GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: BEYOND THE STATE: NON-STATE ACTORS AND SECURITY IN NIGERIA. A CASE OF YEN KATO DA GORA IN KADUNA URBAN AREA.

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ABSTRACT

Studies on security and governance are widespread across the global south and often focus on how power is distributed and transferred from states to nonstate actors. However, they rarely examine actual governance practises or the more specific logic or content of the relationships between states and nonstate actors involved in security governance. As a result, rather than concentrating on institutions and what they do or do not in particular contexts, this research examines what social and political structures are present and how they interact. Additionally, this research sheds more light on emerging indigenous strategies and non-state mechanisms of crime fighting and management in Nigeria, particularly within regions with a long history of crime and violence (the northern part of Nigeria). It also examines the role and relevance of non-state actors in providing security within the country, with the goal of contributing to academic and policy debates about the future of African security and governance system.

To understand and analyse the proliferation and effectiveness of non-state informal policing security systems within various communities in northern Nigeria, the study used a case study approach (Kaduna) and a mix method research approach combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods to understand and analyse the proliferation and effectiveness of non-state informal policing security system within various communities in northern Nigeria. The findings of the study revealed that, in addition to the state institutions in charge of security in Nigeria, there are other policing structures and actors that compete with, accommodate, complement, or substitute the role and responsibility of the state/formal policing organisation, particularly in areas where there is little to no formal policing presence in most cities in Nigeria and Africa. Findings in the study area also revealed that they have a complementary as well as a substitutive relationship, particularly in areas with little or no formal policing presence.

The study concludes that in order to combat crime and restore overall security and public safety, the state should collaborate with local actors, who are equally effective in crime management and prevention due to their community roots, local knowledge, familiarity with the language, geography, and socio-political terrains. In the end, the discourse in this study does not suggest that one system is better than another or that the role of the state in working to ensure the safety and social welfare of the populace is insignificant. It however makes an effort to highlight how crucial local insights, responses, and comprehensions are to reducing crime and security across the nation. Working with communities and non-state customary institutions is just as important as working with central state institutions and governments, as local knowledge, responses, and understandings are crucial in battling crime and insecurity within Nigerian cities.

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DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Conference Presentations and Proceedings

- **Yakubu K.N** (2022) Establishing an effective policing system for the people by the people in African states through the hybrid system. The conference was hosted by University College London (UCL) and the Development Studies Association (DSA) from 6-8th July 2022 in London, United Kingdom. The paper was presented under panel P62, Narratives on extractive processes and security tomorrow.

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1. ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
2. AU African Union
3. BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
4. CBAGs Community-Based Armed Groups
5. CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force
6. CLEEN Centre for Law Enforcement Education
7. CNN Cable News Network
8. COVID 19 Coronavirus Disease of 2019
9. CPA Criminal Procedure Act
10. CPC Criminal Procedure Code
11. DCAF Democratic Control of Armed Forces
12. DFID Department for International Development
13. DPO Divisional Police Officer
14. DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
15. DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
16. DSS Department of Security Service
17. DSS Department of State Services
18. ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
19. EENA European Emergency Number Association
20. ESN Eastern Security Network
21. ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
22. FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
23. FCDO Foreign commonwealth and Development Office
24. FCIID Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department
25. FCLP Frontiers in Crime, Livelihoods, and Urban Poverty
26. FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
27. FCT the Federal capital territory
28. FGN Federal Government of Nigeria
29. FSARS Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad
30. GIS Geographic Information System
31. GOC Head of Patrol
32. GOV Government
33. GPS Global Positioning system
34. GRA Government Residential Areas
35. GRC Gendarmerie Royale du Canada
36. HR Human Resources
37. IAGCI Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
38. ICF International Coaching Federation
39. ICG International Crisis Group
40. ICU Islamic Court Union
41. ID Identification
42. IDP Internally displaced persons

43. IDRC International Development Research Centre
44. IGP The Inspector-General of Police
45. INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
46. IPOB Indigenous Peoples of Biafra
47. ISWAP Islamic state West Africa Province
48. JTF Joint Task Forces
49. KADGIS Kaduna State Geographic Information Systems
50. KADVIS Kaduna States Vigilance Service
51. KAROTA Kano Road and Transport Authority
52. KJTF KADVIS Joint Task Forces
53. LGA Local Government Area
54. LGPFs Local Government Pension Funds
55. MASSOB Movement for Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra
56. NA Native Authority
57. NAPF Native Authority Police Forces
58. NAPFs Native Authority Police Forces
59. NBC National Boundary Commission
60. NBS National Bureau of Statistics
61. NC North Central
62. NE Northeast
63. NEPU Northern Elements Progressive Union
64. NIA National Intelligence Agency
65. NOPRIN Network for Police Reform in Nigeria
66. NPC National Population commission
67. NPC Nationalist People's Coalition
68. NPF Nigerian Police Force
69. NW Northwest
70. OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
71. OPC- O'odua People's Congress
72. OSM Open-Street Map
73. PMCs Private Military Companies
74. PNG Papua New Guinea
75. PRO Public Relation Officer
76. PSAP Public safety answering point.
77. PSCs Private Security Companies
78. RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
79. RNCC Royal Niger Company Constabulary
80. RULAAC Rule of Law Advocacy and Accountability Centre
81. SAPS South African Police Service
82. SARS Special Anti-Robbery Squad
83. SDG- the Sustainable Development Goals
84. SE Southeast
85. SIP Special Investigative Police
86. SS States

87. SSS State Security Service
88. SW Southwest
89. SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
90. TFG Transitional Federal Government
91. UCL University College London
92. UK United Kingdom
93. UN United Nations
94. UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
95. UNDP United Nations Development Programme
96. UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
97. US United States
98. USD United States Dollar
99. VGN Vigilante Group of Nigeria
100. VIPs Very Important People
101. WAFF West African Frontier Force

CHAPTER 1. THE RESEARCH

1.0   Introduction

This thesis presents an original contribution to knowledge through a research study conducted in Kaduna, Nigeria. It investigates the complex dynamics of security governance in a hybrid context, advancing the literature's understanding of institutional hybridity. The study investigates the complexities of security governance in African cities by examining local indigenous knowledge, governance practises, and the relationships between state and non-state actors. Unlike previous studies on security governance in African cities, this thesis focuses on emerging indigenous strategies and non-state mechanisms for crime prevention and management in Africa. It provides valuable insights into the challenges of achieving sustainable development and effective governance in the face of security concerns by emphasising the critical role of non-state actors in ensuring national security.

Figure 1: Nigeria in the context of Africa (source; Omeni, 2022).

1.1 Background of Study

For more than 50 years, African governments have made an effort to develop policing, security, and criminal justice systems that are functional, effective and somewhat comparable to those in the West (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Hills, 2000; Goldsmith 2003). At independence, many states in Africa anticipated a similar national police force that would provide universal, effective, and just protection from crime and disorder. However, after more than 50 years of independence in most African states, security in many African cities, particularly in Nigerian cities, has become increasingly localised and hybrid. This presents many models and policy pronouncements in contrast and fails to emphasise its ambitions to more closely resemble the centralised, state-provided policing and security in many Western societies. Although effective in most contexts in the global north, the western centralised, state-provided policing and security system has been shown to fail to provide justice, particularly for the poor and vulnerable[1] when applied in African cities. Scholars like Chabal and Daloz (1999), Hills (2000), and Goldsmith (2003) attribute this failure to African governments' unwillingness or inability to deliver the level of service promised due to a lack of resources or bad practises and corruption. However, it is critical to recognise that African countries have unique social, cultural, and political contexts that shape their approaches to policing and security. As a result, any efforts to establish these systems must take into account the local context as well as the historical development of African policing structures and approaches. Given that the state has been unable to provide adequate security in most African countries, other policing structures have emerged, each with varying degrees of legality, effectiveness, availability, methods, and services (Baker, 2002b; Baker, 2004).

Chabal and Daloz (1999) provide a similar perspective into the security governance literature in Africa in their study. Their perception was that since the states in African countries cannot protect their people from violence (through either lack of resources or bad practice) and are themselves responsible for a high level of violence, due to abuse of power and the predatory nature of the 'patrimonial state', it is not surprising that men and women will seek alternative strategies for coping with violence and crime. Consequently, in the absence of government efforts to extend the provision of basic goods and services to rapidly expanding urban settlements, a variety of hybrid governance arrangements will emerge to fill the gap. These alternative arrangements commonly provide functional and socially embedded solutions to social, economic, and political organizations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In addition to Chabal and Daloz (1999), Beall and Fox (2011) found that in African cities, citizens organise themselves into neighbourhood self-defence groups, which sometimes replace the law and authority of government agencies at both the municipal and national levels. An example of this phenomenon can be found in Abia state in Nigeria, when in the late 1990s crime in the area rose to such a level that vigilante groups known

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[1] System here refers to the top-down approach that was adapted by many African countries post-independence led to a monopolisation of security and political power and slowed down economic growth, accelerating the deep-seated crisis in African states (see The Economist, 2012; Routley, 2014; Okenyodo, 2016; Badiora, 2018; Ikuteyijo, 2022; DCAF, 2022; Ojewale, & Onuoha, 2022

as the Bakassi Boys sprung up to help fight crime and insecurity within their communities, because the state was unable to tackle the problem (Chabal and Daloz 1999). The Oodua People's Congress (OPC) and *Yen Kalari* are also examples in the southwestern and northern parts of Nigeria respectively of such groups that rose to defend their communities in Nigeria when there was an incessant increase in crime and little help from the state.

In most African cities, the emergence and re-emergence of indigenously led civil society groups and non-state policing actors/institutions[2] in security governance are often perceived as a consequence of poor state performance i.e., state agencies are incapable or unwilling to deliver security and other public goods (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009). A number of studies on the reality and situation on the ground in most African countries corroborate this viewpoint. According to several scholars, rising crime rates amidst other factors in Nigeria have resulted in the prevalence of non-state informal security providers in communities all through the country's cities (Nsokoma, 2018). This is exacerbated by the government's formal system's lack of resources and manpower to address the issue. Nigeria's Inspector General of Police reported in 2017 that the federal government needed to recruit an additional 31,000 police officers every year for the next five years to ensure effective policing across the country and meet the UN recommended policing ratio of 1:400 persons (Premium Times, 2017). However, given the country's financial situation and debt profile, recruiting more officers has been put on hold, particularly as existing officers continue to fight for better pay and benefits (see Figures 2,3, 4 & 5).

Figure 2: Budget allocation to the Nigerian police formation and command 2016-2021 (source; Nairametrics, 2021).

To better analyse the trend in Figure 2 in real terms, one must consider the effects of inflation on Nigerian budget allocation to police formation and command from 2016 to 2021, as indicated by Nairametrics data. From 303.91 billion in 2016 to 441.39 billion in 2021, the budget allocation increased. Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a measure of inflation, however, you discover

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[2] Non-state policing actors/institutions are defined as 'community-self-help policing groups that protect the public by policing in the law enforcement style' in this study.

that the CPI increased from 108.7 in 2016 to 156.08 in 2021, representing a 43.7% inflation rate over the period. After adjusting for inflation, the real budget allocation to the Nigerian police formation and command in 2016 would be 279.54 billion Naira (in 2021 Naira value), while the real budget allocation in 2021 will be 282.59 billion Naira (in 2016 Naira value). This represents a real terms increase of only 1.09% from 2016 to 2021, indicating that the increase in budget allocation was primarily due to inflation. As a result, from 2016 to 2021, the trend in real terms shows that the allocation to Nigerian police formation and command in the Nigerian budget has been decreasing due to inflation.

Figure 3: Breakdown of 2021 budget allocation to the Nigerian Police force (source; Nairametrics, 2021).

Figure 4: Ranked – Annual Salary of Nigerian Police officers compared to their peers in other African countries (source; Oladipo & Areo, 2020).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, police departments are under increased pressure as crime and violence levels rise (see fig 5). As a result, several groups, such as community-based vigilante organizations, have emerged and continue to emerge in most urban neighbourhoods to address and assist the state with this problem. This non state security organizations commonly referred to as Vigilantes can be viewed from two perspectives. First, it is 'community-self-help policing groups that protect the public by policing in the law enforcement style' (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2014). This concept of vigilantism is also known as 'non-state policing,' according to its proponents. Second, it is "the killing of one or more people by groups of citizens acting without the authority of the government" (Zimring, 2003). This type of vigilantism is known as 'violent vigilantism' (Badiora, 2018). This study, however, focuses on the former type of vigilantes (non-state policing). These groups are usually comprised of local community members who turn into security patrollers during night hours and rely on ad hoc donations from the community to fund their operations. While there is a 2016 federal law that recognizes the vigilante group at large, there is minimal regulation or support of their activities in practice (FCLP, 2019). Although re-emerging in the northern part of Nigeria, such security initiatives and arrangements have been around in other parts of the country for some time. For example, the Pan-Yoruba group O'odua People's Congress (OPC), which derives its name from that of Oduduwa, the ancestor of the Yoruba ethnic group, is responsible for defending, protecting, and promoting Yoruba interests. Around 1999, the OPC began engaging in crime-fighting activities. They are usually employed by local governments in southwest states, for example residents pay about 500 Naira a month (less than 1 USD as of July

2022), some more, some less as tax for security which is, in turn, paid to the OPC directly in Lagos state. Similarly, in the late 90s, the Bakassi Boys emerged as a vigilante group in the Southeast of Nigeria as a result of a sharp increase in crime rates in that part of the country.

Figure 5: Afrobarometer report on Crime and security as most important problem in Nigeria 2007-2022 (source; (Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023).

African historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have long emphasised the significance of giving informal economic and political structures more systematic attention in order to gain a better understanding of them. This emphasis on informal structures is seen as crucial for developing more effective strategies for promoting development and improving governance in African countries (Meagher, 2003). Given the foregoing points, it is clear that a new trend of looking inwards for crime management is gaining traction in most African cities. 'The challenge for criminologists,' according to Mouzelis (2008), is to avoid 'contextless generalisations' and to develop and test theories and policy interventions in new contexts. Bendix (1963) goes on to say, 'Only then will criminology accrue a body of knowledge about what is true of all societies and what is true of one society at one point in time and space.' The research, therefore, responds to Tankebe, Hills, & Cole's (2014) proposal to challenge Euro-centric criminological assumptions regarding the solution to the crime problem in Africa. These assumptions are often based on Western-centric perspectives and may not take into account the unique challenges faced by African communities. Additionally, the research incorporates Di Nunzio's (2014) suggestion to consider local and national political arrangements and street politics in understanding policing and crime prevention strategies. Ultimately, the aim of the research is to challenge and re-evaluate these assumptions and explore alternative approaches to crime prevention in Africa. As Tankebe et al 2014's criminological work argues:

'References to Africa often conjure up [...] an image of corruption, violent conflicts, coup d'états and underdevelopment. However, if we consider the scale of transformations in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) – transformations occasioned by decades of complex political, economic and social processes of change – we see an image that is less malleable

to stereotypical depictions. Changes in the last four decades are especially noteworthy, not least for the student of comparative criminology' (Tankebe et al).

1.2   Statement of Problem

In the literature, African states have been commonly portrayed as failed, fragile, neopatrimonial, weak, predatory, or kleptocratic, (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Diamond, 2008; Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016) or prescriptive, assuming that African developmental states could exist, and describing what kinds of policies, structures, and relationships would make this possible (Mkandawire, 2001). However, this perception has been criticized for oversimplifying the complex historical and political factors that have shaped African states' development. For example, Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou (1999) argue that the perception of African states as "failed" or "fragile" is problematic because it implies that these states are inherently flawed and incapable of achieving success. This view has been challenged by a growing body of scholarship on African political economy that recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of African states, as well as the complex historical and political factors that have shaped their development. It is important to move beyond simplistic labels when discussing African states and instead focus on the underlying causes of the challenges facing these states.

Mkandawire (2001) notes that African states have often been compared to idealized models of states from other contexts, emphasizing what they should be rather than what they are., in this case idealised models of the developmental state, and stressed that there can sometimes be an emphasis on the 'ought,' on what states should be rather than what they are. This emphasis on 'should' can lead to an obsession with what is lacking in comparison to an idealised image of the modern industrial state. Such idealisation of modernity has actually been detrimental to African policy-making due to the disconnect between the components of symbolic modernity (such as factories, universities, hypermarkets, or laptops), whose absence has frequently been the focus of African policy instead of the practical solution of immediate problems (Routley, 2014). Chabal and Daloz's perspective as previously noted also provides valuable insights and explains this phenomenon, but it has been argued that their focus on the "failure" of African states often overlooks the ways in which these states have been able to adapt and survive in the face of complex challenges.

While it is important to acknowledge the challenges facing African states, labeling them as "failed" can create a negative and defeatist narrative that is disempowering for African citizens and policymakers. It is therefore crucial to avoid simplistic labels such as "failed" or "successful" when discussing African states and instead focus on the complex factors that shape their development. As Cooper (2001) noted over two decades ago, the cost of consistently portraying development on the continent as 'a lack, a failure, or distortion is that one fails to ask what is actually happening in Africa.' So, to address this challenge a more nuanced understanding of African states and societies is needed, one that recognizes both their strengths and weaknesses, one that requires engaging with alternative perspectives and approaches and taking a more critical and nuanced approach to the study of African political economy. African historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have long

stressed the importance of giving informal economic and political structures more systematic attention to revamp African civilizations (Meagher, 2003).

Foucault's (1991) concept of governmentality also provides another perspective on this. Foucault defines government in terms of the 'conduct of conducts,' which includes a variety of techniques and practises used by various actors to shape, direct, and influence people's and groups' behaviour and actions in specific directions. The governmentality perspective contends that the state does not relinquish control to nonstate actors as a result of their involvement in shaping and performing tasks related to governance; rather, it's an expression of a shifting sense or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) through which civil society is changed from an unresistant object of government to be acted upon to a reality that's both an object and a subject of government. In Cooper's (2005) 'gatekeeper state,' which refers to a system of government in which the heads of weak states rule through the interface between their nation and the rest of the world but struggle to extend their control beyond their capitals, the colonial legacy of the patrimonial state in Africa is discussed (Routley, 2014). The normative assumptions that are used to compare the governance systems in use in African states to the legal-rational systems that are ostensibly well-established in the West present the fundamental issue with using neopatrimonialism to describe failures in African states (Wai, 2012). Additionally, authors like Tusalem (2016) have connected historical processes exemplified by colonialism's institutional legacies in African history with the occurrence and persistence of state failure. The discourse also suggests that states exercising patrimonial authority, which is disregarded as something 'not deserving' of statehood, cannot modernise Africa unless they adopt legal-rational authority by emulating Western traits (ibid). Therefore, it is debatable whether the governance crises qualify as examples of state failure given the 'unfinished nature' of the African states that colonial rule left behind (Routley, 2014).

However, a number of explanations have been advanced to explain why Africa's security governance system is facing so many challenges, one of which is a lack of research. For example, it is considered that there was a research gap on security institutions in Nigeria after independence, owing to the fact that they were not considered an important political institution worth studying by scholars studying political developments in Africa after independence, despite their profound effects on people's lives and political and economic progress possibilities. If there was a focus on means of state coercion, it was on the military, coups and countercoups, and the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics. The police were ignored, being seen in the dominant political and development literature as non-actors, as objects and not subjects in politics and development. Furthermore, Crank & Kadleck's (2013) study has shown that accurate knowledge of forms of policing in African states is severely limited, for a number of reasons. For an English speaking only observer, the writings on policing in former French or Portuguese colonies, which have retained the colonial language as their lingua franca or for states which have adopted in addition an indigenous language of wide circulation as a second national language (such as Swahili in Tanzania or Kenya) are not easily accessible. According to Oseni, (1993), what is missing is a scholarly literature of the police, a view of policing from the 'inside out' that is how the police

actually work, make decisions on the use of force, implement community policing visions, think about their job, including why they engage in corruption, or what conditions are like within the police as experienced by different rank levels.

In terms of the effectiveness of the security systems in place, several studies on the effectiveness of different policing institutions in controlling and preventing crime and maintaining security within African communities have been undertaken for the formal system (state police) (Tamuno, 1985; Ikechukwu, 1992; Jastremski, Worden & Snipes, 1995; Rotimi, 2001; Ekeh, 2002). One of the main criticisms has been that they are inefficient, thus other security agencies are springing up to meet the people's unmet demands. As a result of persistent insecurity and the state police's seeming failure to handle the situation, many people, including state governments, are turning to informal security outfits as a response to persistent insecurity and the state police's apparent failure to meet the challenge (see Abrahams, 1998; Shaw, 2000; Gleitman, Fridlund and Reisberg, 2004; Baker, 2008; Kantor & Persson, 2010; Adejoh, 2013; Haruna 2019; Heidger, 2019). Samuel (2012) stated this more clearly when he argued that the emergence and proliferation of these groups at neighbourhood level in Nigeria is thus a derivative of the general state of insecurity coupled to the poor performance and service delivery of the formal police. Alemika (2009), Okafo (2007) and Arisukwu and Okunola (2013) also added to the above assessment that the poor performance of the Nigerian police in controlling and preventing crime is a consequence of pervasive corruption. This has been exacerbated by the fact that they are estranged and structurally detached from the people they are intended to police on the ground. As a result, police officers are more likely to be perceived as 'outsiders' within the community being policed (Abrahamsen & William, 2005; Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, & Olabisi, 2017). As a result, many Nigerian communities are increasingly turning to informal security services to maintain security and prevent and manage crime (Adams, 1994; Alemika, 1999; Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000; Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2005; Adebayo, 2006; Prysomko, 2011). Samuel (2012) emphasized this when he asserted that the formation and growth of community-based security organizations at the neighbourhood level in Nigeria is thus a by-product of the general condition of insecurity combined with the formal police's poor performance and service delivery. Moshood, Amali, Omalabake, and Olabisi (2017) conducted a study on people's views and perceptions about the performance of informal security organizations in crime control and prevention in Ilorin urban areas. 'It is clear that the inability of formal security structures (police) to control and prevent rising levels of crime in the neighbourhoods contributed significantly to the proliferation of informal security structures in the Ilorin metropolis,' according to their findings. The incapacity of state security agencies to protect residents and their property, according to these researchers, led the public to seek alternatives (Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, & Olabisi, 2017).

Figure 6 : Security events heatmap Nigeria (Source; Adopted from; Beacon Consultants, 2021).

A number of studies and reports such as Transparency International report (2009), Heidger, (2019), Haruna, (2019), and Musa, Adama, Sadiq and Gusau (2020) have also shown that most state governments in Nigeria, especially Governors in the Northern part of Nigeria, are employing this approach to combating insecurity within the region. They are engaging and backing non-state informal security outfits in the fight against insecurity. For example, as a result of rising levels of insecurity in Plateau State, the state's former governor urged various communities to form vigilante groups (Transparency International, 2010: Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, and Olabisi 2017). Also, in July 2020, Governors of States in the northern part of Nigeria resolved to engage local hunters and vigilante groups in the fight against insecurity in the region. This followed growing concerns over high rates of insecurity in most states in the region. The plan was to infuse local, traditional and informal groups such as local vigilantes, hunters, and community watch groups in the security architecture of the region to foster intelligence gathering, rapid response and sustained surveillance (Musa, Adama, Sadiq and Gusau, 2020). In a similar spirit, in October 2019, the Borno State government sought to find an alternative approach to ending the long-running security situation in the state as a result of the Boko haram insurgency recruiting local hunters in the state security architecture. The hunters are believed to have the most intimate knowledge of the territory of where most of the criminals reside, which is the Sambisa Forest and the greater Lake Chad region, and

thus have the potential to address a blind spot of a tired and overstretched military (Heidger, 2019). The government also planned to recruit 10,000 men with voodoo powers and hunting skills for the campaign around the same time, but it's not clear if this was done as no official report was released on the issue afterwards. Amongst them is an infamous group known as the *Yan-Tauri* (die-hards) who are believed to have spiritual protection against gunshots and other kinds of firepower (Haruna, 2019). Part of the mystique of hunters is that there are charms or other aspects of magic that protects them from harm (Heidger, 2019). A number of reports have shown that hunters carry with them charms that are believed to make them immune from the dangers of battle.

Given these developments and experiments in 'hybrid' security arrangements, this research set out to add further empirical knowledge and analysis of particular instances of security governance in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, this research will aim to provide a better understanding and explanation of how different security institutions interact and co-exist in urban spaces in Africa. According to Agbiboa's (2019) research, the outcome of these types of studies could help with peacebuilding, state-building, and ongoing efforts to strengthen civil-military relations and establish a more stable and productive relationship between informal non-state actors and the state. Responding to prompts in the literature such as this, the research for this thesis aims to add to the body of knowledge on policing in Africa by elucidating the diverse and complex interactions between these groups and the state, as well as their major roles and responsibilities in community security and service delivery. This research is situated within a set of wider scholarly and policy debates related to two areas: governance and security management within African cities, and the interface between different security providers: local traditional institutions[3] of governance and state security institutions.

1.3   Research Questions

The goal of this research is to examine the role of non-state actors in providing security and governance in Nigeria, with a specific focus on Yen Kato Da Gora in the Kaduna Urban Area. The objective is to contribute to academic and policy debates on the effectiveness of non-state actors in achieving sustainable development and security in Africa. To achieve this goal, the research addresses the following research questions:

1. What are the existing infrastructural and institutional capabilities (formal & informal) used to deal with crime in Nigerian cities: Who are the different actors and institutions involved in security provision in Kaduna, Nigeria and Nigeria at large?
2. Why is security structured the way it is in Nigeria and how has the system changed in the ways it has over time?

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[3] Traditional political structure or traditional governance systems as used in most parts of this research refers to institutions whose legitimacy is based on their association with traditional modes of governing a community. These governance systems are led by local indigenous knowledge in the present, or when used historically, refers to governance systems based on monarchy or kinship structures that revolve around the concept of emirates or chieftainship and territorial jurisdiction over which authority is wielded.

3. What role do 'non-state', 'informal' or customary actors and institutions play in security provision in Kaduna and Nigeria at large? How do they operate, how are they structured, and to what extent do they complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for official security provision?
4. What kind of protection do informal security providers offer, and from what? To what extent are women and other vulnerable groups included or excluded in security provision?
5. What are the *de jure* rules of accountability and to what extent are they monitored and enforced? How and by whom (if at all) can they be held accountable for human rights abuses, violence against citizens, and failure to establish law and order?

Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, (2016) argue that it is important to investigate whether informal security and justice institutions are easier for civilians to relate to, as they provide straightforward and speedy justice, while offering popularly endorsed dispute resolution. Building on Bagayoko et al's argument, my research investigates people's perception of informal security arrangements by answering the following research question:

6. To whom, or to what, do people look for protection? How satisfied are people with the level of crime management in the city?

Together the six questions lead to the ultimate question of how security provision can be more accountable, responsive, inclusive, and negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality to foster new forms of public authority better suited to African realities?

1.4 Significance of Study

The importance of non-state actors in ensuring security and governance in Africa has gained increasing recognition in recent years. This is especially important in Nigeria, where the role of non-state actors in providing security and governance needs to be studied further. This research aims to add to the growing body of literature on the subject. Scholars have emphasised the critical role that non-state actors can play in addressing Africa's governance and security challenges. Non-state actors, for example, are important in conflict resolution and promoting sustainable development, according to Oluwole and Ogunsola (2019). Okeke and Ogunbiyi (2020) emphasise the importance of increased collaboration between state and non-state actors in addressing Nigeria's governance and security challenges.

Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature advocating for the study of hybrid governance systems in Africa. Scholars such as Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham (2016) have explored the connections between formal and informal, state and non-state security actors, and how hybridity is constructed, instrumentalized, and recalibrated over time on various terrains. This highlights the importance of understanding the complex interplay between different actors and systems in addressing governance and security challenges in Africa. They then emphasized the need for more research on how African citizens perceive and respond to non-state institutions, particularly those who are most vulnerable and excluded. Luckham, & Kirk (2012) investigated if hybrid security arrangements benefit end-users in fragile and conflict-affected spaces and conclude that they do

not always. They further argued that the main focus of most security literature has been on state security, state-building, the peace process and that there was lack of any serious engagement with citizen security, including the factors determining the (in)security of ordinary citizens and therefore stressed the importance of studying the implications for an end-user perspective. Boege (2006) focused on non-Western local approaches to conflict resolution (non-state customary institutions, mechanisms, and actors) and on the interface between local and liberal Western approaches to peacebuilding. In addition, Boege, Brown, Clements, and Nolan (2008) contended that the conventional perception of so-called fragile states as a hindrance to maintaining peace and development can be far too short-sighted, as it is a result of the promotion of conventional state-building along the lines of the western OECD[4] state model as the best means of sustainable development and peace within all societies. It concludes that 'dominant approaches to state-building today rest on a narrow understanding of the sources of our own (Eurocentric) political and social order'. Though not fully in support or against their study further argued that informal institutions are not fully in the public domain in the sense that they address the concerns of every citizen so they can sometimes be just as exclusive and oppressive as formal security provision, seldom offering equal protection to all people and often ignoring those who are most deprived. According to Boege, Brown, Clements, and Nolan (2008), additional research on the potential capacities (and limitations or shortcomings) of hybrid political systems is needed to establish how hybridity might be used for peacebuilding, good governance, and development. They argued that there has been little scholarly attention paid to local/traditional forms of governance and their interactions with national state-based and international initiatives. Furthermore, FCLP[5] (2019) highlighted the coping strategies that are emerging to tackle security challenges at local level within Nigerian cities. Such strategies involve the increase in community policing, neighborhood-watch, and other informal security initiatives where individuals volunteer aiming to make their neighborhoods safe and crime-free. The study emphasised the need for more research on the emerging crime prevention strategies especially in places with high crime rates rather than solely on how to improve formal policing operations and visibility, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods.

Numerous studies have also examined the significant, intricate, and varied roles played by non-state actors in African governance and security system. For instance, there is a dearth of literature that discusses the diversity of Nigeria's security structures (Aborisade, 2018; Adegbulu, 2013; Agbaje, 2020; Federal Government of Nigeria, 2019; Nwokolo, 2020; Olaniyan, 2017; Onuoha, Nwangwu, & Ugwueze, 2020). While some scholars believe the country's security breakdown is due to a compromised standard among governments and armed security officials (Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016; Onuoha et al., 2020), others believe the security architecture is overstretched (Oyewole, 2013; Thomas & Aghedo, 2014; Aleyomi, & Nwagwu, 2020), in addition to other

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[4] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
[5] Development frontiers in crime, livelihood and urban poverty (FCLP); A research program that aimed to explore and understand the spatial patterns, seasonality and interlinkages of crime, livelihoods, and urban poverty in the city of Kaduna, Nigeria.

administrative flaws (Abang, 2014). As a result, this study will attempt to complement previous studies on governance and security provision in Africa by filling gaps identified in some of these studies. Luckham, & Kirk (2012) stated in their study that the complexity of the situation of hybridity governance systems in countries is insufficiently reflected in the security literature. In addition, few empirical studies were found that investigated the historical backgrounds of hybridity especially in the Northern part of Nigeria (in relation to security provision) which has a rich history of traditional/non-state governance systems and structure that is still in existence today. Furthermore, there is a vast body of scholarship on different forms of hybrid and non-state security provision, but most of such studies are found to neglect the interactions that occur between the non-state and formally constituted security structures.

It is important to note that this study focuses on low-level banditry/crime/threat and general lawlessness, rather than large-scale insurgency or political/ethnic violence. Despite their apparent insignificance, these types of crimes must not be overlooked. According to the Afrobarometer survey in 2022, (see fig 8) 23% of respondents considered theft/break-ins to be the most serious threat to safety and security in Nigerian neighbourhoods, and it was the most commonly cited threat among all respondents, regardless of urban-rural location or other demographic factors. As a result, not only will this study provide new insights into the challenges and opportunities that non-state actors face in Nigeria, but it will also contribute to academic and policy debates about the role of non-state actors in achieving Africa's long-term development and security. This study will improve our understanding of the effectiveness of non-state actors in addressing Africa's governance and security challenges by focusing on civil society's response to small-scale crimes.

Figure 7: Afrobarometers ranking of Most serious threat to safety and security in neighbourhood by urban-rural location in Nigeria 2022 (source Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023)

Due to the activities of sects like the Boko Haram terrorist groups, violent crimes and high-profile crimes like terrorist attacks, intrastate and interstate conflicts, among others, are some of the most studied crimes in recent times in Nigeria, particularly the northern part of the country where the issue is most profound. However, in reality, the majority of government efforts, especially as related to internal security and policing, involves responding to low-level banditry/crime/threat and general threats[6] (Beacon, 2021). As the country debates policing reform and the recent spike in crime and insecurity, it is becoming more and more obvious that overly harsh security responses to misdemeanour offences can actually work to undermine public safety as nations debate policing reform and the recent spike in crime and insecurity (Mintz, 2021). This research, therefore, focuses on such crime types in order to gain a better understanding of how they are dealt within the country. It will focus in particular on how civil society address these problems.

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[6] see Beacon Consultants, 2021: *Security Reports*. https://beaconconsulting.com.ng/security-reports/#reports

1.5   Study Structure

This thesis examines Africa's governance and security landscape through the lens of the critical roles that both formal and informal institutions play in shaping security provision. Recognising the complexities of governance in African contexts, this study employs an analytical framework that combines insights from neoclassical and new institutional economics, resulting in an in-depth knowledge of the hybrid mechanisms of security provision. This methodological approach allows for an extensive look of the underlying principles governing security practices in both formal and informal settings, revealing aspects that are often overlooked in conventional analyses.

The analytical framework views institutions as both formal entities (manifested in laws, regulations, and structured organizations) and informal practices (including cultural norms, traditions, and unwritten rules that guide behavior). This dual perspective captures the essence of African governance and security provision, where formal mechanisms coexist with informal systems deeply embedded in historical and social contexts. Additionally, the framework draws from institutional evolution literature, emphasizing the dynamic interplay between formal and informal regulations over time. This approach is crucial for understanding how hybrid security systems function, reflecting a mix of modern and traditional practices that, despite seeming contradictions, create effective governance mechanisms. This perspective challenges the conventional view, which often dismisses these hybrid practices as inefficient or chaotic, advocating for a more nuanced evaluation of their legitimacy and efficiency within specific socio-political contexts.

Introduction/Background of study

This section introduces the thesis by outlining its context, motivation, problem statement, and significance. The chapters that follow examine the governance and hybrid policing landscapes in Nigerian cities, the diversity of Africa's informal security institutions, and insights into Nigeria's security architecture. The first chapter serves as a study navigation guide. It establishes the foundation for the analytical framework and subsequent data collection and analysis, while addressing key research questions. It serves as the foundation for aligning the research methods with the overall goal of the research.

Analytical Framework and Literature Review

The analytical framework developed in chapters 2-6 of this thesis was carefully designed to go beyond an easy compilation of themes and literatures. It systematically builds a cohesive structure that not only connects governance and state-building, historical perspectives on security governance, and the critical role of non-state actors in Nigeria's security ecosystem, but also explains how their synergy improves our understanding of security provision dynamics within Nigeria. This framework is not arbitrary, it is strategically aligned with the thesis's first two research questions, ensuring that each discussed concept directly contributes to understanding the complexities of security governance in Nigeria.

By delving into governance and state-building, the framework provided a solid understanding of the political and administrative contexts within which security mechanisms operate. A study of historical perspectives on security governance broadens this understanding by shedding light on the evolution of security practices and their implications for current issues. The study of non-state actors, on the other hand, sheds light on the complex fabric of Nigeria's security provision, emphasising the diversity of actors involved and their roles in maintaining public safety and order.

Furthermore, the framework critically examines the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), tracing its colonial roots and assessing their impact on contemporary policing strategies and challenges. This historical lens is critical for understanding the current challenges of Nigeria's security landscape, allowing for a thorough investigation that recognises the past's impact on current governance and security strategies. Essentially, this framework does more than just list topics, it integrates them into a logical story that shows how they relate to one another and to the study's overall goals.

Methodology

This Chapter explains the data sources, materials, methods of data collection, analysis for the research and discusses its conceptual foundations as well as other research design approach used. It comprehensively describes and justifies the research design choices made. It touches on the type of research conducted (mix methods), how data was collected and analysed and who or where data was collected from (sampling). It also discusses the difficulties encountered during the study process (particularly fieldwork) and how these were overcome amongst other things. The methodology employed is directly informed by the analytical framework's emphasis on the dual nature of security institutions in Africa. By employing both qualitative and quantitative methods, the research design captured the complexity of security provision as shaped by formal and informal institutions.

Data and Analysis

The data collection and analysis process is woven with the research questions and the analytical framework of the study. The chapter discusses the primary data that was collected and the subsequent analysis. The qualitative and quantitative data, which were gathered through interviews at various study sites, were collected with a view to helping us understand and evaluate the spread and efficacy of informal security systems within communities. This process entails not just data collection but also direct engagement with the research questions and the themes identified in the analytical framework, ensuring that every part of data serves a specific, targeted purpose within the context of the study. This chapter is the most important part of the research because it contains the thesis' original core. The data narrative is woven here, telling the story of the research findings and how they contribute to a better understanding of the subject, thereby validating the study's significance and impact.

Conclusions, Recommendation and Policy Implications

The conclusion is the final chapter of the thesis. It provides a summary and reflection on the research, and it answers the main research question by highlighting key aspects of the literature studied, as well as data used in the study and recommendations provided, to justify the study's results and state how this is justified or contradicted by the research. This chapter further focuses on the research's analytical components as well as the study's constraints, limitations, and policy implications of the hybrid system for sustainable development.

CHAPTER 2. GOVERNANCE & STATE BUILDING IN AFRICA.

2.0 Introduction

This chapter links critical literature on two broad disciplines of Development Studies and Security Studies, which represents a unique contribution and value-added to the study of Human Security and development. focuses on the hybrid nature of institutions and actors involved in African city governance and security. While the study emphasises local or informal non-state institutions, it does not assume or imply that they are better for people or end users than state-provided security.

Governance and state building are crucial concepts for the development of nations worldwide, and in Africa, they are of particular significance due to the continent's struggles with political instability, conflict, and poor governance. The Nigerian state has faced numerous challenges in building a stable and effective governance system, hindered by issues such as corruption, poverty, and inequality.

This chapter seeks to provide a broad understanding of African governance and state building, with a particular emphasis on Nigeria. It investigates various state building approaches, such as hybrid governance systems. The chapter further seeks to provide insights into the challenges confronting the Nigerian state in its efforts to build a sustainable governance system, through a critical analysis of the existing literature on governance and state building.

Finally, the chapter emphasises the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach to addressing Africa's complex issues of governance and state building.

2.1 Governance and State Building

According to Migdal (1988), stateness is simply the quality of been a state. It is the extent to which a state is able to wield firm control over standing armies and police forces while eliminating non-state-controlled armies, militias, and gangs. The state has been written about time and time again in several disciplines. Marxist Scholars (history and economics) consider it as an institution that stands for the interest of the dominant class (Pierson, 1996). In classic Weberian literature (sociology), the state referred to as a 'compulsory political organization' that controls a territorial area in which 'the administrative staff successfully maintains the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the implementation of law and order,' (Weber 1978; Spruyt, 2011). Another frequently used definition perceives the state as an embodiment of people, territory, government and sovereignty (Spruyt, 2011). Some have also defined it along the line of John Locke's classical social contract theory as a political society constructed through an implicit social contract to provide certain basic functions to its members by those who are entrusted with political authority (Einsiedel, 2005).

Any powerful group that is attempting to legitimize its power as a form of state rule can generally be described as an agent of state-building. Any deliberate attempt at state-building affects power

constellations by consciously or unconsciously opening up social and political opportunities for some groups while closing them to others (Kühn 2011; de Guevara 2012), and responses to this can include both resistance and cooperation and manipulation (De Guevara, 2012). For this research, the term 'state' will be adapted as used in Ababu, (2013) as a set of institutions that perform certain basic functions essential for the existence of a properly functioning political community.

De Guevara (2012) used 'Bob the Builder', a British children's animation series to describe a series of ideologies that underpin today's international politics of state-building. Bob, the main character, is a building contractor who, with a team of animate machines, enthusiastically helps neighbors and friends with constructions and repairs. In their public self-image, powerful (mainly western) states and their team of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often referred to as 'the international community' (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2011) are ready to tackle any project in the course of an intervention. The guiding idea is that the job of transferring western-type institutions to states, which are perceived as failing, is not a matter of whether but only of how (de Guevara, 2012). There are a multitude of different approaches to state-building that originate within different frameworks of reference. First, early concepts of state-building had a predominantly technocratic character and were developed at the interface of the security and development discourse. Their central claim has been that externally driven social engineering is viable, certainly an attractive claim for both development agencies and military planners. These approaches put emphasis on the technical aspects of state-building, such as providing infrastructure, training civil servants, and initiating organizational reform (Debiel, & Lambach, 2009).

The second approach connects state-building with the concept of good governance. This approach tries to tailor the good governance concept toward the specific needs of 'difficult partners.' These approaches emphasize the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, participation, social coherence, and so on. A third and more provocative approach is advocated by Ottaway& Lieven, (2002) in their study on 'Rebuilding Afghanistan' where they cautioned Western states that sticking to the standard model of democratic reconstruction would not work in a country like Afghanistan where the government is struggling to overpower regional warlords. Instead, they argue in favor of an 'ordered anarchy' wherein external actors should concentrate on the most fundamental issues such as providing a minimum degree of security and protecting the arteries of commerce.

2.2.1   State Building and Governance around the World

The dangers of state failure or fragility have driven the emergence of state-building, which is characterised by weak institutions, poor governance, a legitimacy crisis, and corruption (Osaghae, 2007; Ababu, 2013). Fragile states pose risks to their own populations and the international community due to conflict, instability, terrorism, and other challenges (Zoellick, 2008; Ababu, 2013). According to the joint UN-World Bank study 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches

to Preventing Violent Conflict,' violent conflicts today are becoming increasingly complex, involving non-state groups as well as regional and international actors, and are expected to affect more than half of the world's poor by 2030 (United Nations, 2018). Inclusive solutions such as dialogue, institutional reform, and redistributive policies are required to address grievances and prevent conflicts from escalating. Additionally, it emphasises the importance of civil society, the private sector, and regional and international organisations in effective prevention efforts (UN, 2018).

Therefore, state-building is seen as the logical response to address state failure and fragility by strengthening state capacity and institutions to fulfill their core functions. A number of interrelated measures are identified to this effect. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) OECD-DAC a forum that deals with issues surrounding aid, development, and poverty reduction in developing countries in 2008, advocated promoting democratic governance, economic liberalization or marketization, and increasing its functional capacity. The British Department for International Development (DFID) recognized state-building in terms of tackling the causes of fragility and conflict, supporting inclusive political settlement, improving the delivery of fundamental state functions, and responding to public expectations. According to the Crisis States Program (Putzel & John, 2012), state resilience is ensured through the monopoly of legitimate violence, the territorial embeddedness of state administration, state monopoly of taxation, and institutional authority (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010; de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010; Braithwaite, 2010; Ababu, 2013).

Some scholars have however argued that the international politics of state-building is little more than another mechanism by which the non-Western state is internationalized (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010). The Western policy framework of state-building, which is the supposed guiding principle of international relations in the twenty-first century is little more than a new chapter of the modern history of power structures in the international system and their effects on non-Western states' attempts to consolidate their presupposed statehood. Understanding how European state formation influenced the propensity for absolutist or constitutionalist forms of government is important to understanding regime transitions elsewhere (Spruyt, 2011), even though several authors such as Jeffrey Herbst (2000) have asserted that the literature on state-building and formation has focused excessively on the European experience.

In some parts of the West (Western Europe), state making, often referred to as a gradual process of state formation, was essentially a process of monopolizing the use of legitimate physical violence by which rulers of city-states, kingdoms, and principalities took steps to attain Weber's notion of statehood (Isima, 2007). The monopoly of violence gave early state makers in Western Europe the empirical sovereignty to establish the authority of the state and to impose its dominance within its territory and over competing centers of power (Job 1992) or competing foci of authority (Ayoob 1992) among the population (Isima, 2007). In most states in western Europe, the state had to contend fiercely with armed citizens, rival power holders and private armies in order to assert

their authority across the territory they sought to control (examples of England and France) (Tilly, 1990). By doing this, (disarming their own populations) and establishing and expanding their own armed forces thereby enabling them to monopolize the means of violence, they were able to secure internal sovereignty (Isima, 2007).

This process further involved an intimate and mutually reinforcing relationship between taxation and the military force. The central authority was responsible for taxation of property and income of individuals and earnings were used to maintain this system (the monopoly of force and taxation) (Elias1982; Isima, 2007). one of the major functions of the state asides from taxation (which was needed to support war and policing, and to deepen the state's penetration of society) was to command forces that further involved both war-making and policing. war-making and policing was necessary and used by the State elites to 'expand' and 'consolidate' the 'territorial and demographic domain' of the state (Ayoob 1995; Isima, 2007).

Unlike in Europe, where the formation processes of the state and the international system occurred in parallel, international structures of power and domination were already in place when the non-Western state-formation process took off. In post-colonial states, the historical process of state-formation occurred under various structural circumstances and produced various results. What is most striking is how heavily internationalized some or all core state functions are in non-Western nations (Migdal and Schlichte 2005). As a condition for participation in world society, the state model spread globally through internationalization intensified by the influences of globalization, global governance, and not least, the international politics of state-building in non-western states (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010). Yet internally, most states remained hybrid, combining traditional and modern elements of rule (Badie, 2000). Internationally supported reforms aiming at the legal-rational functioning of non-Western states do little to provide the state with more legitimacy. The tasks of law production, implementation and enforcement are increasingly internationalized by two mechanisms. On the one hand, international intervention agencies, donor conditionalities, international staff deployed to national institutions, and the like, ensure that these tasks are brought in line with international norms and values. On the other, non-western states have learned to subscribe to international regimes so as to portray themselves as 'responsible members of the international community', thus ensuring international support (Forster Rothbart 2009). The problem with such internationalized norms and laws is that they usually lack local substance because, on the one hand, states are unwilling or unable to implement them and, on the other hand, internationalized norms tend to lack legitimacy as they are not socially anchored (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010).

2.2.2 State Building in Africa

Western concepts of state autonomy, the democratic constitution of society, and social contract-based understandings of the state are concepts that are closely linked with the historical West-European process of state-formation and the discourses that accompanied it. They are based upon the idea that there are clear distinctions between political and economic, legal, and illegal, as well as private and public, spheres. In non-Western contexts, however, such a separation has at best-taken place partially, if at all. Even where the influences of Western global governance are weak, the state is usually not the result of a collective societal will, but rather of imposed formal structures appropriated by small but powerful local elites (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010). Most scholars from the Western European background have generally emphasized the role of formal institutions as both guiding and constraining power, whereas in the Middle East, Africa or Latin America, a more complicated picture has been uncovered, blurring boundaries between formal and informal, tradition and modernity, north and south, liberal and local. The western model, however, argues that alternative or parallel political structures offer a fragmented agency that maintains a challenge against existing political categories (Richmond, 2013).

Development in Africa and in the rest of the countries of the South is mostly viewed to rest largely on integration with the global economy, under the new global order. The emergence of 'neopatrimonialism' is the result of post-colonial African states' institutional mismatch. As discussed in the previous chapter, this term describes the coexistence of formal bureaucratic structures and deep-seated patrimonial practises. By highlighting this phenomenon, neopatrimonialism calls into question normative assumptions that African states should follow legal-rational systems similar to those found in the West. As such, as argued by Wai (2012), this concept helps explain the unique challenges faced by African states and emphasises the need for a nuanced understanding of governance in these contexts. Taking inspiration from Max Weber's different modes of legitimate domination, scholars argued that states like Zaire, Nigeria or Kenya had formally adopted the trappings of impersonal, technocratic bureaucracy while retaining a deep-seated patrimonialism that saw public office and resources as benefits derived from a clientelistic and prebendalist form of political authority (Médard 1982; Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993; Reno 1995). At the time of decolonization, international structures of power and domination were in place and modern statehood constituted the condition for participation in world society (Siegelberg 2000). As norm and ideology, the state model spread globally; yet internally, most states struggled to catch up with their juridical statehood, bringing about institutions which combined pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial elements to new, hybrid forms of rule (Badie 2000; Schlichte 2005: de Guevara, 2012).

In most developing countries, the state's function has been reduced to essentially adjusting national economies to the global economy instead of originally charting its own development strategy (Mengisteab, 1997). Policy measures that are known to promote the integration of the local economy with the global economy, including attraction of foreign investments, promotion of exports, correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and decontrols of prices, exchange rates and

imports are usually promoted in these countries (Mengisteab, 1997). In most developing countries, their inability to set the development agenda and to chart development strategy for their countries has seriously degraded and bastardized the state (Mengisteab, 1997). More recent scholarship has remarked on the ease with which African states have simply borrowed institutional best practices without actually undertaking any of the functional or political transformations that such practices rely on (Andrews, 2013; Pritchett, Woolcock & Andrews 2013). The problem with internationalized norms and laws is that they tend to lack local substance. Sometimes states are unwilling or unable to implement them, sometimes norms are formally implemented but do not guide people's established practices which, considering the internationalized norms, become informal. For example, in Sierra Leone, despite a comprehensive international intervention aimed at bringing about social and political change, (informal) institutions that shaped state-society relations prior to the intervention have remained largely in place, rendering most of the supposed successes of external state-building an illusion (De Guevara, 2012). Ultimately Such internationalized norms especially in terms of forms of financing contribute to a relative detachment of the state from its society (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2010).

The stylized facts of African state-building remain today much the same as they were three decades ago, pervasive Ethno-clientelism in recruitment and procurement; a patrimonial form of electoral politics that sees the state as a prize and an environment of social norms, in which everyday people expect public servants to use their position to help their relatives and dependents (Yanguas, 2017). According to Chabal and Engel (2005), the best way to understand politics in Africa is as the use of patrimonial power. Despite the formal political structures in place, power essentially moves through the informal sector, or rather, power is exercised on the continent through the interaction between the formal and informal sectors (This form of governance, often dubbed neo-patrimonialism). According to Chabal and Engel (2005), the process by which the new African rulers redesigned the political structures they inherited at independence and redefined the criteria governing political action is known as 'Africanization of politics.' What happened could be described as the convergence of two seemingly at odds political logics. On the one hand, the political institutions appeared to be strengthened as they emerged from the decolonization process, whether it was peaceful or violent. On the other hand, a new political system emerged that frequently clashed with the recently built formal structures. When most African nations gained their independence, the purportedly democratic and pluralist institutions of political representation quickly fell victim to the one-party state and the emergence of a single, rather than plural, political logic. Further down the line, the system evolved in such a way as to call into question the nature of power, and particularly the role of the state, as had been conceived by most political analysts (Chabal, & Engel, 2005). Tankebe et.al (2014), however, cautioned that 'references to Africa often conjure up an image of corruption, violent conflicts, coup d'états and underdevelopment. However, if we consider the scale of transformations in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa), transformations occasioned by decades of complex political, economic and social processes of change we see an image that is less malleable to stereotypical depictions'.

2.2.3 State Building in Nigeria

The process of state formation in Nigeria can be traced back to the late 1840s pacification wars waged by British expeditionary forces against coastal chiefs. This project lasted until the establishment of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1861. During the colonial era, the colonial administration chose not to neutralize alternative centers of authority, but rather adopt the policy of indirect rule as a rational response to constant rebellion to colonial occupation. The process (indirect rule) created and supported division instead of supporting the emergence of strong state bureaucracies, as the various administrative units were made to coincide with the spatial distribution of the major ethnic groups. This fact itself verified the failure of the colonial state to successfully establish public monopolies of violence and to fulfill the first-order condition for making a strong state (Ake 2000; Isima, 2007).

Within the first few years of independence in Nigeria, it was obvious that there was an acute lack of institutional capacity, weak social cohesion and high levels of social exclusion within the state system, which revealed the resilience of other forms of authority and loyalty (traditional and non-state), with which the modern state failed to negotiate the terms of co-existence (Isima, 2007). These factors weakened the chances of having strong states in the region and created an environment conducive to the thriving and proliferation of privatized violence. Due to this the inability of most Sub-Saharan African states to provide and sustain the conditions of welfare and security for citizens, as is the case in the developed world they have been termed weak or failed States. To compensate for their lack of firm hold on the system especially in terms of infrastructural power, state elites deployed the state's despotic power through the military take-over of government in January 1966 to enforce compliance with the authority of the state. Recourse to the use of despotic power became a permanent status of the post-colonial state until the democratic transition of 1999. The absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues concerning the social, economic, and political organization throughout the duration of military rule led to many instances of communal violence such as the Biafra rebellion through the civil war of 1967-1970 (Isima, 2007).

The police's failure to protect citizens from crime, military despotism, and communal conflicts undermined the people's security. This weakened the state's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. As a result, to ensure physical security within the state, alternative forms of authority emerged through localised means. Although military rule ended in 1999, the state's infrastructure power, which should have been used to achieve compliance through peaceful means, was ignored. As a result, the state's institutional capacity declined significantly, giving rise to well-organized and long-lasting vigilante groups and militias. These fragmented expressions of authority reflect the state's inability to ensure citizens' safety. The Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in the Yoruba-speaking south-west, the Hisba in the north, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, and the Bakassi Boys in the eastern states are examples of alternative security systems. These groups use uncontrolled violence to address the challenges of insecurity and socioeconomic marginalisation that exist in their communities (Isima, 2007; Pratten, 2008).

2.3   Approaches to state-building across the world

In recent times, governance especially in the context of state-building is arguably seen as a central dimension of development assistance and functioning and effective state institutions are a prerequisite for sustainable development. In the discourse of state-building, scholars such as Fukuyama (2004) and Rotberg (2004) put emphasis on Western-style structures that extend the state's capacity of public good delivery and promise legitimacy by greater performance. In a scathing critique, Englebert and Tull (2008) contend that a number of myths held by academics and development experts contribute to the persistence of instability as the status quo in Africa. Their argument is made in the context of African countries being labelled as failed states and the international strategies intended to address this problem and the international strategies intended to address this problem. These fallacies include the ideas that it is plausible to transfer Western institutions to Africa, that international players may influence successful state building initiatives, and that African populace perceive their states as failing (Englebert and Tull 2008).

According to a number of studies, the effects of state building modelled after Western political institutional systems reproduce the authoritarian, violent, or neo-patrimonial structures that generated the crisis in the first place. This has been attributed to the fact that these outcomes typically require the inclusion of leaders from rival, violent groups in power-sharing deals (Englebert and Tull 2008; Bates 2008; Englebert 2000). Johnson & Hutchison's (2012) research also showed that attempts to integrate or build alternative political organizational systems that work alongside formal institutions may be one form of resistance to repressive and authoritarian structures.

An increasing number of scholars such as Holsti (1996) and Lemay-Hébert (2009) argue in support of a more socio-political understanding in order to ensure that institutions are rooted in the society and have political legitimacy (Weigand, 2013). Furthermore, Englebert and Tull (2008) demonstrate in their study that what is frequently referred to as a fragile state does not imply the absence of political order. Political authority and order are typically provided through customary practice, local leaders, or through existing kinship networks in what can be considered 'fragile states' by Western-style systems.

There are two leading contemporary approaches to state-building:

1) The Weberian approach (institutional approach/state-centric/centralized) and,
2) The neo-patrimonialism approach (legitimacy/ humancentric/hybrid).

2.3.1 Weberian Model

Weberian theorists fundamentally perceive the Western state as a universal standard for social order (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010; Jackson 2011). Some authors have described the absence of Western-style institutions as a security risk in a globalized world (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, 2010). Cramer, & Goodhand (2002), posit that an imperfect centralized state, corrupt and perhaps conniving with primitive accumulation activities, may be preferable to a decentralized governance system. They further argued that centralized authority is required in order to break up violent primitive accumulation and to protect the interests of the poorest in such conditions and bring about structural transformation. Consequently, societies that do not demonstrate a typical state structure in their governance system are often called 'failed' or 'failing' because they appear chaotic and without obvious institutions in place that can control violence and stop it from spreading into the 'peaceful liberal democracies' in the West (Weigand, 2013).

In the 1990s, the issue of 'state collapse' and 'state failure' became an issue of international concern witnessing an ideological turn in relation to the United Nations (UN) peace operations. During this time, a global consensus began to form that failed or collapsing states and non-state actors posed a greater threat to global peace and security than aggressive, powerful states. This led to the claim that creating strong, legitimate liberal states would both address this threat and advance self-sustaining peace in societies that had experienced war. Therefore, for more than two decades, support initiatives were based on a single model: a western liberal state model that emphasized building centralized state institutions for ensuring state stability (Cramer, & Goodhand, 2002; Paris 2004: Richmond 2005: Mac Ginty 2006: Roberts, 2011). Duffield (2001) notes that this kind of system aims at transforming 'the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities.' However, Escobar (2004) notes that the inability of the system to engage with the 'people', culture, needs, politics and peacebuilding practices can contribute to the creation of 'a 'predatory' peace to the benefit of the elites and a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path'. Indeed, Trotha (2009) denounces as arrogant managerialism the 'good governance' models of state-building so popular in contemporary post-conflict situations: 'the idea of learning to do state-building and implementing it in a planned fashion is such a ludicrous notion that it ought to prompt serious concern over a political mainstream and an academic discipline that allows itself such surreal historical amnesia'.

Even though Western-type state structures have legitimacy in several countries, establishing this kind of institution does not guarantee the same result. The reason for the wide-spread existence of Western state structures lies in the colonial history instead of genuine acceptance and practice of the system, especially in most African countries. Many countries enforced Western-style state structures throughout the colonial period, and after the colonial period, this state form became a prerequisite for participation in the international community, as well as trade, grants, loans, and development assistance. According to Siegelberg (1991), many of these societies now bear the

burden of 'making up for the establishment of anticipated statehood they do not really believe in or understand' (Weigand, 2013).

2.3.2   Neo-Patrimonialism Model

The concept of neopatrimonialism arose in response to the blurring lines between the state and society, as well as private appropriation of public resources. Despite the fact that it is not a uniquely African phenomenon, neopatrimonial theory has predominated in explaining modern African politics (Nyaluke, 2014). Within such a system, elites use their formal positions to meet their clients' informal demands, on which their effective power is based (Wiuff Moe, 2010). However, such systems are thought to become more autocratic, unresponsive, and violent over time.

Max Weber (1978) coined the term to distinguish between different types of state rationalities. Weber's ideal-type of the modern, legal-rational state is distinguished by a lack of personal relationships and personal influence over state means distribution (Schlichte, 2005). The prefix 'neo' denotes a break from traditional patrimonialism and describes a state in which patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucracies coexist (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Routley, 2014).

However, in recent times, the Weberian notions of the state as a set of key functions, including the 'legitimate monopoly of violence' and rational bureaucratic authority, have been replaced by more Tillyan models of state formation as a contested, disorderly and often violent process (Menkhaus, 2006; Boege et al., 2008; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Hagmann and Peclard, 2010; Meagher, 2012). In place of destructive images of greedy warlords and rebel atrocities, violence is associated with 'transformation' and the opening of political and economic space for local actors to counter state neglect by seizing a measure of regulatory authority. The term neo-patrimonialism is derived from Weber's idea of patrimonialism. Theorizing processes of regulatory pluralization rather than centralization, these models are more properly termed neo-Tillyan, but they hint at longer-run processes of Tillyan centralization (Meagher, 2012).

Robert Jackson's definition is perhaps the widest used description of state failure. He defines failed states as states who 'cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance' (Jackson, 2000). Good governance presupposes legitimacy, which in turn is derived from the functions a state performs (Wai, 2012; Routley, 2014).

