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ISLAMIC MORALITY IN LATE OTTOMAN “SECULAR” SCHOOLS

Recent scholarship has taken great strides toward integrating the history of the late Ottoman Empire into world history. By moving beyond the view that the West was the prime agent for change in the East, historians have shed new light on indigenous efforts aimed at repositioning the state, reconceptualizing knowledge, and restructuring “society.”¹ A comparative perspective has helped students of the period recognize that the late Ottoman Empire shared and took action against many of the same problems confronting its contemporaries, East and West. The assertion of Ottoman agency has been critical to finishing off the stereotype of the “sick man of Europe,” but the persistent legacies of modernization theory and nationalist historiography continue to obscure our view of the period.

One field that has suffered from the heavy-handedness of such approaches is education. Although education, particularly the state-supplied variety, has been widely credited with a plethora of momentous effects, few scholars have actually looked at the schools themselves—their architecture, curricula, textbooks, and daily life. In the absence of detailed research on such topics, our understanding of the state schools has been shaped by the inertia of the received wisdom.² One of the most tenacious views is the notion that the schools were agents of a seemingly inevitable process of secularization. Yet the materials I have examined suggest that the term “secular” cannot be applied to schools that, while ostensibly interdenominational, featured their own mosques, observed the Muslim calendar, taught Qur²anic interpretation, and emphasized a specifically Islamic notion of morality. But more than appealing for a change in semantics, I suggest that appreciating the complexities and tensions surrounding the issue of religio-moral schooling allows for a further reappraisal of the changing relationship between the late Ottoman state and its subjects.

In this article, I analyze the notion of morality in late Ottoman state schools.³ I do so by beginning with a global level of analysis and then restricting it to concentrate on a much more specific instrument of moral pedagogy: the textbook. First, I take a brief look at the moral component in contemporary educational programs around the world to place the Ottoman agenda in a broader context. Concurrent trends in such diverse countries as China, France, and Russia provide much-needed

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perspective for the Ottoman case. Second, I situate the moral agenda of the state school within the overall Ottoman effort to foster religio-moral development through education. I suggest that Ottoman state schooling can be understood only as part of a larger campaign intended to safeguard the empire's future by shoring up its religious-political foundation. This moral agenda is visible in various aspects of state schooling: internal government memoranda arguing for steps to reverse moral decay; high-level commissions charged with vetting and revamping the imperial curriculum to increase religio-moral content; and the rules intended to regulate school life. Third, after an overview of these features of late Ottoman schooling, I examine a specific component of the state's plan in more detail. Two textbooks written for the express purpose of teaching Islamic morality in the ostensibly ecumenical schools reveal the extent to which life in the schoolroom was suffused with the moral mission that informed late Ottoman educational policy. The article concludes by answering the following question: How did the late Ottoman state's reliance on morals affect its relationship with its subjects?

As we shall see, the moral element in the late Ottoman approach was overtly Islamic. Except for the fact that we have been prepared by most of the literature on the subject to think of the state schools as avowedly secular, this should not be surprising; in both the Tanzimat period and, especially, the reign of Abdülhamid II, the state's message was imbued with Islamic referents.⁴ But the dominant approach considers the state to have used Islam only for the purposes of an increasingly secular agenda.⁵ Although there most certainly were "secular" reasons for the state's selective sanction of Islam in this context, I think it a mistake, in the words of Şerif Mardin, to "underestimate the sacred."⁶ To many—both Ottoman officials and later historians—what Charles Tripp has termed the "secular logic" of the state was indeed paramount,⁷ but that should not blind us to a range of possibilities that transcended a purely instrumental use of religion.⁸ Just as borrowing the apparatus of "modern" education brought with it a range of ideological and cultural associations, so also were the "secular" aspects of state-sanctioned Islam accompanied by a sweep of associations and implications that may have been equally powerful. The possibility exists, at the very least, that many of these nuances have been overlooked by the historiographical tendency to emphasize the secularizing elements at the expense of those associated with moribund "tradition." At any rate, it is my view that Islam cannot be reduced to the role of merely playing a part in an inherently secular agenda. As we shall see, there are important signs that Ottoman officials hoped that Islam—when yoked with a "modern" delivery system—would play a more transformative role in the lives of its students, and therefore in the future of the empire.

Before turning to the question of what sort of morality the Ottoman schools conveyed, it is useful to step back and take in a comparative perspective. The Ottoman attempt to integrate the Western system with moral content appropriate to the Islamic-Ottoman context shared much with contemporary approaches to state education elsewhere. A moral agenda of one sort or another lay at the heart of state educational projects unfolding in disparate parts of the late-19th-century globe. In the United States, an ethical ethos so permeated public high schools that one historian has described it as "the moral world of the high school" into which students passed in seamless fashion from their "God-fearing Protestant homes."⁹ In Russia, the Otto-

mans' acquisitive neighbor to the north, a variety of educational offerings served the state's campaign, or even its "crusade," to reform society from above,¹⁰ but religio-moral teaching figured prominently in all of them. Rules for "secular" schools expressed the common consideration that religion was "the foundation of the Russian state system."¹¹ As in the Ottoman Empire, the expansion of public education in Russia was symptomatic of the secularizing logic of the state and of the severing of the religious establishment's monopoly over the written word. But it also meant that the state increasingly relied on the cooperation of the religious authorities and on the lesson content they supplied.

In Central Asia, moral education was critical to educational change, both that offered by the czarist government and that offered by the emerging Jadid movement. Adeb Khalid's fine study of the Jadids places education at the center of cultural and social change in Central Asia.¹² The shared features with the Ottoman Empire are many, so close were the educational agendas of the Jadids and the Ottomans. They include: (a) a profound faith in learning that Khalid calls the "cult of knowledge"; (b) an overarching confidence in the corrective and transformative power of that knowledge, when applied through the form of standardized education, to "awaken" the slumbering people from the inertia of ignorance; (c) the necessity of the new pedagogy to prepare young students to face the "needs of the age"; (d) the creation of new schools, classroom furniture, textbooks, and wall maps in order to carry out this modernizing mission; and (e) the penchant for combining new techniques of learning (the Jadids' "new style" schools derived their name from a phonetic approach to literacy that contrasts with the syllabic approach taught in the *maktabs*, or Qur^ʿanic schools) with religio-moral content distilled from the *maktab* and madrasa curriculum. As in the Ottoman case, religious knowledge was desacralized, transforming the notion of what constituted "Islam" just as, conversely, the "secular" nature of modern schooling was itself altered as it became a vehicle for religious education. Many of the Jadids were in contact with the Ottoman Empire, among other parts of the world, through travel, correspondence, and periodical subscription. Although some mutual influence naturally resulted, Khalid emphasizes that Jadidism was first and foremost an indigenous phenomenon. The simultaneous appearance of regional permutations of a modern, moralistic pedagogy further supports the notion that morally infused "modern" education constituted a world phenomenon, and not one merely reliant upon Western European influence.

In China, the parallels with the Ottoman case are remarkable. An equally proud imperial power increasingly felt itself under attack both from the outside world and from internal opposition. Missionary education affected the government's efforts, although probably in a less overt manner than those of their Ottoman counterparts. As in the Ottoman case, military defeat concentrated educational thinking. In the wake of defeat by Japan in the late 19th century and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, moral instruction was emphasized as a critical component of the "self-strengthening" movement. The new schools that emerged as a result bowed to the need to emulate foreign education (both European and Japanese), but they based their curriculum on the Confucian classics.¹³ Moral-training textbooks—a new method of inculcating the morality of the old examination system—were employed to meet the "educational aims" issued by the Board of Education in 1906. As in the Ottoman

Empire, Chinese educators sought to instill in the students of the new schools a cluster of ideals that included loyalty to the emperor, practical study, and indigenous (i.e., Confucian) morality.¹⁴ Although this string of countries could be extended in a number of geographical directions,¹⁵ it is perhaps more apposite to revisit the subject of moral instruction in France, the source of the Ottoman state's educational system.

We must start with a deceptively simple fact—namely, that the French system was the one on which the Ottomans patterned their school-building program. We know that the French Ministry of Education, under Victor Duruy, drafted the report upon which the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869 was based.¹⁶ Although Abdülhamid II's educational strategy drastically altered the schools' content and overall *raison d'être*, the 1869 plan continued to serve as the touchstone for their formal articulation well into the 20th century. Indeed, the centralized, systemic quality of the French-to-Ottoman transfer has stood out as its chief characteristic. This has reinforced the notion that the late Ottoman state was attempting to impose a highly uniform pedagogical and disciplinary regime, the better to control its disparate regions and ethnic groups. Centralizing logic featured prominently in late Ottoman policy, to be sure, but I would suggest that relying too heavily on the more than slightly sinister image of the state as a ruthlessly standardizing and homogenizing force hides many of the subtleties, contradictions, and complexities of late Ottoman education. Further, such a powerful stereotype cannot stand the test of scrutiny, either in the Ottoman Empire or in France. The frequently cited image of the French minister of education proudly looking at his watch and claiming to the emperor "that he could state what, at that precise moment, all the children in France were studying" gave rise to a powerful myth that obscured the persistence of non-conformity and the wild fluctuations that continued to characterize public education in France for generations.¹⁷

In fact, such historians as François Furet, Jacques Ozouf, Mona Ozouf, and Theodore Zeldin have reassessed the historiography of French education in the 19th century in a way that provides a suggestive if cautionary tale for parallel developments in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ These scholars have been part of a trend to see continuities where previously sharp breaks dominated the view. Emphasizing the give-and-take in the French educational context affords the possibility of accommodating the persistence of traditional (particularly religious) modes alongside, or perhaps underneath the surface of, the new *modus operandi*.

