ever been hit during their current relationship. The prevalence of severe pain or injuries resulting from hitting was 12 percent for women and 5 percent for men. Significant risk factors for partner violence were sexual jealousy, patriarchal beliefs, low female contribution to household income, low male socioeconomic status, and alcohol consumption. Partner violence was markedly less common in the developed south and southeast of China than in northern or interior provinces.

By comparison with violence against women, other forms of domestic violence have received comparatively little attention in the People’s Republic. The law is ambivalent on the physical punishment of children. The 1992 Law on the Protection of Minors explicitly prohibited corporal punishment in schools and kindergartens. However, the same law, while forbidding the abuse of children in the family, imposed on parents the obligation of education and discipline in relation to their children. In a society where the physical punishment of children is still widely regarded as necessary, this can easily be understood as authorizing it. A questionnaire survey in 1998 of 493 Chinese schoolchildren on their school and home experience found that 51.1 percent had experienced corporal punishment at school, and 70.6 percent had experienced violence at home (Global Initiative 2009).

Elder abuse has been identified as a growing problem in contemporary China. Greatly extended life expectancy has produced an increase in the numbers of frail old people for whom children have a traditional and legal obligation to care. Yan Yunxiang’s ethnographic study (2003) of changes in rural family life indicates that in the reform era a greater focus is placed on the intimacy of the couple bond, on the nuclear family, and on consumer goods may be leading some of the younger generation to neglect elderly parents.

SEE ALSO Child Piety; Gender Relations; Law on the Protection of Women and Children; Marriage Laws; Rape; Women; Status of.

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DRUGS AND NARCOTICS

From the time of its creation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shared with the Nationalists the aim of opium eradication. This policy was first put into practice during the First United Front (1923–1927) in Guangzhou (Canton), when idealistic republicans with socialist or communist leanings experimented with radical land reform. During the era of the Jiangu Soviet (1931–1934), anti-drug policies were enacted with zeal, becoming a hallmark of Communist rural reform. In line with the moderate New Democracy policies of the later Yan’an years (1936–1945), opium eradication was retained as a theoretical goal. In actual practice, though, narcotic consumption was largely tolerated, and opium poppy cultivation was promoted in order to raise vital revenue for Mao Zedong’s resistance against Nationalist and pro-Japanese forces.

EARLY PRC YEARS

Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the CCP embarked on land reforms in the 1950s that created an unprecedented opportunity for change. The Three-Anti’s and Five-Anti’s Campaigns of the 1950s, which targeted corrupt and criminal elements, facilitated narcotics suppression. Apart from the sporadic campaigns of the early 1950s, the CCP’s control over drug production was maintained during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and eventually extended to the entire country. The 1979 Law on the Protection of Women and Children promulgated in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution prohibited corporal punishment, including the physical punishment of children. The 1992 Law on the Protection of Minors explicitly prohibited corporal punishment in schools and kindergartens. However, the same law, while forbidding the abuse of children in the family, imposed on parents the obligation of education and discipline in relation to their children. In a society where the physical punishment of children is still widely regarded as necessary, this can easily be understood as authorizing it. A questionnaire survey in 1998 of 493 Chinese schoolchildren on their school and home experience found that 51.1 percent had experienced corporal punishment at school, and 70.6 percent had experienced violence at home (Global Initiative 2009).

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from its in-principle position on production of opium crops, the CCP could not afford to be seen as impotent in the fight against this social vice. Yet, in the face of the Korean War and sustained threats from the defeated Nationalists in Taiwan, the PRC leadership initially opted to pursue its antinarcotic policies quietly. The first mass campaign against opiates petered out after intense pressure from forces profiting from its illegal trade. In certain districts opium poppy was grown with official approval throughout the 1950s, partly in order to satisfy the need from China’s fledgling pharmaceutical industry, partly because cadres viewed a gradual weaning-off process as the most desirable option.

Nationalist propaganda from Taibei and Washington seized on the mere existence of state-run opium farms as clear evidence that Beijing was dragging China and swapping the Western world with cheap narcotics. Indeed, international surveillance operations during the early 1950s had revealed that narcotics were being smuggled from Chinese ports (especially Tianjin). In truth, drug squads did easily thwart most illegal activities, and with relative ease. The Five-Anti’s movement greatly reduced the ability of the drug underworld to produce and distribute narcotic substances, and social engineering and unparalleled penetration of the state into local society during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), and the last years of the Mao era ensured that even minor attempts at breaking the antinarcotic legislation of the PRC became all but impossible. With the notable exception of the early 1960s, the central government rarely felt the need to intervene, and then merely by means of legal decrees.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

In marked contrast to the early campaigns, the antidrug campaigns since the 1980s have been unabashed saber rattling. In a world increasingly reliant on the involvement of China in commerce and diplomacy, the government needs to demonstrate that Beijing is serious in its attempts to drain the international market in illegal drugs.

