

# Crusades

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: [www.tandfonline.com/journals/rcru20](http://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rcru20)

## Louis IX and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate – part II

Mohamad El-Merheb

To cite this article: Mohamad El-Merheb (11 Sep 2024): Louis IX and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate – part II, *Crusades*, DOI: [10.1080/14765276.2024.2385894](https://doi.org/10.1080/14765276.2024.2385894)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14765276.2024.2385894>



© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 11 Sep 2024.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 414



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

## Louis IX and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate – part II

Mohamad El-Merheb 

Medieval History, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands

### ABSTRACT

This article argues that Louis IX's crusade, defeats, and captivity shaped the attempts of Sultan al-Malik al-Mu'azzam Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tūrānshāh (d. 648/1250) and *amir* Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Abī 'Alī al-Hadhabānī (d. 658/1260) to gain power in Egypt. It highlights how Louis IX's captivity was used by Tūrānshāh to consolidate his short-lived rule, provided the Mamluks with the right circumstances to assassinate their sultan, and offered Ḥusām al-Dīn a chance to serve the post-Ayyubid regime by securing the return of Damietta to the Muslims and the payment of Louis IX's ransom. Louis IX's intransigence and continuous refusal to consider a peace agreement and unreasonable demands before he was captured, and his constant stalling and discourteous comportment during his captivity influenced the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate, offering the Mamluks opportunity after opportunity to present themselves as protectors of the Egyptian realm. Lastly, this article brings to light new evidence related to the nature and timing of the Mamluk coup against Tūrānshāh and the identity of some of the conspirators who enabled it.

### ARTICLE HISTORY


Received 19 March 2024  
Accepted 24 July 2024

### KEYWORDS

Louis IX; Ayyubid; Mamluk;  
Seventh Crusade; Egypt;  
Arabic historiography

## Introduction

This article highlights the contribution of Louis IX's first crusade to the assumption of power by the Mamluks and the demise of the Ayyubid line in Egypt in 648/1250. Part I covered *amir* Fakhr al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh's (d. 647/1250) attempt to seize the throne following the death of his sultan, al-Salih Ayyub (al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb, r. in Egypt 637/1240-647/1249).<sup>1</sup> The second and present part focuses on two other chief contenders to the throne from the traditional and hereditary military elites: *amir* Husam al-Din (Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Abī 'Alī al-Hadhabānī, d. 658/1260), the sultan's loyal aide and vice-regent in Cairo during the crusade, and Turanshah (al-Malik al-Mu'azzam Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tūrānshāh, d. 648/1250), heir-apparent and ephemeral sultan of Egypt. This article will show how Louis IX's defeat and captivity was used by Turanshah to consolidate his short-lived rule; provided the Mamluks the right

**CONTACT** Mohamad El-Merheb  m.el-merheb@rug.nl

<sup>1</sup>Mohamad El-Merheb, 'Louis IX and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate - Part I', *Crusades* 22, no. 2 (2023): 215-35.

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

circumstances to assassinate their sultan; offered Husam al-Din a chance to claim the throne, which he refrained from seizing; and secured the latter a safe transition to serving the new regime and a leading role in returning Damietta to Muslim hands and guaranteeing the payment of Louis IX's ransom.<sup>2</sup> Part II thus brings to light new evidence on the nature of the Mamluk coup and links it to Louis IX's captivity.

We are fortunate to be so well informed about Husam al-Din's role in the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate.<sup>3</sup> Largely due to his friendship with and patronage of this period's main historian, Ibn Wāsil (604/1208-697/1298), Husam al-Din's exemplary career was remembered favourably by contemporary and later Arabic sources. Before entering the service of al-Salih Ayyub, he was an officer from the traditional military elite of the Syrian city of Hama serving its Ayyubid ruler al-Malik al-Muẓẓaffar Maḥmūd (d. 642/1244).<sup>4</sup> Husam al-Din quickly gained the trust of al-Salih Ayyub, who appointed him to various senior positions including: *atabak* (guardian-tutor) to his son Turanshah, who was stationed in Āmid;<sup>5</sup> leading commander in the army;<sup>6</sup> head of the *halqa* elite regiments;<sup>7</sup> *ustādār* ('mayor of the palace' or major-domo);<sup>8</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Though not the focus of this article, other contenders to the Egyptian throne also made attempts at seizing power that were shaped by the consequences of Louis IX's crusade. They were of slave origin and included the leader of the *Bahriyya* Mamluks *amir* Aqtay (Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy, d. 652/1254), and Shajar al-Durr (r. 648/1250), al-Salih Ayyub's resourceful widow and briefly the sultan of Egypt herself. Both tried to benefit from Louis IX's crusade in order to gain or retain power and were killed trying to achieve their goals. Aqtay and Shajar al-Durr are only mentioned here as the scope of this article is limited to two 'free' contenders to the throne who failed to either sustain the Ayyubid regime or inherit it due to the consequences of the French king's Egyptian campaign.

<sup>3</sup>As per the methodology set out in Part I, I avoid referring to later Mamluk sources and, instead, rely where possible on the following two contemporary and one near-contemporary sources of Louis IX's crusade: (1) Ibn Wāsil, Muḥammad b. Sālim, *Die Chronik des Ibn Wasil: G' amāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Wāsil, mufarriḡ al-kurūb fi aḥbār Banī Ayyūb: kritische Edition des letzten Teils (646/1248-659/1261) mit Kommentar: Untergang der Ayyubiden und Beginn der Mamlukenherrschaft*, ed. Mohamed Rahim, Arabische Studien, volume VI (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarriḡ al-kurūb fi aḥbār banī Ayyūb (629-645/1231-1248)*, ed. Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Rabī' and Sa'īd 'Abd al-Fattāḥ 'Āshūr, vol. 5 (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1972) and occasionally vol. 4 (615-628); (2) Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān fi tāwārīkh al-a'yān*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Zaybaq, vol. 22 (years 588-654 H.) (Damascus: al-Risāla al-'ālamīyya, 2013) as he benefits from Sa'd al-Dīn ibn Hamawīyya's lost chronicle (likewise, fragments of this chronicle are available through al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), *Tārīkh al-Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-al-a'lām*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmūrī, vol. 47 (years 641-50 H.) and vol. 49 (years 661-70 H.), 52 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1987); and (3) Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād wa-al-Atrāk* (MS, Hekimoglu 695, Istanbul: Suleymaniye).

<sup>4</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarriḡ al-kurūb*, 5: 189. See R.S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols. The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1977), 251; Konrad Hirschler, 'Ibn Wāsil: An Ayyubid Perspective on Frankish Lordships and Crusades', in *Medieval Muslim Historians and the Franks in the Levant*, ed. Alex Mallett (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 139; Konrad Hirschler, *Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors* (London: Routledge, 2011), 23. See also Anne-Marie Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade vus par les auteurs arabes', in *Les Relations des pays de l'islam avec le monde latin: Du milieu du Xe siècle au milieu du XIIIe siècle*, ed. Françoise Micheau (Paris: J. Marseille: Vuibert, 2000), 79.

<sup>5</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarriḡ al-kurūb*, 5: 189; Amida, modern Diyarbakir in Turkey. Hirschler mentions Hisn Kayfa in *Authors as Actors*, 23.

<sup>6</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarriḡ al-kurūb*, 5: 210, 337, 340, 361, 369; Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 5.

<sup>7</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 2, Husam al-Dīn was the head of 'al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb's *halqa*'. For more on the changing meaning of *halqa*, see David Ayalon, 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army—II', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1953): 448-76; Ulrich Haarmann, 'The Sons of Mamluks as Fief-Holders in Late Medieval Egypt', in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut, 1984), 142, 144; Amalia Levanoni, 'The *Halqa* in the Mamluk Army: Why Was It Not Dissolved When It Reached Its Nadir?' *Mamluk Studies Review* 15 (2011): 37-65, at 37 who noted that under al-Salih Ayyub 'the *halqa* continued to enjoy elite status, but which units were included in it or the number of its troops is unclear'. There are also several references to the *halqa* troops in Jean de Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1995), but in my opinion Joinville - at times - confused the *halqa* with the *Bahriyya*. It is safe to assume that Husam al-Din commanded professional, elite regiments of the Ayyubid army that did not include *Bahriyya* Mamluks; this observation will become relevant when I discuss the assassination of Turanshah below.

<sup>8</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarriḡ al-kurūb*, 5: 211, 231, 234. *Ustādār* or *ustādh al-dār*, translated as 'mayor of the palace', major-domo, or master of the household. See Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 251 and 290, and Hirschler, 'An Ayyubid Perspective', 139.

*nā'ib al-salṭana* (vice-regent) in Damascus and Baalbek;<sup>9</sup> and, most importantly, vice-regent in Cairo on more than one occasion.<sup>10</sup> Ibn Wasil thus became a first-hand witness of this period since his close friend and patron, Husam al-Din, was the main informant for his *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī Ayyūb* (The Dissipater of Anxieties on the Reports of the Ayyubids), the principal Arabic source for Louis IX's crusade and the end of Ayyubid rule in Egypt. The pair's friendship began when Ibn Wasil first relocated to Cairo in 641/1243 and stayed in Husam al-Din's residence on the Nile.<sup>11</sup> This relationship endured for nearly a decade and they crossed the Red Sea to perform pilgrimage in Mecca together in 649/1252, shortly before Husam al-Din left Egypt to retire in Syria.<sup>12</sup> Ibn Wasil's accounts shaped Husam al-Din's sympathetic portrayal in the Arabic sources, as they influenced other contemporary and later chronicles.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, much of what has been recorded about Turanshah was influenced by the changing views of Ibn Wasil and Husam al-Din of their new sultan.<sup>14</sup>

Husam al-Din's loyalty and proximity to al-Salih Ayyub were unquestionable. He served his lord diligently and was, in return, entrusted with delicate personal matters. Husam al-Din remained loyal even after he was imprisoned in agonising conditions by Sultan al-Salih Isma'īl (al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl, d. 648/1251), al-Salih Ayyub's uncle and archenemy, in Damascus and then in Baalbek between 637/1239 and 641/1243.<sup>15</sup> When Husam al-Din came forward to testify in a personal case related to al-Salih Ayyub, the Shafi'i chief-judge of Cairo deemed his testimony inadmissible at his court for being a partial witness.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, he was with al-Salih Ayyub when news came from Syria of the death of one of the sultan's sons, and he witnessed the eyes of his stern sultan tearing up.<sup>17</sup> According to Husam al-Din, al-Salih Ayyub confided in him about his disappointment and distrust in Turanshah, his only living son and heir to the throne. Husam al-Din related that al-Salih Ayyub confessed to him that 'no good will come of him [Turanshah]' and that the sultan entrusted him to keep the throne of Egypt vacant after his death and not to bring Turanshah from Hisn Kayfa, nor any other Ayyubid relative, but to ask the caliph in Baghdad to appoint a suitable candidate to the seat of the sultanate.<sup>18</sup> The sultan purportedly so abhorred his son that even when his health was deteriorating rapidly and Husam al-Din suggested that Turanshah was brought to Cairo, al-Salih Ayyub yelled: 'I will [only] bring him here to kill him!'<sup>19</sup> Husam al-Din was, likewise, the trusted confidant to whom al-Salih

<sup>9</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*, 5: 352, 361.

