“Caught between the ideology and realities of development: Transiting from the Horn of Africa to Europe”

John R. Campbell*
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Transiting from the Horn of Africa to Europe

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Abstract
While the teloi of development seeks to explicitly link an ideology of ‘market fundamentalism’ to one of ‘rights-based development’, the reality of life for many in developing societies is characterized by growing inequality and despotic rule. In such situations many people leave in search of a better life or protection from persecution. This paper examines the hemorrhaging of people from Ethiopia and Eritrea and the obstacles they encounter as they cross international borders. It also examines the long term consequences which this population movement has for development in the Horn where, in the face of declining official aid flows, remittances from the Diaspora are likely to become increasingly important.

This paper examines the nature and consequences of large-scale migration from Eritrea and Ethiopia. What factors lie behind the flow of immigrants that have been leaving the Horn of Africa over the past 30+ years? What confronts these individuals as they transit Africa and the Middle East to Europe? I shall refer to these individuals as sojourners purposely eliding the term refugee with that of migrant because I wish to stress their journey and what happens to them on that journey. Once in exile these individuals are periodically forced to settle (albeit temporarily) and move in complicated transit that may take days, months or years to complete.

Section (i) sets out my approach to migration. While nearly all the literature on the Horn of Africa focuses on ‘refugees’ this misdirects attention away from the actual processes of migration and the role played by the nation-state. A focus on migration also fails to consider the longer term impact which high levels of migration is likely to have for development in the migrants’ country of origin.

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Section (ii) examines the political situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea and sets out the context against which high levels of migration have occurred. Section (iii) looks at the population hemorrhage and the experience of migrant’s transiting the continent. Section (iv) briefly examines the relationship between migrants and the governments in their country of origin. I conclude by arguing that only markedly different political conditions in the Horn will stem the flow of migration. I also speculate about the possible trajectory of development for Ethiopia and Eritrea given the decline in official aid flows and the likelihood that future overseas investment is likely to depend increasingly on remittances/investment from their Diaspora communities.

i. Migration from the Horn – voluntary or forced?

As David Turton has reminded us, initial efforts to conceptualize and explain migration became mired in a sterile debate: did people leave their countries voluntarily or were they forced out (2003)? He argues that the tendency in migration research has been to adopt policy related categories and concerns which hinder academic research and policy analysis by focusing on the ‘motives’ of migrants rather than on the way a nation exercises its power in relation to a diverse range of ‘ethnic others’.

Turton argues that the dichotomy voluntary v. forced is too simplistic to grasp the complex factors driving migration. Furthermore, and as Papadopolou has noted of transit migration, ‘… the intention [of the migrant, jc] is not always clear at the beginning of the journey, but is usually affected by the structural context of the first country of reception’ and by ‘the nature, operation and inter-relations of migrant social networks’ (2005: 4). Nevertheless European/northern governments have embraced the dichotomy to justify policies intended to prevent the entry of unwanted ‘economic migrants’ and ‘bogus asylum seekers’. Europe perceives immigrants, and in particular ‘black’ immigrants, as a problem: they are a threat to national ‘integration’ and an unwarranted drain on resources (i.e. welfare services, education and housing).

European nations have attempted to control entry by imposing border controls, but such attempts have proved ineffective. In the UK and elsewhere such policies have been superseded by ‘liberal’ policies aimed at managing the entry of desirable migrants (Flynn 2005) and through EU initiatives preventing the entry of unwanted migrants and asylum seekers (Geddes 2003). Indeed the EU has ‘externalised’ its immigration controls via special agreements with states in North Africa and Eastern Europe (Boswell 2003) creating a situation that has significantly redefined the rights of
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resident immigrants (who are subjected to harsh and discriminatory treatment) while militarizing EU borders to deter migrants (and asylum seekers) from entering.

Is immigration a problem in Europe? The evidence is not clear and the answer depends on one’s perspective.

**Table A. Foreign-born population, Selected OECD Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Most recent (year in brackets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>12.5 (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.3 (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>18.8 (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>5.6 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.8 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.6 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11.8 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2 (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A indicates that the percentage of foreign-born population varies immensely across Europe and we are left to conclude that statistics alone do not provide a definitive answer even though governments and the media consistently discuss immigration as in ‘crisis’. This paper is not concerned with the effectiveness of such policies, instead it looks at the impact which EU immigration policies have for the development of immigrant’s home countries.

There is little empirical research that sheds light on this issue. Newland (2004) and more recently Portes have argued that two key factors are at work. First they note that Diaspora communities have very different relations to their countries of origin, a relation that partly reflects the nature of outward migration, i.e. whether migration is circular or one way and whether migration is of unskilled labor or of professionals. The second critical factor concerns the policies pursued by their
home government (towards their Diaspora and in creating conditions for development) and of the
government where they currently reside (e.g. in recognizing the contribution and rights as
immigrants). These factors determine the Diaspora’s willingness to remit and/or invest in their
country of origin and the likelihood that they will return ‘home’.

