SOAS University of London

Suleman, Tariq (2024)
The Politics of Difference: Critical Cross Reading of The Roots of Partition in colonial India and Mandate Palestine.
PhD thesis. SOAS University of London.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00043052

Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners.

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.

The Politics of Difference: Critical Cross Reading of The Roots of Partition in colonial India and Mandate Palestine

Tariq Suleman

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

2024

Department of the Languages and Cultures of the Near and Middle East

SOAS, University of London

I have read and understood Regulation 21 of the General and Admissions Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed: Tariq Suleman Date: 15 Feb 2024

Table of Contents

Introduction 4

Chapter One: Census Culture & Colonial Millet System: Seeing *Difference* 72
Colonial Technologies of Governing Native Populations

Chapter Two: Representation Politics: Governing Through *Difference* 124
Muslim nationalism and Zionism

Chapter Three: Minority Question: Regulating *Difference* 176
The Khilafat Movement and Christian Muslim Associations
Subjectifying Colonial Identity Formation

Chapter Four: Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi: Manifesting *Difference*
Navigating the Palestine Issue Amidst Indian Muslim Dynamics 254

Chapter Five: Partitions: Resolving the Problem of *Difference* 286

Conclusion 342

Bibliography 354

Introduction

This study embarks on a comparative analysis of the partitions of colonial India and historical Palestine, penetrating narratives that transcend the physical demarcation of borders to uncover the profound mental and emotional imprints left on colonized societies. It critically examines the deep-seated impacts of colonialism, intricacies of identity formation, and the multifaceted challenges of governance. Central to this inquiry is the exploration of how communalism, especially in colonial India, hindered the emergence of a cohesive national identity, with colonial categorization of individuals primarily along religious lines playing a pivotal role in the partition dynamics.

The events of the Nakba, including rampant massacres like the Deir Yassin massacre in Palestine, and the refugee exodus accompanied by widespread communal violence in the Indian subcontinent, are manifestations of the deep divisions within partitioned communities. These events serve as stark illustrations of the entrenched divisions within these communities. The research posits that these divisions were not merely theoretical constructs but were concrete realities, meticulously engineered through colonial policies and actions, leaving indelible marks on the affected populations. This research explores the multifaceted nature of partition and its ramifications on communal consciousness and societal structures.

I treat the concept of partition as transcending the conventional view of just a territorial divide, framing it as an intricate colonial discourse encompassing a web of ideas, narratives, and power dynamics rooted in colonial administration. This approach treats partition as a dynamic and evolving discourse, that shapes and is shaped by historical, political, and cultural narratives. It examines communal self-perception and interrelations, moulded by colonial legacies, national identities, and socio-political frameworks. Partition, in this discourse, includes ideologies, rhetoric, and policies that both drive and emerge from

societal splits, collectively influencing public consciousness, political decisions, and social interactions. This perspective offers a profound understanding of partition's wide-ranging impact on societies and historical trajectories, going beyond its tangible manifestations.

Expanding the concept of 'partition' in this research encompasses a more complex spectrum, investigating the manifestations of partition within the mental and social constructs of communities. The study explores how the formation of nation-states acts as a catalyst for partition, leading to the emergence of minorities and majorities that transcend simple demographic categories to reflect deeper societal fissures. It highlights the role of nation-state structures in moulding population demographics and reinforcing societal divisions, thereby influencing the broader socio-political context. The act of producing minorities and majorities is interpreted as an intrinsic aspect of partition, a significant form of societal division, constituting a form of 'mental' partition that precedes, accompanies, or even supersedes territorial partitions. The socio-political processes that categorize populations into distinct groups based on religious, ethnic, or cultural identities are not a passive occurrence but an active and often deliberate outcome of political and administrative policies. This approach underscores how the demarcation of groups into majority and minority status significantly impacts social dynamics, power relations, and individual identities. This can lead to feelings of marginalization or dominance, shape political narratives, and influence inter-community relations. Therefore, understanding partition as the act of producing societal divisions offers a more nuanced comprehension of the term, recognizing its profound and lasting impact on societal structures.

Central to this expanded concept is the investigation of intangible yet powerful forces such as identity, historical context, and collective consciousness, which drive societal divides and foster animosity towards 'the other'. This study aims to examine partition within the

consciousness of divided communities to uncover how mental and emotional divisions impact social cohesion and shape collective memory. The term ‘consciousness’ here denotes a collective state of awareness and reflection on one's surroundings and experiences. This notion is pivotal to my study, which explores how communities cultivate a profound understanding of their own identities and internal divisions, shaped by historical and colonial experience. The use of ‘consciousness’ accentuates the communal dimension of this awareness, emphasizing the shared experiences and perceptions within these societies.

I contend that any comprehensive analysis of the concept of partition must necessarily incorporate an examination of mental partitions alongside physical divisions. In my research, I adopt an inclusive approach to the concept of partition, treating it as a holistic phenomenon that encompasses both its mental and physical dimensions. This dual perspective is essential for a thorough understanding of the multifaceted nature of partition as a concept and its far-reaching implications.

This broader interpretation of partition is crucial for understanding the complex dynamics in post-partition societies, revealing the subtle ways in which communities are continuously shaped and reshaped by both visible and invisible divisions. Understanding that territorial partitions stem from pre-existing divisions in a community's collective consciousness is vital. Even without physical demarcation, the implications of this intangible partition are as tangible and impactful as those of a physical divide. This perspective recognizes that the groundwork for physical partition is often laid in the minds and perceptions of a community.

This research conceptualizes partition as a discourse, fundamentally a social construct, and aims to elucidate how these divisions are systematically engineered rather than mere products of chance. It emphasizes the significant role of colonial strategies in shaping the

social and political landscapes of affected regions. The study highlights that while boundaries were ostensibly drawn based on specific contingencies, the real partitions lay in the divided minds and collective consciousness of the populace, illustrating their lasting impact on society.

The essence of partition's impact lies in how it surpasses mere physical divisions to profoundly influence societal perceptions and relationships. Partition is best understood as an ongoing structural process that shapes societal dynamics rather than a singular event, adapting Patrick Wolfe's structural approach from settler colonialism to partition analysis. Viewing partition as a structure, calls into question narratives that regard the partition in South Asia as accidental,[1] and those suggesting Zionist manoeuvring prompted partition in Palestine.[2] This interpretation suggests that the paths leading to partition in both scenarios were not merely sequences of historical coincidences. Instead, an underlying structural logic was instrumental in creating conditions conducive to partition. This structural logic was encapsulated in a specific period during the mid-20th century when the imperial world was undergoing a transformation, giving way to a nation-state system steered by representative politics. This political restructuring subsequently influenced populations to perceive themselves through the lens of already partitioned communities, as minorities and majorities.

To address the lasting impact of partitions, we must look beyond mere redrawing of boundaries and confront the deep cultural divides rooted in colonial practices. This study sheds light on the persistent challenges in post-colonial societies grappling with partition's legacy, emphasizing the need to reassess our perception of partitions and the crucial role of reconciliation in these societies.

---

[1] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge South Asian Studies 31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[2] Motti Golani, '"The Meat and the Bones": Reassessing the Origins of the Partition of Mandate Palestine', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019).

This study emphasizes the unique historical and cultural contexts both regions while offering critical insights applicable beyond their specific cases. It highlights how emotional and cultural investments often colour the introspection of one's own history of partition, leading to personalized and sometimes biased interpretations. In contrast, studying another region's partition allows for a more detached and objective perspective, offering insight less influenced by personal bias. This comparative approach facilitates a more balanced understanding of historical partitions, blending emotional depth with objective analysis to gain a holistic view of their impacts and implications for current issues like identity and territorial disputes.

Carved out of British colonies through partitions of multi-religious societies, Pakistan and Israel emerged as confessional states in 1947 and 1948, respectively. Their shared colonial experience shaped their post-colonial condition, displaying remarkable similarities between the All India Muslim League's struggle for Pakistan and the Zionist struggle for Israel. A notable commonality was the constitution of a 'religious community' facing trials as a political 'minority'. Both Zionist leaders, seeking a Jewish state for the European Jewish minority, and Indian Muslim leaders, demanding a homeland for the Indian Muslim 'minority', faced similar challenges. These partitions were not merely lines drawn on maps but also represented psychological barriers constructed in the minds of colonial subjects. These mental divisions, product of the structural logic of 'politics of difference', deeply embedded in colonialism, nationalism, and the emerging global order of nation-states, were perhaps more impactful than their physical counterparts.

This research aims to bridge the gap in studies on the partitions of India and Palestine by focusing on structural factors influencing these historical events. It seeks to enhance historical understanding by merging the concepts of territorial partitions and structural

cultural schisms, particularly in the rarely compared contexts of India and Palestine. The central thesis is that structural elements, emerging from a confluence of diverse factors, predominantly drove these partitions. While acknowledging local agency, the study emphasizes the impact of colonial 'politics of difference' and how these policies shaped both the cultural divides and territorial partitions.

Understanding the rise of separatist tendencies among Indian Muslims during colonial times requires acknowledging key factors that influenced them, such as their historical regional dominance and their deep-rooted connection to a broader Muslim heritage. These influences, coupled with a sense of nostalgia and an Islam-centric worldview, were prominent among many Indian Muslim leaders and significantly shaped their political ambitions. I argue that while these factors contributed to separatist aspirations, they alone were not enough to drive the pursuit of a separate Muslim homeland. Muslim separatism was not just a product of religious differences; it was also a response to a form of nationalism perceived as majority-dominated. The colonial regime's 'politics of difference' crystallized these sentiments, transforming latent social separatist inclinations into a concrete and active political movement. The colonial administration's policies both acknowledged and institutionalized these divisions, actively exploiting them for administrative and political ends.

The narrative of Palestine's partition is intricately tied to the geopolitical shifts following World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Key events such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Middle East between Britain and France, and the Balfour Declaration, endorsing the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, played pivotal roles in shaping the region's future. This followed a significant surge in Jewish immigration, driven largely by the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe and the horrors of the Holocaust. This influx intensified competition over land and resources between the Jewish

immigrants and the Arab Palestinians, leading to increasing tensions and conflict. The situation in Palestine was further complicated by the role of British Mandate policies in institutionalizing ‘difference’ in Palestine, categorizing Arabs as the majority and Jews as a minority, exacerbating existing divisions and impacting the socio-political landscape of the region.

The complexities emerging post-partition in identity formation indicate that the impetus for partition lay more in asserting distinctiveness based on ‘difference’ rather than a coherent national identity concept. This partition seems to have been driven primarily by a reaction to perceived disparities between Muslims and other communities in British India, not by a concrete vision for a Muslim nation. This perspective challenges the traditional view that Pakistan’s creation was purely a religious identity response, underscoring the significant roles of political, regional, and socio-economic factors. It also suggests that the identity challenges faced by Pakistan post-partition were not just unforeseen but potentially a predictable outcome of a movement more rooted in opposition than in a unified vision.

In the historiography of partition, the influences of the Mughal era on Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire on Palestinian Arabs are often overshadowed by the more pivotal role of the colonial regime in shaping political identities based on ‘difference’. These partitions extended beyond mere territorial divisions, deeply entrenching structural divisions within the collective mindset. In a parallel vein, the Zionist conception of Jewish nationhood, while rooted in a response to European anti-Semitism and assimilation pressures, also represented a reconnection with historical Jewish roots in Palestine. This identity formation was further reinforced by British colonial policies, which intensified the inherent conflicts based on ‘difference’, deeply affecting both Jewish and Palestinian identities.

This study examines the complex origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rooted in the British Mandate's divisive policies and the influx of European Jewish immigrants asserting a distinct identity in an Arab land. Far from being a simple religious or national clash, this conflict stems from deep-seated divisions based on 'difference'. It explores how Palestine, historically a single geopolitical region, became a land deeply divided between Palestinian occupied territories and the state of Israel. These divisions extend beyond geography, reflecting mental partitions entrenched by colonial 'politics of difference'. Interestingly, the land itself is not physically divided in the traditional sense, yet the people are resolutely committed to partition. The land, once under the British Mandate, now finds itself largely under Israeli control, illustrating how partitions initially form in the minds before manifesting as physical boundaries. The study underscores the need to effectively understand and dismantle these mental barriers to address the ongoing struggle over identity, land, and sovereignty.

I critically examine the colonial governance in India and Palestine, highlighting the similarities and differences in the British colonial logic applied in both regions. The British reinvented local traditions for imperial purposes, using technologies like the census in India and the millet system in Palestine to introduce exclusionary practices and classify populations. This led to the creation of 'partitioned minds', where colonial subjects internalized differences imposed by the colonial regime. Policies and practices of the imperial regime in colonial India and mandate Palestine produced results that were to some degree similar, to some degree quite different. These are the kind of differences which impose severe limitations on comparison; Zionism emerged both as a settler colonial movement and as a form of nationalism that existed before arriving in Palestine, while the Pakistan movement emerged in the heat of events from within colonial India. In both cases, colonial officials tried to squeeze the population into the straitjacket of religion-based identity, with mixed results.

In colonial India, census and separate electorates, created religion-based politics and acted against the emergence of a united anti-colonial front. The Supreme Muslim Council in mandate Palestine channelled the Arab politics into a Muslim vehicle, thus forestalling the creation of the Arab national movement. In colonial India, a 'religious community' becomes a Muslim 'nation' leading to unintended territorial partition. Colonial attempts to divide Christians and Muslims in mandate Palestine initially failed, and the Arab identity triumphed. The continuation of the millet system in mandate Palestine did not mitigate the fact that the 'Jewish millet' understood itself as a nation and a settler community.

Empirical studies of India's history reveal a significant transformation in communal relations following the advent of British colonial rule, which altered the previously existing dynamics among various religious and caste groups. Prior to British intervention, India was characterized by a rich mosaic of cultures, religions, and ethnicities. Despite the inherent differences between and within these groups, including diverse religious and caste distinctions, there was a certain level of harmony that pervaded this diversity.

However, the colonial era marked a departure from this relative harmony. The British arrival and subsequent policies fundamentally upset the communal equilibrium. Notably, communal riots, especially between Hindus and Muslims, began with increased frequency and intensity during this period. This escalation suggests a correlation between the colonial administration's policies and the deepening of religious and caste divisions.[3] By introducing policies that reinforced and institutionalized these differences, the colonial government not only intensified divisions but also created new layers of discord within the Indian society. As a result, the intricate balance of harmony among the diverse religious and caste groups was significantly disrupted, leading to heightened communal tensions and conflicts.

[3] Ian Copland, 'From Communitas to Communalism: Evolving Muslim Loyalties in Princely North India', in *Colonialism, Modernity, and Religious Identities: Religious Reform Movements in South Asia*, ed. Gwilym Beckerlegge, 1st edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 29.

In colonial India and mandate Palestine, the categorization of populations into religion-based communities was a colonial strategy to prevent the emergence of a secular national identity. This approach effectively undermined any attempt by colonial subjects to transcend their religious identities and be perceived as legitimate secular entities. The colonial state, positioning itself as a secular arbiter, further complicated this challenge. In mandate Palestine, this alignment with the Zionist settler project impeded the development of secular nationalism, even post-independence. The colonial state's perceived neutrality stemmed from its definition of societies as religiously divided, categorizing colonial subjects into majority or minority groups. This division necessitated state intervention to maintain order and neutrality, reinforcing the religion-based communal structures.

It is important to note that while in colonial India, representative electoral reforms were effectively implemented, in mandate Palestine, the establishment of representative politics faced significant challenges. Despite these differences, the outcomes in both regions were strikingly similar. This suggests that the impact of representative politics extended beyond the specificities of elections; it was the underlying principle of representation itself, which loomed large beyond contingent events, producing majorities and minorities in both colonial societies. It particularly influenced the consciousness of minorities, structurally embedding the notion of partition in both India and Palestine.

My research aims to unpack the colonial discourse that constituted these subjects within the power relations of colonialism. It explores how colonial subjects, acquiescing to this discourse, were shaped by the process of 'subjectification' - the process refers to the way individuals or groups are shaped into subjects through various social, political, and cultural practices and discourses. A closer scrutiny of the ostensibly secular tools of colonial governance accentuates the pivotal role of the colonial 'subjectification' process. This

process reinforced the notion of partition as a structural element, rather than a mere event. The study traces the genealogy of colonial 'politics of difference', examining how managing differences eventually led to the structural logic of partition in both India and Palestine.

This research critically examines the colonial role in shaping conflicts between communities, resulting in the emergence of polarized communities under the guise of putative nationalisms. It investigates the relationship between grassroots activities and political movements in both regions, tracing the intellectual and political trajectories that led to the creation of Israel and Pakistan. I place both post-colonial states of Israel and Pakistan as an exemplary site for the re-examination of the nature of the colonial legacy. The relationship between colonial governance in India and in Palestine remains seriously understudied, and my work seeks to enhance the understanding of each context, marking an important intervention in the field of both South Asian and Palestinian history. Understanding the links between these two histories is as pressing as ever given the tension of contemporary geopolitics, proposing that Pakistan and Israel can learn much from studying each other's histories.

Partition as structure becomes evident when we examine the cross-communal resistance in colonial India, also underscoring the strength of the colonial process of subjectification. With the imminent prospect of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the Muslim leadership in colonial India launched the Khilafat movement (1919-1924). Religious in configuration, it was an agitation to pressure and lobby the British government to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the authority of its Sultan as Khalifa, the titular head of Islam. The Khilafat movement demonstrated the potential to reject the colonial demarcations and ways of thinking; while equally demonstrating its inability to overthrow them.

In Palestine, the initial resistance to the colonial discourse emerged in the shape of Christian-Muslim associations, though those were soon overtaken by the Arab Higher Committee. The Arab Palestinian ability to initially transcend the religion-based logic stood in contrast with the Indian example and I explain the reasons in Chapter two. Bringing the 'religious identity-based' framework to Palestine allows us to examine dynamics that go against both the settler-colonial logic as well as the logic of a national conflict. The attempted transformation of Muslims into a 'millet' relies on that framework. The inclusion of Jews as a millet goes against their understanding as a settler group. The colonial view of Jews in Palestine as a 'millet', a religious community; underscores a racialised perception of Jews as Asians (at least in some degree). It shows that the British could manoeuvre between different frames of their understanding of Jews as a religious community, as a nation and as settlers, and thus claim, strategically, even handedness, and deny national recognition to Arabs, but also deny settler rights to Jews; and this explains why partition was suggested in both the places, as a form of equivalence. No such instance of territorial partition is found in other settler-colonial contexts.

I start with unpacking what I mean by partition as an invasive and insidious structure. I expand on a 'logic of separation', where partition was both required and generated by separating indigenous communities and their politics. In colonial India, partition was required to constitute a homeland for Muslims in provinces where Muslims already formed a majority whereas Zionist settler colonizers were concerned with possessing the land of Palestine where Arabs were in overwhelming majority and the settler colonial streak necessitated the elimination of local people in mandate Palestine.

In scholarly discourse on colonial partitions, the concept of structure often raises concerns about diminishing individual agency. However, this view overlooks the complexity

of the relationship between structure and agency. Structure in this context doesn't eliminate agency; it reflects how certain discourses, especially those emphasizing difference, become so dominant that individuals not only accept them as valid but also actively engage in their spread. This nuanced understanding highlights that individuals contribute to and shape these structures, rather than being mere passive recipients.

This interaction between structure and agency is starkly apparent in colonial partitions. Such partitions were not solely top-down impositions; often, they arose from the subjects' own actions and beliefs. Influenced by colonial discourse on difference, these subjects came to view partition as not only desirable but necessary for their future and aspirations. They weren't merely passive recipients of an external structure; rather, they actively demanded partition, swayed by and further propagating the prevailing discourse on difference.

This process illustrates the transformation of the colonial idea of difference as a partition from an abstract concept into a structural reality. It reflects a complex interplay where influential colonial narratives on difference intersected with the active participation of subjects. They internalized and then actively promoted the notion of division, thereby solidifying partition as a structural element in their cultural, historical, and political landscape. Therefore, understanding colonial partitions demands recognition of the dual forces of structure and agency. These partitions were shaped by both the subjects' convictions and actions, influenced by the powerful discourse on difference and the broader political and historical context. In this light, partition emerges not as a purely imposed reality but as a manifestation of the collective will, shaped by and shaping the discourse of difference among the people it affected.

My research investigates how colonial governance crafted the notion of difference in various discourses, creating distinctions that previously did not exist. This investigation

explores how the management of these differences gradually led to a structural logic that underpinned the concept of partition. And partition came to be a defining feature of the political landscape during the struggle for independence in British India and in mandate Palestine. Colonial rulers had permanently transformed the very nature of local politics in colonies by instituting certain religious identity-based policies and practices, representing the British way of seeing local populations as riven in a religious frame, making their religious identity as a primary organising principle in colonial India and mandate Palestine. The British promoted the notion that the communal way of life in colonies, especially in colonial India and mandate Palestine, was primordial and thus an inevitable part of their political life. Consequently, religiously defined identities and communal lifestyles became ingrained into the political landscapes of both India and Palestine.

To make a better sense of the conflict arising from religious identity-based politics, it is instructive to consult the literature on the process of political mass mobilisations in both colonial societies. The process of the religious identity-based conflict in colonial India and mandate Palestine was primarily shaped by colonial officials operating within the imperial context while pursuing colonial objectives. Coining a new term 'sectarianization', Hasheemi and Postel define it as a process of producing religious identity-based politics that 'involve popular mobilisation around particular (religious) identity markers'.[4] This type of a political process is not 'a static given', which need not be framed in a 'trans-historical' context as a lasting and fixed characteristic of local communities in colonial India or mandate Palestine. It could be traced all the way back to the seventh century Islam.

To adapt Clausewitz's aphorism that war is 'a continuation of politics by other means', the process of decolonization can be seen as a perpetuation of the colonial 'politics of

[4] Nader Hasheemi and Danny Postel, eds., *Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East* (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2017).

difference'. This involved advancing religious identity-based politics in more subtle ways, even in the absence of overt conflict. Just as war, deemed a structure, continues through alternative means when direct conflict is absent, partition, a manifestation of colonial politics of difference, persisted through incessant, often simmering conflict, even when not overtly recognized as such. The conflict between Pakistan and India, on the one hand, and Israel and Palestine, on the other, bear witness to this ongoing legacy, exemplifying how these deep-seated divisions continue to shape and define political and social landscapes long after the formal end of colonial rule.

The construction of difference on religious lines was one of the colonial technologies of governance in British India which was equally present in mandate Palestine. This aspect has not been researched, let alone used as an analytical framework in studying the Israel Palestine conflict. The absence of the religious identity-based conflict as an analytical framework in the study of Israel Palestine conflict is even more conspicuous since it is used to explain the colonial governance and its aftermath in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and even to some extent in Egypt. The primary reason for such an omission is that Zionism as a settler colonial movement placed the conflict within the frame of national conflict. I am using the analytical frame of 'religion-based identity formation' as it was the colonial government's primary dividing practice in mandate Palestine as much as in colonial India. Since the state of Israel emerged as a sovereign state, a conflict between 'two nations' formed the analytical framework for studying the conflict.

Considering the nature of difference and limitations of the comparison, Zionism as a settler colonial movement, and as a form of nationalism that existed before its arrival in Palestine, I focus more on analysing similarities between the way the Muslim and Jewish communities were transformed under the stresses of their shared experience of colonial

governance. Otherwise, huge differences existed in political dynamics, agencies, and trajectories in both cases. The idea of Pakistan and the idea of Zion (Israel) originated at different places, at different times and took altogether different trajectories. After coming into existence, both states, considering to be under existential threat, made security their defining feature. This could possibly be due to political leadership's fear in both countries that absence of conflict could reopen the debate around the raison d'être for a separate homeland. The existence of both states is a living reality, and their abiding existence is its own justification. Both states still perceive a threat to their ideological identity as a threat to their existence.

My research, a critical inquiry into 'the ontology of the present', focuses on examining the colonial discourse that established the concept of 'difference' in colonial India and mandate Palestine. It explores how such discourse shaped the identities of subjects in these regions, identities that persist to this day. This study is a first detailed engagement with conceptual nexus of imperial imperatives of governance between the imperial rule in India and in Palestine and the emergent notion of 'minorities' in early twentieth century. Examining imperial perspectives, policies and practices, integral to the colonial mode of governance that constituted colonial subjectivities on religious lines, I scrutinise links between the 'Palestine Question' and Zionism on the one hand and the 'Muslim Question' in colonial India on the other; examine parallels, cross influences, interplays, and direct and indirect connections between the emerging ideologies of Zionism and the Indian Muslim nationalism within wider imperial context; study the relationship between the Indian and the Palestinian politics and grassroots activities to achieve their respective objectives; trace the intellectual and political trajectories that culminated in the birth of the Jewish and the Muslim state with pervasive implications of their underlying tensions, paradoxes and contradictions. I connect colonial India and mandate Palestine within the overarching frame of the imperial 'technologies of governance', colonial policies, practices and its infrastructure of knowledge.

I scrutinise the colonial role in shaping the conflict between communities through eventually creating two polarised models of nationalisms out of religious communities.

I locate contemporary developments of the regional and local conflicts in South Asia and Israel/Palestine, as a result of undergoing 'series of transformations', within 'the totality of discursive and non-discursive practices' of the colonial governance. For this research the 'history of the present' marks the essential starting point for the genealogical study of current regional conflicts and rampant religious identity-based strife in both post-colonial states, tracing it to the colonial construction and management of difference. While pursuing a critical inquiry into the 'ontology of the present' of both the states I guard against the influence of the present to influence my reading of their colonial past, in 'a process of becoming the present'.[5] My enquiry into the colonial past helps understand the phenomenon of continued effects of colonial practices still influencing politics in both the regions today. It raises the question if 'a 'viciousness' that silences and excludes',[6] was the secret of colonial governance then why is it still practiced in both post-colonial states of Pakistan and Israel.

Tracing the genealogy of the current variant political state in post-colonial states of South Asia and Israel in a comparative frame, I try to shed new light on the indices of power undergirding postcolonial politics. I place both post-colonial states of Israel and Pakistan as an exemplary site for the re-examination of the nature of colonial legacy. Relationship between the colonial governance in India and Palestine remains seriously understudied, and my work marks an important intervention in the field of both South Asian and Palestinian history. Understanding the links between these two histories is as pressing as ever given the tension of contemporary geopolitics. I hope to enhance understanding of each case by placing

---

[5]Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*, New Ed edition (London: Abacus, 1998), 18.
[6]Michel Foucault, *Freedom and Knowledge* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Special Productions BV, 2014), 11, http://www.fonselders.eu/product/m-f-freedom-and-knowledge/.

it in the context of the other and I am sanguine that both, Pakistan and Israel, can learn a lot by simply studying each other in a comparative relational perspective.

Scientism: Shaping the Nation-State and Defining Majority-Minority Dynamics

Scientism, defined as the belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach, has significantly influenced the formation of nation-states and the dynamics between majority and minority groups. By championing scientific rationality and empiricism, scientism has shaped societal understanding and organization, prioritizing categorization, classification, and order. These principles have been central to establishing nation-states with clear boundaries and homogeneous identities, often favouring majority interests, sometimes to the detriment of minorities. In the colonial context, scientism underpinned imperial endeavours, using scientific methods to classify and dominate colonized peoples, placing them within a 'scientifically' determined hierarchy. This approach legitimized colonial exploitation and shaped the colonial experience, creating lasting societal impacts through the rigid stratification of groups.

Modernity's focus on scientific reasoning further entrenched scientism, influencing the politics of 'difference' and exacerbating colonial efforts to both erase and underscore these differences. Colonial powers, leveraging a scientistic framework, accentuated religious distinctions, employing governance technologies that emphasized empirical categorization. This focus on difference, a hallmark of European colonialism, distinguished it from pre-colonial governance and societal structures. Consequently, scientism's role in fostering nation-states based on distinct identities has led to deep-seated divisions and conflicts. The current global landscape, marked by intolerance and strife, can be traced back to the scientistic organization of societies into nation-states predicated on the 'politics of difference'. This legacy of scientism, with its rigid societal divisions, continues to influence the political

and social fabric of nations, highlighting the profound impact of scientism on shaping modern societies and their challenges.

In the Middle East, the emergence of nation-states was initially propelled by external influences, in contrast to colonial India where British governance introduced these concepts. The Ottoman Empire, acknowledging its decline relative to European powers, initiated self-motivated reforms to modernize its military and administrative systems. This period was marked by significant political changes, including the 1908 Young Turk revolution, and saw the rise of nationalism and various ideologies. These factors collectively influenced the post-World War I formation of new nation-states in the region. In India, British colonial rule directly shaped modern governance and nation-state development, leading to a distinct trajectory compared to the Middle East.

The concept of the nation-state, as we understand it today, is a relatively recent development in the historical context. Its emergence in regions like colonial India and mandate Palestine was shaped by the forces of colonialism and other historical processes. Prior to the colonial era, India and Palestine were characterized by a mosaic of diverse communities, each with their own distinct social, cultural, and religious identities. India, for instance, was a tapestry of princely states, regions, and local communities, each with its unique governance system, languages, and customs. Similarly, Palestine was home to a several religious and ethnic groups, often coexisting under larger imperial entities like the Ottoman Empire.

The nation-state system fundamentally operates on the principle of dividing people into majorities and minorities. This system, deeply rooted in the scientific rationale and empirical classifications fostered by scientism, essentially brought about the partitioning of

societies. It is this division that has led to a world grappling with the consequences of intolerance, hatred and conflict.

Partition extends beyond initial divisions into majority and minority groups, creating complex dynamics where a minority, upon becoming a majority, often confronts its own minorities with secessionist tendencies. These dynamics, while not always leading to physical partitions, contribute to enduring societal bifurcations. This pattern of continuous internal divisions is evident in countries like Palestine, Pakistan, and India, where historical partitions have led to further fragmentation within societies. Colonial powers played a significant role in shaping the contours of nation-states, particularly in post-colonial states like India and Palestine. Their practices, such as arbitrary border drawing, administrative divisions, and population categorization via census, profoundly altered the political and social landscapes. These actions grouped diverse communities into unified administrative units, leading to modern nation-states. Colonial powers constructed and imposed national identities, often based on oversimplified criteria, reorganizing complex societies into nations with defined boundaries. This backdrop highlights the intricate potentiality of partition within emerging nation-states, indicating that societal tensions and divisions are deeply embedded in the local social and political landscapes. Colonial strategies like the census and the millet system reinforced these divisions, categorizing populations and engraining a consciousness of division, setting the stage for potential future conflicts. Post-colonial nation-states continue to be shaped by these colonial legacies. The divisions established during colonial times often form the basis for political organization and representation in newly independent states. The dynamics between majority and minority groups, intensified by colonial methodologies, can lead to conflicts within the nation-state, with minority groups feeling marginalized, and majority groups striving to maintain dominance.

Territorial divisions creating separate nation-states, often rooted in colonial categorizations of majorities and minorities, significantly influence the political and social landscapes of new nations. These divisions, a remnant of colonial rule, establish the structure for political entities and movements aligned with majority-minority distinctions. Far from being mere historical artifacts, these alignments actively shape the politics of independent states.

In post-colonial nations, the relationship between majorities and minorities extends and intensifies colonial era divisions. Originally drawn along majority-minority lines, these partitions evolve, deeply affecting societal frameworks. Partition, therefore, is not static but a continuous process reshaping social structures. Such ingrained majority-minority dynamics often lead to further divisions within national, regional, and local contexts. These sustained partitions, echoing colonial identities and divisions, permeate political, educational, and social realms. This ingrained cycle poses ongoing challenges to the unity and stability of post-colonial states, often leading to enduring social and political strife.

Partition transcends geographical divisions, emerging as a pervasive ethos deeply ingrained within societal structures and mindsets. This concept manifests not just as a tangible reality but also as a potent idea, a movement, a mindset, and a worldview deeply ingrained within the community's psyche. Rooted in colonial ideologies and local politics, it transforms religious groups into political entities, reinforcing distinctions in race, religion, and ethnicity. This thesis investigates the origins of communalism in colonial India, focusing on the formation and evolution of communal discourses, and how they hindered a unified national consciousness. It examines the impact of colonial narratives on identity perceptions and the complex interplay between these narratives and the Muslim leadership's approach to

anti-imperialism, secularism, and the emergence of the nation-state, aiming to unravel the lasting legacy of colonialism in shaping societal divisions and national identities.

Building on this understanding of partition as a deeply ingrained ethos, the determination of truth and falsehood within any discourse can subtly become a mechanism of exclusion, further complicating the interplay between colonial narratives and communal identities. The effectiveness of discourse relies on masking its inherent pursuit of truth, as though its evolution and pursuit are concealed by the truth it claims to unveil. Despite appearing detached from desire and power, discourses often overlook the persistent will to truth within them, an aspect Foucault emphasizes by suggesting that the self tends to fabricate a coherent identity. This enduring pursuit of truth is so embedded that it often obscures the very truth it seeks to disclose,[7] necessitating a deeper examination of 'what is unspoken in what is said'.[8] In colonial India, the practices of Muslim subjects had a constitutive connection with imperial discourse, reflecting Foucault's idea - the self has a tendency to 'fabricates a coherent identity'.[9] The attitude of Muslim leadership towards anti-imperialism mirrored the character of imperialism itself, influenced by a colonial narrative of difference that framed religious identity in opposition to Western secular identity, thereby shaping the Muslim leadership's stance and contributing to the complexities of forming a unified national consciousness in the face of colonial divisions.

Methodology

My study explores the connections and similarities between various regions resulting from colonial discourse. I utilize Foucault's genealogical approach as an effective

[7] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language* (New York, NY: Vintage, 1982), 219.
[8] Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 240.
[9] Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Penguin, 1991), sec. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 81.

methodological tool to trace these links back to the colonial mindset. This approach involves a systematic compilation of colonial knowledge about a specific subject, reflecting the power dynamics in play.[10] The Western perception of the East, rooted in a sense of superiority,[11] established 'a system of truths'[12] that not only guided colonial governance but also disseminated the West's biases among the colonized populations, fundamentally transforming their societal structures.[13]

Genealogy, critical of discursive regimes encompassing 'processes, procedures, and apparatuses', serves as a valuable tool for tracing the evolution of these colonial 'truths'. It allows us to track back from our current understandings to the contingencies of the colonial era.[14] This method, while inspired by Foucault, is not applied rigidly, allowing for a nuanced examination of the colonial legacy and its impact on present-day realities.

Foucault's genealogical approach significantly informed his concepts of 'the art of government' - 'governmentality',[15] as well as 'subject formation'. This approach views the subject as a site where state power is exercised, while simultaneously recognizing the subject's inherent agency. It is this agency that amplifies the process of subject formation, making it a formidable force. Genealogy delves into the intricate relationship between 'power and knowledge', placing it at the core of 'governmentality'. It traces how the 'subject' is constituted through various 'discursive and non-discursive' means, rendering the genealogical method apt for examining the construction of the colonial subject.

[10]Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 2 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 32.
[11]Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, 2003), 29.
[12]Said, 206.
[13]Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 32.
[14]Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003), 16.
[15]Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1–3.

My research employs the concept of 'governmentality' to deepen our understanding of colonial governance in colonial India and mandate Palestine. This approach enables a more nuanced comprehension of colonial governance and offers insight into the constitution of the subject, not merely as an outcome of colonial discourse. In the context of colonial 'subject formation,' subjects were compelled to accept their own constitution,[16] a process whose urgency is underscored by the enduring colonial legacy in post-colonial states.

The subjectification process, stemming from colonial 'modes of secular-liberal' policies and practices, transcends mere functionality.[17] Partition first emerged in the minds of colonial subjects, developing into a structural reality. This mental partition was potent enough to segregate communities, reducing the importance of physical boundaries. Deep-rooted divisions in thought and perception led to the separation of communities, irrespective of physical demarcations. Consequently, the study of subject formation becomes crucial for comprehending these dynamics, especially in understanding how colonial legacies continue to influence post-colonial societies.

Utilizing Foucauldian methodology, this thesis shifts focus from searching for deeper meanings in colonial discourse to analysing the surface appearances of statements.[18] This approach challenges dominant narratives in Indian colonial history, emphasizing descriptions of differences, transformations, and continuities without resorting to totalizing themes. Recognizing the specificity of historical events as instances of 'contingency', the thesis advocates for writing history without judgment, centring on the unintended consequences of power relations as reflected in the appearances and statements that constitute colonial knowledge. These are not merely representations but active participants in shaping history.

[16]Luther Martin, ed., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University Massachusetts Press, 1998), 146.
[17]Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011), 194.
[18] Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 9–10.

This perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of the past, free from the constraints of conventional interpretative frameworks.

The colonial context was a fundamental condition for the existence of the colonial subject, manifesting through 'truth' as a form of subjectivity.[19] Subjectification was a process where the 'subject constitutes himself', employing various techniques, methods, and procedures historically available, often under the influence of factors beyond his control. This process tied colonial subjects to a 'truth' propagated by the colonial regime, typified by notions that colonial society was inherently divided along castes, races, and religions.[20]

Adhering to Foucauldian methodology, my research positions the 'register' of this colonial 'production of truth' at the heart of my critical inquiry into the 'history of the present'. This approach underscores how these propagated truths shaped the colonial subject's identity and societal structure. Foucault delineates two forms of power: 'general power', characterized as 'a structure of actions' that affects a subject's decision-making capacity, retaining an 'unstable and reversible' nature; and 'domination', defined as 'a structure of force', where the subjected individual has no leeway for action.[21] In the colonial context, these two types of power coexisted simultaneously. Within this interplay of force and action, there lies a 'fragmented and shifting vision of power' relations inherent in colonial 'governmentality', which sought to direct the behaviour of its subject population. This dynamic reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of power in the colonial setting.[22]

[19]Michel Foucault, *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson et al., trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador USA, 2016), 80.
[20]Shabnum Tejani, *Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890-1950* (Bloomington, Ind. : Chesham: Indiana University Press, 2008), 118–19.
[21]Barry Hindess, *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 97.
[22]Stephen Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities* (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 3.

Comparing the ‘Palestine Question’ and the ‘Muslim Question’ poses challenges due to specialization and language barriers, and prevailing views that often see partitions in these cases as unique nation-state formations, rather than parallel phenomena. Differences in the duration and nature of British rule – two centuries in India versus a shorter mandate in Palestine, where governance aimed at preparing for self-governance – further complicate the comparison.[23]

My research explores the ‘minoritisation’ of the Jewish community in eighteenth-century Europe and the ‘Muslim minoritisation’ in early twentieth-century colonial India within a broader imperial framework. Existing literature, focused primarily on individual countries, often overlooks the shared roots of ‘colonial governmentality’. Expanding the study's scope reveals a better understanding of how colonial policies contingently fostered minority status, leading to the structural logic of partition. Overlooking the British role in shaping religion-based identities in the colonies risks misinterpreting religious identity-based conflicts and their resolution in post-colonial states. Therefore, it is essential to move beyond country-specific analyses and recognize the influence of colonial administrative policies and practices, prevalent throughout the empire, in the construction and management of difference.

My research focuses on a conceptual rethinking of key issues in existing debates rather than unearthing new archival materials or uncovering unknown facts. While I have conducted some archival research, particularly on Allama Mashriqi’s views on Palestine and Indian Muslims in mandate Palestine where secondary sources were lacking, my primary reliance is on secondary literature. I employ a critical framework and a relational comparative approach to understand current issues in both regions.

[23]‘Appendix: Covenant for the League of Nations Showing the Preliminary Reported Draft and the Covenant as Finally Adopted at the Plenary Session’, *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York* 8, no. 3 (1919): 127–54.

However, the 'historiography of the regional exceptionalism' has so far impeded our understanding of the imperial policy and practice of partition. I apply 'a comparative and transnational' framework critical to understanding the context in which the partitions emerged, emerging differently in different contexts and the way partition turned into a 'travelling theory'.[24] Among other challenges of situating within a comparative and a transnational context, it has been daunting for scholars to research in various archives, in several languages, and at the same time in numerous historiographies.

There is a substantial body of work written from regional perspectives, yet a comparative approach is vital. Understanding the specific contexts in which partitions occurred, and how they differed across various settings, necessitates a comparative and transnational foundation.[25] Such a study involves navigating the complexities of researching in diverse archives, inscribed in different languages and encoded in different historiographies.

It is common to view certain aspects of partition as unique to a region. For instance, the partition of colonial India is often seen as unparalleled due to the vast scale of its territorial division and demographic changes.[26] Similarly, the creation of the Jewish state is frequently regarded as an exceptional case. However, my research aims to transcend these singular regional narratives, advocating for a broader, comparative perspective that acknowledges both unique and shared aspects of these historical events.

European imperialism has significantly shaped global political and intellectual landscapes, making Europe a central 'symbolic point of reference' and a key intellectual

[24]Lucy P. Chester, '"Close Parallels"? Interrelated Discussions of Partition in South Asia and the Palestine Mandate (1936-1948)', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 131.
[25]Chester, 131.
[26]Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.

resource.[27] Europe's influence extends beyond geography, dominating global knowledge structures. As Fineni suggests, the epistemological frameworks in colonies were transformed not just through translation but through prolonged processes of decolonization and critiques of imperialism and Orientalism.[28] Consequently, Eurocentrism is a 'crucial enabling condition' for theoretical models like post-colonialism, which challenge European cultural and political hegemony.[29]

Eurocentrism has been instrumental in developing methodologies countering European dominance. It is a fundamental aspect of my research, forming a critical part of the intellectual framework underpinning my work. Recognizing Eurocentrism's role in shaping ideas and research tools is vital for understanding complexities in knowledge production. Over time, with Europe's global rise in influence, Eurocentrism has become naturalized, often eclipsing earlier and alternative interpretations of history.[30]

Eurocentrism is central to my understanding of Indian Muslim leaders like Maulana Mohamed Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Inayatullah Mashraqi, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Their roles in shaping their community's identity and civilizational framing of Islam were influenced by Eurocentrism, which redefined Islam in the 19th century to align with European historical perspectives, overlooking earlier understandings. Eurocentrism's pervasive influence shapes thinking and knowledge production,[31] imposes modern European categories as universal frameworks for global history.[32] Acknowledging Eurocentrism's transformation of 'Islam' into 'Islamic civilization' highlights the limitations

---

[27] Shahzad Bashir, "Eurocentrism, Islam, and the Intellectual Politics of Civilizational Framing," *InterDisciplines 2: Journal of History and Sociology* Issue: Done with Eurocentrism? Directions, Diversions, and Debates in History and Sociology (2017).
[28] David Fieni, 'French Decadence, Arab Awakenings: Figures of Decay in the Arab "Nahda."', *Boundary 2* 39, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 143–60.
[29] Bashir, 'Eurocentrism, Islam, and the Intellectual Politics of Civilizational Framing'.
[30] Anthony Grafton, *What Was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe.*, New Ed edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[31] Bashir, 'Eurocentrism, Islam, and the Intellectual Politics of Civilizational Framing'.
[32] Bashir.

of civilizational framing. Bashir's idea of 'Eurocentrism's domesticability' suggests that European concepts, deeply embedded in native knowledge systems, have been indigenized and reshaped globally over centuries. Exploring local political leadership in India and Palestine through a historically contingent Eurocentric lens provides clearer insights and novel interpretive methods.[33]

The works of Gottlieb W. Leitner and Jurji Zaidan reflect a nineteenth-century shift in how Islam was historically understood, aligning with a broader transformation in historical perception. This era reinterpreted the history of Indian Muslims as part of a wider Islamic narrative centred around the Middle East, thus diminishing the distinct significance of Muslim India. This repositioning, intended to meet the contemporary social and intellectual needs of Indian Muslims, inadvertently assimilated their history into a universal 'Islamic history', predominantly Eurocentric and Middle Eastern in focus.[34] As a result, efforts to rejuvenate the societal and cultural identity of Indian Muslims were significantly influenced by Eurocentric epistemological frameworks, despite attempts at non-European contextualization. This Eurocentric lens, by placing Islam within a Middle Eastern 'civilization', effectively divorced Indian Muslims from their unique historical narrative. Consequently, Indian Muslims, feeling marginalized, were inclined to collaborate with British colonial powers, seeking affirmation of their identity within this redefined historical and cultural framework.

Indian Muslims played an active role in shaping Eurocentric discourses on their history and Islam, positioning 'Islamic history' as an academic field tailored to the political imperatives of imperial governance. This perspective became crucial for understanding and managing vast Muslim populations under colonial rule in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

[33] Bashir.
[34] Bashir.

Leitner, a philologist and Orientalist, opposed the British colonial policy of English-medium education, advocating for vernacular learning.[35] He promoted educating Maulvis (Muslim religious scholars) about Arabian history's chronological sequence within the broader Islamic and world historical narratives. Leitner's approach, embedding Islam within the context of universal civilization history,[36] typifies the Eurocentric focus on the Middle East, often marginalizing diverse Muslim experiences in regions like India.

Foucault, conversely, rejects the notion of universal historiography that surreptitiously perceives history as a 'macro-consciousness', advocating for a multifaceted history composed of numerous narratives. He criticizes the concept of total history, which attempts to encapsulate a civilization's overall form or a society's underlying principle.[37] Instead, he suggests exploring the contingent beginnings of colonial discourse on Islamic civilization, leading to a reconstitution of colonial subject identities through a multiplicity of local events.[38]

The partitions of colonial India and mandate Palestine, while sharing similarities, are distinct in their contexts. These events, shaped by internal and external political pressures, demand a nuanced narration beyond simple generalizations. Comparative studies help identify both commonalities and specificities, enhancing our understanding of these partitions as not just emotionally charged topics but as complex human and political phenomena. The 20th-century partitions in India and Palestine, though geographically and culturally distinct, both experienced mass migrations, violence, and the birth of new states, underscoring the importance of comparative research for gaining insights into each event.

---

[35] Jeffrey M. Diamond, 'The Orientalist-Literati Relationship in the Northwest: G.W. Leitner, Muhammad Hussain Azad and the Rhetoric of Neo-Orientalism in Colonial Lahore', *South Asia Research* 31, no. 1 (1 February 2011): 25–43.
[36] Bashir, 'Eurocentrism, Islam, and the Intellectual Politics of Civilizational Framing', cited Leitner's Sinin-i-Islam, 1871.
[37] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 9.
[38] Foucault, 218.

Comparative studies provide objectivity, allowing scholars to analyse partitions with emotional detachment, leading to balanced assessments that can be reapplied to one's own history. This approach reveals biases and assumptions, enriching our understanding of culture and history. Comparative study isn't just about identifying similarities but also appreciating differences, offering deeper insights into our historical and cultural perspectives. Engaging in this reflective process enriches our global and self-understanding.

The historiography of the partitions in South Asia and Palestine presents a rich study of the complex interplay of national struggles and territorial divisions marking the end of British colonialism. 1947 was a watershed year in the Indian subcontinent, witnessing the birth of India and Pakistan amidst violence and mass migration. Simultaneously, the 1947 partition plan radically altered Palestine, leading to Israel's creation in 1948 and the Palestinian 'Nakba', a symbol of loss and dislocation.

This highlights the dual character of these partitions, evident in both regions' historiography. The independence movements in colonial India and mandate Palestine wrestled with minority integration, resulting in a paradox: the elation of freedom overshadowed by the anguish of division. Historiographical accounts mirror this duality, with Pakistani and Israeli scholars often focusing on national genesis, while Indian and Palestinian researchers emphasize partition's tragedies. This variance in viewpoints extends beyond national differences, reflecting ongoing scholarly discourse, constantly reinterpreted through diverse sources and methodologies.

These partitions' socio-political, cultural, and humanitarian ramifications offer extensive academic inquiry. Israeli New Historians like Avi Shlaim,[39,40] Benny Morris,[41] and

---

[39] Avi Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine 1921-1951*, New ed of Abridged ed (Clarendon Press, 1998).
[40] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New Ed (Penguin, 2001).

Ilan Pappe,[42] have critically re-evaluated Zionist actions and the 1948 Palestinian exodus, challenging conventional narratives.

The historiography of British involvement in South Asian and Palestinian partitions is diverse. Some view these partitions as accidental outcomes of British policy, while others believe they intentionally fuelled communal tensions. In Pakistan, partition is often seen as key to Muslim identity, a notion debated in Indian scholarship. Palestinian historiography, traditionally framing Partition around Zionist goals, now explores wider influences, reflecting the contentious nature of Partition. Recent focus on grassroots histories reveals personal tales of violence, displacement, and minority struggles, providing a humanized view of these partitions, capturing the wider socio-political context.

Secularism in Colonial India

The recent resurgence of religion in post-colonial states and Europe, in the context with earlier discussions on colonialism's role in shaping religious and secular identities, reveals the complex interplay between these factors. Notably, Donald Smith in the 1960s foresaw the potential rise of Hindu communalism in India under certain conditions.[43] This prediction aligns with the observation that the Indian model of secularism, hindered by conceptual flaws, has inadvertently contributed to the growth of Hindu nationalism, marking a significant deviation from the expected secular ideals.[44] Contrary to the anticipated decline of public religious influence, the persistent religious engagement in India has posed

---

[41] Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*, Updated (Vintage, 2001).
[42] Ilan Pappé, ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question: A Reader*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 1999).
[43]Donald Eugene Smith, *India As A Secular State* (Sagwan Press, 2018), 500.
[44]Rajeev Bhargava, 'The Secular Imperative', *India International Centre Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1995): 3–16.

challenges to the development of a civic ideal, revealing the complex legacy of colonialism in shaping religious and secular dynamics.[45]

While secularism, a European political construct, aimed to separate religion from state governance,[46] its implementation in colonies often politicized religious affiliations. Asad observes that while secularism aimed to mitigate the perceived violence of collective religious expression, it also redefined religious concepts.[47] Presented as an ideal for religiously strife-ridden colonized societies, its implementation in colonies often politicized religious affiliations.[48] Anthony Reid notes that Asia, traditionally a centre of religious pluralism, was unaccustomed to the concept of religious exclusivity introduced by European models linking religion with power. This led to a shift from indigenous religious diversity to enforced uniformity.[49] The colonial introduction of the nation-state form, particularly in representative politics, exacerbated religious divisions, leaving a legacy of intolerance towards religious and cultural differences.

Exploring secularism in India and its parallels in Israel/Palestine reveals their shared secularist underpinnings. Placing Indian secularism in a trans-colonial context illuminates its interpretation and application in both regions. Tejani highlights that Gandhi's secularism, influenced by Hindu dharma, represented a local adaptation and an embrace of religious plurality.[50] Gandhi's use of Hinduism for mass mobilization in the anti-colonial movement[51] challenges traditional interpretations of his secular stance. Donald Smith contends that Gandhi's methods imparted a Hindu-centric perspective to his liberation efforts, questioning

---

[45]Shabnum Tejani, 'Secularism', in *Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies*, ed. Gita Dharampal-Frick et al. (NYU Press, 2015), 253.
[46]Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 1.
[47]Asad, 2.
[48]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 1.
[49]Anthony Reid, "Religious Pluralism or Conformity in Southeast Asia's Cultural Legacy," *Studia Islamika* 22, no. 3 (December 31, 2015): 387–404.
[50]Tejani, 'Secularism', 253.
[51]Ashis Nandy, 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto', in *Gandhi's Significance For Today*, ed. John Hick et al. (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989), 246.

the nature of his secularism.[52] Gandhi's approach of blending religion with politics shares similarities with the Zionist and Pakistan movements. Like their European counterparts, these movements harnessed secular nationalism, enriched with religious zeal, to expedite the process of nation-building.[53] Despite reaching their political objectives, the influence of religion persisted, resisting relegation in their evolving political contexts.

Indian academia's interpretation of 'secular' often collides with notions of non-religiosity, pitting secularism against communalism and modernity against tradition.[54] Scholars like Ashis Nandy, T.N. Madan, Partha Chatterjee, and Rajeev Bhargava critically reassess secularism in India's post-colonial context. Nandy critiques Eurocentric secularism as unsuitable for Indian culture,[55] while Madan advocates for integrating the secular and sacred in Indian society.[56] Chatterjee points out secularism's inadequacies in countering Hindu majoritarianism, and Bhargava proposes an Indian model of secularism based on 'principled distance' between religion and state, emphasizing the need to understand secularism's unique Indian context and transnational history. Collectively, these scholars argue against relegating religion to the private sphere, each contributing unique perspectives to the debate. Nandy attributes religious extremism to modernity, advocating for traditional indigenous tolerance.[57] Madan questions secularism's practicality[58] in a religiously plural and tolerant India.[59] Chatterjee looks for political solutions within modern state structures,[60] and

---

[52]Donald Eugene Smith, 'Gandhi, Hinduism and Mass Politics', in *Religion and Political Modernization*, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 136.
[53]Nikki R. Keddie, 'Secularism & Its Discontents', *Daedalus* 132, no. 3 (2003): 14–30.
[54]Tejani, 'Secularism', 251.
[55]T. N. Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place', in *Religion in India*, ed. T. N. Madan, 2Rev Ed edition (Delhi: OUP India, 2012), 399.
[56]T. N. Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place', in *Secularism and Its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition (Delhi: OUP India, 2000), 319–20.
[57]Ashis Nandy, 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance', in *Secularism and Its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition (Delhi: OUP India, 2000), 337.
[58]Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place', 2012, 395.
[59]Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place', 2000, 319–20.
[60]Partha Chatterjee, 'Secularism and Tolerance', in *Secularism and Its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition (Delhi: OUP India, 2000), 348.

Bhargava challenges the 'western modern vs. indigenous traditional' dichotomy, underscoring the complexity and evolution of Indian secularism.[61]

Talal Asad challenges the notion of Indian secularism's distinctiveness, questioning the presumed universality of secularism and its impact on moderating diverse cultural identities worldwide.[62] He examines how human essence is defined by inalienable rights and how this shapes a person's secular identity.[63] Hannah Arendt underscores the global nature of secularism, linking human rights intrinsically to citizenship and framing individuals' rights within the purview of their respective nation-states.[64]

Secularism and Nationalism

Building on previous discussions about secularism's complexities in the Indian context, Partha Chatterjee addresses the contradictions within nationalist discourse. He observes how nationalism, in resisting colonial political domination, ironically embraced the intellectual tenets of modernity foundational to colonialism.[65] Chatterjee posits that nationalism was outwitted by the 'Cunning of Reason', finding itself both allured and limited by it.[66] Indian nationalism, rooted in a secular notion of Indianness opposing British rule, grappled with internal tensions due to religion-based politics. Contrary to initial appearances, religious politics was not in opposition to, but rather intricately linked with, the evolution of Indian nationalism.

---

[61]Rajeev Bhargava, 'The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism', in *The Future of Secularism*, ed. T.N. Srinivasan (New Delhi; New York: OUP India, 2008), 20–53.
[62]Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 16.
[63]Asad, 130.
[64]Asad, 135.
[65]Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, 2nd edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 30.
[66]Chatterjee, 17.

Secularism is closely linked with the emergence of the modern 'nation-state form',[67] arising in eighteenth-century Europe as part of the development of modern governance. This era saw the rise of secular techniques in population management, such as enumeration, reporting, and regulation,[68] intertwining 'secularism' and 'nation-state' within state power dynamics. The 'category of religion' is considered a by-product of secular thought, emerging from objective cataloguing of religious customs without ascribing them truth or falsity.[69] As secularism, deemed universally applicable, spread to colonies with imperial expansion, it introduced the 'category of religion'. Ashis Nandy situates secularism within 'modernity', underlining a stark division between religion and secularism and pointing to the colonial creation of a dichotomy between the nation-state concept and traditional religious communities.[70]

Sir Mohammad Iqbal, a renowned poet and philosopher, critically assessed the nation-state concept for Indian Muslims, noting its roots in European Christian contexts.[71] K.N. Panikkar highlights how secular colonial governance deepened Hindu-Muslim rifts through selective patronage and a divide-and-rule strategy.[72] This colonial imprint significantly shaped the Indian national movement, leading to the emergence of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. The increasing divide between Hindu and Muslim communities was further propelled by Savarkar's 'two-nation' theory and Muhammad Ali Jinnah's evolution from a nationalist to a Muslim leader. Gandhi's politics, perceived by Jinnah as favouring Hindu interests, culminated in Jinnah's departure from the Congress Party. Influenced by the

[67]Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 7.
[68]Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 3–4.
[69]Margaret C Jacob, *The Secular Enlightenment* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2019), 5.
[70]Akeel Bilgrami, 'Two Concepts of Secularism Reason, Modernity and Archimedean Ideal', *Economic and Political Weekly* 29, no. 28 (9 July 1994).
[71]Faisal Devji, 'From Minority to Nation', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 36.
[72]K.N. Panikkar, 'Communalism', in *Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies* (NYU Press, 2015), 47.

early 1920s Khilafat movement, Jinnah shifted his stance towards championing a distinct Muslim identity in India, ultimately advocating for Pakistan's creation to safeguard Muslim interests after British rule. Despite British efforts to maintain India's unity, the strong support for Pakistan among Indian Muslims revealed an already entrenched mental partition.

Ayesha Jalal posits that the historical narrative of South Asia's partition is dominated by two contrasting yet straightforward paradigms rooted in the two-nation theory.[73] She argues that secularism and religion, rather than being mutually exclusive, collectively shaped Indian-style nationalism.[74] Ironically, the emergence of secular nationalism in India prompted the transformation of Hinduism and Islam into communal ideologies.

In historical Palestine, secularism held a more diverse array of meanings than what is commonly perceived today.[75] With the British conquest of Palestine, an Orientalist view of the region as the biblical 'Holy Land' was imposed. Their colonial governance tactics, refined in India, relied on categorizing subjects by religion, aiming to curb the emergence of 'secular nationalism'.[76] Western secular education, a conduit for European modernity in the colonies, paradoxically threatened colonial rule. It produced a local elite which often collaborated with colonial powers, yet simultaneously fostered a liberal, educated cohort pivotal to the anti-colonial movement. This movement, frequently emphasized religious identities as a response to the spread of secularism, thus revealing the inherent contradictions within the colonial secular framework.

Secularism and Jewish Particularity

[73]Ayesha Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of "Communalism": Partition Historiography Revisited', *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 3 (1996): 681–89.
[74]Josef Frulêchtl, *Our Enlightened Barbarian Modernity and the Project of a Critical Theory of Culture: Inaugural Lecture Delivered on the Appointment to the Chair of Philosophy of Art and Culture at the University of Amsterdam*, 2008, 12.
[75]Keddie, 'Secularism & Its Discontents'.
[76]Laura Robson, 'Becoming a Sectarian Minority: Arab Christians in Twentieth-Century Palestine', in *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, ed. Laura Robson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016), 61.

The post-Enlightenment secularization in Europe significantly transformed Jewish communities, giving rise to the 'Jewish Question'. Foucault identifies this period, with its secular foundations,[77] as a transition from loyalty to sovereign kings to the implementation of 'disciplinary power',[78] aiding the development of nation-states. This shift altered power dynamics from sovereign-focused politics to broader societal governance.[79] In this light, contrasting colonial nationalism with the modern 'nation-state' provides a distinct perspective on its evolution.[80] Modern Europe, characterized by dominant ethnic groups and a focus on minority protection, grappled with linguistic diversity and the challenge of forming unified nations and peoples.[81]

The advent of the 'nation-state' form significantly altered the landscape for historically autonomous Jewish communities, leading to the emergence of the 'Jewish Question'. This political evolution necessitated the disbandment of traditional Jewish corporate structures and identities. It compelled Jews to prove their eligibility for equal rights by forgoing customary practices, dismantling their communal frameworks, and adopting modernity.[82] Motivated by the possibility of overcoming societal stigma, many Jews were prepared to relinquish their distinct communal identities.[83] This internalization of difference, a barrier to complete assimilation into European society, became a crucial underpinning of the Zionist movement.

---

[77]Jacob, *The Secular Enlightenment*, 1.

[78]Mona Lilja and Stellan Vinthagen, "Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power and Biopower: Resisting What Power with What Resistance?," *Journal of Political Power* 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 107–26,

[79] Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*, ed. Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin, 2004).

[80]Gopal Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, New Edition (London; New York: Verso Books, 2012), 158.

[81]Aamir R. Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton University Press, 2007), 151.

[82]James Pasto, 'Islam's "Strange Secret Sharer": Orientalism, Judaism, and the Jewish Question', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 3 (1 July 1998): 437–74.

[83]Aziza Khazzoom, 'The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel', *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 4 (2003): 481–510, https://doi.org/10.2307/1519736.

In late nineteenth-century Europe, Jewish nationalism emerged as a response to widespread anti-Semitism and debates over assimilation, sanctifying Israel.[84] Ahad Ha'am challenged Herzl's view that this nationalism was solely a reaction to 'environmental pressure',[85] seeing it instead as the evolution of a persecuted religious community into a secular nation-state concept. This transformation sparked a 'crisis of secularization' within Zionism, reflecting the complex transition from a communal religion to a secular national identity.[86]

Zionism, which emerged alongside post-Enlightenment ideas of nationalism and secularism, saw the rise of movements such as Haskala (the Hebrew Enlightenment), Hibbat Zion, and 'Doikeyt', capturing the Jewish imagination. 'Doikeyt', which called for Jewish political and national rights within existing residences, gained popularity among European Jews. Championed by the Bund, a Jewish socialist party, it marked the first significant mobilization of Jewish masses for secular political action in modern Jewish history.

After the Balfour Declaration, Zionism gained prominence but encountered a critical dilemma: Jewish endeavours to escape minority status in Europe inadvertently led to efforts to transform the Arab majority in Palestine into a minority, aiming to establish Jewish majority. The Palestinian Arabs, a significant majority, naturally resisted being demoted to minority status in their own land due to Jewish persecution in Europe. Presently, Palestinian Arabs, now a minority within the Jewish state, face allegations of denying the Jewish majority's right to define the state according to their vision.[87]

[84]Norman L. Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', in *Religion and Political Modernization*, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 95.
[85]Anita Shapira, 'Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky: Comments on Their Nationalist Concepts', *Jewish History* 4, no. 2 (1 October 1990): 59–69.
[86]Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', 95.
[87]Asher Susser, 'Partition and the Arab Palestinian Minority in Israel', *Israel Studies* 14, no. 2 (2009): 105–19.

The establishment of Israel as a secular national endeavour witnessed a decline in liberal secularism's influence, with religious factors gaining prominence in both Jewish and Indian nationalisms. The growing religious-secular rift in these regions suggests that secularism's primary counterpoint is not religion, but nationalism.[88] The resurgence of religion challenges the notion of secularism as a constant in modern development,[89] revealing its inconsistency in both India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine.

Upon its establishment, Israel forged a strong bond with Orthodox Judaism, intertwining Judaism as a religion with Jewish nationalism as a secular ideology. This shift represents a significant setback for liberal secularization in Israel,[90] reflecting a secular state's evolving dynamics, similar to Muslim nationalism's evolution in colonial India. Contrary to the traditional view of secularization as distancing society and culture from religious control,[91] the merging of religious and nationalist ideologies in both India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine led to an opposite effect.

In July 2018, the passage of Israel's 'Nation-State Bill', which legally enshrined Israel as the 'Nation-State of the Jewish People', reignited the contentious 'Who is a Jew'? debate, underscoring the friction between Jewish religious nationalism and Israeli secular nationalism. The Israeli practice of relying on religious law to define Jewish identity, through criteria like maternal lineage or religious conversion, muddies the distinction between secular and religious facets of Jewish identity.[92] The Benjamin Shalit case, which centred on the registration of children from a non-Jewish spouse as Jews, highlighted the limits of secularization in Israel. Shalit's legal struggle and the subsequent court ruling in his favour

[88]Bruce Robbins, 'Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said's "Voyage In"', *Social Text*, no. 40 (1994): 25–37, https://doi.org/10.2307/466794.
[89]William J. Samarin, 'Secularism Is Not Inevitable [Abstract]', *African Studies Bulletin* 7, no. 4 (1964): 27–27,
[90]Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', 104.
[91]Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion*, n. e. edition (Penguin: Penguin, 1973), 113.
[92]Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', 113.

shed light on the challenges faced by secular principles in a context where religious considerations wield significant influence. The Knesset's legislative actions following this case further underscored the deep-seated influence of Judaism in shaping the contours of secular Jewish nationalism within Israel.[93]

This dynamic in Israel mirrors broader challenges encountered in both India and Israel, where efforts towards secularization aimed to standardize and unify diverse cultural identities within national boundaries. Such nation-building strategies necessitated the integration of varied identity expressions into a cohesive national narrative. However, this push for secularization often revealed an underlying intolerance for diversity within the liberal nation-state model. By striving to consolidate religious communities under singular national identities, these secularization efforts inadvertently fuelled ongoing inter-community discord, highlighting the complex interplay between secular ambitions and the enduring influence of religious identities in shaping national frameworks.

Historical Context and Dominant Narratives: Partition of Colonial India

The 1947 partition of British India, marking the end of two centuries of British rule, profoundly reshaped India's socio-political landscape. British governance, accentuating majority-minority dynamics through practices like census-taking and separate electorates, heightened communal politics and religious tensions.

Primary Narratives: The Two-Nation Theory, positing Hindus and Muslims as separate nations, was pivotal in partition discourse. Muhammad Ali Jinnah's call for Pakistan stemmed from this theory. In contrast, leaders like Gandhi and Nehru envisioned a secular, unified India with diverse religions and cultures. This ideological split, intensified by British

[93]Zucker, 114.

divide-and-rule policies, led to heightened communal tensions and the eventual partition to protect Muslim interests in a Hindu-majority state.

Historical Context and Dominant Narratives: Partition of Mandate Palestine

Zionism, a late 19th-century Jewish national revival movement in Palestine, arose amid European anti-Semitism. Supported by British backing and Jewish commitment, it transformed the Middle East, culminating in Israel's creation in 1948. This movement faced opposition from Arab resistance to a Jewish-majority state in majority-Arab Palestine.

Primary Narratives: The 1917 Balfour Declaration, promising a Jewish homeland in Palestine, sparked a debate over whether it reflected genuine support for Zionism or was a geopolitical tactic. Britain's post-Holocaust moral stance and Arab nationalism opposing Jewish immigration, were central to the partition narrative. The UN's 1947 resolution to divide Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states emerged from these conflicts. For Palestinians, Israel's establishment meant loss and displacement – the Nakba. Israel's creation, which is deeply intertwined with the Holocaust's moral narrative, demands a nuanced understanding that encompasses both Jewish aspirations and Palestinian experiences of partition.

Partition Historiography: Exploring Trauma in India-Pakistan Literature

In recent decades, Indian historiography has witnessed a shift from primarily analysing the causes of the Partition of India to focusing on its harrowing aftermath. This new trend emphasizes the violence and atrocities that ensued, capturing deeply personal narratives and the societal upheavals that resulted. By emphasizing the catastrophic impacts, historians provide a fuller understanding of the event, weaving together macro-level political analysis with moving micro-level accounts of violence and displacement. Current historiography on

the Partition presents a multifaceted discourse, encompassing a range of perspectives that view it both as a localized solution and within broader, interconnected contexts. Recent studies have broadened the scope, incorporating subaltern and gendered perspectives, focusing on oral histories of victims,[94] and examining international dimensions such as Britain's defence strategies and American involvement.[95] These analyses also examine domestic politics, highlighting the influential roles of the Congress and the Muslim League, while positing the British as facilitators rather than principal architects of the partition.[96] This complex topic continues to stimulate debate, with ongoing research unravelling its complex factors and causes.

Gyanendra Pandey, a key Subaltern historian, argues that the post-Partition violence in India stemmed from intricate factors, particularly in political and communal realms. His significant contribution to the Partition historiography focuses on the violence and its effects on survivors, highlighting the discrepancies between nationalist narratives and actual experiences. Pandey emphasizes the importance of examining evolving communal experiences to fully grasp the Partition's complexities. He advocates for a move beyond simplistic 'nationalist' accounts that rely on fixed community definitions, calling for a more nuanced exploration of the period.[97]

Ishtiaq Ahmad specifically focuses on violence in Lahore, constructing a theory of ethnic cleansing[98] that sheds light on the nature of this violence. Urvashi Butalia employs oral history to unearth the Partition's varied impacts, emphasizing stories from underrepresented

[94] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2000).
[95] Narendra Singh Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (Carroll & Graf, 2006).
[96] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, 58.
[97] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 204–5.
[98] Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy Through Secret British Reports and First Person Accounts* (Rupa & Co, 2011).

groups like women, children, and Dalits. Her work, along with contributions from Indian women writers, underscores the significance of resilience in grappling with the Partition's aftermath.[99] Wazira Ali Zamindar investigates the experiences of displaced communities in Karachi and Delhi, uncovering hidden histories, reframing our perception of Indian and Pakistani citizenship post-Partition. Zamindar examines not only the overt violence but also the bureaucratic hurdles the migrants faced, exploring how individual agency interacted with post-partition state mechanisms.[100] Iqbal Chawla, diverging from the mainstream narratives that typically blame figures like Mountbatten for the partition's violence, highlights the role of preceding policies and accompanied factors, arguing that blaming solely the British officials is overly simplistic. Chawla's approach encourages a more nuanced and thorough understanding of the Partition's complexities.[101]

Recent trauma studies on India's partition increasingly focus on local impacts, exploring the effects in specific areas beyond general narratives. This locality-centred approach in partition studies, spearheaded by scholars like Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, underscores the significance of studying the aftermath in South Asian capitals. Their work sheds light on diverse urban experiences, enhancing our understanding of wider effects of the partition.[102] Ian Talbot furthers this trend with his comparative analysis of Lahore and Amritsar, detailing the partition's influence on violence, migration, and resettlement in these cities. His research particularly underlines the acute communal violence

---

[99] Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence*.
[100] Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (Columbia University Press, 2007).
[101] Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, 'Mountbatten's Response to the Communal Riots in the Punjab, 20 March to 15 August 1947: An Overview', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 4 (October 2016): 683–706, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186316000225.
[102] Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2000), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203450604.

in Lahore, offering insight into the partition's local impacts.[103] Building on Kudaisya, Tan, and Talbot's work, other researchers have embraced locality in their partition studies. Virdee's comparative exploration of Ludhiana and Lyallpur[104] focuses on theoretical aspects, while Chatha's work on Sialkot and Gujranwala uses locality as a key theme to examine these regions' unique post-partition trajectories.[105]

Studying specific localities in partition research offers a nuanced view of its effects, enhancing our understanding of impacted communities. However, this focus might overlook a comprehensive analysis of the root causes of the partition. As narratives shift to Subaltern histories, historians like Pandey emphasize the role of colonial knowledge in exacerbating religious tensions, a critical element in the backdrop of the Partition of colonial India.

