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The appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos

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The appeals to national identity in  
Taiwan's presidential campaign videos

by

Chang, Jung-chun

**Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
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## **Abstract**

This study challenges a common academic notion that, in Taiwan's presidential elections, national identity is an issue independent of other campaign discourses. Previous studies have only recognised and checked how often candidates present visible appeals to national identity in Taiwan's election campaign advertising. However, I argue that to avoid alienating independent voters, candidates might not always explicitly reveal their national identities in campaign communications. Rather, they often show their stance implicitly or even dramatically through symbols such as public policy statements and specific signs, scenes, songs and languages in campaign materials. This argument is supported by content analysis, discourse analysis, and in-depth interviews in this study.

This study aims to answer two questions that have not been fully examined in previous studies on Taiwan's identity politics. First, in Taiwan's presidential elections, what were the symbolic representations of KMT and DPP candidates' national identity appeals in the election campaign videos? Second, what were the rationales behind the arrangements of those symbolic representations?

From 2012 to 2020, the DPP candidates almost exclusively expressed a Taiwanese identity in campaign videos. However, in her 2020 presidential campaign, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen presented 'R.O.C. Taiwan' as a new national identity in order to maximise support from those professing a Taiwanese identity, a R.O.C. identity or both. This is the newest development in Taiwan's identity politics. To compete with the DPP, the KMT's presidential candidates also frequently have identified as Taiwanese in campaign videos, although for the KMT, Taiwanese

identity is by necessity a provincial identity. In addition, the KMT's candidates have used symbols like the image of R.O.C.'s founding father, R.O.C. flag, the anthem of R.O.C. flag, and KMT's party emblem to imply the R.O.C. national identity in campaign videos.

Overall, this study has several research findings which are original and contribute to the study of Taiwan's identity politics. First, in Taiwan's presidential elections, at least from 2012 to 2020, both the KMT and DPP candidates used a synthesis of visual and audial symbolic representations to imply their national or provincial identities in campaign videos. Second, the use of such symbols is influenced by candidates' perceptions of the political, social, economic and cross-Strait contexts in a given election year. In other words, in Taiwan's presidential elections, the appeal to national identity has been actually a compromise between candidates' party stances and some contextual factors in Taiwanese society. Third, in the campaign videos, candidates have elaborated the meanings of national identity from economic, social, cultural, and communicative perspectives to earn the greatest support from the public. Fourth, KMT candidates have emphasised the compatibility of Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity in their campaign videos but, to get more votes from Taiwanese people, have used more symbols to imply Taiwanese identity. In Taiwan's 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen only implied Taiwanese national identity in her campaign videos. However, in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, to counterattack the KMT's accusation concerning her avoidance of R.O.C. identity, Tsai has started to include symbols like the R.O.C. flag in campaign videos to represent the R.O.C. identity. Thus, it is clear

that, for both KMT and DPP's presidential candidates, the appeals to national identity entail dynamic and strategic considerations in campaign communications.

## **Acknowledgements**

I thank God that I have finally completed the thesis.

It has been a long journey, and this has changed my life, my mentality, and my health as well. However, on the other side, I have learned how to persevere through the challenges and hardships that I faced while writing this dissertation.

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Chang Jung-chun, 3 September, 2022

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## Note on Romanisation of Chinese Sources

This thesis uses the Wade-Giles system and Hanyu-Pinyin for the Romanisation of Chinese sources. Names of places in Taiwan and names of Taiwanese individuals, including interviewees, politicians, and campaign slogans, are spelt by the Wade-Giles system except for Chen, Shui-bian and some Taiwanese politicians who are used to their English names.

The Chinese politician such as Xi Jinping uses Hanyu-Pinyin, Chen, Shui-bian's official spelling is also Hanyu-Pinyin that I keep their usage to respect those people and not to confuse the existing knowledge.

## Chapter 1. Introduction

National identity is an important issue in Taiwan's politics. The importance and sensitivity of the issue were fully reflected in one of the country's President Tsai Ing-wen's (蔡英文) speeches. On the night when Tsai celebrated her victory and the change of ruling parties in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, she proclaimed to her supporters: 'As long as I am the president of Taiwan, I will make my best efforts to assure that, in Taiwan, no one needs to apologise for his (her) identity.' (只要我當總統的一天，我會努力，讓我的國民，沒有一個人必須為他們的認同道歉。) (16 January, 2016; Tsai Ing-wen)<sup>1</sup>

Parallel to Tsai's concern about identity, in Taiwan, the issue of national identity, or the question of 'What country do I belong to?' has been recognised by some scholars as a subtle and influential factor in Taiwan's major elections, especially the presidential elections (Achen and Wang, 2017; Brown and Sageman, 2019; Fell, 2011; Shyu, 1995; 2004). As Achen and Wang (2017, p.15) suggest, 'There are many lessons to be taken from the study of Taiwan, and we conclude with just one that seems to us the most important. Taiwan illustrates in great detail the power of identity in politics.' A researcher at Taiwan's Academia Sinica, Wu, Jieh-min, even argues that Taiwan's 2020 presidential election is actually a 'proxy contest about national identity' (CNA, 11 January, 2020).

If national identity is so critical in Taiwan's presidential elections, one related important question will be: How is national identity represented by the candidates in

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<sup>1</sup> Tsai's victory speech was given on the night of 16 January, 2016.  
<https://www.businessweekly.com.tw/focus/indep/27811>

the election campaigns? Regarding the representation of national identity, some scholars have emphasised the connection between symbols and the appeal to national identity (Dryzek, 2006; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, 1999). For example, Dryzek (2006, p. 35) has proposed that national identities ‘are mobilised into existence through symbols invoked by the political leadership.’ However, it remains unexplored how candidates use various kinds of symbols to present their national identities in Taiwan’s elections; this exploration is the purpose of this study.

### **1.1 The significance of national identity in Taiwan’s politics**

Why does the appeal to national identity matter for Taiwan’s two major political parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in presidential campaigns? The answer to this question highlights the significance of this study.

A communications scholar and the spokesperson for the KMT’s 2012 presidential campaign has indicated: ‘Because it is Taiwan’s presidential election, KMT’s candidates must show their Taiwanese identity to win the elections. On the other hand, since Taiwan’s constitutional status is only a province of the Republic of China (R.O.C.), to demonstrate the KMT’s adherence to the constitution, KMT candidates also need to show their R.O.C. identity in campaign communications (Chuang Po-chung, 2 February, 2019, personal interview).<sup>2</sup> Chuang (2 February, 2019, personal interview) further notes that although political scientists and some of the polling

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<sup>2</sup> KMT’s former spokesman, and a main staff member of Ma’s 2012 presidential election campaign team. Chuang is also a political communications professor in Chinese Culture University.

organisations mostly have used ‘Chinese identity’ and ‘Taiwanese identity’ to describe the cleavage of Taiwan’s national identity (e.g., Fell, 2005; Hughes, 2016; Rigger, 2003; Schubert and Damm, 2014; Shen and Wu, 2008), to avoid being attacked by the DPP as pro-China politicians, the KMT’s presidential candidates have used ‘R.O.C.’ instead of ‘China’ in campaign materials. This does not mean KMT candidates have rejected Chinese culture; rather, regarding national identity, KMT candidates just have felt that it is more legitimate for them to say ‘I am a citizen of the R.O.C.’ (我是中華民國國民) than to say ‘I am Chinese.’ (我是中國人)

As for Taiwanese identity, the KMT’s positioning of this identity is based on the R.O.C.’s constitution. According to the current constitution of the Republic of China (R.O.C.), both Taiwan and mainland China are parts of the R.O.C., however, from 1949 until nowadays, the government of the R.O.C. only effectively has governed the regions of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Facing this political reality, as Chuang (2 February, 2019, personal interview) indicates above, the politicians of the KMT demonstrate their R.O.C. identity as a national identity and, because the constitutional status of Taiwan<sup>3</sup> as a province of the R.O.C., Taiwanese identity can only be that of a provincial identity.

The dual identity of the KMT has its historical origin. The late chairman of the KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) argued in 1987 that, after living in Taiwan for almost forty years, he is not only a Chinese but also a Taiwanese (Chiang, 1987; cited from ETtoday, 18 January, 2018)<sup>4</sup>. Another former chairman of the KMT, Chiang

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<sup>3</sup> Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, Act.9

<https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawSingle.aspx?pcode=A0000002&flno=9>

<sup>4</sup> Chiang said this one year before he passed away in 1988.



Chi-chen (江啓臣) also claimed in 2020 that he is both Taiwanese and Chinese. Chiang further explained that, for the KMT, the word ‘China’ means the R.O.C. (CNA, 17 March, 2020) In 2011, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), also a former chairman of the KMT, indicated on his Facebook page that he is willing to work hard for Taiwan, and as for nationality, he is a citizen of the R.O.C. (CNA, 12 July, 2011) The three KMT politicians have clearly indicated that, the KMT should have Taiwanese identity, but, for the party, Taiwanese identity is a provincial identity and the R.O.C. identity is the national identity. Therefore, as presented in chapter five of this thesis, in Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election, for the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou, one of his campaign videos showed a subtitle saying, ‘Taiwan is our homeland; the R.O.C. is our country.’ (咱的台灣，咱的家園，咱的中華民國，咱的國家)

In contrast to the KMT identifying with both Taiwan and the R.O.C., the DPP has proposed to establish an independent country, namely the Republic of Taiwan in the party’s revised platform of 1991 (DPP’s platform, 1991)<sup>5</sup>. For DPP politicians, since the R.O.C. government can only control Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, there is no point for the R.O.C. government to still claim territorial sovereignty over mainland China or insist that the R.O.C. represents China. DPP’s politicians believe that it is more reasonable and realistic to transfer the political status of Taiwan from a part of the R.O.C. into an independent country namely the Republic of Taiwan. Then, in 1999, the DPP’s convention passed the document ‘The Resolution of Taiwan’s Future’ and reiterated that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country which only

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<sup>5</sup> DPP’s party platform promulgated in 1986 and revised the ultimate goal of establishing ‘the Republic of Taiwan’ in 1991.

controls Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, although the current constitutional name of Taiwan is R.O.C., Taiwan and mainland China do not belong to each other. The party also proposed in the document that the fulfilment of Taiwan's independence should be determined through a referendum (DPP's platform, 1999).

The platform regarding Taiwan's independence and the document of the Resolution of Taiwan's Future clearly indicates that the DPP maintains that Taiwan is a sovereign country instead of being just a part of the R.O.C. (according to the R.O.C.'s constitution, the other part of the R.O.C. is mainland China)<sup>6</sup> and, for the party, Taiwanese identity is the national identity instead of merely a provincial identity. Another evidence of the DPP's treatment of Taiwan as a country can be found in the chairwoman of the DPP and the president of the R.O.C., Tsai Ing-wen's 2021 National Day speech. In the speech, Tsai used 'Taiwan' to represent the country 48 times but only mentioned the R.O.C. six times (Office of the President, Republic of China Taiwan, 10 October, 2021). It is consistent with her belief that 'Taiwan' is the name of a country instead of just the name of a province of the R.O.C. After Tsai was re-elected as the president of the R.O.C. in 2020, she mentioned 'Taiwan' 46 times and the R.O.C. only four times in her inauguration speech (Office of the President, Republic of China Taiwan, 20 May, 2020).

However, the DPP's advocacy of Taiwan independence is strongly opposed by the People's Republic of China (the P.R.C., which is called mainland China by the KMT), because the P.R.C. claims that Taiwan is a part of China, and the unification

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<sup>6</sup> Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area <https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Q0010001>

of Taiwan and mainland China will be fulfilled in the future. Since the DPP made Taiwan's independence a key part of its party platform in 1991, the P.R.C. frequently has warned the DPP to stop attempting to make Taiwan an independent country. For instance, on 9 October, 2021, the president of the P.R.C., Xi Jinping (習近平) once again claimed that Taiwan's independence is the greatest obstacle to the unification of China; he warned that anyone who tries to split Taiwan from China will be spurned by the people of China and judged by history (CNA, 9 October, 2021).

Xi also claimed that P.R.C. will make the greatest efforts to fulfil the task of unification, and not exclude military force as an option to accomplish the task. Xi emphasised that the possible use of military force is a warning against the movement toward Taiwan's independence and any foreign forces which may attempt to interfere with unification (Liberty Times net, 2 January, 2019). Apart from the P.R.C., the U.S. government also holds a long-term policy of not supporting Taiwan's independence. As the spokesperson of the American Institute in Taiwan, Amanda Mansour, indicated on 13 February, 2019, the U.S. government does not support the referendum on Taiwan's independence, it is a long-term American policy. Mansour emphasised that the U.S. government disagrees that Taiwan or China takes any actions to change the status quo of The Taiwan Strait (Upmedia, 13 February, 2019).

Facing mainland China and the U.S. government's oppositions toward Taiwan independence, the former secretary general of the DPP's central committee, Chiu Yi-ren (邱義仁) indicated on 4 July, 2021 that he agrees with treating Taiwan independence as a political goal of the DPP; however, the DPP needs a realistic consideration about how to fulfil this political ideal. Chiu emphasised that while

promoting the idea of Taiwan independence, the DPP should consider the possible negative reactions from mainland China, the U.S. government, and some people in Taiwan (CNA, 4 July, 2021). Thus, as Taiwanese political communications scholar Niu Tse-hsun (12 December, 2018, personal interview) has indicated, in Taiwan's presidential election campaigns, for DPP candidates, an important question is: 'How to demonstrate DPP's Taiwanese identity subtly to avoid triggering negative reactions from home or abroad?'

After introducing the importance of national identity issues in Taiwan's presidential elections, in this introductory chapter, the author will define the key concepts of the study, including national identity, provincial identity, R.O.C. identity, Taiwanese identity, native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, and symbols. The main puzzle, research questions, and the layout of the whole thesis will also be introduced in this chapter.

## **1.2 Definitions of key concepts of this study**

In this section, several key concepts will be defined to clarify their meanings in the following content of this thesis. First of all, this study is concerned with the presentation of national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. Therefore, the concept of national identity and a relevant concept, provincial identity, should be first defined in the introductory chapter of this thesis.

### **1.2.1 Definitions of national identity, native Taiwanese, and Mainlanders**

In this study, the researcher defines the concept of national identity as a subjective sense of the belonging to a country and the recognition or emotion toward the history,

culture, emblems, fellows, and current public issues of the country. This definition is based on some scholars' notions of national identity. For example, Huntington (2004, p.12) has defined national identity as 'an overarching system of collective characteristics and values in a nation.' Huntington's definition is certainly a broad description of national identity. However, because 'a nation' could refer to ethnicity or a state, thus, national identity could mean ethnic identity (ethnic nationalism) or civic identity (civic nationalism) (Brubaker, 1992; Shulman, 2004; Wright, Citrin, and Wand, 2012).

Hans Kohn first distinguishes between civic and ethnic nationalism in 1944 and indicates that civic nationalism is about human rights and personal freedoms, whereas ethnic nationalism refers to mystical, religious, and ethnocentric feelings (Tamir, 2019). Hughes (2011, p. 52) argues that ethnic nationalism emphasises that a nation is a community of birth with native culture. An American scholar Stephan Shulman (2004, p.35) defines ethnic national identity as a group of people who believe they are distinguished as having 'a common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions, and race.' Moreover, he asserts that civic nationalism is a territorial and legalistic concept concerning 'the existence of a historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology.' Some other scholars have a similar definition of civic nationalism as a group of people who believe they are citizens of a country in which their freedom and happiness can be protected by the country (Smith, 1983; Stargardt, 1995; Shih, 2000). Shulman's (2004, p.35) research focuses on Ukraine's nationalism issue, defining civic national

identity<sup>7</sup> (civic nationalism) as people in a nation or a state who think they are ‘living in a common territory, believe in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be a part of the nation.’

In addition, some scholars have argued that national identity is not only about the perceived belonging to a country; it also involves the opinions or attitudes toward the public issues of a country. Moreover, national identity has been suggested to have positive functions in enhancing national development. For example, Smith and Kim (2006) argue that national identity is related to the evaluations of a nation’s developments in specific domains, such as the country’s achievements in democracy, economy, social security system, technology, science, and sports. Francis Fukuyama (2018, p.5) maintains that ‘National identity not only enhances physical security; but also inspires good governance; facilitates economic development; fosters trust among citizens; engenders support for strong social safety nets; and ultimately makes possible liberal democracy itself.’ Overall, Barrett (2005, pp. 192-193) indicates that the subjective sense of national identity involves a personal sense of belonging to a national group, feeling toward other members of the group, knowledge of the national emblem, and emotions of national pride and national shame. Thus, in Taiwan’s presidential campaign videos, the symbolic representations of candidates’ appeal to national identity can include information about their national identity stances, their impressions of Taiwanese, the emblem of Taiwan or the R.O.C., and personal opinions about the current public issues of the country. What and why specific

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<sup>7</sup> Stephen Shulman used the term ‘civic national identity’ in the book.


symbols were used to make the candidates' appeals to national identity in their campaign videos are the major research questions of this study.

In Taiwan's case, according to some scholars' observations (Shen and Wu, 2008; Wong, 2021), before the democratic transition started in the late 1980s, the issue of national identity mainly referred to the 'ethnic tension' (Shen and Wu, 2008, p.117) between native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders on Taiwan. Here native Taiwanese has been defined by scholars (Shen and Wu, 2008, p.117) as residents of Taiwan whose ancestors came from mainland China earlier than 1945. In Taiwan, another collective calling of these people is 'Benshengren' (a romanization of the Mandarin term 本省人). According to the earliest de jure population census of Taiwan in 1956, indigenous peoples and Hakka people were part of Benshengren (Wang, 2002, p.25). After the 1990s, Taiwan's government formally distinguished four ethnic groups including Minna, Hakka, Mainlander, and indigenous (p.26). The definition of Benshengren is a comparative concept to people who arrived in Taiwan after 1949, called Waishengren (Lin, 2018, p.4). This study generally defines Benshengren and Waishengren on the basis of the Taiwan government's reports that people who were born in Taiwan before 1945 are Benshengren, these people were native Taiwanese in the Japanese colonial era including Han-Chinese and aboriginal people (Henley, 2004, p.5).

In contrast to native Taiwanese, Mainlanders in Taiwan refers to Taiwanese residents who came from mainland China near or after 1949 and the descendants of these people who were born in Taiwan. The Mainlanders in Taiwan are sometimes called 'Waishengren' (a romanization of the Mandarin term 外省人). (Lin, 2018, p.4)

Scholars have indicated that before the democratization in Taiwan, the minority Mainlanders dominated Taiwan’s politics and caused tension between the two ethnic groups (Shen and Wu, 2008). The diversity of ethnic groups is distinct in Taiwan, the government has changed the population census survey on ethnic identification. For instance: After 1966, Taiwan’s government has removed the question ‘Which ethnic group are you belonging to?’ from the population census (Wang, 2005, p.82). (Figure 1.1) The latest data in 1966 demonstrated the total population in de jure territories were 13,348,096. The number of Benshengren was 11,390,512, accounting for 85.33% of the total population. The sub-groups of Beshengren are Minna, Hakka, and others (indigenous), the percentages were 83.38%, 14.17%, and 2.23%, respectively. The number of Waishengren was 1,949,786, accounting for 14.61% of the total population. The number of the foreigner was 7,798, accounting for 0.1% of the total population. Missing or unknown data was 0.6% (Hsu, 2017).

**Figure 1.1 The proportion of ethnic groups in Taiwan in 1966**






Note: 1966 Taiwan population census survey

Source: Hsu, S.R. (2017). *Literature reviews of Taiwan's ethnic groups' survey*. The 16<sup>th</sup> multidiscipline research workshop of language, geography, and history, Taichung, TW.

In 2002, the Ministry of the Interior conducted a telephone survey of Taiwanese citizens' livelihood status from 26, July 2000 to 20, August 2000 (Figure 1.2). The valid sample scale was 4,062. The number of Minna people was 3,125, accounting for 76.9% of the total number. The number of Hakka people was 441, accounting for 10.9% of the total number. The number of Indigenous peoples were 57 accounting for 1.4% of the total number. Mainlander was 405, accounting for 10.0% of the total number. Missing or unknown data was 34, accounting for 0.8% of the total number (Shu and Chen, 2004, p.5-6).

**Figure1.2 The percentage of four ethnic groups in 2000**



Note: Taiwanese citizens' livelihood status. The Ministry of the Interior, from 26, July 2000 to 20, August 2000.

Source: Hsu, F.C. & Chen, H.M. (2004). *Sweet potato +taro= Taiwan potato? A comparative analysis of ethnic groups' identities in Taiwan*. Population Association of Taiwan annual conference in 2004, Taipei, TW.

Then, in the late 1980s, Taiwan started its democratic transition. The Democratic Progressive Party was founded in 1986. The state of martial law was ended in 1987. Starting from 1992, all of the legislators were regularly elected by the Taiwanese people. The presidential general election started in 1996(Rigger, 2011, p.5). Scholars indicate that, due to the democratization of Taiwan, the political resources are no longer dominated by the minority Mainlanders in Taiwan, and the two ethnic groups are, using Shen and Wu's (2008, p.117) words, 'converging in Taiwanese identity.' In other words, as Schubert (2004) indicates, ethnic national identity (ethnic nationalism) is no longer the main issue in Taiwan's identity politics. The issue has transferred from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism and the key issue is the meaning of Taiwanese identity (Cabestan, 2005; Schubert, 2004; Shen and Wu, 2008).

As introduced above, according to the DPP's 1991 Taiwan independence platform and the party's 1999 Resolution of Taiwan's Future (DPP platform, 1991; 1999), the DPP recognises Taiwan as an independent country and Taiwanese identity is the party's national identity. However, the KMT, as its former leaders Ma Ying-jeou and Chiang Chi-chen (Liberty Times net, 26 August, 2021) have claimed, they are both Taiwanese and citizens of the R.O.C. Therefore, it is clear that the KMT recognises

Taiwan as only a province of the R.O.C., and thus, in reality, the KMT's national identity is the R.O.C. identity instead of The Taiwanese identity.

Since the identity issue in Taiwan has transferred from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism, in this study, as mentioned above, national identity refers to civic national identity and is defined as a subjective sense of the belonging to a country and the recognition or emotion toward the history, culture, emblems, the fellows, and the current public issues of the country (Hughes, 2011; Barrett, 2005). What should be noted is that, in this definition, the country people believe they belong to does not necessarily exist in the world; it could be just a political ideal in the public or politicians' minds (Moore, 1997). For example, as mentioned above, although the DPP politicians have admitted that the current constitutional name of Taiwan is the R.O.C., they believe that the country they belong to should be the Republic of Taiwan (see DPP's 1991 platform of Taiwan independence) instead of the R.O.C. Moreover, referring to what has been mentioned by Fukuyama (2018), Barrett (2005), and Smith and Kim (2006), my definition of national identity not only refers to the perceived citizenship of a country but also includes the opinions toward national development issues in the country.

### **1.2.2 Definition of provincial identity**

The KMT treats R.O.C. identity as that of national identity, however, the party also recognises the importance of Taiwanese identity in presidential elections (Achen and Wang, 2017; Brown and Sageman, 2019). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this recognition started from the party's former chairman Chiang Ching-kuo's self-

identification as both Chinese and Taiwanese. According to Chiang's reasoning, the justification for his Taiwanese identity is based on the fact that he had lived in Taiwan for almost 40 years. Thus, it is clear that for Chiang and his KMT successors, Taiwanese identity is grounded on 'living in Taiwan.' Since the constitutional status of Taiwan is that of a province of the R.O.C., and the former chairman, also the 2012 presidential candidate of the KMT, Ma Ying-jeou has claimed that, as the chairman of the KMT, he always abides by the constitution of the R.O.C. (BBC News, 12 June, 2014), it is appropriate to use the concept 'provincial identity' to specify the nature of Taiwanese identity for the KMT. In this thesis, similar to my definition of national identity, I define provincial identity as a subjective sense of the belonging to a province of a country and the recognition or emotion toward the history, culture, emblems, fellows, and current public issues of the province. The topic of provincial identity has been studied by some scholars. For example, a Chinese scholar has examined the provincial identity in China (Chan, 2019). The study explores the central-local relationship in Guangdong (廣東省) from 1870 to the year of 1910. Another study is conducted by von Heyking (2006, p.1137) who analyses how schools in the province of Alberta in Canada foster a provincial identity for students.

After introducing the definitions of national identity and provincial identity, I continue to provide definitions regarding R.O.C. identity and Taiwanese identity, so as to let the readers of this thesis have a clearer understanding of the meanings of the two identities for both the KMT and DPP.

### **1.2.3 Definitions of R.O.C. identity and Taiwanese identity**

Based on my definitions of national identity and provincial identity, in this study, I define R.O.C. identity as a subjective sense of the belonging to the R.O.C. and the recognition or emotion toward the history, culture, emblems, the fellows, and the current public issues of R.O.C. Regarding the meaning of Taiwanese identity, it is more complicated than that of R.O.C. identity. As introduced earlier in this chapter, for DPP politicians, Taiwan is an independent country instead of being only a part of the R.O.C. Thus, for the DPP, Taiwanese identity is actually a national identity. However, for KMT politicians, as mentioned above, Taiwanese identity is, in actual nature, a provincial identity (Shih, 2000). It is because according to the constitution of the R.O.C., Taiwan is only a province of the R.O.C. instead of being an independent country in the world; therefore, for the KMT, Taiwanese identity can only be a provincial identity instead of a national identity. Thus, in this study, the term ‘Taiwanese identity’ is defined as a subjective sense of the belonging to the province or the country of Taiwan, and the recognition or emotion toward the history, culture, emblems, fellows, and current public issues of Taiwan.

### **1.2.4 Definition of symbols and symbolism**

The main purpose of the study is to examine the symbolic representations, or in other words, the symbolism, of national identity in candidates’ campaign videos in Taiwan’s presidential elections; thus, symbols and symbolism are another set of key concepts of this study. According to the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s notions, people’s basic tools of understanding are symbols, including words,

diagrams, mathematical formulas, etc. Peirce further indicates that a symbol is a kind of sign which is composed of three components: ‘representamen’ refers to the pattern of a sign, ‘interpretant’ is the user’s understanding of a sign, and ‘object’ is the external fact a sign refers to. Peirce also indicates that, unlike the signs of an icon or an index which usually have close and concrete connections with what is represented, a symbol may only have an indirect or abstract association with what is symbolized (Mick, 1986; Wirawan, 2020). Peirce (1894, p.6) had argued in an article that ‘any ordinary word, such as “give,” “bird,” “marriage” is an example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever may be found to realise the idea connected with the word.’

Regarding the components of symbols or signs, Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure also has argued that any sign is composed of the signifier and the signified. A signifier means a sign is used to indicate another thing; the signified refers to the thing that is indicated by a sign. Saussure emphasises that the relationship between a signifier and the signified is arbitrary (Guiraud, 1975). To synthesise Peirce and Saussure’s notions of symbols or signs, the concept of ‘symbol’ can be defined in this study as something, including icons, aural or written words, music, pictures, visual images, that is used to represent some other thing. What should be noticed is that, according to Peirce and Saussure’s ideas, the meaning of a symbol is determined by people’s interpretations. Roland Barthes argues that the interpretation of a symbol could be denotative or connotative, with the former being the conventional definition of a symbol in society, while the latter being a person’s subjective feeling about the symbol (Barthes, 1977; Guiraud, 1975).

As for symbolism, it is basically defined as ‘the idea that things represent other things’ (Elbom, 2022). Elbom (2022) raises an example of symbolism to say that the colour red ‘represents not the colour red itself but something beyond it: for example, passion, or love, or devotion.’ Glatch (2022) also indicates that in literary works, ‘symbolism refers to the use of representational imagery: the writer employs an image with a deeper, non-literal meaning, for the purpose of conveying complex ideas.’

In the study of political science, some scholars (e.g., Arnhart, 1985; Cohen, 1979; Theiler, 2017) have also engaged in examining the practice and function of political symbolism. Theiler (2017, p.2) suggests that the study of political symbolism ‘examines how symbols influence political preferences, identifications, and behaviour.’ He also argues that political symbols and political symbolism are inevitable because they can ‘simplify and summarize the political structures and practices for which they stand,’ ‘connect institutions and beliefs with emotions,’ and ‘help make a polity or political movement more cohesive’ (Theiler, 2017, p.2).

In this study, the researcher investigates the political symbolism of national identity in candidates’ campaign videos. Schill (2012) argues that visual symbols are critical components of political communication. Previous studies on advertising effects have also found that visual symbols are more capable than pure printed words to grasp people’s attention (Bucher and Schumacher, 2006; Pieters and Wedel, 2004). Steains (2018) also argues that when the technique of symbolism is used in films, many things, including ‘an object, colour, character, plot, sound, special effect, camera angle, a transition, and much more’ can be used to represent something else, and that something else ‘is often abstract, like an idea.’ Peng (2005, p. 172), a Taiwanese

political communications scholar, further indicates that election campaign videos include several elements, including narratives, scenes, information sources, languages, and background music. Apparently, these elements are composed of visual and audial symbols, what will be explored in this study are what and why specific visual and audial symbols were used to represent an idea of candidates' national identity stances in their campaign videos. In the following section, I raise the puzzle, academic location, theoretical frameworks, and research questions of this study.

### **1.3 Research puzzle**

As indicated in the first section of this chapter, different scholars have recognised the importance of the national identity issue in Taiwan's elections, especially the presidential elections (Fell, 2011; Shyu, 1995; 2004; Achen and Wang, 2017). However, in some of the previous studies, national identity was not found to be the most salient issue in campaign ads in Taiwan's elections, including the presidential elections. It was either found to be only one category among many issues in Taiwan's electoral advertising (Sullivan, 2008, p.905), or as an issue connected with Taiwan's cross-strait economy (Fell, 2015 p.62). Thus, it becomes a puzzle that, since national identity has been considered an important factor in Taiwan's presidential elections, why didn't most campaign ads in Taiwan's presidential elections contain candidates' explicit statements about their stances regarding national identity? This puzzle also involves an academic question as to how should a researcher recognise the existence of national identity presentations in election campaign communications? If a researcher only counts how many times the national identity issue has been explicitly



mentioned in campaign advertising, chances are the researcher underestimates how frequently a candidate may allude to his or her national identity stance by using various visual or audial symbols in campaign communications.

#### **1.4 Academic location**

In fact, as some scholars (Gronbeck, 1992; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991; Perloff, 1998) indicate, in American presidential campaigns, candidates may use ‘implicative ad’ to attack their opponents. One famous example of this kind of implicative ad was Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 ‘Daisy’ ad. In this campaign video, a drama showed that a little girl’s life is ended by a nuclear explosion. Johnson used this video to imply that his opponent Barry Goldwater is a warmongering politician (Perloff, 1998, p.357). Another example of an implicative ad was identified in a study about Tsai Ing-wen’s 2012 presidential campaign videos. The researcher of this study (Chung, 2014) found that Tsai, the DPP’s female candidate in Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election, used different symbols, such as the scenes of Berlin and London to imply her international perspective and diplomatic competence. Tsai also used the symbols of a candle and a bowl of noodles to represent her warm care for the future of Taiwan. As for the KMT’s implicative ads, one study found that in Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 campaign videos, he used the images of the grassroots Taiwanese people to imply the KMT’s intimacy with the general public (Lin, 2010). All these research findings indicate that candidates may use some symbols to represent or imply some abstract ideas in presidential campaign videos. However, no researchers have

systematically examined the symbolism of national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaigns.

In Taiwan's presidential elections, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, both the KMT and DPP candidates may have a reason to allude to rather than manifest their national identity stands in their campaign videos. As Chuang (2019), the spokesperson of the KMT's 2012 presidential campaign indicates, to struggle for the greatest support from the public, the KMT candidates must show their Taiwanese identity in campaign videos but still need to let voters know that the KMT's national identity is that of the R.O.C. instead of having a Taiwanese identity. As for the DPP candidates, the question is: How to present the DPP's Taiwanese identity in campaign videos to avoid triggering negative reactions from home or abroad (Niu Tse-hsun, 12 December, 2018, personal interview).

Based on these realistic considerations of national identity presentation in election campaigns, and the research findings that implicative ads may be used by candidates as a communication strategy in campaign videos (Chung, 2014; Lin, 2010; Perloff, 1998), one may reasonably assume that, in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos, candidates may use some symbols to imply their national identities instead of always explicitly showing their stands. This assumption reflects the gap between the present study and some previous research (e.g., Fell, 2015; Sullivan, 2008) in terms of the way to identify national identity presentations in campaign communications. Here the argument is that researchers should not only take into account the clearly expressed national identities in Taiwan's campaign communications, otherwise, they may underestimate the implicative symbolic presentations of the appeals to national

identity. Thus, in the next section of this chapter, I will raise two research questions for this study. These questions indicate that the academic location of this study is political communication research which explores the symbolic characteristics of the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. The academic location of my study is the communicative features of the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential elections. It is not a study to explore the origins of Taiwan's national identities (Corcuff, 2002; Hughes, 2016), to compare the weight of national identity with other issues in Taiwan's campaign ads (e.g., Fell, 2015), or the influence of national identity issue on voting behaviours (e.g., Achen and Wang, 2017).

## **1.5 Research questions**

Based on the academic puzzle and the argument introduced above, the researcher raises two research questions as follows.

Research question 1: What symbols have been used to represent national identity by the KMT or DPP candidates in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos?

This question concerns the different types of symbols, including visual and audial ones appearing in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos for the representations of the KMT and DPP candidates' national identity stances. It is a question about the content features of the appeals to national identity in campaign communications. The underlying assumption of this question is that, as argued above, candidates may not always express their national identities explicitly in campaign videos, rather, as

introduced above, due to some considerations, they may allude to their stances via the use of some symbols.

The question stems from the theoretical notion that national identity is ‘mobilised into existence through symbols invoked by political leaders’ (Dryzek, 2006, p. 35). Anderson (2006) and some other scholars (Hallett et al., 2010; Milne, Tregidga, and Walton, 2009) also maintain that media representations are critical to the representation of national identity. In sum, as Hall (1989, p.4) proposes, identities are ‘constituted within, not outside representation.’ Based on these notions, this study focuses on examining the symbolic representations of the appeals to national identity in Taiwan’s presidential campaign videos. I explore how candidates use symbols to represent national identity instead of counting how many times candidates have explicitly expressed their national identities in campaign communications. After identifying the ways in which national identities are represented by different kinds of symbols, the study raises another research question to further investigate why specific symbols have been selected to represent candidates’ national identity stances.

Research question 2: Why have specific symbols been used by the KMT or DPP candidates to represent national identity in Taiwan’s presidential campaign videos?

The theoretical frameworks of this research question are Fairclough (1995) and Van Dijk’s (1988) notions about discourse analysis. Conducting discourse analysis of candidates’ campaign videos based on Fairclough and Van Dijk’s notions, I explore the reasons for candidates to choose specific symbolic representations for the appeals to national identity.

Why is discourse analysis an appropriate tool for answering the second research question? Wodak et al. (1999, p.22) have proposed that ‘national identity is represented and conveyed in discourse, predominantly in narratives of national culture. National identity is thus the product of discourse.’ Fairclough’s discourse theory suggests analysing the interaction or negotiation between the media’s private discourse and the extra-media’s public discourse on specific issues. Fairclough (1995, p. 63) argues that ‘the negotiation and renegotiation of the relationship between public and private discursive practices which takes place with the order of discourse of the media has a general influence on the relationship between the practices, and between the public and private in an overall sense, in other domains of social life.’ According to Fairclough’s (1995) notion, candidates’ selections of specific symbols could be a negotiation between political parties’ private discourse and the voters’ public discourse of national identity. In other words, the negotiation between Taiwanese presidential candidates’ party ideology of national identity and public opinion on national identity is an important lens for understanding the symbolic selection in their national identity appeals.

In addition, to adopt the sociological perspectives of Fairclough’s discourse theory for data analysis, I also employ Van Dijk’s (1988) psychological perspective of discourse analysis to explain why national identity symbols are arranged into a specific structure in candidates’ campaign videos. Van Dijk (1988) argues that people usually understand the meaning of a text through a three-level structure of the symbols in the text. The micro-structure refers to the style or rhetoric of symbols contained in the text. The macro-structure is about the topics or themes of the text.

The super-structure is an abstract outline or an overall idea of the text. Through the theoretical framework proposed by Van Dijk (1988), I can understand why specific symbols have been chosen and arranged in specific ways to present candidates' national identity stances.

What Van Dijk suggests is that all texts are aimed to transfer some meanings from the authors to the audience. In Taiwan's presidential elections, the purpose of campaign communications is to win the election. Campaign videos convey national identity messages layer by layer in order to make them logical and to justify candidates' stances. Clear and systematic arrangements of symbols and storytelling would be more persuasive to the voters.

In Taiwan's presidential campaign videos, one major meaning the videos try to convey to the voters is the candidates' national identity stance. After all, as some scholars have indicated, in Taiwan's elections, national identity is always a critical issue of campaign communications (Achen and Wang, 2017; Brown and Sageman, 2019; Corcuff, 2002; Fell, 2011; Shyu, 1995; 2004).

Based on Van Dijk's (1988) notion, when candidates attempt to imply their national identity in campaign videos (super-structure), they will create some topics or themes (macro-structure) in the videos. The topics or themes are composed of symbols in certain styles or rhetoric (micro-structure). Analysing the micro-, macro-, and super-structures of a campaign video allow researchers to understand why specific symbols and topics are used to imply candidates' national identity for specific purposes. For example, when the DPP's presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen tried to imply in one of her campaign videos that Taiwanese identity is 'in a dark age' and

needs her to 'light up Taiwan,' (super-structure) she presented the images of unhappy Taiwanese people (micro-structure) and the main theme that President Ma Ying-jeou's administration made Taiwanese identity a sad feeling (macro-structure). Thus, in the video, Tsai not only implied that her national identity is Taiwanese identity; she also launched the main theme in the video that Taiwanese identity was not splendid and needed her to light it up again. Without knowing this main theme with the help of Van Dijk's analytic framework, one may not understand why Tsai implied her national identity in that manner.

Since few studies have scrutinised the symbolism of national identity appeal in Taiwan's elections, it is necessary for this study to first identify the symbols used for the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential elections. After identifying the type of symbols used for the appeals, a question that further needs to be examined is the reasons for using the symbols. Stemming from the theoretical frameworks introduced above, the second research question leads to an examination of the sociological and psychological explanations for the selections of specific symbols to represent candidates' national identities in campaign videos. This is the first time a study attempts to explore the reasons behind the symbolic appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign communications.

The cases studied in this study are Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. The analysis of the 2020 data reveals the newest answers to the research questions of this study. The studies of the 2012 and 2016 cases are important because the ruling party of Taiwan shifted from the KMT to the DPP in 2016. Since the DPP nominated Tsai Ing-wen as the candidate for the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections,

the change of the ruling party provides a chance to investigate whether the DPP or KMT candidates have adjusted their appeals to national identity in the two elections. After introducing the puzzle, academic location, and research questions of this study, I introduce the layout of this thesis in the last section of this chapter.

## **1.6 Layout of the dissertation**

The first chapter of this thesis introduces the importance of national identity as an issue in Taiwan's presidential elections. Also included in the chapter are the backgrounds of the KMT and DPP's special considerations about national identity presentation in campaign communications. After defining the key concepts of this study, the academic puzzle, the academic location of this study, the theoretical frameworks and a major argument are raised to highlight the gap between previous studies and the present research regarding the way to recognise national identity presentation in campaign communications. In short, I argue that it is inappropriate to assume that candidates will always explicitly express their national identities in election campaigns, with this argument leading the two research questions of this study: In Taiwan's presidential elections, what specific symbols have been used by the KMT and DPP candidates to represent their national identities and why they have been used? The research findings of these questions are helpful for a better understanding of the communicative feature and mechanisms of Taiwan's identity politics.

Chapter two introduces the political contexts of Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. To make the readers of this thesis easier to understand why the



KMT and DPP candidates chose some symbols to represent their national identity appeals in their campaign videos, some background information, including Taiwan's political, social, and economic situations in those election years, and the political careers of the candidates in the elections are introduced in this chapter.

Chapter three first reviews the notion of national identity and the major studies on Taiwan's national identity and then reviews several studies on the link between Taiwan's election advertising and Taiwan's national identity.

Chapter four introduces the research methods of this study. In this chapter, the researcher first indicates the data collection procedure of this study and then explains the reason and procedure for using the method of content analysis to search for the answer to research question one. After that, the researcher explains why and how to use the method of discourse analysis to answer the second research question. The procedure of conducting a series of in-depth interviews is also introduced in this chapter. The interviewees' opinions will provide auxiliary information to the research findings of content analysis and discourse analysis.

Then, chapters five to seven present the detailed research findings of this study. These three chapters demonstrate the results of content analyses, discourse analyses, and in-depth interviews about how candidates present their national identity stances in their campaign videos in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. Each of these three chapters shows content analysis results in the first section to answer the first research question regarding what symbols have been used by candidates to represent their national identity stances. After locating the configuration of national identity features in a candidate's campaign videos, the researcher selects the high

click-rating (the most viewed) videos found on the data collection day for discourse analysis to explore the deeper meanings of the national identity symbols found in the content analyses. The purpose of discourse analyses is to answer the second research question. That is, why did candidates use specific symbols to represent their national identity stances? It is by discourse analysis that I can demonstrate how social context influenced candidates' strategic thinking about selecting specific symbols to represent their national identity stances. In addition, the in-depth interviewees' opinions will provide further explanations of symbol selections.

Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis by summarising the research findings of chapter five to seven and then discussing the academic implications of those findings. Finally, the researcher indicates the limitations of this study, and provides some suggestions for future studies on the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential elections.

## **Chapter 2. The Contexts of Taiwan's presidential Elections from 2012 to 2020**

Before reviewing relevant studies, introducing the research methods, and presenting the research findings of this study, in this chapter, the researcher first introduces the contexts of the three presidential elections in Taiwan in 2012, 2016, and 2020, especially focusing on the transformations in Taiwan's party politics and political communications from the 1990s to the 2020s. Knowing this background information will be helpful for understanding why the KMT and DPP candidates select specific symbols to represent their national identity stances in their election campaign videos during these three presidential election campaigns.

In this chapter, the researcher first reviews the transformations in Taiwan's political system and political communications during the past three decades, and then briefly introduces the social and political contexts of Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections, as well as the political careers of the candidates and the final results of the elections.

### **2.1 The new ecology of Taiwan's party politics**

#### **2.1.1 From the KMT's one party dominance to a multi-party system**

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has moved from being a one-party state to a multi-party state. Based on previous studies and relevant sources, Taiwan is now the only democratic political entity among the world's Chinese communities (Krumbein, 2020; Rajczyk, 2019). Moreover, Taiwan's democratic system has been developing since the end of martial law in 1987 (Fell, 2005). According to the

Ministry of the Interior's most recent data, as of September 2022, there are 79 officially registered political parties in Taiwan (Ministry of the Interior). Nevertheless, only the KMT and DPP have ever had a majority of seats in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan in the past several decades. A few other parties, such as the New Party (新黨), People First Party (親民黨), and Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟), had operated as critical minority political parties in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan but these three political parties are now in decline. The newest political parties in the country are Taiwan People's Party (台灣民眾黨), New Power Party (時代力量), and Taiwan State-building Party (台灣基進黨). Nevertheless, in Taiwan's 2020 legislative elections, these three small parties only achieved five seats, three seats, and one seat, respectively. <sup>8</sup>Thus, although the full picture of party politics in the country has transformed to a certain extent, it's obvious that the KMT and DPP are still the two largest parties in Taiwan.

Taiwan started full democratic elections in 1991, but in 1986, when Taiwan was still under martial law, the DPP was founded as a new political party in Taiwan. One of the major goals of the DPP, according to the party's 'Taiwan Independence Clause' (台獨黨綱), was to construct an independent sovereign country called the 'Republic of Taiwan.'<sup>9</sup> The foundation of the DPP was one of the major changes in Taiwan's party politics. Since then, the KMT has had to face challenges brought by the DPP in all the major elections in the country.

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<sup>8</sup>Central election commission, 2020 legislator Election result. <https://db.cec.gov.tw/Visual/Legislator?dataLevel=N&legisId=00&typeId=ELC&subjectId=L0&themeId=61b467a2c0c7a7063b79e47477d6fb64>

<sup>9</sup> DPP platform. <https://www.dpp.org.tw/upload/download/黨綱.pdf>

In 1988, the KMT's last martial law leader and president of the R.O.C, Chiang Ching-kuo passed away, with his passing causing splits in the KMT throughout the 1990s. Some KMT politicians challenged the leadership of Chiang's successor President Lee Teng-hui and these KMT dissidents established the New Party in 1993. Then, in 2000, the former secretary general of KMT's central committee James Soong disagreed with President Lee's decision to freeze the Taiwan Provincial Government<sup>10</sup> and left KMT to establish the People First Party (McBeath, 2000).

In 2001, some former KMT and DPP politicians established the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Taiwan's democracy thus stepped into an era of multiple parties. Although the KMT and DPP are still the largest two parties, smaller parties have continuously emerged since the 1990s. Some of them have specific political goals; others have been established to achieve social reforms. For example, the Taiwan State-building Party and the New Power Party were founded in 2012 and 2015 respectively to promote deeper democratic reform and Taiwan independence (Taiwan State-building party platform<sup>11</sup> and New Power Party's secretary Chen<sup>12</sup>), whereas the Green Party Taiwan (綠黨) was established in 1996 to advocate for environmental protection and grassroots democracy (Fell, 2021). These smaller parties may or may not have seats in

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<sup>10</sup> Taipei Times. Making Taiwan province disappear. "The administrative regions 'Taiwan Province' and 'Fujian Province' still officially exist, but without receiving a budget, they are 'frozen,' and so they currently have no functions."

<https://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/03/21/2003733088>

<sup>11</sup> Taiwan Statebuilding Party introduction. <https://www.statebuilding.tw/about/>

<sup>12</sup> People Media. New Power Party: We support Taiwan independence, but against to label party who supports united or independence. <https://www.peoplemedia.tw/news/32a806b7-4030-499c-87e3-f857818b096f>

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan or local councils, but they have enhanced the diversity of Taiwan's party politics. As for Taiwan's presidential and legislative elections, as Figure 2.1 shows, the KMT and DPP have still been the most powerful competitors during the past decade. As seen in the figure below, from 1992 to 2020, the smaller parties' seats decreased every four years. For example, the People First Party had 27 seats in 2004, but has rapidly declined since 2008. The New Party also has been in a similar situation, with the number of its seats decreasing from 2000 to 2004. The New Party has had no legislative seats since 2008. The Taiwan People's Party and New Power Party are two new parties that merit observation.

**Table 2.1 Parties' seats in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan: 1992 to 2020**

	KMT	DPP	People First Party	Taiwan People's Party	New Party	New Power Party	other
1992	94	21					15
1995	67	41			16		4
1998	96	53			7		21
2001	53	69	35		1		18
2004	61	70	27		1		17
2008	81	27	1				4
2012	64	40	3				6
2016	35	68	3			5	2
2020	38	61		5		3	6

Note: The other political parties include Taiwan Solidarity Union and Non-Partisan Solidarity.

Sources: Central Election Commission<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Infographic of legislature election results. <https://db.cec.gov.tw/Visual?type=Legislator>

### **2.1.2 Multiple national identities and multi-party system**


Why Taiwan's party politics has transformed from a KMT party-state to a multi-party system is a crucial question. Some Taiwanese scholars (e. g., Shyu, 2004; Shih, 2004) have identified Taiwan's national identity cleavage as a critical factor in the transformation of the party system. Taiwan's current multi-party system can be explained as a spectrum that reflects this cleavage (Clark and Tna, 2012). As mentioned above, national identity stances are reflected in party platforms and these stances influence candidates' national identity discourses. Facing parties' competing appeals to national identity, Taiwanese voters have selected the parties that are most consistent with their own individual stances. The national identity cleavage exacerbated social cleavages and became a campaign tool. As Chang and Huang (2011) have stated, party competition shapes party identity and then party identity influences the public's national identity.

Regarding the relationship between party politics and national identity, different political parties stress Taiwanese or R.O.C identity to attract support from voters whose identities align with political parties' stances (Chang and Huang, 2011). Since the 1990s, the national identity issue has no longer been a taboo in Taiwanese society; rather, it has become a public choice of Taiwanese national identity or R.O.C. national identity for Taiwan's politicians and voters (Corcuff, 2002; Wu, 2014). Since the single member district system of Taiwan's legislative election is disadvantageous to smaller parties, it is not surprising that, as Figure 2.1 indicates, except for independent voters, Taiwan's voters still overwhelmingly identify with the KMT and DPP (Wu, 2014).

After martial law was lifted in 1987, the political development of Taiwan moved to a new stage. Overall, since the late 1980s, Taiwan's democracy has developed rapidly (Hughes, 2016). Since 2000 in particular, when the DPP's Chen Shui-bian took over the presidency, Taiwan has clearly broken away from the KMT's authoritarian rule as a multi-party system has developed (Corcuff, 2002). This change of ruling party has facilitated the belief among Taiwanese voters in genuine a multi-party democratic system, as people have seen that the KMT is not the only possible ruling party in Taiwan. However, Chen's pro-Taiwan independence policy immediately led to a severe rebuke from Beijing and increased cross-Strait tensions (Schubert and Damm, 2014). Moreover, during Chen's second term from 2004 to 2008, he was accused of corruption by former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh(施明德) and certain KMT legislators. This accusation led to over one million Taiwanese citizens participating in the Red-Shirt Movement in 2006 to demand Chen step down. To a certain extent, the anti-Chen Shui-bian movement planted the seeds for the second change of the ruling party from DPP to KMT in 2008 (Su, 2016, p. 42).



**Figure 2.1 Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by the Election Study Centre, NCCU**



Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

## 2.2 Change in media and political communications in Taiwan

### 2.2.1 From traditional mass media to the Internet era

As for political communications in Taiwan, from the martial law era to nowadays, the major media used by candidates and voters to disseminate and receive election campaign information has shifted from traditional media to the Internet. Before the Internet era, most Taiwanese voters got political information, including election campaign news and campaign advertising, from traditional mass media (Sullivan, 2008, p.675). After cable TV was legalised in Taiwan in 1994, in less than ten years, over eighty percent of households had become subscribers (Taipei Times, 2006; 2021). Regarding the ideologies of Taiwan’s traditional media, under martial law, the largest two newspapers, China Times and the United Daily, all of the three terrestrial TV stations, including TTV, CTV, and CTS, most legal radio stations as well as most

legal magazines were closely controlled by the KMT and supported the party. After the lifting of martial law, some of these media openly criticised the KMT government's performance, making Taiwan's political culture more democratic and pluralistic (Lin, 2013, p.45).

Thanks to the Internet, the production and dissemination of political advertising have been transformed since 2008, and Taiwanese scholars started to analyse the characteristics of Internet users in the context of Taiwan's major elections (Hong, 2010; Hu and Chen, 1999). While traditional media still was carrying political messages in political campaigns, the Internet has rapidly become the most important channel for voters, especially younger ones, to acquire and share political information during the election season (Thorson, 2012).

In addition to the changes occurring in party politics since 2000, media and political communications have also changed and influenced how presidential candidates present their national identities in campaign communications. These changes are, therefore, important contextual factors that help account for the research findings of the present study.

Nowadays in Taiwan, the Internet reflects public opinion and provides politicians and voters with an efficient communication platform. As Lin (2013) indicates, the most significant changes in media and political communications in Taiwan have been caused by the popularity of the Internet. Some interviewees participating in this study also indicated the importance of the Internet in political campaigning. The Internet can create many types of more creative campaign advertisements. According to a report issued by the Taipei Association of Advertising Agencies, Taiwan's 2008

presidential election was a milestone in Internet campaigning. Both the KMT and DPP's candidates in Taiwan's 2008 presidential election spent 4 times more money on producing Internet campaign materials than in Taiwan's 2004 presidential election (onmedia report, 2010). Now, as in many other countries, the Internet has become the mainstream in political campaigning (Lin, 2013; Thorson, 2012). That means political information is not sent only through traditional mass media but also via the Internet. Before the advent of the Internet, the public may have been seen as relatively passive recipients of political information; however, in the Internet era, public opinion has become vitally impactful on presidential candidates' propaganda strategies (Thorson, 2012).

### **2.2.2 The Internet becomes the major channel of electoral campaign communications**

The Internet has become the major channel of electoral campaign communications in Taiwan. According to two research companies, Kepios and We Are Social (2022), more than 91 percent of people in Taiwan use the Internet. In addition, people in Taiwan now spend more time watching online videos and content on social media than traditional mass media. The top five most-used social media platforms in Taiwan are YouTube (89%), Facebook (89%), Line (86%), FB Messenger (55%) and Instagram (54%) (Hootsuite and We Are Social, 2020).

Obviously, Taiwan's election campaigning is catching up with the Internet in the Web 2.0 era. Internet use in campaign communications has developed rapidly from websites, videos online and social media, to Apps. Campaign staff members

disseminate information and launch videos on these platforms. For instance, as Jack Hsiao, the director of the public relations company WeCan (威肯公關), indicates (Jack Hsiao, personal interview, 23 April, 2019), both Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou's teams were using Keywords in Yahoo and Google and released videos about candidates' traits and policies, on YouTube in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election.

Another common type of campaign communication on the Internet is short films. This has been used in Taiwan's election campaigning since 2010 and is an alternative way to release campaign communications (Hu and Chen, 2013). Short films are not confined by time. The length of a TV advertisement is on average 10-60 seconds, whereas a short film might be a 30-minute video. The short film has become a mainstream form of political communication in the Internet era and may depict a persuasive or creative story. TV advertisements are expensive but only present messages less than 1 minute long. They are not suitable for storytelling (Jack Hsiao, personal interview, 23 April, 2019).

The Internet is not only cheaper for longer campaign communications, but also increases relevant news reports in traditional mass media (Wang, 2014 in RTI report). Tsai's team frequently launched campaign videos on the Internet to show celebrities supporting her. These videos were then followed and reported on by TV or newspapers (TVBS News, 29 Dec, 2019). This kind of campaign strategy is much cheaper than directly launching campaign advertisements in traditional mass media.

In addition, another interesting trend of Internet political communication has been, beginning in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, the creation of short films, by both the DPP and KMT supporters, to support and promote candidates. It was not possible

to see this kind of political communication phenomenon before the advent of the Internet era in Taiwan. In several cases of this phenomenon, supporters (some of them are influencers or YouTubers) even actively have invited candidates to be interviewed in the films, and candidates are happy to have such free promotions (KOL Radar, AI analytics company, 2 December, 2019). The interaction is called ‘lifestyle politics’ (Giddens, 1991), which means citizens’ participation in Internet political propaganda (Bennett, Wells and Rnak, 2009; Mascheroni, 2015).

According to the interviewee Jack Hsiao, the Internet provides an exclusive channel for candidates to speak out about their political policies or national identity stances. Campaign teams can also launch much information on Internet channels. As a research data source, the Internet preserves the data containing details of electoral campaign videos. Those details may not appear in TV ads because of the limitations on video length and campaign budgets.


Overall, campaign communication is a complicated task for candidates. In Taiwan, different candidates, different producers, and a change in channels may result in different campaign strategies and communication effects. Based on this, this study explores and compares how Taiwan’s presidential candidates present their national identities in campaign videos on the Internet in Taiwan’s presidential elections since 2012.

### **2.3 The 2012 presidential election**

Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election was held in 1996. Since then, there have been three changes in the ruling parties. Regarding the last four elections, as

Figure 2.2 shows, the DPP has obtained a steady growth in votes and a greater margin over the number of KMT's votes from 2012 to 2020.

**Figure 2.2 Results of Taiwan's Presidential Elections from 1996 to 2020**



Source: Central election commission

Taiwan held its fourth democratic presidential election on 22 March, 2008. In this election, the KMT nominated Ma Ying-jeou as the party's candidate. A promising politician from the outset with a doctorate in Law from Harvard, Ma had substantial experience as the secretary to Chiang Ching-kuo, deputy secretary general of the central committee of the KMT, minister of Justice, mayor of Taipei City, and chairman of the KMT.

Ma's Mainlander background was an issue in the 2008 election. After all, since Lee Teng-hui became (李登輝) Taiwan's president in 1988 and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was elected as Taiwan's president in 2000, Taiwan had been ruled by native

Taiwanese politicians for almost twenty years before the 2008 election. Thus, whether a Mainlander like Ma Ying-jeou could be accepted by most of Taiwan's voters was questionable(Shih, 2013, p.57).

Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 election as Taiwan's president with 7,659,014 votes (58.45%). Ma's victory opened a new era of peaceful cross-Strait interactions. However, his promise to enhance Taiwan's economic development was undermined by the 2007-2008 world-wide financial crash, damaging his prospects for re-election in 2012.

President Ma's 2012 re-election campaign faced a strong challenge from the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen. Because of the financial crisis, Ma failed to keep his promise to strongly grow Taiwan's economy and that became a campaign issue. To solve this problem, in 2010 Ma proposed a ten-year trade pact with mainland China, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This would entail tariff-free cross-Strait trade on many Taiwanese and Chinese products being effective from 2010 (Shih, 2013, p.49).

In the 2012 election campaign, Ma's team stressed his first-term achievements. However, Tsai severely criticised Ma's failure to keep his promise of economic growth and became a strong challenger. Tsai obtained a doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 1984 and started an academic career at Taiwan's Chengchi University. She entered Taiwan's politics as an international trade consultant to Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s and 2000 became minister of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and vice premier of the R.O.C. in 2006. When Ma became president in 2008, Tsai became the chairwoman of the DPP. Tsai was

Taiwan's first female politician to run for the presidency. In her 2012 campaign, she refused to accept the 1992 Consensus and the One China policy. In fact, Tsai stated in 2002 press conference that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country instead of a part of China (Shih, 2011).

Ma won the 2012 election obtaining 6,891,139 votes versus Tsai's 6,093,578 votes. Ma's slim majority seemed to have inspired Tsai to run again in 2016.

In 2012, Ma and Tsai still used traditional mass media. Both broadcasted campaign videos on TV, primarily to announce their platforms or to attack rivals (Brain, 2012). Meanwhile, more and more voters were watching YouTube, so Ma and Tsai decided to launch their campaign videos on YouTube as well to attract support from new media users (commonwealth, 12 July, 2011). However, for both camps, the Internet was still an auxiliary tool. After all, apart from the young, voters tended to rely on television for campaign-related information and political advertising. So, as Internet use increased in Taiwan after the 2012 election, presidential candidates have adopted it more and more for campaign communication (Cheng, 2015).

## **2.4 The 2016 presidential election**

Taiwan's 2016 presidential election was dramatic. First, because the KMT had been resoundingly defeated in the 2014 nine-in-one election<sup>14</sup>, no qualified KMT

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<sup>14</sup> Local election: Municipal Mayors, Municipal Councilors, Chiefs of indigenous districts in municipalities, Councilors of indigenous districts in municipalities, County Magistrates (City Mayors), County (City) Councilors, Township Chiefs, Township Councilors, and chiefs of the village (borough) in 6 municipalities and 16 counties (cities).

<https://web.archive.org/web/20141119062153/http://engweb.cec.gov.tw/files/11-1030-5692.php>



politicians were willing to stand in the KMT primaries in 2015 (Chinatimes, 9 August, 2019). To resolve the potential embarrassment, a KMT congresswoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) was persuaded to stand for nomination in July 2015. This caused pessimism about the KMT's chances among party elites and affected voter support for the party (theinitium, 7 October, 2015).

In addition, the 2014 Sunflower Movement also damaged KMT support (Chao, 16 March, 2016, in TVBS report). In March and April 2014, young demonstrators occupied Taiwan's Legislative Yuan to protest the cross-Strait service trade agreement with mainland China as a black box operation that would damage Taiwan's sovereignty and economic development. Ma's tolerance of the demonstrators enhanced DPP's morale and dismayed KMT supporters. Academic Sinica sociologist Chen Chin-jou argued that the Sunflower protests influenced the 2014 nine-in-one elections, damaging the KMT's 2016 presidential election campaign (Liberty Times, 16 October, 2015).

Hung was a high-school teacher by profession, with a bachelor's degree in Law from Taiwan's Chinese Culture University and a master's in Education from the Northeast Missouri State University. She entered Taiwan's politics as a legislator in 1989. In 2012, Hung became the vice president of the Legislative Yuan. That was the high point in Hung's political career.

After being nominated to be the presidential candidate in July 2015, Hung campaigned on a controversial cross-Strait platform that Taiwan and mainland China should both declare themselves to be part of China (Hung, 2 May, 2015, in Liberty

Times net). This position was different from the KMT's traditional stance of 'One China, Respective Interpretations;' (OCRI) that is, 'One China' has different meanings for Taiwan and the Mainland. Hung's proposal alarmed many KMT politicians and elites and caused public confusion around the KMT's cross-Strait policy. Hung was denounced by the DPP and some media as a totally pro-China candidate (Cole, 2015). When the trouble dragged on to October 2015, the KMT finally decided to substitute KMT chairman Eric Chu as the party's presidential candidate. Although Hung caused controversy for the KMT, it was surprising that the KMT should have to change candidates three months before the 2016 presidential election. That meant Eric Chu only had a very limited amount of time to campaign<sup>15</sup>.

The KMT's decision to replace Hung created a dilemma for the party (the initium, 7 October, 2015). On one side, Hung's radical cross-Strait platform provided the DPP with an excellent excuse to claim that the KMT intended to sell Taiwan out to mainland China. This forced the KMT to spend time refuting the allegation; meanwhile, Hung's repeated clarifications took up news space, giving Hung little chance to promote other policies. To stop the controversy, the KMT elites tried to persuade Hung to change her cross-Strait policy, but she refused. After standing by her for three months, the KMT decided to withdraw her nomination and changed candidates, replacing Hung with Eric Chu.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Rich, T.S & Neeper, H. (2015). The Impact of Replacing Hung Hsiu-Chu. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2015/11/17/the-impact-of-replacing-hung-hsiu-chu/>

<sup>16</sup> Cole, M.J. (2015). The Strange Case of the KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu The KMT is in a process of adjustment before the 2016 elections, but it seems to be moving in the wrong direction. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-strange-case-of-the-kmts-hung-hsiu-chu/>

However, Hung's replacement triggered huge dissatisfaction among her supporters, arguing that it was Hung who had solved KMT's embarrassment that no qualified politicians were willing to stand in the primaries. Besides, Hung had passed all the primary thresholds, including 1,500,000 party members' recommendations and an average of 40 percent support across five polls. Supporters claimed that it was not right to withdraw Hung's nomination just because some people had criticised her cross-Strait policy. Some of Hung's supporters even said that they would not vote for Eric Chu in protest against the party's treatment of Hung. In this context, the KMT's 2016 campaign suffered from a disadvantageous split (the initium, 7 October, 2015).

Eric Chu had less than three months to run his campaign. Chu obtained his doctorate in accounting from New York University and then taught at National Taiwan University. He started in politics as a legislator in 1999 and was twice elected as magistrate of Taoyuan County between 2001 and 2009. In the Ma administration, Chu had been nominated as chairman of the Consumer Protection Committee and the vice premier in the Executive Yuan. From 2010 to 2018, Chu was twice elected as the mayor of New Taipei City. He was also the chairman of KMT from 2015 to 2016. He initially refused to stand in the 2015 primaries, but acceded to the requests of the KMT elites, who persuaded him to replace Hung.

On the DPP's side, as in the 2012 election, Tsai Ing-wen was the nominee. This time, because of the 2014 Sunflower Movement and the DPP's victory in the nine-in-one election, some polls predicted that she had a good chance of becoming Taiwan's first female president in 2016 (BBC, 20 May, 2016). When KMT switched

candidates, however, the political atmosphere became even more advantageous for Tsai.<sup>17</sup>

Tsai won the 2016 presidential election with 6,894,744 votes, while Chu got 3,813,365 votes. As mentioned above, the results of the election were quite consistent with some election polls. After the KMT switched candidates, the party's supporters split into two groups-- those who still supported Hung and those who endorsed Chu. This split inevitably caused harm to Chu's campaign and partly explains his poor performance (Wealth magazine, 07 Oct, 2015).

Tsai's victory made the DPP the ruling party in Taiwan again. This was the third changeover in the ruling party through democratic elections in Taiwan and it marked a further maturing and normalising of Taiwan's democratic progress in the eyes of the electorate (BBC, 20 May, 2016). However, regarding the cross-Strait relations, because Tsai didn't mention the 1992 Consensus<sup>18</sup> (九二共識) in her presidential inaugural address, Beijing believed that she had no intention of maintaining friendly relations (BBC, 20, May 2016). Even worse, China believed that Tsai's denial of the existence of the 1992 Consensus signalled a push for de jure Taiwan independence. Thus, after Tsai's inauguration, China started a confrontational policy of reducing Taiwan's diplomatic space, reducing Taiwan's agricultural imports, and cutting the

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<sup>17</sup> Part of the significant reason for KMT's defeated. <https://www.rfi.fr/tw/政治/20160117-蔡英文為何大勝308萬票?>

<sup>18</sup> the mutual understanding reached by the two sides in November 1992 was that 'the two sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on "one China," but differ as to what that means, and each side could express its interpretation verbally.' This position accords with the ROC Constitution. [https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News\\_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=8384D875F53F3B53](https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=8384D875F53F3B53)

number of Chinese tourists allowed to visit Taiwan. None of these policies altered Tsai's cross-Strait policy and cross-Strait relations became more strained after Tsai took office in May 2016 (BBC, 20 May, 2016).

In their 2016 campaigns, both Tsai and Chu put more resources into Internet campaigning (Business next, 19 May, 2019). Both candidates' teams still produced television advertisements and put their campaign videos on YouTube and Facebook. It appeared that the Internet had become the major vehicle for carrying the candidates' campaign information.

## **2.5 The 2020 presidential election**

Taiwan's 2020 presidential election was a competition between DPP's Tsai Ing-wen and KMT's Han kuo-yu. Tsai won the 2020 presidential election with 8,170,231 votes, while Han got 5,522,119 votes. After Tsai's apparent rejection of the 1992 Consensus in 2016, Beijing proclaimed that the Tsai administration was promoting Taiwan's independence and ruining cross-Strait relations (Kuo, 2020). Moreover, Tsai's perceived echoing of US President Trump's anti-China policy intensified China's doubts about whether Tsai was willing to maintain a peaceful relationship with mainland China. Immediately thereafter, China began clamping down on Taiwan's agricultural exports and revenue from Chinese tourists and students, provoking tension and negatively affecting Taiwan's economy (Chang, 2018).

In domestic affairs, Tsai actively promoted a policy of Transitional Justice and sought to begin confiscating the KMT's 'ill-gotten party assets' (Kuo, 2020). One high-ranking member of the Tsai administration, the former vice president of the

Transitional Justice Commission, Chang Tian-chin (張天欽), admitted that he was Tsai's 'lackey' in purging KMT politicians (The storm media, 1 October, 2019). Meanwhile, some of Tsai's appointments were criticised by some commentators as personal rewards. Such negative reports damaged Tsai and the DPP's public support (The storm media, 1 October, 2019).

In Taiwan's 2018 nine-in-one local election, the DPP candidates were mostly defeated by the KMT ones. The most surprising result was KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu's (韓國瑜) victory in the Kaohsiung mayoral election in November 2018, since the DPP had ruled Kaohsiung continuously for over two decades. In fact, in 2018 Han became unexpectedly popular in political circles (Peng, 1 November, 2018).

According to some commentators, Han's popularity not only won Kaohsiung but also helped other KMT candidates to win elsewhere (Peng, 1 November, 2018).

Han's success in his challenge to the DPP's long-term control of Kaohsiung was certainly remarkable. However, Han was not a new hand in Taiwan's political circles. He got his master's degree in mainland China Studies from Taiwan's National Chengchi University. After graduating, he worked as a journalist for the China Times in Taipei. He was elected as a county councilor for Taipei County in 1990 and as a legislator in the Legislative Yuan from 1993 to 2002. Then, he stepped out of Taiwan's politics for seventeen years and finally accepted KMT's nomination as the candidate for Kaohsiung's mayoral election in 2018. His campaign was described by some commentators as 'mission impossible,' with his victory prompting his candidacy in the 2020 presidential election (commonwealth magazine, 27 February, 2019).

After the 2018 local election, five public opinion polls gave Han the greatest odds among KMT politicians to defeat the DPP candidate in 2020 (Liberty Times net, 15 July, 2019). Facing this situation, Han hesitated to stand in the 2020 election; after all, he had just been elected as mayor of Kaohsiung in 2018. He was not sure whether most Kaohsiung citizens would agree with his standing in the KMT primaries. In the end, Han decided to stand and won the KMT's nomination as the party's presidential candidate. In the DPP camp, President Tsai was nominated again. According to the polls conducted by TVBS, Apollo Survey, and Ettoday, even though Han appeared to have considerable momentum, his support in the polls was behind Tsai's (Pao, 24 October, 2019 in Chinatimes). At the 2020 presidential election, Tsai got 8,170,231 votes, over Han's 5,522,119 votes. Tsai started her second term in May 2020.