Portes argues that to the extent that a developing country has the infrastructure to produce
professionals whose skills are in demand internationally, their nationals are able to legally migrate
to developed countries where they earn good salaries, develop professional skills and remit money
home. Professionals are best placed to remit and invest back home if the infrastructure there permits
it. Unskilled migrants, on the other hand, enter developed countries illegally. As such they are
subject to deportation and, because of their lack of skills, obtain irregular and poorly paid work.
Furthermore they are increasingly unable to leave their host country due to immigration controls. In
short illegal immigrants are unable to remit/invest in their homelands which may reinforce a process
of one-way migration out that depopulates their homeland.

Long term migration clearly raises complex issues about the current and future situation of migrants
and their countries of origin. After examining the history and nature of migration in the Horn I will
conclude by addressing two key issues with respect to Ethiopia and Eritrea. First what is the relation
between migrants and their country of origin? If their governments are hostile or indifferent to them
how does this affect their willingness return and/or to remit/invest back home? Second to what
extent have the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments put into place policies to create an
infrastructure that encourages and makes productive use of investments by their Diaspora?

**ii. Problems in the Horn: The failure of political leadership**

Ethiopia and Eritrea have a long and entangled relationship. The province of Eritrea was seized
from Ethiopian by the Italians in the late 19th century. Following the end of world war II Eritrea was
briefly administered by the United Kingdom until 1952 following a United Nations Referendum
when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia assumed control of Eritrea. Following an abortive army
mutiny in the 1960s Haile Selassie was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1974 by the *Derge* or
Provisional Military Council that assumed power pursued a military campaign against rebellious
ethnic groups and the political opposition which led to wide spread persecution and terror. The
military established extensive forms of bureaucratic governance but was unwilling to negotiate on
issues that might dilute its power.
In 1989 the Derg lost control of Eritrea and Tigre to the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) who formed the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In May 1991, following the end of Russian military support to the Derge, the guerillas entered Addis Ababa and assumed power (Gilkes 1993).

The EPLF soon withdrew from the EPRDF to govern Eritrea leaving the TPLF as the dominant power in Ethiopia. The two liberation fronts transformed themselves into political parties and reorganized the state and the military. The EPRDF then carefully stage-managed the political process in Ethiopia by overseeing the creation of an interim power sharing government, drawing up a new national constitution, initiating national elections and concluding agreements with the EPLF that foreshadowed Eritrean independence in 1993 (Brietzke 1995).

EPRDF-rule generated political dissent. In 1994 the Oromo Liberation Front and other (ethnic-based) opposition parties withdrew from Government. Following the 1995 elections the EPRDF instituted a policy of regionalisation in which it’s ethnic-based fronts became major players in the new regional administrations. Despite the promise of decentralization greater control was exerted over the civil service and regional states. Decentralization left regional governments with grossly inadequate resources and it fuelled demands by ethnic groups for political recognition. In short EPRDF policies lay the basis for social and political fragmentation, a process that has been furthered by military/security campaigns aimed at dissidents and wide swathes of the population who allegedly support banned political organizations. The situation has given rise to growing levels of political conflict, extensive human rights abuses and a constant flow of refugees. The government has pursued an ‘IMF-style’ policy framework intended to secure vital donor support for its development policies which are aimed at alleviating poverty and investing in agriculture-led industrialization (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). Despite its failure to achieve significant market reform and its brutal crackdown on the political opposition, the Government has secured continued donor support.

Eritrea followed a similar trajectory. Almost its first act at independence was to deport 130,000 ‘non-Eritreans’ (i.e. people accused of complicity with the Ethiopian administration including the Eritrean wives and children of Ethiopian soldiers). In 1993 the EPLF organized a national referendum on independence which was universally supported throughout Eritrea and in the Diaspora. This was followed by a period of political consolidation in which the ruling party canvassed for a new constitution and promised democratic elections. Neither materialized. Instead the party became increasingly autocratic. In May 1998 a war erupted with Ethiopia over the
demarcation of their shared border. The war went disastrously wrong for Eritrea which lost large areas of its territory and 19,000 soldiers forcing it to sue for peace. Ethiopia lost an estimated 30,000 soldiers and at least one million people from both countries were displaced (Plaut 2004: 117-18).

During the border war the EPRDF exploited public sentiment and deported 75,000 Eritrean’s/‘Ethiopians of Eritrean descent’. Individuals were arrested at night in their homes; families were split up, assets seized, and following varying periods of detention the ‘aliens’ were driven to the Eritrean border and forced to walk across the battlefield (Byrne 2002). The Eritrean authorities initially assisted deportees who had to prove their eligibility for citizenship; 1-2000 deportees were unable to do this and some were expelled. Eritrea retaliated by deporting 22,000 ‘Ethiopians’. The deportations violated both countries international legal obligations and stripped tens of thousands of individuals of their nationality. A ceasefire came into place in the May 2000 followed by a UN operation to police the disputed border; international arbitration was also initiated to establish the border and assess war claims.