<sup>10</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*, 5: 379; Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 1, 8.

<sup>11</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*, 5: 334. The date is 643/1245 in Hirschler, *Medieval Arabic Historiography* and Hirschler, 'An Ayyūbid Perspective', 140.

<sup>12</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 128, 129. See Hirschler, 'An Ayyūbid Perspective', 140, and Hirschler, *Authors as Actors*, 25.

<sup>13</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji's *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād wa-al-Atrāk* is likewise favourable to Husam al-Din. Ibn al-Khazraji – if this is indeed the true author of this chronicle – often reports events from Husam al-Din's perspective either based on Ibn Wasil or through direct quotations that are not in the *Mufarrij al-kurūb*. Future research will hopefully elucidate more about this important source, its author, and, of course, his links to Husam al-Din.

<sup>14</sup>Similarly, much of what is known about Fakhr al-Din is through his cousin's lost chronicle via Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān* (and al-Dhahabī's *Tārīkh al-Islām*).

<sup>15</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*, 5: 242, 243, 328, 329; Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 261 and 272.

<sup>16</sup>Related in al-Yūnīnī (640/1242–726/1326), *Dhayl mir'āt al-zamān fī tā'rikh al-a'yān*, ed. 'Abbās Hānī al-Jarrākḥ, vol. 17 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2013), 235. For the full translated anecdote see Mohamad El-Merhebe, *Political Thought in the Mamluk Period: The Unnecessary Caliphate* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022), 179.

<sup>17</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 34.

<sup>18</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 35; same anecdote on 41.

<sup>19</sup>Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417.

Ayyub wrote to say that he would, once more, be riding and playing polo when he mistakenly, just before his death, believed that his condition was improving.<sup>20</sup>

Most importantly for our purposes, Husam al-Din was al-Salih Ayyub's chief advisor for all matters related to Louis IX's impending invasion. As will be described below, the sultan kept him briefed about the latest reports on the Frankish army's movements across the Mediterranean, consulted with him before taking any major decision, entrusted him with equipping the Egyptian army and fleet, and appointed him as his vice-regent in Cairo while he was away campaigning in Syria and Palestine. Despite being based in Cairo, Husam al-Din was essential to the Ayyubid war machine and was kept well-informed about the developments throughout Louis IX's campaign.

Well before the Frankish landing, Husam al-Din was made privy to some troubling news from across the sea. Al-Salih Ayyub informed him that Frederick II (1194-1250), Holy Roman emperor and king of Sicily, had sent messengers warning of an imminent crusade led by Louis IX, king of the French (*malik al-Ifrans*).<sup>21</sup> The emperor cautioned the Muslims that Louis IX's army had reached Cyprus, that the 'coastal Franks' (of the Latin lordships of the East) had been mobilising to join the invasion, and that Egypt was the ultimate objective of the Frankish campaign.<sup>22</sup> Al-Salih Ayyub rushed back from his camp in Ashmum Tannah (Ashmūm Ṭannāḥ) to Cairo and summoned Husam al-Din for a meeting at the citadel in order to address this vital dispatch from Frederick II, which, interestingly, was kept secret from Fakhr al-Din.<sup>23</sup> This letter, as related by Ibn al-Khazraji, reflects the astonishing depth of cooperation between Frederick II and al-Salih Ayyub:<sup>24</sup>

al-Firansī [Louis IX] had set out with large numbers [of knights and soldiers] and equipment hitherto unseen. The amity that existed between me and al-Malik al-Kāmil dictates that I act and strive for the Sultan's [al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb] interest. If the Sultan is in a peaceful state of mind and is in no imminent danger from his [Muslim] enemies, I will try to delay this King [in Cyprus] as much as I can, stop his affairs, and dissuade other Frankish kings [of the Latin East] from [joining and] assisting him. Whereas if the Sultan is occupied with other urgencies, advise me so I can broker a peace between the two of you whilst he is still in Cyprus, that is in return for conceding Jerusalem to him.

This letter unveils a cast iron, clandestine alliance between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt against Louis IX. Frederick II offered to assist the Muslim side by either: (1) delaying Louis IX in Cyprus and sabotaging his coalition with the Frankish lords of the East, thus giving the sultan the necessary time to ready for war, or if the sultan was not capable of fighting Louis IX's army (2) mediating a peace agreement based on the recipe of his former ally Sultan al-Kamil (al-Malik al-Kāmil, r. 615/1218-635/1238), ceding Jerusalem in return for Frankish withdrawal from Egypt. Both

<sup>20</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 17, 18, 36; Husam al-Din was initially thrilled by the news, but Ibn Wasil was told by the sons of al-Salih Ayyub's physician that his condition was terminal.

<sup>21</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 163v. It is unclear how many warning messages were sent by Frederick II. See Mohamad El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources: The Saint, the King, and the Sicilian Connection,' *Al-Masāq* 28 (2016): 286, and Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 68.

<sup>22</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 163v.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 164r. The wording here suggests this was a new warning message.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.* This is an improved and more detailed translation of this passage based on the one in El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 290. For more on Frederick II's position during Louis IX's campaign, see Peter Jackson, ed., *The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254: Sources and Documents* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 39–48.

schemes put forward by the emperor served the immediate interests of Sultan al-Salih Ayyub well.<sup>25</sup>

Husam al-Din was amenable to Frederick II's proposition. He believed it came at an opportune time as a peace treaty had to be concluded with either Louis IX or Sultan al-Nasir of Aleppo (al-Malik al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf II, r. 634/1237-658/1260).<sup>26</sup> Husam al-Din was worried that al-Salih Ayyub's army was exhausted following a protracted campaign in Syria and feared the continuous dangers posed by the powerful sultan of Aleppo and other lesser Ayyubid rivals and, additionally, the possible rallying of the coastal Franks under Louis IX.<sup>27</sup> He thus favoured a treaty with the Franks over a war on multiple fronts. As such, Husam al-Din's amenability to the idea of making a peace agreement with Louis IX, similar to that of his rival, Fakhr al-Din, can be regarded as further compelling proof of the 'full integration' of Frankish lordships of the East and crusading campaigns into intra-Ayyubid politics.<sup>28</sup> As discussed in Part I, this was the model of interactions with the Franks that leading Ayyubid figures like Fakhr al-Din, Husam al-Din and Turanshah followed, a model that played a decisive role in shaping the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate and the Muslim responses to Louis IX's crusade.<sup>29</sup>

This was not the case for al-Salih Ayyub, who vehemently rejected any hint of a concession to Louis IX. The sultan vowed to Husam al-Din that he would spare no effort to fight the Frankish invaders: 'what is my excuse before God if this accursed one [Louis IX] attacks us riding wood in the sea while in I am here, in my realm, amongst my soldiers who are more numerous and better equipped?'<sup>30</sup> Realising that al-Salih Ayyub was set on fighting off the crusaders, Husam al-Din counselled him to avoid further campaigning in Syria and to remain close to Cairo, in Tall al-'Ujūl in Palestine, ready to repel any Frankish landing force whether in Egypt or on the Syrian coast, as the Muslims were still not fully certain of Louis IX's target.<sup>31</sup> However, dramatic developments in Syria dictated against this advice and al-Salih Ayyub left for Damascus to organise his army's attack on Homs.<sup>32</sup> The Egyptian sultan was on the verge of capturing the city when news reached him from Cyprus that Louis IX was readying his troops to embark for Damietta.<sup>33</sup> He lifted the siege of Homs and hurriedly concluded a truce with the sultan of Aleppo that was mediated by the caliph's envoy.<sup>34</sup> Al-Salih Ayyub then rushed back – one last time – from Damascus to Egypt on 4 Muharram 647/ 19 April 1249.<sup>35</sup> Enfeebled by his worsening health condition and carried on a litter, he

<sup>25</sup>The content of this letter helps us rationalise Fakhr al-Din's strategy during Louis IX's invasion as discussed in Part I of this article (see note 1 above).

<sup>26</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 164r.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Konrad Hirschler, 'Frankish-Muslim Relations in the Ayyubid Period, c. 589/1193-c.648/1250', in *The Cambridge History of the Crusades 2: Expansion, Impact and Decline*, ed. J. Phillips and A. Jotischky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). The theory of the integration of the Frankish lordships into the Syrian political system in the pre-Saladin period has been challenged; see James Wilson, *Medieval Syria and the Onset of the Crusades: The Political World of Bilad al-Sham 1050–1128* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2023), 168, 174, 221, 236.

<sup>29</sup>See Part I of this article (see note 1 above), 217 and 221.

<sup>30</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 164r-v.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 164v. See also Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 4 for an account reporting that Husam al-Din agreed with al-Salih Ayyub on the need to retake Homs from the sultan of Aleppo. See also Anne-Marie Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 68.

<sup>32</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 165r-v and 166r.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 166r. Confirmed by Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 5.

<sup>34</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 5. See Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 296.

<sup>35</sup>Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 296. See also Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 69.

reached Ashmum Tannah on Monday 3 Safar 647/ 18 May 1249 determined to lead the defence against the imminent invasion.<sup>36</sup>

When Louis IX's army landed in Damietta, Husam al-Din was al-Salih Ayyub's vice-regent in Cairo and remained so throughout the slow Frankish progress towards al-Mansura.<sup>37</sup> While far from the battlefield, he played a central role in the Ayyubid war effort and the dramatic political changes that took place during this crusade. Upon his return from Syria, the sultan had entrusted Husam al-Din with the vice-regency in Cairo and, additionally, building and equipping ships and provisioning the Ayyubid army. Husam al-Din retained his post after al-Salih Ayyub's supposedly secret death on 14 Sha'ban 647/ 22 November 1249 and under the ephemeral rule of Fakhr al-Din.<sup>38</sup> From the Cairo citadel, he continued to receive Frankish prisoners sent from the frontline to the capital, emissaries reporting back to him on their trips between the Muslim camps in Faraskur and al-Mansura, and prompt updates from the battleground via the Ayyubid pigeon postal system.<sup>39</sup> The only noteworthy change was that he had to take a new oath of allegiance before Cairo's chief judge in the name of al-Salih Ayyub, his son Turanshah after him, and Fakhr al-Din as *atabak* and administrator of the realm. These instructions were conveyed through a forged letter sent by Shajar al-Durr, *tawashi* Jamal al-Din Muhsin (*ṭawāshī* Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥsin, al-Salih Ayyub's influential eunuch) and Fakhr al-Din in the name of the dead sultan.<sup>40</sup> Husam al-Din kept on performing his duties diligently under the troika's new regime; he even ratified some of Fakhr al-Din's urgent expenditures, for which the new de facto ruler of Egypt was very grateful.<sup>41</sup>

Yet Husam al-Din and his friend Ibn Wasil had all kinds of reasons to suspect that their sultan had died. Ibn Wasil was informed by one of the sons of al-Salih Ayyub's physician that, just before leaving al-Mansura for Cairo, his father had told him that 'the sultan stopped eating and his pulse was fading' and, as such, believed that he must by now be deceased.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, Husam al-Din and Ibn Wasil marvelled at how some of the newly received sultanic edicts from al-Mansura seemed to be outright reversals of al-Salih Ayyub's decisions.<sup>43</sup> It was not long before clear-cut evidence of the forgery was discovered, as they both traced back the imitation of the deceased sultan's signature on a newly issued decree to the handwriting of one of the latter's servants.<sup>44</sup> What was an open secret in the Muslim camp in al-Mansura was now established in Cairo: Sultan al-Salih Ayyub was dead.

