BLOOD ENEMIES: EXPLOITATION AND URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE NATIONALIST POLITICAL THOUGHT OF TANZANIA, 1958–75*

BY JAMES R. BRENNAN
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

ABSTRACT: The major concepts of nationalist political thought in Tanzania formed at the meeting point between local and international understandings of exploitation, and prescriptions for its removal. These ideas were given social form through a politics of enmity concerned with defining enemies of the nation and creating corresponding purge categories. Acquiring urban citizenship in Tanzania required the demonstrated commitment to fight exploitation for a party and state hostile to urban growth. While such ideas formed the boundaries of legitimate political debate, Africans struggling to lay claim to urban life appropriated nationalist idioms to lampoon official pieties and make sense of class differentiation in a socialist country.

KEY WORDS: Tanzania, nationalism, socialism, political culture, urban.

HISTORICALLY utilitarian in its conception, nationalism as a paradigm has ‘overpowered its subject’ in African studies.1 Reflecting this legacy, historical examinations of Tanzanian nationalism have tended to focus on the movement’s organizational aspects to the neglect of its intellectual content.2 To the extent that scholars have considered nationalist thought, they have located its substance as either descending from generic African and Asian anti-colonialism, ascending out of experiences of local resistance to European colonial rule, or being identical to the intellectual development of Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere. In these treatments, the country’s nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), serves as both the primary source and teleological subject of nationalist thought.3

* I would like to thank Andrew Burton, Frederick Cooper, Jonathon Glassman, Andy Ivaska, Richard Lepine, Leander Schneider and Luise White for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. All translations are by the author.

3 By far the best work on Tanganyikan nationalism remains John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979). To the extent that Iliffe examines TANU nationalist ideology, he tends to characterize its content as owing much to its trailblazing
Susan Geiger summarized the historiographical impasse when she observed that even in John Iliffe’s superlative history of Tanganyika, he mistakenly ‘conflates nationalism and the nationalist movements such as TANU’. Using her criticism as a point of departure, this article argues that TANU had no monopoly over the production of nationalist thought, but rather worked within a shifting discursive field consisting of international and indigenous concepts and terms. TANU and the TANU-led, postcolonial government were not unmoved movers of nationalism, but conduits and translators of popular dissatisfaction limited by their commitment to maintain public order. In Dar es Salaam, the main city of Tanzania, a popular nationalist vocabulary developed that enabled Africans to carve out rhetorical space in the face of steep economic and political obstacles. TANU crafted and coined much of this vocabulary, but never fully controlled its shifting content and meanings.

As a preliminary contribution, this article maps the contours of nationalist political thought in Tanzania as it appeared in the language of the party, government, press, poetry and literature. It seeks to trace and explain the changes in nationalist thought and rhetoric that developed amidst the poignant dilemma facing the TANU government – how to keep nationalist promises of liberation while relying upon the inheritance of colonial order. This article draws methodological inspiration from the political ethnographic approach to authoritarian societies, which understands political power as being significantly constituted in the semiotic realm around political metaphors, personality cults, iconography and ritual. It also employs philological methods by examining developments in the keywords of Kiswahili political vocabulary. The shared discursive activity of thinkers under consideration here was the elaboration of what nationalism meant, which Isaiah Berlin memorably defined as ‘the straightening of bent backs’. Pursuing his insight, this article contends that African nationalists throughout this period understood nationalism to mean first and foremost the elimination of exploitation. Ideas of exploitation developed in distinct ways

predecessors in India and Ghana, ibid. 509. For works locating nationalist thought as a product of local resistance to colonialism, see E. B. M. Barongo, 


6 See generally, Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York, 1983).

that emerged locally out of older pan-ethnic idioms of parasitism and witchcraft eradication. Inextricable from discussions of exploitation was the process of defining who was a good citizen and belonged to the nation, and who the enemy was. This process of defining enemies and constructing purge categories constituted a politics of enmity, or what Carl Schmitt holds to be the fundamental feature of the political, the distinction between friend and enemy.\(^8\) In Tanzania, the category of citizen consisted of three discernible ideals: someone who was ‘African’; someone who either worked as a labourer in urban areas or, preferably, as a farmer in rural areas; and someone who not only refrained from but also fought exploitation. The anti-urban bias of the TANU government moved many town residents to develop an alternative vocabulary that made sense of postcolonial social change and even lampooned self-important official rhetoric.\(^9\) Despite occasional discord, all Tanzanian nationalists came to agree that membership in the new nation depended on the commitment of each citizen to combat exploitation and the enemies who thrive on it.

**CITIZENSHIP AND IDIOMS IN THE COLONIAL CITY**

For most people, urban life in late colonial Tanganyika revolved around securing hard-won necessities like food and housing through low-paying wage or petty commercial work.\(^10\) During the Second World War, the British colonial state made deep commitments to regulate the distribution of urban necessities in order to guarantee minimum standards of living in Dar es Salaam. This raised the material value of urban citizenship, while moving the state to restrict citizenship to ‘productive’ Africans only. To enforce these restrictions, the colonial government began systematically to remove underemployed and unemployed Africans to rural areas where their labour could be utilized more effectively.\(^11\) In addition to rural repatriation, a host of other barriers confronted those Africans seeking to eke out an urban living. Food costs constituted half of African household budgets, and foods were mediated either through racialized state rationing schemes or black markets dominated by Indian traders. Housing was similarly scarce and its access racialized. African landlords profited from the incursion of South Asians into

---

\(^8\) Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago, 1996), 26. The political writings of Schmitt, a former jurist for the Nazi regime in Germany, have recently undergone significant reappraisal. For a starting point, see Gopal Balakrishnan, *The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt* (New York, 2000), and John McCormick, *Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology* (Cambridge, 1997).

\(^9\) In *Tanzanie: l’invention d’une culture politique* (Paris, 1988), Denis-Constant Martin argues that Tanzania’s political vocabulary was neither spontaneous nor popular, but rather the careful work of *le pouvoir politique* – party leaders, government authorities and academics. The subsequent success of this vocabulary later depended on its ability to resonate with the wider public. Martin, *Tanzanie*, 262–3. While this trajectory does apply for some words, Martin makes no allowance for political vocabulary to be re-crafted and even invented from below.


African neighbourhoods like Kariakoo, while cynically joining African tenants driven out by rising rents in decrying the loss of the neighbourhood’s racial integrity. Indians or Arabs had greater interaction with Africans than did the far fewer European residents of the town, and they served as a ready measuring stick to gauge African urban progress. African residents increasingly identified Indians and Arabs as their chief malefactors over the 1940s and 1950s on account of their unyielding domination of the town’s commercial networks and mid-level civil service positions—the two most reliable pathways to acquire a comfortable, ‘middle-class’ urban existence.

The political lives of urban Africans were organized around a multitude of professional, ethnic and *ngoma* or dance societies. The most important of these bodies was the African Association, originally a social club for African civil servants that in 1954 reformed as the TANU, claiming to be the sole representative of African interests. Members of this association, as well as other African elites, understood the relationship between town and country as the former exploiting the latter. Despite their own urban aspirations, African elites in Tanganyika often voiced resentment towards the freedom from agricultural drudgery enjoyed by fellow urban residents, and were well aware of the colonial racial hypocrisy which demanded that they stay on farms to produce foods while Europeans and South Asians enjoyed the fruits of urban life. Erica Fiah, an African newspaper editor in Dar es Salaam frustrated with the hollow rhetoric of wartime sacrifice for *uhuru* (freedom), argued that ‘the African shouldn’t have to farm alone! Do Europeans and Indians back in their homelands not get food by farming?’ There was also a shared disgust with economic disparities resulting from exploitation in colonial Tanganyika. Social and economic inequalities between ‘non-Africans’ and Africans were often staggering, and acquired political meaning in plainly unequal commercial exchanges. Such transactions took many forms, such as poor wages from wealthy employers, low wholesale prices for African produce resold at a high profit, and were understood through moral idioms that attacked individual enrichment as necessarily coming at the expense of community welfare. The most striking belief was the view that certain non-Africans and their African employees were vampires who extracted blood from unsuspecting Africans at night in order to make medicines that would further increase their powers, otherwise known as *mumiani*.

