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Land Tenure and Social Change in Tanzania: A Study of Kinyanambo Village, Mufindi District

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Land Tenure and Social Change in Tanzania:
A Study of Kinyanambo Village, Mufindi District

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

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Abstract

This study traces the historical development of land tenure in Kinyanambo village, Mufindi District, Tanzania, from pre-colonial times to the present day. It demonstrates the evolution of a predominantly individualised land market and the gradual commoditisation of land, processes which originated in the long-term commoditisation of agriculture and which were energised by the arrival of non-African settlers from the 1920s. Land tenure evolved more or less independently of national land tenure policy until 1974. Villagisation then altered the evolutionary path of the local land tenure system, marking a fundamental breakpoint in people's understandings of their land rights and in the local social and political system. Together with the birth of Mafinga town, it created the conditions for the rapid and more geographically concentrated growth of the local population, for urbanisation, and for associated changes in livelihoods, land use, and in relations between people and land.

By 2000, following subsequent economic reforms, Kinyanambo had a deep-rooted, widespread and socially legitimate market in land. Although people's access to land can be eased by their social and political connections, the market is now the primary means of access to land in Kinyanambo – anyone with money can obtain land, provided that they follow the correct local procedures. Yet Kinyanambo's land market has evolved in the face of Tanzania's official discourse on land and the local land tenure system thus contains many problematic tensions, arising from this split between custom and law.

In analysing land tenure and social change particular attention is paid to wealth, gender and '*uenyeji*' and to the links between livelihoods and land. This study demonstrates the value of the property rights approach to land tenure, as the basis of an eclectic analytical approach which is historically and empirically grounded and incorporates solid analysis of social relations and political power.

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The research for this work was fully completed by the end of 2001, the delay in submission being due to the birth of my son.

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Abbreviations

AARW	Action to Assist Rural Women
AC	Area Commissioner
BBTL	Brooke Bond Tanzania Ltd
BRALUP	Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, UDS
CBMS/IMC	Conference of British Missionary Societies/International Missionary Council
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCTRES	Christian Council of Tanzania Refugee and Emergency Services
DALDO	District Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer
DC	District Commissioner
DCDOs	District Community Development Officers
DLDO	District Land Development Officer
DRPT	Devplan Regional Planning Team
DS	District Surveyor
DTO	District Trade Officer
DURPO	District Urban and Rural Planning Officer
DVO	District Valuation Officer
EARC	East Africa Royal Commission
EFC	Escarpment Forestry Company Ltd
Envirocare	Environmental, Human Rights Care and Gender Organization
ETLR	Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FT	The Financial Times
GN	Government Notice
GOT	Government of Tanganyika
ha	Hectares
Hakiardhi	Land Rights Research and Resources Institute
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment, UDS
IRLO	Inginga Regional Land Office
IRSMO	Inginga Regional Surveys and Mapping Office
IRT	Individualisation, Registration and Titling
IRUPO	Inginga Regional Urban Planning Office
km	Kilometres
LDS	Land Development Survey
MDC	Mufindi District Council
MDLO	Mufindi District Land Office
MET	Mufindi Education Trust
MLSRD	Ministry of Land Department of Surveys and Mapping, Survey Records Department
MLUP	Mafinga Land Use Plan (1986-1996)
MP	Member of Parliament
MRT	Mbeya Registry of Title
MTC	Mufindi Tea Company
NALAF	National Land Forum
NAP	National Agricultural Policy
NLP	National Land Policy
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SHFM	Sao Hill Forest Manager
SHTL	Sao Hill Timber Ltd
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
SPM	Southern Paper Mills
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TAWLA	Tanzania Women Lawyers' Association
TAZARA	Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority

TEC	Tanganyika Extract Company
TFA	Tanzania Farmers' Association
TPB	Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board
TPPM	Tanzania Pyrethrum Processing and Marketing Company Ltd
TSh	Tanzanian Shilling
TTCL	Tanganyika Tea Company Ltd
TWICO	Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation
UDS	University of Dar-es-Salaam
UN	United Nations
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania
WW1	World War One
WW2	World War Two

Conversions and Equivalences

1ha = 2.47 acres

100ha = 1km²

1km = 0.625 miles

£1 = TSh 1,200 (the exchange rate during most of my fieldwork)

Glossary of Kiswahili and Kihehe Terms

- Ajira* – employment (permanent and salaried)
Akida – section or district administrator, senior to *jumbe*
Ardhi – land
Balozi (pl. *mabalози*) – ten cell leader, lowest level TANU/CCM party official
Bati – corrugated iron sheet, metal roof
Bi (short for *Bibi*) – grandmother, title used to address elderly women
Binti – daughter, title used to address young, childless, unmarried women
Bustani (pl. *mabustani*) – irrigated farm or garden
Chai – tea
Fundi (pl. *mafundi*) – skilled worker, craftsman
Jumbe – headman
Gharama - expenses
Karani wa kijiji – village leader, subordinate to *jumbe*
Kaya – family, group of people who cook together and identify as a house, economic unit
Kazi – work
Kilimo duni – low-input, low-output agriculture
Kiwanda (pl. *viwanda*) – industrial site, any plot where business or industry is carried out
Kufuata mashamba – to follow farms, to move in order to obtain specific areas of land
Kufuata ndugu – to follow a relative (kin or affine), to move somewhere you have relatives, because they are there
Kuhama – to move from
Kula hela – to eat money, to wrongfully take or cream off money that is not yours
Kulazimishwa – to be caused to be necessary, to be forced
Kupima – to survey or measure
Kusimamia – to stand over, support, manage, supervise
Kusogeza – to cause to move, to push
Lunanzi – subordinate to *karani wa kijiji*
Madebe – storage tins
Magunia – storage sacks
Mali – property
Mama – mother, title used to address most women
Marehemu – the deceased, title used to refer to dead people
Mastoo – outdoor crop stores
Matuta – tie ridges
Mbuga – swampy land
Mgeni (pl. *wageni*) – newcomer, stranger, outsider, guest or foreigner
Mgogoro – trouble, worry, popularly used to mean a conflict or dispute
Mibeho (Kihehe) – obligatory payments made to *jumbe* to hear cases
Msaada – help, financial support
Mwenyeji (pl. *wenyeji*) – inhabitant, local or resident
Mwenyeji kabisa (pl. *wenyeji kabisa*) – totally original inhabitant
Mwenyeji kabisa sana – very much totally an original inhabitant
Mzee – old person, man of status, title used to address most men
Pombe – maize or millet beer
Porini – a place in the wilds, an uncultivated place
Posho – rations, daily supply of food, maintenance
Rasilimali – resources, assets, capital
Rushwa – bribes
Shamba (pl. *mashamba*) – rain-fed farm
Siri – secret
Uenyeji – localness (my conceptual term)
Ufundi – skilled work (self-employed)
Uhamisho – abstract noun of 'causing to move'
Ujamaa – familyhood, Tanzanian socialism (Nyerere's conceptual term)
Ukabila – tribalism
Ulanzi (Kihehe) – alcoholic drink made from the sap of *vitindi* trees

Uma – the people as a whole

Utaratibu – rules, regulations, procedures

Utawala – the state

Vibarua – wage labour (casual, unskilled and daily or weekly paid)

Vihamba – Wachagga coffee and banana plots

Vinyungu (Kihehe) – river-irrigated (riverine) farms or gardens

Vitindi (Kihehe) – species of bamboo trees

Wananchi – citizens

Wazazi – parents

Generally in Kiswahili, the prefix Wa- denotes a group of people, M- a single person, Ki- denotes language and U- denotes place.

Chapter One

Introduction

"Hapa Tanzania hatuuzi ardhi."

- "Here in Tanzania we don't sell land."
(Kinyanambo village leader, February 2000)

"Kama ana haki ya kununua, basi ana haki ya kuuza."

- "If [a person] has a right to buy then [he or she] has a right to sell."
(Kinyanambo villager, February 2000)

This study is an historical exploration of changing land tenure in one Tanzanian village. By closely examining this particular case I have been able to shed light on people's understandings of their land rights and on some of the tensions that are commonplace in modern Tanzania. Yet my arguments and conclusions are more widely relevant to land policy-making across Sub-Saharan Africa. My work contributes to a growing body of literature on land and development in Africa¹ that contains substantial theoretical and empirical debate on a wide variety of issues (Palmer 1997). In order to site this study therein it is thus important from the outset to be aware of the broader context of current interest in land. Three key markers are policy reform, urbanisation and agricultural productivity/food security.

The first, policy reform, is a response to perceived agrarian crisis, of which food shortages, falling agricultural output, population pressure, landlessness, and deteriorating living standards are variously reported as evidence (e.g. Okoth-Ogendo 1993; World Bank 1989). Since the early 1980s there have been widespread attempts to address this crisis through the adoption of so-called structural adjustment and stabilisation policies, typically including market, price and trade liberalisation, privatisation, foreign investment promotion and democratisation. Although the emphasis has shifted to poverty reduction, local capacity- and institution-building, disease (HIV/AIDS) control, debt relief, and environmental sustainability (e.g. Economist 2001b; FT 2001; Narayan 1997; Voipio & Hoebink 1999; World Bank 2000:pp.3-4, 7-8, 21-24), the original policy foundations remain. The current context in which land arises as an issue for

¹ Africa refers henceforth to Sub-Saharan Africa.

policy-makers is therefore marked firstly by these economic and political reforms (Havnevik 1997a; McAuslan 1998:p.525).

Havnevik (1997a) describes the connection between land, agrarian crisis and policy reform well. As rural people have diversified their livelihood strategies in response to deepening poverty, migration to urban areas has increased. However retrenchment in the public and formal sectors (in response to and as part of reforms) has closed off many urban options, thereby increasing pressure on the land and natural resources in rural areas that more people are then forced to depend on for survival. As a result, he argues that there is now a “three-way contestation over land” in Africa, between small farmers and pastoralists, large farmers and investors, and weakened states that are reluctant to relinquish control of land (Ibid:p.3). Yet the state itself is comprised of individuals with their own interests, whilst the membership of any interest group is fluid, adapting in accordance with local circumstances. In this study I therefore consider differential interests in land by wealth, gender and what I call ‘*uenyeji*’ (lit. ‘localness’)² – a characteristic defined in Chapter Two.

The second marker of current interest in land arises in the urbanisation pointed to by Havnevik (1997a). This is especially relevant as Tanzania has one of the highest rates of urbanisation in Africa – her urban population having increased, as a proportion of total population, from 15% in 1980 to 26% in 1998 (Mbilinyi 1997:p.10; Raikes 1986:p.119; World Bank 2000:p.233). Widespread urbanisation of rural areas in Africa, through the development and growth of small regional or district trading-centres and towns, is a major force for change that will make land policy more pressing as land becomes a relatively more monetarily valuable resource. Evidence of this phenomenon has yet to appear widely in the urbanisation literature, which focuses more on cities (e.g. World Bank 2000:Chapter 6). Here, however, I examine the processes of change in rural livelihoods and access to land that come with the rapid urbanisation of a previously rural area.

The third marker of current interest in land is the specific concern with agricultural productivity in Africa (Bassett 1993:pp.11-12). There is much debate over whether or not indigenous land tenure systems constrain agricultural productivity and over the type of tenure system that best facilitates agricultural development. This debate stems from headline-grabbing worries about environmental degradation, population growth, food security and famine. Yet,

² I use single quotation marks to introduce key concepts or indicate problematic terms.

although the validity and reliability of official statistics on food production in Africa are highly questionable (Berry 1984:pp.60-63; Wiggins 2000), and although literature on the political nature of famine suggests that concern with agricultural productivity may anyway be overstated (e.g. Keen 1995), alternative views are in the minority. Food security and agricultural productivity remain firmly on the mainstream agenda and are dynamically linked to land issues in Tanzania and across Africa (CCTRES 1998:pp.4, 10-13, 17, 19; FAO undated:pp.9-10, 20-21; Maxwell & Wiebe 1999). Nonetheless, urbanisation and local development bring economic opportunities which merit at least complementary attention by policy-makers concerned about these issues.

My study of land tenure and social change is thus located within important debates on agrarian change in Africa. Havnevik (1997b) broadens these debates further to incorporate issues of power and social relations at all levels of social organisation – issues that are left out of much of the literature on land, with its tendency to focus on tenure reform, security of tenure and agricultural productivity in different tenure systems. Havnevik's approach to land questions addresses four key areas. First, he argues for a historical perspective that sees land tenure as both process and contested terrain, in which social differentiation and class position matter. Second, he argues that it is vital to look at the state's role, not only in driving land policy, but also in perpetuating longstanding ambiguities and insecurities of tenure. Third, he sees close links between land and political reform, arguing that socio-economic inequalities in access to and control of land cannot be separated from wider questions about democracy. Finally, Havnevik highlights the importance of recent changes in land use, especially the conversion of land use values to exchange values as marketisation of land as a commodity (for example for forestry) is increasingly facilitated by economic reform (1997b:pp.7-9).

In a useful typology of Eastern and Southern African land questions, Palmer (1998) also argues that history is crucial – that when countries became independent matters because it determined both the state of the wider political economy and the range of feasible economic choices available to them – and he identifies three distinct types of land struggles emerging in accordance with the nature of colonial land alienation and settler economies. South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe comprise one category of countries, with substantial alienation of land to white farmers in the past, where redistribution and resettlement of black people onto formerly white-owned land are key policy priorities. Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia fall into a second category, where there was little white settlement but which are now keen to reform land tenure

to attract foreign investment in, among others, tourism and mining. Malawi, Namibia and Mozambique form a third category, where alienation of land was limited to certain parts of the country and there are similar policy priorities to both the other categories (Ibid:pp.2, 4).

At the time I started my research Tanzania was engaged in a major process of land tenure reform (Haramata 1994; McAuslan 1998; NALAF 1997; Palmer 1996b; Shivji 1997a; 1998; Sundet 1997; URT 1994; pers. obs.). However Tanzania was not alone. During the 1990s Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia all debated land issues and, in some cases, undertook legislative changes on tenurial aspects of land law (Birch 1996; Hakata 2001; Kharono 1998; Palmer 1996a; 1996c). Tenure was also an early element in the Zimbabwe land question and is one part of the South African government's land reform programme (Claassens 2000; Palmer 1996a; 1996c; RSA 1996).

I chose Tanzania as the focus of my empirical work for three reasons. First, my specific interest in land tenure narrowed the choice of country down as I wished for analytical purposes to avoid being caught up in currently highly politicised issues of redistribution and resettlement. Although my fieldwork was carried out in a part of Tanzania that had relatively high levels of non-African settlement before Independence, colonial alienation was not a big issue and many old leases had been revoked. Second, there is both foreign and local investment in my study area, making land tenure a key development issue. Third, and most importantly, Tanzania seemed interesting to study as it has undergone substantial shifts in development policy since Independence while simultaneously avoiding the *coup d'états* and civil wars which have beset many other post-colonial African states. The transition from colonial government was remarkably smooth and the presence of a respected national leader – former President Julius K. Nyerere – with integrity, charisma and intelligence had a unifying effect on the country, even when his policies were somewhat controversial. Tanzania has therefore experienced the stability and continuity to make historical analysis more straightforward and potentially more generalisable. However it has also experienced important policy changes that bear directly on land tenure. In sum, Tanzania is a distinctive case but, because of this, one where the key factors that affect people's access to land can be isolated and analysed.

The scholar of Tanzania is blessed, if not overwhelmed, by the wealth of material on all aspects of the country's development. My work nevertheless makes a fresh contribution to the existing literature, with its emphasis on land tenure and social change and its analysis of people's livelihoods and access to land. Changing local understandings of rights to land in

Tanzania have previously been analysed by Wily (1988) in her still important (though unfortunately unpublished) work. More recently, the national politics of land has been the subject of a valuable contribution by Sundet (1997). Wily wrote after a long period of intense academic debate on Tanzanian socialism, whilst Sundet's work was written during, and is itself part of, the land tenure reform process. My work builds on both these studies, but is written against the wider background of debates over land tenure and access to resources that are not specific to Tanzania, reviewed in Chapter Two. One of my aims was to complement Wily's work on Tabora Region with a similar type of study in a different part of Tanzania. I also felt it was important to examine changing rights to land in the aftermath of the major policy changes that were only just beginning in the early to mid-1980s (Wily 1988:pp.385-389). Sundet's (1997) analysis of these changes is restricted to national policy-making, so my focus on local land tenure serves as a useful counterpart to his work.

The majority of people in my study village were neither aware of the land tenure reform process nor of the recently enacted Land Act (URT 1999a) and Village Land Act (URT 1999b).³ However my informants had a clear understanding of their land rights and the principles that they have to operate and negotiate within and around – in other words, of the land tenure system that they help to shape. People's access to resources is of course influenced by both national policies and the historical specificity of local development, making it vital to fully understand the background to a close empirical study like my own. In later chapters I trace relevant policies and local development within a historical periodisation. By way of introduction I outline the broader history of Tanzanian development here and discuss national land tenure policy below.

Development in Tanzania⁴

The area that is now modern Tanzania had a gradual but limited incorporation into the world economy before the colonial period. Trade between East Africa and the Red Sea goes back at least two thousand years and there had been a Portuguese presence on the East African coast since the sixteenth century (Coulson 1982:pp.11, 21-22). However, it was not until

³ This legislation had not been implemented by the time I finished my fieldwork and detailed analysis of it is beyond the scope of my study.

⁴ Tanzania generally refers only to the mainland. Tanganyika refers to the mainland before the union with Zanzibar. Land in Zanzibar is governed separately (James 1971:p.2) and is outside this study's scope.

the nineteenth century that interior peoples began regularly trading with, taxing and raiding the Swahili and Arab trading- and slaving-caravans that were increasingly crossing central Tanganyika, by which time internal trade networks between indigenous producers of goods like iron and salt were already well developed (Ibid:pp.12, 18; Iliffe 1979:pp.18-20; Kjekshus 1996:pp.80-125).

In the 1820s and 1830s, during their countries' industrialisation, American, British and German merchants began trading with the Omani Arabs who by 1840 ruled the East African coast from Zanzibar (Coulson 1982:pp.22-24). Empire-building and mercantilist rivalry intensified until by the end of the century the "Scramble for Africa" was well underway (Pakenham 1992). In 1885, following a successful treaty-signing expedition by one Carl Peters, the Germans declared large parts of Tanganyika as the protectorate of German East Africa under the sovereignty of Peters' German East Africa Company (Coulson 1982:p.26; Iliffe 1969:p.11; 1979:pp.88-90). Then in 1890 the British, concerned about increasing German influence in East Africa, forced the Sultan of Zanzibar to declare his territory a British protectorate and agreed with the Germans the borders of their respective areas (Coulson 1982:pp.26, 35). German East Africa, encompassing Tanganyika and present-day Rwanda and Burundi, was declared a German colony in 1891, after Peters' company failed to establish a regular administration (Ibid:p.35; Iliffe 1969:p.11; 1979:pp.91-98). There followed a decade of military conquest and a period of German colonial rule that lasted until the First World War (WW1) (Coulson 1982:pp.27-42).

WW1 saw widespread fighting in Tanganyika. The smaller German army was technically undefeated until 1920, although the British began to govern most parts of the country from 1916 or 1917 (Coulson 1982:pp.31, 44; EARC 1955:p.21). From 1920 until 1946 Britain administered Tanganyika under a mandate from the League of Nations, officially conferred in 1922 (Coulson 1982:p.44; James 1971:p.15). Then from 1947 until Independence the country was administered as a trusteeship territory of the United Nations (UN) and Tanganyika was thus never strictly speaking a British colony (Chidzero 1961; Coulson 1982:p.45; Iliffe 1979:p.430).

After the Second World War (WW2) the maintenance of their African Empire ceased to be economically rational for Britain (Coulson 1982:p.110). Combined with pressure from the pro-Independence UN Trusteeship Committee and the growing nationalist movement inside Tanganyika, especially after Nyerere founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on 7th July 1954, the British came to accept the need for change. Tanganyika was granted

internal self-government in May 1961 and full Independence in December 1961, with Nyerere as Prime Minister (Ibid:pp.109-120). He promptly resigned and Prime Minister Kawawa's new government passed a constitution making Tanganyika a republic. In December 1962 Nyerere was elected President and in April 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed the United Republic of Tanzania, four months after the British also left Zanzibar (Ibid:pp.131, 135-137, 140-141). Tanzania then formally became a one-party state in 1965 (Coulson 1979:p.1).

The key event after Independence was the publication of the Arusha Declaration (Nyerere 1968a) on 5th February 1967, which sparked a decade of socialist transformation involving a degree of nationalisation and efforts to encourage co-operative production in agriculture and industry (Coulson 1982:pp.176-180). Rural development was the focus of post-Arusha policy, based on Nyerere's concept of *ujamaa* (roughly translated as "familyhood") and his vision of communal living and working (Nyerere 1966a:pp.170, *passim*; 1968c; Kitching 1989:pp.63-70, 104-106). Concerted efforts began to move the rural population into "proper villages" (Nyerere 1966c:p.184) and in November 1973 'villagisation' was made compulsory throughout Tanzania – albeit as living together rather than farming together (Coulson 1982:p.249; Hydén 1980:p.129; Sundet 1997:pp.80-81). By 1975 almost all Tanzanians were living in villages (Coulson 1982:p.249).

The impact of villagisation and Tanzanian socialism on development has been subject to intense scrutiny and debate by observers (e.g. Bernstein 1981; Coulson 1979; Coulson 1982:pp.176-331; Freund 1981; Hydén 1980; Kitching 1989:pp.104-124; McCall 1987; Sender & Smith 1990; Wily 1988; Young 1982:pp.103-124; etc.). Villagisation had a huge impact on virtually all aspects of life in rural Tanzania and villages are now widely accepted by Tanzanians as the basis of political and administrative organisation (URT 1994:p.125). "As a matter of practical politics", villagisation "would be impossible to reverse" (Coldham 1995:p.237). It was a key event in the development of land tenure in Tanzania and marked a fundamental shift in people's understandings of their rights to land. Kjekshus has described the "break-down of the man-controlled ecological system" at the end of the nineteenth century as a breakpoint in Tanganyika's development, especially in relation to land use and land management (1996:pp.126, *passim*). Similarly, villagisation marked a major breakpoint in man-land relations, especially in terms of land tenure – in land relations between the state and ordinary people.

By the late 1970s Tanzania's economy was in crisis. Gradually, and under considerable donor pressure, the country began to adopt structural adjustment and stabilisation policies

(Hydén & Karlström 1993:pp.45-53). Economic reform continues to the present day and has led on to political reforms, such as the introduction of multi-partyism and formal separation of government and party in 1992 (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.26-27; Sundet 1997:pp.159-167; Voipio & Hoebink 1999:pp.24, 29). Since 1995 Tanzania has been led by President Benjamin Mkapa, who was re-elected in October 2000 for a second five-year term. Nyerere had stepped down as President in 1985 and as Chair of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party⁵ in 1990, on both occasions to be replaced by Mkapa's predecessor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. However Nyerere remained influential until his death in October 1999, his willingness to accept leadership changes, encourage debate on pluralism and support economic reform undoubtedly contributing to a smooth, if protracted, transition from socialism to liberalism (Hydén & Karlström 1993:pp.55-56; Sundet 1997:pp.154, 299-300).

National Land Tenure Policy

It is against this history of colonisation, villagisation and gradual liberalisation that land in Tanzania must be understood. Tanzanian land laws and policies have been comprehensively analysed over the years (e.g. Chidzero 1961:Chapter IX; Coldham 1995; Fimbo 1992; James 1971; James & Fimbo 1973; Meek 1946:Chapter IX; Mtengeti-Migiro 1991; Oldaker 1957; Pitblado 1970; Shivji 1998; Sundet 1997; URT 1994; Wily 1988; etc.) and it is beyond this study's scope to repeat that work.⁶ Instead I draw on the existing literature only as relevant to my analysis of changing land tenure in my study village.

The central feature of Tanzanian land tenure is its dual structure (Shivji 1998:p.4). Since colonial times land in Tanzania has been subject to two separate tenure regimes. A formal legal system was developed to deal with land held initially by non-African settlers, whilst 'customary law' dealt with land held by Africans. This has meant that different pieces of land are subject to different and sometimes multiple sets of rules, a situation which was exacerbated by villagisation and which led to the general confusion about land rights that prompted the establishment of a Presidential Land Commission (under Professor Issa Shivji) on 3rd January 1991 (Haramata 1994; URT 1994:p.1). The Commission's Report (URT 1994) detailed the

⁵ CCM was formed on 5th February 1977 with the merger of TANU and the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party (Coulson 1982:p.201; Hydén 1980:p.137). TANU and CCM have ruled Tanzania without interruption since Independence.

⁶ See Wily (1988:pp.42-120) and URT (1994:Chapter 1) for the best overall analyses of land tenure policy in Tanzania.

problems with the existing tenure regimes and proposed recommendations for change, sparking a debate on tenure reform that continued through the 1990s and stimulating research on different land issues in Tanzania (e.g. Izumi 1999; Manji 1998; 2000; Shivji & Kapinga 1998; Yngstrom 1999; etc.).

Underlying the dual structure of Tanzanian land tenure have been four important policy themes, or continuities. In everyday terms these are: that land belongs to the state and not to individuals; that rights to land depend on the use made of the land; that land rights are controlled administratively as opposed to judicially; and that land is not a saleable commodity (Coldham 1995; James 1971; Pitblado 1970; Sundet 1997; URT 1994; Wily 1988).⁷

The first continuity, that land belongs to the state and not to individuals, began in 1895 when the German government declared all 'unowned' lands to be Crown Land (Iliffe 1979:pp.126-127; James 1971:p.14; Pitblado 1970:pp.5-7). Documentary proof of title for 'owned' land was required, effectively nullifying African ownership and allowing land to be alienated to non-African settlers whose legal rights were quite secure (James 1971:p.14). There was no Crown Land in the British period as Tanganyikan land was only mandated to be held in trust for its peoples' benefit (Chidzero 1961:pp.217-220, 225). However, in the 1923 Land Ordinance all lands were formally declared to be "public lands" under the control of the Governor, allowing the state to continue to wield effective control over land (Ibid:pp.220-222), although this was supposed to be "exercised as far as possible in accordance with native customs" (Lugard 1926:p.290; EARC 1955:p.366; Hailey 1946:p.xxiv; James & Fimbo 1973:p.33; Meek 1946:pp.102, 106; Wily 1988:pp.51-54). In 1958 in *Mali ya Taifa (National Property)* Nyerere (1966b; cf. 1966a:p.167; 1966d) upheld the principle of state control and ownership of land in response to proposals by the East Africa Royal Commission to modernise customary land tenure and facilitate freehold ownership by Africans (EARC 1955:especially Chapter 23; Iliffe 1971:pp.37-38; 1979:p.553; James 1971:pp.138-143, 146; Yngstrom 1999:pp.51-54). After Independence freeholds that had been granted during the colonial period were then converted to leaseholds and subsequently to rights of occupancy (James 1971:pp.138, 164-165; Pitblado 1970:p.14; Wily 1988:pp.84-85, 95) and the radical title to all land in Tanzania was vested in the President – a situation that remains today.

⁷ My analysis draws broadly on all these sources.

The second continuity, that rights to land depend on the use made of the land, also began under the Germans. In 1903 a form of lease was introduced whereby continuing occupancy by settlers and subsequent freehold purchase were contingent on development conditions being met (Iliffe 1969:pp.128-129; James 1971:p.15; Meek 1946:p.101; Pitblado 1970:pp.6-7). The British then strengthened the links between use and tenure in all land legislation passed under their rule (James & Fimbo 1973:pp.635-666; Pitblado 1970:pp.9-12). Development conditions were written into leases for land registered as "granted rights of occupancy" under the 1923 Ordinance and enforced through agricultural by-laws and land use regulations for land held by Africans as "deemed rights of occupancy" (Pitblado 1970:pp.7-12; James 1971:Chapter 7; URT 1994:pp.16-17; Wily 1988:pp.61-63).⁸ After Independence use and tenure then became even more closely linked (James 1971:Chapter 7; Pitblado 1970:pp.12-14), particularly after villagisation.

The third continuity, that land rights are controlled administratively as opposed to judicially, follows on from the previous two and has also become more prominent since Independence and villagisation (Lwoga 1985:p.72; Pitblado 1970:pp.12-20, 36; Sundet 1997:pp.55, 88, 103-104; URT 1994:pp.19-20; Wily 1988:p.80). Land disputes are often settled by Ministry of Land⁹ administrators or village governments and land is allocated by, and conditions of use set by, the executive. Meanwhile the judiciary has a limited capacity to cope with land cases and its jurisdiction has frequently been challenged or simply ignored by the executive (Coldham 1995:pp.229-232, 242; Izumi 1999:pp.97-98; Shivji 1998:pp.21-23; Sundet 1997:p.188).

The final continuity in national land tenure policy, that land is not a saleable commodity, is the one that has really brought land issues in Tanzania to a head. Because in Tanzania land is held leasehold and not freehold (because radical title is vested in the state), it cannot theoretically be sold. Both granted and deemed rights of occupancy can only be transferred in consideration of a payment for the unexhausted improvements on the land – in other words, compensation for the resources (*rasilmali*, lit. assets, capital) permanently invested in or on the land, such as permanent dwellings, wells, fences, trees, standing crops, and labour expended in maintaining irrigated gardens and clearing land for the first time (James 1971:pp.42, 124;

⁸ Deemed rights were legally established in 1928 (James & Fimbo 1973:p.33; James 1971:pp.96-97, 130).

⁹ The Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (as at April 2000), also referred to as the Ministry.

James & Fimbo 1973:p.592). This 'compensation principle' began in the German period (Iliffe 1969:p.128; 1979:pp.142-143) and continued under the British whenever land was alienated by the state (Chidzero 1961:p.223; Lugard 1926:p.301; Meek 1946:pp.103, 113). It applied whenever granted rights of occupancy were subsequently transferred and has come to apply to all 'sales' of deemed rights of occupancy (James 1971:p.228).¹⁰

However, the issue of sale is really one of semantics. As we shall see, land is and has long been sold in the study area, as elsewhere in Tanzania, and people there understand it as such while acknowledging that in theory they cannot sell land. Some understand that they can only sell their use rights, because "land belongs to the government". Others argue that if a person has a right to buy land when they move, or has no choice but to pay for land, then they also have a corresponding right to sell land. Thus, regardless of who theoretically owns land, the principle of sale is fundamentally socially legitimate. Yet this suggests a central tension in Tanzanian land tenure policy, which is particularly stark in today's climate of pro-market liberalism.

In this study I examine people's changing understandings of their rights to land. I analyse the evolution of a local land tenure system which accommodates principle and policy alongside the indigenous development of a land market. My analysis hinges on my empirical research, so the remainder of this chapter is therefore devoted to introducing my case study and discussing my fieldwork methodology.

The Case Study

My empirical research centred on Mufindi District, Iringa Region. Iringa lies in south-central Tanzania, in an area known as the Southern Highlands. The region covers 6.5% of mainland Tanzania's area (URT 1991) and contains six districts. Mufindi is located across the central part of the region, bordered by Iringa Rural District to the north, Njombe District to the south, Morogoro Region (Kilombero District) to the east and Mbeya Region (Mbarali District) to the west (MDC 1997:p.1; see Maps 1 and 2, pp.12-13).


There is a good tarmac road – the Tanzam – linking Dar-es-Salaam with Zambia via Iringa Region, which cuts Mufindi in two, and there is another main road from Iringa town to

¹⁰ Interview with Senior Assistant Registrar of Titles, Mbeya Registry of Title (MRT), 9/3/00.

Map 1 – Sketch Map of Tanzania



Map 2 – Sketch Map of Iringa Region



Source – Adapted from URT 1994

Dodoma, the Tanzanian capital. Iringa town is 80km north of Mufindi District along the Tanzam (MDC 1997:p.1) and about 100km north of district headquarters in Mafinga town. The study village, Kinyanambo, one of 131 villages in Mufindi (MDC 1999:Annex VI), is immediately north of Mafinga. It sprawls along the Tanzam for several kilometres, with settlement reducing in density further from the town. Many villages in Mufindi are a long way from this main road, but there are several good dirt feeder roads providing access to the different parts of the district. Three important junctions are located in or just outside Kinyanambo – the junctions between the Tanzam and the Mufindi Circle Road (John's Corner), the Sadani road and the Itimbo road (see Map 3, p.15).

Mufindi District is approximately 712,200ha in area, or 7,122km² (MDC 1997:p.1).¹¹ According to the district government, its population in 1999 was 307,327, of whom 4,209 people in 842 households lived in Kinyanambo (MDC 1999:Annex VI). According to my figures, Kinyanambo actually contained 5,431 people in 1,336 occupied houses,¹² plus a further 140 people in 28 staff houses belonging to a pyrethrum-processing factory located in the village.¹³

The predominant ethnic group in Iringa is the Wahehe, whose language is Kihehe. They are patrilineal and polygamy is quite widespread. 85% of Mufindi's population are Wahehe and the remaining 15% are mostly Wabena and Wakinga migrants from, respectively, the Njombe and Makete districts of Iringa Region (MDC 1997:p.2). Christianity is the main religion, with Catholics and Lutherans predominating. In Kinyanambo, 62% of the household heads in my first survey (see below) were Catholic and 65% were Wahehe.¹⁴

In colonial times many non-African settlers came to the Southern Highlands and Mufindi District is well known for the large tea plantations which began during the British period. The tea industry is concentrated in the district's highlands – an area known, confusingly, as Mufindi. The district also has a thriving timber industry, centred on the Sao Hill Forest near Mafinga. There are some small timber *viwanda* (lit. industrial sites) in Kinyanambo itself and various logging outfits operate in the forest just to the east of the village. There is also a pulp and paper mill at Mgololo in the south of the district.

¹¹ Interview with District Surveyor (DS), 8/12/99.


¹² Table A2, Appendix Three and Tables A8 and A9, Appendix Four.

¹³ Calculated at an average household size of five (MDC 2000:p.8). Table A2 (Note 1), Appendix Three.

¹⁴ Tables A10 and A11, Appendix Four.

Map 3 – Sketch Map of Mufindi District

- showing the five administrative divisions in Mufindi District, the six wards in Ifwagi Division and the location of Kinyanambo relative to some important district roads



Source – Adapted from MDC 1999

Climate and soil fertility vary quite widely in Iringa Region. According to the Danish aid agency (DANIDA *et al* 1982a:pp.2.4-2.12), there are six different agro-ecological zones in the rural parts of the region, of which three are found in Mufindi District. However the district government separates Mufindi into just two agro-ecological zones – the Eastern Highlands (colder, higher altitude (1700m to 2200m), higher rainfall (1400mm average per year), steeper slopes, moderate soil fertility (red clays and dark top soil), and natural humid forest remnants) and the Mufindi Plateau (temperate, lower altitude (1700 to 2000m), less rainfall (950mm average per year), undulating hills, low soil fertility (yellow highly leached clays), and extensive grassland with forest plantation and swamp depressions) (MDC 1997:pp.9-13). Kinyanambo is in the north-eastern part of the Mufindi Plateau, which is colder and wetter than other parts of that zone, dominated by wooded grassland (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.21) and “characterised by a gently rolling relief and deeper soils...[enhancing] its use for agriculture, although the soils are low in fertility” (Moody 1970:p.9).¹⁵ Overall, though, Mufindi is one of the more fertile districts in Iringa, along with Njombe and Makete. These three are the coldest and highest districts in the region, with most of their area above 6000 feet (1800m) in altitude and frost not uncommon in the dry season, June through October, when it is cold at night.

Farming is the main livelihood activity of people in Iringa Region and maize is the main food crop. The agricultural cycle broadly follows the rains but varies according to the variety of maize and the specific geographic conditions. In Kinyanambo, on rain-fed farms (*mashamba*), planting occurs at the start of the rains in mid-November and maize is harvested in July and August. On irrigated farms (*mabustani* or *vinyungu*),¹⁶ planting occurs in September and harvesting takes place in April or May if the maize has not already been eaten as a vegetable. Other important food crops in Kinyanambo are beans, Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes and various leafy green vegetables, whilst *vitindi* trees, which supply the alcoholic *ulanzi* drink, are also widespread.¹⁷ Most food crops can be sold as cash crops, although in Mufindi District as a whole the main cash crops are tea, tobacco, sunflowers, pyrethrum, and a little coffee (MDC 1997:pp.21-22). The Wahehe also have a tradition of cattle-keeping and small numbers of small and large livestock are kept by many families in the district, even in urban areas. Outside agriculture there is a range of other options and livelihoods in Kinyanambo are quite diverse.

¹⁵ Moody (1970:1-5, 8-10) provides a more detailed analysis of Mufindi’s topography, rainfall and land resources.

¹⁶ *Mabustani* is the Kiswahili term for all irrigated farms (gardens), *vinyungu* is a specific Kihehe term for riverine farms.

¹⁷ *Vitindi* are a species of bamboo, *ulanzi* the fermented sap. Both terms are Kihehe.

The Study Village Defined

I define Kinyanambo in this study in accordance with the administrative status it holds within the government of Mufindi District. That is, it is defined as one administrative unit, governed by a village chairperson and village council. Kinyanambo is one of seven villages in Mafinga Ward, Ifwagi Division (Map 3). Along with Wambi and Changarawe, it is one of the three villages that fall partly or wholly within the boundaries of Mafinga town and the effective boundary between Kinyanambo and Mafinga is difficult for the uninformed observer to identify. Nevertheless, the village has its own history and identity and remains a separate entity from the town.


For the purposes of this study, then, Kinyanambo is understood as beginning just north of the point at which the Tanzam runs along an embankment on leaving the town (in a northerly direction) and ending in the area of the Itimbo road junction. It is administratively divided into ten hamlets, each with its own chairperson, which again the uninformed observer cannot easily identify. On the right-hand side of the Tanzam (heading north) are Mugodi, Ikweta, Lumwago, Gangilonga, and Ifingo. On the left-hand side are Idope, Amani, Upendo, Kinanambo, Tanganyika, and Ifingo. Ifingo is the only hamlet that straddles the tarmac road and it starts from the first culvert that crosses the Tanzam after leaving Mafinga. Kinyanambo is approximately 4,400ha in area (10,868 acres)¹⁸ and sprawls just under 9km up the Tanzam. Map 4 (p.18) gives the village outline and Map 5 (p.19) the current approximate village boundaries.¹⁹

Before the separation of government and party Kinyanambo was not divided into hamlets but was instead divided into three areas corresponding to branches of the CCM party. Going north from Mafinga these were known, respectively, as Kinyanambo B, A and C. There was also a Kinyanambo D at the pyrethrum factory quarters. Kinyanambo A, B and C are referred to throughout this study as they remain CCM party branches and relate directly to the development of the village. As in the past, these are the areas within which the lowest-level party officials (*mabalozi*) are organised and these officials are still the first point of contact for all villagers, who have to be referred to the hamlet chair by their *balozi*. Mugodi, Ikweta, Idope, Amani, and Upendo are in Kinyanambo B, Lumwago, Gangilonga, Kinanambo and Tanganyika are in Kinyanambo A, and Kinyanambo C is exclusively comprised of Ifingo.

¹⁸ Interview with DS, 18/11/99.

¹⁹ Map 5, a section of a map drawn for me by the Mufindi District Land Office (MDLO), is not an official map. See discussion of Kinyanambo's boundary in Chapter Seven.

Map 4 – Sketch Map of Kinyanambo's Hamlets





Source – Adapted from 1982 Ministry of Land Surveys and Mapping Division survey sheets 232/2 and 232/4 (Series Y742, Edition 1-TSD) (Government Map Office, Dar-es-Salaam)

Key

- | | |
|----|----------------------------|
| 1 | Mugodi |
| 2 | Ikweta |
| 3 | Lumwago |
| 4 | Gangilonga |
| 5 | Ifingo |
| 5a | Ifingo (Kinyiganga) |
| 6 | Idope |
| 7 | Amani |
| 8 | Upendo |
| 9 | Kinanambo |
| 10 | Tanganyika |
| P | Pyrethrum Factory |
| PQ | Pyrethrum Factory Quarters |

Map 5 – Kinyanambo Village Boundary c.2000



Source MDLO (not to original scale)

The parts of Kinyanambo that are included within the physical boundaries of Mafinga are the built-up areas of all hamlets except Ifingo, thus the built-up areas of Kinyanambo A and B, and some of the village's farm land (see Map 6, p.21). In most of these areas house-plots have already been surveyed as part of the town planning process, whilst areas not yet surveyed are scheduled to be so. In these built-up areas inside the town boundaries there is a dual administration. Owners of house-plots are supposed to register their ownership with the District Land Office to get a formal, rolling 1-year lease (short-term granted right of occupancy), for which they contribute a one-off payment of TSh 24,000 towards the surveying costs. However, town administration is not enforced and many villagers have not registered their house-plots with the District Land Office.²⁰ Instead all villagers have the occupancy and ownership of their house-plots recognised by the Kinyanambo village government, at the very least by their *balози*. Furthermore, allocation of land for both *mashamba* and *vinyungu* outside the areas planned as built-up areas, and most definitely for areas outside the town boundary, falls under the jurisdiction of the village government in practice, although theoretically the power to allocate all land within the town boundary rests with the town.²¹ For all practical purposes, then, all aspects of village life in all hamlets are dealt with by the village government and the village is best defined as one unit which is governed separately from the town.

Fieldwork


I carried out fieldwork in Tanzania between August 1999 and April 2000, a period which included six months' intensive study of Kinyanambo. Kinyanambo was one of sixteen villages in which an International Labour Organization (ILO)/Mufindi District Government Action to Assist Rural Women (AARW) project was operating at the time of my fieldwork. AARW, known locally as Mwakaumu, was a broad-ranging women's development project containing elements of organisation-building, gender awareness-training, group savings and microcredit for a variety of income-generating activities, which had been operating in the district since 1989 (ILO 1997:pp.5-7, 9; 1999:pp.1-12). During a preliminary fieldtrip to Tanzania in May 1999 I visited six project villages in Mufindi as a guest of the ILO (Acknowledgements). From those, I selected

²⁰ Interviews with District Urban and Rural Planning Officer (DURPO), DS, District Valuation Officer (DVO) and District Land Development Officer (DLDO), 17/9/99, 18/11/99, 25/11/99 and 2/12/99.

²¹ Interview with DURPO, 14/2/00.

Map 6 – Mafinga Town Boundary c.2000

- showing the areas planned as built-up areas (for residential, commercial, industrial and community use) in 1986 (vertical shading) and by 2000 (horizontal shading)



Source – MDLO

Kinyanambo as the case study village for my independent doctoral research for a variety of reasons.

Kinyanambo presented an opportunity to examine rural-urban linkages, with potential implications for development well beyond Mufindi District. I hypothesised that this sprawling peri-urban village would contain enormous variation and many axes of social, political and economic differentiation. I further hypothesised that access to land would be quite dynamic, especially in those areas nearest the town, and that land issues of different sorts would be uncovered. Some families might be more farming-dependent than others, there might be resident/stranger tensions and location within the village might indicate some types of differentiation. Although I had considered conducting a comparative study, I realised early on that there was such diversity within Kinyanambo that studying a second village would not significantly add to the value of my research and might even detract from its quality. If the value of a good case study lies in it being a "telling" rather than "typical" case (Mitchell 1984:p.239), then the value of a particularly telling case such as this must outweigh the value of a less detailed (given time and resource constraints) comparative study.

I aimed to address specific questions about the historical development of the land tenure system in Kinyanambo and about people's everyday access to land. I therefore asked: What is the particular trajectory of the development of the land tenure system in Kinyanambo? What factors were important to its development? What is the relative importance of factors such as wealth, gender and *uenyeji*? How are these factors connected and in what ways? I then asked: How does the system work now and on what principles is it based? How do people gain access to land? What rights do they have in land and how do they understand those rights? What are the implications of the local land tenure system for people along different axes of social differentiation? In answering these questions I also addressed issues of a more theoretical nature, discussed in Chapter Two.

During fieldwork I lived in the Makalala B Mission, south-west of Mafinga, beyond Changarawe, and worked in Kinyanambo six (and often seven) days every week. I began with a census exercise, outlined in Appendix Three, which served as an entry point to the village in multiple ways. It enabled me to introduce myself, my research and my assistants, to meet villagers relatively informally and identify key informants, and to start assimilating observational and anecdotal information. Following this I undertook two surveys – an initial large-scale socio-economic survey, carried out in 25% of the houses in six hamlets, and a second, more detailed,

survey focused on land, carried out in 10% of the houses in the same six hamlets. The survey methodology is outlined in Appendix Three, whilst Appendix Two sets out how I defined my units of analysis (economic units). Central to my research, however, were the comprehensive and wide-ranging interviews I held with over 50 villagers, which provided the core empirical material on which I have built my analysis. Observations and spontaneous informal discussions with these key informants and many other villagers were also useful, as were contextual interviews and group discussions in Mufindi, and research at Mafinga Primary Court and the Ministry of Land, all outlined in Appendix One. My village work was further supported by historical and theoretical literature work in England and Tanzania.

I was assisted in Kinyanambo by three research assistants. My senior research assistant acted primarily as an interpreter. She was a retired Mhehe primary school teacher and Regional Education Office employee from Iringa town, who had worked as a Women Leader in the Lutheran church's Iringa Diocese for ten years and had considerable experience of working in villages. My second assistant was also Mhehe and came from Isalavanu village (near Kinyanambo). She had trained as a primary school teacher and had done some rural research as part of that training. My third assistant was Msangu. Originally from Mbeya Region, she had lived in Mafinga for many years, had graduated from the National Social Welfare Training Institute and had previously worked on a DANIDA research project linked to their Southern Highlands' water schemes. The two younger assistants worked mainly on administering the two surveys. All three worked with me on the census and there was of course flexibility to meet the demands of my work schedule.

Methodological Issues

In introducing a case study, it is usually appropriate to address some of the methodological, ethical and political issues concerning the researcher's approach to fieldwork. There is literature on fieldwork methods and ethics to draw on here, for example Devereux and Hoddinott's (1992a) collection.²² However the broader issue worthy of comment is that of the politics of my research. There has been sustained debate about the objectivity of the fieldworker in development research and the importance of acknowledging subjective biases and

²² I found Da Corta and Venkateswarlu (1992), Devereux and Hoddinott (1992b; 1992c), Francis (1992), Heyer (1992), Hoddinott (1992), Olsen (1992), and Wilson (1992) particularly helpful, as well as Sender and Smith (1990: Chapters 2 & 3).

empathies (e.g. Hydén 1980:pp.3-7, 250-251; Wilson 1992; Wily 1988:pp.20-24; etc.). It is not necessary to repeat that debate, but it is important to be open about the approach I took in this particular piece of empirical work. Land is a political issue in Tanzania and asking questions about it in Kinyanambo was a political act. I have three points to discuss. The first relates to how I was viewed, how I responded and what I was told. The second relates to my broader feminist perspective and the way I tried to engage with the people I was studying. The third concerns the willingness to accept limits to what the researcher can claim to know.

First, in the particular context of post-villagisation Tanzania, where there is widespread distrust of the government over land matters, research by an outsider on land is often viewed with suspicion and can have direct material consequences. For example, Wily found that measuring landholdings in Kalumwa village crystallised negative feelings about large landholders and catalysed concerns about land shortages, inadvertently stirring up tensions over land (1988:pp.22-23). Izumi engaged deliberately in “action research”, providing official information to the leaders of Bigwa village to help protect the village’s land rights against Morogoro town, participating in village meetings and discussions and consulting others on the village’s behalf (1999:pp.64-65, 185-187). In my case, some people in Kinyanambo at first feared I might be from the government, coming to find out about their land so that the government could take it away, whilst I simultaneously encountered initial suspicion from some local officials. Such reactions stemmed from the “legacy of bitterness and mistrust” (Coldham 1995:p.241) of the particular circumstances of forcible villagisation in the study area and the subsequent growth of the town, but were overcome in time with patient explanation on my part.

These experiences highlight the more general point that there is a need for honesty and openness on the part of the researcher in any social science research about their aims and objectives and their own position and perspective. Almost every day in the field I was challenged on my aims, although these sometimes hostile challenges were almost always deflected by openness and honesty about my research. My approach was to take whatever time was necessary to answer the questions of whoever in the village was asking, helping me to establish enough trust to thoroughly investigate the land tenure system there. However I also used discretion in deciding what level of knowledge about the village to reveal to people, inside and outside Kinyanambo. It was vital to selectively conceal my knowledge as I realised early on that some informants (inside and outside the village) were attempting to divert my attention away from contentious political issues and to obscure sensitive information (cf. Van Hekken &

Thoden Van Velzen 1972:pp.14-15). I therefore worked harder to understand why people said the things they did – and what they did not say and why not – for example by looking beyond the immediately obvious in my interactions with my interviewees to the hidden text of each interview. My command of Kiswahili, which I had learnt in preparation for fieldwork, was critical in this regard as it enabled me to hear exactly how people were saying things – what words they used – and to communicate directly, making relationships with all my informants more personal.

Second, although this study is not specifically about gender, my own feminist position has informed my approach to research throughout. As noted above, I was introduced to the study area by a women's development project. I made no attempt to hide my sympathies with women and my interest in women's land rights during fieldwork and my choice of only female research assistants was deliberate. As regards possible bias, with the exception of one old man, no-one in Kinyanambo refused to take part in my research on the grounds of gender bias. Furthermore, although men generally have higher status than women in Tanzania, age and education also generate respect. I was therefore fortunate that my assistants were well educated and that my senior assistant commanded particular respect because of her age and previous career.

More importantly, my politics in the field transcended gender. Hydén has called on social scientists to allow their analysis “to be judged by the responses of the people under study” (1980:p.257). But he adds that the researcher should not “be allowed to satisfy himself [sic] with checking his own interpretations. He must also be in a position to give something in return” (Ibid:p.257). In interviewing both men and women in Kinyanambo I therefore used the occasion to share information, for example by informing them of legal rights and procedures where appropriate. I also tested out my developing knowledge of the local land tenure system and my evolving interpretations of changing rights and conditions of access to land. I treated interviews as a two-way process, engaging respectfully with the ‘subjects’ of my research, not pretending an objectivity that I did not feel, and constantly asking “why”. Many informants, male and female, told me at the end of interviews that they had found our discussions helpful to them in understanding how their society and their rights to land were changing and that, just as I had learnt things from them, they too had learnt much from the experience of being interviewed.

Third, the more fundamental political aspect of my approach to research concerns what one can realistically claim to know. In the context of debates on knowledge, relativity and the tensions between Western feminist researchers and women in developing countries, Goetz

argued for the researcher to take a position of “partial knowing”, in which she accepts that all knowledge is partial, situated, local and open to revision and that there are no universal truths about women, so that she can responsibly present claims that “see with others without claiming to be them, or forcing them to see her way” (1991:p.151). This is a position that I both endorse and see as applicable well beyond ‘gender’ research to all fieldwork-based research. It is something which I practised in the course of my fieldwork, the findings and arguments presented in this study being the result of views I formed gradually by comparing the differing accounts I was given by different informants and by the testing of ideas on informants noted above. It was not possible for any one informant to provide me with the objective ‘truth’ as all accounts were partial. However, by laying different accounts side by side, I was able to piece together the story that I tell herein. Of course my understanding of land tenure in Kinyanambo is also partial. The story I tell is not the only story possible and it must be open to revision. However, in my view, it is better to bear these caveats in mind and proceed with what I can claim to know than to wait for a non-existent truth to emerge.

Finally, it remains to touch on some elements not included in this study and some of the practical problems I encountered. First, as there was no land being distributed by the village government during the fieldwork period I was unable to accompany the village land committee to see first-hand how land was measured out and allocated to villagers. Second, I did not physically measure any landholdings, even though a measurement exercise would have enabled me to check the accuracy of people’s reporting of land sizes. The village was far too large to make such an exercise feasible within the time and resources I had available and, more importantly, Wily’s experience, coupled with my own growing knowledge of the study area, suggested that a measurement exercise would be too overtly political and would jeopardise the trust I had established that was critical to the quality of my research. Instead, as there was a flourishing land market in the village, as many house-plots had already been surveyed and as the Wahehe had a long history of measuring farms by pacing acres at the time of allocation (Oldaker 1957:pp.118, 133), I assumed that villagers would have a reasonably accurate idea of the size of their landholdings. People may not have told the truth, for a variety of reasons, so I also used my observations and those of my assistants to assess the accuracy of the information gathered. Generally, however, villagers agreed about land sizes, making intra-village comparisons viable.

Concerning the practical aspects of fieldwork, there were two main difficulties. The first was that in choosing to carry out my research during the rainy season, to see how people lived in the hard part of the year, I had also chosen a time when many people were busy in their farms. However, most people stopped farming and came home before the rain started, around lunchtime each day, and I made prior appointments for the mornings. The second difficulty lay in the number of funerals. There was at least one funeral a week in Kinyanambo and people would often go away for short periods to attend funerals of relatives in other villages. In Tanzania a funeral is an important social gathering, with everyone who knew the deceased expected to attend. Work stops and drinking and mourning usually last several days, although now because of the frequency of funerals only close relatives tend to stay beyond the first day. Some people I had wanted to interview died before I could do so, for example a former village chair and a former village secretary, and, sadly, one key informant and several members of economic units included in my two surveys also died during my fieldwork. Unlike the more predictable rains, funerals were impossible to plan around. Instead I built considerable flexibility into my work schedule on a day-to-day basis.

Structure of the Study

In Chapters Three to Seven I present my case study of Kinyanambo, using an historical approach to trace how the current land tenure system has evolved. Chapter Three explores the development and settlement history of the study area and Chapter Four analyses agriculture, livelihoods and land before villagisation in 1974. Chapter Five considers changes during villagisation and the transitional period that followed and Chapter Six examines the 1990s. Chapter Seven discusses today's land market, analysing the operation of the local land tenure system and exploring its dynamics and tensions. Chapter Eight concludes. First, however, I discuss the theoretical background to my work in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two

Land Tenure and Access to Resources

Land tenure, the manner of holding land for farming (or other use), and access to resources, the right or opportunity of using available assets (and other things needed) to secure one's livelihood (cf. Hawkins 1988:pp.4, 454, 689, 844), are central, linked aspects of development in predominantly rural economies such as Tanzania's. In this chapter I review the literature on land tenure and access to resources and present my understanding of relevant theoretical issues, identifying those to which my research contributes. My starting point is definitional – to expand on what is meant by 'access to resources' and 'land tenure'.

Resources can be defined as all those things that are inputs to the process of generating a livelihood. This includes land, labour (supply and quality, incorporating well-being, health and education), capital (cash, credit and assets such as houses, livestock, trees, crops etc.), technology (knowledge and tools), agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilisers etc.), natural resources (forests, minerals, water etc.), environmental quality, social and political networks that can be drawn on for support, and, finally, the accumulated product of past economic activity. Access to, ownership of and control of resources, and of the incomes¹ and products arising from their use, are key issues that make the difference between prosperity and mere survival or death. They are separate issues but closely connected. For example, one may have conditional access without ownership or control, or technical ownership without actual access or control. One may thus gain from a resource without having access, ownership and control. Moreover, types of access, ownership and control vary in different contexts, because property rights take many different forms.

People develop livelihood strategies around the resources that they have access to at any given time, in the context of available economic opportunities and specific social and political constraints. The social legitimacy of resource claims is thus an important consideration, influencing livelihood strategies by determining which resources are legitimately available to be used in the first place. However it is also important to examine the local political economy and

¹ For simplicity's sake, I use income to mean cash income throughout.

the wider policy environment, particularly as places like Kinyanambo become more integrated into the wider economy through processes of commoditisation and urbanisation.

My focus in this study is on access to land – how people get land to use, the “ease or difficulty” of acquiring rights in land (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.12). However I also consider land ownership and control and examine the interdependence of and connections between land and other resources (cf. Berry 1989a:p.2). For example, I asked questions about the use of fertilisers, pesticides and wage labour in farming, in order to assess how these other resources, and the cash to pay for them, affected the use people made of the land they had available. More importantly, I felt it would be wrong to assume *a priori* that land is the most important resource for development in Kinyanambo. I therefore investigated people’s livelihoods, in order to assess the role of land therein, to understand how land is important and to see what effects tenure changes might be having on development, and development on the land tenure system.

Land tenure specifically refers to the period or manner of holding land resources (as above). It “implies that land is ‘held’ under certain conditions”, of which there is enormous variety (Meek 1946:p.1). However, despite early acknowledgement that land tenure covers “the whole relationship of man to the soil” (Ibid:p.1(fn.1), after Malinowski), and that “land-owning custom” is closely linked to social structures and political and economic organisation (Hailey 1946:p.xi; Biebuyck 1963b:pp.53-54; Gluckman 1944; 1965:Chapters 3 & 5), Bohannan (1963) is correct in arguing that in general (mainstream) usage the term “land-tenure” is rooted in Western conceptions of land and rights. He observed that in the “Western ethnographic situation”, land is measured “astrally” (precisely in relation to the stars) into pieces which are owned and people’s rights in specific pieces are regulated by the tenure system, the rules of holding land (Ibid:pp.101-103). However, there are communities where land is viewed differently, where people have “farm-tenure, but they do not have land-tenure” (Ibid:p.106). They have rights to farms within a genealogical area or territorially-flexible community – rights to use land but not to use specific pieces of land – and the tenure system regulates access to land but not, as its central organising principle, to specific pieces of land (Ibid:pp.105-109).

Bohannan called on social scientists to create a “theory of land-tenure” which goes beyond ethnocentrism, to explain how different communities understand and constitute “man-man” and “man-thing” rights and relations (1963:pp.102, 111).² Such a theory might define land

² I take Bohannan to be speaking about all people here. Henceforth I use these terms without always citing Bohannan.

tenure as “a system of relations between people and groups expressed in terms of their mutual rights and obligations with regard to land” (Middleton 1988:p.ix). Recent work on African land tenure has contributed substantially to this task, with historically grounded case studies being of particular value (e.g. Feierman 1990; Mackenzie 1998; Peters 1994; Wily 1988; Yngstrom 1999).³ The present study makes a fresh contribution. By investigating people’s rights to land in the historically and culturally specific case of Kinyanambo, I attempt to extend further our understanding of changing rights and relations between people and between people and land.

In this chapter I first examine the literature on land tenure in the neo-classical tradition – grounded in economics and premised on the mainstream definition of tenure as the rules of accessing and holding specific pieces of land – in particular, literature on the “evolutionary theory of land rights” (Platteau 1996). I then explore alternative theoretical approaches to land and resources, addressing property and ownership, land and social relations, material and ideological dimensions of struggles over resources, multiple tenure systems and social legitimacy, and land reform in Tanzania. I end by briefly outlining my analytical approach.

The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights (ETLR)

The evolutionary theory of land rights (ETLR) dominates mainstream debate on land and falls squarely within the neo-classical tradition on land tenure – the property rights approach. This has dominated land policy-making in Africa since about 1930, when an “evolutionary model of tenure change” began to emerge in official efforts to transform indigenous land tenure in the direction of individual private property rights in order to encourage agricultural development (Bassett 1993:pp.5-18). However the neo-classical tradition on land tenure is a very broad school, containing a wide range of positions. I therefore set out my understanding of the ETLR here, before discussing two different sets of criticism below.

The basic argument of the ETLR is, very simply, that indigenous tenure systems will evolve into individualised systems of private property under the inexorable pressure of the progressive commoditisation of agriculture (Bassett 1993; Bruce 1988:pp.25-26; EARC 1955:pp.279-290, 323, 346; Feder & Noronha 1987; Hailey 1946; James & Fimbo 1973:pp.27-

³ See also Berry (1993) and collections such as Bassett and Crummey (1993), Biebuyck (1963a) and Downs and Reyna (1988).

28; Lugard 1926:pp.280-281; Migot-Adholla *et al* 1991; Oldaker 1957:pp.122-123, 143; Platteau 1992; 1996; 1998; 2000; World Bank 1989:p.104). The theory's core assumptions are:

1. that customary⁴ land tenure takes the form of communal tenure;
2. that competition for land will increase under the pressure of increasing population and increasing demand for agricultural output, leading to the mismanagement or overexploitation of resources, making customary tenure unstable and constraining agricultural productivity;
3. that freehold tenure is the most propitious form of tenure for agricultural development and increased productivity and that the right to freely dispose of land without approval is a necessary component of freehold tenure;
4. that freehold tenure is propitious because it will lead to consolidation of landholdings and transfers of land from less dynamic and efficient farmers to more progressive farmers, provide the security required for optimal investments in agriculture, and create the opportunity of using land as collateral, with a resulting increase in credit supply;
5. that, although customary tenure is seen as flexible and evolving towards greater individualisation, government intervention to establish clear legal private property rights is needed to consolidate and support such evolutionary processes.

Each of these assumptions has been contested within (and without) the neo-classical tradition and the ETLR modified accordingly by its proponents. However there remains a view that encompasses all five assumptions, which I call the 'pure' ETLR (e.g. World Bank 1989:p.104; cf. Quan 2000:p.38; Platteau 1992:pp.3-4; 1996:p.30). Feder and Noronha provide a particularly clear statement of this position:

"In poor, but uncrowded rural societies, land rights are typically defined for groups rather than individuals. Within the groups, individual or family rights rest on elaborate traditions and customs. Such customs enforce group control over the use and disposition of land. Furthermore...the entitlement of individuals to specific tracts of land is transitory...some efficiency is lost, since people lack incentives to improve the land. But these losses are small as long as land is abundant and farming methods primitive.

"The evolution of permanent and enforceable land rights is closely related to increases in population density, advances in farming technology, and the emergence of agricultural markets. As land becomes scarce, societies can no longer rely on long fallow periods to maintain land fertility. They must adopt fertility-restoring technologies, which require investment of capital and effort – and thus also require incentives for farmers to change their practices. One such incentive is the right to cultivate land continuously and to bequeath or sell it. One nearly universal development is a unified system of land documentation and registration, giving a land owner proof of ownership. *If the registration system is effective and if the state can protect the owner...the system will indeed enhance security of ownership*" (1987:p.143; emphasis added).

This last point provides the justification for World Bank and donor promotion of state intervention in the form of individualisation, registration and titling (IRT) programmes. Such programmes have a long (though limited) history in Africa, having been introduced by respective colonial governments in Buganda (Uganda) in 1900 (Richards 1963) and Kenya from the mid-

⁴ I generally prefer 'indigenous tenure' to refer to non-Western land tenure systems but use 'customary tenure', which is widely used in the literature, with the caveat that customary rules are often "only a generation old" and neither static nor traditional as the term implies (Bruce 1993:p.35; 1988:p.28).

1950s (Coldham 1978:pp.91-92; Okoth-Ogendo 1976:pp.162-167; Swynnerton 1954). In Tanzania, registration of customary landholdings formed part of the Dodoma Land Use Management Programme in the early 1990s (Yngstrom 1999:Chapter 8), whilst the basic neo-classical position on the importance of clear and secure private property rights for development has broadly influenced the Tanzanian land reform process.

The overall logic of mainstream policy is that, although indigenous land tenure systems evolve spontaneously (as above), state support and direction to ensure an effective registration system and more secure rights can speed up the process and bring efficiency gains to agricultural development sooner. State intervention through formalisation of land rights might also improve equity, because clear private property rights are important to poverty reduction (Economist 2001a; 2001c), whilst legal reform is needed to “change the nature of the legal regime and the legal culture that applies to African-held land” (McAuslan 1998:pp.527-529). Nevertheless, various strands of criticism have been levelled at the mainstream discourse, the ‘pure’ ETLR and its policy prescriptions. Two groups fall clearly within the neo-classical tradition itself – the first empirical, the second theoretical.

First Critique of the ETLR – Empirical Evidence

The views falling within this first critique represent a more nuanced and refined branch of the ETLR rather than a separate theoretical approach. Havnevik categorises it as a “structurally oriented theoretical position”, driven by the outstanding lack of empirical evidence to support the basic assumptions of the ETLR (1997b:p.5). There are two parts to the critique. First, evidence of IRT programmes indicates that they neither increase security of tenure, credit and land transfers, nor do they boost agricultural output and productivity. Second, evidence of indigenous tenure systems indicates that they do not always constrain productivity and may evolve towards individualisation without the imposition of IRT.

On the first part, Atwood's (1990) examination of the impact of land registration on three of the key mechanisms through which private property rights are supposed to have beneficial effects on agricultural productivity – land transfers, access to credit, and security-induced on-farm investment in conservation and new technology – is instructive. He challenges assumption four in my outline of the ETLR (above), arguing that titling and registration have not produced wide efficiency gains in crop production in a range of situations across Africa, such as where

there are high transactions costs to land transfers or significant social costs to the repossession of land used as collateral. Atwood sees market imperfections and institutional constraints as the main reasons for this, noting that the local institutional environment which mediates claims to land will not simply disappear with the introduction of titling and registration and that the resulting multiple tenure systems lead to insecurities that may prevent many of the predicted efficiency and productivity gains of IRT programmes from taking place.

Atwood's (1990) position is similar to that of Barrows and Roth (1990), who studied the impact of individualisation and land registration on security of tenure, investment, credit and land markets in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. They challenge assumptions four and five in my outline of the ETLR, arguing that, although registration can support the evolution of an individualised land tenure system if that evolution is already underway, it cannot overcome market imperfections or unleash fundamental changes in economic institutions and behaviour on its own (Ibid:pp.296-297). In a separate examination of land registration policies in Somalia, Roth therefore argues that tenure security (via registration) should be regarded as "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for development" (1993:p.316).

On the second part of the neo-classical empirical critique, Migot-Adholla *et al's* (1991) examination of the impact of indigenous land tenure systems on agricultural productivity in areas of rain-fed agriculture in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda is key. These authors question the first, second and fifth assumptions in my outline of the ETLR and, more importantly, claim to prove empirically the main hypothesis of the ETLR, that land rights do evolve towards full privatisation. They found evidence of individualised land transfers (including sales and rentals) in indigenous tenure systems but no evidence of those systems constraining productivity. They therefore argue that indigenous tenure systems will not constrain agricultural productivity if they are allowed to evolve, except perhaps in situations of dramatic social and economic change, and that, where indigenous systems are efficiently adapting to change by evolving in a more individualised direction, they should be enabled to continue to evolve by governments instead of having change imposed on them. Migot-Adholla *et al* therefore only recommend intervention along IRT lines when, for example, there are weak indigenous systems, planned project interventions or a high incidence of land disputes (Ibid:p.170).

In contrast, Bruce (1993) argues that indigenous tenure systems do at least partly constrain agricultural productivity. He examined the evidence on land use and conservation, security of tenure and investment, farm management, efficiency in resource allocation, access

to land-secured credit, fragmentation and subdivision of holdings, and the land needs of women farmers and kinship groups, and found that, “though sometimes exaggerated, each of these concerns about indigenous tenure systems has a kernel of substance”, that they do need to be taken seriously (Ibid:p.48). Nevertheless, Bruce challenges the fifth assumption in my outline of the ETLR by suggesting that suspected tenure constraints on agricultural productivity be closely examined to assess the usefulness of major reforms like IRT in each particular case.

Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) also take this view. Their study straddles the two strands of the neo-classical empirical critique in finding no evidence of benefits from IRT in Kenya and no evidence of constraints from indigenous tenure in Tanzania. Their two study communities had similar characteristics, enabling them to conclude that policy differences have not caused land markets to behave differently in the two countries and that governments should therefore be cautious in their interventions.

In all these studies – and there are many more – the authors accept different aspects of the ETLR while challenging others. The arguments within the neo-classical empirical critique of the ETLR are therefore quite varied but the overall thrust is that both IRT programmes and indigenous land tenure systems do not always behave as predicted by theory. The critique is further supported by substantial empirically-grounded material that falls outside the neo-classical tradition, with the main neo-classical assumptions about land tenure – on the optimality of freehold tenure (three and four in my outline of the ETLR) – being subject to especially heavy criticism.

For example, Haugerud has shown for Embu District, Kenya, that, although a land market developed after the introduction of IRT, “the largest land owners are not the most innovative or productive farmers and agricultural investment is not the primary motivation of accumulating land through purchase” (1989:p.83). Instead land was bought for speculation, to provide an inheritance for sons, and to gain access to the cash borrowing that possession of title deeds allowed (Ibid:p.77), with the cash often used for non-agricultural purposes (Okoth-Ogendo 1976:pp.175-176). The high cost of registering land also meant that many holdings were left unregistered in Embu after land transfers and that the registered owners of legal title were often not the users of the land, whilst fragmentation and subdivision of landholdings continued because of population growth and unchanged inheritance patterns and because it made ecological and economic sense there (Haugerud 1983:pp.72-77; 1989:pp.66-67, 78-80; cf. Mackenzie 1989:pp.92-93).

Okoth-Ogendo (1976:pp.170-171) thinks that the few economic benefits of IRT in Kenya have not justified its high cost, whilst Shipton (1988) has criticised the increased land disputes and insecurity of tenure that have arisen from its implementation amongst the Luo in South Nyanza District. On equity issues, Shipton notes that those who had sold land since IRT was implemented in South Nyanza tended to be poorer farmers and that the right of sale made it more tempting to sell land in times of urgent cash need (Ibid:pp.115-116). On the first assumption in my outline of the ETLR, it is now widely accepted that indigenous tenure is not usually communal and that farmers enjoy considerable individual freedom under indigenous systems of land tenure, particularly in settled agriculture (Bassett 1993:p.18; Bruce 1988:pp.24-26; 1993:p.35).⁵

These few examples are only indicative of the massive empirical literature (within and without the neo-classical tradition) that raises concerns about the ETLR and IRT programmes.⁶ Overall, the empirical critique suggests that evolution towards fully marketised land is a separate issue from improved agricultural productivity. As one advocate of IRT concedes, "neither individual tenure nor co-operatives, nor collective farming necessarily make crops grow better. Agriculturally they are not ends in themselves" (EARC 1955:p.324). The main policy implication is that IRT programmes may not be the most efficient (or equitable) means to boost agricultural productivity in Africa. There is also broad agreement on the failures of IRT programmes to deliver what they claim and some concern that they may not have economic benefits at all. As we have seen, the internal critics of the ETLR maintain the neo-classical tradition – the property rights approach – but with various caveats. The external critics use a range of alternative theoretical approaches to understanding land tenure, which I discuss below. First, though, I examine the second critique of the ETLR that falls within the neo-classical tradition, Platteau's theoretical critique.

⁵ Early writers on African land tenure systems specified that communal tenure did not preclude individual rights but rather defined them in terms of membership of social groups and/or of political allegiances and authorities (Biebuyck 1963b:pp.54-55; Gluckman 1944; 1965:Chapters 3 & 5; Lugard 1926:p.285; Meek 1946:pp.10, 17, 26-27). Later lack of conceptual rigour among policy-makers who confused common property with open access (Bromley & Cernea 1989; Peters 1994:pp.4-7; Platteau 1992:pp.6-7) makes it necessary to reiterate the point.

⁶ Platteau (1992; 1996) provides the most comprehensive reviews.

Second Critique of the ETLR - Platteau's Position

Although Platteau (especially 1996) contributes importantly to the empirical critique just discussed, his work on the theoretical problems of the ETLR merits special attention. In particular, his suggestion that indigenous land tenure systems may evolve in the direction of collective resource management rather than necessarily that of individualised systems is an argument unique to him (Platteau 1998).

Platteau's critique is two-fold. First, he highlights two key conditions required for the evolution of indigenous land tenure arrangements into individualised systems that are not explicitly stated in the ETLR. These are that new technical packages must be available in order to provide attractive investment opportunities in agriculture and that efficiency and equity considerations must be separable so that the new tenure system is seen as legitimate (1996:p.39). He then identifies four key theoretical limitations of the ETLR (1998). First, there is methodological selection bias. Only surviving land tenure systems can be observed and it cannot be inferred *ex post* that the best systems are the ones that have survived. A second basic theoretical defect is the absence of the state (except where it is required to introduce titling and registration). The ETLR ignores the role of the state in influencing access to resources and, as is sometimes the case in Africa, in obstructing local communities' attempts to collectively manage their resources.⁷ This is connected to his first point, as state policies (both directly relating to land and agriculture, and broader economic policies) influence which land tenure systems survive. Third, Platteau (1998) claims social capital is missing from the ETLR, by which he means a tradition of community collective action necessary to give social legitimacy to legislation or regulations about land. However he might be better to argue that social structures and processes are missing rather than social capital, which is a more controversial concept (e.g. Fine 1999). Finally, Platteau (1998) argues that the ETLR is limited by its failure to consider redistribution and equity issues. He notes that there are many different ways to privatise resources and that lack of agreement on the approach might create conflict in a community, which both adds to the costs of privatisation and may even prevent the supposed individualisation from evolving.

Following this critique, Platteau (1998) explores theoretically the institutional responses available to communities under the pressures of increasing population and land scarcity. The

⁷ The literature on this mostly focuses on pastoral communities (e.g. Gamaledinn 1987; Shivji & Kapinga 1998).

ETLR assumes the response will be to privatise landholdings. However Platteau argues for an alternative – the tightening of the rules and regulations that control access to and use of community land (or other productive resources). Where there are no transactions costs, Platteau maintains that the two responses are theoretically equivalent in their outcomes. This follows from Coase's (1960) argument that, in the absence of transactions costs, the most efficient use of resources will take place if property rights are clearly defined and institutionally supported. Neo-classical economists assume this means clearly defined private property rights. Logically, however, Coase's argument can apply to group (or common) property rights, so long as they are also clearly defined and institutionally supported – that is, the group itself is defined and the regulations for use are clear and enforced. The ETLR assumes that in the real world, where transactions costs are pervasive, privatisation is more efficient because it internalises externalities (social costs and benefits) (Platteau 1998).⁸ In contrast, Platteau argues that due to the high costs of privatisation (from establishing and enforcing private property rights) and the high opportunity costs of dividing communal land (in terms of scale economies and insurance/security), people might find ways to establish efficient and workable institutions of collective resource management, which would be a rational response to overexploitation and potential collapse of communal resources (1998; cf. 1992:pp.7-8, 45-47).⁹

However, as Khan has observed, both Platteau and the ETLR assume a consensual model of institutional change, whereas institutional change is actually more likely to arise from conflict.¹⁰ Platteau's joint work with André on Rwanda draws attention to this very point (André & Platteau 1996). Their study is a particularly illuminating examination of how indigenous tenure systems can come under extreme stress in conditions of land scarcity and rapid population growth. In the Rwandan case, limited opportunities to earn off-farm income combined with extreme poverty in the 1980s to encourage an illegal land market to flourish, in which those with access to off-farm earnings were able to buy up land from those in distress. Social differentiation increased dramatically and the poorest social groups became more marginalised (because of their shrinking landholdings and growing landlessness), whilst insecurity increased

⁸ Coase (1960) was an important contributor to the original property rights school, which informs the whole neo-classical tradition on land tenure – the property rights approach – and which holds that private property rights are optimal because of this internalisation effect (e.g. Demsetz 1967; cf. Platteau 1992:pp.4-5; 1996:p.31).