In September 2001 the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) led by President Afwerki seized power and detained individuals suspected of opposing it. The private media was shut down. Government set aside the Constitution, postponed elections, and indefinitely extended military service for everyone between the ages of 18-50 (AI 2003). Eritrea became a one-party state that uses roadblocks and undertakes random searches (‘giffa’) to round up youth for conscription and to arrest deserters and draft evaders (US 2003). Shoot to kill policies have been used against ‘deserters’ (HRW 2008). Such policies have pushed citizens out of the country in growing numbers: 70,000 people fled to Sudan between 2002 and 2006 (at a rate of 100 per day).

The authorities are ‘wedded to a discredited form of command economy’ in which the Party, through state firms, runs all aspects of the economy (Chatham House 2007). The effect of such policies, taken together with the fact that a large percentage of the productive population are conscripted, has resulted in low economic growth, rising inflation, rising debt and the collapse of the private sector. Officially economic policy is autarkic and very little official aid enters the country. By the end of 2007 Eritrea’s refusal to cooperate with the UN meant that UNMEE operations on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border were sharply curtailed. Tensions on the border are high in part because Eritrean armed forces remain on alert and have entered the disputed border.
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iii. Conflict, drought and population displacement

The initial impetus for population movement out of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the mid-19th century was to escape drought particularly in the mountainous central highlands. Displacement tended to be towards the lowlands but there was also limited migration into The Sudan (Kibreab 1996: 135) and eastwards into Somalia and Djibouti (Ingrams & Pankhurst 2006). Some of these immigrants did not return. In subsequent years these early migrants were to play a significant role in providing shelter, food and assistance to those who followed. Population movements from the late-19th century onwards have been characterized by the rapid movement of large numbers of people seeking temporary refuge from famine, drought and war. While most refugees eventually return home, increasing numbers have, since the late 1960s, embarked on a transcontinental journey away from The Horn.

Thus in early 1967 about 60,000 ‘Ethiopians’ resided in Sudan because of civil war in Eritrea. However by mid-1967 conflict between liberation fronts in Tigre and Eritrea and the Ethiopia armed forces displaced a further 26,000 refugees into Sudan. Successive waves of refugees were to follow the 1974 coup against Haile Sellasie (Smock 1982).

During the 1983/4 famine 190,000 people were displaced from Tigre (Northern Ethiopia) into The Sudan though most returned voluntarily (Bariagaber 1999: 610). However thousands more were to arrive following their escape from resettlement schemes in southern Ethiopia where the Government had forcibly moved 600,000 people (Clay & Holcomb 1985; Gebre 2002). In 1980 there were 390,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians in Sudan; by 1994 there were 850,000. Between 1984 and 1991 approximately 33,195 of these refugees were resettled in the US and about 11,060 in Canada (Woldemikael 1998; Matsuoka & Sorenson 2001: 60).

Refugees in Sudan received limited humanitarian assistance which led many to move to small regional towns or to Khartoum where they worked and lived illegally (and/or relied on remittances from relatives; Kuhlman 1994: chap. 8; Smock 1982; Weaver 1985; Kibreab 1996). In 1994 an estimated that 40,000 erstwhile refugees were living illegally in Khartoum, by 2001 the number had increased to 237,000 (UNHCR 2001). The authorities made life difficult for refugees by refusing to countenance self-settlement and by imposing restrictions on their movement, on employment and on access to services. Indeed throughout the 1980s and 1990s the authorities refouled and/or arrested refugees.
People were also being displaced in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia (Ofcansky & Berry 1993: 89-90). Following the 1977/78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia 700,000 Ethiopians sheltered in refugee camps in Somalia. While most eventually returned a new wave of refugees was created by the 1983/84 famine and by forced villagization which pushed 30,000 Ethiopians into Somalia. By the late 1980s the UN estimated that 450-620,000 Ethiopians were in Somalia. In 2000 and 2003, according to UNHCR estimates, there were 121,096 and 22,276 Ethiopians sheltering in Somalia, respectively (2003).

The 1977/78 Ogaden war and drought displaced a further 42,000 people into Djibouti (Crisp 1984). However Ethiopian pressure on Djibouti forced the refoulement of a small number of individuals and the eventual repatriation of 7,000 people by late 1983. Subsequently others were refouled though most voluntarily returned. While the 1983/4 famine pushed 10,000 people back into Djibouti numbers dwindled to about 3,000 by 2005.iii

Since at least 1991 Ethiopians have been crossing the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Though the route is well establishedviii refugees are subjected to considerable violence and the Somali government refouled Ethiopians.ix Refugees rely on smugglers to ferry them from Bosaso to Aden at a cost of US$50-70.00 per head.5 Thousands have died at the hands of ‘pirates’ and traffickers who have murdered, robbed and forced refugees into the sea to avoid being caught by Yemeni patrols.xi It is estimated that 25,000 (most of whom are Somali) people attempt the journey every year, but on arrival they confront poor conditions in Yemeni refugee camps.xii

