The Xiyang People in the Early Qing Empire,

1644-1724

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Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to grasp the status and significance of the Xiyang people (the people referred to using the ethnonym ‘Xiyang’) in the context of the early Qing Empire beyond the East (China)-West (Europe) or foreign relations frameworks. The temporal focus is on the period from 1644, the year of the first official encounter between the two, to 1724, a watershed in the history of Christianity in China. The research behind this thesis is driven by the question of what it meant to be ‘European’ in the early Qing Empire. In other words how were people perceived who had arrived from the westernmost parts of the Eurasian continent, in an empire that had been embracing diverse elements of populations from Eurasia for many centuries? Was there an official Qing policy in order to determine their ethnicity and their potential for integration into a multiethnic, but predominantly Chinese empire? And, finally, in this process of essential definition, what role did the Christian religion play and what were Qing society's responses to it? In order to reflect on these questions, the dissertation has been subdivided into two parts: one that analyses how the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity influenced the Xiyang people’s presence in it; another that addresses how the Xiyang people’s presence in the Qing Empire influenced the Qing heterogeneity, particularly the relations between the Manchu and Han peoples. The dissertation will lead the reader to understand how the Qing
rulers attempted to make the Xiyang people one of the Qing constituencies and, along the way, how the Xiyang people awakened Han Chinese people’s ‘Hua-Yi’ discrimination and, eventually, their anti-Manchu sentiments.
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Introduction

Perspective

The aim of this dissertation is to grasp the status and significance of the Xiyang 西洋 people in the context of the early Qing Empire beyond the East (China)-West (Europe) or foreign relations frameworks.

One noticeable feature of research on Europeans in the Qing Empire is that scholars tend to employ frameworks such as 'the East (or the Orient) and the West (or the Occident)' or 'China and Europe'.\(^1\) This scholarly tendency, however, is problematic. Above all, it is anachronistic. Such frameworks project present-day divisions onto the past—whether they are of nation-states or modern regional blocs—and postulate the Qing Empire as China and the people in it who had been referred to by the term ‘Xiyang’ as Europeans.\(^2\) However, just as

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\(^1\) Not to mention East Asian language-speaking academic communities, Anglophone academia, in which ‘New Qing History’ has placed much emphasis on the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity, is still not likely to emerge from those frames. This can be glimpsed simply by surveying the titles of the research that addresses the relations between the Qing Empire and Xiyang people. See Jackson and Jaffer, eds., Encounters: the Meeting of Asia and Europe, 1500-1800; Hart, Imagined Civilizations: China, the West, and Their First Encounter; Li, Chine, Europe, Amérique: Rencontres et échanges de Marco Polo à nos jours; Meynard, ‘Fan Shouyi, A Bridge Between China and the West under the Rite Controversy’, 21-31; Zürcher, ‘China and the West: The Image of Europe and Its Impact’, 43-62; Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West 1500-1800; Wu, Encounters and Dialogues: Changing Perspectives on Chinese-Western Exchanges; Hertel and Keevak, eds., Telling Failures: Early Encounters between East Asia and Europe.

\(^2\) Most of them came from the region that would be demarcated by modern Europe, but not all. For example, Dutch and Russians were not covered by ‘Xiyang’ until the late Qing period. In Mingshi,
scholars of European history have raised questions about the historical unity of Europe, so too
a growing number of Qing historians have doubted the placement of the Qing Empire in
Chinese history.  

which was based on Ming sources but at the same time reflected early Qing perspective, the region
called ‘Da Xiyang’ is described as concerning Christian missionaries’ origins and covering Ouluoba
dzhou 歐羅巴洲 in which Yidaliya 意大里亞, Re’erma’er 熱而瑪尼國, Bo’erdwa’er 波而都瓦爾
國— the phonetic transliteration of Italy, Germany, and Portugal, respectively—were located. However,
Mingshi identifies the historical incidents caused by Portugal as perpetrated by the dangerous maritime
forces referred to as ‘Folangji’, without linking the two, and not classifying the Folangji as part of the
‘Da Xiyang’ countries. Mingshi also does not identify the country they called ‘Helan’— in fact,
Holland—as ‘Da Xiyang’ country. Although Mingshi describes Folangji and Helan as being located in
the ‘Xiyang’ region, its authors understand Xiyang as Southeast Asia, not Europe. But they think that
both peoples from Da Xiyang and Folangji followed Christian teachings. See Myŏngsa oegukchŏn
yŏkchu, vol. 2, 543-69, 581, 625, 641-55. In Qing Shilu, the coverage by the term ‘Da Xiyang’ is almost
the same as that of ‘Xiyang’, but Helan still does not fall into the category of Xiyang. Zhigong tu also
does not regard Helan as a Xiyang country. Both sources address England in the same way but
understand it as closely related to Xiyang. Zhigong tu, for example, places England right after Da
Xiyang and Xiao Xiyang in its list of countries. Also, in one of his edicts, the Qianlong emperor used
the expression like ‘Xiyang Yingjiliguo’ as if England belonged to Xiyang. However, it was a citation
from a memorial, not the emperor himself’s wording, and such an expression was rare and not
consistently used afterwards. During the Jiaqing period, the Qing state still differentiated England from
Xiyang, although it understood the two were neighbouring. See Junji chu shangyu dang (FHA),
QL58/2/13; Zhuang Jifa, Xie Sui Zhigong Tu Manwen Tushuo Xiaozhu, 66-85; QSL-JQ13/9/26[jichou];
Junchu shangyu dang (FHA), JQ13/10/17, ‘至扵該夷所稱保䕶西洋之語明係揑説
但無論事之有無, 西洋國有住澳夷目唩哩哆係其管事之人, 如果有鄰國夷人來澳保護, 何以始終並無一禀, 似應令其切實呈禀以察其真偽.’ Qing Shilu and Zhigong tu differentiate Russia from
Xiyang consistently. In the case of Yiyu lu 異域錄, or Lakcaha jecen-de takūraha babe ejehe bithe in
Manchu, in which we can observe a late Kangxi official’s perspective, it distinguishes Xiyang from
Russia (‘si yang ci oljilafi gajiha jiyangiyūn yanar se’) and at the same time understands churches
(‘tianju tang miyoo’) as part of Russians’ life. See Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen-de takūraha babe ejehe bithe,
156, 166, 204, 236, 246-249, 250, 264, 274, 282, 288, 380, 402, 406, 414, 430, 450-453, 458, 474, 484,
498, 728.

3 ‘New Qing History’ in particular has doubted if historians should place the Qing Dynasty within
Chinese history. For ‘New Qing History’, see Dunnell and Millward, ‘Introduction’, 1-12; Waley-Cohen,
‘The New Qing History’, 193-206; Elliott, ‘ Yörota, benkoku ni okeru manshū’, 309-25; Crossley,
‘ “Sin” Ch’ongsa e taehan chosimsırbun chöpkın’, 183-213. There have long been discussions over
definitions and boundaries of Europe. For recent work, see Malmborg and Stråth, ‘Introduction’, 1-25;
Triandafyllidou and Gropas, What is Europe?, 1-22.
More serious, however, is that the unique trace of history left by the particular political unit that existed in eastern Eurasia from 1644 to 1912 can be lumped together with Chinese history behind the broad umbrella term, ‘China’. Such a tendency is especially prominent in an important research field in which scholars have addressed ‘Xiyang people in the Qing Empire’ as a seminal academic topic. Studies of Christianity in China, for example, have looked back on recent decades and concluded that their most critical turn was the shift ‘from a missiological, Eurocentric view to a Sinological, Sinocentric view’. This China-centred approach, which reminds us of Paul A. Cohen’s slogan in the 1980s, however, did not seem to seriously consider its contemporary approaches that assumed a relatively heterogeneous China consisting of diverse peoples.

Even in the field of Chinese history, where Western scholars have ardently raised their voices to consider heterogeneous China, the topic of ‘the Xiyang people in the Qing Empire’ (in their terms, ‘Europeans or Westerners in Qing China’) alone seems not to have been their major interest for recent decades. One positive aspect is that several scholars who studied the Qing Empire–Xiyang relations considered the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity by attempting to explain those relations beyond the ‘Chinese world order’. However, they have not gone so far as to doubt one important premise of the Qing Empire–Xiyang relations—that is, the

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5 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China, passim and especially 149-98.
assumption that the relations lay within the framework of foreign relations between China and Europe.7

To the best of my knowledge, attempts to explain the Qing–Xiyang relations beyond foreign relations have been very limited. For example, Barent ter Haar, by focusing on local commoners’ perspectives, argued that their movements against Xiyang people during the nineteenth century were not anti-foreign campaigns but in the local tradition of anti-outsider sentiments.8 Indeed, from a long-term and, especially, commoners’ perspective, fears coming from the Other would fundamentally not differ, regardless of where the otherness came from, whether because the Other was outside the country or a particular regional boundary. This interpretation, however, does not leave room for consideration of the Qing heterogeneity. For a more recent interpretation, Litian Swen understood the Xiyang people, especially the Jesuits, in the context of Manchu culture. According to him, the Jesuits in the Qing Empire were the Qing emperor’s boo-i aha, which had a master-slave relationship with the Qing emperor.9 Swen’s understanding indeed considered the Qing heterogeneity more seriously than before.

7 As early as the 1960s, Fletcher compared the Qing-Kokand treaty in 1835 with Qing-British treaties after Opium Wars, and Wills differentiated the Ming and Qing foreign policies by emphasising the latter as not rigidly fit the tribute-system model—Wills supported his argument by his later publications. After then, not often though, revisionist approaches continued to appear. For example, Perdue also drew an analogy between regulated trading arrangements of the Inner Asian frontier in the 1720s and the Canton system of the southeast, and Hevia, in comparison with the British empire, described the Qing as a multi-ethnic empire exerting direct rule as the overlord over diverse ethnic lords of domains surrounding it. See Fletcher, ‘The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sin’kiang and Tibet’, 375-85; Wills, ‘Ch’ing Relations with the Dutch’, 252-56; Will, ‘Tribute, defensiveness, and dependency’, 225-29; Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, Chapter 4; Perdue, ‘Empire and Nation in Comparative Perspective’, 294-95; Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, 52-56.
8 ter Haar, Telling Stories, Chapter 4.
9 Swen, Jesuits Mission and Submission, passim; Lee Jun Gab also showed a similar perspective of the Jesuits in the Qing China. See Lee Jun Gab, ‘Kagyŏng yŏn’gan (1796-1820) ŭi ch’ŏnjugyo chŏnp’a’, 204-05.
but the images of both the Xiyang people and the Qing Empire in his description seem to be quite static, and thus the argument sounds simplistic.

When we attempt to remove the foreign relations framework from the relations of the Qing Empire and its Xiyang people, it can be helpful to refer to the following research that sought to understand the minorities’ position in the Qing Empire. Emma Teng, for instance, by positioning Taiwan indigenes in the holistic picture of the Qing constituents, complemented James Millward’s well-known diagram of the ‘Five Nations’ (the Manchus, Mongols, Han Chinese, Tibetans and Uyghurs) under the Qing emperorship. She added to Millward’s diagram a second tier for Taiwan residents. Emma Teng also pointed out several reasons why Taiwan residents could not obtain a position comparable to the ‘Five Nations’: their lack of contribution to the Qing’s state enterprise, centralised leadership, and distinguishable cultural elements.10 One decade later, Jodi L. Weinstein as well explained the relations between the Qing Empire and its several minorities, such as the Tai in southern Yunnan and the Zhongjia and the Miao (Hmong) in Guizhou.11 How about applying the conclusions of Teng and Weinstein to the Xiyang people? Does it go too far to regard the Xiyang people, too, as one of the constituent peoples of the Qing Empire? A well-known image (See figure 1) of the Yongzheng emperor depicted as a brave Xiyang aristocrat seems to provide us with a positive answer to the question. That is because, in the same portrait album, the Qing ruler is represented as leaders of ‘Five Nations’, such as a beg for the Turkestani, a lama or the Bodhisattva for the Tibetans, a Mongol noble for the Mongols, and a Confucian saint for Han Chinese.

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10 Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography*, 242-46.
Figure 1 the Yongzheng emperor is depicted as a brave aristocrat in *Yongzheng xingle tutie* 雍正行樂圖帖 [The Album of the Yongzheng Emperor at Pleasure], the Palace Museum, Beijing

The research behind this thesis is driven by the question of what it meant to be ‘European’ in the early Qing Empire. In other words how were people perceived who had arrived from the westernmost parts of the Eurasian continent, in an empire that had been embracing diverse elements of populations from Eurasia for many centuries? Was there an official Qing policy in order to determine their ethnicity and their potential for integration into a multiethnic, but predominantly Chinese empire? And, finally, in this process of essential definition, what role
did the Christian religion play and what were Qing society’s responses to it? If we can take the Xiyang people as one of the Qing Empire’s constituents, where should their position be located in the Qing world? The answer is still quite complex because their identity was multifaceted. The Xiyang missionaries were sometimes treated as lamas and sometimes as bannermen—specifically boo-i aha, as Swen pointed out. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that Adam Schall and his Xiyang successors were appointed Directors of Imperial Astronomy in their capacity as Han officials. From a more traditional Han angle, the Xiyang people who served at the Qing court could be understood as ‘internal vassals’ (neichen 内臣) and ‘immediate vassals’ (zhichen 直臣) under the Qing emperor’s direct sovereignty and, simultaneously, as ‘vassals of external vassals’ (peichen 陪臣) indirectly under Qing influence. The complex and multifaceted status of the Xiyang people can also be observed in the diverse official channels that concerned them during the Qing period. For example, the funding for the construction of the Xiyang missionaries’ churches or tombs came not only privately from the emperor’s or the Imperial Household Department’s funds but also officially from the Ministry of Revenue (hubu 戶部). The management of the Xiyang people as well involved at least three different governmental agencies, the Imperial Household Department, the Ministry of Rites, and the Canton government.

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12 DQHD-KX, juan 3, libu 1, guanzhi 1, Qintian jian, 131; DQHD-YZ, juan 3, libu, guanzha 1, Qinqian jian, 161. This situation continued until the Qing state made official post quotas for Xiyang Director and Xiyang Vice-Directors in the Qianlong period.
13 For example, QCXCMDY, no. 4, 4-5.
The multifaceted identity of the Xiyang people cannot be easily explained by traditional typological criteria such as Mark Mancall’s, which divided the Qing world into ‘south-eastern crescent’ and ‘north-western crescent’, respectively, within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rites and within that of the Court of Colonial Affairs.¹⁴ A revisionist typology that categorised Chosŏn into the ‘north-western crescent’, too, cannot easily position the Xiyang people within the Qing world.¹⁵ It is also not entirely suitable to rely on the new frameworks created by Teng or Weinstein. The status of the Xiyang people was thus borderline. Their borderline status, however, did not remain unchanging. As Han influence in the Qing Empire became increasingly prominent and the empire experienced a significant change in nature during its later period, the Xiyang people became marginalised, and especially with the death of the last Xiyang man at the Qing court¹⁶ and the conclusion of the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), they were definitely regarded as alien or foreign in the end. However, as the nature of the Qing Empire changed, this process of selective marginalisation and exclusion was not limited to just the

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¹⁵ For example, Koo Bumjin analysed the Qing ruler’s treatment of Chosŏn throughout the Qing period and concluded that ‘the organizing principle that governed the Qing tribute system was the time when the society in question was incorporated into the Qing hegemonic world order’, more precisely speaking, whether the time of being incorporated was before the Qing Empire conquered the Ming Dynasty. See Lim Jongtae, ‘Tributary Relations between the Chosŏn and Ch’ing Courts’, 163-164; Koo Bumjin, ‘Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn Sahaeng Insŏn’, 18-29. However, although time of being incorporating was crucial as Koo argued, Xiyang people’s position is still ambiguous. Xiyang, as people or country(ies), had been classified as (a) tributary(ies) under the control of the Ministry of Rites since the Ming period, but it is also possible to interpret that they were incorporated before or at the time of the Qing Empire conquering the Ming Dynasty, as exemplified by Buglio and de Magalhães and Adam Schall, respectively.
¹⁶ He was Gaetano Pires Pereira (Bi Xueyuan 畢學源, 1763–1838), a Portuguese Lazarist (Congregatio missionis), who served as the Vice Director (jianfu 監副) of the Directorate of Astronomy between 1823 to 1826.
Xiyang people, but it covered other alien groups, including even the one who once ruled Qing China.

The temporal focus of this dissertation will be on the early Qing period, when the Qing Empire is expected to have preserved its heterogeneity in its original form relatively well. This assumption is based on a growing number of studies that have highlighted the significant change in the nature of the Qing Empire. According to them, from the early nineteenth century, the influence of the Han Chinese elite on the empire became more prominent than before.\(^\text{17}\)

Indeed, during the late-Qing period, Han elites made their way into more official posts, even including ones that had until then been off-limits to Han Chinese officials, such as positions concerning the Chosŏn dynasty and the Romanov empire. The same period also saw a significant shift in the Qing state’s border policy: Its hitherto pluralist approach to the ‘north-western crescent’\(^\text{18}\) became more centralised and bureaucratic;\(^\text{19}\) the Qing–Chosŏn borderland transformed from a buffer zone into a linear border;\(^\text{20}\) and greater numbers of Qing policymakers perceived the outside world as a unified, integrated whole rather than a collection of discrete, localised and segmented entities.\(^\text{21}\)

Thus, this dissertation addresses the period before the early nineteenth century; however, it does not cover the entire period before the early nineteenth century but will focus primarily on the period up to the Kangxi. This is because, first, I have to take into account the time allotted for this project and the limits of my ability;

\[^{17}\text{In particular, Seunghyun Han, developing Polachek’s view, regards the early nineteenth century as the beginning of the re-emergence of Han elite activism. See Polachek, The Inner Opium War, 39-99; Han, After the Prosperous Age, passim.}\n
\[^{18}\text{Mancall, ‘The Ch’ing Tribute System’, 72-75.}\n
\[^{19}\text{Koo Bumjin, Ch’ong nara, k’imera ŭi cheguk, 227-40; Gao Yue, Qing mo Dongbei xinzheng yanjiu, passim.}\n
\[^{20}\text{Kim, Ginseng and Borderland, 13-15.}\n
\[^{21}\text{Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 2-21.}\]
and, second, because one feels that, from the Yongzheng reign, the Qing policy towards the Xiyang people was different from that of the previous period—whether that feeling is the reflection of the historical truth or merely of the remaining historical sources may be left unanswered. Indeed, according to scholars in studies of Christianity in China, the year 1724, when the Yongzheng emperor issued a historic ban on the proselytisation of Christianity, was a watershed in the history of Christianity in China.22

To reflect the Qing heterogeneity, this dissertation has tried to listen to voices other than that of the Han Chinese, especially the Manchu voice. This can be a double-edged sword. Whereas one can attribute the innovative quality of this dissertation to that new voice, the predominance of the same voice opens up this thesis to the criticism that the dissertation is focused too much on agency from above. In fact, the first rationale behind this choice lies in the relatively high accessibility of Manchu materials compared to those left by any other minority populations in their own language. Manchu sources, however, although they reflect the voice of a non-Han people, at the same time, are undeniably the records of the ruling. Considering my limited time and abilities, I had to leave aside the opportunity to listen to other non-Han peoples’ voices as a future project during my post-doctoral period. The Han and Xiyang voices the reader will sometimes hear in the following are also very ‘elite’, and there are no voices from Han or Xiyang commoners. This, again, has everything to do with the nature of the sources on which, simply because of their high accessibility, the dissertation had to rely. Nevertheless, the dissertation disagrees that the images it reconstructs should occupy any more

22 Dudink, ‘Opponent’, 503, 508-09, 519-26. For the details after 1724, refer to Laamann’s research. Lars Peter Laamann, Christian Heretics in Late Imperial China: Christian Inculturation and State Control, 1720-1850, passim.
dominant position than those described in the sources left *from below*, if any. The reconstruction in the dissertation is just one of the various historical images that resulted from the interactions between the Qing Empire and its constituent peoples—if confined according to the dissertation’s focus—especially the Xiyang, Manchu, and Han peoples.

**Sources**

This project has novelty in terms of the source used as well, not only the perspective as explained above. The first source is the Manchu Secret Documents (Ma. narhūšaha bithe dangse). They are part of the Grand Secretariat documents from the First Historical Archives in Beijing and were found by Martin Gimm in 1983. Although some researchers have published general introductions to MSD, and a few articles have been written based on them, a number of misunderstandings are evident in those introductions. It was not until An

23 Or narhūšame dangse.
24 The Manchu Secret Documents are now registered at UNESCO as ‘Records of the Qing's Grand Secretariat’.
26 For example, ‘these documents are unique, due to an edict by the Kangxi emperor of 14 March 1677, which ordered the original memorials to be destroyed once they had been copied into the Secret Files Archives’ (Gimm, ‘The Manchu Secret Documents’, 190) and ‘These documents are unique, because according to an order of the Kangxi Emperor in 1677 the original memorials were to be destroyed after they had been copied into the secret documents’ (Deiwiks, ‘The Manchu Secret Documents’, 641) are misunderstandings about the nature of document disposal between the eleventh to fifteenth of April 1677 (KX16/3/10-14). The documents concerning his father’s reign were ordered to be destroyed by the Kangxi emperor. See KXMZZ, 4 (nos. 7, 8); NPM, *Gongzhong dang Kangxi chao zouzhe*, vol. 8, 14-15, 17.
Shuangcheng translated a large part of their contents in 2014 that the substance of MSD became known to the wider public. Despite An’s publication of his translation, the original Manchu text has remained inaccessible, however, and for this reason, the present thesis relies inevitably on An’s translation rather than on the original text. Nonetheless, I was able to consult a small number of photographs that were available at the time of writing on the website of Zhongguo Dang’an (www.archives.gov.cn), as well as some quotations in Gimm’s recent book.

The second source is private compilations of ‘currently enforced regulations’ (xianxing zeli 现行則例) from the Kangxi period. Although these compilations are archived in several Japanese archives, they have hardly been used to date in studies of Xiyang people or of Christianity in the Qing period. This is surprising, because these compilations circulated in Qing society during the Kangxi period, and they thus provide vital information regarding the common legal knowledge that Qing intellectuals and officials shared during the same period. These materials are, therefore, potentially very useful for those who want to shed light on the legal issues regarding the Xiyang people or Christianity during the Kangxi period. I consulted the following private compilations for this present study:

- Ji Rongren’s (嵇永仁, 1637–76) Jizheng beikao 集政備考, which contains legal statutes until the 9th year of the reign of the Kangxi emperor;
- E’hai’s (鄂海, or Ohai, ?–1725) Liubu zeli quanshu 六部則例全書, which has E’hai’s preface written on 24 January 1716 (KX55/1/1);

27 QCXCMDY.
28 ‘Qingdai Neige bibendang’. Unfortunately, this website is currently not accessible. For photos on the website, see Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13.
29 Gimm, Der Fall Prinz Rong, 20-27.
Sun Lun’s 孫綸 Dingli cheng’an hejuan 定例成案合鐫, which contains the preface for the 46th year of the Kangxi emperor’s reign and was published in the 58th year of that reign;

Li Zhen’s 李珍 Dingli quanbian 定例全編, which was published in the 54th year of the Kangxi emperor’s reign;

Zhang Guangyue’s 張光月 Li’an quanjí 例案全集, which has the preface for the 61st year of the Kangxi emperor’s reign.

The third source is The Peking Acts or Historical Records of What Happened in Peking, Day to Day, from December 4th of the Year 1705 When There Arrived the Most Illustrious, Most Reverend and Most Excellent Lord Charles Thomas Maillard de Tournon, Patriarch of Antioch, Visitor Apostolic with Powers of Personal Legate, or in short, the Acta Pekinensia. This source deals primarily with the affairs concerning the papal legate’s visit to China in 1705 but has not been extensively used in historical studies due to its massive volume, diverse languages, and the papal ban on publication. Fortunately, however, a recent translation project led by Paul Rule and Claudia von Collani has made AP, especially the part from December 1705 to December 1707, accessible to Anglophone scholars. AP is especially useful for Chapters V and VI of this dissertation because it provides vivid, nearly day-by-day information about the Manchu people’s perspective of Han Chinese and Xiyang people during the early eighteenth century.

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30 AP I, XIV.
31 AP I; AP II.
Chapterisation

This dissertation consists of two parts, and both parts try to shed light on how the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity fed into the history of the Xiyang people and reconstruct seminal moments concerning the Xiyang people in Qing history. While Part I examines how the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity influenced the Xiyang people’s presence in ‘China’, Part II explores, conversely, how the former was influenced by the latter. Each Part focuses especially on the two topics: the Xiyang people’s status in the Qing Empire; and the relations of the Manchu and Han peoples in it.

Specifically, Chapter I analyses how, before its extensive exposure to Han influence, the Qing Empire treated a new people group—that is, the Xiyang people. The temporal focus of this chapter is from the first official encounter of the Qing Empire and Xiyang people in 1644 to the occurrence of the Calendar Case, a seminal incident when Han influence came once again to the fore. The reader will find how the Qing Empire treated the Xiyang people during this period as being similar to the way the Qing Empire related to Inner Asian peoples whom they incorporated in the course of the empire’s territorial expansion. The chapter examines that similarity by analysing the distribution pattern of religious buildings in Beijing’s Inner City and Outer City, the Qing ruler’s understanding of the West, and the status and roles that the Xiyang people enjoyed in the Qing Empire. Along the way, the chapter also seeks to determine why the maritime Xiyang people were treated in the same way as the inland Inner Asians by paying attention to Inner Asian preponderance in the main imperial posts until the 1660s.

The subsequent chapter deals with the Calendar Case (1664-65), which was triggered by the accusation of a Chinese literatus against the Xiyang people and their followers, namely Chinese Christians. This legal case has been subject to various interpretations, such as being
cited as a xenophobic incident; a cultural clash between the East and the West; a clash between modern and traditional science; a conflict between philosophers and technocrats; a political scandal linked to fluctuating political fortunes; an attempt by the Manchu ruling class to remove Han influence from the court; a conflict between two different schools of hemerological thought; the expression of Yang Guangxian’s personal rage from his personal background; or a clash between two different astronomical paradigms. Despite this wide range of interpretations, this old legal case is still worthy of further scholarly attention, not least because previous studies have mostly been based on Western sources. In addition, although it was literally a legal case, the Calendar Case has seldom been examined from a legal perspective. Hence, based on a new Qing source—that is, the Manchu Secret Documents—the chapter will reconstruct the specific legal process, accusations against Xiyang individuals, legal grounds for those accusations, and the Qing state’s final judgement during the Calendar Case, and based on that reconstruction, it will also discuss the historical significance of the case.

32 Cohen, *China and Christianity*, 20-34.
33 Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact*, passim; Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, 91-96.
37 Swen, *Jesuits Mission and Submission*, 61-70
38 Huang, ‘Zeri zhi zheng’, 265-79.
40 Chu, ‘Scientific Dispute in the Imperial Court’, 28-34.
41 For the historiography of the Calendar Case, also refer to Dudink, ‘Opponents’, 513-15; Jami, ‘Revisiting the Calendar Case’, 459-77.
42 For example, a very few researchers, such as Victor K. P. Fong and Yao Yu, have attempted to focus on the Calendar Case from a legal perspective. See Fong, ‘Kangxi liyu zaitan’, 375-96; Yao Yu, ‘Jinzhi shiwu xieshu’, 108-18.
The Calendar Case is important in Qing history, particularly because Han society broke its silence after the Ming–Qing transition and began to speak up again concerning *aliens* in ‘China’. During the mid-seventeenth century, Han intellectual society was struggling to establish social order by separating and eliminating heterodox (*yiduan* 異端) elements from the orthodoxy (*zheng* 正), rejecting Neo-Confucian-style empty discussions; and, most importantly, recovering Confucian rituals as the external norm. That was because Han intellectuals attributed to the disintegration of Confucian values, the social chaos in the late Ming period and eventually the fall of the Ming Dynasty. However, contrary to this intellectual tendency, from the mid-seventeenth century, the Christian side’s mission strategy became bolder by relying on the Manchu ruler’s protection rather than being submissive to the elite and Confucian superiority. In fact, Christians could be regarded as heterodox—because of the alienness of Christianity—and thus were expected to be especially careful and low-key at that time. This invidious position taken by Christians during the very period of ‘Confucian purism’ and ‘Confucian ritualism’, was in stark contrast to contemporary Buddhists’ decision to acknowledge Confucian dominance and chose submission for the sake of survival. Even worse, contrary to the Han elite’s expectations, the Manchu emperorship provided lavish protection for the Xiyang people and their religion. This situation looked undesirable to the Han elite. Although those Han collaborators, as Confucian realists, had chosen to submit to Manchu rule during the Ming–Qing transition, their inevitable submission was only to prevent the ‘loss of civilisation’ (*wang tianxia* 亡天下) and to transform the *barbarian* Manchu dynasty into a deserving Chinese dynasty in the end. In this chapter, the reader will witness disappointed Han elites’ *mentalité*, which dominated the times, silhouetted against Yang Guangxian’s ambivalent feelings towards the Han ethnicity.
The Calendar Case also served as a bridge through which Xiyang-related late-Ming knowledge was transmitted to the early Qing. For example, the Calendar Case recalled the associations between the ‘Xiyang people, Christianity, Macao, dangerous maritime forces called Folangji’. In fact, those negative associations had once been raised and confirmed during the Nanjing Anti-Christian Incident (1616–17) and, as a result of the spread of anti-Christian compilations, became a part of the knowledge landscape from the 1630s to the early 1640s. Although the early Qing state did not take the negative associations seriously—which seems related to the fact that the officials serving as channels for information between Macao and the Qing central government were mostly from Liaodong—it is still meaningful in itself that Xiyang-related knowledge circulated among late-Ming Han intellectuals began to be raised and delivered to the early Qing officialdom.

Despite the growing Han influence on the Qing Empire, the Xiyang people’s status, which Chapter I describes, was maintained during the Calendar Case and even the post-Calendar Case period. For instance, the only accusation the Qing state took issue with was, in fact, irrelevant to ‘Xiyang issues’—that is, the hemerological accusation that the estimation based on the Hongfan doctrine of the five elements (Hongfan wuxing 洪範五行) caused the selection of an inauspicious tomb direction and burial time for Prince Rong. The accusations in the first subcase, which deeply concerned and directly targeted the alien and heretical nature of the Xiyang people and their religion, however, were not taken seriously by the Qing state from the very beginning of the legal process. Consequently, the Calendar Case was closed only by leaving several Han Christians involved in the hemerological case as scapegoats, seemingly to appease the discontent of Han opponents.
The Calendar Case needs to be compared to the Nanjing incident in the late Ming period, especially in terms of the Christian side’s response or rationale to defend Christianity. During the Nanjing incident, the Xiyang people tried to identify themselves as part of the ‘Chinese world order’—especially as *peichen* 陪臣 (vassals of external vassals)—and as *Western Confucian scholars* who complemented Confucianism (*buru* 補儒). By contrast, during the Calendar Case, to defend Christianity, Schall von Bell highlighted his status as a legitimate *subject* of the multi-ethnic Qing Empire (especially as *neichen* 内臣, i.e., internal vassals, and *zhichen* 直臣, i.e., immediate vassals, under the Qing emperor’s direct sovereignty) and claimed an impartial status for the Xiyang religion like that enjoyed by Tibetan Buddhists for their religion in the empire.

Indeed, the Qing state responded positively to the Xiyang people’s request for a legitimate status in the empire. According to Nicolas Standaert, the tolerance that the ‘Edict of Toleration’ (1692) intended was that Xiyang religious professionals and a small number of Chinese male Christians were allowed to engage in the *personal* practice of Christianity within the churches as an allowed space. He pointed out that was the same way religious professionals and Chinese male adherents of Tibetan Buddhism, (Chinese) Buddhism, and Daoism were allowed to engage in the personal practice of their religions within their own temples. Thus, the Edict meant that, at least in the Qing context, Christians were provided with religious *freedom* to the same degree enjoyed by people of other religions, but alongside the *duty* (or restriction) that was levied on other religions as well. This can be interpreted as the Qing state’s official acknowledgement of the Xiyang people’s religion as legitimate (*zheng*).

The same rationale can be observed in earlier decisions, for example, the conclusion by the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials in 1669. When the Council inserted in their
conclusion the ban on Christians’ ‘meetings, and the action of distributing Christian materials such as *Tianxue chuangai* 天學傳槪 or bronze statues should still be banned’, the Council based the decision on the fact that ‘a permanent ban on all temple gatherings is now being enforced’—in other words, that *other Qing religions have also taken on obligations as much as they enjoyed freedom*. Although the Kangxi emperor’s edict in the same year (i.e., the 1669 ban) replaced the Council’s conclusion, in the end, the former and the latter were along the same lines, in that both declared Christianity not heretical.

The Calendar Case also closely concerned the obligations levied on Qing religions. Although previous scholarship, to my knowledge, has not paid attention, the Calendar Case occurred under an ongoing ban on the collective practice of religion—presumably, the one issued in July of 1663. The Xiyang religion, as one of the Qing religions, was not an exception from the obligations levied on all Qing religions. If it had been, the exception was possible only by imperial favour, which could be beyond legal boundaries. Indeed, it was the Shunzhi emperor’s special protection that had allowed Christians, exceptionally until then, to enjoy the collective practice of religion (that is, Mass) and unlimited participation of Qing believers in it. However, the political atmosphere changed after the Shunzhi emperor’s death. In the changed political mood, everything returned to normal, and thus *law*, not *imperial favour* beyond the law, became binding on the Xiyang people.

Sometimes, policies toward the Xiyang religion were also applied to other Qing religions. For example, in late 1665, right around the time of the closure of the Calendar Case, the Qing state checked the numbers of Buddhist and Daoist temples and resident monks in them, which was the first thorough countrywide investigation of both religions. The state also examined if all the Buddhist and Daoist monks and nuns were registered and thus had their ordination
certificates (dudie 度牒). This indicates that towards the end of the Calendar Case—in other words, when the Qing state had almost finished the countrywide investigation of the Xiyang clergy (i.e. missionaries) and Xiyang temples (i.e. Christian churches)—the Qing state also started a countrywide investigation of the Buddhist and Daoist clergy and their religious buildings (See Chapter III).

Qing rulers often juxtaposed the Xiyang people’s religion with other Qing religions, in particular, Tibetan Buddhism. The reader can verify this throughout the dissertation. During the Qing period, the Xiyang world was often supposed to be a homogeneous Christian world like the Buddhist Tibetan-Mongolian world, and Xiyang missionaries were used to communicate with the Xiyang world the same way Tibetan lamas had been used to communicate with the Tibetan-Mongolian world. Some privately published legal compilations during the late Kangxi period, which were expected to reflect contemporary legal experts’ perspectives, put Christianity into the same category with Tibetan Buddhism by listing the ‘Edict of Toleration’ in the same section for Tibetan Buddhism. Even during the Yongzheng period, despite a different atmosphere from his predecessors in terms of the treatment of the Xiyang people, the Yongzheng emperor still clearly singled out Christianity’s similarities to Tibetan Buddhism.

Meanwhile, the idea that Xiyang people’s residence and activities should be restricted to specific spaces can be quite consistently observed in the Qing state’s decisions, such as the one by the author of the red rescripts⁴³—probably Oboi—during the Calendar Case, and both Prince Kang’s conclusion and the Kangxi emperor’s rescript in 1669. This was also true for the

⁴³ See Chapter II
later period. During the later Kangxi period, for example, the emperor said, ‘It is good to get
Xiyang people together in a specially allotted space, since they are the same people’
(emphasis mine). 44 Those attempts to set aside space for the Xiyang people remind us of the
separation principle the Qing state had often employed in controlling their major constituent
peoples since the historic policy shift from cohabitation to separation of culturally different
ethnic groups during the very early Qing period. 45 Even the Yongzheng ban (1724), regarded
as a definite and long-lasting prohibition of Christianity, seems to have been along the same
line as his predecessors’ policy towards the Xiyang people. That was because the intent of the
1724 ban, in essence, was that Xiyang missionaries should be gathered in a specially allotted
space—at first only in Beijing and Macao but, after Ignaz Köglers’ (Dai Jinxian, 1680–1746)
petition to the Yongzheng emperor, also in Canton.

However, the Yongzheng government’s policy on the Xiyang people feels quite different
from that of the preceding period. In fact, this sense of difference is related to the paucity of
remaining relevant Qing materials. Interestingly, from the Yongzheng reign, we can rarely find
materials containing information about Manchu rulers’ favouritism towards the Xiyang people,
although there is evidence that, until the later Kangxi period, such information indeed
circulated among Qing intellectuals and officials through gazettes (jingbao 京報 or dichao
邸抄) or privately published compilations of the Current Regulations (xianxing zeli 現行則例).
For example, the ‘Edict of Toleration’, which shows the imperial favours to Christianity in a
quite clear way, has not yet been found from centrally produced sources during the Qing period.

44 AP I, 89, note 165, 89-93[48-50] (the number in the square bracket means the original page), 144-
46[75].
Although, as Standaert and Zhuang Jifa have explained, the Edict can be verified by the rubbings from the back of the tombstone of Tomás Pereira and the stele at the South Church in Beijing, in fact, those materials should be categorised with Xiyang sources, not Qing sources, because they are on a tombstone left by the Xiyang people (or their followers). However, the Edict was included in several privately produced—thus, locally circulating—legal compilations, proving that the Edict was indeed within the Kangxi contemporary intellectual knowledge landscape. The paucity of remaining relevant sources could be attributed to the Yongzheng emperor, who had often expressed concerns since assuming princehood that his father’s favouritism towards aliens (i.e., Xiyang people) could lead to a serious threat to their Manchu empire. It is meaningful to listen to Lynn Struve, who, in her critical review article on Kessler’s book, pointed out the Yongzheng emperor’s possible role in distorting the image of the Kangxi period. From her perspective, the Qing shilu 清實錄, the representative official records of the Qing, should be under the category of ‘secondary works’ that ‘have little more than a chronological framework’ (see Chapter VI).

While Part I deals with the influence of Qing heterogeneity on the statuses of the Xiyang people and their religion in the Qing Empire, Part II addresses how the Xiyang people’s presence in ‘China’ influenced Qing heterogeneity and, in particular, the relations between the Manchu and Han peoples. The reader’s first question naturally may be, ‘What do the issues concerning Xiyang people tell us about relations between the Manchu ruler and the Han elite?’ To answer this question, we need to understand an interesting possible mechanism regarding the Xiyang issue in the Qing Empire (i.e., the alien regime): to some Han elites, the problems

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caused by the Xiyang people seemed as if another yi 夷, which meant ‘alien’ or ‘barbarian’, were damaging ‘Chineseness’ in the already hopeless situation whereby the Han elite had been displaced by yi (i.e. the Manchu invaders); thus, the more attention the Han elite paid to the Xiyang issue by denouncing the Xiyang people as yi, the more likely the Han elite would unearth the long-buried trauma that the Manchus—another yi—had inflicted until just a few decades previously. In this sense, the Xiyang problem represented a detonator that might trigger an explosion, so to speak, or a stone that could stir up the muddy waters that had settled for a while after the traumatic Ming–Qing transition under an outwardly ‘peaceful, crystal-clear’ mid-Qing lake.

The reader also needs to understand the historical context around the eighteenth century. On the Han side, the Han elite was becoming disappointed by intensified historical tendencies since the late Ming period, especially in the mid-seventeenth century: the Han elite’s intellectual orientation was moving towards ‘Confucian purism’ and ‘Confucian ritualism’; the Christian side was shifting their strategy for their religious propagation from reliance on the Confucian elite to reliance on the Manchu emperorship; the Manchu ruler prioritised pluralist, paralleled, and equal coexistence under the Qing imperial house,\textsuperscript{47} not necessarily guaranteeing Confucian superiority, and was providing protection for Christians. Meanwhile, on the Manchu side, from the late 1690s to the 1710s, the Manchu rulers were struggling to consolidate Qing rule over the Han world especially. The Kangxi emperor’s six visits to Jiangnan, the heart of

\textsuperscript{47} Millward, Beyond the Pass, 197-203.
the Han world, show how much he wanted to win the absolute loyalty of the Han elite.⁴⁸ During this period, the relatively stable northern front⁴⁹ also enabled the emperor to focus on ‘the southern front’. At the same time, the aged Kangxi emperor now, as time drew closer to the end of his reign, was more conscious of possible threats from the Han people and was more often reminded of past serious threats the Han people posed to his empire. Against this historical background, both the Han elite and the Manchu ruler began to recognise the same challenge—namely, the denial by some Xiyang people of seminal Chinese rites—*de facto* Han rites⁵⁰. Moreover, in 1707, at Nanjing, a symbolic place for the Han tradition, the Xiyang legate Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (Duoluo 多羅 or 鎔羅，1668–1710) completely proscribed those Chinese rites. The last two chapters analyse what this provocation from the Xiyang people meant to the Manchu ruler and the Han elite, respectively, and how it influenced Manchu-Han relations during and after the eighteenth century.

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⁴⁸ During the tours, the emperor tried to envision his benevolent rule (*renzheng* 仁政) by granting tax exemption; conferring accolades on the aged; succouring the poor; increasing quotas for local schools; or granting amnesties to criminals. He also showed respect to Han cultural traditions by visiting the Ming Taizu’s mausoleum and Emperor Yu’s temple. See Kishimoto Mio, ‘Shinchō kōtei no kōnan junkō’, 15-17, 32-34.

⁴⁹ This stability resulted from a series of incidents such as the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), the Dolon Nor Convention (1691), and the defeat of Galdan (1696), before the northern frontier became insecure again in 1715 due to the Zunghars issue.

⁵⁰ These can be summarised as the rites to honour Confucius; the rites to commemorate ancestors; and the rites of dedicating tablets to the deceased. Although they have been called ‘Chinese rites’, from the Manchu ruler’s perspective, they are *de facto* Han rites.
Part I: The Xiyang People under the Qing Sovereignty
Chapter I: The First Encounter with the Xiyang People

In 1657 (SZ14), Johann Adam Schall von Bell, the Director of the Directorate of Astronomy, appealed for the emperor’s help to assist one of his officials who had fallen ill during the course of an investiture mission to Ryukyu:

I could not help deploring when I read [the report from Huang Daolong 黄道隆]. [In retrospect], according to our country’s (musei gurun) order in June of the Shunzhi 11th year that the investiture mission (ce bume fungner) to Ryukyu be accompanied by an official from the Astronomical Section (tiyan wen k’o) [of our Directorate], I had chosen an Erudite (boši) Zhu Tingshu 朱廷樞 and sent him as [a member of the investiture mission]. However, the extreme difficulties [on the way to Ryukyu] led Zhu Tingshu to illness and death at last. [Soon after], officials of the Offices of Scrutiny (k’o i hafasa) and Ministries (jurgan i hafasa) memorialised that the vacancy for Zhu should be filled, and then I appointed Huang Daolong, a Director of the Imperial Observatory (ling tai lang) [as a new member of the mission] … Seeing that Zhu Tingshu died of illness and now Huang Daolong is suffering from hunger, [I cannot help feeling sorry for] the extreme difficulties those pitiable officials have been experiencing. To confer a title to [the king of] a foreign country (tulergi gurun) is an invaluable occasion for [our] country … it was through Your Majesty’s edict that those officials were selected from the Astronomical Section and became [the members of the mission]. [Therefore, Your Majesty,] could you possibly send another imperial edict to the relevant local officials that this pitiable official, [Huang], should be additionally provided with food and goods lest he is observed as a sick envoy in a remote land? [If this present request is] accepted,
any small officials in any distant lands will acknowledge Your Majesty’s attentiveness to
your officials (emphasis mine).¹

Although Schall von Bell’s efforts, unfortunately, did not come to fruition because Huang also
died from the hardships of his journey and the Qing ruler ordered the mission to return to
Beijing,² the memorial above raises several questions regarding the position of the Xiyang
people in the Qing Empire: Considering that the investiture ritual and the calendrical project
lay at the centre of the Celestial Empire (tianchao 天朝)’s legitimacy in imperial China, how
was it possible for a ‘foreigner’ to take such significant roles in both areas; and what does
Schall von Bell’s use of the rhetorical antithesis of We and Others before the Qing emperor
mean?

An answer to this question can be found when we examine the way the Qing Empire had
treated Inner Asian subjects until its encounter with Xiyang people, because it is possible that
the empire’s Inner Asian experience also influenced its treatment of Xiyang people. First, by
analysing the distribution pattern of Christian churches in the Beijing Cities, this chapter will
consider the possibility of the empire aligning its treatment of the Xiyang people with that of
Inner Asian subjects. Then, some plausible reasons behind such treatment of Xiyang people
will be explored in terms of the early Qing Empire’s geographical knowledge and ethnicity
composition. Lastly, we will identify the Xiyang people’s ‘coordinates’ in the consistent

¹ For the original Manchu texts, see Wu Yuanfeng, ‘Qing chu Tang Ruowang’, 348-50.
² This mission was the first investiture embassy the Qing Empire sent to the Ryukyu Kingdom to appoint
Shōshitsu 尚質 as a new king in 1654. The calendrical experts Zhu Tingshu and Huang Daolong died
one after the other, however, and in the end the mission had to return to Beijing by the will of the
Shunzhi emperor in 1659 (SZ16/run 闕 3). Wu Yuanfeng, ‘Qing chu cefeng Liuqiu’, 78-81; Wu
pattern, or mechanism, in which the early Qing Empire incorporated and successfully utilised its Inner Asian subjects.

The Churches in the Inner City

On the sixth of June 1644, Qing troops led by Dorgon entered Beijing. Soon, in order to guarantee the bannermen’s settlements in the capital, Dorgon ordered that the Northern City of Beijing be vacated within three days. At this urgent point, a stranger in commoner’s clothes, who introduced himself as a Xiyang missionary and calendrical expert of the Ming Dynasty, came to the Manchu court and petitioned to be allowed to remain in the Northern City as before. The stranger emphasised that he was also an alien in Chinese territory, just as the Manchus were. Interestingly, the Manchu soldiers, who had driven out all of the Han Chinese population, readily admitted this Xiyang individual, suggesting a somewhat receptive attitude—as if the soldiers might have seen from the stranger’s appearance similarities with Central Asians or Russians (Figure 2). This stranger was Johann Adam Schall von Bell, a Jesuit from Cologne, who until then had lived in a complex of three buildings in the Northern City including a chapel, a church, and an office called the Calendar Department (liju 星局). Under Dorgon’s evacuation order, Schall von Bell’s residence also had to be vacated soon. At the Manchu court, Schall von Bell met Fan Wencheng 范文程 (1597-1666), a Chinese Bordered Yellow bannerman with the titles of second-ranking Lieutenant Colonel (jalan-i janggin) and Grand Academician of

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3 QSL-SZ1/5/12[jihai].
4 Bornet, *Lettres et Mémoires*, 142-43. Litian Swen points out, however, that the Manchu soldiers’ hospitality to Adam Schall concerned the then Qing ruling group’s awareness of the Red Barbarian Canon’s Xiyang connection. See Swen, *Jesuits Mission and Submission*, 25-49.
the Inner Court of the Secretariat (Nei hanlin mishuyuan zhangyuan shi daxueshi 内翰林秘書院掌院事大學士).\textsuperscript{5} This dramatic encounter between a Xiyang person and the Qing Empire came to a happy end because Fan allowed Schall von Bell to remain in the Northern City, or the Inner City as the Qing termed it.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Schall von Bell and Fan Wencheng.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{5} QSL-CD 8/8/16[jingchou] (1643.9.28). There is no definitive evidence at to whether Schall von Bell had a Manchu hairstyle when he met Fan Wencheng, but he did sport that style by 1656. See the account left by Joan Nieuhof, who visited China 1656: ‘he (Schall von Bell) was, as he told us, born in Cullen, and went shaved and clothed after the Tartar fashion’ (Nieuhof, An Embassy from the East-India Company, 117). Considering Dorgon’s determined attitude to the hairstyles of the surrendering population as a sign of their submission prior to June 1644, it is highly likely that Schall von Bell had adopted the Manchu hairstyle by the time of his first meeting with Fan Wencheng. It was only after the twenty-eighth of June 1644 that Dorgon temporarily allowed a more relaxed enforcement of the order.
How could Schall von Bell be allowed to remain in the Manchu ‘enclave’? The first reason could be that he was regarded as a cleric. The evacuation order of October 1648 permitted two exceptions:

1. Sub-officials (shuban 書辦) and functionaries (liyi ren 吏役人) who have resided in high or low offices of the Six Ministries, the Censorate, the Hanlin Academy, or the Shuntian Prefecture should not be moved if they were in charge of storehouses.

2. Buddhist or Daoist monks who have resided in temples (siyuan miaoyu 寺院廟宇) should not be moved out (wudong 勿動).

Schall von Bell was likely to fall into the second category because he was a cleric in a ‘temple’. Indeed, he had introduced himself as a ‘religious preacher’ from Xiyang (the West Ocean). Fan also asked him why his ‘temple’ was named ‘tang’ rather than ‘miao’, as the latter was a more common appellation for temples at that time.

While it is true that, since Later Jin, the forerunner of the Qing Empire, the Jurchen khanate had adopted a quasi-principle of not allowing its troops to harm temples and the clergy during the war, other factors also need to be considered when interpreting Schall von Bell’s...
continued residence in the Inner City. One concerns how the Manchu rulers viewed Christian churches, as revealed by the history of their siting and reconstruction: throughout the Qing period, all the Christian churches, not just Schall von Bell’s, were built in the Inner City by imperial order; indeed one was even built in the Imperial City, deep inside the Inner City; and no Christian church was built in the Outer City, which was for the Han Chinese population.

In the case of Schall von Bell’s church, although Ricci had built the original during the Ming period, Schall von Bell constructed a new one after 1650 on land bestowed by the Shunzhi emperor. In 1705, the Beijing missionaries began expanding this new church with money borrowed from the Kangxi emperor. That expansion was completed in 1711, but following significant damage due to two earthquakes and a fire in 1775, Xiyang missionaries rebuilt the church with money from the Qianlong emperor. Similarly, in 1655, Lodovico Buglio, SJ (Li Leisi 利類思, 1606-82) and Gabriel de Magalhães, SJ (An Wensi 安文思, 1610-77) erected the East Church outside the Dong’an 東安 Gate of the Imperial City. When they built it, they tore down the original building that the Shunzhi emperor had bought through the Imperial Household Department officials in 1653. The East Church was, in turn, partially pulled down by the Qing state during the Calendar Case but was later rebuilt with imperial funds. It was rebuilt again after being destroyed by an earthquake in 1720. In 1807, the church experienced a fire and was eventually demolished by the imperial order. Meanwhile, in 1703, missionaries built another church, which would later be called ‘the North Church’, on land and a building bestowed by the Kangxi emperor around Canchikou 蠶池口, inside the Xi’an 西安

10 The demolition was suspended by the Qing ruler’s intervention. See QCXCMDY, 266.
Gate of the Imperial City. This church was confiscated and destroyed in 1827. In 1723, with the Kangxi emperor’s permission, Teodorico Pedrini, CM (1671-1746) bought a building inside the Inner City and built the West Church for himself and several non-Jesuit Italians.\(^\text{11}\)

This pattern contrasts with other religious buildings, particularly those of religions that had long been part of the Chinese religious landscape, such as Islam, Buddhism, and Daoism.\(^\text{12}\) As Fang Xiaofeng found, Buddhist and Daoist temples were randomly spread across the Inner and Outer Cities,\(^\text{13}\) and Islamic mosques, although relatively few in Beijing, were also spread across both cities: of the thirty-nine mosques in Beijing by 1911, fifteen were in the suburbs, seven in the Outer City, and seventeen in the Inner City.\(^\text{14}\) Around the mid-eighteenth century, meanwhile, one mosque was located in the Inner City and four in the Outer City.\(^\text{15}\) It can be reliably concluded, therefore, that buildings serving those three religions were randomly built in both the Inner City and the Outer City.

The distribution pattern for Christian churches, however, is similar to that of Tibetan lamaseries. According to Susan Naquin, all thirty-one lamaseries outside the Imperial City during the late eighteenth century were located in the Inner City or suburban areas, but not the Outer City.\(^\text{16}\) This pattern is also observed in Zhang Xinyu and Ma Jia’s recent studies on


\(^{12}\) Although Christianity was present in China already in the seventh century, it was not until the sixteenth century that it became a permanent part of the Chinese religious landscape. See Bays, A New History of Christianity, 6-11, 18.

\(^{13}\) Fang Xiaofeng, Qingdai Beijing gongting, 241-46; Shu Shiguang and Wu Chengzhong, ‘Qingdai Beijing liulanxing simiao’, 47-48. For the mid-eighteenth century in particular, see Zhang Xu, Chūgoku no toshi, 87-88, 89-90, 100-01, 106-07.

\(^{14}\) Naquin, Peking, 573.

\(^{15}\) Zhang Xu, Chūgoku no toshi, 87-90, 100-01, 106-07.

\(^{16}\) Naquin, Peking, 585.
Beijing lamaseries. Although Zhang’s listing places Baoji si 寶集寺 and Dachong enfu yuan si 大崇恩福源寺 in the Outer City, both temples are irrelevant to the Qing period. Baoji si was built in the Tang period but ‘disappeared’ in the early Ming period; Dachong enfu yuan si was built in the Yuan period but later became a Daoist temple called Chongen guan 崇恩觀. Therefore, no Tibetan lamaseries were located in the Outer City during the Qing period.\(^{17}\) It is also meaningful to consider the timing of the Shunzhi emperor’s bestowal of land for Christian churches. For example, for the West Church, he granted a land to Schall von Bell in the Shunzhi 7\(^{th}\) year (c.1650).\(^ {18}\) During a similar period, the emperor ordered the construction of three symbolic lamaseries, such as Yong’an si 永安寺 and Pusheng si 普勝寺 in the Imperial City and Huang si 黃寺 in the northern suburbs.\(^ {19}\)

The distribution pattern of Russian orthodox buildings was also similar to that of lamaseries. The Kangxi emperor built a chapel in the Inner City, which was called ‘the North Building’ (beiguan 北館) or St Sophia Church, for the Cossacks who surrendered and were enrolled in the Bordered Yellow Banner. The emperor also converted one of the Guest Houses for Foreigners (huitong guan 會同館) into ‘the Russia House’ (E’luosi guan 俄羅斯館 in Chinese or oros kuren in Manchu) for local believers and Russian ecclesiastical missions, again located in the Inner City. Yet no Russian religious building was found in the Outer City. In fact,

\(^{17}\) Ma Jia, *Qingdai Beijing zangchuan fojiao*, 43-45; Zhang Xinyu, *Qingdai Beijing zangchuan fosi xiujian*, 149-66.


\(^{19}\) Naquin, *Peking*, 309; Huang Hao, *Zai Beijing de Zangzu wenwu*, 42, 46-48. The original name of Yong’an si was ‘Baita si’. Its name change happened after it was repaired in 1742.
throughout the Qing period, Qing official documents always called Russian orthodox priests ‘lama’.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3}
\caption{Centres of Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism, and Islam\textsuperscript{21}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{20} Cai Hongsheng, \textit{E’luosiguan jishi}, 12-32. During the late Qianlong period, for example, we still observe Tibetan Buddhist terms like ‘\textit{da lama}’ or ‘\textit{fucihi}’ in the Manchu translation for a Russian document. For example, ‘meni oros taciiyiyan i doroi \textit{fucihi} de doroloro, aislame nomun hülara baiTai jalin, meni sanat yamun ci mimbe ninggu ci jergi diyaceke hafan obume tucibufi, \textit{da lama} i o a kima sabe dahalame gemun hecen de unggiihe, (emphasis mine)’ in Evan Orlov’s petition entitled ‘To Report to the Court of Colonial Affairs about the Russian Chief Lama (i.e., Archimandrite) Joachim’s of Highhandedness to Them (為報理藩院俄羅斯大喇嘛伊鄂阿奇木欺壓伊等事呈文)’ (QL52/11). This petition is numbered as 03-0192-3178-020 and archived in Manwen lufu zouzhe of Junjichu quanzong at FHA.

Figure 4 The Eight Banner neighbourhoods of Qing Beijing. Unshaded areas were for the Manchu banners; shaded regions were for the Mongol banners; diagonally barred sites were for the Chinese banners.22

This pattern, whereby buildings serving Tibetan Buddhism, Christianity, and Russian Orthodoxy were restricted to the Inner City, would seem unlikely to be coincidental, since temple building activities in Beijing were strictly—more strictly over time—monitored and regulated by the Qing authorities due to the city’s significance as the empire’s centre. For example, in the Tiancong 7th year (c. 1633), the Ministry of Rites (libu 禮部) prescribed that those who built temples without the Ministry’s permission should be punished—very probably

in order to target lamasery building activities. In the Shunzhi 2nd year (c. 1645), meanwhile, the Qing state ordered that all edicts bestowed by the Ming government on temples (si, miao, an, and guan) ‘inside and outside (neiwei 内外)’ should be returned to the Ministry of Rites. The emperor also decreed that a temple or statue building activities inside and outside Beijing were allowed only if approved by the Ministry of Rites.23 In the 7th year of the Shunzhi Reign (c. 1650), the government made clear that no temple building activities were allowed except for repairs. In the Kangxi 4th year (c. 1665), the government decided that temple building activities in Xingjing 興京, Shengjing 盛京, and Beijing should be allowed only on an imperial decree, and limited the number of monks allowed to reside in the existing temples on the basis of size of the temple and whether it was built privately or by imperial order.24

It is also noticeable to consider the pattern of the use of imperial funds in the building of temples in Beijing. Throughout the Qing period, Tibetan Buddhist temples were the most frequent recipients of imperial construction funding in Beijing (twenty-five out of all the imperially-funded temples25, or 43.9%). In contrast, Ming rulers built forty-four temples with imperial funds, but only three of these were lamaseries (6.8%).26 The second most common

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23 DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3622-23.
24 DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3624.
25 Fifty-seven temples, constituting 5% of all the buildings in Beijing.
26 Naquin, however, does not provide a specific figure for the number of Ming imperially-funded lamaseries. She merely mentions that Ming Wuzong built a lamasery (Zhenguo si 鎮國寺) west of the lakes. Thus, for the Ming imperially-funded lamaseries figure, I consulted the Wanli Gazetteer of Shuntian Prefecture, and Zhang Xinyu’s table for Beijing lamaseries based on neiwwfu zouxiao dang of the Qianlong period and Li Decheng’s Zangchuan fojiao yu Beijing. According to Zhang’s table, there were two imperially-funded lamaseries during the Ming period: Zhenguo si that Wuzong built and Longfu si 隆福寺 that Daizong built. For Xiyu si 西域寺 (or Santa si 三塔寺), although Zhang merely describes it as imperially repaired, the Wanli Gazetteer of Shuntian Prefecture categorises Xiyu si as an imperially built (chijian 敕建) temple. See Naquin, Beijing, 134, 332; Zhang Xinyu, Qingdai Beijing zangchuan fosi, 152-53; Shen Yingwen, (Wanli) Shuntian fu zhi, juan 2, yingjian, simiao, Wanping xian,
type of imperially-funded temple in Beijing comprised shrines to exemplary individuals associated with the Qing dynasty, constituting 35.1% (twenty temples). Thus, most of the imperially-funded new temples in Beijing were closely related to ‘the Qing Empire’s peculiar characteristic’ that differentiated it from its Han predecessor, the Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, none of all these new imperially-funded temples was built in Beijing’s Han Chinese realm, the Outer City.²⁷ Here, we again find a juxtaposition of Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism, and Russian Orthodoxy because, as we saw above, the religious buildings for those three religions were imperially sponsored.

**The Lama from the West²⁸**

In 1655, a number of officials from the Office of Scrutiny for Works (gōngke 工科) and the Ministry of Rites criticised Naldai, a bithesi and gūsai sefu²⁹, on the grounds that the latter had abused the opportunity to memorialise by recommending a strange lama who claimed ‘would preach dharma to the Qing people for three years and make the world peaceful’. A noteworthy
event recorded in the accusers’ arguments is that in 1652, the emperor sent this lama to Adam Schall and ‘nomonhan lama’:

Show him to tang zo wang\textsuperscript{30} and nomonhan lama.

Why did the Shunzhi emperor send the lama to Adam Schall and ‘nomonhan lama’?