Space and a lack of parallelism in available data do not permit a detailed comparison of the French and Ottoman cases here, but two points stand out. The first is that the French case is most instructive in pointing the way toward a realization that the sharp lines and trajectories that have characterized the history of education in France have yielded to a considerably more nuanced depiction. The deeply contested nature of public education in France, the persistence of elements of non-conformity, and the wide swings of the educational pendulum between a Catholic and a secular agenda¹⁹ all suggest a level of complexity that we would do well to remember in the Ottoman case. Instead of looking for a process of educational *adoption*, we are doubtless better served by examining the ways in which the Ottoman state was engaged in a process of *adaptation*, or "Ottomanization." The second and much more conjectural point is that looking at the French and Ottoman experience together—

and in a broader comparative perspective—suggests that it is perhaps more useful to think of educational change as taking place in “world time,” and not necessarily as a result of a borrowing from the West by the East.²⁰ This is particularly intriguing when we remember that national (or imperial) educational systems across the globe placed parallel emphasis on moral education. Such simultaneity suggests that there was a common world-time reaction to the perceived speeding up of time,²¹ to concerns about keeping abreast with the “demands of the present,” and to the feeling that flight from the “traditional” theological understandings of the way in which the world worked was accelerating, leading to moral decay. New-style education appeared as a seemingly universal beacon of hope, particularly when it was meant to convey a reworked but “traditionally” inspired notion of morality. It is this moral dimension, however, that is frequently overlooked in assessing educational change.

NEW-STYLE SCHOOLS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The secondary literature almost invariably refers to the schools built by the Ottoman state in the 19th and early 20th centuries as “secular,” “Western,” and “modern.”²² This classification stems from an understandable desire to distinguish these state-run institutions from those operated by the religious establishment. But such a dichotomy has unfortunately tended to exaggerate the differences—and minimize the similarities—between the two school systems. Equally worrisome is the extent to which the presumption of pedagogically induced dichotomy has underpinned a much larger schism: the notion of “cultural dualism,” or even “schizophrenia,” in late Ottoman society.²³ Attempts to find 19th-century antecedents for a therefore more “natural” 20th-century process of secularization have juxtaposed moribund “traditional” religious instruction with triumphant “modern” secular education. Recently some scholars have begun to call into question the normative and teleological assumptions inherent in modernization theory.²⁴ In a recent example of this trend, Nikki R. Keddie identifies secularization theory to be a “sub-category” of modernization theory. This welcome candor loses some of its power, however, when she proceeds to outline the development of secularism in the Ottoman–Turkish context.²⁵ Her reliance on the work of Niyazi Berkes for much of this review precludes an escape from his heavily dichotomous schema. For all its brilliance, Berkes’s work is run through with a teleological approach to secularism that reduces appreciation of the very transformations, tensions, and continuums that Keddie initially set out to assess. Whatever the underlying reasons for its persistence (and it would be remiss to avoid mention of a nationalist element in the study of secularism in Ottoman context) the putative secularizing agenda of the state schools flies in the face of what we know about the Islamist policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Given the extent to which a separate trend of scholarship has identified the period of Sultan Abdülhamid II with Islamic activism, the so-called Pan-Islamic policies, it is odd that the religious dimension of his educational agenda needs to be emphasized.

As I have demonstrated elsewhere, archival evidence clearly shows that the Hamidian educational project was intended to inoculate the empire against the contagion of Western encroachment, missionary activity in particular.²⁶ Here my point is not to dismiss the received wisdom but, rather, to suggest that the schools contained

tensions and nuances that are obscured by the monolithic nature of the terms and the agenda assigned to these institutions that were as complex in their genealogy of historical referents as they were in their daily functioning.

New-style schools challenged and eventually surpassed those operated by the various religious establishments, historically the purveyors of almost all formal education in the empire. As a result, the state schools were critical to the transformations that took place in the late Ottoman Empire: they were central to the state's campaign to reassert central authority after a period of decentralization; they were essential to filling the increasingly onerous manpower requirements of the rapidly burgeoning state bureaucracy; by offering new career options to staff and students alike, the new schools expanded the available range of socio-economic opportunity; and, not least, they provided an unprecedentedly direct level of contact between the state and its youngest subjects. These changes were symptomatic of a process by which the state, as an extension of the sultan, was redefining the relationship with his subjects.

Given the importance of these and other changes associated with the expansion of state education, however, the available explanations of the nature and purpose of the education in question are disquietingly problematic. The state schools have invariably been described as agents of the intertwined and all-encompassing forces of "secularization" and "modernization," a matter to which we return later. Concerning the question of the underlying purpose behind the schools, even those few scholars who recognize the importance of the state's Islamic profile tend to ascribe it to a cynical attempt to mobilize the population by appealing to Islam as the common denominator to which the majority of the empire's population could adhere. The extent to which the state altered or "invented" traditions in this effort has been well shown by the pioneering work of Selim Deringil. But as has been shown, there is a danger that this interpretation reduces Islam to something akin to mere window dressing—propaganda that conceals a "concrete policy of a rational secular programme."²⁷

Although there was much in the late Ottoman educational endeavor that conforms to such an instrumental interpretation (as the discussion of loyalty and quietism to be taken up later in this article shows), our understanding of it should, in my view, be balanced by an appreciation of the considerable extent to which it incorporated elements of the Ottoman and Islamic tradition for its own sake. The fact that the state used Islam for its own "rational" ends should not diminish its evocative and ultimately otherworldly power. Conversely, the quasi-religious faith that Ottomans from across the political spectrum placed in education to transform society reveals the extent to which a supra-rational dimension can be discerned in an ostensibly profane endeavor. At any rate, state bureaucrats involved in the educational expansion of the late Ottoman period frequently stressed the imperative of upholding what in today's parlance might be termed "Ottoman values." They feared that the empire's youth were being "seduced" away from their religion, ways of thought, and life patterns, including ways of dress, by the models associated with foreign encroachment.²⁸ To combat the noxious effects of this influence, these officials argued for more state schools, usually referred to as "Muslim schools," with an educational program that would stress morality. As we shall see, the moral lessons provided in the late Ottoman state curriculum were decidedly Islamic, forcing us to rethink some of the notions associated with the presumed split between "religious" and "secular"

education that has pervaded the secondary literature on the subject. The late–19th-century Ottoman approach thus combined the optimism engendered by the relatively new conception of education as worldly or profane science (*maarif*) with the Islamic underpinning that had been crucial to official Ottoman legitimation for centuries.

While the frequently overlooked continuities with some aspects of the madrasa tradition are quite striking (e.g., a student body segregated from the rest of the population, distinctive clothing, special food provided on the important dates of the Muslim calendar, etc.), I wish to make clear that I am not arguing that an essentialized, unchanged “Islam” acted in the Hamidian state schools as it did in the more typical context of the *maktab* and madrasa, where religious content suffused the entire endeavor. To be sure, the new-style schools were based on a very different epistemological and organizational approach. My understanding is that the hybridity of the new-style schools suggests that instead of looking for contrasts between the “old” and the “new,” we should be prepared for a continuum of possible permutations combining elements of both traditions, changing each one in the process.

Those expecting to find evidence of “secular” schools of the secondary literature among the archival material in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul will be sorely disappointed. Instead they will encounter schools intended to serve a most anti-secular agenda. Built in large part to counter the growing influence of the West, outfitted with a curriculum redesigned in the Hamidian era to give much greater weight to Ottoman and Islamic tradition, decorated with the symbols of state-sanctioned Islam, staffed with healthy numbers of ulema, and organized around the Muslim calendar, the Hamidian schools can hardly be explained using the terms “Western” or “Westernizing.”

Indeed, a primary reason for educational expansion in the Hamidian period was to improve the moral qualities of the empire’s youth by reasserting indigenous values—namely, Islamic morality. In this respect, the Hamidian educational agenda differed substantially from that of the preceding period of reforms known collectively as the Tanzimat. Broadly speaking, state education during the Tanzimat had been more about imitating the best attributes of Western European education, French in particular.²⁹ Less thought was given to the ways in which French-style schooling could be adapted to benefit the particular exigencies of the Ottoman context. Under Abdülhamid II, by contrast, state-sponsored education began to assert a much more independent streak, largely as a response to the perception that the growing presence of foreign missionary schools was undermining Ottoman efforts aimed at fostering feelings of loyalty and “Ottomanness.”

From this standpoint, the Hamidian educational agenda resorted to indigenous values. Teaching the empire’s young subjects the skills deemed necessary to survive “the demands of the present” was of course critical, but the Hamidian project placed new emphasis on loyalty, moral character, and right conduct.³⁰ It identified the new-style school as the main weapon in the struggle against foreign encroachment and internal moral decline.

