I first heard the story of the Nubian and the Roman circus under somewhat dubious circumstances, which need not detain us here, from a consultant of the British Transport Authority whose job it was to persuade the British public and politicians that increasing the size and number of juggernauts would be of great benefit to the environment. As it is a shaggy dog story, I give only the gist.

During the heyday of Roman circuses a group of mixed Christians was to be fed to the lions. As they were escorted in front of the expectantly cheering crowd, a giant Nubian man gently grouped his fellow believers together and told them to leave the lions to him. By various means the Nubian dispatched the first three males who attacked with great efficiency. Neither the audience, nor the Caesar, were pleased at this peremptory reversal of their anticipated afternoon's entertainment. So the lions were caged, a troupe of gladiators sent in to seize, bind and bury the Nubian up to his neck in the sand. When the lions were released again it took some time before a cautious male stepped up to the immobilized Christian, sniffed him and decided it was safe to proceed to lunch. As he passed over the Nubian, however, the latter undeterred twisted his neck and bit off the animal's genitals. Upon which a voice from the crowd was heard to call out: 'Fight fair, you black bastard!' History does not relate subsequent events.

This party piece embodies themes which some anthropologists may find unsavoury, concerned as they maintain themselves to be with understanding and explaining people in other cultures to a more or less uninterested world. Behind this safe liberal attitude however, lurk more similarities with the Romans in the story than most care, or dare, to admit. Who, after all, represents these others? And on whose terms are they, as a recent school of thought would have it, allowed their voices back?

In praise of pillage

'Quietness, grown sick of rest, would purge
By any desperate change.'

(Anthony and Cleopatra I, iii)

Anthropologists have a reputation as a predatory lineage. They are great colonizers: so we now have the anthropology-of-almost-anything from violence or evil to women, and doubtless soon premature balding. While
consists in the inscription of social action (strictly, 'our own constructions of other people's constructions'—Geertz 1973: 9). This is made possible by the 'fixing' of transient human discourse into autonomous text, detached from actual utterances and speakers' intentions. Culture therefore can, and should, be read like a text. A logical development is to submit ethnographies themselves to textual analysis which, as fate would have it, casts serious doubts on its original prophet's own pronouncements (see Clifford 1983: 132–33; Crapanzano 1986: 68–76). The textual critics also identify themselves with an assortment of 'post-structuralist' and effectively 'post-Marxist' French thinkers. Despite internal differences in stress, the latter are generally sceptical of the humanist focus on interpretation and meaning of the former. They presume distrust in the capacity of reason and language to reveal eternal, or even immediate, truths, preferring instead to stress the play of power in cultural discourse. Discourse on this reading is closer to the preconditions of action and speech, its historical context, than to the voices of human actors. There are important differences between the main protagonists (Hobart 1985). Whether attempting a synthesis and rendering allegiance both unto Caesar and unto God is sophisticated eclecticism or plain philosophical naiveté, depends a bit on whether one takes the textualists' own view or that of their critics.

One of the textualists' main charges is that anthropologists (usually British) have been slow to appreciate that ethnographies do not simply capture and encapsulate facts. Some of the accused whom I know agree, others contend they have taken it into account from the first, others seem not to grasp what all the fuss is about. There is certainly a prima facie case for arguing that writing is not a neutral medium between reality and its representation, but a process with its own history and implications. Looking, for instance, at textual traditions allows the exploration of such issues as how regional differences were construed, how they become perpetuated and affect the course of inquiry. What began as a useful corrective to a naive theory of representation (Clifford 1983) has come, however, to lay claim, in such works as Writing Culture, to be a full-blown vision of anthropology as critical textuality, ethnography as polyphony, or culture as genre.

At this point the problems begin. While juicy images are eye-catching and suitably erudite sources—abstruse Polish logicians or obscure Elizabethans are to be recommended—often secure professional preferment, ideas involve presuppositions and have implications beyond their immediate application. Although a critical reading of ethnography proposes a purgative of Western ethnocentrism, as a theoretical approach it easily becomes a glaring example of what it condemns, because it is riddled with its own cultural conceptions—hence the American and French Foucaults. Like so much ' reflexive' thinking, what purports to be radical and emancipatory, on close scrutiny turns out to be unreflective, conservative, and subtly hegemonic. It requires everyone to participate on its own terms.

Such remarks about evidently well-meaning scholars need substantiation. In what follows I consider critically the implications of several linked, if not obvious, presuppositions of this textual criticism. These include such old stand-bys as a material metaphor of culture, the psychic unity of mankind,
the metaphysics of presence and a correspondent theory of meaning, which may be explicitly eschewed but are unwittingly retained. These combine in a naive theory of agency. (Crudely, culture is treated as the negotiated product of a dialogue between humans who share a common subjectivity expressed in different cultural styles but which is revealed by a sensitive reading of their authentic voices.) If this seems simplistic, it looks pretty polished compared to the better known anthropological accounts of South East Asia. Both though achieve a sort of hegemony by establishing the superiority of the knowing author over their objects of study and, recursively, reconstitute the peoples in question and authorize them to exist and act in quite alien ways. Even the brief analysis of one culture, Bali, with which I conclude, suggests the currency of ideas about identity and agency which are entirely precluded from recognition.

In short, although the new textual criticism is notionally concerned with how we distort the Other, it lands up indulging our seemingly endless passion with ourselves, our language, metaphors and intellectual spectacles, and oddly leaves other peoples even more remote than before. (Ironically, Foucault's suggestively impersonal epithet, 'the Other', has increasingly become an anthropological convenience for lumping the rest of the world together.) The concern with ethnography as knowledge overlooks the world of action and agents of which it is part. So, despite claiming to embrace the Other and liberate its polyphonic discourse, such approaches perpetuate the vision of the anthropologist as the superior 'knowing subject' who beneficently grants the Other its right to appear on its own behalf in the circus of contemporary academia. Unfortunately, like the Nubian, the Other has first been safely trussed up in relations of economic and political dependence, and firmly embedded in the sands of Western intellectual categories. So much is fairly familiar. The cruellest cut of all, however, is that the Other is only authorized to participate according to Western notions of self and action, and so is liable to be deemed not to be playing fair when it does not co-operate.

On authors and authorizing

'Is there no voice more worthy than my own?'

... (Julius Caesar iii, 1, 49)...

the superiority of the knowing author over their objects of study and, recursively, reconstitute the peoples in question and authorize them to exist and act in quite alien ways. Even the brief analysis of one culture, Bali, with which I conclude, suggests the currency of ideas about identity and agency which are entirely precluded from recognition.

In short, although the new textual criticism is notionally concerned with how we distort the Other, it lands up indulging our seemingly endless passion with ourselves, our language, metaphors and intellectual spectacles, and oddly leaves other peoples even more remote than before. (Ironically, Foucault's suggestively impersonal epithet, 'the Other', has increasingly become an anthropological convenience for lumping the rest of the world together.) The concern with ethnography as knowledge overlooks the world of action and agents of which it is part. So, despite claiming to embrace the Other and liberate its polyphonic discourse, such approaches perpetuate the vision of the anthropologist as the superior 'knowing subject' who beneficently grants the Other its right to appear on its own behalf in the circus of contemporary academia. Unfortunately, like the Nubian, the Other has first been safely trussed up in relations of economic and political dependence, and firmly embedded in the sands of Western intellectual categories. So much is fairly familiar. The cruellest cut of all, however, is that the Other is only authorized to participate according to Western notions of self and action, and so is liable to be deemed not to be playing fair when it does not co-operate.

As far as they go, Clifford's criticisms are pertinent but are they as radical as is claimed?

In spite of the brave attempt, Clifford's own text holds him back. Ethnographies are implicitly divided into genres; and their subject matter is assumed to be homogeneous. (Incidentally, if ethnographies are complex and heterogeneous how would we establish that new ones would produce a truer account than existing ones?) Although Clifford briefly raises the question of the authorship of field notes and the role of the reader in realizing there to be more than the 'text's dominant voice' (1983: 136, 141), he proceeds most of the time as if the text were a unitary object and the sole agent of the monograph the anthropologist. As a result he embraces an antidiluvian model of agency which excludes the complex relations of action and language which are at the heart of our 'ambiguous, multi-vocal world' (1983: 119). The key problem is 'how is unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account ... composed by an individual author?' (1983: 120). Clifford reasonably notes, however, that,

it is difficult to say very much about experience ... if only because appeals to experience often act as validations for ethnographic authority ... But this experiential world, an intersubjective ground for objective forms of knowledge, is precisely what is missing or problematic for an ethnographer entering an alien culture.

(1983: 128)

As far as they go, Clifford's criticisms are pertinent but are they as radical as is claimed?

In spite of the brave attempt, Clifford's own text holds him back. Ethnographies are implicitly divided into genres; and their subject matter is assumed to be homogeneous. (Incidentally, if ethnographies are complex and heterogeneous how would we establish that new ones would produce a truer account than existing ones?) Although Clifford briefly raises the question of the authorship of field notes and the role of the reader in realizing there to be more than the 'text's dominant voice' (1983: 136, 141), he proceeds most of the time as if the text were a unitary object and the sole agent of the monograph the anthropologist. As a result he embraces an antidiluvian model of agency which excludes the complex relations of action and language which are at the heart of our 'ambiguous, multi-vocal world' (1983: 119). The key problem is 'how is unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account ... composed by an individual author?' (1983: 120). Clifford reasonably notes, however, that,

it is difficult to say very much about experience ... if only because appeals to experience often act as validations for ethnographic authority ... But this experiential world, an intersubjective ground for objective forms of knowledge, is precisely what is missing or problematic for an ethnographer entering an alien culture.

