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Eastern Orthodox Christianity

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Eastern Orthodoxy represents one of the three principal branches of Christianity and the second largest Christian denomination. With its historical connections with the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire, the traditional and contemporary areas of its greatest spread and influence are in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Near East. It represents a decentralized church organization of autocephalous (administratively independent) doctrinally and liturgically united ecclesial bodies. Among these ecclesial bodies the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople has the honor of titular primacy, while several of them function in effect as national churches. The continuity of Eastern Orthodoxy with the apostolic church through the process of apostolic succession is strongly emphasized, with faith and worship being delineated and regulated by its adherence to and recognition of only the decisions and canons of the first seven ecumenical councils (325–787 CE).

Introduction

The provenance, historical trajectories, and modern transformations of Eastern Orthodox cultures vis-à-vis the ethics of war display both significant analogies and dissimilarities to the respective Western Christian developments but have received much less in-depth and comprehensive treatment. However, in the last three decades some intense debates have evolved among Eastern Orthodox theologians, Byzantinists, and historians of the modern period centered on the Eastern Orthodox Churches' and cultures' traditional and current stances on the legitimization and conduct of just, justifiable, and "holy" warfare, as well as on pacifism and nonresistance to violence. These debates have ranged from the scriptural and patristic substructures of these stances to their more recent reformulations and political instrumentalizations in modern ideologized, "nationalized," and reformist trends in Eastern Orthodox thought and societies.

The study of the Eastern Orthodox perspectives on the morality and justifiability of warfare, the principal stages of their evolution, and figures involved in their conceptualization and elaboration is still hampered by the fact that a good of deal of the relevant

late antique, medieval, and early modern material has been neither edited and published nor translated into modern Western European languages and thus remains not sufficiently accessible and little known, not only to the general public but also to the larger scholarly audience.[1] While comprising predominantly texts already available in English translations, it is hoped that the present selection of sources will provide an informative and balanced picture of the normative and influential Eastern Orthodox perspectives on the nature and laws of war, as they evolved in diverse religio-historical contexts. It is also hoped that this selection will usefully complement the Orthodox resource book on war, peace, and nationalism published in 1999[2] in representing classical and modern theological, juridical, religio-philosophical, and ideological discourses on the problems of warfare in Eastern Orthodoxy as well as stimulate further efforts to gather and publish relevant source material essential for further study.

Similarly with Catholic and Protestant Christianity, the New Testament sources of the traditional approaches to the ethics of war and normativity of peace in Eastern Orthodoxy can be traced to the Gospel passages regarding the recourse to armed force and violence as well as to Christ's moral precepts and their underlying pacific perspectives (Matthew 5–7, 26:52, Luke 2:14, 3:14, 6:29, etc.). The pronouncements and exhortations of the early Church Fathers[3] on the questions of war, violence, nonretaliation, and nonviolent martyrdom, reflecting the prevalent antimilitarism and pacific views of the early Church, formed another authoritative resource of texts that, with its plurality of voices, had been continuously drawn on in early medieval as well as modern Eastern Orthodox thought in this sphere. The early Christian ideal of the normativity and affirmation of peace in all its dimensions, from the peace of the spirit to the peace among humans, as elaborated further during the patristic period, remained one of the preeminent themes and found some striking expressions in Eastern Orthodox theology, ethics, anthropology, hymnography, and hagiography.

As in Western Christianity the Old Testament accounts of righteous wars in the service of God in Deuteronomy, Numbers, Joshua, and the Maccabees provided a convenient normative source for justifying, sanctioning, and conducting warfare, especially in the sphere of imperial Byzantine political theology and the related Eastern Orthodox versions of rulership ideology, with their dependence on the Old Testament kingship models of Saul, David, and Solomon. Eastern Orthodoxy retained also the dichotomies and tensions between the notions of war and peace respectively in the Old and New Testament (which despite some evident continuities, differed in some important spheres), which were also reflected in the corresponding Old Testament–related imperial and more New Testament–based clerical attitudes to warfare in medieval Eastern Christendom.[4]

Apart from scriptural and patristic sources, early medieval Byzantine stances on warfare experienced also the formative impact of inherited Greco-Roman concepts, moral norms, and theorizing (including military manuals) concerning the legitimacy of and causes for resorting to military force, right conduct on the battlefield and in the wake of the cessation of the conflict, just and unjust wars, and so on. Some of these concepts such as self-defense and recovery of lost imperial territory and possessions entered imperial secular law books and collections such as the *Basilika* and *Epanagoge*.[5] The classical legacy of concepts and attitudes included the ever-influential Aristotelian precepts on the

nature and morality of war and peace as the preferable condition and desired outcome of any warfare.

The process of the institutionalization of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire that began during the reign of Constantine the Great (306–337) led to various models of rapprochement between the imperial state and the church authorities. The newly developing consonance between the secular and ecclesiastical order in the sphere of the justification and sanctioning of warfare in some instances followed divergent trajectories in the West and East Roman Empire occasioned by the different evolution of church–state relations in the Latin West and Greek East. In the characteristic political and religious conditions in the Latin West St. Ambrose (ca. 339–397) and St. Augustine (354–430) were to lay the foundation of the medieval Catholic just war tradition. In the Greek East, adhering to a different corpus of patristic writings and a different model of relationships with the East Roman/Byzantine centralized imperial state and political theology, the Eastern Orthodox Church retained important elements from pre-Constantinian Christian pacific attitudes to war, its legitimation, and morality. In East Roman Christian/Byzantine culture and society these clerical attitudes coexisted with the inherited traditions of the pre-Christian just war tradition and the political and military needs of the imperial state, which preserved some central features of pre-Christian Roman military structures and ethos.

The Christian East Roman/Byzantine ideology of warfare was thus strongly indebted to the largely secular late Roman just war tradition but subjected it to an inevitable Christianization that began as early as the reign of Constantine. In the maturing Christianized version of this Byzantine ideology of warfare it was the divinely ordained mission of the Christian Romans (the new "chosen people") to safeguard Constantinople, seen as both the "New Rome" and the "New Jerusalem," and its single universal Christian empire, the "New Israel," against the encroachments of the new "barbarians": first pagans, in later periods Muslims, and, on occasion, West European Christians. Elaborating the notion of Byzantium representing the new "chosen people," Byzantine chroniclers, ideologues, and propagandists could depict Byzantine wars as God-guided campaigns against the new "infidel" enemies (often recognized as new versions of the Old Testament adversaries of the Israelites), in which successful warrior-emperors could be associated with the paradigmatic figures in the biblical Israelite God-commanded wars such as Moses, Joshua, or David.

The sources in the first section of the present anthology intend, therefore, to illustrate the synthesis and cross-fertilization of these diverse concepts, normative regulations, and imagery in the periods of the formation and maturing of imperial Christian ideology of warfare in Byzantium. The section includes extracts from Byzantine military manuals, with their Christian just war statements (acknowledging the "evil" or antinormative nature of war and the permissibility of defensive warfare) and emphasis on religious practices in the Byzantine army, imperial statements and military orations, as well as military religious services. While no evidence of a systematic attempt at formulating a just war theory coming from within the Byzantine Church has been unearthed as yet, the roots and precepts of the mature Byzantine just war theory developed by the imperial court and government are thus much easier to trace and categorize. Both more extensive and narrower categorizations of such just war theory have been proposed: in the former it

can be defined as comprising generally five major types of justification of warfare: "self-defense," "recovery of lost territory," "breach of agreement," "averting a greater evil," and "pursuit of peace,"[6] most of which are indeed illustrated in the selected extracts.

As in Western Christendom, the responsibilities of the Eastern Orthodox Church in the practical spheres of medieval warfare were manifested in military religious services, the presence of military chaplains in the army, the celebration of Eucharistic liturgies in the field, the employment of Christian religious symbolism and relics for military purposes, prebattle blessings of standards and weapons, services for fallen soldiers, and thanksgiving ceremonies to commemorate victory.[7] At the same time, a series of rulings in Eastern Orthodox canon law unequivocally proscribe clerics and monks from bearing arms and taking part in any fighting or acts of violence, given the pacific nature of their vocation. While these canonic regulations made the nonparticipation of clergy and monks in warfare obligatory and unambiguous, throughout the medieval period a certain ambiguity persisted, in both canon law and Byzantine political military ideology, concerning the status of the Christian soldiers and whether their involvement in fighting on behalf of the Byzantine Empire could bring them spiritual recompense. Given their importance for understanding core notions and dichotomies in Byzantine clerical and secular attitudes regarding warfare and Christian soldiery, the principal statements in Eastern Orthodox canon law addressing these problems, beginning with those of St. Athansasios of Alexandria and St. Basil the Great, are reproduced in the present selection along with extracts from the debates that their pronouncements provoked.

During the pre-crusading period of the ninth and eleventh centuries when the first notions of absolution and heavenly rewards for fallen Christian soldiers were formulated by Pope Leo IV (847–855), Pope John (872–882), and Pope Leo IX (1049–1054),[8] the Eastern Orthodox Church by and large did not share the changing stances of Western Christendom on Christian involvement in warfare. Nonetheless, a conscious attempt to formulate a Christian just war theory and articulate the notion of a Christian military martyrdom can be discerned in a statement attributed to St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher (826/7–869), the celebrated missionary to the Slavs. This approach was not however affirmed or developed more systematically in the medieval period. With very few exceptions the mainstream followers of the Eastern Orthodox Church thought and practice, especially the ecclesiastical elites, remained opposed to the idea of Christian "military martyrdom" for fallen soldiers. At the same time, a number of assertions and allusions in Byzantine military manuals and services commemorating fallen soldiers indicate that vocabulary and imagery related to the notion of Byzantine Christian warriors receiving spiritual recompense for their fighting on behalf of Orthodoxy and their Christian brethren, including martyrdom status, was integrated into the military religious ideology evolving among the Byzantine military classes, becoming an important element of their distinctive lay piety. It is thus very likely that the imperial government attempted to foster and gain acceptance for such notions regarding the status of the Byzantine soldier in more cases and more energetically than the extant evidence suggests. Such developments can be detected especially in the Byzantine Anatolian frontier zones where the local church and hierarchs may have played some role in this process and where Byzantine troops and military formations continuously confronted the *ghazwa* warfare of advancing Turkoman groups from around the mid-eleventh century onward.[9] Moreover, in the evolution of

the increasingly popular cult of military saints (such as St. George and St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki, widely adopted as patrons by the Byzantine military aristocracy), some of its earlier antiwarfare perspectives were tamed or neutralized. This shift arguably facilitated the development of its easier integration into Byzantine lay military piety.[10] Consequently, the extracts selected for the section on "Medieval Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on the Status of the Christian Soldier" intend to convey both the ecclesiastical perspectives in this sphere and those developed in Byzantine lay military piety, as they highlight the interrelations, interdependence, and occasional tensions between these two dominant trends in Byzantine ideologies of warfare.

From the First Crusade (1095–1099) onward, Byzantine theologians, canonists, and *literati* became acquainted with aspects of the war theology of the crusading movement, with its amalgamation of pilgrimage, just war, and religious (holy) war notions. However, no comparable innovations in canon law or theological attempts to systematize just and religious war doctrines were undertaken in high and late medieval Byzantium or the Byzantine Commonwealth of Southeastern Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. The debate on whether Byzantium ever conceptualized and put into practice elements (or a restricted version) of the ideology of the wars fought for ostensibly religious purposes in the contemporaneous Islamic and Western Christian worlds, which has developed among Byzantinists in the last twenty years or so,[11] has brought to the attention of a wider audience some important but less well-known evidence of the interrelations between Byzantine Orthodox Christianity, on the one hand, and Byzantine political and military ideology and warfare, on the other. The varying approaches to this religio-historic problem arise mainly from views concerning the applicability to the Eastern Orthodox world of criteria for wars fought with a religious rationale that had been voiced in medieval Western Christian and Islamic societies. The balance of argument and current state of evidence indicates that the religious elements and rhetoric present in the several Byzantine campaigns usually treated in this context were sporadic and not a consequence of a consistently and systematically developed ideology of religious war. It is also becoming increasingly evident that the Byzantine evidence should be treated on its own terms and within its own religio-political settings due to which, among other contrasts with the Latin West, the Byzantine Church entirely delegated the justification and practice of warfare to the secular imperial government and thus did not promulgate war or release warlike declarations. With this problematic finally receiving the attention it deserves, some of the extracts in the two sections on Byzantine ideology of warfare (such as the religiously charged orations of Herakleios or the texts dwelling on the spiritual recompense for fallen soldiers) have obvious implications for the pro and contra arguments in the above debate.

The classical Byzantine synthesis between inherited religious and political pacific models, the late Roman just war tradition, and some innovations in the theory and practice of warfare created an ambivalent and flexible system of nuanced attitudes to war in which various compromises were achieved to neutralize the inherent tensions between the various elements. The elaboration of more systematic theories for the religious and philosophical justification of war was apparently not seen as necessary; similarly, the *jus in bello* regulations in Byzantine military treatises often largely reproduced earlier Greco-Roman models. This synthesis was well suited to the religious and secular needs of an imperial

state that viewed itself as the sole "holy and Orthodox universal empire"; it seemed sufficiently appropriate also to the Orthodox monarchies and principalities that emerged in the Byzantine Commonwealth in the Balkans, Ukraine, and Russia.

Russian secular and religious concepts of just war began to crystallize early in the history of Orthodox Russia. Defensive war was, as a rule, seen as justifiable, as were military conflicts aimed at regaining territories unjustly lost to an invader – they could be seen accordingly as wars of liberation. These notions of just war were intertwined with a commitment to the inviolability of frontiers and the belief that war represented the judgment of God. In the period following the beginning of the Christianization of Kievan Rus' in 988, religious components in the conflicts that arose between medieval Russian Christian princes and the nomadic Turkic Kumans (illustrated in the present anthology with several extracts from contemporaneous Russian historical records) and other Turkic nomadic and settled peoples seem largely comparable to those present in other medieval Christian ideologies of warfare, especially in the Byzantine version. As in Byzantium, such religious elements were not of central importance in justifications for engaging in the armed conflicts that preimperial Russian military power subsequently waged against the Mongols, Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean Tatars, as well as Russia's western Catholic neighbors. At the same time, on occasion Muscovite rulers could seek religious justification, principally the defense and protection of Orthodox peoples under "alien" rule, for military offensives against Catholic and Muslim powers – as exemplified by Grand Prince Ivan III's (1462–1505) campaign against Catholic Lithuania in 1500 and Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible's (1533–1584) offensive against the Muslim Kazan Khanate in 1552.

In the sphere of Russian military religious ideology, lay pacifism, as exemplified by the cult of the passion-bearer prince-martyrs of Kievan Rus', Saints Boris and Gleb (d. 1015), coexisted with the cult or high renown for warrior-princes, praised as defenders of Orthodoxy and subsequently declared saints, such as St. Alexander Nevskii (1236–1263, proclaimed a saint in 1547) and St. Dmitrii Donskoi (1359–1389, canonized as a saint in 1988). These two pious warrior-princes pursued their military feats in the period of Tatar Golden Horde's suzerainty over the Russian lands (1236–1452), during which the Russian Church played the role of the preeminent carrier of the cultural heritage and evolving ethno-religious consciousness in Russia. In the early stages of this era the Russian Church remained generally pacific, in harmony with prevailing Byzantine clerical attitudes of the period. But with the onset of the decline and fragmentation of the Golden Horde, Muscovite high ecclesiastical circles became crucially involved in the formulation and promotion of a militant anti-Tatar religio-political ideology. Coupled with intensely anti-Muslim rhetoric, this ideology is represented in the present anthology with several ecclesiastical and royal pronouncements made before and after the Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552. As a number of historians have approached the Kazan campaign as a crusade-like venture against a clear-cut "infidel" enemy,[12] these statements deserve closer critical scrutiny in the framework of earlier Christian anti-Muslim war efforts with an analogous religious justification and a comparable level of royal and clerical involvement in the process.

In the aftermath of the Ottoman conquests in Anatolia and the Balkans and the integration of these regions into the new Ottoman version of the Islamic caliphate in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Orthodox Churches in these regions, along with

the Constantinople patriarchate, found themselves in completely new religious and political circumstances. In the wake of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, an evolving Russian religio-political ideology came to claim the imperial leadership of the Orthodox Christian Commonwealth through the already adopted notion of Muscovy as "The New Israel" and the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome,'' which enjoyed a gradual, if not methodical elaboration.

This new Russian version of imperial Orthodox Christianity inevitably developed some new perspectives on the moral and religious issues of war and peace and legitimate frameworks for engaging in armed conflict. But the inherited and newly emerging concepts in this sphere were not systematically developed even in the period when Russian military thinking came under strong Western influence during and after the reforms of Peter the Great (1682–1725). This influence is particularly visible in the first original Russian tract on international law, written in 1717 by the prominent diplomat Baron Petr Shafirov, who discussed the just causes of Russia's war against Sweden (1701–1721). Extracts from this tract are reproduced below. Increasing Russian military involvement in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not lead to further major developments in Russian military thought on conceptual guidelines related to *casus belli* issues and *jus in bello* regulations. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 enhanced belief in the defense of the homeland as the highest form of just war and the ultimate patriotic duty, notions articulated also in some of the orations of the influential theologian St. Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow (1821–1867, canonized in 1994).

Russia's role as a protector of Eastern Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire was recognized in a peace treaty that was signed between the two imperial powers in 1774. This treaty was cited repeatedly in Russian foreign policy, providing legal grounds to intervene through diplomatic pressure or militarily in the turbulent processes that led to the formation of the post-Ottoman nation-states in Southeastern Europe. Russian interventionism in the Balkans and the conflicts marking these state-formation processes coincided with the rise of Russian Slavophilism, European Pan-Slavism, and its Russian versions in the ideological, political, and religious spheres. Nineteenth-century Russo-Ottoman conflicts (both political and military), as well as the wide-ranging popularity and emotional appeal of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, generated discourses dwelling on the religious justification of military offensives against the Ottoman empire (represented below by a selection of pertinent extracts). The conceptualization and spread of Tolstoiian pacifism from the 1880s onward provoked powerful opposition among Russian ecclesiastical and religiously oriented intellectual circles. This was accompanied by reassessments of Christian just war traditions and the morality of war – a process that continued into the interwar period and is illustrated here by an assortment of excerpts from writings exemplifying these Tolstoiian, anti-Tolstoiian, and just war reappraisal discourses.

Concurrent with the intensification of Russian interventionism in the late Ottoman Balkans the respective Orthodox Churches, after having acted during the Ottoman era as a nationally and culturally unifying force, inevitably played a crucial role in the formation of the corresponding national ideologies. Orthodox ecclesiastical elites were directly involved in the nation/state-building processes and often in the legitimization of the military conflicts that accompanied these processes in the post-Ottoman Orthodox-majority

states. The ecclesiastical, political, and national spheres in the Orthodox world in Southeastern Europe continued to merge and interact profoundly and unpredictably in the tense years preceding World War I and the equally tense interwar period, generating blends of nationalism, militarism, and Orthodoxy, which are represented in the current anthology by a small selection of excerpts from contemporaneous sources.

A selection of extracts from the sermons and pronouncements of leading Russian ecclesiastical figures from the period of the Russian Revolution (and the onset of Bolshevik antichurch campaigns) and World War II are intended to demonstrate some important continuities with preceding Russian and earlier Orthodox discourses on the legitimacy and morality of warfare, yet employed under the different circumstances of first a civil war and then a national defensive war.

Following World War II nearly all European Eastern Orthodox Churches (apart from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul and the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus) were forced to function and survive in the framework of the militantly secularist and repressive Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. After initial stages of anti-Church repression, Communist governments became aware of the potential of using the national Orthodox Churches as a tool of their foreign policy through the existing network of international Orthodoxy as well as the World Council of Churches and similar international ecclesiastical institutions. A small selection of excerpts from this period illustrates the participation of these Orthodox Churches in international ecclesiastical and lay peace initiatives during the Cold War period, a participation that the respective Communist governments endeavored to supervise and control.

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 marked the beginning of a new period for the revitalization of the Orthodox Churches and the restoration of their traditional place in the social and religious life of the region. However, the military conflicts of Yugoslav Succession in the 1990s posed some obvious challenges to international Orthodoxy. The various meetings, initiatives, statements, and appeals organized and hosted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Orthodox Churches in response to these and other contemporary conflicts intensified the debate on contemporary challenges to Eastern Orthodox views on the ethics of war and peace. Inevitably, the debate developed in the framework of newly actualized issues such as interreligious violence, ethnic cleansing, and the justification of humanitarian intervention.[13]

Against the backdrop of these developments and the rising prominence of a morality of war problematic in inter-Orthodox and ecumenical dialogues (as well as increasing contacts with institutions related to the implementation of the League of Nations Covenant, the U.N. Charter, etc.) in 2003 the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew, emphatically reiterated traditional pacific Eastern Orthodox patristic and clerical precepts on warfare. Meanwhile, after a decade of redefining its new models of relations with the state, and indeed the military, in 2000 the Jubilee Council of Russian Bishops issued a statement of faith that contains a section entitled "War and Peace." This section contains a systematic and up-to-date Orthodox reappraisal of the Christian just war tradition and its relevance to modernity. This chapter concludes with excerpts from these statements by Bartholomew and the Russian Bishops, in light of their importance for understanding the dispute on the existence or nonexistence of a just war tradition in Eastern Orthodoxy among Orthodox theologians and ecclesiastics.[14]

It is hoped that this chapter will broaden the study of the principal currents in Eastern Orthodox perspectives on warfare and their classification.[15] A related aim has been to show that the long-standing neglect of the problematic of nonmonolithic plurality of Eastern Orthodox attitudes to warfare[16] is undeserved. Further exploration of the theological, philosophical, and ideological roots of this Eastern Orthodox plurality will undoubtedly contribute to a better understanding of the diversity of Christian approaches to war and peace making. Likewise, it will bring to light their modern relevance and applicability to crucial problems in the ethics of war in the twenty-first century.