The broad Hamidian desire to re-emphasize Islamic morality manifested itself in specific, pragmatic policies. Once the government had cleared the ground—and the funding—for a spate of school construction after 1884, the year in which the Education Tax was enacted, the moral agenda began to appear. Its thrust can be detected

in two main areas: curricular and extracurricular. Beginning in early 1885, the sultan impaneled a series of commissions and charged them with vetting the curriculum inherited from the preceding regime. Although the first commission seems to have made little progress,³¹ subsequent incarnations were clearly more effective. Within a year's time, the sultan appointed another commission, this time chaired by the *şeyhülislam*, the highest-ranking member of the ulema in the empire. After reviewing all of the empire's school levels, the commission produced a report recommending that Arabic, like French, be taught in every grade of the *idadî* schools and in all of the higher institutions in the capital.³² Next, it recommended creating new "courses on the biographies and features of the Prophets, the historical deeds of the companions of the Prophet, and the biographies of the religious authorities and the famous ulema."³³ Further, it proposed that the projected lessons in religious principles include "the instruction of the science of morals (*ilm-i ahlâk*) and of Islamic jurisprudence (*fikh*) in abridged form."

By augmenting the time in the schoolday spent on courses such as Arabic and morals, the curricular review aimed at modifying the Tanzimat-era lesson plan with content it deemed appropriate to the task of moral regeneration. In this endeavor it was conscious of the success that non-Muslim schools in the empire had enjoyed due to the inculcation of moral principles. The imperial decree establishing the commission had made explicit mention of the enviable state of moral instruction in the non-Muslim schools of the empire, noting that "[b]y reorganizing their curricula, the non-Muslim schools have striven for excellence with respect to their students' morals and have produced results."³⁴ By contrast, in the Muslim schools, "the opposite situation is a source of regret to the sultan." The reference to the state institutions as being "Muslim schools" is telling; nominally interdenominational, they were nevertheless conceived of as instruments of a broader attempt to reassert the Islamic basis of the empire. As a result of this and other, similarly guided curricular-reform efforts, moral education, absent in the Tanzimat-era educational plan of 1869,³⁵ came to be inserted into the imperial curriculum. A memorandum of the Meclis-i Mahsus from 1900 makes clear, however, that the process of curricular modification required continual attention. This memorandum noted that although lessons in morals had been added to some of the schools' curricula, the texts available were deficient, consisting of treatises "composed from here and there."³⁶ The presence of such defective moral texts combined with the fact that ulema were not the ones providing the instruction caused the high-ranking signatories to this memorandum to worry about the future. Their concerns and the remedy they propose underscore the centrality of the moral dimension in state education:

It is obvious that men whose religious principles are contaminated with weakness will truly not be able to serve faith and state (*din ü devlet*). Since it is natural that this situation will bring about moral and material harms, and considering that it is the Sultan's absolute wish that sufficient attention be paid to the teaching of the necessary lessons in the schools and that religious duties be completely fulfilled, first, an inspection committee (*heyet*) composed of twelve individuals, eight ulema and four civil officials, should be appointed. The aforementioned committee will examine the situation of all of the Muslim schools, the school curricula, and degree to which the lessons are in agreement with what is desired.³⁷

Further, this committee was to ascertain whether Islamic duties were being performed outside of class, as well as whether potentially detrimental material, such as Western philosophy (*felsefe*), was being taught in the classroom.³⁸ It seems highly likely that this sort of scrutiny produced the two textbooks on morals to be examined shortly.

By the turn of the century, then, the modification process ensured that religious and moral sciences (*ulûm-u diniye ve ahlâkiye*) assumed a dominant place in the weekly schedule.³⁹ Listed first in the lesson program, these courses were to receive a constant three hours per week in a schedule that ranged from nineteen to twenty-four hours. The only courses that surpassed this total were those in Turkish and French. The textbooks seem to have been written in accordance with the stipulations associated with moral instruction in the 1899–1900 curriculum. As we shall see, they reveal that the time allotted to moral instruction during classtime was intended to be used to cover specifically Islamic material.

Having taken measures to control what was to be taught in the classroom, the education bureaucracy was nevertheless unwilling to leave it at that, making efforts aimed at controlling actual practice. It maintained a vigilant attitude toward lapses in moral rectitude on the part of both teachers and students. Consider the case of a certain Midhat Bey, an instructor at the Mekteb-i Mülkiye, the prominent school for training civil officials in the capital. In 1890, reports reached the palace that Midhat Bey had been taking liberties with the curriculum and textbook stipulated for his history course.⁴⁰ He seems to have had his charges spending long hours on ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman history, leaving them little time for their other subjects. What is more, he was reported to have subverted school decorum by mocking his fellow teachers and making light of the school's activities. Worse still was the charge that he was undermining the religious principles of his students. Apart from certain unspecified transgressions regarding Christianity, he was accused of having mockingly discussed religious principles (*akaid-i diniye*), "the lofty morals of some of the Prophets," and the four orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence.⁴¹ The imperial decree that responded to this case stressed that teachers should not stray from the prescribed texts. Rather, they should give serious attention to correcting their students' belief (*tashih-i ʾitikad*) and to their moral instruction (*tehzib-i ahlâk*). Extrapolating from the case at hand, the decree goes on to declare that "in the Islamic schools the subject requiring the utmost attention is the matter of strengthening Islamic principles."⁴²

While the educational establishment was thus trying to insure that what was taught inside the classroom matched the newly altered curriculum, it was simultaneously manifesting an interest in what was taking place outside of class. Monitoring of extracurricular life took several forms, although they can be treated only summarily in the scope of this article.⁴³ Several steps were taken to provide a formal structure that would induce students to live in compliance with the moral lessons they were being taught. Both the yearly calendar and the daily regimen followed an Islamic rhythm. Such important times as the month of Ramadan and the Prophet's birthday were marked on the school calendar.⁴⁴ Likewise, the schoolday accommodated time for students to pray.⁴⁵ Moreover, as more and more state schools at the secondary level were converted to boarding institutions,⁴⁶ the state assumed some parental

functions. School regulations charged specific member of the schools' staff with supervising moral comportment. For example, the assistants (*muavin*) were assigned both the general responsibility of enjoining harmonious relations and preventing quarrels among the students and such specific tasks as, when assigned nightly guard duty, sleeping in the students' dormitory, rising a quarter of an hour before their charges in the morning, monitoring their getting dressed "in orderly and prompt fashion" and performing their ablutions and, after prayer, directing them toward their study halls.⁴⁷ An assistant needed to be present to take the roll, monitor students while they ate, and supervise them when they studied their lessons.⁴⁸ The overseers (*mubassır*) were to play a supporting role to the assistants and, in schools having no assistants, to fulfill their functions. The overseers were assigned never to leave the students' side during recess and were also required to act as hall monitors during class-time to observe the behavior of those students excused from class by the assistants.⁴⁹

Eventually, these rules were deemed to require bolstering, and an order was issued to augment the supervisory role of a third official, the vice-principal (*müdir-i sani*).⁵⁰ By 1906, with the appearance of opposition groups in state schools, the Hamidian government had ample cause to worry about more than the potentially immoral side of unsupervised student activity, but it was the area of religio-moral learning and behavior that the new regulation addressed. The vice-principals were to oversee lessons relating to religious and moral sciences, devoting special attention to instruction in religious manners (*âdab-i diniye*) and proper morals (*ahlâk-i hasane*), and to monitor the students' religio-moral conduct.⁵¹ Monitoring could be reinforced with preliminary warnings and subsequent punishment.⁵² In classic bureaucratic fashion, an attempt to quantify moral conduct developed. The vice-principal was to maintain registers to record each student's moral instruction and behavior, and the degree to which he performed his religious obligations. At the end of each year, students were to be assigned scores corresponding to their religious and moral education (*terbiye-i diniye ve ahlâkiye*), with the aggregate sum printed on their diplomas. Thus, a student's religio-moral behavior was to have a potentially lasting impact on his career.

Naturally, these regulations tell us only about the state's intent. How such officials actually understood these tasks and whether they acted accordingly are of course much more difficult to ascertain.⁵³ Nevertheless, all of the above means of stipulating and then enforcing pedagogical and everyday life were related to a broad desire to bolster morality and discipline through state schooling. Let us now turn to how morals were understood in the context of late Ottoman education.

THE MEANING OF "MORALS"

Conceived as a means of combating the negative effects of the Western penetration into the Ottoman Empire, the instruction of morals was largely envisioned as a corrective measure. In order to mitigate the deleterious consequences of foreign influence, imperial subjects needed only to be returned to the true path. It is important to bear in mind that the Hamidian educational project was not simply, as modernization theory would have had us believe, an attempt to import "modern" practices and modes of thinking into the imperial domains.⁵⁴ It did, of course, engage in such direct importation, but it was ultimately concerned with preserving the em-

pire by adopting Western methods but then *adapting* them for its own purposes. Indeed, the Western-based school system with its centralized planning proved easy to modify. The insertion of moral content into the curriculum was perhaps the defining example of the Hamidian effort to refit the Tanzimat curriculum to accord with its view of late Ottoman realities.