(1983: 128)

It becomes necessary to conceive ethnography, not as the experience and interpretation of a circumscribed 'other' reality, but rather as a constructive negotiation involving at least two, and usually more, conscious, politically significant subjects. Paradigms of experience and interpretation are yielding to paradigms of discourse, of dialogue and polyphony.

(1983: 133)
language or some tentatively cautious expression, but as ‘voice’, which brings to mind Derrida’s point that voice implies the intimate and immediate presence of experience and subjectivity. Despite the supposed transition from experience to discourse, the theme of voices reappears continually in the images of dialogue and polyphony. Voice somehow captures the reality of personal experience. Fieldwork, we are told, rests on inter-subjectivity but this simply begs the question of personal identity and shared subjectivity in the first place. In other words, we seem to be faced with a very old fashioned idea of the self, not just as the sole kind of agent, but as an autonomous, ‘knowing subject’ in Foucault’s sardonic phrase. This suspicion is borne out by the depiction of ethnography as a negotiation between conscious subjects which conjures up all sorts of utilitarian ghosts. Negotiation presupposes not only an account of intention, interests and self but also, as Durkheim observed long ago, a culturally variable language in which it is conducted (Hobart 1986). After all this has been imposed on the unfortunate Other—at once generalized in its spurious specificity and revalorized by superior agency—it is naïve at best to inform them or the reader that they are now politically significant subjects.

The textualists’ own text tells us much more though. In the Introduction to Writing culture, the essays, we are told (paraphrasing Geertz 1973: 15) focus on ‘the constructed, artificial nature’ of ‘text making’. For ethnography ‘is always caught up in the invention, not the representation, of culture’. It is ‘situated between powerful systems of meaning’, ‘at the boundaries of civilizations, cultures, classes’, and so on. So the essays ‘reach beyond texts to contexts of power, resistance, institutional constraint’ (Clifford 1986a: 2) within which anthropological ideas are ‘enmeshed’ (1986a: 11) by ‘staging dialogues’ (1986a: 14) to reach the ‘polyphony’ of ‘negotiated realities’ whereby the falsity of ‘monophonic authority’ is ‘revealed’ (1986a: 15). Such ‘post-modernism’ is distinct in ‘demanding new forms of inventiveness and subtlety’ (1986a: 22–23), where ‘divergent styles of writing are . . . grappling with these new orders of complexity’ (1986a: 13).

The metaphors are striking. Texts are things made, as cultures are invented, by anthropologists. Power is conceived as force working against resistances and constraints. Meaning and culture, indeed knowledge itself, are bounded, concrete entities. The moving spirit in this solidified world is Mind through the instrument of language. Culture is revealed through language as authentic voices. As Clifford’s allegories, more constitutive than deconstructive, run amuck he is left with a serious problem of agency. The author of the ethnographic text has become still less a partial instrument than the agent who enables people in other cultures to speak and—the more the text assumes immediacy instead of the fieldwork—in a sense to exist. Paradoxically, purging the author’s bias has culminated in the ethnographer being left to authorize and perpetuate the Other. Ethnography becomes the poisoned chalice of an elixir of immortality.

The theoretical pretensions of the approach are perhaps best brought out by two other contributors. Tyler, with great aplomb, undertakes to tell us what post-modern ethnography should look like, blithely lumping anyone in sight under that label (1986: 125) from Lyotard to Habermas despite the latter’s strenuous denials (1985). Previous scholars ‘have missed the true import of “discourse”, which is “the other as us”, for the point of discourse is not how to make a better representation, but how to avoid representation’ (1986: 128). Oh, good! Behind all the talk of polyphony, pluralism and so on, there is a true view and the textualists, or at least Tyler, have it. (If discourse has a true import, Tyler is backing the wrong horse in embracing post-modernism which is usually associated with aiming to challenge the possibility of such true knowledge.) The Other has now been absorbed into the superior language of the ethnographer (a danger of which Asad warned, 1986: 156–60), made safe for democracy and, further, has become conflated with the self-centred and total ego of the anthropologist.

Tyler sets out to undermine the delightfully simple-minded view that ‘the ethnographic text’ represents reality. Meaning is to be found, not in representation, but instead in evocation (note once again the appeal to primal ‘voice’) which frees ethnography from ‘mimesis’, objects, facts, descriptions, and so on (1986: 130). Apart from pre-empting inquiry into indigenous notions and usage of reference (on which Balinese for instance are rather subtle), Tyler is flogging the long-dead horse of crude Correspondence Theory seemingly unaware that the argument passed him by some time ago (on his own countrymen alone, see Davidson 1973; Goodman 1981; Quine 1953, 1960). The idea that the sole, let alone simple, purging of the author’s bias has culminated in the ethnographer being left to authorize and perpetuate the Other. Ethnography becomes the poisoned chalice of an elixir of immortality.

The theoretical pretensions of the approach are perhaps best brought out by two other contributors. Tyler, with great aplomb, undertakes to tell us what post-modern ethnography should look like, blithely lumping anyone in sight under that label (1986: 125) from Lyotard to Habermas despite the latter’s strenuous denials (1985). Previous scholars ‘have missed the true import of “discourse”, which is “the other as us”, for the point of discourse is not how to make a better representation, but how to avoid representation’ (1986: 128). Oh, good! Behind all the talk of polyphony, pluralism and so on, there is a true view and the textualists, or at least Tyler, have it. (If discourse has a true import, Tyler is backing the wrong horse in embracing post-modernism which is usually associated with aiming to challenge the possibility of such true knowledge.) The Other has now been absorbed into the superior language of the ethnographer (a danger of which Asad warned, 1986: 156–60), made safe for democracy and, further, has become conflated with the self-centred and total ego of the anthropologist.

The promised post-modern revolution, overshadowed by the past, pales into an abortive rebellion. Perhaps we learn a bit about Clifford and his ideas, but not much about his ‘entourage but precious little about people in other cultures. Inspection suggests that this exclusion is built into the approach. For the knowable world is bounded, concrete entities. The moving spirit in this solidified world is Power is conceived as force working against resistances and constraints. Meaning and culture, indeed knowledge itself, is Mind through the instrument of language. Culture is revealed through language as authentic voices. As Clifford’s allegories, more constitutive than deconstructive, run amuck he is left with a serious problem of agency. The author of the ethnographic text has become still less a partial instrument than the agent who enables people in other cultures to speak and—the more the text assumes immediacy instead of the fieldwork—in a sense to exist. Paradoxically, purging the author’s bias has culminated in the ethnographer being left to authorize and perpetuate the Other. Ethnography becomes the poisoned chalice of an elixir of immortality.

The theoretical pretensions of the approach are perhaps best brought out by two other contributors. Tyler, with great aplomb, undertakes to tell us what post-modern ethnography should look like, blithely lumping anyone in sight under that label (1986: 125) from Lyotard to Habermas despite the latter’s strenuous denials (1985). Previous scholars ‘have missed the true import of “discourse”, which is “the other as us”, for the point of discourse is not how to make a better representation, but how to avoid representation’ (1986: 128). Oh, good! Behind all the talk of polyphony, pluralism and so on, there is a true view and the textualists, or at least Tyler, have it. (If discourse has a true import, Tyler is backing the wrong horse in embracing post-modernism which is usually associated with aiming to challenge the possibility of such true knowledge.) The Other has now been absorbed into the superior language of the ethnographer (a danger of which Asad warned, 1986: 156–60), made safe for democracy and, further, has become conflated with the self-centred and total ego of the anthropologist.

The promised post-modern revolution, overshadowed by the past, pales into an abortive rebellion. Perhaps we learn a bit about Clifford and his ideas, but not much about his ‘entourage but precious little about people in other cultures. Inspection suggests that this exclusion is built into the approach. For the knowable world is bounded, concrete entities. The moving spirit in this solidified world is Power is conceived as force working against resistances and constraints. Meaning and culture, indeed knowledge itself, is Mind through the instrument of language. Culture is revealed through language as authentic voices. As Clifford’s allegories, more constitutive than deconstructive, run amuck he is left with a serious problem of agency. The author of the ethnographic text has become still less a partial instrument than the agent who enables people in other cultures to speak and—the more the text assumes immediacy instead of the fieldwork—in a sense to exist. Paradoxically, purging the author’s bias has culminated in the ethnographer being left to authorize and perpetuate the Other. Ethnography becomes the poisoned chalice of an elixir of immortality.

The theoretical pretensions of the approach are perhaps best brought out by two other contributors. Tyler, with great aplomb, undertakes to tell us what post-modern ethnography should look like, blithely lumping anyone in sight under that label (1986: 125) from Lyotard to Habermas despite the latter’s strenuous denials (1985). Previous scholars ‘have missed the true import of “discourse”, which is “the other as us”, for the point of discourse is not how to make a better representation, but how to avoid representation’ (1986: 128). Oh, good! Behind all the talk of polyphony, pluralism and so on, there is a true view and the textualists, or at least Tyler, have it. (If discourse has a true import, Tyler is backing the wrong horse in embracing post-modernism which is usually associated with aiming to challenge the possibility of such true knowledge.) The Other has now been absorbed into the superior language of the ethnographer (a danger of which Asad warned, 1986: 156–60), made safe for democracy and, further, has become conflated with the self-centred and total ego of the anthropologist.
To the extent that Tyler is coherent, he unwittingly embraces most of the presuppositions behind the arguments he attacks. Why, for instance, should culture be about meaning? And why should we be offered a dichotomous choice between ethnography and representation in the first place? The answers open a can of worms. He assumes essential processes of understanding which constitute exclusive, indeed dichotomous, classes. Doing away with representing would not dispose of the ontological problem of what is being done, or if it is doing to what. One evokes something, however conceived, unless we are to imagine pure undirected evoking, like pure emoting. (Would Tyler wish to argue that his critique of representation is itself purely evocative?) In all this, the nature of the evoking self is treated as curiously unproblematic. Instead we are offered the Western mind reflecting on itself and its creations: 'post-modern ethnography is an object of meditation' (1986: 134). These are not quibbles because they point to confusions in the critical textual project quite beside the rampant essentialism, ontological myopia and assured egoism which the reader has, mercifully briefly, encountered above.