To put Fakhr al-Din's mind at ease, Husam al-Din continued to exchange courteous letters with him. Privately, however, he took every possible measure to protect Turanshah's claim to the throne and obstruct Fakhr al-Din's attempt to seize power. In the words of Ibn Wasil, 'so great was his [Husam al-Din's] love for his master al-Malik al-

<sup>36</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 9, 10; Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 69.

<sup>37</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 9. According to Ibn al-Khazraji, prior to that and at the end of the campaign in Syria, Husam al-Din was appointed head of the *halqa* regiments in Syria and Egypt, and in charge all the offices (*dawāwin*), the sultanic pavilion (*al-dahlīz al-sultānī*) and the sultanic coffers; refer to Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 164v.

<sup>38</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 10. Some overlap in this paragraph with Part I (see note 1 above) is inevitable.

<sup>39</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 14 and 56; while in Cairo, Husam al-Din was regularly informed about the battles. This near-instant access to information from the frontline increases the credibility of Ibn Wasil's references to this crusade.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 38, 39; Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 170v. See Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 125, 126.

<sup>41</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 170v-171r.

<sup>42</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 40.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 42, 43.

Ṣāliḥ [Ayyub] that he could not bear to witness the kingship slip away from his line'.<sup>45</sup> Husam al-Din acted against the explicit wish of his erstwhile lord and sent one of his trusted *mamlūks* to hasten Turanshah's return to Egypt, warning him: 'if you are late, all will be lost and Fakhr al-Dīn will gain full control of the realm and may even appoint your cousin al-Malik al-Muḡīth ibn al-Malik al-ʿĀdil [II] to the throne'.<sup>46</sup> Ibn Wasil had heard rumours that Fakhr al-Din intended to rule in the name of this puppet Ayyubid prince. Based on these rumours, Husam al-Din apprehended Turanshah's young cousin in the citadel of Cairo as a precaution.<sup>47</sup> It mattered little whether Husam al-Din acted out of sincere loyalty to al-Salih Ayyub's house or simply to hamper Fakhr al-Din's dreams, but his quick actions turned Turanshah into the only legitimate sultan of Egypt and Damascus.

Turanshah's journey to Cairo proved both perilous and formative for his brief rule. Throughout this voyage, which some expected him not to survive, the new sultan strove to gain loyalty and started appointing his close followers to the sultanate's senior posts while making fatal mistakes along the way.<sup>48</sup> On 11 Ramadan 647/ 18 December 1249, Turanshah left Hisn Kayfa for Cairo with a retinue of fifty of his close aides, travelling through the safe territories of the caliph of Baghdad to avoid the patrols of Mosul and Aleppo which were on the lookout for him.<sup>49</sup> Turanshah, who nearly died of thirst during this journey, vowed to grant Alexandria to *amir* Aqtay (Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy d. 652/1254), a promise that he later reneged on and would cost him dearly, as shall be discussed below.<sup>50</sup> On 27 Ramadan 647/ 3 January 1250, the new sultan reached Damascus where he was greeted like a conqueror. Turanshah lingered there, buying loyalties and squandering over 300,000 dinars from Damascus's treasury on lavish gifts to his own followers and his father's *amirs*, so much so that he had to request more funds from al-Karak to cover his expenses.<sup>51</sup> In addition to his companions from Hisn Kayfa, the vice-regent of Damascus and some Kurdish *amirs*, the beneficiaries of Turanshah's generosity included Ibn Hashish (Ibn Ḥashīsh), the Christian head of his chancery, who, it was said, held sway over the sultan (*ghālib ʿalā amrihi*).<sup>52</sup> Turanshah announced the latter's conversion to Islam, renaming him Muʿīn al-Dīn after al-Salih Ayyub's renowned vizier and Fakhr al-Din's brother – thus signalling his intention to appoint Ibn Hashish as his vizier.<sup>53</sup> With news of the retinue's safe arrival in Damascus reaching Cairo, al-Salih Ayyub's death was announced and Turanshah's sultanate was proclaimed publicly on Wednesday 4 Shawwal 647/ 10 January 1250.<sup>54</sup>

The new sultan's beginnings in Egypt were promising. Turanshah's arrival brought a much-needed sense of unity and, unlike his father, he seemed to personify the erudite Ayyubid leader who blossomed in the company of scholars. In his younger days, Turanshah was favoured by Sultan al-Kamil who enjoyed the presence of his grandchild in his

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 44, 45. Likewise, Shajar al-Durr and *tawashi* Jamal al-Din dispatched *amir* Aqtay, the leader of the *Bahriyya* Mamluk regiment, to escort Turanshah from Hisn Kayfa.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 44, 46, 47, 50; Turanshah left Hisn Kayfa on 12 Ramadan 647/ 19 December 1249.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 46, 47 and 50; see Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 140 and 142.

<sup>50</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 46. See Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 408 and 417, and Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 151.

<sup>51</sup>Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 408; Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 171r.

<sup>52</sup>See Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 46; Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 171r. Ibn Ḥashīsh was from Egypt.

<sup>53</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 53.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 52.



council for his intelligence, scholarly interests, and ability to compose Arabic poetry and engage in discussions with scholars and, in some cases, surpass them.<sup>55</sup> These erudite inclinations were also known to Husam al-Din since the time he was Turanshah's *atabak*; as such, he promised Ibn Wasil that he would introduce him to the new sultan as soon as he reached Egypt because, 'unlike his father', he showed an interest in knowledge and learning.<sup>56</sup> Ibn Wasil's opportunity soon arose; he set out with Husam al-Din to greet the sultan as he approached Cairo. Grateful for his loyalty, Turanshah asked Husam al-Din to ride on his right hand side as a sign of honour and, moreover, bestowed on him a robe of honour, a mare, a gilded saddle and sword, and 3,000 dinars.<sup>57</sup> Afterwards, Ibn Wasil was introduced by his friend to the sultan and joined the latter's council where he engaged in lively discussions on Arabic philosophical theology (*kalām*), jurisprudence, poetry, and literature that left him admiring Turanshah's erudition.<sup>58</sup> Following a short stay in Cairo, the sultan went to al-Mansura to join his father's army and Mamluks.<sup>59</sup> The Muslim camp now buzzed with members of the military and civilian elites and leading religious scholars who came to offer their support and allegiance to the new sultan.<sup>60</sup> As for Husam al-Din, he returned content from al-Mansura to Cairo after being confirmed in his role of vice-regent, followed by Ibn Wasil who intended upon his return to dedicate a book to the sultan.<sup>61</sup> For now, Turanshah's reign seemed secure, harmony returned to the Muslims and, once again, the sultanate table was headed by an Ayyubid sultan.

This ostensible unity in the Muslim camp further complicated Louis IX's untenable military situation. Still encamped on the outskirts of al-Mansura, the Frankish army was suffering on land and, more devastatingly, losing the naval battle at the Nile.<sup>62</sup> Disease and continuous attrition by Muslim ground forces were already taking their toll on Louis IX's army as recounted by Frankish and Arabic sources.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, provisions were dwindling and exorbitantly priced in the Frankish camp, a situation that was compounded by a series of river battles that showed a growing Muslim confidence.<sup>64</sup> In a stunning move that reflected their profound knowledge of the Nile, the Egyptians dismantled a number of light ships and carried them on camels to a location further north on the Damietta branch of the river. From there, they set out to ambush Frankish ships sailing upstream from Damietta and, together with other Muslim ships coming downstream from al-Mansura, nearly severed all of Louis IX's supply lines. For the

---

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 34.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 46 and 59.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 59–61. According to Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v., a gift of 5,000 dinars was bestowed on Husam al-Din.

<sup>58</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 61, 62. When Ibn Wasil expressed his admiration for Turanshah, Husam al-Din responded, 'I told you so'. See page 64 in the same source for more on the scholarly discussions that took place in Turanshah's council.

<sup>59</sup>Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 146; Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 73.

<sup>60</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 63.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 63, 64 and 66.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 65, 66. For more on these clashes, see Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 146, 147 and Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 73, 74.

<sup>63</sup>In addition to Joinville, the following two Frankish sources provide valuable information: Louis IX's letter from Outremer: 'Louis IX to his subjects in France, [before 10] August 1250', in André Du Chesne, ed., *Historiae Francorum scriptores coaetanei ab ipsius gentis origine*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1649), 5: 428–32, in Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 108–114, at 110; and Janet Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century. The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 99 (ch. 65).

<sup>64</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 65, 66. The author witnessed some of this naval action while he was on his way from al-Mansura to Cairo to join Husam al-Din.

first time since his triumphant landing in Damietta, Louis IX was compelled to pursue a truce with the Muslims.

Muslim sources confirm that after the Frankish naval setbacks there were attempts at negotiation. While they differ on Turanshah's motivation for contemplating an agreement with Louis IX, these sources concur that any Muslim-Frankish discussions were within the framework of al-Kamil and Frederick II's old formula of ceding Jerusalem in return for peace. Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī reported that the Franks sought a truce modelled along the 'agreement concluded between them and Sultan al-Kamil'.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, Ibn Wāsil recounted that the Franks wrote to the Muslims to seek a truce following the latter's naval victories on the Nile.<sup>66</sup> The chief judge and a senior Muslim *amir* received a delegation of Frankish emissaries.<sup>67</sup> The Franks offered to return Damietta in exchange for Jerusalem and other coastal holdings (in Palestine and Syria), but their request was swiftly dismissed as the Egyptians were evidently aware of the dire conditions in the Frankish camp.<sup>68</sup> By contrast, Ibn al-Khazraji related that Turanshah considered a truce with Louis IX so that he could concentrate on consolidating his rule and eliminating his father's leading *amirs*.<sup>69</sup> When Turanshah received the Frankish envoys, he proposed his grandfather's formula, Jerusalem in return of Damietta, but Louis IX requested instead that the Muslims forfeit 'all the lands conquered by Saladin'.<sup>70</sup> Such an unreasonable demand was well beyond the power of any Ayyubid sultan of Egypt. At any rate, the three contemporary accounts show that, in a new turn of events, Louis IX was now willing to concede to Turanshah what he had previously denied al-Salih Ayyub and Frederick II.

