


EMOTION AS A KARMIC MODE
RASA IN AJITASENA'S ALAÑKĀRA-CINTĀMAÑI (15TH CENTURY)

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Introduction

In the fifteenth century, around the town of Puttūr in Karnataka, the Jain king Kāmirāya ruled over the Baṅga principality known as Baṅgavāḍi. Ajitasena, a Jain monk from the Digambara Senagaṇa lineage, served at the court of Kāmirāya and composed at least two texts on poetics, the *Alañkāra-cintāmaṇi* (“Wish-Granting Jewel of Ornament”) and the *Śṛṅgāra-mañjarī* (“Bouquet of the Erotic Emotion”).² King Kāmirāya appears to have been keen on commissioning new texts on poetics, as we know of one more work, the *Śṛṅgārārṇava-candrikā* (“Moonlight on the Ocean of the Erotic Emotion”), authored by another poet who served at his court, Vijayavarṇī. From the *Śṛṅgārārṇava-candrikā* (1.16-1.22), we learn that King Kāmirāya was the son of Queen Viṭhaladevī (Viṭṭhalāmbā) and the nephew of King Pāṇḍya Baṅga. Once, as he was sitting in a poetry circle (*kāvya-goṣṭhi*), the king began to ask Vijayavarṇī questions about the qualities of poetry, aesthetic emotions, poetic ornaments, and other similar subjects. Eventually, upon the king’s request, Vijayavarṇī wrote the *Śṛṅgārārṇava-candrikā*, a compendium on poetics that provides a succinct account of these and other topics.

Similarly to the *Śṛṅgārārṇava-candrikā*, the *Alañkāra-cintāmaṇi* covers the traditional subjects of Sanskrit poetics and appears to be a manual on poetic composition for inclusion in the curriculum for Jain monks. Ajitasena’s target audience was likely nascent Jain poets who had to learn to write hymns of praise, present Jain principles at courtly and literary gatherings, and participate in verbal competitions and debates with non-Jain poets. As part of this program, Ajitasena dedicates three chapters (two through four) to a detailed analysis of poetic techniques, such as visual, verbal, and semantic literary ornaments (*citra-*, *śabda-*, and *arthālañkāra*). The

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² The dating of Ajitasena and King Kāmirāya has been contested. There must have been several authors named Ajitasena beginning from the second half of the first millennium. However, in his *History of South Kanara*, K.V. Ramesh 1970: 182f. provides inscriptional evidence for the dating of King Kāmirāya to the last quarter of the fifteenth century, which is further supported by A.N. Upadhye 1973.

chapter on *citra-kāvya*, or visual poetry, provides an exposition of various games, puzzles, and difficult poetic configurations,³ which were used for memorization, cognitive gymnastics, and preparation for scholarly debates. The genre of *citra-kāvya* brings together the sonic, semantic, and visual dimensions of poetry, thereby creating a powerful effect on the audience. One of the *citra* figures for which Ajitasena provides many examples is *praśnōttara*, which includes a series of questions and answers. This kind of riddle poetry, as Lienhard (1984: 150) states, was particularly popular in court settings where it took the form of a conversation between the poet and the king.

Ajitasena’s focus on poetic virtuosity is consistent with the broader trend on poetic composition in the genre of *citra-kāvya* among Jain monks. In his “Jain Uses of *Citrakāvya*,” Steven M. Vose (2016: 312) discusses three hymns of Jinaprabhasūri (fourteenth century), composed as *citra-kāvya* and in multiple languages, and notes (following Nalini Balbir) that “these two genres of hymn enjoyed some popularity among intellectually inclined Śvetāmbara monks in the eleventh through seventeenth centuries, the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries seeing the height of their interest.”⁴ Ajitasena’s emphasis on *citra-kāvya* is clearly connected to his perception of his own work as a source of praise for Jain heroes because visual poetry was often composed for the sake of praising deities or great humans. This was observed by the Jain scholar Nami sādhu (eleventh century), quoted by Alessandro Battistini (2014: 22): “As in the majority of cases, the subject of *citra* is the praise of a deity, not poetry with *rasa*.” Many illustrative verses in the *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* can be read as panegyric poems for great and enlightened Jain beings. Ajitasena claims that the *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* itself is a panegyric: “It has examples from old legends, wise sayings, and the like, that extol virtuous people. Therefore, it is a panegyric (*stotra*).”⁵

Ajitasena draws illustrations from earlier *purāṇas*, such as the *Ādi-purāṇa* of Jinasena (2.128), and gives examples largely with his own verses that extoll Jain heroes, including the Jinas themselves and particularly Bharata, a world-emperor, or *cakra-vartin*, and a son of the

³ On *citra-kāvya*, Gerow 1971: 175 states that “it refers to the composition of various puzzles and games, riddles and conundrums and the like.”

⁴ Vose 2016: 312 further notes that “for this entire period, there are approximately fifty extant Jain works in total in the three largest manuscript archives in Gujarat, which suggests that a specific class of well-trained monks composed these genres of poetry.” Ānandavardhana famously called *citra-kāvya* the third and lowest class of poetry. It is well-known, however, that he himself penned a *citra-kāvya*, called the *Devī-śataka*, “The Goddess’ Century,” in praise of the Goddess. On the division of poetry into three types, see *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.173-175. There are other—one might say canonical—examples of visual poetry in Bhāravi’s *Kirātārjunīya* (canto fifteen) and Māgha’s *Śiśu-pāla-vadha* (chapter nineteen). Many of the binding verses can be written to form images of weapons and royal paraphernalia, such as an arrow (*śara*), a sword (*khaṅga*), and a battle-drum (*muraḅa*).

⁵ *atrōdāharaṇaṃ pūrva-purāṇādi-subhāṣitam |
pūṇya-puruṣa-saṃstotra-param stotram idaṃ tataḥ || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 1.5*

first Jina Rṣabha.⁶ As Upadhye (1973: 4) notes, Ajitasena quotes from the “*Pūrvapurāṇa* (p. 1), *Jinaśataka* (p. 89), *Amoghavṛtti* (p. 102), and *Aṣṭasahasrī* (p. 59) of Vidyānanda” and refers to a number of earlier authors and texts, such as Samantabhadra (1.3, 2.128, 4.283, 5.156, 5.304), Jinasena (2.128), Vāgbhaṭa (p. 305), and others. Overall, the numerous verses dedicated to virtuous Jain men, including the Jinas and the world-emperor Bharata, render the *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* as a training ground for the composition of panegyrics.