The world Tyler is trying to enter has already been depicted by Baudrillard. It is a world of simulacra created by the knowing subject who in turn becomes a simulation. Simulation, unlike representation, starts 'from the radical negation of the sign as value' (1983a: 11). If one follows this path, the image goes through successive phases:

- it is the reflection of a basic reality
- it masks and perverts a basic reality
- it masks the absence of a basic reality
- it bears no relation to any reality

whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum. . . When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality: of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. There is an escalation of the true, of the lived experience; a resurrection of the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared.

(1983a: 11–12)
forms of domination by underwriting the conditions which made this possible. We are invited to witness a conspiracy against oppression but are left with Neros fiddling while Rome burns.

Hegemony and cryogeny

Steering clear of the Charybdis of a regressive reflexivity is no excuse for leaping back into the gorges of the Scylla of naïve realism. A study of regional traditions of ethnographic writing may promise an escape from ethnocentric generalization and enable one in theory to stand back and look at the circumstances in which certain ideas come to be accepted as typifying a particular area of the world (see Strathern in this volume). There are two difficulties however. The first is a trap to which textualism is also prey. It may crudely be epitomized by the question of how much perceived variation is due to the emergence of a specific textual tradition and how much to real differences between regions? The second is whether one can trace an emergent tradition without constructing a genealogy which represents sectarian interests at the expense of views of people in other societies, subjects or schools. Focusing on the former obscures the ways in which commentary necessarily involves relations of power as much as does ethnographic writing.

My objection is that to see ethnography in terms of an allelomorphic dichotomy of reality and textually-informed knowing subject is misguided. It rests on a dubious, and highly essentialized, vision of reality, knowledge and agency. In its baldest version it assumes a naïve realism (facts are given), linked to a passive theory of knowledge based on a visual metaphor (truth will be perceived when distortions are removed, cf. Rorty 1980: 3-45). The facts and values of a culture, however heterogeneous and changing, are ultimately given. The problem becomes how best to cope with the distortions inevitably imposed by ethnography, whether these be inadequacies of circumstances, method, personality, intellectual or textual tradition, and so on. Reflexivity just adds to the burden of anthropologist as hero. The antithetical view, sometimes labelled idealist, that humans invent culture (Wagner 1981; and that ethnography is therefore constructions of constructions) only shifts the emphasis from the world 'out there' to the world 'in there' of the knowing subject. Juggling both views at once, whether by accepting both naturalism and cultural variability (Blok 1977) or by textualizing the world (see Strathern in this volume) is a trap which textualism is also prey. It may crudely be epitomized by the question of how much perceived variation is due to the emergence of a specific textual tradition and how much to real differences between regions? The second is whether one can trace an emergent tradition without constructing a genealogy which represents sectarian interests at the expense of views of people in other societies, subjects or schools. Focusing on the former obscures the ways in which commentary necessarily involves relations of power as much as does ethnographic writing.

My objection is that to see ethnography in terms of an allelomorphic dichotomy of reality and textually-informed knowing subject is misguided.

I would merely add that imposing our ideas of knowledge, self and reality are the more incisive the more carefully they are wrapped up in another for a long time. Ethnography is a newcomer to a world of complex and confused past dialectical relationships. The facts reported by ethnographers do not exist in vacuo but are continually being reworked by agents, including ethnographers themselves, in particular cultural and historical situations. Knowledge, including that pernicious thing the ethnographer's self-consciousness, is not a passive process of realizing what is already there, but again a continued re-working on different occasions (even if academics sometimes have to run fast to stand still). In other words, the reality and the textual traditions which notionally might determine the 'content' of ethnography are themselves the results of previous (and, more often than is usually allowed, mutual but not necessarily mutually comprehensible) acts, as is the knowledge and consciousness of both ethnographers and their subjects.

Inden, writing about Orientalism, has raised a point which applies with equal force to anthropologists. For Western knowledge is privileged in relation to that of the Orientals and it invariably places itself in a relationship of intellectual dominance over that of the Easterners. It has appropriated the power to represent the Oriental, to translate and explain his (and her) thoughts and acts not only to Europeans and Americans but also to the Orientals themselves. But that is not all. Once his special knowledge enabled the Orientalist and his countrymen to gain trade concessions, conquer, colonize, rule and punish the East. Now it authorizes the area studies specialist and his colleagues in government to advise and assist, develop and modernize, arm and stabilize the countries of the so-called Third World. In many respects the intellectual activities of the Orientalist have even produced the very Orient which it constructed in its discourse.

(Inden 1986: 408; my emphases)
of agency in the relationship of subjects, authors, texts and readers. What is seminal depends partly on what it spawns. So, rather than just add another premature contribution, it may well briefly considering how some of the best known approaches to South East Asia depict their subjects, how far certain works attain the curious status of being definitive and how a textual tradition may become an agent in constituting ethnographic reality.

The question of how South East Asia has been represented by the West would, and indeed already has, taken up several books (on recent anthropological work on Indonesia alone see Boon 1977, 1982; de Josselin de Jong 1983a, 1984; Koentjaraningrat, 1975; on how this has affected, or been used by, the peoples concerned, see the contributions to Hobart and Taylor 1986). As anthropologists are relative innocents in a field well worked over by archaeologists, historians and orientalists, the arguments over the nature and implications of a specifically South East Asian textual tradition, were it desirable, would be a substantial undertaking well beyond the scope of this paper. So instead I shall consider briefly whether there are (as Inden has argued for India, forthcoming) what might be regarded with hindsight as hegemonic texts which have established the terms of future discussion and which have, in a sense, helped to constitute South East Asian societies. While future research will, no doubt, reveal more influential sources (Conrad's novels?), for anthropological purposes I shall suggest there is a fascinating cryogenic trend which serves, accidentally or deliberately, to freeze South East Asian societies from changes which are depicted as modern and external.

The way in which Western discourses affect their 'objects' is apparent in the notion of South East Asia itself. The term is a convenience born in the aftermath of the Second World War to cover the area including Thailand (then Siam) and the colonies of Dutch Indonesia, the Hispano-American Philippines, British Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei, the White Rajas' Sarawak, and French Indo-China. Subsequently it has served various parties' interests, not least those of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), at times to represent themselves as having something in common, while historians have traced genealogies of kingship (from Java to Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand, although not under those names) within the region, in broader terms South East Asian societies have usually been regarded as peripheral to the two great Civilizations of India and China, as the composites Indo-China and Indonesia suggest. The political marginality was long under-written by archaeological, historical and cultural de Jong 1983a, 1984; Koentjaraningrat, 1975; on how this has affected, or been used by, the peoples concerned, see the contributions to Hobart and Taylor 1986). As anthropologists are relative innocents in a field well worked over by archaeologists, historians and orientalists, the arguments over the nature and implications of a specifically South East Asian textual tradition, were it desirable, would be a substantial undertaking well beyond the scope of this paper. So instead I shall consider briefly whether there are (as Inden has argued for India, forthcoming) what might be regarded with hindsight as hegemonic texts which have established the terms of future discussion and which have, in a sense, helped to constitute South East Asian societies. While future research will, no doubt, reveal more influential sources (Conrad's novels?), for anthropological purposes I shall suggest there is a fascinating cryogenic trend which serves, accidentally or deliberately, to freeze South East Asian societies from changes which are portrayed as diversified, largely decentralized and disorganized. As Boon has pointed out (1986), the British colonial authors on Sumatera, Java and Bali alone (Marsden 1811; Raffles 1817; Crawford 1820) described, and indeed commended, these three adjacent islands as potential models, as 'controllable', 'monumental' and 'Kawifed' (literally, Indianized) respectively. Another way this diversity is expressed is in an opposition between the central (Hindu-Buddhist) states of Java and Bali on the one hand and the local rulers (often mercantile Muslim) of small lowland areas and aperhal swidden societies of the 'Outer Islands' on the other (a dichotomy given geographical flesh by Geertz 1963a). Whether the former constituted far-flung empires or barely controlled the perimeters of their own capitals, depends on one's prior assumptions; as does whether the sources upon which rival interpretations are based are considered historical chronicles or not (e.g. Pigeaud 1960-63; cf. Berg 1965). Even the adherents of a vision of dynastic splendour firmly place this in a long-lost past. So the purported subsequent disorganization and squalor make the past, and the necessity of a European managerial presence, appear desirable by contrast.

The themes of diversity and disorganization spread well beyond Indonesia. An example is Embree's famous characterization of Thai society (maybe by contrast to Japan where he worked before) as 'a loosely structured social system'. Here we learn that the Thai are 'individualistic' to the point of an 'almost determined lack of regularity, discipline and regulation' (1950: 182), in which 'obligations are not allowed to burden one unduly' (1950: 184). This extreme individualism leads to 'permissiveness' which celebrates 'enjoyment not hard work' and indeed 'to tell a lie successfully, to dupe someone else, is praiseworthy in Thai culture' (1950: 191, 190, 186). Similar themes permeate Leach's Political systems of Highland Burma (although I hardly think either would generally be considered to have wielded a hegemonic influence over subsequent regional ethnography). Highland Burma certainly exemplifies several common trends in the literature. The Kachin are incapable of efficient central organization and attempts invariably collapse. And their appearance of stability or continuity is ritual or symbolic (see Gellner's critique, 1973). The extent of local variation invites recourse to a conjunctural history of plural influences. So, what is culturally geographical flesh by Geertz 1963a): whether the former constituted far-flung empires or barely controlled the perimeters of their own capitals, depends on one's prior assumptions; as does whether the sources upon which rival interpretations are based are considered historical chronicles or not (e.g. Pigeaud 1960-63; cf. Berg 1965). Even the adherents of a vision of dynastic splendour firmly place this in a long-lost past. So the purported subsequent disorganization and squalor make the past, and the necessity of a European managerial presence, appear desirable by contrast.

