Post-Analytic Philosophy and Hegelian Amphibians

Paul Giladi

"… we can be free of what is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job as rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a system of political and ethical ideas which would be the best from an absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent historical perspective." – Bernard Williams

For Hegel, what makes philosophy *sui generis* and axiologically significant is how such inquiry enables *Geist* (spirit) to understand itself: philosophical reflection on *Geistigkeit* (mindedness) illuminates the particular kind of epistemic architecture we have for experiencing the world from our human perspective, by doing justice to our *geistige Einstellung* (spiritual attitude), our status as discursive amphibians engaging in multifaceted modes of sense-making. In this chapter, I argue that a particularly rich and helpful way of making sense of Hegel's metaphilosophy is provided by reflecting on Hegel in relation to the development of '*post-analytic philosophy*'. I take the expression 'post-analytic philosophy' to have a narrow extension in one sense of the term, and a broad extension in another sense of the term. By the n*arrow* extension, I mean the respective specific criticisms levelled against analytic philosophy by W. V. Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), by Wilfrid Sellars in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1956), by Donald Davidson in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' (1974), and by Richard Rorty in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979). By the *broad* extension, 'post-analytic philosophy' refers to the Anglo-American analytic tradition's internal critique through (a) its gradual rapprochement with its continental European cousin's traditions as well as through (b) the revival of pragmatism. Post-analytic philosophy's self-image is no longer a conception of philosophy as monogamous with the *Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences), but a Hegelian conception of philosophy as a *humanistic discipline*, discursively polyamorous with both the natural sciences and cultural theory.

I

Contemporary metaphilosophical discourse, at least in the Anglo-American analytic tradition,[i] principally focuses on two debates. The first dispute centres on questions concerning the viability of conceiving philosophical inquiry either as conceptual analysis or as experimentally oriented science.[ii] Is philosophical methodology typified and distinguished by engaging in *a priori* investigations and using intuitions as the starting-off point of departure into metaphysics et al.? Or is philosophical methodology now best explicated in terms of how well it supports our best current natural and empirical scientific theories and practices? The second debate focuses on whether philosophy ought to be constructive – and *solve* problems – or whether philosophy ought to be therapeutic – and *dissolve* problems.[iii]

Focusing on the first debate in particular, for the purpose of this chapter, I would contend that an arguably more significant dialectic is occluded in contemporary Anglophone metaphilosophical discourse: *why should analytic metaphilosophy be conceived as a first-*

order debate between armchair apriorism and experimentalism? In this respect, I take the more substantive metaphilosophical dispute to concern *second-order* discourse about the role philosophy plays in relation to *both* the natural sciences as well as the human sciences. To use Bernard Williams's expression, what is the professional *self-image* of philosophy in the Anglo-American analytic tradition?

I think it is reasonable to claim that the professional self-image of philosophy in the Anglo-American analytic tradition is naturalism, the view that *the image of the world provided by the natural sciences is all there is to the world*.[iv] Naturalism, therefore, has metaphysical *and* methodological dimensions: (i) at the most fundamental ontological level, reality is just what the natural sciences deem it to be; (ii) our ways of intelligibly articulating reality, the ways in which we make sense of things, are ultimately justifiable only by the methods and practices of the *Naturwissenschaften*. The conjunction of (i) and (ii) is often referred to as 'scientific naturalism'.

A significant consequence of the naturalisation of philosophic inquiry and the ascendancy of scientific naturalism is that the defence of the autonomy of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences) has also changed, to the extent that in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, defending the autonomy of philosophy is *almost* exclusively articulated from some kind of naturalistic standpoint. For, even though one might deem philosophy as irreducible to natural science, one often still maintains a naturalistic bent that philosophy must be practised in such a way that is supportive of or continuous with physics, chemistry, and biology. To put this another way, given how rapid and entrenched naturalisation has been, it is reasonable to claim that the *default* position for mainstream analytic philosophers is naturalism *tout court*, insofar as the burden of proof is automatically on those who are critical of or resistant to naturalism *tout court*. As Williams, Jaegwon Kim, and Mario De Caro & David Macarthur respectively write:

> It is hard to deny that over too much of the subject, the idea of getting it right which has gone into the self-image of analytic philosophy, and which has supported some of its exclusions, is one drawn from the natural sciences; and that the effects of this can be unhappy. (Williams 2006: 203)

> If current analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it is unquestionably, naturalism. (Kim 2003: 84)

> Naturalism is the current orthodoxy, at least within Anglo-American philosophy. (De Caro and Macarthur 2004: 1)

In terms of one's philosophical coming-of-age in many analytic departments, one is baptised a naturalist, to remove the original sin of supernaturalism. And in terms of one's aspirations to be taken seriously in the Anglophone philosophical world and maintain good working relationships with the relevant powers-that-be, naturalism must be a doctrine which demands absolute loyalty on pain of some intellectual *auto da fé*. To quote Hilary Putnam:

> [t]oday the most common use of the term "naturalism" might be described as follows: philosophers – perhaps even a majority of all the philosophers writing about issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language – announce in one or another conspicuous place in their essays and books that they are "naturalists" or that the view or account being defended is a "naturalist" one; this announcement, in its placing and emphasis, resembles the placing of the announcement in articles written in Stalin's Soviet Union that a view was in agreement with Comrade Stalin's; as in the case of the latter announcement, it is supposed to be clear that any view which is not "naturalist" (not in agreement with Comrade Stalin's) is anathema, and could not possibly be correct. (Putnam 2004: 59)

Over many years, however, the naturalistic self-image of Anglo-American analytic philosophy has come under scrutiny by analytically-trained thinkers, such as Richard Bernstein, Robert Brandom, Stanley Cavell, Donald Davidson, Susan Haack, John Haugeland, Alasdair MacIntyre, Joseph Margolis, John McDowell, Adrian Moore, Stephen Mulhall, Thomas Nagel, Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams,[v] who are – in varying respects and with varying levels of intensity – *internal critics* of the Anglo-American analytic tradition.[vi] Crucially, though, these 'post-analytic'[vii] thinkers are *not* clustered together because each of them contributes to a fully defined and articulated philosophical tradition. As George Duke et al. correctly write, "it would be an exaggeration to speak of a unified philosophical movement embodying a rapprochement" (Duke et al. 2010: 7). Rather, Bernstein et al. are clustered in terms of how they all *broadly* share a critical stance towards the naturalistic self-image, where the more critical a thinker is of the naturalist orthodoxy, the closer such a thinker is to being branded 'apostate'.[viii] To understand this in more detail, I think it would be helpful to illustrate the way in which Russell's conception of the analytic method *grounds* the orthodoxy of naturalism:

> Modern analytical empiricism [...] differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, **which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy**. It has the advantage, in comparison with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. **Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science.** I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is

possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble. (Russell 1945: 834)

There is something almost *irresistible* to the analytic method. Crucially, what makes the analytic method so appealing and enduring is that its charming qualities are deep-rooted in our psychological architecture and cognitive make-up: as human beings, to use Adrian Moore's expression, we are sense-making creatures. We inquire into things, to render the world around us rationally intelligible and meaningful. From an anthropological perspective, then, the analytic method's charm consists in appealing to our basic cognitive drive to render reality discursively accessible.