Tracing the Roots: The Genesis of the India-Pakistan Partition

In British India, amidst a rising Hindu majority, a distinct political consciousness emerged among some Muslims, though not universally shared, with many Muslims choosing to stay in India post-partition, embracing a pluralistic Indian identity. Historians trace this Muslim political awareness, set against an expanding Hindu majority, back to the eighteenth century, culminating in the twentieth-century partition.[106]

Critiques of the Two-Nation theory[107] argue that the British Empire's motivations for partition were more about geopolitical control and suppressing nationalist movements than addressing communal tensions. Creating Muslim-majority Pakistan was seen as a defence

[103] Ian Talbot, *Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957* (Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2007).
[104] Pippa Virdee, *From the Ashes of 1947: Reimagining Punjab* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[105] Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot 1947-1961* (Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2011).
[106] J. Sai Deepak, *India, Bharat And Pakistan* (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2022).
[107] Anand K. Verma, *Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two-Nation Theory* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008).

against the Soviet influence, ensuring Western presence in South Asia.[108] Partition also offered Britain an organized withdrawal, potentially preventing broader conflict.[109] British policies, ostensibly secular, increasingly politicized religious identities among Indian Muslims, fuelling the communal divide that sharply separated Hindus and Muslims.[110] While British accounts often portray the partition as safeguarding minorities, contemporary historians advocate for a more intricate understanding of this crucial phase in South Asian history.[111]

Hamza Alavi challenges the view that Pakistan's creation was purely based on Islamic ideology, highlighting the significant roles of economic disparities and elite conflicts. He argues that the aspirations of the Muslim 'salariat' class were more pivotal in shaping Pakistan than mere religious fervour. While Islam provided unity, regional identities like Bengali, Sindhi, and Pashtun later contested Punjabi dominance. Alavi points to this class's reluctance to decentralize power as a key factor in Pakistan's identity struggles.[112]

Paul Brass highlights the crucial role of elite structures in communal conflicts.[113] He contends that communal violence often results from an 'institutionalized riot system', where orchestrated events mimic spontaneity for political gain. Despite authorities' awareness, such riots persist for their political utility.[114] Brass views Muslim separatism as a reaction to

[108] Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game*.
[109] Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Partition of India*, 1st Edition (Chatto & Windus London, 1961).
[110] Tejani, *Indian Secularism*.
[111] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*.
[112] Hamza Alavi, 'Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology', in *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State*, ed. Anita M. Weiss, First Edition (Vanguard Books Ltd., 1987), 23–46.
[113] Paul R. Brass, 'Elite Interests, Popular Passions, and Social Power in the Language Politics of India - Paul R. Brass', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27, no. No. 3 (May 2004): 353–75.
[114] Paul R. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005).

colonial politics rather than religious divides,[115] igniting debate with Francis Robinson. Brass underscores the role of Muslim elite in Uttar Pradesh in exaggerating religious differences in the late 19th century, whereas Robinson emphasizes Hindu and Muslim revivalism's lasting influence on identity formation. Robinson challenges the idea of elites freely manipulating cultural symbols, noting their deep roots in cultural contexts.[116] Both Brass and Robinson concurred that Hindu majoritarian politics were essential in shaping Muslim separatism.

Farzana Shaikh posits that Islamic thought significantly influenced modern Indian Muslim politics during colonial times. She notes that many Muslims engaged deeply with Islamic history, interpreting Mughal heritage and Islamic tenets in a way that favoured separatism. Viewing themselves as a 'charismatic community' focused on righteousness, they leaned towards the Muslim League, which clashed with the British liberal-democratic ideals and contributed to the Partition. Shaikh suggests that Islamic traditions, rather than bureaucratic categorizations, primarily drove Muslim separatism,[117] prompting questions about the wider Muslim population's alignment with these elite viewpoints. Mushir-ul-Haq, exploring why minority Muslims supported the Pakistan movement, concludes that they viewed it as a chance to establish a true Islamic state, echoing aspirations to create a 'Kingdom of God'.[118]

C. H. Philips analyses the immediate events leading to partition alongside deep-rooted cultural and historical factors influencing Muslim separatism in India. He highlights the impact of medieval Muslim triumphs and contemporary socio-economic challenges on

---

[115] Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, First Edition (London ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 124.
[116] Francis Robinson, 'Islam and Muslim Separatism: A Historiographic Debate', in *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, Second (New Delhi: Manohar, 1985), 344.
[117] Farzana Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam : Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947* (Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1989), https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/21999301.
[118] Mushir ul Haq, 'The Authority of Religion in Indian Muslim Politics', in *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, Second (New Delhi: Manohar, 1985), 420.

Muslim communities, noting the dense Muslim populations in the North-West and the North-East India as key drivers of separatist sentiment. Philips underscores the British colonial administration's recognition and leverage of Muslim identity in governance, evident in policies like weighted representation and separate communal electorates.[119] He posits that British strategies in India were tailored to the country's complex socio-political landscape, acknowledging and institutionalizing religious and cultural differences. Philips emphasizes Muhammad Ali Jinnah's pivotal transformation from a logical, methodical politician to Qaid-e-Islam, a revered Muslim leader effectively navigating opposition, as key to understanding the partition. Furthermore, Philips notes the broad appeal of the 'Muslim homeland' concept,[120] especially among Muslims historically behind Hindus in commerce, industry, and public service. This idea, with its historical and religious significance, particularly resonated with the Muslim middle class.[121]

Kaushik Roy attributes the inevitability of the 1947 Partition to structural factors like colonial policies and societal divisions.[122] Satya P. Mohanty focuses on the lasting structural aftermath of colonialism, including the Partition.[123] In contrast, Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre examine key individuals, decisions, and events leading to Partition from a contingency perspective.[124] Mushirul Hasan views the Partition as a critical but singular aspect of India's independence, advocating for a broader understanding beyond the two-nation theory,[125] analysing a wide array of social and political factors.[126] Meanwhile, Jaswant

---

[119] C. H. Philips, *The Partition of India 1947* (Leeds University Press, 1967), 9.
[120] Philips, 10.
[121] Philips, 16.
[122] Kaushik Roy, *Partition of India Why 1947?*, 1st edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[123] S. Mohanty, ed., *Colonialism, Modernity, and Literature: A View from India*, 2011th edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
[124] Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins, *Freedom At Midnight* (VIKAS PUBLISHING HOUSE PVT LTD, 2004).
[125] Mushirul Hasan, 'Memories of a Fragmented Nation: Rewriting the Histories of India's Partition', *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 41 (10 October 1998): 2662–68, https://doi.org/10.2307/4407270.
[126] Mushirul Hasan, ed., *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Singh critically assesses Muhammad Ali Jinnah's role within the broader context of Partition.[127]

Studies on India's Partition often integrate both contingent and structural factors. Yasmin Khan explores situational elements alongside the colonial context, suggesting that the Partition arose from specific events and decisions at the time, rather than being inevitable. She points out the unanticipated consequences of British withdrawal and critical choices by leaders, underscoring the partition's legacy of widespread distress.[128] Urvashi Butalia's anthology presents diverse essays on the partition, combining specific viewpoints with broader structural and contingent aspects, revealing its complex roots.[129] Michael Edwardes contrasts wide-ranging colonial frameworks with specific pre-partition policies and actions.[130] Ayesha Jalal examines Saadat Hasan Manto's works, offering insights into both the overarching socio-political structures and situational factors of Partition.[131] Robert Pearce evaluates British Prime Minister Clement Attlee's decisions within the context of the British empire's structural decline and immediate post-war challenges.[132]

In historical narratives focusing on contingency, interpretations of authors influenced by the bureaucratic mindset of the era are evident, particularly in critiques of Jinnah, who was accused of siding with the British against Congress's push for independence. Such perspectives, possibly coloured by contemporary bias, risk oversimplifying the complex motivations and actions of key figures. Gowher Rizvi interprets Linlithgow's support for Jinnah and the Muslim League as a reaction to Congress's aggressive independence

[127] Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence* (Rupa, 2009).
[128] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (Yale University Press, 2008).
[129] Urvashi Butalia, ed., *Partition: The Long Shadow* (Viking, 2015).
[130] Michael Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India* (Hassell Street Press, 2021).
[131] Ayesha Jalal, *The Pity of Partition: Manto's Life, Times, and Work across the India-Pakistan Divide* (Princeton University Press, 2013).
[132] Robert Pearce, *Attlee's Labour Governments 1945-51* (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1993), https://www.routledge.com/Attlees-Labour-Governments-1945-51/Pearce/p/book/9780415088930.

demands.[133] Devendra Panigrahi delves into the imperialist narrative, spotlighting Churchill and Viceroy Linlithgow's roles during World War II in promoting the idea of Pakistan. He suggests Linlithgow's significant impact on the Lahore Resolution of 1940, advocating partition.[134] Linlithgow's belief in the British control of India for another 30 years, a view shared with his successor Lord Wavell,[135] likely influenced Jinnah's alignment with prolonged British rule in India. Contrasting with calls for immediate independence, Jinnah envisioned India's co-governance with Britain. As British MP Woodrow Wyatt noted from their 1946 discussion, Jinnah proposed delaying independence, promising Muslim support under his leadership.[136]

Narendra Singh Sarila, former aide to Lord Mountbatten, argues that Cold War dynamics heavily swayed Britain's decision to partition India, citing declassified documents showing covert operations' impact on the independence movement. He points out that wartime errors of the Congress and the 1942 Quit India movement inadvertently strengthened Jinnah, aligning with the British interests in the Persian Gulf oil and Soviet containment, thereby facilitating Pakistan's creation. Sarila sees the partition as inevitable due to Jinnah's aspirations, Congress' blunders, and British tactics, particularly citing a missed Gandhi-Jinnah reconciliation chance in 1928.[137] Nisid Hajari examines the transition from unity to rivalry leading to Partition, analysing its social aftermath, focusing on Jinnah's personal grievances as reflective of wider communal tensions.[138] Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre's book portrays Lord Mountbatten's pivotal role as the last Viceroy during India's partition and independence in 1947. It details his management of intricate political scenarios,

---

[133] Gowher Rizvi, *Linlithgow and India: A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936-43* (Royal Historical Society, 1978).
[134] Devendra Panigrahi, *India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat* (Routledge, 2004), 5.
[135] Panigrahi, 6.
[136] Woodrow Wyatt, *Confessions of an Optimist* (HarperCollins Publishers, 1987), 131.
[137] Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game*.
[138] Nisid Hajari, *Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition*, 1st edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).

vividly narrating the era's negotiations, human tragedies, and key figures like Gandhi, Nehru, and Jinnah.[139] The narrative largely reflects Mountbatten's viewpoint, aligning with the British official perspective.

Ayesha Jalal presents a revisionist perspective on the partition history, challenging conventional narratives. Jalal highlights the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha's reluctance to share power, which led to their support for partitioning Muslim-majority areas like Punjab and Bengal. She views Congress's push for this division as indicative of their partition bias. Her analysis offers a nuanced examination of the dynamics between the Muslim League, Congress, and the British, shedding new light on the critical decisions that led to Partition.[140] Ayesha Jalal[141] and C. H. Philips[142] argue that Jinnah's advocacy for Pakistan was more a strategic bargaining tool than a true quest for a separate nation. Ishtiaq Ahmed counters this, suggesting that when political ideas become widely embraced, they gain momentum, limiting the leader's flexibility. Debates over Jinnah's true intentions thus lose relevance.[143] Jalal also challenges the common view, stating it was Congress, not Jinnah, who pushed for partition. In her Dawn article, 'Between Myth and History', Jalal clarifies her stance, focusing on the clash between Muslim 'nationhood' claims and the fluctuating politics of the late colonial era, leading to the establishment of Pakistan.[144]

H.V. Hodson had a distinctive vantage point on the era's politics, given his role as the Reforms Commissioner to Lord Linlithgow. Following his tenure in this capacity, Hodson posited that significant oversights by the Congress leadership played a key role in the genesis

[139] Lapierre and Collins, *Freedom At Midnight*.
[140] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 1985.
[141] Jalal.
[142] Philips, *The Partition of India 1947*, 19.
[143] Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Jinnah: His Successes, Failures and Role in History* (Gurgaon, Haryana, India: Penguin, 2020), xx.
[144] Ayesha Jalal, 'Between Myth and History', DAWN.COM, 23 March 2005, http://www.dawn.com/news/1067388.

of Pakistan.[145] Wolpert, aligning with this perspective, scrutinizes the tactical errors made by the Congress, Gandhi's inconsistent positions, and Nehru's impulsive decisions, highlighting how these factors collectively played a critical role in the events leading to the partition.[146] While many believe that Gandhi expedited independence, Woodrow Wyatt contends that he actually delayed it.[147] Gottschalk's study emphasizes how 'modernity', influenced by 19th-century European thought and colonial aims, reshaped Indian religious identities, particularly through the lens of 'scientism'. He explores how this view transformed religions into markers of distinct civilizations, notably Hinduism and Islam, portraying them as conflicting political groups. This perspective was pivotal in redefining India's religious landscape, from village life to the census, setting the stage for the partition. Gottschalk delves into the enduring impact of these colonial-modern constructs on the region's historical narrative.[148] David Gilmartin contends that the partition in India was driven more by a constructed binary of religious identities than by inherent civilizational differences.[149]

In the Indian political discourse, shaped by colonial focus on 'difference', the notions of 'majority' and 'minority' are complicated when intersecting with intricate ideas like 'religion', 'ethnicity', and 'culture'. This complexity challenges the simplistic classifications fostered by colonialism. Talal Asad points out that 'majority' and 'minority' primarily arise in electoral contexts, but the term culture refers to broader societal norms and traditions. He

---

[145] H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain - India - Pakistan*, New Ed (OUP Pakistan, 1986).
[146] Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Oxford University, 1998).
[147] Wyatt, *Confessions of an Optimist*, 124.
[148] Peter Gottschalk, *Religion, Science, and Empire: Classifying Hinduism and Islam in British India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[149] David Gilmartin, 'The Historiography of India's Partition: Between Civilization and Modernity', *Journal of Asian Studies* 74, no. 1 (1 February 2015): 23–41.

observes that labelling groups as cultural or religious minorities intertwines these concepts, suggesting a natural predisposition of certain groups to specific political roles.[150]

Twentieth-century debates on majorities and minorities in mandate Palestine and pre-partition India emphasized demographics, particularly religious affiliations, in influencing political developments. In Palestine, similar to colonial India, Zionists, as a demographic minority, encouraged Jewish immigration to shift the population balance, aiming to create Jewish-majority areas. The Balfour Declaration, advocating a 'national home for the Jewish people', reflected this goal in a religiously diverse region.[151] In such charged atmospheres, demographic data transcended mere statistics, fuelling the ideologies and political strategies of the era.

Walter Bennett Evans identifies the 1919 Government of India Act, which initiated 'diarchy', as a catalyst for heightened Hindu-Muslim tensions and provincial electoral politics.[152] He argues that deep-rooted cultural, religious, and societal differences, beyond British 'divide and rule' tactics, significantly contributed to Pakistan's creation.[153] Ian Copland observes that riots between Hindus and Muslims grew more frequent and intense as the colonial era progressed, suggesting a link between these escalations and British policies that possibly deepened religious divisions.[154] Kenneth W. Jones notes that British colonialism in India triggered major socio-religious movements, reshaping identity throughout the subcontinent. He points out that organizations like the Arya Samaj, Muslim Anjumans, and Sikh sabhas, initially aiming to bridge the divides, ended up exacerbating religious and

---

[150] Prof Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 257.
[151] Nimrod Lin, 'People Who Count: Zionism, Demography And Democracy in Mandate Palestine' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Toronto, Canada, University of Toronto, 2018), ii.
[152] Walter Bennett Evans, *The Genesis of the Pakistan Idea, A Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations* (Karachi: OUP, 2013), Roger D. Long, Introduction, xxv.
[153] Evans, *The Genesis of the Pakistan Idea, A Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations*.
[154] Copland, 'From Communitas to Communalism: Evolving Muslim Loyalties in Princely North India', 29.

political conflicts.[155] Avril Powell reflects on India's volatile state under Christian influences, indicating how these movements, inadvertently contributed to the turmoil.[156]

Sugata Bose posits that in India's anti-colonial struggle, religion initially united the nation through moral values but later, its use for majoritarian dominance stoked minority fears. He suggests that Muslim separatism emerged as a response to a majority-dominated nationalism, rather than inherent religious differences. As British control waned, the ambitions of assertive minorities complicated sovereignty talks. Late-colonial nationalists, influenced by religious divides from colonial times, aimed for a centralized state but ironically contributed to the partition.[157] Dipesh Chakrabarty highlights religion's centrality to India's identity, arguing that colonial histories showcasing the 'unreasonable origins of reason' demonstrate the limitations of conventional narratives and rationalist methods in fully grasping India's intricate history and the experiences of its marginalized communities under colonial rule.[158]

In summary, the Indian Partition, stemming from the Two-Nation Theory, reflects the subcontinent's complex history, where Muslim separatism was a reaction to Hindu majoritarianism. This event highlights the dominance of a single 'ethnic culture' in nation-state evolution, representing just one facet of collective identity in the vast spectrum of nationalist movements.[159]

---

[155] Kenneth W. Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1.
[156] Avril A. Powell, 'Duties of Ahmadi Women: Educative Processes in the Early Stages of the Ahmadiyya Movement', in *Gurus and Their Followers: New Religious Reform Movements in Colonial India*, ed. Antony Copley, 0 edition (New Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 128.
[157] Sugata Bose, 'Nation, Reason and Religion: India's Independence in International Perspective', *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 31 (1 August 1998): 2090–97.
[158] Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of "Subaltern Studies"', *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 14 (1995): 751–59.
[159] Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, 80–81.

"Insufficiently Imagined"[160] Nations: Indian Muslim and Zionist Ideologies Unravelled

In 'Muslim Zion', Faisal Devji reinterprets the formation of Pakistan and Israel, arguing that they were driven by ideological and religious convictions rather than solely historical ties, distinguishing them from typical nation-states. He challenges traditional nationality concepts based on 'blood and soil'[161] by comparing Zionism and Pakistan's creation, both arising from minority fears and a willingness to forsake old lands for new. Devji highlights the significant role of Muslim minorities in shaping Pakistan, countering the perception of its creation as merely strategic.[162] He portrays Zionism as grounded in Jewish entitlement to ancestral land but influenced by European ideas, and contrasts this with Pakistan, described not as a protector of Islam but as its nationalization.[163] Devji's analysis invites a re-evaluation of national identities, emphasizing the need to explore the ideological and historical subtleties in nation-building. He draws parallels between the responses of Jewish minorities in Europe and Muslims in India to perceived threats, coining the term 'Muslim Zion' to describe Pakistan.[164] This comparative perspective disrupts conventional narratives, demanding deeper insight into the distinct historical, cultural, and political contexts of each movement. Both Zionism and the Pakistan movement, distinct from European secular nationalism, require nuanced understanding within a comparative framework. Devji underscores the parallels between the Jews' historical ties to Palestine and

[160] 'The Phrase That Pakistan Was an "Insufficiently Imagined" Nation-State Was Coined by the Novelist Salman Rushdie.', n.d.
[161] Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013), 3.
[162] Devji, 7.
[163] Devji, 250.
[164] David Gilmartin, 'Review: Devji, "Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea" | H-Asia | H-Net', 26 January 2015, https://networks.h-net.org/node/22055/discussions/59129/review-gilmartin-devji-muslim-zion-pakistan-political-idea.

the symbolic importance that Indian Muslims from minority regions place on Pakistan, marking a shift from European romantic nationalism.[165]

A notable contrast exists between Zionism's 'Law of Return', granting Israeli citizenship to Jews globally and Jinnah's willingness to leave some Muslims outside Pakistan's borders for the greater good of the majority,[166] highlighting that Pakistan wasn't envisioned for all Indian Muslims. Additionally, Devji suggests that the idea of Pakistan faded upon its creation.[167] Zionism on the other hand, persists in Israel due to deep-rooted Jewish ties to the land and a long history of yearning for a homeland amidst persecution. Venkat Dhulipala refutes the notion of Pakistan as an ill-defined concept, asserting it was a well-developed vision that gradually gained clarity and support, particularly in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) among Muslim minorities. He challenges the view that Pakistan's creation was accidental, highlighting U.P.'s conceptualization of Pakistan as a 'New Medina' (Islamic utopian state). Dhulipala notes the Deobandi Ulema's significant influence in shaping this vision, positioning Pakistan as a successor to the Turkish Caliphate with the aspirations of rejuvenating global Islam. He also discusses the Muslim League's portrayal of Pakistan as a potential Islamic superpower, a vision that played a crucial role in rallying Muslim support.[168]

The Zionist movement emerged in response to anti-Semitism and fears of assimilation, fuelled by the aspiration for statehood to normalize the Jewish people. Conversely, Muslim separatism in colonial India stemmed from nostalgia for past Muslim rule and was compounded by the community's struggle with their waning influence amid the changing

[165]Faisal Devji, 'The New World in the Old: An Alternative History of the Religious State', *Hurst Publishers* (blog), 15 August 2013, https://www.hurstpublishers.com/the-new-world-in-the-old-an-alternative-history-of-the-religious-state/.
[166]Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 279.
[167]Devji, *Muslim Zion*, 248.
[168] Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 4–6.

political landscape under colonial governance.[169] Consequently, many Muslims in colonial India envisioned themselves as the heirs to the pre-British imperial elite.[170] Zionism transformed from a cultural revival into a political movement, adopting various European ideologies and advocating for the Jews' 'right to return' to their ancestral homeland. This contrasts with Ayesha Jalal's depiction of Pakistan as initially a strategic bargaining chip in Jinnah's negotiations,[171] later solidifying into a nation tied to a specific territory. Conversely, Israel's identity as a unified 'Israeli nation' remains undefined despite ongoing civic debates. Eric Hobsbawm notes that Pakistan's emergence was less a product of an Indian Muslim national movement and more a reaction to an Indian movement that failed to address the Muslim distinctiveness.[172] In a world where nation-states prevail, territorial division seemed a logical solution, with Muslims often viewing their identity more communally than nationally.[173] Whether India's violent partition influenced Britain's decision to refer Palestine to the United Nations, diverging from its Indian approach, remains speculative. In both instances, significant violence followed British withdrawal, with partition being the common outcome, albeit driven by different factors.

Israel's Genesis: A Mosaic of Historical Narratives

The concept of partitioning Palestine, introduced in 1937, predates and parallels India's partition in colonial history. Both regions under British rule witnessed the merging of imperial strategies with local ambitions, favouring ethnically homogeneous nation-states to address ethnic and communal conflicts. During the late 19th century, rising Zionist

[169] Farzana Shaikh, 'Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea', *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, 26 January 2015, http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3846.
[170] Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*, 139.
[171] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Reprint (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 57.
[172] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Second Edition: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 71.
[173] Hobsbawm, 70.

immigration to Palestine intersected with Britain's regional geopolitical interests. The Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations' mandate supported a 'Jewish national home' in Palestine, often privileging Jewish settlers (Yishuv) over Palestinian Arabs, exacerbating tensions and leading to significant Arab resistance. This bias further aggravated tensions, culminating in the 1929 disturbances and a significant Arab uprising in the mid-1930s against Zionist activities and British rule. The Peel Commission's 1937 partition recommendation, actualized in 1948, led to the Nakba and the subsequent establishment of Israel.

Zionism, founded by Theodor Herzl in the late 19th century, aimed to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, as a secular response to European antisemitism. Influenced by European nationalism, this movement proposed resettling European Jews in Palestine,[174] aligning with British colonial interests. The 1917 Balfour Declaration and post-Holocaust developments boosted Zionism. The UN's 1947 partition of Palestine led to divergent reactions: Jewish leaders celebrated it, while Arabs viewed it as infringement of their rights. Israel's establishment in 1948 fulfilled Zionist aspirations but triggered Arab conflicts, marking the period as 'Nakba' for Palestinians.

The Indian subcontinent, with its rich mosaic of ethnic and religious diversity, embarked on a divergent path compared to Palestine. Historically a crucible of coexistence among diverse communities, the subcontinent's equilibrium was unsettled by the British colonial strategy of 'divide and rule', which sowed the seeds of communalism. Israel and Pakistan, both conceived from religious narratives, followed distinct trajectories. Israel was born from the Zionist movement, grounded in Jewish historical connections to Palestine and envisioned as a haven from European anti-Semitism. Pakistan was formed as a Muslim nation distinct from India's Hindu majority. In the years that followed their establishment, Israel has

[174] Laura Robson, *States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, First edition (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017), 3.

largely remained true to its Zionist foundations, amidst debates over its Jewish-democratic identity, whereas Pakistan has experienced fluctuations between various governance models.[175]

This contrasting backdrop sets the stage for the dynamics in Palestine post-World War I, where Jewish immigration intensified local tensions. Arabs saw the influx of Jews as an encroachment on their identity, while Jews viewed British-imposed restrictions as obstacles to their Zionist aspirations. Economically, Jewish and Arab Palestinians operated in distinct realms,[176] starkly different from the intricate economic and cultural interdependencies observed within India's diverse communities. The 1930s marked an escalation in these tensions, culminating in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. T.G. Fraser's comparative analysis of India, Palestine, and Ireland underscores the pivotal role of clashing national identities in the narrative of these partitions,[177] illustrating how the intertwining of politics, religion, and identity shaped the distinct yet interconnected histories of these regions.

The 'Jewish Question' in Europe and the 'Muslim Question' in Colonial India

Comparative studies on mandate Palestine and colonial India highlight a literature gap in addressing the 'Jewish Question' in Europe and the 'Muslim Question' in Palestine/Israel. The link between the two became pronounced with Britain's partition plans for India. Chaim Weizmann paralleled India's 'Muslim Question' with Palestine's 'Jewish Question', proposing a 'Palestinian Pakistan.'[178] This perspective was mirrored by British officials like Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who drew comparisons between the challenges in Palestine

[175] Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, Reprint edition (Oxford University Press, 2018), Epilogue, 252.
[176] Louis Kriesberg, 'Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations', *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 7, no. 1 (2000): 63–80.
[177] T. G. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).
[178] Lucy P. Chester, 'On Creating a "Palestinian Pakistan"', *Sh'ma, A Journal of Jewish Ideas*, accessed 2 September 2012.

and India[179] in a cabinet conversation. The European mindset, deeply rooted in the concept of 'homogeneous nation-states',[180] influenced colonial representations, on arrival in colonies in the form of 'representative institutions',[181] counted on the dynamics of the colonial ordering of subject populations into a majority and minorities - 'minoritisation' being integral to the form of a nation state.[182] Hannah Arendt asserts that post-Enlightenment European 'Jewish emancipation' aimed to strip Jews of their history and distinct identity. This process was an effort to replace their complex 'Jewishness' with a more streamlined civil identity.[183] In the evolving landscape of nation-states, the 'Jewishness' of a religious community transformed into a national identity.

This redefinition of identity was not limited to the Jewish community. Benjamin Thomas White points out that Syria's 'ethno-religious' composition wasn't referred to as 'minority' before the French Mandate. He posits that the nation-state structure sets the stage for self-identification as minorities or majorities, even though these categories are subjective.[184] The concept of 'minorities' in Syria emerged as the French reordered Syrian society based on religious affiliations while upholding the secular ideals inherent in the nation-state model.[185] This 'minoritisation' exposed the 'crisis of secularism' in colonial settings, originating from modern Europe's perception of 'difference'. This crisis is rooted in

[179]'CAB 128 (10)', n.d., 19.
[180]Matthew Frank, *Making Minorities History: Population Transfer in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Oxford, United Kingdom: OUP Oxford, 2017), 8.
[181]Cyril Henry Philips, 'Review: The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India by K.B. Krishna', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 10, no. 3 (October 1940).
[182]Benjamin White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 7, no. 1 (2007): 64–85.
[183]Hannah Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, Reprint edition (New York: Schocken Books, 2008), xvi.
[184]Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh University Press, UK, 2011), 209.
[185]White, 44.

the idea of 'minority', which can be traced back to how difference was perceived in modern Europe.[186]

Dmitry Shumsky offers a revisionist perspective on Zionism, challenging the commonly held view that Zionism inherently aimed for an ethnically-centric Jewish nation-state in Palestine,[187] specifically at the expense of negating Palestinian-Arab political presence. Instead, Shumsky posits that early Zionism, during its initial weaker phase, did not foresee a Jewish majority in Palestine, thus avoiding explicit calls for a solely Jewish state due to limited influence. He explores how early Zionism, influenced by European perspectives, initially envisaged Jewish self-determination within a diverse Ottoman context or a multinational democracy. Key Zionist leaders like Pinsker, Herzl, Ha'am, Jabotinsky, and Ben-Gurion considered various forms of national coexistence. A significant example is Vladimir Jabotinsky, who in 1926 proposed a bi-national state in Palestine's ethnically mixed areas, recognizing the need to accommodate a multi-national reality.[188] Shumsky's analysis re-evaluates the historical trajectory of Zionism,[189] suggesting that the concept of an exclusive Jewish state evolved from a series of developments. European Powers' backing of the Jewish National Home in the Mandate, without Palestinian participation, created conditions unfavourable to Arabs,[190] contributing to the evolution of Zionist objectives. Shumsky's work invites a rethinking of partition, portraying it as a consequence of contingent developments rather than a predestined event.

Motti Golani's contention that Zionists were the primary drivers of the partition in mandate Palestine complements Shumsky's challenge to the traditional understanding of

[186]Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*, 2.
[187]Dmitry Shumsky, *Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 2.
[188] Shumsky, 125.
[189] Shumsky, *Beyond the Nation-State*.
[190]John J. McTague, 'Zionist-British Negotiations over the Draft Mandate for Palestine, 1920', *Jewish Social Studies* 42, no. 3/4 (1980): 281–92.

Zionism, adding depth to the historical narrative of the partition in mandate Palestine. Golani suggests that Zionist leaders originated the 'Balfour Declaration' and Peel Commission's 'partition plan', which were later adopted by British officials as official policy.[191] Reginald Coupland, acting as a liaison between the British and Zionists, advocated for 'partition',[192] influenced by his belief in the inadequacy of nascent Palestinian nationalism to achieve 'responsible self-government'.[193]

When the UN backed Palestine's partition in 1947 with Resolution 181, the British government abstained from supporting it, leaving Arabs and Jews to manage the conflict,[194] as T.G. Fraser posits. This highlighted the colonial tactic of magnifying differences, a precursor to partition often neglected in regional studies. Fraser's comparative study of India, Palestine, and Ireland, all ex-British territories, fills this void. Concentrating on 'the politics of partition', he scrutinizes local politics and re-evaluates the drivers of partition in these areas, pinpointing clashing national identities as a crucial element.[195]

Partition Perspectives: Navigating the Narratives of Palestine and India

The discourse surrounding the partition of Palestine is marked by debates between contingency and structural inevitability, reflecting a complex interplay of perspectives. Palestinian scholars often highlight British pro-Zionist inclinations, contrasting with Zionist emphasis on the non-recognition of Jewish land rights by Palestinians. The narrative surrounding the 1948 partition and the subsequent establishment of Israel is nuanced, integrating specific historical events with broader structural elements, drawing parallels with

[191]Golani, '"The Meat and the Bones": Reassessing the Origins of the Partition of Mandate Palestine', 108.
[192]Arie Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 76.
[193]Dubnov, 77.
[194]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 170.
[195]T. G. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).

the scholarship surrounding India's Partition. Unlike the mutual agreement that characterized India's division, the partition of Palestine was primarily driven by Zionist ambitions, leading to significant conflict and the displacement of approximately 750,000 Palestinians. Ilan Pappé's view of premeditated Israeli statehood contrasts with the disorganized Palestinian response.[196] Benny Morris chronicles the war, emphasizing individual actors and unforeseen events,[197] including the Palestinian refugee crisis.[198] Tom Segev explores the interactions of key figures during the Mandate,[199] while Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry focus on critical events shaping the conflict.[200] Nur Masalha focuses on the ideologies of imperialism and expansion.[201] Rashid Khalidi analyses the geopolitical forces affecting Palestinian statehood.[202] Michael J. Cohen offers a structural view on partition through the lens of international politics.[203]

This multifaceted exploration of the partition of Palestine sets the stage for a comparative examination of the partition of India, where British colonial strategies exacerbated religious tensions, leading to significant social and political upheaval. Penderel Moon's critique of British policies in India underscores how colonial tactics deepened divisions, with the Muslim League playing a pivotal role in advocating for Pakistan amidst growing Hindu-Muslim rifts.[204] Moon examines Jinnah's intermittent support for population exchange and its strategic implications, acknowledging Jinnah's practical concerns.[205] He

---

[196] Ilan Pappe, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51* (Basingstoke u.a: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988).
[197] Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (Yale University Press, 2009).
[198] Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 2nd edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[199] Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate* (Metropolitan Books, 2011).
[200] Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction - Fourth Edition*, Fourth edition (London: Pluto Press, 2017).
[201] Nur Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion* (Pluto Press, 2000).
[202] Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Reprint edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007).
[203] Michael J. Cohen, *Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948* (Princeton University Press, 2014).
[204] Moon, *Divide and Quit*, 22–23.
[205] Moon, 69.

reflects on the partition's preventability and his role in it.[206] Despite British efforts, Indian Muslims' strong drive led to the partition.[207] Aamir Mufti links 'minoritisation' in British India to 'secularisation' in modernity, comparing it with the 'Jewish Question' in Europe.[208] Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh argue against the inevitability of India's Partition, highlighting the unpredictability of colonial rule and social inequalities,[209] and view partition as an ongoing process with lasting and unresolved consequences.[210]

Gilmartin links India's partition to the 19th-century European idea of religions as separate 'civilizations', influencing British and Indian views and reshaping India's religious history. Historians argue this mindset, more than age-old divisions, was key in the 1947 religious partition.[211] Peter Gottschalk shows how colonial 'scientism' led to rigid religious classifications, influencing both local and imperial domains, while the first all-India census emphasized religion as a key statistical category.[212]

Tools like census and separate electorate redefined religions as distinct entities, influencing everything from village life to colonial administration. The existing literature on colonial-era partitions, though vast, frequently falls short in detailed comparative studies across regions. *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, offers a trans-colonial view, framing partitions within the British Empire's broader context.[213] They argue that partition in colonial contexts was not merely a response to local challenges but a strategic tool developed by 'neo-imperial thinkers' to reinvigorate the declining British Empire. This strategy was propagated

---

[206] Moon, 9.
[207] Moon, 63.
[208] Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*, 4.
[209] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, 125.
[210] Talbot and Singh, 13.
[211] Gilmartin, 'The Historiography of India's Partition'.
[212] Gottschalk, *Religion, Science, and Empire*, 182.
[213] Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, eds., *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 25.

by colonial officials moving across colonies, making partition a key tactic in imperial governance.[214] This approach demonstrates a sophisticated strategy within British imperial policy, enabling tailored governance across diverse regions under British authority.[215] Their work reveals partition as a more deliberate and pervasive concept than previously recognized, intricately linked to the wider aims and tactics of the British Empire. Sinanoglou emphasizes the complex interplay between local contexts and broader transnational dynamics in partitions.[216] Moving beyond the traditional focus on local causes, she advocates for a more interconnected view. Sinanoglou highlights the importance of 'imperial secondment and transfer', showing how colonial officials, drawing on experiences from different territories and previous British imperial partitions, significantly contributed to refining the partition discourse.[217]

Twentieth-century European historiography shows that the concept of 'partition' was already prevalent in European thought, significantly promoting it as a solution to national security issues.[218] The emergence of 'nation-states' in Europe gave rise to discussions on 'minority protection', with an ideal of creating a Europe devoid of minorities.[219] However, this narrative evolved as the British started to question the ability of colonial majorities to protect the rights of minorities.[220] Such scepticism underpinned the logic for partitioning India and resonated in Palestine, where both the British and Zionists considered relocating Arabs to establish a predominantly Jewish state. This pattern suggests that the formation of

---

[214]Margaret O'Callaghan, 'Genealogies of Partition; History, History-Writing and "the Troubles" in Ireland', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 9, no. 4 (1 December 2006): 619–34.
[215]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 61.
[216]Penny Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 156.
[217]Sinanoglou, 156.
[218]A. Dirk Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', in *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, ed. Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 291.
[219]Moses, 261.
[220]Moses, 282.

nations, especially from minority perspectives, frequently culminates in partition as a structural response, underscoring the intrinsic connection between nationhood and partition. Moreover, colonial 'technologies' of governance significantly influenced how minorities perceived, imagined, and defined their identities, despite some resistance to being categorized as minorities.[221]

Introduction to Chapters

Chapter One: This chapter scrutinizes the intricacies of British colonial governance in India and mandate Palestine, with a particular focus on the implementation of census activities in India and the strategic alteration of the Ottoman Millet system in Palestine for colonial ends. It examines how these administrative measures profoundly shaped the identity perceptions of colonial subjects by emphasizing religious distinctions and categorizing populations accordingly. Through an exploration of these imperial technologies, the chapter reveals their significant role in shaping social landscapes, underlining the creation of communal identities through the lens of religious disparity. The analysis extends to how these colonial administrative strategies not only redefined societal perspectives but also embedded religious identity as a central element of political life. In doing so, it highlights the lasting impact of these strategies on the formation of communal identities and their enduring influence on the post-colonial fabric.

Chapter Two: This chapter explores how the introduction of 'representative' institutions, a cornerstone of nation-state formation, inadvertently fuelled religious identity politics under the guise of secularization. A comparative analysis of colonial India and mandate Palestine reveals how the imperial concept of 'representation' transformed religious groups into political entities, dividing populations into majorities and minorities. This process hindered

[221]Saba Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 66–69.

the development of secular national identities among colonial subjects. Ironically, it rooted religious nationalism more deeply in emerging nations like Pakistan and Israel, showcasing the intricate relationship between secular goals and religious identities. The chapter sheds light on the enduring influence of communal identity formation on the post-colonial landscape, providing insight into the complex legacy of colonial governance and its continued impact on shaping both local and national identities.

Chapter Three: This chapter investigates the profound influence of representative politics on Indian Muslims, concentrating on the critical role played by the Caliphate movement in shaping and voicing their colonial identity. It explores the complex interaction between the identities imposed by colonial authorities and those adopted by the colonized subjects. Through a comparative analysis of situations in colonial India and mandate Palestine, the chapter sheds light on the varied responses and forms of resistance to colonial rule in these two regions, highlighting the distinct paths and reactions that developed in both these colonial contexts.

Chapter Four: This section explores the deep connections between Indian Muslims and Palestine under British colonial rule, with a focus on how the Palestine Question resonated as a central concept with Indian Muslims. It shines a light on Allama Mashriqi's significant involvement in Palestinian matters in the late 1930s, demonstrating the intricate ties between these regions through their shared colonial experiences. This part of the study examines Indian Muslims' perceptions and responses to the Palestinian situation, illustrating the intertwined historical narratives and shared legacies of colonialism in these distinct but interconnected regions. Highlighting Allama Mashriqi's political odyssey, the section showcases the profound impact of colonial strategies in converting religious differences into political identities and underscores the dynamic interplay between individual agency and

colonial discourses. This period, marked by colonial narratives and personal initiatives, mirrors the complex interplay of politics, religion, and colonialism, offering insightful perspectives on Muslim separatism and the partition process.

Chapter Five: This chapter explores the colonial process of 'minoritisation' and its pivotal influence on partition ideologies in both colonial India and mandate Palestine. It delves into the emergence of the ‘minority question’, a central element in the partitions of these regions. The analysis examines the intertwining of religious identity with partition concepts, revealing a complex interplay between the nationalist narratives of Indian Muslims and Zionists. This scrutiny uncovers the significant impact of colonial governance in sculpting these historical events. The research broadens the understanding of ‘partition’, examining its psychological and social aspects within community structures. It focuses on the role of nation-state in fostering partition, particularly how it delineates majorities and minorities, leading to profound societal divisions. This study emphasizes the active construction of these societal groups through deliberate political and administrative action. By framing the emergence of minorities and majorities as a form of ‘mental partition’, the research provides a deeper insight into partition as an active and multifaceted socio-political process. This approach sheds light on how such societal divisions significantly affect social dynamics, power structures, and the identities of individuals and groups, thereby moulding the overall socio-political fabric.

Chapter 1

Census Taking & Millet System: Seeing *Difference*

Colonial Epistemic Technologies of Governance

This chapter explores the intricate mechanisms of colonial governance, focusing on the British implementation of census practices in colonial India and the adaptation of the Ottoman Millet system for colonial purposes in mandate Palestine. These methodologies structured administrative practices and profoundly influenced the perceptions of identity among colonial subjects, embedding religious distinctions at the core of societal self-awareness. I examine how these colonial technologies—census taking in India and the reconfigured Millet system in Palestine—acted as tools for categorizing and managing populations, shaping the political and social landscapes through the prism of religious difference. This analysis uncovers the deep-seated impacts of colonial administrative strategies on the formation of communal identities and their enduring legacy in shaping post-colonial realities.

Technologies of colonial governance were a mirror to how colonial powers viewed the societies they dominated. In the aftermath of the 1857 rebellion, the census methodology in colonial India underwent a significant transformation. Initially conducted in a rudimentary manner that classified the colonial subjects primarily by religious affiliations, it evolved into a more elaborate and comprehensive system of classification. This evolution transformed the census into an indispensable instrument for population management, effectively moulding political representation along religious divides. Similarly, the millet system, a vestige of the Ottoman Empire that was reinterpreted during the reforms of the nineteenth century, experienced substantial modifications under the aegis of British colonial administration. Initially designed to provide non-Muslim groups with collective autonomy, the British-

modified millet system sought to enable collective political representation. This reinterpretation of the system effectively stripped the millets of their autonomy that was a hallmark of the Ottoman-era millet system, turning it into a tool to divide Arab nationalism and interpret conflicts through a religious lens. Such a transformation disregarded the national identity of Palestinian Arabs and overlooked the settler colonial aspects of Zionism.

The pre-existing Ottoman millet system in mandate Palestine made the immediate implementation of a census system similar to India's unnecessary. However, both the census and the millet systems shared a commonality in their ability to categorize populations along religious lines, embedding these distinctions as key elements of colonial identity in both regions.

Colonial knowledge, initially manifesting as abstract Orientalist notions among colonial officials, was subsequently instilled in the minds of colonial subjects. The true impact of this knowledge transfer becomes evident in the colonial subjects' willingness to embrace these concepts.[222] This chapter investigates the transformations brought about by census activities in colonial India and the application of the millet system in mandate Palestine, focusing on their role as imperial epistemic technologies of governance that mirrored colonial perceptions of subject societies.

The census in colonial India and the millet system in mandate Palestine, as tools for managing populations, redefined and streamlined existing identities, elevating religious distinctions as the foremost marker of difference. These instruments were central to the colonial 'dividing practices', a hallmark of governance technologies that segmented the entire subject populace into distinct religious groups. This approach aligns with Michel Foucault's

---

[222]Kenneth W. Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', in *The Census in British India: New Perspectives Edited by N. Gerald Barrier*, 1 edition (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1981), 75.

notion of ‘governmentality’,[223] which describes a form of governance that harnesses the energies of its subjects while ensuring their control. This lens offers fresh insights into the mechanisms of colonial rule in both colonial India and mandate Palestine, shedding light on how the practices of census taking and the millet system’s adaptation fostered a contentious environment. This environment not only perpetuated but also entrenched ‘religious identity-based’ politics, deepening the divisive impact of these colonial administrative strategies.

The framework of religious identity-based politics has largely been overlooked in the historiography of Israel and Palestine, particularly in analyses of the conflict. While this approach has informed studies on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt, it has not been applied to historical Palestine. This omission can be attributed to the Zionist narrative, which positions itself within the context of nation-building and pursues a settler colonial project, casting the Arab-Israeli conflict in national rather than sectarian terms. Consequently, ‘sectarianism’ as an analytical lens has been absent in the exploration of Israel and Palestine’s history and in discussions surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Introducing the framework of religious identity-based politics to the study of Palestine reveals the complexities that go against both settler-colonial and national conflict narratives. The effort to categorize Muslims within a ‘millet’ structure exemplifies this approach, challenging the perception of Jews solely as a settler colonial entity by including them as a millet, which contrasts with their self-view as part of a colonial venture. This analysis highlights the emergence of local identities shaped by colonial definitions of religion as the cornerstone of identity in both colonial India and historical Palestine. It underscores how these identities evolved during the colonial era amid growing nationalist movements. After detailing how the British census and millet system encapsulated colonial perceptions of local

[223]Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*, 1–3.

societies, this examination examines the history of these practices. It investigates how Indians and Palestinians engaged in the process of self-subjectification, adopting and adapting the identities imposed by colonial categorizations.

Census Practices in British India

The practice of conducting census exercises in colonial India had profoundly influenced self-perceptions, fundamentally transforming how individuals from one religious community perceived their relationships with members of other religious communities. Since the 1850s, the colonial regime imposed an imagined framework that gradually led to the development of governing institutions, giving tangible social presence to the state's initial abstract conceptions.[224] Various provincial and partial censuses conducted in the 1850s established religion as the central factor, overshadowing all other social relationships.[225] These census exercises led to significant changes in the perception of colonial subjects, with enumerated communities supplanting the previously vague traditional views.[226] The politicized modern religious identities that emerged from these colonial censuses were distinct from the practices of the Mughals.[227] The colonial regime's use of quantification in governing India introduced 'religious identity-based' politics.[228] As new categories were created for colonial governance by the censuses, these were quickly adopted by indigenous community leaders to lobby the colonial government for influence and to further their 'communal' interests.[229]

From the onset of their conquest of India, the British articulated an imperial policy to maintain the 'status quo' concerning local religious practices. Highlighting the merits of such a policy, Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, issued an order in 1772

---

[224]Bernard S. Cohn, *The Bernard Cohn Omnibus by Bernard S. Cohn* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 224–54.
[225]Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*, New edition (Routledge, 2000), 40.
[226]Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas* (Columbia University Press, 2010).
[227]Arjun Appadurai, 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, ed. Peter van der Veer and Breckenridge, Carol A. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).
[228]Nicolas B. Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 227.
[229]Gottschalk, *Religion, Science, and Empire*, 183.

stating that the religious courts of Muslims and Hindus would continue to apply in matters of personal law.[230] He considered it prudent 'to assure the Hindu and Mussulman subjects of Great Britain that their private laws, which they severally hold sacred',[231] would be upheld. Census-taking exercises began to take a more defined shape in colonial India after the transition to Crown rule in 1858, when the Mughal state structures were dismantled, yet those earlier colonial perceptions of 'religion' persisted.

It was the 1857 Indian revolt against British rule that necessitated the census-taking exercises.[232] The concerns the British had in the aftermath of the revolt were reflected in their new policies, from army recruitment to the formation of regiments and the identity formation of local communities. The enumerative scheme was crucial for identifying potential rebels, and army recruitment became a means to distinguish rebellious sentiments from loyalty among soldiers. Colonial officials considered 'two ways of exercising power over men, of controlling their relations, of separating out their dangerous mixtures'.[233] In the spirit of 'separating out their dangerous mixtures,' Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, in 1862: 'Keep your Sikh regiments in Punjab and they will be ready to act against the Hindoos, keep your Hindoos out of Punjab and they will be ready to act against the Sikhs... Depend upon it, the natural antagonism of races is no inconsiderable element of our strength... If all India were to unite against us, how long could we maintain ourselves'?[234]

The outcome of the census-taking exercise, through the dissolution of fragmented social groups into a perception of single political unity, was the formation of an insular

[230]Laura Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine* (University of Texas Press, 2011), 49.
[231]Robson, 'Becoming a Sectarian Minority: Arab Christians in Twentieth-Century Palestine', 9.
[232]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, 198.
[233]Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New Ed edition (London: Penguin, 1991), 198.
[234]C. H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947* (Oxford University Press, 1964), 508.

religious identity.[235] The census-taking exercise served as a 'technique of power proper to disciplinary partitioning',[236] with army recruitment being one immediate field to demonstrate its efficacy. In 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Wikeley, Assistant Adjutant-General on Special Recruitment Duty, received a petition from Punjabi Brahmans who were dissatisfied with being grouped with Brahmans of different ethnicities. He sent a demi-official letter to Major A.H.P. Harrison, the Recruiting Staff Officer at the Army Headquarters, stating the Brahmans' complaints that 'the down-country Brahmans will not associate with them nor eat with them, and that they do not even speak the same language'. He suggested that 'to keep these people content during the initial stages of their career, it seems advisable to place them with an ordinary Punjabi regiment... If they remain where they are, it may negatively impact their recruitment. So far, only 22 have been enlisted'.[237] This incident illustrates that even in the early twentieth century in colonial India, identities were still fluid. Those Punjabi Brahmans had more in common with other Punjabis, regardless of their religious denomination, than with Brahmans from other parts of India. The series of census-taking exercises that had been occurring since 1871, as a consistent colonial practice, would soon alter this dynamic.

In Indian society, the colonial discourse initiated the process of 'enumerating, reporting, and regulating' as a governance technique, which subsequently altered the self-perception of colonial subjects. This necessitates an analysis of how the people under colonial rule were transformed into colonial subjects. As a fundamental aspect of the colonial production of knowledge, the census was typically viewed as a bureaucratic necessity for the modern state; it provided a snapshot of social realities that facilitated a form of national

---

[235]Sumit Guha, 'The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 1600-1990', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003): 1600–1990.
[236]Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 199.
[237]'Simla Records 1916: Proceedings "War, 1916-17", Nos. 20797-20834 and Appendix', 1916, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

accounting. However, the census-taking exercise in colonial India went beyond merely mirroring its social fabric; by attributing political significance to local religious communities, it played a crucial role in shaping that very fabric.

History of the Colonial Census Taking Exercise

Partial enumerations of specific population segments in various parts of colonial India were conducted from time to time, primarily as 'experimental operations',[238] well before the colonial regime decided to conduct its first comprehensive, India-wide census in 1871.[239] Given the urgent need of the colonial regime to understand the size of the Muslim and Hindu communities, the partial censuses conducted in the North-Western Province in 1853 and 1865 focused solely on counting the numbers of Hindu and Muslim communities residing in the province. Questions related to caste and occupation were introduced only in the general census of 1871.[240] The official rationale for this extensive, India-wide enumeration in 1871 was administrative, aimed at gathering information on population growth rates, food supply sufficiency, the impact of local and imperial taxation, the organization of adequate judicial and police arrangements, the spread of education, public health, and so forth.[241]

The initial efforts at conducting census exercises in colonial India were complicated by the ambiguous nature of 'religion' in the region, challenging the colonial authorities' ability to classify according to Western conceptions of religion. The diversity and fluidity of local beliefs and practices presented a significant challenge to colonial authorities. Colonial officials responded by categorizing the population into five broad religious groups: Hindus,

[238] H. Beverley, 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872' (The Bengal Secretariat Press, 1872), 2.
[239] Beverley, 1.
[240] W. G. Plowdon, 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872', Census, General Report (Allahabad: The North West Provinces Government Press, 1873), 2, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24264.
[241] Beverley, 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872', 1.

Muhammadans, Christians, Buddhists, and Others.[242] However, this simplistic division struggled to capture the complex reality on the ground. Complications arose, particularly with defining ‘Hinduism’. Sikhs, for instance, were initially categorized as ‘Hindus’, highlighting the difficulties in establishing clear boundaries within Hinduism. H. Beverley, the Inspector General of Registration in Bengal, noted in his 1872 report the challenges in distinguishing ‘pure Hindus’ from lower castes that had adopted various forms of Hinduism.[243] The Census Commissioner observed that, apart from Christianity and Islam, it was difficult to pinpoint a ‘definite creed’ within Hinduism, as the term ‘dharma’—which closely relates to the Western concept of ‘religion’—encompasses conduct as much as belief.[244]

The difficulty colonial officials faced in defining the category of religion became apparent from the 1872 North Western Province census report, which proposed a simplistic solution: ‘the inhabitants of the provinces may, in regard to religion, be distinguished broadly as Hindus and Mohammedans’.[245] This approach was deeply rooted in the British perception of Indian society as an entity deeply rooted in tradition and comprised largely of primordial communities.

However, the reality that British colonial officials encountered on the ground was confounding. Beverley, the Inspector General of Registration in Bengal, highlighted the prevalent ambivalence among census commissioners by questioning what ‘the test’ should be for categorizing Hinduism in the census.[246] The Commissioner believed that the challenge of categorizing the ambiguous and fluid nature of Hindu practices in Bengal into a rigid Western

[242]Beverley, 129.
[243]Plowdon, ‘Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872’, xix.
[244]J. A. Bains, review of *Review of Census of India, 1911; Vol. i. Report*, by E. A. Gait, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 77, no. 6 (1914): 113, https://doi.org/10.2307/2340307.
[245]Plowdon, ‘Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872’, xix.
[246]Beverley, ‘Report of the Census of Bengal 1872’, 129.

notion of religion stemmed from the diverse aboriginal or semi-aboriginal tribes influenced by Aryan Hindus.

He further argued, 'In regard to religion … unless a test of belief is prescribed and a line of demarcation laid down by authority, it is impossible to adopt a classification that will meet with universal acceptance'.[247] The Western perspective encountered the 'Orient' and pondered questions such as whether belief in Krishna or Durga would define a pure Hindu, or whether only those from whom a Brahmin would accept water should be classified as Hindus. Would the disposal of the dead, through cremation or burial, serve as a definitive test? The need for some practical criterion became evident, as without it, there would be no consensus on categorizing the various tribes and castes in India who practiced Hinduism in its many forms.[248]

Ultimately, British officials recognized the need to formulate a 'clear definition' of Hinduism.[249] The 1911 census report indicated the ongoing difficulty the Census Commission faced in grasping the complex local interpretations of Hinduism, which was not solely a religious denomination but also denoted nationality and ethnicity. When someone identified as Hindu, it implied a confluence of religion, parentage, and country.[250] The colonial regime bulldozed all myriad variations and diverse meanings of what is broadly considered as Hinduism into a rigid structure of religion in the Western sense. Consequently, the British managed to construct 'Hinduism' as a religion along lines similar to Christianity, imposing a unified framework on a richly diverse set of beliefs and practices that were previously not bound by the strict confines of a single organized religion. This redefinition of Hinduism and the emphasis on religious categorization in the census not only reflected the size of each

[247]Beverley, 130.
[248]Plowdon, 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872', xx.
[249]Beverley, 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872', 129.
[250]Bains, 'Review of Census of India, 1911; Vol. i. Report', 115.

religious community in relation to the total population but also highlighted the comparative positions of various religious groups within colonial India. The numerical strength of a community became synonymous with its political influence, transforming the way religious communities were viewed and interacted within the colonial framework.

In their efforts to categorize religions, especially those without clear boundaries, the census commissioners overlooked a crucial historical context: for centuries, these religious communities had not only coexisted side by side but had also profoundly influenced and shaped each other's social, cultural, and religious practices through ongoing interaction.[251] Census activities progressively solidified religion as a crucial classification by meticulously documenting the size of each religious community, both in terms of the overall population and in relation to other faith groups.[252] The numerical strength of a community was not the sole metric for assessing its growth; other factors, such as literacy rates, especially English literacy within a community, were also evaluated.[253] Censuses began to present comparative analyses of different religious communities.[254] Interestingly, the section of the census that omitted any reference to religion was the one on 'infirmities', which included the deaf, dumb, blind, lepers, idiots, and the insane,[255] presumably because such conditions were deemed not to confer any advantage to any community. To the census officials, religion was more than just a basic categorization.[256] They meticulously recorded and analysed changes in the population sizes of all religious groups, mapping their geographic distribution and observing shifts in their social dynamics.[257]

---

[251]Beverley, 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872', 129.
[252]Plowdon, 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872', 2–4.
[253]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 81.
[254]Plowdon, 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872', 88–99.
[255]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 80.
[256]Jones, 80–81.
[257]Plowdon, "Census Of The North Western Provinces, 1872," see tables at page 86, showing how carefully Census officials mapped the patterns of such changes.

By incorporating education metrics alongside religious affiliation, census officials aimed to compare the developmental strides of one religious community against others. The 1911 Punjab census, for instance, conducted an in-depth analysis of the economic and occupational tendencies within religious communities. This data was meticulously categorized by religion and caste, highlighting employment in the army, police, and other government services, ownership of agricultural lands, factories, mines, and other businesses, as well as possession of non-agricultural wealth.[258] Such detailed breakdowns reflect the colonial mindset, which sought to imbue economic dynamics with a religious dimension. The censuses underscored the colonial perspective on religion, endowing local communities with a political identity rooted in their religious affiliations. Consequently, this prompted colonial subjects to embrace the colonial agenda of attributing political importance to their religious identities.

Caste and Religion in Census

Initially, race and caste were central categories in the censuses. Over time, however, the significance and centrality of these categories shifted as the relationship between race and religion was contested and eventually transformed. In colonial perceptions, race and religion became increasingly intertwined,[259] with Hindus and Muslims being portrayed as distinct races in opposition to each other.[260] Anderson points out that over time, during the colonial era, 'the census categories became more visibly and exclusively racial'.[261]

---

[258]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 83.
[259]R. B. Bhagat, 'Hindu-Muslim Tension in India: An Interface between Census and Politics during Colonial India: Paper Presented at the IUSSP Seminar on the Demography of Conflict and Violence, Held in Oslo, Norway, 8 - 11 November 200', n.d.
[260]J. A. Bains, 'Census of India, 1891 : General Report, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Census Commissioner for India', Census (London: Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893), 158, https://archive.org/details/cu31924023177268. See also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. Ed (Verso Books, 2006), 244.
[261]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 244.

Even though W.C. Plowden, the 1871 Census Administrator, argued that the 'caste statistics' were the most unsatisfactory part of the return, the Lieutenant Governor refused to exclude castes in future censuses[262] since the British considered 'the caste system' as an articulation of social reality in India.[263] In 1901, H.H. Risley, the Census Commissioner, decided to conduct 'an ethnographic survey of India', marking the peak of 'caste' as a distinct category in colonial India.[264] Nicholas Dirks' meticulous work on the colonial invention of a uniform language of 'caste' offers insight into a vast, intricate, and complex tapestry of social differentiation, elucidating the emergence of social and cultural technologies for the construction of new identities in colonial India.[265]

H. H. Risley, among others, recognized the divisive potential of caste in the context of burgeoning nationalist movements;[266] both colonial administrators and the Indian political elite were acutely aware of the antagonistic relationship between caste-based politics and the emerging nationalist discourse. Contrary to what might be expected, Risley himself was a vocal critic of including caste as a category in the census. By 1911, the overwhelming number of objections received by the census bureau regarding the caste categorization compelled Risley to cease the practice of ranking castes by status. Despite this adjustment, caste continued to be listed as a demographic variable in the census records,[267] albeit without the hierarchical classifications that had previously characterized the data collection process.

While caste identities continued to be listed in subsequent censuses, the manner in which they were acknowledged underwent significant transformation. In the Punjab, for example, religion emerged as a predominant focus for British Indian officials during census

---

[262]Plowdon, 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872', 4.
[263]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, 210.
[264]Dirks, 15.
[265]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*.
[266]Dirks, 231.
[267]Dirks, 223.

exercises. Over the years, the emphasis on religion within census data and reports grew markedly.[268] By 1931, caste was finally omitted as a distinct category from the census,[269] but religion remained a principal classification. This persistent focus suggests that British census officials were particularly fixated on the demographic proportions of Hindus and Muslims, indicating a prioritization of religious identities over caste distinctions in the colonial administrative agenda.

Census: Endowing Pre-existing Differences with New Meanings

A critical linkage existed between the colonial 'classifying mind' behind the census taking exercises and the creation of fixed religious identities, which were once perceived as more adaptable and fluid. These exercises were integral to the colonial governance technologies, where the mere act of enumeration by census officials not only legitimized but also reinforced colonial dominion, embedding colonial hegemony through the detailed knowledge of the governed populations. This process underscores the intrinsic connection between knowledge production and power assertion within the colonial framework, illustrating how administrative practices were leveraged to solidify colonial control.[270]

The oppressive nature of colonial policy in India was apparent; however, the colonial regime attempted to mask a substantial portion of its power by exercising it indirectly, to varying degrees. The census was one such indirect expression of colonial power, shaping the social characteristics of the population. This does not imply that the colonial regime always fully succeeded in achieving its objectives. It is important to examine not only the forms of collective identities promoted by colonial governance practices but also how specific

[268]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 79.
[269]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, 16.
[270]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 164.

communities negotiated these forms, whether by embracing, adapting, or outright rejecting them.[271]

The colonial imposition of collective indigenous identities through systematic categorization and enumeration effectively solidified previously indefinite religious affiliations into distinct political communities. Prior to the advent of modern statistical methodologies, local identities were considered indeterminate, contextual, fluid, and often transcended religious lines, lacking a clear understanding of group distribution across territories and their potential political influence.[272] The census' objectification of religion, grounded in social and cultural distinctions, not only solidified these identities as contemporary realities[273] but also rendered its own discourse on religion as the dominant narrative by embedding it within the census framework. This facilitated the creation of relevant rules for managing differences, thereby enhancing the colonial administration's efficacy in governing Indian society.

The census reports were crafted in a way that aligned the colonial officials' perceptions of colonial society and its inhabitants with their preconceived notions of the 'Orient'. This conception was rooted in the Orient's unique position within the European Western experience.[274] In colonial discourse, India was represented as an embodiment of Orientalism, a portrayal upheld by a comprehensive framework that included institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, as well as colonial bureaucracies and styles.[275] Theodore Morison's 1932 assertion that 'It is useful to enumerate the grounds of difference

[271]Jonathan Xavier Inda, ed., *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*, 1 edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 9.
[272]Shani, "Empire, Liberalism and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Colonial Governmentality in Indian Subcontinent."
[273]Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996), 8.
[274]Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary Ed with 1995 Afterword Ed edition (London New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 1.
[275]Said, 2.

between Hindu and Muslim; the only thing that matters is that they do in fact feel and think of themselves as separate peoples' was a reflection of the colonial 'scientifically racialized' worldview. This perspective aimed at identifying and segregating distinct groups within a population.[276] There is a lack of 'historical evidence' to suggest that communal conflicts between Hindus and Muslims occurred in a sustained manner during the pre-colonial period.[277] Such conflicts are essentially a modern phenomenon, with communal riots being a significantly rare occurrence before the 1880s.[278] The colonial practice of conducting consecutive census exercises, driven by a communal discourse, played a crucial role in solidifying communities defined by religious lines. This was achieved through a cyclical process of generating 'description, action, and change', which contributed to the entrenchment of communal identities.[279]

The emergence of communal divisions can be attributed to the colonial officials' pursuit of 'completeness and unambiguity', coupled with their aversion to multiple, politically 'transvestite', ambiguous, or fluid identities.[280] This approach necessitated 'the most elaborate description', ensuring that each individual was accorded a distinct entry.[281] The colonial fixation on establishing rigidly defined categories led to the implementation of the census as a tool to assign everyone a specific, pre-defined category, allowing no room for exceptions. This system of classification was meticulously crafted to be non-overlapping, reinforcing the demarcation of communal boundaries.[282]

---

[276]Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, New ed of 2 Revised ed edition (New Delhi; New York: OUP India, 2006), 2.
[277]Bhagat, 'Hindu-Muslim Tension in India: An Interface between Census and Politics during Colonial India: Paper Presented at the IUSSP Seminar on the Demography of Conflict and Violence, Held in Oslo, Norway, 8 - 11 November 200'.
[278]Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885-1947* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 51.
[279]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 89.
[280]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 166.
[281]Beverley, 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872', 5.
[282]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 166.

The partition of Bengal in 1905 stands as a stark illustration of colonial efforts to delineate and segregate overlapping identities, particularly separating Hindus from Muslims, along religious lines. This strategy was deeply influenced by the Orientalist perspective that had already shaped the British understanding of India.[283] H.H. Risley, the Indian Home Secretary at the time, perceived Indian society through the lens of 'ethnological realities'.[284] Nicholas Dirks highlights that it was Risley's ethnological perspective that laid the ideological groundwork for a significant escalation in communalism. Risley played a pivotal role in formulating the proposal for the partition of Bengal in 1903, as the Home Secretary. The rationale behind this partition was predicated on the notion that dividing Hindus, viewed by the British as 'politically threatening', from Muslims, considered loyal, would yield political benefits for the colonial administration.[285] Although the official justification for the partition was administrative efficiency due to Bengal's large size, the underlying motive was to weaken Bengal as a burgeoning hub of revolutionary nationalism.

The partition provoked widespread agitation, underscoring the colonial concern about separating Muslims from radical nationalism. The agitation led to the demand for separate electorates, a demand that was strategically used by Risley to justify the introduction of separate electorates in the 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms. Dirks regards this as 'one of the most influential, and deadly, decisions' made by the British colonial administration, setting the stage for the eventual demand for a separate Muslim homeland, which culminated in the partition of India.[286] Risley's strategy to combat the growing Indian nationalism in Bengal involved partitioning Bengal into Muslim and Hindu regions,[287] thereby politicizing religious identity. Although Muslim leaders initially did not support the partition, the Hindu nationalist

[283]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 45.
[284]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, 226.
[285]Dirks, 226.
[286]Dirks, 226.
[287]Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 157.

backlash provided momentum to separatist Muslim politics, further entrenching communal divisions. This move exemplified the colonial tactic of manipulating local politics to maintain control, exacerbating communal tensions, and laying the groundwork for partitioned minds and searing divisions between religious communities.

Colonial officials increasingly acknowledged the profound link between census data and political identity. In 1911, the Census Commissioner emphasized the complex interplay between census operations and colonial subjects, noting a reciprocal dynamic where each shaped the definition of the other. The Commissioner recognized that in India, the predominant divisions were more social than religious, with individuals more inclined to categorize their neighbours by social standing and lifestyle rather than religious convictions.[288] By 1931, the Census Commissioner explicitly stated that India could be considered the most religious country globally, emphasizing the importance of religion in the Indian census.[289] Contrary to accusations that census categorization exacerbated religious divisions in India, the Commissioner defended the census as a means to accurately document the existing social and religious realities in the country. It was seen as a tool for recording these realities as faithfully as possible.[290]

The colonial officials held a perception that India had historically featured two distinct and separate communities, Muslims and Hindus, with minimal interaction between them. This perception laid the foundation for the emergence of a 'religious identity-based' politics, promoting the notion of 'mutually exclusive communities' as the standard.

[288]Bains, 'Review of Census of India, 1911; Vol. i. Report', 113.
[289]J. H. Hutton, 'Census of India, 1931', Census (Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1933), 379, https://archive.org/stream/CensusOfIndia1931/Census%20of%20India%201931_djvu.txt.
[290]Hutton, 379.

Consequently, the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ naturally became a viable tactic for sustaining colonial rule in India.[291]

Subjectification of Communalism: Unravelling the Politics of a Divided Society

Before the colonial enumeration and categorization processes were put in place, local communities did not usually engage in precise self-identification. Although these processes were intended for administrative purposes,[292] it became evident that the census led colonial subjects to redefine themselves. This redefinition process underscored the vast diversity and differences within Indian society, which the colonial administration aimed to homogenize. J. A. Bains, the Census Commissioner of India in 1911, emphasized the complexities associated with categorizing such diversity. He noted, ‘the circumstances of India, from an administrative standpoint, make it necessary for the census report to be extended considerably beyond the limits which would suffice in the case of a more homogeneous country and population’.[293] The substantial diversity and ambiguity within local religious practices posed a significant challenge for colonial officials, who sought to catalogue and define them, even for administrative purposes.

The census operations in colonial India were instrumental in effecting transformative shifts beyond the British’s initial aim of mere documentation. These procedures contributed to the establishment and institutionalization of politics based on religious identity, normalizing the Hindu-Muslim conflict.[294] This phenomenon was one of the lasting impacts of colonial thought on the perception of India, marked by the essentialization and institutionalization of the religious divide.

---

[291]R. B. Bhagat, ‘Census and the Construction of Communalism in India’, *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 46/47 (2001): 4352–56.
[292]Michael Mann, *South Asia’s Modern History: Thematic Perspectives*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2014), 169.
[293]Bains, ‘Review of Census of India, 1911; Vol. i. Report’.
[294]Appadurai, ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’, 12.

The act of systematically describing the social order[295] in Indian society had reached a point where the mere anticipation of upcoming census exercises contributed to the exacerbation of communal tensions. This turned the census into a contentious and disputed terrain. This degree of success in the colonial project, which involved essentializing, enumerating, and constructing a new social reality, can be gauged by how significantly the notion of enumerated communities permeated the practical consciousness of colonial subjects. It left an indelible mark on the political consciousness of India.

Norbert Peabody challenged the prevailing assumption that colonized subjects were either passive bystanders or unwitting enablers of imperialism.[296] He argued that the process of colonization remained incomplete without the active involvement of carefully constructed subjects who legitimized it. The colonial regime employed various historical tools, including 'the census, mapping, and museums', to establish a comprehensive classificatory system that provided incentives for its subjects.

Aware of the colonial regime's intention to allocate state benefits based on census results, colonial subjects enthusiastically participated in the census process. The significant impact of colonial census-taking exercises was observed in the way Indians embraced these categories, effectively collaborating in their own categorization by the colonial authorities. The census, which enabled the creation of precise differences and rigorous classifications, served as a conduit for conceptualizing a novel form of 'religion' within a certified definition. This involved meticulous mapping, counting, and detailed comparisons with other religious communities. The census thus introduced an entirely new concept of a religious community[297] that was more detailed and precise than ever before. This reshaped the way Indian subjects

---

[295] Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 73–74.
[296] Norbert Peabody, 'Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial and Early Colonial India', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001): 819–50.
[297] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 203.

thought about religion, shifting them from being mere subjects of colonial reports[298] to active participants in the construction of their religious identity. Notably, even during popular anti-colonial movements, there was no concerted effort to obstruct the colonial census-taking process. The 1921 census occurred amidst Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, yet Gandhi himself publicly endorsed cooperation with the colonial authorities regarding the census.[299]

The effectiveness of the census in shaping the identities of the subjects it intended to catalogue hinged largely on the attitudes and reactions of those very subjects. Educated Indians, in particular, began to recognize the profound implications of the census as they looked to it for an official and authoritative portrayal of their own world. This portrayal often aligned with their aspirations and concerns. Censuses had the effect of pitting the newly emerging English-educated local elites from different 'religious' communities against each other, primarily in pursuit of economic opportunities. Despite the Hindu community's relative success in securing these new jobs, their apprehensions regarding competition with the Muslim community were on the rise. While anxieties existed prior to census reports, the census now provided concrete 'evidence of government attitudes and indicators of British policy'.[300] The institution of the census served as the apparatus through which the colonial regime exerted its authority over all its subjects. Simultaneously, subject communities harnessed the knowledge derived from census reports in their interactions with other religious communities and in their dealings with colonial officials. This exchange of information and its strategic use marked a significant aspect of the power dynamics during the colonial era.

[298]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 84.
[299]Shriram Maheshwari, *The Census Administration Under the Raj and After* (Concept Publishing Company, 1996), 15.
[300]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 87.

The alignment between the content of census reports and their intended descriptions played a crucial role in igniting the initial catalyst that shaped colonial thinking, pushing them toward the adoption of constitutional reforms, specifically in the introduction of limited representative institutions. In response to these extensive political reforms, the Muslim elite opted to identify themselves as a religiously defined political community, echoing the delineation found in census reports.[301] They strategically employed census figures as a foundation for political mobilization and to assert their entitlement to seats in the legislature. A deeper examination of this phenomenon is pursued in the subsequent chapter.

The census had already delineated religious communities, and the eventual boundary line was merely one manifestation of this, acting more as a reflection rather than the sole outcome. Overlooking the role of chance in how events unfolded, it's clear that the British choice to grant independence to two separate states, divided along religious lines, underscored the importance of the census in defining the borders of these new nations. Together with other forms of governmental data gathering, the census laid the groundwork for a reimagined social structure.[302] The enduring impact of the census in shaping local identities, particularly in the context of religious identity-based politics, remains a complex and challenging phenomenon to fully comprehend.

---

[301]N. Gerald Barrier, *The Census in British India: New Perspectives*, 1 edition (Manohar Publications, 1981), 100.
[302]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 97.

Colonial Millet System: Seeing Difference

In this section, I undertake an in-depth analysis of the impact of the millet system in Mandate Palestine as a critical component of colonial knowledge production. It played a vital role in shaping the colonial 'regime of truth' that defined colonial subjects. Similar to the institution of the census in colonial India, the millet system transformed what had previously been nebulous concepts in the minds of colonial officials into the foundational framework for defining colonial subjects. I further explore how British officials adapted and extended the existing Ottoman millet system to align with their own mode of colonial governance. Additionally, this study examines how colonial discourse surrounding the millet system found acceptance among colonial subjects, illustrating the intricate interplay between colonial policies and the responses of the subjects themselves.