Regarding the political communications patterns of Han and Tsai's 2020 campaigns, the first characteristic is the Internet becoming the most important channel of electoral campaigning (Liao, 24 November, 2019 in the storm media). The two candidates' teams launched videos on YouTube and set up official Facebook accounts to post articles, photos, and videos about their political platforms and campaign activities. The second trait of this new political communication is both teams sometimes broadcast campaign activities live on the Internet. Thus, both teams were exploiting mass media to release campaign information to voters. This is a cheap and efficient way of establishing direct connections between candidates and the public. (Upmedia, 17 Dec, 2019).

A third and interesting trait of this new political communication is the candidates, especially Han Kuo-yu, adopting a YouTuber style to frequently and directly interact

with the public (Mirror Media, 29 October, 2019). Previously, people learned about candidates' words and deeds mainly through relevant news reports in the mass media and did not often directly interact with candidates. Watching candidates' television debates was one of the best ways for the public to understand candidates' public policy platforms. In Taiwan's 2020 presidential campaign, Han frequently talked about what he was thinking or planning to do on Internet platforms as his live shows. People watched his shows and gave him immediate responses. This was a new way of interaction between a candidate and voters. Of course, without the Internet, it was impossible to imagine that a candidate could interact with voters so easily and frequently.

The fourth new feature of the 2020 campaign is candidates' supporters actively organising their own social media groups (Mirror Media, 29 October, 2019). Both Tsai and Han had more than one fans group on Facebook. Fans might join one or more groups depending on their enthusiasm for the campaign. Antagonistic fans groups might attack each other and were not controlled by candidates' teams. In other words, the election campaigns were not only the candidates' campaigns but also the fans' campaigns. This was a new and unprecedented political communication phenomenon in Taiwan. Thanks to the popularity of the Internet, fans' active participation intensified to an unprecedented extent (Appledaily, 30 December, 2019).

Finally, the fifth and last new feature of the 2020 campaign is the phenomenon of YouTubers outside of the candidates' official campaign teams joining the campaign in support of specific candidates (Appledaily, 30 December, 2019). On Han's side, 'Bit



King,' 'the KUSO,' and 'the Historian'<sup>19</sup> produced videos periodically to support Han Kuo-yu or to attack the DPP. These Internet celebrities were autonomous allies of the Han camp. As for Tsai, her team invited several YouTubers to promote her platforms in their own shows. Tsai sometimes appeared as a guest on these shows to interact with the YouTubers. This kind of propaganda was a new way for DPP's presidential candidates to promote their policy platforms.

## **2.6 Summary of the chapter**

In this chapter, the researcher has presented the changes in party politics and the transformations in the electoral campaign in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. This was a period in which Taiwan's politics and political system further developed away from the KMT's authoritarian one-party dominance to a multi-party democratic system.

It was also in this critical period that the major electoral campaign channels transformed from being completely dominated by traditional mass media to having this traditional media being upended by the new media of the Internet. Presidential candidates became more and more reliant on this new medium for campaign communication, not only because of its greater promotional efficiency, but also because it was cheaper. Thus, the changing domestic political context, the transformation in campaign communication, and the easing and tensing of cross-Strait relations altogether created the contextual influences on candidates' strategies of the appeals to national identity that the researcher will analyse and present in chapters

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<sup>19</sup> Taiwanese influencers' YouTube channels' name.

five to seven. Before showing the research findings of this study, in the next two chapters, I review relevant literature to the present study and the research methods used for data collection and data analysis.

### **Chapter 3. Literature Review: National identity and election campaign communications**

This study attempts to answer two research questions regarding what and why specific symbols have been selected to represent candidates' national identities in Taiwan's presidential election campaign videos. Given the salience of the national identity issue in Taiwan's contemporary politics (Achen and Wang, 2017; Fell, 2011; Hughes, 2011; Shyu, 1995; 2004), several scholars have studied how campaign advertising reflects political parties' stances on Taiwan's national identity (Fell, 2015; Sullivan, 2008). However, few previous studies have further explored the symbolic features of the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's campaign communications. Moreover, in Taiwan's presidential elections, can national identity be alluded to by various symbols instead of always being expressed explicitly in election campaign communications? If so, only counting the explicitly expressed national identity in campaign communications may underestimate the importance of the alluded appeals to national identity. It is the major concern of this study.

To answer the research questions of this study, it is necessary to review some relevant academic studies to better understand scholarly ideas in academia as preparatory background to the study of national identity and symbolic representations. In the first section of this chapter, the researcher introduces the core conceptions of identity and national identity. The second section is a review of the major studies concerning national identity in Taiwan, as well as in other countries. The third section introduces previous studies on symbolic representations for national identity. In the fourth section, the researcher introduces Fairclough and Van Dijk's discourse theories

as a framework to explore the rationale behind symbolic representations of national identity.

What should be noted here is that the data of this study are campaign videos uploaded to YouTube by Taiwan's presidential election candidates. Strictly speaking, by definition of advertising or political advertising, the videos should not be recognised as a kind of advertising or political advertising. Kotler (1984, p. 58) defines advertising as 'any paid form of non-personal presentation of ideas, goods or services through mass media such as newspapers, magazines, television or radio by an identified sponsor.' As for political advertising, Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (1994, p.2) define political television ads as 'any programming format under the control of the party or candidate and for which time is given or purchased on a broadcast (or narrowcast) outlet.' Since it is free for candidates to upload their campaign videos to YouTube, the videos may not be seen as a kind of advertising. However, as Perloff (1998, p. 345) argues, political ads 'offer a way of communicating with, and hopefully persuading the electorate.' The freely uploaded campaign videos have a similar function as political ads in elections. Therefore, in this chapter, the researcher still reviews some previous studies on the connection between political advertising and the appeals to national identity.

### **3.1 The basic notions of identity and national identity**

The purpose of this study is to explore the symbolic representations of national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. Thus, in this chapter, it is necessary to first introduce scholars' notions of identity and national identity.

### **3.1.1 The meaning of identity**

According to Smith (1991), the concept of identity may refer, among other things, to role identity, national identity, or cultural identity. The term 'identity' may be traced back to the tragedy of Oedipus, which demonstrates that self-identity is composed of identities of territory, social class, religion, ethnicity, gender, and family. One's identity is always practised within the social space of a community. As such, it is socially represented. As for national identity, Smith (1991) suggests that it is a complex psychological state involving identities related to territory, laws, institutions, and common values related to a political community. These values may be cultural, historical, and ideological. Moreover, ethnicity may influence national identity. Ethnicity is concerned with an individual's ties with his or her ancestors' traditional customs, languages, and genetic lineage, even though the person may have migrated. Hence, Smith (1991) suggests that the definition of identity can be interpreted as people sharing histories, memories, cultures, and common values (ideology) in a community or territory, and these people are entitled to have legal rights, a common economy, and duties in a nation.

Hall et al. (1996) have proposed three conceptions of identity: first, the enlightenment subject, where the essential self is a person's identity; second, the sociological subject, where the subject is formed in interaction with society, projecting oneself onto cultural, territorial and ideological identities and internalising their meanings and values; third, the post-modern subject, who has no fixed or permanent identity, but assumes different identities at different times (Hall et al., 1996, pp. 557-558).

### **3.1.2 Significance of national identity**

Huntington (2004, p.12) has provided a broad definition of national identity as ‘an overarching system of collective characteristics and values in a nation.’ Since the word ‘nation’ could refer to a country or ethnicity, some scholars differentiated the concept of ethnic national identity (ethnic nationalism) from civic national identity (civic nationalism) (Brubaker, 1992; Shulman, 2004; Wright, Citrin, and Wand, 2012). Shulman (2004, p.1) has defined both ethnic national identity and civic national identity. The former is a group of people who believe they have ‘a common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions, and race.’ And the latter, people in a state or a nation who think they are ‘living in a common territory, believe in common political principle, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be a part of the nation.’ Some other scholars (Shih, 2000; Smith, 1983; Stargardt, 1995) have similarly defined civic national identity and emphasised that the concept refers to a group of people’s beliefs that they are citizens of a country in which their freedom and happiness can be protected. Hughes (2011, p.51) maintains that ethnic nationalism emphasises that ‘the nation is a community of birth with a native culture;’ civic nationalism ‘is a territorial and legalistic concept that stresses the existence of a historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology.’ Moreover, Smith and Kim (2006) have suggested that national identity involves the evaluation of a nation’s developments in specific domains, such as the country’s achievements in democracy, economy, social security system, technology, science, and sports. Francis Fukuyama (2018, p.5) maintains that ‘National identity

not only enhances physical security, but also inspires good governance; facilitates economic development; fosters trust among citizens; engenders support for strong social safety nets; and ultimately makes possible liberal democracy itself.' Barrett (2005, p.192-193) also indicates that the subjective sense of national identity involves a personal sense of belonging to a national group, feeling towards other members of the group, knowledge of the national emblem, and emotions of national pride and national shame.

Thus, based on the notions of national identity as explicated above, in this study, national identity refers to civic national identity and is defined as a subjective sense of the belonging to a country and the recognition or emotion toward the history, culture, emblems, the fellows, and the current public issues of the country. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, due to democratisation, Taiwan's identity politics has transferred from the ethnic tension caused by the minority Mainlanders ruling the majority native Taiwanese to a civic oriented argument about the meaning of Taiwanese identity (Shen and Wu, 2008; Wong, 2001). Schubert (2004, p. 537) argues that Taiwan's national identity issue is neither pure ethnic nationalism nor civic nationalism, but it has tended to be more civic after the beginning of Taiwan's democratisation in the 1980s. Regarding the transformation of Taiwan's national identity issue, Hughes (2016) describes it as a three-stage evolution as explained as follows.

The first stage started in 1945, involving nation-building under an authoritarian political system in which the ruling KMT defined national identity according to Chinese ethnicity. The establishment of multi-party politics in 1986 heralded a new

period with the two main political parties striving to articulate a more inclusive vision of national identity based on citizenship and loyalty to Taiwan. Since 2008, a combination of growing economic dependence on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and a return of the KMT to the presidency has heralded a new phase, in which identity politics is largely shaped by a tension between a state-led attempt to present Taiwan once again as part of the Chinese nation on the one hand and a defence of the civic vision by groups in civil society on the other. (Hughes, 2016, P.165)

Hughes' observation also indicates that due to democratisation, Taiwan's national identity has shifted from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism. However, after Ma Ying-jeou became Taiwan's president in 2008, as introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, the KMT has started to remind Taiwanese people that it is natural for those who live in Taiwan to have a Taiwanese identity. Nevertheless, regarding national identity, Taiwanese people should hold R.O.C. identity as well; after all, Taiwan is just a part of R.O.C., with the KMT insisting on a dual identity for the denizens of Taiwan. For the KMT, Taiwanese identity is a provincial identity, and the R.O.C. identity is a national identity.

Unlike the KMT's dual identity, the DPP, at least before Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, always has considered the Taiwanese identity as the national identity. From the time when the DPP began advocating Taiwan independence in its platform in 1991 and the Resolution of Taiwan's Future in 1999, the party has publicly claimed that, although for now, the constitutional name of Taiwan is the R.O.C., DPP believes that Taiwan should be an independent sovereign country with the name of Republic of Taiwan (DPP Platform). In other words, the DPP's national



identity stance is that Taiwan should be treated as a country instead of merely a part of the R.O.C. This stand is different from the KMT's R.O.C. identity, and thus has caused a conflict of national identity between the two parties in Taiwan's presidential elections (Wu, 2020). Since the conflict is concerned with the perceived status of Taiwan as its own country or a part of the R.O.C., the issue of Taiwan's national identity is now in nature more of a civic national identity rather than an ethnic national identity.

For the DPP and KMT's politicians, the question is how to represent their individual stances regarding national identity in major political settings, such as the presidential elections. After all, in election campaigns, it is easier for candidates to win votes from those who share the same identity (Achen and Wang, 2017; Shyu, 1995; 2004). Thus, identity is an essential factor in the design of campaign communications. This is especially the case in Taiwan's presidential elections, because, as mentioned before, in Taiwan, there is more than one national identity. Therefore, how to appropriately represent a candidate's national identity stance in campaign communications is a critical task for the campaign teams.

After introducing the notions of identity and national identity, the researcher will undertake a review of previous studies dealing with the national identity issue in Taiwan as well as some other countries. Then, a review of the connection between national identity and symbolic representation is presented in the third section of this chapter. This review provides a framework for searching for the answer to the first research question, that is, the symbolic features of the appeals to national identity in campaign videos. In the last section of the chapter, the researcher introduces

Fairclough and Van Dijk's discourse theories. These theoretical notions are useful as frameworks to consider the appeals to national identity as a discourse and then to analyse the social and psychological rationales behind the symbolic representation of national identities.

### **3.2 Previous studies on Taiwan and other countries' national identity**

Since the 1990s, studies regarding Taiwan's national identity have been a focus of Taiwan Studies. As Schubert and Damm (2014) indicate, the issue itself is so contentious that scholars have tried to employ a range of academic perspectives, from those of political science, sociology, anthropology, history, and psychology, to explain the identity divide among Taiwanese people.

Schubert and Damm (2014) further argue that Taiwan's identity politics is influenced by domestic issues and the 'China factor.' Hence, in Taiwan, national identity is a potential site of struggle and a valuable tool in campaign communications. Chen (2013) has found that the Chinese identity of Taiwanese people is represented by the KMT, but this identity has been reshaped by social context, political factors, and economic development. In short, the process of Taiwan's nativisation and democratisation have largely strengthened Taiwanese identity and weakened Chinese identity among Taiwanese citizens (Shih, 2000). In the next section, the researcher reviews some of the major studies on Taiwan's national identity issue from political and ethnic approaches. Also included in the section is a brief review of previous studies regarding other countries' national identity issues.

### **3.2.1 Political and ethnic approach**

Previous studies on Taiwan's national identity have followed political and ethnic approaches. Political scientists like Alan Wachman (1994) and others have also argued that the development of democracy in Taiwan has made more Taiwanese consider themselves as citizens living in an independent country with freedom of speech and free elections, this being quite different from the highly restricted political lives of Chinese in mainland China. Furthermore, as Schubert and Damm (2014) point out, some political science researchers (e.g., Chang and Wang, 2005; Shaw, 2002; Schubert, 2006; Tien and Chu, 1996; Davison, 2003) believe that Taiwan's national identity cleavage reflects some Taiwanese people's need to reject 'the authoritarian signification movement of early KMT's rule' (Schubert and Damm, 2014, p. 3). In other words, as Schubert and Damm (2014) indicate, some researchers (e.g., Gold, 1994; Lin, 2002; Chang, 2003; Chao, 2003) suggest that, along with the democratisation of Taiwan initiated by the country's former President Chiang Ching-kuo and then promoted by Chiang's successor, former President Lee Teng-hui, several Taiwanese people have changed their national identity from the ethnic-based Chinese identity to a civic identity as being a member of an independent and democratic Taiwan, or, at least, the R.O.C. on Taiwan.

The DPP became the ruling party of Taiwan in 2000. Schubert (2004) and some other researchers (e.g., Dittmer, 2004; Lynch, 2004; Greene, 2008; Wang and Liu, 2004) focus their studies of Taiwan's national identity on former President Chen Shui-bian's policy of 'Taiwanization.' What has been especially noticed in these studies is Chen's decision to launch textbook reform to increase young Taiwanese

students' Taiwanese consciousness and the movement to re-join the United Nations (U.N.) under the name of 'Taiwan.'

Afterwards, as Schubert and Damm (2014, p.3) point out, when the KMT won Taiwan's presidential election in 2008, research has shifted to investigating whether the Ma administration's policy to ease tensions between the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. is compatible with the increasing Taiwanese identity on the island. The major findings of these studies are that while the cross-Strait relationship from 2008 to 2016 was becoming more cooperative compared with the situation during the time of the Chen administration, the rapidly increasing friendly interactions between Taiwan and the P.R.C. has triggered some Taiwanese people's fears about the possibility of being reunified with mainland China in the foreseeable future, with the Sunflower Movement in 2014 being considered as the most significant indicator of this fear. (Shubert, 2016, pp. 421,429).

Thus, according to Schubert and Damm (2014), political scientists' studies on Taiwan's national identity mainly have focused on Taiwan's political development and transformation and the effects of political change, especially the effects of democratisation on Taiwan's identity divide. Additionally, As Hall (1989) suggests, identity differences among members of a community can be a result of the execution of political power. In Taiwan's case, as Momesso (2022, p. 7) notes, the dynamics of democratic development and the increasing numbers of foreign workers and spouses have created a stronger civic oriented Taiwanese identity on the island.

Overall, as mentioned above, most political science studies regarding Taiwan's national identity divide agree that democratisation has enhanced Taiwanese

consciousness. Survey results by institutions like the National Chengchi University's Election Study Center have provided empirical evidence for this argument (Schubert and Damm, 2014). The most frequently used method for measuring Taiwanese citizens' national identity is to ask survey respondents: Do you think you are Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese? Since 2010, all the relevant survey results have shown that the greatest majority of Taiwan's citizens identify themselves as Taiwanese, followed by dual identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese), with Chinese identity has always been the least declared national identity in Taiwan (Schubert and Damm, 2014).

In addition to political science, ethnic analysis has also been employed to explain the origins of Taiwanese identity and the remaining Chinese identity in Taiwan. Corcuff's (2002) edited volume analyses the historical aspects, transition, and dimensions of ethnicity and nationalism affecting Taiwan's national identity. From a historical viewpoint, Corcuff (2002) analyses the relationship between internal change in the KMT and its external opposition, especially during Lee Teng-hui's ruling years. According to Corcuff's observations, Lee has strived to change ideological symbols, with the policy of 'knowing Taiwan' aiming at sweeping away the Han Chinese identity as an essential step to build a civic Taiwanese identity.

Another typical example of this kind of study is Hughes' (2016, p.153-168) historical review of the national identity divide in Taiwan. Hughes has reviewed Taiwan's history pre-and post-1945 and has indicated that before 1945, except for the indigenous people of Taiwan, most Taiwanese people's ancestors were Han migrants from mainland China who came during the Qing dynasty. After the Qing ceded

Taiwan to Japan in 1895, the feeling of abandonment and dissatisfaction with having second-class status under Japanese colonial rule enhanced Taiwanese consciousness. In 1945, although Taiwan was ceded to the Republic of China as a result of Japan's surrender, the cultural gap between the new KMT rulers from mainland China and the native Taiwanese people, plus military suppression during the 228 Incident in 1947 increased Taiwanese consciousness even further and enlarged the identity cleavage in Taiwan. Fleischauer (2014), Edmondson (2008) and Hillenbrand (2005) also indicate that for some Taiwanese, the 228 Incident is still a traumatic historical memory. The 228 Incident is considered by some scholars as an explanation for some Taiwanese people's persistent rejection of Chinese identity.

Since the time of the 228 Incident, according to Hughes (2016), the KMT has made great efforts to strengthen the Chinese identity in Taiwan, whereas anti-KMT forces started to promote Taiwanese identity as a counter ideology. This conflict is conceptualized by Hughes as Taiwan's 'identity politics.' From the 1970s, however, to ease the domestic tension caused by the identity divide and to maintain its status as the ruling party in Taiwan, KMT leaders Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui adopted a nativisation policy and a dual identity. That is, they persuaded people to identify themselves as being both Taiwanese and Chinese (Corcuff, 2002; Hughes, 2016). This dual identity became the KMT's stance on Taiwan's national identity and is considered by Rigger (1999, p. 548,551) as a wise strategy for Taiwan in maintaining the cross-Strait status quo.

Conversely, as Hughes and other scholars note, the DPP has emphasised Taiwanese national identity. When the DPP became the ruling party between 2000 and 2008 and

from 2016, strengthening Taiwanese consciousness has become a major task for the DPP. Overall, since the 1970s, both the KMT and DPP have put more emphasis on nativisation in Taiwan. As Hughes (2011, p.51) notes, nativisation has been the most crucial task for Taiwan, more crucial than talking about Taiwan's historical link with China. That is why nativisation emphasises civic Taiwanese nationalism over Chinese ethnic nationalism.

### **3.2.2 Studies on other countries' national identity**

In sum, Taiwan's national identity has absorbed the research interests of quite a few scholars. In addition, the national identity issue of other countries has also been considered by some scholars as a significant research topic. For example, Davis (2003, p.17) has found that, in the 1910s, an Irish nationalist Padraic Pearse made a great contribution to the representation of Irish national identity by publishing a series of essays to express his thoughts about the Irish people and their nation. Davis (2003, p.17) emphasises that the 'sentiment' expressed in Pearse's essays was a crucial force in the promotion of Irish national identity. Kaiser (2003) examines how Kosovo's national identity was represented when Serb nationalist troops executed an ethnic cleansing campaign against Albanians in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Kaiser (2003) indicates that the Kosovo Liberation Army successfully persuaded the Albanians living in Europe and the United States to contribute money to support its cause as being a critical factor in the representation of Kosovo's identity. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO) defeated the Serbs, Kosovo proclaimed itself to be an independent country in 2008. It is a case of national identity representation

under the military threat from a hostile force. Another interesting study has been completed by Smith (1992, p.55), which concerns the possibility and difficulty of representing a 'European political identity.' The European Union was established in 1993. Smith (1992, p.55) expresses his concern about the representation of a 'European identity' on the eve of the EU being set up, as the European Union was established the following year, in 1993. He expresses his suspicions regarding the possibility of representing a European identity given that different European countries have their established cultural identities. For Smith (1992, p.55), another challenge to the establishment of a genuine European identity is the trend of globalisation. These studies and the previous works on Taiwan's national identity all involve questions about identity representation. Thus, in the next section, the researcher will review some scholars' notions regarding the symbolic representations of national identity.

### **3.3 Symbolic representations of national identity**

Sullivan (2007, p.15) examines Taiwan's campaign advertising and finds that national identity has been framed as an issue in election advertising. Fell (2011, p.7) also finds that although all the major political parties take a quite moderate stance on the identity issue and mostly indirectly link the stance to relevant public issues, no party has ignored the importance of national identity as an appeal to win more support from voters. Fell's study offers solid evidence to indicate that in Taiwan, election campaign advertising is a major vehicle for political elites to represent a national identity among the general public. This fact inspires the researcher of the present study to examine the strategies of national identity representation employed by



Taiwan's presidential election candidates. Since the office of the president represents the whole country and the agendas raised in presidential elections are more likely to be implemented nationally, it is particularly suitable to investigate the different national identities and relevant issues presented in different presidential candidates' campaign communications, especially campaign videos.

Fell (2011, p.97) examines the connection between national identity and party agendas in campaign advertisements in Taiwan's 2001, 2004, and 2008 legislative elections. The findings of this study indicate that electoral candidates do use certain symbols for identity representation. For example, the KMT candidates have used the R.O.C. national flag and symbols related to the R.O.C. nationalism or 'Love Taiwan' in their campaign advertisements. Conversely, the DPP candidates have used the slogans 'Fight China' or 'Protect Taiwan' to emphasise their stance on Taiwanese national identity. These findings coincide with Corcuff's (2002, p. 75) earlier notions that official maps, the national emblems, such as the anthem, the flag, the national flower, textbooks, and banknotes can be used to represent national identity.

### **3.3.1 Symbolic representations in implicative ads**

The study conducted by Fell (2011) indicates that candidates may not always explicitly express their national identities in campaign advertising. Sometimes candidates use specific symbolic representations, such as slogans or national symbols to imply their national identity stances in political ads. Perloff (1998, pp.356-357) also maintains that in some American presidential elections, candidates use some symbolic representations in 'implicative ads' to imply opponents' negative

characteristics. In the next section, the researcher reviews some studies concerning symbolic representations of national identity. The research findings of these studies are the basis of categories in the content analysis of this study. The categories include campaign platforms or public policies, slogans or signs, scenes, music, language, and the overall stance of the national identity of each campaign video.

### **3.3.2 Public policy implies national identity**

Perloff (1998, p.357) has introduced a case to indicate that candidates' ideologies can be represented by the statement of public policy. For example, in the American 1996 presidential election, the Democratic candidate Clinton released a TV ad to attack his Republican opponent Dole's opposition to the Family Leave Law (an Act providing certain employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave per year). In the ad, a couple discusses how they spend time with their daughter before she died and then indicates that this tragedy could happen because of Dole's opposition to the Law. By attacking his opponent's stance on the family leave policy, Clinton implies his ideology of promoting social welfare in the campaign ad.

Regarding the connection between public policy and national identity, Lin (2015) proposes that in Taiwan, several public policies, such as the determination of textbook content, the cross-Strait policy, and Taiwan's U.S. and Japan policies were all related to national identity. Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui (2005) has also indicated that several public policies are made based on Taiwanese national identity, for example, the making of the memorial day of the 228 Incident a holiday, the replacing the indication of ancestral home with the place of birth on citizens'

identification cards, to increase the amount of material dealing with Taiwan's history and geography in elementary and junior high school textbooks, and adding the pictures related to Taiwan's local characteristics on Taiwan's banknotes.

Moreover, Smith and Kim (2006) have argued that national identity involves the evaluation of a nation's developments in specific domains, such as the country's achievements in democracy, economy, social security systems, technology, science, and sport. Francis Fukuyama (2018, p.5) suggests that 'National identity not only enhances physical security, but also inspires good governance; facilitates economic development; fosters trust among citizens; engenders support for strong social safety nets; and ultimately makes possible liberal democracy itself.' What these scholars have argued is that the subjective sense of national identity not only concerns the sense of belonging to a country but is also related to the subjective opinions toward the public issues in the country. Thus, in campaign videos, candidates' appeals to national identity may involve their opinions toward the country's public issues in specific domains.

### **3.3.3 Signs and scenes as symbolic representations of national identity**

In addition to public policy statements, other symbolic representations may be used in political ads or other communicative works to imply national identity (Edensor, 2002; Hawkins, 2010; Isaacs-Martin, 2010; Wen and White, 2020; Wiltgren, 2014). As Hall (1989) emphasises, identity can be represented by different representations, such as by movies and other artistic works in which exists 'creative power.' Edensor (2002, p.6) argues that 'the habitual, un-reflexive routines of everyday life also

provide fertile ground for the development of national identity. Thus, the cultural expression and experience of national identity is usually neither spectacular nor remarkable, but is generated in mundane, quotidian forms and practices.’ Edensor (2002) has maintained that the images of landscapes and ceremonies, or the forms of popular culture can be representatives of national identity.

Hawkins (2010) suggests that the representation of national identity ‘depends on the representation of a historical narrative’ (p. 229). He argues that the narrative ‘appears in the public symbols incorporated into daily life: images on currency, street names, naming patterns for commercial and government establishments, and symbols in popular culture’ (p. 229). Isaacs-Martin (2010) examines the representation of national identity in South Africa and suggests that ‘symbols such as flags legitimise state and nation’ (p. 86). However, he argues that the leaders of South Africa continually fail to acknowledge the historical narratives of South Africa’s national flag to create the country’s national identity (p. 89). Wiltgren (2014) also examines the role that national symbols, such as flags and maps, play in the representation of national identity. He has found that national symbols ‘are frequently used by 14-year-old youth in a multi-ethnic, suburban municipality in Stockholm’ (p. 308). Wen and White (2020, p.1) suggest that ‘the depiction of landscape in art has played a major role in the creation of cultural identities in both China and Europe.’ The two researchers further indicate that in Europe, ‘landscape art has been produced in a variety of contexts, including providing support for nationalism and the determination of national identity’ (p.1). In Taiwan, the Taipei 101 skyscraper, Jade Mountain, the folk art of glove puppetry, Taiwanese cuisine, and the endangered Formosan

landlocked salmon have been named in 2006 in an online poll as the best symbols for Taiwan (Hughes, 2011, p.53). Based on the research findings mentioned above, in campaign videos, in addition to the statements of public policies, the signs, slogans, and scenes related to national symbols may also be used to represent candidates' appeals to national identities.

### **3.3.4 Language and music as symbolic representations of national identity**

Moreover, scholars have noticed the relationship between language and national identity. Davies (1997) argues that in the historical period of the Renaissance, the popularity of using national language for literary creation enhanced the development of nation-states in Europe. Chiung (2006) maintains that the spoken and written language of Chinese is an essential part of Chinese identity; therefore, if Taiwanese people attempt to remove Chinese identity in Taiwan and build up a totally new Taiwanese identity, it is worth considering replacing the Chinese language with Roma-phone or indigenous languages. Kloter (2004, p.2)<sup>20</sup> observes that after becoming Taiwan's president in 2000, Chen Shui-bian has been successful in making himself the representative of a genuine Taiwanese identity by frequently speaking Minnanyu. However, is Minnanyu the only representative language of Taiwanese identity? Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui has raised the idea of 'new Taiwanese' (新台灣人) in 2005 to claim that native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakka,

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<sup>20</sup> Electronic version's page. Language policy in the KMT and DPP eras. *China Perspectives*, 56.

<https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.442>

and indigenous residents can all be included in the new identification of 'New Taiwanese', as long as they identify with Taiwan as their country and cherish the country's democratic system. Since Minnanyu, Mandarin, Hakka (客家), and indigenous languages are frequently used by native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakka, and indigenous residents in Taiwan (Lai, 2018), from the perspective of 'New Taiwanese', Minnanyu is not necessary the only representative language for Taiwanese identity, instead, using multiple languages in campaign communications can convey an ethnically inclusive Taiwanese identity.

Among the various symbolic representations of national identity, music or songs have been recognised by scholars as another kind of contributor. Maes (2018) maintains that a nation's music can bring people together and enhance their national identity. Biddle and Knights (2008) also argue that nation-states tend to create their own music for national identity representation. Aldoughli (2019) examines the symbolic representation of national identity in Syria and finds that the country's nationalist songs do strengthen the national identity of Syrians.

All these studies introduced above indicate that national identity can be represented by various symbols like the statements of electoral campaign platforms or public policies, the design of banknotes, the flag or map of a nation, or even the image of a country's landscapes. Thus, when political elites attempt to demonstrate their national identities to the public, explicit expression is not their only choice. Rather, they can use various symbolic representations to present national identity stances. The empirical studies reviewed in this section provide the researcher with a framework that can be used to search for the answer to the first research question of this study.

By using the method of content analysis, the researcher explores what kinds of symbolic representations, including policy or platform statements raised by candidates, national symbols or slogans, scenes or landscapes, music, and languages, have been used to present candidates' national identities in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. This analytic framework is also similar to Peng's (2005, p. 172) notion that televised campaign ads can be analysed by examining their narratives, scenes, sources, languages, and music.

Regarding content analysis, as Berelson (1952, p.18) notes, 'content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of the communication.' Thus, the researcher uses content analysis to search for the answer to the first research question of this study, that is: What symbols, including visual and audial ones, have been used to represent DPP and KMT candidates' national identity stances in their campaign videos in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections? The purpose of this question is to identify the different symbols that were employed to reveal or imply candidates' national identity stances. This is the first stage of data analysis in this study.

As reviewed by Krippendorff (1980, pp.13-19), the paradigm of content analysis can be traced back to the late 1600s when 'the Church was worried about the spread of nonreligious matters through newspapers' (p.13). Following this paradigm, researchers have conducted content analysis for religious, ethical, academic, and political purposes (Krippendorff, 1980, pp. 13-19). For example, LoebI published a book in 1903 to suggest a classification framework to explore the structure of the content of newspapers. Lasswell and his associates (Lasswell et al., 1965) use the

method of content analysis for propaganda analysis. In sum, as Krippendorff (1980, p. 13) notes, several studies have used content analysis for different purposes---‘ranging from concerns with political symbols and propaganda to myths, folktales, and riddles.’

In social science, content analysis is a systematic tool for analysing media content. The method can deduce the features of content and be re-verified (Krippendorff, 2018). Markoff, Shapiro and Weitman (1975) indicate that pictures, visuals, and music may be analysed using content analysis. Conducting content analysis requires coders who can recognise features within the content and implement coding to translate texts into categories (Markoff, Shapiro and Weitman, 1975). After identifying the symbolic features of national identity appeals in campaign videos, the researcher further explores the rationales behind those features by using the qualitative method of discourse analysis.

In the literature of studies on Taiwan’s campaign communications, as mentioned in the literature review chapter of this thesis, the method of content analysis has been widely used to examine the features of political advertising (Cheng, 2004; Fell, 2002; 2015; Peng, Chen and Hackley, 2008; Sullivan, 2008; 2009; Niu, 2005). For example, Fell (2011) uses content analysis to examine the party agendas in Taiwan’s 2001, 2004, and 2008 legislative elections. Niu also uses content analysis to explore the campaign advertising strategies adopted by the KMT and DPP in Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, 2001 legislative election, 2002 Taipei mayoral election, and 2004 presidential election. Thus, the researcher conducted a series of content analyses to identify the symbols selected for the appeals to national identity in Taiwan’s



presidential campaign videos. However, while previous studies on Taiwan's electoral campaign advertising mostly treated national identity as one of the various issues in the content analysis of campaign ads (Sullivan, 2008; Fell, 2005), the researcher focused on examining the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos and the use of various kinds of symbolic representations for national identity as the categories of content analysis.

The theoretical notions of discourse analysis are reviewed in the next section of this chapter.

### **3.4 National identity as a discourse**

#### **3.4.1 Discourse analysis and the appeals to national identity**

In the previous section of this chapter, the researcher reviews some studies to indicate that national identity can be represented by using various symbolic representations. However, why specific symbols are selected for the appeals to national identity is another question that needs to be investigated. This is exactly the second research question of this study. To answer this question, the theoretical notion behind using discourse analysis as a conducive tool is because, as Fairclough (1995) argues, discourse analysis can reveal hidden values, stands, and perspectives in advertisements and campaign rhetoric. In addition, by using critical discourse analysis (CDA), researchers can understand what, how and why a discourse has been represented, and, according to Fairclough (1995), the reasons may be related to socio-culture factors (Fairclough, 1995).

Wodak and her associates (1999, p.22) also argue that ‘national identity is represented and conveyed in discourses, predominantly in narratives of national culture. National identity is thus the product of discourse.’ Roper (2012) further indicates that identity is context-dependent; identity may change when social expectations change. Thus, the appeals to national identity in campaign videos can be considered as a discourse and the hidden meanings or the rationale behind the appeal can be explored by the method of discourse analysis.

### **3.4.2 Van Dijk’s notion of discourse analysis**

Generally speaking, researchers can follow different approaches to conduct a discourse analysis; two approaches are especially relevant to the present study. The first is Fairclough’s sociocultural practice; the second is Van Dijk’s social-psychological approach. Van Dijk (1988) argues that elite discourses guide people’s thoughts. It is from this claim that Van Dijk interprets the process of elites’ and people’s conceptualisations of social issues and the effects of social factors on people’s minds.

The reason for conducting discourse analyses is that the meanings of symbols related to national identity may not be explicitly presented in campaign videos. Therefore, it is necessary to use discourse analyses to explore the contextual considerations behind the symbols used in the videos. Thus, it can be said that discourse analysis plays a role as a framework of rhetorical analysis in my study, whereas content analysis is used to locate the manifest textual characteristics of campaign videos. As Van Dijk (1983, p.26) argues, ‘while content analysis is

primarily based on observable, countable data, such as words, phrases, sentences, or stylistic features, a discourse analysis will---apart from making explicit such surface structures in terms of modern grammars---also pay attention to underlying semantic structures and make explicit implications, presuppositions, connections, strategies, etc., which usually remain implicit in the discourse’.

According to Van Dijk (1988), discourse analysis includes the examination of three structures of a text. The first dimension is the micro-structure, which is related to textual style and rhetoric. Specifically, micro-structure refers to a grammatical and lexical choice in a text. Van Dijk (1983) emphasises that to make the discourse of a text comprehensible, the symbols used in the microstructure should ‘exhibit local semantic coherence’ (p.32). The second dimension is the macro-structure, which is concerned with the topic and theme. As Van Dijk (1983) indicates, ‘to be meaningful, a discourse should not only be locally coherent, but also globally coherent---there must be some kind of “semantic unity” to the whole discourse.’ (p. 33) The third is the super-structure. This is an abstract outline or an overall idea in a text.

Van Dijk’s method originates from the study of semantics and pragmatics. Moreover, the symbols used in advertisements may imply cultural meanings that may shape identity, influence people’s subliminal thoughts and also affect the understanding of groups within society (Wodak et al., 1999). What Van Dijk argues is that the meaning of discourse in a text is usually comprehended within a multi-dimensional symbolic structure. Therefore, to understand why specific symbols are used and arranged to present discourse in a text, researchers need to explore the symbolic features in the micro-, macro-, and super-structures of the text. Just as Van

Dijk (1983) argues, ‘the psychology of discourse processing, concerned with the cognitive principles of the comprehension and remembering of texts, is of fundamental importance in mass communication research (p. 21).’

Following Van Dijk’s notion, one may predict that, in Taiwan’s presidential election campaign videos, when a candidate tries to imply his or her national identity in a super-structure as the overall idea of a campaign video, the candidate may include one or more topics or themes as the macro-structure with certain styles or rhetoric as the micro-structure in the video. If the macro and micro-structures are not represented randomly, knowing the topic(s)/theme(s) and the style/rhetoric of the video will help researchers to understand the reasons for the candidate to imply national identity in certain manners. For example, if a campaign video implies a candidate’s Taiwanese identity and includes the topic of Taiwan’s economic recession with a gloomy style, the topic and the style imply that Taiwanese identity should include a sense of a prosperous Taiwan, and the candidate can resume this sense for the Taiwanese people.

### **3.4.3 Fairclough’s idea of discourse analysis**

When a researcher explores the deeper meanings of a text, in addition to the structure, as Van Dijk (1988) suggests, the social context is also a major consideration. Fairclough argues that a text does not exist in a stable structure, which means that social interactions and dynamics will advance different contexts of a text. Hence, Fairclough (1995) suggests an intertextual analysis, inspired by Foucault and Gramsci. Since ideologies and identities arise in group interactions, discourses are

shaped by private institutions and social factors known as public discourses.

Fairclough (1992) argues that intertextual analysis 'has an important mediating role in linking text to context. What intertextual analysis draws attention to is the discursive processes of text producers and interpreters, how they draw upon the repertoires of genres and discourses available within orders of discourse, generating variable configurations of these resources which are realised in the forms of texts' (p.213). As

Fairclough argues:

The negotiation and renegotiation of the relationship between public and private discursive practices which takes place with the order of discourse of the media have a general influence on the relationship between the practices, and between the public and private in an overall sense, in other domains of social life (Fairclough, 1995, p.63).

According to this idea and its application, the researcher assumes that campaign camps, campaign video producers, and voters interact with each other, and all are influenced by diverse social conditions. My argument is that every candidate needs to know the national identities existing among members of the public. In the meanwhile, they know their parties' national identity principles (private discourse). Then, they have to make a balance between the party's principles and the public's stance (public discourse) to present their own national identity in campaign videos.

Fairclough (1995) argues that text is shaped by sociocultural practice. Applying these notions to the present study, one may assume that the negotiation between candidates' party stances, the public's expectations, and social contexts will determine the symbolic representations of national identity in campaign videos.

Fairclough's (1995) idea helps answer questions such as why did Ma present a dual

national identity in campaign ads? or why did Tsai use the terms ‘Taiwan’ or ‘this country’ instead of R.O.C. in her 2012 and 2016 campaign videos, but used the term of ‘Taiwan R.O.C.’ in her 2020 election campaign?’ Presumably, these choices of symbols for national identity were influenced by contextual factors, and discourse analysis is an appropriate tool to explore the contextual considerations, because, as mentioned above, the main task of discourse analysis is to explore the connection between a text and the influential factors in the social context in which the text is generated. Therefore, the reasons for candidates to use specific symbols to present their national identity stands explicitly or implicitly may stem from their perceptions of the social or political atmosphere, and discourse analysis is a tool to explore those perceptions.

In sum, Fairclough’s (1995) theoretical notion of discourse analysis emphasises that the discourse of a text is a negotiation between the author’s private discourse and the audience’s public discourse. Applying this notion to the present study, one may assume that the symbolic representation of national identity is a negotiated result of candidates’ private and voters’ public discourses of national identity. Moreover, Van Dijk (1988) maintains that the meaning of discourse is derived from a hierarchical structure of symbolic representations. These theoretical and analytic notions provide me with useful frameworks to realise why specific symbols have been arranged in a certain way in campaign videos for the appeals to national identity.

Overall, while scholars have conducted several studies on election campaign advertising, most research focuses on examining the types of campaign advertising in Taiwan and their communication effects. Although national identity has been

recognised by researchers as a critical campaign issue in Taiwan's elections, few previous studies have scrutinised how candidates use various symbols to represent their national identities in campaign advertising. This research gap justifies the significance of this study.

The studies reviewed in this chapter indicate that national identity can be represented by various symbolic representations, such as statements of public policies or campaign platforms, national symbols or slogans, scenes, or landscapes of a nation, or even music and languages. National identity can also be considered as a discourse in political communications. The symbolic representations of the discourse can be a negotiated product between the political elites' and the public's stances regarding their respective national identities. In addition, the meaning of the discourse of national identity is derived from a hierarchical structure of symbolic representations. All these theoretical and analytical notions are the frameworks of the present study. These frameworks follow the academic tradition of communications study, and as such, they are different from the perspective of previous studies on Taiwan's party politics. In fact, using a perspective of communication to examine Taiwan's national identity is the major originality of this study. In the next chapter, the researcher introduces the research methods of this study. The procedures of data collection and data analysis are explained in detail to indicate how the research questions are answered appropriately and systematically.

## **Chapter 4. Research Methods**

To answer the research questions of this study, the researcher employs the methods of content analysis, discourse analysis, and in-depth interviews for data collection and data analysis. The multi-methodological approach is novel in the study of national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential campaign communications. The first research question is about the features of various symbols being used for national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. A series of content analyses are employed to answer this question.

After identifying the symbols selected to represent national identity, the method of discourse analysis is used to answer the second research question which explores the meanings behind the symbol selection. In addition to content analysis and discourse analysis, a series of in-depth interviews are conducted as a data collection method to provide me with auxiliary information to cross-validate the results of content analysis and discourse analysis. In this chapter, the researcher presents the operational procedures of content analysis, discourse analysis, and in-depth interviews to explain how I collect and analyse the data to answer my research questions.

### **4.1 Data collection**

The data of this study are collected from two approaches. First, I collect all the available 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential campaign videos launched by the KMT and DPP candidates' camps on their YouTube websites. The data collected from this Internet channel are used for content analysis and discourse analysis of national identity appeals. I collect data from YouTube for two reasons. First, compared with



the campaign ads appearing in newspapers or magazines, campaign videos provide both visual and audial data for analysis. Second, according to the spokesperson of the KMT's 2012 presidential campaign, in Chuang Po-chung's opinion (Chuang Po-chung, personal interview, 2 February, 2019), both the KMT and DPP's 2012, 2016, and 2020 campaign videos, including the ones first presented on television or the Internet were still able to be accessed on their YouTube channel. Chuang (personal interview, 2 February, 2019) also maintains that Internet campaign videos may be longer in length and carry more information than TV campaign videos, but the two versions of videos may all contain national identity appeals. Since the DPP and the KMT's presidential election teams were dismissed after the election day, and the two parties' TV and Internet versions of campaign videos can all be found on YouTube, the Internet channel is the best source to collect video data for this study. Thus, the videos analysed in this study are total population sampling data, which means the data are all the videos that can be found on the YouTube channel. The 2020 election is selected for study because it is near to the newest development of Taiwan's identity politics. Tracing back to examine the 2012 and 2016 cases enables me to explore the possible change of the appeals to national identity when different parties were taking power in Taiwan, that is, the shift of the ruling party of Taiwan from the KMT to the DPP.

Among the 2012 videos, a total of 68 items of Ma Ying-jeou's campaign videos and 26 items of Tsai Ing-wen's videos are found and collected from the Internet. The 2016 videos include 50 items of Eric Chu's campaign videos and 43 items of Tsai Ing-wen's videos. Among the 2020 videos, 13 items of them are from Han Kuo-yu's

campaign videos and 23 items are from Tsai Ing-wen's videos. These are the data for content analysis. The complete lists of these videos are demonstrated in chapters five to seven, respectively. These three chapters present the research findings of this study.

Considering the space limitations of this thesis, among the videos collected for content analysis, only the videos that obtained more people's viewing, that is, the videos having the top three click-through rates on data collection day are included in the discourse analysis. Thus, among the campaign videos of the three election years, the researcher only chooses the top three popular KMT and DPP videos for discourse analysis. The titles of the videos included in the discourse analysis are also shown in chapters five to seven, respectively.

Regarding the second approach of data collection, the researcher conducted a series of in-depth interviews to collect some auxiliary information about the symbol selection process for national identity appeals. According to Denzin (1970, p.30), there is a methodological paradigm to use in-depth interviews to examine the 'institutionalised norms and status.' In this study, the interviewees are election campaign staff, campaign video producers from advertising or public relations companies, political news reporters, and Taiwan's political communications scholars. Campaign video producers and some of the campaign staff had engaged in the production processes of the videos, interviewing these people may help the researcher to know more about the considerations behind symbol selections. In addition, reporters who covered the news about presidential elections and political communications scholars who observed presidential campaigns may also have insights on symbol selections for national identity appeals.

Before the in-depth interviews started, with the help of some Taiwanese news reporters and political communications scholars, the researcher collected a name list of campaign staff, video producers, political news reporters, and political communications scholars who had participated in or observed the symbol selection processes for national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential elections from 2012 to 2020. The name list is the sampling frame of in-depth interviewees. Then, I made phone calls to ask about these people's willingness to accept the interviews. Some of them rejected and some accepted. It can only be a convenience sampling procedure because accepting the invitations to interviews is these people's courtesy. A total of six campaign staff (3 of KMT and 3 of DPP), four campaign video producers (2 of KMT and 2 of DPP), two political news reporters, and two political communications scholars agreed to be interviewed by me. All the interviewees' names are noted with their statements appearing in the thesis. The list of interviewees is shown in Table 4.1.

All interviews were completed in Taipei, Taiwan in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Each interviewee responded to a semi-structured<sup>21</sup> questionnaires within one hour. For campaign staff and campaign video producers, the main questions were: (1) In the presidential campaigns you worked for, what were the considerations behind symbol selections for national identity appeals? Did some factors, including candidates or campaign staff's ideas, political party's platforms, perceived voters' social or psychological characteristics, and the social contexts of the election affect symbol selections? (2) Who had the power to select symbols for national identity appeals in

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<sup>21</sup>Semi-structured questionnaire is an open way to conduct interviews with the interviewees, with some ideas or relevant answers being derived from interviewees' memory.

campaign videos? For political news reporters and political communications scholars, I requested them to interpret the candidates' symbol selections for the appeals to national identity in the three presidential campaign videos. All the in-depth interviews were conducted in Mandarin; the complete interview questionnaires and the Chinese transcripts of all interviews are attached in the appendix of this thesis.

**Table 4.1 The list of interviewees and interview dates**

Interviewee	Identity	Interview date
Lee Hou-ching	Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 and 2016 campaign leader	17 January, 2019 22 January, 2019
Wu Nien-jen	Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 campaign video director	8 March, 2019
Jack Hsiao	2012-2016 Ma Ing-jeou and Eric Chu's campaign producer; the president of WeCan PR company	23 April, 2019
Kurt Lu	Tsai Ing-wen's 2016 campaign video producer	15 February, 2019
Lee Ming-hsien	Ma Ing-jeou's 2012 campaign spokesman	21 December, 2018
Chuang Po-chung	Ma Ing-jeou's 2012 campaign spokesman	2 February, 2019 and 16 February, 2019 (supplementary interview)
Lin Hsiang-pin	Han Kuo-yu's 2020 campaign video producer	13 January, 2020
Chang Wu-ueh	Han Kuo-yu's 2020 campaign chief consultant	13 January, 2020
Juan Chao-hsiung	Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 campaign spokesman	14 January, 2020

Sidney Lin	Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 campaign propaganda deputy executive	11 February, 2020
Niu Tse-hsun	Taiwanese political communications scholar	12 December, 2018 17 January, 2020
John Wen	Taiwanese political communications and speech communication scholar	13 January, 2020
Yang Hsiang-chun	senior political journalist	15 April, 2019
Travis Fan	senior political journalist and the head of political centre in TVBS	28 January, 2020

Note: Lee Hou-ching and Niu Tse-hsun were interviewed twice.

In the next section, the researcher introduces the data analysis procedures of content analysis and discourse analysis. The data collected from the in-depth interview are just used as auxiliary information to cross-validate the research findings of content analysis and discourse analysis.

## **4.2 Data analysis**

### **4.2.1 Content Analysis**

In this study, while analysing the symbols related to national identity in candidates' campaign videos, six categories are used in the coding procedures: (1) the platforms or public policies related to national identity, (2) the signs or slogans related to national identity, (3) the scenes related to national identity, (4) the songs related to national identity, (5) the languages used in the campaign videos, and (6) the overall

stances of national identity, including Taiwanese identity, R.O.C. identity, and the dual identity (both the Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity).

Regarding the relationship between public policy/campaign platforms and national identity, as introduced in the literature review chapter, candidates' appeals to national identity may be embedded into their statements on public policy or campaign platforms (Beland, 2017; Chang and Huang, 2011; Lin, 2015). Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui (2005) also indicates that in Taiwan, several public policies are made based on Taiwanese identity (see chapter three). Moreover, Smith and Kim (2006) have argued that national identity is related to the evaluations of a nation's developments in specific domains, such as the country's achievements in democracy, economy, social security system, technology, science, and sports. However, none of the previous studies has explored how the KMT or the DPP's presidential candidates appeal to their national identities to the public in campaign videos by raising issues of public policies.

As for the symbolic representations of national identity, as introduced in the literature review chapter, national identity can be represented by slogans or national symbols, such as the map of a country, the national flag, and the picture of the founding father of a country (Corcuff, 2002; Fell, 2014; Hawkins, 2010; Hughes, 2011; Isaacs-Martin, 2010; Wiltgren, 2014). In addition, scenes of a country can be used to represent national identity (Wen and White, 2020). Moreover, as indicated in the literature review chapter, songs and languages in everyday life can be also related to the representation of national identity (Biddle and Knights, 2008; Chiang, 2006; Edensor, 2002; Kloter, 2004; Lai, 2018; Maes, 2018). Therefore, in this study, in

addition to the overall stances on national identity, the researcher uses public policy or platform statements, signs or slogans, scenes, songs, and languages as the categories of the content analyses. These categories partially respond to Peng's (2005, p. 172) suggestion that while conducting a content analysis on television political ads, researchers can use narrative, source, sign, scene, and sound as categories for the analysis, because these categories are basic elements of visual or audial symbols in a video or film.

#### **4.2.2 Coding procedures of content analysis**

In this study, the unit of analysis of content analysis is each campaign video. The categories in the content analysis, including the platform/policy, sign/slogan, scene, song, language, and the overall stance of national identity in each campaign video, are determined based on previous research findings regarding the symbolic representations of national identity. The coding procedure starts by reviewing each campaign video to set up the coding scheme of the categories and their sub-categories related to candidates' Taiwanese identity or the R.O.C. identity (see Table 4.2). In each category, its sub-categories need a coder's 'decisions' concerning the calculated frequency of their appearances in a video. Thus, as Table 4.2 presents, since the six categories have 72 sub-categories in total in the coding scheme, to complete the coding procedure for a video, the coder needs to make 72 decisions as the coding results of one video.

In the series of content analyses of this study, the researcher is the first coder, and the second coder is a communications researcher who has taken research method courses from the graduate school of a university in Taiwan. The inter-coder reliability

is a coefficient that indicates the consistency between two or more coders' coding results. The formula of inter-coder reliability for two coders is  $R=2M/N1+N2$ , where R is the inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of the two coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of decisions each coder makes. As mentioned above, in this study, a coder needs to make a total of 72 decisions while coding a campaign video, thus, for this study, the N1 and N2 in the inter-coder reliability formula equal 72 decisions multiplied by the number of a candidate's videos that each coder analyses, and the M in the formula represents the consistent coding decisions between the two coders. It is better if the coefficient is higher, thus, the researcher sets 0.90 as the acceptable threshold of inter-coder reliability. Since the inter-coder reliability of each of the serial content analyses in the three election years' data is all above 0.90, the researcher decided not to invite a third coder to join the coding processes. The unit of analysis is each campaign video.

Following the coding scheme, the two coders implemented the coding works separately. Then, the researcher calculated the frequencies of coding results in each category and the inter-coder reliability coefficients of content analysis for each candidate's campaign videos.

While reviewing each campaign video, the researcher has found that candidates' national identity stances were frequently implied in a dramatic style in which a synthesis of multiple symbols was used as indicative components. Thus, to answer the first research question regarding what symbols have been used by candidates to represent their national identity stances, in addition to public policy or campaign



platform statements, the signs or slogans, scenes, songs, and languages ought to be taken into account and coded systematically. The full coding scheme is as follows.

**Table 4.2 The coding scheme of content analysis on the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's 2012 to 2020 presidential election campaign videos**

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**platform/policy:**

**policy statements or campaign platforms related to Taiwanese identity:** (1) a united and peaceful Taiwan, (2) social justice in Taiwan, (3) Taiwanese younger generation's future, (4) Taiwan's economy, (5) Taiwan goes to the world, (6) to solve Taiwan's struggles, (7) to protect Taiwan's democracy and the freedom of speech, (8) to strengthen Taiwan's national defense, (9) to consolidate Taiwan's sovereignty, (10) cooperation among Taiwanese people, (11) to develop Taiwan's local industry.

**policy statements or campaign platforms related to R.O.C identity:** (1) to extend the R.O.C.'s friendships with other countries/the R.O.C. acquires visa-free treatments from other countries.

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**sign/slogan:**

**signs or slogans related to Taiwanese identity:** (1) Taiwan, come on, bravo, (2) stable future in Taiwan/pluralism and tolerance in Taiwan/live together in Taiwan, (3) keep on going Taiwan (4) love Taiwan, (5) Taiwan next, (6) proud to be Taiwanese, (7) Taiwan's future, (8) an integrated Taiwan, (9) one Taiwan, (10) an opened Taiwan, (11) light up Taiwan, (12) to create a Taiwan with happiness, (13) to resume Taiwan's glory, (14) Taiwan safe; people rich.

**signs or slogans related to R.O.C. identity:** (1) KMT party emblem, (2) the R.O.C. passport, (3) the name of the R.O.C., (4) the R.O.C. flag/emblem, (5) the picture of R.O.C. founding father.

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**scene:**

**scenes related to Taiwanese identity:** (1) candidates interact with grassroots Taiwanese people, (2) Taiwan's local industry, (3) traditional Taiwanese culture, (4) young Taiwanese, (5) Taiwanese people's minds/expectations/support for candidates, (6) Taiwan's agriculture, (7) Taiwan's transportation system, (8) Taiwan's countryside scenery, (9) stagnant Taiwan.

**scenes related to R.O.C. identity:** (1) people show the love of the R.O.C. flag, (2) Tsai Ing-wen shows herself as the president of the R.O.C., (3) Tsai Ing-wen shows herself as the chief commander of the R.O.C. force.

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**song:**

**songs related to Taiwanese identity:** (1) joyful gathering (歡聚歌), (2) let the world know this name (讓世界叫響這個名字), (3) move forward (向前衝), (4) Taiwan, come on, bravo!

(台灣加油讚), (5) we are one (an English song), (6) Formosa (美麗島), (7) thanks for your help (承蒙您, 按仔細), (8) the happy paradise (快樂天堂), (9) we will change the future someday (總有一日咱會改變未來), (10) I will join you to support Tsai Ing-wen (有你做伴, 與你一齊挺小英), (11) a better world (an English song), (12) persistence (堅持), (13) Taiwan melody (台灣美樂地), (14) the light of the island (島嶼天光), (15) red flower rain (紅花雨), (16) waiting for one person (等一個人).

**songs related to R.O.C. identity:** (1) anthem of the R.O.C. flag (國旗歌), (2) the shining new blue sky (耀眼新藍天), (3) Den Tapre Landsoldat (我現在要出征), (4) confidence and courage are our names (自信勇敢咱的名).

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**language:**

(1) Mandarin, (2) Minnanyu, (3) Hakka, (4) indigenous language, (5) Taiwan's new immigrants' languages, (6) English.

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**the overall stance on national identity in each campaign video:**

(1) Taiwanese identity only, (2) R.O.C. identity only, (3) dual identity (Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity).

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Note: 1. The unit of analysis is each campaign video.

2. A total of 6 categories and 72 sub-categories are included in the coding scheme.

3. Each campaign video may contain multiple policy/platform statements, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

What should be noted is that among the videos of the three presidential campaigns, the campaign videos launched by the candidates like the PFP's James Soong (宋楚瑜) and KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu are not analysed in this study. Soong participated in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections but only got 2.77, 12.84, and 4.3 per cent of the votes. These low percentages of votes indicate that, in the three presidential elections, Soong was not considered a serious candidate by most voters. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that Soong's national identity stance was not influential in Taiwan's identity politics. As for Hung, she was once nominated as the KMT's presidential candidate in July 2015 but was asked by the KMT to withdraw from the election in October 2015.

After conducting a series of content analyses to specify the specific symbols that have been used by candidates to represent their national identity stances, The researcher used the method of discourse analysis to explore the deeper meanings behind the symbols related to national identity in the campaign videos. As some scholars have noted, explicit features of a text can be presented in content categories; the implicit meanings of the text can be analysed by qualitative methods (Vaismoradi and Snelgrove, 2019).

### **4.2.3 Discourse analysis**

To answer the second research question which asks why specific symbols were selected to represent candidates' national identity stances in their presidential campaign videos, the researcher employed discourse analysis to examine the underlying meanings of the symbols in the videos. Lasswell (1949, p.6) argues that content analysis may not be able to explore the underlying relationships between texts and social contexts. It is a method that describes the 'what' instead of the 'why' of a phenomenon. It is for this reason that a qualitative approach to textual analysis like discourse analysis helps explore why specific symbols were used in campaign videos. As a way of exploring the meanings and ideologies behind Taiwanese presidential candidates' campaign videos, this is a relatively novel approach in the area of Taiwan Studies.

In the past, the method of discourse analysis has been employed to examine some of Taiwan's political texts. For example, Yang (2013) uses critical discourse analysis to examine the relationship between power and language in the debate on ECFA between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen in 2012. Yang employs Van Dijk's socio-

cognitive model to explore the lexical choices and syntactic structures in Ma and Tsai's arguments in the debate (p.85) and to unfold the manifestation of dominance and power in the languages used by Ma and Tsai (p.86). In addition, Yang's study has found that the KMT's supporters usually speak Mandarin, and the DPP's supporters frequently speak Taiwanese (Minnanyu); but Ma Ying-jeou spoke several different languages in the debate, including Minnanyu, Hakka, and Amis (an indigenous language in Taiwan). That demonstrated more power than Tsai Ing-wen. Yang (2013) thus argues that language can attract people's attention and shows cultural sharing.

Another scholar, Lutgard Lams (2018) has adopted a discourse-analytical approach as a theoretical perspective to examine the agenda-setting and framing functions in the KMT and DPP's campaign materials in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election. Lams (2018, p.305) mentions that, in the election, certain issues were represented among the public, media and political elite. Both Lams and Yang use discourse analysis to study Taiwan's politics; it is a method to interpret why specific symbols or languages were used in Taiwan's political texts. However, none of the previous studies uses discourse analysis to investigate why specific symbols may be used to represent candidates' national identities in Taiwan's presidential election campaign videos.

Generally speaking, there are many approaches to conducting a discourse analysis. This study adopts two approaches which are related to the paradigm of critical discourse analysis. The first is Fairclough's sociocultural practice; the second is Van Dijk's social-psychological approach. Van Dijk (1988) argues that elite discourses guide people's thoughts. It is from this claim that Van Dijk interprets the process of

elites' and people's conceptualisations of social issues and the effects of social factors on people's minds.

In this study, the reason to conduct discourse analyses apart from content analyses is that the meanings of symbols related to national identity may not be explicitly presented in campaign videos. Therefore, it is necessary to use discourse analyses to explore the contextual considerations behind the symbols used in the videos. Thus, it can be said that discourse analysis plays a role as a framework of rhetorical analysis in my study, whereas content analysis is used to locate the manifest textual characteristics of campaign videos.

According to Van Dijk (1988), discourse analysis includes the examination of three structures of a text. The first is the super-structure. This is an abstract outline or an overall idea in a text. The second is the macro-structure, which is concerned with the topic and theme of the text. Lastly, the micro-structure is related to textual style and rhetoric. Following Van Dijk's notions, one may assume that, in Taiwan's presidential elections, candidates may arrange symbols in micro-, macro-, and super-structures to present national identities in campaign videos. By this strategy, candidates' teams make it possible for the public to recognise candidates' national identity stands. Based upon Van Dijk's notion, it is predictable that candidates may imply their national identity stands (the super-structure) in campaign videos by including one or more topics (the macro-structure) with certain styles or rhetoric (the micro-structure). Knowing the topics and the style of campaign videos will lead researchers to understand why candidates imply national identities in particular manners. In other words, candidates may imply their national identity stands for

different purposes by including specific topics with certain styles in different videos. To understand the purposes of those symbol selections, researchers may adopt Van Dijk's suggestion to examine the topics/themes and the styles/rhetoric of the campaign videos.

When a researcher explores the deeper meanings of a text, in addition to examining the structure of symbols as Van Dijk suggests (1988), exploring the connection between social context and the text is another task. Fairclough (1995) suggests that a text does not exist in a stable structure; societal interactions and dynamics will advance different contexts of a text. Hence, Fairclough (1995) proposes an intertextual analysis inspired by Foucault and Gramsci. Fairclough (1995) argues that the intertextual constitution of texts is connected with the audience (p.208).

Intertextual analysis crucially mediates the connection between language and social context. The intertextual analysis concerns the discursive process of text producers and interpreters, as well as how they draw upon the repertoires of genres and discourses available within orders which are realised in the forms of texts (p.213).

Since ideologies and identities arise in group interactions, discourses are shaped by private institutions and social factors known as public discourses. As Fairclough maintains,

The negotiation and renegotiation of the relationship between public and private discursive practices which takes place with the order of discourse of the media have a general influence on the relationship between the practices, and between the public and private in an overall sense, in other domains of social life. (Fairclough, 1995, p.63)

According to this notion, this study assumes that campaign teams, campaign video producers, and voters interact with each other, and all are influenced by diverse social

conditions. My argument is that every candidate needs to know the public's national identity. In the meanwhile, they know their parties' stances on national identity (private discourse). Then, they have to make a balance between the party's principles and the public's stance (public discourse) to present their own private and public discourses of national identity in campaign videos.

In sum, Fairclough (1995) and Van Dijk (1988) claim that a text is shaped by sociocultural and socio-psychological practices of symbol selections. To explore the practices embedded in campaign videos is to search for the answer to the second research question of this study. The reasons for candidates to use specific symbols to represent their national identity stands may stem from their perceptions of the social or political atmosphere, and discourse analysis is a tool to explore those perceptions.

#### **4.2.4 procedures for conducting discourse analysis**

Regarding the procedures of discourse analysis, the researcher adopted Van Dijk's (1988) and Fairclough's (1995) approaches to explore the rationales behind the symbol selections of national identity appeals in candidates' campaign videos. Due to the space limitations of the thesis, only the videos having the top three click-through rates on data collection day were included in the discourse analysis.

While conducting discourse analysis of those videos, the researcher first watched each video carefully and then follow Fairclough's notion to explore how the video makes a negotiation between the candidates' party stance on national identity and the social context related to the video content. Using Fairclough's words, it is an intertextual analysis of the candidates' private discourses and the public's discourses

on national identities. A typical example of this kind of negotiation appears in some of Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 campaign videos in which Tsai raised a new term of national identity as the 'R.O.C. Taiwan'. Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos did not use any symbols relating to the R.O.C. Nevertheless, in Tsai's 2020 presidential election campaign, the national identity of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' made a debut in Tsai's campaign videos. This is probably because Tsai's 2020 opponent Han Kuo-yu held a significant R.O.C. national identity and seemed menacing at the beginning of his campaign. Besides, Tsai might have been trying to win the support of those who disliked Han but held the R.O.C. identity or both the R.O.C. identity and Taiwanese identity. In other words, the DPP and Tsai's private discourse of national identity was always about Taiwanese national identity before 2020. However, facing the reality that in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, the R.O.C. identity was a popular discourse among the public, Tsai chose to negotiate between her private discourse and the public discourse of national identity to raise the new 'R.O.C. Taiwan' identity. Using intertextual discourse analysis, one may explore the latent symbolic strategies of national identity appeals in candidates' campaign videos. <sup>22</sup>

After exploring the negotiation between the candidates' private discourse of national identity and the public's discourses, the researcher continued to follow Van Dijk's notion to analyse the styles or rhetoric of symbols selected in the videos, including the styles or rhetoric of policy or platform narratives, the signs or slogans, the scenes, the songs, and the languages appearing in the videos. This is what Van

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<sup>22</sup> Tsai fights for R.O.C. discourse; Tsai tries to define R.O.C. meaning, etc..  
<https://www.tpoc.com.tw/article/897>



Dijk referred to as the micro-structure of the video. The next step is to identify the main topics of the videos. This is the macro-structure of the videos. Finally, the micro and macro-structures of the videos will help the researcher to identify the overall idea or the super-structure of the videos regarding the national identity implied in the videos.

For example, in one of Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 campaign videos, the content was about a romance between a young Taiwanese boy and an overseas Chinese girl. The boy travelled to a foreign country with the R.O.C. flag and emblem to make his country more visible abroad. He came across the girl in her country and drew her curiosity to the flag, because Taiwan was the homeland of the girl's mother. The R.O.C. flag thus became a catalyst for the young couple's romance. The micro-structure or the style of the video is romantic, and the macro-structure or the main topic of the video is a love story brought about by the R.O.C. flag. The super-structure or the overall idea of the video is certainly the R.O.C. identity. Here we can see how Van Dijk's analytic framework helps for explaining why specific symbols can be arranged in a certain way to imply an originally serious idea of national identity. Ma's team put the national symbol of the R.O.C. in a romantic frame to imply the desirability and potential happiness of the R.O.C. identity. It is a way to make R.O.C. identity more acceptable and persuasive to the viewers, maybe, especially the younger ones, of the video. The more detailed discourse analysis of this video is presented in the next chapter of this thesis.

In the video introduced above, the boy and the girl start their relationship by discussing the meaning of the R.O.C. flag; however, they call the R.O.C. 'Taiwan' in

the video. From Fairclough's (1995) perspective, it is a negotiation between the KMT's R.O.C. identity and the country's international calling as 'Taiwan.' It is a typical example of the importance and necessity of contextual considerations behind the appeals to national identity in campaign videos, and Fairclough's (1995) notion of 'negotiation' helps explain specific symbolic representation for the appeals to national identity.

In sum, in this study, the data are the online campaign videos concerning the symbols selected for the appeal to national identity in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. Quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis are employed to discover the symbolism of the appeals to national identity in the videos. The method of in-depth interviews is used to collect auxiliary information to cross-validate the research findings of content analysis and discourse analysis. After introducing the fieldwork of this study in the next section of this chapter, the researcher starts to present the research findings in the next three chapters and then provides the whole conclusion of this study in the last chapter of this thesis.

### **4.3 Fieldwork**

The fieldwork was divided into two stages, with the first being conducted from September, 2018 to August, 2019, and the second being conducted from January, 2020 to March, 2020. In the first stage, the researcher focused on the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. First, the researcher collected data and carried out a preliminary video analysis. The method of content analysis was used to classify national identity categories and extracted relevant policies/platforms, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and

languages as symbolic elements to be further analysed through discourse analysis.

Second, based on the preliminary findings from content analyses and discourse analyses, the researcher started to interview some of the interviewees, including two senior political journalists and two political communications scholars for each candidate's election campaign.

In line with journalists' and scholars' responses, the researcher adjusted some questions for more in-depth interviews in the next step. After the in-depth interviews, the researcher spent a month sifting the results of the interviews and thinking about interview questions for campaign video producers and spokespeople for each candidate. During the in-depth interviews, the researcher interviewed campaign video producers and spokespersons. At the end of the first fieldwork stage, the researcher started to write the draft of the thesis in September 2019.

The second stage focused on the 2020 presidential election. The researcher collected all videos from October, 2019 to January, 2020 and then went back to Taiwan to do another round of fieldwork. As with the first stage, the researcher conducted content and discourse analysis first, and, based on the results of these analyses, the researcher prepared in-depth interview questions about the 2020 presidential election. After interviewing journalists and scholars, the researcher revised some interview questions to ask campaign video producers and campaign speakers.

Overall, the researcher designed different questions for different interviewees according to their professions. For some of the interviewees, the researcher made an

appointment with their office staff. In addition, some interviewees introduced more relevant interviewees for my in-depth interviews.

After introducing the research methods, the researcher demonstrates the research findings in the next three chapters and concludes the thesis with an overall discussion on the meanings of all research findings of this study.

## **Chapter 5. The appeals to national identity in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election campaign videos**

Taiwan's 2012 presidential election was a competition between the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou and the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen. In the election, Ma was Taiwan's incumbent president who was running for his second with Tsai playing the role of the challenger to Ma. In this chapter, the researcher first presents the results of content analyses which reveal the symbols used by Ma and Tsai for national identity appeals in their 2012 presidential election campaign videos. All of these videos are total population sampling data for content analyses. The unit of analysis is every single campaign video. The findings of content analysis answer the first research question: What symbolic representations were used for national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential election campaign videos? Some of the in-depth interviewees' opinions are used as auxiliary information to the findings of content analyses.