However, construing the analytic method as the exclusive ally of our anthropological disposition for sense-making is rather problematic. For, in many respects, the most sensitive, reflective, and nuanced inquiries are motivated precisely by (i) wanting to render reality intelligible and meaningful; and on (ii) wanting to help us feel at home with our sense-making nature. Such philosophical problematisation can be most clearly evidenced (at a general level) in our struggles to balance the analytical drive with our default commitment to phenomena, which *eo ipso* seem to radically differ from leptons, quarks, and quantum fields. The phenomena in question range from first-person intentional states, reasons, meaning, to numbers, and moods. In many respects, these phenomena are integral parts of the manifest image of the world, a humanistic perspective that is indispensable for human beings qua inquirers. The subsequent situation, then, is one in which the conflict between the analytical drive and the humanistic drive illustrates that "there can be no presumption that procedures suited to the natural sciences will in general serve philosophy well" (Moore 2017: 45). To quote Williams and McDowell respectively here:

> … when we reflect on our conceptualisation of the world, we might be able to recognise from inside it that some of our concepts and ways of representing the world are more dependent than others on our own perspective, our peculiar and local ways of apprehending things. (Williams 2006: 185)

> Modern science understands its subject matter in a way that threatens, at least, to leave it disenchanted, as Weber put the point in an image that has become a commonplace. The image marks a contrast between two kinds of intelligibility: the kind that is sought by (as we call it) natural science ["the kind we find in a phenomenon when we see it as governed by natural law"] and the kind we find in something when we place it in relation to other occupants of "the logical space of reasons" ["the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning"]. (McDowell 1994: 70)

Arguably, the most significant anti-Russellian turn in Anglo-American philosophy comes from Sellars.

II

In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars aimed to radically revise the project of epistemology. Central to his Kantian commitment to the *conceptual* irreducibility of normativity and intentionality is Sellars's rejection of an *analysis*/*definition* of knowledge:

> In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (E&PM: §36)

Rather than conceiving of knowledge in terms of justified true belief,[ix] or even in terms of that model's Nozickean modifications,[x] Sellars abandons any *talk about knowledge* that frames it as something to be analysed. The concern about analysis from the Sellarsian perspective, which importantly differs from Timothy Williamson's arguments for the category of knowledge as fundamental and therefore unanalysable,[xi] is that analysis fails to do justice to the *intersubjective dimensions* of epistemic practice. As Sellars writes:

> … one couldn't have observational knowledge of *any* fact unless one knew many *other* things as well. And let me emphasize that the point is not taken care of by distinguishing between *knowing how* and *knowing that*, and admitting that observational knowledge requires a lot of 'know how.' For the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form '*X is a reliable symptom of Y*'. And to admit this requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge "stands on its own feet". (E&PM: §36)

Focusing on the production and reproduction of epistemic norms and knowledge-attributions that undercuts the Myth of the Given necessarily involves articulating knowledge as a particular kind of language-game – where this epistemic practice is inherently normative, insofar as one is, to use Robert Brandom's well-known left-wing Sellarsian expression, playing the game of giving and asking for reasons. To put this another way, the idea of framing questions about knowledge in this manner views such an epistemic kind as something one cannot intelligibly grasp independently of a deliberative public sphere. Since Sellars construes human beings as *persons* – i.e. *intentional, linguistic, discursive, agentive beings* – the normative *space of reasons* clearly contrasts with the descriptive *space of nature*. As Sellars puts it:

> To say that a certain person desired to do A, thought it his duty to do B but was forced to do C, is not to describe him as one might *describe* a scientific specimen. One does, indeed, describe him, but one does something more. And it is this something more which is the irreducible core framework of persons … Now, the fundamental principles of a community, which define what is 'correct' or 'incorrect', 'right' or 'wrong', 'done' or 'not done', are the most general common

intentions of that community with respect to the behavior of the members of the group. It follows that to recognize a featherless biped or dolphin or Martian as a person requires that one think thoughts of the form 'We (one) shall do (or abstain from doing) actions of kind A in circumstances of kind C'. To think thoughts of this kind is not to *classify* or *explain*, but to *rehearse an intention*. (SPR: 39-40)

In Hegelian fashion, Sellars insists that what individuates *persons* is not just a description of their practices, but also an account of how those practices convey persons' sensitivity to a normative community; the ways in which persons are sensitive to fellow language-using agents. For Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, "Sellars is getting at the point that recognising someone as a person is not merely an observative act, but also a practical act of the second kind … We become and remain the types of beings that have specific, agent-relative engagements with others through an ongoing network of hails and acknowledgments …" (Kukla and Lance 2009: 180-181). Equally, epistemic kinds are not discrete, purely representational kinds that can be broken down into primitives, to the extent that epistemic kinds are articulated asocially. Speech-acts involved in playing the game of giving and asking for reasons "are the acts they are in virtue of being planted within and constituted by a rich social and institutional context" (Kukla and Lance 2016: 86). Any commitment to the social dimension of knowledge-attribution must involve a commitment to viewing the fixation of belief, to use Peirce's term, as something that cannot be achieved independently of practices of inquiry. Since knowledge-attribution is a normative practice through-and-through, it is necessarily social, as norms can only be meaningfully established through deliberative discourse in order to be deemed authoritative, legitimate, and valid for those engaging in such discourse.

According to Sellars, because norms are "social achievements" (Brandom 2002: 216), established by the *intersubjective* epistemic practices between agents, norms get their normative purchase – i.e. their *rational bindingness* – by virtue of being assented to and acknowledged by a community of discursive agents. To quote Steven Levine here, "[n]orms have no existence outside of their being taken as correct or incorrect – as being authoritative or not – by a community of persons" (Levine 2019: 253). Crucially, though, the practice of assenting to and acknowledging normative constraints and normative entitlements comprises determining the content of norms "through a 'process of *negotiation*' involving ourselves *and* those who attribute norms to us" (Houlgate 2007: 139). By virtue of being a process of *negotiation*, norms and identities are never *fixed* but always subject to "further assessment, challenge, defence, and correction" (Brandom 1994: 647). As such, for Sellars, one replaces

the model of conceptual analysis with a normative pragmatic framework: *knowing is a recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons*.