One possible answer is that the emperor regarded the lama, Schall von Bell, and ‘nomonhan lama’ as sharing a mutual origin. Above all, the lama introduced himself as originating from the West Heaven (\textit{wargi abka})\textsuperscript{31}. He also depicted himself as having some form of relationship with the Panchen Lama in Tibet and Sakyamuni in India. Moreover, all the possible prelates called ‘nomonhan lama’ in the 1650s were connected to the West (figures 4, 5). To my knowledge, the period around 1652 saw the appearance of three seminal figures called ‘nomonhan’, a eulogistic title for a Tibetan Buddhist prelate or a ruler with expertise in the Tibetan Buddhist sutras:

(1) Gush Khan of the Khoshots\textsuperscript{32}

(2) Nomun Khan lama (\textit{Nuomen han lama} 諸門汗喇嘛) under Jasaktu Khan of the Khalkha Right Wing\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} Schall von Bell’s Manchurised Chinese name, Tang Ruowang.

\textsuperscript{31} ‘An arhat (\textit{lohan}) from the West Territory (\textit{wargi ba}) said, “… How can I leave [this country] without offering any help to the emperor (\textit{han}) and His country (\textit{gurun}) although I enjoyed His gracious food and clothes!” … Considering his grandiose remarks, [I think that] he has some virtues (\textit{eredemu}) that can be beneficial [to us].’

\textsuperscript{32} QSL-SZ6/10/7[renchen]; FHA and Zhongguo Zangxue yanjiu zhongxin, eds., \textit{Qingchu wushi Dalai lama}, no. 33, 24; Xidurigu, \textit{Qing Nei mishu yuan}, 183.

\textsuperscript{33} QSL-SZ5/1/18[jiayin].
(3) Danjin Lama of the Khalkha Left Wing

From the emperor’s perspective, Adam Schall also came from the West:

(a) *Tang žo wang*, you came, across the sea, from the Country of the Western Ocean
(Ma. *si yang gurun*; Ch. *Xiyang*), which is located 100,000 *li* away [from us] ([the edict on the first of April 1653](#)

(b) *Tang žo wang* has studied the teachings of the Far West (Ma. *tai sy i tacihiyan*; Ch. *Taixi zhijiao* 泰西之教) ([the edict which was inscribed in the stele at the South Church on the fifteenth of March 1657](#)).

Whether those renderings for Schall von Bell’s homeland, such as ‘Xiyang’ (Ma. *siyang* or *siyang*) or ‘Taixi’ (Ma. *tai sy*), meant a country, countries, a region, or an ocean in the West, one thing for sure is that they all concerned the West. Indeed, in his first encounter with the Qing Empire, Adam Schall had introduced himself as from the Western Ocean.

If the emperor’s view of the West lay behind his order to send the lama to Adam Schall and ‘nomonhan lama’, what does this say about the early Qing understanding of the West?

Until the Qing conqueror entered China, the West had been mainly described in China proper using three terms: ‘Xiyu’ 西域 (the Western Territory), ‘Xihai’ 西海 (the Western Sea) and ‘Xiyang’ (the Western Ocean). The first term, ‘Xiyu’, appeared after Zhang Qian 張騫 (? - 114 BCE) pioneered the Silk Road during the Han period. That term initially meant present-

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34 Zhang Mu, *Menggu youmuji, juan 8*, 183; QSL-SZ9/11/16[jiashen]; QSL-SZ9/11/27[yiwei]. Danjin Lama, alternatively called ‘Yisidanjinlama 伊思丹津喇嘛’ or ‘Yisidajinlamatuoyin 伊思丹津喇嘛托音’, was the son of Tümenkhen sain noyan. Danjin Lama was appointed as a *jasagh* lama by the Shunzhi emperor in the 12th year of the Shunzhi Reign (1655).

35 For the original Manchu edict, see Stary, ‘Mandschourische Inschriften’, 171-80. For the Chinese version of the edict, see QSL-SZ10/3/2[wuchen].

36 Beijing tushuguan jinshizu, *Beijing tushuguan cang*, vol. 61, 95, the Shunzhi emperor’s *Tianzhu tang bei* 天主堂碑 (Nantang bei 南堂碑).
day East Turkestan and a part of Central Asia but was extended to cover India and Persia during the Tang period. During the Yuan and Ming periods, ‘Xiyu’ primarily covered Tibet and Central Asia. The second term, ‘Xihai’, originated in the traditional Chinese worldview. It meant one of four barbarians (siyi 四夷) outside China or one of four seas (sihai 四海) that surrounded those four barbarians. During the Han Dynasty, the term was used to describe Koko Nor, the Aral Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, or the Arabian Sea. During the Northern and Southern Dynasties, ‘Xihai’ started to be linked to the Indian Ocean that would be called ‘the Southwestern Sea’ (Xinan hai) during the Tang Dynasty. The last term, ‘Xiyang’, appeared in the early Yuan period and meant a region, polities, or sometimes, trade networks. ‘Xiyang’ covered Hormuz, Mecca, Aden, Southern India’s coastal areas, the area from Borneo to the Indian Ocean, and even Africa fell under the umbrella of the term ‘Xiyang’. However, as time went by, ‘Xiyang’, among the three terms, came to embrace the areas that had until then been described by the rest two, ‘Xiyu’ or ‘Xihai’.

One seminal semantic change regarding the West occurred in late-Ming China: ‘Xiyang’ began to be linked to Europe. In this change, the Jesuits played an essential role, as the knowledge related to Europe was transmitted to China by them, who, as early as the 1580s, introduced their place of origin as Xiyang. To avoid confusion with the previous nomenclature for the West, Matteo Ricci added prefixes like ‘da 大’ (great) or ‘tai 泰’ (big) to the designations ‘Xi’ or ‘Xiyang’, and during the 1620s and 1630s, this clarification was spread

through Giulio Aleni, SJ’s (1582-1649) writings. Thus, late Ming intellectuals often called knowledge relating to Europe ‘Xixue 西學’ (the Western Learning) or ‘Taixi zhi xue 泰西之學’ (the Learning of the Far West).\(^{38}\)

However, it is not clear to what extent such late-Ming understanding influenced the early Qing ruler’s worldview. Above all, their access to knowledge about Europe was limited by the fact that they mostly came from Inner Asia. It was only after the Qing conquerors entered China proper and, in particular, established channels to the coastal areas that they obtained sufficient knowledge about Europe.\(^{39}\) Before that happened, the small number of Xiyang people in Beijing, including Schall von Bell, comprised the narrow but almost sole source of information on Europe. Yet, that is not to say the early Qing rulers were thoroughly influenced by other worldviews, such as the Mongol one, which was rooted in Tibetan Buddhism. At that time, the Qing Empire’s entry into the Tibet Buddhist world was still at an early stage. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that the early Qing worldview was in the process of formation as the empire gradually conquered the lands and peoples of Inner Asia and East Eurasia. Regarding the West, the early Qing rulers merely had a vague assumption that India marked the end of the West.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) Brook, ‘Europaeology?’, 264-67. Chinese elites, except southeast coastal officials, were reluctant to accept this ‘clarification’, however. See Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*, 49-57.

\(^{39}\) In fact, even their Ming predecessors had had to rely on those channels to update their knowledge of Europe. Numbers of Manchu soldiers might have encountered the very few Portuguese soldiers who helped the Ming government, however. See Swen, *Jesuits Mission and Submission*, 35-37; Dong Shaoxin and Yilong Huang, ‘Chongzhen nianjian yuan Hua Pubing’, 77-79.

\(^{40}\) Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*, 60-61. During Pieter van Goyer and Jakob van Keyzer’s visit to Beijing in 1656, the Qing authorities hinted at the possible connection between the Xiyang and the Dutch. Some argued that, during the similar period, the Qing ruler also suggested a possible linkage between the Xiyang and Russia because Schall von Bell acted as translator for the Russian envoy Fedor Isakovic Bajkov. However, a recent study shows that this episode was groundless.
Some records from *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔 [The Manchu Archives] adumbrate how the early Qing conquerors’ view of the West developed.

(a) [1619] The person who had spied out to Fushun in the west (*wargi*) reported …

(b) [1622] People from Guangning 廣寕 on the west (*wargi*) side of the river …

(c) [1628] In the second year of the Tiancong Reign, for the attack of the Cahars of the Mongol federation, Sure Han [i.e., Hong Taiji] sent emissions to *beiles* of the Kurchin, *tabunang* of the Karachin, *beiles* of the Aohan and the Naiman, and *beiles* of the Khalkha. All of whom had surrendered and [now] become part of Outer Mongol in the northwest (*amargi wargi*). [Sure Han] ordered them to assemble at the appointed place …

(d) [1638] the Khalkha Mongols in the northwest …

In 1619, the West, from the Qing ruler’s perspective, covered an area relatively close to Hetu Ala, then Nurhaci’s base (a). In the 1620s, when the Jurchen khanate had consolidated its control over the Liao River’s east side (b, c), the West was commonly understood as the west side of the Liao River (*birai wargi*). Subsequently, towards the late 1620s, as the khanate marched further west, their West extended correspondingly beyond the Liao River’s west side and, around 1635, reached all the way to the pastures of the Khalkha Mongols (d).


41 MBRT, vol. I, TM4/2/1(1619.3.16), 119.
42 MBRT, vol. II, TM7/1/27(1622.3.8), 501.
43 MBRT, vol. IV, TC2/9/3(1628.9.29), 176.
44 QSL-CD 3/7/6[dingmao].
The early Qing rulers’ vague view of the West, which seemed to lie somewhere between their Inner Asian experience and late Ming knowledge, is exemplified in the following different designations for Schall von Bell’s origin:
Mr Tang 湯, whose official name is Ruowang 若望 and whose common name is Daowei 道未, is from Germany (Ri’ermaniya guo 日爾瑪你亞國) in the Great Xiyang (Da Xiyang 大西洋) … (on the front of Schall von Bell’s tombstone)47

Adam Schall (tang zo wang), you came from the Western Territory (Ma. wargi ba; Ch. xiyu) (on the back of Schall’s tombstone)48

Although both quotes (i, ii) above come from a single source, Schall von Bell’s tombstone, erected by a single person, the Kangxi emperor, in 1669 (KX8), the nomenclatures for the West in the two quotes, interestingly, seem not to correspond to each other because during the late-Ming, ‘Da Xiyang’ was a common designation for Europe while ‘Xiyu’ referred to India.

Regarding the early Qing ruler’s Europe-related knowledge, it is also helpful to examine the ethnic distribution of the Qing conquerors. Therefore, in the following, I will analyse the ethnic compositions in the Qing state’s main central posts (the Grand Secretary, the Ministers of the Six Ministries, and the Left Censor-in-chief of the Censorate) and provincial posts (the Governor-general and the Provincial Governor) from the 1640s to the 1660s.

First, the percentages of Manchu, Mongol, Hanjun, and Han individuals in these posts, which stood at 21.0%, 0.9%, 44.5%, and 33.6% in the 1640s; 18.8%, 0.3%, 46.1%, and 34.8% in the 1650s; 20.6%, 1.0%, 49.4%, and 29.0% in the 1660s (Graph 1), can be converted into two categories of Inner Asian (Manchu, Mongol, Hanjun) and Han officials, i.e., 66.4% : 33.6% (2.0:1) in the 1640s; 65.2% : 34.8% (1.9:1) in the 1650s; and 71.0% : 29.0% (2.4:1) in the

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45 I modified this map from CHC 9-1, 33.
46 Perdue, China Marches West, 95.
1660s. As Graph 2 shows, these figures suggest that Inner Asian Qing officials dominated major policy decisions from the 1640s to the 1660s.

Graph 1 Ethnic Distribution of Principal Officials over Time

Graph 2 Percentages of Inner Asian Officials and Han Officials over Time
Second, when we compare the percentages of Han individuals in these positions in the 1640s, 1650s, and 1660s, although the proportions of Han Grand Secretaries, Ministries and Left Censors-in-chief, and Governors-general increased gradually over time, that does not mean that Han officials dominated those posts, but in fact, Inner Asian officials were still the majority in those posts during the same periods. Meanwhile, the proportion of Han Provincial Governors decreased sharply. On the whole, Inner Asian officials were dominant in both main central and main provincial posts from the 1640s to the 1660s (Graphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).

Graph 3 Percentages of Inner Asian officials and Han officials over time (detailed)

The figures for i) Grand Secretaries, ii) Ministers and Left Censors-in-chief, iii) Governors-General, and iv) Provincial Governors change over time as follow: i) 13.8% → 42.1% → 39.0%; ii) 26.2% → 47.9% → 50.0%; iii) 3.8% → 7.8% → 13.9%; and iv) 54.6% → 33.5% → 19.3%, respectively. In contrast, the percentages of Inner Asian officials in posts i), ii), iii), and iv) over the same period change as follow: i) 86.2% → 57.9% → 61.0%; ii) 73.7% → 52.1% → 50.0%; iii) 96.2% → 92.2% → 86.1%; and iv) 45.4% → 66.5% → 80.7%. For those figures, I mainly consulted Narakino Sen, Shindai jū yō shokkan no kenkyū, 231-333.
Graph 4 Yearly percentages of Inner Asian and Han Grand Secretaries

Graph 5 Yearly percentages of Inner Asian and Han Ministers and Left Censors-in-chief
This preponderance of Inner Asian officials in main posts suggests that they considerably influenced the Qing state’s scope of accessible knowledge. However, despite this preponderance of Inner Asian officials in the Qing officialdom, some scholars point out that some specific areas, especially the Ministry of Justice, had been under the Han officials’

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influence. But Su Yigong’s recent study on the same Ministry rebuts this argument and reveals Han officials’ lesser influence in the Ministry due to their limited Manchu language ability. Another scholar, although rejecting Su’s conclusion, still acknowledges Han officials’ little influence in the Ministry, especially over certain specific issues such as ‘those relating to the Manchu people’. Indeed, as we have seen above with regard to the Qing authorities’ attitude to church construction in Beijing’s Cities, matters relating to the Xiyang were none other than those relating to the Manchu people.

From the analysis thus far, we can sum up a number of noticeable points regarding the lama episode mentioned earlier. Primarily, it was against the backdrop of the early Qing ruler’s forming geographical view (or worldview) that the Shunzhi emperor sent the lama to Adam Schall and nomonhan lama. Second, until the early 1650s, the early Qing geographical view (or worldview) was not a direct successor to late Ming intellectual traditions, but was based on an amalgamation of both the Qing Empire’s Inner Asian experience to date and fragmented geographical information from Han Chinese or court missionaries. Third, as far as knowledge of Europe is concerned, the early Qing Empire in the 1650s needed more time to recover the level achieved during the late Ming. Lastly, this ‘informational lag’ was closely related to the ethnic compositions of the early conquerors.

**Making the Qing People**

In the two preceding sections, we have assumed the possibility that the early Qing rulers’ Inner Asian experience might influence their perspective of Europe and Europeans when they encountered Xiyang missionaries for the first time. If so, what was this so-called ‘Inner Asian experience’? In this new section, by examining how this young empire in the east of Eurasia
expanded its territories and accommodated neighbouring peoples, we will advance our knowledge about the nature of the early Qing Empire.

One aspect of the Qing Empire’s growth was its territorial expansion. The Qing Empire started with about thirteen armies on the east side of the Liao River in 1583 but, by unifying the Jurchen populations, became a Jurchen federation and khanate in 1616. Then, during the 1620s, it consolidated control over the Liaodong area and expanded beyond the Liao River. Subsequently, through the 1630s and 1640s, the khanate (the Qing Empire after 1636), in the west, expanded to Inner Mongolia and, in the east, delineated the boundaries with the Chosŏn government and conquered China proper. From then onward, the Qing Empire’s westward march was pronounced and, during the 1680s and 1690s, it established a border with the Romanov empire and subjugated the Khalka Mongols in Outer Mongolia. Finally, in the 1720s, the empire set territorial boundaries with Vietnam and, in the 1750s, marching further west, conquered Zungharia in East Turkestan.51

Another feature of the Qing Empire’s growth was its incorporation of peoples, accompanying its territorial expansion, who had inhabited Eastern Eurasia: until the late eighteenth century, as the Qing Empire’s territories covered Inner Mongolia, East Turkestan, Qinghai, and Tibet, its subjects came to include Jurchen, Han Chinese, Mongol, Tibetan, East Turkestani, and Korean peoples, and even people from the Lê regime. This feature of the Qing Empire’s growth can be explained in terms of a sovereignty manifested through the exercise of

jurisdiction over their subjects, as much as through its territoriality.\textsuperscript{52} The meaning of the Manchu word ‘gurun’, which appears in the name of the empire itself, ‘Daicing Gurun’, and translated commonly as ‘country’, was, in fact, closer to people rather than territory.\textsuperscript{53} The Mongol word ‘ulus’ in ‘Yeke Monggol Ulus’ (the Great Yuan Empire) was also more akin to people than territory.\textsuperscript{54} The Qing term ‘waifan 外藩’, which commonly designated the northern and western areas of the Qing Empire, originally meant Mongol or Turkestani leaders, not territories, upon whom the Qing rulers bestowed noble titles. However, during the later period, \textit{fanbu} 藩部, which signified a specific territory, became more prevalent as a surrogate term for \textit{waifan}.\textsuperscript{55}

Changes in the composition of the Qing banners (\textit{qi} 旗) over time epitomised this second type of expansion. For example, before 1644, the Qing banners included Chinese called \textit{nikan}; Tungusic Jurchens; Koreans; and Mongols,\textsuperscript{56} all of whom were incorporated into the Qing Empire (precisely speaking, the forerunner of it) during its conquest of Manchuria. From 1644, the Qing banners came to embrace an extensive Han Chinese population as the empire passed


\textsuperscript{53} Imanishi Shunju, ‘Manju zakki 3’, 6-10.

\textsuperscript{54} In the nineteenth century, A. C. d’Ohsson pointed out the meaning of ‘ulus’ concerned people rather than territory. Later, B. Ia. Vladimirtsov and G. Doerfer argued the same point in the 1930s and 1960s, respectively. More recently, Hodong Kim also reached the same conclusion after analysing \textit{Monggol-un niyuca tobčiyan} and \textit{Jami’ al-tawārīkh}. See Kim, ‘Mongol cheguk kwa Taewŏn’, 236-38; Kim, ‘Monggol cheguk ûi ‘ullusû cheje’ ûi hyŏngsŏng’, 339-40.

\textsuperscript{55} Kataoka Kazutada, ‘Chōga kitei kara mita’, 244-45, 257-59.

\textsuperscript{56} Koo Bumjin, \textit{Ch’ŏng nara, k’imeru ûi cheguk}, 65-66; Sugiyama Kiyohiko, ‘Dai Shin teikoku no shihai kōzō’, 136. On the Jurchen people (\textit{jušen gisun i gurun})’s distinguished identity from the Ming (\textit{nikan gurun}), Chosŏn (\textit{solho gurun}), and Mongol (\textit{monggo gurun}) peoples, see Feng Mingzhu et al, eds. \textit{Mawen yuandang}, vol. 1, \textit{zezi dang}, September of Tianming 4\textsuperscript{th} year, 293; MBRT, vol. 1, 189.
the Shanhai Pass and, later, suppressed the Three Feudatories’ Rebellion (sanfan 三藩) and the Zheng regime. Russians also began to be enrolled in the banners from 1648, and, in particular, following the surrender of large numbers of Russians in 1683, the Kangxi emperor created a *half* Russian niru in the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner. This half niru later became a ‘whole’ niru as it accepted more Russians. In the meantime, the Qing banners absorbed non-Jurchen Manchurian tribes such as the Kuyala, Heje, Sibe, Solon, Butha, inter alia. During a later period, the Qianlong emperor assigned some Uighurs, Tibetans, and Vietnamese people to the Qing banners. In this way, as the Qing Empire expanded territorially and, as a result, incorporated diverse peoples, the Qing banners also came to include such various peoples, encompassing Manchu, Mongol, Han, Korean, Russian, Vietnamese, Uighur, and Tibetan ethnicities (see Figure 7).

Considering this process of Qing imperial development, we may assume sovereignty conflicts involving individuals ‘naturalised’ into the Qing Empire, yet whose original home

57 *Qinding baqi tongzhi*, juan 22, juan 25, 389-90, 448-49.
61 *Qinding baqi tongzhi*, juan 7, 131-32; juan 5, 81.
63 From the Nurhaci period onward, Koreans were introduced on a large scale into the *Aisin Gurun* and later the *Daicing Gurun*. These included both captives and voluntarily surrendered Koreans. It is likely that while the former became *booi*, the latter retained their freedom after their submission. The *Baqi Manzhou shizu tongpu* lists forty-three Gaoli out of a total of 1,168 clans. Of the one hundred and fifty-seven people who the forty-three clans produced, one hundred and thirty-two (84%) were subject to *booi* companies. Until the Qianlong period, the Manchu Banners had eight companies for Koreans: six Chosŏn companies (*Chaoxian zuoling*); and two Koryŏ companies (*Gaoli zuoling*). See Koo Bumjin, *Ch'ŏngnara, k'imeraŭi chegu*, 146-49.
polities remained independent. Although, for example, Koreans, Russians, and Vietnamese enrolled in the Qing banners became ‘Qing subjects’, their original home polities, namely the Chosŏn Dynasty, the Romanov Empire, and the Lê regime, were guaranteed to retain their independent rule over their subjects after coming under the wing of the Qing led world. Indeed, the Manchu renderings for those countries, ‘Coohiyan Gurun’, ‘Oros Gurun’, and ‘An’nan Gurun’, respectively, contained the term ‘gurun’, which posited independent rulership according to Qing official parlance. For example, the Qing Manchu Veritable Records (Manzhou shilu 滿洲實錄) changed designations for Jurchen tribes from ‘gurun’ to ‘aiman’ (or ‘golo’) as the extent of Nurhaci’s influence over the Jurchen tribes became more prominent, and during the Shunzhi period, the emperor instructed Qing princes not to use the expression ‘gurun’ for the Khalkha Mongols because he did not regard the latter as an independent polity.

As one of those ‘naturalised’ into the Qing Empire yet whose original home polity remained independent, Gūlmahūn is a good example. A Manchu bannerman, Gūlmahūn, once Chŏng Myŏngsu 鄭命壽 in Korean, had been a state-owned slave under the Chosŏn Dynasty.

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64 Especially for the Chosŏn, after conquering it, Hong Taiji called the Chosŏn king ‘the king of a country’ (yiguo zhi wang 一國之王) and ‘the lord of a country’ (yiguo zhi zhu 一國之主) and seated the king beside Hong Taiji himself. According to a recent study that examined Qing-Chosŏn, Qing-Vietnam, and Qing-Kokand borderlands, the Qing-Chosŏn borderland showed the clearest delineation regarding subjects and domains. This study also points out that practical arrangements in the Qing-Chosŏn borderland most closely resemble post-Westphalian ones. See Koo Bumjin, ‘Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn Sahaeng Insŏn’, 20-21; Kim, Asymmetry and Elastic Sovereignty, 21.


66 Lee Sun-ae, ‘Oegug (tulergi gurun) esŏ oebŏn (tulergi golo) ŭro’, 147.

before the Jurchen army captured and enrolled him as a *booi* in the Qing banners in 1627. Taking on the new identity of a Qing subject, Gülmaхūn learnt the Manchu language in Beijing and became an interpreter in charge of Qing-Chosŏn affairs. He also enjoyed a close relationship with heavyweights such as Inggūldai and Mafuta. In 1643, Gülmaхūn was appointed *nirui janggin* (captain), and around the same time, the Qing state despatched him as a second-rank imperial envoy (*fushi* 副使) to Chosŏn. According to the *Qing shilu* 清實錄 [the Qing Veritable Records], Gülmaхūn also enjoyed the title of Bureau Secretary in the Ministry of Revenue (*hubu zhushi* 戶部主事) in 1645.

The way in which Chŏng Myŏngsu was provided with a new identity as a Manchu bannerman and used as a mediator between the Qing and the Chosŏn is emblematic of how the Qing Empire treated other subjugated peoples. For example, Qing rulers enrolled subjugated Mongols into the Eight Banners and used them as intermediaries between the Qing rulers and Mongol princes and high Tibetan lamas. The Mongol Eight Banners exclusively occupied all the posts for Mongol or Tibetan interpreters in the Grand Secretariat (*neige* 內閣) and the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifan yuan* 理藩院). Also, they took up all posts for Mongol

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68 QSL-CD8/9/12[guimao].
69 CWSL, Injo 21/9/26; 22/4/23.
70 QSL-SZ2/11/11[jiwei].
71 Seonmin Kim emphasised Gülmaхūn’s mediating role in Qing-Chŏson trade. Kim, ‘Chosŏn t’ongsa Kulmahun’, 53-60.
72 In addition to Gülmaхūn, other Koreans also served as interpreters in the Qing Empire. They include, for example, Xindali 新達理 (maybe Sindari in Manchu) and others who were recorded in ‘Manzhou qifen nei zhi Gaoli xingshi’ of the *Baqi Manzhou shizu tongpu* (juan 72, 73). Fujimoto yukio, ‘Shinchō Chosŏn tsūji Shōko’, 276.
and Tibetan teachers in the Directorate of Education (Guozi jian 國子監).\footnote{These practices would be institutionalised by the eighteenth century. Murakami Nobuaki, “‘Minzoku” no siten kara mita’, 154-55.} For Russians, the Kangxi emperor created a separate nīru in the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner and enrolled subjugated Cossacks into the newly created nīru, although the then Ministry of Revenue suggested that the Cossacks be dispersed into the existing companies. This new Russian nīru was led by ‘Wulanggeli 伍朗各理’, who was the first subjugated Russian. The Russians in the nīru were provided with a building (beiguan 北館), land, and salary and were expected to serve as interpreters or spies. They were also used to persuade enemies to surrender.\footnote{Liu Xiaomeng, ‘Guanyu Qindai Beijing de Eluosi ren’, 365-68, 72.} Likewise, the Qing Empire prepared new nīrus for surrendered Koreans,\footnote{Because there were fewer surrendered Koreans than surrendered Mongols, the Qing prepared companies (nīru) rather than banners (gūsa) for the Koreans.} which were led by Korean descendants, such as the Chosŏn nīru (Chaoxian zuoling 朝鮮佐領) and the Koryŏ nīru (Gaoli zuoling 高麗佐領). Within the boundaries allotted in the Qing banners, those Koreans, Russians, and Mongols, all Qing subjects, could preserve their own original cultures.\footnote{Huang Lijun, ‘Baqi zhidu yu zuqun renting’, 251-68.} In sum, using the banners system, the Qing Empire instilled into the incorporated populations a new identity as Qing people, while simultaneously preserving their original cultures and making efficient use of them in relations with neighbouring countries. This mechanism provided the background against which Gülmaḥūn became a high official in the Qing Empire.\footnote{Among Koreans, Chang Ming (尚明 or 常明), the Kangxi emperor’s close friend, became the Adjutant General (yuqian dachen 御前大臣) and the Chamberlain of the Imperial Guard (ling shiwei nei dachen 領侍衛內大臣), and Gingiyan’s nephews attained the status of ‘Prince of the First Degree’ (qinwang 親王). See Koo Bumjin, Ch’ŏng nara, K’imeraŭi Cheguk, 146-49; Sugiyama Kiyohiko, Shinchō teikoku no keisei to hakkise, 356-61.}
Gūlmahūn was also a borderline man residing in a twilight zone of Qing sovereignty. He enjoyed a new identity endowed by the Qing Empire and simultaneously enjoyed his life as Chŏng Myŏngsu. He was a high official in the Qing Empire and, albeit not openly, also received official titles from the Chosŏn government, such as Fourth Minister of the Ministers-Without-Portfolio Office (Tongjijingch'ubusa 同知中樞府事) in 1639 and First Minister of the Ministers-Without-Portfolio Office (Yŏngjijingch'ubusa 領中樞府事) in 1648, and attendant privileges.78

Gūlmahūn’s life has significant implications in our understanding the early Qing Empire’s nature and the Xiyang people’s status within it. Like Gūlmahūn, Schall von Bell was a Qing subject and yet simultaneously a Xiyangman from an independent political unit. As we saw at the beginning of this present chapter, when he memorialised the Shunzhi emperor to appeal for Huang Daolong, Schall von Bell was a second-rank official79 and one of the Nine Chief Ministers (jiuqing 九卿). He took the leading role in the calendrical projects and the investiture mission, which lay at a seminal position in the Celestial Empire's legitimacy (Tianchao 天朝). Considering Adam Schall’s role, it is no surprise that his emolument surpassed that of first-rank officials at that time.80 In the early Qing world, diverse peoples were allowed to be part of the Qing state. The Qing ruler enrolled them in the Qing banners and provided them with a new identity as Qing people. Simultaneously, the Qing ruler, preserving their abilities and

78 By exemplifying Gūlmahūn’s life, Seonmin Kim pointed out that studies of the Qing-Chosŏn relations should go beyond the nation-state framework. See Kim, ‘Chosŏn t'ongsa Kulmahun’, 61-62; CWSL Injo 26/3/7(imin).

79 Schall von Bell was the then Commissioner of the Office of Transmission (tongzheng shi si tongzheng shi 通政使司通政使).

cultures, employed their abilities and cultures in various areas for the empire. Likewise, the Qing ruler left room for ‘the Xiyangs’ to be part of the Qing state. Xiyang people could remain in the Manchu enclave; received bannerman titles such as *jalan-i janggin* (Lieutenant Colonel, *canling* 參領)\(^81\); and, with their preserved abilities and cultures, served as intermediaries between the Qing Empire and areas of the Xiyang world such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Rome.\(^82\)

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\(^81\) Zhang Xingyao et al., ‘Qinming Chuanjiao Yueshu’, 213.

\(^82\) For example, Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, 120, 160. Also see Chapter V of this dissertation.
Figure 7 The Structure of the Qing Empire and the Ethnic Groups Incorporated in the Eight Banners (Reproduced from Sugiyama, ‘Dai Shin teikoku no shihai kōzō’, 137, 141.)
Chapter II: The Calendar Case in the Early Qing Context

Accusations

During the Calendar Case, a government-level measure to address the Xiyang clergy appeared for the first time in Qing history. Although several attacks against Schall von Bell did not have significant ramifications at the Qing court during the Shunzhi Reign (1644-61), on the twenty-fourth of September 1664, the Kangxi government, as a response to a petition (1664.9.15, KX3/7/26) by Yang Guangxian, secretly ordered an investigation into Schall von Bell and,

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]

During the Calendar Case interrogation, Qing officials searched through their archives to find the originals of those three petitions (Y-4, Y-6, and Y-IV) but could not find them. Thus, Yang submitted the drafts (gao 稿) of those three petitions. Although An Shuangchen understands Yang’s second petition (Y-6) to be Zheng guoti cheng (Y-IV), according to the

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]
from the next day, began hearing the case. The political atmosphere at that time was not in Schall von Bell’s favour. His firm protector, the Shunzhi emperor, was no longer alive, and Manchu-centrism, which dominated the Qing court after the Four Regents seized power, was leading to Schall von Bell’s Han Chinese supporters being ejected from the centre of power. At the same time, the ‘victims’ of two events—the abolition of the Muslim Section (Huihui ke 回回科) and the Mistranslation incident—had since watched for a chance for revenge against Schall von Bell.4

3 *Manchu Secret Documents*, the former is a different and separate petition, although both include criticism of the phrase, ‘yi Xiyang xinfa’ on the almanac. An Shuangcheng also points out that Yang visited the Office of Transmission on both the twelfth and sixteenth of July. The Manchu Secret Documents provide evidence, however, that despite the Office official’s suggestion to ‘visit again after the rain ritual’, Yang did not return to the Office. See An Shuangcheng, ‘Tang Ruowang an shimo’, 81; QXCMDY, 22, 24-25, 67, 88-89.

4 In particular, the latter incident resulted from the Ministry of Rites’ mistranslation of ‘chen shi 辰時’, the Chinese zodiac hour calculated by the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy for Prince Rong’s funeral time, into a Manchu word ‘morin’ (horse) that meant ‘wu shi 午時’. The correct translation should have been ‘muduri’ (dragon). Although official(s) in the Directorate requested the correction, Engede refused the request and pushed ahead with the wrong funeral time. Soon after, however, this mistranslation was revealed by an official report of the Directorate, and those responsible were punished. The Calendar Case closely concerned Engede’s retaliation against Adam Schall. It seems that Engede wanted to attribute the cause for his misfortune in respect to Prince Rong’s funeral to fundamental flaws in Adam Schall’s method and a resultant fundamentally wrong date selection, thereby making his mistranslation leading to the wrong hour selection trivial. See QSL-SZ15/11/21[jiayin]; BDY, Xuanze yi, 42; QXCMDY, 68, 72-73, 78; Huang, ‘Zeri zhi zheng yu “Kangxi liyu”’, 255; Väth, *Johann Adam Schall von Bell*, 207, 298-99, 303-04; Gimm, *Der Fall Prinz Rong*, 32-37. For the political atmosphere in respect to the Calendar Case, see Eugenio, ‘Yang Guangxian’s Opposition to Adam Schall’, 313; Huang, ‘Zeri zhi zheng yu “Kangxi liyu”’, 255-58; Huang, ‘Kangxi chao Hanren shidafu’, 157-59. Although Ma Weihua offers a fresh angle on the Calendar Case by linking it with the Qing Empire’s frontier policy around the Kangxi 3rd year, he does not appear to provide decisive evidence for his hypothesis. See Ma Weihua, ‘Wushi Dalai Lama jinjing chaojin’, 144.
The Petition for ‘Exterminating Heretical Teachings’ and Its Attached Documents

What were Yang’s specific accusations against Schall von Bell during the Calendar Case?

Above all, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang* 請誅邪教狀 [Petition to Exterminate Heretical Teachings] (1665.9.15, hereafter Y-I), which triggered the Calendar Case, accuses Schall von Bell of Plotting Treason (*moupan* 謀叛) and Writing Books on Sorcery (*yaoshu* 妖書):

An official, intending to plot treason, has been trying to win all the people’s hearts. For that purpose, he wrote and distributed books on sorcery and spread, through heretical teachings, his followers over the capital and provinces. Such an act is indeed treasonable.

I fear that serious incidents will happen soon.\(^5\)

The crimes committed by Tang Ruowang 湯若望 and Li Zubai 李祖白 correspond to the two offences in the Great Qing Code: Plotting Treason (*moupan*) and Writing Books on Sorcery (*yaoshu*).\(^7\)

According to *Da Qing lü jijie fuli* 大淸律集解附例 [Statutes of the Great Qing with Collected Commentaries and Appended Sub-statutes],\(^8\) the official code of law during the Calendar

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\(^5\) BDY, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*, 5. Its Manchu translation in the Manchu Secret Documents is almost the same: ‘tušan i hafan i gurun ci ubašaki seme, fangga bithe arafi ulame, geren be hülimbume, miosihon tacihiyan i hoki be ging hecen, geren golo de selgiyefi, abkai fejergi niyalmai mujilen be dorgideri falifi, fudarara araban toktohobi,, badarara be jobošoci acambi.’

\(^6\) Adam Schall’s Chinese name.

\(^7\) BDY, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*, 6. This dissertation mainly uses Chen Zhanshan’s annotated edition written in simplified characters. For citation, however, I consulted the edition in traditional characters from *Tianzhujiao Dongchuan wenxian xubian* (TDWX).

\(^8\) QSK-SZA/3/24[yichou]; DQLJF, *juan shou*, ‘Yuzhi Da Qing lü xu’ (KX3/5), 2a-2b. *Da Qing lü jijie fuli* was the first official code of law in Qing history. Its statutes closely followed those of *Da Ming lü*, while its sub-statutes followed the Wanli edition of *Wenxing tiaoli* [The Regulations for Criminal
Case,9 those convicted of moupan and zao yaoshu (or more precisely, zao yaoshu yaoyan 造妖書妖言 [Writing Books on Sorcery or Speaking about Sorcery]) crimes were to be sentenced to beheading (zhan 斬) and suspended beheading (zhan jianhou 斬監候),10 respectively.

Yang elaborated on those two charges:

Y-I-a Jesus, whom Schall von Bell follows, was the leader of traitors and was executed on the charge of plotting rebellion.

Y-I-b Schall von Bell entered Beijing not in a legitimate way but in an illegal way.


Y-I-d Schall von Bell’s followers have been building thirty churches in key cities around the country and have resided in those cities.

Y-I-e More than 10,000 of Schall von Bell’s followers have inhabited Macao as their den and, being connected with maritime forces, have freely been crossing the border between Macao and China proper.

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9 Although the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th years of the Shunzhi reign have each been proposed as the proclamation date for the Da Qing lü jijie fuli (Shunzhi sannian zou ding lü) in Yang Yifan and Tian Tao, eds., Zhongguo zhenxi falü dianji xubian, vol. 5, 1-5), relevant accounts in Qing shilu make it highly likely that the Qing state compiled Da Qing lü jijie fuli in the Shunzhi 3rd year and proclaimed it the following year.

10 According to a decision in the Shunzhi 2nd year, anyone convicted of Zao yaoshu yaoyan was granted delayed execution. DQLJF, juan shou, Da Qing lü fu, zhenfan sizui [jianhou zaishen zou jue], zhanxing [jianshou], xinglü, 6a.
Y-I-f Schall von Bell, residing inside the Palace, has been leaking secrets of the Qing court to the enemy.

Y-I-g Schall von Bell and his followers wrote ‘following the Xiyang new methods’ in the Qing Calendar as if the Qing Empire were in the control of a Xiyang country (or countries).\^{11}

These seven accusations can be grouped into two types: those targeted at ‘the Xiyang teachings’ (Y-I-a and Y-I-c); and those targeted at ‘Xiyang people and their followers’ (Y-I-b, Y-I-d, Y-I-e, Y-I-f, and Y-I-g). Yang regarded the former and the latter types as corresponding to the crime of Writing Books on Sorcery or Speaking about Sorcery (\textit{zao yaoshu yaoyan}) and the crime of Plotting Treason (\textit{moupan}), respectively.

Yang also submitted other materials as attachments to Y-I: 

\textit{Xiejiao tushuo} 邪教圖說 [Illustrated Explanation of the Heretical Teachings] (\textit{hereafter Y-II}), which contains pictures about Jesus’s sufferings and Yang’s explanation of them; a letter written to Xu Zhijian 許之漸 on the twentieth of April 1664 (KX3/3/25) (\textit{hereafter Y-III}); the original draft of the petition of ‘Straightening the Country’s Essence’ (\textit{Zheng guoti cheng 正國體呈}), which Yang had submitted to the Ministry of Rites on the third of January 1661 (SZ17/12/3) (\textit{hereafter Y-IV}); and some supporting materials for his accusations, such as \textit{Tianxue chuangai} and the Calendar of the Shunzhi 8\textsuperscript{th} year.

An analysis of those three documents (Y-II, Y-III, and Y-IV) follows, focusing on the noteworthy charges raised in them.\^{12} First, Y-II contained Yang’s explanation of three pictures

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} BDY, \textit{Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang}, 5-6. 
\textsuperscript{12} All other charges are listed in Appendix 1.}
of Jesus’s sufferings, which had originally been in *Jincheng shu xiang* [Images in a Booklet Presented to His Majesty] (1640).\(^\text{13}\) Y-II’s focus is to prove that the Heavenly Lord, Jesus, was the leader of traitors to Judea.\(^\text{14}\)

Second, the following noticeable criticisms are included in Y-III:

Y-III-a Schall von Bell and his followers argue that the first human was created by the Heavenly Lord and was the ancestor of all sovereigns and subjects in the world. Such an argument makes their lord and fathers descendants of the heretical teachings. Therefore, they should be beheaded (*zhan*) and be cut into pieces (*cunzhan* 寸斬).

Y-III-b That Li Zubai obtained a history book of Judea written in Chinese means Li has already betrayed his own country and has been serving Judea.

Y-III-c Their chest should be split (*bi pou Zubai zhi xiong* 必剖祖白之胸), their flesh should be chewed (*dan Zubai zhi rou* 咀祖白之肉), and their skin should be made into a mat for a bed (*qin Zubai zhi pi* 寝祖白之皮), because they say that all ancient saints’ teachings came from these heretical teachings.

Y-III-d They have been describing the Shunzhi emperor as a seeker or a proponent of Christianity. Describing the emperor in this way is the same as resisting the sovereign (*yichen kangjun* 以臣抗君), expressly betraying their own country (*mingbei benguo*, 明背本國), and expressly serving a foreign country (*mingcong taguo* 明從他國).

Y-III-e Jesus’s teachings are *de facto* the same as heretical teachings, such as Bailian 白蓮 or Wenxiang 聞香 teachings.

\(^{13}\) On the eighth of September 1640 (CZ13/7/23), Adam Schall presented some translated excerpts from Western books with Christian pictures to the Chongzhen emperor. Those excerpts and pictures were compiled into a booklet entitled *Jincheng shu xiang* on the fourteenth of November 1640 (CZ13/10/2). See Johann Adam Schall von Bell, *Jincheng shu xiang*.

\(^{14}\) BDY, *Xiejiao santu shuoping*, 30, 34.
Y-III-f Thirty churches have been built in key cities around the whole country, and Xiyang people have resided in the cities.

Y-III-g Macao has become a big city inhabited by more than 10,000 Xiyang people.

Y-III-h Their intention to write ‘Following the Xiyang new methods’ on the cover of the Qing Calendar is to claim that the Qing Empire is under the authority of the Xiyang country(or countries).15

These accusations in Y-III, like those in Y-I, can also be grouped into two types, against ‘the Xiyang teachings’ (Y-III-a, Y-III-c, and Y-III-e) and Xiyang people and their followers (Y-III-b, Y-III-d, Y-III-f, Y-III-g, and Y-III-h), and each corresponds to the charge of Writing Books on Sorcery or Speaking about Sorcery and that of Plotting Treason. The one further accusation that can be added to those two charges is of Plotting Rebellion and High Treason (moufan dani 謀反大逆), especially High Treason. Although the expression ‘cunzhan’ (to cut into pieces) (Y-III-a) sounds merely rhetorical, it is reminiscent of Death by Slicing (lingchi chusi 凌遲處死), which was the penalty for the crime of Plotting Rebellion and High Treason. Indeed, Yang thinks that the Christian apologetic texts contain words which resist and despise the Qing sovereign (Y-III-a and Y-III-d).16

15 BDY, Yu Xu Qingyu shiyu shu, 7-16.
16 DQLJF, juan 18, xingbu, zeidao, moufan dani, 1a. Both Da Minglü and Da Qinglü contain articles on mou dani (in mingli lü’s shi’e category) and mou fan dani (in xinglü’s zeidao category). Still, Da Qinglü clarifies in parentheses the meaning of dani, in particular, as ‘a crime against the monarch’. Although some argue that the implications of mou fan and mou dani initially differed from each other, those two crimes were commonly referred to in a single phrase as ‘mou fan dani’, at least during the late imperial period. See Lü Li, ‘Han “moufan”, “dani”, “dani budao” bianxi’, 192; Ru Guojian, Yao Rongtao, and Wang Zhiqiang, eds., Zhongguo fazhi shi, 324; Shen Jiaben, Hanlü zhiyi, juan 3, zeilü 1, dani wudao, 1414; The Great Qing Code, 237. Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, statutes (lü) and sub-statutes (li例) of the Ming period are cited from DMLH. In DMLH, statutes are from Da Minglü fuli (30 vols.) which Shu Hua 舒化, the then Minister of War, presented to the throne in the 9th month of the Wanli 13th year, and sub-statutes are compiled according to Huang’s analysis of wenxing tiaoli 間刑條例 from the Hongzhi 13th year to the Chongzhen years.
Thirdly, Y-IV makes an issue of Xiyang calendrical methods. Yang’s attack aims mainly at the phrase in the Qing Calendar, ‘Following the Xiyang new methods’, which sounds like the Qing Empire is subject to a Xiyang country (or countries)’s influence (Y-IV-a). He also points out the contradiction between the Xiyang calendrical methods and traditional Chinese methods in estimating twelve nodal qi (jieqi 節氣) and intercalary months (runyue 閏月) (Y-IV-b). Although its contents are focused on calendrical methods, Y-IV’s main reasoning is, however, like Y-I and Y-III, still based on the two types of accusations—against ‘the Xiyang teachings’ (Y-IV-c and Y-IV-d) and ‘Xiyang people and their followers’ (Y-IV-a and Y-IV-e). One noticeable difference is that Y-IV employs the word zuodao 左道 (in YIV-c), which means heterodox teachings. This word would have reminded Yang’s contemporaries of the article in the Great Qing Code, the Prohibition Concerning Sorcerers and Sorceress (Jinzhi shiwu xieshu 禁止師巫邪術).18

The Documents Submitted during Interrogation

During interrogation, Yang also submitted other additional documents.19 In chronological order, they included: Zhai miu shi lun 摘謬十論 [Argument of Quotations of Ten Fallacies] (hereafter Y-1); Xuanze yi 選議 [Discussion on Hemerology] (hereafter Y-2); Zhongxing shuo 中星說 [Explanation of the Centred Star] (hereafter Y-3); the petition submitted to the

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17 BDY, Zheng guoti cheng gao, 35-38.
18 DQLJF, juan 11, 5a-5b.
19 Those materials are found throughout the Manchu Secret Documents, although especially in CXCMDY, 9, 22, 24, 27, 30, 54, 67, 105-7.
Ministry of Rites in 1659 (SZ16/5) (*hereafter Y-4*); *Pixie lun* [On Refuting Heresy] (*hereafter Y-5*); the petition submitted to the Office of Transmission in 1660 (SZ17/5) (*hereafter Y-6*); and *Shixin lu* 始信錄 [Record that Makes People Believe], which was compiled in 1660 (SZ17/11) (*hereafter Y-7*). Of these, *Y-4* and *Y-7* can be ruled out from the following analysis because *Y-4* simply introduces *Y-1* and *Y-2*, and *Y-7* is merely a compilation of Yang’s previous work (i.e. *Y-3* and *Y-5*, and his late Ming memorials). Thus, the contents of the remaining materials (*Y-1*, *Y-2*, *Y-3*, *Y-5*, and *Y-6*) can be grouped into those devoted to calendrical calculation (*Y-1*, *Y-2*, and *Y-3*); one on Christian doctrine (*Y-5*); and one on the phrase ‘Following the Xiyang new methods’ in the Qing Calendar (*Y-6*). When we leave out technical issues relating to the calendrical calculation from the contents of those five, the remaining accusations can be summarised as follows:

*Y-1-a* The reason they prepared the calendar only to cover two hundred years was that they wished the Qing Empire a short life.²³

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²⁰ *Y-4* is not included in *Budeyi*. According to the Manchu Secret Documents, Yang urged the emperor in this petition to read Yang’s two booklets attached to the petition, *Zhai miu shi lun* and *Xuanze yi*, so as to become aware of the serious problems with the Xiyang calendrical method. Although Yang initially argued in the petition that he had already pointed out the issue of ‘yi Xiyang xinfa’ on the almanac, after further interrogation, he acknowledged his lapse of memory and confessed he did not address the phrase in the petition. See QCXCMDY, 22, 24, 67, 96.

²¹ Yang compiled *Pixie lun*, *Zhongxing shuo*, and his late Ming memorials, including *Zun Shengxue shu*, into a book entitled *Shixin lu* in late 1660. *Shixin lu* is unfortunately not extant. Although its preface is in his nephew’s (Wang Taizheng) name, the interrogation during the Calendar Case revealed that its actual author was Yang himself. See QCXCMDY, 26-28; Huang, ‘Yang Guangxian zhushu lunlue’, 14.

²² *Y-6* is not included in *Budeyi*. According to The Manchu Secret Documents, Yang criticised ‘yi Xiyang xinfa’ on the almanac in this petition. The petition included a sentence, ‘These five characters of “yi Xiyang Xinfa” mean that [our Qing Empire] follows [Xiyang] countries’ calendar. This is to deceive the emperor and expresses disdain for our Dynasty, and thus a grave crime.’ See QCXCMDY, 24.

²³ BDY, *Zhai miu shi lun*, 46.
Y-2-a With evil intentions, they selected an inauspicious tomb direction and burial time.²⁴

Y-3-a Succession to the Way (daotong 道統) was interrupted by the Xiyang new methods, and this serious situation corresponds to what the Wangzhi 王制 section of the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記) described, ‘Those who give false reports about spirits, dates, and divination so as to bewilder the multitudes are put to death.’²⁵

Y-5-a Jesus was the executed leader of traitors.²⁶

Y-5-b Christianity is sorcerous (yao 妖) and heretical (xie 邪) teachings.²⁷

Y-5-c The Christian teachings disregard the Heaven, the Earth, the ruler, the father, and the teacher because they regard the Heaven, who is the father of the emperor, as lowly as something the Supreme Emperor (Shangdi 上帝) lightly manages and also because they let Christians throw away the tablets for the Heaven, the Earth, the ruler, the father, and the teacher.²⁸

Y-5-d The Xiyang people are engaged in espionage because they reside across the Qing Empire and frequently cross the boundaries.²⁹

Y-5-e During the Ming period, Ricci let the Xiyang people into China, leading them to occupy and fortify Macao.³⁰

²⁴ BDY, Xuanze yi, 42.
²⁵ BDY, Zhongxing shuo, 39-40; QCXCMDY, 102.
²⁶ BDY, Pixie lun shang, 16, 20-21; Pixie lun xia, 27; Xiejiao santu shuoping, 30-34.
²⁷ BDY, Pixie lun shang, 21-22; Pixie lun xia, 28.
²⁸ BDY, Pixie lun zhong, 15.
²⁹ BDY, Pixie lun xia, 27-29.
³⁰ BDY, Pixie lun xia, 29.
Y-5-f and Y-6-a Their intention in writing ‘Following the Xiyang new methods’ in the Qing Calendar cover is to claim that the Qing Empire has obeyed the Xiyang Calendar. Hence, they are guilty of deceiving the sovereign and despising the government.  

All the Charges during the Calendar Case (Appendix 1)

From the analysis of all the specific charges raised during the Calendar Case, we can derive the following four conclusions. First, categorising all the charges Yang submitted to the Qing authorities, we can extract nineteen types of charges, excluding technical ones relating to specific calendrical calculation. Second, these nineteen charges can then be grouped into three umbrella categories: (1) the charges against ‘the Xiyang teachings’, (2) the charges against ‘Xiyang people and Christians’, and (3) the charges against ‘the selection of an inauspicious tomb direction and burial time for Prince Rong’. Thirdly, all the relevant legal provisions that Yang quoted can be listed, by gravity of punishment, as (i) Plotting Rebellion and High Treason, (ii) Plotting Treason, (iii) Writing Books on Sorcery or Speaking about Sorcery, and (iv) Prohibition Concerning Sorcerers and Sorceresses, and according to Da Qing lü jijie fuli, all of Yang’s quotes are from statutes, not from sub-statutes.

31 QCXCMDY, 24; BDY, Pixie lun xia, 28.
32 The Qing officials were not likely to consult the first and third volumes of Pixie lun. This can be deduced because the Manchu Secret Documents do not mention them, even though those two volumes contained sensitive accusations, such as that Xiyang people despised the Heaven who is the Father of the Heavenly Son (Tianzi 天子), and that Xiyang people attempted to fortify Macao during the Ming period (QCXCMDY, 27). If this assumption is correct, we can leave some accusations (Y5-a, Y5-b, Y5-c, Y5-d, Y5-e, and Y5-f) out of the table in Appendix 1. This does not influence the above three types of accusation (1, 2, and 3) or the related four articles (i, ii, iii, and iv) of the Qing Code, however.
Verdicts

While the previous section primarily analysed the accusations from the accuser’s perspective, we will now, in this current section, turn our eyes to the other side, the side who had to listen to and judge those accusations. Hence, the primary questions that this section attempts to answer are, ‘Which accusations did the Qing authorities regard as worth investigating?’ and ‘How did they respond to those accusations?’.

The Issues Accepted For Investigation

On the twenty-fourth of September, nine days after Yang submitted Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang (Y-I), the Qing centre secretly initiated an investigation of Schall von Bell. The next day, the official interrogation began. At the same time, as soon as they grasped the situation, Beijing’s Christian community also started their counterattack. For example, on the tenth of October (KX3/8/21), Xu Qian 許謙, a Christian eunuch, brought a countersuit against Yang Guangxian, alleging that Yang had criticised the Qing Dynasty in Shixin lu (Y-7) and was involved in illegal activities such as the publication of Ming history.33

As the interrogation progressed, the Qing state narrowed down all the issues raised to nine (Table 1). Above all, according to Y-I, they began to address the questions of (A) whether the Christian teachings are heretical; (B) whether Xiyang people and Christians are treasonous; (C) whether churches and Xiyang residents are spread throughout the country as Tianxue chuan gai describes; (D) whether Chinese officials, including Tong Guoqi 佟國器 and Xu Zuanzeng 許紹曾, built churches; (E) whether Yang has done anti-Qing activities as Xu Qian’s

33 QCXCMDY, 25.
accusations against him. After receiving Y-IV and Y-1, the officials recognised another issue, (F) whether the Xiyang new method contradicts the traditional Chinese calendrical one. When they read Y-4, the Qing officials also started to deal with hemerological issues (G and H) because Y-4 referred to Y-2, which mainly concerned hemerological accusations regarding Prince Rong’s burial. 34 Meanwhile, the Qing authorities also investigated (I) whether and why the officials (at the Ministry of Rites, the Office of Transmission, and the Office of Scrutiny for Rites) had not previously accepted Yang’s petitions.

Table 1: Issues addressed by the Qing state during the Calendar Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcase</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Heretical Teaching Case</td>
<td>A. Whether Christian teachings are heretical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Whether Xiyang people and Christians are treasonous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. The actual conditions of churches and Xiyang people’s residency across the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Whether Chinese officials, including Tong Guoqi and Xu Zuanzeng, participated in the construction of churches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Investigation of Yang’s alleged anti-Manchu attitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Old-New Methods Conflict Case</td>
<td>F. Which calendrical method is superior: the Xiyang new method or the traditional one?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Prince Rong’s Burial Case</td>
<td>G. Whether the tomb direction for Prince Rong’s funeral is inauspicious.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 The first mention of this in the Manchu Secret Documents is found in the Ministry of Rites’ memorial on the twenty-first of December 1664 (KX3/11/5). See QCXCMDY, 68.
A Guideline Memorial for the Heretical Teaching Case (Subcase 1) and the Old-New Methods Conflict Case (Subcase 2)

To review these issues, excluding G and H, it is necessary to examine the memorial that the Ministry of Rites and the Ministry of Personnel submitted on the twenty-seventh of December (KX3/11/11). That is because this memorial would serve as a guideline for future investigations.

First, both Ministries investigated Issues A, B, C, and D and, acknowledging the allegations in Y-I, denounced Christian teachings as heretical (Ma. miosihon). Thus, they decided to transfer to the Minister of Justice eight people involved in writing and distributing Tianxue chuangai. These eight included a group of officials (Schall von Bell, Li Zubai, Xu Zhijian, and Pan Jinxiao 潘盡孝) and a group who were not officials (Ferdinand Verbiest, Gabriel de Magalhães, Ludovico Buglio, and Xu Qian). In the case of the former group, they

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35 The following analysis of this memorial is based on QCXCMKY, 8-37. According to Xiyang sources, the Ministry of Rites read this memorial’s contents to the missionaries on the twenty-seventh of December. See Väth, *Johann Adam Schall von Bell*, 304-05.

36 By the time of the memorial issued by the two Ministries on the thirtieth of November and the following rescript, the Qing state had decided to sentence only those who had already been summoned, rather than to conduct a countrywide search for those who had received Li’s *Tianxue chuangai* or Yang’s *Shixin lu* or had converted to Christianity. See QCXCMKY, 28.
were first stripped of their government posts before they were transferred to the Ministry of Justice—Xiyang sources record that Xu Zhijian was dismissed from his post but did not undergo interrogation by the Ministry of Justice. Then, the Ministries removed the images of Jesus in the West Church (Xitang 西堂). In the other churches, including those in the provinces, the officials decided to demolish these images and, at the same time, the church buildings themselves. The government also collected and burnt Christian items across the country, including Christian books and the printing woodblocks for *Tianxue chuangai*. In the meantime, Tong Guoqi and Xu Zuanzeng, whom *Tianxue chuangai* described as Chinese patrons, were ordered to be arrested and transferred to Beijing. In addition, in relation to the Macao-related accusations, both Ministries asked the Guangdong provincial officials for more information (See The Remaining Issues).

Subsequently, the two Ministries examined Issue F. The Ministries, above all, removed culpable officials from their government posts, who were named during the interrogation: 1) Zhou Yin 周胤 (Left Vice-Director of the Directorate of Astronomy, *zuo jianfu* 左监副); 2) Song Kecheng 宋可成 (Director of the Spring Office, *chunguan zheng* 春官正); 3) Liu Youtai

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37 QCXCMDY, 35.
39 In respect to the churches in Beijing, the Qing state decided to demolish the East Church (*Dongtang*), in which Buglio and Magalhães had resided, and the one located outside the Fucheng Gate. Although Tongji had originally bought the missionaries the building for the East Church by imperial order, the building at the time of the Calendar Case was one the missionaries had subsequently rebuilt. The ‘one located outside the Fucheng Gate’ seems to have been ‘Shengmu tang 聖母堂’ that Adam Schall had built inside the *Tenggong zhahan* 膳公柵欄 (The Fenced Area of Mr Teng) cemetery. See QCXCMDY, 36; ‘Shengmu tang bei’ (*jing* 京 1884), *qianmian* 前面 in BTST, vol. 61, 155.
40 On the thirtieth of November, the two Ministries requested the transport of Tong Guoqi and Xu Zuanzeng to Beijing, which the Qing centre approved the same day. See QCXCMDY, 28-29.
劉有泰 (Director of the Mid-year Office, zhongguan zheng 中官正); 4) Song Fa 宋發 (Director of the Autumn Office, qiuguan zheng 秋官正); 5) Zhu Guangxian 朱光顯 (Director of the Winter Office, dongguan zheng 冬官正); 6) Yin Kai 尹凱 (Director of Calendrical Calculations in the Five Offices, wuguan baozhang zheng 五官保章正); and 7) Zhang Wenming 張文明 (wuguan baozhang zheng). 41 On whether to intercalate the Shunzhi eighteenth year, the issue raised in Y-IV, the two Ministries decided not to investigate further because the government was now using the Xiyang new method. The ten fallacies, raised in Y-1, were deferred until they could be addressed in a separate memorial at a subsequent date.

Then, regarding Issue I, the two Ministries suggested overlooking the possible guilt for the officials involved because an Amnesty (enshe 恩赦), proclaimed on the seventh of February 1661 (SZ18/1/9), covered the times of occurrence. The officials involved were those who had not accepted Y-6 and Y-IV in 1660 and 1661, respectively, and included the then Transmission Commissioner (Tongzhengshi 通政使) and the then Left Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Rites (Like zuo geishizhong 禮科左給事中).

Lastly, in respect to Issue E, although the two Ministries exculpated Yang Guangxian from Xu Qian’s allegation that the former had shown anti-Manchu attitudes, they nonetheless decided to send him to the Ministry of Justice for the following five reasons:

(1) Yang’s accusations against Schall von Bell and Li Zubai, for Plotting Treason and High Treason, respectively, turned out to be far-fetched;

(2) He had overstated his exploits when claiming in the preface of Shixin lu that ‘the Ming Dynasty had wanted to appoint him General-in-Chief’ and that ‘his name was

41 After dismissing them from their posts, the Ministry of Rites continued to interrogate them about issues F, G and H.
recorded in history after he impeached Wen Tiren 溫體仁 during the late Ming period';

(3) He himself wrote the preface of *Shixin lu* even though it was published under the name of Wang Taizheng 王泰徵;

(4) He did not return to the Office of Transmission despite their permission to do so after rejecting his petition (Y-IV);

(5) He had distributed 5,000 copies of *Shixin lu* to locals.

The Qing centre responded to these results of the two Ministries’ investigation on the fourth of January 1665 (KX3/11/19), as follows:

(a) Yang should not be sent to the Ministry of Justice because, as per Yang’s accusation, the Christian teachings were heretical;

(b) When summoning Xiyang missionaries from the provinces to Beijing, officials should not arrest them as criminals (*jafambi*) but just escort (*gaimbi*) them to the capital;\(^{42}\)

(c) The removal of images of Jesus and the destruction of churches should be suspended temporarily and be revisited after the closure of Subcase 1.\(^{43}\)

And thus, following this instruction, the two Ministries handed the seven offenders (Schall von Bell, Ferdinand Verbiest, Li Zubai, Pan Jinxiao, Gabriel de Magalhães, Ludovico Buglio, and

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\(^{42}\) QCXCMGY, 258. For the original text, see ‘Qingdai Neige bibendang’, ‘golo de bisire, si yang ni bai niyalma be jafara be guwebufi, gijing hecen de gajifi gisurefi wasimbu’ (See Figure 11). This is also corroborated in Xiyang sources. See Väth, *Johann Adam Schall von Bell*, 306.

