic, as follows:

CP: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’

Quantity: ‘Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purpose of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.’

Quality: ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.’

Relation: ‘Be relevant.’


Although the Gricean postulates are widely accepted as a theory of general principles of human communication, it is clear that partners in a conversation have to resort to more than just the rules of their language and the cooperative principle. For instance, to (1) conventional meaning of words and context, (2) background meaning, such as common cultural assumptions etc. That is, dimensions such as those listed as the seven Jain nayas. What counts as an appropriate, informative, true (plausible), relevant, and unequivocal expression cannot be judged in abstract, but only by the participants in a specific discourse. But it is the task of the analyst to elicit both the unspoken conditions of communicative success and the social conditions of fulfilment of speech acts in concrete situations. Here, I only indicate simi-
larities and differences between the Gricean conversational postulates and analogous categories of the Jain analysis of speech and discourse ethics, and attempt to elicit the implications for a comparison with the theory of communicative action.  

**Cooperative principle—non-violence (ahiṁsā)**

Grice regards the cooperative principle as fundamental for any conversation. His notion of ‘appropriateness’ corresponds to Habermas’ more general notion of ‘communicative intent’, which presupposes a commitment to the universal validity claims of propositional truth, expressive truthfulness and normative rightness, in addition to the basic condition of linguistic comprehensibility. Despite their differences, both notions are grounded in Kantian moral philosophy, rather than in utilitarian principles.  

Interestingly, in the two key Jain texts mentioned, no equivalent to the cooperative principle per se can be found, nor, of course, is there any mention of a specific consensus orientation. This is in accordance with the individual- or jīva-centred attitude that is recommended from the ‘ultimate point of view’ (PN).

However, a passage in Kundakunda’s *Samaya-sāra*, whose importance has been emphasised by CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54), clearly states the necessity to observe the ‘accepted purpose of the talk exchange’ (here: religious instruction), as maintained by Grice’s principle. The purpose of this statement is to explain, why the teaching of (ultimately incommunicable) Jain doctrines forces ascetics to give up their ideal meditative silence temporarily to use worldly pragmatic language (VN) in agreement with conventional standards of comprehensibility and rightness:  

‘Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to understand anything except through the medium of his non-Aryan language, so the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary people except through the vyavahāra point of view’ (SSā 1.8)."
The true insights of Jain teaching, it is stated here, cannot be understood by pupils and the wider public if ascetics do not orientate themselves towards the capacities and expectations of their audience and take a co-operative attitude. This is a Jain version of the theory of ‘skilful means’ (upâya). The commentator Amâtacandra explicitly states that ascetics should direct their utterances towards the pragmatic ‘purpose of the discussion’:

‘The ultimate reality must be subjected to an intellectual analysis and the constituent elements so obtained must be selected and emphasised according to the interest of the student and also consistent with the purpose of the discussion. The variations in the context and the intellectual aim will naturally determine the nature of the descriptions adopted with reference to the reality studied. The method of selective description to suit the purpose of the context is the method adopted by the ordinary man … Since the method is determined by a purpose of practical interest, the investigation will be relevant only to that purpose and the conclusion obtained must therefore be partial … ’ (Commentary on SSŚ 1.8; p. 18 of Chakravarti’s rendition).

Supporting the spiritual quest of others is one of the duties of the (thera-kalpa) ascetic (DVS1 9.4.5). Yet, ultimately, social co-operation is not seen as a religious value in itself, but as a hindrance for the process of self-purification. Teaching religion to others is merely a ‘method determined by a purpose of practical interest’, but not directly oriented towards salvation itself, and therefore akin to the attitude ‘adopted by the ordinary man who is engaged in his pursuit in life’ (SSŚ 1.8, Commentary p.18).

The doctrine of the ultimately (PN) non-religious character of teaching religious knowledge is, I think, the prime reason for the conspicuous absence of any mention of a functional equivalent of the cooperative principle itself in the Āyār. From the ‘practical point of view’ (VN) co-operative intent is acceptable, and even assumes a religious function, if the objective of the conversation is the furtherance of non-violence. In fact, the only difference between worldly co-operation (laukika-upakāra) and religious instruction or supra-mundane co-operation (lokôttara-upakāra) is the purpose of co-operation itself; that is, either the pursuit of worldly aims, or of the purification of the soul. The same holds true for the difference between ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ rhetoric, as we will see later. One should, therefore, expect mentioning of the cooperative principle in the AS’s discussion of pragmatic language.

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192 For Buddhist notions see for instance PYE (1978).
193 See the discussion of the ‘maxim of relation’ below.
194 TULSI (1985: 174 f.).
usage as well. In order to explain its absence, I suggest an additional argument, derived from the observation that violence is the main threat to co-operation, and, conversely, that non-violence is its fundamental pre-condition. Thus, we find that the value of *ahiṁśā*, which ultimately promotes total non-action (*ayoga*) in the world, also reflects, on a secondary level, the potential of total (hierarchical and non-violent) co-operation, in the sense of opening spaces, refuges, for existence (*Seinlassen*). Accordingly, many Jain texts emphasise that the implication of *ahiṁśā*, non-violence, is *dayā*, compassion. The *ahiṁśā-mahā-vrata*, therefore, implies the sought-after cooperative principle, although it does not say so explicitly. Indeed, from a Jain point of view, it could be argued, with good reason, that the positive notion of communicative intent is merely an application of the more general negative moral principle of non-violence within the sphere of social life. This begs the question: How universal are the cooperative principle and the formal pragmatic validity claims? Does communicative intent presuppose a more fundamental commitment to an ethics of (physical) non-violence? The cooperative principle, albeit apparently only concerned with straightforward information transmission from speaker to hearer, implies normative conditions such as physical non-violence (and of non-silence) to ensure ongoing linguistic co-operation. But it remains indifferent to the distinction between violent and non-violent aspects of overt speech (and of thought) itself. Communicative action considers form and content of speech also only under formal aspects, that is, acceptability, which may include violent communications. The Jain principle of *ahiṁśā*, by contrast, implies not only formal but also qualitative conditions for the perpetuation of co-operation.

Numerous examples of rules concerning violent speech in the Āyār and DVS implicitly refer to non-violence as a condition for co-operation and as form of co-operation, as in the following *sloka*:

‘Revered is he who speaks not ill in one’s absence, who uses not a sharp tongue in one’s presence, who speaks not with assertion, nor uses words that are harsh’ (DVS2 9.3.8–9).

It is not apparent from this statement why these attitudes should be revered, apart from general considerations of the detrimental effects of violence on the karmic

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195 Christian theologians attacked the self-limitation of universal pragmatics to formal conditions of social communication from similar vantage points. Peukert (1984), (1992), for instance, argues for the priority of the ‘resource’ of ‘universal solidarity’ in the lifeworld over communicative ethics. The objective idealist Hösle (1997: 248 ff.) complains about the moral indeterminacy of formal consensus (reasonable/unreasonable) and calls for a defence of ethics based on substantial values; as do other ‘Neo-Aristotelians’ discussed by Habermas (1983), (1991), who accepts this point and modifies his position in Habermas (2004).
constitution on the speaker. But it is clear by implication that one who avoids ‘sharp
tongue’ etc., is revered also because, otherwise, the continuation of co-operation is
threatened and might be terminated. This and many similar statements implicitly
stress the value of completely avoiding ‘face-threatening acts’, although not saying
so openly. They are presented in the form of negations of non-universalisable
maxims.\(^{196}\) The closest one can get to an explicit, positive postulate of a ‘co-
operative principle’ are statements concerning the ascetic values of offering fear-
lessness (abhiyāna-āhāra) and supra-mundane co-operation (pāramārthikōpakāra) for
the upliftment of the soul, which are seen as the greatest gift to society, in fact, consti-
tuting its fundamental condition.

Paradoxically, however, the methods of liberation taught by Jain ascetics do not
emphasise co-operation but its direct opposite: separation and non-interaction with
the world. This paradox is the main obstacle for an understanding of the social im-
lications of the principle of ahinśā. SEYFORT RUEGG (1985) addressed this prob-
lem in Gricean terms in an interpretation of the Ābhiprāyika- and Neyārtha-sūtras of
Tibetan Buddhism. He argues that the Buddha’s way of teaching non-cooperation
amounts to an act of ‘flouting’ not only of the conversational maxims, but of the co-
operative principle itself. But because the Buddha’s acts of ‘flouting’ are not in-
tended for the achievement of worldly gains, but for the spiritual liberation of oth-
ers, SEYFORT RUEGG introduces the terms ‘salvific principle’ and ‘salvific violence’
as religious supplements to the pragmatic Gricean ‘cooperative principle’:

‘In fact Grice’s Cooperative Principle yields in such Sūtras to what we
might call a Salvific Principle put to use in a perlocutionary manner.
Still, in conformity even with this Salvific Principle of the Buddha,
‘flouting’—or more specifically upāya-governed salvific exploita-
tion—of the Conversational Maxims are to be found in Ābhiprāyika
and Neyārtha Sūtras, just as they have been recognized in Grice’s sec-
ond type of conversational implicature involving exploitation of con-
versational maxims’ (SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 317)).

SEYFORT RUEGG’s remarks are useful for understanding salvific violence, which
‘conquers violence’. At the same time, his analysis is problematic, because he does
not clearly distinguish between linguistic co-operation and social co-operation. Even
the Buddha (or Mahāvīra) was of course forced to observe the cooperative principle
during his sermons, like everyone else who wishes to communicate (SEYFORT
RUEGG (1985: 315)), even if esoteric Buddhist (and Digambara Jain) schools deny
this. From a pragmatic point of view, the ‘salvific principle’ of insight creation

\(^{196}\) Cf. WELLMER (1986: 24 f.).
through acts of symbolic violence appears merely as a culturally specific norm, a systematic distortion of communication which, indeed, as Seyfort Ruegg (1985: 318) argues, cannot be inferred from the surface meaning of a communication, only elicited via a systematic hermeneutics of the doctrinal system as a whole. Yet, from an emic point of view, the non-motivated ‘intentional ground’ of socially ‘purposeful’ communication, cannot be simply identified with the codified doctrinal system of Buddhism, as Seyfort Ruegg (1985: 314 f.) suggests, because it refers to the existential conditions of meaning per se which can be explored only through direct meditative experience. From an etic point of view, the Buddhist intention to put an end to intention as a value, compared for instance with the phenomenological theory of the constitutive role of the structure of intentionality of consciousness or Dasein, is one ideology amongst others, and must be communicated in a conventional way.¹⁹⁷

The conundrum of ideal non-cooperation becomes clearer, if we consider not only discourse but also religious practice. The practice of renunciation, which Buddhist and Jain doctrines aim to stimulate, is a religiously sanctioned act of social separation and selective non-cooperation, which does involve what might be termed ‘sacred violence’, in opposition to ‘physical violence’ and ‘symbolic violence’ (flouting) in the two forms of latent strategic action and systematically distorted communication (‘salvific violence’). Within a hierarchical system, renunciation is a paradoxical act of status encompassment which creates at the same time new asymmetrical social relationships (renouncer/renounced, guru/devotees) and symmetrical social relationships (between devotees). In this way, acts of social separation and religious self-limitation are socially constitutive and culturally regenerative. Renunciation does not necessarily violate the conversational ‘cooperative principle’. But, as a one-sided act of transcendence and symbolic incorporation of already established links of social co-operation, it contributes to the legitimation of stratified systems of functional differentiation and moral divisions of labour. Following Dumont (1980: 197) and Seyfort Ruegg (1985), I therefore propose to distinguish between the ‘salvific’ violence of (Jain) religious rhetoric and the ‘sacred violence’ of the quasi-sacrificial act of renunciation itself.¹⁹⁸ Effectively, Jain renouncers do not live outside society, but ‘unbound … amongst the bound’ (Âyâr 2.16.7). After renunciation, linguistic co-operation is strictly regulated, but continues. Worldly social co-operation, however, is severed more radically, although only unilaterally, while the scope of social co-operation in religious contexts is actually widened.¹⁹⁹ Sacred violence differentiates the levels of institutional non-violence and violence, while conditioning the patterns of selective co-operation. The necessary violence

¹⁹⁸ On ‘sacred violence’, see for instance Girard (1977) and his critics.
¹⁹⁹ Flügel (2006a: 333 f.).
(ārambhajā hiṃśā) of the social world is always presupposed by Jain ascetics, in form of Brāhmaṇic household rites, the state and the socio-economic institutions and activities of their followers, which grant them one-sided material support:

‘The lay estate … cannot exist without activity and there can be no activity without the taking of life; in its grosser form this is to be avoided sedulously but the implicit part of it is hard to avoid’ (Āśādhara’s 13th CE Sāgara-dhārmāmyta 4.12 summarised by Williams (1983: 121)).

Institutionalised ahīṃśā, therefore, does not only imply dayā, but also hiṃśā, within a structure of moral division of labour. That is, conceptually as well as practically, it necessarily implies—even presupposes—its own opposite.

In all these cases, from the practical point of view (VN), the principle of co-operation is implicitly presupposed, if not constituted, by unconditional acts of one-sided renunciation, although only the avoidance of violence is expressed. From the transcendental point of view (PN), however, ahīṃśā requires total non-cooperation with the world. Both possibilities of action, co-operation and non-cooperation, are open only to an individual which, by positing renunciation as the norm, is able to ‘offer cooperation’, or withdraw it, selectively. It is mainly because the interdependence (and potential conflict) between the renouncer and the world cannot be stated openly in systems of hierarchical co-operation, that the Jain principle of ahīṃśā fulfils the functions both of the linguistic cooperative principle and of the constitutive principle of social co-operation only implicitly: without saying so. In fact, most Jain norms for well spoken language do not advocate positive values, but the avoidance of their violation. Negative principles such as these are of a different kind than positive prescriptions à la Grice, who demands ‘do cooperate’, whereas the Jains implicitly say, ‘do not not cooperate’. Thus, co-operation is implied in ahīṃśā, but in a modalised form.

The method of universalisation of specific moral norms and maxims qua double negation has been defended by Wellmer (1986: 21–37), against Habermas (1991: 167 f., 172 f.) objection that consequentialist concepts of universal morality, predicated on norms of prohibition qua single or double negation, are inspired by the restricted ‘liberal’ aim of creating spaces of negatively defined individual freedom, contrasted with positive maxims, which are oriented towards publicly negotiated common interest. According to Habermas, the individualist conception of morality is based on a

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201 Dumont (1980: 44, 60).
202 Wellmer (1986: 21 f.) argues that because obligatory norms of specific content cannot be derived from the categorical imperative of Kant, secondary moral norms are necessary which can only be derived by way of negation of non-universalisable maxims. See also the work of Singer (1961) and Hare (1981), critically discussed by Wellmer.
negative reading of the monologically applied categorical imperative. In contrast to positive duties, negative duties (and positive permissions) derive their plausibility from the qualities of apodictic prohibition: (a) unconditional validity, (b) determinateness of content, and (c) unequivocal specification of addressees. From the perspective of the potential victim, to every negative duty corresponds a right; for example, to the duty not to kill, the right to body and life. Yet, a principle of morality which permits only the legitimation of general norms of prohibition cannot serve as an unequivocal basis for the constitution of a positive common will. WELLMER (1986: 31 f.) and HABERMAS (1991: 170 f.) agree that neither positive nor negative duties can claim absolute validity, because every situation is different, and requires the invocation of different norms. In discourses of norm application, as opposed to norm legitimation, both negative and positive rights and duties can act as reasons for appropriate action, though positive norms tend to be more unspecific. Yet, in concrete situations, moral norms themselves cannot be legitimated privately, only from the perspective of ‘common interest’, determining what is equally good ‘for all’. While positive norms are burdened with discourses concerning concrete aims (problem of prognostics, performance, attribution of outcomes and unintended consequences, expectation and moral division of labour, evaluation of a result in terms of quantifiable aims), negative norms seem to remain aloof of problems of application, which cannot be avoided altogether though. Negatively defined principles can only protect the integrity and subjective freedom of the potential victim and, by implication, the freedom of the individual moral person itself. This may be the general principle underlying the Jain practice of deliberate renunciation of all violent action.