From Byzantium to the Rise of Muscovy

Imperial Christian Ideology of Warfare in Medieval Byzantium

Byzantine Military Treatises

In the late East Roman Christian/early Byzantine empire the formation and evolution of Christian theologies and general socio-cultural notions of war and peace inevitably developed under the impact of prevailing contemporaneous Church attitudes (which maintained some pre-Constantinian pacifistic perspectives in this sphere) and the inherited traditions of the political-military ideology of the Roman imperial state (which included core elements of the pre-Christian just war tradition of Greco-Roman antiquity). This progressively Christianized "just war" tradition (understood as intended to defend imperial territories, regain lost territories, and protect imperial subjects) became a fundamental part of Byzantine imperial ideology, closely interwoven with the reinterpreted and actualized Romano-Byzantine paradigms of God-guidedness in battle and imperial triumphalism, as manifested in the gradual Christianization of the traditional Roman victory parades.

Such Christianization of the inherited Roman political-military ideology can be discerned in Byzantine manuals such as the *Strategikon*, attributed to Emperor Maurice (582–602); the *Taktika*, ascribed to Emperor Leo VI the Wise (886–912); *Praecepta Militaria*, ascribed to Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969); and other texts belonging to this genre.[17] Drawing heavily on earlier Hellenistic and Roman authorities (highlighting thus the continuity of the tradition of tactical and strategic manuals from Greco-Roman antiquity to the Byzantine Middle Ages), these manuals inevitably contain much valuable material and advice reflecting the evolving Byzantine Christian stances on warfare. In the sphere of legitimization of warfare it is certainly important that an ancient and influential military tract such as Onasander's *Strategikos*, continuously used as a source for the medieval Byzantine military treatises, emphasizes how warfare should be motivated by a just cause and likewise that it should be waged justly – echoes of which are perceptible in the corresponding, more elaborate just war statements in one of the classical and authoritative Byzantine military tracts, the *Taktika*, ascribed to Leo VI.

From: Onasander, *Strategikos*, 10 (first century CE)[18]

It is most important that the cause of a war must be wisely constituted, and that it be evident to all that the war is being waged justly.

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From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 169 (late ninth/early tenth century CE)[19]

Certainly justice must be at the beginning of every action. More than other actions, the beginnings of war must be just. Not only must it be just but the war must be conducted with prudence. For then God will become benevolent and will fight along with our armies. The men will be more enthusiastic, holding the shield of justice before them, with the realization that they are not initiating injustice but are warding off those committing unjust acts.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, 2.49–50[20]

For we have always welcomed peace, both for our subjects and for the barbarians, through Christ, God and ruler of all, if the foreigners enclosed within their own bounds are content, professing no injustice, while you yourself (the general) withhold your hand from them, sprinkling the earth neither with foreign nor with our own blood. But if the foe is not sensible, and himself commences the injustice, then indeed there is a just cause present – an unjust war having been begun by the enemy – to undertake war against them with good courage and with eagerness, since they furnish the causes, raising unjust hands against our subjects. So take courage, for you have the God of righteousness as a help, and taking up the fight on behalf of your brethren you will achieve a complete victory.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 14, 16[21]

14. Do not act unjustly or initiate an unjust war. Do not launch unjust attacks or pillaging raids against people who have done you no wrong. Live in piety but also, as far as it depends on you, live in peace with your enemy. . . .

16 The belief that one is not acting unjustly but is being treated unjustly will bring [you] the Divinity as your general and leader, and you will be compelled to believe that God has obligated himself to bring a just war to a good conclusion, and an unjust one to the contrary.

Combining religious and secular notions, these just war statements in Leo VI's *Taktika* thus uphold the Christian ideal of the normativity of peace. Defensive warfare is legitimized only in response to hostilities unjustly initiated by imperial adversaries. In its prologue the tract declares that peace should be sought first and foremost. But should the peace be broken by warfare (whose origin is attributed to the devil), a defensive response will be necessary, thereby ensuring by military means the security and safety of those who have been attacked, and the subsequent reestablishment of peace.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, Prologue 4[22]

For honored by the image and word of God, all men ought to embrace peace and foster love for one another instead of taking up murderous weapons in their hands

> to use against their own people. But since the devil, the killer of men from the beginning, the enemy of our race, has made use of sin to bring men to the point of waging war against their own kind, it becomes entirely necessary for men to wage war making use of contrivances of the devil, developed through men and, without flinching, to take their stand against those nations that want war. They must then make provision for their security by military means, employing them to defend themselves against the onslaughts of the enemy, to take action against them, and to make them suffer what they may well deserve. With everyone embracing his own safety, peace will be cherished by all and will become a way of life.

In Leo VI's *Taktika* war is defined thus as a necessary evil. A similar affirmation of peace as the archetypal and desirable norm and war as "a great evil" and even "the worst of all evils" is clearly articulated in another well-known Byzantine military tract, *Peri Strategikes* (*De Re Strategica*). In it, defensive war is considered a legitimate reaction against attacks that had been unleashed by Byzantium's enemies.

From: *Peri Strategikes* (*De Re Strategica*), 4:9–14 (sixth century CE)[23]

> I know well that war is a great evil and the worst of all evils. But since our enemies clearly look upon the shedding of our blood as one of their basic duties and the height of virtue, and since each one must stand up for his own country and his own people with word, pen, and deed, we have decided to write about strategy. By putting it into practice we shall be able not only to resist our enemies but even to conquer them.

The articulation of this Christian rhetoric on war and peace in the framework of military strategy included the prerequisite, as asserted in Leo VI's *Taktika* and the *Strategikon* ascribed to Maurice, that the army commander's military ethics should be ruled by the love of God and justice, which would bring him divine favor and victory during his campaign.

From: Maurice, *Strategikon*, Prologue (late sixth/early seventh century CE)[24]

> First, we urge upon the general that his most important concern be the love of God and justice; building on these, he should strive to win the favor of God, without which it is impossible to carry out any plan, however well devised it may seem, or to overcome any enemy, however weak he may be thought. For all things are ruled by the providence of God. Armed with the favor of God and, without pausing to rest, employing his tactical and strategical skills, he manages the army entrusted to him with confidence and is able to counter the various machinations of the enemy.

From: Maurice, *Strategikon*, 8.2[25]

> Before getting into danger, the general should worship God. When he does get into danger, then, he can with confidence pray to God as a friend.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika* 2:22–23[26]

22. Before everything else, O general be concerned about the love of God and righteousness in such manner that you constantly have God before your eyes. Fear him. Love him with all your heart and all your soul. Keep his commandments and, in turn, you will receive his favor. . . .

23. For you must realize that, apart from God's favor, it is not possible to bring any plan to a successful conclusion, however intelligent you may seem to be; it is not possible to overcome the enemy, however weak they may be thought. Everything lies in the providence of God. . . .

From: Leo VI *Taktika*, Epilogue 73[27]

And so, it is always necessary for you, O General, in a fitting, dutiful way, to devote yourself to prayer to God and to observe his commandments. By so doing you will receive salvation and victory from above in Christ the true God and eternal Emperor of all. . . .

The need to plead for divine help and favor in warfare remains thus an important theme in the Christian just war tradition articulated in Byzantine military manuals. Apart from conveying in general the *jus ad bellum* regulations of this evolving tradition, as well as specifying to some extent its *jus in bello* guidelines, these Byzantine military treatises do not aim to develop in greater depth a theory addressing more general questions raised by the need for a Christian justification of warfare. But as practical manuals dealing with the reality of warfare, they dwell in some detail on the religious practices that were prescribed in Byzantine military camps. These range from prebattle blessing of standards and Eucharistic liturgies to religious burials of fallen warriors, as well as the related religious duties of soldiers and priests.

From: Maurice's *Strategikon*, 2.18[28]

[P]rayers should be said in camp on the actual day of battle before anyone goes out the gate. All, led by the priests, the general, and the other officers, should recite the "Kyrie eleison" (Lord have mercy) for some time in unison. Then, in hopes of success, each meros* should shout the "Nobiscum Deus" (God is with us) three times as it marches out of camp.

From: Maurice's *Strategikon*, 7.17[29]

Whether the bandon† or tagma‡ is in service with the rest of the army or is camping someplace by itself, the "Trisagion"§ must be sung, and the other customary

* Military divison.
† Basic military unit.
‡ Military unit of regiment size.
§ The "Thrice-Holy" prayer.

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practices observed, early in the morning before any other duty and again in the evening after supper and the dismissal.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, 14.1[30]

1. O general, before all else, we enjoin upon you that on the day of battle your army should be free from sin. The night before, the priests are to offer fervent prayers of intercession. Everyone should be sanctified and so, by words and deeds, they should be convinced that they have the help of God.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika* 13.1[31]

A day or two before combat, the tourmarchs* should see that the standards are blessed by the priests and then present them to the standard-bearers of the tagmata.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika* 16.11[32]

11. Show particular concern for the burial of the dead. Reverence for those who have died is always good and holy. It is especially necessary in the case of those who have fallen in battle, for it is with them that piety must manifest itself.

From: *Praecepta Militaria*, 4.106–120 (ca. 963–969 CE)[33]

As the enemy draws near, the entire contingent of the host, every last one of them, must say the invincible prayer proper to Christians, "Lord Jesus Christ, our God, have mercy on us, Amen," and in this way let them begin their advance against the enemy Have the signal given to them either by trumpet or another instrument for them to repeat the same prayer at the signal's end, "Lord Jesus Christ, our God have mercy on us," and, "Come to the aid of us Christians, making us worthy to rise up and fight to the death for our faith and our brethren by fortifying and strengthening our souls, our hearts, and our whole body, the mighty Lord of battles, incomparable in power, through the intercession of the Mother of God Who bore Thee, and of all the saints, Amen."

Imperial Statements and Addresses

Statements and addresses attributed to Byzantine emperors reveal important (mainly secular) aspects of the Byzantine ideology of warfare. However, the ultimatum that, according to Anna Komnene's *Alexiad*, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) delivered to the Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah, demonstrates that in such instances traditional secular concerns such as the inviolability of imperial frontiers could be combined with

* Byzantine military commanders in charge of a "tourma" (military detachment).

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religiously motivated aims such as a demand for a halt in military aggression against Christian communities, as clearly articulated in the following text.

From: Anna Komnene (1083–1153), *Alexiad*, 15.6.5[34]

> "If you are willing," he said, "to yield to the authority of Rome and to put an end to your raids on the Christians, you will enjoy favors and honor, living in freedom for the rest of your lives on lands set aside for you. I refer to the lands where you used to dwell before Romanus Diogenes became emperor and before he met the sultan in battle – an unfortunate and notorious clash which ended in the Roman's defeat and capture. It would be wise, therefore, to choose peace rather than war, to refrain from crossing the frontiers of the Empire and to be content with your own territories. The advice I give is in your interests. On the other hand, if you reject it, you can be sure of this: I will exterminate your race."

Pre-Battle Military Orations

Pre-or postbattle orations delivered by (or on behalf of) Byzantine emperors or army commanders[35] also reveal much about the Christian ideology and justification of warfare that supported the Byzantine military efforts, especially against non-Christian adversaries. The first example of such a speech, attributed to the Roman army commander Justinian (supposedly delivered during Byzantine-Sasanian hostilities in 576) conflates just war with anti-Persian and anti-Zoroastrian rhetoric to highlight the contrasts between Christianity and the Persian belligerent "false religion" and its "unjust altars." Significantly, the oration introduces the notion of higher, heavenly recompense for the East Roman soldiers.

From: Theophylaktos Simokattes, *History*, 3.13.13–20 (early seventh century CE)[36]

> The Romans have hired Justice as an ally, since they have once again sought peace; the Medes [Persians] have marshaled Justice in opposition to themselves, since they abhor peace virtually always and honor belligerence like an auspicious god. Ours is not a false religion, nor have we set up spurious gods as leaders we do not do obeisance to a god that turns to ashes, who is now ablaze but is soon not even visible; smoke and fuel do not constitute religion, but their fading proves their falsehood. The barbarian exults in cheerful circumstances, but success is unaccustomed to remain stable when it ascends unjust altars. Injustice is often successful, but is also turned toward destruction. Today angels are recruiting you and are recording the souls of the dead, providing for them not a corresponding recompense, but one that infinitely exceeds in the weight of the gift.

The second selection of prebattle orations represents exhortations attributed to the Emperor Herakleios (610–641), which were supposedly delivered to his troops during the last Sasanian Persian-Byzantine conflict (603–628) – customarily seen as the last great war of antiquity. The orations highlight Herakleios' endeavor to magnify the religious dimension

of this war, portraying the Sasanian enemies as implacable enemies of Christendom who have destroyed and defiled Christian sanctuaries. Significantly, apart from calling for self-sacrifice, the harangues ascribed to Herakleios go as far as to promise heavenly rewards (recompense from God) and even martyr's crowns to imperial Christian soldiers who fell in the battle for the salvation of their Christian brethren. This is arguably the first occurrence of such a promise in Byzantine sources. It must be said, however, that this sanctification of warfare did not find widespread acceptance among ecclesiastical elites or more generally within the medieval Byzantine ideology of warfare – see the section on the "Medieval Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on the Status of the Christian Soldier" below.

From: Theophanes the Confessor (ca. 760–ca. 817/18 CE), *Chronographia*, 303.12–304.13[37]

> And he spoke to them those words of encouragement: "You see, O my brethren and children, how the enemies of God have trampled upon our land, have laid our cities waste, have burned our sanctuaries and have filled with the blood of murder the altars of the bloodless sacrifice; how they defile with their impassioned pleasures our churches. "

From: Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 307.1–11[38]

> As for Herakleios, he called together his troops and roused them with these words of exhortation: "Men, my brethren, let us keep in mind the fear of God and fight to avenge the insult done to God. Let us stand bravely against the enemy who have inflicted many terrible things on the Christians. Let us respect the sovereign state of the Romans and oppose the enemy who are armed with impiety. Let us be inspired with faith that defeats murder. Let us be mindful of the fact that we are within the Persian land and that flight carries a great danger. Let us avenge the rape of our virgins and be afflicted in our hearts as we see the severed limbs of our soldiers. The danger is not without recompense: nay, it leads to the eternal life. Let us stand bravely, and the Lord our God will assist us and destroy the enemy."

From: Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 310.25–311.2[39]

> The emperor gathered his troops and gave them courage by assuaging them with these words of exhortation: "Be not disturbed, O brethren, by the multitude (of the enemy). For when God wills it, one man will rout a thousand. So, let us sacrifice ourselves to God for the salvation of our brothers. May we win the crown of martyrdom so that we may be praised in the future and receive our recompense from God."

The second half of the tenth century saw campaigns of Byzantine offensive warfare and expansion against its Near Eastern Muslim neighbors, accompanied by a heightened religious element in the rhetoric employed to conceptualize or justify these campaigns, as well as in contemporaneous military manuals.[40] Such enhanced religious sentiment is

evident in two military orations ascribed to Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (908–945, co-emperor; 945–959, emperor) that were delivered in the context of the unfolding Byzantine conflicts with the Muslim Hamdanid dynasty in eastern Anatolia and northern Syria. By framing the hostilities in religious terms, which included appealing to the powerful prayers of holy men, employing sacred relics, and anointing soldiers with "holy water," the emperor sought to infuse his troops with confidence in eventual victory of the imperial Christian cause.

From: Constantine VII, Postbattle Military Oration (ca. 950 CE)[41]

Therefore have no fear, my men, have no fear, fill your souls with zeal and show the enemy what those who put their faith in Christ can accomplish. Be the avengers and champions not only of Christians but of Christ Himself. Do men know that those who fight on their behalf are rewarded, and will Christ not stretch forth His hand to those girded for battle against His foes?. And so let us put all our hope in Him, and instead of our whole panoply let us arm ourselves with His cross, equipped with which you have lately made the fierce soldiers of the Hamdanid the victims of your swords. . . .

You know how virtuous it is to fight on behalf of Christians, and how much glory the man who does so achieves for himself. This is more profitable than all wealth, more praiseworthy than all other honor.

From: Constantine VII, Postbattle Oration 3, 8 (ca. 958 CE)[42]

[A]fter appealing to the most venerable and saintly fathers and enjoining them to offer prayers of supplication, we have appointed them to pray incessantly and unstintingly on your behalf; but we have also directed those in the churches of the City guarded by God and the pious monasteries to perform the same task, so that as the entreaty of all those holy men rises up to the ears of the Lord God of hosts and is blended and united with your fervor and trust in us, the route before you may be easy and smooth. . . .

[A]s I devote my exertions to your salvation and to *prospering you*, behold, that after drawing holy water from the immaculate and most sacred relics of the Passion of Christ our true God – from the precious wooden fragments (of the True Cross) and the undefiled Lance, the precious Titulus, the wonder-working Reed, the life-giving blood which flowed from His precious rib, the most sacred Tunic, the holy swaddling clothes, the God-bearing winding sheet, and the other relics of His undefiled Passion – we have sent it to be sprinkled upon you, for you to be anointed by it and to garb yourselves with the divine power from on high. For I trust in my true God and Savior Christ, that just as He restored and endowed the human race with life through the blood and water which flowed from His precious rib, so will He through the sprinkling of this holy water quicken and restore you and furnish you with confidence and might and domination against the enemy.

Military Religious Services

The numerous invocations of peace in Byzantine liturgical and hymnographic literature occasionally coexist with prayers (and prayer services) for the safety and well-being of Orthodox soldiers/armies and their victory in battle. Accompanied with military imagery and symbolism, these prayers often allude to the empire's previous victories on the battlefield, as aided by God. Characteristically, for example, the *Liturgy of St. Basil* pleads for victory only over war-minded barbarian adversaries, so that lasting peace may be achieved.[43] The following tenth-century military service characteristically conflates the constantly actualized inherited paradigms of imperial triumphalism (Christianized with invocations of the victory-giving powers of the cross) with that of Byzantium as "The New Israel." Its related typology associates the archetypal Old Testament protagonists of God-ordained, righteous wars such as David and the Philistines with, respectively, the Byzantine warrior-emperors and their "barbarian" enemies.

From: Military Religious Service (tenth century CE)[44]

Savior, who gave power to wise David,
cast down our adversaries as you did Goliath of old,
Compassionate One,
with your invisible slingshot, Christ,
crush their insolent acts and designs,
so that with faith we may honor you.

Life-giving son of God, by the prayers of your mother,
and by the divine supplications of the angels and gloriously triumphant martyrs,
gladden your faithful emperors,
shatter the throngs of barbarians, and to the army
that worships you, show mercy.

O Lord who showed to Constantine the first emperor of the Christians
the divine cross, and uttered from the heavens
"Trust in this sign,"
You, O Lord, by the power of the cross give now
victory and vigor and truly divine power
to your army in your compassion.

O Lord who fought with most gentle David
to defeat the Philistine,
fight beside your faithful emperors.
and armed with the cross
cast down their enemies.

Medieval Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on the Status of the Christian Soldier

Eastern Orthodox Canon Law

The codification of ecclesiastical legislation in the Eastern Roman Empire following the legalization of the status of the Christian Church by Constantine's Edict of Milan of 313 led to the compilations of the first Byzantine collections or synopses of the rulings of the so-called Apostolic Canons and those of the Ecumenical and Local Councils. The earliest of these collections date most likely from the sixth century and some of these synopses came to include also authoritative pronouncements of Eastern Church Fathers that were thus accorded a canonical status. A number of canons drawn from these regulations and patristic writings that formed the basis of Eastern Orthodox canon law (such as Canon 7 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon of 451)[45] spell out prohibitions on Christian clergy and monks becoming involved in military service or the secular state administration and government.[46] Emphasizing the precepts of clerical and monastic nonresistance to violence, these canonical regulations enunciated that both clergy and monks were expected to maintain the pacific and pacifistic standards of the early Church. They were accordingly prohibited from any military activity, a domain that was strictly reserved to the laity. Within both the evolving canon law and political military ideology one can however detect symptomatic tensions and debates regarding the status of Christian soldiers and whether their participation in warfare could bring them spiritual rewards. The disputes within Byzantine canon law largely draw on the contrasting approaches of St. Basil the Great (ca. 330–379) and the influential Nicene theologian and anti-Arian polemicist, St. Athanasios of Alexandria (ca. 296–373). Enormously influential, St. Basil was counted in Eastern Orthodoxy as one of the "Three Holy Hierarchs," while in Roman Catholicism St. Athanasios was eventually recognized as one of the Four Great Doctors of the Eastern Church alongside the Three Hierarchs.

From: St. Athanasios of Alexandria, Epistle 48, *To Ammoun the Monk* (written before 357)[47]

> Since in other transactions in life too we shall find differences to occur in some way or another: for instance, it is not permissible to murder anyone (Exod. 20:13), yet in war it is praiseworthy and lawful to slay the adversaries. Thus at any rate those who have distinguished themselves in war are entitled to and are accorded great honors, and columns are erected in memory of them reciting their exploits. So that the same matter in some respect and at some time or other is not permitted, but in another respect and at some other time when there is a good occasion for it, may be allowed and permitted.

Killing in war was considered both lawful and praiseworthy by St. Athanasios of Alexandria in his *Epistle to Ammoun the Monk* (one of his three epistles that have received the status

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of canons) and has inevitably been of central importance to Eastern Orthodox thought on the legality and justifiability of warfare in theological and canon law discussions, as will be shown below. While the epistle mainly concerns issues of sexual purity, when the passage in question is extracted as a separate assertion it can be read as a rare Eastern Christian patristic legitimization of slaying in war (albeit under determinate circumstances). Not only was such killing said to be permissible, but moreover it was characterized as a commendable deed that might bring honor and renown to the doer.[48] When, however, the pronouncement is considered in the overall context of the rhetoric and imagery of the epistle, it admittedly can allow for different readings, some of which cast doubt on its interpretation as a patristic justification of killing on the battlefield.[49] While the debates on the precise meaning and contextualization of St. Athanasios' statement seem certain to continue, it is equally certain that those who seek to recognize (at least elements of) a just war tradition in Eastern Orthodox religious thought will continue to use it as an authoritative patristic testimony for an early and important articulation of just war thinking in Eastern Christendom.