The themes of diversity and disorganization spread well beyond Indonesia. An example is Embree's famous characterization of Thai society (maybe by contrast to Japan where he worked before) as 'a loosely structured social system'. Here we learn that the Thai are 'individualistic' to the point of an 'almost determined lack of regularity, discipline and regulation' (1950: 182), in which 'obligations are not allowed to burden one unduly' (1950: 184). This extreme individualism leads to 'permissiveness' which celebrates 'enjoyment not hard work' and indeed 'to tell a lie successfully, to dupe someone else, is praiseworthy in Thai culture' (1950: 191, 190, 186). Similar themes permeate Leach's Political systems of Highland Burma (although I hardly think either would generally be considered to have wielded a hegemonic influence over subsequent regional ethnography). Highland Burma certainly exemplifies several common trends in the literature. The Kachin are incapable of efficient central organization and attempts invariably collapse. And their appearance of stability or continuity is ritual or symbolic (see Gellner's critique, 1973). The extent of local variation invites recourse to a conjunctural history of plural influences. So, what is culturally geographical flesh by Geertz 1963a): whether the former constituted far-flung empires or barely controlled the perimeters of their own capitals, depends on one's prior assumptions; as does whether the sources upon which rival interpretations are based are considered historical chronicles or not (e.g. Pigeaud 1960-63; cf. Berg 1965). Even the adherents of a vision of dynastic splendour firmly place this in a long-lost past. So the purported subsequent disorganization and squalor make the past, and the necessity of a European managerial presence, appear desirable by contrast.

The themes of diversity and disorganization spread well beyond Indonesia. An example is Embree's famous characterization of Thai society (maybe by contrast to Japan where he worked before) as 'a loosely structured social system'. Here we learn that the Thai are 'individualistic' to the point of an 'almost determined lack of regularity, discipline and regulation' (1950: 182), in which 'obligations are not allowed to burden one unduly' (1950: 184). This extreme individualism leads to 'permissiveness' which celebrates 'enjoyment not hard work' and indeed 'to tell a lie successfully, to dupe someone else, is praiseworthy in Thai culture' (1950: 191, 190, 186). Similar themes permeate Leach's Political systems of Highland Burma (although I hardly think either would generally be considered to have wielded a hegemonic influence over subsequent regional ethnography). Highland Burma certainly exemplifies several common trends in the literature. The Kachin are incapable of efficient central organization and attempts invariably collapse. And their appearance of stability or continuity is ritual or symbolic (see Gellner's critique, 1973). The extent of local variation invites recourse to a conjunctural history of plural influences. So, what is culturally geographical flesh by Geertz 1963a): whether the former constituted far-flung empires or barely controlled the perimeters of their own capitals, depends on one's prior assumptions; as does whether the sources upon which rival interpretations are based are considered historical chronicles or not (e.g. Pigeaud 1960-63; cf. Berg 1965). Even the adherents of a vision of dynastic splendour firmly place this in a long-lost past. So the purported subsequent disorganization and squalor make the past, and the necessity of a European managerial presence, appear desirable by contrast.
How emergent academic traditions may directly affect their object of study is strikingly evident in the Netherlands. This was realized in the details. see Koentjaraningrat's nice analysis. The potential overlap of interests is evident in the stress on adatrecht, Indonesian customary law, which elicited inquiry into collective representations and the perceived needs of government, whether explicitly interventionist or not. Adatrecht was an extraordinary hybrid, not least because adat is an Arabic word (Indonesians had to borrow, via Islam, the term by which their cultures were to be epitomized). It required the conjunction between law, broadly conceived, and supposedly general indigenous ideas of a pervasive cosmic harmony. So not only was inquiry into the nature of social processes effectively pre-empted both by the assumptions of the model and the developing dogma that Indonesia, beneath the differences, was a culture area (some of the earlier writings especially include glorious exceptions), but the reified structures came to be upheld by law and celebrated as distinctly Indonesian. In Bali for instance, apart from transmogrifying intricate networks of ties between princes, overseers and peasants into administrative villages or irrigation complexes, subtle regional differences in understanding of economic and political clientage and ranking became rigidified into monolithic systems of land tenure and caste. The twist in the tale is that adat is recognized in Indonesian law, so culture reconstituted is now official.

While mainland South East Asia tended to be conceived in terms of Grand Systems (usually Hinayana Buddhist) imitated by marginal minorities and maritime South East Asia, a field unified in its diversity, two popular anthropological approaches to Indonesia reiterate presuppositions similar to those noted above. The first is the Leiden, and sometime Oxford, tradition of structuralism, which was dominant for a long time in the Netherlands (and, as its proponents will soon tell one, predates Lévi-Strauss, although it is distinguished by a greater focus on the empirical study of surface structures). The second is associated with the writings of Clifford Geertz. The former, under the guiding hand of the de Josselin de Jong lineage, constitutes an exclusive genealogy; the latter reflects the prolix hermeneutic imagination of Clifford Geertz who, as it happens, is also the man who unshackled adat. adat refers to an Islamic law of which the principles are recorded in

or emphases) at a level of abstraction such that it determines conceptual structures without having to explain, or even consider, divergences in actual behaviour. From its inception the Leiden School was heavily indebted to Durkheim (see de Josselin de Jong 1983b) and drew implicitly on his theory of human nature as mechanically reflecting collective representations, a position which they did not have to modify as much as all that when they decided to claim, in varying degree, Lévi-Strauss as a collateral.

Although Geertz has written about both Java and Bali, there are certain continuities behind the contrasts. If 'traditional institutions' still work in Bali (1959a: 34), Java is perilously unstructured and disorganized. The imposition of foreign ideas and institutions, mainly through Dutch economic and administrative policies (1963a), have reduced villages to amorphous suburbs (cf. Jay 1969; Koentjaraningrat 1985: 99–229), while the burgeoning towns are at once shakily held together and divided by allegiance to different status groups, reincarnate as rival political parties (Geertz 1957, 1965). The implication that things were in some kind of balance before the Dutch made it all go wrong not only fits ill with historians' portrayals of widespread strife and confusion (e.g. Ricklefs 1978), but also, dichotomously, equates corporate groups and formal organization with structure and their absence with chaos. The assumptions are illustrated by the problem the Javanese have had, according to Geertz, in achieving 'economic take-off' (1963b). By under-playing the degree to which Java was integrated into the Dutch economy and the subsequent strangle-hold of the Chinese on commercial capital, the impression is created of the Javanese as rude dolts, drowning their superiors but largely failing to grasp even the rudiments of modern business, rather than as the rural sector of a complex industrialized, and partly international, economy trying to gain entry into fiercely defended monopolies (cf. Dewey's subtler account, 1962).

Geertz traces the complexity and internal political instability of Java to the co-existence of three ideal typical status groups which provided the nuclei of social structure (1960: 5). Of these, the Santri (Muslim) and Priyayi (Hindu-Buddhist) models have been imported and coexist more or less less easily with an indigenous Abangan tradition, which looks like the Little Tradition aping its Hindu elders and betters. Although he recognizes the significance of cultural borrowing, Geertz has had at times to engage in quite fancy footwork to dissociate Java and Bali from India. His theory of human nature requires it. For humans are essentially (sic) driven by the need (Geertz 1960). Java is profoundly influenced by and resembles in its construction of foreign ideas and institutions, mainly through Dutch economic and administrative policies (1963a), have reduced villages to amorphous suburbs (cf. Jay 1969; Koentjaraningrat 1985: 99–229), while the burgeoning towns are at once shakily held together and divided by allegiance to different status groups, reincarnate as rival political parties (Geertz 1957, 1965). The implication that things were in some kind of balance before the Dutch made it all go wrong not only fits ill with historians' portrayals of widespread strife and confusion (e.g. Ricklefs 1978), but also, dichotomously, equates corporate groups and formal organization with structure and their absence with chaos. The assumptions are illustrated by the problem the Javanese have had, according to Geertz, in achieving 'economic take-off' (1963b). By under-playing the degree to which Java was integrated into the Dutch economy and the subsequent strangle-hold of the Chinese on commercial capital, the impression is created of the Javanese as rude dolts, drowning their superiors but largely failing to grasp even the rudiments of modern business, rather than as the rural sector of a complex industrialized, and partly international, economy trying to gain entry into fiercely defended monopolies (cf. Dewey's subtler account, 1962).
Java as the economic and political hub of Indonesia, and Bali as quiant and unlikely. (Perhaps because of its proximity and historical links, in some unstated manner Bali is paradoxically made to exemplify at once the idyllic beauty and Otherness of pre-conquest Java, and its potential violence and instability.) In a well-known article directly addressed to the problem of variation, Geertz seeks to explain variation in terms of a kaleidoscopic model of village institutions or 'planes of social organisation', which may be mixed in different combinations like playing cards (1959b: 991–92). (Later, he gives more stress to the dynamic implications of differences in styles of life between aristocrats and commoners, e.g. 1980.)