The absence of positive principles in Jain ethics has frequently been criticised. In HABERMAS (1991: 166 f.) view, positive duties cannot be based on negative duties, but only on the principle of mutual recognition informing communicative action. In

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204 See the ‘ten commandments’ of GERT’s (1973) ‘minimal ethic’, and C. FREED (1978: 29) cited by HABERMAS (1991: 172): ‘What we may not do to each other, the things which are wrong, are precisely those forms of personal interaction which deny to our victim the status of a freely choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious person—the special status of moral personality.’

205 According to HEGEL (1981: 148 ff.) voluntary death is the absolute proof of freedom in the struggle for recognition. Liberation, both in a social and a religious sense, is also the positive implication of the Jain practice of sallekhanâ, the culmination of the process of implementing the negatively formulated rule of non-violence. HABERMAS (1991: 173 f.), similarly, notes the fundamental nature of ‘self-referential’ norms which implicitly define the duty of fulfilling the pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action, i.e. the positive norms of preserving the physical integrity of the body and life and personal freedom which seems sometimes more important than death.
his conception of morality, private morality and public justice differ not in principle, only in terms of the types of institutionally mediated interaction. The positive normative equivalent of the apodictic prohibition of speaking the untruth (“you should not lie”) from the communication theoretical perspective is phrased in the following way:

‘Act with an orientation to mutual understanding and allow everyone the communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims’


Interestingly, this is not a maxim of truthfulness, but a reformulation of the cooperative principle. Being truthful, does not only imply the renunciation of deception, but is a positive act which contributes to the constitution of a social relationship.

There is another, practical, reason for the negative formulation of the cooperative principle. A negative statement forces the ‘user’ or interpreter of such a principle to work out the implied positive contextual presuppositions. This process involves the personal experiences of the individual concerned, in such a way that the positive ‘implied’ meanings and/or functions of the formal principle appear to be generated from the inner pool of values and expectations of the individual itself, and not as an externally imposed rule. The realm of ‘sociability’ or of ‘the social’ itself is theorised as an aspect of personal character, and not as an independently existing dimension of intersubjectivity (as in modern law, moral philosophy and sociology). From the perspective of Jain ethics, positive rules are generally regarded as lower order specifications of negative rules, whose conditions of application are implicitly presupposed. Negative rules secure a higher degree of formality and universality than positive rules, and hence greater contextual adaptability. These are some of the reasons why positive principles are seldom expressed explicitly in the âgamas, but left to the interpretative imagination of their users, who have to work out their conditions of fulfilment. However, if ahimsâ is the functional equivalent of the cooperation principle, likewise do the modalities of the satya-mahâ-vrata correspond to the conversational maxims, to which I will turn now.

**Quantity—restraint (sañjama)**

There is no equivalent Habermasian validity claim for Grice’s quantity-maxim, although it could be easily constructed. Functional equivalents of the maxim among the Jain rules of speaking are the principles of deliberation, moderation, and restraint (sañjama <> sañjama>). Even if something is true, but is not to be said

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207 Closest to Grice’s formulation of this principle is Āyār 2.4.1.6–7 (examples: Āyār 2.4.8–11, cf. DVS 7.11, Āyār 2.4.2.19).
(avattavva <avaktavya>), because it may create harm, or if it cannot be understood, one should not say it. The purpose of the latter maxim is to avoid unintentional ambiguity due to ignorance of the listeners (cf. SSā 1.8). The information processing aspect is expressed in Jain texts in general terms, such as ‘speaking with precision’ or ‘straightforward’ (rju). Often prescriptions are mixed with moral considerations, thus overlapping with the manner aspect, as the following example demonstrates:

‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, considering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint’ (Āyār 2.4.2.19).

There is no mention here of the recipient of an utterance, nor of the ‘information’ to be communicated. The reasons are similar as in the case of the ‘cooperative principle’ ahiṃsā. Restrained speech is regarded in Jainism primarily (PN) as an exercise in self-purification, to be measured in terms of the strength of the commitment to Jain values, and the degree of Jain interactional competence. Only indirectly (VN) is restrained speech regarded as a vehicle for the univocal transmission of information. This, again, derives from the fact that the realm of the ‘social’ is only presupposed as a background for the individual ‘path of purification’.210

The problem of ambiguity resulting from the fact that, from the perspective of PN, VN might be taken as a ‘mixture of truth and untruth’ is important. Interestingly, it is discussed in the Āyār and DVS itself in the context of half-true speech, or satyā-myṣā bhāṣā (see infra pp. 162–169):

208 Cf. CAILLAT (1975: 80). See VANDERVEKEN’S (1993: 378) generalisation of this maxim in terms of the ‘strength’ of illocutionary acts, ‘in the sense that they have more conditions of success, of non-defective performance … ’. For similar Jain formulations see BALBIR (1993: 71). From the hearer’s point of view (which is not mentioned in the Āyār sections on speech), the most important quality is the ability to ‘conquer one’s senses’ and not to become restless through the ‘lashes of words reaching the ears’ (DVS 9.3.8).

209 CARRITHERS (1990: 157–9) singles saôvara out, as the singular ‘aesthetic standard’ ‘underlying both the rules and the morality’ of Jainism. This concept of aesthetics (which is linked, in a footnote, with the concept of habitus) does not account for the normative religious aspects of saôvara. The same applies to LAIDLAW (1995: 159).

210 BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 218 ff.) suggest corresponding off-record strategies to Grice’s quantity-maxim: understatement, overstatement, and tautologisation. STRECKER (1988: 194) sees silence as an extreme-form of the off-record strategy of understatement and thus as a violation of the quantity maxim. From the ‘practical point of view’ this may be correct. For Jains, silence is the prime vehicle of exercising restraint, as indicated by the bhāṣā-gupti, and counts as a form of penance. For instance, an ascetic who fasts for one month ‘may express himself by four ways only: by begging for alms, by putting a question, by making a request for lodging and by giving an answer’ (Thañ 183b, in SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).
‘Speaks not the wise something which is not known, or which generates confusion—whether this or that sense is right’ (DVS 2.7.4).

Ideally, a mendicant should remain silent. Otherwise, straightforward speech should be used. All language that could be both truth and false should be avoided:

‘In speaking (a monk) should use as few words as possible; he should not delight in another’s foibles; he should avoid deceiving speech, and should answer after ripe reflection.—One will repent of having used the third kind of speech (which is both true and untrue—P.F.); a secret should not be made known. This is the Nirgrantha’s command.—[A monk] should not call one names, nor “friend”, nor by his Gotra; “thou, thou” is vulgar; never address one by “thou”’ (Suy 1.9.25–27).

Quality—truth (satya)

The equivalent of Grice’s quality-maxim is satya, or truth. Vanderveken (1993: 377) has shown that the maxim of quality can be generalised to cover commissives and directives, as well as assertives. A maxim of truth is positively expressed in the satya-mahā-vrata, which Jain ascetics recite twice a day during their obligatory pratikramana ritual (see supra).211 However, in accordance with the preferred Jain method of negative determination, the general principle of truth is treated in this context only in terms of its characteristic violations (aticāra), that is, as the opposite of non-truth (asatya). The precise implications of the maxim of truth for language usage are specified elsewhere in form of a distinction of four types or ‘species’ of speech (bhāsā-jāya <bhāšā-jāta>), which are at the centre of the Jain theory of discourse, which looks at speech primarily as an object, and not from the perspective of the speaker. These analytical categories should be known and utilised by mendicants (ideally by all Jains) to prevent both the preparation and performance of violence (ārambhā):

‘A mendicant should know that there are four kinds of speech: The first is truth; the second is untruth; the third is truth mixed with untruth; what is neither truth, nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is the fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth’ (Āyār 2.4.1.4).212

211 Williams (1983: 73) quotes Somadeva’s (959 CE) ‘casuistic analysis’ of the satya agurata for the laity with the help of this tetrad as an original statement, although it is clearly only a restatement of Āyār 2.4.1.4.

212 Āyār 2.4.1.4: aha bhikkhā jāṇejjā cattāri bhāsā-jāyānī, taṁ jahā—saccam egaṁ padhamaṁ bhāsa-jāyāṁ, bīyaṁ mosāṁ, tayāyaṁ saccā-mosāṁ, jaṁ n’eva saccān n’eva mosāṁ n’eva saccā-mosāṁ—asaṭcā-mosāṁ pāṁ tathā cattāhaṁ bhāsa-jāyāṁ. Caillat (1991: 8 n.4) located the following parallels to the above sūtra in the Śvetāmbara canon: Uttar 24.20–23, Śaṅk 4.23 (238), Vīy
Notably, the same scheme of four modes is applied to speech and to cognition (mana <manas>) or knowledge (nāṇa <jñāna>) (Viy 622b/8.7.1b, 874b/15.1.4). Hence, the four bhāsā-guttis <bhāsā-guptis>, or controls of speech, and the four mana-guttis <mano-guptis>, or controls of the inner sense, are both characterised by the same terms in Uttar 24.19–23. The four modes, thus, represent general attitudes towards truth, both in mind and in speech:

1. saccā <satyā> truth
2. mosā <mṛṣā> untruth
3. saaccā-mosā <satyā-mṛṣā> truth mixed with untruth
4. asaccā-mosā <asatyā-mṛṣā> neither truth nor untruth

The formal structure of the four alternatives (tetra-lemma) is known as catus-koṭi in Buddhist literature, but used differently here. As the frequent use of the four

13.7.1a (621a-b), Pannavaññā 11 (860–866). See also Viy 16.2.2b (701a), 18.7.1 (749a), 19.8 (770b), Samavāya 13.1, and DVS 7.1–3. Öhira (1994: 14, 155) is of the opinion that the four modes were first taught at the time of DVS 7, which she dates between 5th–4th century BCE. 213 As the frequent use of the four

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213 There is an extensive academic literature on the catus-koṭi in Buddhist philosophy. See for instance Schayer (1933), Rau (1954), Murti (1955), Bham (1957), Robinson (1957), Staal (1962), Smart (1964), Jayatilleke (1967), Chi (1974), Seyfort Ruegg (1977), Wayman (1977), Jones (1978), Gunaratne (1980), (1986), Bharadwaja (1984), Schroeder (2000), and others. Staal (1962: 52 n. 4) suggests the earliest passage to be Majjhima-nikāya 63. Nāgārjuna’s (2nd CE) positive formulation of the ‘tetralemma’ (Robinson (1957: 303)) in his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā 18.6 attracted most academic interest (even more so the negated forms): ‘Everything is either true or not true, or both true or not true, or neither true or not true; that is the Buddha’s teaching’ (Translated by Robinson (1957: 302), cf. MMK 18.8). In contrast to the debate on the use of the catus-koṭi in ‘Buddhist logic’, focusing largely on the ‘negative dialectic’ of Nāgārjuna, the cited Jain cases indicate that the catus-koṭi was used (at least by Jains) as a quasi-systematic scholastic frame for the discussion of logical alternatives, without specific doctrinal implications being connected with the frame itself. Murti (1955: 129) noted early on: ‘Four alternative views are possible on any subject’ (referring to Madhyamaka and Jainism: he also cites Haribhadra) (see also Chitt (1974: 298)). Notably, the four alternatives in Āyār 2.4.1.4 etc., are disjunctive, not additive, as stereotypical representations of ‘Jaina Logic’ generally assume. Because Jain usage of catus-koṭis was ignored, and because of the almost exclusive focus on Nāgārjuna, Buddhist scholars compared the ‘four-cornered negation’ only with the ‘Jain relativism’ in general. They derived the catus-koṭi either speculatively from Jain syād-vāda (Gunaratne (1980: 232)) or vice versa (Bham (1957: 128)), or (and) contrasted it with ‘the relativistic logic proposed by the Jains, to which Buddhism was opposed’ (Jayatilleke (1967: 82)). According to Rau (1954), the mythical Sanjaya framed the four alternatives already in the 7th century BCE, negating all of them, whereas ‘Jaina logicians saw a relative truth in each pole and thus adopted a more positive and determinate attitude toward our cognitions of the world.’ For recent, less logocentric, views on Nāgārjuna, focusing on ‘skillful means’, see for instance Jones (1978), Schroeder (2000). A similar four-valued theory of truth was defended by the Megarians (Priest–Routley (1989: 13)), which demonstrates that no specific philosophical position is associated with the form itself, only with its uses.
alternatives (*catur-bhaṅga or catur-bhaṅgī*) as a classificatory scheme in Þāṇ IV, for instance, indicates, the *catus-koṭī* is used in Jain scholasticism in a similar way as the *nikṣepa* pattern, described by BRUHN–HÄRTEL (1978: v) as a formal ‘dialectical technique (often employed in a “pseudo-exegetical function”).

JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2) understood the first three modes to refer to assertions and the fourth to injunctions. According to Paṅ 860 (255b), the first two modes are distinct (*pajjattiya <paryāptā>*) ways of speaking, which can be analysed in terms of the true/false distinction, and the third and fourth are indistinct (*apajjattiya <aparyāptā]*) ways of speaking, whose validity or non-validity is indeterminable. The sub-categories of distinct speech are true speech (*satyā bhāṣā*) and false speech (*måśā bhāṣā*), and the sub-categories of indistinct speech are true-as-well-as-false speech (*satyā-måśā bhāṣā*) and neither-true-nor-false speech (*asatyā-måśā bhāṣā*). A *muni* should use only the first and the last mode of speech, and avoid the remaining two ‘by all means’ (DVS2 7.1) in order to minimise harm:

‘A monk or a nun, considering well, should use true and accurate speech, or speech which is neither truth nor untruth (i.e. injunctions); for such speech is not sinful, blameable, rough, stinging, &c.’ (Āyār 2.4.1.7).

214 See DUNDAS (2007: 50 f.) on the analogy between four types of armies and four types of ascetics in Þāṇ 292 (4.280–1). ALSDORF (1966: 186 f., cf. 190 f.) discussed a different type of *catur-bhaṅgas* in Jaina literature, made up of combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities. He pointed out that the use of the ‘fourfold combination’ is ‘very typical of the scholastic who never misses an opportunity to make a “caturbhanga”, i.e. the four possible combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities…’ (p. 186).

215 Þāṇ 3.239 offers also a trilemma: (1) to state the truth (*tadvacana*), (2) to state the untruth (*tadvacana*), (3) to state something meaningless or negative (*avacana*); Þāṇ 7.129 a heptalemma: (1) speech (*ullāpa*), (2) taciturnity (*an-ullāpa*), (3) flattery (*ullāpa*), (4) insult (*an-ullāpa*), (5) dialogue (*saññāpā*), (6) prattle (*pralāpa*), (7) contradiction (*vi-pralāpa*).