The interest in security and justice provision beyond the confines of the state stems from the perception that state institutions are failing in their core functions and lack legitimacy and public support. In many African countries, as Ebo (2007) observes:

> The Westphalian assumption that monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion lies with the state and its institutions meet a veritable challenge in the face of the wide support and legitimacy enjoyed by non-state security institutions. The security sector has typically manifested both formal and informal tracks. Even in states which are ostensibly stable, statutory institutions have been unable to provide security to all categories of its citizens at affordable levels, with supplementary roles being played by an array of traditional security actors.

2.4   Hybrid Governance System in Africa

Neopatrimonialism and state failure have become catchphrases for a variety of issues facing the African state. Neopatrimonial structures are blamed for a variety of social, economic, and political ills that amount to 'state failure' in Africa in both mainstream and critical political scientist discourses (Pitcher, Moran, & Johnston, 2009). This perspective casts a deterministic shadow over the political landscape in Africa, where it is believed that enduring neopatrimonial structures have contributed to state decline and where African states are doomed to eventual state failure (Wai, 2012).

The discourse of hybridity, which has offered many a way out of the constraints and assumptions of the neopatrimonialism framework, recognizes that neo-patrimonial political systems can be described as 'hybrid' political systems. These systems are characterized by the coexistence of legal-rational institutions and the norms and patterns of patrimonial systems, as described by political scientists such as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Tom (2011). The phrase refers to a trend away from normative state building strategies and toward more practical ones that place more emphasis on 'what works' than on principles of good governance. On the one hand, hybrid governance analyses take an explicitly non-normative approach to questions of public authority and governance by suspending judgments on less ideal forms of order that may involve cooperation between public authorities or organisations with informal or illiberal institutions, such as vigilante groups, informal enterprise associations, or religious authorities. On the other hand, hybrid arrangements are given a normative validity by being repackaged as 'realistic,' 'legal,' and 'arrangements that work' (Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014).

Hybrid political systems are defined here as including non-state order, combining overlapping sectors of social and political organisation, and producing specific localised practice, in agreement with Boege et al. (2008) and Hutnyck (2005) definition. Hybrid political orders combine informal and traditional institutions and practice with formal institutions and rules (Jarstad and Belloni 2012; Johnson & Hutchison, 2012). Weber (1947) uses the concept of patrimonialism to refer to a form of governance in which 'authority is mainly oriented to tradition but in its exercise makes the claim of full personal powers'. In recent times, the term 'hybrid' is usually applied to security

arrangements in Africa to describe complex security governance structures. Hybrid systems are usually thought to form when war and conflict weaken or decimate state security forces and institutions, which usually leads to, multiple state and non-state security actors and governance structures emerging to fill the security vacuums (IDRC, 2019).

The term 'hybridity' is also used to capture the intersections of formality and informality and to illuminate the complex nature of security governance in Africa (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Other names for this approach include the 'mediated state', 'negotiated state', 'real governance', and 'governance without government' (Meagher, 2012). Other related formulations include the notion of 'twilight institutions' and 'institutional multiplicity' (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). 'Hybrid' security arrangements are generally characterized by complex interactions among a variety state and non-state providers of security, as the state shares authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other actors, networks and institutions across the formal/informal divide (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016).

In general, the resulting political order can be classified as hybrid when existing institutions overlap or incorporate traditional political order or informal institutions. According to recent studies on the matter, hybrid political systems contain 'liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors which coexist, interact, and even clash' (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). Several scholars have noted that the Western liberal state regards elements of hybrid political orders as illegitimate, such as neopatrimonialism, traditional leaders' participation in governance, and clientelism (Belloni 2012; Jarstad and Belloni 2012). However, in post-conflict settings, where internal mechanisms are more effective at providing local solutions, these practices and procedures are regarded as essential to society (Kumar and De la Haye 2012; Johnson & Hutchison, 2012). Hybridity is not a new phenomenon in post-colonial societies, (from Latin America to Africa hybrid political systems, multiple sovereignties, legitimacy, and authority have existed since colonial rule) (Tom, 2011). In the 18th century, colonialism, and population displacement in countries such as the US, UK, and France led to interracial contact, resulting in new debates on the notion of hybridity (Kraidy, 2002). However, hybridity, during this period was defined in the negative sense since there was a general fear among Westerners that the other ethnic groups they encountered and colonized would pollute them, thus often invoking biology so as to 'justify ideologies of white superiority and warned of the danger of interracial breeding described as 'miscegenation' and 'amalgamation' (Kraidy, 2002). Hence, for Knox (1850), hybridity, in the context of interracial contact had a negative consequence as it was 'a degradation of humanity and was rejected by nature' (Young, 1995). Although Knox and others focused on hybridity in relation to interracial breeding and the negative connotations associated with it, hybridity during this time period was not limited to this type of interaction. It existed on the commercial farms, mines, and even in colonial administration (Tom, 2011).

Revisiting Chabal and Engel's (2005) analysis of patrimonial power in Africa, it becomes essential to further explore its significance within the context of the discourse on hybridity. Politics in

Africa, they argue, is best understood as the exercise of power through informal means, even in the presence of formal political structures. In other words, power on the continent is transferred and wielded through the interaction of the formal and informal sectors. This understanding of patrimonial power sheds light on the complexities of African governance and serves as a necessary foundation for further investigations into the concept of hybridity. The discourse of hybridity provides a framework for better understanding the dynamics and nuances of power and governance in African contexts by acknowledging the coexistence and interaction of formal and informal systems. Chabal, & Engel, (2005) described the African political system as the Africanization of politics, that is the process by which the new African rulers redesigned the political structures inherited at independence and redefined the parameters guiding political action. What happened could be described as the convergence of two seemingly at odds political logics. On the one hand, the political institutions appeared to be strengthened as they emerged from the decolonization process, whether it was peaceful or violent. On the other hand, a new political system emerged that frequently clashed with the recently built formal structures. The majority of African countries' ostensibly democratic and pluralist political representational structures quickly gave way to one-party states as a result of the development of a single, not plural, political logic. Further down the line, the system evolved in such a way as to call into question the nature of power, and particularly the role of the state, as had been conceived by most political analysts (Chabal, & Engel, 2005).

Bhabha (1994), a prominent theorist of hybridity, celebrates the notion of hybridity as evidence of the resilience of the colonized and 'as the contamination of imperial ideology, aesthetics, and identity, by the natives who are striking back at imperial domination'. For Bhabha (1994), in the colonial situation, the indigenous people who encountered the colonisers were caught between two cultures: their own and the one the coloniser had imposed on them. As the natives continuously negotiated, resisted, undermined, and re-appropriated the dominant colonial culture in their struggle for survival, new cultural forms and practices hybrid cultures emerged. In many places, such customary non-state institutions of governance that existed prior to the era of colonial rule have survived the onslaught of colonialism and 'national liberation'. They have, of course, been subject to considerable change and have had to adapt to new circumstances, yet they have shown remarkable resilience (Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009).

2.4.1 Examples of Hybrid Systems in Africa

The process by which institutions of both the state and the non-state come together around stable forms of order and authority is more important in hybrid governance than the state itself. Development professionals and academics are debating whether it is possible to create more appropriate forms of order by 'working with the grain' of local institutions operating on the ground in weak state contexts rather than focusing on fixing failed states from above (Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014). The integration of different political orders within localities represents a hybridity within political and social organisation in regions where reality is complicated by colonialism's historical legacies and the imposition of formal institutional structures. Hybrid political orders

place a strong emphasis on the traditional or non-state institutions that have a significant political impact on all African nations. Where formal institutional structures have been imposed and the colonial legacy has complicated reality, the incorporation of various political orders within localities represents a hybridity in political and social organisation. People's continued strong loyalty to and trust in existing traditional institutions, on the other hand, helps to explain the governance crisis in postcolonial African states. Colonialists recognised this, prioritising the integration of traditional governance institutions as a means of restoring order (Johnson & Hutchison, 2012).

In Africa, there are numerous examples of hybrid systems that address security challenges by incorporating both formal and informal systems. Amotekun, a regional security network established by six southwestern Nigerian states to combat rising insecurity and crime, is one such example. Amotekun works with the Nigerian police and other security agencies, utilising both formal and traditional structures (Oyero, 2021). Community Policing Forums (CPFs) in South Africa are community-based organisations that work with the South African Police Service to improve community safety. CPFs include both formal and informal bodies, such as community leaders and religious organisations (Van Vuuren, 1996). In Kenya, Nyumba Kumi is a community policing programme that began in 2013 and involves residents in identifying and reporting criminal activity. Through this programme, traditional leaders and elders also play a role in resolving disputes within communities (Ndono, Muthama, & Muigua, 2019). These examples demonstrate the various approaches used throughout Africa to establish hybrid systems that integrate various stakeholders in ensuring security and fostering community well-being. Following chapters in this thesis provide more examples of the aforementioned system observed in various African countries where traditional or non-state institutions wield significant political influence and power. These examples highlight the importance of hybridity as a framework for understanding the complex dynamics of governance in Africa.

2.5 Conclusion

Hybrid models differ considerably from the Weberian model state and the manner it operates, even in the core governance realms of security, representation, and welfare. First and foremost, the security domain which in the Weberian context is seen as being at the heart of statehood is structured in a non-state-centric way. The maintenance of internal security and order is not based on the state monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force, instead, state institutions share responsibilities with non-state actors (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009). Moreover, in directing attention to the detailed consideration of local dynamics, 'hybrid governance' approaches obscure the role of more powerful non-local actors in shaping, and sometimes reshaping, relations of power, and accountability on the ground (Meagher, 2012).

The fundamental ideas that frame research on global governance have clear boundaries. When studies of global governance claim that nonstate actors' power and authority have increased while

states have decreased, this is a fundamental misreading of the relations between states and nonstate actors due to their commitment to power as sovereignty and the associated concern with the institutionalisation of political authority. When focusing on the incorporation of these organisations into existing formal institutions, power-sharing agreements, and the absorption of these organisations, political order that exists outside of formal institutional structures is frequently seen as a challenge to state building efforts (Johnson & Hutchison, 2012). Studies of global governance inadvertently uphold the highly state-centric framework that they seek to transcend by linking the analysis of governance processes to a concern with authority: the focus is negatively defined in relation to sovereignty, aimed at analysing to which actors' power and authority have flowed from the state (Sending & Neumann, 2006). In the end, the discourse in this chapter does not entail that one approach is better than the other nor is it implying that the state is not important in providing security and social welfare to the people. It tries however to emphasize the crucial role of local knowledge, responses, and understandings to fighting crime and insecurity within the African state. Working with communities and non-state customary institutions is equally as vital as working with central state institutions and governments. For at the end of the day, the extent to which state institutions are rooted in society is decisive for the state's stability, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Mainstream western concepts of state-building today tend to overburden the actual state institutions on the ground 'the set of expectations is simply too great' (Woodward, 2006). Of course, encouraging local customary governance, on the one hand, can be at odds with building central institutions of the state on the other, strong communities might lack the incentive to support central state institutions (Boege, Brown, Clements, and Nolan, 2008). The challenge is therefore to find appropriate forms of complementarity and interaction in this research.

CHAPTER 3. NON-STATE INFORMAL POLICING INITIATIVES: FORMS OF CRIME PREVENTION FRAMEWORKS AND TECHNIQUES

3.0   Introduction

This chapter investigates the existing infrastructure and institutional capabilities used to combat crime in Nigerian cities, as well as the various actors and institutions involved in security provision in Nigeria, as part of a larger research goal to investigate the role of non-state actors in providing security and governance in Nigeria for long-term development. Due to factors such as corruption, weak institutions, and insufficient resources, the Nigerian state has struggled to provide adequate security for its citizens, prompting non-state actors to step in to provide security through informal policing initiatives. The effectiveness of non-state informal policing initiatives in Nigeria, such as community policing, vigilante groups, and private security firms, in reducing crime and improving security is examined and analysed in this chapter. Non-state informal policing is thought to be especially prevalent in Africa, where informal mechanisms are estimated to settle between 80 and 90 percent of disputes in the Global South. Non-state informal policing entities have emerged across the continent in response to an increase in crime and general lawlessness, and they are evolving to fill gaps left by the central state's security. People who have been neglected by the state's governance and protection, or who have been subjected to direct state persecution, frequently form these groups.

This section discusses the various actors and institutions involved in hybrid security provision on the African continent, particularly in Nigeria, as well as non-state informal policing initiatives. It also examines the role of 'non-state,' 'informal,' or 'local/traditional' actors and institutions in security provision in relation to the state, using four institutional interaction patterns to do so: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. By examining the role of non-state actors in providing security in Nigeria, the chapter contributes to academic and policy debates on the effectiveness of non-state actors in achieving sustainable development and security in Africa, including a consideration of hybrid security and non-state 'policing.' It also sheds light on the difficulties that the Nigerian government faces in providing security for its citizens, as well as potential solutions to these challenges.

3.1 Background

Non-state (informal) actors, such as vigilante groups and private security firms, are used to carry out 'law and order' functions (preventing crime, investigating, detaining and punishing those responsible for crimes). Non-state policing is believed to emerge in circumstances where formal police agencies are unable to carry out their duties due to a lack of resources and capacity; a corruption problem; a trend of human rights violations; conflict and instability; or a lack of accessibility to formal security and justice mechanisms (Idris, 2019). They are thought to be more accountable, more responsive to local demands, and more legitimate in the eyes of the general public. There are also risks, though, notably of lack of representation (e.g., women, minorities) and of human rights abuses (ibid).

Non-state informal security organizations are often thought to have emerged from an intention to challenge the state, but studies have shown that they typically emerge from a postcolonial context in which the state and its institutions are incapable of delivering security and other public goods, and in these cases, the primary goal of such state officials or those who hold or compete for political office is usually self-enrichment. This combination of state fragility and elite rapacity has become a trademark of neo-patrimonial states in Africa, giving rise to a range of security responses among local communities, one of which is a return to non-state informal forms of order (Agbiboa, 2019). Over the years, they have emerged as security entities in response to real or perceived threats, and they often evolve to fill gaps left by security provided by the central state. Typically, these groups emerge from populations that have been neglected by the state's governance and protection, or as a result of direct persecution by the state (Governing Safer Cities Report, 2017). In other words, these structures, are emerging to fill unmet needs (Adejoh, 2013).

A central empirical issue concerning the hybrid governance system practised in most African cities (in which state and non-state, formal and informal, governance actors interact with one another), is the issue of stability. In the case of hybrid systems, the informal or non-state systems have been documented to function effectively, providing public goods and services in a negotiated relationship with the formal institutions of governance (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Agbiboa (2019) in his research suggested that the Ideal-type models of well-functioning states are unlikely to accurately reflect governance in African societies where formal institutions are often absent or ineffective and have been replaced by local security groups and hybrid security arrangements. It also suggests that a state-centric approach is likely to undermine local actors' security and service delivery potential because the approach has been ineffective in explaining the complex relationships between non-state informal entities and the formal state in East and West Africa, particularly the roles and responsibilities that each assumes in security and service delivery. The research also concluded that a hybrid security approach has the advantage of helping to build up the sense of local ownership and agency for managing various security threats to their daily lives.

Furthermore, the rise of non-state informal entities establishes the need for state forces (including the police) that are part of the community and accountable to it; state security forces need to understand the local culture and language of the communities they serve. The emergence of non-state informal entities does not necessarily spell doom for the power and authority of the state; it can help to expand and complement the state or rebuild trust in formal state institutions (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Derks (2012) lists a number of reasons residents might not be able to rely on the state for security:

1. The police and other agencies are unable to perform their duties because they lack the resources, expertise, and capacity to offer effective protection.

2. The police and other security organisations may be dishonest, working together with criminal gangs, or being employed to further political objectives. They frequently also show blatant disregard for human rights. In these situations, the general populace lacks confidence in the state's security and justice systems, or they are afraid of them and perceive them as a danger to their safety rather than a source of security (Idris, 2019).

3. Other structures of power and public order are frequently paralleled by formal state security and justice institutions in nations where the process of state building is in its formative stages or fragile. As a result, they may be viewed and treated as foreign entities, formed to increase centralised authority by the national government, former colonial governments, or even the international community (as is the case with the military and police in, for instance, Afghanistan and Iraq) (Idris, 2019).

4. Formal institutions are frequently situated far away, and their services are costly. They also speak a language that the locals do not understand (sometimes literally, but more often in the sense that their legal language is foreign to people's everyday lives). Many people, especially those in the poorer and more remote areas of fragile and (post-)conflict states, lack security and access to justice as a result (Idris, 2019).

Available literature on the subject has shown that informal security systems have played a positive role in crime control and security maintenance in several communities where they exist, and they enjoy remarkable public acclaim in such places where they have helped in maintaining security and managing crime (CLEEN, 2002; Ozekhome, 2003; Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008; Alemika, 2008; and Akinyele, 2008). Non-state policing has advantages such as being generally regarded as more approachable to citizens in terms of proximity, language used, and methods, having greater popular legitimacy, being receptive to local demands, having horizontal accountability, and providing a reasonably priced way to establish security (Cross, 2013; Baker, 2008b). However, there are also risks involved with the system and they include the potential for such organisations to become unsustainable, to be vulnerable to corruption, power abuses, and manipulation by local elites, to frequently not comply (fully) with international human rights standards, and to lack the tools, abilities, and methods necessary for modern policing, such as forensic science and record-keeping (Baker, 2008).

In a study by Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) on informal policing in four states of Nigeria, the research showed that informal security structures in the various states succeeded in several areas where the formal police failed. Specifically, it was found that respondents in Benue (85.7%), Ekiti (79.2%), Enugu (87.5%) and Jigawa State (94.1%), respectively expressed satisfaction with the performance of the informal policing organizations in curbing crime. The rating of the formal police by the same respondents was a far cry from this. One of the reasons for the success story of the informal security structures according to the study is the fact that these organizations are not incapacitated by corruption and inefficiency as the formal police. The informal security groups are also reported to provide speedy, safety and security services relative to the police and are as well closer to the people.

3.2 Police and Policing Initiatives in Nigeria: Non-State Policing and Vigilantism in Nigeria

It is important to distinguish between the concepts of 'police' and 'policing' from the onset. The police are a specific type of institution, whereas 'policing' refers to a set of processes with specific social functions (Zumve, 2012). As observed by Maguire (1997), 'Police are not found in every society, but 'policing' is arguably a universal requirement of any social order, which may be carried out by a variety of different processes and institutional arrangements. Policing, as defined in this study and adapted from Baker, (2004b), is any organised activity that seeks to maintain communal order, security, and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, breach investigation, and punishment, and is thus a governance mechanism. As a result, policing is seen in this study as a function that non-state organisations as well as the state police can provide.

In this research the term vigilante is used interchangeably to refer to informal security actors; non-state actors; customary and traditional authorities. Vigilante is a contested concept. The word has been used to describe movements of different nature and composition across the world (Fourchard, 2008). Etymologically, the term originates from the Latin vigilare ('to keep awake') and the Spanish vigilante ('watchman' or 'guard') and means some form of protection from danger (Zabyelina, 2019). The act of Vigilantism is generally defined as 'an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts' (Adejoh, 2013).

Vigilantism is commonly associated with an attempt of a single person or a group to achieve some improvement or refinement in the social order. Rosenbaum and Sederberg, (1974), (in Zabyelina, 2019) developed what has become the classical typology of vigilantism. Their typology illustrates three types of vigilantism: (a) crime control; (b) control of social groups; and (c) regime control.

In the *crime-control type*, vigilantes act as an informal police force, acting against individuals they believe committed or may commit crime, according to their interpretation of deviance (Button 2002). Protesting against government inaction, inefficiency, corruption, and/or simply leniency of

punishment, vigilantes perform street patrols, apprehend real or perceived offenders or transgressors, and deliver what they think is a 'just' punishment for them. This research intends to focus on crime-control type of vigilantism.

In *social-group-control vigilantism*, self-organized groups of vigilantes move their attention away from street patrols to the social environment (Pedahzur and Perliger ,2003). They attack distinct social groups, aiming to neutralize the dangers to the social or public order they consider these groups to be posing. This form of vigilantism is often driven by racial and/or ethnic considerations e.g., attacks on immigrant settlements.

Finally, *regime-control vigilantes* attempt to amend the government and its agencies when those fail or are perceived as such. They intend to change the regime, in order to make the 'superstructure' into a more efficient guardian of the 'base'. This is one of the most violent and organized forms of vigilantism and is sometimes considered more as a rebel act or revolutionary movements rather than vigilantism. The latter use violence in order to overthrow the established order.

3.3   Insecurity in Africa and the Rise of Non-State Informal Security Providers

The regulation of violence and the development of legitimacy are two of the most significant responsibilities that a state must fulfil in order to ensure stability in terms of crime management and conflict resolution. The inability of a state to provide security and/or basic welfare undermines its legitimacy, especially when the state is only one of several entities responsible for maintaining social order (Rothbart, 2009). Studies have shown that in Africa formal institutional, organisational and bureaucratic frameworks modelled on Western ideals established at independence have not overall been conducive to democratic security governance (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Olaoba (2002) contends that there is nothing universal about a foreign social control system. He notes that the reliance on an imported system has created tension between traditional and foreign models of social control, justice, and law in Africa. For example, the English system was developed from the traditions, customs, and native practices (tribal laws) of England (see Tilly, 1990; Isima, 2007; and Spruyt, 2011). Thus, the English system is perhaps best suited for regulating relationships among the English, not among Nigerians (Friday, & Eze, 2019).   In addition, it is clear that majority of mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly behaviour and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these unwritten rules risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underpin political behaviour (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004).

In Africa, traditional social control techniques are widely used, and their efficacy is well known (see Tade & Olaitan, 2015). Due to their roots in the community and local knowledge of the

society/community in terms of languages, geography, and culture, they are known to generally enjoy better support and acceptability. This commonly translates to them being viewed as more effective in identifying, tracking, and combating insurgents. National governments and international actors have been attempting to incorporate traditional, customary, or informal security mechanisms into their security governance strategies in this politically charged environment (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Most African states, including Nigeria, invest a lot of resources in promoting foreign social control systems over traditional systems. However, because foreign institutions reflect foreign (typically European) norms rather than African norms, the average African finds himself in a perplexing (normless) situation in which official governing rules of conduct deviate from and/or do not reflect customary practices (ibid).

Most police institutions in African countries are fundamentally unchanged from what they were two decades ago. They have remained politicized, under-resourced and inadequately trained. Nigeria, West Africa's oil-rich nation and Africa's most populous country, is at the forefront of this trend. Nigeria's police have received millions of pounds and dollars in technical aid, training programmes, and in-kind support since the country gained independence from the UK in 1960 (Hills, 2008). Yet the Nigeria Police (NP) is widely perceived as ineffective and corrupt (Adejoh, 2013). A study claims that 66 percent of Nigerians considered all police personnel in the country as being involved in corruption, while another 58 percent of the people expressed no trust at all in the police (Afrobarometer, 2001). In some cases, there is also an issue of inappropriate spending and misplaced priorities in the allocation of funds for the institution's activities. For example, in the N20.51 trillion '2023 Budget,' it was discovered that police commands and other security agencies proposed spending more than N149 million naira on newspaper purchases in 2023. Police commands and formations proposed spending N61,498,580 on newspapers; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) proposed spending N10,816,896 on newspapers; and academies and departments within the Ministry of Defence proposed spending N76,890,927 on newspapers (See fig 9) (Ripples, 2022). To a significant extent, the police themselves are engaged in criminal activities and are often feared rather than respected in society (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2005; Okafor, 2007; Odinkalu, 2008).

Figure 8: 2023 Budget - EFCC, Police, Defence Ministry to spend N149m (324,244.11USD) on newspapers (source; Ripples, 2022 adapted from 2023 budget of FGN).

However, a central empirical issue concerning the hybrid governance system practised in most African cities (in which state and non-state, formal and informal, governance actors interact with one another), is the issue of stability. The question of stability in this context focuses on the process by which state and non-state institutions coalesce around stable forms of order and authority, ranging from cohesive arrangements in Senegal to more chaotic hybrid systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014). In the case of hybrid systems, the informal or non-state systems have been documented to function effectively as a 'second state' providing public goods and services in a negotiated relationship with the formal institutions of governance (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Still, it is important and as suggested by several authors[7] including Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, (2016) to rethink security through the lenses provided by hybrid governance systems especially in African states to help identify new forms of public authority and mechanisms of accountability which may perhaps be better suited to the governance of security in African countries, especially at grass root levels. These hybrid systems can be found all over the world, but they are more common in developing countries, particularly in Africa (Idris, 2019). Different models of state-nonstate relations are frequently mixed and exist concurrently. Non-state security providers may supplement the state in one area, replace it in another, and compete in a third (Voloskyi, 2020). Although some non-state actors are involved in security operations in Northern Ireland and some former Soviet Union/Eastern European nations, they are better categorised as examples of formal police reform (such as formal police agencies) in response to greatly altered circumstances and the challenges faced in these

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[7] See, for example, Tankebe, Hills, & Cole (2014) and Di Nunzio (2014).

countries (Idris, 2019). The Policia Comunitaria, which was established by indigenous communities in Guerrero State, Mexico, in response to police failure to address rising crime and violence, is a good example of non-state policing in action. The Policia Comunitaria has been very successful in reducing crime rates and fostering a sense of safety and freedom among the populace, particularly among women. While acknowledging the force's effectiveness, the relationship with the state is tense; state authorities worry that the Policia Communitaria transgresses the law (Idris, 2019). The formation of 'peasant patrols' to protect villages and property as a result of rising cattle theft and other crimes in rural northern Peru and the state's inability to address them gave rise to the *rondas campesinas*, another hybrid group. Their responsibilities now include other aspects of security, conflict resolution, and even socioeconomic development initiatives. Even though many of the punishments used by the *rondas campesinas* violate human rights, they have been documented to be successful in lowering cattle rustling and other crimes. The state's response has changed over time, ranging from outright hostility to legal recognition to more recent conflict over the rondas groups' opposition to proposed hydropower projects in their region (ibid).

Bagayoko and Cormac (2012) noted that formal and informal governance mechanisms characterise African security systems. Non-state security providers in Africa include *sungusungu* committees and vigilante groups in Tanzania and Nigeria, respectively, while Papua New Guinea (PNG) serves as a case study outside of the continent. After the Uganda-Tanzania war, soldiers were demobilised in Tanzania, which resulted in an increase in cattle theft and other crimes that the government was powerless to stop. Traditional village assemblies established *sungusungu* committees to patrol communities, catch and punish offenders, and track down cattle that had been stolen (property). Although there are worries about violations of human rights, the *sungusungu* committees are seen as effective in providing security and empowering communities. *Sungusungu* committees are recognised and endorsed by the state because they fulfil local needs and adhere to the socialist ideology of the state, but they are not officially recognised as legal entities (Idris, 2019). Numerous vigilante groups exist in Nigeria, which is largely attributed to the formal police force's lack of effectiveness amongst other things. Most states accept vigilante groups as long as they are not violent and abusive, despite the fact that they are not recognised by national law (Idris, 2019). Low police numbers, citizen access issues, and rising crime are all thought to be contributing factors to the emergence of non-state policing providers in Papua New Guinea (PNG). These include organisations descended from established structures, those receiving overt or covert state support, and those acting directly against the will of the government. In PNG, it has been noted that the state's strategy toward non-state actors has changed from being ad hoc to one that promotes collaborations between these and state security providers (ibid).

3.4 Forms of Non-State Informal Policing

Establishing stronger states in Africa is important to the success of conceiving, designing, and implementing agendas that seek to improve peace and human security (Isima, 2007). According to several researchers, the inability of the state to adequately provide safety and security has prompted citizens to take matters into their own hands, including engaging in vigilantism (see CLEEN, 2003; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2005; Van der Spuy, & Röntsch, 2008; AfroCritic, 2013; Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014). In the absence of effective state institutions, particularly for combating crime in Africa (a widespread issue in Africa), alternatives are emerging, and the significance of partnerships in the delivery of policing services and community safety is steadily increasing (Jones and Newburn 2006; Gressgrd and Jensen, 2015). Ideal-typical models of stable and democratic states fail to reflect the societal realities of failing states in contemporary Africa, in which the absent state has been replaced by hybrid security arrangements or non-state informal organisations working 'beside the state.' In Nigeria's Middle Belt, for instance, vigilante groups work beside the state in security delivery (Agbiboa, 2019). Furthermore, in Nigeria, it is alleged that in most of Nigeria's 36 states, where the largely federally controlled security structures often fail to monitor or respond to grassroots insecurity, state governments have set up supplementary community police organisations or empowered community-based vigilantes. The forms and extent of non-state informal organisations engagement with the state exhibits wide variations, both geographically and over time. In some cases, the state may actively oppose non-state informal organisations to maintain its monopoly on security and justice delivery. In other cases, it may lend non-state informal organisations its tacit or overt approval. The state (or other states in the region) may look away, seek to infiltrate, and influence non-state informal organisations or may actively assume control over them or reinvent them (Agbiboa, 2019).

For analytical clarity, the various forms of non-state informal policing investigated in this thesis will be classified based on their interaction/relationship with the state. Formal and informal institutions interact in a variety of ways. The types of interactions that occur between them are divided into four categories by Helmke and Levitsky (2004). The first is complementary interaction. This occurs when they work together to achieve a common goal. The second is a mutually accommodating relationship. This occurs when they work together without interfering with one another. The third and fourth forms of interaction are competitive and substitutive relationship. This occurs when informal institutions undermine formal ones; or when informal institutions compensate for absent or ineffective formal institutions in a substitutive relationship.

3.4.1 Complementary informal institutions

Complementary informal institutions 'fill in gaps' by dealing with situations not covered by formal norms or by aiding the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework. These non-formal organisations frequently improve efficiency (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004). Complementing occurs when there is a perceived security gap in the area or sphere under the authority of the state. For example, the community may believe that the state is not doing enough

to address gangsterism issues. Communities organise their own security forces to assist the police in such cases (Baker, 2002; Super, 2014; Voloskyi, 2020). Such assistance can take the form of community patrolling alongside the police, or it can take the form of information and local knowledge sharing. (Baker, 2002; Berg, 2010; Voloskyi, 2020). Complementary informal institutions can also act as a foundation for formal institutions, by generating or reinforcing incentives to uphold formal regulations that would otherwise be only on paper. In this context, it is considered that informal institutions do not only coexist with effective formal institutions, but rather play a critical role in making the formal rules of the game effective (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004).

There are several examples of complementary informal institutions or informal security providers/organizations in Africa. Rwanda's Gacaca Courts, which were established after the 1994 genocide, are an example of a complementary institution. These community-based justice systems aimed to promote truth-telling, reconciliation, and healing by involving local communities. The Gacaca Courts demonstrate the alignment of formal and informal approaches by integrating traditional conflict resolution mechanisms into the formal justice system (see Longman, 2009). Another example is Kenya's Nyumba Kumi System, in which neighbourhoods are divided into groups of ten households. Each group has a designated leader who is in charge of maintaining security and resolving disputes at the local level. This community policing initiative is consistent with the concept of complementary informal institutions, emphasising active community participation in ensuring security and fostering community cohesion (Ndono, Muthama, & Muigua, 2019). These examples demonstrate that complementary informal institutions and informal security providers exist in Africa. They demonstrate how these institutions address security, justice, and socioeconomic needs by leveraging local knowledge, community support, and traditional practises.

Amotekun - Complementary

Western Nigeria Security Network Agency aka 'Operation *Àmòtékún*' was launched on January 9, 2020, in Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria (Daily Trust, 2020). The Yoruba word *Amoteku*n literarily means 'leopard'. *Amotekun*, is a form of community policing security outfit put together by the governors of six South-Western states of Nigeria, namely Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Osun and Ekiti as a counter measure or response to the problem of insecurity in the region. *Amotekun* further emerged because people were dissatisfied with how the Nigerian security agents were responding to proven cases of conflicts and attacks in the southwest region of Nigeria (Adepegba, 2020). The security outfit was established to control the development of incessant crime rate that has been disturbing the South-West states. Some of the prominent ones include banditry, kidnapping, insurgents, herdsmen and farmers clashes and armed robbers etc., which have made life intolerable for Nigerians in various parts of the country. The overwhelming insecurity in the region had forced the six governors of the South-west to inaugurate the security outfit to tackle peculiar security threats in the region. The *Amotekun* Corps has also received constitutional support from the region's six state legislatures. Ondo, Ogun, Oyo and Ekiti states have since kick-started the

operations of the security outfit endorsed by the governments of the six South-West states last year (Oyero, 2021).

The Southwest Zone is the first to have come up with a regional plan for the joint protection of its citizens in the country. The security outfit is intended to operate as a support vigilance network that will offer surveillance and intelligence services to the Police and other formal security agencies to monitor, detect, report, prevent and possibly deter crime and arrest criminal elements in the South-West region. It is not an alternative to the Police force but a complement conventional security outfit. The outfit is simply an intelligence gathering that will help the Police in no small measure to bring about peace and orderliness in the country (Ozekhome, 2020). The overall aim of Operation *Amotekun* is not different from other similar groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force in the North-East and other local vigilante groups in other regions of the country. *Amotekun* was created to have a synergy with the Police and is intended to be supervised by the Police and not to be used to abuse citizens (Ozekhome, 2020). The security outfit is poised to complement the efforts of other security agencies including the new community policing initiative of the Nigeria Police and other existing security agencies (Ogunnaike, 2021).

In support of the outfit, all the six South West governors contributed twenty vehicles each, with Oyo contributing thirty-three (33) vehicles to assist the operatives in carrying out their duties. They also procured 100 units of motorcycles each (Daily Trust, 2020). However there have been disagreements about how the security outfit should be run. The Inspector General of Police emphasized that the *Amotekun* Corps should be operated at the state level like others of its kind and not as a regional outfit. According to him, every state has one form of security arrangement, whether it is vigilante or neighbourhood watch that is working in the state to fight crime and *Amotekun* should not act different from these initiatives (Oyero, 2020). Nevertheless, most stakeholders in the southwest have disagreed that the statement is the IGP's opinion and that his opinion is not a law but an expression of personal view. They have also opposed plans by the Nigerian government to utilise Mohammed Adamu, the then-Inspector-General of Police, to define and oversee *Amotekun's* structure, arguing that this would limit state or regional authority of the group (Sahara Reporters, 2020). Operation *Amotekun* is similar to the Civilian Joint Task Force in the North-East, Hisbah in Kano State, and other local vigilante groups in other parts of the country in that it was created to work in tandem with the police and is intended to be supervised by the police rather than used to abuse citizens. Those hired will be familiar with the region's terrain, culture, and language, which will be useful to the police and other security organisations (Ozekhome, 2020).

Figure 9: An image of the Amotekun officers in action (source; Oriowo, 2021)

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) - Complementary

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a local group formed in 2013 to support the Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and to protect local communities from attacks from Boko Haram. The group has been engaged in security operations and more recently, involved in providing security to camps for internally displaced populations (Olokor, Ede, Naku, Bitrus, Abraham, & Isenyo, 2020). They monitor and provide security for communities displaced by the conflict, including the almost two million people in IDP camps in north-eastern Nigeria (UNICEF, 2017). In early 2013, residents of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in north-eastern Nigeria started organizing into groups to defend themselves against the radical extremist group known as Boko Haram and formed the Civilian Joint Task Force's organisation (I.C.G, 2017). Soon afterwards, security services and civilian authorities became closely involved in the Civilian Joint Task Force's organisation, management and operations. The army-led Joint Task Force quickly recognised the vigilantes' potential and with the help of local and traditional authorities, it organised them according to its own command structure, establishing a CJTF unit for each of Maiduguri's ten security sectors. Vigilante leaders were selected by the Joint Task Force officers and management functions were handled by Borno state officials. The CJTF units were involved in intelligence and surveillance missions, they also patrolled roads and manned checkpoints and their local knowledge helped in identifying and vetting newcomers or any suspicious persons/activity in public spaces vulnerable to attack, such as mosques and markets (ICAS, 2019).

In 2020, the Nigerian Army absorbed 400 members of the civilian JTF into its fold to assist in prosecuting the war against Boko Haram terrorists. However, this initiative has sometimes been observed to pit prominent socio-cultural groups representing different regions of the country

against one another and several groups have criticized the move calling it a violation of the federal character principle in national appointments in the country (Olokor, Ede, Naku, Bitrus, Abraham, & Isenyo, 2020). The commissioning of the 400 civilian JTF members in Borno State into the Nigerian Army, according to groups like the Yoruba socio-political group Afenifere, the Middle Belt Forum, and the apex Igbo socio-cultural organisation *Ohanaeze Ndigbo*, violated the federal character principle in national appointments. They have further cautioned that such actions could affect the integrity and spirit of federal character that ensures fairness in national employment raising issues such as *'Who has guaranteed the integrity of the people absorbed into the Army? Who is sure they are not even sympathetic to the Boko Haram cause?'* Others have also added that they are not objecting to the absorption of the CJTF members into the military for assisting them in the war against insurgency, but they maintain that there should be equity in the exercise. So, their bone of contention is that, if the Nigerian Army wants to recruit CJTF members into its fold, it should also introduce similar outfits in other parts of the country, so that there will be equity in representation in the Army (Olokor, Ede, Naku, Bitrus, Abraham, & Isenyo, 2020).

The Vigilante Hunters of Borno- Complementary

In Borno, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria who are mainly hunters specialize in hunting animals in the forests. The group has over 1,000 registered members across the 27 local government areas of the state who are purely hunters that either inherited the profession or learnt it and make it their means of livelihood. They do this by gathering themselves in large numbers and embark on hunting tours to forests for three months and travel for as far as 150 kilometres in the forest for hunting activities before returning to town (Bitrus, 2020). To be accepted and registered as a member of the group a background check would be carried out on individuals to ascertain if they are qualified to join the group. After the background check is cleared, accepted individuals would be given identity cards and made to swear by the holy Qur'an that they will not sabotage the group. New members are further fortified with different kinds of items to protect them against spirits and evil forces especially due to some challenges they encounter in the bushes (Bitrus, 2020).

Asides from their hunting activities, they also help in the fight against insurgency in the Northeast. They have been actively engaged in the fight against Boko haram. Their leadership have even gone as far as officially sending emissaries to the government to register their interest, willingness and preparedness to lead the war against the Boko Haram terrorists. During the Chibok girls' kidnap case[8], they were contacted and involved in the rescue mission where they spent over 90 days combing the bushes to hunt the criminals. Many of their activities, however, are hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, most of which are related to obtaining adequate permission from the state government to carry out their duties, as well as a lack of access to arms, ammunition, and vehicles to aid their movement into the bush where the terrorists reside. There are other groups like the vigilantes but who are actively working under the government. The vigilantes have accused such

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[8] On 14–15 April 2014, 276 female students aged from 16 to 18 were kidnapped by the Boko Haram terrorist group from a Government Girls Secondary School at the town of Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria.

groups of being political thugs who only use vehicles given to them to patrol within the town and don't go into bushes where the Boko Haram insurgents are hiding. They have also accused such groups of feeding fat on government largesse. They on the other hand have claimed that they don't want to work directly for the government or join the military like the civilian JTF, they are also not requesting money or any personal favour, from the government, and only want the government to provide them with logistics, arms, ammunition and see what they will do to the terrorists given a timeline of six months (Bitrus, 2020).

Figure 10: A cross section of both VGN and CJTF members in Borno ready for action (source; Soniyi, 2019).

3.4.2 Accommodating informal institutions.

These informal institutions establish incentives for people to behave in ways that affect the substantive effects of formal norms without outright breaking them; they contradict the spirit but not the letter of the formal regulations. In most cases, the state accommodates non-state security regulations that address concerns outside of the official legal system, such as witchcraft or socially inappropriate behaviour (Super, 2014). For example, the South African government not only tolerates but occasionally encourages non-state security regulations, both officially and unofficially. Unofficially, police encourage citizens to use non-state security services rather than the police in cases of minor infractions. 'When people go to the police station to report something, they are sent back and told to talk to the community leaders' (Drivdal, 2016). Members of the police in New Brighton township, near Port Elizabeth, South Africa, are known to refer some cases to the Amadlozi[9], who are thought to be able to act and investigate in ways that the police cannot

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[9] Amadlozi - a vigilante group operating in the townships of Port Elizabeth.

(Jensen and Buur, 2004; Voloskyi, 2020). Accommodating informal institutions are frequently developed by players who are dissatisfied with the outcomes produced by formal norms but are unable to amend or publicly break those rules. As such, they frequently assist in reconciling the interests of these individuals with the current formal institutional frameworks. As a result, while accepting informal institutions may not improve efficiency, they may improve the stability of formal institutions by damping calls for reform (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).

One example of Accommodating Informal Institutions or Security Providers in Africa is the O'dua People Congress (OPC) in Nigeria. The OPC was founded in 1994 as a Yoruba nationalist cultural group, but it gradually evolved into a more political organisation. While its primary goal is to protect the Yoruba people's interests and cultural traditions, the OPC has also been involved in acts of violence and criminal activity. Despite these reservations, the Nigerian state has accommodated the OPC, particularly during the 1990s military regime, using it to counter political opponents and maintain social order (see Kasali, 2011). In Mali, the Dozos, a traditional hunter community, have taken on informal security roles. They have been recognised by the Malian government and have been involved in efforts to combat jihadist groups operating in the country's northern region (see Hagberg, 2019). These examples demonstrate how accommodating informal institutions or informal security providers/organizations in Africa correspond to the description given above.

HISBA, Vigilante Group - Accommodating Relationship

The Hisba[10] Islamic vigilante group is predominant in Muslim States of Northern Nigeria that have adopted the Sharia legal system. The States include: Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, and Kaduna are located in the northwest; Yobe, Borno, Bauchi, and Gombe are located in the northeast; while Niger State is located in the north central area (Inyang, & Abraham, 2013). Hisba enforces the Sharia legal system which is in use in most states in northern Nigeria and serves as a mechanism for safeguarding the welfare and laws of the community. Kano is among the first states in northern Nigeria to establish a Hisba commission following the introduction of Sharia law in the country in 1999. In Kano, one of the biggest cities in Nigeria and the biggest in Northern Nigeria, Hisba, vigilante group with religious affiliation was formed to respond to issues of noncompliance with Sharia/Islamic law within the city. The group has been operating in Kano since the late 1990s but was officially set up in Kano, and Zamfara in northern Nigeria in 2000, amid allegations that the federal police failed to effect Sharia (Spencer, 2017). They act as Islamic law enforcers instated under Sharia law. They often oversee three areas of social life: women in public – including their dressing, proximity to unrelated men in conversation or public transport; drinking, and non-religious music and singing (Last, 2008).

The group started out as a volunteer community watch or policing kind of group that constituted young men within the community and their activities were run locally by committees. After the

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[10] Hisba is an Arabic word which refers to 'an act which is performed for the common good, or with the intention of seeking reward from God'.

Hisba group became successful, the state government began to seek their services. Over time they became part of the state security outlet and the state government started to finance and control them. They created new guidelines and policies different from what the local committees had set up. The Hisba are sometimes categorized as vigilantes but are not considered as such within the community and this is because they now operate by day in uniforms and have been known to have clashes with the formal Nigerian police, while the local vigilante groups operate late at night with local weapons and equipment's such as bows and arrows and have good relations with the police (Last, 2008). Apart from the Hisbah and vigilantes there are other informal/traditional group that work to secure the cities. Some of them include the traditional group of hunters known as *Yan Farauta* and their dogs, *Yan Tauri* (very strong men) who use charms to fortify themselves, *Yan Daba* (lairs of young marginal toughs). Most of these groups and their members have their own neighbourhoods that they are in charge of securing which are mostly found at the outskirts of the cities (Last, 2008). Others that operate within the city include, Kano State Security Guard, the Kano state chapter of the VGN, and the Kano Road and Transport Authority (KAROTA). The VGN, Hisba, and KAROTA are the most popular informal policing structures in Kano state (Ogbozor, 2016).

Figure 11: Hisbah operatives destroying alcoholic drinks in Kano (source; Coic, 2022)

The O'dua People Congress (OPC) - Accommodating

For the OPC, a Sovereign National Conference is required if Nigeria's various ethnic and social groups are to coexist under one undivided Federal State free of oppression, marginalisation, and other forms of injustice. The OPC was founded during the dark and brutal era of General Sani Abacha's dictatorial military rule. It was thought to be an ethnic reaction to the military regime's perceived oppression of Yoruba people (Vanguard news, 2020). This persecution was thought to

have culminated in the annulment of Chief M.K. O. Abiola's, a Yoruba, victory in the June 12,1993 presidential election in Nigeria. But the OPC has meddled into vigilante activities and is perceived to be effective in using unorthodox means to fish out and eliminate criminals. For this reason, the group has often clashed with the Police who believe that the OPC is usurping their traditional roles or Constitutional functions. The police also accuse the OPC of going too far and using unlawful means to kill innocent individuals (Vanguard news, 2020). The OPC, on the other hand, accuses the police of collaborating with and assisting criminals. They claim that when suspects are apprehended and handed over to the police, the police collect a bribe from the suspects, release them, and then turn against their captors. The OPC and the police, on the one hand, and the police and civil society, on the other, had regular fierce and bloody battles. Both sides have suffered a large number of casualties as a result of this violent conflict (Ozekhome, 2020).

3.4.3 Competing informal institutions.

In this scenario, formal norms and procedures are not consistently implemented, allowing actors to disregard or violate them. These informal institutions create incentives in ways that contradict formal rules: in order to follow one rule, actors must break another. Clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics, and corruption are some of the most well-known instances of particularistic informal organisations. In post-colonial situations where formal institutions were imposed on indigenous rules and authority systems, competing informal institutions are common (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004).

Several examples of competitive informal security providers or organisations can be found in Africa, especially where the state's security apparatus is weak or insufficient. One such example is Somalia's Al-Shabaab militant group, which arose as an Islamist insurgency opposed to the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab gradually established its own governance structures and gained control of territories, effectively challenging the authority of formal state institutions (see Blanchard, 2020). Another example of competing informal institutions can be found in Kenya's Mungiki sect. Initially a quasi-religious and cultural movement, the Mungiki evolved into a criminal organisation engaged in extortion, protection rackets, and political violence. Along with formal state institutions, they established parallel governance structures that included informal taxation systems and dispute resolution mechanisms (see Ndago, 2021). The Kamajors emerged as a traditional militia group operating in the country's southeastern regions during the Sierra Leone Civil War. The Kamajors, combine elements of traditional secret societies and local self-defense groups, and their existence demonstrates the coexistence of traditional cultural practises and informal security arrangements with formal state institutions (see Hoffman, 2004). The Zamazamas are informal miners in South Africa who engage in illegal mining activities within abandoned mines. They create their own security structures to protect their operations, which sometimes results in clashes with formal law enforcement agencies (see Munakamwe, 2017). Another example is the Sudanese Janjaweed. The Janjaweed militias, made up primarily of Arab nomads, have been implicated in numerous atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, in the Darfur region. Their actions demonstrate the existence of competing informal security providers as well

as the complexities they add to formal state structures (see Mohamed, 2010). These examples demonstrate how competitive informal institutions emerge in Africa, usually as a result of governance gaps, perceived shortcomings in formal institutions, or societal grievances.

The Mungiki sect in Kenya- Competition

One of the principal reasons for the existence of urban vigilantism in Nairobi is to be found in public anxiety about the city and a perception of the incapacity of the police to tackle criminality effectively (Anderson, 2002). The *Mungiki*[11] is a sect that was established in the 1980s (Henningsen and Jones 2013; Refworld, 2013). It was founded as a 'self-defence force' and is made up of Kenya's most populous ethnic group, the Kikuyu (IHS 2010; Refworld, 2013). The *Mungiki* advocate for a return to traditional Kikuyu values and religion, as well as a rejection of Western and Christian ways of life (Henningsen and Jones 2013; Afrik.com 2010; Norway 2010; Refworld, 2013). The majority of *Mungiki's* members are unemployed, young, and impoverished. They oppose the existing government as well as the wealthy elites. Tribal clashes come to bear in the *Mungiki* way of life, since the gang aims to cleanse Kenya of people who are not like the *Mungiki* (Serena, 2018).

The sect began as a form of vigilantism in the 1990s, when tribal clashes decimated small communities across Kenya (Serena, 2018). The *Mungiki* are also notorious for criminal and 'mafia-like' behaviour utilising violence and intimidation to attain their goals, according to Afrik.com, a French independent worldwide media source on Africa (2013) (cited in Refworld, 2013). Its exact population is unknown, but it claims tens of thousands of members, many of them are unemployed youngsters whose communities were destroyed in tribal violence in the 1990s. It has taken on a politically aggressive tone, siding with the poor against wealthy elites it accuses of serving former colonial masters' interests (Reuters, 2009). 'The fact that they were hired for security to protect the land is a clear indication that they run the entire security system' *Gikaria*, a former Nakuru mayor, stated (Mail & Guardian, 2016). *Mungiki* is suspected of being responsible for the deaths of 50 persons in Nairobi in 2002 as a result of incidents involving matatu owners. A conflict between the cult and Nairobi police in February 2003 resulted in the deaths of two officers and the arrest of 74 members of the group (Mail & Guardian, 2016).

Even after the group was banned in 2003, it was involved in a number of horrific and violent acts. In 2007, Kenyan authorities apprehended and executed 500 young men suspected of being linked to the *Mungiki*. Rather than deterring the gang's members, this only encouraged them to become more violent. Following the disputed 2007 elections, fighting broke out in the Rift Valley, and it embarked on a retribution mission to avenge the people and authorities (Serena, 2018). After this they allegedly embarked on a killing spree, beheading matatu drivers, conductors and *Mungiki* defectors, and those who refused to take their oath. In response, armed security forces stormed the *Mathare* slums where the sect was operating from, leading to the deaths of at least 100 people (Mail & Guardian, 2016). The gang, armed with machetes, smashed down the doors of his

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[11] *Mungiki* is a Kikuyu word that meaning 'multitude,' and the Kikuyu are Kenya's most prominent traditional tribe.

neighbours, pushed them out, demanded their identity cards, and forcefully circumcised any who were not Kikuyus, according to a terrified witness. 'Anyone who resisted had his head chopped off while his family watched in horror. I prayed that they would not ask me to say anything else in the language, as those were the only two words I knew' Omondi said in an interview in Nakuru, Kenya, north of Nairobi (Mail & Guardian, 2016). Again, In April 2009, the group was implicated in hacking to death 28 people in another revenge mission in Gathaithi, in the central city of Nyeri (Mail & Guardian, 2016). By the end of the conflict, at least 1,300 Kenyans had died, with 650,000 displaced by violence. According to the Waki report, which was tasked with investigating the 2007-2008 bloodbath, the *Mungiki* sect was deeply involved in the massacre (Mail & Guardian, 2016).

Membership numbers range from 100,000 to one million and members of tribes other than the Kikuyu are despised by the group. Politicians, local police, and government officials are all connected to the gang. Kenya banned the group in 2003, following a battle with a rival gang in 2002 that resulted in the deaths of 20 persons. Even after the gang was banned, it remained (Serena, 2018). Authorities allege that the *Mungiki* hacked to death twenty-eight individuals in the central Kenyan city of Nyeri in 2009. That incident was a retaliation mission against those who stood up to the *Mungiki* and attempted to cleanse their town of the vicious gang (Serena, 2018). There is no easy solution to the problem of *Mungiki*. The original goal of the *Mungiki* was to alleviate poverty. Solving Kenya's chronic poverty in the lower classes is one approach to rid the country of certain gang members, but poverty eradication in Africa has been a centuries-long challenge. Traditional tribal concern, which extends back several millennia, likewise lacks a feasible answer for the short term (Serena, 2018).

3.4.4   Substitutive informal institutions

Where governmental mechanisms are weak or lack authority, substitute institutions emerge. Actors who want results that are compatible with formal rules and processes use substitutive informal institutions, just as they do complementary institutions. They do, however, exist in situations where formal norms are not consistently enforced, much like competing institutions. As a result, substitutive informal institutions do what formal institutions failed to do (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004). In Africa, it is common to completely or partially substitute official state security regulations. For example, dwellers of rich neighbourhoods frustrated by the police's inability to deal with crime in most parts of Africa hire private security firms and set up gated communities, effectively replacing the police, while poor neighbourhoods that cannot afford to hire private security firms typically have vigilante organisations replace official police forces (Baker, 2002; Voloskyi, 2020).

Various examples of the Substitutive informal institutions exist all over the African continent, operating alongside or in place of formal structures. These institutions include the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, the Ombudsman system in Ghana, the Sungusungu in Tanzania, Asafo Companies in Ghana, Clan-based Security Systems in Somalia, Nyumba Kumi in Kenya, the Trokosi System in

Ghana, and Community Policing Forums in South Africa. They demonstrate the blending of formal and informal systems of governance in Africa, where the use of substitutive institutions arises from perceived gaps or failures in the state's ability to provide adequate security, justice, and services. The Bakassi Boys were formed in Nigeria's southeastern region as a vigilante group to combat crime and maintain law and order in their communities. Despite allegations of extrajudicial violence and human rights violations, they were widely supported by local residents who saw them as a more effective alternative to the corrupt and ineffective state police (see Harnischfeger, 2003). The Sungusungu in Tanzania, Asafo Companies in Ghana, and Clan-based Security Systems in Somalia all rely on informal structures and local knowledge to provide security, which fits the definition of informal institutions that enjoy community support and acceptability (see Abrahams, 1987 and Li, 1995, respectively). Despite operating outside of the formal legal framework, the Trokosi System in Ghana wields significant social influence and power within certain communities, and the South African Community Policing Forums provide a platform for community participation in crime prevention and law enforcement (see Ameh, 2017 & Van Vuuren, 1996).

The Bakassi Boys- Substitutive Relationship

In the eastern part of Nigeria, the *Bakassi* Boys vigilante group emerged as a response to extreme insecurity caused by rampant armed robbery, organized crime, and an underfunded and corrupt police force that posed an unsustainable threat to physical well-being and local livelihoods in the late 1990s (CLEEN, 2002; Meagher, 2007). The rise of vigilantism in Nigeria's south-east can be traced back to the explosion of these violent crimes in Aba, Abia State, and its environs in 1997 and 1998. This commercial town, which hosts the large Ariaria market, was gripped by insecurity and lawlessness as armed robbery and other forms of violent crime reached unprecedented levels (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Historically, the *Bakassi* Boys vigilante was formed by the members of Shoemakers Association in Aba (in southwestern Nigeria) when they could no longer bear the oppression of criminals who operated in the town with reckless abandon. They 'seasoned' themselves and thereafter embarked on a self-imposed job of flushing out and killing as many criminals as they could catch in Aba. Aba has been described as tranquil and peaceful since that time. They performed the same thing at Nnewi, a commercial town in Anambra State noted for being a booming location for armed robbery operations, among other things (Akosah- Sarpong, 2002).

Robbery and extortion by armed gangs, the most notorious of which was known as the Mafia, became a regular occurrence, affecting more than just the Aba population, as traders from all over the country, who used to come to Aba to transact business in the Ariaria market, began to avoid the town out of fear. Between 1997 and 1999, traders in Aba estimate that roughly 200 people were killed by armed robberies. Residents of Aba estimated that one out of every 10 people in the town owned a pistol, which they used for self-defence or criminal purposes (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The traders, who were the worst victims, formed a resistance movement that defeated the armed robbers and the Mafia, and *Bakassi* was born as a result. *Bakassi* Boys is a collective of

artisans (mostly shoemakers) and traders from Aba's Ariaria Market expansion (called *Bakassi*). The *Bakassi* Boys, a civilian vigilante group, was formed as a result of their efforts. Suspected criminals who had previously roamed freely around the city and its environs were apprehended, 'tried' at the *Bakassi* 'Court,' and those found guilty had their limbs, legs, and heads cut off with machetes before being burned. One month after the *Bakassi* operation began, the city was said to have returned to normalcy. The *Bakassi* Boys arrested and brought back to Aba suspects who had fled to neighbouring cities and villages to face a 'trial.' On the other side, the threat of armed robbers and the Nigerian Police Force's failure to fulfil its constitutional responsibility rendered Onitsha and Nnewi in Anambra State uninhabitable (Ozekhome, 2020).

The Bakassi Boys were hailed as heroes when they took on the task of combating crime. The overwhelming feeling of many people was relief at being able to 'sleep with both eyes closed'-an expression commonly used when describing the 'post-*Bakassi* era', after what was perceived as years of suffering from violent crime, abuses by the security forces, and government inaction, people appeared to have given up expecting the government or the police to provide protection or security. According to Harnischfeger (2003), the *Bakassi* Boys were addressing state failures by 'reviving pre-colonial traditions, including the use of the occult to fight evil'. However, conflicting accounts indicate that, far from enacting ethicized notions of justice, the vigilante group was popular for its adherence to principles of fairness and accountability rather than for its occult practices (Newswatch, 1999; Baker, 2002; Ukiwo, 2002; Meagher, 2007). They show that the *Bakassi* Boys were known for their strict code of conduct, which involved not just the interrogation and public execution of suspected thieves, but also the investigation of allegations and of the character of suspects, they released those found innocent of wrongdoing, amongst others in order to uphold a strict anti-corruption mandate. Vigilante operations were backed from the outset by a supervisory committee made up of elected executives of local traders' and producers' associations, underpinning a general reputation for fairness that persisted for almost two years (Meagher, 2012). These procedures provided local legitimacy, but they were insufficient to establish regulatory authority. The relief gradually became tempered with terror as it became clear that the *Bakassi* Boys' methods were occasionally arbitrary and often harsh; however, there is still very little public expression of indignation at the violence used by the *Bakassi* Boys (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The real basis of what might be termed a 'regulatory shift' stemmed from the formal integration of the vigilante group into the machinery of government in Abia and Anambra States. In both states, the group was formally registered as a state vigilante service in 2000, allocated offices and vehicles for their activities, put on the state payroll, and brought under the authority of a state-appointed committee, prompting an Abia State official to declare that the vigilante group had been made 'constitutional' (Punch, 2000; CLEEN, 2002).

Tanzania Sungusungu- Substitutive

The *Sungusungu* is a form of village vigilantism in rural Tanzania that emerged in the 1980s as an indigenous response to the widespread problem of cattle raiding and robbery and the failure of the law enforcement and justice system to prevent these crimes. The demobilisation of soldiers in the aftermath of the Tanzania/Uganda conflict led to increasing insecurity and violence associated with cattle-rustling and banditry in Tanzania (Denney & Jenkins, 2013). The state was largely ineffective in managing the violence and as a result, in the early 1980s, villages responded autonomously, forming defence groups called *sungusungu* in order to confront these gangs of thieves (Denney & Jenkins, 2013; Idris, 2019). In rural Kenya and Tanzania, a form of law enforcement and dispute resolution known as *sungusungu* arose to combat crime, initially in opposition to state institutions (particularly the police and the judiciary) and it was based on local customary law rather than state law. *Sungusungu* led to the development of 'hybrid forms of organization, which are, strictly speaking, illegal but are officially authorized, neither part of the state nor totally rejected by it' (Heald 2007). In their work on *Sungusungu*, for example, Abraham (1987), Fleisher (2000), and Heald (2007) were able to demonstrate how local people 'mobilized indigenous modes of governance and turned these to new ends, thereby creating new forms of political unity and consciousness'. The *sungusungu* has a long pedigree among cattle herders. Customary methods of pursuit, capture, and retrieval of livestock by *sungusungu* are appreciated and utilized by the Tanzanian state, which, in 1990, attempted to incorporate them into an integrated policing system (Heald, 2002). In recent years, they have appeared in modified form in a number of Tanzanian urban centres. However, it has been noted that the police often delegate the more distasteful or risky work to vigilante groups and informal militias, making it difficult to subsequently outlaw such groups if they become predatory (Buur, 2002; Beall and Fox, 2011).