I think a crucial motivation for Sellars's move here is not simply his staunch Kantianism about normativity and meaning.[xii] His pragmatic abandonment of the framework of analysis about knowledge in 1956 also seems to spring from a prophetic concern with an apparently ossified noetic state of play:[xiii] mainstream analytic epistemology's apparent inability to get over Gettier-style problematics since 1963 led to discursive banality in talk about knowledge. For, one either had to find a counter-example to Gettier cases which safely secured the third necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge; or one had to put forward a fourth necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge having recognised the hopelessness of the three-condition model. Since Sellars aligned himself in complex ways with the pragmatist tradition, I think one has good reason to suppose his critique of the project of analysis is in part a William James-inspired worry that normative epistemology was *talking* about normative matters in the wrong way. Overcoming the rigidity of conceptual analysis in this context would involve broadening one's conceptual vocabulary. As Sellars writes about the importance of expanding one's discursive repertoire:

> The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term … To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect to all these things … in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are barred. (SPR: 1)

Such a vision of what philosophy looks like and what its particular mode of cognitive engagement aspires to achieve seems to be shared by Nicholas Rescher:

> The definitive mission of philosophy is to provide a basis for understanding the world and our place within it as intelligent agents – with 'the world' understood comprehensively to encompass the realms of nature, culture, and artifice. The aim of the enterprise is to provide us with cognitive orientation for conducting our intellectual and practical affairs. And the data of philosophy by whose means this project must be managed include alike the observation- based science of reality, the imaginable realm of speculative possibility, and the normative manifold of evaluation. Given this massive mandate, the prime flaw of philosophising is a narrowness of vision. Granted the issues are complex and specialisation becomes necessary. But its cultivation is never sufficient because the details must always be fitted into a comprehensive whole.[xiv]

> A philosopher who achieves her proximate, localised ends at the cost of off-loading difficulties onto other sectors of the wider domain is simply not doing an adequate job. With rationally cogent philosophising, it is not local minimalism but global optimalism that is required. To be acceptable, a philosophical problem-solution must form an integral part of a wider doctrine that makes acceptably good sense overall. Here only systemic, holistically attuned positions can yield truly satisfactory solutions – solutions that do not involve undue externalities for the larger scheme of things.[xv]

Central to both Sellars's and Rescher's respective conceptions of the aims and task of philosophy is a commitment to *holism*. The kind of holism one can reasonably attribute to Sellars and Rescher is a Hegelian variety: in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel (in)famously claimed that "[t]he True is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development".[xvi] Here, the framework for understanding objects of experience is *not* restricted to the level of *ordinary* consciousness, where we can only make 'thin' judgements that express their atomistic separation and only an artificial kind of unity. Thinness, then, consists in failing to account for relations of identity-in-difference, the *interconnectedness yet basic* difference between objects. Hegel sees his absolute idealism as an expression of *philosophical* consciousness precisely because it aims to capture both the inherent unity of all finite things while crucially also preserving and maintaining their individuality. As he writes in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*:

> For our ordinary consciousness (i.e., the consciousness at the level of sense-perception and understanding) the objects that it knows count as self-standing and self-founded in their isolation from one another, their mutual dependence on one another is regarded as something external to the object, and not as belonging to their nature. It must certainly be maintained against this that the objects of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being within themselves, but within something else … [T]he true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances… and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense 'finite' consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea. (EL §45Z: 88-89)

Ordinary consciousness treats finite particulars as ultimate, absolute or self-explanatory simply because its framework does not allow it to go beyond what is immediately given to us in perception. However, Hegel's point is that if we are to *think philosophically*, we must be prepared to reject the metaphysical supposition that finite particulars are the only things that exist, that they can be adequately made sense of as atomistic and non-holistic, as well as the epistemic supposition that explanation is restricted to the standards of ordinary consciousness. Thus, the intellectual demand on rational agents aims to accommodate the reality of particulars and to maintain their dependence on structures, such as universals, in order to do justice to both the nature of determinate being and the standards of philosophical consciousness. This is why, for Hegel, a move from ordinary to philosophical consciousness consists in recognising, to use Paolo Diego Bubbio's terminology, 'mediate objectivity' – "an ongoing process of mediation between subject and object which is always already in place".[xvii] Rather than viewing reality as loosely connected sets of objects, we ought to conceive of Being as a complex and interconnected whole in which finite members are

dialectically related.[xviii] Such a move aims to supplant the perspective of *Verstand* (the understanding), with the perspective of *Vernunft* (reason) in discourse about sense-making.

For Hegel, the advantage of drawing this distinction between reason and understanding is that we can be in a position to not be wrapped up in the various dualisms which are the inevitable consequence of reflecting only from the perspective of *Verstand*, i.e. purely *analytical* forms of reflection. What *Vernunft* provides consciousness with is the means to avoid the pitfalls of dualisms and the problems of analysis by thinking dialectically, i.e. by drawing distinctions yet establishing interconnectedness to a whole:

> This cognition is thus the recognition of this content and its form, and *liberation* from the one-sidedness of the forms and the elevation of them into the absolute form … (EPM: §573, 267)

> What man seeks in this situation, ensnared here as he is in finitude on every side, is the region of a higher, more substantial, truth, in which all oppositions and contradictions in the finite can find their final resolution, and freedom its full satisfaction … The highest truth, truth as such, is the resolution of the highest opposition and contradiction. In it validity and power are swept away from the opposition between freedom and necessity, between spirit and nature, between knowledge and its object, between law and impulse, from opposition and contradiction as such, whatever forms they make take. Their validity and power as opposition and contradiction is gone … The ordinary consciousness, on the other hand, cannot extricate itself from this opposition and either remains despairingly in contradiction or else casts it aside and helps itself in some other way. But philosophy enters into the heart of the self-contradictory characteristics, knows them in their essential nature, i.e. as in their one-sidedness not absolute but self-dissolving, and it sets them in the harmony and unity which is truth. To grasp this Concept is the task of philosophy. (LA I: 99-100)

The arguments Hegel gives in this engaging passage – namely that the task of philosophy is to lead our ways of understanding all aspects of our world away from purely dualistic and oppositional ways of thinking, and to enable us to reflect on the intelligibility of both difference and unity in our world – serve as a powerful critique of strategies that ignore (whether wilfully or not) the philosophical nature of certain problematics. If one applies this general metaphilosophical riposte to the development of strict scientific naturalism since Quine in the Anglo-American world, I think there is good reason to suppose Hegel would agree with the following claim by Lynne Baker, namely that "[s]cientific naturalism often seems like a change of subject that lacks respect for the peculiar projects and puzzles that traditionally occupy philosophers".[xix]