⁹ See Hardin's (1968) account of "the tragedy of the commons" that follows from open access to communal resources.

¹⁰ Dr M. Khan's comments were made in Platteau's seminar presentation at SOAS, 27/10/98 (Platteau 1998), where there was vigorous discussion about the absence of power and social relations in the whole property rights approach. I am grateful to Dr C. Cramer for subsequently clarifying some of the key points.

as families competing for scarce land resources disputed customary tenure arrangements. André and Platteau argue that these factors contributed to rising levels of violence within rural communities and to social breakdown in the form of the 1994 genocide, although they do not claim that the genocide was the result of these factors alone.

Rwanda is an extreme example, with its particular history and ethnic tensions, but it clearly illustrates the limits of the ETLR. In situations such as this, where the system could not evolve its way out of severe crisis, government intervention might be the only option, yet it would need to be extremely circumspect in order not to aggravate the crisis. In particular, policy-makers would need to understand the specific nature of the land tenure system and the direction of change it was taking before the crisis was reached.

The Value of the Property Rights Approach

The fundamental problem with the ETLR, and indeed the property rights approach as a whole, is its absence of analysis of power and social relations. This absence is typical of neo-classical theories in general, where a range of factors and variables contribute to an outcome but those which would involve analysis of power and social relations are usually treated as exogenous, on the grounds that making power and social relations endogenous to theoretical analysis makes theory messy and non-generalisable. However I do not consider this a valid justification for ignoring these important aspects of land tenure systems. There is also a second problem with the neo-classical tradition on land tenure – the absence of historical analysis. Historical facts may be presented and land transactions analysed over a period of years (e.g. Pinckney & Kimuyu 1994), but there is a general failure to ask why changes have occurred – to examine changing conditions of production and access to resources and processes of commoditisation that influence the nature and direction of changes in indigenous land tenure systems.

Nevertheless, there is still much of value in the property rights approach. Platteau has argued that the ETLR should not be abandoned altogether as it makes "two essential, valid points":

"(1) that land arrangements and practices, far from being static, are evolving autonomously under the pressure of growing land scarcity; and (2) that the significant shifts which thus take place are geared towards increased individualization of tenure rights and increased transferability of land" (1996:p.74; 2000:p.70).

Notwithstanding this perceived tendency towards individual rights, he has also indicated how the most basic assumptions of the property rights approach can accommodate common property and do not necessitate evolution towards full privatisation of land rights (1998). As Bromley and Cernea have noted,

“common property is in essence “private” property for the group...[and it lies]...in a continuum between the free-for-all of an open access regime and complete individualization that is the essence of a private property regime” (1984:pp.10, 14).

It seems clear to me that a wide range of property regimes, of varying regulations and regulators, can be located on this continuum and that there may therefore be a whole range of evolutionary paths that land tenure systems can follow.¹¹

Bromley and Cernea rightly point out that it is essential for any property regime to have “an authority system able to ensure that the expectations of rights holders are met. Compliance, protected and reinforced by an authority system, is a necessary condition for the viability of any property regime...When the authority system breaks down – for whatever reason – then the management or self-management of resource use cannot be exercised any longer” (1989:p.17). This results in degeneration into an open access regime in which “there are no property rights...there is only possession” (Ibid:p.21). Arguably, the disadvantages of an open access regime, where one must constantly “stand guard” over one’s land (Ibid:p.21), are such that, in the absence of transactions costs, any regime of clearly defined property rights is preferable, rational and therefore logically possible.¹² The real value of the property rights approach, then, lies in this theoretical possibility that there can be a variety of rational property regimes and land tenure systems and, by implication, a variety of evolutionary paths.

The real world is of course imperfect. The land tenure system that evolves in any one place will depend on particular local circumstances and it may not always be the most economically rational.¹³ Different systems will clearly follow different evolutionary paths and the different trajectories and patterns of change will only be identifiable through historical analysis, incorporating analysis of power and social relations. In tracing the particular trajectory of change – the evolutionary path – of the land tenure system in Kinyanambo, I therefore demonstrate in this study the contribution that careful historical analysis of power and social relations can make to our understanding of changing land tenure systems. For it is only with studies such as this

¹¹ I use evolution throughout to mean only the ongoing adaptation of land tenure systems to changing circumstances, not in the unilinear and teleological sense of there being a finite point (or ideal system) to be reached.

¹² I use rational here in its broadest sense, not its strict economic sense.

¹³ In identical circumstances, different systems might be more or less efficient and therefore more or less economically rational. In differing circumstances economic rationality is harder to assess.

that we will be able to start bridging the gap between neo-classical economics and alternative theoretical approaches to land and resources.

Alternative Theoretical Approaches to Land and Resources

Alternatives to the property rights approach to land tenure tend to focus on either processes or structures. One major theoretical approach is concerned with processes of negotiation and struggle over access to resources (e.g. Berry 1989b; 1993). It is particularly associated with literature on gender and land, valuable work on gender aspects of access to land having highlighted the importance of social and political relations and institutions (e.g. Mackenzie 1998; Yngstrom 1999).

A second theoretical approach seeks to identify relevant actors and structures within the state whose interactions and relationships inform access to resources (e.g. Amanour 1997; Kanyinga 1997; Moyo 1998; Shivji & Kapinga 1998). This approach has been called a structuralist political economy approach (Izumi 1999:p.3) and is rooted in traditional class perspectives. It is particularly associated with work on the politics of land reform in Tanzania (e.g. Shivji 1997a; 1998; Sundet 1997).

Whilst it is useful to distinguish theoretical alternatives to the property rights approach in this way, it is important not to focus too much on either process or structure at the expense of the other – not least because they are often interconnected. State structures and local social and political processes are only two of many variables influencing land tenure systems in particular historical contexts and, as Berry observes with regard to social identity, each separate variable is only an “additional thread” in our understanding and not the sole explanation of access to resources (1988:p.69). Both structure and process are therefore important to analysis and, in exploring changing land tenure in Kinyanambo, this study examines both. Nevertheless, the literature emphasising social and political processes has contributed more to my analytical approach and thus dominates my discussion in the remainder of this chapter. I begin by exploring the concepts of property and ownership.

Property and Ownership

The property rights approach to land tenure is premised on the essentially Western notion of 'property' as material resources that can be 'owned'. The concept is absolute – there are things (property) that exist and to which rights (including ownership) pertain and, although those rights may be restricted, the property itself exists. Lugard provides an example of this concept in operation in his comments on how land ownership rights are more restricted in Africa than in England (1926:pp.316-317), whilst Meek's (1946) analysis of African land tenure is also premised on it. However Meek claims that because individual rights in Africa are restricted – “qualified by membership of a family, clan or local group” – they “in fact partake more of the nature of possession than of property” (Ibid:p.17). This implies that ownership requires a certain degree of individual freedom of action and that some things are more 'property' than others, yet Meek himself acknowledges that errors arise from assuming “native conceptions of ownership must be basically the same as those of Europeans” (Ibid:p.11).

Western notions of property and ownership can anyway not be taken at face value.¹⁴ Property has ideologies attached to it and the relationship between people and property is essentially social in nature – as seen in the social significance of the form or amount of property, in the social meaning of the distribution of property within a family or wider community, and in the ideologies and social norms which determine the manner of transmitting property to heirs (through inheritance and marriage transactions). As Whitehead puts it, “property is not primarily a relation between people and things, but a relation between people and people – a social relation, or a set of social relations” (1984:p.176). Property links families and wider communities and “social positions and persons” (Gluckman 1965:p.157; Hirschon 1984:pp.5, 9). Concepts of property are also historically and culturally situated and may change over time (Hirschon 1984:pp.6-7). Theorists and policy-makers within the neo-classical tradition often miss (or ignore) all these issues by assuming the Western notion of property, yet if what counts as property varies then we cannot assume it is always conceived of as private ownership of physical things. Even where property is conceived in this way, its enjoyment may be restricted, as with English farmers who own freehold land but are subject to the rights of others to access public rights of way or to shoot or fish on their land (cf. James 1971:p.52; Lugard 1926:p.316).

¹⁴ See McAuslan (2000:pp.76-79), for example, on the differences between English law, civil law and Roman Dutch law.

Ownership does not therefore straightforwardly correlate with possession, whilst property rights are everywhere a function of social and political systems.

Whitehead's (1984) theoretical examination of the social character of property is particularly instructive here. Whitehead builds on Strathern's work on marriage transactions in the Papua New Guinean Highlands, in which she shows how anthropologists have misinterpreted the meanings inherent in marriage transactions, inaccurately perceiving women as being exchanged as property in marriage (in the Western sense – as objects), when in fact it is aspects of social relations that are being exchanged between one kinship group and another and the person who represents the social exchange cannot herself be alienated (1984:pp.162-166; Whitehead 1984:pp.178, 188). Whitehead argues that this misperception of women as property arose from differing understandings of the concepts of property and personhood in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. She notes that capitalism requires people to be disembodied from property in a way that they are not in non-capitalist societies and that this produces changes in the legal concept of the person as “the producer of labour becomes a commodity, and a bearer of value...a legal subject and a bearer of rights” (Pashukanis 1978:p.112, as cited in Whitehead 1984:p.179). Whitehead therefore contends that it is necessary to look at how societies construct acting subjects in order to understand property relations and she sees kinship systems as the key to this, arguing, for example, that “what kinship does, through ideological and legal practices, is to construct men and women as subjects differently so that one gender may transact the other at marriage” (1984:pp.189, 187).

It is because acting subjects are constructed differently in different societies that relations of “persons to things” (property relations) take historically and culturally specific forms (Whitehead 1984:p.191) and it follows that concepts of ownership will also be historically and culturally specific. For example, Whitehead shows that the concept of ownership among the Kusasi people of Ghana does not give them “an abstracted and definable capacity to assert a dominion over things (and people) which can be separated and distinguished from the dominion of other persons similarly constructed” (Ibid:p.186). Instead Kusasi ownership rights are contextual and determined primarily by kinship status – they are “subject to ideologies” and “manipulable by those with kinship-ascribed power” (Ibid:p.186). Unsurprisingly, the Kusasi notion of acting subjects does not correspond to the Western (legal) notion of individuals with rights (Ibid:p.186).

Ultimately both property and ownership turn on issues of control and power, over things and over people. Control and power vary for different individuals in different societies. However, lack of power in one sphere may be offset by more power in another (Hirschon 1984:p.19) and, as Oboler (1994) demonstrates, public ideologies about property often overstate or mask the realities of control. In studying the house-property complex in African cattle-herding societies, Oboler observed a common perception of cattle belonging to men and of women having no real property rights, yet she found that at least in some of these societies there are different named categories of cattle and that different individuals have predominant rights in each.¹⁵ Oboler (1994) argues that women have more rights in some categories of cattle than others and defend and manipulate those rights using various strategies of drawing on supportive social norms. Furthermore, everyone's "powers to act with regard to the herd" are constrained by others' rights and "no single individual holds total rights of what we would call ownership", making it wrong to call men the real owners of cattle (Ibid:pp.354-355). Oboler thus warns against relying primarily on male informants, who may distort the public ideology of property rights in their favour (Ibid:pp.344, 353). By extension, the researcher should avoid relying on any one category of informant.

Property and ownership can clearly have different meanings in different social systems and invariably have social meanings that are not always obvious at first sight. Yet, whilst Bohannan's non-ethnocentric "theory of land-tenure" (1963, above) requires the nature of property in African social systems to be specifically examined (Okoth-Ogendo 1989:p.7), it also requires a working formulation of the concepts of property and ownership for use in comparative analysis. In this vein, Bromley and Cernea have suggested that property should be conceived of not as "an object such as land" but as "a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to respect the conditions that protect that stream" (1989:p.5). For them, property is "a social contract that defines an individual and an object of value vis-a-vis [sic] all other individuals" (Ibid:p.21). Private (or any other type of) ownership is then simply one possible outcome of the social contract, whilst property is the right, the social contract itself, and not the object to which the right pertains.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Colson (1963:pp.145-146), Dey (1981:p.113), Gluckman (1965:pp.116-117, 146-147, 152-155, 161), James and Fimbo (1973:pp.28-29), and Meek (1946:pp.20-21) for other examples of distinct categories of property and rights, especially in land.

¹⁶ Such an approach is implicit in much anthropological work, for example in Gluckman's claim that Barotse property law defines "the duties between persons in respect of things" rather than "the rights of persons over things" (1965:p.163).

In Africa, people have commonly held bundles of interlinked and often overlapping rights to different benefits (Biebuyck 1963b:p.57; Berry 1988:p.63; Gluckman 1944:p.15; 1965:p.77; Okoth-Ogendo 1976:p.153). For example, "a village could claim grazing rights over a parcel of land subject to the hunting rights of another, the transit rights of a third and the cultivation rights of a fourth" (Okoth-Ogendo 1976:p.153). Land rights are broadly of four types – "use, transfer, allocation or control, and administration" – which may be held by different people or groups in respect of the same piece of land (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.14). Different people or groups within each society exercise varying degrees of control over the allocation of all such rights, but this control does not, "as is generally the case with Anglo-American property notions, imply *ownership* of the *physical solus*" (Okoth-Ogendo 1976:p.153, original emphasis). Okoth-Ogendo has thus warned against defining African property in land as "a specific 'bundle of rights' of any size or character which an individual or group of individuals may have in respect of the *physical solum*", on the grounds that it may lead back to the "ownership trap" – "the insistence that 'a communal something' was always present in African land relations even if the familiar categories of ownership found in Western society were missing" (1989:p.11, original emphasis).

Okoth-Ogendo argues that if

"the idea of a right merely signifies the manner in which claims are asserted in particular fact or jural contexts, or in respect of specific things or objects, then the existence of a right is best understood in terms of a power which society allocates to its various members to execute a particular range or quantum of functions in respect of any given subject matter" (1989:p.7).

This coincides with Bromley and Cernea's (1989) argument. Power to allocate and control resources may result in individual ownership of things termed property (the Western case), but the existence of such power does not in itself necessitate this manner of allocation and control. Instead the property regime that results from this power will depend on the way a society perceives the resource in question and the social process of vesting and controlling the power itself (Okoth-Ogendo 1989:p.8). Culture and ideology matter to the former and social and political organisation to the latter.

For land in Africa, Okoth-Ogendo (1989:p.8) argues that the soil itself has always been perceived separately from the things on it (trees, crops, buildings etc.), that land often has symbolic value and is priceless. For example, land may have ritual significance or be a symbolic indicator of kinship group membership (Berry 1984:pp.91-92; Colson 1971:pp.199-201; Saul 1993:pp.79-80, 86). Meanwhile power over land is accessed and controlled through social and

political processes which require investigation in specific contexts, but which generally hinge on membership of production units (Okoth-Ogendo 1989:pp.9-10) or, as Berry adds, other social groups (1989a:p.2; 1989b:pp.41-42), “land control units and units of production” often not being “identical” in Africa (Saul 1993:p.77). Okoth-Ogendo therefore argues that the origin of power over land in Africa lies in “social adhesion rather than in market operations” and that its purpose is social preservation, both transgenerationally (through inheritance) and immediately (through rights to land for different types of production and use) (1989:pp.10-11).

However, the viability of this argument must be seriously questioned in view of the extensive historical processes of commoditisation on the continent. Okoth-Ogendo defines African property in land as “the value equivalents of the status differentia which a particular category of membership in a production unit carries” and claims that

“the quantum of those equivalents would remain relatively fluid as society as a whole adjusts to changes both internal and external and as production processes incorporate elements outside the land economy” (1989:p.11).

Tenure rights can be built through social contributions and may increase or decrease as the balance of power in respect of land alters (Ibid:p.12), for example with commoditisation, urbanisation and national political-economic change. Yet these forces of change may so fundamentally alter the balance of power over land that, whilst power over land is not wholly marketised – as it is not in the West either – it is visibly shifting in that direction.

Both Okoth-Ogendo (1989) and Bromley and Cernea (1989) offer excellent working formulations of property that incorporate the social and political dimensions of African – and other – land tenure systems. However, although property is social in nature and revolves around power, this does not mean that the basis of power over land does not change under the influence of commoditisation, nor that markets are not central to changing land tenure systems. As African societies continue to develop and their land tenure systems to evolve, it would be surprising to find that concepts of property and ownership did not also change. Both “social adhesion” and “market operations” (Okoth-Ogendo 1989:p.10) must therefore be analysed.

Land and Social Relations

I want now to specifically address land and social relations. There are multiple and complex links between the two and thus various channels through which changes in “man-thing” rights and relations affect “man-man” rights and relations and vice versa. Gender is one obvious

area of linkage, primarily linking land and social relations through marriage and inheritance. For example, in her examination of Luo women's changing access to land in Kisumu and South Nyanza districts, Kenya, Pala found that women as wives and mothers traditionally held important structural positions in their husband's lineage, each being the head of a potential lineage segment within the polygamous household and the guardian of their unmarried sons' property (1980:pp.194, 207; cf. Mackenzie 1990:p.619). Their own access to land was secured through marriage, grounded in an ideology of corporate rights to land which proscribed the alienation of land by individuals and ensured usufruct rights for both men and women. However population growth and state policies during the colonial period increased social differentiation within lineages, contributing to an individualisation of landholdings and increasing land disputes, and the subsequent registration of land in individual male names as part of IRT then undermined women's status in the lineage and extinguished their "rights in land by nullifying the corporate landholdings that had guaranteed their rights" (Pala 1980:pp.189, 195, 197, 199-200, 206-207; cf. Coldham 1978:pp.92-102).¹⁷

Like Pala (1980), Yngstrom (1999) found that marriage traditionally ensured access to land for Wagogo men and women in Dodoma District, Tanzania, with men depending on marriage for access to both land and their wives' labour. However Yngstrom argues that women's rights as wives were not undermined by land registration in the 1990s but that their access to land in their own lineages, as sisters and daughters, became more problematic. This was because, although daughters' rights to inherit land had long been subordinate to their brothers', a stronger ideology of male lineage control over land was emerging with land's "relative scarcity and the consequent increase in its relative value" (Ibid:pp.219, 243-247, 263-265, 269). However the ideology of male lineage control was not yet an accepted justification of male claims to land per se, so male claims on women's land during the registration process were more likely to be successful if made on the basis of land shortage (Ibid:pp.241-244, 246, 265-266).

Yngstrom's (1999) work also draws attention to the links between land and social relations on the grounds of social seniority. Seniority may stem from a range of factors, such as gender, age, achievement, education, wealth, and so on. Yngstrom found that men who were senior by virtue of their wealth tended to have firmer control of land than other social groups,

¹⁷ IRT programmes are often criticised for undermining women's land rights (e.g. Davison 1987; Platteau 1996:pp.40-42; Mackenzie 1990), as also are land resettlement schemes (e.g. Brain 1976; Colson 1963; Hanger & Moris 1973).

although marginal social groups, such as poorer junior men, were able to negotiate access to land through the management of social relations (Ibid:pp.219-224, 234-240, 244). However she argues that the registration of customary landholdings in individual names has reduced the scope for this, because flexible, negotiated rights to use land could set up ownership claims, creating uncertainties during adjudication and registration and “provoking new conflicts over land” (Ibid:pp.263, 267-270).

Statutory changes in land tenure systems may thus enable those with greater social standing to entrench their social positions (cf. Yngstrom 1999:pp.291-292), because new sources of wealth and/or power can be used to “restructure social relations rather than destroy them” (Berry 1989b:p.44). Statutory changes may also institutionalise rural inequalities based on access to state resources and off-farm income (Haugerud 1983) and may aggravate resident-stranger tensions in communities, as decisions have to be made about whether land given temporarily to strangers is now to become theirs permanently, registered as such (Shipton 1988:p.107). More generally, where administrative interventions or legal ambiguities make it risky to grant temporary land rights, permanent rightholders will tend to restrict such access to land (Saul 1993:p.77). Thus Saul found that, although “temporary access to land by nonmembers of the agnatic corporation *is possible*” among the Bobo of Bare village in Western Burkina, “as long as the permanent rights of the descent unit are securely recognised”, land tended not to be lent in successive farming cycles to people in the same agnatic borrowing group and people tended not to borrow from patrilineal relatives, because in both cases this could provide grounds for future contestation over ownership (Ibid:pp.77, 86, 92, 95, original emphasis). Villagers were even more reluctant to lend land to newcomers out of fears of colonisation (Ibid:p.81-82, 86-88).

It is important at this juncture to distinguish between types of strangers or newcomers and residents. Some newcomers “intend to identify themselves with the tribe”, merging with it through marriage, others “settle on the land, but remain aliens to the tribe”, whilst others may acquire land in a community without physically moving there (Lugard 1926:p.313). Similarly, residents will be distinguished by their length of residence or migration time, their seniority on various grounds (as above) and their degree of social, political and economic involvement in the community.

With population growth and agricultural commoditisation (triggering land scarcity and/or increasing the profitability of farming), there is “a tendency for land to be reserved for its

"primary" claimants", who are "often the direct male descendants of the previous landholders" (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.13). Access to land by other claimants, such as lineage members, affines (including wives) and strangers, will then depend on the nature of their relationship with the primary claimant, the rules of the community and their position within it. Yet land rights can change over time as people's status and "degree of assimilation within the landholding group" change (Berry 1988:p.63), just as they often change over the life-cycle. People may thus find themselves operating through different types of rights at different times, for example moving from "derivative or occupational" (usufruct) forms of rights to "proprietary" forms (James & Fimbo 1973:pp.28-29) as their overall social position changes and their communities themselves change.

Social identity is clearly "based on multiple criteria" (Berry 1988:p.64) and people will "change their alliance and social identity depending on certain problems they face under specific conditions at different periods of time and place, which makes it difficult to classify individuals and groups into one exclusive social category" (Izumi 1999:p.60).

However, if access to resources does rest on social relations, then it is important to somehow demarcate social boundaries (cf. Berry 1988:p.63). The "prevalence of kinship as a principle of social organization in African communities" (Berry 1984:p.82) makes it crucial in this regard, but as other factors are also important, and as their relative importance may change over time (as implied above), it is therefore essential to examine different axes of social differentiation, as well as their interactions (Berry 1989b:p.50).¹⁸

In Kinyanambo, I identified wealth, gender and *uenyaji* (Chapter One) as key factors for analysis. Wealth and gender groups were relatively straightforward to identify and are commonly analysed in the literature. However *uenyaji* is a more complex characteristic, shaped by migration time, residence, kinship and involvement in the local social and political system. I identified three main *uenyaji* groups, situated in the particularities of Kinyanambo's (and Tanzania's) history, which will be introduced as the story of land tenure in Kinyanambo unfolds. My conceptualisation of *uenyaji* groups draws on Guyer's (1995) analysis of the dynamics of agrarian change by cohort – in her case, groups of Nigerian women who entered farming around the same time, in specific historical circumstances. Guyer argues that analysis by cohort provides a more nuanced understanding of patterns of change than analysis by more standard factors such as age and generation, enabling us to understand "present ethnography" in

¹⁸ Mackenzie's (1998) work on race, class, gender and land in colonial Kenya is a good example of this sort of analysis.

historical and temporal context and to project forward at least the short-term implications of the current situation for different groups of people.

Social differentiation is only part of the picture though. It is also important to examine the structures of social organisation that frame all social interactions – in particular, the structure of economic units, rather than households per se, as apparent diversity in household composition may disguise basic organisational structures. For example, Gastellu (1987) identified two basic structures within very diverse households in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In the Serer tribe, the production and consumption groups were in households but the accumulation group comprised a group of nonlocalised uterine kin. “A production-consumption group is therefore organized into as many ‘accumulation subgroups’ as there are different matrilineal segments represented” (Ibid:pp.272-273). In contrast, in the Agni tribe, the production, consumption and accumulation group was the same – the household. Yet Gastellu found a “longer-term collective logic” in both systems, with maintenance of the lineage the central goal of competing matrilineal accumulation groups in Serer and of competing male household heads in Agni, who used surpluses to establish themselves as founders of important descent groups (Ibid:pp.274-277). However we identify and define economic units, though, it is important to remember that they are embedded in wider structures and can have permeable boundaries (whose permeability may anyway reduce with pressure on resources (Peters 1984:p.16)) and that we need to examine transfers both within and between units to analyse processes of social change (Guyer & Peters 1987).¹⁹

Some of the most valuable work on the social dynamics of access to resources in Africa has been done by Berry, who has historically and theoretically explored the way

“institutions have served as channels of access to productive resources; have shaped strategies of agricultural production and investment; and have been affected, in turn, by farmers’ patterns of resource use” (1989b:p.41; 1993:*passim*).²⁰

The core of Berry’s argument is that

“strategies of production and accumulation are directed towards establishing or strengthening social relations, which in turn affect the terms on which people gain access to resources...[and that]...social identity and status...[therefore]...become objects as well as instruments of investment” and accumulation (1989b:pp.43, 46; 1984:p.92).

¹⁹ See Appendix Two on my investigation and definition of households and economic units in Kinyambo.

²⁰ Berry (1993:*passim*, especially Chapters 5, 6 & 7) refers throughout the following discussion. However I do not address her central contention that “while access to labor has become increasingly individualized”, access to land continues “to be mediated through membership in various social networks” (Ibid:pp.17, 104) until Chapter Eight. Note also the similarities between Berry’s work and Hydén’s work on the “economy of affection” – a term he coined to refer to the economic importance in rural Africa of affective ties based on common descent, residence and so on (1980:p.18).

People thus invest in meanings as well as in the means of production, making struggles over meanings as much part of the resource allocation process as struggles over material resources (Berry 1988:p.66). Berry further argues that, as a result, strategies used to gain access to resources sometimes interfere with the productive use of the resources themselves, because resources that might otherwise be invested productively are diverted into investments in social relations (1989b:pp.48-49; 1984:p.92). For example, kinship is a common basis for labour recruitment in Africa but guarantees neither efficiency nor high productivity, whilst land acquired to reinforce membership of a territorially-defined social group by a non-resident member may not be farmed productively (or even at all) as that was not the purpose of its acquisition (1984:pp.93-94; 1988:p.67).

However, we should not assume that social investments are necessarily unproductive. As Kerner (1988) shows with the case of the entrepreneurial Bwana Hela in Kilimanjaro Region, Tanzania, investment in social relations does not necessarily preclude successful agricultural development. In fact Kerner argues that it is precisely participation and investment in social relations and institutions that “provides the symbolic capital to concentrate the rights to control land and labour” (Ibid:p.184), whilst Berry herself does not argue that social investments wipe out the inegalitarian effects of commoditisation. Moreover, different types of investment may be mutually supportive. For example, the gains of a strategy of diverting agrarian profits into children's education (because formal employment, which requires education, generates more income than farming) might be maximised by simultaneous investment in social relations to help in competition over both education and employment (Haugerud 1989:pp.73-74).

Nevertheless, Berry argues that, in encouraging people to diversify their assets and incomes sources, agrarian crises in Africa have locked people into “multiple channels of access and strategies of resource management which perpetuate low productivity” (1989b:pp.41, 49-50). It has become difficult to withdraw from investing in social relations as a means of accessing resources, because investments such as participation in kinship-based work groups provide a safety mechanism for access to the means of subsistence should the market economy fail to provide a livelihood altogether (Ibid:pp.45, 51; 1984:p.94), when social relations may be drawn on for employment, loans, gifts of food or cash, provision of free labour or land, and so on. Yet, whilst investments in social relations do lessen risk and uncertainty, they can simultaneously undermine those same social relations, as Berry found for Yoruba farmers in Nigeria who had educated their children but were later eclipsed in status and authority by the

better-educated children (1988:p.68). Furthermore, poverty itself reduces people's ability to maintain social investments, putting further strain on the social networks that provide security.

Berry thus warns that if

"increasing numbers of impoverished rural people simply divest themselves, intentionally or no [sic], of membership in access-controlling institutions, they will form a new category of dispossessed people...[who lack]...the social and institutional means...[to effectively exploit]...“the physical means of production” (1989b:p.51).

Berry's work (*passim*) also highlights the importance of analysing the dynamics of rural change in a way that engages head on with issues of power. Although people negotiate their access to resources using whatever power they have available – which depends to a large extent on their social position – and some people are better placed to secure and advance their own interests than others, fluid situations of economic change, such as those arising from urbanisation and development, offer opportunities to contest the very (written and unwritten) rules about access to resources themselves and to change the existing balance of power in a given society. I therefore move on now to consider political aspects of access to resources.

Material and Ideological Dimensions of Struggles Over Resources

Politics is about struggles over resources, meanings and identities – it has both material and ideological dimensions. Development is a struggle over limited resources in both these dimensions. Interventions may leave some people materially worse off while simultaneously inducing changes to established ideologies at a faster rate than would otherwise have occurred. Development projects and policies (bringing new resources or altering the allocation and distribution of existing ones) cannot therefore operate in a political vacuum and are frequently contested because of their material and/or ideological consequences. For example, Gambian women have famously resisted irrigated-rice projects that required their labour while guaranteeing them neither income nor land, forcing men to pay them in cash or kind to secure their labour and prompting a renegotiation of conjugal contracts (Dey 1981:pp.118-120; Watts 1993). The ensuing "transformations of work, property rights, and labor entitlements [were] evidently material, but they [were] also simultaneously cultural and symbolic" (Watts 1993:p.184).

The everyday business of earning a livelihood can also be highly political. In one village in Mbeya Region, Tanzania, a women's co-operative beer-brewing enterprise was taken over by

local men because their economic independence had threatened the men's "position of power in the family", especially those with no regular income of their own (Nkhoma-Wamunza 1992:pp.206-210, 212; cf. Pottier 1996). In my study area, some men responded to women's increased access to resources for generating their own incomes as members of the AARW project in the early 1990s by reinforcing their cultural hold over them, for example by insisting that their wives obtained their permission to join the project (ILO Undated:pp.19, 25).

However, struggles over resources are obviously not just political because of their gendered effects – they affect other social relations too. In particular, the role of elites is important. Although change – whether from externally imposed projects or policies or from internally and externally driven socio-economic processes such as population growth, agricultural commoditisation and urbanisation – may threaten the interests of senior social groups, they nevertheless tend to start out from a stronger political position and often manage to maintain their interests and improve, or at least retain, their position. Peters' historical analysis of land and water rights in Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana) is illustrative here (1984; 1994:Chapter 3). Peters shows how Tswana elites were able to draw on the ideological proclivities of the colonial administration (for individual ownership as the best means of resource management) to establish borehole ownership syndicates in the 1930s, which they then controlled, while simultaneously using the traditional inclusionary language of stewardship to gain support for the boreholes among the Tswana people as a whole. The elites drew on the Tswana "ethic of equivalence" (1984:p.3), but their ability to retain power while imposing change suggests, as Whitehead puts it, that, although kinship (or indeed other social relations) may operate with an ideology of sharing, this "does not imply equality or the absence of power" in such relations (1984:p.185).

We must therefore consider how both social and political relations are played out in wider contexts if we are to fully understand the material and ideological dimensions of particular struggles over resources. This is because the social and the political are intertwined in every society – power over resources and meanings being at the same time both social and political. Feierman's (1990) work on colonial Tanganyika is of particular value here. Feierman explores the social and political aspects of resistance to the 1950s anti-soil erosion Usambara Scheme, which mandated labour-intensive construction of tie ridges (*matuta*) on all farmland. In the Shambaai farming areas of the Usambara mountains, local custom ensured that the poorest households were always able to access land for subsistence farming, by borrowing it rent-free

from their richer neighbours. However, only unimproved land was made available to poorer households. Improvements such as terracing or tree-planting were associated with land used for permanent cash crops and improved land was generally not lent out, not least because “a borrower who improved the land in one year and used it in the next established a strong claim to ownership” (Ibid:pp.182-183). The Scheme therefore threatened “the right of every resident of Shambaai to the free use of land for subsistence”, because *matuta* construction on subsistence land converted it into improved land that was no longer available for lending out (Ibid:pp.181-183). It also increased the work burdens of poor farmers who had to build new *matuta* each year on different pieces of borrowed land. Women whose husbands had died or migrated for work (as was then common) were hardest hit – with no resident male kin to join male work-groups for *matuta* construction, these women had to use their own labour or cash to build them themselves – and women thus played a leading role in resisting the Scheme (Ibid:pp.170, 183-188).

Feierman's (1990) work clearly illustrates the connections between land resources and the meanings attached to different types of land. The Usambara Scheme was opposed because, by changing the nature of land from unimproved to improved, it threatened an important customarily-sanctioned safety-net for the poor that was part of the overall set of social institutions by which Shambaai was organised. However it also triggered deep political concerns. People feared (and rightly so) that the British wanted them to leave their mountains and their whole way of life, especially poorer landless people who would be forced to move down to the plains. This was an issue because population pressures had created land shortages, aggravated by European settlement and the closing off of forest lands in reserves, which the Scheme made worse (Ibid:pp.160-164, 169-170, 182-184, 188, 191-194, 196-198, 200). In opposing the chiefs who enforced *matuta* construction on behalf of the British, except for chiefs who were also rainmakers and thereby legitimate powerholders in the Shambaai universe, the Shambaa people linked these problems with their lack of local political control (Ibid:pp.167-168, 171-173, 175, 178, 189-194; cf. Mamdani 1996:p.164). Opposition to the Usambara Scheme was therefore backwards-looking, an effort to protect the right “of continued subsistence in the mountains for all peasants, even the weak”, as well as simultaneously forwards-looking, in accepting change as inevitable but asking “that control of local politics and the local economy be left in local hands” (Feierman 1990:pp.45, 195).

Maack's (1996) study of opposition to the 1950s Uluguru Land Usage Scheme in Tanganyika raises many similar issues.²¹ Although the Waluguru were "protesting against a way of life in which increased hard work did not bring increased rewards", as enforced terrace construction "brought hunger by destroying the soil and lowering yields", their resistance also had ideological dimensions (Maack 1996:pp.152, 159, 161-162). For example, the Scheme forced men and women to labour together communally in a way that was not acceptable in Waluguru society and its imposition was based on erroneous British ideas about the traditional control of land and labour, which was anyway changing with increasing land shortage and land commoditisation (Ibid:pp.159, 162-165). It thus symbolised both the material and the ideological discontent that the Waluguru felt at their growing economic hardship and political subordination under colonial rule.

In both the Ulugurus and the Usambaras, local opposition to colonial land use policies not only undermined the effectiveness of those policies, but also contributed to the growing nationalist movement in Tanganyika (Feierman 1990:pp.174-180; Hydén 1980:pp.61-62; Iliffe 1979:pp.496-499, 526-527; Maack 1996:pp.167-168; Mamdani 1996:p.104; Sundet 1997:p.22; Wily 1988:p.63). Although resistance was overt and occasional violence broke out in both areas (Feierman 1990:pp.170-171, 173, 175-176; Maack 1996:p.152), it was nevertheless effectively channelled into the political arena by TANU. Where there is limited scope for the political management of struggles over resources and meanings, though, there is a distinct possibility of more serious violence, particularly in situations of extreme economic hardship. The centrality of land to everyday life and survival in rural Africa thus raises the spectre of violent conflict – half the conflicts recorded in André and Platteau's Rwandan study arose from land disputes (1996:p.28), whilst contemporary Zimbabwe demonstrates how easily broader political and economic grievances can be channelled into a single focus on land by unscrupulous rulers.²² Nor is modern Tanzania exempt from serious tensions over resources. In Kilimanjaro Region, with its high population density, violence against women (especially widows) and children has increased in the face of land shortages and general insecurity of tenure (Envirocare 1998).²³ In Arusha Region, insecurity of tenure has contributed to very poor relations between pastoralists

²¹ See also Spear's (1996) discussion of colonial land policy and land shortage on Mount Meru and Monson's (1996) account of colonial forestry policy in the Inner Kilombero Valley.

²² See also Kanyinga (1997) on Kenyan land politics.

²³ Interviews at Envirocare, Dar-es-Salaam, 28/5/99 and 16/8/99, and Moshi, 20/3/00.

and foreign landholders (Shivji & Kapinga 1998).²⁴ In Mtwara and Lindi regions, traditional matrilineal inheritance patterns have been breaking down under the weight of acute poverty, leaving young men landless and desperate, whilst in Kagera, Mwanza and Shinyanga regions, violence and intimidation through witchcraft accusations are being used against women with land (Booth *et al* 1993:p.23; Manji 2000).²⁵

Violence is linked to struggles over resources insofar as such struggles can be seen as crises that threaten established ways of organising life. Violence can thus be a sign of deeper material and ideological struggles – struggles that are too fundamental to the identity of the parties involved to be resolved in any other way. Yet, as Scott has argued, “everyday” resistance to change in the form of “passive non-compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion and deception” is much more common in rural economies than open conflict and violence (1986:p.7). Moreover, although “everyday peasant resistance” flows from “fundamental material needs”, some forms of resistance, such as “gossip”, “slander” and “withdrawal of deference”, are specifically “symbolic or ideological” (ibid:pp.22, 26). Scott’s everyday resistance is therefore also “part of a struggle over both resources and meanings” (Agarwal 1994:p.423), whilst all struggles over resources, violent and everyday, share a common thread in being fundamentally struggles over power.

Scott has been criticised for failing to analyse how forms of contestation might be socially differentiated, for example by gender (Agarwal 1994:p.424; Hart 1991; Kandiyoti 1998:pp.141-142) His (1986) analysis is based on research on the introduction of labour-displacing mechanisation in rice production in rural Malaysia, yet, in her research in the same area, Hart (1991) found clear gender differences in people’s responses. Hart found that women were more able “to organise collectively and challenge openly the interests of large landowners”, whereas men were more likely to turn to “individual and largely clandestine acts of sabotage”, which she argues was at least partly because

“poor men were enmeshed in subservient political patronage relations with rural party bosses who wielded political and economic power at the local level, whereas women were largely excluded from these relations” (ibid:pp.94, 104, 112-113; Kandiyoti 1998:p.142).

This made women’s position “increasingly precarious and difficult” (Hart 1991:p.116), to the extent that they had less to lose through open resistance to change.

²⁴ Interview at Hakiardhi, Dar-es-Salaam, 13/5/99; Pers. coms. with Mr D. Kibamba (Hakiardhi, Dar-es-Salaam), 1999-2000, and Dr R. Palmer (Oxfam, UK), 1998-2000.

²⁵ Informal interview with Ms S. Maoulidi (Plan International, Dar-es-Salaam), 14/5/99; Pers. coms. with Ms A. Manji (Keele University Law Department), 1998-99.

An understanding of the overall nature of struggles over resources and meanings in a given society clearly has to come from a perspective that considers all aspects of power and social relations, including those aspects which may be hidden or disguised. Scott's (1990) conceptualisation of public and hidden transcripts is helpful here. Scott argues that "public transcripts", which reflect the "official story", are unlikely to tell the whole story about power relations in a given society as it is frequently in the interests of both dominant and subservient groups "to tacitly conspire in misrepresentation" (Ibid:p.2). However researchers, who must try to distinguish between the official and the hidden, have the advantage of being able to listen to the "hidden transcripts" of both sides "offstage", outside the public arena, and to compare them with each other and with the public transcript (Ibid:pp.4, 15).²⁶

Ultimately, as Peters notes, the

"mediating institutions and ideologies between dominating and dominated are the objects and arenas for competition and struggle among different social groups and categories... Claims to use and control resources and to exercise authority over things and people are premised on an ideology or a set of meanings...[and]...struggles over resources or over power then necessarily take place in terms of such meanings" (1984:pp.1-2).

That struggles over land are also struggles over meanings is most obvious in "legal and legislative contexts", where "a category of person or act becomes defined in one way rather than in another" (Ibid:p.7). It is more obvious still when there are multiple tenure systems to contend with and thus multiple arenas within which the socially legitimate is defined, interpreted and contested.

Multiple Tenure Systems and Social Legitimacy

As Bruce rightly points out, all land tenure systems contain multiple types of tenure for different types of land and different land uses (1988:p.27). However, in the former European colonies in Africa there tend to be multiple land tenure systems, falling within two distinct legal regimes for land – Western tenure (applied to urban land, for example, or farms alienated to non-African settlers) and indigenous tenure (applied to most African-held land) (Ibid:pp.31-32). Western tenure arose when the colonial powers imported their own land laws, known as the received law (McAuslan 2000:pp.76-77), and European concepts of legal tenure "became basic

²⁶ In contrast, see Mosse (1994) on the public nature of participatory rural appraisal research.

to the general land law of each territory" (Colson 1971:p.196).²⁷ These received laws were imported into countries generally deemed by the colonial powers to be devoid of 'proper' law, pre-existing land tenure arrangements being thought of only "as a stage in the evolutionary process" (McAuslan 2000:p.83; Okoth-Ogendo 2000:p.127). Yet, at the same time, comprehensive efforts were made to codify such arrangements into systems of customary law and land tenure, particularly during the "great invention of 'tribal' traditions" of the 1920s and 1930s, when many of the ideas, practices and laws that are termed customary in much literature on Africa were "created" (Ranger 1983:p.242).²⁸

Early in the colonial period Lugard had argued that

"the natural evolution of land tenure should not be arbitrarily interfered with, either on the one hand by introducing foreign principles and theories not understood by the people, or, on the other hand, by stereotyping by legislation primitive systems which are in a transitional state" (1926:p.301).

Yet European colonial administrators, assuming that African traditions were unchanging (Ranger 1983:p.247), that customary land tenure was deep-rooted and "by its nature resistant to change" (EARC 1955:p.347), nevertheless sought to codify (and thus simultaneously systematise and ossify) the traditional (Ranger 1983:p.212). In so doing, they "totally misunderstood the realities of pre-colonial Africa" (Ibid:p.247), where in "dynamic, changing communities", with fluid, ambiguous boundaries (Berry 1993:pp.25, 27-29), custom and continuity were valued but "custom was loosely defined and infinitely flexible" (Ranger 1983:p.247).

Colonial courts frequently investigated customary laws and land tenure systems by questioning elders, taking evidence and cross-examining witnesses, although such investigations involved "selective understanding by colonial officials" and "selective presentation of claims" (Chanock 1982:pp.57-58, 65-66; Berry 1993:pp.25, 29-32; Merry 1982:p.74). This "led to a stating, defining, clarifying, a regularizing of customary practices (both real and manufactured) in a way which was designed to turn fluid accounts of relationships at work into rules" (Chanock 1982:p.65).²⁹

The process of codifying customary law was central to "gaining, defining and perpetuating positions of power and advantage for some over others", positions which were not necessarily

²⁷ The 1923 Land Ordinance, based on the then principles of English land law, set out Tanganyika's received law.

²⁸ This whole subject is much debated (e.g. Berry 1993:especially Chapter 2; Chanock 1982; Colson 1971; Mackenzie 1998; Mamdani 1996; Ranger 1983; Wily 1988:Chapter 1; etc.).

²⁹ See Gluckman, for example, who acknowledged that his classification and analysis of different property rights among the Barotse "would read doctrines into Barotse law that do not exist there" (1965:p.161).

“traditional” (Chanock 1982:p.56), whilst customary law became “a domain in which the alternative realities of the less powerful in society” confronted “the representations of the more powerful” (Mackenzie 1990:p.611). Customary law therefore became a subject of contestation and colonial courts an arena of political struggle, reducing the reliability of court records as sources on customary land laws (Berry 1993:pp.30, 37, 40-41; Mackenzie 1998:pp.17, 63-97).³⁰ Yet codification also introduced some rigidities into processes of struggle over resources as, once written down in the court records, “‘traditions’ relating to community identity and land right [sic]” became “unable so readily to reflect change in the future” (Ranger 1983:pp.250-251).

Nevertheless, customs cannot really be treated as abstract, rigid principles for legal purposes because they are only “a basis for the negotiations which go on between the parties” (Tanner 1966:p.107). Customary law might then be better defined as “usual practice” (Ibid:p.109), and of course practices change. For example, African land tenure systems were not considered by the colonial powers to incorporate a concept of individual proprietary ownership of land, so customary land policy focused on communal tenure on the assumption that “rights must vest in the political unit whose members” inhabited a particular area (Colson 1971:p.196; Shivji 1997a:p.5). At the same time, however, socio-economic changes were producing “conditions leading to the rising demand for the recognition of individual tenure with full proprietary rights” and individual and communal rights often co-existed (Colson 1971:p.197; Berry 1993:p.41). Social boundaries were thus

“threatened, undermined, and refashioned by the growing commercialization associated with customary rule, and hence the state’s reliance on customary tenure simply obfuscated the complex struggles within African communities over the meaning and contours of these social boundaries” (Watts 1993:p.159; cf. Berry 1993:pp.32-35).

As well as having both Western and indigenous land tenure systems, many former African colonies also contain multiple indigenous systems because the tenure rules of different tribes were codified separately (Mamdani 1996:p.22). This situation has been aggravated by post-Independence attempts to reform land laws, because state interventions such as IRT have combined with the increasing commoditisation of land to result in the emergence of a confusing array of rules and practices which people negotiate their land claims within and around. Legal pluralism is thus a central feature of African property relations, yet permanent tenure changes, for example from state policies such as villagisation in Tanzania, “depend on resource

³⁰ Court records were also written formally and not in the language cases were heard in (Redmayne 1964:pp.321-322).

transmission *not* reverting over time...to the acute indeterminacies and struggles of a mixed legal framework" (Guyer 1987:p.10, original emphasis).

Problems are caused when policies wipe "out existing rights in land" without destroying "the legal system under which land is controlled" (Colson 1963:p.151-152). For example, although many existing customary derivative rights may be extinguished during the processes of land registration that often accompany land reforms, courts may later protect those rights by permitting ownership claims by customary land-users (Coldham 1978:pp. 99, 102-109), particularly where customary rights continue to be seen as socially legitimate. Thus, where customary law "continues to govern the way in which most people deal with their land...the effectiveness of legislation as an instrument of social change is severely limited" (Ibid:p.111). Furthermore, as Okoth-Ogendo specifically notes, "it doesn't matter what other laws govern the determination of land rights in general" so long as inheritance is governed by customary law (2000:p.128). Yet inheritance tends to remain within the ambit of customary law across Africa,³¹ so policies which neglect inheritance, such as those which aim to increase women's land rights by focusing on rights within marriage, can only have a limited impact – gains within marriage cannot be passed on to future generations because customary law generally restricts women's rights to bequeath and inherit land (Guyer 1987:pp.2-8).³² In sum, where there are multiple tenure systems, claims on rural land may "proliferate through the reactivation of customary rights or the reinterpretation of existing rights or rules of access" and land may become subject to a "proliferation of overlapping claims – through inheritance, investment of labour, or the reinterpretation of market transactions" (Berry 1988:pp.61-62).

Merry has described legal pluralism as a situation in which "alternative modes of resolving disputes coexist which are rooted in vastly different legal principles" (1982:p.71). She calls each of these modes a "legal sphere" and claims that they are "usually hierarchically ranked and of unequal power" (Ibid:p.71). All legal spheres have:

"a set of rules defined by "custom" or "laws enacted by a political authority"; accepted procedures in the process of resolving disputes; "a political and economic context" from which the arbitrator derives authority to act; and "a structure of accessibility specifying economic, sex-linked, ethnic, and other requirements for access to the legal spheres"" (Mackenzie 1993:p.217, quoting Merry 1982:p.71).

³¹ Customary law has regulated inheritance in Tanzania since 1923 and was partly codified in 1963 (James & Fimbo 1973:pp.35, 122-125, 165-170; James 1971:pp.22, 62; Mtengeti-Migiro 1991:pp.364-367).

³² See also Tsikata (1996) on the legal system's preference for the lineage in inheritance in colonial Ghana and Tadesse (1985) on the cultural obstacles to changes in women's rights after land reform in Ethiopia.

Merry argues that understanding “the implications of legal pluralism and legal change for the social lives of individual actors” requires an examination of their choices of legal sphere, because these choices “have implications for the kinds of legal decisions rendered, the patterns of behaviour which are reinforced, and the structure of the legal systems themselves” (1982:pp.68-69).

Mackenzie's (1989; 1990; 1993) work on the selective use of customary laws and traditional gender ideologies to legitimise claims to land in Murang'a District, Kenya, is particularly useful here. Mackenzie argues that competing sets of rights exist within different legal spheres and that strategies of access to and control of land involve choices about which different legal sphere and set of rights to operate within. She shows through individual case studies how “women and men legitimate claims to land through customary as well as statutory law” (1990:pp.629-634). Both legal spheres are “resources to which there is differential gender, as well as class, access”, although neither has watertight, impermeable boundaries, and individuals try to utilise the legal sphere that they think will give them the most favourable outcome (Ibid:pp.616, 637; 1993:pp.195-196, 213). Mackenzie goes on to argue that, although insecurity of tenure has increased for women in Kenya since the introduction of IRT, the co-existence of competing legal spheres provides continuing space for women to contest their land rights (1989:p.91; 1993:pp.200-201). For example, a widow who wishes to retain control of her deceased husband's land for the use of her daughters can draw on the customary (albeit uncommon) practice of taking a female husband, whilst a dying father who wishes to bequeath land to a daughter can either indicate this clearly to his lineage/kinship sub-group while still alive, officially register some land in his daughter's name, or help her to purchase her own land in her own name (Mackenzie 1989:pp.102-106; 1990:pp.630, 633, 635; 1993:pp.196-198). Investments in social relations would help here, by using wealth “to promote interpretations of custom” that strengthen claims to productive resources (Berry 1993:p.42).

Mackenzie concludes that customary rights to land are

“malleable and manipulable by individuals or groups...[are]...“subject to continual construction and reconstruction in the resolution of conflict, [and] are part of the process of legitimation of individual material interests and thus social differentiation. Customary law, then, is constituted and fought over in processes of change in modes of production and reproduction [and] is constructed and appropriated by individuals located differentially in relations of class and gender” (1990:pp.609-610).

Moreover, the “language of custom” can be used to “*mystify* the process of social differentiation” and serve as a legitimising language to allow groups and individuals differentiated by class and

gender to negotiate and contest access to resources (Ibid:p.613, original emphasis; 1993:pp.202-203; 1998:p.16). For example, in the Bechuanaland case (above), Peters comments on the Tswana elite's "strategy of private appropriation", that they redefined "traditional [shared] forms of resource control as unprogressive and hindering proper management", whilst at the same time claiming the "support of tradition in that there existed customary practices whereby improvements to existing [sic] resources justified more exclusionary forms of use" (1984:p.12). In contrast, in Bukoba District, Tanzania, Manji found Haya widows framing their land claims "in terms of the rights of their orphaned children", "terms which may be accepted and which are understood to be legitimate" in a society where widows have no right to make direct claims to land as individuals (2000:pp.486-487). Both these examples, from the perspectives of the powerful and the powerless, suggest the importance of the articulation of all claims to resources – their definition, interpretation and presentation – to their perceived legitimacy.

Agarwal has observed that claims to resources operate within two spheres of legitimacy, one social and one legal, and that there is therefore a need "to distinguish between the *legal* recognition of a claim and its *social* recognition, and between recognition and enforcement" (1994:pp.19, 58-60, original emphasis). This means that nominal legal land rights will be effectively useless if they clash with firmly entrenched local perceptions of what is socially legitimate. Alternatively, however, such a clash might create the opportunity to contest the validity of social perceptions of legitimacy, presenting the possibility of change not only in the prevailing allocation of resources and related rights, but also in the fundamental ideology and social meanings tied up therein. Establishing the social legitimacy of new claims to resources would then require contestation, although not all cases would be accepted as socially legitimate ones for contestation in the first place as notions of legitimacy stem from deep-rooted beliefs and ethical principles (Ibid:pp.58, 67).

Drawing on Fraser's work on the politics of needs, Agarwal argues that there are three distinct political moments in contesting needs:

"The first is the struggle to establish or deny the political status of a given need, the struggle to validate the need as a matter of legitimate political concern or to enclave it as a nonpolitical matter. The second is the struggle over the interpretation of the need, the struggle for the power to define it and, so, to determine what would satisfy it. The third moment is the struggle over the satisfaction of the need, the struggle to secure or withhold provision" (Fraser 1989:p.164, as cited in Agarwal 1994:p.421).

In Agarwal's own words, the three struggles are those to "establish the legitimacy of a need, those to interpret how that need should be satisfied, and those to secure satisfaction of the need" (1994:p.466). This conceptualisation would apply equally to struggles over resources.

There can be various outcomes where land tenure systems or changes to them are not perceived as socially legitimate. For example, following land reforms, different people might still be able to claim access to the same piece of land on different grounds, with all the claims having validity in one or all tenure systems, thus making for conflict between the rival claimants (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.17). However the customary legal sphere might remain a more socially legitimate arena for contesting claims to resources than the statutory legal sphere and, as Mackenzie found in Murang'a, without either the support of customary kinship groupings or access to statutory law (via financial resources and education), it can be hard for those whose individual land rights are not yet fully socially legitimate to exercise the authority generally conferred on holders of title deeds (1990:pp.623, 629-634; 1993:p.199), making for "a gap between law and practice" (Agarwal 1994:p.249).

Following land alienations, an individual might be angry that their land has been taken if it appears "to have been taken lawlessly, whereas in fact it had been transferred legally according to the national land code, of which he [sic] knew nothing" (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.10). More generally, when new land tenure systems are introduced or indigenous tenure systems change, "the old rules" may simply "come to be applied in new ways" (Ibid:p.11) and national land laws may not be universally implemented if they are not universally considered to be legitimate. Thus, although an attempt was made after Independence to unify the many different customary laws in Tanzania – but not customary land laws – non-local magistrates still have to compromise with local court assessors in making judgements that sit with local perceptions of legitimacy and the unified customary law that exists on paper does not therefore exist in practice (Mamdani 1996:p.131; Tanner 1966:p.111; Wily 1988:pp.86-87; pers. obs.).

Local notions of what is socially legitimate also constrain choices about how land and resources are accessed. If, for example, people believe the rules about access to land to be fair then they are unlikely to disobey them, even where the personal benefits of doing so would outweigh the personal costs (Platteau 1992:p.34). However, changes to land tenure that are not seen as legitimate "will increase the malfunctioning of the land market" – transactions costs might increase, reflecting subjective notions and standards of justice and fairness, as people resist changes to land rights they see as illegitimate (for example by blocking "the normal

functioning of the legal system") and the efficiency of land usage might consequently fall (Platteau 1996:pp.39, 55-57, 61; 1992:pp.35-36). A land tenure reform that is regarded as unfair or unjust – that is not regarded as socially legitimate – might not even be adopted at all without force. In sum, property is not property without legitimacy because it lacks the basic requirement of property that it be recognised by others (Platteau 1996:p.46; Bromley & Cernea 1989; above). Property rights therefore need to be institutionalised through the "creation and acceptance of social norms" if they are to become socially legitimate (Izumi 1999:p.31). Social legitimacy must, then, be an important consideration in any realistic process of land reform.

Land Reform in Tanzania

Land issues have become more prominent in Tanzania since liberalisation began in the 1980s. The more liberal policy climate encouraged an increasing number of land disputes to swamp the courts, disputes which primarily arose because the physical changes of villagisation were implemented in "the absence of any legal framework", while retrospective attempts to legislate lacked legitimacy and were subject to contestation by pre-existing rights-holders who at the very least wanted financial compensation (Coldham 1995:pp.229-230, 232, 236-241; Shivji 1997a:p.6; 1998:pp.16-18; Sundet 1997:pp.104, 140-141, 186). Moreover, although customary land tenure had remained intact after villagisation, it became increasingly insecure as the state made visible its virtually unlimited power to expropriate and alienate land or leave it to be customarily 'owned' (Haramata 1994). Yet, as all this insecurity and confusion was neither conducive to investment nor economic development, Tanzania's land laws had to be reformed to facilitate the government's own liberalisation programme (Sundet 1997:pp.252-253).³³ Furthermore, widespread bureaucratic maladministration – practices such as double and arbitrary land allocations – and a general lack of accountability and transparency had become commonplace, which meant that the government needed anyway to "streamline and rationalise the land administration" (Ibid:p.289; Fimbo 1992:pp.84-99; Juma 1996; Shivji 1996; 1998:p.27).

The liberal policy climate simultaneously created space for a degree of public debate on land. Rather than seeing tenure reform as a predominantly technical and legal issue, though, academics and national and international NGOs have linked land to political reform and

³³ Sundet's account of Tanzania's land policy-making process is excellent (1997:especially Chapter 6).

democracy (e.g. Havnevik 1997b:pp.7-8; NALAF 1997; Palmer 1996b; 1996c; Shivji 1996; 1997a; 1998; Shivji & Kapinga 1998). Criticism has fallen on the government's liberalisation programme, amid fears that land reform's main purpose was to facilitate privatisation and alienation to foreign investors, and on the government's secretive and non-transparent approach to land policy-making in the 1990s (Mbilinyi 1997:p.6; NALAF 1997; Palmer 1996b; Shivji 1996; 1998:pp.33-40; Sundet 1997:pp.209, 214-215, 227, 255-256, 283).³⁴ This criticism was rooted in the fact that the comprehensive Report of the high-profile Presidential Land Commission (URT 1994) was effectively ignored by Ministry of Land policy-makers (Kapinga 1996; Palmer 1996b).³⁵ However, Sundet argues that the Report was not ignored as such – Ministry officials agreed with most of its analysis of the problems but simply could not accept the anti-executive bias of its proposed solutions (1997:pp.225-226).

A fundamental problem identified by the Commission was “the overarching monopolist state ownership of land” itself, “which has created a rent-seeking bureaucracy with [a] vested interest in maintaining the status quo” (Shivji 1997a:p.7), whilst the multiple institutions that dealt with land were found to be “inaccessible” and failing “to command legitimacy with the people” (Coldham 1995:p.232). Democratisation was therefore an important part of the proposed solution, being seen as “a process where the subjects became [sic] capable of contesting and transforming the existing power structure” (Izumi 1999:p.4), and the Report thus advocated “an overall democratisation of the land tenure system”, with greater emphasis on local control of land and transparent dispute settlement procedures (Shivji 1997a:p.8; 1996; Haramata 1994; URT 1994). This required “institutional adaptation” and the relinquishing by the state of some control over land, although all the major provisions of the 1923 Land Ordinance were to be retained (Havnevik 1997b:pp.8-9; Shivji 1998:p.57).³⁶

A key objective for the Ministry, however, was to continue executive “control over land management and administration” – in particular, to “ensure optimal control of land allocation and land use” (Sundet 1997:pp.209, 217). The National Land Policy (NLP), published in June 1995, the Draft Land Bill, published in 1996, and the 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act therefore all

³⁴ Pers. coms. with Mr D. Kibamba (Hakiardhi, Dar-es-Salaam), 1999-2000.

³⁵ Pers. coms. with Dr R. Palmer (Oxfam, UK), 1998-2000.

³⁶ See Sundet's summary and analysis of the Commission's recommendations (1997:pp.195-204, 258-268). The Report was itself subject to various criticisms, for example over Shivji's lack of attention to women's land rights (which he has rebutted (Shivji 1998:Chapter 8; 1997b) and which also applied to the government) (Interview at TAWLA, Dar-es-Salaam, 26/5/99; Shaba 1996; Manji 1998; McAuslan 1998:pp.541-542).

rejected, according to critics, the Commission's central recommendations about "democratisation and the entrenching of checks and balances in land administration and control" (Kapinga 1996:pp.12-13; Palmer 1996c; Shivji 1996; 1999; Sundet 1997),³⁷ with Shivji (1999) maintaining that "by and large, the Acts do not represent a major departure from the existing system". However the 1999 Acts do go some way to addressing these issues, with a unique form of "tenure democratisation" placing responsibility for land administration (for guiding management and distribution) and for local dispute resolution in the hands of elected village councils, the existing structures of local government (Palmer 2000:p.281; Manji 2001:p.334). It remains to be seen, though, how the Acts will be operationalised – the government expects tenure reform to be a long process, taking several decades, because so much authority over land has to be devolved (Palmer 2000:pp.280-281; cf. McAuslan 1998:pp.548-550).

The case of land reform in Tanzania also raises broader structural issues. As Shivji sees it, land is the "terrain of democratic struggles" and his structuralist position is essentially a critique of the dominant role of the state (1997a; cf. 1996; Kapinga 1996) – although this element of Tanzanian land tenure is not new (Chapter One). More generally, however, he argues that there is a "deep structural link between the use and control of resources and the organisation and exercise of power" (Shivji 1998:p.48). The structuralist theoretical approach to land tenure therefore also has value, for example, in encouraging researchers to be aware of the "'hidden level' of government" – "the administrators and technocrats who occupy the senior posts of the civil service" – that influences national policy (Sundet 1997:p.301) and, by extension, policy implementation at the local level. This hidden level of government is "insulated from the political branch of government and the public" and its actions are often invisible to both (Ibid:p.302).

It is important, nonetheless, not to blur analysis with desired solution or political agenda – in particular, democratisation may not necessarily be the answer to Tanzania's land problems. In her study of how the land rights of smallholders in Bigwa village have been undermined by the recent expansion of Morogoro, a major provincial town, Izumi examines power relations and politics within the village and between the village and the state and argues that "limited knowledge and access to information, lack of negotiation power and of economic resources" all constrain the capability of local communities to tackle their land problems (1999:p.30). However

³⁷ Pers. coms. with Mr D. Kibamba (Hakiardhi, Dar-es-Salaam), 1999-2000, and Dr R. Palmer (Oxfam, UK), 1998-2000.

she is critical of the democratisation strand of the Tanzanian (and wider structuralist) land reform debate, arguing that land sales are often forced by poverty and immediate cash needs and that democratisation will not answer these problems and solve land disputes by itself. She claims that this is particularly because of the absence of "politicised peasants", having observed in Morogoro that "the process of displacement under urban expansion" did not lead to "a power struggle towards democratisation" (Ibid:pp.125, 196). The structuralist debate on land and democracy is not (at least not yet)³⁸ taking place in the villages and, as Izumi's work suggests, it is thus only by investigating local land tenure systems that it becomes possible to examine the relevance (or otherwise) of national land policy-making to everyday struggles over land.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed a broad range of literature on land tenure and access to resources in Africa and raised a host of relevant issues. There are debates over the type of land tenure system that best facilitates agricultural development, over the evolution of land tenure systems – whether in the direction of individualised property rights or not – and over the role of the state in land tenure reform. There are debates over the meaning of property and ownership and over the links between land and social relations, over the material and ideological dimensions of struggles over resources, and over multiple tenure systems and social legitimacy. Finally, there is the debate over land reform in Tanzania.

Throughout this review I have focused on the ideas that have most influenced my work. Much of the material discussed in this chapter has guided my approach to my empirical work, as well as influencing my subsequent analysis. In particular, my familiarity with the literature enabled me to engage constructively with the realities encountered during fieldwork and to locate them in a wider empirical and theoretical context as my understanding of the study area evolved. Of course theories are not binding, but are only developed in the light of experience. This is especially the case in development studies, where it is unproductive to theorise in a vacuum, cut off from the realities of people's lives. Theories, as ways of understanding the world, can anyway never be definitive as the world is always changing. The literature I have reviewed in this chapter does not therefore tell the whole story about changes in land tenure

³⁸ As at April 2000.

systems, it simply forms the foundation on which I have constructed my understanding of changing land tenure in Kinyanambo.

Within the literature on land tenure and access to resources in Africa there is, broadly speaking, a gap between mainstream debates, grounded in neo-classical economics, and alternative theoretical approaches to land and resources, focusing on issues of structure and process. However there are valuable elements to be found in both sets of approaches. I therefore take an eclectic analytical approach in this study, drawing from the whole range of available analytical tools and concepts to elucidate the complex situation I found in Kinyanambo. Such a strategy, I feel, is required if we are to benefit fully from the insights of different theoretical approaches to land tenure and access to resources and thereby develop a more comprehensive understanding of changing rights and relations between people and between people and land.

In analysing changing land tenure in Kinyanambo, I therefore take the property rights approach as my starting point, but add a clear historical perspective and a focus on power and social relations, to shed light on key aspects of "man-man" and "man-thing" rights and relations. I consider local understandings of land ownership and rights to land and local perceptions of social legitimacy in relation to land. My analysis is woven into an account of processes of commoditisation and urbanisation, of changing livelihoods and land use, from pre-colonial times to the present day.

Chapter Three

Kinyanambo Before Villagisation – Settlement and Development

In this chapter I discuss Kinyanambo's development up to villagisation in 1974. I analyse the historical context within which changes in the land tenure system must be understood, drawing on my primary and secondary data and relevant background literature.¹ I start by discussing the early political history of the wider study area (Iringa/Mufindi – Uhehe) and the origins of Kinyanambo. I then examine settlement in the immediate study area (Sao Hill/Rungemba) since the start of the colonial period, focusing on land alienations to non-African settlers and the migration and settlement of the *wenyeji*, the original inhabitants of Kinyanambo.² Finally, I consider population growth, development and the birth of Mafinga town.


Old Kinyanambo

Before villagisation Kinyanambo was completely different from how it appears today. There was a core area of settlement near the Kinyanambo River and the junction of the Great North Road (the old road)³ and the road to Madibira, and various other settled areas nearby. The core area, where the Kinyanambo village leader, the *karani wa kijiji*, lived, was the administrative centre of all the settlements within the area of the modern village – villages throughout the immediate study area then being administrative units rather than necessarily nucleated settlements (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.24). However a much larger area fell under the jurisdiction of the *jumbe* (lit. headman) at Rungemba, the village that borders Kinyanambo to the north (see Map 7, p.69). The everyday reality for most of my informants was that their own settlements in old Kinyanambo were separate villages under the *jumbe*. Each had its own

¹ To preserve anonymity, I generally do not reference information from key informant interviews, but names are real unless stated otherwise.

² *Mwenyeji* (pl. *wenyeji*) usually translates as inhabitant, local or resident. Its opposite, *mgeni* (pl. *wageni*), translates as guest, stranger, newcomer, outsider, or foreigner. I use newcomer and sometimes outsider or stranger for *mgeni*, depending on context, but the Kiswahili for *mwenyeji* as it captures the nuances of the term far better than in English.

³ The British Great North Road linked Nairobi in Kenya with Mwenzo (Old Fife) on the Rhodesian border via Arusha, Dodoma and Iringa in Tanganyika. The 310-mile Iringa-Mwenzo stretch was surveyed in 1927, realigned in 1928 (east of the German Iringa-Malangali road) and completed in 1932 (Blue Book 1927:p.48; 1928:p.82; 1929:p.93; 1930:pp.94-95; 1931:p.107; 1932:p.112; Graham 1979:p.4).

Map 7 – Sketch Map of Rungemba Jumbeate c.1952

Source – Adapted from 1952 Department of Lands and Surveys Sketch Map of the Iringa District (Southern Highlands Province) (survey sheet E:14233^D) (SOAS Library)

identity and was associated with certain families and 'Kinyanambo' usually just described the core area. At villagisation people moved from the outlying areas to the core area, which today is the centre of Kinyanambo A, and those areas, still farmed but no longer occupied, are referred to now as Mahameni – the places people moved from.⁴

My *wenyeji* informants described the shape and nature of old Kinyanambo as follows (see Map 8, p.71):

"In colonial times there were few people and they were scattered and lived far apart."

"Before villagisation people lived in groups scattered like tiny villages."

"A long time ago people chose their own names for villages to show what was their area...Mahameni is different places, for example Luang'a is one. Mahameni is where people lived before villagisation."

"Before villagisation there were *wenyeji* in Luang'a and Kinyiganga."

"Lumwago was a separate place from both Mafinga and Kinyanambo."

"Makota is in Kinyanambo, but there are no people living there now, only farms."

"Kinyanambo was the village near the Kinyanambo River and the old road."

However, to understand Kinyanambo as it was before villagisation, and to place later changes in context, we must begin our story in the pre-colonial period.

Early History of Uhehe⁵

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Southern Highlands were occupied by the ancestors of the Wahehe, Wabena, Wapogoro and Wasangu peoples (Iliffe 1979:p.22). They lived in small scattered family groups with little political organisation until consolidation was triggered by migration and war in the 1840s. At that time Wangoni migrants from South Africa attacked the Wasangu, who in turn attacked their neighbours and dominated the Southern Highlands until the Wahehe emerged in the 1860s (Iliffe 1969:pp.16-17; 1979:p.56).


The Wahehe descended from the people of fifteen or more small chiefdoms that in 1800 occupied the Udzungwa mountains and the central Uhehe plateau, roughly the area of present-day Iringa Rural, Iringa Urban and Mufindi districts (Redmayne 1968:p.40). The clan names and territories of several of these chiefdoms are worth noting: Muyinga of Ng'uluhe, Mudemu of

⁴ From *kuhama*, to move from.

⁵ Redmayne (1964; 1968) is the authority on Wahehe history, Brown and Hutt (1935) the main anthropological source.

Map 8 – Sketch Map of Old Kinyanambo

- showing some of the main settlements, roads and tracks in the immediate study area before villagisation, along with important rivers and hills



Source – Adapted from 1959 Directorate of Overseas Surveys survey sheets 232/II and 232/IV (D.O.S. 422 (Series Y742), First Edition) (SOAS Library) and 1982 Ministry of Land Surveys and Mapping Division survey sheets 232/2 and 232/4 (Series Y742, Edition 1-TSD) (Government Map Office, Dar-es-Salaam)

Ifwagi, another Mudemu of Ndevelwa, Kalinga of Kwa Kalinga, Nyenza of Usavila, and Kindole of Lungemba.⁶ Ifwagi, Kwa Kalinga and Lungemba are all in present-day Mufindi District, near Kinyanambo, and Ng'uluhe, in the Dabaga area of Iringa Rural, is nearby (Ibid:pp.40, 48). Muyinga, Mudemu, Kalinga and Nyenza are all clan names found in Kinyanambo today, some of whose members arrived before villagisation. The Muyingas⁷ have been the ruling clan of the Wahehe since the mid-nineteenth century and probably originated in Usagara, in the north-east of Iringa Region (Redmayne 1968:p.39). The story goes that one Mufwimi, on a hunting expedition in the early eighteenth century, strayed into Ng'uluhe, where the Mduda clan then lived, and fathered a son, named Muyinga, who later became Chief of Ng'uluhe (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.24-25; Chalamila 1970:pp.240-241; Mumford 1934:p.203).

Muyinga and Wahehe ascendancy began sometime between 1855 and 1860, when a son of Chief Kilonge of Ng'uluhe and Sekindole, a daughter of Chief Kindole of Lungemba, succeeded to the chieftom of Ng'uluhe. On succession this new chief took the name Munyigumba, claimed the neighbouring chieftom of Lungemba through his mother and moved his residence there (Redmayne 1968:p.42). He then used a combination of wars and alliances to expand his territory and consolidate his power *vis-à-vis* other Wahehe chiefs and neighbouring peoples like the Wasangu (Ibid:pp.42-44; Chalamila 1970:pp.241-242; Iliffe 1979:pp.56-57). By the time of his death around 1878-79 Munyigumba was the overall Chief of Uhehe, whose subjects had acquired the reputation of being a successful "warrior people" (Redmayne 1968:pp.43-44). By 1881 Munyigumba's son, Mkwawa, was Chief of Uhehe. Mkwawa built a new capital at Kalenga and continued the Wahehe dominance begun by his father by engaging in almost constant raiding and war. By 1890 he was feared by all (Ibid:pp.46-50).⁸


The Wahehe were agriculturally well developed (see Chapter Four) and politically well organised. Mkwawa and Munyigumba delegated authority to appointed subordinate rulers who were either their relatives, formerly independent rulers or their descendants, or people selected for their intelligence or bravery (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.44-45; Iliffe 1979:p.57; Redmayne

⁶ Lungemba is Rungemba. Spelling varies because the *r* and *l* sounds are indistinguishable in Kihehe.

⁷ Vamuyinga (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.25) or Vayinga (Mumford 1934:p.203; Redmayne 1964:p.96) in Kihehe, Kinamuyinga in Kiswahili. I use anglicised plurals for all clan names and certain titles (e.g. *jumbes*) to minimise the reader's confusion.

⁸ Map 9 (p.73) shows the Muyingas' expanding domain. Kinyanambo falls within the area marked "acquired by marriage Chief Kilonge 1820".

Map 9 – Sketch Map of the Muyingas' Expanding Domain



1968:pp.45-46). These subordinate rulers, who in turn had their own subordinates, were powerful men with considerable autonomy over their territories – so long as they maintained order, collected tribute for the Chief and mobilised men for war (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.32, 46-47; Redmayne 1968:pp.45-46). The Chief retained ultimate control through the willingness to sack or fight traitorous subordinate rulers and the generally sensible choice of subordinates in the first place. Pre-colonial Uhehe thus had a clearly structured, centrally-controlled, yet flexible political organisation. The state's overall strength lay in the fact that every adult ruling man was an armed spear-carrying warrior – 20,000 men of fighting age, living in scattered homesteads across Uhehe, supported Mkwawa's 2,000-3,000 core warriors at Kalenga (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.33, 36; Iliffe 1979:pp.57-58). Past success in warfare stimulated Wahehe identity (Iliffe 1979:p.318) and remains important today. All the *wenyeji* clans in Kinyanambo were Wahehe and, although people from other ethnic groups had moved there by 1974, the true *wenyeji kabisa* (lit. totally originally inhabitants) were all Wahehe. However, as late as the 1930s many Wahehe identified more with the smaller clan/group to which their ancestors belonged than with their 'tribe' as such (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.24; Redmayne 1964:pp.36, 306; 1968:p.38).

Wahehe power declined in the 1890s under the dual onslaught of the German military conquest and a devastating outbreak of rinderpest, which killed 90% of cattle in Tanganyika between 1890 and 1895. Accompanied by smallpox, jiggers, locust plagues and the widespread wars against the Germans, rinderpest destroyed the economic base of many established and prosperous communities, resulting in extremely severe famine across Tanganyika (Coulson 1982:pp.28-31; Kjekshus 1996:pp.126-151, 186-190). Nonetheless, the Wahehe provided the most serious resistance to German rule until the witchdoctor-led Maji-Maji Rebellion of 1905-07, which spread right across south-eastern Tanganyika to the borders of Uhehe (Gwassa & Iliffe 1967; Iliffe 1979:Chapter 6). The Germans saw the Wahehe as "a major obstacle to their occupation and colonisation of the interior", whilst Mkwawa regarded the Germans as the biggest threat to his empire yet (Redmayne 1968:p.50). In 1891 Mkwawa's forces overcame an initial German military expedition in less than fifteen minutes. Sporadic conflict then followed until the Germans defeated the Wahehe at Kalenga in 1894, with four years of further resistance only dissipating after Mkwawa's suicide on 19th July 1898 (Ibid:pp.50-55; Iliffe 1969:p.17; 1979:pp.107-116).