12 This sentiment is most plain in the letters and editorials of the newspaper *Kwetu* (Dar es Salaam, 1937–51).
13 *Kwetu*, 9 Jan. 1944.

14 It is a commonplace of African witchcraft studies that such ‘zero-sum’ moral idioms structure witchcraft beliefs. Ralph Austen usefully summarizes the similarities between moral economy and witchcraft by writing that the central trope of moral economy posits an opposition between ‘the maximizing individual and ever-expanding market’ on the one hand, and ‘a community governed by norms of collective survival and believing in a zero-sum universe—that is, a world where all profit is gained at someone else’s loss’, on the other. ‘The communal/zero-sum side of this equation is broadly consistent with African beliefs identifying capitalism and witchcraft as the dangerous appropriation of limited reproductive resources by selfish individuals’. Ralph Austen, ‘The moral economy of witchcraft: an essay in comparative history’, in Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (eds.), *Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa* (Chicago, 1993), 92.

15 For a regional overview, see Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley, 2000), 10–30. For Tanzania, see Peter Pels,
Although economic growth in the 1950s presented unprecedented urban opportunities for Africans, immigrants to towns still faced high living costs and a hostile government. TANU, which embarked on successful membership drives in Dar es Salaam through speeches keenly attuned to the complaints of local citizens against exploitation, grew territorially at an exponential pace after 1955. TANU speakers regularly attacked colonial exploitation by using vivid metaphors of blood and suction. The formidable Bibi Titi Mohamed warned a crowd in the Southern Highlands that ‘[t]here are C.I.D. people here, Africans who sell the blood of their fellows for what? Sh. 50/- or even Sh. 20/-’. Haruna Idi Taratibu told a Dodoma crowd to respect the British Government but scorn Indians who had come to Kenya as poor labourers to build a railway line and stayed behind to become rich at Africans’ expense. John Mwakangale told a Southern Province crowd that the whites have sucked our blood for too long, it cannot be tolerated … We have been quiet under the yoke because we have only just begun to realise how much we were being exploited … The Arabs tied chains around our necks and sent us to America; the British would like to do likewise.¹⁶

Throughout Tanganyika, TANU nationalists utilized trans-ethnic African idioms which understood the exploitation of strangers as the metaphorical-to-literal sucking of blood or other fluids from indigenous people – in Swahili, unyonyaji. At its most dramatic, concerns about unyonyaji took the form of mumiani scares, which were particularly prominent in the late 1950s throughout East and Central Africa. In the Dar es Salaam suburb of Buguruni, a violent episode occurred in 1959 that resulted in the death of a police officer believed to be mumiani. Although TANU leaders condemned the violence and ‘superstition’ associated with this event,¹⁷ they embraced its underlying sentiment. Unyonyaji was becoming a central part of political discourse, within which fantastic beliefs about vampires stood at one edge of a wide spectrum. The party’s watchword, however, was uhuru, translated as ‘freedom’ and historically embedded initially in the complex history of pawnship, slavery and abolition, and later revived in colonial propaganda of the Second World War.¹⁸ Fearing the spread of radical interpretations of

¹⁶ ‘African political affairs’, enclosed in Grattan-Bellew to Webber, 16 Feb. 1959, Colonial Office (CO) 822/1325/1B, Public Records Office (now the National Archives), Kew.


¹⁸ Uhuru coexisted with uunguwa as nineteenth-century terms referring to freedom from slavery. Reception of the nationalist message of uhuru in the 1950s varied not just by area but by town – in Shambai, uhuru was associated with emancipation from pawnship and connoted the end of a social order where individuals were valued over lineages; in the former fugitive slave community of Makorora on the coast, TANU’s uhuru was met coldly by residents who understood the term as a re-negotiation of patronage and proudly announced they had already received uhuru from Sultan Barghash. Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, 213; Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888 (Portsmouth NH, 1995), 113. The
uhuru, which some took to mean freedom from taxation, the colonial
government enjoined TANU to explain that Uhuru ni Jasho (Freedom is
Sweat), and encouraged it to spread a new slogan, Uhuru na Kazi (Freedom
and Work). The rhetoric of many party nationalists met the understanding
of urban Africans concerned with improving their daily lives with arguments
that uhuru meant freedom from exploitation or unyonyaji, which nationalists
promised to remove in their bid to protect fellow Africans. Elaborating on
what exploitation or unyonyaji meant and how best to combat it became an
important topic of postcolonial discourse and debate.

UNYONYAJI NA MIRIJA: CREATING A NATIONALIST VOCABULARY IN
UJAMAA TANZANIA

A growing literature has identified and addressed the significant continuities
between the colonial and postcolonial ambitions of the state in Africa.
In urban Tanzania, the postcolonial government continued its predecessor’s
emphasis on maintaining living standards by regulating costs of urban
necessities and trying to limit urban citizenship to ‘productive’ (i.e.
fully employed) Africans. There were however significant discontinuities,
particularly pronounced in urban areas. The TANU government would not
tolerate the legacy of racial privilege and segregation, and dissolved certain
individual property rights by asserting the administration’s discretionary
control over all lands and several buildings. Shortly after independence,
Julius Nyerere had proclaimed that ujamaa or ‘African Socialism’ was
Tanganyika’s aim, and that there was ‘[n]o room for land parasites’. In
1962, the same year that Nyerere published his pamphlet Ujamaa – The
Basis of African Socialism, the government effectively nationalized all
lands through the Freehold Titles Act. Opportunities for public political
dissent quickly constricted after independence and were practically
eliminated following the abortive 1964 army mutiny, after which Tanzania’s
labour unions were nationalized and a one-party state was constitutionally
inscribed the next year. The Arusha Declaration restated Tanzania’s

The popularization of uhuru came out of the East African Inter-territorial Language
Committee’s recommendations for wartime propaganda, where it was used throughout
the colony but particularly in towns to explain the need for Africans to agree to military
and labour conscription and lower living standards as sacrifice for the war effort for
everyone’s uhuru against Axis powers. See for example Shaaban Robert, Utenzi wa vita
vya uhuru (Nairobi, 1967). In towns such as Dar es Salaam, this association of uhuru with
sacrifice emboldened Africans to claim fair recompense, which TANU promised in its
inversion of this late colonial propaganda term.

19 Tanganyika Standard, 10 Oct. 1959; ‘Baada ya Uhuru ni Nini?’ by ‘Msema Kweli’,
Mwafrika, 12 Dec. 1959; Randal Sadleir, Tanzania: Journey to Republic (London, 1999),
227–30.
20 See in particular Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa
and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996), and Frederick Cooper, Africa since
1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge, 2002).
21 Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism (1962), reprinted in
Apr. 1962.
22 For a history of this process from the perspective of Tanganyika’s opposition parties,
see James R. Brennan, ‘The short history of political opposition and multi-party
urban policy as primarily state regulation of migration and basic necessities. The shift in urban policy was mainly racial—the state increasingly targeted businesses and properties controlled by non-Africans, particularly South Asians, through discursive purge categories of *ujamaa*.\(^{23}\)

*Ujamaa* roughly translates as ‘familyhood’, and this term itself has understandably served as the point of departure for conceptual discussions of Tanzanian socialism. ‘The foundation, and the objective, of African socialism’, Julius Nyerere wrote, ‘is the extended family’.\(^{24}\) In his formulation, *ujamaa* calls for the return to African traditional society, presently damaged or destroyed by European colonialism but where previously there had been ‘hardly any room for parasitism’. True socialism was an ‘attitude of the mind’ where people fought the acquisitive impulse that led individuals or groups within the ‘tribe’ to exploit one another.\(^{25}\) As it permeated and developed in the country’s public sphere after 1962, however, the intellectual content of *ujamaa* became much more than the background and trajectory of Julius Nyerere’s thought,\(^{26}\) transforming into a popular language with unintended consequences. Nyerere’s promise to remove parasitism resounded with the public, but neither he nor they really sought to return to the deeply romanticized ‘African traditional society’ that theoretically undergirded *ujamaa*. Much subsequent political debate would instead turn on who did or did not belong to the new *ujamaa* family, and how this could be divined.