Insight into the processes behind Ethiopians transiting this route comes from a recent IOM mission to Bosaso which interviewed fifty individuals out of an estimated 5000 Ethiopians at the port (Yitna 2006). Typically individuals came from poor farming families in northeastern Ethiopia and were seeking work in Saudi Arabia. They financed their trip – with savings of between US$115-800.00 per person – from savings, sale of property and loans. Nearly all traveled with the support of their families. The journey was punctuated by numerous stops. At each stage sojourners paid a ‘broker’ from their own ethnic groups, and each stage had to be negotiated and paid for separately. While the smuggling networks were well organized, there was little evidence of trafficking. In 2006 it was estimated that 10,000 Ethiopians were legally registered in Yemen and that 500 Ethiopians sought to enter Yemen weekly on route to Saudi Arabia (Terrazas 2007: 12). Once in Yemen the hope was to move on to Saudi Arabia where an estimated 40,000 Eritreans reside (the Saudi Authorities
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recently built a wall to close off this route; US 2003). The Saudi’s are not hospitable to African sojourners who end up working illegally unless they are attached to recognized political parties.iii

Ethiopians and Eritreans in Saudi Arabia – the latter having crossed the Red Sea – transit Northern Syria and enter Turkey illegally. Brewer & Yukseker report that while these migrants seek to avoid the Turkish police nevertheless 622 were arrested between 1995 and 2005 (2005/6: 71). Though they constitute a small proportion of the migrants/asylum seekers in Istanbul, their numbers – which include single women and some families – are increasing. Seventy seven percent of Ethiopians went to Turkey because friends were there, compared to 28% of Eritreans. They share a derelict room with co-ethnics or co-religionists but are isolated from other migrants and Turkish society (p. 40, 77). Living conditions are poor: there is little support/charity available and most rely on jobs in the informal sector (though 11% of Ethiopians receive help from their families). Most seek to enter Europe via Greece. Because they are constantly on the move they appear to be a very transient group.

A third route for refugees has been to move south. As the statistics in Appendix I indicate there was a massive flow of Ethiopian civilians and soldiers to Kenya in 1991 when the Derge collapsed. While many of those individuals returned, there has been a constant flow of ethnic-Oromo people, political refugees, journalists, academics and professionals. Refugee numbers spiked in late 2005 and early 2006 following the EPRDF’s crackdown on opposition political parties after the 2005 elections.xiv

The Kenyan government views refugees as a security problem and has failed to enact refugee legislation. During the 1990s the authorities turned a blind eye as Ethiopian agents abducted, harassed and killed resident Ethiopians. This coincided with police harassment of refugees who were detained to extort bribes (HRW 2002). Refugees in UNHCR camps in northern Kenya were also subjected to extensive violence causing many to flee into the towns (Crisp 2000) where they were forced to bribe UNHCR staff in Nairobi to have their refugee applications processed.xv

From about 2000 when the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war ended a trickle of Eritrean youth escaping conscription have sought refuge in Ethiopia where they have been placed in refugee camps (see Appendix I).xvi A small number of them have been allowed to apply for resettlement to the US.
Over the past 35 years an untold number of Ethiopians and Eritreans have left their homes seeking refuge. On the basis of official estimates between 1996 and 2006 (but excluding 2003 and 2004 for which the figures are incomplete) an estimated 3.14 million individuals were registered as refugees in The Horn or in Kenya (see Appendix I). Official figures are an underestimate, but in any event a minimum of 349,000 individuals were living as refugees outside Ethiopia and Eritrea each year. There are no reliable statistics indicating how many of these people continued to reside elsewhere in the Horn nor is there reliable information about how many left the Horn.

Sudan hosted the majority of the refugees. With the success of the EPLF in the late 1980s it became possible for some to return home. Following independence in 1993 about 130,000 returned voluntarily. However as late as 2005 an estimated 116,000 remained and, as supporters of banned opposition political parties, they applied for refugee status (Bascom 2005: 167; Rake 2007: 437). There were many reasons why Eritreans were/are unwilling to return. Many believed that their land and homes had been occupied by others and many were integrated into Sudanese society. Furthermore economic conditions in Eritrea during the mid-90s were poor; severe drought undermined agricultural production and 70 percent of the population depended on food aid.

In 1999 UNHCRs invoked the cessation clause for Ethiopian refugees, this was followed by a further invocation in 2002 for Eritrean refugees. This meant that from the date of invocation Ethiopians and Eritreans who fled the country prior to 1991 ‘no longer had a well founded fear of persecution’ and could now lawfully be returned to their country of origin. Those who remained faced a stark choice: they could stay illegally – in which case they might be arrested or forcibly returned—or they could move on. Rather than remain illegally and without the possibility of being resettled, many traveled to Cairo where they arrived in four ‘waves’: in 1978/9 (to escape the ‘red terror’); between 1984-88 (to escape conscription); in the early 1990s (when the Derge fell); and following the 1998-2000 border war (Cooper 1992: table 1.6, p.13; Zohry & Harrel-Bond 2003: 57-8).