But what exactly was the term "morals" meant to convey? In what follows, I examine both the state's campaign to reinsert morality into the curriculum and two textbooks specifically written to teach morals to late Ottoman students. But first I consider the philological and contextual evidence of the meaning of morals in the Hamidian context. Semseddin Sami's dictionary of 1900, incidentally published to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Abdülhamid's reign, is instructive in this regard.⁵⁵ The entry under *hulk* defines that term as "natural disposition" or "characteristic" but goes on to dwell on the plural form *ahlâk*. Three definitions are provided. The first offers a neutral stance, stating that *ahlâk* are both the good and bad dispositions with which every person is endowed. The second meaning is that of a particular division of philosophy that treats the issue of human ethics. The third definition moves away from the normative neutrality of the first two meanings. No longer both good and bad, *ahlâk* are here defined solely as "good dispositions" (*iyi huylar*) and as "the virtues (*fezail*) that adorn the human being with respect to sense and truth" (*ma'nen ve hakikaten*). "In students, morals are to be looked for before all things." The term "public morality" (*ahlâk-i umumî*) is then introduced and defined as "the qualities that have been accepted as custom in a society." An example follows: "It is absolutely necessary to protect public morality from sedition (*fesad*)."⁵⁶ It is this last, communal sense that informs the usage of the term "morals" in the parlance of the late Ottoman educational project.

In the context of official memoranda, in fact, the term "morals" was given little positive definition; rather, it was the *absence* of morals and religious principles (*akaid-i diniye*) and their being "broken" (*bozuk*) that stand out.⁵⁷ This absence was blamed for the heedlessness of Ottoman youth and for a general loss of Islamic identity exhibited by change in dress and ways of thinking, and the adoption of "Frankish habits."⁵⁸ Ultimately, the sorry state of morals was deemed to have an adverse effect on loyalty to the Ottoman state and its titular head, the sultan or caliph.

Although the notion of morals could thus connote a range of meanings, the authorities, both in the provinces and in the capital, advanced the notion of intensified moral instruction as the solution to reverse the disappointing trends they identified in the realm of public morality. In order to restore public morality, the late Ottoman educational campaign deployed a variety of means. Perhaps the most trusted vehicle was the written text, to which we turn shortly. But it was only one element of many aimed at revivifying the empire's moral life. Mosque and school were the twin instruments of that policy. Internal government memoranda show that the state conceived of these ostensibly distinct institutions as fulfilling the same agenda—namely, strengthening the moral fiber of the empire's Muslim subjects so that they could better withstand the onslaught of foreign missionaries and the lure of Western fashion, both cultural and intellectual. In the provinces of Iraq, in Syria, and on Cyprus, state funds intended to defray the expenses of school construction were used for what Deringil has termed counter-propaganda. Itinerant ulema were sent to the countryside to inveigh against the foreign threat.⁵⁹ Again, while the state may have

seen such efforts to harness Islam as part of a propaganda campaign, there is also ample evidence to suggest that there was more at work than mere instrumentalism can explain. I see the Ottoman educational campaign, its moral component in particular, as being pitched at a more holistic, more totalizing level. It was as if by combining Islamic morality with the Western educational system, so successfully demonstrated by Europeans in their home countries and on Ottoman territory by both foreign missionaries and the empire's own minority groups, Ottoman officialdom hoped to have discovered a formula that would allow the empire to vault over its many problems.

Those youths already enrolled in state schools were easier to reach. Bolstering the main solution—namely, the emphasis on moral instruction—was a complementary set of actions that included increasing the instruction of Arabic, adding theological subjects to the curriculum, assigning texts devoted to the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and enforcing religious observance. As I suggested earlier, state monitoring of student behavior represented an attempt to enforce outside the classroom those lessons which were taught inside it. In short, the Ottoman educational project was more than a pedagogical one; it sought to take a growing share of the empire's youth, enroll them in its schools, clothe them in its uniforms, house many of them in dormitories, teach them within the classroom through state-sanctioned textbooks, and, to the extent that it was possible, supervise their activity outside it. It is important, however, to distinguish between intention and result. Largely because the latter is so persistently difficult to recover, scholarship on late Ottoman education has concentrated almost exclusively on the state's desiderata and has tended to make some remarkable assumptions about the way state-supplied learning was received by its students. For the moment, suffice it to say that care must be taken to avoid bringing preconceptions to the as-yet-to-be-written *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of late Ottoman education.

Let us now turn to two of the vehicles used to impart these lessons. The *Rehber-i Ahlâk* (Guide to Morals) and the *İlm-i Ahlâk* (Science of Morals) were published at the turn of the century for the express purpose of moral instruction in Ottoman state schools.⁶⁰ Although we know almost nothing about the authors of these texts,⁶¹ any specific material that they might have replaced, or the way they would have been used inside the classroom or outside of it, their analysis nevertheless suggests that central government policy had by 1900 made its presence felt in tangible form at the local level.

TWO TEXTBOOKS ON MORALS

The first text to be considered here, the *Rehber-i Ahlâk*, is written in a simpler style and is considerably shorter than its higher-level analog. Let us first consider its form, which both reveals and conceals its agenda. Like the late Ottoman education project generally, the *Rehber-i Ahlâk* mixes elements inspired by Western Europe with those exhibiting a clearly Islamic and Ottoman lineage. The text would seem to owe its very existence to having been selected to assist in the instruction of one of many courses comprising a curriculum mandated by the central government in a system inspired by the example of Western Europe. Further, the fact that each student seems to have had his own copy of the work—based on examination of actual texts in

which the students inscribed their names or applied their seals (*mühür*)—distinguishes it from the “traditional” pedagogical practice of the Islamic world.⁶² Perhaps it is our own late-20th-century view of the place of religious subjects in the school curriculum that makes us think so, but there is an important distinction to be drawn between the internal consistency of the core curriculum of the madrasa experience and the contrasting polyglot nature of the Hamidian curriculum. Combining morals with chemistry and French derives from a very different tradition from the one that linked grammar, logic, theology, and jurisprudence.⁶³

Several of the text’s formal aspects likewise call to mind the Western pedagogical tradition. The physical appearance of the pages of the bulk of the text in the *Rehber* exhibits a feature quite rare in late Ottoman literary production: glossary entries are supplied below the main text in the form of a footnote apparatus.⁶⁴ The notes, separated from the main text by a horizontal line, serve to explicate words and phrases presumably considered difficult to the student readers.

Punctuation is another strikingly exogenous feature of the text in question. The script tradition of the Arabo-Islamic world typically eschews punctuation. Over the course of the 19th century, this began to change. Punctuation marks and spacing devices such as indented paragraphs representative of the Latin-based scripts crept into the printed and, less frequently, handwritten texts produced in the Ottoman Empire. The trend that rendered Ottoman institutions increasingly similar in formal appearance to their Western counterparts was thus reinforced by a parallel movement in the literary and cultural spheres of the empire. The *Rehber* reflects this trend, exhibiting many characteristics of the Western editorial tradition. Hyphens, commas, ellipses, question marks, exclamation points, quotation marks, and periods all appear liberally throughout the text, as does the separation and indentation of paragraphs. In most cases, such punctuation is curiously redundant. For example, periods almost invariably appear in the wake of verbal forms that inherently indicate the conclusion of the thought expressed.⁶⁵ Commas and periods often unnecessarily precede the conjunctive particle *ki*, which itself signals the arrival of a clause.⁶⁶ These largely superficial aspects of the *Rehber*’s formal articulation reflect the broader pattern of adapting Western modes of organization reflected in the state school system and in important aspects of late Ottoman society generally.

There is, however, a more substantive aspect of the text’s formal organization that suggests the strong influence not of the Western but of the Ottoman and Islamic heritage. This is the fact that approximately 90 percent of the text appears in the form of questions posed by a student and the answers supplied by a teacher.⁶⁷ This didactic method recalls an important mode of theological disputation prevalent in the Islamic tradition.⁶⁸ Of closer provenance is the question-and-answer format to be found in the opinions (*fetva*) rendered by the Ottoman *şeyhülislams* since the early years of the empire and by all muftis since very early in Islamic history.⁶⁹ The question–response technique is a formal device that also has a direct bearing on the content of the text. Like the *fetva*-rendering of the *şeyhülislam*, the voice providing the answers has an unquestionably authoritative role. “The student” poses the questions, which are, of course, fully and correctly answered by “the teacher.” Even the terms used to denote these two roles contribute to defining the sense of the knowledge being imparted. While the term for questioner is the Persian-derived word *şakird*, the

word denoting the teacher is the Arabic *muallim* (or occasionally *hoca*; see later). Now, in the official parlance of the state-education apparatus generally, *şakird* is virtually interchangeable with the Arabic *talebe*. But synonyms for *muallim*, such as *üstad*, rarely appear. Given the Hamidian-era trend toward re-emphasizing the Islamic dimension in education, this nomenclature adds to the religious nuance of the teacher–student relationship. For the term *muallim* has a clear semantic association with the *ilmiye*, the religious establishment responsible for “traditional” learning. Such learning, *ilm*, is to be understood in contradistinction to the “new style” education, referred to as *maarif*, and usually parsed as the “learning of useful things” or as “the process of becoming acquainted with things unknown.”⁷⁰ The nuance of religious authority imparted by the term *muallim* is particularly pronounced in a context where the teacher is holding forth on the subject of morality.