216 I do not give the original wording in all cases. In different words, the same teaching is expressed in DVS, 7.1–3, which may be the oldest text concerning this subject:

> cauñhāṁ khaṁ bhāśāṁ parīsāṁkhyāṁ pannaṁ /
> doñhāṁ tu vipayaṁ sikkhe, do na bhāseja savasava // 1 //
> jā ya saccā avattavā saccāmaṁya yā jā musā /
> jā ya buddhehi ‘yāṁ, na tain bhāseja pannaṁ // 2 //
> a-sacca-moṣaṁ saccāṁ ca anavajjam akakkhaṁ /
> sa-uppeham asaṅhiddaṁ gīrāṁ bhāseja pannaṁ // 3 //

‘[1] Of the four kinds of speech, the thoughtful monk] should, after consideration, learn the training in two, [but] should not use the other two ones at any occasion.
(α) Speaking truthfully can either be interpreted ethically, as straightforward and accurate talk (on-record), or ontologically, as an assertion of the way things are. Both perspectives can be found in the Jain and non-Jain commentary literature alike, often mixed together, as the identical characterisation of the four guptis of mind and speech illustrates. Satyâ bhâšâ refers both to the psychological and the normative conditions of truthfulness, that is, sincere, grammatically accurate and contextually acceptable speech, and to propositional truth. It is explicitly recognised in the Jain scriptures (though not in these terms) that, as a speech act, propositional language has also an expressive and normative content. The normative, the expressive, and the propositional components of spoken language are altogether necessary to communicate something.

Paññ 862 states that ‘the truth or validity of the speech depends on various situations and conditions’ (MĀLVAÑIYĀ (1970: 325)). Ten different dimensions or ‘validity conditions’ of truthful speech are distinguished (the compound saccâ <satyâ> can be translated as ‘sincere’ or ‘true’ ‘according to the conventions of ____’):

1. jañavaya-saccâ <janapada-satyâ> Country
2. sammata-saccâ <sammata-satyâ> Consensus
3. thavāna-saccâ <sthāpanā-satyâ> Representation
4. nāma-saccâ <nāma-satyâ> Name
5. rūva-saccâ <rūpa-satyâ> Form

[2] That [form of speech] which is true, [but] not to be uttered, that which is half-true, that which is [quite] untrue and which is not practised by the Jinas, the thoughtful monk should not use.

[3] [But] he should, after deliberation, use a speech not exposed to doubt, [a speech] which is neither true nor untrue and [a speech] which is true, provided that it is not to be blamed [and] rough’ (SCHUBRING (1932: 101)).

See Âyār 2.4.8–11 and cf. DVS 7.11, 7.2 for examples.


218 Mookerjee, in TULŞI (1985: 107): ‘Truthfulness is the revelation of truth. (Gloss) Truth means the straight-forwardness [jñatā] in deed (physical movement), intention and word, and non-discrepant behaviour. The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.’ (Note) Here “truth”, as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. Umâsvâti [Tattvārtha-bhāṣya 7.9], however has included revelation of ontological reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.’

219 Lord 308 (4.349) gives the nikṣepa of satya: name, object, knowledge, knowledge and action according to truth. Lord 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of truth defined in terms of unequivocality or sincerity (ujjuvayā <ṛjutā>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) seamless combination of the three, with the intention not to deceive.

220 See also Âyā 10.89.

221 JACOBI (1895: 160) translated bhāva-satyā as ‘sincerity of the mind’, and yoga-satyā as ‘sincerity of acting’.
6. pañccha-saccā <pratītya-satyā> Confirmation
7. vavahāra-saccā <vyavahāra-satyā> Custom
8. bhāva-saccā <bhāva-satyā> Inner Meaning
9. yoga-saccā <yoga-satyā> Practice
10. ovamma-saccā <aupamya-satyā> Analogy

The same list is given and explained in Mūlācāra 5.111–116, with exception of yoga-satyā, which is replaced by category No. 8 sambhāvanā-satyā, translated by OKUDA (1975: 128) as ‘truth of possibilities’ (Möglichkeitswahrheit; see infra p. 161). There is no apparent systematic connection between the categories in this list. Yet, the list is clearly informed by the four ‘doors of disquisition’ (anuyogaddāra <anuyoga-dvāra>) of canonical hermeneutics (AñD 75), especially by the method of contextual interpretation (anugama <anugama>) through progressive specification via fixed standpoints (naya) (AñD 601–606). The occurrence of the terms nāma, sthāpanā and bhāva indicates the deliberate incorporation of a variant of the ‘canonical’ nikkheva <nikṣepa>, as BHATT (1978) suggested, although the davva <dravya> standpoint is missing. A nikṣepa is a scholastic scheme which delineates fixed perspectives for the analysis of the principal dimensions of the possible contextual meanings of a word (contemporary linguistics is still struggling to establish comparable categories). The original purpose of the list of ten, as a whole, may have been similar. That is, assessing the meaning of an utterance from several commonly relevant perspectives.

Most categories are self-explanatory. Truthful utterances based on the linguistic conventions of a country are explained by the commentaries through the example that ‘in Konkan piccaô is said for payas and that by the gopâla the lotus is called aravinda only’ (Schubring (2000: 157 n. 4, § 74)). Because terms such as these are synonyms, they are all equally true. Similarly, what is accepted by many people, i.e. linguistic

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222 MĀc 5.111: Jaya-vada sammada ṭhavañña nāme rūvā pañccha-sacca ya sambhāvāna vavahāre bhāve opamma-sacce ya.
223 According to AñD 605, contextual interpretation (anugama) of the meaning of a sutta should progress in the following sequence: ‘Know that the characteristic features (of exposition) are sixfold, viz. (1) the (correct) utterance of the text (saṁhitā), (2) disjunction and parting (of words), (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5) anticipation of objections, and (8) establishment (of the correct meaning).’
224 Cf. Thān 4.349.
225 BHATT (1978: 14) emphasises that the nikhṣepa in Paññ 863 ‘has no execution in the canonical context.’ The material is therefore likely to belong to ‘post-canonical works from which it was taken before the canon acquired its present shape.’ He lists similar passages in the canon and the commentary literature (BHATT (1978: 157)).
226 PaññU 81: Jana-pada-satyaṁ nāma nānā-desi-bhāṣā-rūpam apy avipratipattyā yad ekārtha-pratyāvana-vyavahāra-samartham iti, yathādakārthe konkanādiṣu payaṁ piccaṁ nirām udakam ity-
expressions, is conventionally true (sammata-satya). Pragmatic theories of truth would fall under this perspective. A figurative representation, such as a statue which is not god itself, may itself not be accurate, but that what it symbolises can be recognised as true (sthāpanā- satya). The same applies to a name such as Devadatta or ‘given by god’ (nāma-satya) (MĀc 113). Allusions to external appearance in form of prototypes such as ‘white cranes’ (not all cranes are white) are examples of rūpa-satya. According to the commentators Haribhadra (PaññV) and Malayagiri (PaññT), the term pratītya-satya designates an utterance which is true only under certain conditions, and thus predicated on empirical confirmation. Examples are relative size (‘this is long’) or the relative state of transformation of objects at a given time (cf. MĀc 114). Like other conventional expressions which, under certain conditions, could equally be classified as ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’, common or idiomatic utterances such as ‘the kūra (i.e. the cooked rice) is cooking’ (MĀc 114) are acceptable as customarily true (vyavahāra-satya). The Śvetāmbara commentators explain the inner truth (bhāva-satya) expressed by certain utterances with the example of a ‘white crane’ (ṣuklā balkā), whereas Vaṭṭakera interprets the term as designating the ‘higher truth’, i.e. saying something untrue in order to avoid injury to someone (MĀc 116). This perspective is also applied to someone.

227 PaññU 81: sammata-satya nāma kumuda-kuvalayātpala-tāmarasānānāṃ samāne pañkajasaṁbhāve gopaḷānānāṃ sammataṃ arati vā pariṇānām eva pañkajam iti.
228 PaññU 81: sthāpanā-satya nāma akṣara-mudrā-vyāśādiṣu yathā māṣako ‘yaḥ kārṣapāya yathā satī samām idān sahasram idam iti.
229 PaññU 81: nāma-satya nāma kulama-varddhayam api kula-varddham āpy ucayate dhanam avaridhamāno ‘pi dhanām avaridhāna ity ucayate, api pākṣa tu pākṣa iti.
231 OKUDA (1975: 127) translates pratītya-satya as ‘relative truth’.
232 PaññU 81: pratītya-satyaḥ nāma yathā anāmikāyā dirghatvaḥ dravyatvān cēti, tathā hi tasyānāṁśā-śāntāṃśaḥ dravyasāya tat tat-sahākārī-kāraṇa-sāntadānena tat tad-rūpam abhivyayata iti satyaḥ. PaññṬ 257a uses the expression pratītya-āśriya, recourse to confirmation. PaññV 11.17 gives the synonym apekṣā, consideration or regard.
234 PaññU 81: bhāva-satyaḥ nāma ṣuklā balākā, saty api pañca-varṣa-saṁbhāve.
other contexts in the Śvetāmbara texts Āyār 2.4.1.6 and DVS 7.11. An example of truth based on association with practice (yoga-satyā) is to describe someone according to his/her activity, for instance the designation chattrī (a kṣatriya who should protect his realm performs chattrā-yoga), or daṇḍī (who performs daṇḍa-yoga or punishment). Instead of yoga-satyā, the Mālācāra 115 has sambhāvanā-satyā, which means that assuming the possibility of something is a valid condition of truthful language: ‘If he wanted, he could do it. If Indra wanted, he could overturn the Jambudvīpa’ (OKUDA (1975: 128)). As an example of speaking the truth, using comparison or analogy (auptmya-satyā), MĀc 116 mentions the word palidovama <palyōpama>, literally ‘like a sack of corn’, which designates a high number.

(β) Untruthful language or speaking untruthfully (mṛṣā bhāṣā) is the proscribed opposite of truth or truthfulness. In contrast to the ten conditions of truth, featuring the semantics of propositional utterances, the ten conditions out of which untruth ‘arises’ (compound: -nissiya <niśṣītā>), listed in Paṇḍ 863, are primarily psycho-physical conditions. According to SCHÜBRING (2000: 157, § 69), ‘speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as mosā.’ Eight of the ten categories overlap with the standard Jain list of the eighteen sources of sin (pāva-ṭhāna <pāpa-sthāna>), starting with the four passions (kaśāya <kaśāya>), and attachment and aversion, which in the Paṇḍ are the sole cause of karmic bondage, disregarding yoga, or activity (MĀLVAṆĪYA (1970: 384)). Most types of untrue speech, conditioned by these factors, can be categorised as expressive utterances. The last two categories, ākhyāyika-

237 PaṇḍU 81: upamayā satyañ nāma samudravat taḍāgaṁ.
238 The problem of the vagueness of the concept of ‘heaps’ is also addressed in the so-called sorites paradoxes attributed to Eubilides.
239 Thāg 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of untruth defined in terms of equivocality or insincerity (anujayatā <anujukatā>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) contradictory combination of the three, with the intent to deceive.
240 According to Jain philosophy, cognitive and motivational factors are linked. See also Hymes (1972a: 283) notion of communicative competence: ‘The specification of ability for use as part of competence allows for the role of non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly determining competence. In speaking of competence, it is especially important not to separate cognitive from affective and volitive factors, so far as the impact of the theory on educational practice is concerned; but also with regard to speech design and explanation.’
241 Arguably, conditions such as anger and pride can also evoke (painfully) true statements.
242 Viy 1.9.1 (95a).
niśrīta\(^{243}\) and upaghāta-niśrīta\(^{244}\) do not refer merely to an underlying negative psycho-physical state in general, but to the unspecified psycho-physical conditions of two specific types of self-referentially defined commonly untrue speech acts—hearsay and false accusation—with predominately constantive and regulative attributes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Meanings</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. koha-nissiya &lt;krodha-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Anger</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. māna-nissiya &lt;māna-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Pride</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. māyā-nissiya &lt;māyā-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Deceit</td>
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<td>4. lobha-nissiya &lt;lobha-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Greed</td>
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<td>5. pejja-nissiya &lt;premana-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Attachment</td>
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<td>6. dosa-nissiya &lt;dveṣa-niśrīta&gt;</td>
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<td>7. hāsa-nissiya &lt;hāsya-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Ridicule</td>
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<td>8. bhaya-nissiya &lt;bhaya-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Fear</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. akkhāiya-nissiya &lt;ākhyāyika-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>Hearsay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. uvaghāya-nissiya &lt;upaghāta-niśrīta&gt;</td>
<td>False Accusation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAILLAT (1991: 11) observed that the Pañṇ presents the kaśyāyas as the cause of untruth, not of injury, as in Âyār 2.4.1.1 and DVS 7.11. This change of perspective, from ahiśsā to -satya as the main criterion, may reflect the shift of emphasis in classical Jain karman theory from act to intention. The ten categories seem to have in common that they refer to acts which, intentionally or unintentionally, produce unwholesome perlocutionary effects in the addressee (and the speaker as well). They are either factually false, ethically wrong or both.\(^{245}\)

\((\gamma)\) The category ‘partially true speech’\(^{246}\) or ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’ (saccā-mosā bhāsā <satyā-måšā bhāšā>) should not be mixed up with the conditionally true standpoints of syād-vāda, which apply only to valid statements, not to false

\(^{243}\) Following Haribhadra (PañṇU 82: ākhyāyikā asaṁbhavyābhidhānān) and Malayagiri (PañṇT₁ 258b.9: ākhyāyikā-niśrītā yat-kathāv-asambhavyābhidhānān), akkhāiya <ākhyāyika> is usually understood as a narrative (kathā) of something non-existing or impossible, based on mere ‘legend’ or hearsay. See RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 59), and G HATAGE (1996 I: 64). This betrays the spirit of realism of Jain philosophy. Though, kathā may also refer to ‘talk’, ‘discussion’ or ‘disputation’. Potentially negative consequences of knowledge based on mere hearsay are explained in Viy 9.31(430a–438a). Thān 7.80 lists seven types of gossip (vi-kahā <vi-kathā>).

\(^{244}\) Uvaghāya/uvaghāha <upaghāta> is explained by Malayagiri (PañṇT₁ 258b.10) through the example cauras tvam (‘you are a thief’), understood here as abhyākhyāna—false and groundless accusation. The term upaghāta generally designates an act of violence, but here more specifically an insult. See also Âyār 2.4.8 for this and similar examples of ‘sinful speech’.

\(^{245}\) Thān 6.100 lists six types of unwholesome speech. Thān 6.101 lists six types of false accusations, related to the context of enumeration (pathārā <prastāra>) in confession.

knowledge (apramāṇa). ‘Truth-mixed-with-untruth’ designates intentionally or unintentionally ambiguous or unclear speech, which is strictly prohibited.\textsuperscript{247} The meaning of the term is explained by DVS 7.4–10:

4. But this and that topic which confines the Eternal within limits—this half-true speech the wise [monk] should avoid.
5. By a speech which is untrue, though its appearance is that of a true one, a man is touched by sin, how much more a man who speaks plain untruth!’ (DVS 7.4).\textsuperscript{248}

Satyâ-mråś bhâśâ is sinful language, based on the whole on non-universalisable ethical principles. For instance, the language of heretical forest-monks, who do not abstain from killing, whose thought, speech and behaviour is not well controlled:

‘They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time: “do not beat me, beat others; do not abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me, capture others; do not torment me, torment others; do not deprive me of life, deprive others of life”’ (Suy 2.2.21).