Crucially, however, the lack of respect for the peculiarity and *sui generis* features of the normative space of reasons does not necessarily find its expression in only reductionist and eliminativist philosophical projects: the expressions finding a place for mind in the natural world and making elbow room for intentionality in the world described by physics, which seem to be staples of more liberal and pluralistic conceptual attitudes, both seem to

presuppose that one ought to accept from the very outset the vocabulary and general *Weltanschauung* of the natural sciences and then find some meaningful and coherent way of quite literally fitting in phenomena such as intentionality and normativity into that nomothetic picture. The Hegelian concern about such a model is a crisis of communication: the model remains locked in the viewpoint of the understanding and is therefore dialectically inhibited from *radically revising the very notion of how sense-making ought to be constituted and practised*. For all of the indisputably important and impressive noetic achievements of the natural sciences,[xx] the march to scientism constitutes a type of 'self-renunciation' and a failure of rationality.[xxi] To quote Williams here:

> We run the risk, in fact, that the whole humanistic enterprise of trying to understand ourselves is coming to seem peculiar. For various reasons, education is being driven towards an increasing concentration on the technical and the commercial, to a point at which any more reflective enquiry may come to seem unnecessary and archaic, something that at best is preserved as part of the heritage industry. If that is how it is preserved, it will not be the passionate and intelligent activity that it needs to be. (Williams 2006: 198-199)

I think a particularly helpful way of seeing how this works is provided by reflecting on Hegel's arguments in 'Observing Reason'.

III

The form of consciousness in this chapter of the *Phenomenology* is concerned with achieving at homeness in the world only through the natural sciences. Since the natural sciences are serving as *the* cognitive guide here, the phenomenological subject is interested in making sense of things only nomothetically, by subsuming individuals under general categories or universal laws of nature:

> Formerly, it just happened to consciousness that it perceived and *experienced* quite a bit in the thing; however, here it itself makes the observations and engages the experience. Meaning something and perceiving, which formerly were sublated for us, are now sublated by consciousness for consciousness itself. Reason sets out to *know* the truth, and what was a thing for meaning-something and perceiving is now to be found as a concept, which is to say, reason is to have in thinghood only the consciousness of itself. Reason thus now has a universal *interest* in the world because it is the certainty of having its present moment in the world, or is certain that the present is rational. It seeks its other, while knowing that it possesses nothing else in that other but itself; it seeks only its own infinity. (PS: §240, 142)

However, the practice of purely observing nature and aiming to 'carve reality at the joints' through the exercise of nomothetic rationality quickly sees the phenomenological subject finding *Verstand* rationally unsatisfying. As Hegel writes:

> Observation, which kept [its biological categories] apart in orderly fashion and believed that in them it had hold of something fixed, sees one principle reaching out over and across another, sees disarray and transitions forming themselves, and sees something combined in this one which it at first took to be utterly separated, and sees something separated which it had counted as belonging together … the observing, in clinging tenaciously to motionless self-consistent being, must see itself here teased with cases that rob it of every determination, which silence the universality it has reached, and which set it back again to unthinking observing and describing. (PS: §247, 146-147)

For Hegel, to properly develop a conception of nature, one must go beyond a particular kind of empiricism, namely an empiricism which only, as Cinzia Ferrini notes, "… analyses objects by distinguishing and isolating their various features, [where] these features [then] acquire the form of universality by being separated. Yet this highlights the first inconvenience of description, the superficiality of abstracting universals from particulars and then consequent instability and arbitrariness of these general forms under which things are merely subsumed" (Ferrini 2009: 92-93).

Hegel's critique of *Verstand* is made especially complex by how he seems to blend his metaphysical concerns about a non-dialectical relationship between the categories of individuality/universality/particularity with a phenomenologico-hermeneutic concern about the practices of nomothetic enquiry *simpliciter*. However, while Hegel's objections to abstract universality are well-documented in the literature, there seems to be comparatively less attention devoted to his objection to the practice of observation. For example, Robert Stern's analysis of 'Observing Reason' principally focuses on Hegelian worries about universals, but only hints at what might be construed as the more philosophically striking objection to scientific naturalism in that chapter of the *Phenomenology*: "Observing Reason thus finds itself constructing laws that are increasingly general and removed from the concreteness of the experimental situation" (Stern 2013: 123).

An advantage of diagnosing scientism et al. as cognitive pathologies lies in how the one-sided conceptual structure that constitutes the framework of scientism reveals underpinnings of the eliminativist and reductionist attitudes that serve as steering drives of nomothetic practice. I think one has compelling reason to think that scientistic positions such as eliminativism exhibit marked degrees of anthropological self-loathing, to the extent that the desire for a purely nomothetic account of the world conveys a fear of complexity and a corresponding repugnance to the necessarily qualitative features of embeddedness and embodiment. Such theories, as Rescher writes, "… turn Occam's razor into Robespierre's guillotine" (Rescher 2017: 40). From a Hegelian-Husserlian perspective, purging the

lifeworld of all its idiosyncratic and unique *Geistig* features, to quote Tim Mooney, involves a self-refuting "secularised Platonism" (Rescher 2017: 40), for scientism necessarily presupposes the grammar of the lifeworld in an effort to excise it in favour of the pure scientific image. As Robert Hanna argues, "the basic natural sciences, as rational human cognitive achievements, and also natural scientists themselves, as fully engaging in pre-exact-scientific and trans-exact-scientific human rationality at every moment of their conscious and self-conscious lives, are necessarily irreducible to the physical facts known by those very sciences and those very scientists" (Hanna 2014: 756).

For Hegel, what distinguishes *Geist* from mere *Natur* (Nature) is self-consciousness and the ways in which intentional and goal-driven self-reflexive action renders human beings as thoroughgoingly active in the world. Such a position would be illustrative of Kant's notion of *pragmatic anthropology*, which crucially draws a distinction between *die Welt kennen* and *Welt haben*: "the expressions "to know the world" and "to have the world" are rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only *understands* the play that one has watched, while the other has *participated* in it" (APPV: [120], 4.) To quote Terry Pinkard: "[o]n Hegel's view, one acts in terms of the nature of that to which one concretely first-personally refers, that is, to oneself and to one's own nature as having practical reason embedded within it" (Pinkard 2012: 184).[xxii] *Geist*, as mutual recognitive relationships between agents, sees personhood constituted intersubjectively.[xxiii] Socialisation involves not just grasping the Gricean norms of assertion, it also involves knowing how to *move* in the normative space of reasons. Successful navigation in the space of reasons requires grasping the plurality of inferential commitments and entitlements one has in the communicative use of concepts. Emphasis on communication as an intersubjectively constituted performative act transforms the subject from being an observer/voyeur to being a speaker and hearer.[xxiv]

Understood in this Hegelian way, arguably the most pressing problem with the framework of nomothetic reason as exhaustive of inquiry is that the erasure of "*self-conscious thinking*" (EPM: §572, 267), namely the first-person intentional perspective and the intersubjective dimension of rational agency, leaves humanity in the grip of a voyeuristic picture. As Williams notes as well:

> What would be scientistic would be an *a priori* assumption that … identified linguistic behaviour as independent of human cultural activities in general, or, alternatively, took the differently reductive line, that cultural activities are all or mostly to be explained in terms of natural selection. (Williams 2006: 188)

The attempt to translate the vocabulary of the manifest image into the vocabulary of the pure and ideal scientific image[xxv] amounts to a debilitating variety of alienation in which humanity is estranged from its *Geistig* and therefore necessarily pluralist matrix of sense-making practices.