The experience of Taddele (1991) who fled Ethiopia in 1983 for Sudan and who went on to Khartoum and Cairo illustrates the situation that many individuals found themselves in. A minor government official accused of belonging to a banned party, Taddele walked for 13 days to reach the border where he contracted malaria. It took another 3 days to reach a town where he and his cousin were jailed. On release he made his way to Gedaref where he registered as a refugee and worked for several months. He then traveled to Khartoum, worked to accumulate money and, with
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Information provided by an Ethiopian who had been deported from Egypt, planned his journey to Cairo. He joined a small group of Eritreans he met on the train from Khartoum to the Egyptian border; the party got lost in the desert before stumbling into fishermen on the Nile who fed, sheltered and helped them reach Aswan where they boarded a train to Cairo and sheltered in a Christian church.

The ‘Ethiopians’ population in Cairo is in constant flux because those whose claims are not recognized by UNHCR, and most are not, move on (Cooper 1992: 17). No one settles in Cairo. ‘Ethiopians’ live in small apartments dispersed across the city, often with others of the same ethnicity. Cooper describes them as forming ‘mini-communities’ whose day-to-day lives consist of going to the UNHCR office and attending Protestant churches or NGOs in search of support (1992: 25; Brown, Riordan & Sharpe 2004). In the early nineties they were typically single men in their mid-twenties. Most had completed secondary school, had come from towns and had middle class backgrounds (Cooper 1992:17). While 19% had arrived on a direct flight to Cairo, over half had spent two or more years in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia or Saudi Arabia. They are in every sense long term sojourners constantly on the move.

Here as in Khartoum and the Middle East they confront discrimination and racism and are forced to live and work illegally. Even with valid ID they were/are frequently harassed and arrested by the authorities or blackmailed by ordinary Egyptians. An unknown number are detained before being deported (to the Sudanese border or just dumped in the desert); some deportees manage to return. In 1992 there were perhaps 1,000 in Cairo, by 2002 the number had risen to 5,000.

Those currently resident in Cairo include single women, families, Eritreans and an unknown number of individuals who were deported and/or stripped of their nationality by Eritrea and/or Ethiopia during the border war (Thomas 2006). Refused recognition by UNHCR, they live in poverty and without access to medical or social services; they are dependent on support provided by Protestant Churches. Neither the Eritrean nor the Ethiopian embassy will assist the so called ‘mixed-nationals’ because they ‘have no place’ back home (p.19). Such actions violate international law. xx Given their situation it is not surprising that individuals move on quickly. Thus in early 2007 some 600 to 2000 ‘Eritreans’ crossed illegally into Israel from Egypt. Their arrival prompted the Eritrean ambassador to demand their deportation as military deserters. xxi Disturbingly in August 2008 the Israeli military secretly deported ninety individuals – including many Eritreans – back to Egypt without assessing their claims to asylum.xxx
In the early 1990s many individuals traveled from Khartoum, using smugglers, west across the Sahara to Libya which has been an important destination for hundreds of thousands of African migrants. The journey to Kufra, an oasis just inside Libya, takes six days by truck; many do not survive the trip (Fortress Europe 2007). Migrants pay to be taken to Tripoli, but nearly all are forced out at Kufra where they are detained by the authorities before being allowed to move on (Hamood 2006:31; and footnote 23).

Following the 1992 UN air and arms embargo Libya encouraged labor migration from West Africa and The Horn (Hamood 2006, forthcoming; de Hass 2006). However changes in the Libyan economy and growing resentment against foreigners resulted in an anti-immigrant backlash and the adoption of repressive measures against foreigners. As early as 1994 about 1000 Eritreans/Ethiopians were detained and repatriated. By May 2007 approximately 60,000 Africans were held in detention centers and prisons across Libya; reports suggest that 3-600 Eritreans (including women and children) were held in 2006 (Amnesty International 2006; Fortress Europe 2007: 6). Between 2003 and early 2007 – a period of political rapprochement with Europe – Libya deported 258,000 ‘irregular immigrants’. Detainees were routinely subjected to beatings and abuse. Once in detention they have four options: (1) bribe their way out; (2) those unable to pay are taken to a detention centre in the south where, on threat of expulsion they pay to be released; failing which (3) they are either kept hostage (and their families overseas pay a ransom for their release); or (4) they are deported by plane to their country of origin or dumped in the desert (Fortress Europe 2007: 5). Between 1998 and 2003 approximately 14,000 people were dumped in the desert where many must have died (ibid: 4). Those deported by air may face problems on return. Thus in 2004 two plane loads of Eritreans were deported. Nearly all the one hundred persons on the first flight were detained, beaten, interrogated and imprisoned on arrival in Asmara. The second flight, containing 60 persons, was hijacked over Sudan and forced to land in Khartoum where many were granted asylum.

Libya has not instituted an immigration policy nor is there an asylum procedure (Baldwin-Edwards 2006: 10). Furthermore Libya is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention and it does not recognize the UNHCR. However it has entered into bilateral agreements with Italy and other EU countries to accept returned migrants who are subsequently deported to their country of origin. Despite the lack of protection for refugees and migrants the EU is establishing external border controls there aimed
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at preventing the illegal entry of Africans into Europe. EU cooperation with Libya has continued despite the latter’s arrest and detention of thousands of migrants. Libya has made no attempt to regulate the abuse suffered by detainees and in effect it protects smuggling operations worth an estimated 100 million Euro pa (Fortress Europe 2007: 7).