The ten types of truth-mixed-with-untruth listed in Paṇṭ 865\textsuperscript{249} do not explicitly address expressive or regulative aspects of speech acts, but only propositional content; despite the fact that performatives can also be both true and untrue. According to the commentaries, all types deal with indiscriminate speech, and with semantic and logical fallacies, such as category mistakes regarding the quality or quantity of objects or temporal modalities which can be easily ‘mixed up’ (compound: -missiyā <miœritā>), for instance in utterances designating part-whole relationships.

1. uppanṇa-missiyā <utpanna-miœritā> Born
2. vigaya-missiyā <vigata-miœritā> Destroyed
3. uppanṇa-vigaya-missiyā <utpanna-vigata-miœritā> Born-Destroyed
4. jīva-missiyā <jīva-miœritā> Life
5. ajīva-missiyā <ajīva-miœritā> Matter
6. jīvājīva-missiyā <jīvājīva-miœritā> Life-Matter

\textsuperscript{247} On combinations of truth and untruth in behaviour (vyavahāra), intent (pariñcata), belief (dṛṣṭi) etc., for instance in succession, theorised in terms of character types, see Šhâò 241 (4.35–44). See CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80) on types of duplicity to be avoided.

\textsuperscript{248} DSV 7.4–5:

\begin{verbatim}
eyañ ca atthamannañ vā jañ tu nāmei sāsayān / sa bhāsān sacca-mosañ pi tañ pi dhīro vilājāe // 4 // viṭahān pi tahāmottin jañ girān bhāsae naro / tanhā so puṭho pāveañā, kiṁ puça jo musañ vae // 5 //
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{249} See also Šhâò 10.91.
7. *ananta-miœritâ* <*ananta-miœritâ*> Infinite
8. *parîta-miœritâ* <*parîta-miœritâ*> Separate
9. *addhâ-miœritâ* <*adhvâ-miœritâ*> Time
10. *addhâddhâ-miœritâ* <*ardhâdvâ-miœritâ*> Halftime

The list of ten modalities evidently reflects general issues of particular concern for Jain doctrine. It can be thematically subdivided in two triplets and two pairs. The first triplet—*utpanna, vigata, utpanna-vigata*—addresses unclear distinctions concerning life and death. The commentators explain the meaning of *utpanna-miœritâ* as speaking in non-specific ways about the born, mixed with references to the yet unborn; for instance birth occurring in this or that village or town, that ten or more or less boys were born (‘ten boys were born in this village today’) etc.250 In the same way, *vigata-miœritâ* refers to cases of ‘stating mortality in an indefinite way, e.g. saying that ten people have died in this village, etc.’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 400)).251 *Utpanna-vigata-miœritâ* refers to both true and false, or contradictory assertions (visanâvada) regarding manifestations of both birth and death.252 The second triplet—*jîva, ajîva, jîvâjîva*—similarly addresses the problem of pointing in a general way to ‘great numbers’ of either living or dead beings, or quantities of mixed living and dead beings.253

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(ajīva), and both life and matter (jīvājīva). The consequence of imprecise language may be unintentional violence against individual living beings (in a ‘heap of dead beings’). According to Āvassaya-nijjutti (ĀvNi 8.56–100), one of the principal heretics of the canonical period, Rohagutta, committed the mistake of mixing up categories by positing a third principle, nojīva or the half-living, which mediates between jīva and ajīva. Hence, his heresy was called terāsiyā.254 The pair ananta and parāt addresses indiscriminate language regarding aspects of finite-infinite, part-whole, or singular term-existence relationships. The commentaries explain ananta-miśrītā with reference to the case of certain plants, for instance root vegetables such as radish (mūlaka), which have only one body, yet are composed of an infinite number of souls (ananta-jīva).255 The category parāt-miśrītā focuses, conversely, for instance on the independence and separateness of each individual element within a composite form of vegetation.256 The two ontological levels of the relationship between one and many can easily be mixed up in these cases; which has potential ethical (karmic) consequences. One of the principle concerns of the Pannavanā, highlighted in Malayagiri’s commentary, is the difference between the categories infinite (ananta) and uncountable (asaṅkhyāta).257 With regard to adhva, time, speech is both true and untrue if one says, for some reason, that ‘it is night’ during the daytime, or ‘get up, it is day’ when it is night.258 The same applies to the part of a measure of time, or ardhādhva, such as a

254 See LEUMANN’s (1885) article on the seven early schisms (niñhava).


258 This characterisation cannot be related to the difference between experienced or conventional time (samaya) and imperceptible abstract time (addhā) explained in Viy 11.11.1 (532b) (DELEU (1970: 178)), because in this case the speech act would be neither-true-nor-false. As the authoritative work of Jain scholastic hermeneutics, the Añuvogadārūṇīn shows, Jains are careful to distinguish semantic ambiguity from philosophical perspectivism (anekānta-vāda, syād-vāda, nīkepya, naya etc.), which is seen as an analytic instrument for disambiguation: ‘Whereas in the fallacy of chhal (fraud), one word has two meanings, no word in this argument [of syād-vāda] is of such nature. … To declare the existence of an object from one point of view and to declare its non-existence from another point of view, is not to indulge in a pun, and thus to be guilty of this fallacy’ (KANNOOMAL (1917: 16)). Cf. C. R. JAIN (1929: 8, 16–18), GANERI (2001: 133). It should be noted that similes and analogies are considered to be media of disambiguation and not convey-
prahara, a quarter of the bright or dark period of the day. The statements may be true in as much as time in general is concerned, but false with regard to time in particular (i.e. it may be bright, although technically it is still night).

Examples for a potential mix up of the modalities of time, which may have negative moral consequences in cases of promises for instance, are given in Āyār 2.4.2, and in DVS 7.6–10 as paradigmatic cases for satyā-māśā speech. The illocutionary form of these sentences is not essential, since they can be transformed into propositions of the form: ‘x promises (commands etc.), that p’.

‘6. Such speech therefore, as e.g. “we [shall] go”, “we shall say”, “we shall have to do that”, or: “I shall do that”, or “he shall do that”, 7. uncertain in the future or with regard to a matter of the present [or] of the past, a wise monk] should avoid. 8.9. If [a monk] does not know, [or] has some doubt about, a matter which concerns past, present and future, he should not say: “it is thus”; 10. (this he should do only) when there is no room for doubt’ (DVS 7.6–10).

ors of mixed truth and untruth. Obviously, they can play both roles. On chala, features of ‘god’, ‘bad debates’ etc., especially in the Nyāya-sūtra, see Matilal (1999, Chapters 2–3).


Habermas (1981: 97–117) / (1984–1987 II: 62–76), and others, showed that semantic content of normative sentences can be transformed into propositional sentences while the reverse is not always possible.

DVS 7.6–10:

tanmā gacchāmo, vakkhāmo, amugān vē bhavissai //
ahaṁ vē gacchāmo karissāmi, eso vē gacchāmo karissā // 6 //
evamāl u jā bhāsā esa-kālāmni saṁkiyā //
saṁpaṭṭāvāyam aññe vē tanmā dihō vivajjae // 7 //
āyammi ya kālaṁni paccuppānnam añgā /
jamattān na nā jāne jā “evamayāni” ti no vace // 8 //
āyammi ya kālaṁni paccuppānnam añgā /
jattha saṁkā bhave tanmā “evamayāni” ti no vace // 9 //
āyammi ya kālaṁni paccuppānnam añgā /
nissaṁkyāni bhave jān ti “evamayāni” ti niddise // 10 //
Somadeva, in his *Yaśas-tilaka* of 959 CE (YT, p. 349–350), mentions a similar example of a statement which is on the whole true but to some extent false, that is, when someone ‘after promising to give something at the end of a fortnight, gives it after a month or a year’ (HANDIQUI (1968: 265)). He also mentions the statement ‘he cooks food or weaves clothes’ as one which is to some extent true but on the whole false because ‘properly speaking, one cooks rice etc. and weaves yarn’. A different example of mixed speech, mentioned in Viy 18.7.1 (749a), are utterances of someone who is possessed. The fact that this case, referring to an existentially mixed psycho-physical state rather than to semantic ambiguity, cannot be easily fitted into any of the ten categories illustrates that the list is not exhaustive. From other viewpoints, the examples may also fit the categories of the other lists.

All of the ten enumerated modalities seem to refer to utterances in which the universal and the particular, or modalities of time, quantifiers, or other categories, are mixed up in an indiscriminate and hence ambiguous way. Though the mistakes discussed in the texts seem to be primarily based on indiscriminate cognition, producing objectionable uncertainty (cf. Āyār 2.4.1–2), the ten categories are very broad and can cover a great variety of motives, logical and semantic conundrums, such as vagueness or paradoxes, and linguistic forms and discursive strategies, such as off-record uses of metaphor, similes, veiled speech and politeness, which Brown and Levinson have analysed as popular forms for saying one thing and meaning another. These phenomena deserve more detailed analysis in future studies. For the purpose of this essay, a few comparative notes on the implications of the findings for the question of the stance of Jain philosophy on the law of non-contradiction must suffice.

For PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 3), ‘admission or insistence, that some statement is both true and false, in a context where not everything is accepted or some things are rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach—in fact a dialethic approach’, i.e. the assumption that ‘the world is inconsistent’. The Greek word *dialetheia* (two-
way truth) refers to a true contradiction facing both truth and falsity.\textsuperscript{266} PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17) were the first to point out parallels between Jaina logic and modern discursive logic, but argue, like most logicians before them, that Jain perspectivism is predicated on the rejection of the law of contradiction.\textsuperscript{267} However, GANERI (2002: 274) demonstrated in his re-construction of the assumptions underlying the method of seven-fold predication (\textit{sapta-bha\textstyle{\ddot{o}}g\textstyle{\iota}}), based on an extension of discursive logic via modalised many-valued truth-tables, that Jain logic ‘does not involve any radical departure from classical logic … The underlying logic \textit{within} each standpoint is classical, and it is further assumed that each standpoint or participant is internally consistent.’ The findings of BALCEROWICZ (2003: 64) on the contextual logic of the seven \textit{nayas} concur with this general conclusion. Both authors show that Jain logic is context-sensitive and a quasi-functional system.

To sy\textit{\ddot{a}}d-v\textit{\ddot{a}}da and anek\textit{\ddot{a}}nta-v\textit{\ddot{a}}da the Jain \textit{catus-kot\textstyle{\iota}} of the modes of speech can be added, as another example of ‘Jain logic’ which clearly operates within the confines of the law of non-contradiction, and does not need to be interpreted as a form of scepticism, nor of syncretism predicated on the notion of a total truth integration of all viewpoints, as MATILAL (1981) argues. Our brief glance at the Jain interpretation of the third mode of the so-called ‘four-valued logic’ of the \textit{catus-kot\textstyle{\iota}}, applied to language usage, that is, the explicit exclusion of the values ‘false’ and ‘both true and false’, showed that ‘Jain logic’ does not ‘flatly deny’\textsuperscript{268} the law of non-contradiction. The examples in Jain scriptures for modes of speech which are both-true-and-false, and their explicit rejection, demonstrate, on the contrary, that Jain philosophy is unequivocally opposed to violations of the law of non-contradiction. This conclusion is also borne out by the Jain analysis of the temporal aspects of action (Viy 1.1.1=13a, 9.33.2d = 484a), which explicitly denies the possibility that an action that is being performed is not equal to the completed action, as the heretic Jam\textstyle{\ddot{a}}li held (‘has the bed been made or is it being made’). The question of the identity of an action in time has important consequence for the evaluation of karmic consequences, also of speech-acts.

\textsuperscript{266} PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from Greek antiquity defending this view.

\textsuperscript{267} ‘In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discursive logic, initiated by Ja\textstyle{\ddot{z}}kowski, and they may similarly be interpreted in terms of integration of different worlds, or positions, reflecting partial truth … Naturally such a theory risks trivialisation unless some (cogent) restrictions are imposed on the parties admitted as having obtained partial truth—restrictions of a type that might well be applied to block amalgamation leading to violations of Non-Contradiction.

Unlike the Jains, the M\textstyle{\ddot{a}}dhyamikas apparently affirmed the law of Contradiction. But this does not prevent a certain unity of opposites, e.g. in the negative dialectic of N\textstyle{\ddot{a}}g\textstyle{\ddot{\acute{a}}}rjuna, a concept, such as Being, can become indistinguishable from its opposite, Non-Being’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17)).

\textsuperscript{268} STCHERBATSKY (1958: 415), cited in PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 16)).
Contrary to PRIEST–ROUTLEY’s (1989) intuitions, it seems, the main technique of argumentation used by Jain philosophers in all these cases resembles Aristotle’s refutation of Heraclitus and other ‘paraconsistent’ thinkers in ancient Greece:

‘Key parts of his analysis involved the use of time to avoid contradiction—instead of saying that a changing thing was both in a given state and also not in that state, it was said that the thing was in that state at time \( t_1 \), but not in that state at a different time \( t_2 \)—and the theory of potentiality—required to reunify these now temporarily isolated states as parts of the one (and same) change. The appeal to different temporal quantifiers illustrated the method of (alleged) equivocation used since ancient times to avoid contradiction and reinforce consistency hypothesis; namely, where both \( A \) and \( \neg A \) appear to hold, find a respect or factor or difference \( r \) such that it can be said that \( A \) holds in respect \( r_1 \) and \( \neg A \) in respect \( r_2 \). It can then be said that a contradiction resulted only by equivocation on respect or factor \( r \). Often however the method of alleged equivocation does not work in a convincing way, and it breaks down in an irreparable way with the semantic paradoxes, as the Megarians were the first to realize’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 8)).

Speech that is both-true-and-untrue is rejected in the Jain scriptures, because it mixes aspects which can be discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method of perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain philosophers would have agreed with Aristotle on this point is a question which can only be clearly answered in a separate study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is fundamental, also for Jain perspectivism.