Left with a diplomatic and military impasse, Louis IX decided to retreat to Damietta. On Tuesday 1 Muharram 648/ 5 April 1250, his army began a disastrous withdrawal that culminated in a crushing defeat at the battle of Faraskur. The Franks had been in control of two camps that were separated by the Sea of Ashmum (Baḥr Ashmūm):<sup>71</sup> a well-fortified camp on the northern bank and Jadila (Jadīla), previously a Muslim camp located in the outskirts of al-Mansura.<sup>72</sup> Two weeks earlier, the bulk of Louis IX's army successfully crossed to the northern bank<sup>73</sup> and, four days before their retreat, the Franks set fire to both camps and prepared their ships to sail.<sup>74</sup> In the rush to flee on the night of the retreat, the Frankish rear-guard that remained in Jadila forgot to set light to 'a great bridge of ships made from pine tree wood' that connected the two

<sup>65</sup>Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'at al-zamān*, 412.

<sup>66</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 66, 67.

<sup>67</sup>Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 149–151 [301, 302]. The Muslims seem to have requested keeping Louis IX as a hostage until Damietta was back in their hands.

<sup>68</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 66, 67. Eddé believes the Franks referred to 'Ascalon et la Galilée orientale perdues par les Francs en 1247': Eddé 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 74.

<sup>69</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v–177r. If true, this provides another instance of the above-mentioned 'full integration' of Frankish lordships and crusading campaigns into intra-Ayyubid politics.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 177r.

<sup>71</sup>Subsequently to the battle of al-Mansura on 4 Dhu al-Qa'da 647/ 8 February 1250.

<sup>72</sup>See Part I (see note 1 above), 232 and 234. Ibn al-Khazraji says that after crossing the bridge, Muslim soldiers reached the Frankish camp where the tents were still intact and some Franks were still present, which could suggest that the fire was started in the camp of Jadila: Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177r.

<sup>73</sup>Before Tuesday 22 March 1250 according to Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 147 [294, 295].

<sup>74</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 69; a stealthy withdrawal must have been impossible owing to the proximity of the two armies and the flat terrain. For more details, see Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 146–9, and Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 74.

camps across the Sea of Ashmum.<sup>75</sup> Alerted by the fires and commotion, the Egyptian army immediately crossed to the north bank using the abandoned bridge and started chasing the Franks. It was not long before the Muslim vanguard caught up with the core of Louis IX's army, which was on a slow, northward, nocturnal retreat, marching in parallel to the Frankish fleet, which was sailing downstream on the Damietta branch of the Nile hoping to go unnoticed under the cover of night. The Muslim army immediately pressed the retreating crusader column (which stretched for kilometres) hard against the Nile.<sup>76</sup> Throughout what must have been a long night for the Franks, the vulnerable column was subjected to wave after wave of attacks carried out by Mamluk regiments, *halqa* troops, regular cavalymen and soldiers, volunteers, and Bedouins. The outcome of the battle on the Nile was no different from the one raging on the ground, the Frankish fleet was thoroughly overpowered by its Egyptian counterpart, depriving the crusaders of an alternative escape route.<sup>77</sup> By the morning of Wednesday 2 Muharram 648/ 6 April 1250, Louis IX's army was completely routed and nearly all its soldiers killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. The Muslim victory was decisive, a letter sent by Sultan Turanshah to his vice-regent in Damascus put the number of killed Franks at 30,000 'not including those who threw themselves into the depths [of the Nile]'.<sup>78</sup> Ibn Wasil related that, throughout the battle of Faraskur, al-Salih Ayyub's Mamluks held 'highest the glass [of victory], and the best chances [of winning]'.<sup>79</sup> Once more, Louis IX's ill-judged decisions gifted the Mamluks an occasion to distinguish themselves and lead the Egyptian army to victory.

Louis IX's life was spared after surrendering to the Muslims. He was captured in the village of Munyat Abi 'Abdallah, just north of Sharmsah (Sharmsāh) and south of Faraskur.<sup>80</sup> Ibn Wasil related that Louis IX and his close aides had withdrawn to a hill in this village where the king received *tawashi* Jamal al-Din Muhsin, who granted him safe-conduct.<sup>81</sup> This account is confirmed by Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī who mentions that Louis IX retreated to the 'Munya' where he sent to Sultan Turanshah asking for quarter.<sup>82</sup> Ibn al-Khazraji described Louis IX's capitulation as follows:

<sup>75</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177r. See Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 74.

<sup>76</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177v; Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 69, 70.

<sup>77</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177r.

<sup>78</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 69; Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 412. Sibṭ estimates the number at 100,000, but then relates that Turanshah's letter put the number at 30,000.

<sup>79</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 69, 70. This is correctly translated by Jackson as the 'mamluks had the decisive influence and the largest role'; see Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 148.

<sup>80</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177v; Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 70; Munyat Abi 'Abdallah or simply Munyat 'Abdallah. It is highly likely that the village is called now Mit al-Khouly 'Abdallah (pronounced Mit al-Khouly 'Abdilla by its inhabitants), nearly an hour's walk of 4.5 km from Sharmsah. According to a rough estimate, the distance between al-Mansura and the location where Louis IX was captured is thus over 28 kilometres or a 6- to 8-hour walk. This calculation is for indicative purposes only: the landscape has changed, and it is likely that some of the canals have shifted or disappeared and new ones emerged. Moreover, the speed of one person on a hike cannot be compared to the movement of an army on a nocturnal retreat. To identify all geographical locations of relevance to this crusade I greatly benefitted from the following works: Muḥammad Muṣṭafa Ziyāda, *Ḥamlat Lūwīs al-Tāsi' 'alā Miṣr wa-Hazimatuhu fī al-Manṣūra* (Cairo: al-Majlis al-'Alā li-Ri'āyat al-Funūn wa-al-Adab wa-al-'Ulūm al-Ijtimā'iyah, 1961); and Edwin John Davis, *The Invasion of Egypt in A.D. 1249 (A.H. 647) by Louis IX of France (St. Louis), and a History of the Contemporary Sultans of Egypt* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Co., 1897). Furthermore, I am very grateful to Isma'il Ghuzzi, curator of the Mansura National Museum, who provided valuable guidance on some of these locations. A final remark in this lengthy footnote: in line with the methodology stated above, I will not treat a variety of claims made by later sources on the circumstances of Louis IX's surrender and his alleged attempts to escape in disguise in the present study.

<sup>81</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 70.

<sup>82</sup>Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 413. See Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 74.

When al-Firansī realised that he was defeated and overpowered and knew that his situation was futile and there was no escape for him, he withdrew to a residence in [the village of] Munyat Abī ‘Abdallah in the company of 500 courageous Frankish knights. He asked for *ṭawāshī* Shihāb al-Dīn Rashīd and [*amīr*] Sayf al-Dīn al-Qaymarī, who came to meet him; [Louis IX] asked them for safe passage (*amān*) for him and those who were in his company and requested that he was not to be paraded among the mob and rabble, which they accorded him. He [Louis IX] and those who were in his [close] company were handed over to the Muslims.<sup>83</sup>

The safety granted to Louis IX upon his capitulation did not extend to the Frankish soldiers who were in Munyat Abī ‘Abdallah defending their king. As soon as Louis IX surrendered, the Franks hastily tried to force their way out of the village in groups, but were all killed by the surrounding Muslim forces, with the exception of two knights who managed to break through Muslim lines and escape only to drown while trying to cross the Nile.<sup>84</sup> This account therefore suggests that Louis IX abandoned his soldiers and was only concerned with his own safety and that of his close entourage and, additionally, his personal pride. Ibn al-Khazrajī’s account conflicts on this point with those by later Muslim sources that acknowledge Louis IX’s courage. For instance, later Mamluk historian al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) related (on the authority of Sa’d al-Dīn ibn Hamawiyya’s lost chronicle), ‘Should the Frenchman [Louis IX] have wanted to, he could have saved himself by escaping on a fast horse or a boat, but he remained in the rear-guard (*al-sāqa*) protecting his followers.’<sup>85</sup> Be that as it may, the French king was now Turanshah’s prisoner; he was swiftly transported by mule to the Nile where he boarded a fast ship to al-Mansura amid pomp and ceremony as crowds of people on both banks celebrated the victory.<sup>86</sup>

Louis IX was treated courteously, and the conditions of his captivity seem to have been more than adequate for his comfort.<sup>87</sup> The sultan recognised the value of holding his royal captive and treated him accordingly. Turanshah said in the aforesaid letter addressed to the vice-regent in Damascus that he ‘safeguarded, greeted and honoured’ the French king.<sup>88</sup> As a sign of his esteem, the sultan appointed to Louis IX’s service his trusted *tawāshī* Sabih (Ṣabīḥ al-Mu‘azzamī) who had accompanied him from Hisn Kayfa and had only recently been promoted to a high-ranking role.<sup>89</sup> Louis IX was held in al-Mansura in the residence of the influential chancery secretary Fakhr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Luqmān (d. 693/1293) and was later relocated to the sultan’s camp in

<sup>83</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177v; Eddé, ‘Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade’, 74, 75; Cecilia Gaposchkin, ‘The Captivity of Louis IX’, *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 18 (2013): 85–114, at 95.

<sup>84</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177v.

<sup>85</sup>al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, 47: 50. This account is on the authority of the contemporary historian to the crusade Sa’d al-Dīn ibn Hamawiyya (d. 674/1276). See Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 160; Claude Cahen, ‘Une source pour l’histoire ayyūbide: Les mémoires de Sa’d al-Dīn ibn Hamawiyya Djuwaynī’, in *Les peuples musulmans dans l’histoire médiévale* (Damascus: Presses de l’Ifpo, 1977), 457–82, in 467–82 (first printed in the *Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg*, 7 (1950): 320–37); and El-Merheb, ‘Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources’, 294.

<sup>86</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 177v. See Eddé, ‘Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade’, 75.

<sup>87</sup>Anecdotes of mistreatment are absent from the contemporary Muslim sources used in this article but seem to appear in later Mamluk ones, as discussed in more detail in El-Merheb, ‘Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources’. For more on Louis IX’s captivity, see Megan Cassidy-Welch, ‘Imprisonment and Freedom in the Life of Louis IX,’ in *Imprisonment in the Medieval Religious Imagination*, c. 1150–1400 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101–23; William Chester Jordan, ‘*Etiā Reges, Even Kings*’, *Speculum* 90, no. 3 (2015): 613–34; and especially Gaposchkin, ‘The Captivity of Louis IX’ (the last article covers Arabic sources as well as Frankish ones).