From: St. Basil the Great, *Epistle* 188.13 (ca. 374)[50]

> Our Fathers did not consider murders committed in the course of wars to be classifiable as murders at all, on the score, it seems to me, of allowing a pardon to men fighting in defense of sobriety and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable to refuse them Communion for three years, on the ground that they are not clean-handed.

This well-known thirteenth canon of St. Basil the Great from his first Canonical Epistle to Amphilochus, Bishop of Iconium (378), clearly stipulates that the act of killing during war needs to be distinguished from voluntary murder, although it is advisable that the perpetrators should abstain from Communion for three years. The allusion to the "fathers" and their attitude with respect to killing in time of war evidently refer to the above statement of St Athanasios. The canon needs to be considered in the context of the evolving fourth-century Christian clerical attitudes with respect to the phenomenon of "involuntary murder" (treated in the preceding, eleventh canon of St. Basil) and the penance required for having shed blood in armed conflict, treated in Canon 14 from the fourth-century (or later) canons attributed to St. Hippolytus of Rome (ca. 170–ca. 235).[51] While clearly acknowledging the permissibility and occasional necessity of "fighting in defense of sobriety and piety," St. Basil refuses to recognize killing during war as a "praiseworthy" deed, advising that those responsible for such acts should abstain from Communion for three years. Hence St. Basil's canon has been often seen as forestalling the development of just war theory in Eastern Orthodox thought in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, comparable to that conceptualized (in its early and formative stages) by St. Augustine and St. Ambrose in the contemporaneous Latin West.[52] At the same time, while condemning the praise and rewards bestowed during wars on the combatants in accordance with "the magnitude of the slaughter,"[53] St. Basil could also state that the military profession could be consonant with the Christian faith and "perfect love for God."[54]

Later Byzantine Canonists: Theodore Balsamon (ca. 1130/40–d. after 1195), Ioannes Zonaras (d. after 1159), Matthew Blastares (d. after 1346)

The interpretative commentary to St. Basil's thirteenth canon in the important and influential collection of Eastern Orthodox canon law from 1800, the *Pedalion* (The Rudder), specifies that this canon (and its stipulation that those who have slain adversaries during warfare should be prohibited from Communion for three years) has an "advisory and indecisive" character,[55] and this was indeed the way it was considered by the later, twelfth-century leading Byzantine canonists Theodore Balsamon and Ioannes Zonaras. At the same time, both canonists refer to the proceedings of a Church synod during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969) during which Patriarch Polyeuktos (956–970) and the ecclesiastical hierarchy invoked the authority of St. Basil's thirteenth canon to deny the emperor's request that the Church should establish canonical regulations through which Byzantine soldiers who fell in warfare would begin to be honored on par with the holy martyrs and accordingly be celebrated with hymns and feast days, as recounted in Ioannes Scylitzes' *Synoposis Historiarum*.

From: Ioannes Scylitzes, *Synoposis Historiarum* (second half of the eleventh century CE)[56]

> [Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas] was also eager to institute a law that the soldiers who perished in battle should be deemed worthy of the privileges of martyrs, placing the salvation of the soul in war alone and not in any other sphere. He urged the patriarch and the bishops to agree to this doctrine, but some of them nobly opposed him and frustrated his plan, putting forward the canon of the great [St.] Basil, which states that those who have slain an adversary in a battle should be debarred from Communion for three years.

This conflict over the military martyrdom status for Christian soldiers fallen on the battlefield requested by Nikephoros II Phokas is symptomatic of the enduring tension between Byzantine imperial and clerical approaches to the ideology of medieval Christian warfare.[57] Byzantine ecclesiastical perspectives on the legitimacy and consequences of Christian participation in warfare were themselves characterized by internal contradictions and disagreements. Contrasting positions on the applicability of St. Basil's thirteenth canon are illustrated in the passages below, from Theodore Balsamon and Ioannes Zonaras, on one hand, and the influential fourteenth-century canonist and hieromonk[58] Matthew Blastares, on the other.

From: Theodore Balsamon, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon*[59]

> This canon sets forth views in a manner proper to the holiness of the Divine Father, but is not in force, because, if it were established, soldiers who are engrossed with successive wars and slaying the enemy, would never partake of the divine

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> Sanctified Elements. Wherefore, it is unendurable. However, it is written that when that emperor Phokas deemed those slain in wars worthy to be numbered with the martyrs, the bishops at that time making use of this canon, silenced the imperial interference, saying, how will we number with the martyrs those who fall in wars. . . .

From: Ioannes Zonaras, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon*[60]

> The saint speaks not by command, that those who slay during wars refrain from Communion for three years, but according to counsel. In addition, such counsel appears to be burdensome. For it might follow from it that soldiers never partake of the Divine Gifts. At any rate I think that this counsel of St. Basil never was in force. In the meantime, at the right moment it was profitable for those who refer to ecclesiastical traditions.

The views of Balsamon and Zonaras on the practical applicability of St. Basil's thirteenth canon were summarized in Matthew Blastares' systematic fourteenth-century encyclopedic collection, *Syntagma kata stoicheion* ("The Alphabetical Collection"), which was to become the standard reference work in the sphere of Eastern Orthodox canon law in the post-Byzantine period.

From: Matthew Blastares, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon* (1355)[61]

> For it will follow, they say, in consequence of this that the most brave of the soldiers by their way of life will be deprived of the good participation, which is an unendurable punishment for Christians. For what reason, they say, are their hands not clean, which he himself testifies fight for chastity and piety, viewing this as best of all? If these men were not willing to come to blows with their opponents . . . might those things that ruin piety be hastened when the barbarians bring everything under their sway in the great absence of opposition, and when they zealously decide to strengthen their own worship? Who will be the one that pursues chastity, when all are compelled to live in accordance with those who have already become rulers?

Blastares also refers to the tenth-century synod that relied on the authority of St. Basil's thirteenth canon to thwart Phokas' attempts to secure martyrdom status for Byzantine soldiers slain in battle and the ecclesiastical arguments to achieve this: "How it is possible to number with the martyrs those who fell during war, whom Basil the Great excluded from the Sanctified Elements for three years since their hands were not clean?"[62] Both Balsamon and Blastares also recount (with some differences) another instance during the same synod when St. Basil's canon was applied to effect the defrocking of certain priests and bishops who were arraigned for having fought and killed enemies in battles.[63] Ultimately, Blastares rejects the arguments of Balsamon and Zonaras and confirms the validity and relevance of the three-year penance of exclusion from Communion

recommended in St. Basil's canon on the basis of his own theological and scriptural arguments.[64] The scriptural arguments, according to Blastares, include allusions to and exegesis of the aftermath of the God-commanded war of obliteration of the Israelites against the Midianites, when Eleazar the priest ordered the Israelite soldiers who were returning from the bloodshed

> to remain outside the encampment for seven days, showing, I believe, that although slaughters against enemies are legal, nevertheless, the man who kills a human being . . . appears to be blameworthy [65]

Blastares thus reasserts the theological and ecclesiastical appropriateness of the prohibition envisaged in St. Basil's canon. At the same time, inevitably conscious of the existing patterns of justifying Byzantine Christian engagement in armed conflict on the basis of St. Athanasios' canonical epistle to Ammoun, he emphasizes also St. Basil's tribute to those who safeguard "the race of the Christians" and fight its enemies; indeed, drawing on it he proceeds to affirm the legitimacy of Christian defensive warfare by posing the rhetorical question: "[F]or what might be a more worthy reason for praise than to defend on behalf of chastity and piety?"[66]

There exist various records of strong Eastern Orthodox disquiet at the phenomenon of Western priests carrying arms and participating in fighting during the crusading era. The following extract from Anna Komnene's *Alexiad* highlights both the criticism of this "Latin" phenomenon and the view, shared in both Byzantine secular and ecclesiastical circles, that the pacifistic precepts in the New Testament and Eastern Orthodox canon law categorically disallow such a practice for Eastern Orthodox monks and priests.

From: Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, 10.8.8[67]

> The Latin customs with regard to priests differ from ours. We are bidden by canon law and the teaching of the Gospel, "Touch not, grumble not, attack not – for thou art consecrated."[68] But your Latin barbarian will at the same time handle sacred objects, fasten a shield to his left arm and grasp a spear in his right. He will communicate the Body and Blood of the Deity and meanwhile gaze on bloodshed and become himself "a man of blood" (as David says in the Psalms).[69] Thus the race is no less devoted to religion than to war Our rules, as I have just said, derive from Aaron, Moses and our first high priest.

The Vita of St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher (826/7–869)

The above discussions on the nature and implications of Christian involvement in warfare within the tradition of Byzantine canon law not only show a shift toward moderating the harshness of St. Basil's thirteenth canon (thereby considering it an advisory rather than a mandatory canonical requirement) but also betray a concern with the spiritual dimensions of engagement in warfare to shield fellow Christians from harm or, in the words of St. Basil, "on behalf of sobriety and piety." In Western Christendom an analogous concern with the potential spiritual rewards for those who have died defending the Church and Christian faith received dramatic and influential expression (especially in

settings where the papacy played a leading role) in the period leading to and during the crusading era. Within the Eastern Orthodox tradition, comparable notions are recorded to have been articulated (roughly one century before Phokas failed to win clerical support for his Christian military martyrdom initiative) during the ambassadorial visit of the celebrated missionary to the Slavs, St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher, to the court of the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–861) in 851. The ninth-century *Vita* of St. Constantine recounts his debates with Muslim (Hagarene) theologians at the Abbasid court during which they ask him why Christians do not apply in practice the precepts in the well-known verses in Matthew 5:38–44 teaching nonviolence and nonresistance to evil/evildoers, as well as love and prayer for one's enemies. In his reported reply, St. Constantine in effect gives priority to John 15:13 ("No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends"), arguing that as private people Christians can bear any offenses, but when in company they defend each other and sacrifice their lives in battle for their neighbors.

From: *Vita Constantini* (late ninth century)[70]

(The Muslim scribes ask St. Constantine–Cyril:) "Your God is Christ. He commanded you to pray for enemies, to do good to those who hate and persecute you and to offer the other cheek to those who hit you, but what do you actually do? If anyone offends you, you sharpen your sword and go into battle and kill. Why do you not obey your Christ?" Having heard this, St. Cyril asked his fellow-polemists: "If there are two commandments written in one law, who will be its best respecter – the one who obeys only one commandment or the one who obeys both?" When the Hagarenes said that the best respecter of law is the one who obeys both commandments, the holy preacher continued: "Christ is our God Who ordered us to pray for our offenders and to do good to them. He also said that no one of us can show greater love in life than he who gives his life for his friends (John 15:3). That is why we generously endure offenses caused us as private people. But in company we defend one another and give our lives in battle for our neighbors, so that you, having taken our fellows prisoners, could not imprison their souls together with their bodies by forcing them into renouncing their faith and into godless deeds. Our Christ-loving soldiers protect our Holy Church with arms in their hands. They safeguard the sovereign in whose sacred person they respect the image of the rule of the Heavenly King. They safeguard their land because with its fall the home authority will inevitably fall too and the evangelical faith will be shaken. These are precious pledges for which soldiers should fight to the last. And if they give their lives in battlefield, the Church will include them in the community of the holy martyrs and call them intercessors before God."

St. Constantine–Cyril's reply clearly interprets the martial feats of the ''Christ-loving soldiers'' in defense of their lands, the Church, and Christianity through the prism of the precept in John 15:3 as constituting paradigmatic Christian duties for which they should "fight to the last." What is more, after fulfilling these "precious pledges," the

Church would qualify these Christian soldiers as martyrs and intercessors before God. This explicit legitimization of Christian just war notions and the potential martyr status of the Christian warrior ascribed to St. Constantine–Cyril can perhaps be best understood within the religio-political framework of his mission to the court of al-Mutawakkil.[71] Unlike contemporary and later Catholicism, however, when such notions do appear on occasion in medieval Eastern Orthodoxy, they were not developed in any systematic fashion or integrated into a consistent theory. Overall, the concept of military martyrdom failed to find acceptance in the mainstream of Byzantine Church thought and practice.[72] At the same time, within the Byzantine Commonwealth (and particularly in the Slavonic Orthodox world), the continuing prestige of St. Constantine–Cyril's pronouncements made it possible for his proclamation at the Abbasid court, as narrated in his *Vita*, to be used as an authoritative basis for later Eastern Orthodox attempts to articulate and elaborate just war concepts (if not a structured theory).

Religious Services Commemorating Fallen Christian Soldiers

The Byzantine Church may have halted the Emperor Phokas' attempts to attribute martyrdom status to soldiers fallen in battle, but a number of indications suggest that the idea of Byzantine Christian warriors anticipating heavenly rewards for their defense of Orthodoxy, including the conferral of martyrdom status, became part of the evolving military religious ideology developed in the lay piety of the Byzantine military classes. Indeed, an ideology underpinned by such notions may have been encouraged more frequently by the imperial court than the only recorded case of such an imperial initiative during Phokas' reign would suggest. Certainly, the military treatise *Taktika*, ascribed to Emperor Leo VI (866–912), emphasized that in battling their Saracen (Muslim) adversaries, Byzantine Christian soldiers were also fighting for God, their Christian brethren, and the salvation of their souls.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, 18.127[73]

> If we are well armed and drawn up in formation, with God fighting along beside us, we charge against them bravely and in good spirits on behalf of the salvation of our souls, and we carry on the struggle without hesitation on behalf of God himself, our kinsmen, and our brothers the other Christians, then we place our hopes in God. We shall not fail to achieve, rather, we shall certainly achieve the glory of victory over them.

The tract, moreover, evidently also envisages a religious service to commemorate soldiers who have sacrificed their lives for their faith and brethren. They are praised with the honorific "blessed" and their names are to be held in eternal memory.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, 14.31[74]

> After the battle, O general, you are obliged to see to the comfort of the soldiers wounded in the action, as well as to provide proper burial for those who have fallen. Constantly pronounce them blessed because they have not preferred their

own lives over their faith and their brothers. This is a religious act and it greatly helps the morale of the living.

From: Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 72[75]

The bodies of the soldiers who have been killed in battle are sacred, especially those who have been most valiant in the fight on behalf of Christians. By all means, it is necessary to honor them reverently and to dignify them with burial and eternal memory.

A service of the type prescribed in Leo VI's *Taktika* has been indeed uncovered in a tenth-century Greek version of the *Triodion* (the pre-Easter Orthodox liturgical service book) and is dedicated to those who have died in battle or as prisoners of war.

From: "All Souls Service for the Saturday of Meatfare Week" (tenth century)[76]

Let us gather together people of Christ
And celebrate the memory
Of our brothers who died in battle
And those who perished in intolerable captivity.
Let us entreat on their behalf.

They were valiant until their slaughter
Your servants, Lover of Man;
They received
Blows pitilessly
Persevering in fetters;
Let it be that these men for these things
Achieve atonement of their souls, Lover of Man.

You alone who are without sin,
Took in those
Who are your servants,
Illustrious generals,
Commanding commanders,
Brave soldiers,
Judge them worthy of your repose.

This service ultimately was not integrated within the Eastern Orthodox calendar. It indicates nonetheless a distinctive trend in the ethics and martyrology of Byzantine Christian warfare, elements of which, as already observed, can be traced to the Anatolian frontier zones of the empire. The evolution of this cult of the Byzantine warrior saints demonstrates much about the ritual and iconographic dimensions of the Byzantine lay military-religious ethos, some aspects of which the Church was patently not enthusiastic to support. Significantly, the canonization and widespread veneration of historical Orthodox warrior-princes in some of the late medieval

cultures of the Byzantine Commonwealth (notably Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia), as well as the proliferation of hagiographical biographies, suggest that in these cultures the Orthodox Churches were more prepared to foster and cultivate lay military piety than was the Byzantine mother Church. At the same time both South Slavonic and Russian Orthodox cultures offer some early paradigmatic examples of saintly princes who accepted martyrdom without resorting to violence or self-defense – for example, St. John Vladimir, Prince of Duklja (d. 1016), and Saints Boris and Gleb, Princes of Kievan Rus' (d. 1015).

Eastern Orthodox Lay Pacifism

Saints Boris and Gleb, the first Russian saints to be canonized in 1072, represent also the paradigmatic figures of lay pacifism in the Eastern Slavonic Orthodox world. According to sources such as Nestor's *Lives of Boris and Gleb* and the Russian *Primary Chronicle*, upon the death of their father, Vladimir I (Grand Prince of Kiev), the two saints were killed by assassins who had been dispatched by their brother, Sviatopolk, who sought to remove them as rivals to the throne. In the face of this attack as passion-bearers and followers of Christ's example, they chose the path of nonresistance to evil. The martyrdom of Saints Boris and Gleb, and their exemplary nonretaliation to violence, have been repeatedly invoked in the tradition of Eastern Orthodox pacifism. At the same time, in the following extract from the Russian *Primary Chronicle* their intercession is sought for a victory of the princes of the new Christian nation over its "pagan" adversaries. Indeed, as early as the thirteenth century, their cult as protectors of Russia was mobilized to legitimate Russian war campaigns.[77]

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 137–139 (1337 CE)[78]

After Gleb had been slain they took him and carried him away, to bury him beside his brother Boris beside the Church of St. Basil.

United thus in body and still more in soul, ye dwell with the Lord and King of all, in eternal joy, ineffable light, bestowing salutary gifts upon the land of Rus'. . . . Rejoice, martyrs in Christ from the land of Rus', who gave healing in them who draw near to you in faith and love. Rejoice, ye who have trampled the serpent of evil beneath your feet. Ye have appeared amid bright rays, enlightening like beacons the whole land of Rus'. Ye, glorious ones, with the sacred drops of your blood ye have dyed a robe of purple which ye wear in beauty, and reign forevermore with Christ, interceding with him for his new Christian nation and for your fellows, for our land is hallowed by your blood. By virtue of your relics deposited in the church, ye illuminate it with the Holy Spirit, for there in heavenly bliss, as martyrs among the army of martyrs, ye intercede for your nation. Rejoice, bright day-springs, our Christ-loving martyrs and intercessors! Subject the pagans to our Princes, beseeching our Lord God that they may live in concord and in health, freed from intestine war and the crafts of the devil.

Religious Elements in Russian War Campaigns against the Polovtsians (Kumans)

Apart from resorting to just war precepts bearing on self-defense, the inviolability of frontiers, and punishment of oath-breaking adversaries, Russian medieval accounts of confrontations between Russia and the nomadic Turkic Polovtsians (Kumans), the Mongols, as well as the Kazan and Crimean Tatars, display on occasion (without being central to the justification of the war effort) a number of religious elements. Such elements can be detected in the following extracts from the Russian *Primary Chronicle* regarding Russian-Polovtsian fighting: defeat at the hands of the Polovtsians is interpreted as a divine chastisement for the sins of the Russian Christians; the Polovtsians are depicted as enemies of Christianity who have destroyed or defiled Christian shrines; divine inspiration is shown to move the Russian princes to initiate a campaign of war against the Polovtsians; the Cross is invoked to ensure success in battle; while ecclesiastical blessings are conferred on the Russian war effort.

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 172[79]

For great is the power of the Cross. By the Cross are vanquished the powers of the devil. The Cross helps our princes in combat, and the faithful who are protected by the Cross conquer in battle the foes who oppose them.

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 232–233[80]

The godless sons of Ishmael slew the brethren in the monastery..... Then they set fire to the shrine of the Holy Virgin. ....[T]hey seized the eikons, burned the doors, and blasphemed against God and our faith..... Thus they said, "Where is their God? Let him come and deliver them,". ....they did not know that God punishes his servants by means of barbarian incursions that they may appear as gold which has been tried in the furnace.

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 276[81]

During the following year, God inspired the princes of Rus' with a noble project, for they resolved to attack the Polovcians and invade their territory, and this project was actually realized.

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 278–279[82]

The princes of Rus' and all the soldiery offered their prayers to God and made their vows to God and to the Blessed Virgin. . . .

Now God on high inspired an awful fear in the Polovcians, so that terror and trembling beset them at the sight of the Russian forces, and they wavered. . . .

On April 4, God thus performed a great salvation and bestowed upon us a mighty victory over our foes.

From: The Russian *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 282[83]

On August 12, the Polovcians abandoned their camp, after the capture of which the Russian soldiery returned home with a great victory. Svyatopolk arrived before the Crypt Monastery at matins on the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin [August 15] and the brethren embraced him amid great rejoicing, because our enemies were overthrown through the prayers of the Holy Virgin and of our holy father Theodosius. For Svyatopolk, before he went forth to war or on some other mission, made it a habit to kneel beside the tomb of Theodosius, and after receiving the blessing of the prior who was present, he proceeded with his errand.

The Battle of Kulikovo

Medieval Russian accounts and reactions to the Battle of Kulikovo field (near the Don River) in 1380 in which the combined Russian troops of Dmitrii Donskoi (1350–1389, Prince of Moscow and Grand Prince of Vladimir) defeated the larger Tatar army of the Golden Horde and its allies (led by Mamai), also conflated just war rhetoric with a heightened religious sentiment, including the notion of divine support and ecclesiastical intercession for the Russian military victory. This is vividly demonstrated in the frequently cited encounter between Dmitrii Donskoi (proclaimed in 1988 a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church) and one of the most highly esteemed saints of Orthodox Russia, St. Sergius of Radonezh (ca. 1319/22–1392). The following account shows St. Sergius offering strong spiritual support for the Russian anti-Mongol war effort.[84]

From: *The Life of St. Sergius*, 8 (1430s)[85]

A rumor spread that Khan Mamai was raising a large army as a punishment for our sins and that with all his heathen Tatar hordes he would invade Russian soil. The puissant and reigning prince, who held the scepter of all Russia, great Dmitry, having a great faith in the saint, came to ask him if he counseled him to go against the heathen. The saint, bestowing on him his blessing, and strengthened by prayer, said to him: "It behooveth you, Lord, to have a care for the lives of the flock committed to you by God. Go forth against the heathen; and upheld by the strong arm of God, conquer; and return to your country sound in health, and glorify God with loud praise."...