The Uhehe State in the Colonial Period

The Germans governed Tanganyika in a very decentralised manner. After conquering the Wahehe they first tried to rule through surviving members of the Muyinga clan, then appointed two of Mkwawa's former subordinate rulers as *akidas* (section or district administrators) and eventually came to rely on the many territorial *jumbes*, often former subordinate rulers or former rulers of defeated clans, who effectively ruled Uhehe until the British 'recreated' the Uhehe chiefdom in 1926 (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.37-39, 49; Coulson 1982:p.41; Iliffe 1969:pp.143-145, 154-155; Redmayne 1968:p.54). The Germans also replaced Mkwawa's tribute with taxes, which they introduced across Tanganyika in 1898 (Coulson 1982:p.35; Iliffe 1979:pp.132-134).

The Wahehe remained subdued until the end of the German period and most did not take part in the Maji-Maji Rebellion (Redmayne 1968:p.55). However, during WW1 the Wahehe turned against the Germans quite early, beginning to actively support the British from June 1916 (Iliffe 1979:pp.251-252). Their previous power and warrior reputation brought the Wahehe much respect and the British regarded them as "one of the more important Tanganyika peoples whose political institutions were suitable to be developed under British rule" (Redmayne 1968:p.55). When combined with the economic potential of the Southern Highlands, these factors assured British interest in the development of Uhehe and the Wahehe people.

The British administered Uhehe in accordance with the policy of Indirect Rule, which they developed in Tanganyika during the 1920s (Iliffe 1979:pp.318-325). Coulson describes this policy as:

"an attempt to rule the country through chiefs, or at least to give the chiefs an appearance of ruling the country. They were allowed to hold their own courts, and to keep part of the tax revenue they collected for use in development projects. But sitting behind them were the British Provincial and District Commissioners. Chiefs were expected to do what the British told them, and those who took too independent a line were replaced, regardless of the legitimacy of their claims to be chiefs" (1982:pp.94-95).

Under Indirect Rule districts were governed by native authorities that were structured and organised differently throughout Tanganyika to take account of the varied forms of political organisation that the British encountered. From 1926 to 1962 Uhehe – the Iringa District of Southern Highlands Province⁹ – was governed by a unified Native Authority under the restored Uhehe Chief (Redmayne 1964:p.4). Initially this was Chief Sapi, Mkwawa's German-educated

⁹ Although administrative boundaries and names were periodically altered, Iringa District (Uhehe) was in Southern Highlands Province for most of the British period (Redmayne 1964:p.465).

son, but on 30th April 1940 the British deposed Sapi and installed his son, Adam Sapi, as Chief (GOT 1941:p.46; Iliffe 1979:p.357). Under the Chief came the sub-chiefs and under them the *jumbes*.¹⁰ Kinyanambo was located in the sub-chiefdom of Kalenga until 1940, when it was subdivided into two new sub-chiefdoms, Kalenga and Kiponzero, because of its unwieldy size (GOT 1941:p.47). Kinyanambo moved to the new sub-chiefdom of Kiponzelo but remained in the jumbeate of Rungemba, the southernmost jumbeate in Kiponzelo.¹¹ Whom, though, would the British have found living in the immediate study area when they first arrived? What origins of Kinyanambo can be traced?

The Origins of Kinyanambo

A 1916 map of German East Africa is a useful source in identifying some of the settlements in the immediate study area at the start of the British period (see Map 10, p.77).¹² Some places on the map are recognisable and broadly in the right positions in relation to each other. 'Rungemba' is clearly shown with two tracks leading south from it, one crossing the 'Little Ruaha River', the other crossing a western tributary in an area marked 'Njamapala'. This tributary must be the Nyamalala River that today separates Kinyanambo from Luganga village and which originates in the area of the National Service Camp, near the original Mafinga village. To the south, two large hills marked 'Ideterro' and 'Irandi' are Ideteru and Irundi hills. The village between them, 'Kirindima', is almost certainly where one of my informants was born. 'Makalala' is Makalala A, where his neighbour, the British settler Capt Snape, had a livestock farm, whilst 'Tebotala' is roughly where Itulavanu village is today, on the Mufindi Circle Road.¹³ Further west, 'Bueni' is Sao Hill, a post and telegraph station in the British period where the Consolata Seminary is today, whilst 'Malangani' is roughly where Isalavanu village is today, on the road to Madibira. The village marked 'Kwamuliwua' is Makalala B, where my oldest informant then lived and where I lived during fieldwork.


¹⁰ See Redmayne (1964) on political authority in Uhehe between 1926 and 1962, and Chapter Four.

¹¹ 1952 Department of Lands and Surveys Sketch Map of the Iringa District (Southern Highlands Province) (survey sheet E¹⁴233^D) (SOAS Library).

¹² 1916 British Ordnance Survey Map of German East Africa, sheets E4 (Iringa) and F4 (Gawiro) (SOAS Library). Analysis is based on my geographic knowledge of the area, with reference to the 1952 Map of Iringa District cited at Note 11 and 1982 Ministry of Land Surveys and Mapping Division survey sheets 232/2, 232/3 and 232/4 (Series Y742, Edition 1-TSD) (Government Map Office, Dar-es-Salaam).

¹³ This road goes from John's Corner on the Great North Road/Tanzam to the Mufindi tea estates, following the German route south of 'Tebotala'. It was improved by the British in 1934 (Blue Book 1934:p.128).

Map 10 – The Immediate Study Area c.1916



Source – 1916 British Ordnance Survey Map of German East Africa Sheet E4 (Iringa) (SOAS Library)

There are various inaccuracies in this map, such as the probable confusion of the 'Ndembera River' with other rivers in the area. Such inaccuracies, albeit understandable since the map was prepared by the British during WW1, make it unwise to draw too many conclusions about the origins of Kinyanambo. However, there remains an old German track in present-day Tanganyika hamlet – overgrown, but wide enough for carts – that crosses the Great North Road and goes to Madibira via Makalala B/'Kwamuliwua' and which must have been part of the 'Rungemba-Bueni' track shown on the map.¹⁴ There is another old track in Kinyanambo that runs south from the Makwawa area of Rungemba, just north of Kinyanambo, and crosses the Nyamalala River, skirting the western edge of the present-day government forest. This track was probably the western of the two 'Rungemba-Tebotála' tracks shown on the 1916 map. The parents of some old *wenyeji* migrated into the Makwawa area and Rungemba, whilst other *wenyeji* originated from Mafinga village, just south of Kinyanambo, including one of the oldest clans in modern Kinyanambo, the Mgumbas. Several of my Mgumba informants were born in Mafinga in the 1920s and I found evidence of other Mgumbas living there during the German period. Mafinga is not marked on the 1916 map, although it existed then, at least to the extent that it was occupied by one or more Mgumba families. It was most probably in the area marked 'Njamapala'. However it may have been part of 'Tebotála' as the Tebitala Stream marked on a much later map flows into the Nyamalala River in the part of Mafinga where my oldest informant had lived.¹⁵ Finally, the 'Mfiguhu Mts' on the 1916 map seem likely to be the hills to the west of Kinyanambo which include the big double-peaked Ihwalumwe Hill near Luang'a Mahameni, where another old *wenyeji* clan, the Nyigos, lived. 'Muhansinji' would then have been a village in the Kinyanambo area in German times, but unfortunately there are no clues as to whether this settlement died out or was in fact the place that became known as Luang'a Mahameni.

My oldest informant in Kinyanambo, Bi Sekadinde, was born in a forest in the Njombe area at "the time of running from the Germans", probably during the Maji-Maji Rebellion as her father, though Mhehe, was a witchdoctor.¹⁶ One week after her birth the family moved to Makalala B. Her father's family of nine wives and all their children were the only people living there while she was growing up. She married at the usual time, three or four years after the

¹⁴ I walked from the Consolata Seminary to Makalala B ('Bueni' to 'Kwamuliwua') on the now overgrown German track.

¹⁵ Registered Plan 8810, dated 26/10/67, of L.O.23688, MDLO File MFD/502.

¹⁶ She could have been born even earlier – throughout Tanganyika people hid in the bushes when *akidas* came to collect taxes, whilst some Wahehe ran away when German patrols went out to appoint *jumbes* (Iliffe 1969:p.161; Redmayne 1964:p.236).

onset of menstruation, to her Mgumba cousin from Mafinga, the son of her father's sister. On marriage, as was usual, she moved to her husband's area at Mafinga. Then, after she had had two children and her husband had married a second wife, life was disrupted by the arrival of the land surveyors and the first British settlers in the area.

Meanwhile, another old informant had moved to the study area with his family, around 1927-28. Mzee Dennis Tonga was born in 1918 in Mdabulo in Mufindi but when he was about nine years old his father moved to Kinyanambo. As Mzee Dennis explained, "he moved as he had cattle, he had about 25 cows. Mdabulo was not good for cattle but this area had a big space". By 15th June 1929 there was a European farming settlement at Mufindi of "post-war establishment", comprising 46 land alienations at the western end of the Mufindi Forest and two forest reserves (GOT 1929:pp.7, 42).¹⁷ Of the 46 land alienations, at least 43 were to Germans who still held them at the outbreak of WW2, on leases taking effect from between 27th February 1928 and 5th July 1929 (McDonald 1946:pp.231-261). However rainfall records began in November 1927 (GOT 1929:p.42), suggesting that the alienations were occupied by settlers before formal leases were signed. The precise arrival times of European settlers in Mufindi are unknown, but these alienations were near where the Tongas lived. We know that "provision was made, prior to the alienation of the Mufindi farms, for the local native population, whether they moved or desired to remain where they were" (GOT 1929:p.7). It therefore seems highly likely that Mzee Dennis's father seized the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the settlers to take compensation for his land in Mufindi and move to a less populated area where he could acquire a large area of grazing land.

The Tongas moved to the core area of old Kinyanambo, which Mzee Dennis described:

"The area was called Kinyanambo even though almost no-one lived here. This place here [Kinyanambo A] was *porini*,¹⁸ where no-one lived. It was wild bush and there were lions... There was a river, and at the river a log was put to cross over. There were two trees, one on each side of the river. A log was used to cross between them, so 'Kinyanambo' was the name given to the place. This was even before people came to live here."

In Kihehe, *Kinyi* means 'something containing something'. *Nambo* is the specific word for the fork in branches of trees, in this case the forked branches used for the log-bridge frame. Kinyanambo thus means 'the river with the forked log-bridge' and it was originally the place where people crossed the river.

¹⁷ At least one forest reserve was alienated before 1909 (Wright 1971:p.82).

¹⁸ lit. a place in the wilds, an uncultivated place

The Tongas were the first clan to settle in the core area of old Kinyanambo and Mzee Dennis was described as *mwenyeji kabisa sana*¹⁹ by other villagers. His father first stayed at Mafinga with relatives while he built a house in Kinyanambo, where he got land from the *jumbe*. He was left to choose an area and chose Kinyanambo, near the river and the old road, which was then being built. "He asked the *jumbe* and was told, 'OK, if you like it, take it'." It was a big area, but at that time people did not measure their land and Mzee Dennis can only estimate that his father got more than 250 acres. They used about 3 acres for farming crops and the rest for grazing cattle. His father's land stretched from where the Tanzam is today up to the start of the pyrethrum factory area. Together with land taken later by Mzee Dennis and his three brothers, the Tonga family area covered the central settled parts of present-day Tanganyika and Kinanambo hamlets and a large area to the west of the Great North Road, including the area of the pyrethrum factory itself. His father's choice was initially fortuitous – unlike their relatives in Mafinga, the Tongas' lives were not disrupted by the arrival of the British settlers.

Non-African Settlers

Kinyanambo's land tenure system cannot be understood without an awareness of the history of non-African settlement and land alienation in the study area. European penetration of Uhehe began in 1896, when the Germans constructed a fort at Iringa, seven miles from Kalenga, and the Benedictines set up a mission at nearby Tosamaganga (Redmayne 1968:pp.53-54). The first land grants were then made to four German farmers in 1897 and the German Lutherans established a mission in Mufindi in 1899 (Dwight *et al* 1904:p.514; Redmayne 1964:pp.219-220; Wright 1971:p.109). Although German colonisation had been partly motivated to find space for settlers, they received little direct support and, as a result, both settlers and missionaries arrived only sporadically in Tanganyika throughout the German period (Coulson 1982:p.33; Iliffe 1969:p.64; 1971:p.13; 1979:p.142). The Germans felt that European agriculture "could prosper only in the highlands", so settlement was initially concentrated in the Usambaras and Mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru in the north, the most accessible highland areas (Iliffe 1969:p.14). Plans to settle Uhehe "founded on lack of transport" (Iliffe 1979:p.145). By 1908, in the entire Southern Highlands, there were only five independent settlers within a 100-

¹⁹ lit. very much totally an original inhabitant

mile radius of Iringa and four plantations and four more settlers at Rungwe and Mbosi (Kjekshus 1996:p.155). The missions also developed slowly, with neither the Benedictines nor the Lutherans having established any new missions in the immediate study area by 1913 (Iliffe 1979:p.217).²⁰

Non-African settlement in the Southern Highlands took off during the British period, from 1926 (URT 1994:p.15). Yet, from the start of their Mandate the overall thrust of British policy was to protect "native interests against European encroachment" (Iliffe 1979:p.262). At the end of WW1 the British sought to restore order after the fighting, to "destroy the German presence" and to discourage new settlers because of concerns that there was insufficient African labour to support a settler economy (Ibid:p.262). They deported German settlers and missionaries until 1922, by which time Tanganyika's pre-war European population of 4,998 (in 1913) had halved (Ibid:pp.141, 262). During WW1 the British had confiscated German property and in 1922 the estates and plantations were auctioned off (Coulson 1982:p.45). German settlers were allowed to return from 1925 (Iliffe 1979:p.303) and they did so with enthusiasm, flocking to newly opened-up places like Mufindi. British settlers were encouraged to balance them, but by June 1939 there were 2,729 German settlers to only 2,100 British and a total European population in Tanganyika (excluding officials) of only 6,514. Investors and settlers were deterred by uncertainty over Tanganyika's administrative status in the interwar years, by slow post-war economic recovery and by the Great Depression in the 1930s (Iliffe 1979:pp.302-303; Coulson 1982:pp.44-45; EARC 1955:p.21). Nevertheless, by the end of 1944 a total of 1,844,544 acres of land in 2,131 plots had been alienated in Tanganyika, of which 378 plots, totalling 408,826 acres, were in Southern Highlands Province (McDonald 1946:pp.1, 52).

After WW2 British policy altered substantially (Chidzero 1961:pp.229-230; URT 1994:pp.14-15). A larger role was envisaged for settlers and they were given more active government support. European settlement was not directly subsidised, the compulsory eviction of Africans from their land was disallowed and the government retained control of all land (Iliffe 1979:pp.450-451). However the view was taken that

"a limited amount of non-native settlement, by suitably selected persons of the right type and under conditions of proper Government control, is likely to be conducive to the economic development of the Territory".²¹

²⁰ Box 250, Conference of British Missionary Societies/International Missionary Council (CBMS/IMC) Archives, file on 'German Missions: Memoranda and Statistics', document titled 'Missions in German East Africa' (SOAS Library)

²¹ Government correspondence of 21st February 1946, quoted by Iliffe (1979:p.451).

By 1948 there were 10,648 Europeans in Tanganyika and by 1958, 20,598 (Iliffe 1979:p.450). By Independence over 3 million acres of land had been alienated – around 2% of Tanganyika's land (Ibid:p.451; Blue Book 1960:p.62; Chidzero 1961:pp.230-232; James 1971:pp.15, 18, 98; URT 1994:p.14; Wily 1988:p.58).

Settlers in Sao Hill/Rungemba


“At one time Sao Hill was looked on by Europeans as an area of Tanganyika that could become a southern equivalent of the Kenya White Highlands” (Moody 1970:p.25). Within weeks of his arrival in 1925 Governor Cameron was visited by “a small advance guard” of European settlers from Kenya who wanted land in the “Iringa highlands” (Cameron 1939:p.37; Listowel 1965:p.76). The Governor favoured alienation and managed to persuade the Colonial Office, who had initially preferred to wait until a railway was constructed (Blue Book 1925:p.58; Cameron 1939:pp.38-40; Wily 1988:p.56). A flying survey was carried out to establish “what lands are available for alienation to non-natives” and in 1926 49,752 acres were alienated in the then Iringa Province, of which 43,450 acres were in Iringa District (Blue Book 1925:p.60; 1926:pp.50-51). A further 75,505 acres were alienated in Iringa Province in 1927, 96,414 in 1928 and 29,000 in 1929 (Blue Book 1927:p.70; 1928:p.63; 1929:p.73). We can assume that most of this land was in Iringa District because, although alienation slowed during the Great Depression, a total of 233,910 acres had been alienated for European settlement in Iringa District by the end of 1933 (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.220; URT 1994:pp.14-15).

In 1928 Cameron commissioned a Land Development Survey (LDS) to assess prospects for settler alienation and production if a railway were built, which reported on Iringa Province in 1929 (Blue Book 1928:p.64; 1929:pp.72-73; GOT 1929:p.3). By then there were already 16 farms alienated in the immediate study area, the “Sao Area”, which “lies along the Iringa-Malangali road and extends from Mile 50 to Mile 75” (GOT 1929:pp.61-62).²² The British Iringa-Malangali road was a section of the Great North Road and Kinyanambo, just north of John's Corner at Mile 55 (McDonald 1946:p.23), was in the northern part of the Sao Area. Colonial land alienation in this area has had a profound impact on Kinyanambo and still affects land issues there today.

The most significant settlers and land alienations were identified by my informants:

²² Map 11 (p.83) shows the location of these farms (a cluster each in Rungemba and Sao) and the farms in Mufindi.

Map 11 – Sketch Map of Alienated Farms in Uhehe c.1933



Source – Brown & Hutt 1935

"A British person called Lord Chesham came and took land in Mafinga, so my family moved to an area beyond the river, called Lumwago. The whole of Mafinga village moved, all five or six families. Lord Chesham took my family's land for his cattle, but we got compensation for our land, which was a lot in those days."

"Lord Chesham came when the British took over from the Germans. He took big land. Then when the other British came he gave them land, but he came first. He had land from Rungemba to Mafinga to the Mufindi tea estates... The lease of that land [Kihwelo's] was not Lord Chesham's but another white person who lived there."

Kihwelo's farm "belonged to Johnson".

"Lord Chesham's area was at Rungemba, he took a very big area right up to Mafinga but later he only used the part at Rungemba. He took land in Kinyanambo but he didn't use it so he left the people to farm... Merali was a person who owned another big area where Kitelewasi is now. Also, at Makalala A there was a white person called Snape who had cattle."

"Merali was the Indian settler."

Documentary evidence on the settlers is limited. During the British period land was not registered and brought under statutory law until it had been surveyed and, as there were lengthy delays in surveys being carried out, transactions were often not recorded (McDonald 1946:p.1). However there are enough records to enable me to discuss the three areas of most significance to Kinyanambo.

Kihwelo's Farm at Luganga

The first was a farm at Luganga, for which I found a map dated 20th August 1929 describing it as approximately 5,449 acres in area and belonging to one Brig Gen Cary-Barnard.²³ This farm was just north of the main Mafinga village where the Mgumbas then lived, but it included the area north of the Mufindi Circle Road, near today's Don Bosco Seminary, where Bi Sekadinde and her husband lived. She said they had to move when "a white man called *Pima* came and bought the land". In Kiswahili, *kupima* means to survey or measure, so it was very probably around this time that Bi Sekadinde moved to the core area of old Kinyanambo, which the Tongas had already settled. Her husband went to the *jumbe* at Rungemba to get new land and was given an area south of the Tongas.

Two 99-year leases, for 3,462 acres to Patrick Hemmingway and 1,948 acres to Douglas Alexander, also relate to this farm. Both leases took effect from 13th March 1928, which was when the land would have originally been alienated to Cary-Barnard, but there are no

²³ Survey Sheet E14-66 of Farm 3126(S), filed under L.O.3125 in the Ministry of Land Surveys and Records Department (MLSRD).

records of when it was subdivided and transferred.²⁴ The whole area was later split into three separate farms and new leases were issued in the mid-1950s. The records contain minor inconsistencies but it is clear that Alexander's land came to be occupied by a Col Brett while Hemmingway's land was split into an area that he retained and another area, about 1550 acres, which was transferred to Lt Col George Granville Johnson.²⁵

Johnson's farm was the northern portion of the original farm. It was subsequently transferred to Oswald Howard Maynard on 10th June 1959 and revoked by the government on 27th October 1966.²⁶ Other records suggest that the new owner was Oswald Howard Woodbridge, that the lease was revoked on 11th October 1966 and that a new lease for the land was issued to Albert Beatus Kihwelo the following day.²⁷ Exactly 33 years later, on 12th October 1999, the District Land Office visited this farm to prepare a valuation report and settle the dispute between the new owner, Nico Kihwelo, Albert's son, and the Kinyanambo villagers farming some of this land (see Chapter Seven).

Lord Chesham and the Settlers at Mafinga

The second area of significance was the land alienated to Lord Chesham. John Compton Cavendish, the fourth Baron Chesham, was a British ex-army officer and Chairman of Tanganyika, Southern Highlands, Estates Ltd (Black & Black 1961:p.204; Kidd & Williamson 2000:pp.317-318). He instigated "the Chesham scheme", a settlement scheme aimed at "persons with some independent income" (Cameron 1939:pp.40-41), which initially attracted mostly other British ex-officers. In 1937 a 110,000-acre landholding was formally alienated to Chesham's company, which had been "formed for the purpose of developing the land by non-native settlement on mixed farming lines" (Blue Book 1937:p.148).²⁸ According to the British government, responding to questions from the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission, the land "was sparsely settled" and "the natives, who numbered 287, all elected to move on receipt of compensation" (Blue Book 1937:p.148). Compensation was assessed for

²⁴ MRT records on C.T.5109 and C.T.5110, filed under L.O.3125. 99 years was the standard length of leases granted before Independence. New leases were usually not granted on transfer, making the with effect from date that of the land's first alienation (Interviews with DVO, 2/12/99, and Senior Assistant Registrar of Titles, MRT, 9/3/00).

²⁵ File on L.O.3125 in the Iringa Regional Surveys and Mapping Office (IRSMO); MRT records on C.T.5109 and C.T.5110.

²⁶ MRT records on C.T.5109 and C.T.5110.

²⁷ MDLO Register for Farms; MDLO File MFD/502.

²⁸ The original land concession was granted in 1936 (Listowel 1965:p.120).

each house, each acre of cultivated land and each head of cattle, plus 50% “for the general inconvenience of removal” (Ibid:p.148; Meek 1946:p.113). In total, £1,700 was paid to those who were moved (Blue Book 1937:p.148).

To put the scale of this alienation in perspective, it is worth noting that 110,000 acres – 44,534ha or 445km² – is over 6% of the total area of Mufindi District today. This excludes the land originally alienated to Cary-Barnard in Luganga, and Chesham's and Snape's land in Rungemba (see below). Chesham's area at Mafinga was nearly three times the total area (41,000 acres) alienated to all German settlers in Mufindi by 1939 (McDonald 1946:map attachment) and almost twice the total area (57,747 acres) occupied by the large Mufindi tea estates today. Most villages in the district currently range in size from 3,500 to 5,000ha, depending on their population.²⁹ Chesham therefore took an area, occupied by just 287 Africans in 1937, that might contain between nine and 13 entire villages today.³⁰

Chesham was initially based at the Southern Highlands Club, which he built in Mafinga and opened in 1937 after eighteen months' preparation. It became a gathering place for settlers from far afield and, along with the scheme, created jobs for many of my *wenyeji* informants. Chesham also built an airstrip at the Club, an important factor in the development of the local area given the limitations of other modes of transport in the colonial period.³¹ The Club stayed open during WW2, although most British ex-officers left Mafinga in 1939 (Listowel 1965:p.120). Those still alive – including Chesham – returned after the war and, with the pro-settlement shift in British policy, were joined by a larger second wave of European (and some Indian) settlers.

Over time portions of Chesham's land were transferred to other settlers. Records of actual transactions are scarce, but we know that on 12th March 1952 the government granted three formal rights of occupancy to Chesham's company. One lease covered a 45-acre commercial site at John's Corner and another the 500 acres of the Southern Highlands Club and airstrip. The third – main – lease described an area of “87,300 acres or thereabouts at Sao Hill”, excluding 28 specified portions of land adding up to 41,380 acres (including the two areas just cited). This right of occupancy was therefore for the remaining 45,920 acres.³² The 87,300

²⁹ Interview with DS, 8/12/99.


³⁰ Map 12 (p.87) indicates the overall scale of colonial alienation in the study area.

³¹ The airstrip appears on two 1945 War Office Aviation Route Maps, Dodoma-Mbeya and Dar-Mbeya (SOAS Library).

³² MRT file on L.O.12966, L.O.12967 and L.O.12968. MLSRD Map Sheet E14-362, dated 8th August 1953, filed under L.O.12968, shows the portions bordering the Club.

Map 12 – Colonial Alienation in Iringa District c.1955

- showing Sao Hill/Rungemba (largest shaded area) and Mufindi (second largest shaded area)



Source – EARC 1955

acres was a re-alienation (Chidzero 1961:p.231), but I have been unable to establish why, nor what happened to the rest of the original 110,000-acre holding. Nevertheless, it seems clear that by the time of his death on 26th April 1952 (Black & Black 1961:p.205) Chesham had disposed of more than half the land originally alienated for his settlement scheme.

On 18th June 1952 all three leases were sold to Israel Massada of Kenya.³³ Judging from two official maps of the study area, the rate of individual settler land registration then increased. In 1952 there were five separate non-African landholdings in the Rungemba area and a further five in the Mafinga/Sao Hill area, south of Kinyanambo and east of the Great North Road.³⁴ By 1962 there were still five major landholdings in Rungemba but at least 20 separate registered landholdings in Mafinga/Sao Hill.³⁵ My view is that this reflects individual registration of some of the portions of Chesham's land specified in the 1952 leases and not an overall increase in the number of settlers. Numbers did increase after WW2, but by the mid-to-late-1950s, in the run-up to Independence, many settlers were already leaving the study area.³⁶ Most of those who remained went after the 1967 Arusha Declaration, leaving their land behind.

The main lease for Chesham's land was revoked from Massada by Governor Turnbull on 22nd April 1960³⁷ for "inadequate development" (Blue Book 1960:p.63). After Independence the *jumbe* then distributed some of this land to villages in the area including Kinyanambo, although most was retained by the national government and is now part of the Sao Hill Forest. The Southern Highlands Club and airstrip, whose lease had not been revoked in 1960, was taken by the government for Mafinga National Service, along with various settler farms, on a lease for 4,169 acres with effect from 1st March 1967.³⁸ Other land originally alienated under the Chesham scheme included 450 acres on which the Southern Highlands School (for non-African children) had been established by 1952.³⁹ This was sold in 1967 to the Lutheran Church's Southern Diocese (Njombe) and the buildings now serve as a Lutheran Vocational Training Centre. Finally, parts of three European dairy farms near Makalala A became the government-

³³ MRT file on L.O.12966, L.O.12967 and L.O.12968.

³⁴ 1952 Map of Iringa District (Note 11).

³⁵ 1962 Survey Division, Ministry of Lands, Forests and Wildlife Map of Iringa District (SOAS Library).

³⁶ In Tanganyika as a whole there were far higher average annual rates of alienation between 1949 and 1957 than previously (Shivji 1997a:p.5).

³⁷ MRT file on L.O.12966, L.O.12967 and L.O.12968.

³⁸ MDLO Register for Farms.

³⁹ MRT file on L.O.12966, L.O.12967 and L.O.12968.

owned Sao Hill Livestock Breeding Station that opened in July 1967. 13,000 acres was appropriated, plus the buildings, houses, cattle dips and 792 head of cattle on the land (Moody 1970:p.20).

Alienated Land at Rungemba

The third area of significance to Kinyanambo was the cluster of alienations north of Kinyanambo and west of the Great North Road. The Rungemba cluster was surveyed in January 1928, although leases date from 14th August 1926. Lord Chesham had an area of at least 1,438.2 acres at Rungemba, to which he moved after WW2, and his buildings, on a since-revoked 10-acre holding, have been used as a government Community Development Training College since 1973.⁴⁰ However the main settler at Rungemba was Capt John Edward Macartney Snape, who had various different pieces of land at different times. I found no records of land that my informants said he had at Makalala A, but several leases relate to his land in Rungemba. One was for 2,492 acres with effect from 24th May 1930, which was transferred on 12th March 1942 to Rajabali Shivji and Merali Shivji as tenants in common with equal shares. On 3rd November 1954 Rajabali then transferred his half-share to Merali and on 8th January 1968 the whole area was surrendered to the government,⁴¹ following Merali's departure after the Arusha Declaration.

By June or early July 1972 a 3,209.29-acre piece of land in the Rungemba area had come to be occupied by the Kitelewasi *ujamaa* village (see Chapter Four) and the then Mufindi Land Development Officer recommended that the rights of the ex-occupiers of this piece of land, Merali Shivji and Sadradin Merali Shivji, be revoked and given over to Kitelewasi.⁴² Although the documentary evidence is inconclusive, my analysis suggests that this was also Snape's former land. Snape's holdings in the Rungemba cluster were shown on both the 1952 and 1962 maps cited above. The land that was transferred to Rajabali and Merali Shivji was immediately west of the Great North Road, whilst two other leases, for land west and north west of this, were also attributed to Snape. I found no records on the largest area, the westernmost area, but it clearly falls within Kitelewasi. It therefore seems probable that it was transferred by

⁴⁰ MLSRD Map Sheet E14-32, filed under L.O.1547; MRT file on L.O.22437 and records on C.T.1503, filed under L.O.1547; IRSMO files on L.O.1547 and L.O.22437; MDLO File MFD/538.

⁴¹ MRT file on L.O.5791.

⁴² MDLO File MFD/508, relating to L.O.22821.

Snape to Merali and Sadradin, under a new lease, before being occupied by Kitelewasi. The eastern area, of Rajabali and Merali, was probably given to the *ujamaa* village at its start, after Merali had left, as that lease was already revoked and the land legally available (cf. DRPT 1971:p.9).⁴³

Some of Lord Chesham's land at Rungemba was also given to Kitelewasi,⁴⁴ but Kitelewasi is predominantly comprised of Merali's former land. Importantly, the boundaries of Kitelewasi and Kinyanambo at villagisation were those that had pertained between old Kinyanambo and the alienated areas of Merali/Snape at Rungemba, which is directly relevant to the unresolved boundary dispute between Kinyanambo and Kitelewasi (see Chapter Seven). Thus the alienations at Rungemba – like that at Luganga – continue to have repercussions for Kinyanambo more than 70 years after their initial alienation to British settlers, whilst the alienation of land at Mafinga directly and indirectly affected both the migration and settlement of the Kinyanambo *wenyeji* during the colonial period and the later development of Mafinga town.

Wenyeji Migration and Settlement⁴⁵

Lord Chesham's arrival in Mafinga brought with it a major upheaval for the *wenyeji* of Mafinga village and its environs. Mzee Amiri Mgumba explained that, although some people moved to Kitelewasi and Sadani, his family and others went to Lumwago Mahameni. They crossed the Nyamalala River and settled on the other side of the valley, clearing new farms and fanning out north along the Lumwago River and east into the area of the present-day government forest. They went to Rungemba to ask the *jumbe* for new land and he came and gave each family land. Mzee Mwendibalula Mgumba's family also moved to Lumwago Mahameni. His parents chose the general area of Lumwago and the specific site where they built their house – west of the Lumwago River in an area sometimes called Mugodi Mahameni.

Mzee Israel Mbalinga moved with his parents from Irundi Hill, south of Mafinga, to an area near the Tanscan *kiwanda* in today's Kinyanambo C. His parents asked the *jumbe* where to farm and were told where to farm and where to live, but they took lots of land as there was only one other family near them at that time. In all these cases, the *jumbe* would have endorsed

⁴³ 1952 and 1962 Maps of Iringa District (Notes 11 and 35), on L.O.5791, L.O.9600 and L.O.8879/8880.

⁴⁴ MDLO File MFD/538.

⁴⁵ Map 8 refers.

each family's choice of location and confirmed their area, using his official authority to give them the right to the land while taking into account the areas and wishes of existing inhabitants as appropriate.

Families in other parts of old Kinyanambo were not disrupted by the arrival of the settlers. The Tongas did not have to move, nor their western neighbours, the Mdudas, nor the Nyigos beyond them in Luang'a Mahameni. The Mwipopos in Kinyiganga Mahameni also did not move. Together with the Mgumbas, the Tongas, Nyigos, Mdudas and Mwipopos were the five main *wenyeji* clans in Kinyanambo before Independence. I was only able to establish the origins of the Tongas with any certainty (above) because my older informants among the other four clans, unlike Mzee Dennis, had all been born in old Kinyanambo. Nevertheless, those four clans had almost certainly been living in their respective areas since before the arrival of the Tongas in the late 1920s.

Old Kinyanambo gradually expanded through the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as the *wenyeji* clans were joined by newcomers. Apart from movement directly induced by the arrival of the settlers, there were two main types of migration into old Kinyanambo before villagisation – for marriage and for work. On marriage, women usually moved to the place where their husbands lived (cf. Brown & Hutt 1935:p.103) and with their husbands thereafter, as illustrated by Bi Sekadinde (above) and Bi Rehema,⁴⁶ who moved on re-marriage in the late 1950s from Changarawe to the area of present-day Ikweta hamlet where her new husband had land. For their part, men sometimes came to Kinyanambo to look for wives among their relatives, or their neighbours if they lived nearby. If successful they would then often stay.

Migration into old Kinyanambo for work – almost always by men – was triggered by the employment opportunities on the settler farms. For example, Mzee Samuel,⁴⁷ an Mbena from Njombe District, came around 1950 to work on Johnson's farm. After four years he moved to Lumwago Mahameni where his friends from Johnson's farm lived. For three years he stayed with the family of the old man who had welcomed him to the area, Marehemu Saidi Mgumba, whom he helped farm without payment. Then, when he wanted to get his own land, he went to the *jumbe*, but was told he could only get land if he paid taxes. All men over 18 were supposed to pay the British hut and poll tax, levied on male household heads (Blue Book 1923:p.30), but

⁴⁶ Not her real name.

⁴⁷ Not his real name.

as Mzee Samuel was unmarried and living in Mzee Saidi's house he had been able to avoid it. He therefore started paying taxes and duly got land (cf. Redmayne 1964:p.386). Mzee Samuel cited 12 male household heads living in Lumwago before Independence but, as they lived scattered, he said there might have been others. Several later died and only four of them moved with him to Kinyanambo at villagisation.

After Independence, and especially after the Arusha Declaration, migration for work increased. The husband of one of my informants won a government contract to supply meat to the National Service Camp and moved to the core area of old Kinyanambo from Nundwe in Mufindi with three of his wives and more than 1,000 cows. Other men came to build the Tanzam (from about 1967 to 1971) and later the hospital at Mafinga (under construction by 1972).⁴⁸ However, throughout the pre-villagisation period most people who came for work either came from nearby and had some knowledge of the area or had relatives who had already moved to Kinyanambo. These connections helped them to be welcomed by the *wenyeji* already living in old Kinyanambo and to get land.

Data from my first survey confirm my analysis of the reasons for migration into old Kinyanambo. 23% of the 156 surveyed household heads (36 household heads) had lived in old Kinyanambo's core and/or Mahameni areas.⁴⁹ Of these, 25 household heads were born in old Kinyanambo (70%), five arrived during British rule (14%) and six arrived in the post-Independence period (16%). All 11 household heads who migrated into old Kinyanambo came from areas within present-day Iringa Region and only one came from outside Mufindi District. Of the five household heads who arrived during British rule, four came from neighbouring places – Mafinga and Changarawe, and Irundi and Ideteru hills. Two moved with their parents when the settlers arrived, whilst two, both now widows, moved on marriage. The fifth, an Mbena from Upangwa in Njombe District, was following his relative.⁵⁰ Of the six household heads, all now widows, who moved to Kinyanambo between Independence and villagisation, two came from neighbouring places – Isalavanu and Isupilo. The former was following her relative and the latter moved on marriage. The remaining four came from places further away – Ukelemi to the south-west and Ludilo, Mdabulo and Mtwango in the heart of the Mufindi tea estates. Two came with

⁴⁸ The Iringa-Zambia section of the Great North Road was gradually levelled, re-aligned and tarmacked from 1967 to 1971, becoming part of the completed Tanzam by 1973. Construction workers also came with the laying of the Tazama (Tanzania-Zambia) oil pipeline through the immediate study area in the late 1960s (cf. Coulson 1982:pp.173, 218).

⁴⁹ Table A12, Appendix Four.

⁵⁰ *Kufuata ndugu*, lit. to follow a relative (kin or affine), to move somewhere you have relatives, because they are there

husbands who were building the Tanzam and two came with husbands who were following their relatives.

By 1974 there were thus substantially more people in old Kinyanambo than the five main *wenyeji* clans. At villagisation the Kaguo, Kangusi and Ngulo clans lived in Makota Mahameni. At Magunzi Mahameni and the Kinyanambo C area there were the Mahanga, Mbwilo and Mbalinga clans. The Kisinda clan lived in the part of present-day Kinyanambo B nearest to Mafinga. Meanwhile the Nyigos at Luang'a, the Mwipopos at Kinyiganga, the Mgumbas at Lumwago and the Tongas and Mdudas in the core area of old Kinyanambo had all been joined by various newcomers, whilst some of the *wenyeji* had themselves moved beyond their original clan areas, on marriage or to get more land. For example, Mzee Amiri Mgumba moved from Lumwago Mahameni to the Kinyanambo C area a few years before villagisation to get more space, because the ten or so families then living in Lumwago were making it feel crowded. Overall, only 13 of the 32 surveyed household heads living in old Kinyanambo at villagisation (41%) were from the five main *wenyeji* clans.⁵¹

Population Growth

The growth of old Kinyanambo took place against a background of wider population growth. In 1928 the total population of Uhehe was 65,000 people (GOT 1929:p.4). By 1948 the total African population of Uhehe (by then Iringa District) was 180,906, an almost three-fold increase over twenty years (GOT 1950:p.64). By 1957 the total African population of Iringa District was 245,965 (GOT 1963:p.37, table 21), a 36% increase since 1948 and a 278% increase since 1928. Although data collection was also improving (Redmayne 1964:pp.32-33), these figures suggest a level of population growth that would not have been possible without substantial development and increasing prosperity throughout the British period, in turn encouraging in-migration.

Migration into Uhehe has deep historical roots. Munyigumba and Mkwawa had depended economically on servile groups and prisoners of war (see Chapter Four), ensuring the enforced in-migration of neighbouring people such as the Wabena. In the colonial period, when migration in search of employment became increasingly common in response to monetary

⁵¹ Four of the 36 *wenyeji* household heads were then living elsewhere.

taxes and the increasing availability of goods (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.151-153; Egero 1974), the presence of the settlers helped create economic conditions that were favourable to migration into Uhehe. The settler farms themselves benefited from Uhehe's position on the route taken by men from further south seeking employment on the German-built Central Railway Line, which was one reason why the establishment of the Mufindi tea estates, which have attracted predominantly Wakinga migrants, was encouraged (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.24; GOT 1929:p.67). Nevertheless, the ethnic proportions among Iringa District's African population as a whole remained fairly constant during the colonial period, at about 80% Wahehe to 20% other ethnic groups (GOT 1950:p.64; GOT 1963:p.49, table 27).

The first population figures for the immediate study area come from the 1967 Census. The total population of Mufindi District – by then a separate district – was 118,467, whilst the total population of Ifwagi Division, in which Kinyanambo still lies, was 33,969 (URT 1969:pp.1, 52). There were six sub-divisions in Ifwagi in 1967 and Kinyanambo was in Rungemba. Within the division, Rungemba had the smallest total population, 4,145 people, and also the largest area, 588km². It therefore also had the lowest population density, seven persons per km², less than half that of the division overall (15.5 persons per km²) and the district average (16.6 persons per km²) (Ibid:p.282).

My best estimate is that 190 of the household heads in modern Kinyanambo were living in the old village at the time of villagisation.⁵² Many were children, although many other then residents would since have died or moved away. Assuming these factors balanced each other out and that each of the 190 household heads represented one pre-villagisation household gives a maximum of 855 people in old Kinyanambo in 1974.⁵³ However, both these assumptions are tenuous and, judging from the accounts of my *wenyeji* informants, I would be surprised if there were many more than half this number of people in 1974. By then Kinyanambo was poised on the brink of fundamental change from villagisation and the birth of Mafinga town. These two crucial events in the development of the local land tenure system followed almost 50 years of continuous local development – development that led directly to the siting of Mafinga next to Kinyanambo.

⁵² Extrapolated from data in Table A2 and hamlet groups in Appendix Three and Table A12 in Appendix Four.

⁵³ Calculated using the 1967 Census' average household size for Mufindi District – 4.5 persons (URT 1969:p.1).

Key Aspects of Change – 1920s to 1974

Historically, the main employment-generating and income-earning industry in Mufindi District has been the tea industry, there being no other industries before 1970.⁵⁴ For example, of the seven industrial establishments in Iringa Region employing over 100 people each in 1967, the only two in Mufindi District were the tea factories at Lugoda and Kilima (DRPT 1971:p.24). Tea-growing started slowly after the arrival of the early settlers in the 1920s. By 1939 there were 24 German-owned tea estates in Mufindi and two owned by non-Germans but the industry was still in its infancy (McDonald 1946:p.35; Moody 1970:p.25).⁵⁵ On the outbreak of WW2 the Kenyan-owned Tanganyika Tea Company Ltd (TTCL) took over all the German tea estates – an area totalling 25,415.5 acres, of which only 2,388 acres were under tea by 1945. TTCL also took over the German tea-processing factory at Lugoda and built a second factory of its own (McDonald 1946:pp.35-38, 231-249; GOT 1941:p.51). After the war the tea industry then really took off, with estates amalgamating and new land alienations being made right up to the 1990s as tea-planting increased. By 2000 Brooke Bond Tanzania Ltd (BBTL, formerly TTCL) held 51,297 acres of land and Mufindi Tea Company (MTC) held 6,450 acres, which between them accounted for 3.3% of the total land in Mufindi District.⁵⁶

The development of the tea industry has affected Kinyanambo in three important ways. First, the industry has boosted the local economy by providing substantial wage labour (*vibarua*) and employment (*ajira*) opportunities over the past sixty years.⁵⁷ The estates and their workers have also provided a market for local goods and services. Kinyanambo's location is important in this regard, as the estates were initially all reached from the Great North Road via the Mufindi Circle Road turn-off at John's Corner (McDonald 1946:p.23). Many of my informants had or still have direct and/or indirect connections with the tea industry through these economic channels. Second, along with the presence of Mufindi Forest and the early establishment of forest reserves, the catchment forest and wind protection requirements of the tea bushes contributed to the later development of a timber industry that has overtaken tea in strategic importance to the district and to Kinyanambo's economy today (cf. GOT 1929:pp.6-8, 41-48, 66-67).

⁵⁴ Interview with DURPO, 14/2/00.

⁵⁵ MDLO Register for Farms; MDLO Kalamazoo for Farms and Industries.

⁵⁶ Interview with DS, 8/12/99; MDLO Kalamazoo for Farms and Industries.

⁵⁷ I distinguish throughout between different types of work (*kazi*). Wage labour is casual, unskilled and daily or weekly paid, employment is permanent and salaried.

Third, the large size and expansion of the estates, and the location of many villages between them, combined with an increasing population to exert land pressures, which continue today,⁵⁸ with two key effects. First, by 1970 the Mufindi tea estates were causing “local land shortage among smallholder farmers in the area” (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.21) and this reduced availability of land provided a clear incentive for out-migration, especially to accessible areas with lower population densities. 27% of the household heads in my first survey who migrated into old Kinyanambo came from villages near the tea estates (3 of 11, above), as did 14% of those who migrated into modern Kinyanambo (15 of 110).⁵⁹ The proportion is probably only lower now because Mafinga's presence encourages in-migration from a wider geographic area. Second, and more significantly, the site of the first Mufindi District headquarters at Kibao was hemmed in by the tea estates and therefore had limited scope for expansion as a town, which was the main reason why district headquarters was moved.⁶⁰

Indirect Rule had ended formally on 1st July 1962 (Listowel 1965:pp.320-322; Redmayne 1964:p.4), although real political change was limited before villagisation (see Chapter Four). Mufindi District was then subdivided from Iringa District on 1st October 1964 and the then Southern Highlands Region was split into the Iringa and Mbeya regions of today (DRPT 1971:p.3; Thomas 1967:p.26).⁶¹ By 1968 Mufindi still did not have its own district council and an economic report on Iringa Region recommended “the establishment and consolidation of a fully-fledged District headquarters for Mufindi” (DRPT 1971:pp.34, 4). By October 1970 “district offices of most ministries” had opened at Kibao, “originally a very small commercial settlement” near BBTL's headquarters (Moody 1970:p.1). However the unsuitability of Kibao was realised very quickly⁶² and Tanzania's Second Five-Year Development Plan, published in mid-1969, included plans “for a new district headquarters to be established at Changarawe, near John's Corner, on the Great North Road” (Moody 1970:p.1; Coulson 1982:p.300).

It was a combination of pre-villagisation demographics, settlement and development that led to the siting of Mafinga town – and the new district headquarters – in the immediate study area. We have already seen that population density there was substantially lower than the

⁵⁸ Interview with Mufindi North Member of Parliament (MP), 10/9/99.

⁵⁹ Table A14, Appendix Four.

⁶⁰ Interview with Mufindi District Council (MDC) Chairman/Mufindi District CCM Chairman, 22/11/99.

⁶¹ As previous note.

⁶² As Note 60.

district average. This was partly because large areas had been alienated to settlers. By the late 1960s, after most settlers had left, much of this land returned to the government. Being predominantly unoccupied it became available for local developments like the Sao Hill Livestock Breeding Station and the National Service Camp, and for the establishment of a new town.

However, transport, communications and infrastructure were at least as important as demographics and settlement. Kibao had housed district headquarters because it was near the main industry (tea), but it was neither in the centre of the district nor on the old road.⁶³ Sao Hill and Malangali were better located (on and near the Great North Road respectively) – but only until the Tanzam was built. Nyololo, on the Tanzam at the southern turn-off to the Mufindi Circle Road, was convenient for the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) railway station at Makambako in Njombe District.⁶⁴ However the area that is now Mafinga town was not only on the Tanzam, about equidistant from Makambako and Iringa, but also near several important feeder roads – to Sadani and Madibira in the west, to north-east Mufindi via Itimbo and to Mufindi proper via the Mufindi Circle Road. Combined with Lord Chesham's old airstrip, Mafinga's transport connections were unrivalled in the district. Furthermore, there were postal and telephone services at John's Corner by mid-1968, as well as the district's only two water development projects – the Mafinga National Service Water Supply and the John's Corner Water Supply, of which the latter had the capacity to serve 10,000 people and 5,000 livestock and was "already attracting people from the surrounding areas" in 1968 (DRPT 1971:pp.13, 11).

By dint of its low population density, large areas of mostly unoccupied alienated land, transport connections and infrastructure developments, the immediate study area was therefore prime real estate and an obvious choice for district headquarters. The move to Mafinga coincided with villagisation in 1974 and was followed by the development of the timber industry and the construction of the pyrethrum factory in Kinyanambo. From 1974 development in Mufindi District thus became centred on Mafinga town, nearly 40 years after the original Mafinga village had ceased to exist. There would be profound implications for the *wenyeji*'s understanding of their land rights from villagisation and the birth of the town. To fully understand the changes that followed, however, we must first examine agriculture, livelihoods and land in old Kinyanambo.

⁶³ Interview with MDC Chairman/Mufindi District CCM Chairman, 22/11/99.

⁶⁴ The TAZARA railway began construction in 1970 and was officially opened in October 1975. It runs from Dar-es-Salaam to Kapiri-Moshi in Zambia, passing through the Southern Highlands east of Mufindi (Coulson 1982:pp.231-234).

Chapter Four

Kinyanambo Before Villagisation – Agriculture, Livelihoods and Land

I start this chapter by discussing agriculture and livelihoods in the study area up to 1974. I demonstrate the continuing centrality of land to pre-villagisation economic life in old Kinyanambo and highlight broader processes of commoditisation and social differentiation. I then analyse social and political elements of the land tenure system before villagisation, exploring means of access to land and the *wenyeji*'s concepts of their land rights, before concluding with an examination of old Kinyanambo's changing land tenure system.

Pre-Colonial Agriculture and Livelihoods in Uhehe

Agriculture, and therefore land, has long been central to livelihoods in the study area. Agriculture was generally well developed in pre-colonial Tanganyika, incorporating a wide variety of techniques and capable of supporting large populations (Kjekshus 1996:pp.24-48). However, because the Uhehe state (1860s to 1890s) was dominated by war, the common view of the Wahehe is that they were aggressive raiders with a limited economic base, who consumed more than they produced and whose economy was based primarily on cattle in order to provide the mobility necessary for political and military success. Kjekshus (1996:pp.19, 38-39) has challenged this view, arguing instead that the Wahehe were agriculturalists as well as cattle-keepers (cf. Redmayne 1964:pp.97-99) and that their notorious raiding was driven primarily by the need to acquire fresh labour, rather than cattle or trade goods, as ruling men did not work and only women and slaves farmed.¹ Using evidence contained in reports written by non-African travellers to Uhehe in the 1880s and 1890s, Kjekshus argues that, although there were large nucleated villages in lowland areas where predominantly cattle were kept, such as Kalenga with a population of between 5,000 and 6,000 people in 1890, there were dispersed

¹ See also the Iringa District Book (Tanganyika District Books Vol.5, SOAS Library), section authored by the German Capt Nigmann noting that house and farm work fell to women as Wahehe men engaged only in "warlike work" (p.26).

homestead settlements practising mixed agriculture in Uhehe's highlands and uplands (1996:pp.38-39), fortified villages being unnecessary because of the Wahehe's fierce reputation (Iliffe 1979:p.57; Redmayne 1964:p.181). Early travellers to the lowlands reported miles of uncultivated areas and masses of cattle, generating the view that the Wahehe were cattle-keepers and not agriculturalists. However there is evidence of complex ecologically specific agricultural systems in the highlands, in which crops and field methods changed according to altitude and rain zones, whose surpluses were probably used to feed the lowland villages (Kjekshus 1996:pp.39-40).

Thus, although the main farming method in the Uhehe highlands was shifting cultivation (Redmayne 1964:p.131) – “the clearing of bush and its cultivation for perhaps two to three years, followed by from six to twelve years in which the land was left unused to recover its fertility” (Iliffe 1971:p.8) – more sophisticated methods were also used. Ridges were built for cultivation on flat ground and terraces constructed on steeper ground, both maintained by slaves (non-ruling men and prisoners of war), whose main farming implements were large iron hoes (Kjekshus 1996:p.39).² Maize had replaced millet as the main food crop in Uhehe during the nineteenth century and by the 1880s “every homestead...was surrounded by a large maize field” (Iliffe 1979:p.69; 1971:pp.8-9; Redmayne 1964:p.97). However millets and peas remained important crops in the highlands, whilst sweet potatoes, beans and cucumbers³ were also grown in the valleys (Kjekshus 1996:p.39).

Uhehe lay between two of nineteenth-century Tanganyika's major trade routes and astride the cattle-marketing trails that had long linked Ugogo with the salt-producers (in Ubena) and iron-producers (in Ukinga and Upangwa) of southern Tanganyika (Graham 1979:p.1; Iliffe 1979:pp.37, 40-41; Kjekshus 1996:pp.88, 90, 103). The use of cloth was universal among the Wahehe by the 1890s, yet they remained better known for raiding the trade caravans in Ugogo than for trading with them (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.32, 190; Kjekshus 1996:p.12; Redmayne 1968:pp.47-50). Overall, agriculture was the economic foundation of the society that the ruling Wahehe men fought to maintain and pre-colonial processes of commoditisation were mostly limited to the internal trading of agricultural surpluses and the local exchange of basic commodities (Kjekshus 1996:p.39; Redmayne 1964:pp.100-101; 1968:pp.39-40).

² See also Wilson's (1932) evidence of pre-colonial agricultural methods in Uhehe. (He claimed that the terraces on which Mufindi Forest now stands were at least 900 years old.)

³ Vegetables from the squash/marrow family, called pumpkins in the immediate study area.

Colonial and Post-Independence Agricultural Change

The commoditisation of agriculture in Tanganyika as a whole had begun under the influence of pre-colonial trade and population growth (Iliffe 1971:p.9; 1979:pp.67-77; Kjekshus 1996). Colonisation served to intensify the process as both the Germans and the British viewed Tanganyika as a source of agricultural raw materials, especially export crops such as sisal, cotton and coffee (Bryceson 1978:pp.13-14, 24; Coulson 1982:pp.33, 36-38, 45-50; Egero 1974:p.4). The Germans initially permitted both individual settlers and large plantations, but the economy became dominated by neither (Iliffe 1971:pp.12-13; 1979:pp.126-128, 141-148). Africans continued to develop their own agriculture, selling food and cash crops to pay taxes and only working for the Germans as a last resort (Egero 1974:pp.4-6, 9; Iliffe 1971:pp.14-18). Taxation provided the main pressure for Africans to earn money, but transportation and marketing were also developed to encourage smallholders to grow export crops, especially after the Maji-Maji Rebellion, and by 1913 African smallholders were "exporting rubber, coffee, beeswax, cotton, groundnuts, and other crops in increasing quantities, and selling livestock and food to the cities and to the plantation workers" (Coulson 1982:pp.35-42; Bryceson 1978:pp.15-16, 18). For example, I heard of Wahehe men "traditionally" taking beeswax and honey from Mufindi to Tanga to trade for salt, which may date from this time (cf. Egero 1974:p.5).

WW1 brought disruption and famine to Tanganyika but after the war the British re-established the German balance between plantations, settlers and smallholders and continued the commoditisation of agriculture by trying to ensure that all (male) Africans either worked or produced crops for sale (Bryceson 1978:pp.26-27; Coulson 1982:pp.31, 45; Iliffe 1969:pp.201-202; 1979:pp.240-272, 289). Non-payment of taxes was punishable by jail or fines, as was the disregard of the agricultural regulations and by-laws used to make Africans change their farming practices (Bryceson 1978:pp.26-27, 36-37; Coulson 1982:pp.48, 52-53; Fimbo 1992:p.32; Shivji 1998:p.6). From the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s British agricultural policy was increasingly dominated by such administrative interventions, legitimised by a conservation ethic and discourse that generally silenced local knowledge and viewed Africans as bad cultivators and destroyers of the land (Coulson 1982:p.52; Mackenzie 1998:pp.8-15; e.g. EARC 1955).⁴

Specific environmental concerns had first emerged in the 1920s (Iliffe 1979:p.348) as the LDS Report's comments on Mufindi Forest demonstrate:

⁴ This whole issue is currently under much debate (e.g. Leach & Mearns 1996).

"native cultivation and burning have accounted for extensive destruction of the forest...The shifting of cultivation every two years is not done because of soil exhaustion, but merely because of a reduction of yields. The natives have found that by burning felled trees on the field to be cultivated, higher yields of crops are obtained than on land cropped for the third year in succession...The burning, however, consumes the organic matter in the soil; hence the sudden drop from high, forced yields after the first two years. The soil does not recover except after several years of fallow. The native system is destructive, therefore, both of the forest and the soil" (GOT 1929:p.47).

The remedy was "to compel him [sic] to effect the burning off the field; the fertilising ash may then be conveyed to the field...[which] will preserve the permanent fertility of the soil" (GOT 1929:p.47). To protect the forest, the LDS Report also recommended the designation of "Government Forest Reserves" and the provision in settlers' leases for the maintenance of one sixth of their holding as forest, whilst the Uhehe Native Authority passed a law restricting tree felling (Ibid:p.48; Brown & Hutt 1935:p.22). Simultaneously, however, other farming practices in Uhehe were being praised for their sophistication, such as the riverine fields of "banked-up ground upon which foodstuffs are grown", "laid out in rectangles", each ridged piece divided by "dykes running towards the rivers" (Wilson 1932:p.254) – today's *vinyungu*.

During the 1930s depression years conservation was side-lined by the government's Tanganyika-wide "plant more crops" campaign to generate more export revenue and reduce famine (Ilfie 1979:p.349; Anderson 1984:pp.329, 331-332, 335-336; Brown & Hutt 1935:p.227). Administrators in Uhehe experimented with smallholder cash crops and the area under food crop cultivation (maize and recently introduced cassava) increased, "partly the result of a gradually expanding market, partly because of instructions issued by the administration", yet agriculture remained primarily undertaken "to feed the household" (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.135, 158, 161). Moreover, environmental concerns did not completely disappear (Anderson 1984). "Vigorous efforts" were still being made to combat soil erosion in 1938 (McMahon 1939:p.77) and in 1940 Iringa District Native Courts were prosecuting people for "wilful or careless destruction of trees by fire or cutting down", whilst special guards had been appointed to prevent grass fires (GOT 1941:pp.51, 54).

The government intervened more actively in agriculture during WW2 to ensure the production of adequate food supplies and strategically important goods (Coulson 1982:pp.48-50). After the war British policy towards African smallholders then turned to large-scale agricultural and land use schemes (Ibid:pp.50-55; Ilfie 1979:pp.473-475). These schemes were mostly unsuccessful, primarily because, as with the Usambara and Uluguru Mountains' schemes, they were subject to intense opposition from those affected (Chapter Two). Schemes

which succeeded tended to be only those that coincided with budding African capitalism or whose techniques were close to those used in local agricultural systems (Iliffe 1979:pp.473-475; Mackenzie 1998:p.11). However colonial (and post-Independence) agricultural development and settlement schemes did create employment. For example, one of my male informants worked on the Groundnuts Scheme at Kongwa and Nachingwea in the late 1940s (cf. Chidzero 1961:p.234) and then went with a Rungemba settler in the 1960s to work on a tobacco scheme at Kiweli in Iringa Rural District (cf. Awiti 1973:pp.37-39).

The only large-scale colonial agricultural scheme to directly affect the Southern Highlands was the Iringa Dipping Scheme, which was first planned in 1939 and involved the compulsory dipping of cattle for a fee (Coulson 1982:p.53; Redmayne 1964:p.26). Cattle-dipping was staunchly opposed in the cattle market areas of Njombe District and on the cattle marketing trails from Iringa and Mbeya to Songea in southern Tanganyika, being regarded as a cattle tax by Africans (Graham 1979:pp.6-7). However, livestock were not central to agriculture in the immediate study area. Disease was frequent and cattle were valued for ceremonial occasions, wealth accumulation and as currency (for bridewealth and compensation payments), rather than as a regular food source (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.144-145; Moody 1970:pp.17-20).

Despite specific concerns about felling and burning in forest areas, the study area was probably less affected by colonial policies on smallholder agriculture than other parts of Tanganyika because the Wahehe were already agriculturally well developed. The ridging and terracing imposed elsewhere were unnecessary in Uhehe as they had been used there since pre-colonial times. Smallholder agriculture was also unlikely to have been a priority in the Southern Highlands, given the growing numbers of non-African settler farms after WW2. Those in the immediate study area – such as Merali's tobacco farm and Johnson's vegetable farm, whose cauliflower, spinach, onions, carrots, and cabbages were taken weekly by aeroplane to Dar-es-Salaam (cf. Booth 1991:p.14; Moody 1970:p.7) – instead provided many local jobs. Almost all my male *wenyeji* informants had worked for the settlers at some point in the late 1940s and the 1950s, mostly as '*shamba* boys' or on building and painting their houses. The settler farms also attracted migrants, whilst the farm workers provided a market for the dynamic local Africans who sold grain surpluses and other goods in their own shops (cf. Brown & Hutt 1935:p.221; Redmayne 1964:p.294).⁵

⁵ By 1962 there were 1,841 licensed African retailers in the area of today's Iringa Region and 270 non-African retailers (DRPT 1971:p.26).

During the 1950s the colonial government embarked on a major rethinking of agricultural and land tenure policies and development strategies across British East Africa (EARC 1955; Iliffe 1979:pp.552-553; Swynnerton 1954). In Tanganyika in 1956 the British adopted “the new “focal point” approach”, which concentrated government resources on the most progressive farmers in each district, in order to stimulate the growth of a prosperous class of farmers, and which saw the end of large-scale agricultural and land use schemes (Coulson 1982:p.55; Iliffe 1971:pp.36-38; 1979:p.553). The Uluguru Scheme was officially abandoned in 1956, the Usambara Scheme in 1957 and the Iringa Dipping Scheme in 1958, after a mass boycott (Coulson 1982:p.53; Feierman 1990:p.180; Redmayne 1964:pp.26, 304). The introduction of freehold tenure and IRT was also mooted in Tanganyika, although it did not get far (Chapter One).

In the Southern Highlands, the change in agricultural policy led to the development of pyrethrum as an important cash crop and the opening up of land and rise of successful maize farmers in Ismani, north of Iringa town (Coulson 1982:pp.58, 163-164; Iliffe 1971:pp.39-40; 1979:pp.454, 457). The overall intention of the focal point approach was “to increase inequality” and it succeeded (Coulson 1982:pp.55-58; Wily 1988:pp.64-65, 78-79). The 1950s “boom years” saw “the emergence of a distinct group of “progressive farmers” – sometimes called “master farmers”” (Iliffe 1971:p.40). Ploughs became common in the Southern Highlands and some Africans obtained tractors but, although the new policy benefited some farmers, increased cash crop production made Tanganyika as a whole more reliant on primary product exports and therefore on fluctuations in international demand (Ibid:p.41).

The post-Independence government initially retained the focal point – now “improvement” – approach. Smallholder co-operatives, which had grown rapidly since 1955, were made widely compulsory to improve marketing. Agricultural training and education were emphasised and extension services encouraged fertiliser use (Coulson 1982:pp.147-158; Feierman 1990:pp.232-234; Hydén 1980:pp.76-82; Mpangala 1996:p.52; Raikes 1986:p.123). Dynamic African men also bought land from non-African settlers, as in Kihwelo’s purchase of Johnson’s farm. However the government simultaneously adopted the “transformation approach” recommended by the World Bank in 1960, experimenting (mostly unsuccessfully) with modernised village settlement schemes and large-scale irrigation projects (Coulson 1982:pp.147-148, 159-162, 238-239; Hydén 1980:pp.71-75; James 1971:pp.23-26). Meanwhile growing public sector employment in the 1960s replaced declining agricultural employment

(Egero 1974:p.30; Feierman 1990:p.239), caused in the immediate study area by the settlers' departures.

By 1967 government policy had settled in favour of the transformation approach, as Nyerere's socialist vision could no longer accommodate rich, progressive, capitalist farmers (Hydén 1980:p.92). Instead *ujamaa* villages were vigorously promoted, in which farming was undertaken co-operatively on communally-owned village land and surplus crops were sold to raise money for village development efforts (Coulson 1982:pp.235-246). By 1970 there were six *ujamaa* villages in Mufindi District, growing wheat and maize, including one at Ikongosi near John's Corner (Moody 1970:pp.25-26). By mid-1972 another *ujamaa* village had started at Kitelewasi, on Merali's old farm, where the 'villagers' farmed tobacco and beans together and maize individually.⁶ Hybrid maize packages were being introduced at this time on *ujamaa* farms across Iringa Region and the Kitelewasi *ujamaa* villagers, like others in the region throughout the *ujamaa* period (1967 to 1977), received technical assistance from Korean experts who taught them to use chemical fertilisers and to plant seeds in nursery beds before transplanting the seedlings to their farms (cf. DRPT 1971:p.14; Rasmussen 1986:pp.193-194).⁷ Families from nearby areas – Kikombo, Rungemba, Makwawa and probably Makota Mahameni – were told to farm there by the Area Commissioner (AC), Mnyawami,⁸ as it was the time of *ujamaa*. However, it was not yet the time of *uhamisho*,⁹ so, although records indicated that 300 families were living in Kitelewasi *ujamaa* village by April 1973,¹⁰ my informants said people only farmed there and even the leaders continued to live in their old homes.

Farming Practices, Land Use and Livelihoods in Old Kinyambo

Kinyambo was not directly affected by the *ujamaa* policy until villagisation was enforced in 1974. By that time, although livelihoods had changed since the pre-colonial period with the increasing commoditisation of agriculture and the impact of the non-African settlers, farming practices and land use in old Kinyambo were similar to those we know of in pre-

⁶ MDLO File MFD/508.

⁷ Interview with District Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer (DALDO), 24/11/99.

⁸ J.F. Mwakamyanda, Mufindi's first AC (cf. Moody 1970:p.29; URT 1971:p.110), was succeeded by E. Mnyawami before villagisation.

⁹ lit. abstract noun of 'causing to move'

¹⁰ MDLO File MFD/508.

colonial Uhehe and agriculture still dominated livelihoods. In 1969 most land in Mufindi District was devoted to agriculture. 63.3% was rough grazing land, 4.2% was under smallholder cultivation and a further 0.4% was occupied by the tea estates, compared with 31.8% covered by woods and forests and 0.4% comprising urban and rocky areas and swamps (Berry & Berry 1969). In 1970 the average area of land under household cultivation on the Mufindi Plateau (where Kinyanambo lies) was between 3 and 4 hectares (7.4 to 9.9 acres) and there was "plenty of unoccupied land suitable for cultivation" (Conyers *et al* 1971:pp.21-22, 3).¹¹ People's plots were usually scattered and some had *vinyungu*, diverting water "from streams in furrows to irrigate vegetables" (Ibid:pp.22-23). Shifting cultivation was still widely practised on *mashamba*, with ridges used for planting most crops. Most farmers cultivated by hand with hoes but those who owned oxen used ploughs. Soil fertility was good and fertiliser and insecticide use not widespread – "fallow or shifting cultivation, inter-cropping, ridging and the use of fire to clear land all help to maintain fertility and some people also use manure or compost" (Ibid:pp.21-23).

Many of my informants claimed that land productivity in old Kinyanambo was higher before chemical fertilisers began to be widely used during the *ujamaa* period. Although farm sizes before villagisation were generally larger than today, farming practices kept productivity (yield per acre) high enough for many informants to have regularly produced surpluses. Even so, different types of land were considered more or less fertile according to the tools and inputs available to individual farmers. The observations of one woman who moved to Kinyanambo in the early 1970s are instructive:

"When my husband first came here there were only a few people with a big area of land. He asked to buy land from them and they said the land was infertile and the crops didn't grow. He said, 'sell me anyway as I know myself how to grow crops here'. Then we came and saw that people here only farmed where there were trees. They cut the trees, burnt the land and farmed. The places where only grass grew were not good for growing maize. But my husband had a tractor so he farmed all the land he bought and he got crops. Before, the people had no tractor so there was limited farming and crops. They only farmed the area with trees."

My informant's husband was able to buy a large area of grassland because the *wenyeji* did not believe it was fertile. They lacked the necessary tools to farm it productively – a tractor to plough a large area of land and apply manure. Hoeing or ploughing with oxen was relatively more time-consuming and only worthwhile on more fertile land – land covered in trees or bush – where the yield per acre was higher. Thus the *wenyeji* still predominantly farmed by felling trees and burning as they had in the 1920s.

¹¹ Conyers *et al's* (1971) data on the Mufindi Plateau broadly supports my informants' accounts of farming at this time.

The main smallholder cash crop in the immediate study area in 1970 was pyrethrum (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.21; Moody 1970:pp.10, 12). Maize remained the main food crop, with both hybrid and local varieties grown, and surpluses were increasingly sold (Moody 1970:pp.10-11; Rasmussen 1986:p.193). Pyrethrum and maize were mostly marketed through co-operatives but other produce was sold privately locally (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.23). Millet was grown on land cleared for the first time, then maize and beans were inter-cropped in subsequent years. Irish and sweet potatoes were also grown, as were *vitindi* trees, though less than today as there were fewer people to drink the *ulanzi*.

In 1970 co-operative labour among relatives and neighbours was common on the Mufindi Plateau in return for food and drink and hired labour was reported to be "very rare" (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.23). However hired labour was not rare in old Kinyanambo. As one *mwenyeji* said: "Even before villagisation there were wage labourers. There were a few people who were very poor and they would do wage labour to get money to buy things like salt".¹² Wage labourers were hired by progressive male African farmers to clear new land for farming, by rich men who were too busy with employment or business interests to help their wives with heavy farming tasks like hoeing, and by the skilled craftsmen (*mafundi*) who engaged in house-building and other such trades, usually on a self-employed basis. They were also hired by women. For example, one of my *mwenyeji* informants, who attended the teacher training school at Tosamaganga Mission and then worked as a primary school teacher from 1954 to 1987, regularly gave her sisters money to pay labourers on her 3-acre *shamba* in Makota Mahameni, enabling her to get food from her land when she was working elsewhere. Other women paid labourers to pound maize, using money from selling their own maize surpluses, from brewing maize or millet beer (*pombe*) for sale, or from selling *ulanzi* from their *vitindi* trees. The pounded maize flour was then sold to get money for clothes and personal items.

However, most women in old Kinyanambo farmed by themselves without help from wage labourers and were kept busy producing food for their families, relying on their husbands to earn the money to meet cash needs. Women whose husbands worked elsewhere had more autonomy over farming decisions, but all married women had responsibility for growing food on land given to them by their husbands for this purpose. Sometimes men also grew food crops on separate plots which they either shared out among their wives or sold. Husbands with ploughs

¹² There was a standard payment rate for wage labourers as early as the 1930s, by which time employed Wahehe men had started to pay others to cultivate their fields (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.157).

and oxen usually helped their wives with ploughing and in the early years of marriage men sometimes helped with weeding and other tasks. Initial clearing of land was also done by men. However women could usually only rely on their children for help with farming, or perhaps their co-wives when they were sick. Young children scared birds away and daughters weeded alongside their mothers while sons from about the ages of seven to 15 looked after their father's livestock. Meanwhile unmarried women, who were few, either established their own households (often with close relatives) or lived in the missions, working for food and shelter. Households selling maize tended to be those where men were present, where big enough areas could be cleared and farmed to produce a surplus, and pyrethrum was grown only by men.¹³

Only 30-45% of households on the Mufindi Plateau owned cattle in 1970 – “the average number owned is probably about ten and very few people have more than 50”, although “virtually all households keep some chickens” (Conyers *et al* 1971:pp.23, 3). Livestock were grazed on “uncultivated land (especially the low lying *mbuga*^[14] areas, which are particularly valuable for dry season grazing) and on temporary fallow land” (Ibid:p.23). The *mbuga* in old Kinyanambo were individually owned, although people were free to graze their cattle throughout. As one of my informants explained:

“The *mbuga* was divided so that one family could have an area for grazing, their own *mbuga*, and an area for farms. People shared the *mbuga*, but each knew whose area each bit was.”

One *mwenyeji* man accumulated about 30 cows between the 1940s and 1974, inheriting some from his father and buying the rest himself. His older brother had about the same number in 1974. An informant from a different *wenyeji* family worked for Lord Chesham as a builder, using his wages to buy 25 cows before he married in the 1950s, whilst another informant, who trained and worked as a veterinary officer from 1949 to 1980, had 10 cows and seven goats when he moved to Kinyanambo in 1951, his stock peaking in the late 1960s at 20 cows and 12 goats.¹⁵

Livestock were predominantly kept for household use – for ploughing, fertiliser (manure), meat, milk, and for bridewealth and the accumulation of wives. Two exceptions were the man with a meat supply business and 1,000 cows (Chapter Three) and another man who sold ghee that he made by machine. Wahehe bridewealth had long been (and still is) three cows, two sheep, two hoes, and money for cloth, although the cash equivalent was already the

¹³ See also Brown and Hutt's (1935:pp.97-115, 134-166) detailed account of gender divisions of labour and rights and responsibilities within Wahehe marriages, which coincides with my own findings on the early 1970s.

¹⁴ lit. swampy land

¹⁵ Women also owned and inherited livestock (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.143; Odgaard 1998:p.9; Redmayne 1964:p.52).

preferred payment by the 1930s (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.99, 157; Redmayne 1964:pp.54-55). Men with no livestock relied heavily on employment for cash – without oxen they were unable to plough large areas and sell surplus crops so instead worked in a variety of jobs.

For example, Mzee Tomas¹⁶ (from Nundwe in Mufindi) harvested tea for seven years on a TTCL estate in the 1950s, then ground tea leaves and made boxes at the Stone Valley factory for five years around the time of Independence. He received wages, food and accommodation, plus a week's annual leave to help his parents with farming. Later he worked on the construction of the TAZARA railway, moving at villagisation to Kinyanambo in the hope of work building the pyrethrum factory. It was only then that he married, got land in Kinyanambo from a relative and began farming. Another informant, Mzee John¹⁷ (from Changarawe), worked as a '*shamba* boy' at the Southern Highlands School after being educated at Makalala A Middle School in the late 1950s. At Independence he went to Lugoda to work at the Mufindi Club (for the British tea estate managers) and then to Makalala B to help the Consolata Fathers build the mission there. He married in Kinyanambo in 1965 but from 1967 to 1973 worked throughout the Southern Highlands on road construction. He then returned permanently to Kinyanambo and began to more regularly help his (by then) two wives to farm.

Both these men undertook employment over a long period of time but neither worked continuously. They had breaks between different jobs when they returned home to parents or wives and helped directly with farming and whilst working elsewhere they continued to have land farmed on their behalf by wage labourers or family members. Overall, employment was a temporary aspect of most people's livelihoods before villagisation, even those who worked a lot. It was undertaken as required, to earn cash to pay taxes or bridewealth and buy cattle and everyday goods. In contrast, land and farming were central to long-term livelihood security – all the older people I interviewed had become permanent farmers at some point in their lives.

Social Differentiation

By 1974 old Kinyanambo was a thriving and prosperous village. Not everyone living there was rich – there were poor people who undertook wage labour for richer neighbours and

¹⁶ Not his real name.

¹⁷ Not his real name.

there were some people, mostly newcomers, with less land than others. However the evidence suggests that, on the whole, the British colonial and post-Independence periods (up to 1974) were times of gradually increasing prosperity (cf. Redmayne 1964:pp.296, 299). Although economic life was consistently dominated by agriculture, livelihood options began to diversify in the 1920s and 1930s. Prosperity increased with the arrival of the first non-African settlers in the immediate study area and again with the influx of settlers in the late 1940s and 1950s. The 1960s saw continued development and improving living standards. Although prosperity had probably already peaked before the end of that decade,¹⁸ future growth prospects looked promising in light of infrastructure and communications developments and the impending birth of Mafinga town. In early 1974 life was perceived as good by my *wenyeji* informants. The sea-change wrought by villagisation was therefore remembered in a negative light, as marking the end of the old way of life and the start of a new uneven way, even if villagisation itself was not the cause of this.