\(^{43}\) QCXCMGY, 37.
Xu Qian) over to the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, the two Ministries asked the concerned officials, for example, the Ministry of War and the Governor-general Lu Chongjun, respectively, to escort Xiyang missionaries from the provinces to Beijing and to provide more information on the Xiyang people in Macao.44

The Ministry of Justice concluded that the seven offenders committed ‘plotting to establish heretical teachings’ and ‘deluding multitudes by writing a new book’. The Ministry decided the penalties for those seven based on the article on the Prohibition Concerning Sorcerers and Sorceress (Zao yaoshu yaoyan). As laid down in the statute (lüwen 律文) of Zao yaoshu yaoyan, Schall von Bell, as the principal, was sentenced to ‘strangulation without delay’ (Ch. ljjiao 立絞, Ma. tatame wambi),45 and the remaining six, as accessories, were sentenced to ‘one hundred strokes of heavy bamboo and exile to 3000 li’.

However, when it comes to the penalties for those accessories, several things needed to be considered. First, those to be exiled, following the practice at that time, were to be sent to Ningguta in the extreme northeast (liuxi 流徙)46 after having received forty strokes (the

44 QCXCMDY, 37-40. The official letter from the two Ministries letter reached the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Justice on the fifth of January 1665 (KX3/11/20), and the Guangdong officials on the twenty-third of February (KX4/1/9).
45 Gimm, Der Fall Prinz Rong, 21. Xiyang sources also provide evidence that the sentence imposed on Adam Schall was strangulation (Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 306-07). However, according to the Shunzhi edition of Qing lü jijie fuli, the main culprit who violated the Jinzhi shiwu xieshu statute should be sentenced to ‘strangulation with delay (jiao jianhou 絞監候)’. On the other hand, according to QCXCMDY, 273, another memorial from the Minister of Justice records that Adam Schall was sentenced to death by slicing (lingchi chusi 凌遲處死). It is uncertain whether this disparity resulted from An’s misinterpretation or from errors in the original text.
46 Liuxi 流徙 was a form of exile during the early Qing period. Someone sentenced to liuxi was sent to a specific location regardless of the distance involved (lishu 里數). In this regard, liuxi was an early form of the later faqian 發遣. Until the early Qianlong period, the principal destination for liuxi was the northeast area of China. See Wang Yunhong, ‘Qing chu liuxi Dongbei kao’, 10-12.
practical conversion of one hundred strokes). Second, although, in principle, officials such as Li and Pan were eligible for ‘redemption’ (shoushu 收贖), this was not allowed on this occasion because the Qing authorities regarded the case as more severe than usual. Third, Xu received one further penalty because the Qing state rebutted his allegation about Yang’s anti-Manchuism. Under the Great Qing Code, this further penalty was applicable under the provision that ‘the sentence has not yet been executed although one falsely accuses another of a charge on which the latter is to be sentenced to death’.

Fourth, Xu’s penalties were to be converted according to the special provisions for bannermen, because he was a bannerman. Xu originally belonged to the Chahar Mongols but, during the Calendar Case, was regarded as a Manchu bannerman because his master was temporarily working for the Hircaci niru of the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner.

After receiving the Ministry of Justice’s report containing all these details, the Qing centre ordered the Three Judicial Offices (san fansi 三法司), which consisted of the Ministry of Justice, the Censorate, and the Court of Judicial Review, to review the Ministry’s report.

Meanwhile, Xu Zuanzeng and Tong Guoqi were sent to Beijing for interrogation (in respect to Issue D). Xu Zuanzeng, the then Provincial Surveillance Commissioner (anchashi 按察使) of Henan Province, reached Beijing on the fourth of January 1665 (KX3/11/19). According to Xu’s statement, he had once been baptised under the influence of Xu Guangqi 徐光啟, his grandfather on his mother’s side. He stated, however, that he had abandoned his

47 DQLJF, juan 1, 1a.
48 DQLJF, juan 22, 7b.
49 QCXCMDY, 40-41, 44-45. Xu Qian had become a Chahar Mongol slave under his current master, Bodi’s, father (Dorji Darhan). At the time of the Calendar Case, Xu was selling tobacco for a living outside the Xuanwu 宣武 Gate and visited Bodi once or twice a year. An Shuangcheng’s transcription into ‘Xu Qian 徐謙’ is wrong. See BDY, Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang, 6-7.
Christian faith when he received his shengyuan degree at seventeen. He also proffered the defence that, during his term in office at the Sichuan Province, he had given fifty silver taels to Xiyang missionaries on philanthropic grounds, not to build a church. Tong Guoqi, who was by then retired and living in Jiangnan, reached Beijing on the tenth of March (KX4/1/24). Like Xu, his defence was also that the twenty silver taels he had given to Xiyang missionaries during his term of office in Fujian Province were alms to poor clerics. In the end, Both Xu and Tong were transferred to the Ministry of Justice.  

Prince Rong’s Burial Case (Subcase 3)

While the Qing authorities examined Subcases 1 and 2, they also scrutinised Subcase 3, which concerned Prince Rong’s burial (Issues G and H). For example, on the twenty-first of December 1664 (KX3/11/5), the Ministry of Rites asked for the Ministry of Personnel’s cooperation in addressing these issues, and in response, the Qing centre approved it. The critical questions regarding the Subcase 3 were, ‘who selected the burial date and time?’; ‘whether Schall von Bell participated in that selecting process?’; ‘whether the Hongfan doctrine of the five elements (Hongfan wuxing) had serious faults?’; and ‘if any, whether officials of the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy were aware of these?’.

After interrogating all the suspects who allegedly participated in the project to select the date and time of Prince Rong’s burial, the Ministry of Rites concluded that Schall von Bell, Du Ruyu, Yang Hongliang, Li Zubai, Song Kecheng, Zhu Guangxian, Song Fa, Liu Youtai, Liu Yuqing, and Jia Liangqi were responsible for the incorrect selection. All

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50 Although the Manchu Secret Documents do not go on to recount the penalties imposed on Tong and Xu by the Qing authorities (QCXCMDY, 46-47, 178-80), Western sources describe how Tong’s friends bribed his way out of custody (Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 306).

51 QCXCMDY, 68.
of them, excluding Liu Youqing and Jia Liangqi, who had already died, and Schall von Bell and Li Zubai, who had already been sent to the Ministry of Justice for interrogation under Subcase 1, were to be sent to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Rites also summoned the offenders’ sons or brothers, including Liu Biyuan 刘必远 and Liu Kui 刘魁 (Liu Youqing’s sons), Jia Wenyu 贾文郁 (Jia Liangqi’s son), Song Keli 宋可立 (Song Kecheng’s younger brother), Song Zepu 宋泽溥 (Song Kecheng’s son), Li Shi 李式 (Li Zubai’s son), and Pan Jinxiao (Schall von Bell’s adopted son). With regard to the minister who had rejected Yang’s petition (Y-4) and Xuanze yi (Y-2) in 1659, the Ministry of Rites ruled for acquittal because the minister had been unaware of the contents of the petition and the booklet. Moreover, this rejection had occurred before the proclamation of the Amnesty by Grace (enshe, 1661.2.7), and thus the Amnesty pardoned the minister’s guilt. The bithesi who had criticised Yang at the office of the Ministry of Rites was also spared because the Qing authorities concluded he had not participated in the selection process.\(^5\)

Following the Ministry of Rites’ decisions above, all the offenders concerned reached the office of the Ministry of Justice on the eighth of March 1665 (KX4/1/22). The Ministry of Justice also received all the relevant documents, including Lidai tongshu 歷代通書 [The Almanac by Period], Xuanze danshu 選擇丹書 [The Red Book for Hemerology], and Yijian tongshu 易見通書 [The Easy Guide for Hemerology].\(^5\) At that time, however, the Ministry of Justice was in the middle of investigating another ongoing case (Subcase 1) and, as one of the Three Judicial Offices, was ordered to submit an opinion on it. Above all, Schall von Bell, Li

\(^5\) QCXCMDY, 67-97, 220-50.
\(^5\) QCXCMDY, 250.
Zubai, and Pan Jinxiao, all of whom were involved in that case, were simultaneously engaged in the current Prince Rong burial case. Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice asked the Qing centre whether the requested review of Subcase 1 could be postponed until a final verdict in the Price Rong case had been reached.\(^{54}\)

In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice was well aware of the gravity of the Prince Rong case. The Ministry, bearing in mind the provisions of the Plotting Rebellion and High Treason article\(^{55}\), memorialised on the twenty-fourth of March (KX4/2/8) that they would arrest the alleged offenders’ associates and seal off their residences. The Qing centre approved the Ministry’s request. On the twenty-sixth of March, the Ministry informed the Censorate of their approved request, which the Censorate swiftly delivered to the Five Censorial Offices for the City Wards (\textit{wucheng chayuan} 五城察院) in Beijing and the Governors and Governors-General of Hunan, Zhili, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces, where the offenders’ associates and residences were located.\(^{56}\) On the fourteenth of April (KX4/2/29), the Ministry concluded that this hemerological incident was a case of High Treason, and, following that conclusion, the Qing centre ordered a review thereof by the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials. This Council consisted of Nine Chief Ministers (Chief Officials of the Six Ministries; Transmission Commissioners; and Chief Officials of the Court of Judicial Review),\(^{57}\) Supervising Secretaries of the Six Offices of Scrutiny, and Investigating Censors of the Circuits.

However, one pivotal decision, another imperial amnesty (1665.4.19, KX4/3/5), reversed the situation dramatically. According to Western sources, a comet appeared on the thirteenth of November 1664 (KX3/9/26). It did not fade away until the twenty-fifth of January 1665.

\(^{54}\) QCXCMDY, 118.  
^{55}\) DQLJF, \textit{juan} 18, 1a-1b.  
^{56}\) QCXCMDY, 212-13.  
(KX3/12/16) and reappeared on the thirteenth of April (KX4/2/28). On the sixteenth, there was a big earthquake. The Qing centre acknowledged the series of natural phenomena as heavenly signs and, on the nineteenth, proclaimed an amnesty in the name of the emperor. This amnesty saved the Xiyang missionaries and Xu Qian, except Schall von Bell, who would not be pardoned until the thirtieth (KX4/3/16) after another ‘heavenly sign’, a fire at the imperial residences.58

According to the Qing shilu, meanwhile, a comet appeared on the eighteenth of November 1664 (KX3/10/1) and did not fade away until the twenty-fifth of January (KX3/12/10). At that time, Yang Yongjian 楊雍建 (1631-1704), a Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Justice, reported the natural phenomenon. The Qing centre responded to Yang Yongjian’s memorial by issuing this edict:

The constellation showed abnormal phenomena because [our] rule lacks virtue and propriety, so by reflecting on yourselves and by endeavouring to be just, respond to the Heavenly signs!59

The comet appeared again on the fifth of April (KX4/2/20) and did not disappear. In response, on the fourteenth of April, the Qing centre issued another edict to the Ministry of Personnel, to tighten discipline among officials and to present opinions for improvement.60 The earthquake on the sixteenth of April (KX4/3/2) is also identified in Qing sources.61 This context was reflected in the following edict issued on the nineteenth of April:

58 Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 304, 313-15.
59 QSL-KX3/10/1[jiwei]; KX3/10/29[dinghai]; KX3/11/10[dingyou]; KX3/11/13[gengzi]; KX3/11/19[bingwu]; KX3/12/5[renxu]; KX3/12/10[dingmao].
60 QSL-KX4/2/12[jisi]; KX4/2/28[yiyou]; KX4/2/29[bingxu]; KX4/3/3[jichou].
61 This earthquake also damaged the observatory’s simplified armilla (jianyi 簡儀) See BDY, Wu kouhun ci shu, 91.
Last year, [the Heavens] warned [us] with a stellar abnormality, and now the abnormal phenomenon has reappeared. Again, on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} day of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} month, another natural abnormality appeared in the form of an earthquake. I presume that [the Heavens] hints that a lack of propriety and uprightness in [our] rule, the poverty of people’s livelihoods, or the false accusation or penalisation of certain innocent subjects have caused this imbalance in the Heavens. [I am] afraid and only reflect on [myself]. Therefore, [I] will reform [myself] with all people under Heaven by this amnesty.\textsuperscript{62}

In the end, this imperial amnesty led not only to the discharge of Buglio, Magalhães, Verbiest, and Xu Qian, who were in custody due to Subcase 1, but also spared further interrogation the missionaries who were being escorted from the provinces to Beijing due to the same case. However, the government did not release Adam Schall, Li Zubai, and Pan Jinxiao who were also involved in the same case, because they were involved in the case of High Treason (Subcase 3) at the same time.

However, this amnesty influenced the judgement on Subcase 3 as well. For example, on the twenty-seventh of April, when the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials supported the Ministry of Justice’s verdict which had been reached on the fourteenth of April, ‘the author of the red rescripts’ rebutted the that Council’s conclusion and requested a more lenient verdict, specifically one in which Schall von Bell, Du Ruyu, and Yang Hongliang should be spared death. ‘The author of the red rescripts’ defended that Schall von Bell had performed his duties well over many years; he merely approved his subordinates’ decision due to a lack of knowledge about hemerology which was beyond his expertise, astronomy; and his old age was

\textsuperscript{62} QSL-KX4/3/5[xinmao].
taken into consideration. ‘The author of the red rescripts’ also pointed out that Du Ruyu and Yang Hongliang had successfully selected auspicious places for other imperial mausoleums like Yongling 永陵, Fuling 福陵, Zhaoling 昭陵, and Xiaoling 孝陵.⁶³

In obedience to this order, the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials put forward two further opinions on the eleventh of May (KX4/3/27)⁶⁴. One possible option was that Schall von Bell, Du, and Yang were to be exiled to Ningguta after receiving forty strokes; Li and the four offenders were to be beheaded without delay (zhán lijié 斬立決); and the offenders’ relatives and associates were to become slaves or to be exiled to Ningguta after receiving forty strokes. Another possible option was that Schall von Bell, Du, and Yang were to be exiled to Ningguta even without receiving forty strokes; Li and the four offenders were spared death; and the offenders’ relatives and associates were to be pardoned. In the end, the Qing centre’s final decision was to spare Schall von Bell, Du, Yang, and their relatives and associates not only from death but also from receiving strokes or being exiled. Interestingly, penalties were only applied to Li and the four offenders; the relatives and associates of these five; and the late Liu Youqing and the late Jia Liangqi’s relatives and associates.⁶⁵

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⁶³ QCXCMDY, 256-57, 260; QSL-KX4/3/16[renyin].
⁶⁴ Fušeo was the leader of this Council. According to Litian Swen, because Fušeo was the son of Haoge, Buglio, and Magalhães’ original master, Fušeo argued that ‘the penalty should only be applied to the five Chinese ministers’. However, according to the Manchu Secret Documents, Fušeo submitted two options, the first being to execute five Christians and the other to spare their lives. Also, Deiwiks’ article, on which Swen bases his argument, does not seem to corroborate this (Deiwiks, ‘The Secret Manchu Document’, 643, ‘Fushou with the title Prince Xian deals in his sole memorial with the death penalty for the five Chinese astronomers’). See Swen, Jesuits Mission and Submission, 71-72.
⁶⁵ QCXCMDY, 268; QSL-KX4/4/3[jiwei]. This can be deduced from the account (‘欽遵 … 入官、責打、流徙訖’ in Libu ti gao, 359-60. Xiyang sources describe how these five Christians were to be beheaded and their sons to be caned with forty strokes and sent to Manchuria for life (Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 315). That Liu Youqing’s and Jia Liangqi’s families were exiled (liuxi) is corroborated by the account (‘皇上殺欽天監五官及流徙已死劉賈二人之家屬而不赦’) in BDY, Si Kouhun ci shu, 86.
When the legal case relating to the burial of Prince Rong, i.e., Subcase 3, was closed as described above, on the twenty-ninth of May (KX4/4/15), the Ministry of Justice, as it had promised, submitted the Three Judicial Offices’ opinion on Subcase 1. Since the amnesty of the nineteenth of April had already pardoned Buglio, Magalhães, Verbiest, and Xu Qian among those involved in Subcase 1 (Schall von Bell, Li Zubai, Buglio, Magalhães, Verbiest, Xu Qian, and Pan Jinxiao), the Three Judicial Offices submitted their opinion only for the remaining three (Schall von Bell, Li Zubai, and Pan Jinxiao). The amnesty of the nineteenth of April was unable to provide a pardon for the three’s conviction of High Treason in Subcase 3, as this was too grave a crime to be covered by the amnesty. However, the Qing centre’s interventions on the twenty-seventh April and the eleventh of May pardoned them for the crime of High Treason, and thus the amnesty of the nineteenth of April could now be applied to their remaining charges. Unfortunately, this came too late for Li Zubai, since he had already been executed.66

The Old-New Methods Conflict Case (Subcase 2)

The superiority of the traditional calendrical method was the central claim in Y-IV (Straightening Country’s Essence), Y-1 (Argument of Quotations of Ten Fallacies), and Y-3 (Explanation of the Centred Star). In respect to this issue, as we saw above, the Ministry of Rites and the Ministry of Personnel had reported on the twenty-seventh of December 1664 that they should not investigate anymore whether to intercalate the Shunzhi 8th year, i.e. the issue raised in Y-IV, because the government was now already using the Xiyang new method. The Ministries had also put off any conclusions about the ten calendrical fallacies in the New Method, which were raised in Y-1, to a forthcoming memorial. Although the Qing centre at

66 QCXCMDY, 273.
first accepted the suggestion of the two Ministries, it suddenly ordered the Left and Right Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Rites on the tenth of January 1665 (KX3/11/25) to confront Yang Guangxian with Schall von Bell to investigate this issue further. According to the Ministry report of the first of February (KX33/12/17), it was ordered to confront Yang Guangxian with Schall von Bell to investigate this issue further. However, soon later, on the twenty-seventh, the Ministry memorialised that they were not able to come to any conclusion because the issue was too technical. In the same memorial, they also requested that the Qing centre order provincial officials to find calendrical experts in the provinces and send them to Beijing. The Qing centre, eventually, as with the Prince Rong burial case, decided to refer the matter to the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials.

The Council also seemed to find the issue too technical and difficult to address, however. In his memorial on the fifteenth of March (KX4/1/29), Prince Kang (Giyešu) could only give a vague answer that the hundred-ke system has been used, and the ninety-six-ke one has never been used. After being reprimanded for that vague answer, the Council presented another opinion on the twenty-fifth of March. Although the Council still found it hard to make any final judgement, it answered more definitively by pointing out the following five charges:

1. A day and night had been split based on the hundred-ke system, not the ninety-six-ke system;

2. Both Schall von Bell and Zhang Qichun 張其淳, the Acting Director of the Imperial Directorate of Astronomy, reported that ‘the air of spring (chunqi 春氣) has already arrived’ according to what they had observed one day before the Onset of Spring (lichun 立春);

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67 QCXCMDY, 51-52.
68 QCXCMDY, 66.
69 QCXCMDY, 66.
70 QCXCMDY, 117.
(3) The Xiyang new method changed the traditional order of twenty-eight xiu (constellations);

(4) The Xiyang new method removed one (Ziqi 紫氣) of the Four Imaginary Stars (siyu 四餘);

(5) Schall von Bell presented a two hundred year calendar, not a boundless calendar (Wujiang biao 無疆表), in the hope of the early downfall of the Qing Empire.

Concerning the Council’s answer, the Qing centre asked on the twenty-seventh of March how it was possible to know that ‘the air of spring had arrived’ one day before spring really arrived,\(^{71}\) and on the ninth of April (KX4/2/24), the Council replied that although Schall von Bell said observing the Onset of Spring one day earlier had been an old practice, the Council could find no mention of that practice in *Da Ming huidian* 大明會典 [The Collected Statutes of the Great Ming]. The Council then sent all the involved officials to the Ministry of Personnel to judge whether they should be removed from their government posts.\(^{72}\) At this point, however, we run once again into the amnesty of the nineteenth of April, which had already influenced Subcase 1 and Subcase 3. In light of that amnesty, on the fifteenth of May, the Ministry suggested a pardon for all involved, which was confirmed by the Ministry of Justice on the twenty-sixth (KX4/4/12). This, therefore, marked the closure of Subcase 2, regarding the superiority of the traditional calendrical method.\(^{73}\)

\(^{71}\) QCXCMDY, 140-41.
\(^{72}\) QCXCMDY, 173-74.
\(^{73}\) QCXCMDY, 269-72.
The Remaining Issues

Although the three subcases were almost closed, some issues in Subcase 1 were still ongoing, especially the investigation into ‘the actual conditions of churches and Xiyang people’s residence across the country’ (Issue C). The Ministry of Rites’ letter (1665.1) reached Canton on the twenty-third of February (KX4/1/9). In response, the Governor-general, Lu Chongjun 卢崇峻, memorialised the throne on the ninth of April (KX4/2/24), responding to the three questions in the Ministry of Rites’ letter, namely: ‘whether Xiyang people in Macao were now illegally crossing the set boundaries?’; ‘whether, for a long time, the Xiyang people of Macao had regularly paid taxes to the Qing state?’; and ‘what was the Governor-general’s opinion about the future maintenance of Xiyang residents in Macao?’.

According to Lu, although the Xiyang people in Macao had paid shipping and land taxes to the Ming and Qing states, they paid no further taxes following the haijin 海禁 (the Sea Embargo). He also pointed out that Xiyang people could not cross the set boundaries because of the Xiangshan military post (Xiangshan zhai 香山寨) and a border gate (guanzha 關閘) between Macao and China proper. Thirdly, Lu suggested that Macao’s Xiyang people be returned to their homelands or to Beijing. Although, by imperial grace, this population of 5,600 in Macao had to date been allowed to reside in Macao by relying on rice from China proper, the prolonged Sea Embargo would now mean that they would run out of money and eventually not able to afford to buy rice.

Lastly, Lu pointed out that he had previously presented a similar opinion in May 1663 (KX2/4) although it was later rejected at the ministerial level.\(^{74}\) Therefore, when the Qing centre now ordered each Ministry to review Lu’s current answer, the Ministry of War,

\(^{74}\) QCXCMDY, 175-77.
presumably the Ministry that had rejected Lu’s opinion in 1663, was first to respond to the Qing center’s order by submitting the two documents that they produced in 1663. These documents were their memorial on the seventeenth of March 1664 (KX3/2/20) and the resultant rescript on the nineteenth (KX3/2/22). According to that memorial, the Xiyang people had been resident in Macao for a long time, since the Jiajing reign of the Ming Dynasty, and they should therefore remain there. The memorial added that the Guangdong government should guarantee the Xiyang people’s subsistence by despatching Circuit Intendant(s) and providing them with rice. Subsequently, in the rescript written on the nineteenth, the Qing centre approved the Ministry of War’s requests. Regarding the Ministry of War and the Guangdong officials’s confrontation since 1663 over ‘whether to allow the Xiyang people to remain in Macao or not’, the Ministry of Rites took a median position. The Ministry of Rites returned the ball to the Ministry of War’s court by memorialising on the seventeenth of June (KX4/5/5) that the Ministry of War should resolve this issue, as they had allowed the Xiyang people to remain in Macao by rebutting the Guangdong officials’ opinion in 1664 to return them to their homelands.75

In the meantime, the Xiyang missionaries sent to Beijing by provincial officials were beginning to arrive. In late April, the Ministry of Rites received seven individuals from Shandong and Shanxi provinces, including Domingo Coronado (Guo Duomin 郭多敏, 1614-65), Antonio de Santa María Caballero (Li Andang 利安當, 1602-69), Jean Valat (Wang Ruwang 汪儒望, 1614-96), Michel Trigault (Jin Mige 金彌格, 1602-67), Christian Wolfgang Herdtrich (En Lige 恩理格, 1625-84), and two Chinese hired by Coronado. The Ministry of Rites interrogated them about ‘whether they had been invited by Schall von Bell’, ‘whether

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75 QCXCMDY, 274-76. Extant Qing documents do not provide any further concrete account of events after this, however.
they had been directed by Schall von Bell’, and ‘whether Schall von Bell had sent them Tianxue chuangai’. Although they were acquitted of the charges concerning Schall von Bell, they were convicted of the charge of ‘confusing multitudes by spreading the Xiyang teachings to them’. At this point, however, their guilt did not need to be addressed any further because the amnesty of the nineteenth of April had already pardoned it.\textsuperscript{76}

At the end of April (KX4/3/16), ‘the author of the red rescrips’ issued the following order:

On how to \textbf{raise}\textsuperscript{77} those Xiyang people after the interrogation is over, submit your opinion (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{78}

On receipt of this rescript, the Ministry of Rites answered on the seventh of May (KX4/4/3) that, except Coronado, who had died, the others would be provided with food every day, and they would reside with Buglio for a while. Furthermore, on how to \textit{raise} the Xiyang people as a whole, the Ministry promised to submit another opinion after all the Xiyang missionaries had reached Beijing. This answer was approved by the Qing centre on the nineteenth of May (KX4/4/5).\textsuperscript{79} When twenty-five individuals from all but four provinces had reached Beijing around the eighth of September (KX4/7/29), the Ministry, as they promised, came up with a blueprint for managing the Xiyang people henceforth:

Now [in Beijing], there are twenty-five Xiyang individuals, including Li Andang (Caballero). If they are \textbf{raised} here, we are afraid that this proliferation of the heretical teachings will happen again after a long time. Thus, we think that these Xiyang

\textsuperscript{76} QCXCMDY, 258-60.
\textsuperscript{77} It is no clear which Manchu vocabulary An Shuangcheng translated into ‘\textit{huanyang} 蒙善’, but I presume that it was ‘\textit{ujimbi}’, which is often translated into ‘to raise’ or ‘to capture’.
\textsuperscript{78} QCXCMDY, 260.
\textsuperscript{79} This approval was delivered to the missionaries on the twenty-first of May. After that those missionaries who had already reached Beijing resided with Buglio, Magalhães, and Verbiest at the East Church. Although the Qing state provided them with food, the Jesuits also had to supplement this at their own expense, because the food was not enough. See Väth, \textit{Johann Adam Schall von Bell}, 318.
individuals should also be sent to Guangdong Province so that the Governor-general will ensure that they settle down as other members of the Xiyang people have done (emphasis mine).

The Qing centre, however, revised the Ministry’s opinion. Schall von Bell, Buglio, Magalhães, and Verbiest were allowed to remain in Beijing, but under the Ministry’s close watch. The others, however, as in the Ministry’s opinion, were to be sent to Canton, to be monitored by the Guangdong Governor and Governor-general lest they spread Christian teachings once again. It was on this basis that the missionaries, excluding Schall von Bell, Buglio, Magalhães, and Verbiest, were sent to Canton on the thirteenth of September.

The Historical Significance of the Calendar Case

Through the preceding two sections, mainly using narhāšaha bīthe dangse, we have thus far analysed the specific charges Yang Guangxian lodged against Xiyang people and Christians; the legal grounds on which he based those charges; and the Qing state’s response. Founded on the analysis above, this present section seeks to discuss the historical significance of the Calendar Case in terms the legal peculiarities in the process of it; the early Qing state’s particular judicial aspects; the consistency of their policies towards Xiyang people; the Han elite’s ethnic sentiments; and the delivery of the Xiyang-related knowledge between the late-Ming and the early-Qing.

80 QCXCMDY, 277-80.
81 Väth, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 319.
The Legal Peculiarities of the Calendar Case

One of the legal peculiarities of the Calendar Case is that, regarding the Subcase 1, from the early stage of the investigation the Qing state did not acknowledge the two most serious charges, Plotting Treason (*moupan*) and High Treason (*dani* 大逆), which Yang had lodged in his Y-I (Petition of Exterminating Heretical Teachings) against Adam Schall’s side. For instance, in the memorial of the Ministry of Rites and the Ministry of Personnel on the twenty-seventh of December of 1664, the two Ministries regarded those two charges as farfetched. Although looking as if taking sides with Yang by preventing him from being transferred to the Ministry of Justice, the *last arbiter* during the Calendar Case—who left red rescripts in the Manchu Secret Documents—as well concluded that those charges as groundless. We also observed the Qing state’s same position in the conclusion reached by the Ministry of Justice in mid-January of 1665.82

In fact, the Qing legal authorities had already ruled out those charges before receiving the investigation results about provincial and Macao Xiyang people although those two serious charges were based on Yang Guangxian’s argument against provincial and Macao Xiyang people. The Guangdong officials’ answer (to the Ministry of Rites’ questions) about Macao Xiyang people reached Beijing in late May (KX4/4/6), far after the dates of all the relevant conclusions as examined above: a) the twenty-seventh of December 1664 (of the Ministries of Rites and Personnel’s); b) the fourth of January 1665 (of the red rescript’s); c) mid-January (the Ministry of Justice’s); d) the eighth of March (when the Three Judicial Offices was about to submit their conclusion); and e) the ninth of May (when the Ministry of Rites regarded the first subcase as closed and thus submitted their opinion on Xiyang churches and the images of

82 QCXCMDY, 35-37, 44.
Jesus in them). Likewise, all those dates, excluding the Ministry of Rites’ final report (e), preceded the first group of provincial Xiyang missionaries reaching Beijing for interrogation (towards the end of April).

The other legal peculiarity of the Calendar Case is, although, when concluding Christianity as heretical, the Qing legal authorities relied on the statute of *Zao yaoshu yaoyan* [Writing Books on Sorcery or Speaking about Sorcery], the same legal authorities, when enforcing punishment for the offenders, rather depended on another statute, *Jinzhi shiwu xieshu* [Prohibition Concerning Sorcerers and Sorceress]. In other words, although, when addressing Subcase 1, the Ministry of Justice alleged that those involved had ‘plotted to establish heretical teachings and confused multitudes by writing a new book’ (emphasis mine)—which corresponds more to the phrase in the *Zao yaoshu yaoyan* article, ‘Those who make a prophecy, a book on sorcery, or rumour on sorcery, as well as those who disturb the multitudes by circulating and using them (凡造讖緯妖書妖言及傳用惑眾者, emphasis mine)”83—, the Ministry of Justice’s eventual verdict, however, was based on the *Jinzhi shiwu xieshu* article.84 That inconsistency is more evident in the Chinese language than in Manchu. The phrase, ‘plotted to establish heretical teachings and confused multitudes by writing a new book’, was paraphrased in Chinese as ‘湯捏造天學傳槪書惑人入伊敎內是實 (it is true that Adam Schall fabricated the book called *Tianxue chuangai* and deluded people into entering his teachings. [emphasis mine])’ or ‘李祖白謊造天學傳槪書傳人是實 (it is true that Li Zubai

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83 DQLJF, juan 18, xinglü, zeidao, zao yaoshu yaoyan, 2b.
84 DQLJF, juan 11, lili, jisi, jinzhi shiwu xieshu, 5a-5b.
authored the book called Tianxue chuangai and distributed it to people. [emphasis mine]).'  
Both corresponded more to the Zao yaoshu yaoyan article, not the Jinzhi shiwu xieshu. Later, the Ministry itself also quoted its previous verdict as follows:

Indeed, Tang Ruowang, Li Zubai, and others spread heretical teachings and confused multitudes by writing a new book (emphasis mine).  

For this simultaneous application of two different legal articles to one case, one may assume a transitional period for a legal change in punishing religious crimes. According to B. J. ter Haar, a linguistic change—the labelisation of the term ‘Bailian’—occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as a result, the legal ground for punishing religious crimes changed from the Zao yaoshu yaoyan article to the Jinzhi shiwu xieshu article. He adds that in the course of this change, the legal authorities employed both articles simultaneously for a certain period of time. For example, while addressing the Qiao Jishi 喬濟時 case (1577) and the Liu Tianxu 劉天緒 case (1606-7), the Ming officials based their verdicts on both Zao yaoshu yanyan and Jinzhi shiwu xieshu articles, but with each article for the principal and for the accessory, respectively. Those two cases were somewhat different from the Ministry of Justice’s verdict in the Calendar Case, however. In that latter case, as we examined above, although the Ministry based its verdict on the two articles but with each in concluding Christianity was heretical teaching and in punishing the involved convicts, respectively, regardless of whether the subject was the principal or the accessory.

85 Libu ti gao, 356. Libu ti gao describes the time the Qing state received Yang’s accusation against Adam Schall (借修曆為名行其邪敎傳惑天下之人) was the 3rd month of the Kangxi 3rd year (康熙三年三月). This probably reflects a mistake in the copying process, however (Libu ti gao, 355).
86 QCXCMDY, 118, 273.
The Penalty Conversion Criteria for the Bannerman in the Kangxi 3rd year

Through the Calendar Case, we also witness the early Qing state’s some particular judicial practices. Noteworthy is that, towards the end of Kangxi 3rd year, in adjusting the gravity of the penalties for bannermen, the Qing state’ relied on the decision of the 13th year of the Shunzhi Reign, rather than the decision of the 18th year of that reign. This is well reflected in the punishment applied to Xu Qian.

In fact, contrary to the brief mention in the Manchu Secret Documents, the process of calculating Xu’s penalties was quite complicated, and in addressing Xu’s case, the Qing authorities had to consider several articles simultaneously. First, Xu Qian was judged as one of the accessories (weicongzhe 為從者) according to the Jinzhi shiwu xieshu article, and at the same time was an offender ‘who accused an innocent of a false accusation punishable with death, but the accused had not yet been executed’ according to the article of Wugao 誣告 (False Accusations). Thus, Xu’s two sentences resulted from the both articles were ‘100 strokes of the heavy bamboo and exile to 3000 li’ and ‘100 strokes of the heavy bamboo, exile to 3000 li, and an additional three years of penal servitude [at the place of exile]’, respectively,88 and according to the article of Erzui jufa yi zhonglun 二罪俱發以重論 (Where Two Offences Come to Light, Sentence on the Basis of the More Serious),89 Xu’s final penalties should be the latter of the two sentences.

However, since the Qing authorities regarded Xu Qian as a Manchu bannermen during the interrogation, his punishment had to be adjusted according to some special statutes for bannermen. There were two statutes applicable to Xu Qian at that time:

88 DQLJF, juan 22, xinglü, susong, wugao, 7b.
89 A criminal involved in more than one charge should bear the sentence due for the graver of those charges. See DQLJF, juan 1, mingli, er zui ju fa yi zhonglun, 33b-34a.
[The decision made in the Shunzhi 13th year]

From now on, if a bannerman is punished with military exile, with exile, or with penal servitude, he shall bear a converted penalty, such as wearing the cangue for three months, two months, or one month, respectively. The number of strokes [of the light or heavy bamboo] they should bear, however, shall still be valid, but instead with the whip.\textsuperscript{90}

[The decision made in the Shunzhi eighteenth year]

If a bannerman committed a crime …, the one-year penal servitude shall be converted to the 20-day cangue-wearing. Every increased degree, add five days. For the total penal servitude (\textit{zongtu} 總徒, four years) and the authorised penal servitude (\textit{zhuntu} 准徒, five years), also add, respectively five days. The 2000 li exile shall be converted to 50-day cangue-wearing. Every increased degree, add five days. The ‘military exile to the near place’ shall be converted to 70-day cangue-wearing; the ‘[military exile to] a frontier garrison (\textit{bianwei} 邊衛)’ shall be 75-day [cangue-wearing]; the ‘[military exile to] the far frontier (\textit{bianyuan} 邊遠)’, ‘the extreme frontier (\textit{jibian} 極邊)’, ‘the malarial regions (\textit{yanzhang} 烟瘴)’, ‘the sea-coast (\textit{yanhai} 沿海)’, and ‘beyond the frontier (\textit{bianwai} 邊外)’ each shall be 80-day [cangue-wearing]. The ‘military exile forever (\textit{yongyuan} 永遠)’ shall be converted to 90-day cangue-wearing.\textsuperscript{91}

Of those two decisions, we may expect that the Qing state prioritised the Shunzhi 18th year’s than the Shunzhi 13th year’s since the former was closer to the time of its judgement (the Kangxi 3rd year), and that therefore Xu Qian’s penalty (‘100 strokes of the heavy bamboo, exile to 3000 li exile’)

\textsuperscript{90} QSL-SZ13/6/3[gengchen].
\textsuperscript{91} DQHD-YZ, \textit{juan} 150, 9508; DQHDSL-JQ, \textit{juan} 586, 140-41.
li, and an additional three-year penal servitude at the place of exile’) was converted to ‘100 strokes of the whip and 100 days of cangue-wearing’.\footnote{According to the criteria stipulated in the Shunzhi 18th year, the 1st degree of tu 徒 (1 year) can be converted to cangue-wearing for 20 days; the 2nd (1.5 years) to cangue-wearing for 25 days; the 3rd (2 years) to cangue-wearing for 30 days; the 4th (2.5 years) to cangue-wearing for 35 days; the 5th (3 years) to cangue-wearing for 40 days; the 1st degree of liu 流 (2000 li 里) to cangue-wearing for 50 days; the 2nd (2500 li) to cangue-wearing for 55 days; the 3rd (3000 li) to cangue-wearing for 60 days; chongjun fujin 充軍夫隸 to cangue-wearing for 70 days; Chongjin bianwei 充軍邊衛 to cangue-wearing for 75 days; every chongjun binyuan 充軍邊遠, chongjun jibian 充軍極邊, chongjun yanzhang 充軍瘴瘴, chongjun yanhai 充軍沿海, and Chongjun bianwai 充軍邊外 to cangue-wearing for 80 days; chongjun yongyuan 充軍永遠 to cangue-wearing for 90 days (Wu Kunxiu et al., eds., Da Qing lüli genyuan, juan 3, yuan zeng lü, fanzui mian faqian, chen deng jin an, 39). Thus, the total of the 3rd degree of liu (3000 li) and the 5th degree of tu (3 years) can be converted to cangue-wearing for 100 days.} In fact, however, the Ministry of Justice sentenced Xu Qian to ‘100 strokes of the whip and 90 days of cangue-wearing’, which corresponds to the Shunzhi 13th year criteria.\footnote{However, it is not clear whether the Shunzhi 13th year criteria meant each military exile, exile, and penal servitude shall be converted into ‘[regardless of the detailed degree under each], wearing the cangue for three months, two months, and one month’ or ‘wearing the cangue for [up to] three months, [up to] two months, or [up to] one month’. Although I prefer to choose the former interpretation, in fact, both interpretations calculate the 3rd degree of liu (3000 li) and the 5th degree of tu (3 years) as cangue-wearing for 60 and 30 days, respectively.}

If so, why did the Qing state cite the Shunzhi 13th year decision, not the Shunzhi 18th year one, which was nearer to time of the government’s judgement? In fact, it is also the Shunzhi 18th year criteria, not the Shunzhi 13th year one, that was left at last in the Great Qing Code until the late Qing period.\footnote{Xue Yunsheng, Duli cunyi, juan 2, mingli lü shang-2, fanzui mian faqian, 1a-2a.}

Above all, in fact, it is not that the Shunzhi 18th year decision had since been included in the Great Qing Code from the early Qing period; it was inserted sometime between the mid-Kangxi period and the Yongzheng 3rd year. When we compare the versions of the Great Qing Code included in the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Jiaqing editions of the Da Qing Huidian 大清
會典 [The Collected Statutes of the Great Qing Dynasty], it is only during the Yongzheng Reign that the statute of *fanzui mian fangqian* (Committing Offences and Avoiding Banishment), which contains the Shunzhi 18th decision, appeared for the first time in the *Great Qing Code*.95 That statute is not found from the *Great Qing Code* that is included in the Kangxi edition—compiled during the mid-Kangxi period—of the *Da Qing Huidian*. The statute, however, had already been included in the ‘previous version of the *Great Qing Code*’ (*yuan zeng lu* 原增律) at the time of the Qing state revising the *Code* in the Yongzheng 3rd year.96

The reason the Qing state cited the Shunzhi 13th year decision was that the *Great Qing Code* being circulated during the late Kangxi 3rd year contained the Shunzhi 13th year decision, not the Shunzhi 18th year decision. As I mentioned earlier, the ‘Wu’ edition of the *Great Qing Code*, which this chapter has relied on while examining of the Shunzhi edition of the *Great Qing Code*, has a separate section named ‘*Da Qinglu xinli* 大清律新例 (The New Sub-statutes of the Great Qing Code) that set apart all the sub-statutes inserted in the *Code* on the seventh of April 1664 (KX3/3/12) by imperial order.97 Since this section contains the Shunzhi 13th year decision,98 we can conclude that the Shunzhi 13th year decision was valid in April 1664, when was just a few months before the Ministry of Justice reached its verdict about Xu Qian.

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95 *DQHD-YZ*, juan 150, xingbu, lili 1, mingli shang, *fanzui mian faqian*, 9507-08.
96 Wu, *Da Qing lili genyuan*, juan 3, yuan zeng li, *fanzui mian faqian*, 39-40. This revision project started in the 9th month of the Yongzheng 1st year. However, this project was enabled by the groundwork that had begun during the Kangxi reign. For example, the revised *Code* that resulted from the project initiated in the Kangxi 28th year was offered to the emperor in the Kangxi 46th year. See Yao Yu, ‘Kangxi sishi liu nian xiujian’, 92.
97 Su Yigong, *Ming Qing li li yu tiaoli*, 146-48. Around ten years before Su’s analysis, Shimada Masao pointed out that some editions of *Da Qing li li fuli* had a separate section for those new (sub)statutes inserted in April of 1664 (Shimada Masao, ‘Shin ritsu no seiritsu’, 26-27). Su (and I) could not have access to the edition Shimada argued was archived in the Fu Sinian Library at the Institute of History and Philosophy, Academia Sinica. Based on Shimada’s article, however, Su put this edition into the *Bing* category. See Su Yigong, *Ming qing li li yu tiaoli*, 144-45.
98 *DQLJF*, *Da Qing li li xinli*, 8b-9b.
The Policy Direction for the Xiyang People

The Calendar Case is also significant in that its proceedings revealed the Qing Empire’s future policy direction regarding Xiyang affairs. Above all, we observed policy consistency between the Oboi regency and the Kangxi emperor’s qinzheng 親政 (Personal Rule) period. On one hand, during the Oboi Regency, which has been assumed as not favourable to Xiyang people and Christians, the Qing state kept its favourable attitude towards Xiyang people that had been taken since the Shunzhi period. For example, ‘the author of the red rescripts’, who was the final arbiter during the Calendar Case—despite his general support for Yang Guangxian—had already dismissed the charges of Plotting Treason (moupan) and High Treason (dani) lodged by Yang against Adam Schall’s side in the Subcase 1, before receiving evidential materials for the charges. Also, on the fourth of January 1665 (KX3/11/19), ‘the author of the red rescripts’ rebutted the Ministries of Rites and Personnel’s suggestion (twenty-seventh of December 1664) that all the provincial Xiyang missionaries be ‘arrested’ and instead ordered local officials to escort them to Beijing ‘not to forcibly’ (golo de bisire, si yang ni bai niyalma be jafara be guwebufi).99

On the other hand, during the Kangxi qinzheng period, which has been admired as the all-time favourable to Xiyang people and Christians, the Kangxi emperor held as much strictness to both as during the Oboi Recency. For example, in September of 1669, the Kangxi emperor rebutted the Prince Kang’s favourable opinion, ‘… [Xiyang people’s] venerating Heavenly

99 The author of the rescript uses the vocabulary ‘gajifi’ while Ministers use ‘jafara’. An Shuangcheng translated ‘jafara’, ‘gaifi’, and ‘jafara be guwebufi’ into ‘to arrest’ (jina 統拿); ‘to deliver’ (song 送), or ‘to take along with’ (dai 帶); and ‘to save them from being arrested’ (zhao mian jina 着免緝拿), respectively. QCXCMDY, 36, 37, 40, 175, 258, 274, 277.
Lord is their old tradition, which they have kept since they were in their homeland(s). There is no clear evidence that they have ever done any bad things. [We suggest that] … the Governor and the Governor-general send Antonio de Santa Mara Caballero and other [Xiyang missionaries] to Beijing through postal stations!, 100 and instead, not changing the guideline set in 1665 by the author of the red rescripts, ordered to save Yang Guangxian and his family from being punished and not to lift the Canton confinement of the Xiyang missionaries.101 At that time, faced with this unexpectedly hostile response from the emperor, contemporary missionaries could not hide their discomfiture since they had until then been sure of the emperor’s favourable stance on Xiyang people and Christians, to the degree that many of them attempted reasonable explanations for the emperor response.102

A noticeable element in this policy consistency between the two periods is that the Qing state tried to control Xiyang people by gathering them together in some specially prepared space for them. For example, to the author of the rescripts’ order to come up with a plan for raising Xiyang missionaries being sent in Beijing, the Ministry of Rites suggested that all the Xiyang missionaries be gathered in Guangdong Province. The author of the red rescripts shared the Ministry’s suggestion, with a slight modification that four of the missionaries, Schall von Bell, Buglio, Magalhães, and Verbiest, were to remain in Beijing. The idea that Xiyang missionaries should be restricted to a specific space, was also observed in both Prince Kang’s conclusion and the Kangxi emperor’s rescript in 1669. When the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials suggested the transfer of Xiyang people to Beijing, although the Kangxi

100 QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol 1, 555-56.
101 For this edict’s meaning, see Chapter III, especially, the second section (The Meaning of the 1669 Ban). XC, 81-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 556.
102 See Chapter IV’s second section.
emperor did not approve the suggested destination, he agreed with the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials that the Xiyang people should be in some designated areas of the empire.

This policy direction is not only applicable to 1665 and 1669 policies. The fact that in 1671, the Kangxi emperor lifted the Canton confinement, did not mean that the Qing ruler gave Xiyang missionaries unlimited freedom to go around China proper. For the Qing state to allow them to return to their own churches in provinces, can be interpreted as expansion of the existing allotted space (Beijing or Canton) for Xiyang people to Xiyang churches in the provinces, parallel to the expansion of the existing allotted space (Beijing) for bannermen to Manchu cities (mancheng 滿城) in the provinces. In the context of the early Qing, to allow a clergy to stay in his own temples (zhun qi ge gui bentang 准其各歸本堂) had already implied his limited movement. Indeed, the Qing law stipulated religious professionals, such as (Han) Buddhist, Daoist, and Tibetan Buddhist clergies, should not leave their own temple without permission. Although these regulations were often regarded as perfunctory in Qing society, they were, also often, really applied to those who violated them. For instance, that the Zhejiang Governor Zhang Penghe 張鵬翮 (1649-1725) found a fault with Prospero Intorcetta, SJ (1625-98)ʼs residence at the Hangzhou church—away from the latterʼs original church in the Jiangxi Province—was, in fact, that Zhang applied to Intorcetta the existing legal principle that the clergy should not leave his own temple.

How Zhangʼs contemporaries understood that legal principle can be observed from the fact that during the late Kangxi period, for example, a privately compiled legal reference

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103 See Chapter IVʼs second section.

104 DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3623. Similar regulations had also been issued on Buddhist monks and nuns and Daoist clergies in Beijing in the Shunzhi 3rd year. See Dingli quanbian, juan 19, 43a; DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3628; Li an quanji, juan 14, 7b-8a; DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3629.

105 Le Gobien, Histoire de lʼedit de lʼempereur de la Chine, 40.
book—which collected together ‘currently enforced regulations’ (xianxing zeli) at that time—juxtaposed ‘the Edict of Toleration’ (1692) with the law that regulated the lama’s movement within his own lamasery in the section entitled fan lama xifang sengren youfang ji fanshi 凡喇嘛西方僧人遊方及犯事 [All the Issues Related to Movements or Crimes by Lamas or Western Monks]. Indeed, according to Nicolas Standaert, the toleration that the ‘Edict of Toleration’ declared was of rituals at limited space (i.e., churches) by religious professionals (missionaries) and a small number of male worshippers—the degree that the Qing state had until then allowed other Qing religions to enjoy. The Kangxi emperor, the final arbiter who lifted the Canton confinement and endorsed the ‘Edict of Toleration’, as well, kept monitoring closely if Xiyang missionaries stayed at their churches, for example, during his Southern Tours (nanxun). (see following chapters).

The empire’s stance that it would control Xiyang people by gathering them together within specially prepared space, seems to have been kept throughout the Kangxi reign, and, at least in principle, even the whole Qing period. The Kangxi emperor repeated that stance, not only by enforcing the policies examined above, but also by saying, ‘It is good to get Xiyang people together in a specially allotted space, since they are the same people’ on many occasions later, such as his conversation with Grimaldi right after the emperor returned from the fourth Southern Tour (1703.3.3 - 4.30) and his edict (1706.6.24, KX45/5/14) in response to the

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106 Dingli quanbian, juan shou, 103a; juan 19, 49a.
107 Standaert, ‘The ‘Edict of Tolerance’’, 357.
109 AP I, 89, note 165, 89-93[48-50] (the number in the square bracket means the original page), 144-46[75].
110 AP I, 391-92[208]; KLGW, 9-10.
Xiyang legate Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (Duoluo, 1668-1710)’s visit to Beijing. The Yongzheng Decree (1724), which has been regarded as a definite and long-lasting prohibition of Christianity until the late Qing period, also prescribed, in essence, that Xiyang missionaries should be gathered in specially allotted space—at first Beijing and Macao but, after Ignaz Kögler’s (Dai Jinxian 戴進賢, 1680-1746) petition to the Yongzheng emperor, Beijing and Canton.111

This approach to Xiyang people, interestingly, echoes the early Qing Empire’s one well-known policy. During the early Qing period, the Qing ruler had once allowed Manchu and Han Chinese peoples to reside together in the Liaodong area, but this policy of cohabitation was soon reversed as conflicts and tension between the two became intense, resulting in the two ethnic groups being ordered to reside separately.112 This experience influenced later policies, such as the separation between the Inner and Outer Cities in Beijing, and the preparation of Manchu cities in the provinces.113 In the same way that, having experienced the problems of cohabitation, early Qing rulers had separated different ethnic groups, the Kangxi emperor, after experiencing trouble from the cohabitation between Xiyang people and Han Chinese, also started to separate them by decreeing that Xiyang people could only live in Beijing and Guangdong—especially, between 1691 and 1724, in Beijing and provincial churches.

111 QZXT, nos. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46.
113 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 89-132; Park Minsu, Ch’ŏng ŭi ipkwan gwa kiin ŭi Pukkyŏng iju yŏng’gu, 137-48.
The Han Elite’s Mentalité

As a series of studies by Okamoto Sae revealed, during the Qing period, many of those so-called ‘twice-serving officials’ (erchen 貳臣)—who had once served the Ming Dynasty as officials but had accepted Qing rule—continued to regard themselves as ‘officials loyal to the Ming Dynasty (yilao 遺老)’, or as Confucian literati, sometimes willingly risking their lives for the Confucian cause. For these twice-serving officials, having surrendered to Qing rule was inevitable and the most practical second-best way to save China during a turbulent age. After surrendering, they also played active roles in the Qing empire-building project. However, they never forgot their identity as Confucian literati, constantly struggling to transform the barbarian dynasty into a deserving Chinese Dynasty. They wanted to prevent a ‘loss of civilisation’ (wang tianxia 亡天下), which they considered to be a worse scenario, and a more serious loss, than the ‘loss of the state’ (wangguo 亡國). Notable is that a similar mentality to that of the twice-serving officials is observed in Yang Guangxian.

Admittedly, since Yang never served as an official of the Ming Dynasty, he cannot be categorised as a twice-serving official in the strict sense. However, Yang’s life was not much far from the Ming scholar-officials’ life. For example, Yang was born into the family of a Ming hereditary official and was an honorary licentiate by imperial favour (enyin guansheng 恩蔭官生). Yang also had a strong shidafu 士大夫 consciousness to the degree that, carrying a coffin

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115 Huang, ‘Yang Guangxian jiashi’, 15-17. Although the perspective is different from this present thesis, Harriet T. Zurndorfer also attempted to understand Yang’s behaviours against the background of his contemporary intellectuals’ mentalité. See Zurndorfer, ‘One Adam’, 164-67.
for himself, he denounced man of power at the Beijing city gate and that, considering his righteous indignation over social issues, his father dissuaded him from entering the government service.\textsuperscript{116} In fact, Yang’s active role in transforming the \textit{barbarian} Manchu dynasty into a civilised and befitting Chinese dynasty, can be regarded as the epitome of twice-serving official’s role in the early Qing period.

For instance, as the same way Yang had risked his life to urge the Ming Chongzhen emperor to succeed the holy tradition from the Yao–Shun period,\textsuperscript{117} in 1669 once again, risked his life to urge the Qing Kangxi emperor to succeed the holy tradition from the Yao-Shun period:

\begin{quote}
I think the calendrical method now being used at the [Imperial] Directorate [of Astronomy] is not only Guo Shoujing’s 郭守敬 method, but rather the method that is handed down from Emperors Yao and Shun (\textit{Yao Shun xiangchuan zhi fa 堯舜相傳之法}). Your Majesty’s position Your Majesty should get right is handed down from Emperors Yao and Shun; Your Majesty’s tradition Your Majesty succeeded is also handed down from Emperors Yao and Shun; and \textbf{therefore, Your Majesty’s calendar Your Majesty proclaims must also be handed down from Emperors Yao and Shun!} Although Your Majesty has followed Emperor Yao and Shun in every aspect, why does Your Majesty not do so only when it comes to the calendar? … Nan Huairen 南懷仁 is Christian, and how is it possible that Your Majesty, as the Sage Ruler (\textit{shengjun 聖君}), who must follow Emperors Yao and Shun, follows Christian teachings at all?

… The reason I, who will be laid in a coffin soon due to the currently worsening disease,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{117} BDY, \textit{Zun Shengxue shu}, 50-51.
keep working without taking a break is for the Law of Emperors Yao and Shun, for Your Majesty’s State Tradition (guotong 國統), for Your Majesty’s State System (guoti 國體), and not for myself. I beg your understanding. I dare to say this at the risk of my life (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{118}

That is to say, Yang’s consciousness of shidafu, which had been exerted in the crisis of the world (or Chinese civilisation) during the late Ming period, was awakened again by his sense of crisis about the Manchu ruler’s attempt to substitute the Chinese traditional calendral system with the Xiyang one.\textsuperscript{119}

However, Yang’s sense of crisis during the early Qing period was not because he regarded the Xiyang world and its calendrical system as completely uncivilised. Yang had to confess that he was incompetent for the calendrical affairs\textsuperscript{120} and the Xiyang calendrical system could be more accurate than the Chinese one. What Yang feared the most was in fact, not that the China fell into an uncivilised condition but that the Manchu ruler allowed for Chinese ones—whether they the calendrical system or teachings—to be substituted with Xiyang ones.

We’d rather have no calendrical methods in China (Zhongxia 中夏) than let Xiyang people be in China. If we have no good calendrical method, we just become as the Han Family (Hanjia 漢家), who could not explain scientifically why eclipses happened. [During that period] although eclipses frequently occurred on the end of the month, [the Han Family] enjoyed their reign for no less than 400 years.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{118} XC, 74-75.
\textsuperscript{119} BDY, Zhongxing shuo, 39-40; QCXCMDY, 102.
\textsuperscript{120} BDY, Er kouhun ci shu, 82.
\textsuperscript{121} BDY, Rishi tianxiang yan, 79.
For Yang, a desirable China was not one that would have good calendrical methods, but one that would not have any Xiyang people. Although he described an undesirable China, indirectly, as one that had good calendrical methods but also had any Xiyang people, the China that Yang denounced was in fact the one over which the Manchu ruler reigned. On the contrary, the China he ardently desired that did not have Xiyang people although it had not a good calendrical method, was Han China (Hanjia), which has been assumed as the origin of the Han people (Hanren 漢人). Here, we encounter Yang’s more candid motivation, i.e., to preserve the Han culture, hidden behind his justification, i.e., to guardian civilisation or the world.

On the other hand, while desiring ‘Hanjia’, which did not have Xiyang people, at the same time Yang expressed his anger toward his Han contemporaries (Hanren), from his perspective, who were was not fitting because they, without shame, became a cat’s paw for the Xiyang people and thus was not able to prevent current situation.

(1) Han people (Hanren) are willing to be [Xiyang people’s] informants and are secretly delivering the news by sea.\textsuperscript{122}

(2) Xu Zhijian, an instructor at the Directorate of Education (Guozi jian 國子監), is a serious criminal before the Orthodox Teachings (mingjiao 名教) because for a book on sorcery, he wrote a preface as ‘Buddhists and Daoists also understand [the social orders] between the ruler and the subject and between the father and the son (jun chen fu zi 君臣父子), and Confucians are also not without a harmful effect’. [Fortunately], by Your Majesty’s great grace, he was only deprived of his government post [for his guiltiness]. [When such a great grace he received from Your Majesty is considered], even though he had returned to his hometown, stayed at home and

\textsuperscript{122} BDY, Si kouhun ci shu, 89.
reflected on his guiltiness all his life, **he still could not have avoided getting spit on or insulted.** How much more blameful he must be because he has still lurked in Beijing, been visiting everyday Schall von Bell or the provincial Xiyang missionaries, who were sent to Beijing, and been plotting to return to his office … **As a Han official (Hanguan 漢官) who lost his government post, in order to avoid unnecessary suspicion or derision, he should have left the capital,** but he dares to continue to stay in the capital without fear (emphasis mine).\(^\text{123}\)

The target of Yang’s anger became clearer by his word choices like *hanren* (Han commoners) and *Hanguan* (Han officials), ethnographic designations in substitute for neutral ones like *minren* 民人 (commoners) and *guangyuan* 官員 (officials).

Interestingly, Yang’s feeling towards Han people is ambivalent in that he also found it piteous to see his *zu* 族’s predicament.

Their hearts are of wolf cubs, and their weapons are sharp and fierce. How is it possible that we are together with these wicked people in China (*Zhongguo* 中國)? Your servant is afraid not for myself, but for *zu*, for the world [or civilisation] (*tianxia*), and for the Court.\(^\text{124}\)

Although Yang does not clarify the semantic boundary of the term ‘*zu*’, the meaning of ‘*zu*’ and ‘*Han*’ had until then used as implying ‘cultural or biological characteristic that cannot be

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\(^{123}\) BDY, *Si kouhun ci shu*, 86.

\(^{124}\) BDY, *Si kouhun ci shu*, 89.
easily changed’ and ‘Han ethnicity’, respectively, since the sixth to seventh centuries. And during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries following Yang’s times, both terms would coincidentally be combined as ‘Hanzu 漢族’ and frequently appear in Han Chinese people’s anti-Manchu slogans. Thus, considering this historical flow since the sixth and seventh centuries until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we can place Yang Guangxian’s anti-Xiyang sentiment somewhere between those two periods.

We may still need more evidence before concluding that Yang Guangxian’s desire for past ‘Hanjia’, anger and ambivalent pity for present ‘Hanren’, and otherisation of the Xiyang people represents Yang’s contemporary Han elites’ hearts under the Manchu rule. However, it is coincidental that, as we will examine the following chapters, when the Qing Empire began to decline during the 1760s and 1770s following Prosperous Period (shengshi 盛世), a Han elite from Jiangnan who had Ming loyalist ancestry would attempt to solve the desire that Yang had harbouried, albeit in a fiction, by depicting that a Han hero from Jiangnan eliminates cruelly all the alien, heterodox elements, such as Tibetan Buddhist, Mongol, Miao, and Islam influences. It is also coincidental that this novel which allegedly lack of money prevented it from being published would be widely circulated, albeit in the form of a manuscript, and become popular in the Jiangnan region. Isn’t the life of Yang Guangxian a self-portrait of the Han elite in which they poured out their pent-up frustration—under the alien rule—towards

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125 BDY, Pixie lun xia (28) cites the phrase, ‘fei wo zulei qi xin bi yi 非我族類其心必異’ from Chunqiu zuoshi chuan as ‘fei wo zulei qi xin bi shu 非我族類其心必殊’. For a diachronic analysis for the term zulei, see Chin, ‘Antiquarian as Ethnographer’, 130-35; Liu, The Clash of Empires, 72-73; Elliott, ‘Hushuo’, 182-90. It is also meaningful to refer to Ticolas Tackett’s research in which, by using Benedict Anderson’s theoretical framework, he sheds light on Han shidafu’s national consciousness in Northern Song China as a precursor of modern nationalism. See Tackett, The Origins of the Chinese Nation, 1-16, 159-73.
126 Young, Confucianism and Christianity, 95-96; Huang, ‘Kangxi chao Hanren shidafu’, 160-61.
127 See Chapter VI.
an innocent monitory scapegoat? Interestingly, the charge Christians accused Yang of was anti-Qing activities, and when the Han Chinese encounter another alien force—other than the Manchus—after the nineteenth century, Yang would be evoked as national hero.