The world-emperor Bharata’s particularly strong presence in the treatise is evident through many verses that extol him while illustrating literary figures and aesthetic emotions. For example, in verses on psychophysical responses (*sāttvika-bhāva*), four out of eight instances feature the *cakra-vartin*.⁷ In a verse on paralysis, Ajitasena writes: “Paralysis, that is immobility of the body, occurs due to fear, desire, etc. For instance, beautiful women appear to turn into sculptures on the wall as they cannot take their eyes off the *cakra-vartin* [Bharata].”⁸ Women are so engrossed in looking at the handsome *cakra-vartin*, that they become completely motionless and look like the familiar statues on the walls. The powerful effect of the *cakra-vartin* on women arises in the next verse that defines the psychophysical response of fainting: “Fainting is a severe confusion of the sense organs due to joy, sorrow, etc. All the sense organs of women become stupefied upon seeing the *cakra-vartin*.”⁹ If the preceding verse (5.21) points to women’s attachment to Bharata’s looks, this verse (5.22) comments on his ability to produce intense feelings of joy and perhaps awe that can result in fainting. In the definition of the psychophysical reaction of trembling (*kampa*), we read that Bharata scares his enemies and makes them tremble so much that the ocean itself begins to tremble (5.24). In describing the condition of the change in color (*vaivarṇya*), the world-emperor who is the sun itself burns the faces of his enemies, and they appear as though possessed by darkness (5.25).

This panegyric-cum-poetic manual extols the world-emperor Bharata and equips poets with the necessary tools and understanding for composing their own works. It is noteworthy that Ajitasena does not emphasize theories about the nature of aesthetic emotion in his text: he dedicates only a handful verses to the production of *rasa* and includes a standard exposition of different emotional states. Nevertheless, in his discussion of aesthetic experience, Ajitasena says something completely different from earlier theorists; that is, he explains *rasa* in terms of the Jain karmic doctrine, which, on the one hand, situates the *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* in the context

⁶ For the story of Bharata, see *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritra*, tr. Johnson 1937: 96f.

⁷ See more on *sāttvika-bhāva* in the conclusion of the paper.

⁸ *bhīti-rāgādīnā stambhaḥ kāya-niṣkriyatā yathā |
cakri-lagna-dṛśaḥ kāntāḥ pratimā iva bhīti-gāḥ || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.21*

⁹ *sukha-duḥkhādīnākṣāṇām mūrchanam pralayo dṛḍham |
cakry-ālokanataḥ strīṇām mūrchatīndriya-saṁcayaḥ || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.22*

of Jain philosophy, and on the other, necessitates an explanation that Ajitasena, owing to his preference for brevity, does not provide.

This paper investigates connections between Jain metaphysics and Ajitasena's interpretation of the production of *rasa* in his *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi*. It elaborates on the ways Ajitasena connects the rise of *sthāyi-bhāva* (stable emotion) with different types of material karmas and, in doing so, argues that the category of emotion ought to be understood as a cognitive, embodied, and karmic concept. In *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Emotions in Classical Indian Philosophy*, Maria Heim, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad & Roy Tzohar (2021: 2) discuss the many assumptions the English term emotion might evoke in western readers, including “the dualism of mind and body,” the “view of emotions as pertaining primarily to an ‘inner’ subjective state,” and the juxtaposition of passions to “reason and cognition.” They note that discussions of emotion in Indian sources transcend these and other notions, and the term emotion can serve as an umbrella term that encompasses “expressively rich and conceptually wide-ranging” phenomena.¹⁰ In this essay, I use the term “emotion” to refer to *sthāyi-bhāva*, a stable emotion, and show that for Ajitasena the production of *sthāyi-bhāva* is inseparable from the rise of *kaṣāya* and *no-kaṣāya*, passions and quasi-passions.¹¹ Thus, all of these categories exist on the same spectrum and can be denoted by term “emotion.”

I first focus on knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) and will-obstructing (*vīryāntarāya*) karmas mentioned in the text in order to reflect on the role of will in spectators' engagement with drama or poetry and to understand what type of cognition (*jñāna*) Ajitasena sees as essential for aesthetic experience. Next, I examine the nature of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma that Ajitasena identifies as the source of stable emotion (*sthāyi-bhāva*), further revealing *rasa*. I particularly emphasize the importance of conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma, which causes and is caused by passions (*kaṣāya*) and quasi-passions (*no-kaṣāya*). Central to this analysis is the idea that passion (*kaṣāya*) and emotion (*bhāva*) are both internal cognitive processes (*cid-vṛtti-paryayaḥ*) and material karmic modes, a condition that allows passions and emotions to act as a form of “glue” between the immaterial soul and material karma.¹² In order to address this seeming contradiction about the dual nature of emotion that Ajitasena highlights by conflating Jain metaphysical theories with theories of aesthetics, I turn to the Digambara

¹⁰ Heim, Ram-Prasad & Tzohar 2021: 4.

¹¹ The terms *no-kaṣāya* and *akaṣāya* denote weaker passions, as glossed in *Sarvārtha-siddhi* 8.9: *īṣad arthe nañāḥ prayogād īṣat-kaṣāyo 'kaṣāya iti*.

¹² On the analysis of emotion in relation to the mind, body, and self in Indian philosophy and religion, see Bilimoria & Wenta 2015. They refute the idea that India “never elaborated a clear-cut dichotomy between mind, body, and soul or Self,” and show that the Sanskrit philosophical tradition “provides an appropriate starting point in theorising emotions in India insofar as it conspicuously acknowledges the strict distinction between materiality of the ‘body’ and immateriality of the ‘spirit’ or ‘Self’ elaborated in Brāhmanical tradition” (Bilimoria & Wenta 2015: 22).

philosopher Kundakunda's *Pravacana-sāra*, or "Essence of Discourse" (ca. fourth-eighth centuries), and commentaries on his text by the scholiasts Amṛtacandra (eleventh century) and Jayasena (ca. 1180).¹³

In her "Philosophy as Drama: Amṛtacandra and Abhinavagupta," Phyllis Granoff (2016: 275) observes that the language of Amṛtacandra's commentaries on Kundakunda's works, including the *Samaya-sāra* and the *Pravacana-sāra*, is "steeped in the language of the drama and aesthetic theory," particularly Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. As Granoff (2016: 280) remarks, Amṛtacandra goes so far as to define knowledge (*jñāna*) as the stable emotion (*sthāyī-bhāva*) of the soul, to be experienced as the *rasa* of reality (*paramārtha-rasatayā*).¹⁴ In his commentaries on Kundakunda's texts, therefore, Amṛtacandra forms a natural connection between Jain metaphysics and theories of aesthetics. In the *Pravacana-sāra*, these Jain philosophers redefine the concept of *cāritra*, ordinarily understood as virtuous conduct, as a mental state of devotion and equanimity that operates through joy (*sukha*), further showing how it functions as a mode (*bhāva*) of the soul.¹⁵ The categories of conduct (*cāritra*) and cognition (*citta-vṛtti*) become intertwined to a degree of identity: the soul transforms into the pure state of equanimity that embodies virtuous conduct, which is itself a mental state. This hybrid categorization points to a broad range of meanings these categories afford and reaffirms their malleable semantic boundaries. Thus, Ajitasena's introduction of karmic processes reveals the complex nature of emotion - as a mental and embodied state - which transforms the self in conformity with Jain metaphysics.