How exactly was the old way of life remembered as good? Extended families lived near each other and neighbours worked co-operatively on heavy tasks like hoeing and house-building, yet separate households had their own physical space from where their animals could not wander off and disappear into someone else's cooking pot. Kinship was not felt as a burden – children could and did help their parents more than today. Cash was available to men and women through employment, skilled work, wage labour or sales of surplus crops, livestock products, alcohol and maize flour. Goods were affordable and, more importantly, fertilisers and insecticides, now expensive and necessary, were not required. Land, though less fertile in old Kinyanambo than in Mufindi proper, was productive enough. It was sufficiently plentiful to allow a variety of techniques and inputs according to means, so that even poorer families without cattle for manure could grow enough food by fallowing and felling and burning. Nevertheless, complex processes of social change were affecting the lives and livelihoods of the Kinyanambo *wenyeji* and social differentiation was increasing, via two main channels.

The first channel, education, originated in pre-colonial Uhehe. Under Chief Mkwawa young ruling men had been formally educated at Kalenga during periods of military service and some intelligent non-ruling men had become powerful subordinate rulers (Iliffe 1979:p.57; Mumford 1934:p.212; Redmayne 1968:p.45). Western-style education then began with the

¹⁸ See Coulson (1982) on economic development in Tanzania as a whole.

introduction of mission 'bush' and primary schools in the German period and primary education remained dominated by the missions until the 1977 introduction of universal primary education (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.215; Coulson 1982:pp.41-42, 82-83, 86-87, 216-217; Iliffe 1979:pp.223-224, 235-236, 546; Nyerere 1979b:p.49; Redmayne 1964:p.42). The mostly Catholic missions took in girls and (more usually) boys and sent bright ones on for further study at mission-run boarding middle schools like the teacher training school at Tosamaganga.¹⁹ In the immediate study area, the Consolata Fathers started Makalala Mission in 1953 (Redmayne 1964:p.40), building the church and middle school at Makalala A and later another church and school (now Mafinga Seminary) at Makalala B. They had previously founded Mufindi West (Kibao) Mission in 1932 and Mdabulo Mission in 1933 (Ibid:p.40). Meanwhile the British colonial government started a pioneering secondary school at Malangali in 1927 (Ibid:pp.265-267; Iliffe 1979:p.339; Mumford 1930),²⁰ which remains the only government secondary school in Mufindi District (MDC 1997:pp.62-63), and established a technical school at Ifunda (north of Rungemba) and a veterinary college at John's Corner after WW2.

The significance of education increased when Adam Sapi became Chief of Uhehe in 1940. Educated by the British himself, he was instrumental in encouraging the Wahehe to send their children to school (GOT 1941:p.53; Iliffe 1979:p.341; Redmayne 1964:p.281). Education then increasingly contributed to social differentiation as livelihood options diversified and employment opportunities grew (cf. Redmayne 1964:pp.296, 299). In particular, it created a new class of administrative workers, whom Feierman has called "literate functionaries" (1990:p.22). These were people who worked for the colonial government as clerks, messengers and junior administrators and who came to dominate TANU, forming a new 'bureaucratic' class which has been central to local and national politics since Independence (Ibid:pp.22-23, 232-233, 237-238; Coulson 1982:pp.81, 91-93) and, in Kinyanambo, especially since villagisation.

The second main channel of social differentiation in the study area before villagisation was wealth accumulation. In pre-colonial Uhehe, differentiation occurred primarily according to social and political status, but leaders received goods (such as grain and livestock) and labour from their subjects and slaves, enabling them to accumulate greater wealth (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.28-32). During the colonial period new forms of accumulation then emerged with the

¹⁹ The "Teacher's [sic] College" closed in 1967 (DRPT 1971:p.27).

²⁰ Box 258 of the CBMS/IMC Archives, file on 'Malangali Government School (W.B.Mumford)' (SOAS Library).

commoditisation of agriculture and in old Kinyanambo cash crops and businesses became central to wealth accumulation. Cash crops in particular were important to increasing differentiation throughout colonial Tanganyika. African smallholders rapidly adopted cash crops wherever circumstances (especially ecological conditions) were favourable, improving their "economic situation without apparent social strain", yet where there were hierarchical political structures new cash crops were also often adopted "primarily as a means of increasing the economic power of the ruling strata" (Egero 1974:p.18). Pyrethrum-growing in old Kinyanambo is a case in point.

Pyrethrum first began to be grown in the study area by non-African settlers during the 1930s and a marketing arrangement was made with the Kenya Farmers' Association in 1938 (McDonald 1946:p.41-42; McMahon 1939:p.75). However, it was not until around the time of Independence that pyrethrum became an African cash crop, Africans having only recently been allowed to grow it (Raikes 1986:p.114; Rasmussen 1986:p.193). In the late 1950s a handful of progressive farmers started growing pyrethrum in old Kinyanambo, marketing their crops in Ifupila for onward sale to a processing factory in Arusha. These farmers were socially and politically dominant *wenyeji* men – they led the way when others were reluctant to adopt the new crop and they used the profits to expand and diversify their livelihoods. For example, Mzee Maiko²¹ worked for Lord Chesham in a senior position and then ran a guest-house at the junction of the old road and the Sadani road for many years after leaving this employment. He became an experienced businessman and left Kinyanambo in the early 1970s to build three more guest-houses along the TAZARA railway, using his profits from pyrethrum-growing to take advantage of this new economic opportunity.

Mzee Maiko was the first *mwenyeji* to grow pyrethrum in old Kinyanambo and he explained how he persuaded others to adopt the crop:

"At first people didn't want to grow pyrethrum, so I grew it myself. I sent a man to Ifupila to sell the crop for me, as a small job. That man brought back the receipt and lots of money. He couldn't believe it was such a good price. He thought it was too much money and he couldn't read the receipt. But I told him, 'yes, that is correct'. I took the receipt and read out how much I sold and how much I got. Then that man started convincing others to grow pyrethrum. He saw that you got a good price for a good crop. I told him, 'if you grow it yourself you will get the same money', so he grew it himself."

Mzee Maiko sold seedlings to farmers in the old Kinyanambo and Itimbo areas as the crop spread. Then after Independence Nyerere himself came and urged people to grow

²¹ Not his real name.

pyrethrum to get money.²² As another male informant, a 1950s immigrant and poorer farmer, recalled: "Nyerere told us that if we were poor with no money we should grow cash crops like pyrethrum to get money". At this time many local people joined TANU and the pyrethrum-growers' association which was affiliated to TANU.

In the mid-1960s, after the crop had become more widespread, the government opened a pyrethrum-buying station in old Kinyanambo, at Mzee Maiko's house.²³

"The Area Commissioner told people to bring their pyrethrum to my house and so they came from as far as Itimbo.^[24] A clerk came from Ifwagi each month to buy all the pyrethrum of this area. He measured it and gave people a receipt for the amount. It was like this for four or five years. Then people stopped growing pyrethrum, until now. The co-operative buying stopped... Usually we got some money at first and the rest came later, but one year we waited and no money came, so people stopped growing it."

Across post-Independence Tanzania smallholder pyrethrum was sold through licensed co-operative societies that set a price floor at which they purchased the crop from their members (DRPT 1971:pp.15, 25). The co-operatives acted primarily as marketing agents, selling the crop to the Tanganyika Extract Company (TEC) in Arusha and giving extra payments to members later if their crops fetched a higher price (Ibid:pp.15, 25). The non-payment reported by my informants was probably not unusual, although it was not clear in this case whether it was because the price declined (Conyers *et al* 1971:p.22; Moody 1970:p.12; Rasmussen 1986:p.193) or because the Kinyanambo farmers' money was "eaten" further up the system, at regional level, as some informants claimed.²⁵ Either way, having seen production peak nationally in 1967, with 3,880 tonnes marketed in Iringa Region alone, pyrethrum's popularity had largely declined by 1974 (DANIDA *et al* 1982a:p.2.3; DRPT 1971:p.17; Mbilinyi 1997:pp.16-17).

Whilst the case of pyrethrum-growing illustrates Egero's (1974) argument about elite groups adopting cash crops to strengthen their own economic position, it also raises two important points about increasing social differentiation in old Kinyanambo. The first is that the process was relatively inclusive and manageable and indeed was perhaps managed by the

²² Nyerere visited the study area during his Tanganyika-wide travels in 1962, after his resignation as prime minister (Coulson 1982:pp.135-136).

²³ This was the "Kinyang'ambo" [sic] buying station of the "Ifwagi Farmer's [sic] Co-operative Society", a marketing co-operative which came under the "Iringa Farmer's [sic] Co-operative Union" (Moody 1970:p.26). The Kinyanambo branch covered the areas that are now Itimbo, Sao Hill, Kikombo, Ndolezi, Rungemba, and Kinyanambo villages. Mzee Maiko was branch chair and had been the local TANU chair from before Independence until the early 1960s.

²⁴ At this time it became difficult not to grow pyrethrum – one informant even claiming he was forced to do so by local officials.

²⁵ *kula hela*, lit. to eat money, to wrongfully take or cream off money that is not yours. See also Coulson (1982:pp.150-152), Feerman (1990:p.234) and Raikes (1986:p.124) on the increasing corruption and inefficiency in Tanzanian co-operatives after Independence.

wenyeji elite. By encouraging others to grow pyrethrum and supporting their efforts, Mzee Maiko (and *wenyeji* like him) helped poorer farmers to raise their incomes too. He took the initial risk and demonstrated that pyrethrum-growing was profitable – others then followed suit. Although he was initially richer and was able to accumulate relatively more wealth by having started pyrethrum-growing earlier, he did not generate hostility to his own wealth accumulation as he was not excluding interested farmers from also making money in this way.

The second important point is that the process of increasing social differentiation through wealth accumulation disguised the process of increasing social differentiation through education – it disguised the rise of the bureaucratic class as an important political class. The Independence movement had not been strong in the study area (Iliffe 1979:pp.520, 567) and the political system in Uhehe remained largely intact during the 1960s.²⁶ The *wenyeji* elite in old Kinyanambo, (predominantly male) members of the senior, longest-standing clans, retained power and authority and real post-Independence political change was not properly consolidated until villagisation.²⁷ Until then pyrethrum-growing and general prosperity drew attention away from increasing social differentiation through education, even as younger, formally educated people were increasingly taking up employment in the public sector and coming to dominate TANU. Moreover, the two types of differentiation also overlapped. Across pre-villagisation Tanzania, there were capitalist farmers like Mzee Maiko who were TANU leaders and TANU leaders who were “getting deeply involved in the practices of capitalism and landlordism” (Nyerere 1968b:p.259).

We have seen that gradual changes occurred to *wenyeji* livelihoods between the pre-colonial period and villagisation with the commoditisation of agriculture and the growth of the cash economy and that these changes contributed to increasing social differentiation in old Kinyanambo. Nonetheless, the underlying basis of the local social and political system stayed more or less the same – in part, because the continuing importance of agriculture to livelihoods meant that land remained central therein. Combined with the adaptability of the land tenure system itself, this stability thus mediated the visible impact of socio-economic and political change right up until 1974.

²⁶ Chief Adam sympathised with TANU but was loyal to the British. He was the third African appointed to Tanganyika’s Legislative Council (in 1947) and held many public offices after Independence (Iliffe 1979:pp 475-476, 535; Listowel 1965:p.322).

²⁷ This was not unique in Tanzania. For example, the authority of the Shambaai chiefship in the Usambaras was also slow to decline, with real change not felt there until after the Chief’s death in the 1970s (Feierman 1990:pp.232, 248).

Land, Social Relations and Political Power

Although there is much literature on traditional African land tenure systems,²⁸ detailed sources on Uhehe are limited. Brown and Hutt (1935) and Redmayne (1964) both discuss land tenure, albeit not in great detail, Odgaard (1998) examines Wahehe women's customary rights to land and there is some information on customary law during the German period in the Iringa District Book.²⁹ Whilst drawing on these sources for support, I nevertheless rely primarily on my informants' accounts of land tenure in old Kinyanambo "before villagisation", as it was during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This enables me to analyse the local land tenure system as it was just before this fundamental breakpoint and facilitates comparison with today's system, as it has evolved since 1974. It also allows me to describe pre-villagisation land tenure with a reasonable degree of certainty and confidence as my analysis hinges on evidence that I have obtained and interpreted myself. My *wenyeji* informants themselves described villagisation as a breakpoint and we discussed the changes between then and now. The comparison was to a specific point in time and one which was sharp in memory – the changes of villagisation being so sudden and deeply felt that the previous way of life was a frequent and natural reference point.

First Right

In old Kinyanambo land does not appear to have had any independent symbolic meaning, aside from specific ritually significant sites such as family graves. Instead its value was two-fold. It lay, first, in the use of the land – for farming, grazing or running a business – and was therefore bought and sold. Second, it lay in the social and political status conferred by ownership, especially first ownership, and was therefore also lent out or given away for free. In both these senses, the value of land was tangible and material. We have already seen the value of land to livelihoods, so I concentrate here on its social and political value.

The social value of land was enshrined in the principle that access to land in a particular place went with the right to live there (cf. Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.61, 80, 127-128). The political value lay in the fact that those who had settled in a particular place first had prior claim to land there – 'first right' – and thus had the power to welcome newcomers (or not) and to decide which area of land to give them. This important principle of first right was discussed by the

²⁸ See Meek (1946:pp.1-31) on "native systems of tenure" in general and Biebuyck (1963b) and Lugard (1926:p.287) on Africa. See James and Fimbo (1973), Koda (1999) and Oldaker (1957) on customary land tenure in Tanzania.

²⁹ Note 1.

Culwicks (1935) with respect to land tenure in Ukena and I quote from them at length as their analysis also applies to Uhehe:³⁰

“Any member of the tribe, or any stranger who has been granted permission to settle...can of right take and clear as much land as he^[31] requires...The work he has put into the plot gives it value. It is now his property and no one may encroach on it. So long as it continues to be used, it remains in the possession of him or his heirs...When a man deserts exhausted ground, he no longer calls it “my field”. He will, however, refer to it as “my old field,” indicating thereby that he still has certain proprietary rights over it should he care to exercise them. He has, in fact, the right of first refusal when that land is ready for use again. So long as his former occupation of it is remembered, anyone else thinking of taking possession of it will first ask him if he wants it any more. If he says no and the other takes it, his rights naturally lapse in favour of the newcomer...This practice is based more on a tacit understanding than on a formulated right. Everybody knows that a certain plot is So-and-So’s old field and he may want to come back to it again in due course, so nobody else thinks of appropriating it without first asking him. There is such abundance of fertile land that disputes do not arise, but...the first occupier could if necessary make good his claim in the tribal courts...

“The temporary occupier of a field is thus regarded as something more than merely its user, he has rights which extend beyond the period of actual use. It is considered as his absolute property so long as he wishes to keep it...His rights over it last as long as he wishes, whether it is in use or not, and, further, he has the right of disposal. He can if he wants dispose of a field...receiving in exchange goods, cash or services of some kind. But as land has no value, he is really, of course, selling the work of clearing and breaking the ground and any crops which may be growing on it at the time of the transfer, i.e. he is actually being paid for improvements and not for the land itself, though at the same time he as the owner is transferring his rights over the actual land” (Culwick & Culwick 1935:pp.235-237).

The Culwicks clearly believed that land had no value to the Wabena (by which they meant market value) and that the land itself was not really sold, even though absolute ownership rights were being transferred. It is not possible to know whether the Wabena in the 1930s undertook one exchange (selling the land) or two simultaneous exchanges (transferring land rights and receiving compensation for prior improvements). It is also not possible to know the precise nature of the value of land to the Wahehe in the 1930s, though Brown and Hutt (1935:pp.130-132) take a broadly similar, if less detailed, position to the Culwicks (1935). My Wahehe informants made clear, however, that in old Kinyanambo there had been outright land sales before villagisation, perceived as such, and that it was only after villagisation that the semantics became convoluted. Nevertheless, the above quotation effectively demonstrates the nature of the Wabena – and Wahehe – concept of land ownership based on the principle of first right. This principle gave land a central place in the social and political system in the study area before villagisation, analytically binding together land, social relations and political power.

³⁰ The Wahehe and Wabena peoples are culturally very close, having mutually comprehensible languages and many similar customs (cf. Mumford 1934:p.205). However not all the Culwicks’ (1935) analysis applies to the Wahehe and that which I extend to them is thus only that on first right. See also Biebuyck (1963b:pp.56-57) on the importance of first occupancy of land across Africa.

³¹ In analysing Wabena rights to land, the Culwicks ignored gender. Most women had their own fields, but they implied that these were obtained through male household heads without further analysis (1935:pp.231, 236).

Land and Social Relations

The *wenyeji kabisa* of old Kinyanambo were those families who had been there for a long time and originally acquired large areas of land as first occupants of the areas associated with them. *Wenyeji* men cleared land as they needed it, especially as their families grew, and passed it on to their children, who in turn took and cleared more land for their own families. These people had prior rights to land *vis-à-vis* newcomers. However, whereas in some parts of Africa land was owned or controlled by descent groups (clans or lineages) and transfers outside the group could be redeemed or vetoed (e.g. Colson 1963:pp.142-145; Mackenzie 1998:pp.27-28), clan land in old Kinyanambo was understood simply as family land and could straightforwardly be transferred to newcomers, as one of my male informants explained:

"When people say clan land, it means this is when someone lives somewhere and they look for their own land for themselves and their children. Then when they die their children continue using their land. But if it is a big area then someone might give land to another person. Then that person becomes the new owner. So clan land is just like family land... The real meaning is that each person farms an area with their children."

Clan land in old Kinyanambo could thus be inherited, but it could also be transferred outside the family, becoming the new owner's clan land. Land was clearly not inalienable and giving land to newcomers, or indeed selling to them, was unproblematic. Land went with the right to live somewhere and being allocated land – being shown which area to clear and farm or use for grazing, which no *mwenyeji* wanted for the future – meant that a newcomer was welcomed into the community.

However, not all newcomers were the same. Those with greater pre-existing social ties would get land faster and perhaps more fertile land or a larger area. The means of access to land also varied according to the social relationship between the two parties and the wishes of the holder of first right. Relatives and newcomers marrying in had greater social ties and usually only strangers, with no pre-existing ties to the *wenyeji*, bought land. For example, the stranger who moved to Kinyanambo to supply meat to the National Service Camp in the late 1960s bought all his land from two men of different *wenyeji* clans, but was then able to give part of this land to an affine who followed him to Kinyanambo. In contrast, my veterinary officer informant was given 30 acres of land in the core area of old Kinyanambo by the *jumbe* after he married in 1951, his family having moved to the neighbouring Makalala A area in the 1940s and having already established useful social ties. Newcomers could also borrow land, as well as buy or be given, and the distinction between borrowing and being given was made clear at the time of transfer (cf. Redmayne 1964:p.350). Thus a newcomer might initially borrow (or buy) a piece of

land on arrival in old Kinyanambo and then be given another piece once he had been living there for a while.

The link between land and social relations was clearly mediated in different ways according to position within the social system and in this gender was also crucial. In old Kinyanambo male newcomers were straightforwardly given (or lent or sold) land if they were accepted by the *wenyeji*. Internal movement within Uhehe was common and a newcomer would only be turned away if there was insufficient land or he was “notoriously a bad character” such as a criminal or witch (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.61, 79; Redmayne 1964:p.297). The social system was fluid and able to absorb male newcomers so long as there was sufficient land for all.

However, a female newcomer could only gain access to land through a man. A Mhehe woman marrying a man from elsewhere would be shown land at her husband's place, either by him or his family, for her to use to provide food for her family. Her husband was also obliged to build her a house and she to live wherever he put her (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.103-104, 106, 110; Redmayne 1964:p.64). For their part, men were usually only given land by their families when they first got married as there was no need for them to farm separately until they had responsibility for a wife and children. People spoke of getting land from the man's parents (*wazazi*) on marriage, which meant getting either a part of his father's land or a part of the land his mother had been using since her marriage. It was also common in Uhehe to get land from the man's maternal uncles (Redmayne 1964:p.59). Land given to a wife was hers for the duration of the marriage (Brown & Hutt 1935:p.132). If the marriage ended in divorce, the land was usually retained by the man and the woman would return to her parents or brothers and be given land by them (cf. Redmayne 1964:p.57). If the man died, the woman might also return to her own family as it was not always easy in practice to stay and retain access to the land she had been farming without marrying one of her husband's brothers.³² However a widow had the right to continue cultivating her husband's land while she remained capable of maintaining her own household (Redmayne 1964:pp.53-54).

A Mhehe woman marrying a man from the same place as herself, whether a close neighbour or a newcomer himself, would also be shown land to use by her husband, but she was often given additional land by her own family over which she had considerable control.³³ On

³² The frequency of the levirate was already reducing in the early colonial period (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.21, 113; Mumford 1934:p.208; Redmayne 1964:p.54), yet I still encountered several instances of it, including one in the 1990s.

³³ African women often controlled land obtained from their own families (e.g. Brain 1976:p.266; Colson 1963:p.146).

divorce or widowhood, she then straightforwardly retained this land. Women who married in their home areas were also more able to assert their rights to inherit land from their parents. Women could and did traditionally inherit land in Uhehe, although in smaller shares than their brothers, as well as possessions from both their parents, although men and older children took precedence (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.85-86, 118-119; Iringa District Book:p.27; Mumford 1934:p.207; Odgaard 1998:pp.2-3, 5-6, 8-9; Redmayne 1964:pp.51-53). Many of my older and middle-aged female informants reported being given land by their parents and/or inheriting it before villagisation, especially *wenyeji* women who had remained in old Kinyanambo on marriage, had never married or who had returned home on widowhood or divorce.³⁴ Most of these women were still using that land and expected to pass it on in turn to their own children, sons and daughters. However there were also women who had not been able to assert their land claims, for example daughters of more junior wives or women lacking support from male relatives such as brothers.

The rights of women were also limited to the extent that newcomers always obtained land from male landowners and it was only male landowners who could dispose of clan land outside the family. Before villagisation people generally thought of their land in terms of specific areas, associated with the Mahameni places they lived in, as their farms were usually near their houses. As one *mwenyeji* explained: "People would say that grandfather farmed here and the graves are here so the land is theirs." Male landowners could give away, lend out or sell the family land, whether a father who had first settled and taken land or acquired it from a prior occupier, or a son who had been given it by (or inherited it from) his father. However, although women could give and bequeath land to their children, I encountered no cases of women selling or giving away land to newcomers before villagisation, nor of any such newcomer acquiring land from a woman.

In sum, if land was transferred then certain rights in it were also transferred. The means of transfer – gift, sale or loan – determined the nature of the rights being transferred. Loans (including of men's land to their wives) transferred use rights, outright gifts and sales transferred absolute disposal rights, and the type of transfer was influenced by the nature and strength of the relationship between the two parties.

³⁴ My findings contradict Oldaker, who claimed that no women in Uhehe inherited land (1957:p.137). In Tanzania as a whole, however, women's inheritance has tended to be more problematic (Koda 1999; Mtengeti-Migiro 1991).

Land and Political Power

Just as access to land in old Kinyanambo was influenced by social relations, the land tenure system was also linked closely to the political system. The *wenyeji*'s power to welcome newcomers to their areas (or not) and indicate what land might be available to them gave land a political value and *wenyeji* landowners a special social and political status. Their power and status remained until villagisation, preserving stability, because, whilst the structure of political organisation in Uhehe changed several times between the mid-nineteenth century and 1974, the underlying basis of political power did not. From the Uhehe State through German and British rule to the young post-Independence Tanzania, the centre of gravity of political power in the study area was constantly local.

In pre-colonial Uhehe, Munyigumba's and Mkwawa's relatively autonomous subordinate rulers, who had reported directly to the Chief, had "watched over and witnessed the division of land" (Redmayne 1964:pp.239). These men evolved into powerful local *jumbes* in the absence of a Chief under the Germans (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.49-50, 58-59). They were called to witness land alienations to non-African settlers, mark out boundaries and organise the removal of Africans and payment of cash compensation as required (Redmayne 1964:pp.202, 226, 228-229). The *jumbes* then retained considerable autonomy and power under the British system of Indirect Rule, despite the insertion of a layer of sub-chiefs (generally relatives of the Chief or former territorial rulers or their descendants) between themselves and the restored Chief. Although the *jumbes* were almost always members of senior *wenyeji* clans, their powers were subject to social norms and the support of their *wenyeji* subjects (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp. 51-53, 58-59, 62, 66-67, 73-74). Unpopular *jumbes* could be (and sometimes were) forced from office, albeit usually in favour of a more popular relative as the position of *jumbe* was, in effect, hereditary (Ibid:pp.53, 62; Redmayne 1964:pp.57, 377).

Generally under Indirect Rule colonial governments did not intervene "between the native rulers and the people under their jurisdiction" in land matters "except to advise, and to maintain justice", to ensure that native rulers' powers were "rightly exercised" (Lugard 1926:pp.300, 309), and customary law guided the colonial courts so long as it was "not repugnant to justice and morality" or inconsistent with government laws and policies (James & Fimbo 1973:p.35; James 1971:p.62; cf. Mamdani 1996:p.63; Merry 1982:p.74). The Uhehe Native Authority was therefore responsible for allocating land, marking boundaries, giving African newcomers permission to settle, judging land disputes and witnessing agreements,

negotiating with the government over land alienation to non-African settlers, and organising consequent movement and compensation payment (Redmayne 1964:p.275). The *jumbe*, the lowest-paid official in the Native Authority hierarchy, was officially in charge of allocating land and carrying out these other tasks (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.61-62; Oldaker 1957:p.125). However in practice the *jumbe* would consult with the *karani wa kijiji* and the *wenyeji* of the area on all land matters.³⁵ Thus, as we saw in Chapter Three, even the *wenyeji* who moved to accommodate non-African settlers in the 1920s and 1930s could not be allocated land rights by the *jumbe* in new areas without consideration being given to the claims of prior occupants. When my informants said they were given land by the *jumbe*, it often meant that he simply endorsed their choice of which area of unused land to use (cf. Brown & Hutt 1935:p.128). Increasingly, however, as more people came to live in old Kinyanambo, the *jumbe* actually showed newcomers where to live and farm. But, although the *jumbe* officially had land allocating authority, he consulted with and generally deferred to the *wenyeji* because the principle of first right was socially and politically entrenched. Similarly, a newcomer would always approach the *wenyeji* first himself to make enquiries about where he might live and farm, before going to the *jumbe* to have him come and confirm the area. It would have been considered "extremely discourteous" to do otherwise (Redmayne 1964:p.351).³⁶

With the abolition of Indirect Rule after Independence, elected district councils replaced native authorities, regional and area commissioners took on the powers of chiefs, sub-chiefdoms and jumbeates became divisions and sub-divisions, and village development committees were created across Tanzania (Coulson 1982:p.136; Feierman 1990:pp.229, 239; Fimbo 1992:pp.34-35; Graham 1979:p.14; James 1971:p.232). Sub-chiefs became divisional executive officers and *jumbes* became sub-divisional, and later village, executive officers (Mamdani 1996:p.107; Redmayne 1964:p.346), although in old Kinyanambo people still referred to the office as that of the *jumbe* until 1974. Judicial and executive powers were formally split in 1964, from when all customary law cases were heard by full-time magistrates, assisted by locally elected assessors, at local primary courts, and the power of the *wenyeji* elite (wealthy

³⁵ *Karanis* were appointed by individual *jumbes* on the grounds of kinship, ability or their families' importance in the local community, and were unpaid except for a period from the late 1950s to 1963 (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.75-77; Redmayne 1964:pp.270-271, 345, 347, 380, 382-384). *Karanis* also appointed their own subordinates, called *lunanzis* (Redmayne 1964:pp.351-353). Kinyanambo's last *karani wa kijiji* was Marehemu Yusef Tonga, of the Tongas of old core Kinyanambo.

³⁶ Redmayne claims that it was the *karani* who was called to witness land transactions and to confirm the extension of landholdings into uncultivated bush (1964:pp.349-350, 383). However my informants (and Brown and Hutt (1935:pp.61-62)) spoke exclusively of the *jumbe* in this regard, although practices may have varied in different parts of Uhehe.

farmers and *wenyeji kabisa* with first right over land) may have been diminished in principle by this change (Mamdani 1996:p.107; Tanner 1966:pp.105, 108, 111; cf. Chapter Two).

However, across post-Independence Tanzania “the whole structure of traditional hierarchy in relation to land administration...crumbled and the method by which the vacuum [was] filled is veiled in obscurity” (James & Fimbo 1973:p.69). Although this lack of clarity was evident from my informants’ accounts, it did seem clear that a village development committee, comprising the TANU *mabalozi* in the areas of Kinyanambo, Kitelewasi and Rungemba, and after 1969 a similarly constituted ward development committee, had taken on responsibility for local land matters and legally had sole responsibility for land allocation (Ibid:p.77; cf. Lwoga 1985:p.63; Van Hekken & Thoden Van Velzen 1972:pp.81, 119-120).³⁷ However it also seemed clear that the *wenyeji* elite continued to wield considerable power over land right up until villagisation, retaining their informal social and political status and in many cases taking up new local leadership positions within TANU (cf. Redmayne 1964:pp.408-409). One of my *mwenyeji* informants, for example, who worked as a legal representative to the Rungemba *jumbe* from the mid-1950s (cf. Ibid:pp.302-303, 334), became a leading member of the village and then ward development committee after Independence.

Mumford viewed the strong political structure and acceptance of authority in Uhehe as a projection of the obedience, respect and awe that children learned to give their fathers in polygamous households (1934:p.207). If correct, this would make it unsurprising that political change after Independence was limited. However local political leaders probably also had an economic interest in retaining their position as land-allocating authorities and maintaining the political status quo. It had not been uncommon in colonial Tanganyika for land-allocating authorities to be paid with fees or gifts (James & Fimbo 1973:p.74; Oldaker 1957:p.128) and in Uhehe the practice of paying political leaders was well established. For example, *jumbes* received obligatory payments (*mibeho*) from litigants during the German period (and sometimes optional extra payments), on top of their salaries, whilst the introduction of taxes allowed them to “eat” tax money (Redmayne 1964:p.231; Brown & Hutt 1935:p.50).³⁸ During the British period

³⁷ Ten house cells, which TANU *mabalozi* represent, were introduced in 1964. The area of a village development committee was made coterminous with the TANU branch and the administrative ward in 1967 and the TANU branch chairperson automatically became chair of the village development committee (Van Hekken & Thoden Van Velzen 1972:pp.79, 82, 109, 113, 119). Ward development committees replaced village development committees in July 1969, with TANU branch chairs becoming ward development committee chairs and ward executive officers replacing village executive officers to become ward development committee secretaries (James 1971:p.232; Fimbo 1992:p.35).

³⁸ Cf. Iringa District Book (pp.15, 23-24), Note 1.

payments to *jumbes* for favourable court judgements were widely practised, sub-chiefs could delay justice until “it dawns upon the plaintiff that a judicious present will hasten matters” and the tendency to “eat” taxes affected all leaders from the sub-chiefs down (Brown & Hutt 1935:pp.55-57, 64; Redmayne 1964:p.344). Payments were also made in regular amounts to non-salaried leaders across Uhehe for dealing with disputes and cases (Redmayne 1964:p.349).

The subject of payments to lower-level leaders was difficult to discuss openly with my *wenyeji* informants. Nevertheless, it seemed clear that in old Kinyanambo payments had long been made to subordinate leaders and the *wenyeji* in areas where land was sought and it seemed that such payments continued until villagisation. These payments were an entrenched part of the land allocation process. They were symbolic, socially meaningful payments which were a central part of the local social and political system. Because newcomers needed to be accepted by the *wenyeji* of an area in order to be able to live there harmoniously and get land, payments could be considered as gifts which helped ensure a welcome rather than as bribes for good land. Gifts were given to the *wenyeji* because the principle of first right was so entrenched and because their power and status as ‘original inhabitants’ meant that it was almost always their members who held local political positions.

In essence, continuing local control of access to land contributed to a fundamental stability in the study area in the years up to 1974, despite the socio-economic changes that had been gradually taking place since pre-colonial times and the actual political changes that accompanied colonialism and Independence. As we have seen, the key to this long term stability lay in the principle of first right, the principle that linked together land, social relations and political power. Nevertheless, important processes of change in “man-man” and “man-thing” rights and relations (Bohannan 1963:p.102) were at work in old Kinyanambo and the local land tenure system was engaged in continuing evolution.

The Changing Land Tenure System in Old Kinyanambo

Three main processes of change fed into the development of the land tenure system in old Kinyanambo. These were the commoditisation of agriculture, rising employment and population growth, which together stimulated the commoditisation of land. All these processes

operated within the national land tenure policy environment, but this influenced land tenure before villagisation to a more limited extent.

The commoditisation of agriculture stimulated the commoditisation of land in old Kinyanambo in several ways. First, the spread of cash crops, particularly pyrethrum, turned land into an income-generating resource, one that produced market value (cash) (cf. EARC 1955:p.287). This began with the marketing of food crops (and agricultural products such as meat, milk and ghee), for example to workers on the Mufindi tea estates and the local settlers' farms. The marketing of food crops was itself intensified by the increased demand for food due to rising employment and population growth more generally (cf. *Ibid*:p.321). Second, the possibility of income from farming raised the demand for land as land became an asset – a resource for wealth accumulation that could be sold for cash or bought and used productively to get richer. Third, the increased demand for agricultural products (food and cash crops) encouraged greater use of wage labourers for heavy tasks such as clearing new farms. As wage labourers were paid in cash, those hiring them incurred a direct financial cost on particular pieces of land. If the land was subsequently transferred to another person, that cost then needed to be recouped. As one *mwenyeji* informant put it, if the owner of a piece of land “had put wage labourers to farm on that land before, then the newcomer would have to return the expenses.” Thus direct financial expenditure on land contributed to its commoditisation.

Rising employment further stimulated the commoditisation of both agriculture and land. It not only encouraged the use of wage labourers on the farms at home of people employed elsewhere, but also created a class of (predominantly) men who, although they retained home ties, often settled in new areas after moving around for work, not infrequently after marrying in a place of work. These men needed to establish themselves in their new homes and, although marriage facilitated this, social relations still had to be built up over time. As marriages were often unstable, divorce being frequent in Uhehe (Redmayne 1964:p.64), it could be hard for them to get much land on marriage. In the short term, while their wives would be given land by their own families, male newcomers might only be given a small area by their in-laws, though all men in Uhehe would usually get some land from their affines (*Ibid*:p.61). If they wanted more land – and quickly (which most did) – an alternative was to purchase it from their earnings.

This phenomenon became increasingly common from the 1960s as migration for work increased and uncleared land started to become less plentiful. Around the Mufindi tea estates, land shortages were being felt by 1970 and, although the population density in the immediate

study area was well below the district and division averages at that time (Chapter Three), the substantial alienations in Sao Hill/Rungemba would have had some impact on the availability of land there too. Natural population growth and inward migration thus contributed to the gradual commoditisation of land, most noticeably in the expansion of the core area of old Kinyanambo around the Sadani road junction (cf. DRPT 1971:p.5). However, the main impact of population growth awaited the birth of Mafinga town.

Alongside these processes of socio-economic change, the impact of the national policy environment must also be considered. German land tenure policy had little direct impact as non-African settlement in the immediate study area was very limited until the British period, but it laid the foundations for later policy. Since the start of the colonial period national land tenure policy had held that land could not be bought or sold and that absolute rights to land belonged to the state, in the person of the ultimate holder of political power, the Governor and later the President (Chapter One). However, in developing the notion that land in Tanzania was traditionally neither bought, sold nor individually owned, land tenure policy diverged from reality.

Even before the colonial period land was bought and sold in Tanganyika, yet various British administrative officers who had investigated local land tenure systems (including A.T. Culwick) recommended that land sales should be restricted (Meek 1946:pp.108-112) and policies were adopted to prevent any further commoditisation of land. The Germans had prohibited land sales among Africans in some areas and the British restricted transfers of land held customarily (as deemed rights of occupancy) from Africans to non-Africans (Ibid:pp.103, 110; James 1971:pp.19, 191; James & Fimbo 1973:p.455).³⁹ Nevertheless, the British colonial government regarded it as "inevitable" that the commoditisation of agriculture would continue to lead "to a wide extension of the conception of private proprietary rights" (Meek 1946:p.107).

The underlying logic of national land tenure policy had been elaborated by Lugard and was extended by Nyerere:

"As land acquires an economic value, there is no doubt a natural tendency towards its accumulation in the hands of the wealthier classes, with the consequent creation of a landless peasantry... The first and most important step to preserve the peasant proprietor is the prohibition of the sale or transfer of land, without the consent of the Governor, to any person, European or other, who is not subject to the local native jurisdiction" (Lugard 1926:pp.294-296);

"If people are given land to use as their property, then they have the right to sell it. It will not be difficult to predict who, in fifty years time, will be the landlords and who the tenants... even if

³⁹ There was no provision in the 1923 Land Ordinance preventing "the free purchase and sale by persons of any race of [granted] rights of occupancy subject to the fulfilment of their conditions" and the Ordinance allowed the Governor to grant rights of occupancy to both natives and non-natives, although very few Africans actually acquired such granted rights (EARC 1955:p.366; James 1971:p.96; Meek 1946:p.106; Wily 1988:pp.79, 95).

there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants" (Nyerere 1966b:p.55; cf. 1966a:p.167).

Yet, in the same pamphlet (*Mali ya Taifa* (Chapter One)), Nyerere endorsed the idea of payment for improvements (value added) to land:

"By clearing that ground I have actually added to its value and have enabled it to be used to satisfy a human need. Whoever then takes this piece of ground must pay me for adding value to it through clearing it by my own labour" (1966b:p.54).⁴⁰

As the commoditisation of land increased up to 1974 national land tenure policy, in seeking "to eliminate buying and selling of land" (James & Fimbo 1973:p.302), became more and more irrelevant to local land tenure systems throughout Tanzania. Available evidence shows conclusively that the commoditisation of land in old Kinyanambo was not a unique process (James 1971:p.30).⁴¹ As early as 1800 there was some buying and selling of the best types of land in Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979:p.16). In the Usambara Mountains, land near villages was bought and sold in the late nineteenth century (Feierman 1990:p.59(fn.29)). Land sales were common in Buhaya by 1924 and coffee plots were bought and sold in Unyakyusa in the late 1930s (Iliffe 1979:pp.282, 297). Land and trees were purchased in the Uluguru Mountains during the British period, when clan heads also began renting out land to non-clan clients (Maack 1996:pp.163-165). Among the Wachagga of Kilimanjaro, coffee and banana plots (*vihamba*) started to be bought and sold around 1927 (Iliffe 1979:pp.275, 277). The Chagga Council declared *vihamba* to be freehold property in 1946 and, by Independence, this land was completely individualised, with progressive Wachagga farmers asserting freehold rights over ordinary farms too (Ibid:p.459; James 1971:p.63). On the Tanganyikan coast, where people had "sold a great amount of land" to the Germans at the start of the twentieth century, African newcomers had purchased land directly at least since the 1930s, obtaining "primary rights by making a payment (*ubaani*) to the right-holder of some fallow land" (Tanner 1960:pp.18, 20, 23). In less settled areas this payment was "gate-money" to enter the community, but it was "outright purchase in areas of land shortage" (Ibid:p.18).⁴²

⁴⁰ The idea that human labour is what adds value to land was espoused by John Locke in his seventeenth-century Second Treatise of Government, Chapter V, especially sections 40-43 (Laslett 1988:pp.296-298).

⁴¹ Neither was it unique to Tanzania (cf. Hailey 1946:pp.xiii-xv; Mamdani 1996:pp.139, 168-169). For example, see Lugard (1926:p.286) and Feder and Noronha (1987:p.154) on West Africa, Mackenzie (1989:p.99; 1990:pp.625, 628; 1993:pp.207-208, 210-211; 1998:pp.27-28, 177-179) and Coldham (1978:pp.94-95) on Kenya, and Colson (1971:pp.209-210) on commoditisation around towns.

⁴² See also Iliffe (1979:pp.459-461) on the marketability and concentration of landholdings in areas where good land was scarce.

In all these areas, increasing land sales between Africans were stimulated because land was fertile or suited to cash crops or because of population pressure and land shortage (James 1971:pp.21-22, 63, 184; James & Fimbo 1973:p.296). Rising demand for land then intensified “already-existing class differences” or created such differences (Egero 1974:p.18), as in the prosperous maize-growing area of Ismani. By villagisation there was a “general practice of renting land and buying land” in Ismani and households owned and farmed land individually (Awiti 1973:pp.35-36). “As a result there is already an uneven distribution of land. A strong capitalist peasant class has developed as opposed to a poor peasant class that have little or no land of their own” (Ibid:p.35). However Ismani also saw rapid individualisation and commoditisation of land because its population was predominantly comprised of migrants with no shared “traditional norms” about land (James 1971:p.63).

Contrary to Conyers *et al* (1971:p.21), who said land on the Mufindi Plateau could not be sold or rented in 1970, my informants made clear that land was sold in old Kinyambo before villagisation, although I found no evidence of land renting at that time as land was not yet too scarce. One newcomer, Mzee Zacariah,⁴³ bought 5 acres of *mashamba* and 1 acre of *vinzungu* in 1968 in the area of present-day Ganglonga from a member of a *wenyeji* clan, explaining that he had to pay for the land because there were *vitindi* trees on it and some parts had been cultivated – he had to pay for these investments in the land and could not just take it freely. Using today’s official discourse he said he was “buying the resources on the land”, but before I pressed him on the nature and meaning of his purchase he had been speaking freely of having unproblematically bought land on his arrival in old Kinyambo.⁴⁴

Houses were also bought and sold in old Kinyambo. Like land sales, house sales had a long history in Tanzania. For example, the Iringa District Book (p.24)⁴⁵ records the occurrence of house sales in Uhehe in the German period, whilst houses were being sold in Unyamwezi from the 1930s and Usukuma from the 1940s (Iliffe 1979:p.297; Meek 1946:p.111; Wily 1988:p.286). Across colonial Tanganyika houses could be sold if they had cash value but, except in Uchagga, were generally sold separately to the land on which they stood (Oldaker 1957:p.139). One of my informants bought his house in present-day Lumwago – “a small ruin” –

⁴³ Not his real name.

⁴⁴ He initially said “*nilinunua mashamba na mabustani*” (I bought rain-fed and irrigated farms), rather than “*nilirudisha gharama*” (I returned the expenses).

⁴⁵ Note 1.

when he moved to old Kinyanambo in 1973 from a man who was leaving the area. He paid the man for the house but was given 1 acre around the house, plus other land for farming, by his maternal uncles who were *wenyeji* and still had the rights to that land.

In old Kinyanambo, then, the main impact of national land tenure policy was clearly not in its disavowal of individual ownership and sales. Instead it lay in the alienation of large areas of land to non-African settlers and the granting of generous compensation payments, the impact of which lasted long after the last such alienation took place. This contributed to the commoditisation of land as land was clearly seen to be in demand and to have financial value. Market principles were further in evidence as land "close to a railway or motor road" received greater compensation (Meek 1946:p.113).⁴⁶ Moreover, the (male) African occupiers of the land had rights that were not ignored by the colonial government and, in paying them compensation, the government implicitly acknowledged their rights as those of 'owners'.⁴⁷ These factors, combined with the application to alienated land of a tenure regime based on European legal concepts (Chapter Two), helped to lay the foundations for an increasing perception of land as an individualised marketable commodity (cf. Brown & Hutt 1935:p.127; Colson 1971:p.211; James 1971:p.189; Lugard 1926:p.285).

However, national land tenure policy had only a limited impact overall on the development of the local land tenure system before 1974 because the *wenyeji* were more or less free to run their own land affairs. Although Meek claimed that native authorities in colonial Tanganyika had "shown considerable initiative in introducing modifications into the native land law" (1946:p.112), their legislative powers were more often used to "secure better land use" (Oldaker 1957:p.124) and seldom to control tenure and the "disposition of proprietary rights in land" (James & Fimbo 1973:pp.448-449). Land tenure rules were thus effectively left unwritten, allowing local land tenure systems to evolve by themselves right up until villagisation (cf. *Ibid*:p.xi).

Yet the increasing divergence between policy and local concepts and practices did occasionally become apparent and there was little scope to formally facilitate changes that conflicted with policy. For example, in one court case during the British period, Chief Adam said that

⁴⁶ Generally before villagisation compensation for unexhausted improvements was based on market (rather than cost or replacement) prices (James 1971:p.132).

⁴⁷ This may explain why I encountered no hostility among my informants to these alienations. Cf. Brown and Hutt (1935:p.222) and Redmayne (1964:pp.220, 292-293) on the general lack of hostility to land alienation in colonial Uhehe.

“to claim a man could sell two mango trees without selling the ground on which they grew was like a fairy story in which a man sold the top floor of a house and then tried to take away the ground floor which was still his” (Redmayne 1964:p.325).

The Iringa District Officer overruled the Chief, stating instead that “a man could sell the mango trees without selling his rights in the land on which they grew” (Ibid:p.325). Arguably this was to sustain the idea that land was traditionally not sold by Africans and thereby prevent change. National land tenure policy therefore constrained the evolution of land tenure systems across Tanganyika to at least some extent.

Nonetheless, my research suggests that the local land tenure system in old Kinyanambo gradually adapted to change without the emergence of tensions. By 1974 people could straightforwardly buy and sell land, but there were not lots of sales as people were also able to access land in other ways. However there were undoubtedly more sales in the late 1960s and early 1970s than there would have been (if any) in the 1920s. Gradual processes of land and agricultural commoditisation, which intensified over time, had led to the evolution of a more individualised land tenure system as the ETLR would predict (Chapter Two). Moreover, contrary to Oldaker’s claim that “the average African has no conception of individual *ownership* of land” (1957:p.123, original emphasis), my *wenyeji* informants did have clear conceptions of their ownership rights before villagisation and of the specific nature of those rights in different situations. For example, a woman would regard the land that her husband had given her to use during their marriage as hers and knew that she could give parts of it to her children to use,⁴⁸ whilst simultaneously understanding that her rights were not absolute and that her husband had ultimate authority over her land.

The commoditisation of land was to intensify after 1974 as population pressures increased with villagisation and the concurrent birth of Mafinga town. Yet, at the same time, these two events acted as a major breakpoint in the local land tenure system. As we shall now see, they ushered in a time of transition during which social relations were renegotiated and the balance of political power shifted, as national policies stimulated tensions in the local land tenure system. The events of 1974 thus introduced a distinctly different balance of power over society and over land, over “man-man” and “man-thing” rights and relations.

⁴⁸ Usufruct rights were often indefinite and heritable in Africa (e.g. James & Fimbo 1973:p.29; Gluckman 1965:pp.85-86).

Chapter Five

Kinyanambo in Transition – 1974 to 1992

Villagisation was carried out in Iringa Region in the second half of 1974 as Operation Sogeza (De Vries & Fortmann 1979:p.128).¹ It began in Mufindi District in July 1974 and by October that year most people had moved.² Across Tanzania villagisation “irreversibly altered the spatial organisation of peasants” (McCall 1987:p.193) and Kinyanambo was no exception. It was a dramatic, traumatic event, which has had a profound impact on the land tenure system in Kinyanambo, as elsewhere in Tanzania, acting both to crystallise and intensify existing processes of change and as a catalyst for further change. In this chapter I discuss the events of 1974, the subsequent growth and definition of the village and the birth and growth of Mafinga town, exploring settlement and development between villagisation and 1992 and outlining relevant national policy changes. I then examine changing farming practices, land use and livelihoods in Kinyanambo and address social and political change, before concluding with an analysis of the changing land tenure system during this period of transition.

Villagisation³

The intention of the villagisation policy was that people living in scattered rural locations should be moved closer together to be provided with services. However the idea of village development was not in itself new – agricultural development and settlement schemes had been experimented with in the 1960s, as well as by the colonial government after WW2 and, in the form of sleeping sickness concentrations, in the 1920s and 1930s (Coulson 1982:pp.31-32; Iliffe 1979:p.271; Kjekshus 1996:pp.168-179; Wily 1988:pp.88-89). In his Inaugural Presidential

¹ *Kusogeza* literally means ‘to cause to move’, ‘to push’, although De Vries and Fortmann translate it as Operation Moving (1979:p.128). As one of my informants explained: “*Sogeza* means to come near. It was the time of being pushed within the village, to another house in the same village. *Uhamisho* is moving to another village.” There is no Kiswahili word that directly translates as villagisation.

² The phrase ‘during villagisation’ in reference to Mufindi refers to July to October 1974 throughout this study.

³ For more comprehensive accounts of villagisation see, for example, Coulson (1982:pp.235-271), Hydén (1980:pp.96-155), Kitching (1989:pp.104-124) and Sundet (1997:pp.55-86).

Address on 10th December 1962 Nyerere had argued that Tanzanians would only be able to develop if they lived in villages:

“Unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living...if we do not start living in proper village communities then all our attempts to develop the country will be just so much wasted effort” (1966c:p.184).

Village development was meant to be both voluntary and socialist in nature, involving communal farming and development work within *ujamaa* villages (Coulson 1982:pp.239-240; Nyerere 1968c:pp.351-356; 1979a:pp.32-33). However progress was initially slow, so the policy began to be implemented and planned on a larger scale (Coulson 1982:pp.240-242; Hydén 1980:pp.101-102; Wily 1988:p.98). Intensive efforts by officials led to Operation Rufiji in 1969, Operation Dodoma in 1970 and 1971, and to success in Mtwara Region under the personal direction of the Regional Commissioner, one Dr Klerruu. Dr Klerruu was transferred to Iringa Region in 1971, where he oversaw a rapid increase in the number of *ujamaa* villages, to 650, before being assassinated by a large-scale farmer in Ismani that Christmas Day (Coulson 1979:p.7; 1982:pp.247-248; De Vries & Fortmann 1979:p.128; Hydén 1980:pp.102-103). However, the majority of these villages were “*ujamaa* villages in little more than name and intent” and by the end of 1974, when 98.8% of the region’s rural population had been resettled, the total number of *ujamaa* villages in Iringa Region had dropped to 619 (De Vries & Fortmann 1979:p.128; Graham 1979:p.21; Hydén 1980:p.103).

From 1973 to 1975 villagisation was enforced across Tanzania. Army and government vehicles were available for transport and local people’s militias, established under party supervision in 1971, helped to implement the policy alongside army and national service troops, with salaried officials in every division and ward showing them where to go (Coulson 1982:pp.250-253; Mamdani 1996:pp.175-176; Shivji 1998:p.12; TANU 1979:p.40). Iringa Region was no exception and, within the region, Mufindi District was particularly remembered for its considerable use of force.⁴ Local people’s militias were widely used and the destruction and burning of houses – “the ‘fire weapon’” – and use of lorries to move people were all common in the district, whilst people across the region often found themselves sleeping outside in the cold season of the year (Coulson 1979:p.8; De Vries & Fortmann 1979:pp.131-132). Operation Sogeza is still remembered by many people in Kinyanambo today as a traumatic

⁴ De Vries and Fortmann (1979) carried out fieldwork in Iringa between October and December 1974 and their report of Operation Sogeza fully supports my informants’ accounts of the physical enforcement of villagisation. See also Friis-Hansen (1986:pp.23-25, 34-35). Cf. Yngstrom (1999:p.181), Lwoga (1985) and Wily (1988:pp.150-156) on the use and threat of force elsewhere in Tanzania.

event and most of my *wenyeji* informants' accounts of it were emotionally charged. Their own words convey their experiences best.

"At the time of villagisation I didn't want to move. We were removed [from Kinyiganga Mahameni] to here [present-day Lumwago]. The government came with lorries and put people in the lorries and people were brought here with no houses, so we slept under the trees until we had built ourselves houses, and all the cattle were put together in a fenced area down by the river [Kinyiganga]...I was forced to move. No-one dared to refuse. There were no soldiers, only village and [district] government leaders. There were poles for building houses so these were brought in the lorries too so they could be used for building new houses...The village leaders were against us and not our friends anymore. They didn't speak on the villagers' behalf to stay [in Mahameni] or to be moved in a better way."

"At first I refused to move but the Area Commissioner, Mnyawami, forced me to come [to Kinyanambo] by burning my house at [the nearby area of] Kikombo. He burnt other houses too as others didn't want to leave, he burnt many houses everywhere."

"I moved here [to present-day Gangilonga] at the time of *Sogeza*. We didn't like to move but we were forced so we had to...I moved house myself when I was told to, there were no soldiers...I didn't want to be physically forced so I left when I was told."

"We moved to Kinyanambo from Lumwago Msituni⁵ at villagisation. We chose [present-day] Mugodi as we had cows and it was a good place for grazing, people were few so there was enough space...The government told us to move to be near the hospital and schools...we carried our own things, we were not brought in lorries...People from the district government came to Lumwago Msituni and told us to move. I didn't see them myself but we heard about it so we moved...We were just told to go to Kinyanambo, but we could live anywhere within it."

"The government told us to leave Magunzi. We were forced to move, we didn't decide ourselves. Some houses of people who had refused to move were burnt in Magunzi. They were beaten and their houses were burnt...We chose Makwawa [in Rungemba] because we thought it was easy to go back and farm our farms at Magunzi, but after we left the government planted trees there so we couldn't use our land."


"I liked [present-day] Gangilonga as it was near the water so I chose here...I followed orders. I was not happy but I was forced by the police to move. They had guns and they told me to burn my own house and move, and I did, and the DC⁶ was there. It was war."

These accounts all indicate the extent of upheaval that villagisation caused in old Kinyanambo. The *wenyeji* living in the various Mahameni areas were all moved to the core area of the old village, where the 'new' village was planned – around the junction of the newly-built Tanzam and the Sadani road (see Map 13, p.132), the centre of present-day Kinyanambo A. However there was a degree of choice over where to live within the designated settlement area, so a few of them settled along the Tanzam in what is now Kinyanambo B. Some moved to other villages altogether, like my informant who went to the Makwawa area of Rungemba village, while there were a few newcomers from further afield who moved to Kinyanambo. These newcomers often had relatives in Kinyanambo, or were transferred to work in the new district headquarters or wanted to be near the transport connections, infrastructure developments and

⁵ lit. Lumwago in the forest, the part of Lumwago Mahameni now in Division Three of Sao Hill Forest

⁶ AC Mnyawami. The title later changed to District Commissioner (DC).

Map 13 – Sketch Map of Kinyanambo Village Post-Villagisation



Source – Adapted from Maps 4 and 8

Key

- A Kinyanambo A (from 1974) (main settlement at villagisation)
- B Kinyanambo B (by 1977) (peripheral settlement at villagisation and area of surveyed urban house-plots)
- C Kinyanambo C (from 1982)
- F Village Farm
- G Village Grazing Areas
- S Kinyanambo Primary School
- T Village Tree Farm

economic opportunities that the immediate study area offered. The newcomers were generally allocated previously uncultivated land, whilst the *wenyeji* mostly kept their old farms. However most residents of the new village got house-plots on somebody else's land.

Data from my first survey confirm this picture of people's movements during villagisation. Eight household heads were already living in the area of present-day Kinyanambo A and a ninth was in the area of present-day Kinyanambo B. All nine simply stayed where they were (6% of the 156 household heads surveyed). However 29 household heads physically moved to modern Kinyanambo during villagisation (19% of those surveyed),⁷ of whom 23 came from the various Mahameni places in old Kinyanambo (79% of the 29 villagisation migrants). One of the remaining six came from Kikombo, four from villages near the Mufindi tea estates and one from Ismani in Iringa Rural District. 28 of the villagisation migrants settled in the area of present-day Kinyanambo A and one moved to the Kinyiganga area of present-day Ifingo, just north of Kinyanambo A.

Nine of the 29 villagisation migrants were children at the time and moved with their parents. However 15 of the 20 adult migrants said specifically that they were forced⁸ by the government to move to Kinyanambo and only one of these was not from the old village. The other five gave a variety of reasons for moving to Kinyanambo. The man from Ismani was following a relative and thought Kinyanambo was a good place for farming – he came to get land. Another man came hoping to get work at the planned pyrethrum factory. One woman came with her husband who was looking for land and hoping to get work at TWICO (see below), whilst another came with her husband who was following a relative. Finally, one *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo saw villagisation as an opportunity to get away from his relatives, by moving to a different area within the new village.

My survey data also suggest that villagisation effected a permanent change in settlement for most people in Kinyanambo, as only seven of the 38 household heads who either moved to Kinyanambo during villagisation or were already living in the areas of present-day Kinyanambo A and B have subsequently moved within the village. Three of them moved to different areas within Kinyanambo A, whilst the other four moved to Kinyanambo C. However it

⁷ Table A13, Appendix Four.

⁸ *kulazimishwa*, lit. to be caused to be necessary

is not possible to know how many people moved to Kinyanambo during villagisation and subsequently left the village altogether.

Post-Villagisation Migration and Population Growth

Migration into the new Kinyanambo village continued steadily in the years after villagisation, with migration from outside Mufindi District – almost non-existent before 1974 – much increased. 13% of the household heads in my first survey (21 of 156) moved to Kinyanambo in the late 1970s, after villagisation but before 1980, and a further 13% moved there between 1980 and 1989.⁹ However, only 13 household heads in each group came from places within Mufindi District (62% of each group). Five of the late 1970s migrants and three of the 1980s migrants came from other parts of Iringa Region (including one *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo returning home from Njombe District), whilst the remaining eight 1970s and 1980s migrants came from elsewhere in Tanzania.

Throughout this whole period of transition, migration into Kinyanambo was for a broad mix of social and economic reasons. For example, 71% of the late 1970s migrants (15 of 21) had clear social ties with Kinyanambo. 10 were following a relative, one was following a friend, three were women following their husbands (including one who moved on marriage) and one was the *mwenyeji* returning home. 48% of the late 1970s migrants (10 of 21) had clear economic reasons for their migration. Five were transferred by the government for work in Mafinga (either directly for the government or in parastatal organisations), three came to Kinyanambo hoping to get work in the area (at Mufideco (see below) and the pyrethrum factory), one came to do business and one thought Kinyanambo was a good place for farming. 24% of the late 1970s migrants (5 of 21) also gave as an additional reason for moving to Kinyanambo that they got a house-plot there, in the areas of present-day Idope and Amani in Kinyanambo B.

The pattern in the 1980s was very similar. 71% of the 1980s migrants also had clear social ties with Kinyanambo, including two *wenyeji* returning home from Rungemba, and 48% also had clear economic reasons for their migration. Four of the 1980s migrants moved to Kinyanambo in part because they got a house-plot there, in the areas of present-day Idope and

⁹ Table A13, Appendix Four.

Upendo in Kinyanambo B, whilst a fifth got a cheap place to rent in the Idope area and a sixth, a resident of neighbouring Luganga village, gave getting a house-plot in the Upendo area as their sole reason for moving to Kinyanambo. My survey data suggest, then, that, although social and economic reasons for migration continued to predominate, as they had before villagisation, the reason of getting a house-plot in the village was becoming increasingly important.

A related change lay in the pattern of settlement, which altered with the growth of Mafinga. Whereas before villagisation people were very scattered and settlement during villagisation concentrated in the area of present-day Kinyanambo A, post-villagisation migration concentrated in the areas of present-day Kinyanambo B and to a lesser extent Kinyanambo C. 13 of the 21 late 1970s migrants moved to Kinyanambo B (62% of the group), of whom two later moved on to Kinyanambo C, while a further two migrants moved directly to Kinyanambo C.¹⁰ Two others moved on to Kinyanambo B and C from, respectively, the pyrethrum factory quarters and Kinyanambo A. Among the 21 1980s migrants, 12 moved to Kinyanambo B (57% of the group) and six moved to Kinyanambo C (29%), although one from each area subsequently moved to Kinyanambo A. Only three moved directly to Kinyanambo A and of these two then moved on to Kinyanambo C.

The 1970s and 1980s also witnessed more general population growth in the study area. The total population of Mufindi District increased by 47% between the censuses of 1967 and 1978, from 118,467 people (URT 1969:p.1) to 173,824 people (URT 1978a:p.101), and by a further 32% between the censuses of 1978 and 1988, to 229,304 people (URT 1988a:p.103). In 1978 Kinyanambo was part of the new Mafinga Ward, initially called John's Corner or Wambi Ward, whose population was 15,434 (URT 1978a:p.101), or 9% of the then district total. However no individual village population figures were given for Kinyanambo in the 1978 census and of the 120 registered villages listed as being in Mufindi District at that time neither Kinyanambo, Wambi, Changarawe nor Kitelewasi appears at all (URT 1978b:pp.347-353), even though at least Kinyanambo and Wambi had registered as villages by then and all four villages (plus Itimbo, Rungemba, Sao Hill and Mafinga (later Luganga) villages) were part of John's Corner Ward in 1975.¹¹ The Mafinga Land Use Plan (1986-1996) (MLUP) nevertheless claimed that the population of Kinyanambo in 1978 was 1,458 (IRUPO 1987:p.5).

¹⁰ The main part of Kinyanambo C was not occupied until 1982. However migrants often stayed with relatives or friends until they found somewhere to live and built their own house, which could take several years.

¹¹ Kiswahili document dated 27/11/75 from the Ikonongo Ward Secretary at John's Corner to the TANU Secretary at Mufindi (reference number KM/3/33), titled '*Mipaka ya Vijiji, Kata ya Iko-nongo na John's Corner*' (MDLO).

In Chapter Three I estimated that the population of old Kinyanambo in 1974 was at most 855 people. By 1980 69 of my 156 surveyed household heads were living in Kinyanambo¹² and by extrapolating using the same methodology as for the 1974 population calculation I estimate that a maximum of 2,367 people were living in Kinyanambo in 1980.¹³ This suggests a population increase of 177% and gives at least some indication of Kinyanambo's growth at villagisation and during the 1970s.

The total population of Mafinga Ward grew by 62% between the censuses of 1978 and 1988, to 24,988 people (URT 1988b:pp.260-261). This was split between an urban population of 12,818, which included the population of Wambi village, and a rural population of 12,170, which covered the villages of Kinyanambo, Kitelewasi, Rungemba, Itimbo, Luganga, Sao Hill, Changarawe and Ndolezi (URT 1988b:pp.260-261). Kinyanambo, with 3,136 people in 1988, was by far the largest of these villages (Ibid:pp.260-261). Furthermore, this figure is broadly in line with my own estimate of Kinyanambo's population in 1990. By then 90 of my 156 surveyed household heads were living in the village and by extrapolating in the same manner as previously I estimate that a maximum of 3,192 people were living in Kinyanambo in 1990¹⁴ – an increase of about 35% since 1980 and much less than the more rapid growth of the 1970s.

No firm conclusions can be drawn about Kinyanambo's actual population, nor about its rate of growth, between villagisation and 1990, as questions could only be asked of people still living there and not of those who have died or moved away. However it seems clear from both my survey data and the official census data that this period did see quite substantial population growth. That growth was associated with important processes of urbanisation and development that, in turn, helped to shape the new Kinyanambo village.

Making and Defining the Village

The first leader of modern Kinyanambo was Mama Lucia Seng'owo, who moved there during villagisation from nearby Kikombo. Around 40 years old at the time, Mama Seng'owo had long been active in TANU. She was a member of the pre-villagisation ward development

¹² Table A13, Appendix Four.

¹³ See Note 52, Chapter Three, and caveats in text there. My 1980 figure is calculated using the 1978 Census' average household size for Mufindi District – 4.5 persons (URT 1978a:p.101, tables 1 and 3).

¹⁴ Calculated using the 1988 Census' average household size for Iringa Region – 4.8 persons (URT 1988a.p.25).

committee and had been involved in organising the *ujamaa* village at Kitelewasi. Although she probably led Kinyanambo from August 1974, she was not elected as the first official chairperson of the new village until after it had been registered, in 1975. I was unable to establish exactly when this was, because there was no official record of the village's registration in either Kinyanambo itself or Mufindi District headquarters. However, as Wambi was registered on 15th November 1975 and its village registration number, IR KIJ 115, directly precedes Kinyanambo's number, IR KIJ 116, we can assume that Kinyanambo's registration took place on or shortly after this date.¹⁵


Around this time boundaries were also agreed between the various newly constituted villages in the immediate study area. Official minutes recorded Kinyanambo as being bounded by the Magusi River to the south, the Mgali River to the north, the Nyamalala River to the east and the Kisalawe and Walume hills to the west. However these boundaries are neither precise, geographically accurate nor consistent with those of other villages listed in the same document.¹⁶ For example, Rungemba village, which is directly north of Kinyanambo, is said to be bounded on its southern side by the Msongwe River and not the Mgali River, which is given as the northern boundary of Kinyanambo but is actually south-west of the village. I have therefore estimated the original post-villagisation boundaries of Kinyanambo by drawing on my informants' accounts, as shown in Map 14 (p.138).

The post-villagisation villages were all administered under a new national structure, formalised most notably in the 1975 Villages and *Ujamaa* Villages Act (Coldham 1995:p.231; Thiele 1986:p.543). Development villages controlled land allocation and acted as primary multi-purpose co-operatives, whilst strict *ujamaa* villages also focused on communal production (McCall 1987:p.195; Mpangala 1996:p.53; Ponte 2001:p.86; Sundet 1997:pp.83-84). All adult members of development villages, like Kinyanambo, formed a village assembly which elected a village council of some 25 people to run various committees, including one dealing with land, and which was itself headed by the chairperson and secretary of the TANU (and after 1977, CCM) party branch. The party branch was organised into ten cells headed by *mabalozi*, whose members elected the branch (and hence village) chairperson, albeit subject to district-level party

¹⁵ Interviews with District Co-operatives Officers, 21/2/00, and the Wambi Village Executive Officer, 29/2/00.

¹⁶ Note 11; Pers. coms. with DS, 2000. Confusion over village boundaries was widespread in Iringa Region (DANIDA *et al* 1982b:pp.4.3, 4.7-4.8).

Map 14 – Sketch Map of Kinyanambo Village's Approximate Boundaries in 1974



Source – Adapted from Maps 5 and 8, with reference to Rungemba, Kitelewasi and Kikombo boundary surveys (dated 27/6/89) and Luganga, Ikongosi, Itulavanu, Mtili, Ifwagi and Sawala boundary surveys (dated 24/6/89) (MLSRD)

approval (Bernstein 1981:p.46; Coldham 1995:p.231; Fimbo 1992:pp.39-40; Shivji 1998:p.14; Sundet 1997:pp.85-86; Thiele 1986:p.543; Wily 1988:p.181).

In Kinyanambo, Mama Seng'owo quickly proved unpopular and she was replaced as chairperson by Mzee Jeremias Muyinga in a special election in 1976. However Mzee Muyinga did not stand in the official village elections held across Tanzania in 1977 and instead Marehemu Alois Madendula Mavika, who had previously been the village secretary, was elected chairperson. Marehemu Mavika was then re-elected in 1982 and remained in post until 1987, when one Mzee Juma¹⁷ was elected as the next village chairperson. Kinyanambo was served by several different village secretaries during this period, who from 1978 were all directly appointed by the party's National Executive Committee and, along with the village chairs, were full-time salaried officials (Bernstein 1981:p.46; Thiele 1986:p.543).

By 10th December 1975 a village plan had been drawn up for Kinyanambo which included a school, dispensary, petrol station and marketplace in the residential area at the Sadani Road junction.¹⁸ By 1977 a second school and marketplace had been planned for Kinyanambo B. The original primary school, in present-day Tanganyika, began construction in 1976 and opened on 30th November 1977. One new classroom was built each year until 1980, a sixth was added in 1984 and a seventh only in 1998. The school was also allocated 3ha of *mashamba* and *mabustani* by the village government, used to teach the children about agriculture, raise money for the school and provide food for examination periods (cf. Nyerere 1979b:p.49).¹⁹ However most of the other planned village developments did not materialise.

The 1975 Act required the new village administrations to set up economic enterprises, mobilising rural people "for collective self-employment through communal village projects" in line with Nyerere's *ujamaa* policy (Tibaijuka 1981:p.34; Fimbo 1992:p.40; Thiele 1986:p.548; cf. Nyerere 1968c). However, "the collective spirit" did not automatically emerge in the Southern Highlands (Tibaijuka 1981:p.3). Agricultural activities, especially maize production, dominated village projects, but "the efforts being put into collective farming by individuals" were generally "very modest" (Ibid:pp.12, 28, 35).

¹⁷ Not his real name.

¹⁸ Survey of Kinyanambo Village, Mufindi District (Plan No.E¹⁴530/4, Registered Plan No.17239, dated 10/12/75) (MLSRD).

¹⁹ Interviews at Kinyanambo Primary School, 6/12/99 and 28/2/00.

Despite the many contradictions between my different informants' accounts of the subject, it seemed clear that Kinyanambo did not have a village farm until around 1981-82. My informants remembered that all the villages in the immediate study area had been told by local officials since villagisation that they must have a village farm and Kinyanambo's new leaders made some attempts to achieve this (cf. Friis-Hansen 1986:pp.26, 29-31). However, as one informant explained, "everyone was busy on their own farms at home. Later, after finishing, they farmed the *ujamaa* farms, but the result was bad. I only involved myself for a year as I saw it was not a success". One village secretary was even sacked by the Regional Commissioner in the late 1970s for his failure to establish a village farm, even though such farms were generally neglected across Tanzania (Bernstein 1981:p.58).

It was only when the pyrethrum factory was nearing completion that Kinyanambo began a village farm in earnest, of (probably) at least 32 acres in the Kinyanambo C area, although most of the land was not farmed. The factory initially ploughed the land and maize and pyrethrum were planted. However the maize harvest was low as there was no fertiliser and the pyrethrum crop was limited by a shortage of seedlings. Only a small number of people had been involved during the first year and in the second year only the village chairperson and secretary continued, growing pyrethrum for sale for several more years, with the proceeds distributed among those who took part. Then in 1989 the factory again ploughed the land and provided a small number of seedlings to those farming there, this time individual villagers who kept their own profits. By 1992, however, the Iringa-Mufindi Co-operative Union, whose Nyamalala branch in the Wambi village office was the only organisation buying pyrethrum, was closed down, technically bankrupt, like all other co-operatives in Tanzania (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.17; Booth 1991:pp.16-17; cf. Mbilinyi 1997:pp.21-22), and Kinyanambo's pyrethrum-growing project and village farm finally ceased.

Kinyanambo also had a village shop from around 1979, like the many other villages in Tanzania which started shops because their monopoly position enabled them to raise considerable income (Thiele 1986:p.548), most private shops having closed by the late 1970s as a result of Operation Maduka (Hydén 1980:p.132; Ponte 2000:p.1018; Sundet 1997:p.99). The shop sold basic consumer goods brought by the Regional Trading Corporation and was run from different people's houses over the years. However it closed down in 1991 after losing money and a vendor who had stolen some of the goods was sent to prison. For a while in the 1980s and early 1990s there was also a village butcher. The village obtained a licence and

rented a house for the project, franchising it to an individual man who paid the village for the use of the house and licence and kept all the profits himself. Then there were two village *pombe* clubs, which again moved around different people's houses. The Kinyanambo B club closed down in 1992 when individuals began opening rival clubs, but the Kinyanambo A one remains. Finally, the Kinyanambo CCM women's section, Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (UWT), ran a *pombe* club from shortly after villagisation until 1978 and then a shop from 1977 to around 1990-91, where one of my informants worked. This closed because of competition from the private shops that sprang up with liberalisation and because, after the introduction of income tax on their profits in 1987, the UWT members who owned shares in the shop found that there was too little income remaining to make continuing worthwhile.

Meanwhile, the boundaries of the new Kinyanambo village had shrunk since the village was first registered, as in 1978 Kinyanambo was officially reduced in size, for two reasons. First, a small area in the west of the village was carved off to help create a new village, Ndolezi, which a few residents of Kinyanambo, mostly *wenyeji* from Luang'a Mahameni, moved to. Second, the easternmost part of the village, formerly Magunzi Mahameni and some of Lumwago Mahameni, was taken by the national government for plantation forestry and is now Division Three of the Sao Hill Forest.²⁰ Map 15 (p.142) shows the approximate shape of the village after the boundary changes of 1978.


At the time of these alienations no-one was living in the alienated areas, although many *wenyeji* still had farms there they considered their own. The *wenyeji* with land in the forest area lost their land with its nationalisation but continued to own and harvest any trees they had planted, and do so to this day, as allowed for under the 1957 Forests Ordinance (Cap.389) (although tree-felling itself was only allowed after a big fire in 1984) (James 1971:pp107-110; James & Fimbo 1973:pp.42-45).²¹ However, in the area designated for Ndolezi only the jurisdiction over the land changed and the *wenyeji* with land there thus continued to assert their rights as landowners.

A key influence on Kinyanambo at this time was the birth and subsequent growth of Mafinga. The town was declared during 1974-75 as the administrative headquarters of Mufindi District and all district headquarters' offices and employees were transferred to the immediate

²⁰ According to the Sao Hill Forest Manager (SHFM), none of Kinyanambo's land was taken, only land within neighbouring Itimbo (Interview, 23/2/00). However my informants were adamant that land was taken from both villages.

²¹ Interviews with SHFM, 23/2/00, and District Trade Officer (DTO), 23/2/00.

Map 15 – Sketch Map of Kinyanambo Village's Approximate Boundaries c.1978



Source – Adapted from Map 14

study area from Kibao, contributing to the very rapid population growth of the late 1970s noted above (IRUPO 1987:pp.i, 8). The presence of district headquarters then combined with existing transport connections and infrastructure developments to create continuing economic opportunities that drew more people into the area.


The official declaration of Mafinga as a township did not take place until 30th March 1984. The declaration of the town as a planning area was made under the 1956 Town and Country Planning Ordinance (Cap.378), as was the normal administrative practice in Tanzania (James 1971:pp.103-104; Shivji 1997a:p.6).²² Since the British period the declaration of the creation or extension of town boundaries has been held to extinguish all pre-existing customary rights over land therein on payment of compensation to those affected. However in the mid-1980s it was judicially established that such deemed rights have to be acquired under the 1967 Land Acquisition Act, which allows customary land rights to be extinguished, on payment of compensation for unexhausted improvements, when land is acquired for a public purpose (James & Fimbo 1973:pp.30, 34; James 1971:p.100; Shivji 1998:p.15; Shivji & Kapinga 1998:p.30; Sundet 1997:pp.37-38; Yngstrom 1999:pp.203-204).²³ Residents of a declared urban area then become subject to town planning legislation and have to obtain granted rights of occupancy or else be regarded as squatters (James 1971:pp.100-101; James & Fimbo 1973:pp.30, 34). The law favours the making of grants to those putting land to constructive use, usually the actual occupiers or builders, but land may not be regranted if that does not fit in with the town plan. Furthermore, the law does not oblige "the government to compensate an owner who does not qualify for a regrant", although "there is an obligation on a person to whom the land is subsequently granted to compensate the former owner for unexhausted improvements he succeeds to on the land" (James 1971:pp.101, 106).