The reasons are compelling. By the late 1950s the so-called Golden Triangle between China, Burma, and Thailand had emerged as the origin of some 50 percent of the global trade in illegal opiates, especially heroine. With Yunnan Province lying just next door to Burma and Thailand, any opening along the borders was bound to have an effect on China’s internal situation. Cross-border smuggling and, importantly, the first confirmed cases of HIV/AIDS in travelers (in particular foreign travelers) caused the central authorities to clamp down on the production and consumption of opiates, first and foremost in this province. Cities such as Baoshan gained such renown in its public fight against narcotics that the confidence of investors in the drug trade began to suffer.

The suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen movement lent a particular rhetorical tone to the narcotics suppression campaign, which by then extended from the former opium-producing province of Yunnan into every corner of China. The attempted eradication of opium in the 1940s by the “patriotic” official Lin Zexu was hailed as part and parcel of a movement to wipe out all elements of “bourgeois liberalism.” What precisely made (domestically produced) methamphetamine (“ice,” derived from ephedrine), cocaine, and amphetamines “bourgeois” or even “imperialist” was not discussed in the state media, but the effect was to associate the Tiananmen demonstrations with the consumption of drugs.

A later interpretation was that narcotics were being channelled into China from Xinjiang, China’s Wild West, by Muslim extremists intent on muzzling the PRC. This belief was compounded by separatist attacks against state targets in metropolitan China, notably Beijing and Shanghai.

DRUG USE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

In today’s mega-cities a vibrant entertainment sphere for the young has opened up. Many youngsters encounter their first narcotic experience in a nightclub or in the company of friends, often in parks. The predominance of amphetamines seems to indicate that China’s dependence on inhaled sedative opiates is well and truly over, and that Shanghai today has more in common with contemporary New York City than with the Shanghai of the 1930s. China’s narcotic culture is thus in a process of globalization, in tune with its economic integration into the wider world.

The link between injected drugs and HIV/AIDS is frequently made. According to figures compiled in 1999, more than 70 percent of the infected population are intravenous drug users. The extent of the problem becomes palpable when 2003 estimates by the National Narcotics Control Commission (guojia jindu weiyuanhui, NNCC) are taken into account. Out of a total of nearly 3,000 counties and cities in China, 2,200 have been classified as suffering from endemic drug abuse, and there are some 1.05 million recreational users. Female addiction appears to be substantial: Although less than 17 percent of the total number recorded at that time were women, in certain areas female drug abusers accounts for more than one-third of all cases.

There are regional differences in narcotics consumption within China. Sichuan, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces, all within relatively easy travel distance from Laos and Burma, have experienced a boom in illegal drugs. Although the smugglers are usually locals, a larger criminal network stretching throughout China to Hong Kong and
Taiwan has developed. In addition to “traditional” criminal activities such as prostitution, people smuggling, and drug trafficking, these crime networks (triads) concentrate on international money laundering and Internet fraud. As opposed to the Mafia and to comparable criminal organizations in Russia and the United States, China’s gangs usually work discretely and in quasi-legal activities (e.g., local transport, street markets, bars, and public entertainment). In Europe and in the Americas, their commercial activities in Chinatowns are often fully legal (e.g., restaurants, shops).

Traditional triads have successfully infiltrated local government structures, resulting in extra-legal (weifa) activities that are not, strictly speaking, against the law. This legal twilight zone clearly has benefited the distribution of illegal drugs since the death of Deng Xiaoping. Another important factor has been the increased capability of producing synthetic drugs within the PRC. Whereas amphetamines were the drug of choice of young clubbers during the 1990s, there has been a trend in the 2000s toward ketamine, particularly in the southern provinces. China thus is evolving from importer to drug-producing country. According to intelligence from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), easy access to chemical substances and to laboratories greatly facilitates the production of opiates and methamphetamine.

ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGNS

Official education campaigns have tended to focus more on related issues, such as illegal trade, than on drug prevention per se. However, recently there has been a clear change in the level of official recognition accorded to China’s drug addiction problem. In 1990 the NNCC was formed from existing drug-suppression agencies belonging to government ministries, the police, and China’s customs services. In 1998 the Ministry for Public Security established a dedicated drug-suppression agency (jinduju) with branch agencies at provincial, district, and local levels. A majority of these subagencies operate in conjunction with newly created police drug squads. In the
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same year, China’s parliament approved the creation of a national narcotics control foundation (Zhongguo dupin jijinshuyuan) to provide financial and educational support. Simultaneous changes in China’s legal system produced a gradual shift from a penalizing to a preventative approach. In 2000, China’s approximately 1,000 drug rehabilitation centers provided help for 224,000 out-patient habitual drug users, as well as for 120,000 in-patient users. The philosophy guiding the centers can be summarized as “education, moral improvement, recuperation” (jiaoyu, gaozhi, wanjiu). In a landmark event in October 2005, the UNODC was granted permission to set up a permanent office in Beijing.

SEE ALSO HIV/AIDS; Lin Zexu; Opium, 1800–1950.

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