It is only when we move beyond the *Rehber*’s form to consider its content that we see how squarely it stands in the Islamic and Ottoman traditions. Given the fact that this text was created for use in an ostensibly interdenominational educational project, its use of strictly Muslim sources and concepts is striking.

The Islamic identity of the text appears through both form and substance. The most obvious examples of this are the mention of the Prophet Muhammad, the inclusion of specifically Islamic duties and injunctions, and the citation of hadith. The Prophet is first mentioned in the section of the text devoted to explaining *diyanet*, which might be translated as “religion,” “religiosity,” or “piety.” In response to the student’s question, “In what way are we to be religious?” the teacher responds in quintessentially Islamic terms.

By always performing and implementing without hesitation all of the commands of God, the Possessor of Majesty, and our Prophet Muhammad Mustafa, may God the Exalted bless him with the best salutations; by pronouncing the Attestation of Faith; by performing prayers five times [per day] in the direction of the *kible* [i.e., toward Mecca] in a pure state; by fasting; by giving alms; if it is in our capacity, by performing the pilgrimage to Mecca; and, without any shortcoming or deliberation, by loving them [i.e., God and His Prophet] with the utmost capacity of our hearts and keeping them in our mind and mention at all times.⁷¹

It would be difficult to find more explicit evidence of the text’s Islamic identity than this articulation of the Five Pillars of Islam.

Other important features of Islamic discourse reinforce the *Rehber*’s sectarian nature. Most obvious is the liberal sprinkling of hadith, the reported sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad, to bolster the argument. For example, the section on cleanliness (*nezafet*) begins with the student’s typically simple query: “What is cleanliness?” To this the teacher replies,

Teacher—Maintaining orderliness in our clothes, our belongings, and our bodies [lit. all our limbs].

Student—Why must we be orderly?

Teacher—In the first place, in accordance with the meaning of the noble Hadith (Cleanliness stems from belief [*al-naẓāfah min al-īmān*]), our maintaining orderliness is one of the divine commands; secondly, . . .⁷²

The hadith stands out from the rest of the text both through the use of parentheses and its being rendered in the original Arabic.

When the *Rehber* seeks to inculcate key values deemed necessary to the maintenance of discipline in the schools, it is no coincidence that many of these values have a clearly Islamic resonance. These include such concepts as religiosity (*diyanet*); laudable moral qualities (*ahlâk-ı hamide*); cleanliness (*nezâfet*); effort (*mesai*); ascetic discipline (*riyazet*); sound management (*hüsn-ü idare*); contentment (*kanaat*); knowledge (*ilm*); patience (*sabır*); forbearance (*hilm*); and order (*intizam*). The *Rehber* devotes a chapter to explaining these concepts and more through the question-and-answer format. Interestingly, the longest chapters are those on obedience and respect and on faithfulness. Let us turn to the first of these to see how the author marshals Islamic principles in imparting his catechism.

Student— What is obedience?

Teacher— Submission to and reliance on the commands, according to the canonical law of Islam (*şer-i şerif*), of those who are more intelligent and greater than we with respect to both age and station.

Student — Whom must we obey?

Teacher— It is a necessity that we obey and respect [the following:] First, God the Exalted, the Creator and Destroyer of places, hearts, and especially, all creatures; secondly, the Prophet, the Possessor of Glory; thirdly, those greater than we, such as our father and mother, the Sultan, the teacher, and officers.⁷³

It is clear from this passage that the implicit hierarchy is both an Islamic and an Ottoman one. Mention of God alone could, of course, refer to any religion’s conception of the deity, but when the word *Allah* is immediately followed by the Arabic formula *ta^cāllā* (meaning “may [He] be exalted”), so typical of Islamic phrasing, the specifically Islamic nature of the text is clear. This is immediately confirmed by the second object of obedience, the Prophet Muhammad. Parents are inherently universal, but in the context of the imperial school system, the mention of sultan, teacher, and officers have obvious Ottoman referents.

The Islamic–Ottoman link implicit in this passage revisits the tone established in the Introduction (*mukaddeme*). This section begins by praising God and lauding the sultan’s role in causing education to be spread throughout the empire through the establishment of schools, printing houses, and libraries, each of which is a “proof announcing the Truth.”⁷⁴ The Hamidian educational agenda cements the connection between the divine and the imperial. The dissemination of knowledge in this context means the spreading of religion. Precisely which religion is being referred to is clear from the Islamic basis of the Ottoman Empire in general and the specifically Islamic phrasing employed.

The Islamic elements of the *Rehber* are, however, not limited to formal or semantic associations. As was shown in the examples cited earlier, a clearly Islamic conception of thought and action informs the content of the text. Perhaps more significant than this variety of Islamic elements in the *Rehber* is the extent to which its author draws on them in pursuing his pedagogical agenda.

In its explanation of morals, Ali İrfan’s *Rehber* emphasizes qualities that are of great importance to the neo-patrimonial and bureaucratized nature of the late–19th-century Ottoman Empire. Religious justification is marshalled in support of an interrelated cluster of attributes that I label “quietist.” This brings together such complementary qualities as respect for authority, duty, loyalty, and hierarchy,

all critical to the Hamidian neo-patrimonial agenda. Indeed, the *Rehber's* approach to the related concepts of obedience, loyalty, and morality resembled those voiced by the former Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa:

Loyalty is honesty in words and deeds, [it is] material and moral safekeeping. The following concepts are all derived from loyalty: Blessedness, compassion, probity, and patriotism. Possessors of these qualities are called loyal and those who prefer their opposites are liars and traitors. Happiness and peace in the affairs of the state originate from loyalty.⁷⁵

The rapid expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the 19th century entailed qualitative as well as quantitative change. The proliferation of ministries and commissions, and the elaboration of a palace bureaucracy that paralleled that of the Sublime Porte, all required considerable manpower. The men taken into this expanded scribal service had to be not only capable bureaucrats but loyal servants of the sultan, as well. The state school system was charged with the critical task of producing such doubly suitable candidates. The *Rehber's* attempt to inculcate the key values listed earlier illustrates one facet of the state's campaign to supply the state's personnel needs—and to do so in a way that directly links its institutional, bureaucratic task with its religio-moral agenda.

The quietism of the *Rehber* makes frequent use of patently Islamic tenets and principles but also reaches beyond the strictly canonical domain to delineate a broader conception of normative behavior. The clearest example of the way the text extends beyond the realm of the shari^ca, where Qur^ʿan and hadith directly support the text, and into the sphere of less clearly religious areas of human interaction, is the way it treats the concept of duty. As shown in the discussion of the text's discussion of the Five Pillars of Islam, the *Rehber* makes ample use of core Islamic notions in adumbrating one aspect of those duties incumbent on the individual (*farz-i ayn*). A cognate of the same term (*feriza*, pl. *feraiz*, meaning religious duty) appears in the text, connoting duties not associated with Islamic practice per se, such as the universal obligation to love one's parents, siblings, friends (or whatever one holds dear⁷⁶) and the need to work and to avoid its opposite, laziness.⁷⁷ Conversely, the text takes general notions found in the Qur^ʿan and hadith and provides a practical application. Thus, the oft-repeated patience (*sabır*) of the Qur^ʿan assumes a more specific context in the chapter by the same name in the *Rehber*:

Student— What is patience?

Teacher— Patience means enduring every misfortune and calamity. As for this, it is such a fine and admirable moral quality that just as when we are patient we endure without complaint every evil [that befalls us], so also do we never pay attention to the calumnies made against us by evil and corrupt men, and we are on guard against soiling our tongue with cursing and offense.⁷⁸

This hypothetical context of practicing patience is given further grounding in a subsequent passage by more nearly fixing its temporal and geographical locus.

Student— What are the merits of patience?

Teacher— When are patient, it does not do to be grieved or sorry in the face of illnesses, misfortune, and grief. By always saying, (God has ordained it this way[;] it is necessary to be patient and bear it. [T]his, too, will certainly pass.), we do not allow

the illnesses and troubles to increase but rather we are always hopeful that we will find health and prosperity. . . . Apart from that, if we are good, we will have performed good deeds for the state and the millet, benefited everyone, and rendered permanent our good name in this world.⁷⁹

A similar concern for regulating daily activity appears in other attributes of the *Rehber*'s quietism. The concepts of forbearance (*hilm*), order (*intizam*), obedience and respect (*itaat ü ihtiram*), and restraining the tongue (*zabt-ı lisan*) each have their own chapter in the text. In delineating and advocating these attributes, the text mixes religious and non-religious justification. Thus, it argues for restraining the tongue both by presenting the Arabic of the hadith, *Salāmat al-insān fī ḥifẓ al-lisān* (man's well-being stems from restraining his tongue) and by citing the Turkish folk proverb *Ok yarası geçer ama dil yarası geçmez* (the wound of an arrow will pass but not the wound inflicted by the tongue).⁸⁰ Likewise, the *Rehber* relies on both what it terms “religious” and “natural” reasons in advocating love and respect for one's parents. The text reinforces the dual nature of its argumentation by citing both “holy books” (*kutub-u mukaddese*) and evidence from the animal kingdom.⁸¹ Interestingly, such love and respect should also characterize the student's relationship with his teacher (*hoca*).