The Tanzanian government's decision to turn to the *Sungusungu* for law and order was an admission of corruption and a lack of trust in the police to deal with cattle theft. Local police routinely 'demand a bribe before agreeing to investigate any complaint, and after receiving it, they proceed to extort bribes from the alleged perpetrators, and after receiving those, they will go on to demand more money from the complainant, and so on, until one or both sides are either broke or tired of the game,' according to the complaint. This sentiment is reminiscent of how colonial police forces were frequently accused of supplementing their wages by extorting fowl, food, beer, and even women from the communities where they worked. The *Sungusungu* provided local communities with law enforcers who are community members and accountable to them (Agbiboa, 2019). The *Sungusungu* faced stiff opposition from the state's official police and courts from the start, who saw them as a serious threat to the state's administration of law enforcement and justice; these officials argued that the Sungusungu was 'attempting to turn the clock back to primitive punitive measures.' However, the *Sungusungu* groups' effectiveness and popularity, combined with growing dissatisfaction with the police's corrupt practises, weakened resistance to their activities over time. Ultimately, the state was forced to endorse the *Sungusungu* as a revolutionary force within the villages that ought to be encouraged rather than harassed by bureaucracy (Agbiboa, 2019). Since the *sungusungu* movement met a need and resonated with the socialist

ideology of the state, it was later sanctioned by the government and incorporated within official state policy (Cross, 2013). While the Tanzanian state has allowed *sungusungu* tribes to codify their own laws and execute their own punishments, according to Heald (2009), it has ultimately been unable to 'contradict its own courts by fully legalizing them'. 'The groups occupy a quasi-legal space and consequently are, to an extent, left in danger of prosecution' (Jenkins, 2013; Idris, 2019).

The group functioned by groups of men patrol their village on a rotational system, protecting property, apprehending and arresting thieves, deciding on punishments, and recovering stolen cattle. Whipping, shunning, and family banishment, as well as harsh fines, beatings, and breaking thieves' ankles, are all possible punishments (Heald, 2009; Jenkins, 2013). The groups have also been used to retrieve women who had left their husbands or eloped, thereby depriving their parents of bride wealth (Cross, 2013; Idris, 2019). The *sungusungu* committees are well-rooted in traditional governance mechanisms and elected by democratic village assemblies called *iritongo* (Denney, 2015). The *iritongo* are democratic assemblies which are led by the ruling generation, but where all adult men are allowed to speak. Trials are usually heard first by the *sungusungu* committee, but they are always held before the entire *iritongo* (Heald, 2009; Jenkins, 2013; Idris, 2019).

Residents of the villages served by the *Sungusungu* organisations trusted them because they were locals, and they saw them as a credible alternative to the corrupt, expensive, and ineffective services of the regular police and courts. Members of the *Sungusungu*, unlike police officers, can be voted out of office if they fail to consistently carry out their duties because they are not 'invulnerable to community sentiment. Composed of men between ages 18 and 50, the *Sungusungu* routinely conduct house-to-house investigations, soliciting accusations against anyone suspected of cattle theft and seeking corroborating evidence from other accusers. Those found guilty of cattle theft are often handed over to the state police to be incarcerated while they awaited official investigation of their cases. Also, to enhance village security, members of the *Sungusungu* routinely conduct night-time patrols (Agbiboa, 2019). The *sungusungu* have been praised as 'arguably the most successful form of community policing in Eastern Africa' (Heald, 2009; Denney, 2015), but have also been implicated in the systematic use of torture (Cross, 2013). Nevertheless, the *sungusungu* have enabled communities to take back power and have heralded a new vision of community responsibility for local safety and security (Jenkins, 2013; Idris, 2019).

Although the rise of the *Sungusungu* and its alliance with the police forces led to a dramatic reduction in the incidence of cattle-thieving, the group's members succumbed to the same corrupt practices that undermined the official law enforcement agencies. For example, some *Sungusungu* village commanders were accused of soliciting payoffs from cattle thieves in return for looking the other way. Other commanders were implicated in demanding advance payments from villagers who came to them with various security needs. After collecting these advance payments, the commanders made no efforts to perform the tasks. Others have actively cashed in on their privileged access to, and knowledge of, communal practices (for example, sleeping habits and security regimes) to weaponize their comrades in the cattle raiding business. In addition, some

would incarcerate suspects, 'sometimes for days, and beat them with a hippopotamus-hide whip.' All of these abuses notwithstanding, some villagers have argued that the *Sungusungu* is a 'lesser evil' than the official police forces. These villagers are of the view that members of the *Sungusungu* often demand bribes that are considerably lower than those demanded by the police, and that, not infrequently, the *Sungusungu* delivers on its promise of security (Agbiboa, 2019).

Figure 12: Supposed Sungusung members at a function in Kisii. Photo by Jacob Owiti (Source; Nation, 2018)

Table 1: Summary of the types of interactions that occur between formal and informal institutions.

Interaction Type	Meaning	Characteristics	Example
Competing Relationship	They are informal institutions that coexist with ineffective formal institutions.	They are common in settings where formal rules and procedures are not consistently enforced, allowing actors to ignore or violate them. These informal institution's structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate another.	Competing informal institutions are often found in postcolonial contexts in which formal institutions were imposed on indigenous rules and authority structures. Particularistic informal institutions such as clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics, and corruption are among the most familiar examples. An example of this is the Mungiki sect in Kenya.

Complementary Relationship	These are informal institutions that coexist with effective formal institutions, such that actors expect that the rules that exist on paper will be enforced.	Such institutions fill in gaps either by addressing contingencies not dealt with in the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework and such informal institutions often enhance efficiency. They are often characterised by myriad of norms, routines, and operating procedures that ease decision making and coordination within bureaucracies, and judicial norms. Thus, scholars have linked the effectiveness of the U.S. Constitution to a complementary set of shared belief sand expectations among citizens.	Examples include Amotekun; Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the Vigilante Hunters of Borno in Nigeria.
Substitutive Relationship	This is a group that combines ineffective formal institutions with compatible outcomes, which corresponds to substitutive in formal institutions.	Substitute informal institutions, like complementary institutions, are employed by actors seeking outcomes that are compatible with formal rules and procedures. They do, however, exist in environments where formal rules are not routinely enforced, as do competing institutions. As a result, substitutive informal institutions accomplish what formal institutions were intended but failed to do.	Substitutive institutions tend to emerge where state structures are weak or lack authority like The Bakassi Boys of Nigeria and Tanzania Sungusungu.

Source: Adapted and modified from Helmke, & Levitsky, (2004).

Together, these four types show the interactions between formal and informal institutions that are most prevalent in Africa. Achieving results (resolution of post-election conflict, public security) that the formal rules failed to achieve may be made possible by substitutive informal institutions, which subvert formal rules and procedures. Additionally, although accommodating informal institutions generally go against the rule of law, they may produce results (democratic stability) that are generally regarded as advantageous. However, it is still unclear whether accommodating and substitute institutions can promote the creation of more efficient formal structures or if they 'crowd out' such development (by putting a stop to calls for formal institutional change or by fostering the emergence of new actors, abilities, and interests connected to the upkeep of the informal rules) (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004). All in all, as Voloskyi, 2020 put it '*the reality is far more complex and dynamic than the failed state and the Westphalian conceptions allow. The relations between state and non-state actors cannot be reduced to antagonism. They are characterised by a diverse set of possible interactions, including complimenting, accommodation, competition, and substitution. Nor these interactions cannot be reduced to the struggle for power and resources. They are an endless process of negotiations of the authorities and boundaries of sovereignty of the state and non-state actors'.*

Therefore, instead of viewing non-state security actors as a threat to the legitimacy and power of the state, it is crucial to see them as a process of negotiating the state's authority and redefining its role. When citizens express their concerns and demand that the state address them, they create a new set of expectations about the role of the state. Similarly, when the state fails to meet these expectations, citizens redefine the state's authority, imposing new expectations on it. As a result, non-state security actors are 'shaped by power, or by various techniques and practices of government,' but they also shape the government's power, practices, and techniques (Abrahamsen, 2003; Voloskyi, 2020).

3.5   Conclusion

Generally, non-state informal policing in Africa has a long history and has taken very diverse forms. However, discourses on non-state informal policing would be incomplete without taking community-based, bottom-up or self-help policing activities into consideration. Self-help in social ordering amongst impoverished groups has a long history, as it does in the majority of African nations. Informal efforts to maintain order predate top-down state-initiated community policing, which is a hallmark of modern advancements in state-centred policing. Over time, they have included hunters in most parts of Nigeria i.e. *olode* in the southwest and *yen daba* in the north, anti-cattle *Sungusungu* raiding movements in Tanzania, political ethnocentric religious militia *Mungiki* in Nairobi, the *Oodua* People's Congress in south-western Nigeria, and the *Bakassi* Boys in south-east Nigeria. However, acknowledging the effective role and responsibilities of non-state informal entities with respect to the delivery of security and other public goods, involve recognizing their limitations. This was certainly the case with the *Mungiki* of Kenya and *Bakassi* Boys in Nigeria have been reported to brutally punish or massacre anyone suspected of or arrested for crime as noted in the works of Harnischfeger, (2003), Meagher, (2007), and Bruce, (2009).

However, it is also important to clarify that the emergence of non-state informal policing entities does not necessarily spell doom for the power and authority of the state as it has been documented to help to expand and complement the state or rebuild trust in formal state institutions. These forces played a major role in fending off attacks and provide regular armed forces with critical local knowledge, thereby bolstering the effectiveness of counter-insurgency campaigns. But such groups also can undermine central authority, widen conflict by targeting ethnic or political rivals or threaten longer-term stability by continuing as an autonomous armed force after the original conflict has subsided. Non-state informal actors may sometimes abuse the civilians they are supposed to protect by misusing their powerful position in local communities. As Agbiboa, (2019) also noted, this dynamic can, in turn, jeopardize the order and security they tried to establish in the first place. States may also use non-state informal entities to perpetuate certain types of violence against civilians. The challenge here is to recognize and build on the positive potential of non-state informal entities to foster a new model of policing that serves all equally.

The interactions and negotiations between the state and non-state actors according to Super, 2020 as cited in Voloskyi, 2020 'do not necessarily rely on the official legislature but social norms which the study alleged define the degree of tolerable deviance. As a result, the key question that this research would explore further is why there are specific patterns of interaction between non-state security organizations and the state. What practices are legitimate, and where the line between legitimate and illegitimate actions is never clearly defined. It is the result of consensus, compromise, and imposing, in other words, informal negotiations and agreements within and between institutions.

CHAPTER 4. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN NIGERIA- A CASE OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

4.0   Introduction

The legacy of colonialism has profoundly influenced the intricacies of governance, statehood, and political dynamics in Africa. Colonial powers established formal state structures on the continent, often overlooking indigenous governance systems, leading to a dualistic arrangement where traditional and formal institutions coexisted. This complex interplay shaped governance and statehood. The arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers split ethnic groups and communities, posing significant challenges to national integration and state cohesion. The use of indirect rule allowed traditional authorities to manage local affairs under colonial supervision, creating hybrid governance systems that persistently affect modern state structures and political dynamics in Africa. However, the disruption and erosion of indigenous governance systems during colonial times have had enduring effects on post-independence state-building and governance challenges. Re-evaluating the long-lasting effects of colonialism on African statehood and governance is just as important as acknowledging the complex effects of colonial legacies on governance and statehood. This historical period highlights the continued impact of colonialism on power dynamics, as evidenced by the transition from pluralistic frameworks to increasingly centralised one-party systems. However, attributing these transitions solely to colonial legacies ignores important intra-national developments following independence. As Frederick Cooper warns, simplifying these narrative risks ignoring critical, country-specific evolutions that shaped modern governance structures, particularly in Nigeria. As a result, a more in-depth examination is required to understand the multifaceted nature of these transformations, taking into account both colonial imprints and postcolonial realities.

This chapter aims to contextualize contemporary developments and deepen the understanding of security and governance dynamics in Nigeria by examining the historical evolution of governance and security, particularly in Northern Nigeria. It explores the various institutional forms that have emerged in postcolonial African societies concerning urban security, shaped by long-standing experiences with institutions and institutional change. The chapter starts by acknowledging that these institutional forms are partly innovative responses to current political, social, and economic developments, yet deeply influenced by historical experiences. This approach provides a comprehensive insight into how governance and security were administered, especially in Northern Nigeria, an area that has received limited attention in this context. The chapter seeks to illuminate the reasons behind the current security provision structure and identify factors influencing its evolution by exploring Northern Nigeria's historical governance and security roots. This exploration is crucial for contributing to academic and policy discussions about the effectiveness of non-state actors in security provision and long-term development in Africa. Ultimately, the chapter places the recent evolution of security within a historical framework,

highlighting the diversity of security governance throughout Nigeria's extended history, with a primary focus on historical governance patterns in Northern Nigeria.

4.1   Background

For centuries before the dawn of colonial rule, governance in several parts of Africa was identified with Native, Indigenous or Traditional institutions and their rulers. In Nigeria for example, local administration was mostly centred around the native ruler who was considered the repository of spiritual, legislative, executive, and judicial functions, with a few exceptions in the south-east among the Igbos. Many local security systems were established by native or indigenous political structures to preserve both internal and external security throughout the pre-colonial era. They were known as 'age grade' in pre-colonial South-east Nigeria, and they served as a policing force (Tanumo, 1970). In pre-colonial Southwestern Nigeria, groups of hunters comprised of able-bodied men conducted the primary police duty of crime control and prevention, while priests (*Baba Alawo*) worked as investigators. By consulting the Oracle, concealed criminals and crimes were discovered through the priests. As a result, they were the primary law enforcement agents (Rotimi, 2001).

Traditional rulers[12] or Native rulers (these terms will be used interchangeably in this study) were also involved in ensuring personal security of citizens and their properties, by maintaining law and order through the Native Authority System, and their vast network of intelligence gathering system during the colonial period. Police officers were among the numerous palace officials in the North's centralised emirate states, the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the West. In the northern emirates they were known as *dogarai,* but they had no common name in the kingdoms of the West. They were known similarly as *ilari* (in Oyo), *emese* (in the Ife, Ijesa and Ekiti kingdoms) or *aguren* in Ijebu-ode. But they had the following main features every place, North or West (i) they were drawn from palace slaves; (ii) they were appointed by, and were responsible to, the kings; (iii) they had a political head who was a senior official of government and nearly always an eunuch; (iv) they had a distinctive dress and/ or haircut (v) they combined the triple roles of bodyguard, messenger and executioner and (vi) they also performed diplomatic and revenue- collecting functions (Mohammed, 2007).

However, with the advent of colonialism, the native institutions were relegated to serving the colonial powers (Hallouch, 2018). Even though indirect rule was the method of governance used in most parts of Nigeria and other parts of Africa at large during the colonial period (where the people were still indirectly administered through the native institutions) the real power was in the hands of the colonial agents. After independence, the administration of communities was handed over to the civilian government, with little or no acknowledgment of the native institutions in most

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[12] The term 'traditional ruler' refers to the traditional head of an ethnic unit or clan who currently holds the highest traditional authority within the ethnic unit or clan.

cases. Subsequent manifestations in the general political system of the country underscored the need to engage the native institutions in governance (ibid).

There is a fairly substantial scholarly literature by African and foreign academics on the history of policing (See Tanumo, 1970; Igbinovia, 1981; Marenin, 1982; Mohammed, 2007; Crank and Kadleck, 2013; Beek, Göpfert, Owen, & Steinberg, 2017; Bierschenk, 2017; Hallouch, 2018). Descriptions of the formal aspects of policing systems (structure, recruiting standards, etc.) can be found in official documents, non-governmental organisation publications, scholarly writings, etc. Nonetheless, Crank and Kadleck (2013) argue that further research on the history of policing in Africa is needed because accurate knowledge of policing in African states is extremely lacking for a variety of reasons. For example, for an English speaking only observer, the writings on policing in former French or Portuguese colonies are not easily accessible due to language barrier. What is lacking is a scholarly literature on Africa's realities that are equally relevant and part of the history of most African cities' current policing system.

It is critical to understand the history of Africa's security and governance systems in order to clarify as well as provide information or points of view that might otherwise be overlooked about native institutions in Africa that have served as the bedrock for governance and security institutions in most parts of Africa. Furthermore, examining the historical circumstances that have shaped how cities are governed in Africa will help in understanding the evolution and transformation of security governance in Africa, which is partly what this chapter aims to accomplish. The section will be divided into three parts that examine the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial governance systems in Nigeria, with each section subdivided to evaluate the security system during each era to provide a better understanding of how governance and security were provided, particularly in the Northern part of Nigeria, which is the focus of this study.

Figure 13: Map showing pre-colonial empires in Nigeria (source: Nairaland, n.d)

4.2   Pre-Colonial Governance and Security System in Northern Nigeria

4.2.1   Pre-Colonial Governance System and Structure in Northern Nigeria

Mwale (2017) demonstrated in his work that the continent had well-organized societies with law-abiding citizens prior to colonisation and invasion. Structures existed to keep order and sanity in place. In the past, policing was informed by the African value system, and the continent had policing systems based on justice for all principles. Pre-colonial policing was unique and effective, and it differed greatly from modern-day policing. The pre-colonial model of policing was restorative, with the emphasis on pro-activity, which primarily focused on crime prevention (Mwale, 2017). There were several ways to keep law and order in the pre-colonial era. Pre-colonial policing efforts sought to change the beliefs that informed the behaviour of social systems and were not unilateral in nature. Policing began at a young age, through various socialisation media. The young were taught and imbued with positive values that saw them conform to the required social norms, such as integrity, honesty, solidarity, hospitality, communality, and good neighbourliness, from a young age (ibid).

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From a broader perspective and structure, native rulers were frequently assisted in their onerous work of securing their lands by subordinate chiefs appointed by them in the pre-colonial era. They were divine kings and personifications of the various communities under them. They were seen and observed as the pivots around which everything revolved, the supreme spiritual head as well as the civil authority in the land. For example, the Yoruba system in the Southwest was composed of the Oba and a Council of a number of high chiefs of the community/town over which the Oba presided. For the great Benin Empire, the government of Benin Empire revolved around the Oba, who was regarded as the incarnation of the people's soul (see fig 15). He was an absolute monarch, and by his divine attributes, he had the fear and respect of his entire subjects (Mohammed, 2007).

Figure 14: Native Benin King flanked by his subjects and chiefs (Source: edonationsatelite.blogspot)

Figure 15: Native chiefs from Northern Nigerian pre-colonial kingdoms (source: Nairaland, n.d)

The defeat of the Hausa States by an Islamic leader and scholar, Sheikh Usman Danfodio, from 1804 to 1809, resulted in the extinction of Hausa kingdoms and the foundation of Emirates largely governed by Fulani scholars in what subsequently became the northern part of Nigeria. One could argue that during the period of Danfodio's defeat of the Hausa States and the establishment of the Emirates in northern Nigeria, an existing tradition was swept away, and a new tradition was created, and this transformation resulted in significant changes to the system of governance and the consolidation of power under the Caliph or Amir-al Muminin, who held supreme authority within the Northern Nigeria Caliphate, known as the Emirates. The governance system in place at the time was monarchical and highly centralised, with the Caliph and subsequent Emirs wielding significant power over the state. Their authority was cemented by the implementation of Sharia law, which governs various aspects of religious rituals and day-to-day life in Islam (Hallouch, 2018). However, it is important to note that the emergence of these new institutions and the enforcement of Sharia law built on long-standing practises. These enduring institutions, both formal and informal, played an important role in regulating regional security and governance. These practises coalesced and evolved over time, forming what is now commonly referred to as 'traditional', 'Native' or 'Indigenous' despite minor variations in their nuances. As a result, the formation of the Emirates and the implementation of Sharia law can be viewed as a transformation of governance structures that drew on existing traditions while also introducing new elements that shaped the socio-political landscape of northern Nigeria at the time.

In pre-colonial Northern Nigeria, *Emir* is the leader of an emirate, entrusted with legislative, executive, and judicial authority. The *Emir* is the political, spiritual and administrative head of the Emirate and has an advisory council who help in day-to-day administration of the Emirate. He assigns specific security duties to a number of institutional heads like the *Waziri*, a senior official; *Madawaki,* a military commander; *Galadima*, who administers the capital city; while the *Alkalis* administered justice based on Sharia law. These groups of individuals are regarded as the *Emir's* ministers appointed to various offices for the purpose of administrative activities. One of the most important ministers is the *Waziri* who is regarded as a senior official and head of administration. Not only that, but he also oversees all ministries and carries out the day-to-day administrative responsibilities on behalf of the *Emir*. The Emirates are again divided into districts. Each district's administrative head is known as '*Hakimi*.' He is chosen by the *Emir* to manage the affairs of each district which includes maintaining peace and order and collection of taxes like *Jangali* (cattle tax), *Jizyah* (land tax) and *Zakat* (religious tax/charity) (Morton, 2017).

In terms of organizational structure, the centralized kingdoms known as emirates are the primary groupings, districts are secondary and village areas tertiary. The district is made up of various villages. The District Head is empowered to appoint Village Heads. The primary function of these Village Heads is to assist the *Hakimi* or District Administrator in the administration of the districts. Within the local communities, three people are the most respected. *The Mai Unguwa* (village/community head), Imam/Pastor (religious leader) and the *Attajiri, Maisukuni or Dan kasuwa,* (roughly translated as the businessman). The village head is the main symbol of authority; he oversees the resolution of disputes, ensures stability, and is seen and accepted as the representative of the people. The Imam is the spiritual head of the community (People's Daily Newspaper, 2012). He leads everyone in prayer at least five times a day, does the marriage solemnization, the naming ceremony, leads the funeral service and when the village head struggles to find the solution to problems, the Imam helps out by bringing scholarly opinion and useful references on how such disputes could be resolved from the perspective of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad). The businessman is the economic hub of the community; he provides loans, gives out the Zakat (charity) and his businesses help in providing employment to the people. Coming down to the household level, domestic authority rests with the *Mai Gida* (male head of the household). The *Uwar Gida* (senior wife of the compound) settles minor disputes within the household and gives advice and aid to the younger women (Yusha, 2012).

This structure, which persists today in most villages (rural areas) has a hierarchy and is replicated in most communities at the district level with a district head (*Hakimi*), and the Emir (*Sarki*) at the state or provincial level. The beauty of this structure back then as documented by Last (2008) in his work on 'the search for security in Muslim northern Nigeria', is that if a stranger comes to town, even if it is at the middle of the night, the village head or the ward head will know immediately, he will provide shelter and food for the guest until he leaves, if he decides to stay in town the village head will get a portion of the farms under his care and give it to the guest to use

and look after himself. If the guest proves to be trustworthy, he might be honoured with a girl in the village so that he can marry her thereby being co-opted as a full-time member of the community (Morton, 2017).

4.2.2 Pre-Colonial Security Governance System

In terms of security, native African societies had means of social control, reformation, and moral cleansing[13] during the pre-colonial period, which served as instruments to correct and serve justice. There were various channels traditionally through which societies-controlled crime. This included elder's councils, chiefs, and village heads, among others, whose roles included interpreting the community's code of conduct and behaviour as passed down from generation to generation (Ayuk, Owan, & Uyang, 2013). In Northern Nigeria, there were pre-colonial palace administrators that performed police duties. In the northern emirates they were known as *dogarai* whose primary duty was to serve as bodyguards to the kings, in addition these slave officials also performed police functions. Smith (1977) notes that the *dogarai* had the duty to capture and discipline offenders and to guard the town together with warders. In their study on Kano, Fika and Ubah (1973) explore the many responsibilities of the *dogarai* in the state, which include performing essential police functions like preventing crime or identifying and prosecuting criminals after they have committed a crime. As part of the court process, they also carried out the decrees of law. Fika (1978) notes that in civil matters the plaintiff went up to the court and lodged his complaint in the company of official orderlies and messengers. According to him 'once the complaint was brought before the Alkali (judge) and the grievance was formally outlined, a *dogari* would be directed to summon the respondent. If it was a criminal offense the accused was usually arrested by *dogari* and brought before the court in chains'. In regard to the execution of the commands of justice, Ubah (1973) states that punishment was usually by mutilation or death, the Sarkin *dogarai* supervised those who performed the duty. A condemned criminal was tied to a pole in the city market and his head was cut off with a sword by the *hauni*, a slave official under the *Sarkin dogarai*. Amputation of the limb (for crimes related to theft) was the work of the dan *jawal*, another slave official.

Before the advent of the *Dogarai* era, there were the native local gangs of hunters (*yan farauta*) with their dogs, and very strong men (*yan tauri*) fortified by charms, who were popularly known as '*yan daba*' and served as a substitution of what can be termed as an equivalent of the state army. The word *yen daba* originates from the Hausa word '*Daba*' which literally means group. Apart from being hunters they also functioned primarily as part of the local army/security system during this time. Like most hunters all over the world, they use weapons like arrows, axes, darts, knives, clubs and poison when hunting for animals. They also protect themselves from dangerous animals and accidents using domesticated hunting dogs, riding horses and camels and also use charms to protect themselves which were sometimes local concoctions in the form of drugs known commonly as *Maganin Karfe* which literally means medicine against iron. Even though their main

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[13] Moral cleansing describes behaviors aimed at restoring moral self-worth in response to past transgressions.

occupation was hunting, whenever there was war, crisis or conflict that threatened the state, the Emir summons them and they obliged (Dan-Asabe, 1991).

During these times the colonial administration attempted to undermine the security system by outlawing specific organizations that were devoted to the kings out of fear that people might rebel against colonial rule at the time. For example, the establishment of the European colonial rule during this period banned and made organized group hunting illegal and with that came the decline of the *yen daba* in the north. This action was necessary for the new rulers because the *yandaba* members were part of the traditional army/security system for the native rulers who had just been overthrown and they feared if they allowed them to remain, they may regroup and retaliate. Over the years these groups of young local hunters, builders, blacksmith etc. were completely transformed from their former roles, functions and cultural significance due to the new political system in the region and subsequent clashes between political parties in the region. They were transformed from local hunters to political thugs and hence bore a new name from '*Yandaba*' to '*Yanbanga*' (Dan-Asabe, 1991).

4.3   Colonial Governance System and Structure: Indirect Rule

4.3.1   The Direct (French) and Indirect (British) rule system in Africa

Indirect rule has been used widely in several nations around the world. Indirect rule was practised by a number of colonial powers, such as the British in Uganda and Nigeria, the Dutch in the East Indies, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the French in Algeria and Tunisia, and the Belgians in Rwanda and Burundi. But in Africa, there were mainly two systems the French and the British that used different ruling strategies. In theory, the French system of governance, direct rule, was completely contradictory to the British indirect rule. The British in Northern Nigeria considered it their responsibility to conserve what was good in indigenous institutions and support the institutions to develop on their own lines (Crowder 1964). The relationship between the British political officer and the chief was basically that of an adviser who interfered only in rare and on key issues such as taxation with the chief and the native authority under him. There was thus a minimum undermining and little interference with the established sources of authority. The main difference for the Fulani Emirs of Northern Nigeria was that they now paid allegiance to the British Government rather than the Sultan of Sokoto, and they collected taxes on their behalf. However, they typically kept 70% of the money they raised for the management of their local authority (Mavhunga, 2014). The political officer and native chief, who presided over a region that matched a pre-colonial political unit, had an advisory relationship under the British system. The relation between the British political officer and the chief was in general that of an adviser who only in extreme cases intervened with the chief and the native authority under him.

Figure 16: The British during colonization in Nigeria (source: Nairaland, n.d)

The French system, however, placed the chief in an entirely subordinate role to the political officer. Citizens and non-citizens were segregated in French colonies in West Africa, for example, French citizens were subject to French law, while non-citizens (Africans) were regulated by African law. As a result, the legal system became a battleground for competing interests among colonial society's various and asymmetrical groups (Agbiboa, 2019). Furthermore, in the French system, the chief was merely an agent of the central colonial administration with clearly defined duties and powers in relation to the French political officer. The chief does not head a local government unit, nor did the area which he governed on behalf of the government automatically correspond to a pre-colonial political unit. The French split their colonies administratively into cantons in the interests of conformity, which frequently cut across pre-colonial political boundaries. Chiefs did not remain chiefs of their old political units but of the new cantons, even though at times the two overlapped. Most critical of all, chiefs were not necessarily those who would have been selected according to customary procedures; often they were those who had shown loyalty to the French or had obtained some education (Crowder 1964). It was evident at the time that the French had redefined the nature of the chief's authority, reducing his role to 'that of a mouthpiece for orders emanating from outside.'

In general, the French administrative system purposefully weakened the chiefs' authority in the name of administrative uniformity, not only within particular territories but also across the two great federations of West and Equatorial Africa (Crowder, 1964). The difference between the two systems is emphasized in national character and political traditions. While the British were conscientious in their regard for traditional methods of selection of chiefs, the French saw them as agents of the administration and were more concerned with their prospective efficiency than their authenticity. Within the French system, individual territories were not considered as having special characters, so that the same administrative organization was imposed on all of them, political officers would be dispatched from one territory to another occasionally every year, which gave them little time to learn the local way of life or language of the native people (Crowder, 1964). On

the other hand, the British political officers stayed in the same territory for an extensive period of time, in the same region and part of the requirement for their promotion depended on the ability of the political officer to understand indigenous languages. In conclusion, the disparities between the French and British systems of administration in Africa were not only disparities in degree but in kind. Both may have used chiefs, but the stance of the chief in each system was profoundly different (Crowder, 1964). Another notable distinction between the British and French approaches to the region is the degree to which the inhabitants were given autonomy. The French occupied all of the main positions under French administration; British administration generally followed the concept of administering through native rulers whenever possible (Agbiboa, 2019).

4.3.2   Indirect rule system in Nigeria

The British conceived the Indirect Rule as a system of colonial administration through which the native chiefs were thought of as a fundamental part of the government (Tibenderana, 1988). Following the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, and in order to legitimise their dominance over the regions, colonial authorities established a system of administration that incorporated the native rulers' already perfected structure. This was the beginning of the Indirect Rule administration, in which the Emir retained control of the instruments of authority and power, including the police, courts, prisons, treasuries, and revenue collection, but was stripped of all executive powers. Native Yoruba kings were treated similarly, with the *Obas* only possessing the power of being the sole native authority. The *Obas* (kings) were no longer the land givers, Commanders-in-Chief, or Chief Executives, despite the fact that they still issued instructions to their subjects (Mohammed, 2007).

In Northern Nigeria, Indirect Rule reached its peak with the British triumph of the Sokoto Caliphate and was referred to as the explicit ideology of British colonialism in the early twentieth century (Gerring, Ziblatt, Van Gorp & Arévalo, 2011; Hallouch, 2018). Prior to the introduction of Indirect rule, the Caliph was the supreme authority over the Caliphate, but under British rule, the time of the Caliphate came to an end and a Sultan was appointed by the Governor as a replacement of the Caliph. At the inception of British rule in Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick D. Lugard, a British officer and the then governor of both the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, decided to adapt the emirates' existing political system to meet colonial needs. The Lugardian doctrine of native administration was founded on the notion that there existed a strong, rather autocratic, Emir or chief whose authority the government could officially recognise and to whom it could delegate some responsibility. Under this arrangement the Emir would be subordinate to the British administrative officer but in appearance would be made to look like the actual ruler of his subjects (Rotimi, 2001).

Though indirect rule rested mainly on a chief in most parts of Africa as an executive, its main aim was not to preserve the institution of chieftaincy, but to inspire local self-government through indigenous political institutions, whether these were controlled by a single executive authority, or by a council of elders. A policy of minimum interference with chiefs and traditional forms of

government was pursued in Northern Nigeria. The indirect rule was created due to the challenges the then governor, Lord Lugard faced in governing the region. With a large area amounting to about nine million, he could not ensure the day-to-day administration of the Sokoto Caliphate. To solve this problem indirect rule was introduced, he believed the Fulani Caliphate which had already a developed system of administration based on the Islamic principles could not be abolished easily. He then suggested the idea of ruling the Caliphate through the emirate model.

In addition, there were other motives that pushed Lugard to keep and adapt to the traditional political institutions of the Fulani government. This was mainly due to the lack of finance and experienced administrators which impeded him to provide a direct administration. Hence, reliance on the native authorities was the cheapest and most efficient system since it would maintain order and stability and would serve the colonial rule as well. The Emir was in charge of legislative affairs as well as collecting taxes through his agents' activities. Each emir or chief was appointed an administrator by the governor who supervised and oversaw the activities of the Emirs and was responsible for the native administration of his province and other various departments through the British staff. Each native administration under the emir had districts with a district head. District heads were controlled by the emir and were responsible for collecting taxes on his behalf and reimbursing them to the native treasury. The districts were further divided into villages, each under a village head just like the pre-colonial period (Hallouch, 2018).

Figure 17: Sir Frederick Lugard (to the right) and Percy Girouard (to the left) (source, Wikipedia, 2021)

According to Mamdani, (2002), Indirect Rule was a type of contract between the British colonial government and the native rulers of Northern Nigeria. When Lugard left Nigeria in 1906, Percy Girouard took over as the administrator of Northern Nigeria. During his reign, the emphasis switched from the 'rule through native chiefs' doctrine to 'rule through native chiefs on native lines' (Ariyo, 2011). Apart from those of the Resident, this policy shift meant a rising desire to shield the Emirs and chiefs from all outside influences (Rotimi, 2001). This was essential because some Emirs were given powers as the sole Native Authorities to run their Emirates, almost to the exclusion of other authorities who had significant role in the administration of their Emirates prior to the arrival of the British (Mohammed, 2007). Basically, the Native Authority system was divided into two: Administration, Finance; and Security. The Administration and Finance was composed of the following: Family Head; Ward Head; Village Head; District Head (Ariyo, 2011).

Figure 18: Sir Frederick Lugard (middle) and the Sardauna of Sokoto; Sir Ahmadu Bello (to his left) during the amalgamation of Nigeria (source: Nairaland, n.d)

This system had significance in terms of politics, economics, and security. It served as both a tax collection mechanism and a security reporting system. The Family Head was responsible for informing the Ward Head of the arrival of a visitor to his home, including the visitor's entire biodata, parentage, town, occupation, and reason for the trip. The entire administrative organization are fully aware of individuals movements inside their jurisdiction using this strategy (Mohammed, 2007). In terms of taxation in Northern Nigeria's emirates, it was noted that one of Governor Lugard's attractions to native emirate government was its effective taxing system, which he adopted with adjustments. The procedures for collecting taxes were similarly steeped in tradition, making the entire process less burdensome. During colonial times, most emirate subjects continued to regard the requirement to pay tax as a function of their emirate membership. It was unusual to have a problem with evasion that required the intervention of the police to apprehend the evaders (Rotimi, 2001).

On the other hand, the security department was composed of the following units: Emirs' personal Bodyguards (*Dogarai*); Native Authority Police; and Prisons. The Bodyguards (*Dogarai*), Prison Guards, and Police were a carefully picked group of people who were devoted to the Emirate. The heads of these units were carefully chosen to protect the Emir's person while also ensuring the territory's peace and security. The head of the Police Force was frequently handed to a prince to underline the importance of the police within the Native Authority organization. The Court, which was an arm of the security system, was firmly in the hands of intellectual families who were well-versed in Sharia law - *Alkalai*. All appeals were directed above the legal system to the Emir's council, putting the Emir at the forefront of the legal system–to be advised by the *Waziri* and *Wali* (Mohammed, 2007).

The advent of British colonialism, however, disrupted all previous systems to some measure, as the final authority shifted to colonial officials. The native rulers' authority was diminished, since they became subordinate to British officials. Instead of giving orders, they began to receive orders from the Resident District Officers. The district officer was an administrator and, in certain cases, a magistrate who served as a liaison between the colonial government's professional and technical services and the people of his region[14]. Native authority structures across the country were undermined as a result of these developments. Nevertheless, in spite of the transfer of power, which was as a result of colonialism, the influence of native rulers continued to be felt as co-security administrators of their various districts. However, in addition to the security forces deployed to oversee the behaviour of the governed, colonial officials relied heavily on native rulers to maintain internal security within their territories. They were found to be very suitable and were equipped by the colonialists to continue to exercise their judicial and legislative powers, all with the goal of maintaining peace and stability, during the colonial era. Native rulers' responsibility in security issues during the pre-colonial period were continued when colonial governance emerged. The colonial officer's cautious acceptance and respect for them strengthened their capacity to maintain law and order in the Native Authority (Mohammed, 2007).

4.4   Colonial Era Security Governance System

Mamdani (1996) defined Nigeria's indirect rule as a kind of agreement between the British colonial authority and Northern Nigeria's traditional rulers. At the time, indirect rule involved building alliances with local elites and outsourcing security to local law enforcement and militias (Bagayoko et al., 2016). Because colonialism involved the transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society to another, it created a two-tiered legal system: one for colonised people and one for colonisers. The general consensus was that 'natives' needed to be treated differently under the law. From the 1920s, British indirect rule, often known as 'decentralized despotism,' was

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[14] See Hallouch, 2018. British Indirect Rule and Islam in Northern Nigeria. (1900-1940). PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 249-267. Retrieved March 27, 2020, from https://grdspublishing.org/index.php/people/article/view/1407/1190

underpinned by customary law. By delegating some form of Native Authority to administer law and order under colonial supervision, the colonial state adapted local hierarchies and judicial traditions. 'Order is today largely secured by the system by which the native community polices itself,' Lord Hailey wrote in the early 1950s, 'in the sense that only the major types of crime are dealt with by the Government Police Force, which has usually a very small establishment, the great majority of offences or breaches of law being dealt with through the agency of Native Authority or Tribal Messenger' (Agbiboa, 2019).

In Northern Nigeria private guards were used by Native authorities in Northern provinces and night guards in most parts of the southwest for security purposes. Hunters from the country were often used as night guards in the 19th century before they were forbidden by the British administration because they were considered too dangerous, and replaced with a civil police force (Watson, 2003). Nevertheless, they were re-introduced in the early 1930s in areas where criminal activities were rampant, and the police absent (Fourchard, 2008). Colonial policing was primarily focused on urban areas, and its primary goal was to protect property and the affluent classes. However, even in some urban areas, especially those with large populations of Africans, colonial policing was sometimes 'selective and often only superficial.' On the other hand, rural areas and townships were infamously under-policed and crime-ridden (Agbiboa, 2019).

Colonial police forces operated as the colonial government's eyes and ears, and recruitment into the colonial police force was primarily influenced by the colonial state's technical needs rather than the needs of the subject population. Colonial police forces had 'nothing to do with serving the community.' Their main responsibilities included coercing labour, dealing with threats to colonial-imposed legislation, protecting white-owned property, and upholding colonial rule. This pattern persists today, with many individuals in postcolonial Africa believing that the majority of formal state policing units are corrupt and unfamiliar with the communities they serve. Colonial police institutions reflect the African postcolonial state, which 'presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow, it relied unduly on coercion for compliance, rather than authority' (Agbiboa, 2019).

4.4.1   The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and 'Native Authority' (NA) police

In northern Nigeria the 'Native Authority' (NA) police had the primary duty of maintaining law and order (Rotimi, 2001). Native Authority Police Forces (NAPFs) arose from the adaptation of pre-colonial police organizations from the North's centralized emirate states and the West's Yoruba and Edo kingdoms, or their establishment in areas where they had not previously existed, particularly among certain Northern required communities. Regardless of how they came to be, British colonial administrators wanted to achieve certain goals. For one, they hoped to acquire the trust of the local authorities. They also wanted to strengthen the local administrations. Three, they aimed to keep administrative costs low. The intention to mediate in the supposed racial superiority battle between the North and the South of Nigeria was a fourth goal, but one that was unique to

the British administrators in the north. The earnestness with which British administrators in both regions pursued these goals showed their commitment to the native administration system of rule (Rotimi, 2001).

From the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria in 1861, several police forces were established for the Lagos Colony, the Niger Coast, Northern and Southern Protectorates. Native Authorities and Local Governments police forces were also established, particularly in the Northern and Western parts of the country, under the jurisdiction of the native rulers. In the western and northern areas of the territory, where centralized traditional institutions existed, local police forces managed by native rulers were established under the indirect rule system, which was intended to reduce the cost of maintaining the colonial administration (Aluko & Ogunseye, 2019). Under these laws, and over the time, 'palace messengers' in the Emirates of the North, (the palace *dogarai*) were recognized and reformed as *yan doka* (law custodians/enforcers) (Alemika, 2010).

Tamuno (1970) explored the process of establishing a civil Government Police Force in Northern Nigeria between 1900 and 1906, as well as the reorganization of the police between 1907 and 1913, with the goal of demilitarizing the force. He mentions that the indigenous police organization of the emirates, the *dogarai*, was recognized as a unit of administration during the reorganization under Governor Percy Girouard. There are three obvious reasons for the restructuring. First and foremost, it was intended to rid the emirates of the predominantly foreign Government Police, especially those in the northern provinces of Kano, Sokoto, Zaria, and Borno. Two, it was supposed to ensure the Emirs' loyalty by allowing them to utilise their indigenous *dogarai* as police. This was very much in keeping with Girouard's administrative policy move from 'rule through native chiefs' to 'rule through native chiefs on native lines.' Three, using the *dogarai* rather than the Government Police would be less expensive. In 1908, the reorganization was put into practice on a larger scale (Adamu, 2007).

But Tamuno's explanation of the *dogarai's* emergence as a unit of native governance is incomplete. The *dogarai* did not get instant official recognition as a unit of administration when the British arrived, and they were not barred from carrying out their responsibilities. They were presumably overlooked because of the British stance toward slavery at the time. Slave offices were among the institutions that the British had pledged not to recognize. A slave must first be liberated before being able to occupy public office. The *dogarai*, however, did not have to wait long for acknowledgment. They gained it in 1907, after a spirited campaign led by administrative officers in Kano province, with H.R. Palmer leading the charge. Palmer had joined Northern Nigeria's administrative service in October 1904, and his first posting was as an Assistant Resident to Katsina (then grouped inside Kano province) (Rotimi, n.d).

The late I920s saw a shift in the face of policing in most of the North, which included the involvement of nobles in the work of policing, which had previously been solely the domain of commoners. Members of the royal family in the emirates were urged to serve as uniformed heads

of the NA police units or as councillors-in-charge of police under the princely liaison officer scheme, which began in 1928 (Rotimi, n.d). By 1929, the programme had been implemented in the local administrations of Kano, Sokoto, Zaria, and Katsina. The following are examples of the first set of liaison officers: 'Bunu, the son of the Sultan of Sokoto (1928); Abdu, Sardauna, a younger brother of the Sultan (1929), who was replaced in 1930 by another brother of the Sultan, Abdu Jatau; Mallam Sadu, a brother of the Emir of *Gwandu* (1930), who replaced Mallam Iliasu, a brother of the same Emir (1929); Usman Nagogo, a son of the Emir of Katsina (1929); Abubakar, a nephew of the Sultan of Sokoto (1931); Muhammad Lawal, a son of the Emir of Zaria (1929-37); Bello, the eldest son of a former Emir of *Gwandu* (1938); Mallam Faruku, son of the Emir of Kano (1937-39); and the Lamido's son in Adamawa (1945)' (Tamuno 1970). Some of these royals were appointed as administrative chiefs of the forces, while others, like Usman Nagogo in Katsina, Muhammad Lawal in Zaria, and Aliyu Mustapha in Yola, actually commanded their forces. Nagogo was Chief of Police in Katsina NAPF, until he became Emir in 1944, and Aliyu commanded the Adamawa NA police from 1945 until 1953, when he ascended the throne as the Lamido (Adamu, 2007).

The year 1930 was significant in Nigerian policing history. The two Government Police Forces of Southern and Northern Nigeria were amalgamated in that year. These were the Northern Nigeria Police Force and Southern Nigeria Police Force, which respectively came into effect with the proclamation of Northern Nigeria Protectorate in Lokoja on January 1, 1900, and the proclamation of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria also in 1900. These two Forces were amalgamated as the Nigeria Police Force in 1930, with jurisdiction over the entire country. This marked the beginning of a national police force in the territory. The Nigeria Police Force coexisted with local administration police forces in Local Government Areas in Western Nigeria and Native Authorities in Northern Nigeria between 1930 and 1966. During the colonial era, the primary purpose of colonial police forces was to protect newly acquired territories by the British imperialist power from indigenous popular revolt against oppression and exploitation. Members of the colonial police forces were viewed as dishonourable and treacherous by the general public (Killingray 1991). Members of different colonial police and armed forces in Nigeria were accused of 'looting, stealing, and otherwise abusing their positions.' They 'turned themselves loose upon the people, filling the position vacated by kidnappers, rioters, marauders, and freebooters' rather than protecting the peace for the town (Duru, 2011).

Despite their limitations, colonial police were generally seen as controlling crime during this time quite effectively, despite having to deal with some esoteric crimes like cultist murders in southeast Nigeria (Omeni, 2022). Detective work and investigation, for example, were particularly impressive by the mid-1940s. Man-Leopard Murders by David Pratten actually exemplifies how adaptable colonial policing could be under pressure and uncertainty, as well as how successfully colonial police occasionally worked with local populations to solve cases (Omeni, 2022). In addition, colonial imperial police assisted both mercantile corporations and the British Crown in furthering their commercial and political interests in the Niger River region. The emergence of

early constabularies following the annexation of the Colony of Lagos in 1861; the militaristic and naval role of the powerful Royal Niger Company Constabulary (RNCC) in the late nineteenth century; the deployment of NPF detachments as part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) during World War I; and the political struggle for accelerated 'Nigerianization' of the police force by the 1930s and until independence in 1960. During this time, the police institution had a warm relationship with the state political institutions it supported, but it became even more distant from the citizenry (Omeni, 2022).

During this time, the police encountered significant challenges in their interactions with civilians as a result of their proclivity to support the colonial state at the expense of the citizenry. Tamuno (1970; 1972) examined this characteristic extensively in his work "The Police in Modern Nigeria," shedding light on the challenges faced by the police and the consequent negative impact on their relationship with the civilian population. Furthermore, in his work "Colonialism by Proxy," Ochonu (2009; 2014) demonstrates how colonial police, including constabularies like the Hausa Constabulary (NA), developed their own subcultures with a "charged atmosphere of religious difference" in their policing of the population. These institutional pathologies had significant implications for the way the police functioned and interacted with the communities they served. The British administration would 'outsource' this subculture by deploying Hausa policemen (Dogarai) to dominate the Tiv and Idoma areas of the Middle Belt Region. Ochonu (2014) refers to this as 'colonialism by proxy' (Omeni, 2022). The application of so-called corporal punishment in small-community and even individual cases could be scaled back from the use of colonial police to subjugate sizable populations. According to Rao and Pierce (2001) in Discipline and the Other Body, the colonial police's use of such punishment in northern Nigeria exposed the duality of colonialism and colonial policing.

> If colonialism was about the management of difference the 'civilized' ruling the 'uncivilized' the allegedly necessary violence of colonial government threatened to undermine the very distinction that justified, it. Disciplining 'uncivilized' people through the use of force could often seem the . . . way to correct their behaviour, but there was a problem: Violence also appeared to be the antithesis of civilized government.

The British government in Nigeria struggled with this conundrum, as Falola (2009) demonstrates in *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria*: On the one hand, they had to appear and act civilised, but on the other, they had to order their colonial police to use force and sometimes a lot of it, including the use of Maxim guns to appease the irate, 'uncivilised' Nigerians.

Nonetheless, the police, particularly the NA, were believed to be more effective than their NPF counterparts, who were better trained and equipped at the time. Their deeper understanding of the local area in which they operated is typically credited with their greater success. Because they were more familiar with the people's culture and conventions, it was easier for them to investigate crime and track down offenders than their NPF colleagues, who were made up of more strangers. The

NA police are said to be more daring in their pursuit of criminals than their NPF counterparts, presumably due to their familiarity with their surroundings. Despite the fact that they were unarmed, they were successful (Alemika, 2010).

4.5   Post-Independence Era

Colonization in Africa was not designed to create strong states, and the colonial authorities did not eliminate the obstacles to strong statehood in the region. The opportunity for real state making opened up with the end of the colonial occupation as new national elites inherited states whose institutional capacity and social cohesion was too weak to provide secure livelihood and physical protection. The quest for strong and secure states in sub-Saharan Africa has yet to produce the developmental state which employs extracted resources and viable bureaucracies to provide human security for its citizens. This constitutes the security predicament of African states such as Nigeria, where this predicament is most severe and obvious (Isima, 2007). The new national elites in most sub-Saharan countries did not address the dualism of the colonial era (Indirect rule) the coexistence of non-formal traditional institutions and formal state structures. Rather, they maintained what has been called the artificiality and remoteness of the colonial state (Azarya & Chazan 1998; Isima, 2007). This failure undermined the ability of the post-colonial state to meet expectations and prompted the disengagement of sections of the population from the state (Isima, 2007).

In 1960 (after independence), Nigeria adopted a parliamentary system of government emulating that of its ex-colonizer (the United Kingdom). The Governor-General, who served as the representative of the Queen and the Head of State, appointed the Prime Minister (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who doubled as Foreign Affairs advocate of Nigeria) as the Head of Government, and his cabinet from among members of the legislature. In 1963, Nigeria cut ties with the British Monarchy and established the position of President as the Head of State. In 1979, Nigeria switched to a presidential system modelled after that of the United States, primarily to achieve a more enhanced separation of powers, and checks and balances, among the three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial). Although Nigeria was a dictatorship (military rule) from 1983 through 1998, the presidential system of government was reinstituted in 1999 (when Nigeria returned to a democratic system of government) and endures to this day (Goitom, 2017).

The police operated under military dictatorships for the majority of the next four decades during the military regime. Numerous notorious armed robbers and gangs formed as a result of the high rate of violent crime during this time (Omeni, 2022). Working under authoritarian rule was a significant challenge for the NPF, in addition to the rise in violent crime. Such regimes' police forces are not apolitical. On the contrary, they frequently stifle free will and abuse the police's constitutional right to use excessive force, making them coercive tools that always support the state. In Nigeria, this was demonstrated to be true for the majority of the time between 1970 and 1998. The work of Omeni (2022) on policing and the NPF during this time period showed how

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military rule worsened the relationship between the police and the general public and promoted the NPF's culture of coercion further.

The military's takeover of power in January 1966 provided traditional leadership with some room to breathe. The military authorities courted them in order to gain popular support. Thus, the military restored their lost glory, and they were once again seen as manifestations of law and order, albeit only for a short time (Mohammed, 2007). Following the countercoup in July 1966, with Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon as Head of State, and the accompanying reforms that centralized the country's Police, Judiciary, and Prisons, native rulers were relieved of much of the security business. The NA/LGPFs ceased to exist under the military regimes of Maj-Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi (15 January - 29 July 1966) and Lt. Col. (later General) Yakubu Gowon (from 29 July 1966). Military rule tipped the scale in favour of the NPF in terms of operational control of the military. In the West, it represented a return to the pre-July 1961 status quo. It amounted to a Pyrrhic victory in the long-drawn conflict between native authority and regional government on one side and the NPF on the other in the North. Furthermore, the creation of a twelve-state system for Nigeria automatically decentralized native rulers' bargaining leverage. General Obasanjo's dictatorship, which ruled from 1976 to 1979, instituted changes that further weakened the rights of native rulers. For example, by the Land Use Decree, their jurisdiction over land was handed to the State Governors. As a result of the erosion of most of their rights, native rulers were left with no meaningful role to play in concerns of governance and security. Furthermore, the Federal Republic's 1979 Constitution did not attach any security function to the traditional class, but simply permitted them to stay relevant as members of Traditional Councils in respective LGAs and States. The 1999 Constitution likewise did not attach any role to traditional leaders in any way (Mohammed, 2007).

It is an irony of fate that traditional rulers in Africa and specifically in Nigeria are recognized in all States of the Federation and graded by State Governments, but they are not given official recognition and security roles by the 1999 Constitution. Regardless of the foregoing, they have served as pillars of national security from the grassroots to the heart of the country.

Native rulers have also played an important role in reducing tensions in situations that may have escalated into catastrophic crises across the continent, as well as providing services in the absence of state delivery. For example, the collapse of the Congolese state has not impeded the continuation of public services, with a variety of non-state players filling gaps in delivery systems. Even in the war-torn eastern DRC, there are pockets of normalcy as well as initiation of municipal service supply and taxation thanks to the tradition informal systems in place (Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014). In Nigeria, Alemika and Chuckwuma (2000) discovered that there is a reliance on a wide range of traditional initiatives of informal policing organizations (neighbourhood watches, community guards, and vigilante formations) for the delivery of a measure of safety and security. As a result, it may be argued that the interventionist policies of some native rulers have attested to

how necessary and beneficial they are. They have been and will continue to be important regarding security issues impacting any part of the country (Adamu, 2007).

Traditional rulers' rights and roles gradually dwindled when the country gained independence on October 1, 1960. The administration of native authorities underwent drastic changes in the post-independence era, developments that the previous rulers were unprepared for. Traditional rulers were driven out of government with limited powers, having previously held the status of being the only acknowledged leaders by the authority. In cases where they refused to play along with the government of the day, they were humiliated by politicians. As a result, many of them became active in underground politics for personal security. Those that did not comply were deposed., only those who cooperated were co-opted into governance (Mohammed, 2007).

In Nigeria, the role of traditional leaders in governance is complex and ever evolving. In an effort to preserve and manage political control through already-existing social networks, British colonial rulers commonly granted local leaders the means and power to collect taxes. Nigeria distinguished itself from the experiences of many African nations after gaining independence in 1960 by maintaining authority structures and defining responsibilities for traditional leaders (Johnson & Hutchison, 2012). Local governments in Nigeria were considered as potential agents of development and democratisation, with the belief that their establishment would promote the stable emergence of democratic rule (Yahaya 1980). The institution of local government advisory councils was formalised and legislated by the constitution of 1979 (Blench et al. 2006). Local leaders were not given any official roles during the 1999 constitutional changes, in part because of worries that regional interests would prevent democratic consolidation, especially given Nigeria's decentralised federal structure. This has resulted in a variety of ad hoc hybrid political systems in different states: some states rely on patronage networks to support the rentier state model (Vaughan 2005); others add new chiefs to allocate political benefits, such as the expansion of 10 to 35 chiefs in Kaduna state in 2004 or of 15 to 89 chiefs in Plateau state in 2003 (Blench et al. 2006); yet others adopt parallel sharia court systems despite the constitutional dispensation of (Johnson & Hutchison, 2012).

Despite the aforementioned negative developments, traditional rulers have continued to fulfil security-related obligations. They continue to resolve family and communal disagreements calmly. It is critical to emphasize that, while many traditional rulers have lost power in the political sphere, they remain in control of subjects in their areas of influence. Politicians and the military have had to persuade them on several occasions and have had to resort to getting their blessings during campaigns or overthrowing governments through coups d'état. This just adds to the traditional rulers' importance in the current era. Traditional rulers have always worked as agents of moderation and temperance in Nigeria's history of governance, reducing tension and stabilizing the polity during times of crisis (Mohammed, 2007).

The present-day governance system still has both formal and informal governance structures, directly and indirectly, involved in governing most cities. Though the formal governance structures

are the recognized governance institution, the informal still have more power especially within the local communities even though the roles of the traditional institutions have been significantly diminished to traditional rites performance while the constitution has not allotted any particular governance recognition to them.

4.6   Conclusion

Understanding the evolution of the Nigerian Police Force requires acknowledging the lasting impact of pre-colonial and colonial legacies on its current structure and operations. These historical elements significantly shape the legitimacy and accountability of today's Nigerian policing. Rooted in a colonial era focused on safeguarding British imperialist interests, the Nigerian Police Force was often seen as an agent of colonial oppression rather than a protector of the people. This perception has persisted, influencing contemporary public views and raising questions about the police's legitimacy and accountability. Even after the merger of the Nigeria Police Force in 1930 with local administration police forces, the colonial legacy continued to influence its operations and goals, focusing more on population control than on community service and protection. This historical footprint continues to manifest in a policing system that struggles to connect with the communities it serves, often failing to meet their service demands while maintaining public trust. By dissecting these historical influences on the Nigerian Police Force, we gain insights into the prevailing challenges and strengths of our current security frameworks. This analysis is critical for identifying areas of systemic inertia that may hinder responsiveness to contemporary societal needs, as well as for recognizing adaptive strategies that have emerged in response to past failures. In essence, acknowledging and examining these historical legacies enables a more nuanced approach to reforming and enhancing the capacity of policing bodies, ensuring they are better equipped to address the dynamic and multifaceted nature of modern societal security concerns.

During Nigeria's 50th-anniversary independence celebrations in 2010, the BBC aired documentaries, including one from 1960, which illuminated Nigeria's transition from traditional systems to colonial indirect rule, and then to a parliamentary system at independence, highlighting the uncertainties about its future. Many African nations, at the time of gaining independence, aspired to establish a national police force capable of providing universal, effective, and just protection against crime and disorder. However, it became apparent that African governments faced challenges in fulfilling these aspirations. Before the establishment of formal governance and policing systems in Africa, local communities had their own traditional security structures, comprising local individuals and drawing credibility and authority from the community they served. These pre-colonial structures, some scholars argue, were more effective in serving the people. Last (2008) suggests that during the colonial period, security was most effective when the Emir held considerable power, and the Native Authority (NA) and NA police were widespread. His research on the search for security in Northern Nigeria details the efficiency and organization of the traditional system, offering insights into the historical context of security and policing in the region.

Last (2008) argued that the colonial period saw security at its highest/best when the Emir was all-powerful, and the Native Authority (NA) and NA police were ubiquitous. Last's (2008) research on the search for security in Northern part of Nigeria gave details of how efficient and organized the traditional system was.

> 'The palace could know by noon where everyone (and I mean everyone) had slept the night before; the chain of daily intelligence ran from the ward-head up to the Emir and that applied to the European residential areas (the 'GRA') too. In Sokoto, for example, there was still in the 1960s a deaf-mute man who reported daily which European slept where and how many bottles of liquor had been consumed the previous evening. In the 1950s there were also sanitary inspectors, going around in teams of two - a man and a woman (she would be the one to enter inside a house however private) and making their weekly reports on each building. The degree of surveillance was astonishing, with even the head of thieves reporting to the Palace along with the heads of the deaf-mutes and the blind; beggars were organized too. In the past, any complainant could expect to see the Emir (or his local headman) personally any day after the dawn prayer; thus, even people's complaints served to feed into governmental intelligence. The colonial authorities were dependent on this system, as did the regional governments after Independence. Today the system has long been abolished, and the current levels of population density would make it hard to re-institute even were there the political will to do so. Even a rural village area (one well known to me) that had some 1500 taxpayers in 1955 has today, I was told by the aged Village Head, over 75,000 people no one pays tax now, so such records as there are informal. But a corollary of this new-found freedom for the individual to be invisible is for the general public a new sense of insecurity: no longer is anyone in charge. Thieves and robbers lived in known settlements outside the walls of the main cities and did so until the 1970s (and in some areas may be still doing). Traditionally, if an item was stolen from your lodgings, you went along to the thieves' village and saw their headman locally known as 'Sarkin Barayi', who would recover the item for you; you then gave him a substantial present, of course. The system of a *Sarkin barayi* was not confined to big cities but was less formal outside: thieves were still part of an ordered system. But even in the countryside till recently, incoming robbers found it hard to make their get-away. If they were strangers, they were instantly recognizable, and within an hour or two would be caught (sometimes killed) after a hue and cry by the local group of youths. Only the frontier 'bush' (often on a watershed, and therefore high ground and waterless) where few people lived, afforded shelter to 'outlaws' (Last, 2008).