**A Bridge of Xiyang knowledge between the Late-Ming and the Early-Qing**

During the Calendar Case, we also observed an interesting phenomenon in the Qing central government’s treatment of Macao-related issues: a knowledge gap between the late Ming and the early Qing, which this thesis describes as ‘informational lag’. During the late Ming period, a maritime power referred to as ‘Folangji’, including the Portuguese, had incurred fear among Chinese people, for example, by the rumour that they kidnapped children in the coastal area. Some individuals during the Ming period were also well-acquainted with the massacre of Chinese people in Manila that was committed by Spanish settlers. Thus, during the Ming period, the Jesuits struggled to obscure any linkage between themselves and Macao because the latter was being understood as closely connected to the Folangji. However, the close connection between Xiyang missionaries, Macao, and Folangji was highlighted during the Nanjing Anti-Christian Incident (1616-17). These negative associations remained during the later period and became part of the knowledge landscape from the 1630s to the early 1640s through a series of anti-Christian publications. Yang Guangxian, once a ‘late Ming Confucianist’, was familiar with late Ming intellectual traditions, including knowledge of the Folangji. Indeed, he had read Shen Que’s documents and was well aware of the Nanjing Incident. That was one

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129 For Ming Chinese people’s understanding of Folangji, see Keevak, *Embassies to China*, 39-60.
130 Sheen, ‘Myŏngdae Pullanggi inshik’, 72-75, 81-83.
131 Huang, ‘Cong Shixin lu xu xijiu Yang Guangxian de xingge’, 1-5.
of the reasons Yang Guangxian provoked the Calendar Case and thus reignited the Ming Confucianists’ anti-Christian and anti-European sentiments. However, during the Calendar Case, Yang’s accusation that revealed the Xiyang people’s close linkage to Macao and dangerous maritime forces, interestingly, seemed not to be taken seriously by Qing central officials.

For example, in the petition entitled ‘Exterminating Heretical Teachings’ (*Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*, 15 September 1664), Yang Guangxian described Macao as a den of the Xiyang people and a channel for maritime forces.

Macao (*Xiangshan’ao* 香山澳), where more than 10,000 people inhabit, is [the heretical crowd’s] den. [Through Macao] they receive or send people who come and go on the sea. Although Schall von Bell has hidden in the palace under the pretext of managing calendrical projects, he has spied on secrets of the Court.133

In his earlier petition entitled ‘Straightening the Country’s Essence’ (*Zheng guoti cheng*, 1661.1.3), Yang had also raised the issue of possible linkages between Schall von Bell, the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy (*Qintian jian* 欽天監), Xiyang people, Christians, Macao, and dangerous maritime forces:

Schall von Bell could hide in the palace under the pretext of managing the new [calendrical] project and spread heretical teachings [throughout the country]! Now that [the heretical] crowd becomes numerous, it is to be feared that an incident such as that in which some of them plotted with Matteo Ricci to attack Japan [during the Ming period] as Jesus the Heavenly Lord had committed treason against his own country, will happen. Isn’t this the same as asking for trouble by raising a tiger? … It is in their nature to

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133 BDY, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*, 6.
conspire to conquer other countries. Now, outside, they are bringing their like into Macao in Guangdong province and, inside, are entering government posts at Your Majesty’s elbow!\textsuperscript{134}

However, the central government responded to these accusations on the twenty-seventh of December 1664 (KX3/11/11), as if such information was new to them, by asking Guangdong provincial officials about ‘whether Xiyang people had lived in Macao for a long time and had paid taxes to the government’; ‘whether they had freely been crossing borders’; and ‘whether they should be allowed to remain there subsequently’.\textsuperscript{135}

In fact, these questions were not new to Guangdong’s officials. In their report on the ninth of April 1665 (KX4/2/24), the Governor and Governor-general highlighted the fact that the central government had asked them the same question before. Indeed, in 1663 (KX2/4), the Qing centre asked the Guangdong government about the Xiyang people in Macao, and then the Guangdong officials suggested the total deportation of the Xiyang people to their respective homelands. However, the Qing centre rejected the suggestion because at that time a ‘Ministry’ (\textit{bu} 部) argued that the Xiyang people should be allowed to remain in Macao as before. By contrast, the Guangdong officials had until now maintained their stance against the Xiyang people’s stay in Macao, but this time, had an added option: the Xiyang people could also be sent to \textit{Beijing}.\textsuperscript{136}

Since the ‘Ministry’ that had opposed the Xiyang people’s deportation in 1663 was the Ministry of War, in response to the Guangdong officials’ report above (9 April 1665), the Ministry of War transferred their previous memorial (17 March 1664) and the resultant rescript

\textsuperscript{134} BDY, \textit{Zheng guoti cheng gao}, 38.  
\textsuperscript{135} QCXCMDY, 29, 37.  
\textsuperscript{136} QCXCMDY, 175-77.
(19 March 1664) to the Ministries of Rites and Personnel, who were now in charge of investigating Yang’s accusations. According to the transferred documents, the Ministry of War had suggested the following in 1664:

According to [our] investigation into the yi 夷 people in Macao, they came from Xiyang, [the] faraway [region], and have resided [here] for years since the Jiajing Reign of the Ming Dynasty. Considering this, we think that [our government] should allow them to remain as before. Our government should also provide everyday rice that they can buy according to the number of their family members. [We suggest] that Your Majesty order the Governor and Governor-general to count the Xiyang people [in Macao] through Circuit Intendants or Prefects. [But] the rice supply for each household should not exceed the allotted quota according to the number of family members. Along the line, the stationed soldiers should always keep a close eye. Regarding taxes, the relevant Ministry should present its opinion after investigation.137

After reading the documents, the two Ministries returned the ball to the Ministry of War’s court. In their memorial on the seventeenth of June 1665 (KX4/5/5), the two Ministries suggested that the Ministry of War should resolve this Macao-related issue, pointing out that the reemergence of the issue was due to the Ministry of War’s previous rejection of the Guangdong officials’ suggestion. In the end, the Qing centre approved the two Ministries’ opinion138. Unfortunately, the account in available Qing sources stops here, without providing further information.

According to some Western or other indirect Qing sources, the Qing central government had addressed issues relating to Macao much earlier than this latest recurrence. Qing troops led

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137 QCXCMDY, 276.
138 QCXCMDY, 276.
by Tong Yangjia 佟養甲 (?-1648) and Li Chengdong 李成棟 (?-1649) captured Canton in 1647, and the Qing authorities stationed five hundred Qing soldiers at the Qianshan 前山 stronghold (zhai寨) under the command of an Assistant Regional Commander (canjiang参將), the highest-ranking post at the Qianshan stronghold since the Ming period.\(^{139}\) Despite Li Chengdong’s betrayal in May 1648, the Qing state soon recaptured Canton City with the assistance of the Han Princes, and, in January 1651, the Portuguese in Macao submitted an instrument of surrender to the Assistant Regional Commander of the Qianshan stronghold.\(^{140}\)

In the subsequent military reform in August, the Qing state established a military organisation for Macao, consisting of one Assistant Regional Commander; one thousand naval troops; one Assistant Brigade Commander of the Central Army (zhongjun shoubei中軍守備); two Company Commanders (qianzong千總); and four Squad Leaders (bazong把總).\(^{141}\)

As the Qing state enforced a maritime embargo and a ban on coastal settlement over the Guangdong coastal areas, the Qing policy towards Macao entered a new phase. In late July 1655, the Qing state, after failing to persuade Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 to surrender, imposed a ban on maritime trade in coastal areas (known as the Sea Ban) in order to isolate the Zheng regime.\(^{142}\) This order was a major blow to the Portuguese in Macao, whose livelihoods depended on maritime trade. An even more severe impact came with the Coastal Evacuation

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141 QSL-SZ8/7/11[bingxu].
142 QSL-SZ12/6/19[renshen].
(or Coastal Removal) Policy in 1661, through which the Qing state attempted to reinforce the ongoing Sea Embargo. According to the Coastal Evacuation Policy, anyone residing outside of set boundaries was required to evacuate by a set time. A Portuguese source witnessed how the Coastal Evacuation order aimed at the Chinese in Macao was implemented in Canton on the third of May 1662. As a result, the Portuguese lost all their craftsmen, boatmen, and small traders, who were mostly Chinese and were essential providers of food and other daily necessities. Around the same time, the Qing authorities increased the number of soldiers at the Qianshan stronghold to one thousand five hundred.

From the summer of 1662, the Jesuits began to take action as the Macao authorities asked them for help. Hearing about Macao’s difficult situation, Le Favre, the new Vice Provincial, who was in Ganzhou 贛州 at the time, travelled to Beijing to meet his fellow Jesuits in Beijing. In the meantime, aware of Macao’s current predicament, the Beijing Jesuits had already been trying to resolve the issue. However, the Regents and the Ministry of War were determined to enforce the Coastal Removal over Macao, although the Guangdong officials remained on the fence, handling the issue diplomatically. At last, the Beijing Jesuits’ leverage at the Qing Court worked and prevented the worst-case scenario. They changed the Ministry of War’s position to a more favourable direction and, at the same time, were able to prevent the enforcement of the Regents’ secret order to depopulate Macao and dismantle all its fortifications. The Beijing Jesuits’ involvement in the Calendar Case in September 1664 reduced their influence,

143 QSL-SZ18/8/13[jiwei].
144 Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, 87-88.
146 Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, 89-91.
Simultaneously, Macao lost Shang Kexi’s protection as the Qing centre began to keep a closer eye on Shang’s influence in Guangdong province. The atmosphere in the central Court was also changing after the three consecutive Qing military attacks on Taiwan failed between June and July 1665. Due to these failures, the pro-war faction in the court was losing power, and central officials reinforced the ongoing Coastal Removal policy.  

When all the above facts are considered, the central officials’ response on the twenty-seventh of December 1664 to Yang’s accusation sounds somewhat unexpected. Primarily, until late 1664, the central government had already addressed Macao-related issues more than a few times. In particular, just a few months earlier (17 March 1664), the Ministry of War—whose Minister was at the time Minggandari (?-1669), a Mongol bannerman—expressed their opinion about Xiyang people’s continued residence in Macao, and in May 1663 (KX2/4) the Guangdong officials also presented their opinion about the same issue. Kicebe and Asha, the Ministers of Rites and Personnel respectively, who were investigating the Macao issue on the twenty-seventh of December 1664, had held the same positions since March and September 1664 respectively.

A combination of several factors could have been behind this scene. For example, some may point out the potential for malfunction or miscommunication in early Qing bureaucracy; the Qing state’s weak presence in the Southeast coastal area; the Guangdong government’s intentional concealment of information about Macao; or the success of the missionaries’ age-

147 For the specifics regarding the Calendar Case, see Chapters II, III, and IV of this dissertation.
148 Chae Kyungsoo, ‘Ch’ŏn’gyeryŏng ūi chŏllyakchŏk ūimi chaegeom’t’o’, 85-86.
149 Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 309-11; Oh Keum-sung, ‘Ipkwanch’o Ch’ongjogwŏllyŏg ūi ch’im’t’u wa chiyŏksahoe’, 64-67.
150 Wills, Embassies and Illusion, 88-101.
old strategy of concealing their connection with Macao. One thing we have to note more, however, is that the primary messengers delivering information on Macao to the central government were Liaodong natives: Tong Yangjia, who memorialised that the Canton trade market should be re-opened, was a ‘Tong of Fushun’ and a Chinese bannerman of the Plain Blue Banners; Inggūldai, the Minister of the Ministry of Revenue who reviewed Tong’s request and influenced the final decision, was a Manchu bannerman of the Plain White Banners; Li Qifeng, who passed the Portuguese authorities’ submission document onto the Qing ruler and reported in 1651 that Xiyang nationals (si yang gurun i niyalma) had inhabited Macao for a long time and had paid taxes to the government, was also from Liaodong (Guangning) and a Chinese bannerman of the Bordered Red Banners; Lu Xingzu (?-1667), the Guangdong Governor (later the Governor-general) who talked about applying the Sea Embargo to Macao in 1663 was a Chinese bannerman of the Bordered White Banners; Prince Shang Kexi, General Wang Guoguang (?-1670) and Governor-general Lu Chongjun (?-1701), all of whom served as channels for information between Macao and the Qing central government, were from Liaodong.

152 QSL-SZ4/8/9[dingchou].
154 Li Qifeng, the Guangdong Provincial Governor’s ‘Guanyu Aomen yimu Weiliduo cheng di touching wenshu qiqing yishi tongren de tiben (tiehuang Man Han hebi)’ (SZ8/run2/13) in FHA, Aomen wenti Ming Qing zhendang huicui, no. 7, 46-48. Li worked to mediate between Macao and the Qing centre. See Li’s ‘Helan chuanzhi lai Yue yaoqiu maoyi’ (SZ10/3/3), in FHA, Ming Qing gongcang Zhong Xi shangmao dang’an, vol. 1, no. 8, 104-21 (Li’s ‘Ti bao Helan chuanzhi lai Yue yaoqiu maoyi kong yu zhu Ao Puren fasheng maodun xu cong changji yi ben’, in FHA, Ming Qing shiqi Aomen wenti dang’an wenxian huibian, no. 14, 25-30).
Such a weighted distribution of communicators affected the Qing state’s ability to access accurate information about Macao. For example, for Macao-related information, the early Qing conquerors often had to consult materials left behind by their Ming predecessors, such as Da Ming huidian [The Collected Statutes of the Great Ming] or Guangdong tongzhi [The General History of Guangdong Province]. At the same time, however, they had to rely on local officials who had been in charge since the Ming period or on hearsay information from local people because the latest editions of such compilations were the Wanli editions, which contained much invalid or outdated information. Otherwise, they had to depend on their Inner Asian experience as they were accustomed to for their maritime policy.

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155 Li Qifeng, ‘Helan chuanzhi lai Yue yaoqiu maoyi’, 104-10.
156 Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, 57-78.
Figure 8: Cases containing the Manchu Secret Documents

Figure 9: Covers of the Manchu Secret Documents
Figure 12: The former part of QCXCMDY doc.28

Figure 13: The latter part of QCXCMDY doc.28
Chapter III: The Search for the Ban on Buddhist and Daoist xianghui 香會 in 1664

As mentioned in Chapter II, Nicolas Standaert interprets the ‘Edict of Toleration’, the Kangxi emperor’s historic edict in 1692, from a new angle. He suggests that although the Western world has often understood it as a proclamation of the freedom to propagate Christianity publicly, the tolerance that the edict declared was that of religious professionals (missionaries) and a small number of Chinese male worshippers being allowed to engage in the personal practice of Christianity within an allowed space (churches); it was the same tolerance the Qing state allowed religious professionals and Chinese male adherents of Tibetan Buddhism, (Chinese) Buddhism, and Daoism in Qing society to enjoy. The notable contribution of this interpretation lies in its attempts to understand the Qing policy on Christianity within the boundaries of the Qing state’s general religious policy. But the Qing state’s approach, which placed Christianity in line with other religions in Qing society, can be traced back to an earlier period.

To my knowledge, no scholars have paid on the following remark by Yang Guangxian during the interrogation in December 1664:

[Ministries of Rites and Personnel answered on the twenty-seventh of December 1664 (KX3/11/11)]:

Yang Guangxian accused the Christians, ‘When xianghui 香會 is currently prohibited by edict, they alone, resisting the government, continue to hold more than sixty gatherings at each church per year. This bulletin[s] that they have been distributing for the

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1 Standaert, ‘The ‘Edict of Tolerance’’, 353-57.
2 QCXCMDY, 37.
gathering[s] is[are] the evidence’. Schall von Bell answered, ‘We hand out [a catechism called] Tianzhujiao yao 天主教要, a bronze statue, and an embroidered pouch to each person who enters our teachings. We accept 200 people a year. We have four gatherings a month for learning Christian teachings. We donate 1,000 to 2,000 copper coins (wen) to poor people at each gathering. Although our teachings are in no way heretical, when heretical teachings are strictly prohibited now, and in case some unenlightened people may be unable to tell the true from the false and regard our teachings as heretical, we [have] suspended our gatherings’. So if their teachings were not heretical, why did they suspend their gatherings? (emphasis mine)\(^3\)

The complete version of Yang’s accusation above can be found in his petition on the fifteenth of September 1664, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*:

Whereas Buddhist and Daoist xianghui is currently strictly prohibited by the edict, they alone, resisting the government, continue to hold more than sixty gatherings at each church per year. At each gathering, [they] accept 20 to 30 followers and give them a bronze medal and an embroidered pouch as proof [of their conversion]. Since I, Guangxian, could not believe that [information] was true, I allowed my relative Jiangguang to enter their gatherings as if he wanted to be a Christian. Indeed, they gave him a bronze medal, an embroidered pouch, a book on sorcery, and a bulletin for the gathering (emphasis mine).\(^4\)

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\(^3\) QCXCMDY, 30.

\(^4\) BDY, *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang*, 6.
We can reconstruct some facts from the two citations above. First, [an] imperial edict[s] on Buddhist or Daoist xianghui was [were] in effect around the fifteenth of September, 1664 (KX3/7/26), or more precisely, from the fifteenth of September 1664 to the end of 1664. Second, Yang Guangxian heard that despite this [these] ban[s], Christians had been holding gatherings in their churches as before. Third, according to his relative, who pretended to be a convert, more than sixty gatherings (it must be assumed that these gatherings were a weekly Mass held on a particular day) had been held at the church, and during the gatherings, people were learning about Christian teachings, money was collected, and bulletins were handed out. What was the edict that banned Buddhist and Daoist xianghui and, at the same time, was in effect from September 1664 or to December 1664? In fact, the answer concerns an important clue to understanding the early Qing state’s policy on Christianity. In this chapter, the dissertation will estimate when the edict was issued and examine the implications of the timing to understand a seminal feature of the Qing policy on Christianity.

**Remaining Sources**

During the Qing period, the edicts or important rescripts of emperors were supposed to be included in centrally-published legal compilations such as *Da Qing huidian, Da Qing lüli*, or *Xianxing zeli*. If omitted for some reason, those edicts or rescripts were to be included in *Qing shilu* or *Qijuzhu* 起居注. If we examine the accounts in those centrally compiled materials

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5 Based on the date that Yang submitted *Qing zhu xiejiao zhuang* (on September, 15 1664).

6 Based on the date the Ministries of Rites and Personnel submitted their memorial (on December 27, 1664).

7 It seems that missionaries held Mass almost every week and required Chinese Christians to attend Mass at least seventeen times a year. In addition to regular Mass, there were sodalities called *kuhui* 苦会, and Christians had sodality meetings in their house or the church. See Golvers, *François de Rougemont*, 408-09, 424-30.
between the Shunzhi reign and September 1664 (KX3/7/26) closely, we should be able to identify the ban on Buddhist and Daoist xianghui mentioned by Yang in his petition of September 1664.

Before beginning the analysis, we need to limit our scope. Qijuzhu will be excluded from our current analysis because its coverage begins from the 10th year of the Kangxi reign (c. 1671), and it is thus beyond our time span of interest. All editions of Da Qing huidian (the Kangxi, Yongzheng, Qianlong, Jiaqing, and Guangxu editions) throughout the Qing period, and after the Yongzheng edition, and all the sub-statutes (shili 事例 or zeli 則例) will be consulted. The Kangxi edition, which was submitted to the throne on the third of June in 1690 (KX29/4/26), and which covers the period to the Kangxi 25th year (c. 1686), will be used for preference, because it was compiled closest to our time of interest. We will use the edition of the Da Qing lüli that Su Yigong classified as the Wu edition. The Wu edition is the one that was ‘being currently circulated in the market’ in early 1671, as described in Zhang Weichi’s 張惟赤 memorial on the twenty-ninth of January, 1671 (KX9/12/19). One important feature of this edition is that all the new statutes that had been added before the seventh of April, 1664 (KX3/3/12) were included together in a separate section named ‘Da Qing lüli xinli’. This enables us to identify the statutes that were inserted in Da Qing lüli around our period of interest. The statutes classified as ‘regulations currently in use’ (xianxing li 現行例) in the section on ‘prohibitions concerning sorcerers and sorceress’ (jinzi shiwu xieshu) of Da Qing lüli genyuan 大清律例根源 will also be used because these were the statutes that the Qing authorities of the

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8 Yamane Yukio, ‘Ming Shin no kaiten’, 487-89.
9 For Su’s classification, see Su Yigong, Ming Qing lüli yu tiaoli, 136-38.
10 Su Yigong, Ming Qing lüli yu tiaoli, 146-48.
Kangxi period consulted in matters to do with religion before *Da Qing lüli* 大清律例 was amended in the 3rd year of the Yongzheng reign (c. 1725).

Several compilations of *Xianxing zeli* look especially useful on the basis that they were compiled close to the time we are interested in. For example, *Huang Qing dianlüe* 皇淸典略 allegedly contains legal statutes until the Kangxi 5th year (c. 1666), and Pan Jing’s 潘敬 *Liubu tiding xinli* 六部題定新例 has a separate section for legal statutes until the Kangxi 11th year (c. 1672). Unfortunately, however, none of this material is available. *Huang Qing dianlüe* is known not to be extant, and although *Liubu tiding xinli* can be found at the Institute of Advanced Studies on Asia at Tokyo University, the institute has been closed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. \(^{11}\)

This chapter is mainly based on *Liubu zeli quanshu*, which was privately compiled for reference by E’hai (or Ohai, ?-1725), the Governor-general of Sichuan-Shaanxi. This compilation includes a preface by E’hai, written on the twentieth-fourth of January, 1716 (KX55/1/1), according to which, he began the compilation when he was the Provincial Surveillance Commissioner of Shanxi province (appointed on 6 July 1697). The edition being used here can be found in the Digital Collections of the Library of Congress. One drawback of this edition is that the part before the *zeidao* 賊盜 section of *Xingbu xianxing zeli* 刑部現行則例 is missing. This means that the section *jisi* 祭祀, which is one of relevant parts for this present analysis, cannot be consulted. As an alternative, therefore, I referred to another edition of *Xingbu xianxing zeli*, which was included in *Qinding gujin tushu jicheng* 欽定古今圖書集

\(^{11}\) Takato Takuji, ‘Guanyu Qing chu fangke zeli ji’, 350-51; Tanii Yōko, ‘Shindai sokurei shōrei kō’, 205-6; Yang Yifan, *Gudai zhenxi falü dianji xin bian*, vol. 1, 15-17. *Gudai zhenxi falü dianji xin bian* (vols. 11, 12, 13) contains *Liubu tiding xinli* but not the part for the Ministry of Rites, which is the part most closely related to this article.
Xingbu xianxing zeli began to be compiled in the 8th month of the Kangxi 7th year (late 1668) on the order of the Kangxi emperor, and the proclamation of the finished version was approved in the 4th month of the Kangxi 19th year (mid 1680). Since this first edition is not extant, the edition used here, that contained in Qinding gujin tushu jicheng, is the earliest currently known version. This edition contains the regulations of the Ministry of Justice until the Kangxi 28th year (c. 1689).\(^\text{12}\)

For compilations of regulations other than E’hai’s Liubu zeli quanshu 六部則例全書, I also consulted Sun Lun’s Dingli cheng’an hejuan 定例成案合鐫, which has a preface dated in the Kangxi 46th year (c. 1707) and was published in the 58th year of the Kangxi reign (c. 1719); Li Zhen’s Dingli quanbian 定例全編, which was published in the 54th year of the Kangxi reign (c. 1715); and Zhang Guangyue’s Li’an quanji 例案全集, which has a preface dated in the Kangxi 61st year (c. 1722).

**Bans on Buddhist and Daoist xianghui**

Within the limited scope noted above, a listing of possible references to the ban on Buddhist and Daoist xianghui is given below:

\(^{(T-1)}\) [23 July 1646 (SZ3/6/11)] Lin Qilong 林起龍, the Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel (like jishizhong 吏科給事中) memorialised ‘As the social climate is recently becoming severely bad, heterodoxies are also arising like a swarm of bees. By burning incense (shaoxiang 燒香) or performing penitential rituals (lichen) in the name of the Bailian, Dacheng 大成, Hunyuan 混元, or Wuwei 無為

\(^{12}\) Su Yigong, ‘Kangxi chao Xingbu xianxing zeli’, 102-03.
teachings, [the heterodoxies] are inciting and confusing the popular feeling. Because of [these heterodoxies], [people] sometimes plot rebellion or high treason, or follow thieves or people causing public disorder. Such people [who are using heterodoxies to incite and confuse the popular feeling] are really the most serious villains among the wicked. I entreat Your Majesty to order as soon as possible that, [for Beijing,] the Five Censorial Offices for the City Wards (wucheng chayuan 五城察院) and the [two] Brigades of the Gendarmerie (xunbu 巡捕) and, [for the provinces,] Governors (xunfu 巡撫) and Regional Investigating Censors (xun’an yushi 巡按御史) immediately arrest and heavily punish every religious sect as soon as it is discovered. I entreat [Your Majesty] to quench the fire while it is small!' [His Majesty] approved [Lin’s] request.14

(T-2) [18 April 1647 (SZ4/3/14)] Order to the Ministry of War: ‘… Sorcerers of the left way (zuodao yaoren 左道妖人), by pronouncing fortune and misfortune, and ne’er-do-wells and scoundrels (youshou wulai 游手無賴), by spreading false rumors, are encouraging the locals to all evacuate in order to loot the regions. Now, any deaths or destruction that have been inflicted by the Great Forces [i.e., the Qing armed forces] only involve those who truly had caused public disorder by rebelling or making a disturbance, not innocent people. Our ordinary people should be prevented from courting hardship by believing those sorcerous remarks and false rumors. Your Ministry should issue an order that will enlighten [our ordinary people], and Governors and Regional Investigating

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13 Zhang Deze, Qingdai guojia jiguan kaolüe, 96.  
14 QSL-SZ3/6/11[bingxu].
Censors should put up notices of the order [across the country] to enlighten [all our ordinary people].”

(T-3) [c. 1651 (SZ8)] What was decided in the 8th year of the Shunzhi reign: ‘No Buddhist or Daoist rites (daochang 道場) are allowed in the Imperial city.’

(T-4) [22 December 1656 (SZ13/11/7)] The Shunzhi emperor’s edict: ‘Any behavior which seduces the multitudes by the left way (zuodao)—for example, that religious sects, including the teachings of Wuwei, Bailian, or Wenxiang, who deceive unenlightened commoners by forming associations or cliques—are detestable. From now on, if anyone again should copycat heretical teachings (xiejiao 邪教) and thus hold gatherings (juhui 聚會), burn incense (shaoxiang), collect money (lianqian 歳錢), or be praised as a Buddhist deity (haofo 號佛), for Beijing, the Five Censorial Offices for the City Wards, and for the provinces, Governors, Governors-general, Commissioners (si), Circuit Intendants (dao) and all relevant officials shall take all measures to arrest them, thoroughly investigate their wicked deeds, and sentence them to heavier penalties than the ones prescribed in the Code.’

(T-5) [c. 1662 (KX1)] What was decided in the 1st year of the Kangxi reign: ‘Holding Buddhist or Daoist rites (daochang) is only allowed within one’s own courtyard (zai ben jia yuan nei 在本家院內). It is prohibited to hold any Buddhist or Daoist rites on the streets, including setting up reed-woven canopies (da gai xipeng 搭蓋蓆棚); erecting pennants and hanging placards (yangfan guabang 揚旛掛榜); monks parading with parasols opened and with incense and paper held up (seng dao zhangsan pengtuo xiang

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15 QSL-SZ4/3/14[yimao].
16 DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3625.
17 DQHD-KX, juan 116, 5749-50.
bo raojie xingzou 僧道張傘捧香帛遶街行走); collecting water; drawing a line on the
ground and opening the afterworld (qushui huadi kai fengdou 取水畫地開酆都); wearing
body armor and helmets (chuan dai kuijia 穿戴盔甲), among other things. If this
prohibition is violated, the Buddhist or Daoist monks involved shall be punished with 20
strokes and shall be forced to leave the priesthood, and the officials of Buddhist and
Daoist Registries in charge of these monks shall be deprived of their government posts.
Also, if the person [or family] who held the Buddhist or Daoist rite is an official, they
shall be sent to the relevant Ministry for interrogation, and if they are a commoner, they
shall be punished [without being sent to the relevant Ministry] on the charge of violating
a prohibition (weijin 違禁).  

(T-6) Gatherings (juhui) shall be prohibited

(T-6-1) The Ministry of Rites’ request was approved by [the emperor]: ‘On the streets in
the capital, setting up reed-woven canopies (da xi peng 搭蓆棚), erecting pennants and
hanging placards (yangfan guanbang 揚臚掛榜), or burning incense and collecting water
(xingxiang qushui 行香取水) is not allowed. If this prohibition is violated, the Buddhist
or Daoist monks involved shall be sentenced to 20 strokes, and they shall be forced to
leave their priesthood. The officials of Buddhist and Daoist Registries [those in charge of
these monks] shall be deprived of their government posts. Our Ministry shall levy heavy
penalties on those who invited the monks’.  

19 Liubu zeli quanshu, dingli, libu zeli, juan xia, 86a.
(T-6-2) For the past several years, it has been prohibited to recite [or chant] scriptures (nianjing 念經) in the Imperial city. In addition, [in the Imperial city.] only the prescribed music has been allowed. Anyone who used a large trumpet has been punished.²⁰

(T-6-3) It has been announced in the capital and the provinces in past years that it is prohibited to seduce the multitudes through heretical teachings, for men and women to gather together (nannü juhui 男女聚會), to burn incense (shaoxiang), to put up flags (zhangzhi 張幟), to sound gongs (mingluo 嘗鑼), to collect money (lianjian), or to be praised as a Buddhist deity (haofo), and so on. Anyone who violates this prohibition shall be sent to the Ministry of Justice and be severely punished.²¹

(T-6-4) Because every twenty-eighth day of the third month is the Dongyue 東嶽’s (the deity for Mt Tai) birthday, [on that day] our Ministry issues an announcement prohibiting and constraining those who burn incense (shaoxiang). Because every eighth day of the fourth month is the Buddha’s birthday, [on that day] our Ministry issues an announcement to prohibit jumping-god rituals (tiaoshen 跳神) or redeem a vow to a deity (huanyuan 還願), suspending punishment [of criminals], and banning slaughter [of animals]. Our Ministry will also send this announcement to all the relevant officials.²²

Orders T-1 and T-2 above can be ruled out of our analysis because they were temporary measures against the background of the ongoing war, at the very early stage of the Qing empire. The background to order T-1 is depicted more clearly in the complete text of Lin Qilong’s memorial, which is included in Huang Qing zouyi 皇清奏議. According to the full text of Lin’s memorial, various kinds of religious sects were becoming rampant in the chaos of China proper

²⁰ Liubu zeli quanshu, dingli, libu zeli, juan xia, 86a.
²¹ Liubu zeli quanshu, dingli, libu zeli, juan xia, 86a.
²² Liubu zeli quanshu, dingli, libu zeli, juan xia, 86a.
at this time, and were spreading rumors across Beijing, such as ‘the Qing troops will slaughter people’ or ‘the Qing emperor will search for and destroy Buddhist statues or portraits of ancestors’. These rumors were raising panic among the populace, and it was in that atmosphere that Lin submitted the memorial in record T-1. The edict in T-2 was also issued in the same atmosphere. This is clear from the phrase, ‘Now, any deaths or destruction that have been inflicted by the Great Forces [i.e., the Qing armed forces] only involve those who truly had caused public disorder by rebelling or making a disturbance, not innocent people. Our ordinary people should be prevented from courting hardship by believing those sorcerous remarks and false rumors’.

There appear to be important clues in record T-6 of *Liubu zeli quanshu*, which was compiled during the late Kangxi period. This record is part of the regulations (*zeli*) left by the Ministry of Rites, which was the main office involved in the interrogation of the Calendar Case, and can be found under the title ‘Prohibition of Gatherings’ (*jinzhì juhui* 禁止聚會) in the section on ‘Buddhist and Daoist monks’ (*seng dao* 僧道). In other words, record T-6 is none other than the Ministry of Rites’ collection of bans on Buddhist and Daoist gatherings, up to the late Kangxi period. One concern we naturally have, however, is whether, despite E’hai’s ardent effort to collect all the relevant regulations as completely as possible, his compilation, which finished fifty-two years after the Kangxi 3rd year, really include the ban we are now

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23 Luo Zhenyu, *Huang Qing zouyi*, Lin Qilong’s ‘Qing su jinzhi yiduan yan shu 請速禁止異端讞言疏’ (SZ3), 46.
24 When compiling the section for *Dingli*, which contains record T6, E’hai tried to consult as many materials as he could, including the Ministry of War’s *Zhonggu zhengkao* 中樞政考, the Ministry of Justice’s *Xingbu xianxing zeli*, various compilations of regulations that were privately circulated, compilations of judicial precedents (*cheng’an* 成案) held in his office, his own judicial experience, and information from official gazettes. See *Liubu zeli quanshu*, *zuan ji zeli ji yan*, 1a-1b.
tracing? One positive consideration here is that, concerns about selective additions, omissions, or revisions to the regulations of the Ministry of Rites, which were often done by the government during a state-led compilation process, are relatively negligible. *Xuezheng quanshu* 學政全書 is the only compilation of the regulations of the Ministry of Rites produced by the central government during the Qing period. Moreover, its coverage has nothing to do with the parts of regulations that are related to our analysis, but those concerning bans on Buddhist or Daoist gatherings have been left as private compilations. In contrast to the government-led compilations, private ones tended to include as complete a list of regulations as possible, including outdated ones, because the purpose of compiling private editions was usually to make the most comprehensive reference for the daily, real *business* of officials.\(^{26}\)

Now, let us analyze record T-6. First, although the expression ‘*daochang*’ (Buddhist or Daoist rite or activity) in T-5 is substituted by ‘*nianjing*’ (recite or chant scriptures) in T-6-1, and the expressions ‘*sengdao zhangsan* 僧道張傘’ (monks … with parasol opened) and ‘*huadi kao Fengdou chuandai kuijia* 畫地開酆都穿戴盔甲’ (drawing a line on the ground and opening the afterworld and wearing body armor and helmets) in T-5 is not found in T-6-1, it can be concluded that the ban referred to in T-6-1 largely corresponds with the ban of the Kangxi 1\(^{st}\) year in account T-5.

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\(^{25}\) For example, during the government-led compilation (in the Kangxi 15\(^{th}\) year) and enlargement (in the Kangxi 25\(^{th}\) year) of *Chufen zeli*, the Qing central government selected and published only those regulations applicable at the point of publication. Private editions of *Chufen zeli*, meanwhile, reflected the addition, omission or revision due to the selection process, because private publishers mainly based their publications on official editions (*Qinding*). E’hai tried to make up for the missing parts as much as he could. See *Liubu zeli quanshu*, *zuan ji zeli ji yan*, 3a.

\(^{26}\) One issue that captures the attention is Takato Takuji’s recent study, in which he sheds light on the government’s other large-scale compilation in the Kangxi seventh year. The specific consequences resulting from that compilation project await further study, however. See Takato Takuji, ‘*Guanyu Qing chu fangke zeli ji*’, 354-58.
Next, although T-6-2 again uses the term ‘nianjing’ rather than the term ‘daochang’ found in account T-3, it otherwise corresponds to the ban of the Shunzhi 8\(^{\text{th}}\) year recounted in T-3. Both accounts concern a prohibition on Buddhist or Daoist rites in the Imperial city. Although the reference in T-6-2 about banning particular instruments such as large trumpets (\textit{dahao laba} 大號喇叭) in the Imperial city is not found in account T-3, a reference to this can be found in the record (\textit{hereafter T-3-1}) in \textit{Qing shilu} on the 7\(^{\text{th}}\) day of the 6\(^{\text{th}}\) month of the Shunzhi 8\(^{\text{th}}\) year (July 23, 1651),\(^{27}\) which is a more specific description of the ban referred to in the account in T-3.

Although account T-4 does not mention ‘nannü juhui’ (for men and women to gather together), ‘\textit{zhangzhi}’ (to raise flags), and ‘\textit{mingluo}’ (to sound gongs), all of which are included in account T-6-3, the ban referred to in T-6-3 is clearly the same edict as that of the 11\(^{\text{th}}\) month of the Shunzhi 13\(^{\text{th}}\) year given in T-4. The complete text (\textit{hereafter T-4-1}) of edict T-4 in \textit{Qing shilu} stipulates ‘\textit{zhangzhi mingluo nannü zahuan} 張幟鳴鑼男女雜還’ (raising flags and sounding gongs, mixing men and women).\(^{28}\)

Lastly, I could not identify the particular time relating to the regulation in T-6-4. Because it concerns just two particular days, however—the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) day of the 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) month for the Dongyue deity, and 8\(^{\text{th}}\) day of the 8\(^{\text{th}}\) month for Buddha—the regulation can be safely omitted from our choices. The ban that we are tracing was a prolonged one, covering from at least the fifteenth of September to the end of 1664.

According to the analysis above, our choices for the ban on Buddhist or Daoist gatherings in the Kangxi 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) year can be narrowed down to three: the Shunzhi 8\(^{\text{th}}\) year ban, the Shunzhi 13\(^{\text{th}}\) year ban, and the Kangxi 1\(^{\text{st}}\) year ban. Of these, the order of the Shunzhi 8\(^{\text{th}}\) year, which

\(^{27}\) QSL-SZ8/6/7[renzi].
\(^{28}\) QSL-SZ13/11/7[xinhai].
prohibited religious activities inside the Imperial city, can be ruled out because there were no Christian churches inside the Imperial city before the one built by French Jesuits in 1703. This ban could thus not be applied to any Christian Masses that were held at churches because at that point, all the churches were located outside the Imperial city.

Next, the Kangxi 1st year order did not target religious activities in and of themselves, but those activities held outside the allowed spaces, specifically ‘on the streets’. Since the Christian Mass was normally held inside churches, the Kangxi 1st year ban was also irrelevant to the ban that Yang Guangxian was relying on in his argument against the Christian Mass in the Kangxi 3rd year. If Yang had been relying on the Kangxi 1st year ban, Schall von Bell would have been able to defend himself by saying that the ban should not be applicable to the Christian Mass because it was held inside buildings, and never on the streets. Instead, Schall von Bell focused his counterargument rather on the nature of the gathering, by emphasizing what was going on during the gathering and the purpose of the gathering. He argued that Christians merely follow their formulated rituals, learn Christian teachings, and donate money to society during the Mass. Schall von Bell’s language choices in his defense and the main point of the ban Yang was mentioning were not likely to concern where religious rites were held, and this makes us turn to a notable word, ‘xiejiao’ (heretical teachings), which all those participating in the interrogation were using.

In light of that observation, it is significant that the Shunzhi 13th year ban (T-4) is the only remaining choice, and this does indeed contain the word, ‘xiejiao’. It also focuses more on the nature of the gatherings. According to this ban, as indicated by the phrase, ‘from now on’, anyone who copycats heretical teachings, holds gatherings, burns incense, collects money, and so on shall be subject to the ban. Indeed, it was also in the Shunzhi 13th year that Yang
Guangxian reached Beijing. However, the eight-year interval between the Shunzhi 13th and the Kangxi 3rd years sounds too long for us to conclude that the ban in place during the latter was the same ban as that instituted during the former.

**Features of the Qing Policy on Heretical Teachings**

What was the ban between the Shunzhi 13th and the Kangxi 3rd years, given that all the parties (Yang Guangxian, Schall von Bell, and the Ministries of Rites and Personnel) agreed that it was ‘now’ in effect? One clue is the fact that, throughout the Kangxi period, whenever a ban related to heretical teachings was issued, the Shunzhi 13th year ban was recalled. In *Da Qing huidian*, for example, a decision (hereafter T-7) in the 12th year of the Kangxi reign (c. 1673) is included as follows:

[A discussed decision that was approved in the Kangxi 12th year]:

‘For activities such as holding gatherings (*juhui*), reciting scriptures (*nianjing*), holding flags (*zhiqi*), sounding gongs (*mingluo*), and burning incense in a group (*jizhong nianxiang*), all of which are the result of being seduced by heretical teachings such as the Wuwei, the Bailian, the Fenxiang, the Hunyuan, the Longyuan, the Hongyang, the Yuantong, or the Dacheng teachings, inform the Eight Banners, the capital, and the provinces that all such activities shall be strictly prohibited and that all violators shall be whipped or beaten or wear the cangue.’

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29 QCXCMDY, 22
30 DQHD-KX, *juan* 71, 3627.
The incident that provoked decision T-7 was Fudali’s report about a ‘mad monk’ who resided at the Haihui si in the capital:

Previously it has been strictly prohibited for religious sects, including the Huangtian 黃天 or Hongyang teachings, to engage in activities such as allowing men and women to gather together (nannü zaji 男女雜集) and reciting scriptures and propagating their teachings (songjing shuofa 誦經說法). Such [heretical teachings] have not yet been eliminated, however. I, your servant, believe that since antiquity, such people [who, as members of such heretical teachings, engage in such activities] have only had harmful effects, and never helpful effects [on society]. I am afraid that if they are not eliminated at an early stage, unenlightened people will be seduced by them. I suggest that were Your Majesty to evict this monk and strictly prohibit heretical teachings such as the Huangtian teachings, the capital and provinces will be renewed, and the world will be very happy (emphasis mine).32

One notable aspect of Fudali’s report is that there had been (a) ban(s) on religious sects, including the Huangtian or Hongyang teachings, who conducted activities such as allowing men and women to gather together and recite scriptures and lecture about their teachings. What, then, was (were) the ban(s) that Fudali mentions? I could not find a ban before the Kangxi 11th year particularly targeting the Huangtian or Hongyang teachings, but if we look at bans before the Kangxi 11th year that targeted activities such as gathering both men and women together

31 He was the then-Manchu Hanlin Chancellor (Hanlin yuan zhangyuan xueshi 翰林院掌院學士). See QZN, 904-06.
32 QJZ-KX-1, 69-70.
and reciting scriptures or propagating teachings, two stand out: the Shunzhi 13th year ban that we have already addressed, and the ban (hereafter T-8) in the 6th month of the Kangxi 4th year (c. July 1665) that ordered a crackdown on monks who did not have ordination certificates (dudie). Qing sources, however, do not provide more specific details about ban T-8. We only know that, at that time, Buddhist or Daoist monks were wringing money out of commoners by taking advantage of people’s religious zeal, and that it was their meetings, which allowed both men and women to gather together, that triggered edict T-8.

Setting aside the Kangxi 4th year ban (T-8) for a while, let us focus on comparing the Kangxi 12th year ban (T-7) and the Shunzhi 13th year ban (T-4, T-4-1, and T-6-3). Such a comparison reveals considerable similarities between the two bans. First, if we look at accounts T-4 and T-7, both bans start by criticizing certain bad teachings that seduced the multitudes, and by listing specific kinds of such teachings. The difference, however, is the addition of six more teachings (Fenxiang, Hunyuan, Longyuan, Hongyang, Yuantong, and Dacheng) in the Kangxi 12th ban, compared to the three teachings in the Shunzhi 13th year ban (Wuwei, Bailian, and Wenxiang).

Second, both bans also list and proscribe specific activities associated with the bad teachings. When accounts T-4 and T-7 are compared, the Shunzhi 13th year ban lists and proscribes ‘holding gatherings, burning incense, collecting money, and being praised as a Buddhist deity’; and the Kangxi 12th year ban lists and proscribes ‘holding gatherings, reciting scriptures, holding flags, sounding gongs, and burning incense in a group’. Although reciting scripture is not mentioned in the Shunzhi 13th year ban, it is assumed that since this activity is fundamental to any group meeting for religious purposes it was already considered to be covered by the ban. The activities of holding flags and sounding gongs in the Kangxi 12th year ban

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33 QSL-KX4/6/22[dingchou].
ban seem at first sight to be missing in the Shunzhi 13th year ban (T-4), but they are in fact included as ‘raising flags’ and ‘sounding gongs’ in account T-4-1, which is the complete version of account T-4. Thus, the only differences in the lists of activities proscribed in the respective bans are ‘collecting money (liangqian)’ and ‘being praised as a Buddhist deity (haofo)’, neither of which are present in the Kangxi 12th year ban.

Third, both bans ended by specifying the officials who would be in charge of the enforcement, and by defining the penalties. For example, while the Shunzhi 13th year ban ordered officials in the capital and the provinces to punish the people involved more severely than stipulated in Da Qing lüli, the Kangxi 12th year ban added an order to Eight Banner officials and added penalties such as whipping and wearing the cangue, especially addressing bannermen. It can thus be concluded that the Kangxi 12th year ban was an updated and supplemented version of the Shunzhi 13th year ban.

According to our analysis thus far, an interesting feature of the Qing policies on heretical teachings (or sects) is that the main concerns of the Qing authorities appear to have rested in what the adherents of those teachings did, rather than in what their doctrines were. This aligns with the observations in previous studies that when distinguishing between ‘orthodoxy’ (zheng) and ‘heresy’ (xie), the Qing state was largely concerned with the extent to which the teachings deviated from the orthopraxy, meaning the right behavior.34 Indeed, although the bans of the Shunzhi 13th year and the Kangxi 12th year targeted heretical teachings with different names, the subjects of the bans, in practice, were specific, observable stereotypical activities that society assumed to be heretical at that time. This is made clear in the Shunzhi emperor’s remark, ‘From now on, if anyone again, should copycat heretical teachings (zhongxing xiejiao 踐行邪

(T-4, T-4-1, emphasis mine). His concerns here lay in the risk of commoners copying activities that were deemed heretical. Such an approach by the Qing authorities is understandable, since it was in practice impossible for the Qing state to grasp the doctrines of each of the potentially heretical teachings in its vast territories, and thus it inevitably began to focus on easily distinguishable, seemingly heretical activities arising from teachings. This was not unique to the Qing authorities; the rulers or elites of other dynasties in Chinese history also had their own ‘lists’ of stereotypes for heretical or bad teachings. Those lists were sometimes carried over to subsequent periods, with the stereotypes being added to, removed, or changed.\textsuperscript{35} Da Minglü 大明律, for example, contained ‘to burn incense and gather crowds’ (shaoxiang jizhong 燒香集眾), ‘to falsely claim to be in a society such as [one with the name of] the Mattreya Buddha’ (wangcehng Mile fo … denghui 妄稱彌勒佛 … 等會), ‘to dress themselves up as gods’ (zhuangban shenxiang 裝扮神像), and ‘to sound gongs’ as stereotypes of heretical teachings, and these were carried over to Da Qinglü without any changes.\textsuperscript{36}

But if Da Qinglü already included certain stereotypes of heretical activities, which were inherited from Da Minglü, why did the Shunzhi and Kangxi governments bother to issue edicts to prohibit similar activities again? Why did the Qing authorities simply not reiterate the article in Da Qinglü that contained the prohibition of those activities? To answer this question, we need to understand how the Qing empire used its predecessor’s Code, Da Minglü. It is known that the Qing ruler replaced Da Minglü in a hurry to restore order in China proper, and in 1647 (SZA4/3) proclaimed its own Code, Da Qinglü, as a relatively rough draft. This did not mean,

\textsuperscript{35} ter Haar, \textit{The White Lotus Teaching}, 16, 44-59.

\textsuperscript{36} Da Minglü, 89; DQLJF, juan 11, 5a-b.
however, that the early Qing state ignored the realities that it faced, or that it did not intend the Code to deal with new situations as they arose. The Qing emperors were particularly not constrained by the order issued by the first ruler of the Ming Dynasty that no one could change the Code, even though this had been strictly observed by the Ming emperors. Putting these factors together, it is evident that the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods should be seen as an adjustment period for the Qing Code. Working-level officials developed new regulations that reflected the Qing realities, and these new regulations were classified and compiled as ‘the regulations currently in use’ (xianxing lǐ) or ‘the current regulations’ (xianxing zeli). When Da Qinglü (Da Qinglü) or huidian were revised, those regulations were inserted into them after a selection process.

This procedure can also be clearly seen in the bans on heretical teachings. As we saw, at the stage of the Shunzhi 13th year ban, by saying ‘sentence him to a heavier penalty than that prescribed in the Code (yu dinglü wai jiadeng zhizui 於定律外加等治罪)’, the Qing authorities gave an indication that new regulations could be placed above existing statutes in the Code. In the Kangxi 12th year ban, the Qing authorities inserted new regulations especially for bannermen, which had never been a consideration for their Ming predecessors.

The nature of the Shunzhi and Kangxi era as an adjustment period is also clear in the Kangxi 18th year ban (hereafter T-9):

[A discussed decision that was approved in the Kangxi 18th year]:

In all cases where anyone, by welcoming the gods, offering incense, sounding gongs, or beating drums, acts in a reckless and unrestrained fashion (fan yingshen jinxiao, mingluo jigu, sixing wuji zhe 凡迎神進香，鳴鑼擊鼓，肆行無忌者), the principals shall be punished by strangulation with delay, and be executed after the Autumn Assizes, and the accessories shall wear a cangue for three months. If [the accessory is] a bannerman, he shall be additionally whipped 100 times, and if [the accessory is] a commoner, he shall
additionally receive 40 strokes. Regardless of whether the offenders are bannermen or
commoners, their punishment shall not be commuted to monetary redemption. In all cases
where an official[s] fails to take action to investigate and arrest the offender and the
incident subsequently comes to light, … officers [who are involved] shall be …

The original and complete form (hereafter T-9-1) of the ban above can be found in certain
private compilations mentioned earlier, including Li’an quanji or Dingli cheng’an hejuan. In
record T-9-1, we learn more detailed information from the phrase, ‘In all cases where by
welcoming the gods, offering incense, sounding gongs, beating drums, putting up paraphernalia
such as flags and etc., anyone acts in a reckless and unrestrained fashion’, regarding the
heretical activities described in record T-9. This additional information corresponds to
‘holding gatherings’ and ‘raising flags’, both of which are included in both the Shunzhi 13th
year ban and the Kangxi 12th year ban. In other words, the Kangxi 18th year ban re-prohibited
the heretical stereotypes (holding religious gatherings, reciting scriptures, raising flags,
sounding gongs, burning incense, and being praised as a Buddhist deity) that had been
proscribed in the Shunzhi 13th year ban and the Kangxi 12th year ban, particularly activities
such as holding gatherings, raising flags, burning incense, sounding gongs, and so on. The
significance of the Kangxi 18th ban lies in more than just its reiteration of previous bans,
however. It supplemented the previous bans with detailed regulations for the punishment of the
officials involved. It can be concluded, therefore, that the Kangxi 18th year ban was a
continuation and development of the Shunzhi 13th year and the Kangxi 12th year bans.

37 DQHD-KX, juan 116, 5751-52.
38 Li’an quanji, juan 14, 14a-14b. The same content can also be found in Dingli cheng’an hejuan, juan
11, 6a-7a.
The Kangxi 18th year ban, however, was not just an incremental progression of the previous bans, since it actually contradicted a statute\(^\text{39}\) in Da Qinglü which had been carried over unchanged from Da Minglü. Specifically, both Da Qinglü and Da Minglü contained an escape clause below the main statute of the article on the Prohibition Concerning Sorcerers and Sorceresses (jinzhi shiwu xieshu). As mentioned earlier, to distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy, Chinese rulers and elites had focused more on the behavioral stereotypes of certain sects that were assumed to be heretical rather than on the contents of the sect’s teachings. The subjects targeted in the main statute of the article jinzhi shiwu xieshu were therefore specifically those who carried out those activities for a religious purpose. Focusing on actions alone, however, risked criminalising innocent people who just followed the stereotypes. This is why the architects of Da Minglü put the aforementioned escape clause below the main statute. For example, a folk festival called saihui 賽會 had certain similarities with the heretical stereotypes. People participating in that festival also held gatherings (juhui), a religious procession, sounded gongs, beat drums, and so on. The folk festival, however, was not heretical, although it was regarded as undesirable. The escape clause thus stipulated that for saihui, punishment shall only be applied to the principals, not other participants, Moreover, even the punishment shall be limited to 100 strokes, which is lighter than ‘100 strokes and exile 3000 li’ for the accessories to a genuine heretical crime. In the Kangxi 18th year ban, however, the Qing authorities raised objections to the decision by the architects of Da Minglü and also to the decision by their predecessors who proclaimed Da Qinglü. The Kangxi 18th year ban clearly stipulated that although certain activities were part of saihui, they should still be punished in accordance with the punishment meted out to heretical sects. Because the activities of the folk festival were

\(^\text{39}\) DQLJF, juan 11, 5a-5b.
similar to the heretical stereotypes, the principals should be punished by ‘strangulation with delay’. The accessories should also be punished by a period of three months in a cangue and either 40 or 100 strokes depending on their rank.

The Kangxi 18th year ban was not the end of the story in terms of the Kangxi government’s policies on heretical teachings. In the 26th year of the Kangxi reign, Liu Kai 刘楷, the Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Justice (xingke jishizhong 刑科给事中), memorialised the throne that obscene fictions (yinci xiaoshuo 淫词小说) should be proscribed.40 Although nine Chief Ministers responded that it was unnecessary to issue a new ban because two similar bans had already been issued in the Shunzhi 16th year and the Kangxi 2nd year, the Kangxi emperor rejected that opinion and agreed to the need for a new ban on obscene fictions. What is striking in this episode is the emperor’s rationale for his decision: his concern lay not in the obscene fictions themselves, but in the potential for those works to become a channel through which heretical teachings of Buddhist or Daoist monks might spread.

**The Kangxi emperor:** ‘People like reading obscene fictions, but [such obscene fictions] corrupt public morals and poisonously seduce people’s hearts and minds. I think that enjoying obscene fictions is not useful—not only useless, but also harmful. When it comes to the heretical teachings of Buddhist and Daoist monks, they are against the rules of decorum. They seriously delude the world. In particular, it should be a matter of

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40 Li’an quanjı, juan 14, 12a.
ridicule that unenlightened people regard what a monk who uses esoteric techniques says as enlightened, and even revere him as a god. All [such things] should be proscribed!”

Chen Tingjing 陳廷敬 and Dong Na 董訥: ‘Indeed, it concerns the morals of the time and the people’s hearts and minds, that the books of heretical teachings frighten and seduce multitudes. Seeing that Your Majesty’s wise thought even reaches such considerations, Your Majesty indeed has a deep and farsighted discernment!’

Folun 佛倫: ‘We thought that if a new ban were issued, some wicked men, by taking advantage of this ban, could cause trouble and threaten commoners. That is why we answered [that issuing a new ban was not necessary]. However, seeing that Your Majesty’s thought considers people’s hearts and minds and the social custom, Your Majesty’s wise discernment is truly incredible. From now on, all the obscene fictions and the printing woodblocks for them shall be burnt and thus [such activities as printing or reading obscene fictions] shall be cut off forever.’

At the emperor’s wish, this issue was re-investigated, and on the seventh of April, 1687 (KX26/2/26) a ban on obscene fictions was approved. The ban was included in Da Qing huidian 大清會典 as follows:

Sometimes, scoundrel fanatics call themselves Buddhist or Daoist monks. They say that ‘the spirit of the founder [of the teachings] has arrived’, and perform planchette writing; stating irrational heretical teachings, making false predictions; and tell lies to seduce and

41 QJZ-KX-1, KX26/2/16[jiazi], 1595. Although this story is also found in Qing shilu, Qing shilu relates that the Nine Chief Ministers accepted Liu Kai’s opinion. See QSL-KX26/2/16[jiazi].
42 QJZ-KX-1, KX26/2/16[jiazi], 1595.
43 QJZ-KX-1, KX26/2/16[jiazi], 1595.
incite the unenlightened. Some unenlightened people even flock to [those monks], honor them and are even willing to become their pupils. Inform Banner [officials], [Beijing] Five Wards [officials], Provincial Governors, Governors-General, and other local officials that from now on, such heretical teachings shall be proscribed!\textsuperscript{44}

Another ban was instituted in the 48\textsuperscript{th} year of the Kangxi reign, as a response to the memorial by Zhang Lian 張蓮, the Investigating Censor of the Jiangnan Circuit (\textit{Jiangnan dao yushi 江南道御事}).\textsuperscript{45} This ban focused on folk festivals (\textit{minhui 民會}), esoteric techniques (\textit{fangshu 方術}) and obscene fictions (\textit{yinci xiaoshuo}). It also proscribed ‘planchette writing’ (\textit{fuji 扶乩} or \textit{fuluan 扶鸞}), which had previously been addressed in the Kangxi 26\textsuperscript{th} ban, and ‘sounding gongs, beating drums (\textit{jigu 擊鼓}), gathering multitudes, burning incense, and allowing men and women to gather together’, which had been addressed in the Shunzhi 13\textsuperscript{th} year ban, the Kangxi 12\textsuperscript{th} year ban, and the Kangxi 18\textsuperscript{th} year ban. The Kangxi 48\textsuperscript{th} year ban specifically included a new phrase, ‘to proscribe it forever’ (\textit{yongxing jinzhi 永行禁止}), which must be taken as indicating the Qing ruler’s desire to put an end to issues concerning such heretical activities, which had repeatedly been mentioned in previous bans.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Table 2: Bans on Buddhist or Daoist gatherings during the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Banned Activities</th>
<th>Special Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 8\textsuperscript{th} year of the</td>
<td>Using \textit{laba} and \textit{suona} 搖吶, holding Buddhist or Daoist rites</td>
<td>Regulations about playing musical instruments and holding Buddhist or Daoist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{44} DQHD-YZ, \textit{juan} 102, 6797. Also See \textit{Li’an quanji, juan} 14, 11b-12b.  
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Li’an quanji, juan} 14, 13b-14a.  
\textsuperscript{46} DQHD-YZ, \textit{juan} 102, 6797-98.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign Period</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Punishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shunzhi reign</td>
<td>Holding gatherings, burning incense, putting up flags, sounding gongs, collecting money, being praised as a Buddhist deity</td>
<td>Offenders should receive heavier penalties than those prescribed in the Code, a countrywide ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 13th year of Shunzhi reign</td>
<td>Setting up canopies, putting up flags or placards, having Buddhist or Daoist monks parading with parasols opened, burning incense, collecting water, drawing a line on the ground, opening the after-world, wearing body armor and helmets</td>
<td>Prohibition on holding religious activities in the streets (outside the allowed spaces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1st year of Kangxi reign</td>
<td>Holding gatherings, burning incense in a group, putting up flags, sounding gongs, reciting scriptures</td>
<td>Punishment regulations added for bannerman offenders, a countrywide ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 12th year of Kangxi reign</td>
<td>Welcoming the gods, burning incense, sounding gongs, beating drums, putting up flags</td>
<td>The folk festival (<em>saihui</em>) shall also be regarded as a heretical activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 18th year of Kangxi reign</td>
<td>Publishing obscene fictions, engaging in planchette writing, becoming pupils of heretical monks</td>
<td>To ban obscene fictions because they can be a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The bans in the Shunzhi 13th, Kangxi 12th, 18th, 26th, and 48th years that we have analysed so far are not the only bans on heretical teachings that were issued by the central government during this period. The main reason these bans were the subject of this present analysis is simply because they have been preserved in a relatively complete condition, and also because they contain relatively more specific details than the others. The survival of those bans seems to have been related to a series of central government-led projects for the maintenance of the regulations during the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods. In fact, aside from those relatively complete and detailed central bans, we can also find remaining fragments of other central bans on heretical teachings during the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods. Those fragments, however, are scattered across diverse Qing sources. To the best of my knowledge, they can be listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 48th</td>
<td>Sounding gongs, beating drums, holding gatherings, burning incense, allowing men and women to gather together, engaging in planchette writing</td>
<td>The phrase ‘to proscribe it forever’ is added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangxi reign</td>
<td>channel for Buddhist or Daoist heretical teachings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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47 Yamamoto Eishi points out that the Shunzhi thirteenth year and the Kangxi twelfth, fifteenth and nineteenth years were critical moments in the promulgation of regulations against gangsters (guanggun). Interestingly, those years overlap with the periods of the bans on heretical teachings. See Yamamoto Eishi, ‘Kōkon rei no seiritsu’, 223-28.
the Ministry of Revenue agreed with the Governor-General of Guangdong Province’s accusation against Buddhist or Daoist heretical teachings and suggested a ban on such teachings and gatherings. This opinion was approved by the throne.48

a ban on heretical teachings was proclaimed across the country and relevant punishment regulations for the officials involved were also approved.49

a decision was made that all offenders against the bans on heretical teaching should be punished in accordance with the relevant statute (lü) in the Code. The decision also mentioned punishment regulations for officials involved.50

A ban was imposed on Buddhist or Daoist monks holding gatherings in Beijing, men and women gathering together, the setting up of canopies and elevated platforms, the staging of plays, collecting money, thanking the gods, and holding folk festivals (saihui).51

While seeking to identify such a ban, we identified the following four important facts. First, from the Shunzhi 13th year through the entire Kangxi period, there were repeated bans that shared the same target—‘multitudes-seducing by heretical teachings (or sects)’ (xiejiao huo zhong 邪敎惑衆). Second, the bans had almost the same structure as the Shunzhi 13th year ban. In other words, they were expanded or upgraded versions of the Shunzhi 13th year ban. Third, the concerns addressed by those bans lay less with the heretical teachings themselves than with the activities that were assumed to be heretical by contemporaries. Fourth, those activities had at least three shared features as stereotypes or labels: being Buddhist or Daoist

48 QSL-KX4/6/2[dingchou].
49 DQHD-KX, juan 116, 5750-51.
50 DQHD-KX, juan 116, 5751.
51 DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3626.
(sengdao 僧道), holding gatherings (juhui 聚會), and burning incense (shaoxiang 燒香). We can thus conclude that whenever the Kangxi government encountered problems related to religion it repeatedly recalled the Shunzhi 13th year ban, adding further provisions to the basic structure outlined by the Shunzhi 13th year ban.