Cognition and Will

Ajitasena explains the production of *rasa* through Jain karmic theory. While the prominent medieval philosopher and theorist Abhinavagupta (ca. 1000) mentions the presence of good karma as one of the conditions for aesthetic pleasure,¹⁶ Ajitasena positions karma at the heart of the production of *rasa*. For emotion (*bhāva*) to arise, it requires a number of conditions, including a degree of delusion, feeling, will, and knowledge, all of which are controlled by the obstruction or influx of karma. In his *Śṛṅgārārṇava-candrikā* (3.23-3.24), Vijayavarṇī,

¹³ Kundakunda discusses the question of the immaterial soul's material bondage in *Pravacana-sāra* 2.81f. On the dating of Kundakunda, see Soni 2020. On the dating of Amṛtacandra, see Granoff 2016.

¹⁴ *Ātma-khyāti* p. 316; see Granoff 2016: 281.

¹⁵ On the meaning of *sukha* in Śvetāmbara and Digambara philosophical sources, see Jaini 2016.

¹⁶ See *Abhinava-bhāratī*'s translation by Pollock 2016: 204, and Pollock 2016: 34. For an analysis of "the emotive sphere of the human being," see Cuneo 2007: 26, who argues that according to Abhinavagupta, "the emotional experience is considered as a complex mental phenomenon in which the cognitive component plays a fundamental role or even, one might argue, is the only real core of the experience."

mentioned earlier as a contemporary of Ajitasena working at the same court, also notes that the spectator's experience of various *rasas*, or aesthetic emotions, is based on their karma, while in an actor *rasa* is only imagined to be present. He defines a stable emotion as a mental action or mode: when this mode becomes strong and continuous, it is called a stable emotion.¹⁷ The stable emotion turns into *rasa*, he explains, when it is clearly manifested by the experience of the foundational factors, reactions, psychophysical responses, and transient emotions.¹⁸ While Vijayavarṇī's definitions are rather standard and straightforward, Ajitasena's rendering of emotion is more complex and expressed in the following two verses:

When knowledge-obscuring and will-obstructing karmas are partially suppressed and eliminated, sensory knowledge appears in a person by means of sense organs and mind.¹⁹ (5.1)

That which a person experiences and which arises from deluding-karma is a stable emotion that is a mental mode, and that reveals *rasa*.²⁰ (5.2)

This definition raises questions about the relationship among emotion, knowledge, and karma. While these verses are foundational for the analysis of Ajitasena's views on aesthetic emotion, they are rather cryptic in that Ajitasena does not explain the reasons for these specific karmas to be involved in the production of *rasa*, the relationship between karma and emotion, nor the specific types of deluding and knowledge-obscuring karma at play. He does explicitly state, though, that the experience of *rasa* pertains to the spectator:

¹⁷ *cittasya vṛtti-bhedo yaḥ pariṇāmāparākhyakah |*
sthiratvaṃ prāptavān so 'yaṃ sthāyi-bhāvo nigadyate || Śṛṅgārāṇava-candrikā 3.3

¹⁸ *vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ |*
budhyamānais tu suvyaktaḥ sthāyi-bhāvo raso bhavet || Śṛṅgārāṇava-candrikā 3.5

¹⁹ The soul is characterized by five dispositions, four of which are defined by karma; the final, *pāriṇāmika*, is caused solely by the soul's inherent capacity for change. Among the four karma-related states are subsidential (*aupaśamika*), destructional (*kṣāyika*), destruction-cum-subsidential (*aupaśamika-kṣāyikau/miśra*), and rising (*audayika*). Verse 5.1 refers to the destruction-cum-subsidence (*aupaśamika-kṣāyikau/miśra*) of karma, which Pūjyapāda likens to the partial destruction of dirt in a water-jar by means of clearing nuts; see *Sarvārtha-siddhi* 2.1.

²⁰ *kṣayōpaśamane jñānāvṛti-vīryāntarāyayoḥ |*
indriyāndriyair jīve tv indriya-jñānam udbhavet || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.1
tena saṃvedyamāno yo mohānīya-samudbhavaḥ |
rasābhivyāñjakaḥ sthāyi-bhāvaś cid-vṛtti-paryayaḥ || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.2

Factors bring about aesthetic emotions (*rasas*) [in the minds] of spectators and listeners of drama and poetry, etc. Factors are twofold: foundational and stimulant.²¹ (5.5)

Aesthetic and stable emotions are not in the actors trained to perform aesthetic and stable emotions; they are in the spectators who recall earlier aesthetic emotions etc.²² (5.63)

Actors only exhibit and act out stable and aesthetic emotions because it is their job, but it is the spectators who experience them. Further, the spectators experience them only if they have a memory trace of the emotions that the actors perform, which goes back to the notion of *vāsanā* (memory trace or latent disposition, often glossed as *saṃskāra*), which a number of theorists, including Abhinavagupta, state to be an important condition for the experience of *rasa*.²³ Ajitasena appears to reiterate this idea in his standard concise manner. His discussion of the role of foundational and stimulant factors, as well as physical reactions, is in conformity with earlier theories.

The focus of the analysis below, therefore, will be on the experience of cognition, will, and emotion, as outlined in *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.1-5.2. I will first briefly delineate the difference between the experience of liberated and non-liberated souls in Jainism and then examine the Jain karmic doctrine to offer answers to the following questions: What kind of knowledge does one require to experience an aesthetic emotion? What kind of activity does the notion of will denote? What is the nature of delusion needed for aesthetic pleasure?