(δ) The most interesting of the four modes of speech (and cognition) is ‘speaking neither truth nor untruth’ (asaccā-mosā). That is, speech to which the true/false distinction is not applicable. Muni Nathmal (Ācārya Mahāprajñā) characterised asatyā-mōsā language as vyavahāra-bhāṣā, or conventional speech (Ṭhān 4.23, Hindi commentary). Twelve types of the asatyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā are distinguished in Paṇṇa 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (499b):269

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269 Lalwani’s (1985 IV: 133 f.) rendition of Viy 10.3.34 reads as follows: ‘[Gautama speaks] Bhante! There are twelve forms of language—address, order, prayer, question, advice, refusal, consent, enquiry, conviction, confusion, distinct and indistinct. Now, when one says, I shall take lodge, I shall lie, I shall stand, I shall sit, I shall stretch, do these forms conform to the fifth type viz. advice, and it is correct to say that they are never false?—[Mahāvīra answers] Yes Gautama! They conform to the fifth type and they are never false.’
1. āmantanī <āmantraṇī> Address
2. ānavatī <ājnāpanī> Order
3. jāyanī <yācanā> Request
4. pucchaṇī <pyecchaṇī> Question
5. paṇavatī <prajñāpanī> Communication
6. paccaṅkaṇī <pratīyākyānī> Renunciation
7. icchānulomā <ichānulomā> Consent
8. anabhiggahiyā <anabhīgherītā> Unintelligible
9. abhiggahiyā <abhīgherītā> Intelligible
10. saṁsaya-karaṇī <saṁśaya-karaṇī> Doubt-Creating
11. vṛtyādī <vyākṛtā> Explicit
12. avvṛtyādī <avyākṛtā> Implicit

Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in MĀc 5.118–119. The categories 1–7 are identical in both texts. Of the last five, only saṁśaya (No. 10) is mentioned by Vaṭṭakera, and a category labelled anakkara <anakśara>, ‘incomprehensible’, which can be read as an equivalent of anabhiggahiyā <anabhīgherītā> (No. 8, maybe also incorporating aspects of No. 12).²⁷⁰

Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by Jacobi (1884: 150 n. 2, 151)²⁷¹ and Mālvanītā (1971: 325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, considering the great variety of listed speech acts (only the first three are injunctions), it seems better to use Austin’s (1962) term ‘performatives’, which are by definition neither true nor false, to characterise the first seven terms.²⁷² The last five terms cover aspects which Grice discussed under the conversational maxims of relation (‘relevance’) and manner (‘avoid obscurity’). In Austin’s terminology, addressing,

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²⁷⁰ On articulated (akkara-suya) evidence, composed of written and oral sources see Schubring (2000: § 74).
²⁷¹ Āyār 2.4.1.4 n., 2.4.1.7.
²⁷² Austin (1962) distinguishes between implicit and explicit, self-verifying, performatives. An ‘explicit performative sentence’, such as taking a vow, ‘indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (Austin (1962: 6 f.))—this would be a ‘descriptive fallacy’ (Austin (1962: 3)). ‘None of the utterances cited is either true or false’ (Austin (1962: 3)). ‘It is essential to realize that “true” and “false”, like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. … This doctrine is quite different from much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what works, &c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances’ (Austin (1962: 144)). The problem of determining truth-values of performative utterances has been discussed, for example, by Faßnacht (1981: 182).
ordering, requesting, and questioning etc. are all illocutionary acts. Questions, commands, and exclamations are not propositions, since they can not be asserted or denied; that is, they are neither true nor false. Imperatives (directives), such as orders and requests, and regulatives (commissives), such as consenting and renouncing (promising, vowing etc.), through which the speaker commits him/herself to perform certain actions in future, imply normative conditions which ought to be fulfilled, but which are not fulfilled yet. In this sense, the propositional content is also neither true nor false. Truth, and its opposite, falsity, are properties that belong only to propositions. Propositions are statements that either assert or deny that something is the case. Not all sentences are true or false, because not all sentences make such claims. Commands, questions, and expressions of volition neither assert nor deny that something is the case, and are, consequently, neither true nor false.

ARISTOTLE (PH 4) already noted that 'every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.' Problems related to the ontological and truth-functional status of future events and the grammatical future were also discussed in Greek philosophy, which may or may not have influenced Indian philosophy in this point. In De Interpretatione (PH), ARISTOTLE offers the following solution to a paradox posed by Diodorus Cronus as to the truth-value of the sentence ‘Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?’ Any definite answer (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to this indecidable question is presently neither true nor false, but if in future one becomes true, then the other becomes false:

‘One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good’ (PH 9).

For Aristotle, as for the Jains, it is both unethical and factually wrong to assume the future is determined, since actions evidently influence events. Although it is not entirely clear what exactly Aristotle and the Jain author(s) had in mind, in both cases the commitment to free will and to the logic of events overrides the logic of

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273 Thāṅk 6.111 lists six types of question-contexts, not all of which can be categorised as neither-true-nor-false; e.g. vuggaha-pañha <vyudgraha-prāśna>, questioning an opponent.

274 On ambiguities created by the use of the future tense see also FAUCONNIER (1981: 180 f.), and others.
propositions. Generally, empirical facts can neither be proven true nor false by logical necessity: ‘Even if I say “It’s raining now” when the sun is shining, I have not said something that is necessarily false, just something that happens to be false’ (HARNAD (1999: 1)). From a purely logical point of view, Bertrand RUSSELL (1905) showed that all predicates with variables are not propositions to which a truth value can be attached in an unambiguous way. Hence they are neither true nor false. However, they can be transformed into propositions by replacing the variable with a value or a quantifier. It is, of course, difficult to say to what extent ancient Jain philosophers already shared certain intuitions with modern logicians.

The first seven categories, sometimes combined, cover most speech acts a Jain ascetic would conventionally use in contexts of monastic life; for example taking vows (paccakkhāna), requesting permission (āpucchaṇa), ordering (ājñā), confessing (ālocaṇa), begging forgiveness (kṣamāpanā) etc., Āmantaṇi <Āmantraṇi> speech or language, for instance, is ‘used for attracting somebody’s attention, a vocative word or expression’ (GHATAGE (2003 III.2: 1001)), for instance ‘O Devadatta’. MĀLVAṆIYĀ (1971: 325) gives the following examples of an address and an order: ‘when a person wanting John to come near him says “O! John”’ or ‘when a person says to another person, “Go ahead.’ However, not in all contexts are such expressions neither-true-nor-false. Under certain circumstances, the first example may represent or can be read as an ‘indirect’ or ‘implicit performative’ speech act clad in form of an address, and it could be argued that, in certain contexts, the second example does not correspond to the prescription in Âyār 2.4 for mendicants to avoid pragmatic interventions.

The last five terms of the list are of a different nature. The term āpabhīṣghahiyā <anabhīghṛhitā> refers to ‘unintelligible or incomprehensible speech’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 156)), which is either ‘irrelevant’ (DELEU (1970: 169)) or ‘unacceptable’ (GHATAGE (1996 I: 237)), but neither-true-nor-false. Its antonym, āpabhīṣghhaṃma boddhavvā, intelligible instruction, refers to ‘clear and intelligible
language’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 351)), which is ‘relevant’ and ‘acceptable’, and neither-true-nor-false. Malayagiri’s commentary explains the difference between irrelevant and relevant speech through the following example: ‘to the question “What shall I do now?” the answer “Do as you like” is abhiggahiyā, the answer “Do this, do not that!” is abhiggahiyā’ (DELEU (1970: 169)).

It is not entirely clear why saṁsaya-karaṇī bhāṣā, ‘ambiguous language which causes doubt’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 570)), is regarded as neither-true-nor-false, and therefore permissible. It must be assumed that only the use of strategically ambiguous messages for the purpose of creating vairāgya-shocks is seen as legitimate, but not language which creates doubt about Jainism in the minds of believers. He seems to follow Malayagiri (Paṇṭī), who argued that from the niṣcaya-naya not only satya-mṛṣā but also asatyā-mṛṣā statements are false—‘if they are spoken with the intention of deceiving others’ (MĀLVAṆĪYĀ (1971: 346)). However, Viy 18.7.1 (749a) states that, by definition, the speech of a Kevalin, because it is harmless, can only be true or neither-true-nor-false. The statement associates higher moral truth with this type of speech, which can thus be compared with the ‘twilight-language’ (sandhā-bhāṣā) of Tantric Buddhism, which is also characterised as neither-true-nor-false. According to OKUDA (1975: 129), MĀc 119 explains saṁsaya-vayaṇī <saṁsaya-vacana> as ‘speech which expresses doubt’. But its commentator Vasunandin (11th–12th century) interprets this as ‘speech of children and old people’ as well as the sounds of (five-sensed) ‘roaring buffalos’ etc., which cause doubt as to their meaning, while the Digambara authors Apārajetī and Aśādhara and the Śvetāmbara Haribhadra commenting on DVS 7, read saṁsaya-karaṇī simply as ‘ambiguous speech’ (anekārthā-sādhāraṇā). Haribhadra classifies speech of children as anakkhara <anakṣara>, incomprehensible, which also figures as the ninth and last category listed in MĀc

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278 Paṇṭī 259a: abhīghṛtā prati-niyātārthāvadhāraṇāṁ, yathā idāṁ idāṁ karttavyam idāṁ nēti.

279 Paṇṭī 259a: anabhīghrahā yatra na pratiṇiyātārthāvadhāraṇāṁ, yathā bhāukāryेṣv avasthitēṣu kaścit kaṁca na prechati—kim idāṁ karomi?, sa prāha—yat pratibhāsate tat kury iti. See SPERBER–WILSON’s (1986) arguments for considering ‘relevance’ as the key to communication and cognition.


281 Jambūvjaya’s edition of the Ṭhān 4.23 (238) contains the following commentary of Jinabhadra’s Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣā (VĀBh) 376–7: anabhīghaya jā tīsu vi sāddo cēya kevalo asacca-musa.
174, which Vasunandin reserves for expressions of animals of two-four senses, and for sounds created by snipping fingers etc. (OKUDA (1975: 129)).

Vyākṛtā bhāṣā refers to clear distinct speech with explicit unambiguous meaning (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 511)). There is no example given by the commentaries for distinct speech which is neither-true-nor-untrue. Avyākṛtā-bhāṣā, refers to indistinct involuted or poetic speech consisting of obscure or unintelligible words with deep and profound meaning (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 445), cf. GHATAGE (2001 II: 800)). Mantras or sūtras may be fitting examples. The fact that the Mūlācāra does not mention these two categories reinforces the suspicion that they are redundant, and overlapping with the category of incomprehensible language.

The most interesting case is pannavaññi-bhāṣā <prajñāpani-bhāṣā>, explanation, the generic term which Mahāvīra himself employs in the scriptures to designate his discourse, which also gives the Pannavaññi-suttañi its name. Like all descriptions of speech acts, pannavāni is a somewhat ambiguous term, because it refers both to the illocutionary act, locutionary content, and perlocutionary effect of proclaiming something. This ambiguity is reflected in different translations of the word. SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 69) and DELEU (1970: 169) translate pannavāni as ‘communication’ (Mitteilung). According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157 f., § 69), the examples for ‘communication’ given in Viy 10.3.3 (499b) = Paṇḍ 866, ‘We want to [wollen] lie down’ (āsaissāmo) etc., refer to ‘expressions of an intention’ (to do something). However, DELEU (1970: 169) and LALWANI (1985: 133) translate āsaissāmo <āśavīyāmāḥ> as ‘we will lie down’ and ‘we shall lie down’ respec-

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282 Paṇḍ 259a: saṁsāya-karaṇī yā vāk anekārthābhidhāyitā parasya saṁsāyam utpādayati, yathā saṁdhavamānyatam ity atra saṁdhava-sābda lavoṣa-vstra-purasvājīṣu. SCHUBRING (2000: 157 f., § 74): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.’

283 Paṇḍ 259a: vyākṛtā yā prakāṭūrthā.

284 Paṇḍ 259a: avyākṛtā atigambhūra-sadbārthā avyakākṣara-pravaktā vā avibhāvītārthānāt.

285 The Pāli equivalents of pannavaññi and pannatta are paññāpana, paññatta (MĀLANVĪ (1971: 212)). The word pannatti <prajñāpti>, teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used in the canon, for instance at Viy 2.1.90, or Viy 16.6 (709b) where the verbs pannaveti parīveti <prajñāpayati prarūpayati> are used in to describe Mahāvīra’s preaching activity. Hence, his teachings are called pannavañña <prajñāpana>, exposition, or parāṇa <parīṇapa>, explanation (AnP 51, MĀLANVĪ (1971: 210)). The ‘proclamations’ (Kundmachung) or preachings of the unattached ones are also called nīgghanta pāvayaṇa/pavayaṇa <nirgrantha pravacana> in Viy 2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and Čaṇḍ 176a. See SCHUBRING (2000: 73, § 37).
tively, that is, as the description of a future action or state. Mālvanīyā (1971: 211), who points to kindred views in the Pāli text Puggala-paññatti, prefers the word ‘describing’ as a translation of pannañāti which he renders as ‘speech that intends to describe a thing’. In this, he follows the 13th century commentary of Ācārya Malayagiri who stated that pannañāti ‘means the speech that intends to describe the thing (or event) [as it is].’ It is a form of asaccā-mosā speech, ‘a speech which has nothing to do with norm (validity or invalidity) but which only describes the thing (or event)’: ‘To be more explicit, the speech which has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots but which simply describes the thing is called Prajināpanī.’ Mālvanīyā (1971: 212) cites the example quoted by the commentator Malayagiri’s Prajināpanâ-þikā, ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth)’, and notes: ‘The gāthā in point contains no command “do not kill” but simply describes the fact that those who do not kill live long and remain healthy.’ Such speech ‘has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots’ (Mālvanīyā (1971: 211)). Hence, it should be distinguished from implicit performative speech. But, of course, it may be interpreted as such by a listener who infers an ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. Monier-Williams’ (1986: 659) Sanskrit-English Dictionary translates the causative prajñāpana as ‘statement, assertion’.

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286 Deleu (1970: 169) writes: ‘āsaisāmo is āsāyisyāmah, not, as Abhay. says, āsāyisyāmah.’ According to the rules of speech in Āyār 2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a statement if one cannot be entirely sure.


288 Contrary to Mālvanīyā’s (1971: 211) view that asatyā-māsha speech ‘has nothing to do with norm’ it is obvious that by referring to situations that ought to be both imperatives, commissives (vows), and declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened being. Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle showed that from the hearer’s perspective even literal speech implies a contextual horizon to be intelligible (Habermas (1980: 452) / (1984–1987 I: 337)). According to Paṇṭ 246b, asatyā-māsha speech signifies not only ohāraṇi <avadhāraṇi> or determinative expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’, but all attempts to communicate transcendental truth through descriptive (prajñāpani) speech, which is assumed to be context-free and thus by definition neither-true-nor-false (satyā-māsha). The Paṇṭ accounts for the use of certain classificatory terms and words which express universals (e.g. masculine, feminine, neuter) without clearly specifying their contextual range of meaning. Imperatives such as ‘go ahead’ belong to this category too. For instance, we may ‘order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out orders. … This ājñāpani (imperative) speech too could not be held as false. It should be regarded as a case of prajñāpani speech’ (Mālvanīyā (1971: 326)).

289 Paṇṭ 249b:

\[
pāṇivahālu niyattā havanīti dīhāyu arogā ya /
emāi paṇṇattā paṇṇavaṇi viyārāgehihi
\]
Lalwani (1985 IV: 133) apparently follows the Illustrated Ardhamāgadhī Dictionary of Ratnacandra (1988 III: 443), based on Malayagiri, in using the word ‘advice’ (upadeśa). What is probably meant by the term pannavana is that from the conventional point of view, which underlies the Jain ‘catus-koṭi’ of language usage, the testimony of an authoritative person is neither true nor untrue, because its meaning may be incomprehensible for a hearer, similarly to unintelligible utterances of non-enlightened creatures. With imperatives and addresses expressing universal truths or ideals has in common that no referent exists in re at a given place and point of time (as for instance in Malayagiri’s example which should not be read as a prediction relating to a specific individual). The multidimensional implications of a general statement or rule such as this cannot be understood entirely in an instant, as Wittgenstein (1953: 53–55, § 138–40) noted in his remarks on the relation between meaning and use of a word (Wittgenstein (1953: 190 ff., § 138 f.)). Moreover, the example given by the commentaries concerning the necessary link between non-violence and health cannot be proved or disproved from a conventional perspective. It must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the speaker. Interestingly enough, the two truth theory is not invoked by the commentaries in defence of the concept of transcendental speech, being neither-true-nor-false, in spite of its capability to immunise any statement against criticism.