Based on the studies introduced in the literature review chapter of this thesis, a total of six categories are used to analyse the videos' symbolic representations of national identity. They are the following: (1) the public policy or campaign platforms related to national identity, (2) the signs or slogans related to national identity, (3) the scenes related to national identity, (4) the songs related to national identity, (5) the languages used in the campaign videos, and (6) the overall stance of national identity in each campaign video.

Underlying the framework of these categories is an argument that national identity can be represented by more than one kind of symbol in campaign videos. In other words, the viewers of a campaign video may recognise the implied national identity

by viewing the synthesis of multiple symbols appearing in the video. Therefore, similar to Peng's (2005, p. 172) suggests, researchers may analyse campaign ads from their multiple characteristics, including narratives, sources, scenes, languages, and music, the researcher also has tried to uncover what symbols were used to represent national identity in Ma and Tsai's 2012 campaign videos.

Then, following the frameworks suggested by Fairclough and Van Dijk, the researcher will present the results of discourse analyses to answer the second research question of this study, that is, the rationales behind the uses of specific symbolic representations for the appeals to national identity. Some of the in-depth interviewees' opinions are also be used as supplementary explanations for the results of discourse analyses.

In previous chapters, the researcher has indicated the reason to conduct discourse analysis in this study. As Wodak and her associates (1999, P. 22) maintain, national identity is represented and conveyed in discourses. Fairclough (1995, p. 63) argues that the discourses presented in media are negotiations between the media's private discourses and the public's discourses. What Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 258) stress is that the media's discourses are 'socially constitutive' and 'socially shaped.' This perspective is particularly useful for answering the 'why' question of this study. Based on Fairclough's perspective, the symbolic representation of national identity could be a negotiated result after considering both political parties' and the public's discourses on identity and other issues.

In addition to Fairclough's perspective, Van Dijk's (1983) approach to discourse analysis is also helpful for understanding why specific symbolic representations are

arranged in a certain way to make the viewers of campaign videos recognise candidates' national identities. Van Dijk (1983, p. 32) argues that discourse analysis involves the examination of three structures of a text. The micro-structure refers to textual style and rhetoric. Van Dijk stresses that to make the discourse of a text comprehensible, the symbols in the micro-structure should have 'local coherence'. The macro-structure is the topic or theme of the text, and the super-structure is the overall idea of the text. Van Dijk's conceptual framework is used to explain why specific symbolic representations were presented in certain styles on certain campaign topics to finally imply candidates' national identities.

Following Van Dijk's notion, it is predictable that candidates may imply their national identities for different purposes by bringing up some topics with certain styles in different campaign videos. Thus, facing a video which implies a candidate's national identity (the super-structure), knowing the topic or theme (the macro-structure) and the style or rhetoric (the micro-structure) of the video helps researchers to understand the purpose of making the video.

## **5.1 Symbolic representations of national identity in Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 presidential election campaign videos**

### **5.1.1 Symbolic representations of Ma's national identity**

Since Ma Ying-jeou won the 2012 presidential election, in this section, the researcher will first present the content analysis results of Ma's campaign videos. A total of 68 entries of Ma's 2012 campaign videos were found on the Internet. The titles of the videos are listed in Table 5.1. The first category of content analysis is the

major platforms or public policies related to national identity. As introduced in the literature review chapter, some scholars have indicated that politicians' national identity stances could influence their ideas concerning public policies. In other words, for political elites, one way to present or imply national identity is to express specific public policy statements. The content analysis results as shown in Table 5.2 indicate that Ma attempted to imply his dual identity in his platforms. Among the 68 videos, the statements urging for a united and peaceful Taiwan were advocated 42 times. It is a platform which reflects Ma's idea of Taiwanese identity. Facing the DPP's attack on his Mainlander background in 2008, it is understandable for Ma to emphasise a united and peaceful Taiwan. Since Taiwan is a multi-ethnic country consisting of native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakka, and indigenous residents, Ma's urge for a united Taiwan was actually proposing ethnic inclusion for Taiwanese identity. This appeal echoed Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui's (2005) suggestion that Taiwanese identity should not be represented based on ethnic exclusion. While the platform seemed to be different from a clear statement such as 'I am Taiwanese,' it can be considered as Ma's elaboration of the substance of Taiwanese identity.

Regarding the signs or slogans related to Ma's Taiwanese identity, in the 68 videos, the slogan of 'Taiwan, come on, bravo!' appeared 39 times at the end of each video. It was the main campaign slogan of Ma's 2012 presidential race. Moreover, slogans of 'stable future' (安穩的未來), 'pluralism' (多元), or 'tolerance' (包容) appeared 22 times. These slogans, similar to the ethnic inclusion, appeared in some videos to stress that 'no matter where you have come from, we are all Taiwanese.' One of these videos presented images of new immigrants, indigenous people, Hakka, native



Taiwanese, and Mainlanders. In another video, even two foreigners, an American and a Dominican described their love for Taiwan and their enthusiasm for being Taiwanese.

As for the scenes, Ma's Taiwanese identity was represented 57 times by different scenes, including Taiwanese people living in peace and happiness, his intimate interactions with grassroots Taiwanese, and his concerns about people's demands for an ideal Taiwan. Ma's Taiwanese identity was also implied in scenes of traditional Taiwanese culture (19 times) and Taiwan's scenery (25 times). (see Table 5.2). For instance, two videos showed that Ma learned Minnanyu (閩南語) and Hakka (客家語) and then delivered public speeches in Minnanyu and Hakka. Another video showed Taiwanese opera and puppet shows. In another video, Ma invited famous performers and promoters of Taiwanese culture to express their thoughts. Other scenes, such as 'Hsinchu Loyalty Temple' (新竹義民廟), Hakka printing, and indigenous ceremonies, were also used as symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity.

Moreover, Ma's Taiwanese identity was also reflected in several songs and the multiple languages in the videos. Table 5.2 indicates that Ma's videos presented several campaign theme songs, including Joyful gathering (歡聚歌) (6 times), Let the world know this name (讓世界叫響這個名字) (once), Move forward (向前衝) (once), Taiwan, come on, bravo! (台灣加油讚) (once), We are one (once), Formosa (美麗島) (once), Persistence (堅持) (once), Thanks for your help (承蒙您，按仔細) (in Hakka, means 'thank you') (once), and The happy paradise (快樂天堂) (once). These songs appeared in some of the videos with the scenes delineating the ethnic

inclusion of Taiwanese people, the beauty of Taiwan's scenery, or Taiwanese people's diligence. The lyrics of these songs were used by Ma's camp to imply Taiwanese identity. Among the theme songs listed above, the one namely 'Joyful gathering' appeared most frequently in Ma's videos. The implication of this theme song will be further analysed in the discourse analysis section of this chapter.

Regarding the language used in Ma's campaign videos, Table 5.2 indicates that Ma's videos were dubbed in different languages, including Minnanyu (24 times), Mandarin (43 times), indigenous languages (twice), Hakka (7 times), and English (twice). Using different languages had implications for Ma's Taiwanese identity. First of all, presenting different ethnic languages echoed Ma's claim that Taiwanese identity should be ethnically inclusive. Second, since the DPP had always questioned Ma's Taiwanese identity, presenting the native Taiwanese language, the Minnanyu in the videos, could be a way to demonstrate his Taiwanese identity more clearly.

As for the R.O.C. national identity, the diplomatic statement about extending R.O.C.'s non-official ties with other countries appeared 16 times in the videos. Moreover, several signs or slogans appeared, including the KMT's party emblem (43 times), the R.O.C. passport (30 times), the name of 'R.O.C.' (27 times) and the national flag of R.O.C. (21 times) were used to represent R.O.C. identity. The party emblem can be considered as implying the R.O.C. identity for two reasons. First, it looks very similar to the R.O.C. national emblem. Second, two of the former KMT chairmen, Chiang Chi-chen and Eric Chu, had argued that the KMT's emblem contains R.O.C.'s national spirit (Liberty Times, 9 April, 2021; Chinatimes, 9 April, 2021). In addition, the appearance of scenes describing people's love for the R.O.C.

flag (5 times) and the song of the anthem of the R.O.C. flag (twice) was also used to imply the R.O.C. identity.

Overall, the content analysis results indicate that all of Ma's 2012 campaign videos contained both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C identity (see Table 5.2). The repeated appearance of dual identity in Ma's campaign videos implies that Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identities are equally important for Taiwanese people; the two identities co-exist in Taiwanese society without any contradiction. That is the biggest picture of identity appeal running through the whole package of Ma's 2012 campaign videos.

To show the compatibility of Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity, the R.O.C. flag frequently appeared in the videos which mainly implied Taiwanese identity. Another example can be found in a series of videos named 'We are Taiwanese, and we are citizens of R.O.C.' In the videos, some Taiwanese celebrities like Huang Chun-tsun (黃俊雄), Pai Bing-bing (白冰冰), and Sun Tsui-feng's (孫秀鳳) statements emphasise that their ancestors came from mainland China but they themselves were born and brought up in Taiwan. These three celebrities are proud of their ancestors who had a very arduous life in Taiwan, but they love Taiwan. The celebrities emphasised that Taiwan is their homeland. At the end of the series, they all restated 'We are Taiwanese, and we are the citizens of the R.O.C.' After presenting the symbolic representations of Ma's dual identity, the researcher now moves to answer the second research question of this study which concerns the rationales behind the selections of those symbols.

**Table 5.1 Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 campaign videos**

1. Joyful gathering (歡聚歌)
2. The song of national flag (國旗歌篇)
3. Love the national flag (愛國旗篇)
4. Study Confucian analects (讀經篇)
5. Taiwan, come on, bravo! (台灣加油讚)
6. Keep moving forward, Taiwan (台灣繼續向前衝)
7. The forum of young generation's policy (青年政策論壇)
8. Speech in front of a temple (廟口開講篇)
9. Taiwan, come on, Bravo part 2 (台灣加油讚: part 2)
10. We are family (我們都是一家人)
11. Book and newspaper stall (書報攤篇)
12. Golden ten years: sustainability, reducing the wealth gap, good dwelling, safe life, integral government, full scape construction, education (黃金十年: 永續篇, 均富篇, 樂業篇, 保安篇, 廉能政府篇, 全面建設篇, 教育篇)
13. Visa and love (愛情簽證篇)
14. A girl with the R.O.C. flag: part 1 and part 2 (國旗女孩, 上,下)
15. Animations of policies (in Mandarin and Hakka): social welfare (政策動畫社福篇: 台語, 客語)
16. Animations of policies (in Mandarin and Minnanyu): young generation (政策動畫青年篇: 國語, 台語)
17. Animations of policies (in Minnanyu and Hakka): Female policy (政策動畫婦女篇: 台語, 客語)
18. Animations of policies in Mandarin and Minnanyu: (政府動畫經濟篇: 國語, 台語)
19. I am a Taiwanese: Pai Bing-bing (我是台灣人: 白冰冰)
20. I am a Taiwanese: Sun Tsui-feng (我是台灣人: 孫翠鳳)
21. We are Taiwanese: Huang Chun-tsun Puppet theatre (我們都是台灣人: 黃俊雄布袋戲)
22. Breakfast restaurant (早餐店)
23. Night market (夜市篇)
24. Learning Minnanyu (學習台語篇)
25. Learning Hakka (學習客語篇)
26. To say 'Thank you' in Hakka (承蒙您, 按仔細)
27. The loyalty temple in Hsinchu (新竹褒忠義民廟)
28. Diplomacy of fruits (in Mandarin and Minnanyu) (水果外交篇: 國語, 台語)
29. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Chiang Yen-Ting (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 江彥霆)
30. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Lin Tao Min (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 林道名)
31. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Ma Ying-Jeou (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 馬英九)
32. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love we are Taiwanese: Arelis (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 蕾妮絲)
33. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Chan Che (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 詹澈)
34. A sharp return: Mandarin (in Hakka, and Minnanyu)
35. A brave Taiwanese: Daniel chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: Daniel)
36. A brave Taiwanese: Liang Yu-Ping chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: 梁又平)
37. Rice wine: the good memory in our life (米酒: 生活中的美好記憶)

38. Happy paradise (快樂天堂)
39. Seeing Taiwan: Ho Su-shen talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 何思慎, 看見台灣篇)
40. Keep resting assured: Li Kai-fu talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 李開復, 繼續放心篇)
41. The Ten Golden Years : Lin Tsu-chia talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 林祖嘉, 黃金十年篇)
42. The sincere diplomacy: Huang Mao-hsiung talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 黃茂雄, 誠懇外交篇)
43. Determination: Lai-Cheng talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 賴政, 決心篇)
44. A brave Taiwanese, Peng Chieh chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: 彭傑)
45. Huang Chun-tsun talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 黃俊雄系列)
46. The atmosphere of democracy: Yang Chih-liang talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 楊志良, 民主氣氛篇)
47. Yang Chih-liang: Raising Taiwan up (楊志良: 向上提升)
48. Real characteristics: Ye Chin-chuang talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九系列: 葉金川, 真實篇)
49. Yang Chih-liang: the abstinence of power (楊志良: 節制權力篇)
50. Beautiful island (美麗島)
51. Persistence (堅持篇)
52. Core principles (核心價值篇)
53. Saving national flag (搶救國旗篇)
54. Humanitarian diplomacy: Chu Chih-yang talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 朱志洋, 人道外交篇)
55. Pai Bing-bing talks about Ma Ying-jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 白冰冰為馬英九, 加油篇)
56. Policy: Cancer screening (政績系列: 癌症篩檢)
57. Fast forward (in Mandarin, Minnanyu, long and short version): (快轉篇: 國語, 台語, 長短版)
58. Whose coat? (外衣篇)
59. Happy to work; happy life (快樂打拼幸福滿點)
60. Gulliver (格列佛篇)
61. True Taiwan: The Taiwan spirit to strive for the descendants (真台灣: 為子孫奮鬥的台灣精神)
62. Happy farmers (開心農夫)
63. Golden Ten Years : Keep the value of happiness added (黃金十年: 讓幸福不停增值)
64. The best partner (黃金搭檔篇)
65. Come on, Taiwan (台灣加油)
66. Wife (嫁後)
67. Ma Ying-jeou and Chou Mei-ching pray for Taiwan (馬英九、周美青為台灣祈福篇)
68. Vote for ourselves (這一票我們為自己篇)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

**Table 5.2 Symbolic representations of identity in Ma's 2012 campaign videos**

**Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

**Platform/policy:**

a united and peaceful Taiwan (42 times)

**Sign/slogan:**

Taiwan, come on, bravo! (39), stable future in Taiwan/pluralism and tolerance in Taiwan/live together in Taiwan (22)

**Scene:**

peaceful and happy Taiwanese/ Ma was concerned about Taiwanese people and prayed for Taiwan (57), Taiwan's scenery (25), Taiwan's local industry (20), traditional Taiwanese culture (19)

**Song:**

Joyful gathering (歡聚歌) (6), Let the world know this name (讓世界叫響這個名字) (1), Move forward (向前衝) (1), Taiwan, come on, bravo (台灣加油讚) (1), We are one (1), Formosa (美麗島) (1), Persistence (堅持) (1), Thanks for your help (承蒙您，按仔細) (1), The happy paradise (快樂天堂) (1)

**Language:**

Mandarin (43), Minnanyu (24), Hakka (7), indigenous (2), English (2)

**Symbolic representations of R.O.C. identity:**

**Platform/policy:**

extending R.O.C.'s friendships with other countries/ visa free treatments for R.O.C. (16)

**Sign/slogan:**

KMT's party emblem (43), R.O.C. passport (30), the name of R.O.C. (27), R.O.C. flag/R.O.C. emblem (21)

**Scene:**

people showed love for R.O.C. flag (5)

**Song:**

anthem of R.O.C. flag (2)

**Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (0), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (68)

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Note 1: A total of 68 Ma's 2012 campaign videos were found on the Internet and included in the content analysis. The coding scheme includes 6 categories and a total of 72 sub-categories.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.91. The formula of inter-coder reliability is  $R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$  where R is the inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,  $R = \frac{2 \times 4455}{72 \times 68 + 72 \times 68} = 0.91$

### **5.1.2 The rationale behind Ma's symbolic representations of national identity**

After revealing the distribution of different symbolic representations of Ma's dual identity, it is important to further explore the rationales behind these representations by using the method of discourse analysis. In this section, the researcher will follow the analytic frameworks suggested by Fairclough and Van Dijk to analyse three of Ma's videos. These were the top three viewed films on data collection day. Discourse analysis is a qualitative and subjective research method, the opinions of in-depth interviewees may provide auxiliary information to discourse analysis findings.

#### **Video 1: Keep moving forward, Taiwan! (台灣繼續向前衝!)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3i3OJ7fyg8>) (first launched on YouTube on 6 October, 2011, reaching 8,421 viewing times on data collection day, 15 October, 2018)

#### **Description of the video content:**

The length of this video is 2 minutes and 4 seconds. The video started with a Minnanyu song namely 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan!' (台灣繼續向前衝!) The song penetrates the whole video as the theme song. Then, several quick shots of the rural areas in Taiwan appeared one by one in the video, including farmers working in paddy fields, fishermen driving boats on coastal waters, eaves of a temple, and a high-speed rail running through a Taiwanese rural area. A series of scenes then showed Ma's campaign activities, including Ma bowing to God in a temple of Taiwan's traditional beliefs, tasting and praising Taiwanese traditional foods, and being welcomed by his supporters in traditional markets, night markets, and a baseball

stadium. Also appearing in the video are scenes of a dragon boat race and a lion dance. As the video shows Ma warmly interacting with his supporters, both Ma and his supporters give thumbs up with smiles. Close to the end of the video, a scene shows some Taiwanese people walking fast in a night market with the subtitle 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan must win! The video finally ends by showing some of Ma's supporters in a traditional market, standing together in front of a billboard of one of Ma's advertisements. They all give thumbs up and shout the slogan 'Come on Taiwan, Awesome!'. In the video, there was only one shot showing the R.O.C. flag. It was a shot demonstrating a girl walking in a parade and waving the flag to show her support for Ma.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

Why did Ma's team use those symbolic representations to imply Ma's dual identity? According to Fairclough's notion introduced in chapter three of this thesis, this could be an indication of a negotiation between the KMT's private discourse of dual identity and voters' public discourse of national identity. The result of content analysis reveals that, for Ma's team, the principle of negotiation is: all of Ma's 68 campaign videos must demonstrate or imply KMT's dual identity. Nevertheless, the weighting of showing Taiwanese identity versus R.O.C. national identity could vary in different videos.

The video described above is an example of putting more stress on Ma's Taiwanese identity than on his R.O.C. national identity. That explains the purpose of most scenes in the video, including Ma's intimate interactions with grassroots Taiwanese people,



his paying of respect to traditional Taiwanese beliefs, and his praise of Taiwan's traditional foods. These scenes indicate, as researcher Yao, (2017, p.1) argues, 'how social discourse in daily activities functions to drive the symbolic transformation of this Chinese cultural heritage site, evoking the sense of Taiwan as a national community.' Another researcher Tseng, (2016) also points out that Taiwan's LuKang Lung-Shan temple (鹿港龍山寺) is a symbol to represent Taiwanese identity rather than Chinese cultural heritage. The symbol is branding Taiwan not only in culture, but also in politics.

In addition, one newspaper report indicated that in this video, the frequent appearance of the thumbs up sign, the slogans of 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan must win!' and 'Come on Taiwan, Awesome!', and the theme song namely 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan' also represent Ma's Taiwanese identity. 'Thumbs up' and 'Taiwan must win' fully demonstrated Ma's determination to build up Taiwan. Trying to contrast himself with the DPP's corruption and ideological conflict, Ma uses the slogan 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan' to represent his concern for Taiwan's future and to consolidate Taiwan's power (NewTalk, 4 October, 2011). As for R.O.C. identity, there was only one quick shot showing the R.O.C. flag in the video.

Thus, it is clear that the video focused on showing Ma's Taiwanese identity. But why does Ma need to stress his Taiwanese identity? Due to his Mainlander background, Ma was frequently questioned by the DPP about his Taiwanese identity; thus, the public discourse on identity in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election focuses more on Ma's Taiwanese identity than on his R.O.C. national identity. In-depth interviewee Niu Tse-hsun explains why Ma may have stressed his Taiwanese identity.

Ma is always attacked as a Mainlander who is pro-China. Thus, Ma aimed to construct a new discourse 'both Taiwanese and R.O.C. identities.' Ma also thought this discourse is the better way for KMT's successor to solve the identity dilemma in the election. (Niu Tse-hsun)

Another interviewee, Ma's 2012 campaign spokesman Chuang Po-chung, also indicates that 'Taiwan' is a significant symbol for both the KMT and DPP to satisfy the public's expectations. In other words, symbolism utilisation is a campaign strategy to persuade voters.

Considering the potential influence of this public discourse on Ma's 2012 election, it is understandable that, as mentioned before, although Ma and the KMT's private discourse of national identity is about R.O.C. identity, Ma's team used much more symbolic representations to imply Ma's Taiwanese identity than to show his R.O.C. identity in the video. According to interviewee Jack Hsiao's opinion, in Taiwan, the public is more interested in the discourse of Taiwanese identity than in R.O.C. identity.

Jack Hsiao noted that sometimes, Ma's team avoided mentioning issues related to China, because the public did not like it. As Hsiao indicates,

Ma's campaign videos had been designed prudently according to social issues. Ma showed his love for Taiwan and his concern for the Taiwanese people's livelihood. In addition, to fulfil the public's needs, Ma used different campaign strategies for different generations. (Jack Hsiao)

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

Van Dijk's approach to discourse analysis needs researchers to examine three structures of the discourse in a text. The micro-structure is about the style or rhetoric

of the text. The macro-structure is the theme or topic of the text. The super-structure refers to the overall idea of the text.

Regarding the micro-structure of the video described above, the styles of the theme song and all of the scenes in the video are obviously oriented positively. The video shows enthusiastic interactions between Ma and his supporters, the sign thumbs up, the slogans of 'Keep moving forward, Taiwan must win!' and 'Come on Taiwan, Awesome,' the smiles of grassroots people, the fast-moving train, and the people walking fast in a market; all these scenes and signs present a Taiwan with energy and happiness. Moreover, the scene showing Ma's worshipping in a temple highlights Ma's respect for Taiwan's traditional beliefs and his sincere Taiwanese identity.

The macro-structure of this video contains two major themes and one minor one. The first was about the vigour of Taiwan's rural areas. Scenes depicting this theme show farmers, fishermen, and small businessmen working diligently in their hometowns, with people having beliefs and respecting their traditional culture, and the local economy looking prosperous. Another theme of the video is Ma's campaign activities in rural areas. Scenes of this theme show Ma's worshipping in a local temple and his enthusiastic interactions with local people. The two themes lead to a major part of the super-structure in the video. It is a general impression of Taiwan being a thriving place and Ma fully identifying himself as a popular member of Taiwanese society. The video shows that Ma can fully assimilate himself into the lives of grassroots Taiwanese. He worships, smiles, talks and tastes food with local Taiwanese fervently. It is a campaign video visualizing the abstract concept of Taiwanese identity in a positive tone.

One of the in-depth interviewees, scholar Niu Tse-hsun, analyses the campaign video strategy and indicates that,

Ma's team made prominent Taiwanese integrity, diligence, and brave characteristics. It's a way to connect rustic and honesty with Ma's kindness, Taiwanese traditional culture and rural living were used to eliminate Ma's elite image. In other words, Ma is part of the Taiwanese people, who always support and recognise Taiwan. (Niu Tse-hsun)

While the video emphasises Ma's Taiwanese identity, it is interesting to find that, as mentioned above, there is still a quick shot showing a local Taiwanese girl joining a welcome parade for Ma and waving the R.O.C. flag. The style of this scene is also done in a positive tone. When the scene was put together with other scenes depicting Taiwanese identity, the third macro-structure was created in the video, that is, among the local Taiwanese, at least some of them have the R.O.C. identity. This topic then implies the minor part of the super-structure, that is, the R.O.C. identity. Thus, the whole super-structure actually consists of Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity. It is a super-structure signifying Ma's dual identity.

### **Video 2: Joyful gathering (歡聚歌)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKUoPx27Bpk>) (first launched on YouTube on 8 September 2011, reaching 4,113 viewing times on data collection day, 15 October, 2018)

### **Description of the video content:**

The length of this video is 1 minute and 1 second. The format of the video is that of an MTV film. A series of scenes appear one by one to match part of the words of a song namely 'Joyful Gathering.' It is a Minnanyu song mixed with indigenous and Hakka phrases. The main theme of the song is to urge different ethnic residents in

Taiwan, including native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakka, indigenous residents, and new immigrants from mainland China and other countries, to live in peace in Taiwan.

Some words from the song were selected to match the scenes of the video. The words being selected were as follows.

No matter whether you are native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, indigenous residents, or Hakka, from generation to generation, hope God protect you. No matter whether you are native Taiwanese, Mainlanders or Hakka, we are going to sing and dance tonight with no discrimination. Love others, just like loving your children. This island consists of spectacular views of mountains and rivers with four distinct seasons. We are all family. Let us sing, and the singing is charming. Tonight, we are family and fated to get together. Let us have no more quarrels, I will stay with you.

The words match several scenes in the video, including some Hakka making foods, indigenous residents dancing and singing at a festival, and an episode of Taiwanese opera. Images of Taiwanese people of different ages and occupational groups also appear in the video, including elementary school students, labourers, farmers, hairdressers, and the owner of a Vietnamese eatery. The video ends with a scene showing Ma wearing a piece of Tang suit (唐衫) and using a Chinese brush to write a four-word campaign slogan, which in Chinese means ‘Come on, Taiwan!’ As Ma is writing the slogan, the video shows several primary school students standing around happily. Finally, the video ends with a subtitle consisting of four phrases: ‘Our Taiwan, Our homeland; Our R.O.C., Our country.’

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough’s framework:**

Taiwanese society consists of different ethnicities; all ethnic groups should live in peace in Taiwan. That is the main theme of this video, which exposes Ma’s

interpretation of Taiwanese identity in the aspect of ethnic inclusion. The theme song urges different ethnic groups of Taiwan to see each other as family, because as the song indicates, all the ethnic groups live in Taiwan and share the natural resources of Taiwan. Since all ethnic groups are voters in a presidential election, it is natural for Ma to seek support from all of them.

While the video mainly focuses on showing Ma's ethnic-integrated Taiwanese identity, the video also demonstrates his R.O.C. identity. As mentioned before, the DPP frequently questioned Ma's Taiwanese identity because of his Mainlander background. Such questioning was likely to trigger a strong public discourse concerning Ma's Taiwanese identity. Thus, it is understandable to see many of Ma's campaign videos focusing more on his Taiwanese identity than on the R.O.C. identity. One of the interviewees, a senior political news reporter Yang Hsiang-jung, points out his observation on Ma's dual identity as follows.

Ma sometimes used the word 'Taiwan' in his public speech, but the official name of the country is still the R.O.C. Thus, Ma showed his concern about the legitimacy of the R.O.C. when he talked about the country's international status. For example, when Ma discussed the R.O.C.'s sovereignty and the visa-free treatments offered by other countries in one of his campaign videos, he let you see the cover of the R.O.C. passport which is printed with the national emblem. (Yang Hsiang-jung)

Another interviewee, Chung Po-chung, further indicates that the KMT knows the importance of Taiwanese identity in presidential elections; on the other hand, the party still insists on the R.O.C. national identity. To avoid being labelled as a 'pro-China' party, the KMT uses the term 'R.O.C. identity' instead of 'Chinese identity' as the party's national identity. As Chuang indicates,

Taiwan's presidential election is a symbolic fight about Taiwan. The KMT could not endure the DPP dominating the use of the word 'Taiwan'; on the other hand, the KMT cannot adopt the label of 'pro-China party.' Therefore, KMT employs the words 'R.O.C.' and 'Taiwan,' which fit KMT's core principle and many Taiwanese people's ideology. (Chuang, Po-chung)

However, the results of the content analysis indicate that, for Ma's team, the negotiation bottom line between the team's private discourse and the public discourse is: no matter how much a video stresses Ma's Taiwanese identity, it still needs to demonstrate his R.O.C. identity in some way. That could explain why the video's ending shot shows Ma wearing a piece of Tang shirt and using a Chinese brush to write his campaign slogan.

Since, as Wu (2014) indicates, the KMT insists that 'China' stands for the 'Republic of China,' the symbolic representation of Chinese culture implies R.O.C. national identity in this video. In addition, at the end of the video, the subtitles mentioned above indicate that while Ma does have both Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. national identity, for Ma, Taiwan is just a 'homeland;' whereas the R.O.C. is the 'country.' In other words, for Ma, Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity with the R.O.C. identity being the national identity.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The micro-structure, or the style of the scenes and signs in the video are oriented in a very positive manner, with people of different ethnic groups looking happy and energetic in the video. The video shows no interactions between the groups; indigenous residents, Hakka, native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, and new immigrants just show up in turn in the video. This arrangement seems to imply that, although

different ethnic groups have their own lives and cultures, as the theme song suggests, different ethnic groups should live in peace in Taiwan, because, as the song argues, they share the beautiful natural resources of Taiwan. Interviewee Yang Hsian-jung believes that the reason Ma showed positive images of different ethnic groups in the video was to seek the greatest support from voters in different ethnic groups.

The emotional factors can be seen in Ma's videos, with Ma staying in rural areas, working with farmers, and chatting with ordinary people to show his concern and love for this land. Ma uses native Taiwanese symbols to eliminate the disadvantage of his Mainlander background, which was awkward since the presidents of Taiwan had been native Taiwanese from Lee Teng-hui (1988~2000) to Chen Shui-bian (2000~2008).

Interviewee Chung Po-chung indicates that Ma's 2012 rival Tsai Ing-wen has no such background issue as Ma did. As Chung Po-chung notes,

Tsai is not a Mainlander, she only emphasised that she is a native Taiwanese with Hakka and indigenous blood. Thus, it was more natural for Tsai and the DPP to emphasise the Taiwanese identity in Tsai's campaign videos. On the other hand, because Ma is a Mainlander, therefore, Ma needed to stress his close relationship with grassroots Taiwanese people in his videos. (Chuang Po-chung)

The style of the theme song is well-intentioned and encouraging; it highlights the importance of ethnic inclusion in Taiwan and invites different ethnic groups to sing and dance together joyfully. All the scenes of the different ethnic groups and the theme song jointly point to a macro-structure of the video: indigenous residents, Hakka, native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, and the new immigrants are all Taiwanese! This topic was parallel to Lee Teng-hui's (2005) idea of the 'New Taiwanese identity.' Lee argued that no matter which ethnic group Taiwanese residents belong



to, they are all 'New Taiwanese,' as long as they are willing to engage in Taiwan's development and identify with Taiwan's democratic system.

In addition to the topic of ethnic inclusion, the video contains another macro-structure (topic) as the heritage of Chinese culture. The micro-structure or the style of this topic was to show Ma wearing a piece of Tang shirt and writing with a Chinese brush (calligraphy) in front of young students. This style of presentation has two meanings. First, Ma has an identity with Chinese traditional culture. Second, Ma wishes to pass this identity to young Taiwanese. Since, as introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, the KMT insists that 'China' means the R.O.C., Ma's team was using the topic of Chinese cultural identity to imply the R.O.C. national identity.

Interviewee Chuang Po-chung explains the meanings of symbolic representations of the dual identity in Ma's campaign videos.

Ma's team use various symbols to represent Taiwanese and the R.O.C. identities. Some of those symbols are related to culture, such as Taiwanese opera, calligraphy, and reading Chinese classical literature with Minnanyu pronunciation. Ma integrates both Chinese culture and Taiwanese cultures, which is a way to show identity tolerance. (Chuang Po-chung)

Chuang also explains why Ma needs to imply the R.O.C. identity in his campaign videos.

It's indispensable for the KMT to imply the R.O.C. identity, since the DPP always ignored R.O.C.- related symbols, such as the national flag, or the formal name of R.O.C. etc. The KMT celebrated the R.O.C. Centennial in 2011 and continued to promote the reverence of the R.O.C. in the 2012 presidential election. Both R.O.C. and Taiwan-related symbols are important for the KMT, the purpose was to proclaim Ma's love for this country and the legitimacy of this country. (Chuang Po-chung)

As for the super-structure of the video, Ma's team uses the subtitle appearing at the end to point out that the overall idea of the video is: 'Our Taiwan, Our homeland; Our R.O.C., Our country' That is an explicit expression of Ma's dual identity. In this subtitle, Taiwanese identity is defined as a provincial identity, with the R.O.C. identity being defined as the national identity. This is because, as the subtitle indicates, Taiwan is just a homeland, while the R.O.C. is a country.

**Video 3: A girl with the R.O.C. flag (國旗女孩)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OatkmnEiBz0>) (first launched on YouTube on 13 October, 2011, reaching 2,448 viewing time on data collection day, 15 October, 2018)

**Description of the video content:**

The length of this video is 8 minutes and 57 seconds. It is a romantic story in which a Taiwanese boy travels to a foreign country and comes across an overseas Chinese (華僑) girl in a sightseeing spot. The boy likes photography. He always carries the R.O.C. flag with him when travels abroad. When he takes pictures while sightseeing in foreign countries, he always puts the flag into his photos. The reason for doing that, according to the boy's explanation in the video, is to make sure the flag is visible abroad. The girl grew up in a foreign country, but her mother came from Taiwan. The boy then talks to the girl and explains the meaning of the flag. He gives her a badge and a R.O.C. flag, and then makes an appointment with her to watch a sports game in a stadium. The boy asks the girl to wear the R.O.C. badge when they meet again. Then, the video shows the girl waiting for the boy outside the stadium with the badge on her scarf and a R.O.C. flag in her hands, but he does not show up on time. She is

disappointed and sticks the flag on a fence near the stadium and then leaves. The boy rushes to the stadium, but he is late. He does not find the girl but sees the flag. The video ends with the girl's gazing at the R.O.C. badge and a monologue that 'although the country is so far away and so unfamiliar to me, I still want to see another home of mine.'

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

This video focuses on showing the R.O.C. identity. From the start to the end of the video, the R.O.C. flag appears many times. In the video, the main actor of the story expresses his strong identity with the R.O.C. The main actress also demonstrates her curiosity with the flag and the badge of the R.O.C. Since the KMT's national identity stance is that of the R.O.C. identity, it is understandable that Ma's team used the national symbols of the R.O.C., including the flag and the badge, as catalysts of the romantic story described in the video. In fact, it has been noted that the R.O.C flag has become much more important in KMT's campaign advertising for Ma Ying-jeou (Fell, 2012, p. 48). Verrall (2021, p.115) also finds that 'Ma administration's new emphasis on expressly political symbols like the flag indicates a clear shift to an overtly nationalist design aesthetic.' Interviewee Niu Tse-hsun believes that one reason for Ma to imply the R.O.C. identity is to show his diplomatic achievement of acquiring visa-free treatment for R.O.C. passport holders from many different countries.

Considering the campaign strategy, the R.O.C. identity was Ma's advantage because Ma did have successful diplomatic relations with many foreign countries to get visa-free treatments for

the R.O.C. from those countries. It was a niche for Ma to promote his R.O.C. discourse. (Niu Tse-hsun)

However, in the video, while the boy and the girl talk about the R.O.C., they called the country 'Taiwan' instead of the 'Republic of China.' For the KMT, Taiwanese identity is in nature a provincial identity instead of a national identity. Then, why did Ma's team arrange for the main characters of the video to call the R.O.C. 'Taiwan?' From Fairclough's perspective, the content of a text might be a negotiation between an organisation's private discourse and the public discourse of those outsiders. Thus, presumably, the KMT knows that although the 'Republic of China' is the formal and constitutional name of the country, the R.O.C. is frequently mentioned as 'Taiwan' at home and abroad. Therefore, there is no need to ask the main characters to call the country the 'R.O.C.' in the video. Besides, the main slogan of Ma's 2012 campaign was 'Come on, Taiwan!' The name of Taiwan was frequently mentioned in Ma's campaign videos; therefore, Ma's team did not stress that for the KMT, Taiwan is just a part of R.O.C. instead of an independent country per se.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The micro-structure or the style of this video is quite romantic. It is a love story of a patriotic Taiwanese boy who meets an overseas Chinese girl whose mother also comes from Taiwan. The lovers start their conversation on the meaning of the R.O.C. flag. While travelling abroad, the boy always carries the flag with him; he believes it is a good way to make the R.O.C. more visible in other countries. The girl agrees with the boy's idea, because her mother is from the same country as the boy. The boy is

late on his first date with the girl; she leaves a R.O.C. flag as a sign of her earlier appearance.

Thus, the macro-structure or the main topic of the video is an exotic romance catalysed by the R.O.C. flag. The lovers' strong identifications with the R.O.C. flag bring about the super-structure of the video: the R.O.C. national identity. At the end of the video, the girl is disappointed for missing the boy on their first date. She decides to visit Taiwan, because, as she says, after all, Taiwan is her second homeland.

The overall idea of R.O.C. national identity is implied by wrapping it in a love story. Ma's team seemed to believe that it was an easier way to promote the R.O.C. identity. The rhetoric of the story is: we like each other because we all identify with the national symbol of the R.O.C. It is a little bit artificial but still makes sense in the story to a certain extent. The scenario is implying to the viewers of the video that loving your country the R.O.C. may even help you to find a good lover in your life. It is a soft and dramatic approach to express the abstract concept of the R.O.C. national identity. Interviewee Chuang Po-chung believes that it is a good idea to use the R.O.C. flag as a symbolic representation of the R.O.C. identity, because the symbol is quite tangible.

Some tangible symbols, such as the R.O.C. national flag, ECFA, and visa-free treatment, are suitable to represent the R.O.C. identity, people can easily understand the relationship between the symbols and the identity. (Chuang Po-chung)

While stressing the R.O.C. national identity in the video, Ma's team still let the main characters call the R.O.C. 'Taiwan' in the video. As analysed above, it could be

a negotiation between the KMT and the public, because it is a fact that the country has been frequently mentioned as ‘Taiwan’ at home and abroad. That also means that Ma does not consider the R.O.C. national identity as being contradictory to Taiwanese identity, because for the KMT, Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity and the R.O.C. identity is the national identity.

The discourse analysis of the three entries of Ma’s 2012 campaign videos are revealed above. Some of the in-depth interviewees’ opinions provide the readers of this thesis with more insights into the rationales behind the symbolic arrangements of Ma’s videos.

Regarding Ma’s dual identity, one interviewee, the KMT’s 2012 campaign spokesman Chuang Po-chung stated that the national symbols of the R.O.C. were important in Ma’s campaign videos. Chuang stresses that it is in accordance with the KMT’s principles and Ma Ying-jeou’s idea that Taiwan is our homeland; the R.O.C. is our country. Chuang argues that

While some people feel that the name ‘Taiwan’ exclusively belongs to the DPP, the KMT still tries its best to connect the two symbols of ‘Taiwan’ and ‘R.O.C.’ to remind the Taiwanese that Taiwan and R.O.C. are both important in terms of identity orientation, although, for the KMT, Taiwanese identity is only a provincial identity and the R.O.C. identity is the real national identity. (Chuang Po-chung)

According to Chuang, Ma’s dual identity is a strategy to create an integrated image of the KMT being the party that is more tolerant than the DPP. Besides, Chuang indicates that the KMT has been trying to remind Taiwan’s electorate that the R.O.C. is the formal name of Taiwan. In addition, it happened to be the R.O.C.’s 100-year birthday when Ma started his 2012 campaign. Thus, the KMT launched several promotional products related to the R.O.C. flag. In addition, some of the promotional

activities, such as ‘Saving the National Flag’ (搶救國旗) and ‘To Love the National Flag’ (愛國旗) were all closely concerned with the symbolic meaning of the R.O.C.

Spokesman Chuang believes that the R.O.C is the common denominator for Taiwanese people, which is Ma’s belief in the R.O.C. national identity.

Interviewee Jack Hsiao, the campaign consultant of Ma’s camp, also raised an example to indicate the significance of the R.O.C. national identity in some of Ma’s videos.

One example was that in one campaign video about ECFA, the original version used ‘Taiwan’ as the country’s name, but it didn’t match the core principles of the KMT. Therefore, I amended the national name from ‘Taiwan’ to ‘R.O.C.’ After all, for the KMT, the R.O.C. is the formal name used in international settings. It was also a tactic to differentiate the KMT from the DPP, because DPP seldom called the country the ‘R.O.C.’ (Jack Hsiao)

As for Ma’s Taiwanese identity, Chuang indicates that

in order to show Ma’s connection with local Taiwanese, the KMT and Ma’s 2012 election team tried hard to build up a relationship between Ma Ying-jeou and Taiwan’s Ma village in Miaoli. That was a political tactic. Because Miaoli is a Hakka city and most of the people in Ma village speak Minnanyu, it naturally enhanced Ma’s relationship with Hakka and the native Taiwanese. (Chuang Po-chung)

In addition to using multiple languages to highlight the multi-ethnic essence of Taiwanese identity, Ma’s team uses Ma’s platforms to imply his Taiwanese identity. As one of the in-depth interviewees, Jack Hsiao, the director of a contracted public relations company with Ma’s team, indicates,

Ma’s camp believed that loving Taiwan was not just a slogan. Ma’s campaign videos should let grassroots Taiwanese know how much the Ma administration had done to maintain or enhance Taiwanese farmers’, labourers’, and fishermen’s rights and profits. Therefore, Ma’s platforms, including ECFA, the free trade agreements with other countries, and the ‘Ten Golden Years’ were fully promoted in Ma’s campaign videos, and their campaign effects were satisfactory. (Hsiao)

Speaking of Ma's dual identity, another interviewee, scholar Niu Tse-hsun argues that the R.O.C. national identity had been used by the KMT to confront the DPP's Taiwan chauvinism. As Niu indicates,

although the national identity of the R.O.C. is believed adequate for the KMT, the DPP raises incredibly strong arguments against it. Because of the KMT's conviction of the residential essence of the name of Taiwan, it's hard to untangle some people's abhorrence of the KMT's refusal to admit that Taiwanese identity is a national identity. Hence, national identity may still be seen as a controversial issue in Taiwan. Thus, how to use 'Taiwan' or 'R.O.C.' in political campaign videos becomes a symbolic strategy for both the KMT and DPP. (Niu Tse hsun)

The three interviewees' opinions confirm that the arrangements of symbolic representations for Ma's dual identity are indeed a negotiation between the KMT's private discourse and the public's discourse on national identity. For the KMT, the R.O.C. identity is the only legitimate national identity; Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity. However, to counter-attack the DPP's accusation of the KMT's ignorance of Taiwan, and to urge for votes from all the ethnic groups in Taiwan, Ma's team decided to use symbolic representations for both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. national identity in Ma's 2012 campaign videos. The results of content analysis and discourse analysis suggest that while all of Ma's 2012 campaign videos contain symbolic representations of both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. national identity, what was negotiable for Ma's team were two things: the weight of focus on the two identities, and the non-necessity to clarify the difference between the two identities in most of Ma's campaign videos.



## **5.2 The Symbolic representations of national identity in Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 presidential election campaign videos**

### **5.2.1 Symbolic representations of Tsai's national Identity**

A total of 26 entries of Tsai's 2012 campaign videos were found on the Internet. The titles of the videos are listed in Table 5.3. While Ma Ying-jeou implies a dual identity in his 2012 campaign videos, the results of content analysis show that Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 campaign videos only imply Taiwanese identity in all of her 26 campaign videos (see Table 5.4). In other words, none of Tsai's videos showed any symbols related to the R.O.C. As introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, for the DPP, Taiwanese identity is a national identity instead of merely a provincial identity. Therefore, it is understandable why Tsai's 2012 campaign videos only contain symbols related to Taiwanese identity. Just as the R.O.C. identity is a national identity for the KMT, Taiwanese identity should be identified as a national identity for the DPP.

Tsai's Taiwanese national identity is also represented by her platforms or public policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages in her 2012 campaign videos. As Table 5.4 indicates, Tsai urged the building of a fair and just society (打造一個公平正義的社會). Among the 26 campaign videos, 21 videos contain this appeal. While mentioning this policy, Tsai asserted that the Ma administration had failed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor in the first term of his presidency. Moreover, Ma's policy of increasing trade volume between Taiwan and mainland China only benefitted financial groups instead of grassroots Taiwanese. These attacks reminded

the public that one basic element of Taiwanese national identity is to maintain economic fairness.

Tsai's team also used some signs or slogans to reinforce a whole new image of Taiwan (see Table 5.4). The slogan of 'Keep on Going, Taiwan' (台灣繼續向前行) appeared 23 times in the 26 videos, followed by the slogan of 'Love Taiwan' (愛台灣) 20 times, 'Taiwan Next'<sup>23</sup> 15 times, and 'Proud to be Taiwanese' (台灣人的驕傲) 13 times. These slogans show Tsai's Taiwanese national identity and highlight the name of Taiwan.

One of Tsai's videos proclaims that 'Taiwan is our country. We fight for a country with fairness and justice. We love Taiwan. We are proud of being Taiwanese, and we need all people to change Taiwan.' The title of this video is 'Our Country is Great Because of You' (國家因你而偉大). It proposes Tsai be the first female Taiwanese president, and she will change Taiwan's weak status in international society. In sum, Tsai's campaign videos remind local people that she is a candidate deeply concerned about Taiwan.

As Table 5.4 indicates, several scenes in Tsai's campaign videos also imply her Taiwanese national identity. Tsai uses Taiwan's public transportation system for campaign activities (11 times) and visits the countryside (10 times). In these videos, Tsai talks to farmers and shows concern for local Taiwanese people as well as agricultural products. Moreover, beautiful scenery and local features, such as seashores, mountain views, lighthouses, and trains are also displayed. In addition to sightseeing, scenes about Taiwan's traditional culture appeared 9 times, including

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<sup>23</sup> Tsai's team used English slogan 'Taiwan Next.'

Taiwanese opera, temples, and dragon dancing. All these scenes imply Tsai's Taiwanese national identity.

Regarding the songs and languages in Tsai's videos, Table 5.4 shows that Tsai's videos present several campaign theme songs in her videos. All these songs focus on one appeal: As long as we Taiwanese make efforts to change the status quo, Taiwan will be better in the future. As for language, Tsai speaks Mandarin (18 times) more frequently than Minnanyu (5 times) and Hakka (once) in her videos. This is not a surprise, since she had admitted publicly that she is not a fluent Minnanyu speaker in 2011 and seldom delivers public speeches in Minnanyu. In the videos, Tsai even speaks Mandarin in Hakka and Indigenous communities. In addition to Mandarin, one of Tsai's videos is dubbed into Vietnamese, thereby, stressing that, in Taiwan, the children of foreign spouses should learn their mothers' language and culture. The language used in Tsai's campaign video are implying her idea of Taiwanese national identity in the aspect of ethnic inclusion.

In sum, the content analysis results of Tsai's 2012 campaign videos show that Tsai's team tries to use various symbolic representations to imply Tsai's Taiwanese national identity. In the next section of this chapter, the researcher uses Fairclough and Van Dijk's frameworks of discourse analysis to explore the rationales behind the symbolic representations appearing in three of Tsai's 2012 campaign videos. These videos had the top three viewing times on the data collection day of this study.

### **Table 5.3 Tsai' Ing-wen's 2012 campaign videos**

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1. Fairness for farmers (給農民一點公平)
2. Your keys (你的鑰匙)
3. Their distance (他們的距離)

4. Social housing (社會住宅)
5. Taiwan's big family, it's good to have new members (台灣大家庭, 有新成員真好)
6. It's good because you (因你而美好)
7. God bless Taiwan (天佑台灣)
8. A warm accompany (溫暖相伴)
9. It's good to have you (有你真好)
10. Non-nuclear homeland: Koto island (非核家園：蘭嶼篇)
11. Hualien and Taitung's hope (花蓮與台東的希望)
12. The country is great because of you (國家因你而偉大)
13. Give yourself a chance to change (給自己一個改變的機會)
14. Females in charge (女性當家)
15. Make a wish in 2012 (許願 2012)
16. Long-term care (長期照護)
17. Unemployment subsidy for youth (青年失業津貼)
18. Our expectation for a female president (我們期盼有一位女總統)
19. Hakka daughter will succeed (客家女兒出頭天)
20. I will not forget people's expectations (我不會忘記人民的期望)
21. A collection of Tsai's campaign videos (蔡英文競選影片合輯)
22. To be a winner of the election (成為勝選者)
23. The road of determination, it's good to have you (堅持的路, 有你真好)
24. It will be bad without you (沒你就糟了)
25. Let's welcome the victory (讓我們迎向勝利)
26. The future of Taiwan (台灣的未來)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

### **Table 5.4 Symbolic representations of national identity in Tsai's 2012 campaign videos**

#### **Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

##### **Platform/policy:**

change the unfair situation caused by Ma's cross-Strait policy (21 times)

##### **Sign/slogan:**

Keep on going Taiwan (23), love Taiwan (20), Taiwan next (15), proud to be Taiwanese (13)

##### **Scene:**

Taiwan's transportation system (11), Tsai interacting with grassroots Taiwanese (10), Taiwan's countryside scenery (10), Taiwanese traditional culture (9)

##### **Song:**

We will change the future someday (總有一日咱會改變未來) (1), I will join you to support Tsai Ing-wen (有你作伴與你一齊挺小英) (1), A better world (1), Persistence (堅持) (1)

##### **Language:**

Mandarin (18), Minnanyu (5), Hakka (1), new immigrant language (1)

##### **Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (26), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (0)

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Note 1: A total of 26 Tsai's 2012 campaign videos were found on the Internet and included in the content analysis. The coding scheme includes 6 categories and a total of 72 sub-categories.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.93. The formula of inter-coder reliability is  $R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$  where R is the inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,  $R = \frac{2 \times 1740}{(72 \times 26 + 72 \times 26)} = 0.93$ .

## 5.2.2 The rationale behind Tsai's symbolic representations of national identity

**Video 1: The country is great because of you** (<https://fb.watch/amIS94qPy1>) (the video was originally launched on YouTube but was removed from YouTube for some unknown reason) (國家因你而偉大) (first launched on YouTube on 5 January, 2012, reaching 356,929 viewing times on data collection day, 3 January, 2019)

### Description of the video content:

The length of this video is 2 minutes and 22 seconds. This video depicts a series of scenes showing different people standing on the roofs of their houses or apartments, overlooking distant scenes. A monologue matches the scenes, saying that:

Standing on the roof of your house, how long have you not done this? Standing on the roof of your house, take a look at the places you grew up and work. Here is your homeland, some roads take you to school. You see the basketball playground where you had a date with your first lover. You also find the alley where firecrackers were set off for your wedding, and the sidewalk where you picked up kids from school. There are mountains and seas in your homeland with beautiful sunshine and romantic fog. Standing on the roof of your house, this is your homeland and your country. Is it a great country? The country is under your feet and needs you to love it, to care for it. Standing on the roof of your house, here is your country. Take a look at the incompetent government, you are not afraid of enduring hardship, but you hate unfairness; you do not care your job is menial, but you hate injustice. Now, we need a fair and just country. We want the right to work. We want a house in which to live. We are against bullying. We do not want a terrible judicial system. We want to save stray animals and our environment. We want a non-nuclear home. We want happiness, and to let our children be proud of living here. As Taiwanese, go to stand on the roof of your house. Here is your country. Is it a great country? The country is on your feet, it needs you to love it and change it.

### Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:

As introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, for the DPP, 'Taiwan' is not just the name of the homeland; it is also the name of the country. In fact, during Chen Shui-

bian's presidency from 2000 to 2008, the DPP government launched 'a movement to rectify Taiwan's name' (台灣正名運動). As Hughes (2011, p. 53) indicates, the movement 'involved dropping references to "China" and the R.O.C. when referring to the state and its various organisations.' In this video, although the name 'Taiwan' did not appear, the monologue clearly reminded viewers that 'your homeland is your country.' (這是你的家園和國家) This claim is consistent with the DPP's private discourse of national identity, that is, for the DPP, Taiwanese identity is the national identity. Interviewee Lee Hou-ching believes that this video was implying that Taiwan is the country of Taiwanese, and the country needs a better leader than Ma Ying-jeou.

Standing on the roof is a metaphor; the video implied leader on this land should lead passengers moving on; this leader is an intelligent person who overlooks this land (understanding Taiwan) and clearly knows Taiwan's next step. Specifically speaking, Tsai was that intelligent leader who was able to guide Taiwanese people to a progressive future. The DPP believes that the KMT is the government in exile, and that Taiwanese people need their own regime. The DPP adheres to the party's core principle that this land is our motherland, it's not a big island, though. Taiwan should be a progressive country full of vivid energy and creative thoughts. We, the Taiwanese make our own path, which belongs to all Taiwanese people. (Lee Hou-ching)

It is predictable that the DPP supporters agreed with the party's stance on national identity; however, how does Tsai's team negotiate with the public discourse of those who do not accept the stance on Taiwanese national identity? Three persuasion strategies are used in this video. First, the video evokes the viewers' memories that the homeland under their feet is the place they grew up and started a family. Second, the video equals the viewers' homeland to their country. It is persuasive to a certain extent, because even the KMT had never denied that Taiwan is a part of the R.O.C. Third, the video raises several public issues the viewers are likely concerned about

and then encourages them to change the status quo of Taiwan's politics. It is a strategy to raise the viewers' self-perception as political reformers. What Tsai's team wishes are that once the viewers take that compliment, they are more likely to accept the video's claim that 'your homeland is your country.' The implication of this claim is that if you identified with your homeland Taiwan, you should be able to accept that the Taiwanese identity is a national identity.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The styles of the scenes, the background music, and Tsai's monologue in this video are all gloomy. Tsai's monologue is presented in a slow and serious tone. She suggests viewers stand on the roofs of their houses to review the places they grew up, went to school, worked, and started a family. The video shows that those who have taken Tsai's suggestion are quiet, serious, and worried. The rhetoric of Tsai's monologue is: this is the place you dwell; you cannot get away from it, so you have to think and care about what kind of place you are now living in. Then, Tsai brings about several public issues to remind viewers of the poor performance of the Ma administration from 2008 to 2012. The argument for Tsai's attack on Ma is quite straightforward: the government has caused unfairness, unjustness, unemployment, ignorance of animals' rights, incompetence in the judicial system, environmental contamination, and the potential risk of nuclear energy. Speaking of this video, interviewee Yang Hsiang-jung explains the rationale behind the symbolic arrangements.

The DPP is good at raising emotional ideology discourse to independent voters. National identity is a long-term formulation that is hard to change. Hence, how to initiate the sensation of national identity is a task for the campaign. (Yang Hsiang-jung)

In the monologue, Tsai first calls the places people reviewed as ‘your homeland;’ then, she immediately says, the homeland is ‘your country.’ Tsai asked the viewers if it is a great country? Finally, she concludes for the viewers that the country needs to be changed. Thus, the macro-structure or the main theme is: This is your country; it is not great because of the poor performance of the government; so, the status quo should be changed.

The super-structure or the overall idea of the video implies three reminders. First, people living in Taiwan should have Taiwanese identity, because their life histories developed in Taiwan. Second, Taiwan is not only the homeland of the Taiwanese; it is their country. Thus, Taiwanese identity is not only a provincial identity; it is a national identity. This is certainly the DPP’s basic principle to identify Taiwan as an independent sovereign country. Third, Taiwanese national identity entails a standard of living, which means Taiwanese deserve to identify with a great Taiwan instead of a country full of many different kinds of troubles. In other words, for Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwanese national identity includes collective accountability of the Taiwanese to make Taiwan a great country. It is Tsai’s normative interpretation of the meaning of Taiwanese national identity. The monologue of the video indicates that for Tsai, it is not enough to recognize Taiwan as ‘your country;’ it is more important to make Taiwan ‘a great country.’ Interviewee Wu Nien-Jen, one of the producers of Tsai’s campaign videos elaborates on the rationale behind this video.



Taiwan is already an independent country. It's meaningless to argue whether Taiwan is independent or not. What we do know is that this land is where we live. The priority is to protect this place, and to enhance our capability. (Wu Nien-jen)

**Video 2: The future of Taiwan (台灣的未來)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Phw-8CRFx4>) (first launched on YouTube on 26 August, 2011, reaching 135,000 viewing times on data collection day, 3 January, 2019)

**Description of the video content:**

It is a 20-second video. The main scene was shot in Berlin, Germany. The video starts by showing a wing of a plane with light music, implying someone is going abroad from Taiwan. A subtitle then appears as follows: 'Taiwan, where are you?' After that is a quick shot showing time passing on a clock, followed by several quick shots showing a person getting off a plane, and waiting to take a subway to the downtown area of Berlin. The second subtitle appears as follows: 'Taiwan, what do you want?' The next scene depicts Tsai sitting on a sidewalk seat and reading a book in Berlin, followed by another scene showing Tsai looking at the street view while on a bus. The third subtitle then appears as follows: 'Taiwan, where are you going?' The video then ends by showing a scene where Tsai is walking on a street in the city with a smile. The ending subtitle is: 'What's next?' Tsai's campaign logo 'Taiwan next' also appears at the ending shot of the video. All the subtitles are shown in English.

**Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

The video shows not a single Chinese character or Chinese monologue. Among Tsai's 2012 campaign videos, this one look especially international oriented. Those

who understand the meanings of the English subtitles should be able to recognise that the video is showing Tsai's concern about Taiwan's future in international society. The main body of the subtitles is 'Taiwan' instead of 'R.O.C.' This symbolic arrangement certainly fits the DPP's private discourse that 'Taiwan' should be the name of the country in the international arena. So, the repeated appearance of the word 'Taiwan' in the subtitles is highlighting the DPP's basic stance regarding Taiwanese national identity.

While the targeted viewers of the video are likely to be those who are concerned about Taiwan's international relations; the appearance of Tsai in the video could be considered a negotiated symbolic arrangement for the grassroots Taiwanese who are not familiar with foreign issues. For those viewers, at least they could tell from the video that Tsai seemed to deal with something related to Taiwan in a foreign country. As long as the grassroots viewers recognised the English word 'Taiwan' in the subtitles, and the word 'Taiwan' is symbolically connected with some foreign scenes in the video, they could get the hint that 'Taiwan' is a country name in international society. What the DPP is trying to promote in this video is the Taiwanese national identity in the international aspect. As Hughes (2011, p.67) once indicates, 'Using English is a way for DPP to promote Taiwan in the international society. The DPP's idea of Taiwanese national identity is to strengthen civic consciousness and to facilitate Taiwan's role in the processes of globalisation. The DPP uses Chinese or English characters for the word 'Taiwan' at home and abroad to highlight Taiwan's sovereignty.' Interviewee Wu Nien-jen adds some points to emphasise the importance of Taiwan for international society.

This island is small, but we do our best in the electronics industry. We let people in the world see us, it's a way to show Taiwanese power. Many countries need Taiwan's help, so that makes other countries stand with us. (Wu Nien-jen)

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style of the video is quite international oriented. All the symbols in the micro-structure of this video, including every scene and word, are foreign to Taiwanese viewers to a certain extent, except for the image of Tsai and the meaning of the English word 'Taiwan.' Nevertheless, the scenes showing Tsai reading, thinking and walking in a foreign city lead the viewers to recognise the macro-structure of the video, that is, the DPP's presidential election candidate Tsai Ing-wen is concerned about and engaged in raising Taiwan's status in a foreign country. Interviewee Lee Hou-ching explains the need for Tsai to show her capability of dealing with international affairs for Taiwan.

'Go abroad' is a symbol to present Tsai's vision of international affairs. Tsai's image is always that of a capable leader since she played a role as a negotiator dealing with different foreign affairs and studied in foreign countries. 'International' is a symbol to distinguish from Ma's cross-strait policy. Taiwan's future should not rely on China. The DPP should make efforts to let the world recognise Taiwan. (Lee Hou-ching)

Making Tsai personally appear in Berlin has three symbolic implications. First, it creates an impression that Tsai is cable of representing Taiwan in international society. In the video, Tsai looks very comfortable in a foreign country. The scene showing Tsai reading a book on a chair by the road in Berlin also implies that she knows international issues. Second, it also implies that international society accepts Tsai to be the leader of Taiwan. The scenes show that Tsai can walk and read freely in

a foreign country without any restrictions. It is an implication that Tsai is welcomed in international society. Third, the scene shows Tsai looking serious on a bus in Berlin with the subtitle ‘Taiwan, where are you going?’<sup>24</sup> represents her worry about Taiwan’s status in the world. All these scenes and the subtitles constitute the macro-structure or the topic of the video: this demonstrates Tsai’s concern about the future of Taiwan.

Regarding the super-structure or the overall idea of the video, making the word ‘Taiwan’ repeatedly appear with foreign scenes pushes the viewers to think about the meaning of ‘Taiwan’ in an international framework. That eventually leads the viewers to understand, from an international perspective, Taiwan itself is a nation, and Taiwanese identity is the national identity. What this video seems to argue is that if Taiwan itself is not a country, it is meaningless to worry about Taiwan’s future at the international level.

**Video 3: Let’s welcome the victory (讓我們迎向勝利)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Za9Q-VeUw6A>) (first launched on YouTube on 12 January, 2012, reaching 135,000 viewing times on data collection day, 3 January, 2019)

**Description of the video content:**

The length of the video is 1 minute and 39 seconds, and it was launched on YouTube two days before the election day of Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election. The video starts with a scene of Tsai’s campaign bus. Then, a series of scenes demonstrate Tsai’s intimate interactions with her supporters from various backgrounds, including indigenous residents, grassroots males and females, young

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<sup>24</sup> Tsai’s team used English subtitle

boys and girls, and children. The scenes were shown with Tsai's monologue as follows.

These days, I appreciate your companionship with me. Let's forget all the disturbance and split in the campaign. However, I will not forget the weight and meaning of every piggy bank you sent me as campaign donations. I will not forget your every smile, the expressions in your eyes, and my missions in the future. On January 14, the election day, we will decide the future. We want victory; we have to win. I am Tsai Ing-wen. I will keep my promise.

The video ends with Tsai's image with her campaign logo 'Taiwan Next.'

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

Tsai reminds the viewers in the video that election day is coming, and she must win the election. While running for the presidency of the R.O.C., the video shows no symbols related to the R.O.C. at all; only scenes of Tsai's campaign activities in Taiwanese society are shown, and the video ends with Tsai's campaign logo 'Taiwan Next.' Therefore, it could be said that the video is talking about Tsai's impression and expectation of the presidential election in 'Taiwan' instead of the 'R.O.C.' Since it is a presidential election, what is implied as the basic idea of the video is certainly the DPP's private discourse regarding Taiwanese national identity. Interviewee Lee Hou-ching explains the meaning of 'Taiwan Next' as follows.

Taiwan next is a slogan to imply that Taiwan needs a new ruling party and a new president who will guide Taiwan to detach from China's power. We also used an arrow to present the next step, which entails that Taiwan must make progress. (Lee Hou-ching)

However, interestingly enough, while Tsai says in the monologue that she must win the election, she also urges voters to forget all the turbulence and split caused by the party competition in the election. This urge could be a negotiation between the DPP's

private discourse and some voters' public discourse regarding national identity. After all, some voters may appreciate Tsai's personal characteristics or her platforms but disagree with the DPP's idea of national identity. This negotiation is understandable for Tsai's need to acquire as many votes as possible on election day.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The micro-structure or the style of the video, including the scenes of Tsai's interactions with her supporters, Tsai's campaign slogan, and the meaning of her monologue in the video were grateful and full of expectation. It is understandable because election day is coming soon. After a campaign lasting for almost one year, all the video wants to stress is Tsai's expectation to win the election. The video shows that Tsai's supporters also are hoping she could be the winner of the competition. This positive oriented micro-structure elaborates the macro-structure or the main theme of the video: Tsai needs a victory in the election, and she will keep her promise after being elected as the president of Taiwan.

The video ends by showing Tsai's name with her campaign logo 'Taiwan Next.' Although it is a presidential election of the R.O.C., no symbols related to the R.O.C. are shown in the video. Therefore, the super-structure or the overall idea is only related to Taiwan instead of the R.O.C.; it implies that Tsai's national identity is Taiwanese national identity instead of the R.O.C. national identity. This implication actually implies another idea of Taiwanese national identity: the realisation and legitimacy of Taiwanese national identity depend on Tsai's victory in the election. After all, Tsai's competitor Ma Ying-jeou's idea of national identity is the R.O.C.

national identity instead of the Taiwanese national identity. Therefore, as long as the DPP and the KMT both participate in Taiwan's presidential election, national identity will always be a critical issue in the election. Which party's candidate wins the presidential election means which party has a stronger power to define or represent a national identity for the Taiwanese. Interviewee Wu Nien-jen argues that the DPP's victory in the presidential election ensures the legitimacy of the party's idea concerning Taiwanese national identity.

Taiwan's democracy succeeds through DPP's striving. Tsai's victory means Taiwan's democracy and Taiwanese national identity win. The love for Taiwan is the substance of Taiwanese national identity; only love and the Taiwanese themselves, that is, the voters of the presidential election, can ensure the legitimacy of Taiwanese national identity. The DPP believes that the Taiwanese should identify with Taiwan; Taiwan's freedom and democracy cannot be destroyed. (Wu Nien-jen)

The discourse analysis reveals some rationales behind the symbolic representations in the videos discussed above. Some of the in-depth interviewees also provide their opinions about the symbolic implications of Tsai's videos. First of all, one of the producers of Tsai's videos, Wu Nien-jen says as follows:

Campaign videos are productions decorated by layers of elements, including the initial stance of the DPP, the candidate's traits, public expectations, and the opponent's strategies. (Wu Nien-jen)

Wu's opinion indicates that the symbolic arrangements of Tsai's videos are based on multiple considerations; the DPP's stance regarding national identity is one of the concerns. Second, regarding the scenes about Tsai's interactions with grassroots Taiwanese, one of Tsai's staff, Lee Hou-ching, argues that caring about Taiwanese is an indicator of Taiwanese national identity. As Lee proposes:

These scenes remind viewers that Tsai is always standing with the Taiwanese people and permanently cares about their lives. That was the best way to demonstrate Tsai's Taiwanese national identity. While the KMT has a stance on dual identity or a pro-China policy, Tsai's videos emphasise that she only cares about the Taiwanese people wholeheartedly. (Lee Hou-ching)

In fact, researchers have noticed that the DPP has tried to make a connection between the grassroots in Taiwan and Taiwanese national identity. For example, Zemanek (2018) points out that 'grassroots' is a factor being used for branding Taiwan. Both Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen used the concept of 'grassroots' to imply the national identity issue. 'The activities could be seen to present "Taiwan" in minjian (民間), or civil society.' (Zemanek, 2018, p.5)

Third, as for the reason to use 'Taiwan Next' as Tsai's major campaign slogan, Lee Hou-ching explains that,

Tsai's team raised various slogans to differentiate the DPP's policies from the KMT's allegedly pro-China policy. The meaning of 'Taiwan Next' was not only related to Taiwanese identity, but also a new era for Taiwan. 'Taiwan Next' was the main slogan of Tsai's 2012 campaign. The logo contains an arrow representing a movement. The arrow meant 'we should go further to the next step' and that Taiwan should detach from mainland China's economic manipulation. (Lee Hou-ching)

Overall, Wu Nien-jen provides a holistic observation of the basic rationale behind the symbolic representations of Tsai's campaign videos.

Tsai's videos implied that she was more concerned about local people's lives than cross-Strait relations. The DPP's national identity and Taiwanese consciousness entailed the party's concern for the Taiwanese. Taiwan's industrial and technological developments, the young generations' future, and Taiwan's democracy were highlighted in Tsai's campaign videos as a contrast to the KMT's China-centred and elite oriented ideology. (Wu Nien-jen)



### 5.3 Overview of this chapter

To conclude this chapter, the researcher wants to make some points about the research findings introduced in this chapter. First, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that, regarding the first research question, Ma implied his Taiwanese identity by urging for a united and peaceful Taiwan. Ma's team also used some slogans and scenes of his intimate interactions with grassroots Taiwanese with campaign theme songs and multiple languages to imply his idea of ethnic inclusion in Taiwanese identity.

Ma's R.O.C. identity was mainly represented by the symbols of the R.O.C. flag, the pictures depicting the R.O.C.'s founding father, and his literacy of traditional Chinese culture. Following the KMT's stance on dual identity, all of Ma's 2012 campaign videos contained symbolic representations of both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. national identity. This research finding indicates that for the KMT and Ma, there is no contradiction between Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. national identity, both identities can exist in Taiwanese society and are all meaningful and valuable to Taiwanese. However, the content analysis results indicate that, in Ma's 2012 campaign videos, more symbols are used to represent Ma's Taiwanese identity than his R.O.C. identity. Since the presidential election was held in Taiwan, it is natural to find that, to strive for the greatest votes from Taiwanese voters, Ma put more emphasis on Taiwanese identity than on R.O.C. identity.