First, all non-liberated human beings are bound by karma, which enables them to experience worldly pleasure. A liberated soul, whose nature is pure equanimity, will not be able to relish a dramatic performance, as we know from the examples found in canonical and exegetical literature. When the god Sūriyābha wishes to perform a spectacle of thirty-two

²¹ *nāṭakādiṣu kāvyādaṁ paśyatāṁ śṛṅvatāṁ rasān |*
vibhāvayed vibhāvaś cālabanōddīpanād dvidhā || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.5

²² *rasa-bhāvābhinetṛtve 'dhikṛte nartake rasāḥ |*
bhāvā na kiṁ tu sabhyeṣu smṛta-pūrva-rasādiṣu || Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi 5.63

²³ *Abhinava-bhāratī* p. 286:

asman-mate saṃvedanam evānanda-ghanam āsvādyate | tatra kā duḥkha-śaṅkā | kevalam tasyaiva
citratā-karaṇe rati-śokādi-vāsanā-vyāpārah |

“In our view, the consciousness itself is savored as pure bliss. How can one even doubt that there might be pain? The latent dispositions of passion, grief, and the like serve only to give variation.”

The spectator’s seemingly negative emotions such as grief or disgust are his or her latent dispositions (*vāsanās*), but they do not interfere with the highest pleasure of savoring his or her own consciousness.

dances and dramas to express his devotion to the living Jina Mahāvīra and the monks, the Jina does not give his consent.²⁴ In his commentary on this episode in the *Rāya-paseṇiya-sutta*, the twelfth-century scholiast Malayagiri explains that the Jina’s refusal to give Sūriyābha permission for the performance “ensues from the fact that the Jina himself had conquered all desires and passions and, therefore, had no interest in watching a dance-drama, while monks were not supposed to see it, as it would ruin their religious practice (*svādhyāya*).”²⁵ The Jina is no longer confined by the empirical knowledge received through the sense organs, and, being free from passions (*kaṣāya*), he remains unattached to sensory objects, including the many exciting and beautiful aspects of a performance.²⁶

According to Jain karmic doctrine, there are four destructive (*ghātiya*) and four non-destructive (*aghātiya*) types of karma.²⁷ The destructive karma include deluding (*mohanīya*), knowledge-obscuring (*jñānâvaraṇīya*), insight-obscuring (*darśanâvaraṇīya*), and obstructing (*antarāya*) karmas. It is these destructive karmas that are mentioned in the verses, particularly the deluding, knowledge-obscuring, and will-obstructing varieties. Ajitasena explains that for a stable emotion to arise, the karmas that hinder knowledge and will must subside and be eliminated, allowing the spectator to acquire knowledge through the senses and mind. There are five types of knowledge-obscuring karmas: karmas that obscure (1) sensory or empirical knowledge (*mati*), (2) testimonial knowledge (*śruta*), (3) clairvoyant cognition (*avadhi*), (4) telepathy (*manaḥ-paryaya*), and (5) omniscience (*kevala*). Among these types of knowledge, only the first two, sensory knowledge and testimonial knowledge, are acquired through the sense organs; that is, in early Jain epistemology they are considered indirect (*parokṣa*) types of cognition.

We have seen that the spectators experience *rasa* not only upon having their knowledge-obscuring karma suppressed, but also upon tapping into their memory traces of having seen the *rasas* performed previously by the actors. This suggests that knowledge-obscuring karma that needs to subside is the one that also releases an ability to remember and recollect. Sensory knowledge involves memory, generated by the mind (*manas*), recognition, reasoning, and

²⁴ *Rāya-paseṇiya* 24, p. 251. On the Jina’s silence as rejection, see Restifo 2019.

²⁵ Restifo 2019: 14.

²⁶ In his *Ātma-khyāti* 38 (p. 80), Amṛtacandra notes that empirical knowledge, or *saṃvedana*, is received through senses (*sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇa-nimitta-saṃvedana-pariṇatave ’pi*). As Wiley 2000: 350 explains, beginning with the twelfth spiritual stage (*guṇa-sthāna*), “when all passions (*kaṣāyas*) are overcome through the destruction of all conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karmas,” vibrations from the physical activity of the body, speech, and mind “cause the influx of *sātā-vedanīya* (pleasant-feeling-producing) karmic matter, but its binding lasts only an instant and its rise does not lead to the binding of new karmic matter with the soul.”

²⁷ On karma and Jain epistemology and ontology, see Balcerowicz 2020.

apprehension.²⁸ Hence, it is the karma that hinders sensory knowledge (*mati-jñāna*) to which Ajitasena refers in the verse.

Another karma that needs to subside, as *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.1 states, is will-obstructing karma (*vīryāntarāya*), which is one of the four obstructing karmas.²⁹ Padmanabh Jaini (1979: 123) suggests that the “*vīrya* quality” can be interpreted to be the fuel of the soul, and from that perspective, will-obstructing karma might lead to the weakening of “every aspect of the soul.” In his “Sacred Matter Reflections on the Relationship of Karmic and Natural Causality,” Peter Flügel notes (2012: n. 41) that most scholars have understood *vīrya* as “will” or “will-power.” Flügel (2012: 127f.) explains that in canonical and exegetical literature *vīrya* appears as both a quality of the soul and a product of the body, a conundrum that is resolved by indicating two types of *vīrya*: inactive (*akaraṇa*) and active (*sakaraṇa*). The active type of will pertains to non-liberated souls, and the inactive belongs to liberated souls. The active variety of *vīrya* is produced by the body and generates activity (*yoga*).³⁰ This activity can lead to carelessness, which can subsequently produce a conduct-deluding state (*cāritra-mohanīyam*) and a state of false belief (*mithyātva-mohanīyam*),³¹ both of which play a role in the formation of *rasa* as part of deluding karma that *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.2 (cited above) mentions as the source of stable emotion, or *sthāyi-bhāva*.

In his commentary titled the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* on the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* by Umāsvāmin (ca. 350 CE), the Digambara philosopher and scholar Pūjyapāda Devanandin (540–600 CE) states that each of the three types of activity (*yoga*) - physical, verbal, and mental (*kāya-vān-*

²⁸ TS 1.13: *matih smṛtiḥ samjñā cintābhīnibodha ity anarthāntaram*. On retention (*dhāraṇā*) as one of the four varieties of sensory knowledge, see also TS 1.15 and *Sarvārtha-siddhi* 1.15. On the concept of mind as an internal sense organ that is involved in recollection and the contemplation of virtues and flaws, see *Sarvārtha-siddhi* 1.14. In his commentary on TS 1.11 titled the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* (*Rāja-vārtika*), the Digambara philosopher Akalaṅka (eighth century) explains the nature of empirical knowledge in the following way:

upāttānīndriyāṇi manasā cānupāttaṃ prakāśōpadeśādi tat-prādhānyād avagamaḥ parokṣam | yathā gati-śakty-upetasyāpi svayam eva gantum asamarthasya yaṣṭy-ādy-avalambana-prādhānyam gamanam, tathā mati-śrutāvaraṇa-kṣayōpaśame sati jñā-svabhāvasyātmanaḥ svayam evārthān upalabdhum asamarthasya pūrvōkta-pratyaya-pradhānam jñānam parāyattatvāt tad ubhayaṃ parokṣam ity ucyate |