At the centre of popular *ujamaa* rhetoric stood the idea of *unyonyaji*, which literally translates as ‘sucking’ or ‘suckling’. Nationalists translated *unyonyaji* into English as the conventional socialist term ‘exploitation’, but the core meanings to which *unyonyaji* appealed were grounded on distinctly democracy in *Tanganyika, 1958–1964*, in Gregory H. Maddox and James L. Giblin (eds.), *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford, 2005), 250–76.

\(^{23}\) Nyerere’s government supported a voluntary urban cooperative after independence (COSATU), and in 1967 began a wave of nationalizations: wholesale business (1967), housing (1971) and retail shops (1976), and also banned pawnshops (1972). Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford, 1982), passim.

\(^{24}\) Michael Schatzberg has demonstrated that the idiom of family as nation is ubiquitous in official postcolonial discourses throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. See his *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food* (Bloomington, 2001).

\(^{25}\) Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, 162.

local beliefs and metaphors. In one very popular and long-standing campaign, nationalists pronounced *ujamaa* to be *dawa ya unyonyaji*, or the medicine to combat and protect against ‘sucking’. This campaign appealed to the widely held belief that people needed medical protection from evil spirits and exorcism for those already bewitched. The eradication of *uchawi* or ‘witchcraft’ had long been a concern of Africans throughout East and Central Africa, upon which itinerant *waganga* or traditional healers could build lucrative medical/exorcist practices. These beliefs flourished in Dar es Salaam, where people from most classes and backgrounds feared bewitching by evil spirits (locally referred to as *shetani* or *jini*) or malevolent sorcerers (*wachawi*) – particularly in peri-urban areas such as Buguruni, site of the 1959 *mumiani* riot. Contemporary with the Arusha Declaration in the late 1960s, local residents in peri-urban neighbourhoods patronized a famous *mganga*, Hamedi Said Matoroka, to administer medicine (*dawa*) to them. Unlike their colonial predecessors, the regional commissioner and neighbourhood TANU officers not only welcomed Matoroka – who followed in a long line of Ngindo-trained *waganga* selling *dawa* for use against evil spirits in peri-urban Dar es Salaam – but asked that local residents cooperate rather than hinder his work. Fear of bewitching, these officials believed, had discouraged local residents from investing in modern buildings and style of dress, and they hoped Matoroka’s *dawa* would improve conditions. Those who did not buy the medicine had to fear accusations of *uchawi*, and the many who purchased the *dawa* gave over huge sums that Matoroka shared.

27 It is difficult to overstate how deeply the term *unyonyaji* penetrated nationalist discourse. An editorial from the TANU party newspaper *Uhuru* on the presumably innocuous question of radio licence fees gives some clue: ‘There are several types of *unyonyaji*. There is the person who exploits [literally ‘sucks’, *kumnyonya*] another person or the person who exploits the Nation. Although it is true that many of us really hate exploiters [*wanyonyaji*], but we always forget to ask ourselves if we ourselves exploit or not. Maybe you who have your radio, and every day at 600 you listen to music, world news etc., have you already cut your straw of *unyonyaji* regarding your radio? Have you already paid your radio licence for this year? If not, why in your heart do you hate so much *unyonyaji*? Remember that the machines that broadcast the news every day is paid by the money of society’. ‘Unyonyaji’, *Uhuru*, 27 Mar. 1968.


with TANU and government officials. Nationalists thus could be pragmatic enough to utilize such profoundly ‘unmodern’ means to meet distinctly modern goals of 

\textit{maendeleo} or ‘development’. The often-used metaphor of \textit{ujamaa} as \textit{dawa} for \textit{unyonyaji} demonstrates the successful grafting of local discourses to the Fabian socialism of Julius Nyerere.

The colonial state had dismissed witchcraft eradication discourse and prohibited anti-witchcraft leaders from selecting sorcerers (\textit{wachawi}) to eradicate it. In its production of \textit{ujamaa} thought, the postcolonial state embraced key elements of eradication discourse, and jealously guarded for itself the task of selecting the nation’s enemies for eradication. The principal duty of the \textit{ujamaa} revolution was \textit{to remove} – Nyerere stated in 1965 that the meaning of revolution was not simply to remove government, but to remove exploitation and bring justice in its place. Arising from this desire, a nationalist-socialist language quickly emerged in the early years of independence. \textit{Unyonyaji} invoked obviously biological forms of parasitism. \textit{Usiwe kupe} or ‘don’t be a tick’ was a popular \textit{ujamaa} slogan that tapped into familiar frustrations with local parasites. Social \textit{makupe} or ticks were inimical to national development and progress, and as such were rhetorically targeted for removal. But unlike Rwanda’s \textit{inyenzi} or cockroaches – a term which originally referred to monarchist Tutsi guerrillas and later appropriated by Hutu \textit{génocidaires} to mark Tutsis for extermination – Tanzania’s \textit{makupe} could cease to be vermin by adopting socialist behaviour. Alongside the vocabulary of biological parasites emerged a sociological terminology that translated local social strata into a more conventionally socialist vocabulary of enemies. Several words however nicely bridged the chasm between

\begin{itemize}
    \item For a treatment of this phenomenon cast in terms of a postcolonial engagement with modernity in Cameroon, see Peter Geschiere, \textit{The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa} (Charlottesville, 1997). Perhaps the strongest connection between the Maji Maji uprising of 1905–7 and the later nationalist movement is not the former’s ‘mass mobilization against colonialism’ but rather the willingness of TANU to adopt metaphors of, and even occasionally the services of, famous territorial \textit{waganga} who drew their authority from training with famous Ngindo healers, dating back to the period of Kinjitikile and Ngoja’s father, Kimwera. See Terence Ranger, ‘Witch-craft eradication movements in central and southern Tanzania and their connection with the Maji Maji Rising’, Seminar Paper, University College, Dar es Salaam, 30 Nov. 1966.
formal socialist terminology and popular usage and meaning. *Wahuni* or ‘hooligans’, yet another enemy of *ujamaa*, took on a rich array of meanings in reference to public anxiety towards young, unemployed African men over the late colonial and postcolonial context of urban Tanzania. Mhuni captured the unease of more established urban residents with crime and the breakdown of social order, and served as a discursive antonym for the *mwananchi* or ‘citizen’, distinguished by his employment, marriage and implied loyalty to party leaders and urban administrators. The many colourful embodiments of the *wanyonyaji* or exploiters of Tanzania – *kupe*, *mhuni*, *kabaila*, *bwanyenye*, *bepari* – together comprised the purge categories of nationalist discourse. These terms were employed more intensively in the public sphere after independence, and particularly after the Arusha Declaration, when TANU published a political primer that officially defined the meanings of these terms.