In Mandate Palestine, the discourse of 'religious identity-based politics' emerged precisely when British officials strategically 'adapted and extended' the millet system as a fundamental organizing principle of colonial governance. This transformation elevated 'religion' to a primary indicator of political identity in Palestine. British mandate officials reconfigured the Muslim population as the dominant millet, primarily to forestall any potential display of solidarity between Arab Christians and Muslims in the context of an anti-colonial united Arab movement. By situating the examination of the millet system in Mandate Palestine within the broader framework of the imperial power's interactions with the local population and the emergence of 'religious identity-based politics' as a distinct historical event, I aim to contextualize the formation of the 'colonial subject' within the specific historical, cultural, and political dynamics of the local context.[303]

Even before the conquest of Palestine, the British government, driven by its 'sympathy with Jewish aspirations', made a commitment to the Zionist movement. This

[303]Thomas Lemke, *Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique* (Boulder, Colo.: Routledge, 2012).

commitment aimed to facilitate the establishment of 'a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine'.[304] A critical examination of the Balfour Declaration reveals the British Orientalist perspective, as articulated by Lord Balfour. He considered Zionism to be deeply ingrained in age-old traditions, current necessities, and future aspirations, of far greater significance than the desires and preferences of the 700,000 Arabs who resided in that historic land.[305]

Casting Colonial Political Rationale: The Imperial Formation of Religious Identities

Informed by their extensive experience with colonial governance in India and influenced by their Oriental worldview, the imperial construction of collective religious identities in Palestine was further reinforced by the historical context of European involvement in the Ottoman Empire, under the pretext of safeguarding religious 'minorities'. Starting in the 1820s, nations such as Britain, France, and Russia actively supported various Christian secessionist 'nationalist' movements within the Ottoman Empire. These European powers succeeded in securing the secession of predominantly Christian-populated regions from the predominantly Muslim Ottoman Empire, as stipulated by the terms of the Berlin Treaty.

Greece was the first of these predominantly Christian provinces within the Ottoman Empire to gain independence and become a sovereign nation-state.[306] Within the framework where the concept of the nation-state had significantly transformed the European landscape, the division of populations along ethnic and religious lines was regarded as a beneficial and stabilizing approach. This ethos was embraced notably by Greece and Turkey, which pursued aggressive homogenization policies based on ethnic and religious lines, rooted in the notion of 'population transfer' as a viable remedy for areas with mixed demographics. The

[304] The Road to Rebellion Arab Palestine in the 1930's by W. F. Abboushi, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.6, No.3 (Spring,1977),pp.23-46:p23

[305]Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, Seeds of Conflict* (New York: George Braziller, Inc, 1973), 73.

[306]Peter Sluglett, 'From Millet to Minority', in *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, ed. Laura Robson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016), 22.

underlying belief was that such transfers would reinforce the nation-state framework[307] by clearly delineating Christian Greeks from Muslim Turks.

European Jews arriving in Palestine already identified as a nation and perceived themselves as a minority within a broader geopolitical context, influenced by their experiences and nationalist movements in Europe. In contrast, Palestinian Arabs had not yet coalesced into a unified national identity and were less conscious of their status as a majority or minority within the territory. This discrepancy in self-perception and national consciousness between the two groups added layers of complexity to the evolving social and political landscape of Mandate Palestine.

The colonial practice of categorizing subjects into distinct religious groups, combined with the advent of 'nation-state' concepts, profoundly impacted these communities, effectively politicizing them. In this evolving scenario, smaller communities were especially precarious. The 'nation-state' ideology, predicated on homogeneity, invariably rendered minorities insecure, compelling leaders from these groups to consider drastic options: either to seek autonomy and establish a majority within their own state or to assimilate into the dominant majority. This dilemma was existential for some. For instance, Zionist leaders opted to create a context where they could be the majority, in response to this paradigm. This move was in part a resurrection of the millet system, which had faded into obscurity, now reimagined within the mandate over Palestine, albeit under vastly changed circumstances that did not prioritize the preservation of minority rights as the original system might have.

The influx of Jewish immigrants from Europe into Palestine significantly influenced the nature of British rule during the Mandate period. According to Laura Robson, the primary political motive behind the imperial construction of 'religious identities' in Palestine was to

[307] Sluglett, 23–24.

provide a framework for the growing European Jewish settler community within the governance structure of Palestine.[308] To accommodate the increasing number of Jewish arrivals from Europe within the governmental framework, the mandate authorities reinforced religious affiliations as a basis for political participation. The imperial policy effectively applied the millet system to divide the Palestinian population along religious lines. Arab Muslims were designated as a millet, thereby marginalizing the substantial Arab Christian population. Simultaneously, the British authorities cooperated with the Zionists to consolidate the Jewish population.[309] The formation of the Muslim millet aimed to pacify, control, and fragment the Palestinian Arab population into distinct Christian and Muslim communities.

The classification of communities as religious entities through the millet system extended beyond Muslim Arabs; Christian Arabs were also designated as a millet. Additionally, Jews were categorized as a millet, with two Rabbis representing the Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities separately, a departure from the Ottoman practice of having a single Rabbi. Despite recognizing Jews' religious autonomy as a religious community in Mandate Palestine, the Rabbinate institution, responsible for providing religious services to Jews, was not granted political significance. The imperial interpretation of Jews transcended mere religious identity; they were recognized as a nation. The Palestine administration, translating the Balfour Declaration into imperial policy and practice, created an imbalance. Jews were considered and treated as a nation, while Arabs were reduced to millets, divided along religious lines. This disparity was primarily a result of the mandate's objective to facilitate the Zionist project in Palestine, which lay at the core of the Balfour Declaration.

The Christian community in Palestine has historically been an integral part of its social, political, and religious fabric, reflecting the diverse identities within the early phases

[308]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 13.
[309]Robson, 160.

of the Mandate. Scholars like Issa Khalaf,[310] Rashid Khalidi[311] and Ted Swedenburg[312] have emphasized this multiplicity of Palestinian identities. With a long history of coexistence, Christian Arabs had assimilated into Muslim society to such an extent that both communities often shared festivals and holidays, living peacefully alongside each other.[313] However, the situation of Christian Arabs brought to the forefront the ‘dividing practices’ employed by the mandate authorities in Mandate Palestine.[314] These practices led to the establishment of ‘separate representation for the Arab Christians’, effectively marginalizing the Arab Christian community to the point of ‘near-invisibility’,[315] especially as the ‘politics of Muslim versus Jew’ took hold in interwar Palestine.[316]

The emergence of religious identity-based politics, a prominent feature of the political landscape in Mandate Palestine,[317] resulted from the perceived threat posed by the rapidly growing ‘secular nationalist activities’, particularly among the Arab youth from the multi-religious Arab middle class.[318] Scholars have noted that initially, Palestinian Christians were hopeful that the British would liberate Jerusalem.[319] However, this sentiment changed significantly due to British support for Jewish immigration, which deeply impacted Palestine’s Christian communities. They felt threatened by Jewish immigration, much like

[310]Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
[311]Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
[312]Ted Swedenburg, *Memories Of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Fayetteville, Ark: University of Arkansas Press, 2003).
[313]Daphne Tsimhoni, ‘The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine’, *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 20, no. No. 4 (October 1984): 166–92.
[314]Tsimhoni.
[315]Daphne Tsimhoni, review of *Review of Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, by Laura Robson, *Middle East Journal* 66, no. 2 (2012): 387–88.
[316]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*.
[317]Laura Robson, ‘Communalism and Nationalism in the Mandate: The Greek Orthodox Controversy and the National Movement’, *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 41, no. No. 1 (Autumn 2011): 6–23.
[318]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 160.
[319]Roberto Mazza, ‘Churches at War: The Impact of the First World War on the Christian Institutions of Jerusalem, 1914-20’, *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 207–27.

their Muslim counterparts. As a result, Arab Christian leaders joined their Muslim counterparts in opposing British policies regarding Jewish immigration.

The pretext for European interventions in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in places like Palestine, was the perceived need to protect religious 'minorities', primarily Christian communities, from what was perceived as the challenges posed by Muslim Ottoman rule. The British, in their earlier involvement, had participated in these 'protectorate' politics by supporting the Jewish community. However, when they assumed the Mandate over Palestine, concerns arose that the historical affiliations of European powers with the local Arab Christian population might lead to unintended European interventions in Palestine, with these local religious minorities serving as proxies.

In an attempt to avert possible European interventions and driven by internal dynamics, such as backing from British Protestants for the Zionist initiative, the British Mandate authorities decided to diverge from the traditional Ottoman 'millet system'. This choice was influenced by apprehensions that perceiving Arab Christians as inherent allies within Palestine could conflict with their wider political goals. As a result, the British implemented their own rendition of the millet system in Mandate Palestine, which turned out to be very different from the original Ottoman practice.

The Ottoman Millet System

A notable aspect of the Ottoman millet system was its framework for governing the non-Muslim subjects within the Ottoman Empire while accommodating religious diversity. Originally, the Ottoman authorities recognized only three semi-autonomous millets: 'the Greek Orthodox', the Armenian Orthodox', and 'the Jews'.[320] However, in 1848, the Ottoman

[320]Karen Barkey and George Gavrilis, 'The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy', *Ethnopolitics* 15, no. 1 (2016): 24–42.

Empire extended millet status to 'the Melkite Catholic Church', granting it the ability to articulate the aspirations for autonomy held by numerous Christian denominations within the Empire. By the year 1900, the number of 'officially sanctioned Christian millets' had grown to twelve.[321]

Karen Barkey and George Gavrilis argue that the Ottoman Empire faced a complex challenge of governing smaller religious groups that lacked clear leadership and whose populations were not always distinctly defined. In response, the Ottoman authorities devised a solution by amalgamating these various smaller denominations under the broader umbrella organizations of the three major communities. For instance, the category of the 'Greek Orthodox' Church ended up encompassing a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups, as well as significant regional and geographic dispersion within its fold.[322]

The millet system, regarded as a functional form of non-territorial autonomy, constituted an indirect mode of governance devised by the Ottoman Empire. However, the semi-autonomous status of non-Muslim communities within this system was coupled with various social and economic restrictions,[323] including the imposition of a special tax known as jizya, which was levied on these communities in lieu of military service.[324] A crucial aspect of the Ottoman millet arrangement was its emphasis on 'local parochialism', which limited the practice of religious services strictly to the locally prevailing rituals of each particular church, conducted in the community's local language. Consequently, the millet arrangement gave rise to a situation where it simultaneously fostered religious universalism and local

[321]Bruce Masters, 'The Establishment of the Melkite Catholic Millet in 1848 and the Politics of Identity in Tanzimat Syria', *Syria and Bilad Al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq*, The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage, Volume: 43 (12 July 2010): 455–73, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004191044_024.
[322]Barkey and Gavrilis.
[323]Barkey and Gavrilis.
[324]Sluglett, 'From Millet to Minority', 21.

parochialism.[325] In contrast, the colonial understanding of religious communities held a universal notion consistent across the British Empire. Even in the case of India, colonial authorities reshaped Hinduism, which originally comprised vague beliefs, to conform to the European concept of 'religion', primarily derived from Christianity.

In the early Ottoman period, Braude characterizes the millet system as a form of 'benign neglect of communal arrangements',[326] and he views the Ottoman Empire as a political entity that effectively upheld religious and ethnic tolerance in the face of considerable diversity within its borders.[327] Analysing the various roles of religion within the Ottoman political system, ranging from an institution to a system of beliefs, Barkey concludes that over the first four centuries of the Ottoman Empire, religion and politics developed a distinctive relationship that promoted 'religious openness and toleration'.[328]

In broad terms, the millet system served as the framework employed by the Ottoman Empire to govern its non-Muslim subjects, without rendering these non-Muslim communities powerless in their interactions with the state. A noteworthy aspect of the relationship between minorities and the state was the consistent process of 'negotiations and renegotiations'.[329] The semi-autonomous 'self-governing' status granted to non-Muslim communities residing in the Ottoman Empire, referred to as millets, was a concept that retained its flexibility for an extended period.[330]

During the Ottoman Empire, Muslims constituted the ruling elite, which meant that the Muslim community could not have classified itself as a millet. However, Benjamin

[325]Barkey and Gavrilis, 'The Ottoman Millet System'.
[326]Benjamin Braude, ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition, with a New Introduction*, Abridged edition (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 18.
[327]Karen Barkey, 'Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19, no. 1/2 (2005): 5–19.
[328]Barkey.
[329]Sluglett, 'From Millet to Minority', 29.
[330]Sluglett, 21.

Braude challenges the prevailing perception of a millet during the Ottoman Empire, asserting that the concept of a 'millet' during the empire's zenith did not refer to an autonomous, protected community of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects.[331] According to Braude, the term 'millet' was officially applied to Muslims, along with Christian sovereigns and, occasionally, Jewish favourites, but it was never employed to designate the majority of the non-Muslim subjects within the empire.[332]

Peter Sluglett draws a distinction between a millet in the Ottoman Empire and a 'religious community' in the post-Ottoman Arab world. He views the former as a characteristic of the multi-ethnic Ottoman state that ceased to exist after the First World War, while the latter often presents challenges within the context of the modern nation-state.[333] The transition from millets to religiously constituted political communities poses a significant issue, as exemplified by the manner in which the mandate regime transformed Ottoman millets into religious minorities. This transformation underscores the pervasive nature of the problem.[334]

During the expansion of the millet system in twentieth-century mandate Palestine, Arab Christians were perceived to have a deeper attachment to the distinct Churches of their specific denominations.[335] Jacob Norris, employing a combination of 'micro-historical methodology' within a transnational context, argues that in the nineteenth century, Christians formed a majority in Bethlehem, and it was not productive to characterize their lives solely in terms of the denominational identities prescribed by the millet system. Christians had a

---

[331]Benjamin Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System', in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition, with a New Introduction*, ed. Benjamin Braude (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 66.
[332]Braude, 67.
[333]Sluglett, 'From Millet to Minority', 37.
[334]Sluglett, 37.
[335]Jacob Norris, 'Across Confessional Borders: A Microhistory of Ottoman Christians and Their Migratory Paths', in *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, ed. Laura Robson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016), 40.

tendency to blur 'confessional boundaries continuously as a means to achieve their social and economic goals', gradually rendering Church identity 'irrelevant to the lives of many Ottoman Christians'.[336] Benjamin Braude views the millet system primarily as a localized arrangement, subject to significant variations over time and place.[337] This flexible approach to governance may have been one of the key factors that enabled the vast Ottoman Empire to endure for over four centuries, despite encompassing an extensive mosaic of ethnic and religious diversity while maintaining the pluralistic nature of its society.

The concept of the millet system remains a subject of contention in Ottoman historiography. Laura Robson argues that the construction of the millet system was fundamentally influenced by European intervention. Before European intervention in the late eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, there was no history of systematic, government-imposed religious legal differentiation.[338] Despite these ongoing debates, it is clear that during the nineteenth century, Western intervention aimed at supporting Christian and Jewish communities in the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire significantly heightened the economic and cultural divisions associated with the millet system.[339] Bruce Alan Masters hesitates to view the various communities within the Ottoman Empire through a 'sectarian' lens,[340] given the nature of the millet system before it was institutionalized through European intervention.

However, Ussama Makdisi underscores that 'the codification of the millet system, the solidification of sectarian categories, and the legal, political, and cultural entrenchment of

[336]Norris, 41.
[337]Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System', 70.
[338]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 47.
[339]Robson, 47.
[340]Bruce Alan Masters, *Christians Jews Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*, Revised ed. edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

sectarian differences'[341] resulted from European powers' interventions in the Ottoman Empire, particularly from the early nineteenth century onwards.[342] Benjamin Braude was perhaps the first to argue that the Ottomans lacked a coherent policy towards non-Muslim communities until European intervention influenced reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century.[343]

Regardless of whether a coherent policy existed around the millet system, Ussama Makdisi argues that the Ottoman Empire distributed privileges among its communities while simultaneously discriminating against non-Muslims and non-Ottomans.[344] There is no doubt that non-Muslim communities were subjected to a range of formal discriminatory practices, encompassing regulations on attire, restrictions on the construction of places of worship, the imposition of the jizya (poll tax), and, most significantly, the application of an Islamic legal system that openly favoured Muslims. The millet system essentially granted various non-Muslim communities religious and civil autonomy in exchange for their social, fiscal, and political subordination.[345] Before European intervention in the Ottoman Empire, the millet system had somehow created favourable conditions for the coexistence of diverse religious communities throughout the Empire.[346] Undeniably, during the Ottoman era, politics exerted control over religion,[347] and religious and ethnic diversity was the norm across the Empire.[348] The millet system played a crucial role in providing the social space for this plurality of religions to coexist.

---

[341]Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2000).
[342]Jack Fairey, *The Great Powers and Orthodox Christendom: The Crisis over the Eastern Church in the Era of the Crimean War*, Histories of the Sacred and the Secular 1700-2000 (Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
[343]Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System', 69–88.
[344]Ussama Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019), 19.
[345]Makdisi, 19.
[346]Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Reissue edition (New York: Routledge, 1999), 11.
[347]Fatih Öztürk, *Ottoman and Turkish Law* (iUniverse, 2014), 74.
[348]Öztürk, 43.

The British Millet System: Adaptations in the British Colonial Context

While professing to preserve the Ottoman tradition of the millet system in Palestine, the British imperial strategy aimed to expand this system by categorizing its subject population into politically informed religious communities. At the commencement of its mandate, the Palestine government opted to maintain the millet system, aligning itself with the broader British imperial strategy of upholding an 'imagined religious status quo'. This was perceived as a stabilizing element following the disruptive colonial conquest.

The imperial policy of maintaining an 'imagined religious status quo' was also applied in colonial India with the objectives of assuaging the concerns of the subject population, pre-empting any potential anti-colonial resistance, and reducing the administrative costs of governing its colonies. The British viewed millets in essentialist terms, assuming that these religiously defined communities remained largely unchanged over time, both in their 'constitution' and 'context'. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the British mandate reinstated the millet system in Palestine. This occurred as most non-Muslim communities in the Middle East transitioned from being millets to acquiring the status of minorities in the 1920s and 1930s.[349]

The mandate regime envisioned a Palestinian society in which religion held significant political implications. Consequently, religion was categorized as 'irreducible political entities' within state-designed classifications. Equipped with an Orientalist perspective that perceived Palestinian society as inherently primordial and intensely religious, the mandate government embarked on a systematic enforcement of a 'legal and political' segregation between Muslim and Christian communities. This initiative gave rise to a new form of religious identity-based politics in Palestine. Uri Kupferschmidt elucidates the

[349]Sluglett, 'From Millet to Minority', 19.

challenging situation British officials confronted in Palestine. Britain, as a Christian power, was committed to establishing a Jewish national home while simultaneously governing a Muslim majority in a land considered sacred by the three major monotheistic religions.[350]

The British mandate, in its efforts to preserve the 'millet system', went a step further by developing extensive legal, political, and administrative frameworks to classify its subject population along confessional lines. This imperial strategy, intended to uphold the 'status quo', essentially entailed the colonial creation of 'native' traditions and the contrivance of 'customary' religious categorizations in Palestine. In line with the sentiments expressed by a British colonial administrator, Warren Hastings, during the establishment of British rule in India, the first High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, articulated a similar stance. He emphasized that the British government had decided not to alter laws that directly affected the lives of the local population and to which they were accustomed.[351] His Attorney General, Norman Bentwich, concurred that 'the Ottoman Law' must continue to serve as the foundation of the legal system in Palestine, in keeping with the established traditions of British administration, without causing significant disruptions.[352] In early 1919, the subject of granting autonomy to Christian communities in Palestine was deliberated, particularly in relation to the governance of the Holy Places and the status of Catholics. The Reverend P.N. Waggett, a British Catholic priest serving as a consultant on religious affairs to the military administration, noted the importance of these communities maintaining their autonomy, especially in matters of personal status and education, consistent with the arrangements that were in place before the occupation.[353] Samuel and Bentwich regarded the millet system as a 'stabilizing' factor amidst the upheaval of colonial occupation. In fact, it can be more

[350]Khalidi, *The Iron Cage*, 53.
[351]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 49.
[352]Robson, 49.
[353] Tsimhoni, 'The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine'.

accurately characterized that the mandate's legal system was 'an English superstructure' constructed upon an Ottoman foundation.[354]

While upholding the millet system as part of the imperial policy to maintain the 'status quo' of religious practices in Palestine, the British also introduced the concept of a secular nation-state as a modern goal to aspire to. In both colonial India and mandate Palestine, the ideal of the nation-state served as the framework for conceptualizing local identities based on religious lines. The conflicting ideas arising from the desire to modernize Palestine's legal structures and the necessity to re-traditionalize the Ottoman legal system, particularly along religious lines, which had been perceived as corrupted due to European influences, in order to authentically reflect the millet system, played a role in the decision to extend and preserve the millet system.

In their efforts to establish effective colonial governance mechanisms in Palestine and pre-empt local resistance, British officials developed strategies to categorize the local population into distinct religious communities, under the guise of maintaining the existing 'communal' arrangement – the millet system. The British mandate authorities introduced the singularity of religious identity at the heart of their political structure for mandate Palestine with the specific goal of accommodating the European Jewish settler community. This initiative laid the groundwork for an essentially apolitical system centred on religious identity in Palestine,[355] as the Ottoman millet system was reimagined as a fundamental organizing principle of the mandate state. By placing the construction of religion-based identities at the

[354]Norman Bentwich, 'The Legal System of Israel', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (1964): 236–55.
[355]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 12.

core of colonial politics, the diverse local political landscape transitioned into a rigorously religiously defined system with adversarial political communities.[356]

In their efforts to both maintain and expand the millet system, Samuel and Bentwich made the deliberate choice to preserve the legal separation of religious communities. This decision aimed to facilitate the political integration of new Jewish immigrants arriving from Europe. Samuel later defended his decision to further develop the millet system by citing the Ottoman example, noting that the Ottomans, with their centuries of experience, effectively managed communities under the millet system. He explained, 'Consequently, I continued and developed it, and I made it my duty to organize and legitimize these communal entities... The political system of that country should, in my judgment, be based mainly on these lines'.[357] The British attempt to 're-traditionalize' the Ottoman millet system resulted in a complex web of rules and regulations.[358] By 1930, for instance, the mandate land law had become an intricate blend of various legal sources, including original Ottoman laws, provisional laws, tribunal judgments, Sultanic Firmans, administrative orders with legal force, and a multitude of post-war proclamations, public orders, orders-in-council, ordinances, amending ordinances, and additional orders and regulations, resulting in a convoluted legal framework.[359]

Despite internal disagreements on how to implement the millet system, officials within the Palestine administration collectively perceived Palestine as fundamentally divided along religious lines, aligning with the official policy of promoting religiously informed identities as the natural basis for the legal organization of the Palestinian population. In the process of 'sectarianization' of Palestinian political life, Samuel extended the millet system to include Muslims, categorizing them as a millet. Under the mandate government's authority,

[356]Tudor Parfitt, 'The Use of the Jew in Colonial Discourse', in *Orientalism and the Jews*, ed. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar (Waltham, Massachusetts, Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2004).
[357]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 53.
[358]Robson, 54.
[359]Martin Bunton, *Colonial Land Policies in Palestine 1917-1936* (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2007), 39.

new legal institutions were introduced for Muslims, including the establishment of the Supreme Moslem Council, which was entrusted with the administration and oversight of Muslim religious courts. This decision to redefine 'the Muslim community' as the largest millet was motivated by the challenges the mandate authorities faced in maintaining the millet system. Unlike other religious communities, there had never been independent Muslim religious institutions during the Ottoman period, as the central Ottoman authority directly managed Islamic courts and other religious institutions.

While the British authorities effectively divided the Arab population in Palestine by segregating Muslims from Christians, they concurrently perceived Muslims residing throughout the British Empire as a unified and homogenous community, constituting a global Umma. This notion of Muslims forming a global Umma was an integral aspect of the colonial conception of Muslims as a distinct race.[360] The concept of 'pan-Islam' began to gain prominence in the late nineteenth century, particularly in contrast to the 'Christian West', as the majority of Muslims found themselves under the rule of European Christian empires.[361] With nearly half of the world's Muslim population as its subjects by the turn of the nineteenth century, and influenced by a 'racialized perception of religious difference',[362] the British Empire played a significant role in creating conditions that eventually led to the imagining of a single and homogenous 'Muslim world'.[363]

It is conceivable that the British authorities' underlying assumption regarding the close connections between Palestinian Muslims and their co-religionists in India played a pivotal role in their decision to reclassify Muslims in Palestine as a millet. This move aimed to appease Muslim sentiments in both Palestine and India, as winning the support of Indian

[360] Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 5.
[361] Aydin, 5.
[362] Aydin, 54.
[363] Cemil Aydin, 'Imperial Paradoxes: A Caliphate for Subaltern Muslims', *ReOrient* 1, no. 2 (2016): 171–91.

Muslims was crucial for the British Empire. The British perceived the possibility of an anti-colonial alliance between Indian Muslims and the Indian National Congress as a significant threat to their rule in India. Similarly, the prospect of Arab Muslims and Christians uniting posed a comparable challenge to the British-supported Zionist project. Both scenarios presented the British with the potentially favourable outcome of having Muslim communities in India and Arab regions unite in support of British policies. This alignment would serve British interests by creating a more amenable environment for their strategic objectives in both the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East.

With the intention of mollifying what the mandate authorities perceived as strong religious sentiments among Palestinian Muslims, Colonial and India Office officials viewed the newly established Muslim millet in Palestine as representing the concept of pan-Islam.[364] In a broader context, this policy of appeasement toward the colonial notion of pan-Islam was driven by global imperial interests. The mandatory regime's commitment to pacify Arab Muslims seemed to be based on a strategy similar to communalization in India. They believed that Muslim loyalties to their global Umma transcended their local 'political, economic, or social interests', and gaining their support was essential for successful rule in both India and Palestine.

The Supreme Muslim Council: An Invention of Tradition

The establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council marked a significant extension of the millet system, aligning with the British imperial strategy to foster religious differentiation within its colonial framework. By creating this Council, the British effectively integrated the Muslim community into a system that already accommodated Christian and Jewish communal organizations, granting Muslims a similar level of autonomy. Nevertheless, the

[364]'Note on the Pan-Islamic Movement, File No. 210-N of 1933', n.d., New Delhi, National Archives of India.

Supreme Muslim Council differentiated itself by positioning as a national entity from the outset, thereby asserting a distinct role and set of aspirations within the wider socio-political context.[365]

The formation of the Supreme Muslim Council was a critical component of the colonial agenda, serving not only as a religious authority but also as a key instrument in the promotion of religious distinctiveness. The practical effect of this establishment was particularly evident in the legal domain, where State courts were transformed into Muslim courts with exclusive jurisdiction over Muslim individuals. This was a departure from the treatment of Christian and Jewish communities, whose religious courts operated with a greater degree of independence from government intervention. Thus, while the Council provided a formal mechanism for representing Muslim interests to the mandate authorities, it also underscored the nuanced complexities of colonial governance, where religious autonomy was both granted and circumscribed.

In addition to quelling emerging nationalist tensions among Palestinian Arabs by confining their political activities to the religious realm, the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council was a part of Samuel's strategy to create a religious mode of representation for Palestine that could legitimize the smooth inclusion of the European Jewish presence.[366] Under Ottoman rule, the Mufti of Jerusalem held limited authority, but during the British mandate, their power was significantly expanded. Samuel acknowledged that the formation of the Supreme Muslim Council marked a departure from the previous Ottoman legal system, as there was no precedent for granting such extensive powers of appointing and dismissing judges of religious courts to a Muslim Council. However, he justified this innovation by citing the unique circumstances in Palestine and the natural desire of the Muslim community

[365] Tsimhoni, 'The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine'.
[366] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 59.

to exercise autonomy in their religious affairs.[367] This 'legal fiction' allowed the Supreme Muslim Council to function as an autonomous body while the mandate government continued to pay salaries to its officials. Similar arrangements existed in colonial India, where the colonial regime resurrected the institution of qazis – government judicial officials responsible for administering Muslim law. This had a significant impact on the religious identity formation of the Muslim community, particularly in Punjab during late nineteenth-century India.[368]

The Supreme Muslim Council, as established by Samuel, was inherently susceptible to the abuse of its powers, with procedures and structures that facilitated such misconduct. Samuel took this even further by waiving the fundamental requirement for periodic re-elections of the presidency, effectively making Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, a scion of a notable Palestinian family, a lifelong president of the Supreme Muslim Council.[369] Amin al-Husseini, an Arab Muslim nationalist in Mandate Palestine, was appointed as the Grand Mufti of Palestine, responsible for overseeing Jerusalem's Islamic holy places.

The position of the Mufti of Jerusalem was created by the British military government in 1918, and Amin al-Husseini used this position to rally local Arab nationalists against the Zionist project. Despite being a government employee whose salary was paid by the Mandate government, he wielded enormous and direct influence over the lives of approximately 'a million Muslims' in Palestine.[370] Harry Luke, the Assistant Governor of Jerusalem, criticized the excessive powers granted to the Supreme Muslim Council, describing the constitution and regulations as a delegation of jurisdiction and powers that almost amounted to the abdication

[367]Robson, 60.
[368]Robert Ivermee, 'Shari'at and Muslim Community in Colonial Punjab, 1865–1885', *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 4 (2014): 1068–95.
[369]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 60–61.
[370]Joseph Nevo, 'Al-Hajj Amin and the British in World War II', *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 20, no. 1 (January 1984): 3–16.

of the Administration of Palestine's responsibilities, which should have been carried out by the government.[371] By 1934, some Muslims had begun to voice their concerns about the financial responsibility of the government and the judicial irresponsibility of the Council. They questioned the nature of judicial independence, as judges were perceived to be influenced by the Mufti's personal political ambitions, using the courts and judicial patronage for his benefit.[372]

The establishment of the 'Supreme Muslim Council' was a significant component of the colonial governance's technological apparatus aimed at pre-empting any potential Arab nationalist challenge to the mandate itself. Samuel openly communicated to Foreign Secretary George Curzon in 1920 that the Supreme Muslim Council 'may serve to check any agitation for political autonomy'.[373] By 1926, it was considered a successful policy, as it appeared to channel the political energies of Palestinian Muslims into religious identity-based politics rather than secular nationalist activities. Sir John Shuckburgh, the Assistant Undersecretary of State, proudly stated that the creation of the 'Supreme Muslim Council' was 'one of our most successful moves in Palestine. It practically gave the Mohammedans self-government in regard to Moslem affairs'.[374]

The expansion of the millet system to include Muslims appears to have been driven by the mandatory government's need to forge relations with the Muslim population. It was a strategic move by the mandatory government to establish relations with the Muslim population, which was significantly influenced by the specific needs and demands of the Jewish community. This perspective implies that the considerations and interests of the Jewish community played a crucial role in shaping colonial policy, including the engagement

---

[371]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 61.
[372]Robson, 61.
[373]Nicholas E. Roberts, *Islam under the Palestine Mandate: Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council*, Sew edition (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2015), 93.
[374]Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 61.

with the Muslim communities through the extension of the millet system. This approach underscores the complex interplay of community interests and colonial strategies in the region's administrative policies.

While the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British occupation of Palestine, and the increasing Jewish immigration had already stirred intense religious sentiments, it was primarily the colonial establishment of the 'Supreme Muslim Council' that gradually led Palestinian Muslims to shift away from secular nationalist discourse in favour of an Islamist political framework. Through the creation of this institution, the British deliberately solidified communal identities as a central aspect of politics in Palestine.[375] This not only constituted colonial Muslim subjects but also encouraged them to embrace their role as colonial subjects.

Imperial 'Dividing Practices': Subjectivation of Muslim Subject

The process of 'subjectivation' in mandate Palestine played a crucial role in determining the fate of secular nationalist initiatives among the Muslim subject population. While it was not entirely successful in shaping them into the ideal colonial subjects, the modern colonial power was intricately linked to various forms of colonial power. 'Subjectivation' refers to the process through which individuals or groups actively constitute themselves as subjects using historical techniques, methods, and procedures available to them.[376]

Colonial subjectivity was not a passive outcome but a dynamic process. Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, understood that his power hinged on the British perception that he represented the Islamic authority recognized by all Muslims in Palestine. The British

---

[375]Robson, 62.
[376]Michel Foucault, *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961--1984: Interviews, 1966-84*, 2Rev Ed edition (New York, N.Y.: MIT Press, 1996), 472.

authorities also saw his family as a symbol of Palestinian cooperation[377] with them and considered him a trustworthy and moderating leader.[378] Despite lacking the required academic qualifications and failing to secure sufficient votes for election, the British appointed him as the Mufti of Jerusalem.[379] Recognizing the influence that Amin al-Husseini's family held over the Muslim community, the British sought to utilize their influence to effectively govern the Muslim population in Palestine,[380] a fact that the Mufti was well aware of.

Amin al-Husseini remained a controversial figure throughout his political career. While some view his vehement opposition to the Zionist project in Palestine as rooted in Palestinian nationalism, Zionist historians dispute this perspective. Initially, Amin al-Husseini was considered a loyal ally by the mandate authorities, but this changed when the Arab revolt erupted in 1936. During the wave of protests and opposition to the British and Jews in Palestine, Amin al-Husseini took the lead in forming the Arab Higher Committee. Although the British initially engaged with Amin al-Husseini and the Arab Higher Committee, their efforts were unsuccessful, and a general strike ensued. It was during this period that the Mufti was removed from the presidency of the Muslim Supreme Council. His opposition to the British led to an arrest warrant, but Amin al-Husseini managed to evade arrest by fleeing to Lebanon. From his exile, he continued to be active in Palestinian politics until the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, which effectively marginalized Amin al-Husseini's role in Palestinian leadership.

The colonial process of self-subjectification may not have been as successful as the British had hoped. Despite efforts by the Mufti to defuse anti-Christian rhetoric and his later collaboration with the British after the 1936-39 Arab revolt, the inability of the Palestinian

---

[377]Ilan Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2010), 209.
[378]Pappe, 219.
[379]Pappe, 218.
[380]Nevo, 'Al-Hajj Amin and the British in World War II'.

nationalist movement to incorporate Palestinian Jews into its fold highlights the limited success of self-subjectivation during the mandate period. It is undeniable that the relative calm in Palestine from 1921 to 1929 can be attributed in large part to the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council.[381] The British invention of this council further extended Amin al-Husseini's influence across Palestine.[382] This move can be seen as an attempt to undermine the Palestinian nationalist movement, which was incomplete without the involvement of Muslim-Christian associations.[383] By placing Amin al-Husseini at the centre of colonial politics, the colonial authorities reinforced the religious Muslim identity-based politics and marginalized Arab Christians.

The impact of this 'self-subjectivation', where the Muslim community willingly submitted to the dividing practices of the colonial millet system, was profound. By 1931, the religious idiom had largely replaced the secular nationalist expression in significant segments of Muslim society. This shift is evident in the name of the organization founded by the Mufti's opposition, known as the 'Party of the Islamic Nation', which was established as a rival to the World Muslim Congress in December 1931. This choice of name reflects the success of the tone set by the Supreme Muslim Council, emphasizing religion-based identity politics among Palestinians and replacing the earlier explicitly multi-religious nationalist discourse.

The millet system implemented in mandate Palestine was not an aberration but rather reflected a broader colonial practice of 'religious identity-based' politics embedded in British imperial knowledge and policies. The arrival of British imperialism in India and Palestine brought with it a discursive framework for social ordering and power relationships with the subject populations. Just as the census-taking exercise in colonial India divided people into

---

[381] Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty*, 222.
[382] Pappe, 223.
[383] Pappe, 175.

religious communities, the millet system created similar 'communitarian' structures in mandate Palestine.

Within these structures, the British positioned themselves as impartial arbiters, appearing above or outside of 'local' and 'religious identity-based' conflicts, rather than as instigators. They would mediate disputes among the communities they had constituted, often presenting themselves as the rational, civilized actors seeking to restrain the passions of the local population.[384] Reading the memoirs and official reports of colonial officials during the British mandate in Palestine can be perplexing, as these officials often seemed genuinely surprised and bewildered by the consequences of their policies, rarely taking responsibility for the catastrophic events that unfolded.[385]

When placing mandate Palestine within the broader historical context of the British Empire, it becomes evident that, much like in British India, the consequences of the British imperial strategy of constructing a 'religious identity-based' political landscape continued to echo long after their departure. By the time the British withdrew from Palestine, the centrality of 'religious identity' as an organizing principle had been etched into the Palestinian social and political landscape, leaving a lasting impact on the collective consciousness of its people.

Just as the census-taking exercises in colonial India exacerbated tensions and conflicts between religious communities, albeit in different forms,[386] the millet system in mandate Palestine disrupted the delicate cultural and political equilibrium that had existed among diverse religious communities for nearly a millennium. A comparative study of British-ruled India and Palestine, both of which experienced bloody partitions with profound consequences for their subsequent histories, offers insight into how colonial regimes wielded control over

[384] Khalidi, *The Iron Cage*, 51.
[385] Khalidi, 51.
[386] Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 85.

subject populations through governance technologies such as census-taking and the millet system, ultimately fostering deep internal divisions.

Connecting the thread of ‘religious identity-based’ politics across the British Empire highlights the lasting colonial legacies in South Asia and Israel/Palestine. The repercussions of categorizing local populations into religiously defined communities during colonial rule were so profound that, even decades after the British withdrew from India and Palestine, ‘religious identity’ remains a defining factor in local politics. This enduring influence underscores the enduring impact of colonial policies on the post-colonial societies of these regions.

Conclusion

My research suggests that colonial authorities, guided by their perceptions of colonial societies, likely crafted governance technologies embedding these views. The census and millet systems appear to exemplify these technologies, shaped by colonial insights into the local populace, and likely gave rise to a colonial discourse centred on difference. This discourse likely required the articulation of difference, predominantly along religious lines, as a significant aspect of administering colonized societies. I have argued that the colonial construction of difference likely necessitated the complicity of colonial subjects, who likely had to consent to their own defined roles within this colonial discourse on difference, thereby acknowledging and potentially perpetuating the colonial narrative.

My research has revealed that examining the origins of colonial administrators' views on communal diversity and how these were transmitted to their subjects, coupled with an analysis of the methods of colonial governance employed, provides a thorough insight into the potential influence of 'religious identity-based' politics in both colonial India and Mandate Palestine. The British colonial narrative, which emphasized presumed communal differences, played a pivotal role in fostering 'separation' among communities within the local political milieu, potentially laying the groundwork for 'religious identity-based' conflicts. In both colonial India and mandate Palestine, the entrenched European notion of 'the Orient' as inherently divided may have been reflected in the design of the census and the reconfiguration and implementation of the millet system in mandate Palestine. These systems may have operationalized the colonial concept of segmented populations into tangible categories, potentially solidifying pre-existing social and cultural rifts into defined political

entities and shaping the 'thought processes' of colonial subjects towards accepting these constructed divisions as the norm.[387]

The colonization of India, as suggested by Bernard Cohen, was not merely territorial but also an 'acquisition of knowledge',[388] representing a process through which Europe managed and even constructed the Orient through systematic discourse.[389] This production of colonial knowledge about the Orient extended beyond European confines and was significantly influenced by the 'Orientals' themselves, albeit within the constraints of colonial narratives.

The census exercises served as a living testament to this knowledge production, illustrating how colonial administrators in India navigated the complex and fluid practices of Hinduism. In their colonial governance, the British recast Hinduism into a form that aligned with Western concepts of religion, characterized by clear and defined boundaries. This redefinition elevated religion to a critical category within the colonial census, which methodically documented the size of each religious community in relation to the total population and to other religious groups. Consequently, the census began to compare the demographic profiles of different religious communities within colonial India. This practice implicitly linked the numerical strength of a religious community to its potential political influence, equating demographic prevalence with power in the colonial context.

In mandate Palestine, the emergence of 'religious identity-based politics' as a significant discourse coincided with British officials modifying and expanding the Ottoman millet system to serve as a fundamental organizing principle of their colonial governance. This adaptation made 'religion' a key determinant of political identity in the region.

---

[387]Jones, 97.
[388]Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, 16.
[389]Said, *Orientalism*, 2003, 3.

Categorizing Jews in Palestine as a 'millet'—essentially viewing them as a religious community—partially reflected a racialized view of Jews as Asians to some extent. This classification strategy enabled the British to navigate through various perceptions of Jews: as a religious group, a nation, and a settler community, thereby allowing the British to maintain a facade of neutrality in their governance decisions. It effectively obscured the national identity of the Arab population while simultaneously denying the Jews' settler colonial rights. The critical aspect in mandate Palestine was not merely the modification and expansion of the millet system by the British, but rather the acceptance and integration of this colonial framework by the local populations. This acceptance and integration played a pivotal role in shaping the political discourse and dynamics of the region during the mandate period.

Foucauldian analytical frameworks[390] help us understand how the division of populations based on 'religious identity' allowed colonial powers to impose normative judgments. In *Discipline and Punish*,[391] Foucault explains how the prison, as a form of visibility, generates narratives about criminality. These narratives, in turn, reinforce the logic of the prison system, creating a reciprocal relationship between visibility and the concept of criminality.

My research demonstrates that religious categorization within colonial censuses in India and the classification of the Arab population through the millet system in mandate Palestine served as forms of visibility. They gave rise to narratives on religious distinctions, which legitimized and rationalized these forms of religious categorization. The interplay between these narratives on difference and the visibility of tangible practices such as census-taking, the millet system, and other religion-focused colonial policies mutually conditioned each other. Census-taking exercises and the colonial millet system were the 'visibility' in the

[390] 177–84 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[391] Foucault.

colonial context, laying the groundwork for new social realities, including the emergence of religious identity-based politics.

Rather than delving into deeper interpretations of colonial discourse, my analysis focuses on the 'colonial truth' that contributed to the emergence of 'religion-based identity politics'. This phenomenon was facilitated through the visible practices of census-taking and the implementation of the colonial millet system. These practices, integral to colonial governance technologies, involved extensive bureaucratic processes that significantly influenced the definition and perception of Indian society. By systematically collecting statistics, these governance mechanisms played a crucial role in shaping the nature and character of societal structures within the colonial context. This underscores the direct impact of colonial administrative actions on the formation of religion-based political identities.

This chapter examined the intricate frameworks of colonial governance, with a particular focus on two key methodologies: the British census activities in colonial India and the adaptation of the Ottoman Millet system for colonial purposes in mandate Palestine. These methodologies not only structured administrative operations but also profoundly shaped the perceptions of identity among colonial subjects, placing religious distinctions at the core of societal self-perception. The exploration uncovers how these imperial technologies—census-taking in India and the modified Millet system in Palestine—functioned as tools for categorizing and managing populations, ultimately sculpting the social landscapes through the lens of religious disparity. This analysis sheds light on the profound impacts of colonial administrative strategies on the formation of communal identities and their enduring influence in shaping the post-colonial landscape.

In the process of implementing British colonial strategies across colonial India and mandate Palestine, colonial officials undertook the task of reshaping local governance

practices, imbuing them with novel colonial interpretations. In India, this transformation was evident in the process of conducting censuses, while in Palestine, it entailed the reconfiguration of the Ottoman millet system. Despite exhibiting certain similarities, these colonial governance mechanisms yielded diverse outcomes in each respective context. Both strategies were oriented towards accommodating diverse populations within sectarian frameworks, albeit with varying degrees of success. In colonial India, the execution of census operations and the establishment of separate electorates inadvertently fuelled religion-based identity politics, which hindered the emergence of a unified anti-colonial movement. In contrast, in mandate Palestine, the perpetuation of the millet system did not alter the self-perception of the Jewish community as a nation and a settler group, even though they were officially categorized as a 'millet'.

The British endeavours to delineate and regulate religious and communal identities through these mechanisms highlight the profound impact of colonial administrative practices on the social and political dynamics of colonial India and mandate Palestine. These imperial governance technologies succeeded in establishing a potent colonial discourse centred on 'difference', one so persuasive that the local populace not only adopted this 'regime of truth' as their own but also internalized it within their collective consciousness, resulting in an irreversible transformation of the colonial landscape. The escalation of communal violence and the escalating intolerance towards difference serve as testament to the effectiveness of these colonial technologies. Their success would have been unattainable without the active participation of the local population, who played a central role in their implementation. This intricate interplay between colonial strategies and local agency underscores the profound and enduring influence of these administrative practices, leaving an indelible imprint on the identities and histories of colonial societies.

Chapter 2

Representative Politics

Governing Through Difference

This chapter scrutinizes the intricacies of representative politics within the colonial contexts of India and Palestine, examining how the British administration navigated the challenges of governing extensive territories with limited personnel. By the 1830s, the realization dawned upon the colonial officials in India that effective administration of a continent with approximately 150 million inhabitants was unfeasible with merely a thousand Company officials, supported solely by a mercenary army.[392] This acknowledgment underscored the necessity for the active involvement of local elite classes and the passive compliance of the wider populace in the colonial governance apparatus. This analysis examines the constitutional reforms and political strategies employed by the British to imbue the notion of 'difference' with definitive political substance and normative frameworks, thereby facilitating a complex interplay of collaboration and acquiescence that shaped the colonial and post-colonial trajectory of these regions.

Providing a restricted constitutional role to the local elite classes, who could align themselves with colonial rule, became imperative for maintaining the colonial enterprise in India. It also served as a vital tool for restraining nationalist aspirations by exerting influence over their anti-colonial endeavours, essentially allowing for the regulation of the local population. The need for a constitutional role, albeit a limited one, for local elite classes became pressing when widespread unrest erupted in response to the partition of Bengal in 1905. The fervent agitation by revolutionary Indian nationalists against British rule underscored the necessity for the swift implementation of representative politics.

---

[392]Cyril Henry Philips and M. Doreen Wainwright, *Indian Society and the Beginnings of Modernisation, c.1830-1850* (London: University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1976), 1.

The colonial endeavour to introduce the classification of local populations into religious communities obstructed the efforts of colonial subjects to assert a secular national identity in colonial India and mandate Palestine. The colonial state could lay claim to being secular and non-sectarian because, by definition, it was meant to act as a neutral arbitrator. However, since colonial subjects were primarily identified in terms of their religious identity, transcending this categorization in a way that would be deemed legitimate by others proved to be an insurmountable challenge. As 'secularism' remained a defining characteristic of the colonial state, the task of establishing a non-religious identity-based alternative for the subject population remained intractable. The neutrality of the colonial state was contingent upon the religious identity-based nature of local society. I situate 'secularism' within the very epistemological framework of colonial knowledge, which informed the conceptualization and enactment of representative institutions in colonial India and mandate Palestine.

The colonial practice of conducting census exercises categorized the Indian population along religious lines, and the introduction of representative politics further fragmented colonial subjects into majorities and minorities. Being part of a minority meant that such a group had the potential to benefit or suffer, depending on the colonial state's inclination to maintain neutrality or intervene to safeguard against perceived or actual disadvantages caused by the majority. It was not the particular details of the elections that held significance; rather, it was the overarching concept of representative politics that cast a long shadow, transcending immediate events and giving rise to entrenched political divisions between majorities and minorities.

This chapter examines the implementation of representative politics in British-ruled India and Palestine, exploring how the concept of the 'religious community' (discussed in the previous chapter) evolved into a political entity. It contextualizes the histories of

representative politics within the framework of Western secularism. The analysis centres on the emergence of representative politics as a facet of the colonial process of 'secularization', which reframed the politics of religious identity, particularly in the context of Muslim politics in India and Zionist politics in Palestine.

The chapter underscores that representative politics was a natural extension of earlier colonial policies and practices, such as census-taking in colonial India and the millet system in mandate Palestine. It scrutinizes how pre-existing collective religious identities were transformed into permanent political entities through their association with the distribution of political power. The politics of religious identity was a consequence of a political system that linked a community's electoral size to its political influence. Instead of viewing the formation of the 'Indian Muslim' political identity resulting from representative politics as an isolated case, this analysis places it within a broader colonial context, considering it alongside the formation of Jewish identity in Europe and mandate Palestine, which is often seen as a unique case in Israeli historiography.

Representative politics in colonial India and mandate Palestine were characterized by the introduction of political frameworks by the colonial powers, aimed ostensibly at providing local populations with a degree of representation in governance. However, these systems were often structured to prioritize colonial interests over genuine representation or empowerment of the local populace.

In colonial India, the British Raj initiated the inclusion of Indians in governance through legislative councils, starting with the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and expanding with further reforms in 1892 and 1909, which increased Indian participation. Despite these reforms, significant power remained with British officials. The introduction of the dyarchy system in 1919 under the Government of India Act further attempted to delegate some

responsibilities to elected Indian ministers, but critical domains like finance and law remained under British control. The Government of India Act of 1935 aimed to provide greater autonomy to provincial governments, yet substantial authority was still retained by British governors and the Viceroy, limiting the scope of self-governance.

In Mandate Palestine, under the British Mandate established by the League of Nations after World War I, there were attempts to develop self-governing institutions. Nonetheless, the British retained overall control, and efforts to establish legislative councils were often resisted by both Arab and Jewish communities, who had distinct national goals. The British recognized the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the representative body for Jews, which significantly influenced Jewish affairs and the promotion of Jewish immigration and settlement. Arab interests were intermittently represented by local leaders and the Arab Higher Committee, with relations often strained by disputes over policies affecting land and immigration.

These systems offered limited genuine representation, keeping ultimate authority with the colonial powers and contributing to divisions among local communities, impacting the political landscapes of both regions post-colonization. In both colonial India and mandate Palestine, the colonial regime's proposal to establish a legislative council with limited constitutional powers was met with differing responses from nationalist movements. The key consideration for these movements was whether such a council would ultimately lead to self-rule or further consolidate colonial power over the subject populations. In colonial India, nationalist leaders believed that the legislative council would eventually pave the way for self-rule, leading to internal demands for representational institutions. They saw it as a stepping stone towards greater autonomy and self-governance.

On the other hand, in mandate Palestine, international pressure, primarily driven by the Mandates system, played a significant role in pushing for representational politics. Arab nationalist leaders in Palestine were concerned that accepting representative institutions would be seen as giving consent to the Balfour Declaration, which supported the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. As a result, they were less enthusiastic about representative politics, and the efforts in this regard largely failed. This marked a stark difference between colonial India, where representative politics was successfully implemented and played a role in the path to self-rule, and mandate Palestine, where it faced significant challenges and did not lead to the same outcomes.

The concept of 'minoritization' in colonial India was intricately linked to the emergence of representative politics, and it played a significant role in the larger development of the nation-state.[393] Both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League aspired to and ultimately achieved the creation of a nation-state in 1947, although it required the partition of India. The idea of 'minoritization' was not unique to India but was influenced by broader global developments. For example, the Turkish Peace Settlement, particularly the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923, endorsed a population exchange between Greece and Turkey to address the 'minority problem' in both countries. This population exchange aimed to create 'homogeneous nation-states'[394] by eliminating minority populations, reflecting a nation-state paradigm prevalent in Europe. This European model of homogenizing nation-states, deeply ingrained in the European mindset, was transplanted to the colonies as a governance technology through the introduction of representative institutions.[395] It contributed to the complex dynamics of identity, nationalism, and governance in colonial India and other colonial contexts.

---

[393]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.
[394]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 8.
[395]Philips, 'Review: The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India by K.B. Krishna'.

Securing Governance: Colonial Practices of Purchasing Alliance and Assistance

In colonial India, governance was characterized by a bifurcated system that distinguished between direct British rule and indirect administration over the numerous autonomous princely states scattered throughout the region. This division, according to Sir Reginald Coupland, occurred rather fortuitously.[396] Coupland, who held the prestigious position of Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford and was a member of both the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India and the Royal Commission on Palestine (1936-37) led by Lord Peel, dedicated a significant portion of his career to the exploration of the British Empire, with a particular focus on India. His contributions included membership in Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission to India, during which he produced an extensive analysis of the constitutional challenges faced by colonial India, further cementing his reputation as a leading expert in his field.

The British approach to colonial governance, particularly in relation to the princely states, was strategically indirect. They aimed to solidify their position amidst the prevailing conflict and complexity by securing the loyalty of key regional leaders—ranging from powerful rulers to minor chieftains—through agreements to honour and safeguard their hereditary rights within their territories.[397] This tactic was not only about maintaining order but also about leveraging local power structures to the British advantage.

Furthermore, this strategy extended to the political arena, where the colonial administration found it advantageous to utilize the Council of Princes. Viceroy Lord Curzon described this body as an instrument to undermine nationalist sentiments, effectively

[396]Coupland Reginald, *India: A Re-Statement* (H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1945), 35.
[397]Reginald, 36.

employing traditional authorities to counter the growing demand for self-rule.[398] The political landscape was further manipulated by promoting representative politics that ostensibly aimed to include Muslim leadership. However, this inclusion was a calculated move to divide the Indian populace along religious lines, thereby diluting the nationalist movement led predominantly by the Congress. The British effectively marshalled communal identities as a means to prevent a unified front against colonial rule, turning the promise of political representation into a tool for securing allegiance and assistance from select groups against the broader nationalist cause.

This study explores the emergence and evolution of 'representative politics', analyzing how imperial tactics of identifying and governing diversity set the stage for politics rooted in religious identity, culminating in deeply fragmented societies and divided communities within colonial India and Mandate Palestine. An analysis of British policies to implement representative politics in both contexts uncovers a history that could have unfolded in numerous alternative directions. The colonial ‘dividing practices’ were inherently tied to resolving the communal issues that were, ironically, a result of colonial policies themselves. It was this resolution, or the attempt at it, that embedded the concept of ‘partition’ within the societal framework of the colonial states, shaping the trajectory of their political evolution and the eventual demarcation of boundary lines was carried out through and between religious communities, emphasizing communal divisions.

The emergence of politics grounded in religious identity in colonial India can be closely linked to the timeline of constitutional reforms initiated by the British. As the framework for representative politics began to take shape under these reforms, the dynamics of religious identity became increasingly pronounced. This shift was, in many respects, a

---

[398]Countess of Minto Mary, ed., *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State* (London: MACMILLAN AND CO, LIMITED, St. Martin’s Street, 1934), 100.

strategic response by the imperial authorities to the growing influence and mobilization of the Indian National Congress, which was perceived as a challenge to colonial rule. The British administration, seeking to counterbalance this burgeoning nationalist movement, resorted to a policy of ‘counterpoise’,[399] deliberately cultivating communal divisions as a means of maintaining control.

A pivotal moment in the institutionalization of communal politics was the introduction of separate electorates for Indian Muslims with the Government of India Act of 1919.[400] This policy decision became a crucial structural element in the communalization of national politics, effectively entrenching divisions based on religious identity within the political system. The separate electorates ensured that Muslims would vote for their representatives independently of the Hindu majority, a move that, while ostensibly aimed at protecting minority rights, served to deepen the communal rift and set the stage for the politicization of religious identity on a broader scale.

The mandate system implemented in Palestine under British auspices presented a unique challenge, fundamentally altering the political landscape by denying Palestinian Arabs the recognition of national sovereignty while concurrently laying the legal groundwork for the establishment of a Jewish national home. This dual objective placed colonial administrators and Palestinian Arabs in a complex and often contradictory position, distinguishing the Palestinian mandate from other colonial contexts from the outset.

A comparative analysis of the Muslim League's stance in colonial India and the Zionist leadership's approach in Mandate Palestine towards the concept of representative

---

[399]K. B. Krishna, *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India* (London: Alien and Unwin, 1939), 38.

[400]Giorgio Shani, “Empire, Liberalism and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Colonial Governmentality in Indian Subcontinent,” *The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2006.* Vol.5 (2006): 19–36.

politics offers a lens through which to explore how the British adapted and manipulated the secular ideals of representational governance in both territories, yielding somewhat parallel results. In each instance, the British colonial strategy involved bolstering the political influence of the numerically smaller community—Muslims in India and Jews in Palestine—to counterbalance the dominant weight of the majority community within the framework of representative politics. This research situates the Indian Muslims' assertion of a distinct and separate 'nation' within the broader colonial milieu, paralleling the Zionist movement's claim for a unique and separate nationhood with aspirations for a territorial majority in Palestine. By examining these claims side by side, the study sheds light on the broader colonial tactics of divide and rule and the reconfiguration of secular principles of representation to serve imperial ends, ultimately leading to significant and lasting geopolitical transformations in both regions.

The British Mandate in Palestine is marked by a distinctive and exceptional characteristic: the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into its terms, embedding the seeds of the Arab-Zionist conflict within the very framework of British governance in the region. This declaration represented a 'double undertaking' by the British, promising support to the Jewish people for the establishment of a national home in Palestine, while simultaneously assuring the non-Jewish population of the protection of their civil and religious rights.[401] Such inherently conflicting commitments were not mirrored in the governance structures established by the British in other colonies, such as the Charter of the East India Company or the subsequent instruments of direct rule in India, which did not contain comparable contradictory obligations.

[401] The Road to Rebellion Arab Palestine in the 1930's by W. F. Abboushi, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.6, No.3 (Spring,1977),pp.23-46:p23

While the specific terms of the Mandate constrained British actions in Palestine in a way that was unique to that context, the broader colonial practices and policies in both India and Palestine nonetheless led to similar outcomes, particularly in terms of dividing populations along communal lines and manipulating representative institutions to maintain colonial control. Even in the absence of the Balfour Declaration, it is conceivable that the British authorities in Palestine might have pursued strategies akin to those employed in colonial India, such as adapting the millet system (a form of non-territorial, communal representation) and reforming representative institutions. These strategies, along with practices like census-taking, which classified colonial subjects along religious and ethnic lines, were part of a broader colonial toolkit used to manage diverse populations and maintain imperial dominance. Therefore, while the specific conditions and commitments in Palestine were unique, the underlying logic of colonial rule and the manipulation of communal identities for imperial purposes were consistent with British practices across their empire.

The colonial initiative to introduce representative politics in Mandate Palestine infused the existing local resistance to British support for Zionist goals with new dynamics. The British faced the intricate challenge of integrating their contradictory policy—promoting the establishment of a Jewish national home while pledging to safeguard the civil rights of the indigenous Arab population—into the fabric of representational governance. This endeavour significantly influenced the evolution of the conflict in the region. Penny Sinanoglou has posited that the British Empire's emphasis on the secular ideal of representative government was a key factor in the genesis of partition proposals in Palestine.[402] These proposals emerged as potential resolutions to the inherent contradictions and political complexities arising from the mandate's non-representative governance

[402]Penny Sinanoglou, 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938', *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 131–52.

structure, which struggled to reconcile the conflicting national aspirations of Jews and Arabs under a single administrative framework.

T.G. Fraser has highlighted a broader pattern in which distinct communities under colonial rule—Catholics in Ireland, Muslims in India, and Jews in Palestine—developed strong, politicized communal identities that sought constitutional recognition and expression.[403] According to Fraser, the drive for partitions in these regions can be understood as a result of the interplay between these emergent collective identities and the existing colonial state structures.[404] The partitions, therefore, were not merely administrative decisions but were deeply rooted in the colonial manipulation of communal identities and the structural imperatives of colonial governance, which sought to manage diverse populations through division and separation.

The notion that the colonial introduction of representative politics was designed to guide colonized peoples towards eventual independence, as implied by Reginald Coupland,[405] lacks evidence of a coherent imperial strategy. A critical examination of the motivations behind the establishment of 'representative institutions' by the colonial authorities requires a nuanced understanding, recognizing that these constitutional reforms often served dual purposes. In some instances, they were intended to quell burgeoning dissent or to delay demands for autonomy, while in others, they aimed to pre-emptively neutralize potential threats to colonial dominance.

---

[403]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 8.
[404]Fraser, 5.
[405]Reginald, *India*, 71.

The advice of Edmund Burke to 'reform in order to preserve'[406] captures the essence of a longstanding imperial tactic. This approach sought to mitigate unrest and dissatisfaction among colonial subjects by granting incremental concessions in the guise of constitutional reforms. These reforms, while introducing elements of self-governance, were typically framed as distant promises, strategically deployed to placate demands for immediate political change and to maintain the colonial status quo. Thus, the introduction of representative politics in colonial contexts can be viewed more as a mechanism for retaining control and delaying independence rather than a genuine step towards decolonization.

Secularism: The Logic of Representative Politics

The process of secularization in Europe, primarily aimed at redefining the role of Christianity within modern Western society,[407] had a distinctively different implication in the colonial contexts of India and Mandate Palestine. In Europe, secularization was part of a broader discourse on the evolving place of Christianity in societal structures, focusing more on the religion's adjustment to modernity rather than a comprehensive disengagement from all religious influences in public life. However, in the colonies, the importation and application of secular principles played a crucial role in foregrounding religion as a central element of identity, thereby politicizing the concept of 'religious community' and paving the way for 'religious identity-based politics'. This transformation was instrumental in creating and solidifying communal divisions, which were then manipulated within the colonial framework of representative institutions.

The representative institutions introduced by colonial regimes were secular in essence due to their foundational principles and operational frameworks, which were derived from

---

[406]David Bromwich, review of *Review of The Useful Cobbler: Edmund Burke and the Politics of Progress, ; Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics*, by James Conniff and Stephen K. White, *Political Theory* 24, no. 4 (1996): 739–46.
[407]Peter van der Veer, 'The Secular Production of Religion', *Etnofoor* 8, no. 2 (1995): 5–14.

Western models of governance. These institutions were designed to separate the religious beliefs of the population from the administrative and legislative processes, following the secular ethos of the Enlightenment that influenced colonial powers. These institutions including legal and administrative frameworks, education systems, legislative bodies, and civil services, were designed to operate independently of religious doctrines, focusing on secular laws and principles. They were part of the colonial strategy to modernize and control the colonies by introducing Western forms of governance. While the institutions themselves were secular, colonial policies often manipulated religious identities for political ends, contributing to communal divisions and conflicts.

To fully grasp the emergence and implications of secularization in the colonial settings of India and Mandate Palestine, it is essential to contextualize it within the broader narrative of European historiography and imperial practices. This perspective reveals that the application of secular ideals in the colonies was not merely a direct extension of European secularization but a complex reconfiguration adapted to serve the strategic interests of colonial governance. This adaptation involved redefining secularism to accommodate and exploit existing religious divisions, thereby facilitating the introduction of representative institutions that would have lasting impacts on the social and political fabric of these regions. Understanding this nuanced application of secularism is critical to comprehending the dynamics of representative politics and its consequences for local populations in colonial contexts.

In the contexts of colonial India and Mandate Palestine, secularism—traditionally understood in the Western sense as the separation of state functions from religious institutions—was reinterpreted and redefined by the colonial powers. This reinterpretation was deeply embedded in the colonial epistemological framework, which informed the

establishment of representative institutions in these territories. By situating secularism within this colonial knowledge system, it becomes clear that the process of secularization was central to the colonial project, serving as a foundational principle for the introduction and operation of representative politics.

The colonial application of secularism did not merely mimic the Western model of state-religion separation but was strategically employed to reorganize and manage the religious and cultural diversities of the colonies. This approach facilitated the creation of a political landscape where communal identities were brought to the forefront, significantly influencing the formation of political allegiances and the functioning of representative institutions.

Understanding the colonial process of secularization is crucial for comprehending the deployment and reception of representative institutions in colonial India and Mandate Palestine. It sheds light on how these institutions were perceived by the local populations and the ways in which they navigated the new political terrain shaped by the colonial redefinition of secularism. This perspective reveals that the reactions of local communities to the introduction of representative politics were deeply intertwined with the broader colonial agenda of managing religious and cultural diversities through a reinterpreted secular framework, highlighting the complex interplay between colonial policies, secularism, and local dynamics in shaping the political landscapes of these regions.

The British interpretation of 'secularism'—perceived as a clear dichotomy from religion—influenced their administrative and policy decisions in colonial India, notably in the categorization of the population by religion during censuses and the subsequent codification of these distinctions through electoral reforms. This approach effectively endowed religious communities with a collective political identity, embedding the concept of secularism within

the colonial framework not as a neutral stance towards religion, but as part of a broader assertion of cultural superiority and a reductionist view of Indian society as fundamentally segmented along religious lines.

This colonial brand of secularism, while ostensibly promoting a disengagement from religious considerations, paradoxically reinforced the significance of religion as a key determinant of social and political identity. By institutionalizing religious divisions, the colonial authorities facilitated and deepened communal separations, contributing to the conditions that led to social fragmentation and, ultimately, the partition.

In this light, an examination of secularism's role in dividing communities on religious lines is imperative. The British implementation of secular principles, far from being an impartial or benign force, was deeply intertwined with the perpetuation and politicization of religious identities. The mutual interdependence and discursive linkage between 'secular' and 'religious' under colonial rule suggest that secularism, as practiced by the British, was a co-architect of the partition, playing a critical role in shaping the communal dynamics that culminated in the division of India. This nuanced understanding challenges the conventional perception of secularism as merely a backdrop to religious conflict, positioning it instead as an active participant in the historical processes that led to partition.

In the Western context, the normative goal of secular discourse has traditionally been to prevent the politicization of religious communities, aiming to maintain a clear separation between religious affiliations and political processes. However, the process of secularization in colonial India and mandate Palestine, as implemented by the British, diverged significantly from this norm. Instead of circumventing the politicization of religious communities, the colonial framework of secularization actively facilitated and even necessitated it, laying the groundwork for the emergence of religious-identity based politics.

This paradoxical outcome arose because colonial secularism was not merely about distancing the state from religious affairs but was instrumental in redefining and emphasizing religious identities within the political sphere. By categorizing populations along religious lines, through measures such as census-taking and electoral reforms, and establishing systems of representation that reinforced these divisions, the colonial authorities effectively embedded religious identity at the heart of political life. This not only contradicted the supposed secular intent to neutralize religious influence in politics but also made religious affiliation a key determinant of political representation and power.

Therefore, in the colonial contexts of India and Palestine, secularism and religious-identity based politics were not opposing forces but rather two sides of the same coin. The colonial secularization process directly contributed to the politicization of religious identities, making them central to the logic of representative politics. This interdependence suggests that the colonial implementation of secular principles was a critical factor in shaping the political landscapes of these regions, leading to the entrenchment of communal divisions and the eventual conflicts that arose from these divisions. Despite its ostensibly secular facade, the colonial project in both India and Mandate Palestine was marked by actions and policies of the colonial state and its institutions that led to the specific politicization of religious communities. The examination of the secular dimension of the colonial state is vital for understanding how politicized religious communities emerged within these colonial contexts.

Secularism, in the colonial setting, acted as a structuring principle that informed both the discursive (such as legislation, policy debates, and public discourse) and non-discursive (such as administrative practices, census-taking, and the implementation of laws) practices of colonial governance. These practices, under the guise of secular administration, often emphasized and entrenched religious identities, making them a basis for political organization

and representation. This process was not neutral or benign but was deeply implicated in the creation of communal divides that had not been as politically significant prior to colonial intervention.

The colonial use of secularism, therefore, played a pivotal role in shaping the social and political landscape along religious lines, leading to heightened communal consciousness and tensions. It was this politicization of religious identity, facilitated by the colonial state's secular practices, that laid the groundwork for the deep social and political schisms that made partition a seemingly inevitable resolution to the colonial dilemma. By crediting secularism with such a central role in the colonial project, it becomes clear that the colonial state's secular policies and practices were instrumental in creating the conditions conducive for the eventual partition of both India and Palestine, highlighting the complex interplay between secularism, colonial governance, and the politicization of religious communities.

Secularism: ‘Jewish Question’ in Europe

Secularization, as a concept integral to the hegemonic discourse of imperialism, played a significant role both in Europe and in its colonies. This process, deeply entwined with the imperial project, had profound effects on various religious communities, leading to their politicization and communalization within different socio-political contexts. In colonial India, the Muslim community underwent a process of ‘communalisation’, where their religious identity was increasingly politicized as a result of colonial policies and practices. This transformation was facilitated by the colonial state’s use of secularism as a tool to categorize and manage the diverse population, embedding religious identities within the political and social fabric of the colony. The British administration’s policies, such as the establishment of separate electorates and the emphasis on religious demographics in censuses, played a pivotal role in transforming religious affiliations into key components of political

identity, thereby communalizing the Muslim population. Similarly, in post-Enlightenment Europe, the Jewish community experienced a parallel process of politicization, particularly evident in France with the emergence of the 'Jewish Question'. This phenomenon was a direct outcome of the European secularization movement, which, while promoting the separation of church and state and the integration of individuals into the nation-state regardless of their religious affiliation, also led to the unintended consequence of highlighting religious differences. In this context, Jews found themselves at the centre of political debates about citizenship, rights, and national identity, leading to their politicization as a distinct communal group.

Both these processes—communalization in colonial India and the politicization of the Jewish community in Europe—illustrate the complex ways in which secularization, as wielded by imperial and nationalistic forces, contributed to the redefinition of religious communities into politically significant entities. These developments underscore the paradoxical role of secularization in both reinforcing and challenging existing social and religious hierarchies, leading to new forms of communal identity and political mobilization.

The Enlightenment, characterized as an intellectual and social movement, marked the advent of a 'secular' worldview[408] that profoundly influenced various communities, including a significant secularizing movement within Jewish communities known as the Jewish Enlightenment. This movement, often regarded as a value-neutral process, challenged traditional religious conceptions of morality, elevating secularism itself to the status of a value. Mufti argues that one of the core tenets of the Enlightenment was the secularization of public and political life, which was highly valued. The capacity of non-Western, colonized societies to adopt this secular trajectory became a crucial criterion for their perceived

[408] Jacob, *The Secular Enlightenment*, 1.

eligibility to join the ranks of modern civilization.[409] This perspective implies that the embrace of secularism was seen not merely as a cultural or philosophical choice but as a fundamental indicator of a society's progress and modernity.

European knowledge and political thought underwent a radical reorientation, positioning secularism as a defining characteristic of the emerging instruments of power.[410] This transformation facilitated the emergence of the secular nation-state as a novel entity within the nascent European political landscape. The advent of the secular nation-state, while offering avenues for assimilation, concurrently fuelled anti-Semitism, reshaping Jewish communities and giving rise to the 'Jewish Question'. The profound impact of these evolving ideas led to the late-nineteenth-century conceptualization of the Jews as a secular nation, marking a significant departure from their traditionally religious community identity. This shift precipitated a 'crisis of secularization' within the Zionist movement,[411] as it grappled with the transition from a religiously defined community to a secular national entity.

Secularism, traditionally understood as the process by which societal and cultural sectors are emancipated from the control of religious institutions and symbols,[412] paradoxically intertwined with religious nationalism in mobilizing the Jewish population. This duality resulted in the formation of a Jewish nation that, while secular in its external manifestations, retained a sacred core. Consequently, despite Israel's establishment as a secular national endeavour, the country continues to experience tensions between secular and religious identities, with the religious-secular divide becoming increasingly pronounced. This ongoing struggle highlights the complex interplay between secularism and religious identity in the context of national formation and identity politics.

[409]Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony*, 4.
[410]Mona Lilja and Stellan Vinthagen, "Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power and Biopower: Resisting What Power with What Resistance?," *Journal of Political Power* 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 107–26,
[411]Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', 95.
[412]Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion*, 113.

The emergence of a secular tradition within Jewish culture is a direct outcome of the broader process of secularization in the West. However, the secular Jewish tradition is distinguished not merely by the extensive and complex history of Jewish existence in Western societies but also by the unique role of Judaism as a central component of secular Jewish national identity.[413] This intertwining of secular and religious elements within Jewish identity makes it distinctively multifaceted.

Ahad Ha'am, despite his secular orientation, advocated for a deeper appreciation of Jewish religion among secular individuals, aiming to unify the Jewish people around shared national objectives.[414] This approach underscores the nuanced relationship between religion and secularism in Jewish cultural discourse. Theodor Herzl, often seen as a proponent of liberal and secular ideologies within the Zionist movement, displayed a notable instance of this complexity when he denied Morris de Jonge, a baptized Jew, entry into the Zionist movement, citing the necessity of a connection to Judaism for membership.[415] This incident raises questions about Herzl's own views on the place of Judaism within the Jewish national identity, suggesting an acknowledgment of the religion's integral role even within a secular nationalist framework. David Ben-Gurion's stance represents a further layer of this intricate relationship. His secular Jewish identity was marked by ambivalence, characterized neither by a complete severance from Judaism nor by a full-scale effort to nationalize the religion. Instead, Ben-Gurion saw the Bible as a cornerstone of authentic Jewish nationalism and perceived no inherent contradiction between secularism and religion. For Ben-Gurion, the secular and religious dimensions were deeply intertwined, with both ideologies and their practices forming a hybrid construct that defied simple categorization. This complex interplay between secularism and Judaism within the context of Jewish national identity highlights the

[413]Yuval Jobani, 'Three Basic Models of Secular Jewish Culture', *Israel Studies* 13, no. 3 (2008): 160–69.
[414]Jobani.
[415]Netanel Fisher and Avi Shilon, 'Integrating Non-Jewish Immigrants and the Formation of Israel's Ethnic–Civic Nationhood: From Ben Gurion to the Present', *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 2 (4 March 2017).

unique and often paradoxical nature of secular Jewish culture, shaped by a history of negotiating between secular modernity and religious tradition.