Ifekwe et al., 2019 were able to show in their work that traditional authorities have always been called upon and employed to resolve crises as they arise. Additionally, governments are now realizing that traditional rulers are the most effective and efficient way to win the hearts and minds of the public on critical problems. As Adamu (2007) rightly put it 'It is impossible to deny that without the leavening impact of our traditional rulers, we might not have survived as a nation. They have acted as respected interlocutors on behalf of the people with their elected and appointed government officials, and they continue to do so. They've always been powerful foundations of stability in our society, allowing us to manage our enormous and diverse populations. Apart from

encapsulating the dynamic, evolving linkages to our historic past and future, they also inspire pride in our society's originality and ethics'. It is crucial that academics and the general populace recognize that these institutions were in place before colonialism to effectively manage and govern the continent as a whole. Colonialism and modernity have marginalized these institutions, yet it appears that the current system hasn't been very effective in achieving its goals. Could there be a lesson to be drawn from our historical reality, which we have been attempting to ignore or avoid in order to comply with the global idea of development?

CHAPTER 5. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND STRUCTURES IN NIGERIA

5.0 Introduction

Security is a fundamental need for both individuals and societies, and ensuring it is the primary responsibility of any government. The security architecture of a government is critical to achieving this goal. This chapter focuses on Nigeria's security structures and systems, a country that has faced numerous security challenges. In this chapter, I examine the evolution and structure of the Nigerian security system, as well as the performance and limitations of the country's two major security apparatuses, the formal police and the informal system, which work together to protect citizens in most cities. It also looks into the role of non-state, informal, or customary actors and institutions in Nigeria as a whole. The aim of this analysis is to provide a better understanding of how different security institutions interact and co-exist in the urban space to re-create actors and systems of security governance.

Nigeria's security architecture and structures are critical components in dealing with the country's security challenges. By examining the performance of security apparatuses and the role of non-state actors, this chapter aims to provide insights that can help improve the country's security. Security is critical, and I believe that this chapter will contribute to the Nigerian debate on security and governance.

5.1 Background

As discussed in the previous chapter, policing in Africa can be traced back through three epochs: pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial. In the pre-colonial era, crime prevention was the duty of indigenous institutions responsible for crime control. For example, in Nigeria, the absence of codified laws and social structure provided the necessary basis for the regulation of behaviour which was largely enforced by various institutions responsible for crime prevention in different parts of the country e.g., secret societies, messengers and palace guards (Marenin, 1985; Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi, 2010; Inyang, & Abraham, 2013). In the pre-colonial South-east Nigeria, they were called '*age grade*' and they performed a policing function (Tanumo, 1970), while in pre-colonial Southwestern Nigeria, they were made up of groups of hunters comprising of able-bodied men, who performed the major police function of crime control and prevention. In addition to this, priests (*Baba Alawo*) served as detectives in the southwest. Through the priests, hidden criminals and crimes were uncovered by consulting the Oracle. Thus, they served as the principal agents of law enforcement (Tanumo, 1970; Moshood, Amali, Omolabak & Olabisi, 2017).

During the colonial era, policing was carried out based on the requirements of the British law. This model marked a paradigm shift from the traditional pattern of policing where a lot of emphasis was placed on traditions, customs and unwritten laws. It was observed that during this era, the police mostly served and protected the commercial interest of the colonial masters to the detriment of the masses whom they were commissioned to protect. Rotimi (2001) described this pattern of

policing as that in which 'strangers policed strangers and further stating that the police were pitched against the people they were meant to protect and there were series of clashes between both parties' (Inyang, & Abraham, 2013).

The post-colonial era (1960s independence) witnessed the emergence of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). The Independence Constitution of 1960 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes provision for a single police force. By this provision, no other security agency is allowed to be established in the Nigerian Federation. This inevitably imposes the statutory responsibility of 'detection and prevention of crime, apprehending and prosecution of offenders, protection of lives and property of citizens, preservation and execution of Nigeria's Independence constitutional laws and order' on the NPF (Moshood, Amali, Omolabak & Olabisi, 2017). The post-colonial era of policing which incorporates the present Nigerian Police Force reflects a cultural transfer with reference to style of policing from the colonial law enforcement officers (Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi, 2010; Inyang, & Abraham, 2013).

Figure 19: An Historical Map of Nigeria Showing three federal Regions Created by British Colonial Rule in 1954 (source; Nigerian Nostalgia, 2014).

When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it inherited a national police force (established in 1930 with national jurisdiction) as well as certain local administration police units, albeit with a

noticeable regional decentralization. The colonial forces, which were established with a mandate influenced by the need to quell dissent and uphold colonial control, are where the police forces of Africa's former British colonies got their roots (Robins, 2009). The eventual foundation of a unified Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the dissolution of local police units that existed in various regions of the nation occurred in 1971 as a result of the new administration's efforts to fully centralize the federal government's control over the police (ibid).

The fragmentation of the security sector in most African states is particularly notable for its impact on national security (Isima, 2007). Security forces are typically made up of the public sector (the civil institutions), a private sector (vigilantes, militias, private security companies (PSCs), and private military companies (PMCs) (Isima, 2007; Richmond, 2013). The issue of security, as enshrined in the 1999 constitution (amended), is the state's primary responsibility. It includes the government's roles in providing security and protection to the lives and properties of its citizens. At various levels, its agencies respond to these cardinal objectives (national, state and local government levels). The formal security apparatus is divided into two parts: external security parastatals and internal security parastatals. Ordinarily securing the state from external threats is principally the responsibility of the Nigeria Armed Forces, while the internal security responsibilities are vested mainly with the Nigeria Police and her offshoot services to provide internal security and the maintenance of law and order for the good of the populace. Such other para-military agencies include the Department of Security Service (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Customs, the Immigration, the Federal Road Safety Commission, the Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Border Patrol Commission etc.

5.2 Security Structures in Nigeria

5.2.1 Formal Security Structure

The term 'state' is sometimes used to refer to formal institutions and generally refers to actors whose role is formally organized and constituted by the *de jure* state authority (Thomas and Aghedo, 2014). Formal Security System refers to the institution of the state established to control human conduct. These institutions include the police, the courts and the correctional institutions such as the prisons, remand homes etc (Friday & Eze 2019). Formal institutions are institutions, whose boundaries, authority structures and ways of working are for the most part codified through publicly recognized rules, regulations and standards i.e., constitutions, laws, property rights, charters, organizational blueprints and so on (Hyden, 2006).

In Nigeria, the formal security system is dependent on its laws. The country uses a tripartite system of criminal law and justice: the Criminal Code, based on English common law and legal practice; the Penal Code based on Muslim law and justice; and Customary Law, based on the customs and traditions of the people of the south. In Section 215(3) of the 1999 Constitution, the obligation of law enforcement falls on the Nigerian Police and its affairs being the responsibility of the federal government. These translate that, the federal government has virtually exclusive responsibility for

the police, unlike such federations as Canada and the United States where there are federal, provincial/state and municipal police systems (Akosah- Sarpong, 2002).

As enshrined in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, the issue of security is the principal responsibility of the state which includes the roles of government in the provision of security and protection to lives and properties of its citizens. These cardinal objectives are responded to at various levels by its agencies at (national, state and local government levels). The National security apparatus operates at two levels, the external and internal security considerations. Ordinarily securing the state from external threats is principally the responsibility of the Nigeria Armed Forces, while the internal security responsibilities are vested mainly in the Nigeria Police and her offshoot services (Thomas and Aghedo, 2014). Constitutionally, the armed forces, police and prisons are answerable to the federal government because they are under the exclusive and legislative list.

The Nigeria Police Force is currently centralised and federally managed. According to the 1999 Constitution and the Police Act, the President has total operational control. The Federal Republic of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, Section 214, states:

There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.

Furthermore, section 4 of the Police Act, which has been in effect since 1943, specifies the following duties for the Nigeria Police Force:

The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders; the preservation of law and order; the protection of life and property; the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged; and shall perform such military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required of them.

Additionally, a number of laws in the nation, particularly the Police Act, Criminal Procedure Act (CPA), and Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), give the police broad authority to take action to prevent crime, investigate crime, question suspects, and prosecute suspects. They also have the right to search people and property in order to prevent crime, detect or investigate crime, find and apprehend offenders, and collect evidence for prosecution. They also have the right to grant suspects bail while an investigation is ongoing (Van der Spuy, & Röntsch, 2008).

Nigeria also boasts other para-military agencies. There are agencies like the Department of Security Service (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Customs, the Immigration, the Federal Road Safety Commission, the Security and Civil Défense Corps, the Border Patrol Commission, and at the level of the international community, there is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU). The Nigerian Civil Défense Corp is one of such agencies invested by the government to provide security and defence for the people's survival (Tyomlia, 2018). As noted by Fayemi and Olonisakin (2008), Nigeria's security sector comprises the following (see fig 21):

i.   The armed forces (army, air force and navy).
ii.   The Nigerian police service.
iii.   Paramilitary bodies including customs and exercise, the immigration service, intelligence services including military intelligence and the state security services.
iv.   Judicial and state service bodies judiciary, justice ministry, correctional service (prison).
v.   Private security outfits.
vi.   Militia groups –including, for example, the *Odua* People's Congress, Bakassi Boys, Hisba Corps, *Amotekun*.
vii.   Community vigilante groups- *Yen kato da gora*, *yen Kalari*, state vigilante services etc.

Figure 20: National Security Architecture (Adapted from Thomas and Aghedo, 2014).

In terms of police operations, the Force is divided into 36 State Commands and the FCT Command, each of which is led by a Commissioner of Police. Area Commands, Divisional Commands, Police Stations, and Police Posts are subordinate to the State Commands. The police station and police posts are the main operational units of law enforcement (Alemika, 2010). Over 370,000 police officers were employed in 2021, the majority of whom belonged to the junior officers' cadre. As they are typically involved in day-to-day policing, such as check point duties, station duties, and other policing activities that have direct relations with the public, these officers can be thought of as the force's foot soldiers (Ikuteyijo, 2022). The Inspector-General of Police (IGP) is in charge of safety, maintenance and security of public order. The IGP also has control over the Commissioners of Police of each state including all of the police squadrons in Nigeria. The Inspector-General is answerable to the Minister of Internal Affairs and, ultimately, to the President of Nigeria (Akosah-Sarpong, 2002).

The NPF is structured into five directorates, each of which is controlled by a Deputy Inspector-General: The Criminal Investigation Division, Logistics, Supplies, Training, and Operations. Six administrative divisions are also included in it: the Administration Division, the Inspector General's Office, the Operations Office, the Logistic and Supplies Department, the Investigation and Intelligence Division, and the Training and Command Department. The Investigations and Intelligence Division is distinguished by specialisation, which includes the narcotics and forensic units, the criminal investigation and intelligence units, and the Interpol liaison unit (Van der Spuy, & Röntsch, 2008).

5.2.2 Shortcomings with the formal system in Nigeria

The Nigerian Police Force is plagued with several issues that have hampered their ability to carry out their duties successfully to a large extent. Nepotism, ethnicism, corruption, institutional weaknesses such as insufficient manpower (both in terms of strength and expertise), inadequate education and training, inadequate equipment, and poor conditions of service for the average police officer; poor social relations between subordinate and superior officers; lack of public cooperation; and, most recently, the poor perception of the police force by the public (Ibeanu, 2007, Ozekhome, 2020). Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of the issues with Nigeria's formal policing system, this section discusses the main observed challenges under the seven headings below.

1. Constitutional Issues; the Nigerian Police ACT

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is one of Nigeria's four critical state apparatuses, along with the judiciary, the civil service, and the military. Today, the NPF has grown to be the largest police force in Africa, interacting with the world's largest Black population. Its origins go as far back into Nigeria's colonial past as 1861 (Omeni, 2022). The history of the Nigerian police act dates back to the 19th century, when the colonial authority issued the first colonial police act in 1943. The British treated the land and its people as resources to be controlled and plundered, and because the strategy at the time was to subdue the natives, the police force in the country prior to Nigeria's

independence in 1960 was organized around subjugation, to ensure that the natives could not exercise their right to freedom or agitation for independence (Jay Research, 2020). Unfortunately, the psychology of institutions hasn't changed much in the last few decades. In fact, the country only formally repelled some parts of the old law to implement a new law, the Nigerian Police Act of 2020, in the year 2020. As a result, the law (police act) in Nigeria has always been that developed by the colonial masters since 1943, right before independence. Of course, there have been some cosmetic changes, but if you look at the 1943 act and the changes we've had since then (1969 and 2004), they've all been cosmetic (see Amusan, & Saka, 2018).

On September 16, Nigeria's President Muhamadu Buhari signed the Nigeria Police Act, (2020), which repeals the Police Act of 2004. The new Act's overarching purpose is to develop an effective police service based on the principles of accountability and transparency, human rights protection, and collaboration with other security agencies (Adediran, 2020). The new Police Act seeks to modernise the police with the goal of providing for a police force that is more responsive to the needs of the public and has its operations rooted in the values of fairness, justice, equity, and accountability. While some scholars believe that the act has undergone significant change, for instance, Okechukwu Nwanguma, the Executive Director of the Rule of Law Advocacy and Accountability Centre (RULAAC), asserts that the new Police Act is different from the old act noting that the act's provision for a four-year secured term for the Inspector General of Police aids visioning and planning for the police through the office of IGP, as opposed to the old tradition of the IGP being removed abruptly by the president, causing them to serve in fear of not knowing when their tenure will be terminated (ibid). He added that it is commendable that the new Act mandates training for police officers to enhance their operational and professional competence. Moreover, he added, 'A novel inclusion here (in the act) is the responsibility of the police to collaborate with other agencies to take necessary action and provide the required assistance or support to persons in distress, including victims of traffic accidents, fire disasters, earthquakes, and floods'. The New Police Act (2020) also forbids arrests made in lieu of arrest, requires that police notify suspects of their arrests and their families, and permits suspects to make statements in front of witnesses if they so desire (Adediran, 2020).

However, some experts disagree, including Emmanuel Ikule, the National Coordinator of the Network for Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), who claims that nothing 'remarkably' changed in the old Police Act, which had 11 parts and 69 sections, while the new Nigerian Police Act (2020) has 17 parts and 145 sections, with 76 new sections. For example, he noted that despite the new act, reports of police brutality in Nigeria have not decreased, with gory cases being revealed with the recent #EndSARS[15] protests (a national protest calling for the end of a controversial police unit, as well as an end to the brutality and extrajudicial killings of Nigerians by the police who are

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[15] SARS: Special Anti-Robbery Squad - The notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Nigeria has enjoyed impunity for the continued use of torture and other ill-treatment to execute, punish and extract information from suspects.

supposed to protect them). According to Mr. Ikule, the powers granted to the police under both the old and new Acts continue to be very broad and arbitrary. He further stated that 'As long as the power remains subjective to each police officer, more laws will never solve the problem. If we must see an era where the police do not torture suspects in detention, are not trigger happy, or power-drunk, we must attack their minds and that begins with the training these officers undergo and I dare say, giving new police officers exemplary superior officers and rooting out the bad eggs which give the force the bad name'.

Despite all the takes, the Review of the Police Act of 1943, which dates back to the colonial era, clearly offers some opportunity for rethinking the role and organisation of the police, nonetheless. The NPF's reform has been an intended goal of Nigeria's various governments, both civilian and military which were largely unsuccessful. The first attempt to reform the Nigerian Police Force was significantly in 1999, when civilian authority was established (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The new administration announced its plans to restructure the NPF, hire more people through a huge recruitment drive, promote officers, train employees, and raise pay scales.

In 2002, another wave of attempts to expand the force and improve working conditions began. Reform initiatives coincided with a significantly more 'belligerent policing strategy' that resulted from an eight-point anti-crime campaign in 2002, led by a new Inspector General named Tafa Balogun (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The establishment of community partnerships in policing and the highly publicised Operation Fire-for-Fire, which was described as a 'massive onslaught against crimes of violence,' were on the agenda. According to the Inspector General of Police, the latter reflected a 'new approach globally.' At the time the IG anticipated that this 'concept of community policing will ultimately permeate every aspect of our policing function, so as to achieve public confidence and satisfaction in the quality of service we deliver. 'However, the contentious 'Operation Fire-for-Fire,' which Balogun personally supported, seems to have only served to affirm the NPF's disregard for civil rights and use of lethal force (Balogun, 2004).

All in all, just as Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008) put it, it is critical that the public police reform project be framed within a larger institutional context that recognises that maintaining order, providing basic safety, and even the prospects for social crime prevention will necessarily rely on the careful pooling of contributions from a wide range of sectors (government, business, and communities).

2. *Issues with Sections of the law*
This will only focus on Section 214(1) and 215 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 214(1) and 215 (2) provide as follows:

- *214(1)*
  'There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force and subject to the provisions of this section no other Police Force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof'.

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria only allows for a single police force which means that no other security agency is recognized or permissible under the law. This inevitably enforces the legal responsibility of apprehending and prosecution of offenders, detection and prevention of crime, enforcement and maintenance of laws and order, protection of lives and property of citizens on the NPF. After over five decades since Nigeria got political independence, the country's security architecture remains structurally centralized with damning consequences for the management of crime and insecurity at the grassroots (Inyang, & Abraham, 2013). However, there has been a persistent push in recent years for the establishment of state police to assist the federal government in addressing or mitigating Nigeria's serious security challenges. Nigeria is managed by a federal system, and in the spirit of true federalism, it should have accepted the concept of state policing long ago (Ozekhome, 2020). Despite persistent agitations for community, LGA and state policing so that local people familiar with the language, geography, and socio-political terrains will be part of security provision, the federal government continues to hold on to the police and armed forces tenaciously (Thomas and Aghedo, 2014).

Many have criticized this setting and blamed it for an increase in crime. For example, in analysing Nigeria's security architecture Thomas and Aghedo (2014) blame what they referred to as the centralization of security apparatus within the country for the rise in violent insecurity. Egbosiuba (2019) also agreed to this stating that 'What is clear to most Nigerians is that the centralized police force the country established and has had since Nigeria independence in 1960 is largely a failure'. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI)[16], Nigeria has consistently ranked low in terms of peace and security (Abdullahi, 2020). In 2021, Nigeria received a Global Peace Index (GPI) score of 2.71, a slight decrease from the previous two years. The score placed the country 146th out of 163 countries in the global ranking and 39th among Sub-Saharan African countries that year (see fig 22). This shows that, despite the existence of a centralised security apparatus, Nigeria faces significant challenges in maintaining internal peace and security. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the GPI does not explicitly measure the degree of centralization of a country's security apparatus. Nonetheless, by examining Nigeria's overall rankings as well as specific indicators related to violence and crime, the GPI provides a broader understanding of the country's security situation. This allows for a better understanding of how the centralization of security apparatus interacts with other factors to influence the prevalence of violent insecurity (Statista, 2023).

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[16] The Global Peace Index (GPI) provides a comprehensive assessment of peace and security levels across nations to assess the issue and evaluate the reliability of the data. A link between the centralization of security apparatus and the prevalence of violent insecurity can be explored using the GPI by examining Nigeria's performance in the GPI over time.

Figure 21: Nigeria's Global Peace Index (GPI) trend from 2019 to 2021 (source; Statista, 2023).

Regardless, given Nigeria's diverse multi-ethnic makeup, the government has opted for a centralised police force operating under federal government authority. In contrast to systems that include multiple levels of policing, such as federal, provincial/state, and municipal structures, this arrangement gives the federal government nearly exclusive responsibility for law enforcement. They are concerned that allowing local communities to establish police forces will lead to them being used against each other during ethnic rivalry or politicians using them against opposition parties during elections and such concern is genuine and legitimate. Historically, the Native Authority Police Forces (NAPF) were a critical part of everyday policing in the province and other parts of the northern region during the colonial period. There were more Native Authority Police Forces (NAPF) than there were Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and by the 1950s, recruitment from the province had increased exponentially. Most NAPF recruits were largely posted within their divisions and Native Authorities (NA's). The officers were tasked with policing their own communities, which created tension between the community and the NA, especially when the orders and directives were seen as contradicting community values and norms. Nevertheless, despite such tensions, there have been documented cases of effective collaboration between the two. Researchers such as Lar (2016) have shown that this relationship existed even during the colonial period, as he documented that one of the most important areas of cooperation between the NPF and the NAPF was the role the NAPF played in gathering local intelligence and keeping the NPF and the provincial government informed. A.T.G Trumble, a Senior Assistant Superintendent in the colonial government, praised the 'very close cooperation between the Nigeria Police and the

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Native Administration Police,' which he claimed resulted in the successful investigation of a number of burglaries and tin stealing crimes, in the Plateau Province's 1939 Annual Report.

However, in today's multi-ethnic cities, such ethnic issues are becoming irrelevant. Urbanization, particularly within cities, is eroding the legitimacy of such concerns. Most urban areas in Nigeria, for example, are religiously and ethnically diverse, with residents primarily belonging to the three major ethnic groups in the country: Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo ethnic groups (Akinyemi, & Isiugo-Abanihe, 2014). Cities today are more ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse than they were during colonial times, and members of security organizations are still consciously collaborating with others within and outside the organization's make-up to make it more inclusive. It is therefore critical to consider other options, particularly given the fact that the federal government's manpower is insufficient to protect the lives and property of its people. The Nigerian Police Force is the country's primary law enforcement organization, with a staff of around 371,800 in a country with a population of over 180 million people (Ozekhome, 2020).

- *215 (2)*
'The Nigeria Police Force shall be under the command of the Inspector-General of Police and any contingents of the Nigeria Police Force stationed in a State shall subject to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of the Commissioner of Police of that State. Also, every state governor is the Chief Security Officer of his state and whose primary responsibility is contained in Section 14 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.'

Despite the existence of police commands in the 36 states of the federation as well as the Federal capital territory (FCT) Abuja, the central decision-making authority over the police rests with the Inspector General of police who is answerable directly to the President (Fayemi and Olonisakin, 2008). Nigeria is made up of 36 states and 774 local governments, with each local government subdivided into towns, towns subdivided into villages, villages subdivided into communities, and communities subdivided into clans (Ozekhome, 2020). The federal Constitution prohibits the establishment of local government police or any other police force, rather, the Commissioner of Police for each state is in charge of the provincial, county, and divisional units. Police operations are reported by police units in divisions and counties to province headquarters, which are then forwarded to state headquarters. These reports are then forwarded to the police headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital (Akosah- Sarpong, 2002).

Given the above, the federal government cannot reasonably be expected to provide enough security for the country with the current number of security agencies (Ozekhome, 2020). As a result, the importance of other bodies such as state policing cannot be overstated. However, thanks to a new police act enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Nigeria Police Act, 2020, which repeals the Police Act Cap. P19, Laws of the Federation, 2004 and enacts the Nigeria Police Act, 2020 to provide for a more effective and well-organized Police Force guided by the principles of transparency and accountability in its operations and resource management (Ozekhome, 2020). One of the main aims of the act is to promote community policing operations,

which is why the country's strategy to implement community policing is still underway. The goal of this law is to create a more efficient and effective police force based on the principles of accountability and transparency. Its main goals are to preserve human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to collaborate with other security agencies.

3. *Unequal Service to all*

It is alleged by several scholars such as Clapham, (1999) that in most African cities public/formal policing not only fails to serve all equally, but neither is it free. In terms of offering protection to citizens, the state police are widely criticized as being inefficient in curbing crime and widely perceived as indifferent, inept, inefficient and corrupt (Chukwuma 2000; Adu-Mireku 2002; Shaw 2002; Baker, 2004b). Clapham (1999) even abandoned the distinction between public (or state-managed) security systems and private ones (commercial) after failing to find true public policing in Africa. Clapham believes it is naive to imagine that African states actually represent the populations of the territories ascribed to them (Baker, 2004b). He contends that most African states have never developed 'public' security systems in the first place, i.e. security systems that protect all citizens without discrimination and is accountable to them. Essentially the state security system, in his view, has been developed to support the ruling elite in their hold on power and wealth (Baker, 2004b). He argues that the public security system has little distinctions from the privatized security systems controlled by groups and individuals. What divides them in his view is the degree to which these essentially private security systems are efficient and accountable (Clapham 1999; Baker, 2004b).

In line with Claphan's argument, many sub-Saharan states studies have shown that, security has long been defined and provided by the state on an exclusionary basis and as a private good for the protection of the ruling elite and other special groups, thereby forcing civilians to provide their own security, particularly in areas of territory not covered by state security provision (Bourne 2002; Isima, 2007). Omeni (2022) supports this assertion in his work by arguing that the present NPF is a broken institution that does not place the 'average Nigerian's interest and well-being at the core of its culture.' In Nigeria, there have been the debates that the NPF better or in some cases totally serves the interests of their financiers just like the police during the colonial era and nothing better can be expected from them since it is obvious that 'he who pays the piper dictates the tune' (Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi, 2010; Inyang, & Abraham, 2013). Consequently, the Nigerian Police Force has been referred to and touted as merely a reactionary and not a proactive law enforcement agency with its maintenance of internal security and crime control and prevention having been dramatically and intermittently evaded (Alemika, 2009). This fundamental shortcoming has been manifested and reflected in the growing incidence of insecurity and criminality in virtually all parts of Nigerian cities (See fig 23). Although there have been arguments that this problem is not unique to Africa and was present in many other areas around the world for long periods of time, the fact that the current system is centralized and was formed with the sole aim of accountability and providing equal service to all makes this an exceptional case. Furthermore, the Nigerian Police Force has admitted time and time again that a number of issues, including a lack of resources,

inadequate or insufficient support from the central government, and substandard working conditions, leave their workforce undermotivated, undertrained, and underequipped, make it difficult for them to maintain security and prevent and control (reduce) crime. (Anucha, 2012; Moshood, Amali, Omolabak & Olabisi, 2017).

Figure 22: Nigeria's diverse security threats (source; African centre for strategic studies).

Nigeria is currently one of the few countries in the world with only one police force, prompting people to propose that states should be permitted to have their own police, and even local governments should be allowed to have their own community policing, particularly in light of increased insecurity. Many experts have urged the National Assembly to change the Nigerian Constitution to give states authority of the police, thereby breaking the strata of security agencies as it is clear that the Federal government alone cannot handle the nation's security (Sahara Reporters, 2020). The current police force is purely a federal institution; under the 1999 constitution, no local or state-wide police were allowed until recently, when states began to advocate for their own security (Amotekun, and Vigilante), and the Nigerian police act was amended to accommodate the idea of community policing, which has yet to be officially implemented (Nwangoro, 2021).

Many critics of the development of decentralized police forces have expressed concern that officers and men from local units can be used to threaten and intimidate political opponents. Critics of the proposal point to the use of the NA police by politicians in the old Northern and Western regions during the First Republic as an example. Another noteworthy example is found in Dan Asabe's (1991) work, in which the gang known as the Yen daba, who were historically hunters, were drawn into politics to provide security for the then-dominant Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) party. In contrast to the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), which was made up of elites and harassed NEPU members using formal security (Native police) at the time, the NEPU was a poor majority party at the time. In response, the NEPU employed local hunters known as the 'Yen daba' to act as their bodyguards (they were also acknowledged as a component of the security system during the pre-colonial period), but regrettably this led to them evolving into political thugs over time, as they do even today. This is similar to how the Bakassi boys became political thugs after government and politicians became involved in their activities. The strategy used at the time is still being used today; these groups are used as political thugs and touts by politicians, and their members have become a nuisance wherever they are found, as is currently the case with the ESN in southeast Nigeria.

4. *Lack of Public Trust and Police Brutality*

The police in Nigeria are known for being overbearing. For many citizens, arbitrary detentions and a lack of due process perpetuate a sense of vulnerability. In September 2007, then-Inspector General of Police Mike Okiro made the infamous observation that while robbers had killed 62 officers during his first 100 days on the job, the police had killed 785 robbers in the line of duty. Widespread criticism followed the remarks, both for the excessive violence surrounding a robbery and because the absence of official reports to support the claim suggested there had been extrajudicial killings (Okenyodo, 2016). A study by DCAF (2022) in the neighbouring country of Niger revealed that some security force members believed upholding human rights was occasionally in conflict with their responsibilities. This was reflected in their service delivery, and they were eventually perceived as violent toward the populace, reducing public trust in the country's security institutions (DCAF, 2022). Similarly, Okenyodo (2016) observed that low public trust in Nigerian police hinders the kind of public cooperation required to combat threats to internal security posed by irregular forces such as insurgents, criminal gangs, and extremists. According to the study, crime is most prevalent and persistent in marginalised areas with high levels of governmental mistrust, which is often cultivated over time (Okenyodo, 2016). According to a Transparency International survey, 72% of Nigerians believe that police are corrupt. When police interact with citizens on a daily basis, they frequently demand bribes. In fact, 33 percent of the 11,500 individuals whose opinions the CLEEN Foundation gathered for its National Crime and Safety Survey had paid or been asked to pay a bribe to the police. 'The Nigeria Police Force has fallen to its lowest level and has in fact become a subject of ridicule within the law enforcement community and among members of the enlarged public,' then-Inspector General of Police Mohammed Abubakar acknowledged the severity of the challenge in 2012. He further noted that:

Police duties have become commercialized.… Our men are deployed to rich individuals and corporate entities such that we lack manpower to provide security for the common man. Our investigations departments cannot equitably handle matters unless those involved have money to part with. Complainants suddenly become suspects at different investigation levels following spurious petitions filed with the connivance of police officers. Our police stations, State [Criminal Investigations Divisions] and operations offices have become business centres and collection points for rendering returns from all kinds of squads and teams set up for the benefit of superior officers. Our special anti-robbery squads (SARS) have become killer teams engaging in deals for land speculators and debt collectors. Toll stations in the name of checkpoints adorn our highways with policemen shamefully collecting money from motorists in the full glare of the public…

By any international standard, the problems confronting Nigerian police in their pursuit of the most basic standards of accountability and effectiveness/responsiveness are tremendous. One significant problem here is the nature and extent of political influence and control over the police as an organization (Van der Spuy, & Röntsch, 2008). In a global study of 127 countries, the World Internal Security and Police Index placed Nigeria's police as the worst in the world in 2016, with an overwhelming 81 percent of respondents admitting to paying a bribe to a cop in the previous year. Many of these bribes were paid at improvised roadblocks set up by cops to demand money from cars and passengers (Chow, 2020). In 2020, there was a national call in Nigeria to reform the policing system, owing to issues of brutality, corruption, and lack of trust in the state enforcement system, however the Black Lives Matter movement was the major inspiration for the movement. The global pandemic, as well as the Black Lives Matter movement that sparked the #EndSARS in Nigeria (a national protest in major cities of Nigeria, calling for an end to police brutality and extrajudicial killings of Nigerians by the police), had resonated around the world in 2020. People in Nigeria demanded an end to police brutality for the same reasons that Black people in the United States and people all over the world demanded police reform. The institution is thought to exist as a violent resource that the state can use to impose order in an uneven and unfair society (Hill, 2020). October 2020, #EndSARS began trending shortly after Nigeria's 60th anniversary of independence, with hundreds of individuals sharing accounts of abuse and assault. Protests erupted in numerous major towns across the country, fuelled by demands to reform the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a dreaded unit of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). The #EndSARS protests, which were largely held by youths and trended on social media, began on October 5, 2020, in response to the police shooting of a young man in Ughelli, Delta State (Ogbonnaya, 2020).

One of the biggest security risks Nigeria faces is armed robbery. It has grown more prevalent and violent across the nation over time (see table 2). Due to the ongoing difficulties the Nigerian Police Force faces, the State Anti-Robbery Section, which is a part of the State Criminal Investigation Departments within the 36 state commands and FCT, has been ineffective for a long time (NPF). These include, for example, a lack of funding, inadequate equipment, poorly supervised operations, and lax accountability. The NPF chose not to address these problems and instead created the Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad (FSARS), whose operations are overseen by the Commissioner of Police in Abuja and directly answer to the Inspector General of Police. The 36

states and the FCT all adopted FSARS. They do not report to the States' Commissioners of Police (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020). SARS was formed in September 1992 as a special unit of the NPF under the Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department (FCIID) to investigate, detain, and prosecute people suspected of involvement in high-profile crimes such as armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and illegal firearms possession. Cybercrime was added to the agency's operational jurisdiction in 2018. The FSARS team was said to have been successful when it was first established in the 1990s, busting armed robbery operations all over the nation. However, over time, they were overcome by the enduring difficulties faced by Nigeria's police institutions. FSARS is accused of violating human rights, including torture, extrajudicial executions, and the disappearance of suspects under their custody. Youth are particularly targeted, primarily due to their gullibility and ignorance of their constitutional rights. Meanwhile, police officers frequently have preconceived notions about young people, labelling them as criminals, internet fraudsters, or armed robbers because they have dreadlocks, ripped jeans, tattoos, flashy cars, or ostensibly expensive technology like smart phones (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020).

Table 2: Level of Crime from 2006 to 2010 in Nigeria

Year	Theft	Armed Robbery	Kidnapping	Assassination	Fraud
2006	37289	3142	349	2550	5532
2007	6111	2074	298	2074	5580
2008	1901	2863	372	2000	6395
2009	21082	3327	277	2007	9860
2010	33927	4340	709	3956	9058

Source: Bakwai, Aliyu, Muhammad, Ayeni, Emetarom, Abdulkareem, & Undie, (2013).

Over time SARS became known for its suspected links to extrajudicial killings, extortion, torture, and acts of intimidation, as is typical of the NPF, which is dubbed 'No Permanent Friend' by some. SARS was defined as a 'police unit with license to kill' by an online news organization in 2016 (Ogbonnaya, 2020). Nigerians marched for weeks, from Abuja to Lagos, demanding an end to the killings, unlawful arrests, torture, sexual violence, and other suffering perpetrated by notorious police unit (Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) (Hill, 2020). The demonstrators' initial demands were straightforward and simple: the federal government should abolish SARS, bring justice to victims of police violence, and reform the police. However, the demands were broadened to include ending insecurity and corruption, reviving educational and health institutions, lowering the cost of governance, and creating jobs and income-generating opportunities for youth (Ogbonnaya, 2020). The Nigeria Police Force's inspector general caved to the criticism in December, revealing plans to reorganize the unit by converting it into SWAT, prosecute incidents of human rights violations, and push a better training programme for recruits. Many others, on the other hand, believe SWAT is no different from SARS, and that it is simply the continuation of a long history of deception and inaction. Gimba Kakanda, a journalist and political observer, commented on this saying: 'It's just like an old wine in a new bottle'.

Figure 23: Map showing the reach of Nigeria's #EndSARS Movement (source; African centre for strategic studies)

The Nigerian government has repeatedly promised to change the methods used by a police force that critics claim is rife with corruption and brutality over the past three decades, but each time, the issues have persisted or gotten worse (Chow, 2020). The government had the opportunity to improve policing during Nigeria's democratic transition in 1999, the country's decades-long military dictatorship, and the country's independence in 1960. However, rather than reforming the police to focus on protecting Nigerian citizens, studies such as Omeni (2022) have shown that successive governments prefer political control, among other reasons, which have allowed the colonial era's policing culture of us-versus-them to persist (Curtice, 2022).

5. *History, Reform and Institutional Issues*

According to Omeni (2022), the story of police shortcomings in Nigeria is much more complicated when considering that the institution in question is over 150 years old and has never placed the interests and welfare of the average Nigerian at the centre of its culture. Omeni contends that Nigerian policing is still influenced by British colonial rule. These colonial roots had a significant

impact on academic and policy discourse regarding the ongoing problem of policing and the police institution in Nigeria[17].

By the 1940s, the NPF had shown little desire to abandon that commitment, owing to the fact that the colonial police were always on the side of the state, and serving the people and serving the colonial state were frequently incompatible (Omeni, 2022). By the time Nigeria's democracy was restored in 1999, the military interregnum had exposed the worst aspects of policing and the police institution's shortcomings. Because it was tainted by its colonial roots, exploited by First Republic politics, and granted a democratic veil without the necessary institutional reform, the NPF was marginalised by succeeding military regimes. This was a hollow force: it lacked substance and was unprepared to serve the interests of hundreds of millions of Nigerians with a force size of less than 100,000 operational personnel (Omeni, 2022).

However, Omeni (2022) also makes a compelling case that Nigeria's leaders have repeatedly broken promises and failed to reform the police to meet the needs of Nigerian citizens, despite its colonial legacy and blaming them for its failure. Omeni demonstrates that while colonial-era policing practices, trainings, and pathologies still exist today, the culture of police abuse—most notoriously made public by the flagrant abuses committed by the SARS unit—persists due to more systemic problems like institutional neglect, political unrest, and authoritarian dynamics. In other words, politicians and police in Nigeria served their own agendas rather than defending common Nigerians from the institution's pathologies (Curtice, 2022). Omeni continues by saying that it is difficult to simply disregard decades of organisational culture and historical experience. Both influence the likelihood and speed of substantive reform, and large organisations in particular are frequently slow to change their old ways of doing things. Police forces are no different in this regard. For these reasons, the NPF has kept the colonial and military-era traditions that underpinned an uneasy relationship with the populace, despite much rhetoric about modernization and reform. The darkest forms of coercion, such as torture, extortion, extrajudicial killings, and impunity, are at the core of this tradition (Omeni, 2022).

Furthermore, as Adebanwi and Obadare (2010; 2011) argue that the flaws of the police institution can be interpreted as a microcosm of the failure of the composition and function of the Nigerian state in general. The NPF's interests, like those of the Nigerian state, were not initially aligned with those of the citizenry. This misalignment of police and public interests can be traced all the way back to Nigeria's history (Omeni, 2022). Consequently, what this all translates to is that the modern NPF is a broken institution.

6. *Lack of Funding, Training and Estrangement*

Recently (2020), Nigerian police officers considered going on strike to protest inadequate funding, low pay, and poor working conditions (Ikuteyijo, 2022). The welfare of the officers was one of the

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[17] Crowder, M. (1968). West Africa under colonial rule. Michael Crowder's West Africa Under Colonial Rule delves deeper into the motivations behind the creation of West African police forces, highlighting their similarities and differences as well as the goal they were created to protect colonial interests.

main reasons for the officers' strike action. To put this in context, the national police budget for operational and capital expenses increased steadily between 2011 and 2016, rising from NGN 11.9 billion (USD $72.9 million) to NGN 25.4 billion (USD $127.6 million). However, despite this increase in funding, effectiveness has not increased in tandem (Okenyodo, 2016). It may appear to be a large sum, but the Nigerian Police's budget for 2020, which was the highest in the past five years at N403 billion (US$980 million), even though it was a third of the total security budget five years ago, has not had a significant impact on the welfare of the officers (Ikuteyijo, 2020). Welfare concerns for them go beyond wages. Clothing, health care, affordable, decent housing, and promotion are also part of the package. The state of the police barracks, which have been shown to be in disrepair, is also considered to be part of the officers' welfare (Ikuteyijo, 2022). In addition, the starting pay for a Police Recruit in Nigeria is approximately N9019 per month. That's about £11.95 in today's money, at an exchange rate of 1GBP-755 Naira. The monthly wage for a Police Sergeant on Grade 05 is N46,000 (£91.86) (NPF, 2022). Hill (2020) provided an example of how much this is in actual terms by stating that a book purchased on his last visit to Lagos in 2016 cost N4500 (£8.98), and that prices had skyrocketed since the pandemic began. To make matters worse, around 10% of them have been reported to be detailed to protect VIPs and some others involved in non-police duties such as carrying the handbags of the wives of very important individuals, despite the fact that Nigeria is grossly under-policed (Sahara Reporters, 2020).

Figure 24: Afrobarometer data on 'who is corrupt' in Nigeria 2022 (source; Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023).

Another reason for the poor performance of the Nigeria Police is corruption (Okafor, 2007; Adejoh, 2013). Abrahamsen & William, (2005) added to the issue of pervasive corruption that has led to the poor performance of the Nigerian police in controlling and preventing crime (see fig 25).

They contend that the problem is compounded by the fact that the police are estranged and structurally distant from the people on the ground that they are supposed to police. Consequently, police personnel are more likely to be viewed as 'outsiders' within the community being policed. Large population in most urban areas, sometimes makes it difficult for the police to secure some parts of cities (Nsokoma, 2018; Nzelibe and Bello, 2018).

In addition, in the last five years, Nigeria's Inspector General of Police has consistently complained and reported that the federal government needed to recruit additional personnel (police officers) annually over a five-year period to ensure effective policing across the country and to enable the country to meet the UN policing ratio of 1:450 people (Premium Times, 2021). The shortage of personnel is further compounded by the fact that the police are sometimes estranged and structurally distant from the people they are supposed to police. As a result, police officers are more likely to be viewed as 'outsiders' within the community they serve. What the country requires is not a new structure, but rather a reform of the current one (s). One of the major problems with policing in Nigerian cities has always been that the formal system and its officers are estranged from the areas they police. As a consequence, several groups such as community-based vigilante organizations have emerged in most neighbourhoods in urban areas to address and assist the state with this problem. These groups are comprised of local community members who turn into security patrollers during night hours, and mostly rely on ad hoc donations from the community for their operations to help curb crime. While there is a 2016 law that recognizes such groups there is minimal regulation or support of their activities in practice (FCLP, 2019).

This has further led to persistent calls for community and state policing so that locals familiar with the language, geography, and socio-political terrains can be part of security provision. Many people have criticised this environment and blamed it for an increase in crime. According to Egbosiuba (2019), 'what is clear to most Nigerians is that the centralised police force the country established and has had since Nigeria's independence in 1960 is largely a failure.' This is yet another reason incorporating a community-based security system into the country's security architecture is critical. During the research, the community-based operators frequently mentioned how fast and effective they are in apprehending criminals and also assisting the police in this regard because they know the ins and outs of their communities and can easily detect where or who criminals are (FCLP, 2019).

5.2.3   Resolution of some of the issues

The Nigerian Police Force has been overburdened by deteriorating domestic security and undermined by internal issues such as indiscipline, poor training, a lack of experience in specialized professions, low pay, and frequent strikes. Corruption and dishonesty are rampant, jeopardizing the public's already shaky trust and contributing to a widespread failure to report crimes (Akosah- Sarpong, 2002). In recent years, an enormous amount of time and effort has been put into attempts to reform Africa and more specifically Nigeria's policing and security structure. The clamour for state policing has been resonating in Nigeria for years, as it has become clear that

the Nigeria Police Force, as it currently stands, seems unable to meet the rising demands of law enforcement in the criminal justice system (Ozekhome, 2020).

Most states are beginning to call for a new system where states are allowed to have their own security outfits. In August 2020, FGN approved N13 billion for take-off of community policing initiative across the country as part of measures adopted to consolidate efforts aimed at containing the security situation in the country (Akande 2020). Even though many have argued that such moves will decline the role played by formal security apparatuses and make them less visible, it is important to note that this system may offer benefits of increased resources and local knowledge. Moreover, this does not mean formal establishments will cease to exist or be less important players. Rather they will remain a crucial part of the 'security governance system' that continues to coordinate, regulate, monitor and shape security (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016).

As a response to the prevailing insecurity and the apparent inability of the police to rise to the occasion, many Nigerians, including state governments, are beginning to seek respite in informal security outfits (see Abrahams, 1998; Shaw, 2000; Gleitman, Fridlund and Reisberg, 2004; Baker, 2008; Kantor & Persson, 2010; Haruna 2019; Heidger, 2019). In other words, these structures, are emerging to fill unmet needs (Adejoh, 2013). Samuel (2012) stated this clearer when he argued that the emergence and proliferation of community-based security groups at neighbourhood level in Nigeria is thus a derivative of the general state of insecurity coupled to the poor performance and service delivery of the formal police. The underlying assumption being that the rate of increase of crime in Nigeria became more and more unbearable (see fig 26) forcing communities to take steps to defend and protect themselves from the depredations of criminals (Ferreira, 1996; Alemika, 1999). Several studies and reports such as Transparency International report (2009), Heidger, (2019), Haruna, (2019), and Musa, Adama, Sadiq and Gusau (2020) have shown that some state governments in Nigeria especially Governors in the Northern part of Nigeria are employing a different approach to combating insecurity within the region. They are engaging and endorsing informal security outfits in the fight against insecurity, as one of the approaches for mitigating criminality and ensuring a crime-free society.

Figure 25: Insecurity in Nigeria 2019-2020 (source; Adebajo, 2020)[18]

In July, 2020, Governors of states in northern Nigeria resolved to involve local hunters and vigilante groups in the fight against banditry and other forms of insecurity in the region. This followed growing concerns over the recent killings in most states in the region. The plan is to infuse such groups i.e., local vigilantes, hunters, and community watch groups in the security architecture of the region to foster intelligence gathering, rapid response and sustained surveillance (Musa, Adama, Sadiq and Gusau, 2020). Similarly, in October 2019, the government of Borno State sought to find a new way to end the region's long-running conflict and insurgency (the Boko haram insurgency). Part of the initiative taken by the State government was to recruit local hunters to join the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency that entered its eleventh year in July, 2019. The hunters are believed to have the most intimate knowledge of Boko Haram's territory, which is the Sambisa Forest and the greater Lake Chad region, and thus have the potential to address a blind spot of a tired and overstretched military (Heidger, 2019). The government also claimed that 10,000 men with voodoo powers and hunting skills would be recruited for the campaign. Among them are the Yan-Tauri (die-hards), who are said to have spiritual protection against gunshots and other forms of firepower (Haruna, 2019). Several reports have also revealed that hunters carry charms that some believe will protect them from the dangers of battle. The fact that there are charms or other aspects of magic that protect hunters from harm adds to their mystique (Heidger, 2019).

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[18] Fig 26 reveals a significant increase in violent crime, particularly beginning in April of this year. Abductions, forced disappearances, airstrikes, armed clashes, arrests, attacks, explosions, looting and property destruction, mob violence, sexual violence, suicide bombings, violent demonstrations, and other activities are all contained in the ACLED database.

The state police have a number of challenges, the most significant of which being their susceptibility to abuse by politicians and others, which is particularly distinctive to Nigerian nature. But we can put some checks and balances in place, such as the governor appointing police chiefs but not being able to sack them, leaving that to a specific percentage of the legislature (Adeoye, 2020). State governments are already primarily responsible for the police's operating costs; logistics, cars, and fuel are all state government responsibilities. The federal government merely covers the salaries of the police officers, while the operating costs are covered by the state (Sahara Reporters, 2020). Experts have also stated that, in addition to the need for a state police force, local government police should be considered. It is apparent that the federal government cannot handle the country's security on its own, since it has obviously failed over the years. In some countries, the policing system is designed so that if an insecurity issue is larger than the local government police, the state police are called in, and if it is larger than the federal police, the military is called in. In such countries, the military is always the last resort, but in Nigeria, the military is almost always the first choice because we have failed miserably (Nwangoro, 2021).

5.3   Informal Security Sector in Nigeria

The shortcomings of state-led policing in Africa have catalysed the emergence of informal policing initiatives across the continent. Formal police forces are often hampered by systemic issues like underfunding, insufficient training, and pervasive corruption, leading to diminished public trust and confidence in their ability to provide safety and security. Consequently, communities are increasingly turning to alternative security providers. Empirical research underscores the relative success of informal security structures in addressing security challenges where formal law enforcement agencies have been ineffective. These informal groups are often seen as providing more responsive, efficient, and community-oriented security services, thereby earning the trust and support of local populations. In contrast, formal police are frequently perceived as corrupt, inefficient, and disconnected from the specific needs of the communities they are meant to serve.

The rise of non-state, informal entities signal a need to rethink the provision of policing and security. There's a growing understanding that state security forces, including the police, must integrate more deeply into the communities they serve. This integration involves fostering accountability, understanding local cultures, and addressing unique security concerns effectively. Historically, efforts to reform police and security forces worldwide have aimed to make them more responsive and respectful of local community dynamics[19]. Such reforms seek to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of security institutions by fostering a deeper connection and understanding between security personnel and the communities they protect. Recognizing this global perspective not only deepens our understanding of the challenges faced by Nigerian security forces but also places these efforts within a broader, historical context of striving towards more community-centered policing paradigms. The emergence of non-state informal entities, rather than

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[19] See Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2006); Adediran, I. (2020); Jackson, P. (2011).

undermining state authority, has spurred a reevaluation of the role of formal state institutions and the potential for collaborative partnerships to enhance trust and security provision.

Informal institutions are primarily built on traditional governance systems, social understandings, networks, and socially sanctioned norms like conventions, customs, and traditions. These institutions, functioning on expectations of reciprocity, are widely recognized as legitimate though not officially codified (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Local-level and traditional security providers are often viewed by communities as more effective, efficient, and legitimate compared to state counterparts. State-enforced procedures are frequently seen as inaccessible or hard to comprehend, supporting Rod Nixon's (2006) view that traditional structures should form the cultural foundation for future state-building efforts (Nixon 2006; Boege, Brown, Clements, and Nolan, 2008). Traditional security providers' methods align more closely with the norms and historical legacies of the communities relying on their services (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016).

In Nigeria, informal security actors like vigilantes play diverse roles. For instance, a 2021 study by the Centre for Civilians in Conflict in Northeast Nigeria's Monguno Local Government Area examined the impact of evolving armed opposition group tactics. The study found significant improvements in the security situation, attributed to enhanced engagement and protection efforts by Nigerian security forces and collaboration with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), an armed civilian coalition supporting the military (CCIC, 2022).

Despite their critical roles in community safety and security, research often focuses on the negative impacts of informal security providers, such as human rights violations, rather than their positive contributions (Ogbozor, 2016). Vigilante groups like the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria's South-eastern States in the 1990s have been effective in local security provision, enjoying greater legitimacy due to community roots and efficiency in utilizing local knowledge (CLEEN, 2002; Harnischfeger, 2003; Meagher, 2012; Adejoh, 2013).

The Vigilante Group of Nigeria is a prominent informal security actor in Nigeria, known for providing essential policing services, especially in rural areas. Their tasks range from security provision and early warning systems to traffic control, intelligence gathering, conflict resolution, and community development initiatives (Ogbozor, 2016). These vigilante and self-defence groups have deep historical roots in Nigeria, dating back to the pre-colonial era when local communities, particularly in the south-east, maintained standing armies for protection against neighboring attacks. Parallels exist between these historical community-founded groups and contemporary self-defence organizations like the Bakassi Boys. These groups have continued to operate despite the colonial state's claimed monopoly on the use of force, revealing a connection between historical warrior cults and modern vigilante organizations in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

5.3.1 Vigilante

In Nigeria, a Vigilante is a self-organized security force with full legal and legislative backing that works with police to gather intelligence and reduce crime (Elekwa, 2019). Through improved home security, increased vigilance, and accurate reporting of suspicious incidents of crime to the police, Vigilante assists people in protecting their lives and property while also reducing their fear of crime (Okeke, 2013; Obidiegwu, & Elekwa, 2019). Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) identified four different types of vigilantism in Nigeria. Ethnic vigilantism, religious vigilantism, neighbourhood or communal 'vigilantism,' and state-sponsored vigilantism are the four types of vigilantism.

Religious vigilantism is a variant of vigilantism that exists to enforce religious laws and doctrines. As Shaw (2002) reveals, this type of vigilantism arrived on the shores of Africa for the first time in the mid- 1990s following the establishment of popular democracy in South Africa. It has since spread into Nigeria with the introduction, in some northern states, of the Hisbah groups to enforce the observance of the Sharia (Islamic law). According to Chukwuma (2002), these groups make it their duty to enforce laws such as banning the sale and consumption of alcohol, regulation of indecent dressing, and apprehending petty thieves.

Ethnic vigilantism, as the name suggests, refers to groups that organize along ethnic or tribal lines to defend their narrow interests and sometimes carry out crime-control functions. In Nigeria, this type of vigilantism is best typified by groups such as the *Odua'a* People's Congress (OPC), which is active in the southwestern part of Nigeria; and the *Egbesu* Boys which operates mainly in the oil-rich Delta region of the country (Amnesty International, 2002). The OPC began originally as a self-determination group that protects the Yoruba ethnic group interest but subsequently extended its activities to fighting alleged criminals (CLEEN, 2002).

The third type of vigilantism is *state-sponsored vigilantism*. This variant of vigilantism operates with the support of governments or state agencies. In Africa, this was first noticed during the apartheid era in South Africa. During that period, the state used specialized police or military units to destabilize and intimidate the political opposition or sponsored civilians, with pecuniary, personal, or political interests (Haysom, 1986; Pauw, 1991; Scharf 2000). In Nigeria an example of such groups will be the Civilian JTF assisting the Nigerian military in the North-eastern part of the country to fight the Boko haram terrorist group.

The fourth type of vigilantism is what is popularly referred to as *neighbourhood or community vigilantes*. These are groups of people that are organized by street associations in the cities or villages in the rural areas, to main street entrances or village gates, as the case may be, at night. They also carry out foot patrols at night to assure community members of safety and security. They do not carry weapons but are rather armed with whistles, which they use in rousing the neighbourhoods if there are unwholesome 'guests' (Amnesty International, 2002; Chukwuma, 2003). This category includes such groups as neighbourhood watchers, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults and hunters' guilds. Usually, the methods of operation of informal

security structures typically include traditional divining methods, traditional protection methods, praying and fasting, and mob action (Chukwuma, 2003).

Traditionally, the concept of informal security took on the character of the fourth typology. Typically, they consist of able-bodied young men of each community member supported financially and materially by the other community members and charged with the task of securing the community and enforcing the law, usually with the aid of small weapons, such as machetes, bows and arrows, spears, and some guns. Often, these watchers are more active at night than during the day and seek to limit access to parts of the community by erecting temporary, movable obstacles on the roads that would slow vehicular and human traffic (Okafor, 2007). The first three typologies are more recent developments which are traceable to mounting frustration with the steady increase in violent crimes in the country, and the inefficiency and widespread corruption of the police force (Amnesty International, 2002; Haruna 2019). It has also been argued in some quarters that the emergence of these later variants of informal security is more political than simply an attempt to fight crime (Adejoh, 2013). Nevertheless, this research focuses on crime-control type of vigilantes neighborhood or community vigilantism.

5.3.2   Structure of the VGN

According to Okafor and Aniche (2018), the traditional concept of vigilante in Nigeria refers to an unarmed voluntary organisation formed by individuals in local areas. Their mission is to assist law enforcement by apprehending and turning over suspected criminals or delinquents to the police. Prior to the year 2000, VGN operations at the regional and national levels were either non-existent or limited. State chapters of the VGN, on the other hand, banded together to form a national united group in order to improve cooperation and service delivery. The establishment of a national platform aimed to gain support from national authorities by coordinating VGN operations with federal government agencies. As Ogbozor (2016) points out, this entailed the establishment of regional and national coordination offices to promote and advocate for the organisation, particularly with federal government institutions. With a large membership at the federal, regional, state, and local government levels, the VGN has grown to become one of Nigeria's largest policing organisations, reaching millions of people. According to the VGN's leadership, its ability to supplement the formal security sector has been recognised. The organization's rural-based structure enables it to function as a support agency for national security forces (see fig 21).

Figure 26: National structure of the VGN (Source; adapted from Ogbozor, 2016)

It has also been argued in some quarters that the advent of these latter versions of informal security is more political than merely an attempt to combat crime (Adejoh, 2013). This is due to the fact that vigilante organizations can sometimes be taken over by ethnic militias or violent groups. Although certain ethnic militias participate in vigilante service, they are not strictly speaking vigilante security apparatus because they are involved in actions that are not necessarily or principally vigilante service. The point is that ethnic militant groups like the Odua People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and others do not engage in vigilante actions as their major activities or functions. It just so happened that these extreme ethnic organizations began to take or usurp the tasks of vigilante protection along the way (Okafor and Aniche 2018).

5.3.3 Limitations of the Informal System

First, growing insurgencies have led to many states subcontracting certain security functions to informal actors or vigilante groups. This approach at times is viewed as a necessity, but can sometimes be dangerous, especially when it's a substitutive or competitive and not complementary or accommodating relationship. The substitutive or competitive relationship is more prevalent in weak/fragile states that are politically fluid and fractious. The more fragile the state, the more it is dependent on others to provide security, and also the less able it is to police them or prevent abuse of power (Lawrence, 2017).

Second, informal security or traditional policing can, in fact, be harsh and sometimes ruthless as they have been documented in some cases to morph into predatory, quasi-criminal organizations

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or enemies of the central state (I.C.G, 2017). Informal security groups in African cities and towns range from mild neighbourhood-watch-style operations, which patrol settlements to keep them crime-free, to those that use violent methods to enforce justice. They have been documented to sometimes take advantage of their newfound authority and compensate for lack of support and resources by seeking to maximize their power and wealth through extortion, kidnapping, and other violent abuses (Baker, 2008: Beall, Jo, and Fox, Sean, 2011).

Third, by their very nature, vigilante groups contain inherent risk. Contemporary Nigerian vigilantism signifies the articulation of claims to a set of rights built on the historical and spiritual legitimacy of young powerful men, (sometimes referred to as 'sons of the soil'), protecting their community under the protection of local religious injunction and protection. Typically recruited from local communities, their members likely share the same ethnic or political identity, collective interests and threat perceptions, raising the odds that they will act as local militias potentially more powerful than state authorities and pursue narrow ethnic agendas, a short-term necessary evil that could pave the way for longer-term conflict (Leach, 2004).

Fourth, it is understood that informal security structures get infiltrated by thieves and bad eggs sometimes such that they become a part of the problem rather than a solution to crime and insecurity (Akinyele, 2008). It is also argued that some of them not only wield arms contrary to the law and misuse same, but indeed indulge in various forms of violence, including rape, torture, extortion and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2002; Harnischfeger, 2003; Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004; Segun, 2008).

Fifth, while using non-state armed actors to combat insurgencies is a necessary evil, it should be used infrequently. When vigilantes pursue their own political-ethnic agendas, lack strong command and control structures that allow battlefield commanders to promote their own interests, are largely unsupervised by either local or national authorities, or are ignored, unrecognized, and cast aside once their military utility has expired, the greatest dangers are posed. Support from an outside force, which goes against the central state's intentions, raises the likelihood of vigilantes fuelling more insecurity (ICG 2017). Furthermore, it is believed that politicians have significant influence over informal security groups in many communities because a number of these groups receive support from the government at the local and state levels (Akinyele, 2008).

Lastly, in a violent crisis, vigilante groups face a dilemma: they can defend civilians and assist regular troops in defeating deadly insurgent groups, but they also run the risk of assaulting rival communities or preying on the towns and villages they are supposed to guard. For example, the Kamajors of Sierra Leone and the Arrow Boys of South Sudan (local vigilante groups) began as community protectors but evolved into formidable ethnic militias or outright insurgents that dragged the country deeper into civil conflict (ICG 2017). This risk is inherent in the situations when vigilantes are most likely to form, such as when weak states are unable to fight armed groups on their own. It is thought that under specific conditions and with the prevalence of certain factors and behaviour by central governments, this is possible. Vigilante organizations, particularly those

whose members share a common ethnic or political identity, collective interests, and threat perceptions, are prone to have agendas that differ from or even clash with those of the central authority. States that are too weak to protect communities from insurgents are more likely to allow vigilantes to use their power to further their goals (ICG 2017).