Paṇḍ 832–857 gives another example for speech which is neither-true-nor-false by discussing the question of the ‘congruity of grammatical and natural gender and number’ (Schubring (2000: 158, § 74)). It argues that words such as go, cow, which express (genderless) universals but are employed in masculine singular, are not false or both-true-and-false, say, with regard to female cows, but neither-true-nor-false. The same applies to imperatives (ājñāpanā), since ‘we may order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out our orders’ (Mālvaṇiyā (1971: 326)).

The last of the four variants of ohāraṇi-bhāṣā <avadhāraṇi-bhāṣā>, or determinate speech, is another example of speech which is neither-true-nor-false. Reflexive

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290 Uttar 28.16 ff. lists amongst the ten sources of right insight (samyag-darśana) communications such as upadeśa, instruction, ājñā, command, bija, seed (suggestion), as well as abhīgama, comprehension of the sacred scriptures, and vīstāra, complete course of study (including proofs, pramāṇa, and perspectives, naya): nisagguvaesa-ruî, āṅā-ruî sutta-bīya-ruî-meva / abhīgama-viṭṭhāra-ruî, kīriyā-saṅkheva-dhamma-ruî // .

291 Cf. Murti (1955: 129) on transcendental language which expresses truth which is beyond language; and Ganeri (2002: 271) on the non-assertible (inexpressible) in classical Jain seven-valued logic (sapta-bhaṅgi), which may be conceptually related to incomprehensible speech.

292 This example could be interpreted as an early version of the ‘misleading form thesis’ addressed by Russell (1905) and others. See Haack (1974: 53–55). By contrast, the example ‘Devadatta, give me the cow’, mentioned by Glasenapp (1915: 46), is neither-true-nor-untrue as a simple performative.
expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ are said to be capable of expressing any of the four modes of speech, depending on whether they serve religion (ārāhiya <ārādhita>), in which case they are true by definition, harm religion (virāhiya <virādhita>), in which case they are false, both serve and harm religion, in which case they are true-as-well-as-false, or whether they do neither, in which case they are neither-true-nor-false (Paṇṇ 830–831 [246b]).

The examples show that in the Jain philosophy of speech pragmatic efficacy, that is, non-violence, supersedes propositional truth:

’It goes with the sphere of ethics that all four modes of speech, and consequently the mode of wrong speech as well, are admitted, provided they are employed in a pious way of mind (āuttam = samyak), while even true speech coming from a sinner’s mouth will count for nothing (Pannav. 268a)’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).

Conversely, as mentioned before, ‘a mode of speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as mosā’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74)). In other words, the speaker’s beliefs, attitudes or intentions (if not his/her Being), and the specific pragmatic context is decisive, not the words themselves, or the propositional meaning. Arguments relating to the ‘higher truth’ of morality based on similar considerations. HANDIQUI (1968: 266) notes that the 10th century Digambara ācārya Somadeva is more concerned with ethics than with propositional truth:

’Somadeva appears in certain circumstances to attach greater importance to self-preservation and philanthropic considerations than to speaking the truth. He opines that the truth must not be spoken if it is likely to endanger others and bring inevitable ruin to oneself.’

Another example of this attitude is given by the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Hemacandra who, in his 12th century Yoga-śāstra (YŚ 2.61) and self-commentary, narrates that the sage Kauśika, who was famous for speaking the truth, ‘went to hell because accurate information given by him led to the capture and killing of a band of robbers’ (cited by HANDIQUI (1968: 266 n. 4)):

‘On the other hand (api), even though a statement may be true, it should not be spoken if it causes affliction to others [This is] because,

even if it is accepted [by all the people] in the world, Kauṣika was sent to hell [on account of making such a statement]’ (YS 2.61).²⁹⁵

The explanations of the four modes of speech in canonical Jain literature and its medieval Sanskrit commentaries show that they are conceived as meta-rules, on a level of abstraction comparable to the discourse ethics of universal pragmatics, while the sub-categories and examples correspond to the level of empirical semantics and pragmatics. The levels of abstraction of the lists of examples in the commentaries vary, since the Jain lists are relatively unsystematic, although some may have been intended as scholastic devices for cumulative indexication qua fixed analytical perspectives. From the point of view of comparative analytical philosophy, some examples could serve as illustrations for one or other of the conversational postulates à la Grice (‘be relevant’ etc.), Searle, or Habermas, while others can be related to the modern logical investigations of vagueness, category mistakes, quantifiers, or modalities of time in particular. In contrast to modern intentionalist semantics, Jain philosophers of language analyse examples of fundamental types of speech rarely with reference to the intention of the speaker, but prefer an objective or listener’s standpoint. That is, they investigate the structure of the utterance as a whole, from the de-contextualised point of view of the four combinations of the basic true/false distinction, seen from the perspective of discourse ethics. The same perspective is preferred by universal pragmatics.

We can conclude from this brief discussion of the explanations of the four modes of speech in the Śvetāmbara canon and commentaries that the rules of Jain discourse are less concerned with referential truth than with the pragmatics of speech;²⁹⁶ in particular with the expression of the ‘higher truth’ of religious insight gained through direct self-experience, and speaking in accordance with the ethics of non-violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that truth in Jain discourse is always defined as an aspect of objective illocutionary force, depending on the form of the utterance and the intentional state of a speaker alone, without the need to be backed up by argument in processes of critical inquiry. The primacy of pragmatic ethical and moral considerations, considered from a monological perspective, makes the Jain theory of speech in many ways akin to Habermas’ theory of communicative action. The analysis of the implications of the Jain maxim of truth for language usage show that it combines as it were the validity claims two, three and four:


²⁹⁶ GANERI (2002: 277) shows that the sapta-bhāgī is also ‘not strictly truth-functional’, but suggests a solution to this problem.
propositional truth, normative rightness, and expressive truthfulness. Despite the primacy of non-violence and sincerity of expression, there are numerous examples for rules concerning referential truth, the ideal of univocal or straight (jīv) speech, and the avoidance of deception, especially Āyār 2.4.1.1, Āyār 2.4.2.19, and DVS 8.46.297 Such rules of avoidance of false representations (including false references

297 Interestingly, some ślokas are similar to the last of Grice’s quality maxims: ‘Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence’, which invokes questions of referential truth and of the relationship between representational and expressive functions of language. The definition of the concept truth and falsehood, or of aspects thereof, is a notoriously difficult problem for modern science and philosophy, whose discourse is constituted by this fundamental distinction according to FOUCAULT (1981) and LUHMANN (1990). It is therefore interesting to see how the Jains tackle this issue, which is one of their foremost concerns. There is a note by LALWANI added to DVS 24.12 which identifies three types of falsehood: ‘(i) to deny what is, (ii) to establish what is not, and (iii) to alter the meaning’. They can be illustrated by the following examples:

(i) Jains are epistemic realists. Hence, it is not surprising that there are explicit statements defending the ideal of objective truth in the scriptures, as opposed to mere appearance, opinion, or consensus. The following passage stresses the necessity for ascetics to use their faculty of judgement to discover the truth of a given phenomenon, and not to be deceived by false appearances: ‘Employing their judgment, they should know something for certain and something for uncertain: (1) Having received food or not having received food, having eaten it or not having eaten it, has come or has not come, comes or does not come, will come or will not come’ (Āyār 2.4.1.1–2). This orientation toward the world, predicated on a realistic analysis of the modalities of time, is diametrically opposed to Brāhmañism and Vedāntic concepts such as māyā etc. This is evident in the following passage, which implicitly criticises the confusion of natural phenomena with illusory imagery of divine agency: ‘A monk should not say: “The god of the sky! the god of the thunderstorm! the god of lightning! the god who begins to rain! the god who ceases to rain! may rain fall or may it not fall! may the crops grow or may they not grow! may the night wane or may it not wane! may the sun rise or may it not rise! may the king conquer or may he not conquer!” They should not use such speech. … But knowing the nature of things, he should say: “the air; the follower of Guhya; a cloud has gathered or come down; the cloud has rained”’ (Āyār 2.4.1.12–13).

(ii) False appearance and deception should be avoided by all means: ‘A muni speaks of appearance, ignoring the truth, encounters a sin. Then what to speak of one who indulges in whole untruth [Note by LALWANI: When a woman is dressed as a man and if she be called a man, it is a falsehood, though in her dress she appears like a man …].’ (DVS 7.5, cf. Āyār 2.4.1.3). Ways of ‘establishing what is not’, such as vague promises and speculation, are also seen indiscriminate or deceptive utterances, because of the confusion of past, present, and future. Language which may create doubt (‘maybe or not’) has to be avoided by all means: ‘When one knows not true implication, in the context of the present, past, and future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. When one is in doubt about implication, in the context of the present, past and future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. “Surely it’s so”,—says one when one has not an iota of doubt of implication about the present, the past and future’ (DVS 7.8–10, cf. DVS 7.6–7, Āyār 2.4.1.5). It is remarkable, that early Jainism already insists on the correct use of temporal modalities, which must be related to
to past, present and future) and non-deceptive speech etc., can be understood as expressions of a pragmatic anti-illusionist (anti-Brâhmaëic) realism, that is, as anti-deception strategies. From the perspective of politeness theory, one could add that the underlying cognitive realism does not only serve as a strategy of self-protection, as Williams (1983: xix) argues, but also to calculate the karmic consequences of speech acts, and functional demands on social inferiors, who (have to) read and fulfil the pragmatic implications of intentionally ambiguous statements of social superiors.

Relation

The Gricean maxim of relation, concerning the relevance of a statement, is generally determined by the ‘purpose of the talk exchange’ as already stressed by the cooperative principle, of which it is but a mode (and therefore absent in Habermas’ scheme). The principle of relevance is vital for the selection of appropriate contextual references of both utterances and standpoints of interpretation. In religious discourses, the implicit limitations inscribed in the semantic structure of the ideological system, enforced by a system of related institutional and social sanctions, play an important role in the discrimination of relevant contextual references.

The philosophy of transmigration, but also with the critique of the Brâhmaëic sacred-word theory: ‘speech exists only the moment when being spoken’ (Schubring (2000: 149, § 68). The practical value of all the cited examples is the same: reducing illusory appearances to their ‘real’ content.

(iii) There are no further maxims concerning ‘changing the meaning’ in the texts on the ways of speaking. Effectively, however, Jain narrative literature is based on a method of ‘changing the meaning’ of Indian folklore (Hertel (1922)). The combined systematicity and context-sensitivity of Jain rules and regulations is particularly obvious in the following statement of the Digambara author Vasunandin’s (1100 CE) Œrâvakâcâra 209, which propagates not only the ‘abstention from untruth spoken out of passion or hate’ but ‘from truth too, if it provokes the destruction of a living being’ (cited in Williams (1983: 78)). This and similar examples illustrate how the hierarchically superior principle of ahiësâ supersedes the maxim of truthfulness in cases of rule-contradiction. Cf. Mâlvanîyâ (1971: 325) on the role of the (situational) conditions of truthfulness in the Pannavanâ. 290

290 Âmâtacandra’s commentary on the Samaya-sâra ( supra p. 147) states this implication openly. Similar references can be found with regard to public debates at the royal court etc. Cf. ÂyâRD 4.2.

290 Habermas (1980: 418) / (1984 I: 312) remarks that it is hard to establish the universality of this maxim.

300 Śrîmad Râjacandra’s rules of speech recommend avoiding controversial religious themes: ‘1. While you are talking of one thing, you may not, unless it is absolutely unavoidable, bring in another thing. 2. Listen attentively to what the other is saying. 3. You should answer it patiently and with a sense or propriety. 4. Only such words be uttered as do not involve you either in self-praise or self-abasement. 5. For the time being, the less you talk of religion the better. 6. Do not involve yourself with others on issues pertaining to religion” (in Mehta (1991: 72)).
I have argued elsewhere, that the ethical ‘code’ of ahiṅsā/hiṅsā forces limitations and therefore an attitude of reflective distance onto those individuals who observe themselves self-referentially with the help of this semantic differential. Cognitive distance, in turn, generates the potential of a selective, discriminating relationship towards the world, i.e. it allows for choice, by presupposing the perceptibility of potentialities, the modalisation of perception, which—as we have seen—is generated through the practices of meditative introversion and perspective alteration.

In other words, the ways in which contextually relevant references are selected are negatively determined, and channelled, by Jain values and rules, given that they de facto orientate practice. Through its in-built directionality, the dominant ethical code of Jainism (ahiṅsā/hiṅsā) regulates pragmatic choices in everyday life, to the extent of the religious commitment and power of judgement of the user. Conversely, any semantically coded generalised strategy of selective choice implies corresponding processes of exclusion of non-relevant references, which form the complementary horizon of the unsaid and the unspeakable of legitimate religious experience. The discriminative functions of implied references to background knowledge and pragmatic conditions of fulfilment of religious claims, can be socially exploited through the off-record strategies of ‘presupposition, hint, give associative clues’ etc., which are associated with the Gricean maxim of relation. Precisely these qualities are associated with the proverbial South Asian ability both to tolerate and to ignore, which Hacker (1985) called ‘inclusivism’.

**Manner**

The last maxim is explicitly concerned with the phenomenon of intentional multivocal speech, stressing the necessity of grammatically correct and unambiguous speech. The correlates of this maxim are held in great esteem by the Jains. The Āyār refers several times to the necessity of using clear language:

> ‘Well considering (what one is to say), speaking with precision, one should employ language in moderation and restraint: the singular, dual, plural; feminine, masculine, neuter gender; praise, blame, praise mixed with blame, blame mixed with praise; past, present, or future (tenses), the first and second, or third person’ (Āyār 2.4.1.3).

Not only referential truth, relevance, and the syntactically correct use of words is discussed in such contexts (cf. DVS 8.49), but also the orientation towards the intended effect of (religious) speech on the hearer. That is, not to create doubt, and

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302 Cf. Āyār 2.4.1.7, 2.4.2.19. See also Thāṇ 10.96 etc.
lack of clarity (DVS 7.4). Manner can be interpreted as a combination of the validity claims of truth and sincerity with the condition of grammatical comprehensibility. Such features are usually considered in conjunction with other aspects of ideal speech acts, such as key, tone, spirit or style. Grammar is not singled out in the Jain equivalent of the manner-maxim and privileged over other aspects of communicative competence, as it is in modern linguistics, but presented together with other rules of use, such as stylistic rules of performance.

Jain ascetic rules of manner directly address the problem of implicit meaning, and the necessity to avoid the (manner related) off-record politeness strategies of ‘vagueness, ambiguity, over generalization, or incompleteness’ (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 230 f.)). The clauses stating that both politeness (Āyār 2.4.2.3–6) and speech which might harm (Āyār 2.4.2.1–2) is to be avoided at all costs, however, forces the exclusion of a wide range of topics onto the performer of ‘pure speech’. This is what makes Jain doctrinal texts often so dry—most of the ‘juicy bits’ are ‘potentialised’, left out, remain unsaid, although they are implicitly presupposed. In fact this is the area, where the ‘rhetoric’ of silence is, as it were, forced upon the Jain ascetic, who has to select words carefully, in order to steer between the need to communicate with the world and the obligation to observe the principles of satya and ahiṃsā.