Unlike Ma's dual identity, Tsai only implied her Taiwanese national identity in her campaign videos. The major symbolic representations of Tsai's idea of Taiwanese national identity are, on one hand, to show her great concern for Taiwanese people's

well-being and, on the other hand, to claim that Ma failed to maintain Taiwan's economic prosperity and social justice in the first term of his presidency. In addition, Tsai asserts that Ma's friendly cross-Strait policy has endangered Taiwan's independence and sovereignty. This attack implies that Ma does not have a true Taiwanese identity. Thus, both Ma and Tsai's teams make use of specific symbols, including platforms, specific signs, scenes, songs, and languages to represent the candidates' national identity stances. Basically, the content analysis results are consistent with Fell and Chen's (2014, p.17) research findings that in Taiwan's 2012 election, the KMT's campaign strategy focused on Taiwan's economic growth and cross-Strait issues, whereas the DPP concentrated on social justice issues.

Furthermore, the content analysis results indicate two things. First, in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election, candidates did not always claim their national identities in their campaign videos. This finding is consistent with some scholars' research findings that in Taiwan's election campaign communications, candidates sometimes use national symbols to present their national identities (Corcuff, 2002; Fell, 2011; Sullivan, 2008). Second, the content analysis findings indicate that in candidates' 2012 campaign videos, national identities could be represented by multiple symbols, including platforms about public policies, signs or slogans, scenes, songs, and languages. Since more than one kind of symbol could be used in a single video, the synthesis of symbols and the reasons for the integration could be quite complicated and thus need to be further explored by a qualitative method like discourse analysis.

The second research question of this study thus asks why Ma and Tsai's teams have made use of specific symbols to represent the candidates' national identities. The

results of discourse analysis indicate that, first, both candidates have used selected symbols deliberately to imply specific identity-related discourses. Yu and Hsu (2019) find that, in 2012, both the KMT and DPP had advertising strategies that appealed to their supporters. This study also finds that Ma deals with cross-Strait relations in his campaign videos, but Tsai does not raise any positive suggestions about how Taiwan should interact with mainland China.

The discourse analysis results also show that both Ma and Tsai's teams considered supporters' expectations for symbol selection. The discourse analysis results, and some in-depth interviewees' opinions indicate that the two candidates' national identity stances are not only consistent with target voters' expectations but also complied with their political parties' basic principles of national identity. In other words, both candidates' national identity appeals fit into the internal and external social context surrounding the election teams.

Regarding the textual structure of the campaign videos, Van Dijk's analytic framework is especially helpful for explaining the symbolic representations of national identity in campaign videos. The micro-structure in the videos is about the style or rhetoric of the symbol selections. The discourse analysis shows that in their 2012 campaign videos, both Ma and Tsai's teams have chosen different styles in different videos for different purposes.

Overall, the results of content analysis and discourse analysis indicate that the appeal of national identity in campaign communications is not a simple task for the candidates in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election. At the first glance, candidates did not explicitly express their national identities in campaign videos; nevertheless, the

content analysis, discourse analysis, and some in-depth interviewees' opinions indicate that Ma and Tsai did use specific symbolic representations to imply their national identities for different purposes. The symbolic representations of national identity are complicated in that the parties' principles, voters' expectations, and communication effects need to be considered carefully. Therefore, the research findings presented in this chapter extend our knowledge about the communication of national identity in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election campaign. It is what had not been examined thoroughly and systematically in previous studies. In the next chapter, the researcher will continue to introduce the research findings about national identity appeals in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election.

## **Chapter 6. The appeals to national Identity in Taiwan's 2016 Presidential Election campaign videos**

Ma Ying-jeou's second term of a presidency ended in 2016. Hung Hsiu-chu was first nominated as the KMT's candidate for Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, but she was replaced by Eric Chu as the KMT's candidate. In the 2016 election, the DPP once again nominated Tsai Ing-wen as the party's candidate. Tsai finally won this election and became the first female president of Taiwan. This was the second time Taiwan's ruling party shifted from KMT to DPP, with the first being in the year 2000.

In this chapter, the researcher first presents the content analysis results to answer the first research question, which concerns the features of symbols selected to represent candidates' national identities. Then, to answer the second research question regarding why specific symbols were used to represent candidates' national identities, the researcher demonstrates the results of discourse analysis of the two candidates' most popular videos. Some in-depth interviewees' opinions provide more explanations for the content analysis and discourse analysis results. Since Tsai Ing-wen was the winner of the 2016 election, in this chapter, the researcher first presents the research findings of her campaign videos.

### **6.1 The Symbolic representations of national identity in Tsai Ing-wen's 2016 presidential election campaign videos**

#### **6.1.1 Symbolic representations of Tsai's national identity**

Table 6.1 shows the list of Tsai Ing-wen's 2016 campaign videos. A total of 43 videos have been collected from the Internet. Table 6.2 presents the content analysis

results of these videos. As Table 6.2 shows, Tsai presented the Taiwanese identity in all of her 2016 campaign videos. Tsai kept this stance since 2012; it was the DPP's basic position of national identity. What can be noted is that although Tsai was running for the presidency of the R.O.C. in her 2016 campaign, none of her campaign videos showed any symbolic representations of R.O.C. identity. That once again indicates that for the DPP, Taiwanese identity is exactly the national identity instead of merely a provincial identity.

Regarding the campaign platforms or public policies related to national identity in Tsai's videos, as Table 6.2 presents, she displays tolerance, cooperation, and pluralism among Taiwanese people 18 times in her campaign videos, the young generation's happiness 13 times, local industry 12 times, and let Taiwan go to the world 7 times. Unlike Chu's proposition, Tsai does not propose to increase the export of Taiwanese products to mainland China to enhance Taiwanese people's revenues. That coincides with her emphasis on Taiwanese identity, in other words, Tsai seems to define Taiwanese identity from an economic angle by stressing the importance of developing Taiwan's local industry and the necessity to expand the international markets of Taiwanese products. One of the in-depth interviewees, a Taiwanese political communications scholar Niu Tse-hsun observes Tsai's platforms and indicates:

Tsai proposed strengthening local economic industry to attack Ma's pro-China policy. Compared with Ma, Tsai proposed to export Taiwanese products to international markets. In addition, Tsai visited rural areas to see local industry, which showed her concerns about the Taiwanese industry. It's a strategy to please those who disagreed with expanding the scope of cross-Strait economic cooperation. (Niu Tse-hsun)

Among Tsai's 2016 platforms, the young generation's happiness is another critical issue. It has been noted as a successful strategy to reinforce young voters' Taiwanese identity. One commentator wrote an article on the Internet forum of Foreign Policy to indicate that

Tsai owes much of her success to younger voters. They not only want economic reform, but insist that Taiwan be a 'normal country,' distinct from mainland China, which lies across the Taiwan Strait and considers the self-governing island of 23 million to be part of its sovereignty territory, one that will eventually be re-absorbed. (Keim, 2016)

The article also attributes Tsai's concerns about the young generation to the Sunflower Movement (太陽花運動) that occurred in 2014, two years before Taiwan's 2016 presidential election. The author of the article indicates that the Movement consists of 'hundreds of students and other mostly young protesters anxious about the effect of cross-Strait economic enmeshment on Taiwan's freedom and sovereignty occupied the legislature in an attempt to block one of the latest pending trade pacts with China' (Keim, 2016). Since the Sunflower protesters are so concerned about Taiwan's economic reliance on the mainland Chinese market and its threat to Taiwan's independent sovereignty, it is not surprising to find that Tsai stresses her care for the happiness of young voters in her campaign videos. What Tsai tries to imply is that she shares the same Taiwanese identity with Taiwan's young people. Thus, we can see that, apart from the economic aspect, Tsai's Taiwanese identity also embeds a generational consideration.

As for the urge to maintain cooperation and pluralism among different ethnic groups, as indicated in the last chapter of this thesis, this was a general appeal to

Taiwanese identity raised by both the KMT and DPP's 2012 presidential election candidates. After all, the fact is that Taiwan is a multi-ethnic country which consists of native Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakka, indigenous residents, and new immigrants. Therefore, to acquire the greatest number of votes to achieve victory, both parties' candidates proclaim that all the ethnic groups are Taiwanese, and all the Taiwanese should support the candidates who expressed their Taiwanese identity in election campaigns. This appeal echoes Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui's (2005) appeal that the 'New Taiwanese identity' should not be represented based on ethnic exclusion.

In addition to the platforms, Table 6.2 shows that various slogans were used to represent Tsai's Taiwanese identity, including 'Light Up Taiwan' (點亮台灣) (31 times), 'Love Taiwan' (愛台灣) (30 times), 'Taiwan's Future' (台灣的未來) (27 times), and 'To Create a Taiwan with Happiness' (創造台灣的美好未來) (26 times). Most of these slogans clearly represent Tsai's Taiwanese identity. The main theme or the most frequently appeared slogan of Tsai's 2016 campaign was 'Light up Taiwan', which means that, in Tsai's opinion, at the time when she ran for the presidency, Taiwan was in a dark age, and she will 'light up' the whole country.

As a challenger in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, it is natural for Tsai to criticise the KMT government's performances in the period 2008 to 2016 and to urge a ruling party shift in her 2016 campaign. Thus, for Tsai, the meaning of Taiwanese identity varies depending on the country's political ecology. From the stance of the DPP, when the KMT is ruling Taiwan, the country is in a dark age, and the meaning of Taiwanese identity will be to 'light up' Taiwan; when the DPP is the ruling party



of Taiwan, Taiwan deserves to be identified with, because the DPP president has lit up the country. Thus, in addition to economy and generation, the political context is another aspect of Tsai's idea of Taiwanese identity.

As for the major scenes in Tsai's videos, Table 6.2 shows that Tsai's team stresses people's hopes for Taiwan's future (16 times). Along with these scenes are Tsai's attacks on the stagnation in Ma's previous 8-year administration (6 times). Some of Tsai's 2016 campaign videos use 'freeze-framed' scenes of cars, people, and streetscapes to display the stagnant situation in Taiwan. In these scenes, Tsai's team stress that people expect that their lives can be changed in the future; as Taiwanese, they believe they deserve a better life that can be provided by the challenger of Tsai Ing-wen. As Denton, Trent, and Friedenbergl (2020, p.77) indicate, the challenger in a presidential election needs to 'persuade voters that change is needed, and that the challenger is the best person to bring about the change.'

Tsai's 2016 campaign videos also show scenes of her interactions with grassroots Taiwanese in Taiwan's rural areas (8 times). These scenes show Tsai going fishing, picking tea, and tasting Vietnamese cuisine with new immigrants to demonstrate her concerns about Taiwan's agriculture and traditional culture. These scenes seek to indicate that Tsai has a close relationship with the Taiwanese people, and she was willing to live together with the grassroots. In these scenes, Tsai expresses her interpretation of Taiwanese identity by showing that she can live in Taiwan as grassroots Taiwanese do in their daily lives. In addition, since Tsai is a female candidate, her campaign team has created a feminine and gentle image of Tsai

in some of her campaign videos. One interviewee, a producer of Tsai's campaign videos, Lee Hou-ching, indicates that

Campaign videos should be a product tailor-made for a candidate. For example, Tsai's image had to be adorned with more emotional elements. That was why a series of 'Local Hope' videos was created. 'Local Hope' was also in accordance with the DPP's localised strategy. The initial principle of the DPP was to love Taiwan. Therefore, Tsai went to many rural spots and showed her concern for grassroots Taiwanese. This series of 'Local Hope' videos demonstrated Tsai's personal image and the DPP's main appeal to Taiwan. (Lee Hou-ching)

Regarding songs and languages, as Table 6.2 presents, Tsai Ing-wen's 2016 campaign videos present a theme song namely Taiwan melody (台灣美樂地) (3 times) and another theme song called 'The light of the island' (島嶼天光) (once). The narrations in the videos used Mandarin (31 times), Minnanyu (14 times), Hakka (once), indigenous languages (once), new immigrants' languages (twice) and English (5 times). That seems to imply Tsai's idea of ethnic inclusion in her Taiwanese identity.

**Table 6.1 Tsai Ing-wen's 2016 campaign videos**

- 
1. Good night wish Taiwan safe (晚安，願台灣平安)
  2. Local hope: Light up Taiwan (在地希望點亮台灣)
  3. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Yuanlin Changhua (在地希望點亮台灣: 彰化員林)
  4. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Linnei Yunlin (在地希望點亮台灣: 雲林林內)
  5. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Luzhu Taoyuan (在地希望點亮台灣: 桃園蘆竹)
  6. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Dongshan Yilan (在地希望點亮台灣: 宜蘭冬山)
  7. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Taichung (在地希望點亮台灣: 台中)
  8. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Tainan (在地希望點亮台灣: 台南)
  9. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Chutien Pingtung (在地希望點亮台灣: 屏東竹田)
  10. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Fataan Hualien (在地希望點亮台灣: 花蓮馬太鞍)
  11. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Shiyu Penghu (在地希望點亮台灣: 澎湖西嶼)
  12. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Jushan Nantou (在地希望點亮台灣: 南投竹山)
  13. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Chiayi (在地希望點亮台灣: 嘉義)
  14. Local hope: light up Taiwan: Pasikau Taitung (在地希望點亮台灣: 台東巴喜告)
  15. Local hope light up the world: English version (在地希望點亮世界: 英文版)

16. Three small pigs light up Taiwan (三隻小豬撲滿點亮台灣)
17. Light up Taiwan: Taiwan melody album (點亮台灣: 台灣美樂地專輯)
18. Taiwan melody: go home (台灣美樂地: 回家)
19. Taiwan melody: light point (台灣美樂地: 亮點)
20. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: treatment for rare disease (英派期待: 罕病篇)
21. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: long term care (英派期待: 照顧篇)
22. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: young generation (英派期待: 青年篇)
23. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: new immigrants (英派期待: 新移民篇)
24. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: traditional market 1 (英派期待: 菜市場篇 1)
25. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: traditional market 2 (英派期待: 市場篇 2)
26. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: light up Taiwan (英派期待: 點亮台灣)
27. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: pluralism (英派期待: 多元篇)
28. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: hard working (英派期待: 認真篇)
29. Tsai's long term care policy 3D version: (蔡英文的長期照顧政策 3D 小英版)
30. Tsai Ing-wen's expectancy: safety living policy (英派期待: 安心居住政策)
31. Tsai's food health policy (蔡英文的食品安全政策)
32. Tsai's sustainable energy policy (蔡英文的永續能源政策)
33. Tsai Ing-wen: Hakka female supports Hakka (蔡英文: 客家妹挺客家人)
34. Romantic the 3<sup>rd</sup> Taiwan provincial road (浪漫臺三線)
35. Meeting Mr. Jen: People anti-SARS heroes (遇見大仁哥: 人民是抗 SARS 英雄)
36. Meeting Mr. Jen: My parent (遇見大仁哥: 我的父母)
37. Public service is indispensable (義無反顧的公共服務)
38. Come on! Taiwan team (台灣隊加油)
39. All the best (願你平安)
40. Following children's steps (跟著孩子走)
41. Vote for great happiness; chasing for freedom (投票大確信呼喊自由篇)
42. Voting for the missing home (為想念的家投一票)
43. Revival Taiwan (台灣再起)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

## **Table 6.2 Symbolic representations of national identity in Tsai's 2016 campaign videos**

### **Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

#### **Platform/policy:**

tolerance/cooperation/pluralism in Taiwan (18 times), young Taiwanese generation's future (13), develop Taiwan's local industry (12), Taiwan goes to the world (7)

#### **Sign/slogan:**

Light up Taiwan (31), love Taiwan (30), Taiwan's Future (27), To create a Taiwan with happiness (26)

#### **Scene:**

Taiwanese people's mind/expectancy/support (16), Tsai with grassroots Taiwanese (8), Taiwan's agriculture (8), stagnant Taiwan (6)

**Song:**

Taiwan melody (台灣美樂地) (3), The light of the island (島嶼天光) (1)

**Language:**

Mandarin (31), minnanyu (14), Hakka (1), indigenous language (1), English (5), new immigrants' language (2)

**Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (43), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (0)

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Note 1: A total of 43 Tsai's 2016 campaign videos were found on the Internet and included in the content analysis.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.92. The formula of inter-coder reliability is

$R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$  where R is the inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,

$R = \frac{2 \times 2848}{72 \times 43 + 72 \times 43} = 0.92$

### 6.1.2 The rationale behind Tsai's symbolic representations of national identity

Just like what has been found in the 2012 campaign videos, as the content analysis results indicate, Tsai used specific symbolic representations to imply the Taiwanese national identity in her 2016 campaign videos. In this section, this researcher presents the results of discourse analysis on Tsai's top three popular videos on the data collection day to explore the rationales behind the symbolic utilisation.

**Video 1: All the best! (願你平安)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1TKb1FX4kA>) (first launched on YouTube on 17 September, 2015, reaching 110,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

The length of this video is 1 minute and 1 second. It consists of scenes showing the daily lives of grassroots Taiwanese. The scenes were people waiting for an underground train, riding motorcycles, walking across a street and a traditional market, being crowded in a hospital, working in an office, an agricultural land, a

construction site, a stock market, and a resource recycling site. Also included are the scenes showing the police cracking down on people's demonstrations, a middle-aged man reading a newspaper report about the economic recession, two senior male citizens playing chess in a park, and a baby playing with her toys. The video then shows Tsai Ing-wen looking out a car window with a serious look on her face and then writing the phrase 'All the best!' in Chinese. The ending shot is an overlook of a city at sunrise with the slogan 'To Light up Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen.'

Along with the scenes were light music and Tsai's Mandarin monologue as follows. A few sentences of it were spoken in Minnanyu or Hakka.

The past few years might be the longest countdown for most people; counted more frequently, and felt longer. People are looking for a government to solve problems; whereas the government were punishing those who are considered as being troublemakers. The issues of food safety, economic recession, and public security appeared one by one. People kept crying. People lived in panic (Minnanyu); felt unfairness for some fellow's death (Minnanyu). All the best! (Hakka) I didn't say anything (Minnanyu), doesn't mean I have nothing to say (Minnanyu). It's because I am heartbroken (Minnanyu). I'm sorry (Minnanyu)! We had not done enough; not good enough either. Let me be in charge. All the best! The sky is dark, but it will be bright. Let's light up Taiwan!

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

The slogan being raised at the end of the video, 'Let's light up Taiwan,' implies Tsai's idea that Taiwan was in a dark age when the 2016 presidential election was proceeding, and Taiwanese identity should be a sense of brightness instead of a feeling of frustration. One interviewee Kurt Lu, a producer of Tsai's campaign videos explains the reason for making this video.

Tsai's 2016 campaign videos presented people's expectations to live safely. Because of the KMT's rule, and the turbulence of the Sunflowers Movement, Taiwanese people lived in a

fearful, dark, and hopeless future. However, Taiwan could be lightened, and Tsai Ing-wen will brighten Taiwan. (Kurt Lu)

Additionally, no symbols related to the R.O.C. are shown in the video, despite the fact that Tsai was running for the presidency of the R.O.C. The avoidance of R.O.C. and the implication of Taiwanese identity certainly fit the DPP's private discourse of national identity, that is, Taiwan is an independent sovereign country instead of being merely a part of the R.O.C. Nevertheless, from start to end, except for the slogan, Tsai's monologue does not explicitly mention the issue of identity; the way she shows her Taiwanese identity is to express strong sympathy for the sufferings of the Taiwanese people. This symbolic arrangement can be considered a negotiation between the DPP's private discourse on national identity and the public's discourse on daily lives. After all, economic recession, food safety, and public security are more concrete issues than national identity for grassroots Taiwanese. Producer Lu confirms this analysis and indicates that,

Taiwan was under a deplorable condition, and people felt disappointed; I just scripted people's very frustrating minds in campaign videos, and we are waiting for daybreak which represents hope.' (Kurt Lu)

If a presidential candidate cannot persuade voters that she has a strong sympathy for their sufferings in daily lives, how can she make them believe that she does have Taiwanese identity or concerns about Taiwanese people's lives? As one Americanprogress report evinces,

In a general election that pivoted primarily on economic and identity issues, Taiwan voters elected Tsai Ing-wen to be their next president. Taking 56 per cent of the vote, Tsai's victory was fueled by a younger generation that is frustrated with stagnant wages and high rents. (DeLeon, 26 February, 2016)

A scholar (Copper, 2020, p.20) also points out that as a challenger, it was a strategy for Tsai to show her deep concern about the issues Taiwanese people cared about seriously.

Unemployment, stagnant wages, an increase in low-paying jobs and Taiwan's companies hollowing out and moving to China were all on voters' minds. The DPP pounced on these issues. Voters were at least somewhat impressed with Tsai Ing-wen's proposals for a more efficient and fair economy.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style or the micro-structure of the scenes and Tsai's monologue are quite gloomy and serious. Producer Lu indicates that 'dark image is a way to present a worrying Taiwan.'

The scenes show Taiwanese people of different occupational groups living unhappily and miserable. No smiles appear on their faces. This micro-structure implies that when Tsai was running for the presidency in the 2016 election, Taiwan was in a dark age caused by the ruling party of the KMT. This micro-structure naturally leads to the macro-structure or the main topic of the video, that is, to 'Light up Taiwan.'

How can a video with such micro and macro-structure imply Tsai's Taiwanese identity? First, all the scenes just depict Taiwanese people's daily lives, but showing these scenes means that Tsai understands what kinds of lives people are living in Taiwan. Tsai's monologue indicates that she knows that people were suffering from the problems of economic recession, food safety, and social unfairness; she is not an

outsider, and she lives in the same country as grassroots Taiwanese. As Copper (2020, p.12) indicates,

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was better qualified, it was said, by virtue of its DNA, meaning closer personal ties with the voters at the grassroots level and its history of advancing democracy from the bottom up.

Second, Tsai apologises in the monologue for not working hard enough to improve people's life quality. At the first glance, it seems odd for Tsai to apologise to the public, after all, the DPP was not the ruling party from 2008 to 2016. Nevertheless, what Tsai tries to imply is that since she is Taiwanese and a politician in the country, she feels responsible for the Taiwanese people's life quality. Lin and Wu (2017, p.142) argue that Tsai used a strategy to compare with Ma's ruling weakness.

According to Lin and Wu (2017, p.142), the Ma administration's poor performance and KMT's fiasco in Taiwan's 2014 election changed some people's preference for the KMT.

Finally, as the DPP's candidate for the presidential election, Tsai promised to bring about a brighter day for the Taiwanese people; she asked voters to let her be in charge of the whole country and showed a willingness to 'light up' Taiwan. In a sincere manner, she sought to imply her Taiwanese identity to the voters in the election.

Producer Lu stresses Tsai is a rational person. She likes to prove her ability more than shouting slogans.

Tsai's promise to the public indicates that for her, a politician's Taiwanese identity is still slightly different from the identity of the public. As a presidential candidate, it



is not enough for her to just tell the voters that ‘I am also a Taiwanese;’ she also needs to promise to bring about change and a brighter future for the Taiwanese people.

**Video 2: Come on! Taiwan team (台灣隊加油)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZFQbCdNSKos>) (first launched on YouTube on 17 September, 2015, reaching 92,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

This is a one-minute and one-second video. It was first launched on YouTube on 17 September, 2015, eleven days before the DPP’s twenty-ninth birthday. The video was presented as both a party birthday celebration film and one of Tsai’s 2016 campaign videos.

The video starts with an image of a cute baby boy who was born in 1986, then, two scenes show the baby growing up gradually, from an infant who sometimes cries and messes up, to a little boy who knows how to take care of the elder members of the family. The baby is certainly a metaphor for a political party, the DPP, and the party is an important new member of Taiwanese society.

The video then quickly shows Taiwanese farmers in a paddy, fishermen on their boats, greengrocers in a traditional market, and some labours working at a construction site; these scenes together with Tsai’s monologue imply that the DPP has been close to Taiwan’s grassroots since its establishment. The following scenes describe the party has failed in Taiwan’s elections but never lost its morale. After talking about the DPP’s story, the video shifts its main theme to show Tsai’s overseas campaign activities in Chicago and Washington, D.C. In the two cities, Tsai was meeting and talking to some overseas Taiwanese and American politicians. The video

finally ends with a scene showing Tsai and her comrades encouraging each other and being confident of victory in the 2016 election. All the scenes in the video are shown with Tsai's Mandarin monologue. The content of Tsai's monologue is as follows.

This kid, you look at him growing up. He cried and messed up, and needed babysitting. Now, he gradually knows how to take care of others. Come on! Taiwan team. We don't need to smear mud on ourselves, because we stand in mud originally. What we need to defeat is the predicament of this era instead of any specific persons. Come on! Taiwan team. Head down to retrospect; keep your head up and strive. Squat, then jump. It is the government instead of the people who needs competitiveness. Come on! Taiwan team. In the dark, candlelight looks bright, not to mention lights up all the candles. Come on! Taiwan team. To trust only one person might cause disappointment; to trust the whole team will bring about hope. Come on! Taiwan team. The DPP is twenty-nine years old. Happy birthday to the party. Everyone would be happy when the party celebrates its thirtieth birthday. Come on! Taiwan team.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

The term 'Taiwan team' clearly expresses Tsai and the whole DPP's Taiwanese identity. The name 'Taiwan team' also implies that Tsai and her comrades are ready to be the administrators of Taiwan.

Tsai should have no problems sharing Taiwanese identity with the DPP's supporters. This has been especially the case since the 2014 Sunflower Movement. As a Global Taiwan institute report maintains (Lai, 2020, p.14), 'even though the Sunflower Movement was a domestically focused political protest against the way the CSSTA (Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement) was rushed through Taiwan's legislature, the movement's subtext was, in fact, broader dissatisfaction with and warning about integration with China, an authoritarian regime fundamentally opposed to democratic values.' This social context has been advantageous for Tsai and the DPP whose national identity coincided with large numbers of Taiwanese people.

However, could Tsai win the 2016 presidential election and become the leader of the Taiwan team? No one could be absolutely sure before the election results came out. The DPP did defeat the KMT in Taiwan's 2014 nine-in-one election and was predicted as having a chance to win the 2016 presidential election. As one commentator (Huang, 2014) observed about the 2014 nine-in-one election, 'No doubt the DPP is the major winner, and its share of the popular vote in the 22 districts surpassed the KMT's by a significant margin, which projects an optimistic future for the 2016 presidential election.'

Nevertheless, it was also a fact that Tsai was defeated by the KMT's Eric Chu in the 2010 New Taipei City Mayor election. Two years later, Tsai failed again in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election. In Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, Tsai competed with Chu again. This was her third time competing in an election with a KMT candidate. The failures in past elections and DPP's forerunner Koo Kwang-ming's (辜寬敏) suspicion of a female president could explain Tsai's claim in the monologue that 'To trust only one person might cause disappointment; to trust the whole team will bring about hope.' Talking about the purpose of stressing the 'Taiwan team' in the video, producer Lu notes,

It's an inspiration from a sports tournament; we Taiwanese are fans supporting the Taiwan team (DPP), that is, players (party's politicians) should strive for victory. To a certain extent, all Taiwanese people are on the Taiwan team, we Taiwanese represent our country. (Kurt Lu)

Anyway, it is still odd to find Tsai committed in her campaign video saying that trusting her might cause disappointment. However, from Fairclough's viewpoint, the content of a text could be a product of a comprehensive consideration of the text

producer's private discourse and the public's discourse. For Tsai, she needs to face the fact that Taiwan had never been ruled by a female president and she had never defeated her KMT opponents in elections before 2016.

Thus, in the video, Tsai urges voters to trust the whole 'Taiwan team' rather than only trust her. It is a negotiation between Tsai's self-confidence and the public's concerns about her capability to win the election and her female leadership.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style or the micro-structure of the video is active and in a positive manner. All the scenes appearing in the video attempt to tell the voters that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are more mature than the KMT's candidate in dealing with political affairs and willing to carry out their responsibilities as the rulers of Taiwan.

There are two macro-structures or main topics in the video. The first concerns the maturation of the DPP. The party is described as a baby who was born in Taiwan in 1986. Tsai's monologue admits that the baby cried and messed up in his childhood but gradually come to know how to take care of those who need help. This description is a metaphor to justify all the negative and positive histories of the party. The metaphor of the baby also implies that the DPP is a member of the family, namely Taiwan; it is a way to imply the party's Taiwanese identity, and the identity always has been there since the establishment of the party in 1986.

Furthermore, showing the scenes of farmers in a paddy, fishermen on their boats, greengrocers in a traditional market, and labours working at a construction site was to

further imply that DPP and the grassroots Taiwanese all live in Taiwan, sharing the same Taiwanese identity. One in-depth interviewee Niu Tse-hsun indicates,

Indeed, farmers and labours are the DPP's basic supporters. Tsai uses the scenes of interacting with labours and farmers to develop voters' favourable impressions; this is an effective symbolic strategy. (Niu Tse-hsun)

The scenes appear with Tsai's monologue that 'We don't need to smear mud on ourselves; because we stand in mud originally.' (不需要抹泥巴 我們本來就站在泥巴裡) These words imply the DPP's native-born Taiwanese identity and they allude that some other political parties pretend that they have Taiwanese identity. As one of Tsai's campaign staff members, Lee Hou-ching says,

The DPP's love of Taiwan is innate. We don't have to show our love for Taiwan in campaign videos intentionally. The DPP's image is always of a political party with integrity and a party that loves this country. The KMT is a political party with a controversial national identity; it is hard to persuade Taiwanese people that the KMT loves Taiwan. The DPP shows a sincere love of Taiwan. (Lee Hou-ching)

The second macro-structure or main topic of the video is Tsai's capability to be the first female president of Taiwan. Scenes about this topic show Tsai's visiting Chicago and Washington, D.C. In the scenes, Tsai was welcomed by overseas Taiwanese and several American politicians. The purpose of these scenes is to show Tsai's potential leadership being affirmed in foreign countries and sharing Taiwanese identity with overseas Taiwanese. Producer Lu further explains why the video depicts Tsai's campaign activities in America.

The scenes are inspired by the fact that Taiwanese athletes often strive for international ranking and victories in international games. Taiwan as a country in the world is similar to an athlete in international games; we hope that Taiwan can be a respectable member of the international society. (Kurt Lu)

When the video attempts to persuade viewers that Tsai is ready to be the president of Taiwan, it is interesting to find Tsai admitting in her monologue that trusting her ability might cause disappointment; whereas trusting a team led by her will bring about hope. Thus, what Tsai tries to argue in the monologue is that it is not enough for a presidential candidate alone to express her will to light up Taiwan; the whole team's endeavour will make the public more confident that the Tsai administration can bring about a brighter future for the country.

Here we can see how Tsai interprets Taiwanese identity from another angle: from the administrative perspective, a candidate's Taiwanese identity means her promise to the public that the whole team led by her will have the same Taiwanese identity. The team is named 'Taiwan team' in the video, not only to imply the super-structure of Taiwanese identity but also to indicate that it is a collective national identity of Tsai's team instead of merely being Tsai's personal national identity.

**Video 3: Vote for big happiness; chasing for freedom (投票大確信呼喊自由篇)**  
([https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N51d9km\\_51c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N51d9km_51c)) (first launched on YouTube on 3 January, 2016, reaching 58,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

It is a very short campaign video, only lasting for forty seconds. The video shows several high school female students wearing school uniforms and standing together with smiles on a school's playground. Then, they slowly take off their skirts to show their sports shorts and throw the skirts into the sky. The girls then cheer together for their behaviours, one of them facing the camera while smiling. The video ends with

several subtitles, including ‘You are twenty years old now, go to vote,’ ‘On January 16, vote for great happiness,’ and ‘Light up Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chieh-jen (陳建仁) (Tsai’s running mate).’ The scenes appear with light music, but no soundbites or monologues appear in the video.

The video is actually echoing a small-scale student protest that happened at Taichung Girls’ Senior High School on 2 October, 2015. On that day, several students took off their uniform skirts to show their sports shorts in the flag-raising ceremony on the playground. The girls protested the school’s rule that all the students must wear skirts when walking in or out of the school’s front gate. The protest was widely reported by Taiwan’s mass media. Since the school finally allowed its students to wear sport uniform to come to the school, the student protest has been considered an iconic event challenging Taiwanese high schools’ traditional norm.

Although the students and their peer groups were not twenty years old yet in 2016 and thus not having the right to vote, the video uses the event to urge first-time voters in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election to vote for Tsai. The ending subtitles remind the younger voters that voting for Tsai is to vote for great happiness, because Tsai and her running mate can ‘light up Taiwan.’ One interviewee, Tsai’s staff member Lee Hou-ching agrees that the purpose of DPP in making this video is to urge support from young voters.

We launched the attractive video one month or one week before election day. It was the most significant video to urge people to vote for Tsai. We targeted the younger generation in 2016 and created specific content for our target audiences. (Lee Hou-ching)

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough’s framework:**

The video fully agrees with young students' protesting schools' traditional norms. The DPP's private discourse of campaign strategy is to have the greatest support from young voters in Taiwan. Therefore, it is natural for Tsai's camp to publicly support the young students' movement shown in the video. Ryan Brading (2017) reviews the history of the DPP's young voter policy and indicates that since Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, the DPP created a cartoon figure with the nickname of 'A-Bian' to represent the party's candidate Chen Shui-bian. The party also produced and sold several products with the logo of A-Bian to the public. These products, using Brading's words, 'were identity symbols that charmed young Taiwanese voters with their rather innocent and cute designs. They brought together common Taiwanese--- especially the young, who were captivated by the hopes and dreams A-Bian represented.' (Brading, 2017).

In 2006, the DPP established the 'Youth Council' as the party's talent pool. The DPP began offering training programs to enhance the youngsters' Taiwanese identity. This is actually a strategy to show the DPP's value on young voters' support in Taiwan's major elections. Lee Hou-ching adds,

Young voters were brave to proclaim their ideology. They proposed some issues, such as anti-nuclear, Taiwan independence, Taiwan consciousness and so on. We won't fight against their expressions, because it's people's freedom of speech, Taiwan is a pluralistic society with different opinions. (Lee Hou-Ching)

After the KMT took over the presidency in 2008 and won the presidential election again in 2012, the DPP had an even greater consciousness about the importance of young voters' support of the party. Thus, in the 2014 Sunflower Movement, the DPP politicians like Tsai Ing-wen, Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), and



Yu shyi-kun (游錫堃) joined the student protestors outside the Legislative Yuan. As Brading (2017) indicates, although there has been no evidence to prove the Movement as being related to party politics, the DPP politicians have supported the student protestors' 'anti-China consciousness' and their 'Taiwanese consciousness'. One of the interviewees, Niu Tze-hsun argues that the Sunflower Movement did have to do with young voters' Taiwanese identity.

Because of the Sunflower Movement, Taiwanese identity has been a highly valued issue in the 2016 presidential election. Taiwan's consciousness up surged in Taiwan; this has been especially the case for the young, thus providing the DPP with the best chance to promote their Taiwanese identity. (Niu Tze-hsun)

In fact, Taiwan's millennials have been recognised by local and foreign media as a 'born independent' generation. Anna Fifield (2019), writing an article in the Washington Post, describes the members of this generation as those 'who like to say they were "born independent," (天然獨) never having thought that their homeland could be submitted to the People's Republic of China the way Hong Kong was in 1997.' The DPP certainly realises that the self-identified 'born independent' younger voters share the same Taiwanese identity with the party's politicians.

Therefore, it is natural for Tsai to support young students protesting traditional discipline in schools. In the video introduced above, challenging high schools' rigid norms is implied as being consistent with Tsai's campaign slogan to 'light up Taiwan.' It is implied in the video as an action to bring about the brightness of Taiwanese identity.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style of the video is satire. A number of female high school students take off their uniform skirts and publicly show their sports shorts with smiles on their faces. They look satisfied with their behaviour and cheer with each other for successfully overthrowing the school's rule that sports shorts can only be worn in sports classes.

This micro-structure then leads to the macro-structure of the video through the subtitles 'You are twenty years old now, go to vote!' and 'On January 16, vote for great happiness.' The underlying connection between the micro and macro-structures is: You can decide what is the great happiness in your life; that is, you should decide what to go after. Interviewee Lee Hou-ching, a core member of Tsai's 2016 campaign team, explains the purpose of making this video.

We scripted a hopeful scenario for young Taiwanese, but the young should decide whether they want to change Taiwan's environment. What we try to say is that the DPP is willing to assist young people; their votes decide their future. (Lee Hou-ching)

The ending subtitle shows the names of Tsai and her running mate. That further specifies the macro-structure or the main topic of the video as: On 16 January, go vote for Tsai; it is a vote for your great happiness, just as you have decided to publicly overthrow the rigid school norms. Finally, another subtitle 'Light up Taiwan' appears at the end of the video, which implies the super-structure or the overall idea of the video: to fight against any authoritarian regulations on Taiwanese; that is a core idea of Taiwanese identity. Just as a commentator of Taiwan's politics says, in the 2016 election, young voters were

energized by the Democratic Progressive Party's 'Light Up Taiwan' campaign—which highlighted the theme of building a robust and vibrant Taiwan—the support of Taiwanese youth with a definite 21st-century focus meant that Tsai's election was never in doubt during the final month before voters went to the polls on January 16. (Americanprogress, deLeon, 26 February, 2016)

What should be noted is that this video especially targets first-time voters in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election. In the election, the decisions of 1,290,000 first-time Taiwanese voters were an influential factor in the election results. Since the video specifically targets young voters, an effective persuasive strategy is to show that Tsai shares similar ideas with young people on specific issues of pressing concern to the youth. Lin and Wu (2017, p.151) also note young voters' support of the DPP.

Young voters with stronger Taiwanese identities who are more concerned about the issues of distributive justice and environmental protection enthusiastically have supported the DPP in recent years (Lin and Wu, 2017, p.151).

That could explain why the video chose the skirt-wearing protest as an example to demonstrate Tsai's solidarity with youngsters. Moreover, as a female presidential candidate, it was even more convincing to find Tsai having sympathy for female students' protests against authoritarian rules. Overall, the video demonstrates another interpretation of Taiwanese identity, supporting the dominated and disadvantaged Taiwanese, such as the strictly regulated high school female students in their fight for their right to autonomy. Interviewee Kurt Lu, a producer of Tsai's campaign videos, also admits that the video is targeting young voters.

For the younger generation, the DPP uses many symbols to imply Taiwanese identity in campaign videos. Taiwanese identity is DPP's core principle, which has already been assimilated into our minds and our videos. (Kurt Lu)

## **6.2 The Symbolic representations of national identity in Eric Chu's 2016 presidential election campaign videos**

### **6.2.1 Symbolic representations of Chu's national identity**

Table 6.3 shows all the titles of Chu's 50 campaign videos. They are a record of Chu's campaign activities in most of Taiwan's administrative regions and his campaign platforms. Regarding the overall national identity stance, as Table 6.4 shows, Eric Chu presents a dual Taiwanese-R.O.C. identity in all of his 50 campaign videos. This stance is the same as that in Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 campaign videos; it is also the KMT's basic national identity stance. As mentioned before, for the KMT, Taiwanese identity is a provincial identity instead of a national identity; however, Taiwanese identity is implied in all of Chu's 2016 campaign videos. Moreover, Chu's campaign's main theme of 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force' also highlights the value of Taiwanese identity for Chu and the KMT.

In Eric Chu's 2016 campaign videos, as Table 6.4 shows, Chu fully demonstrated that the most important mission for a new leader in Taiwan is to develop the country's economy. This platform appears 18 times in Chu's videos. In addition to the more abstract appeal of economic development, Chu also claims 14 times to solve Taiwan's struggles by launching more specific policies, including helping small business companies, increasing Taiwan's international trade, and developing Taiwan's local industry. Additionally, Chu emphasises cooperation among Taiwanese (16 times) and social stability (15 times) in the videos. These policies highlight Chu's Taiwanese identity concerning economic development and social integration. As one Taiwanese

local commentator (Lin, 2016) indicates, Chu's 2016 campaign platforms mainly focus on

strengthening Taiwan's domestic supply chain and advocating further opening toward China. He believes that any kind of opening measures, be it toward ASEAN, China, Japan or the United States, will be reciprocated. For Chu, free trade agreements such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with China (ECFA), the U.S. led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiative are musts for Taiwan.

Regarding the signs or slogans in Chu's campaign videos, Table 6.4 shows that the signs of 'Taiwan's future' (30 times), 'An integrated Taiwan' (27 times), 'One Taiwan' (26 times), and 'An opened Taiwan' (22 times), appear frequently to imply Taiwanese identity. Chu's campaign videos use these slogans to stress the importance of a peaceful, integrated, multi-ethnic Taiwan.

Chu's videos emphasise that all Taiwanese should maintain 'One Taiwan' and develop Taiwan's economy by maintaining good relations with mainland China and other countries. People in Taiwan should not live in an environment full of hatred. Some of Chu's videos stress 'open to the world'--- that is, Taiwan should not practise Chen Shui-bian's closed-door diplomacy and isolationism. In short, Chu's videos emphasise that the Taiwanese should be more concerned about opening up and strengthening cross-Strait trade instead of internal political struggles. In other words, Chu's interpretation of Taiwanese identity focuses on Taiwan in international society.

As for the scenes of Chu's campaign videos, Table 6.4 reveals that many scenes are related to Taiwan's youth (12 times) and the kindness of grassroots Taiwanese (11 times). These scenes urge a prosperous environment for the next generation and could be a response to young voters' resurgent political participation in the Sunflower

Movement in 2014. The appeals of the Movement focused on unemployment, economic recession, low wages, and mainland China's alleged threat to Taiwan's sovereignty.

The KMT team, therefore, attempts to persuade the electorate in the videos that the DPP had instigated the Sunflower Movement. Chu's videos emphasise that the cross-Strait business was beneficial for the next generation and a prosperous Taiwan.

In addition to the scenes related to the economic aspect of Taiwanese identity, Chu's team also use softer scenes like the scenery of Taiwan's countryside (8 times), agricultural areas (6 times), and temples (5 times) to represent his Taiwanese identity.

Regarding songs and languages, as Table 6.4 shows, Chu's team only use two campaign theme songs to imply Taiwanese identity. As for language, Table 6.4 shows that Chu's videos use Minnanyu, Mandarin, Hakka, and indigenous languages in his videos. As mentioned before, it was a strategy to urge support from different ethnic groups and an indication of Chu's idea that Taiwan's different ethnic groups are all Taiwanese. As Fell (2018, p.71) indicates, it is an 'inclusive appeal by using multiple languages and multiple ethnicities.'

As for R.O.C. identity, as Table 6.4 indicates, Chu does not raise any platform or policy to imply the R.O.C. identity. He mainly uses the signs of the KMT's party emblem (50 times), the name of the R.O.C. (21 times), the R.O.C. flag (20 times), and the picture of R.O.C.'s founding father (once) to represent the R.O.C. identity. Moreover, the scenes showing people's love for the R.O.C. flag (20 times) and the song of the R.O.C. flag (once) are also used to imply the R.O.C. identity.

Overall, similar to Ma's identity appeal strategy in the 2012 election, Chu uses a synthesis of multiple symbols to represent Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity. The content analysis results also demonstrate that, compared with Ma's campaign strategy, Chu also puts more stress on Taiwanese identity than on R.O.C. identity. It is conceivable since the original KMT 2016 presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu was criticised by the DPP and some of the KMT politicians for raising a too pro-China cross-Strait policy, the replacement presidential candidate Eric Chu has to present more about Taiwanese identity in his campaign videos to ease the political turbulence caused by Hung.

In the next section, this researcher presents the results of discourse analysis on three of Chu's campaign videos which reached the greatest number of viewers on the data collection day of this study.

**Table 6.3 Eric Chu's 2016 campaign videos**

- 
1. one Taiwan: It must be in time (一定來得及)
  2. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Yilan (台灣就是力量: 宜蘭)
  3. one Taiwan: To get back an integrated Taiwan (找回一個整合的台灣)
  4. Your support is my motivation (你們的支持就是我的動力)
  5. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: keelung (台灣就是力量: 基隆)
  6. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: PengHu (台灣就是力量: 澎湖)
  7. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: HsinChu (台灣就是力量: 新竹)
  8. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taichung (台灣就是力量: 台中)
  9. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Kinmen (台灣就是力量: 金門)
  10. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: visit US (台灣就是力量: 訪美)
  11. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: visit Washington, D.C (台灣就是力量: 訪華府)
  12. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Hualien (台灣就是力量: 花蓮)
  13. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taipei (台灣就是力量: 台北)
  14. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: protect R.O.C. is the force (台灣就是力量, 保衛中華民國就是力量)
  15. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: start from New Taipei city, to be the NO.1 in the world (台灣就是力量: 從新北出發, 拼世界第一)
  16. one Taiwan: Let all Taiwan do it: healthy lunch (讓全台灣都做得好: 營養午餐篇)
  17. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Pington (台灣就是力量: 屏東)

18. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: defend Chinese ethnic (台灣就是力量: 捍衛中華民族)
19. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Miaoli (台灣就是力量: 苗栗)
20. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Chiayi (台灣就是力量: 嘉義)
21. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: National flag warming movement sequel 1 (台灣就是力量: 國旗暖暖行動號之一)
22. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan (台灣就是力量: 台南)
23. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: find the Taiwan, which belongs to us. (台灣就是力量: 找回屬於我們的那一個台灣)
24. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: National flag warming movement sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 國旗暖暖行動號之二)
25. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taitung (台灣就是力量: 台東)
26. one Taiwan: Sports is the force (運動就是力量)
27. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Hong is still here (台灣就是力量: 柱姐始終留下來)
28. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Kaoshiung (台灣就是力量: 高雄)
29. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: HsinChu: sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 新竹之二)
30. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Pingtung: sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 屏東之二)
31. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: New Taipei city (台灣就是力量: 新北市)
32. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Yunlin (台灣就是力量: 雲林)
33. one Taiwan: We are one family (我們是一家人)
34. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 台南之二)
35. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Miaoli sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 苗栗之二)
36. one Taiwan: Our Taiwan (我們的台灣)
37. one Taiwan: Rally for Taiwan's stability, you are the power (為台灣安定而走。你，就是力量)
38. one Taiwan: Taipei (台北市)
39. one Taiwan: Keelung (基隆)
40. one Taiwan: Labour's mind (勞工心聲篇)
41. one Taiwan: Farmer's mind (農夫心聲篇)
42. one beautiful scenery of Taiwan (台灣最美麗的風景)
43. one Taiwan: Mom's mind (媽媽心聲篇)
44. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Nantou (台灣就是力量: 南投)
45. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taichung sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 台中之二)
46. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 台南之二)
47. one Taiwan: Going to vote together (support our national flag) (一齊去投票)
48. one Taiwan: We need a steady Taiwan, please support Eric Chu (咱需要安定的台灣，請支持朱立倫)
49. one Taiwan: Taoyuan (桃園市)
50. one Taiwan: New Taipei city (新北市)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

### **Table 6.4 Symbolic representations of identity in Chu's 2016 campaign videos**

#### **Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

##### **Platform/policy:**



Taiwan's economy (18 times), Taiwanese people's cooperation (16), stableness of Taiwanese society (15), solve Taiwan's struggle (14)

**Sign/slogan:**

Taiwan's future (30), an integrated Taiwan (27), One Taiwan (26), an opened Taiwan (22)

**Scene:**

Taiwan's next generation (12), kindness of Taiwanese (11), Taiwan's countryside (8), Taiwan's agriculture (6), Taiwan's temples (5)

**Song:**

kids have dreams (有夢的孩子) (1), fight to win (愛拼才會贏) (1)

**Language:**

Mandarin (26), minnanyu (23), Hakka (6), indigenous (1)

**Symbolic representations of R.O.C. identity:**

**Sign/slogan:**

KMT emblem (50), the name of R.O.C. (21), R.O.C. flag (20), R.O.C. founding father (1)

**Scene:**

people showed love for the R.O.C. flag (20)

**Song:**

anthem of the R.O.C. flag (1)

**Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (0), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (50)

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Note 1: A total of 50 Chu's 2016 campaign videos were found on the Internet and included in the content analysis. The coding scheme includes 6 categories and a total of 72 sub-categories.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.94. The formula of inter-coder reliability is  $R=2M/N1+N2$  where R is inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,  $R= 2 \times 3384 / (72 \times 50 + 72 \times 50) = 0.94$

### **6.2.2 The rationale behind Chu's symbolic representations of national identity**

The content analysis results indicate that Chu uses some platforms, signs or slogans, scenes, songs, and languages to represent his dual identity. The platform of economic development, the slogan of 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force,' the scenes of Chu's interactions with local people in many cities, the scene showing Chu's concern about the younger generation's future, and the use of languages of different

ethnic groups all represented Chu's Taiwanese identity. The R.O.C. flag and national anthem are the most evident symbols of Chu's R.O.C. identity. In this section, this researcher presents the discourse analysis results of three entries of Chu's 2016 campaign videos to explain the rationales behind these symbolic representations of Chu's dual identity.

**Video 1: One Taiwan: To get back an integrated Taiwan (找回一個整合的台灣)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJ0KVelqr6o&t=6s>) (first launched on YouTube on 25 November, 2015, reaching 160,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

It is a one minute and fifty-five second video. In the video, Chu faces the camera and reads a monologue on the topic of 'to get back an integrated Taiwan.' The monologue is as follows.

In these years, I have frequently seen two Taiwans. One of them is a Taiwan that needs to be carefully protected; the other one is a Taiwan which must go abroad for an adventure. One makes people worry; the other one makes people proud. One is where we argue with each other; one is a Taiwan where we embrace each other. So often we have faced various dilemmas, how should we choose? I have been thinking, although some people have said that openness would bring about danger, we would rather believe that they didn't say that with malice. Although some people have said that economic development was Satan; we would rather believe that those who blocked the Act (the cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement) were not enemies. Although some people have said that the purpose of participating in an election is to overthrow the opponent, we would rather believe that participating in an election is to discuss the future of the country. Although some people would like to divide Taiwan into four or eight parts, I would rather work hard to make the two opposite Taiwans return to a Taiwan with warm and mutual trust. There is only one Taiwan; I also had only one idea, that is, to hold your hands, to express my thankfulness to Taiwan, and to keep on working hard for Taiwan. I am Eric Chu.

The monologue is matched with light music and several scenes appear quickly throughout the video. The scenes include the sun rising behind the Taipei 101

building, a road full of motorcycles, a wind farm, one aeroplane taking off, a street night view, three quick shots of different scenic views of Taiwan, scenes of urban and rural areas, a fight in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, and a shot of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. The subtitle 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force' appears at the end of the video.

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

From Fairclough's perspective, the negotiation between Chu's private discourse of economic development and some people's fear of economic dependence on mainland China is clearly expressed in this video. Should Taiwan increase the cross-Strait economic interaction to make profits for the Taiwanese, or decrease the cross-Strait trade to guard the sovereignty of the country? There are two opinions or dilemmas mentioned in Chu's monologue. Chu's personal idea, as introduced above, is certainly to increase the cross-Strait economic interactions for Taiwan's good. However, the 2014 Sunflower Movement did reflect some young voters' fear that the increased cross-Strait trade would threaten Taiwan's economic and political independence from mainland China. Thus, the future direction of Taiwan's cross-Strait policy was becoming a factor causing division or even conflict in Taiwanese society.

Facing this situation, Chu chooses not to attack the Sunflower protestors or the DPP for creating division in Taiwan. Instead, he uses a negotiated and understanding tone to say in the monologue that the protestors and the DPP are not his enemies, and that he has no malice. Chu further claims in the monologue that he is participating in

the presidential election for the purpose of discussing the future of Taiwan instead of knocking down his DPP opponent.

Chu does not specify the means to integrate divided Taiwan. He only claims in general terms that he will ‘work hard to make the two opposite Taiwans return to a Taiwan with warmth and mutual trust.’ This position indicates that for Chu, it is enough to just show his tolerance and understanding of the divided opinions concerning Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. Thus, the purpose of this video is to show that he is a leader with an inclusive Taiwanese identity; he will work hard to integrate a divided Taiwan into a Taiwan with warmth and mutual trust. This is actually implying that his electoral opponent, the DPP’s candidate Tsai Ing-wen, is unable or unwilling to play the role of a communicator able to negotiate or an integrator. One of the interviewees, Jack Hsiao, explains the purpose of making this video.

The dilemma of the cross-Strait policy and the divided public opinions about the policy caused difficulty for Eric Chu to claim any appeals strongly. Maintaining a neutral style is better for Chu to reveal his peaceful and integrated idea for Taiwan. Instead of focusing on policy, Chu uses an emotional appeal (integration and tolerance) in campaign videos to present his love for Taiwan. (Jack Hsiao)

As a commentator (Lin, 2016) observes, in Chu’s 2016 campaign, he ‘wants to end the vicious infighting among the political parties, which he believes causes the nation to undermine itself and to remain stuck in stagnation.’

In fact, as Lin (2016) indicates, Chu’s personal opinion about the cross-Strait policy is to ‘advocate further opening toward China,’ but he knew that many Taiwanese are tired of the political struggle in Taiwan. As Brading (2017, p.155) indicates, after the Sunflower protestors occupied and paralysed the Legislative Yuan,

‘Anti-Sunflower rallies were organised by people calling themselves “Carnations,” a flower representing motherhood. They called on the students to leave the Legislative Chamber so that the public might consider the issue calmly.’ Therefore, Chu expresses his willingness to integrate divided Taiwan into a united country, which was the main purpose of this video. It is a typical example of the negotiation between the candidate’s private discourse and the public’s expectation of inclusive Taiwanese identity.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk’s framework:**

The video adopts a preaching style for Chu’s monologue. The purpose of using this kind of micro-structure is to enhance Chu’s seriousness and sincerity in the hope to get back an integrated Taiwan. From the perspective of persuasive communication (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949), Chu offers two-sided information about the pros and cons of a more open cross-Strait policy. Hovland and his associates (1949) find that two-sided information is more persuasive than a one-sided message for those who are better educated. The video’s preaching style seems to target the viewers who are better educated and willing to deliberate Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. What Chu tries to assert in the video is that the cross-Strait policy is an issue that can be discussed rationally; there is no need to let the issue cause division or even serious conflicts between political parties or among the public, because ‘there is only one Taiwan.’

Chu’s argument brings about two macro-structures or main themes of the video. The first is that politicians or the general public should communicate with each other

on the future of Taiwan with mutual understanding and trust; serious opposition does not help locate the best interest of Taiwan. Second, Chu is the presidential candidate who is willing to discuss Taiwan's mainland policy with his electoral opponent and can even get back an integrated Taiwan as long as he is elected as the president of Taiwan. Since Chu does not propose any specific measures to integrate a divided Taiwan, the main purpose of the video is actually to imply a super-structure or the overall idea of Chu's inclusive Taiwanese identity. As an interviewee, Jack Hsiao explains why Chu does not raise any specific measures to ease the struggle between the KMT and DPP concerning the cross-Strait policy.

Regarding the cross-Strait policy, Chu deals with the discourse in a balanced manner to avoid irritating members of the public who have different opinions. The video lacks specific viewpoints, but we have made it a safe discourse. (Jack Hsiao)

**Video 2: One Taiwan: It must be in time (一定來得及)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBGmc3kkdGw>) (first launched on YouTube on 10 October 2015, reaching 160,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

It is a 30 second video. Fast music and several short scenes appeared with Chu's monologue as follows.

Sorry, I know I am late, but hopefully, still be in time. Taiwan needs a man who can solve the country's problems. To break through Taiwan's present predicaments, it must be in time!

The video starts with several scenes, including an empty city, several empty chairs in an empty meeting room, an open book, and a corner of an empty park. Then the Chu shows up and starts to read his monologue. Along with the monologue were images of some people, including two senior citizens, a street vendor, a young male

white-collar worker, a woman holding a child, and several kids. They show up one by one as they just suddenly saw someone. The video then ends with the subtitle ‘One Taiwan, Eric Chu.’

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough’s framework:**

There is a background story to this video where Eric Chu replaced Hung Hsiu-chu as the KMT’s presidential candidate in October 2015, three months before Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election day. Chu was the mayor of New Taipei City when KMT was defeated in the nine-in-one election in 2014. As the chairman of the KMT, Ma Ying-jeou took responsibility for the defeat and resigned as the chairman of the party. Chu was then elected as the new chairman of the KMT. In 2015, the party started the procedures for holding a primary election for Taiwan’s presidential election in 2016. Since no KMT politician was willing to participate in the primary election, as the head of the KMT, Chu was expected to be the party’s presidential candidate. However, Chu did not show up on the deadline for primary registration; Hung was the only registered KMT politician.

Commentator Rebecca Lin (2016) has written about Chu’s hesitation to join the 2016 presidential election and the consequence of Chu’s decision as follows.

Since Taiwan’s first democratic presidential elections in 1996, it has always been the KMT chairman who ran for president. ‘After Chu was elected as party chairman and asked me to serve as secretary-general, I assumed he wanted to step forward to run for president,’ recalls Lee Shu-chuan, who served as New Taipei city deputy mayor and the Executive Yuan secretary-general before Chu recruited him as his right-hand person at party headquarters. Lee did not hesitate to place himself in harm’s way by coming to Chu’s aid, but little did he imagine that Chu would refuse to run on the grounds of uniting the party. At the time, Lee frankly warned Chu that the blue camp had high expectations of him. ‘If you don’t run, it means you don’t dare to take the challenge,’ Lee told Chu. He predicted that sentiment within the blue camp would shift from expectation to disappointment and eventually to anger. Chu quietly

listened to what Lee had to say and then replied, ‘You are too honest; politics isn’t as simple as you think.’

After Hung was nominated as KMT’s 2016 presidential election candidate, she started her campaign and raised a new cross-Strait policy as ‘One China, same interpretation.’ (一中同表) This new idea immediately triggered the suspicions of some KMT politicians and the DPP began attacking Hung’s very strong pro-China position. Because Taiwan also held the legislative elections in 2016, a number of the KMT’s legislative candidates started to complain that Hung’s new cross-Strait platform had damaged their election campaigns. Meanwhile, some KMT members strongly supported Hung, because, after all, she had been formally nominated as the presidential candidate in KMT’s 2015 convention. No matter how the KMT explained the necessity of replacing Hung with Chu, Hung and some KMT supporters remained resistant. Although Hung argued that her cross-strait policy of ‘One China, same interpretation’ was not different from the KMT’s cross-Strait policy, some native Taiwanese KMT politicians insisted that Hung’s statement had alienated the KMT’s native Taiwanese constituency and independent voters. Commentator Lin (2016) describes the awkward situation of KMT at that time as follows.

After more than a dozen legislative candidates in northern Taiwan threatened to withdraw from the KMT should Hung uphold her candidacy, with even Ma interfering, Chu was forced to go back on his pledge that he wanted to do a good job as New Taipei City mayor and serve out his four-year term. With his back against the wall, Chu had no choice but to accept the nomination and join the presidential race. Chu, who prides himself on representing a new generation of KMT politicians, soon realized that he could not disregard certain historic liabilities. It became apparent that he was unprepared to deal with the longstanding grudges among the older generation that threaten to split the party.



The KMT finally replaced Hung with Chu as the party's 2016 presidential candidate in October of 2015. It was not in Chu's original career plan at that time; his idea was to complete his second term as mayor of New Taipei City from 2014 to 2018. However, facing great pressure to replace Hung, as the KMT's chairman, he had no choice but to accept the party's nomination as the new replacement presidential candidate for the 2016 election.

Thus, for Chu, the video analysed here is actually a negotiation between his private career planning and his comrades' expectations for his greater political mission. If it was not a negotiation, it would not be necessary for Chu to apologise in the video for his late participation in the presidential election. As interviewee Jack Hsiao indicates,

in order to appease the anger of the public, including Hung's supporters, Sunflower Movement participants, and KMT's supporters, Eric Chu's apology is not only for his late entry as a candidate but also for the ideological controversy of the Sunflower Movement. (Jack Hsiao)

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The micro-structure or the style of the video is to highlight Chu's apology for 'being late' as the KMT's presidential candidate. Jack Hsiao is the producer of this video and one of the in-depth interviewees. He explains the rationale behind the low-key style as follows.

One critical consideration was whether it was appropriate for Chu to say 'Sorry, I am late' in this video since this had been a famous phrase of a mainland China politician after the Sichuan earthquake. Thereby, whether to use it or not was debated in the video production meeting. The final decision was to use this phrase because the campaign team thought it could deliver a sincere apology. (Jack Hsiao)

Before Chu shows up to talk in the video, several scenes depict an empty city, empty chairs in an empty meeting room, and an empty park. The impression of emptiness represents the idea of ‘waiting’ or ‘expectation.’ This idea then serves as a justification for Chu’s appearance in the video.

When Chu starts to talk in the video, his monologue contains two macro-structures or main themes of the video. The first is his apology for being late as the KMT’s presidential candidate; but Chu emphasises that hopefully, it is still in time. The second is more important than the first one, because Chu stresses that, after all, Taiwan is facing some problems and the country needs a leader to break through the predicaments facing the nation. The video then shows some people’s sudden surprise and happiness to find someone coming in front of their eyes. Here the ‘someone’ certainly implies Eric Chu.

The two macro-structures lead to the super-structure of the video, that is, what is really important is not whether Chu’s participation in the presidential race is late; rather, it is critical that Chu is the person who can solve Taiwan’s problems. Thus, the super-structure or the overall idea of the video has been upgraded from Chu’s apology into a topic of Taiwan leaders’ administrative capability. Finally, the ending subtitle of ‘One Taiwan, Eric Chu’ brings about the conclusion of the video: Chu is a capable presidential candidate with a Taiwanese identity. Of course, the purpose of making Chu apologise publicly is to create an image of Chu as a responsible and honest politician who is willing to say sorry for his once hesitation to join the presidential race. This strategy is to imply that whoever claims that Taiwan is the force should first be a responsible person. Referring to Chu’s strategy of making an apology in

front of the camera and his final failure in the election, one of the interviewees, a senior political news reporter Yang Hsiang-chun notes,

Even though Eric Chu strives to turn things around, the social context was predominated by the DPP. The 'One Taiwan' discourse cannot remedy KMT's feeble situation, nevertheless, Eric Chu still emphasises that he is a capable presidential candidate. (Yang Hsiang-chun)

**Video 3: One Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: National flag warming movement sequel 1 (台灣就是力量: 國旗暖暖行動號之一)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdUQw92tqq4>) (first launched on YouTube on 23 December, 2015, reaching 60,000 viewing times on data collection day, 2 October, 2018)

**Description of the video:**

The video lasts for 52 seconds. It is one of Chu's campaign videos that implies his R.O.C. identity. The video is also evidence to say that for Chu and the KMT, the real national identity is the R.O.C. identity; Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity.

On 16 January, 2016, Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections on the same day. The video thus shows Chu and two KMT legislative candidates Wang Chin-shih (王進士) and Hau Lung-bin's (郝龍斌) campaign activities in different cities in Taiwan. At the beginning of the video, Chu launches a campaign rally in Tamsui (淡水), a northern district of New Taipei City. It is Taiwan's winter season, and Chu has sent warm packs to his supporters, Chu's campaign slogan 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force' is printed on the warm pack. A picture shows that all the attendants of the rally are waving small R.O.C. flags. Then, a scene shows that KMT's legislative candidate Wan Chin-shih has sent warm packs to his supporters in Pingtung, which is Wang's constituency. The following scene presents Chu's wife sending hot red bean soup to Chu's supporters to keep them warm, and a middle-aged

male voter raising his thumb up for the soup. A small R.O.C. flag is printed on the jacket of Chu's wife. The video then shows another KMT legislative candidate, Hau Lung-bin sending warm packs to people in his constituency of Keelung. The last scene shows Chu sending warm packs to his supporters and their children. One boy takes the warm pack; people standing near the child are holding small R.O.C. flags. The R.O.C. flag also appears on the boy's hat. The video finally ends with a subtitle 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force; the R.O.C. flag warms Taiwan, Eric Chu and Wang Ju-hsuan (王如玄) (Chu's running mate).' No soundbites or monologues appear in the video, with rock music having been played throughout the whole video.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

In general, Chu puts more stress on his Taiwanese identity than on his R.O.C. identity in his 2016 presidential campaign, his major campaign slogan being 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force.' It is an extension of the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 presidential campaign slogan 'Taiwan keeps moving.' Since the presidential election is being held in Taiwan, it is natural for the KMT candidates to put more emphasis on Taiwanese identity in their campaigns. However, compared with Ma's 2012 campaign, Chu's 2016 campaign videos show more R.O.C. flags. As Fell (2018, p.71) indicates, there is a necessity for Chu to use R.O.C.-related symbols to urge support from the KMT's traditional adherents, especially those who originally supported Hung as the KMT's presidential candidate.

Chu did need to appeal to those traditional supporters with R.O.C. identities, including those that had originally supported Hung's aborted presidential campaign. The R.O.C. flag became more prominent in KMT ads in the final two weeks of the campaign. Its prime pre-election

weekend rally was titled 'National Flag Party' and participants were encouraged to wear anything with a R.O.C. flag on it. (Fell, 2018. P.71)

Thus, from Fairclough's perspective, the video analysed here could be considered a negotiation between Chu's campaign's main theme of Taiwanese identity and some KMT traditional supporters' persistence in maintaining the R.O.C. national identity.

When asked by commentator Rebecca Lin about his odds to win the 2016 presidential election, Chu admits that for him, the campaign is 'an impossible task (Lin, 2016).'

Chu became the candidate three months before the election day, thereby making his race run on a very tight schedule. Eliminating the anger of Hung's supporters is another tough issue that he needed to deal with in the campaign. After all, he could not afford to ignore the strong R.O.C. identity of Hung's supporters and the traditional KMT followers.

Nevertheless, although the video stresses the R.O.C. identity; the ending subtitle still contains the words 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force,' and 'R.O.C. flag warms Taiwan.' Thus, for Chu and the KMT, to include symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity in a video that puts emphasis on R.O.C. identity is also a negotiation between the two kinds of identities. Interviewee Jack Hsiao notes that, for Chu, both Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity are indispensable for realistic consideration.

The R.O.C. symbol is always significant for the KMT candidates, supporters, and some middle-class voters. Taiwan and the R.O.C can be a co-existent discourse; they are not contradictory. Considering DPP's denial of R.O.C. symbols, the KMT must highlight the R.O.C. symbols for independent voters and also appeal to Hung's supporters. (Jack Hsiao)

In fact, we can say that the dual identity itself is KMT's negotiated stance between national identity and provincial identity. This negotiation is the party's survival strategy corresponding to Taiwan's democratisation. Just as Batto (2019, p. 85) found from the long-term survey data collected by Taiwan's National Chengchi university,

throughout the presidencies of Lee and Chen, citizens with some Chinese identity outnumbered those with exclusively Taiwanese identity. However, the two lines crossed in about 2008 so that citizens with exclusive Taiwanese identity became the majority early in the Ma presidency. Moreover, the gap continued to grow, and by 2014 there were almost twice as many respondents with exclusive Taiwanese identity as with some Chinese identity. If identity is, in fact, the most important factor in voting choices, one should expect to see a concrete reflection of this long-term growth in Taiwanese identity in election results.

Facing such an identity shift in Taiwan's democratisation, it is not surprising to find why Ma and Chu need to include both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity in their campaign videos. As for the question about which identity should be implied more in a campaign video is a negotiation case by case.

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style or the micro-structure of the video is quite positive and warm. The background rock music implies that Chu's campaign activities are lively, receiving a warm welcome in multiple cities. The scenes of rally attendants waving the R.O.C. flag and the flag on a child's hat represent the consensus of the R.O.C. identity among Chu and his supporters. In addition, the R.O.C. flag appears in campaign activities where the Chu couple and two KMT legislative candidates distribute warm packs and hot red bean soup to people. These scenes are shown for the purpose of connecting the two concepts of warmth and the R.O.C. identity. As interviewee Jack Hsiao

indicates, the KMT's presidential candidates always need to show both Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity in their campaign videos.

Chu's campaign videos need to show Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity; both identities are important for the KMT; they are a broad identity appeal to the whole Taiwanese people. (Hsiao)

The scenes of the micro-structure naturally bring about the macro-structures of the two main topics of the video. The first is that Chu is a presidential candidate who does have the R.O.C. identity. As introduced above, Chu needs to show this national identity stance to KMT's traditional supporters and Hung's fans. The best and most convincing way to complete the task is to make a video showing how he supports the R.O.C. identity.

The second main topic of the video is that R.O.C. identity can warm your heart. It is a simple way to explain why the R.O.C. identity is important or even necessary for the voters of the election. The association between the R.O.C. flag and warmth is especially meaningful in the winter season when Chu launches his national flag campaign activities.

Regarding the super-structure or the overall idea of the video, it is interesting to find that the dual identity is actually the ultimate message Chu attempts to imply. R.O.C. identity is certainly the major topic of the video; however, the ending subtitles still contain Chu's campaign slogan 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force.' In addition, one subtitle says 'R.O.C. flag warms Taiwan.' This subtitle was important because it suggests that the R.O.C. identity and Taiwanese identity are not mutually exclusive ideas; rather, the former can make the latter warmer and more inclusive. This

implicative argument is also a very subtle strategy to remind people that the DPP's presidential candidates have no R.O.C. identity, although they are actually running for the presidency of the Republic of China.

### **6.3 Overview of this chapter**

Similar to the campaign strategies of national identity expression used by the KMT and DPP in 2012, the two parties' 2016 presidential candidates also used a synthesis of symbols to represent their identity stances. The winner of Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, DPP's Tsai Ing-wen, implies her Taiwanese identity in all of her campaign videos. Although Tsai is legally running for the presidency of R.O.C.; she treats Taiwanese identity as her only national identity; therefore, Tsai avoids any symbols related to the R.O.C. in her campaign videos.