Assembling all his armies, he marched against the heathen Tatars; but, seeing the multitudes of them, he began to doubt. Of a sudden, a courier from the saint arrived, in all haste, with the message, "Be in no doubt, Lord; go forward with faith and confront the enemy's ferocity; and fear not, for God will be on your side." Forthwith, the Grand Duke Dmitry and all his armies, were filled with a spirit of temerity; and went into battle against the pagans. They fought; many fell; but God was with them, and helped the great and invincible Dmitry, who vanquished the ungodly Tatars. In that same hour the saint was engaged with his brethren

before God in prayer for victory over the pagans. Within an hour of the final defeat of the ungodly, the saint, who was a seer, announced to the brotherhood what had happened, the victory, the courage of the Grand Duke Dmitry, and the names, too, of those who had died at the hands of the pagans; and he made intercession for them to all-merciful God.

The Russian perception (contemporaneous or later) of the religious dimension of the Battle of Kulikovo is also evident in other chronicle and literary accounts such as the *Zadonshchina* ("The Tale of the Events beyond the Don"), which categorizes it as a self-sacrificial struggle on behalf of the Russian land and Christian faith against the "infidel" invader Mamai and his "Muslim Tatar" army.[86]

From: *Zadonshchina* (first half of fifteenth century CE)[87]

"Do you know, dear brothers, that Emperor Mamai
invaded the Russian land at the swift river Don . . . ?

Let us lay down our lives for the Russian land and the Christian faith.
Let us encourage the Land of Russia . . .
Let us sing of the defeat of Mamai, the infidel. . . .

"Lord, Great Prince, the infidel Tatars have begun
advancing into our lands. . . .
We will put our brave warriors to the test
For the Russian land and the Christian faith." . . .

Oh, great princes of Russia,
fight the enemy with your valorous army,
Fight for the Russian land and the Christian faith,
fight against the infidel emperor, Mamai. . . .

But God was merciful to the Russian land,
and still more Tatars fell on the battlefield.
And then Prince Dmitry Ivanovich addressed the dead: . . .

"Here you gave your lives for the holy Church
for the Russian land and for the Christian faith.
Forgive me, brethren, and give me your blessing
For this life and for the life everlasting."

The Muscovite Anti-Tatar Ideology of Warfare

After the disintegration of the Golden Horde in the 1420s, the confrontation with its successor state (the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean Khanates) led the Grand Duchy of Moscow (from 1547, Tsardom of Russia/Muscovy) to emphasize the religious

dimensions of the conflict. In this connection, some circles in the Muscovite ecclesiastical elite played a major role in the conceptualization of anti-Tatar ideology,[88] an ideology that was used to justify military campaigns against the Khanates, in particular the Kazan one. In the preparatory stages and aftermath of Ivan IV the Terrible's (1533–1584) brutal conquest of Kazan in 1552, the anti-Tatar campaign was frequently legitimized as a just war to restore Muscovite suzerainty over the Kievan Rus', a patrimony that had been seized by the Tatars. Religious justification was also sought to further the political-military goals of conquest. This was articulated by prominent religious and secular publicists, whose arguments for a religiously oriented *casus belli* included mention of vengeance, the rescue of Russian Orthodox Christians from Muslim Tatar captivity, as well as the expansion of Russian Orthodoxy.

Following his move to Russia in 1515 the prominent Greek monk, scholar, and publicist Maxim the Greek (1475–1556) appealed to Vasilii III, Grand Prince of Moscow (1505–1533) not only to embrace the cause of the liberation of Byzantium from Ottoman Muslim oppression, but also to launch an offensive against the Kazan Khanate, offering him a war justification that combined a forceful religious rationale with *Realpolitik* considerations.

From: Maxim the Greek, *Epistle to Grand Prince Vasilii III* (1521/22)[89]

"Let us be exalted by holy zeal and avenge the blood of our many Orthodox brethren who were killed there, and we shall, in addition, not permit the godless abodes to boast against Christ and against the Orthodox who revere Him. "

For as long as we have sufficient time, and as long as there is no pagan uprising to disturb us, let us advance against and attack the killers of the Christians from the city of Kazan, and let us not waste the time for action with sterile deeds.... When the abominable Kazan shall have disappeared, it shall be easier for us to oppose other [enemies] since we shall become formidable on this account.

A similar understanding of the struggle between Moscow and Kazan as a religious conflict to be solved by a Russian war of conquest partially underlies the justification for anti-Kazan warfare that the contemporary secular publicist Ivan Peresvetov proposed to Ivan IV. Ivan also urged the Russian ruler to expand the Christian faith by liberating the Orthodox people under Ottoman suzerainty.[90]

The conquest of the Kazan Khanate was legitimized by condemning it as an anti-Christian power that had destroyed Christian sanctuaries and oppressed numerous Christians. This sort of discourse was forcefully articulated in a number of official pronouncements that were attributed to Ivan IV and to the Metropolitan of Moscow and all Russia, Makarii (1542–1563).

From: Makarii, Metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia, *Second Epistle to Ivan IV* (13 July 1552)[91]

[Thou shouldst] in firm, tsar-like fashion take a stand with thy Christ-loving host against thy foes, the godless Kazanian Tatars, traitors and apostates, who

continually shed innocent Christian blood and befoul and destroy the holy churches; the more so it is befitting for thee, O pious Tsar Ivan . . . and all thy Christ-loving host, to struggle firmly, valiantly and courageously, with God's help, for God's holy churches and for all Orthodox Christians, innocently led into captivity, robbed, and tormented by them [Kazanians] . . . it is most [befitting] for thee to struggle for our holy, pure and most honorable Christian faith of the Greek creed . . . against her [the Orthodox faith] the dragon, the cunning enemy, the devil, haughtily becometh infuriated, and together with pagan tsars, thy foes, the Crimean tsar and his accomplices, the pagan peoples, the Crimean and Kazanian Tatars, taketh up a fierce battle against her. . . .

From: Ivan IV, *Address to Metropolitan Makarii and the Ecclesiastical Assembly* (1553)[92]

[Not] long ago, I held council with thee [Makarii and with the Ecclesiastical assembly] about [the fact that] the Kazan tsars and all the people of Kazan have been betraying us for many years in spite of our benevolence toward them and that they are capturing [our] Christians. They have plundered many cities and villages of our God-given Russian state; in these cities several holy churches were destroyed and demolished, and venerable monasteries were plundered; and a multitude of Christian people from the clergy and the monastic order, princes and boyars, children and youths, of both male and female sex, were taken into captivity and scattered over the face of the whole world. . . .

From: Ivan IV, *Address to Metropolitan Makarii and the Ecclesiastical Assembly* (October 1552)[93]

And the Almighty Lord looked upon us from Heaven. He handed over to us the ruling capital, the populous city of Kazan, with all its inhabitants, and He removed [from there] Mohammed's deceit and erected the life-giving Cross in the desolated abomination of Kazan. [B]y God's design and His holy will, and on account of thy [the Russian clergy's] holy prayers, the city of Kazan which was pagan before, we enlightened with Christianity in the name of the life-giving Trinity. . . .

From: Metropolitan Makarii, *Address to Ivan IV* (October 1552)[94]

[A]nd God granted thee His mercy: He placed the city and tsardom of Kazan into thy hands, and he enlightened thee with His grace, as He had enlightened the previous pious tsars who acted according to His will, and He granted the victory of the Cross to the pious Tsar Constantine, co-equal to the Apostles, against his foes, and to other pious tsars, and also to thine ancestor, the Grand Prince Vladimir, who enlightened the Russian land with holy baptism and defeated many foreign nations [*inoplemennyx*], and to the praiseworthy Grand Prince Dmitrij (Donskoj) who defeated the barbarians on the Don river, and to the holy Alexander Nevskij

> who defeated the Latins. And upon thee, O pious Tsar, God's grace descended from above: Thou wert granted the ruling city of Kazan with all its environs, and the dragon, who had his lair there, and who was fiercely devouring us, was destroyed by thy piety and the power of the Cross, and on account of thee, O pious Tsar, the evil spirits were expelled and piety was introduced [in their place] and the life-giving Cross and the holy churches were erected [there] and by thine imperial hand many captive Christians were liberated from bondage.

Opinions vary as to what extent Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan was underpinned by a religious rationale. Some authors recognize it to be, at least partially, a "religious crusade,"[95] while others view the religious elements in the campaign as secondary and subordinate to its primarily secular military and political goals.[96] When seen against the background of medieval religious warfare, Ivan IV's campaign certainly does not realize all the characteristics of a crusade. At the same time, justifications for this campaign do evince an intensely religious rhetoric in which the local war effort is situated within the general contemporaneous Muslim-Christian conflict in Europe. This religious rhetoric appears vividly in the following diplomatic note, which was released in Moscow after the takeover of Kazan.

From: *Diplomatic Note to the Lithuanian Magnates* (1553)[97]

> The Mussulman nation of Kazan which had shed Christian blood for many years and which had caused our Sovereign much annoyance before he reached his mature age, by God's grace, this Mussulman nation of Kazan died by the sword of our Sovereign; and our Sovereign appointed his viceroys and governors in Kazan, and he enlightened this Mussulman abode with the Orthodox Christian faith and he destroyed the mosques and built churches [in their place], and God's name is being glorified now in this city by the Christian faith. And we praise God for this, and may God also grant in the future that Christian blood be avenged against other Mussulman nations.

Early Imperial Russia to Post-Communism

Russian Just War Tradition and International Law of War

Peter the Great's (1682–1725) policies of modernization of the Russian state included military reforms that drew on contemporaneous Western European models. The emergent international law was a point of reference, and translations were made of works such as Hugo Grotius' seminal *De iure belli ac pacis* ("On the Law of War and Peace," 1625). The impact of this European discourse on the norms of war and peace is clearly discernible in the first original treatise on international law (of unofficial character) to appear in Russian, *A Discourse Concerning the Just Reasons Which His Czarish Majesty, Peter I, Had for the Beginning of the War against the King of Sweden, Charles XII*, composed in 1717 by one of Peter's diplomats, Baron Petr Shafirov (1670–1739). The

tract intended to present and promote the Russian case for the just causes and legality of Russia's initiation, along with its allies, of the Great Northern War against Sweden (1701–1721); hence the work was also translated into German and English.[98] Shafirov addresses the principal issues of contemporary international law of war (but not in a systematic fashion) from his formulation of an acceptable just war doctrine (reclaiming the hereditary Russian dominions that had been unjustly annexed by Sweden) to breaches of armistice agreements, as well as violations of *jus in bello* and the status of the prisoners of war, all attributed to the Swedish side. The following extracts reveal Shafirov's stance that the course of the conflict was determined by a divine providence favoring the Russian Tsar; in so doing the text sheds light on some of the religiously related episodes of the war (the Swedish King's alliances with the "hereditary" Turkish and Tatar enemies of Christendom and the alleged profanation of Orthodox churches by Swedish troops) so as to provide additional justification for the Russian war effort.

From: Baron Petr Shafirov, *A Discourse Concerning the Just Reasons Which His Czarish Majesty, Peter I, Had for the Beginning of the War against the King of Sweden, Charles XII* (1717), Article 1[99]

The ancient and modern Causes, for which his Czarish Majesty, as a Father of his Country, was in Justice obliged to make War against *Sweden*, and to recover the hereditary Dominions, which had been unjustly wrested from the Crown of *Russia*. . . .

Now, though all the ancient Causes above related, would have been weighty and urging enough for *Russia* to begin a War against the Crown of *Sweden*, yet his Czarish Majesty's equitable Mind did not permit him to do it, had not Sweden given new Causes for it; he sacredly and inviolably observed a Peace extorted from his Predecessors, and he chose rather to employ his Arms against the *Turks* and *Tatars*, the constant Enemies of Christendom, than to imbrue them with Christian Blood in revenging past Injuries. But God's just Judgment, who suffers no Injustice to go unpunished, hardened the Hearts of the *Swedes*, and gave them over to such a Blindness, that they themselves blew up the Fire of old Offences and Injuries, which seemed buried under the Ashes of Time and Oblivion, by a new Insult offered to his Czarish Majesty's own high Person. . . .

From: Petr Shafirov, *Rassuzhdenie* (A Discourse)[100]

[H]e [the king of Sweden] continued his wicked Intrigues against his Czarish Majesty to a degree, that during his Stay at *Bender* he stirred up against him the hereditary Enemy of the Christian Name, and a Rupture actually ensued in 1711. Those Infidels broke the Peace of thirty Years they had made with his Czarish Majesty, and sent the *Tartar Can* to make a sudden Irruption into his Dominions, who carried away from the Lesser-Russian and Polish *Ukraina* a great number of Christians into Slavery.

From: Shafirov, *A Discourse*, Article 3[101]

[W]hen the Russians came to the Place where the Swedish Baggage stood, they saw with Astonishment, that the Stables of many of the Generals and Officers, for Horses and Cows, were filled with [an] abundance of Images, as that of our Savior, of the Holy Virgin, of the Apostles and other Saints, which had been taken out of the Churches to make Doors and Stalls for Horses which without doubt was done with no other Design than to scoff at and jest with Religion despoiling the Churches, and profaning sacred things.

Russian Pan-Slavism, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878

Russian victories in the Russo-Ottoman conflicts of the second half of the eighteenth century made it possible for Russia to demand and receive in the peace treaty of 1774 a de facto recognition of its self-declared mandate to protect the rights of Orthodox Christian communities under Ottoman suzerainty. Subsequent Russian interventionism in the Balkans on behalf of these communities became a tool of Russian foreign policy. But according to the ideology of Russian Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, the self-determination and "liberation" of the various Slavonic peoples under foreign domination could be envisaged as possible only through Russian military aid or engagement, which in the case of the Orthodox Christians under Ottoman domination received also an additional religious justification. While never a dominant factor in Russian foreign policy formulation, this ideology occasionally exercised considerable influence within the Russian court, as well as in diplomatic and military circles. The following extracts represent some of the leading nineteenth-century representatives of these trends: Aleksei S. Khomiakov (1804–1860), Nikolai Y. Danilevskii (1822–1885), the prominent poet Fedor I. Tiutchev (1803–1873), Ivan S. Aksakov (1823–1886), as well as Tsar Alexander II's (1818–1881) "Kremlin Address" (1876). The extracts below illustrate some of the principal religiously based legitimacy frameworks in Pan-Slav discourse for the use of armed force against the Ottoman empire (in the case of the Crimean War, also against its Western allies and defined on occasions as a "holy undertaking" or "sacred mission"). This is accompanied in some cases by notions such as the providential destiny of Russia as the religio-military guardian or liberator of the Christian Orthodox East (based on and reviving the Byzantine imperial heritage) against both Ottoman Islam and the imperialism of an expansionist Europe (or revolution-plagued Europe of 1848).

From: Aleksei Khomiakov, "Letter to a Foreign Friend on the Eve of the Eastern (Crimean) War" (1854)[102]

The year which is just beginning will leave deep traces in history. The forces of all the nations advance and regard each other. A terrible struggle will begin. . . .

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Turkey has failed in its obligation toward us; it violated its promises, to the detriment of the rights of our brothers. Russia demanded guarantees; they were refused. . . .

England and France have strengthened Turkey's hopes by their alliance and help; they have aroused the courage of the Mohammedans and fanaticized their passions. . . .

Russia arms herself. The Russian people do not think of conquests: conquests never had anything alluring for it. It thinks of its duty, it thinks of a holy war. I shall not call it a crusade, I shall not dishonor it by this name. God has not given us the task of conquering far-off lands, however precious they may be to our religious feelings, but he does give us the task of saving brothers who are blood of our blood and heart of our heart. A war which would be criminal in the first case is holy in the second case. Thus Russia understands the struggle which she is about to enter. This is the reason why she arms with joy, ready, if need be, for the fullest mobilization. . . .

[T]here is something unworthy in the attitude of men who call themselves Christians and who draw their sword to deprive Christians of the right to protect their brothers against the arbitrary cruelties of Mohammedans. . . .

Whatever happens, Providence has marked out our time to become a decisive era in the destiny of the world. Thanks should be given to the Western powers. [U]nwittingly they push Russia herself to enter a new road on which she had been vainly invited for many years. . . .

Human blood is precious, war is horrible – but the designs of Providence are inscrutable, and a task must be fulfilled whatever its rigors.

Wave flags! Sound, trumpets of battle! Nations, forward into battle! God orders mankind to march on!

From: Fedor Tiutchev, *Russia and Revolution* (1848)[103]

Besides – why hide it – it is hardly likely that all these earthquake shocks which are overturning the West are stopping at the threshold of the countries of the East; and how, in this war to the death, in this impious crusade that the Revolution, already mistress of three-quarters of Western Europe, is preparing against Russia, how could the Christian East, the Slav-Orthodox East whose life is indissolubly bound to ours not be behind us in the struggle, and the war may even begin through it. . . .

In short, what would not be the terrible confusion into which these countries of the East at close quarters with the Revolution would fall if the legitimate sovereign, if the Orthodox Emperor of the East for long delayed his appearance!

No, it is impossible, the forewarnings of a thousand years are not deceptive. Russia, the country of faith, will not lack faith at the supreme moment. She will not be frightened of the splendor of her destiny and will not recoil before her mission.

From: Fedor Tiutchev, *Dawn* (1848/49)[104]

Arise, O Rus! The hour is near!
Arise to do Christ's service!
Is it not time, while crossing yourself,
To ring Byzantium's bells?

Now let the church bell sound ring out
And all the East resound!
It summons and awakens you –
Arise, take heart, to arms!

Enclothe your breast in the armor of faith,
And God be with you, stout giant!
O Rus, great is the coming day,
The worldwide, Orthodox day!

From: Fedor Tiutchev, *A Prophecy* (1850)[105]

When Byzantium is restored to us
The ancient vaults of Saint Sophia
Will shelter the altar of Christ anew.
Kneel them before it, O Tsar of Russia –
You will arise all Slavdom's Tsar!

From: Nikolai Danilevskii, *Russia and Europe* (1869)[106]

The religious aspect of the cultural activity belongs to the Slav cultural type and to Russia in particular; it is its inalienable achievement, founded on the psychology of its people and on its guardianship of religious truth. . . .

The political independence of the race is the indispensable foundation of culture, and consequently all the Slav forces must be directed toward this goal. . . .

But first, as a *sine qua non* condition of success, strong and powerful Russia has to face the difficult task of liberating her racial brothers; for this struggle, she must steel them and herself in the spirit of independence and Pan-Slav consciousness.

From: Danilevskii, *Russia and Europe*[107]

"Sooner or later, whether we like it or not a struggle with Europe (or at least with its most significant part) over the Eastern Question, that is, over the freedom and independence of the Slavs, over the possession of Constantinople – over all that which in Europe's opinion is the object of Russia's illicit ambition, and which,

for every Russian worthy of the name, is the irresistible demand of its historical calling – is inevitable. . . .

"We do not preach war we assert, and not merely assert but demonstrate, that a struggle is inevitable, and we submit that although war is a very great evil, there is something far worse than war, something for which war can also serve as a cure, for 'man shall not live by bread alone.'"

From: Ivan Aksakov, "On the Eastern Question" (1861)[108]

There too [i.e., in Austria] Russia will fulfill her mission of liberating the ethnically homogeneous and largely Orthodox peoples and the whole Slavonic world will breathe more easily under the patronage of Russia once she finally fulfills her Christian and fraternal duty.

From: Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, "Kremlin Address" (11 November 1876)[109]

I know that all Russia joins with me in taking the deepest interest in the sufferings of our brothers by faith and by origin. I have striven and am continuing to strive to achieve by peaceful means a real improvement in the life of all the Christian inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula. Deliberations between the representatives of the six great powers are shortly to be begun at Constantinople for the determination of conditions of peace. I much desire that we shall reach a general agreement. If this is not attained and if I see that we are not gaining such guarantees as would assure the execution of our just demands upon the Porte, then I firmly intend to act independently and I am convinced that in such an eventuality all Russia will respond to my appeal, when I count it necessary and the honor of Russia requires it. I am convinced likewise that Moscow, as always, will set the example. May God help us to fulfill our sacred mission.

From: Ivan Aksakov, "Speech to the Slavonic Benevolent Committee" (Moscow, 26 September 1877)[110]

The Russian common people have little historical knowledge and no abstract conceptions about the mission of Russia in the Slavonic world; but they have historical instinct, and they clearly perceive one thing, that the war was caused neither by the caprice of an autocratic Tsar nor by unintelligible political considerations. Free from all ambition and all desire for military glory, they accepted the war as a moral duty imposed by Providence – a war for the faith, for Orthodox Christians of the same race as themselves, tortured by the wicked enemies of Christianity. . . .

All the importance of Russia in the great world lies in her peculiar religious and national characteristics combined with external material force – in her Orthodoxy and Slavonism, which distinguish her from Western Europe. She cannot attain her full development without securing the triumph of those spiritual elements in their ancient homes and re-establishing equality of rights for races closely allied to

her by blood and spirit. Without the emancipation of the orthodox East from the Turkish yoke, and from the material and moral encroachments of the West, Russia must remain forever mutilated and maimed. For her the war was a necessity, an act of self-defense, or rather the natural continuation of her historic organic development. Blessed is the country whose political missions coincide with the fulfillment of a high moral duty.