<sup>88</sup>Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir’āt al-zamān*, 413.

<sup>89</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 70; for a discussion on the role of *ṭawāshī* Sabīḥ al-Mu‘azzamī see El-Merheb, ‘Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources’, 297, 298.

Faraskur.<sup>90</sup> Throughout the period of captivity, the Muslims entrusted Louis IX's security to the senior officers of the *halqa* and took every possible measure to accommodate him:

[they] arranged for him to choose all the food, beverages, singers and musical instruments he desired and gave him leave to keep in his company whomever he selected from amongst his singers, brothers, and servants and whomever he preferred for his close companionship, and [they] greatly honoured him.<sup>91</sup>

This gallantry was even extended to personal gestures from Turanshah, who bestowed fifty robes of honour on the French king and 'other [Frankish] kings and counts' held in Muslim captivity. However, Louis IX objected to wearing them, fearing it could be interpreted as a sign of submission to the sultan, 'my lands are as great as those of the king of Egypt, how can I consent to wearing his robe?'<sup>92</sup> Moreover, Louis IX declined an invitation to a sultanic banquet, claiming that he had only been invited so that Turanshah's soldiers could ridicule him.

Although some contemporary Arabic sources were appalled by Louis IX's dismissive response to the Ayyubid sultan's courtesy, they were far from surprised.<sup>93</sup> They fully realised that the French king was stalling to avoid returning Damietta to the Egyptians. Ibn al-Khazraji recounted that whenever the Muslims demanded the surrender of the city in exchange for his release, Louis IX would contrive all sorts of excuses, claiming that he personally favoured such an arrangement but the decision was beyond his control.<sup>94</sup> Similarly, Ibn Wasil complained that following the victory at Faraskur Turanshah was 'indolent' (*mutarākhī*) and, moreover, mishandled (*sū' al-tadbīr*) the matter of Damietta because, had he immediately forced Louis IX to cede the city, the latter would have yielded straight away.<sup>95</sup> Unlike Joinville's *Vie de Saint Louis*,<sup>96</sup> contemporary Arabic sources did not elaborate on the discussions that took place between Turanshah and Louis IX; nonetheless three conclusions can be drawn from them: (1) that such negotiations did take place and were centred on the release of the Frankish captives in return for Damietta and the payment of a ransom; (2) that Turanshah preferred the conclusion of a truce to further military action even though the Franks of Damietta were too weak to field any serious resistance to the Muslim army; and (3) that, by trying to avoid abandoning Damietta, Louis IX displayed another instance of obstinacy and miscalculation by missing an early and tangible opportunity to redeem himself and what remained of his army.

For a very brief period, Turanshah was on the verge of consolidating his power. This was largely owing to Louis IX, who unintentionally helped his cause, but also because the

<sup>90</sup>As will be discussed below, 18.

<sup>91</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 178r.

<sup>92</sup>Al-Dhahabi, *Tārikh al-Islām*, 51. See Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 160. According to Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 199 [403], after his release and on his way to Acre, Louis IX wore the clothes that had been gifted to him by the sultan.

<sup>93</sup>This article outlines overlooked aspects of the narrative of this crusade based upon contemporaneous Arabic sources and how their authors historically documented these events. This perspective has received less attention as focus has traditionally been placed upon the Latin and Old French source materials. The discussion of Louis IX's 'insolence' and 'intransigence' is developed based on how the Arabic sources used in this article interpreted his actions and positions while in captivity. Some sources, such as Ibn Wasil, clearly demonstrate authorial agency in their accounts. I hope to be able to consider this point in greater detail in a more comprehensive study of these accounts and address the jarring juxtaposition of this depiction of Louis IX with the Latin sources' interpretation by studying how the timing and refusals mentioned in Arabic sources are supported or contradicted by Frankish ones.

<sup>94</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 179r.

<sup>95</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 72.

<sup>96</sup>For more on negotiations during Louis IX's captivity, see Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 165–9 [335–44].

battle of al-Mansura was a threefold success for Turanshah. Firstly, Louis IX's opening favour to the new sultan was ridding him of Fakhr al-Din, the main internal threat to his inheritance. Turanshah's main contestant was eliminated and his father's army inflicted a conclusive defeat on the crusaders. Secondly, Louis IX's advance towards Cairo identified Turanshah with the Egyptian resistance against the invading Frankish army and allowed him to assume the much-needed role of a legitimate sultan capable of uniting the Muslims. Powerful *amirs*, members of the civilian elite, and influential religious scholars flocked to Turanshah's camp in al-Mansura, including the renowned jurist 'Izz al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), who was the leading figure of the Shafi'i legal school and the 'legitimizing authority' in Egypt and Syria.<sup>97</sup> Thirdly, Louis IX's humiliating defeat allowed Turanshah to bolster his legitimacy and image among his subjects.<sup>98</sup> Notwithstanding the Mamluk regiment's prominent role at the battle of Faraskur, Turanshah had every right to claim the victory since it was – after all – his and al-Salih Ayyub's army that had defeated the Franks. In his letter to his vice-regent in Damascus, Turanshah boasted about his great victory over Louis IX, 'the enemy of [our] religion' whose 'evil had taken hold of the people of these lands, parents and children alike'.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, Louis IX's regalia, including his mantle, were paraded in the streets of Damascus to highlight the extent of the sultan's triumph.<sup>100</sup>

Now that Louis IX was his captive, the conclusion of a peace agreement with the Franks made perfect sense from Turanshah's standpoint. Such a deal would have allowed him to regain Damietta, avoid unnecessary losses to his army, and secure the payment of a ransom to refill the depleted treasury following the costly war and his own extravagance on his way from Hisn Kayfa to Cairo. As mentioned above, the new sultan could then focus on eliminating his father's Mamluks and other leading military and administrative figures from amongst the Ṣāliḥī *amirs* (i.e. those of al-Salih Ayyub).<sup>101</sup> The wheels of this plan were set in motion.

Yet Turanshah's false sense of security resulted in errors, and it quickly became clear that his provincial experience in Hisn Kayfa was insufficient to govern Egypt. Emboldened by the victories over the Franks and overly eager to appoint members of his northern Mesopotamian entourage to the main offices of the sultanate, Turanshah quickly made powerful and dangerous enemies. He appointed his close followers to the chief judgeship, vice-regency in Cairo, vizierate, and other leading military and administrative posts, many of whom were from the personal retinue that he brought with him from Hisn Kayfa, thus excluding seasoned Salihī *amirs* and officials.<sup>102</sup> Most of his new appointees were unsuitable for their roles and some were even regarded in Egypt as repulsive characters (*arādhil*).<sup>103</sup> Besides, Turanshah failed to command respect because he was increasingly seen as 'lacking prestige and mischievous' and reckless

<sup>97</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 63. For more on this scholar being the legitimating authority in Egypt and Syria, see Sherman A. Jackson, *Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfi* (New York: Brill, 1996), 10; El-Merheb, *Political Thought in the Mamluk Period*, 179, 181, 182, 186, 187. Ibn 'Abd al-Salam is the same jurist who rejected Husam al-Din's testimony at court for being too close to al-Salih Ayyub: above, 3.

<sup>98</sup>Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, *Mir'at al-zamān*, 416. Turanshah's subjects initially rejoiced at his arrival (*tayammanū wa istabsharū*).

<sup>99</sup>Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, *Mir'at al-zamān*, 412.

<sup>100</sup>As mentioned by some later Mamluk sources: see El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 297; Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 95.

<sup>101</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v, 177r.

<sup>102</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 70–3; Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176r–177v and 179r.

<sup>103</sup>Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, *Mir'at al-zamān*, 417.

and thoughtless (*kāna fihi naw' khiffa*), since he had affronted nearly all of his father's senior aides, *amirs*, and administrators.<sup>104</sup> As soon as he reached al-Mansura, the ungrateful new sultan also antagonised the officers of the *Bahriyya* Mamluks and *halqa* regiments with his parsimony despite their eminent role in defeating Louis IX's army; some sources lamented that instead of easily enlisting them as firm supporters of his rule given their loyal service to his father, Turanshah turned them into his sworn enemies.<sup>105</sup> Most dangerously, he deceived Aqtay, the ruthless leader of the *Bahriyya*, by failing to deliver on the promise he made during their joint journey from Hisn Kayfa to grant him Alexandria.<sup>106</sup> To make matters worse, rumours circulated in the Muslim camp that Turanshah was planning to kill Aqtay by sending him on a perilous trip to Mosul.<sup>107</sup> It was also said that whenever the sultan was intoxicated he would cut the top of a bundle of candles with his sword shouting, 'so I shall do to the *Bahriyya*'.<sup>108</sup> The Mamluks now feared that the sultan would not spare them.

Turanshah's chain of fatal errors intensified. He dismissed Husam al-Din, who had striven so exceptionally and loyally to preserve the throne of Egypt for him. Husam al-Din was summoned to Faraskur, where he was discharged from his post of vice-regent in Cairo and denied a private audience with the sultan.<sup>109</sup> Before travelling to Faraskur, Husam al-Din, completely disillusioned with Turanshah, prophesied to Ibn Wasil that the new sultan would soon die: 'mark my words, this boy [...] will suffer the same fate as his uncle', referring to al-ʿĀdil II (r. 635/1238-637/1240) who failed to retain his rule in Egypt.<sup>110</sup> Once in Turanshah's camp, Husam al-Din was received discourteously, the sultan would only meet him at the public banquet (*simāt*) and never sought his counsel in private.<sup>111</sup> This could not have come as a complete surprise to Husam al-Din, as he is said to have remarked after receiving Turanshah on the outskirts of Cairo:

I greeted him after his journey [from Hisn Kayfa] and was jubilant to meet him, but as soon as we conversed my happiness turned to sorrow, he had little wisdom, and I knew [...] that he would never rule Egypt.<sup>112</sup>

In line with his treatment of Husam al-Din, the sultan dismissed some of the most trustworthy Salihi commanders including Qaymari *amirs* and highly experienced administrators and judges, and even wrote threatening letters to Shajar al-Durr in Cairo requesting that she repay coinage and jewels, thus depriving himself of the support of his father's entourage.<sup>113</sup> A major backlash loomed in the Muslim camp. Turanshah had chosen

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 416, and Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v.

<sup>105</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 62. See Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176r. for more on Turanshah antagonizing the *halqa*.

<sup>106</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 73.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 74 and 75. Turanshah furthermore offended Baybars' master, imprisoned him and confiscated his *mamlūks*, including Baybars – who later reigned as Mamluk sultan al-Zāhir Baybars (r. 658/1260-676/1277).

<sup>108</sup>Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 416.

<sup>109</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 72, 73; Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v.

<sup>110</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 72–74.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 73.

<sup>112</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176r.