The research questions of this study ask what and why specific symbols were used to represent candidates' national identity. The content and discourse analyses of the 2016 data reveal that first, Tsai proposes platforms to develop Taiwan's domestic industry and to expand the export markets of Taiwanese products to more countries instead of overly relying on mainland China's importation of Taiwanese goods. This platform reflects Tsai's interpretation of Taiwanese identity from an economic perspective.

Some of Tsai's videos show her concern about the future and happiness of Taiwan's younger generation. The discourse analysis of one video reveals that Tsai even publicly supports female high school students' protesting against the school's traditional rule concerning uniform wearing. Targeting young voters in campaign



videos is a strategy corresponding to support for the DPP from younger Taiwanese.

This campaign strategy reflects Tsai's generational concern about Taiwanese identity.

In Tsai's campaign videos, many scenes show her having very intimate interactions with grassroots Taiwanese. It was a campaign strategy both Tsai and her opponent Ma Ying-jeou used in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election. On the surface, it seems natural to show a presidential candidate having a close relationship with the voters; yet it is actually an important persuasive strategy to imply that the candidates share Taiwanese identity with Taiwanese people.

As a challenger in the 2016 presidential election, it is natural for Tsai to urge change in her campaign videos, that is the meaning of her major campaign slogan 'Light up Taiwan.' In other words, Tsai implies that Taiwan was in a dark age because of the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou's administration, which is why she needs to light up Taiwan for the Taiwanese. Thus, the discourse analysis of this campaign video of Tsai finds that the video adopts a gloomy style to describe people's upset and unhappiness under Ma's tenure. The reason for creating such a campaign video is to highlight the necessity of change for the Taiwanese. Thus, we can see that Tsai's interpretation of Taiwanese identity is contingent on her status in the presidential race. When she is a challenger, it is more reasonable for her to claim that Taiwan is in darkness. This appeal makes her campaign meaningful in terms of bringing light to Taiwan. In other words, Tsai is implying that Taiwanese identity should be a national identity full of brightness; no one should be happy to identify with Taiwan in darkness.

Finally, the discourse analysis finds that Tsai also interprets Taiwanese identity as the whole DPP team's position rather than only her personal national identity. That is why in a video Tsai asks voters to trust her team instead of only trusting her. In other words, Tsai believes that it is not enough to persuade voters that she identifies with Taiwan; she has to promise the voters that after being elected as the president of Taiwan, all the members of her government would help her to complete the task of lighting up Taiwan.

As for Eric Chu's uses of symbolic representations of his dual identity, the content analysis finds that Chu puts more emphasis on showing his Taiwanese identity in his campaign videos. He chooses 'One Taiwan, Taiwan is the force' as his campaign's main theme.

After accepting the nomination to be the KMT's presidential candidate, Chu has less than 100 days to run his campaign. Within those days, as the topics of his campaign videos shown in Table 6.3, he spends most of his time visiting voters living in different cities in Taiwan. Thus, most of his campaign videos look like documentary films that record Chu's campaign activities. The main purpose of these videos is to show Chu's concerns about the grassroots Taiwanese' daily lives. It is a way to repeatedly imply Chu's Taiwanese identity.

Regarding the platforms proposed in the videos, Chu shows the greatest concern about Taiwan's economic development. Although the KMT's proposal of increasing cross-Strait economic interaction was questioned or even attacked by the Sunflower protestors and DPP politicians, Chu still tries to persuade voters in his campaign videos that the KMT's mainland policies toward China will benefit Taiwan's

economic development. As introduced earlier in this chapter, Chu believes in the necessity of keeping Taiwan's door open to the world, including mainland China. He actually claims this position in his campaign videos.

However, the slogan of 'One Taiwan' reflects Chu's urge for an integrated or inclusive Taiwanese identity. As the discourse analysis reveals, in one of his campaign videos, Chu shows understanding and tolerance toward those who attack the KMT's cross-Strait policy. He also demonstrates confidence in decreasing the political and social cleavage in Taiwan. In the video, he emphasises that the purpose of his participation in the election is to discuss the future of Taiwan instead of overthrowing the opponent. The phrase in his monologue that 'because there is only one Taiwan' embeds an argument that those having Taiwanese identity should not treat each other as enemies. That is Chu's interpretation of Taiwanese identity within the frame of the electoral race.

Another finding is that Chu justifies his late participation in the election campaign by emphasising that, after all, Taiwan needs a leader like him who can break through the country's predicaments. Thus, Chu implies that it is not enough for a presidential candidate merely to tell the voters that he or she is Taiwanese; a national leader's Taiwanese identity should be highlighted by his or her administrative ability.

As for Chu's R.O.C. identity, some of his campaign videos use the R.O.C. flag as the major symbolic representation of his R.O.C. identity. Although Chu puts more stress on his Taiwanese identity than on his R.O.C. identity in his presidential campaign, the R.O.C. flag is shown frequently in his campaign videos. As has been discussed previously, this is mainly because his replacement for Hung has triggered

some of the KMT's traditional supporters to doubt Chu, thinking that he may have a weak R.O.C. identity. To reduce those people's suspicions, Chu launches videos to show his unquestionable R.O.C. identity. Nevertheless, showing R.O.C. identity in campaign videos does not mean Chu neglects Taiwanese identity. Instead, even in a video focusing on the R.O.C. identity, Chu's major campaign slogan 'One Taiwan' still appears at the end of the video.

Overall, the results of the content analysis indicate that, similar to the findings presented in the last chapter, in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election, both the KMT and DPP's candidates not only use the synthesis of multiple symbolic representations to imply their identities with Taiwan or the R.O.C., but they also tell viewers of the videos that what the national leader of Taiwan should do based on Taiwanese identity or R.O.C. identity. The discourse analyses further find that when candidates elaborate on the meanings of Taiwanese identity or R.O.C. identity in the videos, they sometimes need to negotiate between the party's private discourse and some voters' public discourse on national identity. Moreover, the videos' micro-, macro- and super-structures of symbolic representations allow candidates to use storytelling techniques or dramatic styles to present their interpretations of the meanings of Taiwanese identity or the R.O.C. identity. These are original research findings that have not been uncovered in previous studies on the national identity appeal in Taiwan's presidential elections. In the next chapter, the researcher continues to present the research findings of the 2020 data and then provides a conclusion of the whole study in the last chapter of this thesis.

## **Chapter 7. The appeals to national identity in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election campaign videos**

Taiwan's 2020 presidential election was dramatic and fiercely competitive. President Tsai Ing-wen is running for her second-term as president facing a strong rival, the KMT mayor of Kaohsiung, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜). Han is an atypical KMT candidate who adopts strategies differing from those used by previous KMT candidates. Like Ma and Chu, Han presents a dual Taiwanese-R.O.C. identity in his campaign videos. At the same time, though, from an academic perspective, the really interesting and unforeseen finding is that Tsai changed her national identity stance from that of a Taiwanese-only identity to one of a dual Taiwanese-R.O.C. identity. Unlike Tsai's insistence on maintaining Taiwanese identity in 2012 and 2016, this change deserves close analysis.

In this chapter, to answer the first research question about what symbols are used to represent candidates' national identities, the researcher first presents the content analysis results of Tsai and Han's campaign videos. Then I will present the results of discourse analysis to answer the second question regarding why specific symbols have been used to represent candidates' national identities. The results of the in-depth interview are used to provide additional explanations for the findings of content analysis and discourse analysis. At the end of this chapter, an overview will be provided by discussing the meanings of the major findings from data analysis. Since Tsai actually won the 2020 election, I first present the research findings of her campaign videos.

## **7.1 The Symbolic representations of national identity in Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 presidential election campaign videos**

### **7.1.1 Symbolic representations of Tsai's national identity**

Table 7.1 shows the titles of Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 campaign videos. It appears that Tsai mainly used the videos to urge people, especially her supporters, to vote for her on election day. Among Tsai's 24 videos, at least 13 clearly focused on this appeal. Table 7.2 reveals the various symbolic representations of Tsai's national identity. It is interesting to find that Tsai presented either the Taiwanese identity or Taiwanese-R.O.C. identity in her 2020 campaign videos. This dual identity stance was not found in her 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns, where she only demonstrated Taiwanese identity in her campaign videos.

Since the DPP's basic stance is the Taiwanese national identity, Tsai's dual identity in 2020 became a new proposition of her national identity. Among Tsai's 2020 campaign videos, although most of them only implied Taiwanese identity, dual identity appeared 7 times. This proportion indicates that, unsurprisingly, Tsai still values Taiwanese identity. However, what really needs to be explored is why Tsai includes R.O.C. identity in her campaign videos. As shown in the previous chapters, Tsai did not mention anything related to R.O.C. identity in her 2012 or 2016 videos. Thus, what made her include the R.O.C. identity in the 2020 videos needs to be explained. One explanation is that Tsai's 2020 rival, Han Kuo-yu, repeatedly pointed out that since being elected as the president of the R.O.C. in 2016, she had seldom mentioned the name of the R.O.C. publicly. In the 2020 presidential election, Han identified himself as the protector of the R.O.C. and most of his supporters strongly

identified with the R.O.C. in campaign rallies. This might have stimulated Tsai to include the R.O.C. identity in her campaign videos to deflect Han's attack. In addition, Tsai was believed to have attempted to reshape Taiwan's political landscape and to marginalise KMT by raising the new national identity of 'R.O.C. Taiwan.' As a commentator, Courtney Donovan Smith (2022) writes on an Internet medium 'Taiwan News,'

Tsai's move was a bold and clever stroke. For the first time, the president of the country and the leader of the DPP were not just laying claim to the R.O.C. as 'Taiwanese.' The R.O.C. was being cleaved in two---leaving the KMT the sole major party claiming the period the R.O.C. was in China as theirs. From a KMT perspective, in a sense, the President and the DPP had 'stolen' their legacy and repurposed it as belonging to everyone in Taiwan as a shared experience, which the President addressed in the same inauguration speech: 'I want everyone to know that Taiwan has overcome countless challenges over the past 70 years, relying on not just one or two heroes, but thanks to countless heroes such as yourselves, working together to turn the wheels of history. You have helped make Taiwan a happy, safe, and prosperous place for generations to come.'

Smith (2022) also points out in the same article that

What truly sets Tsai Ing-wen apart is her remarkable ability to disarm, neutralise, and absorb some enemies---and marginalise the rest. She appears to be counting on---and the KMT still seems to plan on obliging her---the opposition party to move further and further outside of the mainstream of Taiwan politics.

Thus, Tsai's mention of R.O.C.-Taiwan in her 2020 campaign videos is really a significant finding of this study. The researcher has more discussion on this phenomenon in the discourse analysis section of this chapter. Regarding the platforms or public policies related to national identity in Tsai's 2020 videos, as Table 7.2 shows, Tsai focuses on Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech (16 times), Taiwan's national defense/ preparation to face mainland China's perceived threat to Taiwan (11 times), and the consolidation of Taiwan's sovereignty (10 times). Tsai especially emphasises Taiwan's democracy and freedom in her later campaign. In her

videos, Tsai invites Internet celebrities and overseas Taiwanese to endorse her performance and her will to protect Taiwan's democracy. She uses supporters' anxieties about mainland China's suppression of the democratic movement in Hong Kong to stress that defending Taiwan's sovereignty is her most important task.

All these platforms are seen as highlighting Tsai's Taiwanese identity from the perspective of national security. These policy statements are basically parallel to those in Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos. As I mentioned in the last chapter, when Tsai proclaims in the videos that Taiwan should protect its own sovereignty, democracy, freedom of speech, and economic autonomy, she is actually interpreting the necessity and ideals of Taiwanese identity. As the DPP Chairwoman and the president of Taiwan, Tsai's Taiwanese identity has been repeatedly implied in her 2012 and 2016 campaign videos. Thus, for Tsai, the issue of national identity is not about whether she has a Taiwanese identity. Rather, the issue is about the significance of Taiwanese identity in terms of the values and ideals of this national identity.

Regarding the signs or slogans related to Taiwanese national identity in Tsai's videos, as Table 7.2 shows, Tsai's videos mainly show slogans about Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech (21 times) and Taiwan's future (19 times). These slogans are inter-correlated. They imply that Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech cannot be destroyed and should be protected while facing the threat from mainland China. The threats implied in Tsai's videos refer to Taiwan's undermined diplomatic relations and it is being excluded from international organisations. Taiwan's force, dignity and sovereignty are thus being damaged. Tsai stresses in the videos that the DPP is not a pro-China party and urges people to vote for her.



As for the major scenes in Tsai's videos, Table 7.2 shows that Tsai's team mainly presents images of Taiwanese young people (18 times) and Tsai's supporters (13 times). There are two series of videos related to the scenes. One was '2020 I will go home to vote, how about you?' These videos invite young overseas Taiwanese to present their anxieties and concerns about Taiwan. Tsai's team also invites supporters and Internet celebrities to say why they support Tsai. They all mention democracy, freedom of speech, and Taiwan's future. Hence, in Tsai's videos, scenes, slogans, and platforms are coordinated with each other in campaign videos.

Finally, regarding the songs and languages used in Tsai's videos, as Table 7.2 shows, Tsai's camp launches one campaign theme song in her campaign videos to represent Taiwanese identity. The song describes the confidence and courage of the Taiwanese people. As for languages, in the videos, the major language is Mandarin (appeared 22 times), followed by Minnanyu (5 times), Hakka (once), English (twice), and the languages of Taiwan's new immigrants (once). The multi-language arrangement is used to present a multi-ethnic Taiwan and Tsai's idea of inclusive Taiwanese identity. In sum, it appears that Tsai uses the synthesis of various symbols to express her Taiwanese national identity, especially focusing on her will to protect Taiwan's sovereignty and the freedom of speech of the Taiwanese people.

In addition to Taiwanese identity, the R.O.C. identity is also represented by several symbols in Tsai's 2020 campaign videos. Compared with the national identity appeal of 'Taiwanese identity only' in Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos, it is certainly a significant change, as of Tsai adopts the symbolic representations of the R.O.C. identity in her 2020 campaign videos. As Table 7.2 demonstrates, the appearance of

the R.O.C. flag (4 times) and the name of the R.O.C. (once) are used to imply the R.O.C. identity in Tsai's videos. Moreover, several scenes are also used to represent the R.O.C. identity in the videos, including the scenes of people showing their love for the R.O.C. flag (twice), and the scenes showing Tsai as the president of R.O.C (once) and the chief commander of the R.O.C.'s military force (twice).

Overall, the content analysis results indicate that Tsai emphasises the significance of Taiwanese identity by saying that it is an identity being threatened by mainland China. The turbulence of Hong Kong in 2019 is used by Tsai's team as a warning sign of Taiwan's future. As a commentator, Anna Fifield (2020) notes in the Washington Post,

Tsai, who was trailing badly in the polls only a year ago, has experienced a sharp turnaround in her fortunes, partly because the situation in Hong Kong offers a premonition of what could happen if Taiwan agreed to a similar deal with Beijing.

In her videos, Tsai shows Taiwanese people, especially the young voters' anxieties about the loss of freedom of speech and the sovereignty of Taiwan. Then, she suggests in the videos that the way to secure Taiwan is to vote for her on election day. Here we can see how Tsai interprets Taiwanese identity as a national treasure that can only be guarded by her and the DPP. On the other hand, Tsai decides not to avoid the R.O.C. identity as she did in the 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns. Completely avoiding or denying the existence of the R.O.C. identity will just put her under attack by implying that she does not recognise the legal status of the country under her rule. To solve this problem, Tsai finally creates a new national identity as a 'R.O.C. Taiwan' identity. It is a synthesis of the originally distinct Taiwanese identity and the

R.O.C. identity. That is a perfect example to show that, at least for Tsai, national identity is not a sacred cow that can never be changed; rather, it is a dynamic construct that can be adjusted when needed.

**Table 7.1 Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 campaign videos**

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1. Captain Taiwan (台灣隊長)
2. We are all in R.O.C. (中華民國不分你我)
3. Caring about Taiwan (關心台灣)
4. Tsai's accomplishment: Saving Taiwan (小英政績: 保台灣)
5. Love Taiwan from the world (從世界愛上台灣)
6. Tsai's army is recruiting: Vote for Taiwan and Tsai Ing-wen (英眼部隊開始招募, 為台灣投一張票, 為小英投一張票)
7. President Tsai's campaign song (小英總統競選歌曲: 自信勇敢, 咱的名)
8. The overseas Taiwanese youth: I will go back to vote, how about you? (海外台灣青年: 我會回家投票, 那你呢?)
9. The new immigrants are our family; they are the new pride of Taiwan (新住民是我們的家人, 是台灣新驕傲)
10. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Japan version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (日本篇)
11. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (U.S. version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (美國篇)
12. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Pacific rim version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (環太平洋篇)
13. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Europe version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (歐洲篇)
14. To guard our future (守護咱的未來)
15. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Canada version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (加拿大篇)
16. 2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Taiwan version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (台灣篇)
17. We have a capable government (有政府, 會做事)
18. Going back to home town again (二次返鄉)
19. Everyone requests another one (Mister version) (一個拉一個) (先生篇)
20. Speak loudly (大聲說話)
21. Everyone requests another one (The chicken chop lady version) (一個拉一個) (雞排妹篇)
22. Everyone requests another one (The Chung Ming-shuan version) (一個拉一個) (鍾明軒篇)
23. Everyone requests another one (The Gua-gi version) (一個拉一個) (呱吉篇)
24. Everyone requests another one (President Tsai version) (一個拉一個) (小英總統篇)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

**Table 7.2 Symbolic representations of dual identity in Tsai's 2020 campaign videos**

**Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

**Platform/policy:**

to protect Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech (16 times), to strengthen Taiwan's national defense (11), to consolidate Taiwan's sovereignty (10)

**Sign/slogan:**

Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech (21), Taiwan's future (19)

**Scene:**

Taiwanese young people (18), Tsai's interaction with grassroots Taiwanese (13)

**Song:**

confidence and courage are our names (自信勇敢咱的名) (1)

**Language:**

Mandarin (22), Minnanyu (5), Hakka (1), English (2), new immigrants' languages (1) indigenous languages (1)

**Symbolic representations of R.O.C. identity:**

**Sign/slogan:**

R.O.C. flag (4), name of R.O.C. (1)

**Scene:**

Tsai showing herself as the president of the R.O.C. (1), Tsai showing herself as the chief commander of the R.O.C.'s military force (2), people showing love for the R.O.C. flag (2)

**Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (20), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (7)

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Note 1: A total of 24 Tsai's 2020 campaign videos were found on Internet and included in the content analysis. The coding scheme includes 6 categories and a total of 72 sub-categories.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.92. The formula of inter-coder reliability is  $R = 2M / (N1 + N2)$  where R is the inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,  $R = 2 \times 1590 / (72 \times 24 + 72 \times 24) = 0.92$ .

### **7.1.2 The rationale behind Tsai's symbolic representations of national identity**

Tsai's campaign videos reveal her Taiwanese identity and the attempt to highlight Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy in sharp contrast to mainland China's authoritarian political institutions. When the protest against the Extradition Bill broke out in Hong Kong in 2019, Tsai took the chance to urge 'Don't let the status quo of Hong Kong become the future of Taiwan' (不要讓今日的香港變成明天的台灣). Thus, protecting Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech from mainland China's potential threat has important implications for Tsai's Taiwanese identity in 2020. Regarding Taiwan's future, Tsai's videos imply that democracy and freedom of speech are Taiwan's values. Tsai's team invite celebrities to argue that the 1992 Consensus (九二共識) equals 'One county, Two Systems' (一國兩制). Tsai's victory in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election suggests that the fear appeal worked effectively in appealing to DPP supporters and independent voters. In this section, the researcher uses discourse analysis to further explore the rationales behind the symbolic representations of Tsai's 2020 campaign videos. As I have done in previous chapters, three videos that reached the highest viewers on the data collection day are analysed here.

#### **Video 1: Love Taiwan from the world (從世界愛上台灣)**

([https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBL1rktsI\\_E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBL1rktsI_E)) (first launched on YouTube on 3 December, 2019, reaching 331,631 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January 2020)

#### **Description of the video:**

The length of this video is 2 minutes and 30 seconds. It looks like a documentary film recording some overseas Taiwanese and foreigners' impressions of living in

Taiwan. A narrative in Mandarin alternately appears with the main actors' dialogues in each scene.

The video starts with a scene showing a young female Taiwanese walking down a corridor in Taiwan's Taoyuan International Airport. She is about to travel to a foreign country. The narrator says: 'Since being born, we all knew ourselves through knowing the world.' Then, several short scenes appear in turn in the video, including a young Taiwanese man and a young foreign lady riding a bicycle together in a rural area of Holland, a middle-aged Taiwanese woman wandering in the Place du Louvre, and the faces of a male and a female Taiwanese.

The narrator then says: 'I have left my hometown for an overseas journey. I have inherited the spirit of an island's people.' The following scene shows the Taiwanese girl who appeared at the beginning of the video coming across a foreign male tourist in the corridor of the Airport. The tourist is looking at writing in Chinese calligraphy on the wall of the corridor. The girl asks the tourist whether he likes the writing. He replies: 'It is very beautiful.' The girl then says: 'We use this kind of Chinese traditional characters every day.' The narrator then says: 'Taiwan is a land which preserves traditional culture.' Meanwhile, a quick shot shows a phrase in the calligraphic work: Its name is Taiwan (名字叫台灣).

The video then shows several scenes to highlight the relative advantages of living in Taiwan, such as Taiwan's passport allows Taiwanese to travel to many countries; Taiwan has hundreds of mountains over 3,000 meters with spectacular scenery; Taiwan has universal health care; Taiwan good public security; and Taiwan is a country which values transitional justice (轉型正義). One scene then showed a Japanese cook's appreciation for Taiwan's aid after Japan's 2011 earthquake disaster.

At last, a scene shows a male Taiwanese journalist taking pictures of Hong Kong's 2019 turbulence. The narrator then says: 'I am recording a history of Hong Kong's 2019 incident. We Taiwanese have made efforts to preserve freedom and democracy that are not easy to come by. Hopefully, someday, Taiwan can be treated as a real independent country.' The video ends with the subtitles: Seeing Taiwan from the world; so, we can love ourselves more, Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te (賴清德) (Tsai's running mate).

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

The purpose of this video is to remind voters that, compared with living in other countries, how good it is to live in Taiwan. It is similar to a comparative advertisement. The cross-country comparison aims to increase the credibility of the video.

As an incumbent presidential candidate, it is natural for Tsai to self-affirm the achievements of the first term of her presidency from 2016 to 2020. The video also highlights Taiwanese identity by mentioning 'Taiwan' repeatedly in the video. At the end of the video, the narrator indicates that, hopefully, someday Taiwan can be treated as a real independent country. This expectation clearly signifies Tsai's idea that for her and the DPP, Taiwan should be recognised as a country and Taiwanese identity is the national identity.

However, at the beginning of the video, a Chinese calligraphic work is shown to the viewers. A young Taiwanese girl even praises the artistic value of the work and indicates that it is the traditional Chinese characters Taiwanese people use every day.

It is rare for Tsai's campaign videos to include any symbolic representations of Chinese culture. Thus, it can be considered as a negotiation between the DPP's Taiwanese identity and the Chinese identity as represented by some aspects of traditional Chinese culture, such as Chinese characters, in Taiwanese people's daily lives.

Referring to this campaign video, an in-depth interviewee, a Taiwanese rhetoric scholar John Wen explains the reason Tsai's team mentioned Chinese calligraphy in the video.

It's a blurred strategy to disconnect Chinese culture from mainland China. In other words, Chinese culture does not belong to Mainland China, both Hong Kong and Taiwan share Chinese culture. Admitting Chinese culture is a preliminary way to integrate Taiwan with the R.O.C. (John Wen)

As a BBC news report (2011) indicates, 'Taiwanese people are proud of the way they have preserved traditional Chinese culture.' The news also cited the words of Emile Sheng, Taiwan's former minister of the Council for Cultural Affairs to note that 'Chinese culture is the basis of Taiwanese culture, but because of politics, some people try to deny this.'

In fact, after Chen Shui-bian was elected as Taiwan's president in 2000, the DPP had started to put more stress on Taiwanese culture rather than on traditional Chinese culture as the basis of Taiwanese people's lives. In her study of cultural policies before and after 2000, Chang Bi-yu (2004, p.8) argues that 'the DPP has, since coming to power, taken many measures to express a more Taiwan-centric position with the intention of creating cultural meaning and changing people's values.' Chang (2004) indicates that, since 2000, DPP has 'pushed for de-sinification---focusing



mainly on the policy of Taiwanisation.’ Thus, to praise the art of Chinese calligraphy in the campaign video should not be explained as a change in Tsai or the DPP’s cultural policy; rather, it is more understandable to consider the praise as a compromise or negotiation between the party’s original de-sinification policy and the need to strive for the votes from those who are not totally against Chinese traditional culture.

In fact, in her political career, Tsai has had experience compromising her national identity stance. Tsai was the chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council from 2000 to 2004. On 29 May, 2000, when Tsai was questioned by a KMT legislator, she first indicated that she is Taiwanese. Nevertheless, then, at the same time, Tsai indicated that ‘I am Chinese, because I read Chinese textbooks when growing up, and I had a Chinese-style education. However, please don’t forget that Taiwan is a multicultural society, in addition to the influence of Chinese culture, Taiwan is affected by many other cultures (The Legislative Yuan Communique, Volume 89, # 41, p. 91).<sup>25</sup>’ These words indicate that, as early as 2000, Tsai recognised the existence of Chinese culture in Taiwanese society, which can explain why Tsai’s team agrees to recognise the value of Chinese traditional culture, such as the Chinese calligraphy work in the campaign video.

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<sup>25</sup> Legislative Yuan Report 89(41):91 Tsai Ing-wen noted 1. I am Taiwanese; it’s very important. 2. With no doubt, I am Chinese in cultural and ethnic sense 3. In politics, I am a citizen of R.O.C. 立法院公報第 89 卷 41 期第 91 頁：蔡英文提到 第一，我是台灣人，這是非常重要的部分。第二，在文化和血源上，我是中國人，這也沒有問題。第三，在政治上，我是中華民國的國民。

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style or micro-structure of the video is similar to a comparative advertisement. Tsai's team highlights the advantages of Taiwanese identity by comparing living in other countries with living in Taiwan. The dialogues between overseas Taiwanese and foreigners made the advantages of living in Taiwan or being Taiwanese, such as having a powerful passport, better social security, and universal health care, more objective and convincing. This well-being has been repeatedly voiced by both the DPP and KMT politicians to be well-known by most Taiwanese. When the good things about Taiwanese identity are confirmed by foreigners and overseas Taiwanese, the happiness of being Taiwanese seems to be more realistic for Taiwanese voters.

Each of the dialogues between overseas Taiwanese and foreigners creates a macro-structure or a topic of the video, that is, the merit of being Taiwanese or living in Taiwan. The macro-structures then lead to a super-structure of the video: Taiwanese identity is desirable and valuable from a global perspective, because Taiwanese can enjoy some well-being that is not available in many other countries.

Here we can see how Tsai's team interprets Taiwanese identity from a realistic and empirical perspective. Tsai implies in the video that Taiwanese identity is meaningful because this identity can provide Taiwanese with substantial happiness in their daily lives. In other words, Tsai does not promote Taiwanese identity as a normative belief, such as saying that you should have a Taiwanese identity simply because you are Taiwanese. That is the reason why the video uses the technique of comparative advertising to imply the value of Taiwanese identity. Finally, at the end of the video, Tsai's team adds a footnote to Taiwanese identity by saying that hopefully someday

Taiwan can be treated as a real independent country. This expectation once again proves that Tsai considers Taiwan to be an independent country and that Taiwanese identity is a national identity instead of merely a provincial identity.

**Video 2: Speak loudly (大聲說話)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jqtpKLSukwk>) (first launched on YouTube on 6 January, 2020, reaching 127,869 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January, 2020)

**Description of the video:**

The length of this video is 3 minutes and 10 seconds. A monologue goes through the whole video with matching scenes. The content of the monologue is as follows.

This is the lives we are used to living: your son plays electronic games all day; your daughter and others fight against each other on the Internet every day, and you go home by taking the last-time Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) train. You are worried originally. However, this year, you have started to treasure this kind of peaceful life. Just several hundred miles away, every day, numerous young people are arrested, detained, abused, or just disappear. So, the '1992 Consensus' is 'One Country, Two Systems.' So, the 'One Country; Two Systems' is a dictatorship. Some people have chosen to keep silent. Some people have chosen to seek a connection with the dictator. This year, the dictator has spoken loudly. Nevertheless, in the same year, the democratic camps have got together and spoken loudly. In this year, we finally have seen the face of the dictator; we also have heard the roar of democracy. This year, we really have realised for the first time, that no matter how different we are from each other, we all love the peaceful lives in this place. We all love this democratic and free country. Now, it is our turn for us to speak. The whole world is watching how Taiwan will speak loudly. Please take a look at our peaceful lives again. On what ground could we enjoy freedom and democracy? Please take a look at our children again. The answer is in their eyes. Without any hesitation, Taiwan will speak loudly that we have chosen to stand by democracy. We have chosen to stand by freedom. We have chosen to stand by the whole world. On 11 January, 2020, may we be proud of our consolidation.

The scenes of the video are mostly of the daily lives of grassroots Taiwanese, especially the activities of young people. One scene shows a male middle-aged worker reading a newspaper report with the headline saying that the R.O.C. deserves to have formal diplomatic relationships with other countries. The negative event described in the monologue and the matched scenes point to the 2019 Hong Kong

turbulence; the dictators alluded to are the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. The video ends by showing the names of Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate Lai Ching-te with Tsai's campaign slogan '2020 Taiwan must win.'

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

Fairclough (2005) emphasises that a text is usually a negotiation of between the author's private discourse and his or her recognition of the public's relevant discourse. Sometimes the two discourses are consistent; sometimes a negotiation between the two discourses is necessary for publishing the text. In Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, for Tsai, the most important discourse was how to defeat her rival in the presidential race. However, after the Hong Kong turbulence escalated in 2019 and was the focus of news reports in Taiwan's media, Tsai's team has to consider how to respond to the Hong Kong situation to increase the public's support of her and the DPP. Thus, strictly speaking, although Hong Kong's situation was not directly related to Taiwan's presidential election, Tsai's team decided to prioritise the Hong Kong discourse in her campaign agenda and launched this video. As indicated by Tsai's 2020 campaign spokesperson Juan Chao-hsiung,

Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement was not triggered by us, but we have the same belief in democracy and freedom as Hong Kong's demonstrators. We know that Taiwanese people cannot accept unification between Taiwan and mainland China, and Taiwanese people treasure democracy and freedom of speech. The DPP has grasped this opinion of the public and then invites Internet celebrities to echo and strengthen this opinion in relevant campaign videos. (Juan, Chao-hsiung)

While talking about the video, a Washington Post article (Fifield, 2020) also mentions the connection between the Hong Kong situation and Taiwan's 2020 presidential election.

Voters had seen many videos in the final months of the campaign, but this one caused ripples because of how starkly it holds up Hong Kong as an example of the kind of future that Taiwan could face if it agreed to closer ties with China.

In fact, the content analysis results of Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos indicate that Tsai, in those campaigns, did not particularly care about the Hong Kong issue, Tsai being more concerned about Taiwan's economic development and social justice in Taiwanese society. Those were the critical issues in Tsai's attacks on her KMT rivals. By the end of 2019, with the Hong Kong turmoil becoming serious, Tsai immediately changes the focus of her campaign from urging people to vote for her again to a warning that the status quo of Hong Kong can be the future of Taiwan. This is actually a negotiation between Tsai's original campaign agenda and the most updated public discourse. Tsai agrees to make this negotiation because she can interpret the Hong Kong crisis as a potential threat to Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy. Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with her enduring opposition to the 1992 Consensus between China and Taiwan and the idea of 'One Country; Two Systems' proposed by mainland China for governing Hong Kong.

In the video, another negotiation is the appearance of the words 'R.O.C.' in the headline of a newspaper article. A scene shows that a middle-aged male Taiwanese was reading the article attentively. The content analysis results indicate that, among Tsai's 2020 campaign videos, the name 'R.O.C.' is a symbolic arrangement not having been found in Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos. As indicated above, it is Tsai's compromise to sometimes include R.O.C. into her national identity for the

purpose of marginalising the KMT and striving for support from voters who still have the R.O.C. national identity.

**Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

The style or the micro-structure of the video is heavy and serious. Most of the scenes in the video are just episodes of Taiwanese youngsters' normal lives, they are not put together into an integrated storyline. The scenes and the monologue admit that many Taiwanese young people are not living commendable lives, and that the general public is living boring lives. These scenes are persuasive to a certain extent, because they fit some voters' general impressions of Taiwanese society.

Then, the description of the bland lives of people in Taiwan is contrasted with Hong Kong's unquiet situation in 2019. This contrast leads to the macro-structure of the video: life in Taiwan is living in peace, because the DPP government has maintained Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy. This macro-structure is also persuasive to a certain extent because the news reports about Hong Kong's turmoil do mention some of Hong Kong's young protestors being arrested and detained by the police. Furthermore, Hong Kong had become a part of China, being ruled by Beijing and governed by the principle of 'One Country; Two systems.'

To make the macro-structure more persuasive, the video describes the Hong Kong government's repression of the turmoil as the behaviour of a dictatorship. That is certainly a rhetorical statement about the Hong Kong government's management of social order because the video neither defines what a dictatorship is nor does the video mention some Hong Kong citizens' opposition to young protestors' damage to

the city's public assets. Tsai just uses the Hong Kong situation to justify her rejection of the idea of 'One Country; Two Systems' and takes the chance to stress that the DPP government is the protector of Taiwan's freedom and democracy.

In addition, the video also implies that, although some Taiwanese young people are not as diligent as their parents expected, at least they can live in a democratic country and enjoy the freedom of speech; they, unlike their counterparts in Hong Kong, will not be arrested, detained, or even disappeared as long as the DPP is still the ruling party of Taiwan. This is another implication of the video's macro-structure: the targeting of support from young voters for Tsai's second term of the presidency.

Overall, the video is implying a super-structure concerning two things. First, Taiwan is a country that deserves all Taiwanese to identify with, because, compared to Hong Kong, Taiwanese people can enjoy the freedom of speech and democracy. Second, Taiwanese identity must be carefully protected rather than taken for granted by Taiwanese citizens. While China constantly urges Taiwan to accept 'One Country; Two Systems' for re-unification between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Hong Kong situation clearly has demonstrated the negative consequences of being controlled by Beijing. Therefore, Taiwanese voters should protect Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy by supporting Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, the leader and the party who resolutely opposes re-unification and 'One Country; Two Systems.'

**Video 3: We are all in R.O.C. (中華民國不分你我)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJKa1NOhXhg>) (first launched on YouTube on 8 October, 2019, reaching 7,990 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January, 2020)

**Description of the video:**

This is a 30-second video which focuses on the R.O.C. identity. Several scenes delineate how the R.O.C. flag is related to Taiwanese people's lives. A monologue appears in the video as follows.

It is in children's drawings; in the rhythm of youngsters' dancing; in our daily lives, and in the travelling packs of every journey. There is no need to fight or make slogans about it.

Then, the video shows Tsai in the presidential palace saying 'You and I are all in the R.O.C.' A soundbite of Tsai continues: 'National defence of Taiwan needs you and me.' The video then ends with Tsai's campaign slogan '2020, Taiwan must win.'

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

The video was launched two days before the R.O.C.'s 2019 National Day. Thus, it can be considered a film issued for the occasion by the president of R.O.C. This campaign video has caused many ripples, because in the history of Tsai's three presidential campaigns, from 2012 to 2020, it was the first time Tsai explicitly chose the R.O.C. identity as the main topic in one of her campaign videos.

The video immediately attracted the media's attention with Tsai's 2020 presidential rival presenting a severe critique, and with Sun Ta-chien (孫大千), a former KMT legislator and core staff member of Han Kuo-yu's campaign team, accusing Tsai of making a fraudulent appeal for votes with this release of this video (ETtoday, 2019). Sun's denunciation reflects the unusualness of Tsai's demonstration of the R.O.C. identity. As shown by the content analysis results of Tsai's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos, she only implied Taiwanese identity in all of her previous campaign videos. Then, why did Tsai launch a video to demonstrate the R.O.C. identity in her 2020 presidential campaign? Interviewee John Wen explains this video.



It's a campaign strategy. 'R.O.C. Taiwan' means Taiwan is an independent country. Tsai has changed the discourse of national identity to target the voters who have the R.O.C. identity or both Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity. Tsai affirmed her legitimate position as the R.O.C. Taiwan's president and the R.O.C. Taiwan's sovereignty (John Wen).

Liao Tai-siang (廖泰祥) (Newtalk, 8 October, 2019), one of the spokespersons of Tsai's 2020 presidential campaign office, indicates that Tsai has decided to launch the video for two reasons. First, she wants to declare clearly that, as the president of the R.O.C., she is continuously making efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the R.O.C. from the threats of mainland China. Second, the video is a counterattack to the KMT's accusation that Tsai does not recognise the legitimacy of the R.O.C. or the R.O.C.'s flag.

Liao's explanation actually highlights that Tsai's R.O.C. video is a negotiation between her original Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity in two regards. First, for Tsai, it is undeniable that she is the incumbent president of the R.O.C. at the time of the launching of the video. Since the name and the flag of R.O.C. are officially related to her presidency, it is negotiable for Tsai to occasionally recognise the national symbol of the R.O.C. Second, ignoring or avoiding the national symbols of the R.O.C. was becoming an excuse for Tsai's rival to attack her credibility as being the president of the R.O.C. In addition, it was becoming an issue about her personal character, with potential damage to her presidential campaign. In fact, in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, one significant phenomenon was the appropriation and strong support of the R.O.C. flag by the KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu and his supporters. As a reporter (Wang, 2019) indicates in Taiwan's Commonwealth Magazine, 'Han has given people who are patriotic the chance to see national flags at his side.' Han's strong support and ubiquitous use of the R.O.C. flag puts pressure on

Tsai's ignoring the national symbols of the R.O.C. Thus, although Tsai's national identity is Taiwanese identity, she chooses to compromise her personal national identity with the R.O.C. identity. One of the interviewees, Juan Chao-hsiung, the spokesperson of Tsai's 2020 campaign office, explains the reason for making this video.

DPP supporters use 'Taiwan' to refer to the country, but we need to take the 'R.O.C.' into account. Young voters accept the term 'R.O.C. Taiwan.' They have waved the R.O.C. flag in international sporting games to cheer up Taiwan's athletes. Furthermore, we want to highlight that 'R.O.C. Taiwan' is undoubtedly a different country from mainland China. (Juan Chao-hsiung)

In addition, the DPP's avoidance of the national symbols of the R.O.C. allows the KMT to monopolise the R.O.C. identity in presidential races, as well as offering the KMT an excuse to attack the DPP's loyalty to the country. To break through this situation and to win votes from those who disliked the KMT's presidential candidates but still have the R.O.C. identity, it is a wise negotiation for the DPP to recognise the national symbols of the R.O.C. on some occasions, such as in National Day celebrations or presidential elections. After all, it is reasonable for the DPP to assume that at least some independent voters might agree that the R.O.C. president ought to identify with the R.O.C. As interviewee Juan Chao-hsiung, Tsai's spokesman, notes, making a video to recognise the R.O.C. identity is a strategy to urge support from those who have the R.O.C. identity but dislike the KMT's candidate Han Kuo-yu. It was a negotiation between Tsai's Taiwanese national identity and some voters' R.O.C. national identity.

Tsai agreed to make some videos containing symbols related to the R.O.C. identity. It was done to win votes from voters a disliking Han Kuo-yu yet have a strong R.O.C. identity. Tsai has used the term 'R.O.C. Taiwan' as the greatest common denominator of Taiwan's national identity to appeal to the greatest number of voters. (Juan Chao-hsiung)

### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

This is a campaign video in which Tsai recognises the R.O.C. identity. In the video, Tsai admits that she is a member of the R.O.C. However, a deeper inspection of the

video will find that the micro-structure or the style of the video was to downplay the significance of the R.O.C. identity or to demonstrate the DPP's reluctant recognition of the R.O.C. identity.

The scenes of the video stress that it is normal to see the R.O.C. flag in people's daily lives, such as on a kid's drawing, driver's license, a person's passport, or on a playground. It is also often seen in international sporting games and events such as the waving of the R.O.C. flag by Taiwan's cheerleading squads on playing fields. The monologue in this video is saying that there is no need to fight or to come up with a slogan for the R.O.C. identity. This micro-structure implies that it is unnecessary to emphasise the existence of the R.O.C. identity. It delivers the impression that Tsai has nothing, in particular, to say about the R.O.C. identity. In fact, it is a 30-second short video in which no deliberation of the R.O.C. identity is included.

Two macro-structures or main topics are included in the video. The first is Tsai's pronouncement that you and I are all in the R.O.C., with a scene showing Tsai making this statement in the presidential palace as the president of the country. In light of Tsai's inclination towards Taiwanese identity and her usual avoidance of the R.O.C. identity, this declaration was so surprising that the spokesperson for Tsai's 2020 campaign office needed to provide further explanation for the video. However, Tsai is expressing her recognition of the R.O.C. identity in the presidential palace. It is actually a purposive arrangement to indicate that it is not an issue for her to mention the official name of the country, after all, she is the president of the R.O.C. So, the scene and this proclamation is a way for Tsai to directly counterattack KMT's accusation that she does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the R.O.C. However,

interviewee Travis Fan, a senior political news reporter, indicates that juxtaposing the terms of R.O.C. and Taiwan is a way to claim that the R.O.C. is Taiwan, although the Constitution of the country regulates that Taiwan is just a province of the R.O.C.

The DPP's strategy is to integrate the terms of R.O.C. and Taiwan. To raise the term of 'R.O.C. Taiwan' is to claim Taiwan's sovereignty in a blurred way. (Travis Fan)

The second macro-structure of the video is Tsai's other claim in the video. It came out immediately after Tsai proclaimed that you and I are all in the R.O.C. Tsai's second claim is: 'National defence of Taiwan needs you and me.' Here we can see how fast Tsai turns the R.O.C. identity back to Taiwanese identity. The critical implication of this second claim is that the R.O.C. is just an official name of the country; whereas Taiwan is the place all Taiwanese people need to defend in a concerted manner.

The two macro-structures then lead to the super-structure of the video, that is, the integration or coexistence of Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity. In Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, Tsai's new reference to the country as the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' became the most significant issue of national identity.

In her victory speech on 11 January, 2020, Tsai referred to Taiwan as the 'R.O.C. Taiwan, such a beautiful and brave country.' Tsai also mentioned the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' to international media. After being re-elected as the president of Taiwan, Tsai accepted an interview from the BBC on 14 January, 2020 and told the interviewer that 'We are already an independent country with the name of R.O.C. Taiwan.' Thus, the video analysed here is actually a prelude to Tsai's new concept of national identity as the 'R.O.C. Taiwan.' Referring to the idea of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan,'

Tsai's spokesperson Juan Chao-hsiung further notes that unity and solidarity are the most important appeals for an incumbent candidate like Tsai in the presidential election. As the president, Tsai is responsible for integrating people who have different national identities in Taiwan.

President Tsai needs to demonstrate her intelligence as the incumbent president of Taiwan. The most convincing discourse of national identity needed to emphasise solidarity. This strategy also might get more votes from the public. (Juan Chao-hsiung)

Juan also points out that although the R.O.C.'s Constitution states that the country's territory includes mainland China and Taiwan, the reality is that the government of the R.O.C. can only control Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Therefore, Juan argues, the symbol 'R.O.C.' has to be adjusted from the R.O.C. into the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' to fit people's image of reality.

Juan stresses that the DPP knows that the national identity of the party's supporters is Taiwanese national identity and that they consider Taiwan to be an independent country rather than just a province of the R.O.C. But Tsai Ing-wen also needs votes from those who disliked Han Kuo-yu but still identify themselves as citizens of the R.O.C. Therefore, the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' became the greatest common denominator of Taiwan's national identity. Yet, Juan stresses, 'we insisted that our country is not a part of mainland China, this principle is clear.'

Juan also emphasises that although most of Tsai's young supporters have Taiwanese national identity; they should be able to accept the moniker of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan.' Juan argues that when Taiwan's youngsters cheer for Taiwanese players in international sports games, they wave the R.O.C. flag. Another in-depth interviewee,

a Taiwanese rhetoric scholar, John Wen, maintains that Tsai's definition of the R.O.C. is different from that of the KMT; Tsai uses Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement and holds an anti-China attitude in her campaign videos. Wen further argues that Tsai is not afraid of losing young voters' support with the identity of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan', as long as she still expresses antagonism towards mainland China.

Overall, the discourse analysis results indicate that Tsai's 2020 campaign videos still emphasised Taiwanese identity. The reason some videos compare the lives of people in Taiwan with those in other countries and Hong Kong is to highlight the values of Taiwanese identity in terms of Taiwan's better social security, health insurance, freedom of speech, and democracy. Another finding is to strive for support from those who still have the R.O.C. identity and to counterattack the KMT's questioning about Tsai's national identity, Tsai has chosen to recognise the R.O.C. identity in her campaign communications, as she even has integrated the original Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity into a new national identity of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan.' In the next section, I present the content analysis and discourse analysis results of Han Kuo-yu's 2020 campaign videos.

## **7.2 The Symbolic representations of national identity in Han Kuo-yu's 2020 presidential election campaign videos**

### **7.2.1 symbolic representations of Han's national Identity**

Table 7.3 shows the titles of Han Kuo-yu's 2020 campaign videos. Three major categories of topics were included to demonstrate Han's personal image, his campaign platforms, and celebrities' recommendations for Han. Compared with the

quantities of Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu's presidential campaign videos in 2012 and 2016, Han launched fewer videos in his 2020 presidential race.

Regarding the national identity stance implied in the videos, Table 7.4 shows that Han implies both Taiwanese and R.O.C. identities in his campaign videos. Among the 13 videos, dual identity appeared eight times and 'Taiwanese identity only' five times. None of the videos only imply the R.O.C. identity. In other words, unlike KMT's 2012 and 2016 campaign videos which implied a dual identity throughout, Han's 2020 videos implied a dual identity only in some of his campaign videos. But that does not mean that Han has a different national identity stance from that of Ma Ying-jeou or Eric Chu. In fact, for Han, the only legitimate national identity is still the R.O.C. identity, whereas the Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity.

From the beginning of the 2020 campaign, Han defined his presidential race as 'a battle to protect the R.O.C.' (中華民國保衛戰) In each large-scale campaign rally, most participants waved the R.O.C. flag or put the flag logo on their clothing. So, there is no doubt that Han has a strong R.O.C. national identity. At the same time, Han's major campaign slogan is 'Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich.' (台灣安全, 人民有錢) This is the clearest evidence that, like Ma and Chu, Han also invokes Taiwanese identity in his campaign. Yet, for Han, Ma, and Chu, this Taiwanese identity is not a national identity but just a provincial identity. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, KMT's basic identity stance is 'I am Taiwanese; I am also a citizen of R.O.C.'

Han's 2020 videos, as Table 7.4 shows, propose policies focusing on 'Keep Taiwan Secure' (12 times), and 'Make People Rich.' (11 times) These appeals are the main

themes of Han's presidential campaign, with the slogan 'Make People Rich' being an extension to Han's 2018 Kaohsiung mayoral election slogan 'Goods go out, people Come in, Kaohsiung makes a fortune.' (貨出去, 人進來, 高雄發大財) Because the slogan was effective in the mayoral election, Han extends and uses it in his presidential campaign. The implication of 'Keep Taiwan Secure' involves Taiwan's national defence and stable social order. Han does not explicitly mention cross-Strait policy in his videos; he only emphasises domestic prosperity and stability. Han's campaign videos fully demonstrate that the most important mission for a new leader of Taiwan is to develop the economy. In the videos, most policies are related to 'Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich', these being the main claims of Han's 2020 national identity appeals. Because the slogans are all about Taiwan, it is a clear indication of Han's Taiwanese identity.

Regarding the signs or slogans in Han's videos, Table 7.4 shows that the name 'Taiwan' (8 times) and the slogan of 'Resume Taiwan's Glory' (8 times) appear frequently. These most frequently appearing signs and slogans also highlight Han's Taiwanese identity concerning Taiwan's economic development and the future prospects for Taiwan's younger generations. Han's videos challenge Tsai's first-term presidential performance. For instance, one video urges Taiwan to 'Resume Glory' and attacks the DPP for Taiwan's economic recession and inferior status in the international society. Han tries to persuade the electorate that he can revive Taiwan's economy and international status.

As for the scenes, Table 7.4 shows that, to imply Taiwanese identity, Han's videos portray local industry and people (6 times), Mayor Han in Kaohsiung (6 times), and



Han interacting with grassroots Taiwanese (5 times). The scenes of local industry and Han's interactions with the grassroots highlight Han's non-elite character and his concern for people's wellbeing. Han's interactions with farmers and fishermen are scenes showing his grassroots image and implying his Taiwanese identity. The scenes of Mayor Han in Kaohsiung are shown to persuade the electorate that he is a hard-working politician. Han had left political life for 17 years before being elected the mayor of Kaohsiung in 2018. He then became the KMT's presidential candidate in 2019. This personal history makes Han face two critiques---his limited achievements as a mayor and the label of a runaway mayor. Han chooses to emphasise his achievements in Kaohsiung to persuade the electorate that he can also be a capable national leader.

Han shows how he beat the DPP in Kaohsiung and improved the city's economic performance. Han received overseas orders for Kaohsiung's agricultural products, using them to persuade the electorate that if he becomes the president of the nation, people's lives will improve materially. This strategy aims to dissolve his 'runaway mayor' label.

In Han's videos, two songs and multi-ethnic languages are also used to imply Taiwanese identity, with the songs demonstrating Han's identification with Taiwan and people's appreciation of Han's concerns for Taiwanese people. Han speaks Mandarin in his videos (12 times), however, different languages, including Minnanyu (twice) and Hakka (once) also appear in the videos to show Han's respect for Taiwan's multi-ethnic groups.

In addition to implying Taiwanese identity, Han also uses some symbols to represent the R.O.C. identity. Han does not raise any platforms implying his R.O.C. identity; however, the R.O.C. flag (6 times) and the name of R.O.C. (once) appear in Han's videos. Moreover, the scenes showing Han's supporters waving the R.O.C. flag at campaign rallies (5 times) also imply the R.O.C. identity. In Han's videos, three theme songs were used to imply Han's R.O.C. identity. One of the songs namely 'Den Tapre Landsoldat' (in English meaning, 'I am now going to a war.') (我現在要出征) matches Han's self-positioning of his presidential race as a battle to protect the R.O.C.

The R.O.C. flag is displayed frequently in Han's videos as an important symbol of the R.O.C. identity; this may explain why Han does not mention the name R.O.C. frequently in his videos. In fact, in the videos, Han more often calls the country 'Taiwan' than 'R.O.C.' In other words, Han does not particularly show himself identifying with the R.O.C.; what he stresses is his concern about Taiwan's economy and people's lives. That implies his Taiwanese identity, even if it is strategic in nature.

Overall, Han's campaign videos mainly express his personal charisma, and his concerns about Taiwan's security, prosperity, and the younger generation's future. Han's campaign slogan 'Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich' clearly indicates his Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, Han defines his presidential race as a battle to protect the R.O.C., with the flag of the R.O.C. appearing frequently in his campaign videos. These are all evidence of Han's R.O.C. identity. Yet, in his campaign videos, Han himself emphasises Taiwanese identity more than the R.O.C.

identity. In fact, Han's camp has deeper considerations for not over emphasising Han's R.O.C. identity in campaign videos. Interviewee Chang Wu-ueh, Han's chief consultant, explains the considerations.

First, the national identity issue might intensify social cleavages and exacerbate cross-Strait tension. In addition, Han does have the same dual identity as Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu, but the campaign context has changed a lot since 2008. The China-U.S. relationship affected mainland China's policies toward Taiwan. It also has influenced the support from the U.S. for the candidates in Taiwan's presidential election. Thus, as a candidate in Taiwan's presidential election, Han needs to determine how to present his national identity, which national identity can satisfy the U.S. government and Taiwanese voters, and to maintain peaceful relations with mainland China. (Chang Wu-ueh)

Another in-depth interviewee Niu Tse-hsun also believes that Han's less emphasis on R.O.C. identity in campaign videos might be more acceptable to the U.S. government.

With mainland China basically keeping silent about Taiwan's presidential election, and with the U.S. government seeming to strongly support the DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen's anti-China stance, Han finally decided not to over emphasise his R.O.C. identity in his campaign videos but to talk more about his Taiwanese identity in the videos. (Niu Tse-hsun)

Han doesn't emphasise his R.O.C. identity in any of his campaign videos. The discourse of the R.O.C. identity might involve relations between Taiwan and Mainland China. Because cross-Strait interaction and the 1992 Consensus had been stigmatised by the DPP, Han's camp avoids making national identity ads. For Han's camp, this controversial issue is too sensitive to solve. The safest way is to just stress Han's Taiwanese identity in his campaign videos. (Niu Tse-hsun)

In addition, Han does not talk about the KMT's cross-Strait policies, nor does he display Chinese and Taiwanese culture in the video. According to interviewee Chang Wu-ueh, Han's chief campaign consultant, Han uses the word 'up' as the closing mark of most of his videos, deliberately weakening the KMT's image in each video.

Chang explains that

the main reasons for doing that are: First, Han is an atypical candidate; he wants to highlight his personal character instead of strengthening his image as a traditional KMT presidential candidate. Second, Han's vice-president candidate Chang San-cheng (張善政) is not a KMT

member then. Third, many of Han's supporters are not traditional KMT supporters. (Chang Wu-ueh)

The interviewees' opinions indicate that Han does have a deeper consideration about how to imply his Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity in campaign videos. In the next section, I present the results of discourse analysis on three of Han's campaign videos to further demonstrate the rationales behind the symbolic representations of Han's dual identity.

### **Table 7.3 Han Kuo-yu's 2020 campaign videos**

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1. Den Tapre Landsoldat (我現在要出征)
2. Starts from the south of Taiwan; to resume Taiwan's glory (從南方出發, 重現台灣榮光)
3. Step by step, being a pragmatic person: Li Si-chuan (一步一步務實地做, 李四川)
4. Policy for the young generation: entrepreneurship, bid for investment (青年創業, 招商引資)
5. The shining blue sky (耀眼新藍天)
6. Waiting for a person (等一個人)
7. The navigation of national policies, Taiwan takes off: Celebrities' recommendations (國政領航, 台灣起飛: 名人推薦篇)
8. Policy of the young generation: young and old live together: social housing (青銀共住, 社會住宅)
9. Millions of grassroots stand up to the rally party(百萬庶民站出來, 凱道勝選晚會)
10. Taiwan upgrades, the glory will appear again (美好再現, 台灣再起)
11. We will let Taiwan be a prosperous country again (有你有我, 讓臺灣重返光榮)
12. Connecting to international society: student loans (國際接軌, 學生貸款)
13. Han Kuo-yu's campaign video: several mayors' support (韓國瑜競選廣告: 縣市首長篇)

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Note: All the videos are collected from YouTube.

### **Table 7.4 Symbolic representations of dual identity in Han's 2020 campaign videos**

#### **Symbolic representations of Taiwanese identity:**

##### **Platform/policy:**

to strengthen Taiwan's national defense (12 times), Taiwan's economy (12)

**Sign/slogan:**

the name of Taiwan (8), resume Taiwan's glory (8), Taiwan Secure, People Rich (12)

**Scene:**

Taiwan's local industry (6), Mayor Han in Kaohsiung (6), Han interacts with grassroots Taiwanese (5)

**Song:**

Red flower rain (紅花雨) (1), waiting for one person (等一個人) (1)

**Language:**

Mandarin (12), Minnanyu (2), Hakka (1)

**Symbolic representations of R.O.C. identity:****Sign/slogan:**

R.O.C. flag (6), name of the R.O.C. (1)

**Scene:**

Han's supporters show love for the R.O.C. flag (5)

**Song:**

the anthem of the R.O.C. flag (國旗歌) (1), The shining new blue sky (耀眼新藍天) (1), Den Tapre Landsoldat (我現在要出征) (1)

**Overall stance of identity in each video:**

Taiwanese identity only (5), R.O.C. identity only (0), dual identity (8)

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Note 1: A total of 13 Han's 2020 campaign videos were found on Internet and included in the content analysis. The coding scheme includes 6 categories and a total of 72 sub-categories.

Note 2: A video may contain multiple platforms/policies, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages.

Note 3: The inter-coder reliability is 0.93. The formula of inter-coder reliability is  $R = 2M / (N1 + N2)$  where R is inter-coder reliability coefficient; M is the identical coding decisions of 2 coders; N1 and N2 are the numbers of coding decisions each coder makes. In this analysis,  $R = 2 \times 870 / (72 \times 13 + 72 \times 13) = 0.93$ .

**7.2.2 The rationale behind Han's symbolic representations of national identity**

**Video 1: Start from the south of Taiwan; to resume Taiwan's glory (從南方出發, 重現台灣榮光)** (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yn0VJ1V3g4>) (first launched on YouTube on 2 November, 2019, reaching 647,873 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January, 2020)

**Description of the video:**

This is a 30-second short video. Han Kuo-yu reads the monologue as follows.

My good friends, since I was elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung City, my administrative team has cleaned the city's ditches for 3,000 kilometres, re-paved 230 roads, and launched Taiwan's first bilingual education programmes in elementary schools. I hope that after Kaohsiung becomes better, all of Taiwan will attach more importance to education, care more about vulnerable groups, and make great efforts to take care of the grassroots people. Kaohsiung has become better; Taiwan will be better.

Several scenes appear in the video to match Han's monologue. Most of the scenes are the records of Mayor Han and his Kaohsiung colleague's daily work. The video then ends with the subtitles of 'Start from the south; Resume Taiwan's glory,' and 'R.O.C. presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu, Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich.'

**Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

At the first glance, this is just a short documentary video, showing what Han has done for Kaohsiung since he took over the mayor's office in December, 2018. However, it is actually a campaign video to justify his decision to run for the presidency of Taiwan. Legally speaking, he had the right to join the 2020 presidential race, even though he had just started the mayor's work in Kaohsiung only 9 months before the 2020 presidential election. His decision to run for the presidency indicates that he has at least a certain extent of confidence in his victory in the presidential election.

However, the decision only reflects his private discourse about his personal political career. People, especially the voters in Kaohsiung may have different

thinking about Han's running away to seek the presidency, and the DPP also grabbing the chance to attack Han for his 'abandonment' of Kaohsiung. In this case, the video analysed here can be considered as a negotiation between Han's decision for the presidency and the public's suspicion about his credibility as a committed politician. In other words, in the presidential campaign, Han can only show his Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity as well as his ideal of ruling the whole country to urge people's support; he still makes the video to argue that what he has done for Kaohsiung will predict what he can achieve as the president of Taiwan. For Han, this is negotiable and persuasive to make sense of Kaohsiung identity to Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity.

Thus, the video itself indicates how necessary it is for Han to explain why his identification with Kaohsiung can be or even should be transferred into identification with Taiwan. After all, as an article in 'The Diplomat' (Reichenbach, 2020) notes, 'Han is accused of neglecting his mayoral duties and abandoning Kaohsiung during his presidential campaign.' British researcher Dafydd Fell also indicates in a press interview (Thomas, 2020) that leaving the mayor's office of Kaohsiung inevitably harmed Han's presidential campaign. Fell notes that

Han's decision to first seek the KMT nomination for the presidential candidate so soon after being elected meant that it was inevitable, he would alienate a large section of the Kaohsiung electorate, including many that actually voted for him in 2018.

Fell and Reichenbach's observations fully describe Han's predicament of being labelled as a 'runaway' mayor by his opponent in the presidential campaign. His decision to launch this video indicates his attempt to negotiate with the public,

especially the Kaohsiung citizens, by saying that his remarkable achievements in Kaohsiung deserve to be extended to the whole country. The reason for Han to raise the slogan ‘Start from the south, Resume Taiwan’s glory’ in the video is to argue that his Taiwanese identity stemmed from Kaohsiung identity. It was to argue that Kaohsiung is a part of Taiwan, therefore, a resumed glory in Taiwan entails an even better future for Kaohsiung.

At last, it is interesting to find that, at the end of the video, Han identifies himself as the ‘R.O.C. presidential candidate.’ It is a self-identification not found in Ma Ying-jeou or Eric Chu’s campaign videos. This self-calling appears with Han’s campaign slogan ‘Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich.’ Thus, the content of the video and all the ending subtitles demonstrate that, for Han, the Kaohsiung identity, Taiwanese identity, and the R.O.C. identity are all connected instead of mutually exclusive.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk’s framework:**

The micro-structure or the rhetoric of the video is quite obvious. Han tries to use this video to persuade people, especially the Kaohsiung citizens, that it is a reasonable decision for him to run for the presidency after only being elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung 9 months previously.

In the video, Han reads the monologue by himself. It is a way to show his willingness to face the public’s suspicions or questions and to explain the decision personally. The scenes showing Han working in Kaohsiung serve two purposes. First, they are a reminder of Han’s involvement in the city’s administration. Second, the visual images of Han working as mayor are more convincing than just a series of statistics about Han’s achievements as the mayor of Kaohsiung.



Han mentions three major works that he accomplished in Kaohsiung, including cleaning the city's ditches for 3,000 kilometres, re-paving 230 roads, and launching Taiwan's first bilingual education program in elementary schools. These are the works that Han is most proud of, because they are closely related to Kaohsiung people's daily lives and the younger generation's future but had never been completed before by the former DPP mayors of Kaohsiung. Han's mentioning of these achievements in the video means that he is confident that the accomplishments are undeniable.

At the micro-structure level, Han indicates what he has done for Kaohsiung. Those facts together lead to the macro-structure of the video; that is, of his being an administrator with unparalleled courage and efficiency. Based on this macro-structure, Han raises the super-structure or the overall idea of the video as 'Start from the south, Resume Taiwan's glory.' This super-structure has three implications.

First, if he were an incapable politician, he would be unqualified to run for the presidency of Taiwan. Second, Kaohsiung's citizens should not only care about their own happiness; they should be glad to see Taiwan's other cities become better as Kaohsiung has experienced under Han's administration. Third, and the most intentional for Han, the starting point of Taiwanese identity is to identify with the city of Taiwan. That is an interesting argument, as this is the first time Taiwanese identity is defined as a provincial identity that composes of identities with respective cities in Taiwan. In other words, what Han tries to argue is that he is not abandoning his mayoral office in Kaohsiung for the presidential palace in Taipei; he is just starting his work to resume Taiwan's glory by first making Kaohsiung better than ever.

Interviewee Chung Po-Chung indicates that anyway, Han has to justify his decision for joining the 2020 presidential election. Making Kaohsiung identity a starting point for Taiwanese identity might be the only possible argument for Han.

Han raises the campaign slogan ‘Starts from the south’ to imply that his Taiwanese or even R.O.C. identity stems from his concerns about Kaohsiung citizens’ happiness. That is a strategy to justify his decision to join the 2020 presidential election. In other words, Han tries to make Kaohsiung the starting point of his idea to keep Taiwan secure and to make Taiwanese people rich; he just tries to argue that he will never abandon Kaohsiung. (Chung Po-Chung)

Another interviewee, a senior political news reporter Yang Hsiang-chun also notes that it is difficult for Han to justify his decision to join the presidential race. He has to figure out a way to connect Kaohsiung identity with Taiwanese identity.

Han has to explain why he joined the presidential election after he was just elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung for less than one year. So, he re-defines his runaway as ‘Starts from the south.’ His rhetoric is that ‘My love for Taiwan starts from my concerns about Kaohsiung.’ I wonder how many Kaohsiung citizens would accept this rhetoric; but Han has no choice but to make a plausible reason for his decision to run for the presidency. (Yang Hsiang-chun)

## **Video 2: Den Tapre Landsoldat (我現在要出征)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kozn0q6tf4k>) (first launched on YouTube on 18 October, 2019, reaching 370,129 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January, 2020)

### **Description of the video:**

This is a 30-second short video where Han sings his campaign song ‘Den Tapre Landsoldat’ (我現在要出征) in Mandarin as the theme song of the video. In the middle of the video, some people begin singing the song along with Han. The song was originally a Danish military song. The title of it means ‘A Brave Soldier’ in English. The song was translated into Chinese over 50 years ago. Many Taiwanese people are familiar with it. The Chinese title of the song means ‘I am going out to

battle.’ Han has chosen the song as his major campaign song. The lyrics of the song are as follows.

I am going out for battle; I am going out for battle. A beauty wants to be my company, my God! A beauty wants to be in my company. You definitely can’t go with me; I am going out to battle! If I can survive the battle, I will come back to see you. If the enemy does not invade my country, how can I leave you for battle? However, every citizen in my country needs my protection. That is why I have to go out to battle. Aha! Aha! Aha!

Several scenes appear to match the theme song. In those scenes, people of different genders, ages, and occupations all show a cheer-up gesture. One scene then shows Han with a very serious expression on his face walking on a grass field and then looking up at the sky. The video then depicts a mosaic picture where Han and his supporters are giving the same cheer-up gesture. The ending subtitle of the video is: Star from the South, Resume Taiwan’s Glory. R.O.C.’s presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu, Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich.

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough’s framework:**

This video looks like a normal campaign video where Han and his supporters are just showing their resolution to win the 2020 presidential election. However, the video actually opens up about Han’s difficult decision to leave the mayoral office in Kaohsiung for the presidential palace in Taipei and serve all the people living in Taiwan.

The theme song of this video fully reflects Han’s expectation to make a negotiation with Kaohsiung’s electorate. As an article in the Internet magazine ‘The Diplomat’ indicates (Reichenbach, 2020).

initially, Han grabbed Taiwan's attention when he exploded into the limelight as a fringe KMT player who unexpectedly won the 2018 mayoral election in Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second most populated city. This victory was surprising because Kaohsiung has long been considered a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stronghold, with its last KMT mayor being Wu Den-yih in 1998.

As soon as Han was elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung, his name began to be frequently tested in public opinion polls for the likelihood of being elected as the president of Taiwan in 2020. With most polls indicating Han having a good chance of winning the 2020 presidential election, he finally decided to join the KMT's primary election for the presidential candidacy only nine months after having started his mayoral administration. As mentioned above, it was a difficult decision for Han to make, because the decision would inevitably trigger the disappointment of some Kaohsiung citizens, as well as political rival's attacking him for shirking his mayoral duties. As the article on 'The Diplomat' notes (Reichenbach, 2020),

after announcing his presidential candidacy, early polls showed Han with a nearly 30-point lead over incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. But eventually, his popularity faltered, and polls swung in the other direction, leading to Tsai's landslide victory in January 2020. Now, voters in Kaohsiung are calling for Han to be removed from the mayor's office.

The early polls made Han confident in his victory in the presidential election; however, when Han became the KMT's 2020 presidential candidate, after just having been elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung 9 months before. It was natural that some Kaohsiung citizens opposed and disagreed with Han's bigger political ambition. Thus, the video analysed here indicates that Han tries to negotiate by saying that, first of all, he has been forced to join the presidential race; second, he promises that no matter whether he wins or loses the race, he will definitely continue to serve Kaohsiung. All

these ideas are represented in the lyrics of the campaign theme song. As a news report indicates (EBC news, 16 October, 2019),

the lyric of the song fully reflects Han's situation and mood---especially the words 'If I can survive the battle, I will come back to see you. If the enemy does not invade my country, how can I leave you for battle? However, every citizen in my country needs my protection.' These sentences can be used to explain why he join the presidential election after only taking over the mayor's office in Kaohsiung for 9 months.

The lyrics say: 'If the enemy does not invade my country, how can I leave you for battle?' Here the enemy's invasion implies the DPP destroying the R.O.C.'s legitimacy, and thus, as the protector of the R.O.C., Han argues that he has been forced to join the presidential election to protect his country. The lyrics also say, 'If I can survive the battle, I will come back to see you.' This is a critical part of the negotiation. What Han tried to persuade Kaohsiung citizens is that if he wins the presidential election, he will continue to make the city better during his presidential administration. If he loses the race, he will also come back to serve Kaohsiung as the mayor of the city. So, what Han wants to imply in the theme song is that he has to leave Kaohsiung temporarily to fight for the R.O.C. identity; but he will still hold his promises and identification with Kaohsiung and Taiwan.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's framework:**

According to Van Dijk (2018), the micro-structure of a text refers to the style or rhetoric of the text. The style of the video is moving and tragic. Han sings the theme song by himself; the lyrics of the song can be seen as fully reflecting his mood of finally deciding to join the 2020 presidential election. The lyrics describe a man forced to go out for battle, because his country has been invaded and his people need

protection. In the lyrics, the man also promises that if he survives the battle, he will come home to see his lover. The whole song then shows Han's rhetoric regarding his decision to run for the presidency.

The song provides Han with the argument that, because the enemy has invaded his country and his people need his protection, he is forced to join the presidential race. This is certainly a metaphorical description of the DPP's avoidance of the R.O.C. identity. The description also matches Han's definition of his presidential campaign as a battle to protect the R.O.C., and his accusation that the incumbent DPP President Tsai Ing-wen totally ignores the legitimacy of the R.O.C.