The possibility of endogenous progressive change is effectively ruled out ab initio because these planes are 'fixed and invariant' (Geertz 1959b: 991). Geertz does not, however, clarify a significant ontological confusion over whether planes of organization are indigenous or analyst's constructs. The former reading would be in keeping with his general concern with local conceptual systems, but this would leave the unfortunate Balinese trapped inside a static conceptual model and seemingly unable to do much about changes in the world. (Two years earlier—in 1957—Geertz had proposed that the instabilities of Java were due to 'culture' lagging behind changes in 'structure'.) Organizational deficiencies in Bali are due to the system still working through traditional ties to achieve traditional goals (1963b), so external influences, for example national politics, are disruptive. Like giving a child a machine gun, they are excessively powerful tools with which to pursue petty local rivalries, as they are in the hands of people who are not yet equipped to handle them (1959a).

In the vast literature on Bali a trend, so far more or less implicit, emerges clearly which one might label that of 'the cryogenic text'. In 1925 Korn, one of the great Dutch scholars on Bali, for instance, wrote an article appositely in the *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* (Colonial Journal) with the arresting title 'Bali is apart ... is fijner bezenuwd dan eenig ander deel van Indie' ('Bali is a thing apart, it is more delicately strung than any other part of the Indies'). This was in fact only one in a long series of curious representations of the island which, as Boven has argued (1977: 10–89), stretches back to Cornelis de Houtman's retrospectively famous stop there in 1597. It continues in ever more numerous projects to 'rescue' Balinese culture—and sometimes the Balinese—from the depredations of tourists, Western economic and Indonesian political influences, if not from the Balinese themselves, which have been generated by the same vision (1959a). (Later, he gives more stress to the dynamic implications of differences in styles of life between aristocrats and commoners, e.g. 1980.)

The possibility of endogenous progressive change is effectively ruled out ab initio because these planes are 'fixed and invariant' (Geertz 1959b: 991). Geertz does not, however, clarify a significant ontological confusion over whether planes of organization are indigenous or analyst's constructs. The former reading would be in keeping with his general concern with local conceptual systems, but this would leave the unfortunate Balinese trapped inside a static conceptual model and seemingly unable to do much about changes in the world. (Two years earlier—in 1957—Geertz had proposed that the instabilities of Java were due to 'culture' lagging behind changes in 'structure'.) Organizational deficiencies in Bali are due to the system still working through traditional ties to achieve traditional goals (1963b), so external influences, for example national politics, are disruptive. Like giving a child a machine gun, they are excessively powerful tools with which to pursue petty local rivalries, as they are in the hands of people who are not yet equipped to handle them (1959a).

In the vast literature on Bali a trend, so far more or less implicit, emerges clearly which one might label that of 'the cryogenic text'. In 1925 Korn, one of the great Dutch scholars on Bali, for instance, wrote an article appositely in the *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* (Colonial Journal) with the arresting title 'Bali is apart ... is fijner bezenuwd dan eenig ander deel van Indie' ('Bali is a thing apart, it is more delicately strung than any other part of the Indies'). This was in fact only one in a long series of curious representations of the island which, as Boven has argued (1977: 10–89), stretches back to Cornelis de Houtman's retrospectively famous stop there in 1597. It continues in ever more numerous projects to 'rescue' Balinese culture—and sometimes the Balinese—from the depredations of tourists, Western economic and Indonesian political influences, if not from the Balinese themselves, which have been generated by the same vision (1959a). (Later, he gives more stress to the dynamic implications of differences in styles of life between aristocrats and commoners, e.g. 1980.)

The possibility of endogenous progressive change is effectively ruled out ab initio because these planes are 'fixed and invariant' (Geertz 1959b: 991). Geertz does not, however, clarify a significant ontological confusion over whether planes of organization are indigenous or analyst's constructs. The former reading would be in keeping with his general concern with local conceptual systems, but this would leave the unfortunate Balinese trapped inside a static conceptual model and seemingly unable to do much about changes in the world. (Two years earlier—in 1957—Geertz had proposed that the instabilities of Java were due to 'culture' lagging behind changes in 'structure'.) Organizational deficiencies in Bali are due to the system still working through traditional ties to achieve traditional goals (1963b), so external influences, for example national politics, are disruptive. Like giving a child a machine gun, they are excessively powerful tools with which to pursue petty local rivalries, as they are in the hands of people who are not yet equipped to handle them (1959a).

The museological urge was clear in the excitement over the Tasaday who became

the simulation model for all conceivable Indians before ethnography ... frozen, cryogenized, sterilized, protected to death, they have become referential simulacra, and the science itself a pure simulation.

(1983a: 15)

We also apply this cryogenic urge to ourselves, he suggests. For 'our entire linear and accumulative culture would collapse if we could not stockpile the past in plain view' (1983a: 19). There is a trend towards appropriating a homogenized and re-constituted past (or perhaps how the world might have been?). If Bali does not loom large in contemporary Indonesian self-images, the reasons are interesting. Nehru not least claimed it as 'the morning of the world', what it (and presumably India) had been like when still young. And why scholars, museum curators and tourists armed with cameras descend on Bali in hordes is intriguing. Culture, suitably reified, has become a commodity to be owned.

Similar tendencies may be discerned in ethnographical accounts. Gellner, for instance, has charged Leach with hypostatizing the Kachin, as he assumes that change is explicable

by specifying the contradictory ideals that are operating—which can be done through 'static' models employing 'static' concepts—thereby simultaneously indicating the mechanism of change and describing a changing society by means of two unchanging models.

(1973: 97)

Behind this rests our old friend the Correspondence Theory of truth and meaning, according to which concepts somehow describe, or mirror, the world. As Geller points out, however, there is no such simple parallelism between concepts and things such as Leach seems to expect. ... The concept of 'change', for instance, does not itself change yet it can 'reflect' reality as much as the concept 'stability' (1973: 97). The difficulties stem from a kind of Idealism, the view that human action is ultimately explicable in terms of static, indeed frozen, cultural ideals (1973: 105–6), shared in different ways by Clifford Geertz and the Dutch structuralists.

We also apply this cryogenic urge to ourselves, he suggests. For 'our entire linear and accumulative culture would collapse if we could not stockpile the past in plain view' (1983a: 19). There is a trend towards appropriating a homogenized and re-constituted past (or perhaps how the world might have been?). If Bali does not loom large in contemporary Indonesian self-images, the reasons are interesting. Nehru not least claimed it as 'the morning of the world', what it (and presumably India) had been like when still young. And why scholars, museum curators and tourists armed with cameras descend on Bali in hordes is intriguing. Culture, suitably reified, has become a commodity to be owned.

Similar tendencies may be discerned in ethnographical accounts. Gellner, for instance, has charged Leach with hypostatizing the Kachin, as he assumes that change is explicable

by specifying the contradictory ideals that are operating—which can be done through 'static' models employing 'static' concepts—thereby simultaneously indicating the mechanism of change and describing a changing society by means of two unchanging models.
world, merely introduces Mind—or here middle-class American minds—as the central agent to the exclusion of those who do the acting and thinking. It is a world without practice, where consciousness is aloof from the endless, and endlessly changing, mutual reworking of humans and culture.

Adopting or rejecting such an approach is not just a matter of scholarly indulgence which matters little to the ‘real world’. Cryogeny underwrites, in different ways, the latest exercise in Imperial domination, the need to ‘develop’ others because, coming from static societies and unequipped with a Western dynamic individualism, they cannot do it for themselves. Now in itself it doesn’t really matter a hoot if academics are wildly wrong in imagining how the world is: in so far as it is not governed by the abstract ruminations of epistemologists, the world will carry on regardless. It matters very much, however, if our ideas affect other people, let alone how we see about changing them, whether the consequences are foreseen or not. For people in other societies adopt, or have imposed on them, ideas and practices which implicate absurd, or even occasionally useful, theories which may come to be seen as legitimate and proper goals (see R. H. Taylor on ‘the Burmese road to socialism’, 1986; or Picard on tourism in Bali, 1986). If societies are not discrete entities, and their members passive pawns, but all related in a complex dialectic, might we then not learn something from others’ usage?

Not yet

In the rest of this chapter I sketch out Balinese notions of action and agency and argue their bearing on an understanding of the self. These are sufficiently distinct as to vitiate the textualists’ models among others and to give us reason to reflect on the adequacy of our own categories. The reason for concentrating on action is simply that Balinese often stress action in talking about human and trans-human affairs. First though, what kind of assumptions about knowledge, reality and agency would such an undertaking require? Instead of ethnographers and natives realizing a meeting of minds in some briefly achieved epistemological arcadia, it helps to regard knowledge and the self as culturally and historically situated. Language is not the means to represent a potentially transparent reality, be this metaphorically portrayed as ‘internal’ or ‘external’, but it partly constitutes, and is itself reconstituted through, public usage. As Taylor has argued cogently, imagining how the world is: in so far as it is not governed by the abstract ruminations of epistemologists, the world will carry on regardless. It matters very much, however, if our ideas affect other people, let alone how we see about changing them, whether the consequences are foreseen or not. For people in other societies adopt, or have imposed on them, ideas and practices which implicate absurd, or even occasionally useful, theories which may come to be seen as legitimate and proper goals (see R. H. Taylor on ‘the Burmese road to socialism’, 1986; or Picard on tourism in Bali, 1986). If societies are not discrete entities, and their members passive pawns, but all related in a complex dialectic, might we then not learn something from others’ usage?