As a planned urban development, land within the town boundaries was designated for various uses – residential, commercial, industrial and such like – as set out in the MLUP (IRUPO 1987).²⁴ Residential areas, for example, were to be surveyed into a mixture of low-, medium- and high-density house-plots to avoid unplanned squatter development and poor-

²² Interview with DURPO, 7/2/00.

²³ See Fimbo's careful discussion of the law here, his central point being that Cap.378 is only regulatory and does not extinguish customary land rights *per se* (1992:pp.65-76, 117-118).

²⁴ Map 16 (p.144) shows planned land use in Mafinga in 1986.










MAFINGA LAND USE PLAN (1986—1996)

EXISTING LAND USE

SCALE 1:50,000



LEGEND:

-  TOWN BOUNDARY
-  ROADS / PATHS
-  CONTOURS
-  STREAMS
-  TAZAMA PIPE LINE
-  PLANNED RESIDENTIAL AREAS
-  UNPLANNED RESIDENTIAL AREAS
-  INSTITUTIONAL
-  OPEN SPACE AND CEMETERIES
-  INDUSTRIAL
-  GREEN AREAS
- 
- 

quality housing.²⁵ The areas of present-day Idope, Amani and Upendo in Kinyanambo B were among the first parts of the new town to be surveyed, from about 1977-79, but, although a further residential block was earmarked for present-day Kinanambo, no further surveying was actually carried out until the 1990s (IRUPO 1987:pp.2, 26).²⁶ Nevertheless, the availability of house-plots from around 1980 was a key factor behind the increasing migration into Kinyanambo B noted above and the existence of the planned area triggered its naming as Kinyanambo B, as distinct from the main villagisation settlement at Kinyanambo A. Kinyanambo B's proximity to Mafinga was also important in encouraging settlement there – digging for water standpipes began in the late 1970s and it was nearer the social and economic facilities of the town.

However, not everybody in the Mafinga township was pleased to be part of a town and all that it entailed. For example, the Township (Building) Rules, made under the Townships Ordinance (Cap.101), forbid the construction of temporary or "native" buildings – those made with mud or mud-bricks – without special permission, whilst no development is supposed to take place in a planning area anyway without planning consent (James 1971:pp.103-104; Shivji 1998:p.29).²⁷ In 1978 the local government therefore held public meetings at which they told people about the house taxes and other regulations that would apply (cf. James 1971:pp.103-105, 115) and announced that all those people in Kinyanambo, Wambi and Changarawe who did not want to be part of the town could move to a new village, Ndolezi, just outside the town boundaries (above). However few people took up this offer as the advantages of being part of a town were nonetheless widely felt and by 1988 Ndolezi's population was only 692 (URT 1988b:pp.260-261). Furthermore, many of the township regulations could not realistically be enforced, such as the prohibitions on crop cultivation and livestock-keeping on urban house-plots (James 1971:p.105). In Kinyanambo, for example, a delegation went to the DC to ask for permission to continue farming outside their houses, as they had done in the past because their household rubbish made the land fertile (cf. IRUPO 1987:p.16; Oldaker 1957:p.140). Families who could not afford fertiliser for their other fields were suffering from poor harvests so the DC

²⁵ The standard sizes are 1,250m² for low-density plots, 1,000m² for medium-density (the majority) and a minimum of 700m² for high-density. These sizes apply in undeveloped areas but are varied when plot boundaries are drawn around existing buildings (Interviews with DS, DURPO and DLDO, 18/11/99, 25/11/99 and 2/12/99).

²⁶ Interview with DS, 18/11/99.

²⁷ Interviews with DS and DURPO, 18/11/99 and 25/11/99. Several of my informants who moved to Mafinga in the mid-1970s built their houses in the Idope and Amani areas of Kinyanambo before house-plots were surveyed precisely in order to use the cheaper "native" building materials.

agreed. Building regulations were also difficult to uphold – “it is very hard politically to demolish” a quickly constructed mud or mud-brick house once it is built,²⁸ yet the District Land Office lacked the staff to carry out the necessary development checks to prevent such construction.

Mafinga’s growth was nonetheless hindered somewhat in its early days by an overall hostility to house-building. This stemmed from the stipulation in the Arusha Declaration’s Leadership Code that “no TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others” (Nyerere 1968a:p.249; James & Fimbo 1973:p.381; James 1971:pp.216-217). Nyerere had considered landlords to be in a “class of parasites” (1966a:p.167; James 1971:pp.142-143) and, although restrictions on civil servants and parastatal managers owning rental properties were unofficially relaxed after the 1974-75 food crisis (Coulson 1982:p.198; see below), DC Mkusa, who followed Mnyawami, remained suspicious of anyone building a modern house in Mafinga. Even if it was for themselves, he wondered where they had got the money from, given the high costs and low wages of the time. It was thus only around 1984-86, when a new DC, Mahawa, took over, that construction of modern homes really began to take off in Mafinga.

Meanwhile, life was becoming increasingly difficult for the local cattle-keepers as the population of the immediate study area continued to grow. During villagisation all the cattle belonging to the people who moved to Kinyanambo were put in two fenced-off areas of *mbuga* by the Kinyiganga River, one behind present-day Mugodi, the other behind present-day Lumwago, and their owners were encouraged to live nearby.²⁹ However the fenced-off areas were too small for the numbers of cattle expected to graze there, diseases became common and former management practices and livestock herds gradually declined. In 1975 a few of the people with cattle were allowed to move from the main residential area at Kinyanambo A to an area beyond the primary school, along the old road, where several cattle-keepers who were already living at villagisation had remained and where the village then established a new communal grazing area. Other cattle-keepers loaned their livestock out individually to friends and relatives in Kinyanambo and neighbouring villages, although most eventually died.

By 1982 the overall situation for the cattle-keepers was so bad that one *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo, Mzee Amri Mahanga, who had moved from Magunzi Mahameni to Changarawe at villagisation, decided to seek permission to move to an area big and empty enough for all his

²⁸ Interview with DURPO, 25/11/99.

²⁹ Map 13 refers.

animals, having become particularly unpopular because his sheep and goats were eating other people's crops and food stores. Although his initial request to the ward leaders was refused – having brought all the people to live together they did not want anyone to go off and live separately again – Mzee Amri was then told by the district leaders to choose a new place for himself. He chose the area around the Itimbo road junction, not far from Magunzi Mahameni, which was then uninhabited and uncultivated and was well outside the town boundaries. He was joined by Mzee Israel Mbalinga, by then in Makwawa, whose family had lived in that area before villagisation (Chapter Three), and by others from Kinyanambo and Kitelewasi who wanted space for grazing or had had farms there in the past. By 1986 there were enough people to establish a CCM ten cell and Mzee Amri was elected *balози*. The area was named Kinyanambo C, because the land was part of Kinyanambo village.

The move to Kinyanambo C was partly facilitated by a change in government attitude from the early 1980s. As incentives to private farmers began to be restored in line with the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) (see below),

“it became unofficial policy to permit peasants who had been relocated during villagisation to move back and build houses on their *mahame* (former land holdings) where there were sound agricultural reasons for doing so” (Booth *et al* 1993:p.21; Sundet 1997:p.133; Wily 1988:pp.114, 159-160, 296, 324).

In Kinyanambo, however, Mzee Amri had only been allowed to move with conditions – he was to welcome others with livestock so that there would be many people living together and he was to receive and assist strangers who came to the junction to catch buses down Itimbo road and needed somewhere to sleep while they waited.

The movements of the cattle-keepers after the initial population concentration at villagisation contributed to a gradual spreading out of the village that was not uncommon in Mufindi District. However the movement to Ndolezi was more unusual, because migration between villages was generally due to overcrowding (DANIDA *et al* 1982b:pp.4.5, 4.13). Yet both these changes were directly attributable to Kinyanambo's proximity to Mafinga town, whose presence was therefore central to shaping the new village.

National Policy and Local Development

While modern Kinyanambo was being made and defined as a village in the 1970s and 1980s, the national policy environment was shifting from socialism to liberalism.³⁰ The socialist heyday, the *ujamaa* period that began with the 1967 publication of the Arusha Declaration, was already waning by 1974 and was effectively over by 1977, when Nyerere acknowledged the mistakes that had been made during villagisation (1979b:p.66). However, it was not until the release of the NAP in 1983 that the policy change was indisputable, and publicly so with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement of 1986 (Sundet 1996:p.61; 1997:p.132; Wily 1988:p.110).

Villagisation had occurred at a time of generally poor weather conditions across Tanzania, with a particularly severe drought reducing grain harvests in 1974 to less than half the normal, creating food shortages that were aggravated in many areas by the actual destruction of crops and food stores during the process of physical movement. However, as most people still had to farm to survive they got on with it as best they could, helped by increasing policy emphasis on food production regardless of its form and hence away from communal farming (Coulson 1982:p.257; Hydén 1980:pp.129, 143, 146-147; Kitching 1989:p.117; Sundet 1997:pp.83-84, 87). Producer prices were raised to boost production, whilst a donor-funded National Maize Project introduced and encouraged the subsidised use of improved seed varieties and chemical fertilisers by individual farmers from 1975, hybrid packages having already been introduced on *ujamaa* farms (Bernstein 1981:p.47; Coulson 1982:p.257; Hydén 1980:pp.141-143, 149; Kitching 1989:pp.117-118). Technical assistance and marketing services were extended to food crops like sorghum, millet and root vegetables, whilst in Iringa Region Operation Kilimo, which had immediately followed Operation Sogeza, mandated crop acreages (De Vries & Fortmann 1979:p.132; Tibaijuka 1981:pp.14-18).

“The 1970s were not easy years” and factors such as a massive increase in oil prices, collapsing coffee prices, war with Idi Amin’s Uganda and more poor weather combined to plunge Tanzania into economic crisis during 1979 (Coulson 1982:p.223; Hydén & Karlstrom 1993:p.49; Kitching 1989:pp.117-118; Young 1982:pp.119-121). By early 1980 Tanzania was “in the grip of unprecedented shortages” of both domestically produced and imported food and basic consumer goods, such as salt, sugar, rice, wheat flour, kerosene, cooking oil, pesticides,

³⁰ See Sundet’s (1997:pp.106-190) detailed account of policy-making during this transition.

fertilisers, farm implements, and even clothes (Coulson 1982:pp.223, 311; Booth *et al* 1993:p.59; Mbilinyi 1997:p.16). In response to the deteriorating economic situation, an Agricultural Task Force was set up in 1982 to review policies and propose reforms (Izumi 1999:p.87; Sundet 1997:pp.124-132; Wily 1988:pp.111-117).

From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s “a single marketing channel [had] operated for the major food grains” in Tanzania (Mbilinyi 1997:p.7). Initially this was through state-controlled co-operatives, but in 1975 both primary and regional co-operatives were abolished, the former being replaced by registered villages under the 1975 Act and the latter in 1976 by crop authorities (parastatal organisations that combined marketing, extension work, crop-processing and transportation), although control of marketing was returned to reintroduced co-operatives in 1984 (Bernstein 1981:p.56; Coulson 1982:p.278; Hydén 1980:p.133; Mpangala 1996:pp.50, 53; Sundet 1997:pp.90, 115, 117, 132; Raikes 1986:pp.124-125). Farmers also received producer price supports from the 1970s in the form of official pan-territorial prices, whereby the same prices were paid across Tanzania regardless of production and transportation costs, whilst fertilisers were subsidised and their distribution nationalised (Mbilinyi 1997:p.7; Raikes 1986:pp.122-123; Turuka 1996:p.32).

However, the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of major problems in the state's marketing and distribution networks, including deteriorating physical and transportation infrastructure and the periodic and sometimes continuous shortages of basic consumer goods, at their worst in the early 1980s, when goods could only be obtained (if at all) with political influence or by paying high black market prices (Booth *et al* 1993:p.14; Kitching 1989:p.118; Mpangala 1996:p.54; Ndaró 1992:p.170; Nyerere 1979b:p.44; Raikes 1986:p.105; Sender & Smith 1990:pp.97, 104). Food crops were increasingly traded privately, locally and on the black market, as real producer prices for officially marketed crops declined and distribution problems and shortages pushed up unofficial prices (Raikes 1986:pp.118, 125; Sender & Smith 1990:p.96; Tibaijuka 1981:p.18). In 1984, for example, the official maize price was TSh 2/20 per kilogram while the black market price in Iringa Rural District was TSh 13/= per kilogram (Rasmussen 1986:pp.202-203; Sosovele 1986:p.18). This situation was further exacerbated by falling production nationally in most crops from the late 1970s and, more dramatically, during the early 1980s – although production figures are unreliable and subject to differing interpretations (Bernstein 1981:pp.51-52; Hydén 1980:p.121; Mbilinyi 1997:p.16; Raikes 1986:pp.116, 120; Young 1982:pp.119-121; cf. Chapter One).

The government's response to Tanzania's economic plight required "an ideological somersault", which gradually took place as the political space for reforms widened during the 1980s (Hydén & Karlström 1993:pp.53, 55-56). The Agricultural Task Force's NAP signalled a key shift in policy as commercial farming was encouraged, progressive farmers were allowed to acquire more land and "communal farming ceased to be imposed" (Sundet 1997:pp.133-134, 148; 1996:p.61; Izumi 1999:pp.87-89; Wily 1988:pp.112-113). Meanwhile the 1982 National Economic Survival Programme and the 1984 budget abolished pan-territorial crop prices, effectively legalised the black market in staple grains and adopted devaluation and monetary restraint as policy instruments to tackle Tanzania's high inflation and high real effective exchange rate (Booth 1991:pp.4-5; Booth *et al* 1993:pp.11-12; Hydén & Karlström 1993:pp.49-50; Ponte 2000:p.1018; Turuka 1996:p.33). After Nyerere's resignation in 1985, the government then agreed the 1986-1989 Economic Recovery Program with the IMF (Hydén & Karlström 1993:p.52; Ponte 2000:p.1018). All restrictions on the transport and movement of grain were lifted, with private traders allowed to purchase crops from the co-operatives, the National Milling Corporation and finally individual producers (who preferred their cash up front to the delayed payments of the co-operatives), whilst the government also relinquished its monopoly over the distribution of basic consumer goods (Booth 1991:pp.5-6; Mpangala 1996:p.50; Ponte 2000:p.1019). A follow-up Economic Recovery Program II - Economic and Social Action Program was then agreed from 1989-1992, which liberalised the procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs and began reducing subsidies on fertiliser purchases, and further reforms continued in the 1990s (Ponte 2000:p.1019; Turuka 1996:p.33).

However, national policy changes were slow to filter down to the villages and in Kinyanambo the full impact of liberalisation was not felt until the 1990s. The commoditisation of agriculture and land nevertheless continued during this period of transition, in particular as the gradual urbanisation of the immediate study area brought with it more people and more demand for local goods and services. Yet urbanisation was itself a product of the continuing development of the immediate study area and thus urbanisation, local development and commoditisation were all intertwined. Important pre-villagisation developments were the construction of Mafinga hospital and the Tanzam and the siting of the National Service Camp within Lord Chesham's former land, which brought with them an influx of construction workers and national servicemen and women, some of whom settled permanently in the area, creating a demand for locally produced food and, more remuneratively, alcohol (cf. Mascarenhas

1981:p.11; Tibaijuka 1981:p.18). Mufindi also had a District Development Corporation, Mufideco, which, like all those set up in Tanzania from 1971 onwards, sought to make money from trade and small-scale investments like hotels, farms and petrol stations (Coulson 1982:pp.278-279; DANIDA *et al* 1982b:p.5.29). The district's proximity to the TAZARA railway station at Makambako, which itself was rapidly urbanising (Graham 1979:p.25; IRUPO 1987:pp.8, 18), and its situation on the Tanzam have further encouraged the development of trade and industry. However the main stimuli to local development since villagisation have been the construction of a pyrethrum-processing factory in Kinyanambo and the growth of the district's timber industry.

The Pyrethrum-Processing Factory

By 1974 pyrethrum was no longer widely grown in the immediate study area. Nevertheless, when production went up during the 1960s the government had decided, on the recommendations of both the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization and the Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board's (TPB's) own consultants, that the TEC processing factory in Arusha would not suffice and that a second processing factory should be built in the Southern Highlands, where around 70% of pyrethrum flowers were produced. Possible sites included Njombe town and Matamba in Makete District. However the Mufindi North MP, Hon J.J. Mungai MP, wanted the factory in his constituency and, as one of my informants put it, "he won the case". The contract for the design and construction of the new factory was signed on 15th November 1975 and construction started shortly thereafter. After various delays it finally went into production in 1982, to remain the only big industrial development in the Mafinga township until the 1990s.³¹

The pyrethrum factory was granted some 217.7ha of land in Kinyanambo, including an 82ha residential plot on which 28 staff houses were built and a 125ha industrial plot on which the factory itself, associated offices and a small dam were built. There is also an area of farms which are loaned out to the factory's permanent workers.³² Before the factory was built most of the land had belonged to Mzee Dennis Tonga (Chapter Three) and was mostly covered with *vitindi* trees that he had planted. Mzee Dennis had lived and farmed there before Independence

³¹ Interview at Tanzania Pyrethrum Processing & Marketing Company Ltd (TPPM), 8/11/99. In 1987 in Mafinga there were only "small scale industries for carpentry, garages, a petrol station and 8 milling machines scattered in residential areas" (IRUPO 1987:p.15).

³² Interview at TPPM, 18/11/99; Survey of Mafinga Pyrethrum Extract Plant Plot, Mufindi District (Plan No.E¹⁴336/4, Registered Plan No.18317) (TPPM).

but had already moved to his present house near the Tanzam when it was announced that the factory would be built. The government told him that the land belonged to them, but they gave him TSh 700 in compensation for his trees, which at the time was enough money to buy a simple house.

Several of my informants got jobs at the pyrethrum factory during its construction, for example one operated a cement-mixer while another worked as a messenger, but most of these jobs ended when production began. Skilled newcomers were then transferred to Kinyanambo by the government for permanent jobs at the factory, such as one couple I met who worked there as an electrician and a typist. By 1987 there were a total of 88 such employees (IRUPO 1987:p.15). Other newcomers moved to Kinyanambo in the hope of getting work at the factory. For example, Mama Aneta³³ came in early 1981 to look for work as a typist and, although unsuccessful in this, was given permission to cook and sell food to the workers instead. The construction and presence of the pyrethrum-processing factory therefore created many employment and small business opportunities, although it did not trigger a resumption of pyrethrum-growing in the immediate study area, except to a limited extent (as above) on the village farm (cf. Raikes 1986:p.130).

The Timber Industry

By the time of villagisation there had been only small-scale developments in timber and forestry in Mufindi District, predominantly linked to the conservation requirements of the tea industry. In 1970 one third of the district's area was covered in woods and forests (Chapter Four) and it contained three main forestry projects. The 16,740ha Mufindi Scarp Forest Reserve comprised a mixture of natural forest and planted conifers (Moody 1970:pp.10, 28), the planting of which probably began in 1951.³⁴ At Msiwazi, on the Mufindi Circle Road, there was a saw mill and a 570ha plantation of cypress trees and pines. Finally, the Sao Hill Forest Production Station had access to over 24,000ha within the area enclosed by the Mufindi Circle Road (Conyers 1969:p.14; Moody:pp.28-29), land which was almost certainly part of the area originally alienated to Lord Chesham. A headquarters and "lodging camp" had been built,

³³ Not her real name.

³⁴ Interview with SHFM, 25/11/99.

6,000ha planted with cypress trees and pines and it was planned to plant another 800ha per year until the plantation's output would support a Tanzanian pulp industry (Moody 1970:p.28).

Development of the Mufindi timber industry continued through the 1970s and by 1979 Iringa Region, although containing only 15% of Tanzania's total natural high forest, contained 53% of the country's total plantation forest.³⁵ Development had intensified rapidly after villagisation, and partly by chance – the Norwegian aid agency (NORAD) had allocated aid money to a forestry school in Uganda but had shifted it to the incipient timber industry in Mufindi after Idi Amin came to power in 1971. In late 1975 the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO) began building a saw mill at Sao Hill with the NORAD funds, commencing timber production in 1976,³⁶ and by 1981 a pulp and paper mill, “the largest single industrial project [in Tanzania]...to date”, was under construction at Mgololo (Mascarenhas 1981:p.1). The Southern Paper Mills (SPM) plant was completed in 1985, creating 1,600 new jobs, and remains Tanzania's “only integrated pulp and paper mill” (Newsweek 1999a; Graham 1979:p.22). These developments encouraged further tree-planting in the district and lay behind the expansion of Sao Hill Forest to Division Three, where planting had started in 1979.

Like the pyrethrum factory, the expanding timber industry created plentiful employment and small business opportunities and fuelled migration into the local area. As well as the obvious construction jobs and employment at the various mills, there was lots of tree-planting work for wage labourers such as Mzee Ben,³⁷ who came to work at the main Sao Hill plantation in 1979 after finishing primary school in Kiponzelo. Mzee Ben did not want to remain a wage labourer, though, so he moved to Kinyanambo five months later to train as a carpenter, a skill he continues to earn a living from today. Like the tea industry, the timber industry's workforce also provided a market for local goods and services, something which would become even more important to Kinyanambo in the 1990s. Meanwhile the commoditisation of agriculture was continuing, even as farming practices and land use were undergoing change, and the period 1974 to 1992 witnessed a gradual transition in people's livelihoods as the new Kinyanambo village emerged alongside Mafinga town.

³⁵ Iringa contained 496km² of plantation forest and 2,423km² of natural high forest (over 500m in altitude), out of 935km² and 16,185km² respectively overall (Rodgers *et al* 1985:pp.12-13).

³⁶ Interview at Sao Hill Timber Ltd (SHTL), 23/11/99.

³⁷ Not his real name.

Changing Farming Practices, Land Use and Livelihoods

It is important to stress that Kinyanambo's favourable geographic and economic situation has given the village particular advantages and that, even during the worst hardships of the early 1980s, Kinyanambo villagers – *wenyeji* and newcomers alike – probably suffered less than people in some other parts of Tanzania. Nonetheless, they have still had to adapt their farming practices, land use and livelihoods to post-villagisation life. Tanzanians' real incomes declined dramatically between 1970 and 1984 and, although GDP growth improved in the second half of the 1980s, life in the rural areas remained tough (Booth 1991:p.6; Hydén & Karlström 1993:p.51; Sundet 1997:p.110). Living standards fell because of the high prices and shortages of basic consumer goods and the low prices and delayed payments for officially marketed crops, and because the many new schools, dispensaries and so on that were built across the country during the Arusha decade suffered from falling government spending between villagisation and the mid-1980s such that the new infrastructure was not matched by adequate supplies of desks, school books, drugs and trained staff (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.82-83; Coulson 1982:pp.195-196; Freund 1981:p.487; IRUPO 1987:pp.12-13; Kerner 1988:p.178; Nkhoma-Wamunza 1992:pp.197-198, 202; Nyerere 1979b:pp.44-45; Sender & Smith 1990:p.96). The deteriorating national economic situation was accompanied by the continuing "monetization of the rural economy" (McCall 1987:p.200), increasing the pressure to earn cash. For example, an annual development tax was introduced in 1984 to fund local government, which was especially unpopular in Iringa Region because it was levied on all able-bodied adults, unlike the colonial tax, abolished in 1968, that had been paid only by men (Booth *et al* 1993:p.21, 84-85; Hydén 1980:p.102; Rasmussen 1986:p.191). In addition, village councils were empowered from 1979 to collect and impose various fees and fines (Sundet 1997:p.91).

Fortunately the people of Kinyanambo had available to them a wide range of income-earning opportunities. The *wenyeji* who owned *vitindi* trees found that the population concentration at villagisation boosted their *ulanzi* sales because of increased social drinking, whilst *wenyeji* women specifically benefited from the increased year-round demand for *pombe* that accompanied urbanisation and population growth (cf. McCall 1987:pp.207-208).³⁸ There were also profits to be made on the black market. Iringa Region had been a big maize producer before villagisation and increased production in the mid-to-late 1970s, when subsidised maize

³⁸ *Ulanzi* is only tapped during the rains and is more a drink of the villages.

packages first became more widely available, allowed some of the *wenyeji* to capitalise on national supply-side problems by using their own private channels to market maize (DANIDA *et al* 1982a:p.2.3; Raikes 1986:p.118; Rasmussen 1986:pp.191-192, 202-203). Migrant labour among men then became less common in the study area – low real wages and high inflation made employment less attractive, whilst the maize packages, better transportation facilities and food shortages made farming relatively more profitable (Rasmussen 1986:pp.191, 200). Meanwhile low-salaried government employees could offset their declining real incomes, caused in part by the flourishing private maize trade, by diversifying into agriculture themselves on land loaned by their employers or allocated to them by the Kinyanambo village government. As one of my informants explained (emphasising his honesty because corruption was then so common), “people [transferred] from Dar-es-Salaam found life here was easier as we also farmed...there were other ways of getting money than stealing”. Finally, there were all the possibilities – for employment and wage labour, small businesses and skilled work – arising from the timber industry, the pyrethrum factory and, slightly further afield, the tea industry, from district headquarters, the National Service Camp and the growing town.

However, these income-earning opportunities were not shared equally by all. Women had fewer opportunities as both employment and black market trading were mostly dominated by men (cf. Booth *et al* 1993:p.85), although there were exceptions such as TWICO, which employed lots of women in the 1970s.³⁹ They therefore tended to suffer disproportionately from the hardships of the 1970s and 1980s, having to undertake lower-paid wage labour, for example, or brew *pombe* to meet their cash needs, while at the same time finding time for farming to meet their continuing responsibility for feeding their families (McCall 1987:pp. 200, 207; Nkhoma-Wamunza 1992:pp.198-199). Women without husbands to lend some financial support were particularly hard pressed and often relied on their children or other relatives for remittances. For example, after her husband died in 1976, Mama Yustina's⁴⁰ eldest son went to work at the Urafiki textiles factory in Dar-es-Salaam, sending her money for the next 15 years to pay for his siblings' education.

Other people, particularly middle-aged and older people, became or returned to being primarily farmers during these difficult years. Mzee Tomas (Chapter Four), who moved to

³⁹ Interview at SHTL, 23/11/99.

⁴⁰ Not her real name.

Kinyanambo at villagisation, took up farming when his construction job at the pyrethrum factory ended, despite his previous long history of employment. Mzee John (Chapter Four), a *mwenyeji* with a similarly long employment history, left his job at the pyrethrum factory in 1982 when his widowed mother asked him to help run his stepfather's milling machine. However, their business ceased when the cost of spare parts became prohibitive and he returned again to farming. Mzee Maiko (Chapter Four), who had been away from Kinyanambo since the early 1970s, returned home in the late 1970s, a victim of theft, corruption and the anti-capitalist business climate of the time, to become a full-time farmer. Yet just as these men were coming to depend on agriculture, villagisation and urbanisation were having important effects on local farming practices and land use and thus on people's ability to farm as they had done in the past.

Before villagisation people's farms had tended to be near their houses, although plots were often scattered and *mbuga* and *vinyungu* were not always immediately nearby. As a result, most of the *wenyeji* – those from the various Mahameni areas – kept most of their land at villagisation, simply having their existing landholdings “given” to them, or, rather, confirmed, by the village government. However some of the minority who lived in the old core area had land taken from them for the incomers to build houses, newcomers and *wenyeji* of Mahameni alike. House-plots were allocated or confirmed by the village government in the main settlement area, whilst *mashamba* and *vinyungu* were paced out and allocated to the newcomers. These new farms were either fairly close to the village centre, in the *mbuga* by nearby rivers which had previously been uncultivated and used for grazing, or on various other uncultivated bits of land. Land was also set aside for a village farm and several communal grazing areas were established (as above), whilst a 2.25-acre village tree farm was started at the back of present-day Tanganyika around 1977-78, from which trees were being sold by 1991. In the late 1980s small individual plots were then allocated at the back of present-day Kinanambo for people to plant their own trees (cf. IRUPO 1987:p.1).

After villagisation, and in light of the 1974-75 food crisis in Tanzania, the Kinyanambo *wenyeji* were thus allowed to continue farming their old land. Operation Sogezha had begun at harvest time and, so long as they returned each night to sleep in the new village, they were allowed to harvest their crops in Mahameni and plant again in their old farms. This was feasible for most *wenyeji* in the short term and helped to minimise the disruption to food production in Kinyanambo at this time. However, as the new village became more established, many *wenyeji* ceased farming the land that was furthest away from their new homes and sought new farms

nearby, because the increased travelling time to more distant fields, a burden particularly felt by women, reduced the actual time available for farming (cf. McCall 1987:pp.201-203; Raikes 1986:p.112; Rasmussen 1986:p.200).

Apart from these changes – and the gestures towards communal farming and introduction of subsidised maize packages – agriculture was also changing in other ways. In the late 1970s traditional crops and methods still dominated across Tanzania (Kitching 1989:p.122; Nyerere 1979b:p.53) – the so-called *kilimo duni*, low-input, low-output agriculture – and by 1980 maize, beans, peas, Irish and sweet potatoes, and sunflowers were all still grown on the Mufindi Plateau, with irrigation (for vegetables) and oxen only used by a fifth and a tenth of all smallholders respectively (DANIDA *et al* 1982b:p.5.7). The most profitable crop in Iringa Region then was Irish potatoes, on which some farmers used chemical inputs, having first learned to use them on maize. However maize accounted for three quarters of all the region's land under annual crops in 1979 and land use in the highland areas had effectively changed during the 1970s “from a system providing food security by diversifying into many crops, to one which secures food by intensifying into maize” (Rasmussen 1986:p.199).

Cattle-keeping was gradually declining in Kinyanambo during this time (as above), continuing to be beset by disease and low dipping and vaccination levels,⁴¹ although small numbers of sheep, goats, pigs and chickens were still kept by many families across the region (DANIDA *et al* 1982b:pp.5.26, 5.28-5.33). Small boys and girls were no longer able to graze cattle or help with farming after the introduction of universal primary education and women increasingly began to hire wage labourers instead – often young men and women who had moved into the immediate study area looking for work – especially as their own husbands took up new employment, skilled work and business opportunities (cf. Friis-Hansen 1986:p.51; Mascarenhas 1981:p.10). This was facilitated by a decline in the official hostility to the hiring of agricultural wage labour set out in the Arusha Declaration, although leaders had been more constrained than ordinary people and seasonal labour more tolerated than permanent labour (Coulson 1982:p.183; James & Fimbo 1973:p.381; Nyerere 1968c:pp.342-344; Sundet 1997:p.47; Wily 1988:p.210).

At a more fundamental level, over the longer term, post-villagisation agriculture has been marked by “less fallow, lower yields and land degradation” across Tanzania (McCall

⁴¹ Interview with DALDO, 24/11/99.

1987:p.199; Booth *et al* 1993:p.25).⁴² The concentration of people increased the pressure on land nearest the new villages, causing a decline in long fallowing (to forest or bush) (Mohamed 1989:p.3; Raikes 1986:p.111; Rasmussen 1986:pp.199-200), which was significant in Kinyanambo because it had been such a longstanding practice there. It also meant that people's landholdings were no longer sufficient to permit full rotation of land usage (Mohamed 1989:pp.29-30), particularly those who had land taken away from them at villagisation. Moreover, long fallowing became politically very difficult as the increased demand for land arising from sustained population growth made it hard for the village government to allow some people to keep big landholdings ostensibly unused while others had an immediate need of land on which to grow food. One present-day hamlet chairman explained the change well:

"In the past, one person could own a very large piece of land...and not use it all. But now the government [*utawala*, lit. state] says that land belongs to the nation, so no-one can own a large area and not use it...The government says there is no use of someone owning a large area and not using it when others are starving as they have no land, so the village government checks that land is used, and if not they can take it and give it to others, and they do".

It was thus no longer prudent for the *wenyeji* to practice long fallowing if they wished to retain their land, even if they had enough land to do so. Short fallowing (for one or two years) was allowed, though, and superseded long fallowing in Mufindi District by the early 1980s (Mohamed 1989:pp.2-3, 30).

A related problem after villagisation was that people were no longer able to expand their landholdings as they saw fit. Mzee Jeremiah⁴³ resented villagisation precisely because of this. He was a young man, already living in the area of present-day Ilope at villagisation, who was given 3 acres of *mashamba* and 1 acre of *vinyungu* by the village government. Although he had actually been farming a smaller area before villagisation, his aim had been to enlarge his landholdings over time to enable him to fallow and rotate his farms. As he complained: "I was stopped in my plan when others came and the land was divided to them". Yet those newcomers could also not expand their landholdings as they might have done in the past.

The main consequence of reduced fallowing was a steadily increasing need for chemical fertilisers or manure to boost land productivity (Friis-Hansen 1986:pp.141-143; Mohamed 1989:p.30; Raikes 1986:p.108). Yet just as people came to rely more on imported chemical inputs – manure supplies having fallen as cattle-keeping declined – distribution

⁴² See also Friis-Hansen (1986) on villagisation's impact on land use and farming practices in the Southern Highlands.

⁴³ Not his real name.

problems increasingly affected their availability and price. In villages near towns, like Kinyanambo, heavy input use remained worthwhile because markets were readily to hand, but the poorer people who could have benefited most had the greatest difficulty buying inputs at the appropriate seasonal times (Booth *et al* 1993:p.64; Rasmussen 1986:p.197). Limited knowledge about input use posed a further problem as people in the Southern Highlands often used insufficient amounts of chemical fertilisers to sustain high yields for long periods of continuous cultivation (Mohamed 1989:p.17; cf. Turuka 1996:p.33). Overall, then, it is not surprising that my informants consistently reported that maize yields had fallen “since villagisation”, especially since the end of the 1970s.⁴⁴

Social and Political Change

As well as affecting farming practices, land use and livelihoods, villagisation and the birth of Mafinga town also marked fundamental social and political change – in the visible disempowerment of the *wenyeji* elite of old Kinyanambo, both wealthy farmers and *wenyeji kabisa* with first right over land. In their place came younger and better-educated newcomers – in particular, the “literate functionaries” who had gradually been gaining power since Independence (Feierman 1990:pp.22, 237-239). Thus, although education and wealth accumulation both continued as channels of social differentiation in post-villagisation Kinyanambo, the former, as manifested in the bureaucratic class, became much more important, with wealth accumulation only gradually returning to prominence after the onset of economic reform.

In pre-villagisation Tanzania wealthy farmers had generally been “rare and politically weak”, tending only to be found in areas, like Iringa Region, where capitalism – the commoditisation of agriculture and land – was entrenched (Iliffe 1979:p.463; Bernstein 1981:p.59). In such places it was not uncommon for them to have held power locally, even after the Arusha Declaration, as they did in old Kinyanambo.⁴⁵ However, whilst some observers have claimed that villagisation generally left dominant local elements in place, particularly where they had good connections to the party and state (e.g. Freund 1981:p.494; Kerner 1988:pp.170-171;

⁴⁴ That harvests were bigger in the past is also suggested by the fact that maize is no longer kept in outdoor stores (*mastoo*), but instead in smaller sacks (*magunia*) and tins (*madebe*).

⁴⁵ See also Van Hekken and Thoden Van Velzen (1972:pp.108-113) on Rungwe District in the 1960s and Sender and Smith (1990:pp.110-113; cf. Feierman 1990:pp.194-195) on the Usambaras in the 1970s.

Yngstrom 1999:pp.182-183), the realities of power relations depended on the particular local circumstances (cf. Bernstein 1981:pp.59-61). In Kinyanambo the power of the *wenyeji* elite was waning by the time of villagisation and the events of 1974 thus marked a symbolic breakpoint with the past – reinforced by the post-villagisation abolition of the co-operatives and the earlier decentralisation reforms of 1972 that replaced district councils with district development councils and devolved executive powers to regional governments, co-operatives and district councils having long been dominated by wealthy farmers and other local elites (ibid:p.56; Fimbo 1992:pp.37-38; Hydén 1980:pp.133-134; Sundet 1997:p.98).⁴⁶

In Hydén's words, villagisation showed up a "definite antagonism between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty-capitalist farmers and other local petty-bourgeois elements, on the other" (1980:p.107). He argues that wealthy farmers had not generally been seen as exploiters by their poorer neighbours but instead were considered to have earned their wealth by being more willing to take risks and modernise agriculture, like Kinyanambo's Mzee Maiko (ibid:p.113). If elected as leaders it was because they seemed well qualified or better able to deal with state officials (Hydén 1980:pp.114, 122, 133; Van Hekken & Thoden Van Velzen 1972:pp.46-47). They also gave back to their communities, supporting their kin and, like Mzee Maiko, helping others to develop their own livelihoods (Hydén 1980:pp.113, 117).

After Independence a division emerged across rural Tanzania between elected TANU chairs – people like Mzee Maiko, firmly rooted in local politics – and centrally-appointed TANU secretaries (Feierman 1990:pp.238-239). At the same time, the party/state, as an institution, was becoming much stronger. TANU secretaries at sub-district level had been paid from the late 1950s and after Independence these party officials were made formal administrators, their salaries increased and their status, especially at ward and division level, raised against people in elected positions (Coulson 1979:p.12; 1982:p.254; Hydén 1980:p.177; Iliffe 1979:p.558). They became more influential than elected village level officials, such as *mabalozi*, in terms of accessing resources from the state and they were able to draw on regional development funds, created in 1967, to strengthen themselves against the patronage of the *wenyeji* elite (Coulson 1979:pp.12, 323-324; Hydén 1980:p.108). This all helped to offset the fact that the appointed officials, drawn from among the better-educated and increasingly younger "literate functionaries"

⁴⁶ See Sundet (1997:pp.76-79) for a brief overview of decentralisation.

(usually men), were often not from the immediate area (Feierman 1990:pp.154-155).⁴⁷ It was these appointed officials who then carried out villagisation against the wishes of the *wenyeji*, demonstrating clearly that they were “not our friends anymore” (above) and, in so doing, symbolically destroying the power of the *wenyeji* elite.

Meanwhile, decentralisation (involving the posting of ministerial and technical staff to regional and district offices and of full-time agricultural extension and rural development staff directly to villages) had, along with the post-Arusha growth of the parastatal sector, resulted in a “proliferation of state functionaries” – a massive increase in the size of the bureaucratic class (Freund 1981:p.491; Feierman 1990:p.240; Hydén 1980:p.170; Kitching 1989:p.107; Shivji 1998:p.22). In 1975 and 1976, however, as many as one-fifth of all government employees, mostly junior staff, were retrenched (Freund 1981:p.495; Hydén 1980:p.170; Nyerere 1979b:p.63). The “vast majority” of these people “returned to their land and got absorbed in peasant farming” (Hydén 1980:p.170), where they formed a pool of educated, committed party members from among whom the new village leaderships emerged. The elections in 1977 and, even more so, in 1987 thus saw more younger, better-educated people winning leadership positions across Tanzania (Ibid:pp.137-138; Wily 1988:pp.188-189; cf. Sundet 1997:p.101). For example, Mzee Alfonse,⁴⁸ then only around 25 years old, was elected to the Kinyanambo village council in 1977, having just returned home following retrenchment from his job as an agricultural extension worker near Makambako. Mzee Juma (above), a newcomer from Tanga Region who had been employed in Mafinga, at Mufideco and then at what later became the National Microfinance Bank, stayed on in Kinyanambo after retrenchment from the government in the late 1970s, running an off-licence, making furniture and farming, and became village chairperson in 1987 when he was still only in his thirties.

The changes marked by villagisation were most clearly visible to people like Mzee Maiko who, on his return to Kinyanambo in 1977, found the village a very different place – one where younger, better-educated party people held power without reliance on the more traditional authority that derived from first right. Yet the *wenyeji* did continue to wield social and political influence after villagisation, albeit not always in formal or obvious ways. For example,

⁴⁷ The civil service was increasingly becoming a national service, although the deliberate policy of transferring staff around the country (to prevent the build up of ethnic tensions and local patronage bases) was more relevant at district and regional levels (Feierman 1990:p.224; Hydén 1980:p.178; Van Hekken & Thoden Van Velzen 1972:p.124 (Note 20); cf. Iliffe 1979:p.558). My whole argument here draws heavily on Feierman (1990:especially Chapter 9).

⁴⁸ Not his real name.

the young chair of the village land committee during the late 1970s and 1980s, himself closely related to one of the main *wenyeji* clans, found it prudent to go and talk to the *wenyeji* to persuade them of the need to give up their land for newcomers, rather than simply taking it without their consent. Furthermore, although I was offered various plausible reasons for Mama Seng'owo's unpopularity as village chairperson, the most common was that she was not a *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo. Her immediate successor, Mzee Muyinga, was a *mwenyeji* from the most senior Wahehe clan, whilst Marehemu Mavika who followed, though originally from nearby Wasa, was at least already living in old Kinyanambo at the time of villagisation.

Before villagisation the *wenyeji kabisa* had lived alongside the various newcomers who were gradually moving into old Kinyanambo. However after villagisation these two groups coalesced into one coherent *uenyeji* group, which I call 'the *wenyeji* group' – their common denominator being that they had all lived in old Kinyanambo. A second *uenyeji* group then emerged, which I call 'the *wenyeji* of villagisation time'. These were the newcomers of villagisation, the late 1970s and the 1980s. Although less coherent as a group, they have in common that they were all newcomers *vis-à-vis* the *wenyeji* group, yet by the time of my fieldwork they had established themselves socially and politically in the modern village. Some of these newcomers were employees, transferred to the immediate study area by the government, of whom some subsequently took up their own skilled work or small businesses. Others, often those with pre-existing social ties to Kinyanambo, came looking for work, and sometimes land, and took up wage labour, skilled work, small businesses or farming. Thus, although all villagers were allocated land for farming, the *wenyeji* of villagisation time generally tended to have less agriculturally-rooted livelihoods than the *wenyeji* of old Kinyanambo, albeit that this was very much a function of their generally better education and relative youth.

Meanwhile, the nature of wealth accumulation as a channel of social differentiation was also changing. Access to land, which anyway had not usually been a problem for anyone in old Kinyanambo, continued to have little bearing on social differentiation (cf. Booth *et al* 1993:pp.35, 71). However, as elsewhere in rural Tanzania, livestock ownership and crop and livestock output were increasingly joined by off-farm earnings and remittances – hence access to wage labour, skilled work, business opportunities and employment – as important sources of wealth accumulation and markers of social differentiation (Ibid:pp.35-36; cf. Sender & Smith 1990:pp.43-44; Wily 1988:pp.211-216). Thus in Iringa Region, whereas large-scale farmers mostly suffered from rising costs during the economic reforms of the 1980s, urban business

people, benefiting from the liberalisation of imports and local trading, became a new wealthy elite (Booth 1991:pp.7, 9-10, 20).

In Kinyanambo many of the *wenyeji* gradually became relatively poorer after villagisation – suffering from both the decline in their livestock herds and the decreasing access to employment and skilled work that resulted from their more limited education as compared to the *wenyeji* of villagisation time. At the same time, the increasing monetisation of the economy combined with population growth to fuel the commoditisation of land in the immediate study area. Pressure mounted on the *wenyeji* to sell their land, as *kilimo duni* and falling yields from the villagisation- and urbanisation-induced changes in farming practices and land use made asset sales a more promising source of cash than agriculture itself. The beneficiaries were to be found among the *wenyeji* of villagisation time, as well as the people from Mafinga (and other outsiders), who had the off-farm income to invest more profitably in agriculture and who have steadily been acquiring village land.

The Land Tenure System in Transition

The evolving land tenure system in Kinyanambo was influenced in three key ways during the period of transition between 1974 and 1992. First, the strengthening and increased visibility of the link between land tenure and land use – one of the most significant effects of villagisation across Tanzania – altered the *wenyeji*'s understandings of their land rights. Second, villagisation and the birth of Mafinga undermined their longstanding authority over land. Third, processes of urbanisation, population growth and liberalisation continued the commoditisation of land.

Although it has only become of significance to most Tanzanians since villagisation, the link between land tenure and land use is conceptually deep-rooted in national land tenure policy (Chapter One) and it is helpful to explore its development a little further here. Since the very beginning of the colonial period, alienated land held by non-African settlers had been subject to development conditions and from 1926 Africans were subject to a raft of native authority agricultural and land use by-laws and regulations, of which we saw some examples in Chapter Four (Fimbo 1992:p.32; Mamdani 1996:p.124). From the 1950s general legal powers to regulate and control agriculture were extended in turn to district councils, district development councils and ward development committees (Fimbo 1992:pp.34-35, 38-39). However, the use of

by-laws and regulations then relaxed somewhat after Independence because they had been such an unpopular aspect of colonial rule. Although they were widely revived after the 1974-75 food crisis, their use generally decreased again after the launch of the NAP, which had prescribed extensive land use planning that was little implemented (Ibid:p.41; Hydén 1980:p.124; Izumi 1999:pp.87, 101-103; Sundet 1997:pp.63-64, 144, 150; Wily 1988:p.114).

Nyerere had taken the view that, because Tanzania's economy was dependent on land, the government had "to see to it" that land was used "for the benefit of the whole nation", to ensure that the country produced "enough food and enough cash crops for export" (1968a:p.247). He therefore argued that a person should be given land with instructions laid down "to be followed by him [sic] in using and maintaining that land", but added that he should not then "be interfered with in his right to use that land" (1966b:pp.56-57). The seeming contradiction arose because "other citizens" had "the right to make regulations" governing land use – because land belonged to the nation (Ibid:p.57).

Nyerere further argued that before colonialism

"land was always recognized as belonging to the community. Each individual within our society had a right to the use of land, because otherwise he [sic] could not earn his living and one cannot have the right to life without also having the right to some means of maintaining life. But the African's right to land was simply the right to use it: he had no other right to it, nor did it occur to him to try and claim one" (1966a:p.166).

Of course land rights had not been quite so straightforward (Chapter Four), but Nyerere nonetheless claimed that the "traditional African custom of land holding" was for "a member of society" to be "entitled to a piece of land on condition that he uses it" and he wanted land policy to reflect this (1966a:p.167). He also considered it to be a "vital" part of that tradition that "a man [sic] will return his land to the public immediately he stops using that land", whether because he could not use it or did not want to (1966b:p.57).

After Independence a land tenure "machinery conducive to land utilization and to penalising the non-user of land" was therefore created, based on the principles that security is dependent on use and that land is not commercial (James 1971:pp.169, 209). In Tanzania people who are allocated land but do not develop it forfeit their legal rights to it, whilst in cases of double allocation "the land belongs to the one who first developed it irrespective of whether he [sic] was allocated the land last in time" (James & Fimbo 1973:p.86). Nevertheless, it had become legally accepted by the time of villagisation that, where individual ownership of land had evolved, security of tenure did not in fact rest on cultivation and use, and that the use condition was more important in areas of land shortage without recognised individual ownership

(Ibid:p.560). Moreover, in places like Kinyanambo, where land was owned and was not scarce before villagisation, national land tenure policy had anyway meant little in practice.

Villagisation brought matters to a head, for three main reasons. First, once people were living closer together, and their farms were not all far from the village centre, their farming practices became easier to control (Friis-Hansen 1986:p.32; McCall 1987:p.210; Sundet 1996:p.60). Regulations that made little agricultural sense could be overturned, such as the prohibition on farming on house-plots (as above), but local government orders generally became harder to avoid. Second, the stipulation that people had to use their land in order not to lose it altered longstanding fallowing practices (as above), with tangible implications for agricultural productivity in Kinyanambo. Third, and most importantly, despite the long-term trend towards the state control of land use, villagisation made starkly visible that security of tenure rested both on use and on the will of the state and it therefore opened the *wenyeji*'s eyes to the changed nature of their rights to land. As Wily puts it, post-Independence policies had

"confirmed the radical title of land in the hands of the state, and demonstrated its ability to co-opt land at will and direct its use. Villagization brought the realities of this power directly and fully to every small farmer in the country" (1988:p.106).

However it was still a long time before the *wenyeji*'s new understanding was complete. As one of my informants put it, the *wenyeji* saw first that "land now belongs to the people as a whole [*uma*] and not to individuals". Then later, "after people were living together, when there were many people, the government said no-one could keep land without using it" and they saw that "if land was left unused it was taken and divided to others". One *mwenyeji* spoke eloquently about the impact of villagisation on him:

"I can't use my land now because the others have built houses. They were given my land to farm and build houses on...It was my land, and if I wanted to plant trees or farm it and let other land rest then I could...It was my land because I had planned to use it, to rotate my farms... Then people were put in the places I was using, for trees and for farming, and the places I wasn't using, which were resting, and I could no longer rotate my land as I had planned.

"The Area Commissioner supervised villagisation and his workers told people where to build houses...[but] they didn't know if the new place was someone else's fields, they were just told to put people in a place... The newcomers didn't want to move. They had to leave good fields and build new houses...I said nothing as it was government policy...I wasn't angry with the newcomers as I knew they were forced to move...I didn't say anything because nothing could be done, but I was unhappy that they took my land."

My informant had therefore acquiesced in the changes of villagisation, having understood the way things were, but this conflicted with his own notion of what was right and just, as it still does today.

As well as forcing a re-evaluation of their land rights, villagisation and the birth of Mafinga also directly challenged the *wenyeji*'s authority over land, especially over its allocation, as they had remained powerful in land matters up until then. Yet there has been much confusion in post-villagisation Tanzania over who has legal authority over land. After Independence elected village (and then ward) development committees carried out land allocation, but appointed district and ward officials played an important advisory and oversight role (Awiti 1973:p.35; James & Fimbo 1973:pp.77-78), whilst control over land use policy gave higher-level officials influence too. At villagisation land was then placed under the control of the elected village councils, although in practice decisions over land were taken "by its land committee or, more usually, by its office-bearers" (Coldham 1995:pp.231-232; Shivji 1996:p.6). The 1975 Act, and the Directions that went with it (G.N.168 of 22nd August 1975), stipulated that district development councils were to allocate land to the villages and village councils were then to allocate land to individual villagers (Friis-Hansen 1986:pp.28-29; Shivji 1998:p.14; Sundet 1996:p.60; 1997:p.97; Yngstrom 1999:p.204). The Act provided for all adult members of a village to be allocated land, although in practice across Tanzania land allocation was done by family, with male household heads getting the family land and only women who were widows or unmarried mothers, for example, getting land easily in their own right (Koda 1999:p.6; McCall 1987:pp.205-206; Wily 1988:pp.293-294). Village councils had vested in them

"rights to expropriate, reserve and reallocate individually held land; to establish communal plantations and control the income thus generated; to restrict or ban certain land uses in any part of the Village territory via "orders" and "by-laws" which threaten fines; and finally to arbitrate in local disputes" (Von Oppen 1996:p.99).

Yet it was not specified which land laws applied in the new villages (although most people assumed the continuation of customary law), nor how district development councils were to acquire the land to give to villages in the first place, whilst village councils were also often subjected to orders and directions on land from above (Shivji 1998:pp.14-15; Sundet 1996:p.60; 1997:p.97; Yngstrom 1999:p.204).

As Sundet puts it, villagisation

"went ahead without paying any regard to the legal aspects of tenurial rights. Farmers were forcibly moved away from their lands without their rights being legally extinguished. And the land they moved onto had not been legally appropriated and was often the legal property of other dispossessed farmers" (1996:p.60).

Although the 1967 Land Acquisition Act allowed land to be acquired for public purposes (as above) and the 1973 Rural Lands (Planning & Utilization) Act, intended to facilitate villagisation, allowed specified areas to be declared for development, in no part of the country were the legal

anomalies of villagisation resolved (Shivji 1998:pp.13-15; Sundet 1997:p.96; Yngstrom 1999:p.204).⁴⁹ Moreover, "it was widely taken to be true" at the time of villagisation "that all village land had become communal ownership [sic] of the village" and that local administrations were effectively "at liberty to allocate land at will" (Sundet 1997:pp.97, 103). Yet it was not clear whether the new villages owned land on behalf of villagers or the state and, even when village council powers were not used, their very existence affected how people perceived their land rights (Von Oppen 1996:p.99; Wily 1988:pp.108-109, 297). In Kinyanambo the inclusion of part of the village's land within Mafinga's boundaries further confused matters. For example, about 2018ha within the town boundaries were planned for later urban use, until which time farming was temporarily allowed but no ownership rights were to be conferred (IRUPO 1987:p.27).⁵⁰ Farms allocated from this area by the village government could therefore easily be taken later for the town, making the temporary rights of those farming there (some of whom did not realise that their rights were so temporary) very insecure indeed.

Regardless of the legal position, however, the events of 1974, in clearly demonstrating that the state now had power over land, visibly undermined the *wenyeji*'s previous authority over land. Yet the state's power was nevertheless constrained by local perceptions of what was right and just, ensuring that those with first right over land could not be ignored. Compare the following accounts from two of my informants:

"At villagisation many people came to this area...the newcomers went to the village office and were shown where to live and where to farm."

"People were told to come to Kinyanambo but the government didn't tell them where to build, they just brought people in lorries to the general area...They asked the *wenyeji* to show the newcomers where to build and where to have farms."

Thus, although newcomers were given land by the village government, it was in practice the *wenyeji* who were called on to show them which areas were available, not least because they all had to live together harmoniously in the new village.

Another way in which the *wenyeji* retained influence in land matters was through their direct incorporation into the government (cf. Chapter Four). Thus Mzee Amri allocated land in Kinyanambo C to the people who settled there after him in his capacity as first *balози* of the

⁴⁹ Many villagisation related cases began to be filed in the 1980s as liberalisation, continuing agricultural commoditisation and the launch of the NAP brought legal problems to prominence. Legislation in 1992 (the Regulation of Land Tenure (Establishment of Villages) Act) sought to clarify matters by extinguishing prior customary rights but was declared unconstitutional in 1994. The validity of land allocations made as a result of villagisation was thus not confirmed until the 1999 Village Land Act (Izumi 1999:pp. 118-120; Mvungi & Mwakyembe 1996; Shivji 1998:pp. 16-18, 33; Sundet 1996:pp.61-63, 70; 1997:pp.130, 140-142, 204-207, 251; URT 1999b, Part IV, Section 15).

⁵⁰ About 810ha were planned "to be fully exposed to agricultural use" and in those areas "owners may be given rights of occupancy if the need to do so arises" (IRUPO 1987:p.27).

area, showing them where to build and where to graze livestock and farm, although many were simply allocated their former landholdings. Other *wenyeji mabalozi* served on the village land committee. Mama Maria,⁵¹ who moved to Kinyanambo by herself in 1978, recounted that in 1979 the village government called all newcomers without farms to come to the village office, from where they were taken by the chairperson and three *wenyeji mabalozi* committee members to be shown the areas of *mashamba* and *mabustani* which they were being given.

Arguably, then, and despite their visible disempowerment (as above), the *wenyeji* continued to have an important role in land matters after villagisation. Yet villagisation marked a breakpoint in the local land tenure system because it pushed their former power and authority – by virtue of first right – explicitly out of the official legal sphere and into the realm of unofficial, yet officially sanctioned, socially legitimate practice. The *wenyeji mabalozi* gave out land as *mabalozi*, not as *wenyeji*, but it was as *wenyeji* that their power to allocate land was considered socially legitimate. The situation after villagisation can therefore be simultaneously understood as both local government – bureaucratic class – acceptance of the strength of *wenyeji* claims to power over land, that is, acceptance of their social legitimacy, and as the *wenyeji*'s acceptance of the new political reality and establishment of their place within it.

At the same time, the commoditisation of land was continuing to affect the evolving land tenure system in Kinyanambo. Initially after villagisation there was a hiatus in all payments for land. Although in theory people who had lost their land could have claimed government compensation for cultivated fields or houses that were destroyed, “very few of that minority of peasants who were required to leave houses made of cement blocks, or with a *bati*^[52] roof which could not be removed” received any money (Nyerere 1979b:p.66; Coulson 1982:p.221). Holders of deemed rights to land were legally eligible for compensation on alienation. However, as Shivji points out, although “the relation between the holder of a granted right and the state was largely contractual”, a deemed right was “a *permissive* right”, held “with the implied permission or consent of the Governor” and, later, the President (1997a:p.5, original emphasis). This meant that holders of deemed rights

“did not occupy land as of right...the relation between the state and the native occupier of land was *administrative*, dependent on policy at a particular time rather than governed by law and the subject of legal right” (Ibid:p.5, original emphasis; cf. Shivji 1998:pp.3-4; James 1971:p.62; Chapter One).

⁵¹ Not her real name.

⁵² lit. corrugated iron sheet

The way in which the villagisation policy was implemented thus meant that neither the *wenyeji* who lost land for houses in the core area of old Kinyanambo, nor those whose land in the *mbuga* was taken for the newcomers' farms, received any compensation.

This practice continued into the 1980s as new land allocations were made. For example, when Mama Yustina's son came back to Kinyanambo in 1992 he found that most of his parents' uncultivated land in the *mbuga* had been taken by the village government and given to other people as farms, but that neither those people nor the village government had given his mother any compensation. However, compensation was paid by the government for large one-off alienations such as the pyrethrum factory – though not for the forest (Division Three), as people with land there were instead allowed to keep their trees – and by people (but not the government) acquiring surveyed house-plots from the District Land Office, because they could not easily develop their plots without settling with the former landowners (cf. Izumi 1999:p.163; Shivji 1998:pp.30, 39). These compensation payments mitigated the loss for those, *wenyeji* and newcomers alike, whose land in the areas surveyed for house-plots was being given away by the District Land Office. This loss was worse for the *wenyeji* who lost land both at villagisation and with urbanisation, whose landholdings have therefore been steadily eroding now for some 25 years.

With increasing economic reform during the 1980s and under the twin pressures of urbanisation and population growth, payments for land more generally resumed. This took two forms – sitting allowances and sales. At first after villagisation, as Mama Maria said, “people were not paying for land, the committee just distributed it for free”. Around 1980, however, sitting allowances began to be paid to the village land committee, distributed among the particular leaders who allocated land – in effect, a payment for their time and trouble in sitting (meeting) to allocate land. According to one of my informants, this started in response to the village government having seen some of the *wenyeji* beginning to ask for compensation from those being allocated their farm land.

The sitting allowance rate paid by those receiving land from the village government appears to have initially been TSh 500 per acre, but this had increased to TSh 2,000 per acre by the early 1990s. Nyerere had supported those who devoted “all their time to political work” receiving “enough money to live on and work properly” and village chairs and secretaries received salaries from 1978 (1979b:p.55; above). Yet other leaders were unpaid and, especially given the harsh economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s, it is hardly surprising that those

who spent time on village land administration wanted some sort of recompense, as they would have received in the past. Once the practice of paying sitting allowances had begun it then became very difficult to avoid paying it to obtain any land – not just uncultivated land being distributed by the village government – as the 1975 Directions stipulated that no-one could transfer a right to use land in the village or dispose of their house by sale or otherwise without the approval of the village council (Fimbo 1992:p.128).⁵³ There was certainly no “right to free sale” and, as the NAP later made clear, land which families no longer wanted was instead supposed to be returned to the village government to be allocated afresh (Sundet 1997:p.131).

Nevertheless, high population densities and land pressures had already led to increased land prices across Iringa Region by 1980 (DANIDA *et al* 1982b:p.4.9; cf. Friis-Hansen 1986:p.127). In the immediate study area urbanisation then contributed to the more rapid commoditisation of land by increasing the demand for land for both cultivation and construction. The new political-economic environment also “engendered a sharp rise in the demand for land” – the NAP’s encouragement of the acquisition and titling of land as an incentive to investment in agriculture resulted in a large increase in the granting of rights of occupancy, especially to wealthy, well-connected individuals and urban businesspeople over land that they had often first bought from individual villagers (Sundet 1997:pp.133-134, 140; Izumi 1999:pp.88, 110; Wily 1988:pp.112, 217-220). This so-called “land-grabbing” was first fuelled by the high inflation of the 1980s, which made investments in land a popular form of saving for both political leaders and wealthy individuals, and then facilitated by the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration, which amended the Arusha Declaration to formally allow leaders to engage in private business (widely practised but banned until then) (Shivji 1998:pp.36-38; Coldham 1995:pp.230, 236; Izumi 1999:pp.76, 89, 155-156; Sundet 1997:pp.156, 180). The 1990 Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act also had a bearing as it altered policy to require the Ministry to assist investors (including foreign ones) needing land (Izumi 1999:pp.90-92; Shivji 1998:p.33; Sundet 1997:pp.153, 176-179). Peri-urban areas across Tanzania were particularly hit by these commoditisation pressures (Sundet 1997:p.184).

In response to this demand the Kinyanambo *wenyeji* therefore gradually started to sell their land once more, although such sales now simultaneously began to be couched in the

⁵³ Fimbo questions the continuing legality of these directions, since the supporting 1975 Act has been repealed and its institutional provisions merged into the 1982 Local Government (District Authorities) Act, which reintroduced elected district councils (1992:p.128; Booth *et al* 1993:p.21; Shivji 1998:p.14; Sundet 1997:pp.115-117).

official discourse of compensation payments for unexhausted improvements. I said in Chapter Four that the compensation principle was justified by Nyerere on the grounds that labour has value. However, although the principle of charging for improvements had been specifically incorporated into customary land law in 1963, and although in other parts of Tanzania sales may increasingly have been made “under the guise of ‘repayments for clearing costs’” from the Arusha Declaration (Wily 1988:pp.90, 96),⁵⁴ land sales in Kinyanambo were regarded straightforwardly as sales before villagisation and it was only after villagisation that the ideological language of national land tenure policy (and of *ujamaa*) became embedded in the local land tenure system. Yet, whilst land for farms was increasingly being sold (albeit officially in compensation for the resources (*rasilmali*) or expenses (*gharama*) invested in or on the land), those whose land was given away by the District Land Office as house-plots expected – and received – straightforward compensation from the newcomers getting their land. This was because they were not selling their land – it was being involuntarily alienated and compensation remained the appropriate, and socially legitimate, form of payment for alienations, as it had been since land was first alienated to non-African settlers in the past. Both the compensation principle and the growing commoditisation of land sat side by side with the policy that “here in Tanzania we don't sell land” (*“hapa Tanzania hatuuzi ardhi”*). As the land tenure system in Kinyanambo continued to evolve during this period of transition, everyday practices therefore came to diverge more and more from national land tenure policy, setting up tensions which have become even more acute during the 1990s.

⁵⁴ See also James (1971:pp.288-290), who notes that, although the compensation principle “was not known to early customary law”, it had “become firmly established in the case-law” since Independence.

Chapter Six

Kinyanambo in the 1990s

In this chapter I consider Kinyanambo's continuing development up to 1999-2000, drawing extensively on data from my two surveys. I highlight the impact of specific national policies in the immediate study area, within the broader context of national policy reform, and discuss migration, urbanisation and local development during the 1990s. I then analyse people's livelihoods in Kinyanambo today, their landholdings and their land use and farming practices – to assess the importance of agriculture, and hence land, to livelihoods. Finally, I explore wealth differences and social change in modern Kinyanambo.

I begin with a brief statement of methodology and terms used. My census of Kinyanambo counted 'houses' – residential loci where people live (see Appendix Three). Both my surveys were carried out with the smallest economic grouping in each sampled house, which I term the 'surveyed economic unit'. This usually consisted of the resident nuclear family (the core economic group of the head of the sampled house, as defined by the residents of the house), which usually included all the residents of the house and could also incorporate non-resident members. However, as these units of analysis do not always equate to 'households', the conjugal and/or familial and social entities which in some cases consist of multiple economic units spread between one or more houses, I frequently distinguish between surveyed household heads – being the head of the household of which the surveyed unit is a part – and the surveyed units themselves. To take just one example (from a polygamous household), the surveyed economic unit in house A consists of a second wife – the head of the house – and her children by her husband – the head of the household – who is resident in a different house with his first wife and her children. This latter family are a separate economic unit within the broader household, so, although I also sought specific information on the household head and on the economic links between the different units in the household, data collection in house A generally focused on the surveyed unit – the second wife's family. Households in Kinyanambo are complex structures, as elsewhere in Africa (cf. Chapter Two), and I elaborate further on my definition of the various types of unit in Appendix Two.

Tanzania in the 1990s

The 1990s have seen Tanzania continuing with the process of gradual liberalisation that began in the early 1980s and the country has been much praised for its efforts (e.g. FT 1999a; 2000a; Vesely 2000). According to the World Bank's *World Development Report 1999/2000*, published while I was conducting my fieldwork, Tanzania was ranked 199th out of 210 countries in terms of GNP per capita and, although still 11th from the bottom, this was an improvement on rankings in the bottom five over many previous years (Voipio & Hoebink 1999:p.14; World Bank 2000:p.231). Nevertheless, whilst economic reform has been accompanied by increased "dynamism in economic life", poverty remains widespread in rural Tanzania (Booth *et al* 1993:p.118; Narayan 1997). Tanzania's GNP growth of 3.2% between 1997 and 1998 was equivalent to only 0.6% growth per capita, whilst agriculture, which occupies around 80% of the population either full or part-time, accounted for only 46% of GDP in 1998, although its share of both GDP and export earnings is increasing (Mbilinyi 1997:p.9; World Bank 2000:pp.231, 253).

Economic reform provides the context within which land has become an important national policy issue (Chapters One and Two). However it is only by examining its local impact that the local dimensions of the land issue can be understood. Kinyanambo's development has been directly affected by various national policies during the 1990s, of which public sector staff retrenchment, privatisation and foreign investment promotion, the continuing liberalisation of agriculture and the introduction of cost-sharing in the public services have been particularly important.

Retrenchment

By February 1998 around 63,000 people had been retrenched nation-wide, under the Civil Service Reform Programme that began in 1992, and further cuts were still planned (Izumi 1999:p.221; Voipio & Hoebink 1999:p.23). Retrenchment has had three main effects in the immediate study area. First, people formerly employed in the public sector, in both parastatals and directly by the government, have had to develop alternative livelihood strategies, often needing their own land if they had previously lived in staff quarters and either not farmed or farmed land borrowed from their employer. Land was also sought to secure a livelihood in old age as government pensions became inadequate and their payment erratic – a concern for those still in employment too (cf. Izumi 1999:p.234). These factors have contributed to increased migration into Kinyanambo and increased demand for land. Second, formerly

employed people already resident in Kinyanambo, especially *wenyeji* of villagisation time, began to identify themselves more as 'villagers' after retrenchment and to get more involved in village politics. Third, the 1992 separation of government and party combined with general budgetary cuts to leave many lower-level officials with reduced salaries, albeit without losing their jobs. For example, in Kinyanambo the then village secretary, whilst continuing to be paid by the government in that capacity, had to "volunteer" to act as CCM branch secretary after 1992, receiving only "pocket money" from the village for his work (cf. Sundet 1997:p.164). As he said, this was "money to help us live", but "it was not a salary. It was not enough to live on". Yet retrenchment for some, whether real or effective, brought increased salaries for others – one district government employee I knew was only able to buy food with her salary when she started working in Mafinga in 1993 but by 2000 was able to "save a bit" and buy other goods too.

Privatisation and Foreign Investment

Privatisation has been overseen by the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) since 1993 and by 2000 two-thirds of Tanzania's public companies had been sold. However 'privatisation' has included a variety of leasing and management contracts and many important enterprises remain state-owned (FT 1999c; 2000b). Mufindi District is a typical case. The pyrethrum-processing factory was privatised on 6th February 1998, having been out of production for six months beforehand, and is now 100% owned by International Chemical Producers, a South African company.¹ The SPM pulp mill at Mgololo had such serious cash-flow problems that it ceased production in 1999 while the government sought the transfer of "its share ownership at concessionary terms to a strategic investor" (Newsweek 1999a)² and the tea industry's former monopoly sales and marketing arm, Tanzania Tea Blenders Ltd, jointly owned by the state and BBTL, was put up for full privatisation in early 2000.³ In contrast, the TWICO saw mill at Sao Hill remains state-owned, having been leased to a private Norwegian company in 1996 for 20 years.⁴

¹ Interviews at TPPM, 8/11/99 and 18/11/99.

² Interviews with SHFM, 25/11/99, and DTO, 23/2/00. Privatisation was not imminent when I finished my fieldwork, but I heard anecdotal reports in October 2001 that a foreign buyer had been found.

³ PSRC website, December 2001.

⁴ Interview at SHTL, 23/11/99; Tree Farms A/S website, December 2001.

As this brief account of privatisation in Mufindi shows, foreign investors are once again very important to the district's development (cf. Chapter Three).⁵ Government promotion of foreign investment is based on the principle, as President Mkapa has put it, that it does not matter "whose capital it is, but where the factory is built – because that is what creates jobs" (FT 2000c). However, during the 1990s land reform debate the government was much criticised for being more concerned, in its pursuit of foreign investment, to ensure the land rights of foreign companies than individual Tanzanians (Chapter Two). For their part, foreign investors have varied interests in national policies on land. During my fieldwork, for example, the government was being lobbied against an increase in land rent by the Mufindi North MP and at least one of the district's major timber companies. Annual land rent on granted rights of occupancy (technically called a "land fee" as its nominal purpose is to cover administrative costs) was raised from TSh 3 per acre to TSh 600 per acre in July 1997, yet large areas of land are required for the tea and timber industries which cannot be used for production all the time. 50% of the tea companies' land is set aside for environmental protection, whilst the long-term future of the timber industry requires land to be available, hence leased, but trees to be neither planted nor harvested all at once. The land rent increase was therefore a distinct disincentive to investment and was potentially damaging to the district's continuing development (Mtanzania 1999).⁶

Agriculture

The liberalisation of agriculture was well underway by the end of the 1980s. However, it was not until 1994-96 that the marketing of all food and export crops was fully liberalised, when the functions of the parastatal crop authorities were streamlined and their monopoly status abolished (FT 1999b; Mbilinyi 1997:p.6; Ponte 2000:p.1019). As a result, the privately-owned Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd was licensed to pack and sell tea in 1995 and now produces Chai Bora at its factory in Mafinga, officially opened during my fieldwork (Mwamunyange 1999; Newsweek 1999b), whilst Mufindi District's timber industry was also opened up to private producers from 1996 (MDC 2000:p.17).

⁵ Other key foreign concerns are the Zambian-based African Plantations Corporations, founded and run by an Israeli, which owns MTC (Economist 1999:p.146) and the Canadian-owned and run timber company, United Lumber (Interview at United Lumber, 23/11/99).

⁶ Interviews with Mufindi North MP, 10/9/99, DURPO and DVO, 17/9/99 and 2/12/99, and at Escarpment Forestry Company Ltd (EFC), 16/2/00.

In the smallholder agricultural sector, subsidised inputs had been completely terminated by 1995, contributing to both price increases and availability problems nation-wide (FT 1999b; Ponte 2000:p.1019; Turuka 1996:pp.33, 41). For much of the 1990s the private sector was unable to fill the gaps in state supply and, even when inputs became more widely available, people were often dissuaded from their use because their costs had generally increased faster than producer prices since the mid-1980s (Mbilinyi 1997:pp.21-25; Narayan 1997:pp.42-43; Turuka 1996:p.33).⁷ During my fieldwork I heard many complaints, from people in Kinyanambo and from Mwakaumu women groups elsewhere in Mufindi District, about the cost of chemical fertilisers and pesticides and of farming tools such as hoes, even though all these items were by then available in Mafinga, whose central market had expanded rapidly since full agricultural liberalisation.⁸

Agriculture was also affected by bad weather conditions across Tanzania in the second half of the 1990s, alternating floods and droughts (FT 1999b). In the immediate study area the 1998 harvest suffered from drought (cf. EIU 1997:p.17), whilst in 1998/1999 there was enough rain but it came late and all at once. Then in 1999/2000 there was too much rain and the whole El Niño phenomenon was widely blamed by my informants for food and cash shortages.⁹ Nevertheless, despite these various difficulties, Tanzanian farmers in areas, like Kinyanambo, "on or near good all-weather roads, and not far from major consumption centres" have generally benefited from the overall encouragement of food production that has been stimulated by the continuing liberalisation of agriculture, especially wealthier farmers with greater resources, and hence flexibility (Mbilinyi 1997:pp.8, 23; Narayan 1997:pp.40, 44-46; Ponte 2001:p.89).

Cost-Sharing

The final national policy to directly affect Kinyanambo during the 1990s has been the introduction of user charges for public services such as health and education (Booth *et al* 1993:p.22; Mbilinyi 1997:p.5). This so-called cost-sharing coincided with continuing high price inflation across rural Tanzania in the first half of the 1990s, particularly in health services, although the improving availability of many basic consumer goods has probably "more than

⁷ Interview with DALDO, 24/11/99.

⁸ Interviews with AARW Project Co-ordinator, 18/2/00, and Community Development Assistant (for Kinyanambo), 22/2/00.

⁹ Interview with DALDO, 24/11/99.

compensated" (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.58-61; Narayan 1997:pp.21-23; Sundet 1997:p.168). In the immediate study area, for example, drugs had become obtainable by the time of my fieldwork, at both Mafinga hospital and the numerous privately-run drugstores that opened during the 1990s – such as the one at the Sadani Road junction which began construction in late 1999 and opened for business before I left. Yet drugs remain expensive and at Mafinga hospital even women giving birth have to provide the medical staff with essentials such as soap and plastic gloves.

The introduction of cost-sharing has also coincided with the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. Nation-wide HIV infection rates have recently been estimated to exceed 24% in urban areas and 10% in rural areas (FT 2000b) and the Southern Highlands have been very badly affected, particularly the areas along the Tanzam (cf. Mung'ong'o 1998:pp.20-21).¹⁰ That people were dying "every day like chickens"¹¹ was taken for granted in the immediate study area, but it had become taboo to ask what people had died from. In Mafinga in 1996 and 1997 there were funerals virtually every day and by 1999-2000, although the death rate appeared to have reduced, my fieldwork was regularly interrupted by funerals. Disease places extra burdens not only on local health services, but also on the resources of sick people and their relatives. For example, 5% of the economic units in my first survey (7 of 156) were undertaking long-term care of sick people in 1999 and for two of them it was their most time-consuming activity. 54% of the economic units in my second survey (32 of 61) cited health-care as a major expense in 1999 and the amounts paid, mostly on drugs,¹² ranged from TSh 1,000 to TSh 100,000 and averaged TSh 21,009. 8% (5 of 61) cited a funeral as a major expense in 1999. Disease has also created many orphans in Kinyanambo. For example, 124 pupils registered at Kinyanambo Primary School at the start of the 2000 school year – almost 30% of the 424 pupils at the school – were orphans whose relatives were paying for them to attend school.¹³ Many of these orphans lived with their grandparents, often widowed grandmothers.

However, education costs for (compulsory) primary schooling – fees and the purchase of uniforms and books – now impose a financial burden on all families in Kinyanambo with children of primary school age. Fees began to be charged again around 1984-85, having been

¹⁰ Pers. coms. with Ms U. Gade-Bisgaard, UNICEF Tanzania HIV/AIDS Programme Co-ordinator, December 2001.