Huang Liuhong’s 黃六鴻 (fl. 1651-1706) account in *Fuhui quanshu* 福惠全書 [Complete Book of Happiness and Benevolence] offers some insights into how the stereotypes or labels that had been established since the Shunzhi 13th year circulated at the local level during the early Qing period. Although the book was completed in the Kangxi 33rd year (c. 1694), the following account seemed to be based on Huang’s personal experience as a local official between the Kangxi 9th and 17th years (c. 1670-78):52

Nowadays, teachings such as the Bailian, Wuwei, Haungji 皇極, Dacheng, Hongyang and Luozu 螺祖 are the heretical teachings that wicked people founded … As a shepherd of commoners, [a local official] should enlighten people, point out the ridiculousness of [those teachings’], break the stupidity [of those teachings], thoroughly investigate [the teachings], and disband the sects of those [teachings’]. [The local official] should also order the heads of the baojia system to prohibit activities such as gathering multitudes, burning incense, reciting scriptures and holding gatherings, and to perform continual

52 At the age of nineteen, Huang Liuhong passed the provincial examination (xiangshi 鄉試) of the Shunzhi eighth year. Between the Kangxi ninth and eleventh years, Huang served as the Magistrate of the Tancheng County (the Shandong Province), and between the Kangxi fourteenth to seventeenth years, he was the Magistrate of the Dongguang County (the Hebei Province). After that, Huang was selected as a capital official (jingguan 京官) and served as Xingren 行人, like geishizhong, gongke zhangyin geshizhong, etc. In the Kangxi 32nd year, he resigned from his office and spent the rest of his life in his hometown, the Xinchang County (the Jiangxi Province). For more about Huang’s life and the editions of *Fuhui chuanshu* see Kim Hyungchong, ‘Myŏng Ch’ŏng shidae Chungguk ŭi kwanjamsŏ’, 18–34.
inspections of both men and women who seem to be involved [in those activities]. At the beginning and end of every month, the heads of the baojia system should also submit a signed baojia report that contains the attestation phrase, ‘there are no heretical men or women’s activities such as gathering multitudes, burning incense, reciting scriptures or holding gatherings’ (emphasis mine).\(^{53}\)

Indeed, the Shunzhi 13\(^{th}\) year ban would continue to be recalled not only during the Kangxi period, but also in much later periods, whenever the issue of gatherings as a result of heretical teachings arose again.\(^{54}\)

**The Meaning of the Ban on xianghui**

To summarise our analysis thus far, the main question we were trying to answer was, ‘What ban on Buddhist or Daoist xianghui (the burning of incense at a temple) did all the parties (Yang Guangxian, Schall von Bell, the Ministry of Rites, and the Ministry of Personnel) agreed was now (towards the end of the Kangxi 3\(^{rd}\) year) in effect?’ Along the way, we provisionally concluded that in terms of the contents, the Shunzhi 13\(^{th}\) year ban would be the most probable source for the ban, but the Shunzhi 13\(^{th}\) year ban could not be the ban ‘currently enforced’ at the point of the Kangxi 3\(^{rd}\) year. We have thus tried to find another ban with similar content to the Shunzhi 13\(^{th}\) year ban, which was being enforced at the point of the Kangxi 3\(^{rd}\) period.

It is reasonable to conclude through the analysis thus far, therefore, that ‘the ban on Buddhist or Daoist xianghui (the burning of incense at a temple) which all the parties (Yang Guangxian, Schall von Bell, the Ministry of Rites, and the Ministry of Personnel) agreed was

\(^{53}\) Huang Liuhong, *Fuhui quanshu*, 10b-11a.
\(^{54}\) See, for example, this instance during the Jiaqing reign: QSL-JQ20/11/18[jihai].
now (the Kangxi 3\textsuperscript{rd} year) in effect’ should be, first, a ‘recent’ ban, that is, one instituted not long before the Kangxi 3\textsuperscript{rd} year, and, that secondly, its form should be an updated version of the series of bans that had been repeatedly issued by the central government since the Shunzhi 13\textsuperscript{th} year to target the established heretical stereotypes, including ‘sengdao’, ‘shaoxiang’, and ‘juhui’.

In further support of this contention, there is circumstantial evidence that the Qing state was particularly concerned about Buddhism and Daoism around the Kangxi 3\textsuperscript{rd} year. According to \textit{Da Qing huidian}, for example, the Qing state in the Kangxi 4\textsuperscript{th} year decided that in Xingjing, Shengjing, and Beijing, any new (Buddhist and Daoist) temples (\textit{simiao} 寺廟) could be built only with the emperor’s express approval. This decision also included the provision that the number of residential monks allotted to existing temples should be limited according to the temple’s size and whether the temple had been built privately or with imperial funds.

What we have reached is also supported by Ji Rongren’s (1637-76) \textit{Jizheng beikao}\textsuperscript{55}, which contains legal statutes until the Kangxi 9\textsuperscript{th} year. Its section on ‘heretical teachings seducing multitudes’ (xiejiao huozhong) contains the Ministry of Rites’ answer in the Kangxi 2\textsuperscript{nd} year to a memorial by Wu Guolong 吳國龍, a Censor, and the Qing center’s approval (on 10 July 1663, KX2/6/6) of the Ministry’s answer. The gist of this ban was that because previous

\textsuperscript{55} After I had completed this article, I fortunately acquired a copy of \textit{Jizheng beikao}, which together with \textit{Liubu tiding xinli}, are the oldest extant compilations of regulations (\textit{zeli}). I had initially sought out this compilation in the hope that it might be able to provide crucial further evidence in respect to our analysis, since it was completed the closest to the period addressed in this article, but I was not able to have an access to \textit{Jizheng beikao} because the National Archives of Japan were closed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
bans, such as the Shunzhi 13th year ban, the Shunzhi 18th\textsuperscript{56} year ban, and the Kangxi 1st year ban, had by then become nominal, the entire population of the country (\textit{Wucheng ge zhi sheng} 五城各直省) should be reminded (\textit{zai xing} 再行) of them.\textsuperscript{57} To date, this ban seems to be the most probable source for the ban on Buddhist and Daoist \textit{xianghui} that Yang, Schall von Bell, and the two Ministries mentioned as being enforced in the Kangxi 3rd year.

In addition to concluding thus far that the ban on Buddhist and Daoist \textit{xianghui} was being enforced shortly before the Calendar Case, we also need to also pay attention to the following historical fact. According to \textit{Da Qing h uidian zeli}, at some point in time close to the Kangxi 6th year, the Qing state investigated the number of (Buddhist and Daoist) temples across the country as a whole.\textsuperscript{58} Although the record is written in the section for the Kangxi 6th year in \textit{Da Qing huidian zeli},\textsuperscript{59} the circumstantial evidence suggests that the record was the result of the investigation initiated in the Kangxi 4th year. Above all, \textit{Qing shilu} does not mention anything about the investigation in the section for the Kangxi 6th year. Instead, the record of September 29, 1665 (KX4/8/21) in \textit{Qing shilu} shows that the government ordered a countrywide investigation of the ordination certificates (\textit{dudie} 度牒) of Buddhist and Daoist monks and nuns, and of the numbers of Buddhist and Daoist temples and the chief monks at them.\textsuperscript{60} This countrywide investigation seemed to arise from i) a request from the Governor-General of the Guangdong province, Lu Chongjun 盧崇峻 (?-1701), to ‘force Buddhist and

\textsuperscript{56} This seems to be a mistake by the compiler of \textit{Jizheng bei kao}, because the contents of this ban are the same as those of the Shunzhi 13th year ban.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Jizheng bei kao}, lili, juan 2, 11a-11b.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Da Qing huidian zeli}, juan 92, libu 禮部, ciji qingli si 祠祭清吏司, \textit{fangji} 方伎, \textit{sengdao} 僧道.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Da Qing huidian zeli}, juan 92, libu 禮部, ciji qingli si 祠祭清吏司, \textit{fangji} 方伎, \textit{sengdao} 僧道
\textsuperscript{60} QSL-KX4/8/21[jiaxu].
Daoist monks to leave the priesthood because heterodox Buddhists and Daoists (yiduan sengdao 異端僧道) are seducing the country and wringing [money] out of people’; ii) the Ministry of Revenue’s subsequent reply in early August 1665 (KX4/6/22) that ‘provincial officials [should] investigate Buddhist and Daoist monks in their jurisdictions and prohibit all gatherings that allowed both men and women to be together’; and iii) the Qing center’s approval of the Ministry’s reply. Although it is not clear exactly when Lu Chongjun submitted the aforementioned request, the Qing center’s response appeared in August and September 1665, which was right around the time of the closure of the Calendar Case (September 1664 to September 1665). This indicates that during the period when the Qing state had almost finished the countrywide investigation of the Xiyang ‘clergy’, (i.e., missionaries) and Xiyang ‘religious buildings’, (i.e., Christian churches), the Qing state also started a countrywide investigation of the Buddhist and Daoist ‘clergy’ and their ‘religious buildings’.

To summarise, a ban, presumably one instituted in July 1663, of Buddhist and Daoist xianghui was being enforced shortly before the Calendar Case, that is, the Qing government’s countrywide investigation of the ‘Xiyang clergy’ and their religious buildings; and when the Qing government had almost finished its countrywide investigation of them, it began a countrywide investigation of the Buddhist and Daoist clergy and their religious building. Therefore, the Qing state’s policies on Xiyang Christianity were not an independent variable that was separate from the Qing government’s general religious policies, but rather, both were closely interconnected and interacted with each other: The Qing state’s policy on its legitimate religions was applied to the Xiyang people’s religion as to any other legitimate religion; at the same time, Qing policies on Christianity also applied to other Qing religions.

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61 QSL-KX4/6/22[dingchou].
Chapter IV: The Legal Status of Xiyang Teachings

Overtopping the Verdicts

As a result of the Calendar Case, the Xiyang people’s influence started to wane. In early March 1665 (KX4/1), the Qing centre drew up plans to assign Manchu officials to the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy. Before that time, there had been no Manchu officials at the Directorate, and Adam Schall, a Xiyang person, had occupied the Director’s post that was officially reserved for Han Chinese.¹ In the following month (KX4/2), the government appointed a Manchu Seal-Holding Director, a Manchu Vice Director, and other Manchu officials.² In addition, Yang Guangxian, one of the main actors of the Calendar Case, became a Right Vice Director on the twenty-first of May 1665 (KX4/4/7)³ and, despite refusing five times, was also appointed as the Han Director on the thirteenth of September (KX4/8/5).⁴ The Calendar based on the Xiyang New calendrical method was soon replaced by the Calendar of the Great Unification (datong li 大統曆), which was based on the traditional method. Indeed, the phrase,

¹ Adam Schall served at the Directorate in the capacity of Han Director (Han jianzheng 漢監正). DQHD-KX, juan 3, libu 1, guandi 1, Qing tianjian, 131.
² Huang, ‘Qingchu Qintianjian zhong ge minzu tianwenjia’, 99-100.
³ BDY, Yi kouhun ci shu, 80.
⁴ BDY, Wu kouhun ci shu, 91.
‘In accordance with the Xiyang New method’ (yi xiyang xinfa 依西洋新法) was also removed from the almanac.5

**The Old-New Methods Conflict Case (Subcase 2)**

The Xiyang missionaries started to fight back, however.6 Their opportunity came when the Kangxi emperor began to officially exercise his independence from the Regents’ influence (25 August 1667).7 This was because, although the emperor had a serious interest in astronomy and calendrical methods and was further encouraged by the appearance of a comet in the southwest sky of Beijing in March 1668, the figures who by now dominated the Directorate, including Yang Guangxian, found themselves unable to live up to the demands for information that the emperor’s interest was now placing on them.8

The calendar for the Kangxi 8th year, for example, brought these issues to a head. The Kangxi 8th year calendar was at first calculated based on the Muslim calendrical method9 because Wu Mingxuan 吳明炫 or 吳明烜, a Vice Director of the Directorate, had identified certain issues in the Kangxi 7th year calendar, which was based on the Calendar of the Great Unification (datong) method.10 On the twenty-seventh and twenty-ninth of December

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5 DQHD-KX, juan 161, 7746-47; DQHD-YZ, juan 246, 15519-20; DQHDZL-QL, juan 158.
6 As early as June 1665 (KX4/5), when the Calendar Case was almost completed, Buglio made a frontal attack on Yang’s distortion of the Christian doctrine and his accusations concerning Macao in his treatise Budeyi bian [A Rebuttal of I Cannot Do Otherwise]. See Buglio, Budeyi bian, 95-131. However, the exact times at which Jie lifa xingjiao bian and Zhongguo churen bian were written is no clear (BDYF, 132-35).
7 Golvers, Letters of a Peking Jesuit, 161.
8 Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics, 58-60; Jami, ‘Revisiting the Calendar Case’, 475-76.
9 QSL-KX7/7/15[renzi].
10 QSL-KX7/8/30[bingshen]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 543-44; XC, 50.
(KX7/11/24, 26), however, the emperor entrusted the Kangxi 8th year calendar to Verbiest after having seen Verbiest successfully predict the sun’s position in a contest with Wu and Yang in late December (KX7/11/24-26). When Verbiest won again in another contest with Wu and Yang in February 1669 (KX8/1), the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials memorialised the throne on the twenty-fourth of February (KX8/1/24), that the calendar for the Kangxi 9th year should also be entrusted to Verbiest.  

The Beijing missionaries’ renewed influence allowed the fightback to gather pace. We can see this in Verbiest’s memorial at the end of January 1669 (KX7/12), in which he again brought up the same issues that had been addressed during the Calendar Case, such as the ways to set intercalary months or twelve nodal qi (jieqi) and to calculate the length of a day. The implication, then, was that if this memorial were to be approved, that approval would in effect overturn one of the verdicts of the Calendar Case. The emperor could not rush into a decision at that point, however, because the Regents, who had been the main arbiters during the Calendar Case, were still influential. The emperor therefore left the judgement to the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials. He referred the matter formally to the Council on the twenty-sixth of February 1669, highlighting the disparity between the Council’s approval, two days previously, of Verbiest’s method for the Kangxi 9th year calendar, and its approval of Yang’s method during the Calendar Case.

On the sixth of March (KX8/2/5), a Ministry of Rites’ official, one of the members of the Council, responded as follows:

\[11\] XC, 97.
\[12\] XC, 49-53.
\[13\] Although Pingyi Chu suggests that the Kangxi emperor played a leading role in calling for the competitions, according to Xichao ding’an, the contest held in early 1669 was suggested by the Council. See Chu, ‘Scientific Dispute in the Imperial Court’, 20-22; XC, 52. The competitions in late 1668, meanwhile, likely resulted from Verbiest’s opinion. See Golvers, The Astronomia Europaea, 60-61.
\[14\] XC, 53; QSL-KX8/1/26[gengshen].
(a) Last time, [we] memorialised [Your Majesty] that because the hundred-ke system has been used [to calculate the length of a day] since the Yao-Shun era, the hundred-ke system should continue to be used. Now, however, because Verbiest’s ninety-six-ke system is proving more accurate in predicting astronomical phenomena, from the 9th year of the Kangxi reign onwards, only the ninety-six-ke system should be used, and all calendrical affairs should also be entrusted to Verbiest … (b) Last time, [we] also memorialised [Your Majesty] that [Ziqi] should be inserted as before because it had been included in previous calendars. [We pointed out that] Schall von Bell arbitrarily removed this from his calendar and only left the remaining three of the Four Imaginary Stars (siyu): Yuebei 月孛, Rahu (luohou 羅睺), and Ketu (jidu 計都). Now, however, because Verbiest and Wu say [Ziqi] is not needed in calculating the calendar, from the 9th year of the Kangxi reign onwards, Ziqi does not have to be inserted in the Calendar of the Sun, Moon, and Five Planets (qizheng li 七政曆). In respect to the Zi constellation (zixing 觴星) and the Can constellation (canxing 参星), these should also be entrusted to Verbiest for estimation because the calendar is already being based on his ninety-six-ke system. In respect to the issue regarding the two-hundred-year calendar, no more discussion is needed because the issue was already closed when Your Majesty approved the contents of our memorial last time. [In respect to the houqi 候氣 method\footnote{The houqi method was a way of estimating twenty-four qi (twelve central qi and twelve nodal qi). According to this method, the observer observed the movement of the ashes in specially prepared bamboo pipes. The houqi practice was based on the belief that yin and yang energy would blow the ashes at the beginning of qi, but was not common during the late imperial period. See QCXCMDY, 56; Chu, ‘Scientific Dispute in the Imperial Court’, 11-12.}, Verbiest states that although the houqi (watching for ethers) belongs to the traditional methods, it has nothing to do with calculating the calendar. Therefore, houqi should be stopped hereafter (numbering and emphasis mine).
The memorial that the official refers to (a, b) in this response is the one submitted by the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials on the twenty-fifth of March 1665 (KX4/2/9) during the Calendar Case. In that memorial, the Council had pointed out five reasons as evidence of Schall von Bell’s guilt, all of which were related to the Old-New Methods Conflict Case (Subcase 2). Specifically: (i) the ninety-six-ke system was used for the length of a day; (ii) although observation was done one day before the Onset of Spring (lichun), Schall von Bell and others reported that ‘the air of spring (chunqi) has already arrived’; (iii) the positions for the Zi constellation and the Can constellation were reversed; (iv) Ziqi, one of the Four Imaginary Stars, was removed; and (v) the two-hundred-year calendar, not the boundless calendar, was presented to the throne. It is clear, therefore, that the new interpretation articulated by the official in the above memorial had the effect of overturning all five of the previous conclusions of the Old-New Methods Conflict Case. Moreover, the Ministry also argued in this same memorial that Yang Guangxian, the Director of the Directorate, should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice and severely punished. When, on the eighth of March 1669 (KX8/2/7), the emperor approved all these suggestions, except the one regarding Yang’s punishment, the previous verdict of the Old-New Methods Conflict Case was therefore officially overturned.

The Heretical Teaching Case (Subcase 1) and The Prince Rong Burial Case (Subcase 3)

That one of the subcases in the Calendar Case was overturned did not necessarily mean that the remaining two would also be overturned. In the edict on the eighth of March in which the emperor officially overturned the Old-New Methods Conflict Case, it is clear that he was still acknowledging that Yang’s other accusations were substantiated (shì):
Although Yang Guangxian ought to be sent to the Ministry of Justice and be punished severely [as memorialised], a decision on his transfer to the Ministry of Justice is to be suspended for a while because his [other] accusations against Schall von Bell turned out to be true. Yang shall only be deprived of his government post. For other issues, do as you memorialised. (emphasis mine)\(^{16}\).

According to extant accounts, the Xiyang missionaries started their attempts to overturn the verdicts in the remaining subcases from June 1669. First, in their petition in early June, Buglio, Magalhães, and Verbiest tried to reverse the verdict in the Heretical Teachings Case (Subcase 1).\(^{17}\) Second, in respect to the Prince Rong Burial Case (Subcase 3), Verbiest launched his counterattack during the same period (in the early June), by writing *Wangtui jixiong bian* 妄推吉凶辯 [A Criticism of the Nonsensical Propagation of Good-and-Bad-Luck Arguments] and *Wangze bian* 妄擇辯 [A Criticism of Nonsensical Hemerology], focusing on the core issues in the case, namely geomancy and hemerology.\(^{18}\)

This was possible by the changed atmosphere during this period. Above all, through the missionaries’ efforts, all traces of the Old Traditional Method had been being removed: in early March 1669, based on the Council’s conclusion and the emperor’s approval of it, Yang was deprived of his post at the Directorate; in late March (KX8/2/29), it was ordered that Wu was to remain in office temporarily, only under the condition that he cooperate with Verbiest;\(^{19}\) and

\(^{16}\) XC, 53-55; In *Qing shilu*, this section is written as ‘Yang Guangxian should be dismissed from his post, but he is allowed not to be sent to the Ministry of Justice. For other issues, do as you memorialised’ concisely without the phrase, ‘because his [other] accusations against Schall von Bell turned out to be true’. See QSL-KX8/2/7[gengwu].

\(^{17}\) ‘Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’, 393-94.

\(^{18}\) Huang, ‘Zeri zhi zheng’, 271.

\(^{19}\) XC, 58-59.
on the twelfth of April 1669, the Qing authorities delivered a message to all provincial officials that the intercalary month of the calendar for the Kangxi 8th year should be ignored. Second, the Qing authorities had been finding themselves in ardent need of the Xiyang missionaries and their calendrical knowledge, to the point that they struggled to appoint Verbiest to a post at the Directorate and accepted Verbiest’s compromise offer, agreeing to take charge of the calendrical affairs provided that he was given no government title. Last, but the most importantly, around this period, the emperor arrested Oboi and his clique, who had been the main arbiters during the Calendar Case.

The Ministry of Rites’ response to the three missionaries’ petition, which mainly concerned Subcase 1, was negative, however. The Ministry insisted that the verdict in the

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20 XC, 59-60.
21 XC, 53, 55-56, 57. The Kangxi emperor accepted the compromise offer on the twelfth of July 1669 (KX8/6/15).
22 Bai Xinliang deduces that this likely occurred on the eighth of June 1669 (KX8/5/10) on the basis, firstly, that the edict ‘announcing Oboi and his clique’s twelve charges’ was drawn up on the tenth of June (KX8/5/12) and, secondly, that the emperor gave military power to Oboi’s enemy, Wang Hongzuo (1603-74), on the eighth of June, by appointing him the Chief official of the Ministry of War. See Bai Xinliang, ‘Kangxi qin Aobai Shijian ka’, 74-75; KXMZZ, 1-2; NPM, Gongzhong dang Kangxi chao zouze, vol. 8, 3-7. Although the three missionaries’ petition in early June as mentioned is dated with the words ‘We petition on the 5th day of the 5th month in the Kangxi 8th year’, the phrase ‘Now is the time for this undeserved disgrace to be removed because now the powerful traitor’s (quanjian 權奸) guilt has been revealed’ indicates that the petition must have been made after the arrest of Oboi. This petition, with some modification, is included in Zhengjiao fengbao at the part for the 7th month of the Kangxi 8th year. Ma Weihua assumes that the three missionaries submitted the petition around the 20th day of the 7th month in the Kangxi 8th year. Meanwhile, Jose Suarez’s report says that the time of petitioning was ‘on the 5th day of the 5th month of the Kangxi 8th year’ in the lunar calendar and ‘the twenty-first of June 1669’ in the Western calendar, which do not correspond to each other because the former and the latter should be the third of June 1669 in the Western calendar and the 23rd day of the 5th month in the Kangxi 8th year in the lunar calendar, respectively. Nonetheless, his report says that the petition resulted from the Kangxi emperor’s order made after Oboi’s arrest to report Oboi’s misdeeds. In Libu tigao, this part is rendered as ‘康熙八年五月內據湯同鄕利安南等告稱’. See ‘Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’, 394; de Rougemont, Innocentia Victrix, 6; Huang Bolu, Zhengjiao fengbao 311-13; Ma Weihua, ‘Aobai beiqin yu Kangxi liyu’, 64; LE-O, 24; Libu ti gao, 360. Also see Bosmans, 50, which describes that Oboi and his clique were summoned by the emperor on the fourteenth of June.
Heretical Teaching Case should remain unchanged. They argued, especially, that the Christian teachings should still be regarded as heretical for two reasons: firstly, because the Shunzhi emperor’s edict (issued in the 11th month of the Shunzhi 13th year) had proclaimed as heterodox all except Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist teachings; and secondly, because the Christian rituals of baptism and anointing, their teaching of forgiveness, and their acceptance that there was no need to burn paper for the deceased seemed to be heretical. It has to be assumed that this opinion reflected that of the incumbent Minister, Buyan 布顔, who had been in the post of the Left Vice Minister of Rites (libu zuo shilang 禮部左侍郞) during the Calendar Case.

From this point, however, the situation quickly reversed because the Kangxi emperor intervened with the following order.

Now, [they are arguing] that the accusations against Schall von Bell were groundless.

How about clarifying the right and the wrong [of this case]? You, the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials, Nine Chief Ministers, Supervising Secretaries of the Six Offices of Scrutiny, and Investigating Censors of the Circuits, report your opinion after thoroughly discussing about [this case]!

23 ‘Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’, 394-96. Examples of this attitude can also be found in the Ministries’ memorial on the twenty-seventh of December 1664 (KX3/11/11). See QCXCMDS, 31-32.
24 QZN, 174, 349-51.
25 ‘Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’, 396. The date (‘the 26th day of the 7th month in the Kangxi 8th year’) following the citation of the rescript does not make sense because, as a response to the rescript, the Council submitted their conclusion on the 12th day of the 7th month in the Kangxi 8th year. The latter part of this document looks like a version in which the Christians abbreviated a series of documents: in chronological order, the Council’s memorial (KX8/7/20), the emperor’s rescript (KX8/7/23), the Council’s memorial (?), and the emperor’s rescript (KX8/8/11). See XC, 77-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 555-56. ‘The 26th day of the 7th month in the Kangxi 8th year’ seems to be the date on which the Council submitted another memorial after the 23rd day of the 7th month in the Kangxi 8th year (XC, 80, ‘康熙八年七月二十日題, 本月二十三日奉旨: “議政王貝勒大臣九卿科道會同將這本內情節再加詳議具奏”’).
The Council’s conclusion (See R-I in Appendix 3) on the sixteenth of August 1669 (KX8/7/20) contradicted the Ministry of Rites’ opinion above. According to the Council’s conclusion, because the Christian belief (or rituals) had been part of their custom in their homelands, it was unfair for Xiyang people to suffer a disadvantage merely due to their Christian belief (R-I-1). From the Council’s perspective, it was also unfair to deprive Chinese Christian officials of their government posts simply because they followed Christian teachings (literally, ‘entered the teachings’, *rujiao* 入教), donated money to Xiyang missionaries or wrote a preface for a Christian book (R-I-2). The Council also ordered that Schall von Bell’s honorific title and official rank be restored (R-I-3) and Xu Zuanzeng and Xu Zhijian’s government posts also be restored (R-I-4). With regard to the church and buildings in the Jesuits’ *Tenggong zhalan* 滕公柵欄 [The Fenced Area of Mr. Teng] cemetery outside the Fucheng 阜城 Gate, the Council acknowledged that both the money accruing from the sale by the Ministry of Works, and the vacated land on which the buildings had been built should be handed over to Verbiest and other missionaries (R-I-5). The Council added that the missionaries should be freed from confinement and sent to Beijing through postal stations (R-I-6). In respect to the Xiyang books, the bronze statues, and the woodblocks for *Tianxue chuangai*, however, the Council pointed out that nothing further could be said about them because they had already been burnt (R-I-7).

In the same memorial, the Council also addressed the Prince Rong Burial Case (Subcase 3) since a number of officials of the Directorate such as Wu Zhoubin 吳周斌 had petitioned against Yang and his clique in respect to this case. According to these officials, the Hongfan doctrine of the five elements, which was based on the chapter *hongfan* 洪範 of *Shujing* 書經, was time-honoured and reliable. Yang’s accusation that the Hongfan doctrine was *Mieman jing*...
滅蠻經 [Scriptures to Destroy Barbarians] and would have harmful effects on the Manchu regime was groundless. The officials also presented historical examples in which the Hongfan doctrine was used without any problems, including Yang Weide’s 楊維德 Yingyuan zonglu 墳原總錄 [The Compilation of Geomancy for Burial Grounds] during the Song period and Luo Qingxiao’s 羅青霄 Yinyang bianyi 陰陽辨疑 [The Discussion on Yin and Yang] and Song Huishan’s 宋輝山 Tongshu 通書 [The Almanac] during the Ming period. Based on these officials’ petitions, the Council now concluded that the Hongfan doctrine could be used at the Directorate. The Council added that the relevant Minister should rehabilitate the officials who were executed in the Prince Rong Burial Case, as well as their exiled relatives.27

This conclusion, alongside the Council’s other discussion (see R-II)28 arising from the emperor’s order for reconsideration (19 August 1669; KX8/7/23), was at last confirmed by the emperor with certain caveats (5 September 1669; KX8/8/11, R-VIII).29 From a legal perspective, therefore, all the previous verdicts of the three subcases in the Calendar Case had been completely overturned.

The Remaining Issues

The reversed conclusions began to take effect. Schall von Bell was rehabilitated, and his honorific title and official rank restored.30 The rehabilitation also applied to the five executed Christian officials, Liu Youqing, Jia Liangqi, and their exiled relatives. Later, the Qing

27 XC, 78.
28 XC, 81-83.
29 XC, 81-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Wang Xianqing, Donghua lu, vol. 1, 556.
30 ’Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’, 397; XC, 83-84.
authorities also reinstated Du Ruyu 杜如預, Yang Hongliang, Song Keli (Song Kecheng’s younger brother), and Tang Shihong 湯士弘 (the son of Adam Schall’s adopted son) and addressed the issue of returning the officials’ confiscated property to them.\(^\text{31}\)

Despite this atmosphere of recovery, certain details of the Old-New Methods Conflict Case were still being discussed among central officials. For example, there remained no consensus on the question of whether the *Ziqi*, one of the Four Imaginary Stars, should be removed from the calendars. This was because on thirtieth of March (KX8/2/29) the Kangxi emperor ‘specially ordered’ (*teyu 特諭*) that since *Ziqi* had traditionally been included in calendars it should not be removed.\(^\text{32}\) At first, Verbiest obeyed the ‘special order’, but towards the end of July he again began to insist that estimating *Ziqi* was groundless, and indeed equivalent to committing fraud.\(^\text{33}\) The Ministry of Rites counterattacked by emphasising that *Ziqi* had been included in calendars since antiquity and reminding Verbiest of the emperor’s ‘special order’ of the thirtieth of March. In response to this disagreement, the Kangxi emperor ordered that the history of *Ziqi* estimation should be examined and reported.\(^\text{34}\) Verbiest answered that although the estimation of *Ziqi* was introduced for the first time during the Tang period, thereafter prestigious calendar experts had not estimated *Ziqi*. It was only from the late Ming period that the estimation of *Ziqi* restarted. He emphasised that during the Shunzhi period, the estimation was abandoned again because it was regarded as groundless.\(^\text{35}\) Meanwhile, the Ministry of Rites answered that according to Hua Xiang’s 華湘 memorial, which was included

\(^{32}\) XC, 62.
\(^{33}\) XC, 65-66.
\(^{34}\) XC, 66-67.
\(^{35}\) XC, 67-68.
in ‘Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考’ [The Encyclopaedia of the Historical Records], the Four Imaginary Stars (siyu), including Ziqi, were surely included, at least during the Yuan and Ming periods. The Ministry, however, was not sure from what point the estimation was omitted from the calendars. Eventually, on the seventh of September (KX8/8/23), the Kangxi emperor also referred this issue to the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials.\(^{36}\) The Council supported Verbiest’s opinion, answering that although, as the Ministry of Rites had pointed out, Ziqi had been included in some calendars during the Yuan and Ming periods, unlike the three other Imaginary Stars, Ziqi had nothing to do with calendrical prediction and was not included in calendars during the Shunzhi reign. Now that calendrical affairs were already entrusted to Verbiest, they argued, there was no longer a need for Ziqi to be included in calendars.\(^{37}\) The Council’s conclusion was finally approved by the Kangxi emperor on the twenty-sixth of September (KX8/9/2).\(^{38}\)

During the same period, other issues from the Old-New Methods Conflict Case were also being settled in Verbiest’s favour. His request to ignore the intercalary month of the Kangxi 8\(^{th}\) year calendar\(^{39}\) was approved on the twelfth of April (KX8/3/12), and the opinion that the observation equipment for the hundred-ke system\(^{40}\) should be retained in the Observatory\(^{41}\)

\(^{36}\) XC, 68-69.
\(^{37}\) Unlike Yang’s argument, ironically, the Four Imaginary Stars (siyu) did not belong to the Chinese ‘traditional’ calendrical system. Instead, they seem to have originated from Babylonian, Greek, or Persian astronomy or astrology. Although knowledge about the Four Imaginary Stars came into China during the Tang period, it merely circulated at a private level. It was not until the Shoushi li 授時曆 stage of the Yuan period that the government employed the Four Imaginary Stars in their official calendar. Lee Eun Hee, Hahn Young Ho, and Kang Min Jeong, ‘Sayŏ ŭi Chungguk chŏllae’, 392-94, 399, 420.
\(^{38}\) XC, 69-71.
\(^{39}\) XC, 59.
\(^{40}\) XC, 61-62.
\(^{41}\) XC, 63-64.
was officially substituted with Verbiest’s opinion that it should be removed from the Observatory. The tenth of September 1669 (KX8/8/16), when the equipment for the Old method was finally taken away to a ‘warehouse’,\(^{42}\) therefore marked the point at which the Old method itself began to fade from contemporary memory.

The Beijing missionaries were also struggling to bring the confinement of the missionaries in Canton to an end. At first, Verbiest, Magalhães, and Buglio submitted a petition for cessation to the Ministry of Rites, but this was dismissed. On the thirty-first of December 1670 (KX9/11/20), however, the missionaries memorialised the Kangxi emperor directly, and on the eighth of January 1671 (KX9/11/28), the emperor ordered the Ministry of Rites to revisit the issue of the confinement. The Ministry, however, reminded the emperor that in 1669 he had personally rejected by an edict (R-VIII) the Council’s opinion that the confinement of the missionaries should be ended, and the Ministry therefore argued that there was no need to discuss the Beijing missionaries’ request any further. In response, on the twenty-eighth of February (KX9/12/18), the Council suggested lifting the confinement restriction by arguing that continued confinement would make it appear as if the Calendar Case had not in fact been overturned. The Council added a more practical reason, that ten of the missionaries in Canton were well-versed in calendrical affairs and could be used to the empire’s advantage. Eventually, on the thirty-first of January (KX9/12/21), the emperor partially accepted the Council’s suggestions by an edict (R-VII). On the one hand, he said that the missionaries specialised in calendrical affairs could be transferred to Beijing and the rest could be returned to their own churches in the provinces. On the other hand, however, he reiterated his edict of 1669 that no-

\(^{42}\) XC, 64-65.
one in the empire should partake of the Christian teachings. On the twenty-sixth of February (KX10/1/18), the Ministry of War transferred this conclusion to all the provincial Governors and Governors-general.\(^43\) Thus it was that in March of 1671 the news reached the missionaries at Canton that they could return to their own churches in the provinces during September.\(^44\)

**The Meaning of the 1669 Ban**

All the three subcases that constituted this legal case were closed towards the end of May 1665, and in mid-September, the Calendar Case ended with Xiyang missionaries being sent to Canton for confinement. Although the outcome of the case spared Xiyang missionaries and their churches from complete destruction, this ‘salvation’ was not the product of complete acquittal from the charges that had been levied against them, but instead from special interference in the case by the Manchu ruler. Thus, even after the closure of the case, Beijing missionaries still made intense efforts to nullify the three confirmed charges and to remove all vestiges of the case. However, these efforts ended with an edict by the Kangxi emperor on September 5, 1669 (KX 8/8/11), which, as explored below, was a very disappointing conclusion for the Christian side.

This edict (**R-VIII, hereafter the 1669 ban**) was the first government-level measure to address the Xiyang clergy in Qing history, and served as the most significant legal grounds for the Kangxi government’s policy towards the Xiyang community and Christianity. Albeit slightly modified by the 1671 ban (the Kangxi 9\(^{th}\) year order, **R-VII**), the 1669 ban remained the Qing empire’s keynote policy toward Christianity until the ‘Edict of Toleration’ (the Kangxi 31\(^{st}\) order) in 1692. Around the end of the Kangxi reign, the 1669 ban re-emerged and

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\(^{44}\) Witek, ‘Catholic Missionaries’, 335-36.
recovered its previous position as the Empire’s keynote policy, overriding the Edict of Toleration and the Permit (yinpiao) edict (the Kangxi 45th order).

Previous understanding of the 1669 ban is encapsulated in section 2.6.3. (‘Opponents’) of the Handbook of Christianity in China Volume One: 635-1800, which compiled almost all the relevant scholarship before 2001. Ad Dudink, the author of this section, regarded the 1669 ban as ‘the first prohibition of any further propagation of Christianity’.\textsuperscript{45} Citing Dudink’s section, R. G. Tiedemann, a well-known historian of the history of Christianity in China, also understood the 1669 ban as proscribing ‘further’ propagation.\textsuperscript{46} Eugenio Menegon as well agreed that the 1669 ban meant ‘the further propagation of Christianity among Han subjects’ and understood the provision as ‘missionaries could care for existing communities’.\textsuperscript{47} It is true that the 1669 ban clearly expresses the Qing authorities’ concerns about the appearance of new converts or churches. Indeed, at least during the Kangxi period, we cannot observe any pressure from the central government on existing Chinese Christian communities for apostasy. However, was the keynote of the 1669 ban only to prevent new Christian converts or churches? In other words, through this ban, was it the case that as long as no new Christian converts or churches appeared, existing Christian communities would be allowed to profess their faith freely? Moreover, did existing buildings remain open to Chinese people, and were Xiyang missionaries allowed to visit and take care of their existing Christian communities?

This section will point out that the keynote of the 1669 ban was different from what modern scholars have understood—and, equally, from what the Xiyang people in Qing China understood. The analysis will primarily focus on Xiyang people’s deep misunderstanding (or distortion) of the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials’ opinion (1669, KX8/7/20, 45

\textsuperscript{45} Dudink, ‘Opponents’, 515.
\textsuperscript{46} Tiedemann, ‘Christianity in East Asia’, 461-62.
\textsuperscript{47} Menegon, Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars, 107.
hereafter the Council’s Conclusion), which served as the basis for the 1669 ban. This section will not only lead us to a better comprehension of the 1669 ban—and, further, of the Qing state’s policy on Christianity—but will also encourage us reconsider East-West communication during the early modern period.

What Was Banned?

Interpreting the 1669 ban has not just been a matter for modern-day scholars. In Adrien Grelon SJ’s (1618–96) letter of November 10, 1669—written shortly after the 1669 ban was issued (September 5, 1669)—we can observe diverse contemporary interpretations of this policy.

According to the letter, it was through official gazettes, not the Beijing Jesuits, that Grelon heard about the 1669 ban and the process through which it came about. Grelon felt hopeful when he read from the gazettes the Council’s Conclusion: ‘Schall von Bell was declared an innocent victim’, ‘Yang Guangxian was sentenced to death, and his wife and children were sentenced to exile to Manchuria’, and ‘the Council requested the confined missionaries’ transfer from Canton to Beijing’. Yet Grelon was soon disappointed as he became aware that the Kangxi emperor did not approve the Council’s conclusion. Grelon had firmly believed that the emperor, who had shown great favours to Ferdinand Verbiest, SJ (1623-88), would surely approve such a ‘hopeful’, ‘advantageous’, ‘just’, and ‘fair’ conclusion. Contrary to Grelon’s expectation, however, the emperor issued an edict in the same year that ‘exempted Yang and his family’s penalties’, ‘denied the necessity to transfer the confined missionaries to Beijing’, ‘allowed only three Chinese officials48 and European missionaries to profess their Christian faith as before’, and ‘ordered provincial Governors and Governors-general to strictly inspect

48 These ‘three Chinese officials’ seem to be Xu Zuanzeng, Xu Zhijian, and Pan Jinxiao, who were involved in the Calendar Case and later, during the rehabilitation process, referred to as ‘Christian officials.’
any acts by other people, except the allowed ones, to make a new Christian convert or restore the churches’.

… (R-VIII-a) The twenty-five [missionaries], including Caballero, do not have to be transferred to the capital. (R-VIII-b) With regard to the Christian teachings, only Verbiest and the others shall be allowed to freely practice as usual, (R-VIII-c) but in case there will again appear [acts] like building churches or entering the teachings in the capital and provinces, strictly and clearly inform people that these shall still be banned. (R-VIII-d) For the remaining things, do as you memorialised.49

The Xiyang missionaries were left very confused, with Grelon asking: ‘Why ever did the Kangxi emperor, who had shown such favourable attitudes to Xiyang missionaries, substitute such a hopeful, advantageous, just, and fair conclusion with such an unjust and unfair one?’ One of the missionaries’ initial responses was to assume that the Kangxi emperor’s true and sympathetic intention lay hidden somewhere in the 1669 edict. For example, they interpreted ‘only Verbiest and the others’ as all the Beijing missionaries; ‘shall be allowed to freely practice as usual’ as shall be allowed to freely practice as before the Calendar Case; and ‘The twenty-five [missionaries], including Caballero, shall not have to be transferred to the capital’ as The twenty-five [missionaries], including Caballero, shall not have to be transferred to the capital, but shall directly be sent to their original churches.50

Indeed, the 1669 ban contained an element of ambiguity. The most crucial part lay in the sentence R-VIII-c, where the direct object of the verb ‘ban’ was unclear. It could be ‘the Christian teachings’ (qi Tianzhu jiao 其天主教, hereafter R-VIII-b-1), or it could also be ‘[acts] like building churches or entering the teachings in the capital and provinces’ (Zhili ge

49 XC, 81-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Wang Xianqing, Donghua lu, vol. 1, 556.
50 Bosmans, ‘Documents relatifs a Ferdinand Verbiest’, 53-57.
Therefore, the intention of the 1669 ban appears bifurcated. As mentioned earlier, modern scholars tend to choose R-VIII-c-1 as the object of the verb, and thus their emphasis lies on ‘the appearance of new churches or new converts’.

What about the Kangxi contemporary understanding of the 1669 ban? Grelon and François de Rougemont, SJ (1624–1676), whose accounts date from very shortly after the issue of the 1669 ban, understood the object of the verb ‘ban’ as R-VIII-c-1, in the same way that most modern scholars do. They argued that what the ban proscribed was the appearance of new churches or converts.51 On the other hand, Jose Suarez, SJ (1656–1736), whose account dates from more than twenty years after the issue of the ban, understood the object of the verb ‘ban’ as R-VIII-b-1, as indicated in sentences such as ‘Although in the same year a new edict proscribed the practice of Christianity [emphasis added]’ and ‘the freedom of the Christian faith [emphasis added] was proscribed pertinaciously’.52 Verbiest, meanwhile, seemed to understand the object of the verb ‘ban’ as R-VIII-c-1, since he wrote in 1677, ‘because we are not allowed to build new churches [emphasis added]’ and, in 1684, ‘until now, to propagate Christianity [emphasis added] is prohibited in China’.53 In 1687 (KX26/3/22), however, Verbiest asked the emperor ‘to approve by imperial order that anybody can accept and profess God’s Law [emphasis added]’—in the Chinese version of this sentence, ‘所奉天主敎，祈照康熙初年未曾誣造之前，任隨其便，不阻其門’. This indicates that, at this point, Verbiest understood that the object of the verb ‘ban’ was not just the appearance of new churches or

52 LE-O, 12, 47.
converts, but also an individual’s personal profession of their faith or the practice of Christianity.\(^{54}\)

How about Qing officials’ understanding of the 1669 ban? In 1692, the Ministry of Rites understood that the ban proscribed Christian teachings (\textbf{R-VIII-c-1}). This is clearly evident in the Ministry’s opinion (7 March 1692) about Tomé Pereira’s (1645–1708) memorial (2 February 1692), in which they cited the Council’s Conclusion and the Kangxi emperor’s edict in response (i.e., the 1669 ban). One issue that deserves our attention here is that although the Ministry cited the original text of the 1669 ban entirely unchanged, they went on to add their own interpretation by citing the Council’s Conclusion, summarised and modified as ‘only Xiyang people should be allowed to practice the Christian teachings (\textit{ying zhi ling Xiyang ren gongfeng 应止令西洋人供奉})’. In other words, the Ministry understood the Council’s Conclusion as \textit{Chinese people, regardless of their time of entrance to Christianity, should not be allowed to practice Christianity}. Given this understanding, it seems unlikely that the Ministry regarded the 1669 ban, which was stricter than the Council’s Conclusion, as proscribing only the appearance of new buildings and converts and not as proscribing the practice of Christianity by Chinese Christians, regardless of whether they were pre-existing or new. Indeed, the final conclusion that the Ministry submitted to the throne about Tomé Pereira’s memorial was that, based on the Council’s Conclusion and the emperor’s revision of it in 1669, no Chinese people should be allowed to practice Christianity (\textit{zhi ling Xiyang ren gongfeng 止令西洋人供奉}).\(^{55}\)

\(^{54}\) Although this memorial by Verbiest is not extant, abbreviated forms of it can be found in \textit{Qijuzhu} and \textit{Xichao ding’an}. See QJZ-KX-1, 1617, KX26/4/13; XC, 183-84. The Latin translation can be found in \textit{Letters of a Peking Jesuit} (no. 114: F. Verbiest to Emperor Kangxi, 1687.5.3, 739-40).

\(^{55}\) XC, 184.
How did the Kangxi emperor himself understand the meaning of the 1669 ban? As examined earlier, when Verbiest memorialised in 1687 that ‘it would be approved by imperial order that anybody can accept and profess God’s Law’, the Ministry of Rites, based on the Council’s Conclusion and the 1669 ban, answered that Verbiest’s request required no further discussion. In this incident, one detail that merits further attention is the Kangxi emperor’s reply to the Ministry’s opinion. On receiving it, the emperor expressed his agreement; yet to prevent any possible misunderstandings about Christianity by local officials, he instructed that the following sentence, which seems to have been included in commentaries of the Sacred Edict, be removed: ‘The Christian teachings are the same as Bailian teachings or plotting treason’. Christians subsequently began to emphasise this instruction from the Kangxi emperor. Around 1691, for instance, when Chen Qianji, the Magistrate of Lin’an County, issued a notice denouncing Christianity as heretical, Prospero Intorcetta, SJ (1625-98), who resided at the Hangzhou church, carried the aforementioned imperial instruction of 1687 and appealed not only to Chen but also to the Governor of Zhejiang Province against the former’s treatment of Christianity. The reason Intorcetta relied on the instruction of 1687 was because he deemed it ‘very favourable to Christians’.

Ironically, the instruction was not particularly favourable to Christianity. Above all, the instruction was the result of the emperor’s acknowledgement of the Ministry of Rites’ opinion that Verbiest’s request did not have to be reconsidered because the 1669 ban was still valid. Moreover, if we examine the more detailed conversation recorded in Qijuzhu between the

56 XC, 184.
57 Le Gobien, Histoire de l'edit de l'empereur de la Chine, 26.
emperor and his Grand Secretaries and Academicians, the emperor clearly expressed his position on the proscription of Christianity:

The Christian teachings should be proscribed. The Ministry [of Rites’] decision is perfectly correct (bu yi jidang 部議極當).  

In other words, in 1687, the Kangxi emperor agreed with the proscription of Christianity, even though he did not regard the religion as heretical. This position was not new; in fact, it merely reaffirmed the key element of the 1669 ban, on which the Ministry of Rites’ answer was based. As explored above, therefore, the 1669 ban proscribed not just the appearance of new buildings or converts, but Christianity itself.

The Meaning of the Council’s Conclusion

However, to fully understand the meaning of the 1669 ban, we need to further examine what became its basis, that is, the Council’s Conclusion. In interpreting this, two things need to be considered. First, the Council reached the conclusion against the backdrop of all temple gatherings being prohibited. The Ministry of Rites cited the Council’s Conclusion in Kangxi 26th year (c. 1687) as follows (hereafter R-IV):

(R-IV-a) All meetings at temples shall be prohibited from now on forever. (R-IV-b)

Their meetings, and the action of distributing Christian materials such as Tianxue chuangan or bronze statues should still be banned.

58 QJZ-KX-1, 1617.  
59 This sentence can also be interpreted as ‘a permanent ban on all temple gatherings is now being enforced’.  
60 XC, 183-84.
Second, as seen above, the Council’s Conclusion included a sentence (R-IV-b) about maintaining a ban on religious meetings and the distribution of Christian materials. What were the respective meanings of (R-IV-a) and (R-IV-b), and why did the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials base their conclusion on these sentences?

Above all, did the Qing authorities use the term simiao (temple) in sentence (R-IV-a) to mean churches? During the late imperial period, this term generally signified Buddhist or Daoist temples. Schall von Bell, who was well aware of the general meanings of such terms, intentionally introduced his church to Fan Wencheng, the renowned Qing official, as tang 堂 (hall), in order to differentiate Christianity from other religions. Indeed, the term tang, and Schall von Bell’s explanation for using it, quite impressed the Qing official. I also have not yet seen churches being referred to as simiao in Qing official documents. Although some gazetteers include contents relating to Christian churches in the section for siguan 寺觀, which is an interchangeable term for simiao, it seems that no gazetteers name a Christian church simiao or siguan. If the term simiao was used almost exclusively for Buddhist or Daoist temples, why did the Qing state include content relating to Buddhist or Daoist temples alongside content relating to Qing policies on Christianity?

Here, as examined in Chapter III, we see again the juxtaposition of Christianity and other Qing religions. If the Xiyang people’s religion was indeed a legitimate Qing religion, it should now also be subject to the duties expected for Qing religions. we need to consider that the Qing

61 Bornet, Lettres et mémoires d’Adam Schall, 144-45.
62 For the use of terms like si, miao, and tang in Beijing during the late imperial period, see Naquin, Peking, 20-21. I used the Erudition Database of Chinese Local Records (Airusheng Zhongguo Fangzhiku 愛如生中國方志庫) chuji 初集 and erji 二集.
authorities regarded the collective practice of religion, or simply, religious gatherings (juhui), as undesirable and often prohibited them. By contrast, the religious activities that they approved of and permitted were based on personal cultivation, as indicated by such frequently-used Chinese expressions as, ‘to burn incense and cultivate oneself at the temple’ (simiao fenxiu 寺廟焚修 or zaisi fenxiu 在寺焚修) and ‘to burn incense and cultivate oneself behind closed doors’ (bihu fenxiu 閉戶焚修). These expressions indicate that desirable forms of religious practice were personal, conducted by professional clergy, and limited to an allowed space. That contemporaries understood religious practices in such a way is also evidenced by Nicolas Standaert’s interpretation of the Edict of Toleration (1692). According to Standaert, the meaning of the Edict was that religious professionals and a few Chinese male Christians were allowed to engage in the personal practice of Christianity within churches as an allowed space, in the same way that Tibetan Buddhist, (Chinese) Buddhist, and Daoist religious professionals and a few male adherents were allowed to engage in the personal practice of their religions, namely, in the Chinese term, shaoxiang (offering incense and making sacrifices), within allowed spaces such as their own temples.

If the Qing state regarded Christianity in line with other religions in the Qing Empire around the Calendar Case and, in 1692, even allowed Christians to enjoy the same tolerance Qing peoples with other religions enjoyed, it sounds natural that the Qing state also required Christians to observe the same duty to which all legitimate Qing religions were subject. In other words, The main reason that, in 1669, the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials mentioned the ban (B-a) on the collective practice of religion—which all Qing religions had

63 QSL-TC5/run11/11[gengxu]; QSL-QL33/8/20[yiyou].
64 QSL-DG18/11/14[renzi].
65 QSL-QL8/3/7[xinyou].
66 Standaert, ‘The ‘Edict of Tolerance’’, 357.
been required to observe—alongside the ban (B-b) on religious meetings and the act of distributing Christian materials—that is, the collective practice of the Christian faith—was because the Council concluded that Christian teachings should be cleared from the charge of heresy and be regarded as one of the accepted teachings of the Qing Empire, in line with (Chinese or Tibetan) Buddhism and Daoism, but imposing the corresponding duty to Christians.

It can be said that the Council indeed proclaimed ‘freedom of religion’, as Europeans, especially Suarez, understood, but with the requirement for Christians of the same duty to which all legitimate Qing religions were subject.

The ‘freedom’ proposed by the Council should be understood in the strict legal sense and be distinguished from any imperial favor (endian 恩典). The Council’s Conclusion should not be interpreted as saying from now on, Christian teachings will be addressed in the way that they were when they enjoyed exceptional favor under the Shunzhi emperor. We should remember that the Qing government took a stricter approach to the collective practice of religion, to the extent that it did not even look favorably on folk festivals, which had been regarded as an exception during the Ming Reign.\(^67\) Therefore, it was only thanks to the Shunzhi emperor’s favor that Christians could enjoy the collective practice of their religion (i.e., Mass) exceptionally, outside of the strict legal boundaries enforced at the time.\(^68\) However, by late

\(^{67}\) See Chapter III.

\(^{68}\) The Qianlong emperor described this favour as ‘fa wai zhi ren 法外之仁’ or ‘fa wai shi’en 法外施恩’. According to Lee Jun Gab, during the Later Jin and Qing periods, those expressions did not appear until the Shunzhi Reign, and their usage and meaning established during the Yongzheng Reign. Lee also argued that those expressions were rooted in the Chinese legal tradition, which Confucianism had greatly influenced. In addressing issues to do with Christianity, however, the Qianlong emperor applied such favour only to Xiyang missionaries, excluding Chinese Christians. See Lee Jun Gab, ‘Kŏllyung 49 nyŏn (1784) - 51 nyŏn (1786) ŭi kyoan gwa Kŏllyungje’, 265-72; Lee Jun Gab, ‘Kŏllyung yŏn’gan chŏnjugyo t’anap ŭi shilche’, 342-47.
1664, when the Shunzhi emperor had already died and the Four Regents—who were not favorable to European missionaries—came to wield power on behalf of the new emperor Xuanye, even Schall von Bell could not make the Christian gatherings continue as before.\(^6^9\)

Let’s go back to a more fundamental question: ‘What was the difference between the Council’s Conclusion and the 1669 ban?’ First, from the Council’s perspective, it was not illegal for Chinese officials to convert to Christianity, donate money to missionaries, write a preface for a Christian book, or even distribute Christian items to Chinese people. The Council thought it unfair for Chinese officials to be deprived of their government positions just because of their pro-Christian activities. Second, based on the fact that Christianity had long formed part of the European people’s home cultures and had never seduced people into evildoing, the Council confirmed that Christians were cleared of the charge of being heretical. Third, although the Council’s Conclusion overturned the heresy charge, it did not exempt Christians from the ban on the collective practice of religion that was being applied to other religious teachings in Qing China. In respect to the 1669 ban, although this also cleared Christianity from the charge of being heretical, it did not include it as one of the legitimate religious teachings in the empire. In other words, although both the Council’s Conclusion and the 1669 ban agreed that Christianity was not heretical, they showed two different positions toward the status of Christianity as a legitimate religious teaching and thus toward Christians’ freedom of practice.

\(^6^9\) QCXCMDY, 30, ‘Schall von Bell answered, “… Although our teachings are in no way heretical, in case that during this period, when heretical teachings are being strictly prohibited, some unenlightened people will be unable to tell the true from the false and regard our teachings as heretical, we [have] suspended our gatherings.”’
The 1671 ban\textsuperscript{70} as well, which was often interpreted as a ‘partial withdrawal of the 1669 ban’ or an acknowledgment of European missionaries’ open activities among the existing Chinese Christian communities,\textsuperscript{71} did not seem to go beyond the 1669 or 1687\textsuperscript{72} edicts. The 1671 ban left unchanged the principle that only European people were allowed to practice Christianity, merely amending the space to which they were restricted from Beijing and Canton to Beijing and their own churches. There is no need to stretch any further the meaning of this order permitting missionaries to be sent to their own churches in provinces. In the Qing context, having the clergy stay at their temples already assumed that the scope of the clergy’s movement should be confined to the vicinity of these sites. Around 1652 (SZ9), for example, the Qing government ordered that Buddhist and Daoist monks stay at their designated temples,\textsuperscript{73} and in 1647 (SZ4), the Qing authorities ordered lamas, the clergy of Tibetan Buddhism, not to go out of designated areas.\textsuperscript{74} Although this order was partially withdrawn for lamas residing outside Beijing, the Qing authorities still stipulated that lamas who went out of their designated areas should return from non-designated areas within three days.\textsuperscript{75} In 1691, Zhang Penghe 張鵬翮 (1649–1725), the Governor of Zhejiang Province, attacked Intorcetta\textsuperscript{76} because the latter was

\textsuperscript{70} Innocentia Victrix, 39b-40a, ‘此內有通曉的著取來京，與南懷仁等同居，其不曉曆法的，准其各歸本堂，除伊敎焚修外，其直隸各省一應人等不許入敎，仍着遵前旨禁止。’
\textsuperscript{71} Dudink understood it as ‘the missionaries were not allowed to make new converts or to build new churches, but were still free to practice their own religion and to care for their existing communities’. Similarly, Liam Matthew Brockey argued that the 1671 ban ‘stated that they [the missionaries] could practice their religion with the followers they had already made, but were barred from making new converts’. See Ad Dudink, ‘Opponents’, 515, 517, 520; Brockey, Journey to the East, 136.
\textsuperscript{72} Le Gobien, Histoire de l'edit de l'empereur de la Chine, 22-26; QIZ-KX-1, 1617.
\textsuperscript{73} DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3623. A similar order was also issued in the Shunzhi 3rd year regarding Beijing Buddhist monks and nuns and Daoist monks. See Dingli quanbian, juan 19, 43a.
\textsuperscript{74} DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3628.
\textsuperscript{75} Li’an quanji, juan 14, 7b-8a; DQHD-KX, juan 71, 3629.
\textsuperscript{76} Le Gobien, Histoire de l'edit de l'empereur de la Chine, 40, 46-49.
at that time residing at the Hangzhou church, away from his original church in Jiangxi Province. Zhang’s interpretation combined his common sense in law that movement of any clergy shall be confined to in and around the temple\textsuperscript{77} with the sentence from the 1671 ban, ‘准其各归本堂，除伊教焚修外 (but those who are not well-versed in the calendrical affairs shall now be allowed to return to their own churches [in provinces])’,\textsuperscript{78} to argue that Intorcetta should have been in his registered church in Jiangchang prefecture, Jiangxi province. Additionally, we can observe from some privately published legal compilations how the Kangxi emperor’s contemporaries expected the scope of the European clergy’s movement to be confined to the vicinity of their temples. The compiler of \textit{Dingli quanbian} \textsuperscript{79}定例全编, which was printed in the Kangxi 54th year (c.1715), for example, listed the Edict of Toleration—the policy that guaranteed the most liberty to Christians in Qing history—in a section named ‘All issues relating to movements or crimes by lamas or European monks [emphasis added]’ (凡喇嘛西方僧人遊方及犯事). The aforementioned ban ordering lamas who traveled out of their designated areas to return from non-designated areas within three days is also listed in the same section.\textsuperscript{79}

Moreover, the measure whereby the Kangxi emperor returned the confined missionaries to their own churches seems to be less of a remarkable favour than an expression of his confidence at that time in his control over his empire. According to the Kangxi edition of \textit{Da

\textsuperscript{77} Especially see Le Gobien, \textit{Histoire de l'edit de l'empereur de la Chine}, 40, ‘Je ne sais en quel temps l'Européen Intorcetta a abandonné son ancienne église de Kiansi pour venir s'établir en celle de Chekiam: s'il se dit religieux, il doit observer religieusement les lois de l'empire, fermer la porte, & ne recevoir aucune visite.’

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Innocentia Victrix}, 39b-40a.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Dingli quanbian}, juan shou, 103a; juan 19, 49a
Qing huidian, around 1667, there were about 80,000 Buddhist and Daoist temples, accommodating a total of around 140,000 monks and nuns.\(^8^0\) Although it is difficult to establish whether the Kangxi government had performed a countrywide survey of lamaseries, according to one study, in Beijing in the 6\(^{th}\) year of the Kangxi Reign (c. 1667) alone, there were at least 25 lamaseries, if we count only those that are clearly traceable.\(^8^1\) As for the number of lamas, a survey 60 years after the Kangxi 6\(^{th}\) year (c. 1673) reported that 1,100 monks resided at lamaseries in Beijing.\(^8^2\) In contrast, according to the investigation in the Calendar Case, there were a mere 30 and 28 Xiyang churches and Xiyang missionaries across the country, respectively.\(^8^3\) Considering that the emperor was confident enough that by the 15\(^{th}\) year of his reign (c. 1676), he felt able to stop the certificates (\textit{dudie} 度牒) policy, which had been used to monitor the activities of the 140,000 Buddhist and Daoist clergy and 80,000 temples,\(^8^4\) his decision to return a mere 28 Xiyang missionaries to their places of worship in 30 churches does not seem to be a significant favour.