Amidst these rich epithets stood the official image that justified *ujamaa* – the problem of *unyonyaji na mirija* or ‘sucking with straws’. The image had two manifestations. The first portrayed an African man or men sitting around a jug sucking alcoholic drink with a straw; the second represented non-Africans or ‘exploiter’ Africans standing around a poor, thin African sucking his sweat or blood with straws. The first image acts to reproach Africans who prefer indolence and intoxication to doing the nation’s work; the second image links and deliberately confuses literal fears of blood-sucking by foreigners with the idiom of parasites who profit from the sweat of others. The second, more explosive image was also treated by *Ngurumo* in a series of political cartoons in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. It depicts a slim young African, wearing only a hat and shorts, surrounded by four corpulent *wanyonyaji* or exploiters – a European, an Arab, an Indian (with passport in breast pocket), and an African – who are sucking blood from straws inserted in the African’s body. In the following cartoon, his expression turns from one of pain to joy as black arms holding scissors cut the straws. The caption reads *mirija imekatika*, ‘the straws have been cut’, the defining act of *ujamaa* that ends the young man’s suffering. In the next scene he is depicted as now having not only political vocabulary in Swahili’, *Kiswahili*, 41 (1971), 3–17; J. K. Kiimbila, ‘Uchunguzi wa maneno ya kisiasa’, *Kiswahili*, 41 (1971), 18–21; and L. M. Thonya, *Misingi ya Kiswahili* (Dar es Salaam, 1978), 21–32. For another analysis of Tanzania’s political vocabulary, see Martin, *Tanzanie*, 248–70.

Burton, *African Underclass*, 4–6. The words *uhuni* and *mhuni* may have gained currency in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as they do not appear in Krapf’s 1882 dictionary; they derive from an Arabic term meaning someone disloyal or a traitor, but developed wider meanings by the time of Johnson’s 1939 dictionary as ‘vagabond’ and, later, ‘hooligan’.


The party defined *unyonyaji* as *hali ya maisha inayomezesha mtu au kikundi cha watu au tabaka la watu kupata ridhiki bila kufanya kazi kwa kutumia mtu au watu au tabaka jingine la watu* (condition of life that enables a person or group of people or class of people to get necessities without working by using a person or another class of people), and *mirija as chombo kinachotumika kwa kunyonyea jasho la mtu au watu vengine* (apparatus used for sucking sweat of another person or people). *Ibid.*
the strength to farm with his hoe but also to strike the *wanyonyaji* still surrounding him.\footnote{The first image appears occasionally in the pages of *Ngurumo*, an independent Swahili newspaper published in Dar es Salaam. One cartoon depicts Malawian dictator Hastings Banda sitting on a stool and sucking through a straw labelled ‘South Africa – Rhodesia’ the fluids contained in two jugs labelled ‘Malawi’ and ‘Africa’. *Ngurumo*, 6–13 Feb., 20 Sept. 1967. Nyerere himself enters later cartoons as *fagio la*...}
Following the Arusha Declaration, the language of battling *unyonyaji* became ubiquitous and served as a ritual mantra to signify citizenship. Government produced a didactic pamphlet for its civil servants explaining how self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) applies to the workplace. The pamphlet begins by defining *mnyonyaji* (the exploiter) as ‘one who lives without working; lives off of the sweat of others’. Its goal is to make the civil servant reflect on his role in *ujamaa* and instruct him to question whether his actions were exploitative and/or parasitic. Among the state-supported artists who dutifully applied the now-official language to their work, one poet of the popular *shairi* verse offered a representation of *ujamaa*’s enemies in the government paper *Uhuru*:

> What punishment should we give, to those guilty of sucking  
> Who suck like a tick, until they clot and die from sucking  
> They don’t let go even when burned with a wick, how will we warn them  
> What punishment should we give, to the exploiters of Tanzania?

This language also thrived in English propaganda. In an article about the growth of political consciousness, a reporter for the government’s English-language newspaper observed that ‘[t]here is not a word in Tanzania which is as loathed as “unyonyaji” … It is repeatedly uttered at every place of work and in every home to remind the un-initiated of the dangers of exploitation’. The nationalist elaboration of *unyonyaji* bridged local understandings of extraction with international socialist prescriptions for economic justice, and enabled the TANU state to signify who belonged to the new nation and, more importantly, who did not.

**RURAL BIAS AND URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN *UJAMAA* SOCIALISM**

*Ujamaa* ideology stressed that the nation’s primary activity was agriculture, and implied that cities themselves, particularly Dar es Salaam, were parasites on the nation’s agricultural sweat. The Arusha Declaration emphasized agricultural over industrial production, and Nyerere evinced deep agrarian sensibilities – traceable among urban-based Tanzanian intellectuals since Erica Fiah in the 1940s – in his prediction of potential forms of class conflict: ‘If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation

*ujamaa* or ‘broom of ujamaa’, sweeping away the insect-like *wanonyaji*; in another he fuels the fire burning the exploiters, together in a sack called *ubepari* (capitalism) with wood called *taifa* (nation). The eradication of blood-sucking, the reader understands, is now nearing completion thanks to Nyerere’s war against the exploiters.

38 Joseph A. Namata, *Huduma Serikalini na Siasa ya Kujitegemea* (Dar es Salaam, 1967). A series of questions for workers to ask themselves are provided to promote proper behaviour and eliminate exploiting/sucking (*huku ni kunyonya?*), covering such matters as arriving late to work and criticizing others to gain promotions. The pamphlet offered a disturbingly prophetic criticism that a farmer might direct at a bureaucrat – ‘your game is my death’ (*mchezo wenu ni mauti yangu*).


in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants’.

The country’s decentralization policy removed several productive activities from Dar es Salaam, culminating in the transfer of the capital to Dodoma in 1974. Such was official prejudice against cities that trade unionists felt compelled to hold public meetings to state that urban workers did not exploit farmers, but joined with them in their struggle against capitalists.

Such anti-urban sensibilities were commonly expressed in nationalist rhetoric. Propagandistic cartoons addressed the unwillingness of urbanites to do the nation’s work on farms. One depicted a hoe chasing an unwilling farmer with the caption reading ‘don’t fear the hoe’; another showed an urban water carrier being handed a hoe by an arm inscribed taifa (‘nation’) with the caption reading ‘you will build with the hoe, not with the water can’.

One memorable ujamaa image in the popular press shows Nyerere driving a bulldozer labelled ‘Arusha’ to knock down a multi-storeyed building held up by regional foe Hastings Banda, the anti-socialist, anti-liberationist President of Malawi—the multi-storeyed building representing the dual enemies of dense urbanization and capital accumulation. Government encouraged the publication of stories, plays and personal testimonials, and produced its own propaganda pamphlets to convince urban residents that life on ujamaa or cooperative villages was far superior to the uncertainties and immoralities of town life.

The state-owned Tanzania Film Company released its first and only feature-length film in 1976 entitled Fimbo ya Mnyonge or ‘The Poor Man’s Stick’. The film, as crudely didactic as any colonial-era production designed to discourage urban immigration, told the story of a man named Yombayomba who subsists in his rural home by begging friends for food. Yombayomba—a play on ombaomba, a term for beggars—migrates to a town where he tries petty commerce, the occupation of choice for most young men, but fails. At this point Yombayomba decides to visit the TANU headquarters, where he is advised to join an ujamaa village, and after further urban frustrations, including assault by a gang, the protagonist and his wife eventually re-locate. Despite their seeming material poverty, the villagers educate Yombayomba on the meaning of ujamaa, and he later returns to his home village to transform it into a true ujamaa

---

Fig. 2. ‘You will build with the hoe, not with the water can’. Cartoon from *Ngurumo*, 14 Mar. 1967.
settlement – concluding that ‘the poor man’s stick is to live together, ujamaa is to live together’. 45