The Zionist movement intricately wove its claims to Jewish nationalism with affirmations of its Judaic heritage, thereby establishing a secular nationalism that was deeply rooted in Judaism as a communal religion. Despite this, the Israeli state's legitimacy has not been directly predicated on Judaism. However, the complete secularization of Israel remains a complex endeavour,[416] given the nation's efforts to integrate Jewish religious heritage into the fabric of a modern national identity.[417] The definition of Jewish nationhood has been subject to extensive debates, ranging from those advocating for a strictly secular national identity to those favouring an identity deeply imbued with religious elements. With the establishment of the State of Israel, these discussions gained increased significance,[418] as the practical implications of national identity came to the forefront of societal discourse.

Israel's approach to nationality presents a unique dichotomy. While Israeli citizenship is theoretically available to all residents of Israel, Jewish nationhood is conceptualized as an identity exclusive to Jews, both within Israel and the global diaspora. This distinction underscores the ongoing negotiation between civic and ethnic-religious conceptions of nationhood within Israeli society. It is premature to conclusively assess the contours of Jewish nationhood, as its parameters continue to evolve. However, it is evident that the relationship between religious and secular communities in Israel, much like in South Asia, has become increasingly strained over recent decades. This tension reflects the broader challenges faced by societies attempting to navigate the complexities of modern national identity in the context of historical religious traditions and secular democratic principles.

---

[416]Zucker, 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel', 115.
[417]Zucker, 95.
[418]Fisher and Shilon, 'Integrating Non-Jewish Immigrants and the Formation of Israel's Ethnic–Civic Nationhood'.

Secularization, at its core, is about delineating and managing distinctions by segregating the sacred from the profane, the normal from the abnormal, and differentiating among various social and religious groups. In a secular framework, exclusion is often rationalized through an 'imagined difference', which emerges from the secular discourse's portrayal of a universal norm within the context of the European constitutional political order.[419] This process has historically facilitated the depoliticization of the inherent discrimination that accompanies the construction of such differences.[420]

Wendy Brown discusses tolerance within a secular framework as a 'discursive practice' that offers rights to minorities, such as Jews, contingent upon their compliance with majority expectations. Being a 'tolerated minority' in this context implies conditional rights, where tolerance can be revoked for failing to adhere to these conditions.[421] The secularization of the state apparatus and the reduction of the Church's public influence were hotly debated topics, particularly evident during discussions on Jewish emancipation in the French National Assembly between 1789 and 1791. These debates underscored a tacit secular consensus in favour of Jewish emancipation.[422] However, this tolerance facilitated the assimilation of Jews into the French national identity within the secularization process, while simultaneously limiting their participation due to perceived racial distinctions. This racialization of Judaism as 'a race' entrenched their difference within the French national consciousness, indicating that even secular assimilation processes could not fully transcend the Jewish identity. This form of assimilation, as Brown suggests, reveals the intrinsic dynamics of 'the

---

[419]Wendy Brown, 'Tolerance and/or Equality? The "Jewish Question" and the "Woman Question"', *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 15, no. 2 (9 July 2004): 1–31.
[420]Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 14.
[421]Brown, 71.
[422]Arie M. Dubnov, 'Notes on the Zionist Passage to India, or: The Analogical Imagination and Its Boundaries', *Journal of Israeli History* 35, no. 2 (2 July 2016): 177–214.

governmentality of tolerance',[423] where assimilation comes at the cost of surrendering essential aspects of identity. The pervasive anti-Semitism that Jews faced necessitated 'the state of exception', a concept where normal rules are suspended, as a persistent condition imposed upon them. This highlights the complexities and contradictions inherent in secular processes of assimilation and tolerance, which, while aiming to integrate, simultaneously perpetuate exclusion and discrimination.

Constitutional Reforms and Religious identity-based Politics in Colonial India

The Indian Councils Act of 1861 marked a significant turning point in colonial governance in India, following the establishment of direct British rule. For the first time, it introduced 'non-official' members into provincial councils, with almost half of these positions filled by Indians.[424] This marked the inaugural introduction of the principle of representation into what could be termed the Indian constitution. Lord Ripon, serving as Viceroy from 1880 to 1884, sought to expand upon this nascent representative governance by advocating for the establishment of elected municipal councils and rural district boards. However, this move faced staunch opposition from the Indian Civil Service, which argued that India's population was not sufficiently advanced for representative government.[425]

Despite this resistance, the India Act of 1909 was enacted to increase the non-British presence within legislative councils, though it fell short of fulfilling nationalist aspirations for a fully responsible government. A decade later, in the context of radically different circumstances shaped by India's significant contributions to the British Empire during the First World War, the Government of India Act of 1919 was introduced. Amid the ongoing conflict, on August 20, 1917, Edwin Samuel Montagu, the Secretary of State for India,

---

[423] Brown, 'Tolerance and/or Equality?'
[424] Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia--Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 4 (1987): 731–46.
[425] Rudolph.

articulated the British Government's policy to encourage Indian support for the war effort. He promised the increased association of Indians in administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, aiming for the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.[426] However, the fulfilment of responsible government in India was to come only after another decade and the devastation of a second World War, culminating in the dramatic and consequential communal partition of the country.[427] This sequence of constitutional reforms and political promises, set against the backdrop of global conflict and nationalistic aspirations, highlights the complex path toward independence and partition in colonial India.

Examining the Indian Muslim response to the introduction of representative politics sheds light on the impact of colonial discourse on the shaping of Indian Muslim identity. The colonial approach to governance, characterized by its classificatory lens and logic, imposed constraints on the colonial subjects' perceptions and interactions, influencing their self-conception and their relationships with both the colonial regime and other communities.

The partition of Bengal and subsequent colonial policies and practices played a significant role in further entrenching religious identities. In 1906, the Muslim elite, already delineated along religious lines through census operations, petitioned the Viceroy, advocating for special consideration for Muslims in any forthcoming constitutional frameworks.[428] Their demands were grounded in the demographic data from the 1901 census and the historical significance of Muslims in pre-colonial India. They sought separate electorates to ensure a guaranteed number of seats for their community in future legislative bodies,[429] reflecting the colonial imposition of voting rights based on religious affiliation. Moreover, the Muslim

---

[426]Rudolph.
[427]Rudolph.
[428]Francis Robinson, 'The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 8 (1998): 271–89, https://doi.org/10.2307/3679298.
[429]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 89.

leadership proposed that the general electorate be further subdivided into 'community' categories, advocating for the segregation of 'tribals' and certain other groups from 'Hindus' to amplify the relative size of the Muslim population.[430] They argued for additional representation, not solely based on their numerical strength but also reflecting their political significance and contributions to the Empire's defence. They asserted that the Muslim community's entitlements should extend across the entire spectrum of government patronage,[431] underscoring a demand for greater political influence and recognition within the colonial governance framework. This manoeuvring by the Indian Muslim leadership highlights the complex interplay between colonial administrative practices, the politicization of religious identities, and the strategic positioning of communities within the colonial state's representational politics. It underscores how colonial policies not only shaped communal identities but also influenced the political aspirations and strategies of different religious groups within the colonial context.

The demands of the Muslim community for separate electorates were institutionalized in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, also known as the Minto-Morley Reforms. This legislation marked a significant turning point by embedding 'communal interests' at the heart of future constitutional frameworks in British India.[432] The implementation of representative politics, as structured by these reforms, entrenched the division of power along religious lines, with the census playing a crucial role in determining the representation of various religious communities based solely on their numerical size.

The introduction of separate electorates for Muslims in 1909 became a pivotal moment, significantly contributing to the growing apprehensions within the Hindu community. The census had already merged religious identity with the numerical strength of

[430]Jones, 89.
[431]Jones, 89.
[432]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 121.

each community, and the advent of representative politics further linked this identity to political power.[433] This linkage between religious demographics and political representation heightened communal consciousness and set the stage for increased communal tensions, as political representation and power came to be seen as directly correlated with the size of one's religious community.

The partition of Bengal in 1905, a significant event in colonial India's history, was met with vigorous opposition, primarily from the Hindu community. This widespread resistance, characterized by revolutionary nationalist movements, challenged the colonial expectation that the partition would be passively accepted and perhaps even collapse under its own weight. In response to the intense opposition, the colonial government turned to Muslim community leaders, seeking their support to counterbalance the nationalist fervour led predominantly by Hindus. This strategy is often cited as an example of the British colonial practice of 'divide and rule',[434] which aimed to create and exploit divisions among India's diverse communities to maintain control.

This period marked a pivotal moment in Indian politics, as it led to the entrenchment of Muslim separatism as a lasting element of the political landscape.[435] The establishment of the All-India Muslim League in 1906, just a year after the Bengal partition, can be seen as a direct response to these developments. The founding of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 provided a political platform for Muslims and emerged as a counterbalance to the Indian National Congress,[436] which was widely perceived to be influenced by Hindu interests. This move further solidified the communal lines in Indian politics, setting the stage for the complex interplay of communal identities and nationalist aspirations that would continue to

[433] Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 95.
[434] Anil Baran Ray, 'Communal Attitudes to British Policy: The Case of the Partition of Bengal 1905', *Social Scientist* 6, no. 5 (1977): 34–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/3520087.
[435] Ray.
[436] Ray.

shape the subcontinent's political discourse in the years leading up to independence and partition.

The introduction of representative institutions in colonial India did not equate to the promotion of democratic values. Instead, these reforms were aimed at enlisting the support of local political elites, while preserving the existing hierarchical and inequitable social and political structures. The exceedingly slow pace at which self-governing institutions were introduced suggests that the British had no immediate plans to relinquish control over India. This deliberate gradualism underscores the colonial strategy of maintaining dominance and delaying any significant transfer of power to Indian hands.

From the very beginning, it was clear that the introduction of a representative system based on separate electorates, while intended to mitigate the rising tide of nationalist sentiment, inadvertently fostered political competition between Hindu and Muslim communities. The period from 1906 to 1909 was marked by significant apprehension among British officials regarding the potential consequences of these reforms. Viceroy Lord Minto, on 11 June 1906, expressed caution about the rapid implementation of Western political frameworks in India, acknowledging the long and gradual evolution of constitutional governance in Britain and the potential unpreparedness of the Indian populace for such systems.[437] Further, in a correspondence dated 5 July 1906 to Lord Morley, Minto articulated his concerns about including an Indian member in his Executive Council, citing the challenge of separating any Indian, regardless of their competence, from the pervasive influences of religion.[438] These statements reflect the British officials' trepidation about the complexities of administering a diverse and multifaceted society like India, especially in the context of introducing representative political mechanisms.

[437]Mary, *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State*, 98.
[438]Mary, 97.

The Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 were motivated by multiple factors, including not just the desire to curb the burgeoning influence of revolutionary nationalist movements in Bengal but also to respond to the demands of a new class of educated Indians. These individuals, products of the secular colonial education system, increasingly perceived themselves as deserving a more significant role in India's governance.[439] The establishment of representative institutions was also seen as a strategy to prevent this educated class from aligning themselves with the Indian National Congress, which they might have viewed as their only avenue for political engagement and reform.[440]

The foresight of Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay in 1822, underscores the long-standing awareness among British officials of the potential consequences of their governance and educational policies in India. Elphinstone cautioned that these policies would eventually empower the local population to a degree that might challenge the British ability to restrict them to subordinate roles, potentially leading to a significant upheaval against British rule.[441]

Therefore, the introduction of representative institutions through the Minto-Morley Reforms was not only a tactical move to dilute nationalist fervour but also a strategic response to the aspirations of the loyal and moderate educated Indian class, aiming to incorporate them into the colonial administration in a controlled manner.[442] This approach was intended to mitigate the risk of political unrest by providing a structured outlet for the participation of this emerging class in the governance of India, thereby maintaining the stability of British rule. The urgency to implement reforms through the Minto-Morley Reforms was largely driven by the escalating influence of nationalist and anti-colonial

[439] Mary, 104.
[440] Mary, 104.
[441] Krishna, *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India*, 40–41.
[442] Mary, *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State*, 104.

activities in India. The British introduction of a system of government and education that exposed Indians to European ideas, including nationalism, inadvertently sowed the seeds of ideological movements that challenged the very foundation of British colonial rule. These circumstances led the British to conclude that representation in the new constitutional framework should be based on religious communities.[443]

The decision to institutionalize separate electorates based on religious identity was met with strong opposition from the Hindu elite, who accused the British of employing a 'divide and rule' strategy to maintain their colonial dominion by exacerbating communal divisions. In contrast, the significant positive reception of the India Act of 1909 among many Muslims seemed to validate the British perspective of Indian society as inherently fragmented along communal lines.[444] This divergent response highlighted the complexities of implementing constitutional reforms in a deeply pluralistic society and underscored the challenges of balancing competing communal interests within the framework of colonial governance.

The British colonial administration harboured significant concerns regarding the introduction of representative institutions that entailed transferring power to Indian representatives. Highlighting the gravity of these reforms, Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, expressed his apprehensions in a correspondence dated 20th March 1909, accompanying the final draft of the constitutional reforms sent to Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India. Minto remarked, 'I do not believe that any dispatch fraught with greater difficulties and greater possibilities has ever left India. It deals with a future which no one can foretell',[445] reflecting the uncertainty and the potential transformative impact of these reforms. Minto's

---

[443]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 121.
[444]Tejani, 125.
[445]Mary, *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State*, 104.

conviction that ‘Ideas can only be combated by ideas, and you won’t keep the younger generation away from the Congress unless you have another programme and another set of ideas to set up against theirs’[446] illustrates the strategic thinking behind the reforms. The British sought to offer an alternative political platform to counteract the allure of the Congress and its nationalist ideology, particularly among India's younger, educated generation. The correspondence between Lord Morley and Lord Minto sheds light on the complexities and challenges they anticipated with the introduction of separate electorates. The Minto-Morley Reforms, by instituting separate electorates for Muslims, wherein only Muslims could elect Muslim candidates, institutionalized communal divisions within the political framework, deepening the rift between Hindu and Muslim communities. This decision was emblematic of the colonial strategy to manage the diverse and often competing interests in Indian society, yet it also laid the groundwork for increased communal polarization.

Formation of Indian Muslims’ Religion-Based Identity

Shabnum Tejani pinpoints a critical juncture in colonial Indian history when 'communalism' emerged as a distinct and recognized phenomenon. According to Tejani, this shift occurred during the debates leading up to the constitutional reforms of 1909, a period that also saw the term ‘communal’ gaining prominence for the first time.[447] Tejani argues that the introduction of separate electorates for Muslims played a pivotal role in the ‘communalization of Indian politics’, as it institutionalized religious identity as a basis for political organization and representation.[448]

---

[446]Mary, 99.
[447]Shabnum Tejani, *Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890-1950* (Bloomington, Ind.: Chesham: Indiana University Press, 2008), 113.
[448]Tejani, 115.

The discussions surrounding these constitutional reforms not only highlighted but also intensified the focus on 'religious identity-based politics'. However, this period marked the crystallization rather than the inception of communal politics. Following Tejani's conceptualization of 'communalism' as the politicization of religious identities—viewed by many as the introduction of sectarianism into the public sphere [449] —the origins of communalism can be traced back to earlier colonial practices, notably the conduct of census operations. These censuses categorized the Indian population along religious lines, thereby constructing and reinforcing communal identities. Thus, while the representative politics introduced by the 1909 reforms solidified the communalization process, its roots extend further back to the colonial practice of census-taking. This practice laid the groundwork for communal identities, which were later cemented into the political landscape through the establishment of separate electorates, contributing to the enduring legacy of communalism in Indian politics. [450]

Contrary to Tejani's focus on the discursive formation of communalism as source of 'communalism' through the enactment of representative politics, my argument traces its origins to the non-discursive practice of census-taking exercises conducted by the colonial administration. While Tejani highlights the formal debates and legislative processes that accompanied the introduction of representative institutions as the birthplace of communalism, I contend that the groundwork for communal identities and politics was laid earlier, through the systematic categorization of the population along religious lines in census operations. These exercises, by defining and solidifying communal boundaries, provided the basis for indigenous community leaders to articulate and mobilize political demands based on religious identity,[451] thereby prefiguring the communal politics that would later be formalized within

[449]Tejani, 'Secularism', 251.
[450]Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, 227.
[451]Gottschalk, *Religion, Science, and Empire*, 183.

the representative political framework. This perspective emphasizes the role of non-discursive administrative practices, such as census-taking, in shaping the contours of communalism in colonial India, prior to the legal codification of representative politics.

Tejani explores the orientalist perspective traditionally held by the colonial administration, which posited that Indian society was inherently structured around its various communities.[452] This view, which saw Indian history and tradition as deeply entwined with caste, race, and religion,[453] significantly influenced the design of constitutional reforms. These reforms were predicated on the notion that Indian society operated primarily through these communal lenses.

When the Muslim delegation met with Viceroy Minto in 1906, he explicitly stated that India was suited only for 'a representation of Communities' at that time,[454] underscoring the colonial commitment to communal representation. The intent behind introducing these reforms was to navigate the complexities of an evolving Indian society while ensuring continued colonial control. By favouring Muslims, rural landowners, and the so-called 'depressed classes'—essentially, the more conservative segments of Indian society—the British aimed to counterbalance the burgeoning anti-colonial nationalist movements, predominantly led by urban, upper-caste Hindus.

The British were acutely aware of the impermanence of their rule in India and recognized the growing discontent among the Indian populace.[455] This understanding prompted them to adapt to the changing conditions to sustain their administration.[456] Despite ongoing concerns about the stability of their rule, the immediate catalyst for the introduction

---

[452]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 113.
[453]Tejani, 118–19.
[454]Mary, *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State*, 102.
[455]Krishna, *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India*, 40–41.
[456]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 117.

of representative institutions in 1909 was to quell the unrest that had erupted following the partition of Bengal in 1905, which divided the region into a Muslim-majority East Bengal and a Hindu-majority West Bengal. This move, while intended to manage the political landscape, inadvertently fuelled further agitation and highlighted the complexities of governing a diverse and divided society.

After constituting religiously informed communities, the British claimed to adhere to the imperial policy of 'non-interference' in the disputes of the local population. By adopting a neutral stance, they believed their authority in India would remain secure 'as long as the continuance of British rule in India ... has at least maintained a neutral authority above the warring communities'.[457] However, the British officials' assertion that they stood midway between two mutually irreconcilable and uncompromising extreme nationalist movements overlooks the fact that it was the British who created this Kafkaesque situation in the first place. During the debates between 1906 and 1909 concerning 'the question of representation', the British devised the argument of 'balancing Indian society's communal interests'.[458] Tejani contends that the process of these debates and reforms transformed the very notion of 'communal interests' into a categorization of 'majority' and 'minority',[459] with the numerical strength of a community determining their political significance.

The gradual implementation of 'representative politics' in British India catalyzed political competition between Hindu and Muslim communities. The Indian National Congress, by endorsing the colonial strategy of 'separate electorates',[460] also played a significant role in fostering this competition. In the 1916 Lucknow Pact with the Muslim

[457]R. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission* (Oxford University Press, 1942), 23.
[458]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 142.
[459]Tejani, 143.
[460]Muhammad Saleem Ahmed, 'Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and the All-India Muslim League', in *The All India Muslim League, 1906-47*, ed. Nadeem Shafiq Malik (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1997), 235.

League, the Congress embraced the 'separate electorate' system, viewing it as a means to achieve greater self-governance.[461]

The Government of India Act of 1919, commonly referred to as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, expanded the scope of communal representation by introducing direct elections for representatives.[462] This development intensified existing tensions within the Hindu community, who perceived it as a move toward 'full representative Government' in the future.[463] However, the underlying intention of these reforms was to extend the duration of British dominion in India, rather than to transition towards self-rule.

The establishment of 'representative institutions' in colonial India was a critical aspect of colonial governance, illustrating a distinct approach to secularization and representative politics that diverged from European models. While the British ostensibly offered progressive liberal reforms in the form of 'representative politics', these were not devoid of coercive tactics. A stark example of this duality is the Rowlatt Act of 1919, which extended 'wartime emergency powers' and led to one of the most tragic events in colonial Indian history, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. On April 13, 1919, in response to the arrests of nationalist leaders Saifuddin Kitchlew and Satya Pal and amidst the celebrations of the Sikh festival of Baisakhi, General Reginald Dyer ordered British troops to fire upon an unarmed crowd gathered in Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar.[464] This brutal action resulted in the deaths of approximately 380 Indians and injuries to over a thousand, highlighting the severe contradictions within the British colonial strategy of coupling 'representative' reforms with repressive measures to maintain control.

---

[461]Ahmed, 235.
[462]Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', 95.
[463]H.N. Mitra, ed., 'The Govt. of India Act 1919: Rules Thereunder and Govt Reports 1920' (N.N. MITTER, ANNUAL REGISTER OFFICE, SIBPUR, CALCUTTA, India, 1921), i.
[464]*Punjab Disturbances: Compiled from the Civil and Military Gazette*, Second (Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1919), 8.

The evolution toward self-government in colonial India progressed at an exceedingly slow pace, suggesting that achieving full independence by 1947 would have been unlikely under normal circumstances. The British approach to constitutional reforms was to implement changes gradually, aiming to safeguard their authority. However, external pressures, including the assertive nationalist movements led by the Indian National Congress and the impact of two World Wars, compelled the British to accelerate the pace of reforms. These external factors, alongside the rising tide of the nationalist movement and various international events, necessitated continuous adjustments to the British strategy for introducing self-governance mechanisms. This dynamic environment contributed to the formulation of the Government of India Act of 1935,[465] marking a significant step in the constitutional development toward self-rule

The eventual withdrawal of British rule in 1947, though not initially intended, was a direct consequence of the gradual introduction of representative politics by the colonial administration. British officials, who often viewed even minor concessions toward self-governance as overly generous, were ultimately overtaken by the rapid pace of political developments. Reginald Coupland's remarks on the Cripps Mission proposal in 1942, which was seen by many as a promise of full self-government and Dominion status after the war,[466] underscore the tension between British caution and the inexorable push toward Indian independence.

In the context of how the discourse of secularization, through census-taking exercises and the introduction of representative politics, shaped the ‘politics of religious identity’ in colonial India,[467] K.B. Krishna views political independence as inherently incomplete without

[465]R. Coupland, *The Future Of India Report On The Constitutional Problem In India* (Oxford University Press, 1943), v.
[466]Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, 11.
[467]Jones, ‘Religious Identity and the Indian Census’, 90.

the abolition of ‘communal representation’.[468] This perspective underscores the deep entrenchment of communal identities in the political fabric of colonial India, which were significantly influenced by the colonial administration's policies. However, Krishna’s analysis also reflects a paradox. The process of self-subjectification, or the internalization of communal identities, was so profound in colonial India that Krishna himself appears to adopt the colonial narrative that frames ‘religion’ as the fundamental issue. He asserts that true emancipation for both Hindus and Muslims is contingent upon liberating Indian society from the confines of Islam and Hinduism.[469] This statement highlights the complex legacy of colonial governance, wherein the politics of religious identity, initially fostered and institutionalized by colonial practices, became so ingrained that the discourse of liberation itself became entangled with the need to transcend these religious categorizations.

Absence of Representative Institutions in Palestine

The Mandate System, established in the aftermath of World War I, was distinct from traditional colonial rule. It was designed to administer mandated territories as a ‘sacred trust of civilization’, with the explicit goal of guiding the populations of these territories towards self-governance. The system was predicated on the belief that the inhabitants of these territories were not yet capable of navigating the complexities of the modern world independently.[470]

Despite the ostensibly altruistic goal of preparing the mandated populations for independence,[471] the Mandate System was also strategically used to fulfil the territorial ambitions of Great Britain and France, particularly in regions previously under Ottoman

[468]Krishna, *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India*, 350.
[469]Krishna, 350.
[470]‘Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.’, 28 June 1919.
[471]James C. Hales, ‘The Reform and Extension of the Mandate System. A Legal Solution of the Colonial Problem’, *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 26 (1940): 153–210.

control.[472] In the case of Palestine, British support for Zionist aspirations, as articulated in the Balfour Declaration, was integrated into the terms of the Mandate. This move not only facilitated the advancement of Zionist goals but also aligned with British imperial interests in the region, demonstrating the dual nature of the Mandate System as both a mechanism for administrative oversight and a tool for achieving geopolitical objectives.

From the outset, the British mandate authorities in Palestine established a range of governance structures that created favourable conditions for the establishment of the Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi – the Jewish National Council. These entities functioned as governing bodies for the Jewish community, operating independently of the mandatory regime.[473] Under the auspices of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, the Zionist leadership effectively formed a virtual non-territorial Jewish state, complete with its own executive and legislative branches, mirroring the Mandatory Administration in many ways. Conversely, the British established the Supreme Muslim Council, granting it authority over Muslim religious courts and endowments,[474] but this hardly equated to a self-governing Arab community analogous to that of the Jewish community.[475] The British demonstrated a lack of interest in rectifying this disparity during the 1923 elections for the Legislative Council in Palestine, which the Arab Muslim leadership boycotted. The electoral framework, defined by the mandate's terms which included the Balfour Declaration, meant that Arab Muslim participation could have been interpreted as an endorsement of the Declaration.[476]

[472]Matz Nele, 'Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship', *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online* 9, no. 1 (1 January 2005): 70–71, https://doi.org/10.1163/138946305775160483.
[473]'Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom' (UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1946), Chapter: viii, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/angtoc.asp.
[474]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 15.
[475]'Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom', Chapter: viii.
[476]Evyatar Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923', *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 2 (1987): 194–210.

John Shuckburgh, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, later provided insight into the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, revealing the lack of foresight and sincerity in the British promises made during the wartime urgency.[477] He suggested that the commitments were not expected to be fulfilled, as the Cabinet did not anticipate the eventual complexities. The commitment to the Balfour Declaration wavered at times; Prime Minister Lloyd George might have abandoned it as readily as it was conceived if a separate peace with Turkey had seemed feasible.[478] Nonetheless, the British Government ultimately enshrined the Balfour Declaration within the articles of its Mandate over Palestine, cementing its place in the mandate's legal framework.

In contrast to India, where the subject population largely accepted representative institutions, the mandate government in Palestine faced considerable challenges in establishing a representative institutional framework for political and administrative purposes. The mandate's aim to introduce representative politics was to encourage the political participation of the main population segments in governance and to foster collaboration for the peaceful administration of the territory.[479] However, securing the Arab leadership's acceptance of the mandate's terms, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, proved to be a critical obstacle. With Arabs constituting the majority, they contested the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the mandate, which aimed to establish a national home for Jews in Palestine. The British found it virtually impossible to introduce representative institutions without either forsaking the Jewish national home project or negating the national existence of the Arab population. In navigating this dilemma, the British enabled the Jewish

[477]Friesel.

[478]Jonathan Schneer; The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2011

[479]Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'.

community to develop semi-autonomous governmental institutions,[480] while simultaneously inhibiting the Palestinian Arabs from establishing similar structures.[481]

Albert M. Hyamson suggested that the British envisioned laying the groundwork for significant constitutional reforms toward self-government within their first five years of rule in Palestine.[482] However, the inherent contradictions in the mandate's objectives and the local demographic realities presented insurmountable challenges to these aspirations, highlighting the complexities of implementing the mandate's dual commitments to both the Jewish and Arab populations.

Palestine Government and Politics of Representation

In the wake of the Jaffa riots in May 1921, an Arab delegation travelled to London to advocate for the establishment of representative institutions. Prior to their arrival, Shuckburgh explicitly informed the Palestinian Arabs that any discussions must acknowledge the British government's unwavering commitment to fulfil the promises made to the Jewish community in the Balfour Declaration. After the discussions, Shuckburgh stated that the talks were futile, as the Palestinian Arabs did not grasp the British government's firm stance on upholding the Balfour Declaration.[483] Winston Churchill directly informed the Arab delegates that the British Government intended to implement the Balfour Declaration and suggested they consult with Dr. Weizmann.[484] Given the British government's position, the prospects for implementing representative politics in Mandate Palestine appeared to be minimal.

In 1923, the British Government initiated a series of constitutional proposals aimed at introducing representative governance in Palestine. These proposals included the formation

[480] Khalidi;2006:p37
[481] Ibid:p46
[482]Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'.
[483] Huneidi;1998:p27
[484]Friesel;1987:p199

of a Legislative Council with equal representation for Jewish and Arab communities based on the principle of parity, the reconstitution of the Advisory Council to encourage Arab political leaders to collaborate with the Palestine Administration, and the recognition of an Arab Agency, mirroring the Jewish Agency.[485] However, these proposals were unequivocally rejected by the Arab community. Consequently, the British government deemed further attempts along these lines futile and decided against pursuing similar initiatives in the future.[486]

The British were keen on establishing representative institutions in Mandate Palestine, yet they aimed to do so in a manner that would not hinder the advancement of the Zionist project. Recurrent outbreaks of violence in the territory were often attributed to the absence of such institutions. Although the Arab population consistently demanded the establishment of representative bodies, the British hesitated to create institutions that would accurately reflect the demographic composition of Palestinian society, prioritizing the continuation of the Zionist agenda over a truly representative governance structure.

In May 1930, another Palestinian delegation travelled to London to renew their demands for the establishment of representative institutions. Confronted with the Palestinian call for a representative parliament 'elected by the people in proportion to their numbers, irrespective of race or creed', British Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield clarified that any such parliament would be obliged to adhere to the objectives of the Mandate. He emphasized that the Mandatory power was constrained to establishing councils solely within the mandate's

[485]'The Palestine Mandate', *Bulletin of International News* 6, no. 6 (1929): 3–12.
[486]'The Palestine Mandate'.

terms and for the purpose of fulfilling its stipulations. According to Lord Passfield, these conditions defined the extent of British authority in the matter.[487]

The British consistently rejected the Arab Muslim demand for representative politics, conditioning any such concession on the acceptance of the British colonial policy to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Herbert Samuel, underlining this stance, informed the elected Arab Executive that acknowledging the British policy, as outlined in the Mandate terms regarding the Jewish national home, was essential for their recognition by the government.[488] Rashid Khalidi metaphorically described the Balfour Declaration as an 'iron cage' for the Palestinian leadership, encapsulating the constraints it imposed on their political aspirations.[489] Sydney Moody, a District Officer in Safed, acknowledged the inherent advantage held by the Jewish community due to the unequivocal commitment represented by the Balfour Declaration.[490] Given these circumstances, the likelihood of realizing the Arab demand for representative politics in Palestine appeared exceedingly slim. Sir Ronald Storrs, the military governor of Jerusalem, bleakly assessed the chances of the native Arabs achieving political justice from the British government, comparing their prospects to those of the Dervishes facing Kitchener's machine guns at Omdurman[491]—suggesting an almost insurmountable challenge.

All the inquiry commission reports produced by the Mandate government corroborate that the Arab stance on representative politics was well understood by the British. Despite this clarity, the British remained steadfast in their attempts to secure Arab cooperation in fulfilling the objectives of the Balfour Declaration. As early as 1923, colonial officials

---

[487]Rashid Khalidi; The Iron Cage: The Story of Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, Beacon Press, Boston,2006:p34
[488] Ibid:p42
[489]Ibid:p47
[490]Friesel;1987:p205
[491] Mathew;2011:p27

recognized the impasse that their unwavering policy created, yet no alteration to the British policy ensued. Shuckburgh acknowledged from the onset of the Mandate that leading the Arabs towards political collaboration under the prevailing conditions was futile.[492] Moody's assessment further highlighted the dilemma, noting that any engagement with the Arab population of Palestine was contingent upon addressing the implications of the Balfour Declaration.[493]

Initially, the British officials assumed that the Palestinian reaction was merely a transitory phase and expected that once Palestinians realized the British were serious about implementing the Balfour Declaration, they would acquiesce.[494] Sydney Moody, the District Officer in Safed, argued that it was unlikely the Arabs would agree to cooperate with the British Mandate in establishing a Legislative Council based partially on elections.[495] He proposed the formation of an 'Advisory Council' as an alternative to a 'Legislative Council', recognizing the potential ineffectiveness of this approach. However, Moody believed that with sufficient tact, patience, and diplomacy, and by avoiding overt conflicts, a resolution could eventually emerge over time[496]—a luxury that the Mandate authorities ultimately did not possess.

On 25 November 1935, leaders from five Arab political parties came together to submit a memorandum to the British High Commissioner in Palestine. This memorandum articulated their demands for the establishment of representative institutions and called for an immediate cessation of Jewish immigration to the region. In response, the High Commissioner suggested the formation of a Legislative Council, stipulating that the

[492]Friesel;1987:p203

[493]Friesel;1987:p203

[494] Sahar Huneidi; Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No.2 (Winter, 1998), pp.23-41:p28

[495]Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'.

[496]Friesel.

legitimacy of the Mandate should remain unquestioned. While the Arab press criticized this proposal, the Arab political leadership cautiously refrained from outright rejection. Nonetheless, the proposal was ultimately dismissed by Jewish leaders and both Houses of Parliament in Britain.[497]

The inability of the Mandate authorities to successfully implement representative institutions led the British to consider partition as a potential solution. The concept of partition first emerged following the failure of renewed efforts to establish a 'Legislative Council' in 1935.[498] The lack of representative bodies, coupled with the rising Jewish immigration to Palestine, sparked the Arab revolt in 1936. The Arab leadership blamed Zionist influence on the British for undermining the establishment of a representative Legislative Council.[499]

The British government initially did not fully anticipate Arab resistance to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The inclusion of the Balfour Declaration within the mandate's terms reflected British optimism that Arabs would eventually cooperate in its implementation. In 1937, the British Colonial Secretary conveyed to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Declaration was based on the hope that Jews and Arabs would resolve their differences and unite under a common Palestinian citizenship.[500]

This oversight may have stemmed from an underestimation of the significance of Arab opposition, possibly considering it inconsequential.[501] Alternatively, this approach might have been influenced by racial biases, as suggested by a confidential memo from

[497]Kattan;2009:p93
[498]Penny Sinanoglou, 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938', *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (2009): 131–52.
[499]Sinanoglou.
[500] Kattan;2009:p255
[501] Abboushi;1977:P33

Balfour in 1919. In it, Balfour asserted that the merits of Zionism, regardless of its perceived righteousness or faults, were of much greater significance than the 'desires and prejudices' of the 700,000 Arabs residing in the region, highlighting a dismissive attitude towards Arab concerns and aspirations.[502] Despite the complexities and resistance, the British government persisted in implementing the Balfour Declaration, making conflict management a central aspect of its policy in Palestine. Shuckburgh acknowledged the duplicity in British communications, admitting that conflicting messages were being sent to the Arab and Jewish communities. To the Arabs, the British downplayed the significance of their Zionist policy, suggesting it was not a matter of grave concern. Conversely, they assured the Jewish community that any softening of the Balfour Declaration's language was actually beneficial to the Zionist movement.

Moody's reflections were even more candid, revealing a personal struggle with the contradictory nature of British diplomacy, often finding himself delivering disparate messages to Jews and Muslims. He candidly referenced the pragmatic, if not cynical, utility of Machiavelli's *Prince* in navigating the intricate and often contradictory demands of British governance in Palestine.[503] This admission highlights the pragmatic, and at times manipulative, approach adopted by British officials in their efforts to balance the conflicting aspirations of the Jewish and Arab populations under the Mandate.

Facing intense pressure from the Arab population in Palestine, the British Mandate government ultimately agreed to the principle of representative politics, adopting a simple majority rule in the 1939 White Paper. This document outlined a plan for an independent Palestine within ten years. However, the practical realization of this concession to the

[502] Kattan;2010:p123
[503]Friesel;1987:p204

Palestinians was contingent upon the approval of the Jewish minority, effectively limiting its potential impact.

The outbreak of the Second World War and subsequent developments rendered the 1939 White Paper ineffective, negating what could be considered the major political achievement of the Palestinian Arabs during the Mandate period. These events shifted the dynamics significantly, ultimately tipping the balance in favour of Zionist aspirations and altering the trajectory of the region's future.

Zionist Demand for Political Parity

The Zionist leadership's stance towards representative politics bore a striking resemblance to the approach adopted by the Muslim League leadership in colonial India. Both groups faced the challenge of the 'principle of arithmetic' inherent in representative politics, where their relatively smaller numbers threatened their political influence.[504] The anxiety among Zionists mirrored that of the Muslim League, as both feared that representative politics could diminish their political power due to their numerical inferiority. This parallel is further illustrated by the strategies both groups employed to address their demographic disadvantage. In colonial India, the Muslim League sought to overcome its numerical inferiority by demanding parity and the exclusive right to represent Muslims, thereby countering the numerical dominance of the Congress. Similarly, in Mandate Palestine, the Jewish minority demanded equal standing with the Arab majority, seeking safeguards to ensure their political representation despite being outnumbered.

In both cases, the majority's insistence on rule by majority and the minority's demand for special considerations created an impasse. In colonial India, the Congress's firm

[504] Farzana Shaikh, 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. No. 3 (1986): 539–57.

commitment to majority rule clashed with the Muslim League's assertion that ideological differences between Muslims and non-Muslims made numerical considerations irrelevant,[505] preventing a constitutional settlement. Likewise, in Palestine, the Arab demand for majority rule was met with resistance from the Zionist leadership, who were unwilling to be governed by an Arab majority. These similarities highlight the shared historical and political contexts that shaped the demands for parity by minority groups in both colonial India and Mandate Palestine, underscoring the complexities of implementing representative politics in diverse societies.

During the Mandate period in Palestine, successive British administrations faced challenges in creating representative institutions that were not fully elective, primarily due to the Arab majority. This majority posed a significant obstacle to British plans for facilitating a Jewish homeland in the region. David Ben-Gurion, recognizing the potential consequences of a representative system based on majority rule, advocated for Jewish 'parity' with the Arabs in all governmental institutions, despite Jews being a smaller minority at the time. Additionally, the Zionist leadership sought to exclude immigration issues from the future legislative council's purview, aiming for a future Jewish majority.

By the issuance of the Peel Commission Report in 1936, the demand for 'parity' had been officially adopted by the Zionist movement. This concept of political parity emerged as one of the proposed solutions to the ongoing conflict in Mandatory Palestine.[506] The insistence on parity by the Zionists reflected an acknowledgment of their numerical disadvantage in any representative system. By advocating for equality in representation, regardless of their smaller numbers, the Zionist movement sought to secure a significant

---

[505] Shaikh.

[506] Susan Lee Hattis, 'Jabotinsky's Parity Plan for Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 1 (1977): 90–96.

political presence, side-lining the conventional 'principles of arithmetic' that typically govern representative politics.

The colonial officials' endorsement of the Zionist demand for parity was intricately linked to their objective of supporting the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. This support, however, stood in contrast to the liberal principles of representative politics, which typically favour majority rule. Conversely, in colonial India, the British authorities' recognition of the Muslim League's demand for parity stemmed from their perception of Indian society as divided into distinct religious communities, which inherently hindered any consensus among the Indian populace.

For both the Zionist leadership in Palestine and the Muslim League in India, the concept of representative politics, with its emphasis on numerical strength, posed a significant challenge. Consequently, both groups explicitly rejected the democratic principle that political power should be proportionate to population size. The pursuit of parity by the Zionists was driven by concerns over their minority status in any democratic framework, highlighting their apprehension about being marginalized in a system governed by majority rule. This issue came to a head in 1939 when Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald presented the concept of parity to the Arab leadership, who dismissed the proposal outright,[507] unwilling to consider a political arrangement that would grant equal power to a demographic minority. This rejection underscored the deep divisions and conflicting aspirations that characterized the political landscape in both Mandate Palestine and colonial India.

The perception of Muslims as more than just a minority, but rather as a distinct political entity, significantly influenced colonial representation policies in India. The advent of the Second World War, coupled with the Congress Party's refusal to support British war

[507]Hattis.

efforts, emboldened the Muslim League to assert its demand for outright parity with the Congress. The League posited itself as a national, rather than a communal, organization, advocating for the recognition of Indian Muslims as a key component in all future constitutional discussions and seeking an equal role alongside the majority community in these negotiations.[508]

A similar stance was adopted by the Zionist leadership in Mandate Palestine, who claimed to represent the global Jewish community. This assertion gained traction after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, which effectively recognized their political aspirations. Despite not having represented all Jews prior to the Declaration, the Zionist movement leveraged this newfound status to bolster their political position. Similarly, the Muslim League claimed to speak for the entire Muslim community in India, despite its poor showing in the 1937 elections.[509] The League's claim was grounded in its identity as an exclusively Muslim party, which it argued justified restricting Congress's appeal to the Muslim electorate. This strategic positioning by both the Muslim League in India and the Zionist leadership in Palestine highlights the complex interplay between communal identities, political representation, and colonial policies in shaping the political landscapes of their respective regions.

The colonial process of 'secularization' served as a crucial mechanism for the imperial construction and management of differences, which in turn facilitated the emergence of 'communitarian' politics. This dynamic played a significant role in creating the conditions conducive to the partition of late-colonial India and Mandate Palestine. The act of partition

[508]Shaikh, 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan'.
[509]Shaikh.

further exacerbated the communalization of politics in the newly established nation-states of India and Pakistan,[510] entrenching communal identities within their political frameworks.

In contemporary India, there has been a push by Hindu extremists for the state to formally recognize the inherently Hindu character of India, its civilization, and its nationalism. This movement has led to calls for an official departure from the principles of Indian secularism,[511] reflecting a shift towards a more explicitly communal basis for national identity. A similar trend is observable in the State of Israel, where there has been a push to formally recognize Israel as a Jewish state. This aspiration was institutionalized in the Nationality Bill, which officially declares Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The parallel developments in India and Israel highlight the enduring impact of colonial secularization processes and the ways in which they have shaped, and continue to influence, the politics of identity and nationalism in both countries.

---

[510] Panikkar, 'Communalism', 49.
[511] Amartya Sen, 'The Threats to Secular India', *Social Scientist* 21, no. 3/4 (1993): 5–23.

Conclusion

The emergence of representative politics in colonial contexts was intrinsically linked to earlier colonial policies, notably the census exercises in India and the millet system in Mandate Palestine. These practices embedded religious identity within the framework of political power, thereby converting existing religious communities into distinct political entities. This transformation brought religion-based disputes to the forefront of the political arena, with the concept of representation playing a crucial role. In Palestine, the direction of the Arab-Israel conflict was significantly influenced by the notion of representative politics, despite its limited implementation, with the agenda being heavily influenced by Zionist interests rather than the demographic realities of Palestinian society. In contrast, colonial India saw the introduction of separate electorates for Muslims, aimed at protecting communal interests within the broader framework of representative institutions.[512]

This research concludes that the principle of representative politics, driven by colonial strategies of managing religious and communal differences through constitutional means, led to parallel outcomes in both regions. While representative politics took root as an institution in India, it found little success in Palestine, primarily due to the overriding influence of Zionist aspirations. Thus, colonial governance can be characterized by its approach to managing diversity through constitutional development, shaping the political landscapes of both colonial India and Mandate Palestine in profound ways.

In colonial India, census operations played a pivotal role in intertwining religious identities with the numerical representation of communities. This fusion prompted the demand from Muslims for separate electorates, a demand that was institutionalized in the

[512]Giorgio Shani, "Empire, Liberalism and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Colonial Governmentality in Indian Subcontinent," *The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2006.* Vol.5 (2006): 19–36.

Indian Councils Act of 1909. By making religious identity a cornerstone of future constitutional frameworks, the Act entrenched the division of political power along religious lines. This division not only set the Muslim community in opposition to Hindus but also cemented Muslim separatism as a persistent element of India's political landscape during the colonial era.

In Mandate Palestine, British governance structures were tailored to facilitate the creation of a Jewish homeland, showing a discernible preference for Zionist aspirations. This led to a skewed power dynamic favouring Zionists. In an attempt to legitimize this setup, the British called for elections for the Legislative Council in 1923. However, the Arab Muslim leadership boycotted these elections, viewing the electoral system, which was a part of the mandate's framework, as indirectly endorsing the Balfour Declaration. As a result, the notion of representative politics in the region became contingent upon Arab Muslim consent to operate within the mandate's conditions, effectively making their participation an implicit nod to the mandate's governance model and its implications.

The European notion of 'homogeneous nation-states'[513] significantly shaped colonial governance, especially when it took the form of 'representative institutions' in the colonies.[514] This model was underpinned by the colonial practice of classifying subject populations into majorities and minorities, a process essential to the nation-state concept known as 'minoritization'.[515] The transition to representative politics was crucial in deepening the divide among religious communities within the local political landscape. The imperial tactic of infusing religious identity into politics was designed to prevent colonial subjects from embracing a secular national identity, thereby preserving 'secularism' as an exclusive trait of the colonial state. This strategy effectively prevented the colonized from forming a collective

[513]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 8.
[514]Philips, 'Review: The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India by K.B. Krishna'.
[515]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.

identity based on non-religious grounds, thereby fuelling the emergence of religious nationalism.

The colonial state's claim to secular neutrality allowed it to position itself as a 'neutral arbiter', intervening in local affairs under the guise of protecting minority interests. However, this so-called neutrality was contingent upon the religious divisions that the colonial powers themselves had entrenched within local societies. Understanding 'secularism' within the colonial epistemological framework revealed how it shaped the development and implementation of representative institutions in colonial India and Mandate Palestine. Essentially, constitutional reforms served as a tool to manage and regulate subject populations, aiming to contain nationalist sentiments and anti-colonial activities by reinforcing the divisions based on religious identity.

Understanding the colonial process of secularization and its impact on representative politics reveals how constitutional reforms were strategically designed to contain nationalist movements and regulate subject populations. This study situates the evolution of representative politics within the broader framework of colonial secularization, illustrating its significant role in reshaping local politics and creating conditions conducive to partition in both India and Palestine.

In colonial India, the push for representative institutions was primarily driven by internal demands. Contrarily, in Mandate Palestine, it was international pressures from the Mandate system that advocated for the implementation of representative politics. Arab nationalist leaders were wary, believing that embracing such institutions would imply acceptance of the Balfour Declaration, thereby influencing the divergent paths towards representation in the two regions.

Chapter 3

Resistance to Colonial Subjectification

Subjectifying *Difference*

This chapter probes into the vibrant landscape of anti-colonial resistance, where cross-sectarian alliances emerged as formidable challenges to the colonial order. By examining the Hindu-Muslim collaboration within India’s Khilafat movement and the Muslim-Christian mobilizations in Mandate Palestine, we uncover the nuanced dynamics of colonial subjects navigating and, at times, contesting their religiously defined identities imposed by colonial powers. These historical episodes reveal not just the complexities of identity negotiations under colonial rule but also the persistent aspiration among diverse communities to transcend sectarian divides in pursuit of a common cause against colonialism.

The Khilafat Movement marked a significant moment in Indian history, where Muslims sought to influence the British government to protect the status of the Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of Islam and maintain the territorial sanctity of Muslim holy sites following the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration post-World War I. Amidst demands from Indian Muslims for separate political representation and the apparent disinterest of Hindus in Muslim-centric issues, the Khilafat Movement emerged as a major organized effort to challenge British colonial rule across communal lines, rallying around a Muslim cause.

However, the movement's transnational goals were not realized, nor did it successfully establish a cross-communal alliance. The interplay between Mahatma Gandhi and the Khilafat leadership, and their collective quest for Hindu-Muslim unity, sheds light on the colonial construction of ‘Indian Muslims’ as a distinct identity. This chapter explores the Khilafat Movement as an instance of cross-communal resistance against colonial categorization, exploring its possibilities and inherent constraints. A detailed analysis of this

cross-communal resistance highlights the profound impact of colonial policies and practices in shaping colonial subjects and defining their roles within the colonial cultural and historical milieu. The exploration of these dynamics further illuminates how partition became an ingrained structure within the colonial narrative.

The Khilafat Movement's strategy of mass mobilization through religious symbols was notably effective in reinforcing the colonial narrative on communal relations, highlighting and amplifying the distinctions between Hindus and Muslims, and thereby validating the colonial emphasis on communal differences. The movement showcased the potential for challenging the colonial framework of religion-based differentiation and its ideological underpinnings, yet it also revealed the limitations of fully transcending these colonial constructs. This episode not only underscores a missed opportunity for Indian communities to counteract colonial-imposed identities but also illustrates the enduring influence of colonial policies and practices that laid the groundwork for the eventual partition of Indian society. The movement inadvertently demonstrated the efficacy of the colonial state's divisive strategies, integral to its governance mechanisms.

Ultimately, the discourse surrounding Hindu-Muslim unity, and even the primary goals of the Khilafat Movement, ended up reinforcing colonial subjectivities and diluting the unified national identity that Gandhi sought to foster. The experience of being categorized as a 'minority' led Indian Muslims to concentrate on navigating the challenges posed by potential 'majority rule' post-British rule, overlooking the possibilities for broader anti-colonial solidarity that the Khilafat Movement offered. This focus on communal survival strategies exemplifies the deep-seated impact of colonial categorization and its role in shaping the political landscape of the subcontinent.

In Mandate Palestine, the British colonial approach to managing religious identities presented a starkly different scenario compared to India. An illustrative example is the colonial effort to categorize the Christian community, which, unlike in India, did not solidify divisive political identities but rather became a catalyst for unity. The formation of Christian-Muslim associations marked a significant move towards transcending religion-based political identities, aligning instead with an Arab nationalist framework. This ability of Arab Palestinians to navigate beyond sectarian divisions contrasts with the Indian experience, where religious identities were more deeply entrenched in political divisions. Although initially, the resistance in Palestine was framed within Christian-Muslim associations, this approach was quickly superseded by the formation of the Arab Higher Committee, which represented a cohesive Arab stance against British Zionist policies. This united Arab front against the British and Zionist agendas emerged relatively early during the British mandate, highlighting a collective resistance that was not as prevalent in the Indian context.

The nature of British governance in Palestine was significantly influenced by the influx of European Jews, which in turn catalysed the Christian-Muslim alliance against British Zionist policies from as early as 1918. This alliance underscores the Palestinian Arabs' capacity to overcome colonial-imposed religious identities, a capacity that was notably absent in the Indian context, despite similar British policies towards Christian communities in Palestine being informed by their experiences in colonial India. This divergence highlights the unique dynamics at play in Palestine, where the presence of European Jews and the specific colonial policies in place fostered an environment conducive to cross-communal solidarity against external political agendas.

Arab Christians in Mandate Palestine did not perceive themselves as merely a disenfranchised religious group; instead, they positioned themselves at the core of Palestine’s

emerging national identity. The rise of new middle classes, predominantly urban and comprising both Muslims and Christians, eschewed defining their political identities solely based on religious affiliation. They identified more with their economic status, which accorded them elite social standing and set them apart from other social strata.[516] The demarcation between Christian and Muslim identities was not as pronounced in Palestine as it was in the colonial Indian setting. Arab Christians played a pivotal role in the Palestinian Arab national movement, recognizing that their political interests would be compromised if they were categorized strictly as a religious minority. This nuanced understanding of their position in the broader national context underscores the complex interplay of religious, economic, and national identities in shaping the political landscape of Mandate Palestine.

[516] Itamar Radai, 'The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class Under the British Mandate, 1920–39', *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 3 (2016): 487–506.

The Khilafat Movement: Subjectifying Difference

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned with Germany against the British and their allies. The subsequent defeat led to the partitioning of Ottoman territories among France, Greece, and Britain, deeply unsettling Indian Muslims who feared the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a concern that dominated the political discourse in colonial India for six years. This apprehension gave rise to the Khilafat Movement, a pivotal chapter in the political history of colonial India, where Indian Muslims endeavoured to influence the British government to uphold the Ottoman Sultan's status as the Caliph of Islam and maintain the territorial integrity of Muslim holy sites post-war. While the movement had a pan-Islamic character, its leadership, primarily consisting of the Oxford-educated journalist Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar, his brother Shaukat Ali, and the esteemed scholar Abul Kalam Azad, aimed for widespread political mobilization of Indian Muslims on a pan-Indian scale. The Khilafat leaders collaborated with Mahatma Gandhi, who in turn pledged non-violent support in exchange for Hindu backing of the Khilafat cause. This alliance is often hailed as a 'major milestone' in the annals of Hindu-Muslim relations, marking a significant moment of cross-communal solidarity in the struggle against colonial rule.

The Khilafat Movement was largely indifferent to Indian independence; its alliance with Gandhi was primarily a 'marriage of convenience'. The Indian Muslim leadership conditioned their support for the British Government on the safeguarding of the Ottoman Empire's holy places. Gandhi launched a non-violent non-cooperation movement against the British, championing the Khilafat cause, which he saw as an opportunity to rally Muslim support for nationalism. The campaign by Gandhi and the Ali brothers for mass mobilization using religious symbols was remarkably successful in reinforcing the colonial discourse on communal relations. The differences between Hindus and Muslims became more pronounced

during the movement. The Khilafat Movement's significance lies in its reinforcement of the colonial narrative that Hindus and Muslims could not coexist. Initially benefiting from Gandhi's leadership and its alliance with his non-cooperation movement, the movement came to an abrupt end in 1924 with the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Republic.

The impending dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by European powers catalysed the first significant mass protest against British rule in India. The Indian Muslim community's sentiments towards the Ottoman Empire were influenced by various factors, notably the empire's role as the last stronghold of Muslim power in a world largely under colonial dominance. Additionally, religious affiliations tied the concept of the Caliphate to early Islamic governance, effectively making it a potent symbol for rallying Indian Muslims. The primary aim of this agitation was to sway European powers to support the Caliphate cause. While the British attributed the rise of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements in India to the aftermath of World War I and its economic repercussions,[517] some scholars frame the Khilafat agitation within the broader context of 'Pan-Islamism'.[518]

Exploring the interactions between Gandhi and the Khilafat leadership, and their collective efforts towards fostering Hindu-Muslim unity, reveals how Indian Muslims internalized the colonial construct of their identity. Once categorized as a minority, Indian Muslims became increasingly concerned with addressing the challenges of minority status in a future India governed by a Hindu majority, post-British rule. This transformation of the subject population into distinct 'minorities' and a 'majority' set the stage for claims to statehood in post-British India, where minorities found themselves in a potentially disadvantaged and vulnerable position.

---

[517] Bamford, xiii.

[518] M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British India - The Politics of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924* (OUP, 2009).

At first glance, Gandhi seemed poised to foster a new form of politics capable of transcending the colonial liberal paradigms. Despite his critique of liberal politics, Gandhi ultimately could not extricate himself from the overarching political frameworks of his time. It would be unfair to solely blame him for this inability, which contributed to the perpetuation of partition logic. As previously discussed, 'minoritization' was largely a result of gradual 'devolution of power', which relegated 'Hindu and Muslim representation' to 'religious lines',[519] ultimately paving the way for the conception of a 'Muslim nation' in colonial India. The introduction of 'separate electorates' for Muslims through the 1909 constitutional reforms solidified a distinct 'corporate Muslim identity' within Indian politics.[520] Meanwhile, the Khilafat movement exemplified forms of self-identification that further entrenched the 'minoritization' of Indian Muslims.

The use of the term 'Indian Muslims' in this discussion is not intended to imply that the Muslim community in colonial India was homogenous. Instead, terms like 'Muslims', 'Indian Muslims', and 'Muslim community' are employed as they are found in colonial archives, with the understanding that Muslims in India constituted a diverse group with multiple identities spanning religion, race, class, and occupation. Amid the intricate dynamics of Indian society, Muslims coexisted with other communities, navigating their multifaceted aspirations encompassing economic, social, and political dimensions.[521]

Politics during the colonial era was predominantly the domain of the elite, although the broader Indian populace became increasingly involved due to new electoral reforms. This era of politics, characterized by the delineation of minorities and a majority, required

---

[519]Rafiq Zakaria, *The Widening Divide: An Insight Into Hindu-Muslim Relations* (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), 36.
[520]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 115.
[521]BalrajPuri, "Autonomy and Participation: Dimensions of Indian Muslim Identity," *Economic and Political Weekly* 13, no. 40 (1978): 1706–12.

widespread mobilization to foster the 'imagining of a nation'. The notion of a 'minority' as a contemporary political concept is inherently linked to the emergence of nation-states.[522]

By the end of World War I, the 'political consciousness' in India had yet to fully crystallize.[523] Judith Brown argues that during the Khilafat Movement, India was still in a phase of 'self-definition and self-creation',[524] with the movement primarily heightening awareness of belonging to religious identity-based communities rather than fostering a sense of nationhood. The concept of a 'nation-state' was not prevalent in early twentieth-century colonial India; instead, the term 'Dominion' was more commonly used, signifying the type of relationship an independent India was envisioned to have with Imperial Britain, rather than denoting a specific form of governance.

In this context, I employ the notion of a 'nation-state' to describe a system of governance that was in the process of formation during the early decades of the twentieth century, with the introduction of representative politics setting the stage for India's evolution into a nation-state post-British rule. Modern nation-states are characterized as entities possessing a defined 'national' territory, where state authority is uniformly exercised, and legitimacy is derived from a form of representation that resonates with the cultural identity of the majority of the population.[525] It was the emerging numerical superiority of Hindus as the 'majority' community within the framework of representative politics in colonial India that ignited fears, whether real or perceived, among the Muslim 'minority' of a potential oppressive Hindu 'majority' rule after the British exit. In this milieu, 'federalism' emerged as a potential remedy to address the apprehensions of Indian Muslims regarding their future status as a 'minority'.

---

[522]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.
[523]Simone Panter-Brick, *Gandhi and Nationalism: The Path to Indian Independence*, Reprint edition (London New York: I.B.Tauris, 2014), 15.
[524]Panter-Brick, 15.
[525]White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East*, 2.

Rooted in an Orientalist perspective, the British viewed India as unprepared for self-governance and believed it should not be defined along secular national lines. To undermine the nascent process of national self-imagining among Indians, the British introduced 'representative' institutions that emphasized religious 'difference' over secular national identity—a contrast to the defining elements of European politics. The onset of 'modernity' in colonial India was marked by the institutionalization of various principles, some of which were conflicting or evolving, including constitutionalism, moral authority, democracy, human rights, civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market, and secularism. This modernity also brought the politics of 'minorities and majority' to the forefront, embodying the essence of the 'nation-state form'.[526] Modernity positioned religion as a pivotal point of colonial interaction, framing it as a confrontation between the 'enlightened' secular West and what was perceived as the religiously despotic East. This interaction profoundly altered the British understanding of local religious practices, elevating religious identity as the primary indicator of political reform and the sole legitimate foundation for political claims.[527]

The clash and cooperation between Eastern cultural traditions and religious practices—where religion was deeply intertwined with complex social and political relations[528]—and the pressures of Western modernity, fostered a novel historical narrative. This narrative redefined the concept of religious 'minorities' in the colonial context, shaping a distinct understanding of identity and belonging in the colonies.

'Pan-Islam' and the 'Muslim World'

The delineation of the Muslim community as a 'minority' within the confines of colonial India was only part of a broader process that extended to conceptualizing the

---

[526]Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 13.
[527]UssamaMakdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2000), 2.
[528]Makdisi, 2.

expansive transnational domain they occupied within the 'Muslim world'. The notion of the 'Muslim World' became central to colonial narratives in the 1880s, emerging alongside the concept of the 'Christian West' at a time when the majority of Muslim-majority regions fell under European Christian colonial dominion.[529] This era marked the inception of an imperial discourse that framed Muslims as an inferior race,[530] contributing to the construction of Muslims as a distinct category in opposition to the West.[531]

The concept of 'pan-Islamism', with the Khilafat movement as one of its expressions, should be understood in conjunction with the colonial construct of 'the Muslim world'. This framework inadvertently produced a 'template of a racial, civilizational, and geopolitical Muslim world' that stood in contrast to the Western paradigm.[532] As a global power, British colonial authorities adopted a wide-ranging view of the political ambitions of Muslims throughout their empire, often perceiving them as a singular, homogenous entity. However, the reality was that the Muslim community was far from monolithic; 'pan-Islamism' held varied significances across different Muslim societies and was interpreted distinctly by colonial rulers.[533] This divergence highlights the complexities and nuances within the Muslim identity and the colonial perception of it, underscoring the multifaceted nature of religious and political affiliations in the colonial era.

The diversity within pan-Islamism in India, far from presenting a unified stance, can be categorized into four distinct groups:

- The first, and perhaps most visible, consisted of the western-educated Aligarh Muslims such as Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, and Zafar Ali Khan.

[529]Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*, 5.
[530]Aydin, 5.
[531]Aydin, 13.
[532]Aydin, 13.
[533]Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, 2nd Revised Edition (Clarendon Press, 1994).

These individuals utilized their platforms, including newspapers like Comrade, Hamdard, Urdu-i-Mu'alla, and Zamindar, to voice religious grievances and rally support.

- The second faction drew inspiration from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, with Abu'l Kalam Azad at its helm. Azad, through his publication Al-Hilal, advocated for a combined resistance against colonial rule, seeking alliance with the Hindu community to bolster the anti-colonial effort.
- The third group comprised the Ulema of Deoband, led by Mahmud al-Hasan, known as Shaikh al-Hind. This faction believed in a revivalist approach, arguing that a return to the early principles of Islam would empower Muslims to launch a Jihad against British colonialism.
- The fourth strand included Muslims whose anti-colonial activism was marked by their transnational mobility, spanning Europe, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. These individuals, many of whom had travelled to England for education or were in Germany to further the Indian liberation cause, were convinced of the revolutionary socialism's potential in India's freedom struggle.[534]

The emergence of 'Pan-Islam' as a modern concept within the discourse of political Islamic revivalism and the call for unity was a response to Western colonial assertions of political and cultural supremacy. This notion significantly altered Muslim political thought in colonial India, particularly in relation to the Khilafat institution, transforming it into a collection of religious symbols central to the Muslim faith. The idea of a 'Muslim world' as an intrinsic part of the identity of Indian Muslims, characterized as a 'minority,' highlights their transnational nature, which is evident both internationally and within the national context of India. The term 'Pan-Islamism' is widely recognized to have non-Muslim

[534]Ansari, "Pan-Islam and the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists."

origins[535] and was a direct consequence of British strategies aimed at leveraging pro-Ottoman sentiments among Indian Muslims. This was intended to ensure their allegiance amidst the perceived Russian threat to British imperial interests. By aligning with the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamism, in its broadest interpretation, symbolized a universal bond of solidarity among Muslims worldwide, transcending geographical and political boundaries.

It would be simplistic to regard the 'Muslim community' in India as a uniform entity, given the significant variations in how Muslims reacted to the evolving conditions under British colonial rule. Similarly, it would be an oversimplification to perceive colonial rule in India as a homogeneous form of imperial governance, despite its occasional appearance as such.

The complexity of colonial governance becomes apparent in the way the British colonial regime managed the Khilafat Movement. This episode illustrates the regime's nuanced approach to strategic manipulation and control, as they sought to shape the conduct of the Muslim population in response to their political agitation. By examining this critical juncture through the lens of Foucault's critique of modern European political thought,[536] we gain insights into the mechanisms of power and subjectivity employed by the colonial authorities.[537] The handling of the Khilafat Movement serves as a clear example of the intricate strategies deployed by colonial governance to maintain dominance and manage dissent within its territories.

Colonial Governmentality

[535]Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*.
[536]James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, eds., *The Final Foucault*, 1st MIT Press Ed edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1988), 19.
[537]Jonathan Simons, *Foucault and the Political*, 1 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 1994).

The colonial regime's approach to the Khilafat Movement offers valuable insights into the operational dynamics of colonial governmentality. While the regime could have easily relied on coercion to maintain control during the Khilafat Movement, it instead chose to seek the allegiance of its subjects. This period saw Indian Muslims engaging in self-subjectification and internalizing colonial subjectivity, particularly through the process of 'minoritisation', with the Khilafat Movement serving as a prime example. The shift towards colonial governmentality became more pronounced after World War I, culminating in a period from 1919 to 1922 during the Khilafat Movement. This era marked a closer resemblance to modern governance, characterized by mutual determination between the colonial state and its subjects.[538] The subsequent resistance against colonial subjugation became a defining feature of this era.

Faced with the combined challenge of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements, the colonial regime demonstrated its use of modern governing technologies, marking a departure from its previous strategies. Since the 1857 uprising, the regime had not encountered a unified movement that posed such a significant threat to its control, potentially leading to widespread civil unrest. The initial response to nationalist agitation, labelled as 'seditious' by the Home Department, included repressive measures like the Rowlett Act of 1919.[539] The strategic choices made by the Khilafat leadership aimed to challenge the colonial 'governing technologies'. Had the colonial regime persisted in its repressive tactics in dealing with the Khilafat Movement, the outcomes might have been markedly different, highlighting the nuanced strategies employed by the colonial government in response to significant political challenges.

---

[538] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 1 edition (Chicago: Routledge, 1983), 220–21.

[539] Kim Wagner, *Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear and the Making of a Massacre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).

Initially, the colonial government in India was divided on how to respond to the Khilafat agitation and Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, which commenced on 4 September 1920 with the aim of withdrawing cooperation from the British government to secure Swaraj, or self-rule, for India. Some officials advocated for a harsh crackdown on the leaders of these movements, ready to face the ensuing consequences. Conversely, the Viceroy's Council and the Home Department considered various long-term colonial strategies.[540]

By June 1920, the colonial government had adopted a policy of minimal interference with the anti-colonial agitations as its 'settled policy'.[541] Despite significant opposition from the Army Command, which was concerned about the Khilafat agitation's impact on the loyalty of the Indian Army, Viceroy Lord Chelmsford announced the government's policy of non-interference in September 1920 through an officially promulgated Indian government Resolution. This decision was influenced by the impending Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, which were seen as a viable solution to the challenges faced by the British in India. The regime also recognized the genuine commitment to non-violence in Gandhi's teachings.[542]

Gandhi's strategic use of non-violence in his resistance against colonial rule was a pivotal factor in altering the colonial policy towards the non-cooperation movement.[543] The introduction of Gandhi's principle of non-violence into the local political discourse transformed traditional colonial governance into a more nuanced form of colonial governmentality. Gandhi's approach created an alternative discourse to the colonial narrative, presenting novel challenges for the British officials to navigate. The adoption of non-violence

[540]D. A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement--1920-1922', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 2 (1966): 241–59.
[541]Low.
[542]Low.
[543]A. C. Niemeijer, 'Crisis', in *The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924* (Brill, 1972), 126–43, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76v5c.9.

deprived the colonial regime of its justification for using force, as it struggled to counter a non-violent opposition with violence, thereby fundamentally altering the dynamics of colonial rule in India.

Subjectivity encompasses a multiplicity, as articulated by Mikhail Bakhtin,[544] focusing on the moulding of pre-existing elements.[545] This notion underscores the importance for any liberation movement to divest itself of colonial subjectivity. The concept of Muslim unity, coupled with the recognition of Muslim distinctiveness, legitimized the Muslim assertion of belonging to a global community. The embedded notion of Muslim racialization ensured that desires for separatism were articulated within the framework of 'Muslim solidarity'.[546] Beyond the colonial racialization of Muslim identity, Muslim intellectuals proactively embraced and propagated the notion of their unique difference in absolute terms. This self-ascribed distinctiveness contributed to the shaping of a collective identity that emphasized irreducible differences, further entrenching the idea of a distinct Muslim community within the broader discourse on identity and solidarity.

The colonial lineage of 'the different modes by which ... human beings are made subjects'[547] unveils that the concept of the Indian subject, subjected to the colonial power matrix, cannot be dissociated from the definitions imposed during the colonial process. Francis Robinson highlights that the establishment of British colonial rule in India fundamentally altered the identities of its Indian subjects.[548] Peter Hardy characterizes the colonial regime's policy in India, based on religious identity, as a strategy of 'balance and

[544]Felix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethicoaesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Julian Prefaris and Paul Bains, New edition edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 2.
[545]Mark Kelly, 'Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self', in *A Companion to Foucault*, ed. Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
[546]Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*, 6.
[547]Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95.
[548]Francis Robinson, "The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 8 (1998): 271–89.

rule', exploiting pre-existing religious disparities to cement their dominion while striving to maintain a careful equilibrium between Hindus and Muslims.[549]

Scholars have debated the pre-colonial existence of 'Hindu' or 'Muslim' identities in any politically significant sense, suggesting that pre-colonial Indian society was too diversified into various local identities to support the formation of broader affiliations.[550] While extensive research has explored the pre-colonial political mobilization around Islamic notions, it is argued that the Muslim identity was not 'invented' but rather reshaped by the colonial regime.

The introduction of modern governance technologies, novel forms of knowledge, advancements in transportation and communication, and the proliferation of capitalist production methods facilitated the emergence of new identities at local, regional, and supra-regional levels. Among these newly forged identities, 'Muslim identity' stood out as particularly prominent,[551] illustrating the profound impact of colonial interventions on the social and political landscape of India.

Genealogy of the Constitution of Colonial Subjectivity

The constitution of 'Muslims' as colonial subjects by the colonial regime and their participation in the shaping of their own subjectivity became particularly evident during the Caliphate Movement. Analysing the role of Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Johar within this movement is essential to grasp the ongoing process of Muslim subjectification. This process experienced a temporary disruption during the Khilafat Movement, highlighting a moment of

[549]Gail Minault, review of *The Muslims of British India*, by P Hardy, *International Journal of Middle East Studies, Cambridge University Press* Vol. 5, no. No. 3 (June 1974): 366–67.
[550]C. A. Bayly, "The Pre-History of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860," *Modern Asian Studies* 19, no. 2 (1985): 177–203.
[551]Francis Robinson, "The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 8 (1998): 271–89.

active engagement by Muslim subjects in challenging and negotiating their identities within the colonial framework.

The Khilafat Movement, a significant episode in the history of Indian Muslims, ultimately failed to achieve its goals, yet it significantly influenced Muslim politics in India. Inherent with insurmountable contradictions and anomalies, the movement was arguably doomed from the start. Its primary aim was to restore the medieval institution of the Caliphate, a goal that was misaligned with the evolving socio-political landscape of the time. Far from advancing its intended objectives, the movement instead intensified the sentiment of Muslim nationalism and established a lasting and influential role for Muslim clergy in Indian politics.

For the first time in a considerable duration, Indian Muslim leadership unified, collaborating with Hindus over an issue rooted in Islamic concern, which briefly fostered Hindu-Muslim unity. Additionally, the movement cultivated a cadre of Muslim leaders adept in organizing and mobilizing masses for large-scale campaigns. Therefore, delving into the life and political strategies of Khilafat leader Mohammad Ali Johar is pivotal for a comprehensive understanding of the movement's dynamics and its enduring impact on the political fabric of Indian Muslims.

Mohammad Ali Johar exemplifies the complexities of colonial subjectification, and examining his personal journey sheds light on the nuanced impact of colonialism on individual experiences, which are neither purely individualistic nor solely shaped by the imposition of dominant discourses. Ali navigated seamlessly between the broad conceptual framework of the Muslim Ummah and the narrower geographical confines of India, illustrating the multifaceted nature of colonial subjectivity.

The concept of the Muslim Ummah, which played a significant role in Ali's political and personal identity, is rooted in the emergence of 'Islamic history' as a distinct academic discipline. This development was driven by the imperatives of colonial governance, as European powers sought to manage their expansive territories across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The need to understand and govern large Muslim populations led to the generation of scholarly work aimed at facilitating control and administration. Mohammad Ali's engagement with both the global Islamic community and the Indian nationalist movement reflects the intersection of these historical and political currents, highlighting the intricate interplay between colonial structures and individual agency.

During his visit to Jerusalem in November 1928, invited by Mufti Amin Al-Husseini on behalf of the Muslim Supreme Council, Mohammad Ali vocally criticized the British Zionist policy in Palestine and British governance in Muslim countries at large. The Khilafat leader's entry into Palestine, facilitated by a last-minute intervention by the Muslim Council, was closely associated with the Wailing Wall dispute.