5.3.4 Resolution of some of the Issues

In Nigeria, the reputation of vigilantes can be either positive or negative. In some cases, such as the Lake Chad region of Northeast Nigeria, where vigilante groups play an important role in combating Boko Haram, the role and contribution of informal security actors is recognised as potentially beneficial (International Crisis Group, 2017). Violent abuses must be addressed formally and structurally while retaining vigilantes' crucial function as community protectors (Ogbozor, 2016). Working with informal security players entails collaborating with extra-legal non-state actors such as customary authorities, rebel organizations, vigilantes, and, in urban areas, neighbourhood watch systems. Caution is urged because it is commonly assumed that informal players, such as chiefs or rebel groups, cannot be engaged if their character is repressive or they have a poor human rights record. Because of their community roots, informal actors are a source of local knowledge, intelligence, and manpower, and they can provide more effective security than state actors. Their presence, however, raises legitimate worries about participation in the war economy, violations of human rights, and unrestricted access to arms. The increase in the number of armed civilians constitutes a medium-term risk to future stability. If such groups are not to become a future source of instability, methods for disbanding, formalizing, or regulating them must be created (Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, & Olabisi, 2017)

Furthermore, research by I.C.G. (2017) demonstrates that, if properly managed by state authorities and international actors, they can help national leaders form long-term political alliances with provincial elites and strengthen state legitimacy among local people. It is even suggested that if they can be successfully managed by state authorities and international actors, they can enable national leaders to forge lasting political pacts with provincial elites and bolster state legitimacy among local communities.

5.4 Conclusion

Most police institutions in African countries are fundamentally unchanged from what they were decades ago. They have remained politicised, under-resourced and inadequately trained. This trend is particularly marked in Nigeria, West Africa's oil-rich nation and Africa's most populous country. Since the country's independence from the UK in 1960, Nigeria's police have received the equivalent of millions of UK pounds and US dollars in technical assistance, training programmes and support in kind (Hills, 2008). Yet the Nigeria Police (NP) is widely perceived as ineffective and corrupt (Adejoh, 2013). A study by Afrobarometer, (2001) claims that 66 percent of Nigerians considered all police personnel in the country as being involved in corruption, while another 58 percent of the people expressed no trust at all in the police. As a response to the

prevailing insecurity and the apparent inability of the police to rise to the occasion, many Nigerians, including state governments, are beginning to seek respite in informal security outfits, in other words, these structures, are emerging to fill unmet needs. Another Afrobarometer study from 2005 revealed that widespread popular perceptions of corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. Almost three-quarters (75%) of Nigerians believe that most or all police are corrupt. Concern over police extortion was a prominent issue in the public sphere in 2004 and 2005. Another study by CLEEN Foundation (Alemika, & Chukwuma, 2007), which thoroughly contextualises the challenges confronting the NPF and highlights institutional deficiencies of the police, demonstrates that the police are a barrier to change due to, among other things, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in crime prevention, control, detection, and apprehension; poor rule of law record; violation of rights; lack of accountability; incivility, and widespread corruption. In general, the populace continues to despise the police and is afraid of their brutality, extortion, and ineffectiveness. This is also confirmed by reports from foreign and international organisations (such as BBC and CCIC), who document the use of torture, excessive force, and extra-judicial killings by Nigerian police.

However, it would be an exaggeration to say that formal security, policing, and justice institutions are in all instances subverted, corrupted or made incapable of performing their security functions (Bagayoko, Hutchful, & Luckham, 2016). Every security outfit has its deficiencies. It is believed that a single security unit either formal or informal cannot ensure the overall security needs of more than 160 million Nigerians including foreigners living and doing business in the country. Of course, we should also consider the fact that policing resources are overstretched in Nigeria, coupled with the inadequate number of police officers in the country proportionate to the number of residents. There is an estimate of 180 officers for every 100,000 residents, which is among the lowest ration in the world. Therefore, what the police can actually do is debatable, which makes the role of local informal security providers crucial at addressing local crime and resolving the problem at local scales.

Several studies have shown instances where both formal and informal policing system work together to curb insecurity in most African cities. Obidiegwu, & Elekwa, (2019) asserted in their study that for security of lives and properties of members of any society to be achieved there is need for the integration of the informal mechanism of crime detection and prevention into the formal policing strategies. Inyang and Abraham (2013) noted that informal and formal policing strategies become integrated in a lot of cases to assist the formal policing institutions when they have difficulties in detecting perpetrators of specific crimes. When strategies of traditional policing and techniques are adopted, people who engage in crimes, who could evade detection and apprehension from the formal policing may be easily caught and made to face the full wrath of the law. Umar and Bappi (2014), suggest in their research that crime has multiple causes, and the solutions must be equally multifaceted and cannot be handled by only the police force. Adejoh (2013) noted that community policing is more effective when it is carried out as a collaborative and collective responsibility among police, vigilante, and community members. It is therefore

important for all recognized agencies working to keep our cities safe to come together and work to achieve safer cities for all.

Hence, there is need for partnership between the two sectors (formal and informal) for effective security system in the country. This fact is acknowledged by security experts who argue that 'any comprehensive strategy to reduce crime must not only include the contribution of the police and the criminal justice system but also the whole range of environmental, social, economic and educational factors which affect the likelihood of crime'. To this end, many countries of the world due to the ravaging security challenges and the apparent inability of the conventional police to handle the situation alone satisfactorily have encouraged the establishment of partnerships between government organizations and private/community organizations in addressing crime.

CHAPTER 6. METHODOLOGY

6.0   Introduction

This section discusses the methodological framework i.e., data sources, materials, and methods of data collection and analysis of the research. The study is designed to support the research objective of gaining an understanding of the best ways to manage African cities so they can be safe and productive. The research pursued this objective by examining the role of non-state actors in providing security and governance in Nigeria, with a specific focus on Yen Kato Da Gora in the Kaduna Urban Area.

This research builds on an international project carried out in Nigeria from 2017-2019 - the Development Frontiers in Crime, Livelihoods, and Urban Poverty in Nigeria project (FCLP). The FCLP was a DfID-ESRC funded research project led by the UCL Department of Geography in partnership with researchers at the Centre for Spatial Information Science, and Department of Urban and Regional Planning of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. It was a project that sought to explore and understand the spatial patterns, seasonality, and interlinkages of crime, livelihoods, and urban poverty in Nigeria. The aim of the project was to develop a platform for investigating trends in victimizations in Nigeria through a mixed-methods study seeking to address the dearth of existing reliable data related to the effects of seasonal migration on patterns of work and crime in the city. Combining statistical modelling, geo-visualization, and ethnographic insights, the research aimed to develop location appropriate approaches to investigate perceptions and seasonal trends of crime and victimization in a West African city (Project Website: http://development-frontiers.com/). The FCLP study focused on the patterns of property crime at the street level but also aimed to better understand the relationship between offenders and victims of crime. As one of three research assistants on the FCLP project, one of my observations was that there should be more emphasis on the emerging crime prevention strategies in places with high crime rates rather than solely on how to improve formal policing operations and visibility, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods. It is also critical to document and contextualise the effectiveness and limitations of other alternative systems/approaches that have emerged and are emerging to address this issue, particularly in high crime zones and disadvantaged communities. This research, therefore, builds on these points in order to better understand security provision and governance within African communities.

It is important to emphasise that this study is more interested in the mechanisms and relations that control and provide security in low-income communities than in establishing statistically representative sample patterns. It is also important to emphasise that the goal of this study is to go beyond analysing people's perceptions and look into how, who, and whether people benefit from hybrid security arrangements, particularly those who live in low-income areas. By engaging with and challenging mainstream representations of non-state security institutions in Nigeria, as well as engaging with the evolving literature on hybrid security governance, the overall goal is to question

and rethink Weberian conceptual categories of state-building that have tended to dominate security governance literature. The research is, therefore, taking on Tankebe et al (2014)'s invitation to counter Euro-centric criminological assumptions about how to fix the crime problem in Africa, and Di Nunzio (2014)'s call to consider local and national political arrangements, and particularly street politics to understand policing and crime prevention strategies in Africa. Finally, this study focuses on non-state security/vigilante organisations founded in response to low-level banditry/crime/threat and general lawlessness[20], as opposed to insurgent threats or large-scale insurgency and political or ethnic violence.

6.1   Focus of the Study.

The research covers 5 residential/commercial districts within Kaduna Urban area namely, Rigasa, Badarawa, Malali, Unguwan Dosa, and Kawo (see fig 28, 29 & 30). All of these locations were picked for their distinct characteristics that help in better explaining the phenomena in question and fulfilling the stated goals of the research. The sites were, therefore, purposively sampled: they were selected to identify variation within the city, as well as for pragmatic reasons. The study sites were chosen primarily because the researcher had prior understanding of the area's social and physical characteristics, which facilitated direct contact with a range of research participants, including several community leaders, local residents, and the local police. Second, the physical settings and socio-demographic features of selected communities differ significantly. The research area has several land uses including residential areas, each of which can be classified as high, medium, or low density. The most under-resourced populations live in high-density residential areas, which account for nearly half of all residential land use and have no formal physical planning. These areas are characterized by uneven property layouts, narrow and mainly unpaved streets. In contrast, the more affluent population's medium and low–density residential districts which have formal physical planning and generally paved and broad streets with regular-sized plots that are well planned on large city blocks (see fig 28). No other districts within Kaduna provide this combination and proximity between planned and unplanned urbanization, making the area ideal for studying the patterns of crime in the city (Musah, Umar, Yakubu, Ahmad, Babagana, Ahmed, Thieme & Cheshire, 2020).

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[20] Low-level banditry, crime, threat, and lawlessness in Nigeria include petty theft, armed robbery, carjacking, cultism, cybercrime, kidnapping, and youth delinquency.

Figure 27: Map selected study sites within the study area (source; Authors computation)

Furthermore, all of the districts selected for the study have informal non-state security agencies operating within the communities, and several studies have revealed that most of these neighbourhoods have high crime rates, with some of them being designated as top crime hotspots within Kaduna Metropolis. Azua, & Isioye (2014), carrying out geospatial analysis of crime zones in Kaduna Metropolis, Northern Nigeria, identified eight high crime zones within Kaduna metropolis including Rigasa, Kawo, Kakuri, Sabon Gari, Sabon Tasha, Barnawa, Kabala Doki, and Kurmin Mashi. Ayuba, Mugu, Tanko, & Bulus's (2016) geospatial analysis of crime in Kaduna Metropolis concluded that Rigasa, Tudun Wada, Sabon Tasha, and Rigachikun are areas where almost all crime types are prevalent. Nzelibe and Bello (2018) also concluded that Badarawa, Rigasa, Ungwan-Sanusi, Ungwan-Rimi amongst others have the highest crime rate within the Metropolis. All these studies examined several categories of crime which include murder and manslaughter, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, theft and auto theft, rape, forgery, suicide, cheating, and kidnapping.

Figure 28: Kaduna urban area showing selected study sites (KADGIS data)

However, there are some limitations to the data used for analysis in these studies. Ayuba et al reported in their study that out of the seventeen (17) Divisional head Quarters within the study area, only 15 provided consistent records on crime incidents that were used in their analysis that covered all the seventeen (17) areas, while Azua & Isioye's (2014) study reported getting data from only fourteen (14). Crime data used in both studies were obtained from Kaduna Police Command. Police incident reports in Nigeria have been reported in a number of studies to only represent a fraction of the total number of committed offences (Ebbe, 2000; Gyong 2010; Ayodele and Aderinto 2014, Umar 2017). Access to data and under-reporting is a major concern in most countries (Shaw et al., 2003; Sidebottom 2015, Umar 2017). In addition, police incident reporting in Nigeria has been subject to controversy, including allegations of egregious acts of record alteration (Alemika and Chukwu, 2005). Consequently, official crime data in Nigeria would perhaps represent a biased sample of offences (Umar, 2017). There are also other issues with crime data from police records. Umar (2017) and Alemika, (2004) detailed such issues in the section on crime data of their research as:

'In theory, every crime incident is to be reported to the police station nearest to where such crime occurs, although this is not the case in reality. Every police station in Nigeria maintains a single police crime diary (usually a notebook) where all reported crimes are manually recorded (i.e., not in digital format). Typically, each entry would have the date, time, and type of crime reported as well as the details of both the victim and any potential suspects. However, it is important to note that most entries into the police crime diary are not very detailed. For instance, many would be entered using the name of a nearby landmark such as a market or place of worship or local neighbourhood name rather than the specific address of where the incident occurred. This is symptomatic of the lack of a comprehensive addressing system that is not only unique to the city of Kaduna or Nigeria but also of many other places in developing countries. As such, this presents a major challenge for the geocoding of police crime data. Even if the geocoding were to be straightforward, the official police incident report data is not readily available for public or research use.'

Figure 29: Map of five (5) selected study sites, showing land uses and site division (source; Authors computation)

6.2   Challenges Faced during the Study: A Global Pandemic and a National Security Crisis.

The Covid 19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed as a result of it had significant implications for doctoral research students, given the time pressure on their research, and especially affecting those undertaking fieldwork (see Whitby, 2022; University of Bath, n.d.; Sverdlik, Hall, & Vallerand, 2022). A lot of researchers were badly hit; from those who had to totally change their research design, to those who had to adjust to the current trend of remote studies/fieldwork and even some that had to abandon or put their research on hold until things get back to normal, if they ever do (see Ramos, 2021; Joseph, 2021; Apuzzo, and Kirkpatrick, 2020; Stoye, 2020; Radecki, and Schonfeld, 2020). For most international students studying in the UK, like myself, especially students from Africa and whose research is externally funded, the only choice was to readjust their research design to fit the current trend. It became a race against funding time, even where universities tried to adjust requirements and timelines (see Nguyen, 2021; Kercher, 2021).

For example, my research, which is on security governance, entails investigating how different security providers interact and co-exist in urban spaces to re-create a hybrid system of actors and systems of governance especially in places that have little or no access to state facilities. In this case, the research design should normally involve face-to-face interaction for data collection through interviews and focus group discussions. But many researchers including myself had to re-adjust their projects considering social-distancing measures by using mediated forms that can achieve similar ends such as online interviews (to virtually replicate the face-to-face interview or focus group), video-calling (e.g., Skype/ Zoom) or the use of text-based instant messaging (e.g., WhatsApp) (see Tremblay, Castiglione, Audet, Desmarais, Horace, & Peláez, 2021; Sah, Singh, & Sah, 2020; GOV.UK, 2021; Jowett, 2020).

In my case, two major challenges were involved. First, I was doing qualitative fieldwork research that would involve interviewing over a hundred people at a time when face to face interactions were restricted in most parts of the world as a result of Covid 19. Second, my study area happens to be one of the epicentres of kidnappings and banditry in Nigeria, and the country itself was going through a national security pandemic of incessant killings by different criminal groups (Vanguard 2018). Therefore, I had not just Covid to contend with, but also the security situation in my study area and this meant I was dealing with a double barrel of gun powder waiting to explode. On the one hand I had to convince the research ethics committee to approve my research on time because I wasn't sure if the pandemic situation was going to get worse or better at the time and, on the other hand, I had to convince them that the security situation in my study area was something I could handle in terms of carrying out qualitative research in an area that the FCDO[21] advises against all travel to, due to perceived frequent violent attacks and a high threat of kidnappings.

6.2.1 Challenges before Fieldwork (COVID-19)

We had barely started our program during the 2019/2020 academic session when the Covid-19 pandemic struck. For a lot of doctoral researchers, especially researchers carrying out primary qualitative research, this was a devastating blow. It meant researchers had to either totally change their research design, adjust to the current trend of remote activities/research and in some other cases abandon or put their research on hold until things get back to normal, if they ever did.

Students at this time also faced other challenges. For instance, students in London had to cope with staff strike action against budget cuts, but thankfully this did not last too long and did not significantly affect students. But just as we were beginning to feel hopeful and were about to resume our social lives, which the majority of us needed for our mental and emotional well-being, Covid struck. According to a medical study by Pietrabissa & Simpson (2020), social isolations during the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant global impact, with major psychological implications for most people. Studies by several experts have also shown that mental health issues

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[21] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office: The FCDO provides travel advice to British citizens so that they can make informed decisions about travelling abroad.

and loneliness are prevalent amongst doctoral students. Some such studies were conducted by Evans et al (2018) where they found that 41% and 39% of U.S. graduate students (of which 90% were doctoral researchers) had moderate to severe rates of anxiety and depression respectively (Evans, Borriello & Field, 2018). Another study by Nature Graduate Survey, carried out specifically among doctoral researchers, found that 51% experienced psychological distress, and 32% experienced so many symptoms that they were at high risk for having or developing mental health disorders (Forrester, 2021).

In the midst of all of these challenges, most doctoral students, particularly international students, had to return home to continue their studies remotely, due mainly to restrictions imposed in most countries that affected students in different ways. For example, the UK government imposed a national lockdown in November 2020, which resulted in most school activities being put on hold or slowed down, including the suspension of all fieldwork approvals in most schools in the UK. Fortunately, after a short while fate smiled on us. The decision was revisited and applications were re-considered for fieldwork, granting access to two kinds of project: 1) Fieldwork which involved travelling to a destination which was exempted from the travel ban as advertised in the FCO website (https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice); and 2) fieldwork in any destination provided that a) the researcher is already in the location of the fieldwork project (for example, having remained there for health and safety reasons at the beginning of the pandemic), and b) the project was being conducted in full respect of local health and safety guidance and local research approval.

Luckily, the second category seemed feasible as I had already planned to go home (the same country, Nigeria, where I had planned to carry out fieldwork). But, in addition to the aforementioned difficulties, most students were frustrated with the slow and, in some cases, unresponsive pace at which applications were reviewed. In my case, for example, I had to first get my upgrade approved before I could apply for fieldwork. Despite having completed my upgrade viva in March 2020, my upgrade was not approved until December 2020. Following that, it was a battle to have my fieldwork approved. Fortunately, I started my application early, but it still took almost 4 months to get approved. I applied in October 2020 and got approval in February 2021. Unfortunately, the months-long delay meant that things had worsened considerably in terms of security by the time I arrived at my study site, and instead of the eight months I had originally planned to stay at my study site to carry out the fieldwork, I could only stay for about six months.

My initial plan was to go for the fieldwork around November 2020, which would have been perfect considering that the security situation had not got as bad as it did subsequently afterwards. Fortunately, despite these obstacles, I was able to collect approximately 70% of the data I required at the time, and thanks to the second alternative research design I had prepared as a result of Covid mitigation measures, I had something to fall back on (online/digital interviews), which assisted in completing the remaining 30% of my data collection. Relocating, on the other hand, presented its own set of challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, intermittent internet connections, unstable electricity supply, lack of access to standard libraries, and other issues.

6.2.2 Challenges during Fieldwork (Insecurity)

It is well-known that data collection in developing countries can be very challenging. Elahi (2008) highlighted some of these challenges. According to the study there are internal problems such as lack of institutional setup and weak infrastructure as well as external ones such as low literacy ratio and lack of awareness that makes data collection in developing countries including Nigeria difficult for researchers. In relation to this, a significant challenge for researchers conducting security-related research in the country has been gaining access to data on security issues which I also experienced during this research. For example, key reports on public safety and security, typically conducted by the government, are frequently made inaccessible to the public. Some of such reports include; Report of the Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Police (2006); Report of the Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Nigeria Police Force, led by Alhaji M.D. Yusuf (2008); Report of the Sheik Ahmed Lemu Committee with regard to post-2011 election violence (2011); Report of the Parry Osayande Committee on Police Reform (2012); Report of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution and Security Challenges in the North, led by Alhaji Tanimu Turaki (2015)

In Nigeria, in addition to all the aforementioned factors another major hindrance for researchers carrying out qualitative research especially in the Northern part of the country is the security situation. Insecurity in most cities in Nigeria has worsened over the years, from secessionist agitations, to kidnappings, religious riots, tribal wars, war against Boko haram and the bandit herdsmen attacks (see Udoh, 2015; Akosah- Sarpong, 2002; Nwagboso, 2018; Ozoigbo, 2019; Zubairu, 2020). Insecurity is a critical feature of Nigeria since independence in 1960. No doubt, Nigeria's Fourth Republic has faced many security challenges. However, between 2005 and 2020 there has been an unprecedented increase in the level of insecurity in the country. For example, since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency has contributed to a monumental and complex humanitarian crisis with over 30,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people in the north-east region of the country (Ogbonnaya, 2020). Across the north-west, rural banditry and cattle rustling continue to pose threats to life and property while recurrent clashes between sedentary farmers and nomadic herders in the north-central region are threatening food security and livelihoods. In the south-east, south-south, southwest and parts of the northern regions, secessionist agitations, militancy, farmer-herder conflicts, and kidnapping for ransom not only threaten human security, but also the stability and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state as well as the legitimacy of the State (Ogbonnaya, 2020).

In the Northern part of Nigeria, where my study area is located, things have sadly only been deteriorating and so far, got to a record high at the time of the fieldwork (see footnote 14). There were widespread/prevalent cases of armed robbery, gang and thug activities, banditry and especially kidnappings within Kaduna and other states in the country. Some years back, it was just Boko Haram that was the major terror threat in the North, but about 3 years ago we started having major issues with kidnapping and banditry. Some of these issues have been covered by international media such as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Cable News Network,

Inc. (CNN)[22]. Before, the kidnappings were usually along Kaduna-Abuja highway (for Kaduna), but they moved to the cities and now almost every part of the country is affected and not even the rural areas are spared.

Fortunately for the research team[23], by the time we started the fieldwork, Covid cases had drastically reduced in Nigeria and restrictions were almost non-existent in most cities including the study area. During the fieldwork, my team and I witnessed first-hand some of the challenges that arose due to this issue. During the fieldwork, there were several incidents of insecurity, including a kidnapping attempt near our study site in Malali. The kidnappers were able to abduct four individuals and unfortunately, two of them were killed. In response, the local vigilante group operating in the area killed two of the kidnappers. There were also other cases of insecurity within the study site during the fieldwork (refer to the links provided). At some point, the government started contemplating enacting policies and laws to restrict movement and ultimately address these cases, with curfews being a common tool used to combat the problem. Prior to our departure, many public buildings and schools in the state were closed as a precaution, and security guards were deployed to monitor most public spaces. It's important to note that our limitations were not related to data collection, but rather the challenges posed by the prevalent insecurity. At some point, some public buildings, including all public schools in the state, were closed due to fears of further attacks, and most public spaces such as government buildings and police stations were heavily guarded.

6.3   Sampling and Study population

The study adopted a case study approach and the data for this study were collected through a survey of participants within Kaduna Metropolis.

The research involved three different categories of respondents. The first category involved community members mainly from low-income neighbourhoods from five selected sites within Kaduna urban area to understand perception and experience with security issues and institutions.

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[22] 1. Mando Kaduna kidnapping: Federal College of Forestry Mechanization student'skidnappers kidnap dozens, military rescue over 100: https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-56360063
2.   Gunmen kidnap 26 people in Kaduna State, Jan. 30: https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2021/02/nigeria-gunmen-kidnap-26-people-in-kaduna-state-jan-30
3.   Bandits kidnap Catholic priest, others in Kaduna: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/03/breaking-bandits-kidnap-catholic-priest-others-in-kaduna-village/
4.   Nigeria: Teachers abducted in Kaduna State: https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/15/nigeria-primary-school-children-and-teachers-abducted-in-kaduna-state/
5.   Kaduna Kidnapping: Bandits attack 307 students for GSSS Ikara afta Mando college kidnap: https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/world-56384542

[23] See section on Fieldwork Implementation Strategy

The second category included non-state security providers within the selected neighbourhoods and the third involved the state security agencies.

The study adopted a purposive, cluster and snowballing sampling method. First, the study area was divided into clusters, out of which five neighbourhoods that provided a combination high crime zone, and proximity between planned and unplanned urbanization, were selected for the research (see fig 28 and 29). Participants for the interviews were carefully selected within these clusters using a combination of purposive, snowballing, and convenience sampling methods that were tailored to each neighbourhood's unique characteristics and needs.

Four categories of participants were chosen for the resident interviews with respondents who were perceived to have good knowledge and experience in relation to the research topic of security concerns within communities. Recognizing the complexity and varied dimensions of community matters, the study identified a diverse group of individuals believed to hold valuable insights based on their distinct roles and experiences within their communities. These categories included; The community leaders (Mai Unguwa), the Imam/Pastor (the person who leads Muslim worshippers in prayer and is the head of the Muslim community), the Attajiri, Maisukuni, or Dan kasuwa, loosely translated as the businessman, and the male/female head of households were all chosen to participate in the study given that they are all regarded as having the most knowledge about community issues. Furthermore, young people and other community members (both male and female community members aged 18 and above) were also chosen to take part in the research as stakeholders in the communities. To ensure the research encompassed a wide range of perspectives, young people and other community members, encompassing both genders and aged 18 and above, were also included as vital stakeholders in the study. This deliberate inclusion aimed to broaden the scope of the research to reflect diverse community voices, thereby enhancing the representativeness and relevance of the findings. By integrating the insights of both traditionally authoritative figures and the broader community, the study sought to construct a holistic view of security dynamics within northern Nigerian communities, acknowledging the intricate interplay of social hierarchies, experiences, and perceptions in shaping the communal understanding of security concerns.

The community head is the main symbol of authority, he oversees the resolution of disputes, ensures stability, and is seen and accepted as the representative of the people. The Imam is the spiritual head of the community. He leads everyone in prayer at least five times a day, does the marriage solemnization, the naming ceremony, leads the funeral service and when the village head struggles to find solutions to problems, the Imam will intervene by bringing scholarly opinion and useful references on how such disputes could be resolved from the perspective of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad). The businessman is the economic hub of the community; he provides loans, gives out the Zakkat (charity) and his businesses help in providing employment to the people. Domestic authority rests with the male head of the compound/household as the *Mai Gida*. The senior wife of the compound is the *Uwar Gida*. She settles minor disputes among residents and gives advice and aid to the younger women.

(nigerianscholars.com, n.d.). Other participants comprise of both male and female community members aged 18 and above who have lived in the community for upwards of one year and are aware of the security concerns and practices in the neighborhood.

In light of the security concerns and COVID-related constraints outlined earlier in the thesis, participants were selected for the study based on their residency and employment in the area for at least a year, as well as their specific knowledge of local security issues and procedures. This ensured that the sample encompassed individuals likely to have experienced varying levels of security and who could offer insight into potential disparities in security provision across different demographic groups, including the economically disadvantaged, women, households headed by females, individuals in high or low productivity jobs, and those with disabilities, among others. By incorporating individuals with diverse backgrounds and experiences, the study aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of security distribution within the community, while also addressing the challenges posed by security concerns and pandemic-related restrictions.

As regards the research, the first category of respondents (residents) was purposively recruited within the selected neighbourhoods based on residency/business status, knowledge, involvement, and experience with security issues within Kaduna Metropolis. Participants therefore included community leaders (Mai Unguwa), the Imam/ Pastor, the Attajiri, Maisukuni, or Dan kasuwa, roughly translated as the businessman, and male/female head of compound/household[24]. The second and third category of respondents i.e., security providers (state and non-state) were selected based on their area of jurisdiction i.e., if they fall within the selected study sites. All identified non-state agencies within the study sites were involved in the research. Furthermore, interviews were carried out with leaders and members of the informal security operators that operate within the study area. Some of these groups involved in the interviews are Jurumai Da Gora, (loosely translated as warriors with sticks) and are responsible for safeguarding Unguwan Dosa Ward. Civilian JTF/Committee is another group within the city responsible for safeguarding Malali/Bardawa ward, and lastly, a more formalized group known as the Vigilante who operate all over the city but mostly around middle- and high-income neighbourhoods. The interviews were carried out at their respective offices/branches. Around 50 members participated in the research individually and in a focus group discussion. Some of the members that participated include Chairmen of the groups, Sarkin Yaki (traditional title synonymous with minister of war), Sarkin Matasa (minister of youth affairs), secretary of the groups, G.O.C, discipline officer, financial secretary, female members of the groups and other members.

Because all state security agencies work under the same mandate/law, it was deemed unnecessary to interview every station located within the selected study sites, hence just one Divisional Police station out of the available ones was chosen. According to research findings, Badarawa (one of the study sites) is completely reliant on Malali police station due to the absence of a police station or

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[24] See section on data verification.

even a police post. The Kaduna state police headquarters on the other hand is located in Malali. A divisional police station and police posts are present at all other places.

6.4   Data Collection

This study used a mixture of research methods. It is a technique of understanding a research problem that involves gathering, analysing, and 'mixing' quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study. The use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems and complex phenomena than either approach alone (Tashakkori, & Creswell, 2007). Using both quantitative and qualitative data methods helped to gain a better understanding of the subject. This method aided in cross-validating and confirming results by triangulating one set of results with another, which improves comprehension and increases inference accuracy (Molina-Azorin, 2016). In a mixed method study, the concurrent triangulation method involves using one data collection phase in which quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis are performed independently but concurrently. The findings are integrated during the study's interpretation phase, and both types of research are given equal priority (FoodRisc, 2016).

In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with security agencies generated qualitative data, while semi-structured interviews with over 100 residents from selected districts within Kaduna metropolis generated quantitative data. Semi-structured questionnaires were utilized to collect quantitative data for the quantitative study design, allowing the researcher to uncover residents' perceptions of the benefits/effectiveness of the hybrid security system in their respective neighbourhoods. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were used to generate qualitative data which enabled the researcher to understand and analyse the proliferation and effectiveness of the informal security system in respondents' communities.

Geo-spatial data (geographic information system or GIS data) helped identify the location and spatial distribution of security facilities within Kaduna Metropolis. This involved using a 0.3-pixel high-resolution imagery of Kaduna metropolis obtained from Google. Other data sources include an administrative map of Kaduna metropolis, sourced from the Kaduna State Ministry of lands and survey. Spatial data on the boundary of wards (study area), districts, residential density, and land use types were obtained from Kaduna State Geographic Information System (KADGIS). This was obtained in polygon shapefiles together with the accompanied attributes[25]. The data on the road network of Kaduna metropolis was obtained from Open-Street Map (OSM) in line shapefiles[26].

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[25] Attributes of the spatial boundary data comprise the area in m², perimeter in metres, male population, female population and average population. This data is prepared from joint surveys conducted by a group of government agencies like the National Population commission (NPC), National Boundary Commission (NBC) etc, then made available to state government agencies.

[26] Shapefiles are GIS representation data with .shp format. They are extractions of various environmental features from still imagery that are presented as points, lines or polygons. Examples are boundaries, settlements, roads, trees, infrastructures, amongst others.

In terms of security facility distribution, the coordinates of the locations of security institutions in the study area were gathered using a simple handheld GPS device (mobile phone). For crime spots within the study area, the study builds on existing data on crime mapping in Kaduna urban area by several authors including Ayuba (2017). Furthermore, data were also collected from existing literature and other secondary sources such as journals and crime incidence reports obtained from the internet and Broadcast media (e.g., television or radio discussion programs), archives, textbooks, websites, and print media (e.g., news and magazine articles), published autobiographies, online discussion forums, social media and blogs amongst others.

6.5   Instrumentation

Three instruments were used for the study. The first is a semi-structured interview that had elements of both qualitative and quantitative design. The instrument focused particularly on people's perceptions of security provision and governance within their neighbourhoods and effectiveness of institutions in charge of security provision within the study area to understand the narratives of the key respondents concerning their perception of the hybrid security structures in their communities. Several categories of questions/variables were analysed for this: To whom, or to what, do people look for protection? When do people turn to formal security and justice institutions and when to informal security and justice providers? What are the 'costs' of protection? Do they offer real protection and from what type of insecurity do they offer protection?

The next instrument used was an open-ended questionnaire, for both state and non-state security organizations operating within the study area. The instrument focused on investigating how different security providers interact and co-exist in the urban space to recreate a hybrid system of actors and systems of governance. For the security agencies four categories of variables were analysed. These are roles in security governance, organizational structure, Collaboration Between the Different Agencies and the police, gender, and inclusiveness.

6.6   Data Verification

In qualitative research, verification refers to the techniques used throughout the research process to increase the rigour of the study by ensuring its validity and reliability. Verification strategies aid the researcher in determining when to proceed, pause, or change the research process in order to achieve reliability, validity, and rigour. Qualitative researchers must exhibit rigour, which is linked to openness, relevance to practise, and methodological approach congruence (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers, 2002).

Bias is defined as the 'inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair' (Shah, 2019). When designing and carrying out research, it is critical to minimise bias. Bias exists in all study designs, and while researchers should strive to minimise

bias, identifying potential sources of bias allows for a more critical assessment of the research findings and conclusions (Smith, & Noble, 2014). Researchers have a moral responsibility to explain study restrictions and take into account potential bias sources (Smith, & Noble, 2014). While completely unbiased research is ideal, but in most cases impossible, there are several ways to reduce it. The reliability and validity of a study is determined by the researcher's creativity, sensitivity, flexibility, and skill in using the verification strategies.

Understanding research bias is critical for a number of reasons, including the fact that it affects the validity and reliability of study findings, as well as data misinterpretation, which can have serious practical consequences. It is therefore, important to note that the study took extra precautions to ensure that the data obtained accurately reflected the situation as it is, rather than simply an impression of what is expected. Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers, 2002, recommend using verification strategies to ensure data validity and unbiasedness, some of which were used in this study. As a result, the following are some of the bias elimination and verification strategies employed in this study:

6.6.1   Investigator Responsiveness

Research is only as good as the researcher, and in order to achieve the highest levels of reliability and validity, certain researcher traits or behaviors are essential (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). According to Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers (2002), the investigator should be open-minded, responsive, creative, and insightful throughout the research process and relinquish any ideas that are poorly supported regardless of the excitement and the potential that they first appear to provide.

All individuals involved in the fieldwork process had prior experience, training, and knowledge on how to conduct interviews and related research on their own (personal projects) as well as part of several other projects, including the FCLP project, a DfID-funded project on how to conduct qualitative research interviews. Furthermore, the questionnaires were designed to ensure that participants were objective and to generate as much reliable information from them as possible during the data collection stage. This approach aimed to capture genuine perceptions of security institutions, avoiding responses influenced by what participants thought researchers wanted to hear or expected responses.

To achieve this, the questionnaires incorporated several key strategies to enhance the reliability and objectivity of responses. Neutral wording and the avoidance of leading questions were fundamental to minimize bias. A combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions facilitated the expression of personal perspectives while allowing for the collection of quantifiable data. Anonymity assurances were explicitly stated in the questionnaire instructions, emphasizing the confidentiality of responses and collective analysis without identifying individual participants. These measures aimed to foster an environment where participants could freely express their honest views, thereby reducing the propensity for responses shaped by presumed researcher expectations.

Furthermore, the questionnaire design and data collection process considered specific factors to objectively and accurately assess people's perceptions. According to Adu (2021), these considerations were crucial for generating valid quantitative data. By not employing interviewing as an interrogative technique but rather as a means to establish a supportive atmosphere, the study encouraged participants to speak openly about their true perceptions.

In addition, to ensure the reliability and objectiveness of the responses, the study employed rigorous methodological techniques beyond the design of the questionnaires. This included triangulation, where multiple sources of data (e.g., interviews, observations, and existing records) were used to validate findings. Additionally, confirmation-by-direct-observation was conducted wherever possible, allowing for the corroboration of respondent statements through real-world observations within the communities studied. Such approaches helped mitigate biases and enhanced the credibility of the data collected, ensuring that participants' perceptions of security institutions reflected their genuine experiences rather than preconceived notions or expectations of the research team.

This comprehensive approach to questionnaire design and data collection was meticulously implemented to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the gathered data. They are as follows:

1. Ask simple questions.
2. Ask one question at a time.
3. Restate respondents' response to make sure interviewer understands their response.
4. Graciously bring respondents back on track if they digress.
5. Avoid leading questions (e.g., Do you think engaging in microaggression is bad?)
6. Avoid looking for contradictions.
7. Engage in a conversation with participants and not an interrogation.
8. Give respondents the chance to express their final thoughts and listen attentively during the whole process.

6.6.2 Participant Bias

Participant selection bias can impact both the recruitment process and the study inclusion criteria. The first step in conducting effective research is finding subjects who fit the study's objectives. In this case, three different categories of respondents were used in the study. Community members from five carefully chosen sites in the Kaduna urban area, mostly from low-income neighborhoods, were selected in the first category to learn about their perceptions of security issues and institutions. Within the chosen neighborhoods, the second category included non-state security providers, and the third category consisted of state security agencies.

6.6.3 Inclusion bias

In research, inclusion bias is typically associated with selecting participants who are representative of the study population and, where applicable, allocating participants to ensure similarity between comparison groups (Smith, & Noble, 2014). In relation to these participants were purposefully selected to understand their perception of the security system operated within their communities.

In qualitative research, it is common to recruit participants with a variety of experiences related to the topic under investigation (ibid). As a result, four categories of participants were chosen for the resident interviews who were perceived to have good knowledge and experience in relation to the research topic of security concerns within communities. Kaduna is a big city and an urban centre, the urban life is such that some residents may only work or live in such places but have little to no knowledge about security issues or what's going on within the wider community. This is why the research focuses on people that are knowledgeable about security issues within the communities. Respondents (residents) in this category were especially recruited within the selected neighborhoods for the study based on residency/business status, knowledge, involvement, and experience with Kaduna Metropolis security issues. For instance, it is the responsibility of the Mai unguwas and other leaders in this setting to be aware of daily community activities. It is common knowledge that these are the people who have in-depth knowledge of their communities and things of that nature, which is why they are included in every site. The Mai unguwa is more like a community representative and they act like guardians of the communities (see Fagge & Musa, 2022). Other residents were also interviewed[27].

6.6.4   Sampling Bias

Sampling bias occurs when some members of a population are systematically more likely than others to be chosen for a study. In other words, findings from biased samples can only be generalised to populations that share the sample's characteristics (Bhandari, 2020). Because the case study used in this study primarily represents a specific cultural and ethnic context, it is possible that the study's findings will be influenced by this. Nonetheless, while the findings may not be generalizable or applicable to the entire country, they may be representative of the northern region due to demographic similarities and representation in terms of religion, culture, and general way of life.

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[27] See section on sampling and study population.

Figure 30: A research respondent filling out the consent form.

6.7   Sample size

The target population of the study was drawn from the residents of selected communities in Kaduna urban area of Nigeria. The sampling method adopted for this study was the purposive sampling method. The reason for this sampling technique was that there was no sample frame for the study, and it is often not possible to study an entire population in a study of this nature because of the factors of time and resources, hence the idea of a sample, which is a part of the population. Nevertheless, the samples and participants were selected in such a way that they represented the views of all members of the selected communities (i.e., for residents, in terms of people's perception)[28].

A sample of twenty-five (25) respondents was purposively selected for all study sites making a total of 125 participants in all from the 5 selected sites (25 X 5=125). Although the sample size represents a small portion of the population, scholars such as Agnew (2016) argue that a small sample size is preferable in qualitative research because it allows for a more in-depth analysis, and Britten (1995) further suggests that large qualitative interview studies should typically include 50 to 60 people. Similarly, Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam (2003) recommend that studies using individual interviews have no more than 50 interviews so that researchers can manage the analytic task's complexity. Furthermore, according to Morse (2015), the more usable data obtained from each person, the fewer participants are required.

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[28] See section on data verification.

In terms of security provision, the sample size for non-state security institutions is intended to cover all organized non-state policing security groups identified and known to be operating within the study area. Three (3) groups were identified during the research, and they are all included in the study (i.e., for non-state).

6.8 Fieldwork Implementation Strategy

The research team consisted of three core members and four additional members for logistics (transport and gate keeping). There was one primary investigator/main researcher (me), one research assistant, three gatekeepers, one person in charge of transport (tricycle: keke napep), and one field assistant. The research team was made up of this number of individuals due to the number of locations involved, particularly for gatekeepers. I needed people who were already familiar with the residents to introduce us to them so that our intentions would be understood, and we wouldn't be perceived as outsiders or a threat by the residents (see HELM, n.d.; Andoh-Arthur, 2020). Moreover, to ensure access to some crucial participants, cultural factors being a primary concern, I was accompanied by the male research assistant during most of the study sites. As a female researcher, I recognized that some participants may be hesitant to engage with me directly, thus, in certain instances, I indirectly presented my research assistant as the primary researcher (see Renne, 2004)[29]. Members of the research team were chosen based on their affiliation with the study site and related work experience, which meant that everyone on the team had received prior training on how to carry out their duties and responsibilities. In addition, everyone on the research team lives in Kaduna, except for me and the research assistant, who came in from Zaria. This made it easy for us to navigate the research site and also cut cost for some expenses such as accommodation.

In social research, gatekeepers are crucial middlemen for gaining access to study locations and participants. Gatekeepers can also refer to any person or group of people who may be extremely helpful for gaining access because of their expertise, relationships with, or membership in a research population (Andoh-Arthur, 2020). However, due to personal agendas or concerns about negative consequences for the population they represent, gatekeepers can introduce biases into the research process. Several steps were taken in this study to mitigate these biases. To begin, the research team developed a trusting and transparent relationship with the gatekeepers by providing detailed information about the research objectives, methods, and potential implications. The research's benefits for gatekeepers and the populations they represent were also highlighted. Secondly, the gatekeepers were involved in the research process by providing input on the research design and data collection, ensuring that the process was culturally sensitive and respectful. A mixed-methods approach was also adopted, collecting data from multiple sources and using triangulation to verify the validity of the findings. Gatekeepers were mainly instrumental in gaining access to community heads, while residents were approached directly, with the assistance of a member of the community to ease tensions.

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[29] women's roles in these communities are secondary and subordinate to that of their men (Afolayan, 2019; Renne, 2004; Robson, 2000).

In the case of this research, the gatekeepers were mostly instrumental in gaining access to the community heads, but when it came to residents, they were usually with us just so we had a member of the community with us and we weren't seen as a threat, but they didn't influence the choice of community participants in this case. Suleiman, a resident of Unguwan Dosa in Kaduna metropolis, is the first gatekeeper. Nuhu, the second gatekeeper, is from Badarawa and works in Malali. He is very familiar with all of the study sites and is well known in the neighbourhoods. The field assistant and transport guy, (Mallam Kabiru; who also later doubled as a gatekeeper) are people we met on site. Mal. Kabiru served as our transport guy, he resides in Hayin Banki (close to Unguwan Dosa and Kawo). He is also very familiar with all the neighbourhoods within the Metropolis especially Rigasa. He is a married man with kids and relies on daily earnings from his tricycle business to make a living and take care of himself and his family. Malam Dogari, our third gatekeeper is from Rigasa, is a guard as well as an errand man in the Rigasa emirate council/Sarkis house. They were both instrumental in helping us familiarize ourselves more with the community and reassuring people of our intentions. In terms of data collection, as mentioned earlier, it was a team of seven but the number of people that were involved in the research at any one time differed. I usually had about three people on the ground in each site; me, the research assistant, and the gatekeeper except for Rigasa where we had two gatekeepers (it's paid work for all of them). Also, I have worked with most of them before, so it wasn't an issue for us working together, and they mostly helped with administering questionnaires.

The interviews were carried out within five wards in Kaduna Metropolis. All these sites were selected because they are identified areas within Kaduna metropolis where non-state security providers operate and due to the fact that they provide a good comparative ground for high and low-income neighbourhoods, in addition to some of them being crime hot spots. The general fieldwork process lasted for about a year, starting from when the idea of the research was approved by my research advisory team and trying to establish meaningful contacts to use during the data collection process. The data collection process itself lasted for about 6 months. Some of the enumerators had to travel from Zaria to Kaduna, which is around 80km. The team usually meets at a selected location within the study sites around 8:00-8:30am and start the research/interviews after briefing around the same time. The shortest and longest interviews for the semi structured residential interviews were approximately 10mins and 55 minutes, respectively (for 125 semi structured interviews with residents). Furthermore, three interviews were conducted with members of non-state security agencies. The first and second interview were carried out with members of the non-state policing security agencies (civilian JTF) and took an average of 2 hours to complete (2hrs:30mins and 1:42mins). The third interview was carried out with top officials of the formalized non-state security agency (vigilante; around 1hour:35mins) and then the combined interview with formal police officials lasted around 1 hour.

6.9   Residence Interview

The initial plan was to spend more time for the resident interviews, but two things influenced the pace of the interviews. First, interviews in the first four sites went smoothly because the key stakeholders within such communities were already familiar with the research team from previous work done there. Also, prior to our visit we had already made contact with the community heads to inform them about the visit. Ideally if you are conducting an interview in an Unguwa (community) you first go to the Mai Unguwas house to introduce yourself and let him know your intentions and what you are there to do. On the first day of each residential interview with a new community we visit the Mai Unguwas houses (see fig 58). In a typical setting, we usually have the Mai Unguwa present, except for Rigasa, where we couldn't meet with the Mai Unguwa but we met the Hakimi in his absence and other elders of the community. Others usually present include religious leaders, high ranking traditional members of the society, some businesspeople etc. In most cases we have about 5-10 people usually present in such gatherings. In Rigasa the data collection process took more time to complete: Rigasa is one of the biggest neighbourhoods within Kaduna Metropolis and the team spent a considerable amount of time establishing contact with key stakeholders and community members within the community.

Figure 31: Some members of the research team conducting interview with community members in study area.

Most of the *Mai Unguwas* have spent most, if not all, of their lives in these communities. They are comparable to a city's mayor or governor but are more in touch with their people. Most of the time, the Mai Unguwa helped us connect with important participants and groups that would have been difficult to reach on our own, such as influential businessmen, religious leaders, and women leaders etc. For, example in Malali, we were able to interview a very prominent businessman as a result of the community head giving us his contact and making a call through to him on our behalf and introducing us to him. He lives in a more affluent neighbourhood within Malali, and we had to go to his house to interview him. Selection of respondents within communities for this study was done purposively as stated earlier. The participants were selected based on their residency/business status (within the study area), knowledge, involvement, and experience with security issues within the neighbourhood[30].

In total, we were able to interview 25 people from each of the following wards: Badarawa, Malali, and Unguwan Dosa (total=75), 25 people in Kawo but nulled 2 of the interviews due to quality of response from participants (total= 23), and lastly, we also interviewed 25 people in Rigasa but nulled 4 of the interviews (total = 21). We had to cancel/remove some of the interviews because of the kind of response given which were mostly omission or no information at all. We nulled about 4 of such interviews in Rigasa and two in Kawo. All in all, we had a total of 119 valid responses out of 125 interviews conducted from the data collection process.

Figure 32: Author conducting an interview with a member of the community who is filling out a consent form.

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[30] See section on sampling and study population.

6.10 Data Analysis

Qualitative data was analysed using content and thematic analytical techniques. This involved an iterative process of transcription and data coding. The analysis involved developing a system of indexing the data into sets of categories that provided structure to the data based on the research objectives and the items included in the interview guide. The analysis of collected data also involved transcribing verbatim recorded interviews which was conducted in the interviewee's preferred language (mostly Hausa). Transcribed interviews and focus group discussions were then translated to English and analysed for emergent themes and primary coding categories using content analysis. Furthermore, quantitative data from semi-structured questionnaires was coded and entered into Microsoft Excel for analysis. Transcripts were content coded and relevant information were extracted from the transcripts. Identified coding categories and themes were then organized into a formal codebook, and illustrative quotes relevant to emergent themes.

Generally, a combination of descriptive and inferential statistical methods were used in analysing data generated. Descriptive statistics such as appropriate maps, tables, frequency count, and percentage distribution were employed to show the relationship between different variables in the study area. Frequency distribution and simple percentages were used to analyse demographic information of the respondents, while the chi-square technique was used to test the formulated hypotheses for this study.

In terms of the GIS data employed, the coordinates for the security institutions were typed in Microsoft excel and converted to '.csv' format which is compatible with GIS applications. It was further charted alongside other data into ArcMap 10.6.1 window for further processing. The points were overlaid on the community boundaries to understand their distribution on space. The average nearest neighbour for the security infrastructures were calculated for the distribution in ArcMap 10.6.1 window. Due to distance between Rigasa and the other communities (Badarawa, Ungwan Dosa, Malali and Kawo) the computation was then done separately for the two main clusters using Euclidean distance.

6.11 Ethical Considerations

Research participants include informal security providers, formal security institutions (police), traditional leaders, businessmen, residents amongst others. Researching groups that are linked to crime and violence management especially in places with a high crime rate sometimes call for special attention. The security and well-being of the researcher and research participants are of major importance and therefore the research prioritized the health and wellbeing of participants and the researcher when necessary. Participants were selected according to their affiliation with governance and provision of security of lives, property, and crime control within the study area including residents. Participants include both non-state and state security institutions including but not limited to leaders and members of the vigilante groups, youth crime prevention initiative clubs,

informal security organizations, and formal security organizations. The research was therefore guided by five main ethical issues: Researcher's safety, Informed consent, Voluntary participation, Confidentiality, and Anonymity. The awareness of ambient risks around the study area is another issue the study took into consideration especially since some parts of the research site are crime hotspots and others well known for incidents of mobile phone theft/snatching (Malali and Ungwan Dosa) in the evening and at night, so any interview or data collection will be done in the morning or afternoon[31] (see Azua, & Isioye, 2014; Ayuba, Mugu, Tanko, & Bulus, 2016; Ayuba 2017; Nzelibe and Bello, 2018).

Participants were fully informed about the purpose and goal of the research being conducted. Participants were informed about who or what group funded the research, how the findings will be used if there are any potential adverse impacts of their participation, and who will have access to the findings. This was done so that the participant can make an informed decision as to whether they want to participate in the research or not.

Participants were given the option and allowed to withdraw their participation at any time during the research without negatively impacting on their involvement in the research or their relationship with the researcher or research bodies involved. It was made clear to participants at the beginning that they can decide to not want to participate in the project at any time and if they choose to leave it is their right. Participants were also informed that any identifying information will not be made available to or accessed by anyone other than the researcher except where stated otherwise.

6.12 Conclusion

The research was designed to understand the best ways of managing African cities so they can be safe and productive. The research pursued this objective by investigating how different security providers interact and co-exist in the urban space to re-create a hybrid system of actors and system of governance especially in low-income neighbourhoods and places that have little or no access to state facilities. Its focus is on cases of non-state security groups/vigilante groups formed in response to low-level banditry/crime/threat and general lawlessness, as opposed to insurgent threats or large-scale insurgency and political or ethnic violence.

A combination of data collection instruments will be used in this study. These include questionnaires, interviews, focus group discussions with key stakeholders and residents, and collection of data from existing literature and other secondary sources. The study adopted a case study approach. Kaduna, Nigeria was stratified into the high, medium and low densities. Quantitative and qualitative research designs were adopted for this study. For the quantitative

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[31] The team typically visits the community head's home in each neighbourhood on the first day before starting the field interviews. With a focus on crime issues, the community's properties were described to us, and we were repeatedly warned not to conduct data collection or the research process after late afternoon. We were also urged to depart by 5 or 6 o'clock. In addition to numerous sources, including other studies, residents and other security personnel later chorused and reiterated this to us on various occasions throughout the research.

research design, questionnaires were used to generate quantitative data. This enabled the researchers to uncover the perceptions of the respondents on the effectiveness of the informal security structures in their respective neighbourhoods. On the other hand, for the qualitative research design, in-depth interviews were applied to generate qualitative data. This enabled the researchers to understand the narratives of the key respondents with reference to the proliferation and effectiveness of the informal security structures in their communities. The research involved three different categories of respondents. The first category will involve community members of low-income neighbourhoods from five (5) selected sites within Kaduna urban area to understand perception and experience with security issues and institutions. The second category will include non-state security providers within the selected neighbourhoods and the third will involve the state security agencies**.**

Next the state and non-state security organizations were interviewed in order to investigate how different security providers interact and co-exist in the urban space to recreate a hybrid system of actors and systems of governance especially in low-income neighbourhoods and places that have little or no access to state facilities. The interview focused particularly on the roles and responsibilities of non-state institutions in security governance within Kaduna urban area. It also touched on the relationship between formal and informal policing institutions and relationships with local communities in the state to better understand the constraints, limitations, and policy implications of this system for sustainable development. For the state security, 1 top/high ranking official of the NPF was interviewed and 1 other officer was also interviewed. For the non-state two groups were involved in the research i.e., KADVIS and civilian JTF. Both groups were interviewed for the research, one involving a focus group discussion (JTF) and the other a top official of the security agency (KADVIS).

CHAPTER 7. DATA PRESENTATION

7.0   Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to present a clearer picture and a better understanding of the urban context of Kaduna, especially in relation to its spatial and socio-cultural characteristics within the larger context of Nigeria, as well as to further help explain how this helps us better understand the insecurity situation in the study area and Nigeria generally.

Additionally, this section aims to establish the following: an understanding of Nigeria and Kaduna's geography, historical development, planning, and urban form in order to best understand and evaluate the major security challenges in the city; Spatial distribution of the available security infrastructures.

7.1   Background - Nigeria

All 36 of Nigeria's states, including the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, are presently impacted by the country's persistent and alarming security issues (see fig 35, 36 & 37). Afrobarometer's 2022 report on Nigeria highlights crime and violence as major concerns for citizens, with an increasing number of people feeling unsafe. The report reveals a surge in violence across all states, and the government is struggling to address the issue of insecurity. Crime and insecurity are the top concerns for Nigerians, according to the survey, and citizens feel that the government should prioritize addressing these problems. The majority of people report feeling unsafe and view Nigeria as an unsafe place to live, with abductions being perceived as a 'very serious' issue (Mbaegbu, & Duntoye, 2023). (See fig 34 and 35).

Fig 33: Afrobarometer survey on safety in Nigeria (source; Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023).

Fig 34: Most important problems in Nigeria 2022 (source; (Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023)

Fig 35: Map showing the number of people reported killed in Nigeria in Q3 2022 by zones (source; Amata, 2022)

Across the north-west, rural banditry and cattle rustling continue to pose threats to life and property, while ongoing conflicts between sedentary farmers and nomadic herders in the north-central region are endangering people's livelihoods and the availability of food. Secessionist movements, militancy, farmer-herder disputes, and kidnappings for ransom provide a threat to human security in the south-east and south-south regions of Nigeria. All this not only threatens human security but also poses a challenge to the state's stability, territorial integrity, and legitimacy (Ogbonnaya, 2020). Despite government efforts and interventions ranging from the deployment of highly trained security personnel in collaboration with international organisations to massive budgetary allocations to combat insecurity, these challenges have persisted over the years, and the issue has become a persistent source of concern for policymakers and the country. As the country's security situation worsens, more communities are devising alternate means to 'defend' themselves. The Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, Oduua People's Congress, Arewa Consultative Forum, and Ohanaeze are examples of groups that have risen to defend their communities against crime. These organisations operate throughout the country and occasionally serve as unofficial security forces for state governments (Akosah-Sarpong, 2002).

Fig 36: Number (5,113) of people killed in Nigeria as a result of insecurity across the country over a period of 11months (source; Ndujihe, 2019).

Table 3: Hotspot of Insecurity issues in Nigeria

S/N	Type of Insecurity	Geopolitical Zones	Most affected states
1	Religious Extremism	North East	Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe
2	Transhumance Conflict	North Central	Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa
3	Ethnic Conflict	North Central	Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa
		North West	Kaduna
		South South	Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom
4	Mineral Resource Conflict	South South	Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom
		North West	Kaduna and Zamfara
5	Civil Crime (i.e. offences against property, persons and lawful authority)	North Central	Abuja, Benue, Niger and Plateau
		North West	Kano and Sokoto
		South East	Abia and Ebonyi
		South South	Delta
		South West	Lagos, Ondo, and Oyo

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria, 2018.

Furthermore, table 3 above demonstrates that property crimes are the most often committed civil offences in Nigeria. Armed robbery, wounding with menace, theft, burglary, store breaking, pretense and fraud, forgery, receiving stolen property, unlawful possessions, arson, and other connected offences are among these crimes, according to the Nigerian Police. Crimes against persons follow with offences such as homicide, manslaughter, attempted suicide, assault, child theft, slave selling, rape and indecent assault, kidnapping, unnatural offences, and other connected offences. The least amount of crime is committed in offences against lawful authority. Forgery of currency, coining offences, gambling, breach of peace, perjury, bribery and corruption, escape from jail, and other related offences are examples of such offences, according to the Nigeria Police (Aleyomi and Nwagwu, 2020). Against this backdrop, this research focuses on low-level banditry/crime/threat and general lawlessness, rather than insurgent threats or large-scale insurgency and political or ethnic conflict.

Figure 37: Nigeria's Security Events by state/location (Source; Adopted from; Beacon Consultants, 2021).

Security reports from Beacon[32] and records from ACLED, Nigeria has experienced a significant increase in insecurity-related incidents. A detailed breakdown by region (see Fig 38) highlights the security challenges across Nigeria. In 2021, Nigeria witnessed a total of 8,372 fatalities nationwide, as analyzed from security incidents. Among the geopolitical regions, the Northwest region recorded the highest number of casualties with 3,051 fatalities, followed by the Northeast

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[32] Beacon Consulting is a security risk management and intelligence consulting company in Nigeria. The Beacon Consulting team provides security expertise and analysis to help adopt proactive measures to improve security posture, facilitate compliance, and enhance operational efficiency for the safety purposes.

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(1,895), the North Central (1,684), the Southeast (853), the South-South (448), and the Southwest (441). The data further reveals that the Northwest accounted for 36.4% of the annual fatality figures, with the Northeast at 22.6% and the North Central at 20.1%. Consequently, the overall fatality rate for Northern Nigeria reached 79.2% (Beacon Consultants, 2021). In the fourth quarter of 2021 (October to December), Nigeria recorded a total of 1,516 deaths nationwide. The Northwest region suffered the highest number of casualties with 673 fatalities, followed by the Northeast (413), North Central (235), South East (114), South West (51), and South-South (30) (Beacon Consultants, 2021).

These figures underscore the gravity of the security situation in Nigeria, emphasizing the need for effective measures to address the rising insecurity across the country (see fig 38).

7.2.1 Insecurity in Northern Nigeria

The Northern region of Nigeria has experienced an increase in insecurity in recent years, manifested in threats such as kidnappings, religious riots, tribal conflicts, and so-called 'bandit herdsmen' attacks on villages, as well as the fight against Boko Haram. These issues have continued over time despite government interventions, such as the deployment of trained and experienced security officers working with foreign organisations and substantial funding expenditures (FCLP 2019).

The insecurity in the country's north is so complicated that there is no single explanation for why it has got to this point. Many have hypothesized that the increase of the violence currently observed is the result of a combination of factors, incidents, and a period of time in which there was a lack of accountability (Adepegba, 2020). Concerns about the high level of insecurity in the region have been expressed by prominent voices in the North. One of them is Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto, who described the criminals as bold and the region as the worst place to live in the nation (Olokor, 2020). According to the Sultan 'They travelled from home to house, village to village, market to market, openly carrying AK-47 rifles, purchasing foodstuffs and other items, and even collecting tax,' without being challenged by security. According to the monarch and top traditional ruler in the region, the security system in the country has entirely crumbled. 'Security situation in Northern Nigeria has assumed a worrisome situation. A few weeks ago, approximately 76 people were killed in a Sokoto town in a single day. I was there with the governor to commiserate with the affected community. People think North is safe, but that assumption is not true. In fact, it's the worst place to be in this country because bandits go around in the villages, households and markets with their AK-47 and nobody is challenging them'.

Figure 38: Number of security incidents in Major Northern Nigerian States (source; Samuel, 2020).

The ongoing and recurrent state of crime in the nation and region has been attributed by some to insufficient government funding for security but others suggest the budget is not the key. Ignatius Kaigama, the catholic archbishop of the Abuja Diocese, states, 'We understand that the budget for national and state security is huge. Let us not deceive ourselves that the bigger the budget the more peace will flow. Weapons don't bring peace' (Olokor, 2020).