Urban idlers were condemned as exploiters, the wahuni or unemployed young men living in towns being the most egregious sinners in this regard. In his 1962 pamphlet, Ujamaa, Nyerere asserted that in traditional African society everyone had been a worker and ‘[l]oitering was an unthinkable disgrace’. He wrote that ‘I do not use the word “worker” simply as opposed to “employer”, but also as opposed to “loiterer” or “idler”’. 46 Violating the national work ethic was in itself a form of exploitation, albeit exploitation of omission rather than commission. The postcolonial state redoubled its predecessor’s policy of the demonization and repatriation of the urban underemployed and unemployed, physically removing wahuni and wavivu to the rural areas – the proper location for their participation in the developmental project. ‘Every person has to work hard and share’, observed one editorial, ‘these are the politics which are used by our republic to build the nation. Unyonyaji in Tanzania is forbidden’. 47 Much official rhetoric and policy over the 1960s and 1970s was directed towards removing the exploitation of shiftless Africans. Another shairi poet offered the following verse in regard to the country’s idlers:

The lazy are a hindrance, to our development  
They don’t like work, they don’t grin when they work  
To deceive is their work, our home is a broken heart  
The lazy are the enemy, we must keep our eye on them. 48

There was a popular aspect to demonizing wahuni insofar as some Africans welcomed fierce vigilance against thieves – one Buguruni resident asked government to bring a revolution to the neighbourhood to remove magai (i.e. wahuni) who hid their stolen wealth there. 49 The grim colonial practice of repatriating underemployed and unemployed wahuni was pursued with greater zeal during the postcolonial years, and continued to be based on the same colonial calculus of unrealized labour productivity until demographic


46 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 165. Nyerere’s vilification of the urban ‘lazy’ had only increased by the 1970s. In his article ‘Wafanyakazi wavivu, wazembe na wategaji ni wanyonyaji’, Ujamaa, 35 (1974), 5–18, Julius Nyerere argued that urban workers had more responsibility to work hard than did farmers, because their laziness was not automatically punished, while farmers’ laziness was automatically punished by decreased crop production. 47 Uhuru, 21 Jan. 1965.


realities finally overwhelmed the zeal and resources of the *ujamaa* state by the 1980s.

The urban public sphere, much like urban public space, remained aggressively male under *ujamaa*. Nationalist paean to Tanzanian women invariably depicted them as rural and in the plural. African male nationalists, particularly members of the TANU Youth League, identified single urban women as a virulent group of bloodsuckers (*swanyonyaji*).\(^{50}\) Single women in towns were suspected of being prostitutes, around which practice a rich language developed – *guberi*, a term for colonialist or imperialist, also meant ‘prostitute’. Men came to use the graphic term *kupe* (tick) to describe women, because of their alleged reliance on male providers.\(^{51}\) In his travels around Dar es Salaam, the cartoon character ‘Bwanyenye’ meets two types of women – those traditionally dressed in *kangas* who usually exhort him to act in accordance with *ujamaa* and get work, and those in decidedly modern dress who insult him for his rural appearance. Bwanyenye treats the former with respect, but harangues ‘modern’ women for destroying the nation’s reputation by dressing irresponsibly (*kuvaakihuni*) or like an animal (*ya kinyama*), pointing out that even his waist cloth at least covered his private parts.\(^{52}\) Young unmarried women living in towns – alongside their male counterparts – formed major focal points of postcolonial nationalist anxiety.

**OTE DUGU MOJA: THE SOUTH ASIAN CARICATURE IN *UJAMAAYATIONALIST RHETORIC**

South Asians had long served as unpopular figures in the imagination of many Tanzanian Africans. Before and during the anti-colonial nationalist movement, Indians were frequently targeted as primary obstacles to development and African self-improvement. By the time TANU had become an important force demanding independence, Indians had – at least in Africans’ popular perception – responded by ridiculing Africans’ competence to rule themselves. Ramadhan Machado Plantan, editor of the independent newspaper *Zuhra*, warned Asians that their days of calling on African prostitutes, insulting Africans with the widely understood Gujarati epithet *golo* (slave), and dismissing nationalist ambitions with the question ‘where will he get the ability/competence to rule?’ (*ataweza wapi kuupata utawala?*, often ‘Indianized’ as *weja wapi*?), were finally coming to an end.\(^{53}\) The name Patel had become common slang to refer to all Indians, while the term *mwananchi*, meaning citizen with strong connotations of patriotism (literally, ‘child of the land’) was exclusively used to describe Africans – *Mwananchi* and *Patel* became self-evidently antonymic terms in popular discourse.\(^{54}\)

---


\(^{53}\) *Zuhra*, 22 Nov. 1957.

After independence, bitter sarcasm directed at the disparity between the postcolonial ideal of equality and persisting reality of racial inequality – encapsulated in the phrase *ote dugu moja*, a reference to the distinctly Indian pronunciation of the nationalist mantra *sisi sote undugu mmoja* or ‘we are all one family’ – became a defining element of Tanzanian nationalist rhetoric. Typical in its vocabulary and tone, one African writer evaluated racial inequalities persisting within the ‘family’ of postcolonial Tanzania:

One day at a Sundowner, Patel was there with his tea, Smith with his glass of beer, everyone saying we are one family (*sisi wote dugu moja*) in front of *manaizesheni* (successful Africans), tomorrow (Patel) will see his servant and disregard this *Mwananchi*, in fact he lords it over him and bullies him and continues to suck his blood. For the same work Kabwela receives 150/- and Patel receives 300/-; Juma carries a heavy load, and Patel carries a light load. Oh friend what kind of family is this? (*Oh jamma undugu huu ni wa namna gani?*)

Indians’ failure to integrate into the *ujamaa* family was underscored by their lack of participation in ‘nation-building’ activities, despite government’s regular exhortations. One writer suggested that government arrest *dugu moja* if they were caught staring from windows instead of actively joining in such activities as political marches or the reception of foreign dignitaries. The rural bias of *ujamaa* and absence of any corresponding urban policy enabled the proliferation of popular interpretations of urban *ujamaa* that frequently turned on removing South Asian privilege and isolation. The continuation of racial segregation in Dar es Salaam bitterly frustrated African nationalists. For them, urban *ujamaa* should, above all, result in the eradication of this iniquity. The politics of *ujamaa*, one observer wrote, was ‘to live as a family without regard to race, wealth, tribe, status, etc.’. He was disheartened, however, to see *uzunguni* or the European neighbourhood continue to exist, populated by ‘Indians, Hindus, Khojas, Europeans’, but not one African. He called on government to take up Zanzibar’s urban policies, where Africans now lived side by side with ‘whites’ (*watu weupe* or ‘non-Africans’), in order to help mainlanders identify ‘our enemies’.

Tanzania’s popular press was particularly anxious to demonstrate how Indians repeatedly transgressed the spirit and norms of *ujamaa*. Beginning in the late 1960s, the party daily *Uhuru* began a sort of ‘everyman’ column, the self-entitled *Miye* (*Kaka Miye* in Sunday’s *Mzalendo* paper), in which a recurring set of characters were engaged in fictional dialogues about issues of the day. *Miye*’s attempts at political humour regularly came at the expense of South Asians, while Arabs and Europeans were less frequently lampooned. In his representation of fictional Indian characters, *Miye* employed *Kiswahili*

---

55 Even before independence, African writers complained that Indians used this phrase only when they needed to get something from Africans. ‘Huu ni “Udugu” wa Kabila Gani?’ by ‘Msema Kweli’, *Mwafrika*, 6 Aug. 1960.