Student— In what way should we respect their excellencies, our honorable teachers (*muallimin-i kiramımız hazeratını*)?

Teacher— It is our duty to love our *hocas*, like our parents, more than everyone else, never to forget them by committing their advice and wise writings to memory, to conform to them always, and sometimes even if due to our inopportune actions they become angry, scold, or blame, not to resist them but to be quiet and obedient and never to blame or insult them, to learn by heart the assignments and lessons they assign, to complete our education, and, after obtaining the diploma, to treat them with extraordinary respect and obedience even if we become more knowledgeable and superior [to them in rank].⁸²

The text defines the teacher's role explicitly in parental terms.

Student— Why must we respect our teachers?

Teacher— The rights of our teachers (*muallim*) are every bit as great as those of our parents with respect to us. Because [while] our parents are the cause of our existence and our growth, our teachers rescue us from the world of ignorance by teaching us and instructing us in both upbringing (*terbiye*) and science and knowledge (*ulûm u fûnûn*). In this respect we come to be considered distinguished and respected by the people. We live with all repose, and, ultimately, we leave life with a lasting good name.⁸³

As this passage demonstrates, the position of the teacher vis-à-vis the student not only equals but exceeds that of his parents. By initiating the student into the realm of *terbiye* and science and knowledge, the teacher provides access to a world of ease where he can make his mark. This is a world to which, by implication, the parents do not belong. Their role in the child's life is reduced to birth and early childhood development.⁸⁴ Parents are thus equated with the “world of ignorance.” It is a telling aspect of the state's moralizing campaign that it is the teacher, in this context clearly

an extension of the Ottoman state, who can rescue the student from the ignorant orbit of the family.

An analysis of the second textbook confirms and reinforces many of the themes that appear in the first. For this reason and in the interest of space, I shall address only some of the most salient features of Ali Rıza's *İlm-i Ahlâk*. The differences between the two works seems to derive largely from the different level of their intended student readers. While the *Rehber* was composed for advanced primary and, presumably, lower secondary pupils, the second text aimed at the secondary level only. More than twice as long, organized in a more epistemologically advanced manner, composed in a more sophisticated prose, and with fewer of the simple pedagogical devices of the first, the *İlm-i Ahlâk* provided its readers with a more detailed treatment of morality.

It is clear from the work's Introduction that it was intended to fill a perceived lack of textbooks devoted to moral instruction. Ali Rıza writes that "while numerous works are being published in connection with the arts and sciences (*ulûm u fûnûn*), there still has been nothing published in book form concerning the science of morals as stipulated in the book list for the civil school curriculum recently published by the Ministry of Education."⁸⁵ Ali İrfan, the author of the *Rehber*, makes a similar allusion to the lack of books on morals by referring to the fact that libraries were packed with all manner of books on the arts and sciences, but that it was moral lessons that were critical across the entire span of a child's education.⁸⁶ While Ali Rıza reveals a more explicit connection between official desiderata, as represented in the ministry's publication, and the appearance of his book, both texts seem strongly linked to official objectives. Equally noteworthy is what Ali Rıza has to say about his methodology. He states that he created his text by examining various books on the subject of the science of morals that had been listed in the curriculum. Interpreting and abstracting (*tercüme ve telhis*) their contents, he compiled and collected them and then adorned and buttressed them with one or more appropriate Qur'anic verses, traditions of the sayings of the Prophet, and sayings of the Islamic greats.⁸⁷ Although it would be helpful to know what sorts of texts the author had at his disposal, the fact that he chose to embroider their discussions with standard Islamic referents is significant and underscores his common approach with Ali İrfan.

Ali Rıza sets about his task of "adorning and buttressing" in unstinting fashion. Rare is the discussion that lacks a conspicuously Islamic supporting reference. For example, the introductory chapter, which takes up the task of defining morals and identifying what subjects come under its rubric, contains the Qur'anic citation, "*wa innaka la^{ca}alā khuluqin ^{ca}azîmin*" in the original Arabic (For truly yours is a sublime nature).⁸⁸ The text goes on to explain the the verse's meaning in Turkish, elaborating on the etymological connection between *khuluq* and *akhlâq*: "We created you to be a great creation, in other words, we combined all of the good moral qualities together in you."⁸⁹ Numerous examples of similar citations follow. Indeed, the text is so replete with Islamic references that it makes citing more than a few examples superfluous. The textbook employs such a strategy to comment on a host of theoretical and practical moral issues and duties, ranging from the distinguishing between good and evil to the necessity of paying taxes and performing military service, but I shall focus on its approach to the role of the family in order to compare it with the *Rehber*.

Like that text, the *İlm-i Ahlâk* takes an equivocal view of the family. On the one hand, its author acknowledges the importance of parents for their role as providers of education in childhood (*sabavet*), the time in which the child receives the basis of his moral development.⁹⁰ On the other hand, failure at this crucial task can lead to problems that may be corrected only with extreme difficulty. "Children deprived of parental education (*ta'lim ü terbiye*) during their childhood later become immoral." The passage goes on to state that examples of such children being impervious to subsequent attempts to educate them are well known; parents must not show the slightest laziness in the performance of their critical duties of teaching their children to fulfill their religious obligations and to be endowed with good moral qualities.⁹¹ Typically, a supporting hadith of the Prophet is supplied here, this time on the authority of the Caliph Abu Bakr: "Commence your children to perform their religious duties and teach them their moral beneficences (*mekârim-i ahlâkiye*) from the age of seven. When they reach the age of ten undertake their education (*terbiye*) and all of their good moral qualities (*mahasin-i ahlâkiye*), because childhood is like a green tree; once it dries it can only be straightened by fire."⁹²

The text's presentation of the awesomely demanding parental duties with respect to education neatly prepares the way for the involvement of the schoolteacher. Such duties are described as dual, material and spiritual, with the commensurate potential for parental error leading to harmful effects (*mazarrat*).⁹³ After once again emphasizing that the holiest of parental responsibilities is to do one's utmost duty toward education (including the necessity of inculcating awareness of the dangers of ignorance and the benefits of learning), the author broaches the subject of schooling. Some exceptions aside, he says, "education in school is more reliable and more complete than that which takes place among the family."⁹⁴ This superiority translates into tacit support for the teacher's arrogation of parental rights.

Since the teacher takes the place of a child's parents while he is at school, the teacher has partial authority to exercise their rights and influence. Because for a period of time he is fulfilling a portion of the parents' duties; as a result of this he is chosen to fulfill a portion of their rights.

Now, for this reason the child is obliged to render to his teacher the same duties of respect and obedience that he owes his parents. These are among the student's primary duties.⁹⁵

As in the *Rehber*, the positive portrayal of school-derived education is juxtaposed with the possibility of trouble in the home environment. If the influence at home is bad, the text continues, the teacher will have great difficulty in removing those ill effects. Thus, the treatment of the family and its relationship with the schoolteacher, both positive and negative, shows a marked similarity with that offered in the *Rehber*. In both texts it is clear that the teacher is poised to take on the more important educational role once the family's influence has been surpassed.

Thus, despite some important differences in pedagogical approach, both texts appear strikingly similar in content. Without more information about the process by which texts were selected for use in the late Ottoman schools, it is impossible to say for certain whether this convergence represents more than mere coincidence. Given the attention the state devoted to monitoring the printed word both in the

realm of education and more generally, however, it seems that a random coincidence is quite unlikely. What we can say for certain is that the state school texts devoted to morals in this period struck a strong blow for enlarging the state's role vis-à-vis the individual student. Even more striking is the role that Islamic referents played in moral instruction. Although this might seem natural given the late Ottoman policy of emphasizing Islam, it nevertheless represented a critical departure from the existing Tanzimat approach. Thanks to the recent research of Akşin Somel, we are able to identify this contrast. Somel's analysis of an earlier moral textbook, Sadık Rifat Paşa's *Ahlâk Risalesi* of 1847, allows us to see that the Islamic content only implicit in that earlier work is made unavoidably conspicuous in the two later books I refer to in this article.⁹⁶ The conscious emphasis our authors placed on explicitly Islamic references reflects the extent to which the Hamidian agenda elicited a marked contrast to the preceding Tanzimat approach. The fact that it was mainly in the latter period that empirewide schooling plans were turned into reality underscores the importance of this shift toward a consciously indigenous Ottoman and Islamic agenda. Moreover, by bringing more and more students to board at its schools, the state was acting to ensure that it imparted its lessons on a nearly full-time basis.