Figure 39: Map showing the number of casualties in Kaduna state between Jan-March 29, 2022 (source; Amata, 2022)

Others have hypothesized that the problem persists because wealthy people and government officials believe they are not 'directly affected' because they typically have security personnel assigned to them. Additionally, it is believed that criminals would consider the risk of targeting high profile persons compared to the villagers, whom they can easily overpower. Experts have also observed that in this situation, the most vulnerable communities suffer the most (Adepegba, 2020).

Experts have also criticized the government for being unprepared to address the problem head-on, particularly at the outset. For instance, very little was done to investigate and prosecute suspects when the attacks first began in remote areas. According to a report, 'There are no cases that we are aware of that have gone to trial; no one has been found guilty of inciting this violence.' The security agencies are now overburdened as a result of such group's increased boldness in aiming for bigger targets and the attacks' intensification (Adepegba, 2020).

Others have attributed the success of insurgencies, crime, and terrorism in Nigeria to the country's wealth, abundance of business opportunities, lax security architecture, security infrastructure, corruption, lack of will and determination on the part of those in charge of security, limited experience, and exposure to unconventional fighting techniques. Furthermore, the fact that criminals, particularly terrorists, can readily blend in with northern Nigerians in terms of physical appearance, language, religion, and other cultural aspects makes it easier for them to make Nigeria their destination (Adeoye, 2020). There are also reports that the attacks are carried out to scare community residents away so that illegal miners can mine to their hearts' content without interference from the community or follow-up by authorities because everyone is too busy trying to manage the security situation (Adepegba, 2020).

More specifically, in urban areas like Kaduna, population explosion, stark economic inequality and deprivation, unemployment, socio-political condition among others are factors that contribute to crime occurrence (Dodo, 2008; Francis *et al* 2006). Kaduna state is a cosmopolitan city with different cultures, ethnic groups, religions, and tribes. Kaduna State is today one of the largest and most important cities in northern Nigeria (Ifatimehin, Okafor & Ishaya, 2008). Apart from Maiduguri, the epicentre of Boko Haram attacks and insurgency; Kano, which frequently witnesses 'blasphemy'-related violence; Plateau and Benue States; the flashpoints of herdsmen's attacks on farming communities, Kaduna takes the central stage for sectarian and communal conflicts (Vanguard 2018). In recent years ethnic and tribal wars, religious conflicts have led to an increase in criminal activities such as kidnapping, theft, and robbery which has plagued the city (FCLP 2019). The state governor, Mal. Nasir El-Rufai has repeatedly shown his frustration over the insecurity in the state, alleging that the situation had overwhelmed the police. To make matters worse, the state government has complained that a sizable number of Nigeria Police Force members who should be fighting criminal elements in the nation are instead taking part in non-police activities like carrying the bags of Very Important People's (VIPs) wives (Sahara Reporters, 2020). The state government is currently working on a bill to restructure police architecture by creating state police, to meet contemporary challenges. The new structure will involve the

community in tackling insecurity in the state, through traditional and political leaders. The government is planning to adopt community policing in communities to complement security and help solve insecurity issues. This will be done by engaging traditional, community, political leaders among others in tackling insecurity. furthermore, district heads will be expected to provide/select honest youths within their communities and send them to the local government for thorough screening for community policing (Alabelewe, 2020).

The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the potential for differing arguments and proposals that may arise from the findings related to the insecurity in Kaduna. The failure to differentiate and develop appropriate local responses to the threats driving insecurity may lead to the exacerbation of this crisis. Experts such as Ayandele (2021) suggest that Kaduna could adopt a similar strategy used to combat Boko Haram in Borno, which involves integrating local security agencies into the national security structure to build up local security forces. This could reduce the need for the redeployment of Nigeria's already overstretched armed forces to the same locations and enable the maintenance of a security presence following military and state operations.

7.3   Study Area - Kaduna

Figure 40: Map of Kaduna Metropolis in the context of Nigeria, showing all 34 wards (Adapted from Nzelibe and Bello, 2018)

The study was carried out in Kaduna State, an important city in Northern Nigeria that unofficially serves as the region's administrative centre, symbolic political capital of Northern Nigeria, and one of Nigeria's main commercial and industrial hubs (see fig 41) (Ayandele, 2021). After Lagos with 10,578,000 inhabitants, Kano with 3,395,000, Ibadan with 2,837,000, and Abuja with 1,995,000, Kaduna was regarded as Nigeria's fifth-largest and most populous city based on a 2015 data with 1.14million and a population density of about 4,560person/km2 (UNDESA, 2009; Bununu et al., 2015; Umar, 2017). Kaduna metropolis occupies a total land area of about 250 km2 and it is a diverse city that is home to many different ethnic groups, tribes, and cultures. Nearly all of Nigeria's major ethnic groups as well as some foreigners call it home (Bununu et al, 2015).

Kaduna city, the capital of present-day Kaduna State is today one of the largest and most important cities in northern Nigeria (Ifatimehin, Okafor & Ishaya, 2008). An important aspect of the history of Kaduna lies in its colonial origin. Many of the other large cities in northern Nigeria, like Kano, Sokoto, and Maiduguri were major towns and the sites of emirates in the pre-colonial period (Falola & Heaton, 2008). These ancient towns were significant trading hubs for the majority of the 19th century and had distinct traditional settlement patterns, with the rulers' palace serving as the centres or cores of these towns. On the other hand, Lord Frederick Lugard, a British colonial governor in Nigeria, founded Kaduna in 1912 (Falola, 1987). The city, which is now the capital of Kaduna state in northwest Nigeria, started as a garrison town in 1912 and later developed into the regional capital of the Northern Protectorate. The metropolis was designed by Max Locks (1964) a Consultancy *company* in the fields of urban and regional planning, research and training to accommodate administrative and industrial hubs which have resulted in the city attracting people of different races, religions, and cultures making it one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria (Mohammed, 2013).

Kaduna's population has grown dramatically over the years as a result of its status as a colonial administration town and, later, a regional and state capital (see table 4). According to a Kaduna State Government estimate, the population of Kaduna was 149,910 during the 1963 national census, but by 1985, the population had surged to 664,162. (Bununu et al., 2015). Although several studies have criticized the population figures presented for most Nigerian cities, particularly those from the National Population Commission (NPC), owing to flawed or inconclusive censuses, it is completely obvious that the population of Kaduna, particularly the urban area, is rapidly expanding. Potts (2012) made one such argument in a review of datasets used in the analysis of the population, size, and growth of Nigerian towns. According to the report, '*Africapolis dataset used in the analysis puts the city's population at 114,000 in 1963 based on the census conducted that year. By 1970, 1990, 2000 and 2010 the Africapolis estimates show the city's population to be 322,000, 699,000, 1,030,000 and 1,361,000, respectively. Whereas the 1991 and 2006 official censuses had estimated Kaduna's population to be 994,000 and 1,129,000, respectively. It must be noted that there exists a lack of acceptable estimates on the size and growth of Nigerian towns and cities'.*

Table 4: Population figures and growth of Kaduna Metropolis from 1973-2020

Year	Pop fig	Area (km^2)	Period (years)	Growth within period (kn2)	Annual growth rate (%)
1973	191,898	35.10	-		
1990	332,995	92.39	17	57.3	9.6
2001	504,556	129.39	11	37.0	3.6
2006	1,139,578	145.94	5	16.6	2.7
2012	1,323,883	263.24	6	117.3	13.4
2020	4,142,978		8	-	2.47%

Source: Afon, & Alwadood, (2016).

Figure 41: The built-up area of Kaduna metropolis for 1973, 1990, 2001, 2006 and 2012. (Source; Afon, & Alwadood, 2016).

Kaduna's urban centre is one of the largest cities in the Northern part of Nigeria and it has grown tremendously in a little over one hundred years from a small administrative town to a metropolis with a population in excess of one million people (Bununu et al., 2015). It is located on latitude 10°30'N and longitude 7°28'E with a height of about 600-650m above mean sea level. Spatially, it spans about 7.7 hectares, from Katabu in the north to the oil refinery in the south. The state capital covers an area of about 25km by 10km and comprises of Kaduna North, Kaduna South, and part of Igabi Local Government Area (see fig 42). Based on the 2006 census from the National Population Commission, the population of the whole state was around 6,113,503 and the population of Kaduna urban centre was around 1,129,000 (NPC 2006). The demographic data from the National Population Commission estimation from 2006 census, therefore, puts the population of Kaduna Metropolis in 2020 to about 4,142,978 using 2.47% growth rate. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) put the annual population growth rate of the state at 2.47%.

7.3.1   Selected Study sites

The study area is made up of 30 neighbourhoods (see fig 43 and 44), out of which 5 of which provided a combination and proximity between planned and unplanned urbanization and gave a basis for assessing crime as the five can be classified as some of the city's crime hotspots.

Figure 42: Map of the study area in the context of Kaduna Metropolitan area (source; Authors computation).

Figure 43: Map of neighbourhoods in Kaduna Metropolitan area (Adapted from Ayuba, 2017)

Figure 44: Heat map of crime hotspots in Kaduna Metropolis

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The information offered here is part of research that helps in analysing the distribution and spatial patterns of crime facilities in Kaduna. To do this, the research focused on presenting and explaining the study area's existing infrastructure capacity to manage crime.

Figure 45: Map of land use distribution and security facility distribution within selected study sites in Kaduna (source; authors computation).

In terms of provision of security facilities, in the entire study area there are a total of 15 security facilities (as shown in table 4 and figure 39). Malali has the highest number which includes the divisional police headquarters. The Yen kato da Gora beats are distributed amongst Badarawa, Malali and Ungwan Dosa. The state Vigilante (KADVIS) a represented more in Rigasa than any other community.

CHAPTER 8 - DATA PRESENTATION

Section 1; Qualitative Data

8.0   Introduction

The primary goal of this chapter is to delve into the perspectives and insights of various informal security providers. The thesis is organised thematically and is divided into two sections: quantitative and qualitative. The ultimate goal is to answer the research questions that have been posed. Section 1 of Chapter 8 is dedicated to presenting and discussing the qualitative data and information gathered through interviews conducted at five distinct study sites. This section provides a comprehensive breakdown of the responses obtained from the interviews with security personnel, organised by themes.

The goal here is to understand and analyse the proliferation and effectiveness of the informal security system in their communities. The participants' real names will not be used in the research (quantitative and qualitative sections of the study) despite the fact that consent was obtained to use their names and also take and publish photographs from almost all participants who allowed me to take their pictures (a few were undecided). Due to ethical concerns, participant faces will be blurred in photographs and names will be used in a pseudonymous manner. Security personnel will be referred to as leaders/top officials (for high-ranking members of the groups) and members (no rank or low-ranking members). The letters R, 1, 2, 3, and so forth, were used to indicate the responses when there were multiple respondents.

8.1   Theme 1: What are the existing infrastructural and institutional capabilities (formal & informal) used to deal with crime in the study area? How do these vary?

In Kaduna, as in most Nigerian cities, there are essentially two actors involved in security provision: the formal, which includes police, military, and other paramilitary agencies; and the informal. The informal/local security providers in residential areas of Kaduna are made up of traditional community elders and community members who come together to form a locally run joint security service known as CJTF/*Kato de Gora*, a kind of Joint Task Force that harnessed pre-colonial governance structures, and contemporary youth-led street knowledge, which together would address security issues at neighbourhood scales. CJTF means Civilian Joint Task Force and they comprise groups of people who come together from the same neighbourhood, with the sole aim of maintaining law and order within a community (see fig 46). They are usually comprised of representatives from the emirate and local community members who turn into security patrollers during night hours and rely on ad hoc donations from the community for their operations.

All of the communities involved in the study still have the traditional governance system in place, with the head of such communities (Mai-Unguwas) still in charge of its affairs. One of the residents reiterated this point, saying '*if a stranger wants to settle in this community or even rent a house he will have to come and see the Mai Unguwa first after which they will try to find out about his background, and if he is fit to live within the community, we will accept him*'. This demonstrates how important and relevant the Mai Unguwas are in the communities, as well as how traditional leaders in such communities are still regarded. They are also known for overseeing the resolution of disputes, ensuring stability, and acting as the people's representative to the government in such communities.

Figure 46: Researcher interviewing a community elder in one of the neighbourhoods.

Commenting on the various security providers within the neighbourhoods and their link with one another and the traditional governance structures one of the community leaders commented saying:

They are many, first, we have the police, secondly, we have civilian JTF, committee and KADVIS, the Palace and other organizations that enlighten or orient individuals on peaceful coexistence and community development. The leader (CJTF leader) is like a father a figurehead to us all. But if the case is not resolved then the police will be involved. The palace plays a significant role in ensuring that disputes do not escalate at all. The Sarki (King) is closer to the people. But when it comes to going after offenders, you involve the civilian JTF or the police. The CJTF leader may not ask for an offender to be apprehended. But disputes can be taken to the Mai Unguwa. The Mai Unguwa will then take the case to the palace and from there to the Hakimi's (Official in charge of traditional districts). As you can see it's all in stages. If they escalate, they'll be taken to the police station or KADVIS, but the head ensures that peace is sustained at all times through sermons, orientation and other means.

On how the groups are usually established; the system and some of the practices of these groups predate the present system and go as far back as the precolonial and colonial era. It's also clear that the groups work directly with both the local traditional governance structures which predate

the colonial system and the formal security/governance indirectly. According to some of the leaders of the groups and other members of the community:

R1*: Civilian JTF was form in response to increase in insecurity within the neighbourhoods. Cases of phone snatching, house and shop burgling and rape amongst other social vices were on the increase within Malali and Badarawa districts and there was increase in loss of lives and damage of properties. In response to that, the traditional rulers, religious leaders and stakeholders within our communities decided to come together to address these issues. Specifically, the traditional community leaders i.e., the Mai Unguwas (head of communities) and Hakimai (traditional official in charge of districts) through Sarkin Matasa (youth leaders) decided to form a joint task force to address insecurity within these neighbourhoods.*

Another leader in a different ward (Malali neighbourhood) also corroborated this by saying:

R2: *The idea was conceived and implemented by the ward heads (Mai Unguwa's) of Malali and Badarawa. They felt that various challenges were coming up within their communities as a result of increase in population especially youth population. The nine heads from the various communities came up with this plan to curb the increasing violence in their communities. As members of the community, we [youth] had a good understanding with the heads and decided to come together to discuss how to come up with a committee that will deal with the offenders and so, the civilian JTF was created.*

R3: *This group was formed because of the many troubles in the society such as theft and robbery cases, fighting among youths using sophisticated weapons and so on. Our wives and parents could not go about their daily activities in peace, even the children could not go to school unless they are assigned escorts.*

The informal or traditional system is further subdivided into two broad categories: those managed by the traditional system, namely the *Yen Kato Da Gora* (ojumaimai, committee, civilian JTF), and those managed by the formal system, namely the vigilantes (yen banga). According to research findings, they both began as crime fighting initiatives within their neighbourhoods as a result of an increase in crime in most communities, particularly low-income neighbourhoods within the city, and after recording success and support from the masses, there were demands to start working with the government. This did not sit well with some of the group's leaders, who felt it would mean government control; as one of them put it, '*he who feeds you, controls you,*' implying that if the government starts funding them, they will eventually take over. Others, however, disagreed, believing that they needed the support of the state to continue their crime-fighting operations. This eventually resulted in the group breaking up. It is important to however note that this research focuses and discusses the particular approach of the community-based security provider – the Joint Task Forces (CJTF), who are formed in response to an increase in crime mostly within low-income neighbourhoods that also sometimes double as crime hot spots within most cities.

Commenting on how the vigilante group was formed, one of the leaders of vigilante commented on this saying:

We started this as a result of the hardship we were in. So many nuisances in the neighbourhood. We woke up one day, picked up some sticks and tried to clean up these things. At first, we didn't have a name, but we later became the Ungwan Rimi security committee. We were later known as the JTF. In 2016, when Mal Nasir became the governor, he established the Kaduna State Vigilante Services, which recognized our group as part of government establishment. At that time Muhammad was the state commander. We paid him a visit and he explained how everything works. We obtained and filled in the forms. Since then, we have been working under the Kaduna State Vigilante services, from 2016 to date.

The government-recognized Vigilantes usually operate in high- and middle-income residential neighbourhoods and receive grant/help for their services from the government. Meanwhile, the *yen Kato Da Gora* (CJTF) were founded primarily in response to an increase in crime in communities surrounding low-income neighbourhoods with little or no access to formal security services, and they depend solely on community contributions if they need help i.e., they provide a volunteer type of service without pay most times. In fact, they sometimes share the same name (all known as Yan Kato-da-Gora in Hausa, or Civilian JTF/ KADVIS JTF in English). The major difference between them is that one is more formalized than the other; one is a state recognized vigilante service, and the other a community-based initiative. Basically, the local JTF (CJTF) only operate within their neighbourhoods, don't recruit from outside, don't work with government (in principle) and get funding from community contributions while the KADVIS JTF (KJTF) work more with government and across the whole city, have members from different neighbourhoods and get training from the government. They are also called upon by the government to cover events in case of police shortage. Additionally, some work with the army for counter-terrorism operations in the near-by forests e.g., in Maiduguri (fight against Boko haram).

On payment for the CJTF services, one of their members commented on this by saying *'No, we don't request anything. Though if you give us, we won't refuse it. We don't tax anyone, when we catch a culprit after our investigation, we take them directly to the police, who take up the case'.*

Explaining how the other group (KJTF) operates, a member explained saying: *Apart from taking care of the neighbourhoods, companies also employ our services and in such cases our men are being paid for their services.*

They are, however, both community policing initiatives with a similar modus operandi. Both organizations work within the city to support each other and the state's efforts to combat insecurity. One of the top officers backed up these claims when he stated:

The police, the JTF and the vigilante. *We work together in ungwan rimi. the last joint patrol we had, I provided 20 of our members.*

Figure 47: A cross section of some members of the Kaduna state vigilante service.

Figure 48: The research team with members of the Civilian JTF in Unguwan Dosa

Some of the other differences as mentioned by leaders of both groups include.

8.1.2 Boundary and mode of operation:

In terms of operation, they have boundaries between units and communities and each group seems to operate around certain places and have their boundaries. Interestingly, when someone from a community commits a crime in another community, he is either handed over to CJTF from his community or CJTF from his community are invited. Some of their members commented on this saying:

R1: *We started the vigilante in 2016 and we have a common sector commander that controls us all. But like I told you before, the operations of the JTF is quite different. The JTF members have a feeling of being constrained when they join the vigilante. The JTF have no government involvement in their activities and have decided not to work with the government because they feel they will be tied down. And they want to operate independently.*

R2: *From time to time. Whenever our members go to patrol in ungwan rimi, the JTF often complain about us not informing them. They feel that they are in ungwan rimi and we are in ungwan kudu. But I have informed the DPO that I'm the supervisor of the entire ungwan rimi. And the DPO understands that we operate under the law.*

R3: *I know the border between ungwan Rimi and Ungwan sarki, the border between ungwan Rimi and Hayi, the border between ungwan Rimi and kabala, the border between ungwan Rimi and Doka. These are neighbourhoods we share a boundary with. So, we are being guided because we have a boundary. If you go beyond a line, you know that you are breaking the law. That's how we work. Secondary schools in Kaduna State are now being taken care of by vigilante. JTF are not stationed there because they are not recognized by the government.*

R4: *If someone commits a crime within our boundary he can be apprehended here. But if it's outside the boundary we handle the case differently. An example, someone steals from ungwan rimi and we find out that the person who bought the phone is staying somewhere else. The first thing to do is to report the case to vigilante office in that neighbourhood. They will help with the arrest of the thief and hand them to us here. If there is no vigilante office in the neighbourhood, we take it to the JTF office. And if there's none, we take it to the police station. And honestly, the police really cooperate with us. We also have a gazette while they work voluntarily to improve the neighbourhood.*

8.1.3 Operation and Organizational Structure:

KJTF; *We have a state commander (1 individual). He has his 2IC (second in command- 1 individual). We have the admin (1), then operation (3), patrol and guard (P&G-3), provost (1), publicity secretary (1), and welfare (1). We also have a similar structure at the local government level.*

CJTF: *The Yen kato da gora (committee) chairman and then vice-chairman are at the top of the leadership ladder. After them is the PRO (in charge of broadcasting information from the top to other members). Other members include Shugaban alkalin shariah (in charge of rules and regulations), discipline officer and his assistant, secretary, assistant secretary. There is also the commander who has up to 4 commanders under him, he is in charge of organizing and conducting patrol and guard duties (P and G) which happens on foot. In addition, the head of patrol (sometimes referred to as GOC), his 2IC (second in command) and over 100 patrol team members sometimes provide security for events such as weddings.*

8.1.4 Guidance and Constitution/Law:

Both groups work with the police, but one works on an official level under the guidance of the law (Kaduna vigilante law 2016), whereas the other works more informally and under the traditional governance system (the palace and Emir/Mai unguwas). On how their activities are guided, the JTFs reacted that most of their activities are guided by the traditional institution, religious laws and the country's constitution through the office of the DPO. vigilante on the other hand have an official gazette that contains all the rules of conduct and operation for their activities. One of their leaders of vigilante corroborated this by saying;

KJTF: *When we first started before becoming vigilante in 2016, we did not have any guidance. We were still part of the JTF then but even then, we got one. But the constitution of the JTF is not as well-thought-out as that of the Kaduna State Vigilante services. Because if you take a look at their constitution, it's like that of the police. We were recently screened by the Department of State Services (DSS) and we are awaiting the training exercise. In my command, 86 have scaled through the screening exercise.*

CJTF: *The JTF are being guided by the DPO. Whenever there are mistakes, the DPO will point it out and make corrections. But now we simply go through our practices (review) so that we don't go beyond our boundary.*

8.2   Theme 2.   What role do 'non-state', 'informal' or customary actors and institutions play in security provision? how do they operate, how are they structured, and to what extent do they complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for official security provision?

8.2.1 Structure

The group's (*yen kato da gora*) leadership posts and structure are not permanent. According to them, the organization is still developing, so their membership structure is still evolving. Some elements of it, such as those appointed by the palace and king, such as the *Sarkin Matasa* and the

Sarkin Yaki, are permanent. *Sarkin Yaki* and *Sarkin Matasa* are the highest-ranking members of the group. The traditional title of *Sarkin Yaki* refers to the Minister of War. Everything concerning security falls under the appointee's supervision whenever he is available and in town. He reports on whatever is going on to the royal palace. Another traditional position is that of the *Sarkin Matasa* (minister of youth affairs). The appointee is appointed based on his ability to have a good rapport with youths within the community. The title usually falls on someone whom youths listen to and who can keep the youths in line.

The chairman and vice-chairman of the *yen kato da gora* (committee) are at the top of the leadership ladder in terms of security provision within communities and at the neighbourhood level. The PRO comes after them (in charge of broadcasting information from the top to other members). *Shugaban alkalin shariah* (in charge of rules and regulations), discipline officer and his assistant, secretary, and assistant secretary are among the other members. There is also the commander, who is in charge of organizing and conducting patrol and guard tasks (P and G) usually on foot. He usually has up to four commanders reporting to him. Additionally, the head of patrol (also known as the GOC), his 2IC (second in command), and over 100 patrol team members offer protection for events such as weddings on occasion. Most patrols happen at night from around 4pm to 3am, with the approval of the police. Members meet at 3:30pm and start the patrol 4:00pm. There is also daytime patrol which according to them is a way of scaring away offenders, by making them aware of their presence in the neighbourhood. According to the commander:

There is no specific time for conducting patrol, it depends on the time by which criminal activities takes place whether in the morning afternoon, or evening. The time is just targeted on when crime is been committed or going on. Even though we are community security, we work under the police force and are not on our own. Because we operate in partnership with them, we must alert them when we go out on patrol or other security operations. The essence of informing them is that when we go on patrol and find out the criminals are using more sophisticated weapons (Guns) unlike ours that are (Local Knife, Machete, Sticks), we can call to inform them about the situation at hand, and the need for them to send backup. But that doesn't mean we can't do our job, as you see us now, we are always ready and prepared to go to patrol. Right now, we have more than 30 people outside on duty and even if there is no one on duty the commander calls for emergency patrol and most of our members will show up.

Figure 49: One of the high-ranking members of the JTF.

They also claim that retired police and military officers provide them with some of their policing ideas and training. Their leaders are occasionally invited by the state to attend seminars or other similar activities, particularly on how to properly carry out their responsibilities, which they are expected to impart to their members.

We usually get advice from some retired force men who happen to be elders of the community and our divisional police, they give some tips and advice on how to do some things. Our head here also has more ties to the police and so he enlightens us after his meetings with them on how to do things properly and professionally.

They claim to rely on experience from more knowledgeable people in other aspects of their operations, such as training, guidelines, laws and regulations, and so on. One of the participants made the following remark:

As you see this is a voluntary work, anything you want to do you have to study it first before you partake in it, it is like the religion setting for example you have to ask questions about what you don't understand from people practicing before you. For example, there is self-defence committee before we partake in all this stuff, we had to make inquiry from people that have already passed

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through similar training. We also talk to more knowledgeable members from other communities. We know we are not the first to set this kind of organization in motion, so we ask others about the problems they encounter doing this type of job and try to improve on it. There are some groups where members go beyond the line, thereby breaking the law and that's how our members get into trouble because nobody is against the law. Even though you are an ordinary person once you don't break the law no matter how educated and well learned someone is, he cannot fault or arrest you.

8.2.2   Membership

Several districts in Kaduna's urban area have informal security providers operating within them, for example, the Malali unit, which is made up of federal and state low-cost, *unguwan shekara*, village, and *unguwan gado*, among others. For Malali/Badarawa communities, there are nine units of CJTF. There are also nine *Sarkin M*atasa (Youth leaders) attached to each CJTF unit. At the inception, 10 members were selected from each community and the group was made up of 90 members all together but currently they allege to have about 300 members. In the Kaduna urban area, the Badarawa/Malali office is the headquarters of the *Yen kato da gora* (CJTF).

They operate on a neighbourhood level, with the headquarters in charge of the overall success of the numerous units. The headquarters is made up of an equal number of people from each district who are nominated by their unit chairmen. As a result, each district is represented at the headquarters. At the neighbourhood level, the same is done. At the neighbourhood level, the unit is made up of people from the various wards. The headquarters handles all formal matters from the local, state, and federal governments, while the neighbourhood s handle ward-level issues. The group meets once a week at the headquarters after Isha'I prayer (Islamic night prayers performed around 8 p.m. until 10 p.m.). During these discussions, each unit presents their problems. During such meetings, the way forward and how to communicate with the government so that things are done properly are generally negotiated.

Summarizing the membership process, one of the leaders commented saying.

Currently, there are over 300 members in CJTF Malali/Badarawa. At the inception, 10 members were selected from each community, and we had 90 members all together. All members must fill a form duly signed by youth leader, his parents and also present 2 guarantors then sworn in by a lawyer. Each member must be of good character.

8.2.3   Recruitment

The organisation is entirely run by volunteers, with little or no regular employees in most situations. The majority of members work as security operatives at night and go about their everyday lives during the day. Members included those with regular jobs such as carpenter, electrician, painter, mason, government worker, footballer, agent (house), driver, and students. Even though they have regular jobs, some claim that they sometimes work as security operatives

during the day when they are less busy. According to a member *'we go to the office sometimes when we are less busy or have nothing doing instead of roaming about aimlessly'*.

The organisation currently has over 300 members who are selected through a structured process.

Even though participants are volunteers, certain conditions must be met before a volunteer is accepted into the organisation. Some of the requirements include being physically fit, being a member of the community, you are applying from/to, being recommended by the Sarkin Matasa (traditional minister of youth affairs), providing two referees, and filling out an application form (which must be signed by the district head, youth leader, applicant's parents) and providing your passport photograph. To be admitted into the group, new members must also be youthful (youth) and must be of good character.

The following are the details provided by the group's leader:

Our recruits are from the age of 20-25 years above. We have been very welcoming to youths who wish to be part of us without pushing them aside or neglecting them which is very important. As I said earlier, we are an organization that work very hard to be welcoming and listening to the youths. It is not only one's son that is their child, but every child here is like everybody's child and its only God that can really change someone's good character to a bad one and vice versa. In this organization if a child is brought in for disciplinary actions, we discipline them and further ask them if they want us to assist them with a job. The youths see the organization as one that helps empower them and they also want to be member, that is why we have been getting a lot of applications. Even today we are expecting new ones.

As previously stated, volunteers must be from the community they are applying to, primarily for reasons of accessibility and patrol, especially when they have to carry out impromptu patrols, and because most of it is done on foot, travelling from a long distance will almost certainly cause delays. Aside from ease of access, the group believes that recruiting members from within the community is essential because only people from the community are most aware of the community's problems. Members are also contacted via mobile phones in the event of an emergency, and because it is located within their base, they can quickly assemble at their respective offices. In Malali, the chairman further buttressed on such conditions as follows:

We don't take persons from outside the neighbourhood to do this job. Because it is those who live here that understand the challenges of the neighbourhood. All neighbourhoods that have this same security arrangement do the same (they only take people from within their neighbourhoods). This is mostly because only an insider can really understand the problems of his/her community, an outsider may not understand the problems. For example, imagine they post a police officer from Kano to Malali, where does he know in Malali? You see he can't know anywhere in Malali. There are police members though that have been in certain divisions for so long and such policemen may know all the nooks and crannies of places they oversee. In our own case for instance, I know every

single household and their members in this neighbourhood because it's my home. If the police were to call us with a name of an offender, I can easily locate and deliver the culprit to them within an hour because I know him, his parents and so on.

In addition to the aforementioned criteria, members are chosen for their zeal, willingness, and ability to do the job. According to the chairman:

Unlike the job of say a policeman, this job requires that a person works right within his neighbourhood. These comes with resentment from other residents. So not everyone can handle such, therefore, we choose those who have the community's interest at heart and want to bring about positive change in the community. Each selected individual proceeds to take an oath in the presence of a lawyer before they are finally accepted.

8.2.4 Registration

Unlike KADVIS, which operates under the Kaduna state vigilante law of 2016, an official law has yet to be established/proclaimed to back their activities, but the group claims that they are recognised by the state government and are registered. One of the members described how they operate as well as the registration process.

'to start this initiative within your neighbourhood, you first go to the Sarkin Unguwa (community head) to tell him about your intentions of forming the group, he will then take you to the police station closest to the neighbourhood to inform the DPO (Divisional Police Officer- the senior officer in charge of the police division where the neighbourhood is located) about your plans, then the DPO will take you to the court which will give you permission. After this process we start recruiting members from interested people within the neighbourhood. We will then be given an office and other resources such as ID Cards for members and other equipment's needed to safeguard the community by the Sarkin Unguwa, after which we start operating to safeguard the community.'

One of the leaders of the group further commented on their registration status saying;

We wrote a letter to the commissioner of police, the D.P.O the royal palace and others in which we told them this is what we want, and they helped in building of the organization. And that is how it came to be even though it is just temporal because it is not yet well-structured, we are wanting for the right time to make it more formal.

Another commented:

We're basically doing this on the side. Our only saving grace is that the police are fully aware of our organisation and operations. That is why we encourage our members to be vigilant in dealing with offenders in order to avoid becoming offenders themselves. Because we collaborate with the police, they are familiar with our organization. In fact, the government is beginning to recognize

our existence as a result of our ability to help ensure and maintain peace during the state's recent communal/ethnic clashes/violence.

8.2.5   Funding

The committee is funded by the palace, contributions from its members, and donations from well-to-do members of the community and other well-wishers. They also stated that they do not charge for their services and that they do it for the love of God and to keep their communities safe and secure. According to one of the committee's leaders;

Funds come from the founders of the organization. Sometimes we receive money from residents who are satisfied with our activities. We keep record of every amount of money that comes in and use it for activities here whenever required.

He further commented on whether they charge for security or seek payment or other forms of compensation from people who bring cases to them.

No, we don't request anything. Though if you give us, we won't refuse it. We don't tax anyone, when we catch a culprit after our investigation, we take them directly to the police, who take up the case.

Another member commented on the issue saying;

No people don't pay for our services. Though sometimes we solicit for funds formally from some particular community members who we know are aware of the importance of our operations.

8.2.6   Units

There are multiple units in the organization, and it is organized into various departments/units, just like formal institutions. Despite the fact that its primary mission is conflict resolution, they have various units that deal with a variety of different situations. For example, they have a screening department that is in charge of screening new recruits, a unit that deals with family issues, another unit that deals with gang issues, a unit that deals with women's complaints, and so on. One of their leaders summarized the situation, saying:

We have a specific department which is meant for screening and from there we can detect whether it's a negative or positive agenda that brought you. The forms are taken for further screening by the D.P.O who screens and vets the people himself before signing. The intending member will also have to get full recommendation from the elders of the society before he becomes a member fully. That is why with the help of God and this organization everyone is now living in peace and can now sleep peacefully.

8.2.7   Sub-Theme 2.2: Role: complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for official security provision?

In terms of their relationship, informal security providers see themselves as middlemen between the police and the public. People, according to them, report crimes to them more than to the police. However, if a crime falls outside of their jurisdiction, they forward the case to the police and do not take up such cases. Also, before proceeding with any case, they ask if people want them to handle it or take it to the police on their behalf.

When a case is reported to us, we ask the victim if he wants us to take it to the police. If he says yes, we proceed to the police station and give our report.

Another member commented saying;

We are like the local government councillors in the arms of government. They are the ones close to the people and that's how we are close to the people, that's why most of the complains comes to us first before the police. We are the bridge in security between people and the police, they bring culprits to us and, we on the other hand, hand them over to the police.

8.3   Theme 3: What kind of protection do informal security providers offer, and from what? To what extent are women and other vulnerable groups included or excluded in security provision, and are they equally well or poorly served by these arrangements?

8.3.1   What kind of protection do informal security providers offer, and from what?

According to the group, there are certain types of crimes that they do not handle or get involved in. According to them, they frequently refer people who bring such cases to them to the police. They believe they are unqualified to handle or address crimes such as rape, homosexuality, and robbery. Though they claim to be involved only to assist the police in apprehending offenders, they then take them to the police station or their own station and wait for the police to come and get them. Some of their top officials described how it works as follows:

R1: *We have our limitations because we are just a small security group that can only solve what we are capable of and forward the rest to the police. For instance, if rape case is brought to us, we do what we can and later hand over to the police and they forward it to the human right commission. Also, for a drug case we take the suspect and the drug to the police, and they (police) forward it to the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). So, you see, we can accept any crime or case here and forward the ones that are beyond us to the police.*

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R2: *We hand over the offenders and that's it. But we sometimes testify in cases relating to drugs. Whenever we take an offender to the police, we provide a written statement, and the offender provides theirs and that is what the police uses.*

R3: *When we assist in the apprehending of criminals and bring them here, they (police) come and pick them up, but if their vehicles are not available or faulty, they tell us to bring them. It hasn't even been a week since they picked 15 offenders here who were caught smoking in the cemetery. The Imam was required to make a report, and it was the king who directed one of the commanders present to make the arrest. This is a religious graveyard, so you can see how serious this is.*

Even vigilantes who legally engage with the authorities have a restriction on the types of cases they can take on. One of their top officials:

We don't apprehend every offender. We don't handle any case that requires an investigation here. If, for instance, we apprehend a thief, we hand the thief to the police. There are arrests that we make on our own and sometimes the DPO will ask us to make an arrest and we'll make the arrest. You know that the police aren't conversant with the residents. But I can tell you the inhabitants of any house here.

There are also specific types of crimes or offences that they specialize in or prioritize. For instance, they can assist in the resolution of disagreements, misunderstandings, deception, scamming, and small-scale security threats, e.g., theft such as when a youngster steals from his father. They occasionally handle more serious cases, such as murder, when the police request their assistance, but their primary role is to apprehend suspects.

Some of their top officials reacted to this by saying:

R1: *In a situation where you give someone a job to do, and he does not do it, it can be settled here, so we hear from both sides and make them come to an agreement. There are those in which someone will collect his friends' phone and sell it. This can also be settled here, it happened because of betrayal. There are cases in which a person constitutes a nuisance to another, that can also be settled here. So, if you see an offender being punished here that means he resisting arrest or was acting stubborn during investigation. Some of them will not co-operate until you punish them.*

R2: *If a child offends his parent or if a parent reports their child for stealing from them, in such cases we ask the parent what they want done to the kid as punishment. Sometimes they may ask us to flog the offender twice or three times and the police is not involved at all. Sometimes a thief may steal petty items and the victim may decide they want the offender to receive a minor punishment only as a deterrent.*

R3: *We recently dealt with a case involving a girl who frequently ran away from home, claiming her parents wanted to force her to marry someone against her will, and they brought the case to us. The parents claimed she was gradually becoming a prostitute and that they wanted her to settle*

down, but whenever they brought up the case, she would flee. The majority of these girls are children, ranging in age from 13 to 16 years. We usually don't bother if they're older than that because we believe they're old enough to know what's wrong and what's right. In these cases, we mostly go to the homes and preach to both parties; sometimes the girls listen to us, but some other times they run away from home and are later found in another city. We are very cautious in such cases, especially with the older ones; if they are 18 or older, they can lock you up and claim you are interfering in their affairs as adults. Even their parents can't control such girls, but for the younger ones, we do our best to keep them in school or at their parents' house. But, after like three attempts and realising that even the parents aren't serious, we sometimes abandon the issue.

R4: *The types of crimes we handle here in the office include for example, disputes between married couples, debt, if people quarrel or fight. This are the kinds of cases we resolve here. Normally these are cases that should be resolved by the neighbourhood head. But things have changed and now we have taken that responsibility. However, if we can't resolve the disputes, we take it to the police. For example, the other day there was a man that came to our office to report how his landlord had given him 2 weeks eviction notice and we felt that was not right especially because the landlord had even sold the house before informing him about the eviction. So, what we did was to look for the new owner of the house and the agent that sold the house and asked them to look for a way to resolve the issue with the man. And we asked them to give him the normal six months most landlords usually give or at least 3 months to get a new place. In the end they gave him 3 months to look for a new place which he accepted, and everything was resolved.*

R5: *Most times we try to settle most of the cases here, even the ones related to theft, as long as its not a serious one. We do this because we believe the police are corrupt and when they take them there or go there, they end up spending a lot of money and at the end of the day the victims usually even spending more money than the cost of the stolen item and they don't even get justice or recover the stolen items. So, what we do is to invite both parties and sometimes their parents and try to settle the case here amicably.*

8.3.2 Crime and Punishment

Different types of crimes carry different punishments. Flogging, manual work, or even spiritual exercises (being forced to pray for a long period) are the most common punishments, but they can also simply issue a warning to offenders, especially if they cooperate with their investigations and the offence is minor. They claim that they do not handle major crimes and instead refer such cases to the police, and they only deal with minor offences and other conflict-related issues. When it comes to major crimes, they usually apprehend the perpetrators and either transport them to a police station or notify the police and wait for them to come and pick them up from their offices. In response to this statement, some of their members from the different wards stated:

R1: *We don't have any written constitution. Offenders may be flogged or forced to clean up filthy gutters in order to discourage them from committing an offence. In the hopes that they will learn their lesson, we sometimes ask them to perform lengthy prayers (with 100 units). Prayer as a*

punishment is usually reserved for criminals who have offended their parents and do not take prayer seriously.

R2: *We usually beat up muggers (phone snatchers) when we catch them. These muggers are armed with lethal weapons, so it's pointless to be gentle with them. Even if they don't hurt you with the daggers and knives they carry, you will be alarmed if they ask you to hand over your phone. So, what is the point of having pity or mercy on such people who have no fear of God or compassion for their fellow man? We will mercilessly beat such person(s) and then take him to the police station.*

R3: *For example, when a small boy is brought to us by his parents for stealing (minor theft), we usually flog him. For warning, 5-10 strokes of the cain (whip) are used. If you are apprehended and brought to us again, we will do even more to ensure that such children refrain from such acts at an early stage. And sometimes we don't even touch them, especially if they cooperate with us and answer questions honestly. Nobody will touch you. In such cases, we simply investigate and try to solve the problem. The investigators will question you and ask if you committed the crime. They will inform you that no one will know if you are guilty, and sometimes, some of them cooperate and confess. There are some cases here that even I don't know the culprit because its amongst friends. They all come here and when the culprit confesses, and the phone is brought forward the owner would say no need to reveal the culprit because they are all friends. Even those we arrested yesterday, about 7 of them, were smoking marijuana and promised not to do it again, so we had a written agreement with them that if they're ever caught again, they would be handed over to the police. You can look it up in our records; it happened yesterday. We recorded it so that if they do it again, they will be punished accordingly.*

R4*: I swear to God I won't lie, there is a parent who brought his child because he was given money for a haircut more than 5 to 10 times but refused to do it. When we apprehend you as a result of that, you know we're going to cut your hair and take a picture of you, so you don't lie around saying you did it yourself. The photographs are usually kept with the commander. You can see this boy his father brought him, over there. Do you have any idea what his crime is? His father pays N50,000.00 for his school fees, but take a look at his trouser how he shaped an expensive cloth. He was brought here by his father so that we could talk to him and discipline him. The father brought him here not to beat him, but to scare him, and hopefully, by God's grace, he will stop and be of good behaviour after today.*

R5: *If it's a case of dispute, between neighbours for example, we resolve that here and write an undertaking. We include it in our weekly briefing which we hand to the Hakimi.*

R6: *If we apprehend a weed smoker for instance, we flog them 15 times. If you are caught with up to 10 packs of weeds in your possession, we flog you 25 to 30 times. If someone steals a phone for instance, and the victim doesn't want to involve the police, we give them their phone and flog the thief 25 to 30 times. However, in cases of muggings, people causing disturbances in the*

neighbourhood, or when a thief breaks into a house, we apprehend them and turn them over to the police, we don't handle such cases.

There are also some exceptional cases involving repeat offenders or very stubborn criminals. They claim to handle such cases specially.

In such cases, the first step is to flog the offender, and we have a special committee for that. I'm sure he's never had canes (whip) like ours before. For example, if we tell them to give him 20 strokes, he will already be confessing his crimes after 5 strokes. Though we don't always go that far because simply looking at an individual/offender can tell us what kind of person he or she is and what approach we should take. We don't even need to worry about punishing him; instead, we advise them to be good. As a result, approximately 70% of cases are usually resolved through admonishment.

In addition, despite the fact that their primary mission is to apprehend criminals, counsel and urge them to stop committing crimes, one of their leaders stated that in extreme circumstances, convicts are subjected to corporal punishment.

'We don't punish all criminals the same way; we have a notorious group of criminals known as 'yen sara suka,' and when we catch these types of criminals, we usually do to them what they do to others.' This could include cutting people with sharp objects like machetes and knives after beating them to a pulp before handing them over to the police, where they will be tortured again. However, for other criminals involved in petty crimes, we simply beat them to the point where they are unable to stand up after the beating to teach them a lesson not to do such things again, and if they are caught doing it again, we flog them even more'.

All crime cases or conflicts presented to them are recorded in a book for safekeeping and reference, exactly like the police. Their workplace has a cell (usually simply a portion of the room is set aside for this purpose) and a store where they keep their weapons (mostly big sticks).

Every case is documented, and we have crime records dating back to the establishment of this division. The secretary can show you the record book so you can double-check it. Every report that is written is kept here. Also, that area over there serves as our store, but that spot over there, where those youngsters are seated, serves as our cell, and the boy in white sitting over there is a suspect.

According to them, they decide on the types of punishments based on religious scriptures (Bible and Quran). They also consult with elders and traditional title holders (community leader, Hakimi, and so on) to determine what kind of punishment to impose or what to do with offenders. All of this is only applicable to the cases they handle. If it is outside of their jurisdiction, they do not even consider it and refer it to the police.

In some cases, we must consult with the elders of the community, community leaders, and other members of the emirate, and whatever they advise us to do is what we do. So we don't just sit down

and make decisions on our own. However, this is only for cases that we handle; there are some cases that we do not consider at all and instead refer to the police, such as murder and other serious crimes.

Figure 50: Picture of one of the cells in a JTF facility

Figure 51: Some of their disciplining devices (sticks)

Figure 52: Some of their disciplining devices.

8.3.3 Sub-Theme 3.2: To what extent are women and other vulnerable groups included or excluded, and are women equally well or poorly served by these arrangements?

Women make up a small percentage of the organization's membership. According to one of the respondents, female members join the groups because they are interested in it and have a passion for the job. '*They come here on their own to join because they are passionate, and do you even know that they are not paid or compensated' he added. They simply want to make their own contributions*.' One of the female members we met and interviewed informed us that her unit has only four members (Badarawa). Their role is restricted in that they only deal with women's issues and do not get involved in any men's issues, offences, or dealings. One reason for this is that Kaduna is located in Northern Nigeria, and most communities there are very conservative, with men having restricted access to women who are not members of their families or close relatives.

We assist in the resolving female-related issues because, for example, a male cannot enter a matrimonial home unless he is a close family member or relative. However, as women We can go inside, and if someone commits an offence, we can go to your house and inform you that you have been summoned by an officer/office. If you present yourself to the officer, we will give you advice based on the facts of the case and try to resolve it there. There was a case of a married woman fleeing after her husband discovered her with her boyfriend. We were involved in the case, and we found her and returned her to her husband. We resolved the problem and gave them some advice.

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Figure 53: One of the female leaders of the CJTF female unit

Furthermore, women are not involved in every aspect of crime fighting and management in the organizations, but there are instances where female members are specifically required.

We frequently have cases where female members are specifically requested; for example, an Islamic school requested both a female and a male member. Also, because the issue involved another woman, a woman brought a complaint here yesterday and met with our female members. As a result, in such cases, we send female members.

Nonetheless, as one of the members stated, there are some things they don't do or get involved in.

'We participate in practically all of the activities that men do. We also patrol together, although we don't participate in interrogation or chasing down offenders to bring to the police station. We also don't serve as cell guards.

In terms of who they help, the chairman stressed that they don't pick and choose who they help; they help everyone, from the elderly to the young, and they help people of all religions and ethnic groups who need it. The Kaduna metropolitan area is a multi-ethnic, multi-tribal, multi-religious city. They informed us that in dealing with the various ethnic groups and religions that reside in the neighbourhoods, they assure equity and justice. They also gave some instances saying;

There is an 8-year-old boy who was being called nicknames he didn't like by his friends; he came here and told us about it; we consoled him and called all of his friends who were calling him those names and encouraged them to stop doing so, which they did. There is another time that a primary school pupil, passing by here after closing from school came in here, we asked him what was looking for, and he said his friend had collected his pencil. He pointed to the friend who was outside, We called him in and asked where he got the pencil, and he said he saw it on the ground, so we requested him to return it to the owner, which he did. So, as you can see, the cases we handle have no age restrictions; anyone can come in and we will do our best to assist them.

One of the members commented on how they deal with the multi-cultural, ethic, and religious diversity and nature of the communities, saying;

Residents of various ethnic and religious backgrounds come here to report cases. We make every effort to be fair in our interactions with everyone. For example, we assign our Muslim or Christian members to a case involving a Muslim or a Christian. And this is how we work. If there are no Christian members present, as in a case involving a Christian, we do our best. Although Muslims make up the majority of the population here, Christians are generally pleased with how we handle cases. As a way of ensuring equity, we sometimes become stricter with Muslims in cases involving Christians, which the Christians appreciate. We don't have any problem in that regard.

Figure 54: One of the religious leaders interviewed for the research.

8.4   Theme 4: What are the de jure rules of accountability and to what extent are they monitored and enforced? How and by whom (if at all) can they be held accountable for human rights abuses, violence against citizens, and failure to establish law and order?

8.4.1   How and by whom (if at all) can they be held accountable for human rights abuses, violence against citizens, and failure to establish law and order?

Both Federal and State law does not recognize CJTF as a security organization, they are only registered with State Government and Local Government as Community Based Organization, though the police recognize CJTF informally. On how their activities are guided, they reacted that

their activities are guided by the traditional institution, religious laws and the country's constitution through the office of the DPO, thereby merging societal legal codes with traditional religious practices.

The JTF are being guided by the DPO. Whenever there are mistakes, the DPO will point it out and make corrections. But now we simply go through our practices (review) so that we don't go beyond our boundary.

When it comes to how the JTF handles defaulting members, they have their own method. In the past, members have been caught indulging in criminal activity and other vices. Even if the majority of such members expel themselves from the group before they are apprehended, because when they are caught in any form of indiscipline, their punishment is usually harsher, and they are instantly expelled from the group. As a result, even within the organization, disciplinary proceedings are taken against individuals who are involved in criminal activity, any type of offence, or indiscipline. Furthermore, their I.D. card, which serves as a kind of identification and connects them to the group, is revoked. They further said that the registration process prevents things like enrolling irresponsible people in the group because it requires vetting and vouching for potential members by influential and important members of the society prior to enrolment. According to a top member;

We discharge such individuals (guilty of oath breaking) and ensure that we collect their I.D card, which serves as a form of identification that connects them to us. To be honest, we've had fewer problems since we started filling out this form. Previously, people simply came in to register and we accepted them verbally. Some people want this membership for personal gain, so they can use it to achieve one of their goals or have a personal vendetta. We had this type of problem with some members a while ago, and when they were caught committing a crime and were arrested, they expelled themselves before we did. They are held in the police station for three days and flogged 15 times; a member is punished three times more than a normal person to serve as a lesson to others because he knows and is in compliance with the law, but he chooses to break it.

One of the leaders also admitted that it can be difficult to control the young ones when they are left in charge of cases. He claimed that they sometimes overstep their boundary in how certain cases should be handled.

We occasionally have misunderstandings, which are usually caused by the younger members. It is usually the result of arrogance. The law prohibits detaining an offender. For example, if we apprehend an offender, we detain them at our office because taking them to the police station is too difficult. We can only detain a person for that reason; otherwise, we do not detain offenders. But they do it all the time. We have limits when it comes to interrogation. We are only permitted to use the whip. However, they have the ability to use extremely painful sticks. During patrols, we only use sticks to defend ourselves.

They also claim to encourage the public to report any of their members who engage in any form of indiscipline. If it is a case that they can handle, they deal with such person(s) in their office, and if it is beyond their abilities, they refer the case to the police station. As a result, not even their own members are spared. According to some of the leaders;

R1: *When a member commits an offence, we usually take disciplinary action against him or her at the office. Following that, we ask anyone who has a case against such a member if they want to go to the police or if they are fine with us handling it. If they prefer that the police handle the case, we usually help get such a member to the police station and ensure that justice is served. We do not let members who commit crimes go unpunished. In our operations, we adhere to strict principles. And one of our guiding principles is that if a member commits a crime, his or her punishment will be greater than that of a non-member.*

R2: *It is usually an offence committed by someone who then reports the problem to us. We have made it clear to the public that any member who has committed an offence should be reported. Because we are closer to the people, we are able to respond adequately to every reported case. You see, there are people who don't feel comfortable going to the police and instead come to us for assistance. So, if we don't take care of them, who will?*

They also admitted to making mistakes from time to time, such as apprehending the wrong criminal and beating him up. However, they claim that when they are wrong, they apologize to the person(s) affected. However, there are some cases that cannot be resolved through an apology, such as when an offender is mistakenly killed, and in such cases, they say such members must face the law. Nonetheless, they claim that this rarely occurs and that they have learned a lot about how to do the job effectively over the years.

R1: *There are some things we do where, if we make a mistake, we immediately apologize to the people. Even before going out on patrol, we call the P and G of the new barrack to let him know.*

R2: *Yes, some of our members have acted inappropriately in the past. We are, after all, human, and security personnel are frequently found wanting. And everyone knows that a member's offence is taken more seriously than a non- members offence.*

R3: *However, there was a recent problem in one of our offices. They apprehended a thief late at night, beat him up, and locked him up at our station (their office), hoping to take him to the police station the next day. He was already dead when they arrived at the cell the next morning. All of the individuals involved were imprisoned, and the case is still pending in court.*

Figure 55: A cross section of some of the JTF members in Malali/Badarawa ward with the research team by their office.

8.5 Theme 5: What are the constraints, limitations, and policy implications of this system for sustainable development?

8.5.1 How effective is the system.

Their methods, according to them, are extremely effective. They also claim that people prefer to report crime cases to them because they are less expensive, have no hidden charges, are quick and to the point (quickly resolved), and are more sincere and just in their crime fighting and justice system. In the case of the police, there is a lengthy bureaucratic process and numerous follow-ups before a case is resolved (if it is resolved). They also believe that offenders fear them more than the police because when they catch offenders, they mercilessly beat/flog them, especially if they are involved in crimes that harm others, such as gang members known to steal and terrorize the neighbourhood with dangerous weapons. According to one of their members;

R1: *We are more just than the police, and we also handle minor offences. When women come to us with complaints about their husbands, we try to find a subtle way to handle and solve the*

problem. This is why people prefer to come to us. Going to the police station costs money. But we don't take payment. We even spend our own money sometimes.

R2: *In a community like this, there is always a fear of following up on cases with the police, even if you are the one who brings a case to the police. When a court date is set, the victims may fail to respond or appear, leaving the police with no choice but to release the offender. You can even see the offender walking around afterwards, claiming that he was arrested but that nothing happened because the victims did not follow up. However, it has only happened twice here that we handed a case to the police and the offender was released due to a lack of follow-up, so from then on we make sure to confirm with the victims if they intend to follow up on their cases or require our assistance in doing so.*

R3: *Some people avoid the station because they do not want to be involved with the police at all, even if they are the ones who reported the case to the police, and they are afraid of being charged extra fees. We usually have a lot of these problems. This issue is also linked to a lack of working materials and case files in their offices (police). For example, if the I.P.O. is provided with adequate and sufficient materials, such as 100 case files each, such issues will not arise. However, the police sometimes use their own money to purchase these items.*

R4: *It's the same as a politician campaigning with his own money. If he prints banners, buys shirts, and so on, the first thing he will do if he is elected is to recover his money before moving on to other things. However, when all of these things are available and the government ensures that everyone is aware of their availability by using the media and other forms of communication to inform everyone that enough case files, writing materials, and so on are available at each police station, there will be fewer of these issues. In addition, a contact should be provided to report any police officer who attempts to collect an additional fee despite the fact that bail is free, you find people paying for it. Corruption is everywhere, even in schools, where students sit on the floor due to a lack of benches and chairs, even when the government makes provisions for it, but then there is a third party who blocks all supply and takes all the money for himself or directs it somewhere else because the furniture is being produced but not sent to the schools, this is the truth about what is going on.*

8.5.2   What are the constraints, challenges, and limitations, of this system?

Several groups working together to reduce crime in the city will undoubtedly face challenges, highs and lows. The informal security operators, like the general public, have complained that the police are not always just in their criminal justice system. They claim that when they apprehend criminals and take them to the police station, they are released quickly without being prosecuted or following the proper procedure. They also complained that this sometimes lowered their motivation to continue their work or even work with them. Despite this, the majority of them admitted that a few bad eggs spoiled the bunch but that a lot of them still do a good job.

R1: *Most of the time, it is the fault of corrupt police officers who ensure that cases brought to them do not go through the proper channels and make money by extorting criminals. I once took an offender to the police station and before I returned to the office he had been released. I inquired and decided to meet with the DPO the following day. But before I could proceed, the corrupt cop arrived to beg me not to follow up so that he doesn't get fired.*

R2: *We catch a lot of en sara suka members (gang members) in this neighbourhood and used to take them to the police station right away as advised by the Divisional Police Officer so that they can take them to prison or charge them to court, but we've noticed that such criminals, including those accused of murder, are set free after a few days. As a result, these are the types of actions that sometimes discourage residents from reporting crime cases to the police.*

They also claim to face challenges and difficulties as a result of a lack of cooperation, particularly from state officials while on duty. Despite the fact that the state government is aware of their activities and recognises them as part of the city's crime fighting apparatus. Some of their members commented saying;

R1: *That is why we are very proud of some of our branches, such as the Unguwar Dosa office; we follow the rules and no one has ever accused, reported, or arrested any of its members for doing something wrong or mercilessly beating or punishing someone to the point of death. Despite the fact that we had a similar problem last week when someone tried to harass us by asking, 'Which law backs us up, who knows us?' He claimed our institution was illegal, and said he is a high-ranking member of a state security institution and is familiar with government-backed legal institutions such as KASTELEA (Kaduna State Traffic and Environmental Law Enforcement agency) and doesn't recognize us as such. He even mentioned knowing influential people in government. We simply told him that if you don't know us, the government of Kaduna does, and that if you truly are a member of the security agency, as you claim, you should be aware of us; if not, you can go and ask. We eventually came to an agreement, and he turned everything into a joke, but before that he was very serious and harassing us.*

R2: *One of the major issues we are currently dealing with is people refusing to cooperate with our officers, particularly state officials. For example, while road safety is not our responsibility, take a look at that unfinished road over there; people are driving on it regardless, resulting in far too many accidents. As of now, nearly six people have died as a result of it. It is not our responsibility to maintain or control the road, but we have decided to take control and limit the number of casualties. Some officers injured our accountant there sometime there for trying to maintain order there. One officer even insulted us by saying he couldn't take orders from people like us on the road. So, as you can see, we need all the help we can get, and working together with members of the community is the only way we can succeed.*

R3: *In some cases, the police ask us to assist them in apprehending offenders, and the offenders flee before they are apprehended. In some cases, we are blamed and even imprisoned. We don't*

get paid for this job; we volunteer for it. Sarki (one of their leaders), for example, has been injured and even imprisoned several times as a result of such issues. Nonetheless, he will treat himself and still go about his business and this job as if nothing had happened.

R4: *When we are out on patrol, we may come across someone who is involved in illegal activity, and when we approach them, they begin to resist arrest and even ask us, 'Do you know who I am?' It can get violent at times, and we may slap such a person. When the case is presented to the DPO, we expect him to warn us behind closed doors rather than in front of the offenders, who are usually relatives of high-ranking members of society. We are sometimes even locked up. There was even a recent case where I was locked up because we apprehended a prostitute who was involved in drug abuse here in Calabar quarters (Malali), and the commissioner ordered that we be locked up. They would not have released us and if it wasn't for the intervention of high-ranking members of our community. After that incident, I vowed to quit the whole thing, but after speaking with the elders of the community, I changed my mind.*

They also described some of the challenges they face as a result of their status as a crime-fighting organization operating in a formal controlled territory, particularly with little legal support.

R1: *You know that no matter how noble an organization's intentions and actions are, if they are not supported by the constitution, they can be closed down.*

R2: *The issue of legitimacy is one of the challenges we face. We don't have the government's support, and if something goes wrong, we're on our own. As a result, we require the government's full and complete support.*

Despite the fact that certain state officials and residents do not always cooperate, they claim that a large part of their success is due to the support they receive from other members of the state institutions and people, particularly those who live in the communities where they work. Furthermore, they claim that people make up stories to smear their organization's reputation, particularly criminals or persons they have previously disciplined in some way. According to them, this is mostly how they earned their terrible reputation.

Most of the time, those who make such complaints have not been fair to us. For example, we may need to use force to apprehend an offender who has a weapon and is willing to use it. You can't really blame us if we cause these people harm.

Some of their members have also been targeted for attack and retaliation by gangs and other criminal groups. Despite the fact that they do not receive much-needed assistance, they continue to work and, for the most part, rely on their own money and resources to care for themselves. They described some of the ways they have been attacked.