At a reception hosted by the Council, Mohammad Ali articulated that Muslims harboured no animosity towards Jews; rather, their contention was with British Imperialism. He asserted that Britain's governance of Palestine was driven not by the interests of Arabs or Jews, but by its own imperial ambitions, stating, 'Great Britain rules Palestine not for the sake of the Arabs nor for the sake of the Jews, but for her own interest'.[552] This stance highlighted the complex interplay of colonial politics, religious identities, and international diplomacy during that era.

[552] 'Indian Moslem Leader Lashes Great Britain's Rule in Palestine' (JTA, 25 November 1928), London, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, http://www.jta.org/1928/11/25/archive/indian-moslem-leader-lashes-great-britains-rule-in-palestine#ixzz2qnkP0cag.

In the British Parliament, Labour MP Lieut. Commander Kenworthy expressed objections to the Palestine government's decision to permit entry to Mohammad Ali, a prominent Indian Muslim leader. Kenworthy highlighted Ali's open criticism of the British Government's Zionist policy and his challenges to the terms of the Palestine mandate during his visit. The MP also raised concerns about the implications of allowing a non-Palestinian Muslim to agitate against British rule on a territory under British control.[553] In response to these concerns, Colonial Secretary Leo Amery reassured that the Colonial Office would conduct a thorough review of the statements made by 'the Indian Muslim leader' while he was in Palestine.[554] This incident underscores the tensions and complexities of colonial governance, international diplomacy, and the interplay between domestic and foreign political actors during that period.

In certain segments of Palestinian society, there was considerable discontent regarding Mohammad Ali's involvement in the Wailing Wall dispute. The pro-Palestinian magazine 'Near East and India', published out of London, scrutinized Mohammad Ali's critique of the British imperial approach to Palestine. In an editorial, the magazine contended that the Jewish community's own missteps were responsible for the unfortunate situation at the Western Wall. It further suggested that it was improbable for Palestinian Muslims to set aside their 'perfect quarrel' with the Jews to instead adopt the broader, more ambiguous dispute against the British, as advocated by Mohammad Ali.[555] This perspective illustrates the complex web of local and international interests and the diverse reactions to Mohammad Ali's stance during his visit to Palestine.

[553] 'Kenworthy Questions Government on Mohamed Ali's Admission to Palestine' (JTA, 30 November 1928), London, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, http://www.jta.org/1928/11/30/archive/kenworthy-questions-government-on-mohamed-alis-admission-to-palestine#ixzz2qnhgEBtp.
[554] 'Kenworthy Asks Further Question on Wailing Wall', 5 December 1928, London, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, http://www.jta.org/1928/12/05/archive/kenworthy-asks-further-question-on-wailing-wall#ixzz2qnxJl2v1.
[555] 'News Brief' (JTA, 3 December 1928), London, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, http://www.jta.org/1928/12/03/archive/palestine-jews-have-to-blame-their-own-mistakes#ixzz2qntD5XNp.

The British response to Mohammad Ali's critique of British imperialism was shaped by broader geopolitical concerns, particularly in the aftermath of World War I. The British government harboured apprehensions about the potential rise of a substantial coalition of anti-British states within the Muslim world, stretching from Egypt and Turkey in the west to Iran and Afghanistan in the east. A more pressing worry was the possibility that anti-British sentiment in these states could undermine the loyalty of the Muslim community in India to British rule. These fears underscored the strategic importance of maintaining influence over the Muslim population within the British Empire and highlighted the interconnected nature of colonial governance and international diplomacy.

In colonial India, Muslims, constituted as a minority within the British Raj, harboured concerns about being marginalized from power-sharing arrangements. Their collaboration with the colonial regime led to friction with nationalist factions. This dynamic highlights the 'practices of exclusion' embedded within the nation-state framework, necessitating a nuanced understanding of power. In this context, power is not only repressive but also productive, imposing 'limits and constraints on the infinite possibilities' and shaping identities and political alignments.

Contrastingly, in mandate Palestine, Muslims were in the majority, and Mohammad Ali's apprehension regarding the Zionist minority was distinct from the perspective of the Palestinian Arabs. This difference underpinned Mohammad Ali's anti-British stance in Palestine, which starkly diverged from his political activities in colonial India. His position reflects the complex interplay of identity, power, and politics across different colonial contexts, demonstrating how geopolitical and demographic factors can significantly influence political strategies and alliances.

Placing Mohammad Ali alongside Gandhi within a historico-critical framework allows for an exploration of how Foucauldian concepts of governmental ‘counter-conducts’ and a ‘critical’ mindset contribute to a de-subjugating mode of thought as a form of critique. This de-subjugating thought process serves to disrupt, albeit temporarily, the ongoing process of colonial subjectification driven by colonial governmental norms. Simultaneously, it is fundamental to the development and sophistication of colonial political governmentality.

Rather than adopting a normative approach to analysing the behaviour of colonial subjects, a performative perspective that challenges colonial ‘regimes of truth’ is favoured. This approach emphasizes the active role of individuals like Mohammad Ali and Gandhi in questioning and resisting the structures and narratives imposed by colonial authority. Through their actions and discourses, they exemplify the performative enactment of critique, illustrating how resistance and counter-conducts can emerge within and against the prevailing colonial framework, thereby contributing to a nuanced understanding of colonial subjectivity and governmentality.

Communalism during colonial rule in India presented a paradoxical impact on the formation of the Indian nation as an imagined community. On one side, communalism obstructed the envisioning of a unified Indian nation; on the other, it became a critical element in the conceptualization of this imagined nation. The colonial subject was shaped in a manner that predominantly encouraged envisioning through the lens of religious-identity-based communal structures, which was counterproductive to the early stages of nation-building.

The Caliphate Movement notably underscored this impediment, demonstrating the challenges in fostering a subjectivity conducive to the collective imagining of a nation, which remains central to the Indian communal issue. The colonial narrative on religion and the

segmentation of the local populace along religious lines fostered communalism. However, it was the evolution of the colonial regime into a form of colonial governmentality, a transformation that took a definitive shape post-World War I, that ultimately crystallized the nature of Muslim subjectivity during the Caliphate Movement. This transition marked a significant phase in solidifying the communal divisions and shaping the discourse around nationhood and communal identity in colonial India.

The Khilafat Movement served as a crucial platform for challenging colonial subjectification, rallying individuals around established colonial identities. The categories of 'Muslim' and 'Pan-Islam' were utilized by the colonial regime as tools to manage anti-colonial nationalist sentiments among Muslims, based on the notion that religion could act as a counterforce to nationalism.[556] A detailed analysis of the Khilafat Movement, particularly focusing on the ideological underpinnings of its leadership, reveals that the inherent contradictions within the movement had a lasting impact on India's quest for nationhood. These contradictions not only shaped the movement's trajectory but also influenced the broader narrative of India's struggle for independence, intertwining religious identity with the national liberation discourse in complex and enduring ways.

While the Khilafat leadership was primarily focused on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, viewed as the last significant power capable of safeguarding the sanctity of Islam,[557] it remained supportive of the colonial government during World War I.[558] Within Indian historiography, the Khilafat Movement is often regarded as a challenge to colonial

---

[556] Hussein Askary, 'Pan-Islamism Is the Death of the Nation!', *EIR*, 13 July 2012, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2012/eirv39n27-20120713/index.html.
[557] K. H. Ansari, "Pan-Islam and the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists," *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 509–37.
[558] P. C. Bamford, "Histories of Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements" (Government of India Press, Delhi, 1925), 118, National Archives of India.

norms. Scholars like Faisal Devji,[559] Gail Minault,[560] Mushir ul Hasan,[561] and Muhammad Naeem Qureshi[562] have identified the movement as a pivotal moment in the political evolution of Indian Muslims, marking a redefinition of their political stance to address the historical diminution of their political authority.

Although the movement appeared to pose a threat to British rule in India, its underlying dynamics actually reinforced colonial subjectivities. By navigating the complex interplay between allegiance to the colonial regime and the pursuit of Islamic political objectives, the Khilafat Movement inadvertently solidified the frameworks within which Indian Muslims were defined and understood by the colonial system, thereby contributing to the perpetuation of colonial constructs of identity and political engagement.

Indian Muslim Journey: From Rebellion to Acquiescence

Indian Muslims, perceiving themselves as a dispossessed ruling elite due to the loss of their empire to British colonization, embarked on a quest to redefine their position within the colonial framework. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a leading figure among Indian Muslim reformers, aimed to recalibrate the Muslim response to colonial rule by advocating for an alignment of Indian Muslim interests with unwavering loyalty to the British Empire's policies.[563] This stance was particularly significant given the British association of Muslims with the 1857 revolt, an event that marked a pivotal moment of resistance against British authority. W. W. Hunter's 1871 publication, *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel*

---

[559]Faisal Devji, *The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptations of Violence*, First Edition (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012).
[560]Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, First Edition (Columbia University Press, 1982).
[561]Mushirul Hasan, 'Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement', *Economic and Political Weekly* 16, no. 20 (16 May 1981): 903–12, https://doi.org/10.2307/4369836.
[562]M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British India - The Politics of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924* (OUP, 2009).
[563]Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid AḥmadKhān, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muslim India," *Studia Islamica*, no. 13 (1960): 55–78.

against the Queen?[564] encapsulates the British perception of Muslims during this period, highlighting the suspicion and scrutiny directed towards the Muslim community. Against this backdrop, Sir Syed's mission was to shift the Indian Muslim community's stance from opposition to acquiescence and encourage the British government to move from suppression to a more paternalistic approach.[565]

By linking the prosperity of Indian Muslims to the stability of British colonial rule, Sir Syed envisioned a pathway out of decline for the community under British patronage. His strategy involved placing the protection of Muslim interests firmly within the realm of British oversight, thereby establishing a foundation for the anti-Congress stance that would eventually lead to the advocacy for separate electorates.[566] This approach signified a significant moment in the history of Indian Muslims, setting the stage for future political developments and the complex interplay of loyalty, identity, and colonial governance.

The British initially perceived the Khilafat agitation as reminiscent of the 1857 uprisings,[567] marking it as the first significant act of resistance by Indian Muslims since that tumultuous period.[568] However, the leadership of the Khilafat movement did not aim to directly confront the colonial regime; rather, it functioned more as a pressure group than an outright anti-colonial entity. This movement represented a nuanced shift towards critical loyalty, deviating from previous Muslim political strategies that predominantly sought colonial favour.

[564]W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musulmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen?* (Trieste Publishing, 2017).
[565]Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*, 2nd Edition (Gollancz, 1946), 16.
[566]Ahmad, "Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Jamāl Al-Dīn Al-Afghānī and Muslim India."
[567]Judith M. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915–1922* (Cambridge Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 231.
[568]Penderel Moon, *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA* (London: The English Universities Press Limited, 1968), 113.

Despite the diversity within the Muslim community,[569] both in terms of composition and perspectives, the Khilafat movement managed to unite a broad spectrum of Indian Muslims, highlighting the limitations of elitist political approaches.[570] This unity among Indian Muslims, encompassing various opinions, life experiences, and strands of pan-Islamism, marked a pivotal moment in their collective history. The few who did not support the Khilafat cause, such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, faced demonization for their stance. Jinnah's focus on national politics and adherence to the Muslim League's constitution, which discouraged involvement in the government's foreign policies,[571] was primarily due to his reservations about the movement's religious undertones.

An Intelligence Bureau report on the 12th session of the Muslim League captured the tension, documenting how British loyalists were met with derogatory shouts that accused them of betraying the Caliphate cause, supporting repressive acts like the Rowlett Act and Martial Law in Punjab, and being subservient to British interests.[572] This episode illustrates the complex dynamics within the Indian Muslim community during this period, where allegiance to the Khilafat movement became a litmus test for loyalty to the broader Muslim cause.

Despite its transnational pan-Islamic aspirations, the Khilafat Movement was unable to secure unanimous support from Muslims worldwide for its vision of a 'global political system' centred around the Caliphate. The Palestine issue, however, stood out as a unique cause that resonated universally among Muslims, eliciting a broadly consistent response

[569]HuseinKhimjee, *Pakistan: A Legacy of the Indian Khilafat Movement: A Legacy of the Indian Khilafat Movement* (iUniverse, 2013), 6.
[570]Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 250.
[571]Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Brothers Publishers, 1961), 43.
[572] "Intelligent Bureau Report by K. S. Tsadduq Hussain, Deputy Superintendent of Police, on the All-India Muslim League, Twelfth Session, 1919," March 1920, Deposit 59, National Archives of India.

across different regions.[573] In India, the Khilafat Movement highlighted a resistance among Indian Muslims to the concept of secular 'nationalism', which they perceived as foreign and incongruent with their religious and cultural values. This scepticism towards nationalism led to accusations that Indian Muslims lacked a 'nationalist urge' in relation to India,[574] fostering anti-nationalist sentiments within the community. The movement thus played a significant role in shaping the political attitudes of Indian Muslims, steering them away from the emerging nationalist discourse and contributing to the complex interplay of religious identity and political allegiance during the colonial period.

In colonial India, the acquiescence of the Muslim leadership to the 'minoritisation' of their community highlights the role of 'self-subjectification' in shaping colonial subjectivity, which ultimately contributed to the structural logic leading to partition. My analysis delves into the self-subjectifying practices of the Muslim community as a manifestation of colonial power during the Khilafat Movement. Understanding the nuances and contingencies that led to 'Muslim separatism' necessitates examining the self-subjectification process of 'Indian Muslims' within the broader context of colonial 'minoritisation'.

The objectives of the Khilafat Movement and its political actions, aimed at transcending the Indian context, inadvertently reinforced colonial subjectivity while undermining the unity of the Indian identity. Thus, the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim relations and the overarching goals and immediate aims of the Khilafat Movement were counterproductive to the reconstitution of Indian subjectivity. This situation demonstrates that both communities, deeply entrenched in colonial subjectivity, struggled to find a 'neutral' common ground, illustrating the profound impact of colonial practices on shaping communal identities and relations in India.

---

[573] Puri, "Autonomy and Participation."

[574] Gopal Krishna, "The Caliphate Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no. 1/2 (April 1, 1968): 37–53.

The concept of 'counter-conduct' refers to resistance against the various 'colonial policies, practices, and processes' designed to direct the actions of others.[575] In the context of the Khilafat Movement, the leadership did not seek to directly oppose the colonial mechanisms that governed their behaviour; instead, they engaged Indian Muslims within the framework of colonial subjecthood. Despite opportunities for resistance, particularly under the guise of 'freedom fighters', the Khilafat leaders chose to remain entrenched within the colonial schema of subjectification, inadvertently embarking on a path towards 'separatism' that ultimately contributed to the partition. The colonial process of 'subjectivity', which treats the population both as the target and the means of its power,[576] effectively shaped Indian Muslims as colonial subjects who actively engaged in their own construction within this role. The Khilafat Movement exemplifies this dynamic of colonial 'subject' formation, where the leaders, constrained by their established identity, recognized their perceived collaborative stance with the colonial regime among other communities.

Maulana Mohammed Ali's letter to the Viceroy on 24 April 1919 underscores this recognition. He highlighted the frequent assurances of Muslim loyalty and support to the government, to the extent that it was often taken for granted. This, he noted, led other communities to criticize the Muslim community's relationship with the government,[577] reflecting the complex interplay of loyalty, identity, and resistance within the colonial context.

The Khilafat Movement, marked by an unprecedented mass mobilization, underscored the conditional nature of Hindu-Muslim cooperation, which was based on the acknowledgment of their religious distinctiveness, thereby cementing religious identity as the foundation of communal unity. Maulana Mohammad Ali characterized the national

[575] M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell, 2009 edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 201.
[576] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 170.
[577]Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Selected Writings*, vol. II (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1985), 226, Letter to Viceroy Chelmsford, 24 April 1919.

endeavour for 'Hindu-Muslim unity' as a pursuit of 'intercommunal unity', envisaging it as a 'federation of faiths'.[578] Fazlul Haq, in his role as President during the 1918 Muslim League session in Delhi, echoed the concerns of Indian Muslims regarding their future in a predominantly Hindu India, stating that 'the future of Islam in India seems to be wrapped in gloom and anxiety'.[579] He urged Muslims to foster amicable relations with Hindus as a strategic measure for their communal preservation.[580] This sentiment reflected a newfound realization among Muslims, who had coexisted with Hindus for centuries, that their continued existence necessitated a collaborative approach with the Hindu community.

While the inception of 'Muslim separatism' cannot be attributed directly to the Khilafat Movement, the movement played a crucial role in reinforcing and accelerating an already developing trend towards communal consolidation. This period marked a significant phase in the evolution of Muslim political consciousness in colonial India, contributing to the shaping of communal identities and intercommunal dynamics that would have lasting implications for the subcontinent.

The Ottoman Caliph in the British Imperial Imagining

Understanding the historical stance of Indian Muslims towards the Khilafat issue necessitates a genealogical examination of the political significance of the Caliphate in the context of British imperial foreign policy. During their alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the British leveraged the status of the Ottoman Caliph to secure the allegiance of Muslim subjects throughout the Empire, particularly in India. This strategy, referred to as the 'Ottoman

[578]Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Selected Writings (1920-1923)*, vol. III (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), 330.
[579]Gopal Krishna, 'The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no. 1/2 (1 April 1968): 37–53.
[580]Krishna.

Caliph' policy, was an integral component of Britain's broader imperial strategy in India,[581] given the profound influence that colonial India exerted on Muslims residing in territories under British dominion.

The British Empire, motivated by its expansive imperial interests, intentionally magnified the Ottoman Sultan's role as Caliph to resonate with Muslims globally. This approach was partly driven by the Anglo-Russian rivalry of the mid-nineteenth century, which prompted the British to support the nascent pan-Islamic movement as a means to mollify Indian Muslims and counter Russian influence. This strategic manipulation of religious sentiments and political affiliations underscores the complex interplay between colonial imperatives and the religious and political identities of colonial subjects, particularly in the context of the vast and diverse Muslim populations within the British Empire.

The British Empire's strategy to manage its Muslim subjects in India often involved leveraging the authority of the Ottoman Caliphs, thereby promoting the notion of a 'Muslim world'. Recognizing the significant sway that the Caliphs held over Indian Muslims, the British sought to utilize this influence to their advantage. One notable instance was when the British requested Caliph Selim III to intervene with Tipu Sultan, the sovereign of Mysore, who was fiercely resisting British advances, urging him to cease hostilities[582] and embrace the British as allies.[583] Similarly, during the 1857 uprising, often termed the 'Mutiny', the Ottoman Caliph was aligned with British interests, advocating for Indian Muslims to foster friendly relations with the British. This relationship was further emphasized during the

[581]Ram Lakhan Shukla, *Britain, India And The Turkish Empire, 1853-1882* (People's Publishing House, 1973), 144.
[582]Azmi Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain* (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997), 12.
[583]Ozcan, 13.

Crimean War, where the British positioned themselves as defenders of the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression, reinforcing their image as protectors of the Caliphate.[584]

However, the commitment to 'pan-Islamic solidarity' was not always consistent, as seen when the Ottoman Caliphate did not express solidarity with Afghanistan during its invasion by the British in the early 1840s.[585] These historical episodes illustrate the complex and often pragmatic interactions between the British Empire, the Ottoman Caliphate, and the Muslim subjects of colonial India, highlighting the instrumental use of religious and political affiliations in the geopolitics of the time.

The emergence of 'Pan-Islam' sentiments among Muslims might not have gained significant momentum without the substantial influence exerted by the British in shaping this ideology.[586] Historically, the Muslim world was never a monolith of political unity; the existence of multiple competing Caliphs across different Islamic societies since the fall of Baghdad in the mid-thirteenth century attests to this diversity.[587] The concept of a unified 'Muslim world' emerged despite the lack of alignment between theoretical discourse and the practical realities surrounding the notion of the Caliphate.

This period of emerging Pan-Islamic sentiment coincided with European expansion into Muslim territories, with France occupying Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, Britain taking control of Egypt in 1882 and Sudan in 1889, and Libya and Morocco falling under European occupation in 1912. The European approach to Muslim populations differed markedly from their treatment of Jews within Europe. In regions like India, European powers, including the British, often usurped control from Muslim rulers, a dynamic not applicable to Jewish communities in Europe.

---

[584] Shukla, 130.
[585] William Dalrymple, *Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan* (London: Bloomsbury Paperbacks, 2014).
[586] "Pan-Islamic Congress 1933-1935 - IOR/L/P&S/12/2118," n.d., London, India Office, British Library.
[587] Aydin, "Imperial Paradoxes."

Initially, the British harboured perceptions of Indian Muslims as inherently rebellious, viewing them as a significant threat to their colonial rule, unlike their perceptions of Jews in Europe. Indian Muslims were recognized for their martial prowess, classified among the 'martial races',[588] a distinction that harks back to their resistance against the British during the 1857 uprising. In contrast, Jewish communities in Europe were often stereotypically associated with effeminacy.[589] This contrasting perception underscores the complex interplay of racial, religious, and cultural narratives that influenced colonial attitudes and policies toward different communities under British rule.

---

[588]Heather Streets, *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2004).
[589]Sherene Seikaly and Max Ajl, "Of Europe: Zionism and the Jewish Other," in *Europe after Derrida*, ed. Agnes Czajka and Bora Isyar, Crisis and Potentiality (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 126.

Gandhi and the Khilafat

Gandhi's approach to anticolonial agitation and his relationship with the Khilafat leadership are pivotal in understanding the process of 'subjectification' within the broader framework of colonial governance, particularly concerning Indian Muslims. Gandhi's perspective on religious identity-based 'communal' classification as socially and politically constructed sheds light on his belief that altering the social and political order could lead to modifications in colonial communal classifications. However, Gandhi's strategy of seeking détente between Hindu and Muslim communities occurred within the confines of colonial categories, ultimately reinforcing colonial subjectivities. Rather than directly challenging the colonial political order's categorization of religious communities, Gandhi's efforts were situated within these existing frameworks, inadvertently perpetuating colonial subjectification.

This approach underscores the complex dynamics at play within colonial governance, where attempts to challenge colonial norms and classifications often remain constrained by the very structures they seek to subvert. Gandhi's strategy, while aiming for reconciliation between communities, inadvertently contributed to the entrenchment of colonial subjectivities among Indian Muslims by working within colonial categories rather than challenging them outright.

It was during the Khilafat movement that Gandhi was transformed from being a political organizer to a political thinker, developing a critique of modern liberalism and colonial subjectivity. S. C. Biswas claims that previously Gandhi had no significant place in Indian politics;[590] it was the Khilafat movement that transformed him into 'the supreme leader

[590] S. C. Biswas, *Gandhi: Theory and Practice, Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*, Reprint edition (South Asia Books, 1990), 132.

of the Indian people'.[591] Gail Minault describes how Gandhi, during the Khilafat movement, electrified people throughout India, who in a state of euphoria were chanting 'Hindu Musulman ki jai'! (Victory to Hindu Muslim unity)'.[592] Mohibbul Hasan argues that no Muslim leader ever received the adulation of Indian Muslims as Gandhi did; in Gandhi's own words, 'the Muslims accepted me as their true friend'.[593] However, as soon as he suspended the Non-cooperation movement, he was considered 'as so evil and detestable'.[594] The journey Gandhi traversed from being adulated by Muslims to becoming 'so evil and detestable' in their eyes signifies the pivotal role he played in their subjectification.

Gandhi realized that the Khilafat issue was the best opportunity for bringing about 'Hindu-Muslim unity'.[595] It brought to the surface the common colonial vulnerability, which Gandhi captured as the basis of forming a political alliance between both communities and forging a collective resistance against colonial rule while recognizing existing differences.[596] The Khilafat agitation would have been launched even without the guidance Gandhi provided. It was Gandhi who transformed the Khilafat movement into a mass movement, shifting the stance of the Khilafat leadership from loyalty to the British to sympathizing with anti-colonial nationalists, persuading them to influence the British by increasingly 'withholding all cooperation' from them.[597] Mindful of the hesitant state of Hindu-Muslim relations, Gandhi pressed both communities to cultivate 'absolute, indissoluble unity'.[598] Gandhi being at the core of political changes at that period, a study of Gandhi is essentially 'a

[591]Mohibbul Hasan, 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims', in *Gandhi: Theory and Practice, Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*, ed. S. C. Biswas, Reprint edition (South Asia Books, 1990), 132.
[592]Minault, *The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, 71.
[593]Hasan, 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims', 131.
[594]Hasan, 131.
[595]Krishna, 'The Khilafat Movement in India'.
[596]Amy Allen, '"Dependency, Subordination, and Recognition: On Judith Butler's Theory of Subjection"', *Continental Philosophy Review* 38, no. 3–4 (1 October 2005): 199–222.
[597]Niemeijer, 'Crisis'.
[598]Hasan, 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims', 137.

study of change in Indian Politics'.[599] Examining the process of 'minoritisation' through the prism of the politics Gandhi practiced during the Khilafat movement is helpful to learn about the nature of Indian politics when Indians were far from being a nation.[600] At the time, national consciousness in general, and in Gandhi in particular, was 'intertwined… in an interdependent and indispensable relationship',[601] making the study of Gandhi relevant to the study of Muslim 'minoritisation'. Evidently, Gandhi had a significant effect 'on the fate and future' of Muslim politics,[602] especially on the process of their minoritisation during and immediately after the Khilafat movement, with enormous implications for the future of Hindu-Muslim relations, which have so far not been studied.

The Colonial Discourse and Politics of 'Subjectivity'

The colonial discourse and politics of 'subjectivity' constitute a multifaceted interplay of power dynamics and identity formation within colonial contexts. 'Subjectivity' encompasses the internal experiences, perspectives, and interpretations of individuals or groups, shaped by social, cultural, and historical factors. In the colonial setting, subjectivity is not solely influenced by internal factors but is also constructed and manipulated by external colonial forces to uphold power and control over colonized populations. Colonial discourse refers to the language, narratives, and ideologies utilized by colonial powers to legitimize and perpetuate their rule over colonized territories. This discourse often portrays colonized peoples as inferior and in need of civilizing influence, serving to justify colonial domination. Additionally, colonial powers frequently employed strategies of divide and rule, fostering divisions among different ethnic, religious, or cultural groups to undermine collective resistance and maintain control. This approach not only exacerbated existing divisions within

[599]Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, xvi.
[600]Panter-Brick, *Gandhi and Nationalism*, 15.
[601]Panter-Brick, 15.
[602]al Sharif Mujahid, 'The Khilafat Movement', in *Mohamed Ali: Life and Work*, ed. S Moinul Haq (Karachi, Pakistan: Pakistan Historical Society, 1978), 125.

colonized societies but also reinforced colonial subjectivities rooted in racial, ethnic, religious, or caste-based hierarchies. Despite resistance efforts, colonial powers sought to co-opt or suppress dissent through strategies of co-option, coercion, and repression. Overall, understanding the colonial discourse and politics of 'subjectivity' is essential for comprehending the enduring legacies of colonialism and their ramifications for contemporary societies and identities.

The Khilafat issue, despite being deemed irrelevant to India's real interests[603] by Sir Penderel Moon, emerged as a pivotal moment in colonial history, stripping the colonial regime of its perceived invincibility and exposing its vulnerabilities. This episode underscores the colonial regime's reliance on individuals and communities that had been gradually shaped and influenced over time. The colonial administration utilized the 'technology of subjectivity' as a governing tool, aiming to mould colonial subjects to align with its interests. However, this process was not entirely successful in determining all aspects of the social existence of colonial subjects. Instead, colonial subjects maintained a degree of agency,[604] existing as dynamic and fluid entities shaped by ongoing power relations. Despite efforts to reinforce colonial subjectivities, the inherently unfinished nature of the subject formation process allowed for the possibility of resistance to persist.

The Khilafat leadership aimed to unite Indian Muslims into a cohesive political force, recognizing that their numerical minority status could be offset by collective strength in bargaining with the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress.[605] This strategy mirrored colonial intentions, as evidenced by Viceroy Lord Curzon's 1904 justification of the partition of Bengal, which highlighted the newfound unity among Bengali Muslims - 'a unity … they

---

[603] Moon, *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA*, 98.

[604] Amy Allen, 'Foucault and the Politics of Our Selves', *History of the Human Sciences* 24, no. 4 (1 October 2011): 43–59.

[605] Minault, *The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, 2–3.

had not enjoyed since the days of the Mussulman … kings'.[606]. Conversely, colonial authorities viewed Hindu-Muslim unity as a significant threat, fearing its potential to undermine their control over India.[607]

During the Khilafat movement, efforts to foster Hindu-Muslim unity were observed as the pinnacle of such endeavours,[608] albeit with limited and transient success. This unity, although fleeting, underscored the profound implications of colonial politics in shaping religiously-driven political movements. Indian Muslims experienced a gradual and protracted process of subjectivity transformation, wherein they were subjected to disciplinary measures, normalization, legal constraints, and objectification.[609] The Khilafat leadership further entrenched this colonial subjectivity by portraying the unity between Hindu and Muslim communities as politically legitimate, thus perpetuating the politicization of religious identity[610]—a characteristic deeply ingrained in colonial discourse. Gandhi was unable to strip religiously constituted communities of the political connotations imposed by the colonial regime. The politicization of religion was a salient feature of the Khilafat movement, driven by colonial discourse, in which Gandhi apparently played a significant role.[611]

The question remains: what hindered the Khilafat leadership from resisting and reworking the power relations ingrained in their colonial subjectivity, thereby embracing the incoherence of identity[612] necessary for counter-conduct against colonial policies? Despite the need for alternative critical vocabularies, normative frameworks, and transformative practices, crucial for challenging colonial norms, the Khilafat leadership seemed reluctant to question

[606]DharaAnjaria, *Curzon's India: Networks of Colonial Governance, 1899-1905* (Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2015), 208.
[607]Moon, *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA*, 105.
[608]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 145.
[609]Michel Foucault et al., *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981--1982*, trans. Graham Burchell, Reprint edition (New York: Picador USA, 2005), 319.
[610]Khimjee, *Pakistan*, 8.
[611]Tejani, *Indian Secularism*, 177.
[612]Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997), 130.

their own colonial subjectivity. Could this reluctance be attributed to the pervasive fear of the Hindu majority, or as Butler suggests, to the inherent difficulty in criticizing the terms that secure one's existence?[613] Perhaps this explains why the Khilafat leadership inadvertently served the colonial regime instead of the nationalist cause. Moreover, the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements, despite their collaboration, did not signify a convergence into a single Indian nationalism but rather an alliance between two communities already defined along religious lines and harbouring divergent interests. Despite Gandhi's religious plurality and Maulana Mohamed Ali's intense religiosity, religion remained the driving force behind the divergent political aspirations of these religiously defined communities. Thus, while 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' were constructed identities, they were nonetheless real, and both the Khilafat leadership and Gandhi inadvertently validated the colonial discourse on the communal makeup of Indian society.

The process of self-subjectification served as a locus for resistance against various configurations of colonial power relations and their corresponding 'truth regimes'.[614] Despite the asymmetrical nature of colonial power relations, which often subjected colonial subjects to coerced subjugation, there remained a space for individuals to reject assimilation into the colonial discourse. Gandhi's advocacy of non-violent resistance exemplifies this resistance, demonstrating that colonial subjects could challenge colonial truth regimes and modify established rules[615] within the colonial practical systems. By designing a counter discourse centred on non-violence, Gandhi effectively challenged the dominant colonial narrative.

Gandhian Counter-Conduct

---

[613]Butler, 129.

[614]Joseph D. Lewandowski, "Rethinking Power and Subjectivity after Foucault," *Symplokē* 3, no. 2 (1995): 221–43.

[615]Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984 v. 1*, New Ed edition (London: Penguin, 2000), 297.

Gandhi's leadership of the Khilafat movement prompts a re-evaluation of our understanding of colonial subjectivity, revealing that his efforts to dismantle colonial constructs were not entirely divorced from colonial categories. It is crucial to avoid portraying the Khilafat leadership as passive recipients of Gandhi's guidance; rather, they actively sought his involvement in leading the agitation. The emergence of 'Gandhi' as a political figure coincided with a period of turmoil in Muslim politics, and his ascent to leadership was intricately linked to the Khilafat movement's momentum. Examining Gandhi's role in shaping local subjectivity within the colonial context, particularly his support for the religious cause of the Khilafat institution, underscores how inadvertently his actions may have reinforced colonial subjectivity.

On 31st January 1919, prior to the initiation of the Khilafat movement, the Viceroy of India communicated to the Secretary of State for India regarding the significant unrest among Muslims in India concerning the potential disintegration of the Turkish Empire. He expressed concerns that failure to address these sentiments might exacerbate existing tensions,[616] particularly due to what he termed as 'Hindu intrigue' capitalizing on Muslim grievances, which could lead to widespread disorder across India.[617] Subsequently, in 1925, an official history of the Khilafat movement was compiled by P.C. Bamford, utilizing classified political proceedings from the Home Department.[618] This report affirmed the colonial authorities' awareness of the strong Muslim sentiment surrounding the Khilafat issue, albeit they did not view it as a direct threat to their rule. Instead, their primary apprehension lay in the potential alliance between the Khilafat leadership and Gandhi's Non-cooperation movement, as

[616]Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India."
[617]Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India."
[618]P. C. Bamford, *Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements* (K.K. Book Distributors, 1925).

Gandhi had effectively demonstrated a weakening of tacit consent for colonial rule among the literate classes.[619]

Gandhi's approach to resistance was marked by his adaptation of indigenous strategies for freedom, rejecting the rules imposed by colonial governance technologies aimed at sustaining their authority. Imperialism and colonialism were characterized by a unique form of violence, prompting violent resistance against colonial rule and, in turn, violent counter-resistance. In response, Gandhi conceived the strategy of nonviolent resistance, seeking to shift the anti-colonial struggle into a nonviolent contestation, thereby challenging the prevailing violent colonial episteme.

The struggle against colonial subjugation defined the colonial period, presenting Gandhi with the analytical challenge of unravelling the complex relationship between colonial power and subjects. Resistance demanded an alternative form of subjectivity, requiring individuals to reject their status as colonial subjects 'in order to expose the law as less powerful than it seems'.[620] Gandhi recognized that resistance constituted acts of freedom[621] within the context of colonial subjectivity's historical contingency. He advocated for a local subjectivity grounded in Satyagraha, characterized by perfect self-possession, self-restraint, unwavering commitment to truth, and a boundless capacity for self-suffering.[622]

The struggle for freedom among the colonized was not merely about establishing the practice of liberty; rather, it represented a profound act of liberation.[623] Gandhi recognized that true freedom lay in challenging the existing colonial power dynamics and reconfiguring

---

[619]Moon, *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA*, 113.
[620]Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 130.
[621]Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 1 edition (Chicago: Routledge, 1983), 222–23.
[622]P. C. Bamford, *Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements* (K.K. Book Distributors, 1925), 8.
[623]Bell Vikki, 'The Promise of Liberalism and the Performance of Freedom', in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 86.

the regime of relations into a new framework. To advance practices of freedom, Gandhi developed Satyagraha as a tool to construct a resistant subject, rooted in non-violent resistance. He understood that mere speeches at joint Hindu-Muslim conferences were insufficient[624] to dismantle the colonial discourse governing subjecthood. Instead, resistance required both individual and collective practices, involving critical reflection on colonial norms and the cultivation of alternative subjectivities. Gandhi advocated for the adoption of non-violence as a central strategy, believing it to be a universal principle across religions,[625] capable of transcending religious divides.[626] Furthermore, Gandhi prioritized the value of truth over victory in constituting a resistant subjectivity, epitomizing his creed of truth and non-violence.[627] His approach aimed to provoke transformative practices of freedom,[628] encompassing a diverse array of actions oriented towards constructing resistant subjectivities.

Devji argues that Gandhi strategically employed the temptation of violence as a means to transform it through the force of suffering into an unexpected outcome.[629] This approach was embodied in the practice of Satyagraha, intricately linked with the principle of ahimsa, or non-violence. Gandhi regarded the connection between truth and non-violence as fundamental, guiding his resistance tactics. He advocated for withdrawing from confrontation when peaceful protests incited violence,[630] fearing that any degree of violence would compromise the integrity of resistance. Gandhi's strategy involved prolonged non-violent

[624]Mahatma Gandhi, *Young India, 1927-1928* (S. Ganesan, 1935), 486.
[625]Mahatma Gandhi, *Young India, 1924-1926* (S. Ganesan, 1927), 70.
[626]Gandhi, 30.
[627]N.B. Ben, ed., *Wit and Wisdom of Gandhi* (New Delhi: New Book Society of India, 1960), 229.
[628]Howard Caygill, *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 71.
[629]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 7.
[630]Caygill, *On Resistance*, 72.

resistance to erode the morale of the colonial regime while simultaneously nurturing a resilient subjectivity[631] committed to non-violence.

Gandhi's conception of non-violence went beyond mere passive resistance;[632] it carried a powerful charge aimed at reclaiming sovereignty from the state and distributing it as a quality inherent in individuals.[633] In challenging the formation of colonial subjects, Gandhi demonstrated that individuals could redefine themselves by harnessing the norms and values of their local society in innovative ways, thereby inventing entirely new forms of subjectivity, sometimes even transcending the notion of subjecthood altogether. For Gandhi, the imperative to exist outside the confines of colonial subjectivity was crucial for navigating power dynamics in a manner conducive to the practice of freedom. His decision to confront the specific political rationality underpinning colonial governance involved questioning the legitimacy of an alien power to govern Indians.

The Hindu-Muslim Unity and Swaraj

Gandhi recognized the profound significance of the Khilafat issue to Muslims and saw it as an opportunity to forge unity between Hindu and Muslim communities in the nationalist struggle for independence. Despite the fact that Hindu-Muslim differences were often unrelated to religion,[634] Gandhi leveraged religious sentiment to garner support, assuring Hindus that Muslims would reciprocate by safeguarding their interests, particularly regarding the protection of cows,[635] once they had done their utmost to save the Khilafat. Though without making it conditional, Gandhi went on to argue that ‘the only chance Hindus have of saving the cow from the butcher’s knife is by trying to save Islam from the

---

[631]Caygill, 73.
[632]Caygill, 76.
[633]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 6.
[634]William Gould, *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44.
[635]Mahatma Gandhi, *Young India, 1919-1922*, Second Edition (Madras: S. Ganesan, 1924), 411.

impending peril'.[636] By emphasizing the interconnectedness of Hindu and Muslim causes, Gandhi sought to mobilize both communities for the nationalist cause. However, some scholars argue that Gandhi's approach of 'Hinduising' the national movement inadvertently contributed to further divisions rather than fostering unity.[637]

Declaring the Khilafat issue as 'an opportunity of a lifetime', which may not occur again 'for another hundred years', Gandhi advised Hindus that if they wanted to develop a lasting 'friendship' with the Muslim community, 'they must perish with them in the attempt to vindicate the honour of Islam'.[638] The Khilafat leadership was quick to reciprocate Gandhi's gratitude for his support, and six months later, the Khilafat Committee entrusted its leadership to Gandhi.[639] Recognizing the Muslim community's lack of interest in the national politics, hardly showing urgency for Swaraj compared to the Hindu community,[640] Gandhi considered the 'Hindu-Muslim unity' as a pre-requisite for ending the colonial rule. He contended that 'with all the resources of its armed strength, diplomacy and organisation' the mighty British could not separate Muslims from Hindus.[641] The struggle Gandhi waged for 'the Hindu-Muslim unity', based on a prejudice and a choice of a fragile relationship of 'friendship' as opposed to 'brotherhood',[642] requires placing 'political relations among Indians in the colonial context of liberalism',[643] indicating that it required a bond of brotherhood to form a nation, so Gandhi's choice of strategy for forging Hindu-Muslim unity was already doomed even if it was successful to form a friendship.

---

[636]Gandhi, 412.
[637]Moon, *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA*, 105.
[638]Gandhi, *Young India, 1919-1922*, 408.
[639]Uma Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India's Partition 1928-1940* (South Asia Books, 1977), 22.
[640]Gandhi, *Young India, 1919-1922*, 413–14.
[641]Gandhi, *Young India, 1927-1928*, 66.
[642]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 70.
[643]Devji, 69.

Gandhi even declared that he considered his 'usefulness' only if he could achieve 'the Hindu-Muslim unity',[644] which he thought was 'important and pressing', since it was impeding all progress.[645] Declaring it 'the question of questions', Gandhi vowed to 'leave no stone unturned to reach the bottom of this sea of darkness, doubt and despair'.[646] The Kohat riots brought the struggle for the 'Hindu-Muslim unity' to a close, and the Ali brothers gradually 'drifted away from Gandhi'.[647] Gandhi's struggle for the 'Hindu-Muslim unity' was confined to the period from 1919 to 1924, bringing both communities together in a political alliance. By 1924, Gandhi realized that the Khilafat issue had no mass appeal left among Muslims, so it could not keep them mobilized for Swaraj. When the Khilafat institution was abolished in March 1924 by the Turkish government, Gandhi disengaged himself even from the struggle for the 'Hindu-Muslim unity'. Pronouncing the Khilafat issue simply a mirage, Gandhi lamented in April 1925 that Muslims 'do not yet regard India as their home of which they must feel proud'.[648]

A drastic change is noticed in the way Gandhi perceived the 'Muslim question' at the All-Parties Conference convened in January 1925 when Hindu-Muslim riots were rampant. Gandhi changed course and decided to prioritize 'untouchability and spinning wheel' as more urgent issues. Declaring in January 1927 that the issue of Hindu-Muslim unity 'had passed out of human hands into God's hands',[649] Gandhi claimed that Hindu-Muslim unity was just 'a paper-unity', not really 'a heart-unity'.[650]

---

[644]Rakhahari Chatterji, *Gandhi and the Ali Brothers: Biography of a Friendship*, 1 edition (New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2013), 159.
[645]Gandhi, *Young India, 1924-1926*, 163–69.
[646]Gandhi, 163–69.
[647]Rajmohan Gandhi, *Mohandas: A True Story of a Man, His People and an Empire* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 2006), 297.
[648]Gandhi, *Young India, 1924-1926*, 209.
[649]Gandhi, *Young India, 1927-1928*, 66.
[650]Mahatma Gandhi, *To The Hindus and Muslims*, Gandhi Series, Volume III (Karachi: Anand T. Hingorani, 1942), 387.

Realizing the profound influence of colonial subjectification and its stratagem of 'dividing practices', Gandhi concluded that the resolution of the 'Muslim question' depended on the departure of the British from India.[651] The colonial power's role in constructing a purportedly threatened Muslim minority, requiring protection from the Hindu majority, underscored its strategy of division as part of colonial governance. Gandhi consistently emphasized that the British were responsible for perpetuating Hindu-Muslim conflict,[652] and its cessation would accompany their departure from India. However, this overlooks the challenge of deconstructing the entrenched colonial subjectivity once the British left, given its persistence over time. Gandhi believed that the British sowed distrust between Hindu and Muslim communities to maintain colonial domination, rendering it seemingly indispensable.[653] The colonial regime, positioned as an arbiter between fractious subject communities, justified its presence through the ostensible protection of Muslim 'minority' rights. Faced with ongoing Hindu-Muslim strife, Gandhi, who had been imprisoned on sedition charges in 1922 and released in 1924 due to health concerns, announced a year-long retreat from politics in April 1925. He expressed willingness to contribute to Hindu-Muslim unity only if he perceived a pathway out of the prevailing darkness,[654] which he found lacking at the time.

Gandhi Experimenting with the 'Muslim Question'

Gandhi staked his hopes on the British colonial regime's departure from India as the sole solution to the 'Muslim question,' a perspective that warrants re-evaluation by challenging the notion of independence as a panacea for resolving this issue. His failure to grasp the entrenched nature of colonial power dynamics and subjectivity led him to

[651]M. K. Gandhi, *THE WAY TO COMMUNAL HARMONY*, ed. U. R. Rao, First Edition (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1963), 140.
[652]Gandhi, *Young India, 1924-1926*, 73.
[653]Gandhi, *Young India, 1919-1922*, 420.
[654]Hasan, 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims', 143.

underestimate the lasting impact of colonial rule on Indian society. Gandhi's belief that the 'Muslim question' would vanish with colonial departure overlooked the complexities of the colonial reality and the emergence of new variables, such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah's leadership championing Muslim minority rights. Dismissing the notion of Muslim minority status as absurd, Gandhi failed to anticipate colonial efforts to exploit this division, leading up to the independence, steadily structuring 'partition' in the colonial governance. As Indian Muslims asserted their minority identity more assertively, the transition from minority to nationhood made dismantling the concept of a 'Muslim nation' increasingly challenging.

Gandhi's new stance on the 'Hindu-Muslim' issue greatly influenced his attitude towards designing strategies for the freedom movement. He had difficulty understanding why Muslims so persistently demanded safeguards as a 'minority', arguing that the Hindu majority was 'merely a paper majority'.[655] Claiming that 'only political parties' exist, Gandhi maintained that both communities were 'bound to unite',[656] even if the British government simply announced that it was going to withdraw from India whether Indians agreed or not. Gandhi's biggest miscalculation was his contention that the 'Unity will not precede but will succeed freedom'.[657]

Though Devji finds Gandhi 'often ambiguous about the difference between friendship and brotherhood', still he considers Gandhi 'as an advocate of the former against the latter'.[658] It was through 'friendship', that Gandhi sought a contractual alliance simply to bypass the mediation of the colonial state between both Hindu and Muslim communities.[659] He viewed his relationship with Ali brothers, more as 'an alliance' between both communities,[660] holding

[655]Hasan, 146.
[656]Hasan, 146.
[657]Hasan, 146.
[658]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 71.
[659]Devji, 69.
[660]Gandhi, *Young India, 1924-1926*, 62.

'friendship' as a basic 'trust-building' condition. Gandhi argued that they were still far from reaching 'at the stage when a pact is even a possibility … the restoration of friendly feeling is a condition precedent to any effectual pact'.[661] His struggle for the 'Hindu-Muslim' unity was an attempt to develop trust through 'friendship' between both communities as a necessary 'condition', leading to some kind of a lasting arrangement to settle their differences, hoping such a 'settlement' to engender in Muslims an absolute toleration of Hindu 'idols and temples'.[662] He realised how fragile 'friendship' with Muslims was that despite investing enormous energy and resources in it, there was still no trust between two communities. Conceding that though 'the Muslim problem' was 'the problem of problems', but 'Give and take is possible only when there is some trust between the respective communities and their representatives'.[663] Gandhi believed that 'the iceberg of communal differences will melt under the warmth of the sun of freedom',[664] only to learn when the British departed from India that partition was structured deep inside those communal differences.

The idea of imagining a nation typically involves the establishment of a strong sense of unity and solidarity among its people. This unity often extends beyond mere acquaintance or cooperation and requires a deeper connection rooted in shared history, culture, and identity. While friendship can foster goodwill and cooperation between individuals or groups, the bond of brotherhood signifies a much deeper and more profound connection, often characterized by a sense of familial loyalty, mutual support, and collective identity. In the context of Gandhi's efforts to forge Hindu-Muslim unity, the choice of fostering a relationship based on friendship rather than brotherhood may have been inadequate for achieving the level of unity necessary to envision a unified nation. Brotherhood implies a

[661]Gandhi, 57.
[662]Gandhi, 64.
[663]Mushiral Hasan, ed., *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr M. A. Ansari 1912-1935* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1979), 101.
[664]Mahatma Gandhi, "Gandhi's Speech at the Minorities Committee," *Young India* XIII, no. No 44 (October 29, 1931).

more intimate and enduring bond, suggesting a shared destiny and collective purpose that transcends individual or group interests. Therefore, Gandhi's reliance on friendship as a basis for unity may have been insufficient to overcome the deep-seated divisions and historical animosities between Hindu and Muslim communities, ultimately undermining the success of his efforts to foster lasting unity in colonial India.

Gandhi and 'Muslim' Insecurities

The goodwill Gandhi garnered from the Muslim community during the Khilafat movement dwindled significantly in the aftermath.[665] British authorities were swift to discredit Gandhi as an advocate for Muslim interests, signalling a loss of trust among Muslims.[666] Dr. Ansari, a prominent nationalist Muslim leader, lamented Gandhi's departure from the path of Hindu-Muslim unity, suggesting that continued efforts in this regard could have yielded tangible results by now.[667] Other nationalist Muslim leaders echoed similar sentiments, urging Gandhi to prioritize the resolution of Hindu-Muslim tensions before pursuing the broader independence movement. Despite Gandhi's optimism that India would attain freedom even without resolving the Hindu-Muslim question,[668] his stance inadvertently bolstered the separatist agenda of the Muslim League. Criticism from Gandhi's Muslim associates, such as Shuaib Qureishi[669] and Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman,[670] highlighted a growing disillusionment with his approach to Hindu-Muslim unity. Despite their initial hopes for a united India under Gandhi's leadership, both eventually aligned with Jinnah's call for a separate Muslim homeland. However, their disillusionment with Gandhi's strategy for Hindu-

[665]*Portsmouth Evening News*, 13 April 1931.
[666]*Hull Daily Mail*, 13 April 1931.
[667]Hasan, *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr M. A. Ansari 1912-1935*, 96.
[668]Gandhi, *THE WAY TO COMMUNAL HARMONY*, 135.
[669]Hasan, *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr M. A. Ansari 1912-1935*, 96.
[670]Hasan, 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims', 145.

Muslim unity failed to account for the underlying complexities that had made partition an inevitability in the communal dynamics of the time.

In 1928, the Congress released the 'Nehru Report', marking the first significant effort to challenge colonial policies aimed at exacerbating religious divisions by proposing a joint electorate system to replace the separate electorate. However, the entrenched self-subjectification of the Muslim minority at the time led to strong opposition. Maulana Mohamed Ali, influenced by the overwhelming pressure of Muslim public opinion, criticized the report as perpetuating servitude.[671] Shaukat Ali, instead of bridging communities as before, joined other prominent Muslim leaders such as Maulana Shafi Daoodi, Sir Abdul Qayum, A. H. Ghaznavi, Maulana Yakoob, and Mohammad Iqbal in condemning the report for not adequately protecting Muslim communal interests. Jinnah similarly dismissed the Nehru report as inadequate, indicating that it was not the final resolution on the matter.

Once the colonial regime redefined local identities into broader categories of 'minorities' and 'majority' by imposing religious distinctions, it sowed seeds of insecurity among the minorities regarding their future under majority rule. Despite these insecurities becoming tangible over time, Gandhi did not perceive Muslim anxieties as genuine.[672] Maulana Abu al-Kalam Azad, during the Cabinet Mission, highlighted that while Muslims might be in the majority in certain provinces, they were still a minority in India as a whole.[673] This overarching minority status led to fears about their position and status in independent India, demonstrating the complex interplay between local and national identities in the context of colonialism and nationalism.

[671]Hasan, 144.
[672]Hasan, 146.
[673]Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009), 139.

In response to Gandhi's approach to the Hindu-Muslim issue, a consensus began to form among Muslim public opinion, as evidenced by the Urdu press, which suggested that Hindus were utilizing nationalist fervour to undermine the tangible rights and interests of Muslims.[674] This sentiment was echoed by Fazal Haque in June 1935 when he urged Muslims to prioritize their community's interests over Indian Swaraj.[675] The anxieties among Muslims about the potential dominance of Hindu rule after British rule contributed to the persistent demand for a separate Muslim homeland by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Rather than addressing these anxieties, Gandhi dismissed them as unfounded, rejecting potential constitutional solutions such as the two-nation idea or demands for parity and power-sharing between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress.[676] In doing so, Gandhi inadvertently reinforced the colonial discourse that emphasized religious differences and shaped the societal dynamics of India.

Aftermath: the 'Communal' Divide

The necessity to advocate for 'Hindu-Muslim unity' during the Khilafat movement highlighted the prevalence of religious identity-based politics in Indian society at that time. Gandhi's support for the Khilafat cause significantly amplified its religious identity-based appeal, garnering widespread support. Despite the pursuit of unity, the Khilafat movement inadvertently accentuated religious differences and contributed to the partitioning of communal relations. Hindu and Muslim communities engaged in political activism as separate religiously defined entities, rather than as unified Indians, thereby hindering the attainment of a national consensus regarding India's future. This divergence occurred amidst

---

[674]Chatterji, *Gandhi and the Ali Brothers: Biography of a Friendship*, 185.
[675]Chatterji, 184.
[676]Panter-Brick, *Gandhi and Nationalism*, xii.

British assertions that India was not adequately prepared for full responsible self-government.[677]

Gandhi effectively mobilized Hindu masses using a religious framework for political ends, inadvertently excluding certain segments of the population from the broader 'national liberation movement'. Scholars like William Gould argue that 'the UP Congress inherited rather than invented' the utilization of religious idiom, symbols, and imagery to denote the Indian nation.[678] It is conceivable that Gandhi may have struggled to develop his non-violence strategy within a secular framework that could have united all religious communities against colonial rule. However, due to colonial influences, Indian Muslim leaders perceived Gandhi as inherently Hindu, evident in his attire, language, demeanour and cultural practices deeply rooted in Hindu traditions. Gandhi's obsession with cow protection further reinforced this perception, leading the Muslim elite to feel increasingly marginalized and their identity more threatened with Gandhi leading the Congress.

The resistance from Indian Muslim leaders necessitated a critical examination of the legitimacy of prevailing norms established by the colonial regime. However, Gandhi's strategy for an alternative subjectivity, infused with a 'Hindu' idiom, proved counterproductive to the formation of a multicultural Indian nation. Gandhi's use of terms like Ram Rajya (the governance of the Hindu deity Ram), suggesting the emergence of 'a just order' post-independence,[679] implied to Muslims that it would be a Hindu-dominated political system. Gandhi elaborated his concept of 'Swaraj' as encompassing four purposes of life—dharma, artha, karma, and moksha—as envisioned in Hindu faith, with each aspect in a balanced state, not allowing dominance of one over the others. Given its integral association with Hinduism, this conception of 'Swaraj' failed to resonate with communities beyond the

---

[677]Gould, *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India*, 44.
[678]Gould, 39.
[679]Mohammed Ayoob, 'Gandhi's Role in the Partition of India', *Foreign Affairs*, 19 October 2017.

religious divide. By defining ‘Swaraj’ in Hindu religious terminology, Gandhi inadvertently affirmed the validity of the colonial discourse on religious differences, thereby undermining the confidence of the Muslim community.

Religion, as the defining feature of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements, established the trajectory and essence of religious identity-based politics in the years to follow. Despite Gandhi’s efforts to challenge the legitimacy and artificiality of the religious divide fabricated by the British, he ultimately ceded control over ‘the Muslim question’ to Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Gandhi’s inability to realize his paramount objective of a unified, independent India[680] became apparent, as his actions inadvertently further deepened and intensified divisions, already sown by the colonial regime.

Unknown to Gandhi, the mechanisms of colonial governance had already entrenched the Hindu-Muslim divide in local politics. Gandhi’s involvement in the quest for 'Hindu-Muslim unity' inadvertently reinforced colonial subjectivities, ultimately contributing to India's partition. As the necessity of Hindu-Muslim unity became intertwined with India’s quest for freedom, the insecurities of minority communities exacerbated tensions and mistrust between the two groups. Gandhi’s withdrawal from efforts to foster Hindu-Muslim unity also played a role in perpetuating colonial subjectivities. By dismissing the concept of a ‘Muslim minority’ as a colonial tactic, labelling Hindu-Muslim unity as illusory, and questioning the legitimacy of Muslim anxieties, Gandhi inadvertently marginalized nationalist Muslims and further entrenched them within the colonial framework. Gandhi did not directly cause religious divisions; rather, he operated within a colonial system where such divisions were already deeply ingrained in local politics.

[680]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 2.

Despite the experimental and uncertain nature of Gandhi's politics regarding Hindu-Muslim relations,[681] it's important to recognize that his efforts alone could not have diverted the course towards partition. Partition was deeply ingrained in the fabric of Indian society, a result of colonial governance structures. Gandhi's attempts to promote Hindu-Muslim unity highlighted the enduring power of colonial divisions. He mistakenly believed that with the departure of the British, Muslims would no longer be considered a minority and would seamlessly integrate into the Indian nation. However, upon independence, Gandhi realized that the divisions had become too entrenched for fragmented communities to unite—the wedge of colonial influence had already created irreparable divides. Ultimately, it was the colonial regime, which initially framed the 'Muslim question', that solidified its resolution through the partitioning of India.

---

[681]Richard Gordon, 'Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919 to 1920', *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3 (1973): 443–73.

Palestine: Christian Muslim Associations

In Mandate Palestine, resistance to the colonial imposition of 'difference' initially manifested through the formation of the Christian-Muslim Association, marking the early consolidation of an Arab coalition in opposition to British Zionist policies during the nascent stages of British rule. This united front stood in stark contrast to the sectarian divisions observed in colonial India, underscoring a unique aspect of Palestinian resistance. The nature of British governance in Mandate Palestine was distinctly influenced by the European Jewish presence, shaping the Christian-Muslim alliance's stance against British Zionist policies from 1918 onwards. This alliance highlights the Palestinian Arabs' capacity to transcend colonial-imposed divisions based on religious identity, offering a notable divergence from the Indian context. Such unity was achieved despite British policies towards its Christian subjects in Mandate Palestine, which were informed by broader imperial strategies employed in colonial India. This nuanced interplay between colonial policies, local demographics, and resistance movements illustrates the complex dynamics of identity and colonial resistance in Mandate Palestine.

In Palestine, Arab Christian communities, constituting approximately 10% of the total population,[682] played a pivotal role in the political landscape. By the year 1914, these communities had become a cornerstone of an emerging middle class, pivotal in shaping Palestine's identity as a burgeoning modern nation. Arab Christians, rather than perceiving themselves as a marginalized religious group, positioned themselves at the forefront of national identity formation. This burgeoning middle class, predominantly urban and encompassing both Muslims and Christians, eschewed political division along religious lines. Instead, they identified themselves through their economic status, which conferred upon them

[682] James L. Gelvin, *Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*, New Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 100.

elite social standing and differentiated them from other societal strata.[683] This collective identity transcended religious affiliations, uniting the Christian and Muslim elites in their endeavour to navigate modernity.

These elites were committed to transforming their society into a modern entity, yet their vision of modernity was not merely an imitation of Western paradigms.[684] This approach mirrored efforts observed in colonial India, where local elites also sought to reinterpret modernity to suit their distinct cultural and social contexts. In Palestine, this experimentation with modernity by Christian and Muslim elites was a testament to their shared aspirations for a society that was modern yet reflective of their unique heritage and values.

Newspapers under the proprietorship and editorial direction of Arab Christians significantly influenced the redefinition of the Christian Orthodox movement and articulated the aspirations to advance the Palestinian Arab national cause. Leading Arab national newspapers, such as *Filistin* based in Jaffa, *Al-Karmil* in Haifa, and *Mir'at al-Sharq* in Jerusalem, were owned by elite Palestinian Christians. These publications were instrumental in shaping the Palestinian Arab national movement, with their proprietors leveraging the press as a platform to voice opposition against Zionist encroachments and colonial injustices.[685]

Targeting the literate segments of Palestinian society, both Muslims and Christians, as well as the British government, these newspapers positioned Palestinian Arab nationalism at the forefront of their discourse. They depicted the Arab Orthodox cause not as a separate entity but as an integral component of a larger political struggle against British imperialism

[683] Radai, 'The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class Under the British Mandate, 1920–39'.
[684] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 6.
[685] Robson, 13.

and European Zionism.[686] Through their editorial policies and content, these newspapers played a crucial role in unifying the Palestinian Arab cause, presenting a collective front that transcended religious lines and highlighted the shared aspirations for national sovereignty and resistance against foreign domination.

During the mandate period, editors of these influential newspapers skilfully integrated their Christian identity into the broader narrative of Palestinian nationalism and anti-imperialism. This integration shed light on the deliberate evolution of Christianity's political significance and how communal and political identities began to merge in novel ways, influenced by colonial policies.[687] Unlike the distinct communal separations evident in the colonial Indian context, the identities of Christians and Muslims in Palestine were not distinctly demarcated at any point.

Arab Christians, who were well-educated, economically prosperous, and politically active in the leadership of the Palestinian Arab national movement, recognized the potential political disadvantages of being categorized strictly as a religious minority. Their active participation and leadership in the national movement were strategies to ensure that their communal identity was intertwined with the broader national identity, thus safeguarding their political interests. This strategic positioning underscored the complex interplay between religious identity and nationalistic aspirations in the context of colonial governance, illustrating how Arab Christians navigated these dynamics to maintain their influence and avoid marginalization.

The colonial narrative in Mandate Palestine, with its emphasis on constructing religion-based identities, marked a significant shift from an inclusive multi-religious nationalism to a more segmented political landscape defined by religious affiliations. This

[686] Robson, 86.
[687] Robson, 13.

delineation, particularly of the Arab Christian communities, became a cornerstone of the administrative framework in Mandate Palestine. The colonial authorities employed strategies that involved creating and perpetuating ethnic and religious divisions, a tactic nearly identical to the imperial governance methods previously honed in colonial India. These methods encompassed extensive legal, political, and administrative classifications of colonial subjects, which in turn shaped the colonial officials' perceptions of the identities of Arab Christians within Palestinian society.[688]

Such classifications underscored the prominence of religious identities, positioning Arab Christians within a framework that both highlighted and isolated their communal identity within the broader Palestinian Arab society. This approach not only mirrored the colonial strategies of divide and rule but also redefined the social and political fabric of Palestine, impacting how Arab Christians navigated their identity and political affiliations in the face of colonial governance. The colonial emphasis on religious identities thus played a pivotal role in reconfiguring the dynamics of community and nationalism in Mandate Palestine, with long-lasting implications on the socio-political landscape.

In Mandate Palestine, religious identity, while influencing occupation, economic status, and social milieu, did not solely dictate political affiliations or representation. However, during this period, religious identity increasingly became a significant determinant of political identity. The marginalization of Arab Christian communities was a direct consequence of colonial policies that framed local politics predominantly as a Muslim versus Jewish conflict. This oversimplification overlooked the nuanced and multi-faceted nature of Palestinian society, where multiple religious identities had previously coexisted with a degree of political and social interdependence.

[688] Robson, 8.

With the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council, figures like Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini pivoted away from the secular national discourse—a discourse that had actively involved Arab Christians—to a more religion-centric political narrative.[689] This shift marked a departure from the inclusive, pluralistic political environment that had characterized early Palestinian nationalism, where Arab Christians held significant influence.

By the late 1930s, the nationalist discourse in Palestine had become predominantly Muslim Arab, leading to the substantial exclusion of Palestinian Christians from political dialogues and activities. This exclusion represented a stark transformation from the previously pluralistic society that valued multi-faith contributions to the nationalist cause. The reorientation towards a religion-based political framework not only altered the dynamics of Palestinian nationalism but also significantly diminished the political standing and influence of Arab Christians within the national movement, underscoring the profound impact of colonial governance and internal political shifts on the fabric of Palestinian society.

The World Muslim Conference, convened in December 1930, aimed to recast the Palestinian national movement within the broader context of pan-Islamism, seeking to garner support from Muslims globally, with a particular emphasis on Indian Muslims. This strategic pivot towards pan-Islam was designed to unify Muslim sentiment and activism in support of the Palestinian cause, transcending local and regional confines to tap into a wider Islamic solidarity. In contrast, the Second Arab Orthodox Congress, held simultaneously, represented a concerted effort by the Arab Greek Orthodox community to reaffirm their integral role within the Palestinian Arab national fabric. This congress focused on what was ostensibly a religious issue—the succession of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem[690]—yet the

[689] Erik Freas, 'Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 1 (2012): 19–51.
[690] Freas.

implications were deeply entwined with national identity and communal autonomy within the broader Palestinian context.

These concurrent events underscore the multi-dimensional nature of the Palestinian national movement during this period, reflecting the diverse strategies employed by different segments of Palestinian society to assert their place and influence within the national narrative. While one sought to internationalize the Palestinian cause through the lens of Islamic solidarity, the other aimed to consolidate communal identity and autonomy within the national framework, highlighting the complex interplay between religious identity, communal interests, and national aspirations in Mandate Palestine.

The historical interactions between Muslim and Christian communities in Palestine have been marked by periods of turbulence as well as cooperation, significantly shaping the trajectory of the nationalist movement at various junctures.[691] The emergence of a Christian-Muslim alliance in opposition to the British mandate's Zionist policies, particularly with Arab Christians taking a leading role in the anti-colonial efforts, prompted a strategic response from the British authorities. In an attempt to fracture this unity, the British mandate administration reclassified Arab Christians into a religious category known as a 'millet', effectively side-lining them from the political arena of Palestine. This move was aimed at weakening the nationalist movement by dividing its constituent communities along religious lines.

The politicization of religious identities intensified in the late 1930s, with some Palestinian Muslim leaders adopting and adapting the mandate's new religion-based political structures to consolidate support for the nationalist cause. This period saw a growing reliance

[691] Edwar Makhoul, *The Role of Arab Christians in the Palestinian National Movement* (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2017), 12.

on Islamist rhetoric, which further marginalized the political influence of Arab Christian communities within the nationalist discourse.

By the departure of the British in 1948, the Arab Christian communities, which had once played a pivotal role in local Arab politics, found themselves politically marginalized, delineated as entities distinct from their Muslim and Jewish counterparts. This relegation to the periphery of the nationalist movement rendered them nearly invisible[692] within the political landscape of Palestine, a stark contrast to their earlier prominence. This shift not only reflected the changing dynamics of religious and political identities in Palestine but also underscored the lasting impact of colonial strategies on the fabric of Palestinian society.

The complex mosaic of ethnic and religious diversity in Jerusalem presented a significant administrative challenge for the mandate authorities from the outset of their occupation. In response, the British sought to manage this diversity by reviving and expanding the millet system, a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which effectively segmented Palestinian society along religious lines.[693] This system designated distinct legal and administrative frameworks for different religious communities, making religion a cornerstone of the individual's relationship with the state and a key organizing principle of the colonial governance structure.

Under Ottoman rule, various religious communities, including the Protestant Christians, were recognized as distinct millets, each with a degree of autonomy in personal and communal affairs. However, in a departure from this tradition, the British mandate authorities chose not to extend millet status to the Protestant Christian community. This

---

[692] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 3.
[693] K.M.J. Sanchez Summerer, 'Preserving the Catholics of the Holy Land or Integrating Them into the Palestine Nation (1920–1950)?', in *Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East*, ed. S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah and H.L. Murre-van den Berg (Brill, 2016), 121, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h27r.9.

decision was likely influenced by the perspectives of the British Anglican Church, which viewed the millet system as an outdated construct that could potentially undermine the image of Christianity and adversely affect the efficacy of their missionary activities in the region.[694]

By side-lining the Protestant community from the millet structure, the British not only altered the religious administrative landscape established by the Ottomans but also reflected their own religious and cultural biases in the governance of Palestine. This approach to managing the religious diversity of Jerusalem under the mandate highlights the complexities and contradictions inherent in colonial governance, particularly in regions with deeply entrenched religious and ethnic identities.

The British Empire commonly employed the production of religion-based identities across its colonies as part of its administrative and governance strategies. This approach was often couched in the colonial claim of preserving a supposedly pre-existing legal and political 'status quo', which purportedly reflected the traditional structures and divisions within colonial societies. By emphasizing and sometimes exacerbating religious distinctions, the British colonial authorities positioned themselves as indispensable arbiters and mediators in what they portrayed as age-old religious conflicts.

This narrative of the colonial power as a 'necessary mediator between inveterate religious enemies' served multiple purposes. Firstly, it provided a veneer of legitimacy to the British colonial presence, suggesting that their rule was essential for maintaining peace and order among conflicting religious communities. Secondly, it justified the implementation of divisive governance strategies, such as the millet system in the Ottoman Empire's former territories, by presenting them as continuations of historical practices rather than colonial impositions. This framing of religion-based politics not only facilitated the management and

[694] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 145.

control of diverse colonial populations but also reinforced the colonial justification for British imperialism. By presenting themselves as neutral and benevolent mediators, the British sought to legitimize their rule and suppress nationalist or anti-colonial sentiments that transcended religious lines, thereby maintaining their imperial dominance under the guise of preserving peace and order.

In colonial India, the shaping of religion-based identities and the corresponding political structure unfolded over an extended period, resulting in a system where access to state resources and benefits was mediated through institutions that represented various religious communities. This gradual development allowed for a more intricate intertwining of religion and politics, deeply embedding these identities within the administrative and legal frameworks of the imperial state. Contrastingly, in Mandate Palestine, the British authorities faced the immediate and pressing challenge of integrating the European Jewish settler community into the existing social and political landscape. To address this, they swiftly began establishing legal and political frameworks that were fundamentally based on religious affiliations from the very onset of their occupation. This effort aimed to quickly solidify a religion-based political system, drawing upon and expanding the Ottoman Millet system to create more complex and comprehensive governing structures centred around religious communities.

The urgency and immediacy of this task in Palestine meant that the British mandate authorities bypassed the lengthy and detailed census-taking rituals that were characteristic of colonial administration in India. These censuses in India were instrumental in categorizing the population along various axes, including religion, which then informed the broader colonial governance strategies. In Palestine, however, the imperative to accommodate the Jewish settler community and manage the resultant demographic and political complexities

necessitated a more expedited approach to establishing a religion-based administrative system, reflecting the distinct colonial imperatives and challenges faced by the British in these two different contexts.

Prior to the British conquest of Palestine, British support for the Zionist movement had already crystallized, driven by the aim of addressing European anti-Semitism through the establishment of a 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine.[695] This intention was formally articulated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which was issued to Zionist leaders before Britain had established control over Palestine. The declaration stated, 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement of this object'.[696] This commitment was subsequently enshrined in the mandate terms set by the League of Nations, underscoring the legal and political backing for the Zionist project within the framework of British imperial policy.

The introduction of the European Zionist presence in Palestine, endorsed and facilitated by the British mandate authorities, had profound implications for the local political and social fabric, particularly for Palestine's Arab Christian communities. The British mandate's governing structures were designed not only to accommodate the increasing European Jewish settler population but also to strategically manage the aspirations of the emerging multi-religious middle class. This approach aimed to prevent the coalescence of secular nationalist sentiments into a unified anti-colonial movement that could challenge the mandate's objectives and the Zionist project.[697]

---

[695] Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Bedford Books, 2001), 102–3.
[696] Smith, 102–3.
[697] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 160.

As a result, the local political landscape underwent significant transformation, with new forms of religion-based identities being constructed for Arab Christian communities and other groups within Palestinian society.[698] The mandate's policies and administrative practices, informed by the imperative to establish a Jewish National Home, thus played a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of identity, governance, and resistance in Mandate Palestine, fundamentally altering the trajectory of the region's history.

Despite the British mandate's immediate imperative to establish religion-based identities in Palestine following its occupation, there emerged a movement aimed at the Arabization of the Greek Orthodox Church. This movement sought to align the Orthodox Christian leadership with the wider national struggle against foreign encroachment on Palestinian land, resources, and cultural heritage. This initiative reflected a broader effort to integrate Christian communities into the national resistance against colonial and Zionist agendas. The British authorities, driven by their Zionist policy commitments, felt a pressing need to implement representative institutions in Palestine that would yield outcomes akin to those seen in colonial India, where religious identities were used to manage and manipulate political affiliations and loyalties. In this context, religion-based political identities became a defining feature of Arab political identity in Palestine, contributing to the marginalization of Arab Christians within the national discourse.[699]

In response to this marginalization, there was an attempt to establish a pan-Arab Christian 'voting bloc' aimed at ensuring Christian participation in the legislative and representative politics of the mandate. This effort was reflective of the British mandate's approach to the political landscape in Palestine, which sought to homogenize diverse Christian denominations into a single political entity. By doing so, the British authorities

[698] Robson, 7–8.
[699] Robson, 12.

aimed to simplify the complex tapestry of Palestinian society into more manageable segments, disregarding the nuanced differences and historical contestations among various Christian groups. This initiative was part of a broader strategy to navigate the religious and political complexities of mandate Palestine, often at the expense of the authentic representation and inclusion of its diverse communities.

Robson contends that the British strategy of delineating colonial subjects in Mandate Palestine along religious lines was ultimately effective. He argues that by the time the British mandate concluded in 1948, British colonial policies had firmly established a form of modern sectarianism as a key organizing principle within the Palestinian Arab political framework.[700] This assertion implies that the British were successful in embedding sectarian distinctions into the political and social fabric of Palestine, influencing the nature of political organization and identity.