The emperor, however, would still remain vigilant to the provincial missionaries’ movements. During his six Southern Tours, for example, he displayed great interest in the provincial churches and the missionaries who were expected to be there. Towards the end of 1683, when he reached Jinan 濟南 in Shandong Province,\(^8^5\) the emperor sought out the

\(^{8^0}\) DQHD-KX, \textit{juan} 71, 3625.

\(^{8^1}\) Ma Jia, Qingdai Beijing zangchuan fojiao siyuan, 1, 43-45. ‘Beijing’, as Ma Jia defined it, includes \textit{huangcheng} 皇城, \textit{neicheng} 内城, \textit{waicheng} 外城, \textit{jiaojiong} 郊坰, and \textit{huangjia yuanyou} 皇家苑囿.

\(^{8^2}\) DQHDZL-QL, \textit{juan} 142, 512-13.

\(^{8^3}\) QCXCMDY, 29; XC, 81-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; \textit{Donghua lu}, vol. 1, 556.

\(^{8^4}\) The Qianlong emperor would later mention that ‘there were not yet that many monks at that time’, as one of the reasons for this measure. See Yang Jian, \textit{Qing wangchao fojiao shiwu guanli}, 111-12; Dingli guanbian, \textit{juan} 19, 49b-50a.

\(^{8^5}\) This imperial tour was followed by the first Southern Tour to Jiangnan.
churches and missionaries in the area. At that time, however, Jean Vala, SJ (1614–96) and Bernardo de la Encamación, OFM (c. 1630–1718) were away,\textsuperscript{86} even though, according to the information collected during the Calendar Case\textsuperscript{87}, they were supposed to be in Jinan. In Nanjing, the emperor met Encamación and heard the reason for his absence from Jinan. While in the area, the emperor also sought out the local churches and met Giandomenico Gabiani, SJ (1623–96), who had been transferred to Beijing during the Calendar Case and was now expected to be in Nanjing. Although there do not appear to be any records extant about whether the emperor met other missionaries in Nanjing, it is clear that upon his return to the capital, he asked Verbiest about the churches, their locations, and whether they currently existed, all of which he seems to have already carefully noted during his Tours.\textsuperscript{88} Later, Jinan’s Christian community pointed out that Encamación should have been present during the emperor’s visit to the city. When José de Osca OFM (1659–1735) expressed his reluctance to meet the emperor during the second Southern Tour, his congregation strongly recommended that he remain at the churches, explaining that the absence of missionaries during the emperor’s first visit might have aroused his suspicion.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{86} Meng Dewei, \textit{Ling yu ru}, 79.
\textsuperscript{87} During the Calendar Case, the Qing state summoned to Beijing all the Xiyang missionaries across the empire for interrogation and recorded relevant information about them. For example, see QCXCMGY, 277-80. Also, see note 83.
\textsuperscript{88} For example, see XC, 156.
\textsuperscript{89} Meng Dewei, \textit{Ling yu ru}, 83. For the Kangxi emperor’s similar attitude, see Spencer, \textit{Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor}, 137-38; Mungello, \textit{The Forgotten Christians of Hangzhou}, 59; Meng Dewei, \textit{Ling yu ru}, 84-85; AP I, 89, note 165, 89-93[48-50] (the number in the square bracket means the original page), 144-46[75].
A Crucial Sentence

The sentence about a ban on Christian gatherings (R-IV-b) must have had no small influence on the Christian community, especially when we consider regular Mass was one of their central rites. The fact that this time the ban was clearly targeted at Christianity was also seminal—Schall von Bell had to suspend the Mass due to a ban targeted at Buddhism and Daoism in 1664.90 Interestingly, however, this important sentence (R-IV-b) tended to be underestimated or covered up in European sources.

In a report that seems to have been written no later than 1693,91 Suarez sets out the four stages through which the 1669 ban was proclaimed. First, the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials debated the two opinions on the legal status of Xiyang teachings: The Manchu officials’ opinion that both Xiyang and Chinese peoples should be permitted to practice Christian teachings; and the Han officials’ opinion that only Xiyang people, not Chinese, should be allowed to practice Christian teachings. Second, the Council reached a conclusion (S-I) in favour of the Han officials’ opinion. Third, the Kangxi emperor, after receiving the first conclusion, ordered the Council to reconsider it, and thus the Council submitted a new conclusion (S-II), which reflected the Manchu officials’ opinion. Fourth, this second conclusion was overturned by an edict of the Kangxi emperor (the 1669 ban) because Han officials bought off the emperor’s favoured courtier, and through him succeeded in persuading the emperor.92

90 QCXCMDY, 30.
92 LE-C, 9-12.
This explanation of the course to the 1669 ban seems, at first sight, to correspond to the description in *Xichao ding’an* 熙朝定案, the well-known compilation of pro-Christian documents during the Qing period. Are the two documents (R-I\textsuperscript{94} and R-II\textsuperscript{95}) in *Xichao ding’an* the Council’s two conclusions (S-I and S-II) as described by Suarez? Overall comparison between the two documents leads instead to the conclusion that R-II was produced to complement R-I. In other words, the latter came to include additional information, such as some new accusations against Yang Guangxian (that, for example, Yang abused his authority at the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy in his destruction of both the honorific tablet and the memorial monument that the Shunzhi emperor had bestowed upon Schall von Bell). Therefore, the relationship between R-I and R-II does not correspond with Suarez’s depiction of the Council having changed its mind and thus are not conclusions S-I and S-II.

Interestingly, the Council’s second conclusion (S-II), which Suarez regarded as favourable to Christianity, does not seem to correspond to either R-I or R-II. This raises another question: What is the relationship between that second conclusion of the Council, as described by Suarez, and documents R-I and R-II? Fortunately, we can answer this question because, except for a few differences concerning the lexicon or the word order, Suarez’s Latin translation is the same as that of ‘the Council’s Sentence’ (*Sententia Comitiorum*) in François

\textsuperscript{93} In this dissertation, *Xichao ding’an* is more valued as a historical source than *Zhengjiao fengbao* because the former was written far earlier than the latter and thus is more likely to preserve the original form of the related documents. Therefore, if both books contain similar contents, Xichao ding’an is always cited first in this dissertation. The edition of *Xichao ding’an* I consulted is the one in XC. According to Han Qi, this edition resulted from his analytic comparison of various editions from Shanghai Library Bibliotheca Zi-ka-wei, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, and Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma, and an edition Yilong Huang compiled personally (XC, 12-13, 437).

\textsuperscript{94}XC, 77-80 (no. 29).

\textsuperscript{95}XC, 81-83 (no. 30).
de Rougemont’s *Innocentia Victrix*, which preserved the original Chinese text (hereafter R-III). Thus, through a close comparison of R-I, R-II, and R-III, it can be concluded that R-III is actually a summary of R-II in Xichao ding’an.

One thing we have to pay attention to is that, although R-III is a summary of R-II, it nonetheless contains information—namely, ‘But their meetings and the act of distributing Christian materials such as *Tianxue chuangai* or bronze statues should still be banned’—that does not appear in either R-II or R-I. The quoted sentence is translated into Latin as ‘prohibition of large-scale gatherings’ and ‘prohibition of distributing booklets for evangelism or bronze medals’ in both Suarez’s report and Rougemont’s *Innocentia Victrix*. Both also added almost the same comments, despite a few differences in the lexicon.

Although the sentence is not found in both the most detailed version of the Council’s conclusions (i.e., R-I and R-II), it was indeed part of the Council’s Conclusion. We have already examined the Ministry of Rites’ citation of the Council’s Conclusion in the Kangxi 26th year. Subsequently, in the Kangxi 31st year, the Ministry of Rites quoted it with the above

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96 *Innocentia Victrix* is a compilation of historical materials (both Chinese documents and their Latin translations) regarding the Calendar Case and was published in Canton in 1671, 20 years earlier than Suarez’s report. It has been understood that François de Rougemont, SJ (1624–76) compiled *Innocentia Victrix* on the order of António de Gouvea, SJ (1592–1677). See Golvers, François de Rougemont, 25-26; LE-O, 39-44; *Innocentia Victrix*, 22a-24a.

97 *Innocentia Victrix*, 20a-22a (XC, 396). The Chinese documents from *Innocentia Victrix* can also be found in XC with the title of ‘Tang Ruowang zhaoxue wenjian’.

98 *Innocentia Victrix*, 22b, ‘sic tamen, ut prohibeat instituere coetus maiores: item spargere supradictum libellum de propagante eiusdem Religionis; aerea item numismata [a parenthesis: ne dare tur ansa scilicet renouandae suspiciones, et calumnae, quâ nos iam absolverant, de agitata clam defectione.]’; LE-O, 40, ‘sic tamen, ut prohibeatur [a parenthesis: Hae autem idicirco vetanda judicabant, ne dare tur ansa suspiciones (qua nostros iam absolverant) de agitate defectione.] instituere coetus maiores, et spargere libellum de propagante ejsusdem Religionis, aut aerea numismata.’ However, ‘prohibition of large-scale gatherings’ and ‘prohibition of distributing booklets for evangelism or bronze medals’ are not included in Thierry Meynard’s Chinese translation of Suarez’s report (LE-C, 10).

99 XC, 184

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sentence included (hereafter R-V). Most importantly, an account (hereafter R-VI) dated September 5, 1669 (KX8/8/11) in Qing shilu, which provides a comprehensive summary of documents R-I and R-II, also contains the same sentence.

Generally speaking, the records R-I and R-II in Xichao ding’an preserve the Council’s Conclusion more concretely and faithfully than records R-III, R-IV, R-V, and R-VI; only the sentence in question (‘But their meetings, and the action of distributing Christian materials […]’ etc.) is omitted. This seems to concern the intention of the author (or authors) of Xichao ding’an. A Similar phenomenon can be observed in the compilation with regard to another sensitive sentence. For example, when recording the edict of 1687 (examined above), Xichao ding’an, unlike Qijuzhu, failed to mention the Kangxi emperor’s clear opinion against Christianity: ‘The Christian teachings should be proscribed. The Ministry [of Rites’] decision was perfectly correct’. Such omissions—which, to me, appear intentional—reflect how Xichao ding’an was written to highlight imperial favor toward Christianity and to boost its status in Chinese society. Indeed, the author[s] intended to distribute Xichao ding’an to officials and literati rather than to circulate it secretly within the Christian community.

If the omission was indeed intended, when did it occur? Xichao ding’an was the compilation of Qing official documents, especially including imperial edicts, and, as mentioned, the author[s] of Xichao ding’an intended to distribute Xichao ding’an to officials and literati rather than to circulate it secretly within the Christian community. This meant that no element of the Council’s Conclusion would have been removed without a legitimate reason. Thus, we need to look for a period of time during which the author[s] would have had such a reason.

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100 XC, 183-84
101 QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 555-56
102 XC, 184, QJZ-KX-1, 1617.
103 Missionaries often presented Xichao ding’an to officials as a gift during the Qing period (XC, 5-6).
With a little authorial license, I speculate that the timing of the omission seems to lie sometime after the issue of the ‘Edict of Toleration’ in 1692, which, from the missionaries’ perspective, officially guaranteed ‘freedom of religion’.

Lastly, if the Council’s Conclusion was also not as favourable as the missionaries understood at the time, how should we interpret Xiyang missionaries’ contrasting interpretations of the Council’s Conclusion and the 1669 ban, along with their deep disappointment about the change from the former to the latter? Grelon in particular contrasted the Council’s Conclusion (‘hopeful, advantageous, just, and fair’) with the Kangxi emperor’s Edict (‘unjust and unfair’). He was particularly impressed by the Council’s Conclusion, saying that it revealed the Qing state’s definite approval of Christianity and was the most wonderful result that the missionaries had achieved in their eighty years of ministry. Meanwhile, Suarez praised the Council’s Conclusion as amounting to a declaration of religious freedom, while deploiring the Kangxi emperor’s edict as the proscription of Christianity.

However, it was not that Rougemont, Grelon, or Suarez were unaware of the above prohibitive sentence. Grelon, for example, acquired another gazette that contained the full text of the Council’s Conclusion after he had read an excerpt (or summary) from the gazettes examined earlier. He enclosed two summaries of the full text at the end of his letter. In the first summary, he interpreted the sentence in question as proscribing ‘regular meetings’ and the distribution of ‘medals and agnus Dei [a holy casket called shengdu 聖匵 at the time]’. In the second summary, he interpreted it as proscribing ‘gatherings of Christians’ and the distribution of ‘medals, agnus Dei, and Tianxue chuangai’.

104 Bosmans, ‘Documents relatifs a Ferdinand Verbiest’, 60.
105 For agnus Dei, see Ad Duink, ‘The Sheng-ch’ao tso-p’i (1623) of Hü Ta-shou’, 117-18, note 73.
107 Bosmans, ‘Documents relatifs a Ferdinand Verbiest’, 60.
meanwhile, interpreted the sentence as a ‘prohibition on big gatherings’ and a ‘prohibition on distributing booklets for evangelism or bronze medals’.

The reason why Europeans interpreted the Council’s Conclusion so positively—despite their recognition of the prohibitive sentence—was presumably that they did not take the sentence seriously. Interestingly, however, Rougemont, Suarez, and Grelon all seemed to have felt a certain discomfort about their own laudatory accounts of the Council’s Conclusion. Suarez and Rougemont, for example, added a footnote, ‘lest the cleared charges be aroused again’, after the Latin translation of the sentence in question, although the footnote is not found anywhere in the original Chinese text. This added comment appears aimed at making the reader feel that the prohibitive sentence was an expression of the Qing state’s solicitude for the missionaries. Similarly, at the end of Grelon’s praise for the Council’s Conclusion, he confesses—so as ‘not to cover up anything’—that while the Conclusion allows all Christians to profess their faith freely and clears them of the charge of being heretical, it contains ‘a clause which is unfavourable to us’.

Despite having undergone difficult times during the Calendar Case, the missionaries began to hope for a brighter future now that—thanks to the outstanding work of their Beijing counterparts—all the charges they had faced had been overturned. Subsequently, the vestiges of the Calendar Case were also removed from the calendrical affairs and from their contemporaries’ memories. In this political atmosphere, the missionaries might well have

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108 For example, Innocentia Victrix, 22b, ‘sic tamen, ut prohibeantur instituere coetus maiores: item spargere supradictum libellum de propagatione eiusdem Religionis; aerea item numismata [a perenthesis: ne daretur an; si re uno demidet rene uandae suspicione, et calunniae, quâ nos iam absoluerant, de agitâ clam defectione.]’ Also see LE-O, 40, ‘sic tamen, ut prohibeantur [a perenthesis: Hae autem idicirco vetanda judicabant, ne daretur an; si reprehensor (qua nostros iam absoluerant) de agitate defectione.] instituere coetus maiores, et spargere libellum de propagatione eiusdem Religionis, aut aerea numismata.’

109 Bosmans, ‘Documents relatifs a Ferdinand Verbiest’, 60.
expected the Council’s Conclusion to signify the beginning of a new rosy era, like that of the Shunzhi period. To the sanguine missionaries, the sentence, ‘But their meetings and the act of distributing Christian materials such as Tianxue chuangai or bronze statues should still be banned’ sounded trivial and incongruous with the rest of the Council’s Conclusion. They may have regarded it as a minor cautionary clause, added unnecessarily to a remarkable declaration by a Qing ruler who otherwise seemed to be offering freedom of religion. Thus, this trivial sentence was simply overlooked, or if mentioned at all, merely to a degree that allowed the authors to clear their consciences.

In this respect, there existed a significant disparity between the Qing ruler’s and the Xiyang people’s perspectives on the status of Christian teachings in the Qing empire. From the Qing ruler’s perspective, that prohibitive sentence was crucial, whereas the Xiyang community underestimated it. Within the boundaries of legitimate Qing religions, Xiyang people’s collective practice of their religion, i.e., Mass, was not treated as an exception, even though the missionaries had been given special favour by the Shunzhi emperor. Once that special favour was removed, the law was clearly applicable to Christianity.
Part II: The Xiyang People and the Manchu-Han Relations
Chapter V: The Kangxi Emperor and the Rites Controversy

Trying to understand the meaning of the Xiyang people’s existence in the Qing Empire, Chapters V and VI examine the Qing ruler’s and the Han elite’s responses to the Rites Controversy, respectively. From the late 1690s to the 1710s, Xuanye (1654-1722), the fourth emperor of the Qing Empire, struggled to consolidate Qing rule over the Han world. His six visits to Jiangnan, the heart of the Han world, show how much he tried and wanted to win the absolute loyalty of the Han elite during this period.¹ The relatively stable northern front² also enabled the emperor to focus more on this ‘southern front’. His efforts, however, were confronted by an unexpected challenge, i.e., the denial by certain members of the Xiyang community of seminal Chinese—de facto Han—rites that the Han elite had until then prioritised. In 1707, at Nanjing, a symbolic location for Han tradition, the Xiyang legate Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (Duoluo 多羅 or 鐸羅, 1668-1710) even completely proscribed these seminal Chinese rites. What did such provocation mean to the Manchu ruler and the Han elite? Half a century previously, the Han elite had risked their lives merely for their hair. Could they turn a blind eye to this serious challenge to their own time-honoured and

¹ During the tours, the emperor tried to envision his benevolent rule (renzheng) by granting tax exemptions; conferring accolades on the aged; succouring the poor; increasing quotas for local schools; or granting amnesties to criminals. He also showed respect to Han cultural traditions by visiting the Ming Taizu mausoleum and Emperor Yu’s temple. See Kishimoto Mio, ‘Shinchō kōtei no kōnan junkō’, 15-17, 32-34.
² This stability resulted from a series of incidents such as the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), the Dolon Nor Convention (1691), and the defeat of Galdan (1696), before the northern frontier became insecure again in 1715 due to the Zunghars issue.
symbolic rituals, rather than merely their hair, this time? And how did the Kangxi emperor, who would not have been unaware of the Han elite’s discontent, address this problem?

**Before the Legate’s Arrival in Beijing**

**The Emperor’s Initial Response to the Rites Controversy**

In November 1700, the Kangxi emperor became officially aware of the Rites Controversy. This was because, amidst the dispute over Chinese rites reignited by Maigrot and Charmot, the Jesuits required Chinese proponents of the Jesuit interpretation of the rites and then asked the most authoritative figure, the emperor, for a definite statement on the Rites Controversy. Their memorial on the issue was written in Manchu, with Heshiheng 赫世亨 and Gerbillon’s help, by Antoine Thomas, the then Superior of the Residence of St. Joseph, and on the thirtieth of November (KX39/10/20) was officially submitted to the throne. In this memorial, the Beijing Jesuits presented their interpretations of the Chinese rites concerning Confucius and deceased ancestors, and the designations for the Christian God, and requested the emperor’s position on these interpretations. The emperor declared, on the same day, in favour of the Jesuits with the following rescript:

> What you wrote sounds very good and accords with the great Way. To revere Heaven, to serve the master, and to respect teachers and elders are universal norms! [Such natural attitudes] cannot be controlled.

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3 It is also possible that the Kangxi emperor already perceived it through unofficial channels.
4 AP II, 571[680]; The Beijing Jesuits, *Brevis relatio*, 9a-9b. In fact, the memorial was sent to the throne around the nineteenth before the official submission.
5 The Beijing Jesuits and the Kangxi emperor, ‘Statement on Chinese Rites’. The original Chinese version included in the gazette is not extant. However, there is another Chinese version (maybe a translation) of the rescript in *Brevis Relatio*. 

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The Manchu and Latin versions of these memorials and rescripts (both of which, as a document, are called *Declaratio Rituum*, or simply the Declaration), together with Thomas’ letter that promised to send more materials the following year, were delivered, via Fuzhou in Fujian Province at the end of 1700, to Jean Basset, MEP (Bai Risheng 白日陞, 1662-1707) at the port of Amoy and was finally submitted by Louis Le Comte, SJ (Li Ming 李明, 1655-1729) to the Pope on the eighth of November 1701 (KX40/10/19).6

In 1701, as Thomas had promised, the Beijing Jesuits published a comprehensive report, the *Brevis Relatio*7, which contained not only the Manchu and Latin versions of the Declaration, the same content that the Beijing Jesuits had sent to Rome the previous year, but also newly inserted sections, including the Chinese version of the Declaration and the testimonies of ten prominent Chinese or Manchu literati for the Chinese Rites. The *Brevis Relatio* was sent through François Noël, SJ (Wei Fangji 衛方濟, 1651-1729) and Caspar Castner, SJ (Pang Jiabin 龐嘉賓, 1655-1709) to Pope Clement XI and the Particular Congregation in Rome. Subsequently, Thomas also sent to Rome the testimonies of Qing Christians that had been collected from sixty letters with around four hundred and thirty different names in total.8 In the meantime, within the Qing Empire, a Chinese version of the Declaration began to circulate among literati through the official gazette. For example, it was thanks to the official gazette that Maigrot had already read the Chinese version in February 1701 before obtaining the three-

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6 AP I, 519-20[281], 552, note 855.
8 Standaert, Chinese Voices in the Rites Controversy, 13-33.
language version through Visdelou and Beauvollier in Fuzhou in July 1701 and receiving the *Brevis Relatio* from the Beijing Jesuits in September 1701.9

After the emperor had become clearly aware of the Rites Controversy in November of 1700, did any noticeable change appear in his attitude to the Xiyang community? Qing sources do not provide any relevant detailed accounts of this.10 Only from *Qi ji zhu* and *Shengzu wuxing Jiangnan quanlu* 聖祖五幸江南全錄 [The Complete Records of the Kangxi Emperor’s Fifth Southern Tour]11, we can merely find an episode in which the emperor met a number of Xiyang missionaries at the Beiting xiang 碑亭巷 in Nanjing.12

Unlike Qing sources, however, some Western sources indicate subtle changes in the emperor’s attitude to the Xiyang community and their religion. First, the emperor’s side began to gather intelligence about the Xiyang community in Japan. According to a letter by Antoine Thomas on seventeenth of December 1701 (KX42/12/11), Yinti 胤禔, who was the first son of the emperor and then in charge of all Xiyang-related matters, despatched a spy named ‘Wang’ to Japan to investigate Christianity-related issues there. After completing his investigation, Wang reported to Yinti that the reason for the Japanese government’s proscription of Christianity and deportation of the Xiyang community was rooted in the government’s worries that Japanese Christians might become fifth columnists when the Xiyang attacks Japan in the

9 AP I, 521[282].
10 AP I, 12-13[5].
11 *Shengzu wuxing Jiangnan quanlu* contains relatively detailed accounts of the fourth (KX42/1/16 - KX42/3/15) and fifth (KX44/2/9 - KX44/run4/28) Southern Tours. It is likely that the author accompanied the emperor as a capital official (jingguan) on the fifth Southern Tour. See Liu Lu, ‘Minjian huayu Zhong de Kangxi nanxun’, 348.
future.13 From then on, Yinti provided continual warnings to his father of the confusion to be expected in the empire due to the Xiyang people.14

Second, the emperor himself also monitored the Xiyang community’s activities through his Southern Tours. For example, after the fourth Southern Tour (1703.3.3-4.30), the emperor warned Grimaldi that he had noticed certain ‘great differences in the modus agendi of the missionaries’ during the Tour, and that if this altered behaviour was not amended, it might cause fatal difficulties for the Xiyang people in China. He also added that henceforth, even the emperor himself would not assist the Xiyang people against any Governor-general accusing a Xiyang individual of changes in behaviour of this kind. To emphasise the seriousness of this warning, the emperor repeated it three times.15 From this exchange between the Kangxi emperor and Grimaldi, the changed ‘modus agendi of the missionaries’ that the emperor noticed appears to include behaviour contrary to Chinese customs, diversifying missionary orders, increasing numbers of churches, and widespread missionary movements outside of the prescribed boundaries.16

13 Antoine Thomas, circular letter (1701.12.17) in ARSI: JS167:217 (quoted from AP II, 119, note 43). For the Kangxi emperor and Yinti’s understanding of contemporary Japan, see the decree issued in Nanjing on the tenth of April 1707 (AP II, 501[632]) and Yinti’s remark in front of his nephew and Franciscans in Jinan on the 12th of June 1707 (AP II, 545[664]).
14 See Pereira’s letter to Kilian on the twentieth of August 1707 (AP II, 192[451]).
15 AP I, 144-145[75]. According to Bernardino della Chiesa, OFM (Yi Daren 伊大仁 or 伊大任, 1644-1721)’s letter to Propaganda Fide (1704.10.4), this conversation took place in April of 1704. See Sinica Franciscana 5:476-8, 1704.10.4 (quoted from AP I, 89, note 165).
16 AP I, 89, note 165, 89-93[48-50], 144-146[75]. See ‘He [i.e., the Kangxi emperor] added somewhat angrily that Europeans were wandering around luanluan de, maomao de, meaning contrary to our good customs, and with a danger of being held in slight esteem … We [i.e., Xiyang missionaries] were not looking for the wealthy, but lovers of virtue, and people like that were more readily found in the villages etc. If we are restricted by the Emperor solely to the cities, it would seem honourable indeed, but useless for us, who find profit in nothing but the salvation of souls’. Also see the emperor’s solutions to the problem: (1) to make all Xiyang missionaries reside together in the same space, regardless of the individual order or nation; (2) to cut down on the number of churches by integrating them into a few;
The Kangxi emperor’s observation was not far from the truth. In terms of increases in the number of missionaries and churches, there were 127 missionaries, 244 churches, and 144 residences across twelve provinces of the empire by 1701, an approximately three- and sevenfold increase in the first two from the 28 missionaries and 30 churches during the Calendar Case era, respectively. The missionary orders active in Qing China missionary work had also diversified, as they now included Franciscans (OFM), Dominicans (OP), Augustinians (OSA), the Missions étrangères de Paris (MEP), and Lazarists. In particular, the increasing number of secular clergy (ecclesiastics) despatched by Propaganda Fide was particularly noticeable during this period and appears to lead the Kangxi emperor to perceive the diversification of the missionaries during his fourth Southern Tour. This was because the secular clergy’s general lack of scientific knowledge led the emperor to note a significant difference between these new arrivals and previous missionaries. For example, after returning to Beijing from his fourth and fifth Southern Tours, the Kangxi emperor complained to the Beijing missionaries that the new arrivals who he had met during the tours knew nothing and he could not find anything to learn from them. Some officials also shared the emperor’s view, asking ‘Does St. Peter’s Society (Sheng Bodulu hui 聖伯都祿會) know anything at all’?

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17 Witek, ‘Catholic Missionaries’, 345. Although Witek estimates that the Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Mission Étrangères de Paris numbered 59, 29, 18, 6, and 15, respectively, he, maybe mistakenly, estimated the total of those missionaries at 117, not 127.
18 QCXCMDY, 29; XC, 81-83; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 556.
19 From the twenty-third of December 1673, the Pope allowed secular clergy to travel to China freely, and after 1680, Propaganda Fide began to send missionaries to China (Claudia von Collani, ‘Missionaries’, 297).
20 ‘St. Peter’s Society’ meant secular missionaries sent by Propaganda Fide to China.
21 AP I, 147[76].
De Tournon also witnessed the emperor say ‘some ignorant [missionaries] came to China some ten years ago’.\textsuperscript{22}

Worthy of note is the Kangxi emperor’s worry that the aforementioned changes among the Xiyang people could lead to confusion among the Chinese population within China proper (\textit{neidi} 内地). For example, in the Kangxi emperor’s rescript to Grimaldi’s report on the twenty-third of July 1705 regarding the Papal legate’s arrival at the Qing, the emperor, while pointing out recent strife between Chinese Christians being caused by the strife amidst the Xiyang people, expressed his concern that in the future Chinese in China proper would become involved in conflicts among the Xiyang people.\textsuperscript{23} This concern cannot be dismissed as a product of his imagination but rather seemed to be a reasonable assumption based on long, acute observation. Indeed, until then, alongside with, as mentioned earlier, the increases in the number of missionaries and churches and the extension of the scope of missionaries’ movement in local areas, the number of Chinese Christians in China proper also grew significantly, by eighty-two per cent, from around 110,000 in 1663 to around 200,000 in 1705.\textsuperscript{24} As the emperor assumed, were any strife amidst the Xiyang people to spread to their Chinese followers, the impact on Qing society in China proper would not be negligible.

While the emperor’s side had been keeping an eye on the situation regarding the Xiyang people inside and outside the country since the end of 1700, Rome decided to send to China Charles Maillard de Tournon in the capacity of a \textit{legatus a latere} and Apostolic Visitor to re-

\textsuperscript{22} AP I, 142[74].
\textsuperscript{23} QCXCMDY, 284.
\textsuperscript{24} Standaert, ‘General Characteristics’, 382-83.
investigate the Rites Controversy. On the seventh of February 1702 (KX41/1/11), de Tournon informed Grimaldi, the then Vice-Provincial, in advance of his departure and, on the fourth (KX41/6/10), left for the Qing Empire. Over the time de Tournon made his way to China, the Vatican reached a conclusion (Cum Deus Optimus) on the Rites Controversy on the twentieth of November 1704 (KX43/10/23), which in general supported Maigrot’s stance, although the Vatican would defer official promulgation of that conclusion until de Tournon’s return to Rome. De Tournon, however, remained confident during his stay in China that the Vatican would keep to its earlier conclusion on the Rites Controversy, which was made by Pope Innocent XII and against the Chinese rites—it was from around early 1706 that de Tournon became aware of Cum Deus Optimus.

The Papal legate arrived at Canton on the eighth of April 1704 (KX44/3/15) via Macau on the second of April (KX44/3/9). Although de Tournon’s initial intention was to go further into China to Nanjing with his true identity concealed, he soon changed his initial plan and wanted to officially obtain an entry permit from the Qing emperor. Thus, on the eighth of May

25 Towards late 1700, not long before the Kangxi emperor’s Declaration was delivered to Rome, the Vatican was leaning towards opposition to the Chinese Rites. However, the new Pope Clement XI (r. 1700-21) did not accept his predecessor’s conclusion, and instead ordered a re-examination of the issue. Therefore, the Vatican waited for additional materials from the Beijing Jesuits for the re-examination—the Declaration was then already in the hands of the Vatican—and decided to send de Tournon to China. de Tournon’s letter reached Beijing on the 17th of January 1704 (KX42/12/11), and upon receiving it, Grimaldi wrote letters to Fuzhou and Guangzhou to meet de Tournon’s requests in the letter (AP I, 7-11[3-5]; AP II, 34-37[Compendium of the Acta Pekinensia for 1705 and 1706]).


27 Noll, 100 Roman Documents, 8-24. This conclusion was based on the materials that had been submitted by the Jesuit Procurators (François Noël and Caspar Castner) in early 1703.

28 AP I, 124, note 226; AP II, 295-296[509], 306, note 18. However, de Tournon had then not yet acquired Cum Deus Optimus although he seems to have been aware in early 1706 that the Vatican decided Cum Deus Optimus and sent its draft copies to de Tournon through some channels.

29 AP I, 124, note 226; AP II, 295-296[509], 306, note 18. However, de Tournon had then not yet acquired Cum Deus Optimus although he seems to have been aware in early 1706 that the Vatican decided Cum Deus Optimus and sent its draft copies to de Tournon through some channels.

30 AP II, 35-36[Compendium of the Acta Pekinensia for 1705 and 1706].
1705 (KX44/4/16), de Tournon sent Grimaldi two letters to inform the latter of his changed plan and of certain guidelines for introducing de Tournon to the emperor, for instance, ‘not to reveal de Tournon’s status as legate but, if needed, to mention his status as Patriarch and General Superior of Missionaries’ and ‘to leave to Grimaldi’s judgement whether de Tournon’s role of Commissary Visitor would be revealed’. Those two letters reached Beijing in July 1705 (KX44/5), and from then the Beijing missionaries began to ask the Kangxi emperor to grant an official permission to the legate.31

The Two Orders

When the Beijing Jesuits asked the Kangxi emperor in July 1705 if de Tournon could visit Beijing,32 the emperor responded in a cautious way by saying that their request would be revisited after he obtained more complete information about the legate. The Beijing Jesuits, however, pleaded for permission by emphasising that the purpose of the legate’s visit was merely to express the Pope’s gratitude to the emperor, and that the legate was being accompanied by select medical doctors. Although the emperor finally accepted the missionaries’ request,33 he was somewhat reluctant at heart (‘Pu Lai, Pa’34, he shouldn’t come, and that’s that).35

31 AP I, 11-12[4-5].
32 AP I, 12-13[5].
33 QCXCMDY, 284-85; 287-89; AP I, 14-16.
34 Possibly ‘不來, 罷’.
35 AP I, 15[6].
What deserves our attention in the emperor’s response is that he ordered the officials of the Imperial Household Department to ensure the following two things. First, on the way to Beijing, de Tournon should be dressed in Chinese clothes:

What kind of clothes and hat is de Tournon wearing? Carefully check and report them [to me] (1705.7.25).36

de Tournon is not a tribute envoy sent by [a] Xiyang king[s], but a cleric who practices his [religious] teachings. **He should be in dressed in the clothes of this region** (1705.7.28) (emphasis mine).37

Second, the emperor ordered the relevant edicts, which would be sent to the Provincial Governor and the Governor-general of Guangdong Province, to be written in Qing characters (Qingzi 清字), i.e., the Manchu language:

Show this edict to the Xiyang people in case they have any [different] opinions about it.
If they find [the contents of it] appropriate, Heshiheng should make an edict in Qing characters and hand it over to the son[s] or brother[s] [in Beijing] of the Provincial Governor and the Governor-general to make sure it is soon delivered to [the Provincial Governor and the Governor-general]. The [Manchu] edict should also be submitted to me (1705.7.28) (emphasis mine).38

Why did the Kangxi emperor order that de Tournon be dressed in Chinese clothes and the imperial edicts be written in Manchu?

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36 QCXCMDY, 285. Also see AP I, 15[6].
37 QCXCMDY, 287. Also see AP I, 16[6].
38 QCXCMDY, 287-88. Also see AP I, 16[7].
One plausible answer is that the emperor had already grasped the purpose of de Tournon’s visit. When the Beijing Jesuits reported to the Kangxi emperor about a Vatican high official’s visit, which was unprecedented in China, the emperor, as we saw earlier, had already been observing unusual changes among the Xiyang people in the empire since his Declaration in 1700. Also, it did not sound convincing to the emperor that such a high-ranking official would endure such a long and life-risking voyage merely to express the Pope’s gratitude to him.\(^{39}\) Indeed, it seems that the emperor had been receiving reports from local officials that the legate’s visit had a certain grave purpose. For example, in a letter to the Beijing Jesuits, written by Guo Shilong 郭世隆 (1645-1716), the Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces dated around the tenth of September, the day following de Tournon’s departure for Beijing, Guo said he had heard from de Tournon’s interpreter that the purpose of the legate’s visit was to *shangliang* 商量 (to transact some business) with the emperor. Although *Acta Pekinensia* does not provide concrete evidence that Guo also reported the same hearsay to the emperor, if ones considers that Guo’s had a very harsh stance against the Xiyang people\(^{40}\) and one of his main duties was to monitor the Xiyang people in China proper as well as Macau and to report on them to the throne, it is highly unlikely that Guo did not report to the emperor what he reported to the Beijing Jesuits. Moreover, considering how rude and shocking the expression ‘to transact some business with emperor’ sounded to Chinese listeners at the time, if Guo had not reported it to the throne, it would most likely have reached the emperor’s ears from any other official who had heard it. De Tournon’s side used the expression ‘repeatedly’ and ‘routinely’, not once or twice.\(^{41}\) It would not have been difficult for the Kangxi emperor, who

\(^{39}\) *AP I*, 54-55[26-27].

\(^{40}\) *AP I*, 144[74-75].

\(^{41}\) *AP I*, 54-55[27]. Stumpf does not rule out the possibility that Guo indeed reported it to the throne.
had a keen intellect, to link the grave ‘business’ that the high Vatican official sought to discuss, in spite of the long and life-risking distance involved, with the Rites Controversy, which was at the time the ‘hottest’ issue among the Xiyang people.

At this moment, however, a seminal question from the emperor’s perspective was although the Vatican had already received his Declaration regarding the Rites Controversy, why did the Pope now bring up the same issue again, and go so far as to send this legate? Moreover, the legate, for some reason, was hiding his real purpose of visiting the empire. This circumstantial evidence indicated to the emperor that the Declaration had most likely not been ‘efficacious’ in Rome. If the most authoritative statement from the Qing Empire was unable to end the Controversy in Rome, would a face-to-face meeting with the author of the Declaration be any more likely to end the same Controversy? If the Vatican had dispatched this legate after reading the Declaration, what was the Vatican’s purpose other than to persuade the emperor to agree with their stance against the Chinese rites? Not long beforehand, Han Chinese literati had risked their necks merely for their Chinese hairstyle. Would they shut their eyes to any denial of their core culture, even by Xiyang aliens? Would the Han elite condone the alien Manchu ruler who welcomed these Xiyang aliens to China even if from a Han elite perspective, said ruler’s legitimacy to rule over China came from his proper role as the guardian and embodiment of their Chinese culture? Moreover, as far as Chinese culture was concerned, the Han elite during this period in particular had a more inflexible and uncompromising attitude than ever in Chinese history, since they had experienced the great socio-political disorder of the late Ming and early Qing period. Considering all these concerns from the emperor’s perspective, it is reasonable to understand the emperor’s two orders at the point of de Tournon’s departure for Beijing as part of his preparations against any negative scenarios.

42 See Chapter VI.
Although the ostensible reason for the first order, which required de Tournon to dress in Chinese clothes, was that de Tournon was not a tribute envoy, the emperor’s true intention was to display to the Han Chinese world, that the legate, by making him dress to appear Chinese, was obedient to the Qing emperor’s virtuous influence. From the Manchu emperor’s perspective, allowing the legate to visit Beijing not only meant allowing him to meet the emperor, but, as de Tournon expected that he should ‘be conducted to Peking with public honours’, it also meant allowing him to travel through the Han Chinese world, ‘China proper’, and to receive attention from its population. Hence, de Tournon’s clothes had to satisfy the expectations of the main audience, i.e., the Han Chinese. In the same vein, the setting of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s visit to Beijing had been shaped to make it most suitable to the then main audience, the Mongols, and the spatial structure of Canton during the Qianlong period would be intentionally divided into ‘Canton City’, the world of the Han elite, in which the obedience of Siamese tribute envoys to the Qing emperor’s virtuous influence was displayed before the Han elite, and ‘the Canton Factory-Macao area’, in which the Xiyang people lived relatively freely, beyond sight of the Han elite. By forcing the Chinese style on de Tournon’s clothing,

43 AP I, 11[4].
44 Elverskog, Our Great Qing, 74, 104-5; Kim Sung-Soo, ‘Ose Tallai rama Pukkyŏng haeng, 149.
45 According to Murao Susumu, Qing rulers attempted to create a boundary in Canton between the Xiyang and Han Chinese population, and this boundary, which Murao calls the ‘Canton Factory-Macao boundary’, became particularly marked from the Yongzheng period. Outside of this ideological boundary, Qing rulers allowed the uncontrollable yi population to live relatively freely according to their own customs beyond the Han elite’s ken, whereas within this boundary, ritual performances were displayed at Huaiyuan 懷遠 (Cherishing Guests from Afar)-yi 车, within view of the Han elite, by docile yi 夷 people such as Siamese envoys. This ideological ‘boundary-setting’ seems to be in line with the Qing state's more frequent use of faqian 發遣 [to exile the criminal to a remote area outside China proper] sentencing from the eighteenth century onward. One of the reasons for this sentencing was to prevent [uncontrollable, negative influences] from reaching China proper (neidi), i.e., the Han world (‘發遣巴里坤人犯, 本屬去死一間之匪徒, 以之投畀遠方, 既不致漸染腹地民俗’). A priority for the Manchu ruler was to remove from view of the Han elite any uncontrollable elements such as ‘unedified
the emperor also aimed to deflate in advance the legate’s overbearing attitude to Chinese culture. 46

The second order, which ensured his edicts would be delivered in Manchu to the Governors, was also likely to reflect the emperor’s concern over and consciousness of the population in China proper. In fact, neither of the recipients of the edicts regarding de Tournon’s visit lacked a command of Chinese to the degree they needed Manchu translations of Chinese edicts. Although both Guo Shilong 郭世隆 (1645-1716, the then Governor-general of Guangdong-Guangxi Provinces) and Shi Wensheng 石文晟 (1644-1720 47, the then Provincial Governor of Guangdong Province) were bannermen 48, their memorials written in Chinese can be found in the Qing archives, such as the archives of the Grand Secretariat (neige dagku 内閣大庫) 49. Shi in particular was well-known for his Qing jian tunliang shu 請減屯糧疏 [Memorial to Request Tax Reductions for Military Farms] 50 written in Chinese in the Kangxi 34th year during his Governorship of Yunnan Province. Thus, one consideration

barbarians’ or repeat offenders, which might arouse the Han elite’s suspicion about their Manchu ruler’s edifying power. In this regard, Huagchao xu wenxian tongkao renamed faqian 发遣, to waiqian 外遣 (exile to the outside) by contrasting it with other exiles to areas within China proper. See Murao Susumu, ‘Kenryū kibō’, 653-86, 678-79; Murao Susumu, ‘Kōshū to Makao no “aida”’, 70-83; Murao Susumu, ‘Tokuni issho o mōketa’, 17-19; Liu Jinzao, Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao, juan 250, tu liu, ‘遣分二項. 一發新疆, 一發吉林・黑龍江. 軍罪雖發極邊煙瘴, 仍在內地. 遣罪則發於邊外, 極苦之地. 所謂屏諸四裔不與同中國者, 此軍與遣之分別也’; Kim Hanbark, ‘18 segi Ch‘ŏngjo ŭi kullyubŏm kwalli’, 273-75.

46 When they met Maigrot and Appiani in Jehol on the thirtieth of July 1706, the emperor’s side also required the Xiyang missionaries to dress in the Chinese style (AP I, 685-86[384]).
47 QZN, 1377, 1565.
48 Guo and Shi were Chinese Bordered Red Banner and Chinese Plain White Banner men, respectively.
49 Eight and three Chinese memorials can be found for Guo and Shi, respectively. For this search, I used the Institute of History and Philosophy, Academia Sinica website: (http://archive.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/mctkm2/index.html).
50 Wang Wencheng, et al., eds., Dianxi Yunnan jingji shiliao jixiao, 267-70.
behind the second order is a practice during the Qing period whereby sensitive issues were
made linguistically off limits to Han Chinese. For example, Qing rulers consistently forbade
the use of the Chinese language and thus Han Chinese officials from being involved in issues
relating to the Chosŏn and Russia.\footnote{Kolmaš, The Ambans and Assistant Ambans of Tibet, 67-71. In addressing Russia-related issues, the Qing state had consistently excluded the Chinese language before the Treaty of Tianjin in June 1858. See Koo Bumjin, ‘Ch’ongdade tae Rŏshia oegyo’, 175-85. In Maci (the Censor-in-chief of the Left, zuo du yushi)’s Manchu memorial (題為差往俄羅斯大臣請不分滿漢一體差遣事, 02-02-012-000831-0002, FHA) sent on the twelfth day of the third month of the Kangxi twenty-seventh year, he suggested the use of the Chinese language and Chinese (Han) and Chinese banner (Hanjun) officials in Russia-related issues (’acara be baire jalin, oros gurun i han nenehe waka be aliyame uhei sain þuwalíasun i banjiki seme, bithe wesimbume elcin takūraha manggi, þuwalindi onco gosingga ofi, eiten be baktambume hebei wang beile ambasa be gisurebufi acara be yabubufi, amban membe takūrafi gisurebume unggrimbi … ere amban takūrafi gisurebunrengge, amaga jalan i suduri bithe de tutara be dahame, holbubuhangge umesi ujen oyonggo, ede giyan i nikan bithe kamcífi ujen cooha, nikan ambasa be suwalíyame tuwaliyame tucibufi unggici acambi,’). After receiving Maci’s memorial, the Kangxi emperor ordered the Deliberative Princes and Officials to discuss Maci’s suggestion (’hebei wang, beile, ambasa acafi gisurefí wesímbi,’). Although I could find no further records on this issue, in light of the Qing state’s subsequent consistent exclusion of the Chinese language and Han officials, Maci’s suggestion seems not to have been accepted at last.\footnote{AP II, 545[664].}}

Indeed, almost all the individuals involved in de Tournon’s visit were from within the
emperor’s very close circle and thus the related information remained private.

(1) Firstborn prince Yinti, Crown Prince Yinreng, third son Yinzhi 胤祉, fourth son
Yinzhen 胤禟 (later the Yongzheng emperor), ninth son Yintang 胤塘, thirteenth son
Yinxiang 胤祥, fifteenth son Yinwu 胤禑, sixth son Yinlu 胤祿, Yinti’s nephew\footnote{AP II, 545[664].}, and
some members of the imperial household.

(2) Booi officials (Upper Three Banners) from the Imperial Household Department in
charge of Yangxin dian 養心殿 (The Hall of Mind Cultivation) or Wuying dian 武英殿
(The Hall of Military Prowess), including Heshiheng, Zhang Changzhu 張常住, Zhao Chang 趙昌, Bursai, Wang Daohua 王道化, Hesu 和素, Li Guoping 李國屏, and Fo 54.

(3) Eunuchs who attended to the Kangxi emperor, including Xiao Liang 55, the chief eunuch of the bedchamber Li Yu 李玉, the Zongguan 總管 of the eunuchs 57 Liang Jiugong, and the chief eunuch of Yangxin dian Zhang Qilin 張麒麟.

(4) Governors-general of Guangdong-Guangxi Provinces, including Guo Shilong and Zhao Hongcan 趙弘燦, and Provincial Governors of Guangdong Province, including Shi Wensheng 石文晟 and Fan Shichong 范時崇.

(5) Sons or brothers of Governors-general of Guangdong-Guangxi Provinces and Provincial Governors of Guangdong Province, including Guo Zhaojin, the son of Guo Shilong 58.

(6) Pagharà, a ‘Tartar’ (Manchu or Mongol) Mandarin from the Ministry of Works 59.

(7) The Kangxi emperor’s spies 60.

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53 Although Collani understands that Wang was Heshiheng (‘Charles Maigrot's Role in the Chinese Rites Controversy’, 162), Wang appeared in records following Heshiheng’s death.

54 AP I, 541[294], 568[311]. According to Candela’s diary, this figure is described as the ‘superintendent of the imperial buildings’ and superior in rank to Zhao (AP I, 541, note 851).

55 AP II, 123[409].

56 AP I, 326[170].

57 AP I, 295[152], the original Latin text is ‘Liam Kieu Cum’.

58 Guo’s name is transliterated as ‘Co Chao Chin’, ‘Kuo Chao Chin’, or ‘Co Xeu Kin’ (AP I, 181, note 403).

59 AP II, 461[607].

60 AP I, 42[20], 327[171].
(8) Yinti’s henchmen, including a spy called Wang, spies around the Beijing missionaries, and Foiorò (also called Zhang or Fopao).

Besides the emperor’s sons, the eunuchs, and the emperor’s spies in categories (1), (3), and (7), respectively, who were under the emperor’s immediate control, the officials in category (2) were also under the emperor’s direct control because they were booi of the emperor’s own banners, called the Upper Three Banners (the Bordered Yellow, the Plain Yellow, and the Plain White Banners). The Guangdong Governor in category (4) was a distinctive post compared to other gubernatorial posts because the emperor had a prominent, direct, and personal influence in the appointment process throughout Qing history, and throughout the Kangxi period, all but one of the Guangdong Governors were bannermen. The one exception was Peng Peng who was well-known as a qingguan 清官 (an honest and upright official). Indeed, Shi Wensheng and Fan Shichong, who dealt with the de Tournon issue, were members of the emperor’s Upper Three Banners. As for the Governors-general of Guangdong-Guangxi Provinces in category (4), Guo Shilong was a member of the Bordered Red Banner, whereas as the only Han Chinese Governor-general of Guangdong-Guangxi

61 AP II, 119-20[408], 119, note 43.
62 AP I, 340[178].
63 AP II, 417[578], 461[607], 640[723], 733[787].
64 Rawski, The Last Emperors, 62. For the assumption of Heshiheng and Zhao Chang’s banners as the Bordered Yellow Banner and the Plain Yellow Banner, respectively, see Chen Guodong, ‘Kangxi xiaochen Yangxindian zongjianzao Zhao’, 273; Chen Guodong, ’Wuyingdian zongjianzao Heshiheng’, 96-97.
65 Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 311-14.
66 QSL-KX39/10/10[wuchen], ‘總這爾去一如張鵬翮、李光地、郭琇、彭鵬所行, 則不但為當今名臣, 即後世亦可取重矣.’ A few days after this praise of Peng, on the 15th day of the 10th month in the Kangxi 39th year, the Kangxi emperor appointed Peng as the Governor of the Guangdong Province (QSL-KX39/10/15[guiyou]).
Provinces throughout the Kangxi period, Zhao Hongcan was a renowned, trusted general, along with his father Zhao Liangdong, in the battlefields of Ningxia, Sichuan, and Yunnan during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, which was the ‘Han people’s Rebellion’. As for category (5), since Guo Shilong, Shi Wensheng, and Fan Shichong were bannermen, their sons and brothers, also as bannermen, resided in the Inner City, which was the original hometown of all bannermen. They served as a liaison between the capital and the Canton government during the Rites Controversy period, came to meet de Tournon when he reached Beijing, took care of Mariani before he left Beijing, and conducted Barros and Beauvollier, who were appointed as new envoys to Rome instead of Bouvet, to Canton. Lastly, although there are no more details about categories (6) and (8) in Acta Pekinensia, they certainly carried out secret and private missions assigned by the emperor’s side.

The secrecy which characterised the way the Qing ruler dealt with de Tournon’s visit is also prominently visible in the nature of the spaces in which seminal incidents occurred during the visit. For example, the venues in which the individuals involved were interrogated and detained included Jehol, the emperor’s villa (Changchun yuan 暢春園), Heshiheng’s residence,

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68 Guan Hanhua, ‘Shihun Qingdai qianqi liangguang zongdu’, 82.
69 Wen Tao, ‘Qing chu mingjiang Zhao Liangdong’, 77-80; Zhao Shuxing, Zhao Liangdong yu Wu Sangui panluan, 30-74, 99.
70 For example, see ‘Let Heshiheng write it in the Manchu language and deliver it soon [to the Guangdong government] through the Provincial Governor and the Governor-in-general’s son(s) or brother(s)’ (QCXCMDY, 287-88) or ‘I called the Provincial Governor and the Governor-in-general’s son(s) or brother(s) and, according to Your Majesty’s edict, copied (chaoxie 抄寫) it in the Manchu language. … I delivered it to the Governor-in-general’s nephew (zuzhi 族侄) … and the Provincial Governor’s son …’ (QCXCMDY, 289).
71 AP I, 29-30.
72 AP II, 299, 575-76.
73 AP II, 185.
Zhang Changzhu’s residence, *Shenxing si* (The Office of Palace Justice) of the Imperial Household Department, the North Church, the East Church, and the West Church (see Table 3), all of which were located outside official channels.\(^74\)

**Table 3: Places of interrogation and detention for the involved during de Tournon’s visit in Beijing\(^75\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place for Interrogation</th>
<th>Place for Detention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appiani</td>
<td>The Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>A residence up against the outer wall within the Palace of the Tribunal (the Ministry of Justice), in the custody of the Ministry of Justice, the emperor’s villa, the North Church, the premises of the glassblowing workshop around the North Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guéty</td>
<td>Jehol, the emperor’s villa</td>
<td>Jehol, Heshiheng’s residence, the Ministry of War (to be escorted to Canton the following day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maigrot</td>
<td>The emperor’s quarters in Jehol, a Church</td>
<td>Jehol, the North Church, the Ministry of War (to be escorted to Canton the following day)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^74\) There are a few exceptions. For example, Appiani, who had already gone through official channels after being apprehended by local officials in Sichuan Province, was detained in the custody of the Ministry of Justice, and Guéty, Maigrot, and Mezzafalce were allowed to spend a night at the Ministry of War to be sent to Canton the following day.

\(^75\) The following Table is based on AP II, 191[450], 198[454], 207[458], 208[459], 241[478], 252[485], 259[488], 263[491], 277[499], 576[683], 770-772[810-812], 774-775[813-814], 778[815], 779[816].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mezzafalce</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The East Church, Zhang Changzhu’s residence, the Ministry of War (to be escorted to Canton the following day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariani</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The West Church, ‘handed over to the mandarin Guo Zhaojin, the son of Guo Shilong the zongdu 總督 of the province of Guangdong’ (to be escorted to Canton the following day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Wang</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The Office of Palace Justice of the Imperial Household Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Gu</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The Office of Palace Justice of the Imperial Household Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Xiu</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The Office of Palace Justice of the Imperial Household Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lu</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Yan</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
<td>The emperor’s villa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private space was also used when the emperor’s side interrogated applicants for permits (yinpiao 印票) and issued them. For instance, the Franciscans in Linqing who applied for permits were interrogated in a temple by a private circle consisting of Yinti and his uncle and nephew.\(^{76}\) The closed way in which permits were issued meant that after 1708, local officials

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\(^{76}\) See AP II, 540-41[661-64].
in Shandong, Fujian, Huguang, ‘Jiangnan’, Sichuan, and Shaanxi and even central officials unable to recognise the permits or to ascertain if the permits for particular individual missionaries had actually been issued by the government, had to ask the Imperial Household Department for help several times.  

**The Role of Language**

**The Meaning of Using Manchu**

In this section, by focusing on the pattern of the Kangxi emperor’s language choice, we will examine the emperor’s strategic approach to the Rites Controversy. One primary aspect worthy of attention is his preference for his mother tongue when dealing with the Rites Controversy. As we have seen above, the edicts ordered to be delivered to Guangdong officials, as well as other materials during the Rites Controversy were also preferably produced in Manchu. Indeed, the existing Qing materials pertaining to the Rites Controversy, particularly imperial edicts, remained largely in Manchu. Since imperial edicts were issued officially in Manchu during de Tournon’s stay, the legate had to gain access to their contents through ‘relay interpreting’: when the emperor’s booi officials read out an edict in Manchu in a closed place attended by Xiyang people, ‘the Qing interpreter’, for example Gerbillon or Parrenin, interpreted what he heard into spoken Chinese, after which the legate’s interpreter, in most cases Appiani, interpreted the Chinese into Italian or Latin. For example, on the eleventh of August 1706, when the emperor’s side proclaimed an edict concerning the meeting between the emperor and

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77 QCXCMGY, 311-21.
Maigrot on the second of August, although de Tournon ordered all the Jesuits to be removed from the room, he made an exception for Parrenin. This was because Parrenin was ‘the Qing interpreter’ at the time.\textsuperscript{78}

Of note is the instance in which a verbal edict initially spoken in Chinese eventually became a written Manchu edict. For example, the Kangxi emperor, during the sixth Southern Tour, uttered an edict in Chinese, but interestingly, the Jesuits in Beijing received it eventually in the form of written Manchu edict. This edict concerns the emperor’s coaching of the Beijing Jesuits to write to de Tournon and now remains in vernacular Chinese among the documents from the Hall of Diligence (\textit{Maoqin dian} 應勤殿) of the Palace of Heavenly Purity (\textit{Qinqing gong} 乾清宮), which was once a study and private space for the Kangxi emperor. When we consider that this edict contains the emperor’s corrections, made with his own vermillion pen\textsuperscript{79}, it is highly likely that one of his officials produced it by taking down what the emperor said in vernacular Chinese and later submitted it to the emperor for correction (Figure 14). It is interesting that according to \textit{Acta Pekinensia}, a ‘lapse of memory’ by the emperor meant that he sent that edict twice to the Jesuits in Beijing.\textsuperscript{80} Those two same edicts reached Beijing on the twenty-sixth of April 1707 (KX46/3/24, \textit{hereafter Edict A}\textsuperscript{81}) and on the eleventh of May (KX46/4/10, \textit{hereafter Edict B}\textsuperscript{82}), respectively.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} AP I, 583[320-21].
\textsuperscript{79} KLGW, no. 3 ‘Kangxi jiao Xiyang ren dai xin yu Duoluo shuo 康熙教西洋人帶信與多羅說’ [The Kangxi Emperor ordered the Xiyang people to send a letter to de Tournon], 11-12. This document is entitled ‘康熙著西洋人帶信給羅馬教王特使多羅諭’ in QZXT.
\textsuperscript{80} AP II, 461[607].
\textsuperscript{81} AP II, 434-35[594].
\textsuperscript{82} AP II, 460-61[606-7].
\end{flushleft}
What is the relation between those two edicts recorded in *Acta Pekinensia* and the draft edict (hereafter Edict C for the original and Edict D for the version revised by the emperor) from the Hall of Diligence? An important clue is the passage, ‘When [I] memorialised His Majesty, “I am reporting that Grimaldi and others gave advice to de Tournon in a letter”83, His Majesty ordered as follows’84. Since this passage corresponds to sentence, ‘The emperor was informed that Fr. Grimaldi and his fellow Jesuits have written to Duoluo (the Lord Patriarch, exhorting him etc.)’85 in the Edict B, it can be concluded that Edict B is Edict D. However, Edict D, which was originally in Chinese, according to *Acta Pekinensia*, was in Manchu when it reached Beijing on the eleventh of May 1707 (‘The contents of the letter, which was originally written in Manchu, were, in accordance with a true and faithful translation, as follows.’)86 This process can be summarised as follows: (a) what the Kangxi emperor said in vernacular Chinese (b) was taken down into a draft by an official; (c) that draft was submitted to the emperor for correction; (d) the corrected draft was translated into Manchu; and (e) was sent to the Jesuits in Beijing.87

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83 AP II, 435[594-95], 461-62[607]. However, this letter did not reach de Tournon because he was suddenly exiled to Macao by the emperor’s order.
84 ‘奏閔明我等帶信勸多羅等語具奏奉旨’.
85 However, it looks odd that the date (‘三月十六日’) given in Edict D does not correspond to the date (‘On the 26th day of the 3rd moon’) in Edict B. A similar case can be seen in the document in KLGW that bears the date of ‘the seventeenth day of the third month (三月十七日)’ although *Atti Imperiali* records the date for same document as ‘the seventh day of the third month’. However, QZXT’s understanding of the date in Edict D as of the Kangxi forty-fifth year is a mistake. The annotators of AP I use QZXT’s wrong calculation without criticism (AP I, 281, note 572).
86 AP II, 460[606].
87 It is not exceptional that the Kangxi emperor uttered colloquial Chinese to those who was able to use the Manchu language. He preferred the Manchu language when his utterance was documented but did colloquial Chinese in private conversations. For example, AP I, 63[31], 153[79], AP II, 113[405].
Figure 14: ‘Kangxi jiao Xiyang ren dai xin yu Duoluo shuo 康熙教西洋人帶信與多羅說’ [The Kangxi Emperor ordered the Xiyang people to send a letter to de Tournon] from the 1932 colour edition of KLGW
Another incident that highlights the special significance of the Manchu language occurred when the Kangxi emperor appointed Joachim Bouvet, SJ (Baijin 白晋, 1656-1730) as his envoy to Rome. On the third of January 1706 (KX44/11/19), interestingly, avoiding official channels, the emperor secretly gave Bouvet an edict in Manchu (hereafter the appointment edict)\(^{88}\).

On the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) day [of the 11\(^{\text{th}}\) month in the Kangxi 44\(^{\text{th}}\) year], Bursai, a bithesi, asked the emperor, ‘if [I] could be accompanied by one of the Old Xiyang men (fe si yang ni niyalma), because I, unable to speak the Xiyang language, and Mariani (ša guwe an), as a new arrival and thus unable to speak any languages of this country, will not be able to communicate to each other.’ Then, the emperor said to the Hesihen [i.e., Heshiheng] and Zhang Changzhu, ‘What Bursai says is indeed correct. Select Baijin [i.e., Bouvet] of the Old Xiyang men. When they reach Fujian, Bursai shall come back [to Beijing] and Baijin shall continue all the way to Xiyang\(^{89}\). There is no other reason for Baijin’s company to Xiyang, but because he will hand over [my] gifts to the King of Edification (giyoo hüwa wang), send my regards to him that China (dulimbai gurun) is very peaceful and I am well, and inquire after the King of Edification’.\(^ {90}\)

\(^{88}\) AP I, 109[57]. According to Bouvet, this order (mandatum) was written both in Manchu and Chinese (AP I, 284[146]), but the copy of it archived in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu is in Manchu. Although the translators of AP I comment, ‘in the Jesuit Roman Archives (JS 169: 362-4) there is a Latin translation of the edict in Bouvet’s hand and attested by him, together with Manchu and Chinese copies’ (AP I, 102, note 195), those Manchu and Chinese copies are different documents. While the Manchu one (ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 363-64) is the copy of the appointment edict, the Chinese one (ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 365) is the Ministry of War’s huopiao 火票 (urgent dispatch, issued on KX44/11/20) to order all relevant local officials to provide Bouvet and Mariani with means of transport and their necessities. I appreciate Ricci Institute’s help for providing those materials.