¹¹ Interview with AARW Project Co-ordinator, 18/2/00.

¹² Some people paid for treatment from traditional healers or rented transport to take a sick person to hospital.

¹³ Pers. coms. with Kinyanambo Primary School committee leaders, 7/3/00.

abolished in 1973 (Hydén 1980:p.122; Izumi 1999:p.74), and in Kinyanambo in 1999 stood at TSh 3,000 per pupil per year.¹⁴ Secondary school fees are then often too high for those who pass the examinations to take up their places and some of my key informants had dropped out or had to withdraw their children because of their family's or their own inability to pay these fees. Nonetheless, 37 pupils from Kinyanambo Primary School started secondary school in 1999, more than in any previous year. 34 of them went to one of the Mufindi Education Trust's (MET's) eight schools, which have helped supplement the government's limited post-primary educational provision in the district since 1984 and whose basic annual fees were TSh 60,000 per pupil per year.¹⁵ 41% of the economic units in my second survey (25 of 61) cited school fees as a major expense in 1999 and the amounts paid, among the 23 units who provided this information, ranged from TSh 3,000 to TSh 150,000 according to the number of children and type(s) of school and averaged TSh 22,172.

The overall impact of cost-sharing in public services, of disease, of public sector staff retrenchment, of high prices for farming inputs and other basic consumer goods, and of fluctuating weather conditions has been to make the 1990s a period of economic uncertainty for most people in Kinyanambo. It has also been to increase their need for cash, especially as the 1990s have seen increased sales taxes (Mbilinyi 1997:p.5), on top of existing development and income/profits taxes and license fees for bicycles, places of business and the like. Yet economic reform has also brought new opportunities. Already by the early 1990s liberalisation had begun to stimulate village economies across Tanzania through the diversification of people's income-generating activities (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.iv, 63; Ponte 2001:pp.90-91). By the late 1990s, at least in the immediate study area, it had contributed to increasing income-earning opportunities in a variety of new and expanding businesses and industries.

Even so, people in Kinyanambo have been under pressure during the 1990s and specific social strains have emerged, such as rising crime and, more notably, increasing household nucleation. Furthermore, people now face increased demands to engage in unpaid development work because, in the absence of government resources, self-help has become "the only means of advance" (Booth *et al* 1993:p.22). Early in my fieldwork, for example, people in Kinyanambo B were rounded up by the village government for several days' work building

¹⁴ Interview at Upendo Primary School, 13/10/99.

¹⁵ Interviews at MET, 6/9/99, and Kinyanambo Primary School, 6/12/99 and 28/2/00; Draft MET proposal (as at 12/11/99) for a "Girl's Secondary Education Support Project (Fund)" (MET).

new classrooms at Upendo Primary School, which, although planned by 1977, had only begun to be built in 1996. Those who did not participate (including a few village government leaders, busy with their own activities) were expected to contribute financially towards the construction costs, in addition to the TSh 800 that all families in Kinyanambo B were already supposed to have paid. Upendo Primary School has thus mostly been funded and built by villagers, especially the parents of pupils, although various district entities have helped with building materials and other costs.¹⁶ Meanwhile other village developments, such as the planned government dispensary, have still not been built and the village is struggling to find an area for a new cemetery, the existing cemetery (in Kinanambo) having been surveyed for house-plots and the original planned replacement (in Ikweta) having already been built on (cf. Shivji 1998:p.27).¹⁷

Migration, Urbanisation and Local Development

As well as affecting Kinyanambo's development through specific national policies, economic reform has also contributed to three key, interlinked processes of change in the immediate study area during the 1990s – migration, urbanisation and local development, which together encouraged continuing population growth. By 1999 I estimate that Kinyanambo contained 5,431 people (Chapter One) – an increase of 70% since my maximum estimate of 3,192 people in 1990 (Chapter Five). Moreover, the village's population grew faster as the decade progressed. 22 of the 156 household heads in my first survey arrived in Kinyanambo between 1990 and 1994, 34 between 1995 and 1998 (including one *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo returning home) and a further 10 in 1999.¹⁸ 42% of the household heads in this survey thus arrived in Kinyanambo during the 1990s – more than three times as many as during the 1980s. At the same time, and although much harder to measure, outwards migration from Kinyanambo appears to have been relatively low as my informants talked consistently only about growth. 55% of the 1990s migrants came from places within Mufindi District (36 of 66), 30% (20 of 66) from other parts of Iringa Region and the remaining 15% (10 of 66) from elsewhere in Tanzania. The continuing preponderance of migrants from within Iringa Region

¹⁶ Interview at Upendo Primary School, 13/10/99.

¹⁷ Minutes of Village Council Handing-Over Meeting, 6/1/00; cf. IRUPO 1987:pp.14, 27.

¹⁸ Table A13, Appendix Four.

(albeit with an increasing proportion from outside Mufindi District) is reflected in the fact that 92% of the household heads in my first survey (144 of 156) were from the Wahehe, Wabena, Wakinga and Wawanji ethnic groups, which are indigenous to the region.¹⁹

Migration into Kinyanambo continues to be for a wide variety of primarily social and economic reasons. 71% of the 1990s migrants (47 of 66) had at least one social link with Kinyanambo, many of them more than one. 40 were following a relative, one was following a friend, five were women following their husbands, four were men following their wives (including two who moved on marriage), one came to look after a relative's house and another to be nearer relatives, one moved with relatives when young, and one was the *mwenyeji* returning home. 41% of the 1990s migrants (27 of 66) had clear economic reasons for their migration. Five were transferred by the government for work (and another by the Lutheran church), 11 came to do business (including one of those transferred by the government) and eight came hoping to get work in the area (as skilled house-builders, for example, or agricultural wage labourers). One thought Kinyanambo was a good place for farming and a further two were specifically following farms.²⁰ In addition to these economic and social reasons, three of the 1990s migrants came to get medical treatment and two for the local transportation services. The reason of getting a house-plot in the village also remains important. 18% of the 1990s migrants (12 of 66) moved to Kinyanambo at least in part because they either found a place to rent or got a house-plot to build on there, predominantly in Idope and Upendo. In three cases, where the migrants were all previously living in the immediate study area, the availability of housing was their sole reason for moving to Kinyanambo. This emphasises a key change since villagisation, that, whereas migrants into old Kinyanambo were usually migrating specifically to the village, migrants since then have often either originally come from the immediate study area or moved there first, and simply ended up living in Kinyanambo when they might just as easily have ended up in, say, Changarawe. However this point should not be overstated – only 33 of the 110 surveyed household heads who were neither *wenyeji* of old Kinyanambo nor born in the modern village moved to Kinyanambo from the immediate study area, and of these 15 reported having prior social ties to Kinyanambo.²¹

¹⁹ Table A10, Appendix Four.

²⁰ *kufuata mashamba*, lit. to follow farms, to move in order to obtain specific areas of land

²¹ Table A14, Appendix Four.

Meanwhile, urbanisation and local development have continued to contribute to the more rapid growth of both Kinyanambo B and C. Kinyanambo B was particularly affected by retrenchment, as former employees who wanted to stay near the services and economic opportunities of Mafinga used their retrenchment money to build houses there. After the abolition of National Service in 1994 some of the regular soldiers who then became permanently based at the former National Service Camp in Mafinga also built houses for their families in Kinyanambo B.²² In addition, Kinyanambo B got electricity during the 1990s, which was only extended up to the Sadani road junction in 1999.²³ House-plots had become available in Kinyanambo A from the District Land Office by the late 1990s, having been surveyed shortly before and during my fieldwork in Kinanambo and Lumwago respectively. However Kinyanambo B is generally more popular, the hamlets nearest Mafinga being more crowded and having higher land prices than elsewhere in the village. Yet house-plots in Kinyanambo are still cheaper than in Mafinga, the annual land rent being only TSh 6 per m² on registered house-plots in Kinyanambo compared with TSh 10 per m² near Mafinga's central market – rates which are set by the District Land Office “according to the marketability of the plots”.²⁴

In proportionate terms, Kinyanambo C grew even faster than Kinyanambo B during the 1990s and it is now well known as the place to buy potatoes on the Tanzam. Only 45% of the surveyed household heads in Ifingo moved to the village during the 1990s (14 of 31), compared with 56% and 61% of those in Upendo and Idope (15 of 27 and 23 of 38 respectively). However a further six household heads moved to Ifingo from elsewhere in Kinyanambo during the 1990s, making a total of 65% who moved to Ifingo during this period overall. In contrast, only five of the 65 household heads in Upendo and Idope had ever lived anywhere else in the village.

Ifingo's appeal lies primarily in the perceived availability of land. Once it had been opened up again to settlement in 1982, Kinyanambo C had increasingly begun to attract people who wanted land for farming or grazing. Being outside the town boundaries, larger farms can be surveyed and registered there than inside the township area, making Ifingo particularly attractive to outsiders seeking farms near their homes in town – such as district government employees who want land for business and farming that would also be easily accessible (along

²² Interview at Upendo Primary School, 13/10/99.

²³ 10 of the 156 economic units in my first survey had electricity connected to their houses, of whom nine lived in Kinyanambo B and one in Kinyanambo A.

²⁴ Interview with DLDO, 2/12/99.

the Tanzam) if they were to be transferred elsewhere (cf. Izumi 1999:p.92).²⁵ However boundary stones had been placed along the District Land Office's proposed town boundary extension into Ifingo by the time I finished my fieldwork (shown on Map 5, Chapter One), making it clear that land may not be so easy to obtain there in the future. Ifingo is thus also attractive to those who hope to profit once the town boundaries are officially extended and house-plots created (cf. Shivji 1998:pp.31, 39), because formal purchasers of house-plots from the District Land Office have to settle with the landowners in order to be able to develop their land. Finally, Ifingo is also growing as a result of the opening up of Division Three of Sao Hill Forest in late 1998. Logging in Division Three effectively started during 1999, initially by Tanscan, who set up a *kiwanda* in Ifingo in 1998, followed shortly by some half a dozen smaller operators with *viwanda* in Ifingo and Mafinga, and Ifingo has seen an influx of young men looking for work in the industry since around that time.²⁶

The timber industry in Mufindi District is dominated by a Norwegian holding company called Tree Farms – the parent company of Sao Hill Timber Ltd, which operates the TWICO saw mill, and Escarpment Forestry Company Ltd, which has a processing *kiwanda* in Kinanambo next to the pyrethrum factory, in the part of the village planned for industrial use. Escarpment had plans to build staff quarters and a large furniture-making and joinery workshop in Kinyanambo, although their long-term objective is to develop environmentally certified timber plantations to meet Western demand 20 years hence. United Lumber (which has considerable forest resources of its own), Tanscan and up to a dozen smaller logging, processing and treatment companies also operate in the industry, providing many opportunities for wage labourers in particular. For example, around 50 of the 80 people working for United Lumber in late 1999 were casual workers, only 30 being permanent employees. The industry is intensely price-competitive, although there are quality differences between the larger companies targeting export markets and the smaller companies who rely on the domestic market, mostly in Dar-es-Salaam, but also, as it grows, from Mafinga itself. Along with various taxes and licensing and registration fees, this makes it very difficult for the smaller companies to make even small profits, whilst competition has forced several operators out of business and encouraged the

²⁵ Interview with DTO, 23/2/00.

²⁶ Interview with SHFM, 23/2/00.

industry to start consolidating.²⁷ Overall, however, the timber industry has enormous growth potential, given the forest resources that have been cultivated for over fifty years, and it offers continuing employment, wage labour, skilled work and business opportunities to the people of Kinyanambo.

15% of the economic units in my first survey (24 of 156) had been directly involved in the district's timber industry during 1999, that is, had at least one member who had undertaken a livelihood activity in the industry that year. However timber's importance to people in Kinyanambo was rivalled by the construction industry (especially house-building), in which 19% of surveyed units (29 of 156) had been directly involved. Construction has boomed in the 1990s with migration, urbanisation and local development, creating many opportunities for people in Kinyanambo, as a peri-urban village, in, for example, small businesses such as quarrying rocks for house-building (cf. Booth *et al* 1993:p.63). Both these industries have now eclipsed Mufindi's oldest industry, the tea industry – in which only 2% of surveyed units (3 of 156) were involved during 1999 – in importance to Kinyanambo.

The current importance of the timber and construction industries also demonstrates the multiplier effects that have arisen from government-led development in the district. Past government investments – in infrastructure projects such as the Tanzam and Mafinga hospital, in the pyrethrum-processing factory and the timber industry, in the establishment of the National Service Camp and the move of district headquarters to Mafinga – set the foundations for long-term growth in the immediate study area. Specific multiplier effects are then visible, for example, in the rapid expansion of the timber industry once it was opened up to private producers and in the growth of sectors such as skilled carpentry. Furthermore, timber workers congregate in the bars of Mafinga on the weekends, creating much demand for both locally-produced alcohol and a variety of other local goods and services. High alcohol consumption is a sign of prosperity here – people with jobs and money, which they choose to spend in the bars, contribute to the overall velocity of circulation of money in the local economy and stimulate further development.²⁸ Finally, local people have also begun to plant their own trees for timber – 34% of the economic units in my second survey (21 of 61) were doing so by 2000, predominantly pines and eucalyptus (17 and 7 units respectively).

²⁷ Interviews at SHTL, 23/11/99, United Lumber, 23/11/99, Ihembe Industries Ltd, 25/1/00, EFC, 16/2/00, Lugano Investment, 23/2/00, and Kangesa Timber, 3/3/00.

²⁸ Interview with DTO, 23/2/00.

However, despite the construction of the pyrethrum-processing factory and the historical importance of pyrethrum-growing in the immediate study area, there is very little participation in the pyrethrum industry in Kinyanambo today. The factory had 50 permanent employees in 1999, down from 88 in the mid-1980s, and an average of 5 wage labourers were engaged each day during the peak production period between September and March.²⁹ Although I encountered several employees and former employees, only one of the economic units in my first survey was involved in the industry during 1999. Some of my informants expressed interest in growing pyrethrum again now that the factory had been privatised and the Kinyanambo Mwakaumu women's group were preparing seedlings for planting in early 2000, but Mwakaumu faced a shortage of seedlings and seeds were still supplied by the state-owned TPB. There was also a lack of trust in the industry among the men who had experienced non-payment for their crops in the past and concerns over marketing remained. More fundamentally, whilst producer prices stood at TSh 650 per kilogram for the highest grade of pyrethrum flower in April 1999,³⁰ far higher than the price of TSh 2 per kilogram that Kinyanambo villagers received from the Ifwagi Farmers' Co-operative Society from around the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, one of my informants observed that "at the time of selling pyrethrum for TSh 2 per kilo, an egg cost 20 cents. Now each egg costs TSh 100". Thus, whereas 1 kilogram of pyrethrum flowers would buy ten eggs in the past, in 1999 it would only buy six eggs, making people's reluctance to grow pyrethrum for sale understandable. Pyrethrum is also a very time-consuming and labour-intensive crop – the first harvest comes three months after seedlings are planted and flowers then need to be picked and dried weekly thereafter for the rest of the year (ILO/AARW 1999). The care needed to grow high-quality pyrethrum therefore seemed excessive to many of my informants, who felt that they had a wide range of relatively more productive income-generating activities open to them now, in different industries and in different types of work.

Livelihoods in Kinyanambo Today

In my first survey I gathered detailed information on the livelihoods of all 156 surveyed economic units, asking them to report all the activities undertaken by all unit members (resident

²⁹ Interview at TPPM, 18/11/99.

³⁰ As previous note.

and non-resident)³¹ during the 1999 calendar year, except for education and housework. Table 1 presents a summary picture of all the agricultural and non-agricultural income- and non-income-generating activities that I found.

Table 1 – Livelihood Activities in Kinyanambo in 1999

Livelihood Activity	Number of Units Reporting Occurrence of Activity In 1999 ¹	% of Units Reporting Occurrence of Activity In 1999 (n=156)
Food Production (Farming Crops For Own Consumption)	155	99%
Farming and Selling Crops	34	22%
Raising Animals (For Own Consumption/Use)	112	72%
Raising Animals and Selling Animal Food Products	17	11%
Petty Crop-Trading	12	7%
Producing and Selling Alcohol	73	47%
Small Business	53	34%
Business	3	2%
Skilled Work (<i>Ufundi</i>) (Self-Employed)	27	17%
Employment (<i>Ajira</i>) (Permanent/Salaried)	20	13%
Wage Labour (<i>Vibarua</i>) (Casual/Unskilled/Daily or Weekly Paid)	55	35%
Renting Out Rooms or Houses ²	9	6%
Government Pension	2	1%
<i>Msaada</i> (Financial Support)	21	14%
Political Leadership Positions	9	6%
Long-Term Care of Sick Person	7	4%
Traditional Healer	1	< 1%

¹ Units often engaged in activities in more than one capacity, for example farming two different types of crops for sale or undertaking more than one kind of skilled work.

² Renting out farm land is excluded from my livelihoods data and is analysed in Chapter Seven along with house and land sales.

This table requires some explanation in order to fully appreciate the wide range of livelihood activities in Kinyanambo today. I discuss agriculture below, so I concentrate here on the main non-agricultural livelihood activities. First, among the 73 economic units that produced and sold alcohol in 1999 there were 55 cases of *pombe*-brewing and 42 cases of *ulanzi*-cutting (in 35% and 27% of all surveyed units respectively). Second, there were 69 different small businesses among the 53 units that undertook such activities in 1999. They were: running a bar, kiosk, shop, small café or *pombe* club (18); cooking and selling various types of food (17); selling charcoal (self-produced or traded) (7); making and selling mats, pots or baskets (5); embroidery, knitting or sewing for sale (5); breaking/crushing or digging/quarrying and selling stones for house-building (5); selling firewood, piped water or trees for people to cut (4); making and selling bricks (2); trading *ulanzi* (2); selling second-hand clothes (2); buying maize and

³¹ In three cases, where the household head was not part of the surveyed unit (being husbands living with other wives), their livelihood activities were included as they farmed with the surveyed unit.

selling flour (1); and making and selling wooden crosses for graves (1). In addition, one larger crop-trading business and two timber businesses were recorded.

Third, among the 27 units that engaged in skilled work in 1999 were eight carpenters (mostly furniture-makers), 12 skilled house-builders and four house-painters. Other trades encountered were bicycle and vehicle repairs, electricians, roofing, mining, metalwork, and digging pit latrines and wells. Fourth, among the 20 units with a member in employment (of whom none had more than one member so engaged) were three people in the district's tea industry, two in its timber industry, one at the pyrethrum factory and 10 who were directly employed by the government. In all but a handful of cases of both employment and skilled work, the work took place locally.

Fifth, among the 55 units that undertook wage labour there were 37 cases of agricultural wage labour (in 24% of all surveyed units), mostly seasonal work for other villagers during the hoeing and planting period and some during weeding and harvesting. There were also 11 cases each of wage labour in the district's timber industry, predominantly cutting planks of wood, and in the construction industry. Finally, among the 21 units receiving *msaada* (lit. help) 12 received it from children of unit members who were no longer part of their unit, eight from other relatives of unit members and one from friends and neighbours.

I also gathered data on economic units' most time-consuming and most lucrative activities and on their total number of income sources in 1999. From this, Table 2 provides a summary picture of surveyed units' most time-consuming activity in 1999, defined as the one activity on which more time was spent by unit members as a whole than any other activity.³²

Table 2 – Most Time-Consuming Livelihood Activities in Kinyanambo in 1999

Livelihood Activity	Number of Units Reporting Activity as Most Time-Consuming in 1999	% of Units Reporting Activity as Most Time-Consuming in 1999 (n=156)
Food Production (Farming Crops or Raising Animals For Own Consumption)	101	65%
Agricultural Income-Generating Activities (Farming and Selling Crops or Raising Animals and Selling Animal Food Products)	4	3%
Petty Crop-Trading	4	3%
Producing and Selling Alcohol	2	1%
Small Business	8	5%
Skilled Work	9	6%
Employment	14	9%
Wage Labour	10	6%
Long-Term Care of Sick Person	2	1%
Traditional Healer	1	< 1%
Not Known	1	< 1%

³² Unit members (including children) usually participated in more than one livelihood activity as most were not full-time.

This table shows that food production (for own consumption) was the most time-consuming activity for 65% of all surveyed units in 1999, a finding whose significance I discuss below. However, in 82% of the cases where food production was not the unit's most time-consuming activity (45 of 55), the activity that was the most time-consuming was also the most lucrative. Table 3 therefore provides a summary picture of surveyed units' most lucrative activities in 1999, defined as the one activity which provided the unit with more income than any other activity, thus the unit's largest single source of income in 1999.

Table 3 – Most Lucrative Livelihood Activities in Kinyanambo in 1999

Livelihood Activity	Number of Units Reporting Activity as Most Lucrative In 1999	% of Units Reporting Activity as Most Lucrative in 1999 (n=156)
Agricultural Income-Generating Activities (Farming and Selling Crops or Raising Animals and Selling Animal Food Products)	8	5%
Petty Crop-Trading	6	4%
Producing and Selling Alcohol		
<i>Pombe</i> -Brewing	29	19%
<i>Ulanzi</i> -Cutting	15	10%
Small Business	26	17%
Business	2	1%
Skilled Work	17	11%
Employment	17	11%
Wage Labour		
Agricultural	13	8%
Non-Agricultural	12	8%
Renting Out Rooms or Houses	2	1%
Government Pension	1	< 1%
<i>Msaada</i>	7	4%
Traditional Healer	1	< 1%

This table shows that 46 units (29% of all those surveyed) reported some form of non-agricultural work for wages as their most lucrative activity in 1999 – skilled work, employment and non-agricultural wage labour. In contrast, only 27 units (17%) reported an agricultural activity as their most lucrative – agricultural wage labour, petty crop-trading or agricultural income-generating activities. Adding one unit whose most lucrative activity was a small business buying maize and selling flour makes a total of 18% whose most lucrative activity was in agriculture (excluding activities in the export crops sector) – less than a fifth of all surveyed units. 44 units (28%) reported producing and selling alcohol as their most lucrative activity. Adding the three units with small businesses trading *ulanzi* and running a bar and *pombe* club to the latter makes a total of 30% with most lucrative activities in the alcohol industry. 15% of all surveyed units (23 units) reported most lucrative activities in the construction industry, including a district government surveyor (mostly occupied with marking out Mafinga house-plots) and the

two units whose largest single source of income was rental income, while 9% (14 units) had most lucrative activities in the district's timber industry.

Between them, agriculture and the alcohol, construction and timber industries therefore accounted for the most lucrative activities of 72% of all surveyed units in 1999 (112 units), which underlines the importance of urbanisation and local development to people's livelihoods in modern Kinyanambo. Population growth in the Mafinga area is particularly important – the alcohol industry and agriculture, supplying people's daily wants and needs, each accounted for more units' most lucrative activities than either the construction or timber industries. However, the impact of all these factors is even clearer when it is considered that, of the units reporting their most lucrative activity to be a small business in sectors other than these four, many were providing other goods and services, such as charcoal and firewood, that are advantageous for urban dwellers to obtain locally (cf. Ndaro 1992:p.179).

For 21% of all surveyed units (32 units), their most lucrative activity was also their sole source of income in 1999. However, all other economic units had at least one other source of income, the mean average number being 2.6. Table 4 presents the data.

Table 4 – Number of Income Sources in Kinyanambo in 1999

Number of Income Sources ¹	Number of Units Reporting Each Number of Income Sources	% of Units Reporting Each Number of Income Sources (n=156)
1	32	21%
2	55	35%
3	34	22%
4	24	15%
5	7	4%
6 - 10	4	3%

¹ I counted income from each separate activity (as per Table 1). Income from two different types of wage labour was thus two sources, whilst income from two unit members undertaking the same type of wage labour was one source.

At this point it is instructive to disaggregate my livelihoods data a little.³³ For example, there were interesting differences in the number of income sources according to the *uenyeji* group of the unit's household head: *wenyeji*, *wenyeji* of villagisation time and newcomers (1990s migrants who had not lived in old Kinyanambo).³⁴ 29% of newcomer units had only one source of income in 1999 (19 of 65), compared with 13% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (6 of 45) and 8% of *wenyeji* units (3 of 36), whilst 38% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (17 of 45) had four or more different sources of income in 1999, followed by 25% of *wenyeji* units (9 of

³³ None of my survey findings have been subjected to standard statistical tests. However I have closely scrutinised the raw data, concentrating my analysis on wealth, gender and *uenyeji*.

³⁴ A further group comprised household heads who were born in modern Kinyanambo (between 20 and 26 years old at the time of my fieldwork) (Table A15, Appendix Four).

36) and just 12% of newcomer units (8 of 65). These differences arise, in part, because it often takes time for newcomer units to establish multiple income sources – usually because their members initially lack the local knowledge and contacts to develop their livelihood strategies in this way. However, I also encountered some newcomers, especially young and single people, who were either quite confident in their work and thus considered their one source of income to be secure enough that they saw less need to diversify than people in other *uenyeji* groups (for example a traditional healer and several highly skilled craftsmen) or who lacked the financial imperative to undertake more income-generating activities because their one source of income was sufficiently lucrative to meet their cash needs, even if they had the labour resources to undertake more income-generating activities should they so choose. For example, six of the 19 surveyed newcomer units with only one source of income were relatively wealthy and headed by young men, of whom three were unmarried, and they all contained three or fewer members.

Several interesting points can also be raised here about gender. For example, livelihood activities in the alcohol industry are dominated by women, although this is unsurprising given that beer-brewing has long been a major source of income for women across Tanzania (Nkhoma-Wamunza 1992:p.201). 52% of the units in female-headed households in my first survey (27 of 52)³⁵ reported either *pombe*-brewing or *ulanzi*-cutting as their most lucrative activity in 1999. Moreover, 18 of these units were headed by widows, a full 12% of all 156 units in that survey, and 11 of them were *wenyeji* widows from among the 16 *wenyeji* units in female-headed households for whom one of these two activities was their most lucrative. Continuing inwards migration thus provides an expanding market for these women, enabling many to support themselves in the absence of other help.³⁶ However, *pombe*-brewing was also the most lucrative activity in nine of the 104 units in male-headed households (9%). Unlike *ulanzi* (the most lucrative activity in eight units headed by men), which can be cut by men or women, *pombe* is only ever brewed by women in the study area (although men have recently started to carry and sell it (cf. Mung'ong'o 1998:p.16)). This means that in each of these nine units an adult woman, a wife or daughter, was the main breadwinner.

This last point serves as a reminder that it is not always the household head who undertakes the unit's most lucrative activity. However, all cases in which either employment or

³⁵ Table A16, Appendix Four.

³⁶ There were six privately-run *pombe* clubs in Kinyanambo by 2000 and one run by the village government (Minutes of Village Council Handing-Over Meeting, 6/1/00), purchasing both *pombe* and *ulanzi*. Many villagers also supplied *pombe* to the bars in Mafinga.

skilled work was the unit's most lucrative activity were among units in male-headed households and the unit member so involved was always the household head. I did encounter a few women beyond my survey who either were or had been in employment, but they were quite rare. I also observed that women are rarely *mafundi* in the immediate study area. Some people had daughters who were training at Ifunda Technical College, to be mechanics for example, or were working in technical jobs in various factories, but I came across no self-employed female skilled workers in Kinyanambo at all – women in the study area do not dig wells or latrines, nor make furniture or metal tools and implements, and cannot repair bicycles or motorcycles as a business even if they are able to fix their own.

The main reason for this is that gender divisions of labour, which have changed little in the study area since before villagisation, are deeply ingrained. More men now help with 'traditional' female activities, like firewood and water collection and cleaning the house, but these activities are still predominantly done by women. Similarly, women can clear land that has been farmed before, but they still never cut trees or clear land that is being farmed for the first time.³⁷ Women only look after animals if they are near the house, whilst men only carry babies and children if both they and their mother are sick. One important change, however, is that, whereas it used to be Wahehe men who looked for land, women now do this too (see Chapter Seven).

It is therefore no surprise to find among the various small businesses operated by people in Kinyanambo that, although both men and women were cooking and selling food, men only cooked fried meat or chips, whilst women made *maandazi* (fried cakes), bread and staple meals such as rice or *ugali* (sticky maize porridge) and beans.³⁸ Furthermore, activities such as quarrying rocks for house-building and burning and selling charcoal are male activities; embroidery, basket-making and so on are women's activities. Yet, whilst I found no women running larger businesses, in at least two Mafinga-based timber companies the owners' wives appeared to be effectively co-managing the business with their husbands. Women can and do also work as wage labourers for *mafundi* and a few women work in the timber *viwanda* – although even here gender differences appear because, as one timber business owner put it,

³⁷ Even a successful Mwakaumu women's group's timber business in Ilhalimba village hired male wage labourers to fell the trees and cut them into planks (Nkomolla 1999:pp.8-10).

³⁸ The only men who grind maize or cook staple food (even for themselves) are men who live alone, such as youths and widowers.

most of “the work is hard [and] women are weak”.³⁹ Women thus draw water for house-builders, cook food for timber workers, gather sawdust or do other work, such as looking after tree seedlings, which requires “tender hands”.⁴⁰

From this discussion it is clear that there is considerable diversity of livelihoods in Kinyanambo today. This diversity is the result of two simultaneous, interlinked processes of change. First, it reflects the fact that at least some people are responding positively to the economic opportunities arising from urbanisation and local development, within the context of national economic reform. Second, however, it also reflects the responses of the (so far) more numerous people, squeezed by land pressures, declining soil fertility and recent climatic and economic uncertainty, who need to diversify into a wider range of income-generating activities and multiple income sources, in particular non-agricultural ones, to secure a livelihood (cf. Chapter Two). These two processes could be approximately described as, respectively, ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘survival’ drives to diversification. However, as almost everyone in Kinyanambo still farms, growing at least some of their own food, detailed examination of landholdings, land use and farming practices, and food production is still required to assess the overall importance of agriculture, and hence land, to peoples’ livelihoods in Kinyanambo today.

Agriculture in Kinyanambo Today

Landholdings

I defined the total landholding in Kinyanambo of each of the 156 economic units in my first survey – the amount of land owned by each unit as at January 2000 – as the total acreage owned, of all types of land, whether jointly or separately, by all members of the unit.⁴¹ By ownership I mean the possession of recognised rights to control (to use or fallow) and transfer land – rights that were either registered in the village office or known to relevant village leaders (such as the unit’s *balози* or hamlet leader) or other witnesses (often *wenyeji*). Table 5 presents a summary picture of the data.

³⁹ Interview at Lugano Investment, 23/2/00.

⁴⁰ Interviews at EFC, 16/2/00, SHTL, 23/11/99, and Lugano Investment, 23/2/00.

⁴¹ For units in multiple-unit households, I excluded land held jointly by the household head and members of other economic units. I also excluded land owned separately by the household head in the three cases where he was not part of the surveyed unit.

Table 5 – Landholdings in Kinyanambo as at January 2000

Total Acreage Owned by Unit in Kinyanambo	Number of Units Owning Each Amount of Land	% of Units Owning Each Amount of Land (n=156)
0	18	12%
Less Than 1 Acre	25	16%
1 to 1.99 Acres	26	17%
2 to 2.99 Acres	25	16%
3 to 3.99 Acres	14	9%
4 to 4.99 Acres	17	11%
5 to 9.99 Acres	23	15%
10 Acres of More	8	5%

Among the surveyed units, the biggest landholding in Kinyanambo was 29.5 acres, whilst the mean average landholding was 3.3 acres.⁴² In contrast to frequent claims by observers that female-headed households in Tanzania consistently have less land than male-headed households (e.g. Mbilinyi 1997:pp.27-31; Voipio & Hoebink 1999:p.25), I found no marked differences in the proportionate spread of different acreages between units in male- and female-headed households in Kinyanambo. However, there were quite marked differences between units according to the *uenyaji* group of the unit's household head. For example, 54% of newcomer units owned either no land in Kinyanambo or less than one acre (35 of 65), compared with 16% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (7 of 45) and 3% of *wenyeji* units (1 of 36). 23% of newcomer units (15 of 65) owned no land at all in Kinyanambo, compared with 4% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (2 of 45) and no *wenyeji* units. At the opposite end of the landholding spectrum, only 11% of newcomer units owned 4 or more acres of land in Kinyanambo (7 of 65), compared with 36% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (16 of 45) and 64% of *wenyeji* units (23 of 36). Yet *wenyeji* of villagisation time units, though more evenly distributed across the whole range of landholdings, accounted for over half of all units who owned 10 acres or more of land in Kinyanambo. To consider these differences another way, Table 6 therefore shows the proportion of units in each *uenyaji* group with landholdings above and below the survey mean acreage of 3.3.

Table 6 – Landholdings in Kinyanambo by *Uenyaji*

<i>Uenyaji</i> Group	Proportion of Units in Each <i>Uenyaji</i> Group With Landholdings Above the Mean	Proportion of Units in Each <i>Uenyaji</i> Group With Landholdings Below the Mean
Newcomers (n=65)	12% (8)	88% (57)
Born in Modern Kinyanambo (n=10)	20% (2)	80% (8)
<i>Wenyeji</i> of Villagisation Time (n=45)	40% (18)	60% (27)
<i>Wenyeji</i> (n=36)	78% (28)	22% (8)

⁴² This chimes with an official report from 1993 of the average smallholder landholding in the Southern Highlands being between 2 and 5 acres (Interview with DALDO, 24/11/99), but see Wily (1988:p.225) on the problems of using broad regional or national average landholding data.

The sum total of landholdings in Kinyanambo reported by all surveyed units was 519 acres. Extrapolating from this gives 2,076 acres as the total area owned by people in the six surveyed hamlets. However, as these hamlets contained only 47% of the total number of economic units in Kinyanambo,⁴³ further extrapolation suggests that the total area owned by villagers as a whole is 3620.5 acres – roughly a third of the village's approximate total land area of 10,868 acres.⁴⁴ Yet I was told that almost all land in Kinyanambo is owned and that there is very little left for the village government to distribute.

Two explanations suggest themselves. The first is that survey respondents underreported their landholdings. However, although this may have happened in some cases, I was generally happy that this was not usually the case (cf. Chapter One). The second, and more likely, explanation is that substantial areas of village land (in other words, acreages above the survey maximum of 29.5) are owned by businesses, non-residents and small numbers of individual residents (none of whom happened to be in my survey sample, but several of whom were key informants (notably past and present village leaders)). To take just three examples I encountered directly – one resident cattle-keeper, a 1980s migrant from Iringa town, owns some 120 acres, a non-resident businessman from Mafinga owns 225 acres, whilst the pyrethrum factory owns some 538 acres (217.7ha). I also heard many anecdotal reports of other (usually non-resident) individuals with lots of land in Kinyanambo and one hamlet leader told me explicitly that people from Mafinga can and do come to him to get land. Finally, many villagers in neighbouring villages own land within Kinyanambo's boundaries.

Concerning landholdings outside Kinyanambo, 31% of all economic units in my first survey owned land elsewhere (48 of 156), five of them in more than one other place. 23 of the units with landholdings elsewhere owned land nearby, in the Mafinga area and neighbouring villages, 15 owned land in other villages in Mufindi District, 12 in other parts of Iringa Region and three in other parts of Tanzania. Four of the units with land elsewhere had only a house-plot outside Kinyanambo, and of the 44 units who had farm land outside Kinyanambo only 31 were farming it in the 1999/2000 agricultural year.

The 48 units who owned land elsewhere generally tended to own more land outside Kinyanambo than they owned inside. For example, their mean landholding in Kinyanambo was

⁴³ Table A5, Appendix Three.

⁴⁴ Mean acreages owned for each surveyed hamlet (Table A17, Appendix Four) extrapolated according to numbers of occupied houses in Table A2 and hamlet groups in Appendix Three.

just 2.1 acres while their mean landholding outside Kinyanambo was 6.1 acres. The maximum area owned outside Kinyanambo by any of these 48 units was 42 acres; the total area owned outside, 295 acres. Furthermore, only 11 of the 48 units with land elsewhere owned more than the survey mean acreage of 3.3 in Kinyanambo, suggesting that units owning land outside the village were also unlikely to be those with the biggest landholdings inside the village.

Surveyed units' propensity to own land outside Kinyanambo also differed quite noticeably according to the *uenyaji* group of the unit's household head. 54% of newcomer units owned land elsewhere (35 of 65), compared with only 27% of *wenyaji* of villagisation time units (12 of 45) and no *wenyaji* units. The only unit whose household head was born in modern Kinyanambo to own land outside Kinyanambo was a unit owning land in Rungemba, from where the head's father had originally come. In effect, the longer people live in Kinyanambo, the more distant their connections with other places become and the less likely they are to have land elsewhere. *Wenyaji* families in particular are unlikely to have land elsewhere because of their greater initial endowments of land. For their part, newcomers tend to retain their landholdings elsewhere until they obtain land in Kinyanambo, as even those who are well connected are not always able to get land straight away. Most people then sell or give away their other land once they have moved permanently out of an area, although some deliberately keep it if it is more fertile or if they want to retain their social ties in case they later decide to go back (cf. Chapter Two), in which case the land is often loaned without charge to relatives.

Land Use and Farming Practices

Table 7 presents a summary picture of the amounts of land farmed in Kinyanambo by each of the 156 economic units in my first survey during the 1999/2000 agricultural year. I defined this as the total acreage farmed, whether jointly or separately, by all members of the unit⁴⁵ – in other words, the total land area on which planting had been completed by the end of my fieldwork.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Exclusions as per Note 41.

⁴⁶ Land containing trees which were generating crops in 1999/2000 was also included, although most people had only a few trees scattered about their land and grew other crops in between their trees.

Table 7 – Land Farmed in Kinyanambo, 1999/2000

Total Acreage Farmed by Unit in Kinyanambo, 1999/2000	Number of Units Farming Each Amount of Land	% of Units Farming Each Amount of Land (n=156)
0	5	3%
Less Than 1 Acre	20	13%
1 to 1.99 Acres	43	28%
2 to 2.99 Acres	47	30%
3 to 3.99 Acres	20	13%
4 to 4.99 Acres	10	6%
5 to 9.99 Acres	10	6%
10 Acres or More	1	< 1%

Among the surveyed units, the maximum area farmed in Kinyanambo was 10.75 acres, whilst the mean area farmed was 2.4 acres. A total of 372 acres was farmed in Kinyanambo by the 151 units farming there in 1999/2000 – equivalent to 72% of the total landholdings in Kinyanambo of all 156 surveyed units. The five units not farming in Kinyanambo all lived in Idope and all had household heads who had arrived in the village since 1995. Four were farming elsewhere, whilst one unit was not engaged in farming at all – a young single mother with two small business activities, she was renting two rooms in a house around which the owner farmed and had not yet found any land for farming herself.

The amount of land farmed by surveyed units in Kinyanambo did not appear to be markedly affected by either the sex of the unit's household head or the overall size of the unit. This contrasts with evidence from elsewhere in Tanzania that smaller households tend to farm less land (Mbilinyi 1997:p.28). However, although the proportionate spread of different acreages farmed within each *uenyaji* group was more even than for landholdings, there were still some differences here. For example, 80% of all newcomer units (52 of 65) were farming less than the survey mean acreage of 2.4, compared with only 40% of *wenyaji* of villagisation time units (18 of 45) and 22% of *wenyaji* units (8 of 36).

Concerning surveyed units' use of their own land in Kinyanambo, 52% of the units who owned some land in Kinyanambo were farming all that land (72 of 138, cf. Table 5), whilst 4% (6 units) were farming none of it. 15 units were renting and/or borrowing other land in the village, of whom six were already farming all their own land and clearly wanted more land to farm. Those units not farming all (or any) of their own land usually rented or borrowed land which was more fertile, nearer their home, or a type of land they did not own. Meanwhile 70% of the units who were farming some land in Kinyanambo owned all the land they farmed (106 of 151, cf. Table 7). 30% of all those farming in Kinyanambo (45 units) were therefore either renting and/or borrowing at least some of the land they farmed there (including house-plots), of whom 19 units

(13% of all 151) owned none of it. However only one surveyed unit who owned farm land in Kinyanambo reported lending out land they owned and none reported renting out land they owned. Instead it was usually reported that land was being left fallow or was not used because it was too far away or because the unit was unable to farm it (through sickness, lack of money for inputs and so on). This leaves open the question of who does lend and rent out land in Kinyanambo, which I address in Chapter Seven.

A total of 36 economic units (23% of the 156 surveyed) were farming land outside Kinyanambo in the 1999/2000 agricultural year and four of them farmed in two other places. 69% (25 of 36) were farming more land outside Kinyanambo than they farmed inside, whilst 86% (31 of 36) owned at least some of the land they farmed elsewhere, even though they were not all farming all of it. The mean acreage farmed inside Kinyanambo by these 36 units was just 1.2, half the survey mean acreage of 2.4, whilst their mean acreage farmed outside Kinyanambo was 2.3. The maximum area farmed outside Kinyanambo by any of these 36 units was 6.5 acres; the total acreage farmed outside, 82 acres.

23 of the units farming land outside Kinyanambo were farming nearby, in the Mafinga area and neighbouring villages, eight units were farming in other villages in Mufindi District, eight in other parts of Iringa Region and one elsewhere in Tanzania. Most of the units with farms nearby were using their own labour for farming, although some of them, and most of those with farms further away, employed wage labourers either under their own periodic supervision or that of relatives. In a few cases of those with farms further away, non-resident unit members were physically farming the land.

37% of newcomer units (24 of 65) were farming land outside Kinyanambo, as were 24% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (11 of 45), but no *wenyeji* units. The reasons why they farmed outside Kinyanambo were very similar to the reasons why units had landholdings outside Kinyanambo. However, most of those units whose land outside Kinyanambo was nearby had simply gone there to farm because they could not get farms in Kinyanambo – land was not available – or because the land in Kinyanambo that was available was not fertile. For example, among the 14 economic units in my second survey who were expecting to obtain farms outside Kinyanambo during 2000, six were looking in Ndolezi and five in Kitelewasi. Five units reported that there are no *mashamba* available in Kinyanambo, and two no *vinyungu*, whilst six units reported that the *mashamba* in Kinyanambo, and two the *vinyungu*, were not fertile. Members of three units also said specifically that the land elsewhere is fertile. Yet only

6% of units in my first survey (9 of 156) reported that they could not get more land for farming in Kinyanambo if they wanted it. Six of them reported that there is no land available in Kinyanambo, whilst a seventh reported that the farms in Kinyanambo were simply too small – suggesting that land is available in the village, but that there are shortages of certain types of land and of land in certain places. Moreover, when I explored the issue of land availability with my key informants, I found people generally reporting that they could get land in Kinyanambo, but not necessarily fertile land or enough for their needs (especially in contiguous pieces).

Turning now to current farming practices, my second survey provided much useful data on the 1999/2000 agricultural year. 58 of the 61 economic units in that survey were farming some land in Kinyanambo during 1999/2000. 83% of them were farming *mashamba* (48 of 58), 83% *vinyungu* and 95% were farming their house-plot (55 of 58). 69% (40 of 58) were farming all three types of land. On average people grew between four and six crops on each type of land and Table 8 shows the most common crops (figures in brackets giving the numbers of units growing each one).

Table 8 – Crops Grown in Kinyanambo, 1999/2000

In <i>Mashamba</i>	In <i>Vinyungu</i>	On House-plots
Maize (47)	Maize (48)	Maize (54)
Green Vegetables (42)	Green Vegetables (45)	Green Vegetables (46)
Beans (41)	Beans (44)	Beans (43)
Irish Potatoes (34)	Irish Potatoes (29)	Irish Potatoes (41)
<i>Vitindi</i> Trees (32)	Sweet Potatoes (10)	Banana Trees (30)
Sweet Potatoes (23)	Banana Trees (8)	<i>Mapindegezi</i> Trees (25)
Pine Trees (8)	<i>Mapindegezi</i> Trees (5)	Sunflowers (19)
Banana Trees (7)	Green Peas (5)	Pine Trees (14)
<i>Mapindegezi</i> Trees (Local Peaches) (7)	Pine Trees (3)	Sweet Potatoes (12)
Eucalyptus Trees (3)	Pumpkins (3)	Pumpkins (5)
Pumpkins (3)	Tomatoes (3)	Eucalyptus Trees (4)

There were also a handful of units growing cassava, millet, groundnuts, split peas, chillis, pear trees, *mabohora* trees (local passionfruits), cypress trees, and *mihekya* trees (a local species used for fences). In effect, almost all crops are grown on all types of land, with the particular choice of what to grow and where determined by people's food preferences and the suitability of their available land. For example, trees for timber are less likely to be grown in the riverine *vinyungu*, where the land is generally more fertile and can support multiple cropping. It

is therefore preferred for growing food crops (for both consumption and sale) as it is perceived to be both more productive and more reliable than rain-fed land (*mashamba* and house-plots).⁴⁷

Concerning wage labour usage, 21% of the economic units in my second survey who were farming in Kinyanambo in 1999/2000 employed wage labourers (12 of 58). All of them employed wage labourers in their *mashamba*, whilst six also did so in their *vinyungu*. As in the past, agricultural wage labourers are usually employed because unit members are busy with other activities. However, an increasingly important reason for the use of wage labourers in Kinyanambo today is sickness or old age – in other words, they are employed when unit members are physically unable to farm by themselves. For example, although seven of the 12 units employing wage labour in Kinyanambo in 1999/2000 were wealthy units headed in six cases by a monogamously married man and in one case by a widower, the other five were poor units headed by widows, three of whom received *msaada* from children or other relatives in 1999 and for one of whom it was their single biggest source of income. Thus, whereas before villagisation wage labourers tended to be employed by wealthy people, wage labour is now used by poorer people too.

Regarding other inputs, 54% of the economic units who were farming *mashamba* in Kinyanambo in 1999/2000 used fertiliser (26 of 48) and 94% used pesticide (45 of 48). 4% (2 units) used neither type of input in their *mashamba*. 65% of the units who were farming *vinyungu* in Kinyanambo in 1999/2000 used fertiliser (31 of 48) and 94% used pesticide (45 of 48). 6% (3 units) used neither type of input in their *vinyungu*. As the reason for the non-use of these inputs is almost always lack of money, people in Kinyanambo are therefore prioritising pesticide when a choice has to be made.⁴⁸ My informants may have regularly complained that the land in Kinyanambo was infertile but they knew that fertiliser was likely to be a waste of money if they could not also afford to buy pesticide – a smaller intact harvest being preferable to a larger harvest at risk of destruction by insects before harvesting time.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Very few people water crops on their house-plots as, although there are various rivers in Kinyanambo, water collection is very labour-intensive and only 67 units in my first survey had a non-river water source near their house, usually their own wells.

⁴⁸ Very few units reported that their land was fertile and did not need fertiliser, nor that there had been no insects requiring pesticide that season.

⁴⁹ See Rasmussen (1986:pp.194-195) on similar preferences in Iringa Region during the 1980s. Pesticide is also needed while maize is stored (Interview at Tanzania Farmers' Association (TFA), 7/9/99).

Most people buy chemical fertilisers and pesticides and apply fertiliser twice, for planting and growing, although a small number use animal manure at least once.⁵⁰ Chickens, ducks, guinea pigs, rabbits, goats, pigs, sheep, and cows are all kept for both food and sale and, in the absence of large cattle herds, some people now use the droppings from smaller animals like guinea pigs to help fertilise their land.⁵¹ A handful of people with larger animals also sell manure, whilst some people buy Marc fertiliser from the pyrethrum factory (a processing by-product). The small numbers of trees planted by most people also help to improve the fertility of their land. Animals are now generally kept in stalls or pens and allowed to graze a little on the rubbish around house-plots, as well as on fallow land, with only a few large cattle-keepers in the village having their own specific grazing land. However the communal village grazing area remains. Finally, it is notable that only six of the units in my first survey had ox-ploughs and only two had tractors, whilst two of my key informants also had tractors and one had a plough which he used with donkeys. However, most of the people with tractors and ploughs hire them out and, although tractors are used far more now in the timber industry than in agriculture, around 20% of farming families in Mufindi District use ox-ploughs.⁵²

Food Production

As we saw in Chapter Five, reduced yields and declining land fertility are seen as the legacy of villagisation across Tanzania. The testimony of my informants in Kinyanambo and Mwakaumu women groups in other villages did not contradict this, with people frequently complaining that “the land is tired” (“*ardhi imechoka*”) (cf. Narayan 1997:pp.42-43; Ponte 2001:p.87). To try to assess the viability of agriculture – or at least people’s food production – in Kinyanambo today, I gathered data on the 1998 and 1999 maize harvests of 58 economic units in my second survey.⁵³ I established how much maize was harvested from the unit’s *mashamba* (and house-plot) in July/August 1998, how much was harvested from the unit’s *vinyungu* in April/May 1999, and how long all that maize lasted before the unit had to start buying more maize to meet their food needs. I then asked how much maize was harvested from the unit’s *mashamba* (and house-plot) in July/August 1999, to consider short-term production changes.

⁵⁰ Interview at TFA, 7/9/99.

⁵¹ See Friis-Hansen (1986:pp.112-113) on the beginnings of this practice in the Southern Highlands in the 1980s.

⁵² Interview with DALDO, 24/11/99.

⁵³ Three units whose household heads only arrived in Kinyanambo during 1999 were excluded.

My data include all of each unit's maize, even from farms outside Kinyanambo, because it was not easy to separate out the amounts of maize produced in different fields harvested at the same time once it had been de-cobbed and stored in sacks and because I was anyway interested in the overall ability of people in Kinyanambo to feed themselves. A summary of the results is presented in Table 9.

Table 9 – Maize Production in Kinyanambo, 1998/1999

Number of Months Unit's Maize Lasted For Unit's Food in 1998/1999	Number of Units Whose Maize Lasted Each Amount of Time	% of Units Whose Maize Lasted Each Amount of Time (n=58)
0	5	9%
From 1 to 5 Months	19	33%
6 Months	9	16%
From 7 to 11 Months	14	24%
12 Months or More	11	19%

In addition, 11 units were given maize in 1998/1999 – seven by close relatives, two by the district government (via their hamlet leaders), one by a neighbour and one by both relatives and friends. Only two of these 11 units had harvested no maize at all themselves, but one of them plus seven of the others were headed by mostly poor, older widows. Only three units sold any maize in 1998/1999, whilst a fourth used part of its harvest to feed workers in its timber business.⁵⁴

Of the 58 units for whom data was gathered, 57% (33 units) had a bigger maize harvest from their *mashamba* (and house-plot) in 1999 than in 1998 and 24% (14 units) had a smaller harvest. This is not particularly unexpected as weather conditions in 1999 were better than in 1998. Moreover, given the generally bad weather conditions of the late 1990s, it seems to be a positive sign of the viability of food production that more than half of these 58 units managed to grow enough maize in 1998/1999 to meet their food needs for half the year or more, as Table 9 shows. Nonetheless, maize harvests in 1998/1999 were clearly insufficient to satisfy all units' food needs, requiring the vast majority to buy maize for at least part of the year.

Through all my interviews with key informants I detected a general understanding that maize production cannot be relied on as a livelihood, whether to provide food alone or a surplus for sale. It is clearly impossible to know whether yields have indeed gradually fallen in the immediate study area over time, as my informants claimed. Yet it is unquestionable that they perceived this to be the case. Two related questions therefore arise. First, given these

⁵⁴ No units used their own maize for *pombe*-brewing. Although the practice in the past, almost all people brewing *pombe* now said they buy maize for that purpose because their own harvests are too low to meet the high demand.

perceptions, why are so many people still spending so much time on food production (and wanting more land, see Chapter Seven)? Second, given the steadily increasing and diversifying income-earning opportunities in the immediate study area – since non-African settlers first arrived in the late 1930s, more rapidly after villagisation and the birth of Mafinga and, more recently, with economic reform – why are more people not moving out of farming altogether in favour of these new opportunities?

The answer to these questions is three-fold. First, the combination of food shortages within living memory (for example after villagisation), recently bad weather conditions (reducing overall production and thereby pushing up food prices) and overall economic uncertainty (including that from inflation and recent policy changes) means that it remains risky to rely on being able to afford or even obtain enough food on the open market. The reason why virtually every house-plot in Kinyanambo is planted with maize⁵⁵ is therefore to ensure that at least some food needs will be met, regardless of market conditions, with food production being, in effect, a form of livelihood insurance. Second, the economic uncertainty of the 1990s, by increasing peoples' needs for cash, has made food production a rational part of any livelihood strategy where land is available and the unit has the means to produce at least some of their own food – because any food produced leaves more money to meet other needs. On both these counts, then, what may at first appear to be a cultural disposition towards food production, the immediate study area still being in many ways very much a rural area, in fact has a very clear material base. The possibility of earning some additional income from farming then reinforces the disposition.

Finally, urbanisation and liberalisation, being relatively recent, have not yet stimulated fundamental structural changes in peoples' livelihoods. The new income-earning opportunities they bring are not regarded as sufficiently secure, nor economic conditions as sufficiently stable, for people to abandon farming completely. Here even the case of the 39 units in my first survey whose most time-consuming activity was neither food production nor a directly agricultural activity and whose most lucrative activity was also not a directly agricultural activity is instructive. 67% of this group (26 of 39, or 17% of all 156 units surveyed) were newcomer units who, being migrants in the first place, might be thought more likely to respond positively to new opportunities (and thus act as pioneers of social change), yet only one of the 39 was not

⁵⁵ Of the three units in my second survey who were not farming their house-plot in 1999/2000, one was renting rooms, another a house around which the owner farmed, and one had a house-plot that was too small to farm.

involved in food production at all. Despite the diversity of livelihood activities we saw above, agriculture therefore remains vital to almost everyone's livelihood in Kinyanambo today. For as long as this is the case, land will remain a key asset in Kinyanambo, regardless of its (actual or perceived) productivity.

Wealth Differences

During my fieldwork I studied wealth (and poverty) in Kinyanambo in two different ways. First, I gathered information on housing quality, on the roof and wall materials of all occupied houses in the village. I used these criteria to rank and group the ten hamlets by visible wealth, to help choose a balanced sample for my two surveys and subsequently to stratify the sampling within each chosen hamlet so as to select surveyed units in proportion to the visible wealth therein (Appendix Three). Second, I gathered information on the possession by each of the 156 economic units in my first survey of various listed items, in order to construct a possessions score (P Score). I broadly followed the methodology of Sender and Smith (1990:Chapter 3, especially pp.27-30) in this, although I chose my own list of items. I counted the possession of five status goods (watches/clocks, radios, bicycles, motorcycles and cars) and five income-generating machines (ox-ploughs, tractors and sewing, milling and logging machines).⁵⁶ P Scores were calculated by allocating one point for the possession, by any member of the economic unit, of at least one of each listed item as at January 2000. Table 10 initiates the analysis by showing the spread of P Scores I encountered. Although the maximum possible score was 10, no surveyed unit scored more than 7.

Table 10 – P Scores

P Score	Number of Units With Each P Score	% of Units With Each P Score (n=156)
0	43	28%
1	34	22%
2	41	26%
3	31	20%
4	5	3%
5	1	< 1%
6	0	0%
7	1	< 1%

⁵⁶ I did not count clothes or shoes because I wanted to avoid causing the embarrassment, by asking questions about such personal items, that Sender and Smith encountered in their research (1990:p.28). I did not count furniture for similar reasons, nor did I count housing structure as I was analysing it separately (as above).

The mean average P Score was 1.5. However over a fifth of all surveyed economic units in each of the surveyed hamlets had P Scores of 0. Gangilonga was the poorest hamlet on this count, with 44% of surveyed units there scoring 0 (7 of 16), whilst Upendo was the least poor, with only 22% scoring 0 (6 of 27). Having chosen my surveyed hamlets and stratified my sampling within each hamlet by visible wealth in the first place, I obviously expected to find both a range of P Scores within each hamlet and that some hamlets would appear to be richer or poorer than others. Yet the two measures of wealth nevertheless generated somewhat different results. From richest to poorest by visible wealth the six surveyed hamlets were ranked Upendo, Idope, Gangilonga, Tanganyika, Lumwago, and Ifingo.⁵⁷ However according to their mean P Scores, the hamlets were ranked Upendo (2.1), Ifingo (1.7), Idope (1.6), Lumwago (1.4), and Gangilonga and Tanganyika (1.1 each). The main discrepancy is Ifingo, where, because of its greater distance from Mafinga, far more units have bicycles than in any other surveyed hamlet. This both increased the average P Scores of surveyed units in Ifingo and suggests that people in Ifingo prioritise buying a bicycle over building a more expensive higher-quality house.

Table 11, showing the proportion of surveyed units living in each house type with different P Scores, sets my two measures of wealth side by side.

Table 11 – P Scores and House Types

P Score	Modern/Metal (n=56)	Mud/Metal (n=53)	Mud/Thatch (n=47)
0	16% (9)	30% (16)	38% (18)
1	16% (9)	23% (12)	28% (13)
2	25% (14)	30% (16)	23% (11)
3	30% (17)	17% (9)	11% (5)
4	9% (5)	(0)	(0)
5	2% (1)	(0)	(0)
7	2% (1)	(0)	(0)

All units with a P Score of 4 or more lived in modern/metal houses. A higher proportion of units living in mud/thatch houses had P Scores of either 0 or 1 than those living in mud/metal houses, who in turn were also more likely to have P Scores of 0 or 1 than units living in modern/metal houses. Furthermore, the mean P Score among units living in modern/metal houses was 2.1, among units in mud/metal houses it was 1.3 and among units in mud/thatch houses it was 1.1. Excluding Ifingo (because of its geographic specificity over bicycles) reduces the mean P Score among units living in mud/thatch houses to 0.8, although the mean P Scores for the other house types are unchanged. Between them these observations suggest that,

⁵⁷ Tables A4 and A5, Appendix Three.

although housing quality may not fully reflect wealth differences in Kinyanambo today, there is a general connection between P Scores and house types – that units with higher P Scores do tend to live in higher-quality houses while units with lower P Scores do tend to live in lower-quality houses – lending support to my initial hamlet selection and survey sampling methodology in its attempt to create a survey sample that was representative of relative wealth and poverty in Kinyanambo.

Disaggregating the wealth data by *uenyeji* and gender raises several further points. For example, whilst newcomer units had a mean P Score of 1.9 and *wenyeji* of villagisation time units had a mean P Score of 1.4, both *wenyeji* units and units whose household heads were born in modern Kinyanambo had mean P Scores of 1.1. Furthermore, *wenyeji* units were proportionately more likely to be living in mud/thatch houses, *wenyeji* of villagisation time units in mud/metal houses and newcomer units in modern/metal houses, although units whose household heads were born in modern Kinyanambo were also more likely to be living in modern/metal houses. Overall, though, this suggests that longer-term residents of Kinyanambo were generally poorer than more recent arrivals.

There were even more marked differences in wealth by gender – the mean P Score among the 52 surveyed units in female-headed households being just 0.7, compared with a mean of 2 among the 104 units in male-headed households. Moreover, 52% of the units in female-headed households had P Scores of 0 (27 of 52), 37% had P Scores of 1 (18 of 52) and only one (the core unit in a multiple-unit household comprising the widows of a polygamously married man, headed by his first wife) had a P Score of 4 or more. In contrast, only 15% of the units in male-headed households had P Scores of 0 (16 of 104) while a further 15% had P Scores of 1. Yet, although proportionately more units in female-headed households were living in mud/thatch houses than units in male-headed households, and vice versa for mud/metal houses, the proportions were almost identical for modern/metal houses. There are two reasons for this. The first is that some widows inherit modern/metal houses from their deceased husbands, even when his possessions are inherited by children and other relatives. The second is that many female household heads who have not yet or never married live in modern/metal houses – often because they have greater control over their own resources and can therefore save up to build a better house.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Housing quality was a particular priority for women in my various Mwakaumu group discussions as modern houses, being both better ventilated and easier to keep clean, are less likely to cause them and their children health problems.

Table 12 therefore presents an overall picture of gendered wealth differences, by setting out the mean P Scores for surveyed units in both male- and female-headed households according to the type of house they were living in.

Table 12 – Gender Differences in Wealth

Gender of Household Head	Modern/Metal	Mud/Metal	Mud/Thatch
Male	2.5	1.7	1.7
Female	1.4	0.4	0.3

This table indicates that surveyed units in female-headed households were indeed poorer on the whole than units in male-headed households – a phenomenon remarked upon by other observers of Tanzania (e.g. Sender & Smith 1990; Narayan 1997:pp.12-13, 30-39; Mbilinyi 1997:p.12) – although obviously there will always be exceptions to any rule. Moreover, both this table and the data on *uenyaji* and wealth lend additional support to my contention that there is a general connection between P Scores and house types.

I want to conclude my analysis of wealth differences in Kinyanambo today by discussing livelihoods. Broadly speaking, people engaging in livelihood activities such as business, employment and skilled work are among the wealthiest in the village. The main difference between these activities and many of the other livelihood activities that people in Kinyanambo engage in is that they tend to generate higher incomes and, being less seasonal, do so throughout the year. For example, employment now provides a relatively reliable fixed income for those who are employed, whilst skilled workers, being scarcer, command higher rates of pay than wage labourers.

In keeping with these observations, it is interesting to note that, although units owning and/or farming 4 acres of land or more in Kinyanambo tended to have, on average, higher P Scores than other units, there did not appear to be a clear link between P Scores and either landholdings or land farmed in Kinyanambo. Most notably, the average P Score of those units owning or farming less than 1 acre of land in Kinyanambo (i.e. usually just a house-plot and/or *vinyungu*) was greater than that both for units with no landholdings or farms in Kinyanambo and for units with landholdings or farms in Kinyanambo in each of the size groupings between 1 and 5 acres, as Tables 13 and 14 now show.

Table 13 – P Scores and Landholdings in Kinyanambo

Total Acreage Owned by Unit in Kinyanambo, as at January 2000	Number of Units Owning Each Amount of Land	Mean P Score of Units Within Each Group
0	18	1.1
Less Than 1 Acre	25	2
1 to 1.99 Acres	26	1.4
2 to 2.99 Acres	25	1.1
3 to 3.99 Acres	14	1.2
4 to 4.99 Acres	17	1.6
5 to 9.99 Acres	23	2
10 Acres of More	8	2.1

Table 14 – P Scores and Land Farmed in Kinyanambo

Total Acreage Farmed by Unit in Kinyanambo, 1999/2000	Number of Units Farming Each Amount of Land	Mean P Score of Units Within Each Group
0	5	1.6
Less Than 1 Acre	20	1.9
1 to 1.99 Acres	43	1.4
2 to 2.99 Acres	47	1.4
3 to 3.99 Acres	20	1.2
4 to 4.99 Acres	10	1.7
5 to 9.99 Acres	10	2.3
10 Acres or More	1	3

This is not a dissimilar finding to Wily's (1988:p.193), who argued that farm size in Tabora Region in the mid-1980s was an indicator neither of wealth nor of economic status, but it contrasts with Sender and Smith's contemporaneous finding of a close relationship between possessions and acreages farmed in the Usambaras (an area with a longer history of land commoditisation) and thus of wealth/poverty and access to the physical means of production (1990:pp.31-35). However, Sender and Smith also found a link between wealth and participation in salaried employment (Ibid:pp.43-45), whilst Wily (1988:pp.217-221, 255) found rural wealth to be urban-based. In Kinyanambo's case in 2000, after well over a decade of subsequent economic reforms, my findings suggest the emergence of two subsets of wealthier people – those with the largest landholdings and farms and those with quite small landholdings and farms. I observed that members of both subsets tend to have access to income from businesses (and small businesses), employment and skilled work, but, whereas the latter are only farming to supplement their food supply (at least in the short-term, being predominantly newcomers to Kinyanambo), the former (often *wenyeji* of villagisation time who have had time to acquire more land) are more likely to be generating at least some income from their agriculture.

Finally, wage labour is worthy of further comment because there are some noticeable differences between suppliers. For example, economic units in my first survey supplying non-agricultural wage labour were predominantly in male-headed households – much of the work,

for example in timber and construction, being carried out by young men – and tended to have higher P Scores than units supplying agricultural wage labour. In contrast, the latter tended to have older household heads – 47% of the 32 units who supplied only agricultural wage labour in 1999 (15 units) being headed by grandparents or great-grandparents, who comprised only 22% of all surveyed household heads (34 of 156).⁵⁹ However among these 32 units, the 15 units in male-headed households had a mean P Score of 1.7 – higher than the survey mean of 1.5 – while the 17 units in female-headed households, 12 of whom were widows, had a mean P Score of just 0.4. There is a parallel here with the units in my second survey employing agricultural wage labourers (above) – the five of them headed by women (all widows) had an average P Score of 0.2, whereas the seven headed by men had an average P Score of 2.7. Overall, then, the 23 units in female-headed households using or supplying agricultural wage labour (no users of agricultural wage labour also supplied it) were among the poorest in the village.

Social Change

Female poverty, particularly on the part of older women and widows, is tied up with the phenomenon of increasing household nucleation in Kinyanambo today. I heard many complaints from older people that their children do not help them – not because they do not want to, but because they are unable to. There was a clear perception among my key informants that support networks are breaking down as kinship relations are renegotiated in the light of changing social and economic circumstances, for example as economic uncertainty and especially disease force younger people to prioritise their immediate families.⁶⁰ Older people also complained that their children are dying and leaving them with grandchildren to bring up alone – they had expected to be looked after by these same children in old age and, in the absence of state support, are now finding it difficult to manage.

For example, 12 of the 156 economic units in my first survey contained only people of the grandparent and grandchildren generations, with no working age adults, whilst a further unit

⁵⁹ Table A18, Appendix Four.

⁶⁰ See also Mung'ong'o (1998:pp.23-24, 28) on the breakdown of extended families and support for older generations in Njombe District, Mwamfupe (1998:pp.17-18) on Mbeya Region and Jambiya (1998:pp.17-19) on the Usambaras. The current process of household nucleation is distinct from the household fragmentation that sometimes occurred at villagisation (Wily 1988:pp.166-174).

contained a grandparent, grandchild and great-grandchild – making up 8% of the survey total. Only four of the 13 were in households headed by men, of whom all were married, whereas seven of the nine in households headed by women were widows. A further 21 units (13%) contained grandparents, some of their unmarried children, and grandchildren by both these children and deceased children,⁶¹ of whom nine were headed by widows and three by widowers. Thus 16 economic units in all in my first survey were headed by widowed grandmothers bringing up often orphaned grandchildren, or 10% of the total. The significance of this is that older women tend to have more limited livelihood options than both older men and their children's generation, given both their more limited education and their more deep-rooted view of gender divisions of labour. These women and their dependants are therefore more vulnerable to poverty than other social groups in the village. Such people – with few possessions and little ability to earn large incomes, often struggling physically to farm, yet needing to feed and educate their grandchildren – are among those who are selling and renting out land in Kinyanambo today.

Another aspect of increasing household nucleation related to this decline in support for the old is the apparent strength of the conjugal unit among younger people.⁶² It is not uncommon in Kinyanambo today for married couples to co-operate in dividing responsibilities and decision-making powers over different aspects of household expenditure and accumulation as it suits them, nor for them to budget together.⁶³ For example, Mama Alicia,⁶⁴ who has three young children, is responsible for all aspects of food production in her family. Her husband works as a self-employed roofer and her younger sister runs a small kiosk which provides the regular income to meet many of their everyday needs. However, whenever Mama Alicia's husband gets paid for a job the family sit together and plan what to do with the money, which he then gives to her to go and spend accordingly. Yet, despite such signs of closer economic bonds, individuals do still tend to exercise greater control over their own incomes and some young women I met had chosen to stay unmarried in order to keep full control of their own resources.

⁶¹ Table A18, Appendix Four.

⁶² See also O'Laughlin (1995) on the importance of analysing conjugal bonds.

⁶³ Interviews with AARW Gender and Training Officer, 18/2/00, and District Community Development Officers (DCDOs), 22/9/99.

⁶⁴ Not her real name.

Increasing household nucleation does not mean that social ties are now unimportant. They remain important factors in migration (as above) and access to land (see Chapter Seven), whilst most people hope for *msaada* from their relatives as those who receive it, so long as they are not dependent on it, are better off as a result. However the majority of units in my first survey viewed themselves as single economic units (i.e. primarily self-supporting) and extended families thus do appear to be less economically relevant than they were in the past. For example, in polygamous households, men who are no longer employed often cannot now support all their wives and children as once they would. Moreover, in an area where polygamy was formerly common, only 43 units in my first survey were parts of self-identified multiple-unit households. Only 25 of them were in currently polygamous households, whilst 18 were in multiple-unit households of various other types (Appendix Two). The remaining 113 economic units (72% of all 156 surveyed) were part of self-identified single-unit households. It is these single-unit households, especially those containing younger people, who are contributing most to the process of household nucleation. Many of them are also headed by relative newcomers to Kinyambo, a group who, as we have seen, are relatively wealthier and less involved in agriculture than other *wenyeji* groups. For example, only 22% of newcomer units had household heads who were grandparents or great-grandparents (14 of 65), compared with 44% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (20 of 45) and 58% of *wenyeji* units (21 of 36).

It remains, then, to draw some final conclusions about social change in Kinyambo during the 1990s. First, processes of social differentiation have clearly continued apace as economic reforms have deepened, with wealth accumulation now the key channel of differentiation and livelihood activities now the key indicators both of relative wealth and of social position within the village (and the town). For example, a relatively wealthy 'middle class' appears to be solidifying, as the public sector workers who remained after retrenchment benefit from better-paid and more secure jobs and some of those who have been retrenched join the often younger and better-educated newcomers who have been flooding into the Mafinga area in taking up the skilled work and business opportunities offered by the growing town. Second, as urbanisation, local development and economic reforms have continued, the newcomers of the 1990s and the *wenyeji* of villagisation time who have most effectively adapted their livelihoods to take advantage of these changing conditions appear to have superseded the formerly dominant *wenyeji* to become a new political and economic elite.

There are two further important points. First, many of the newcomers to Kinyanambo during the 1990s have little attachment to the village as an entity, especially those in Kinyanambo B (where many have indeed settled) for whom, being so close to Mafinga, Kinyanambo seems like just another part of the town and not really a village at all. At the same time, many *wenyeji* of villagisation time have become more closely identified with the village because, having by now permanently settled in Kinyanambo, they have had time to establish strong social and political relations there. As they then turn increasingly to agriculture for their livelihoods – either because they have not responded so positively to the increasing economic opportunities of the 1990s and are thus more reliant on food production or because they have responded by developing profitable agricultural activities, often after having retired or been retrenched – they find that they have much more in common with the *wenyeji* of old Kinyanambo, who were previously more dependent on agriculture than themselves. As these last two *uenyeji* groups grow older and as agriculture still remains central to livelihood security in old age, these people have a central interest in what now happens to land in the village. Moreover, as land becomes even more important in old age – as many of the children who in the past would have provided additional support are either dying or focusing on their own immediate families – the importance of farming (and hence land) to these two groups points to the possibility of increasing tensions between themselves as ‘villagers’ and the various newcomers and outsiders who are steadily acquiring ‘village’ land. For even if new economic opportunities expand to the extent that younger people – and newcomers and urban-based outsiders – increasingly adopt a more diverse range of non-agricultural livelihood activities, relying less on their own food production and gradually moving away from farming altogether (cf. Jambiya 1998; Mung’ong’o 1998; Mwamfupe 1998) – although this seems unlikely, as we have seen – it is difficult to foresee a time when agriculture will not still be important in old age. Overall, therefore, all *uenyeji* groups perceive a need for land, although those people with relatively more land, especially *wenyeji* and *wenyeji* of villagisation time, face the greatest pressure from the many newcomers and outsiders wanting land.

Second, processes of commoditisation have increased everybody’s need for cash during the 1990s and, whilst livelihoods have undoubtedly become increasingly diverse, particularly as more people move into non-agricultural income-generating activities, some activities now appear, for some people, to be more secure and/or lucrative than others. Although some people have clearly benefited more than others from the increasing economic

opportunities of the 1990s, my evidence suggests that, with few exceptions, poorer people have shared in these benefits too. For example, those who lack entrepreneurial flair and educational achievement can still take advantage of the increasing demand for locally-produced alcohol and the increasing demand for wage labourers. Even the very poorest, especially those who are physically unable to work, can use *msaada* to pay others to farm their land – because, although ordinary people generally may prioritise the economic needs of their immediate families, *msaada* is still willingly dispensed by those who can afford to do so as it generates social and political returns. Finally, the example of *msaada* draws our attention to the important role of health in influencing people's ability to respond to economic opportunity, and thus to the vital difference in circumstances between those who are sick and those who are healthy. It is not unreasonable, then, in concluding this chapter, to suggest that, as disease (and HIV/AIDS in particular) continues to take its toll, health may well become an increasingly important aspect of social differentiation in Kinyanambo in the future.

Chapter Seven

Land Tenure in Kinyanambo Today

In this chapter I first outline the various means of access to land in Kinyanambo and then examine land transfers, especially market transactions, in some depth. I explore people's demand for land and expected future land transfers, with evidence in this first half of the chapter coming predominantly from my two surveys. Drawing more heavily on my key informant interviews, I then discuss the supply of land and analyse the operation of Kinyanambo's land tenure system, considering its dynamics and tensions, before concluding with a discussion of people's understanding of their land rights in Kinyanambo today.

Means of Access to Land

We saw in Chapter Six that some people in Kinyanambo farm land elsewhere because there is no land available in Kinyanambo (or because the land there is infertile). Yet 94% of the economic units in my first survey (147 of 156) reported that they could get more land for farming in Kinyanambo if they wanted it, and only 6% (9 units) that they could not. There is thus apparently no overall land shortage in Kinyanambo, nor in Mufindi District as a whole – confirming what I was told emphatically early on in my fieldwork by a senior district political figure who himself owns land in Kinyanambo. However, given that almost all the land in Kinyanambo is owned and that there is very little left for the village government to distribute, this widespread perception of land availability must therefore mean that land is being transferred between people and that land transfers are an integral part of the local land tenure system.

In order to explore this, the 147 economic units who reported that land is available in Kinyanambo – that they could get more land for farming if they wanted it – were asked how they would get it, with respondents encouraged to give as many different means of access as were relevant to themselves. Importantly, there was no checklist. All responses, presented as a summary picture in Table 15, were therefore offered by respondents.

Table 15 – Means of Access to More Farm Land in Kinyanambo

Means of Access to More Farm Land in Kinyanambo	Number of Units Reporting Each Means of Access	% of Units Reporting Each Means of Access (n=147)
Asking Relatives ¹	13	9%
Asking Individuals ²	2	1%
Asking the Village Government	17	12%
Being Given by Relatives	5	3%
Being Given by Individuals	4	3%
Being Given by the Village Government	4	3%
Buying ³ from Individuals	97	66%
Buying from the Village Government	14	10%
Renting from Individuals	37	25%
Borrowing from Relatives	3	2%
Inheriting from Relatives	4	3%

¹ Relatives were almost always resident in Kinyanambo.