Libya is the principle staging post used by irregular migrants to enter southern Europe. Though the number of migrants arriving in Italy via Libya was down by a fifth in early 2007 (to 12,753), nevertheless 21,400 migrants landed in Sicily in 2006 (this included 2,500 Eritreans who were the third largest group and who constituted 12 percent of all arrivals and 20% of all asylum applications; Fortress Europe 2007: 8). The number of migrants who died crossing the Mediterranean between 1997 and 2007 is estimated at 10,000; in the first nine months of 2007 a further 502 died.xxxvi

As Table B shows the Italian authorities have sought to intercept migrants at sea:
Maritime interception has, however, been sharply criticized as a ‘blockade’ which has driven up the number of deaths among those seeking to enter (Albahari 2006).

The Italians also return migrants to Libya without ascertaining their asylum claims. Thus between 2004 and late 2006 at least 2,800 migrants were expelled via a ‘readmission’ agreement (HRW 2006; AI 2005). Back in Libya they are detained and the cycle of extortion starts again. As a result of the numbers seeking to cross into Europe the size of boats has decreased thereby increasing the risk of drowning for subsequent migrants because smaller boats are less sea-worth and because the Maltese and Italian authorities are reluctant to rescue migrants from sinking boats. In any event increasing numbers of Libyan-based migrants are being diverted to Malta. In 2002 the Maltese authorities deported 223 Eritreans to Eritrea where they were arrested, detained, and held incommunicado (HRW 2003). In mid-2006 Malta refused to take any more migrants until EU member states accepted ‘their share’. In July 2006 Malta refused to allow a boatload of Eritreans to land until Spain, where the boat containing them was registered, accepted them. In the face of growing numbers of illegal migrants Malta has failed to provide adequate shelter or assistance and it has sought a ‘readmission’ agreement with Libya.

### Table B: Intercepts along the Italian coast, 1998 to 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<td>1,973</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>10,151</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>13,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38,159</td>
<td>49,999</td>
<td>26,817</td>
<td>20,143</td>
<td>23,719</td>
<td>14,331</td>
<td>13,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lutterbeck 2006: 76).
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If we set aside organized trafficking which Ethiopia has done little to control, the final option is for an individual to fly to Europe. Tens of thousands have gone to North America and Europe on student visas where many overstay their visa (becoming an illegal immigrant) and others claim asylum (Terrazas 2007).

Less direct routes to Europe are also used. Eritreans tend to travel overland to Sudan (because of official barriers to legal exit) and fly out of Khartoum; whereas Ethiopians and Somalis fly from Addis Ababa and Nairobi (ICMPD 2007: sec. 2.4.2). Individuals may fly indirectly (via Dubai, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria) or directly to Europe by arriving at one airport before transiting to a final destination. Organized flights for major Muslim festivals provide a major route out of the Horn to Saudi Arabia. Kebede (nd: 4) reports that in 2000 the Saudi authorities issued 11,000 visas for Ethiopians to attend Hajj; the Ethiopian authorities believe that many of those who go on Hajj stay and migrate elsewhere.

Air travel is said to be the most expensive way to reach Europe, but given the absence of comparable information about the costs incurred on other routes this assertion must be questioned. While flying directly from the Horn to Europe entails a high initial cost (not to mention the fee paid to traffickers/agents), the cost of transiting overland suggests that financial costs are repeatedly incurred over a long period. The decision to fly directly from the region may reflect a different concern, namely the perceived risk that a child is likely to face on a long overland journey. Furthermore an unknown number of individuals flying into Europe are apprehended and deported.

How many Eritreans and Ethiopians have entered Europe legally or illegally? The absence of an accurate information about immigration (legal or illegal), asylum applications or even deportations means that no answer can be given. Furthermore illegal entrants are likely to have been left out of official censuses and surveys. Writing on the Ethiopian Diaspora Terrazas’ (2007: 7) suggests that relatively limited numbers have reached Europe as opposed to the US, Canada and Saudi Arabia:

Table C. Number of Ethiopian-born Foreign Stock by Country of Residence, 2000
If Terrazas’ is to be believed, the descendents of Ethiopian-born stock would significantly increase the total (p. 7):

### Table D. Distribution of Ethiopian-born stock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>The Lebanon</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>105,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures on the number of Eritreans in Europe and North America are equally problematic. One study suggested that by 2000, approximately 720,000 formally registered and 350,000 illegal and unregistered Eritrean’s lived outside their country. (Tewolde 2005). It is not clear whether this estimate includes the several hundred thousand in transit across Africa and the Middle East, but it certainly excludes the recent exodus that has taken place since 2000. A very rough guess would be that between 1:4 or 1:5 of all Eritreans now live outside their country.
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The above figures are provisional. Estimates for the UK, which are based on information provided by community organizations, suggests that the total number of Ethiopians and Eritreans is 30-35,000 (Papadopolous, Lees, Lay & Gebrehiwot 2004; Rutter 2003: 14). This estimate is not in line with much lower official statistics on the number of individuals who have sought asylum which suggests that birth rates and illegal entry are contributing to the growth in numbers.