“[Cognition through] internal aids, such as senses and the mind, and external aids, such as light and teachings, etc., is indirect, because understanding occurs mainly through them. Just as a man, who is inherently capable of walking but cannot walk by himself, walks in reliance upon the support of a walking stick, etc., in the same way a man, whose self is pure wisdom, and whose empirical knowledge-obscuring karmas subside and are eliminated, is not capable of perceiving objects himself and obtains knowledge by means of the mentioned above ways (i.e., the senses, mind, light, and teachings). Because this empirical knowledge depends on another, it is called indirect” (*Tattvārtha-vārtika* 1.11, p. 52).

²⁹ The other obstructing karmas are those that obstruct giving (*dānāntarāya*), obstruct obtaining (*lābhāntarāya*), obstruct pleasure (*bhogāntarāya*), and obstruct repeated pleasure (*upabhogāntarāya*). See Jaini 1979: 123.

³⁰ *Bhagavatī-vivaraṇa* 1.3.34, p. 56b.

³¹ *Bhagavatī-vivaraṇa* 1.3.27, p. 52a.

manah-karma) - is contingent on the suppression and elimination of will-obstructing (*vīryāntarāya*) karma.³² Active will (*sakaraṇa-vīrya*), therefore, constitutes the foundation of any activity - from thought to speech to movement - in a non-liberated individual.³³

As such, we can conclude, the suppression, elimination, or rise of will-obstructing karma affects the degree of a soul's engagement with the world, including dramatic performance.³⁴

Ajitasena's mention of the suppression of the two karmas - sensory knowledge-obscuring and will-obstructing - points to the conditions for the inflow of sensory input and the spectator's experience of it in the form of emotion. Through the elimination and suppression of will-obstructing (*vīryāntarāya*) karma, the spectator is able to focus on the performance. Once the spectator sees and hears what is happening on stage, sensory knowledge (*mati-jñāna*), acquired by the elimination and suppression of sensory knowledge-obscuring (*mati-jñānâvaraṇīya*) karma, generates an emotion by means of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma. In what follows, I pursue this third thread: the relationship between emotion and deluding karma.

Emotion and Conduct-Deluding Karma

Deluding (*mohanīya*) karma, broached in *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.2, consists of insight-deluding (*darśana-mohanīya*) and conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma, where the former generates false belief (*mithyātva*)³⁵ and the latter manifests as passions (*kaṣāya*) and quasi-passions (*no-kaṣāya*). It is with the help of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma and other karmas, such as feeling-producing karma (*vedanīya-karma*), that the soul experiences passions and emotions. Feeling-producing karma is not considered a destructive type of karma, but it harms the soul and is closely tied to deluding karma:³⁶

³² *Sarvārtha-siddhi* 6.1. See also *Tātparyā* 2.86, p. 241.

³³ Flügel 2012: 128 notes that “together with consciousness (*uvaoga*), the main quality of the soul, *vīrya* represents the quality of free will which distinguishes Jaina karman theory from deterministic interpretations of karman, such as the Ājīvika doctrine or Śāṅkara's insistence on God as the latent source of karmic power.”

³⁴ *Bhagavatī-vivaraṇa* 1.3.34 (p. 56b): *vīryāntarāya-karma-kṣayôpaśama-samuttho jīva-pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*. “Different modes of the soul occur based on the partial destruction and suppression of will-obstructing karma.”

³⁵ On the meaning of *mithyātva* as a state of turning away from the path revealed by the omniscient ones, refusing to believe the truth, and being incapable of reflecting on what is good and what is bad, see *Gommaṭa-sāra* p. 24.

³⁶ *Gommaṭa-sāra* 1.19ab:

ghādivaṃ veyañīyaṃ mohassa baleṇa ghādade jīvaṃ.

“Feeling-producing karma, akin to destructive karmas, harms the soul through delusion.”

“Feeling-producing karma, akin to destructive karmas, harms the soul through the rise of certain forms of deluding karma, specifically pleasure and displeasure; i.e., it hurts the soul by bringing about sensory experience that produces pleasure and displeasure in the form of joy and sorrow.”³⁷

Feeling-producing karma appears to mediate between cognitions and passions, which is why it is listed among destructive karmas: it follows knowledge- and insight-obscuring karmas and precedes deluding karma.³⁸ In other words, it emerges after an individual cognizes an object and manifests in what can be called a good or bad mood.³⁹ The general mood then becomes a foundation for further emotional responses generated by conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma.

The arising of conduct-deluding karma is particularly relevant to our discussion. In fact, without this karma, one would not be able to experience the diversity of emotions that drama and poetry evoke. Conduct-deluding karma manifests through different passions (*kaṣāya*), including anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*), and greed (*lobha*) - often grouped under two states, desire (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) - as well as laughter (*hāsyā*), pleasure (*rati*), displeasure (*arati*), sorrow (*śoka*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*jugupsā*), women’s sexual desire for men (*strī-veda*), men’s sexual desire for women (*pum-veda*), and a neuter-gender person’s sexual desire for both men and women (*napuṃsaka-veda*).⁴⁰ While there is an overlap between some of these passions and aesthetic emotional states such as stable emotions (*bhāva*), there is not necessarily a direct equivalency between them. Nevertheless, given the passionate nature of conduct-deluding karma, it must be this type of deluding karma, mentioned in *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.2, that is responsible for the experience of emotional states that reveal *rasa*, or aesthetic emotion. By defining the production of *sthāyi-bhāva* by means of the rise of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma, such as conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma that manifests as

³⁷ *Jīva-tattva-pradīpikā* 1.19:

ghāti-karmavad vedanīyaṃ karma mohanīya-viśeṣa-raty-araty-udaya-balaṇaīva jīvaṃ ghātayati sukha-duḥkha-rūpa-sātāsāta-nimittēṃdriya-viṣayānubhavanena hantīti |

³⁸ *Gommaṭa-sāra* 1.19cd:

idi ghādīnaṃ majjhe mohassādimmi paḍhidaṃ tu. “

“Hence, it is studied among destructive karmas and before deluding karma.”

³⁹ Feeling-producing karma can be understood as a type of mood generator, in the sense suggested by Barrett 2017: pleasure-producing karma increases one’s wellbeing and displeasure-producing karma decreases it.