58 Letter of J. Kimilu, *Ngurumo*, 12 Sept. 1969. Several prominent African politicians in fact had begun moving into *uzunguni* or the ‘European area’ shortly before independence, but the neighbourhood did remain exclusive in a class sense.
cha Kihindi, or the distinctive pidgin Swahili dialect spoken by many South Asians. Characterized by its lack of affixes, excessive use of pronouns and substitution of ‘j’ for ‘z’, Kiswahili cha Kihindi reflects its origins as a commercial bridge between Indians and Africans, and symbolized the failure of the former fully to master the language’s complexities.59 A key literary tool of Miye was to contrast his own correct Kiswahili with the tortuous, caricatured Swahili of his Indian characters, in particular a recurrent Indian shopkeeper named Mamujee.60

The purpose of Miye was to reveal, again and again, just how out of touch Indians were with ujamaa and the basic tenets of Tanzanian nationalism. In one typical column, Miye demonstrates that Indians continue to hold firmly colonial attitudes about ‘multi-racial’ society rather than heeding calls to ‘build the nation’. This fictional conversation followed a real speech by India’s President Varahagiri Venkata Giri, who had just exhorted Indians in Dar es Salaam to respect ujamaa and help to build the nation by taking up farmwork:

Miye: And you, Bwana Mamujee, when a guest of the nation arrives, quit that game of peeping through the window. You have to line up on the streets with other Tanzanians to receive him.
Mamujee: Yes friend, big man already say, All Indians agree, Hindus, Arabs, Swahili all one family (ote dugu moja). Giri already say.
Miye: And in the work of building the nation, don’t stay behind.
Mamujee: Friend, if all Indians build nation, who sell curry powder?
Mama Mamujee: If all Indians close shop, where get bread?
Miye: The honorable Giri, has already said, you now have to wind up your shops and begin the work of building the nation.
Mama Mamujee: If all Indian go build nation, where Swahili get rice?
Miye: At the cooperative shops.
Mamujee: If all Indian close shop, where Swahili get …
Miye: Get lost!
Mamujee: Friend, you smoke goro? Say what now? God divide people three parts: White rule, Indian build shop, Swahili dance. Don’t you know?

After this conversation, Miye bitterly ruminates on how the Indian President’s call was being (mis)received by hawa ndugu zetu, or ‘our family members’.61 In a visit to the city of Mwanza, Mamujee complains to Miye that everyone now uses the word taifisha (nationalize), when the only word he could find in his dictionary was taifa (nation).62 Miye later addresses two

59 A. M. Khamis, ‘Swahili as a national language’, in Gabriel Ruhumbika (ed.), Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership (Dar es Salaam, 1974), 201. In addition, Khamis mentions the existence of Kiswahili cha Kimanga or Arab Swahili, which also appears in the columns of Miye and other Kiswahili media, though with less frequency.
60 The comic and social effects of this caricature are difficult to communicate in translation. The pivotal role of Swahili language in Tanzania’s nation-building project has been long recognized by scholars. See, inter alia, Wilfred Whiteley, Swahili: The Rise of a National Language (London, 1975); and more recently, Ali Mazrui and Alamin Mazrui, Swahili State and Society: The Political Economy of an African Language (Nairobi, 1995).
Indians distraught about the recent building nationalization by greeting them with *hamjambo wananchi*. The address is meant to convey bittersweet irony, for *wananchi* or ‘patriot citizen’ sharply contrasts with what for Miye are plainly ‘unpatriotic’ and non-citizen Indians. One replies, ‘we are not citizens. Will TANU card do instead?’

Racial debate also focused on the purpose of the media itself. One Dar es Salaam resident complained that Indian, Arab and Somali shopowners played Radio Tanganyika only to attract business, without any interest in the political education programming or even understanding of Swahili broadcasts. In response to a South Asian’s complaint regarding the termination of Hindi-language programming on Radio Tanzania – particularly unjust, he griped, given the large radio fee contributions made by Indians – TANU’s English-language daily *Nationalist* produced an instructive rant encapsulating the spectrum of African resentment towards Indians:

Let it be said frankly that Wananchi have tolerated enough of the abuses of these people [Indians]. Indeed, these are the same people who during our struggle for Uhuru used to tell us ‘weja wapi’. These are the people who have refused to learn our national language, Kiswahili. These are the same people who, when there is a national function or meeting go to the beaches instead of attending. These are the people who have failed to offer any substantial Africanisation in their businesses. These are the people who have refused to take part physically in nation building work. These are the people who hoard foodstuffs. These are the people who increase prices unilaterally whenever there is a call for national sacrifice!! These are the people who threaten us with imaginary inflations and all sorts of dangers in order to hold back our nation building spirit! These are the same people who are prepared to exploit Wananchi remorselessly under the guise of ‘dugu moja’. These are the people who are prepared to call themselves Tanzanians only as long as they remain a privileged group! It is imperative this claim for special privilege should stop. It is incompatible with our attitude to citizenship and nation-building and cannot be tolerated.

Popular and official attitudes towards Indians seem to have coincided, and it is difficult to determine who was influenced by whom. Despite Nyerere’s own philosophical opposition and personal dislike of racial polemics, many prominent members of the mainland and especially Zanzibari government actively inflamed anti-Asian sentiment. Asian dominance of retail and wholesale commerce became a regular focal point of nationalist attacks against exploitation. Calls by black Tanzanian parliamentarians to expel Asians were regular; some proposed expulsion even if they had assumed citizenship. Zanzibar President Abeid Karume, Tanzania’s second-highest

---


65 *Nationalist*, 26 Nov. 1966.

66 Dar es Salaam’s member of parliament, Kitwana S. Kondo, argued in parliament that many Asians were opportunists in that they have naturalized for economic motives. He stated that ‘The Asians make known their citizenship only in times of hardship or when they want to obtain something’. Amid cheers and applause from the House, Mr. Kondo said: ‘Asians are forming a community of their own. They show no willingness to co-operate and integrate with other people’. Mr. Kondo stated further that some Asians hated not only Africans, but they also hated and suspected fellow Asians who joined

The cost and availability of housing became perhaps the most pressing issue among Dar es Salaam’s residents. Continued segregated housing patterns and striking disparities in wealth between Indians and Africans made the former an easy target. An inordinate percentage of the large, multi-storeyed residential buildings constructed in the 1960s were built by and for Indians, and having access to their communal and financial resources was deemed necessary to get good housing. One African observed in reference to Dar es Salaam’s perpetual housing crisis, \textit{kama wewe si Patel hupati chumba, ‘if you are not Indian, you won’t get a room’}.\footnote{Letter of Peter Shizya, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1964.} In April 1971, in response to popular pressure for more housing and government’s plain inability to provide it, the state nationalized all buildings worth over 100,000 shillings and not entirely occupied by the owner. This move alienated a large number of Indians who had invested their life savings in housing, in part to demonstrate their commitment to living in the new nation. The subsequent exodus of Tanzania’s Asians was exacerbated by Idi Amin’s expulsion of all Indians from Uganda in August 1972. Such was the unpopularity of South Asians in Tanzania that Nyerere’s government refused to accept any refugees, turning away 83 Indians stranded at sea without a country. The wave of housing and business nationalizations between 1967 and 1976 effectively drove out over half of Tanzania’s Indian population.\footnote{Nationalist, 24 Apr. 1971; Daily News, 18 Aug. 1972. See also Ronald Aminzade, ‘The politics of race and nation: citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika’, \textit{Political Power and Social Theory}, 14 (2000), 53–90; and Richa Nagar, ‘The South Asian diaspora in Tanzania: a history retold’, \textit{Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East}, 16 (1996), 62–80. Those Indian traders who remained, however, profited from numerous grey- or black-market opportunities, and were ideally placed to take advantage of the liberalization policies begun in the late 1980s. \textit{Ibid.} For background on South Asians’ expulsions in postcolonial East Africa, see Michael Twaddle (ed.), \textit{Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians} (London, 1975).}

\begin{center}
\textit{KABWELA AND NAIZESHENI: URBAN CITIZENSHIP AND CLASS IN UJAMAA SOCIALISM}
\end{center}