The lyrics of the theme song also contained the man's promise that if he can survive the battle, he will come back to see his lover. Han used this part of the lyrics to imply that no matter whether he wins or loses the presidential election, he will continue to take care of Kaohsiung citizens and ensure their happiness. This is Han's critical promise to Kaohsiung's electorate; if he becomes the president of the country, he will not forget the city in the south of Taiwan.

Han chooses the song as the micro-structure of the video not only because it can function as a symbolic representation for his justification to join the presidential election, but also because the song is so familiar to many Taiwanese people, so an explanation of its meaning is not needed. In the middle of the video, some people at the campaign rally are depicted as singing along with Han, as the video also shows people of different social backgrounds all giving a cheer-up gesture for Han. This implies that Han's justification for the video is understood and accepted by many Taiwanese people.

Thus, the song and the images of people together lead to the macro-structure of the video; that is, Han finally making his decision to run for the presidency of the country: it was not to run away from his mayoralty of Kaohsiung; it is a soldier to fight for his country's legitimacy, and he promises to return if he survives from the battle. This macro-structure then leads to the super-structure presented by the ending subtitles of the video: Han is a politician with the R.O.C. identity and Taiwanese identity. The way he realises the dual identity is to join the presidential election and to keep Taiwan secure as well as to make people rich. Furthermore, his fight for this dual identity stems from his identification with Kaohsiung, the largest city in the south of Taiwan.

**Video 3: The shining blue sky (耀眼新藍天)**

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJFTiah7ksw>) (first launched on YouTube on 3 December, 2019, reaching 234,874 viewing times on data collection day, 14 January, 2020)

**Description of the video:**

It is a 1 minute and 34 seconds video. One of Han's rock-style campaign songs permeates the video. The lyrics of the song are as follows.

Walking sweaty on the soil; ploughing every field of heart with footprints. Changing will finally come, let us create a new blue sky together. Be diligent every moment; the grief and the bitterness will finally become sweet. Raising your warm hands, let us create a new blue sky. Walking ahead step by step; never give up all the way. Fearless of a storm, no compromise; let the future be brighter. Follow me, up! Go fighting, up! Make your dreams bravely; grit your teeth and break through the limitation. The dark clouds will disappear, and the blue sky will show up. Follow me, up! To fight passionately and don't back off. Just stand firm and overcome the crisis. The day must come!

The matching scenes are Han's close interactions with some people, including policemen, military officers, farmers, labour workers, youngsters, disabled persons and supporters in the rallies. Several shots show Han's serious facial expressions. The video then ends with the subtitle 'The shining new blue sky.'

### **Discourse analysis based on Fairclough's framework:**

This video implies Han's dual identity. What Han tries to show in the video is that he has both a strong Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity. It is a typical negotiation for the KMT's candidates to make in Taiwan's presidential elections. No matter what identity the KMT candidates really hold; they must express or imply a dual identity in their presidential campaigns.

On the one hand, like Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu in the 2012 and 2016 elections, Han shows his concern for and makes real administrative efforts to further the well-being of the Taiwanese people. Before being elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung in 2018, Han had left Taiwan's political scene for 17 years, therefore, he shows his contributions to the Taiwanese people in a montage of retrospective images highlighting his achievements in his short tenure as mayor of Kaohsiung. Scenes of this kind depict policemen and military officers paying respects to Han, as well as Mayor Han joining the disabled's sports games, squatting on the ground to check the growth of crops, making safety inspections of public construction, and communicating with youngsters about their future. All these scenes imply that Han has made efforts to express his great concerns about the Taiwanese people.



On the other hand, the video implies Han's R.O.C. identity by showing the R.O.C. flag many times on the screen. The flag appears on Han's neck tag, supporters' clothing, and almost everywhere in the rallies. What Han tries to imply is that the R.O.C. identity is not only his personal stance but that of many Taiwanese people. That is an important message of the video. One of the interviewees Lin Hsiang-pin, a producer of Han's campaign videos, explains why the R.O.C. flag appears so frequently in Han's campaign videos.

It is stunning to see one million supporters in a rally waving the R.O.C. flag spontaneously; Taiwanese people eventually have noticed that national identity is a significant issue. (Lin Hsiang-pin)

As mentioned before, Han defines his presidential campaign as a battle to protect the R.O.C. That is a strong appeal not found in Ma Ying-jeou or Eric Chu's 2012 and 2016 campaigns. The content analysis and discourse results indicate that Ma and Chu focused more on Taiwanese identity than on the R.O.C. identity in their campaigns. Even when launching videos focusing on their R.O.C. identity, they use styles of symbolic representations for identity in soft tones. Thus, whether Han's stronger appeal to the R.O.C. identity can be accepted by many Taiwanese people becomes a critical issue in the 2020 election. In this video, several scenes showed Han supporters excitedly waving the R.O.C. flag at the campaign rallies. The purpose of these scenes is to imply that Han shares a strong R.O.C. identity with many voters, with it being not only his personal idea of national identity. Using Fairclough's (2005) words, Han uses scenes full of R.O.C. flags to imply that his private discourse of R.O.C. identity is parallel to many people's zeal for the same national identity.

What should be further noted is that, in the video, Han implies two things about the R.O.C. identity. First, the lyrics of the campaign theme song include the words ‘bitter,’ ‘grief,’ ‘never give up,’ and ‘fighting.’ These words are implying that now in Taiwan, it is not easy to express one’s R.O.C. identity. With the DPP being the ruling party in Taiwan when Han’s campaign was launched, the theme song is also implying that the DPP upholds the Taiwanese national identity and suppresses the R.O.C. identity. Second, since the colour blue refers to the KMT in Taiwan, the R.O.C. flag and the title of the video ‘The shining blue sky’ together imply that the only way to highlight the R.O.C. identity is to make KMT the ruling party of Taiwan again. Since 2012, this is the first time a KMT’s presidential candidate reminds voters that the R.O.C. identity is in danger and the KMT is the only saviour of this national identity.

#### **Discourse analysis based on Van Dijk’s framework:**

The microstructure or the style of the video is active and encouraging, which is fully demonstrated in the lyrics and the rhythm of the campaign theme song. Two categories of scenes are contained in the micro-structure. The first one shows Han’s endeavours in the first year of his mayoralty. As most of these scenes have been reported by the media, they serve as a reminder of what Han has done for the well-being of people, especially the citizens of Kaohsiung. The lyrics of the theme song make sense for the scenes implying Han’s concerns about Taiwanese people’s lives in multiple respects, including farmers’ harvests, the safety of public construction, the happiness of the disabled, and the future of young people.

The second category of scenes demonstrates people’s zealous support of Han in Han’s campaign rallies. The scenes show Han’s fans waving the R.O.C. flag in the

rallies and Han being deeply touched. These emotional scenes also appear in television news reports. Thus, both categories of scenes are familiar to many voters; they are an understandable micro-structure.

The micro-structure leads to the understanding of the two macro-structures of the main topics of the video. The first one is about Han's achievements as the mayor of Kaohsiung. The matching lyrics in the campaign song remind viewers that Han has dealt with official business personally and industriously.

The second macro-structure shows Han as a popular presidential candidate who shares the same R.O.C. identity with his supporters. The two macro-structures together lead to the super-structure or the overall idea that Han has both a strong Taiwanese identity and the R.O.C. identity.

In addition, the campaign theme song further reminds viewers that the blue sky is covered by dark clouds; therefore, people need to vote for Han to make the blue sky shine again. Since blue is the colour representing the KMT, 'shining blue sky' is a desire for voters to vote for Han, so the KMT can be the ruling party of Taiwan again. In fact, 'shining blue sky' is another way to say changing the status quo in Taiwan's politics. Since Han is the challenger in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, it is natural for him to raise this appeal, just like Tsai Ing-wen did in her 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns when she was a challenger for the presidency.

However, as Tsai was urging a change in the 2012 and 2016 elections, as the research findings present in previous chapters, she used campaign videos to imply that, due to Ma Ying-jeou's poor presidential performance, Taiwan was in a dark age and Taiwanese national identity was not bringing about happiness for Taiwanese

people. After having been elected as the president in 2016 and becoming the incumbent presidential candidate in the 2020 election, she no longer feels about a diminished Taiwanese national identity anymore; it was the challenger Han's turn to imply that the R.O.C. national identity is suppressed and needs to shine. Thus, as mentioned before, we can see how presidential candidates have used symbolic representations to imply the status of national identity, partly depending on their roles in the elections.

### **7.3 Overview of this chapter**

Compared to the 2012 and 2016 elections, Taiwan's 2020 presidential election has been distinctive in terms of Tsai Ing-wen's new national identity appeal and Han Kuo-yu's awkward candidacy. In addition, the Hong Kong 2019 anti-extradition movement was an influential factor in Taiwan's 2020 election. None of these situations occurred in Taiwan's previous presidential elections.

Overall, the first major research finding presented in this chapter is that, in Taiwan's presidential election, candidates use national identity protection to highlight the significance of their election campaigns. In 2019, Hong Kong broke out the anti-extradition movement. The DPP's 2020 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen immediately used this incident to define her campaign as to protect the value of Taiwanese national identity, specifically referring to Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy. On the other hand, the KMT's candidate Han Kuo-yu defined his campaign as a battle to protect the R.O.C. national identity. Han even used this excuse

to justify his desire to leave the mayoral office of Kaohsiung, only having started being mayor there for a short period.

While being asked to elaborate on the two candidates' strategies of using national identity to urge support from the public, the most in-depth interviewees gave a higher credit to Tsai. As two of the interviewees, Niu Tse-hsun and a senior political news reporter Travis Fan indicate, Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement has provided Tsai with an excellent opportunity to legitimise her antagonism against mainland China. Tsai uses this chance to persuade the Taiwanese people that she is the only leader in Taiwan who has the will to protect Taiwan's democracy and freedom from China's threats to Taiwan. This strategy created a very advantageous condition for Tsai's 2020 campaign.

The second important research finding is that candidates represented the scope of national identity to acquire the greatest votes. When both Tsai and Han started their campaigns, Han was leading in electoral polls. Since Han identified himself as the guardian of the R.O.C., and many of his supporters displayed the same national identity as Han, Tsai decided to prevent Han from monopolising the R.O.C. identity and accusing her of totally ignoring the legitimacy of this identity. Thus, Tsai raised a new national identity of the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' as a counterattack to Han's accusation.

According to interviewee Juan Chao-hsiung, Tsai's 2020 campaign spokesman, extending Tsai's original Taiwanese national identity into the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' identity is advantageous for Tsai in two respects. First, the new national identity can appeal to those who have Taiwanese national identity, R.O.C. identity, or both

identities. Second, the new identity helps get votes from those who disliked Han but still held the R.O.C. identity.

While Tsai has expanded the scope of her national identity from the original Taiwanese identity to 'R.O.C. Taiwan' identity, Tsai's rival Han Kuo-yu integrates the Kaohsiung identity into his original dual identity. In two of Han's campaign videos analysed in this chapter, the ending subtitles are 'Han Kuo-yu, the R.O.C.'s presidential candidate, Keep Taiwan secure; Make People Rich, and Start from the South.' This has been the first time a KMT presidential candidate includes a city's identity as a part of his dual identity. The purpose of this integration is to promise that running for the presidency does not mean abandoning the original identification with the city where the candidate's administrative career started.

Finally, overall, the major findings presented in this chapter indicate that, as the researcher argues in the first chapter of this study, in Taiwan's presidential election, candidates indeed use symbolic representations to imply their national identities. The best example is found in one of Han's campaign videos analysed in this chapter. In the video, Han says nothing but sings a song to imply that the reason for him joining the 2020 presidential election is to protect the R.O.C. identity. The abundance of R.O.C. flags in the video is another symbolic representation of Han's national identity. This video is evidence to indicate that, for Taiwan's presidential candidates, national identity appeal is usually implied rather than explicitly expressed in their campaign communications. Thus, for Taiwan's presidential candidates, as the research findings demonstrate in this chapter, the question is how to use specific symbols to imply their national identities for specific purposes instead of whether or

not to present national identities in campaign communications. In other words, for presidential candidates, the national identity appeal is actually a part of the campaign strategy.

In addition, the discourse analysis results indicate that both KMT and DPP's candidates used implied appeals to national identity to justify their candidacies in Taiwan's presidential elections. Moreover, in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, candidates used or adjusted their national identity appeals as an offensive or defensive campaign strategy in the presidential race.

In the next and last chapter of this thesis, I make some conclusions regarding this study and provide some suggestions for future studies on the relevant issues of this research.

## **Chapter 8. Conclusion**

### **8.1 Studying the appeals to Taiwan's national identity: some original approaches**

After presenting the research findings concerning the appeals to national identity in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential campaign videos, the researcher now concludes this thesis by first summarising these findings and then indicating their academic implications in terms of the contributions to the study on the appeal to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign communications. Finally, I will indicate the limitations of this study and make some suggestions for future studies on relevant topics.

The two research questions of this study are the following: first, what symbols have been used to represent candidates' national identities in campaign videos in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections? Second, why have specific symbols been used to represent candidates' national identities? Or, in other words, what were the rationales behind the symbolic representations of national identities? A series of content analyses are conducted to answer the first research question. The second question is answered by executing discourse analysis on the most popular campaign videos in the three presidential elections. The opinions of in-depth interviewees and relevant literature are used as supplementary information to the content analysis and discourse analysis results. The multi-methodological approach is original for the study of the appeal to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign communications.

Previous studies on Taiwan's national identity mainly have focused on exploring the historical background of Taiwan's national identity and the evolution of Taiwan's



national identity from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism (Chen, 2013; Corcuff, 2002; Davison, 2003; Hughes, 2011; Rigger, 2003; Schubert and Damm, 2014; Shaw, 2002; Tien and Chu, 1996). Other studies have examined the connections between Taiwan's national identity and some other issues like the cross-Strait policy in Taiwan's electoral campaign advertising (Fell, 2015; Sullivan, 2007). This study examines the symbolic features of national identity itself in the context of Taiwan's presidential elections and the considerations of these symbol selections. It is a study taking a political communications approach to fully examine the symbolic representations of candidates' appeals to national identity in Taiwan's presidential election campaign videos.

In fact, Fell (2011, p. 97) and Corcuff (2002, p. 75) have found that, in Taiwan's elections, candidates may not always explicitly express their national identities in campaign advertising but use some symbolic representations, such as the national flag or some slogans to imply their identity stances. However, previous studies like these have not provided more complete answers to the 'what' and 'why' questions about the symbolic features of the appeal to national identity in Taiwan's presidential elections. Answering these questions more fully signifies the major contribution of this study in terms of providing a deeper understanding concerning the appeal to national identity from both political and communicative perspectives.

## **8.2 What symbolic representations were used?**

Regarding the first or the 'what' research question of this study, I find that in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections, both the KMT and DPP's

candidates implied their identity stances in campaign videos by employing different symbolic representations, including platform/policy statements, signs/slogans, scenes, songs, and languages. Although in previous studies, researchers have found the appeal to national identity to be relevant to party agendas or public policies (Beland, 2016; Fell, 2011; Muir and Wethererell, 2010; Lee, 2005; Perloff, 1998; Smith and Kim, 2006), national symbols (Hawkins, 2010; Isaacs-Martin, 2010; Wiltgren, 2014), national scenes (Edensor, 2002; Wen and White, 2020), languages (Chiang, 2006; Davis, 1997; Kloter, 2004; Lai, 2018), and music or songs (Biddle, 2008; Maes, 2018); none of the previous studies have examined what symbolic representations are combined to imply Taiwan's national identities. My study thus contributes to the understanding of the appeals to Taiwan's national identity by confirming that these appeals as alluded to in campaign videos utilise a synthesis of multiple symbols instead of a single symbolic representation. Moreover, my study finds that from 2012 to 2020, some changes in symbol selections are found in both the KMT and DPP's presidential campaign videos.

### **8.2.1 A synthesis of multiple symbolic representations**

Regarding the symbolic representations for national identity appeal, content analysis results indicate that both the KMT and DPP's presidential candidates used multiple symbolic representations in their campaign videos to imply their Taiwanese identity or the R.O.C. identity. It is the synthesis of multiple symbols instead of any single symbolic representation that created the implied message of the appeal to national identity.

In the 2012 presidential election, both of the candidates, KMT's Ma Ying-jeou and DPP's Tsai Ing-wen used multiple kinds of symbols, including platform or policy proposals, signs or slogans, scenes, songs, and languages in campaign videos to imply their national identities. Ma's Taiwanese identity was represented by the slogan of 'Taiwan, come on, Bravo,' the scenes showing Ma's close interactions with grassroots Taiwanese, and his respect for traditional Taiwanese cultures. Moreover, the songs and languages used in Ma's 2012 campaign videos demonstrated his idea of Taiwanese identity in terms of ethnic inclusion in Taiwanese society.

As for the R.O.C. identity, the content analysis results indicate that Ma implied his R.O.C. national identity by pointing out his diplomatic achievement of extending R.O.C.'s unofficial relationships with other countries. In addition, the R.O.C. passport, the R.O.C. flag, the Tang shirt (唐衫), and Chinese calligraphy works were used to represent Ma's R.O.C. identity in his campaign videos.

In the 2012 presidential election, Tsai promoted social justice and fairness as well as a better social welfare system to improve Taiwanese people's lives. Attacking the Ma administration while simultaneously pushing her platforms, she often implied the country with which Taiwanese people identify should be one where people can have happy and meaningful lives.

In Tsai's 2012 campaign videos, the scenes of Tsai visiting Taiwan's rural areas and her close interactions with grassroots and young Taiwanese implied that Tsai shares Taiwanese identity with the Taiwanese people. In addition, similar to Ma's campaign strategy, Tsai's videos also used Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, indigenous

languages, English, and the new immigrant's languages to intimate her idea of ethnic inclusion in Taiwanese identity.

In the 2016 election, KMT's presidential candidate Eric Chu frequently presented such slogans as 'One Taiwan,' and 'Open Taiwan.' to signify his Taiwanese identity. The images of diligent grassroots Taiwanese, the scenes depicting young voters' lives, and the scenery of Taiwan's landscapes were also used to imply Chu's identification with Taiwan. Furthermore, Chu used Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, and indigenous languages in his videos to imply the aspect of ethnic inclusion in Taiwanese identity.

Chu's 2016 rival was Tsai Ing-wen. In her 2016 campaign videos, Tsai used the slogans of 'Light up Taiwan,' 'Love Taiwan,' and 'To create a Taiwan with happiness' to imply her Taiwanese identity. In addition, Taiwanese identity was intimated in the scenes which demonstrated Tsai's interactions with grassroots Taiwanese. Moreover, Tsai used Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, indigenous and new immigrants' languages, and English in her campaign videos, this multi-lingual strategy reflects Tsai's idea of ethnic inclusion for Taiwanese identity.

Taiwan's 2020 presidential election was a competition between the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen and the KMT's Han Kuo-yu. Being the incumbent president of Taiwan, Tsai was striving to be re-elected to a second term, with Han playing the role of the challenger in the race. In the election campaign, Han presented both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity, but none of the videos only demonstrated Han's R.O.C. identity; this is because Han was well known before beginning to seek the presidency, and, as he frequently proclaimed in the campaign, to be the protector of the R.O.C., so, for balance, he put more emphasis on showing his Taiwanese identity in the campaign

videos. In fact, Han's major campaign slogan was 'Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich,' it was an appeal to make voters believe that he is really concerned about Taiwan's security and prosperity instead of only caring about the legitimacy of the R.O.C.

Han proposed a platform for easing cross-Strait relations as a measure to revitalise Taiwan's prosperity. As for the appeal to keep Taiwan secure, it is actually a way to declare to people that he is definitely not a pro-China politician. In addition to 'Keep Taiwan Secure; Make People Rich,' the slogan 'Resume Taiwan's Glory' appeared frequently in Han's videos. As a challenger, Han accused Tsai, in the first term of her presidency, of causing Taiwan's economic depression and the bitterness of grassroots Taiwanese. Han used this accusation to highlight his mission of resuming Taiwan's glory. He also professed in the video that only when Taiwan becomes glorious again, the younger generations will have a brighter future.

Han's videos presented his close interactions with grassroots Taiwanese, these being mostly with the people in Kaohsiung. As having only recently been elected as mayor of Kaohsiung when beginning his presidential campaign, Han's videos included many scenes of him diligently carrying out his mayor duties. The purpose of these scenes is to remind people of his hard work on behalf of the largest city in southern Taiwan; these scenes were also used as evidence of his administrative capability as a political leader. As for the songs and languages appearing in the videos, like the strategies of other presidential candidates from both the DPP and KMT, Han used campaign theme songs and the languages of Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, and Taiwan's new immigrants to demonstrate his idea of ethnic inclusion for

Taiwanese identity. Regarding the R.O.C. identity, when the videos depicted Han's making appearances at his campaign rallies, the R.O.C. flag was visible in all of his supporters' hands or on their clothing. The national flag was the major symbolic representation of Han's R.O.C. identity.

In the 2020 election, when the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Movement broke out in 2019, Tsai immediately used the incident in her videos to urge The Taiwanese not to make the status quo of Hong Kong become Taiwan's future. To imply her Taiwanese identity, Tsai used slogans about democracy and freedom of speech and 'Taiwan's future' in her videos. As for the songs and languages used in the videos, Tsai included Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, and the new immigrants' language videos to imply her idea of ethnic inclusion in Taiwanese identity.

The summary of the above research findings indicates that, from 2012 to 2020, both KMT and DPP's presidential candidates used multiple symbolic representations to imply their Taiwanese or R.O.C. identity. In a sense, it is not surprising to find that, as Peng (2005) notes, in modern politics, televised election advertisements may contain multiple components, including narratives, sources, scenes, languages, and music. This study confirms that this is the case for the appeal to national identity in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos. What should be noted is that it is the synthesis of multiple symbolic representations instead of any single category of symbols that represent candidates' appeals to national identity in their campaign videos.

Additionally, as mentioned in previous chapters, in the presidential election campaign videos analysed in this study, all of the KMT candidates, including Ma

Ying-jeou, Eric Chu, and Han Kuo-yu used more symbols to represent their Taiwanese identity than for their R.O.C. identity. It is conceivable that since direct presidential elections started being held in Taiwan, the KMT has had to put more emphasis on Taiwanese identity to strive for the greatest support from Taiwanese voters. Nevertheless, all of the KMT candidates' 2012, 2016, and 2020 campaign videos expressed the compatibility of Taiwanese identity with the R.O.C. identity. As for the DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen, since the DPP treats Taiwanese identity as the party's only national identity, it is natural for Tsai to use many symbols to represent Taiwanese identity in her campaign videos as well. However, the research findings indicate that both KMT and DPP candidates adopted a dynamic strategy of the appeal to national identity in the campaign videos. This is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

### **8.2.2 Dynamic symbolic representations**

The content analysis results indicate that there were no fixed communication formulas of symbol selection for the appeal to national identity in both KMT or DPP candidates' campaign videos. The symbol selections of the appeals to national identity were dynamic and decided by different candidates in different election years.

For example, in one of his 2012 campaign videos, Ma used a drama to imply his R.O.C. identity; he himself not being an actor in the drama, it was a romantic story that featured a Taiwanese young boy and an overseas Chinese girl as the protagonists with the R.O.C. flag being used as a catalyst of the romantic relationship.

Nevertheless, in the 2016 presidential election, KMT candidate Eric Chu launched a video to show his personal R.O.C. identity. In the 2020 election, KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu implied his R.O.C. identity in some of his campaign videos by showing his supporters passionately waving the R.O.C. flag.

The change in the appeal to national identity is also found in the ways candidates define the status of national identity. For example, with DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen being the challenger in the 2012 and 2016 elections, she used symbolic representations, including scenes of unhappy Taiwanese and the slogan of ‘Light up Taiwan’ to imply that Taiwanese identity was in a dark age because of the Ma administration’s poor performance. Then, in the 2020 election, with Tsai being the incumbent president of Taiwan seeking to be elected to a second term, at the early stage of her campaign, she implied in her campaign videos that Taiwanese identity was in a secure state. However, when the Anti-Extradition Movement in Hong Kong broke out in June 2019, Tsai immediately launched a video to imply that Taiwanese identity is being threatened by mainland China’s communist regime. This case fully indicates that a presidential candidate may change her appeal to national identity when the context of the election changes.

In the KMT camp, presidential candidates’ appeals to national identity may also change in different election years. For example, in the 2012 and 2016 elections, the KMT’s presidential candidates Ma Ying-jeou and Eric Chu did not imply in their campaign videos that the R.O.C. identity was in danger; yet, in the 2020 election, KMT’s presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu implied in his videos that the R.O.C. identity was risky because DPP avoided proclaiming the R.O.C.’s legitimacy. Thus,



Han intimated that he began his campaign for the presidency to protect the R.O.C. identity.

Another interesting finding is that while DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen only implied her Taiwanese identity in her 2012 and 2016 campaign videos, she presented both Taiwanese identity and R.O.C. identity in her 2020 videos. However, in one of Tsai's 2020 campaign videos, she proclaimed that she and other Taiwanese people are all citizens of the R.O.C., this being a national identity stance that Tsai did not imply in her previous two presidential campaigns. Thus, we can find that the ways to use symbolic representations for national identity in campaign videos were dynamic for both parties' presidential candidates during the years covered by this research. There were no fixed patterns of symbolic arrangements for the appeals to national identity; even with stances regarding national identity being temporarily changed to suit the needs of the campaign strategy.

Moreover, what should be noted again is that previous studies have focused on examining historical changes with regard to Taiwan's identity politics (Davison, 2003; Rigger, 2003; Schubert and Damm, 2014; Wachman, 1994) and point out that, because of the democratisation process, Taiwan's national identity issue has undergone a transformation from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism where the critical issue is whether Taiwanese identity is a national identity (Cabestan, 2005; Schubert, 2004; Shen and Wu, 2008). However, my study finds that from 2012 to 2020, while the KMT's presidential candidates do emphasise their Taiwanese identity, they still include the R.O.C. identity in their campaign videos. This means

that the KMT still insists that the R.O.C. identity is the national identity and Taiwanese identity is only a provincial identity.

On the other side, for the DPP's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen, even though she launched a 2020 campaign video to recognise the existence of R.O.C. identity, the content analysis results clearly show that her basic national identity stance is still Taiwanese national identity. Therefore, from 2012 to 2020, what really has changed in KMT and DPP candidates' campaign videos is not the basic stances of their national identity stances but rather the symbol selection strategies regarding their national identity appeals.

After all, from the start of the democratization process in Taiwan, the KMT has not rejected or avoided Taiwanese identity in election campaigns. Thus, my study confirms the research findings that have been revealed in previous studies: subsequent to the starting of the democratization process in the 1980s, the KMT has put more emphasis on the Taiwanese identity or Taiwanese consciousness in electoral campaign communications (Rigger, 2003; Schubert, 2004; Schubert and Damm, 2014; Shen and Wu, 2008). However, as my research findings demonstrate, for the KMT, the R.O.C. identity is still the national identity, and the Taiwanese identity is just a provincial identity. This is the party's basic stance, and it has not changed since 2012. As for the DPP, the 'R.O.C. Taiwan' identity, as proposed by Tsai Ing-wen in her 2020 presidential campaign, is a new concept of national identity for the party, and whether it will be maintained as the formal national identity of the DPP is a research topic that deserves more examination in the future.

### **8.3 Why were the symbolic representations used?**

After summarising the findings of the first research question, the researcher now discusses the answers to the second research question: why are Taiwan's presidential candidates using so complicated symbolic representations to imply their Taiwanese or R.O.C. identity? Do the candidates use symbolic representations of national identity to accomplish some unspoken goals in their campaign videos? As far as I am concerned, several considerations can account for the arrangements of symbolic representations for the appeals to national identity as I have found in this study. The first one is based on Fairclough's notion of negotiating between the party's ideology of national identity and the public's concerns about public issues in election years. Second, Van Dijk's notion helps elaborate the textual logic of campaign videos and the justifications of candidates' national identity stances.

#### **8.3.1 Negotiating between political parties' ideologies and public opinion**

As Fairclough (1995) notes, the content of a text is usually a negotiation between an author's private discourse and the public's discourse. To make the text more acceptable for the audience, and also for the good of the author, negotiation is sometimes necessary as a realistic consideration.

In the first chapter of this study, I cite two in-depth interviewees and other information sources' opinions to indicate that, for the DPP, Taiwan is an independent sovereignty country; although the party acknowledged that for the time being the constitutional name of Taiwan is the R.O.C., the DPP prefers to call the country 'Taiwan' and seldom mentions the R.O.C. in the party's political communications.

Therefore, for the DPP's presidential candidate, the party's ideology of national identity is that Taiwanese identity is a national identity instead of just a provincial identity. However, as explained in the first chapter, to avoid negative reactions from home or abroad, the DPP's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, had to negotiate by using symbolic representations to imply Taiwanese national identity instead of explicitly promoting the idea of Taiwan independence in her campaign videos. This political consideration basically explains why symbolic representations of national identity are so important and necessary for DPP's presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen.

On the other hand, for the KMT, according to the constitution of the country, R.O.C. identity is the national identity, and hence this is the KMT's ideology of national identity. Since Taiwan's constitutional status is only a province of the R.O.C., Taiwanese identity can only be a provincial identity instead of a national identity. However, to earn the greatest number of votes from the Taiwanese people, apart from manifesting and identifying with R.O.C. identity, KMT's presidential candidates also need to negotiate by putting more stress on their Taiwanese identity without unambiguously specifying its nature as provincial identity.

Thus, for both the DPP and KMT's presidential candidates, raising the appeal to national identity is not as simple as claiming 'I am Taiwanese,' or 'I am a citizen of R.O.C.' in their campaign videos; rather, for the two parties' specific political considerations, the appeal to national identity becomes a negotiation between political parties' ideologies and public opinion. It is a subtle communicative work fulfilled by using various symbolic representations.

### **8.3.2 Elaborating a national identity stance for other purposes**

Apart from making negotiations between the party's ideology of national identity and issues of pressing concern to the public in the election year, the discourse analysis based on Van Dijk's (1988) notion also finds that KMT and DPP presidential candidates use symbols and themes to elaborate national identity in campaign videos for some other purposes.

Speaking of the discourse of a text, Van Dijk's (1988) idea is that the author of a text may use a complicated three-layer structure, from micro-structure (the rhetoric or style of the symbols in the text), to macro-structure (the themes or topics of the text), to super-structure (the overall idea of the text), to make the audience understand the general meaning of the text. In other words, the author may define the overall meaning of a text by using some symbols in a specific way to show one or more relevant themes in the text.

Thus, when a presidential candidate attempts to imply national identity as the overall idea of a campaign video, he or she may use some symbols in certain ways to raise one or more themes relevant to his or her national identity stance. By doing so, a candidate may define national identity by some issues for specific purposes, and of course, all the different purposes aim to reach the same goal: victory in the presidential election. In addition, the symbols used to imply national identity must be logically arranged layer by layer to achieve the campaign's purposes. One of the major purposes is to justify campaign platforms.

### **8.3.2.1 Justifying campaign platforms**

It has been indicated in previous chapters that, as Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui (2005) and other scholars argued, public policies may be related to specific national identities (Beland, 2016; Lin, 2015; Muir and Wethererell, 2010, Perloff, 1998; Smith and Kim, 2006). In Taiwan's case, the results of discourse analysis indicate that party platforms mentioned in campaign videos are connected with implied appeals to national identity.

For example, in Taiwan's 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections, as the results of content analysis and discourse analysis indicate, both the KMT and DPP candidates raised platforms in their campaigns to revitalise Taiwan's economy. What the candidates were trying to imply is that when being leaders of the Taiwanese people or citizens of the R.O.C., (as Han Kuo-yu proposed), such leaders are responsible for making people rich and prosperous in Taiwan. What the candidates were trying to propose is that there should be some tangible benefits to people for recognising that they are Taiwanese or citizens of the R.O.C. Otherwise, what is the value of Taiwanese identity or R.O.C. identity?

### **8.3.2.2 Creating an image as a national identity protector**

Discourse analysis results also indicate that Taiwan's politicians used symbolic representations of national identity to justify their presidential candidacy by creating a self-image as a national identity protector. Both the KMT and DPP's presidential candidates implied in their campaign videos that the national identity, whether it be either Taiwanese identity or R.O.C. identity, was in a risky or miserable situation that

needed to be protected or changed by the candidates. For example, in Taiwan's 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, as the challenger of the elections, the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen implied in some of her campaign videos that Taiwanese people are living in a country which is not great, and this is because of the Ma administration's poor performances. The mood of the videos was gloomy and the images of Taiwanese people in the videos depicted their frustration and listlessness. In the 2020 presidential election, after Hong Kong the Anti-Extradition Movement broke out in 2019, Tsai immediately used this incident to imply in one of her campaign videos that if Taiwan accepts the 1992 Consensus or the idea of 'One China; Two Systems,' the status quo of Hong Kong will be the future of Taiwan. What Tsai was implying is that Taiwan's freedom of speech and democracy is threatened by mainland China; therefore, Taiwan needs her leadership to protect the valuable substantiation of Taiwanese identity.

Similar to Tsai's strategy, Han Kuo-yu, the challenger in the 2020 presidential election, implied in one of his popular campaign videos that he and his supporters' national identity, the R.O.C. identity, was in danger, because his rival, the incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen, rarely mentioned or recognised the R.O.C. Then, in the video, Han intimated that because the R.O.C. identity immediately needed to be protected by him, he has been forced to join the 2020 presidential election after just being elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung 9 months ago.

### **8.3.2.3 Making the appeal to national identity more convincing**

According to the results of discourse analysis, Taiwan's presidential candidates make specific arrangements concerning symbolic representations of their national

identities in the campaign videos to make the identity appeals more convincing to the voters. In the videos, candidates of both parties demonstrated that they could worship, work, and eat as grassroots Taiwanese do in their daily lives. This is a campaign strategy adopted by all of the KMT and DPP candidates in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. It was not a cliché in campaign videos; it was a kind of scene that reinforced people's beliefs in candidates' national or provincial identities. What candidates tried to imply in the campaign videos is that 'as a Taiwanese or a citizen of the R.O.C. as you people are, I can do whatever you are doing every day in your lives.'

### **8.3.3 Enhancing communication effects of the appeals to national identity**

Beyond the reasons for symbol selection indicated above, the discourse analysis finds that, in some of the campaign videos analysed in this study, the main reason for symbol selection is to enhance the communication effects of the appeals to national identity in the videos in several respects, including making the appeals more appealing to the general public, urging support from young voters, counterattacking rivals' accusations, and to urging support from multiple ethnic groups.

American political scientist H.D. Lasswell (1949) has argued that all kinds of human communicative behaviours bear a purpose in creating some kinds of communicative effects, such as changing others' beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours. As communications researchers, Deighton, Romer, and McQueen (1989) note, using drama can be an effective way to persuade. In this study, the discourse analysis finds that Taiwan's presidential candidates do use dramatized symbolic representations to



imply national identities in some videos. For example, in one of Ma's 2012 campaign videos, the R.O.C. identity was implanted into a romantic story in which the R.O.C. flag is the catalyst of the relationship between a young Taiwanese boy and a young overseas Chinese girl.

In fact, for the producers of campaign videos, national identity is indeed an abstract idea. Unless candidates always want to proclaim their national identity stances explicitly and rigidly in front of the camera, video producers need to figure out how to use and integrate multiple audial and visual symbols to represent and imply candidates' national identity appeals in an understandable, appealing, and persuasive manner. Meanwhile, the strategies of symbol arrangements are sometimes needed to satisfy specific purposes behind the national identity appeals. This is the communicative aspect of national identity appeal in Taiwan's presidential elections; an aspect that has not been fully explored in previous studies on Taiwan's national identity appeals.

### **8.3.3.1 Seeking younger voters' support**

The results of discourse analysis indicate that candidates in Taiwan's presidential elections tended to believe that, among the voters in presidential elections, the younger ones have the strongest national identity, and thus need to be treated as a particularly important target group in campaign videos. As introduced in previous chapters, since election polls repeatedly have found that those younger than 30 years of age mostly have a Taiwanese national identity and throw their support to the DPP much more than to the KMT. In all three presidential elections that she participated in

from 2012 to 2020, Tsai's videos made great efforts to target younger voters by seeking support and consolidating their Taiwanese national identity. To break through the DPP's monopoly of support from younger voters, the KMT's presidential candidates Eric Chu and Han Kuo-yu also implied their Taiwanese identity and serious concern about young people's future in campaign videos. Thus, we can see that there was a target segmentation consideration of identity appeal in campaign videos; young voters enjoy the special caring eyes of Taiwan's presidential candidates.

### **8.3.3.2 To counterattack rivals' accusations**

For DPP's presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwanese national identity is not a fixed political belief; it could be transformed to counterattack the accusation of her avoidance of the R.O.C. identity. As introduced in chapter 7, in Taiwan's 2020 presidential election, DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen launched a campaign video to recognise the R.O.C. identity. Tsai joined the presidential elections in 2012, 2016, and 2020. This is the first time she acknowledged the existence of the R.O.C. identity. As one commentator and an in-depth interviewee indicated, Tsai did it to counterattack her rival Han Kuo-yu's accusation that, as the incumbent President of the R.O.C., she rarely mentioned R.O.C. in her public speeches. Besides, it was a strategy to break through KMT's monopoly of the R.O.C. identity and to strive for support from those who disliked Han but still had the R.O.C. identity.

On the other hand, also in the 2020 election, Han transformed the Taiwanese identity from a single idea into a continuity composed of sequential identifications

with Taiwan's cities. Han's campaign slogan 'Starts from the south' implied this transformation. The slogan implied and suggested that identifying with Taiwan could be started by identifying with Kaohsiung, the largest southern city of Taiwan. According to two interviewees' opinions, Han tied Kaohsiung identity with the Taiwanese identity, it was actually a campaign strategy to counterattack DPP's accusation of his leaving the Kaohsiung mayor's office for the Presidential palace in Taipei.

### **8.3.3.3 To call for support from multiple ethnic groups**

Both KMT and DPP's presidential candidates adopted the idea of ethnic inclusion as a substance of Taiwanese identity or R.O.C. identity. Thus, we can see that the two parties' candidates used Mandarin, Minnanyu, Hakka, indigenous, and the new immigrants' languages for the theme songs, soundbites, or monologues in their campaign videos. This strategy entailed a realistic consideration that Taiwanese voters are composed of different ethnic groups; therefore, no presidential candidates could neglect the multi-ethnic nature of Taiwanese identity.

## **8.4 National identity is not just national identity**

Overall, this study uncovers more details and substances of national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential campaign communications. The research findings indicate that when presidential candidates tried to demonstrate their national identities in campaign videos, they tended to do it in subtle ways by using the synthesis of various symbolic representations instead of just explicitly expressing who they are in

the videos. Besides, national identity appeals are endowed with multiple meanings as a campaign strategy to win the elections.

In other words, in this study, the most important research finding and a significant contribution to the study of Taiwan's national identity politics is that, in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos, national identity is not just a claim of national identity; it is the justifications for presidential candidacy and campaign platforms. It is especially targeted to young voters and used as a measure to counterattack the rivals' accusations. The symbolic representations of national identity appeal are arranged to be convincing and appealing all for the purpose to bring about electoral victory for the presidential candidates. Compared with previous studies on Taiwan's national identity appeal, Sullivan (2008) used four categories, including values, issues, traits, and strategy to content analyse Taiwan's campaign advertising and only put national identity into the category of 'values.' However, in my study, the issues of cross-Strait economic cooperation and the potential threat to Taiwan's democracy and freedom of speech from mainland China are found related to national identity appeals. The point is that only when social context is taken into consideration can researchers acquire a deeper understanding of the whole picture of national identity appeal in campaign communications.

Moreover, while Corcuff (2002) listed political doctrine, official commemorations, history textbooks, and banknotes as symbols of Taiwan's democratisation and the transition of national identity under Lee Teng-hui's administration; my study finds that more symbols had been used to represent national identity in candidates' campaign videos. As the research findings of this study suggest, in Taiwan's

presidential campaign videos, the symbolic presentations of national identity appeal are subtle and delicate, and we just start to know more about the details and implications of the appeal.

In the next section, I will point out some limitations of this study and provide some suggestions for future relevant studies.

### **8.5 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future studies**

The major limitation of this study is the difficulty of interviewing more relevant persons for the research. As I mentioned in the research method chapter, some of the candidates' campaign staff members and the producers of campaign videos were unwilling to be interviewed by me for personal reasons or confidential considerations. Another limitation is that since Taiwan's 2020 presidential election had just ended not long ago, not many research findings about the election are available as references for this study.

Finally, while this study has contributed to a deeper understanding of national identity appeals in Taiwan's presidential campaign videos, two suggestions could be made for future studies on the relevant topic to this research. First, after knowing more about the nature of national identity appeals in candidates' campaign videos, scholars may use surveys or focus group interviews to investigate voters' reactions to the national identity appeals in campaign videos. This kind of research may help researchers to know more about the communication effects of the appeals.

Second, in her 2020 presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen presented 'R.O.C. Taiwan' as a new national identity. This is different from DPP's traditional stance on

Taiwanese national identity or KMT's traditional R.O.C identity. Rather, it can be considered as an integration of the two major parties' national identity stances.

Although this may just be a tactical move in Tsai's campaign, her electoral victory does suggest another research path, that is, may this newly suggested national identity be accepted by most of Taiwan's people in future presidential elections, and if so, what does that mean for the transformation of Taiwan's identity politics?

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**\*Part of the interviewees' opinions are translated into English and used as auxiliary information to the research findings of content analysis and discourse analysis.**

**All the translations have been checked by a proofreader.**

## APPENDIX A --- Interview Transcript

### 1. Interviewee: Tsai Ing-wen 2012 campaign video Director, Wu Nien-jen

吳念真 導演

Interviewed date: 8 March, 2019

2012 因為民進黨在非常低落， 蔡英文做了一件事我很佩服， 像台灣的女性， 在家道中落， 撐住了這個家，是這個女人。228 事件受難者家的女人帶起整個家。2012 是往下墜落，一個極點，她出來當主席。當時我覺得，蛤？怎麼是她？她以前都是國際談判的角色，當過李登輝幕僚。好像民進黨或男生都在欺負女生， 當時也最有可能出來對戰的就是她。再來就是這次輸了也沒關係，可以累積資源未來再努力。我的感覺不一定是對的。但在那時刻，唯一耳目一新，從內心就想支持她，就是這樣。跟民進黨之間拍廣告都當義工。民進黨都不會干涉，

我記得有拍另一個廣告不敢用。第一個畫面，垃圾桶中的廢棄物，陳水扁被鏑起來，這對民進黨支持者是最大打擊，這是很大的痛。我想帶領大家往新的路，但民進黨覺得這是打擊，但從廣告角度來說，因為我覺得，在那時候，可以出來和馬英九對決，就是這樣。

就像此刻，四個老先生叫蔡英文不要出來選，對於女性家庭主婦很生氣。自己人叫自己人不要出來。還有男人在幹嘛。這個女人把破落的家撐到這樣的局面。以我來說，當然我覺得這中間充滿陰謀，不公平。特別我知道蔡英文，她是一個幕僚跟她工作很累，但會讚嘆她很斯文。面對文字，對出去曖昧的攻擊，挖苦的就刪掉。她很在意文字，她不是典型的政治人物。

我們不管省籍問題。大家不承認的，大陸對待台灣，來自中原的人，才應該是管理者。台灣的問題， 歷史某些奇怪基因，化外的人，台灣的人經濟上建立， 唸很多書了。現在台灣最亂，某些人還沒做到什麼事但被拱， 這是一種情感投訴。這就是這種管理者思維，台灣歷史過程一直在這個陰影。 他們中原才是主流，他們的人才是管理者。他們的歷史才是歷史，這是台灣最大的問題。

我以前連講一句話都沒有，但我也會被攻擊啊！因為我很像是主流文化之外。我們也許理想化，台灣現狀就是如此。統一獨立在此刻很難，這一切讓時間去走。歷史研究到最後，有種叫天意。陳水扁滿意度七十幾，投票才三十幾，這有毛病嗎？因為我們中原才是管理者。

誰知道第二年他當上總統，後來被抓去關，這無法預料。

統一獨立，這是名字之爭。台灣本來就獨立了啊！馬英九是台獨罪犯，這爭論沒意義，這地方是我們安身立命的地方，先顧好這地方，要欺負我們的要抵擋。要有自己的實力，要做到亮光被看到，電子產業獨一無二，人家也會替你說話。我生長地方是這地方，情感是這地方，這地方不能被搶走被指導。這是自由的地方。我們到這年紀，很多事你很悲傷，你也要讓年輕人決定。讓他們走，我們老了，未來世界是年輕人的。台灣有時候這樣選舉失敗很難受，看到公投同婚反對聲音很強，台灣不是這麼開放與保守，你們可以改變啊。

選舉本身，政黨到最後都會擺爛，有利益就會鬥爭。就不會關心百姓。台灣的選舉還是要聯合起來讓一個人出現，最笨的是不要讓一個人出現，但你在監督他時還是不要流於情，因為這些人是我們選出來的。要相信一句話，只要百姓英明，不要期待英明領導人。這好不容易不造神，又開始了。這東西就是這樣心裡的角度。從2014年選舉到現在，藍色很沉悶，終於找到一個像樣的人，可以宣洩的對象就去擁戴。

大學教育畢業率這麼高，網路和媒體怎麼這麼弱智。但的確存在這問題啊，台灣現實狀況與媒體是兩個世界的。你們爽就好啦，我寧願相信選舉那一剎那，我還是覺得台灣人會想一下。中時的民調用屁股想都知道會怎樣這都是過程，可能是媒體的計劃或協調好的，台灣也不要太在意媒體。民視也是郭倍宏，他想選總統也會罵小英。台灣言論很自由，到最後沒有尺度。最嚴重的是政治這樣搞下來，沒有共同尊敬的人、共同相信的媒體。各取所需。

政黨廣告來說，愛台灣就是叫老百姓來支持我。一起愛台灣，站在政黨角度，趕快來選我，每個人對愛台灣定義不同。我最近跟台商聊天，他們會回來，是因為在大陸待不下去，但又要求台灣政府要怎樣。你們在大陸都不敢，你回來就叫台灣怎樣，你愛台灣，不然就為台灣的幸福去做著想，有些人愛台灣，我為我的政黨努力著想。最愛台灣的人是一般人，生活必須努力做很多事情，那才是愛台灣。農業栽培友善方法，花蓮不要蓋工業區，地理特性是什麼？屏東燈會，縣長找我代言，應該你自己代言啊！我跟他討論，很多設計那不能事先公開是一個驚喜，我覺得內容很好，但場地很複雜。屏東最遠，你愈謙卑，人家愈注意到你。很多縣長會出來大聲說，我們要辦燈會。



一群老師帶小朋友撿漂流木，騎腳踏車發電。你自己要講旁白，今年台灣燈會在屏東，我們這裡比較鄉下，但我這裡熱情，開闊景點多，若不嫌棄，請多走幾步來台灣玩。而且這個時節就是台灣屏東最暖和。

很多人做廣告，就是要很謙卑。我為了要很多人來，做得很模糊，但稍微一個有光點，就會被注意。同樣的，如果把光點做太大，大家想像太好，但做不好就死得很難看。他自己後來也一直在寫臉書道歉，有誠意。你如果真愛台灣，對你現在所做的事情很認真，抱持著往前走。你要做得到，都是小小的事情。我兒子用新的方式作歌仔戲，這些人都是陌生的人，你可以去。你如果固守傳統，觀眾會走，歌仔戲的形式包裝新的故事會比較好，因此，年輕人在寫歌仔戲劇本，編腔、樂曲、指揮都很年輕。出現的劇情，同性戀的，孟婆湯電梯下來，我形式不變但很多內容和現在息息相關。年輕人創造這些，老人年輕人都開心，這是顛覆，這就是愛台灣。把這地方的傳統保存可行而有效的，而不是固守說這是我們的文化。或是新的產業發展，這是愛台灣，喜歡在電視上講話都不愛台灣，為了自己的利益。政黨只是宣傳，你們的人在做什麼。蘇貞昌說，一把掃把保護台灣，國民黨罵他無聊啊！這對台灣人很受用，我就是要保護台灣，為了未來，讓此刻的事情往前走就是愛台灣。

廣告是販售商品，國民黨就是這樣。這是歷史的，他們來自中原，情感連結還是在。他們比較跟中共，很矛盾，反攻大陸，現在要我們不要激怒他們。兩岸要怎樣才有錢賺？這樣很卑微。為什麼不發明專利給世界賺錢？可能是文化血緣。蔡英文就說，我和百姓和年輕人一起，這是宣傳角度，區別性。蔡英文有資格，因為她不太懂，什麼都很好奇。你跟她說什麼，她都會聽。因此，旁邊的人常下指導棋，而她不會去反駁。

民主這不是上天給的，這是拼出來的。台灣被關，時機到了拼出來的，所以我們感激。只有這塊土地，我們應該要珍惜。這是海島，我們要打拼。台灣人生存不容易，回顧過去就會珍惜，會很有自信。但我們活得不錯，我們可以罵總統不要被關，當完總統還會被關。大陸人問我，台灣人總統這是很中原的問法。李登輝和陳水扁，民選的。李登輝當很久，做完的存在價值就是罵總統不會被關。陳水扁是當完總統還是會被關。言論自由和司法獨立，這是民主兩個很重的支持。所以這是台灣的自信。因為這是大陸沒有的。你會越珍惜這兩個，這若不是去爭取的，國民黨不會給你的啦！這是我們爭取的，我們要保護，你自己要丟掉把大陸當爹，被要脅。台商在那裡都不敢說，回台灣要求一大堆，這太過分了吧！

台灣不是母親，這是生死存活的地方，離開這地方就無法投入情感。你是一個作者，離開台灣到美國，情感斷裂呼吸不到東西就寫不出來。我對出生的地方更有情感，因為那地方生命共同體的感覺，照顧彼此。

妳離開就活不下去了。或許我很有錢，但我保證你住了很難受。情感在，所以你在。

國家認同名稱，到底要不要獨立，我覺得早就獨立，只是名字。我覺得土地對人的情感的重量就是國家認同。只是台灣常常被這名詞抓住，我們早就有自己的國家憲法，情感在人也在就好。名字要怎麼改讓以後再說。國家認同應該是對土地的愛和認同。此刻的自由和民主不能被破壞，認同這塊土地。

民進黨的廣告，授權小孩子年輕人不計報酬的，真正表達出來。回去投票，年輕人都知道啊，這樣有情感的。國民黨都是開會，長輩下決定，不是創作者的意見。民進黨能傳導出真正的想法。決定都是年輕人。我覺得要讓年輕人要樂觀，台灣沒有像外面講得這麼壞。我相信有正義感，各國也有我們不孤單。當你擁有實力，就不用恐懼。國家也是，有發展出特別的力量，科技成就，人家就會在意你。

## 2. Interviewee: Tsai Ing-wen 2012 Campaign leader, Lee Hou-ching

李厚慶 文宣部主任 (第二次訪問)

Interviewed date: 22 January, 2019

Taiwan next，一時之選，想很久，提了很多，就叫這個，是因為馬英九執政希望台灣有點一直依附在中國，所以應該走出去要有下一站。所以才叫這個。還有箭頭的視覺，前進的力量，等待中國不如靠自己走出來。還是台灣主體代表性，凸顯對手依附中國，走出去，也象徵台灣走出去，也凸顯蔡英文國際化。她的求學或者擔任官職處理談判，她都帶給印象是有能力的帶領國家。

一路有你，台一線貫穿台灣的專案，兩週的時間，一路從屏東北上到台北，每一天不同鄉鎮，透過不同行程去探訪做選舉活動與晚會，記錄這過程。不只是讓大家知道我們走一遭，透過畫面可以看到蔡英文跟人民再一起，各地不同風貌。

台灣第一，女總統有斷句，也可以串再一起。雙關語，台灣優先，放第一女總統。也是凸顯女性當家。屋頂篇，選前推出，喚起大家出來投票，文案的撰寫畫面很簡單，可以看清這塊土地望向遠方，彷彿是這島嶼的船長或乘客，帶大家去思考接下來往哪裡走，選擇一樣的路線？還是要有台灣自己的方向？台灣自己當家的概念，也凸顯國民黨是外來政權，或許他的思維要統一，

民進黨就是要在這土地不大但安身立命，人的能量創意源源不絕的台灣力量是正面的。

以前網路宣傳在選戰比重還沒這麼高，2012 有網路部、新聞部、文宣部各自作業，2016 新聞部獨立，但整體宣傳扣連新載具。可能和過去大量文字宣傳不一樣，有更多的影片。所以我們必須要有新的組織規劃去統合。所以把文宣和網路變成媒體創意中心。但我們沒有要拋棄舊的，因此都是媒體統合使用才會創立這樣的部門。媒體創意中心。對整合議題更方便，網路以前自己負責，和文宣分開。

### 3. Interviewee: 2012 Ma Ing-jeou campaign spokesman, Chuang Po-chung

莊伯仲 發言人

Interviewed date: 2 February, 2019

操盤手，金溥聰。小站延伸到按讚，臉書的，幫馬英九加油有別於俗套。國旗：因為有外省原罪，特別強調和本省人的關聯。蔡英文不需要這個，他只要強調客家妹，原住民血統，馬英九需要加強土地連結，下鄉長住 long stay，日住民宿夜訪民情，白天餵牛種田，晚上聊天。真台灣，黃俊雄，就是說白了要幫他化解疑慮。台灣，閩南客家外省，苗栗馬家莊，湖南人，姓馬就送作堆，當作客家人。但他家人也都沒有去做這件事，這只是政治手段，土地連結，包裝擦脂抹粉。中華民國，政治場域爭奪，搶不過民進黨，中國不能接受，最大公約數也是民進黨的死穴。政治符碼爭奪就搶中華民國，在往台灣靠攏。中華民國是國家，台灣是家園，這兩種的連結是國民黨的策略。我們國號就是中華民國，台灣是所在地。建立連結包容，這會對民進黨造成壓力，國民黨會比較寬闊，民進黨比較偏狹。建國百年，一方面民進黨對國旗不重視，因此國民黨把這些東西畫上等號是不可少的，過去說中學為體西學為用，中華民國為體，台灣為用。借殼上市，並不衝突。和金開會，他的堅持。你看到蔡總統開始也掛國旗，其實這是最大公約數。

進可攻退可守，因為馬英九是外省人，如果是王金平，就不用搞這套。台灣元素。不是你的才要叫中國台灣。因為馬英九是外省人，所以要夠本土，積極面希望跟民進黨爭逐這個符號，加強經營，前有馬英九後有搶市場因素。因為競選連任，政績是大家所累積的。我們簽證是大家努力的，馬英九

外交休兵，用力推展免簽國。因為馬英九沒有本土吸引力，農產品賣到大陸讓菜農有感動。ECFA 要拿出證明是有成果的。馬英九是外省人，和農漁民是最直接的，ECFA 受質疑必須拿出來。護照，中華民國，外交休兵，對岸沒有弄我們，只有斷交一個，至少要拿出中華民國是走得通的，也沒有鬥爭，一方防守與進攻。

威肯：主要的廣告片雪苧製作。威肯算上游，有關係但不是子母公司。造勢活動是威肯，議題廣告片。常設組織，黨部，然後會再設立競選總部。任務型編制，每週會有例會，通常由金主導。幕僚提意見看毛片。金主導性強，拍板定案。他是馬英九密友，意志很強，都以金為主。大方向有，細節會建議。水果的有幾篇都提到台灣，就有跟金講說不是主打中華民國嗎？最後就有修正。區隔和對岸。馬英九的電視廣告都會放在競選 YouTube 上，只是內容長度的不同，網路通常包含更精細的內容，但國家認同都是不會缺少的

蔡英文台灣第一女總統：她本來就對中華民國虛以委蛇，比較緊張的是女總統這個字。因為台灣女總統、客家妹。她在這兩邊都輸給馬英九。我們在意的是能否拿到票。女生票馬英九比較有吸引力。客家話蔡英文也不會講。基本評估也證明馬英九是領先的。

總統比較重要，地方比較其次，也會變來變去 以前解嚴時會強調中華民國，到現在台灣，到兩者都不排斥。

台灣獨立？中華民國本來就主權國家，應該說正名制憲。蔡丁貴推台灣正名。你不能說台灣獨立，這只會被中國統治。早年大家重視中華民國，慢慢變台灣，到現在兩者未必排斥。大家發現對岸對台灣打壓，就會用中華民國。各年齡層期待也不一樣，但年紀比較大會知道現實。

文宣失誤：民進黨水果月曆，馬英九銷售到大陸。民進黨推出水果月曆，六月是西瓜，每個月售價很慘。後來國民黨操作成唱衰月曆，果農就告發。國民黨為了強調本土，無米樂、崑濱伯，沒有取得授權照片，後來還是出來道歉。蔡英文有推三隻小豬，馬英九推平安符，加強與本土連結，台灣平安。

馬英九唱歌仔戲，強調跟本土連結。寫書法是內化個人喜好。讀經篇：閩南語是中原古音，宣揚中華文化的美好，和台灣閩南語連結。民進黨批評倡導讀經，家長送小孩上讀經班也不爽，民進黨的批評。你來我往，攻防此起彼落。黃金十年，當時被批評抄襲蔡英文。也被質疑是要連任第三任？回應：要長遠規劃。黃金十年，在南京北伐戰爭到對日抗戰中的黃金十年，這有關聯性。

原住民：最有資格稱呼為本土，但他們對台獨沒興趣。但他們也得不到好處。到頭來還是漢人，他們要求自治。國民黨在原住民統治比較久，民進黨比較大閩南人沙文主義。

勞工：因為在野黨比較偏左派。國民黨和四大公會走比較近。

馬英九的包袱，228 發生的時候他還沒出生，但他還是要每年去道歉。背負外省人的罪。李登輝在，不用搞這些，至少沒有外省人包袱，不用強調閩南語愛台灣。他只強調中華民國主權和中國對抗。國民黨的兩包袱，中國與外省人，現在不會在選舉提中國，會被攻擊，所以馬英九算是立下論述，我們是中華民國的國民。其他候選人不需強調本省，國旗國號要看局勢，和民進黨區隔。王金平的話，至少在省籍沒有包袱，但中華民國要看當時局勢。

經濟議題：農民、南部、經濟和政治。國民黨喜歡經濟牌，有政績可以說。因為馬英九先天有外省包袱，賣台，一方面要消毒，一方面要加分。多數人可能經濟比較重要，但可能也有重疊。消毒就要拿出成績，沒有出賣台灣，但有賣出水果。

一中同表：票房毒藥，。朱立倫想取而代之？應該是洪秀柱言論太危險。光譜：太極端都不行，最獨的。相對的，最統統促黨、新黨、親民黨、國民黨、民進黨、時代力量、台聯，只有中間的有希望。言論自由可以隨便，但獲得選票就是中間靠攏。一般民眾比較中道，激進的投票率很低。

4. Interviewee: 2012-2016 Ma Ing-jeou and Eric Chu's campaign producer, the president of WeCan PR company, Jack Hsiao 蕭展正，威肯公關董事長  
Interviewed date: 23 April, 2019

我來晚了，四川大地震的大陸官員所說的話，當時有考慮到真的要用大陸官員的話嗎？但這可以謙卑傳達道歉。文青片要的是情緒，希望吸引選民注意到道歉。一中同表的關係，太陽花事件後兩岸的定位是有爭議的。困境要解決，要貼在兩岸還是實質內容？否決一中同表還是不說？因為沒辦法說得更好。他和朱立倫合作多次，桃園和新北，已經選完 2014 年，淵源很深，和核心幕僚很熟。直接和候選人去討論不是和黨部。接著推出包容篇，兩岸問題是困難的，政治人物訂出訴求，來選舉，例如蔡英文的維持現狀。九二共識受到挑戰 要如何？國民黨有兩種聲音，一種是少提，

一種是對的事情。民進黨如果和兩岸交流會不會違逆基調？要順著走還是不說或改變？一中同表換候選人，不認同一中同表， 都很危險。

民進黨的維持現狀，那國民黨是什麼？ 那他們就決定用情緒， 往上就是愛台灣。

實體政策訴求，往上提升到情緒訴求， 包容不能分離， 抽象的去滿足中間選民和基本認同， 不談實體，只談選民情緒與感知。城市交流很具體，我們如果談和平互利，就是抽象的。做法很多。這樣很空洞，但維持現狀也是很空洞，也是情緒。對兩邊來說都無法解套兩岸，因此尋求最安全的方式。

大框架就決定了戰局，到競選總部和 3-4 位核心人物決策文宣、 局處長、 高階。廣告公司提案，他們再調整。他們就是競選總部的核心，聽候選人的，因此提了方向。候選人覺得可以，就找廣告公司拍片，經過幾次的修改決定後，就通知黨部通知記者發表。會找到業界信賴， 合作基礎， 也不會侷限在兩三家， 有些文青， 娛樂， 每支片子不同。腳本，廣告， 吵架，談，就會達成妥協。 論理，不同表現形式，看腳本大綱，開始拍會做反饋和修正， 微調。就是公關公司和競選總部來決定。 議題回應、 民調、 網民的情緒， 都是製作影片的影響， 就他和四五人的決定。網民的情緒，大家判斷可能會不同，就溝通和吵架。年輕人的票？很多形象比較好的立委來幫吸引年輕票，大家說國民黨老，所以就用新秀。 他們知道有難度。無法在三個月內 10/18 提名，只能呼應到一塊。年輕人對於太陽花， 國民黨的老不爽， 換柱事件， 這已成定案，因此只能找不分區年輕候選人呈現。

這是一個相對差異，表現出候選人的不同性格，國慶、 光復、 行憲紀念日、新年， 暖暖包就可以出手，中產階級選民和年輕人在中華民國還是認同，中華民國在台灣可以並存的，台灣反而是不能接受的。2016 年因為服貿運動，民進黨有操作，但今年國旗又大紅。當國民黨執政，因為潛意識裡覺得中華民國不好，但也無法改。這只是一種運動來吸引選民。蔡英文是不拿國旗的，這是國民黨要做的區別。因為換柱，是不是要讓支持柱和中間的選民共同元素都是中華民國。愛台灣是口號或訴求，具體落實是中華民國。藍軍從不否認， 也是和民進黨最大的差距，他們只是用台灣借殼上市。綠營愛中華民國嗎？不認同國旗，國名，如果這樣可以帶來利益和政策繁榮，大家可以接受，但事實是不行的。這次 2018 的反彈就是一個結果。

有時候廣告只是一種表演？補蔡英文的缺點，蔡英文是女版馬英九，不識人間煙火、不接地氣。馬英九的 long stay， 台北市長、 以前的法務部長。馬英九會認真學，一方面表演也會記住果農稻農的困難。住在別人家裡，清晨就要去採水果知道過程， join 在裡頭， 吸收這些。蔡英文純表演，文青表

演。表演還是學習？政治傳播都是表演，也可以滿足新聞，但對行動和候選人是不一樣。媒體決定論，議題內容，決定閱聽人思考關鍵。知溝理論等等燒錢，電視，偏中老年人才會看電視。中間的人跑去看網路、手機。因此很清楚，托播從老三台到衛星台。要從選民的載具去放。製作思考的是內容，通路只是必要條件。電視也不能不放，家庭婦女、中老年人。只好兩個都上，對於內容製作來說，議題是什麼才是重要的。現在還會分眾，臉書、網紅、幽默比較好的，直撥，每個人都是內容製造者。因此網路是互動的，要搭配不同的群眾、傳播模式去修改內容。以前內容決定廣告通路，被迫成長成不同分眾。電視、網路。網路更重於電視。網路需要四到五種形式，其中也要有可以放入電視的，以前是 90 秒，經費決定。到後面會比較短，或超長，但可能只播一支。重兵的或短的 15 秒，記得要投票。便宜。網路可以先從 120 秒、60-120 秒、30-120 秒、這是人可以接受的。再擷取中間的 30 秒放在電視。刪減成吸引人可以看的，全訊息的一種製作方式。有個大概的網路吸引眼球注意是 30-120 秒，彈性很大，網路也沒有長度限制。因此可以先想內容，再去想如何抽取其中內容。製作完再分長度，一部分給電視，電視 10 秒一個 spot，網路可以 77 秒，不受秒數限制。

2020 的訴求，要想出新的訴求，因為 2018 不是國民黨贏，這次贏是因為反對民進黨，只是把所有反對民進黨因素綜合在一起。知識份子看到卡管，吳音寧、韓國瑜、柯文哲等等。中產階級覺得贏太多了，所以下一次國民黨也是要好好地選，對政治人物嚴格程度提升了。這次好處是實質選票得的高，三都中。未來三到六個月拿出成績，這樣對 2020 會比較好。國民黨必須展現改革行動力。兩岸的部分，牽扯到和平和經濟，所以在這部分要提出有力的方式也是民進黨舉棋不定的。中華民國、兩岸互動、互利，應該是未來會出的，用這個來逼蔡英文，要跟或反對。介乎藍綠之間的柯文哲或許也是個因素。可以創造議題，但每個議題不會是網軍可以控制的而已，到時候報紙媒體也會展現力道。談一些各種貿易協定，住宅政策等等政策實質的。政策和國家認同是並存、相輔相成。負面選戰 1970 開始就有，用愛台灣是暗喻民眾你不愛台灣，候選人誰講更多愛台灣就打負面選戰更多。國民黨用兩種認同是兩種結合不會有衝突。對主權被欺壓會有意見，但對國旗也會拿啊！網軍會操作，因為中華民國國旗被打壓都是中共的問題。但如果我們不去刺激中共，就不會被打壓。

2012，金浦聰為主導人，作風較為強勢。做文宣的人會比較強勢，每天都要選擇，用廣告帶動議題，要割捨什麼，每天都在選擇，回應。強回應、軟回應、不回應？直接明快。國旗與台灣都要繼續講，這是大方向。是和 DPP 清新和本土，鄰家女孩的 PK 元素。因為 DPP 不願意承認 92 共識，而且當

時國民黨已經執政四年維持了兩岸和平。愛台灣，當時馬英九是現任者也用了免簽和政績表現實質的真正愛台灣，走得出去，邦交，水果篇，賣到日本的高端水果。evidence 數字，媒體權威的報導，簽證，熟軟的感性的愛情，來表現 performance，這是比較有感性的，用比較可愛的方式，政績拍得八股不好，說故事來說服民眾，民眾有感。用一些感性的方式。不是單純談政績，這是用不同手法上位到台灣。放進很多國際元素，不去談農業出產多少，沒有感覺。而是拍成有趣的，台灣人可以走出去，國外的人可以走進來。這樣的愛台灣方式在具體的行為。他們想好一些主題，手法交給廣告公司。政策方向 決定往不只大陸，像是日本，有些元素統計資料會參考，台灣對日本人有好感，所以給廣告公司。和金先生，選舉合作很久，衝突。愛台灣的方式，會帶一些政務官來，框架出來，發想創意，金會管很細，所以就生出日本水果篇。廣告公司有時候會歪掉，如果往大陸去講，就不會是金要的。

政策決定策略，決定再開始發想。民調執行最徹底，分眾的設定，關注的議題，再去做廣告。農民這篇，國民黨在國中小居於弱勢，本土台灣人 60 歲以上的，農業低級產業都弱勢。農漁捍衛漁權，議題不夠大就用新聞處理。農民議題大就用廣告處理。Survey 完後用政績，往上就是正在實現愛台灣的成果 20-30 歲，比較緊張的民調支持。喜歡什麼主題，喜歡愛情，所以有國旗女孩，棒球、周美青看棒球。會買單。護照，大家喜歡旅行，國外打工，台灣走出去實現的是什麼。辣妹，護照走得出去。馬英九人格特質，包含楊志良、外配、神父，他找的不是知名度很高的，而是很有本土奉獻程度的人。選總統找的是有特色的，傳達奉獻在這裡，很認真。優秀的特質，和馬英九奉獻在台灣，死為台灣魂。串在一起的形象。也是共同參與討論出來的。

5. Interviewee: 2016 Tsai Ing-wen's campaign producer, Director Kurt Lu 盧建彰  
導演

Interviewed date: 15 February, 2019

對社會是關注的，之前有個人林錦滄，找我幫柯文哲拍，任期四年。兩百多萬人，台北市有想法的都想請你出來談。我聽了很多人，和自己的焦慮，讓我們擔心的講出來，對孩子的未來擔憂講出來。溝通順利的，後來就幫小英拍，第一支片就開始幫忙。也沒見過小英，但就是把期望寫出來，願你平安。這不管任何宗教都會說，是人類共同期望，就寫下



來。為台灣量身打造，共同在這時代的恐懼與憂慮，也有盼望與願望。天會黑也會亮，當時對台灣的感受感覺，學運太陽花，也都跟他們有關係。有很多小人物、大人物。我們都是大人物，這些都是在這思考裡面。缺乏政治算計沒有廣告高度目的導向，很像抒發個人情感，我和大家一樣普通，很容易造成共鳴，這是大家的渴求，只是把擔心與追求的表現出來。