To briefly summarise the results of the comparison between the Jain rules of speech with Habermas’ validity claims and the Gricean postulates, it is apparent that for all of the universal pragmatic principles and conversational postulates there are functional equivalences amongst the Jain principles and rules of speech, which are by no means ‘primitive’ and ‘ill-assorted’, as for instance the philologist SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74) believed. Jain principles and rules of discourse are not mere examples of a culture-specific ‘particularistic ethics’, as LAIDLAW (1995: 14) argues, but form a ‘comparatively systematic code which is well-grounded in objective considerations’ (CAILLAT (1991: 14)). The Gricean maxims and the Jain rules of speech are similar, though not identical. The norms of unequivocal and grammatically correct signification and transmission of information are fundamental for the Jain understanding of proper language use, but not sufficient for an understanding of its primarily ethical concerns, which overlap with Habermas’ theory of communicative action. The Jain texts deliberately avoid defining certain words as ‘sacred’. However, for Jainism, too, ‘correct speech is of religious value’ (CAILLAT (1984: 71)) in so far as the foremost

303 Cf. HYMES (1972b: 62).
304 For an early universalistic ethical statement see the ‘very difficult passage’ JACOBI (1884: 31 n. 4) Āyār 1.3.3.1 equating self and world: saṇḍhīṁ logassa jāṇītā. āyao bahiyā pāsa. tambhā na haṁtā na vighāyaḥ. All beings intend to live. Knowing the intention, one should not be non-vigilant. Consider all other beings as thyself. Therefore, you should not kill them yourself, nor get them killed by others (ĀyārBh 3.51, p. 214).
requirement for the realisation of Jain norms is restraint (negative politeness) in mind, speech and action. The religious ideal of correct, truthful and non-violent manner of speech is summarised in the following passage, already quoted above:

‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, considering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint’ (Āyār 2.4.2.19).³⁰⁵

What is manifest in this statement is that the Jain maxims themselves address the necessity of avoiding the violence and the consequential karmic results of ‘flouting’ the rules of proper speech by means of off-record strategies. At the same time, negative politeness (especially conventional indirectness) is regarded as mandatory for maintaining the vows of non-violence and truth in language usage. A different matter altogether is the ‘salvific’ use of off-record strategies in contexts of religious instruction which will be discussed below.

(Ad 3) In addition to the general principles and maxims of proper speech discussed thus far, much space of the language related sections in the Āyār and DSV is devoted to experience-near examples and practical rules for selection of what to say and what not to say in accordance with the satya-vrata. These regulations do not have the status of general principles or maxims, but are derivatives of the latter, and provide generalised examples or schemata for the interpretation of certain types of situation. Generally single utterances and types of speech-acts (strategies) are discussed in the manner of modern analytical philosophy, often focusing on negative examples (asatya). The respective passages are almost identical in both key texts (Āyār 2.4.2.7–16 = DVS 7.22–35). They can be summarised as follows: First and foremost, one should avoid interventions in worldly affairs, particularly those involving value-judgements, taking sides, practical advice, or demands. Recommended speech-strategies are usually forms of negative politeness, such as conventional indirectness, impersonalisation or nominalisation.³⁰⁶ Impersonalisation by way of transforming directives and commissives

³⁰⁵ Conversely: ‘[1.] The monks and nuns may not use the following six forbidden forms of speech: lying, sneering, insult, coarse speaking, worldly speech, or speech renewing atoned matters. 2. There are six cases of idle talk about right conduct: of speaking rashly in relation to others, of damaging living creatures, of untruthfulness, of forbidden appropriation, of a jade, a eunuch, or a slave. Whoever uses those six kinds of idle talk, without being able to prove them fully, ranks as one who has committed the transgression himself’ (KS 6.1).

³⁰⁶ Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134 ff.). In Paññṭ folio 259 B cited by MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 212), and discussed earlier, the positive karmic consequences of not killing are expressed in this way; avoiding commandments of the form ‘do not kill’ for example by saying: ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth).’
into assertives, that is, a second-person performative perspective into a third-person observer’s perspective, is the preferred method; evidently, because in this way ‘illocutionary force switches over into the propositional content and thereby loses, if not its meaning, at least its force’ (HABERMAS (1993: 27)).307

For instance, one should not say ‘this should be done’, but ‘this is’. And one should not speak about forbidden subjects, such as business-choices etc., at all. One should not ask householders to do something, or ‘forecast’, or make promises to them (DVS2 7.46 f.; 51). Another example of depersonalisation and nominalisation is the ‘avoidance of harsh words’. That is, (false) accusations, abuse, and other varieties of face-threatening acts, such as speaking about the other’s negative attributes (instead one should select positive ones, without being polite) (Āyār 2.4.2.1–11), or flattery, compulsive requests and rejection.308 The most general strategy of nominalisation is not to mention anything which might lead to violent acts:

‘In the same manner, a muni who is wise, Says not “This cow is fit for being milked”, or “this ox is catigable” Or “capable of drawing a plough or carrying a load” Or “of drawing a chariot”. (But if need be) Permissible is the following vocabulary: “This is a milch cow” “The ox is young” “The bull is thick or short” Or “this is worthy of a chariot” (DVS2 7.24–5).

By the same token, a mendicant is not to say ‘this is the murderer’ or ‘this is a thief’ if such a person enters the house in the night, because if s/he gives a warning, either the thief or s/he him/herself might get killed, or ‘the householder will suspect the ascetic … to be the thief’ (Āyār 2.2.2.4). The reverse strategy is applied to past acts of violence, as evident in the recommendation not to say ‘well done’ about an accomplished worldly task but always to stress the amount of unavoidable karman-producing violence employed (Āyār 2.4.2.3–6).309 The second generally recommended strategy is thus to avoid references which might imply the potential for future acts of violence in both worlds,310 and to condone past and present acts of violence, in order to stimulate

307 See also AUSTIN (1962: 4) and Bourdieu (1991a: 109) on disguising a performative utterance as a descriptive or constative statement. For somewhat different reasons, the counter-intuitive nominal style is also preferred by scientists and philosophers, as Jacobi (1903) has shown with regard to scientific Sanskrit.


310 Umāsvāti’s Śrāvaka-prajñapti (ŚrPr) 264 says: ‘the aim of speech should be the intelligent pursuit of what is best for both worlds and the avoidance of what may cause hurt to others or to oneself or both”; and Kārttikeya defined satya as ‘the avoidance of harmful, harsh, cruel, or secret speech and the use of balanced language that gives satisfaction to all living creatures and expresses the sacred truth’ (in Williams (1983: 77 f.)).
acts of repentance. The latter is the only case of assertiveness which is explicitly demanded from an ascetic. In fact, a sermon is not considered to be *asatya* by Amṛta-candra (c. 11th CE) and other medieval writers, even if unpleasing (*apriya*) (PASU 91–101), in accordance with the general principle that determinate (*avadhāraṇi*) speech which enhances religion is true by definition. The determining factor in the Jain literature on speech, rather than the semantics of words, is the non-violent function of the utterance, not the intention of the speaker. Because this would amount to a general absolution for the religious uses of symbolic violence.

There is only a fine line between unnecessary and necessary violent speech, however, especially in the *satyā-mṛṣā* and *asatyā-mṛṣā* modes. The avoidance of transgression requires great analytic skill (which explains why only senior ascetics are permitted to conduct sermons). The statement quoted above, about the required proper knowledge of ‘true implication in the context of past, present and future’ (*Āyār* 2.4.1.5), is relevant here. An ascetic must be able to discriminate temporal modalities so as to avoid and to repent acts of violence. The ability to distinguish between modalities of time is also the general condition of strategic manipulation, of one’s individual purity, for instance, or of others, and of the self-realisation of the individual in the context of the hierarchical Brāhmaṇical system, where ‘the temporal is intellectually subordinate to the spiritual and enclosed in it’ (DUMONT (1980: 196)). Temporal modalisation, in particular, enables a competent individual to apprehend or create unequivocal speech, and strategic ways of instrumentalising implicitly presupposed background knowledge. By means of the ideal standards of on-recordness, and of non-violence, a competent Jain can discriminate truth and falseness, and right and wrong, as well as explicit and implicit meaning, and its facets of false judgement, unclear speech, ambiguity of meaning, and deceptive purpose. The cultural specific conceptualisation of the ideal of clear, unambiguous

312 MĀLVANIYA (1971: 325).
313 Cf. DVS 7.8–10. See p. 179 ff.
314 Cf. JAINI (1979: 139, 145–7). CAILLAT (1991: 13) dismisses the ‘trival remarks’ on temporal modalisation as unimportant. However, Jains generally do not consider the ‘social functions’ of speech acts, but only the *karmic*, ‘individual functions’. Hemacandra’s YŚ 2.53–64 describes the consequences of *asatyā* as follows: ‘A liar may have his tongue and an ear cut off, may be beaten and imprisoned, treated with contumely, and deprived of his possessions. In another incarnation he may be afflicted with dumbness, speech defects, and fetid breath’ (WILLIAMS (1983: 78)).
316 Cf. HARE (1972).
speech generates also its opposite—an awareness of the implications of speech and the option to exploit them through lies, deception and intentional multivocality.\footnote{One may talk about the ‘invention’ of the symbolical: of the poetic and of rhetorics in this context.}

Compliance with Jain rules of unequivocal, non-violent speech requires reflective monitoring of speech and conscious analysis of conditions of acceptability. The ability to discriminate between various modes of speech renders linguistic and social co-operation as problematic and therefore as manipulable. Rule-generated reflexivity also creates the cognitive potential for the strategic manipulation of social meanings, for instance through the intentional construction of multivocal statements (as it were an instrumentalisation of anekânta-vâda and syâd-vâda). The doctrinally promoted distancing from the world, and the resulting apperception of the variability of perspectives and meanings, can be exploited in many ways—for salvific purposes or for personal gain. There are numerous instances of conscious flouting of (Jain) maxims, for both purposes, for instance in Jain narrative literature. What distinguishes religious and worldly usage of language is, from the point of view of Jain doctrine, only the effect, not the intention of the speaker, nor the words themselves. The speaker has to construct the message from the objective viewpoint of its potential violent/non-violent function, not from a instrumental means-ends perspective. In practice it is difficult to decide which intention prevails—speaker’s intention or systemic intention (SEYFORT RUEGG). The Jains, too, have no other means for judging sincerity of expression, or orientation towards objectivity, but previous conduct. One has to investigate speech acts in context in order to understand the selection and the specific strategic value of certain generalised pragmatic strategies derived from general cultural value-orientations, and recurring functional imperatives. The analysis of isolated types of speech-acts has generally proved to be less fruitful, because it only leads to the proliferation of examples.

(Ad 4) Jains have a keen interest in the actual functioning of their principles (of speech) in particular contexts of speech and of action. Therefore they have added not only meta-rules (concerning the actual observance of rules) but also contextual examples (dṛṣṭānta or udāharaṇa) and regulations for specific situations to the general principles, maxims, and generalised strategies or types of speech. And here, too, we can find the discussion of the role of social norms and institutionalised contexts of language usage, which force a certain direction of interpretation and execution of unsaid social intentions of the speaker upon the hearer. GUMPERZ (1995: 130 ff.) coined the term ‘contextualisation conventions’ to analyse processes of negotiation of implicit socio-cultural presuppositions of different ‘activity types’ defined by a purpose or goal. In the opening stages of any conversation, he observed,
'contextualisation cues' are exchanged to create a platform for co-operation by signalling contextually relevant presuppositions and preferences regarding norm selection. These relational signals 'are inherently ambiguous, i.e. subject to multiple interpretations', and may or may not be accepted:

‘Conversational inference is thus not a matter of assigning truth values to instances of talk. An inference is adequate if it is (a) reasonable given the circumstances at hand, (b) confirmed by information conveyed at various levels of signalling, and (c) implicitly accepted in the course of conversational negotiation’ (Gumperz (1995: 208)).

The rhetorical and practical significance of examples has been recognised in the Jain scriptures from early on. Examples function as arguments in intersubjective negotiations of situation definitions. Different types of examples are distinguished for instance in Ēkaṇa 4.499–503. At the same time, the texts reflect the awareness that general principles and rules cannot be legitimised with reference to examples alone. Ēkaṇa 4.499 and 10.95 point to the common fault (āharana-tad-dosa <āharana-tad-dosā>) of using too many examples and quotes during a debate, and to faulty ways of relating example (udhyaṇa) and rule, amongst other mistakes in the way of speaking.

From a monological observer’s perspective, four paradigmatic contexts of pragmatic ‘religious’ speech discussed in Jain scriptures have been distinguished in this essay. They all concentrate on language usage of ascetics, as paradigms of Jain culture, and presuppose established co-operation: (a) religious debates at royal courts, (b) public sermons of leading ascetics, (c) informal communication of an ascetic with non-ascetics, and (d) communication between ascetics in the context of the monastic hierarchy. I dealt with the third case thus far, and already discussed the implications of narratives presented in public sermons elsewhere.318 For the purpose of the argument of this essay, it will suffice to briefly examine cases of hierarchical monastic communication and of public debate to indicate the role of institutionalised normative expectations of reading and fulfilling the social implications of formal language usage.

The discursive context which is most relevant for ascetics in day to day life is the monastic hierarchy. It has three dimensions which sometimes, but not always, overlap: seniority (dikkhā-pariyāya <dikṣā-parpyāya>), guru-sīsa (<guru-śiṣya>) relationship, and the administrative hierarchy. 319 Qua rule, it is the duty of lower-standing ascetics to serve higher-standing ascetics (as it is the duty of the laity to serve the ascetics). Non-compliance with this norm is sanctioned by elaborated judicial procedures which might lead to excommunication. That is, the social norms

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themselves tend to force an implicature upon the juniors, and restraint upon seniors (ideally: silence). I have shown elsewhere in greater detail that a junior mendicant is expected to read the implications of the speech and minute gestures and conversational clues of the guru, and obliged to serve him/her politely, that is, to perform sevā, as it is the duty of the householder to serve all mendicants. Hence, Jain householders are called uvāsagas <upāsakas>, or servants of the samaṇas <śramaṇas>. Pragmatic intentions and demands are never stated openly within the śramaṇa-saṅgha. But it is a general rule that juniors are supposed to read the implications of seniors and should try to fulfill their unstated wishes:

‘Guessing the teachers thought and the purport of his words, one should express one’s assent, and execute (what he desires to be done). An excellent pupil needs no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly directed; he always carries out his duties as he is told’ (Uttar 1.43 f.).

The way of interpreting the implications of every gesture of superiors and serving (veyāvacca <vaiyāṛtya>) them in accordance with the rules (vinaya), is defined as a religious act of internal asceticism (abhattantara-tava <abhyantara-tapas>). Immersing oneself in the mind of a senior and reading his/her unstated wishes is an act of self-purification qua identification with an officially more advanced soul, taken as an external symbolic manifestation of one’s own inner potential, just like a statue in a temple. At the same time, the prestige of seniors who ‘get things done without ever saying so’ is strengthened by this conventional procedure, which through use of implicit language also reproduces a sense of in-group membership. This example is a good illustration of the general fact that multi-functional public roles imply unforced functional contributions from inferiors. The observation also applies to the laity’s duty to serve the ascetics. The asymmetrical relationship between mendicants and laity is conceptualised as a relationship between speakers and hearers—the laity are called both uvāsagas <upāsakas>, servants, and sāvagas <śrāvakas>, hearers. In both cases, as I have argued above, it is not a particular form of language usage, but the force of the norms and sanctions of the speech situation which direct the Jains of lower status.