<sup>113</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 73; Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 176v, 179r. There is a telling account in Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417: Turanshah threatened Shajar al-Durr and asked her to return money and jewels, so 'she wrote' to the *amirs*. A later author is more overt in his accusation, as he claims that Shajar al-Durr incited the *amirs* to kill Turanshah; see Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi' al-ghurar*, 9 vols (Cairo: Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, 1960), 7: 382.

to antagonise Husam al-Din, his most powerful, seasoned and loyal commander, at the worst time.

Husam al-Din's prophecy was fulfilled on Monday 28 Muharram 648/ 2 May 1250: the sultan was killed by his father's Mamluks.<sup>114</sup> Contemporary Arabic sources generally agree on the main circumstances of Turanshah's assassination as detailed in Ibn Wasil's narrative, which depicts a plot carried out by the *Bahriyya*.<sup>115</sup> Following one of the sultanic banquets, Turanshah was retiring to his private quarters in the main pavilion when suddenly Baybars (r. 658/1260-676/1277) struck him with his sword, but only wounded him slightly.<sup>116</sup> The assailant panicked and ran away. In the commotion that followed, many rushed to the aid of their sultan. When it was suggested that an Isma'ili (Ismā'īlī) assassin might have been behind the attempt on his life, Turanshah responded furiously 'no, it was nobody else but the *Bahriyya*!'<sup>117</sup> With this accusation made publicly by the sultan, the Mamluks now feared for their lives and were forced to press on with their designs.<sup>118</sup> They attacked Turanshah, who fled to a wooden tower that stood beside the sultanic pavilion where a physician attended to his wound. Led by Aqtay, swords drawn, and determined to finish off their sultan, the Mamluks surrounded the tower and threatened to set it alight. Watching all this from the windows of the tower, Turanshah implored his *amirs* and followers for help to no avail: the reckless sultan had already alienated most of them while the few remaining loyal ones refrained from intervening because they feared the redoubtable *Bahriyya* regiment. As soon as Husam al-Din and the Qaymariyya *amirs* were informed of the developing situation, they rode with their companies towards the main camp, but the Mamluks sent messengers informing them that the sultan was already dead and, as such, it was needless to spark internal strife that would 'bring about the end of Islam'.<sup>119</sup> Similarly, the intercessions of the caliph's envoy, who was present at the camp in Faraskur, were futile: he was threatened and asked to confine himself to his tent. When the sultan's music band tried to mobilise the *halqa* soldiers by beating their drums, they were also threatened and forced to stop. Realising that there was no help in sight, Turanshah agreed to descend from the tower after receiving assurances from Aqtay. The sultan implored him, 'I promised to grant you Alexandria, I stand by my promise, I shall grant you whatever you wish,' but it was too little too late as Aqtay did not trust a word he said.<sup>120</sup> In a final desperate move, Turanshah rushed towards the Nile trying to reach a ship, but Baybars followed and with his sword dealt him a deadly blow.<sup>121</sup> Ibn Wasil relates that the sultan's corpse lay outside where it fell for two days until some Sufi mendicants (*faqīrs*) ventured to carry it to the western bank of the Nile and bury it.<sup>122</sup> According to this prevalent

<sup>114</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 74–9. The date of the coup is different in Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417, 418.

<sup>115</sup>The events follow the narrative of Ibn Wasil, *Die Chronik*, 64, 74–9. Ibn Wasil was on his way to dedicating two books on astronomy and history to Turanshah. After spending the night in one of Husam al-Din's villages, he had to turn back to Cairo after news of the assassination reached him from a Kurdish soldier who was escaping for Cairo.

<sup>116</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 75–7. See Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 151. The assailant is referred to as 'some of the *Bahriyya*' in Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417, and as an 'unknown assailant' in Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 170r.

<sup>117</sup>I benefit here from the translation in English in Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 151.

<sup>118</sup>Purportedly, Turanshah vowed to kill all the Mamluks; see Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417.

<sup>119</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 76.

<sup>120</sup>*Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>121</sup>Turanshah was killed by archers and sword blows in another account: see to Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417.

<sup>122</sup>According to Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, Turanshah's corpse was left outdoors for three days and was only buried following the intercession of the caliph's envoy: see *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417.



version of events, Husam al-Din and the other Salihi and ‘free’ *amirs* were unable to help Turanshah.<sup>123</sup>

The plot may, however, have been more intricate than a mere assassination carried out by the Mamluks. Ibn al-Khazraji’s history suggests a well-organised, multipartite coup that involved anonymous powerful accomplices.<sup>124</sup> The coup was supposedly master-minded by ‘twenty-three conspirators’ including some of the *Bahriyya* Mamluks led by Aqtay and other Salihi *mamlūks* and *amirs* such as ‘Izz al-Din Aybak (r. 648/1250-655/1257, al-Malik al-Mu‘izz ‘Izz al-Din Aybak al-Turkmānī al-Şāliḥī) and further unnamed yet seemingly influential individuals from al-Salih Ayyub’s entourage.<sup>125</sup> According to this account, when the Mamluks surrounded the tower and started firing arrows at the sultan, the regular soldiers became agitated and began mobilising for combat, but the sergeants of the *halqa* calmed them down saying ‘this [the attempt on the sultan’s life and the ongoing besieging of the tower] is for the best’.<sup>126</sup> The Salihi *amirs*, including Sayf al-Din al-Qaymari, *tawashi* Baha’ al-Din Rashid, and the leaders of the *halqa* rode to Husam al-Din’s headquarters, which was located on the right flank of the army (*maymana*), to deliberate on their response. However, Husam al-Din did not show any enthusiasm or zeal (*himma*, *ḥamiyya*) to aid his sultan. Seeing the ‘negligence’ (*tahāwun*) of the army’s leading *amirs*, it became clear to everyone in Faraskur that Turanshah’s fate was sealed. The commanders of the *Bahriyya* seized on this apathy and decided to kill the sultan ‘in agreement’ with the above-mentioned, twenty-three conspirators.<sup>127</sup> When the *Bahriyya* set fire to the tower, Turanshah screamed:

By God, be compassionate to me, take this realm to yourselves, send me back naked to where I came from [Hisn Kayfa]! O soldiers of the *ḥalqa*! O Ḥusām al-Dīn! O Sayf al-Dīn al-Qaymarī! O *ṭawāshī* Bahā’ al-Dīn Rashīd! ...

but not a single person answered his pleadings and the onlookers stood watching like ‘dead statues’.<sup>128</sup> Only a handful of religious scholars had the courage to defy the Mamluks:

You call yourselves Muslims? His [Turanshah’s] safety was entrusted to you! He is your master and son of your master! Have you no fear of God? Have you no honour? What will be said throughout the lands about your deeds today? [...].

The *Bahriyya* ignored their protests and killed Turanshah claiming that this was to everyone’s benefit as he intended to eliminate all his father’s Mamluks and Salihi *amirs*.<sup>129</sup>

Against the backdrop of this alleged widespread collusion, it is Husam al-Din’s reaction to the ongoing coup that warrants close scrutiny. His alleged inability to rescue Turanshah was perplexing since he was an effective commander in the Ayyubid army, the ex-

<sup>123</sup>Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 171–5 [348–353]. Notwithstanding some inaccuracies, Joinville is well informed about the coup and the motivation of the conspirators, and his account is not drastically different from that of the main Muslim sources. A comparison between Frankish and Muslim accounts of the coup warrants a dedicated study.

<sup>124</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 179r-v and 180r.

<sup>125</sup>Qutuz (r. 1259/657–658/1260) was allegedly Aybak’s contact with the conspirators; in Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 179r.

<sup>126</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 179r-v.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., 179v.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., 179v-180r.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., 180r.

leader of the *halqa* regiments, and still had at his disposal a significant cavalry force. Likewise, his military encampment was not that far from the sultan's pavilion. Although it is unclear whether Husam al-Din and the above-mentioned Salihī *amirs* were present in person at the main camp during the siege of the tower, they were evidently not surprised by this turn of events and, more crucially, did not lift a finger to save their sultan.

Very quickly, the Salihī *amirs* and *Bahriyya* Mamluks arrived at a power-sharing scheme. The depth and ease of their arrangement could only have emanated from a meticulously planned coup, a joint coup one might even suspect. The new ruling junta swiftly settled on 'lady' (*al-sitt*) Shajar al-Durr as the new sultan (*fa takūn al-sultān*) because, in their own words, 'she was the wife of our master [al-Salih Ayyub] and administered his realm, he kept no secrets from her.'<sup>130</sup> According to Ibn al-Khazraji's account, the Mamluks first offered the role of Shajar al-Durr's 'administrator' (*mudabbiran lahā*) to *tawashi* Baha' al-Din Rashid, who declined.<sup>131</sup> They next offered it to Aybak who accepted the responsibility and, accordingly, made everyone take an oath of allegiance to him. By contrast, Ibn Wasil related that the junta first offered Husam al-Din the *atabak* role for being al-Salih Ayyub's most trusted aid, but he declined.<sup>132</sup> The junta's proposition to Husam al-Din followed their deal struck with Shajar al-Durr on her assuming the sultanate. Ibn Wasil observed that the new sultan(a)'s signature and seal was to appear on every sultan's decree and, moreover, that although Muslim women were known to have effectively ruled kingdoms, citing the contemporaneous case of Aleppo, a woman becoming the formal sultan was a situation that – as far as he could tell – was 'unknown before in Islam'.<sup>133</sup> Subsequently, the *atabak* function was offered to *tawashi* Baha' al-Din Rashid, then to another one of al-Salih Ayyub's senior *amirs*, and finally to Aybak who accepted it.<sup>134</sup>

Comparing the accounts of Ibn Wasil and Ibn al-Khazraji helps elucidate the nature of the Mamluk coup and the ensuing power-sharing deal. It is noteworthy that, in both versions, the proposed names for the roles of sultan and her administrator/*atabak* were all Salihī figures, *amirs* and aides and never from amongst the *Bahriyya* Mamluks. This raises two questions: were other non-Mamluk members of al-Salih Ayyub's entourage, such as Husam al-Din and Shajar al-Durr, also involved in planning the coup and, consequently, did the *Bahriyya* Mamluks consider Shajar al-Durr to be their own representative in the power-sharing arrangement and, as such, regard her as one of them (which, if true, would make her the first Mamluk sultan)? Moreover, based on the list of names of individuals who were offered key roles in the new regime, one can safely speculate on the

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., 180v. Interestingly, this source uses *sultān* instead of *sultāna* for Shajar al-Durr's title.

<sup>131</sup>The offer probably did not entail marrying Shajar al-Durr, perhaps simply because Baha' al-Din Rashid was a *tawashi*.