CONCLUSION

Thus, with its teachers infringing on parental roles and its schools accepting a growing number of boarding students, the state was edging the family aside. The removal of the family from the field of education—its moral component, in particular—cleared the way for the pre-eminence of the relationship between the state and the student. The state, acting through the local bureaucrats employed in each school, now stood in loco parentis, a role made possible by the state's emphasis on morality. It is usually understood that the loser in this educational rearrangement was the religious establishment. Yet the state's reliance on the ulema in setting the curriculum, preparing the texts to be used, and in the schools themselves suggests that they were very much a feature of state education in this period.

The moral teaching to which the students were exposed in these schools was not secular. There were, of course, elements common to most notions of civic morality, such as respect for one's elders or obedience to authority. But it is the specifically Islamic character of state-supplied morality that is conspicuous in what we have been taught to think of as "secular" schools. Perhaps it makes more sense to call them "new-style" or, better, "state" schools instead of "secular" or "modern."

Much more important than this issue of semantics is the question of what this educational combination meant. A comparative perspective shows that the late Ottoman Empire was not alone in seeking a mixture of "traditional" and "modern" elements. The hybrid nature of the Ottoman schools, employing an overtly Western system to impart a message that included both the Western and the "Islamic," blurs our usually dichotomized understanding of late Ottoman society. The mixture of medium and message inherent in the late Ottoman schools forces us to rethink some of the key tenets of late Ottoman history: bifurcation, development of secularism, even the monolithic profile of "the state." I suggest that the schools be understood as com-

plex and sometimes contradictory institutions of mixed pedagogical and epistemological parentage. This composite nature should help us to imagine a wide range of possibilities for encounter and influence, much wider certainly than the prevailing treatment—and terminology—have prepared us to envision.

NOTES

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¹I am thinking here of such scholars as Engin D. Akarlı, Selim Deringil, Hasan Kayalı, Elizabeth B. Frierson, and Carter V. Findley, to name only a few.

²Many have written on the topic. The following monographs rank among the most influential: Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); Andreas Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Hasan Ali Koçer, *Türkiye'de Modern Eğitimin Doğuşu ve Gelişimi (1773-1923)*; (Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1970); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). Separate mention should be made of the progenitors of the field: Mahmud Cevad, *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihçe-i Teşkilat ve İcraati*. (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1919-20), and Osman Nuri Ergin, *İstanbul Mektepleri ve İlim, Terbiye ve San'at Müesseseleri Dolayısıyla Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, 5 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1939-43).

³Most of the evidence on which my argument rests is derived from *idadî* (preparatory) schools.

⁴For a recent overview of the Hamidian attempt to define the Ottoman image, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

⁵Idem, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993): 5-6. He states, “Although the state spoke the political language of Islam, it was in fact implementing the concrete policy of a rational secular programme.”

⁶Comments delivered at the conference “Islam and Modernity,” Banz, Germany, August, 1997. For amplification of Mardin's notion that “so-called ‘religious’ factors supposedly obstructing social change sometimes turn out to be so unequivocally and distinctly religious,” see his “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century” in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 403-46.

⁷Charles Tripp, “Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East” in *Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushirvan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 51-69.

⁸I am aware of the tension between an understanding of modern religion as a source of worldly morality for those who follow it and religion conceived as a fund of moral principles that can be used for purposes of political adherence. In this article, I use the term “religion” broadly to include both understandings. The problems associated with the changes that religions undergo in the process of being fitted to modern political needs (and vice versa) are too broad to be treated justly in this context. I thank Engin Akarlı for alerting me to the wider ramifications of this question.

⁹William J. Reese, *The Origins of the American High School* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 162.

¹⁰See Patrick L. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969).

¹¹Jeffrey Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 47.

¹²Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

¹³Paul Bailey, *Reform the People: Changing Attitudes towards Popular Education in Early 20th Century China* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 26–27. My thanks to Frank Dikötter for this and other sources on China. For a synopsis of the situation in Japan, where a similar movement away from the Western model was exhibited and where moral instruction was also critical in this period, see Roberta Wollons, “The Black Forest in a Bamboo Garden: Missionary Kindergartens in Japan, 1868–1912,” *History of Education Quarterly* 33 (1993): 1–35.

¹⁴Paul Bailey, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Marianne Bastid, *Educational Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988), vii–xi.

¹⁵I would be remiss if I did not mention the situation in Egypt, technically still an Ottoman possession. John W. Livingston’s recent article on educational reform in Egypt has highlighted another important instance of an attempt to reconcile an exogenous tradition with an indigenous one—namely, Shaykh Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi’s quest for an integration of Western scientific knowledge with Islamic *‘ilm*. Although the dynamics and level of education were obviously different, Livingston’s work confirms the importance of hybridity in educational reform: John W. Livingston, “Western Science and Educational Reform in the Thought of Shaykh Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996): 543. For an excellent treatment of the issue of moral education in British Egypt, see Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

¹⁶Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 179–80.

¹⁷Robert Gildea, *Education in Provincial France, 1800–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 1, 50; Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848–1945, Vol. II: Intellect, Taste and Anxiety* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 180.

¹⁸Zeldin, *France 1848–1945*; François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Mona Ozouf, *L'école, l'église et la république, 1871–1914* (Paris: Editions Cana, 1982).

¹⁹On French efforts to inculcate a “secular” notion of morality, see Phyllis Stock-Morton, *Moral Education for a Secular Society: The Development of Morale Laïque in Nineteenth Century France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

²⁰The notion of *Weltzeit* (world time) was put forward in the context of Middle Eastern history by Reinhard Schulze in his *Geschichte der Islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1994), 14 ff. and in his “Was ist die Islamische Aufklärung?” *Die Welt des Islams* 36 (1996): 317–25. For an English-language account of the debate over the question of an “Islamic Enlightenment,” see Knut S. Vikør, “Muhammadan Piety and Islamic Enlightenment: Survey of a Historiographical Debate,” paper presented at the ISMM, Istanbul Workshop, July 1998. I thank Ulrike Freitag for bringing this to my attention.

²¹A point that Deringil makes effectively with respect to the Eurasian empires: Deringil, “Invention of Tradition,” 3. Expanding the basis of comparison to include China and the United States only underscores its salience.

²²Bernard Lewis uses these terms in describing the intent of the educational changes of the Tanzimat: Lewis, *Emergence*, 114, 122. They appear in the major related works—that is, those of Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin, and Carter Findley. More recent examples, showing that such a view continues to inform the work of some of the best scholars in the field, include Donald Quataert, “Part IV: The Age of Reforms,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1916*, ed. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 765; and Palmira Brummett, “Dogs, Women, Cholera, and Other Menaces in the Streets: Cartoon Satire in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27 (1995): 433, n. 2.

²³For the concept of cultural dualism, see Berkes, *Development*, 106 ff., esp. 109; Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 35–39, 135 ff. Even if one were prepared for argument’s sake to accept the notion, far more credit should be given, I believe, to the people involved for their ability to assimilate the allegedly opposing tendencies.

²⁴For recent critiques of modernization theory, see Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

²⁵Nikki R. Keddie, "Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global Comparison," *New Left Review* 226 (1997): 21–40.

²⁶See my "Education for the Empire: Ottoman State Secondary Schools During the Reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997).

²⁷Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808–1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993): 5–6.

²⁸For reports of such "seduction" (*iğfal*) in various provinces, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BOA), Y Mtv. 29/48 (for Syria); BOA, İrade Maarif 1310 Ş 5 (for Syria again); Atillâ Çetin, "Maarif Nâzırı Ahmed Zühû Paşa'nın Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki Yabancı Okullar Hakkında Raporu," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10–11 (1981–82), 195 ff. (an empirewide survey); and BOA, Y Mtv. 180/177 (for Greek influence on Cyprus).

²⁹See, for example, Berkes, *Development*, 110–16, 179–81.

³⁰The best recent description of education in the Abdülhamid II period can be found in Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 93–111.

³¹BOA, ŞD 209/54, 10 Cemaziyelahir 1303/16 March 1886.

³²BOA, Y Mtv. 25/52, 6 Cemaziyelahir 1304/2 March 1887.

³³Ibid.

³⁴BOA, İrade Dah. 80409, 4 Cemaziyelevvel 1304/29 January 1887.

³⁵There were, however, courses in the military schools that studied texts devoted to morals. I am indebted to Bill Blair of Princeton University for bringing this to my attention.

³⁶BOA, Y A Res. 105/13, 13 Ramazan 1317/15 January 1900.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹*Leyli ve neharî umum mekâtib-i idâdiye-i mülkiye'ye mahsus olarak maarif-i umumiye nezaret-i celilesince mukaddema tanzim ve bu defa ta'dil ve tashih edilen ders programları ile ta'limat dir* (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Asır Matbaası, 1318 [1900/1901]). Evidence of the pronounced Islamic flavor in the state-school curriculum can also be found in the official Educational Yearbooks published from 1898 to 1901. See *Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-i Umumiye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1316–1319/1898–1901).

⁴⁰BOA, İrade Dahiliye 91851, 24 Şaban 1307/15 April 1890.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid. The text reads: "Mekâtib-i İslâmiyede en ziyade riayet olunmak lâzım gelen şey takviye-i akaid-i İslâmiye maddesi."

⁴³For a more complete discussion, see my "Education for the Empire," 140 ff. and 237 ff.