In his 1962 pamphlet \textit{Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism}, Julius Nyerere argued that \textit{ujamaa} did not start from the existence of conflicting classes in society, and even doubts that a word for class exists in any TANU and co-operated with ‘the indigenous people of this country’. He appealed to the Immigration Department to be ‘very cautious when granting citizenship to such people’. ‘Asians exploit under political patronage’, \textit{Nationalist}, 17 July 1968.
indigenous African language. The passage is famous for its idealization of Africa’s past; it also demonstrates the chasm between Nyerere’s idealization of Africa’s present and the reality of a robust language of class emerging on the streets of Dar es Salaam. While class conflict under ujamaa socialism has not passed unnoticed by researchers, the popular language of class that comprised a central element of postcolonial urban life largely has. Unavoidably, this language developed within the values and constraints of ujamaa ideology. The postcolonial Tanzanian nationalism of ujamaa rested on loyal citizenry willing to partake in nation-building exercises and not only refrain from exploitation of fellow citizens but to fight it. To the extent that there were classes within this national conception of citizenship, there were two – the peasant (mkulima), who was the ideal citizen and lived and farmed in the rural areas; and the worker (mfanyakazi), the urban citizen necessary for some aspects of national development but whose activities and growth were more closely scrutinized by the state. These nationalist categories of citizenship were understood in opposition to urban-based wanyonyaji such as wahuni, ‘immodest’ women, and Indians.

Anti-urban in its bias, official ujamaa rhetoric never clearly defined in positive terms the ideal African urban citizen. He (the basic categories were male) was instead known by the exploitation he suffered as a result of the costs and dangers of city living. African residents of Dar es Salaam, however, articulated a more positive terminology for the ordinary townsman: kabwela. This term had similar connotations to the contemporary meaning of mswahili – a person who was simultaneously crafty and potentially deceitful, yet also poor and generally exploited. Kabwela was the common denominator of urban nationalist frustrations; a Tanzanian Everyman or John Bull (like John Bull, the rhetorical personage of kabwela was also male). Other popular terms for the urban poor carried disagreeable connotations – mhuni was plainly pejorative and officially condemned; mmatumbi, another popular

72 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 169. Such logic was hardly unique to Tanzania – M. Crawford Young writes that ‘in its generalized African form, nationalism denied the existence of class’. Young, ‘Nationalism’, 441.
73 The best starting point for this is the work of Issa Shivji: The Silent Class Struggle (Dar es Salaam, 1973) and Class Struggles in Tanzania (London, 1976).
74 The origins of the term are obscure. Kabwela appears to have originated from a popular song and slogan hailing Nyerere’s return from the United Nations in 1957, but by the early 1960s it had become the ubiquitous term for the deserving urban citizen who needed the TANU government’s assistance. During the 1960s, the origins of the word kabwela became a topic of debate in the press. To the extent that there was any consensus, the original term appears to have been ‘Tata Kabwela’, which, far from meaning a poor person seeking protection and help from the government (its common employment in discourse), was originally a term written on a jerry can (debe) by a Zaramo mganda musician on a Saturday in 1957 when Nyerere returned triumphant from his third trip to the United Nations – the mganda wrote a song entitled ‘Tata Kabwela UNO’, meaning simply that Nyerere (baba) has returned from UNO for the third time – kabwela the Zaramo word for someone who has returned (perhaps from the root kabla, meaning ‘before’ or ‘previous’). Letter of R. A. Chambuso, Ngurumo, 3 July 1965; letter of S. Sh. Mbonde, Ngurumo, 26 May 1967; letter of Mahamad Jume, Uhuru, 2 Dec. 1967; letter of Nyanza Omari, Ngurumo, 8 Aug. 1968. Another argued that it was a Zaramo joking (kuitana) word for a child who knows nothing. Letter from N. A. Mkopire, Ngurumo, 19 July 1965. Temu, ‘Political vocabulary’, claims that kabwela is a Nyamwezi word.
term for ‘everyman’, was too ethnically specific. Its imprecise origins and usage enabled *kabwela* to become the ubiquitous term used in public discourse to make sense of the plight of town-dwellers, especially among the residents of Dar es Salaam where the term originated. Despite working hard and (somewhat) honestly, *kabwela* found himself exploited by rack-renting landlords, cheating shopkeepers and abusive employers. The rhetorical personage of *kabwela* enabled TANU and its undesired but intractable urban population to negotiate with each other.

The popular discursive antonym to *kabwela* was *naizesheni*, or *naizi* for short. *Naizesheni* referred to those urban Africans who with relatively little effort came to enjoy the lion’s share of the fruits of independence by inheriting the privileges of departing colonialists. The term clearly derives from ‘nationalization’ and less directly from ‘Africanization’, both processes in the public eye during the early years of independence. Alongside *naizi* emerged a related vocabulary that laid moral judgments against the easy success that some Africans enjoyed. *Nyeupe*, literally meaning ‘white’, was a slang adverb for ‘easy to get’; in this vein, the term *mweusi mzungu* or ‘black European’ refers in part to the easy life that some Africans enjoyed after independence. The popular antonym to *nuyepe* or white was not black (*nuyeusi*) but *kiyenyeji*, meaning ‘local’ or ‘native’; to travel as a stowaway on a train was *chukuza safari kienyeji* or ‘take a trip local-style’, in contrast to those who could afford tickets for a seat. The word *jengesha*, perhaps derived from those who organized the building of the nation, meant ‘to grow fat’, a bodily metaphor ubiquitous in sub-Saharan African political discourse linked to easy success and inattention to others’ welfare.

*Kabwela* and *naizi* were popular class terms that enabled urban residents to speak about the social realities of economic differentiation beyond the Manichean categories of *wananchi* and *wanyonyaji* prescribed in official discourse. The terms were sociologically imprecise – a *kabwela* could be a recently arrived water carrier or an old dockworker who had lived his whole life in Dar es Salaam; a *naizi* could be a landlord, a civil servant or a successful trader – because their dual purpose was to make sense of rapid social changes and to pronounce moral judgments on them. It was typical for *kabwela* to bemoan *naizi*’s easy life, which was believed to have come at his expense. The terms also served to express anxiety over how and where *kabwela* fit in postcolonial urban society. A disgruntled tenant pondered where *kabwela* would live if tin-roofed houses were to arrive in the peri-urban residential area of Manzese, as he had earlier been chased out of Magomeni by the same *naizi* gentrifying forces of African landlords and their affluent African tenants.

Anger arising from economic differentiation between *kabwela* and *naizi* often punctured the spirit of humour in which the terms were cast. The anonymous author of *Ngurumo*’s serial ‘Ala! Kumbe’...
narrated the story of a man named Mzegamzega, who took violent offence to being called kabwela by his neighbours. A friend finally calmed Mzegamzega down by explaining to him that he should not be offended by kabwela because the term merely signified the endless gradations of material inequality in Tanzania:

If it’s like this, then even those who own cars are kabwelas. Because the Volkswagen owner is the kabwela of the Peugeot owner, and the Peugeot owner is kabwela of the Benz owner, and the Benz owner is the kabwela of the lorry, and the lorry owner is the kabwela of the bus owner.\(^78\)

Class consciousness in this popular sense appears to have been particularly sharp among naizi. Middle-to-upper level African civil servants, the most easily identifiable of the naizi, demonstrated their identification with the term when The Civil Service Magazine published a shairi poem criticizing naizi for their selfishness and irresponsibility. Several civil servants responded with their own shairi that either defended naizi behaviour or called on naizi to heed this reproach and behave better.\(^79\)