However, recognising the heterogeneity of the manifest image and the normative space of reasons in no way entails conceiving of intentionality, et al. as "imaginary skyhooks" (Baker 2013: xxii). On the contrary, it deepens our way of viewing reality as intelligible by doing justice to our *geistige Einstellung*, our Hegelian status as *discursive amphibians*. Though Hegel does not obviously suggest his amphibian analogy applies to constantly shifting between space-of-reason-discourse and space-of-nature-discourse, I think there is sufficient reason to believe the analogy also holds in this context:

> Taken quite abstractly, it is the opposition of universal and particular, when each is fixed over against the other on its own account in the same way; more concretely, it appears in nature as the **opposition** of the abstract law to the abundance of individual phenomena, each explicitly with its own character; in the spirit it appears as the **contrast** between the sensuous and the spiritual in man, as the **battle** of spirit against flesh, of duty for duty's sake, of the cold command against particular interest, warmth of heart, sensuous inclinations and impulses, against the individual dispositions in general; as the harsh **opposition** between inner freedom and the necessity of external nature, further as the **contradiction** between the dead inherently empty concept, and the **full concreteness** of life, between theory and subjective thinking, and objective existence and experience. These are **oppositions** which have not been invented at all by the **subtlety of reflection** or the pedantry of philosophy; in numerous forms they have always preoccupied and troubled the human consciousness, even if it is modern culture that has first worked them out most sharply and driven them up to the peak of **harshest contradiction**. Spiritual culture, the modern intellect, produces this **opposition** in man which makes him an **amphibious animal, because he now has to live in two worlds which contradict one another** … If general culture has run into such a **contradiction**, it becomes **the task of philosophy to supersede the oppositions**, i.e. to show that neither the one alternative in its abstraction, nor the other in the like one-sidedness, possesses truth, but that they are both self-dissolving; that truth lies only in the reconciliation and mediation of both, and that this mediation is no mere demand, but what is absolutely accomplished and is ever self-accomplishing. This insight coincides immediately with the ingenuous faith and will which does have precisely this dissolved opposition steadily present to its view, and in action makes it its end and achieves it. **Philosophy affords a reflective insight** into the essence of the opposition only in so far as it shows how truth is just the dissolving of opposition and, at that, not in the sense, as may be supposed, that the opposition and its two sides do not exist at all, **but that they exist reconciled**. (LA I: 53-55 – emphasis added)

Hegel places significant emphasis on the dialectical function of *Vernunft*, which does not conceive of rational activity as a detached, voyeuristic critical reason. Why *Vernunft* is favoured here over analytical reflection is that *Verstand* fails to be completely illustrative of our *geistige Einstellung*. It also fails to adequately make sense of "what reflective attitude to take to our own conceptions" (Williams 2016: 191) – namely, our sense of ourselves as

engaging in multifaceted forms of inquiry. In this respect, then, I think two important points should be noted.

(i) Central to Hegel's project of reconciliation is celebrating difference, where the logic of reconciliation, *contra* Adorno, is designed to prohibit any form of repression of difference. For Adorno, what is symptomatic of western metaphysics is the apparent long-standing philosophical tradition of prioritising universality over individuality, a tradition which begins with Plato and is fully actualised in Hegelian thought.[xxvi] However, such metaphysical prioritisation is regarded by Adorno as harmful: the practice of conceptualisation in terms of bringing things under general descriptions and rule-following is an *intrinsically violent and authoritarian practice*,[xxvii] because difference is obliterated by the system's demand for reconciled unity. Since *Begriffe* function to seize the things they are directed at,[xxviii] the activity of making sense of things through the application of rule-conforming concepts does not respect the integrity of Being; rather, if anything, this particular genus of discursivity is effectively some kind of *viol cognitif*, where reality is forced to conform to concepts. Such violence translates into a form of eerie conservatism, because subsuming things under general terms leads one to assimilate "all individuals into a general type, and thereby exclude or devalue their difference or singularity" (Stern 2009: 367). Ironically, then, it seems Adorno can be regarded as turning Hegelian metaphysics on its head. For, in an effort to distinguish his objective idealism from Schelling's objective idealism, Hegel (in)famously claimed that Schellingian monism left one with a view of Being in terms of "the night in which, as one says, all cows are black" (PS: §16, 12).

While Hegel's project of reconciliation necessarily is committed to a dialectical relationship between universality, particularity and individuality, it does not thereby follow that Hegel is committed to the kind of absolute monism he attributed to Schelling: in the opening stages of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel makes use of Spinoza's 'All Determination is Negation' in an effort to reject precisely what Adorno accuses him of doing: the negation that accompanies determination is *a necessary condition for the possibility of being in any genuine sense*. In other words, Hegel claims that if anything is to be, then it must have determination and so negation, otherwise reality is essentially undifferentiated and undifferentiating. His argument can be understood as follows: for anything to be more than just a completely formal and abstract pure being, which for Hegel is the same as nothingness, there must be some kind of determination. Such determination must involve some negation. The significance of difference and determinate negation also reveals that Hegel's project of reconciliation is deeply *anti-domination*.[xxix] As Hegel writes in the *Differenzschrift*:

> To cancel established oppositions is the sole interest of reason. **But this interest does not mean that it is opposed to opposition and limitation in general**; for necessary opposition is one factor of life, which forms itself by eternally opposing itself, and in the **highest liveliness** totality is possible only through restoration from the **deepest fission**. (DIFF: 91 – emphasis added)

This is perhaps the crucial issue which Adorno's critique of Hegel appears either to neglect or misunderstand. The notion of reconciliation and wholeness that Hegel espouses is *not* one which aims to collapse difference into identity or translate talk about individuals into talk about general kinds, but rather aims to undermine a *non*-dialectical approach to dualities such as universality and individuality:

> When people speak of the Concept, they ordinarily have only abstract universality in mind, and consequently the Concept is usually also defined as a general notion. We speak in this way of the 'concept' of colour, or of a plant, or of an animal, and so on; and these concepts are supposed to arise by omitting the particularities through which the various colours, plants, animals, etc. are distinguished from one another, and holding fast to what they have in common. This is the way in which the understanding apprehends the Concept, and the feeling that such concepts are hollow and empty, that they are mere schemata and shadows, is justified. What is universal about the Concept is indeed not just something common against which the particular stands on its own; instead the universal is what particularises (specifies) itself, remaining at home with itself in its other, with unclouded clarity. (EL: §164Z, 240)

Understood in this way, Hegel could claim that Adorno is guilty of approaching the subject of reconciliation and universality and individuality in *exactly* the sort of way Hegel rejects, namely from the perspective of thinking either universality is *prior* to individuality or individuality is *prior* to universality, rather than from the perspective of thinking of universality and individuality as *interdependent*. So, rather than view Hegel's project of reconciliation as a monochromatic monism, as having no interest in difference, one ought to regard Hegel's project of reconciliation as advocating a polychromatic pluralism. As Charlotte Baumann rightly claims, "[i]t is precisely Hegel's intention to develop a conception of a whole which constitutes different entities and allows for their free existence within it, rather than destroying them" (Baumann 2011: 90).

(ii) For Hegel, the amphibian analogy demands that one must go beyond a particular kind of naturalism, namely a *narrow* naturalism which *alienates us from ourselves*. The notion of self-alienation is crucial for making sense of Hegel's concern about *one-sidedness*: as I previously wrote, one has compelling reason to think that scientistic positions such as eliminativism exhibit marked degrees of anthropological self-loathing, to the extent that the desire for a purely nomothetic account of the world conveys a fear of complexity and a corresponding abhorrence of embeddedness and embodiment. *Geist*, under nomothetic grips,

suffers from *Gattungswesen-Entfremdung* (species-essence alienation), where the species-essence refers to the plurality of powers and capacities human beings naturally have. A crucial feature of our species-essence is our status as *discursive amphibians*:

> … **in the spiritual nature of man duality and inner conflict** burgeon, and in their **contradiction** he is **tossed about**. For in the inner as such, in pure thought, in the world of laws and their universality man cannot hold out; he needs also sensuous existence, feeling, the heart, emotion, etc. The **opposition**, which therefore arises, philosophy thinks as it is in its thoroughgoing universality, and proceeds to the cancellation of the same in a similarly universal way … Consequently, man strives further in the realm of spirit to obtain satisfaction and freedom in knowing and willing, in learning and actions. The ignorant man is not free, because what confronts him is an alien world, something outside him and in the offing, on which he depends, without his having made this foreign world for himself and therefore **without being at home in it by himself as in something his own**. The **impulse** of curiosity, the pressure for knowledge, from the lowest level up to the highest rung of philosophical insight arises only from the **struggle to cancel this situation of unfreedom and to make the world one's own in one's ideas and thought**. (LA I: 97-98 – emphasis added)

The attraction of the dialectical function of *Vernunft* is *not* the overcoming of opposition as such, but rather the overcoming of the alienation that we necessarily experience as a result of *one-sidedness*, which prevents us from being at home with *ourselves* and therefore subjectively incapable of achieving at homeness with the *world*. Understood in such a manner, I think it is reasonable to think of Hegel's concern here, to some extent, in *proto-*Nietzschean ways: *Gattungswesen-Entfremdung* is estrangement from *Geistigkeit* as Dionysian *and* Apollonian. For Nietzsche, Dionysus represents the drive towards transcending fragmented, modern individuated self-consciousness, whereas Apollo represents the drive towards individuation and discreteness:

> Not only is the bond between human beings renewed by the magic of the Dionysiac, but nature, alienated, inimical, or subjugated, celebrates once more her festival of reconciliation with her lost son, humankind … The individual, with all his limits and measure, became submerged here in the self-oblivion of the Dionysiac condition and forgot the statutes of Apollo. Excess revealed itself as the truth; contradiction, bliss born of pain, spoke of itself from out of the heart of nature. Thus, wherever the Dionysiac broke through, the Apolline was suspended and annulled. (BT: 18; 27)

> … one might even describe Apollo as the magnificent divine image of the *principium individuationis* … this deification of individuation knows just one law: the individual, which is to say, respect for the limits of the individual, *measure* in the Hellenic sense. As an ethical divinity Apollo demands measure from all who belong to him and, so that they may respect that measure, knowledge of themselves. Thus the aesthetic necessity of beauty is accompanied by the demands: 'Know thyself' and 'Not too much!', whereas getting above oneself and excess were regarded as the true hostile demons of the non-Apolline sphere … (BT: 18; 27)

While it would be a stretch to claim that Hegel's own seeming fondness for Dionysian revelry[xxx] is the same as Nietzsche's quasi-psychoanalytic concern about the suppression of

the Dionysian self-image in favour of governance by the Apollonian self-image, I would argue that what Rayound Guess argues in the following passage about the Dionysian and Apollonian is applicable to Hegel's dynamical characterisation of our discursive architecture: "[a]lthough these two impulses are in some sense opposed to each other, they generally coexist in any given human soul, institution, work of art, etc … It is precisely the tension between the two of them that is particularly creative. The task is to get them into a productive relation to each other" (Geuss 1999: xi).

However, given the difference between the natural sciences and philosophy *in terms of how they respectively make sense of things*, I think it would be incorrect to suppose that the natural sciences and philosophy should be understood in terms of a *geistig* hierarchy. This is because the way in which art makes sense of things is so *different* to the way in which philosophy makes sense of things: conceived in this way, one ought not to regard the natural sciences and philosophy as rival forms of intelligibility competing with one another to best satisfy our desire for understanding our world. On the contrary, they should be seen as *complementary reflective practices*, practices which are jointly indispensable for adequately and holistically engaging with our environment. Not only that, part of what makes the category of philosophy *sui generis* and significant is how philosophy enables "*self-conscious thinking*" (EPM: §572, 267). The answer, then, to the question 'what might philosophy become?' involves philosophy as not monogamous with the *Naturwissenschaften* but discursively polyamorous with both the natural sciences *and* cultural theory. To quote Williams here:

> I very much prefer that we should retain the category of philosophy and situate ourselves within it, rather than pretend that an enquiry which addresses these issues with a richer and more imaginative range of resources represents "the end of philosophy." The traditions of philosophy demand that we reflect on the presuppositions of what we think and feel. The claim which I am making, from here, from inside the subject, is that in certain areas, at least, this demand itself cannot be adequately met unless we go beyond the conceptions of getting it right that are too closely associated with the inexpressive models drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from the sciences … We can dream of a philosophy that would be thoroughly truthful and honestly helpful … It would need resources of expressive imagination to do almost any of the things it needed to do … (Williams 2006: 211-212)

Such a view can *easily* be misunderstood, so I would like to clarify some points here: this notion of *post-analytic* philosophy is not meant to involve any *postmodern* contempt for the achievements and authority of the natural sciences in favour of a totalising valorisation of literary theory and hermeneutics. To put this another way, I am not advocating a reversal of a hierarchical epistemic power relation which sees the 'tyranny of scientism' replaced by the

'tyranny of cultural theory'. Rather, the move to post-analytic philosophy is meant *to expand the discursive vocabulary* available to enquirers: crucially, such creative and imaginative expansion for coordinating discourse is very much wedded to the interest of 'getting it right'.