\(^{89}\) Bouvet translated the Manchu word, ‘šuwe’ (meaning ‘in person’ or ‘from beginning to end’) into ‘usque’ in Latin (ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 362).

\(^{90}\) ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 363-64. Acta Pekinensia and QCXCMDY also adumbrate this edict’s contents. See AP I, 284[146-47]; QCXCMDY, 293.
One noticeable detail in the *appointment edict* above is that the plan for Bouvet to join the mission, which initially consisted of Mariani and Bursai, was in response to Bursai’s request for a third person to act as interpreter between Bursai himself and Mariani. Indeed, Stumpf in *Acta Pekinensia* also repeats this account to explain the immediate cause of the emperor’s decision that Bouvet should accompany the mission to Rome.91 Bouvet’s record, however, tells a different story by highlighting the emperor’s active role in sending Bouvet to Rome.92 Which account is closer to the truth?

We can find the answer in a letter93 that the Imperial Household Department sent to the Ministry of War on the second of January 1706 (KX44/11/18).

On the 27th day of this month, Heshiheng, a Vice Director (yuanwai lang 員外郎), and Zhang Changzhu, [a Vice Director?]94, informed us, ‘We received an edict from His Majesty, “Since Xiyang men Baijin and Sha Guoxiang’s95 沙國祥 horses are ill, select one person from your department and let [him help] them borrow post horses on their way to [their destination]. If they cannot ride horses, they are allowed to borrow carts. If using a boat will speed the journey, they are allowed to borrow a boat. If there is a ship at anchor close to Jinmen 金門 or Xiamen in Fujian, [the person who accompanied them] shall return to Beijing after accompanying the Xiyang men to the anchorage.”’ Thus, on the same day, we [the Imperial Household Department] submitted, with the green-tipped wooden lath, to His Majesty, a list of possible officials for the assignment, including the bithesi(s) Fobao and Bu’ersai 布爾賽 [Bursai] from the Hall of Mind Cultivation, the

91 AP I, 101-2[54].
92 See the letter Bouvet wrote to the Jesuit General (Tamburini) on the fifteenth of January 1707 (KX45/12/12) (ARSI, Jap-Sin 170: 14-15)
93 QCXCMD, 292.
94 As far as we rely on An Shuangcheng’s translation, it is not clear whether ‘yuanwai lang’ qualifies ‘Zhang Changzhu’ or they were independent each other.
95 Mariani’s Chinese name was Sha Guo’an, but An transcribes the last letter as ‘xiang 祥’. It is needed to check the original document.
superintendent(s) Guanbao, Changrui, Seleng, Shuangding, Aibao, Taoge, Chen Xixiang, and Gao Bin from the Hall of Military Prowess, and the superintendent(s) Wang Kai, Shuangyu, Boheli, and Bashi from the Hall of Southern Fragrance (Nanxun dian 南熏殿) and received a rescript, ‘let Bu’ersai from the Hall of Mind Cultivation go and also let the Ministry of War select a headman (lingcui 領催).’ Therefore, we ask for the Ministry of War’s help in issuing related evidentiary documents with which [the Xiyang men] can obtain [post horses, carts, or boats] and local officials can prepare post horses, carts, or boats for them in advance so that they do not encounter any obstacles on their journey (emphasis mine).

Contrary to the accounts in the appointment edict or Acta Pekinensia, which describe how the emperor initially chose Bursai before later choosing Bouvet by agreeing with Bursai’s request, according to this letter, the emperor had already selected Bouvet before he chose Bursai. More interestingly, although Heshiheng informed the Imperial Household Department of the emperor’s order to designate one of its officials to accompany Bouvet,96 it is also Heshiheng who would explain to de Tournon that ‘the reason Bouvet was selected was because of Bursai’s request’.97

In fact, there are some more questionable aspects regarding Bouvet’s appointment. Above all, the emperor and the Jesuits’ assertion that the appointment was public enough does not sound persuasive. Although the emperor and the Jesuits argued that Bouvet was officially and publicly appointed during the audience with the emperor on the second of January, the presence

96 QCXCMD, 292
97 AP I, 111-12[59].
of the de Tournon side at that audience is not substantiated, and the only channel through which de Tournon’s side received information about that audience was verbally from booi officials following the audience. Also, although Acta Pekinensia argues that the emperor’s orders during the audience were documented and the related edict is included at the end of Acta Pekinensia, no edict concerning that audience can be found either in Acta Varia Imperatorem Tartaro-Sinicum or Atti Imperiali, which are, respectively, Latin and Italian versions of Acta Pekinensia delivered to Rome, or any other collections in the Vatican that are expected to have served as the appendix for Acta Pekinensia. The only copy of that edict is found in Bouvet’s documents in ARSI.

For the mission’s second audience with the emperor as well, which took place on the third of January, although Mariani was—presumably by his own request, present, it is highly likely that the conversation between the emperor and Bouvet could not be understood by Mariani because of his lack of command of Chinese or Manchu. Considering a Manchu word akin to ‘Ketchi’ (kesi, imperial favour) appeared during the conversation, some part or whole of the conversation could have been in Manchu. Even if some of the conversation was in

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98 It is not clear whether Mariani was present at the meeting, but de Tournon was indeed not there.
99 AP I, 102[54].
100 Acta varia inter Imperatorem Tartaro-Sinicum et Ill. m. ac reverendiss. D. Patr. Antioch. anni 1705 et 1706 in Regia Pekinensi jussu ejusdem Imp. ex archivio interioris palatti deprompta, a s. Maj. te cognita, et de speciali hic Latinè versa.
102 See AP I, 102, note 195.
103 AP I, 108[57], ‘Dnûs item Sabinus Mariani petivit admitti in conspectum S.M.’
104 Although the English translators understood ‘Ketchi’ as ‘keqi 客氣’ (Chinese) and explained it as ‘ceremonial acts, formal acknowledgement’ (AP I, 108, note 206), considering Stumpf’s own translation (‘idest favorem aliquem realem, seu donum, sive id esset ferculum ex Mensâ Regiâ, sive aliquid sericum, aut quid simile’), the original seems to have been ‘kesi’ (Manchu).
vernacular Chinese, it was similarly impossible for Mariani to understand it because Bouvet was likely to be the only interpreter during the audience and interpreted just a small part of the conversation when necessary.\textsuperscript{105} When Mariani sensed something dubious during the audience over the ‘language barrier’ and, through Bouvet, asked the emperor for any ‘credentials for Mariani himself’, Bouvet, by mentioning ‘the court’s custom’, avoided interpreting Mariani’s request. Although the emperor’s intervention allowed Mariani’s request to be interpreted, the emperor rejected it by saying, ‘I have already provided for his journey within my kingdom; beyond my kingdom is not my responsibility.’\textsuperscript{106}

As we saw earlier in the Imperial Household Department’s letter to the Ministry of War, the emperor had already appointed Bouvet to the post of envoy before choosing Bursai. In addition, with his high expectations for Bouvet’s role on this mission, the emperor said, ‘it is fitting, in order to show him [the Pope] greater honour, that I should delegate one of my yuxian\textsuperscript{107} who are my assistants and to whom I will commit my favours (gifts) which are to be presented to the Pontiff’\textsuperscript{108} and said he ‘would see his man and would give him Ketchi’.\textsuperscript{109} However, the appointment edict was not delivered to Bouvet during the two official and public audiences emphasised in Acta Pekinensia. If the emperor indeed had any determined will to inform de Tournon’s side of Bouvet’s seminal position on the mission, those official meetings were a good chance to do so by reading before Mariani and Bouvet the Manchu edict that

\textsuperscript{105} AP I, 108[57].
\textsuperscript{106} AP I, 108[57].
\textsuperscript{107} The original text is ‘yu sien’. Its meaning seems to correspond to ‘yuqian 御前’ in light of its usage in Acta Pekinensia. However, in Acta Pekinensia, ‘qian’ is transcribed, almost consistently, as ‘çien’, not ‘sien’.
\textsuperscript{108} AP I, 112[59].
\textsuperscript{109} AP I, 108[57], ‘Et hoc ipsum jam dixerat Mandarini Dnô Pchâe fore ut Imp.or hominem ejus (ita loquebantur) videret coram, et ei daret Keschi; ’(sic).

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articulated Bouvet’s appointment. The emperor, however, did not mention anything about the edict and even declined Mariani’s request for credentials. Rather, the emperor, avoiding all official channels, secretly delivered the appointment edict only to Bouvet, not Mariani.110

The emperor’s side also used ambiguous language on the fourth of January when ordering de Tournon to modify the passage that depicted Bouvet as an assistant in de Tournon’s letter to the Pope.111 First, the emperor emphasised that this current envoy to Rome resulted from his acceptance of de Tournon’s request to want to send his own person to Rome112 and added that the inevitable decision to let Bouvet accompany Mariani was due to the need for an interpreter at Bursai’s request. The emperor also emphasised that Bouvet would have no other role on the mission other than to deliver the imperial gifts to Rome.113 Although the emperor, in fact, intended Bouvet to play the exclusive role as his sole representative in delivering the imperial gifts to the Pope, this intention did not reach de Tournon’s side. The imperial presents were handed over to both Bouvet and Mariani, and although Acta Pekinensia records that the emperor effectively proclaimed Bouvet as his sole representative by entrusting pearls to Bouvet, which Stumpf argued had a more significant symbolic meaning than other items, the silk that was entrusted to Mariani could be interpreted as more significant because it was listed first on the presents list.114

110 AP I, 108-9[57].
111 AP I, 116[62], ‘determinò d’inviarle in quest’anno istesso per corriere espresso consegnato al D. m Sabino Mariani, al quale è stato dato in fine per Compagno il P. Bouvet della Comp. di Giesù’.
112 AP I, 111[59], ‘deinde petijsse, ut ab uno ex Tuis deferretur; quod concessit Imp.’
113 The Manchu original is ‘imbe uttu unggirengge umai gūwa baita turgun / akū,’ (ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 364), and its Latin translation is almost identical (ARSI, Jap-Sin 169: 362, ‘neque enim illum mitto alia ulla de causā.’).
114 AP I, 104[55], 108[57], 111-12[59].
It is also strange that Bouvet did not inform Mariani of the *appointment edict* until they arrived at Canton three months after he had received it. According to *Acta Pekinensia*, it was not until they arrived at Canton that Mariani ‘asked about the edict’, and Mariani obtained his request ‘without any difficulty’ *enhaud gravatè* from Bursai who had been conducting them to Canton. However, considering Mariani’s doubt and curiosity that had already been evidenced during the meeting on the third of January, we cannot easily accept the explanation by *Acta Pekinensia* that Mariani asked about the edict finally but suddenly, just close to the anchorage for departure to Xiyang, three months after he first suspected its presence.\(^{115}\)

Each side’s swift reaction following this conversation about the *appointment edict* also fuels our suspicions. Upon answering Mariani’s question, Bursai informed Bouvet of it, and Bovet immediately wrote Mariani a letter that *confessed* the details about the *appointment edict*. Bouvet also sent the Jesuits in Beijing a letter that reported the current situation at Canton concerning the *appointment edict*. At the same time, Mariani as well swiftly reported to de Tournon in Beijing about what he came to recognise regarding the *appointment edict*. Those letters by both sides reached Beijing around the twelfth of May, and de Tournon flew into a fury after reading Mariani’s letter.\(^{116}\) Despite de Tournon’s fury, *Acta Pekinensia* emphasises that he had turned a deaf ear, although the Beijing Jesuits had surely informed de Tournon of the *appointment edict* in January.\(^{117}\) However, it is not persuasive that despite the emperor and Jesuit sides’ ardent and repetitive efforts to make the appointment clear and public, an issue so sensitive that de Tournon’s side was furious upon discovering it was entirely overlooked

\(^{115}\) AP I, 283[146].

\(^{116}\) AP I, 282-83[146].

\(^{117}\) AP I, 283[146], ‘Surdâ haec aure capiebat S.Ex.’
merely due to the de Tournon side’s lack of attention. As we saw earlier, in fact, Mariani had paid close attention to the issue since the audience on the third of January.

Also questionable is the strangely serene response by the emperor’s side to de Tournon’s strong reaction on the twenty-second of June against Bouvet’s appointment.\(^\text{118}\) From Heshiheng’s perspective, whatever the reason, because he failed in delivering the emperor’s intention to de Tournon, and due to his failure, de Tournon was now blaming the emperor, Heshiheng could be expected to have been offended by de Tournon’s unexpected response. However, he responded to de Tournon’s fury in a quite strangely calm manner by merely affirming (asseveravit) that it was perfectly true that the emperor had ordered the letter to be amended and Heshiheng himself had passed that imperial order to de Tournon.\(^\text{119}\) How could he take such a calm posture when de Tournon accused Heshiheng before the emperor of being a poor messenger, in particular if Heshiheng indeed exactly, repeatedly communicated everything (totum hoc) to de Tournon?\(^\text{120}\) Did this task concerning the mission to Rome lay hold an almost seminal position amidst all his duties during de Tournon’s stay in Beijing? Indeed, Heshiheng’s calm attitude at this point is a striking contrast to his nervous and restless attitude to another misapprehension by de Tournon. At that time, Heshiheng expressed his anger to such a degree that he forced de Tournon’s side to swear before the God.\(^\text{121}\)

The Kangxi emperor, who in any other ordinary situation would have been infuriated at a messenger guilty of causing miscommunication,\(^\text{122}\) however, this time, similarly to

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\(^\text{118}\) Mariani became aware of this Manchu edict in late March 1706, and his report reached de Tournon on the twelfth of May. De Tournon became exceedingly upset and, in late June, complained officially to the emperor (AP I, 281, 284).

\(^\text{119}\) AP I, 372-73[197].

\(^\text{120}\) AP I, 102[54]. For Tournon’s response on the fourth of January, see AP I, 112[59].

\(^\text{121}\) AP I, 633-39[351-55].

\(^\text{122}\) AP II, 113-14[405].
Heshiheng’s kind response, sent the following strangely tender message to the Beijing Jesuits and Appiani:

(a) Take care that you do not report back to Duoluo anything we tell you. (b) The Emperor wishes what follows to be known to you alone. Bai Jin (Father Bouvet) made a mistake. (c) Although he was the legate of such a mighty monarch as the ruler of the Middle Kingdom (China), is it not clear that he ought to give way to that Sha Guo’an 沙國安 (Father Sabino) who happens to be a close friend of the Lord Patriarch? (d) Is this even a matter for discussion? (e) Appiani, do you understand this? (f) Do not care to go and report these things to your Master. (g) If His Majesty had fathomed the mind of the Lord Patriarch, he would certainly not have failed to order Bai Jin (Father Bouvet) to yield in everything to Sha Guo’an (Father Sabino); and if he had ordered him to obey him as his servant, the Jesuit would certainly have been his obedient servant. (h) Appiani, do you really grasp this?123

Above all, the remark that who became the envoy to Rome was ‘even not a matter for discussion’ (d) does not make sense if we consider the gravity of the issue and the emperor’s correspondingly serious attitude that we have witnessed above. Next, although the emperor said that Bouvet should have given way to Mariani (c), the question arises—who, in a Chinese context, would have been able to give up their own official status, which was endowed by the emperor, to someone else simply because the other individual involved was the Papal legate’s close friend? In late imperial China, such behaviour, if any, would only have been possible at the risk of one’s own life. The emperor’s excuse that if he had read de Tournon’s mind in advance, he himself would have ordered Bouvet to give way to Mariani (g), also does not seem to correspond to, as we saw above, the emperor’s high expectations for Bouvet’s role in the

123 AP I, 379[201].
mission. The emperor’s repeated caution to Appiani that what he said should be kept secret from de Tournon (a, b, and f) sounds particularly odd. Did the emperor indeed believe that Appiani, who was the closest ally of de Tournon, would keep it secret from de Tournon? It is also not easily understood why the emperor made such fervent attempts, three in all, to put a bridle on Appiani’s tongue about nothing but the emperor’s kindness. The emperor’s repeated caution rather makes us suspect that perchance he, in fact, wanted to ensure his words were delivered to de Tournon. Without any expectation that Appiani would deliver the emperor’s words to de Tournon, why did the emperor repeatedly ask if Appiani exactly understood what the emperor said to him (e and h)?

Considering all of the factors above, it is reasonable to conclude the emperor had a certain intention in appointing Bouvet as his envoy to Rome and that the emperor specifically used the Manchu language to realise his intention.

If so, what was his intention? This seems to have been linked to the emperor’s larger strategic approach to dealing with the Rites Controversy at that stage in the proceedings, i.e., early 1706. This was because following the Jin Shan meeting on the thirty-first of December 1705, the emperor was more seriously considering direct contact with the Pope. In fact, the emperor had been collecting intelligence about de Tournon through his ‘spies’ and the Manchu booi officials and was also vacillating between two plans, a) to persuade de Tournon at Beijing and b) to negotiate directly with the Pope in Rome. It was because the emperor had the second plan in mind that on the twenty-seventh of December, right before the Jin Shan meeting, the

124 Its Latin transcription and translation are ‘Kin Xan’ and ‘in monte aureo’, respectively. See AP I, 407[217].
emperor himself suggested sending a letter and gifts to the Pope. On the twenty-ninth of December, however, the emperor put off the plan for this correspondence when he received intelligence that de Tournon had reacted strongly against the emperor’s intention to make one of the Beijing Jesuits the liaison between Beijing and Rome. The emperor wanted to observe in person de Tournon’s response on the following day and, based on this, decide which plan he should give more weight to in future. It is likely that during the emperor’s first meeting with the legate at Jin Shan, the emperor observed de Tournon’s somewhat irreconcilable inflexibility. The meeting made the emperor rather more inclined to proceed with the second plan, that is, direct negotiation with the Pope, and the following day (1706.1.1), the emperor resumed the drafting of his letter to the Pope. At the same time, by secretly appointing Bouvet as his leading envoy, the emperor prepared for any possible negative situation that de Tournon’s side might cause in Rome. The emperor wanted to enable Bouvet as the imperial proxy to take the initiative in any possible dispute in Rome. He also intended, if he could not hope to persuade the legate, to nullify all of de Tournon’s decisions by publicising in Rome, through Bouvet, every action for which the legate might be blamed during his stay in China.

If the emperor’s plan B had been exposed to de Tournon at this stage of the mission’s departure from Beijing, however, the emperor could have met with strong opposition from the legate. Therefore, until the mission’s departure, the emperor allowed de Tournon to feel as if this mission to Rome was the result of de Tournon’s request to send ‘his man’ to the Pope. By doing so, the emperor could also present himself as a benevolent monarch, even carefully

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125 AP I, 61[30-31].
126 AP I, 63-73[31-40].
127 AP I, 98[53].
preparing a guide, i.e., Bursai, for the mission’s safe journey to the anchorage. Indeed, it was for this concern that de Tournon was grateful to the emperor when the guide, Bursai, returned from his assignment.\textsuperscript{128} However, on the other hand, the emperor also secretly appointed Bouvet as his sole representative in the mission to the Vatican in another edict written in Manchu.

**The Meaning of Using Chinese**

In the same way as the emperor’s intended preference for the Manchu language in certain situations, we can also sense his carefully planned settings through his choice of the Chinese language in other cases.

For example, on the twenty-first of June, the Kangxi emperor summoned to his imperial villa (\textit{Changchun yuan}), Pereira, Gerbillon, Parrenin, Appiani, and the Manchu booi officials in charge of the Xiyang people. All of them were then confined within the walls of the imperial villa while the emperor drafted an edict with his own vermillion pen and had it translated into vernacular Chinese. The confinement continued from six o’clock in the morning until nine o’clock in the evening. The emperor also ordered de Tournon’s reply to be translated into Chinese,\textsuperscript{129} which contrasts with the emperor’s previous orders to translate into Manchu de Tournon’s statement of the purpose of his visit\textsuperscript{130} (1705.12.26) and de Tournon’s first letter to the Pope (1706.1.4).\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128} AP I, 284-85[147].
\textsuperscript{129} AP I, 368-77[194-200], 385[204-5].
\textsuperscript{130} The Kangxi emperor was so eager to read this statement that he came to Yangxin dian in person to look at the incomplete draft translation (AP I, 63[31]).
\textsuperscript{131} AP I, 62[31], 109[57-58], 462[247].
A series of documents produced over a short period following the twenty-first of June were also written in Chinese. For example, an edict written in vernacular Chinese on the twenty-third remains among the documents from the Hall of Diligence of the Palace of Heavenly Purity.\(^\text{132}\) Another edict\(^\text{133}\), in vernacular Chinese, that contained very harsh words to the legate, which the Kangxi emperor ordered to be shown to de Tournon if the latter wondered about its content, has also been found among the Hall of Diligence documents.\(^\text{134}\) *Acta Pekinensia* also records that ‘an authentic copy’ of this edict was written in Chinese.\(^\text{135}\)

A similar situation as happened on the twenty-first of June also occurred in Jehol in early August. On the fourth of August, the emperor forced Maigrot, Appiani, and the Jesuits to gather at a venue in Jehol and to translate into European the two Manchu edicts that the emperor had penned after the meeting with Maigrot on the second of August. At that time, the emperor also provided them with the Chinese translations of those Manchu edicts.\(^\text{136}\)

The reason the emperor prepared the Chinese translations for his Manchu edicts in late June and early August was to ensure that de Tournon no longer had a leg to stand on, because de Tournon had so far been repeatedly disregarding the emperor’s orders and requests under the pretext that the interpreters were failing to ensure communication between the emperor and the legate. That was why on the twenty-first of June the emperor forced his Manchu edicts to be translated under the watchful eye of de Tournon’s side into vernacular Chinese, a language

\(^{132}\) AP I, 386-87[205]; KLGW, 7.

\(^{133}\) It had been written at least before on the twenty-fourth, when it was revealed to de Tournon’s side.

\(^{134}\) AP I, 387[205], 391-92[208-9]; KLGW, 9-10. The original of this edict seems to have been in Manchu because Yinti was deeply involved in its drafting, and at the palace, Gerbillon and Parrenin heard Yinti reading aloud it during its proofreading. However, because no further information is available, I reserve judgement as to its original language.

\(^{135}\) AP I, 392[208].

\(^{136}\) AP I, 577-81[317-20], 584[321], 593[326-27], 699[391], 701[392-93], 706-7[395-96].
both the emperor’s side and de Tournon’s interpreter could understand.\textsuperscript{137} A similar measure was also taken in Jehol in early August for the same reason. The emperor’s preparation was effective. For instance, when on the eleventh of August the original Manchu edicts were delivered to de Tournon as usual through relay interpreting, de Tournon once again blamed the interpreters, attempting to evade answering the emperor’s comments. Then, as if having already expected this, the emperor’s side handed over to de Tournon the Chinese translation of the emperor’s edict, which, as we saw earlier, had been prepared in Jehol.\textsuperscript{138}

In fact, from a strategic point of view, after June, the emperor no longer needed the legate’s belated reluctant obedience, but clear evidence that it was none other than the legate’s stubbornness, not language barriers, by which de Tournon had repeatedly ignored the emperor’s requests and in the end led to the failure of the papal mission. Now, the emperor ‘wished everything to be made public in Europe’\textsuperscript{139}, and in his view, evidence of the inappropriateness of de Tournon’s behaviour in Beijing looked rather more useful in terms of taking the initiative during direct negotiations with the Pope. That is why, on the twentieth of June, the emperor encouraged the legate to leave Beijing before the emperor’s own departure for Jehol. This marked the first time that the emperor clarified his wish for de Tournon’s departure from Beijing, although the emperor had sometimes indicated it indirectly previously. It was exactly at this time that the emperor expressed this clear wish, that, as saw earlier, he forced Appiani, the Jesuits, and Manchu booi officials to be confined at his own villa and to translate his Manchu edicts into vernacular Chinese on the twenty-first of June. Around this

\textsuperscript{137} AP I, 369[194-95].
\textsuperscript{138} AP I, 593[326-27], 596[328].
\textsuperscript{139} AP I, 386[205], ‘et cupere omnia in Europa fieri publica’.
time, the emperor also checked for any possibility that his letters to the Pope could be intercepted or suppressed by de Tournon.\textsuperscript{140} The emperor’s intention at that moment is well reflected in the following remark to Pereira and Gerbillon on the twenty-second of June:

> After he [i.e., de Tournon] has gone so far astray in his opposition to me, will not the Pope condemn him to death when he returns to Rome?

The emperor was also certain that Mariani would be beheaded in Rome.\textsuperscript{141} Although the emperor temporarily suspended his plan B when he heard about de Tournon’s ‘repentance with tears’,\textsuperscript{142} he soon resumed it when the emperor became aware that the true source of the tears was resentment, not repentance.\textsuperscript{143} The farewell meeting with de Tournon on the thirtieth of June also bolstered the emperor’s determination to enter into direct contact with the Pope, rather than through a legate, because de Tournon’s remark during the farewell meeting made clear that the Pope had not yet concluded the Rites Controversy and there surely left room for negotiations.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{140} AP I, 386[205].
\textsuperscript{141} AP I, 381[202].
\textsuperscript{142} AP I, 390[207].
\textsuperscript{143} AP I, 393-96[209-10]. Although de Tournon’s answer that his tears were meant to express complaint and anger was not interpreted to Heshiheng, Heshiheng very likely grasped the situation when he witnessed de Tournon’s ‘angry outburst’ and ‘violent bodily reaction’.
\textsuperscript{144} Although this official farewell meeting took place in Yangxin dian on the twenty-ninth of June 1706, the emperor saw de Tournon again on the following day (AP I, 405-14[215-20]).
During the Legate’s Stay at Beijing

To Persuade de Tournon

After Arrival in Beijing

As shown by the Kangxi emperor’s careful preparationism which included controlling the legate’s dress code or creating language barriers, when dealing with the Papal legate, the emperor was highly conscious of his Han Chinese constituents. In fact, behind these careful preparations lay the emperor’s accurate prediction about the purpose of the legate’s visit this time.

From the very early stages of the legate’s arrival, the emperor’s attention was focused on rituals. For example, when Gerbillon and Suarez on the fourth of December 1705 (KX44/10/19) memorialised the throne about the legate’s arrival in Beijing, the emperor first of all wondered what kind of rituals were performed by the Beijing Jesuits for the legate. Although the Jesuits answered that no special ceremonies were performed because de Tournon was bedridden, this answer did not satisfy the doubtful emperor. In another example of this, when Piero Sigotti, a surgeon of the legate, died of dysentery on the twelfth of December (KX44/1/18), the emperor’s concern also centred on rituals performed by the Xiyang community, as indicated by his questions to the missionaries, ‘in what garments the corpse had been dressed’, ‘whether it had been enclosed in the coffin resting on a cushion or covered by a silk sheet’, and ‘where the burial was to take place’. Stumpf also noticed the emperor’s particular attention to rituals and illustrated his deep concern over this (‘to us this keen curiosity of the Emperor indicated that the Emperor’s mind was concerned with further issues’).

\[145\] AP I, 30-31[14].
In fact, the legate’s every move was being reported to the emperor by his ‘spies’. When the spies reported on de Tournon’s plan for Sigotti’s funeral, the emperor expressed his deep displeasure in particular regarding the fact that de Tournon ordered the Beijing Jesuits to be clothed in surplices and to parade through the Outer City, the area reserved for the Han Chinese population. When the spies reported on de Tournon’s plan for Sigotti’s funeral, the emperor expressed his deep displeasure in particular regarding the fact that de Tournon ordered the Beijing Jesuits to be clothed in surplices and to parade through the Outer City, the area reserved for the Han Chinese population. What so displeased the emperor? One clue can be found in the Beijing Jesuits’ worries about the funeral rituals. In response to de Tournon’s order, the Beijing Jesuits, long accustomed to reading public sentiment in Beijing, expressed grave concern that Beijing’s Chinese population would deem Xiyang funeral rituals as barbarous and barbaric (‘barbarum’, ‘barbarorum’) and going further, judge the Xiyang people as ‘barbarians’ (‘Barbaros’). Toward the eighteenth of December (KX44/11/3), one day before Sigotti’s funeral, the emperor suddenly ordered Tianxue benyi 天學本義 [The True Origin of the Doctrine of Heaven] to be translated into a European language and sent to de Tournon. Tianxue benyi was a book in which Bouvet tried, using ancient and contemporary Chinese texts, to prove that ancient and contemporary Chinese had already known the true God. The book was read by many literati, and Han Tan 韓菼 (1637-1704), the then Han Chinese head of the Hanlin Academy, even wrote a preface for it. De Tournon, however, prohibited the publication of

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146 However, due to the emperor’s and most missionaries’ objection, the missionaries in the funeral cortège did not wear surplices until they neared the tomb (AP I, 52[25]).
147 For details regarding Sigotti’s funeral, see AP I, 35-53[16-26].
148 Although Sigotti’s funeral was set to be held on the nineteenth of December (KX44/11/4), no one in Beijing could attend the event in mourning clothes because the emperor also returned to Beijing at that time. Thus, the Beijing Jesuits held the funeral on the twenty-second (KX44/11/7) (AP I, 48-49[23]).
149 Alternatively, Gu Jin jingtian jian tianxue benyi 古今敬天鑒天學本義 [The Mirror of Ancient and Modern Revering of Heaven: the Original Meaning of Heavenly Studies].
150 AP I, 48[23].
151 von Collani, ‘Figurism’, 670; AP II, 712-13[772-73].

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Tianxue benyi and confiscated its printed copies and woodblocks in April 1705, shortly after his arrival at Canton. 152 It is not certain whether the emperor had come to hear of such measures by the legate when he ordered the book to be delivered to de Tournon. It is, however, clear that the emperor had read the book beforehand and, by the point he ordered it to be delivered to the legate, knew that the book concerned the Rites Controversy.153 Therefore, the sudden imperial order right before the controversial funeral rituals indicates that the emperor was linking de Tournon’s visit with the Rites Controversy.

From late December, the Kangxi emperor even began to directly ask de Tournon about issues relating to the Rites Controversy. On the twenty-fifth of December (KX44/11/10), for example, Heshiheng and Zhang Changzhu visited the North Church and asked de Tournon if he had read the emperor’s Declaration in Rome. Although the two book officials posed the question as though out of their own curiosity, the inquiry, in fact, came from the emperor.154 This ‘behind closed doors’ conversation between the officials and de Tournon was soon reported to the emperor, and the Kangxi emperor thus clearly grasped the deep negativity of de Tournon’s perspective of the fact that the Jesuits had requested the Declaration in 1700. It was reported that during this ‘behind closed doors’ conversation, de Tournon decried the Beijing Jesuits’ request for the Declaration as ‘audacious’ and ‘temerarious’. Even worse, during the conversation, the legate’s interpreter translated these offensive terms into even more offensive Chinese, ‘Tan çu ta 膽子大’, literally meaning an enlarged gall-bladder.155

153 AP I, 48[23].
154 For example, see ‘they [i.e., the mandarins] had obtained nothing worth reporting to His Majesty about the Imperial Declaration’ (AP I, 59[29]). Also see AP I, 58[28], ‘The mandarins, to prevent further talk diverting them from the commission entrusted to them, urged that a more carefully prepared answer should be given about the Emperor’s Declaration, and …’.
155 For this ‘behind closed doors’ conversation, see AP I, 54-59[26-29], 66-67[34]. Later, Heshiheng repeated parts of the conversation to Pereira.
A Blow at Jin Shan

On the thirty-first of December (KX44/11/15), the first meeting between the emperor and the legate took place at Jin Shan. Frankly speaking, from the emperor’s perspective, meeting de Tournon in person, in itself, would handicap the emperor, because the emperor had already previously sent his most authoritative statement on this issue, the Rites Controversy, to Rome. If the Pope had sent this legate to deal with the Rites Controversy after having already understood the emperor’s position by reading his Declaration, the purpose of the legate’s visit was highly likely none other than to reiterate the Pope’s inflexible stance and to change the emperor’s stance. Thus, while the emperor decided to run the gauntlet of all such scenarios, he also needed to take a highly tactical approach. On the one hand, the emperor treated de Tournon with exceptional favour while, on the other hand, he also in effect threatened de Tournon that the emperor would no longer show a hitherto tolerant attitude if there were any indication of the legate taking measures against Rites in China.

You are quite right in saying that I have been clement to the Europeans: clemency befits a Prince, but only if combined with justice. Clemency should be innate in him, but justice is always before him, urging him to carry out his duty. Until now I have favoured the Europeans, because they have behaved well, and not one of them has done anything deserving punishment. But if they start acting against our laws, they will experience the rigour of our penal laws and I shall not spare them.156 … From the time of Li Madou

156 AP I, 85-86[46-47].
(Father Matteo Ricci) until today the behaviour of the Europeans in this Court has been irreproachable. I would like this testimony of mine to be made known in Europe.\textsuperscript{157}

The emperor, however, achieved nothing more than confirming de Tournon’s uncompromising stance and his still strong distrust of the Jesuits.\textsuperscript{158} De Tournon was far more stubborn and inflexible than expected. After the meeting, the emperor sent de Tournon an ambivalent message through a eunuch, which can be understood as both ‘making your acquaintance’ and ‘knowing your inner disposition’:

I have got to know you.\textsuperscript{159}

In a sense, the Jin Shan meeting did not bring the emperor any beneficial result, but, at the same time, it rather left a blemish on the Manchu emperor’s legitimacy in China. Had any Han Chinese elite observed this event, a foreign envoy sent by a ‘barbarian’ or ‘heterodox’ leader entering the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty and resisting the great Confucian principles, he would have doubted their Manchu ruler’s true transformation into the guardian and protector of Chinese civilisation.

The emperor did not meet however the legate without any safeguards. Although the precise location of the meeting place, Jin Shan (\textit{Kin Xan})\textsuperscript{160}, is still difficult to ascertain, one thing is clear, namely that Jin Shan was ‘a private garden in the Forbidden City’ and to reach it from the North Church, de Tournon had to go through a very special gate described as the

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\item \textsuperscript{157} AP I, 90[48].
\item \textsuperscript{158} AP I, 91[49].
\item \textsuperscript{159} ‘\textit{Novi te}’, which is underlined and emphasised in the original (AP I, 91[49]).
\item \textsuperscript{160} For assumptions about \textit{Kin Xan}’s location, see AP I, 81, note 149.
\end{itemize}
West gate (*portam loci occidentalem*). According to Antoine Thomas’s memorial, this special gate was the emperor’s private gate, and the emperor ordered it be used ‘to avoid fatiguing the Patriarch by traversing the many courts and apartments between the usual southern entrance (the Wu Men 午門) and his private garden’. Since the special gate was highly likely to be the Xihua 西華 gate, the closest gate of the Forbidden City to the North Church, Jin Shan was inside the Xihua gate. Therefore, the meeting between the emperor and the legate took place outside the Han Chinese world. Although *Acta Pekinensia* describes ‘an immense crowd of all kinds of people’ in front of the Xihua gate to see the man from distant lands, it is highly unlikely that there were Han Chinese people among them. Most of the audience allowed in the space between the North Church and the Xihua gate were members of the imperial family, officials of the Imperial Household Department, or court servants. The Inner Court (*neiting* 內廷), where the meeting took place inside the Forbidden City, was also an exclusive space for Manchu and Mongol bannermen, except for a very small number of Han Chinese who worked at the Southern Study (*Nanshu fang* 南書房).

**For Direct Negotiations with the Pope**

Overall, the Kangxi emperor’s shift during the period from de Tournon’s arrival in Beijing to the time of the emperor’s recognition of de Tournon’s Decree proclamation can be described as a process of strategic change from an initial plan ‘to argue down de Tournon in China’ (hereafter Plan A) to a plan ‘to enter into direct negotiations with the Pope in Rome’

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161 AP I, 83[45].
162 AP I, 83, note 152.
163 AP I, 81, note 149.
164 AP I, 82-84[45-46].
165 For the Imperial City and Inner Court at that time, see Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, 15-16, 30-31; Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, 28-34; Naquin, *Peking*, 389-90, 395-96.
(hereafter Plan B). As we have seen, the Jin Shan meeting served as a crucial turning point in this strategic change. On the first of January, that is, the day following the Jian Shan meeting, the emperor immediately resumed Plan B by ordering the completion of the letter to the Pope, a plan the emperor himself had stopped right before the Jin Shan meeting in the hope of a change in de Tournon’s attitude. At the same time, the emperor secretly appointed Bouvet as his true delegate to Rome.

As time went by, the emperor’s confidence in Plan B became firmer as he witnessed de Tournon’s behaviour in Beijing. For example, on the first day of the first month of the Kangxi forty-fifth year (1706.2.13), de Tournon stirred up trouble in Beijing’s Han Chinese society by forbidding Chinese Christians from eating meat on the grounds that the date fell on a Saturday. This ban on the consumption of meat would have made Beijing’s Christians appear very odd to the city’s Han population, because ethnic Han usually consumed jiaozi 餃子 containing meat on the first day of the year. 166 De Tournon’s subsequent moves caused Beijing’s Christians further trouble. Between the seventeenth of February and the third of April (KX45/1/5-2/20), during the first to second lunar months, de Tournon prohibited any use of eggs, dairy products, or fats, on the grounds that the period involved fell during Lent. In Beijing society, the first and second lunar months include a series of important seasonal divisions, such as Powu 破五 (the 5th day of the 1st month), Renri 人日 (the 7th), Ruchun 入春, Dengjie 燈節 (the 15th), Tianchang ri 填倉日 (the 25th), Zhonghe jie 中和節 (the 1st day of the 2nd month), and Longtaitou 龍抬頭 (the 2nd).167 Thus, prohibiting Christians from using ingredients necessary for observing these seasonal divisions meant de facto isolation from society. Moreover, from the thirteenth of

166 This ban on meat-eating would have caused severe difficulties to Manchu Christians as well. Traditionally, Manchu people shared and ate pork after the tangzi 堂子 ritual on the first day of the year. 167 Sang Keysook, ‘Chungguk minsongmunhŏn ûl t'onghae pon’, 6-8.
February (the first day of the new year), de Tournon’s side enforced on Beijing Christians instructions that might shake the foundations of Han culture, such as a series of prohibitions against marriage with non-Christians; the cult of Confucius; the rites for the dead; and the use of tablets for the deceased.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, such moves by de Tournon’s side between February to April and resulting ‘obedience’ by Beijing’s Christians led to rumours that ‘Christians denied Chinese rites’ and the emergence of an anti-Christian atmosphere in the Beijing area (‘an extremely dangerous whisper was spread round verbally by the pagans in opposition to our Law’).\textsuperscript{169}

We can also sense the atmosphere of the time by listening to the appeals of the city’s Christians to the Xiyang missionaries about their ‘grief, fear, and difficulties’. On the twenty-eighth of February, for example, ‘a large number of the Christians of Peking’ came to the Jesuits to complain about their difficulties, and on the second of March, eight Christians from the East Church and the West Church came to de Tournon to appeal their difficulties.\textsuperscript{170} If the complaints until then remained at an individual level, the leaders of the Christian community also began to move at this point. On the seventh of March, Peter Wang, a leading Beijing Christian, \textit{shengyuan} degree-holder, and student in the Directorate of Astronomy (\textit{tianwen sheng} \text{天文生}), visited Appiani and Frosilone,\textsuperscript{171} and in particular, on the twenty-first of March, five representatives of the Beijing Christian community accompanied by one hundred Christians, came to de Tournon to submit to him an official petition about the negative situation. When they submitted the petition to the legate, they did so ‘down their knees’ ‘with the same respectful action with which they present petitions to the Emperor’. However, despite this

\textsuperscript{168} AP I, 172-75[85-86].  
\textsuperscript{169} AP I, 221, 228-29[114-15]  
\textsuperscript{170} AP I, 175-77[87], 181[89].  
\textsuperscript{171} AP I, 192-93[95].
respectful attitude by the Beijing Christians to the legate, a position so respectful that it might raise the suspicions of the Chinese population, de Tournon tried to tear up the petition in the presence of the Christians, and when he unable to do so due to his poor health, he threw the petition to the ground and trampled it underfoot. In fact, not long previously, de Tournon’s side had done the same in front of the Beijing Christians. Following the incident on the twenty-first, a disturbance arose in the Beijing Christian community. Some Christians headed by Lawrence Zhu, a catechist of the West Church, attempted to report the recent moves by de Tournon’s side to the Ministry of Rites. This disturbance was only narrowly prevented by the frantic efforts of the Jesuits, especially a meeting, mediated by Chen Jiale (‘Chin Kiaolo’), between Beijing’s Christian leaders and Frosilone and the Bishop of Beijing on the twentieth-eight of March. However, the root cause of the discord remained, because de Tournon’s side remained unwilling to change their attitude in anyway.

In the meantime, all of these incidents in Beijing were being reported as they happened to the emperor. Therefore, on the twenty-second of February 1706, the emperor warned Pereira that ‘it is quite impossible for the Lord Patriarch to forbid in China what was according to law with regard to the ceremonies of the dead, etc’. The emperor also expressed his anger to Gerbillon on the sixteenth of March by saying, ‘What is he [i.e., de Tournon] doing with our

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172 AP I, 213-18[106-9].
173 Acta Pekinensia describes him as a ‘learned man’ (AP II, 590[693]).
174 AP I, 222-23[112], 226-28[113-14].
175 Suarez tried to stop this disturbance and fell ill from exhaustion.
176 AP I, 228-31[114-16].
177 Acta Pekinensia does not explain in detail the emperor’s moves from mid-March to mid-May, leading the reader to feel that the emperor’s concern about the Papal legate waned during this period. In fact, from the eighteenth of March to the sixth of April, the emperor was away from Beijing hunting, and moreover, from April to mid-May, his mind was entirely occupied by series of severe natural disasters such as earthquakes and drought around the capital. With the onset of these natural disasters, the emperor urged officials to self-reflect and suspended his birthday ceremony and banquets. The emperor assumed this low profile because he was well aware of the symbolic meaning of ‘disasters from heaven’ in a sacred space directly governed by the Son of Heaven. See QSL-KX45/2/27, 2/28, 3/6, 3/8, 3/10, 3/12, 3/14, 3/17, 3/18, 3.20, 3/22.
Chinese?”; ‘Why does he forbid them to celebrate the rite of veneration of ancestors?’; ‘Do you not see that all who are followers of your Law will abandon it?’; ‘anyone who wanted to abolish rites that were established by law will be expelled from China’.

At last, on the twentieth of June, ten days before departing for Jehol, not wanting to leave de Tournon alone in Beijing after embarking on his imperial tour, the emperor issued notice in definite terms that the legate should leave Beijing. The next day, as we saw above, the emperor ordered the Beijing Jesuits and de Tournon’s side to gather in a confined place and, before them, wrote an imperial edict in person about the emperor’s clear stance on the Rites Controversy and de Tournon’s inappropriate behaviour during his stay in Beijing. The edict was then ordered to be translated on the spot into vernacular Chinese and Latin. By doing so, the emperor eliminated any room for excuses due language barriers from de Tournon, received confirmation from the legate that he clearly understood the emperor’s stance and requests, and thus, secured evidence for de Tournon’s stubbornness and inappropriate behaviour. At the same time, at the end of June, the emperor sent a letter with certain imperial instructions regarding de Tournon’s hitherto misbehaviours in Beijing, to Bouvet, who was waiting in Canton for a ship to Rome.178 After the farewell meeting with de Tournon, the emperor immediately ordered the booi officials to obtain from de Tournon ‘a letter to the Supreme Pontiff in which he should give him a full account of everything’, which, before the Pope, would serve as a kind of affidavit for his inappropriate moves in China.179

178 AP II, 132[414].
179 AP I, 418[223].
From early July, assured of his easy victory over Maigrot, the emperor, goaded on by this assurance, gave impetus to his plan B for direct negotiation with the Pope. For example, on the fifth of July, one day before obtaining ‘an instrument of surrender’ from Maigrot, the emperor, now on the way to Jehol, sent a messenger to Beijing to hurry de Tournon into writing the letter for the Pope. On the ninth of July, thinking that he was staring victory in the face, the emperor once again despatched a messenger to Beijing to push de Tournon to finish the letter. From the thirteenth of July, the emperor even notified de Tournon of the contents to be included in the letter. The emperor ordered the letter to include the following:

(1) The imperial edict on the twenty-first of June that the emperor intended to send to Rome through Bouvet but temporarily suspended due to de Tournon’s ‘penitent tears’:

1-a) Although de Tournon answered that he had absolutely no other business than expressing gratitude when the emperor repeatedly asked de Tournon about the true purpose of his visit, why now does de Tournon say that he has very important purposes of his visit to tell the emperor?

1-b) Although de Tournon has thought that the Beijing Jesuits or Heshiheng have any significant influence on the emperor, they do not at all.

1-c) The way de Tournon’s moves have been monitored since his arrival at China, was our dynasty’s rightful measure that must have also been applied to other foreigners in China.

1-d) Since de Tournon is a high Xiyang official and thus all his behaviours can be read as representative of all Xiyang people, his any attitudes that disregard Chinese customs

180 AP I, 432[230], 444-45[237-38], 448[239], 453[241-42]; QCXCMDY, 300.
181 AP I, 443[236-37]; QCXCMDY, 299.
182 AP I, 479-81[256-57].
will surely cause serious difficulties not only to the legate, but also to all other Xiyang people living in China.

(1-e) It is all right for de Tournon as a clergy to pronounce on religious issues, but no pronouncements about the government of the empire are permitted.\(^{183}\)

(2) The documented version of the emperor’s verbal edict on the thirtieth of June, the day following the farewell meeting: if de Tournon makes any decision against the teaching of Confucius, any form of propagation of Christianity in China will be prohibited.\(^{184}\)

(3) The imperial edict sent from Jehol on the fifth of July: as one honours an item belonging to the Kangxi emperor not because he wishes it but because he honours the emperor, one honours the tablet for the deceased only because he honours the deceased.\(^{185}\)

(4) The certain parts from the draft of the letter to Rome that de Tournon was pressed to write by the emperor:

(4-a) If Xiyang people do not intervene in the affairs of the empire and remain virtuous and set good examples, the emperor will protect the Xiyang people’s propagation of their religion in China.

(4-b) Since the Qing emperor wants clerics\(^{186}\) who are well-versed in painting and manual arts, de Tournon asks the Pope to inform all the Xiyang world of the emperor’s wish and to bring such clerics to China.

\(^{183}\) AP I, 369-71[195-96], 471[251].

\(^{184}\) AP I, 411-14[219-20], 416-17[222], 471[251].

\(^{185}\) AP I, 442-47[236-39], 471[251]; QCXCMDY, 299.

\(^{186}\) The appropriate word used by the emperor was ‘xiudao de 修道的’, but de Tournon’s side translated it into an Italian term meaning ‘ecclesiastics’, which would sound like ‘secular clergy’ to the Pope. De
(4-c) All those skilled painters and artisans should be clerics, and if they are not clerics, they ought to be men of good character who do not have the desire to go back to Xiyang.

(4-d) The emperor treated the legate with exceptional favour.

(4-e) The emperor allowed the legate ‘to make a visitation of all the churches in all the Provinces outside the capital’.

Of course, de Tournon reacted strongly against the emperor’s order to include all the contents above. The emperor, however, did never lose the initiative in selecting the contents for the letter to Rome, by threatening de Tournon to send all of these directly to the Pope without going through the legate (1706.7.13)\(^\text{187}\), to order the Supreme Prefect of Fujian Province to punish Maigrot, the source of de Tournon’s stubbornness, for the crime of treason (1706.7.14),\(^\text{188}\) or to sentence de Tournon’s Chinese catechist to capital punishment.\(^\text{189}\) In the end, the letter contained all of the required contents above except for the imperial edict of the twenty-first of June (edict (1) in the quotation).\(^\text{190}\) In fact, the edict of the twenty-first did not have to be contained as it was, because its gist was already included in the other edicts to be

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Tournon’s side insisted on translating this Italian letter into Chinese and had Appiani, Guéty, and the Chinese catechist John Jin Xiu translate it in writing. While translating into Chinese, de Tournon’s side used ‘xiudao de’ for ‘ecclesiastics’ in the original Italian letter, leaving the emperor unaware that the Italian word violated his original intention. For this, the Beijing Jesuits criticised de Tournon that he deceived both the emperor and the Pope. However, de Tournon refused to change the letter by saying it was already sent to Mariani, who was on the way to Rome. De Tournon only agreed that additions would be attached to the letter (AP I, 469-71[250-51], 478-79[255-56]).

\(^\text{187}\) AP I, 472-73[252].

\(^\text{188}\) AP I, 476-77[254-55].

\(^\text{189}\) AP I, 482[258].

\(^\text{190}\) AP I, 483[258].
included in the letter. In the early morning of the sixteenth of July, Zhao Chang left for Jehol with the final draft of the letter.\textsuperscript{191}

From then on, following a series of incidents including Maigrot’s headstrong attitude demonstrated in Jehol on the second of August, de Tournon’s continued stubbornness,\textsuperscript{192} de Tournon’s unrepentant departure from Beijing on the twenty-eighth of August, and the detection on the third of September of Maigrot’s secret letters to Guéty\textsuperscript{193}, the emperor abandoned any further hope in his plan to persuade de Tournon by positive means. Moreover, from the interrogation between the third to the twelfth of September\textsuperscript{194} about the secret correspondence, the emperor came to understand that a Papal order lay behind de Tournon’s behaviour to date and that the Pope would make a final decision as soon as the report from de Tournon and Maigrot reached the Vatican.\textsuperscript{195} The emperor did not have much time left for negotiation with Pope. Hence, on the fourth of September, the emperor ordered all the relevant documents that he had previously prepared in the Palace Archives to be brought, and personally picked out a total of fifty documents. These fifty documents were to be translated into Latin, and each was to bear the seals of the first Prince and the two Manchu officials.\textsuperscript{196} This project was carried out simultaneously in Beijing and Jehol and was completed towards the end of

\textsuperscript{191} QCXCMDY, 304.
\textsuperscript{192} For example, on the fifth of August, the emperor expressed his anger before Yinti, Zhao Chang, Pereira, and many members of the imperial household (AP II, 113-15[405-6]): ‘If you do not write and publish to the whole world as clearly as possible the favours that were granted to Duoluo, the unfortunate words he used in response, the things he did against you, after what you had done on his behalf in petitioning me that His Excellency be called to Beijing, I will regard myself as badly served, and you as not men (in Chinese, wo bu fu, nimen bu zhen ren).’
\textsuperscript{193} AP II, 147-49[423-25].
\textsuperscript{194} AP II, 149[424-25].
\textsuperscript{195} AP II, 85-86[Compendium of the Acta Pekinensia for 1705 and 1706], 158-74[430-40].
\textsuperscript{196} AP II, 125[441].
September. The result was *Acta Varia inter Imperatorem Tartaro-Sinicum, ac Ilmorum Pcham Antiochenum annis 1705. et 1706. in Regia Pekinensi: jussu eius at Imperatoris ex archivio interioris palatij deprompta, à Sua Majestate recognita, et de speciali Decreto latinè versa*. At the same time, on the twenty-ninth of September, the emperor recalled Bouvet and Mariani who, as the mission to return a courtesy to the Pope for the legate’s visit, were waiting for a ship to Rome.\(^{197}\) The emperor intended to demonstrate to Rome the degree of his anger at de Tournon’s inappropriate behaviour and did not acknowledge de Tournon as a qualified emissary.\(^{198}\) Instead, the emperor chose Antonio de Barros as his new envoy\(^{199}\) and entrusted the fifty selected documents to him. On the seventeenth of October, the envoy left for Rome, accompanied by Antoine de Beauvollier, who was well-versed in the Rites Controversy.\(^{200}\) Now, the emperor decided to send ‘negotiators’ for the Rites Controversy, not a goodwill mission.

At the same time, in the course of this strategic change, the emperor’s side had continually checked the real degree of Papal influence in the Xiyang world. On the sixteenth of March (KX45/2/2), for example, the emperor summoned Gerbillon to his Changchun villa and asked much about the Pope, especially the nature of rituals that Xiyang kings performed before the

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\(^{197}\) AP II, 126-27[412-12]. The date written in the recall decree is the twenty-ninth of September. However, since June, the emperor had mentioned the possibility of recalling the envoys to put pressure on de Tournon.

\(^{198}\) AP II, 127[412]. The news that the emperor sent his mission to return courtesy for the Papal legate, had by then already reached Rome through Moscow and Manila channels (AP II, 75[Compendium of the Acta Pekinensia for 1705 and 1706], 128-29[412]).

\(^{199}\) The emperor’s selection of de Barros as his new envoy seems to have been made before the third of October at the latest. See Parrenin’s remark in his letter in Jehol to Stumpf in Beijing on the fourth of October 1706, ‘But we replied that Your Reverences did not yet know of the departure of Father Barros, nor had you seen the command of the King etc’ (AP II, 130[413]).

\(^{200}\) AP II, 183[446], 185-86[447-48].
In late August 1706 as well, Yinti asked Pereira if the Pope intended to invade China and warned his father that he should be on the alert against Xiyang people in case they attempted to occupy China. Around the same time, the Kangxi emperor himself also asked Pereira a question similar to Yinti’s, but ‘with greater sagacity than his son’ and on the seventeenth of November, asked Pereira again about the level of the Pope’s naval power.

The reason, interestingly, for the emperor’s view of the Pope as a secular monarch is likely because Qing rulers projected the image of a tulku, for example, the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan Buddhist world, onto that of the Pope in the Xiyang world. One of the reasons the Kangxi emperor tried to enter into direct contact with the Pope to resolve the Rites Controversy was also likely because the emperor assumed the Pope’s religious and secular influence in the Xiyang world to be similar to that of Dalai Lama in his own world. This image of the Pope can be attributed not only to the Qing ruling group’s experience in Inner Asia, but also to exaggerated descriptions by Xiyang missionaries, such as the Xiyang world as a homogeneous

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201 Although the Beijing Jesuits thought that such inquiries by the emperor had to do with Appiani’s recent remark to Beijing Christians that Xiyang kings showed their respect to the Pope by kissing his foot, it was not merely this remark that piqued the emperor’s curiosity about the nature of Xiyang kings’ loyalty to the Pope. In fact, the emperor was already aware of the information in Appiani’s remark from the very early stage of the legate’s arrival at Beijing. For example, towards the end of December 1705, de Tournon had told the emperor in his written reply that ‘the Supreme Pontiff was the greatest Prince in all the West and that European kings kneels on the ground before him, kissing his feet in the manner of a suppliant’. See AP I, 63-64[32-33], 81-82[45], 201-2[100].
202 AP II, 119[408].
203 AP II, 191[450-51].
204 AP, 119-20[408].
205 AP I, 220[467].
206 A similar image of the Pope can also be found in the edict on the tenth of April: ‘if you Europeans were to come with soldiers, will not our own soldiers fight against them? If your army were able to travel nine thousand leagues in order to get here, will our soldiers not equally be able to do so in the other direction?’ (AP II, 420[580]).
Christian world or the Pope as the absolute authority in the Xiyang world. The Qing ruler’s perspective of the Pope’s image was also reflected in the way the Qing ruler attempted to communicate with the Xiyang world. As the Qing ruler had used lamas to communicate with the Tibetan-Mongolian world, he also used ‘Xiyang lamas’ to communicate with the Xiyang world. For example, for each of the emperor’s five despatches, all the leading envoys without exception were Xiyang missionaries.

Table 4: Qing envoys sent to the Xiyang world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Departure from Beijing</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Imperial Delegate</th>
<th>Companion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Bouvet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1699</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Fontaney</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bouvet</td>
<td>Sabino Mariani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Antonio de Barros</td>
<td>Antoine de Beauvollier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721</td>
<td>Italy, Portugal</td>
<td>Antonio de Magalhães</td>
<td>Mezzabarba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

207 For example, Antoine Thomas’ remark, ‘the whole Christian world’, in his memorial (AP II, 130[413]) might remind Qing rulers of the Mongol-Tibetan world in which Tibetan Buddhism predominated.

208 This consistency in the selection of Qing envoys can be compared to the Qing’s appointment of imperial envoys to the Chosŏn Dynasty. All Qing imperial envoys to Korea were exclusively bannermen (qiren) of the third rank and above (Koo Bumjin, ‘Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn Sahaeng Insŏn’, 10, 19). I exclude the mission by Antonio Provana, José Ramón Arxo, and François Noël (which departed from Beijing in 1707) because it was the Jesuits who initiated the mission, albeit with the approval of the Kangxi emperor.
Although the way in which the Kangxi emperor treated Christianity in a parallel manner to Tibetan Buddhism has already been examined elsewhere in this thesis, it makes sense to refer to the emperor’s quite explicit remark, recorded in *Acta Pekinensia*, below:

The Lamas (Tartar sacrificing priests) have some things in common with Christians …

The chief Lamas, and the more learned ones believe in a God who is one and three, as the Christians do.\(^{209}\)

**Concerns about the Han Constituents**

On the second of August 1706, the emperor met Maigrot face to face for the first time. Since the overall details of the meeting have already been described by several scholars,\(^{210}\) it seems sufficient to summarise the main points of the meeting:

1. Xiyang participants: Maigrot, Appiani, Guéty, Angelita, Thomas, de Beauvollier, Parrenin, Pereira, and de Barros.

2. The emperor used Vernacular Chinese during the conversation.

3. Maigrot’s lack of command of Chinese caused Parrenin as the interpreter to participate in the conversation.

4. When the emperor asked Maigrot if he could recite any passages from the Four Books, Maigrot answered that he could not although he had read them and that learning by heart was not common in Europe. When the emperor asked Parrenin

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\(^{209}\) AP I, 143[74]. This remark was cited during the conversation between de Tournon and Stumpf on the third of February 1706. The Kangxi emperor seems to have made it sometime between December 1705 and February 1706.

\(^{210}\) A representative description can be found in von Collani, ‘Charles Maigrot's Role’, 164-67.
whether learning by heart was not common in Europe, Parrenin answered that learning by heart was not uncommon in Europe.

(5) Maigrot was able to read just two of the four Chinese characters above the imperial throne, and even read one of the two incorrectly.

(6) The emperor pointed out that Maigrot could not distinguish Confucius’ writings from later Confucian scholars’ writings.

(7) The emperor explained that there was no difference between ‘Tianzhu 天主’ and ‘Tian 天’ and that ‘Tian’ is the most suitable designation for the Christian God.

(8) It was revealed that Maigrot had not read Ricci’s Tianzhu shiyi.

(9) Maigrot told the emperor that his Chinese teachers had also held a view similar to Maigrot himself’s.

(10) When the emperor said that clear understanding should precede any definite judgement, Maigrot answered that he himself already had sufficient knowledge for judgement.

(11) The emperor said that a previous test, performed by Visdelou, also showed that he had not fully understood the meanings of the Chinese books.

(12) When the emperor asked Maigrot, ‘how many followers of your law live there?’, Maigrot answered, ‘About five thousand’. When the emperor asked again, ‘Do these people agree with your opinions or do they oppose them? Do they reject Jing Tian 敬天, the cult of the ancestors, the tablets and the veneration of Confucius?’, Maigrot answered, ‘I do not know the followers of our law who live outside the metropolitan city of Fuzhou. Since they are poor and of lowly estate they do not
possess those shrines called Zu Tang in which the tablets are kept. I do not know for certain what anyone in particular does in this regard.\textsuperscript{211}

Although it is quite clear that the meeting revealed Maigrot’s ignorance and his stubbornness despite this ignorance, we have likely overlooked a more important point in this episode, namely the emperor’s particular concern about the possibility of Han Chinese people being involved in the Rites Controversy.\textsuperscript{212} When Maigrot answered that he had five thousand Fujian Christian followers and that all of them were too poor to possess an ancestral shrine, the emperor showed a sudden change in his attitude, from gentleness with occasional smiles to violent anger. As soon as he had heard Maigrot’s answers, the emperor asked back, ‘[If] I arrange for an investigation to be made by the mandarins and I find that you have made a false statement to me in such a matter, what do you think will happen?’ and ordered the officials to remove him immediately.\textsuperscript{213} The point that Zhao Chang took issue with during the meeting with Maigrot the following day also related to the answers about the Han Chinese, especially the Han Confucian elite (‘Can you dare to swear before God that there was indeed no one baccalaureate, licentiate, or graduate doctor among the 5,000 followers that you answered yesterday?’)\textsuperscript{214}

Upon hearing Maigrot’s answer, the emperor’s side immediately began to investigate the Han Chinese involved. The investigation ordered by the emperor covered the number of Christians in Fujian Province, their views on the Rites Controversy, their current practices of

\textsuperscript{211} AP I, 689-97[386-90].
\textsuperscript{212} von Collani also regards this concern as ‘the most important contents of the discourse between the emperor and Maigrot’ (von Collani, ‘Charles Maigrot’s Role’, 167).
\textsuperscript{213} AP I, 697[390].
\textsuperscript{214} AP I, 702[393].
the Chinese rites, and whether they were degree-holders (‘the quality of rank of the persons’). Simultaneously, through Heshiheng, the emperor also embarked on an investigation of the Chinese Christians in Beijing. Around the same period, Yinti busied himself searching for relevant information, investigating not only the area in question, Fujian Province, but ‘throughout the provinces’. He even sent one of his servants to feign seeking baptism to gather inside information on the Christian community. Through these efforts, the emperor’s side was able around early August to at least reach the conclusion that Maigrot had been causing trouble regarding the Rites Controversy in Fujian Province for a long time and that he had even sent a letter against the Chinese rites to the Pope.