⁴⁰ TS 6.15 and 8.10.

kaṣāya and *no-kaṣāya*, Ajitasena suggests that *bhāva*, *kaṣāya*, and *no-kaṣāya* are categories that exist on the same spectrum.

Furthermore, in his *Tattva-dīpikā*, Amṛtacandra explains that desire (*rāga*) is a characteristic of conduct, as there are two types of conduct: with desire (*sa-rāga*) and without desire (*vīta-rāga*).⁴¹ Every action of a non-liberated being is accompanied by desire (*rāga*) and other passions (*kaṣāya*), which suggests that passion and action remain in an entangled relationship with one another.⁴² Because of the material condition of karma, it forms what is called a karmic body, one of the five bodies the soul can acquire.⁴³ On the one hand, as an effect of conduct-deluding karma, passion is distinct from the soul, material, and embodied.⁴⁴ On the other hand, desire (*rāga*) and other passions (*kaṣāya*) are considered to be modes of the soul's impure application of consciousness (*kaluṣôpayoga*),⁴⁵ when the soul identifies with them due to karmic bondage and ignorance.⁴⁶ Because the soul resides in the world in its ignorant state and is surrounded by material karmic particles, they indirectly cause the soul to undergo transformation and develop an impure consciousness that consists of passion states. The presence of these passion states, in turn, enables gross material particles (*pudgala-karma*) to attach to the soul on their own.⁴⁷ Jayasena offers the following metaphor to explain this process: just as rain falls on the ground and indirectly causes the growth of sprouts, similarly, the karma of passion states indirectly causes the karma of gross matter.⁴⁸ While rainwater is distinct from the ground, it becomes absorbed within it. In a similar manner, passions constituting

⁴¹ *Tattva-dīpikā* 1.6, p. 7.

⁴² Drawing on early canonical sources, Wiley 2016: 78 observes that “*pramāda* [recklessness] and *kaṣāyas* are envisioned as inherent components of actions that bound one in *saṃsāra*.” TS 6.5-6.6 divides activities between those that are driven by passions (*sakaṣāya*) and those that are free of passions (*akaṣāya*), see Wiley 2016 for the analysis of these notions in relation to bondage. She explains the types of bondage acquired as a result of mendicant activity at different levels of religious progress (*guṇa-sthāna*). Wiley 2016: 83 shows that from the twelfth *guṇa-sthāna* mendicants act free of passions (*īryā-patha*) and states:

“In the absence of *kaṣāyas*, *sthiti bandha* [duration of bondage] is not possible. Having been modified in the form of karmic matter, in the next moment it becomes non-karmic matter. There is no *sthiti bandha* because it remains bound for only one moment.”

⁴³ TS 2.37: “The five types of bodies are gross, protean, conveyance, fiery and karmic.” (Tr. Tatia 1994).

⁴⁴ E.g., *Ātma-khyāti* p. 167, p. 253.

⁴⁵ *Ātma-khyāti* p. 209. *Kalaśa* 133: *jo du kaluṣôvaogo jīvānaṃ so kasāūdao*. “Passions arise in people with impure application of consciousness.” For an extensive analysis of the concept of *upayoga*, see Bajželj 2024.

⁴⁶ *Samaya-sāra* and *Ātma-khyāti* 89. As Ohira 1982: 81 shows, the idea that passions (*kaṣāya*) constitute *upayoga* appears first in Guṇabhadra's *Kaṣāya-prābhṛta* (ca. 200 CE) and is later reflected in Kundakunda's *Pravacana-sāra*.

⁴⁷ *Tattva-dīpikā* 2.94, pp. 249f.

⁴⁸ *Tātparya* 2.95, p. 251.

bhāva-karma have a nature distinct from the soul, but they come to be regarded as internal modes of the soul. These passional states, therefore, possess a dual nature, bringing together the impure cognition inherent to the soul with karmic matter external to it. It is this ambivalent nature that allows passional states to function as mediators between the immaterial soul and material bondage.⁴⁹

Akin to the common classification of aesthetic emotion (*bhāva*) as a form of mental activity,⁵⁰ Ajitasena defines emotion as a cognitive mode (*cid-vṛtti-paryaya*) wherein the term “mode” (*paryaya/paryāya*) has a technical meaning. In Jain metaphysics, every entity consists of a substance, quality, and mode (*dravya-guṇa-paryāya*).⁵¹ The substance is unchanging and fixed, qualities are “persistent attributes,” and modes are “evanescent phases of those substances and their qualities.”⁵² A common illustration of these three states is a golden earring. The gold from which the earring is made is the substance, or *dravya*; its yellow color is the persistent quality, or *guṇa*; and its shape is a mode, or *paryāya*.⁵³ It is in this sense that emotion (*bhāva*), passion (*kaṣāya*), and quasi-passion (*no-kaṣāya*) are cognitive modes (*paryāya*) of the soul.

Because emotion and passion are mental modes, on the one hand, and effects of conduct-deluding karma, on the other, they are characterized as having both a cognitive condition and an embodied condition. In order to reconcile these two ways of conceptualizing emotion and passion—as an internal mental and embodied process - in the *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* and Jain metaphysics more broadly, we turn to Kundakunda’s *Pravacana-sāra* and its commentaries. These texts create an ontic web of meaning in which the concepts of emotion, action, and cognition are co-constructive of one another.

Early in his *Pravacana-sāra*, Kundakunda points to the existent connection between the soul and conduct, *cāritra*. In his perhaps most well-known work the *Samaya-sāra*, Kundakunda defines the soul as associated with correct insight (*darśana*), knowledge (*jñāna*), and conduct (*cāritra*) and frames the teaching by separating the pure soul from what it is not: matter.⁵⁴ His

⁴⁹ In his discussion of Kundakunda’s *Pravacana-sāra*, Johnson 1995: 143 suggests that according to the absolute (*nīścaya*) view, the karma that binds the immaterial soul appears “as though it were non-material.” He considers it a phenomenon of the internalization of the instrument of bondage by means of the concept of *moha*, or delusion (1995: 148f.). In my reading of Kundakunda and his commentators, *moha* must be understood as both the state of delusion, caused by knowledge-obscuring karma, and deluding karma (*mohanīya-karma*).

⁵⁰ See SV 3.7 (p. 143) where Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra consider *rasa* as an essentially internal state (*ātma-stha*), akin to the real-world emotion of joy, and theorize them as intensified stable emotions, which is a type of mental activity (*citta-vṛtti-rūpa*).

⁵¹ TS 5.37.