² Individuals were non-relatives with land in Kinyanambo, in most cases resident therein.

³ One other unit reported buying (and renting) without specifying who from.

That there is an individualised land market in Kinyanambo today is abundantly clear, with the two most common responses – “buying from individuals” and “renting from individuals”, cited by 66% and 25% of respondents respectively – testifying to the relative importance of private market transactions as means of accessing land in the village today. Moreover, throughout my fieldwork I observed these means of access to land being reported by men and women, young and old, from all *uenyeji* groups and of varying wealth. Yet, as Table 15 also makes clear, there are various other means of access to farm land in Kinyanambo and two other parties from whom it can be obtained – relatives and the village government. It should not necessarily be assumed, therefore, that private market transactions are people’s preferred means of access to land, nor that they are socially legitimate. Table 16 now presents the 11 means of access to land reported in Table 15, ordered according to both source and method.

Table 16 – Source of More Farm Land in Kinyanambo and Method of Access

	Individuals	Relatives	Village Government	Total Responses
Asking¹	2	13	17	32
Being Given	4	5	4	13
Buying	97	-	14	111
Renting	37	-	-	37
Borrowing	-	3	-	3
Inheriting	-	4	-	4
Total Responses	140	25	35	200

¹ “Asking” is not strictly speaking a means of access. Instead the given source is first asked for land and if land is available the means is then decided.

There are several key points to note. First, only 4% of the 200 separate responses involved borrowing and inheriting (in these cases only from relatives), suggesting their limited nature as means of access to land. Second, although farm land can be given (free of charge) by all three sources, this means of access is also limited, making up just 7% of the total responses.

Third, renting, which featured in 19% of the total responses, is generally only a means of access to farm land from individuals. Fourth, buying land, whether from individuals or the village government, featured in 56% of the total responses and is therefore by far the most common means of access to land in Kinyanambo today. Finally, 70% of all 200 responses involved individuals as the source of more farm land, confirming that private transfers now dominate access to land. This individualisation means that both relatives (the most important source of land before villagisation) and the village government (an important source of land at and since villagisation) have been superseded as the main source of land in Kinyanambo today.

Land Transfers and the Land Market

Not only is access to land now highly individualised, it is also highly marketised. A clearer picture of the Kinyanambo land market emerges from the data I gathered on land- and house-renting and borrowing in my first survey, and on recent land transfers in my second survey. During the 1999/2000 agricultural year 6% of the economic units in my first survey (10 of 156) were renting farm land in Kinyanambo and 13% (20 units) were borrowing farm land in Kinyanambo, with five units doing both. Newcomers were more likely to be renting and/or borrowing land than longer-term residents of the village, because they generally had less land there of their own. 26% of newcomer units were renting and/or borrowing land (17 of 65), compared with 16% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (7 of 45) and only 3% of *wenyeji* units (1 of 36). This last *mwenyeji* unit was borrowing land and I came across no *wenyeji* families during my entire fieldwork period who were renting land in Kinyanambo.

Although there were no marked differences in the proportions of units in male- and female-headed households who were renting and/or borrowing farm land in Kinyanambo, there were big differences in wealth, as measured by average P Scores, between the renter and borrower units headed by the different genders, as Table 17 now shows.

Table 17 – Renting and Borrowing Farm Land in Kinyanambo by Gender and Wealth

	Renting Farm Land in Kinyanambo	Borrowing Farm Land in Kinyanambo
Units in Male-Headed Households	2.1	2.3
Units in Female-Headed Households	0.3	0.6

Moreover, 81% of the units in male-headed households who were renting and/or borrowing land in Kinyanambo (13 of 16) had P Scores of 2 or more (the mean average of all 104 surveyed units in male-headed households), whereas only 44% of the units in female-headed households who were renting and/or borrowing land in Kinyanambo (4 of 9) had P Scores over 0.7 (the mean average of all 52 surveyed units in female-headed households). These figures suggest that renter and borrower units in male-headed households tend to be wealthier than other units in male-headed households. I observed that families headed by men who are renting and/or borrowing land are usually those where the man is married and the family want more land to expand their farming. However, although the majority have little land of their own in Kinyanambo, two of the surveyed borrower units already had landholdings in the village of 14.25 acres and 17.25 acres respectively. Meanwhile, among families headed by women, I observed that renting and, in particular, borrowing are important means of access to land for widows and unmarried women – those without a husband or ex-husband to provide them with land. This reflects the fact that it is more difficult for women who need land to find the money to purchase (and sometimes even rent) it.

Turning now to house-renting and borrowing, this is much more common in Kinyanambo today than land-renting and borrowing. As at January 2000 43 of the 156 economic units in my first survey were either renting or borrowing a house, house-plot or rooms in Kinyanambo – 28% of the total surveyed and substantially more than the 25 units who were renting and/or borrowing farm land. 19% of the units in this survey (30 of 156) were renting a house (usually with the house-plot, which they could then farm) or rooms in a house, whilst 8% (13 units) were borrowing a house and/or house-plot.¹ Thus, in contrast to farm land, where borrowing occurs more often than renting, borrowing of housing is less common than renting.

Again, however, newcomers were more likely to be renting or borrowing housing than longer-term residents of the village – 46% of newcomer units (30 of 65), compared with 15% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (7 of 45) and only 8% of *wenyeji* units (3 of 36). Interestingly, all the last were in female-headed households, such as a *mwenyeji* who returned to Kinyanambo in 1998 on widowhood and was borrowing a house from a relative. However, whereas units in female-headed households were just as likely to rent housing as to borrow, units in male-headed households were more likely to rent than to borrow. This is probably

¹ In a few cases the units were borrowing house-plots solely to farm them.

because the majority of units in male-headed households contain at least two income-earning adults – a husband and wife – and are therefore more likely to be able to find the money to rent, whilst the many poorer units in female-headed households are more likely to be able to draw on people's sympathies and thus borrow rather than rent (cf. Wily 1988:p.357).

House-renting and borrowing occurs in all parts of the village, although renting in particular is noticeably more common in the hamlets nearest Mafinga in Kinyanambo B. For example, 44% of surveyed units in Upendo (12 of 27) and 40% of surveyed units in Idope (15 of 38) were either renting or borrowing a house, house-plot or rooms, which between them accounts for 63% of all 43 renter and borrower units. Multiple occupancy (house-sharing) is also a characteristic of the hamlets nearest Mafinga, especially Idope, the closest to Mafinga and the most densely populated of all the Kinyanambo B hamlets. 149 economic units lived in Idope in 127 buildings and one of the surveyed units borrowing (part of) a house and seven who were renting rooms in houses lived in Idope. Such multiple occupancy, especially on the part of renters and borrowers, is a result of the high demand for accommodation near Mafinga, combined with a shortage of space for new construction near the town. Furthermore, and more generally, the many newcomers to the urban area often prefer to rent until they decide to settle permanently and find a house-plot on which to build their own house, whilst land pressures in the settled areas of the village are such that many of the young people born in modern Kinyanambo must live in rented or borrowed accommodation when setting up on their own – if part of their parents' land has been taken to create house-plots, there is often too little left for them to inherit a plot on which to build their own house, at least while their parents are still alive.

Land Transfers in Kinyanambo, 1997-2000

The 61 economic units in my second survey were asked about all the land transfers they had undertaken in Kinyanambo between 1997 and 2000 – all types of transfer in all types of land – and a total of 74 different transfers were recorded. 57% of the surveyed units (35 of 61) had engaged in at least one land transfer during this period, although transfers were generally more common among units living in Kinyanambo B and C. Table 18 presents the data on the number of each type of transfer and the type of land involved.

Table 18 – Land Transfers in Kinyanambo, 1997-2000

	<i>Mashamba</i>	<i>Vinyungu</i>	House-plot	House-plot and House	House	Rooms	Total Transfers
Borrowed/ Borrowing	3	4	1	-	-	-	8
Lent/ Lending Out	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
Rented/ Renting	4	4	-	8	2	4	22
Rented/ Renting Out	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Bought	4	4	7	1	-	-	16
Sold	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Inherited	3	1	1	4	-	-	9
Given Free of Charge	7	6	1	-	-	-	14
Total Transfers	22	22	10	13	2	5	74

54% of all transfers involved market transactions, which I analyse below. However various points of interest relate to the non-market transfers. For example, in 11 of the 14 cases where land was given free of charge, the donor was a close relative who also lived in Kinyanambo. In another case land was given by a neighbour (to a very old, sick and poor widow whose neighbours also helped her to farm), but in only one case was land given free of charge by a stranger (i.e. a non-relative and neither neighbour nor friend). The final case involved a member of one of the five main *wenyeji* clans of old Kinyanambo being given small *vinyungu* by the village government.

Regarding the 11 cases of borrowing and lending out different types of land, the most interesting was a unit borrowing *vinyungu* from the household head's employer, the pyrethrum factory, and then lending that same piece of land to a friend in Kinyanambo. This unit was also one of the two land-borrower units with large landholdings mentioned above. Of the remaining seven cases of borrowing land, in four the land was borrowed from strangers and in two from relatives, all in the village, while in the final case land was borrowed from a friend in the village who had specifically asked the unit to farm his house-plot, to keep it in use until he was able to build a house there. The two other cases of lending out land in Kinyanambo were of *mashamba* loaned to a neighbour and another *vinyungu* loaned to a friend in the village.

Finally, in all cases of land being inherited, this was from relatives. Three widows inherited their houses and house-plots from their husbands and two of them also inherited *mashamba*. One young man inherited a house-plot, *mashamba* and *vinyungu* from his father, having moved to Kinyanambo when his father became sick so as to be able to assert his

inheritance claims. In a more unusual case, the house-plot and ruined house belonging to one woman's daughter was passed on to her by her widowed son-in-law, as her own house in Lumwago was due to be demolished for a road to be built.

Table 19 now presents details of all 17 cases of buying and selling land in Kinyanambo between 1997 and 2000.

Table 19 – Land Transactions in Kinyanambo, 1997-2000 – Purchases and Sales

	Year	Location of Land	Type of Land	Other Party	Area in Acres	Total Price in TSh	Unit Price (TSh per acre)
1	1997	Makota Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Village Government	3	1,500	500
2	1997	Luang'a Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	2	10,000	5,000
3	1998	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.5	60,000	120,000
4	1999	Ifingo	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	4	40,000	10,000
5	1997	Luang'a Mahameni	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.25	10,000	40,000
6	1998	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.5	60,000	120,000
7	1999	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - ?	0.25	?	?
8	1998	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.25	8,000	32,000
9	1999	?	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.5	50,000	100,000
10	1999	Mugodi	House-plot & House	Villager - ?	0.25	?	?
11	1998	Mugodi	House-plot	Villager - ?	0.5	?	?
12	1999	Mugodi	House-plot	Villager - Stranger	0.5	35,000	70,000
13	1999	Idope	House-plot	Villager - Stranger	0.25	60,000	240,000
14	1999	Upendo	House-plot	Villager - Stranger	0.5	50,000	100,000
15	1998	Ifingo	House-plot	Village Government	0.5	?	?
16	1998	Ifingo	House-plot	Villager - Stranger	0.5	30,000	60,000
17	1999	Ifingo	House-plot	Villager - Stranger	0.5	40,000	80,000

These 17 sale transactions in Kinyanambo were undertaken by 14 of the 61 surveyed units. Two cases serve as examples at either extreme. First, Transactions 3 and 6 were purchases made by the same person, Mzee Jonas,² a man employed as a sales officer at one of the biggest timber companies in the district. Although he moved to the immediate study area in 1979, he has only lived in Kinyanambo since the early 1990s, when he began building a house on a plot in Upendo that he had previously bought from a villager in 1985 and which was registered at the District Land Office. He also has an undeveloped 0.25-acre house-plot in Kinanambo, a 2-acre *shamba* in Luang'a Mahameni and 1 acre in Lumwago Mahameni, all bought from villagers in 1987. He was described locally as a "big man" and was clearly regarded as both rich and powerful. I can only speculate as to why he paid so much for *mashamba* and *vinyungu* (a unit price of TSh 120,000 each, the highest of all recorded farm land sale transactions), but I imagine he paid a premium for being a rich *mwenyeji* of villagisation time (an outsider from the district), perhaps paying over the odds to secure

² Not his real name.

patronage and influence, as he bought from a *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo who was a stranger to him. Interestingly, however, he is also (monogamously) married to a *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo, whom he met after moving to the immediate study area. Second, Transaction 9 was a sale – the sole one recorded – made by Bi Lustika,³ a poor widow living in Ifingo. She sold her *vinyungu* to raise money (TSh 50,000) to build her house on the plot she purchased in Transaction 17 as, being in poor health, the construction of a higher-quality house is a priority for her. However, as a widow responsible for raising several children and grandchildren she also needs land for farming. She was therefore renting another *vinyungu* – for much less money (TSh 6,000 per year) than she had been able to raise through her sale (Transaction 6 in Table 20 below).

Table 19 suggests that, on farm land, *vinyungu* are generally more expensive per acre than *mashamba*. On house-plots and houses, although not conclusive, the data suggest that house-plots in Idope (and possibly Upendo) are more expensive than those in Mugodi and Ifingo, which is easily explained. Upendo contains only large low-density house-plots, strictly planned by the District Land Office, while Idope is already very crowded. Both hamlets lie on the most convenient side of the Tanzam for access to Mafinga (a 15-30 minute walk across the *vinyungu*), whereas Mugodi is unplanned, sprawling and on the other side of the tarmac road, and Ifingo is far from town. I therefore expected demand – and hence prices – for house-plots to be highest in Idope, followed by Upendo (and also Amani, between them).

There is not enough data in Table 19 to make any claims about market prices beyond these general points. However, it is worth emphasising that the 17 listed sale transactions were those that occurred in only 10% of the economic units in six hamlets comprising 47% of Kinyanambo's population. By extrapolation I would therefore suggest that there were around 353 separate land sales in Kinyanambo between 1997 and 2000.⁴

Table 20 now provides details of all 23 rental transactions reported by the economic units in my second survey during the same period.

³ Not her real name.

⁴ Extrapolated according to hamlet populations and groups in Appendix Three. Double-counting is most unlikely – as nearly all recorded transactions were purchases, the extrapolated 353 separate transactions would also all have been purchases, with their corresponding (and unreported) sales being the other half of these transactions.

Table 20 – Land Transactions in Kinyanambo, 1997-2000 – Rentals

	Year ¹	Location of Land	Type of Land	Other Party	Size ²	Total Price in TSh	Unit Price ³
1	1997/1998 & 1998/1999	Near Ndolezi	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	1	10,000 pa	10,000
2	1997/1998	?	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	1	3,000 pa	3,000
3	1998/1999 & 1999/2000	Ifingo	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	2	10,000 pa	5,000
4	1999/2000	Lumwago	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager - Stranger	2	6,000 pa	3,000
5	1997/1998	?	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.25	5,000 pa	20,000
6	1998/1999 & 1999/2000	Ifingo Msituni	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.5	6,000 pa	12,000
7	1999/2000	Ifingo	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Stranger	0.5	5,000 pa	10,000
8	1999/2000	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager - Relative	1	2,000 pa	2,000
9	1996-2000	Tanganyika	House-plot & House	Outsider - Stranger	0.5	2,000 pcm	2,000
10	1995-2000	Upendo	House-plot & House	Villager - Stranger	0.5	1,000 pcm	1,000
11	1997-2000	Upendo	House-plot & House	Outsider/Former Villager - Relative (Distant/Clan)	0.25	1,500 pcm	1,500
12	1998-2000	Upendo	House-plot & House	Villager - Stranger	0.25	1,000 pcm	1,000
13	1998-2000	Upendo	House-plot & House	Villager - Friend	0.25	1,000 pcm	1,000
14	1999-2000	Upendo	House-plot & House	Outsider - Stranger	0.5	1,500 pcm	1,500
15	1998-2000	Ifingo	House-plot & House	Villager - Friend	0.25	0	0
16	1999-2000	Ifingo	House-plot & House	Villager - Stranger	0.25	1,000 pcm	1,000
17	1998-1999	?	House	Villager - Stranger	House	4,000 pcm	4,000
18	1999-2000	Idope	House	Villager - Stranger	House	1,000 pcm	1,000
19	1995-2000	Idope	Rooms	Villager - Stranger	2 rooms	4,000 pcm	2,000
20	1996-2000	Idope	Rooms	Villager - Stranger	2 rooms	3,000 pcm	1,500
21	1998-2000	Idope	Rooms	Villager - Stranger	2 rooms	2,000 pcm	1,000
22	1998-2000	Idope	Rooms	Villager - Stranger	1 room	2,000 pcm	2,000
23	2000	Ifingo	Rooms	Outsider/Newcomer - Stranger	1 room	1,000 pcm	1,000

¹ The agricultural year for farm land; the calendar year for accommodation.

² In acres for farm land.

³ TSh per acre per year for farm land; TSh per room per month for accommodation, the unit price being the same as the total price per month for houses regardless of plot size.

These 23 rental transactions in Kinyanambo were undertaken by 18 of the 61 surveyed units. Transaction 23 was the sole case of renting out rooms (or indeed any type of land) recorded, whilst in Transaction 15 the unit was no longer paying rent as their landlord had become their friend. On farm land, Table 20 does not suggest any immediate patterns in terms of unit price, although of the four rented *vinyungu* the one rented from a relative is the cheapest. There is a clearer pattern on housing, however, with unit prices in all but one case being between TSh 1,000 and TSh 2,000 per room or house per month, which is in line with going rates. For example, one young woman told me that rooms can be rented in Idope for as little as TSh 1,200 per month, whereas in Mafinga the going rate is between TSh 4,000 and TSh 6,000 per month. She said that many people move from Mafinga to Idope because renting is cheaper

in Idope, because fewer houses are connected to water and electricity services and because the quality of housing is lower, frequently having no cement on the floor – her comments reflecting a real awareness of the supply-side factors that affect price. Idope, and Kinyanambo B more generally, are thus good places for investment in housing – some people let out individual rooms in their own houses, whilst others build large houses purely for investment, to let out rooms to different people – because land prices and land rents are cheaper than in Mafinga (Chapter Six), yet demand from tenants is high.

By extrapolation (as previously) I would suggest that there were around 599 separate rental transactions in Kinyanambo between 1997 and 2000. Taking this together with the estimated 353 sale transactions gives a figure of 952 market transactions in land over three years, or about 317 per year. Given the total of 1,336 economic units in Kinyanambo in 1999, this is equivalent to as many as one in four economic units having undertaken some form of market transaction in land in Kinyanambo each year between 1997 and 2000 – or twice this number if both parties to each transaction were villagers. The conclusion is clear – there is a firmly entrenched, active and flourishing land market in Kinyanambo, for all types of land and for both temporary and permanent transfers.

Demand for Land

Ultimately it is the demand for land that fuels the development of a land market – as population grows and/or agriculture becomes progressively more commoditised, land becomes more scarce and hence more monetarily valuable (Chapter Two). Land's importance to livelihoods and its perceived fertility then influences the demand, whilst its availability affects supply. To assess current levels of demand for farm land, I asked the economic units in my first survey whether or not they wanted more land for farming in Kinyanambo. 75% responded positively (117 of 156), 25% negatively (39 of 156). Members of most units wanting more land felt that they did not have enough to meet their food needs. However some wanted more land for other reasons too – for example to pass on to their children, as an asset for future sale or to secure a livelihood in old age. These latter reasons highlight the fact that when people say they want more land, they almost invariably mean that they want to own more land themselves, rather than rent or borrow more land. This is because owning is a more secure form of tenure –

owned land, though vulnerable to alienation by the state, being much less vulnerable to other people taking it away.

Table 21 shows, for the 39 units who did not want more farm land in Kinyanambo, all the reasons volunteered as to why more land was not wanted.

Table 21 – Reasons Why More Farm Land in Kinyanambo Was Not Wanted

Reason Why More Farm Land Not Wanted	Number of Units Reporting Each Reason	% of Units Reporting Each Reason (n=39)
The land they have is enough	27	69%
They lack the ability to farm more land ¹	7	18%
They want land elsewhere	4	10%
They lack strength to farm more land	2	5%
They lack farming inputs like fertiliser	2	5%
They lack money to buy pesticide	1	3%
They lack money to employ wage labourers	1	3%
They lack money to buy land	1	3%
They expect to leave Kinyanambo soon	1	3%

¹ For example, through sickness or lack of financial or physical support.

The table shows that by far the most common reason for not wanting more land was that either the present landholding or amount of land farmed was perceived to match the unit's needs and/or preferences. However it should not be assumed that all the units who reported having enough land already actually had enough to meet all their food needs. For example, many of them were poorer *wenyeji* families headed by grandparents, often widowed grandmothers bringing up orphaned grandchildren. Although such people often have relatively large landholdings, their land is not always sufficient, or sufficiently productive given the resources at their disposal, to provide enough food for all the grandchildren that they now have to support. As a result, such units often report that they do not want more land, because they already have as much as (or more than) they are able to farm, even if many of them might need more. People's perceptions of their ability to obtain more farm land in Kinyanambo (through the main market methods) might also influence whether or not they want more land – the mean average P Score of the 117 units wanting more land in Kinyanambo being 1.7, that of the 39 units not wanting more, 1.2. Finally, although there was little difference in demand for land between units in male- and female-headed households, there were slightly more marked differences by *uenyeji* group – 67% of *wenyeji* units wanted more land (24 of 36), 71% of *wenyeji* of villagisation time units (32 of 45), 80% of units whose household head was born in modern Kinyanambo (8 of 10) and 82% of newcomer units (53 of 65).

The key factor in the generally high demand for farm land across Kinyanambo is its low fertility, especially *mashamba*. Many of my key informants reported that before fertiliser

subsidies were removed people could farm a small area of land intensively and get enough food. However, without fertilisers – an increasing problem since they became more expensive and, for a time, harder to obtain – significantly less output can be produced from the same small area. Moreover, even with fertilisers, yields today are widely regarded as lower than in the past and there is thus a clear perception that more land is now needed to get the same output. This, then, explains the high demand for land, especially for *vinyungu*, the more fertile type of land. 26% of the surveyed units wanting more farm land in Kinyanambo wanted only *vinyungu* (30 of 117) and 65% (76 units) wanted *vinyungu* and *mashamba*, compared with just 9% (11 units) who wanted only *mashamba*. Given, as we saw in Chapter Six, that agriculture, and hence land, is vital to almost everyone's livelihood in Kinyanambo today, people thus want more land both despite and because of the very low fertility that they complain of.

To shed further light on demand for land among Kinyanambo villagers, and on some of the factors constraining it and constraining farming today, the 117 surveyed units who wanted more farm land in Kinyanambo were asked why they had not yet obtained it. Table 22 lists all the reasons volunteered.

Table 22 – Reasons Why More Farm Land in Kinyanambo Has Not Yet Been Obtained

Reason Why More Farm Land Not Yet Obtained	Number of Units Reporting Each Reason	% of Units Reporting Each Reason (n=115) ¹
They lacked money to buy land	48	42%
They lacked money to buy fertiliser	30	26%
They are still newcomers to Kinyanambo	21	18%
They were still young and living with parents or relatives until recently so they were unable to get their own land	14	12%
They lacked money to rent land	11	10%
They lacked money to buy pesticide	11	10%
The land they have was enough before	4	3%
They could not find an area to buy from individuals in Kinyanambo ²	4	3%
They lacked money to buy farming inputs	3	3%
They had other livelihood activities before but now need land for farming	3	3%
They lacked money to employ wage labourers	2	2%
They lacked time to farm a bigger area before	2	2%
They lacked strength to farm more land because of sickness	2	2%
They were not sure they would stay in Kinyanambo but now have decided to stay so want more land	2	2%
They did not know the means for getting land in Kinyanambo until recently	1	< 1%
They are waiting to know individual villagers better so they can be given land instead of buying it	1	< 1%
They could not find an area to buy from the village government	1	< 1%
They were only given a small area by the village government	1	< 1%
They lacked money to buy seeds	1	< 1%
They lacked money to rent a tractor for ploughing	1	< 1%
They lacked the ability to buy more land	1	< 1%
They lacked the ability to farm more land	1	< 1%

¹ Two units did not give reasons.

² One unit specified that they could not find a big area.

There were clearly a wide variety of reasons as to why economic units wanting more farm land in Kinyanambo had been unable to obtain it. However the overriding reason was lack of money – especially to buy or rent land and to buy fertilisers and pesticides. Yet this lack of money is often relative rather than absolute, to do with the financial choices that people have to make. For example, Bi Lustika lacked money to buy land because she was spending all her available money, including that from selling *vinyungu*, on building her house. Another unit lacked money to buy land because they were spending all their available money on treatment for a member who had been sick for a long time. In both cases more land was definitely wanted, but these other needs had taken precedence.

The two other main reasons why units had not yet obtained more farm land relate directly to their position in the social system and were a concern for the two *uenyeji* groups with the highest levels of demand – units whose household heads were born in modern Kinyanambo and newcomer units (as above). First, young people in Kinyanambo are unable to acquire their own land while still living with their families, primarily because they are expected to help farm their parents' land for as long as they live as part of their parents' household. In theory, there is nothing to stop adult children still living with their families from buying land if they receive income independently. However, in practice, cultural attitudes about the rights and responsibilities of parents and children mediate against it. Before villagisation Wahehe men and women were generally only given their own land (usually from the man's parents) on marriage. Although they may have been responsible for farming a certain part of their parents' landholding before marriage, the land nevertheless belonged to their parents. In contrast, children can now start to acquire their own land before marriage, but only so long as they set up on their own. At that stage any land available is then often given to the children by their parents. However in most cases the parents' landholdings are insufficient to do this, so children wishing to live and farm independently must look for their own land using other means of access. Young people therefore generally tend to stay with their families until they are able to buy their own land, purchase being the preferred means of access if there is no land to be given – only three of the 10 units in my first survey whose household head was born in modern Kinyanambo were renting or borrowing housing and none were renting or borrowing farm land.

Second, it takes time for newcomers to acquire land – to find out how to get land and who to get it from, where it is available and what, if anything, they might have to pay. Thus “asking” as a means of access to land is usually the first step for newcomers wanting land.

Before villagisation the *wenyeji* with first right over land were consulted and newcomers with relatives in Kinyanambo usually got land quicker – and more and better-quality land. Such newcomers remain at an advantage today because they have an immediate entry point into the social system. However newcomers now ask the village government for land nearly as often as they ask their relatives and individual villagers (Tables 15 & 16). For example, the head of one surveyed unit, who was transferred to Mafinga in 1999 by the government, initially reported that he did not yet know the *utaratibu* (lit. the rules, regulations or procedures) for getting farm land in Kinyanambo but that he would ask the village government. By the time my fieldwork ended four months later, having so established the means of access, he was planning to buy land from some of the villagers.

Finally on demand for land, I closely examined all those cases where people were actively looking for land. 36% of the 61 economic units in my second survey (22 units) were actively looking for land in Kinyanambo in 2000, that is, were expecting to obtain land in the 12 months following the survey. 15 units were only looking in Kinyanambo while seven were also looking elsewhere. Table 23 presents the details of all 13 expected housing transfers in Kinyanambo, whilst Table 24 presents the details of all 25 expected transfers of farm land.

Table 23 – Expected Housing Transfers in Kinyanambo, 2000-01¹

	Location	Type of Housing	Expected Other Party	Size	Type of Transaction	Expected Total Price in TSh	Unit Price in TSh per acre
1	Lumwago	House-plot	District Land Office	0.25	Purchase	50,000	200,000
2	Lumwago	House-plot	Villager	0.5	Purchase	100,000	200,000
3	Ikweta	House-plot	Villager	0.5	Purchase	100,000	200,000
4	Amani	House-plot	Villager	0.5	Purchase	60,000	120,000
5	Idope	House-plot	Villager (in Idope)	0.25	Purchase	1,000,000	4,000,000
6	Idope	House-plot	Villager	?	Purchase	50,000	?
7	Ifingo	House-plot	Villager	0.25	Purchase	30,000	120,000
8	Lumwago	House-plot	?	0.5	Sale	?	?
9	Amani	House-plot	?	0.5	Sale	?	?
10	Kinanambo	House	?	N/A	Renting Out	?	?
11	Lumwago	House	?	N/A	Renting Out	?	?
12	Idope	Rooms	?	1	Renting Out	?	?
13	Idope	House	?	N/A	Renting Out	?	?

¹ Six of the seven cases of incomplete information were in respect of expected sales or rentals. Other parties had not yet been found and the surveyed units were therefore waiting to see what price they could command.

In two cases units were planning to purchase a house-plot and then in one case sell the plot for a profit and in the other build a house on it to rent out (Transfers 4 and 9, and 6 and 13, respectively). A third unit, in a household headed by a young monogamously married man, was also planning to purchase a house-plot and rent out a house (Transfers 1 and 11), but the house-plot was for the future and the house to be rented out was their own house, once they

had finished building a better-quality house for themselves on their current plot. This unit was also expecting to rent out a 2-acre *shamba* which they were not using (Transfer 9 in Table 24 below). Transfer 7 was another house-plot being purchased for the future, whilst Transfer 10 was the case of an older separated man planning to rent out a house he was already building. Transfer 8 was the case of a *wenyeji* family selling some of their land to people looking for house-plots. Most expected housing transactions were therefore explicitly market-driven – to meet demand for rental accommodation and house-plots and raise income for the unit, now or in the future. Furthermore, with the exception of Transfer 5, by a newcomer unit in a premium location in Idope, house-plot prices per acre were broadly similar, suggesting the sort of price predictability and consistency that one would expect in an established and well-functioning land market.

Table 24 – Expected Farm Land Transfers in Kinyanambo, 2000-01

	Location of Land	Type of Land	Expected Other Party	Area in Acres	Type of Transaction	Expected Total Price in TSh	Unit Price (TSh per acre)
1	Lumwago	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager Selling Land	2	Purchase	20,000	10,000
2	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager or Anyone Selling Land	3	Purchase	30,000	10,000
3	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager	1	Purchase	7,000	7,000
4	Ifingo	<i>Mashamba</i>	Village Government	4	Given Free	0	0
5	Lumwago Msituni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Friend	3	Given Free	0	0
6	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Village Government	3	Given Free	~1,000	333
7	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Village Government	2	Given Free	?	?
8	Lumwago	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager	2	Renting	10,000pa	5,000pa
9	Lumwago	<i>Mashamba</i>	?	2	Renting Out	14,000pa	7,000pa
10	Lumwago Msituni	<i>Mashamba</i>	?	1	Renting Out	12,000pa	12,000pa
11	Lumwago Msituni	<i>Mashamba</i>	Villager -- Relative (Child)	2	Lending Out	0	0
12	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	0.5	Purchase	15,000	30,000
13	Lumwago Msituni	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	0.5	Purchase	20,000	40,000
14	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	2	Purchase	120,000	60,000
15	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Purchase	40,000	40,000
16	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Purchase	10,000	10,000
17	Near Pyrethrum Factory	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Purchase	30,000	30,000
18	Idope	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	0.5	Purchase	7,000	14,000
19	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Village Government	0.25	Given Free	?	?
20	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Village Government	2	Given Free	?	?
21	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Renting	40,000pa	40,000pa
22	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Renting	15,000pa	15,000pa
23	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Renting	7,000pa	7,000pa
24	Lumwago Mahameni	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Renting	5,000pa	5,000pa
25	Lumwago	<i>Vinyungu</i>	Villager	1	Renting	7,000pa	7,000pa

As with recent land sales transactions (Table 19), only more definitively, this table shows that *vinyungu* are generally more expensive than *mashamba*. This is because they are both more fertile, and can be farmed all year round, and are more scarce, being found only in the swampy river valleys. The price differences are substantial. Although the cheapest *vinyungu* and most expensive *shamba* were both TSh 10,000 per acre, the cheapest *shamba* was TSh 7,000 per acre and the most expensive *vinyungu* TSh 60,000 per acre. A range is anyway to be expected given that there can be location, quality and fertility differences between different pieces even of the same type of land, as well as that matters of social relations and political power have a bearing on some market transactions. For example, Mzee Jonas heads the unit expecting to purchase 2 acres of *vinyungu* in Lumwago (Transfer 14). This transfer, albeit of land in a different place to where he bought *vinyungu* before, was for a unit price half that which he then paid, yet it was still the most expensive expected *vinyungu* purchase among all 61 surveyed economic units. It seems likely that, having settled permanently in his wife's home village and secured his social connections there, Mzee Jonas now plans to expand into more profitable agriculture by buying good-quality land more cheaply than he had done before (though still for a premium). Although the unit were neither farming crops nor keeping animals for sale in 1999, expansion of their *vinyungu* will make it easier for them to farm for profit in the future as those who acquire big *vinyungu* can make big profits from growing vegetables for sale.

This big man aside, the data on expected land transfers from my second survey is interesting because it shows that all sorts of people in Kinyanambo are engaging in land transfers and, in particular, market transactions. For example, the units represented in Table 24, 18 of them in all, included among them rich and poor, *wenyeji*, *wenyeji* of villagisation time, newcomers and units whose household heads were born in modern Kinyanambo. Six were headed by women and 12 by men, in direct proportion to the balance of units in female- and male-headed households in my first survey overall.⁵ Moreover, the different sorts of people were engaging in the full range of transfers, market and non-market, demonstrating clearly that all people have all means of access to land open to them and that a land market is firmly rooted in modern Kinyanambo. Such a market is thus driven today as much by the villagers themselves as the rich outsiders, who, although still significant because they generally buy relatively larger areas of land, did more to fuel the commoditisation of land during the 1980s and early 1990s.

⁵ Table A16, Appendix Four.

The data on expected farm land transfers also remind us about the issue of payments to the village government (or, more specifically, to members of the village land committee). I shall return to the practice of making payments to register private transfers of land later, payments which usually come on top of the reported or expected purchase/sale prices. However my survey data provide some instructive examples of payments in the case of farms allocated by the village government – now widely described as “buying from the village government” (Tables 15 & 16). In such cases, sitting allowance (of TSh 5,000 per acre by March 2000) remains an unofficial, yet officially sanctioned contribution (as one key informant put it, “a little donation to the village office”), albeit negotiable as it is waived in some cases, such as for well-connected and powerful individuals. However, payments for “*chai*” (lit. tea) to those allocating land, such as the TSh 1,500 paid by one *mwenyeji* to the village land committee to “buy” a 3-acre *shamba* in 1997 (Transaction 1 in Table 19), are distinctly unofficial. Thus in Transfer 6 in Table 24 the unit, headed by a former member of the village government (still a *balози*), expected to pay “*hela kidogo kwa ajili ya chai ya wajumbe*” (“a little money for *chai* for the village councillors”), which was “*siri*” (“secret”), of around only TSh 1,000 (“to buy some sodas”) to get a 3-acre *shamba*. In Transfer 19 the unit, headed by a young man born in modern Kinyanambo to one of the five main *wenyeji* clans of old Kinyanambo, also expected to pay “*pesa kidogo kwa ajili ya wajumbe*” (“a little money for the village councillors”) to get 0.25 acres of *vinyungu*, although they did not yet know how much this would be in their case. In Transfers 7 and 20 the unit, headed by a *mwenyeji* of villagisation time, expected to be given *mashamba* and *vinyungu* free of charge by the village government, although when questioned further said that, as they had not yet gone to ask for the land, they did not know if it might be necessary to pay something. Meanwhile in Transfer 4 the unit, headed by a current village leader, expected to be given 4 acres of *mashamba* completely free. I can only speculate as to whether this was because village leaders do not pay sitting allowances or *chai* for allocations of land to each other or because the unit did not want to admit the existence of any such payments to me, although both explanations seem likely.

Supply of Land

The evidence of a demand-driven land market within the village is everywhere, but so far the absence of suppliers from the picture is startling. It will be recalled that between 1997

and 2000 only one case of renting out rooms in a house and one case of a land sale were reported (Tables 19 & 20). Yet many more units reported buying and renting all types of land. In addition, three farms were lent out, nine separate pieces of land were bequeathed (four of which included houses) and 14 farms and house-plots were given away free of charge (Table 18). Among the expected future transfers in Tables 23 and 24, there were only two putative sales of house-plots and four putative cases of renting out housing, only two cases of renting out and one of lending out farm land, and no expected farm land sales. Bequests can obviously not be predicted in advance (to do so would be morbid) and most people lending out land do not decide to do so until the time of being asked by someone in need, whilst many sales and rentals are unplanned. However, given the very low (and incongruous) reporting of past sales and rentals, it seems likely that at least some future sales and rentals were underreported, raising the question of why people did not report sales and rentals yet reported buying and renting, which I address below.

Nonetheless, it is important here to examine the factors affecting land's supply and consider who its suppliers might be. Land sales and rentals obviously generate cash for their suppliers and it is thus commonly argued that poverty and hunger force the income-poor to sell off their land, often their only asset, to meet immediate cash needs – particularly when pressured by those with higher incomes, such as newcomers and urban-based outsiders seeking land for housing, farming, business or speculation (e.g. Bruce 1988:p.44; Izumi 1999:pp.82, 187-188, 238; Jambiya 1998:pp.19-20; Maxwell & Wiebe 1999:pp.835, 840; Platteau 1992:pp.21-23; 1996:pp.51-54; Shipton 1988:pp.115-116 (cf. Chapter Two); Yngstrom 1999:pp.228-231; etc.). In Kinyanambo, as one woman put it, people can get land “by buying from individual people here in the village who maybe get problems and therefore decide to sell their land”. Sales (and rentals) in such circumstances are usually unplanned. We have seen that, on average, *wenyeji* families are poorer than other families in Kinyanambo, with fewer possessions and lower-quality housing, and that both they and the *wenyeji* of villagisation time are generally poorer than many of the newcomers to Kinyanambo who contribute much to the demand for land. It is therefore perhaps no surprise that the *wenyeji*, who also owned more land on average in Kinyanambo than other people, are widely known both in the village and in Mafinga town as keen sellers of land. As another woman put it, “you can get land by buying from the *wenyeji*, for example the [...] clan is usually selling their land”, whilst in my key informant interviews some senior *wenyeji* conceded that they had sold land, albeit often only

small areas – their reluctance to talk about sales again being notable. However one *mwenyeji* man, a would-be purchaser, explained about land sales more openly:

“It is easy to find a seller...someone will sell. The only thing I need is money to buy the land. Those selling are those people living in Kinyanambo who are poor and are not able to use all their land, they can't farm a big area as they can't pay for fertilisers and wage labourers.”

The main difference between the *wenyeji* and the newcomers (and some *wenyeji* of villagisation time) seeking land is that the latter not only outnumber the *wenyeji* in Kinyanambo today, but also (as well as being generally wealthier) tend to have better access to off-farm sources of income. In contrast, the *wenyeji* who were in business and employment in the past and returned to or took up farming after villagisation have now either lost so much of their land or seen its fertility fall so much that they now have less on-farm income and less secure livelihoods, often being unable even to depend on their children for support. Those who remain relatively well-endowed with land are therefore those who are selling land in the village as, especially when driven by personal financial crises, they face the most pressure to sell from those seeking land. When the government might anyway take the rest of their land for house-plots, *viwanda* or farms for newcomers and outsiders without paying compensation, especially if they are not using it all, it is hardly surprising that they should be willing to sell their land (cf. Izumi 1999:pp.82, 238) – although those who can usually try to rent out their land instead. Meanwhile poorer *wenyeji* (and *wenyeji* of villagisation time) also sell land, even those who have less of it to sell.

Poverty – or rather the need to raise money to meet immediate cash needs – is thus undoubtedly one reason why land is sold in Kinyanambo, for example by the poorest families headed by women, and such poverty therefore drives supply. However this is not the whole story. For as long as there was additional land available from the village government – and this is now no longer the case – and the sitting allowance (or *chai* that they paid in lieu) was less than their sale proceeds, those people selling their land could later go to the village government to ask for more land on the grounds of their (at least relative) poverty and/or their children's future. However, as one former village leader explained:

“Those who sell land have families who need land...If a man sells his land because he has problems and needs money, he finds he has no land and goes to ask the village government for more. But the leaders say 'why did you sell the piece we gave you?'...But there is no more land to be given out again now, regardless of why it was sold.”

Such people are consequently becoming more vulnerable to absolute poverty.

Furthermore, as the town expands, more house-plots are surveyed and newcomers being allocated plots by the District Land Office come to settle with those who own that land, the *wenyeji* and *wenyeji* of villagisation time who acquired land in the main settled areas of the village at villagisation and afterwards find that their landholdings are irreversibly shrinking. As farming practices and land use have changed, following reduced and fertility decreased, any reduction in overall landholdings – in the past from land being taken by the village government, now from being converted into house-plots, and from sales – then makes any future rotation or following more and more difficult, increasing their perception of the need for more land (hence their demand). Many of these people also want more land to pass on to their children – it being, as we have seen, the historic responsibility of Wahehe parents to provide their children with land. Clearly in such circumstances some land sales reflect short-term individualised maximising behaviour – albeit unsurprising given the increasing household nucleation of recent times. Yet where there is such high demand for land, there is much to be gained in terms of the long-term livelihood security of the suppliers of land (and their dependants and future heirs) by renting out rather than selling land, which most people therefore prefer to do. The problem is that the general preference for owning land, rather than renting or borrowing, keeps demand (and hence prices) for buying land high, tempting the very poorest people (and others in times of cash crises) to keep supplying land for sale.

The Operation of the Land Tenure System in Kinyanambo Today

We have already seen some examples of people's land transfers in Kinyanambo today, market and non-market. However it is important to consider the operation of the land tenure system in a more structured manner so as to examine its implications more precisely for people along different axes of social differentiation. To do this I now discuss the different types of land transfer in more detail, beginning with inheritance.

Although a relatively limited means of access to land today, inheritance nevertheless remains important to those who can and do inherit (such as women who are widowed and the adult children of the *wenyeji* and *wenyeji* of villagisation time with relatively large landholdings). As we saw in Chapter Four, both women and men inherited land before villagisation and this generally remains the case – most of my older informants, when specifically asked, said that both their sons and daughters would inherit, even when they had less land to pass on overall

(cf. Odgaard 1998:pp.9-12). Women's inheritance rights are sometimes challenged in Tanzania, but they can still be asserted in the local courts.⁶ For example, in one recent case, the male cousin of a man from Rungemba tried to claim his land there but was stopped by the deceased's sister, who successfully contested his action in Mafinga Primary Court. As she was looking after the deceased's children, she was considered by the court to have the right to his land.⁷ This illustrates the importance of continuing traditions on the obligations relating to inheritance – people looking after orphaned children, aged parents or sick relatives can strengthen their claim to inherit land by drawing on the tradition, from Uhehe of old, that the son (or daughter) who stayed at home “to look after his [sic] aged father” usually inherited the father's landholding (Oldaker 1957:p.136; Odgaard 1998:pp.6, 12).

Many middle-aged and older women in Kinyanambo today anyway have relatively large landholdings that they inherited from fathers or husbands in the past. Given the breakdown in support networks, this inherited land is an increasingly valuable asset, especially for those in polygamous marriages whose husband's possessions have been divided up among many heirs. One such woman is Bi Mikela,⁸ a *mwenyeji kabisa* who inherited 5 acres of *mashamba* and 0.75 acres of *vinyungu* in Luang'a Mahameni from her husband in 1989. She had used this land, given to him by his parents in 1971, throughout their marriage and continues to farm there with her adult daughter. Bi Mikela lives with this daughter and her children in a mud/thatch house on her inherited 0.5-acre house-plot in Tanganyika. She is also raising orphaned grandchildren. With a P Score of 0, the family depend mostly on *pombe* and *ulanzi* for income and received government food aid during 1999 (because of a poor harvest in 1998). They spent TSh 50,000 on health-care in 1999 and, having planted less than half the land because her daughter was too sick to help farm, they could only afford to use pesticide (and not fertiliser) on their crops. Without her inherited land, Bi Mikela and her dependants would be not poor, but destitute.

However, the situation for those widowed today is sometimes more problematic because of the greater pressures on land. Mama Thea,⁹ for example, is a young woman who was widowed during my fieldwork. Originally from Iringa Rural District, she had moved to

⁶ Both genders' inheritance rights have been protected since Tanzania enacted a Bill of Rights in 1984, although very few cases actually go to court (Mtengeti-Migiro 1991:pp.368-370). In the study area, disputes are rare and tend to be arbitrated by either village leaders or the court rather than processed as cases (Information obtained from Mafinga Primary Court, 17/9/99).

⁷ *Madai* No.27/99.

⁸ Not her real name.

⁹ Not her real name.

Kinyanambo in 1996 after marrying her husband, a *mwenyeji* of old Kinyanambo, but was preparing to return home to her mother because her husband's relatives in Kinyanambo were claiming their modern house in Tanganyika and the corresponding 1-acre house-plot, which he had bought from another villager in 1990. Being a newcomer with no relatives of her own in Kinyanambo to help her, she decided it was better to go. Mama Thea was also farming a 1-acre *shamba* which her husband was given by his mother in 1989, which she had been told to return after the 2000 harvest. Meanwhile she is continuing to look after six children – two of her own, two of her husband's from a deceased former wife and two children of her husband's recently deceased sister.

Mama Thea's case is unfortunately not exceptional, although it seems mainly to be a potential problem for newcomers – those without well-established, independent social relations in the village – and those lacking the money and confidence to take their case to the courts (victors usually being awarded costs, but often never seeing the money). As one district government employee put it, even when a husband and wife acquire land together and the wife has been involved in looking for the land and farming it, or helping to build a house and buy things for it, “the husband's relatives can take the land and the house and chase her away so she has no land”.¹⁰ As in Mama Thea's case, this is a particularly big problem when the widow is left with children to bring up.

One solution is to register land, and certainly house-plots, in joint names. However both parties have to agree to do this and some women I interviewed worried that their husbands might think they were planning to leave them if they asked for the house-plot to be registered in both their names. At the time of my fieldwork the District Land Office had registered only one of the 821 fully surveyed and allocated house-plots in Kinyanambo in joint names (a husband and wife who live in Mafinga), although at least 32 others had been registered individually by women in Kinyanambo.¹¹ Mama Janet¹² is a typical case. A well-educated middle-aged woman, formerly a district government employee, she lives in a large modern house on a plot in Upendo, registered in her husband's name, but which they built together. However her husband now lives in Arusha, having effectively left her, and she thinks that he would not agree to have her name added to the registration. Because of this she is unhappy staying there. Mama Janet

¹⁰ Interviews with AARW Community Development Assistant (for Kinyanambo), 22/2/00, and DCDOs, 22/9/99.

¹¹ Interviews with DLDO, 2/12/99 and DS, 8/12/99.

¹² Not her real name.

therefore went to the District Land Office and bought the neighbouring house-plot herself, registered in her own name. She explained that she had followed the procedure her husband had used when obtaining his plot in 1991. "I saw no-one was there for a long time, either building on it or looking after it, so in 1997 I went to the district government to ask for it...I went myself...I got it myself and no-one helped me."¹³ She was planning to build a house on her plot in June 2000 to rent out for an income, but which she could also live in herself if she ever needed to, for example if her husband decides to re-occupy or sell their joint house and plot.

Some people in Kinyanambo, particularly *wenyeji* and *wenyeji* of villagisation time who want to protect their land, have also registered farms in the village. For example, Mzee John (Chapter Four) has had 5.25 acres in Lumwago registered on a 1-year rolling lease since 1st January 1985.¹⁴ This land (*mashamba*) is in the settled area of Lumwago where his second wife lived. Mzee John's stepfather had had land in Upendo for which they received little compensation (from those acquiring the plots) when house-plots were first surveyed, because there were few trees on the land, and it was after this that he registered his own land.

Another couple, Mzee and Mama Biashara,¹⁵ who moved to Kinyanambo in the late 1970s and live in Ikweta, have also registered some of their farms – 9 acres of *mashamba* and over 3 acres of *vinyungu* that they bought in Ifingo. However they have done this in the village office, not the District Land Office, and the land thus remains a deemed right of occupancy. Mzee Biashara argued that it is important to register land "to look after it for the future", but said that it is much cheaper to do so at village level.¹⁶ He added that few people understand the importance of registration yet or know the procedures (*utaratibu*). However

"those few who know are those who register their land...they buy everywhere at a low price and then register it all, so other people lose out as the land is sold and registered already to someone else".

It is because they have both been village leaders in the past and were educated former government employees that the Biasharas understand these things.

¹³ Although technically allocated by the District Land Office, most people first look for the house-plot they want, arrange to settle with any existing landowner and then check whether or not it has already been allocated. If not, they then pay the official TSh 24,000 contribution to the Ministry to register it as theirs (Interview with Kinyanambo Village Executive Officer, 13/10/99).

¹⁴ MDLO Kalamazoo for Farms and Industries.

¹⁵ Not their real names.

¹⁶ Individual fees to survey and register a farm as a granted right of occupancy at the District Land Office (to get a title deed) start at TSh 300,000 and depend on the size of the farm (Interview with DURPO & DVO, 17/9/99, 2/12/99).

Nonetheless, whilst the initial registration of farms and house-plots is important, not all those who know about land registration do so on its transfer. Mama Joan,¹⁷ for example, a middle-aged widow, inherited a house and house-plot in Upendo in 1993 from her husband, registered in his name, and has not re-registered it in her own name. She said this is because she considers the house as being for both herself and her two adult daughters and it should not therefore be registered just in her name. There are two modern buildings on the plot and the second is occupied by her husband's brother and his family. However Mama Joan stressed that the plot and both buildings are hers, built by her husband, and that, as his brother by a different mother, her brother-in-law anyway has no power over her land.

The house-plot is quite big and Mama Joan farms about 0.25 acres, although she would like another 2 acres of *mashamba*, which she would prefer to buy from the village government so that it would be registered in the village office as her land. She also farms about 0.25 acres of *vinyungu* in Lumwago which she has been lent by a relative from Mafinga since 1998. Her brother-in-law farms there too and helped her to get this land – he looked for an area for her to borrow and made the arrangements. However she would like 1 acre of *vinyungu* of her own, which she hopes to buy from a villager who is moving. She explained that, once she has enough money, her brother-in-law will help her to look for a place to buy.

"I can look myself but I need someone to supervise^[18] the transaction. It is better to get help because if a woman looks for land people might refuse, or they might sell it and take the money and then say it is not sold, so I need a witness."

The implication is that it is better for the witness to be male, but in fact nobody buying land in Kinyanambo today would do so without a witness. Mama Joan only came to live in Kinyanambo in 1997 and is thus still a newcomer to the village. Her brother-in-law has lived in Kinyanambo for longer than she and is thus very useful to her as a newcomer negotiating the local land tenure system – having already established the knowledge and social relations to enable both himself and Mama Joan to borrow (free of charge) valuable riverine land. He is also useful as a close male relative, to a woman who had depended on her husband for everything in the past and was lacking the confidence to now manage on her own.

Mama Joan said she wanted to buy her own land rather than rent so that it would always be hers. However Binti Ali,¹⁹ a young unmarried woman, cannot afford to buy land as

¹⁷ Not her real name.

¹⁸ *kusimamia*, lit. to stand over, support, manage etc.

¹⁹ Not her real name.

“those who are selling, sell for a high price”. Neither is she renting, because “it is not very easy to rent now, it is easier to borrow because when you borrow the owner can take the land back at any time”. Binti Ali, who moved to Kinyanambo in the early 1980s with her parents, is therefore borrowing all her land. As the eldest child in her family, she expects to inherit all her mother’s land in Kinyanambo (her father is dead), but in the meantime she has been borrowing a 1-acre *shamba* and 0.25 acres of *vinyungu* since 1998. She found it easy to borrow land – she just went herself to discuss it with the *wenyeji* and got land. The *shamba* is borrowed from a *mwenyeji* man with a lot of land, the *vinyungu* from a woman. Binti Ali lives in a house owned by a relative who is not from Kinyanambo – her uncle’s brother. He built the house and asked her to look after it and, though there are some tenants sharing it with her, she pays no rent.

What these last two cases show (and that of Mama Janet) is that women can get land now in their own right, much more so than in the past when it was almost always obtained through men (fathers, brothers or husbands), but that it is nevertheless easier for those who are younger and/or better educated as they tend to have more confidence in their rights. It is also easier for single women to get land than women who are married, because, as Mama Janet explained,

“women here think that the man is the head of the house, so they just leave the men to deal with these things. It is usually the husband who goes to look for the plot or the land, and when he does, the wife understands that the husband is looking for our house or land. Now I am alone I can look for land that is mine alone, but for couples it is the husband’s responsibility. The single woman is the head of her house, so she recognises that she has to look for everything herself. Those who are married are behind their husbands.”

Although from villagisation village governments were supposed to allocate land to all people, it was only during the 1980s that it started to become easier for married women in Iringa Region to be allocated land in their own right (Booth *et al* 1993:pp.76-77). Efforts by the district government and the AARW project since 1992 to educate village governments in Mufindi about women’s right to be allocated land as individuals helped²⁰ and married women in some project villages do now have their own farms, both as individuals and in their groups. For example, the Kinyanambo Mwakaumu women’s group have been allocated a 20-acre *shamba* on which to grow pyrethrum. Village government land is decreasingly important in Kinyanambo today – Mzee and Mama Biashara, for example, are not unusual in preferring to buy all their land, to get good-quality land, which the land allocated by the village government is often not. However,

²⁰ Interviews with AARW Project Co-ordinator, 18/2/00, and Gender and Training Officer, 18/2/00, and with DCDOs, 22/9/99; Pers. coms. with AARW Project Co-ordinator, May 1999.

although gender can be a mediating factor in other means of access to land, especially as Mama Joan suggests, in the land market, with money and witnesses it is not in itself a hindrance.

For example, Mama Alicia (Chapter Six), who has lived in Kinyanambo since 1994, said that, although she can look for land herself, she would ask her husband for the money to pay for it. It is possible for her to get her own land if she pays for it from her own purse and her husband could not feel bad about this as he would know it was hers and that she had worked for it. Being in a close monogamous marriage, however, she did not see any need to do this and she had already found 0.5 acres of *vinyungu* which he had paid for. Interestingly, Mama Biashara, also in a close monogamous marriage, had told me when questioned informally in front of women companions when I first met her that some of their land in Kinyanambo C is hers and some is her husband's, but when I later interviewed her together with her husband, after getting to know them, they both said that all their land is owned jointly, regardless of who actually bought and registered it. Mzee Biashara explained that, in looking for land to buy, they first sit together and plan and then choose one of them to go and look for the land and pay for it, but as they decide together to get the land it then jointly belongs to them both. The implication was that income from their individual activities (such as his vehicle repairs and her shop) is not pooled, but that they budget together to acquire assets and decide on expenditure for the good of their family.

In contrast to these two cases, Mama Lisa,²¹ the second wife in a more unhappy polygamous marriage, who is raising five children with little help from her husband, specifically needs to look for her own land. Mama Lisa is originally from Mafinga and came to Kinyanambo on marriage in 1980. She had been borrowing 0.25 acres of *vinyungu* from a neighbour during the 1990s, but had not been able to get the money from her husband to then buy it, so the owner took it back to keep it as her own. By 2000 she was looking for 2 acres of *mashamba* and 0.5 acres of *vinyungu* to rent, which she will pay for herself by cooking *pombe* for sale. Mama Lisa had also inherited 2.5 acres of land from her father in 1985 in Ikweta, although she did not know that it was in the township area and did not register it on inheritance. 2.25 acres has therefore been built on by other people, but she has since planted eucalyptus trees on the remaining 0.25 acres, to assert her rights to it and raise its compensation value should others come to build there too. Mama Lisa was very clear about which land was her husband's and

²¹ Not her real name.

which was hers – that which she inherited or borrowed or will rent – and said she could do what she liked with the land that was hers. Yet because she also farms some of her husband's land, she remains vulnerable to its loss should he decide to dispose of it (cf. Koda 1999:pp.6-7).

Such a case occurred recently in Kinyanambo over the 12 acres that Mzee and Mama Biashara had bought in Ifingo. After the sale the previous owner, a *mwenyeji* man, died and his widow then sold part of their area to someone else, who planted banana trees there. The Biasharas accepted that the wife had not been involved in their original transaction and had probably not seen any financial benefit from it, but argued that she had since seen them farming the land. They took their case to the village office, where it was settled in their favour after all the documents relating to the two sales were checked – being the first to buy and use it, the land was deemed theirs. It was at this point that they then registered it properly in the village office, on payment of the necessary sitting allowance.

In a similar case in Luganga, a man had sold some of his first wife's land (which he had been farming for a long time) without informing her, leaving her, his adult daughter and the children and grandchildren that the two women look after with nowhere to grow food. His daughter, having failed to receive any help from the Luganga village government, wrote to the District Community Development Office, who in turn took up the case at Mafinga Primary Court.²² The court found that, as the land had belonged to her mother, her father had no right to sell it and the daughter had the right to use it. The court therefore instructed the Luganga village chairperson to take the land back from the purchaser and give it to the man's daughter.

My discussion so far shows up some of the key differences between land tenure in Kinyanambo today and in the past. Of particular significance, especially to newcomers, is that, as almost all land has now been cultivated by someone at some point, no-one can just take and clear unused land anymore. Moreover, instead of being shown or given such land, as before, they now almost invariably have to pay for it – by buying, renting or paying sitting allowance or *chai*. In the short term, renting is a particularly useful means of access to land for people who have not yet decided to settle permanently in Kinyanambo and for those who need to farm somewhere while they look for land of their own. Such people did not need to rent before villagisation because there were fewer people in the village and newcomers could therefore more easily find land of their own to start farming. In Kinyanambo today, however, renting is

²² *Madai* No.24/99.

easier than borrowing for those without the social connections to facilitate this and, as Binti Ali implied, it is anyway more secure than borrowing for those who can afford the rent.

For example, Mama Prudencia²³ is recently divorced from her husband, a cattle-keeper with large landholdings in Kinyanambo, and came out of their marriage with no land but two of his cows. As a result, she gets a steady income from selling milk, whilst she also has a sewing machine which she uses to make clothes for sale. She now rents a modern house in Gangilonga from the wealthy son of a *wenyeji* family and said it was easy to find a house to rent as she already knew the people to ask. She has 0.25 acres of *vinzungu* which she rented from an older *mwenyeji* woman for one year before buying it outright. In addition, she has a 6-acre *shamba* in IHEME, in Iringa Rural District (up the Tanzam), which she inherited from her brother in 1978. She had been farming there until 1999, paying wage labourers and arranging for someone with a tractor to plough the land in return for using some of it themselves. However, she now plans to rent out that land and concentrate on farming in Kinyanambo, having decided to stay in the village, and has finally found a 3-acre *shamba* which she wants to buy.

What conclusions, then, can be drawn about the operation of the land tenure system in Kinyanambo today? First, social and political relations are clearly useful resources in negotiating the local land tenure system. It helps to know whom to ask for land, where there is good land for sale, what the going rate is, who might be willing to rent out or lend land, and so on. In this, *uenyeji* is a particularly important factor. The suppliers of land with the largest landholdings are more likely to be *wenyeji* or *wenyeji* of villagisation time, giving an advantage to those who have lived longer in the village and thus had time to establish solid social ties, and to newcomers with relatives so established. Any involvement in village leadership is also useful here, as all such connections generate knowledge about the local land tenure system. However confidence in one's rights is also important in access to land, resulting as much from youth, education and former or current government employment as from social and political relations.

The second conclusion, however, is that wealth is a more useful means of securing land. Social and political connections are more likely to facilitate access to land through non-market channels, and are therefore of most value to those without the means to access land in other ways, but anyone in Kinyanambo (or from outside) with enough money can obtain land in the village through market channels. Moreover, gender is not an obstacle to access to land –

²³ Not her real name.

although it plays out in varying ways according to individual circumstances – as women with connections and/or money can and do now easily obtain their own land. Where gender has the most bearing it is usually because, as we have seen, families headed by women are on average poorer than those headed by men. In sum, the links between these three factors – gender, wealth and *uenyeji* – are both case-specific and complex and people thus draw on whatever resources and powers are available to them, in their own particular situation, to access land and generate a livelihood.

Another important conclusion that needs to be reiterated here is that transactions between individuals are now the main source of land in Kinyanambo today, although the village government, which has had less land to distribute as the 1990s have progressed, nevertheless maintains a key role. Furthermore, it is particularly interesting that, despite steadily increasing demand for land during the 1990s, there appears to be no generalised problem of landlessness in Kinyanambo. As we saw in Chapter Six, there are few economic units that do not own at least some land in Kinyanambo and even fewer that do not farm any land in Kinyanambo. Renting and borrowing are common means of access to land for those without their own landholdings and a large minority of people own and/or farm land elsewhere. Aside from the longer-standing issue of declining land fertility (Chapter Five), there does appear to be a trend towards smaller landholdings in Kinyanambo – although this is impossible to assess objectively. However, and perhaps because most people still considered land to be a key asset, I found no-one in Kinyanambo who had sold all their land. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen what will happen if current processes of commoditisation and inwards migration continue, land availability reduces and competition for good-quality land increases – especially for the high-yielding *vinyungu*, where vegetables for sale in the town (the cash crops of the 1990s) are grown.

Dynamics and Tensions in the Local Land Tenure System

I want next to discuss the key dynamics and tensions of the local land tenure system in Kinyanambo today. I do this by analysing four contemporary land cases, all but one of which had been resolved by the time I left. These cases – the exceptions rather than the rules in an otherwise (at least currently) well-functioning land market – are instructive because they each illustrate in practice certain principles of the land tenure system that derive from national land tenure policy.

Mzee Gaudensio's Case – Ownership and Use

Gaudensio Mbulumilo is a villager who moved to old Kinyanambo before Independence – the son of an Mbena man and a *mwenyeji* woman – who recently took the village government to Mafinga Primary Court.²⁴ He claimed that the village government had unlawfully taken a 15-acre farm that was given to him in 1974 by his *mwenyeji* cousin, Stephane Kangusi, and given it to another villager, one Spedito Kalinga. He had only discovered this in 1998 when he found Mzee Spedito and his wage labourers uprooting tree stumps on the land in preparation for farming. On the basis of the evidence presented by various witnesses, the court agreed that the land in question had indeed belonged to Mzee Gaudensio, yet the judgement went against him.

Mzee Gaudensio argued that he had planted *vitindi* and other trees there as crops in the past, that it was an income-generating tree farm. However, on visiting the land the court found only three *vitindi* trees in the entire area, which, moreover, it deemed to be barely two years old. The few trees, and the absence of any signs of caring for them, led the court to conclude that Mzee Gaudensio was not cultivating trees as crops and that he had not therefore developed his land. Accordingly, the court found that the village government was lawfully allowed to allocate the land to someone else, which it had done in 1984, and that it would have been irresponsible for it not to do so given the village's policy that "if anyone is given an area and doesn't develop it within five years, it ought to be divided and given to someone else".²⁵ In line with this policy, it was shown in court that three other villagers who had been given land by the village government in the same area and at the same time as Mzee Spedito had subsequently agreed that the village government could take their land back and re-allocate it because they had failed to use it themselves.

In making the judgement the magistrate stated that "for land to be the property of a villager, it is necessary for the villager to be using the land" ("*ili ardhi iwe mali ya mwanakijiji ni lazima mwanakijiji huyo awe anaiendeleza ardhi hiyo*"). This is in keeping with the fundamental and longstanding tenet of national land tenure policy that land can only be owned insofar as it is used. Nonetheless, the use of land which is not lawfully owned does not establish ownership of it. In another recent Kinyanambo land case in Mafinga Primary Court, one Bosco Tewele was therefore unsuccessful in trying to claim ownership of a 25ha farm adjacent to his own on the

²⁴ *Madai* No.33/99.

²⁵ Court testimony of a Kinyanambo village land committee member.

grounds that he had erected a rain shelter there.²⁶ Witnesses testified that the owner, Ester Mdemu (the plaintiff), who had left Kinyanambo but whose younger sister was farming part of the land, had already built a rain shelter there, before Mzee Bosco's encroachment, and the court found in her favour, that she was appropriately developing her land.

Thus land cannot be left unused for as long as five years without it potentially being taken by the village government and allocated to someone else, but neither can an individual just take it upon themselves to start using a piece of land that belongs to another, even if it is unused by the latter, in an effort to claim it as theirs. Mzee Bosco failed because the lawful owner had already developed the land, whilst Mzee Gaudensio failed because his rights had lapsed and his land had lawfully been allocated to someone else. Although Mzee Spedito did not then develop the land until 1998, he was still the lawful owner because he was the first to develop it. Furthermore, because they were unlawfully occupying the land, neither Mzee Bosco nor Mzee Gaudensio were entitled to any compensation for their unexhausted improvements, the rain shelter and the *vitindi* trees (James & Fimbo 1973:p.606).

However, although the theory – or policy – is that land must be used to be owned, in practice, as Mzee Gaudensio's case shows, land can actually be left unused for far longer than five years and still be owned. The actual situation for any individual landowner depends on whether or not the village government exercises its right to take land that is unused – but that the government has that right makes all people vulnerable to its loss. Moreover, in contrast to the policy as stated in court, one of my *mwenyeji kabisa* informants, a *balози* and court assessor, reported that the village government in practice calls people to account much sooner than five years:

“Now if you don't farm your land you are called and asked why you aren't using your land when others are hungry. If you say you're not farming it they will give the land to someone else, but they'll leave it if you say you plan to farm it again and are just leaving it to get fertile. But if for two years its not farmed, then in the third year they will give the land to someone else even if you don't want them to do that.”

This was corroborated by another key informant, a former member of the village land committee, who said that the village's policy was that land could only be left unused for three years. The *balози* said in defence of this policy that “two years is long enough for land to become fertile again”. However for those who cannot afford fertilisers to supplement short fallowing this claim is debatable.

²⁶ Madai No.10/99.

Mama Rose's Plot – Allocative Authority and the Kinyanambo/Kitelewasi Boundary Dispute

Rose Pondachuma Kalinga is the Chair of Mwakaumu in Kinyanambo and lives in Ifingo, having moved there when young with her mother and her maternal uncle, Mzee Amri Mahanga, the founder of present-day Kinyanambo C (Chapter Five). She had taken a case to Mafinga Primary Court over a 0.5-acre house-plot that she had been given in 1987 by the Kinyanambo village government, but on which a Kitelewasi villager, having been given the same piece of land by the Kitelewasi village government, had built a house.

Mama Rose claimed that her case hinged on who had first been allocated the land. She argued that when first given the land she had grown sweet potatoes on it. Later she grew millet and planted trees around the boundary so that after the harvest children could play football there, before leaving it solely as a play area. Then in 1994 the Kitelewasi village government came into this area, just west of the old road, to mark out house-plots which they began allocating to their own villagers. Only two plots were subsequently developed before the boundary dispute was raised with the district government – one by a relative of someone living in Ifingo, who was given permission to do so by the Kinyanambo owner, and the other, in 1995, on Mama Rose's plot without her permission. People were asked not to develop the plots allocated by Kitelewasi any further until the dispute could be resolved and Mama Rose then took up her case. However, on the assumption that the land was indeed hers, she gave it to a relative who built their own house there in 1998. By the time my fieldwork ended the case had reached the district court, where Mama Rose had won. Although the man she was suing had been given leave to appeal, the date by which he was supposed to do so had passed.

Mama Rose's case is intricately linked to the continuing boundary dispute between Kinyanambo and Kitelewasi villages, the issue being one of which village was lawfully entitled to allocate the plot. The origins of this dispute go back to the time of villagisation, when some of the land that had originally been alienated to Lord Chesham and Capt Snape was distributed to the Kitelewasi *ujamaa* village and the boundaries of Kinyanambo and Kitelewasi then established were those that had pertained between old Kinyanambo and the alienated areas taken over by Merali Shivj at Rungemba (Chapter Three). The *ujamaa* village had been receiving technical assistance from Korean agricultural experts, who, after having asked for more land for their farms, were shown an area south of the Makwawa River by the Kitelewasi villagers that was actually part of Kinyanambo. Although the Koreans left before starting to use this land, it has been claimed by Kitelewasi ever since.

During the late 1980s a village titling programme began in Tanzania, as promoted by the NAP, involving the surveying and demarcation of village boundaries and the registration and issuance of certificates of occupancy to village councils (Coldham 1995:p.231; Shivji 1998:p.19; Sundet 1996:p.61; 1997:pp.130-132, 135-137). However, the process was “slow, expensive, and often characterised by incompetence, malpractice, and a failure to involve the villagers themselves” and village titling was abandoned in the 1995 NLP (Coldham 1995:p.231; Shivji 1998:pp.19-21). In Iringa, for example, only 131 of the 610 registered villages had been surveyed by 1991 and none had actually been titled (Izumi 1999:p.100). In June 1989 several villages in the immediate study area were surveyed, although Kinyanambo, being by then partly within the declared area of Mafinga, was not one of them. On 27th June a survey sheet for Kikombo, Kitelewasi and Rungemba was drawn up, but when the boundary between Kitelewasi and Kinyanambo was demarcated only the leaders of Kitelewasi had been present.²⁷ Under the then commonly used drawing method, villagers were supposed to meet to discuss their boundaries, which a surveyor would then draw directly onto a map without any boundary stones being laid down on site (Izumi 1999:p.226). The leaders of Kinyanambo therefore dispute the official map that was drawn (see Map 17, p.245), whilst the District Land Office (and the Ministry) acknowledges that the correct procedures were not followed and has advised the two governments to meet, under their facilitation, in order to agree their boundary.²⁸


The map puts almost everyone living on the west side of the old road in Kitelewasi, yet all bar the man who built his house on Mama Rose's plot consider themselves to be part of Kinyanambo. Map 18 (p.246) shows the area that Kinyanambo claims as its own. This includes the land on which a Mafinga businessman, Mzee Kangesa, has built a timber *kiwanda*, which he obtained from the Kitelewasi village government in 1993. The boundary dispute has prevented both Mzee Kangesa and others who have bought land in the area from individual villagers from acquiring title deeds.²⁹ Importantly, although the construction on Mama Rose's plot and the previous marking out of house-plots by Kitelewasi village government was what first gave rise to the dispute, it was the construction by Mzee Kangesa of his *kiwanda* in April 1999 that made the people of Kinyanambo aware that a much larger area was being claimed by Kitelewasi than

²⁷ Interviews with DS, 18/11/99, and DLDO, 31/1/00; Registered Plan Number 23105 (MLSRD).

²⁸ Minutes of Village Council Handing-Over Meeting, 6/1/00; Interview with DLDO, 31/1/00. See also Izumi (1999:pp.221-232) and Shivji (1998:p.21) on similar cases elsewhere in Tanzania.


²⁹ Interviews with DLDO, 31/1/00, and at Kangesa Timber, 3/3/00.

Map 17 – Kitelewasi Village Boundaries as Recorded in 1989



Source – Registered Plan Number 23105 (MDLO)

Map 18 – Kitelewasi/Kinyanambo Boundary Dispute



Source – Adapted from Map 17

they had first realised. By the time my fieldwork ended the meeting between the two governments had still not taken place and the boundary dispute remained unresolved. However the District Land Office did agree that most of the disputed area is probably Kinyanambo's land (as shown in Map 5, Chapter One) and the people of Kinyanambo remain responsible, as they always have been, for cutting the grass along the edge of the Tanzam from the southern boundary of the village (between the Mgali and Nyamalala rivers (Map 14, Chapter Five)) right up to the point where the Makwawa River crosses the road.

Kihwelo's Farm at Luganga – Ownership and Use Revisited – The Primacy of Registered Land

Luganga Farm was first alienated in 1928 and by the mid-1950s its 1550-acre northern portion had come to be owned by Lt Col Johnson (Chapter Three). Johnson's Farm was then bought by an African, Marehemu Albert Kihwelo, in 1966 and has since been inherited by his young son, Nico. In 1999 Nico, by now a young man, asked the District Land Office to show him the physical boundaries of his land³⁰ – having found an old map among his father's papers, he wondered whether a fertile area farmed by other people around the Nyamalala River was in fact his. The District Land Office visited the area on 12th October 1999, whence they found that many people were indeed farming *vinyungu* on part of his land. These people had been given the land by the Kinyanambo village government, yet it was leased to Nico on a granted right of occupancy with 66 years still left to run.

Neither Lt Col Johnson nor Marehemu Kihwelo had farmed all the leased land, whilst the *wenyeji* have been farming *vinyungu* there since the colonial period. The actual physical boundaries of the farm, which, although in Luganga, directly borders Kinyanambo along the Nyamalala River, had therefore become blurred, forgotten over time. The village government had then allocated other farms there to many of the recent newcomers to Kinyanambo, as well as to people from Mafinga who had come looking for land in the village. Most of them paid for this land – directly to the *wenyeji* or in the form of sitting allowances to the village government – yet they have now been told that they do not own it. Nico has let them all keep their *vinyungu* for an annual rent of TSh 10,000 per acre, but, although a delegation of Kinyanambo villagers went

³⁰ Interview with DLDO, 31/1/00.

to the DC's office to formally protest, they have been told by both the District Land Office and the village government that they have no legal case.³¹

Angry villagers like Mzee Fernando,³² a *mwenyeji kabisa* who has lost three of the four acres of *vinyungu* he had in the area – land which his sons were using but which they now have to pay rent for – told me that Nico had diverted the course of the Nyamalala River in order to extend his area into Kinyanambo's land and then moved the original boundary stones. The District Land Office insisted that this could not have happened as the farm had been precisely surveyed and boundary stones placed on measurable geographical points.³³ Yet the map drawn when it was surveyed in 1967 includes only one boundary stone at one end of the riverine part of the boundary and thus shows the Nyamalala River itself as the actual boundary.³⁴

It is of course possible that the Kinyanambo village government, under increasing pressure in the 1990s to find land for all the newcomers to the village, decided to encroach onto the leased area on the assumption that because the land was not used it could be re-allocated – as use is supposed to prevail – and that the young Nico could anyway not know the original boundaries of his father's land. They may even have done this in conjunction with the *wenyeji* who thought they had land there, to generate sitting allowances for themselves and sales income for the *wenyeji*, subsequently spreading a rumour about the river being moved when the land's ownership was contested. Regardless of the facts of the case, however, the central point is that, through possession of registered title, Nico's rights to the land (which he was not using) took precedence over those of the many people farming there – granted rights (based in statutory law) being superior to both the deemed rights of customary law and the deemed rights mis-allocated (knowingly or not) by the village government. Furthermore, people's anger at the changed situation – whether because they had paid for the land or because they believed allocation of land by the village government to villagers (and outsiders) to be more socially legitimate than alienation by higher levels of the state – did not prevent them from accepting the District Land Office's ruling, in effect, accepting the power and authority of higher levels of the state over village land. Moreover, this power and authority give a primacy to registered land

³¹ Ownership disputes in respect of alienated land are not uncommon in Tanzania. For example, see Lwoga (1985:p.252) on an earlier dispute in Morogoro Region.