According to Rorty, "Brandom's work can usefully be seen as an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage" (Rorty 1997: 8-9). What Rorty means here is prophetic, but not entirely clear. Even so, I think he is making a thought-provoking point: in perhaps an ironic way, analytic philosophy is much like *Geist* in the *Phenomenology*: it is fallible and moves through various stages and positions in an attempt to achieve rational satisfaction. Where the analytic tradition once aimed to achieve rational satisfaction by admonishing Hegel, its slow and steady rapprochement with Hegel indicates a self-directed need to creatively and imaginatively re-evaluate its web of beliefs.[xxxi]

Crucially, though, from my perspective, analytic philosophy's 'Hegelian stage', the broad extension of 'post-analytic philosophy', would not be identifiable with a mere acceptance or adoption of Hegelian ideas and total contempt for Russell. Rather, what such a stage would in fact involve is a gradual removal of arbitrary and fixed divisions. Hegel, therefore, provides the clues to a much broader metaphilosophical paradigm shift in the analytic tradition, a paradigm shift that goes beyond Hegelianism becoming hegemonic in analytic thinking.

This is what I take to signify by the 'Hegelian stage' of analytic philosophy, the broad extension of 'post-analytic philosophy', whose *telos* of amphibious inquiry is beautifully envisioned by Sellars, who writes:

> Or does the reader not recognise Jones as Man himself in the middle of his journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the subtle and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room, the laboratory, and the study, the language of Henry and William James, of Einstein and of the philosophers who, in their efforts to break out of discourse to an *arche* beyond discourse, have provided the most curious dimension of all? (E&PM: §63)

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[i] The expression 'the Anglo-American analytic tradition' should not be construed as an intellectual monolithic bloc that is an *idée fixe* since its 'founding' at the turn of the 20th century. As Hans-Johann Glock (2008) has recently argued, analytic philosophy is a complex historical tradition tied and "… should be explained in terms

of *family resemblances*. What holds analytic philosophers together is not a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but a thread of overlapping similarities (doctrinal, methodological and stylistic). Thus current analytic philosophers may be tied to Frege and Russell in their logical methods, or to logical positivism and Quine in their respect for science, or to Wittgenstein and linguistic philosophy in their concern with the *a priori*, meaning and concepts, etc." (Glock 2008: 19)

The following from Julian Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom is also worth noting here: "Analytic philosophy is a term which is used with varying degrees of precision. Most generally, it is used to refer to the whole tradition of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. But aside from this purely historical–geographical usage, there is a more precise meaning which tries to describe a type and style of philosophy which is seen as: rooted in logical argument; having the philosophy of language and meaning as its primary subject matter; striving for rigour; and taking as its model scientific enquiry rather than literary or artistic expression". (Baggini & Stangroom 2002: 238)

[ii] See Cappelen (2012), D'Oro & Overgaard (2017), Haug (2013), Ichikawa (2012), Jackson (1998), Kauppinen (2007), Kornblith (2002), Machery (2017), Murphy & Bishop (2009), Nado (2016), Sosa (2007), Stich (1990), Sytsma & Buckwalter (2016), and Sytsma & Livengood (2015).

[iii] Michael Quante (2004) provides a very helpful framework for discussing the second debate: in its narrowest sense, the conception of philosophy as therapeutic claims that the function of philosophy solely consists in curing misunderstandings engendered by philosophical mistakes. In a wider sense, the conception of philosophy as therapeutic claims that the function of philosophy consists in curing misunderstandings engendered by both the mistakes of philosophers and the mistakes of non-philosophers. With regard to 'constructive' philosophy, which Quante regards as equivalent to conceiving of philosophy as a problem-solving discipline, Quante draws four further distinctions: (i) in the *pejorative* sense, this model of philosophy creates the problems that necessarily require therapeutic treatment by mistaking philosophical problematics for real/genuine problems; (ii) in its *narrow* sense, constructive philosophy provides solutions for real problems within common sense that pose genuine threats to the good life; (iii) in its *wider* sense, constructive philosophy goes further in wanting to provide a philosophical framework to support the assumptions of common sense, even when those assumptions are not the cause for various aporias; and in its *revisionary* sense, constructive philosophy aims to replace common sense, which it regards to be entirely bankrupt. See McDowell (1994), Giladi (2015), and Rorty (2010) for further on this topic.

[iv] See Papineau (1993), De Caro & Macarthur (2004, 2010), Ritchie (2008), and Giladi (2019a).

[v] Williams gave the Inaugural Lecture at the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at Southampton University in November 1997.

[vi] There is some similarity but also some difference between my cluster and the original cluster comprising the first collection of writings on post-analytic philosophy by Rajchman and West (1985), which regards Rorty as the *paradigmatic* post-analytic philosopher. As far as I am aware, the only other volume on post-analytic philosophy is Reynolds, Chase, Williams and Mares (2010).

See also the following from Williams: "it is particularly important that "post-analytic" should not be understood in terms of the supposed distinction between analytic and continental philosophy. I say this as one who is, both deniably and undeniably, an analytic philosopher: deniably, because I am disposed to deny it, and undeniably, because I suspect that few who have anything to say on the subject will accept that denial. What I do want to deny is the helpfulness of the distinction itself, and I shall mark that in particular by saying very little about it. But it is worth emphasising that what is unhelpful in this contrast goes beyond the matter of the unfortunate labels it uses". (Williams 2006: 201)

[vii] The following from George Duke, Elena Walsh, James Chase and Jack Reynolds is helpful here: "The term 'postanalytic' has been used to characterise the work of thinkers who, having started out in the mainstream analytic tradition, came to place in question some of its central presuppositions" (Duke et al. 2010: 7).

Construed in such a manner, one may now wonder where Quine fits into the cluster here, for Quine played arguably the most important role in moving analytic philosophy out of its Carnapian phase with his critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his critique of semantic reductionism, and his articulation of ontological relativity and the indeterminacy of translation. More to the point, Quine *self-described as post-analytic*. However, for all of Quine's radical dismantling of the two dogmas of empiricism and break from Carnap and analyticity, Quine's strict and conservative variety of naturalism and conception of philosophy as the abstract arm of empirical science means that he is a *different kind of post-analytic philosopher* to Bernstein et al.