Not yet

(1985b: 84). Nor is action, and so consciousness, necessarily individual. ‘All action is not in the last analysis of individuals; there are irreducibly collective actions’ (1985b: 93). Taylor is implying here something close to Collingwood’s notion of a ‘complex agent’ consisting of humans, not just as agents but also as instruments in more elaborate and changing forms of collaboration (1942: 141–42). Unlike such anthropological notions as corporate group or patron-client ties however, which tend to imply some perduring essential entity or idea, such complex agents constantly rework, and even redefine, themselves (and are directly or indirectly subject to the activities of other agents) on particular occasions in particular circumstances. So knowledge, including self-knowledge, is active, dialectical, cumulative and situated.

In this view, reality is not simply lumpen-matter. ‘Appearance and reality, the subjective and objective, are at once both opposed (i.e. different) and also unified.’ For ‘consciousness and knowledge are not simply static states, but rather active processes’ in which ‘knowledge is the process of the transformation of reality into thought’ (Sayers 1985: 15, 16). This approach has several advantages. It avoids unnecessary essentialized dichotomies in favour of a logic of overlapping classes (Collingwood 1933: 26–53), as well as the epistemological traps which privilege academics as the closest thing we have ever come to pure understanding; and it opens the way to studying how agents in different cultural settings rework their knowledge and experience of, and so, the world in which they and others live.

The stereotype of the Balinese as sybaritically sitting themselves on a surfeit of symbolism underplays the importance of agency. The drawbacks of ideal models come out in cosmological representations of Divinity. It is possible to extrapolate different versions. For example, Divinity is spoken of as Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa. In Old Javanese usage, the language of much Balinese literature and philosophy, *widhi* connotes ‘rule, law ordering, regulation’ and the verb form ‘to command, order’. *Wasa* is ‘power, force, dominion’; and *widhiwas* ‘the power of fate or destiny’ (Zoetmulder 1982: 2262–63, 2213–14). So Divinity appears at once as order, what orders, the power of order(s) or of fate. By ignoring the question of who makes such claims and in what situations, it is possible to regard priests and kings as immanently both the patients (in the sense of being the subjects or recipients of Divine ordinances) and the agents of order and orders to those under their command, rather as village patrons may appear as agents to their followers but as instruments to their superiors. So knowledge, including self-knowledge, is active, dialectical, cumulative and situated.

In this view, reality is not simply lumpen-matter. ‘Appearance and reality, the subjective and objective, are at once both opposed (i.e. different) and also unified.’ For ‘consciousness and knowledge are not simply static states, but rather active processes’ in which ‘knowledge is the process of the transformation of reality into thought’ (Sayers 1985: 15, 16). This approach has several advantages. It avoids unnecessary essentialized dichotomies in favour of a logic of overlapping classes (Collingwood 1933: 26–53), as well as the epistemological traps which privilege academics as the closest thing we have ever come to pure understanding; and it opens the way to studying how agents in different cultural settings rework their knowledge and experience of, and so, the world in which they and others live.

The stereotype of the Balinese as sybaritically sitting themselves on a surfeit of symbolism underplays the importance of agency. The drawbacks of ideal models come out in cosmological representations of Divinity. It is possible to extrapolate different versions. For example, Divinity is spoken of as Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa. In Old Javanese usage, the language of much Balinese literature and philosophy, *widhi* connotes ‘rule, law ordering, regulation’ and the verb form ‘to command, order’. *Wasa* is ‘power, force, dominion’; and *widhiwas* ‘the power of fate or destiny’ (Zoetmulder 1982: 2262–63, 2213–14). So Divinity appears at once as order, what orders, the power of order(s) or of fate. By ignoring the question of who makes such claims and in what situations, it is possible to regard priests and kings as immanently both the patients (in the sense of being the subjects or recipients of Divine ordinances) and the agents of order and orders to those under their command, rather as village patrons may appear as agents to their followers but as instruments to their superiors.

So knowledge, including self-knowledge, is active, dialectical, cumulative and situated.
stillsness is arguably both the precondition of action and action in its most consummate form.

At times, I confess, I too am tempted to succumb to the pleasure of playing with world views. They bear precious little relation, however, to the references to Divinity in whatever guise in different genres of writing (see Vickers 1986), far less to how Balinese talk about and act on such matters when occasion requires. The trouble comes from assuming an essence, revealing which will somehow explain how and why things are as they are. It may be the essential properties of the word or, more relevant in this instance, our constructs (quite possibly the same thing; Goodman 1972: 24–31) or an authorial intention which imbues the vision with meaning. The stress on text and its meaning, exemplified differently by both Geertz and the textualists, simplifies and conceptualizes the relationship between author, audience, referent, theme, text, language and tradition. (The antithetical Utilitarian view of culture as the rusty blunderbuss of legitimacy to scatter opponents as calculation calls, is merely a variation on the theme.) By contrast Balinese texts leave much to the reader, literally in so far as works are often read aloud (ngawacen) and translated (ngaritang) to an audience which makes it unwise to try to infer an essential meaning a priori. Texts are produced and reproduced by complex agents from courts, priestly circles and sects to other interest groups, where the author may be as much instrument as agent and the text's significance is reached contextually.

To return to my example, Divinity is differently instantiated by variously constituted agents in diverse situations (Hobart forthcoming).

In daily life Balinese make use of a rich vocabulary of social action, among the commonest expressions for customary ways of doing things is tata krama; and to participate in the activities of local corporate groups is makrama. While tata is used to speak of order in the sense of fixed rules or proper arrangement, krama is awkward. On different occasions it signifies 'customary or fixed behaviour', 'conduct', 'the rules according to which something happens', 'order', 'succession': but also 'the facts of an event' and 'someone's way of doing something' as well as those who engage in the behaviour or are responsible for ordered behaviour. At once it implies action, proper action and people who (are expected to) act in a particular way. As we shall see the link of action, appropriate action and agency is a recurrent theme.

There are other terms. The expression for doing something on the command of a prince or as part of one's duty to a group is nevah and mayroughly be glossed as 'behaviour' or 'action', but

mean rushing about, but also being prone to action, not unlike Balinese volcanoes and gods. Passive, likewise, is not simply sitting still but accepting or receiving, for better or for worse, the decisions and actions of others. One should recall that 'passionate' means 'prone to anger', 'dominated by intense or impassioned feeling' (Onions 1966: 656; O.E.D. p. 554). The ambiguity inherent in many expressions for action (consider 'to pursue one's interests') was anticipated by Collingwood who stressed the analytical importance of overlapping, rather than exclusive, classes (1933: 26–53). Agents may be part instruments or patients of actions according to the situation or different points of view. (Is a Balinese priest making holy water the agent or the instrument of Divinity? What of the king who commands his troops to battle but becomes the victim of the enemy?) So it may be useful to speak of situations, persons, ideas, even actions as agentive, as requiring or inviting action and the emergence of an agent. Patients do not just suffer, they help to create a context in which action is implied, anticipated, invited or demanded. If Balinese usage allows a link between necessary or anticipated action and humans or groups as agents or instruments to prefigured ends, we would be unwise to dismiss this as prelogical or as proof of mystical ideas of time and causation.

This discussion may illuminate a striking feature of expressions in Balinese and other Indonesian languages for what we call future action. If one asks if something is the case, or if someone has done something (for instance, whether it is the rainy season or whether someone has ever visited a particular place), the answer, largely regardless of the likelihood of it happening, is commonly not 'no' but 'not yet' (durung, wondèn in high and low Balinese respectively, belum in Indonesian and Malay). While a fuller analysis is obviously required of the circumstances in which such replies are elicited, the usage is quite consonant with Balinese ideas that the future is anticipated, but not determined, in various ways by what is already the case. They have a subtle sense of the cultural obligations which constitute being human and of being situated, so to speak, in history. Consider, by contrast, the difficulties most contemporary Europeans have in conceiving of the self as diverse processes (cf. Parfit 1971) or of the future as portrayed in space-time physics.

To return to action, different kinds of being engage in different typical behaviour. Birds fly, snakes crawl and so on; but plants also grow in different ways and one has only to sit for a time to observe that rice fields too have their own peculiar activity. The term for the ways in which different agent or the instrument of Divinity? What of the king who commands his troops to battle but becomes the victim of the enemy?) So it may be useful to speak of situations, persons, ideas, even actions as agentive, as requiring or inviting action and the emergence of an agent. Patients do not just suffer, they help to create a context in which action is implied, anticipated, invited or demanded. If Balinese usage allows a link between necessary or anticipated action and humans or groups as agents or instruments to prefigured ends, we would be unwise to dismiss this as prelogical or as proof of mystical ideas of time and causation.

This discussion may illuminate a striking feature of expressions in Balinese and other Indonesian languages for what we call future action. If one asks if something is the case, or if someone has done something (for instance, whether it is the rainy season or whether someone has ever visited a particular place), the answer, largely regardless of the likelihood of it
Zoetmulder 1982: 958). The result is that action or causation cannot be totally separated from meaning: the categories overlap. The characteristic behaviour of something is a sign of what it is; just as signs equally may be agents, or agentic. Balinese language of action is a far cry from the social scientists’ favourite dichotomies of actor and action, Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, cause and reason, but it is none the poorer for that.

Who do you think you are?24

Can Balinese ideas about persons and suchlike beings throw light on problems about the self outlined earlier or on issues of agency? To consider how they may, I contrast some Balinese representations with what is inevitably something of a parody of common Western presuppositions about the self. Then I turn to what that hardy anthropological perennial, ‘ancestor worship’, might tell us about knowledge and memory as actions.

It is striking how often contemporary Western notions of personal identity are couched in spatial metaphors. Persons are not only construed as in-dividual, in-divisible (Marriott 1976: 109–14), but human experience is spoken of as split into an external world upon which an interior self, or mind, reflects. For

the development of the modern subject/person involves the unification of these spaces — without which the modern conception of a unified personality may not be possible — and then interiorization . . . the space of disclosure is considered to be inside, in the ‘mind’ . . . By space of disclosure, I mean the locus where things emerge at their fullest, clearest, most salient.