⁵² Tatia 1994: 143 on TS 5.37.

⁵³ This example is given in the *Tātparya* 1.10.

⁵⁴ On the Jain ontological model in Kundakunda’s works and the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, see Bajželj 2013.

discussion of the soul in the *Pravacana-sāra* builds upon the same epistemic foundation and already at the outset redefines *cāritra*, commonly understood as an embodied action, as an internal process; that is, a mental state.⁵⁵ He states: “It has been ascertained that virtuous conduct is indeed *dharma*, and *dharma* is equanimity. Equanimity is the soul’s mode that is devoid of delusion and mental agitation.”⁵⁶ The commentator Jayasena explains that virtuous conduct (*cāritra*) means “abiding in pure consciousness,”⁵⁷ *dharma*, and equanimity (*śama*).⁵⁸ He glosses *dharma* as that which lifts a living being, falling into the cycle of reincarnation, and holds it firm in a perfectly pure consciousness.⁵⁹ He further suggests that *dharma* can be of two types. The first and the highest is characterized by the soul’s pure transformation within oneself. The second appears to be accessible to more people, and it is the soul’s devotion (*bhakti*) to the five great souls: the Jinas, enlightened beings, teachers, preceptors, and mendicants.⁶⁰ The state of devotion (*bhakti*) is a form of meditation or concentration (*bhāvanā*) on the Jain heroes’ virtues.⁶¹ Kundakunda tells us that *dharma* is equanimity or tranquility because, in Jayasena’s words, “it assuages the heat of worldly pain produced by the fire of passions and anger with its cooling nectar of joy that comes from the constant contemplation of the soul.”⁶² Equanimity (*śama*) also figures as one of the stable emotions in Sanskrit literature on aesthetics.⁶³ It is a special mode that the self undergoes, one that is devoid of delusion and agitation. Jayasena

⁵⁵ For a discussion of the internalization of virtuous conduct, see Johnson 1995: 186f.

⁵⁶ *cārittaṃ khalu dhammo dhammo jo so samo tti ñiddiṭṭho |
moha-kkhoha-vihīṇo pariṇāmo appaṇo hu samo || Pravacana-sāra 1.7*

In his text, Kundakunda uses both Prakrit words—*caritta* and *cāritta* - as synonymous and denoting good and virtuous conduct.

⁵⁷ *Tātparya* 1.7, p. 9: *śuddha-cit-svarūpe caraṇam*. Similarly, Amṛtacandra glosses *cāritra* as “abiding in one’s true nature,” *svārūpe caraṇam cāritram* (*Tattva-dīpikā*, p. 8).

⁵⁸ Jayasena glosses the Prakrit word *sama* as *śama* and Amṛtacandra, as *sāmya* (*Pravacana-sāra* p. 8). Both terms point to the state of equanimity and tranquility.

⁵⁹ *Tātparya* 1.7, p. 9:

*tad evaṃ cāritram mithyātva-rāgādi-saṃsaraṇa-rūpeṇa bhāva-saṃsāre patantaṃ prāṇinam uddhṛtya
nirvikāra-śuddha-caitanya dharatīti dharmah.*

⁶⁰ *Tātparya* 1.7, p. 9: *pañca-parameṣṭhy-ādi-bhakti-pariṇāma-rūpo*.

⁶¹ *Tātparya* 1.3, p. 5.

⁶² *Tātparya* 1.7, p. 9:

*sa eva dharmah svātma-bhāvanōṭtha-sukhāmṛta-śītala-jalena kāma-krodhādi-rūpāgni-janitasya
saṃsāra-duḥkha-dāhasyōpaśamakavāt śama iti.*

⁶³ On *śama* as a stable emotion of the peaceful *rasa* (*śānta*), see *Alaṅkāra-cintāmaṇi* 5.6, 5.126.

glosses delusion as that which destroys right belief and agitation, as flawed conduct; he also, once again, renders conduct as a *mental activity*: “Agitation, known as delusion of conduct, is the destroyer of the *virtuous conduct which is a mode of a pure and steady mental activity*.”⁶⁴ Agitation confuses and destroys virtuous conduct that in the verse is defined as a mode of pure cognition. As such, Jain authors establish the relationship of identity among the concepts of conduct, cognition, and emotion in a spiritually advanced person. Next, Kundakunda explains how these categories relate to the soul, which has an inherent capacity for transformation:⁶⁵

“It has been taught that a substance becomes that into which it transforms at every moment; therefore, a soul transformed into *dharma* is to be understood as *dharma*.”⁶⁶

In his commentary on this verse, Amṛtacandra glosses *dharma* as a state or mode (*bhāva*) and posits that the soul does not merely take on different states but *becomes* these states: “Therefore, this soul transformed into a *dharma* is this very *dharma*, which proves that *the soul is conduct*.”⁶⁷ We can see that conduct is defined as *dharma*, and *dharma* is variously defined as that which holds the soul in the pure state; devotion (*bhakti*); the state of tranquility and equanimity (*śama*) that operates via joy (*sukha*); and, finally, the soul’s mode (*bhāva*), which can be also understood by the term *pariyāya*.⁶⁸ Further, since virtuous conduct is *dharma*, and *dharma* is a mode of the soul, the conduct itself is stated to be a mode (*bhāva* or *pariyāya*) of the soul. In this ontological model, the soul’s mental, emotional, and physical expressions figure as its attributes (qualities and modes) that are cognitively and karmically defined, which suggests a perpetual interplay of embodied and non-embodied causes and effects. While the relationship of oneness among substance, quality, and mode can be found only in liberated beings, Jain authors point to the apparent temporary identification among them in non-liberated souls.⁶⁹ This hybrid categorization broadens these concepts’ semantic boundaries and explains

⁶⁴ *Tātparyā* 1.7, p. 9:

nirvikāra-nīścala-citta-vṛtti-rūpa-cāritrasya vināśakaś cāritra-mohābhidhānaḥ kṣobha ity ucyate.

⁶⁵ On the soul’s inherent capacity for transformation (*pāriṇāmika-bhāva*), see TS 2.1.

⁶⁶ *parinamadi jeṇa davvaṃ tak-kālaṃ tam-mayaṃ tti paṇṇattam |
tamhā dhamma-pariṇādo ādā dhammo muṇeyavvo || Pravacana-sāra* 1.8

⁶⁷ *Tattva-dīpikā* 1.8: *tato ‘yam ātmā dharmeṇa pariṇato dharma eva bhavatīti siddham ātmanaś cāritratvam.*

⁶⁸ The highly polysemous term *bhāva* is understood as *pariyāya*, or current mode, for instance, in Akalaṅka’s *Tattvārtha-vārtika* 1.5.17. I’d like to thank the “Sanskrit Reading Group on Jaina Philosophy,” organized by Marie-Hélène Gorisse and Ana Bajželj, for an opportunity to read this passage together. See also Johnson 1995: 104, who shows that in Kundakunda’s works the term *pariyāya* is used interchangeably with *bhāva*.