Another sketch of post-analytic philosophy is provided by Christopher Norris, who writes: "What chiefly unites [various ideas and movements of thought under the broad rubric of 'post-analytic' philosophy] – on the negative side – is a growing dissatisfaction with the analytic enterprise as it developed in the wake of logical empiricism. That project is now taken to have failed in all its main objectives, among them more recently

the attempt to develop a truth-theoretic compositional semantics for natural language and a theory of beliefs (or propositional attitudes) that would explain how speakers and interpreters display such remarkable – though everyday – powers of communicative grasp. These ideas have come under attack from many quarters during the past two decades. Most influential here has been Quine's assault on the two 'last dogmas' of empiricism and – supposedly following from that – his case for ontological relativity and meaning-holism as the only way forward in default of any method for individuating objects or items of belief. The result, very often, is an attitude of deep-laid scepticism with regard to the truth-claims of science and the idea that philosophy might offer grounds – reasoned or explanatory grounds – for our understanding of language and the world." (Norris 1997: x) "What these approaches share is a sense that philosophy has now arrived at a stage – with its holistic turn against any version of the logical-empiricist paradigm – where talk of 'truth' (as hitherto conceived) becomes pretty much redundant. That is to say, it either drops out altogether (as in Rorty's neopragmatist appeal to what is 'good in the way of belief'), or else figures merely as a product of formal definition." (Ibid., p. 2) "Such is at least one sense of the term 'post-analytic philosophy': the quest for an alternative to that entire tradition of thought, starting out from logical empiricism, whose upshot – after so much critical labour – would seem to be either a formalised (semantic or metalinguistic) theory of truth devoid of explanatory content, or on the other hand a pragmatist conception that reduces truth to the currency of in-place consensus belief." (Ibid., p. 6)

   While some of what Norris writes about post-analytic philosophy is helpful, my concern is that (a) Norris misconstrues Quine's critique of logical empiricism as undermining the epistemic authority of the natural sciences; and (b) Norris's reliance on Rorty's pragmatist-cum-deconstructionist critique of analytic philosophy as the exemplar of the post-analytic risks post-analytic philosophers such as Williams and Haack being seen as *postmodernist* thinkers.

viii The way I have characterised post-analytic philosophy in the broad sense differs from how Glock articulates the concept: "… continental philosophy presented by Anglophone commentators who refer to analytic thinkers like Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson (e.g. Taylor, Cavell and Mulhall)" (Glock 2008: 256).

ix S knows that *p* iff
   (1) *p* is true
   (2) S believes that *p*
   (3) S is justified in believing that *p*.

x S knows that *p* iff
   (1) *p* is true
   (2) S believes that *p*
   (3) S would believe that *p* if *p* was true
   (4) S would not believe that *p* if *p* was false.
See Nozick (1983).

xi See Williamson (2000).

xii There is a sizeable literature on this subject. See McDowell (1994), Brandom (2000), O'Shea (2007, 2009, 2016), and deVries (2009) in particular.

xiii Pragmatists, whether classical, neo, or new, tend to articulate polemical views about mainstream Anglo-American philosophy as well as mainstream Continental European philosophy.

xiv Rescher 2017: 32.

xv Ibid., p. 42.

xvi PS: §20, 13.

xvii Bubbio 2016: 238-39.

xviii Cf. Hegel, "In our ordinary way of thinking, the world is only an aggregate of finite existences" (EPN: §247, 16).

xix Baker 2013: 101.

xx As Sellars writes: "in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not". (E&PM: §41)

xxi Cf. the following by Alex Rosenberg: "we'll call the worldview that all us atheists … share 'scientism'. This is the conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge of anything; that science's description of the world is correct in its fundamentals; and that when 'complete', what science tells us will not be surprisingly different from what it tells us today" (Rosenberg 2011: 6-7). See also Wilson (1998). However, it is important to note that one can be an atheist without being committed to scientism.

   The 'scientism wars' are frustrating, principally because on one side, there are hermeneutic humanists who think that naturalists *tout court* are denying discourse-pluralism; and on the other, there are scientistic naturalists who think hermeneutic humanists are denying that, in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things. Because the Unity of Science thesis, whether reductionist or eliminativist, is *not* grounded in a careful examination of scientific practice, it risks opening the door to the charge of scientism. However, if one considers *those philosophers of science who are looking at science in*

terms of practices, such as John Dupré, Nancy Cartwright, Steven Horst, and Joseph Rouse, a careful explication of how scientific practices yield a pragmatically efficacious grip on reality, there is reason to reject any top-down commitments to the Unity of Science (as for example driven by some *a priori* commitment to mechanistic physics as the epistemic ideal of inquiry). But, once one sees that pragmatic realism in philosophy of science does not entail – and in fact, strictly speaking, undermines – the Unity of Science thesis, 'scientism' just becomes a chimera. Given this, the following pertinent question arises: 'why, from a diagnostic perspective, does scientism still persist?' Scientism is, therefore, peculiar, because it persists *despite* resting on implausible grounds, since "the omnipresent neo-Pythagoreanism of contemporary science is surely not adequately justified by its empirical successes" (Dupré 1995: 224). I think a particularly compelling answer to this question involves explaining scientism's persistence in terms of scientism's status as the theoretical concomitant of the kind of social pathologies caused by the ideological exercise of formal reason in capitalist modes of production.

[xxii] For further on this subject, see Rödl (2007).

[xxiii] Cf. PS: §182, 111-112.

[xxiv] See Giladi (2019b) for further on this.

[xxv] E.g. what Daniel Dennett calls 'heterophenomenology'. I regard heterophenomenology as a sophisticated right-wing Sellarsian position.

[xxvi] Viz. MP: 79.

[xxvii] Viz. ND: 142-43.

[xxviii] The German term for 'concept', *Begriff*, comes from the verb *Begreifen*, which in turn I derived from *Greifen*. 'Greifen' is often translated as meaning 'to grab' / 'to grip' / 'to seize' / 'to snatch' / 'to capture' / 'to strike' / 'to take hold' / 'to bite'.

[xxix] See Giladi (forthcoming 2020) for further on this.

[xxx] Viz. PS: §47, 29.

[xxxi] As Rorty writes: "philosophers in non-anglophone countries typically think quite hard about Hegel, whereas the rather skimpy training in the history of philosophy which most analytic philosophers receive often tempts them to skip straight from Kant to Frege. It is agreeable to imagine a future in which the tiresome 'analytic-Continental split' is looked back upon as an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of communication – a future in which Sellars and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Putnam and Derrida, Rawls and Foucault, are seen as fellow-travellers on the same journey, fellow-citizens of what Michael Oakeshott called a *civitas pelegrina*". (Rorty 1997: 11)