The evidence on transit migration, while incomplete, presents a consistent picture of incremental movement out of Ethiopia/Eritrea during the 1950s to neighboring countries. By the mid-1960s the number of displaced ‘Ethiopians’ in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya sharply escalated which, alongside other factors in the Horn, resulted in growing numbers of displaced people embarking on lengthy journeys to North Africa or the Saudi peninsula. The complex factors at play make a mockery of simplistic assumptions about voluntary v. forced migration.

In the past decade North African governments have treated African immigrants harshly – a situation which the EU’s militarization of the Mediterranean and the proliferation of ‘externalized’ border controls has reinforced. Sub-Saharan Africans face growing levels of violence, lengthy periods of detention and a heightened risk of death as they transit North Africa and cross the Mediterranean. Enhanced immigration controls are achieved at the expense of international protection for migrants and refugees who are, in effect, bottled-up in North Africa. If migrants succeed in entering Europe they find it impossible to move or leave and their illegal status forces them into a marginal existence.

iv. Migrant relationships to the governments in their country of origin

We can now turn to the relation between these migrants and their governments which, according to the World Bank, will be critical in view of the unpredictability of official aid in the future (Ratha, Mohapatra & Plaza 2008). The draconian policies pursued by Eritrea are directly responsible for the refusal of refugees to return and the huge outflow of population after 2000. There is also evidence that embassies have refused to assist nationals in Cairo, London and Germany (Thomas 2006; Heppner 2007) and that they have demanded the deportation of nationals seeking asylum in Libya, South Africa and Israel (HRW 2006; Mekonnen & Abraha 2004; Heppner 2003).
In Europe and North America Eritrean embassies control the flow of remittances sent by the Diaspora which is worth an estimated $400 million p.a. (Styan 2007). The government has imposed compulsory payments on the Diaspora in the form of an annual levy (two percent of income) as well as additional payments that are collected by the Party/embassy. Initially the Diaspora voluntarily contributed to the EPLF and to the post-war costs of reconstruction and development. However these payments are now compulsory and failure to pay has consequences for one’s family in Eritrea who may be refused an identity card/passport or visa; be unable to sell or transfer property; and they may be refused a permit to rebuild a house or operate a business.

Though it created the Commission for Eritrean’s Living Abroad, there is little evidence that the Diaspora is able to voice its concerns to the authorities (indeed the only concrete act, apart from consultation on the aborted constitution was to encourage the Diaspora to buy shares in a state company). Instead ‘the government appeared to have no compunction about its demands on the Diaspora, viewing them as a ‘lost limb’ that will integrate in host countries and eventually lose touch with Eritrea’ (Chatham House 2007: 7). The evidence for this is two-fold. First the remittances secured from the Diaspora are used to prop up the current regime in Asmara. External funding which is almost completely dependent on Eritrean remittances is used to under right national debt and growing deficit spending (ADB 2003; Eritrea 2005). Second, Eritrean embassies have broken up public meetings, quashed dissent against the Government and destroyed refugee community organizations in Europe and the US.

I am forced to conclude that without a radical change of government the situation for the Diaspora and the economy of the country will deteriorate. Members of the Diaspora cannot safely return home, and the money they are compelled to give the Government is not being used to invest in development. Indeed the failure of Eritrea to lobby on behalf of its Diaspora ensures that their illegal status will not change.

Ethiopia appears to be following a different path. It is certainly true that Ethiopian embassies pursue the policies of a government which has an extremely bad human rights record which includes depriving tens of thousands ethnic Eritrean’s of their citizenship during and after the border war. The authorities also harass Ethiopian refugees in Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti and Cairo (HRW 2002; Brown et al 2004: 674).
However in recent years the government has begun to woo its sizeable Diaspora by introducing policies intended to secure investment. This began by creating the Office of Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Terrazas 2007: 11). Recent legislation has sought to ‘safeguard the rights and privileges of Ethiopians abroad’ by allowing them to return home to work and own property without have to relinquish the nationality of their country of exile. The reasons for this move are not difficult to fathom though it is unclear whether the Government has considered the long term implication of opening up the economy to external investment. As stated at a recent meeting in Addis Ababa to promote Diaspora investment (Yau & Assefa 2007: 1):

The International Monetary Fund reckons that the Ethiopian Diaspora sent back USD 800 million in 2005. This roughly doubles if money flowing from unofficial channels is accounted for, which means simple wired (or mailed) cash alone equals around 10 – 20% of Ethiopia’s USD 13 billion GDP. If we conservatively assume that the diaspora send no more than a tenth of their total income home, it is not hard to see that the “GNP” from Ethiopians abroad is at least as large as the one inside the country’s border.

This does not count other, perhaps more valuable, “soft” assets. An International Organization for Migration (IOM) report estimated that Ethiopia lost 75% of its human capital – including a third of doctors – from emigration between 1980 and 1991. The loss in business management and other technical skills are likely to be at least as severe.

Efforts have focused on encouraging professionals to return, securing investment in urban real estate and encouraging investment in small-scale enterprises (in a context in which nearly all property is state owned and the economy is state run).