From: Ivan Aksakov, "Speech to the Slavonic Benevolent Committee" (Moscow, 4 July 1878)[111]

If the mere reading of the papers makes our blood boil in our veins, what, then, must experience the Sovereign of Russia, who bears the weight of the responsibility which history will lay on his shoulders? Did not he himself give the appellation of a "holy undertaking" to the war in question?. Terrible are the horrors of war, and the heart of our Sovereign cannot lightly call on his subjects for a renewal of deaths, and a fresh shedding of blood – on his subjects ready for all sacrifices. And yet it is not by concessions which are detrimental to the national honor and conscience that one can counteract disasters. Russia wishes not for war, but less still would she desire a peace which dishonors her. . . .

Invincible, invulnerable is the Russian Czar, from the moment when, with a firm belief in the mission of his people, putting aside thoughts about the interests of Western Europe – interests hostile to our own – he will lift up, as say our ancient chronicles, "with dignity, severity, and honor," the standard of Russia, which is also the standard of the Slavs and of all Eastern Christians.

Tolstoiian Pacifism, Anti-Tolstoiism, and Just War Reappraisals

Lev Tolstoi's (1828–1910) reformulation and reassertion of Christian pacifism (developed from ca. 1880 onward) exercised a decisive impact on a number of major contemporaneous and later figures (such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.) as well as movements professing the ideals of nonviolence and nonresistance, including trends such as Christian anarchism and anarcho-pacifism. Apart from its eclectic conceptual roots (which absorbed the impact of Protestant pacifism), Tolstoiism also shows important continuities with the traditions of Eastern Orthodox pacifism.[112] Tolstoi actively campaigned, moreover, on behalf of Russian pacifistic and persecuted dissenting groups such as the Doukhobors. The following extracts are intended to provide a representative sampling of his eclectic pacifism. They illustrate his influential views on nonresistance to evil (and its Gospel provenance) and on national armies as instruments of organized mass murder.

From: Lev Tolstoi, *My Religion* (1884)[113]

This was the passage that gave me the key to the whole: "*Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil*" (Matthew 5:38–39). . . .

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These words suddenly appeared to me as if I had never read them before.... [O]ften in speaking of this passage, Christians took up the Gospel to see for themselves if the words were really there. Through a similar neglect of these words I had failed to understand the words that follow: "*But whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also*" (Matthew 5:39). For the first time I grasped the pivotal idea in the words "*Resist not evil*"; I saw that what followed was only a development of this command; I saw that Jesus did not exhort us to turn the other cheek that we might endure suffering, but that his exhortation was, "*Resist not evil*," and that he afterward declared suffering to be the possible consequence of the practice of this maxim.

From: Lev Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God Is within You* (1893)[114]

The first and crudest form of reply consists in the bold assertion that the use of force is not opposed by the teaching of Christ; that it is permitted, and even enjoined, on the Christian by the Old and New Testaments....

The second, somewhat less gross form of argument, consists in declaring that, though Christ did indeed preach that we should turn the left cheek, and give the cloak also, and this is the highest moral duty; yet that there are wicked men in the world, and if these wicked men were not restrained by force, the whole world and all good men would come to ruin through them....

The third kind of answer, still more subtle than the preceding, consists in asserting that though the command of non-resistance to evil by force is binding on the Christian when the evil is directed against himself personally, it ceases to be binding when the evil is directed against his neighbors, and that then the Christian is not only not bound to fulfill the commandment, but is even bound to act in opposition to it in defense of his neighbors and to use force against transgressors by force....

A fourth, still more refined reply to the question, What ought to be the Christian's attitude to Christ's command of non-resistance to evil by force? consists in declaring that they do not deny the command of non-resistance to evil, but recognize it; but they only do not ascribe to this command the special exclusive value attached to it by sectarians. To regard this command as the indispensable condition of Christian life, as the Quakers, the Mennonites, and the Shakers do now, and as the Moravian brethren, the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Bogomilites and the Paulicians did in the past, is a one-sided heresy.

From: Lev Tolstoy, *The Law of Love and the Law of Violence* (1908)[115]

It would seem natural that if the possibility is once admitted that men may torture or kill their fellow beings in the name of humanity, others may claim the same right to torture and kill in the name of some ideal of the future. The admission of a single exception to the law of love destroys entirely its beneficial effect, although it is the basis of all religious or moral doctrines....

But as soon as one is freed from the superstitions that attempt to justify violence, one understands all the horror of the crimes committed by one nation against another. . . .

[T]he need to oppose evil by violence is merely to provide justification for our habitual vices – of vengeance, cupidity, envy, ambition, pride, cowardice, and spite. . . .

Do not forget that what we all want in common is the union of men, and that this union can never be attained by means of violence. It is enough that everyone should observe the law of love, and this union will then be realized without the need to seek for it. This *supreme law*, alone, is the same for all of us and unites us all.

Revealed by Christ, it is recognized to-day by men, and its observance is obligatory as long as there is revealed to us no other law, a still clearer one, conforming better to the calls of the human conscience.

From: Lev Tolstoi, "Two Wars" (1898)[116]

The people of every nation are being deluded by their rulers, who say to them, "You, who are governed by us, are all in danger of being conquered by other nations; we are watching over your welfare and safety, and consequently we demand of you annually some millions of rubles – the fruit of your labor – to be used by us in the acquisition of arms, cannons, powder, and ships for your defense; we also demand that you yourselves shall enter institutions, organized by us, where you will become senseless particles of a huge machine – the army – which will be under our absolute control. On entering this army you will cease to be men with wills of your own; you will simply do what we require of you. But what we wish, above all else, is to exercise dominion; the means by which we dominate is killing, therefore we will instruct you to kill."

From: Lev Tolstoi, "Nobel's Bequest" (1897)[117]

So that, if peace has not yet been established, it is not because there does not exist among men the universal desire for it; it is not because there is no love for peace and abhorrence of war; but only because there exists the cunning deceit by which men have been, and are, persuaded that peace is impossible and war indispensable. And therefore, to establish peace among men, first of all among Christians, and to abolish war, it is not necessary to inculcate in men anything new; it is only necessary to liberate them from the deceit which has been instilled into them, causing them to act contrary to their general desire.

From: Lev Tolstoi, "Postscript to the 'Life and Death of Ivan Drozhin'" (1895)[118]

The suborned clergy preaches to the soldiers in the churches; suborned writers write books justifying the army; in the schools, those of higher and those of lower

grade, false catechisms are made obligatory, and the children are taught in accordance with them that to kill in war and in executing justice is not only possible, but mandatory. All those that enter the army take the oath of allegiance; everything that might reveal the deception is sternly repressed and punished – the most terrible punishments are inflicted on men that refuse to carry out the demands of service in the army, that is, of murder.

From: Lev Tolstoi, "Letter to a Peace Conference" (1899)[119]

Armies can be reduced and abolished only in opposition to the will, but never by the will, of governments. . . .

Armies will first diminish, and then disappear, only when public opinion brands with contempt those who, whether from fear, or for advantage, sell their liberty and enter the ranks of those murderers, called soldiers; and when the men now ignored and even blamed – who, in despite of all the persecution and suffering they have borne – have refused to yield the control of their actions into the hands of others, and become the tools of murder – are recognized by public opinion, to be the foremost champions and benefactors of mankind. Only then will armies first diminish and then quite disappear, and a new era in the life of mankind will commence. And that time is near.

From: Lev Tolstoi, "Patriotism or Peace" (1896)[120]

It must be understood that, as long as we praise patriotism, and cultivate it in the young, so long will there be armaments to destroy the physical and spiritual life of nations; and wars, vast, awful wars, such as we are preparing for, and into the circle of which we are drawing, debauching them in our patriotism, the new and to be dreaded combatants of the far East.

Tolstoiism provoked powerful and long-lasting opposition both in Russia and internationally in circles ranging from ecclesiastical elites (Tolstoi was excommunicated by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1901) to Christian religious philosophers and theoreticians of war ethics; the following extracts demonstrate some of the main arguments of this anti-Tolstoiian/antipacifistic reaction. A forceful criticism of Tolstoiian views on war and government-organized warfare as well as an attempt to formulate a more "ecumenical" Christian just war theory can be discerned in the writings of the renowned Russian religious philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev (1853–1900).

From: Vladimir Solov'ev, *The Justification of the Good* (1895)[121]

Thus to the first question with regard to war there exists only one indisputable answer: *war is an evil*. Evil may be either absolute (such as deadly sin, eternal damnation) or relative, that is, it may be less than some other evil, and, as compared with it, may be regarded as a good (e.g., a surgical operation to save a patient's life).

The significance of war is not exhausted by the negative definition of it as an evil and a calamity. There is also a positive element in it – not in the sense that it can itself be normal, but in the sense that it may be actually necessary in the given condition. *This* way of regarding abnormal phenomena in general is not to be avoided and must be adopted in virtue of the direct demands of the moral ideal and not in contradiction to it. . . .

It is not a case of deviation from the moral norm but of actual realization of that norm in a way which, though dangerous and irregular, proves from real necessity to be the only possible one *under given conditions*.

It may be that war too depends upon a necessity which renders this essentially abnormal course of action permissible and even obligatory *under certain conditions*. . . .

Theories which take up an absolutely negative attitude toward war and maintain that it is the duty of every one to refuse the demand of the state for military service, altogether deny that the individual has any duties toward the state. This view is particularly ill-founded when it appeals to Christianity.

Christianity has revealed to us our absolute dignity, the unconditional worth of the inner being or of the soul of man. This unconditional worth imposes upon us an unconditional duty – to realize the good in the whole of our life, both personal and collective. We know *for certain* that this task is impossible for the individual taken separately or in isolation, and that it can only be realized if the individual life finds its *completion* in the universal historical life of humanity. One of the means of such completion, one of the forms of the universal life – at the present moment of history the chief and the dominant form – is the *fatherland* definitely organized as the *state*. . . .

But successfully to defend all the weak and innocent against the attacks of evil-doers is impossible for isolated individuals or even groups of many men. Collective organization of such defense is precisely the destination of the military force of the state, and to support the state in one way or another in this work of pity is the moral duty of every one, which no abuses can render void. Just as the fact that ergot is poisonous does not prove that rye is injurious, so the burdens and dangers of *militarism* are no evidence against the necessity of armed forces. . . .

The military or indeed any compulsory organization is not an evil, but a consequence and a symptom of evil.

From: Vladimir Solov'ev, *Three Conversations* (1900)[122]

Prince. – Only think of it: militarism brings forth as its extreme expression the system of universal military service, and, thanks just to that, there perish not only the most modern form of militarism, but all the ancient foundations of the military idea. Wonderful!. . .

Mr. Z. – There isn't the slightest doubt that militarism in Europe and in Russia will eat itself up and die of surfeit, but what sort of joys and triumphs will result from that fact remains to be seen.

Prince. – How? Do you mean to say that you have any doubt but that war and the military business is anything but an unconditional and extreme evil from which humanity has got to free itself absolutely, and as soon as it can? Do you mean to say you doubt that a complete and rapid disappearance of this cannibalism would not be, under any circumstances, a triumph of reason and goodness?

Mr. Z. – I am absolutely convinced to the contrary.

Prince. – That is to say?

Mr. Z. ..... that war is not an unconditional evil, and that peace is not an unconditional good, or speaking more simply, it is possible to have a *good war*; it is also possible to have a *bad peace*.

Prince. – Oh, now I see the difference between your point of view and that of the General. He thinks that war is always good and that peace is always bad.

General. – No, no. I understand perfectly that war can be upon occasion a very bad affair, for instance, when we are beaten, as at Narva or Austerlitz; and peace can be splendid, as for instance, the peace of Nishstadt or Kutchuk-Kainardzh.

From: Vladimir Solov'ev, "Byzantinism and Russia" (1896)[123]

Finding the death penalty to be unjust, Vladimir also related to war with Christian nations negatively as well, preserving his retainers just for defense of the land against barbaric and rapacious nomads, who were amenable to no other arguments apart from armed force. . . .

Vladimir Monomakh, who like his great-grandfather was so suffused with Christian spirit that he considered it impermissible to kill even villains, had to live his entire life on horseback in perpetual campaigns, defending the nation from barbaric predators or pacifying internecine struggles among princes.

An influential theologian and polemicist (who was to take up leadership of the Russian Church in exile after the Russian revolution of 1917), Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii of Kiev and Galicia (1863–1936) composed his "The Christian Faith and War" (1916) at the beginning of World War I. His evident intention was to use scriptural exegesis so as to refute Tolstoiian and related pacifist rejections of Christian participation in warfare (and disobedience to the warring state). He endorsed current and those previous Russian military campaigns as "lesser evils," justifiable by reference to Orthodoxy and Orthodox Slavdom. He does not, however, attempt to sanctify the Russian military effort as a "sacred" cause or obligation, unlike some other religiously oriented authors and clerics in Russia,[124] or indeed in Western Europe, during the war period. Invoking patristic authority for his defense of the Russian military effort, he employs the long-standing interpretation of St. Athanasios' canonical epistle to Ammoun (see section on "Eastern Orthodox Canon Law" above) as legitimizing Christian participation in warfare and the killing of adversaries in battle.

From: Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii, *The Christian Faith and War* (1915)[125]

. . . Christ our Savior and the Apostles did not prohibit their followers from fulfilling their governmental obligations and commanded obedience even to pagan governments. Thus it is clear that although the Lord united His followers in a Churchly union, not in a governmental one, still He did not prohibit their forming a supplementary union for physical self-defense, i.e. a state; but there will never be a state without courts, prisons and wars, and the hopes of our contemporaries that the present war (World War I) will be the final one in history are in direct contradiction not only to reality with its intensifying nationalism, but also to the completely clear predictions of our Savior about the last times when kingdom will rise up against kingdom, and nation against nation (Matthew 24:6–21; cf. Luke 21:10–26). . . .

We hope that after what has been said all followers of Tolstoy, Pietists, and Mennonites will be obliged to recognize that neither in the Old nor in the New Testament is there any prohibition of participating in war. . . .

They [the fighters for peace] may be ready to recognize that our war is unselfish and is no more than self-defense of the nation and its co-believers, the Slavs; but in the horrors of war they see a greater evil than in everything which might come about as the sad results of a peace such as we described above. It would be difficult to weaken the force of such arguments if the contrast between war and peace-time were as extreme as it appears at first glance. . . .

The moral elevation which followed the declaration of war and continues to a considerable extent even to the present is a copious redemption of those unavoidable moral crimes with which any war abounds. Take up the Book of Judges; there in the second chapter this law of national life is set forth: in times of political peace the Jews fell into depravity and idolatry; then the Lord sent hostile tribes against them; the people rose up in defense of their homeland and were transfigured morally, bewailing their former apostasy. . . .

Even now there exist Christian communities to a greater or lesser degree foreign to physical self-defense: these are the monasteries and in general all clergymen, who are not permitted to defend themselves with weapons. . . .

However, to impose the demand for such self-denial, of which are capable only exceptionally zealous believers who consciously have abandoned the world to a whole people including "those with child and those giving suck" such a prohibition would be absolutely unthinkable. War is an evil, but in the given case, and in the majority of Russian wars, a lesser evil than declining war and surrendering to the power of the barbarians either our holy homeland or the other Orthodox nations who are our brothers. . . .

"I did not expect praise for war from a servant of God," a "Christian" of the Tolstoyan sect writes me. The Tolstoyans will respond in the same insincere spirit to this article too. But let them get it into their heads that I am not praising war nor

justifying it, but that I consider it a lesser evil than if kings, governments, nations, and individual citizens had declined it in such a situation as that which prevailed two years ago. . . .

Our soldiers going into the field of battle did not think about how they would kill, but about how they would die. In their eyes a soldier is not a self-satisfied conqueror, but a self-denying ascetic, laying down his life for the Faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. . . .

I feel that the Tolstoyans will applaud spitefully when they read this canon [St. Basil's thirteenth canon][126] and will reproach our soldiers: "You do not have the right to communicate for three years"; but do not be spiteful, friends. [T]he penance for soldiers was abolished by the Church at the time when great piety still existed, when the wars with the Moslems increased. . . .

Finally, we have the perfectly clear teaching of the Church about murder in war which is set forth in the canonical epistle of St. Athanasius the Great to the monk Ammun and confirmed by the Sixth Ecumenical Council.[127] With these words of the Church, or more accurately of the Holy Spirit speaking through her mouth, we will conclude the present article. . . .

Murder is reprehensible as an act of self-will and hatred, i.e. personal murder, but killing an enemy in battle "is tolerated and permitted."

Equally, if not more forceful, was the rejection of Tolstoiism that may be found in works on war ethics that were written by Russian émigrés such as Anton Kersnovskii (1905–1944) and Ivan Il'in (1883–1954). The latter published in 1925 his *On Resistance to Evil by Force* wherein he reaffirmed the necessity of war but questioned whether it can ever be defined as "just." This essay provoked intense disputes in Russian émigré lay intellectual and clerical circles.

From: Anton Kersnovskii, *The Philosophy of War* (1939)[128]

We have to denounce the pseudo-teaching of the "non-resistance to evil by force" as God-opposed, anti-church and in the final analysis – inhuman.

From: Ivan Il'in, *On Resistance to Evil by Force* (1925)[129]

[T]he teaching of Count L. N. Tolstoi and his followers attracted to itself weak and simple-minded people, and assuming a false appearance of a consonance with the spirit of Christ's teachings, has been poisoning Russian religious and political culture. . . .

Resistance to evil by force and sword does not represent, therefore, a sinful action on all these occasions when it is objectively necessary or where it appears to be the only and least unrighteous alternative. Claims that such kind of resistance represents "evil," "sin," or "moral crime" reveal a paucity of moral experience or helpless obscurity of thought.

Nevertheless, this resistance carries out a moral unrighteousness. The very act of *resistance* to evil as such always remains a good, righteous, and necessary

deed. The more difficult the resistance, the greater the dangers and suffering which accompany it, the greater the feat and merit of the one who resists. But this *that* the resisting swordbearer does in the struggle with the evildoer does not represent perfect, nor holy, nor a righteous series of acts. Indeed only the naive rudeness of the doctrinaire moralist can define it as "evil" and "sin," since actually it represents an *unsinful* (!) enactment of unrighteousness. But it would be no less of a mistake to absolutely justify and sanctify the use of force and the sword, since in reality it is a deed which is an unsinful enactment of *unrighteousness* (!). An absolute ban on the sword and the use of force should not be imposed, as a resort to them can be religiously and morally necessary.

The issues of rejection, justifiability, and sanctification of war in earlier and modern Christian frameworks, going beyond the Eastern Orthodox experience, attracted the attention of other prominent Russian émigré figures such as the religious and political philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1874–1948), the influential theologian Vladimir Losskii (1903–1958), and Mother Maria Skobtsova (1891–1945, canonized in 2004).

From: Nikolai Berdiaev, *Slavery and Freedom* (1939)[130]

There never was a really "holy" state; still less can wars be "holy." But all this is intensified once we begin to speak in terms of modern times and modern wars, that more nearly resemble cosmic catastrophe. The military ideals of honor were always un-Christian, against the Gospel, but modern war is immeasurably lower than those concepts of honor. . . .

There is nothing more monstrous than the blessing of war by Christian churches, than that awful combination of words, "Christ-loving soldiers." Man should be a warrior; he is called to warfare. But this has nothing to do with a corporation of the military which is an extreme form of human enslavement. We must clearly distinguish this viewpoint from bourgeois pacifism which is powerless to stop war and may even be a condition lower than war itself. There is a peace more shameful than war: peace is not to be purchased at any price. True war against war is truly war, courage and readiness to sacrifice. Many Christians turn away in horror from revolution because it implies killing and bloodshed, but they accept and even bless war which kills more people and sheds more blood than does revolution. Revolution may be a far lesser evil than war. But only a Christianity purified and liberated from historical enslavement may put the question of war and revolution. . . .

From: Nikolai Berdiaev, *The Divine and Human* (1947)[131]

The denunciation of the evil and sin of war should not be permitted to lead to absolute pacifism, to peace at any price. In the evil condition of our world, war may be the lesser of two evils. While a war of conquest or subjugation is absolute evil, protective or liberating war may be not only justified but hallowed. Good is active in a concrete world-milieu, complex and indistinct, and the action of good

may not always be in a direct line. Good may sometimes be compelled to struggle for the lesser evil. The final abolition of war is linked with a change in the spiritual condition of human society and the social order.

From: Vladimir Losskii, *Seven Days on Road of France* (1940)[132]

War is not fought for absolute values. This was the great error of the so-called "religious" wars and the main cause of their inhuman atrocities. War is equally not waged for relative values that we attempt to render absolute, for abstract concepts we cloak in religion. If we oppose the idol of the "pure race" with the more humane idols of law, liberty and humanity, they would not be any the less idols for it, ideas rendered hypostasized and absolute; the war would still be a war of idols, and not a human war. Human war, the only just war (inasmuch as any war may be called just) is a war for relative values, for values that we know to be relative. It is a war where man – a being called for an absolute goal – dedicates himself spontaneously and without hesitation for a relative value that he knows to be relative: the soil, the land, the Homeland. And this sacrifice acquires an absolute value, imperishable and eternal for the human person. . . .

We also talked about Justice, and even the justice of God, in the name of which we should fight so that justice (which is an attribute of God) would triumph in the face of our adversaries' iniquity. "Our cause is just. This is why God will grant us victory." This is how the prelates spoke, the people's spiritual leaders. The just cause often triumphed in "God's judgment," those judicial duels waged between two parties in conflict. But those two parties abandoned their justice, abandoned their just cause, to give place to divine justice alone – without possibility of appeal – which would manifest through their feat of arms. And again, the Church was obliged to oppose this practice eight hundred years ago. His [God's] justice is not our justice, because His ways are not our ways. We should have prayed for victory with tears and great contrition, bearing in mind this fearsome Justice, before which we are all unjust. We should not have called on Justice, which is beyond our measure, which we could not bear, but on the infinite mercy which made the Son of God descend from Heaven.