國家認同是背景，是所有人的出生背景，很多人會定義為問題，他就是每個台灣人的樣子。我基本上不愛把它看是一個問題。這就是姓什麼住在哪裡，有特色的地方。所以，所有台灣住民都跟認同相關。我們有從這角度出發，我更庶民更赤裸更與政治無關，我要做一個不是政治廣告。寫小說的三個元素去發酵，我倒沒有把土地說成是母親，但有可能我在這狀態裡，因為我在意我的孩子，這些作品不是賺錢，可能中國影片我都沒在做，我都逐一婉謝。為了我想像這個國家這個地方做點什麼稍稍改善。作品內容就會有為人父母，不再是考慮自己的利益。而是比你年輕的利益。鄉土文學的母親大地是一定對得上。

下一代：我比較在意的是貧富差距心理壓力仇恨憂慮，台灣也有這種現象。大學生領 22k，剩下的天數也不到 22k，活到 80 歲才兩萬一千九百天。月薪很少，那也要擔心害怕剩下的天數很少。剩下的天數這是拍給老人看的，大人們沒有 22k，剩下 8k，年輕人不用憂慮，與其鼓勵年輕人，倒不如關心自己，年輕人寫的是未來的考卷。貧富差距是我很焦慮的，一億對一般人很遙遠，這差距會有剝奪和厭惡社會的感覺。割喉案件，很可能是我家人，但我不知道家人朋友，也不希望社會不安定，財產堆積是因為發明了癌症的藥，那很好，但很多現實不是。貧富差距會讓人生病，有些集團不是來自於一般現象。以社會公義來發想。台灣，安平人，通常用地方地理來說。我是中華民國人，也是啊，對我而言，他是很自然的，不是很刻意地要提及。我的工作是在溝通，我不用說我是人，不用浪費資源再說這些大家都知道的事。他不是一個喜好，只是一個溝通，資源時間影像把語言留給其他。

運動迷，到每個城市都會看球。相信運動可以救人，我們沒有歧見的，沒有差異的，為國家隊不會去分黨派，當我們有共同目標，那我們就是台灣隊，民進黨只是台灣隊的一員。我們都在爭取更多不同想法的認同，這是傳播工作者的工作。不同階層不同身份，也是來自於不管你是誰，你只要認同台灣，在這裡生活，在意土地在意這裡的人，這就是台灣隊。有時候過度把政治神話，只是支持球隊，其實是可以一起吃飯一起在一起，不管是什麼政黨，都是這個聯盟這個國家的。反而是一個國家只有一個政黨，就是獨裁那也不好看。我用球迷的角度來看政黨。一個政黨要讓人們認同，要努力提出明星球員出色球技，作為球迷，我們應該要一起為對方加油，因為對方代表國家我們啊。我們

要為我們國家加油，每個人都代表國家，這是這支片。各縣市首長他們也是和我一樣的工作者，沒有比較了不起。就讓他們一起來。是我自己設計，希望大家都來，好處是大家都一樣大，沒有比較跩。大家都是一樣台灣隊，那段拍攝分三隊，合在一起走位不能碰到。

出訪：作為台灣人，很在意國家的位置，世界的角色，假設小英是運動員，也不希望她只在國內厲害，是希望她在國際有能見度。

願你平安：書寫很有溫度，看待小英她是有在思考，相對很會演講的，她比較像思考者不是學者，而是思想者。這對於台灣其實比較好。因為我們比較複雜，台灣面對的問題食安等等都很恐懼，希望能讓把人們放下沈澱的形象是好的，在很黑的地方寫書信。她也是我的期待，因為我真的失望，大家為了事情走出家門。所有人都在等天亮，沒有辦法用言語說，但心情存在我們共同的心情。觀察放進來，我感受到的社會共同心情。我對她的期待也是大家對她的期待，也是反映時代的心跳。早上醒了還沒亮會期待天亮，就是這樣的心情。這沒有很糟糕或不好，但確實就是一直在，這是適切的狀態來描述台灣。

台語客語：對過去看過的廣告不喜歡，一個人用自己的聲音好好說出來是很好的，過去政治廣告不誠懇。

高空往下看：要天亮是一張台南的照片，原本沒有規劃到，但後來因這照片做很好，天會黑也會亮的詮釋。

不分區立委，政黨投票。我以前沒有看過這類廣告，我回到本能，例如食安問題，食安法不完整，回到立委的本質就立法。這是最核心。我們忘記立法委員要幹嘛，好像只來質詢人，我們的立法不夠周全。應該把這提出來，他們應該是人民大聲公而不是大聲兇官員。小孩安全幫忙把關，直指功能，那個場域立法院的功能。忘了做該做的事情。回到事務本質，台灣很多時候都失能，這些人物都在但失能，我們竟然不在意，我們應該在意有沒有好好被對待回到事務本質。所以更 rough 在台灣的地方走，大聲公在台灣各地，反過來說也要讓人意識到這群人是應該要保護人民的。每個人都有功能，社會福利殘障勞工的，之前都停留在某個政治人物個人魅力，現在也是特定立法委員都是個人魅力而非能力。不是專業問題，立委專業制度設計上是有的，立委願意奔走其實是里長級的，應該立委是國家級的，資源錯置的現象，把票投給他的人也沒有意識到這個。

創意發想：競選廣告沒有了不起，和一般廣告一樣，創意是用來解決問題的，所以任何做的想法不是去堆積某個人，大家都看了厭煩。好像政治廣告一直都存在一種形式，回到擅長的正常的廣告有效性，有創意的。有影響力，帶給人吸睛 believe，不是重複廢話。人物放大，但政見呢？難道我會看到你的臉投你嗎？不會啊。操作政治的人有時候跟我們在不同世界。深刻內涵意說故

事說出來，競選廣告應該也是這樣。競選總部非常自由地讓我很自由。就正常工作的方式。

#### 6. Interviewee: 2016 Tsai Ing-wen Campaign leader, Lee Hou-ching

李厚慶 媒體創意中心主任 (第一次訪問)

Interviewed date: 17 January, 2019

影像廣告有幾個軸線，從總統個人比較理性，因此希望多增加感性的東西。不能靠自己講，必須靠行動和人的互動，在地希望跟著這軸線。從兩個目的，蔡英文看起來更有人味，不像學者。走訪這些地方也讓大家看到台灣有不管是文化產業還是年輕人創業，那這其實都回到從土地出發，國家認同一定從這出發對這地方認同。的確有這目的。這是第一波影片，是最早的。台灣美樂地是我們覺得在這選舉裡，音樂很重要，特別是能穿透族群性別不同地域的人，也希望有音樂專輯專案可以把候選人提升到一個國家的概念。一個專輯有很多首歌，人們可以找到故事找到對候選人對選舉的路線的認同。名稱是一時之選，後來就變成美樂地台灣，是一個很好的地方，孕育很多東西。功能性會運用在活動造勢，廣告影片也會用到，自己做一張不會有版權問題。也透過音樂跟年輕人連結，所以這張專輯比照流行音樂操作模式，過去都是送的文宣品，現在變成上架的唱片行賣的。他變成宣傳軸線有排行榜，後來新聞都圍繞到衝到第一名，滾動式的宣傳，本來是文宣，後來變成新聞，就滾動到更大的能量。跟年輕人連結，也挑選兩到三首歌進到 KTV 直接和庶民連結。文宣是手段，目的是每首歌都有反射台灣現狀，土地的意義，族群的多元。甚至會有一些議題，有個蕭賀碩吃飽沒，呼應食安政策，宣傳的線是交錯的，和政策議題也好，候選人特質，對土地的價值選擇也好。

土地：我自己，我那時候有重考這件事，重考有接觸到老師告訴我台灣的故事，打破從教科書的角度，從黨國思想。也因為這樣剛好遇到陳水扁選台北市長我們那一代的年輕人對政治有興趣，因為在這過程 1994 到現在快二十年，台灣國家認同是錯亂的，也因為不同時代可以很主觀的說國民黨有企圖用大中國教育去思考，這和現狀是錯亂的，所以從土地出發慢慢透過選舉，對土地價值的選擇，現在選擇的是虛幻的中華民國，包含的地方還是很務實地在我們在所在的地方做一些事情。但這又不能去講我就是台灣獨立或是不獨立，這會陷

入很複雜的討論，會陷入台獨華獨，我們已經獨立了，幹嘛還要喊獨立。但回到土地，每個出生或落地在這的人，這是最大公約數。這是最連結最多數人，這當然和當時的現狀有關，馬英九執政角度比較認為台灣要密切和中國往來，會帶來經濟發展。但那角度和我們不同的，我們認為雞蛋不能放在同一個籃子裡，畢竟他不是民主國家，一但他有什麼決定我們經濟就被切斷，這是政策的思考，本來台灣就是要望向世界，不可能只跟特定的國家，這樣又跟國家的認同有關。因為在那時候他執政的現狀，很多台灣的利益很可能被大陸吸走，的確和太陽花有關。反服貿的軸線其實是大家對馬英九執政兩任不滿導向中國，我們提的就有差異性，也是民進黨自己的路線，產業有點宣示性，你願意留在台灣，我們會更加善待你，改變你的環境，讓你更有競爭力，有新舊產業，其實也是在連結年輕人的未來，給年輕人一個願景，你只要有想法、肯努力，那我們就當你的助力。那時候選戰是要表達這樣。

其實每一次都會有親民的路線，只是有沒有外顯。本來就會到地方，這一年因為要連結土地，就特別到各個地方去，在地希望有區域的鋪陳，看到台灣的小縮影。走到地方，不要讓蔡英文看起來像菁英台北人，要有接地氣，連結人民，拉出和國民黨的不同。國民黨高高在上比較都會菁英。

我們那一年基本上年輕人優先，第二是客家人，所以有幾個系列，台三線。台灣美樂地有客家歌曲。還有一塊是親子和婦女，放在食安，用比較軟性來對話。年輕人沒有直接製作特別符號，而是分散在影片中，那是一個方向，但沒有特別做影片或文宣，已經內化到我們所做的東西。

民進黨和國民黨的不同，對我們來說，民進黨在講愛台灣和土地，這是內化在心裡的，他不太需要特別去演，去設計，他就是很民主進步黨，以前有勤政清廉愛鄉土。國民黨有包袱，這就是高下立判。他所設定的 TA 外省族群，過去比較緊密的團體。他們要考量歷史上的因素，沒有辦法要大辣辣的位移到台灣這一塊。國民黨都會打經濟，很難比愛台灣這件事。國民黨內部也有本土派內部的掌權問題，會相對的敢去喊，民進黨沒有分歧只有怎麼愛而已。

外省人：我們沒有認為有外省人，不是用外省人，只有先來後到，誰比較早來也比不過原住民。再來就是我們認為，外省人其實是我們不太願意去區分，頂多是客家人原住民，我們不太會去貼這東西。我們的夥伴也可能是這樣的家庭啊。在這次比較包容，以前不是。因為以前國民黨長期執政，所以優勢都集中在外省人，所以以前會有本省外省衝突。以前比較會講，民進黨不斷在反省，民進黨也有外省人獨立台灣會，段宜康就是，我們愛台灣這塊土地。我想慢慢這十年會慢慢本省外省不會再去凸顯。希望站在這塊土地，但客觀還是會有過年風格不一樣，外省本省可能吃的東西不同，但沒有好壞對錯。不同生

活習慣是存在，但會隨時間變成共同的台灣生活模式，不會像以前差異這麼大。國民黨會刻意提是因為要吸他們的人。

媒體創意中心，我們在大選之前會跟幾個製作團隊有合作經驗，條件是要認同我們要對選舉有熱情，他不太會是委外的外包的商業模式，他是我們的支持者，只是有這方面的專業，我們會先訂影片方向，交由他們去提案寫腳本設定場景風格，過程少則兩週長則一兩個月。這一刻台灣停滯了長達四個月，因為文案場景，一直推敲也要因應選舉變化，去改變，重磅影片選前一個月或一週才會推出。渲染力比較大，會投入比較多的資源。選前的光榮革命，年輕人選前一刻發揮行動力去投票，這個討論差不多一個半月，都是內部先定方向目的，再由影片團隊去寫腳本文案。來回會一直改，溝通討論，畢竟他們是製作方，一般人的感受，政治圈和一般人的感受，很多辯論很多來回。

國家認同是蠻一致的認同。國家認同元素：土地，母親，大家都被這地方被孕育，這不會缺席。未來會有保護這塊土地，原因是因為對中國的不耐煩，很多手段，一些利誘。未來會是更重要路線，誰真正想保護台灣，誰是要擁抱中國。這是路線不同於國民黨。我們也不會去講國民黨就是站中國，這是一個反問，你要站哪邊？

網路：我們會觀察反饋，絕對會，但會不會討論不一定。有些只是謾罵。我們不會刪留言，這是多元社會，你有言論自由，你的看法美醜有主觀意見，只要不要違反法律。會去吸收批評和建議，但也會自己判斷。還是要主導議題，宣傳就是要丟出東西，造風讓大家跟著走，或趁浪在浪頭上，還是得分的。你夠大能量就可以帶風向。愛台灣是從土地所出發，愛台灣有很多說法。母親，土地，1997年，蔡振南的歌母親的名字叫台灣，這是一個循環，可能下次就會有。台灣就是母親，說不定又會繞回來。觀察社會氛圍去提出宣傳是大家打中心裡的。

## 7. Interviewee: 2016 Ma Ing-jeou Campaign spokesman, Lee Ming-hsien

李明賢 發言人

Interviewed date: 21 December, 2018

討論主軸: 2016 主軸，安定繁榮拼經濟。選戰很短只有 60 天，所以我們先設定好主軸，發包給公關公司做文宣。整個討論過程會先提出需求，再一起討論。主導權，我們提出大方向，內容方向由廣告公司來設計。這次很壓縮，衝突？國旗篇，文傳會突然想到，節奏很快，不像以前的馬英九有長期計畫的

主軸。暖暖包，國民黨氣勢很低，很有趣，結合巧思，寒冬送暖，跟廠商思考，暖暖包上有 Taiwan，避免撕裂對立

國旗超越藍綠，最大公約數，台灣本土認同，在地化，一個台灣不要撕裂。多元包容兼容，外省本土，不是二元對立，包容在 ROC，這個國家最上位，而非獨派認為或統派的極端台灣與統一。台灣被包容在中華民國之下，台灣是家是地名，這是核心思想，國名是中華民國

換柱的論述，政治考量？中心思想還是維持各表。同表到各表，遇到問題？挺洪的反彈，國民黨內部也有認為要同表，或者社會上有人也是比較支持統一。國民黨內部多數還是要各表，因為各表中華民國才存在。民進黨傳給閱聽人是台灣，國民黨是相互使用，民進黨也遇到台獨與中間的問題。雙方趨於中間，內部都有各自認同。民進黨也有人很獨。台灣共和國和維持現狀，蔡英文的說法是不同的。國民黨是不更改憲法不更改現狀。馬英九、朱立倫、吳敦義都是大陸要先民主再來談判。防守戰，不要分裂兩岸，因為太陽花，國民黨很弱勢，2016，內政兩岸，國家認同很弱勢，所以只能打防守 one

Taiwan。太陽花反馬、服貿、兩岸，這部分要回到防守，質疑民進黨在撕裂對立台灣。經濟上，勞工、經濟、基本薪資、政策白皮書主打經濟，避免撕裂，兩岸持續交流。每天都在開會處理危機，被動防守，王如玄的危機公關。11/17-1/13，約莫 60 天的選戰，廣告元素鋪陳，和以前很長的不一樣。平息換柱、分裂，安內，說服，換柱，黨內已經分裂，挺柱、挺馬、找洪秀柱是安內，再攘外。說服社會。分成兩塊在進行。國民黨內部，雞兔同籠，不同世代、想法、年齡、關在一起怎麼整合？有人認同中國大陸，年輕世代會認同台灣，怎麼去拉鋸整合，不管認同如何，就是認同國家中華民國，用國旗，這是最大的認同。台灣就是力量，國民黨被打成外來政權，包括施政，太陽花世代的兩岸關係走太快，朱立倫試圖建構兩岸交流，國家認同不變，但兩岸節奏可以慢一點，試圖爭取太陽花認同。本土論述。用更多在地論述。吸引年輕人，洪秀柱很少本土？堅持理念，或迎合市場？也有各種主張。因為時間太短，廣告構想成形到推動到拍片非常短，團隊會在場，四到五個人提想法，意識形態的討論，朱立倫沒有來，公關公司擬定就拍，毛片拍了不一定會滿意，大概就修一下。

新媒體，閱聽人：徐巧芯發包八隻微電影，鋪陳朱立倫的點點滴滴，拍出來但很爛就沒有用。價格很貴，內容大概是平易近人，形象包裝的走向，但因為太爛，原本要上架到網路。就作廢。所以是有審查。新媒體，YouTube、FB、國民黨臉書，作串聯和網站，因為一面倒在罵，所以也無法去做反饋了。很多都不理性了。已經陣營被罵到無法反擊，好的建議會參考，但已經無法拯救，灰心了。一支影片出來都被 kuso，也無法反擊。固

本：安內攘外，國民黨內部先鞏固。一群人不諒解，藍軍就分裂兩塊，社會也分成兩塊，支持與不支持國民黨。支持國民黨又分成支持朱與反對。先觸及挺洪，再來是太陽花學運的那塊。有做吸引年輕人的胖卡活動市集。但其實已經挽回不了了。先天不足、後天失調，戰略彌補不了錯誤。

在 2016 時空環境下，兩岸發展和年輕人認同是會有衝突，但因為是 context 的關係，年輕人大概是希望增進台灣能見度，要長期說服。要有具體作法，但國民黨當時太軟弱了。但因為 2016 很難，有幾個方式，發言人上電視 CF 出來，但臉書都被修理，年輕人很活躍，國民黨聲量很弱。輿論市場在媒體也是被修理很慘。國家認同，會偏向意識形態操作。統一或獨立都是意識形態操作。其實過去大選都有效，民進黨就是說國民黨不愛台灣、外來政權、中共同路人，抹紅、戴帽子，這些都有選票。國民黨會操作民進黨撕裂台灣，只是會隨時間變遷有不一樣。到底意識形態或經濟哪個比較重要？有點像蹺蹺板，哪邊比較重要會跟著時空改變。兩岸關係緊張或現狀也會影響國內經濟，優先順序問題，看是什麼層級的選舉，大選兩岸會是關鍵。

2012，外省人，原罪。省籍牌，這會成為民進黨攻擊的對象，國民黨要強調真正的台灣人。2011 5/9，燒成灰都是台灣人，馬英九 ECFA 辯論。

馬英九外省人原罪，所以要重新建構論述，這是一個互動的狀態，因為民進黨一直攻擊，所以必須要回應外省人的話語。符號建構意識形態的策略。民進黨把外省人當作格格不入。創黨元老外省人，現在外省人概念也是有爭議，但內部還是建構比較狹隘本土，對外省比較排斥，會打省籍牌。老一派還是會打

真台灣：誰是真正愛台灣？如何讓台灣真正富強？呈現多元包容的愛台灣，多元族群，外配也很多。用血緣已經是狹隘了。馬英九的想法，是用身體力行去愛台灣，而非血統。不要再像民進黨只會喊口號。只要選舉就會被扣上意識形態，但也是會有票。民進黨和國民黨都可以用愛台灣基本盤的票，中間選民，基本上會用政績。意識形態其實是固本，中間選民不能只靠意識形態。

Visa free ECFA 是彰顯主權的方式，強化的，台灣甚至中華民國是走得出去的。故意在 2012 年 11 月宣布美國免簽，是為了選舉，美國對台免簽，是凸顯阿扁執政免簽零個。馬英九增加 111 國，台灣是走得通的用中華民國（台灣）名字。國旗女孩，吸睛，美女，強調中華民國，淡化政黨色彩，配合國旗元素，符號學連結。

2012 比較精彩，你來我往比較經典。新媒體，會有數據公司提供回覆聲量來處理危機、輿論，大數據應用更順暢。2004---2008 臉書還沒有，2012 有運用，但愈來愈成熟，粉絲團也被 IG、DCARD、YouTube 取代。PTT 其實還好，社群媒體，愈來愈多人用，團隊會看，會跟數據公司合作列報告。輿情

分析，關鍵字，馬英九、吳敦義等等，看聲量。運用更普及，針對議題。被攻擊的很兇，要做危機處理就會看聲量，或看對手哪個被攻擊很慘，就要有所動作。數據公司有指標刻度，警示指標。影片如何擴散才是問題，現在已經不放電視，因為太貴。手機行動載具會取代電視。

8. Interviewee: Scholar who is proficient in Political communication and campaign ads, Niu Tse-hsun 學者 鈕則勳 (第一次訪問)

Interviewed date: 12 December, 2018

洪秀柱自己的國家認同概念，和大多數人印象脫節，強調一中同表，國民黨未必支持，更不用說說服民眾，意識形態深藍的選民，還是去挺國民黨吧！國民黨模糊的認同。2016，一中同表、一中各表，黨內無統整性，廣告上也沒效果。深藍是洪秀柱的隱語概念，去挺朱立倫，波折、無說服力，訊息不一致。朱立倫目標族群不清楚，大市場策略，訴求概念不強，中間選民和淺綠都不強。很虛的打高空，團結做法沒有提出來。

自我感覺良好，打不到痛點，說服力沒有，目標群眾不清，強度不夠，無法 touch 選民痛點。

國旗：前馬吳配，造勢的方式，強打國旗國歌意象，是沒有策略含義，因為對方不用來凸顯我們比較愛中華民國。不是訴求年輕，你不用我就要用，我凸顯出我用我熱愛國家。延續以前國民黨中華民國，希望藉由去換掉換柱的不爽。

外省人：民進黨不會明著打，會暗著打。省級牌還是有用，但太明很不道德，會隱喻的打。朱立倫直接批評民進黨的族群牌操作，我們國民黨是融合的，民進黨認為外省人變邊陲。因為民進黨會打省籍，所以朱立倫就打民進黨的族群牌。民進黨的黨部概念，分開外省和台灣人，還是可以操作台灣本土沙文主義。

未來的認同：會強調中華民國保衛戰，愛台灣也會，愛台灣要更豐富化。實際的好的政策，讓台灣變有錢，因為國民黨的原罪就是會被貼標籤不愛台灣，因此一定要愛台灣，一定要有愛台灣的 logo。經驗法則，民進黨會這樣操作，這次也是守護台灣，疼惜陳菊，邏輯一慣，可以得分的。國民黨先天比較弱，所以一定要喊，要有圖像式的表象，思想重建，不是口號愛台灣，而是要有相關政策，族群融合、變得更有錢。



馬英九已經定調台灣是家園，中華民國是國家。對後繼者比較好處理論述。

民進黨：蔡英文要切割中國大陸，所以才會強調本土經濟策略，打馬英九的親中。蔡的邏輯，強化本土經濟論述，清楚的世界領頭羊產業，但是空的，只是口號。下鄉只是意象，廣告效果吸引閱聽人，會有效。因為馬太爛。農民本來就比較支持她，勞工也是，透過意象，吊高閱聽人的期待。環境因素，因為馬執政很糟，大家的期待，農民勞工都是基本盤，所以她去互動。廣告效果會比較明顯。

民進黨的論述：傳統的戰法，民主是他們建構的意識形態的概念，或許邏輯可能性是高的。馬做得很爛是主要的原因，讓蔡英文觸動中間選民。台灣牌，反服貿之後，打台灣牌效果更明顯。反中國、反賣台，因為服貿的鋪陳。學運讓台灣意識拉高，收割選民的機會。省籍牌愈來愈老，台灣人已經用到爛了，還給民進黨了，愛台灣已經快沒用了。未來可能不太敢打，除非未來有變數，台灣人沒有一輩子欠你。悲情、省籍、愛台灣，證明沒有用。

新媒體：網路意見會參考，大數據參考意見效果。依據這些去做策略調整。大概從柯文哲開始，候選人政營就開始參考，慢慢的會改變論述方式。正負面的回應，必要的，廣告效果好不好可以看，去改變，討論聲量高低，候選人數位選戰，新時代必須要去看數據。

2012，搶救國旗：年輕的人在拍，以為要爭取年輕人，但年輕人不會在乎國家意象的東西，而是賺錢。後來，策略原點考量，因為對方不用我們就要用。凸顯民進黨不用，國民黨的強項，效果存疑。

台灣是家園，中華民國：原罪、外省人，會怕對方猛攻，就用這些去防堵與消毒。建構新的論述 後繼者可以容易鋪陳。

台灣是具有主權，凸顯兩岸關係是好的，國際空間變大。免簽護照很多，有兩岸有外交，主權意識：沒有特別的強調，去推兩岸和外交。即便今天在國際上沒有太多人認同，但在實際上我可以幫國民爭取利益。凸顯主權也是可以。

蔡英文，台灣第一位女總統，形象定位，意象公平正義。沒有藉由廣告鋪陳細膩，應該建構女性男性，傾聽沒有鋪陳，只有靠一支吳念真的廣告。不知道在拍什麼。這對台灣第一女總統沒有支撐效果，應深化比男性強的例證。廣告上形象定位，台灣第一位女總統怎樣豐富內涵。

真台灣：凸顯台灣人特質，勤奮勇敢，地方特色，延續操作行為。台灣人的良善，只有在馬英九身上可以找到。把自己形象和台灣文化做結合，用台灣當地風土民情，馬英九只是群體的一個人，他是代表者。

台灣人的台灣：本土閩南沙文意識，沒有考量客家、原住民，狹隘本土代表民進黨的主流價值，沒有凸顯完全包容的概念。傳統台灣本土牌。對民進黨來說，怎樣包裝台灣認同，用怎樣的方式，不是很刻意的方式，避免造成不好的效果。國民黨認為中華民國是國家認同，被民進黨作為不認同台灣為國家的論述，但實際上，國民黨在馬英九定調台灣是家園，中華民國是國家，這種設計方式透過各種符號鋪陳來防堵民進黨，但這還是很複雜的問題。

## 9. Interviewee: Senior political journalist, Yang Hsiang-chun

政治線資深記者 楊湘鈞

Interviewed date: 15 April, 2019

洪秀柱一中同表，一中各表，深藍的支持者，要反轉洪秀柱的兩岸看法，搶救立委席次，國民黨必須要搶救不統的論述，不符合以前的論述。朱立倫換柱，馬英九的論述要回來，因為這是最好的論述。因此兩岸論述對國民黨很重要。朱立倫不會偏離黨內核心價值，中華民國和台灣。拉回來洪的正確國家觀念，遵從憲法，但他的論述無法被接受。

2016 的氛圍，不管怎樣提兩岸都沒機會。社會氛圍，反服貿、反中、經濟數據、年輕人薪資，搭上這些議題，導向了反中。社會沒有希望。年輕人投票率變高就是表達不滿。人民的宣洩口，就是反中。氛圍已經三五年沒有用，蔡英文 TAIWAN NEXT 不用提兩岸，因為穩贏。社會氛圍幫蔡英文鋪成了。

蔡英文 2012 不好，兩岸很鮮明，2016 不用再提。因為穩贏，社會已經鋪陳。現在藍營的人敢說中華民國，因為社會氛圍，近年其實已經愈來愈少，但最近又有開始願意站出來說，以前看不到，不會直接跟反中對幹。雙重認同，中華民國不能丟。民進黨有台獨黨綱，不認同？但執政兩次，也無法改變。台灣之光，也會拿國旗，代表台灣。中華民國是一個保護傘，我可以接受台灣中華民國在台灣，因為這招牌不能拋掉，要國際可以接受。廣告還是可以吸引，意識形態是一回事，但依附在經濟，國家認同是會跑來跑去的。民進黨在打的是國族意識，建立台灣民族，去掉政治上中國是百分之百，去文化？不知道？去漢族文化 民進黨應該不接受，因為民進黨的論述不可能解釋

台灣國族認同。

新媒體：空戰、網路，不避諱談國家認同。最近，但也是依照個人的特質，勝者就不會去碰。穩當選的人比較不會理會意識形態。落後的人才會打，2012 蔡英文打 ECFA。新媒體影響太大了，以韓國瑜的例子來說，以生活化新的方式在打選戰。陳其邁就是競選場子，助選大官，傳統國民黨的方式。韓國瑜的口號，動態生活的。光看臉書就覺得要選誰，因為新媒體，生活的 fancy，因為會引發閱聽人的吸引力。軟調性，傾聽人民的方式，就是贏定的人。訴諸意識形態攻擊，就是比較輸面的人會打。他們的支持者即時反應度，以前藍營的人不可能，網友的互動，網友的 kuso 也是吸引人的、重要的。即時的速度，網友的參與。官方的話會層層審核，新聞稿要層層審核。綠是不是陷入公務體系，高層是不是反應變慢了？執政者蔡英文會點頭嗎？做的廣告代表民進黨去發，沒辦法這麼快。候選人不需政黨包袱，因此網路攻勢可以很快很新。國民黨官方還是傳統。藍營支持者 2012 使用新媒體不普及，學生使用筆電。2012 藍營軍公教也開始使用，老年人也開始，馬政府就是欠缺這批人。2012 年蔡英文新興網軍，在 ptt 到 2014 從反服貿開始通訊，2016 大贏在這個面向。藍營支持者的使用智慧型裝置留言的數目，有正相關，對抗網民菁英式論述，和主流藍營支持者對抗，吳敦義不知道會不會修正，他會抵抗民意。政治人物會希望隨民意調整，但也有大事會牽絆。綠營：陳其邁，暖男，意識到一些什麼。蔡英文也沒調整，還是空的，自我矛盾。新民意的影響？取決於人。柯文哲，上次與這次的差別，網路帶議題，柯文哲有點走回傳統，靠他自己和老婆的發言。以前不用，都是網民自然創造議題。現在是柯文哲要自己跳出來，變成媒體的報導，支持者再去依附。民眾不希望講空話的候選人。藍營的這些爭出頭的政治人物，羅智強的戰法，不是在聽民眾，設定一個大目標戰略，訴諸全民調、新民意，我主張我就是中國人？以前不講現在講，至少在藍營喊這個基本票跑不掉，可能也呼應韓流。國家認同已經是次等的問題。他就是打空戰，呼應選民，募款給韓國瑜，去推銷民進黨卡管中閔上任，打一些民眾關切的。政治人物與民眾的關係：風向球，堅持，保護人民的韓國瑜，人進來貨出去，保持九二共識。算不算回應民意？跟他主流價值沒有偏離。

2012，馬英九，綠營把自己匡死建立新國家國族認同，馬英九在尋求支持者極大化，傳統支持者連結台灣、淺藍 淺綠不要跑、中間。他不會像洪秀柱，去修正論述。馬英九喊出修正新三不，讓民調下來。以前他不喊。2012 有人批評他搞華獨，但去對比，他盡量在對民眾場合講台灣，官方會用中華民國。對內的政績，免簽，國外會認同政治實力和主權，雙方互利，外國人不會去在意我們的國名。對內，當然會覺得中華民國很好 主權的象徵。就會去忽略掉台

灣或中華民國的名字。陳菊：經濟利益讓國家主權受損？邦交國都丟了，就是口水戰。到底蔡英文國家主權有受損嗎？邦交國斷了許多，但免簽證照用。極端意識形態，會有動機貼台灣國嗎？會有動機去改變嗎？我們國家在世界的艱難處，我們中華民國是有利的。而且台灣國也不一定是共識。國家認同是依附在幸福經濟感受，才會往上延伸到國家認同去宣泄。

台灣第一位女總統，台獨票跑不掉，她在吸引年輕人，新鮮感。藍綠板塊轉移，情勢連結，不一定這樣的。台灣意識形態已經差不多定型，誤以為政治板塊變遷是藍綠政營驅動支持者投票的強或弱。台灣支持者都不看政績，只是在看候選人如何打動支持者，不管候選人怎麼喊，不會去投別人。可能只會亂投或廢票。

台灣第一女總統：感動意識形態，中間選民，對抗的是 ECFA 的國民黨，藍營沒有打動選民的東西。國家認同差不多固定，一點點波動而已。可能和大多數人看法不同。未來要觀察的是，國族認同在藍綠候選人是否真的會贏？國族認同是波動的，國民黨的台灣是省、地方。朱立倫依然在一中架構，延續蔣經國的調性。民進黨綁死自己的論述，國民黨反而有空間。

#### 10. Interviewee: 2020 Tsai Ing-wen's campaign propaganda deputy executive, Sidney

Lin 林鶴明副執行長

Interviewed date: 11 February, 2020

選舉的結果絕對不是只有單一因素，尤其總統大選涉及層面之多。直播技術和網紅並不是今年才出現的產物，在去年九合一選舉時，其實網路社群就有直播與網紅的生態。但對於總統大選來說，2016年時有直播的技術，但不如2020的人手一機來得普遍；而網紅大致上也是2016年後的產物。直播和網紅是當代民眾使用媒介改變之後所產生的新的技術與新的意見領袖，直播只是一種技術，雙方陣營也都有使用，所以我不認為這是勝選的主要因素。網紅的部份，確實造成許多訊息的傳播效果更好，但網紅就像是過去的名嘴，只是他們使用的是網路的介面。因此，善用與網紅的互動，讓訊息的傳播效果更好，這是有助於選舉的。網紅和宣傳是技術層面的操作，最主要的核心還是來自於內容。蔡總統四年執政的績效，才是核心的產物。至於這些技術面的操作要順利，執行團隊能夠掌握候選人的特質、粉絲的喜好，以及換界合作的順利，都是必備條件。了解社群的生態，才能推出好的作品，獲得喜好。這不是什麼很困難的道理，就是你要賣你的產品之前，先搞清楚產品的優缺點為何，讓消費者愛上

你的優點，放下你的缺點，就賣得出去了。不能說大於，畢竟有很多民眾還是仰賴傳統媒介的使用習慣。蔡總統陣營並未偏廢傳統主流媒體的重要性，而是將主流媒體與社群媒體盡可能融合使用，達到各種效果。網路社群的使用確實和過去增加許多，這是趨勢，但是傳統媒體的影響力仍然很重要，也沒有消失。你必須要了解你要推出的訊息適合哪一種平台，然後做到盡可能的分眾，就能獲得更好的回饋。網紅影片等於傳統媒體節目，所以這個過程就和傳統媒體的合作並無差異，只是作品放在網路社群上，傳統主持人變成網紅，然後用不同的思維去創作內容而已。至於合作經驗，主動與被動都有，並沒有一致。腳本規劃都需要幕僚與對方團隊一起討論溝通，至於自由度與否，取決於雙方的默契。很多時候是同時拍兩隻影片，各自放在各自的頻道，達到合作的效果。但也有例外，只放在單一頻道的情形。

#### 11. Interviewee: 2020 Tsai Ing-wen's campaign spokesman, Juan Chao-hsiung

阮昭雄發言人副執行長

Interviewed date: 14 January, 2020

因為是現任者，執政過程裡面，所以這個身為現任總統凸顯中華民國台灣團結國家，是很重要的。這樣的論述是最大公約數，團結意象是有必要的，多方面訴求選民，分眾的選民。每個廣告都會切分眾，政績是現任者很重要的訴求。是很有說服力的，裡面強調現任總統團結台灣，可以把總統高度拉開。這種認同是最大公約數，要最多選票。

競選總部的角色是輔選。中央黨部拍的會比較激烈，凸顯政黨之間的差異，要跟國民黨區隔，提不分區之後，民進黨才追上來政黨票，產品要凸顯差異性。

網紅年齡層年輕，焦慮感，只是透過網紅講出來，網紅自主性很高，是共同期待，願意站出來講出民主和自由。

執政者訴求政績，基本工資提升，對年輕人有感，對社經地位高的當然沒有感。工具上我們比國民黨多元，總統和網紅合拍，多樣的方式講政績，更容易接觸到選民，甚至我們把虛擬網路世界辦成社群之夜，只有蔡英文有辦法做得到。

參選方式要很多元，以前是傳統拜票，現在是要面面俱到。傳統收看者已經愈來愈少，新聞上曝光是還有，網路是一定要有的，未來是趨勢，但偏廢一方都不行。臉書到 IG 都要跟上工具的使用。

中華民國實質內涵，大中國到秋海棠、老母雞，變化很多。對岸和我們有憲法的解釋，實質上我們生活在這裡，台澎金馬，不同時代的符號認同不一樣，中華民國要抓住人民的想像，這也是民進黨台灣前途決議文，維持現狀。台灣符號是民進黨支持者的想像，但又要兼顧中華民國，因此就是中華民國台灣。中華民國國旗也會拿啊！年輕人是接受，但也會認同這樣的存在。因為我們的信仰價值是如此，但我們和對岸是不同國家，很明確的，要改變，也是全國人民去決定的。

反送中也不是我們發動的，會發生這個，和我們核心價值一樣，捍衛自由民主，我們和對岸就是不同國家，你要統一，我們我們辦不到。我們和香港有雷同，我們觀察社會接受，政黨要反映民意，基本是有感的，這本來就是我們的想像和信仰，後來就會具象一點，用廣告，用話語。

網紅，衝流量，但也有自己來，理念相同，有認同才會同框。

現任者和挑戰者不一樣。總統不能講太激烈，我是團結國家的形象，歷任總統會凸顯優勢。

認同不是強加，是慢慢鋪成。很多年輕人都天然獨，我們呼吸的空氣都不一樣。老年人，每個階段需求不同，選舉要集合最大公約數。長照是政績需求，是連任者可以宣傳的。不能淪為口號，愛台灣要凸顯在政績上。

## 12. Interviewee: 2020 Han Kuo-yu's campaign producer, Lin Hsiang-pin

林湘評 製作人

Interviewed date: 13 January, 2020

造成庶民經濟受到很大的影響，民進黨還用假象。這國旗是民眾自發性拿出來，人民的決心這不是韓國於拿出來的。這是韓國於要人民自己認同自己的國家，我們到底在哪裡？我們的主要國家在哪？而是認為認同國家政見剛好刺在心裡，民眾散發的力量。

台北的天空變了，國旗背後的力量是他在整個認同台灣主權國家，讓民眾接受了，讓一百多萬人拿國旗出來是何其難的。到底民進黨執政要把台灣帶到哪？你有本事獨立，卻又不回答貪污，也不回答相關問題。我很樂觀分析國瑜代表庶民，老百姓不會自己反自己，民眾認同感是非常高的。韓國瑜是靠個

人魅力、庶民經濟。他被國民黨遺棄 16-7 年，但他沒有反抗，但在這十七年，他深深了解民眾要什麼，潛意識，剛出來時民眾很反國民黨，而且北南分得很清楚。黨部和國策顧問不同步，以前花很多錢現在沒有錢，而是情義相挺的，一毛錢沒花。我們有提建議，國策顧問的建議，蔡英文一直攻擊韓國瑜沒有政見。因此就拍出這個廣告，我們很清楚的說未來要做什麼。我們點閱率三天超過十五萬，國政顧問政見短板，短版網路中比較適合。三分到五分鐘是最好，讓專家學者都可以講到。讓觀眾可以耐心看完。民眾還是很關注這話題。

第二支的是從以前選舉到現在，沒有政見就是黑韓，他不容許家人被傷害。昨天最後一支，就是十五個縣市，首長準備好了，靠個人魅力贏回來了。藍大於綠，幫他做 90 秒的，今天才下，網路也會有。博恩夜夜秀很有幫助，你黑我，我就要上你的節目。中間的梅花梅花做一半，因為版權的問題，我們用，韓粉掉眼淚，風雨出來，愈冷愈開花，凝聚力量，讓韓粉被打壓的紓解。梅花是國花，象徵中華民國的連結，導演後製都用好了，劉家昌的版權，他就說他要做。韓辦有建議，一直修，縣市首長催票的 90 秒，這三系列主打不同族群。第一主打執政優勢的首長相信會贏，第二喊起韓粉再聚力，一個韓粉拉十票。博恩夜夜秀 500 多萬收視群，其實他本來要消費韓，但反被消費。我們一直在溝通，國政顧問是韓辦提出來的，但我們認為，內容很重要，我們知道哪些新聞會中，我們可以抓住重點，所以他可能弄很大的議題，都沒有我來得多。國政顧問，發想是韓辦，短版是很重要的，但短版又太長，所以我們試著說服要濃縮版，並建議上字幕上 OS，可以互動，可以拉閱聽人看下一段，我發現群眾吃這一套。很嚴謹的變活潑，加重語氣，目的是讓看者重視這一段。梅花的發想就是要用感人畫面，因為選民需要感動才會投票，把連續劇和電影角色拉進來。我們的會員做很多偶像劇，就會去鋪陳這轟轟烈烈的感情，平淡到激情轉化，ending 把劇情拉高。我們知道如何拉民眾情緒，我們是考慮這情節的。

縣市長我們做兩個版，90sec、3 分鐘版。因為短版是媒體可以買的，網路沒有限制，因此我和韓辦還在溝通說兩個都要上，我們有鋪陳版的，這可以上網路，有曙光出來有陽光燦爛我們要帶群眾情境 我認為滿天新聞才是重要，我認為這次沒有廣告而是自發性的朋友做的，問他要不要播，因為長期被民進黨破壞之下提供這個內容。有的比較感性 韓是希望搞笑，但是昨天比較感性，是不同的呈現。所以感性地呈現我覺得可以拉到很多知識藍，自發性廣告、網紅、類戲劇呈現都放進去，民眾很吃這個。以前有公司，這次是多點，遍地開花，國民黨沒有資源，因此韓國瑜也不會天天喊國民黨，民眾和他之間有群眾魅力，因此就不會刻意引伸出來國民黨。未來的廣告趨勢？網紅是一個

趨勢，從大數據、有線電視和電視收視一直往下掉，民眾依賴手機 5g 上網，智能家庭， AI、智慧，準確計算比人更聰明的，所以這未來會改變台灣生態，民眾對電視依賴少，對新媒體依賴變大。要持續和網紅做連結，政策導引年輕人，好的平台和他們合作，關注他們的問題。

### 13. Interviewee: 2020 Han Kuo-yu's chief campaign consultant, Chang Wu-ueh

張五岳 顧問

Interviewed date: 13 January, 2020

高舉中華民國旗幟，會和憲法和九二共識連結，但顯然這不是台灣主流，尤其年輕人的想法。韓高舉中華民國，拒絕一國兩制，但選民還是當成傾中的。廣告沒有打這議題。廣告時間短資源少，因此不能拍攝太多廣告宣傳，因此重點用高雄市政凸顯關心。廣告言情上不像總統候選人，因此廣告放在形象，經濟問題，所以沒有放在國家認同。

台灣安全、人民有錢。希望用最簡單的方式把理念表達。台灣安全也是認同問題，一個領導人的重點不是鼓舞人民上戰場，而是讓人民遠離風險，是有職場賺錢。台灣安全這部分，做總統，國防兩岸外交會好好處理的，人民有錢，透過強而有力的副手，能把人民有錢貫徹。但這次關鍵投票是年輕人和知識份子，對於他們，有錢是無感，年輕人充滿熱情理想很高。年輕人對自由民主認同，所以從這角度，這是不錯的口號，但對背後意義不容易讓年輕人認同。真的決定的是中間選民和知識份子，而不是庶民。

韓的台灣安全和蔡的台灣其實是一致的，但給民眾的效果還是分歧的。網路世界韓很弱，當初第一，他的形象，划龍舟，記者問他反送中，他沒有回答，這負面結果蔓延到現在。他去了中聯辦，負面形象就也一直延續到現在，變成對香港一國兩制的認可。這場選舉，香港反送中，年輕人反中，議題都瀰漫著，哪怕他再透過支持香港，怎樣堅決反對一國兩制，但年輕人還是認為韓是支持一國兩制的。沒有很成功擺脫，他怎麼說顧主權、台灣安全，他還是不夠堅定，沒有強烈字眼，沒有和中國強烈對抗。

當初，不想關於認同問題做文章，因為台灣在強化認同，對台灣不是好現象，很容易撕裂，很容易內部藍綠對立，上網到意識形態，兩岸不管選不選上都很難和諧。沒有表達是在這裡，只能在經濟、民生、民進黨施政議題訴求。我想沒有問題，他的訴求和馬英九是一致的，但不同的是兩岸。美中關係改變了，因為外在大國博弈對抗，兩岸關係發生變化，中國對台政策結構



性變化，因此原來提出的訴求很難獲得選民認可。中共與美國是很大的外在因素，台灣沒有抗美的聲音 美國討厭的人很難被認同，中方喜歡的人也很難。韓形象被固化，馬英九勝選原因是美國表態支持。訪美之行，美方透過金融時報當時給免簽等等訊息。也會讓中華民國台灣安全上產生質變。

選舉經費有限，廣告能夠談的議題不多，兩岸議題比較不容易拍攝，除非讓民眾有感，觀光客、軍機、等等，不容易找到強有力的切入點。形塑兩岸會和國家認同高度連結，因此他選擇口頭質疑，並沒有選擇廣告來形塑。

這是一次比較資源不對稱的，沒有政黨奧援的支持，在野候選人因此在很多文宣議題很難， 韓市長沒有很大的團隊，資源很少，限縮廣告議題文案都欠缺。本來廣告用 UP 符號，所以就不用國民黨的黨徽。 再來也想爭取國民黨以外的人，都是非典型的國民黨人。張善政是無黨籍， 因此沒有決定凸顯政黨形象。 到後面的廣告，國民黨不分區很多不同看法，韓張也有意見，因此更不會打上國徽了。凸顯韓市長，弱化政黨特殊形象，2018 年獲勝是大家不喜歡民進黨，因此這兩位和國民黨也不需要太大的連結。他也不是黨主席，因此沒有必要，也很難擁有黨資源，不分區的意見也不採納。

廣告文宣，網路。廣告效應快速遞減，因為選舉和美國和其他時間都不一樣，我們很常打半年以上，台灣民眾會慢慢強化，不容易改變他的決定，因此，廣告其實太晚拍，花大錢拍好的廣告片不可能，落後於自媒體、 新媒體，電視更是有限。報紙微乎其微。網路網紅此刻在台灣是主流， 大部分透過年輕人效果最強，每一個網紅背後都有 10 萬起跳的粉絲。我們當初考慮找老天鵝卡提諾， 回報後都已經跟對手簽約，或價碼太高，也限縮我們在網路的操作。網紅年輕人更能說服年輕人選民，相輔相成的 很多粉絲就是對於心目認可的人， 透過他們推薦候選人， 認知轉嫁程度會更高。

#### 14. Interviewee: Political communication and speech communication scholar, John

Wen 溫偉群

Interviewed date: 13 January, 2020

政治語言和其他語言其實沒有太大的不同。 唯一的不同是廣告比較短，和演說辯論不一樣，在投放過程中，要考慮更精準的目標， 包括強化、 動員、 反動員。 在不改變投票意向，去改變投票意願，或你本來投票意願不高，但就要強化意願。 或者你的投票意願不這麼高，不改變你的意象，但就是你的意願高一點或低一點。另一種就是很困難的改變投票意向 他本來傾向某政黨但改投別政黨，當然這比例沒這麼高，但有時候可以做小幅挪移。 例如：藍的變中

間，中間變藍的。最難的是完全相反的改變，因為人的想法是一種長期的，所以，短期內要大幅改變的相對比例是低的。

我覺得是策略下的特別針對年輕選民，因為中華民國在各政黨中所想的是不一樣的，而且蔡英文在民進黨裡其實不是深綠，2008年開始她逐漸接觸到的是淺綠或中間選民，那中間有些年輕世代不是那麼意識形態的，所以她並不是那麼傳統的統或獨。有很多年輕世代不喜歡中國大陸，加上香港因素，這就有操作空間。在我看來，蔡英文的中華民國台灣，其實是個以中華民國區別於中國大陸的政治實體，這和蔡英文在演說中說遵循憲法和其他的內涵上不完全一致。蔡英文用的模糊策略，對於意識形態不是那麼強的年輕人來說是有用的。棒球，以前以中華隊，不管蔡英文用多少次台灣隊，年輕球迷還是用中華隊，中華台北。中華民國顯然是一種策略，但中華民國簡化成中國顯然是不一樣的。和對手有關，競爭中間選民，把韓推向深藍，因為韓可以拿到一些非傳統選民或是一些 non-voter，這對蔡英文就有威脅。這就是策略操作，我們不能假設廣告策略會一致的，比如，候選人必須面對選情變化，因此，他對特定選民在時間點想去訴求的，所以可能中華民國台灣距離她台灣獨立也不是這麼遙遠，她只是換了詞來說，她曾說中華民國流亡政府，這當然有策略考慮，可以用模糊，這個國家的詞，但我覺得你說中華民國或香港，我認為年輕人也不一定是完全跟中華文化切割，而是要把中華文化、中國大陸做策略性的應用。現在就是把自己和對手分別畫到中國大陸那邊或否 所以這是有策略的，你當時的情況，訴求的年齡族群，特定的團體會想辦法。當然是策略上 dual，蔡英文也面對綠軍整合的問題，蔡英文說法的猶疑是不可避免的。拉中間選民，蔡英文會搖擺，完全可以理解在拉不同選民。

我覺得有可能，本體論上要區隔，候選人的意志有多少反映到競選團隊幫你打造的競選策略，有些人提到韓的競選團隊是比較龐大的，和過去比較不一樣的，和傳統國民黨團隊有很多矛盾。他甚至批評傳統國民黨，純粹就廣告來說當然有他的訴求。歐巴馬不需要講自己是黑人，韓不需要再說因為大家都知道，包括他的支持者都拿國旗已經很明顯，某些關鍵為了凸顯會說中華民國，但廣告可能會反而要貼近選民，中間的不是意識形態的。比較在階層上被忽略的，因此，這時候再去強調中華民國就沒有太大的意義，這些人不是意識形態而是資源不公平的，更重要的是民生問題，人民有錢更重要。

國民黨民進黨，對中華民國和台灣都不太一樣的。每個人都有自己的想像論述，有勝算的人會往中間走，因為要凝聚。有機會贏的人會往中間靠，選舉永遠都在確保那些會投票的人去投，再另外將不太想投票的人投給你。只要換得選票就好，投票要到最多，哪怕是過程中會感受到不舒服。

15. Interviewee: Senior political journalist and the head of political centre in TVBS,  
Travis Fan 樊啟明 政治中心主任  
Interviewed date: 28 January, 2020

民進黨很成功將中華民國和台灣連結。前幾代中華民國是中國，但現在在民進黨的包裝下，中華人民共和國就是中國。她已經漸漸把中華民國和台灣包裝再一起，年輕人唸書，課本上的知識，中華民國就是台灣的概念，以前會覺得中華民國是從 1911 年開始。韓因為是世代的問題，我個人觀察，去年習近平講九二共識、一國兩制，扣在一起，讓這件事情成為蔡英文的好武器。但兩個是不同概念的，至少在藍營不是。民進黨很厲害，用宣傳，年輕人很自然接受天然獨，剛好打到九二共識、一國兩制的連結，變成好武器。

國民黨又主打九二，踏進死胡同，要有新論述，調整。韓沒有認真處理國家認同。去中聯辦，不想得罪老共。想保持好關係，未來可以執政，可以有好關係。他頂多不談兩岸，被扣帽子接受一國兩制，在國家認同，他沒有講太多。整個被蔡英文牽著鼻子走。

經濟牌和認同牌。這次選舉什麼牌都是皮毛，台灣是很網紅化的社會，很淺的，沒有深入探討。過現在的日子，沒有打什麼牌，都已經對候選人有好惡。經濟藍、認同牌，年輕人可能有。藍營沒有大感受。最後就是回到藍綠對決。社會中堅：賺錢，老年人才有亡國感，只要揮國旗就好了。中間的這塊：大家還是想要過好日子，社會承擔都是這個階層，賺錢養家，養父母，可是韓太過空洞，喊爽的，我們這輩比較實際，你雖然喊，但你也不一定會做到，我不要相信發大財。庶民形象？愛台灣？只是在做失言包裝，他不是精緻的人。個人形象受到檢驗。蔡英文：回到更多人討厭韓，最後韓聲勢很大，會造成蔡英文的緊張，因此投票率很高。投給國民黨會被中共牽制，尤其年輕人，挺綠不在話下，香港事件，會希望不要和中國有過多互動

中華民國，到台灣，到中華民國台灣是策略？我覺得是。民進黨是一個策略，目的希望達到台灣主權獨立。的確，但憲法是一中憲法，但希望建立以台灣為主體，她也不敢修憲，但實質就是把台灣等於中華民國，算是模糊策略，是技巧。

下廣告：TVBS，選舉很長一段時間都沒有下廣告，最後三天韓國瑜很積極。但蔡英文沒有下電視，都下在網路平台，和網紅互動，策略不同。韓還會使用很傳統的媒體，蔡英文很明顯傳統看不到，都是網紅，和訴求有關。民進黨很強，維持很強的印象，國民黨的競選很爛，都是用錢堆出來，為什麼國民黨做不好？因為會給少數一兩家公關公司，合作後，可能有私人情誼，品質和錢成反比。

民進黨做得很好，韓國瑜切割國民黨，分身乏術，沒有錢沒有人，投入的人不多，土法煉鋼。都是高雄的選舉團隊，切割也是，國民黨也沒有能力。民進黨是傳統組織，他們很注重宣傳，空戰，跟年輕人互動好，年輕人理念上投射也願意幫忙、包裝，網紅是另一塊，有行政資源，去關心年輕人，去關心網紅生態，剛好投其所好，支持者所好。韓不會無聊，本身就是話題，爭議性的，廣告的形象包裝，國民黨確實無聊，很不好，不像總統大選的文宣。民進黨就是水準保持，民進黨會變化，給年輕人空間。國民黨是家父長制。

韓國瑜新聞，黑新聞、話題，不會去黑誰，就新聞論新聞，剛好韓國瑜就是可以創造話題，但就是解讀的問題。蔡英文就會變成她回應韓國瑜出包，攻擊點就變成做球給蔡英文來殺韓國瑜。記者問蔡英文怎麼看韓？道德至高者來看？記者不是這樣的。但蔡英文不利的事炒太多，就分散了，沒有新的卡神也拖很久力道不集中。韓國瑜不斷會有新話題，可能有人策略性攻擊，M 台灣和大陸分開很遠。民進黨的論述已經不可逆。國民黨、中華民國概念被轉化，不是憲法的。年輕人也接受，大家也認同中華民國可以對抗中國。但對我們這一輩，這不是這樣的。國民黨可能會被牽著走。民進黨很厲害可以切割歷史。

16. Interviewee: Scholar who is proficient in Political communication and campaign ads, Niu Tse-hsun 學者 鈕則勳 (第二次訪談)

Interviewed date: 17. January, 2020

蔡這次算單純，歷年最少的，主要因為純廣告效果沒有直播強，吸引力強。用純廣告選染力討論性不夠，傳統廣告要轉型，但還是會有，烘托主軸形象催票，年輕人是感性的，她有自己的二次回鄉、辣台妹，都是年輕族群催票。網紅是另一個系統，網紅，自由廣告，直播廣告的概念。韓國瑜 19 年五月間，年輕人覺得韓背離了。聲勢一直往下，失言，專業不夠。網路很多 kuso 韓的影片，一面倒的 kuso，分享轉載，形象繃緊，網紅會評估，蔡阿嘎給你軟釘子碰。網紅很聰明不會和有爭議性的產品一起。

韓國瑜不高舉認同議題，是結構性問題，三年多國民黨完全受限，不敢用兩岸議題，優勢已經被制約，這是十年前馬英九的政策，九二共識、一中各表。九二共識已經被污名化，一中各表北京人也不要。已經過時，對方不要。韓卻拿來做主軸，香港議題，韓以不變應萬變，不敢想任何辦法去突

破芒果乾。找不到突圍方式，想不出新方法，在蔡英文建立的兩岸不利關係氛圍裡面。沈默的螺旋，再來可能是兩岸幕僚覺得用以前馬英九的最安全。時空轉變太快，完全沒有能力解決。以為中國這次對於台灣大選沒有什麼聲音，情勢上看來美國是支持蔡英文的反中，對韓國瑜而言，去碰觸大陸議題沒有好處，反而是強調台灣認同。而且中華民國的認同是大家早就知道的。國民黨半放棄他了，現在國民黨團和韓總部是脫節的，庶民形象被搓爆了，庶民形象無法塑造台灣認同，台灣安全人民有錢是空的，要有論述，要有廣告搭配，但都沒有，主軸變成一個口號。主軸要被烘托，產品消融，幕僚太弱，產品本身衰退，失言，行銷宣傳要顧到高雄市民，民風純樸、颯悍性格，你要去跟高雄市民道歉，他都没做，他反而對抗說我沒落跑。

韓流成也高雄 敗也高雄，已經被民進黨抓在手上強化，認同的議題。國民黨要不要跟柯文哲合作？沒有人關心國民黨改革。議題操作能力不到位，蔣萬安、柯文哲操作能量很強，也不敢打高層，青壯接班也不可能。

蔡英文的部分：因為它主要中間選民也有困境，蔡的盲點：兩岸、國際關係不好，會推給北京，祈求美國，只要台灣團結北京就會轉向，但不能期待。她贏在認同，很簡化，親中或反中，清廉和貪腐，二分邏輯。民主、自由、反送中，環境給了她很好的優勢。中華民國才是最大公約數，她只是想偷渡中華民國台灣，讓她變國號符號概念，會有更潛在的兩岸衝突。沒有這麼容易偷渡。蔡英文的行銷也比韓豐富。蔡英文以民主自由為內涵的反中策略成功。反送中，年輕人之間的溝通，很簡單的鋪陳。要勝選就是二元對立，你佔優勢就好了。清廉一定會贏，今年是親中反中，把對方貼成親中。討厭韓國瑜，其他都次要，討厭誰是最重要，先把她弄掉再說。兩岸和經濟，兩岸出不去，韓沒辦法突破蔡英文建立的論述。他自己的論述是十年前的，自己也沒有新的兩岸論述，經濟，他要有實際東西出來，戰艦？沒有民主有經濟也沒有用，蔡英文贏在這裡。韓的青年政策沒有辦法延續，大家對於品牌可信度已經遞減，所以盲點有了，現在就不會相信你。蔡英文是執政者會去加碼，會說你的政策未必可行。九二共識在台灣認知都沒有了，不清晰怎麼去推行？太舊，沒有戳破蔡英文的兩岸關係不利互動氛圍。國民黨不敢碰，所以只能提出以前的，但被污名化了。想打安全牌嗎？馬英九當資產，但用在另一個人身上就不對，環境變了，裡面的東西被戳爆了。蔡英文的國家認同是一個策略、戰術概念、彈性運用操作空間。對她有利，她要最多選票。不是信念。

## APPENDIX B --- Video Transcript

### Ma Ying-jeou's 2012 videos

#### 1. Joyful gathering (歡聚歌)

原住民，客家人，新移民，芋頭蕃薯不分你跟我。客家採茶，傳統祭祀。一齊跳舞念歌，不分你和我，我們是一家人。四季分明的寶島，各種產業服務。農業、勞工、漁業、小朋友。有緣在一起的一群人。馬英九書法，台灣加油。

咱的台灣，咱的家園，咱的中華民國，咱的家園。台灣加油讚，歌仔戲，原住民，馬英九和小朋友。

#### 2. The song of national flag (國旗歌篇)

國旗歌貫穿，小朋友在唱。台灣的山水壯麗，年輕人吹蠟燭國旗的蛋糕。小朋友畫國旗，國旗女孩的衣服、圍巾，登頂插國旗。競賽得獎拿國旗喝采。馬英九和小朋友，拿國旗祝中華民國生日快樂。

#### 3. Love the national flag (愛國旗篇)

國旗歌。幫忙打掃國旗，打掃的人。出國的國旗貼紙，眷村的國旗，棒球場上的國旗。元旦升旗典禮，珍惜國家。感謝所有曾經用力揮動國旗的人，比起民進黨，你們才是真正守護中華民國尊嚴的人。

#### 4. Study Confucian analects (讀經篇)

小朋友去中華經典協會孔廟讀經班。中華文化，河洛話唸，一代一代傳下來。來學習有回到家的感覺。日本半部論語治天下，中國大陸文革，台灣的優勢。

#### 5. Taiwan, come on, bravo (台灣加油讚)

歌曲，周華健：讓世界叫響這個名字。美麗島嶼，有許多的重要里程正在推進。小孩出生，成功靠堅持。我們一直在前進。傳統產業、漁業、農業、航空業，與世界交流。台灣是進行式不是未來式，為國家的未來加油。更高的國際能見度，一齊為中華民國加油。加油是台灣人的真性情，為溫暖的台灣人大聲喊讚。

## 6. **Keep moving forward, Taiwan (台灣繼續向前衝)**

台灣繼續向前衝。葉啟田的台語歌。向前衝，農業、漁業、火車高鐵，傳統祭祀，和人民一起的畫面。龍舟、國旗、花布、台灣加油。舞龍舞獅，人氣很旺。繼續向前衝，台灣一定贏。

## 7. **The forum of young generation's policy (青年政策論壇)**

去到很多學校與青年有約。態度決定高度。關於減碳與廢核，兩岸的交流問題，接收青年的意見。我們是一個受人尊敬、令人感動的國家。我們促進和平、促進商機。和平締造者和人道援助。113 免簽待遇。正義多元繁榮的台灣。

## 8. **Speech in front of a temple (廟口開講篇)**

去到廟宇。草根民主論壇，聆聽在地。台語發音，鳳梨酥、觀光客、米酒，台灣的繁榮景象。對外開放，對內修正菸酒稅法。兩岸簽訂共同打擊詐騙集團。比民進黨好，和台灣五代同堂合照。喊台灣加油讚。

## 9. **Taiwan, come on, Bravo part 2 (台灣加油讚: part 2)**

台語歌。農漁勞工，台灣一定出頭天，各族群一起加油，台灣加油，繼續向前行，台灣一定贏。

## 10. **We are family (我們都是一家人)**

台灣加油讚，青年成員演唱，看見愛看見希望。國旗原素。ROC，結合流行與台灣元素。有愛就是天堂，合而為一。

## 11. **Book and newspaper stall (書報攤篇)**

以外國人角度表現台灣的人情。台灣火車、捷運、鄉村。台灣早已超乎世界認知。台灣人情味，Taiwan 的名字是中華民國。

## 12. **Golden ten years: sustainability, reducing the wealth gap, good dwelling, safe life, integral government, full scape construction, education (黃金十年: 永續篇, 均富篇, 樂業篇, 保安篇, 廉能政府篇, 全面建設篇, 教育篇)**

未來十年你是主角。節能減碳，風力發電，2020 再生能源國家。未來十年你是主角。黃金十年，願生能養，青年成家方案。快樂工作，政府提供弱勢家庭機會，打造新農村生活，減少每週工時，週休二日，讓中華民國黃金十

年，幸福增值。未來十年你是主角。小孩平安健康，安全生活，二代健保，身心障礙服務，長照服務。廉能政府真的做得到嗎？反貪腐，提升政府效能，清廉反貪腐。便民服務，提升競爭力。黃金十年，幸福增值。未來十年你是主角。全面建設讓幸福增值，家家有產業，創造在家就業，高壓智慧電表、自來水普及、污水普及、軌道服務、數位電視、光纖用戶。孩子有競爭力，12年國教，高中就學率百分之九十，和國際優秀人才接軌，黃金十年，讓幸福增值。

### 13. Visa and love (愛情簽證篇)

床前明月光詩句。飛機、旅行。一個男子喜歡旅行，喜歡到難以自拔。思鄉病。女生，護照畫面。呼吸全世界的空氣，中華民國護照。台灣味讚，想念台灣的味道。很多地方免簽，回家後享受台灣味道。台灣也很美，打工度假的國家，這本護照很重要，有100多個免簽。visa free for you，旅行找到回家的路。54-117，三年內，出發都有溫柔的後盾。中華民國護照帶我們出去。

### 14. A girl with the R.O.C. flag: part 1 and part 2 (國旗女孩, 上,下)

台裔女孩。男孩去旅行帶著國旗。國旗標章、國外街景。男孩繼續架著國旗拍照，喝茶會想起台灣。女孩拍攝美景。國旗設計代表的意義。一齊去看比賽，為台灣加油，送女孩國旗別針。女孩上網了解台灣，帶著國旗別針和國旗出去看比賽。下篇，來到台灣，國旗貼紙。機場，好陌生的另一個家。街景，台北市，鄉村。人們揮舞國旗，新聞裡的馬英九。女孩受訪，第一次來台灣。男孩看到採訪，台灣有認識一個朋友。網友開始幫忙尋找女孩給男孩。繼續走鄉村，照相，搞得大家都知道他。用國旗指引他，送禮物，拼貼成的國旗照片。青天白日滿地紅，自由平等博愛。

### 15. Animations of policies (in Mandarin and Hakka): social welfare (政策動畫社福篇：台語版，客語版)

執政三年，超過民進黨八年。奢侈稅，調綜合所得稅，擴大社會救助，社會津貼。



**16. Animations of policies (in Mandarin and Minnayu): young generation (政策動畫青年篇：國語，台語)**

馬政府執政三年，超過民進黨八年。公立高中免學費，免簽 124 國，青年安心成家，就業接軌。

**17. Animations of policies (in Minnayu and Hakka): Female policy (政策動畫婦女篇：台語，客語)**

馬政府執政三年，超過民進黨八年。擴大家庭照顧，安胎假。五歲以下免費教育。創業貸款。

**18. Animations of policies in Mandarin and Minnayu: (政府動畫經濟篇：國語，台語)**

馬政府執政三年，超過民進黨八年。經濟成長率新高，國民所得超過兩萬美元。ECFA，農產品、茶葉、虱目魚、石斑魚出口大陸，民間消費成長。

**19. I am a Taiwanese: Pai Bing-Bing (我是台灣人：白冰冰)**

台灣，我的故鄉，實在很美麗。我是基隆田寮港的「港姐」，勞工的女兒。過去很可憐，但我沒選擇離開。奉獻自己，抱著滿滿的心。我是中華民國國民，我是台灣人，我愛台灣。

**20. I am a Taiwanese: Sun Tsui-Feng (我是台灣人：孫翠鳳)**

我是台灣人，父親來自天津，唐山過台灣，外省人。我的媽媽是嘉義人，芋仔蕃薯。讓我認識本土的歌仔戲，我很高興生在台灣，讓台灣更美好。台灣是我們安生立命的家園。我是台灣人，我是中華民國的國民。

**21. We are Taiwanese: Huang Chun-Tsun Puppet theatre (我們都是台灣人：黃俊雄布袋戲)**

透過布袋戲，各個角色。外省人，但來台灣很久，已經是台灣人。中華民國的國民。台灣是很好的地方，安身立命的地方。中華民國的國民，我們都是台灣人，中華民國國民。

**22. Breakfast restaurant (早餐店)**

清晨起來準備開店，生活就要努力，用心照顧家人。台灣每一個人都值得疼惜。下一代的未來，比我現在重要。每一刻努力都有價值。你心裡的声音我

們仔細在聽。婦女就業提高，勞動福利，推動兒童上學服務，好的改變必須持續。

### **23. Night market (夜市篇)**

為工作我很認真，到夜市去，渴望創業。會有自己的窩。大家在夜市聚餐，緊握幸福的未來。努力得到更多人的肯定。你心裡的声音，我們仔細在聽。挺過金融海嘯，安心成家，貸款計劃等等。你很拼，政府要更拼。居住正義的決心。這個國家也跨出美好的一步。

### **24. Learning Minnayu (學習台語篇)**

台語發音，馬英九的台語老師，很特別的老師。很久以前就覺得台語很重要，本土的文化，他懂的台語比一般人更多，雖然有外省腔，有時候請教時都是半夜。以前他當台北市長，議員叫他台語報告。228 紀念會上，他可以全程用台語。他是堅持到底，對的、有意義的，會一直做到底。我的學生什麼黨都有。還沒有遇過這樣的。這是我認識的馬英九，認真聽，努力做。

### **25. Learning Hakka (學習客語篇)**

客語老師，很認真，一定會筆記。問到清楚才會停。問到底。他會在車上聽錄音，語言就是文化。他對歇後語很有興趣，童謠，文化很重要。記下來。客家場合會全用客語致詞。五分鐘十分鐘不管什麼語言都很不簡單。他有關心代表重視。他有用心。馬英九是一個認真，非常認真的人。據我了解，溫良恭儉讓，他也有堅持。

### **26. To say 'Thank you' in Hakka (承蒙您, 按仔細)**

火車，和人民互動。阿美族語，小米酒、原住民衣服。感謝的心，感恩就是自家人。守護這土地，我們一條心，我們本是生命共同體。

### **27. The loyalty temple in Hsinchu (新竹褒忠義民廟)**

義民廟，香果，台灣加油旗子。馬英九和客家民眾，花布、客語、客家子弟。保衛我們台灣，台灣已經改變，改革不能停。台灣能繼續好，祝福客家鄉親，完成許多客家相關法條福利。

### **28. Diplomacy of fruits (in Mandarin and Minnayu) (水果外交篇：國語，台語)**

頭戴香蕉帽造型，最佳國民外交。跨海征服世界。芒果，日本人說好吃。鳳梨、芭樂，外銷一萬多噸。釋迦，大陸讚不絕口。老美讚香蕉第一名。木瓜轟動全亞洲，台灣水果出國比賽第一名。國旗。台灣水果和台灣農民，不怕民進黨打壓果價。

**29. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Chiang Yen-Ting (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 江彥霆)**

我爸是礦工，我是瑞芳人。我很高興，我們世世代代都是瑞芳人。出國時很美的地方，會覺得思鄉之情。才發現我一直想家。我對台灣的愛，我身後也一定會在台灣。一定是。喜歡他愛他。最後，時時刻刻有機會，每一天為台灣禱告。希望咱的未來愈來愈好。我是台灣人，我是中華民國國民。