(Taylor 1985a: 277)

We speak so often of persons as substantive and unitary in space that it becomes hard to focus on the many situations in professional and daily life when we treat humans as in some sense dispersed. An alternative view of the self as subject to disparate forces is perhaps expressed in the popular enthusiasm for health foods, bio-rhythms, ions, astrology and the like.

Who do you think you are?24

Can Balinese ideas about persons and suchlike beings throw light on problems about the self outlined earlier or on issues of agency? To consider how they may, I contrast some Balinese representations with what is inevitably something of a parody of common Western presuppositions about the self. Then I turn to what that hardy anthropological perennial, ‘ancestor worship’, might tell us about knowledge and memory as actions.

It is striking how often contemporary Western notions of personal identity are couched in spatial metaphors. Persons are not only construed as in-dividual, in-divisible (Marriott 1976: 109–14), but human experience is spoken of as split into an external world upon which an interior self, or mind, reflects. For

the development of the modern subject/person involves the unification of these spaces — without which the modern conception of a unified personality may not be possible — and then interiorization . . . the space of disclosure is considered to be inside, in the ‘mind’ . . . By space of disclosure, I mean the locus where things emerge at their fullest, clearest, most salient.

(Taylor 1985a: 277)

We speak so often of persons as substantive and unitary in space that it becomes hard to focus on the many situations in professional and daily life when we treat humans as in some sense dispersed. An alternative view of the self as subject to disparate forces is perhaps expressed in the popular enthusiasm for health foods, bio-rhythms, ions, astrology and the like.

Who do you think you are?24
stress the necessity of allowing a balance between alternative personal dispositions.

This brings us conveniently to the Balinese. *Prima facie* many of their representations seem largely to avoid imputing substance, atomism, unitariness or harmony to human nature. Among the ways humans are constituted are the *triwarga*, *triguna* and *tiga-jhana*. The *triwarga*, the goals or motives for action (*dharma*, good; *artha*, wealth or utility; *kama*, pleasure), mix in degree in explaining most actions. The *tiga-jhana*, energy (*baya*), speech (*subda*) and thought (*idep*) are not essences but are closer to abilities, capacities or potentialities. (The contrast with Aristotle's division of plants, animals and humans by the cumulative essences—or souls, *psyche*—of nourishment, perception and thought or reason should make the differences clear, Aristotle 1941: 556–62; 413b–15b). Such potentialities differ in degree and kind over time among different beings: the speech of gods, princes and the village thief is often distinct. As contradictory or incommensurable tendencies are inherent to each scheme, humans are not simple unitary isolates in a Great Chain of Being.

The distinctions have a complicated history of use which is traceable through Old Javanese to Sanskrit. One must beware, however, of false essential continuities. In Bali, the *triguna*, as dispositions, might loosely be glossed as knowledge or purity, *sattwa*; passion, activity, *raja(h)*; and desire or ignorance, *tamas* (Zoetmulder 1982: 1713, 1482, 1914; cf. Monier-Williams 1899: 1135, 863, 438). However, the terms are by no means restricted to humans but are ways in which the cosmos, understood as living processes, changes and are perhaps closer to 'existence' (‘presence’), ‘activity’ and ‘darkness’ respectively (see Inden 1985: 144–48). So when Balinese speak of the state of the self—*bh(b)ujwana ali*—as related in some way to the universe—*bh(b)ujwana ogung*—it neither necessarily implies a displacement of responsibility for, nor a projection of, one's own actions, but a recognition of overlap, dispersal and the complexity of agency and patiency. Contrariety and change are built in. Nor do the schemes depict unchanging essences of human nature, but rather possible ways in which goals, capacities and predispositions combine, clash and work themselves out, or humans learn to command them.

People are also popularly constituted in other, non-coordinate ways. According to a theory of humours the environment impinges directly on people. Extremes of cold (*gesit*), and worse heat (*panes*), are dangerous, the default condition is in-between (*dumalada*) and the ideal, coolness (*etis*). The weather, what one has eaten and all sorts of other factors affect one's being or cause illness and discomfort. So remedial 'ritual' or medical care may be needed to redress the balance. If there is too much water in one's body for example, *marasa nyem*, one has an uncomfortable feeling of heaviness, best relieved by something which makes one sweat. *Rasa* is widely used of what one experiences as within the body. Humans feel the world through the five senses (*ngarasaang sakala antuk panca indriya*), but may also internally feel such states as being disturbed by something (*melawah*) or polluted (*leteh*). The self is an intricate field.

In some accounts feelings are localized. Balinese often link some of what we might call strong emotions to the (*ulun*) *ati*, the (tip of the) liver, or stomach (*basang*); so one may complain of *marasa lek ati*, feeling ashamed or *gedeg basang*, angry. When speaking carefully though, people more often referred to *gedeg keneh*. *Keneh* is opposed to *pemineh* as desire-based thought is to opinion or detached judgement (and is mediated by *manah* which one might loosely render here as mind, will, or inclination). The distinction is parallel to the opposition of *tamas* and *sattwa*. Balinese recognize the complex relationship between such processes and action (Vickers forthcoming). Apart from being the preconditions to action, thought or feeling may be the patient of someone else's actions, for example in making one angry. It may also be passion as when an attractive woman incites desire.

All sorts of other influences are often held to affect humans, especially when things go wrong. Date of birth, where one lives, what one does, caste or descent group affiliation all help to make up the kind of person one is and the misfortunes to which one is subject. More or less unitary invisible agents from deities, ancestors and fate (*ganit*) to the qualities of particular days are also held to affect the living and their actions. These work on Balinese as patients, not mere objects. So ignorance of *dauwasa* (appropriate days for different kinds of activity) or particular deities is as likely to leave one unable to utilize their potential as it is directly to lead to harm. Balinese disquisitions on the relation between the senses, feelings and mind and the world are, of course, far more elaborate than I can deal with here, a point which further underwrites the inanity of sweeping *a priori* assertions.

Knowledge and memory as action

Anthropologists sometimes depict peoples who regard the world as directly affecting them as pre-Copernican (e.g. Douglas 1966: 80). So it may be instructive to consider the language Balinese use to discuss an important class of beings whom they hold to affect their lives in all sorts of ways, namely the dead. In shunting the relations of living and dead away into categories like ‘ancestor worship’, anthropologists impose their own presumptions about the nature of being and action in such a way as to make themselves look intelligent at the expense of both understanding and other peoples.

‘Ancestor’ is a very poor gloss of the Balinese. The term most commonly used is *lalu(h)ur* from *lalu*, ‘above’, ‘superior’; the latter making better sense than ‘ancestor’. (In tourist brochures gods and ancestors are always up in an empyrean heaven whence they descend. In fact their nature and locus is problematic, see J. Hooykaas 1955, 1956.) When humans die, funerary rites are required to transform them from incomplete presences, *pirata*, to their new state of being as *pitaru* (both variations on the Sanskrit *pits*), who are also referred to more elegantly as *b(h)utara*, a generic respect term for aspects of Divinity, which suggests ‘lord’ but also ‘protector’. At any stage though, the dead may affect the living for good or ill. When misfortunes fall upon a household, sooner or later its members normally resort to spirit
of terms: forgetting and remembering. *Lali* (ensap in low Balinese) is to forget or ignore. Now something of its sense may be appreciated by considering its antonym, to remember, *eling* (in ger in low), which is widely synonymous with being conscious. Remembering and forgetting, in contrasting ways, are vital preconditions of action. It is not just that when human neglect is recalled (*kaelingang*) by the ancestors they take steps; or when humans remember what is required of them all is likely to be reasonably well. Memory and consciousness (or, for that matter, forgetting) are not passive faculties, they shape the pattern of agency. Humans are not the helpless victims of bloody-minded ghosts; rather they take part in the process of recreating the dead, who are patients slowly being transformed back into agents, through remembering them. This bears in a different way on the active or passive involvement of ancestors with the living. Where the living go beyond the normal course of duty in remembering the dead, the dead are enabled to respond by energetically helping their kin. (One man in a village where I worked was well known for his assiduous devotion to his old grandmother. After she died he became very rich which was often said to be due to her unusually active help.) Inaction, similarly, brings about a passive response: the dead are reminded, *kaelingang*, that the living have not remembered.

Much of the discussion about remembering holds true for Balinese ways of talking about knowing. They seem to put far less emphasis than we do on learning as the active process, knowing as the steady state thereafter, and memory as its atrophy. In many contexts, all are treated as different kinds of action, as indeed are their associated activities. Seeing, for instance, as my phrase about the dead 'keeping an eye on' the living was intended to suggest, involves active participation: few important events can take place without a witness. A witness is not a passive spectator but an agent who makes the event part of recorded happening. There is a stress on the way such actions continually reconstitute the person and, to the degree that agents are dispersed, affects others. The stripped identity, 'the soul', *ama*, which is said to experience the after-world, is incapable of speech or action: it just suffers as it is the ultimate patient.

This necessarily simplistic overview makes me wonder whether the per-during glories of ethnography are all they are cracked up to be. Most approaches to South East Asia torture what they do not discard altogether into largely useless caricatures on the Procrustean bed of academic essentialism. The standing joke about the informant who rushes home to look up process of recreating the dead, who are patients slowly being transformed back into agents, through remembering them. This bears in a different way on the active or passive involvement of ancestors with the living. Where the living go beyond the normal course of duty in remembering the dead, the dead are enabled to respond by energetically helping their kin. (One man in a village where I worked was well known for his assiduous devotion to his old grandmother. After she died he became very rich which was often said to be due to her unusually active help.) Inaction, similarly, brings about a passive response: the dead are reminded, *kaelingang*, that the living have not remembered.