⁶⁹ *jīvo pariṇamadi jadā suheṇa asuheṇa vā suho asuho |*

how the cognitive nature of emotion does not contradict its embodied karmic nature, nor does its innerness conflict with its external condition as part of the deluded conduct. It also suggests that unenlightened individuals (*jīva* substances) are capable of temporarily identifying with emotions as modes (*paryāya*), which further reveal aesthetic emotions (*rasa*).

Based on our analysis, we now understand Ajitasena's concise statement in the following way: when actors act out different emotions, spectators experience *rasas*, the memory traces of which they possess because of earlier sensory cognition. Required for this process is the suppression and elimination of will-obstructing (*vīryāntarāya*) and sensory knowledge-obscuring (*mati-jñānâvaraṇīya*) karmas. The suppression of will-obstructing karma ensures that the spectator is engaged in watching the drama; the suppression of sensory knowledge-obscuring karma allows the spectator to apprehend what transpires on stage and invokes the memory of previously experienced *rasas*, a necessary condition for aesthetic experience to come into being. The *rasa*, moreover, is revealed through stable emotions (*sthāyi-bhāva*) that are mental and karmic modes, with which the soul identifies due to the rising of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma, particularly conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karmas that manifest through passions. Thus, the experience of emotion - a composite product of will (*vīrya*), sensory knowledge (*mati-jñāna*), and material karmas - is a cognitive and embodied state.

Conclusion

At the center of Ajitasena's work of bringing Jain metaphysics into conversation with the theory of *rasa* is the term *bhāva*, which can be understood and translated as a mode, emotion, and mental and embodied state in both fields. We have seen that Ajitasena and other theorists on aesthetics gloss *sthāyi-bhāva* as an internal psychic activity. Ajitasena specifically explains *sthāyi-bhāva* as a cognitive mode of the soul while ascertaining that it originates from deluding karma and primarily, as I suggested, conduct-deluding karma that manifests via passionate states. The idea that emotion (*bhāva*), more generally, is not confined to the cognitive and mental realm but also encompasses physical conditions is, in fact, widely acknowledged in texts on aesthetics. For instance, in his *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* ("River of *Rasa*," ca. 1500), the early modern Brahman poet Bhānudatta states:

suddheṇa tadā suddho havadi hi pariṇama-sabbhāvo || Pravacana-sāra 1.9

"When the soul, whose true nature is change, transforms into auspicious or inauspicious modes, it becomes auspicious or inauspicious; when it transforms into the pure mode, it becomes pure."

Both auspicious modes, such as the state of devotion, and inauspicious modes are accompanied by desire (*rāga-bhāvena*), while the pure mode of the soul is free from desire (*arāga-bhāvena*); see *Tattva-dīpikā* 1.9. Kundakunda and his commentators posit that there is no substance without pure, auspicious, or inauspicious modes, and there are no modes without a substance; see *Pravacana-sāra* 1.10.

“We reject the argument that “emotion” [*bhāva*] refers exclusively to a mental transformation and therefore the use of the term in reference to bodily transformations such as sweating must be purely figurative. Since the word “emotion” is found in use equally in both cases, it is impossible to decide the matter one way or the other.”⁷⁰

The emotion (*bhāva*) thus is defined as both a mental and embodied process. Similarly, in her “Introduction” to *Words for the Heart*, Maria Heim (2022: 12f.) suggests that goosebumps or tears may not be theorized as necessarily “physical” reactions but might “count as an emotion.” In the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, we read that tears and goosebumps are psychophysical responses (*sāttvika-bhāva*), which also include paralysis, perspiration, change of voice, trembling, change in color, and fainting.⁷¹ They manifest the character’s emotions and bring about aesthetic emotions in the spectator or listener. The psychophysical emotions are invariably embodied - that is, physically manifested - and can be attained via a mental concentration.⁷² They present a combination of some form of intentionality and physicality,⁷³ as they are located in the body, and a physical alteration or movement is neither a precursor to nor a consequence of an emotion but a constituent part of it.

The idea that an embodied response is an integral part of emotion dominates recent discussions in the field of emotion studies. By employing the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory, Monique Scheer (2012: 193) introduces the notion of “emotion-as-practice” that emphasizes the embodied and culturally cultivated aspects of emotion and the self. In Jain metaphysics, passions (*kaṣāya*) are associated with both the application of consciousness (*upayoga*) and embodiment through conduct (*cāritra*) and karma. This renders them as a special category that enables a mechanism whereby the immaterial soul becomes entangled with material karmic particles, thus transforming into a worldly being (*saṃsārin*).⁷⁴ As Amṛtacandra explains, a misconception about oneself (*ātmano vikalpam*) arises via the threefold aberration of the application of consciousness (*upayoga*) - false belief, ignorance, and lack of restraint⁷⁵ -

⁷⁰ “*Bouquet of Rasa*” & “*River of Rasa*” by *Bhānudatta*, tr. Pollock 2009: 133.

⁷¹ *stambhaḥ svedo 'tha romāñcaḥ svāra-bhedo 'tha vepathuḥ |
vaivarṇyam āsru pralaya ity aṣṭau sāttvikā matāḥ || NŚ 7.94*

⁷² NŚ 7.93f.

⁷³ As Pollock 2016: 334, n. 17 states: “For the NŚ it is the *sattva* of the actor that is at issue, for he cannot weep or sweat without *intentionality*” (emphasis in the original).

⁷⁴ On the definition of *saṃsārin*, see Bajželj 2024: 25.

⁷⁵ *Samaya-sāra* 89, *Ātma-khyāti* p. 168: *mithyā-darśanājñānāvīratī-rūpas tri-vidhaḥ savikāraś caitaṇya-pariṇāmaḥ*.

which leads to thoughts such as “I am anger” (*krodho ‘ham iti*).⁷⁶ In this ontological model, the self must identify with what it is not, namely the alien emotion of anger, which affects the self both cognitively as a mental state and physically as a karmic condition. From this vantage point, Ajitasena’s theory, and more broadly, Sanskrit aesthetic theories on emotion, align with the Jain conception of passion (*kaṣāya*) as both internal and performative, as well as intentional and embodied.

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⁷⁶ *Ātma-khyāti* p. 168.

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