However, the reality of the situation suggests that the British attempts to drive a religious wedge between Arab Christian and Muslim communities did not achieve full success. This partial failure can be attributed primarily to the limited time frame available to the British authorities for fostering religion-based identities within the mandate. Additionally, the shared opposition to Zionist aspirations served as a unifying force for Arab Christians and Muslims, preventing the full realization of sectarian divisions. This common cause against Zionist encroachments helped maintain a level of solidarity between the two communities, mitigating the potential for deep-seated enmity and division that the British policies might have otherwise engendered.

If the act of the British mandate authorities delineating Arab Christians as a distinct political faction, ostensibly in rivalry with the Muslim populace—a strategy that markedly

[700] Robson, 13.

curtailed their sway within the expansive Palestinian Arab political milieu—was not sufficiently divisive, the post-1948 era underscored this marginalization even more starkly. This period witnessed a pronounced exacerbation in the side-lining of Arab Christians, as manifest in their disproportionate emigration from the territories constituting the nascent state of Israel.[701]

The 1948 catastrophe, known as al-Nakba, triggered a mass exodus of Arab Muslims from the newly established Israeli state, transforming them from a majority to a marginalized minority within the territory. While the Arab Christian exodus during the same period was also significant, the pre-existing smaller size of the Christian population meant that their departure did not highlight the religious dimensions of their identity as distinctly as it did for the Muslim Arab population.

Despite these developments, Arab Christians continued to play a vital role in the Palestinian Arab national movement post-1948. This enduring involvement suggests that the British mandate's efforts to impose a rigid religion-based identity framework in Palestine were not as effective as similar strategies employed in colonial India. The complexities of Palestinian society, coupled with the shared challenges faced by both Christian and Muslim Arabs, especially in the face of Zionist expansion, ensured that religion did not become an insurmountable barrier to collective national identity and resistance efforts. This resilience of a unified national consciousness, transcending religious divisions, indicates that the colonial project of religion-based subjectification in Mandate Palestine did not achieve the same level of success as observed in other colonial contexts.

In the initial phase of the British occupation of Palestine, the urban political scene swiftly came under the influence of the Muslim Christian Association, a coalition blending

[701] Robson, 15.

urban notables with representatives of the emergent urban middle class. This association dedicated itself to fostering a united Muslim-Christian front within the larger framework of nationalist discourse, with a particular emphasis on articulating an anti-Zionist stance. The very designation 'Muslim Christian Association' reflects the inherently multi-religious composition of its membership, drawn predominantly from the middle class, highlighting the association's commitment to transcending religious divides in pursuit of common nationalist goals.[702]

The inaugural Muslim Christian Association (MCA) was established in Jaffa in 1918, positioning itself as a genuine representative body for the entirety of Palestinian Arab sentiment. Shortly thereafter, a branch was also set up in Jerusalem. The primary focus of these associations was to publicly articulate Arab opposition to Zionism. Initially, the British authorities anticipated that, given the historically moderate posture of the society, these associations would support rather than hinder the administration. They believed that once the associations understood the full scope of the Zionist policy to be implemented, they would help temper rather than inflame public opinion. Despite the broad objectives of the associations being delineated as enhancing the country's interests in various sectors such as agriculture, technology, economics, commerce, scientific revival, education of the youth, and the safeguarding of natural rights both morally and materially, the general committee was specifically tasked with formulating a strategy to publicly counter Zionist ambitions in Palestine. By January 1919, the various Muslim Christian Associations across the region resolved to establish a loose federation, with Jerusalem serving as the headquarters, reiterating their role as the collective voice of Palestinian Arab perspectives.[703] This move underscored the associations' commitment to not only advancing the socio-economic

[702] Robson, 37.
[703] Robson, 38.

development of Palestine but also actively engaging in the political discourse against Zionist encroachments, reflecting the multifaceted nature of their mission.

In the formative years of the Muslim Christian Association, amidst the backdrop of competing pan-Arab nationalist entities, elite Christians formed a distinct political bloc, gravitating towards the comparatively conservative and pro-British stance of the MCA over the more radical pan-Arab perspectives advocated by other clubs. The MCA was emblematic of the ‘older politicians’, predominantly composed of established ‘urban notables’ who had held significant roles during the concluding years of Ottoman governance. This group was characterized by a notable over-representation of Christians, reflecting the association’s composition and its appeal to the Christian elite who sought a political platform aligned with their conservative views and favourable disposition towards British oversight. This alignment underscored the complex interplay of religious, political, and colonial influences shaping the organizational landscape and communal affiliations within the early 20th-century Palestinian Arab political arena.

Opposition to Zionism was equally robust among both Christian and Muslim communities, with no distinct Christian political faction forming during this period. Instead, Christian representatives were actively involved in all major political forums, including the Muslim Christian Associations as well as other significant entities like al-Muntada al-Arabi and al-Nadi al-Arabi. In the early years of the mandate, Christian leaders engaged with great enthusiasm across a spectrum of political clubs and societies, identifying foremost as advocates of the burgeoning middle class committed to pursuing some degree of Arab independence. This broad participation highlights the unified stance against Zionism and the collective aspiration for autonomy, transcending religious divides and fostering a shared nationalistic fervour among the diverse constituents of the Palestinian Arab political

landscape. In 1921, Haifa witnessed a striking manifestation of interfaith solidarity when a Muslim Christian Association demonstration against Zionist activities in Palestine culminated in a remarkable exchange of religious platforms: a Greek Orthodox priest delivered a sermon in a mosque, while an Imam addressed a congregation in a cathedral.[704] This event underscored the depth of communal unity in Mandate Palestine, transcending religious boundaries in a shared opposition to Zionism.

Such a display of interfaith cooperation was notably absent in colonial India, even during the zenith of the Khilafat Movement, which temporarily fostered a sense of alliance between Hindus and Muslims. Despite this brief period of Hindu-Muslim cooperation, the divide between the two communities was deeply ingrained within Indian society, exacerbated by a pervasive fear among Muslims of Hindu majority dominance. In contrast, Mandate Palestine did not exhibit a comparable level of rivalry or tension between Christians and Muslims, allowing for a more cohesive and united front against common external pressures, as exemplified by the unique interfaith gestures in Haifa.

During this era, there was no distinct emergence of a Christian political consciousness. The Christian middle class, characterized by its high level of education, mounted a particularly effective challenge to the colonial narrative. Elite Arab Christians, expressing a diverse array of viewpoints, affiliated themselves with a wide spectrum of political organizations, reflecting a rich tapestry of political engagement and thought. Notably, at this juncture, many prominent Christian leaders consciously eschewed the development of a sectarian political consciousness. This deliberate rejection was a clear stance against the type of sectarianism that the British authorities would seek to institutionalize more systematically in the following decade. These leaders' refusal to align their political identity along strictly

[704] Robson, 37–43.

religious lines underscored a broader commitment to a unified nationalistic vision, one that transcended sectarian divisions in favour of collective goals and aspirations.

Given the British perception of Christians as an 'insignificant minority'[705] within the broader Palestinian demographic, the Christian community discerned little advantage in morphing into a politically active entity defined by religious identity. This recognition that there was nothing to be gained from being relegated to the status of a religious minority underpins another critical reason why the British strategies of divide and rule were not as effective in Mandate Palestine as they had been in colonial India. In the Indian context, the colonial administration successfully exploited pre-existing religious divisions to consolidate their control. In contrast, the cohesive nature of the Palestinian national movement, coupled with the Christian community's strategic decision to avoid being pigeonholed into a narrow religious identity, hindered the British mandate's efforts to fragment Palestinian society along religious lines.

The Christian Community and the Political Representation

In response to the British mandate's establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council, which marginalized the Christian community by privileging Muslim political representation, Christian leaders in Palestine felt compelled to re-evaluate and assert their role within the nationalist movement. They strategically redefined the Arab Orthodox movement as not just a religious endeavour but a crucial political and nationalist force, thereby challenging their exclusion and emphasizing the inseparable link between religious identity and political activism. In doing so, they underscored the critical role of the Orthodox community within the broader Palestinian political sphere, striving to reclaim their pivotal place within a political system that was becoming more segmented along communal lines. This effort also

[705] Robson, 69.

aimed to champion a more inclusive nationalist narrative that recognized the contributions of all religious groups, reinforcing the value of a diverse and unified approach to the national struggle. Through these efforts, Christian leaders endeavoured to counteract the mandate's divisive strategies and maintain the multi-religious essence of Palestinian nationalism, highlighting their community's enduring significance and active involvement in the struggle for self-determination amidst the political system that was increasingly and now clearly becoming communally organised.[706]

In the mid-1930s, the mandate regime once again considered establishing a national legislative council that would include Palestinian Arab participation. This marked the government's second attempt to create a legislative body, following the failure of the first effort in 1923 due to a successful boycott of the elections by Palestinian Arabs. Amidst renewed public debate regarding the structure of the legislative body, Arab Christians from various political backgrounds began to advocate for Christian communal representation in both municipal and national legislative councils. This emerging sense of Arab pan-Christian solidarity[707] reached a pinnacle in 1936, when Christians from across the political spectrum united to support the idea of a communally elected legislative council. This was the first instance in Palestine's history where Christians of all denominations united to form a single political bloc.

The emergence of pan-Christian solidarity was a direct response to the perceived threat to their political existence posed by the increasing Jewish presence in various representative institutions. The Zionist push for 'parity'—an equal balance of Jews and Arabs in the mandate state's representative bodies—effectively diminished Arab representation. This was particularly evident as Arab Christians found themselves being supplanted by

[706] Robson, 76.
[707] Robson, 101.

Jewish members on numerous municipal and regional legislative bodies. Faced with this challenge, Christians swiftly recognized the strategic value of sectarian representation as a means to counter Zionist influence in Palestine. By advocating for separate representation for each religious community—Muslims, Christians, and Jews—Arabs could potentially secure a two-thirds majority in any legislative assembly, thus preserving their political influence.[708]

The newfound Christian solidarity at the national level was a transient phenomenon, momentarily established, with the leaders behind this collective Christian action remaining loyal to their respective parties, political ideologies, and individual religious sects. Throughout the legislative council negotiations, Arab Christian leaders adopted the concept of sectarian political organization from the colonial framework, repurposing it as a mechanism for their anti-Zionist and anti-colonial efforts. Employing a religiously defined identity was essentially a tactical measure, devised to counter the Zionist demand for 'parity'.

Despite these strategic manoeuvres, the diverse Christian communities' dedication to Palestinian nationalism remained steadfast. The sense of Arab national identity was profoundly ingrained across all Christian denominations, rendering the British attempts to sow discord between Arab Christian and Arab Muslim communities ineffective. This enduring commitment underscores the deep-rooted connection to Palestinian nationalism that transcended religious distinctions and tactical political strategies.

The emergence of new Christian solidarity at the national level was a temporary event, temporarily established, with the leadership that formed this collective Christian action remaining committed to their various parties, political platforms, and individual religious denominations. During the legislative council negotiations, Arab Christian leaders appropriated the colonial state's concept of a sectarian political organization and reinvented it

[708] Robson, 102.

as a tool for the anti-Zionist and anti-colonial campaign. Their employment of a religiously defined identity was primarily a strategic move to counter the Zionist demand for 'parity'.[709] Despite such tactical manoeuvring, the commitment of these diverse Christian communities to Palestinian nationalism remained steadfast. The strong Arab national identity shared by all Christian denominations thwarted any British attempts to drive a wedge between Arab Christian and Arab Muslim communities.

The Zionist leadership promptly dismissed the proposal, whereas Christian leaders affirmed the Christian community as an 'integral and indivisible part' of the Arab population, unanimously supporting the acceptance of the proposal. At that time, the Muslim leadership was also inclined to engage in representative politics. However, under pressure from Zionist leaders, the British ultimately chose to forsake the idea of establishing representative institutions in Mandate Palestine. The Zionist insistence on numerical 'parity' stemmed from a racial, rather than a sectarian, rationale, leading the British by the mid-1930s to reconsider their belief that sectarian divisions were the foremost form of political identity in Arab Palestine. Concurrently, Zionist leaders urged the British to formalize a 'parity' policy, advocating for equal representation of Jews and Arabs irrespective of their actual population sizes. Consequently, the British started to incorporate racial categorization in addition to sectarian distinctions to analyse and shape governmental policies.[710]

The British attributed the concept of communalism, a notion they had propagated in Palestine, to what they perceived as inherent and archaic Arab religiosity. British officials consistently portrayed sectarianism as a deeply ingrained, primitive form of political interaction, emphasizing the supposed ancient origins of sectarian identities in Palestine.[711] Despite their reliance on communal terminology to delineate representation in mandate

[709] Robson, 117.
[710] Robson, 107–19.
[711] Robson, 112.

institutions, the pressures exerted by the Zionist movement prompted British officials to increasingly conceive matters in terms of a ‘racial’ dichotomy between Arabs and Jews. The Zionists, who had initiated their movement with the vision of Jews as a nation, were naturally inclined towards being recognized as a national entity rather than a religious minority. In an attempt to alleviate the escalating Arab dissatisfaction with British policies on Jewish immigration, Wauchope proposed the establishment of a legislative council. The cooperation of Arab leaders was deemed essential for the British to sustain their governance in Palestine. Furthermore, the British needed to demonstrate to the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations that they were facilitating the local population’s gradual progression towards self-governance in Mandate Palestine, as stipulated by the terms of their mandate.[712]

Robson highlights that as Arab Christians acknowledged their sectarian identity, the British, influenced by Zionist pressures, shifted their preference towards ‘race’ as a means of identification. This imperial perspective, which categorized the local population primarily on religious grounds, stood in contrast to their recognition of European Jews’ assertion of being a distinct 'race’. This recognition facilitated the imperial administration's accommodation of Zionist political arguments about ‘race’, supporting their claims for ‘parity’ on the basis of nationhood. In an era marked by Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, the British repositioned the Empire as a liberator of ‘oppressed nations’, strategically deploying the concept of nationalism in Mandate Palestine to advance the interests of the British Empire.[713]

This strategic use of nationalism and the prominent involvement of Christian leaders in the Palestinian nationalist movement led to confusion among British officials in London, including figures like Winston Churchill, who struggled to understand the political

[712] Robson, 115.
[713] James Renton, ‘The Age of Nationality and the Origins of the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict’, *The International History Review* 35, no. 3 (2013): 576–99.

commitment of indigenous Arab Christians to Palestinian nationalism.[714] This confusion underscored the complexities of identity and allegiance in the context of Mandate Palestine, challenging imperial assumptions about the primacy of religious identity in political affiliations.

In April 1947, the Protestant Church collectively decided to dispatch a telegram to the United Nations, imploring 'in the name of Christianity ... to grant the Palestinian Arabs their national rights, end the British mandate, declare Palestine an independent country, and to form a democratic government immediately'.[715] This act demonstrated that the colonial strategy of emphasizing 'religious difference' to sow discord between Muslims and Christians in Palestine was unsuccessful. It did not redefine religious affiliation as the primary factor in political engagement within the mandate territory. This failure to fragment the Palestinian community along religious lines has left an enduring legacy, with the unity between Muslims and Christians in the region continuing to this day.

The year 1948 marked a catastrophe (al-Nakba) not only for Arab Muslims but also for Arab Christians, who suffered immensely. Many lost their homes, and numerous Christian Churches and institutions incurred significant damage. The aftermath of al-Nakba saw a mass exodus that became a defining aspect of the Palestinian Christian experience, with Christians leaving the Palestinian territories at a rate twice that of the general population. Factors such as connections to Western institutions, proficiency in Western languages, and a relatively strong economic standing contributed to the ease with which Palestinian Christians could emigrate. Following the establishment of Israel, the new Zionist regime promptly categorized its Arab inhabitants as members of a religious minority, a move that diverged

[714] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 159.
[715] Robson, 156.

from the notion of a 'racial' minority within a secular state framework, further complicating the identity and status of Arab Christians within the newly formed state.[716]

Makdisi challenges the fixed notion of religion-based identity politics by asserting that since it was 'produced', it is inherently mutable.[717] According to Makdisi, this form of identity politics took shape with the advent of the nation-state system as a global paradigm, serving to denote a condition contrary to the ethos of modern national development. It symbolized 'the opposite of a national mythology of coexistence', which aimed to unify all citizens irrespective of their religious affiliations.[718] This perspective underscores the constructed nature of religious identities within political contexts and suggests the potential for evolving beyond divisive identity politics towards more inclusive national narratives.

The enduring impact of the imperial imposition of religious distinctions must be acknowledged. Understanding that religion-informed identities were largely shaped by British colonial strategies does not immediately undo one of its most profound outcomes: the significant marginalization of Palestinian Arab Christian communities within their own homeland.[719] Presently, recognizing these religion-based identities as products of colonial construction does little to mitigate the profound consequences of 'partitions' witnessed in both Palestine and other regions affected by similar colonial policies. The historical divisions sown during colonial rule have left deep-seated challenges that cannot be easily rectified by merely acknowledging their constructed origins.

---

[716] Robson, 161–62.
[717] Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2000), 166.
[718] Makdisi, 166.
[719] Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, 163.

Conclusion

In this analysis, the intricate interplay between colonial governance and the shaping of communal identities, particularly through the institution of representative politics, has been critically examined. The focal point of this exploration was the Khilafat movement, which emerged as a pivotal site for the consolidation of colonial subjectivity among the Indian Muslim community. This movement not only highlighted the process of 'minoritisation' but also underscored the internalization of colonial identity constructs by the community itself. The dual process of external constitution by the colonial regime and self-constitution by the communities themselves unravelled the complexities underpinning the emergence of religion-based identities.

The Khilafat movement in colonial India revealed a critical juncture where the potential to dismantle colonial demarcations and ideologies was palpably present, yet the movement's ultimate inability to fully reject these impositions became evident. Conversely, in Palestine, the initial formation of Christian-Muslim associations laid the groundwork for anti-colonial resistance, which was later reshaped by the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council, redirecting Arab politics towards a predominantly Muslim narrative and hindering the formation of a unified Arab national movement. In India, the transformation of Muslims into a 'nation' led to the unintended consequence of territorial partition, a stark manifestation of the colonial legacy of divide and rule.

The colonial strategy of accentuating differences between Christian and Muslim communities in Palestine did not achieve the same level of success as in India, allowing for a more resilient Arab identity that initially transcended religious divisions. The Khilafat movement's use of religious symbols for mass mobilization inadvertently reinforced the colonial discourse on difference, amplifying the Hindu-Muslim divide and setting the stage

for the eventual partition of Indian society. This phenomenon underscores the potent influence of colonial discourse in shaping and solidifying divisions within colonized societies.

The disparity in the duration of British rule in India and Palestine—three centuries versus three decades—may account for the less pronounced division between Christian and Muslim identities in Palestine compared to the Hindu-Muslim divide in India. Historical contexts, such as the longstanding coexistence of Arab Christians under Muslim rule and the prior status of Muslims in India as rulers before British colonization, further complicated these communal dynamics. The presence of European Jews in Palestine additionally influenced the nature of British rule and the formation of a Christian-Muslim alliance against British Zionist policies from the outset.

A detailed examination of the Khilafat movement as a site of cross-communal resistance illuminates the enduring impact of colonial strategies in fostering divisions, revealing the entrenched power of partition as a structural outcome of colonial governance. Despite opportunities for united resistance against colonial subjectification, the fixation on addressing the minority predicament in a post-British India led to the deepening of communal divides, ultimately manifesting in the partition. This analysis not only sheds light on the historical intricacies of communal identity formation under colonial rule but also prompts a re-evaluation of the lingering effects of colonial divisions in contemporary contexts.

In exploring the dynamics of communal identity formation under colonial rule, this analysis underscores the complexity of the interplay between colonial impositions and the agency of the communities involved. The Khilafat movement, serving as a critical case study, illuminates not only the mechanisms of colonial subjectification but also the active role of Indian Muslims in engaging with and, at times, reinforcing the politics of difference cultivated by colonial governance. While the movement initially presented an opportunity for

cross-communal resistance against colonial categorizations, it ultimately revealed the extent to which Indian Muslims had internalized and contributed to the colonial politics of difference. This nuanced understanding of the Khilafat movement demonstrates that the partition and the enduring communal divides were not solely the result of colonial strategies but were also significantly shaped by the agency and actions of Indian Muslims themselves. In this light, the historical narrative transcends a simplistic portrayal of colonial imposition, acknowledging the complex ways in which the agency of colonized communities became an integral part of the colonial legacy of division.

Chapter 4

Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi: Manifesting *Difference*

Navigating the Palestine Issue Amidst Indian Muslim Dynamics

From the very beginning of the British conquest of Palestine, the Palestine issue held a wide-ranging and significant place in Indian political discourse, more than commonly realized. Sandeep Chawla highlights its instrumental role, noting how it was employed by the British, Congress, and the Muslim League to advance their respective political agendas.[720] For Indians, the Palestine question embodied a symbol of anti-colonial resistance, a bond of solidarity, and a facet of national identity, while the British were cognizant of the profound emotional and religious significance that the issue of Palestine held for Indian Muslims.

With the onset of British governance in Palestine, the British were keenly aware of the significance of controlling the narrative, a notion emphasized by Lord Curzon, as a means to wield influence over their colonial subjects. In 1917, during their conquest of Palestine, they leveraged this understanding to cast themselves as defenders of Muslim rights, seeking to reinforce their influence among Indian Muslims and secure their allegiance. Through strategic propaganda, they highlighted the participation of Indian Muslim soldiers in the defence of Jerusalem's sacred sites, assigning the esteemed duty of protecting the Mosque of Omar to the 123rd Rifles, an Indian regiment, thereby bolstering their image as champions of the Muslim cause.[721] To address concerns, General Allenby reassigned Pathans from the 58th Rifles, who were reluctant to engage against the Muslim Ottomans, to non-combatant roles in communications.[722] In April 1920, Indian soldiers were tasked with protecting Jerusalem's

[720] Sandeep Chawla, 'The Palestine Issue in India Politics in 1920s', in *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan (Monohar, 1985), 43.
[721] 'Wingate to FO India, 13 December 1917; FO/395/152 No. 236464', 13 December 1917, London, The National Archives.
[722] 'GHQ Egypt to WO, 2 Dec. 1917; WO/33/946, No. 8638', 2 December 1917, London, The National Archives.

Jewish Quarter amid riots. They were briefly withdrawn on Governor Storrs' orders but were quickly redeployed the following day as the unrest continued.[723] The British, seeking to sustain support among Indian Muslims, tactically disseminated news about their activities in Muslim-centric regions such as Palestine. This initiative was intended to promote a favourable image of British governance and secure their continued dominance in the region.[724]

In 1931, the Indian Political Department's request for correspondence on Palestine sparked concern in the colonial office. Undersecretary Shuckburgh was particularly apprehensive about the potential complications Indian involvement could cause, given the presence of what he called 'intransigent individuals'.[725] His wariness extended to the Arab nationalist leaders in Palestine, whose firm stance he thought might exacerbate the region's already fragile politics.

Prior to the 1936 Palestinian revolt, British officials remarked on the subdued response from India's Muslim community regarding Palestinian affairs.[726] The likelihood of unrest in India was deemed marginal when set against the backdrop of the broader Arab uprising in the Middle East,[727] in spite of the efforts the Deputy Secretary observed by Muslims in Egypt and Palestine to gain empathy and backing from Indian Muslims.[728] Despite a general apathy, pockets within the Indian Muslim community were keenly attuned to and concerned about the unfolding political situation in Palestine.

---

[723] Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 96.
[724] 'WO to GHQ Egypt, 21 November 1917; WO/33/946 No. 8583-8584', 21 November 1917, London, The National Archives.
[725] 'IOL&R, L/PS/10/1304',172', n.d., sec. 87216/31.
[726] 'IOR/L/P&S/12/2118: Pan-Islamic Congress 1933-1935', n.d., London, India Office, British Library.
[727] 'IOL&R, L/PO/5/34/175', 1938, 34, London, India Office, British Library.
[728] 'File 31/1/36 Pol. 1936, Home Department', 1936, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

Mahatma Gandhi critiqued the British Mandate in Palestine as a betrayal of Indian Muslims and an assault on Muslims globally.[729] However, his stance was largely influenced by his strategic aim of maintaining Muslim allegiance within a unified Indian nation-state. Similarly, Jawaharlal Nehru, aligning with the Palestinian cause, leveraged it to bolster the anti-colonial nationalistic fervour in India. The British perceived such expressions of solidarity by Congress leaders as reminiscent of the earlier alliance with the Khilafat movement during 1920-21.[730] In this milieu, the Palestine issue served as a conduit for Muslim groups in India to affirm their Islamic identity and to express solidarity with the global Muslim community. The All India Muslim League used the issue to rally Indian Muslim support and assert their leadership within the community.

Mashriqi framed the Palestine issue within the broader context of the 'Muslim World', using a historical lens to perceive it as a means for Indian Muslims to reclaim their historical destiny by opposing Zionism. His intention was to enhance the international stature of the Indian Muslim community. For Mashriqi, the Palestinian cause transcended mere politics; it was a platform to demonstrate that incremental reforms were not enough for the Muslim ummah. Casting himself as the 'Sage of the East', Mashriqi viewed the situation as a providential opportunity to garner support for his visionary initiatives.

The concept of the 'Muslim World' took shape from two major forces. The advent of nation-states redefined Indian Muslims as a minority, igniting a desire to affiliate with the broader Muslim ummah. This was intensified by a nostalgic yearning for their former pre-nation-state eminence. Additionally, the advancement of Western science and the colonization of Muslim territories in North Africa reignited the Muslims' drive to reassert

[729] Gandhi, *Young India, 1919-1922*, 162.
[730] 'File 22/85/36 Pol. 1936, Home Department', 1936, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

their influence. These influences are essential to understanding Mashriqi's role in the politics of British India's Muslim minority and the separatist currents within the community.

Despite heavy censorship on news from Palestine,[731] Indian Muslim leaders, including Allama Mashriqi, were well-aware of the political shifts occurring in the region. Mashriqi's approach to the Palestine issue stood out for its direct action, diverging from the verbal advocacy of his peers. His hands-on approach in organizing an army of volunteers and assisting them with passport applications to travel to Palestine, lent substantial weight to his leadership. This active involvement resonated with Indian Muslims, particularly at a time when they felt their influence diminishing. To understand Mashriqi's stance, it's essential to view it within the context of the period's prevalent Islam-centric sentiment. His efforts were more than just reacting to distant crisis; they were aimed at addressing the community's broader concerns and fostering unity.

Mashriqi's political engagement with the Muslim community in India offered an alternative to the Muslim League's narrative of minority status. He addressed the broader discourse on minority-majority dynamics by choosing confrontation over acquiescence. Amidst the global shift towards nation-state formation, Mashriqi focused on the wider Muslim ummah, positioning himself and his followers against the narrower nationalistic approach championed by the Muslim League, which emphasized the unique identity of Indian Muslims.

Allama Al-Mashriqi and the Elegiac Frame of Muslim Mind

[731] Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 97.

> The condition of the nation is ruined. The dear ones are humiliated, and noble ones have been reduced to dust. Knowledge has come to an end, and only the name of the religion remains. --- The Preface of Musadas-e-Hali[732]

Indian Muslim luminaries like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Khawaja Altaf Hussain Hali, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, and Mashriqi, shared a narrative that captured the collective malaise of their community's perceived decline. They endeavoured to reignite pride in the Islamic legacy and to mobilize the community against modern adversities. These thinkers projected their vision far beyond their current circumstances, focusing keenly on the future trajectory of Indian Muslims. Their seminal works, which encouraged a unified response to the challenges faced by Muslims, left an indelible mark on the intellectual milieu of India. While each proposed distinct remedies tailored to their times, their unanimous view was that Islam held the answers to the community's predicaments. Their discourses on identity, advancement, and faith struck a chord with Muslims across the nation, laying a foundation whose influence endures in contemporary discussions on the place and identity of Indian Muslims within the global landscape.

In her work, Eve Tignol offers a detailed analysis of the pivotal role that grief and mourning played in defining Muslim identity from 1857 to the 1940s. She emphasizes how collective mourning practices contributed significantly to both the formation and the transformation of the Muslim community in North India during this period.[733] The elegies were perceived not merely as traditional expressions of mourning; they were recognized as potent instruments for rousing the community. Specifically, the 'Musaddas', inspired by the

[732] Altaf Hussain Hali, *Musadas-e-Hali*, ed. Syed Taqi Abedi (Jehlum: Book Corner, 2015), 35.
[733] Eve Tignol, *Grief and the Shaping of Muslim Communities in North India, c. 1857–1940s* (Cambridge University Press, 2023).

elegy form, was crafted to reflect on and address 'the dilapidated state of the Muslim community.[734]

Confronting the deep-seated feeling of decline among Indian Muslims and their emerging minority status, which placed them at a disadvantage against the Hindu majority, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan advocated for Western education, championing the harmonization of rational thinking with Islamic principles to rejuvenate the community. Concurrently, Khawaja Altaf Hussain Hali, leveraging his stature as a distinguished Urdu poet, sought to instil a renewed sense of dignity and awareness through his evocative recounting of Islamic history. In his seminal 1879 poem 'Musaddas', Hali vividly depicted the decay of the Muslim community in 19th-century India, forecasting an impending deterioration. He juxtaposed the illustrious history of Islam with the woeful state of contemporary Muslims, calling for a resurgence of Islamic pre-eminence. His verses evoke both indignation and nostalgia, casting a stark light on past magnificence against the backdrop of potential oblivion, thus stirring the community to contemplate both its historical legacy and its future prospects.[735] Hali's poem, based on the notion of a unified Indian Muslim identity, mirrored the census categorizations of the colonial era. Unfortunately, this perspective complicated the Indian Muslim community's situation rather than simplifying it. Only by acknowledging their diverse histories and cultural experiences can we truly appreciate the intricate fabric of the community.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal addressed the Muslim community's decline with his concept of 'Khudi', advocating self-realization for spiritual and moral revival. His poems 'Shikwa' and

[734] Eve Tignol, 'A Note on the Origins of Hali's Musaddas-e Madd-o Jazr-e Islām', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 4 (October 2016): 585–89, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186316000080.
[735] Hali, *Musadas-e-Hali*.

'Jawab-e-Shikwa'[736] juxtapose the community's plight with a roadmap for rejuvenation, aiming to spark a collective awakening within the Muslim ummah.

Mashriqi's unique solution to the decline of Indian Muslims also centred on a return to Islamic principles. He saw 'personal transformation' as vital for communal upliftment, urging Muslims to lead disciplined, soldier-like lives, underpinned by equality, brotherhood, and self-purification, to conquer adversities and progress collectively.[737] Focus on self-purification entailed enduring hardship and not suffering as some scholars have highlighted.[738] Suffering and hardship, though related, embody distinct dimensions of the human experience. Suffering encapsulates a deeply subjective encounter with pain and distress, evoking intense emotions and vulnerability. In contrast, hardship represents objective challenges and trials, testing one's resilience without necessarily plunging the soul into profound despair. Mashriqi's political thought, contrary to the notion of redemption through suffering,[739] actually emphasizes the endurance of hardship, aligning with a longstanding tradition within Islamic practices, while dissociating from the concept of suffering, which has no roots in Islamic tradition.

In India, the period was marked by a revival of Brahmanical reformist ideologies, notably driven by Dayanand Saraswati and his Arya Samaj. This movement aimed to revive the pristine Vedic traditions and rejuvenate Hindu customs, countering perceived religious corruption and foreign influences. A key aspect of this cultural revival was a stress on hyper-masculinity, confronting the colonial stereotype of Indian 'effeminacy' and advocating for a return to the valorous traditions of Vedic warriors. The Arya Samaj emerged as a pivotal

[736] Alama Muhammad Iqbal, *Bang-e-Dara by Alama Muhammad Iqbal* (Book Corner, 2010).
[737] Allama Inayatullah Khan Al-Mashraqi, *Isharat* (Ghazni Street, Urdu Bazar, Lahore, Pakistan: Al-Faisal Nashran and Tajiran Books, 2015), 31.
[738] Markus Daechsel, 'Scientism and Its Discontents: The Indo-Muslim "Fascism" of Inayatullah Khan al-Mashriqi', *Modern Intellectual History* Vol. 3, no. No. 3 (2006): 443–72.
[739] Daechsel.

force in establishing a robust and assertive Hindu identity, challenging the colonial premise that Indians required the British to civilize them.

Mashriqi and his contemporaries' engagement with the Palestine issue was deeply embedded in Islamic concerns but likely shaped as well by the contemporary Indian ethos of reform emphasizing moral and physical strength for communal empowerment and national resurgence. Their emphasis on action rather than just intellectual debate reflected the prevailing spirit of assertiveness and self-reliance that characterized India's socio-political dialogue of the era.

Colonial Politics and Espionage Allegations: Mashriqi's Early Engagements

To gain a deeper understanding, it's vital to consider Mashriqi's reputation within his community, marked by the controversies and suspicions his unique leadership style and positions often generated. A case in point is his 1926 trip to Cairo for the Khilafat Conference, a key moment in his political trajectory that was mired in controversy. His educational background as a Cambridge University graduate and his position as Headmaster of the Government High School in Peshawar added layers of complexity and suspicion around his participation in this significant event. The newspaper *Zamindar* published articles on 4 July and again on 11 July 1926, insinuating that Mashriqi had attended the conference as a spy for the Government of India. *Zamindar* was a prominent Urdu newspaper in colonial India that played a critical role in the anti-colonial movement, particularly in advocating for Muslim interests. It supported the All-India Muslim League and the Pakistan movement, emphasizing Muslim unity and the grievances of the Muslim community under British policies. The publication was renowned for being a staunch defender of civil rights and political freedoms, contributing significantly to the shaping of public opinion among Muslims in North India. Despite facing censorship and suppression by colonial authorities, it remained influential in

the struggle for India's independence and the eventual formation of Pakistan. The appearance of such insinuations in a reputable newspaper like *Zamindar* likely exacerbated the suspicions around his attendance at the conference, further igniting speculations about his underlying motives and possible affiliations.

Confronting these accusations, Mashraqi firmly denied any involvement and sought a formal refutation from the Government of India. To support his stance, Sir Norman Bolton, the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, was prepared to issue an official statement affirming this. Before issuing an official statement, he thought it prudent to verify that Mashraqi did not have any mission from the Government of India to attend the conference.[740] The Government of India was hesitant to issue an official statement refuting Mashriqi's involvement, concerned that a formal denial might inadvertently lend credibility to the allegations against him. Reports received by the government indicated that Mashriqi had articulated strong anti-Christian sentiments at the Cairo Conference, accusing Christian nations of trying to divide the Muslim community. These actions and statements contributed to the suspicion that he might be an agent of the British government, sent to stir unrest. Consequently, the government's stance was that any negative repercussions stemming from Mashriqi's conduct and declarations at the conference were his own responsibility.[741] The government's reluctance to comment was intended to prevent escalating the situation and unintentionally validating the accusations against Mashriqi. Without an official denial from the Government of India, these insinuations risked seriously damaging Mashriqi's reputation and credibility, possibly intensifying suspicions about his intentions. The ambiguity

[740] 'Khilafat Conferences, Cairo, File No. 466-N of 1926', 23 November 1926, sec. From Chief Commissioner's Office, NWFP Province to Major A.E.B. Parsons, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department dated 4 November 1926, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

[741] 'Khilafat Conferences, Cairo, File No. 466-N of 1926', From Major A.E.B.Parsons, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department to Chief Commissioner's Office, NWFP Province dated 11 Nov. 1926.

surrounding his role at the conference and the circulation of such allegations could have exacerbated tensions between Mashriqi and various factions within the Indian political scene.

This episode, shedding light on the dynamics within the Muslim community, deepens our understanding of the internal complexities during the struggle for identity and nationhood among Muslims in India. Mashriqi, cognizant of the Muslims' precarious minority status, chose a path divergent from mainstream currents. Paradoxically, his efforts to unify Muslims under a singular Islamic identity potentially led to greater disunity, reflecting the intricate and often contradictory pathways in the broader context of Muslim minoritization and the quest of a separate nation-state.

This incident underscores the intricate political dynamics of the time, where mere insinuations could significantly impact an individual's reputation and standing within the community. It underscores the idiosyncratic nature of Mashriqi's character and provides insight into the context in which he sought to establish his reputation. This episode reflects the challenges of navigating colonial politics, evident even in Mashriqi's early political engagements. Mashriqi's actions and the ensuing allegations contributed to a cloud of uncertainty and suspicion surrounding his role and intentions.

An in-depth analysis of this episode, including a review of Zamindar articles and relevant documents, can help understand the processes of minoritization and rising separatist sentiments within the Muslim minority in India. This investigation can unravel the complexities of internal discord within the Muslim community, juxtaposed with the existential challenges of their minority status. Such research could help appreciate the complexities of the political landscape that individuals like Mashriqi navigated. It promises insights into the interplay between his individual actions and the broader political strategies of the colonial period.

In the 1930s, Mashriqi launched the Khaksar Tehrik, galvanizing Muslims with a call to self-purification, community service, and disciplined action. Rooted in Islamic principles, the movement sought to empower Muslims to actively improve their plight. Mashriqi encouraged Khaksars to immerse themselves in various community-centric endeavours, from aiding the less fortunate and standing by the side of the marginalized. The vision behind the self-purification initiative was to rejuvenate Muslims and inspire them to reclaim their historical prominence. Despite resistance from British authorities and conservative elements, the Khaksar Movement significantly impacted South Asian Muslims. Emphasizing self-improvement, community involvement, and collective accountability, it offered a compelling counter to the perceived downturn of Muslims in the region. The movement's ethos, advocating for proactive engagement and positive change, inspired Muslims to strive for a better future.

Mashriqi, in his later years, turned to the intellect of scientists, valuing their profound contributions across various fields. He regarded their intellectual prowess as unmatched and their theories as cornerstones of modern understanding.[742] In his complex views on evolution, Mashriqi uniquely intertwined the material with the spiritual, believing in a cosmic purpose that positions humanity to master the universe, achieving global harmony and abundance. He saw the destiny of the future as a product of human endeavour and posited that an embrace of a scientifically enlightened Islam could elevate the Muslim world to prominence. According to Mashriqi's perspective, the future's trajectory rested entirely within the realm of human agency. By embracing the concept of scientific Islam, He believed the global Muslim community would inevitably reclaim a leading position among humanity. It is essential to recognize that Mashriqi's approach to the Palestinian issue, much like the Indian nationalist project, was conceived within a colonial hybrid 'modernity'. Colonial modernity necessitated

[742] Inayat Ullah Khan Al-Mashriqi, 'Human Problem (A Message to the Knowers of Nature)', July 1951.

a dual strategy that precipitated profound changes in social identities. The colonial rulers oscillated between reform and preservation, seeking societal stability yet hesitating to fully reform Indian society along rationalist lines. This ambivalence fostered the conditions for a nationalist movement spearheaded by the elite and anti-colonial factions. Against this backdrop, the concept of modernity, mainly confined to politics, shaped Mashriqi's interpretation of Muslim history through the lens of social Darwinism, embedded within the broader context of colonial hybrid modernity.

During India's struggle for independence, the modern state and its nationalism encountered scepticism not only from Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, who saw it as an epistemic imposition on traditional societal structures, but also from Mashriqi, who considered it an historicist aberration. Yet, other leaders and political entities viewed these concepts as vehicles for their agendas. Mashriqi's interpretation of Muslim history, particularly in the context of Palestine, was deeply rooted in historicism, the belief in a divine historical order. He saw history as a non-random, evolutionary process governed by scientific laws, one that would inevitably restore Muslims to a position of dominance, provided they followed a scientifically-aligned Islam. He attributed the Muslim community's decline to straying from true Islamic principles, including its scientific aspects. Mashriqi's vision suggested that a return to these principles was essential for the Muslim community to regain its historical stature.

Mashriqi provocatively suggested that Germans could serve as an exemplar for Muslims in discipline and unity, aiming to inspire reform within his community. Adopting Western scientific methods, he proposed a 'Religion of Science', merging Islamic principles with scientific innovation. Ironically, Mashriqi himself looked Westward, adopting their scientific approach to both life and faith. His advocacy of social Darwinism represented a

blend of scientific and religious ideologies, ironically championed a politico-religious ethos that often diverged from standard scientific and evolutionary paradigms. Mashriqi's leadership through the Khaksar Movement illustrates the influential role local figures play in shaping historical narratives, acting on deeply held beliefs rather than as passive historical figures.

For Mashriqi, Palestine transcended political strategy to become a catalyst for revival and distinction. Confronting the Muslim League's ascendancy in the late 1930s, he crafted a unique politico-religious narrative with authoritarian undertones, promoting a disciplined society. He leveraged the Palestinian struggle not only to reassert his own leadership but also to set his vision apart. Mashriqi's method of mobilizing the Muslim populace for direct action, particularly his initiative to send volunteers to resist Zionism, marked a departure from conventional tactics. The Palestinian cause presented an opportunity for Mashriqi to solidify his leadership credentials and position himself as a forward-thinker at the forefront of an important cause. Mashriqi desire for international acclaim was evident in his attempts to connect with global influencers, citing meetings with notables such as Einstein and Hitler, and his discourse with international thinkers to elevate his status.

Mashriqi and the Palestine Issue

The Palestinian cause struck a chord with Indian Muslims, rooted in a shared Islamic identity. Mashriqi tapped into this empathy, asserting the cause as a uniquely Muslim right. Mashriqi rallied an army of about 10,000 volunteers to counter Zionism in Palestine and sought assistance from Egyptian leaders like Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha and businessman Mohamad Ali Alooba Pasha for transport support.[743] Mashriqi's doctrine of strength through unity advocated militant action to restore Muslims' historical glory. He

[743] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 29 November 1938', *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

aimed to enhance his global and domestic political profile by dispatching volunteers to aid Palestinians against Zionists, countering the All India Muslim League's growing clout.

Mashriqi ordered Khaksars to apply for passports to Palestine, instructing them to submit forms to provincial governors and to highlight their humanitarian mission to waive fees.[744] Believing that conferences were insufficient in resolving the Palestine issue, Mashriqi resolved to dispatch 10,000 Khaksars to alleviate the suffering in Palestine. Committed to this cause, Mashriqi vowed to press Alooba Pasha and Nahas Pasha until they provided personal carriers to transport the volunteers to Palestine or acknowledge their cowardice and helplessness.[745]

As per *Al-Islah*, on 16th September 1938, Allama Mashriqi received an invitation from Mohammad Ali Alooba Pasha, the President of the Conference, to attend the 'World Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim countries for the Defence of Palestine'. The conference was scheduled to take place from 7th to 11th October 1938 in Cairo.[746] On 26th September 1938, *Al-Islah* reported that Mashriqi departed for Bombay en route to Cairo to participate in the conference.[747] In October 1938, Mashriqi was present in Cairo and had a meeting with Alooba Pasha. However, there is no evidence to suggest that during this meeting, the idea of raising and transporting 10,000 Khaksars to fight in Palestine was discussed. Despite this, in November 1938, Allama Mashriqi composed a formal letter to Alooba Pasha, urgently requesting transportation assistance for his contingent of Khaksars to reach Palestine. However, to his dismay, this critical request went unanswered, leaving the Khaksar movement's aspirations unfulfilled.

---

[744] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 17 November 1938', *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.
[745] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 29 November 1938'.
[746] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 16 September 1938', *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.
[747] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 26 September 1938', *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

In Cairo, Mashriqi likely reflected on his previous visit in 1926, during which he immersed himself in a vibrant Muslim domain that served as a hub for intellectual and cultural exchange. This experience provided him with a unique opportunity to connect with Muslims from diverse backgrounds, facilitating the negotiation and sharing of shared norms, values, and collective imaginaries. Mashriqi's presence in Cairo enabled him to engage with fellow Muslims on a broader scale, contributing to the shaping of his ideas and the wider discourse within the Muslim world. Cairo's role as a centre of Muslim intellectual and cultural exchange facilitated the exploration of ideas, fostering unity and solidarity among Muslims grappling with the challenges of colonialism and globalization. Through this collective endeavour, Mashriqi and other Muslim intellectuals addressed the possibilities and dilemmas faced by the Muslim community (ummah) in the context of modernity, ultimately influencing the trajectory of Mashriqi's thought and activism. It is not possible to definitively conclude whether Cairo's intellectual and engaging ethos was the reason Mashriqi did not discuss his plans with Alooba Pasha during their meeting. Cairo's intellectual and culturally rich environment might have had an impact on Mashriqi's overall thinking and ideas, but it is challenging to establish a direct link between that environment and his decision not to discuss specific plans with Alooba Pasha.

It is challenging to ascertain with certainty the specific reasons behind Mashriqi's omission of his elaborate plans to raise and transport 10,000 volunteers to Palestine during his meeting with Alooba Pasha in Cairo. There could be several plausible explanations for this omission. Firstly, it is possible that Mashriqi might not have thought of the idea at that point during his meeting with Alooba Pasha. Plans and strategies often evolve over time, and it is conceivable that he developed the concept later after his meeting in Cairo. Secondly, he might have chosen not to discuss the idea with Alooba Pasha during that specific meeting due to various factors such as the context of the conversation, time constraints, or the dynamics of

the discussion. Lastly, it is also plausible that Mashriqi did discuss the idea during the meeting but did not receive a response or a positive reception from Alooba Pasha, leading to its exclusion from available records. Without direct evidence or historical documentation detailing the specifics of their conversation, it remains open to interpretation why Mashriqi did not mention his plans during that particular meeting in Cairo. Further historical research and evidence might shed more light on this matter.

Request to Grant Passports to Khaksar Volunteers free of Charge

Mashriqi was directly involved in assisting volunteers with passport applications. He actively encouraged volunteers to seek government assistance in obtaining free passports for their intended journey to Palestine. This approach aimed to ease their travel to Palestine, thereby enabling their direct participation in the struggle. The Khaksar Movement's headquarters, Idara-e-Aliya, provided clear guidelines on drafting passport application requests, ensuring that volunteers could effectively articulate their need for government assistance in a coherent and persuasive manner.[748]

The first instance of Khaksar volunteers applying for passports occurred in December 1938. Nasir Mohammed Khan Nizamani, a Khaksar leader, approached the Sind government for free passports for 119 volunteers planning to travel to Palestine. The Chief Secretary of Sind, dubious of the Khaksars' motives and concerned about potential disruptions in Palestine, recommended denying the passports and sought concurrence from the Government of India, which affirmed the decision to reject the request.[749]

[748] 'Al-Islah, Weekly, 17 November 1938'.
[749] 'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38', 1938, sec. C.A.G. Savidge, Under Secretary to the Government of India informed the Chief Secretary to the Government of Sind dated 23rd January 1939, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

The colonial government, with no precedent of granting free passports to public workers for overseas travel, did not make an exception for the Khaksar volunteers. The Sind Government had already raised concerns about the potential implications of Khaksar volunteers in Palestine. Therefore, the central government, anticipating that Palestinian authorities would likely oppose their presence amidst the tense political climate, decided to deny passport issuance to these volunteers, irrespective of the fees. This decision, taken without consulting Palestinian authorities, was in line with the Sind Government's stance.[750]

In anticipation of further applications from Khaksar volunteers, the central government, after deciding to deny passports, extended its directive nationwide. A circular was issued to almost all states, including Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, The Central Provinces, Assam, the North West Frontier Province, Orissa, Baluchistan, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, instructing them to refuse any visa applications from Khaksar volunteers planning to travel to Palestine.[751]

The flow of applications for free passports to travel to Palestine for humanitarian purposes continued to come in. In December 1938, five more Khaksars from Bombay sought passports for humanitarian assistance in Palestine, stressing their commitment to helping all affected individuals. Despite their intentions, the Bombay Government, citing Rule 20 and potential risks, denied their applications, a decision communicated to other local authorities.[752] Apart from Sana-Ullah of Quetta, who received a conditional passport for Bahrain travel, all other Khaksar applications for Palestine were rejected. This approval was

---

[750] 'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38'.

[751] 'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38', sec. C.A.G. Savidge, Under Secretary to the Government of India informed the Chief Secretary to the Government of Sind dated 23rd January 1939.

[752] 'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38', sec. From Sir Gilbert Wiles, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political and Services Department to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department dated 20 January 1939.

provisional, with the possibility of revocation based on future developments or changes in circumstance.[753]

Even in January 1939, 17 Khaksars from Uttar Pradesh's Banda district also had their passport applications turned down, as they intended to aid Palestinians. The Deputy Secretary of the United Provinces reported these applications to the External Affairs Department, with the District Magistrate expressing concerns over their financial stability and the potential risk of them requiring government-funded repatriation.[754]

It is plausible that the Indian government, being part of the Mandatory power in Palestine, might have sensed the irony of the situation. The government, fully cognizant of complexities and contradictions in Indian citizens aiding Palestinians against the same colonial rule over India, likely viewed this as a situation fraught with conflict. This realisation could have influenced its decision to deny passport applications from Khaksars intending to assist in Palestine. Ensuring that individuals traveling abroad had adequate financial resources was crucial, especially if they intended to provide aid, preventing them from becoming dependent on government assistance. Therefore, denying passports by colonial authorities to those with uncertain financial situations, especially if they planned to protest against the British Government in Palestine, was seen as a prudent move.[755]

Mashriqi's Palestine Project: Tracing Pan-Islamic Solidarity in Colonial India

[753] 'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38', sec. Lieutenant T.E.Brownsdon, Under Secretary to the Hon'ble The Agent to the Governor General, Resident and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department dated 20 February 1939.

[754] 'Refusal of Passport Application for Certain Muslims of District Banda (UP) for Proceeding to Palestine to Help the Arabs in Their Struggle against the Mandatory Power in Palestine - File No. 612-G/39 D. No. 206-G/39', 16 January 1939, From the Under Secretary to the Government of India, the External Affairs Department to the Chief Secretary to the Government Of the United Provinces dated 27 January 1939, New Delhi, National Archives of India.

[755] 'Refusal of Passport Application for Certain Muslims of District Banda (UP) for Proceeding to Palestine to Help the Arabs in Their Struggle against the Mandatory Power in Palestine - File No. 612-G/39 D. No. 206-G/39', sec. From Zaheer, Deputy Secretary to Government, United Provinces to the Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department dated 9 January 1939.

In the 1930s, Mashriqi's advocacy for pan-Islamic unity against Zionism resonated with the existing sentiment of pan-Islamic solidarity among Indian Muslims. The Khilafat Movement of the 1920s, which rallied Muslims in India to support the Ottoman Caliphate against Western forces, laid the foundation for this sentiment. This wave of pan-Islamic activism among Indian Muslims, deeply ingrained in nostalgia for the past eminence of Islamic civilization, inspired leaders to reminisce about historical triumphs. Mashriqi's stance on Palestine was a product of this sentiment, showcasing a commitment to defending both faith and territories still under Muslim influence against perceived threats.

Mashriqi's approach was characterized by a longing for the historical grandeur of Islam, yet he employed modern, scientifically-informed methods. His instinctive defence of territories with Muslim identity and his opposition to Zionism were driven by a desire to halt the decline of the Muslim world's historical stature. Advocating for the individual rejuvenation of Muslims, he emphasized the theme of restoration. Mashriqi's strategy was grounded in proactive prevention, embodying a leadership style focused on reclaiming past splendours. In essence, to fully grasp Mashriqi's position on Palestine, one must contextualize it within the broader, nostalgic, Islam-centric perspective held by many Indian Muslim leaders of that era. Muslim masses in colonial India had genuine empathy for their counterparts in Palestine.

Following Israel's formation and the subsequent displacement of Palestinian Arabs, news of which reached Pakistan, Malik Jahangir Khan, a tribal leader from North Waziristan, in a telegram to Jinnah, communicated the strong sentiments of the Waziri tribes. Eagerly anticipating the war's resolution, they deeply empathized with the Arab cause. The Waziris, firmly against ceding the Holy Land to Jewish control, were ready to join the Arabs in this

conflict. This message reflected the profound connection and solidarity Indian Muslims felt with the Arabs.[756]

Such calls to arms often clash with the practical realities of execution and strategic insight. The gap between their fervent promises and the actual capacity for delivery becomes apparent in the face of logistical complexities and geopolitical hurdles. Such proclamations reveal a divide between the rhetoric of aspiration and the feasibility of its implementation. The volunteers rallied by Mashriqi, notably unprepared, inadequately equipped and lacking basic resources, reflect the same shortcomings that hampered the Arab coalition’s efforts against the nascent State of Israel. Despite noble intentions, the coalition's forces, with their scant training and resources, were starkly mismatched against the highly disciplined, well-prepared, and well-equipped Zionist army. This striking disparity not only accentuates the futility of their earnest ambitions but also illustrates the rigorous requirements of military engagement, where sheer zeal falls short in the face of structured military strategy and superior armaments.

Deciphering Mashriqi’s Political Evolution

Understanding Mashriqi’s stance on Palestine requires an in-depth examination of his political ideologies and role in colonial India's political landscape. This analysis will shed light on Mashriqi’s beliefs, drives, and strategies. As the leader of the Khaksar movement, Mashriqi imparted a distinctive identity to it, blending religious, social, and nationalist objectives. His vision extended beyond conventional political frameworks, not seeking formal British acknowledgement for the Khaksar movement. Situating Mashriqi within colonial India's context highlights the Khaksar movement as a significant socio-political force, challenging established norms and championing unique, transformative goals. Ultimately,

[756] ‘Jinnah Papers’, n.d., The Times of India, 09 June 1948, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan.

comprehending Mashriqi's political philosophies and his influence in the broader political arena is crucial to appreciate the significance and impact of his Palestine initiative.

Mashriqi posited that the essence of suzerainty lies in the readiness to make sacrifices and shed blood. Mashriqi argued that Muslims must assert to the British their rightful role as India's guardians, arguing that the Muslim community alone should hold stewardship over British India. Historical precedents worldwide underscored the intrinsic connection between rulership and the courage to shed blood. Mashriqi contended that, historically, governance often necessitated such sacrifices, and he saw Muslims as uniquely suited to this role. He even proposed that if the British were found lacking in effective governance, it would be an opportunity for Muslims to highlight historical patterns of power shifts marked by bloodshed.

In *Aksriyat Ya Khoon*, Mashriqi articulates the formation of a group dedicated to Hindustan's welfare, cultivated over nine years to confront significant challenges, even ruin, for their land. He argues unequivocally against a majority government for Muslims, citing a historical tenet spanning 14 centuries that those who sacrifice, notably through bloodshed, are entitled to guardianship of a territory.[757] Mashriqi's idea, though seemingly anachronistic, is presented within a modern framework.

Mashriqi's philosophy melded a deterministic view of history with a unique blend of Islam and science, advocating for a rigorous scientific exploration of religion to re-establish Islam's global prominence. Entering politics in 1931, Mashriqi aimed to transform Muslims into a unified force, critiquing the aristocratic nature of existing political entities. He reproached the Indian National Congress for what he saw as its weakness and uniformity, and was equally critical of the Muslim League for its aristocratic connections and its advocacy for

[757] 'Aksriyat Ya Khoon & Bait Ul Mal Published by Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi Leader of Khaksar Organisation OC-29/07 POL, R-II, 141310 Z, Government of India, Home Deptt, POLL Sec, File No. 74/2/40', 1940, National Archives of India, New Delhi, https://indianculture.gov.in/flipbook/131566.

partition.[758] However, the Khaksar's reinvention of Islamic teachings didn't significantly permeate the broader narratives surrounding the religio-nationalist discourse or the decolonization process in India and Pakistan. His approach, while innovative, remained somewhat isolated from the mainstream political discourse of the time.

Mashriqi's political trajectory was as intricate and evolving as his personality. Engulfed in the ethos of modernity, yet captivated by the golden age of Islamic civilization, he initially advocated for India's militant conquest. His spiritual ideology was distinctive, blending Islamic principles with scientific rationality, scrutinizing religious doctrines through a scientific lens. Mashriqi's political orientation gradually shifted. Initially advocating for a militant takeover of India, he later endorsed a corporate state model, consistently opposing majority rule but open to dialogue with Congress leaders. Despite his imprisonment in Madras, he actively encouraged Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to pursue conciliatory discussions with leaders like Abul Kalam Azad and Nehru, demonstrating his commitment to unity and dialogue. A significant development occurred on 21 June 1941, when Jinnah expressed a desire for the Khaksar movement to align with the Muslim League. Mashriqi responded affirmatively, pledging the Khaksar Tehrik's support to the Muslim League's quest for India's full independence.[759] However, despite this apparent convergence of goals and his readiness for cooperation, Mashriqi remained circumspect and refrained from officially enlisting with the Muslim League.

These incidents highlight the fluidity and responsiveness of Mashriqi's political philosophy to the changing times. His multifaceted approach, from initially advocating a militant takeover of India to showing nationalist tendencies and openness to dialogue, was

---

[758] Sarfraz Hussain Ansari, 'Politica Thought of Inayatullah Mashriqi' (Unpublished hD Thesis, Islamabad, Pakistan, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, 1996).
[759] Nasim Yousaf, *Pakistan's Freedom & Allama Mashriqi; Statements, Letters, Chronology of Khaksar Tehrik (Movement); Period: Mashriqi's Birth to 1947*, 2013th edition (AMZ Publications, 2013), 225.

evident when, on September 9, 1946, he offered support and collaboration to Jinnah in the shared goal of freedom. Mashriqi acknowledged Jinnah as 'the most revered leader', recognizing the community's immense expectations placed upon him.[760] On August 27, 1943, Mashriqi made a significant overture to Jinnah, asserting that the Khaksars did not view themselves as rivals to the Muslim League. He urged Jinnah to promptly meet Gandhiji and the Viceroy to seek a resolution to the political deadlock, advocating for a Hindu-Muslim settlement to achieve complete independence for an undivided India. Jinnah encouraged by the reassurances of Mashriqi, appealed on 30 August 1946 to the Khaksars to formally join the Muslim League,[761] Mashriqi was still not prepared to join. This reluctance to join, despite apparent alignment in goals and ideologies, reflects the complexity and strategic considerations in Mashriqi's political calculation.

Initially, Jinnah and Mashriqi seemed ideologically opposed, but closer examination reveals potential parallels in their thinking, inadvertently reinforcing the narrative of Muslims as a separate nation. Jinnah's later speeches betray a departure from his earlier secular inclinations, veering towards a more culturally rooted, historically-driven, and Islam-centric narrative. This change brought him closer to Mashriqi's vision of Muslim governance, deeply rooted in Islamic principles and historical consciousness. This alignment, seemingly coincidental, significantly influenced the discourse on identity during the Pakistan movement. This underscores the intricate interplay of national identity, religion, and historical narratives. Although they began from disparate positions, both Jinnah and Mashriqi converged on an idea: the distinctive nationhood of Muslims. This convergence played a crucial role in shaping Pakistan as a unique manifestation of Muslim national identity.

Khaksars & the Government Auxiliary Force

[760] Yousaf, 302.
[761] Yousaf, 302.

Reflecting on his writings and actions, it's plausible that Mashriqi considered arming the Khaksars after their integration into the Government Auxiliary Force – a strategic move to create a formidable force in anticipation of British withdrawal. This aligns with his ambitious vision and proactive approach towards mobilizing the Khaksars for larger political objectives.

According to Mashriqi's sources, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, had recommended to the Viceroy, arming the Khaksars after their enrolment in the Auxiliary Force. Additionally, the Information Bureau of the Government of India had reported that approximately one million young men were affiliated with the Khaksar Organization, having received military training and possessing military knowledge. Mashriqi claimed that the Viceroy had granted approval to Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's proposal and had expressed his intention to seek the British War Office's approval in London.[762] The Hindustan Times on September 5, 1940, reported Mashriqi's offer of 250,000 Khaksars to the Viceroy for the purpose of defending India against foreign aggression. These claims necessitate further archival research to confirm the details regarding armament and Auxiliary Force enrolment. Furthermore, Mashriqi alleged that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan had communicated concerns about the unjust arrest of Khaksars from Punjab by the Uttar Pradesh Government. He warned of potential reciprocal actions against Congress members from U.P. upon their entry into Punjab. It seems obvious from Mashriqi's narrative that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was sympathetic to Khaksar movement. If Sir Sikander had recommended to the Viceroy the provision of enrolment of the Khaksars in the Government Auxiliary Force, it possibly could have extremely serious consequences. Given the dynamics of the relationship between Mashriqi and Sir Sikander Hayat, it seems improbable that Sir Sikander harboured any

[762] 'Aksriyat Ya Khoon & Bait Ul Mal Published by Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi Leader of Khaksar Organisation OC-29/07 POL, R-II, 141310 Z, Government of India, Home Deptt, POLL Sec, File No. 74/2/40', 1940, National Archives of India, New Delhi, https://indianculture.gov.in/flipbook/131566.

affinity for Mashriqi’s political stance. A thorough exploration of archival sources would be necessary to ascertain the veracity of Mashriqi’s assertions.

The British Recognition & the Khaksar Tehreek

To understand the British colonial administration’s preference for the All India Muslim League (AIML) over other Indian Muslim parties, including their disregard for Mashriqi’s Khaksar Movement, it’s essential to consider the political landscape of the era. The British had a strategic approach to engaging with Indian political groups, favouring those they perceived as more manageable within their colonial objectives. The AIML’s advocacy for separate electorates and the idea of a distinct Muslim-majority territory, Pakistan, was more in line with British interests. This stance provided the British with a means to exercise control through the classic strategy of divide and rule, by amplifying communal divisions. In contrast, Mashriqi and the Khaksar Movement, with their different ideological stance and approach, did not fit as neatly into the British strategic framework. Understanding this context is crucial to appreciating the nuances of the British colonial policy and its impact on the dynamics of Indian politics, particularly the Muslim political discourse during the era.

Mashriqi's Khaksar Tehreek represented a radical shift from conventional political movements, with a focus on religious fervour, societal restructuring, and global Islamic unity. Its foundation in grassroots activism and pan-Islamism set it apart from more mainstream movements, making it less appealing to the British colonial authorities. The movement’s pronounced emphasis on Palestine and call for Islamic resistance against Zionism especially clashed with British interests, considering their mandates in Palestine. Mashriqi conceptualized the Khaksar movement not just as a political entity but as a socio-religious crusade with ambitious, multifaceted goals. It aimed to transform Indian society, aspiring towards a Muslim Raj. While Mashriqi’s revolutionary ideals were clear, he refrained from

endorsing violent tactics, choosing instead a path divergent from standard democratic practices. This, coupled with the movement’s unique ideological stance, may have contributed to the ambiguity surrounding its actual strength and influence.

Understanding the true extent of the Khaksar Tehreek’s strength is essential for a comprehensive grasp of its role in the dynamics of Muslim separatism and minority politics under British colonial rule. This knowledge also aids in evaluating the movement’s influence on colonial policies and its contribution to shaping Muslim identity within the larger narrative of minority mobilization during this period. The actual size and influence of the Khaksar movement in colonial India remain shrouded in ambiguity. Historical accounts vary widely, presenting different figures and assessments of its membership and impact. This disparity has led to considerable speculation and debate among historians and scholars. Absence of detailed records from that period, the movement’s evolving nature, and its sporadic expansion across regions further muddle this numerical quest. Furthermore, subjective biases might have led some accounts to inflate or diminish the movement’s reported strength.

To gain a clear insight into the Khaksar movement’s numerical footprint, a meticulous scrutiny of diverse primary documents, archival records, contemporaneous accounts, and academic investigations is required. Only through synthesizing data from these varied repositories can one hope to deduce a more definitive picture of the movement's magnitude and its historical impact. This methodical, evidence-based approach is essential for accurately determining the numerical strength of the Khaksar movement.

On 30 November 1937, The Times published an article titled ‘Muslim India’, in which it asserted that the Khaksar movement, a distinctly Muslim organization, emerged as a response to the activities of the Khudai Khitmatgars or ‘Red Shirts’, who were closely aligned with the Indian National Congress. The primary purpose behind the establishment of

the Khaksar movement was to counteract the perceived Congress bias of the 'Red Shirts' and provide a platform that represented the interests of the Muslim community.[763] The Khaksar movement sought to address concerns of marginalization and underrepresentation by the Congress-dominated political discourse. Understanding this backdrop is key to comprehending the Khaksar movement's inception and its role in the complex political landscape of pre-partition India, marked by growing communal divisions.

The Indian government initially regarded the Khaksar movement as an organization chiefly involved in menial public and social services. A.H. Joyce of the India Office Press Department reported on March 31, 1938, that the movement, composed solely of Muslims, had a modest membership of around 250, attributing this to poor leadership and financial constraints. Yet, in a later correspondence dated April 11, 1940, to H.V. Hudson, Joyce revised the figure, acknowledging a membership of nearly 17,000.[764] The initial underestimation and subsequent acknowledgment of a larger membership indicate a possible strategic narrative adjustment by the government, either to minimize or recognize the movement's influence, highlighting the government's complex approach to managing various political and social groups during a critical period in India's history. This inconsistency, potentially shaped by the evolving narrative of the movement's societal role, contributes to the ambiguity surrounding its true size and influence. Whether deliberate or due to changing perceptions, this ambiguity underscores the complexities in understanding the Khaksar movement's impact during this period.

In 1939, the Khaksar movement garnered considerable attention in India, as evidenced by two notable articles. On July 17, The Christian Science Monitor reported on

[763] 'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', n.d., The Times, 30th November 1937, 'Muslim India', London, British Library.
[764] 'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', sec. Editor of The Illustrated London News, Mr Bruce S. Ingram wrote to A.H. Joyce, Press Department, India Office.

this emerging national movement, highlighting its quiet but expansive growth. With 4,000 centres across India and 350,000 members, the movement focused on instilling discipline and mutual service among its participants, deliberately steering clear of direct political involvement. Despite this apolitical stance, the movement's size and operational efficiency suggested it could significantly influence Indian society, a context that highly values discipline.[765] Similarly, an August 8 article in the Times of India forecasted that the Khaksar organization could rival the Indian National Congress in influence if it maintained its growth trajectory. The article cited a September 1938 census, indicating a membership of 364,000, which had since increased to over 400,000. Allama Mashriqi, the movement's leader, reportedly established the Khaksars to unify and strengthen Muslims in India, viewing the Congress' civil disobedience movement as counterproductive. These reports collectively paint a picture of a rapidly expanding movement, poised to make a significant mark on India's socio-political landscape.[766]

On 15 August 1939, The Scotsman reported that the Khaksar movement, boasting a membership exceeding 400,000, was viewed as the most prominent instance of Nazi and Fascist influence in India. The movement faced allegations of receiving financial support from Herr Hitler, though Mashriqi vehemently refuted such claims. Purportedly, the Khaksars aimed to 'establish hegemony over the world, become rulers once again, and conquer the universe', considering it their religious duty and ultimate aspiration. They believed their ancestors had ruled the world for a millennium and conquered India through courage, unity, and unwavering obedience to their leaders.[767] This historical perspective underscored the movement's vision of restoring past Muslim glory and dominance on a global scale.

[765] 'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 1939.
[766] 'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', Times of India, August 8, 1939.
[767] 'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', sec. The Scotsman, "Nazi Influence in India, Movement Claims 400,000 Members",15 August 1939.

On 12 October 1939, the Hindustan Times published an article titled ‘The Khaksar Menace’, highlighting Mashriqi’s encouragement of Muslims to restore their former glory through specific political beliefs rooted in religious principles. The article suggested that the Muslim League’s failure to meet the expectations of Muslims coupled with its discouragement of Muslim involvement with the Congress, led many to gravitate towards the Khaksar movement. The movement, with its promise of social and practical benefits,[768] appeared as an appealing alternative for those disenchanted with the existing political options. The surge in interest regarding the membership figures of the Khaksar movement underscores its increasing prominence and highlights the challenges faced in accurately gauging its true scale and impact during that period. Further highlighting the growing influence of the Khaksar movement, a Reuters report dated 20 March 1940, stated that the Movement had surpassed 100,000 followers. However, *Al-Islah*, a publication affiliated with the movement, asserted on 1 December 1946, that their membership had expanded to five million throughout British India.

Mashriqi’s Fusion of Islamic Thought and Scientific Inquiry

Mashriqi’s perspective on science and Islam presents a fascinating study in contrasts, echoing the Western dichotomy of science and religion even as he sought to transcend it. He proposed that Islam inherently integrates scientific inquiry, a stance that challenged Western assertions of scientific dominance and the necessity of a religious-secular split. Yet, paradoxically, his viewpoint resonated with the West’s separation of these domains.

Mashriqi’s stance on science and Islam offers a fascinating glimpse into how religious and scientific discourses can intertwine. He challenged the Western norm of separating religion from science, asserting that Islam inherently integrates both. For Mashriqi, scientific

[768] ‘IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement’, sec. Hindustan Times wrote ‘The Khaksar Menace’ on 12 October 1939.

inquiry was not only compatible with Islamic teachings but also a means to validate them. He believed that science wasn’t a separate domain of knowledge but rather a testament to the truths embedded within Islam. This perspective not only validated the teachings of Islamic thought but also served as a counter-narrative to the Western assertion of superiority. In championing this viewpoint, Mashriqi tackled the prevailing notion of Western scientific dominance. He posited that Islam did not need to undergo the religious-secular dichotomy that characterized the Western Enlightenment era, as the integration of faith and reason was already intrinsic to Islamic philosophy. By emphasizing this, Mashriqi sought to elevate Islam's stature in the global discourse, challenging the idea that the West held a monopoly over scientific and intellectual progress. This narrative allowed Mashriqi to reclaim a sense of pride and identity for the Muslim community, reminding them of their rich intellectual heritage and urging them to see science as a continuation of Islamic teachings, rather than a separate or foreign entity.

Mashriqi’s view of science, paradoxically, echoed the very Western modernity he sought to transcend. His perspective seemed to resonate with the West’s separation of science and religion, even as he emphasized Islam's intrinsic fusion of the two. The notion of the ‘Muslim World’ was moulded by two primary influences. Firstly, the emergence of nation-states repositioned Indian Muslims as a minority, sparking a longing to connect with a wider global Muslim community. This sentiment was amplified by nostalgia for their pre-nation-state prestige. Second, Western scientific progress and colonization in North African Muslim regions invigorated the Muslim quest to assert their dominance. Modern tools like the telegraph and steamship, besides boosting imperial control, also posed challenges. These innovations linked disparate communities, allowing rapid information sharing. Affordable printing, propelled by the telegraph, expanded media in colonies, keeping Muslims informed of global happenings. This era heralded the birth of a ‘transnational Muslim identity’.

Conclusion

Allama Mashriqi’s ideology was shaped significantly by the emergence of the ‘Muslim World’, a concept born from the rise of nation-states and Western colonization in regions like North Africa. Technologies like the telegraph and steamship revolutionized communication, creating a modern interconnected Muslim identity, while enhancing imperial control. This era also witnessed Indian Muslims transitioning to a minority within the nation-state framework, igniting a desire to reconnect with the broader Muslim community, fuelled by nostalgia for past prestige. As Europe promoted Christian independence within the Ottoman Empire, the concept of the ‘Muslim World’ evolved alongside. This concept was further shaped by nineteenth century Christian nationalism, and the colonial-era census in India, which religiously categorized populations and sparked debates over the ‘decline’ of Muslim civilization, placed figures like Mashriqi at the heart of these discussions.

The colonial era’s categorization of religions in India and subsequent debates on the decline of Muslim civilization further entrenched Mashriqi within this complex discourse. While colonialism had a significant impact on Muslim societies, attributing separatism solely to it oversimplifies the intricate narrative. The Islamic paradigm was influential among modern Indian Muslim leaders, deeply rooted in Islamic historical discourse. However, British colonial tactics, such as ‘divide and rule’, also exacerbated religious disparities, pushing towards political division.

Mashriqi's progression into the 1940s illustrates a transition from pan-Islamic ideals to national sovereignty. His life and work exemplify the dynamic balance between individual agency and broader societal forces, demonstrating the complexity of the era’s political, religious, and colonial influences.