³² Not his real name.

³³ Interview with DLDO, 31/1/00.

³⁴ Registered Plan 8810, dated 26/10/67, of L.O.23688, MDLO File MFD/502.

which is echoed in the very application of the use conditions for ownership itself. A registered 1550-acre farm with only 655 acres developed after 33 years – of which only 455 acres were anyway attributable to the registered owner's crops, the remainder to his now tenants – is thus used sufficiently to be owned in full, as such use is measured according to fixed conditions in the lease.³⁵ In contrast, those farming land held within the sphere of deemed rights of occupancy are vulnerable to changes in policy (both local and national) as to what constitutes sufficient use and which is invariably more onerous.

Mzee Mkubwa's *Mgogoro* – The Local Politics of Land Tenure

Mzee Mkubwa³⁶ is a Mafinga businessman who runs a medium-sized timber business. A *mwenyeji* of villagisation time, originally from Kagera Region, he moved to Mafinga in 1976 to work for the district government. As such, despite his long residence, he is still widely regarded as a real outsider, being non-Mhehe. The facts of his *mgogoro*³⁷ are straightforward enough, yet it sheds much light on the local politics of land tenure.

Mzee Mkubwa owns a total of 225 acres of land in Kinyanambo, in two separate pieces. The first piece, 25 acres off the Sadani road, which he has had for over 10 years, is not involved in the *mgogoro*. However the second piece, an area of some 200 acres in Ifingo near Division Three (and thus mostly in Lumwago Mahameni) is the subject of the *mgogoro*. Mzee Mkubwa originally obtained 15 acres from the village government there in 1996, land left by a villager who moved to Iringa town, on payment of TSh 3,000 per acre sitting allowance (the rate in the mid-1990s), a total of TSh 45,000. However, as he wanted a larger area he then approached the *wenyeji* direct. He purchased all the rest of the land in small pieces over the course of several years (from July 1996 to February 1999, when the last seller was paid), in order to get one big area on which to plant trees. I have seen copies of the sale receipts relating to at least 157 acres of the purchased land, signed and stamped by the then village chairperson, Mzee Juma (Chapter Five), and the then village secretary (now deceased). Of the 15 named sellers, 13 men and two women, almost all were *wenyeji* of old Kinyanambo or their children, mostly living in Ifingo.

³⁵ Valuation report in MDLO File MFD/502.

³⁶ Not his real name. Because of the sensitivity of this case I generally do not cite specific sources in this section, although I interviewed many of the key players and had sight of various relevant documents.

³⁷ lit. trouble, worry, popularly used to mean a conflict or dispute

The *mgogoro* ostensibly relates to the fact that Mzee Mkubwa had acquired such a big area of the village's land for himself. As one current village leader alleged:

"Some people had their land sold to this man by other people in the village. They noticed that he had been sold their land when he started planting trees and complained to the village government...the village government thinks this is too much land for one man when many people in Kinyanambo need land, so we want this land back that was sold without our knowledge so we can give it to our own people."

Another current village leader explained that:

"The village government wants him to return all the land he has taken from the citizens [*wananchi*], but it's hard for him to do this as he has already planted trees there...he did this without asking the village government, even though he was told to leave the land...we want to know why he is accumulating a big piece of land all to himself...we want him to return the land to be used for village development, and for the children in the future, so it can be divided to people later or given to those who need it even now...it won't be returned to those who sold it."

However, Mzee Mkubwa is certainly not the only large landowner in Kinyanambo today, nor the only outsider with large landholdings in the village. For example, several senior district political figures had also purchased large farms in Kinyanambo C directly from the *wenyeji* and I knew of at least one big man from outside the district – a Mhehe professor at Sokoine University in Morogoro – whose allocation of 100 acres by the village government in 1994 had been facilitated by one of these same district leaders. None of these transfers were registered in the village office, in order to avoid the payment of sitting allowances, although most (including the land of Mzee Mkubwa) had been formally registered at the District Land Office.³⁸

The real complaint against Mzee Mkubwa is that he did not follow the correct local procedures for getting land. That is, he bought directly from the *wenyeji*, albeit witnessed by the then village chair and secretary, and did not go through the village land committee and pay sitting allowance. The rest of the village government therefore assumed that the village chair and secretary must have been getting money for themselves. On 4th October 1998 a meeting was held (following several earlier meetings) at which the allegations were fully aired and Mzee Juma was forced to resign as village chair, in favour of an acting chair, as the *mgogoro* had become so big. Meanwhile the village government was trying to prevent Mzee Mkubwa from planting any trees until the *mgogoro* could be resolved – until he either acquired the land through the correct procedures or returned it to the village government. However Mzee Mkubwa proceeded with his tree planting (not least to raise the land's compensation value in case he was forced to surrender it) and between 26th and 29th October 1999 these trees were then

³⁸ Allocations of registered farms up to 100 acres and of 100 to 500 acres are anyway supposed to be authorised by district and regional land committees respectively (Shivji 1998:pp.22-23; Interview with DURPO and DVO, 17/9/99).

burned, along with some trees he had planted eight years earlier on his land off the Sadani road. He was not alone in suspecting a senior district political figure of having been involved in the arson, a person who allegedly also wanted land for himself in the area that Mzee Mkubwa had acquired and had so far only been able to obtain 8 acres.

Two factors in particular help explain why Mzee Mkubwa's *mgogoro* became so big while the land purchases of other outsiders did not, even though they too did not follow the correct procedures.³⁹ First, they mostly got their land earlier than Mzee Mkubwa, when the local population was smaller, there was less pressure on land and land was less commoditised. Second, and more importantly, Mzee Mkubwa is exceptional in being a real outsider, not even from Iringa Region. Although wealthy, he therefore had fewer social and political resources to draw on in negotiating his way around the local procedures. One former village land committee member may thus not have been wrong in claiming that the case was really about tribalism (*ukabila*), that Mzee Mkubwa (and Mzee Juma (also non-Mhehe)) had incurred the wrath of the local political elite because he had had the temerity, as a real outsider, to go against the locally recognised procedures for obtaining land.⁴⁰

These events were unfolding during my fieldwork and culminated in a meeting between Mzee Mkubwa and the Kinyanambo village government, facilitated by the DC, just before I left. At that meeting the DC told Mzee Mkubwa to settle with the village government through the correct procedures so as to end the *mgogoro*, by paying sitting allowance to formally register his land in the village office. The new village chair (elected in nation-wide elections in December 1999), Mzee Alois Sambala, subsequently confirmed to me that the case was indeed going to be settled, that Mzee Mkubwa had agreed to pay. However, having already paid at least TSh 785,000 to the *wenyeji* for the 157 acres of land I had seen receipts for – he had paid the *wenyeji* TSh 5,000 per acre, more than the then sitting allowance – he would thus have to pay another TSh 785,000 to the village land committee to make his *mgogoro* go away. In summing up his view of the practice of paying sitting allowance, one of my key informants pointed out that this large amount of money being paid to the committee for their time in holding the relevant

³⁹ See also Sundet (1997:pp.180-181, 188) and Shivji (1998:pp.23-24, 36-37) on land being allocated in contravention to the correct local procedures in 1990s Tanzania.

⁴⁰ I came across a similar case involving a non-African settler living in Mufindi – another real outsider – who was trying to acquire a large area of land in another village and thought he had settled everything within that village by paying the villager landowners, only to be told by district leaders that he must pay extra money to the village government (i.e. sitting allowance) to conclude the deal. See also Van Hekken and Thoden Van Velzen (1972:especially Chapters 4 & 7), whose work influenced my approach to analysing Mzee Mkubwa's case.

meeting to register the transfers of land was of course far more than they usually got for spending the same time registering transfers of smaller areas of land and that, therefore, "in truth, it's *chai*".

This *mgogoro* was clearly tied up with both village and district politics and with official discourse on land. Although Tanzania adopted multi-partyism in 1992, CCM's presence has remained overwhelming in many rural areas, with village governments "formally indistinguishable from CCM leaderships" (Booth *et al* 1993:p.27). For example, although five of the ten Kinyanambo hamlet chairs were replaced and several other new faces joined the ranks of village councillors in the December 1999 elections, all those elected were CCM candidates. Moreover, CCM continues to command loyalty, despite its ideology (Ibid:p.103). 89% of the household heads in my first survey were members of CCM (139 of 156), even though the tide of rural opinion is now against socialism in Tanzanian villages, the superiority of individual ownership is widely considered to have proven itself (Ibid:p.108) and, as we have seen, land is highly marketised.

Party and government leaders have long had to be openly committed to socialism. *Ujamaa* was seen as a state of mind, a correct attitude, with leaders supposed to serve people and not exploit them (James 1971:p.29; Kerner 1988:pp.168-169). At the same time, however, local-level indiscretions are longstanding. For example, financial mismanagement and misappropriation of money and goods in village economic activities were commonplace in Tanzania by the early 1990s, whilst government and public sector corruption was found to be widespread by the 1996 Wairoba Commission (Kerner 1988:p.179; Ponte 2001:p.86; Thiele 1986:p.548; Voipio & Hoebink 1999:p.24). In Kinyanambo Mzee Juma was accused in 1991 of stealing bricks that were intended for use in the construction of a teacher's house at Kinyanambo Primary School, a mistake for which he apologised, facilitating his re-election as village chair in 1993. I also came across other allegations against him from 1991, such as having kept private records of the boundaries of some people's lands on receipt of payments directly from them, instead of payments being made to and distributed among the village government. All village leaders are in a position which puts them at a distinct advantage in access to land (on top of the more routine financial benefits) – several of my key informants having told me that they (and other leaders) had been able to make sure they got allocated plenty of good land by being part of the village government, such as Mzee Alfonse (Chapter Five), who specifically joined the government to get land. However, in the case of Mzee

Mkubwa's *mgogoro*, Mzee Juma had clearly gone beyond the bounds of acceptable practice and was ousted as a result.

Meanwhile, the entrenchment of CCM and the espousal of the *ujamaa* ideology and the tenets of national land tenure policy that run counter to the continuing commoditisation of land cause increasing tensions in the evolution of the local land tenure system. For example, although a land market has evolved in Kinyanambo, the wider Tanzanian context has helped to shape that evolution in the direction of a land market which is, in effect, regulated by the local government. The village government now permits people to sell up to 5 acres of their (used) land by themselves to a friend or neighbour, or even a newcomer or outsider, and has done so since around 1995, when the NLP allowed this (see below). They are still supposed to register their sale at the village office, telling them who they sold it to, but do not have to pay the fixed rate sitting allowance (TSh 5,000 per acre) that is paid for obtaining land from the village government and for registering privately purchased land. Instead they are expected to "donate" a part of their profit (at no set rate) towards the costs of registration in the name of the new owner, whilst rentals do not have to be registered at all.⁴¹ However, people are still only allowed to sell the resources they have invested in or on the land. As one current village leader explained, in the convoluted language about land that most leaders use:

"If a person sells 3 acres they are selling their *vitindi* trees which are still [going to be] used [by the purchaser], but even the land is used by the new user, so the trees and land are both used and both are transferred to the new user...that person buys the trees and the land. But if the land is not used [has no trees] and was given by the village government then it cannot be sold and has to be returned to the village government...People are allowed to sell land with something planted on it, or with a house, or land they have farmed, even if they were given it [for free], but they can't sell land with nothing on it."

Nonetheless, people can and frequently do sell both used and unused land without registering the consequent changes of ownership in the village office, usually in order to save money. Yet sales that are not registered, on payment of sitting allowances or smaller amounts of *chai* (if the parties are sufficiently socially and politically connected to be able to arrange this) by the purchaser and donations by the vendor, are vulnerable to contestation as they remain unofficial.

This unofficial and technically illegal (in national land tenure policy terms) yet (at least locally) officially sanctioned system in Kinyanambo which (at least partly) regulates the burgeoning market in land can be justified in terms of longstanding traditions in Uhehe whereby

⁴¹ See also Izumi (1999:p.183), who observed for sales of developed land in Bigwa village, that "10% of the price is supposed to be paid by the seller to the village government" on registration in the village office in the presence of two independent witnesses.

political leaders and land-allocating authorities were paid for their duties (Chapter Four). Moreover, it is not only village leaders involved with land allocation who are paid for their time. Hamlet chairs charge TSh 1,000 from each party in all cases brought to them, whilst each party must pay TSh 2,000 if a case is taken to the village office. Even *mabalozi* charge around TSh 500 to deal with cases. One of my key informants reported that

“getting money from constituents is a law of the people, a custom, but it is not written down... The amount to pay hamlet chairs varies but it is like this everywhere in Tanzania, it is just up to the chairs [in each village] to set the price... the village secretary also gets extra small monies if you want him to write a good letter, but this is more like a bribe”.

Such bribes (*rushwa*) are in contrast to sitting allowances and the charges just noted, which are *posho*, “money you get for doing something”.⁴²

However the split between custom and law – between practice and discourse – creates insecurities of tenure because blind eyes are not always turned. Just as the village government has the power to take land back that is unused and re-allocate it, it also has the power to condemn land transactions should it so choose in any particular case. All people engaging in land transactions thus know that they are vulnerable to sanction, even if they pay lip service to the official discourse. Furthermore, in creating the scope for the regulation of the land market through the payment of sitting allowance, the split between custom and law in turn creates further insecurities of tenure for those who do not pay, as only those who follow the correct procedures for getting land are relatively safe from sanction.

The increasingly widespread practice of tree-planting to raise the value of land is of interest here. This practice might not be necessary if land could officially be sold simply for itself, albeit that trees would remain a valuable resource which add to the land's value. Under the current land tenure system, however, tree-planting is an active process by which people both seek to assert their position as owners (trees not usually being planted on either borrowed or rented land) and raise the compensation value of their land so that in the event of enforced alienation or voluntary sale they will, under the terms of the official discourse, be paid compensation for any unexhausted improvements.⁴³ Yet land is not priced according to the exact number of trees it contains. Its quality for farming is also a consideration and thus in

⁴² lit. rations, daily supply of food, maintenance etc.

⁴³ See also Von Oppen (1996:pp.87-90, 92) and Izumi (1999:pp.5, 197, 244) on the role of tree-planting in land struggles elsewhere in Tanzania, James and Firbo (1973:pp.75, 353-355), Meek (1946:pp.27-28) and Oldaker (1957:pp.132, 138, 141) on tree-planting and ownership more generally in Tanzania, and Bruce (1988:p.41) and Saul (1993:pp.85-86) on elsewhere in Africa.

private land sales the land itself is taken into account and is both perceived and understood to be what is really being sold. In practice in Tanzania, then,

“the development of the so-called land markets is in disguised forms. Incomplete foundations and a couple of coconut trees which purportedly exchange hands are valued way beyond their prices. Such prices obviously contain an element of ‘price of land’ itself. What is being sold here under the guise of an incomplete foundation or coconut trees is land itself meaning the right of the owner to ground rent” (Shivji 1996:p.12; cf. Sundet 1997:p.184).⁴⁴

Or as Lugard (1926:p.296) acknowledged 70 years earlier, when the continuities in national land tenure policy were being established (Chapter One), “the sale of permanent improvements appurtenant to the land, and involving a transfer of user...is for practical purposes indistinguishable from a transfer of the land itself”.

Meanwhile, the regulation of the land market can also be justified in terms of the importance of having some form of regulation of an otherwise (nationally) unofficial land market which might lead to great hardships for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society – such as the many children whose parents and grandparents are selling off their family’s land – if it is not somehow controlled (cf. McAuslan 1998:pp.537-539; Platteau 1992:pp.48-49; Sundet 1997:pp.219, 273). Shivji thus argues, for example, that, as “there is no such thing as a free market”, markets should be regulated so as “to avoid the polarisation of village society” between landowners and landless, categories he equates with rich and poor (1998:p.61). However the regulation that occurs in Kinyanambo can also be criticised (and indeed was criticised by several of my informants) for being arbitrary and insecure – because it is based on custom and not law. The solution might be official national controls on land sales, involving their explicit acknowledgement and thus a major shift in national land tenure policy. In fact Tanzania’s NLP expressly acknowledged land as a commodity that has monetary value, whilst the principle that the main purpose of tenure reform in Tanzania should be to regularise the existing land market was generally accepted by both the government and its critics alike, with “the primary aim” of the 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act being “to provide a legal framework for the operation of a market in land” (Izumi 1999:pp.133, 136; McAuslan 1998:p.532; Okoth-Ogendo 2000:p.127; Shivji 1998:pp.54-55, 60-61; Sundet 1997:pp.211, 270, 273). Nevertheless, this policy change is far from being operationalised (Chapter Two). In the meantime, the combination of evolving practice and official discourse causes “an ever-widening gulf between what is legal and what is real” (Mamdani 1996:p.135), whilst the poorest *wenyeji* and *wenyeji* of villagisation time, in

⁴⁴ See also Feder and Noronha (1987:pp.154-155) on this practice across Africa.

selling their land, are continuing to disempower themselves economically, politically and socially.

The Social Legitimacy of the Land Market

The key question still to be addressed is whether or not the land market (and the land tenure system within which it operates) is regarded as socially legitimate by the people it most directly affects, a question which is intimately bound up with people's understandings of their land rights in Kinyanambo today. People's ownership rights are generally clearly understood. Most people consider that any land they have been given, have inherited or have bought is land they own, even if they are not using it. At the same time, however, they understand the limitations of their ownership rights – that the state can take their land. This explains the injustice felt by those *wenyeji* who lost land at villagisation and for Division Three and urban house-plots, such state alienation being understood, but running counter to local perceptions of what is right and just. Equally, property (*mali*) is also generally clearly understood. To quote one informant, Mzee Markus,⁴⁵ who elaborated his understanding of his land rights for me when I asked him whether or not he perceived tables, houses and land in the same way or not, in other words, as similar or different kinds of property:

"The law is that the table, the house and the land are all the same... I have the right to sell land here if I move somewhere else. It is my right to sell it or give it to someone else as I have to buy land there, so I sell here first. If I buy two farms and farm one and leave one for four years, then, according to the law, there is a rule that I have the right to sell both as they are both my land, both the land I use and the land I don't use. Even the land I don't use, I am protecting it from fires, so it's still mine as I look after it. If I have no right to sell then I have no right to buy."

His words also shed light on a second aspect of legitimacy – how the land market itself is viewed. It will be recalled that land sales have a long history in Kinyanambo, even though they have increased in frequency since villagisation (despite an initial hiatus) and especially during the 1990s. Private sales are thus widely regarded as socially legitimate, because people's understanding is that they own their land and therefore have the right (or, at least, should have the right) to do what they want with it. However village government land sales do not necessarily have the same legitimacy. As Mzee Markus continued:

"If I have paid the [village] government TSh 3,000 for 1 acre then I am buying from the government and the land is mine... The government sell land but if you return it to them [instead of selling] as they say you are supposed to then you don't get anything, no money is given back... The Constitution [*Katiba*] says no-one can sell land and because of this the government

⁴⁵ Not his real name.

say that you are only paying a contribution, but really they are selling the land...If 1 acre is TSh 5,000 sitting allowance then 100 acres is TSh 500,000, for the same transaction. But if it's a contribution it should only be TSh 5,000 as there is one sitting only...I have no doubt that the government is selling land."

The lack of legitimacy thus arises, first, because, whilst government sales are disguised as payments of sitting allowance, people realise that they are, in effect, sales. Second, because often the land being sold is land that has been taken from people who have not received anything back from the village government for it, even if they had originally paid sitting allowance themselves. This jars with people's notions of what is right and just. In view of this, it is also interesting that the *wenyeji* increasingly began to sell their land after villagisation when they saw the village government charging to allocate land and register transfers. Third, the negotiability of sitting allowance (and the existence of its alternative, *chai*) also reduces its legitimacy, at least for those whose negotiating power is weak. Finally, the fact that land is sometimes mis-allocated by the village government when they (knowingly or unknowingly) do not have allocative authority over it – in the main a result of Tanzania's dual tenure system – reduces people's certainty as to the rights they then have.

Land allocation by higher levels of the state is viewed with even less legitimacy than that by the village government, because the amounts of land involved are generally greater, related decisions are more remote, and any complaints made by villagers are ignored. As one of my *mwenyeji* informants expressed it,

"people complain but the land officers bring more people. We are told this area belongs to one person, that area belongs to another... The government doesn't listen to us in meetings... It is like a child talking to its father, even if they are shouting they are not heard either."

His words suggest that not everyone in Kinyanambo views the local land tenure system as completely socially legitimate. Some older people, among the *wenyeji* in particular, mourn the time when their first right to land meant more than it does today. Development and urbanisation have brought with them the conversion of land into primarily an economic commodity, the right to freely be given land no longer goes with the right to live in a place and the privileges of first right no longer exist. Yet land retains some social value, as seen in the occasional hostility to large alienations to (real) outsiders, and, in political terms, despite the change in the face of power, those who hold political power still hold power over land.

However, that private transactions in land are nonetheless socially legitimate can be seen most explicitly in the fact that people were selling land to Mzee Mkubwa (and indeed to other outsiders) and that it was only village and district leaders who took issue with him and not

the *wenyeji* vendors themselves. Yet, as I noted above, many land sales are unplanned and driven by poverty. From this perspective even private land sales could conceivably be seen only as a fact of life, made necessary by economic circumstances, and not as evidence of a socially legitimate land market. On the other hand, there are certainly some people in the village who are buying and selling land speculatively and for sound economic reasons (as also are most of those who are renting out land) and not because of immediate poverty. This may become an increasingly important phenomenon. Furthermore, the ability to rent out or sell some of their land at times of economic crisis enables people to meet their immediate cash needs (i.e. to help themselves) when they most need to. On balance then, and despite the fact that the poorest and most vulnerable people, by gradually disposing of their main asset, may thus be made worse off by the existence of a land market in the longer term, I left Kinyanambo with the distinct impression that the private land market was entirely socially legitimate.

Nevertheless, because national policy and its official discourse on land run counter to evolved and established local market practices, people do know and understand that it is better not to talk about selling or renting out their land (cf. Izumi 1999:pp.66-67). They understand that both they and the village government are trading in land, but the language they use is thus often, and certainly on the part of leaders, about compensation for resources. This was particularly the case in interviews when I pressed people about the nature of any land transactions. However, in my surveys, and more generally on first questioning, most people spoke quite openly about buying and renting land, although they still often did not talk about selling and renting out land. People in Kinyanambo are reluctant to talk about selling and renting out land because, given their experience of villagisation and urbanisation, they are very much aware of how forceful and arbitrary the state can be. This particularly affects the *wenyeji*, who lived through the trauma of villagisation, and the old, who have seen the gradual expansion of state power and authority over land during their lifetimes. Yet it is these same people who are the primary suppliers of land.

The current situation is also a long-term consequence of the anti-landlord rhetoric of the Arusha Declaration – people are more comfortable talking about buying land, because sellers make profit from that which is the property of the nation whereas purchasers do not. They are also more comfortable talking about renting out than selling, because, given the current pressures on land, renting out is now openly officially sanctioned. As my *balazi/court* assessor informant (above) explained: “I can rent my land for two years if I don’t need to use it myself. I

get money for this because I have cut the trees and prepared the land for farming.” However the limit is important – long-term renting is not facilitated, only short-term, because long-term renting counts as non-use by the landlord and might lead to the loss of land. Tenants therefore have fewer incentives to look after the land⁴⁶ and poorer landowners, who are unable to farm all their land, have fewer incentives to retain land over the longer term to rent it out for an income.

In general, then, whilst the land tenure system as a whole – as it has evolved in Kinyanambo, and containing as it does many problematic tensions – may lack broad legitimacy, the land market itself is socially legitimate. Not least, this is because the market has evolved through peoples’ practices, as they operate and negotiate their access to land within and around the local land tenure system. To borrow from the words of Hydén (1980), the land market that has evolved, especially the widespread land market which operates between villagers (rather than that which operates between villagers and outsiders), may thus, in effect, be “small’s” way of fighting back against “big”.

⁴⁶ See also Roth (1993:p.316) on the similar situation in Somalia.

Chapter Eight

Conclusions and Implications

In tracing the historical development of Kinyanambo's land tenure system in this study, I have demonstrated both the evolution of a predominantly individualised land market and the gradual commoditisation of land. These processes of change originated in the long-term commoditisation of agriculture and were energised by the arrival in the immediate study area of non-African settlers from the 1920s, who introduced European legal concepts and generously compensated the (male) African landowners for the large areas alienated to them. The increasing development of the immediate study area that followed, and its accompanying population growth, continued the commoditisation process more or less independently of national land tenure policy until 1974. In that year two key events altered the evolutionary path of the local land tenure system. Villagisation marked a fundamental breakpoint in people's understandings of their rights to land and in local social relations and political power, whilst, together with the birth of Mafinga town, it created the conditions for the more rapid and geographically concentrated growth of the local population, for urbanisation, and for associated changes in livelihoods and in relations between people and land. As land use intensified, liberalisation then fuelled the monetisation of the rural economy and firmly established the role of market forces. The commoditisation of land proceeded apace and by 2000 Kinyanambo had a deep-rooted, widespread and socially legitimate market in land. People's access to land continues to be eased by their social and political connections, particularly their access through non-market channels – and for some groups (such as those with fewer cash resources) more than others. However, as we have seen, access to land through the market predominates and anyone with money can obtain land in Kinyanambo today, provided they follow the correct local procedures. There are going rates, prices can be estimated in advance, and the majority of transactions, especially if properly witnessed, can be upheld.

In some ways the processes of change that we have seen in Kinyanambo are far from unique. "Modern big men", for example, are "major actors in land accumulation" across Africa (Reyna & Downs 1988:p.15). However, whereas 'land-grabbing' by such outsiders has

increasingly fuelled demand for land in Kinyanambo since the onset of economic reform in the 1980s, what is really interesting about the Kinyanambo case – and what we have seen substantial evidence of – is the widespread buying and selling and renting of land among the villagers themselves. This proves that the land market is firmly entrenched, that it exists indigenously within the village and is not driven solely by (wealthy) outsiders.

Kinyanambo is thus a “telling case” (Mitchell 1984:p.239; Chapter One), which sheds much light on the commoditisation of land in Africa and on the evolution of indigenous land tenure systems in an individualised, marketised direction. The trajectory of change in Kinyanambo is both specific to the local area, influenced in particular by its history of settlement, development, population growth and urbanisation, and to the national policy environment of Tanzania. This latter provides the tension-inducing discourse that long denied the very commoditisation of land itself and which has contributed to the evolution of a local land market that is (at least partly) regulated by local government. However, Kinyanambo is almost certainly not atypical – there being some 85 districts in Tanzania alone, each with their own district towns and surrounding peri-urban villages. My analysis is therefore relevant to all parts of Africa where the foundations for the growth of small towns are in place – foundations which primarily rest on the multiplier effects of appropriate government investment and policies to encourage private investment.

Across Africa, urban-rural boundaries are often unclear and urban and rural dynamics are closely interlinked (Berry 1984:pp.78, 80-81, 93; Reyna & Downs 1988:pp.8-9; Roth 1993:p.303). Wily thus identified “the urban-rural interface” as a “potentially illuminating sphere for more study” (1988:p.13), and in focusing on this – in the peri-urban context – I have also helped to fill the need for “careful studies of the operation of both informal and formal land markets in Africa” (Bruce 1988:p.43; Quan 2000:pp.44-46). Proximity to urban centres – markets for village products – undoubtedly influences the economic dynamism of different places (Booth *et al* 1993:p.41). More rural areas may have better natural resource endowments, but urban areas offer many income-earning opportunities in different types of work, in different sectors and in businesses of varying size. Continuing economic reform may place greater weight on such locational advantages than on land itself (*Ibid*:pp.69-71). Yet, as the Kinyanambo case has also shown, in suggesting some answers to questions “about the ways particular local communities in suitable locations have been responding to changes in the pattern of economic opportunity and with what effects” (*Ibid*:p.16), people still feel the need to

grow at least some of their own food and land thus remains central to African livelihoods even in rapidly urbanising areas with plenty of off-farm income-earning opportunities.

Another key lesson is that indigenous land tenure systems evolve of their own accord and in response to their own particularities – national policies being only one factor among many that help to shape their individual (and thus varied) trajectories of change. For example, in contrast to the Kinyanambo case, the land tenure system in Lesotho has adapted to meet the needs of commercial farmers for more land through formal and informal sharecropping and leasing arrangements, as well as through sales (Lawry 1993). In Burkina Faso, the commoditisation of agriculture has contributed to the development of a system of long-term land-borrowing, allowing people secure access to sufficient, good-quality land to successfully produce for market, whilst leaving land ownership in traditional hands (Saul 1993). Meanwhile, elsewhere in Africa, and not just in Kinyanambo, there are places where land sales are “attested by written documents established in the presence of witnesses, thereby ensuring the validity of land transactions” (Platteau 2000:p.64).

Policy Implications

In Chapter One I identified three key markers of current policy interest in African land issues. There are implications from my study for all three. On the issue of people's livelihoods since the onset of economic and political reforms – the first marker – the Kinyanambo case has much to offer. We have seen the importance of off-farm livelihood activities to people in Kinyanambo, especially those that generate regular cash incomes. Such activities are particularly important to improving rural livelihoods when there are “objective limitations to increasing agricultural productivity” and in areas that are “placed in a relatively advantageous position in relation to main markets” (Ponte 2001:p.95; cf. 2000:p.1020). Sender and Smith argued over 10 years ago that a “rapid increase in wage employment is a firmer base for improvements in the material living conditions of the rural poor than focusing on farming” (1990:p.3). The 1990s have shown, at least in Kinyanambo, that more flexible forms of work (such as businesses and self-employed skilled work) are now as important as permanent employment, whilst lower-paid casual wage labour is a useful source of income to those without the education, skills or entrepreneurship to take up higher income-earning opportunities. People in Kinyanambo have multiple income sources and diverse livelihoods, although the most

economically successful invariably engage in employment, skilled work and/or businesses. Nonetheless, agriculture remains a crucial part of almost everyone's livelihood, especially in old age. It will probably stay that way unless and until there is fundamental structural change over the longer term, that is, until off-farm activities consistently provide reliable and secure incomes for the majority of people and until overall economic conditions are sufficiently stable that people have the confidence to give up their reliance on food production on often tired, low-yielding land. In the short term, policy must continue to help those who are farming to do so more productively. More importantly, though, long-term efforts need to be made to create secure alternatives to agriculture and to continue in the pursuit of stable market-oriented economic conditions. However I am not necessarily arguing for more diversification here, something whose long-term desirability is anyway contested (Ponte 2001:pp.94-95), but for specialisation – that is, for policy to create the conditions for people to be able to concentrate their time and labour on a small number of core activities in order to generate a reliable and secure income.

Meanwhile, two connected issues arise – those of perceived land shortage and security of tenure. It is important in discussing land shortage to be clear that "it is more than the physical size of the land which is problematic, its quality and accessibility present major problems in agricultural production" (Mwamfupe 1998:p.15; e.g. Van Hekken & Thoden Van Velzen 1972:pp.13-29). Thus, in Kinyanambo, land was perceived to be available – with money – but that does not mean that land shortage is not an issue for the future, with shortages of good-quality land already an issue in the present. By 2000 over 20% of Mufindi District's land had been alienated on granted rights of occupancy, mostly, though not exclusively, for the tea and timber industries.¹ Given how much of this alienated land is in the immediate study area, and given continuing processes of urbanisation and local development, it is easy to see land pressures growing in Kinyanambo, fuelling the land market and pushing up prices as the years go by.

Such pressures, when combined with the poverty of at least some people in Kinyanambo, require attention to be paid to the issue of security of tenure. Yet, unlike Shivji (1998:pp.96-97), who considers that, as land is a means of survival for most Tanzanians, the more important aspect of tenure security for most Tanzanians is freedom from the fear of alienation, rather than the freedom to transfer land which is implicit in the mainstream meaning

¹ Interview with DS, 8/12/99 and at United Lumber, 23/11/99; MDLO Register for Farms.

of tenure security (Chapter Two), I found that both aspects are equally important to people in Kinyanambo today. Of course people do not want their land to be alienated, but they do nonetheless want the flexibility offered by the land market to buy and sell and rent land in accordance with their circumstances. The poor may get poorer, at least in the short term, by selling their main asset (their land), but in the longer term, with policies that concentrate on improving overall economic conditions and off-farm livelihood options, as above, then the flexibility over their own resources that a land market permits can only aid people's livelihood strategising – by allowing them to choose what resources to invest in and utilise for their own development. For example, efforts could be made to encourage poorer people to rent out their land rather than sell it, by giving assistance for short-term cash crises through some form of mortgaging that is repaid through the rental return.

As regards the issues of urbanisation and agricultural productivity/food security – the second and third markers of current policy interest in African land issues – the Kinyanambo case suggests several directions for policy, particularly concerning land use and urban agriculture. For as long as most people continue to grow at least some of their own food on land which is almost invariably constantly in use, agricultural productivity and food security will continue to be of concern. Yet, without a dramatic recovery in the fertility of land, attempts to improve agricultural productivity – for example by encouraging the use of more appropriate technologies such as donkeys and ploughs instead of more disease-prone oxen or more expensive tractors – can only do so much. However a policy shift in Tanzania to decouple land tenure from land use – though no doubt unlikely – might have great benefits for people's land-use choices. For example, a resumption in long fallowing by those who have big enough farms today should increase their land's fertility, giving them scope to subsequently expand and invest more profitably in agriculture, thereby creating more long-term income-earning opportunities for those who are land-poor. In the immediate study area, long fallowing through tree-planting has the added advantage of generating both income and work while land is 'resting'.

The second direction for policy concerns urban agriculture. For example, planners might allow for house-plots that are bigger than even the current low-density plots in Kinyanambo, so that everyone who wants to can grow some of their own food for as long as they see the need to do so. Larger house-plots would reduce the pressure on surrounding villages from those urban dwellers who would otherwise seek out additional land on which to grow food, whilst countering a widely perceived problem of urban expansion, that the plots created are often too

small for the rural people already living in the new planning areas (e.g. Izumi 1999:p.130). However this need not preclude the existence of high-density settlement pockets for those who want smaller plots. An alternative might be to keep house-plots small – and on land which is not (agriculturally) the best land – while at the same time providing every house-plot owner who wants it with a large allotment, arranged on tracts of good land throughout the town. In either case, donors could help with roads, water supplies and other infrastructure needed to service what would be physically bigger district towns, with probable long-term multiplier effects as an added bonus. Further research is required to establish the most suitable policies in different circumstances. However, in general terms, such planned development of small towns certainly has the potential to spread development more evenly across African countries.

Nevertheless, my study does suggest that increasing social and economic polarisation is likely at least in the short term, for example as increasing household nucleation and the prevalence and consequences of HIV/AIDS worsen the situation of the older generation struggling to bring up the youngest, orphaned generation. By enabling the poorest and most vulnerable to sell their land, land markets may well aggravate these problems (cf. Platteau 2000:p.69). However, the full impact of these factors on social change in Africa cannot be assessed until well in the future. In the meantime the commoditisation of land cannot be stopped – indeed my study has shown the futility of trying to do so. It would be better then to concentrate efforts on trying to improve the lives of the poor and the vulnerable through targeted programmes of support. To develop policies in this way requires more studies of wealth differences, livelihoods and social change – in order to better understand the significance for different groups of people of different directions and processes of change.

The final area of policy to consider is that of land tenure reform and, especially, the regulation of land markets. Although it may be better not to impose rules on communities who have the "capacity to (informally) solve internal organizational problems in an efficient way" (Platteau 1996:p.77), the importance of "a "state-facilitated" evolution of indigenous land tenure systems" (Bruce 1993:p.51), building on everyday practices at local level, is now widely acknowledged (Platteau 1996:pp.74-75; Toulmin & Quan 2000). Yet, as Quan rightly points out, "the relationship between the formalisation of land rights and the development of land markets, and between the development of land markets and the livelihoods of the poor are complex and, as yet, poorly understood" (2000:p.47).

In implementing land tenure reforms it is therefore important to consider land and livelihoods together – because, as we have seen, land tenure systems are partly shaped by people's

livelihood strategies, including their engagement in non-land-based activities (cf. Adams *et al* 2000:pp.138-139, 148-149; Bruce 1988:pp.29-30). However, it is also important to focus on improving transparency and accountability – to avoid the problems that might arise in Tanzania, for example, from the new land laws giving powers over dispute resolution and land administration to village councils. Yet social legitimacy and equity are more clearly visible and contestable in local land tenure systems and policy thus does well to devolve land administration to the local level. For to ignore local systems – what is happening on the ground in different places – simply stores up problems for the future, causing tensions in people's everyday ability to operate and negotiate within and around their local land tenure system.

Theoretical and Methodological Conclusions

Two broad theoretical conclusions stand out from the Kinyanambo case. First, that land markets are indigenously evolving in Africa and that these really are markets. Second, that such markets evolve along their own locally specific trajectories and thus not always as theory would predict. The first conclusion is important because it offers strong countervailing evidence to the notion that land markets in Africa are somehow not real markets, a notion which is bound up in debates over the very nature of African societies themselves.

Mamdani has succinctly drawn our attention to the “two diametrically opposed perspectives” in the literature on rural Africa:

“One looks at the African countryside as nothing but an ensemble of transactions in a marketplace; the other sees it as a collection of households enmeshed in a nonmarket milieu of kin-based relations” (1996:p.12).

According to Yngstrom, any such “market/non-market duality is false” (1999:p.211). Instead she sees the existence of “land transactions in cash” in Dodoma Region as “evidence of the way that kinship relations have become integrated into the cash economy” (Ibid:p.211). Yet Yngstrom is not alone among observers of rural Africa in still managing to convey the impression that land markets in Africa are somehow not real markets, that “land transactions in cash” are “frequently not straightforward market transactions” (Ibid:p.228).

Izumi, for example, describes land sales in Bigwa village as “highly personalised non-market exchanges” (1999:p.168) and, drawing on Izumi's work, Shivji claims that land sales are often confused with “the existence of a ‘land market’ which assumes a robust financial and judicial infrastructure which simply does not exist in many African countries” (1998:p.100). Yet

whilst such “robust infrastructure” undoubtedly contributes to the smooth functioning of markets – the argument behind much policy focus on institutions and capacity-building, and behind IRT – it is incorrect to argue that markets cannot or do not exist in its absence. In defining a ‘market’, Izumi herself says that a market “is an institution which depends on other institutions such as customary, legal, political and other social arrangements which control market systems” (1999:p.33). Thus, although some land sales may well be “highly personalised exchanges”, and although social relations and/or political power can influence prices (Ibid:pp.168-169), this does not mean that there is not a market – only that it may operate differently from markets that are familiar in the West (which themselves take many different forms and have peculiarities of their own), that it is not a (theoretically) perfect market and, perhaps, that it may not be rational (in the strict economic sense (Chapter Two)), points which Izumi anyway later acknowledges (Ibid:p.196).

In contrast to such convoluted semantics, my findings demonstrate that a land market has (fairly straightforwardly) evolved in Kinyamambo. This then takes us beyond the point that empirical research had reached 10 years ago, when Berry asserted, in her still seminal work, that “while access to labor has become increasingly individualized” in Africa, access to land has “continued to be mediated through membership in various social networks” (1993:pp.17, 104). Berry argued that “settlement and rights to land were issues of political control” in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa and that rural property rights remained politicised after the end of colonial rule (Ibid:pp.115, 124; 1984:p.92). As a result, she claimed that control over land remained closely tied to political influence and negotiation and that “people’s ability to exercise claims to land” therefore remained “closely linked to membership in social networks and participation in both formal and informal political processes” (1993:pp.104).

Although she acknowledged that in African rural economies “market activity is ubiquitous”, she claimed that “commercialized transactions were not automatically divested of multiple meanings or separated from social relations or the definition and exercise of authority” (Berry 1993:pp.13, 16). Similarly, Hydén argued for Tanzania over 20 years ago that “the market economy does not unilaterally cause the destruction of the economy of affection. The latter has the ability to survive and also to affect the mode of operation of the market economy” (1980:p.19). Berry’s argument about labour has since been supported by Ponte’s more recent empirical work in Tanzania (2000; 2001). My empirical work now calls for the extension of her argument to land.

What I have shown in this study is that *uenyeji*, though still a factor in easing access to land, has effectively been usurped by wealth. Social and political connections remain useful resources in accessing land through non-market means and are not absent from access to land through the market. Social relations and political power thus contribute to wealth accumulation and are not solely relevant to analysis of *uenyeji*. Nonetheless, the majority of land transfers in Kinyanambo in recent years have been individualised market transactions, in which the key factor is whether or not the would-be acquirer of land has enough money to pay for it, and I therefore conclude that, as the case of Mzee Mkubwa most explicitly demonstrated, wealth ultimately trumps *uenyeji* in the land market today.

The Kinyanambo case thus suggests that land in Africa may be becoming increasingly individualised and commoditised, at least in some places. Most people in Kinyanambo now buy and sell land as individuals for primarily economic reasons and land is an increasingly individualised commodity in Kinyanambo today. Social relations and political power facilitate knowledge about the local land tenure system, about where to find good land to buy, what price to charge or pay, and so on, but such knowledge is both locally specific and not unique to land markets in Africa. In sum, what the Kinyanambo case suggests is that it may be time to update the view that African land tenure systems are especially resistant to processes of commoditisation and social change.

A second important theoretical conclusion from the Kinyanambo case is that the evolution of indigenous land tenure systems – of land markets – is a complex matter, following locally specific trajectories of change that cannot easily be predicted by theory. Yet my study of the evolution of land tenure in Kinyanambo has nevertheless shown that the ETLR cannot be dismissed. Whilst I do not support the main hypothesis of the pure ETLR, that indigenous land tenure systems necessarily evolve towards full privatisation, my empirical findings clearly lend support to the argument that such systems evolve in the general direction of individualised land rights – even though, as I demonstrated clearly in Chapter Two (building on Platteau's (1998) work), this is not theoretically necessary. The Kinyanambo case thus lends nuance to the ETLR, in showing that within this general direction of change there can be different trajectories of change, different evolutionary paths. For example, Kinyanambo's long history of political leaders receiving payments for land-related duties has helped to shape the element of local government regulation in the land tenure system we see today. Yet, whereas the land tenure system in old Kinyanambo adapted easily to change without the emergence of tensions, such tensions have

followed since villagisation – an event which acted as a breakpoint with the past because it brought national land tenure policy to prominence and, at least for a time, suppressed commoditisation. Kinyanambo's land tenure system as a whole may therefore lack broad legitimacy, but the current land market is itself socially legitimate, has strong historical roots, is regulated in a way that may be the most appropriate given the particular local and national circumstances, and may thus be the most rational system (in its broadest sense (Chapter Two)) in the imperfect real world.

The ETLR, and the whole property rights approach to land tenure, does have theoretical flaws – although these are mostly a result of how it is generally interpreted, understood and utilised. Nevertheless, when combined with a historically and empirically grounded focus on social relations and political power, the ETLR helps to provide a generally coherent analytical framework for understanding land tenure. Such a framework – or, rather, eclectic, investigative approach – may yet help bridge the gap between neo-classical economics and alternative theoretical approaches to land and resources.

Finally, to the key methodological lessons of my study. First, the Kinyanambo case has shown that there is clearly great value in studies that examine both land tenure and social change. Land tenure being about both “man-man” and “man-thing” rights and relations (Bohannan 1963; Chapter Two), changes in land tenure are inextricably linked up with processes of social change. Understanding land tenure systems (and access to resources more generally) therefore ultimately rests on analysing processes of social change. Moreover, my study suggests that researchers do best when they are open to the insights of all the varied strands of thought in the literature, drawing on all available tools and taking an interdisciplinary approach. To these tools I now offer the concept of *uenyeji* – one aspect of social and political change – as one that may prove useful to future researchers, particularly, for example, in analysing resident/stranger relations and access to land.

Second, I have learned first-hand that researching land tenure is a long, two-way process, especially in countries where policy and practice are at odds. Furthermore, success in such fieldwork-based, historically investigative empirical research requires, if not a gift, then at least a whole range of skills that must be acquired. As Wiggins has recently observed, “a great deal of careful empirical study” is required to address the complex policy issues facing rural Africa today (2000:p.639). Studies of “social differentiation”, although “no longer a fashionable area of inquiry” (ibid:p.638), are essential if those policy issues are to be most effectively

addressed. The Kinyanambo case illustrates well the issues for people at the urban-rural interface, living in close proximity to a small district town. Similar studies must now examine the issues for people living in other rural situations. In the value of my particular study, then, lies the case for such work to be given a prominent place in the attentions of policy-makers.

Appendix One

Interview and Documentary Sources

Key Informant Interviews in Kinyanambo

I conducted formal interviews with 52 key informants in Kinyanambo, of whom over a quarter were interviewed on two or more occasions. These wide-ranging interviews generated substantial qualitative material on the history, development and economy of Kinyanambo, on changes in agriculture and livelihoods, and on all issues relating to land in the village. Anonymity was guaranteed to all informants in respect of the feelings and opinions they expressed.

My informants came from all 10 hamlets and were selected through a mix of my own encounters and introductions by village leaders or other informants and contacts. I had at least three informants in each hamlet and at least five in each of the six hamlets included in my two surveys. 24 informants were women and 30 men. Six of the women were also interviewed in detail on their farming practices. At least one present or former village leader was interviewed in each hamlet, defined to include minor officials such as *mabalozi* and their assistants, and interviews with these informants focused more on village history and development. Interviews with other informants focused more on their life histories, linking events in their lives with developments in the village, using important historical events as reference points.¹ With the exception of Upendo and Amani, at least one person was interviewed in each hamlet who had lived in Kinyanambo before 1974. There was a deliberate bias towards older people and longer-term residents of the village, although relative newcomers of different ages and sexes were also interviewed. I interviewed people in polygamous and monogamous marriages and people of all marital statuses of different ages, including childless older people. There was a spread of wealth and livelihood activities among informants, including larger landowners, cattle-keepers and some very poor people. 16 informants were involved in my first survey and one informant also took part in my second survey.

¹ This method of dating in life history interviews was suggested by Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1992:pp.107-113). Francis (1992) and Ngaiza and Koda (1991) were other useful guides to conducting life histories.

Most informants spoke Kiswahili, but some spoke Kihehe or mixed Kiswahili with Kihehe, Kibena or Kikinga. My senior research assistant, who interpreted almost all the interviews, spoke Kihehe and Kiswahili and could understand Kibena and Kikinga. Questions were usually asked in English, translated as appropriate and the response translated back into English. However I asked some questions directly in Kiswahili and was fluent enough to follow most interviews directly. I made notes mostly in English and reviewed them with my assistant after each interview, to ensure clarity of recording. We also discussed each informant's reliability and attitude to the research and identified any areas to explore further.

Contextual Interviews and Documentary Sources

I undertook a wide range of contextual interviews during my fieldwork, the majority of which I conducted alone. Most took the format of prepared responses to specific questions, with discussion and expansion as interesting issues arose, and all were in English except for my interviews and informal discussions with Action to Assist Rural Women (AARW) and Mafinga Seminary staff, Mwakaumu women's groups, and a few official informants in Kinyanambo, Wambi and the district government. I met many informants more than once and obtained useful documents from several of them.

- Official Interviews in Mufindi District:
 - Kinyanambo Village Executive Officer (Mr S. Matinya)
 - Head, Upendo Primary School (Mrs T. Sanga)
 - Acting Head and Head, Kinyanambo Primary School (Mr P. Kavenuke and Mr T. Kapteni)
 - Wambi Village Executive Officer (Mr J. Mgao)
 - Mufindi North Member of Parliament (Hon J.J. Mungai MP)
 - Mufindi District Council Chairman and District Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Party Chairman (Mr T. Mgoda)
 - District Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer (DALDO) (Dr E. Mbunda)
 - District Community Development Officers (DCDOs) (Mr S. Mkandawile and Ms C. Mlelwa)
 - District Co-operatives Officers (Mr S. Benela and Mr A. Nyalukela)
 - District Planning Officer
 - District Trade Officer (DTO) (Mr G. Lupembe)

- Sao Hill Forest Manager (SHFM) (Mr Singunda)
 - Escarpment Forestry Company Ltd (EFC) (Managing Director, Mr J. Haule)
 - Ihembe Industries Ltd (Proprietor, Mr H. Lukaminga)
 - Kangesa Timber (Manager, Mr J. Kutika, and Proprietor, Mr Kangesa).
 - Lugano Investment (Proprietor, B.W. Mahenge)
 - Sao Hill Timber Ltd (SHTL) (General Manager, Mr Mathisen)
 - United Lumber (Mr N. Badicil (Manager) and Mr S. Rweyemamu)
 - Tanzania Pyrethrum Processing & Marketing Company Ltd (TPPM) (General Manager, Mr Oommen, and Deputy General Manager, Mr Msola)
 - AARW Project Co-ordinator (Mrs H. Myovela), Gender and Training Officer (Mrs S. Kang'wezi) and Community Development Assistant (for Kinyanambo) (Ms J. Mgoti)
 - HIMA Project (Mufiindi) (Manager, Mr D. Kazikuboma)
 - Mufindi Education Trust (MET) (Secretary, Mr Kalinga)
 - INCOMET (MET's income generating arm) (Manager, Mrs P. Mngongo).
 - Mufindi Community Bank (Manager, Mr Y. Diercyx)
 - Tanzania Farmers' Association (TFA) (Manager, Mafinga branch)
- Other Interviews and Discussions:
 - All AARW staff (regular informal conversations) and Mwakaumu women in Kinyanambo, Igomaa, Nyanyembe, Ukemele, Utosi and Ihalimba villages (various group discussions)
 - Brooke Bond Tanzania Ltd (BBTL), Mufindi Tea Company (MTC) and Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd (various informal conversations, off-site, with expatriate and African workers)
 - Mafinga Seminary (various conversations with Head and other teachers)
- Official Interviews With Tanzanian NGOs Working on Land Issues Outside Mufindi District:
 - Environmental, Human Rights Care and Gender Organization (Envirocare) (Ms L. Lema (Dar-es-Salaam) and Mr Y. Hussein (Moshi))
 - Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (Hakiardhi) (Mr D. Kibamba and Mr Kamata (Dar-es-Salaam))
 - Tanzania Women Lawyers' Association (TAWLA) (Ms T. Silaa (Dar-es-Salaam))
 - Women Advancement Trust (WAT) (Ms J. Nyakyusa (Mbeya))
- Documentary Sources Consulted in Tanzania:
 - Bureau of Statistics Library, Dar-es-Salaam
 - University of Dar-es-Salaam (UDS) Library (Africana Collection)
 - Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA), UDS
 - Tanzania Natural Resources Information Centre, UDS

- Women Research and Documentation Project, UDS
- Government Map Office, Dar-es-Salaam
- Documentary Sources Consulted in England:
 - SOAS Library (including Map Collection and Special Collections)

Mafinga Primary Court

The Mufindi District Court Magistrate, Mr Mwakasanga, granted me access to recent records in Mafinga Primary Court, whose jurisdiction included Kinyanambo. I interviewed one Primary Court Magistrate (Mr Z. Mushi) and studied various recent cases over many visits to the Court, usually with the assistance of the Court Clerks, Ms A. Adamu and Ms F. Mwipopo, and my senior research assistant, who helped with the translation of the Kiswahili records into English. Cases studied concerned property division on divorce and separation in customary marriages, appointments of legal executors for an intestate deceased's estate, and land.

Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development

I made innumerable visits to Mufindi District Land Office (MDLO) and several visits to higher-level land offices in Iringa, Mbeya and Dar-es-Salaam. Most visits to Ministry offices took place alone and all official interviews were conducted in English, usually on the basis of prepared responses to specific questions. I was given access to available files, records, survey sheets and maps as appropriate, although a decentralisation process within the Ministry meant that some material could not be located. It was also not possible to obtain an official map of Kinyanambo, although MDLO provided me with a map of the approximate boundaries of the present-day village. Contacts with Ministry officials are summarised here.

- Official Interviews and Informal Discussions:
 - MDLO - District Land Development Officer (DLDO) (Mr Mwamasage)
 - MDLO - District Urban and Rural Planning Officer (DURPO) (Mr A. Kidwaka)
 - MDLO - District Valuation Officer (DVO) (Ms Z. Kijazi)
 - MDLO - District Surveyor (DS) (Mr E. Kilasi)

- Iringa Regional Land Office (IRLO) - Iringa Urban (Municipal) Land Officer (Mr Msigwa)
- IRLO/Iringa Regional Surveys and Mapping Office (IRSMO) - Iringa Municipal Surveyor (Mr W. Ubald)
- Mbeya Zonal Land Office - Senior Assistant Registrar of Titles, Mbeya Registry of Title (MRT) (Mrs M. Mziray)
- Ministry of Land Department of Surveys and Mapping, Survey Records Department (MLSRD), Dar-es-Salaam - Head of Survey Records (Mr H. Malinde)

Appendix Two

Definition of Analytical Units

The problems of defining the 'household' in an analytically useful way are well documented¹ and arose right at the start of my fieldwork when I was shown around each hamlet by the hamlet leaders. Without any prompting they pointed out the houses of first and second wives to be counted as separate *kaya* ('houses')² in my census. The husband was treated as the head of both wives' *kaya*, but in charge of their two separate 'economic units'.

To clarify matters I sought to establish directly from villagers how they defined their households (and component parts) themselves. Having counted the number of occupied houses (*kaya*) in Kinyanambo during my census, respondent houses sampled for the first survey were thus asked who they considered to be part of their economic unit, defined as the smallest economic grouping in their house – the core economic group – and who else counted as part of their household, but was in a different economic unit. Questions on who was resident and non-resident helped, as did one question specifically asking whether in polygamous households the wives lived and cooked separately or together.

Using this method I identified five types of economic unit in Kinyanambo. The main type was the effective 'nuclear family' – the core economic group of the head of a sampled house (as defined by the residents of the house). This resident nuclear family was the starting point of information-gathering and analysis in both my surveys and throughout this study survey data relate to the core economic units of the sampled houses, the 'surveyed units'. In cases where the head was separated, divorced, widowed or never married this unit usually comprised the household head and their children. In monogamous marriages the core unit usually comprised the head, his wife and their children. In polygamous marriages it usually comprised the resident

¹ Important influences on my thinking were: Ekejiuba (1995), Gastellu (1987), Guyer and Peters (1987), Hart (1995), O'Laughlin (1995) and Peters (1986; 1995); also Davison 1987:pp.20-21.

² I have not found an English translation of *kaya* that I am happy with. It can mean a family as well as more precisely a group of people who cook together and identify as a 'house'. I prefer the latter interpretation and use 'economic unit' to express this.

wife and her children by the household head (the husband) and sometimes the head. I followed local practice in treating husbands as resident with the first wife and therefore part of her unit unless physically resident more often with another wife and therefore part of that wife's unit. The household head was thus head of all units in the household, but was not necessarily part of the surveyed unit in multiple-unit households.

I identified four types of non-core economic units in multiple-unit households, in various combinations and resulting in many different household structures.

Table A1 – Non-Core Economic Units

Type One	Type Two	Type Three	Type Four
Adult sons and daughters of household head, not yet married and still part of head's family.	Children of husband and/or wives by different partners (illegitimate or step-children (from a deceased former partner)).	Other wives of a male household head and their children.	Ex-wives of a male household head and their children.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Usually working elsewhere and not farming, bringing money to their parents, and could return at any time. - Respondents described adult children as separate households if they seldom came home or provided little economic support. - Married children formed separate households, but could rejoin their parents' household after divorce, separation or widowhood. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Usually not part of the core unit even if resident. - Older unmarried children of deceased former partners often used household (but not core unit) land. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If husband alive, each wife and her children usually formed one unit within the household. - Variety of living arrangements, including occasional house sharing, but wives usually had their own farms and budgets.¹ - If husband dead, co-wives usually formed separate households, but sometimes stayed living together with the senior wife as household head of all wives' units. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sometimes used household land even when no longer living as man and wife, so then separate units within the household. - Not in household unless using household land and having economic ties, such as husband providing child support. - Young children of ex-wives living with husband's parents counted as a unit in his household, but ex-wife herself not included. - Adult children as per Type One.

¹ I encountered only a handful of cases in the whole village where the husband, two wives and their children lived as one economic unit.

Appendix Three

Census and Surveys

Census Methodology

At the beginning of my fieldwork I found that there were no accurate records of Kinyanambo's population. To calculate a sample for my two surveys I therefore needed to undertake my own census, on which I worked with all three of my assistants. I also used the census as an opportunity to get a feel for migration patterns and relative wealth in the different parts of the village, to aid my selection of hamlets for inclusion in the surveys. Buildings in the currently built-up areas of the village were divided into three categories, each of which were counted – those which were occupied, those still under construction and not yet occupied, and those which were empty but had been occupied in the past – and the house structures of all occupied houses were recorded. Maps of each hamlet were drawn, with occupied houses given numbers, and I later drew standardised maps of the hamlets selected for the surveys.

Occupied houses were defined as properties occupied by separate economic units. Thus a compound of several buildings housing a nuclear family counted as one house, whereas a building shared by two economically separate families counted as two houses in multiple occupancy. These data are fairly reliable, although it is possible that a few cases of multiple occupancy were missed. Houses under construction and empty houses (albeit often in ruins) were more straightforward to count.

On house structures, each house (separate economic unit) was counted by its highest-order roof and wall material. Most houses contained more than one type of material but the higher-order materials were the more expensive ones. Three main roof types were present in Kinyanambo. Tiles were the highest-order, followed by metal (corrugated iron sheets) and thatch. A few timber-roofed buildings were also found, counted as thatch. Wall types were more varied, but for simplicity were grouped into two broad categories. 'Mud' was the lower-order (mud or mud brick walls) and 'modern' was the higher-order (burnt brick or stone or cement/concrete walls). A handful of thatch-walled, timber-walled and wattle and daub houses

were also found, counted as mud. However the modern category also included houses which had been plastered, even when there was predominantly mud underneath. The most common type of plaster was painted onto mud walls by hand, to make them more robust during the rains. A second type of plaster, known locally as 'chipping' (effectively a rough surfaced render), was created by machine and applied to modern walls.

Census Findings

Table A2 – Occupied Houses, Empty Houses and Houses Under Construction

Area	Occupied Houses	Empty Houses	Houses Under Construction
Mugodi	255	107	72
Idope	149	28	21
Ikweta	182	82	54
Amani	112	37	12
Upendo	108	41	55
Lumwago	51	26	16
Kinanambo ¹	160	102	57
Gangilonga	69	33	7
Tanganyika	128	85	9
Ifingo	122	124	18
Village Total	1336	665	321

¹ 28 staff houses in the pyrethrum factory *kiwanda* were excluded, all modern brick and tiled houses occupied by factory employees and their families outside the main built-up area of Kinanambo (Interview at TPPM, 18/11/99).

Table A3 – Occupied Houses' Structures

Hamlet	% of Occupied Houses with Thatch Roofs	% of Occupied Houses with Metal Roofs	% of Occupied Houses with Tiled Roofs	% of Occupied Houses with Mud Walls	% of Occupied Houses with Modern Walls
Mugodi (n=255)	13%	82%	4%	58%	42%
Idope (n=149)	11%	83%	6%	56%	44%
Ikweta (n=182)	16%	80%	4%	60%	41%
Amani (n=112)	15%	84%	1%	56%	44%
Upendo (n=108)	15%	83%	2%	40%	60%
Lumwago (n=51)	27%	73%	0	80%	20%
Kinanambo (n=160)	34%	66%	0	72%	28%
Gangilonga (n=69)	33%	67%	0	62%	38%
Tanganyika (n=128)	45%	55%	0	71%	29%
Ifingo (n=122)	56%	44%	0	88%	12%

Using the data in Table A3, I ranked the 10 hamlets from highest to lowest by proportion of modern walls and from lowest to highest by proportion of thatch roofs. I then combined the two rankings in an index to assess relative wealth. The index adds the roof rank to twice the wall rank – because it was easier and cheaper to put a metal roof on a house than to modernise or

rebuild the wall structure and because people therefore generally upgraded their roof before modernising their walls (or rebuilding their house).

Table A4 – Hamlets Ranked by House Structure¹

Highest to Lowest % of Modern Walls	Lowest to Highest % of Thatch Roofs
1. Upendo	1. Idope
2. Idope	2. Mugodi
2. Amani	3. Upendo
4. Mugodi	3. Amani
5. Ikweta	5. Ikweta
6. Gangilonga	6. Lumwago
7. Tanganyika	7. Gangilonga
8. Kinanambo	8. Kinanambo
9. Lumwago	9. Tanganyika
10. Ifingo	10. Ifingo

¹ Based on figures in Table A3.

Table A5 – Relative Hamlet Wealth

Wealth Index (Richest to Poorest) ¹	Proportion of Village Population ²
1 - Upendo (5)	8%
1 - Idope (5)	11%
3 - Amani (7)	8%
4 - Mugodi (10)	19%
5 - Ikweta (15)	14%
6 - Gangilonga (19)	5%
7 - Tanganyika (23)	10%
8 - Lumwago (24)	4%
8 - Kinanambo (24)	12%
10 - Ifingo (30)	9%

¹ Actual scores (calculated from rankings in Table A4) in brackets.

² Based on occupied house figures in Table A2.

Survey Methodology

Time and resource constraints meant that I could not include all 10 hamlets in my two surveys. On completion of the census, in order to try to represent some of the diversity within the village in my selection (in terms of visible wealth, construction rates, apparent settlement times and so on), I therefore grouped the hamlets together roughly into six groups as follows:

- Upendo (richest, very high rate of construction)
- Amani/Idope/Ikweta/Mugodi (rich to medium wealth, nearest to Mafinga, densely populated but lots of construction, space permitting)
- Gangilonga (medium wealth, older part of Kinyanambo, settled and planned at villagisation)
- Tanganyika (poorer, core of the old village, very low rate of construction)
- Kinanambo/Lumwago (poorer, older parts of Kinyanambo, relatively near Mafinga, relatively high rate of construction)
- Ifingo (poorest, furthest from Mafinga, older part of Kinyanambo)

Upendo, Gangilonga, Tanganyika and Ifingo were obvious choices. From the other groups I then chose Idope, as it was the closest to Mafinga and contained many cases of multiple occupancy, and Lumwago, as the MDLO were surveying house-plots there during my fieldwork. Both my surveys were carried out in these six hamlets.

Data collection focused on the core economic unit of the sampled houses. The first survey sought basic demographic, economic and historical information about Kinyanambo. Questions were asked about who comprised the surveyed unit and its household; when the household head came to Kinyanambo, why and where from; and about the unit's livelihood activities and income sources, landholdings, means of access to and demand for land, and ownership of various possessions. The second survey went into much more detail, with questions focused on livelihood activities and major expenditures; land farmed, crops grown, input use and recent maize harvests; landholdings, recent land transfers and expectations about future transfers; and decision-making within the unit. Both surveys were designed to elicit qualitative information and many questions were open-ended.

Written Kiswahili questionnaires were administered by two of my assistants, with responses recorded mostly in Kiswahili and translated into English by me. They worked together during a pilot phase, administered first survey questionnaires by themselves and worked together again on the more complicated second survey questionnaires. However I accompanied both assistants on an *ad hoc* basis to maintain administration techniques and ensure consistency and held regular informal training and review sessions. I also initially went through both questionnaires question by question to explain their purpose and what information was required, which enabled my assistants to handle respondents' questions about my questions and about my research aims more generally. With my encouragement they took the initiative in asking follow-up questions and reported extensively on all responses.

First questionnaires were usually carried out with the household head of the surveyed unit, with at least some other unit members present. Where the head was not present information was obtained from other unit members and checked with the head during revisits. However as there was more than one revisit to most houses in the sample, information was generally elicited from all members of the unit, reducing the gender and other biases found in surveys that only interview (usually male) household heads. In the second survey both husband

and wife (in married units) were invariably present and I trained my assistants to direct questions to and clarify answers with both parties.

I checked every questionnaire personally on completion to resolve any inconsistencies while information was still fresh in the mind of the administrator and my assistants returned to ask follow-up questions as required. Gaps were thus identified and dealt with early on, ensuring a high response rate – although as with any social science research, some minor anomalies inevitably remain. During the second survey they also revisited every house in the first survey to further check and clarify data and to ask individual follow-up questions that I designed after having reviewed the entire sample.

Sampling and Stratification Process¹

The six surveyed hamlets contained 47% of the occupied houses in Kinyanambo (Tables A2 and A5) and 49% of my estimated village population (Table A9, Appendix Four). The first survey was undertaken in 25% of each hamlet and the second survey in 10% of each hamlet. The first survey sample was stratified by wealth and in two cases, by geography and occupancy type. The second survey sample was only stratified by wealth. The purpose of stratification was to make the samples more representative of the village as a whole.

First Survey

Three house-type categories were used to stratify this sample by wealth – mud/thatch, mud/metal and modern/metal.² For each hamlet the numbers and percentages of occupied houses in each of the three categories were calculated and the number of houses to be drawn in a 25% sample was calculated from the total number of occupied houses. That number was then divided according to the proportions of house types in the hamlet and the required number of houses selected at random from houses in each house-type category.

¹ Olsen (1992:pp.57-65) was my guide to random sampling and stratification procedures.

² Tiled houses were included as modern/metal, whilst a few modern houses with thatch roofs were included as modern/metal, as thatch was sometimes used to enable habitation before construction was fully complete.

Table A6 – First Survey Wealth Stratification

Hamlet	Number of Houses Sampled ¹	Actual % of Mud/ Thatch Houses	Number in Sample	Actual % of Mud/ Metal Houses	Number in Sample	Actual % of Modern/ Metal Houses	Number in Sample
Idope	38	11%	4	42%	16	47%	18
Upendo	27	14%	4	26%	7	60%	16
Lumwago	14	27%	4	53%	7	20%	3
Tanganyika	32	44%	14	27%	9	29%	9
Gangilonga	18	32%	6	30%	5	38%	7
Ifingo	31	55%	17	33%	10	12%	4
Totals	160 ²	-	49	-	54	-	57

¹ Exactly 25.5% of the occupied houses in Idope, 25% in Upendo, 27.45% in Lumwago, 25% in Tanganyika, 26.09% in Gangilonga and 25.41% in Ifingo.

² Questionnaires were completed in 156 of the sampled houses. The occupants of one house in Tanganyika moved away between sampling and survey completion. The occupants of two houses in Gangilonga and one in Tanganyika moved away before revisits could be made.

Ifingo was also split geographically between the main part of the hamlet around the Itimbo road junction and a smaller, visibly poorer part called Kinyiganga (Map 4, Chapter One). 20 of Ifingo's 122 houses were in Kinyiganga so 5 of the 31 houses in the sample were drawn from there, calculated roughly in proportion to the relative weight of house types.

Idope was also stratified by multiple occupancy to reflect potentially different residence statuses and shed more light on different types of land (and house) tenure. The 149 occupied 'houses' in Idope lived in 127 occupied buildings, of which 114 contained economic units in sole occupancy and 13 contained 35 economic units in multiple occupancy. 77% of units were thus in sole occupancy and 23% in multiple occupancy. Of the sample of 36 houses, 8 were therefore selected from among the units in multiple occupancy and 30 from among the units in sole occupancy. The sample was first stratified by wealth and then calculated according to the proportion of each house type in each occupancy type.

Second Survey

The 10% sample was directly drawn from the 25% sample as the second questionnaire built on information gathered in the first. It was only stratified by wealth and to simplify procedures for the smaller sample only two house-type categories were used – 'modern' (modern/metal) and 'mud' (mud/thatch and mud/metal). The procedure was identical to that used to calculate the 25% sample except that only the already sampled houses were selected from.

Table A7 – Second Survey Wealth Stratification

Hamlet	Number of Houses Sampled ¹	Actual % of Mud Houses	Number in Sample	Actual % of Modern Houses	Number in Sample
Idope	15	53%	8	47%	7
Upendo	11	40%	4	60%	7
Lumwago	5	80%	4	20%	1
Tanganyika	13	71%	9	29%	4
Gangilonga	7	62%	4	38%	3
Ifingo	12	88%	11	12%	1
Totals	63 ²	-	40	-	23

¹ Exactly 10.1% of the occupied houses in Idope, 10.2% in Upendo, 9.8% in Lumwago, 10.2% in Tanganyika, 10.2% in Gangilonga and 9.8% in Ifingo.

² Questionnaires were completed in only 61 of the sampled houses, as two of the houses excluded from the first survey results (one in Gangilonga, one in Tanganyika) had already been sampled for the second survey.

Appendix Four

Supplementary Tables

Table A8 – Unit Size and Resident Population¹

	Tanganyika	Gangilonga	Lumwago	Upendo	Idope	Ifingo	Overall
Mean size of surveyed unit (resident and non-resident members)	4.4	4.9	3.6	4.8	4.2	4.1	4.3
Mean number of occupants in each unit's house (resident unit members and non-member occupants)	3.9	5.1	3.3	4.6	4.1	4.3	4.2

¹ Data relates to my first survey, n=156.

Table A9 – Estimated Population of Kinyanambo in 1999

Area	Number of Occupied Houses	Mean Average Number of Occupants Per House ¹	Estimated Population	% of Estimated Village Population
Mugodi	255	4.1	1046	19%
Idope	149	4.1	611	11%
Ikweta	182	4.1	746	14%
Amani	112	4.1	459	8%
Upendo	108	4.6	497	9%
Lumwago	51	3.3	168	3%
Kinanambo	160	3.3	528	10%
Gangilonga	69	5.1	352	6%
Tanganyika	128	3.9	499	9%
Ifingo	122	4.3	525	10%
Kinyanambo Overall	1336	-	5431	100%

¹ The mean was calculated directly from the survey sample in the six surveyed hamlets (Table A8) and extended to other hamlets as per the hamlet groupings in Appendix Three.

Table A10 – Ethnic Group of Unit's Household Head

Ethnic Group	Number of Household Heads of Each Ethnic Group	% of Household Heads of Each Ethnic Group (n=156)
Mhehe	101	65%
Mbena	29	19%
Mkinga	13	8%
Msambaa	3	2%
Mmbunga	2	1%
Mnyakyusa	2	1%
Others ¹	6	4%

¹ Mchagga, Mmatengo, Mngoni, Mniyha, Mnyamwezi, and Muwanji (one of each).

Table A11 – Religion of Unit's Household Head

Religion of Household Head	Number of Household Heads of Each Religion	% of Household Heads of Each Religion (n=156)
Catholic	97	62%
Lutheran	26	17%
Muslim	10	6%
Assemblies of God	10	6%
Pentecostal	4	3%
7th Day Adventist	3	2%
Full Gospel Church	1	~ 1%
Anglican	1	~ 1%
None (Pagan or Traditional Religion)	4	3%

Table A12 – Number of Household Heads From Old Kinyanambo

Origin of Household Head	Tanganyika (n=30)	Ganglonga (n=16)	Lumwago (n=14)	Upendo (n=27)	Idope (n=38)	Ifingo (n=31)	Totals and % (n=156)
Lived in old Kinyanambo before villagisation (the <i>wenyeji</i> group)	16	9	4	0	2	5	36 (23%)
<i>Sub-total present in Kinyanambo at villagisation</i>	16	8	4	0	1	3	32 (21%)
Arrived at villagisation or later and not from old Kinyanambo, or born in modern Kinyanambo	14	7	10	27	36	26	120 (77%)

Table A13 – Household Head's Arrival Time in Modern Kinyanambo

Household Head's Arrival Time in Modern Kinyanambo	Number of Household Heads in Each Category	% of Household Heads in Each Category (n=156)
Born in modern Kinyanambo (before 1980)	10	6%
Already living in modern (old core) Kinyanambo at villagisation	9	6%
During villagisation (the villagisation migrants)	29	19%
After villagisation and before 1980	21	13%
From 1980 to 1989	21	13%
Between 1990 and 1994	22	14%
Between 1995 and 1998	34	22%
Within the last year (1999)	10	6%

Table A14 – Migration Categories

Category of Migration to Kinyanambo	Number of Household Heads in Each Category	% of Household Heads in Each Category (n=156)	% of Migrant Household Heads (to Modern Kinyanambo) in Each Category (n=110)
Born in modern Kinyanambo	10	6%	-
From old Kinyanambo (core and Mahameni) (the <i>wenyeji</i> group)	36	23%	-
Migrants to modern Kinyanambo (not from old Kinyanambo)	110	71%	100%
- Specific move to modern Kinyanambo from elsewhere	77	49%	70%
- Moved to the immediate study area from elsewhere, then to Kinyanambo ¹	24	15%	22%
- Originally from the immediate study area, then to Kinyanambo ²	9	6%	8%

¹ 12 household heads already had links with Kinyanambo, eight ended up in Kinyanambo by coincidence and the remainder did not give specific reasons for coming to Kinyanambo.

² Three household heads had links with Kinyanambo when they moved, five ended up in Kinyanambo by coincidence and one did not give a specific reason.

Table A15 – *Uenyeji* Group of Unit's Household Head

Household Head's <i>Uenyeji</i> Group	Number of Household Heads in Each Group	% of Household Heads in Each Group (n=156)
<i>Wenyeji</i> ¹	36	23%
<i>Wenyeji</i> of villagisation time ²	45	29%
Newcomers ³	65	42%
Born in modern Kinyanambo	10	6%

¹ As per Table A12

² Villagisation, late 1970s and 1980s migrants who had not lived in old Kinyanambo

³ 1990s migrants who had not lived in old Kinyanambo.

Table A16 – Unit's Household Type

Household Type	Number of Units in Each Type of Household	% of Units in Each Type of Household (n=156)
Female headed (never married)	9	6%
Female headed (<i>de facto</i> , still married but independent unit)	2	1%
Female headed (separated or divorced)	7	5%
Female headed (widowed, own household)	31	20%
Female headed (widowed polygamous wives living together)	3	2%
<i>Sub-total female headed households</i>	52	33%
Male headed (never married)	8	5%
Male headed (monogamously married)	64	41%
Male headed (polygamously married)	19	12%
Male headed (separated or divorced)	4	3%
Male headed (widowed)	9	6%
<i>Sub-total male headed households</i>	104	67%

Table A17 – Mean Acreages Owned and Farmed in Kinyanambo by Hamlet

Hamlet	Mean Acreage Owned in Kinyanambo, as at January 2000	Mean Acreage Farmed in Kinyanambo, 1999/2000
Tanganyika	3.5	2.8
Gangilonga	5.8	3.4
Lumwago	3.7	2.5
Upendo	2.7	2
Idope	1.7	1.6
Ifingo	4.2	2.7

Table A18 – Unit's Generational Spread

Generations in Surveyed Unit	Number of Units in Each Category	% of Units in Each Category (n=156)
Single generation	24	15%
Parents and children	98	63%
Grandparents and grandchildren	12	8%
Grandparents, parents and children	21	14%
Great grandparents, parents and children	1	~ 1%

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