The Ethiopian Diaspora in Europe and North America is large and well organized, though primarily on ethnic lines. In recent years – particularly in relation to 2005 elections – substantial financial support is provided to ethnic-based political parties (who oppose the EPRDF) and to development projects (Lyons 2007). It is altogether possible that the ERPDF’s belated recognition of the developmental role of the Diaspora derives from its desire to sever the links between the Diaspora and opposition political parties. It may also be the case that when the full consequences of opening up the economy finally dawn on the government, namely that it will loose the sinecures that come with a state-run economy, that it will stop short of implementing the measures necessary to secure investment by the Diaspora. There certainly remains deep seated opposition to the government and
its policies within the Diaspora and it is clear that significant economic and political reforms are necessary before the Diaspora will invest significant resources in their homeland.

Conclusion

The dichotomy forced v. voluntary migration is clearly too simplistic to capture the complex factors that drive migrants out of The Horn of Africa nor does it assist in understanding the factors that come into play during migrant’s transit through North Africa or the Middle East where political persecution and exploitation channel and shape migration flows into Europe.

Yet when all is said and done, the well-being of tens of thousands of migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia is intimately linked to the economic development of their country of origin and to the development of accountable governments at home. On one level the absence of development pushes migrants out, however this population exodus is directly linked to the autocratic politics of their governments at home and towards the Diaspora abroad which prevents them from returning – regardless of EU policies – reinforces their status as illegal’s in Europe, and hinders their ability to earn and remit money home. The European Union cannot hope to stem immigration by repressive measures, instead it must actively engage with the governments from which migrants flee to assist development and to ensure the establishment of accountable governments in migrants country of origin which respect human rights and which implement sound economic policies that make good use of Diaspora remittances (particularly as official flows of foreign aid decline).
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Weaver, J. 1985. “Sojourners along the Nile: Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum”, Jo. of Modern African Studies 23, 1, 147-56


Appendix I: Distribution of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Eastern Africa
(Source: USCRI annual reports at: http://www.refugees.org/home.aspx)

Ethiopian Refugees by year and country of residence:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eritrean refugees by year and country of residence:
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<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>196,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>13,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii “Migration and Development – A conceptual view”, address given at City University of London, 8 May 2008.

See the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia website at: http://www.unmeeonline.org/


See: ‘Somali deportations (1300 Ethiopian migrants handed over; 10 October 2006); http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/AMMF-6UFGJA?OpenDocument&query=forced%20returns%20from%20bosaso


For the latest reports see UNHCR reports on ‘deaths at sea’; at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txexis/vtx/asylum.


UNHCR records the presence of 400 Eritreans and 300 Ethiopians seeking refuge in Uganda in 2005 (see: UNHCR Global Report 2006 – Uganda, at: http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4666d26b0.pdf) but accounts from Ethiopian refugees suggest that the number is much higher.


Assuming they had no acquired other rights to protection. The cessation documents can be accessed on UNHCR’s RefWorld at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txexis/vtx/refworld/rwmain.

The most recent round of arrests occurred in July 2007; See: “Human Rights Alert: Eritreans and Ethiopians detained in Sudan face risk of detention, torture and execution if returned home” (8/01/2008) at: http://www.soatsudan.org/public/Press%20Releases%202008.asp.

Specifically article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 5 and 12 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which Ethiopia and Eritrea have signed. The case against Ethiopia was made in: EB (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 809.


See: “57 Eritrean Asylum-seekers reported saved from a sinking boat but secretly incarcerated in Libya” (26 May 2007) at: http://asmarino.com/content/view/64/11/; and “Doomed to drown: the desperate last calls of the migrants no one wanted to rescue” (26/5/07), at: http://asmarino.com/content/view/63/11/.
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xxix See: “Spain to provisionally take in Eritrean immigrants” at: http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:gKljwAK0wJgJ:www.eubusiness.com/afp/060721180502.r3y8oiqp+Eritreans+in+Libya&hl=en&client=firefox-a&gl=uk&strip=1

xxx The issue of trafficking requires a separate discussion and cannot be adequately treated in this paper. The evidence is that agents in Addis Ababa recruit thousands of young women to work in the Middle East. See: Anti-Slavery Society (2005); Kebede (nd); and recent US Department of State Reports on Ethiopia.

xxxi Koser’s figure of 20-25,000 Eritrean’s comes from Eritrean community organizations; 2007: 243).

xxxii Between 1980 and 2004 approximately 12,800 Ethiopians and 4,000 Eritrean’s applied for asylum (Source: http://migrationinformation.org/DataTools/asylumresults.cfm). Even the recent escalation in the number Eritrean’s seeking asylum is insufficient to explain the size of the population (UK 2007b).


xxxiv The bulk of remittances comes either through overseas embassies or through non-official channels, in the latter case this flow is very small. It is interesting to look at similar figures for Ethiopia which are substantially greater. See the World Bank Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2008, at: http://econ.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0.,contentMDK:21352016~menuPK:3145470~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883.00.html.

xxxv See: http://www.shaebia.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi?archive=5&num=1708&printer=1