From: Mother Maria Skobtsova, "Insight in Wartime" (posth. 1947)[133]

I think that, in our notions of war, the definitions of attacking and defending sides are not sufficiently detailed. These notions are put in place at the beginning of a conflict with the aim of using them for diplomatic, political, and economic purposes. But in fact the real moral or even religious distinction has not been made. . . .

There is something in war that makes people listen – not all, but many – and suddenly, amid the roar of cannons, the rattle of machine guns, the groaning of the wounded, they hear something else, they hear the distant, warning trumpet of the archangel.

There is also, in a sense, a more terrible phenomenon, which cannot be accounted for by statistics: it is the brutalization of nations, the lowering of the cultural level, the loss of creative ability – the decadence of souls. Every war throws the whole of mankind back. . . .

The war demands of us, more than ever, that we mobilize absolutely all our spiritual powers and abilities. In our time Christ and the life-giving Holy Spirit demand the whole person. The only difference from state mobilization is that the state enforces mobilization, while our faith waits for volunteers. And, in my view, the destiny of mankind depends on whether these volunteers exist and, if they do, how great their energy is, how ready they are for sacrifice.

Nationalism, Militarism, and Orthodoxy in Post-Ottoman Southeast Europe

The involvement of the Orthodox churches in the post-Ottoman state formations in Southeast Europe, as well as their attitudes to the military confrontations (including the legitimization of anti-Ottoman war efforts) and outbreaks of organized violence that accompanied these processes, have not yet received the close attention and comparative analysis they certainly deserve. One of the obvious instances of this coalescence of nationalism, militarism, and Orthodoxy was the newly established institution of military chaplains. Below are reproduced some statutes on their duties, from a Romanian document dated 1877.

From: Romanian Orthodox Church Statute on the Duties of Military Priests, "Address to Soldiers to Join Battle" (1877)[134]

Soldiers, beloved sons of this sacred Church! For the Fatherland and Church your parents fought until death. We die or live, we belong to God. You should prefer an honored death to a shameful life and subsequently the enemy's powers will be diminished like the spiders' web. God is with you. Forward my sons. Be convinced that God, who is the master of the people's life, will generously embrace your souls in his hands and full of glory you will return to your beloved fatherland, where you will be applauded by the whole people. God bless your arms, and let Him crown you with the glory of victory. Amen.

Some of the most far-reaching and symptomatic attempts to "update" Orthodox justifiable war ethics within nineteenth- and twentieth-century ethno-religious frameworks can be discerned in the writings of the influential Serbian hierarch, theologian, and preacher Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´ (1880–1956, declared a saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2003). The following extracts reveal the interweaving of notions from the Kosovo covenantal mythology (which had evolved in Serbian Orthodox readings of the religious dimension of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389); the Serbian religio-national ideology of "Svetosavlje" (the teachings of St. Sava (1174–1236), which emerged in the interwar period); and a "crusade"-oriented anti-Ottoman just war rhetoric that extolled

the ethos of the Church Militant fighting physical battles against infidel enemies, "sword against the sword."

From: Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *Serbia in Light and Darkness* (1916)[135]

Our kings of old said very often that Serbia must fight on the side of justice, even if justice has for the moment no visible chance to be victorious. Our saint King, Lazar, refused on the eve of the battle of Kosovo to negotiate with the Turkish Sultan, whom he regarded as a bearer of injustice and an enemy of Christianity. . . .

. . . King Lazar perished with all his army on the field of Kosovo fighting for Cross and Freedom against Islam rushing over Europe.

From: Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *Agony of the Church* (1917)[136]

Islam was another kind of Imperialism against which the Church fought. If the Roman Imperialism was cool, calculating, without any fanaticism, Islam was a unique form of religious, fanatical Imperialism, having in view world-conquest and world-dominion, like Rome and yet unlike Rome. Here the Church fought with the sword against the sword. Before the definite fall of the Roman Empire the crusades of Christianity against Islam began, and it has not been finished until this day. Very dramatic was this struggle in Palestine, under Western crusaders, in Spain and Russia. But I think the most dramatic act of this dramatic conflict happened in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, during the last five hundred years.

From: Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *The Serbian People as a Servant of God* 53 (pub. posth. 1984)[137]

[T]he leaders of the Serbian people – be they kings or tsars, or despots or commanders or military governors – served Christ their God from their thrones and seats of power; as founders of churches and monasteries, as defenders of the Orthodox faith, as helpers in defense of neighboring peoples, as protectors of the poor, and as cross-bearing warriors against the infidels.

From: Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, "Kosovo and St. Vitus' Day" (1939)[138]

He [St. Sava] did not want only a holy church but also holy education, a holy culture, a holy dynasty, holy rule, a holy army, a holy country and a holy people. A holy army, entirely surrounded by a halo of sacredness; an army which fought for the sacrosanctity of the people, the sacrosanctity of Christendom, the sacrosanctity of Europe. . . .

The people want with all their heart a holy church, holy schools, a holy culture, a holy dynasty, holy rule, a holy country and – a holy army. Yes, also a holy army. I.e. an army .... which heroically defends the truth and justice of God and – when needed – heroically sacrifices itself for the truth and justice of God.

In the following extract, Patriarch Gavrilo V of Serbia (1881–1950) sets the events of the Serbian military coup on 27 March 1941 (which deposed the Regent Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, two days after he had signed the Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers and was to be followed shortly by the German invasion and occupation of the country) in the framework of the "Kosovo ethics," symbolized by the military deeds of paradigmatic (historic and epic) figures of Serbian anti-Ottoman resistance (Obilic´ and Prince Marko) and the restoration of Serbian statehood (after anti-Ottoman revolts) by Karad̄ord̄e and Obrenovic´. Combining elements of the Kosovo covenantal mythology with militarist imagery and just war notions, Patriarch Gavrilo effectively ascribes to the Serbian military efforts a religio-historic salvific quality.

From: Patriarch Gavrilo V of Serbia, "What Is the significance of March 27?" (1941)[139]

> [T]he Kosovo ethics .... has elevated our past and exalted the spirit of Obilic, who became an ideal and a model of heroism, as well as the scope of Prince Marko, a protector of justice and a hero who defeated the enemy The same Kosovo spirit inspired Karad̄ord̄e and Milos] [Obrenovic] to build a new foundation for the Serbian state, which rose ever higher, and this clearly proves that the entire ascent of the Serbian people in history was won only and exclusively by the sword, in a sea of spilled blood and countless victims, which means that without all of this there is no victory, as there is no resurrection without death.

The Russian Orthodox Church during the Russian Civil War and World War II

Bolshevik legislation and measures against the Russian Orthodox Church began as early as the Russian civil war of 1917–1923. Despite his various pronouncements and protests against these measures, St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia (1918–1925), did not officially "sanctify" the anti-Bolshevik war effort of the White Army, appealing, along with influential preachers such as archpriest Ioann Vostorgov (1864–1918), for a nonviolent resistance to the suppression of Church institutions, hierarchy, and religious life. While condemning civil war as "fratricidal fury," Patriarkh Tikhon condemned the Bolsheviks for signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), defining it as "disgraceful" for extinguishing in the conscience of Russians the Christian warrior ethos, as legitimized through St. Constantine–Cyril's reading of John 15: 13 (see sections entitled "The *Vita* of St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher" and "Tolstoiian Pacifism, Anti-Tolstoiism, and Just War Reappraisals," above).

From: Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov, Sermon "The Struggle for Faith and the Church" (1918)[140]

> By religious processions, petitions, declarations, protests, resolutions, messages to the authorities – by decisive force, by all that is permitted by Christian conscience,

we can and are obliged to fight in the holy fight for faith and church, for the trampled treasures of our soul. Let them cross our dead bodies. Let them shoot us, shoot innocent children and women. Let us go with crosses, icons, unarmed, with prayers and hymns – let Cain and Judas kill us! The time has come to go to martyrdom and suffering!

From: St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow, "Pastoral Letter" (19 January/1 February 1918)[141]

And you, brothers archpastors and pastors, without delaying in your spiritual action for one hour, with burning faith call our sons to defend the trampled rights of the Orthodox church, immediately organize religious leagues, call them to range themselves in the ranks of the spiritual fighters, who to external force will oppose the strength of their holy inspiration, and we firmly trust that the enemies of the church of Christ will be broken and scattered by the strength of the Cross of Christ. . . .

From: St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow, "Letter to the Council of People's Commissars" (13/26 October 1918)[142]

. . . You have deprived our soldiers of everything for which they had fought bravely in the past. You have instructed them, who not so long ago were still valiant and unconquerable, to abandon the defense of the motherland, to escape from the battlefields. You have extinguished in their hearts the conscience which used to inspire them that "No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends" (John 15:13). . . .

Having given up the defense of the motherland from external enemies, you, however, are ceaselessly raising troops.

Against whom will you lead them?. . .

It was not Russia who needed the disgraceful peace with the external enemy concluded by you, but you yourself, who have contrived to finally destroy its internal peace.

. . . Celebrate the anniversary of taking the power by setting free the imprisoned, by putting an end to bloodshed, violence, ruination, constrains on faith; turn not to destruction, but to the institution of order and lawfulness, give to the people their yearned for and deserved respite from fratricidal conflict.

Paradoxically in Russia itself, World War II was to bring about a reinstatement of the Russian Church after several cycles of intensifying Soviet anti-Church repression. This ensued from Stalin's decision to engage the Church's support to boost national unity so as to mobilize for the massive war effort against Nazi Germany. The following extracts from sermons and pronouncements of leading Russian hierarchs during the war reveal that apart from blessing, praying for, and praising the heroic and just defensive war (which in some of the statements acquires a degree of "holiness") of the Russian army

(enhanced by repeated invocations of John 15:13), they viewed the conflict as possessing universal religious and ethical dimensions. In their eyes it was fought on behalf of humanity against an inhuman and anti-Christian enemy.[143]

From: Metropolitan Sergii, "Sermon" (26.06.1941)[144]

A dark and wild storm is threatening our country. Our native land is in danger and calls to us: "All to the ranks, all to the defense of the native soil, its historical sanctuaries, its freedom from foreign enslavement." Shame on him, whoever he be, who remains indifferent to such a call, who leaves it to others to sacrifice themselves for the common cause of the people. We are not taught to act thus by any of our Orthodox God-inspired people, who used not to hesitate to sacrifice themselves for their friends and thus achieved victory over . . . foreign foe[s]. . . .

Fear at an invasion of believers of another faith never has caused, and never will cause, our Orthodox people faintheartedly to betray their best historical traditions and hand over without a struggle both their country and their future destiny to the mercy of a sworn enemy.

From: Metropolitan Sergii, "Sermon" (12.08.1941)[145]

At the present time all our thoughts are turned to the West, to the places where our valiant soldiers are engaged in mortal battle with the enemy who has fallen on our Fatherland. Continually thinking of them, we pray God to give them strength, courage and patience to endure the heavy trials of war, and to crown their efforts with victory.

This time I should like to recall the prayer for those whom the Lord has called to lay down their lives in battle. . . .

[T]here is .....sense and great hope in praying for those who have fallen in battle, and it is our brotherly duty to do this because they laid down their souls for us.

May then the just Judge in his ineffable mercy give to our warriors the crowns of immortality for their self-sacrificing heroic deeds. . . .

From: Metropolitan Aleksei of Leningrad, "Sermon" (10.08.1941)[146]

And just as the Russian people were called during the Napoleonic era to liberate the whole world from the madness of tyranny, so today has fallen to our people the high mission of delivering humanity from the villainies of fascism, of giving back freedom to the enslaved countries and of establishing everywhere peace, which has been so insolently destroyed by fascism. The Russian people march to carry out this holy object with complete self-denial.

From: Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, "Sermon" (3 August 1941)[147]

Fulfilling their most holy duty, all the Orthodox believers of our country give all their efforts to defend the country at the present time. The believers are encouraged

to patriotic deeds not only by the consciousness of their civil and Christian duty, but also by that special blessing of the Holy Orthodox Church.

May the Lord Himself crown with the most complete success the holy labors of all who do not spare their lives for the sake of a more speedy victory over the monster of the human race!

From: Archpriest A. P. Smirnov, "Sermon" (4 December 1941)[148]

On 22 June 1941, our beautiful land put on a crown of thorns. From under the sharp needles, the first ruby drops of sacrificial blood fell over its face, fulfilling the Gospel precept: "Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13).

On that day our country and all who dwell in it took on their shoulders the great and glorious cross of the Holy War of Liberation.

From: Aleksei, Archbishop of Ufa, "On the Altar of the Fatherland" (27 March 1942)[149]

Young and old, the whole of the Orthodox community in Russia have risen for the defense of their Fatherland, and their arms have been blessed with the heavenly blessing conferred on them through the supreme hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, His Beatitude the Metropolitan Sergius. . . .

Faithful sons of Orthodox Russia [t]hey display the loftiest self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, the spirit of the noblest Christian love. [E]mbodying in their exploits the Gospel words: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). . . .

Everything in the Russian people is permeated and illuminated by holy prayer and Christian faith, and this faith will burn and consume those who have dared to invade our holy soil.

From: Pitirim, Bishop of Kaluga, "Praise to Thee, Holy Moscow!" (28 March 1942)[150]

Just wars have always called forth the heroism of the people, fighting forgetful of self. . . .

We Russian people clearly recognize that the German Army is waging an unjust war.

Our Army is fighting for the rights of all humanity, for the righteousness of God, for eternal justice. The Lord God, who sent down on us this great trial, seeing our readiness to defend with our lives our native land, seeing our eager devotion to the noble and lofty aims of the war which we are waging, is giving us victory over the foe.

From: Aleksei, Metropolitan of Leningrad, "Eastertide in Leningrad" (09 April 1942)[151]

In this Easter message the Metropolitan Sergius speaks especially strongly of the base acts and plans of fascist Germany "which has dared to take as its banner the pagan swastika instead of the Cross of Christ." This is not the first time that the Metropolitan Sergius has borne witness, in the name of the Church, to the fact that the fascists and their bloodstained leader Hitler are savage enemies of Christianity, and that he deepens the conviction of believers that there can be no agreement between these bestial degenerates of the human race and Christians without a betrayal of Christ.

The Eastern Orthodox Churches and Peace-Making Initiatives during the Cold War

The following statements by three Eastern Orthodox Church patriarchs, enunciated during the Cold War period, highlight how peace-making activities (and related rhetoric) of the respective ecclesiastical hierarchies were carried through international bodies and networks such as the World Council of Churches, World Peace Council, and Christian Peace Conference. Such activities were also exercised within the Peace and Disarmament Campaign of the 1980s.[152]

From: Patriarch Justinian of Romania (1948–1977), "Evangelical Humanism and Christian Responsibility" (1967)[153]

The struggle for peace has become today an active testimony of God the Creator, Redeemer, and Comforter, namely: God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These efforts reflect, in practice, one of the main means of proving one's active confession of the Christian faith. Acting through the World Council of Churches against a devastating war, Christianity thus witnesses its belief in the immeasurable value of the world, created and redeemed by God. . . .

Peace calls for equality between men and nations and equality rests on justice which in its turn derives from freedom. Peace in freedom is the only peace which ensures human dignity. Therefore, the World Council of Churches is striving for a peace that promotes the freedom of nations and men.

From: Patriarch Pimen I of Moscow (1971–1990), "An Orthodox View on Contemporary Ecumenism"[154]

Every good undertaking which furthers the cause of peace and friendship among peoples, which lowers international tension and opens a sphere of international collaboration and mutual understanding must call forth our warm support, encouragement, understanding and readiness to cooperate. . . .

We are ready to listen and are full of good will and desire to understand other points of view if their aim is the achievement of a stable and just peace among the nations.

Going on from there, we are assuming that it would be useful for the World Council of Churches and for the Ecumenical Movement as a whole to take note of the views of a large body of churches and numerous Christians, who have combined their efforts toward the building of peace within the framework of the Christian Peace Conference.

From: Patriarch Cyril of Bulgaria (1953–1971), "Address of Welcome to Dr. Eugene Blake" (1968)[155]

The problem of war and peace is still the outstanding problem. [T]o work for peace, especially today, is one of the primary tasks of Christian ecumenicity.

The menace of war is constantly hanging over our heads and may overwhelm the world at any moment with all its forces of destruction. Can any duty be more important, therefore, than that of preventing the flames of war from developing into a world conflagration?

The issues of justifiability of warfare and whether just war theory was ever conceptualized in Eastern Orthodox traditions were treated in statements such as the "Orthodox Perspectives on Justice and Peace," issued after the meeting of Orthodox theologians in Minsk in May 1989.

From: "Orthodox Perspectives on Justice and Peace" (1989)[156]

Another problem, specific to the church, is the dilemma presented by the phenomenon of Christian participation in war. The Orthodox Church unreservedly condemns war as evil. Yet it also recognizes that in the defense of the innocent and the protection of one's people from unjust attack, criminal activity and the overthrowing of oppression, it is sometimes necessary, with reluctance, to resort to arms. In every case, such a decision must be taken with full consciousness of its tragic dimensions. Consequently, the Greek fathers of the Church have never developed a "just war theory," preferring rather to speak of the blessings of and the preference for peace.

The Post-Communist Period

In a succession of statements in the 1990s, excerpts from two of which are reproduced here, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I addressed various issues related to the morality of modern warfare, interreligious violence, and militaristic religious nationalism. He focused in particular on the irrationality of war and its adverse impact on the physical and spiritual environment. Especially significant in this series of pronouncements was his reiteration of the traditional Eastern Orthodox patristic and

ecclesiastical pacific stance that the Orthodox Church "forgives armed defense against oppression and violence" only in a limited set of cases.

From: Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, "Environment, Peace, and Economy" (24 May 1999)[157]

In particular, we would like to address the impact of war on the environment. For if ecological issues are acute even during times of peace, when the protection of human beings is perceived positively, then how much more critical are these issues during times of war, when the extermination of others and the destruction of their environment are the unfortunate objective?...

Indeed, if we consider the consequences of war at different historical periods, then we shall also observe the sad reality that, the closer one comes to our period, the more dramatic the effects of military clashes have been on the natural environment....

Finally, the spiritual atmosphere is inundated by boundless falsehoods of propaganda; passions are cultivated in people's souls; hatred and violence are justified. The effects of this spiritual "pollution" are manifested everywhere in the world, irrespective of distance....

This list of environmental effects that result from contemporary warfare clearly shows the irrationality of military conflict, which can only be explained as a paranoid act. For, while war is instigated supposedly in order to protect certain people who are provoked by their unjust treatment by other people, nevertheless warfare ensures that unjust treatment is extended to include numerous others....

Therefore, *the irrationality of war is evident from its effect on humanity and on the natural environment*. It is our duty to intervene, wherever possible, to persuade those who are responsible for making decisions to seek peaceful resolutions to human problems. The choice of military violence as the sole method for resolving conflicts betrays a lack of imagination and intellectual laziness, as well as misplaced confidence in the erroneous notion that evil can be corrected by evil.

As heralds of the Gospel truth, which is the only complete truth, we repeat the words of the Apostle: "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (Romans 12:21). We conclude with this exhortation, adding only our fervent prayers that irrational wars may cease as soon as possible and that the almighty and beneficent Lord may grant everyone the wisdom to understand that war is an impasse.

From: Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, "War and Suffering" (22 October 1999)[158]

War and violence are never means used by God in order to achieve a result. They are for the most part machinations of the devil used to achieve unlawful ends. We say "for the most part" because, as is well known, in a few specific cases the

Orthodox Church forgives an armed defense against oppression and violence. However, as a rule, peaceful resolution of differences and peaceful cooperation are more pleasing to God and more beneficial to humankind.

War and violence breed hatred and revenge, leading to an endless cycle of evil until opponents completely annihilate each other. . . .

[O]ur main concern is not to impose our will on others, but to walk together with justice and not to act unjustly. In the long term, this will prove to be more advantageous, because whatever is built on injustice collapses with the passage of time. This is the reason why wars keep recurring, because after each war things are not regulated on the basis of right, but on the basis of might.

The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Church

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the section on "War and Peace" in the statement of faith, *The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Church*, issued in 2000 by the Jubilee Council of Russian Bishops. It has even been proposed that this document should be adopted as a basis for the Russian state's religious policies. While reiterating the traditional Eastern Orthodox teaching on war as unconditionally evil and the divine, "grace-filled," and salvific gift of peace, the statement identifies the cases in which war must be deemed "necessary," despite its being evil and undesirable. To justify the resort to armed force in such instances the document reproduces the already quoted pronouncement of St. Constantine–Cyril (see section on "The *Vita* of St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher" above), which based, as in previous instances (see sections on "Tolstoiian Pacifism, Anti-Tolstoiism, and Just War Reappraisals" and "The Russian Orthodox Church during the Russian Civil War and World War II"), its justifiable war doctrine on John 15:13. Significantly, the statement reproduces the traditional *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* conditions of the Western Christian just war tradition (as modeled on St. Augustine's teachings), redefining some of them on the basis of scriptural exegesis. The document articulates the Russian Church's special concern for the Christian education of the military, the tasks of military chaplains, a commitment to international peace making, and opposition to any propaganda of war.

From: Jubilee Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, "War and Peace" (2000)[159]

VIII. 1. War is a physical manifestation of the latent illness of humanity, which is fratricidal hatred (Gen. 4:3–12). Wars have accompanied human history since the fall and, according to the Gospel, will continue to accompany it: "And when ye hear of wars and rumors of wars, be ye not troubled: for such things must needs be" (Mark 13:7). *War is evil. Just as the evil in man in general, war is caused by the sinful abuse of the God-given freedom*; "for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies" (Matt. 15:19). . . .