Attributing the Partition merely to the Islamic paradigm overlooks the multifaceted realities of the time. The political milieu, combined with government strategies, magnified religious distinctions into political identities, perhaps equally or even surpassing the influence of the Islamic paradigm. Though colonial scripts shaped numerous societal facets, the individuals within these narratives maintained their autonomy, continuously adapting and sometimes transcending imposed limits. Mashriqi's life and work serve as compelling evidence of this dynamic balance.

Allama Mashriqi's unique and influential role in colonial India offers a profound representation of the complex currents that led to the Partition. His ideological journey and political activism encapsulate the multifaceted socio-political and religious dynamics of the era. Mashriqi's stance, deeply rooted in both Islamic philosophy and contemporary political thought, mirrored the tensions and aspirations of a society grappling with colonial rule and its own evolving identity.

Mashriqi's approach, blending religious tenets with modern political ideologies, reflects the larger struggle within the Indian Muslim community as it navigated the pressures of colonialism, the desire for self-determination, and the quest for a unified Muslim identity. His leadership of the Khaksar movement and his controversial yet significant contributions to the political discourse highlight the challenges and contradictions of that period. In many ways, Mashriqi's life story and his political and ideological shifts are emblematic of the broader narrative of Indian Muslims during the colonial era. He embodies the complexities of a community torn between tradition and modernity, the push for independence, and the realities of colonial division. His journey through these tumultuous times provides invaluable insights into the forces that ultimately culminated in the Partition of India, making him a pivotal figure in understanding this critical juncture in South Asian history.

Chapter 5

PARTITIONS: Colonial Policies, Practices and Perceptions
Resolving the Problem of *Difference*

This chapter undertakes a critical examination of how partitions, deeply embedded in the consciousness of colonial subjects and thus transformed into structural elements, originated from colonial strategies employed in nation-state formation. Central to these strategies were specific census frameworks and the creation of representative institutions, which effectively segmented subject populations into defined majorities and minorities. These administrative manoeuvres extended beyond mere bureaucratic formalities; they played a pivotal role in shaping identities and influencing the political landscape within colonized regions. This discourse highlights the transformative and constitutive nature of colonial governance technologies, revealing how they indelibly imprinted the notion of partition onto the collective consciousness of colonial subjects, rendering these divisions as palpable and definitive as physical borders.

My comparative study situates partition within the overarching framework of ‘technologies of governance’, as applied in colonial India and mandate Palestine while tracing the genealogy of conflicted subjectivities of the Indian Muslim ‘minority’ and the Jewish ‘minority’. The study explores the historical trajectory of the concept of partition, focusing on how the ‘minority question’ evolved during colonial rule and significantly influenced the partition process. This process, deeply embedded within the framework of the newly emerging nation-state system, was fundamentally driven by representative politics. It fostered a perspective where populations were segmented into minorities and a majority, instigating a view that perceived minorities as inherently vulnerable in this divide. Subsequently, these minorities asserted their identity by forming themselves into distinct nations. Significantly, since the genesis of such nations was stringently predicated on

primarily religious differences, the resultant nations constituted were fundamentally religious in nature. This examination reveals how sustained political strategies of differentiation eventually culminated in the birth of religious nationalism, reshaping communities into divided, partitioned entities.

Partition, as we understand it today, emerged as a modern imperial discourse along with a figure of 'minority', which coincided with the advent of 'representative politics'. So, in its modern sense there is no possibility of partition unless the 'the nation state' makes an appearance with its 'legal and diplomatic' accoutrements, normalising partition 'as an inevitability'.[769] In colonial India and mandate Palestine, by shaping the 'minorities and a majority' conflict as essentially an internal one, the colonial discourse complicated the genealogy of partition in relations between Britain and its colonies within an imperial context.

Partition was integral to the process of day-to-day colonial governance. It was not simply an act that took place at the end of colonial rule, there was a 'structural logic' at work, producing conducive conditions for partition. In this context, 'structural logic' refers to the deep-seated divisions within these communities, which manifested not only as theoretical constructs but also as tangible, real-world separations. Originating in the colonial era, these divisions went beyond simple geographical demarcations, profoundly influencing the social and political fabric of the respective societies. This concept links back to the argument that both mental and physical partitions are integral to understanding the full scope and impact of these divisions.

Partition was certainly the single most defining moment in the history of India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine, and it continues to define their present.[770] The act of

[769]O'Callaghan, 'Genealogies of Partition; History, History-Writing and "the Troubles" in Ireland'.
[770]Gerald James Larson, *India's Agony over Religion* (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1995), 182–83.

partition in India and Palestine analysed as structural underscores it being a multi-layered process, relentlessly remaining in a state of flux, persistently triggering further sub-partitions within numerous levels of partitioned states. Framing as a structure, partition stop being a moment in the past, it remains a state of permanent present, 'Past-in-presentness of partition as a history that is not done with, or refuses to be past'.[771] Since partition is a process, once it takes place, it remains in progress, so the conflict that accompanies partition never comes to rest. When the Palestinian scholar Sari Nousseibeh pleaded to his compatriots that further partition to bring a state of Palestine into existence 'was not worth further blood and mayhem',[772] he did not appreciate the fact that partition was already structured, it had begun a life of its own which may have little connection with the circumstances of it coming to be. So, regardless of reasons for partition, its consequences set the future course for further processes of incessant partitions.

The overall colonial policies and practices, particularly the conceptualization of 'minorities', provided a foundational rationale for partition, a narrative that shaped and justified the division. However, as some historians argue, in the context of South Asia, partition was not an inevitability; history could have unfolded along various alternative paths. In each scenario, a 'small number of shifts', 'tipping points', 'political gambles', and 'mistaken assessments' at crucial junctures could have led to a drastically different outcome.

Yet, the process of partition unfolded on two parallel tracks - the mental partitions that had already taken root and were embedded within the social landscape, and the physical partitions that, while bearing an enormous cost, were arguably less destructive than the potential havoc the mental partitions could wreak on society if left unaddressed. When referring to 'partition', I am using the term interchangeably to encompass both its physical

[771]Priya Kumar, 'Testimonies of Loss and Memory: Partition and the Haunting of a Nation', *Interventions* 1, no. ii (1999): 201–15.
[772]Sari Nusseibeh, *What Is a Palestinian State Worth?* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

and mental dimensions. In this context, the term captures the tangible division of territories as well as the intangible divisions within the societal psyche and social landscape.

I propose that research on partition cannot be considered complete without factoring in the role of mental partitions. The dual nature of partition – both as a mental construct embedded in society and as a physical event, a contingent reality with significant consequences – is central to understanding its impact. By situating partition in its duality and connecting it with the troubled history of the colonial construction of 'minorities' as tools of governance in colonial India and mandate Palestine, we deepen our understanding of the 'ontologies of the present'. This approach not only examines the tangible consequences of partition but also probes into the profound psychological and societal impacts, thereby offering a more nuanced comprehension of its historical and contemporary significance.

Although partitions have always been local, it cannot be understood if studied in an isolation. It has been argued that partition was conceived by 'neo-imperial thinkers' as part of a larger endeavour to reinvent the fading British Empire and to meet twentieth century challenges of new realities. The genealogy of partition traces 'the networks of British imperial thought, movements, and policymaking' – borrowing diverse techniques of colonial policies and practices from one part of the empire to meet needs of another, carrying along 'the authority of the English government'.[773] Situating partition as 'both intensely local and fundamentally transnational', Sinanoglou argues that partition emerged across the British empire as an outcome of the 'imperial secondment and transfer.'[774] The 'imperial secondment and transfer' only meant that the 'colonial officials' passing through different colonies, carried with them the knowledge of colonial policies and practices, intrinsic to imperial governance, structuring partition, in the local political landscape.

[773]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 61.
[774]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 156.

My thesis on partition as a structural phenomenon challenges the mainstream historiography that predominantly views the partition in South Asia as an unintended consequence of high-level political manoeuvres as Ayesha Jalal argues,[775] and it equally questions the narrative that it was the Zionists whose manoeuvring prompted partition in mandate Palestine as Moti Golani claims.[776] This perspective overlooks the crucial aspect that the major impetus for bringing communities to the brink of physical partition was, in fact, a partition that had already occurred in the collective mindset. This mental partition laid the groundwork for the eventual physical division, suggesting that the latter would have been unthinkable without the former. To fully grasp the complexities of partition, it is essential to recognize the significant role played by the mental division in precipitating the physical one. This understanding not only reframes the historical narrative but also offers a more comprehensive analysis of the enduring effects of partition on the societies involved.

Emergence of 'Minority' Rendered Partition a Structure

J. A. Laponce claims that 'minority' is 'a subjective condition' of a constituted group, which considers 'itself a minority'.[777] Prior to the colonial rule, local communities did not think of themselves as minorities. Benjamin White's study of the emergence of minorities in French Mandate Syria is so far the only study in the colonial subjection, in which he examines colonial conditions which produced 'minoritisation' in French Syria.[778] Political developments in colonial India and Mandate Palestine followed similar logics and processes to those White describes in his study of colonial Syria. The French could only see the Syrian society fragmented into religious divisions; hence, they administered its population through categorising it into religious communities, the demographic strength of those religious

---

[775] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 1985.
[776] Golani, '"The Meat and the Bones": Reassessing the Origins of the Partition of Mandate Palestine'.
[777]J. A. Laponce, *The Protection of Minorities* (University of California Press, 1960), 4.
[778]Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (EdinburghUniversity Press, UK, 2011).

communities transpired them into ‘minorities’ and a ‘majority’.[779] The same could be said about the British discourse in colonial India and in Mandate Palestine, both shared the genealogy of the emergence of ‘minorities’. Underscoring the ‘numerical inferiority’ of Syrian Christians, the French justified their rule in Syria as claiming to be ‘the only thing standing between Syrian Christians and massacre’.[780] In short, the colonial regime created conditions for the emergence of ‘minority’ consciousness among numerically smaller communities, through its specific practices such as census taking exercises, and electoral reforms, in which the subject population started thinking of itself as ‘minorities and a majority’, though, those ‘categories’ remained ‘subjective’.[781] I confine my study of partition to tracing the genealogy of the emergence of religious identity-based ‘minorities’, which in due course eventuated into ‘nations’. For those minorities, it was the newly acquired status of a ‘nation’, which introduced ‘partition’ as one of its solutions. I examine related debates featuring within the emerging ‘nationalist discourse’ of Muslims in colonial India and Zionists in mandate Palestine to elucidate the constitutive nature of colonial ‘technologies of governance’. With the formation of colonial states in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ‘the modern nation state’ became a globalised condition.

The very colonial concept of separating communities, through partitioning territory into separate nation-states as one of the political solutions to ethno-religious conflicts, has come under scrutiny by scholars who are making use of the comparative framework, situating their research within the broader trans-colonial context of the British Empire. The phenomenon of partition with its imperial roots has emerged as ‘the itinerant transnational paradigm’.[782] T. G. Fraser’s work is unique in offering a narrative coalescing three partitions of territories – Ireland, Palestine and India - all three governed by the British. Any reference

[779]White, 43.
[780]White, 43.
[781]White, 209.
[782]Dubnov and Robson, *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*.

to India is otherwise conspicuous in Israel/Palestine historiography by its absence. Apoplectic debates around the events of 1948 have been taking place unabated[783] producing dozens of monographs but none framed it in a wider imperial context, or engaged with the Indian experience of the British colonialism and placing it alongside the Palestinian encounter with the British imperialism, until Arie Dubnov produced an edited volume with Laura Robson, *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*. He argues that it was within the larger context of the British Empire, the very concept of 'partition' was perceived, whose genealogy traces 'its entanglement with the careful institutionalization of imperial privilege at the heart of an emerging twentieth-century international order'.[784]

Partition was conceived by 'neo-imperial thinkers' as part of a larger endeavour to reinvent the fading British Empire and to meet twentieth century challenges of new realities. The 'colonial officials' passing through different colonies, carried with them the knowledge of processes and practices of partition intrinsic to imperial governance.[785] The genealogy of partition traces 'the networks of British imperial thought, movements, and policymaking' – borrowing diverse techniques of colonial policies and practices from one part of the empire to meet needs of another,[786] carrying along 'the authority of the English government'.[787] Situating partition as 'both intensely local and fundamentally transnational',[788] Sinanoglou argues that partition emerged across the British empire as an outcome of the 'imperial secondment and transfer'. Partition was conceived and advanced by the colonial 'officials who drew both on their own experience on the ground in multiple territories and on prior British imperial partitions. Legions of administrators both in Palestine and in London,

[783]Morris, *1948*; Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition*.
[784]Dubnov and Robson, *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, 25.
[785]O'Callaghan, 'Genealogies of Partition; History, History-Writing and "the Troubles" in Ireland'.
[786]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 172.
[787]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 61.
[788]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 156.

thought through the Palestine problem by placing it side by side with other imperial situations that seemed to them similar in critical ways'. Emergence of the very idea and then detailed plans of partition in Palestine originated from those colonial officials who were 'thinking across but also, crucially, working across the empire'.[789] Significant as it may be, the idea of partition had already gained currency in the European thinking which contributed more in advancing partition as a solution to problems within the emergence of the 'nation state form'.[790]

'Partition' as a form of 'minority protection' was not the colonial concern only. To analyse the concept of partition, it needs to be situated in Europe, where various 'linkages' and permutation of events around the creation of 'nation-states' produced the 'minority protection' discourse to constitute a new Europe, free of minorities.[791] It was the British perception that native majorities could not possibly be trusted with the protection of minority rights.[792] This provided a cogent basis for suggesting partitioning of Palestine and transferring Arabs out of the Jewish nation-state. The British colonial regime viewed the concept of 'minorities protection' as important since it was with their collaboration, the British Empire had ruled colonies.[793] The imperial discourse of 'minority protection' had made its way into the colonies. Mohammad Ali Jinnah invoked the British practice of humanitarian interventions in the name of 'protecting minorities' and pleaded the British that if the British could intervene in Armenia to protect minority rights, 'why should it not be right for us to do so in the case of our minorities in Hindustan if they are oppressed?'[794]

[789]Sinanoglou, 156.
[790]Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', 291.
[791]Moses, 261.
[792]Moses, 282.
[793]Moses, 260.
[794]Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, 19.

The historical correlation I seek between a 'nation' conceived of a 'minority', and 'partition', contingently emerging as one of its solutions, situating the intimate and structural relation between the idea of a 'nation' and the concept of partition within the limits of secularity[795] - as determined by 'multiple modernities'.[796] It was modernity that facilitated conditions conducive for the marginalisation of communities, producing 'minoritisation' in Europe as well as in colonies. Constituted by colonial 'technologies of governance', minorities also acquiesced, imagined, and subjectified themselves into existence, though some preferred not to be catalogued as a minority. In the case of Coptic community in the early twentieth century Egypt, when their leadership presented the idea of Coptic being a separate community constituted as a minority, the vast majority of them refused to be a minority, viewing themselves as an integral to the Egyptian nation.[797] It was the same story with the Arab Jews of Iraq who in 1920s, also declined to be identified as a minority, preferring to be part of the broader Iraqi Arab identity,[798] though, Assyrians and Kurds opted for a minority status.

Partition: A Way Forward

The modern concept of partition emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, where the notion of a 'minority' and its right to 'self-determination' became integral to the discourse of international politics. This concept, viewed as a method to contain conflict, posited that separation could bring conflicting communities to the negotiating table and

[795]Philip Gorski, 'Secularity I: Varieties and Dilemmas', in *A Secular Age beyond the West: Religion, Law and the State in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Mirjam Künkler, Shylashri Shankar, and John Madeley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 34.
[796]Gorski, 38.
[797]Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age*, 66–69.
[798]H. Müller-Sommerfeld, 'The League of Nations, A-Mandates and Minority Rights during the Mandate Period in Iraq (1920–1932)', in *Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East* (Brill, 2016), 265.

potentially resolve disputes.[799] Michael C. Horowitz encapsulates this perspective, suggesting that 'if it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state'.[800] In a similar vein, amidst intractable 'religious identity-based' conflicts and resultant violence, B.R. Ambedkar advocated for 'demographic homogeneity',[801] arguing that the 'partition' of India would result in the creation of two homogeneous nation-states.[802]

However, the actual outcomes of partitions have often diverged from their theoretical justifications. In many cases, the intermingling of conflicting communities was so extensive that even after population transfers, partition did not result in the creation of homogeneous states as envisaged. Despite being framed as a tool for 'atrocity prevention',[803] partitions, paradoxically and tragically, have frequently led to further divisions and conflicts.[804] This reality underscores the complexity and often unforeseen consequences of partition as a political solution, highlighting the gap between theoretical constructs and the realities they produce on the ground.

Framed in analogous terms, Fraser's study concentrates on the development of the concept of partition as a 'problem-solving' mechanism within 'the complex triangular relationship' involving two conflicting political factions and colonial authorities, who acted as arbitrators between them.[805] Fraser's analysis delves into the intricate and multifaceted processes that made partition a reality, particularly highlighting the instances where it faced

---

[799]Chaim D. Kaufmann, 'When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century', *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1 October 1998): 120–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539381.
[800]Michael C. Horowitz, Alex Weisiger, and Carter Johnson, 'The Limits to Partition', *International Security* 33, no. 4 (1 April 2009): 203–10, https://doi.org/10.2307/40207157.
[801]Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', 271.
[802]B. R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan* (Bombay: Thacker And Company Limited Rampart Row, 1941), 217.
[803]Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', 257.
[804]Moses, 257–58.
[805]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 2.

resolute opposition.[806] Some scholars assert that the 'political and cultural processes' leading up to 'partition' should be understood primarily within the framework of religious identity-based politics, juxtaposed against the secular 'national' binary.[807] In my examination of partition, I probe into the genealogy of how the conflicting claims of rival communities were shaped and influenced by imperial policies and practices.

The concept of segregating communities based on ethno-religious identities was deeply rooted in policies like the 'protection of religious minorities', which were ingrained in Indian local politics through the mechanism of representative politics.[808] The practice of dividing political representation along religious lines, aimed at fragmenting 'indigenous political power', was a cornerstone of imperial ideology. This approach consistently hindered the possibility of self-rule by the overwhelming majority, under the pretext that the 'minority was in the way'.[809] This imperial strategy not only reinforced divisions but also systematically obstructed the path to self-governance by leveraging minority concerns.

Federalism: Circumventing Partition

While the concept of the 'nation-state' was not as prominent in colonial India as it was in Europe,[810] the influence of British rule in shaping the 'nation-state form'—thereby rendering the continuation of 'non-nation-state dynastic' forms increasingly implausible—cannot be overlooked. However, it would be simplistic to view the colonial political system of India as inexorably progressing towards the 'nation-state' model, disregarding the various events and alternatives that could have diverted the path to partition. Indeed, there were

[806] Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb, eds., *Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; Delhi, India; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[807] Haimanti Roy, 'A Partition of Contingency? Public Discourse in Bengal, 1946-1947', *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 6 (2009): 1355–84.
[808] Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 158.
[809] Sinanoglou, 171.
[810] Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'Federalism as State Formation in India: A Theory of Shared and Negotiated Sovereignty', *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 31, no. 5 (2010): 553–72.

viable options that offered an alternative to the ‘nation-state’, such as the concept of a ‘federative state formation’, which might have prevented partition.

In colonial India, ‘federalism’ was proposed as a solution to the challenge of minority protection within a ‘nation-state’, conceptualized more as a process of state formation than a constitutional arrangement. The idea of a federation revolved around negotiating a shared yet ‘divided sovereignty’,[811] an idea that failed to resonate with the Congress leadership. Rather than entertaining the notion of sharing ‘sovereignty’ with the Muslim minority, the Congress sought to forge a single nation from a conglomerate of diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities.

Although the ‘federative state’ form, with its emphasis on integrating ‘diverse constituent units’ and accommodating an ‘aggregate of heterogeneous entities’,[812] appeared well-suited to India’s complexities, the nation-state model—distinct from its European counterpart—ultimately prevailed. This outcome reflects a specific historical trajectory wherein the nuances of Indian socio-political context and the potential for alternative state formations were overshadowed by the dominant narrative of nation-state formation.

Federalism in colonial India and mandate Palestine emerged against the backdrop of subject populations being categorized into ‘minorities and a majority’, where minorities were resistant to majority rule, and both communities were intricately intermixed. Defined as ‘an arrangement’ that accommodates ‘two or more self-governing communities’ within the ‘same political space’, federalism was seen as an effective means to reconcile the conflicting claims

---

[811]Rudolph and Rudolph.
[812]Rudolph and Rudolph.

of 'minorities and a majority', particularly in the context of increasing 'identity-based demands'.[813]

As an alternative to partition in colonial India, a federal arrangement could have potentially averted the religious identity-based violence that accompanied partition. This possibility was notably illustrated by the Cabinet Mission, which drew upon the federated structures of the 1919 and 1935 Acts. The Mission's proposal for federation as a key element of constitutional reforms in the 1940s marked a historical juncture where 'federation' emerged as a serious possibility, and partition appeared to be a distant prospect.[814] Despite these considerations, the three centuries of imperial rule in colonial India ultimately culminated in the formation of two nation-states. In the current era, the geographical expanse of colonial India encompasses three distinct nation-states, with the potential for more in the future. This outcome underscores the fluid nature of political boundaries and the enduring impact of colonial legacies on the region's geopolitical landscape.

During the period leading up to Indian independence, the concept of 'Dominion status' was a significant point of discussion in defining India's relationship with the British Empire. As outlined in the Statute of Westminster Act of 1931, Dominions were defined as 'autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status ... though united by a common allegiance to the Crown'.[815] The British wanted India, upon achieving independence, to become a Dominion. Once partition materialized, both newly formed nation-states of India

[813]Wayne Norman, *Theories of Federalism: A Reader*, ed. Dimitrios Karmis, First edition (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1–2.
[814]Sanjib Baruah, *India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 210–11.
[815]Harshan Kumarasingham, 'THE "TROPICAL DOMINIONS": THE APPEAL OF DOMINION STATUS IN THE DECOLONISATION OF INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CEYLON', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 23 (2013): 223–45.

and Pakistan were envisioned as ‘Dominions’, allowing Britain to retain influence without the burdens of costly and increasingly ‘unpalatable direct rule’.[816]

The emergence of India and Pakistan as ‘Tropical Dominions’, a term distinguishing them from the ‘Kith and Kin’ settler Dominions, added complexity to the already ambiguous British conception of Dominion status. Following partition, India was perceived as the ‘Expedient Dominion’, needing Dominion status, while Pakistan, regarded as the 'Siege Dominion', chose to join ‘the British Commonwealth’, albeit briefly from 1947 to 1950 and 1947 to 1956, respectively. The Indian political elite, viewing ‘freedom through the system of Dominion’, adopted a pragmatic approach to independence. By accepting Dominion status, they provided the British with what they most desired, continuing the ties to the Empire under a new guise.[817] Conversely, the Pakistani political elite perceived ‘Dominion status’ as a strategic alliance with Britain, potentially serving as a bulwark against Indian regional dominance. This divergent approach to Dominion status between the two nations highlights the complexity of the post-partition political landscape, where historical legacies, strategic considerations, and differing visions of independence played a pivotal role in shaping the newly formed states’ paths.

Idea of a Nation: ‘a Form of Politics’

The emergence of the concept of a nation in colonial territories marked the advent of a ‘new form of politics’, one that assumed a form markedly different from its Western counterpart. This divergence played a critical role in hindering the success of the ‘federal’ option in India. Despite Mahatma Gandhi’s vocal criticism of modernity and his defiance against Western colonial formations as products of modernity, his approach revealed complexities in his stance. As Ashis Nandy asserts, beneath Gandhi’s spiritual exterior, he

[816]Kumarasingham.
[817]Kumarasingham.

was fundamentally a modernist, committed to the nation-state system. He did not entirely reject European political thought, which underpinned the democratic functioning of government and the modern notion of the state.[818]

The very concept of a ‘nation’ in this new political milieu necessitated the definition of a dominant ethnic/cultural majority in contrast to minorities. This scenario positioned modernity not only as the birthplace of modern governmental rationality but also as the genesis of the ‘minority’ concept. It emerged from the new form of politics engendered by this evolving governmental approach. Thus, the modern nation-state and its attendant political structures, including the notions of majority and minority, were products of a specific historical and ideological context, differing significantly from their Western origins. This divergence fundamentally reshaped the political discourse and dynamics in colonial territories, influencing the pathways to independence and the subsequent formation of nation-states.

The emergence of the ‘Jewish minority’ in Europe and the development of Zionism offer a compelling parallel to the progression of ‘European nationalism’[819] and its adherence to European ideals. Zionism, as a movement, arose from the ‘minoritisation’ of Jews in Europe, a response to rampant anti-Semitism and the threat of assimilation. It represented a collective aspiration to establish statehood, aimed at normalizing and rehabilitating the Jewish community in the eyes of the world.

In colonial India, the situation of the Muslim community presents a different yet instructive contrast. The ‘minority’ status of Muslims, as defined by colonial authorities, significantly shaped their political struggle against the impending rule of the Hindu ‘majority’.

[818]Ashis Nandy, ‘Cultural Frames for Social Intervention: A Personal Credo’, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1984): 411–21.
[819]Yosef Salmon, “The Historical Imagination of Jacob Katz: On the Origins of Jewish Nationalism,” *Jewish Social Studies* 5, no. 3 (1999): 161–79.

This contrasts with the Jewish experience in Europe, where Jews did not possess political power. In India, however, Muslim politics were initially influenced by their historical loss of political power to the British. With no foreseeable opportunity to regain this lost power, traditionally considered a 'Muslim prerogative', [820] Muslim leaders harboured deep apprehensions about becoming subservient to the Hindu 'majority' post-British rule. This fear and the political dynamics it engendered rendered the prospect of partition an increasingly likely outcome.

This juxtaposition of the Jewish minority in Europe with the Muslim minority in colonial India underscores the complex interplay of historical, cultural, and political factors in shaping minority identities and their political aspirations. The unique historical contexts of each group influenced their respective responses to minority status and their pursuit of political autonomy or dominance.

The emergence of the concept of a 'nation' fostered an impulse towards homogenization within the 'nation-state' form of governance. This drive for uniformity often led to the erosion of societal plurality and multiplicity, categorizing the population into distinct minorities and a majority. In both the contexts under study, the notion of 'partition' should be understood as an integral part of the broader study of the 'nation-state', which originally evolved under the pressures of dominating single ethnic cultures.[821]

Understanding the formation of the modern 'nation-state' is crucial to grasping the essence of what constitutes 'a nation'.[822] Notably, in the canonical works of eminent scholars who have delved into the subjects of nation, nationalism, and the nation-state, the issue of

[820] Shaikh, 'Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion'.
[821] Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, 80.
[822] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2Rev Ed edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 368.

'partition' has often been overlooked or not treated as a subject of serious reflection.[823] However, the phenomenon of 'partition' is inextricably linked to the modern concepts of a 'nation' and a 'nation-state'. To fully appreciate the complexities and ramifications of partition, it is essential to study it in conjunction with these concepts. This approach underscores the need to re-examine traditional narratives and frameworks within the field of political science and history, acknowledging that the dynamics of partition are deeply embedded in the evolution and structure of modern nation-states. By doing so, we gain a more comprehensive understanding of how partitions are not merely geopolitical events but are also reflective of the underlying tensions and contradictions inherent in the nation-state model.

The practice of 'partition and transfer of populations' became a state policy before it entered the intellectual discourse.[824] This trend, as noted by O'Callaghan, suggests that 'academically trained' administrators and policymakers, working across different locations within the British Empire, favoured partition as a solution, drawing heavily on their 'imperial experience'.[825] This reliance on imperial precedents was evident in their approaches to addressing the challenges posed by heterogeneous minority populations living within a majority. It is important to recognize that the concept of 'partition' as a means to address the complexities of minority-majority heterogeneity was an intrinsic element of modern European governance strategies, applicable both in mainland Europe and its colonies. This

[823]Joe Cleary, *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15.
[824]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 82.
[825]Penny Sinanoglou, "British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938," *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 131–52.

inclination towards partition persisted, despite its apparent failure to effectively manage the very problem of 'division' it was supposed to resolve – it's supposed 'raison d'etre'.[826]

This historical perspective highlights a critical aspect of colonial governance: the preference for partition as a governance strategy was not just a reactionary measure but a premeditated approach ingrained in the administrative ethos of the time. The implications of this policy choice were profound, not only in its immediate consequences but also in setting a precedent for future governance strategies in both European and colonial contexts. Understanding this context is essential for a comprehensive analysis of partition and its legacy in shaping modern nation-states and their socio-political landscapes.

Divide et Impera – Intrinsic to Imperial Governance

The colonial strategy of 'divide and rule' was a fundamental aspect of imperial governance, as evidenced in historical documents like the cabinet memo of Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, dated 31 January 1940. This memo offers a glimpse into how 'divide and rule' was an essential tool in imperial governance technologies, with Winston Churchill reportedly viewing the Hindu-Muslim conflict as 'the bulwark of British rule in India'.[827] This approach was not just a tactic but an integral part of the colonial administration's efforts to mitigate any threat to its dominance.

The 1905 partition of Bengal is a case in point. This move was designed to weaken the burgeoning radical nationalist movement in Bengal and thwart the emergence of 'an all-India political resistance'.[828] While not officially acknowledged as policy, such 'dividing practices' were central to colonial rule. The effectiveness of colonialism hinged on the

[826]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 82.
[827]Robin James Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-45* (Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 28.
[828]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 158.

acquiescence of the subject population to the colonial regime. As Brueilly notes, the colonial authorities relied on 'a network of indigenous collaborators' to maintain control.[829] The British colonial regime was particularly adept at creating a 'more effective system of collaboration',[830] embedding the notion of 'difference' into the body politic of colonial societies. This strategy involved constructing and emphasizing 'difference', particularly along religious lines, in local communities that had previously managed to coexist despite such differences.

In the broader context of British imperial governance, mandate Palestine presents another example where the genealogy of representative government in colonies is essentially the history of 'minorities'. In India, the evolution of representative government through constitutional reforms led to the emergence of the minority question and ultimately to partition. In contrast, in mandate Palestine, it was the absence of representative government that made partition increasingly likely. The British authorities failed to secure acquiescence from both Jewish and Arab communities to their intended policies.[831]

Thus, partition, as a product of imperial policies and practices, was embedded in various colonial institutions, administrative mechanisms, and knowledge structures. These elements of imperial governance not only facilitated the maintenance of control but also laid the groundwork for the eventual partition of these territories.

The concept of partition in colonial India and mandate Palestine was initially proposed as a means to prevent these societies from descending into civil conflict. Despite efforts to manage the acquiescence of colonial subjects, the practical implementation of partition proved challenging. A British civil servant in Punjab noted the complexity of

---

[829]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 158.
[830]Breuilly, 159.
[831]Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'.

religiously diverse communities, where Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs often shared a common ancestry in villages. He observed the intricate intermixing of these communities, likening them to the blended ingredients of a 'pilau',[832] and questioned the feasibility of creating a homogeneous Muslim state in Pakistan under such conditions. This intermingling of populations meant that partition could not offer a 'clear cut' solution, making the process inevitably 'bitter and bloody',[833] and leaving it unresolved.

Indian Muslims: From Religious Community to Religious Identity-Based Politics

The transformation of Indian Muslims from a religious community to engaging in religious identity-based politics is a complex narrative shaped significantly by British colonial policies in India. The British inadvertently fuelled religious conflicts through the introduction of 'representative' institutions, particularly following the India Act of 1935.[834] This move towards 'democratization' in India deepened religious divisions, ultimately pushing the British, who were reluctant about partition, to concede to partition demands to avert an impending 'civil war'.[835] The overemphasis on the 'two-nation theory' and the quest for a separate 'Muslim homeland' often overshadows the gradual 'devolution of power' through various colonial acts that entrenched 'Hindu and Muslim representation' along religious lines.[836] This long process of 'democratisation' and 'nationalisation' of Indian politics in preceding decades,[837] contributed significantly to the Indian Muslim assertion of identity beyond merely being a religious minority, underscoring their active agency in the political arena.

[832]Hasan, 'Memories of a Fragmented Nation', 14.
[833]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 192–93.
[834]Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, 177.
[835]Talbot and Singh, 2.
[836]Zakaria, *The Widening Divide: An Insight Into Hindu-Muslim Relations*, 36.
[837]Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', 264.

The 1905 partition of Bengal, creating a Muslim majority province, and subsequent constitutional reforms like the 1909 introduction of separate Muslim electorates, bolstered a collective Muslim identity. However, the Muslim community in early twentieth-century colonial India was far from monolithic, presenting a mosaic of intra-Muslim diversity[838] that posed challenges to its leadership and the legitimacy of its nationalistic claims.

Faisal Devji's exploration of the Muslim national movement in India uncovers a fleeting embrace of an 'ecumenical Islam'* as the movement's driving force, suggesting a unique form of Muslim nationalism distinct from mainstream narratives. This 'ecumenical Islam', championed by leaders from the Shia minority, sought to carve out a space within the larger Muslim community, wary of both Sunni and Hindu dominance. This movement, which blurred the Shia-Sunni divide, encapsulated the essence of 'Muslim nationalism', propelling the Pakistan movement but ultimately foundering upon its own success. Devji poignantly remarks that Pakistan's creation marked the 'grave of Islam as an ecumenical religion', with the ironic twist that Islam's 'true home' remained within India's Muslim minority.[839]

The notion of a homogenous 'Muslim nation', rooted in 'ecumenical Islam', was a key argument for Pakistan's creation. Yet, this concept was swiftly abandoned upon Pakistan's establishment, as the Sunni majority redefined the national narrative, side-lining non-Muslims and reducing intra-Muslim diversity to minority status, such as the Ahmadis. This shift highlighted the newly formed state's aversion to pluralism, responding to the complexities of national identity by seeking to erase heterogeneity.[840]

Partitioning British India and Mandate Palestine

---

[838]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 12.

* Muslims, riven by sectarian differences, develop closer relationships based on reciprocal respect. The term is also often referred to efforts towards constituting an organic harmony among different Muslim sects primarily Sunnis and Shias.

[839] Devji, *Muslim Zion*, 247–48.

[840]Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, 3.

Various perspectives exist on the reasons behind India's partition. Narendra Singh Sarila attributes it to geopolitical strategies, suggesting it was a countermeasure against Russian expansion.[841] Other scholars point to British colonial policies and practices,[842] noting that not all partitions in the twentieth century were driven by religious motives. Rajmohan Gandhi highlights the significance of Muslim-majority provinces and the need to address Indian Muslim anxieties to avoid partition.[843] Nicholas Mansergh views it as a result of conflicting nationalist interests, with the British seeking a swift decolonization process.[844] Penderel Moon argues that the British strategy to 'divide and quit' India was primarily an exit strategy, decided even before finalizing the new states' boundaries.[845]

Fraser discusses the role of ancient religious conflicts in colonial India, suggesting that deep-rooted fears and hatreds[846] made partition seem inevitable to prevent an 'undeclared civil war'.[847] He defends Lord Mountbatten's role, stating that by his arrival, India was on the brink of civil war, leaving little room for alternative solutions. By April 1947, even the Congress leadership had reluctantly accepted partition,[848] albeit with hopes of a temporary division and eventual reunification with Pakistan.[849]

Political Intricacies of Partition – The Royal Commission Report (Palestine)

Following a six-month Arab revolt against the mandate's pro-Zionist policies, which resulted in significant loss of life and financial damage, the British government established

[841]Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game*.
[842]Victor Kattan, 'The Empire Departs: The Partitions of British India, Mandate Palestine, and the Dawn of Self-Determination in the Third World', *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 0, no. 0 (20 September 2018): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2018.1514173.
[843]Rajmohan Gandhi, 'Why Partition Occurred: An Understanding', accessed 2 February 2018, http://www.rajmohangandhi.com/why-partition-occurred-understanding.
[844]Nicholas Mansergh, *The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India* (Cambridge University Press, 1978).
[845]Moon, *Divide and Quit*.
[846]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 113.
[847]Fraser, 115.
[848]Fraser, 121.
[849]Hasan, 'Memories of a Fragmented Nation', 14.

the Royal Commission in 1936 to investigate the causes of ongoing violence in mandate Palestine and prevent its recurrence. While its primary focus was to understand the Arab Revolt, the Commission's report proposed a 'two-state solution' to resolve what it saw as a conflict between two irreconcilable national groups, Arabs and Jews. However, the initial partition plan in Palestine resulted in a map with such mixed populations that nearly equal numbers of Arabs and Jews found themselves within territories not designated for them.[850] This led to proposals for Palestinian Arabs to relocate to accommodate a Jewish majority state. The plan included provisions for continued Jewish immigration from Europe, and, recognizing the economic disadvantage of the Arab State, the Commission suggested that the British government provide financial compensation, a small price for the enormous benefit the British were supposed to enjoy from having a 'strategic position in Palestine'.[851]

The Royal Commission Report starkly noted the 'irrepressible conflict' between approximately '1,000,000 Arabs' and 'some 400,000 Jews' within the confines of a small country. Highlighting the profound differences in religion, culture, language, social life, and national aspirations between the two communities, the report described them as 'incompatible'. The Commission, viewing the situation as a deeply rooted 'disease', proposed partition as a 'surgical operation'[852] to separate Jews from Arabs, believing this radical measure to be the only viable solution to the entrenched conflict.

Despite the British government's differing approaches to colonial governance in Palestine and India — recommending partition in the former while striving to maintain territorial unity in the latter — partition emerged as a solution in both cases, deeply

---

[850]John Woodhead, 'The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 18, no. 2 (1939): 171–93, https://doi.org/10.2307/3019878.
[851]Woodhead.
[852] 'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty' (Geneva: The League of Nation, 30 November 1937), 62.

embedded within the colonial administrative framework. Reginald Coupland argued that granting Palestine self-representative institutions would invariably violate one of the terms of the mandate, seeing partition as a means to alleviate ongoing grievances. Contrary to earlier interpretations, Coupland maintained that Jews had always aspired for a state where they would be the majority, even though the concept of a Jewish homeland initially did not imply an eventual Jewish state.

In discussions with the sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff, concerns were raised about partition potentially leading to the creation of two states permanently hostile towards each other. The lack of a natural boundary for division in Palestine was also a significant military concern, with predictions that partition would necessitate the prolonged presence of substantial military forces in the region.[853]

The Royal Commission report advanced the idea of partition even though it was not within the original scope of the commission's terms. The report concluded that partition was 'the only viable solution to the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine'. However, the specific partition plan recommended by the Royal Commission was never implemented. Instead, it laid the groundwork for the partition plan that would emerge a decade later under the auspices of the United Nations. This progression illustrates the enduring influence of colonial governance strategies and recommendations, even when they initially fail to materialize, shaping the geopolitical landscape of the region in the years that followed.

The 'partition proposal' in colonial contexts like Palestine was not solely a political manoeuvre but also had a municipal dimension, much like the federal form, which was itself a 'colonial proposition'.[854] The partition plan was conceptualized primarily as an 'economic

[853] Penny Sinanoglou, *Partitioning Palestine: British Policymaking at the End of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 113–14.
[854]Woodhead, 'The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission'.

federation', with British colonial officials recognizing the impracticality of drawing strategic boundaries in a country as small as Palestine.[855] Under the federal option, the British placed themselves at the centre of the 'federative state formation', supervising relations between Jewish and Arab states.

For colonies such as Ireland, India, and Palestine, the appeal of 'partition', as Coupland noted, lay not just in its potential to separate warring populations but in its prospects for fostering federation, cooperation, and even unity across the empire.[856] This approach sought to first separate these entities from each other before integrating them into the imperial grand scheme of dominions. Thus, partition was seen as a pathway to federation, a means to bring about a settlement between the contending peoples.[857]

In Palestine, the imperial objectives behind proposing a federal state were twofold: maintaining the British Mandate's presence while ensuring the security of a 'Jewish state'.[858] The British viewed their Mandatory role as responsible for protecting 'the Holy Places' and defending both states from external aggression. They also sought to provide the necessary support for the establishment of a self-sustaining 'Arab State', a goal considered highly improbable without British assistance. A technical commission, set up to assess the feasibility of partition, proposed 'economic federalism' due to the overwhelming 'practical difficulties' encountered, doubting the viability of an independent Arab State.[859] The partition of Palestine faced significant political, administrative, and economic challenges, leading to the consideration of federalism as an alternative. This approach was seen as a way to justify the continued British mandate over part of Palestinian territory.

---

[855] Woodhead.
[856] Dubnov and Robson, *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, 59.
[857] Aaron S. Klieman, 'In the Public Domain: The Controversy over Partition for Palestine', *Jewish Social Studies* 42, no. 2 (1980): 147–64.
[858] Woodhead, 'The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission'.
[859] Woodhead.

Federalism in Palestine was initially proposed as a temporary solution to an impasse,[860] facilitating the eventual partition. Similarly, in colonial India, the Cabinet Mission's federal proposal was intended as a 10-year transitional arrangement, aiming to keep the contending communities together. This federal proposal was not envisioned to create a permanent federal state but rather as a precursor to the eventual emergence of two fully sovereign, partitioned nation-states. In response to the Arab reaction to the Royal Commission's partition plan and the technical commission's recommendations, the British government issued a White Paper in 1939, effectively rendering the partition proposals null.[861]

Reginald Coupland's federal scheme for Mandate Palestine did not entail a 'parcellated sovereignty' of a multi-ethnic nature. Instead, it was designed to enforce a gradual transition to a nation-state form, feasible only with the British mandate retaining a significant territorial and security role. Coupland's vision assumed that the Arab and Jewish communities not only could not coexist but also required mediation to prevent conflict. The partitioned territories were thus to be united in a federal formation, subsequently integrating into the British Dominion system.

Oren Kessler contends that Professor Reginald Coupland's proposal for Palestine went beyond mere 'cantonization', advocating for a full partition. As the Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford, Coupland envisioned dividing Palestine into two sovereign entities: an independent Jewish State, akin to Belgium's independence, and an independent Arab state comprising the remainder of Palestine and Transjordania, with autonomy comparable to Arabia's.[862] This marked the first British proposal for partition as a resolution to the Palestine

[860]Woodhead.
[861]Klieman, 'In the Public Domain'.
[862] Oren Kessler, 'Mandate 100 | "A CLEAN CUT" FOR PALESTINE: THE PEEL COMMISSION REEXAMINED', *Fathomjournal.Org*, March 2020.

issue. Unlike the approach to the prolonged Hindu-Muslim conflict in Colonial India, where partition was never proposed and the conflict was viewed through a religious lens, the British interpretation of the Jewish-Arab conflict in mandate Palestine encompassed both racial and religious dimension.

In Palestine, Reginald Coupland attributed partition to a 'clash of national aspirations',[863] highlighting significant disparities in resources between Arab and Jewish communities.[864] This resource inequality, favouring European Jews over Arabs, coupled with British and UN perceptions of European Jews as 'civilizationally superior' to Arabs, heavily influenced the partition debates.[865] In contrast, the British view of Indian Muslims, as described by A. Dirk Moses, was framed by an Orientalist perspective,[866] not assigning 'civilizational superiority' to any community within colonial India. This perspective made the idea of partition less immediately significant in India than in Palestine.

Coupland highlighted the growing inequity in Palestine, exacerbated by the influx of European Jews, and posited that while Arab culture was primarily confined to the intelligentsia, Jewish culture was largely Western.[867] This perspective introduced an Orientalist dimension to the core of the partition debate in Palestine. Coupland underscored the widening gap in the cultural divide between the Westernized Jewish community and the Palestinian Arabs,[868] characterizing the Arab community as predominantly 'Asiatic' and the Jewish community as 'European'. He argued that the partition was the only viable solution to

[863]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 166.
[864]Dubnov and Robson, *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, 169.
[865]Moses, 'Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security', 285.
[866]Moses, 278.
[867]'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 117.
[868]'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 116.

resolve this disparity, advocating even for the 'compulsory transfer' of the Arab population to create a homogenous Jewish State.[869]

However, Coupland's stance on India was markedly different. He strongly opposed partition, recognizing the deep-seated hostility between Hindu and Muslim communities but considering both as 'Asiatic in character', which, in his view, made partition an unsuitable solution. Coupland's contrasting positions on Palestine and India highlight the complex interplay of cultural and historical factors shaping colonial and post-colonial debates on partition.

The Zionist leadership, wary of being the first to accept the partition plan, awaited the Arab response, with Chaim Weizmann indicating a willingness to agree if it promised peace, but he knew that 'the Jewish state was at hand.' Jabotinsky, a Revisionist-Zionist leader, attributed rampant anti-Semitism in Europe to Jews' perpetual minority status, arguing that a sovereign Jewish state would definitively solve the 'Jewish question'.[870] The partition aimed to transform Jews from a minority to a majority, at the expense of Palestinian Arabs.

The report highlighted the Mandate's objective to 'establish the Jewish National Home', assuming that Palestinian inhabitants would embrace Zionism once they recognized the potential of Jewish financial investment to develop their 'backward' country.[871] This partition plan was predicated on the notion that the two nations were at disparate stages of civilization, with 'Western-minded' Jews perceived as more advanced, and Arabs seen as

---

[869]'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 116.

[870] Kessler, 'Mandate 100 | "A CLEAN CUT" FOR PALESTINE: THE PEEL COMMISSION REEXAMINED'.

[871] 'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 53.

living in a bygone era. The report starkly warned of the adverse consequences of merging two distinct civilizations within a single state.[872]

The rationale for partitioning mandate Palestine was reflected in the Royal Commission members' views. Lord William Peel, the Commission's chair and former Secretary of State for India in the 1920s, contrasted Palestinian Arabs with European Jews, suggesting Arabs were challenging to engage with and not of the same 'calibre' or 'standard' as Jews.[873] Reginald Coupland expressed concerns for the survival of European Jews in Palestine as a minority, citing Palestinian Arab resistance to 'minorities'. Sir Laurie Hammond, another Commission member with a background in colonial India, advocated for Jews to introduce 'high civilization' to the 'ignorant, prejudiced' Arab population, a task he deemed exceedingly challenging.[874] Even former British Prime Minister Lloyd George's respect for Jews was tinged with anti-Semitic stereotypes, attributing to them significant influence and 'cunning'. This discourse reveals the underlying racist attitudes that influenced the Commission's deliberations and recommendations.

Transitioning from the partition debates in Palestine, it's crucial to consider how the fear of India mirroring the tumultuous situation in Palestine, albeit on a vastly larger scale, potentially accelerated Britain's decision to withdraw from India. This concern is palpable in various entries found in Viceroy Archibald Wavell's diary, shedding light on the British apprehensions of the time:

---

[872] 'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 58.
[873] 'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 20.
[874] 'Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty', 20.

- On 16 December 1946, Wavell notes: 'Linlithgow … has apparently come to much the same conclusion as I had. … his chief point was that we ought to run no risk of India becoming a second Palestine for us on a larger scale'.
- On 24 December 1946, Wavell records a conversation with Bevin: 'The USA was very worried about India. I pointed out how they had encouraged Congress and pilloried us as imperialists and could hardly expect us to face another Palestine in India'.[875]

These entries suggest that the potential for extensive conflict and the international implications of such a scenario were significant concerns for British policymakers in the lead-up to India's independence. If the prospect of India transforming into another Palestine hastened Britain's withdrawal from India, the tumultuous aftermath of India's partition might have also shaped the British reluctance to pursue a similar partition in Palestine. The challenges posed by the Palestinian mandate were perceived as more complex compared to the decolonization of India. The strategy of 'divide and quit', applied in India, allowed Britain to withdraw swiftly.[876] However, the 'imperative of quitting' deterred a similar approach in Palestine, as partitioning would have necessitated a prolonged British presence to oversee its implementation.

Unlike in India, where partition received eventual consent from major political parties including Congress, in mandate Palestine, the proposal faced staunch opposition from key Arab political factions, indicating that any partition would need to be enforced. Consequently, Britain chose to refer the Palestine Question to the United Nations,[877] leading to a conflict and a partial partition that resulted in the establishment of only one new state.

[875]Archibald Percival Wavell, *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, ed. Penderel Moon, 1st Edition (Oxford University Press, 1973).
[876]Radha Kumar, 'The Troubled History of Partition', *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (1 January 1997): 22–34, https://doi.org/10.2307/20047907.
[877]Elad Ben-Dror, 'The Arab Struggle against Partition: The International Arena of Summer 1947', *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2007): 259–93.

The ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, rooted in the unresolved issue of Kashmir, mirrors the unfinished nature of the partition in Palestine. Following India's division, the British government circulated a Foreign Office document titled *The Future of Arab Palestine*, which indicated that the violent aftermath of India's partition influenced their considerations regarding Palestine's partition. Anticipating the implications of the proposed boundaries for a Jewish state, the British predicted Al-Nakba—the mass exodus of Arabs from the lands that would form the state of Israel. This expectation was based on the assumption that partition in Palestine might lead to a mass displacement of Arabs, similar to the population movements witnessed during India's partition.[878]

European powers, at the outset, were notably invested in establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as enshrined in the Mandate, without granting Palestinians any influence over the decision, thereby placing Arabs in Palestine at a disadvantage according to the mandate's terms.[879] Motti Golani posits that it was actually Zionist leaders who originated the ideas behind both the Balfour Declaration and the Peel Commission's partition plan, before persuading the British to adopt these proposals as their official policy.[880] Reginald Coupland acted as a bridge between the British and the Zionists, advocating for partition,[881] particularly due to his conviction that nascent Palestinian nationalism was incapable of achieving 'responsible self-government'.[882]

In mandate Palestine, the British government favoured partition, whereas in colonial India, they preferred it to remain united. The motivations behind these contrasting approaches were rooted in the specific geopolitical and historical contexts of each region. Despite these

[878]'FO371/68548/E526, OCP(48)3 - "The Future of Palestine," Memorandum by the FO', 10 January 1948, 2, London, The National Archives.
[879]McTague, 'Zionist-British Negotiations over the Draft Mandate for Palestine, 1920'.
[880]Golani, '"The Meat and the Bones": Reassessing the Origins of the Partition of Mandate Palestine', 108.
[881]Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 76.
[882]Dubnov, 77.

differing imperial intentions for colonial India and mandate Palestine, partition occurred in both territories. This outcome underscores how the colonial policies and governance practices had ingrained the seeds of partition within Indian politics, leading to its eventual realization regardless of the initial British preference.

The structural foundation of partition, deeply influenced by colonial governance practices, first took root in the collective minds of communities, eventually manifesting as physical divisions. This process was shaped by the census and millet system, which categorized local populations and solidified religious-based identities; the implementation of representative politics, transforming religious communities into political entities and embedding a sectarian dimension in the perception of populations; and the adoption of the 'nation-state' governance model, delineating the population into defined minorities and a majority. These colonial practices not only institutionalized partition within the administrative framework but also ingrained it in the social consciousness, paving the way for its physical realization.

In contrast to other regions of the Empire, where imperial policies and practices fostered divisions between minorities and a majority, Palestine stood out because British imperialism had crafted a conflicting policy even before its occupation. This policy was then embedded into the Mandate's terms, laying the groundwork for on-the-ground conflicts.[883] Although the League of Nations approved the British Mandate in Palestine, Zionist contributions significantly influenced the drafting of the mandate's terms,[884] shaping the future relationship between British administrations and Zionists. This included defining the

[883]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 155.
[884]McTague, 'Zionist-British Negotiations over the Draft Mandate for Palestine, 1920'.

Zionists' role in the mandate government and granting them considerable influence over land and economic policies.[885]

Britain viewed Palestine as a uniquely challenging territory, distinct from any other it had governed, due to its complex issues.[886] This uniqueness was underscored by the British commitment to establishing a 'Jewish national home' for European Jews, who were outside the 'imagined imperial community', while also promising to protect those adversely affected by this policy. Despite some scholars viewing Palestine as 'a case apart', the mandate's design, which distinguished Palestine from other British colonies,[887] necessitated the introduction of representative institutions to lend legitimacy to the British mandate. This urgency contributed to the eventual emergence of the partition concept.

Every British attempt to implement a representative government in Palestine was met with resistance, as Palestinian Arabs declined to participate in forming a 'Legislative Council' with representatives elected on a partly elective basis.[888] Sydney Moody, a District Officer in Safed, believed the only way forward was through sustained tact, patience, and diplomacy, hoping time would eventually yield a solution.[889] However, the inherent issues inscribed in the mandate's terms made it increasingly difficult to avoid 'overt troubles'. These troubles were embedded within the electoral system, reflected in government statistics, and evident in segregated educational systems and the official millet structure. The recognition of the Jewish Agency and the colonial establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council as representative entities for their respective communities further highlighted the deep-seated divisions fostered by British policies.

---

[885]McTague.
[886]Sinanoglou, 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine', 154.
[887]Sinanoglou, 155.
[888]Friesel, 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'.
[889]Friesel.

Sinanoglou posits that the British focus on establishing 'the ideal of representative government' was the key driver behind 'partition proposals' in Palestine, with the Arab-Zionist conflict playing a secondary role. She suggests that the move towards partition was a consequence of the colonial administration's inability to successfully introduce representative institutions in Mandate Palestine.[890] Coupland, delving into the core of the Palestine issue, identified the 'nationality issue' as central,[891] asserting that 'partition' was the sole method to establish 'self-governing institutions' without breaching any part of the Mandate's obligations.[892] Echoing this sentiment, British Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore highlighted 'nationality' as the critical concern in Palestine. He believed that 'partition' was the solution to alleviate the mutual fears of domination plaguing both communities.[893]

In colonial India, the demand for a separate 'homeland' for Muslims was officially made by the Muslim League in March 1940. By March 1947, with Lord Mountbatten's arrival as the new Viceroy of India, the British began to seriously consider the partition of India. Once the partition became a central topic, it remained a focal point until its realization. In contrast, discussions on partitioning Palestine were intermittent, with the British government formally proposing partition in 1937 and the Zionist leadership endorsing it in 1942. The lack of substantive official discussions on India's partition starkly contrasts with the extensive and often fraught debates over partition possibilities in Palestine.[894]

Notably, the British ultimately rejected the UN resolution on Palestine's partition,[895] despite being the ones to initially propose it. Conversely, in colonial India, they implemented a partition plan they had initially opposed. The extensive history of three centuries of British

[890]Sinanoglou, 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938', 1 March 2009.
[891]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 131.
[892]Fraser, 132.
[893]Fraser, 139.
[894]Chester, '"Close Parallels"? Interrelated Discussions of Partition in South Asia and the Palestine Mandate (1936-1948)', 148.
[895]Chester, 133.

rule in India, compared to the shorter mandate period in Palestine, reveals the complexities and contingencies involved. The protracted imperial deliberations on Palestine's partition ultimately led nowhere, while the hastily executed and ill-conceived partition of India resulted in lasting consequences.

The British government initially set June 1948 as its departure date from India, aiming for 'the definite objective of His Majesty's Government to obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States'.[896] However, they expedited their exit, dividing and leaving India on 15 August 1947. Similarly, August 1948 was designated as the departure date from Palestine, but the British hastened their withdrawal to 15 May 1948. This rapid retreat became a notable aspect of British policy in both territories once the decision to withdraw was made.

Partition: The Problem of 'Difference' – The Cabinet Mission 1946

Amid the strain and exhaustion of the Second World War, in 1942, the British government pledged that once the Indian political leadership united to 'establish a constitutional form of government for an Indian Union or Unions', full independence would be granted to the Indian colony. Reginald Coupland attributed the political stalemate in India to the disparities between Hindus and Muslims, suggesting that these differences were the primary obstacle to achieving full independence. He argued that the Congress party was essentially synonymous with Mr. Gandhi, whom he believed embodied 'the Hindu tradition and the Hindu temperament'. This conflation of Congress with Gandhi, in Coupland's view, significantly undermined the party's ability to represent all Indian communities,[897] thereby legitimizing the Muslim League's assertion as the true representative of Indian Muslims.

---

[896]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 116.
[897] Reginald Coupland, 'The Indian Deadlock', *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 1 (1944): 26–37.

In the colonial setting, partition was deeply embedded within the structure of Indian politics and society, poised for realization not necessarily through its physical manifestation but through the discord it engendered, such as riots and civil strife. It was the logic of the colonial governing system that worked against the Gandhian anti-colonial resistance. Being the product of colonial logic, Gandhi, despite his efforts, could not free himself from this framework to address the 'Muslim question' effectively. The persistence of the 'Muslim' minority question brought Indian politics to a deadlock.

Coupland observed that this stalemate stemmed from the fundamental reality that majority rule, a cornerstone of Western democracy, was inapplicable in India due to the lack of societal homogeneity.[898] He pinpointed the crux of the deadlock to Congress leaders' steadfast commitment to unqualified majority rule and their denial of the Muslim League's legitimacy.[899] For Indian Muslim leaders, the principle of majority rule remained the principal barrier. Thus, any potential Congress-League accord to share power or collaborate in governance was viewed as the sole viable solution to break the impasse.

In March 1946, the British government sent the Cabinet Mission to India with the goal of resolving the political stalemate and overseeing a peaceful transition of power to Indian leaders, all while maintaining India's territorial integrity and moving towards independence. For the British, dividing India was 'never an option'.[900] Reginald Coupland, who had supported the partition of mandate Palestine, warned that partitioning India would be catastrophic not only for the country itself but also pose a danger globally.[901]

Apparently, the Cabinet Mission was tasked with circumventing partition. However, given the way the British addressed the Muslim minority's fear of Hindu majority rule, the

---

[898] Coupland.
[899] Coupland.
[900]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 97.
[901] Coupland, 'The Indian Deadlock'.

notion of partition was inherently embedded in the Cabinet Mission's approach and mindset.[902] Although the Muslim League, under Jinnah's leadership, had articulated the demand for a separate Muslim homeland in the 1940 Lahore resolution, Jinnah's initial acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's federal proposal[903] incited a vehement backlash from his followers, who were driven by intense emotions and motivations. Jinnah's options were already 'savaged tooth and claw by an unthinking mob, fired by blood lust, fear and greed'.[904]

Woodrow Wyatt, a British official working with the Mission and Jinnah, suggested to Jinnah that the Muslim League should tentatively accept the Cabinet's proposal to demonstrate its unfeasibility, viewing it as a preliminary step towards achieving Pakistan.[905] However, Nehru's declaration that the Congress would not be bound by any pre-existing agreements and would address situations as they emerged effectively wrecked the prospect of any possible agreement, unleashing widespread violence. Abul Kalam Azad believed that this breakdown in negotiations significantly propelled India towards partition.[906]

The Partition in Mandate Palestine

The development of 'partition plans' for mandate Palestine shows that the concept of partition held a distinct significance compared to its consideration in India. Lionel George Archer Cust, who served in the Palestine Civil Service from 1920 to 1936, crafted a partition plan that greatly influenced the Royal Commission's final report on the 1936 Arab revolt in Palestine.[907] Cust's perspectives provide a window into the colonial mindset, particularly highlighting the British officials' view of European settlers as inherently superior to the

[902]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 107.
[903]Fraser, 108.
[904]Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 1994, 216.
[905]Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 110.
[906]Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay: Orient Longman Ltd, 1959), 155.
[907]Roza El-Eini, *Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine 1929-1948*, 1 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 317.

natives in colonized regions. He drew parallels between the white settler movement in East Africa and European Jewish immigration to Palestine, suggesting these settlers were from a 'far higher plane of civilization' than the indigenous populations they entered.[908] By comparing native Africans and Arabs in Palestine, Cust revealed a far deeper issue in the analogy between partitioning mandate Palestine and colonial India. This sheds light on the starkly different stances the British adopted in these regions—viewing partition as a viable solution to the 'problem of difference' in mandate Palestine, while opposing partition in colonial India. This contrast underscores the nuanced and often contradictory approaches of British colonial policy, influenced by perceptions of racial and civilizational hierarchies.

In the wider context of reactions to the Holocaust, some Zionists saw the British Mandate in Palestine as a significant barrier to the establishment of a Jewish state. To remove the British from Palestine, Zionist extremist groups like Irgun, associated with Revisionist Zionism, and its offshoot, the Stern Gang or Lehi, resorted to violence against British targets. Lucy Chester argues that the assassination of Lord Moyne by Lehi members in November 1944 effectively halted any 'serious British consideration' of partition.[909] This event compounded the effect of the 1939 White Paper, which had already significantly curtailed the prospect of partition. Sir Edward Bridges' minutes from a Cabinet meeting on 3 November 1944 reveal that Lord Moyne and Sir Harold MacMichael, the former High Commissioner for Palestine, had advocated for partitioning Palestine and granting the Zionists a small, albeit sovereign, state. The assassination of Moyne may have led to the indefinite deferral of the

[908] L.G. Archer Cust, 'CO 733/283/12 - The Future of Palestine', 18 January 1935, London, The National Archives.
[909] Chester, '"Close Parallels"? Interrelated Discussions of Partition in South Asia and the Palestine Mandate (1936-1948)', 141.

Cabinet's consideration of its Palestine Committee Report, which was poised to recommend the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.[910]

When the UN endorsed Resolution 181 in 1947, advocating for the partition of Palestine, the British government chose not to support the resolution. Fraser argues that the British left it to Arabs and Jews to fight it out.[911] That was exactly what Gandhi had asked for in colonial Indian, the British had refused to allow it in colonial India. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin aimed to ensure that, should Palestine be partitioned, King Abdullah of Transjordan would annex the Arab regions.[912] Ironically, after laying the groundwork for partition, the British distanced itself from the process,[913] consistently opposing the establishment of a Jewish or Arab state through force.[914] The widespread religious violence in colonial India by August 1946 convinced both the Congress and the British that a united India was untenable. Conversely, the religious strife in Palestine ultimately led the British to withdraw without partitioning it.

The concept of partition, rooted in the British imperial framework,[915] highlighted 'political contingency' with the period leading up to partition seen as a time ripe with varied possibilities.[916] Roy notes that the Communal Award of 1932 in Bengal led to mass mobilizations along religious lines.[917] The Peel Commission, recognizing the mandate as

---

[910] Michael J. Cohen, 'The Moyne Assassination, November, 1944: A Political Analysis', *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 3 (1979): 358–73.
[911] Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 170.
[912] Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition*, 111.
[913] Ben-Dror, 'The Arab Struggle against Partition'.
[914] Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine*, 1984, 183.
[915] Dubnov, 'The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland', 57.
[916] Roy, 'A Partition of Contingency?'
[917] Roy.

unfeasible, proposed a partition plan due to the 'irreconcilable' nationalist aspirations of Arabs and Jews,[918] deeming it the sole resolution to the impasse.[919]

Partition, as a tool of imperial policy designed to address problem of 'difference' that had evidently divided peoples, can be traced back to the self- subjectification of colonial subjects, ultimately embedding itself in the local political fabric. Nandy observes that colonialism is deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of colonial subjects;[920] thus, addressing 'difference' requires a shift away from colonial identity rather than partition. British imperial policies and practices fostered 'irreconcilable nationalist aspirations' among colonial subjects, and true liberation could only be achieved through the de-subjectification of these colonial identities. To move beyond the colonial era, the 'making' of colonial subjects must be 'unmade', and the ingrained concept of partition in colonial society must be dismantled through the deconstruction of colonial subjectivity.

The World between the World Wars

Grasping the evolving dynamics of the international arena amid the interwar period is pivotal for understanding the rationale behind British policies in colonial India and mandate Palestine. During this era, a profound transformation occurred in the mechanisms of global diplomacy and power distribution, transitioning from a Eurocentric equilibrium to a broader stage of global politics.[921] The impact of two successive world wars fundamentally challenged European hegemony, with the aftermath of the Second World War dismantling the traditional European balance of power framework and giving rise to a new bipolar world order dominated by two superpowers outside Europe. Within this context, British imperial

[918]El-Eini, *Mandated Landscape*, 317.
[919]El-Eini, 320.
[920]Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, 2 edition (OUP India, 2009), 3.
[921]Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 93.

strategies for colonial India and mandate Palestine were formulated, significantly influencing the eventual outcome of British rule and shaping the destinies of India and Palestine.

A defining aspect of the interwar period was the struggle of European powers to maintain their diminishing global dominance. The establishment of the League of Nations represented a strategic compromise, bridging the gap between the fading European balance of power and the rising bipolar world order marked by non-European superpowers. Ostensibly designed to accommodate the new global dynamics, the League aimed to oversee the existing world hierarchy, encompassing independent states (predominantly Western powers), dominions (autonomous communities of white settlers from former colonies), and the colonized regions categorized as colonies and mandates. These entities varied significantly in their political autonomy and influence. While Western colonial powers and the independent dominions held sway over global affairs, colonized regions were stripped of power, segmented into colonies and mandates. This era marked a departure from the 19th-century 'age of nationalism' to the 20th century, characterized by the rise of anti-colonial national liberation movements throughout Asia and Africa. These movements were largely inspired by the nation-state model, challenging the existing colonial order and advocating for self-determination and sovereignty.

With the inception of 'representative institutions', the British India created the conditions for its population to identify themselves as majorities and minorities, although these categories were inherently subjective, embedding the concept of a nation-state, significantly shaping the political and social identities of its populace and giving rise to minority consciousness. This framework in colonial India aligned India's political landscape and institutional development with the nation-state model, often influenced by the Congress' nationalist agenda. The adoption of 'representative institutions' in colonial India marked the

preliminary phase of the nation-state model, pivotal for understanding the transformation of Indian Muslims from a religious minority to a political nation. Indian historiography is rich with discussions on how local politics, shaped by the advent of representative politics, navigated through the complexities of India's future as a nation-state, highlighting the critical role of these institutions in the colonial narrative and the shaping of national identities.

The concept of 'minority' wasn't exclusive to colonial contexts. In the early twentieth century, European nations grappled with 'the minority problem', seeking ways to eliminate ethnographic disparities and problematic populations.[922] The notion of segregating people by ethnicity, religion, or race was deeply rooted in European thought,[923] aimed at crafting a stable world order from a mosaic of national minorities, thus envisaging a uniform nation-state. The advent of nationalism made the ethnic and religious diversity of Europe, which had coexisted for centuries, suddenly problematic, leading to violent conflicts. This perspective wasn't limited to nationalist extremists but was acknowledged as a significant issue by a broad spectrum of European political elites.[924] The complexity of Europe's ethnic and religious mix was perceived as a threat to stability, necessitating measures to mitigate this perceived danger.[925]

The concept of 'nation-state' with clearly defined borders emerged post-World War I, alongside the socio-political categorization of 'minorities'. This era saw religious communities being labelled as 'minorities', reflecting the prevalent religious identity politics.[926] The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 marked a pivotal shift towards 'nation-states', fundamentally altering governance structures. The complexity of multi-ethnic and

---

[922]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 1.
[923]Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (Columbia University Press, 2004), 4.
[924]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 31.
[925]Frank, 31.
[926]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.

multi-religious empires like the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern was replaced by a governance model aiming to represent a homogenized national identity, binding citizens through a unified legal framework.[927] This rise of nationalism became an 'unstoppable force',[928] reshaping Europe into a continent of nation-states.[929] The notion of 'national minorities' emerged, signifying groups distinct from the majority, and posing perceived threats to national unity.[930] This led to the practice of segregating populations to conform to the nation-state model, underscoring the need for a critical re-evaluation of nationalism's role in shaping modern Europe.[931] The nationalist argument that it was a unifying force and represented a 'secular modernity against a resurgent religious fundamentalism,' is in dire need of being historicized.[932]

European imperial powers, with their extensive colonial domains, exported concepts of 'nation', 'nation-state', and 'minorities' to their colonies. Influenced by European approaches to the 'minority problem', David Ben-Gurion asserted in a 1938 Jewish Agency Executive meeting that forcibly transferring Arab populations to establish Israel was not only justified, it was 'moral'.[933] In early 20th-century Europe, 'population transfer' was considered a valid strategy for creating stable nation-states. This approach was evident in the partition and subsequent population exchanges between Greece and Turkey, aimed at forming ethnically uniform states. In cases where communities were already divided along ethnic or religious lines, territorial partition served as a means to formalize these separations, highlighting the use of partition as a tool for segregating communities that were already divided in mindset.

---

[927]Saba Mahmood, 'Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. No 2 (April 2012): 418–46.
[928]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 17.
[929]Frank, 27.
[930]Mahmood, 'Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East'.
[931]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 28.
[932]Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, 2000, 6.
[933]Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Reprint (Oneworld Publications, 2007), xi.

Zionism's core challenge in Europe, addressing the 'Jewish Question', involved transitioning Jews from a marginalized minority to a majority, with Palestine chosen as the locus for this transformation. In contrast, Arabs in Palestine, who constituted the majority, resisted any change that might diminish their status. Similarly, Indian Muslims, designated as a minority within a Hindu-majority India, aspired to establish a nation where they were already in majority. Despite these divisions, the Indian National Congress endeavoured to articulate a vision of Indian nationalism that transcended religious lines, embracing the country's rich mosaic of cultural and religious diversity.

The notion that colonial experiments were later implemented in mainland Europe is often discussed. However, the politics of ethnic differentiation (including Zionism's transformation of a religious community into a nation) and the concept of partition, integral to the nation-state model, were already established norms in Europe before being applied to the colonies. Hannah Arendt highlighted how the emergence of 'minorities' in Europe intensified the continent's 'atmosphere of disintegration', suggesting that the unresolved 'minority issue', involving around thirty million people, contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War.[934] The nation-state model, with its inherent 'minorities issue', led to a fragmented Europe, divided into nation-states, significantly altering the European map. The introduction of the nation-state model in the colonies brought with it the ethos of partition, mirroring the changes seen in Europe. Just as the nation-state model reshaped Europe, it also transformed the post-colonial world's map, indicating a global impact of this political framework. In colonial India, the Congress refused to acknowledge that the 'Muslim minority' even existed 'until it became a running sore, one that could be excised only with partition'. In colonial India, the Congress initially overlooked the existence of a 'Muslim

[934]Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 344.

minority', a stance that persisted until the issue became so contentious that partition emerged as the only perceived remedy.[935]

In Syria, the French sought to impose and sustain a religious political order within a secular nation-state framework,[936] a strategy mirrored by the British in India, where they fostered a political order grounded in religious identity. Gandhi, viewed by Ashis Nandy as a staunch modernist committed to the nation-state model, championed the concept of a nation-state in India.[937] However, Gandhi's vision diverged from the European model, embracing India's cultural and religious diversity. Despite this, the European nation-state ideal, facilitated by the introduction of representative institutions which Gandhi supported, influenced the development of Indian identities during the anti-colonial struggle. Rabindranath Tagore noted the absence of an indigenous term for 'Nation' in Indian languages, suggesting a discord between the concept and Indian cultural context.[938] Yet, Gandhi sought not only to redefine 'nationalism' but to broaden its application,[939] advocating for Hindustani as a national language to foster unity, while critiquing Urdu's association with Muslim religious identity as divisive. This stance, however, alienated Muslims from Gandhi's broader anti-colonial movement, highlighting the complexities of integrating the nation-state concept within India's diverse fabric.

The advent of the nation-state concept introduced a new global order, inherently creating systems of population management where the existence of nation-states inevitably led to the formation of minorities. This dynamic meant that nationalist aspirations could never be fully realized[940] as long as minorities existed, leading to significant population

[935]Panter-Brick, *Gandhi and Nationalism*, 9–10.
[936]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.
[937]Nandy, 'Cultural Frames for Social Intervention'.
[938]Chatterji, *Gandhi and the Ali Brothers: Biography of a Friendship*, 210.
[939]Chatterji, 211.
[940]Frank, *Making Minorities History*, 12.

reorganizations along lines of majority and minority, which in turn defined nation-state boundaries.[941] The mandate system particularly highlighted the concept of 'nation-states in formation', yet India, still under colonial rule, was influenced by these contemporary European ideas. The introduction of representative political institutions marked India's transition from a non-national dynastic empire to the beginnings of a nation-state. Faisal Devji notes that movements like the Khilafat campaign elevated Indian issues to a broader imperial and international stage, suggesting implications that transcended future nation-state borders.[942]

In Syria, post-French withdrawal, the societal fabric had already been redefined with distinct minority groups,[943] a scenario not easily aligned with the previous Ottoman millet system.[944] Similarly, in India, the notion of a Muslim 'minority' had effectively pre-partitioned the country even before the British exit. The example of minority emergence in the French mandate of Syria illustrates that this was not an exclusively British phenomenon but a widespread practice in Europe, reflecting the complex interplay between colonial legacies and the evolving concept of the nation-state.