R1: *Look at my neck (a deep cut that has only recently healed); I went to see a sick person late at night and was cut. All of the criminals assumed I wouldn't make it, which is why they left me to die, but I did, and even though we aren't compensated, this doesn't stop us from doing good work. They have threatened to kill us all, even our families.*

R2: *Another person has been cut on the wrist, and the wound is being treated and stitched. This person (pointing to another) was also attacked in the middle of the night. They attacked him from behind while they were on patrol around 8 p.m. and he was in uniform.*

They also claim that things are improving in comparison to when they first started.

We used to have a lot of problems at first, but now people see the value of what we're doing and understand that it's for the good of everyone in society. As the Imam (religious leader) previously stated, proper home training is done by the entire community, not just the parent.

The police were also interviewed in order to get their viewpoint on some of the claims made and to gain a better understanding of how they collaborate with non-state institutions to provide security in the state. Despite their veto power, state security agencies face some challenges in collaborating with all other organizations to create safer environments for people to live in. Their primary mission is to protect people's lives and property, as well as to prevent, detect, and investigate crime and prosecute criminals. This is done in collaboration with other organizations (state and non-state alike). During the research, the police department was interviewed to learn about some of the challenges that state security providers face when providing security and collaborating with others. According to the respondent, people believe the traditional system is more effective and prefer to report criminal cases to them due to the negative stereotype they have developed about the police. He claims that even if they don't know the officer, people judge him to be corrupt and inhumane simply because he is an officer. They also commented on the process of crime resolution in order to dispel the myth that they release offenders when the JTF brings them without due process.

Contrary to popular belief, we do not release offenders without a thorough investigation. If an offender is brought to us, we question him/her and conduct our investigations; if we find him guilty or he confesses to committing the crime, we take his/her statement and charge such individuals in court, and the court renders the final verdict by deciding whether he is guilty or not. So, if anyone has the authority to release a guilty offender, it is the judge, not us. So, as you can see, there is no such thing as 'we collect money and release offenders,' because we do not do so. In addition, you see our people, we have given the police bakin jinni (bad blood), as you can see, I am a police officer, and my friend here knows. But, before I joined the force, I despised police officers and never imagined myself joining the force. When we were younger, I had a friend who used to call me police to tease me, and I was always offended and told him off. But, as life goes, as I grew older, I was the one who struggled to get this job because I desperately needed one. But, when I first started working, I didn't find it honourable or enjoyable because of the stereotypes people

had about police officers and the stereotype I had created as a result of them. To put that aside, if a police officer does something, people will say it's because we don't like the people, but if people can be reasonable and look at things from our perspective, they'll notice that we don't discipline people for no reason. Such people must have done something for us to behave in this manner. You'll also notice that most offenders and criminals prefer to be brought to the police station because we follow the rules and we don't beat offenders most times, the only time we do is when we're investigating and looking for information.

8.5.3   Policy Implications of this System for Sustainable Development?

Due to alleged instances of the group's members violating the rights of suspected criminals and allegations of working with criminals, the state government made an attempt to ban the group in 2017–2018. One of the leaders addressed the issue, saying:

R1*: Before the government and others were dissatisfied with the integrity of this type of organization, they believed that it could cause problems in the community. This is one of the reasons why the organization's growth has been so slow. However, the government has seen and is pleased with our progress in society now that the organization has made its intentions clear through our actions and crime-deterring success strides. They see us as people who assist the masses in society.*

R2: *The government changed its mind because of the many positive changes that the organization had brought to all of these communities. Previously, this was not a place where any officer could simply walk in. That is why, at the time, we had to establish an organization like this and insist on volunteers coming from the people, after seeking advice from elders, imams, and community leaders, and that is how we got here.*

They claim they are not involved in politics and make every effort to distance themselves from political groups or parties because they believe that if they do, such groups or parties may seek to influence their actions and decisions in the future.

To be honest, this is what we avoid the most. If you travel to many other countries, you will notice how successful and developed they are, particularly as a result of eradicating crimes such as stealing and thuggery. You know how our political system works; the state government requested that we be supported by its other crime-fighting institutions some time ago, and we even met with the DSCS. The person chosen to lead the entire initiative is a politician, but as time passes, we have noticed that we are being used for political purposes, and whenever politics is involved in security issues, it cannot be successful, unless you want to be a part the political system. Every one of us here has a personal political interest, but we all put it aside the moment we walk into this office. We will never be united as a crime-fighting organization if we allow political interests to influence our agendas in this office.

Despite the fact that they do not participate in politics, they sought assistance from the government to improve their policing activities, particularly in terms of infrastructure. Furthermore, they claim to be extremely cautious when seeking assistance from the state and politicians, fearing that they will later begin making demands from them.

Most of us here have discussed how the government should assist the organization, particularly in the form of funds and infrastructural facilities such as vehicles. The government has previously invited us, and the opposing political parties became suspicious of our motives. My concern is that if the government provides us with so much assistance, it may later decide to use our organization as a political tool, which would be contrary to the principles we stand for here. As a result, we sometimes prefer to seek assistance from stakeholders outside of government, which poses a serious challenge to us.

They claim that the government is aware of their achievements and should thus be willing to support them, particularly by legalizing their organization and providing much-needed facilities such as cars and office buildings.

R1: Well, the government knows better than us how it can help us. They are aware of our accomplishments not only in Kaduna, but throughout the country. They are aware of the civilian JTF's existence, so the government is in a better position to find a solution for us because they are aware of our operations throughout the state. We believe the government should assist us because, in reality, we are assisting the government. The government can recognize us in the same way that it recognizes the police. We desperately need financial assistance and vehicles to complete this task efficiently. Because we are having difficulties in this regard.

R2: It would be extremely beneficial if the government could assist us, for example, by purchasing a building for us to use as our office. We require a standard office structure. We also require a few vehicles to facilitate faster and easier navigation. Consider how you would begin your journey if we were called to an operation in a location far from here. For the time being, it's just my motorcycle and this gentleman's car, which we occasionally use for emergencies.

Figure 56: Inside one of the JTF facilities

R3: *We do not have much support from the state or federal governments; we need the government, at the very least at the state level, to pass a law that will provide legitimacy and protection to our organisation, so that we can continue to provide vital services to the community.*

In terms of ways to generally better the situation and improve their activities, another member added;

The most important way is for everyone to believe that we are in this line of work to help him, and for the security personnel or officers to believe that we are in this line of work to help them. State security should support and assist us by providing advice based on their experience as security experts, and members of the community should assist us by trying to cooperate. This, I believe, can lead to greater success. The government should also assist us because we are not paid, and the fuel we use in our motorcycles can be difficult to obtain at times.

In terms of how to improve their relationship with the police, one of the leaders further commented saying.

So, here's what I propose: First and foremost, proper training for at least four weeks is required. We require training because, as you are aware, our members lack experience. When one of our members makes a mistake, people come here to complain. In this neighbourhood, there are people who are much older than me. But why am I in charge here? because no one is coming forward. There are people with more experience than I. But instead, I only have the young inexperienced

ones to work with. So, when they make mistakes, I only correct them, I don't dismiss them. Second, the government should make allowances available, we sometimes spend the entire day here.

The group's vice chairman, on the other hand, was opposed to seeking government assistance in any way. According to him, direct government involvement is something that should be considered because when you are paid by the government, it can easily dictate to you or use you regardless of your intentions as a community organization. He believes that the most important thing they require from the government is legal support for the organization.

The head mentioned that the government should get involved. I don't believe we require government intervention because we operate at the community level. The only way this can work is for the government to provide 20% of the necessary support. It should provide us with the tools and weapons we require rather than money. We are well-served by the community's financial assistance. There will be serious issues if the government's interests are brought into play.

CHAPTER 9 - DATA PRESENTATION
Section 2 : Quantitative Data

9.0   Introduction

This section details the data obtained through semi-structured interviews conducted at five selected sites in the study area. The aim is to reveal the perceptions of residents on the effectiveness of the hybrid security system in their respective neighbourhoods, as well as its benefits. All participants in the research underwent a vetting process to ensure that they had resided in the study area for a minimum of one year and had experience or knowledge of security issues in the area. The informed consent form and the participant screening form were used in the study design to demonstrate how the participants chosen met the necessary criteria. The screening form, which participants must complete before being selected for the study, requests participants' residency and experience/knowledge of security issues in the study area. There were also selection criteria in the informed consent form, which participants had to read and sign before taking part in the study. This selection criterion was crucial in engaging suitable participants for the research. The selection criterion of requiring participants to have resided in the study area for a minimum of one year and have experience or knowledge of security issues in the area is crucial to ensure that the data collected accurately reflects the perceptions and experiences of individuals with a meaningful connection to the study area. This criterion helps to ensure that the participants have a sufficient understanding of the local security situation to provide informed opinions and feedback on the effectiveness of the hybrid security system. Overall, the vetting process for selecting participants is essential to ensure the quality and relevance of the data collected in the study.

9.1   Theme 6: To whom, or to what, do people look for protection? How satisfied are people with the level of crime management in the city?

This section of the study focuses on people's perceptions of community security and governance. It discusses the effectiveness of the study area's security institutions. A total of 125 questionnaires were distributed, with a quality response rate of 95.2 percent i.e., despite providing adequate answers to the quantitative aspects, participants were sometimes hesitant to participate in the qualitative aspects of the questionnaire (follow-up questions). There were 119 valid responses in this case.

In total, 25 people were interviewed from each of the following neighborhoods: Badarawa, Malali, and Unguwan Dosa (total=75), 25 people in Kawo but nulled 2 of the interviews due to quality of response from participants (total= 23), and lastly, we also interviewed 25 people in Rigasa but nulled 4 of the interviews (total = 21). Some interviews had to be removed due to the low quality of the responses we received, which were either devoid of information or provided it insufficiently.

Four of these interviews took place in Rigasa, and two in Kawo. As a result, we received 119 valid responses from 125 interviews conducted as part of the data collection process. Furthermore, all study participants had to have lived in the study area for at least one year and have experience or knowledge of security issues in the study area (a key criterion for their inclusion in the study). For ethical considerations, the participants' real names will not be used, but their gender will. Residents' real names and identities will therefore be anonymized.

Table 5: Sample Composition and Distribution across Study Area.

S/N	Type of respondent	Participants per neighbourhood	Frequency	Total
	Mai Unguwa	1	5x1	5
	Businessmen/Women			
	Men	M: 4	5x4	20
	Women	F: 2	5x2	10
	Head Of H/Hold			
	Men & Women	10	5x10	50
	Community Members (Men and Women including R/Leader; Imam and/or Pastor)			
	Men	M: 6	5x6	27
	Women	F: 2	5x2	13
	Total			**125**

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

The study was conducted in the communities of Unguwan Dosa, Malali, Kawo, Badarawa and Rigasa communities, which are all predominantly considered low-income neighbourhoods. Participants in the research included community leaders (Mai Unguwa), religious leaders (pastor/imam), the Attajiri, Maisukuni, or Dan kasuwa (businessman/woman), male/female head of compound/household and other members of the community aged 18 and above (both male and female). For each community, the Head of the community - *mai Unguwa* - was involved in the research, making a total of 5 community heads. Four businessmen and two businesswomen were chosen randomly and purposively, from each community (based on their willingness to participate in the research), making total of 20 businessmen and ten businesswomen. Members from the community were also recruited; participants include males (30) and females (13) who live in the community (as discussed in the methodology section). Religious leaders were also selected purposively from each of the five communities using the snowball method. In total, two pastors (one from Malali and one from Unguwan Dosa) and five imams (one from each neighbourhood) took part in the study. The study included 44 male and 6 female household heads.

Figure 57: The research team outside the *Mai Unguwas* house (*Unguwan Dosa*) with some other elders of the community, briefing them about the research, our goal, intention, sponsorship etc.

Table 6: Demographic and site characteristic data of respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	96	76.8%
Female	29	23.2
Age	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
18-29 years	34	27.2
30-39 years	41	32.8
40-49 years	27	21.6
50+ years	23	18.4
How long have you lived in this neighbourhood?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
1-10 years	27	21.6
11-20 years	19	15.2
21-30 years	35	28
31 years above:	44	35.2
How would you describe this neighbourhood?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Safe (low crime rate)	51	40.8
Unsafe (high crime rate)	74	59.2
Ethnicity	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Yoruba	13	10.4
Hausa	82	65.6
Igbo	11	8.8
others	19	15.2

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

In the demographic table above, it can be seen that 96 (76.8%) of the respondents are male, while the remaining 29 (23.2%) are female. In terms of age, the majority of respondents are between the ages of 30-39 years (32.8 percent), followed by those between the ages of 18-29 years (27.2

percent), 40-49 years (21.6 percent), and 50+ years (18.4%). As a result, people between the ages of 30 and 39 participated more than those in other age groups.

Figure 58: some community members doing their craft.

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over a hundred tribes. Three ethnic groups make up Nigeria's main tribes: Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo. 82 (65.6%) of the participants in this study are Hausa, 13 (10.4%) Yoruba, 11 (8.8%) Igbo, and the remaining 19 (15.2%) were from other tribes, including non-Nigerians, one from the Niger Republic. The study site, Kaduna, is located in Northern Nigeria and is dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, therefore we can deduce that most respondents were Hausa.

Furthermore, the majority of respondents (35.2 percent) stated that they had lived in their respective neighbourhoods within the study area for more than 30 years. Abubakar Adamu (kawo) has lived in Kawo for 38 years. According to Abubakar Adamu of Kawo II, he lived in Kawo for 38 years and was one of the first people to move to Kawo II, where he established a plant nursery business. He also claims to know everyone who lives in the KTC layout (Kawo II). Alhaji Abubakar Muhammad also spent over a decade (12 years) at the KTC layout in Kawo II, which

he dubbed 'Dan Daji' because '*you hardly find any building here, it was like a forest before now*.' Dan Daji, as used by Alhaji Abubakar Muhammad, is a Hausa word that translates to 'small forest.' Mallam Dan Niger, a migrant from Niger Republic, has spent several years in Malali but only stays for 5-6 months each year before returning to Niger Republic (his main home). Essentially, the majority of respondents have lived in the study area for more than 30 years.

In terms of safety, the majority of residents (59.2 percent) said their neighbourhoods were unsafe, particularly those in Rigasa and Unguwan Dosa. Despite the fact that the majority of residents in the study areas said their neighbourhoods were unsafe, Malali residents had the highest percentage of respondents who said their neighbourhoods were safe, followed by Badarawa residents. The situation in Unguwan Dosa can be linked to the fact that there is no police station/post in the area, and the nearest one is in Malali, which houses the Kaduna state police headquarters. Rigasa, on the other hand, is one of the largest neighbourhoods in Kaduna Metropolis, with many vacant/undeveloped spaces, particularly at the outskirts/peripheral boundary, which most respondents also regarded as the neighbourhood's danger zones/epicentre of crime. Other respondents have remarked that while areas experiencing rapid development may be safe, the edges of such communities remain dangerous, blaming insecurity on a lack of physical development in other areas of the city.

One of these respondents said '*Yes, the reason is that our neighbourhood, Rigasa, is growing in population, and we've made great progress in recent years. We recently received a proposed project (train station), which has helped us achieve a lot, as well as a double-lane road that connects us to the railway, which has provided us with adequate security. We also have internal security, such as the civilian JTF and the committee, who help a lot in dealing with any security risk, and as a result, anyone who wants to stay in Rigasa has no reason to be afraid. Anyone can stay in Rigasa as long as they are honest and straightforward. The only reason anyone won't be able to stay is if they have a skeleton in their closet.*'

Other respondents stated that '*The biggest problem in this area (Rigasa) is the outskirts. The centre is completely secure. I have a farm on the outskirts, but I can't go there because of the insecurity. However, the centre is more secure*'.

Table 7: Security Concerns & Priorities

S/N		Yes, it is a Problem in the community	No, it is not a Problem	RANKING	Percentage (Yes %)
	Violent crime	121	4	2	96.8
	Property crime	125	-	1	100
	Public order crime	125	-	1	100
	Enterprise/organised crime	72	53	3	57.6
	White collar crime	14	111	4	11.2

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

Property crime and public order crime were ranked equally as the major problems in the neighbourhoods and the most prominent problem across study area by participants. Property crime is defined as the nonviolent removal of another person's property without permission. This is frequently done for the alleged criminal's financial benefit. Theft of items from a store or a person (i.e., purse snatching and motor vehicle theft); burglary or breaking and entering into a residence or business and stealing property; and arson, which is an intentionally started fire that takes property from another through destruction, are common types of property crime. In the twenty-first century, intellectual property theft has also been made a property crime; this crime involves stealing someone else's thoughts or idea(s) and profiting from them (Linn, 2017).

Public order crimes are typically classified as victimless crimes because the alleged criminal has no intention of causing harm to another person or stealing anything from them unless it is in the course of a trade. Public law enforcement agencies investigate them, and they include, but are not limited to, drug use and abuse, illegal gambling, pornography, and prostitution (ibid).

Violent crime comes next with majority of participants agreeing that it is a problem within the study area. In the world of violent crime, there are three types of assault: 1st Degree, which is intentionally inflicted bodily harm and may result in a felony murder charge; 2nd Degree, which differs from 1st Degree in that a potentially lethal weapon was used, but death did not result or was not intended; and 3rd Degree, which is a misdemeanour assault causing bodily injury. Violent crime includes homicide, domestic violence, aggravated battery, hate crimes, rape, and physical and sexual abuse of an adult or a child (ibid).

Enterprise/organized crime is the next highest rated crime type. A significant number of respondents agreed that this is a problem in the study area. Enterprise or organized crime involves groups of people who have banded together to form a criminal organization. People, individuals, or groups involved in organized crime, as the name implies, make a business out of crime and are cohesive and effective in their criminal practice. Embezzlement, bribery, extortion, counterfeiting, money laundering, fraud, and stealing from trucks and trains are some examples of enterprise/organized crime (ibid).

Lastly, white collar crime is ranked the crime type with the least issue within the study site. Very few respondents indicated that it is a problem within the study site. Even in the twenty-first century, the definition of white-collar crime is debated. Since the 1930s, the FBI has used a broad definition that encompasses the majority of non-vice elements of organized crime committed by 'person(s) of respectability and high social status.' A white-collar crime is frequently committed against a business by a high-ranking employee of that same business. White collar crime is nonviolent in the sense that the perpetrator does not directly cause bodily harm to anyone, but the consequences of his actions may be harmful, i.e., inspire violence in the victims or cause suicides (ibid).

Essentially, this demonstrates that citizens are concerned about security. Most residents, however, also expressed concern about an increase in adolescent criminality in their neighbourhoods during

the interviews, which has been related to youth involvement in illegal drug use and gangsterism. The most common complaint from locals is gang-related disturbances, theft and kidnapping.

One of the respondents in Rigasa corroborated this by saying *'we have been witnessing such things (criminal activities) happening in Rigasa for a while. Their major hangout (criminals) is one of the largest schools in the whole of Kaduna State. It is the hotspot for selling of weed. Despite the fact that the police are doing an amazing job, we continue to have these issues. Weeds are being sold very freely just like Kolanuts are being sold. Also, you will see girls using weed, and our children will be exposed to this and are seeing all this. That's why we have to admit that we don't have enough security here. We have a school there, as you can see. There are over 20,000 pupils who have been exposed to such negative habits that they can easily pick up. And while the authorities are aware of such unlawful dealings, we still don't know what the relationship is between them and those who sell them'.*

Unemployment and joblessness have also been blamed for a significant increase in crime rates within neighbourhoods. Secondary data indicate that unemployment and joblessness are contributing factors to rising crime rates in Kaduna, Nigeria. According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment rate in Kaduna state in 2020 was 23.5%, which was higher than the national average of 27.1%. Furthermore, the Kaduna State Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning reported that youth unemployment is a significant issue in the state, with more than 50% of young people aged 15 to 34 not in employment, education, or training. Furthermore, secondary data indicates that community participation is critical in ensuring effective security. The Kaduna State Peace Commission has emphasised the importance of community engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and the Nigerian Police Force has emphasised the importance of community policing in addressing the country's security challenges. Involving community members in security provision can help to prevent crime by instilling a sense of ownership and responsibility for their neighbourhood's security, particularly among young people who are at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities. Overall, available secondary data on the issue supports the claim that unemployment and joblessness contribute to rising crime rates in Kaduna and that community involvement is critical for effective security provision.

While commenting on why it is vital for not just security authorities to be active in security provision, but the entire community, especially in order to prevent young people from the culture of crime, one of the religious leaders (Imam) in one of the communities noted that:

Wherever you see a child in society, he or she should not be solely the responsibility of the parents. If he is of good behaviour, he is a son to all society, and you hear things like, 'This society has been blessed with so and so,' but if he is of bad behaviour, he is a loss to society, and you hear things like, 'That delinquent belongs to this or that street.' This is why we used to have so much peace and less crime before, because we focused so much on the youth, which is one of the keys to our community's success. People began migrating to our society because of its calmness and

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peace. Then we had a meeting with the council of elders to discuss the issue, and we decided to set up these initiatives (informal security outfits). We have well-respected and honourable council members, particularly the king, who has participated in some patrols when he is available. That is how we have been able to achieve and maintain peace so far.

Another resident, a pastor who resides in Malali with his family, complained about unemployment and the impact some of the activities within his neighbourhood (Calabar Estate) has on kids and young adults especially ladies. Calabar estate is a commercial area around Malali that is known for harbouring sex workers. He mentioned that a significant number of the young girls living in the neighbourhood end up in prostitution because of poverty and lack of education.

Further commenting on why a lot of youths go into crime, one of the community members noted that:

R1*: We have a problem, and I was hoping you'd inquire about it. I've lived here since 1981. We have an issue with parents. The majority of parents refuse to take responsibility for their children's actions. They are fully aware of their actions, but every time we go to interrogate or apprehend such children, we receive a lot of backlash and resentment from this kind of parents who are quick to run to us when a thief breaks into their house. This is primarily due to the mothers, though some of them eventually accept the truth.*

R2: *It's because they don't have anything to do. They are so full of energy, and they are not into any form of business. That is why they turn to crime.*

R3: *There are a lot of crimes that involve drug abuse here because we have lots of youngsters here. These youngsters are the menace around here. You will find them targeting girls who attend Islamic schools at night and if those girls don't comply with their demands, they harm them.*

R4: Another said when asked if they experience disturbances within their neighbourhood *'Yes, one happened just 10 minutes ago. We also experienced one yesterday. Some delinquents came around and tried to cause trouble, but the civilian JTF came and brought an end to it. Though it doesn't happen so frequently, it's usually as a result of clashes between bus drivers, tricycle riders etc. you also see gangs causing problems but for some time now we haven't experienced that'.*

R5*: we have rampant cases of theft, and this is attributed to having so many different people coming into the area. Most times those coming in don't actually live here. They are mostly strangers who come in and even steal the animals we rear. We have motorcycles and these* criminals break into our houses and steal them and in some cases, they steal pots and so on.

Table 8: Community Perception on Safety, Security and Effectiveness of Policing Institutions.

What type of security providers are actively present in your neighbourhood?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Formal (Police)	9	7.2
Informal	22	17.6
Both	94	75.2
Have you (or other members of your household) ever been a victim of crime in this location?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Yes	88	70.4
No	37	29.6
If yes, who did you report to?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Formal	31	35.23
Informal	57	64.77
Do you pay for security provision in your area?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Yes	39	31.2
No	86	68.8
Are you satisfied with the level of crime management in your local area?	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Yes	93	74.4
No	32	25.6

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

9.2   What type of security providers are actively present in your neighbourhood?

The majority of the residents confirmed the presence of both formal and informal security providers operating within their neighbourhood (75.2%). The formal refers to the state police force in charge of internal security within the country, while informal consists of non-state or traditional institutions who provide security for residents. Generally, there are two major ones operating within the study area (Civilian JTF (non-state volunteers) and KADVIS (vigilante state managed informal actors). Some of the residents added that *'We have the police the civilian JTF and KADVIS. We also have a private union in charge of security found by the youths.* Another responded that *'We have quite a number. We have the police, civilian JTF, vigilante. We used to have taskforce, but they are now known as KADVIS.* So basically, the major security providers within the city, as in most places within the country are the informal security providers (civilian JTF), the vigilantes (KADVIS) and the police as the major bodies involved in security governance within the city.

However, within the study area, there are cases of only the informal (CJTF) operating in some neighbourhoods (Badarawa) and where only the formal operates for various reasons (some parts of Rigasa), mainly because such places are still developing and don't yet have a large enough population to have members from such communities who will be part of the informal security architecture to protect their neighbourhood. The lack of formal presence can be attributed to the fact that there are no police stations within such neighbourhoods, with the nearest one being in Malali, which houses the Kaduna state police headquarters. A resident of Rigasa commented on security outfits present saying

'The police are the only ones in charge of security here. We are currently establishing an office for JTF here. There is also need for all these agencies to work together because these criminals cannot be handled at all by only the JTF. This is because they lack the tools to handle these criminals like the police. The police have a license, they are paid and are well equipped and have the backings of the law. But JTF doesn't have such backing and any constitution to guide them'.

Another respondent commented on the various security providers within the neighbourhoods.

They are many, first, we have the police, secondly, we have civilian JTF, committee and KADVIS, the Palace and other organizations that enlighten or orient individuals on peaceful coexistence and community development. The leader (CJTF leader) is like a father a figurehead to us all. But if the case is not resolved then the police will be involved. The palace plays a significant role in ensuring that disputes do not escalate at all. The Sarki (King) is closer to the people. But when it comes to going after offenders, you involve the civilian JTF or the police. The CJTF leader may not ask for an offender to be apprehended. But disputes can be taken to the mai anguwa. The mai anguwa will then take the case to the palace and from there to the Hakimi's (Official in charge of traditional districts). As you can see it's all in stages. If they escalate, they'll be taken to the police station or KADVIS, but the head ensures that peace is sustained at all times through sermons, orientation and other means.

9.3 Have you (or other members of your household) ever been a victim of crime (please specify the crime type)? Who did you report to? If yes, who did you report to and If Informal, why?

The majority (70.4%) of respondents said they have been victims of crime. Recounting incidents of crime that happened in their neighbourhoods some of the residents said.

R1: Nura from Rigasa has been a victim of crime before, his motorcycle was stolen the same day he bought it *'I bought a motorcycle, and it was stolen that same day. Two bikes actually, one was worth N80,000 and the other was worth N60,000'.* But he did not report the case to any authority and when questioned about why he did not he complained about the bureaucratic process involved in reporting crime and said even if he was to report such case he would have reported to the police because even if he reports to the informal, they will have asked him to report to the police. *'Even if I go to them, they will eventually ask me to make a report at the police station and everyone knows the authority they have, and their job is to protect the rights of people. Also, the civilian JTF will usually hand over offenders to the police'.* He further commented on why crime cases are usually not reported to the police saying *'The vigilantes are feared by the youth, and the JTF mostly deals with them. They are also more familiar with the locals, and the children are more terrified of them. The crime situation has improved, and the number of disturbances has dropped. Since the vigilante has arrived, the situation has improved.'*

R2: Auwal (Ungwan Dosa*); Just yesterday, some thieves broke into this boy's shop through the roof; it was raining, so no one knew what was going on; he sells recharge cards; and you know,*

when it rains, it's easier for them to steal because you can't hear anything. They also stole two wrappers (fabrics) from the house over there yesterday.

R3: Nazir (Kawu): *Armed Robbery is the most common kind of crime within this neighbourhood, you hardly see or hear of petty criminals within this neighbourhood, it's more of armed robbery. There is this friend of mine that was robbed recently, he was about going into his house with his car when they stopped him in front of his house at gun point and went away with his car. There is also a lady whose phone was snatched by armed robbers in front of her house, she was expecting some visitors, so she came out to call them to know if they are close to the house and the boys just came with their knives and asked her to give them the phone, in front of her house.*

R4: Yusuf (Kawu): *It was around 2 am in the morning thieves broke into my house, smashed my windows, and asked for money and phones, I gave them the phones but did not have any money at home to give them. At first, they thought I was lying and wanted to stab me but one of them believed me and asked them to leave me alone, so they left.*

R5: A resident of Rigasa who hasn't being a victim of crime herself before but has witnessed it happen to others narrated the case saying *'No, it hasn't happened to me, but it happened to someone I know. The criminals broke into a woman's house, took everything, and beat up her husband. The incident was reported to the authorities. However, the cops seem unable to respond, and the criminals were able to get away with their crime'.* When asked why the case was not reported to the informal outfits she said *'The civilian JTF where not within the vicinity when it happened. That was why the police were informed.* She further confirmed that they would have preferred to report the case to the informal outfits saying *'It's because they always have a solution to most of the problems. And they don't waste much time before responding. And in most cases, they are willing to risk their lives to protect people. They're not bothered by what they will encounter when they arrive'.*

9.4   Reporting

According to a 2022 Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked about their first point of contact for assistance when they are concerned about their security and the security of their family. Figure 58 shows that in Nigeria, the most common first point of contact for security concerns is family and friends (cited by 44% of respondents), followed by community leaders (17%), religious leaders (14%), and police (10%). It is worth noting that trust in the police is low among Nigerians.

Figure 59: Afrobarometer survey on 'First point of contact for security concerns' in Nigeria in 2022 (source; (Mbaegbu & Duntoye, 2023)

In the study area, out of the 88 (70.4%) respondents that have been victims of crime, most (35.23%) have not reported the cases of crime to the police. Also, respondents said they did not report to the police because they did not catch or know the criminal. Others said it's because the police kept demanding money and that they ended up not doing anything. 'Waste of time' and 'they can't do anything' (police), 'they work with the criminals' (corruption), 'overpopulation,' 'lack of facilities' and 'availability of a more reliable alternative to the police' were other popular reasons given by residents. This aligns with Afrobarometers report, which shows that when compared to other entities, there was a low percentage of respondents who reported to the police, which is consistent with the result here.

R1: Yusuf from Kawu said he preferred reporting crime cases to the committee members (informal security) because they are members of his community and so it's easier for them to catch the criminals involved *'Because the committee people are from the neighbourhood and they know everyone in the neighbourhood, so it's easier for them to fish out the criminals within the neighbourhood unlike the police that takes forever to do anything'.*

R2: Wada from Bardawa Kwaru also had this saying *'It's not that we don't trust them per se (the police), it's just that there aren't many of them in comparison to the population. For example, the police station I've known since I was a child is the only one that still serves the entire community; if you come through Dan Busha through the roundabout around Isa Kaita Road and enter Malali, Bardawa, and pass through Unguwan Dosa, Kwaru, and Unguwan Yero, there is only one police station that serves the entire area. So, you see, it's not their fault; even the police vehicle is regularly faulty'.*

R3: Another respondent also said they would prefer reporting to the informal saying *'Here we usually take such a case to the civilian JTF before proceeding to the police. The offenders are more scared of them (informal) because they take what they do seriously. They (offenders) are not scared of the police. You hear them making derogatory remarks about the police when they see them'.*

R4: Another respondent said they take cases to the palace or police 'It depends. *There are some cases, that are brought here (royal palace) for reconciliation, and they can be from within or outside the neighbourhood. The problems are many, but the most common brought here are usually marital issues between husband and wife, that's a civil case. That's the type of issue brought to the palace. And there are cases that are criminal cases. These are the cases that are taken to authorities, i.e., Uniformed security personnel. For example, a person threatening other people with a weapon. This type of crime is usually taken to the civilian JTF or police because they are best positioned to handle such criminal cases, but the civil cases are brought to the palace. If the situation is not resolved, then it will be taken to the police station.*

9.5 If informal, can you mention the type of crimes they offer protection from within this community? Do you pay for security provision in your area? And who do you pay to (government/other bodies)

The most common kind of crime most respondents said they reported to the informal security providers were issues of theft/stolen items such as money, disputes, gang, clothes, and phones. Some of the residents commented on crime cases usually reported to the informal saying:

R1: *If someone violates my rights and I am unable to confront them. I can then contact them (informal) to intervene, and if the situation does not resolve, we can both be taken to the police station. We could potentially go to the court. You can see that there wouldn't be any disturbance since the authorities are involved.*

R2: *There are many cases that can be reported. For instance, marital disputes and theft. And disputes between neighbours too. They can come in here and resolve such problems.*

R3: M*arital disputes are reported to them; A dispute between husband and wife. They can go there for reconciliation, before going to the police or the court. Now the situation has improved. The*

cases are taken to them before going to the police. Those who feel that they can resolve the dispute with them will do so otherwise they take it to the police.

9.6   Paying for Security

In terms of payment for security services, the majority of respondents (68.8%) do not pay for security. People aren't usually supposed to pay the formal (police) directly to provide services for them, unless they have a case at the police station and need the services of a lawyer and so on, but this isn't always the case due to corruption. In terms of the informal, the *yen kato da gora* do a volunteering kind of service without pay and they function to assist the police where they operate (which is usually around mostly low-income neighbourhoods that have little or no access to formal security services). Some residents reacted to this remark.

R1: *To the best of my knowledge, they are not paid, but they used to receive assistance from some individuals, though I am not certain because I have not witnessed this personally. However, I have heard that people used to talk about the donations that would be given to them as a result of certain operations or patrols that they had done. But I haven't actually seen this.*

R2: *They don't get paid, but some well-off residents in neighbourhood sometimes give them something for their effort. But they don't ask for money, though people do contribute when, for example, they need to renovate their office or pay rent.*

R3: Wada (Bardawa) while sympathizing with the informal security providers said '*You see this yen kato da gora (informal security) nobody pays them to do this job, they are just volunteering. It will be nice if people can contribute even if its N1,000 for them to at least feed themselves or even buy fuel for their motorcycles'.*

R4*: Well, it's God who will reward them since they are not paid. Some of them have their occupation while some don't have any. But their boss sometimes assists some of them with something small to get by so that they can continue with ensuring safety in the neighbourhood. In the past, you will find us coming out of our houses to witness disputes here and there. Once the perpetrators sight the JTF, they take to their heels and may take up to 4 or 5 months without them ever returning. This is because they are aware of the presence of the JTF. And if they apprehend an offender, they punish them accordingly.*

R5: *I don't really know if they are being paid but I know most of them have their occupations. They don't just rely on this because it's voluntary. But sometimes the community meets and decides on how to provide support for them. Like providing them with tools for their work. And because the job is a risky one whenever a member is faced with a challenge the community tries to provide support for them. It's the community that does that not the government.*

9.7 Are you satisfied with the level of crime management in your local area? What is the common challenge you have with security providers and provision within your area? (*Establish for both formal and informal*)? How do you think these organizations can serve you better (*emphasis on informal*)?

When asked if they are satisfied with the level of crime management in their community, the majority (74.4 percent) said yes, but some say that supporting the informal security (CJTF) by integrating them into the formal security system, paying them, and arming them with weapons to fight crime will help reduce crime in their communities. Residents further commented on the challenges residents and security institutions face within the neighbourhoods in terms of security provision saying:

R1: commenting on the challenges the security institutions face said *'I can't really say the exact challenge that the police face, because whenever they arrive people usually disperse. So, we can't say we have any challenge. The civilian JTF, on the other hand, faces difficulties. Criminals may attempt to exact vengeance on them from time to time. They are also lacking in terms of equipment. They are also untrained. However, if they are properly trained, they will be capable of defending themselves and protecting us more'.*

R2*: One significant challenge is that some of them do not care about security here. However, some of them work extremely hard to ensure security. Some police officers provide criminals with information about police patrol times, causing the criminals to flee the crime scene before the police arrive. Another issue is a lack of equipment, fuel, and so on. We don't know if this is due to government negligence. In some cases, police vehicles are damaged and in need of repair. These are some of the challenges, as you can see.*

R3*: The civilian JTF also have challenges with regards to provision of tools like torch lights, batteries especially for night patrols. All these require money. They leave their families at home and risk their lives and yet don't get paid. However, some shop owners make weekly or monthly contributions of 100 naira for them, while others are unable to pay such an amount. So, as you can see, these are some of the difficulties they face.*

R4*: Transportation, the police have a problem with transportation. Sometimes they receive a call and are unable to respond in time, and the call may have ended before they arrive, if they are even able to. So, even if something was going on, it would be over by the time they arrived. Based on this, we can conclude that they have transportation issues. And, based on past experience, they have ammunition problems as well.*

R5: *For the civilian Joint Task Force their main problem is that they are not paid, and their job is unmotivated. They are not being compensated for their efforts. They're just volunteers, and because they're not paid, there will always be a problem.*

Figure 60: Interviewing a businessman in one of the neighbourhoods.

9.8   In your opinion, how (if at all) could managing crime in this neighbourhood be improved?

To improve crime management in the study area, most respondents believed that integrating the informal security (committee) into the formal security system, paying them, and arming them with firearms to fight crime would help reduce crime in their neighbourhoods. Others suggested that creating jobs, good parenting practises, and increasing the number of police officers and stations as additional methods for reducing crime in their communities. One of the local residents, a Malali resident who also has a family, voiced his displeasure with the effects that certain activities in his neighbourhood (Calabar Estate[33]) had on children and young people, particularly women. He claimed that a significant portion of the young girls in the community turn to prostitution as a result of poverty and a lack of education.

One of the residents responded that; Yusuf (Kawu) when asked about how he thinks crime management can be improved said *'First and foremost, it is the obligation of the parents; what do you expect when you have a child and have no idea how the child is fed, where he sleeps, what*

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[33] A commercial area in Malali called Calabar Estate is well-known for its sex workers and brothels.

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sort of companions he has, and so on? Also, inside this area, you will notice that people are only concerned about their own children and watch out for them; they are unconcerned with what happens to their neighbours' children, but if those other children grow corrupt, it will have an impact on your own children. So, if everyone looks out for not only their own children but also for other children, it will go a long way toward making society a better place. For example, if you see a child doing something that is not proper and you correct the child, it will go a great way toward making society a better place'.

R2: Another resident urged that the government provide more assistance to the informal security agencies, saying *'The issue here is that the government should provide assistance to them (informal). They should be paid a stipend. Because they have families and are also protecting the neighbourhood, but no one is willing to help them financially. So, there's an issue if they don't have a source of money to feed their families and send their children to school. However, if the government can offer them with a stipend, it will help them and their families a lot'.*

He further gave an example saying *'They should be given the necessary tools. For example, suppose a police officer arrives on the scene with a substandard weapon or none at all, while the criminal is well-equipped. If the cop is killed, no one will be happy. His family will not be looked after that. They would be able to face any scenario with confidence if they are adequately equipped. 'If they can be appropriately provided with the weapons, they need to protect themselves, then that is the support they require,' he continued. But how can they defend people if they don't have such equipment's? I'm sure you get what I'm saying. When a police officer is killed, his family suffers. And in a lot of cases the families of such victims don't even get their pension'.*

R3: *Residents must support and encourage the civilian JTF because they are critical to the neighbourhood's security. Without them, it will be extremely difficult to lie down at home and feel secure.*

R4: Respondent: *This civilian JTF needs support from the government. Firstly, they don't have equipment. They are not paid salaries. If they are provided with equipment the security situation will improve. If they are paid salaries, they will be able to do their jobs well because they know that they are being paid for it. But if they are not paid, then they may simply not be able to give their best. These are the things that they should be provided with. Equipment and salary. They can also be provided with a vehicle and dogs for patrols.*

R5*: The Civilian JTF should be provided with tools for their operation and salary. The police should be provided with more tools. The police have their salaries, but the civilian JTF are only working voluntarily, and we are satisfied and happy. There's a lot of improvement owing to their operations.*

R6*: The government must provide support for the civilian JTF. We will appreciate that. They should be provided with tools. Vehicles and other things that they need. They should also be*

provided with offices. They are currently renting even though the government is not involved. But we are satisfied with their service delivery. The only unsafe place is the outskirt.

R7: *The situation will improve if the government can provide financial assistance to them. Without such assistance, some of them may turn into bad actors and cause problems. Either the government does something about them, or the residents form an association and contribute to their support. This is what will ensure the neighbourhood's security; otherwise, they may transform into something else.*

R8*: Aside from the civilian JTF, we need to involve the community and hold meetings with parents if we want to improve our security. Parents should be educated on the importance of moral training for their children. Many children lack home training, but such meetings will enlighten parents how to support their kids.*

R9*: It's very simple: the government should investigate the situation of the people and provide adequate equipment to the police. You approach a police officer, who informs you that he has not been provided with the necessary tools. It's clear that it's not his fault. But if you go to the security operatives and find them adequately equipped you will feel more confident and secure. But if he's not equipped, you don't feel that way. In addition, if the government wants to help, it should employ some of these youths into the police or military. This will add to security.*

9.9 Women Specific Add-On Question

Non-state law enforcement agencies are generally perceived as more accountable, responsive to community demands, and legitimate in the eyes of the general public. However, there have been concerns, particularly regarding the underrepresentation of certain groups (such as women and minorities), as seen in a number of studies, including Idris (2019). However, this study discovered that the informal security units operating in the study area enable women to participate in the system, which was further probed as follows;

9.9.1 Can you comment on the most common security concern for women in this community?

In terms of the most common security concern women face within the communities most mentioned harassment, theft, rape, deceit. Some further commented saying:

It's safer for us now. For example, now that the weather is hot and offenders are frightened of the police and civilian JTF, any woman can securely stay inside her home, which was previously impossible due to women's' fear of rapists' at night. Women used to close their doors no matter how hot it was outside before. But now owing to the presence of the civilian JTF who station themselves at various locations, there's that feeling of security for women. As you can see, things have improved in terms of our safety and the safety of our children.

9.9.2   Who do you rely on for security within the community?

Because women can sometimes feel like they are being neglected when it comes to security provision it is important for them to feel safe. Most of the women claimed they rely more on informal security activities and explained why:

R1: *I have more trust in the Civilian JTF. The police also contribute immensely day and night, especially at night. You see them everywhere. The civilian JTF are also there doing their part. You see there's high level of insecurity. When it's time for patrol and you move around you will either encounter a policeman or the civilian JTF. Now that they are all over the neighbourhood, it feels a lot safer to go about our activities. In the past, for instance, you always hear victims of theft crying out for help. But we are free from all that now.*

Figure 61: One of the female leaders interviewed during the research.

Figure 62: Interviewing one of the businesswomen in one of the neighbourhoods.

9.10 Do you think women and other vulnerable groups are included or excluded in security provision, and what is your opinion about the level of service provided generally for women related security issues (if any)? Also, do you think women are well or poorly served by these arrangements?

In general, many respondents claim to be unaware of or unsure of whether women and other vulnerable groups are included or excluded from security provision. Most women believe that security provision for women has improved over time, but that there is still more that can be done to better serve women in terms of security within the study site. Some of the respondents (women) made the following comments:

R1: *Yes, including women in security arrangements will help. Because some cases involve women, and it is preferable for a woman to handle such cases. In situations requiring entry into homes, for example, a woman is better suited to this role than a man. In this situation, a man may face difficulties.*

R2: *It would be helpful to incorporate women in security during police or civilian JTF recruitment. There are some things she can manage that a man might not, and vice versa. There are some activities, such as religious gatherings, where female members can be stationed to handle the women's sections without involving the men. The male sections will then be handled by male members. You see, when there's any religious gatherings and there arise the need for them to*

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intervene in a situation involving women, the men sometimes insist on getting involved. But if there are female members, they can then be stationed accordingly so that men don't have to be involved with the women.

Figure 63: Interviewing a member of the community.

In terms of the level of service provided generally for women related security issues some of the respondents gave their views on this saying:

R1: *I'd say that around half of these security services' (informal) operations take women into account. As I previously stated, there are girls who attend Islamic schools at night and are targeted by criminals. These security guards, however, would've been stationed even before 9 p.m. to ensure that these girls arrive home safely.*

R2: *Yes, special precautions are taken to safeguard the safety and security of women. When a police officer arrives and there are women there, he will not enter their homes. However, because we are familiar with the civilian JTF and they are a member of our team, if the situation needs them to enter the residence, they may do so diplomatically and without causing any disruption. Their primary goal is to bring order to the circumstances in that residence. When they arrive, they don't cause any problems.*

9.11 How well security institutions are doing to prevent crime in study area?

This is used to assess general views about vigilante corps performance, whether security institutions do a good job in maintaining law and order and controlling crime.

Table 9: Security Institutions Rating.

Performance Level	Formal (Police)	%	Informal	%
Very low	12	9.6	1 (1x100)	.8
Low	28	22.4	11	8.8
Satisfactory	36	28.8	29	23.2
High	31	24.8	47	37.6
Very high	18	14.4	39	31.2
	125	100.0	125	100.0
How good a job are the security institutions in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your area?				
Performance Level	Formal (Police)	%	Informal	%
Very low	7	5.6	-	-
Low	31	24.8	11	8.8
Satisfactory	23	6.9	28	22.4
High	37	26.2	36	28.8
Very high	27	41.4	50	40
	125	100.0	125	100.0
How good a job are the security institutions in working together with residents to solve local problems?				
Performance Level	Formal (Police)	%	Informal	%
Very low	-	-	-	-
Low	19	15.2	6	4.8
Satisfactory	46	36.8	28	22.4
High	44	35.2	57	45.6
Very high	16	12.8	34	27.2
	125	100.0	125	100.0

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

Most respondents think both the police and the non-state agencies are doing a good job in terms of preventing crime. Nevertheless, more respondents think the informal agencies are doing a better job in this aspect.

People that opted to report to informal claim to do so because they feel they actually respond by going after criminals, unlike the police and how fast they treat the cases. Commented on this saying.

R1: *They (JTF) respond very quickly. For instance, they may go after an offender and apprehend them before we even start talking about involving the police. Also, we do not take the offenders directly to the police, the civilian JTF are the ones who apprehend these culprits. Then they hand them over to the police. If, for instance, someone cheats you out of something and you don't want to cause a lot of trouble, you can report the case to the civilian JTF. They will then conduct an investigation and proceed to the police if they are unable to resolve the case.*

R2: *The reason why some people go to the civilian JTF is so that their case can be handled within a short period of time. Sometimes when you go to the police it takes a long time to resolve the situation.*

Also, some do so because they feel they are closer to them than the police.

R3: *They have many offices around and they are closer to us. They are on most of the streets. Right now, u will find them on the street behind us and the one ahead. There many of them. And that's why all these disturbances have decreased. But the peripheral areas are unsafe. Few days ago, a couple were badly hurt. This happened behind here. They badly injured him and went away with his wife.*

R4: *The reason is that the civilian JTF are usually within reach. They can handle the situation and protect offenders so that people don't take matters into their own hands'.*

9.11.1 How good a job are the security institutions in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your area?

The majority of respondents believe that both the police and informal agencies are doing a good job dealing with the issues that are causing concern in the study area. Nonetheless, certain officers' work ethics have been questioned, particularly in terms of crime reporting, disclosure, and knowledge.

The police are usually not aware of crime issues/cases within neighbourhoods because people don't report to them, and people also fear reporting cases because they feel the police give out details of people that report criminals to the accused criminal thereby putting them in danger. 'The major problem is when an incident occurs, and nobody reports it. The police are unaware of what's truly going on in the neighbourhood. And when you give information to the police about an offender, there's the possibility of them discovering you as the provider of the information which is risky. That's why some people are afraid to report while some simply don't care as long as they are not the victim.

Others have also cited corruption and overzealous bureaucratic processes on the part of the police for the reason they don't report crime cases to them *'Even if you report a case to the police, they hardly respond at all. Because they will ask you to pay for fuel for their vehicle and in many cases, one doesn't have any money for fuel when they may be struggling to cater for their family'.*

9.11.2 How good a job are the security institutions doing in working together with residents to solve local problems?

Despite the study area's rampant insecurity, many respondents were positive about the collaboration between the police and informal security agencies with residents in addressing security issues. However, it is worth noting that some respondents raised concerns about the effectiveness of this collaboration.

R1: *There needs to be coordination and cooperation amongst all stakeholders. It must be a coordinated effort to include the community and the security outfits. It should be done in a way that ensures that the residents who need security understand the significance of ensuring security in the neighbourhood. And those in charge of the security must make sure that they do their jobs diligently. And there must be respect in the cause of all this. This is how we can achieve effective security. Offenders should be dealt with accordingly and impunity should not be condoned. I think that these are the important things to consider to ensure improved security.*

R2: *There should be cooperation and coordination between the different agencies. There are 3 of them. We have KADVIS, we have CJTF, Centre for Security Patrol (Police). You see if we could get them to work together such that there is co-ordination between them, we will be able to adequately deal with all the offenders and improve the security situation. Also, if there is going to be coordination between the different security groups, then there is need to pay them salaries. This will be huge boost for them. They should also be trained on how to handle weapons that will be used to protect people and themselves. You see that will be development and that will help in curbing the level of crimes.*

Table 10: Authority and satisfaction - extent to which security institutions are seen to have legitimate authority.

Confidence in the institutions in terms of crime management and solving crime cases				
Performance Level	**Formal (Police)**	**%**	**Informal**	**%**
Very low	11	8.8	-	
Low	39	31.2	1	0.8
Satisfactory	22	17.6	27	21.6
High	25	20	51	40.8
Very high	28	22.4	46	36.8
	125	100.0	125	100.0
Satisfaction with the services provided by the institution.				
Performance Level	**Formal (Police)**	**%**	**Informal**	**%**
Very low	15	12	-	-
Low	13	10.4	7	5.6
Satisfactory	29	23.2	41	32.8
High	47	37.6	56	44.8
Very high	21	16.8	21	160.8
	125	100.0	125	100.0
Respecting a citizen's individual rights.				
Performance Level	**Formal (Police)**	**%**	**Informal**	**%**
Very low	13	10.4	2	1.6
Low	37	29.6	10	8
Satisfactory	19	15.2	34	27.2
High	31	24.8	41	32.8
Very high	25	20	38	30.4
	125	100.0	125	100.0
Corruption in service delivery or preferential treatment.				
Performance Level	**Formal (Police)**	**%**	**Informal**	**%**
Very low	9	7.2	49	39.2

Low	14	11.2	34	27.2
Satisfactory	28	22.4	27	21.6
High	33	26.4	11	44
Very high	41	32.8	4	3.2
	125	100.0	125	100.0

(Source: Field Survey and authors computation, 2021).

9.12.1 Confidence in the institutions in terms of crime management and solving crime cases.

While the study area's rampant insecurity is a valid concern, it is important to note that the majority of respondents in the research expressed high confidence in both formal and informal agencies in terms of crime management and crime case resolution. It is worth noting, however, that respondents were more confident in informal outfits in this regard. This could be because these organisations are perceived to be more accessible and responsive to community needs. Despite this, some respondents expressed concern about a lack of respect for police officers, which may have an impact on the effectiveness of the area's formal security agencies. These issues must be taken into account when addressing the overall security situation in the study area. While respondents' positive responses may be surprising given the context, it is important to consider the nuances and complexities of the security situation, as well as individuals' perceptions and experiences within the community.

A resident commented on this saying.

'I think it's because of the type of mindset that our youths have these days. They are obstinate and are unafraid of the police unlike before. They make derogatory comments to the police, but they don't dare do that to the JTF'.

9.12.2 Satisfaction with the services provided by the institutions.

As shown in the table above (table 10), most respondents are satisfied with the services provided by both institutions in terms of crime management within the city in terms of low-level crimes, with most respondents being more satisfied with the informal institutions' activities.

One of the community leaders asserted that crime rate has drastically reduced in the city and attributed this to the activities of the informal security operators. He corroborated this by saying:

The level of crime has gone down a lot. We used to receive cases on a daily basis before. But now we can go days without anyone reporting any case (low level crimes). There used to be lots of cases of violence around here. Mainly gang clash related cases. Until the security operators had a meeting with the governor, and he declared that any gang member that is apprehended will spend seven years in prison. There hangouts have been demolished too. As you can see there are no cases been reported today so far. The only cases these days are issues of truancy reported by parents of kids not having their baths and kids not wanting to go to Islamiyah (Islamic school).

9.12.3 Respecting a citizen's individual rights to treat people well.

Most respondents think both the police and the informal agencies are doing a good job respecting a citizen's individual rights to treat people well. Nevertheless, more respondents think the Informal are doing a better job in this aspect.

9.12.3.1 Corruption in service delivery or preferential treatment.

There is low level of corruption and preferential treatment in service delivery for both the formal and informal agencies. However, results show that the police can do a better job in this aspect. One of the community members commented on challenges some residents face in terms of security provision and treatment from the security agencies saying:

There is the issue of intimidation when the police arrest people sometimes. Because of ethnic and religious differences in the country, there's disunity in the country. For instance, if one person commits an offence, instead of the police to arrest just that offender, they will end up arresting many who will eventually suffer simply because they are not from his tribe, or they have different religions. These are the two major challenges we have in this country. Tribal and religious differences. And this is what is happening in all parts of the country. People no longer work in a professional and just manner. They either have a personal or religious agenda. And this is why there are lots of problems. There is no equity. If one person commits an offence let them be punished alone. They know that it's one person who has committed the offence, but they will go ahead and arrest innocent individuals.

CHAPTER 10. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

10.0 Background

This chapter is critical in the research journey because it expands on the discussions presented in the previous chapters. It entails a thorough analysis and synthesis of the collected data with the goal of delving deeper into the topic and drawing meaningful conclusions and implications from the combined qualitative and quantitative findings.

Chapters 8 and 9 provided a detailed examination of the primary quantitative and qualitative data collected for this thesis, laying the groundwork for this analysis. The emphasis now shifts to a thorough examination and synthesis of the information gathered, with the goal of uncovering significant insights that lead to meaningful conclusions and contributing to a more profound understanding of the research. By delving into these key findings, the nuances and complexities of African security governance can be revealed, leading to a comprehensive understanding of their implications and contributing to the larger discourse and knowledge within the field of security governance in Africa. The sections that follow provide a comprehensive overview of the findings derived from the themes investigated in the preceding chapters (8 and 9). These findings are the result of a thorough examination of both qualitative and quantitative data sources, and they provide valuable insights into the issue of African governance and security.

The chapter presents a detailed integration of the research findings with the analytical framework established in previous chapters, demonstrating how the empirical evidence gathered enriched our understanding of the governance and security landscape in Africa, especially in the context of formal and informal institutions. The findings from both qualitative and quantitative analyses are discussed here to illuminate the nuanced ways in which these institutions interact to shape security provision. The qualitative data, from interviews and case studies, underscore the resilience and adaptability of informal security mechanisms. These mechanisms often operate based on a deep understanding of local contexts and enjoy a high degree of legitimacy among community members. Such insights directly correspond to the theoretical perspective that institutions must be understood as both formal rules and informal practices to grasp their full impact on governance and security. Quantitative findings complement these qualitative insights by illustrating the prevalence and perceived effectiveness of hybrid security arrangements. These results lend empirical support to the theoretical argument that hybrid models, despite often appearing inefficient or chaotic from an external viewpoint, can be highly effective and legitimate within their specific contexts.

10.1.1   Introduction

In the context of security provision in Nigerian cities, an in-depth examination in chapter 4 (historical perspective) uncovered the intricate interplay of traditional and contemporary policing techniques, as demonstrated by KADVIS and Yen Kato Da Gora in the subsequent chapters. These organisations act as a connection between the community-driven strategies typical of pre-colonial governance systems, such as the Native Authority Police Force (NAPF), and various issues of modern urban security. The concepts of legitimacy and accountability are crucial to this subject, since they have historically supported governance systems and continue to impact the operational dynamics and societal acceptability of informal police practices today.

The principle of community involvement is central to KADVIS and Yen Kato Da Gora's operations, a relic of traditional governance that has been preserved and adapted to meet modern demands. This involvement is more than just participation, it is central to the groups' strategies, reflecting a long-held belief in the community's role in maintaining order and resolving conflicts. This echoes the pre-colonial emphasis on communal responsibility for security, which has been adapted to meet current urban challenges such as crime prevention and dispute resolution in densely populated areas.

Furthermore, these groups represent a comprehensive approach to security, which goes beyond simply enforcing laws and includes the promotion of social cohesion and adherence to community values. This aspect of their operation is directly derived from traditional practices in which the preservation of social norms and community cohesion was just as important as combating crime. Such practices reflect a deep cultural understanding of policing as a multifaceted social function dedicated to preserving the community's fabric. According to a community leader, "*Civilian JTF was formed in response to an increase in insecurity...the traditional rulers, religious leaders, and stakeholders...decided to form a joint task force... Specifically, the traditional community leaders i.e., the Mai Unguwas and Hakimai through Sarkin Matasa (youth leaders) decided to form a joint task force to address insecurity within these neighborhoods*". This account emphasises the seamless integration of traditional governance with modern security efforts, emphasising the role of these groups in preserving community cohesion while also addressing security concerns, demonstrating a deep cultural understanding of policing that extends beyond mere crime-fighting.

The adaptation of these groups to contemporary urban challenges also reflects a significant evolution in their organizational and operational frameworks. This evolution is marked by a strategic integration of modern techniques and technologies, alongside traditional methods, to enhance their effectiveness in contemporary security landscapes. This includes organizational restructuring to improve operational efficiency, the implementation of accountability mechanisms to ensure transparency, and the expansion of their operational scope to address a broader range of security threats. These adaptations are indicative of a responsive and dynamic approach to security provision, one that is acutely aware of the changing socio-political context in post-colonial Nigeria.

Furthermore, the rise of informal policing groups such as KADVIS and Yen Kato Da Gora reflects a larger sociopolitical shift towards more decentralised and community-centered security solutions. This shift reflects a growing awareness of centralised policing models' limitations in

meeting the complex security needs of Nigeria's diverse urban populations. By leveraging traditional governance structures and community networks, these organisations provide a compelling model for hybrid security provision that combines the best of traditional and modern approaches.

In addition, the rise of informal policing organisations reflects a larger sociopolitical shift towards more decentralised and community-centered security solutions. This shift reflects a growing awareness of centralised policing models' limitations in meeting the complex security needs of Nigeria's diverse urban populations. By leveraging traditional governance structures and community networks, these organisations provide a compelling model for hybrid security provision that combines the best of traditional and modern approaches.

10.1 Actors and institutions involved in security provision: Existing infrastructural and institutional capabilities (formal & informal) used to deal with crime in Nigerian cities and how they vary.

Policing is crucial to any functional criminal justice system, and many of the difficulties confronting African security systems directly confront police forces on a daily basis. Increasing populations and rising crime rates, coupled with under-resourced police forces, limit the police's ability to prevent and investigate crime (Robins, 2009). In Nigeria, the issue of security, as enshrined in the 1999 constitution (amended), is the state's primary responsibility. It includes the government's roles in providing security and protection to the lives and properties of its citizens. At various levels, its agencies respond to these cardinal objectives (national, state and local government levels).

However, within most Nigerian cities, city policing is primarily carried out by a number of agencies, most of which are classified as formal or informal. The most well-known non-state/informal security services are vigilantes, but this study has revealed that the structure and composition of informal security is far more organised than previously thought. Within neighbourhoods in the study area, as in most Nigerian cities, security is mainly provided by the formal, which includes primarily the police, in collaboration with informal systems. Local community members, traditional community leaders, and youth organisations typically form informal groups to establish a locally run security service, representing a Joint Task Force that harnesses pre-colonial political systems and governance structures, resulting in the formation of hybrid systems combining traditional forms of governance and modern reworkings to address security issues. The main distinction between formal and informal systems is that one is solely managed by the government, whereas the other is managed by 'traditional' governance structures and other community stakeholders, either independently or in collaboration with the government, which oversees their activities. For the informal/local security providers, there are two major groups that operate within the study area. These two groups appear different but yet have a lot in common. The main distinction is that one is more formalized than the other; one is a state-recognized vigilante service known locally as 'yen banga,' and the other is a community-based

initiative known as *Yen Kato Da Gora* (locally known as ojumaimai, committee, civilian JTF). In fact, they sometimes go by the same name, JTF -Civilian JTF/ KADVIS JTF. Although those recognized by the government receive grants/assistance from the government, the others rely solely on community contributions if they require assistance. As security providers, both informal security providers further differ in a number of ways. The difference between them is that the local JTF only operate within their neighbourhoods, don't recruit from outside.