**30. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Lin Tao Min (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 林道名)**

外國人，美國人，因為血統多元，搬來搬去，好像沒有一個地方是屬於長大的地方。交換學生，回美國拿文憑後，馬上買機票飛回來台灣。真正在台灣生活有困難。文化和語言，我決定當台灣人的過程是，漸漸的發現這是我的目的地，才不會後悔。不知道為什麼，我是攝影師，喜歡台灣的人文和美，自然的形象，這是一種快樂。我有中華民國身分證，我當過兵，我是台灣人，我就是中華民國國民。

**31. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Ma Ying-Jeou (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 馬英九)**

國旗、國父像。先祖趙國人，漢朝陝西，客家人江西，搬到湖南。我是第二十二代。從香港來到台灣，我在台灣成長，也打拼六十年。我願意奉獻後半生給這塊土地，希望這塊土地上的人都可以追尋夢想。中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家。台灣是我們安身立命的家園，我是馬英九，是中華民國的國民，我是台灣人。

**32. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Ma Ying-Jeou (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 馬英九)**

法國和多明尼加人，公婆是高雄美濃客家人。在台灣十七年，客家家人學很多東西。我是個性開朗的，也是一個鄰長。不管什麼困難，國旗。從零分開

始，到現在，有房子有溫暖的家。學台灣料理、客家料理，沒有人比我愛台灣。是中華民國的國民，我是台灣人，是客家人的媳婦。

**33. Pluralism, and tolerance of Taiwan's love; we are Taiwanese: Chan Che (多元包容台灣情, 我們都是台灣人: 詹澈)**

兩百多年前，祖先從福建到彰化，後來到台東。童年到壯年都在台東，同學有退除役官兵後代、原住民、阿美卑南，偶爾會有爭吵但大家都是同學。人與人的相處對我們人生觀影響很大。我是詩人、農業推廣者、農運發起人。我愛這片土地，是中華民國的國民，我是台灣人。

**34. A sharp return: Mandarin (in Hakka, and Minnayu)**

台灣新路線請直走，蔡英文催促核四完工請左轉。急轉彎，核四停止商轉，請右轉，國光石化非蓋不可請左轉，反對國光石化請右轉。領 18% 又罵 18% 請左轉，不領 18% 就不做公益，馬上右轉。中華民國是流亡政府，路線重新規劃中。競選中華民國總統請迴轉，變來變去的民進黨你信任嗎？

**35. A brave Taiwanese: Daniel chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: Daniel)**

滑板，好玩克服恐懼，不要想太多，跳出去就不會害怕，後悔不會，聲明的一部分。我的朋友，工作都是從滑板開發。我很希望有機會成為滑板選手。馬英九：希望能讓這塊土地的人，都可以追尋自己的夢想。

**36. A brave Taiwanese: Liang Yu-Ping chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: 梁又平)**

愛上非洲布，但想回到台灣生活。但我們不知道怎麼經營。政府有相關配套可以參與學習。後面有人在支持你，會有人協助，這是一種安心，感謝三年來政府對文化創意產業整體有不一樣的改變。政府給予資源，感謝這三年的政策推動。馬英九：希望能讓這塊土地的人都可以追尋自己的夢想。

**37. Rice wine: the good memory in our life (米酒: 生活中的美好記憶)**

香味都回來了，米酒對薑母鴨，坐月子一定要。一罐 180 太貴，用別的東西代替，味道走掉。米酒就是生活回憶，現在可以放心，安心地喝，業者也開心，客人回來了。

**38. Happy paradise (快樂天堂)**

原住民小孩，中文歌。全世界舉起希望，教育無他，愛與榜樣。周美青與非洲小孩，老鷹帶我們飛翔，更高更遠需要夢想。神秘的的地方，孩子的快樂天堂。我們擁有同樣的陽光，孩子的快樂天堂。原住民手牽手唱歌，和世界接軌，外國人拿國旗，許孩子一個幸福未來。

**39. Seeing Taiwan: Ho Su-shen talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 何思慎, 看見台灣篇)**

我所讚賞的馬英九，除了清廉之外，看到台灣人的實在。台灣水牛的精神，求做事不求作秀。台日關係會從對方角度來看，這三年來，兩國斷交以來關係最好，經貿持續增溫，獲得我們和日本簽投資保障協定。自由貿易和投資自由化，重大突破。日本和中國大陸，和韓國自由貿易協定也採分階段解決。未來我們和日本有了這個協定，只要雙方把貿易自由化成熟後，自由貿易協定就水到渠成，突破外交困境。

**40. Keep resting assured: Li Kai-fu talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 李開復, 繼續放心篇)**

年輕人在投票前要考慮清楚，過去四年有良好發展。兩岸和國際都有巨大提升。兩岸之間和平發展，這是未來台灣的基礎。無論是就業創業，還是自己的事業。馬先生的清廉，值得信任。只要這一點就足夠讓每個人投他，他值得尊敬，他有使命感，對他的政績認可。個人信任，放心馬英九治國能力。

**41. The Ten Golden Years : Lin Tsu-chia talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 林祖嘉, 黃金十年篇)**

對台灣的現在和未來，不管大家喜不喜歡，我們受到中國大陸影響是避免不了。我們把兩岸關係處理好，政治關係暫時擺在一邊。為什麼 ECFA 之後會是黃金十年？我們從幾個角度講，台灣的經貿空間大幅改善，兩岸關係正常化。長遠和平現狀，國內經濟關係，你有國際經濟市場，兩岸市場打開，你有賺錢，有本事去賺錢，要有能力去把錢賺到。有教育空間培育人才，也需要有青年研發企業的能力。全面交通建設都要提升，未來十年要脫胎換骨。

**42. The sincere diplomacy: Huang Mao-hsiung talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 黃茂雄, 誠懇外交篇)**

台灣和日本的關係已經蠻悠久的。六十年來無間斷交流，共同開展事業，引進技術和資金。這次能和日本人簽投資協定，現有一個說法，要到大陸去，要從台灣開始，這也是無可厚非的。有次帶日本人見總統，日本人反映，他們很感動，很驚訝，沒有邦交國的元首願意親切的活絡外交。國際合作上，日本人應該會更多站在我們這一方。至少經貿關係關係一個個都在突破。現在是好時機。務實外交，拓展台灣國際空間。

**43. Determination: Lai-Cheng talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九:**

**賴政, 決心篇)**

司法為人民服務，要有制度上配合。馬英九為了落實填補民眾和司法距離，所以推動觀審制，速審理。旁邊民眾可以參與。會比較客觀中立。希望透過速審制，司法能積極不要太保守。對刑事案件被告有幫助。當然，要制度改變，一定會遇到阻力。畢竟，我們要追求的，就是司法和人民感情契合。為了達到目的，這些事情還是要做。司法一直都很保守，馬總統願意面對批評與改變。但這是進步，他還是去做了。站在人民立場推動改變。

**44. A brave Taiwanese, Peng-Chieh chases his dream (勇敢追夢的台灣人: 彭傑)**

五歲左右，小叮噹，很有趣。開始漫畫人生。三年前，拿了草案分鏡給日本，被打槍。我們做得不夠好，一直畫，畫出夢想。夢想也要滿足其他人。讀者確實接收到。馬英九希望能讓這塊土地的人都可以追尋自己的夢想。

**45. Huang Chun-tsun talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 黃俊雄系列)**

戲劇裡面有種角色不被理解，是領袖，是真正在做事，不是滿足自己。是保護人民的角色。這種角色很難理解，因為需要時間和耐心才知道其辛苦。馬英九一直在做認真的事，很容易讓人誤解。但他一定會做，會給人民安全感，會用各種方式去做總統。他像史艷文，他是書生，他是一位深藏不露的真英雄。

**46. The atmosphere of democracy: Yang Chih-liang talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 楊志良, 民主氣氛篇)**

有些國家民主很穩定，所以選不好沒關係。但台灣不一樣，所以我們每次選舉都很重要，很激烈。台灣沒有這樣的空間，我們清楚，每一次選舉都會對國家影響很大。蔡英文還沒準備好，我聽不到政見。不能只會說謝謝指教，這樣只是部長，沒有新人，都是扁政府的人，我不放心。馬英九的團隊，他可以真正施政，我還是信任馬英九。

#### **47. Yang Chih-liang: Raising Taiwan up (楊志良: 向上提升)**

向上提升的機會，帶領國家，他是一個非常不錯的總統。

#### **48. Real characteristics: Ye Chin-chuang talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九系列: 葉金川, 真實篇)**

難能可貴，他是溫和堅持，二代健保，調保費得罪人，政客不願意做，他還是堅持對就應該做。增加兩百分比的資本利得。賣房子股票，這不少，對窮人沒影響，對有錢人是一筆支出。他認為還是要做，為什麼寧可犧牲選票去做對的事，這就是堅持和魄力。有些人批評他不近人情，這要看人情是什麼，他對他自己就這樣要求，這是真實的馬英九，堅持的魄力。

#### **49. Yang Chih-liang: the abstinence of power (楊志良: 節制權力篇)**

總統權力特別大，但馬總統在這方面是非常節制的，是個不錯的總統。權力應用非常清楚，節制權力，清廉。

#### **50. Beautiful island (美麗島)**

胡德夫歌曲，我們搖籃的美麗島，是母親溫暖的懷抱。馬英九，原住民，祖先，台南，寺廟，傳統慶典，老人長照，小朋友，台灣加油讚，國旗，華路藍縷，以啟山林，繼續向前行，台灣一定贏。

#### **51. Persistence (堅持篇)**

馬英九以前到現在的照。市長、小時候、打拼、 勘災、 和農民在一起。台灣更好，國旗、外交、國軍、三軍統帥、 一路走來始終如一。

#### **52. Core principles (核心價值篇)**

台灣，我們美麗的家。海邊，漁業。我們守護世代的心，傳統產業，公益，勞工，漁業，製麵，舞龍舞獅，客家曬柿子。布袋戲，歌仔戲，奉獻，為家鄉，堅忍，遠大的未來。

**53. Saving national flag (搶救國旗篇)**

搶救國旗，國旗在地上。以前的歷史圖，國父，議會。保護國旗，穿綠背心的人，綠色腳踏車的人，放狗阻擋搶救國旗，越過柵欄，綠色背心的人踩國旗，終究搶到國旗，喝采，贏得國旗安全帽的美人，國旗是絲巾。熱愛國旗，中華民國需要你這一票。

**54. Humanitarian diplomacy: Chu Chih-yang talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 朱志洋, 人道外交篇)**

台灣的企業，未來能否到國外競爭，老百姓福利，技術生活水平。對日本賑災募款，馬總統與夫人親自接聽三小時電話。出於內心的關懷，感動了日本老百姓和政府。企業，深化台日友誼。

**55. Pai Bing-bing talks about Ma Ying-Jeou (我所認識的馬英九: 白冰冰為馬英九, 加油篇)**

這幾年，我們看到鄰近國家有長足進步。我們要輸人，這樣會擔心。我們要有安定的經濟，他不是完美的總統，他還沒一百分，我們再給他做一百分的機會。換一個人會真的好？他善良認真清廉，有一個安定的基礎，趕快來打拼。台灣就是我們的土地，中華民國就是我們的國家。我們一齊為國家和台灣打拼。我很愛台灣。

**56. Policy: Cancer screening (政績系列: 癌症篩檢)**

四大癌症免費篩檢，幸福台灣天燈。為更多人祈福，健康台灣。

**57. Fast forward (in Mandarin, Minnayu, long and short version): (快轉篇: 國語, 台語, 長短版)**

2011，機場轉盤行李很多人。計程車，祭祀，小販，外國人。超市買菜，倒退到 2003 年。民進黨執政八年，核四草率停工。股市跌掉四兆，全球貿易亞洲四小龍之末。經濟成長亞洲四小龍之末。機場客貨運也是之末。別讓一切退回原點。經濟成長成績單，機場載客成長，經濟成長率提高，來台旅客提高。民進黨執政八年拿不出的成績單。

**58. Whose coat? (外衣篇)**



和平鴿，前總統 13 次主張兩岸和平協議，蔡英文也說過，但面對國民黨的他卻反對，難道和平愛台灣只是民進黨的專屬？一般人民不能說也不准想？

#### **59. Happy to work; happy life (快樂打拼幸福滿點)**

努力工作，蓋房子地基要穩。命運怎麼寫我不知道，拼力氣我一點都不怕，為了下一代，再重也要擔起來。不怕辛苦就會有希望，夜裡下班和家人吃飯。一步步努力，未來一定可以期待。你的心聲我們有在聽，你的生活過得很認真，台灣也是，勞保年金工作所得補助，基本工資等等，彈性工時制度，好的改變一定要繼續。實現你的夢是我們共同的夢。

#### **60. Gulliver (格列佛篇)**

2000-2008 民進黨執政，一堆小人綁住巨人，不能讓產業再讓政治權謀和特權利益捆綁。國民黨執政，巨人脫掉枷鎖，東北亞黃金航圈，ECFA，124 免簽國，未來黃金十年，讓這些巨人，曾為台灣打拼創造經濟奇蹟的巨人，再站起來，放手去做吧，台灣的巨人。

#### **61. True Taiwan: The Taiwan spirit to strive for the descendants (真台灣: 為子孫奮鬥的台灣精神)**

馬英九穿白衣服，沒有選舉我們不分彼此，不談政治我們不曾分顏色。馬英九拿毛筆寫下真台灣是我們的家園。中華民國是我們的國家，永遠不會改變。我的身體裡為子孫們奮鬥的台灣精神，台灣傳統工藝美學，台式料理，台灣固力，台灣拚勁，台灣農田，傳統祭祀，人情味，國片，傳統音樂，和新一代的音樂，國旗追夢，勞工拼下去，大愛精神，對外賑災，我們都是中華民國代表隊，驕傲的台灣人，護照，我們一齊挺過金融海嘯，找回國家競爭力，同心守護這塊土地，中華民國印章，真台灣書法，完成台灣精神。

#### **62. Happy farmers (開心農夫)**

農田，辛勤，不管天公如何眷顧，我們還是要付出。台灣是好地方，種田的人做得到，不怕風雨辛苦，只要下一代好好長大。外銷限定，我相信努力耕耘就會有功名。農產品出口進步，知道你很拼，所以我們更要拼。你的人生正在收成，我們台灣也有好的改變，一定要繼續實現你的夢，是我們共同的夢。

**63. Golden Ten Years : Keep the value of happiness added (黃金十年: 讓幸福不停增值)**

在過去，到現在，幸福陪伴我們，從小到大，安定帶來希望和發展。國內到國外，情感都不變，歡樂是甜蜜的成果，幸福要用心灌溉。一張選票給台灣未來一個機會，幸福台灣，黃金十年。

**64. The best partner (黃金搭擋篇)**

棒球，醫生，好的副手可以發揮一加一大於二，經驗默契，好的黃金搭擋才能讓人民安心。救火隊，神聖的一票，推出值得信賴的黃金搭擋。ECFA，免簽 142，水果外銷總值 42 億，各行各業，相乘的能力，加倍的努力，全力為台灣拚下去。

**65. Come on, Taiwan (台灣加油)**

國旗，加油，台灣加油，周美青為台灣加油，中華隊，棒球，台灣好棒，一定贏，中華民國一級棒，台灣一定贏。

**66. Wife (嫁後)**

周美青和馬英九年輕照片，以前一起出席活動，家庭，周美青，外交場合，公益活動，關懷台灣，拜票。

**67. Ma Ying-jeou and Chou Mei-ching pray for Taiwan (馬英九周美青為台灣祈福篇)**

點滿蠟燭，一齊走過世界動盪，國旗，蛻變的未來。祈求智慧去面對一切困難，正面的能量，過往經驗帶領台灣未來走得更穩定。正面能量去捍衛呵護一切的美好。放天燈，堅持努力一定會開花結果。台灣蠟燭地圖，馬英九周美青拿蠟燭。

**68. Vote for ourselves (這一票我們為自己篇)**

希望下一代看到希望，客家語、台語，我們必須站出來。孩子的未來，外國人，希望平安快樂。人民該盡力量，讓世界變得更美好。一齊走過世界動盪。必須捍衛心中的信心、心中的一票。站出來，天燈、蠟燭、台灣地圖、下個世代，台灣平安。

## Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 videos

### 1. Fairness for farmers (給農民一點公平)

台語：農民、稻田、漲價問題。攻擊老農津貼遭阻擋。祭祀、正義。

### 2. Your keys (你的鑰匙)

家，鑰匙。十年收入沒增加。房價炒作，解決問題 Taiwan Next，現在決定未來。

### 3. Their distance (他們的距離)

公車。不同貧富差距，生育輔助，追求美好，公平、幸福不該有距離。公平與政府的責任。Taiwan Next，現在決定未來。

### 4. Social housing (社會住宅)

年輕人買不起房子。蔡英文主張，社會住宅只租不賣。實踐居住正義。低價優質居住環境。Taiwan Next，現在決定未來。

### 5. Taiwan's big family, it's good to have new members (台灣大家庭，有新成員真好)

新移民。語言職能訓練。子女傳承母國語言文化，不該受歧視。Taiwan Next，現在決定未來。

### 6. It's good because you (因你而美好)

地球、衛星、到台灣地圖。交通，女總統，原住民，下鄉和民眾一起。農民、鐵路，台灣第一位女總統，真好一路有你。

### 7. God bless Taiwan (天佑台灣)

台灣歌仔戲，鄉下。蔡英文走過各鄉鎮。路標，董事長樂團的台語歌。鐵路。Taiwan Next。路標不斷閃，代表走訪台灣。農民，造勢。真好一路有你，不分你和我。眾神護台灣，用心看台灣。這是我們的名，用心愛台灣，親民表現，台灣第一位女總統。

### 8. A warm accompany (溫暖相伴)

台灣第一位女總統的遊覽車。Taiwan Next，七爺八爺。走訪街道，受到歡迎。真好一路有你。鄉村。重機支持者。拜票場景。和人民一起。更好的世界。舞龍舞獅，客家人。

#### **9. It's good to have you (有你真好)**

交通景象，遊覽車，走過鄉村，原住民，台灣第一位女總統。蔡英文與人民。鳳梨。蔡英文訴說。舞龍舞獅。民眾的心情，鳳梨農產品，畜牧業。祭祀，台語、農民、客家人、新移民、我們的國家繼續往前走。

#### **10. Non-nuclear homeland: Koto island (非核家園：蘭嶼篇)**

現在決定未來。標語。原住民、風景、去海邊的歌。海邊，小孩子，家園，台灣有一塊乾淨的土地，淨土，核廢料。核電政策，社會成本很高，經濟成本也很高。不好的發電。台灣持續往非核家園發展。與原住民一起，免於核能的依賴。2025 非核家園。

#### **11. Hualien and Taitung's hope (花蓮與台東的希望)**

青青校樹的歌。原住民喜歡。原住民歌，海邊，台九線，遊覽車繼續行駛。稻田，中文歌。農民，傳統祭祀，原住民雕刻。和原住民互動，小孩互動。有天份、才能、智慧。年輕有活力的世代，發展的環境。玉里米。台灣第一位女總統。Taiwan，好山好水，台灣第一好總統。

#### **12. The country is great because of you (國家因你而偉大)**

站上頂樓，看成長工作的地方。家園，有山有海。陽光，農田，市景，你的家園、你的國家，國家偉大嗎？國家正在你腳下，需要你來愛她呵護她。這裡是你的國家，仰望無能的政府，不怕卑微，但痛恨無能不公平的政府，痛恨不正義，我們要公平正義的國家。工作權，房子，反霸凌。不要恐龍司法。美麗灣，非核家園，幸福。要讓孩子驕傲身為台灣人，這裡是你的國家。國家偉大嗎？國家正在你腳下，需要你來愛他、改變他。

#### **13. Give yourself a chance to change (給自己一個改變的機會)**

這四年你過得好嗎？買得起房子嗎？油價奶粉學費漲價。工作、薪水，愈來愈窮。台灣，再四年你受得了嗎？給自己一個改變的機會，給蔡英文一個改變台灣的機會。Taiwan Next，現在決定未來，實現公平正義。

**14. Females in charge (女性當家)**

男子咆哮。颱風，女子點蠟燭，與孩子寫作業。事情最混亂，女人堅強，點蠟燭炒菜，呵護家庭。女性不是沒才能，只是習慣讓男人站前面。

**15. Make a wish in 2012 (許願 2012)**

新的一年，你有什麼願望？希望有個家，加薪給媽媽大紅包。找到工作，買得起房子。農民有好收成，不再有核廢料。未來，改變。這些願望要一起努力。a better world, change future, Taiwan Next。

**16. Long-term care (長期照護)**

照顧長者，政府要挑起責任，400 億，社區長照，創造就業，年輕人一起照顧長輩，公平正義。

**17. Unemployment subsidy for youth (青年失業津貼)**

第一次找工作超過半年，發給失業津貼，公平正義。

**18. Our expectation for a female President (我們期盼有一位女總統)**

祭祀，密語，抽籤，同誠。漁業，麵點糕餅。蔡英文與民眾，養殖場，三隻小豬。國泰民安，台灣民主勝選，台灣加油。

**19. Hakka daughter will succeed (客家女兒出頭天)**

客家花布，客家語言，客語歌，市場，客家菜，客家社區，客家文物，問話， 建築，小英做總統。客家妹，小豬，布袋戲，台灣有客家真好。

**20. I will not forget people's expectations (我不會忘記人民的期望)**

賣水果，這一萬塊辛苦很久，小豬撲滿，農民，賣東西的，小額捐款，早餐店。蔡英文公平正義，屬於自己的台灣。Taiwan Next，現在決定未來。

**21. A collection of Tsai's campaign videos (蔡英文競選影片合輯)**

中文歌開頭，草原、年輕人、火車、鄉下，大家一起改變。十四個女生為公平而美麗的台灣。

**22. To be a winner of the election (成為勝選者)**

隧道，公路，台灣第一女總統。寺廟，火車，民進黨和台灣人民在一起。鄉下的路，經濟和社會，對人民有信賴，改善生活，重視地方文化，原住民，族群的尊嚴，年輕人的未來。台灣的未來，留在家鄉，對未來恐慌。政黨輪替，背負台灣人的期許，你們的期待，我們的責任。

### **23. The road of determination, it's good to have you (堅持的路，有你真好)**

燈塔鄉下，遊覽車再度出現，原住民，蔡英文和民眾一起。台灣人在這筆路藍縷，讓台灣開發成長的地方。祭祀，一齊感受台灣真實的存在，感受台灣人的感情，一起走從南到北。這是一個歷史的旅程，走向未來。為台灣走出一個光明的未來。山景，蔡英文和民眾，祭祀。困難會克服，為了未來，有決心。台灣下一世代有一個更安全更有希望的台灣。真好，一路有你。

### **24. It will be bad without you (沒你就糟了)**

等公車，差一點，面試備取。少一點飯，心痛，買房子差好幾千萬。生孩子，差一萬塊。慢一步就一無所有。差一點，努力耕耘沒有收穫。馬英九，忍受很久。起身出發，回家去投下那一票。台灣沒你不行。

### **25. Let's welcome the victory (讓我們迎向勝利)**

遊覽車，隧道。感謝相伴，原住民。放下紛擾與撕裂。三隻小豬，客家花布，小孩老人，笑容。人民支持，決定未來。現在決定未來。

### **26. The future of Taiwan (台灣的未來)**

選前最後催票。蔡英文呼籲翻轉台灣的未來。

## **Eric Chu's 2016 videos**

### **1. One Taiwan: It must be in time (一定來得及)**

朱立倫為「換柱事件」道歉，但表示他在換柱後參選總統，時間上還是來得及。

### **2. One Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Yilan (台灣就是力量: 宜蘭)**

為台灣打拼團結台灣，兩岸一定和平。拼經濟、了解基層。

### **3. One Taiwan: To get back an integrated Taiwan (找回一個整合的台灣)**

兩個台灣。一個是要出外冒險，令人擔憂。一個是要出外拓展，讓人驕傲。兩種主張，彼此爭吵。說開放是凶險的人，沒有惡意。可以經由選舉，討論國家的未來。兩個台灣可能會撕裂成四個八個台灣。我可以喚回溫暖互信的台灣。台灣只有一個，牽起大家的手，感謝台灣，繼續為台灣努力。

### **4. Your support is my motivation (你們的支持就是我的力量)**

八年長的賽事，達成不可能的目標。但還不夠。扛著許多觀眾的期待、目光、聲音、鞭策。還不夠。百年來耕耘付出，大家一起前進。

### **5. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: keelung (台灣就是力量: 基隆)**

台灣的方向: 包容。客家、河洛、原住民、新住民、都是台灣一份子

開放：歡迎所有觀光客，經過基隆，重新賺大錢。門一定要打開。開放，未來開放全世界。兩岸和平，區域和平的締造者。

**6. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: PengHu (台灣就是力量: 澎湖)**

四面環海，海洋國家。台灣人，自己的島嶼。東沙島、太平島、台灣整個歷史文化的起點。對國際或大陸的觀光客，開放沿岸觀光發展。

**7. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: HsinChu (台灣就是力量: 新竹)**

國父就是客家人。國父建立國民黨，客家鄉親最認同的黨。

**8. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taichung (台灣就是力量: 台中)**

下一代，為了孩子，尚可愛的台灣人。拼經濟，讓中華民國，讓台灣走正確的路。不要看到社會對抗，為台灣打拼。

**9. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Kinmen (台灣就是力量: 金門)**

風獅爺。和平經貿特區、國旗、兩岸和平、金門高粱、寺廟。

**10. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: visit US (訪美)**

11000 公里航程，讓我看見對中華民國的熱情。只有一個台灣，不要分彼此，不要分顏色，不要分南北東西。



**11. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: visit Washington, D.C (台灣就是力量: 訪華府)**

林肯雕像。包容、團結。台灣需要。謝謝美國對台灣民主的支持。

**12. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Hualien (台灣就是力量: 花蓮)**

走向全世界。招商，貿易經濟障礙消失。

**13. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taipei (台灣就是力量: 台北)**

開放的台灣，面對世界的挑戰。共同的理念，就是捍衛中華民國。一切為台灣的人民。台灣的未來在拼經濟。台灣只有一條路，就是要門打開，迎接世界挑戰。

**14. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: protect R.O.C. is the force (台灣就是力量, 保衛中華民國就是力量)**

朱立倫台上說話。前輩最愛中華民國。共同目標就是要捍衛我們的國家，保衛中華民國。兩岸的合作，更是我們台灣所有下一代最重要的機會。我們都是為了台灣的下一代。紅布條：捍衛中華民國。兩岸和平 讓中華民國屹立不搖。

**15. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: start from New Taipei city, to be the NO.1 in the world (台灣就是力量: 從新北出發 拼世界第一)**

台灣要拼世界第一、經濟第一、新北市招商第一。

**16. one Taiwan: Let all Taiwan do it: healthy lunch (讓全台灣都做得到營養午餐篇)**

孩子是國家的未來。南台灣製作蔬菜。守護孩子健康，也守護台灣農業的未來。

在新北市做得到，也會讓全台灣做得到。

**17. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Pington (台灣就是力量: 屏東)**

台灣尾也是台灣頭，台灣是一體。

**18. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: defend Chinese ethnic (台灣就是力量: 捍衛中華民族)**

中華民國萬歲。中華民國的未來，堅持的大原則大方向，以中華民國為主。需要長輩軍公教、基層好朋友。

**19. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Miaoli (台灣就是力量: 苗栗)**

銅鑼車站。不要拼政治，不要搞對抗對立，不要製造兩岸衝突。只有和平，經濟發展，下一代才有希望。更多企業來苗栗投資，兩岸和平，讓社會安定，這才

是我們所期待的。

**20. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Chiayi (台灣就是力量: 嘉義)**

台灣人要有信心，和全世界做生意，走向全世界。台灣人的市場，觀光要開放。

勇敢站出來，跟我們的孩子、晚輩說，一齊出來投票。

**21. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: National flag warming movement sequel 1**

(台灣就是力量: 國旗暖暖行動號之一)

看見國旗。朱立倫發送國旗暖暖包，看見國旗，溫暖台灣。

**22. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan (台灣就是力量: 台南)**

全台首學古蹟。大家站出來為中華民國拚未來，將門打開，自由經濟的國家，台灣的希望。

**23. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: find the Taiwan, which belongs to us.**

(台灣就是力量 找回屬於我們的那一個台灣)

曾經有一個台，不會因為立場不同而被懷疑排擠。原住民出場說：有一個台灣。

不分彼此和地域。原住民：不分彼此和地域。攜手創造奇蹟，漢人和原住民牽手：

有一個台灣，從不自我封閉，勇於向世界開放。那個時候，我們都相信，彼此是

彼此的一部分。台北是高雄的一部分，花蓮是台中的一部分，出外的人是故鄉的

一部分，你的不同意也是我的一部分。就像我們腳下的土地，一直都是緊密地連結再一起。朱立倫：從今天起，讓我們拒絕分隔對立，找回屬於我們的那一個台灣。

#### **24. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: National flag warming movement sequel 2**

(台灣就是力量：國旗暖暖行動號之二)

國旗為主，溫暖送給大家。讓大家看見國旗，國旗杯子蛋糕，更愛我們的國旗，重視我們的憲法。

#### **25. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taitung (台灣就是力量：台東)**

都會、原鄉、原住民、台東觀光。讓子弟回到台東，共同為原住民努力。

#### **26. one Taiwan: Sport is the force (運動就是力量)**

穿國旗 T 恤，國旗歌為主，小孩穿紅藍衣服，國旗底色。

#### **27. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Hong is still here (台灣就是力量：柱姐始終留下來)**

中華民國憲法、護照、國旗、蔣經國、反鎖國。中華民國未來的路才重要，我愛我的國家。

**28. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Kaoshiung (台灣就是力量: 高雄)**

國旗、勞工朋友，公平正義，為了下一代認真打拼。

**29. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: HsinChu: sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 新竹之二)**

客語、花布旗子。中華民國的總統一定致力於兩岸和平、經濟發展、社會安定。

**30. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Pington: sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 屏東之二)**

國台語：豬農，台灣人的飲食習慣，團結在一起。

**31. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: New Taipei city (台灣就是力量 新北市)**

台語發音: 國旗雨傘、黨旗。台灣頭走到台灣尾，本島到外島，很多鄉親搬到新北市，因為建設與發展，大家對新北市有信心，已經升格為全國最大的直轄市。

**32. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Yunlin (台灣就是力量: 雲林)**

台語：民進黨不顧勞工農民、媽媽消費者安全。為了兩岸和平社會發展，希望大家站出來投票。

**33. one Taiwan: We are one family (我們是一家人)**

接力棒從都市到鄉村，雙腳踏遍台灣。用雙手傳遞希望，不分你我。我們同心就是力量。青年就是力量，藍天之中點燃希望，堅定合一。 one Taiwan, we are one 農業、漁業、布農語：我們加油。台語：這是我們台灣。太魯閣語：同心合一。客語：這是我們的台灣。越南語：我們一起加油。阿美語：同心合一。

**34. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 台南之二)**

台語：台灣民主、國旗、安定的力量。

**35. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Miaoli sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 苗栗之二)**

台灣要走正確的道路，一條寬廣的道路。台灣不能走回頭路。客語：全力以赴，團結，國旗。

**36. one Taiwan: Our Taiwan (我們的台灣)**

台灣母親。過去的移民社會由多樣化的族群所組成。閩南人、客家人、外省人、原住民。我們說國語、台語、客家語、原住民話。台灣有特色的飲食文化，有虔誠的宗教信仰，有屬於台灣的節慶祭典。我們創造過台灣奇蹟，力行民主體制。

台灣人善良、樂觀、樂於助人。這是我們永遠的家，我們的台灣。台灣的地圖展現在廣告中，像我的母親一樣。融合各種省籍族群陪著我們長大。中華民國 one

Taiwan，我們一齊為下一代的台灣努力，成為台灣最大的力量。

**37. one Taiwan: Rally for Taiwan's stability, you are the power (為台灣安定而走。**

**你，就是力量)**

國旗飄揚，天燈祈求幸福。國旗臂章、國旗貼紙、大遊行、自由廣場。I love Taiwan 氣球，為下一代而走。洪秀柱，挺著中華民國。馬英九，那台灣的心跳聲。讓中華民國贏，帶著青天白日滿地紅的旗幟迎向勝利。

**38. one Taiwan: Taipei (台北市)**

所有泛藍的好朋友，共同的堅定理念是中華民國。對兩岸關係的主張。

中華民國的堅持，兩岸和平的看法和民進黨不同，我們不能走偏路，

要親近人民。

**39. one Taiwan: Keelung (基隆)**

台語：基隆市場。我們不像民進黨製造社會對立、世代矛盾，選舉都用負面手段，

抹黑、攻擊。為了中華民國，為了大家的未來，為了台灣，一定站出來。

**40. one Taiwan: Labour's mind (基層心聲篇)**

花蓮蘇花公路、遊覽車。觀光可以改變生活環境。台南漁業養殖業者：下一任做

不好，會造成產銷失衡。屏東龍膽石斑養殖業者：這八年來如果沒有簽 ECFA，

說真的，這產業真的會死得很難看。台南，兩岸如果沒和好，我這魚就不用賣了，我就慘了。台南，玉井農會。為了不確定性，有錢人不敢投資。

#### **41. one Taiwan: Farmer's mind (農夫心聲篇)**

台中養豬業者：我無黨無派，不分藍綠。為了台灣人的健康，反對瘦肉精。

#### **42. one beautiful scenery of Taiwan (台灣最美麗的風景)**

從都市到鄉村，基礎產業，台灣有這麼多純樸良善的同胞默默的付出，這些是台灣最美麗的風景。謝謝在台灣各個角落的無名英雄。台灣純樸的人情價值，也是台灣最重要的核心價值。

#### **43. one Taiwan: Mom's mind (媽媽心聲篇)**

不要讓孩子充滿怨恨，我覺得台灣很努力。我想請你不要千方百計阻擋國家。告訴孩子，這個國家停滯了。造神的時代過去了，正義早就不是誰的專屬。

#### **44. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Nantou (台灣就是力量：南投)**

未來最重要的就是兩岸和平。國旗飄揚。拼經濟。南投是台灣的中心點。

#### **45. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Taichung sequel 2 (台灣就是力量：台中之二)**



寺廟、國旗。台中街景。

**46. one Taiwan: Taiwan is the force: Tainan sequel 2 (台灣就是力量: 台南之二)**

台語：朱稱自己是半子。國旗。台灣的政策，台灣安定的力量。

**47. one Taiwan: Going to vote together (support our national flag) (一齊去投票)**

國旗飄揚。團結是我們的希望。為了中華民國，為了我們的未來，為了台灣。

**48. one Taiwan: We need a steady Taiwan, please support Eric Chu (咱需要安定的台灣，請支持朱立倫)**

寶島曼波。國旗飄揚。台灣只有一個，我們和孩子都生活在這裡。我們需要一個安定的台灣。

**49. one Taiwan: Taoyuan (桃園市)**

國旗。跑遍台灣南北。回到陸光新村，每一位長輩。朱立倫當選，就是大家當選。

**50. one Taiwan: New Taipei city (新北市)**

台語：回到新北市，台灣的島嶼圖像、國旗、理性溫和正派。

## **Tsai Ing-wen's 2020 videos**

### **1. Captain Taiwan (台灣隊長)**

民眾舉牌，興建社會住宅。股市半年交易都過萬。有擔當、有手腕、又果斷阻絕瘟疫，守護滷肉飯，提升 GDP 爭取加入 CPTPP。請一起打擊假消息，從 line 到 ptt。衝出台灣第一。觀光新高，失業率新低，新南向飛出國際。農產品狂銷國外，史上最高紀錄。社會住宅承諾蓋八年內 20 萬戶。主權顧乎在。面對強權不會屈服。宣揚武統的恐怖份子就直接強制驅逐。來自街頭跟著自由民主茁壯，我是台灣隊長。如果你也在為台灣努力，那你也是台灣隊長。守護台灣拼命，我們都是台灣隊長。但有國旗，看到未來，長照 租屋、農業補貼。 start on the bottom start from the underground。堅定守護台灣。

### **2. We are all in R.O.C. (中華民國不分你我)**

蔡英文在總統府內表示，她是中華民國總統。中華民國不分你我。影片中展示，國旗經常出現在民眾生活中的許多場合中。

### **3. Caring about Taiwan (關心台灣)**

台灣機車擁擠樣貌。請你和我們一起關心台灣，雖然我們的生活好像一樣忙碌，但這三年來台灣其實愈來愈好。工業技術進步，關心台灣，看見我們的產業。在

中國的台商紛紛回台灣投資。關心台灣，政府實施租屋補貼，年輕人負擔少一點。準公幼，連續四年調漲工資，工業、農業，關心台灣。在意農漁民，農產外銷史上最好。台美關係好。一齊關心台灣。蔡英文說，當然你也會看見我們的不足，但你也會看到反省、改進。關心台灣，你會看見我們的堅韌。台灣英雄揮舞國旗，看見民主自由的可貴。我是蔡英文，請跟我一起關心台灣的未來。

#### **4. Tsai's accomplishment: Saving Taiwan (小英政績: 保台灣)**

蔡英文說話畫面，台灣要贏。國防與產業結合，採購地表最強戰機。蔡英文當三軍統帥，堅定捍衛中華民國。保台灣不喊口號，直接做到。台灣要贏。

#### **5. Love Taiwan from the world (從世界愛上台灣)**

我們都在用這種傳統文字。台灣是文化存續的土地。我們的護照很方便。台灣健保好，公平追求健康的權利。在台灣，多晚都不用擔心個人安全。國家需要面對歷史才能前進，轉型正義是台灣人的勇氣。日本受台灣的幫助。年輕人去香港記錄歷史。在台灣，我們持續遵守得來不易的民主與自由。希望台灣這個國家，可以被當成一個真正獨立的個體看待。從世界看台灣，我們可以更愛自己。從世界愛上台灣。

**6. Tsai's army is recruiting: Vote for Taiwan and Tsai Ing-wen (英眼部隊開始招募, 為台灣投一張票, 為小英投一張票)**

見證未來， 哪怕被阻擋。 只要你記得民主的可貴， 就沒有人可以阻擋你。 因為你有一雙自由的眼睛。 和我們一起用行動守護現在。 加入我們， 英眼部隊， 為台灣投一張票， 為小英守一張票。

**7. President Tsai's campaign song (小英總統競選歌曲: 自信勇敢, 咱的名)**

全新 2020 小英總統競選歌曲《自信勇敢 咱的名》，《自信勇敢 咱的名》 演唱：

滅火器 Fire EX. 編曲： 滅火器/周恆毅 作詞：楊大正 Sam Yang 作曲：楊大正

Sam Yang OP：火氣音樂 FIRE ON MUSIC 用恁送我的萬年筆 / 將心內的話寫佇

批紙 出社會已經遮濟冬 / 毋捌對恁講出我的感謝 我知道恁愛我 / 就親像我愛

我的囡仔 總有無限的疼惜 / 佢上深的寄望 是恁牽著阮的手 / 一步一步陪阮行

行過這個島嶼的坎坷運命 / 猶原勇敢倚佇遐 無論風偌大 / 阮的心袂振動 志氣

是恁共阮號的名 / 阮是驕傲的台灣囡仔 親愛的爸爸媽媽 / 希望恁知影 阮上大

的理想 / 毋是欲偌好額 風風雨雨的社會 / 我一直真拍拚 為清白佢尊嚴 為一

家伙仔 / 簡單平安過生活 是恁牽著阮的手 / 一步一步陪阮行 行過這個島嶼的

坎坷運命 / 猶原勇敢倚佇遐 無論風偌大 / 阮的心袂振動 志氣是恁共阮號的名

/ 阮是驕傲的台灣囡仔 盤過上懸的山 / 藏入上深的海 自信勇敢 / 自由自在

咱倚出來 / 咱倚出來 用咱的愛伶期待 全心為台灣是恁牽著阮的手 / 一步一步  
陪阮行 行過這個島嶼的坎坷運命 / 猶原勇敢倚佇遐 無論風偌大 / 阮的心袂振  
動 志氣是恁共阮號的名 / 阮是驕傲的台灣囡仔 自信勇敢的 / 台灣囡仔。

### **8.The overseas Taiwanese youth: I will go back to vote, how about you? (海外台灣青年：我會回家投票，那你呢？)**

距離投票倒數 27 天。海外青年告訴我們，他們在海外比以往更加憂心台灣的民主與未來。最近這段時間，全世界各地的青年將陸續返家，準備以選票來守護他們最愛的台灣。影片出現的場景，包含東京車站、巴黎街景、布魯克林大橋、捷克藍儂牆等景色，全是海外青年的攝影片段，也都是最原始、最真實的聲音。我們希望這些聲音，能感動海內外所有深愛台灣這座小島的你們。我們回來投票了，那你呢？邀請海外青年背書。海外生活再好，留著海洋民族的血，外面驚濤駭浪還是會想家。我們最愛的台灣，現在正處在一個不能走錯的十字路口上。我發現有個東西很難改變，那就是愛台灣的心。那是一種無論如何都想為台灣做點什麼的心情。德國台僑講台語，問媽媽為什麼要回去投票？因為我們都是台灣未來的一部分，媽咪回去為大家投票。捷克人 1946 年投票時選了共產黨，他們下次自由選舉是在 44 年後。今年是捷克脫離共產的第 30 年。也是台灣民主化的第 23 年。跟我一起回去投票，爭取好不容易得來的投票權吧！

台灣的民主與自由是非常可貴的。是民主運動的前輩用汗水和鮮血爭取來的。

與其逃到下一個地方，他們守著自己的家。台灣是我們的家。我們要一起保護他。我知道，在讓台灣成為更好的國家這條路上，我們都不孤單。我們回來了，回家投票了

### **9.The new immigrants are our family; they are the new pride of Taiwan (新住民**

**是我們的家人, 是台灣新驕傲)**

新住民是我們的家人，是台灣新驕傲！小英總統推出最新競選廣告——《台灣新驕傲》，以泰語、印尼語、緬甸語、湖南話、越南語等新住民語言（包含中文共 6 種語言），強調自 1990 年代解嚴後到現在，新住民逐步撕掉外在標籤，連結兩個家、兩個國家，表達對台灣的愛。這支影片向新住民表示感謝，感謝他們為台灣帶來新的文化、新的體驗，也和所有台灣人一樣，認真工作、努力生活，為這塊土地付出自己的青春。新住民不僅連結了自己的兩個家庭，也為台灣連結了世界。希望透過影片讓民眾更能了解新住民，展現正向、團結、有愛的台灣精神。目前我國新住民已經超過 50 萬人，新住民子女學生也超過 30 萬人，是台灣非常重要的家人。小英總統努力推行新南向政策，不僅代表對東南亞國家的重視，同時也以各種不同的政見照顧新住民，希望他們獲得最好的照顧。韓國瑜市長曾發表的不當比喻，或是張善政呼籲新住民不要投給「沒結婚沒生小孩的蔡

英文」，這些都是充滿歧視意味的態度與發言，不僅讓選舉失去高度和格調，更不利台灣人民團結在一起。新住民族群花了數十年才逐漸撕掉外在的標籤，不需要為了選舉而造成歧視、傷害。期待在這塊土地上的每個人都能友善與共好

這一步我們走了三十年，婆家視我如己出，團圓吃飯 給孩子的愛，讓傳統自由揮灑 傳統服飾 我們一樣努力工作和你一起成就台灣 稅單 我們連結兩個國家 教外語課程 更能定義直得驕傲的台灣 投票所 用選票守護我們的台灣

### **10.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Japan version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (日本篇)**

「我在日本十幾年了，從來沒有投過票。但在出國後才發現，台灣的主權非常重要。」 「香港同事告訴我，一定要好好投票。」 「以前在中國工作，深深感受到中國的壓抑和不自由。」 「錢可以再賺，國家的民主和自由如果失去了，就找不回來了。」 「我喜歡蘿莉塔時尚，日本的次文化風靡全世界，我希望台灣能有個更多元的未來。」 「你手中的那一票 比你想的還重要。」 遍佈全球的台灣青年，為了自己心愛的家園，紛紛用手邊的器材親自拍攝影片，呼籲全球台灣青年返家投票，期待海外的你也一起回家。沒有講稿、沒有設計對白，只有一份熱愛台灣的真誠。每個年輕的臉孔，都在訴說他們的故事。他們都是在日本

工作的台灣人，有影像攝影師、工程師、家庭主婦、創業家、翻譯、台語老師、上班族... 他們是和你們一樣，努力在海外打拼，對故鄉有著滿滿愛與牽掛的台灣人。「我們會回家投票，那你呢？」

### **11.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (U.S. version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (美國篇)**

我們都是有夢想，努力打拼，且無論身在何處，都心繫著故鄉的台灣人。「我2016年來美國讀博士班，那時候我覺得，台灣的環境讓我很失望，所以我逃離來美國。但到這邊的時候才發現，這邊的更多人是與其逃到下一個地方，他們守著自己的家，努力讓他們的家變更好。我才發現，我如果繼續跑，還可以跑到哪裡？我決定回台灣，把台灣變成一個我願意住下來的地方。」- 吳泓儀 美國哈佛大學博士生 「我是在紐約工作的資料科學家。希望有一天可以回到台灣跟大家一起努力，所以我很關心台灣在資料科學和 AI 領域的就業市場，政府是否支持新創，企業是否願意投入 AI 研究，資料科學社群是否蓬勃發展等。近幾年我看到政府對 AI 領域的重視，Amazon、google 等大企業都投資台灣，數位政府唐鳳從政府內部導入科技新創，讓專業發聲，讓我看到回家的路。」我覺得台灣是一個獨立自主的國家 我們一起回去當一個獨立自主的公民 對台灣這塊土地有非常多的關心與憂心 小英執政讓我們看到台美關係走向新巔峰。



### **12.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Pacific rim version) (2020 我會**

#### **回家投票, 那你呢?) (環太平洋篇)**

全球青年大串聯從亞洲到美洲，再從美洲跨至大洋洲。他們是銀行上班族，工程師，牙醫實習生，音樂製作人，導演，留學生。大家在海外努力拚搏時、遇到挫折或突破困難時，往往第一個在腦海中浮現的，還是家鄉的土地與親人。

「在美國念書後，在台灣的一切好像變得很虛幻，好像是另外一個世界一樣。

但只要有人問起台灣，只要有人問起我來自哪裡，我又會很興奮的給那些外國人上一堂台灣的歷史地理課。所以我其實發現，台灣跟我之間的牽絆是永遠不會消失的。」 - 洛杉磯 新銳導演林亮君說，台灣與我們的牽絆，一輩子都不會消失。「我們會回家投票，那你呢？」

### **13.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Europe version) (2020 我會回家**

#### **投票, 那你呢?) (歐洲篇)**

遠在歐洲的台灣人，無論轉機到天荒地老，他們都要回來台灣，投下他們手中的這一票。「談到布拉格，很多人會想到的是城堡、查理大橋。我是查理士大學的訪問學生，原本待完一學年才離開，但是看著臺灣以及香港現在的局勢，我決定，買機票回家投票。我 1997 年出生，同年香港政權轉移中國，但如今我

每天看到香港的新聞都覺得很難過。2020 我會回家投票，那你呢？」- 珊瑚，捷克布拉格。「我是不得不耗費一切力量，讓記憶活下去，因為人們總會遺忘，尤其是年輕人 - 名畫的控訴。這句話提醒生於解除報禁那年，長在自由民主台灣的我，自由的代價不可被遺忘。」- 林芳瑜，奧地利。「這次的選舉決定的，不只有台灣的未來，更是向國際傳遞的重要訊息。為了香港、西藏、新疆還有所有正在受專制迫害的人們。2020，台灣要贏。明年 1 月 11 日，我會回去投票，那你呢？」- 王建慧，法國。參與政治，才能讓國家變成自己期待的樣子。「我們會回家投票，那你呢？」 1997 年出生同年香港政權轉移中國。如今我們看到香港的新聞，覺得很難過。生於解除報禁的年代，長在自由民主台灣的人，自由的代價不可被遺忘。我們看到香港街頭抗爭的年輕人，為了真普選為了基本人權，為了防衛家園不配侵害，很勇敢的上街。一齊用選票守護國家。投台灣一票，讓世界上看到台灣人的選擇。

#### **14.To guard our future (守護咱的未來)**

因為前人的努力、奮鬥與犧牲，讓我們擁有民主制度、言論自由，一個「自由自在、想啥說啥、不必驚惶」的生活。守護我們的未來，也是守護我們所擁有的民主自由，也是守護百年來前人們的追求與志業。明年 1 月 11 日，請大家一定要站出來，把台灣的心聲大聲向世界訴說，支持 3 號蔡英文總統，以及從

黨外時期就為台灣民主奮戰至今的 14 號民主進步黨，一同團結守護台灣未來。

讓下一代更好 不會妄想只想賺大錢。 一齊為民主打拼。 現在才能自由自在

想說什麼就說什麼，不用怕，是我們腳踏實地， 台灣才能讓世界看得見。 關

鍵時刻我們可以守護未來我們的子孫。

### **15.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Canada version) (2020 我會回家**

**投票, 那你呢?) (加拿大篇)**

最近，對手陣營接二連三發表性別歧視的言論。 小英總統的回應是，「我個人

可以承受，但是台灣不能夠繼續容忍這樣的負面選舉文化。這羞辱的不是我個

人，而是台灣民主的格調和人民的智慧。」是的，無論是在政治或其他領域，

女性經常獨自承受各種不公不義。「和你一樣，我也在現實與理想中單打獨

鬥。 所幸有其它女性的提攜，讓我了解，無論是被愛或是被接受，並非因為完

美，而是因為充滿勇氣。她們讓我想起了，所有為愛而勇敢的母親。 還有，始

終保護所有個體的，蔡英文總統。她給我們希望，帶領我們走向進步。」 人在

加拿大的台灣藝術家陳瑋璇，她所刻劃的，是女性溫暖卻堅定的力量；而她不

斷追求的，是女性地位的提升。「我會回家投票，那你呢？」母親讓我想起保

護我們個體的蔡英文總統， 她給我們希望走向進步 我想畫出溫暖又強大的力

量 希望你們也能被事業溫柔對待

## **16.2020 I will go back to vote, how about you? (Taiwan version) (2020 我會回家投票, 那你呢?) (台灣篇)**

倒數 17 天，此刻，全球的台灣青年開始行動了。他們紛紛拿起身邊的相機和手機，在世界各地錄下他們的故事。挺小英的返鄉串聯，橫跨五大洲，從亞洲、美洲、大洋洲、非洲、歐洲，這份對家的愛與牽掛，最終越過大海，傳回台灣。

此刻，全球的台灣青年勇敢的站出來了。他們渴望打造一個家，一個自由、多元、進步、與希望的家。他們將用一張張的選票，投出他們對國家的想望。「我們會回家投票，那你呢？」我們正處在一個不能走錯的十字路口。這個社會對年輕人有太多困難與不友善。當我要改變，就會發現，所有事情走到緊繃都是政治，為何我們不一齊改變。我們不滿意的政治現狀，全世界的台灣人無論身在何處，都站出來。民主是珍貴的，選票改變國家。大家都可以化為台灣隊長。台灣的大家不畏風雨站出來。希望台灣能在國際上大聲喊出自己的名字

## **17.We have a capable government (有政府, 會做事)**

我們看見對手不斷刻意引用錯誤的數據，扭曲小英總統三年來的執政成果。但多數的民眾其實非常清楚，從經濟成長、台商投資、能源轉型、基本工資調漲、育兒政策、照顧農漁民.....再到國防自主、轉型正義等領域，台灣社會這三年來有十足的進步。今天，我們再推出由本土音樂創作人「朱頭皮」老師製作

的《有政府 會做事》，以濃厚的台式「唸歌」風格，加上「洗腦」的旋律與節奏，細數小英總統的政績，相信只要聽幾次就能琅琅上口！ 歌詞中有一句重點：「會曉做代誌，毋驚甲人比！台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機！」代表只要拿出事實與數據，小英總統與執政團隊不怕被比較。 選舉倒數 14 天，隨著台灣社會的進步，選舉應該要逐步擺脫負面選戰，用事實評價政治人物，用選票支持真正會做事的執政團隊，用民主的力量守護台灣！ 《有政府 會做事》歌詞全文： 詞曲：朱約信 會曉做代誌 毋驚甲人比， 台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機。 會曉做代誌， 毋驚甲人比。 台灣好幾百年現在是最好的時機。 有政府來給咱做事情， 咱是幸福快樂的老百姓。 全民有福利國家有福氣， 台灣出頭天天公伯保庇。 不會被人壓低頭， 也不會被人抓牢牢。 靠咱自己拚透透。 全世界看咱第一行。 拚經濟咱一尾活龍 全世界咱生意愈做愈旺， 台商也回流外商也投資又強又勇又猛。 中小企業給挺夠夠， 再生能源來起功效。 前瞻基礎計畫， 電、地、水全齊齊齊。 會曉做代誌， 毋驚甲人比。 台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機。 會曉做代誌， 毋驚甲人比。 台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機。 5G 馬上著來到，這 咱的生活會大變化。 減稅減到笑嗨嗨。 長照托嬰大家都愛。 無厝的青年也免煩惱， 社會住宅一直在做。 出遊也補助，HOTEL 也補助， 逛夜市也給大家鬥普渡。 薪水太低來

加淡薄。生活的品質漸漸提高。老車老機車若要淘汰，政府也協助來幫排解。非洲豬瘟足恐怖，好家在政府足嚴格甲咱顧。農民漁民擔頭重，制度來改善，予咱卡輕鬆。有咧拚經濟否...有喔... 有咧顧主權否...有喔... 有咧發展文化否...有喔... 有咧保護弱勢否...有喔... 繼續衝落去好不好.... 繼續拚落去好不好.... 手牽手心連心 台灣國家繼續向前行好不好.... 文化的發展咻咻叫，各族群語言傳統都愛保惜。予運動選手安心比賽。人才資源場地設施絕對無青菜。男男女女男女女男，結婚攏相同法律來幫忙。轉型正義，國防自主，科技銷全球，代誌做這多，卡講都講不完...。會曉做代誌，毋驚甲人比。台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機。會曉做代誌，毋驚甲人比。台灣好幾百年，現在是最好的時機。

### **18.Going back to home town again (二次返鄉)**

元旦過後，農曆年就近了。在外地求學、工作的你，每到這個時節，再怎麼忙，也要買張車票，搭車回家。就算是夜車，方向依舊明確。在家鄉和工作間奔波，是我們許多外地遊子的共同回憶。不過，這個月，不怕麻煩的，我們回家兩次。一次為了國家，下一次，才能真正回我們的家。1月11日，還有10天，一個拉一個，讓我們一起投票過好年。一次看未來，一次看家人。夜車裡方向依舊明確，只為了守住自由。在家鄉和工作間奔波，家裡、公司和國

家都需要我。為了能挺直腰桿，奔波算什麼！回家兩次。一次回家投票，下一次才能回我們真正的家。投好票，過好年，為國回家

### **19. Everyone requests another one (Mister version) (一個拉一個) (先生篇)**

讓我們把最好的，留給我們的下一代。台灣這幾年，無論是在經濟成長又或是產業發展上，都有著亮眼的成績與表現。這些有目共睹的事實，是再多假消息及造謠都無法抹去的。如同 486 先生所說，當父母後，最擔心的莫過於孩子的未來，同時也總想把最好的留給孩子。除了把繁榮的未來留給孩子外，我們也更應該一起守護台灣珍貴的民主價值，讓孩子在未來能自由的成長、追尋自己的夢想。486 先生站出來了，1 月 11 日，他會去投票，用選票守護台灣的未來，把最好的留給下一代，快來加入一同去投票的行列吧！1 月 11 日，一個拉一個，為了孩子，為了台灣，回家投票。台灣這幾年來愈來愈棒、愈來愈好。我們每一個人都是父母，我們都有自己的孩子，都希望把最好的留給我們下一代。所以，我在這裡懇請，投給支持捍衛台灣主權，用投票守護台灣。

### **20. Speak loudly (大聲說話)**

過去一年，世界上發生了很多事。在幾百公里外的地方，有許多年輕人，正在用

他們的血淚，捍衛自由。無論你現在在做什麼，看到這支影片的朋友，我們想請你放下手邊的事情，看看你的周圍，看看你身邊的朋友、同事，看看此時此刻我們所擁有的生活。1月11日那天，全世界的媒體都會到台灣。他們來看什麼？他們來看，面對中國政府的步步進逼，台灣人民會做出什麼選擇。1月11日那天，我們是要選擇「九二共識、一國兩制」，把年輕人的未來賭進去，還是我們要選擇民主與自由，繼續捍衛我們的主權？我們都是台灣人，我們之間不是沒有共識，不是不能對話。只要我們團結，沒有人可以欺負我們。這次的選舉，真的全世界都在看，看台灣人怎麼做選擇。1月11日，拜託大家，我們一起用選票大聲說話，我們一訂一個拉一個，為了台灣回家投票。台灣，站在世界民主陣營中，面對獨裁專制的最前線。我們只有團結，才有力量面對中國的種種打壓。就在過去這一年，我們看到獨裁專制大聲說話。習近平提出一國兩制台灣方案，無視台灣自由民主的體制；香港政府提出「送中條例」，違背當初一國兩制的承諾；甚至有台灣人聲稱他是代表共產黨來監督台灣選舉。但也在這一年，民主陣營集結起來大聲說話。就在數百公里外，有無數的香港年輕人走上街頭，即使面對黑警與催淚彈，也毫不畏懼。我們拒絕接受九二共識和一國兩制，不走回鎖進中國的老路。在國際上，有越來越多聲援台灣的聲音。2020年，台灣是否會繼續維持自由與民主的道路，1月11日，全世界都在看，台灣會如何大



聲說話。兒子整天打電動，女兒每天在網路跟人筆戰，你原本很擔心，但開始珍惜這寧靜的生活。就在幾百公里外，數不清的青年，每天被逮捕、每天被關押、被寧虐、被失蹤。原來九二共識就是一國兩制，原來一國兩制就是獨裁專制。有些人選擇沈默，有些人選擇攀附，這一年，獨裁專制大聲說話。但也在這一年，民主集結起來，大聲說話。外過人說，我們和台灣站在一起，讚台民主燈塔。蔡英文說，絕不會向壓力投降。我們珍惜這裡的寧靜生活。我們熱愛這個民主自由的國家。全世界都在看台灣會怎麼大聲說話。沒有任何猶豫，我們選擇和民主站在一起，和自由站在一起，選擇和世界站在一起。願我們因為團結感到光榮。

## **21. Everyone requests another one (The chicken chop lady version) (一個拉一個)**

### **(雞排妹篇)**

上一屆總統大選投票率史上最低，只有 66%。而且經驗告訴我們，年輕世代的投票率通常都更低。離投票的日子已經非常近了，如果你身邊有還在猶豫的朋友，請告訴他們，投票結果會如何影響真實生活。有可能他們總說著不想懂政治，但在心中總會有個在乎的議題。試著與他們溝通，幫助他們去理解，如果想改變任何不滿，投票是最有效。就像 @Onedayili 鄭家純 說的，不要小看自己的力量，綿薄之力累積起來，也會有巨大的影響力。有人說藍綠一樣

差，投誰有差嗎？你知道什麼樣的人最傷害台灣民主嗎？就是對政治不關心的人，對政治冷漠的下場，就是被糟糕的人統治。為了台灣，回家投票。

## **22. Everyone requests another one (The Chung Ming-shuan version) (一個拉一個)**

(鍾明軒篇)

台灣的自由民主得來不易。距離投票日剩不到幾天，首投族，你們準備好要回家投票了嗎？台灣的自由民主得來不易，現階段最能讓其他人聽到自己意見的方式，就是投票。就像明軒說的，如果你想要自己決定你的未來，我們就要大聲說話。你們手中的一張票，就是大聲說話最好的方式。台灣的未來，由你決定！如果你不想讓別人決定你的未來，你就要讓人知道啊，現階段的方式就是投票。

## **23. Everyone requests another one (The Gua-gi version) (一個拉一個) (呱吉篇)**

星期六的下午，你有什麼計畫？你可能會想去喝杯咖啡、吃個甜點、到河邊騎單車，用一個下午的滿足，讓你覺得未來 24 個小時的人生不是虛度。但就在幾百公里外，卻有另一群人帶著裝備、在煙塵中奔跑、在不確定的未來中，度過星期六。這個星期六，你也可以選擇去投票。你的選擇，將會影響未來 4 年的台灣，所以更應該要把票投給能夠為台灣作出正確選擇的人。最後幾天，我沒有

對手那麼多的廣告資源，只有你們每一個人，請大家幫忙分享，讓更多人看到。

未來了的 24 小時會不會好，一定要為台灣選出一個能夠做正確決定的人。

#### **24. Everyone requests another one (President Tsai version) (一個拉一個)(小英總統篇)**

一個拉一個，明天請你幫小英總統拉一個。總統大選前的最後時刻，小英總統

想跟各位說說心裡的話：我們現在擁有民主，可以透過選舉表達自己的想法，

是一代又一代的民主前輩，用生命與血汗奮鬥爭取而來的價值，我們應該要好好

珍惜。在這關鍵的時刻，無論在我們之間有多少的不同，我們都是一樣非常熱

愛台灣的安穩生活。台灣這個民主自由的國家，是值得我們去深愛、去守護的。

這次的大選，是我們說話的時刻。讓我們一起用選票大聲說話吧！別忘了，全

世界都在看，台灣會怎麼大聲說話。最後幾天，我們沒有對手那麼多的廣告資

源，只有你們每一個人，請大家幫忙分享，讓更多人看到。全世界都在看我們

怎麼用選票大聲說話

## **Han kuo-yu's 2020 campaign videos**

### **1. Den Tapre Landsoldat (我現在要出征)**

韓國瑜在影片中唱「我現在要出征」。幾位台灣人陸續出現於影片中。鏡頭從韓的鞋子往上照到他的臉，顯示韓正望向天空。影片中出現韓的競選口號：台灣安全，人民有錢。從南方出發，恢復台灣榮光。

### **2. Starts from the south of Taiwan; to resume Taiwan's glory (從南方出發, 重現台灣榮光)**

韓國瑜宣傳高雄政績：清水溝、鋪馬路、台灣第一個中英文雙語教育計畫在高雄實現，希望高雄變好之後，全台灣也能重視教育、關心弱勢族群、大力照顧各階層庶民。從南方出發重現台灣榮光。

庶民 弱勢族群 各地方人士

### **3. Step by step, being a pragmatic person: Li Si-chuan (一步一步務實地做 李四川)**

高雄市副市長李四川說，他對高雄有責任感。高雄以前政績很爛，高雄人真的需要安居樂業的生活環境。

#### **4. Policy of young generation: entrepreneurship, bid for investment (青年創業 招商引資)**

韓國瑜在黑板寫下，青年問題被不利因素控制住。影片中出現韓的競選口號「台灣安全，人民有錢」和中華民國國旗。韓表示，沒有錢要創業，談何容易。所以，我在高雄市成立了青年局，第一年就編了三億新台幣預算，又向銀行借了七億五千萬元，以十億左右的金額，幫年輕人創業。未來要結合更多社會資源幫助年輕人創業，讓年輕人的智慧、專利、想法，有資金往前衝。韓表示，年輕人有無限的創意，我對台灣的年輕人深具信心。同時，我也要招商引資，改善台灣的投資環境，讓台灣及海外商人願意來投資。台灣對外關係絕對不能劍拔弩張，要使海外投資者對台灣的投資環境有信心，所以，我覺得，未來招商引資，以及台灣成立自由經濟貿易區後，年輕人的工作的機會和低薪情況一定會得到舒緩。影片中出現韓的競選口號「台灣安全，人民有錢」、年輕人和外國人的畫面。

#### **5. The shining blue sky (耀眼新藍天)**

軍警向韓敬禮。韓國瑜體驗輪椅羽球賽並和民眾握手。影片中出現國旗海，以及韓到各地造勢畫面。

## **6. Waiting for a person (等一個人)**

韓國瑜關懷弱勢、視察下水道、下鄉與庶民在一起。影片中出現農漁民、小孩、原住民、小攤販。人們用不同的語言說謝謝。韓國瑜幫忙裝燈、裝窗簾。人們穿韓國瑜競選夾克一起唱歌。影片中出現國旗海造勢場面。韓國瑜上台演講。

## **7. The navigation of national policies, Taiwan takes off: Celebrities' recommendations (國政領航, 台灣起飛: 名人推薦篇)**

趙少康說：丟了七個邦交國，兩岸關係這麼緊張，新南向沒成果  
商業總會理事長關心經濟問題。前行政院長陳冲說，中華民國是經貿立國 對外貿易更是我們的生命線。陳樹菊說，希望你能為台灣這塊土地，做一個無私無我的領導人。你要不要投韓國瑜？我覺得是對中華民國、對台灣命運交關的時刻。毛治國說，如果你對台灣的現狀心中有不應該這樣也不可以這樣的覺醒和憤怒，你一定要出來投票。影片中出現競選口號：韓國瑜加油，台灣安全，人民有錢。

## **8. Policy of young generation: young and old live together: social housing (青銀共住, 社會住宅)**

韓國瑜寫黑板，青年政策、住房問題讓很多年輕人很困擾，因此想出了青銀共住政策。影片中出現老年人和年輕人融入的畫面。

**9. Millions of grass-roots stand up to the rally party (百萬庶民站出來,凱道勝選晚會)**

造勢場面中出現國旗海。百萬庶民站出來。

**10. Taiwan upgrades, the glory will appear again (美好再現, 台灣再起)**

建設 棒球國旗 過去的運動賽事 蔣經國 用對這塊土地的愛站上世界頂峰，

101 贏得驕傲 拼得奇蹟 共享美好 你不是在選總統 你是在選中華民國的未來

總統府建築 自己的未來 煙火 家庭 女孩拿國旗品 農民拿農作物 熱血團結必

勝 用自己的一票贏回驕傲 國旗海 造勢 贏回奇蹟 讓美好再現 讓台灣再起 國

旗飄揚

**11. We could let Taiwan be a prosperous country again (有你有我, 讓臺灣重返**

**光榮)**

韓說，很多人問我重回政壇的意義是什麼？為名為權？為錢為利？我想我只是

夠幸運，人生數十載經歷高山谷底，卻還緊抱著理想從不放手。而今，我終於

有了實現理想的機會。從當時年少，意氣風發地下山，走到如今童山濯濯的老

年，唯一不變的是我仍是那個「天心即我心，俠義藏胸襟；殺惡便是善，劍出鬼神驚」的韓國瑜。我感謝那時願意勇敢一戰的自己，我也希望所有台灣人民，也願意為自己再勇敢一次！

如果你覺得過去三年半台灣真的是百業蕭條，人民過得非常沒有信心，年輕人看不到未來，那你就必須要改變。改變就在這張神聖的選票。你要勇敢地投給韓國瑜和張善政。我重新回到台灣的政壇，我有我的理想，我有我的憂慮，以及我對台灣非常多的憂慮。我會努力去做。到底我們的民主政治要走向光明還是黑暗？2020 我們再一起並肩打一場屬於台灣人民神聖的勝仗。

## **12. Connecting to international society: student loan (國際接軌,學生貸款)**

韓寫黑板，青年問題被幾個不利要素控制。韓說，擔心年輕朋友比不上周邊國家，所以，未來大學到博士生一定要有一年出國當交換學生。我會幫你把錢找到，不必擔心學貸利息很沈重，政府會吸收。年輕人發展好，是幫助國家厚植實力，花再多錢都是值得的。

## **13. Han Kuo-yu's campaign video: several mayors' support (韓國瑜競選廣告:縣市首長篇)**



韓國瑜說，國際競爭愈來愈激烈，台灣如何不被邊緣化？朱立倫說：國內經濟衰退、社會動盪，台灣需要改變。嘉義市長黃敏惠說，你沈默，但不該被忽略。盧秀燕說，你溫柔，但有時候你要更強悍。雲林縣長張麗善說：每位勤奮的庶民都應該被看見。彰化縣長王惠美說，你有權利選擇平安富足的生活。苗栗縣長徐耀昌說，你會奮力抗拒酬庸濫權的不公義。韓國瑜說，中華民國的處境，我們一直在努力的保護。南投縣長林明榛：子孫的未來，我們將用生命承擔。澎湖縣長賴峰偉說，無論從哪裡出發在哪裡打拼，金門縣長楊鎮浚說，你需要有人能感同你的處境。新北市長侯友宜說，台灣需要善良的社會化解各種暴戾情緒。宜蘭縣長林姿妙說，台灣需要安定的生活，讓下一代安定的成長。花蓮縣長徐榛蔚說，台灣需要中道的力量，找回樸實的感覺。台東縣長饒慶鈴：台灣需要強化競爭力來面對各式各樣的挑戰。新竹縣長楊文科說，台灣需要謙虛的政府，人民才是真正的頭家。連江縣長劉增應說，只有重返執政才能再現榮光。台中市長盧秀燕說，改變台灣的現在就差你一票。雲林縣長張麗善說，改變台灣的未來就差你一票。新北市長侯友宜說，就差你一票。朱立倫說，我們知道你一直都在。

最後，多位縣市長一齊說：我們一起改變台灣。