Influenced by European ideas of nationalism, late nineteenth-century Zionists proposed relocating Jews from Europe to Palestine, a concept that resonated with British colonial administrators who saw potential imperial benefits in moving European populations to distant territories [945] Within Europe, the Jewish community's minority status posed

[941]Frank, 23.
[942]Devji, *The Impossible Indian*, 78.
[943]White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East*, 209.
[944]White, 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'.
[945]Robson, *States of Separation*, 3.

challenges, yet in the colonial context, imperial powers viewed minorities as strategic assets to further their interests.[946]

The colonial authorities were surprised by the fervour of the anti-colonial movement, which was partly fuelled by Gandhi's strategic use of religious symbols and narratives that inadvertently reinforced the colonial framing of Indian society along religious lines.[947] This approach led to heightened tensions between Hindus and Muslims, who, defined by their religious identities, pursued conflicting political goals. During this period, the Muslim community faced considerable disarray, making it challenging to discern a coherent strategy or rationale in their political actions.[948]

In the period between the World Wars, population management emerged as a key focus of modern governance, leading to a continuous redefinition of the relationship between the state and various population segments. Despite the state's claim to represent the entire populace, in practice, the 'majority' often shaped this relationship, marginalizing those not within its scope as 'minorities'. This dynamic set the stage for Indians to perceive their society through the lens of 'majorities and minorities', even though these categories were inherently subjective. Under colonial governance, the 'majority' did not define this relationship, but the apprehension among 'minorities' about potential majority dominance after the British exit was a tangible concern.

When minority groups faced the dominance of a majority within a nation, they often sought separation, giving rise to the concept of partition as a contingent solution. This phenomenon stemmed from the Western notion of secularism, perceived as an exclusive attribute of Western societies, leaving colonized regions to navigate the complexities of

---

[946]Robson, 5.
[947]Gould, *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India*, 84.
[948]Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 74.

‘difference’ and its role in shaping identities. Decolonization involves more than just the physical liberation of territories; it necessitates a profound transformation of colonial mindsets and reconstitution of subjectivities shaped by colonial experiences.

The profound and enduring impact of partition is more comprehensible when viewed as a structural element inherent to the colonial context. Patrick Wolfe’s argument highlights the critical distinction between the ‘liquidation’ of indigenous populations and ‘settler colonialism’ characterized by immigrant settlements, while elucidating their complex interplay.[949] He introduces ‘structural genocide’, a concept arising from varied historical contexts within the imperial sphere, emphasizing that the ‘elimination’ of minorities—or ‘liquidation’ in broader terms—becomes a systemic aspect of colonial subjectification under the nation-state model. Wolfe’s examination of the liquidation of indigenous groups highlights how these notions are entrenched in the collective mindset of settler colonialists, extending to ‘mental liquidation’ and ‘mental partition’ within societal consciousness, propelled by the politics of difference. He posits that the ‘elimination’ of minorities transcends physical actions, embedding itself in the colonial subjectification process. This insight underlines the significance of collective mental constructs in fostering the divisions and turmoil linked with partition, advocating for an understanding of partition beyond mere territorial division to a pervasive colonial legacy-driven mentality. By focusing on the mental frameworks that underpin partition, my work urges a re-evaluation of partition not solely as a geopolitical occurrence but as a reflection of a deep-rooted colonial mindset. These mental constructs contribute to the deep-seated divisions and conflicts that partition instigates, revealing the critical need to grasp partition’s full spectrum, from not just as a geopolitical

[949] Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (1 December 2006): 387–409.

event but also as a pervasive mindset shaped by colonial legacies, to truly comprehend its extensive and lasting effects.

Post-coloniality

In both colonial India and mandate Palestine, it was secular leadership that championed the idea of partition, leading to the creation of Pakistan and Israel, where the Muslim and Jewish minorities, respectively, were transformed into majorities. These movements were initially driven by the actual or perceived repression of these communities. Today, an ironic twist sees religious factions within these majorities gaining political power, and the minorities in both nations facing repression from these transformed majorities.

H.V. Hodson's reflection on the subcontinent's post-partition landscape, highlighting the 'mutual enmity'[950] of its successor states, resonates with the situation between Israel and Palestine. This animosity can be seen as a product of 'mental partitions' ingrained by colonial discourse that emphasized religious differences, solidifying these divisions into the collective psyche and structuring colonial subjectivity. This analysis extends to examining the parallels between the British colonial framework and the post-colonial realities of Pakistan and Israel, where the legacy of partition continues to shape the socio-political dynamics. The persistence of 'religion-based identity politics', a hallmark of colonial strategy, has not only survived the end of colonial rule but has also intensified in the post-colonial era, affecting an increasing array of societal interactions. The journey toward genuine decolonization, therefore, involves more than merely political independence; it necessitates the challenging task of 'de-communalizing' local politics in these post-colonial states, addressing the deep-seated communal divisions that continue to hinder societal cohesion and progress.

[950]Karl E. Meyer, 'The Invention of Pakistan: How the British Raj Sundered', *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 1 (2003): 77–92.

Resolving the Problem of *Difference*

Partition arose as a means to address 'the problem of difference,' yet its repercussions remain unresolved. Initially envisioned as a resolution to minority and nationhood issues, partition instead perpetuated conflicts by opting for separation over accommodation of 'difference'. This approach sanctified a 'political sacred' for the nation, necessitating the erasure of diversity. This enduring crisis of minority status, rooted in colonial governance, persists in post-colonial states like India, Pakistan, and Israel. The management of religious differences, a colonial governance tool, continues to influence these nations. The persistent 'minority question' reflects colonial assumptions and their impact on the political structures of these new states. This study reveals that colonial practices shaped the colonial subject in ways so profound that populations in post-colonial states are still navigating the legacy of colonial subjectification, indicating an ongoing journey towards de-subjectification that is yet to commence. Post-colonial states may celebrate their liberation, but true freedom remains elusive until they embark on the crucial process of de-subjectification.

In the contemporary landscape, often referred to as the 'Muslim world' and consisting of diverse nation-states, Western media frequently spotlights religion-based political violence. This notion of a 'Muslim World', along with the concept of a unified Muslim community, traces back to colonial legacies, particularly those of the British Empire, which governed a substantial segment of the world's Muslim population in the late 19th century. This governance inadvertently laid the groundwork for a unified imagining of the Muslim world,[951] fostering a collective Muslim identity that continues to shape contemporary challenges. Today, Muslims confront the repercussions of this constructed 'Muslim world', dealing with minority issues both within their countries and globally, compounded by the

[951] Aydin.

enduring narrative of communalism in post-colonial states. The idea of 'difference' thus extends globally through the construct of the 'Muslim world' in the nation-state era, amplifying distinctions not just within local or national contexts but across the global Muslim community.

Despite the enactment of the Emancipation bill in Europe, which was intended to grant Jews legal freedoms, Jews continued to be perceived as a minority. In response to these enduring challenges, post the Emancipation bill, Zionism emerged as a movement aiming to liberate Jews from the constraints of European colonial frameworks and establish them as a majority in Palestine. This transition was shaped by a European discourse similar to that which defined Indian Muslims under British rule. The Dreyfus affair highlighted the limitations of Jewish emancipation in post-Enlightenment Europe, where the political ideology of the nation-state often overrode legal protections. Thus, the nation-state paradigm contributed to the 'minoritization' of both Muslims in India and Jews in Europe, underscoring the profound impact of nationalistic structures on diverse communities.

Through comparative research that juxtaposes the experiences of colonial subjectification, and minoritisation on the lines of 'difference' in colonial India and mandate Palestine, we uncover the shared foundations of imperial governance technologies. The colonial state's Euro-centric view relegated religious differences to mere local 'traditions', framing them as discursive constructs shaped by practices such as the census and the millet system, as a system of subject formation, informing the functioning of a colonial state.[952] These practices, integral to colonial administration, transformed 'invented traditions' into daily colonial life, embedding the concept of 'difference' as an inherent structure.

[952]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 185.

Jose Rabasa's insights on the West's Euro-centric imposition of dominance, which led to the erasure of local narratives, reveal a stark contrast in handling 'difference'. Unlike local narratives that embraced diversity, the colonial perspective was marked by an intolerance towards 'difference'. This tendency to reshape the colonial world according to Western perceptions is manifest in the implementation of the census and the millet system. These systems, as discursive formations, played pivotal roles in delineating distinct religious communities, thereby amplifying religion-based political consciousness. The colonial framework inherently perceived religious diversity as a fundamental trait of colonial societies, categorizing communities on religious grounds. This approach necessitated the governance of these differences, eventually leading to the adoption of partition as a strategy to resolve the 'problem of difference', demonstrating a clear lineage from colonial practices to partition's logic.

The colonial approach to managing diversity forced individuals to define themselves within the imposed colonial 'regime of truth'. The effects of this colonial framing did not always align with colonial intentions, revealing flaws in the process of cultural erasure and rewriting. These flaws, however, open avenues for reconstituting identities from indigenous perspectives.[953] In colonial India, Gandhi sought to challenge colonial narratives by crafting an alternative reality grounded in non-violent resistance and satyagraha, presenting a potent counter-narrative to colonial dominance. Yet, Gandhi's involvement with colonial-style representative politics and the nation-state model, despite its indigenized approach, inadvertently contributed to the entrenchment of Muslim separatism. This occurred through the deepening of the 'minoritization' of Indian Muslims, effectively entrenched the concept of partition within the collective consciousness of the Indian Muslim community.

[953]Bill Ashcroft and etc, eds., *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994), 358.

This research highlights how the structural logic of partition, born from imperial constructions and management of ‘difference’, led to the colonial experiences of Muslim communities in India and Jewish communities in Palestine, transitioning from religious to political minorities, illustrating their efforts to shed minority status. Foucault’s assertion that our knowledge’s universality comes at the cost of exclusions and rejections underscores the ‘viciousness’ of colonial knowledge in silencing and excluding.[954]

The British proficiency in making colonial subjects acquiesce to their power in India and Palestine was predicated on the subjects’ acceptance of the colonial ‘regime of truth’, which entailed significant exclusions. This acquiescence wasn’t passive; it was an active engagement with colonial governance technologies, constructing a ‘regime of truth’ that led subjects to self-objectify, presenting a significant challenge to envisioning alternative subjectivities. Foucault reminds us that a key political challenge today is the ‘politics of ourselves’.[955] By dissecting the ‘hidden structures of power’ behind colonial subjectification, we can begin to deconstruct these impositions and pave the way for post-colonial realities, transcending the confines of colonial subjectivity.

To dismantle the deeply ingrained colonial subjectivity, marked by an intolerance to difference, we must explore and deconstruct the obscured power dynamics that have shaped mental constructs during the colonial period. This process involves a critical examination of the subconscious underpinnings of knowledge that have historically led individuals to accept and internalize colonial dominance. By questioning and overturning the colonial narratives that have prescribed these truths, we initiate a significant transformation. By valuing diversity and promoting an inclusive understanding of identity beyond colonial constraints, we can

[954]Foucault, *Freedom and Knowledge*, 11.
[955]Michel Foucault, ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth’, *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (1993): 198–227.

facilitate the deconstruction of colonial subjectivity, moving towards a more equitable and pluralistic world.

Mapping the 'System of Formation'

In my research on the colonial construction of difference, particularly through mechanisms like the census in colonial India and the millet system in mandate Palestine, I uncovered how these colonial discursive practices reinforced a Euro-centric notion of religion-based local identities, effectively crystallizing these identities into being. These practices not only facilitated the emergence of distinct religious communities but also their autonomy in self-definition, embedding a deep-seated intolerance for difference within the communal landscapes. This intolerance, a direct outcome of colonial discourse, functioned akin to a mental partition among religious communities. Even without manifesting as physical divisions, these discursive practices had the potential to incite societal unrest as profoundly as actual partitions would.

Through this research, I aimed to critically examine religion-based identity as a product of discursive formation, charting the 'system of formation' such as the census, the millet system, and the advent of representative politics. These elements collectively shaped the colonial framework, rendering religion-based identities not only visible but operationally significant. The findings from this research underscore the profound impact of colonial practices on shaping, and in many ways partitioning, the mental landscapes of religious communities within colonial societies.

In conclusion, the British colonial legacy has profoundly and complexly influenced the development and intensification of religious divides, leaving lasting effects on both regional and global political landscapes. This is most apparent in the partitions of India and Palestine, where religious identities were deeply entwined with emerging nationalist

movements, leading to the formation of new states defined along religious lines. Marked by severe violence, massive population movements, and the rise of entrenched hostilities, these partitions have left a legacy of unresolved political, territorial, and communal conflicts, continually challenging international diplomacy and the internal governance of these regions.

Crucially, the role of mental partitions in leading to physical partitions cannot be overstated. To thwart or forestall or roll back the physical manifestation of partition, it is essential to confront the divisions that have already taken root in the collective psyche of communities. In this context, the need for reconciliation becomes paramount. The mental partitions embedded within collective consciousness must be actively dismantled and deconstructed. Failing to address these underlying mental divisions means that physical partitions are merely outward expressions of these pre-existing internal separations. This highlights the critical need to resolve the psychological and perceptual splits within communities, which is fundamental in preventing these divisions from crystallizing into physical demarcations. This understanding of partition, encompassing both its mental and physical dimensions, is essential for navigating the complexities of these historical events and their enduring impact on contemporary society.

In the concluding remarks of this chapter, it is imperative to acknowledge that even in post-colonial states, the rampant instances of partition and the associated violence demand a concerted effort towards reversal. This necessitates a process of reconciling the mental schisms that are collectively harboured within bifurcated communities. The enduring legacy of colonial divisions continues to manifest in these post-colonial contexts, often in the form of deep-seated communal divides and recurring conflicts. Addressing these issues requires more than just political or territorial resolutions; it calls for a profound engagement with the psychological divisions and perceptions that have been ingrained within these societies. Only

through a comprehensive approach that encompasses both the physical realities and the mental constructs of partition can we hope to achieve lasting peace and stability in these regions. This understanding of partition, with its roots in colonial history and its branches extending into contemporary societal dynamics, is crucial for comprehending and addressing the ongoing challenges in post-colonial states.

Conclusion

Ranjit Guha characterizes the colonial experience as ‘a form of human suffering’, akin to an injury that, though healed, still retains a trace of the original pain.[956] This thesis focuses on the depth of this pain and suffering, examining how it lingers in the post-colonial states of Pakistan and Israel, manifesting as ongoing conflict. Summarizing the colonial legacy in the subcontinent, H.V. Hodson remarks on the inherited misfortune of mutual enmity between the two successor states.[957] This shared colonial experience has similarly shaped the post-colonial condition of both Israel and Palestine, underlining the profound and lasting impact of colonialism in these regions.

Situating within the overarching framework of the imperial ‘technologies of governance’, I conducted a comparative analysis of partitions in colonial India and historical Palestine, focusing on narratives that transcend mere geographical divisions. The study explored the profound impacts of colonialism, the complexities of identity, and governance challenges, shedding light on how partitions have become deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of communities. ‘Consciousness’ here refers to a shared awareness and reflection on one’s environment and experiences, crucial for understanding how communities perceive their identities and internal divisions, shaped by colonial legacies and historical events.

The colonial regime’s algorithmic technologies for governing native populations, such as the Census culture and the colonial Millet system, resulted in the bifurcation of communities along lines of difference. Coupled with institutions like representative politics, these systems enabled the colonial regime to govern through and accentuate these differences.

[956]Ranajit Guha, ‘A Conquest Foretold’, *Social Text*, no. 54 (1998): 85–99, https://doi.org/10.2307/466751.
[957]Meyer, ‘The Invention of Pakistan’.

This transformation evolved religiously constituted communities into politically invested ones, fostering Muslim and Jewish nationalisms.

Influential figures like Inayatullah Mashriqi didn't just personify these differences; they actively advanced them. Movements such as the Khilafat movement and Christian-Muslim Associations illustrate the process of subjectifying and solidifying colonial identity formations. This entire process deeply ingrained the concept of 'difference' in the consciousness of diverse communities, leading to mental partitions among the population. The idea of physical partition emerged as a perceived solution to these entrenched mental divisions.

The preceding chapters of this thesis have outlined how colonial strategies and individual actions contributed to a mindset where separation seemed inevitable. Understanding this historical context is critical for comprehending the enduring impact of colonial legacies on contemporary conflicts and the subsequent challenges in nation-building and conflict resolution.

The findings of this study reveal that the physical partitions in India and Palestine, while resulting from specific circumstances, were overshadowed by more persistent mental divisions ingrained in the collective consciousness. These divisions are not isolated incidents but the culmination of a complex interplay of structural forces, significantly influenced by the introduction of the nation-state concept. This systemic shift profoundly affected perceptions of identity, particularly in terms of minority and majority group dynamics. The emergence of Pakistan and Israel from British colonies in 1947 and 1948, respectively, epitomizes the shared colonial experience and its lasting impact on their post-colonial realities. The parallel struggles of the All India Muslim League and the Zionist movement in addressing minority

political challenges highlight similar patterns in their historical narratives, revealing a common thread in their journeys towards nationhood.

The concept of 'partitioned minds' in this research suggests that the true divisions in colonial societies extended beyond physical boundaries to encompass psychological barriers ingrained in the minds of colonial subjects. These mental divisions, moulded by the forces of colonialism, nationalism, and the changing global landscape, often had more profound implications than the physical divisions themselves. This study fills a critical gap in the research on the partitions of India and Palestine by examining how structural elements, rather than mere happenstance, predominantly shaped these historical events. To address the enduring impacts of these partitions, the focus must shift from simply redrawing territorial lines to addressing deeper psychological and cultural divisions. This approach not only deepens our historical understanding but also sheds light on the ongoing challenges faced by post-colonial societies in grappling with the enduring effects of partition.

This research examines the complex dynamics of partition in colonial India and historical Palestine, extending beyond mere geographical delineations to reveal the underlying mental and social constructs within communities. The investigation uncovered how colonial practices, notably census-taking and the implementation of the millet system, played a pivotal role in redefining local governance structures. These practices significantly influenced the concept of the nation-state, leading to the formation of distinct majority and minority groups that surpassed mere demographic categorization. The study highlighted the profound impact of these colonial methodologies on the societal and political landscape, reshaping the way communities perceived themselves and interacted with each other.

This research explores the transformation of pre-colonial societies in India and Palestine under colonial rule, focusing on the significant shifts in identity and societal

organization. In these regions, the colonial establishment of national identities and the creation of nation-states often disregarded existing cultural diversity, leading to a reorganization of societies based on simplified, often arbitrary criteria. The colonial practice of categorizing populations significantly influenced the development of majority-minority dynamics, embedding lasting divisions that continued to shape post-colonial periods.

The study sheds light on how the concept of the nation-state, especially in the realm of representative politics, inadvertently promoted religious identity politics. This phenomenon was evident in the way religious communities were transformed into political entities, thereby cementing religious nationalism in emerging nations like Pakistan and Israel. This development posed challenges to the cultivation of secular national identities within these newly formed states. Colonial methods in nation-state formation deeply ingrained the concept of partitions not only in the territories but also in the consciousness of the colonial subjects, making it a structural aspect of their identity and perception. These methods were characterized by the implementation of specific census processes and the establishment of representative institutions, which were pivotal in forming distinct majority and minority groups within the colonized populations. This deliberate administrative stratification significantly influenced their identities and political dynamics, fostering divisions in the minds of the subject population.

The partitions of India and Palestine were not mere executions of imperial intent, but evolved as intricate outcomes of colonial policies and practices. These partitions were not singular, isolated events that coincided with the culmination of colonial rule; rather, they represented prolonged, complex processes comprised of numerous, contingent and sometimes disjointed acts. Collectively, these acts contributed to the political fragmentation of communities in both regions, marking the departure of British rule. This analysis reinterprets

partition as a dynamic, multi-layered structure that continually evolves, often leading to additional subdivisions within these newly formed societies. Once initiated, these partitions developed their own distinct momentum, shaping the political landscapes in ways that deviated significantly from their original contexts. Therefore, it is essential to acknowledge that the lasting consequences of partition have played a crucial role in determining the historical and future trajectories of these regions, far beyond their initial causes.

The territorial divisions of colonized lands into separate states, often guided by these colonial-era majority-minority classifications, have enduring effects on the political and social dynamics of contemporary nation-states. Far from being mere historical remnants, these divisions continue to actively shape and influence political interactions in these independent states.

A key factor in this process was scientism, functioning akin to an algorithm in the division of colonized societies. Scientism's focus on empirical categorization and classification provided a systematic and methodical approach for colonial powers to organize and govern colonized populations. This algorithmic method of dividing societies into distinct groups based on various criteria often led to the establishment of rigid social and political hierarchies. Such systematic divisions, both territorial and psychological, were pivotal in defining the colonial experience and its persistent impact on these societies, particularly in shaping the partitioned mindset of the subject populations.

A critical aspect of this research is the comparative analysis of India and Palestine, highlighting the diverse responses to colonial rule in these regions. The research examines the role of the Khilafat movement in India as a significant influence in shaping Muslim identity. It also focuses on the involvement of Allama Mashriqi in Palestinian issues, emphasizing the profound interconnections between these two regions, united by their shared experiences of

colonialism. This analysis offers a nuanced understanding of the historical and cultural complexities that shaped the post-colonial landscapes of India and Palestine.

The modern notion of the nation-state, a concept prevalent in contemporary global understanding, emerged relatively recently, significantly shaped by colonialism and historical developments in regions like India, Palestine, and Europe. Before colonial influence, India and Palestine were not unified nation-states but rather collections of diverse communities, each with unique identities and ways of life. In India, this diversity was reflected in a multitude of princely states and local communities, each with its own governance, language, and customs. Similarly, Palestine was characterized by a rich tapestry of religious and ethnic groups, coexisting under the larger framework of imperial powers like the Ottoman Empire. This historical backdrop is essential for understanding the evolution of nation-states in these regions and the complex socio-cultural landscapes they encompass today.

This study brings forth the concept of 'partition potentiality', which becomes crucial when tied to the colonial 'politics of difference'. This colonial approach, which involved categorizing, controlling, and often dividing populations, reveals that tensions and divisions within emerging nation-states are deeply ingrained in societal structures, transcending mere superficiality. The colonial policies deeply entrenched these differences, resulting in pronounced divisions between majority and minority groups, paving the way for potential future conflicts and partitions. This insight sheds light on the complex challenges faced by post-colonial societies, illustrating how the concept of the nation-state often amplified existing societal divisions. More than just tools of administration, colonial strategies played a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics and identities of newly established nation-states.

Tracing the genealogy of the structural logic of partition through examining the colonial constitution of 'difference' led to its emergence at a time when the new imperial

world order unfolded a nation-state system. It was the emergence of 'nation state' as a world order which regulated partition 'as an inevitability'.[958] Nation-state form in itself was developed on the construction of difference. Nation states were governed through representative politics, dividing their populations into minorities and a majority, minorities being perceived as vulnerable within the 'minorities and a majority' divide.

This thesis contends that the existing conflicts and divisions within nation-states are not merely remnants of a colonial past, but active outcomes shaped by colonial practices. It emphasizes the necessity of acknowledging historical roots and ongoing influences to devise effective, long-term solutions for these societies. The research reveals that colonialism's role in delineating majorities and minorities was pivotal in forming the nation-state, significantly affecting the political and societal structures of post-colonial nations. These colonial imprints laid the groundwork for how these new states organized politically and represented their populations, often leading to tensions and conflicts between majority and minority groups.

The study introduces the concept of 'enduring partition potentiality', a lasting effect of colonial divisions and identities that continues to shape the dynamics and narratives of nation-states. It calls for a re-evaluation of the historical evolution of nation-states and stresses the need to address contemporary challenges rooted in post-colonial contexts. This approach highlights the importance of a deeper, strategic understanding to effectively address the lasting impacts of colonial legacies on nation-states.

Moreover, the thesis proposes that partitions influenced by colonial practices extend beyond geographical lines, influencing the societal psyche and creating 'potentialities of partitions'. These enduring divisions necessitate a comprehensive understanding and approach to reconcile mental and social divides, fostering a future where diversity is not only

[958]O'Callaghan, 'Genealogies of Partition; History, History-Writing and "the Troubles" in Ireland'.

acknowledged but celebrated, and the lessons of history inform a more unified world. The research advocates for transcending past divisions and moving toward a future where shared humanity overrides the constructed divides of history, urging a collective effort to reimagine and reshape our global society.

This thesis reframes the understanding of partition, not merely as an outcome of the colonial state's governance practices but as a manifestation of latent potentialities that emerge under specific conditions. This approach aligns with broader theories in social psychology and historical determinism, which suggest that significant events often arise from underlying societal and psychological forces, rather than solely from immediate catalysts. The study focuses on the 'politics of difference', a critical element in both colonial and post-colonial societies, where the emphasis and institutionalization of group distinctions foster a worldview marked by dichotomies, predisposing societies to conflict. This analysis is applicable across various historical and contemporary settings, where underlying tensions and divisions, frequently a legacy of colonialism or structural inequalities, persist beneath a facade of calm. The lack of overt conflict does not necessarily imply harmony; it may instead reflect a fragile equilibrium, sustained by unresolved tensions essential for understanding societal conflicts and relations.

This research contends that even if physical partition had not occurred in India, the deeply rooted mental divisions within the society would have continued to shape social interactions as though a geographical partition existed. Significantly, the concept of Pakistan existed in the consciousness of Indian Muslims well before its actual creation. The study focuses on the idea that mental partitions often precede and are more enduring than physical divisions, profoundly influencing socio-political dynamics. These mental partitions, critical in

driving inter-communal conflict, are ingrained in the population, affecting perceptions and interactions more significantly than physical boundaries.

The recent Gaza War, marked by its shocking inhumanity and devastating ferocity, starkly exposes the deep mental divisions among the inhabitants of both the Jewish state and the occupied Palestinian territories. This conflict, characterized by its extreme intensity, serves as a glaring manifestation of these severe, deeply entrenched mental partitions. Reflecting longstanding divisions and shaped by colonial politics, it perpetuates and heightens tensions in the region. These entrenched mental divisions have fostered an atmosphere rife with animosity and misunderstanding. Therefore, addressing these deep-seated divisions is essential for any meaningful resolution. This conflict underscores the need to specifically target these mental barriers within the peace process, a crucial step towards easing ongoing tensions and achieving lasting peace. The resolution of this conflict hinges on addressing the deep-seated mental divisions that have evolved over generations.

Addressing the physical aspects of the conflict alone is insufficient; a primary focus must be placed on the ingrained mental partitions within the affected populations. By understanding and tackling these mental divisions, we can hope to resolve the enduring physical and political divisions that define the Israel-Palestine landscape. This approach emphasizes the importance of addressing mental partitions as a foundational step in resolving the longstanding issues in the region.

This research focuses on the complex history of partitions in the Indian subcontinent and Palestine, marked by a confluence of colonial manoeuvres and deep cultural legacies. It emphasizes that partitions, whether manifesting as mental divisions or territorial demarcations, are fundamentally social and political constructs. Central to understanding and resolving these divisions is the recognition that while physical partitions are visible, it is the

underlying deeply entrenched constructs within collective consciousness that are the root cause and more enduring. While these partitions have solidified over time into seemingly immovable structures, their constructed nature implies that they can be deconstructed and dismantled.

The study acknowledges that partitions, both mental and physical, are the result of historical and colonial manipulations, especially the colonial emphasis on ‘difference’. These deep-rooted mental divisions have shaped cultural identities and social interactions, extending well beyond physical borders. The research thus posits that the key to dismantling these divisions lies primarily in addressing the mental partitions. By focusing on reconciling the psychological rifts and resolving the internal conflicts within communities, the physical partitions will gradually lose their significance and relevance. In essence, once the mental barriers are dismantled, the physical partitions will naturally wither away.

My research underscores the importance of understanding colonial subjectivity, advocating for placing the ‘colonized subject’ on equal analytical footing with the ‘colonized territory’ in studies of decolonization. Inspired by Avi Shaliam’s assertion that a historian's primary role is to evaluate rather than merely record, this thesis emphasizes the urgent need for the decolonization of the subject. It evaluates how Muslims in colonial India and Jews in mandate Palestine were shaped by colonial forces, a legacy that persists in their post-colonial states. The colonial constitution of difference remains a defining feature in both post-colonial states, making it challenging for these groups to develop alternative post-colonial identities. This situation complicates efforts to diverge from the dominant narrative that religious identity-based politics is the natural order in South Asia and the Middle East.

Today, religious identity politics poses a significant obstacle to building modern, progressive nation-states and secular, democratic societies in these regions. My research

advocates for a relational approach, fostering dialogues that bridge local histories in India, Pakistan, and Israel, challenging totalizing claims and moving beyond viewing each case in isolation.

Echoing Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's call for 'decolonizing the mind', this thesis argues for the cultivation of an indigenous culture that facilitates de-subjectification. Decolonizing the mind involves a comparative analysis of the world which is shaped by experiential consciousness, or 'practical experience', rather than pure consciousness. Emancipation from colonial subjectivity is possible through a specific mode of critical anatomy of truth, emphasizing that liberation is not merely something to possess, but something to actively practice.

This thesis transcends a mere reflection on the past; it serves as a clarion call for proactive, transformative change. It prompts a reimagining of societal constructs, advocating a shift from perpetuating historical divisions to fostering a world united by shared aspirations and mutual respect. At the heart of this transformative vision lies the dismantling of deep-rooted mental partitions, envisioning a society that thrives on its diversity, not merely endures it.

In conclusion, this research not only deepens our historical understanding but also illuminates the path forward for post-colonial societies. It envisions a future where the scars of partition guide us towards a global community rooted in empathy, collaboration, and a collective effort to transcend past divisions. By recognizing these partitions as social constructs and working actively towards their dissolution, we pave the way for a more inclusive, empathetic global society, where diversity is celebrated as a collective strength. This future envisions historical divisions supplanted by bridges of understanding, leading to a world where shared humanity is the cornerstone of a harmonious global community.

Building on this vision, the mosaic of Indian Muslims' historical consciousness presents a poignant case study in the complexities of reconciling with the past. Nostalgia within this community emerges not merely as wistful reminiscence but as a profound yearning for the resplendence of bygone eras. This emotive longing, deeply woven into the collective memory, is a direct legacy of colonial policies—characterized by the rigid stratification of communities, the introduction of separate electorates, and the politicization of communal identities. Such impositions, by highlighting religious divisions, have spurred a sense of loss and alienation, propelling Indian Muslims towards an idealized past perceived as more unified and influential. This nostalgic yearning, set against the backdrop of colonial restructuring, has inadvertently nurtured communal discord and intolerance, reflecting the broader tumult instigated by the colonial reconfiguration of Indian society. The resulting 'partitioned minds'—a metaphor for deep-seated divisions—present a formidable challenge to deconstruction, further complicated by the intricate layers of Muslim nostalgia intertwined with the socio-political echoes of partition. In this crucible of history and memory, the echoes of the past resonate, shaping the contours of identity and belonging, and presenting a significant obstacle to the envisioned future of integration and harmony. As this thesis concludes, it compels us to confront the shadow cast by colonial politics of difference, challenging us to move beyond the allure of a glorified past and towards a future where unity and understanding can flourish amidst the rich mosaic of our diverse global heritage.

Bibliography

Ahmad, Aziz. 'Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muslim India'. *Studia Islamica*, no. 13 (1960): 55–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/1595240.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq. *Jinnah: His Successes, Failures and Role in History*. Gurgaon, Haryana, India: Penguin, 2020.

———. *The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy Through Secret British Reports and First Person Accounts*. Rupa & Co, 2011.

Ahmed, Muhammad Saleem. 'Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and the All-India Muslim League'. In *The All India Muslim League, 1906-47*, edited by Nadeem Shafiq Malik. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1997.

'Aksriyat Ya Khoon & Bait Ul Mal Published by Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi Leader of Khaksar Organisation, OC-29/07 POL, R-II, 141310 Z, Government of India, Home Deptt, POLL Sec, File No. 74/2/40', 1940. National Archives of India, New Delhi. https://indianculture.gov.in/flipbook/131566.

Alavi, Hamza. 'Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology'. In *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State*, edited by Anita M. Weiss, First Edition. Vanguard Books Ltd., 1987.

'Al-Islah, Weekly, 16 September 1938'. *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

'Al-Islah, Weekly, 17 November 1938'. *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

'Al-Islah, Weekly, 26 September 1938'. *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

'Al-Islah, Weekly, 29 November 1938'. *Khaksar Tehrik, Icchra, Lahore*, n.d.

Allen, Amy. '"Dependency, Subordination, and Recognition: On Judith Butler's Theory of Subjection"'. *Continental Philosophy Review* 38, no. 3–4 (1 October 2005): 199–222.

———. 'Foucault and the Politics of Our Selves'. *History of the Human Sciences* 24, no. 4 (1 October 2011): 43–59.

Al-Mashraqi, Allama Inayatullah Khan. *Isharat*. Ghazni Street, Urdu Bazar, Lahore, Pakistan: Al-Faisal Nashran and Tajiran Books, 2015.

Al-Mashriqi, Inayat Ullah Khan. 'Human Problem (A Message to the Knowers of Nature)', July 1951.

Ambedkar, B. R. *Thoughts on Pakistan*. Bombay: Thacker And Company Limited Rampart Row, 1941. https://ia800700.us.archive.org/18/items/thoughtsonpakist035271mbp/thoughtsonpakist035271mbp.pdf.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. Ed. Verso Books, 2006.

'Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom'. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1946. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/angtoc.asp.

Anjaria, Dhara. *Curzon's India: Networks of Colonial Governance, 1899-1905*. Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2015.

Ansari, Sarfraz Hussain. 'Politica Thought of Inayatullah Mashriqi'. Unpublished hD Thesis, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, 1996.

Appadurai, Arjun. 'Number in the Colonial Imagination'. In *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, edited by Peter van der Veer and Breckenridge, Carol A. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.

'Appendix: Covenant for the League of Nations Showing the Preliminary Reported Draft and the Covenant as Finally Adopted at the Plenary Session'. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York* 8, no. 3 (1919): 127–54.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Jewish Writings*. Reprint edition. New York: Schocken Books, 2008.
———. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken Books, 2004.
'Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.', 28 June 1919.
Asad, Prof Talal. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Ashcroft, Bill, and etc, eds. *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*. London ; New York: Routledge, 1994.
Askary, Hussein. 'Pan-Islamism Is the Death of the Nation!' *EIR*, 13 July 2012. http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2012/eirv39n27-20120713/index.html.
Aydin, Cemil. 'Imperial Paradoxes: A Caliphate for Subaltern Muslims'. *ReOrient* 1, no. 2 (2016): 171–91.
———. *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017.
Ayoob, Mohammed. 'Gandhi's Role in the Partition of India'. *Foreign Affairs*, 19 October 2017.
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. *India Wins Freedom*. Bombay: Orient Longman Ltd, 1959.
———. *India Wins Freedom*. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009.
Bains, J. A. 'Census of India, 1891 : General Report, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Census Commissioner for India'. Census. London: Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893. https://archive.org/details/cu31924023177268.
———. Review of *Review of Census of India, 1911; Vol. i. Report*, by E. A. Gait. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 77, no. 6 (1914): 672–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/2340307.
Balakrishnan, Gopal. *Mapping the Nation*. New Edition. London; New York: Verso Books, 2012.
Bamford, P. C. *Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements*. K.K. Book Distributors, 1925.
Barkey, Karen. 'Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model'. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19, no. 1/2 (2005): 5–19.
Barkey, Karen, and George Gavrilis. 'The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy'. *Ethnopolitics* 15, no. 1 (2016): 24–42.
Barraclough, Geoffrey. *An Introduction to Contemporary History*. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
Barrier, N. Gerald. *The Census in British India: New Perspectives*. 1 edition. Manohar Publications, 1981.
Baruah, Sanjib. *India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Bashir, Shahzad. 'Eurocentrism, Islam, and the Intellectual Politics of Civilizational Framing'. *InterDisciplines 2: Journal of History and Sociology* Issue: Done with Eurocentrism? Directions, Diversions, and Debates in History and Sociology (2017).
Ben, N.B., ed. *Wit and Wisdom of Gandhi*. New Delhi: New Book Society of India, 1960.
Ben-Dror, Elad. 'The Arab Struggle against Partition: The International Arena of Summer 1947'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2007): 259–93.
Bentwich, Norman. 'The Legal System of Israel'. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (1964): 236–55.
Berger, Peter L. *The Social Reality of Religion*. N. e. edition. Penguin: Penguin, 1973.
Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Reissue edition. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Beverley, H. 'Report of the Census of Bengal 1872'. The Bengal Secretariat Press, 1872.
Bhagat, R. B. 'Census and the Construction of Communalism in India'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 46/47 (2001): 4352–56.
———. 'Hindu-Muslim Tension in India: An Interface between Census and Politics during Colonial India: Paper Presented at the IUSSP Seminar on the Demography of Conflict and Violence, Held in Oslo, Norway, 8 - 11 November 200', n.d.
Bhargava, Rajeev. 'The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism'. In *The Future of Secularism*, edited by T.N. Srinivasan, 20–53. New Delhi; New York: OUP India, 2008.
———. 'The Secular Imperative'. *India International Centre Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1995): 3–16.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 'Two Concepts of Secularism Reason, Modernity and Archimedean Ideal'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 29, no. 28 (9 July 1994).
Biswas, S. C. *Gandhi: Theory and Practice, Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*. Reprint edition. South Asia Books, 1990.
Bose, Sugata. 'Nation, Reason and Religion: India's Independence in International Perspective'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 31 (1 August 1998): 2090–97.
Brass, Paul R. 'Elite Interests, Popular Passions, and Social Power in the Language Politics of India - Paul R. Brass'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27, no. No. 3 (May 2004): 353–75.
———. *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*. First Edition. London ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
———. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.
Braude, Benjamin, ed. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition, with a New Introduction*. Abridged edition. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.
———. 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System'. In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition, with a New Introduction*, edited by Benjamin Braude. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.
Breuilly, John. *Nationalism and the State*. 2Rev Ed edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.
Bromwich, David. Review of *Review of The Useful Cobbler: Edmund Burke and the Politics of Progress, ; Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics*, by James Conniff and Stephen K. White. *Political Theory* 24, no. 4 (1996): 739–46.
Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915–1922*. Cambridge Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Brown, Wendy. *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
———. 'Tolerance and/or Equality? The "Jewish Question" and the "Woman Question"'. *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 15, no. 2 (9 July 2004): 1–31.
Bunton, Martin. *Colonial Land Policies in Palestine 1917-1936*. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2007.
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Butalia, Urvashi, ed. *Partition: The Long Shadow*. Viking, 2015.
———. *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2000.
Butler, Judith. *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997.
'CAB 128 (10)', n.d.
Caygill, Howard. *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance*. London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. ‘Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of “Subaltern Studies”’. *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 14 (1995): 751–59.
Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. 2nd edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
———. ‘Secularism and Tolerance’. In *Secularism and Its Critics*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition. Delhi: OUP India, 2000.
———. *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*. Columbia University Press, 2004.
Chatterji, Rakhahari. *Gandhi and the Ali Brothers: Biography of a Friendship*. 1 edition. New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2013.
Chattha, Ilyas. *Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot 1947-1961*. Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2011.
Chawla, Muhammad Iqbal. ‘Mountbatten’s Response to the Communal Riots in the Punjab, 20 March to 15 August 1947: An Overview’. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 4 (October 2016): 683–706. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186316000225.
Chawla, Sandeep. ‘The Palestine Issue in India Politics in 1920s’. In *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, edited by Mushirul Hasan, 43–58. Monohar, 1985.
Chester, Lucy P. ‘“Close Parallels”? Interrelated Discussions of Partition in South Asia and the Palestine Mandate (1936-1948)’. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.
———. ‘On Creating a “Palestinian Pakistan”’. *Sh’ma, A Journal of Jewish Ideas*. Accessed 3 September 2012. http://www.shma.com/2011/05/on-creating-a-%E2%80%98palestinian-pakistan%E2%80%99/.
Cleary, Joe. *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Cohen, Michael J. *Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948*. Princeton University Press, 2014.
———. ‘The Moyne Assassination, November, 1944: A Political Analysis’. *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 3 (1979): 358–73.
Cohn, Bernard S. *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996.
———. *The Bernard Cohn Omnibus by Bernard S. Cohn*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Copland, Ian. ‘From Communitas to Communalism: Evolving Muslim Loyalties in Princely North India’. In *Colonialism, Modernity, and Religious Identities: Religious Reform Movements in South Asia*, edited by Gwilym Beckerlegge, 1st edition. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Coupland, R. *The Cripps Mission*. Oxford University Press, 1942.
———. *The Future Of India Report On The Constitutional Problem In India*. Oxford University Press, 1943.
Coupland, Reginald. ‘The Indian Deadlock’. *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 1 (1944): 26–37.
Cust, L.G. Archer. ‘CO 733/283/12 - The Future of Palestine’, 18 January 1935. London. The National Archives.
Daechsel, Markus. ‘Scientism and Its Discontents: The Indo-Muslim “Fascism” of Inayatullah Khan al-Mashriqi’. *Modern Intellectual History* Vol. 3, no. No. 3 (2006): 443–72.
Deepak, J. Sai. *India, Bharat And Pakistan*. New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2022.

Devji, Faisal. ‘From Minority to Nation’. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.

———. *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013.

———. *The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptations of Violence*. First Edition. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012.

———. ‘The New World in the Old: An Alternative History of the Religious State’. *Hurst Publishers* (blog), 15 August 2013. https://www.hurstpublishers.com/the-new-world-in-the-old-an-alternative-history-of-the-religious-state/.

Dhulipala, Venkat. *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Diamond, Jeffrey M. ‘The Orientalist-Literati Relationship in the Northwest: G.W. Leitner, Muhammad Hussain Azad and the Rhetoric of Neo-Orientalism in Colonial Lahore’. *South Asia Research* 31, no. 1 (1 February 2011): 25–43.

Dirks, Nicolas B. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. 1 edition. Chicago: Routledge, 1983.

Dubnov, Arie. ‘The Architect of Two Partitions or A Federalist Daydreamer: A Curious Case of Reginald Coupland’. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.

Dubnov, Arie M. ‘Notes on the Zionist Passage to India, or: The Analogical Imagination and Its Boundaries’. *Journal of Israeli History* 35, no. 2 (2 July 2016): 177–214.

Dubnov, Arie, and Laura Robson, eds. *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*. 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.

Edwardes, Michael. *The Last Years of British India*. Hassell Street Press, 2021.

El-Eini, Roza. *Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine 1929-1948*. 1 edition. London ; New York: Routledge, 2005.

Evans, Walter Bennett. *The Genesis of the Pakistan Idea, A Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations*. Karachi: OUP, 2013.

Fairey, Jack. *The Great Powers and Orthodox Christendom: The Crisis over the Eastern Church in the Era of the Crimean War*. Histories of the Sacred and the Secular 1700-2000. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Fieni, David. ‘French Decadence, Arab Awakenings: Figures of Decay in the Arab “Nahda.”’ *Boundary 2* 39, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 143–60.

‘File 22/85/36 Pol. 1936, Home Department’, 1936. New Delhi. National Archives of India.

‘File 31/1/36 Pol. 1936, Home Department’, 1936. New Delhi. National Archives of India.

Fisher, Netanel, and Avi Shilon. ‘Integrating Non-Jewish Immigrants and the Formation of Israel’s Ethnic–Civic Nationhood: From Ben Gurion to the Present’. *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 2 (4 March 2017): 166–82.

‘FO371/68548/E526, OCP(48)3 - “The Future of Palestine,” Memorandum by the FO’, 10 January 1948. London. The National Archives.

Foucault, Michel. ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth’. *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (1993): 198–227.

———. *Archaeology of Knowledge*. 2 edition. London ; New York: Routledge, 2002.

———. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New Ed edition. London: Penguin, 1991.

———. *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984 v. 1*. New Ed edition. London: Penguin, 2000.

———. *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961--1984: Interviews, 1966-84*. 2Rev Ed edition. New York, N.Y.: MIT Press, 1996.

———. *Freedom and Knowledge*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Special Productions BV, 2014. http://www.fonselders.eu/product/m-f-freedom-and-knowledge/.

———. *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980*. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson, Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador USA, 2016.

———. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. Edited by Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani. Translated by David Macey. London: Penguin, 2004.

———. *The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language*. New York, NY: Vintage, 1982.

———. *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: Penguin, 1991.

Foucault, Michel, Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Arnold I. Davidson. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981--1982*. Translated by Graham Burchell. Reprint edition. New York: Picador USA, 2005.

Frank, Matthew. *Making Minorities History: Population Transfer in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Oxford, United Kingdom: OUP Oxford, 2017.

Fraser, T. G. *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice*. Palgrave Macmillan, 1984.

———. *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984.

Freas, Erik. 'Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?' *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 1 (2012): 19–51.

Friesel, Evyatar. 'British Officials on the Situation in Palestine, 1923'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 2 (1987): 194–210.

FruIêchtl, Josef. *Our Enlightened Barbarian Modernity and the Project of a Critical Theory of Culture: Inaugural Lecture Delivered on the Appointment to the Chair of Philosophy of Art and Culture at the University of Amsterdam*, 2008.

Gandhi, M. K. *THE WAY TO COMMUNAL HARMONY*. Edited by U. R. Rao. First Edition. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1963.

Gandhi, Mahatma. 'Gandhi's Speech at the Minorities Committee'. *Young India* XIII, no. No 44 (29 October 1931).

———. *To The Hindus and Muslims*. Gandhi Series, Volume III. Karachi: Anand T. Hingorani, 1942.

———. *Young India, 1919-1922*. Second Edition. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1924.

———. *Young India, 1924-1926*. S. Ganesan, 1927.

———. *Young India, 1927-1928*. S. Ganesan, 1935.

Gandhi, Rajmohan. *Mohandas: A True Story of a Man, His People and an Empire*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 2006.

———. 'Why Partition Occurred: An Understanding'. Accessed 2 February 2018. http://www.rajmohangandhi.com/why-partition-occurred-understanding.

Gelvin, James L. *Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*. New Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

'GHQ Egypt to WO, 2 Dec. 1917; WO/33/946, No. 8638', 2 December 1917. London. The National Archives.

Gilmartin, David. 'Review: Devji, "Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea" | H-Asia | H-Net', 26 January 2015. https://networks.h-net.org/node/22055/discussions/59129/review-gilmartin-devji-muslim-zion-pakistan-political-idea.

———. 'The Historiography of India's Partition: Between Civilization and Modernity'. *Journal of Asian Studies* 74, no. 1 (1 February 2015): 23–41.

Golani, Motti. '"The Meat and the Bones": Reassessing the Origins of the Partition of Mandate Palestine'. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.

Gordon, Richard. 'Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919 to 1920'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3 (1973): 443–73.

Gorski, Philip. 'Secularity I: Varieties and Dilemmas'. In *A Secular Age beyond the West: Religion, Law and the State in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Mirjam Künkler, Shylashri Shankar, and John Madeley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Gottschalk, Peter. *Religion, Science, and Empire: Classifying Hinduism and Islam in British India*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gould, William. *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Grafton, Anthony. *What Was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe.* New Ed edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Guattari, Felix. *Chaosmosis: An Ethicoaesthetic Paradigm*. Translated by Julian Prefaris and Paul Bains. New edition edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Guha, Ranajit. 'A Conquest Foretold'. *Social Text*, no. 54 (1998): 85–99. https://doi.org/10.2307/466751.

Guha, Sumit. 'The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 1600-1990'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003): 148–67.

Habermas, Jurgen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

Hajari, Nisid. *Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition*. 1st edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015.

Hales, James C. 'The Reform and Extension of the Mandate System. A Legal Solution of the Colonial Problem'. *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 26 (1940): 153–210.

Hali, Altaf Hussain. *Musadas-e-Hali*. Edited by Syed Taqi Abedi. Jehlum: Book Corner, 2015.

Haq, Mushir ul. 'The Authority of Religion in Indian Muslim Politics'. In *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, edited by Mushirul Hasan, Second. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985.

Harms, Gregory, and Todd M. Ferry. *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction - Fourth Edition*. Fourth edition. London: Pluto Press, 2017.

Hasan, Mohibbul. 'Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Muslims'. In *Gandhi: Theory and Practice, Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*, edited by S. C. Biswas, Reprint edition. South Asia Books, 1990.

Hasan, Mushiral, ed. *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr M. A. Ansari 1912-1935*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1979.

Hasan, Mushirul, ed. *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

———. 'Memories of a Fragmented Nation: Rewriting the Histories of India's Partition'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 41 (10 October 1998): 2662–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/4407270.

———, ed. *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Selected Writings*. Vol. II. III vols. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1985.
———, ed. *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Selected Writings (1920-1923)*. Vol. III. III vols. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988.
———. 'Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 16, no. 20 (16 May 1981): 903–12. https://doi.org/10.2307/4369836.
Hasheemi, Nader, and Danny Postel, eds. *Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East*. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2017.
Hattis, Susan Lee. 'Jabotinsky's Parity Plan for Palestine'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 1 (1977): 90–96.
Hindess, Barry. *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Hobsbawm, Eric. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Second Edition: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
———. *On History*. New Ed edition. London: Abacus, 1998.
Hodson, H. V. *The Great Divide: Britain - India - Pakistan*. New Ed. OUP Pakistan, 1986.
Horowitz, Michael C., Alex Weisiger, and Carter Johnson. 'The Limits to Partition'. *International Security* 33, no. 4 (1 April 2009): 203–10. https://doi.org/10.2307/40207157.
Hull Daily Mail. 13 April 1931.
Hutton, J. H. 'Census of India, 1931'. Census. Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1933. https://archive.org/stream/CensusOfIndia1931/Census%20of%20India%201931_djvu.txt.
Inda, Jonathan Xavier, ed. *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*. 1 edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005.
'Indian Moslem Leader Lashes Great Britain's Rule in Palestine'. JTA, 25 November 1928. London. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. http://www.jta.org/1928/11/25/archive/indian-moslem-leader-lashes-great-britains-rule-in-palestine#ixzz2qnkP0cag.
Ingrams, Doreen. *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922, Seeds of Conflict*. New York: George Braziller, Inc, 1973.
'IOL&R, L/PO/5/34/175', 1938. London. India Office, British Library.
'IOL&R,L/PS/10/1304',172', n.d.
'IOR/L/I/1/629: 1938-1941- File 431A Khaksar Movement', n.d. London. British Library.
'IOR/L/P&S/12/2118: Pan-Islamic Congress 1933-1935', n.d. London. India Office, British Library.
Iqbal, Alama Muhammad. *Bang-e-Dara by Alama Muhammad Iqbal*. Book Corner, 2010.
Ivermee, Robert. 'Shari'at and Muslim Community in Colonial Punjab, 1865–1885'. *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 4 (2014): 1068–95.
Jacob, Margaret C. *The Secular Enlightenment*. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2019.
Jalal, Ayesha. 'Between Myth and History'. DAWN.COM, 23 March 2005. http://www.dawn.com/news/1067388.
———. 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of "Communalism": Partition Historiography Revisited'. *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 3 (1996): 681–89.
———. *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*. New edition. Routledge, 2000.
———. *The Pity of Partition: Manto's Life, Times, and Work across the India-Pakistan Divide*. Princeton University Press, 2013.

———. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge South Asian Studies 31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
———. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Reprint. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
'Jinnah Papers', n.d. National Archives of Pakistan. Islamabad, Pakistan.
Jobani, Yuval. 'Three Basic Models of Secular Jewish Culture'. *Israel Studies* 13, no. 3 (2008): 160–69.
Jones, Kenneth W. 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census'. In *The Census in British India: New Perspectives Edited by N. Gerald Barrier*, 1 edition. New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1981.
———. *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*. Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Kattan, Victor. 'The Empire Departs: The Partitions of British India, Mandate Palestine, and the Dawn of Self-Determination in the Third World'. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 0, no. 0 (20 September 2018): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2018.1514173.
Kaufmann, Chaim D. 'When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century'. *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1 October 1998): 120–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539381.
Kaura, Uma. *Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India's Partition 1928-1940*. South Asia Books, 1977.
Kaviraj, Sudipta. *The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas*. Columbia University Press, 2010.
Keddie, Nikki R. 'Secularism & Its Discontents'. *Daedalus* 132, no. 3 (2003): 14–30.
Kelly, Mark. 'Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self'. In *A Companion to Foucault*, edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
'Kenworthy Asks Further Question on Wailing Wall', 5 December 1928. London. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. http://www.jta.org/1928/12/05/archive/kenworthy-asks-further-question-on-wailing-wall#ixzz2qnxJl2v1.
'Kenworthy Questions Government on Mohamed Ali's Admission to Palestine'. JTA, 30 November 1928. London. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. http://www.jta.org/1928/11/30/archive/kenworthy-questions-government-on-mohamed-alis-admission-to-palestine#ixzz2qnhgEBtp.
Kessler, Oren. 'Mandate 100 | "A CLEAN CUT" FOR PALESTINE: THE PEEL COMMISSION REEXAMINED'. *Fathomjournal.Org*, March 2020.
Khalaf, Issa. *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.
Khalidi, Rashid. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
———. *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*. Reprint edition. Boston: Beacon Press, 2007.
Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry. *Pathway to Pakistan*. Brothers Publishers, 1961.
Khan, Yasmin. *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*. Yale University Press, 2008.
Khazzoom, Aziza. 'The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel'. *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 4 (2003): 481–510. https://doi.org/10.2307/1519736.
'Khilafat Conferences, Cairo, File No. 466-N of 1926', 23 November 1926. New Delhi. National Archives of India.

Khimjee, Husein. *Pakistan: A Legacy of the Indian Khilafat Movement: A Legacy of the Indian Khilafat Movement*. iUniverse, 2013.

Klieman, Aaron S. 'In the Public Domain: The Controversy over Partition for Palestine'. *Jewish Social Studies* 42, no. 2 (1980): 147–64.

Kriesberg, Louis. 'Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations'. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 7, no. 1 (2000): 63–80.

Krishna, Gopal. 'The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no. 1/2 (1 April 1968): 37–53.

Krishna, K. B. *The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India*. London: Alien and Unwin, 1939.

Kumar, Priya. 'Testimonies of Loss and Memory: Partition and the Haunting of a Nation'. *Interventions* 1, no. ii (1999): 201–15.

Kumar, Radha. 'The Troubled History of Partition'. *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (1 January 1997): 22–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047907.

Kumarasingham, Harshan. 'THE "TROPICAL DOMINIONS": THE APPEAL OF DOMINION STATUS IN THE DECOLONISATION OF INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CEYLON'. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 23 (2013): 223–45.

Landau, Jacob M. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. 2nd Revised Edition. Clarendon Press, 1994.

Lapierre, Dominique, and Larry Collins. *Freedom At Midnight*. VIKAS PUBLISHING HOUSE PVT LTD, 2004.

Laponce, J. A. *The Protection of Minorities*. University of California Press, 1960.

Larson, Gerald James. *India's Agony over Religion*. Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1995.

Legg, Stephen. *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities*. Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

Lemke, Thomas. *Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique*. Boulder, Colo.: Routledge, 2012.

Lilja, Mona, and Stellan Vinthagen. 'Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power and Biopower: Resisting What Power with What Resistance?' *Journal of Political Power* 7, no. 1 (2 January 2014): 107–26.

Lin, Nimrod. 'People Who Count: Zionism, Demography and Democracy in Mandate Palestine'. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2018.

Low, D. A. 'The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement--1920-1922'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 2 (1966): 241–59.

Madan, T. N. 'Secularism in Its Place'. In *Secularism and Its Critics*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition. Delhi: OUP India, 2000.

———. 'Secularism in Its Place'. In *Religion in India*, edited by T. N. Madan, 2Rev Ed edition. Delhi: OUP India, 2012.

Maheshwari, Shriram. *The Census Administration Under the Raj and After*. Concept Publishing Company, 1996.

Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011.

———. *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report*. Princeton University Press, 2015.

———. 'Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. No 2 (April 2012): 418–46.

Makdisi, Ussama. *Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World*. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019.

———. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2000.
———. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2000.
Makhoul, Edwar. *The Role of Arab Christians in the Palestinian National Movement*. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2017.

Mann, Michael. *South Asia's Modern History: Thematic Perspectives*. 1st ed. Routledge, 2014.

Mansergh, Nicholas. *The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India*. Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Martin, Luther, ed. *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst: University Massachusetts Press, 1998.

Mary, Countess of Minto, ed. *India: Minto and Morley, 1905-1910: Compiled From The Correspondence Between The Viceroy and The Secretary of State*. London: MACMILLAN AND CO, LIMITED, St. Martin's Street, 1934.

Masalha, Nur. *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion*. Pluto Press, 2000.

Masters, Bruce. 'The Establishment of the Melkite Catholic Millet in 1848 and the Politics of Identity in Tanzimat Syria'. *Syria and Bilad Al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq*, The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage, Volume: 43 (12 July 2010): 455–73. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004191044_024.

Masters, Bruce Alan. *Christians Jews Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*. Revised ed. edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Mazza, Roberto. 'Churches at War: The Impact of the First World War on the Christian Institutions of Jerusalem, 1914-20'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 207–27.

McTague, John J. 'Zionist-British Negotiations over the Draft Mandate for Palestine, 1920'. *Jewish Social Studies* 42, no. 3/4 (1980): 281–92.

Metcalf, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalf. *A Concise History of Modern India*. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Meyer, Karl E. 'The Invention of Pakistan: How the British Raj Sundered'. *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 1 (2003): 77–92.

Minault, Gail. *The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. First Edition. Columbia University Press, 1982.

Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Mitra, H.N., ed. 'The Govt. of India Act 1919: Rules Thereunder and Govt Reports 1920'. N.N. MITTER, ANNUAL REGISTER OFFICE, SIBPUR, CALCUTTA, India, 1921.

Mohanty, S., ed. *Colonialism, Modernity, and Literature: A View from India*. 2011th edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Moon, Penderel. *Divide and Quit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Partition of India*. 1st Edition. Chatto & Windus London, 1961.

———. *GANDHI AND MODERN INDIA*. London: The English Universities Press Limited, 1968.

Moore, Robin James. *Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-45*. Oxford : New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. Yale University Press, 2009.

———. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*. Updated. Vintage, 2001.

———. *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*. 2nd edition. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Moses, A. Dirk. ‘Partitions, Hostages, Transfer: Retributive Violence and National Security’. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.
Mufti, Aamir R. *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture*. Princeton University Press, 2007.
Mujahid, al Sharif. ‘The Khilafat Movement’. In *Mohamed Ali: Life and Work*, edited by S Moinul Haq. Karachi, Pakistan: Pakistan Historical Society, 1978.
Müller-Sommerfeld, H. ‘The League of Nations, A-Mandates and Minority Rights during the Mandate Period in Iraq (1920–1932)’. In *Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East*, 258–83. Brill, 2016.
Nandy, Ashis. ‘An Anti-Secularist Manifesto’. In *Gandhi’s Significance For Today*, edited by John Hick, L Hempel, J Clarke Dillman, J.D. Maguire, and C.E. Wright. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989.
———. ‘Cultural Frames for Social Intervention: A Personal Credo’. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1984): 411–21.
———. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. 2 edition. OUP India, 2009.
———. ‘The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance’. In *Secularism and Its Critics*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava, New Ed edition. Delhi: OUP India, 2000.
Nele, Matz. ‘Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship’. *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online* 9, no. 1 (1 January 2005): 47–95. https://doi.org/10.1163/138946305775160483.
Nevo, Joseph. ‘Al-Hajj Amin and the British in World War II’. *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 20, no. 1 (January 1984): 3–16.
‘News Brief’. JTA, 3 December 1928. London. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. http://www.jta.org/1928/12/03/archive/palestine-jews-have-to-blame-their-own-mistakes#ixzz2qntD5XNp.
Niemeijer, A. C. ‘Crisis’. In *The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924*, 126–43. Brill, 1972. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76v5c.9.
Norman, Wayne. *Theories of Federalism: A Reader*. Edited by Dimitrios Karmis. First edition. New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Norris, Jacob. ‘Across Confessional Borders: A Microhistory of Ottoman Christians and Their Migratory Paths’. In *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, edited by Laura Robson. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016.
‘Note on the Pan-Islamic Movement, File No. 210-N of 1933’, n.d. New Delhi. National Archives of India.
Nusseibeh, Sari. *What Is a Palestinian State Worth?* Harvard University Press, 2012.
O’Callaghan, Margaret. ‘Genealogies of Partition; History, History-Writing and “the Troubles” in Ireland’. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 9, no. 4 (1 December 2006): 619–34.
Ozcan, Azmi. *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain*. Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997.
Öztürk, Fatih. *Ottoman and Turkish Law*. iUniverse, 2014.
‘Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic Majesty’. Geneva: The League of Nation, 30 November 1937.
Pandey, Gyanendra. *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

———. *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*. New ed of 2 Revised ed edition. New Delhi; New York: OUP India, 2006.
Panigrahi, Devendra. *India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat*. Routledge, 2004.
Panikkar, K.N. 'Communalism'. In *Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies*, 46–49. NYU Press, 2015.
Panter-Brick, Simone. *Gandhi and Nationalism: The Path to Indian Independence*. Reprint edition. London New York: I.B.Tauris, 2014.
Pappe, Ilan. *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51*. Basingstoke u.a: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988.
———. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Reprint. Oneworld Publications, 2007.
Pappé, Ilan, ed. *The Israel/Palestine Question: A Reader*. 1st ed. Routledge, 1999.
Pappe, Ilan. *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2010.
Parfitt, Tudor. 'The Use of the Jew in Colonial Discourse'. In *Orientalism and the Jews*, edited by Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar. Waltham, Massachusetts, Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2004.
Pasto, James. 'Islam's "Strange Secret Sharer": Orientalism, Judaism, and the Jewish Question'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 3 (1 July 1998): 437–74.
Peabody, Norbert. 'Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial and Early Colonial India'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001): 819–50.
Pearce, Robert. *Attlee's Labour Governments 1945-51*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1993. https://www.routledge.com/Attlees-Labour-Governments-1945-51/Pearce/p/book/9780415088930.
Philips, C. H. *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947*. Oxford University Press, 1964.
———. *The Partition of India 1947*. Leeds University Press, 1967.
Philips, Cyril Henry. 'Review: The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representation in India by K.B. Krishna'. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 10, no. 3 (October 1940).
Philips, Cyril Henry, and M. Doreen Wainwright. *Indian Society and the Beginnings of Modernisation, c.1830-1850*. London: University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1976.
Plowdon, W. G. 'Census of The North Western Provinces, 1872'. Census. General Report. Allahabad: The North West Provinces Government Press, 1873. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24264.
Portsmouth Evening News. 13 April 1931.
Powell, Avril A. 'Duties of Ahmadi Women: Educative Processes in the Early Stages of the Ahmadiyya Movement'. In *Gurus and Their Followers: New Religious Reform Movements in Colonial India*, edited by Antony Copley, 0 edition. New Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Punjab Disturbances: Compiled from the Civil and Military Gazette. Second. Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1919.
Qasmi, Ali Usman, and Megan Eaton Robb, eds. *Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan*. Cambridge, United Kingdom; Delhi, India; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
'Question Regarding the Grant of Passports for Palestine to Khaksar Volunteers Free of Any Charge: File No. 656-G/38(Secret); Confidential. D. No. 6103-G/38', 1938. New Delhi. National Archives of India.

Qureshi, M. Naeem. *Pan-Islam in British India - The Politics of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924*. OUP, 2009.
Radai, Itamar. 'The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class Under the British Mandate, 1920–39'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 3 (2016): 487–506.
Ray, Anil Baran. 'Communal Attitudes to British Policy: The Case of the Partition of Bengal 1905'. *Social Scientist* 6, no. 5 (1977): 34–46. https://doi.org/10.2307/3520087.
'Refusal of Passport Application for Certain Muslims of District Banda (UP) for Proceeding to Palestine to Help the Arabs in Their Struggle against the Mandatory Power in Palestine - File No. 612-G/39 D. No. 206-G/39', 16 January 1939. New Delhi. National Archives of India.
Reginald, Coupland. *India: A Re-Statement*. H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1945.
Renton, James. 'The Age of Nationality and the Origins of the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict'. *The International History Review* 35, no. 3 (2013): 576–99.
Rizvi, Gowher. *Linlithgow and India: A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936-43*. Royal Historical Society, 1978.
Robbins, Bruce. 'Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said's "Voyage In"'. *Social Text*, no. 40 (1994): 25–37. https://doi.org/10.2307/466794.
Roberts, Nicholas E. *Islam under the Palestine Mandate: Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council*. Sew edition. London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2015.
Robinson, Francis. 'Islam and Muslim Separatism: A Historiographic Debate'. In *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, edited by Mushirul Hasan, Second. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985.
———. 'The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia'. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 8 (1998): 271–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/3679298.
Robson, Laura. 'Becoming a Sectarian Minority: Arab Christians in Twentieth-Century Palestine'. In *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, edited by Laura Robson. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016.
———. *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*. University of Texas Press, 2011.
———. 'Communalism and Nationalism in the Mandate: The Greek Orthodox Controversy and the National Movement'. *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 41, no. No. 1 (Autumn 2011): 6–23.
———. *States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. First edition. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017.
Roy, Haimanti. 'A Partition of Contingency? Public Discourse in Bengal, 1946-1947'. *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 6 (2009): 1355–84.
Roy, Kaushik. *Partition of India Why 1947?* 1st edition. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 'Federalism as State Formation in India: A Theory of Shared and Negotiated Sovereignty'. *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 31, no. 5 (2010): 553–72.
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. 'Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia--Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 4 (1987): 731–46.
Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. Penguin Books, 2003.
———. *Orientalism*. 25th Anniversary Ed with 1995 Afterword Ed edition. London New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
Salmon, Yosef. 'The Historical Imagination of Jacob Katz: On the Origins of Jewish Nationalism'. *Jewish Social Studies* 5, no. 3 (1999): 161–79.
Samarin, William J. 'Secularism Is Not Inevitable [Abstract]'. *African Studies Bulletin* 7, no. 4 (1964): 27–27.

Sarila, Narendra Singh. *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition*. Carroll & Graf, 2006.
Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India, 1885-1947*. Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
Segev, Tom. *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate*. Metropolitan Books, 2011.
Seikaly, Sherene, and Max Ajl. 'Of Europe: Zionism and the Jewish Other'. In *Europe after Derrida*, edited by Agnes Czajka and Bora Isyar, 120–33. Crisis and Potentiality. Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
Sen, Amartya. 'The Threats to Secular India'. *Social Scientist* 21, no. 3/4 (1993): 5–23.
Shaikh, Farzana. *Community and Consensus in Islam : Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947*. Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1989. https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/21999301.
———. 'Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea'. *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, 26 January 2015. http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3846.
———. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. Reprint edition. Oxford University Press, 2018.
———. 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan'. *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. No. 3 (1986): 539–57.
Shani, Giorgio. 'Empire, Liberalism and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Colonial Governmentality in South Asia'. *The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2006.* Vol.5 (2006): 19–36.
Shapira, Anita. 'Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky: Comments on Their Nationalist Concepts'. *Jewish History* 4, no. 2 (1 October 1990): 59–69.
Shlaim, Avi. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. New Ed. Penguin, 2001.
———. *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine 1921-1951*. New ed of Abridged ed. Clarendon Press, 1998.
Shumsky, Dmitry. *Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019.
'Simla Records 1916: Proceedings "War, 1916-17", Nos. 20797-20834 and Appendix', 1916. New Delhi. National Archives of India.
Sinanoglou, Penny. 'Analogical Thinking and Partition in British Mandate Palestine'. In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*, edited by Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson, 1st ed. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2019.
———. 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938'. *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (2009): 131–52.
———. 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938'. *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 131–52.
———. *Partitioning Palestine: British Policymaking at the End of Empire*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.
Singh, Jaswant. *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence*. Rupa, 2009.
Sluglett, Peter. 'From Millet to Minority'. In *Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives*, edited by Laura Robson. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016.
Smith, Charles D. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*. Bedford Books, 2001.
Smith, Donald Eugene. 'Gandhi, Hinduism and Mass Politics'. In *Religion and Political Modernization*, edited by Donald Eugene Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.

———. *India As A Secular State*. Sagwan Press, 2018.
Streets, Heather. *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2004.
Summerer, K.M.J. Sanchez. 'Preserving the Catholics of the Holy Land or Integrating Them into the Palestine Nation (1920–1950)?' In *Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East*, edited by S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah and H.L. Murre-van den Berg, 121–52. Brill, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h27r.9.
Susser, Asher. 'Partition and the Arab Palestinian Minority in Israel'. *Israel Studies* 14, no. 2 (2009): 105–19.
Swedenburg, Ted. *Memories Of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past*. Fayetteville, Ark: University of Arkansas Press, 2003.
Talbot, Ian. *Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957*. Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2007.
Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh. *The Partition of India*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Tan, Tai Yong, and Gyanesh Kudaisya. *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*. London: Routledge, 2000. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203450604.
Tejani, Shabnum. *Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890-1950*. Bloomington, Ind. : Chesham: Indiana University Press, 2008.
———. 'Secularism'. In *Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies*, edited by Gita Dharampal-Frick, Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Rachel Dwyer, and Jahnavi Phalkey, 250–54. NYU Press, 2015.
'The Palestine Mandate'. *Bulletin of International News* 6, no. 6 (1929): 3–12.
'The Phrase That Pakistan Was an "Insufficiently Imagined" Nation-State Was Coined by the Novelist Salman Rushdie in Shame.', n.d.
Tignol, Eve. 'A Note on the Origins of Hali's Musaddas-e Madd-o Jazr-e Islām'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 4 (October 2016): 585–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186316000080.
———. *Grief and the Shaping of Muslim Communities in North India, c. 1857–1940s*. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
Tsimhoni, Daphne. Review of *Review of Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine*, by Laura Robson. *Middle East Journal* 66, no. 2 (2012): 387–88.
———. 'The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine'. *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 20, no. No. 4 (October 1984): 166–92.
Veer, Peter van der. 'The Secular Production of Religion'. *Etnofoor* 8, no. 2 (1995): 5–14.
Verma, Anand K. *Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two-Nation Theory*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008.
Vikki, Bell. 'The Promise of Liberalism and the Performance of Freedom'. In *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Virdee, Pippa. *From the Ashes of 1947: Reimagining Punjab*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Wagner, Kim. *Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear and the Making of a Massacre*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019.
Wavell, Archibald Percival. *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*. Edited by Penderel Moon. 1st Edition. Oxford University Press, 1973.
White, Benjamin. 'The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of 'Minorities' in Syria'. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 7, no. 1 (2007): 64–85.

White, Benjamin Thomas. *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria*. Edinburgh University Press, UK, 2011.

'Wingate to FO India, 13 December 1917; FO/395/152 No. 236464', 13 December 1917. London. The National Archives.

'WO to GHQ Egypt, 21 November 1917; WO/33/946 No. 8583-8584', 21 November 1917. London. The National Archives.

Wolfe, Patrick. 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'. *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (1 December 2006): 387–409.

Wolpert, Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford University, 1998.

Woodhead, John. 'The Report of the Palestine Partition Commission'. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 18, no. 2 (1939): 171–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/3019878.

Wyatt, Woodrow. *Confessions of an Optimist*. HarperCollins Publishers, 1987.

Yousaf, Nasim. *Pakistan's Freedom & Allama Mashriqi; Statements, Letters, Chronology of Khaksar Tehrik (Movement); Period: Mashriqi's Birth to 1947*. 2013th edition. AMZ Publications, 2013.

Zakaria, Rafiq. *The Widening Divide: An Insight Into Hindu-Muslim Relations*. New Delhi: Viking, 1995.

Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali. *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories*. Columbia University Press, 2007.

Zucker, Norman L. 'Secularization Conflicts in Israel'. In *Religion and Political Modernization*, edited by Donald Eugene Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.