⁴⁴See, for example, BOA, Y Mtv. 8/58 (1299); and Y Mtv. 109/17 (1312). Ramadan meant special rations of food: olives, cheese, and fruit preserves (*reçel*): *Leyli ve neharî*, 273.

⁴⁵*Leyli ve neharî*, 234.

⁴⁶For a record of the early progress in both opening boarding schools and converting day schools to accommodate boarders, see BOA, İrade Maarif 1310 M 7, 25 Muharrem 1310/19 August 1892.

⁴⁷*Leyli ve neharî*, 234.

⁴⁸Ibid., 236–38.

⁴⁹Ibid., 241.

⁵⁰*Düstûr*, 1. tertib, vol. 8, 434. I translate this title as "vice-principal" both to avoid confusion with the assistants (*muavin*) and because it conjures up the warden-like disciplinary role of the vice-principal in American public high schools.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 435.

⁵³I hope to have more to offer on the subject of school disciplinary cases in subsequent publication.

⁵⁴For a discussion of such "adoption," see Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press), 68 ff.

⁵⁵Şemseddin Sâmî, *Kamus-u Türkî* (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: İkdâm Matbaası, 1317/1899–1900), 586–87.

⁵⁶Redhouse translates the phrase *fesad-i ahlāk* as “bad morals, demoralization of character”: Redhouse Yeni, s.v. “*fesad*.”

⁵⁷Cevdet Paşa’s prescription for the ills befalling the empire’s youth featured a heavy dose of basic religious education, including catechism, moral instruction, and even *fiqh*: BOA, YEE 18/1860, 24 Şaban 1309/24 March 1892.

⁵⁸See, for example, a report by Education Minister Zühdü Paşa that focuses on the spread of Protestant missionary schools in the empire. These competing institutions are portrayed as successful due to a combination of financial inducements and up-to-date instruction, including religious principles: BOA, YEE 35/232, 19 Muharrem 1311/2 August 1893.

⁵⁹For the case of Iraq, see Selim Deringil, “The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda,” *Die Welt des Islams* 30 (1990); idem, “Invention of Tradition,” 19–20; Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908” (Ph.D. diss., Manchester University, 1994); and BOA, YEE 14/188; for Syria, see Deringil, “Invention of Tradition,” 16. The overall response is taken up in my “Education for the Empire,” chap. 3.

⁶⁰Ali İrfan (Eğriboz), *Rehber-i Ahlāk* (Istanbul: A. Asaduriyan, 1317/1899–1900); Ali Rıza, *İlm-i Ahlāk* (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1318/1900–1901]). My thanks are due to the staff of the Istanbul University Rare Book Library, where the text in question was consulted.

⁶¹Ali Rıza appears to have been a translator (*mütercim*) in the palace secretariat (*mabeyn*); T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Millî Kütüphane Başkanlığı, *Türkiye Basmaları Toplu Kataloğu: Arap Harflı Türkçe Eserler* (Ankara: Millî Kütüphane Basımevi, 1990), 2:512. This would suggest that his text was written with Hamidian policy in mind.

⁶²Some of the best accounts of “traditional” educational practices in the Islamic world can be found in Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Messick, *Calligraphic State*; and Roy P. Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

⁶³For a recent treatment of the “traditional” madrasa curriculum in the Sunni world, see Maria Eva Subtelny and Anas B. Khalidov, “The Curriculum of Islamic Higher Learning in Timurid Iran in the Light of the Sunni Revival under Shāh-Rukh,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115 (1995), 222.

⁶⁴This seems to have been more common in contemporary Arabic texts.

⁶⁵The verbal form *dir/dır* is the most rampant example, appearing on almost every page of the text.

⁶⁶For example, İrfan, *Rehber*, 53.

⁶⁷Excluding the brief Introduction, sixty-eight of the book’s seventy-six pages of text (i.e., 89 percent) employ the question-and-answer format. Those that do not are the last two sections of the text, which are devoted to a collection of verse and prose entries, presumably mnemonic devices that touch on the subjects expounded upon in the bulk of the text. Parenthetically, the inclusion of these poems and sayings is perhaps significant for the continuity, albeit severely marginalized, with the Perso-Arabic textual tradition that gave great weight to the poetic.

⁶⁸The question-and-response format was also a key feature of European medieval scholastic discourse, which, of course, shares much with its counterpart in the Islamic world. In this case, it seems unlikely that the specifically European tradition would have influenced the creation of the *Rehber* in this fashion, but that possibility is not completely inconceivable.

⁶⁹*Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. “Fatwā,” by E. Tyan and J. R. Walsh. For specific examples of *fatva*-rendering in the 16th-century Ottoman Empire, see Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebusuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (Istanbul: Enderun, 1983); and Colin Imber, *Ebu’s-su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

⁷⁰Berkes, *Development*, 99.

⁷¹İrfan, *Rehber*, 10–11. For an expression of the need to ensure that young students learned the Muslim credo (*amentü*) in the sibyanî schools, see Ahmed Cevdet’s draft of a catechism in BOA, YEE 18/1860.

⁷²İrfan, *Rehber*, 14. Other examples of the use of hadith to support the moral tenets of the text can be found in passages relating to contentment (*kanaat*, p. 26) and restraining the tongue (*zabt-ı lisan*, p. 40). On other occasions, the author relies on divine authority without explicitly citing hadith text by stating that “God has ordained us” to do such and such, or that “God has ordered us” to do such and such. Similarly, the Islamic principle of a duty incumbent upon an individual or the community (*farz*) is used to reinforce the necessity of acting in a certain way. For example, self-restraint (lit., refraining from the passions of the self) is said to be necessary and perhaps obligatory (*vacib ve belki farz*, p. 43).

⁷³Ibid., 43–44. That the sultan was clearly identified as being the focus of student loyalty is nothing new. Students in all of the state schools frequently had to repeat the phrase *padişahım çok yaşa* (long live the sultan), an utterance that was often reinforced by banners that festooned the school buildings during times of ceremony or the taking of official photographs. For examples of this phenomenon in military, civil, and women’s schools see, respectively, Carney E. S. Gavin, ed., *Imperial Self-Portrait: The Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Photographs Albums* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 185 (Bursa); Library of Congress Photograph Collection, 9520/81123 (Drama); and Istanbul University Rare Book Library, Photograph Collection, no. 90496 (Yanya).

⁷⁴İrfan, *Rehber*, 3. The phrase is *birer bürhan-ı hakikat beyan*.

⁷⁵Cited in M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 23, n. 178. The manuscript from which the quotation is taken is not dated but must have been written after his second term as grand vizier, which ended before Abdülhamid acceded the throne in 1876.

⁷⁶İrfan, *Rehber*, 7–8.

⁷⁷Ibid., 16–17.

⁷⁸Ibid., 29.

⁷⁹Ibid., 31 (parentheses supplied in the original).

⁸⁰Ibid., 40. Interestingly, this saying has a meaning that is directly opposite that of the familiar—and patently untrue—playground rejoinder, “Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never hurt me.”

⁸¹Ibid., 47. The passage cited is, “Love your father and mother all of your life with sincerity of heart, listen to their commands, and do not engage in bad acts against them.”

⁸²Ibid., 49.

⁸³Ibid., 49–50.

⁸⁴In time, of course, states everywhere would act to increase their in loco parentis status even more through the kindergarten. Ali İrfan’s suggestion that “everyone should send their children to school while they are young” hints at the downward trend in the age of school entry that lay ahead for the Ottoman Empire and its successor states: *ibid.*, 29. For more on the kindergarten, see my “From Missionary Tool to Nationalist Mechanism: The Kindergarten in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic,” in *Kindergartens and Cultures: The Global Diffusion of an Idea*, ed. Roberta Wollons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁸⁵Rıza, *İlm-i Ahlâk*, i. Exactly what this “civil school curriculum book list” (*umum mekâtib-i mülkiye kitapları programı*) refers to is unclear, but it suggests that the ministry had circulated a list of texts appropriate for the various courses in the imperial curriculum. (He seems unaware of Ali İrfan’s work, published the previous year.)

⁸⁶İrfan, *Rehber*, 3.

⁸⁷Rıza, *İlm-i Ahlâk*, ii. The text reads: *ve her bahsı bir veya müteaddid ayat-i celile-i fûrkaniye ve ahadis-i şerifiye-i nebeviye ve akval-ı kibar-ı İslâmiye ile tezyin ve te’yid*.

⁸⁸*Qur’an* 68:4.

⁸⁹Rıza, *İlm-i Ahlâk*, 7.

⁹⁰Ibid., 187.

⁹¹Ibid., 187–88.

⁹²Ibid., 188.

⁹³Ibid., 189.

⁹⁴Ibid., 190–91. The text reads: *mektebdeki ta’lim ü terbiye aile arasındaki ta’lim ü terbiyeden daha esash ve mükemmel olur*.

⁹⁵Ibid., 191.

⁹⁶Akşin Somel, “Textbooks as Determiners of Moral Education in 19th Century Ottoman Muslim Primary Schools,” paper presented at the European Science Foundation workshop on Education in the Muslim Mediterranean World, 16 October 1998, Salamanca, Spain.