<sup>132</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 79. The idea of becoming the ruler of Egypt could not have come as a complete surprise to Husam al-Din since Ibn Wasil had already raised this possible eventuality with him. The latter argued that, had al-Salih Ayyub designated a person to run the realm after his death, it would have been Husam al-Din; see Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 41, 42. Humphreys noted that Husam al-Din refused the office 'probably because he realized that even though he was the oldest and most prestigious member of al-Salih Ayyub's entourage, he could not, as a Kurd, command the allegiance of the turbulent mamluk corps': Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 303. Personally, I am more cautious when assessing the relevance of the perceived ethnic differences, especially as Husam al-Din went on to loyally serve the new regime.

<sup>133</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 80. Ibn Wasil cited the recent example of Dayfa Khātūn who was the effective ruler in Aleppo as regent for her grandson. See Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 303, and Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 153, fn. 109 and 110.

<sup>134</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 79.

identities of the conspirators – male and female – from amongst al-Salih Ayyub's entourage who enabled the Mamluk coup against Turanshah.<sup>135</sup>

The timing of the coup was immaculate. The conspirators struck as Turanshah was about to execute his agreement with Louis IX and turn his attention to purging his father's *ancien régime*. On Thursday 24 Muharram 648/ 28 April 1250, Louis IX was moved with his entourage on four galleys from al-Mansura to Faraskur where he was supposed to be freed shortly thereafter as per his deal with Turanshah.<sup>136</sup> While contemporary Arabic sources provide little or no information about the terms of this agreement,<sup>137</sup> they concur that its conclusion would have permitted Turanshah to focus on eradicating his father's entourage: Salihi *amirs*, senior *mamlūks*, administrators, and *Bahriyya* Mamluks.<sup>138</sup> This anticipated purge explains Turanshah's reluctance to attack Damietta after the victory at Faraskur and his – otherwise incomprehensible – dismissal of Husam al-Din, Baha' al-Din Rashid, Sayf al-Din al-Qaymari, 'Izz al-Din al-Qaymari, and other Salihi *amirs* who had been loyal to him. As rumours of his impending move circulated in the Muslim camp, Turanshah failed to see that he was creating the perfect conditions to incubate a coup: summoning a group of his most powerful commanders only to dismiss, mistreat and threaten them; uniting this otherwise disparate group around the mutual fear of being eliminated; and, most dangerously, clustering them far away from Cairo, in a military camp where they were free to hatch and implement their schemes in order to pre-empt the sultan's deal with the Franks. Indeed, this was how the Mamluks justified to the Muslim public the assassination of their legitimate sultan and precisely how Aqtay explained it to Louis IX and Joinville: a pre-emptive strike before the purge.<sup>139</sup> The timing of the coup and the conditions that led to its success were, therefore, strongly shaped by the near implementation of Turanshah's agreement with Louis IX.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>135</sup>Jo Van Steenberghe considered the '*Ṣālihiyya* empowerment' a main feature of the period between 630s/1230s and 640s/1240s and, accordingly, highlighted the continuation of Salihi rule rather than an Ayyubid to Mamluk transition: 'It took about ten years of confronting rivals, rallying supporters, and accumulating human and other resources by various senior members of this post-Ayyūbid Egyptian leadership before this *Ṣālihiyya* rise to power stabilised. In this long process of reshaping Egypt's power elites, a major role was played by such characters as al-Ṣāliḥ's widow and former concubine Shajarat al-Durr (d. 655/1257) and the former *mamlūk amir* Aybak al-Ṣāliḥi (d. 655/1257) ...' Refer to Jo Van Steenberghe, 'The Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo' (2023), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd Edition*, 82. Similarly, the present article contributes to understanding the intricate connections and power hierarchies that existed amongst the various groups within the *Salihyya* including, among others, the *Bahriyya* Mamluks and a variety of Salihi *mamlūks* and *amirs* (free or not), but within the context of an Ayyubid to Mamluk transition.

<sup>136</sup>Louis IX's release was planned for two days later, on Saturday 30 April 1250, but was delayed until 2 May for logistical reasons; see Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 98, 99.

<sup>137</sup>Much of what we know about these negotiations is based on Joinville, Louis IX himself, and other Frankish sources; refer to Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 98. Louis IX was supposed to be released according to the terms detailed in Joinville. On the other hand, Muslim sources are probably silent because Husam al-Din was kept out of the picture by Turanshah and, accordingly, Ibn Wasil had nothing to report about these negotiations.

<sup>138</sup>See fn. 101 above.

<sup>139</sup>For more on how the Mamluks justified the coup to the Muslims, see above, 16. Gaposchkin summarised the Mamluks' explanation as follows: 'Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy justified the assassination to Louis by saying that Tūrān Shāh would have killed Louis and his men regardless of the treaty, and also that Tūrān Shāh had stripped men in his father's service of their rank after his father had died' and, moreover, noted that 'Tūrān Shāh may have wanted the French expelled and the affair wrapped up as quickly as possible so that he could get on with the business of consolidating his authority in Cairo'; see Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 98, 99 and 100.

<sup>140</sup>Aqtay's intentions merit a dedicated study (this applies also to Aybak, Shajar al-Durr and other Salihi *amirs* and Mamluks). This important question has already been raised by Gaposchkin in 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 100: 'What exactly Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy wanted from Louis at this moment is unclear. Perhaps nothing beyond exercising his newly acquired control of the situation.' Likewise, money may have been a motivation, since Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi (and some later Arabic sources) related that Aqtay and the Mamluks were only interested in the ransom money and that

The Muslim sultan was not the only one to misjudge the situation. Similarly, Louis IX's decisions led him straight to the centre of the unfolding events in the Muslim camp. The French king's intransigence towards previous peace offers throughout his Egyptian campaign and his later comportment during captivity put his fate in the hands of the new ruling junta. From the onset of his campaign, Louis IX was not amenable to the respective offers made by Frederick II and al-Salih Ayyub before and after the landing in Egypt.<sup>141</sup> Afterwards, he failed to respond to the subtle invitations for a peace agreement made possible by Fakhr al-Din's strategy before the battle of al-Mansura as discussed in Part I of this article.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, following the Frankish naval defeats and immediately before the battle of Faraskur, Louis IX put forward an unreasonable peace proposal to the Muslims, one that was impossible for Turanshah to accept.<sup>143</sup> Lastly, while in captivity, the king snubbed Turanshah's diplomatic gestures and stalled, in order to avoid ceding Damietta, thus unintentionally contributing to the conspirators' success. With the killing of the Ayyubid sultan, which Louis IX followed from his prison-tent in Faraskur,<sup>144</sup> Muslim-Frankish negotiations were taken up by the new regime.

Husam al-Din alerted Aybak to the dangers resulting from Louis IX's prolonged captivity.<sup>145</sup> He warned that while Damietta was outside Muslim control more Frankish kings might arrive from the West, which would further threaten the new regime's delicate position in two ways. The first risk was that Louis IX, who already had been stalling to avoid returning the city, could become even more stubborn and reject any future proposed deal.<sup>146</sup> A second likelier and more dangerous possibility was that, as new Frankish kings landed in Damietta from Europe, Louis IX would no longer be able to cede the city to the Muslims even if he wanted to. Furthermore, Husam al-Din advised Aybak that any compromise with the Franks was unattainable as long as Louis IX was left to spend his captivity in comfortable conditions.<sup>147</sup> Aybak and the rest of the ruling junta accepted Husam al-Din's advice and, accordingly, mandated the veteran *amir* to lead the negotiations with Louis IX and decide on this pressing matter.<sup>148</sup>

Ibn Wasil's accounts of Husam al-Din's negotiations with Louis IX are better examined within the context of the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate. The author was primarily concerned with portraying his friend and patron Husam al-Din as an indispensable statesman for the emerging regime, the key architect of the return of Damietta, and the only diplomat among the new ruling junta who could outmanoeuvre Louis IX. As such, any praise in Ibn Wasil's *Mufarrij* of Louis IX as 'a thoughtful and intelligent man', any allusion to his 'wisdom, refinement and sound intellect', and any reference to his sense of humour was mostly intended to highlight how Husam al-

---

– after the coup – they stormed Louis IX's tent shouting, 'we want the money'; see Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt al-zamān*, 417. As for Aybak, the successful conclusion of the negotiations, the recapture of Damietta and the partial payment of the ransom meant that he could concentrate on other threats, namely the armies of Ayyubid Aleppo and their allies in Syria, and their sympathizers in Egypt and, especially, the looming Mongol threat.

<sup>141</sup>Refer to 4 above.

<sup>142</sup>As discussed in detail in Part I of this article (see note 1 above).

<sup>143</sup>Refer to 9 above.

<sup>144</sup>Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 99.

<sup>145</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 180v.

<sup>146</sup>See above, 12.

<sup>147</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 180v.

<sup>148</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 80. On the other hand, Ibn al-Khazrajī reports that it was Husam al-Din who raised the matter of Louis IX's captivity with Aybak; see Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 180v.

Din's qualities surpassed those of the French king.<sup>149</sup> Any celebration of Louis IX's virtues by Ibn Wasil was in fact a form of praise to his friend Husam al-Din as the gallant and witty negotiator, the superior diplomat who could best a great Frankish king and, hence, was worthy of holding the highest functions in the emerging regime in Cairo.<sup>150</sup>

Initially, the parleys were conducted in the customary tactful style of an Ayyubid-trained statesman. During one of their cordial dialogues (*muḥāwara*), Husam al-Din humorously accused Louis IX of being insane for needlessly endangering himself and his people.<sup>151</sup> The king laughed and did not reply when Husam al-Din asked why, 'despite all his wisdom', Louis IX had risked his own life and the fate of his people on a perilous sea journey to attack the well-defended Egyptian realm that was filled with Muslim soldiers.<sup>152</sup> Husam al-Din – who like Ibn Wasil, Fakhr al-Din, Turanshah and nearly every Ayyubid sultan, adhered to the Shafī'i legal school (*madhhab*)<sup>153</sup> – went on to playfully tease the French king by observing that as per the legal opinion of some Muslim jurists his (Louis IX's) testimony was inadmissible at a court of law, thereby implying that the king would have been considered a madman by a Muslim judge. Husam al-Din further explained to Louis IX that, according to this legal opinion, anyone who embarked on repeated sea voyages, imperilling their own life and property (*mugharriran bi nafsihi wa mālihi*), would be regarded as an imbecile (*da'if al-'aql*). Louis IX was a sport, he laughed and replied: 'this [legal] ruling is correct, whoever pronounced it was truthful.'<sup>154</sup>

Husam al-Din knew, however, that coercing Louis IX into returning Damietta to Egyptian hands was unavoidable.<sup>155</sup> As mentioned above, the comfortable conditions of the French king's captivity only emboldened him to be more obstinate, rude and less likely to accept his captors' demands.<sup>156</sup> Now that he was armed with a strong mandate from Aybak, Husam al-Din resorted to intimidation as a necessary means to

<sup>149</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 81. I argued in 2017 that such discussions between Louis IX and Husam al-Din as reported by Ibn Wasil have been misinterpreted by French historians: see to El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 298. Jean Richard concluded 'His [Louis IX's] sense of humour captivated his captors': Jean Richard, *Saint Louis: Crusader King of France*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 132. Similarly, Claude Cahen believed that Arabic historians admired some of Louis IX's traits like courage, loyalty and judgement: Cahen, 'Saint Louis et l'Islam', *Journal Asiatique* 258 (1970): 3–12, at 6, 7.