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VIII. 2. Bringing to people the good news of reconciliation (Rom. 10:15), but being in "this world" lying in evil (1 John 5:19) and filled with violence, Christians involuntarily come to face the vital need to take part in various battles. *While recognizing war as evil, the Church does not prohibit her children from participating in hostilities if at stake is the security of their neighbors and the restoration of trampled justice. Then war is considered to be [a] necessary though undesirable means*. In all times, Orthodoxy has had profound respect for soldiers who gave their lives to protect the life and security of their neighbors. The Holy Church has canonized many soldiers, taking into account their Christian virtues and applying to them Christ's word: "Greater love hath no man but this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). [Here the statement reproduces the relevant episode from St. Constantine–Cyril's *Vita*; see section on "The *Vita* of St. Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher" above.]

VIII. 3. "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. 26:52). These words of the Savior justify the idea of just war. From the Christian perspective, *the conception of moral justice in international relations should be based on the following basic principles: love of one's neighbors, people and Fatherland; understanding of the needs of other nations; conviction that it is impossible to serve one's country by immoral means*. . . .

The development of high moral standards in international relations would have [been] impossible without that moral impact which Christianity made on people's hearts and minds. The requirements of justice in war were often far from being complied with, but the very posing of the question of justice sometimes restrained warring people from extreme violence.

In defining just war, the Western Christian tradition, which goes back to St. Augustine, usually puts forward a number of conditions on which war in one's own or others' territory is admissible. [Here the statement reproduces a summary of the relevant conditions of the Western Christian just war tradition.]

In the present system of international relations, *it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an aggressive war from a defensive war*. The distinction between the two is especially subtle where one or two states or the world community initiate hostilities on the ground that it is necessary to protect the people who fell victim to an aggression (see XV. 1). In this regard, the *question* whether the Church should support or deplore the hostilities *needs to be given a special consideration every time they are initiated or threaten to begin*.

Among obvious signs pointing to the equity or inequity of a warring party are *its war methods* and attitude toward its war prisoners and the civilians of the opposite side, especially children, women and elderly. Even in the defense from an aggression, every kind of evil can be done, making one's spiritual and moral stand not superior to that of the aggressor. *War should be waged with righteous indignation, not maliciousness, greed and lust (1 John 2:16) and other fruits of hell*. A war can be correctly assessed as a feat or a robbery only after an analysis is made of the moral state of the warring parties. "Rejoice not over thy greatest enemy being dead, but remember that we die all," Holy Scriptures says (Sirach

8:8). Christian humane attitude to the wounded and war prisoners is based on the words of St. Paul: "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom. 12:21–22).

VIII. 4 . . .*The Church has a special concern for the military, trying to educate them for the faithfulness to lofty moral ideals*. The agreement concluded by the Russian Orthodox Church with the Armed Forces and law-enforcement agencies opens up considerable opportunities for overcoming the artificially created dividing walls, *for bringing the military back to the established Orthodox traditions of service to the fatherland*. Orthodox pastors, both those who perform special service in the army and those who serve in monasteries and parishes, are called to nourish the military strenuously, taking care of their moral condition.

NOTES

1 See, e.g., the brief and cautious overview of this field in Timothy S. Miller, "Introduction," in Timothy S. Miller and John Nesbit (eds.), *Peace and War in Byzantium. Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), pp. 1–17, at pp. 11–12; cf. the comments in John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204* (London: University College Press, 1999), pp. 2–7, passim.

2 Hildo Bos and Jim Forest (eds.), *For the Peace from Above: An Orthodox Resource Book on War, Peace and Nationalism* (Bialystok: Syndesmos Press, 1999); available at http://www.incommunion.org/2004/10/18/toc/

3 Such as St. Justin Martyr (ca. 100–ca. 165), Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215), St. Hippolytus (ca. 170–ca. 236), Tertullian (ca. 160–ca. 225), Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), St. Cyprian of Carthage (d. 258), Arnobius (third to fourth century), and Lactantius (ca. 250–ca. 325).

4 See note 60 below.

5 On this process, see Hélène Ahrweiler, *L'Idéologie politique de l'empire byzantine* (Paris: P.U.F., 1975), pp. 42ff.; Angeliki E. Laiou, "On Just War in Byzantium," in J. Langdon et al. (eds.), *To Hellenikon,* vol. 1: *Hellenic Antiquity and Byzantium. Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis Jr.* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), pp. 153–177, at pp. 163–164.

6 Laiou, "On Just War in Byzantium" (on the basis of an analysis focused especially on Anna Komnene's *Alexiad*); see the more restricted classification of Byzantine types of just war in W. Treadgold, "Byzantium, the Reluctant Warrior," in N. Christie and M. Yazigi (eds.), *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities: Warfare in the Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 209–33, at pp. 212–213; cf. also Angeliki E. Laiou, "The Just War of Eastern Christians and the Holy War of the Crusaders," in Richard Sorabji and David Rodin (eds.), *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 30–44, at pp. 33–34; George T. Dennis, "Defenders of the Christian People: Holy War in Byzantium," in Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottaheden (eds.), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), pp. 31–41, at pp. 37–38.

7 On the military religious services in the Byzantine army, see J.-R. Vieillefond, "Les pratiques religieuses dans l'armée byzantine d'après les traités militaries," *Revue des études anciennes* 37 (1935), 322–330; Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium and the Early Medieval West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1986), pp. 238–251; George T Dennis, "Religious Services in the Byzantine Army," in E. Carr et al. (eds.), *Eulogē ma: Studies in Honor of Robert Taft, S.J.* (Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1993), pp. 107–118.

8 See James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 22–26.

9 On these developments in the military religious ideology of the Byzantine military classes positioned along the Anatolian frontiers, see Gilbert Dagron and Haralambie Mihăescu (eds.), *Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l'empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963–969)* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1986), pp. 284–286; Tia M. Kolbaba, "Fighting for Christianity: Holy War in the Byzantine Empire," *Byzantion* 68 (1998), 194–221, at 206–207; John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204* (London: University College Press, 1999), pp. 30–32.

10 On the rise, spread, and evolution of the cult of Byzantine military saints, see Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les légendes grecques des saints militaries* (Paris: Librairie A. Picard, 1909); Alexander F. C. Webster, "Varieties of Christian Military Saints: From Martyrs under Caesar to Warrior Princes," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 24 (1980), 3–35; Christopher Walter, *The Warrior Saints in Byzantine Art and Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

11 Some of the relevant studies of this problematic have been reprinted in part 1 in John Haldon (ed.), *Byzantine Warfare* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). For further references and summary of the arguments of both sides of the debate, see Yuri Stoyanov, "Norms of War in Eastern Orthodox Christianity," in G. Reichberg, V. Popovski, and N. Turner (eds.), *World Religions and Norms of War* (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2009), pp. 84–128, at pp. 176–180.

12 See, e.g., Henry Huttenbach, "The Origins of Russian Imperialism," in Taras Hunczak (ed.), *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974), pp. 18–44, at p. 25; Henri Troyat, *Ivan the Terrible*, trans. J. Pinkham (London: Phoenix, 2001), p. 65, and note 78 below.

13 For reasons of space the texts of the ecclesiastical appeals and statements resulting from these initiatives cannot be included here; a number of these documents (including texts highlighting some of the controversies related to the conduct of the Serbian Orthodox Church during the conflicts) have been conveniently assembled in Bos and Forest, *For the Peace*, ch. 9; also available at http://www.incommunion.org/2004/10/18/chapter-9/.

14 A recent issue of *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 47:1 (2003), was entirely devoted to these disputes. For a summary of the debate and its pro and contra arguments, see Stoyanov, "Norms," pp. 208–210.

15 For preliminary typologies of the main trends in Eastern Orthodox perspectives on warfare and their proposed elements, see Webster, *The Price of Prophecy*, pp. 20–23; Paul Robinson, "The Justification of War in Russian History and Philosophy," in Paul Robinson (ed.), *Just War in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 62–75.

16 On the modern Orthodox churches' "refusal to be monolithic" in their approaches to the use of force and the patristic roots of this "pluralistic" approach, see Grant White, "Orthodox Christian Positions on War and Peace," in Semegnish Asfaw, Guillermo Kerber, and Peter Weiderud (eds.), *The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2005), pp. 37–39, at p. 37.

17 For surveys of the principal texts of the genre and their literary and historical contexts, see, e.g., Alphonse Dain, "Les stratégistes byzantins," *Travaux et Mémoires* 2 (1967), 317–392; Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 235–393 passim (with a discussion of the Greco-Roman classical inheritance reworked in the genre at pp. 239–266); Denis Sullivan,

"Byzantine Military Manuals: Prescriptions, Practice, and Pedagogy," in Paul Stephenson (ed.), *The Byzantine World* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 149–161.

18 E. Korzenszky and R. Vári (eds.), *Onasandri Strategicus* (Budapest: Typis Societatis Franklinianae, 1935), p. 10 (Greek text); English translation from: Laiou, "On Just War in Byzantium," p. 167. On the influence of the tract in medieval Byzantium and post-Renaissance Europe and the significance of the early articulation of its just war argument, see Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy*, pp. 253–254.

19 Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 169, *The Taktika of Leo VI*, George Dennis (ed. and trans.) (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2010), p. 594 (Greek text), p. 595 (English translation).

20 Leo VI, *Taktika*, 2.30–31 in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, pp. 34–36 (Greek text); English translation from Haldon, *Warfare*, p. 27.

21 Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 14, 16 in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 624 (Greek text), p. 625 (English translation).

22 Leo VI, *Taktika*, Prologue 4, in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, pp. 2–4 (Greek text), pp. 3–5 (English translation).

23 *Peri Strategikes/De Re Strategica* ("The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy"), 4:9–14, in George T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1985), p. 20 (Greek text), p. 21 (English translation). For an assessment that this statement, with its evident Christian provenance, marks the beginning of the process of "delegitimization of war as valid human undertaking," which has acquired a new impetus in the wake of the global wars of the twentieth century, see Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy*, p. 259.

24 *Strategikon*, Prologue, *Strategikon Arta militară. Mauricius*, H. Mihăescu (ed. and trans.) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1970), p. 44 (Greek text); English translation from George T. Dennis (trans.), *Maurice's Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), p. 9.

25 *Strategikon* 8.2, Mihăescu (ed.), p. 204 (Greek text); English translation in Dennis, *Maurice's Strategikon*, p. 83.

26 Leo VI, *Taktika*, 2.22–23 in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 30 (Greek text), p. 31 (English translation).

27 Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 73, in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 642 (Greek text), p. 643 (English translation).

28 *Strategikon* 2.18, Mihăescu (ed.), pp. 94–95 (Greek text); English translation from Dennis, *Maurice's Strategikon*, pp. 33–34.

29 *Strategikon* 7.17, Mihăescu (ed.), p. 192 (Greek text); English translation from Dennis, *Maurice's Strategikon*, p. 77.

30 Leo VI, *Taktika*, 14.1, in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 290 (Greek text), p. 291 (English translation).

31 Leo VI, Taktika 13.1, in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 278 (Greek text), p. 279 (English translation). The analogous practice prescribed for the pre-combat blessing of the standards of the dromons (a type of Byzantine galley) is prescribed in 19:24.

32 Leo VI, *Taktika* 16.11 in *The Taktika of Leo VI*, p. 386 (Greek text), p. 387 (English translation). For the status of the fallen Christian soldiers and the related religious services, see the section on "Religious Services Commemorating Christian Soldiers" below.

33 *Praecepta Militaria* 4.106–120, in Eric McGeer (ed. and trans.), *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), pp. 13–61, at p. 44 (Greek text), p. 45 (English translation).

These prayer instructions are paraphrased in Nikephoros Ouranos' slightly later *Taktika*, 61.160–172 (999–1011 CE), p. 126 (Greek text), p. 127 (English translation).

34 Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, 15.6.5; *Alexiade: règne de l'empereur Alexis I Comnène, 1081–1118*, B. Leib (ed. and trans.), vol. III, Books XI–XV (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989), p. 209 (Greek text); English translation from *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, E. R. A. Sewter (trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 488.

35 On the genre and *raison d'être* of such military orations, see Eric McGeer, "Two Military Orations of Constantine VII," in John W. Nesbit (ed.), *Byzantine Authors: Literary Activities and Preoccupations: Texts and Translations Dedicated to the Memory of Nicolas Oikonomides* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 111–35, at pp. 113–117.

36 Theophylaktos Simokattes, *History*, 3.13.13–20, *Theophylacti Simocattae Historiarum*, I. Bekker (ed.) (Bonn: Weber, 1834), pp. 142–143 (Greek text); English translation from *The History of Theophylact Simocatta*, Michael Whitby (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 93–94. Given the period when Simokattes's work was written, it is possible that in Justinian's speech he may have actually projected back the notion of heavenly recompense for fallen Christian soldiers developed in the religiously charged wartime rhetoric of Herakleios' anti-Persian campaigns of the 620s (see the following selection of orations) to an earlier Persian-Roman military engagement – see Michael Whitby, "Deus Nobiscum: Christianity, Warfare, and Morale in Late Antiquity," in M. Austin, J. Harries, and C. Smith (eds.), *Modus Operandi: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman* (London: Institute of Classical Studies, SAS, University of London, 1998), pp. 191–208, at p. 194.

37 Theophanes the Confessor, "Chronographia," 303.12–304.13, *Theopahis Chronographia*, Carl de Boor (ed.), 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner 1883–1885); English translation from *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History, AD 284–813*, Cyril Mango and Roger Scott (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 436.

38 Theophanes, "Chronographia," 307.10–11; English translation from Mango and Scott, *The Chronicle of Theophanes*, p. 439.

39 Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 310.25–311.2; English translation from Mango and Scott, *The Chronicle of Theophanes*, pp. 442–443. On the possible provenance of the introduction of the notion of military martyrdom in Herakleios' oration, see James Howard Johnston, "Heraclius' Persian Campaign and the Revival of the East Roman Empire," *War in History* 6 (1996), 1–44, at 40; cf. Yuri Stoyanov, *Defenders and Enemies of the True Cross* (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press, 2011), ch. 3 passim.

40 Cf. Vieillefond, "Les pratiques religieuses"; Sullivan, "Byzantine Military Manuals," pp. 356–357.

41 Edited in Hélène Ahrweiler, "Un discours inédit de Constantin VII Porphyrogénète," *Travaux et Mémoires* 2 (1967), 393–404 (Greek text at 397–399), at 398 and 399; English translation from McGeer, "Two Military Orations," pp. 117–120, at pp. 118, 119.

42 Edited in R. Vári, "Zum historischen Exzerptenwerke des Konstantinos Porphyrogennetos," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 17:1 (1908), 75–85 (Greek text at 78–84, at 80, 83); English translation from McGeer, "Two Military Orations," pp. 127–134, at pp. 129, 132–133.

43 See Robert F. Taft, "War and Peace in the Byzantine Divine Liturgy," in Miller and Nesbit, *Peace and War*, pp. 17–33, at pp. 30–31.

44 Edited in A. Pertusi, "Una acolouthia militare inedita del X secolo," *Aevum* 22 (1948), 145–168; English translation from Paul Stephenson, available at http://homepage.mac.com/paulstephenson/military_texts.html.

45 "We have decreed in regard to those who have once been enrolled in the Clergy or who have become Monks shall not join the army nor obtain any secular position of dignity. Let those be

anathematized who dare to do this and fail to repent, so as to return to that which they had previously chosen on God's account." English translation from *The Pedalion (The Rudder) of the Orthodox Catholic Church: The Compilation of the Holy Canons by Saints Nicodemus and Agapius*, D. Cummings (trans.) (Chicago, Ill.: Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1957; reprint New York 1983), p. 251 (English translation of the collection of Eastern Orthodox canon law, the *Pedalion (The Rudder)*, compiled by St. Nikodemos the Hagiorite (ca. 1749–1809) and the hieromonk Agapios, and published in 1800.

46 For other texts of some of the relevant canons, see Louis J. Swift (ed. and trans.), *The Early Fathers on Law and Military Service* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1983), pp. 90–93. For further analysis of these canons, see Alexander F. C. Webster, *The Pacifist Option: The Moral Argument against War in Eastern Orthodox Theology* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 165–181. On these canonical regulations as instituting a kind of "stratification of pacifism" in the post-Constantinian Christian Church and society, see Stanley S. Harakas, "The Morality of War," in Joseph J. Allen (ed.), *Orthodox Synthesis. The Unity of Theological Thought* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir Seminar Press, 1981), pp. 67–95, at pp. 85ff.

47 St. Athanasios of Alexandria, Epistle 48, *To Ammoun the Monk*, in Georgios A. Rhalles and Michael Potles, *Syntagma ton theion kai hieron kanonon* (Athens: G. Chartophylax, 1852), vol. 4, p. 69; English translation from *The Pedalion (The Rudder)*, Cummings (trans.), pp. 758–760, at pp. 759–760.

48 For this "just war" reading of St. Athanasios' statement, see Alexander F. C. Webster, "Justifiable War as a 'Lesser Good' in Eastern Orthodox Moral Tradition," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 47:1 (2003), 3–59, at 25–27; Haldon, *Warfare*, pp. 16, 26.

49 For this line of interpretation of St. Athanasius' assertion, which also has been gaining currency, see Stanley S. Harakas, "The Teaching of Peace in the Fathers," in Stanley S. Harakas, *The Wholeness of Faith and Life: Orthodox Christian Ethics: Part One: Patristic Ethics* (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Orthodox Press), ch. 6, pp. 155–156; John A. McGuckin, "Non-Violence and Peace Traditions in Early and Eastern Christianity," in K. Kuriakose (ed.), *Religion, Terrorism and Globalisation: Non-Violence – A New Agenda* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006), pp. 189–202; John A. McGuckin, *The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to Its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 403–404. Cf. Swift, *The Early Fathers*, p. 95.

50 St. Basil the Great, *Epistle* 188.13, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 4, p. 131; English translation from *Pedalion (The Rudder)*, Cummings (trans.), p. 801.

51 English translation and analysis of the canon in Swift, *The Early Fathers*, p. 93.

52 See, e.g., Harakas, "The Teaching of Peace"; McGuckin, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 403–405.

53 St. Basil, *Homily 21 on Psalm 61*, 4; English translation from *Saint Basil Exegetic Homilies*, Sister Agnes C. Way (trans.) (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), pp. 341–351, at pp. 345–346.

54 St. Basil, *Letter 106*: "I have become acquainted with a man who demonstrated that it is possible even in the military profession to maintain perfect love for God . . . ," *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 32, col. 513; English translation from Swift, *The Early Fathers*, p. 94.

55 *Pedalion (The Rudder)*, Cummings (trans.), pp. 801–802.

56 Ioannes Scylitzes, *Synoposis Historiarum*, Hans Thurn (ed.) (New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), pp. 274–275; English translation from Jonathan Shepard available at http://www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/hca/classics/featureResources/practicalAdvice/NonLanguageTeaching/Teaching_Byzantium.pdf.

57 See the analysis of the differentiation between the imperial and clerical strands of Byzantine Christianity in the sphere of legitimizing warfare and the status of the Christian soldier in Paul Stephenson, "Imperial Christianity and Sacred War in Byzantium," in James K. Wellman, Jr. (ed.), *Belief and Bloodshed: Religion and Violence across Time and Tradition* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 81–97, in which the differentiation between the "Old Testament in tone" imperial Christianity and the "more New Testament–oriented Christianity of the clergy" postulated in Gilbert Dagron, *Emperor and Priest. The Imperial Office in Byzantium*, J. Birrell (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1, 103–104, passim, is applied to the sphere of the ideology of Byzantine warfare.

58 A monk ordained as a priest whose duties include conducting the services in the monastic church.

59 Theodore Balsamon, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 4, p. 133 (Greek text); English translation from Patrick Viscuso, "Christian Participation in Warfare: A Byzantine View," in Miller and Nesbit, *Peace and War*, pp. 33–41, at p. 38.

60 Ioannes Zonaras, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 4, p. 132 (Greek text); English translation from Viscuso, "Christian Participation," p. 38.

61 Matthew Blastares, *Commentary on St. Basil's Thirteenth Canon*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 6, pp. 488–493, at p. 489 (Greek text); English translation from Viscuso, "Christian Participation," p. 34.

62 Blastares, *Commentary*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 6, p. 492; English translation from Viscuso, "Christian Participation," p. 38.

63 Balsamon, *Commentary*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 4, p. 133; Blastares, *Commentary*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 6, p. 492.

64 For a lucid discussion of Blastares' theological and scriptural argumentation to affirm St. Basil's canon, see Viscuso, "Christian Participation."

65 Blastares, *Commentary*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 6, pp. 491–492; English translation from Viscuso, "Christian Participation," p. 37.

66 Blastares, *Commentary*, Rhalles and Potles, *Syntagma*, vol. 6, p. 489; English translation from Viscuso, "Christian Participation," p. 34.

67 Anna Komnene, *Alexiad*, 10.8.8, *Alexiade: règne de l'empereur Alexis I Comnène, 1081–1118*, B. Leib (ed. and trans.), vol. 2, Books V–X (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1943), pp. 218–219 (Greek text); English translation from *The Alexiad*, Sewter (trans.), p. 317.

68 Colossians 2:21.

69 Psalms 59:2, 139:19.

70 *Vita Constantini*, in *Kliment Okhridskii. Sŭbrani sŭchineniia*, B. S. Angelov and K. Kodov (eds.) (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bŭlgarskata Akademiia na Naukite, 1973), vol. 3, pp. 89–109, at p. 93. English translation from *The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church*, available on the website of the Moscow patriarchate at http://www.mospat.ru/index.php?mid=90i.

71 See, e.g., the insightful analysis in David K. Goodin, "Just War Theory and Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Theological Perspective on the Doctrinal Legacy of Chrysostom and Constantine-Cyril," *Theandros: An Online Journal of Orthodox Christian Theology and Philosophy* 2(3), 2005; available at http://www.theandros.com/justwar.html; cf. Marian Gh. Simion, "Seven Factors of Ambivalence in Defining a Just War Theory in Eastern Christianity,"

in Marian Gh. Simion and Ilie Tălpaşanu (eds.), *Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Congress of the American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Montreal: Polytechnic International Press, 2008), pp. 537–543, at p. 539.