The growth of this unofficial vocabulary received a mixed reception from government officials. By their very nature, terms such as kabwela and naizesheni carried humorous, sometimes self-deprecating, overtones far removed from the sombre pronouncements of official propaganda. The rhetorical excesses of ujamaa were often mocked. Before the Arusha Declaration, people might involve the ironic query, ‘where are you going, citizen’ (unakwenda wapi, mwanaanchi), to which the reply was, ‘I’m going to build the nation’ (nakwenda kujenga taifa).\(^80\) Shortly after government pronounced the ‘straws of exploitation’ cut, people on the streets of Dar es Salaam would jokingly tell someone drinking a Fanta soda to stop, because ‘the straws have been cut’ (mirija imekatwa). Mpinduzi wa serikali or government revolutionary became a slang term for an adulterer.\(^81\) Thabit Kombo, a Zanzibari member of parliament, demanded in 1965 that the federal government outlaw the usage of kabwela on the same grounds that the Islands’ government had earlier banned public usage of mhuni – because under ujamaa all people should be equal, and both words made light of irresponsible youth.\(^82\)

Most government officials, who by definition were

\(^78\) Ngurumo, 17 Apr. 1969. In his 1977 novel, Zika Mwenyeewe, Alex Banzi portrays a young official in Dar es Salaam who falls out with his lower-class, Zaramo neighbours. During a heated argument, the protagonist disparages his poorer neighbors by calling them makabwela, and they respond angrily by calling him naizi and harangue him with militant ujamaa slogans – wasalendo oyeey, vibaraka ziil!, or ‘patriots hurrah, down with the puppet-lackeys!’ Alex Banzi, Zika Mwenyeewe (Dar es Salaam, 1977), quoted in Rajmund Ohly, The Zanzibarian Challenge: Swahili Prose in the Years 1975–1981 (Windhoek, 1990), 90–2. For a superlative survey of Swahili literature and drama, see Elena Zubkova Bertoncini, Outline of Swahili Literature (Leiden, 1989).


\(^80\) Scotton, ‘Political words’, 532.

\(^81\) Letter of Abdulla Salum, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1967; Ostrovsky and Tejani, ‘Second tentative word list’.

\(^82\) Ngurumo, 19 June 1965.
naizi, ultimately if rather grudgingly accepted these terms, even briefly lending their imprimatur by giving them official definitions in an ujamaa primer.\textsuperscript{83} Government eventually engaged with this popular discourse by representing itself as the benefactor of kabwela, and used this personage as a convenient foil to wahuni or the unwanted urban hooligans.\textsuperscript{84} Although the TANU state exercised censorship in a heavy-handed way – in 1970 it banned Playboy, Drum and Flamingo magazines, and nationalized the Lonrho-owned, English-language daily newspaper the Standard – it generally tolerated more subtle criticisms embodied in popular press humour.\textsuperscript{85}

It would be mistaken to draw too firm a distinction between official and popular nationalist vocabularies of postcolonial Tanzania. The state’s purge categories still set limits on what could be argued in the popular press. To be mhuni (hooligan) remained anathema. Urban males who identified with kabwela asserted that mhuni was not a natural state, but an unfortunate condition that they struggled to overcome. Many traced the condition to the dilemma of being single and without good housing – landlords often would not rent to single men, and women would not agree to marry men without a home or room.\textsuperscript{86} Urban residents in Tanzania utilized the nationalist vocabulary of official terms like unyonyaji and unofficial ones like naizi and kabwela to address the same set of concerns that Africans in the city had faced since the Second World War – making moral claims to obtain impossibly expensive urban necessities that were promised but not quite delivered by government, and instead mediated through inequitable economic structures. Most Africans came to Dar es Salaam to find work, but urban residency and citizenship were ultimately predicated on each person’s success in securing the mundane needs of food, clothing and housing. Africans in Dar es Salaam used the term unyonyaji and its English equivalent ‘exploitation’ in popular discourse to debate the morality of impossibly high prices of food, clothing and rents.\textsuperscript{87} The rhetorical personage of naizi served as a moral surveillance on wealthy urban Africans to constantly remind them of their responsibilities to the new nation. The rhetorical personage of kabwela enabled poor urban Africans to claim an urban existence otherwise ignored or forbidden by ujamaa policy, and eventually to demand that government take up its

\textsuperscript{83} TANU, Mafunzo ya Azimio la Arusha na Siasa, 36–7. This Arusha Declaration primer defines kabwela as mtu wa hali ya chini (person of low standing), and naizi as mtu wa hali ya juu au mtu mwenye cheo fulani (person of high standing or person of a certain rank).

\textsuperscript{85} Uhuru and Nationalist were TANU papers until government also took them over in 1970. There is no adequate study of press censorship in postcolonial Tanzania; for background see Stephen Arnold, “Popular literature in Tanzania: its background and relation to “East African” literature”, Kiswahili, 51 (1984), 60–86; Hadji S. Konde, Press Freedom in Tanzania (Arusha, 1984); and Martin Sturmer, Sprachpolitik und Pressegeschichte in Tanzania (Wien, 1995), 91–143 (also translated as The Media History of Tanzania [Ndanda, 1999]).

\textsuperscript{86} Letters of Peter Shizya and E. P. Isakwisa, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1964, 11 Feb. 1966. One person caught in this dilemma asked to be called kabwela instead of mhuni, because the latter describes an irresponsible person. Letter of Mohamed Mziwanda, Ngurumo, 18 Feb. 1966.

\textsuperscript{87} This debate covers nearly the entire period under examination. For pre-Arusha Declaration correspondence, see letters of Rapt K. Mbeyu, R. S. Mayao, B. P. Maro and P. Mkwama, Ngurumo, 23 Nov. 1960, 10 Feb. 1961, 10 July 1964, 16 Mar. 1965.
responsibility to remove conditions of *uhuni* (hooliganism) endured unwillingly by *kabwela*.

**CONCLUSION**

The success of Tanzanian nationalist political thought depended on politicians’ abilities to wed local discourses of extraction and eradication with global ideas of anti-colonialism and socialism. By claiming to be the nation’s diviner and eradicator of *unyonyaji*, the TANU government expressed in rich language the revolutionary basis of its sovereignty and legitimacy. However, it found itself confronted with many of the same problems that had faced its colonial predecessor. In urban areas like Dar es Salaam, the post-colonial state chose to continue colonial urban policies, relying on price regulations and movement restrictions rather than committing the necessary investments to manage urban growth. Nationalist politicians also shared the assumption of British colonial officials that Africans (excepting themselves) could best serve the country by engaging in rural production, and adopted the colonial purge category of *mhuni* as their own. Drawing on a politics of enmity, TANU leaders introduced a host of purge categories that served to explain present difficulties and justify aggressive government programmes. At the level of *ujamaa* ideology, urban problems were basically ones involving *wanyonyaji*, and government’s solutions were accordingly predicated on the removal of these enemies.

As Nyerere’s vision was essentially agrarian, the term ‘urban *ujamaa*’ is something of an oxymoron. Yet despite government’s overwhelming rural bias and its heavy-handed repatriation operations, urban growth continued unabated after independence. African migrants to Tanzanian cities were generally unwelcome; at best they were left alone to navigate an urban terrain dominated by ‘bloodsuckers’ of all sorts. With humour and savvy, urban Africans made sense out of fast-moving changes, seemingly beyond government’s discursive and coercive controls, by crafting their own urban vocabulary. Urban class differentiation was understood not through government’s purge categories but through rhetorical personages created by town-dwellers themselves. *Kabwela* and *naizi* opened discursive space that enabled poor Africans to live legitimate lives in cities, and called into question the morality of wealthier Africans who enjoyed the lion’s share of *uhuru*’s fruits. This popular vocabulary revealed African aspirations to urban citizenship, but its deployment also expressed deep enmity towards ‘non-citizens’. In particular, attitudes towards Indians shared by both urban Africans and the state remained quite unambiguous during this period – Indians represented the urban *wanyonyaji* *par excellence* who remained socially aloof despite ubiquitous rhetorical admonishments to join the nation in its work.