<sup>150</sup>El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 297.

<sup>151</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 81. See El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 298, and Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 91.

<sup>152</sup>Or 'riding wood in the sea', as Husam al-Din's erstwhile master al-Salih Ayyub had once described Louis IX's sea journey across the Mediterranean; see 5 above and Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 164v.

<sup>153</sup>One of the exceptions is Sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf (d. 635/1237) of Damascus, who adhered to the Hanbali legal school or at least acted 'as patron of the city's second *madhhab*, the Hanbalites'; see Konrad Hirschler, *Medieval Damascus: Plurality and Diversity in an Arabic Library: The Ashrafiya Library Catalogue* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 19. Louis Pouzet makes this point in a more substantial way as, according to him, Sultan al-Mu'azzam 'Isā was a Hanafi while al-Ashraf 'était de tendance traditionniste': Louis Pouzet, *Damas au VIIIe-XIIIe siècle: vie et structures religieuses d'une métropole islamique*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1991), 36, 91. For more on al-Ashraf's involvement in theological debates, see El-Merheb, *Political Thought in the Mamluk Period*, 170–3.

<sup>154</sup>Ibn Wāsil, *Die Chronik*, 81, 82. See Jackson, *Seventh Crusade*, 154. While Husam al-Din found this legal opinion amusing, for Ibn Wasil a juristic question such as this was a serious matter. He was trained in Shafī'i jurisprudence and, accordingly, was perfectly capable of addressing legal questions like this. Ibn Wasil told his audience that only a minority of Shafī'i jurists considered repeated, purposeless travel by sea that may endanger one's life and fortune a sign of a weak mind. He noted that the prevalent legal opinion within his Shafī'i school (*al-mukhtār min madhhabinā*) was that repetitive sea travel was sanctioned as it was considered a safe medium of travel and, accordingly, did not negate the status of an individual as a valid court witness.

<sup>155</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 180v-181r. See El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 298, 299.

<sup>156</sup>See above, 19.

conclude the negotiations. He visited Louis IX to settle the surrender of Damietta, but when the latter did not return his greetings, he instructed the translator:

Tell this cunning one, I thought you were judicious and now I see that you are the least judicious among men; we had followed the saying of the Prophet, 'If there comes to you a man who is respected among his own people, then honour him,' but you are mean (*la'im*); we have honoured you but you have become meaner.<sup>157</sup>

Husam al-Din added to this grave insult by threatening to put shackles on Louis IX's legs, dress him in a cloak, and sequester him.<sup>158</sup> Realising that the comfortable conditions of his imprisonment were about to change, Louis IX immediately yielded to Husam al-Din's threats and agreed to surrender Damietta and, additionally, pay a ransom.<sup>159</sup>

The new Frankish-Mamluk agreement was to be executed swiftly. Following several rounds of arduous exchanges with the hesitant Franks in Damietta, Louis IX finally succeeded in convincing them to accept his new agreement with the Muslims and cede the city in exchange for his own release along with other prominent Frankish prisoners.<sup>160</sup> On Friday 2 Safar 648/ 6 May 1250, Louis IX was transported by mule to Damietta to complete the exchange, accompanied by Husam al-Din and Aybak.<sup>161</sup> Upon reaching the outskirts of the city, they were all surprised to see that Muslim soldiers had already taken the walls of Damietta while the Franks were fleeing towards their boats in the harbour, carrying all the textiles they could carry.<sup>162</sup> Louis IX 'turned pale' at the spectacle of Damietta being lost to the Muslims while he was still in their custody and the prospect of not being freed. His qualms were not wholly unjustified, Husam al-Din had indeed suggested to do exactly that to Aybak: 'Damietta was our main purpose and we have it now; do not release a great king like this one, I have never come across a man of such sound judgement';<sup>163</sup> but Aybak refused this suggestion replying: 'this is the beginning of my reign and I shall not betray him [Louis IX] by breaking my oath.'<sup>164</sup> Louis IX was released with other leading Frankish prisoners (*wa man ma'ahu min al-akābir wa al-muluk*) one full day after the fall of Damietta, and sailed on a great galley towards the Mediterranean after Aybak and the leading Muslim *amirs* bade him farewell.<sup>165</sup> Ibn al-Khazraji observed that the sailors of the Frankish galley that was carrying Louis IX rowed so strongly to reach the safety of the open sea that he nearly fell in the Nile. The king remained 'yellow like gold' (that is, pale from fear, petrified) until his galley reached saltwater, from where he instantly

---

<sup>157</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 180v.-181r. The translation is based on El-Merheb, 'Louis IX in Medieval Arabic Sources', 298, 299 with minor changes.

<sup>158</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r. This is my translation of '*ya'mala bihi fi al-hils'*; *hils*, as per *Lisān al-'Arab*, is a mat that is spread below a valuable possession in a house or on a mounted animal and is, as such, rarely movable. Joinville, on the other hand, claims that the captors threatened to use the 'bernicles' (barnacles) on Louis IX, in *Vie de Saint Louis*, 167–9 [341]. See Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 98.

<sup>159</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r; the amount is 500,000 dinars according to Ibn al-Khazraji. See Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 101, for a useful and more detailed discussion on the ransom. For more on the agreed ransom amount, see Eddé, 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 76.

<sup>160</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 82. Ibn Wāsil reports that some of the Franks in Damietta had initially objected to the deal and that it took Louis IX several attempts to convince them to accept it.

<sup>161</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid. Refer to 19–20 above for a discussion on the misleading praise of Louis IX by Ibn Wāsil.

<sup>164</sup>Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r.

<sup>165</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 82; Ibn al-Khazraji, *Tārikh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r.

renounced his oath to the Muslims by refusing to settle the rest of the agreed ransom money.<sup>166</sup>

Husam al-Din's negotiation strategy with Louis IX sealed the Muslim triumph and strengthened Aybak's reign. During the tumultuous years of the Ayyubid to Mamluk transition, he performed other vital services for Aybak that guaranteed his personal safety and allowed him a continued senior role in the new regime until his retirement.<sup>167</sup> Husam al-Din's response (or more precisely, the lack thereof) during the coup against Turanshah had earned him the ruling junta's trust, especially that of Aybak. A further significant service to the latter was Husam al-Din's pivotal role in regaining Damietta without the need to fight or lay siege and securing the much-needed (albeit only partially paid) ransom that contributed to replenishing the Egyptian treasury, which must have been severely depleted by war expenditure and the extravagances of Fakhr al-Din and Turanshah.<sup>168</sup> In return, Aybak ensured Husam al-Din's safety and spared him the fate of other Salihī *amirs*, such as some of the Kurdish Qaymari *amirs*, who were arrested or put to death.<sup>169</sup> This unblemished service continued and, on Thursday 10 Dhu al-Qa'da 648/ 3 February 1251, Husam al-Din fought loyally on Aybak's side against some of his old Salihī brethren to contribute to a decisive Egyptian victory over the Syrian armies led by the Ayyubid Sultan al-Nasir of Aleppo.<sup>170</sup> As his long service neared its end, Husam al-Din travelled to Mecca to perform a pilgrimage in the company of Ibn Wasil in 649/1252.<sup>171</sup> Two years later, Aybak granted Husam al-Din his wish to retire from service; he returned to Syria where he was received in honour by Sultan al-Nasir, who granted him a generous income.<sup>172</sup>

## Conclusion

Louis IX's first crusade, defeats, and captivity shaped the attempts of Fakhr al-Din, Turanshah and Husam al-Din to gain power in Egypt. The fortunes of these prominent members of the Ayyubid traditional and hereditary elites, the success of al-Salih Ayyub's *Bahriyya* Mamluks and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk sultanate must be examined in tandem with Louis IX's Egyptian campaign. The French king's intransigence, continuous refusal to consider a peace agreement and unreasonable demands before his capture, as well as his constant stalling and discourteous comportment during his captivity influenced the following succession of events: the tragic end of Fakhr al-Din's bid for power; the conspiracy against the reckless Turanshah; the timing of the coup that ended the latter's short reign; and, lastly, Husam al-Din's decision

<sup>166</sup>Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 181r-v. Needless to say here that there is a major discrepancy with Joinville's account who claims that Louis IX was diligent in ensuring that the full amount of the ransom was paid; see Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, 191 [386, 387].

<sup>167</sup>Robert Irwin calls it the turbulent decade: Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London and Carbondale: Croom Helm and Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 26–36.

<sup>168</sup>A moderate amount according to Eddé, in 'Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade', 86. See Gaposchkin, 'The Captivity of Louis IX', 98.

<sup>169</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 88; in 648/1250, the Qaymari of Damascus helped the sultan of Aleppo capture the city, which led to the arrest of the Qaymari *amirs* in Cairo.

<sup>170</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 111, 114–7, 120. See Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 318.

<sup>171</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 128, 129. In Jumada al-Akhira 649; Ibn Wasil provides an account of the travel to Mecca on the Nile and then across the Red Sea. See Konrad Hirschler, *Medieval Arabic Historiography*, 25.

<sup>172</sup>Ibn Wāṣil, *Die Chronik*, 130; in the year 651 AH. He stayed in Damascus according to Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Tārīkh dawlat al-Akrād*, 191r.

to switch his allegiance to the new junta and benefit from Louis IX's obstinacy during captivity to secure himself a senior role in the emerging regime. A series of injudicious decisions by Louis IX offered the Mamluks one occasion after another to present themselves as indispensable for the Muslim triumph and protectors of the Egyptian realm. Their victories over Louis IX and success in concluding the negotiations and returning Damietta would quickly become strong legitimization tropes of the early Mamluk sultanate, on a par with their victory over the Mongols in 658/1260.

While Stephen Humphreys' seminal framework is still essential to understanding the inevitable demise of the Ayyubid empire, the collapse of al-Salih Ayyub's line in Egypt falls within a different paradigm.<sup>173</sup> The latter's regime depended on a Cairo-based and centralised administration and on unifying Egypt with parts of Syria. Therefore, it did not fit the post-Saladin Ayyubid model of divided appanages, which was destined to fail, but rather resembled the later and more durable Mamluk model. This article's closer examination of Louis IX's campaign hopefully offers further answers to explain the end of the Ayyubids in Egypt and the successful transition to the early Mamluk sultanate.

### **Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

### **ORCID**

*Mohamad El-Merheb*  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5286-4650>

---

<sup>173</sup>Refer to the introduction in Part I of this article (see note 1 above), 216–8.