Much of the discussion about remembering holds true for Balinese ways of talking about knowing. They seem to put far less emphasis than we do on learning as the active process, knowing as the steady state thereafter, and memory as its atrophy. In many contexts, all are treated as different kinds of action, as indeed are their associated activities. Seeing, for instance, as my phrase about the dead 'keeping an eye on' the living was intended to suggest, involves active participation: few important events can take place without a witness. A witness is not a passive spectator but an agent who makes the event part of recorded happening. There is a stress on the way such actions continually reconstitute the person and, to the degree that agents are dispersed, affects others. The stripped identity, 'the soul', *ama*, which is said to experience the after-world, is incapable of speech or action: it just suffers as it is the ultimate patient.
Reflection on how we write about all this summons up banished spectres not just of what we include in our accounts and what we exclude, or are excluded from observing, but also of the implications of our descriptions for others and ourselves. There are several aspects to this. We tend to recreate the world in our image, if not require others to do so. This process sometimes works in complex ways: it is not only contemporary Europeans who re-enact the work of an Elizabethan Englishman who made a (supposedly) black man express the ethnographical dream of the Other:

'And of the Cannibals that each other eat,
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
Do grow beneath their shoulders.'

(\textit{Othello I, iii})

If our depictions are loaded acts, on what authority do we make them? Whether anthropologists—who often exaggerate the importance of their puny loyal opposition to the big guns of economics and political science—are the concerned pluralists and moral liberals they claim is a moot point, as a critical look at the textual critics makes clear. On the home front, I have doubts both about this and about whether there are many situations where the subject or its practitioners constitute a unitary agent in any useful sense. Talk of grand, or regional, anthropological traditions is more about creating autolatrous genealogies than many would admit and the point of the exercise easily becomes forgotten. As anthropologists' representations of other peoples have helped in their own small way to condemn them to the fate of the Nubian, perhaps we should recall the remark of that familiar ancient:

'The Moor is of a free and open nature
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so,
And will as tenderly be led by th' nose
As asses are.'

(\textit{Othello I, iii})

Fortunately, I am reliably informed, it is often the ass which wins.

\textbf{MARK HOBART}

\section*{Notes}

\textit{The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
Do grow beneath their shoulders.}'

(\textit{Othello I, iii})

If our depictions are loaded acts, on what authority do we make them? Whether anthropologists—who often exaggerate the importance of their puny loyal opposition to the big guns of economics and political science—are the concerned pluralists and moral liberals they claim is a moot point, as a critical look at the textual critics makes clear. On the home front, I have doubts both about this and about whether there are many situations where the subject or its practitioners constitute a unitary agent in any useful sense. Talk of grand, or regional, anthropological traditions is more about creating autolatrous genealogies than many would admit and the point of the exercise easily becomes forgotten. As anthropologists' representations of other peoples have helped in their own small way to condemn them to the fate of the Nubian, perhaps we should recall the remark of that familiar ancient:

'The Moor is of a free and open nature
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so,
And will as tenderly be led by th' nose
As asses are.'

(\textit{Othello I, iii})

Fortunately, I am reliably informed, it is often the ass which wins.

\textbf{MARK HOBART}

\section*{Notes}

1 Clifford remarks that here 'the hum of unmarked, impersonal existence can be heard' (1986b: 106). At the end of the book we are told 'the transforming relationship ends with an equality in affection and respect' (1986b: 107). Now, to whom in each case is this so? Short of a remarkable confluence of ideas or of crediting Shostak's informant, or any other contemporary American intellectual fashions, one must conclude all this has precious little to do with the unfortunate Kung.
2 These, despite the airy gesture to power and history common to many textualists, are treated as ahistorical, asocial and unsituated. Otherwise, talk of 'evocation' cross-culturally is meaningless. The project, as he makes abundantly plain, is to promote treating 'the other as us', and eliminate anyone, especially the Other, from exploring the divergent possibilities of discourse. The enthusiastic essentialism is made apparent by Tyler representing (sic) all ethnographic writings as instantiations of a generic 'text' which presumes every text to share the essential characteristics of the genus, as opposed to ethnography being a way of reading disparate materials.
3 Although elsewhere Baudrillard's target is sociology, his remarks on the creation of simulations are not irrelevant.
4 That the silent majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does not mean they don't exist. It means that their representation is no longer possible. The masses are no longer a referent because they no longer belong to the order of representation. They don't express themselves, they are surveyed. They don't reflect upon themselves, they are tested... Now polls, tests, the referendum, media are devices which no longer belong to a dimension of representations, but to one of simulation. They no longer have a referent in view, but a model.
5 Here actual people in other societies have been replaced by the reflexive anthropologists' models.
6 A good critique of the dominant view of self as defined purely by self-conscious 'inner' space, or mind, is to be found in Charles Taylor 1985a. Such a view would not bring about a beautiful transcultural shared experience but would entail that the outlooks of other societies would be close to incomprehensible.
7 These, despite the airy gesture to power and history common to many textualists, are treated as ahistorical, asocial and unsituated. Otherwise, talk of 'evocation' cross-culturally is meaningless. The project, as he makes abundantly plain, is to promote treating 'the other as us', and eliminate anyone, especially the Other, from exploring the divergent possibilities of discourse. The enthusiastic essentialism is made apparent by Tyler representing (sic) all ethnographic writings as instantiations of a generic 'text' which presumes every text to share the essential characteristics of the genus, as opposed to ethnography being a way of reading disparate materials.
8 For instance Margaret Mead and George Elliot are cited as both being ensnared by a pastoral allegory (1986b: 114, 109) which makes sense if one posits meaning as a perduring essence, but hardly if it is historically and contextually situated. If anyone is neo-pastoralist, it may be the textualists themselves.
9 More anthropological debate than might appear is concerned, perlocutionarily, with championing factional interest rather than argument. Behind the ostensible aim of writing academic history, whole books are even devoted to creating simulations are not irrelevant.

\textbf{MARK HOBART}
There is a fascinating history, still largely to be written, of the relationship between European political and economic domination of Africa, the Americas and Asia, and the growth of a scholarly tradition in which the West’s hegemony is established and perpetuated. In part this seems to have required both a distancing and stereotyping (Ardener 1987) and a diversification of the Other (Africa, the Americas across or fantastic; China ancient and ossified; India ancient and degenerate; Arab stark and fanatic). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, it is often discomfiting trends, which may subsequently be perceived to hold more for the authors’ own societies than for those whom they claim to describe, that are most fervently projected on to the Other (Inden 1986). At the same time, ironically, Western philosophers have often required the Other—for instance India, as foil for such otherwise opposed visions as those of both German Romanticism and the Utilitarianism of J. S. Mill (1820), quite apart from the work of Hegel (1919) and of Marx on the Asiatic Mode of production, on which see Inden forthcoming. Something similar may hold of Java in the work of von Humboldt (1836–39).

Now that the long-lost capital of the supposedly mercantile empire of Srimulya in Sumatra has reportedly been located, it will be interesting to see whether, and how, these stereotypes are re-evaluated.

Sometimes the reason is given a collective nature: people are too democratic. Democracy, or egalitarianism, is a frequent explanatory deus ex machina for failure. This is the more interesting in that most South East Asian peoples are often described (by the same authors) as remarkably rank or hierarchical. On a further oscillation, see the next footnote.

The position in fact is slightly more complicated because it is widely assumed that South East Asians are at once too individualistic to allow for order (everyone goes their own way) and conformist to whatever is at hand (they mechanically reproduce cultural values, including individualism). They lose out coming and going.

Perhaps the most invoked ancestor is van Ossenbruggen 1918, although Onvlee 1949 and the syntheses by van Wouden and J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong (both 1935) are important. On the construction of this tradition and its key texts, see P. E. de Josselin de Jong 1983, 1984.

A great deal of effort has gone into defining Indonesia as a field of study. This is the more remarkable in that Indonesia began as a colonial fiction and incorporates what one might, if one is so inclined, consider parts of Melanesia—and not just as forgettable adjuncts but uncomfortably close to the paradigm cases: see de Josselin de Jong 1984.

If one stays for any length of time in a contemporary Javanese village what follows is most forcibly, aside from the crowds and the poverty (familiar, I think)—perhaps it is often discomfiting trends, which may subsequently be perceived to hold more for the authors’ own societies than for those whom they claim to describe, that are most fervently projected on to the Other (Inden 1986). At the same time, ironically, Western philosophers have often required the Other—for instance India, as foil for such otherwise opposed visions as those of both German Romanticism and the Utilitarianism of J. S. Mill (1820), quite apart from the work of Hegel (1919) and of Marx on the Asiatic Mode of production, on which see Inden forthcoming. Something similar may hold of Java in the work of von Humboldt (1836–39).

Now that the long-lost capital of the supposedly mercantile empire of Srimulya in Sumatra has reportedly been located, it will be interesting to see whether, and how, these stereotypes are re-evaluated.

Sometimes the reason is given a collective nature: people are too democratic. Democracy, or egalitarianism, is a frequent explanatory deus ex machina for failure. This is the more interesting in that most South East Asian peoples are
References


Bloch, M. 1977. The past and the present in the present. In the shadow of the silent majorities ... or the end of the social. P. Foss, P. Patton and J. Johnston (trans.). New York: Semiotext(e).


References


References


— — (forthcoming). Writing ritual: the song of the Lliga or the death of the rhinoceros. in *Balinese state and society*, H. Geertz (ed.).