72 Despite becoming moderately and progressively more acquainted with crusading ideology in the era of the Crusades the Byzantine church elites retained a generally negative stance toward its principal notions regarding the status of the Christian warrior. This is also demonstrated by the fact that, in contrast to the high and late medieval Western Christendom, medieval Byzantine ecclesiastics took the formal step to respectively promise remission of sins and bestow martyrdom on Byzantine soldiers who died in battle only on two occasions which clearly represent exceptions to the prevalent clerical attitudes; on religious and historical context of these occasions, see Stoyanov, "Norms of War," pp. 171–172.

73 Leo VI, *Taktika*, 18.127, Dennis (ed. and trans.), respectively pp. 484 (Greek text) and 485 (English translation); see also the observations of Gilbert Dagron, "Byzance et le modèle islamique au Xe siècle, à propos des *Constitutions tactiques* de l'empereur Léon VI," *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 127 (4) (Paris, 1983), pp. 219–243, at p. 223.

74 Leo VI, *Taktika*, 14.31, Dennis (ed. and trans.), respectively pp. 306 (Greek text) and 307 (English translation); see also the observations of Dagron, "Byzance et le modèle islamique," pp. 230–231, and Stephenson, "Imperial Christianity," p. 89.

75 Leo VI, *Taktika*, Epilogue 72, Dennis (ed. and trans.), respectively pp. 560–562 (Greek text) and 561–563 (English translation).

76 T. Détorakis and J. Mossay, "Un office inédit pour ceux qui sont morts à la guerre, dans le Cod. Sin. Gr. 734–735," *Le Muséon* 101 (1988), 183–211; English translation from Paul Stephenson, "'About the emperor Nikephoros and how he leaves his bones in Bulgaria': A Context for the Controversial Chronicle of 811," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 60 (2006), 87–109, at 107–108.

77 See Mari Isoaho, *The Image of Aleksandr Nevskiy in Medieval Russia: Warrior and Saint* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 53–67.

78 *Povest' vremennykh let*, *Lavrent'evskaiia letopis'*, 137–139, *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 1: *Lavrent'evskaia letopis'* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1926), pp. 96–98 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle, Laurentian Text*, Samuel H. Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.) (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 129–130.

79 *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 172; *Polnoe sobranie*, p. 121 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), p. 149.

80 *Primary Chronicle*, Laurentian Text, 232–233; *Polnoe sobranie*, pp. 162–163 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), p. 183.

81 *Primary Chronicle*, 276; *Polnoe Sobranie*, p. 193 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), p. 200.

82 *Chronicle*, 278–279; *Polnoe Sobranie*, pp. 194–195 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), p. 201.

83 *Primary Chronicle*, 282; *Polnoe Sobranie*, p. 197 (Old Russian text); English translation from *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds. and trans.), pp. 203–204.

84 On the provenance of the report of this meeting and St. Sergius' reputed blessing of the campaign of the Golden Horde, the time of its introduction into the life of the saint and its

religio-political underpinnings, see David B. Miller, "The Cult of Saint Sergius of Radonezh and Its Political Uses," *Slavic Review* 52:4 (1993), 680–699, at 692–693.

85 *Life of St. Sergius of Radonezh* 8, *Zhitiia Sergiia Radonezhskogo*, L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev (eds.), *Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi XIV-seredina XV veka* (Moscow: Khudozh. Literatura, 1981), pp. 256–429, at pp. 386–88 (Old Russian text); English translation from *Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales*, Serge A. Zenkovsky (ed. and trans.) (New York: Dutton, 1963), pp. 208–236, at pp. 230–231.

86 For other contemporaneous and later Russian accounts and interpretations of the Battle of Kulikovo, which emphasize what they consider or reconstruct as its religious aspects, see Irina Moroz, "The Idea of the Holy War in the Orthodox World (on Russian Chronicles from the Twelfth-Sixteenth Century)," pp. 52–58, available at http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/pdfs/moroz.pdf. On pronouncements coming from within the modern Russian Orthodox Church regarding the just cause of Dmitrii Donskoi's campaign against the Golden Horde and the Russian Church's role in legitimizing his war effort, see Alexander F. C. Webster, *The Price of Prophecy: Orthodox Churches on Peace, Freedom, and Security* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993), pp. 203–204.

87 *Zadonshchina*, in *Skazaniia i povesti o Kulikovskoi bitve* (Tales and Stories of the Battle of Kulikov), L. A. Dmitriev and O. P. Likhacheva (eds.) (Leningrad: Nauka, 1982), pp. 369–374 (Old Russian text); English translation from *Medieval Russia's Epics*, Zenkovsky, pp. 186–198.

88 See the analysis of Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology, 1438–1560s* (The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1974), pp. 177–283; Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 133–249.

89 Maxim the Greek, *Epistle to Grand Prince Vasilii III*, V. F. Ržiga (ed.), "Opity po istorii russkoi publitsistiki XVI veka" (Experimental Essays on the History of Russian Social and Political Journalism in the 16th century), *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 1 (1943), 111–116, at 113 and 115; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, p. 185.

90 For analysis of and quotations from the aggressive plan for military-political action against the Kazan Khanate that Peresvetov proposed to Ivan IV and its religious components, see Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, pp. 190–192.

91 Makarii, Metropolitan of Moscow and all Russia, *Second Epistle to Ivan IV (13 July 1552)*, in *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu* (Chronicle Collection Named Patriarch's or Nikon's Chronicle), *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles) (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia I. N. Skorokhodova, 1904; reprint Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 192–197, at p. 193; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, p. 199.

92 Ivan IV, *Address to Metropolitan Makarii and the Ecclesiastical Assembly*, in *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu*, pp. 223–225, at p. 224; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, pp. 242–243.

93 Ivan IV, *Address to Metropolitan Makarii*, in *Letopisnyi sbornik*, p. 225; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, p. 207.

94 Metropolitan Makarii, *Address to Ivan IV* (October 1552), in *Letopisnyi sbornik*, pp. 225–227, at p. 226; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, pp. 201–202.

95 For a recent reinstatement, see, among others, Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie, *Ivan the Terrible* (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 47, 206; see also the analysis of the notion of heavenly rewards for Russian Christian warriors fighting in the campaigns against Kazan in Metropolitan Makarii's statements in Moroz, "The Idea of Holy War," pp. 62–63.

96 For a recent reinstatement, see, among others, Galina M. Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 30.

97 *Diplomatic Note to the Lithuanian Magnates*, in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskom gosudarstvom* (Monuments of the Diplomatic Relations between the State of Muscovy and the United Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), *Pt. 2 (1553–1560)*, G. F. Karpov (gen. ed.), *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva*, 59 (1887), p. 372; English translation from Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, p. 208.

98 Petr P. Shafirov, *Razsuzhdenie kakie zakonnye prichiny Petr I, tsar' i povelitel' vserossiiskikh k nachatiiu voiny protiv Karla XII, korolia shvedskogo, v 1700 imel* (1717); both the Russian original text and anonymous English translation from 1722 are reproduced in an edition prepared by William E. Butler: Peter P. Shafirov, *A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the War between Sweden and Russia: 1700–1721* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1973), with an introduction by Butler that situates the tract within the context of contemporaneous international law of war and Russian just war thinking.

99 Shafirov, *A Discourse*, pp. 241, 273–274.

100 Petr Shafirov, *Rassuzhdenie, kakie zakonnye prichiny Petr I, tsar' i povelitel' vserossiĭskiĭ, k nachatiiu voĭny protiv Karla XII, korolia shvedskogo, v 1700 godu imel* (A Discourse Concerningthe Just Reasons Which His Czarish Majesty, Peter I, Had for the Beginning of the War against the King of Sweden, Charles XII), V. Tomsinov (ed.) (Moscow: Zertsalo, 2008), p. 175; elsewhere in the tract Shafirov claims that the Swedish King dispatched Russian Christian civilian captives as a gift to the Sultan to serve as slaves on his galleys where half of them perished.

101 Shafirov, *A Discourse*, pp. 336–337.

102 Aleksei Khomiakov, "Pis'mo k priiateliu-inostrantsu pered' nachalom vostochnoi voiny" (Letter to a Foreign Friend on the Eve of the Eastern [Crimean] War), *Polnoe sobranīe sochinenii Alekseia Stepanovicha Khomiakova*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1900), vol. 3, pp. 187–205 (Russian text); English translation from *The Mind of Modern Russia: Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age*, Hans Kohn (ed.) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955), pp. 108–112. The letter articulates the general outrage in Russia provoked by Western powers (such as the British and French empires) joining the Ottoman empire in an anti-Russian coalition during the Crimean War.

103 Fedor Tiutchev, "Rossiia i Revoliutsiia," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii F.I. Tiutcheva*, P. V. Bikov (ed.) (St. Petersburg: Izd. T-va A. F. Marks, 1913), pp. 456–475 (Russian text); English translation from Jesse Zeldin, *Poems and Political Letters of F. I. Tyutchev* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), pp. 176–187, at pp. 186–187.

104 Fedor Tiutchev, "Razsvet," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii F.I. Tiutcheva*, p. 293 (Russian text); English translation from Zeldin, *Poems*, pp. 131–132. Both "Dawn" and the following political poem, "A Prophecy," were written by Tiutchev in anticipation of a Russian-Ottoman conflict that materialized in the Crimean War.

105 Fedor Tiutchev, "Prorochestvo," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii F.I. Tiutcheva*, p. 294 (Russian text); English translation from Zeldin, *Poems*, p. 132.

106 Nikolai Danilevskii, *Rossiia i Evropa*, 5th ed. (St. Petersburg: Tip. brat. Panteleevykh, 1895); English translation from *The Mind*, Kohn, pp. 195–211, at pp. 201, 209, 210.

107 Danilevskii, *Rossiia i Evropa*, pp. 474–475 (Russian text); English translation from Michael B. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 281–282.

108 Ivan Aksakov, "O vostochnom voprose" (On the Eastern Question), Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi literaturnyi arkhiv/Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva, fond

10, op.1/219; English translation from Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 497.

109 Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, "Kremlin Address," in Sergei Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie* (Emperor Alexander II, His Life and Reign) (St. Petersburg: Izd. A. S. Suvorina, 1903), vol. 1, pp. 335–336 (Russian text); English translation from Benedict Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870–1880* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 227. The Tsar's address was delivered in the buildup to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and was greeted with euphoria in Russian Pan-Slav circles; few days after the speech Russia mobilized troops of 160,000 men.

110 *Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova, 1860–1886* (Moscow: Tip. M. G. Volchaninova, 1886), vol. 1, pp. 266–280, at pp. 273, 274–275 (Russian text); English translation from Ol'ga Novikova, *Russia and England from 1876 to 1880: A Protest and an Appeal* (London: Longmans, Green, 1880), pp. 52–61, at pp. 56, 57. The speech was delivered roughly five months after the beginning of the Russo-Ottoman War. For the continuous commemoration of the war by the Russian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches as a "sacred cause"/"sacred war of liberation" and the contribution of the Russian and Bulgarian clergy to the war effort, see Webster, *The Price of Prophecy*, pp. 204–207.

111 *Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova*, pp. 297–308, at p. 307 (Russian text); English translation from Novikova, *Russia and England*, pp. 99–106, at pp. 105–106. The speech was delivered as a protest against the decisions of the Congress/Treaty of Berlin (13 June–13 July 1878), which was seen in Russian Pan-Slav circles as reversing many of the gains of the Russo-Ottoman War and betraying the Pan-Slav cause. Following his speech Aksakov was exiled for several months and the Pan-Slav Slavonic Benevolent Committee was closed down.

112 See, e.g., the analysis of Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, *Tolstoy's Quest for God* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007), pp. 96–99.

113 Lev Tolstoi, *V chem moiia vera?* (1884); English translation from Lev Tolstoi, *My Religion* (London: W. Scott, 1890), pp. 7–8.

114 Lev Tolstoi, *Tsarstvo Bozhie vnutri vas* (1893); English translation from: Lev Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God Is within You*, Constance Garnett (trans.) (London: William Heinemann, 1894), pp. 45, 46, 47, 48, 50. In these passages Tolstoi summarizes the main negative responses to his ideas on nonviolence and pacifism, ideas that he considers a reflection and reinstatement of the Gospel precepts of nonresistance to evil by force.

115 Lev Tolstoy, *Zakon nasiliia i zakon liubvi* (1908); English translation from Lev Tolstoy, *The Law of Love and the Law of Violence*, Mary Tolstoy (trans.) (London: Anthony Blond, 1970), pp. 32, 92, 96.

116 Lev Tolstoi, "Dve voiny" (1898); English translation from *Tolstoy's Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence*, A. Maude (trans.) (New York: Bergman Publishers, 1967), pp. 21–29, at pp. 22–23.

117 Lev Tolstoi, "Po povodu zaveshchaniia Nobelia" (1897); English translation from Lev Tolstoi, "Nobel's Bequest," in *Tolstoy's Writings*, pp. 233–241, at p. 238.

118 Lev Tolstoi, "Posleslovie k 'Zhizn' i smert' Drozhina" (1895); English translation from Lev Tolstoi, "Postscript to the 'Life and Death of Ivan Drozhin,'" in *Tolstoy's Writings*, pp. 349–377, at p. 355.

119 Lev Tolstoi, "Po povodu kongressa o mire" (1899); English translation from Lev Tolstoi "Letter to a Peace Conference," in *Tolstoy's Writings*, pp. 149–159, at p. 156.

120 Lev Tolstoi, "Patriotism ili mir" (1896); English translation from Lev Tolstoi, "Patriotism or Peace," *Tolstoy's Writings*, pp. 137–149, at p. 145.

121 Vladimir Solov'ev, *Opravdanie dobra. Nravstvennaia filosofiia* (The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy), in *Sochineniia V. S. Solov'eva*, S. Solov'ev and E. Radlov (eds.) (St. Petersburg: N. F. Merts, 1903), vol. 8 (Russian text); English translation from *The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy*, Nathalie Duddington (trans.) (London: Constable, 1918), pp. 387, 404, 405, 406.

122 Vladimir Solov'ev, *Tri razgovora* (Three Conversations), in *Sochineniia* (Writings), Solov'ev and Radlov, vol. 10, pp. 81–197 (Russian text); English translation from *War and Christianity from the Russian Point of View: Three Conversations*, Stephen Graham (trans.) (London: Constable & Company, 1915), pp. 10–11. The book is written as a discussion between five characters; in the present extract the Prince represents Tolstoiism, the General militarism, and Mr. Z. the views of the author.

123 Vladimir Solov'ev, "Vizantinizm i Rossia" (Byzantinism and Russia), in *Sochineniia*, Solov'ev and Radlov, vol. 7, pp. 287–325 (Russian text); English translation from Vladimir Solov'ev, "Byzantinism and Russia," in *Freedom, Faith, and Dogma: Essays by V.S. Soloviev on Christianity and Judaism*, Vladimir Wozniuk (ed. and trans.) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), pp. 191–229, at pp. 195, 196. Solov'ev is referring to the Grand Princes of Kievan Rus', Vladimir I (958–1015, who embraced Christianity in 988) and Vladimir II Monomakh (1053–1125).

124 See, e.g., Viacheslav Ivanov, "Vselenskoe delo (The Universal Task)," *Russkaia Mysl'* 12 (1914), 97–107.

125 Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii, "Khristianskaiia vera i voina," *Russkii inok* 21 (November 1916), 872–877; English translation from Metropolitan Antony Khrapovitsky, *The Christian Faith and War* (Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1973), pp. 5–6, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16.

126 See section on "Eastern Orthodox Canon Law" above.

127 Ibid.

128 Anton Kersnosvkii, *Filosofiia voiny* (The Philosophy of War) (Belgrade, 1939), p. 9. Translation by Y. Stoyanov.

129 Ivan Il'in, *O soprotivlenii zlu siloiu* (On Resistance to Evil by Force) (1925), in *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh*, E. Antonova (ed.) (Moscow: Medium, 1993), pp. 301–480, at pp. 307, 454. Translation by Y. Stoyanov.

130 Nikolai Berdiaev, *O rabstve i svoboda cheloveka* (Slavery and Freedom) (1939); English translation from *Christian Existentialism: A Berdyaev Anthology*, Donald Lowrie (ed. and trans.) (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 301, 302.

131 Nikolai Berdiaev, *Dialectique existentielle du divin et de l'humain* (Paris: J. B. Janin, 1947); English translation from *Christian Existentialism*, p. 303.

132 Vladimir Losskii, *Sept jours sur les routes de France* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1998); English translation from *The Teachings of Modern Orthodox Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature*, John Witte, Jr., and Frank Alexander (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 213, 214.

133 Mother Maria Skobtsova, "Prozrenie v voine" (Insight in Wartime), in *Mat' Mariia. Vospominaniia, stat'i, ocherki* (Mother Maria. Memoires, Articles and Essays) (Paris: YMCA Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 312–337 (Russian text); English translation from *The Teachings of Modern Orthodox Christianity*, pp. 288–290, at p. 289.

134 G. Raşcanu, *Biserica Orthodoxă Română. Jurnalul periodic ecclesiasticu* 4:3 (1877–1878), 178 (Romanian text); English translation from Silviu Hariton, "Religion, Nationalism and Militarism in Nineteenth Century Romania," *Études Balkaniques* 44:4 (2008), 9–36, at 22.

135 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *Serbia in Light and Darkness* (London: Longmans, Green, 1916), p. 40.

136 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *Agony of the Church* (London: Student Christian Movement, 1917), pp. 64–65.
137 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, *The Serbian People as a Servant of God* 53 (publ. posth. 1984); available at http://www.sv-luka.org/library/ServantOfGod.html.
138 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´, "Kosovo i Vidovdan" (1939); available at http://www.svetosavlje.org/biblioteka/vlNikolaj/KosovoiVidovdan/KosovoiVidovdan10.htm (Serbian text). Translation by Y. Stoyanov.
139 Patriarch Gavrilo V of Serbia, "U cˇemu je znacˇaj 27. marta," *Memoari patriarcha srpskog Gavrila* (Belgrade: Sfairos, 1991), p. 270; English translation from Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 17.
140 Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov, "Bor'ba za veru i tserkov" (The Struggle for Faith and Church), in A. I. Vvedenskii, *Tserkov' Patriarkha Tikhona* (The Church of Patriarch Tikhon) (Moscow, 1923), pp. 45–47; English translation from John S. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown), p. 50.
141 St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow, "Poslanie (19.01/01.02.1918)" (Pastoral Letter), in A. I. Vvedenskii, *Tserkov' i gosudarstvo* (Church and State) (Moscow, 1923), pp. 114–115; English translation from *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, p. 49.
142 St. Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow, "Poslanie patriarkha Tikohona Sovetu Narodnykh Komisarov" (Letter to the Council of People's Commissars [26 October 1918]), *Tserkovnye Vedomosti (Vysshee Russkoe Tserkovnoe Upravlenie za granitse)* 9–10 (1925), 20–21. Translation by Y. Stoyanov. In this letter St. Tikhon denounces the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (1918), whose terms were seen in Russia as humiliating and unfair.
143 On church–state relations in wartime Soviet Russia and their impact on the ideology of warfare endorsed by the church, see Steven Miner, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
144 Metropolitan Sergius, "Sermon" (12 August 1941), in Moskovskaiia Patriarkhiia, *The Truth about Religion in Russia* (London: Hutchinson, 1944), pp. 43, 44.
145 Ibid., pp. 46–47, 48.
146 Metropolitan Aleksei of Leningrad, "Sermon" (10 August 1941), in *The Truth about Religion in Russia*, p. 49.
147 Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, "Sermon" (3 August 1941), in *The Truth about Religion in Russia*, pp. 53–54.
148 Archpriest A. P. Smirnov, "Sermon" (4 December 1941), in *The Truth about Religion in Russia*, pp. 58–59.
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152 For an English-language account of the Patriarchate of Moscow's peace-making activities coming from within the church, see *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov': The Russian Orthodox Church*, Doris Bradbury (trans.) (Moscow: Progress, 1982), pp. 112–135; for a critical account, see Webster, *The Price of Prophecy*, chs. 5 and 6 passim.
153 Patriarch Justinian of Romania, "Evangelical Humanism and Christian Responsibility," in *The Orthodox Church in the Ecumenical Movement: Documents and Statements 1902–1975*, Constantin Patelos (ed.) (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1978), pp. 248–250, at p. 249.
154 Patriarch Pimen of Moscow, "An Orthodox View on Contemporary Ecumenism," in *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 325–337, at pp. 335, 336.

155 Patriarch Cyril of Bulgaria (1953–1971), "Address of Welcome to Dr. Eugene Blake," in *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 280–282, at p. 281.
156 "Orthodox Perspectives on Justice and Peace," in *Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation: Insights from Orthodoxy*, Gennadios Limouris (ed.) (Geneva: WCC Publications), pp. 16–28, at pp. 17–18.
157 Patriarch Bartholomew I, "Environment, Peace and, Economy," in Bartholomew I, *Cosmic Grace – Humble Prayer: The Ecological Vision of the Green Patriarch Bartholomew*, John Chryssavgis (ed.) (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 237–243, at pp. 239–240, 241, 242.
158 Patriarch Bartholomew I, "War and Suffering," pp. 261–264, at pp. 262, 263.
159 Jubilee Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, "War and Peace," in *The Orthodox Church and Society: The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church* (Belleville, Mich.: St. Innocent, Firebird Publishers, 2000), available at http://www.mospat.ru/index.php?mid=90.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Due to limitations of space, the following list of readings includes only titles published shortly prior to or after the submission of the manuscript and thus could not be taken into account while completing the chapter.

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