Furthermore, they do not formally work with the government (in principle) and get funding from community contributions while the KADVIS JTF work more with government and across the whole city, have members from different neighbourhoods and get training from the government. A member from the group articulated this autonomy, saying, "*No, we don't request anything. Though if you give us, we won't refuse it. We don't tax anyone when we catch a culprit; after our investigation, we take them directly to the police who take up the case*". This statement emphasises the organization's principled stance on self-sufficiency and commitment to serving the community without formal government assistance. They are also called upon by the government to cover event in case of police shortage. Additionally, some work with the army for counter-terrorism operations in the near-by forests e.g., in Maiduguri (fight against Boko haram). The KADVIS JTF nevertheless works more closely with the government, operating throughout the city and drawing members from various neighbourhoods. This collaboration includes receiving training from government agencies to improve their operational effectiveness. A vigilante group leader discussed their formal relationship with the government: "*In 2016, when Mal Nasir became the governor, he established the Kaduna State Vigilante Services, which recognized our group as part of government establishment*". This formal recognition enables them to supplement the police force, particularly in times of manpower shortage.

In addition, vigilantes usually operate in high- and middle-income neighbourhoods, whereas the CJTF is usually formed in response to an increase in crime in areas where formal security services are limited or non-existent. The Vigilantes are typically paid on a monthly basis, whereas the committees provide non-paid volunteer services. It is a common practice for vigilantes to be compensated by the government for their efforts. For example, they receive subventions or monthly financial support from most state and local government authorities where they operate. State governments in Kaduna (yen banga), Lagos (OPC), Ondo (Amotekun), Imo (ESN) and Kano (Hisbah), for example, offer monthly payments to their state VGN branches. The other group, on the other hand, relies on private donations from members of the community and members of the group raising funds to purchase working equipment for the group through their jobs, which are typically farming, teaching, or trading. Payment for informal group services is not a novel idea, but it usually comes with a price tag. Some of these groups are even referred to as state-sponsored organizations, implying that the government has control over their operations, which can be risky for security organizations.

Despite their differences, they both work under the same banner (informal security operators) to protect their communities from insecurity and crime, and they appear to share a lot, including a

similar organizational structure, a shared history, and a common goal. Even though the informal groups (CJTF) do not work directly with the government, their activities are frequently monitored and regulated by the state to prevent abuse, and they also report on their activities on a regular basis to the government. Regardless of their differences, all the informal security groups perform a similar function: safeguard lives and property in their communities. In a broad sense, the primary duties of vigilantes are to complement security agencies, gather intelligence information, and arrest and hand over suspected criminals to the police. Some groups combine security provisioning with social development activities (construction of roads, bridges, and environmental sanitation facilities), while some engage in land dispute settlement and monitor drug use.

The CJTF's specific responsibilities include protecting the community from crime and conflict; resolving disputes and caring for the population; promoting moral standards; discouraging immoral behaviour; fostering social standards; and ensuring that social norms are understood; as well as providing special services such as traffic control and dealing with issues relating to the abuse of women's rights and domestic violence. For example, one leader outlined their comprehensive approach, stating, *"We catch a lot of en sara suka members (gang members) in this neighbourhood and used to take them to the police station right away... but we've noticed that such criminals, including those accused of murder, are set free after a few days"*. This reflects the CJTF's active involvement in crime prevention and the difficulties they face when collaborating with formal institutions. Furthermore, the CJTF extends their services to special areas such as traffic control and dealing with sensitive issues like the abuse of women's rights and domestic violence, showcasing their versatile role in community safety. One respondent elaborated on their unique role in addressing women-related issues, stating that *"Women make up a small percentage of the organization's membership... Their role is restricted in that they only deal with women's issues and do not get involved in any men's issues, offences, or dealings"*. This shows the CJTF's commitment to meeting the unique needs of women in the community, emphasising their inclusive approach to security provision. Nonetheless, it's worth noting that the goal of this study is to figure out how security is provided in places where there's little or no access to the formal provision. As a result, while this research touches on other types of security, the focus and emphasis is on a volunteer organization that works in low-income areas (civilian JTF).

What is evident from this is that the various security groups involved in the study area appear to be performing similar duties under different groups, resulting in duplication of duties. According to the information presented in this research, the vigilante and the CJTF operate as separate bodies, and if reconciled with the NPF's manpower shortage, which, despite being one of the world's largest police forces, still has a ratio of one officer per 600 Nigerians, which is lower than the UN-recommended rate of one officer per 450 people, requires some manpower reconciliation (IAGCI, 2021). Recently (2021), the government (FGN) launched a new community policing initiative disjointed from the existing systems, with a budget of over N13.3 billion. The new project will involve recruiting and training individuals from communities in order to consolidate efforts aimed at improving security across the country. The situation is perplexing because, despite being aware

of similar groups operating effectively in various parts of the country with a well-defined structure, the government is considering developing a new security system from scratch. This approach would necessitate significant resources and time, whereas incorporating an established and functional system used in most parts of the country into the security architecture would be more practical and effective. They can save valuable resources and time while still benefiting from a tried-and-true model that will stand the test of time.

In addition, in the last five years, Nigeria's Inspector General of Police has consistently complained and reported that the federal government needed to recruit additional personnel (police officers) annually over a five-year period to ensure effective policing across the country and to enable the country to meet the UN policing ratio of 1:450 people (Premium Times, 2021). The shortage of personnel is further compounded by the fact that the police are sometimes estranged and structurally distant from the people they are supposed to police. As a result, police officers are more likely to be viewed as 'outsiders' within the community they serve. What the country requires is not a new structure, but rather a reform of the current one (s). One of the major problems with policing in Nigerian cities has always been that the formal system and its officers are estranged from the areas they police. In their work, Thomas and Aghedo (2014) support this claim by blaming the rise in violent insecurity on what they call the centralization of the security apparatus within the country. Indeed, for more than five decades since the country's political independence, Nigeria's security architecture has remained structurally centralized, with disastrous consequences for the management of crime and insecurity at the grassroots. In Nigeria, security remains elitist and state-centric seeing as counter-insecurity measures are often aggressive (i.e., use of military/force) and often come after an escalation of threat (Oyewole, 2015; Silke & Filippidou, 2019; Uche, 2020; Varin, 2018). People should always be at the heart of integrated peace, security, and development actions, according to Saferworld (2014). Sadly, security is still frequently seen as exclusively a state issue. It's an interesting fact that Nigeria, a multifaceted country with approximately two hundred and fifty ethno/linguistic groups is currently one of the few, countries in the world with a centralized uni-policing force, prompting some to argue that states should be allowed to have their own police, particularly considering rising insecurity and the diverse nature of the country. The centralized federal police force has been criticized as being a cumbersome, out modelled, primitive, and corrupt force in need of reform (Adeoye, 2020).

Despite persistent calls for community and state policing so that locals familiar with the language, geography, and socio-political terrains can be part of security provision, the federal government continues to cling tenaciously to the police and armed forces. Many people have criticized this environment and blamed it for an increase in crime. What is evident to the majority of Nigerians, according to Egbosiuba (2019), is that the centralised police force that the nation established and has had since Nigeria's independence in 1960 is largely ineffective. Von Soest (2007) provides additional support for this claim by arguing that Neopatrimonialism challenges institutional legitimacy and governance. The concentration of power and the misuse of public resources which

is mostly for private gain obstruct efforts to institutionalise order and socioeconomic development and undermine state legitimacy,

However, due to the country's multi-ethnic makeup, Nigeria's government continues to favour a centralized police force owned and controlled by the federal government to keep the country together, which means the federal government has virtually exclusive responsibility for the police, unlike other systems where there are federal, provincial/state and municipal police systems. They are concerned that allowing local communities to establish police forces will lead to them being used against each other during ethnic rivalry or politicians using them against opposition parties during elections and such concern is genuine and legitimate. Historically, the Native Authority Police Forces (NAPF) were a critical part of everyday policing in the province and other parts of the northern region during the colonial period. There were more Native Authority Police Forces (NAPF) than there were Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and by the 1950s, recruitment from the province had increased exponentially. Most NAPF recruits were largely posted within their divisions and Native Authorities (NA's). The officers were tasked with policing their own communities, which created tension between the community and the NA, especially when the orders and directives were seen as contradicting community values and norms. Nevertheless, despite such tensions, there have been documented cases of effective collaboration between the two. Researchers such as Lar (2016) have shown that this relationship existed even during the colonial period, as he documented that one of the most important areas of cooperation between the NPF and the NAPF was the role the NAPF played in gathering local intelligence and keeping the NPF and the provincial government informed. Trumble[34] (1939) noted that the 'very close cooperation between the Nigeria Police and the Native Administration Police,' which he claimed resulted in the successful investigation of a number of burglaries and tin stealing crimes, in the Plateau Province's 1939 Annual Report.

Such ethnic issues, however, are becoming obsolete in today's multi-ethnic cities. The legitimacy of such concerns is being eroded by urbanization, particularly in cities. Kaduna state is uncommon among Nigeria's Northwestern states in that its religious populations are closer to parity; inhabitants have not adhered to customary distinctions between indigenous (historical) communities and settlers (migrants). Rather, increased urbanization has resulted in greater geographic mixing within groups (Johnson & Hutchison, 2012). Residents of the Gbagyi, Adara, Hausa, Atyap-Bajju, Ham, Yoruba, Fulani, Kanuri, Marghi, Nupe, and Igbo ethnic groups, for example, make up the majority of Kaduna's urban population. Cities today are more ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse than they were during colonial times, and members of security organizations are still consciously collaborating with others within and outside the organization's make-up to make it more inclusive.

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[34] A.T.G Trumble was a Senior Assistant Superintendent in the colonial government.

10.2 Role of 'non-state', 'informal' or traditional actors and institutions in security provision. How they operate, how are they structured, and extent to which they complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for official security provision.

Understanding the relationship between the actors, in this case informal (CJTF) and formal (police) policing institutions, is critical for understanding how crime is managed in cities, and the findings of this research in Kaduna can be viewed more clearly through the analytical frameworks presented in this section. Inyang and Abraham (2013) examined how informal and formal policing strategies are frequently combined to assist formal policing institutions in detecting perpetrators of specific crimes when they are having difficulty detecting them. People who commit crimes may be able to elude detection and apprehension when standard policing strategies and procedures are used, but they are easily apprehended and made to face the full wrath of the law when informal intervention is used. The types of interactions that occur between formal and informal institutions are divided into four categories by Helmke and Levitsky (2004). The first is interaction that is complementary. This occurs when they work together to achieve a common goal. The second is a mutually accommodating relationship. This occurs when they work together without interfering with one another. The third form of interaction is a competition. This occurs when informal institutions undermine formal ones; and lastly, substitutive, when informal institutions compensate for absent or ineffective formal institutions in a substitutive relationship.

10.2.1 Relationships with Formal Security Actors

Within the study area, there are broadly two categories of non-state actors who work with the police: those who do so legally under the Kaduna State Vigilante Law (2016) and those who work informally but closely with the police. Furthermore, some of the respondents (security providers) noted that the relationships between informal and formal security actors are sometimes unstable, with mixed results. This is largely owing to the illegitimacy of some of the groups, as community-based organizations continue to struggle for formal official recognition. This has resulted in harassment from officers and some members of the community, as well as hindering their ability to do their jobs in cases where they made arrests involving high-profile members of society and were instead accused of stepping outside of their jurisdiction. They claim that if they had the government's support, they would not be hounded or humiliated as they are when seeking to deliver justice. As long as vigilante groups operate under the supervision of the NPF, the police appear to have few problems. What the police despise the most is when they lack 'authority' over the group's practices. In his study, Lar (2016) emphasizes that the police appear to be particularly concerned when informal actor's excesses are followed by public outcry, so the police act not only to demonstrate to the informal actors such as the vigilantes who is in charge, but also to maintain, and in some cases regain, social legitimacy. When acts are carried out without the involvement of the police, it is frowned upon, to the point of condemnation.

Among the groups (informal), however, it appears that there is an understanding relationship that is largely based on established operational boundaries, and each group is expected to work within its established boundary; if a group accidentally crosses over to another boundary, the case is turned over to the security operators within such communities. This is done in the best interests of the communities because they feel that local residents are the best people to handle issues that impact them, as well as because of their established organizational structure and hierarchy. *Interestingly, when someone from another community outside Malali or Badarawa commits a crime, after the first interrogation, he is either handed over to CJTF from his community or CJTF from his community are invited.*

In terms of operational practices, formal and informal security agencies work closely together, sharing intelligence and conducting joint patrols within communities. The Kato Da Gora group help the police by apprehending criminals and facilitating their handover. Their proximity to the community allows them to act as middlemen for the police and the general public, enhancing their role in crime prevention and addressing broader community issues. One leader described the collaboration between informal security groups and formal law enforcement, saying, "*When a case is reported to us, we ask the victim if he wants us to take it to the police. If he says yes, we proceed to the police station and give our report*". This quote emphasises the collaborative efforts in managing security issues, as well as the groups' role as a link between the community and the formal security system. Furthermore, these actors prioritise conflict resolution within their communities, leveraging their extensive knowledge of societal issues. "*We have our limitations because we are just a small security group that can only solve what we are capable of and forward the rest to the police,*" explained a top official, emphasising their focused mandate and occasional involvement in crime management to assist the police.

Furthermore, several studies have shown that in order to reduce insecurity in most African cities, both formal and informal policing systems must work together. In their study, Obidiegwu and Elekwa (2019) asserted that for the security of lives and property of members of any society to be achieved, the informal mechanism of crime detection and prevention must be integrated into formal policing strategies. There has always been a regular exchange of information between the Nigeria Police and community policing initiatives to reduce crime within neighbourhoods since time immemorial. The Kaduna JTFs are a good example of how restorative justice ethics can be used to shape homegrown and community-based security infrastructures while also liaising with state authorities when necessary. This research also shows that they do not operate as an extra-legal entity, but rather serve as a stopgap measure in the absence of consistent security in their communities.

10.3 The de jure rules of accountability and extent to which they are monitored and enforced, accountability for human rights abuses, violence against citizens, and failure to establish law and order.

The de jure rules of accountability are intended to hold security providers accountable for violations of human rights, attacks on citizens, and failure to maintain law and order. However, due to a lack of transparency, independence, and resources, monitoring and enforcing these rules and ensuring that accountability mechanisms are effective in practise is difficult. It is critical to address these issues in order to protect citizens from violations of other rights as well as human rights.

Interestingly, research findings from this study suggest that informal security organisations in Nigeria are well-organized and have a coordinated organisational structure, which contradicts popular perceptions. These organisations are formed at the neighbourhood, district, and state levels, with each neighbourhood represented at the district and districts represented at the state level. The neighbourhood and district commandants manage the actions of the various units in their jurisdictions, which are managed by their respective community leaders, emirate representatives, and the divisional police officer [DPO] of each unit. The command at the state level has ultimate control, and they are all managed by the state government through the Nigerian police force through the commissioner of police's office. The operations of the group are monitored at the neighbourhood and district levels by neighbourhood and district coordinators, respectively, while the state leadership manages and reports violations to official security authorities. The group is very coordinated in terms of training and recruitment, and members must go through a vetting process before being accepted as security operatives. The admissions process normally comprises filling out a registration form, interviews, screening, and reference checks before becoming a member. The group relies on the expertise of retired police officers and other security operatives for training and professional growth but does not get official formal training from the police or other law enforcement agencies.

Even though the Police do not officially recognize the work of the CJTF, they still manage such groups and have even subjected them to disciplinary actions when found wanting. The state government have repeatedly appreciated their cooperation and efforts in helping communities reduce crime, but they have also reiterated that their role is limited to apprehending criminals and that they have no authority to punish or deal with criminals in any way, and that such cases should be left to the law. They will be prosecuted/arrested and compelled to face the law if they are found lacking in any indiscipline or hostile behaviour toward people. In a few cases where their members were found to have grossly abused civilians, resulting in deaths or serious consequences, the police arrested and even imprisoned some of their members. The leadership supports the idea of the police engaging them when they are found wanting but cautions that they are sometimes overly restrained from doing their jobs and sometimes depicted as bad guys, affecting their morale and job performance. Several states in Nigeria, including Jos, Kano, and Kaduna, recognise some of these

vigilante-like groups and have laws governing their operations (e.g., vigilante and neighbourhood watch laws), which state that 'the State Commissioner of Police shall oversee all operations of registered neighbourhood watch operatives within the State,' but these regulations do not include instructions for disciplinary action in the event of misbehaviour.

Based on the field interviews, the activities of all community-based security providers in the study area seem to be well monitored and managed by the state. In terms of operation, the state coordinator and unit leader, respectively, supervise and monitor group activities at the state and neighbourhood levels. A group leader is usually in charge of supervising the group's activities at the neighbourhood level, and they have different units for dealing with various cases. For example, the disciplinary committee oversees issues of misconduct, and punishment can range from the confiscation of a membership ID card to suspension or expulsion, as well as arrest by police if the case is serious or if the complainant prefers the police to handle the case. Issues involving their members and members of the community are normally handled according to the complainant's preference; if they want them to handle the matter, they will, but they also have the option of involving the police, and they help ensure that justice is delivered. Members of the community are also encouraged to report any members who indulge in any type of indiscipline. If the matter is something they can handle, they deal with the person(s) in their office; if it's something they can't handle, they report the case to the police station.

Within the organization, they don't tolerate indiscipline, and they urge members of the public to report their members involved in any act of indiscipline or crime to them. In cases where their members are involved or caught in any act of indiscipline or crime, they either dismiss them or subject them to severe punishments, usually double that which would be done to a non-member offender or criminal. "*When a member commits an offense, we take disciplinary action...and ensure that justice is served. We do not let members who commit crimes go unpunished,*" one leader explained, highlighting the organization's internal accountability mechanisms. In the past, members have been caught indulging in criminal activity and other vices. Members who engage in illegal activity, commit any sort of offence, or act recklessly even within the organisation face disciplinary action. When one of their members engages in or is discovered to be engaging in misconduct or criminal activity, they either dismiss them or subject them to severe punishments that are typically double that of an offender or criminal who is not a member of the organisation. Even if the majority of these members leave the group before being caught, their punishment is typically harsher, and they are expelled from the group right away if they are discovered acting in any way that is contrary to the rules. Though, they claim that the registration process prevents things like enrolling irresponsible people in the group, which has minimized such occurrences because it requires vetting and vouching for potential members by influential and important members of the society prior to enrolment.

In terms of safeguarding communities against crimes, they were found to be effective across the board and more efficient than Police according to most respondents from the various neighbourhoods. The majority of those interviewed thought that the present informal security

arrangements have significantly reduced the rate of criminal activities in the city. This finding is consistent with those of Stipak (1994), Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi (2010), Inyang and Abraham (2013), Okeke (2014) and Amali (2017) amongst others. These researchers discovered that the accessibility of informal security structures local knowledge, and their use of informal mechanisms (such as charms, incantations, and others) allow them to effectively control and prevent crime. Though in some Nigerian cities, these groups have been charged with human rights violations and 'jungle justice' (a form of public extrajudicial killings in which an alleged criminal is publicly humiliated, beaten, and summarily executed). Scholars like Cross (2013) have observed that this isn't just peculiar to the informal system stating that 'some of the commonly observed problems with non-state policing, such as use of corporal punishment, torture, and persecution of marginalised groups, may not be any more likely to blight non-state delivery than they do the state police'.

However, it is also important to remember that not all vigilante groups are violent extremists who engage in jungle justice and human rights violations. They are best known for using their local knowledge to resolve neighbourhood disputes, reduce antisocial behaviour, and pinpoint specific crime hotspots (Badiora, 2018). Members of informal groups operating in the study area had also admitted to accidentally crossing the line, which had resulted in fatalities in some cases. In fact, in 2016/2017, the Kaduna state government attempted to ban their operations due to alleged infractions but was forced to reconsider due to an increase in insecurity within several neighbourhood after they were banned. Generally, across the country, there have been instances where informal groups have been linked to human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, forced detention, and torture. In a bill entitled 'Prohibition of Certain Associations Act' the federal government of Nigeria at the time, articulated its position on vigilante groups that were actively pursuing goals that not only coalesced with sectarian projects, but also were engaging in recurrent displays of violence meted out on suspected offenders without recourse to legal processes. The bill gave the President the authority to ban 'any group of persons, associations of individuals, or quasi-military groups formed for the purpose of furthering the political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural, or social interests of a group of persons or individual's contrary to the peace, order, and good governance of the federation or the provisions of this act,' according to the bill. This is a reference to groups like the Bakassi Boys of Southeast Nigeria, the Oodu'a People's Congress (OPC) of the Yoruba heartland of the southwest, and the Hisba, religious police where some scholars have particularly highlighted how they abuse human rights law, contest state legitimacy and how they have rooted their social legitimacy within identity discourses, drawing on ethnic and religious registers.

Yvan Guichaoua's (2010) research sheds more light on this phenomenon. He investigated the genealogy and evolution of one of the largest ethnic militias, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), through in-depth interviews with participants as well as a survey. The Pan-Yoruba organization O'odua People's Congress (OPC), which takes its name from Oduduwa, the Yoruba race's ancestor, is in charge of safeguarding, protecting, and promoting Yoruba interests. The OPC first became

active in crime-fighting activities in 1999. They are mainly engaged by local governments in southwest states; for example, citizens in Lagos state pay roughly 500 Naira per month as a security levy, with some paying more and some paying less, which is paid directly to the OPC in Lagos state. The employment of force against other ethnic groups to combat violence against Yorubas is an example of the OPC's vigilantism strategy. Similarly, in the late 1990s, the Bakassi Boys arose as a vigilante group in the Southeast of Nigeria in reaction to significant increases in crime in that region. This organization, like the OPC, gained popular support in the areas where they operated because to a lack of alternatives to safety provision. Meagher (2012) pointed out that despite employing extraordinarily violent and ruthless techniques, these organizations were acclaimed as heroes by many communities and credited with greatly reducing the prevalence of violent crime in their regions of operation. These seeming victories, however, do not negate the reality that both OPC and Bakassi Boys, as well as other similar groups, have been accused of using excessive force and violating human rights.

It can sometimes be difficult to tell whether such groups enjoyed popular support in the areas where they operated due to a lack of alternatives to safety provision, i.e., if it's a case of a better alternative or a case of the better, as the police have also been accused of stalling cases, corruption, and working with criminals, among other vices. It's worth noting that the problem of abuse isn't limited to non-state actors; one of the residents within the study area reported facing similar difficulties with the state institutions: *There is the issue of intimidation when the police arrest people sometimes. Because of ethnic and religious differences in the country, there's disunity in the country. For instance, if one person commits an offence, instead of the police to arrest just that offender, they will end up arresting many who will eventually suffer simply because they are not from his tribe, or they have different religions. These are the two major challenges we have in this country. Tribal and religious differences and this is what is happening in all parts of the country. People no longer work in a professional and just manner. They either have a personal or religious agenda and this is why there are lots of problems. There is no justice, if one person commits an offence let them be punished alone. They know that it's one person who has committed the offence, but they will go ahead and arrest innocent individuals.*

However, despite their shortcomings they are also known to be very effective in reducing crime, as demonstrated in a study in which the majority of participants (68.8%) attested to how effective they have been in reducing criminal activity in their neighbourhoods. The major issue has always been going too far and having politicians use them as political thugs, as Dan Asabe (1991) demonstrated in his work, which looked into the evolution of a well-known youth crime gang within Nigeria from the pre-colonial period through the colonial and post-colonial eras. The Yen daaba were originally hunters who were drawn into politics to provide security for the then Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) party, which was a poor majority party as opposed to the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), which was made up of elites who harassed NEPU members using formal security (Native police) back then. NEPU reacted by hiring local hunters known as 'Yen dab' to act as bodyguards, but this unfortunately transformed them over time into

political thugs, which is still happening today. This is similar to how the Bakassi boys became political thugs after government and politicians became involved in their activities. The strategy used at the time is still being used today; these groups are used as political thugs and touts by politicians, and their members have become a nuisance wherever they are found, as is currently the case with the ESN in southeast Nigeria.

10.4 Kind of protection informal security providers offer and inclusiveness of women and other vulnerable groups in security provision and management.

The informal security providers have certain kind of crimes they handle and some others that they avoid and cannot handle. They focus on conflict resolution and typically handle crimes such as disputes, misunderstandings, betrayal, scamming, and minor thefts, like when a child steals from a parent. They generally avoid involvement in severe cases like rape, homosexuality, murder, and robbery, deferring these to the police. However, they do assist in apprehending offenders in serious cases before handing them over to the police for legal proceedings. As described by their officials, "*We have our limitations because we are just a small security group that can only solve what we are capable of and forward the rest to the police. For instance, if a rape case is brought to us, we do what we can and later hand over to the police*". This stance highlights their commitment to supporting formal law enforcement while recognizing their limitations and ensuring that more serious crimes are managed by the appropriate authorities.

In terms of gender inclusivity in their actions appear to be responsive in addressing gender-related crimes, and they even include women in their group members to address issues relating to women than men cannot handle due to cultural restrictions. In 2000, the UN security Council passed the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda which recognizes two key points. One of these encourages the implementation of a 'gender perspective' in policymaking, which can show how structures of gender inequality impede access, opportunities, and well-being for certain people, as well as ultimately impeding peace (Hugh & Ramanarayanan, 2019). To achieve sustainable peace and security women need to be included, in the design and carrying out security reforms to pay greater attention to gender issues and to actively involve women in all phases of reform programmes (Harsch, 2010). In terms of inclusion, the CJTF have women who work with them, but their role is limited. Women's role is usually limited to marital issues involving women and other related kinds of crime that involve women. They are not involved in most of other cases outside that. Also, since the city is a cosmopolitan city with different tribes, religion, ethnic groups and so on, there are cases where they have to handle issues from victims that are not the same tribe or religion as most members of the group. The group is predominantly made up of members that are Muslims and Hausas, but they also have Christian members who help in resolving cases that have to do with victims that are Christians. Most of their cases are resolved by referring to the holy books (Quran and Bible).

Figure 64: A group of female respondents who participated in the research.

10.5 Perceptions of Security providers and satisfaction with the level of crime management within neighbourhoods.

The inability of formal security structures (police) to control and prevent rising levels of crime in the neighbourhoods, as evidenced by both quantitative and qualitative data, contributed significantly to the prevalence and growth of informal security structures in the study area and throughout the country. Okeke (2013) asserted that there is a direct relationship between negative public perceptions of formal security structures and patronage of informal security structures. This means that the public will turn to informal security structures if they perceive formal security structures to be extortionists (seeking bribes), human rights violators, corrupt, and untrustworthy. Similarly, Diaz (1992), Friedmann (1992), Ferreira (1996), Okiro (2007), Amali (2017) and Lar (2016) among others have all come to similar conclusions. The inadequacy and failure of state security agencies to protect citizens and their property, according to all of these studies, led the public to seek alternatives. Residents prefer the informal security sector to formal agencies for this study, and the majority of people prefer them to handle cases within the study area. This finding is consistent with that of other researchers, including Green (1964), Byrne (1979), Oppler's (1997) Greene (2000), Van Rooyen (2001), and Wrobleski and Hees (2003), Pam (2005). According to Pam (2005), a loss of trust in a state's formal security structures serves as a driver or inducement for the development and growth of local security outfits. This finding is echoed in Oppler's (1997) submission, in which she concludes that the non-responsiveness of formal security structures encourages private citizens to use informal security structures. In the study, more than half of respondents said that they didn't trust the police and preferred reporting crime cases to the CJTF

especially since most criminal cases reported to the police lingered for lengthy periods of time without resolution as opposed to their experiences with the informal security providers who addressed local crime immediately. As one community member puts it, 'you can negotiate your way out of trouble with the police officers.' In contrast, you could not buy your way out of justice with the CJTFs. Overall, residents I interviewed spoke about the effectiveness of CJTFs in reducing insecurity within their neighbourhoods and claimed that there was an increase in crime within neighbourhoods at a time when the State Government placed a ban on the group. The JTF is preferred by the majority of responders for these reasons. There is a widespread belief that police are dishonest and untrustworthy; several respondents stated that they prefer local dispute resolution to using the police, even when the police are present. The informal actors' understanding of the local environment, was another element that contributed to the general choice of CJTF over the police.

The majority are also pleased with the level of crime control in their communities. However, some people offered suggestions on how to improve crime management in the city. Many respondents suggested that the informal security (CJTF) be supported by integrating them into the formal security system, paying them, and arming them with weapons to fight crime in order to further help reduce crime in their communities. Others advocated for the creation of jobs, particularly for young people, to discourage them from joining gangs and engaging in criminal activities. Aside from that, there were other concerns, such as good child upbringing and more police officers/stations.

CHAPTER 11. RECOMMENDATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SECURITY SYSTEM AND CONCLUSION

11.0 Introduction

This research study involved the comprehensive collection and evaluation of new primary evidence, including both quantitative and qualitative data, gathered from Kaduna providing firsthand evidence from the field. The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a clear understanding of Nigeria's security challenges while also proposing potential workable solutions. This study provides insights into the ongoing discourse in Nigeria about security challenges by focusing on the unique context of Kaduna and providing empirical evidence. It emphasises the importance of community-oriented approaches and the need to move away from ineffective crime-focused policing strategies.

The research shows the ineffectiveness of crime-focused policing techniques in improving safety and security in African cities. Community-oriented policing approaches, such as vigilantism, on the other hand, have demonstrated their effectiveness in allowing local agencies to respond more efficiently to the security needs of both residents and the state (DCAF, 2019). This strategy aligns with Rousseau's (2007) concept of social contract policing, which emphasises the importance of inclusivity and community involvement in developing a long-term internal security system. The importance of moving to a better security model, which should include a readiness to collaborate with local agencies to provide security, is being emphasized more and more by security analysts, policymakers, and practitioners (see Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, & Olabisi, 2017; Sedra, 2018; Jackson, 2019). It is widely acknowledged that including local actors in security discussions or reform processes is crucial; this requires working with civil society, the media, and religious organizations. The contributions of state, local, and commercial organizations or groups should be considered as part of a multi-layered approach to community security and safety policy (Baker,2010). Nonetheless, there has been little evidence and research on the effectiveness of collaboration among various security agencies in Nigeria, particularly between and among state and non-state actors, as well as the details of the structure and role of non-state actors in relation to security governance in Nigeria, particularly in northern Nigerian cities, an empirical gap that this thesis sought to address.

The findings of this study demonstrate that most communities in Kaduna metropolis, Northern Nigeria, and the entire nation benefit significantly from the provision of security provided by informal security agencies. It is evident from the quantitative data and qualitative data gathered for this study that the inability of the formal security structures (police) to curb and stop the rising crime rates in most communities had a significant impact on the emergence of informal security structures in the majority of places. Most of the time, informal groups help the police, especially given that the country has a shortage of police officers relative to its population and that its policing resources are overstretched. Because of this, it is questionable what the police can actually do. The

key takeaway is that local informal security providers play an important role in combating local crime (and resolving the problem at the local level first), as well as liaising with formal authorities if matters are outside their jurisdiction or deemed to be risky and demand formal policing responses.

This section, which draws support from data gathered during the research and from related studies, investigates ways to improve and advance a sustainable and functional model for Nigeria's security system. These findings led to the following suggestions, which are categorized into three groups and, if adopted, should improve the nation's hybrid security system.

11.1 Recommendations

Security is a complex issue that necessitates a comprehensive and context-specific approach. There are several strategies that can be implemented to improve security provision. Engaging with non-state actors, building trust, encouraging community participation, strengthening oversight mechanisms, and addressing power imbalances are among the strategies. African governments, security providers, and communities can build more resilient, adaptive, and legitimate security systems that respond to the diverse needs and aspirations of citizens by implementing these strategies.

11.1.1 Nature of Nigeria's Security Architecture

Despite serving a diverse federal polity, the Nigeria Police Force has a highly centralised command structure. The force's centralised structure has been documented to disempower state-level commands, impede service delivery, create bottlenecks, and distance citizens from 'their' police while making interstate cooperation easier than in decentralised police systems. Other possible outcomes include politicisation and a lack of professionalism. Because of the limitations on accountability and the filtering of resources and assets toward the centre, many frontline units at the state level of command are under-resourced and only nominally supervised (Okenyodo, 2016). For instance, the police leadership does not closely collaborate with district commanders, the local populace, or municipal officials, but instead reports primarily to the presidency (ibid.). These call for the President's power to be limited by amending Sections 215(3) of the Constitution as well as Sections 9(4)-(5) and 10(1)-(2) of the Police Act to restrict the President's power, which at the moment allows a minister to give policy instructions to the NPF. The amendment should make it crystal clear that only the Inspector General of Police, or other appropriate police commanders as the IGP may authorise, has operational control over the NPF and its department (Okenyodo, 2016). To enable the zone, state, and local government area commands, as well as the divisional tiers, to take timely initiatives in collaboration with host communities, it would be more practical to decentralise and devolve powers and resources to these tiers. Accountability, transparency, partnership, and participation will all improve as a result (Okenyodo, 2016).

The centralised nature of Nigeria's security architecture has been highlighted as a major concern in both my research and other studies such as Thomas and Aghedo (2014) and Egbosiuba (2019).

This structural centralization has adversely affected the country's ability to manage crime and insecurity, especially at the local level. However, simply attributing this centralization to the need to protect against ethnic division is insufficient. As evidenced by the poor performance of the current police force established since Nigeria's independence in 1960, there must be some political or material interest in maintaining the current system of centralised control over the police and armed forces. This failure has been repeatedly criticised and blamed for the rise in violent insecurity in Nigeria. Despite calls for a decentralised police force comprised of locals familiar with the language, geography, and sociopolitical terrains of various regions, the federal government has consistently refused to relinquish control, and this issue requires further research in the literature.

However, a critical concern for most that are against the hybrid setting is that politicians in many communities wield enormous power over local security groups, owing to the fact that many of these groups receive official assistance at the local and state levels. The main worry expressed by individuals who oppose the establishment of decentralized police forces is that the officers and men of such local units will be used to tyrannize political opponents. The use of the NA police by politicians in the old Northern and Western regions during the First Republic is cited as an example by critics of the idea (Rotimi, n.d). For example, during the interviews, the groups regularly expressed similar concerns stating that, while they seek government assistance, they are cautious about how far they go and prefer that the government, particularly politicians, stay out of their activities because they believe that '*when you are paid by the government, it can dictate to you or use you easily regardless of your intentions as a community organization.*'

Additionally, the police in Nigeria are thought to be politicised. Security leaders are often chosen based more on their political affiliations than their professional background or aptitude for law enforcement. The level of leadership at the helm of the NPF suffers as a result. In these situations, appointees feel more loyalty to their political patron than to their institutions or the people they represent. There is inconsistency in how and to whom the law is applied thereby weakening professional and ethical standards (Okenyodo, 2016). The country's security agencies, particularly the NPF, should be decentralised from the federally controlled to state and local government having a stake in the management of the security system to prevent strong politicisation efforts targeted at the security system within the nation. This should involve establishing independent units at the local level with operational autonomy. Decision-making processes and operations become more transparent and accountable as a result. This helps to mitigate the impact of political interests on security issues, which can be detrimental to national security. Furthermore, decentralisation enables a better understanding of the security challenges confronting specific regions, leading to the development of tailored strategies to address these challenges. This approach increases the effectiveness of security agencies in dealing with security threats while decreasing the possibility of politicisation. In Nigeria, this can be accomplished by introducing the state police, which has long been debated as a means of addressing the country's insecurity, and part of the structure that can be introduced here could incorporate the already established informal

system into its structure. The decentralisation of resources raises concerns about the possibility of political dynamics at the state level being replicated. While allocating resources to lower levels of governance can increase officers' operational autonomy and allow them to engage more actively with the community, it is also important to ensure that routine issues are not hampered by bureaucratic processes at higher decision-making levels. A decentralised system has the potential to strengthen police community-based accountability incentives by reducing their reliance on distant superiors (ibid).

The research emphasises the agility and effectiveness of informal security operators in apprehending criminals and assisting police. These operators have a thorough knowledge of their neighbourhoods and are well-equipped to quickly identify potential criminals and their whereabouts. This collaboration between non-state actors and law enforcement agencies demonstrates the potential value of utilising local knowledge and expertise (see also Aleyomi & Nwagwu, 2020). It is critical to recognise that intelligence gathering, processing, and dissemination are critical in addressing Nigeria's security challenges. Adeoye (2020) emphasises the need for significant improvements in Nigeria's intelligence systems in a comprehensive analysis of the country's security situation. A deficient intelligence infrastructure can perpetuate a poor security situation regardless of the size and strength of the security forces, which include troops, police officers, and other paramilitary personnel. Nigeria's intelligence systems must undergo significant reforms in order to fully capitalise on individuals' contributions to intelligence gathering. This would entail improving intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, ensuring seamless coordination among security agencies, and cultivating a culture of collaboration and information sharing among relevant stakeholders.

Therefore, this study recommends integrating non-state informal security systems into the country's security architecture, especially in light of the fact that one major flaw of the centralised formal policing system has always been that the formal system and its officers are seen to be estranged from the areas they police. Integrating informal security structures into the larger framework for security provision is pertinent and essential for the implementation of intelligence-led policing. It is evident from this study that informal groups are not, as is commonly believed, agents of avarice, illegitimate aggression, and political upheaval. For instance, in the study area, they engage in policing activities including arrests, investigations, and periodic patrols; by doing so, they assist in maintaining order in their communities. They go even further by tackling societal issues and putting more of an emphasis on improving people's quality of life.

11.1.2 Lack of Collaboration and Synergy between Agencies

The lack of synergy among the agencies involved in security governance is one of the major issues that the majority of participants have highlighted in this study. It should be emphasized that a successful and all-encompassing security strategy is necessary for adequate security. Security and policing functions should not be limited to formal security. It is important to develop, put into place, and enforce a cooperative collaboration between the formal and informal security

organizations. This collaboration is essential for a people-centred policing strategy that is both robust and inclusive.

It takes a wide range of actors, including the government, the private sector, civil society, and members of the communities, to effectively collaborate and synergize resources and intelligence in order for a state to alleviate insecurity. This can be achieved through encouraging multi-stakeholder partnerships that is based on local realities and emphasize that security is everyone's responsibility. This can be accomplished through establishing multi-stakeholder partnerships based on local circumstances, which hold that security is everyone's business. Since security is based on national ownership rather than state-centricity, moving the security agenda outside of state security does not imply replacing it, rather, it complements and builds on it to meet local realities. This does not in any way strip the state from its primary objective of protection of lives and property (Aleyomi and Nwagwu, 2020). As Umar and Bappi (2014) noted, crime has various causes, thus solutions must be as multidimensional and cannot be handled alone by the police force.

The study found that local agencies are willing to work with state institutions and that they actually provide a complementary function by helping to reduce crime in areas where institutional presence is lacking. The study found that security providers in the study area play a complementary and substitutive role by helping the state provide security for neighbourhoods and by filling in for security in neighbourhoods without access to security (Badarawa) within the study area. Therefore, the local system complements the official system by assisting the state in reducing crime in communities. They also fill in for the absence of formal institutions in some situations, especially in places like Badarwa where there are no police stations or posts. However, the absence of local groups' legalisation is a significant obstacle. Although the majority of the states and local governments in Nigeria have legalised such groups activities, Nigeria does not have a federal law that backs them. Even though their activities are formally recognised by the federal government and the state as a non-profit organisation, it has been challenging for them to secure federal funding due to the lack of national legislation (Ogbozor, 2016) and legitimacy in the eyes of the law and formal law enforcement officers. According to Denney and Jenkins (2013), the Nigerian government is in favour of the formation of informal policing groups as long as they register with the police, submit to police screening, refrain from carrying weapons, and hand over suspects to the police rather than detaining them (Idris, 2019). The lack of this was a significant issue that was repeatedly brought up during the research.

As a result, collaboration among institutions and agencies involved in security provision is recommended to ensure efficient and effective crime and security management in society. One possible strategy is to create a centralised platform for communication and information sharing among various security agencies. This could include the formation of joint task forces or committees to coordinate efforts and share expertise, as well as the provision of regular training sessions and workshops to improve the skills and knowledge of security personnel from various agencies. It is also critical to establish clear guidelines and protocols in order to streamline

decision-making and ensure a consistent approach to security management. Institutions and agencies can collaborate seamlessly to promote safer communities by implementing these measures. Although the group is open to working together with the government, they are wary of involving it in their affairs for fear of the government demanding things from them or attempting to exert influence, as seen with the NPC and the Bakassi group. The group avoids partisan politics because they believe it will divide them and ultimately lead to their demise. Members of the group have emphasised the importance of having legal support in order to avoid conflicts with other state agencies and community members who may perceive them to be operating illegally.

11.1.3 Training and Recruitment

During the research, local security providers confirmed that they were occasionally infiltrated by criminals and 'bad eggs', mostly to spy on them. The group also noted that it has a good vetting procedure in place for their recruits, which has helped them in their recruitment and training processes, ensuring that they only hire people who have the best interests of their communities in mind. Despite this, they still have incidents of recruits, particularly new recruits, misusing power, and in such circumstances, they encourage members of the public to report any of their members who are found wanting, and they make sure that such situations are dealt with, sometimes resulting in dismissal. These concerns are among the primary arguments against the use of informal police organizations in most cities, especially in Africa. The main cause for concern is that these organizations sometimes reject supervision and are willing to impose jungle justice on individuals they apprehend, which is a serious breach of suspects' rights and a danger to the safety of the public. However, whether such local groups stick to their initial responsibilities of community protection and counter-insurgency or transform into ethnic militias and insurgent groups is largely determined by local leaders' ambitions and relative autonomy from – or alignment with – national governments. To prevent them from deviating uncontrollably from their original purpose, national governments should engage local leaders with influence over local groups as they emerge, such as traditional and religious authorities and business elite, with the goal of establishing finite, mutually acceptable objectives within an overarching national counter-insurgency strategy.

In addition, the quality and quantity of the persons recruited by these organizations is another significant issue. Local group membership must be carefully regulated and validated. Non-state actors in security should be screened, trained, and (re)certified. This would boost confidence among formal security agencies, allowing them to collaborate with designated members of the community to improve security and accountability. To accomplish this, existing regulatory bodies will require legislative reviews to strengthen their mandates and allow them to expand their current reach beyond federally established security agencies to include state- or community-based organisations as well (Okenyodo, 2016).

Experts like Bukarti (2021) noted that arming unemployed, uneducated young people as security providers or volunteers may be convenient now but is both unsustainable in the long term and could even be a future security risk. Ogbozor (2016) further advocated the need for local security

organizations to be trained in human rights and international humanitarian law so that they do not violate people's rights. A law of this type should outline the powers and obligations of local group members, as well as the qualifications and training needed, as well as establish provisions for their oversight and discipline. ICG (2017) also emphasized the necessity of national authorities urging local leaders and local community representatives to rigorously assess recruits. They contended that the greater the number of such recruits, the more difficult it is to govern them, hence, recruitment could be limited to levels commensurate with state and local authorities' capacity to oversee their actions.

11.2 Constraints, limitations, and policy implications of this system for sustainable development.

According to some authors, hybridity in this case, the collaboration of various security groups, particularly formal and informal is advantageous for Africa's development (Boege 2006; Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2008; Tom, 2011; Meagher, 2012; FCLP, 2019). According to research, collaboration between formal and informal security institutions is required to reduce insecurity in the majority of African cities. It is expected that when traditional policing strategies and techniques are adopted, criminals who could evade detection and arrest from formal policing would be easily caught and made to face the full wrath of the law. For example, Obidiegwu and Elekwa (2019) argued that for the protection of lives and property of members of any society to be accomplished, the informal mechanism of crime detection and prevention must be integrated into formal policing strategies. Inyang and Abraham (2013) stated that informal and formal policing strategies are often combined to help formal policing organisations detect offenders of specific crimes when they are having difficulty detecting them. Umar and Bappi (2014), suggest in their research that crime has multiple causes, and the solutions must be equally multifaceted and cannot be handled by only the police force. Adejoh (2013) noted that community policing is more effective when it is carried out as a collaborative and collective responsibility among police, vigilante, and community members. It is therefore important for all recognized agencies working to keep our cities safe to come together and work to achieve safer cities for all. Furthermore, Agbiboa (2019) in his research on the origins, dynamics, and drivers of non-state informal security actors in Africa suggested that the ideal-type models of well-functioning states are unlikely to accurately reflect governance in African societies where formal institutions are often absent or ineffective and have been replaced by local security groups and hybrid security arrangements. It also suggests that a state-centric approach is likely to undermine the potential of local actors for security and service delivery due to the fact that the approach has been ineffective in explaining the complex relations between CBAGs and the formal state, particularly the roles and responsibilities that each assumes in security provision and service delivery in East and West Africa. The research also concluded that a hybrid security approach has the advantage of helping to build up the sense of local ownership and agency for managing various security threats to their daily lives. Furthermore, the rise of CBAGs establishes the need for state forces (including the

police) that are part of the community and accountable to it; state security forces need to understand the local culture and language of the communities they serve. The emergence of CBAGs does not necessarily spell doom for the power and authority of the state; it can help to expand and complement the state or rebuild trust in formal state institutions.

However, there are palpable contradictions in the available scholarship on the development, proliferation and effectiveness of informal security structures in crime control and prevention in Nigerian neighbourhoods (see Reiss, 1971; Reiner, 1992; Ikuteyiyo & Rotimi, 2010; Nimbe & Bayo, 2011; Samuel, 2012). Some research findings speak highly of the effectiveness of the informal security structures in terms of crime reduction and prevention in Nigerian neighbourhoods, while other researchers' findings demonstrated that informal security structures have repeatedly embarked on extra-judicial killings, punishment of innocent suspects, vigilante mob action and oppression, among others (Alemika, 2009; Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000; Moshood, Amali, Omolabak, & Olabisi, 2017). However, what is evident is that non-state security organizations didn't emerge with the intention of challenging the state; rather, they arose as security entities in response to real or perceived threats, and they frequently evolve to fill security gaps left by the central state, as evidenced by this study and the *Global Initiative's* (2017) report on Governing *Safer Cities*. The primary driver of support for vigilantism, according to Tankebe (2009), was perceptions of police trustworthiness. Nivette (2016) found that perceived police criminality and institutional ineffectiveness predicted endorsement of vigilantism. In Nigeria, the lack of a police response to violent robberies aided the rise of the Bakassi Boys, a vigilantism movement that used torture in conjunction with occult forces to combat crime (Harnischfeger, 2003; McCall, 2004; Smith, 2004 Meagher; 2007).

From both the quantitative data and qualitative information collected for this study, it is clear that the inability of the formal security structures (police) to control and prevent the rising levels of crime in the neighbourhoods contributed substantially to the emergence of informal security structures in Nigerian cities. The informal group acts to assist the police, especially given the fact that policing resources in Nigeria are overstretched, as well as the country's insufficient number of police officers in proportion to the number of residents. As a result, what the police can actually do is debatable, and the key point here is that the role of local informal security providers is critical in addressing local crime (and resolving the problem at the local level first), as well as in liaising with formal authorities if matters are outside their jurisdiction or perceived to be risky and warrant formal policing responses.

The state government attempted to ban the group (yen kato da gora) at some point in 2016/2017 as a result of reports of members torturing suspected criminals and collaborating with criminals, but the ban was rescinded after investigations cleared them, as well as a sharp increase in crime in several communities shortly after the ban. The group has also sought government assistance, believing that the government is aware of their accomplishments and should be willing to help them, particularly by legalizing their organization and giving much-needed resources such as cars

and office buildings. Despite the fact that they seek government assistance, they are hesitant of involving the government in their affairs because they feel that, like the Hisba/bakassi group, if the government becomes too involved in their affairs, it will begin to make demands or assert control over them. One of the key reasons the group avoids partisan politics is that they feel this will eventually divide and destroy the organization. Most of their members have reiterated that all they need is legal backing to avoid conflicts with other state agencies and members of the community who sometimes dismiss them and believe they are operating illegally.

One of the main objections to the presence of informal policing structures in most cities, particularly in Africa, is that some of these groups refuse to work under the supervision of the authorities, as well as their willingness to take the law into their own hands by administering 'jungle justice' to those they arrest, which constitutes serious violations of suspects' rights and a threat to citizens' security. In this scenario, the group is very willing to collaborate with state institutions and has already begun doing so. In actuality, they serve a complementary role by assisting in crime prevention in places where institutional presence is weak. They also carry out their activities in accordance with the state's rules and regulations.

Another issue is that they are occasionally infiltrated by criminals and 'bad eggs'[35], making them a part of the problem rather than a solution to crime and insecurity. In this scenario, the group has built a good vetting procedure for their recruits, but despite this, they still urge members of the public to report any of their members who are found wanting, and they make sure that such situations are dealt with, sometimes resulting to dismissal. This has helped them in their recruitment and training processes, ensuring that they only hire people who have the best interests of their communities in mind.

Another key issue is that politicians in many localities wield tremendous influence over informal security groups because many of these groups receive official assistance at the local and state levels. The group has stated that, while they seek government assistance, they are cautious about how far they go and prefer that the government, particularly politicians, stay out of their activities because they believe that '*when you are paid by the government, it can dictate to you or use you easily regardless of your intentions as a community organization*.' The most crucial thing the government can do for them is give legal support, according to most of the CJTF members. It is also important to recognize that these CJTFs welcome and seek government support and recognition on the one hand, but do not want to get involved in partisan politics. They prefer a kind of political neutrality in order to retain a sense of impartiality when it came to dealing with criminal cases, and in order to avoid 'owing' anything to any particular political party.

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[35] Bad eggs: a terminology used to refer or describe a person who is bad, dishonest, or unreliable.

11.3 Further Research, Limitations and Delimitations of Study.

This study has contributed to the rapidly growing security and governance literature in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, by providing a better understanding and explanation of the diverse security institutions involved in security governance in African cities, as well as how they interact and co-exist in urban spaces, with a particular focus on Nigeria and, more specifically, the Northern part of the country. The study's findings corroborate earlier claims that the police's incapacity to regulate and prevent rising crime rates in local communities had a significant impact on the development of informal security systems in Nigerian cities. However, despite its very informative findings, a number of limitations prevented this research from fully achieving some of its goals. These limitations include the Covid 19 pandemic, time constraints, and security concerns.

A more extensive examination of the rules of accountability by both state and non-state informal actors, as well as the extent to which they are monitored and implemented especially at national level, is another issue that future research could investigate. Studies on informal policing organizations frequently focus on victims of non-state informal agencies and human rights violations committed by them, ignoring the important role they play in maintaining the safety and security of local communities. Non-state informal policing institutions can have both negative and positive impact in communities they serve, but as this study has shown, they have a more beneficial impact on the communities in which they operate. However, there have also been allegations of abuses committed by them, which need to be looked into more and legally and structurally addressed, particularly given that these organizations have grown to be major actors in the security field.

The role of women in security governance is another issue that requires more investigation, particularly from the perspective of non-state informal institutions. In order to better understand how women and other vulnerable groups are served by these arrangements, that is, whether they are equally well or poorly served, it would be beneficial to look more thoroughly at how they are included or excluded from security services. This study only briefly touched on this issue.

In terms of statistics, the research's qualitative and quantitative findings are mainly a reflection of Northern Nigeria; due to the country's diversity, if they were duplicated in another region, the outcomes may be different. Other scholars may choose to adopt a comprehensive approach in order to examine a broader scope within the country or continent as a whole.

In addition, since this study takes a northern perspective in reaching its conclusions, the quantitative data that concentrated on gathering people's perceptions of this arrangement could benefit from a bigger scope by looking at it on a national scale cutting across cultures, religion, and different ethnic groups to have a better understanding of the country's perception of the system and its challenges. Nigeria is a vast country with countless ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. As some of these non-state institutions function within cultural, religious, and ethnic jurisdiction, further research can examine how people's perceptions of state and non-state actors

compare across these backgrounds. As Gervanosi's (2010) study showed, there are often differences in people's perception in state institutions between regions of a country, especially in developing states. These geographical variations may account for why some regions have a greater overall societal, political, and economic integration. Furthermore, using data from longitudinal surveys acquired from the same people at different periods, can be utilized to explore how people's behaviour and opinions regarding these systems change over time.

Finally, more research can be conducted to fill the gaps identified here and help better inform African policy on governance and security issues in Nigeria. Despite its limitations, this study was effective in addressing its goal and relevance to the security and governance literature. The study objectives should therefore be more thoroughly addressed especially at the national scale by other researchers, strengthening the security and governance literature and scholarship in Nigeria and Africa at large.

11.4 Conclusion

Security and governance studies in the global south typically focus on how power is transferred and distributed from states to nonstate actors, but they do not examine actual governance practises or the more specific logic or content of the relationships between states and nonstate actors[36]. Most of the time, the emphasis is on shifting the conversation from a negative to a more positive one: rather than focusing on institutions and what they do or do not do in specific contexts, which is why this research focuses on what social and political structures exist and how they interact. In other words, the realities of what and who are playing the roles that we typically assume the state should be playing are more significant than the shortcomings of the state[37]. In the city of Kaduna, where non-state security providers frequently bemoan how their lack of recognition from the state affects their operations, this research has brought to light this reality and knowledge gap.

Many scholars have also noted that the core contribution of hybrid governance research is typically the notion that there are forms of order beyond the state - which is nothing new. Since the colonial era of indirect rule, hybrid arrangements incorporating non-state institutions into formal governance arrangements have been well documented in Africa[38]. What makes this study unique is that it emphasises and highlights the role and structure of non-state security agencies, as well as strategies for working collaboratively with local nonstate forms of order that go beyond state-centred notions of postcolonial governance. The once chaotic nature of African governance and security arrangements, however, has recently been reinterpreted in a new way as a result of a shift from Weberian to Tillyan models of state creation. This shift has emphasised the formation of centralised states capable of monopolising the use of force and enforcing security. As a result, one could argue that the shift represented a genuine shift in how African governance and security

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[36] See Sending & Neumann, 2006
[37] See AfroCritic, 2013
[38] See Meagher, De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014

arrangements are perceived and approached. Africa's rebels, militias, and vigilante groups are more frequently depicted as potential sources of order and state formation now than they were a few years ago in the literature on conflict and governance in Africa, where they were seen as agents of greed, unlawful violence, and political disorder. The praise of non-state order as a means of ingrained kinds of order and authority has taken the place of the criticism of it as institutionally destructive narrative[39].

The security domain, which is regarded as the core of statehood in the Western Weberian context, is structured in a non-state-centric manner. The state's exclusive right to the legal application of physical force is not the foundation for the upkeep of internal security and order. Instead, non-state actors must collaborate with state institutions to share duties. Working relationships with local customary authority are crucial for the efficiency and legitimacy of the state's law enforcement institutions in Pacific Island nations, for instance. In Pacific societies, village chiefs or clan elders are typically responsible for maintaining order and peace in the local areas[40]. Regarding normative presumptions, the frequent references to the 'embeddedness' of nonstate forms of order fail to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate local orders and have a tendency to blur the issue of whether nonstate systems of order and authority are desirable because they are locally acceptable or because creating a sovereign and accountable state is more expensive[41]. As Cramer and Goodhand (2002) put it, 'It is illogical to pretend that societies emerging from years of bitter and destructive warfare will seamlessly merge with the world economy, thriving on the signals of comparative advantage, without intervention'. As a result, basing African governments' potential to maintain peace and sustainable development on the modern Western-style Weberian state, which does not exist in reality outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, might be misleading (OECD). Many states have hybrid models, which differ significantly from the Western model state and how it operates, especially in the basic governing sectors of security, representation, and welfare.

In terms of security, the majority of African police forces now are seen as colonial innovations. They were established as tools of colonial pacification, control, and exploitation during the colonial era. Many African nations had created political systems with strong ruling dynasties that retained individuals who served in both law enforcement and policing capacities prior to colonial colonization. Numerous societies that lacked such ruling dynasties placed a strong emphasis on collective self-policing. Despite this, self-policing, which is practised in many communities, has endured and is still in use. It has resisted colonialism's attempts to eradicate it and has evolved while holding on to old traditions. These systems were frequently rationalised and placed under the control of local authorities that were annexed to colonial administration; however, in other

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[39] See Meagher, 2012
[40] See Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009
[41] See Meagher, 2012

instances, particularly in remote rural areas, they were left alone and are now resurfacing to help address the issue of insecurity in most cities.

It's important for the states in Africa to understand that the challenges of insecurity cannot be addressed by the state alone. The citizens must be part of the process; citizen's-based initiative must be encouraged, and clear mechanisms put in place to check abuses and ill practices. In his research, Agbiboa (2019) acknowledges that a hybrid security approach has the benefit of assisting in the development of a sense of local ownership and agency for controlling various security threats to their everyday life. In this context, it's imperative to recognize how this study's findings contribute to the broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specifically, the exploration of informal policing systems intersects with goals related to peace, justice, and strong institutions (SDG 16), reducing inequalities (SDG 10), and promoting sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11). The empirical insights, particularly from chapters 8 through 11, underscore the potential of these community-based security mechanisms to foster more inclusive, safe, and resilient societies. However, they also highlight the complexities and challenges in aligning these informal systems with global development agendas. This research, therefore, not only enriches our understanding of security governance in the African context but also underscores the necessity for strategic and context-sensitive approaches in leveraging local security mechanisms towards achieving SDGs.

A hybrid security approach that recognizes and supports the roles and responsibilities of non-state informal entities as co-providers of security and justice can strengthen the capacity of weak states to govern and to maintain a strong base in social forces. Although local security providers may be thought of as alternatives to weak or failing states, non-state informal entities as a phenomenon generally aim for 'more state, not less state.' More often than not, their goal is to prop up a weak state by taking on some of its functions. What is evident from this is that they have the potential to transform from protectors of local communities to principal threats to those communities, repeating the same flaws that plague formal state institutions. However, based on the discussion in this paper, it is evident that there are two types of interactions that formal and informal organizations have and it can either benefit the populace or cause more trouble. One camp views informal institution as functional, or problem-solving, in the sense that they solve problems of social interaction and coordination, hence improving the efficiency and performance of formal institutions. A second school of thought views informal institutions as dysfunctional or problem-causing. What is evident, however, is that peace flourishes when they have a complementing or accommodating relationship with one another, as opposed to a substitutive or competing relationship, which produces even more instability.

In the end, the discourse in this study does not suggest that one approach is better than another or that the role of the state in ensuring the safety and social welfare of the populace is insignificant. Its goal was to highlight the importance of local knowledge, responses, and understandings in combating crime and insecurity within the African state. Working with communities and non-state customary institutions is equally as vital as working with central state institutions and

governments. The state's stability, efficacy, and legitimacy ultimately depend on how deeply ingrained its institutions are in society. As Woodward, (2006) put it, 'Today's mainstream western concepts of state-building adopted in African states tend to overwhelm actual state institutions on the ground because the set of expectations is simply too great'. Additionally, Boege, Brown, Clements, and Nolan, (2008) also assert that, encouraging local customary governance, on the one hand, can be at odds with building central institutions of the state on the other as strong communities might lack the incentive to support central state institutions. The challenge is therefore to find appropriate forms of complementarity and interaction, which are what the research aimed to accomplish by describing the role and relationship of actors involved in security governance in the study area.

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