321 HOERNLE (1989: 1 n.1), in UD.
324 ‘The more work … hearers do to supply meaning, the deeper their understanding and the greater their sense of involvement with both text and author’ (TANNEN (1989: 23)).
Speech situations for which Jain ascetics are especially trained are many. The two most important forms of non-ritualised language usage a Jain ascetic has to learn are the public sermon (pavayaṇa <pravacana>) to the laity and the art of debate (paoga <prayoga>) or disputation (vivāda) with other ascetics. 326 Both forms of discourse are primarily instruments of social influence, based on the idea of the superiority of the better argument in public discourse or agonistic dialogues, i.e. verbal battles. Polite formal exchanges within the context of a religious hierarchy (type d and c), by contrast, tend to conform with an ideal of ‘speaking in concordance with the one who knows the truth’ (GAEFFKE (1970: 34–8)). Prayoga was/is important for gaining or maintaining social influence at the royal courts etc., and played a major role in medieval South Asia. The way in which this art was taught in the more advanced stages of monastic education327 resembles Aristotelian style rhetorical training, as the following citation from the Āyāra-dasāo <Ācāra-dasāh> (ĀyārD), a Jaina Cheya-sutta (Cheda-sûtra) text, illustrates:

'It is of four kinds: (a) application of one’s knowledge after a complete assessment of one’s own powers in debate, (b) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full assessment of the parisā (assembly), (c) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full appreciation of the environment (khetta) of the debate, (d) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full estimation of the nature of the adjudicators, the ability of the opponent and the attitude of the authorities, etc. (vatthu)' (ĀyārD 4.2, in TATIA–KUMAR (1981: 32)).

It is interesting to note the similarity between the four factors considered relevant for strategy selection in public debate, and BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 79 ff.) variables for the assessment of the seriousness of a FTA, that is, social distance and relative power in particular. The view that South Asians traditionally knew only poetry, but not rhetoric, because of the ‘absence of the institution of public speech’ (HACKER (1985: 13 f.)),328 must be doubted in the light of the evidence presented. I would argue, on the contrary, that self-conscious pragmatic language usage, politeness, and the art of persuasion via the construction of implicatures, is one of the recognised arts of Jain ascetics (and laity).329

326 Thān 350b, 364b, ĀyārD 4.
327 Cf. CORT (2001: 339 f.).
329 See MATILAL (1999: 31) on rules and regulations for debates (kathā or vāda) in Indian philosophical texts.
In this essay, I proposed a theoretical interpretation of syncretic processes as forms of symbolic communication, broadly following Habermas’ analyses of systematically distorted and latent strategic action, predicated on the work of Grice and sociolinguists such as Hymes, Gumperz, Fishman and Brown and Levinson. The advantage of this perspective, compared to classical hermeneutics, is that social processes within a religious tradition do not have to be understood in terms of an enactment or actualising appropriation of textual meaning, or of rule-specification, but can be investigated as open historical processes for which religious knowledge and linguistic repertoire serves as cognitive resource, which can be used for the pursuit of either power or insight. To the extent that cognition and discourse are historically relevant, production of social meaning and co-operation can be understood in terms of the conditions of acceptability of validity claims. Rarely do human insight and instrumental rationality take precedence over habit and contingencies of life. GADAMER’s (1993: 244) objection to Habermas’ ‘idealisation of the critical power of reflection’ and reasons in discourse is therefore justified. However, Habermas’ theory of communicative action is more narrowly concerned with a critique of both latent strategic action and mediated systemic forms of social reproduction, without illusions about the overwhelming factual role of power and indeterminacy in contemporary social processes. FOUCAULT’s (1981: 56) more radical attack on the repressive aspects of discourse as a form of power itself, especially discourses informed by the ‘will to truth’ backed up by exclusionary mechanisms, nevertheless puts its finger on a crucial problem in both moral philosophy and organised religion. Habermas’ theory of communicative action certainly does not properly account for the poetic ‘world-disclosing’ function of language, nor for the historical conditions of the theorisation of the ‘universal’ validity claims itself, which it merely takes as a primitive given of ‘successful’ prosaic communication. Both SEARLE (1993: 91 f., 99) and APEL (1993: 52 f.), despite their differences, criticise the hidden essentialism of this approach as ‘functionalist’ (in an old-fashioned sense), and suggest that the acceptance of validity conditions is a contingent ‘perlocutionary effect’ of the strategic attempt of getting the hearer to agree—an attempt which initially only commits the speaker (as the Jain example shows). Moreover, Habermas’ original approach privileges the educated classes, and neglects empirical cases of reaching agreement or dissent through open strategic uses of language. Yet, the alternative reduction of validity to an effect of universally present ‘empirico-transcendental’ power in Foucault’s or similar theoretical scenarios currently en vogue in Jaina Studies forecloses the possibility of problematising legitimacy once and for all. This, however, seems unwise, not least because, empiri-
cally, the sources of power and legitimacy often do not coincide. This is one of the reasons why DUMONT’s (1980: xxxi) distinction between (political) power (*pouvoir*) and (religious) potency (*puissance*) has gained currency in South Asia research.

Classical Jainism derives its legitimacy ontologically from the presumed direct meditative insight of its omniscient prophets (*tīrthaṅkara*) into the eternal truth of existence (*sat*), i.e. the difference between self (*jīva*) and non-self (*ajīva*). Those who know, who have experienced direct insight, it is said, share an experiential consensus which transcends discourse and rational argument. However, discourse and argument is necessary for the dispersion of religious knowledge amongst the ignorant, although, initially, it can only facilitate first experiences of insight (*samyag-darśana*) by providing some of its conditions through instruction, but not generate insight itself. For Jain doctrine, insight is a psychophysical event which is unexplainable, a mysterious transformation of consciousness, which may or may not occur, once *karmic* bondage is weakened and religious knowledge fuses with personal experience. Paradigmatic activating conditions of insight are temporary feelings of peace accompanied with ‘instructing’ experiences of loss, suffering, or the sight of a saint. Verbal instruction (*upadeśa*) and suggestion (*dhvani*) may also provoke sudden insight (as a perlocutionary effect).330 In practice, it usually does so only after a previous history of interaction, involving rational argument and agonistic debate, which prepares the epistemic ground for ‘true’ or ‘dogmatic’ insight, which may then be triggered circumstantially, for instance by fitting experiences.

I have not discussed the metaphysics and the psychological conditions of religious experience in this essay,331 especially not the hypothetical experiences of the Jinas, but confined myself to the analysis of the conditions of understanding and accepting Jain religious claims as legitimate (*Einsicht*) and of fulfilment of their pragmatic implications. My argument rests on the observation of a principal two-stage process of Jain religious conversion: first, largely through agonistic discourse, based on rational argument, and, second, largely through non-agonistic instruction.332 Although, in principle, an initiated disciple ‘cannot say “no”’ (BLOCH (1975: 19)) to transmitted Jain doctrine anymore after the ‘initial acceptance of the code’ (BLOCH

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331 See JAMES (1982), and footnotes 21, 28, 29, 61, 143, 286.

332 See FLÜGEL (1993, (1994: 217–346)). This scheme has been abstracted from documented conversions to monkhood. It corresponds to the textual ideal (e.g. Uttar 23), but does not necessarily cover the Jain *cliché* of lay conversion through miracle-working. Lay conversions are gradual affairs, often starting with taking limited vows after public sermons and subsequently adding more severe restrictions. Jain vows do not compel the adherent to reject his ancestral beliefs and practices—unless they are wholly incompatible—but lead to a re-evaluation of these practices.
(1975: 24)), and subsequently receives religious instruction from his seniors predominantly in the mode of unquestioned conformity to revealed fundamental truth, debate and rational argument continue on the basis of the accepted ontological and organisational principles (TS 9.25). In other words, although it is predicated on the acceptance of the validity of ultimately incommunicable evidence or feelings, Jain religious discourse, too, is confined to the level of conventional truth (VN), because ‘whatever is beyond the province of speech is inexpressible (or unspeakable)’ (TULSI (1985: 190)). According to the proposed model, Jainism appeals to rationality and insight in different ways on both idealtypcal developmental stages of conversion, and constitutes a kind of therapeutic discourse, which thrives on the interpretation of experience through a pedagogical scheme of explanation, which runs contrary to everyday perceptions and opens up new perspectives, thus inevitably generating ambiguity by ‘splitting the codes’ (TURNER (1986: 56)) and thereby producing the potential for a transformation of meaning and, subsequently, conduct.

Because the appeal to rationality is predominant in Jain discourse, which conventionally contrasts the three jewels (ratna-traya) of right insight (samyag-darśana), right knowledge (samyag-jñâna) and right conduct (samyak-câritra) to ‘blind ritualism’, it seemed legitimate to privilege the perspective of the ascetics in this essay, which are trained in Jain doctrine. The importance of their power of persuasion for the continuation of the Jain tradition is a universal topos of Jain narrative and biographical literature. There, the problem of the moral ambivalence of religious rhetoric is explicitly addressed as a form of necessary violence (āvassaya-hînsā <āvaṣya-hînsā>), to be repented by means of the obligatory ascetic rites (āvaṣyaka). I have not discussed technical Jain theories of suggestion, implication, figures of speech, or narrative genres, nor any particular linguistic exchange in the manner of the ethnography of speaking, but concentrated on the principles of Jain discourse itself, particularly the ones concerning the illegitimacy of ‘unnecessary violent’ (añāvassaya-hînsā <añāvaṣya-hînsā>) speech. In this way, I hope to have shown how structures of traditional authority together with the constraints of given circumstances directly or indirectly pre-empt processes of negotiated meaning by channelling them in a certain direction. Even if the principles of rational inquiry are upheld by Jain doctrine, open critical inquiry as defined by the theory of communicative action in not possible within the confines of the traditional religious institutions.

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334 Cf. BLOCH (1975: 26 f.).
335 Statement of a young Jain in London in conversation with the present author.
The comparison between the theory of communicative action and Jain discourse ethics showed nevertheless significant similarities. Both approaches are rule-oriented, not goal-oriented. That is, they are concerned with the general interest of many, not with the eudaemonic perspective of a single actor, despite the fact that the methods of universalisation are different. The respective ideals of consensus and non-violence mutually implicate each other. Basic non-violence is presupposed by communicative action, and the general interest of all is presupposed by universal non-violence. Though the criterion of generalisability, equal interest, is not theorised in Jain philosophy, and only touched upon with reference to specific negative rights such as the privileged case of the universal interest in avoiding pain,337 the scope of the moral universe is extended from humanity to all living beings, whose essential spiritual equality is a fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy.338 The vanishing points of both theories, the ideal consensus of an infinite community of interpretation and the ideal omniscient observer, presuppose absolute knowledge and absolute consensus. Yet, there are two significant differences. The main difference between the transcendental pragmatics of mutual recognition and the monadological Jain ethics of non-violence concerns the nature of the fundamental principles. The former is predicated on positive norms and the latter on norms of prohibition.339 The implicit method of universalisation of Jain ethics is the double negation, that is, the negation of non-generalisable statements. The resulting priority of physical non-action as a theoretical limiting case (not as a practical maxim) unburdens the doctrine of discussions of specific dilemmas of norm application, thus safeguarding both generalisability and contextual determinateness, while maintaining a perspective of disengagement with the world and non-specific positive duties. The second main difference between the two types of discourse ethics concerns the moral division of labour presupposed by Jain norms of discourse, which does not permit equal communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims, but privileges institutionally verified competent speakers (âpta).340 Having emerged

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337 Cf. GERT’s (1973) ‘minimal ethic’.
338 See DUMONT’s (1977), (1980) works.
339 The general difference of the two approaches has been pointedly expressed by SCHOPENHAUER (1977: 262, § 121) in his critique of the formalism of Kant’s theory of morality and of state-oriented positive concepts of law from a perspective of Indic conceptions of morality: ‘Der Begriff des Rechts ist nämlich, eben wie auch der der Freiheit, ein negativer: sein Inhalt ist eine bloße Negation. Der Begriff des Unrechts ist der positive und ist gleichbedeutend mit Verletzung im weitem Sinne, also laesio. … Hiernach sind dann die Menschenrechte leicht zu bestimmen: Jeder hat das Recht, alles Das zu thun, wodurch er Keinen verletzt.’
340 Habermas is often accused of the same for somewhat different theoretical reasons.
under historical conditions of normative inequality, Jain discourse ethics is not at all concerned with questions of human justice, only with negative individual freedom.

Dumont and Marriott posed the question whether Jainism, built from the same materials as other South Asian religions, can be interpreted as a blueprint for the formation of ‘strategic groups’, for instance by being connected with a set of specific procedures or dominant strategies, which are derived either from the structure of its dominant ideological codes jīva/ajīva and ahiṃsā/hiṃsā and/or the characteristic social position of its dominant lay-followers. Put in this way, any answer of the question must be vulnerable to the critique of socio-cultural ‘essentialism’ as ‘ahistorical’ and ‘reductionist’. But to ask which principles and procedures the Jains themselves regard as ‘essential’ for the validation of their own politics of cultural synthesis remains indispensable. At least five derivative, and still accepted, paradigmatic pragmatic orientations for contexts of interaction between mendicants and non-mendicants can be isolated on the basis of the Āyār and the DVS: (1) impersonalisation, (2) nominalisation (objectivation), (3) degrees of non-speech, silence, and selective non-interaction, and (4) avoiding disagreement by presupposing common ground. All these strategies leave a speaker with a number of defensible interpretations which are technically neither true nor false (satyâsatya) and therefore useful to gloss over gaps between the often contradictory doctrinal and contextual implications of a speech act. The first three strategy types are those of negative politeness, which generally emphasise the mutual autonomy and non-interference of the interlocutors, for instance, by transforming directives into assertives. The last strategy type is a specific instance of positive politeness strategies, which are used to avoid conflict (and thus violence). For the same purpose off-record strategies are employed, which are considered as legitimate forms of symbolic violence, if used for the furtherance of religious insight. The overall result of this preliminary investigation of Jain discourse resonates with PAINE’s (1981: 3) and BRENNIES’–MYERS’ (1984: 12) observation that in many societies, especially in those without elaborated hierarchies or structures of open coercion, conflict or contradiction, while often endemic, is rarely discussed openly, and expressed confrontation or coercion avoided through indirect speech, oriented toward the creation or maintenance of co-operation and the attainment of basic consensus, without saying so. Of course, not only particular speech acts but even the Jain maxims themselves can be read as generalised strategies, because they embody a certain directionality or orientation toward the world. The differentia specifica between the elements of Jain ontology and those of the culturally dominant religious systems of Hinduism, then, opens up negatively determined spaces for a distinct style of communicative action and rhetorical manipulation with characteristic multiple ambiguities and syncretic effects to be studied by future sociolinguistic investigations of Jain discourse.
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