The interrogation of Guéty from the third to twelfth of September allowed the emperor’s side to identify the Chinese scholars, the juren degree-holder Jiang Weibiao, the shengyuan degree holder Li Souliang 李所良, who had taught Maigrot the Chinese books, and the Xiyang missionary, Giovanni Donato Mezzafalce (He Nadu 何納篤, 1661-1720), who informed Guéty that the purpose of de Tournon’s visit was to rectify the Jesuits’ faults. The Ministry of War was ordered to immediately summon them to Beijing. On the eighth

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215 According to Stumpf’s letter to the Jesuits in Jehol, the emperor was still waiting for the investigation reports in September (AP II, 144-45[421-22]).
216 AP II, 144[422].
217 AP II, 88[Compendium of the Acta Pekinensia for 1705 and 1706].
218 AP I, 585[322], 595[327-28].
219 Also known as Xavier Jiang.
220 Also known as Li Liangjue 李良爵, Li Yifen 李奕芬, or Leantius Li.
221 Giovanni Donato Mezzafalce was the then Vicar Apostolic of Zhejiang. Although Guéty also mentioned Juan de Astudillo, OP (Ai Yuhan 艾毓翰, 1670-1714) and Francisco Nieto Diaz de la Concepcion Consuegra, OFM (Bian Shuji 卞述濟, c. 1662-1739) during the interrogation, the intervention of the Beijing Jesuits prevented them from being summoned (AP II, 166[434-35], 181-82[444-45]).
222 AP II, 180[444].
of November, Chinese people of Beijing who had stood on de Tournon’s side, such as Thomas Gu and Peter Wang, were taken into The Office of Palace Justice (Shenxing si) of the Imperial Household Department, and on the eleventh, the Beijing Christians who stood on the Jesuits’ side, such as John Yan and juren degree-holder John Lu, were also arrested.

During an interrogation of those involved on the twelfth of November, the emperor’s side discovered that in March 1693, Maigrot had issued a Mandate prohibiting the use of ‘Tian’ and ‘Shangdi’ as the designation for the Christian God, the placement of a plaque that bore the Kangxi emperor’s handwriting of ‘Jing Tian’, and the performance of sacrifices or oblations for Confucius or ancestors; he had also prescribed that tablets for the deceased should be removed, or if not, at least the tablet, with characters such as ‘lingwei’ or ‘shenzu’ deleted, should contain phrases relating to the confession of faith. The emperor’s side also perceived that this Mandate had caused ructions within Fujian’s Christian community. After the interrogation, the emperor ordered the immediate arrest of Appiani, who was at the time on

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223 He is a different figure from another Peter Wang who, as a leading figure in the Beijing Christian community, stood against de Tournon.
224 Although the translators understood John Lu to be a shengyuan degree-holder (xiucai 秀才) (AP II, 201), the original text definitely refers to him as a juren degree-holder (Graduati Kiu Gin) (AP I, 555[302]).
225 AP II, 201[455].
226 ‘Declaratio seu Mandatum Provinsionale Illustriissimi ac Reverendissimi Domini Caroli Maigrot, Vicarii Apostolici Fokiensis, nunc Episcopi Cononensis [Provisional Mandate or Decree of the Most Reverend Charles Maigrot, Apostolic Vicar of Fujian, now Bishop of Conon]’.
227 For more details, see von Collani, ‘Charles Maigrot’s Role’, 152-54.
228 For example, around the eleventh of April 1700, angry Fuzhou Christians surrounded Maigrot’s residence to resist his Mandate (AP II, 201-2[456], 246-47[481-82], 289[506]).
his way to the southern provinces with de Tournon,\textsuperscript{229} because the emperor believed that Appiani might have caused similar disturbances in Sichuan.\textsuperscript{230}

On the other hand, the emperor attempted to find out more about the particulars of the disturbances in Fujian. When Jiang Weibiao and Li Suoliang arrived in Beijing towards early December, the emperor asked them about the numbers of Christians in Fujian, whether they were degree-holders, and why degree-holders accepted Christianity despite the possible disadvantages in securing their preferment.\textsuperscript{231} The two Chinese were also confronted with Maigrot and Peter Wang. This series of interrogations clarified the particulars of the disturbances: (1) the disturbances had been caused by Maigrot’s prohibitions on ‘\textit{Tian}’ for God’s name and on certain rites concerning Confucius and the ancestors; (2) fifty Fujian Christians had submitted a petition against Maigrot to the Bishop of Macau; (3) the Pope had issued an instruction to missionaries, ‘If the customs of the peoples do not accord with Christian law, change them all; if you change them badly, I will punish you’; and (4) there were further anti-rites missionaries in Fujian, including Artus de Lionne, MEP (Liang Hongren 梁宏仁, 1655-1713)\textsuperscript{232} and Francisco Varo, OP\textsuperscript{233} (Wan Jiguo 萬濟國).\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{229} AP II, 203-4[456-57].
\textsuperscript{230} AP II, 256[486-87], ‘Bi Tianxiang (Fr. Appiani) has caused a disturbance in Sichuan. He is to be taken back there, questioned and sent back to the Emperor.’ The emperor also had this possibility on his mind on the twenty-first of July 1706, when he seriously asked about whether Appiani had ever pronounced against ‘the cult of Confucius’ or ‘the cult of the dead ancestors’ in Sichuan (AP I, 631-32[350]).
\textsuperscript{231} AP II, 241[478].
\textsuperscript{232} Artus de Lionne was the then Bishop of Rosalia and the Vicar Apostolic of Sichuan. He was resident in Fuzhou in the period around January 1701 (AP I, 466-67[249]).
\textsuperscript{233} The Vicar Apostolic of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan.
\textsuperscript{234} AP II, 243-52[479-84]. According to Gerbillon’s letter to de Tournon on the twenty-second of December 1706, although Peter Wang testified during the interrogation that Christians had removed a \textit{Jingtian} tablet in Nan’an County of Quanzhou Prefecture, Heshiheng and Zhao Chang removed the
In the end, on the seventeenth of December, the infuriated emperor revealed the judgement that he was contemplating:

(1) Maigrot, Mezzafalce, and Guéty shall be sent to Canton provincial officials for expulsion from China on the charge of causing disturbances.

(2) Peter Wang, Thomas Gu, and John Jin Xiu as disturbers of the peace shall be sentenced to forty strokes and exile under the Military Prefect’s supervision in Liaodong.

(3) The two literati who came from Fujian shall be released.

(4) Appiani shall be sent to Sichuan for interrogation for causing disturbances in Sichuan and shall be summoned to Beijing again after the interrogation.

(5) From now on, all newcomers from Xiyang shall first come to Beijing to receive a permit as soon as they arrive in China, and local officials shall expel from China all Xiyang missionaries who do not have a permit, whether they are newcomers or not.

Upon hearing this judgement, the missionaries entreated the emperor to suspend its countrywide proclamation, underlining how missionaries might be expelled before even reaching Beijing to obtain a permit if local officials misunderstood the passage, ‘local officials testimony from their interrogation report to protect the missionaries (AP II, 267[493]). However, it is unclear whether the emperor knew about the tablet removal incident.

235 The emperor had already conceived the Permit policy following his first meeting with Maigrot on the second of August (‘In the future, there will be a careful investigation in every one of the provinces, and if such men are there, they will immediately be expelled’). This is also corroborated by Zhao Chang’s advice to the Beijing Jesuits on the twenty-fourth of November. See AP I, 582[320]; AP II, 224-26[469-70].

236 AP II, 256-58[486-88].
shall expel from China all Xiyang missionaries who do not have a permit, whether they are newcomers or not’. Fortunately, this entreaty was accepted, and the proclamation was temporarily suspended, except for the portions dealing with Sichuan and Guangdong provinces, to which Maigrot, Mezzafalce, and Guéty, and Appiani would be transported.\textsuperscript{237}

In the meantime, the emperor decided to embark on a sixth Southern Tour. Exactly when the emperor decided this is not clear, but the decision was made before the twenty-second of December, the date on which the Jesuits first hear about it. When we consider the account, ‘it was said that they were being taken to determine the levels for a new canal which was to be opened up at great cost’\textsuperscript{238} and the emperor’s travel ‘by land with a few men including Fathers Bouvet and Jartoux to inspect a place where there was to be excavated a channel for a new canal’\textsuperscript{239} on the twenty-second of March 1707 during this Southern Tour, it is highly likely that one of the reasons behind the emperor’s decision concerned the management of the canal, as did his decisions to embark on the previous five Southern Tours.\textsuperscript{240} However, it is also highly likely that this sixth Southern Tour particularly concerned the Rites Controversy, in that it was the emperor himself who suggested to Yinti, ‘I want this favour to be granted. And let a number of copies of the permit be prepared to be taken with us to the South. We will award these in a way that we judge fit’\textsuperscript{241} on the fourth of February 1707, around twenty days before his

\textsuperscript{237} In their response to the judgement, the Jesuits were much influenced by Zhao Chang’s advice. However, it is not clear whether his advice was his own, or whether the emperor was behind it (AP II, 257-59[487]).

\textsuperscript{238} AP II, 314[518].

\textsuperscript{239} AP II, 360[547].

\textsuperscript{240} Cho Younghun, ‘Kanghije wa hwisang ŭi chou’, 60-64.

\textsuperscript{241} AP II, 301[512].
departure on the Southern Tour. Around the time of the decision, on the twenty-third of December 1706, the emperor also finalised the content of the permit.242

On the thirtieth, therefore, the Beijing Jesuits urgently advised all missionaries in China by letter that anyone who wanted to receive a permit must arrive in Nanjing between the middle of the second month of the Kangxi forty-sixth year (c.1707.3.18) and the end of the second month (c.1707.4.2), or must arrive in Beijing before the end of June 1707, when the emperor would depart for Jehol.243

The reason for the speedy development of the situation, from the emperor’s anger over Maigrot’s answer regarding the Han Chinese Christian community in Fujian on the second of August to the emperor’s final judgement on the seventeenth of December, was that the emperor took the higher level of Han Chinese involvement in the Rites Controversy more seriously than expected. As the remarks by the emperor’s side, ‘It is worthy of belief that many similar people are lurking in the provinces’244, and ‘His Majesty rightly is considering the possibility of there being more Xiyang in the provinces like the Bishop of Conon’245 indicate, the discovery of 5,000 anti-rites followers in only a single location, the potential negative impact on China proper of no small number of Xiyang missionaries like Maigrot spread across the provinces would surely be formidable.

After his final notice to leave Beijing was delivered to de Tournon on around the twenty-fifth (or twenty-sixth) of August,246 the emperor summoned the accompanying Jesuits on the

242 AP II, 264[491], 273[496-97].
243 AP II, 120[408].
244 AP II, 257[487].
245 AP II, 269[494].
246 AP II, 120[408].
twenty-seventh and expressed his anger over the Han Chinese involved in the Rites Controversy, including Jin Xiu (de Tournon’s catechist), Wang Jiao (Artus de Lionne’s former procurator), Gu Zhe (Appiani’s spy), and other Han Chinese who were reported to the throne by Fujianese officials or Yinti, even suggesting the decapitation of these Han Chinese (‘he could do nothing less than order that some whose names he knew should have their heads cut off, and he named …’).247

When the Jesuits both in Beijing and Jehol attempted to save as many of them as they could in early September, the emperor underlined that this issue concerned his own government and state, and thus prohibited them from making any further mention of the Han Chinese, with the words, ‘because the Eleuths were never vassals of mine but these Chinese are my people which makes the situation very different, … this was a matter of state and belonged to his imperial authority’, the emperor, added that the issue of ‘the Chinese’, which should be understood as ‘Han Chinese’ rather than ‘people of the Qing’, concerned his own authority.248

In fact, behind the annulment in late September of the original plan to return courtesy to the Pope for the legate’s visit lay strong opposition from ‘his court’, which was likely to consist of non-Han individuals, such as on the fifth of August, from Yinti, Zhao Chang, Pereira, and ‘many members of the imperial household’. The opposition was based on their deep discussions over ways of vindicating the emperor:249 ‘if the Manchu emperor were willing to return courtesy for a legate who had been dispatched to deny the Chinese rites, the emperor could be accused of helping to destroy Chinese civilisation’.

247 AP II, 122[409].
248 AP II, 142-43[420-21].
249 AP II, 115[405-6], 195[452-53].
Meanwhile, de Tournon, who had left Beijing on the twenty-eighth of August and was on his way south, became aware of the imperial judgement of late December towards the middle of January 1707. To invalidate the judgement, and in particular its permit policy, according to which only missionaries who agreed with Ricci’s position and vowed not to return to Xiyang could receive an imperial permit for their continued mission in China, on the seventh of February 1707, in Nanjing, de Tournon proclaimed a decree to all Xiyang missionaries in China. According to this decree, when asked about the Rites Controversy, all Christians should clarify that they supported Maigrot’s position but were against Ricci’s position.

De Tournon’s decree was provocative not only because of its contents, enforcing Maigrot’s anti-rites position, resistance to the emperor’s judgement, and the abolition of the Jing Tian tablet, but also the venue in which the decree was proclaimed. Contrary to the emperor’s efforts to date, Jiangnan, the cultural and historical centre of the Han Chinese people, the constituency uppermost in the emperor’s mind, became the ‘epicentre’ of the Rites Controversy. Nanjing in particular was a kind of ‘spiritual homeland’ for the Han elite, because the city was where the Ming Dynasty had started, and it was homes to the Ming founder’s mausoleum. The heartfelt significance of this city to the Han elite is well illustrated by the fact that the first thing that Sun Wen did after successfully dethroning the Manchu ruler on the twelfth of February 1912 was to proclaim Ji Ming Taizu wen 祭明太祖文 [The Text of the Sacrifice to Ming Taizu] and Ye Ming Taizu ling wen 諴明太祖陵文 [The Text of the Report

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250 AP II, 321-22[523].
251 AP II, 285[504].
252 This decree was produced on the twenty-fifth of January 1707, but its date of issue is given as the seventh of February. See AP II, 294[508], 296-97[509-10], 305-8[514-15]; Noll, 100 Roman Documents, 28-30.
on Ming Taizu’s Mausoleum] in his own name, and to visit Ming Taizu’s mausoleum. The Kangxi emperor also visited Ming Taizu’s mausoleum every time he visited Jiangnan during his five Southern Tours, bar his fourth, in the 42nd year of his reign.253

The proclamation of the Nanjing Decree extended from Nanjing and Yangzhou to Shandong Province, and the emperor became aware of it on the third (or second) of April.254 While the emperor was staying close to Sanchahe255, five Portuguese Jesuits in the region, including José Monteiro (the then Vice-Provincial), José Pereira, Antonio Ferreira, Manoel da Mata, and Manoel de Sousa, declined Yinti’s suggestion to vow to adhere to Ricci’s position. Knowing that the Jesuits had adhered to Ricci’s position and were now very embarrassed by the Nanjing Decree, the emperor suggested that ‘if they were confined to live in their own churches discreetly without any actions against the Chinese Rites, they should be allowed to remain in China proper until Barros returned to China with the Pope’s final decision’. The five Jesuits however chose to leave China, considering it would be almost impossible to remain in the country without any actions against the Chinese Rites. The emperor thus ordered a mitigating measure for them, that they could wait in Canton without leaving China until

253 QSL-KX23/11/2[guihai], KX28/2/26[jiazi], KX38/4/13[renzi], KX44/4/26[jichou], KX46/3/9[renxu].
254 AP II, 388-89[562-63].
255 ‘When sailing down the Grand Canal from Yangzhou, we encounter a bifurcation point forty-five 里 away from Yangzi 楊子 Bridge: one branch heads towards Yizhen 儀真; the other towards Guazhou 瓜洲. People have called this area Sanchahe 三汊河 because of its three tributaries, towards Yizhen, Guazhou, and Yangzhou respectively. Sanchahe has also been called Baota 寶塔 Bay because the Gaomin 高旻 Temple with its Tianzhong 天中 Pagoda are nearby. Qing emperors would rest at this bay on their way to Jiangnan. They named it Zhuyu 茱萸 Bay because it had many cornelian cherry trees, which allegedly drove out evil spirits and brought good fortune to this place. … The bay was a transportation hub through which everyone coming and going to Yangzhou had to pass and was an area of shallow water on the Huaiyang Canal.’ See Cho Younghun, Taenha wa Chungguk sangin, 269-70.
Barros’s return. The emperor’s side even provided them with travel expenses for their journey to Canton.256

At the same time, the emperor wrote an edict in his own handwriting and sent it to the Jesuits in Beijing on the third of April under the utmost secrecy, even from Yinti, who was in charge of all Xiyang-related affairs.257 In this imperial edict, the emperor made it clear that if missionaries received a permit by vowing to adhere to Ricci’s way, they would be allowed to preach the Christian teachings in China, but if they did not, akin to the Japanese government’s measure258 against Japanese Christians, the Qing state would regard Chinese Christians as rebels from now on and the practice of Christian teachings would be banned in China.259 Through this secret edict, the emperor intended to sound out the Beijing Jesuits’ position on this incident, and also to inform all missionaries in China, through the Beijing Jesuits, of his clear and definite position. Honestly speaking, that the emperor should allow the preaching of the Christian gospel if they followed Ricci’s way sounds like an exaggeration aimed at winning over the missionaries, because, as we already seen, the emperor had not allowed the free propagation of Christian teachings. Even ‘the Edict of Toleration’ merely allowed religious

256 AP II, 400-9[569-74].
257 AP II, 408[573], 426-29[590-92], 675[747-48].
258 AP II, 434[594].
259 AP II, 427[590], ‘If Europeans persevere in following the teaching of Li Madou, they will still be able, under my protection, to preach the Law; if however they follow the rule of Yan Dang, I will regard these my subjects of the Middle Kingdom as rebels, and I declare that I will absolutely prohibit the practice of their Law’; 430[592], ‘[That edict] declares that his Christian subjects who hold the opinion of the Most Illustrious Bishop of Conon in opposition to the Chinese rites are in rebellion against him, and in that case he prohibits the Christian Law throughout the whole of his empire.’; and 430[592], ‘For Chinese who abandon the rites of their country by an ancient law are already liable to capital punishment for disobedience, and by a new law are declared guilty of treason by the spoken word and the brush of the Emperor.’ This imperial edict was reread aloud when the emperor granted permits to twenty-four Jesuits at Sanchahe on the twenty-seventh of May 1707.
professionals and a limited number of laymen to practice their religion in very confined areas such as their churches. In the meantime, the emperor’s side dispatched Jartoux to Nanjing, their next destination, to persuade the missionaries there in advance to apply for the permit.260

The emperor’s side reached Nanjing, and on the nineth of April met eleven Jesuits, including Jean-Simon Bayard, SJ (1661-1725, Fan Xiyuan 樊西元).261 Fortunately, Jartoux’s efforts had been effective, and they requested permits, accepting the emperor’s condition that they would be confined to their own churches without any actions against the Chinese Rites until Barros returned to China with the Pope’s final decision. In response to the eleven Jesuits’ decision, the emperor pronounced as follows:

To those eleven men, since they have followed the practices of Father Matteo Ricci, and are not opposed to Chinese teachings, there is granted a piao or permit which entitles them to remain unmolested in their churches. They will wait until I the Emperor return to Jin shan262 (this is the name of a place under the administration of the city).263

In Nanjing, the emperor also met Francesco di San Giorgio Biandrate (Shi Tiren 施提仁, n.d.) and Pierre Hervé, MEP (He Xuan 赫宣, ?-1710), both of whom were against Ricci’s way and denied the Chinese Rites. They stuck to de Tournon’s Nanjing Decree by rejecting the emperor’s minimum condition that they remain confined in their own churches without actions.

260 AP II, 409-17[574-78].
261 In Nanjing, François-Xavier d’Entrecolles (Yin Hongxu 殷弘緒), Jean-Simon Bayard (Fan Xiyuan 樊西元), Joseph de Prémare (Ma Ruose 馬若瑟), Jean François Noélas (Nie Ruohan 楊若翰), Jean-Placide Hervieu (He Cangbi 赫蒼碧), and Joseph de Mailla (Feng Bingzheng 馮秉正) joined Jean de Testard (Pang Kexiu 龐克修), Pierre de Goville (Ge Weili 戈維理), and Emeric de Chavagnac (Sha Shouxin 沙守信) who had already reached Nanjing a few days earlier. All nine were French Jesuits and stayed at the Jesuits’ College. Antonio da Silva and João Duarte (Nie Ruowang 楊若望) were also at the Jesuits’ College at the time.
262 Jin shan also refers to Sanchahe.
263 AP II, 415-18[577-79].
against the Chinese Rites until Barros’ return to China. Therefore, on the tenth of April, in the presence of ‘a large crowd and the Xiyang people themselves’, the Provincial Governor(s) and the Governor(s)-general, he ordered an imperial edict to be proclaimed ‘in a loud voice’:

From the time that Li Madou entered China, that is for more than two hundred years, because no obstacle had been raised against Chinese teaching, permission was granted to Europeans to live in China, according to their Religious practice. **But now, what you are doing is not in accordance with the custom of Father Ricci and it is contrary to Chinese teaching.** You do not honour Confucius, and we absolutely refuse to allow this way of acting. **If in the future, there are still found Europeans who say inappropriate things like that, however many there may be, they will be put to death.** Besides, before the arrival of Father Ricci in China, for some thousands of years, there was no European preaching the Law, yet the empire was not lacking in anything. Taking into consideration that you came from afar to this vast empire of the Chinese, and that you placed no impediment to Chinese teachings, **we granted you permission to preach the Law.** Now you are maintaining that Confucius must not be honoured by the Chinese who follow your European Law. **It seems right that men of this sort should not be tolerated in China.** Moreover in Japan, which is a small kingdom, any European who comes is arrested immediately on arrival and put to death; I don’t know how many have been killed in this way. You Europeans have been much alarmed by this, and up till now none of you have dared to approach Japan. **In the future, if there are found any amongst you Europeans who in preaching your own law oppose Chinese teachings, they will be arrested and put to death.** You (Fathers Hervé and San Giorgio) should hurry after Duoluo and make sure he understands this. **Suggest to him that he should stop trying to inflame the crowds.** If henceforth anything like this happens, Duoluo will be arrested, brought here in custody, and put to death. If as the result of the execution of Duoluo you will not permit Europeans to preach the law in China, and as a result
no European comes to China, so much the better. The Europeans who are now in China, even if they do not preach the Law, have permission to live and practice their religion in their own churches. Also, if you Europeans were to come with soldiers, will not our own soldiers fight against them? If your army were able to travel nine thousand leagues in order to get here, will our soldiers not equally be able to do so in the other direction? You are granted five days before your departure. When, as you follow Duoluo, you reach Guangzhou, you must immediately leave that city. If there is any delay beyond that deadline, the zongdu and fuyuan have orders to arrest you and to take you in chains to Macau, a city in the province of Guangdong (emphasis mine)\textsuperscript{264}

The two missionaries were instantly ordered to be expelled to Macao, where people of China proper (neidi ren) would not be able to see them anymore.

On the nineteenth of April, when the emperor was asked for permits by nine missionaries, including Manuel Mendes, SJ (1656-1741 Meng Youyi 孟由義) in Suzhou 蘇州, he issued the following order:

Proclaim to the Xiyang people: If anybody does not follow Ricci’s principle (guigu 規矩) from now on, he shall never stay in China and shall be expelled to his [homeland]. If the Pope [jiaohua wang 教化王, literally, the king of edification] does not permit you to preach your teachings since you [follow Ricci’s principle], you can simply practice (xiudao 修道) your teachings [without preaching them] in China. If the Pope rebukes you and recalls you to Xiyang since you follow Ricci but not the Pope, I will not allow you to go. If the Pope recalls you by only listening to de Tournon’s saying that you are not obedient to the Pope and have sinned against the Heavenly Lord, I shall also have

\textsuperscript{264} AP II, 501-02[632-33].

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something to say. I will never let you go because you have lived in China for a long time by being adapted to my water and soil and thus have become like Chinese. If the Pope insists that you return since you have sinned, I will write a letter to him, saying ‘If you insist that the Xiyang missionaries, including Pereira, return to you, I will never allow them to depart alive because they are already adapted to my water and soil. If I let them go, I will do so by beheading them.’ If the Pope then says that he does not care whether you are killed since you have already sinned against the Heavenly Lord, I will indeed hunt down all Xiyang missionaries throughout China and send their heads to Xiyang. If the situation proceeds this far, your Pope is indeed the king of edification265. You may feel relieved because anybody who receives the permit shall be regarded as Chinese. You do not have to worry about receiving the permit. On the way back [from the Southern Tour] to Beijing, I will give you the permits at Baitawan in the same way as for Jean-Simon Bayard, SJ and ten other missionaries from Nanjing.266

In the meantime, the emperor also expelled de Tournon from the sight of the people of China proper. In a letter to the Beijing Jesuits, which was likely written in Suzhou since it

265 ‘你們的教化王也就成個教化王了’
266 KLGW, 13-14. According to Acta Pekinensia, on the ninth or tenth of April 1707 (KX46/3/7 or 8), the emperor promised the eleven missionaries, whose names appear later in the quoted edict above (See document #56 in Appendix 2), that he would give them the permits at ‘Jin Shan’, i.e., Baota Bay, on his way back to Beijing (AP II, 417-18[578-79]). The edict quoted above is also included in Atti Imperiali (Atti Imperiali, no. 67, 202-204), according to which the nine missionaries, including Manuel Mendes, came to the emperor on the ninth of April 1707 (KX46/3/7). With regard to the date (KX46/3/17) given in the phrase in KLGW, ‘三月十七日，直郡王、張常住奏西洋人孟由義等九人請求票並履歷摺字覽’, Rosso regards it as a mistake in writing (Rosso, Apostolic Legations to China, 242), while KLGW and QZXT consider it as the date that the edict was proclaimed. Anyway, it is clear that the edict had at least been issued before mid-May 1707, when the emperor began his return to Beijing, because the edict records ‘On the way back [from the Southern Tour] to Beijing, I will give you the permits at Baitawan in the same way as for Jean-Simon Bayard, SJ (Fan Xiyuan 樊西元, 1661-1725) and ten other missionaries from Nanjing’ (俟朕回鑾時在寶塔灣同江寧府方西溝等十一人同賜票).
reached Beijing on the twenty-sixth of April 1707\(^{267}\), the emperor ordered the Jesuits to write a letter to de Tournon with the following contents:

Upon your first arrival, you told the Emperor that you had come here for no other purpose than to render thanks. But now you do nothing else than endlessly stir up matters which concern only a few of us here in China, and are not the business at all of the many people who live outside China. You should think of the kindness with which so great a monarch has in the past treated foreigners, and you should reflect on whether and why in the future you should heed the words of Yang Dan (the Bishop of Conon) and people like him, when all they do here is to stir up trouble and strife. If the Emperor becomes even slightly angry, he will drive all of us out of China and if afterwards you have a change of heart, your change of heart will be too late. If you take our advice, you will leave the country as soon as possible.\(^{268}\)

Although the emperor received a response from the Beijing Jesuits confirming that they had sent the letter to de Tournon as ordered, he sent them another letter with the same order\(^{269}\) while he remained in Jiangnan.\(^{270}\) Even after those two letters, this time, the emperor himself despatched personnel (Foiorò and Pagharà) from Suzhou\(^{271}\) to Canton on the eighteenth of May to expel de Tournon to Macao.\(^{272}\)

Interestingly, we can also observe the emperor’s very careful ‘audience-centred’ approaches in his moves against the Nanjing Decree. First, he ensured that sensitive affairs

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\(^{267}\) During April and May, the Kangxi emperor remained in the Jiangnan area. He departed Hangzhou in mid-May and travelled via Suzhou, Yangzhou, and the Baota Bay touring palace (xinggong 行宮) towards the end of May. During the Southern Tour, the Kangxi emperor’s letters from Jiangnan generally took seven days to reach Beijing.

\(^{268}\) AP II, 434-35[594].

\(^{269}\) AP II, 460-61[606-7].

\(^{270}\) Considering this letter reached Beijing on the eleventh of May, it is likely that the emperor sent it around the third of May.

\(^{271}\) QSL-KX46/4/15[dingyou].

\(^{272}\) AP II, 461[607].
remained out of sight of the Han Chinese. The contents of the permit request form, for example, varied according to the language used. While both European and Chinese versions shared general information such as name, kingdom, order of congregation, age, date of arrival in China, and whether philosophy and theology had been studied, the Chinese version did not contain two phrases, ‘I have no intention to return to Europe’ and in particular, ‘I have so far followed the practices of Fr. Matteo Ricci’, both of which were included in the European language version (‘nothing is to be mentioned of the intention of not returning to Europe, nor of the practices of Father Matteo Ricci’). Although the emperor’s side did not provide any explanation for these omissions, writing sensitive contents only in the European language would have effectively made a Xiyang missionary requesting a permit feel as though they were requesting it in a very public fashion before the European world; it would also have effectively prevented unnecessary attention from being drawn to the Rites Controversy within the Han elite, by leaving no trace of the recent Xiyang challenge to Confucian hegemony. To give another example, by allowing only the eleven Jesuits who had requested permits, to stand outside of the Church by which the emperor would pass in Nanjing, the emperor’s side acted

\[\text{273 AP II, 413-14[576].}\]

\[\text{274 The permit format drawn up by Yinti, which underwent revision by the Kangxi emperor in late December 1706 was as follows: ‘N. of the kingdom of the Western Sea. The man named N., aged N., of the N. Congregation, arrived in the Middle Kingdom in the year N. He has come to the Court to show his respect for the Emperor by prostrating himself, and was admitted into his presence. Accordingly, he has been given this acknowledgement, or permit.’ (AP II, 273[496-97]). Also see ‘该票文内要写明西洋某国人某, 某岁, 系某会人, 来中国已经某年, 永不复回西洋, 曾赴京都酷见, 为此给与信票。’ (QCXCMDY, 311); LEC-J, vol. 1, 图, ‘西洋意大里亚國人伊大任年六十三歲係方濟各會人來中國已經二十三年曾赴京都陛見永不復回西洋為此給與信票 康熙四十六年正月十九日 si yang ni da li ya burun i nyalma, i da žin, ninju ilanse fangji ge hui de bi, dulibai durun de jifi orin ilan aniya, enteheme si yang de bedererakü, ging hecen de heng kileme jifi dele acaha, uttu ofi temgetu bithe buhe, elhe taifin i dehi ningguci aniya, aniya biyai juwan uyun’. At least until the twenty-ninth of June 1707, the permit contained the phrase, ‘I do not intend to return to Europe’ (QCXCMDY, 312).}\]
proactively to prevent any possibly misleading scenes within sight of the Han elite in which the anti-rites missionaries might still be accepted by the emperor.

Secondly, during his stay in Nanjing, now a new epicentre of the Rites Controversy, the emperor tried to highlight his Confucian emperorship as much as possible. For example, in the imperial edict proclaimed in Nanjing on the tenth of April, as we saw earlier, the emperor gave prominent play to his image especially as the guardian of Chinese Confucian culture, by making clear his wholehearted determination to defend Chinese culture to the degree that he was willing to eradicate any alien influence by killing alien clerics who proselytised against Chinese culture and was even willing to wage a war with the alien world. Interestingly, contrary to the emperor’s usual preference for the Manchu language when dealing with the Rites Controversy, this imperial edict was prepared in Chinese and was openly proclaimed, in the presence of many Han high officials and Jiangnan elites, so as to be heard by the entire Han elite. That this imperial edict was written in Chinese can be ascertained by the fact that a Chinese called Paul Wang looked over the shoulder of a scribe as he worked on the draft of the edict and ‘brought to Father da Silva a paper written in Chinese, in his own hand’; the fact that this imperial edict was proclaimed in a very public fashion can be supported by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the emperor published it to Hervé and San Giorgio ‘in a loud voice’, ‘in the presence of a large crowd and the Europeans themselves’, ‘the zongdu and the fuyuan, the Supreme Prefect and Viceroy’. Zhang Changzhu also later witnessed that the edict had ‘been sufficiently publicised’.275 It was also highly likely that those present when the edict was being proclaimed included not only Yu Zhun 子準, the Governor of Jiangsu Province, and Shaomubu 邵穆布, the Governor-general of Anhui, Jiangsu, and Jiangxi Provinces, but also two

275 AP II, 418-23[579-81].
particularly well-known anti-Christian figures, Zhang Penghe, who had caused an anti-Christian incident sixteen years earlier in Jiangnan and was then the Director-general of the Grand Canal; and Zhang Boxing 張伯行, a student (wensheng 文生) of Zhang Penghe and the then Provincial Surveillance Commissioner of Jiangsu Province; two years later, the latter Zhang would write the ‘historic’ memorial that requested the full prohibition of Christianity in China.

At the same time, on the same day that the aforementioned edict was proclaimed, the emperor also proclaimed that he would visit Ming Taizu’s mausoleum in person on the following day, although he had already sent Maci (or Maqi 馬齊 in Chinese, 1652-1739), the Manchu Grand Secretary, to visit Ming Taizu’s mausoleum on his behalf the previous day.Officials ardently opposed this:

Whenever Your Majesty visits Jiangnan, with regard to the Ming Taizu mausoleum, Your Majesty revisits it and performs the rites (guandian 灌奠) in person even after having already despatched an official or imperial prince thereto for the commemorative rites and has moreover repaired the mausoleum and appointed [a descendant of the Ming imperial family] as its custodian. Since antiquity, no ruler has expressed such a respectful attitude to the previous dynasty. Now, however, Your Majesty again intends to visit the mausoleum in person for the rites. Your servants think such a move is excessive. Since you have already despatched a high official there for the rites and the weather is suddenly becoming hotter, Your Majesty need not bother to visit the mausoleum in person.
**Jiangnan from the Emperor’s Perspective**

We have thus far examined how the fourth Manchu emperor remained conscious of the Han elite as the Rites Controversy began to surface. What made the emperor so conscious of the Han elite during that period? To answer this question, it is meaningful to explore the emperor’s perspective of his Han constituents, which could be the more fundamental, real issue underlying the exposed issue, that is, the Rites Controversy itself. In this regard, by focusing on the emperor’s views regarding Jiangnan, the centre of the Han Chinese world, this section sheds light on his perspective of his Han constituents until the early eighteenth century.

Although the geographical range of Jiangnan differs slightly depending on the scholar involved, generally speaking, it forms part of the Lower Yangzi, one of the nine macroregions defined by William Skinner, and covers southern Jiangsu Province and northern Zhejiang Province.\(^{279}\) Since the Song period, the Jiangnan region had long been regarded as China’s socioeconomical centre, and during the late imperial period, almost all innovative social or economic change in Chinese society began in this region. Not only its socioeconomic significance, but also its symbolic implications in Chinese history are noteworthy, because Jiangnan, as a centre of Chinese culture, symbolised the Han Chinese elite’s cultural dominance. Due to this symbolic significance, any ruler in Chinese history who wanted to justify their rule

\(^{279}\) See Skinner, ‘Regional Urbanization’, 212-15. Liu Shiji and Li Bozhong believe the Jiangnan area included eight prefectures (Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Jiangning, and Zhenjiang) and one department (Taicang). However, Xu Wuming and Oh Keum-sung confined the area to six prefectures (Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou) and one department (Taicang). Kuhn’s definition of Jiangnan is somewhat broader by including southern Jiangsu, a corner of eastern Anhui, and northern Zhejiang. See Kuhn, *Soulstealers*, 32-34; Liu Shiji, *Ming Qing shidai Jiangnan*, 1; Li Bozhong, *Duoshijiao kan Jiangnan*, 499, 455, 460-61; Xu Wuming, *Jiangnan shishen*, 1-13; Oh Keum-sung, *Guofa yu shehui guanxing*, 221.
indeed needed the approval of the Confucian elite of this region. The Qing ruler was no exception to this time-honoured tradition.

During the Kangxi era, Jiangnan again once began to enjoy its central position in Chinese society. A series of confrontations between the Manchu state and the Han elite abated with the pacification of the Three Feudatories Rebellion and reached a long truce, in which ‘each side controlled itself to a certain degree’. The Kangxi emperor’s first Tour to Jiangnan in the 1680s was a symbolically important move in this cooperative mood. While the Qing ruler achieved military predominance over the Han elite by pacifying numerous Han rebellions, epitomised in particular by the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, the Kangxi emperor’s first Southern Tour was meant to confirm his predominance by winning the Han elite’s heartfelt support. During the Southern Tour, the emperor paraded his benevolent rule (renzheng 仁政) to the fullest by granting tax exemptions to the local population, conferring accolades on the aged, succouring the poor, increasing the entrance quota for local schools, and proclaiming an amnesty for criminals. The emperor also showed humble respect to Han Chinese cultural traditions by paying tribute at Ming Taizu’s mausoleum and Emperor Yu’s temple.

The recovery of Jiangnan’s influence in Chinese society can be adumbrated by the Jiangnan elite’s advancement to central official posts. According to Narakino Sen, the percentage of Han Chinese in the official posts of Grand Secretaries, Grand Ministers of State, Ministers of Six Ministries, Left Censors-in-chief of the Censorate, Governors-General, and Provincial Governors increased from the 1670s while that of Chinese bannermen (hanjun 漢軍).

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281 Kishimoto Mio, ‘Shinchō kōtei no kōnan junkō’, 32-34.
It is also noticeable that among these Han Chinese officials, there was a significant increase, from 6.3% in the 1660s to 38.5% in the 1670s, of ‘Southern People (nanren 南人)’ who were natives of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong Provinces. On the contrary, the percentage of ‘Northern People (beiren 北人)’ decreased sharply from 93.8% in the 1660s to 61.5% in the 1670s. Such upward and downward trends for Southern People and Northern People, respectively, continued until the mid-1680s, and after a neck-and-neck race for about 20 years, the widening gap between the two became irreversible from the early 1700s. Also noticeable is the almost identical pattern between the graphs for Southern People and Jiangsu and Zhejiang natives until the mid-1700s. This shows that the figures for the latter two provinces led the pattern of the graph for Southern People at least until the 1740s. Moreover, from the 1700s, the figure for the two provinces alone surpassed that for Northern People, and in particular irreversibly overtook the latter (Table 5 and Graph 8) between the early-1730s to the mid-1820s.

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283 The Ming government limited the number of successful candidates from particular southern provinces, such as Nanzhili, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong, and placed them into a category named ‘Southern Paper’ (nanjuan 南卷). These provinces would correspond to Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong Provinces during the Qing period.
284 The Ming government also categorised certain provinces into the ‘Northern Paper’ (beijuan 北卷) category. These provinces covered the Fengtian and Jilin provinces of the Qing period.
Table 5: Percentages of ‘Northern People’, ‘Southern People’, and Jiangsu-Zhejiang people of all successful candidates every decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>‘Southern Paper’ Regions</th>
<th>Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces</th>
<th>‘North Paper’ Regions and Fengtian and Jilin Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>45.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
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<td>45.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44.0%</td>
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<td>43.8%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Northern People</td>
<td>Southern People</td>
<td>Jiangsu-Zhejiang People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1821</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
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<td>1831</td>
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<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>53.6%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1851</td>
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<tr>
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<td>60.0%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
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<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-11</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 8: Percentages of ‘Northern People’, ‘Southern People’, and Jiangsu-Zhejiang people of all successful candidates every decade

Over the cooperative mood, however, subtle tensions can also be observed. For example, none of the officials appointed as Governor of Jiangsu Province, the most significant post in the Jiangnan region, managed to remain in the position for more than two years between 1684
and 1692, despite the central government’s special care in selecting personnel.\textsuperscript{286} Also, the emperor’s explicitly negative remarks against southern Han Chinese, often to be found in his private and Manchu correspondence, contrast with the impartial image of the emperor\textsuperscript{287} in official documents such as \textit{Shilu} or \textit{Qijuzhu}.

(1) Rescript to the memorial sent on the thirteenth of November 1702 (KX41/9/24) by Asan, the Governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui Provinces: ‘Do you try to gain the Han people’s trust? Do you think it is possible to win their confidence? Of course, not! It is likely that you do not know what everyone knows.’\textsuperscript{288}

(2) Rescript to the memorial sent on the nineteenth of March 1710 (KX49/2/20) by Gali, the Governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui Provinces: ‘Local officials and local people in Jiangnan Province are so cunning that you will easily fall for their tricks if you lower your guard for a second.’\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{286} Guy, \textit{Qing Governors and Their Provinces}, 240-44. Yu Fuhai, ‘Kangxi chao zhong wanqi Jiangnan zhengce chutan’, 111. According to Yu Fuhai, one of the crucial reasons Song Luo was able to serve as Jiangsu Governor for an exceptional thirteen years was Song’s respect towards the Jiangnan elite and their culture. Yu adds that after Song’s governorship, the gap between the Qing central government and Jiangnan elites widened once again.

\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Shilu} and \textit{Qijuzhu} describe the Kangxi emperor as an impartial monarch who hated ethnic nepotism and a pragmatist who put the right person in the right position regardless of their ethnic background. For example, see QJZ-KX-1, KX53/7/20[jiwei], 2104, ‘治天下當寬裕仁慈，加惠以因人性，不可拂逆。即如滿洲、蒙古各方之人，飲食日用，其性各殊，必欲一之，則亂，亦斷不可行也 … 爾曾居蒙古地方一年，以漢人之道可治蒙古否？… 拂人之性，使之更改，斷不可行。譬如 陝西、江南百姓，令其易地而居，則不但彼處田土此不能耕，此處機器彼不能用，即水土亦多不服。惟天賦忠孝之性，無有異同，雖 窮荒僻壞，亦有至忠至孝者。'; QJZ-KX-2, vol. 7, KX42/12/19[gengyin], 176, ‘近來督撫，漢人則專庇漢官，旗人則專庇旗員，此種情弊，皆偏執己私。為督撫大僚，不分滿漢，秉公辦事，方得大吏之體。’

\textsuperscript{288} KXMZZ, no. 495, 275.

\textsuperscript{289} KXMZZ, no. 1548, 664.
(3) Rescript to the memorial sent on the nineteenth of July 1711 (KX50/6/4) by Gali, the Governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui Provinces: ‘Southern Han Chinese are sneaky!’\textsuperscript{290}

(4) Rescript to the memorial sent on sixth of July 1715 (KX54/6/6) by Hešeo, Governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui Provinces: ‘You are a Manchu man! I am afraid if you trust Han Chinese people’s hearsay.’\textsuperscript{291}

Even in \textit{Shilu} or \textit{Qijuzhu}, however, the emperor’s biases against Han Chinese are sometimes indirectly exposed:

(a) A Han Chinese easily harbours a grudge. If he himself cannot satisfy the grudge, he will do so through his students or friends. Thus, [the retaliation] does not stop even after decades. I still remember that people of Shandong, Zhili, and Jiangnan carry out reprisals habitually.\textsuperscript{292}

(b) I have a lot of experience of military affairs and sometimes even have myself led a large army. [From my experience], the Green Standard Army are far below the level of Manchu or Mongol [soldiers] … I cannot trust the Green Standard Army even when they are numerous. When I saw Zhao Hongcan, the predecessor Governor-general, [he] said that ‘The Green Standard are useless because they only observe the situation but do not advance in the face of the enemy.’ Indeed, it is the case with the Han Chinese nature. It is written in our \textit{Shilu} that during the Rebellion by Wu Sangui, Cao Shenji 曹申吉 became the Great Secretary under Wu and even wrote a eulogy

\textsuperscript{290} KXMZZ, no. 1750, 731.
\textsuperscript{291} KXMZZ, no. 2611, 1018.
\textsuperscript{292} QJZ-KX-1, KX54/4/25[gengyin], 2167.
for [him] although Cao as a jinshi degree-holder had been promoted from a Hanlin Bachelor to an Academician and was appointed as Governor of Guizhou Province.293

Towards the end of the Kangxi era, and in the face of the war with Tsewang Rabdan in particular, we can sense the emperor’s doubts about his Han constituents more clearly. In early December 1716 (KX55/10/26), for example, the emperor issued an edict to his Grand Secretaries and Nine Chief Ministers:

(Edict I)
To Grand Secretaries and Nine Chief Ministers: (II-1) Since every serious thing always starts from a trivial thing, you should not treat lightly any seemingly trivial thing, and [needless to say] if the problem is serious, you should pay more attention on it. If you have been doing well and kept yourself incorruptible at the office, that is [in a sense] merely for yourself. For more important issues, such as the issue involving the border, you have not always been as considerate or far-sighted [as expected]. (I-2) Maritime defence, for example, is currently [one of] the most important issues, (I-3) and thus, I have always kept alert to ensure my knowledge of it is up to date. Hence, the details I know regarding that issue may be more than those known to Governors-General, Provincial Governors, Provincial Military Commanders, or Regional Commanders. (I-4) Once, when I stopped by Suzhou and visited a shipyard there, I asked [the local people about the shipyard]. (I-5) Then, they all gave me the same answer: ‘Although every year as many as 1,000 [ships] go out to sea for trade, (I-6) only around 50% or 60% percent of them return. (I-7) The rest are sold abroad, and [the merchants who went out] come back with silver instead.’ (I-8) Considering that even the government requires a prohibitive amount of money to build just several scores of sea ships, I wondered how private

293 QIZ-KX-1, KX56/9/20[xinwei], 2433.
individuals could build so many ships. (I-9) Someone points out that it is for profit that merchants have secretly been selling ships, because the keel of a sea ship should be made of ironwood (*tieli* 鐵梨) and spiny bamboo (*le*) 竹, which grow only in Guangdong. (I-10) When the merchants are interrogated, they all lie that their ships were broken up by violent storms. Such evils should quickly be stopped. (I-11) Luzon and Batavia have been inhabited by Han people (*Hanren* 漢人) since the Ming period. Those places now become a hotbed of pirates. (I-12) Even if our patrolling soldiers happen to encounter four or five pirate ships, they cannot catch these pirate ships. That is because our ships are fewer than theirs and [our] helmsmen are reluctant to do their best to chase the pirate ships. Thus, our soldiers always try in vain to pursue the pirate ships. How can they root out pirates? (I-13) Zhang Boxing 張伯行 also once reported that much rice from Jiangsu and Zhejiang was being sold abroad. (I-14) Although such a report is not one hundred percent believable, a preventive action should be needed. (I-15) When one goes abroad for trade, the distance is normally around seven to eight *gengs* 更 and is no farther than twenty *gengs*. (I-16) Hence, the amount of rice to be loaded on the ship should be limited depending on the distance. (I-17) [Chinese ships] for trade may only travel to the East Ocean (*Dongyang* 東洋) and should not be allowed to go to the South Ocean (*Nanyang* 南洋). (I-18) However, incoming foreign ships such as Dutch (*Hongmao* 紅毛) vessels will still be allowed. (I-19) Since every Chinese ship travelling to the South Ocean must pass through Haitan 海壇, if you maintain a vigil, no one will be able to reach the South Ocean unless they can fly. (I-20) Using casemates along the coast will be useful for maritime defence, and the Ming Dynasty also used them. You should order local officials to build casemates [along the coast]. (I-21) Once, while transporting rice from Fujian to Guangdong, [we] needed three hundred to four hundred private ships, and each ship was boarded by thirty to forty people. Like this, [ships going out to sea] means that thousands of people are gathering on the sea, and therefore, special attention is needed. (I-22) You
should also take preventative actions for the people in Taiwan, who have been on visiting terms with the people in Luzon. (I-23) Seek advice from people in Beijing who came from coastal regions, such as Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangnan, or Zhejiang. (I-24) I have summoned Guan Yuanzhong 管源忠, the General of Guangzhou, Manbao 滿保, the Governor-General of Zhejiang-Fujian, and Yang Lin 楊林, the Governor-General of Guangdong-Guangxi. I will talk with them. (I-25) I am afraid that someday in the distant future, China may go through difficulties due to countries outside China (haiwai 海外), like the Xiyang [country]. Also, Han Chinese people are not as like-minded as hundreds of thousands of Manchus and Mongols are all like-minded294. Although it has already been many years since I ascended the throne, I have always felt it difficult to deal with Han Chinese people because they cannot be like-minded295. (I-26) You should not lower your guard although you have been in a long peaceful period. (I-27) Once Guan Yuanzhong and others reach Beijing, consult them and report to me about the result.296

This imperial edict (hereafter Edict I) can be summarised as follows: ‘

Since it is feared that the people of China proper smuggle out ships or rice and are in collusion with maritime forces, the Qing state should focus on maritime defence by a series of measures, such as prohibiting a voyage to the South Ocean, strengthening control of Haitan, repairing or building casemates along the coast, and checking the entry and exit of people in Taiwan.

And this edict has thus been read by many scholars as the most important historical account regarding ‘the second embargo’ during the Qing period.

294 ‘又漢人心不齊 如滿洲蒙古數十萬人皆一心’
295 ‘每以漢人為難治以其不能一心之故’
296 QSL-KX55/10/26[renzi]
However, Edict I needs to be examined from a different perspective, for example, in terms of the Kangxi emperor’s deed-rooted bias against the southern Han Chinese. Primarily, the edict suspects the Suzhou shipyard (chuanchang 船廠) of being behind the ship smuggling (I-4, 5, 6, and 7). Then, by pointing out that the timber for the core structure of a ship comes only from Guangdong, the edict indicates the close involvement of Guangdong province in this issue (I-9). Moreover, the edict spotlights the dangerous linkage between Han insiders’ treasonable activities, such as ship smuggling, and Han maritime forces outside the Qing, who were related to the Great Ming for certain reasons (I-11). Traitors to the Qing Empire were also to be found the Green Standard Army, all of whom were Han Chinese (I-12). At the same time, the emperor assumes there is a kind of mastermind with considerable funding power behind the ship smuggling (I-8) and received a report from officials such as Zhang Boxing that large quantities of rice had been smuggled out of the empire (I-13). The suspicion reaches its peak when the emperor complains that only his Han constituents cannot be like-minded in the empire (I-25).297

Reading this edict, Yanagisawa Akira, however, lays less emphasis on the gravity of the emperor’s perspective of the Han Chinese. Emphasising their interconnectedness, he argues that the primary cause of the second embargo was the Kangxi emperor’s personal experience-based pre-emptive action to forestall any possible unrest or threats from the south-eastern frontier (Chinese world) before his imminent battle on the north-western frontier (non-Chinese

297 Gang Zhao and Liu Xufeng also explained the second embargo by linking it with Qing policies towards the Han Chinese and based their argument on Edict I. See Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, 154-61; Liu Xufeng, ‘Shindai zenki no Fukken shōnin’, 152. Liu especially highlights the Japanese government’s Shōtoku shinrei 正德新例 (KX54) as a background against which the Qing ruler tried to forestall predictable Chinese merchants’ influx into the South Ocean.
Although I generally agree with his balanced interpretation, his underestimation of the gravity of the emperor’s doubt and anxiety about the Han world leaves room to be complemented.

In fact, at the core of his argument lies another edict (hereinafter Edict II). According to Yanagisawa, Edict II as recorded in Qijuzhu is the original and verbal version of Edict I and thus retains the emperor’s intention more accurately.

(Edict II)

After the bu and yuan officials’ reporting time, [the emperor] called the Grand Secretaries, Academicians, Nine Chief Ministers, Supervising Secretaries, and Investigating Censors and spoke to them as follows: ‘(II-1) You are my select officials, and the Supervising Secretaries and Investigating Censors [in particular] are ‘ears and eyes officials’ (er mu zhi guan 耳目之官). [Thus,] for you, it is not enough merely to fulfil your official obligations by being incorruptible and competent. You should pay more attention if the affair is seminal at the empire level. (II-2) Currently, too many high officials are old and thus overly cautious in their work. How can they be far-sighted enough to think of empire-level seminal things? (II-3) You should not treat anything lightly. Often, seemingly a trivial thing leads to a severe incident. I will now tell you clearly what I have thought. (II-4) Currently, maritime defence is an urgently important issue. (II-5) Zhang Boxing has reported that much rice from China proper had been being sold abroad. (II-6) I have kept my eye on the destination to which this rice is sold, and on the sailors. (II-7) Luzon and Batavia are anchorage ports for Hongmao guo 紅毛國 and Xiyang, respectively. These ports harbour enormous numbers of enemies (zeidao). (II-8) Wishing to make a profit, people from China proper often go abroad with rice and sell it [and even sell] their ships.

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298 Yanagisawa Akira, ‘Kōki 56 nen no Nanyō kaikin’, 75-82.
299 QIJ-KX-1, KX55/10/25[xinhai], 2324-25.
Some of them even remain there. (II-9) At a shipyard(s) in Suzhou, I saw [people] make ships diligently every year. (II-10) When [the government] builds just a few vessels for war, tens of thousands of money is needed. Where do the merchants get such colossal funds to build ships so often? You may not know of [this issue] because local officials have never paid attention [to it and thus have never reported it to you]. (II-11) In the past, people used ganzeng 趕缯, niaochuan 鳥船, or liju 犁艍, but currently, people use shachuan 沙船. To travel abroad by shachuan, they have to build its bottom out of the wood used to make the keel. However, outside China, it is hard to find proper wood for the mast and the keel. Hence, people probably rely on our (woguo 我國) merchants. (II-12) Of all the ships that travel abroad, merely 40% return, but 60% remain there. (II-13) When [officials] investigate the number of ships, [sailors] lie that ships were wrecked and sunk by the wind. (II-14) There are few people on board, and the sailing distance is only around seven to eight geng. The amount of rice needed for the journey should be small. Thus, the large amounts of rice loaded on the ship is for trade there. (II-15) Chinese merchant ships (neidi shangchuan 内地商船) are allowed to go to the East Ocean (Dongyang) but are not allowed to go to the South Ocean (Nanyang). (II-16) [For Chinese ships traveling to the South Ocean,] we can block these at Haitan or Nan’ao 南嶼. (II-17) [Incoming] foreign vessels are allowed to come freely. (II-18) In this regard, I have already ordered the Governor-General of Zhejiang-Fujian and the Military Commander of Guangdong to come, and I will talk with them. (II-19) In every matter, you should think deeply and far-sightedly. Now we are moving the army to the northern frontier. In such an urgent situation, based on the false rumour [that we are off guard due to the fight on the northern frontier], pirates [on the southern frontier] may behave rashly. When the Three Feudatories rebels occupied the seven provinces, I was able to wipe out the rebels because I was young and [thus] decisive in every matter. But now I am so old and [therefore] careful in every issue that I try to decide the surest choice. [In the past,] since
Tsewang Rabdan’s [nation] was a tiny one (jixiao zhi guo 極小之國) and [his power] was insignificant, then I [did not suppress him but] merely appeased him despite an old official’s memorial to suppress him as well while suppressing Galdan. Although I then decided to subdue him, still [as before], just ten thousand soldiers are sufficient to do so. However, since even [high officials like] Liu Yinshu 劉蔭樞, based on a false rumour, think of this military campaign as something grave, how much more should faraway [pirates] misjudge the situation? (II-20) If we build casemates at the possible anchorages, ships will not come near the coast. Since the remains of past casemates should be present, ask Fujian or Guangdong officials or xiansan 閑散 in detail about arranging, managing and patrolling the casemates [along the shore]. (II-21) You now recommend Han Chinese candidates for the position of Governor of Guangdong, but official post(s) for seminal coastal areas are not open to Han Chinese people, only to Manchu people. (II-22) (It is because) [officials in these posts] are required to go out to battle very swiftly if there are military affairs. Manchu people carry their food and are mobile, but Chinese people cannot survive if they do not have two meals a day.’ The emperor soon turned his eyes to Han officials and added, ‘Can any of you lead the army?’ The Han officials said, ‘No, Your Majesty’. (II-23) The emperor continued, saying, ‘There are too many who are [in league with the enemy] through the sea. Although that does not matter now, China could suffer damage because of this someday in the distant future. (II-25) Foreigners are so like-minded with each other that their like-mindedness cannot be comparable to Chinese people’s like-mindedness. (II-26) You Han people are always double-minded and thus indeed not like-minded.'
Indeed, the designations in Edict I such as ‘Ming’ and ‘Hanren’, which are directly linked to the Han ethnicity or the previous dynasty, are differently rendered in more general terms such as ‘haizei 海賊’ or ‘daozei 盜賊’ in Edict II. Similarly, Edict II does not include the phrase in Edict I which contains an ethnic designation, ‘I have always felt it difficult to deal with Han Chinese people because they are not like-minded’.

However, the fact that Edict II is more original than Edict I does not necessarily mean that Edict I should be excluded. Indeed, when the emperor referred to Edict I on the 18th and 22nd days of the 12th month in the Kangxi 55th year, he only pointed out the omission by saying ‘There are some omitted or rough parts’ and ‘Why is Nan’ao omitted?’ but did not raise any questions regarding the gist of the edict. Rather, the edict (hereafter Edict III) quoted in the Ministry of War’s memorial (KX56/1/24), which reflected the modifications regarding punishment, and the omissions the emperor pointed out on the 18th and 22nd days of the 12th month of the Kangxi 55th year, was based on Edict I, not Edict II. (III-1), (III-2), (III-3), (III-4), (III-5), (III-6), (III-7), (III-8), and (III-9) in Edict III correspond to (I-4~I-11), (I-13), (I-16), (I-17~I-18), (I-19), (I-20), (I-21~I-22), (I-23), and (I-26) in Edict I, respectively.

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304 In this edict is added penalty clauses and mentions of ‘Nan’ao’. (Zhongguo kexue yuan, Ming Qing shiliao, dingbian, vol. 8, 774a-775b, ‘將軍管源忠等 … 雖稱將違禁行走之人, 從重治罪, 其作何治罪之處, 並未議及。今將治罪款項定議: 前後, 如有打造海船之人, 事圖厚利, 如所造船隻賣與外國者, 查出, 將造船之人與賣船之人, 即行立斬 …’)

305 QJZ-KX-1, KX55/12/18, 2338, ‘朕為此事, 曾下漢旨, 漢大臣懶惰不寫, 止滿字翻漢文, 所以遺漏之處甚多, 所議亦不詳細。’; KX55/12/22, 2340, ‘前因防海事, 朕所下之旨內, 海壇、南㠗二處其屬緊要之語, 寫旨時, 為何將南㠗遺漏, 至於船米賣與外國, 所去之人, 亦存留彼處, 地方官員失於覺察等款, 但議從重治罪, 並未定以何罪 … 爾等將此疏改正呈覽。’

306 Zhongguo kexue yuan, Ming Qing shiliao, dingbian, vol. 8, 774a-775b, ‘康熙五十六年正月內, 兵部會同九卿議得 … 今又聖諭: (III-1) 蘇州船廠, 每年造船, 多至千餘, 出洋貿易, 其回來者, 不過十之五六, 其餘皆賣在海外, 貴銀而歸。海船桅木龍骨, 皆中國所產, 海外無此大木, 故商人射利偷賣。即加查訊, 彼但捏稱遭風打壞, 海外如, 吕宋、啓臘吧等口岸, 多聚漢人, 此即海賊之根。 (III-2) 如張伯行啓奏, “江浙間米, 俱出海口去賣” 等語。 (III-3) 貿易人等, 所帶米糧, 酌量足敷口食, 不應太
Equally, Edict II reveals the emperor’s suspicions of the Han Chinese as clearly as Edict I. Although the designations in Edict I such as ‘Ming’ or ‘Hanren’, which are reminiscent of Ming loyalists (yimin 遺民), are rendered in a more general terms such as ‘haizei’ or ‘daozei’ in Edict II (II-7), it is still no major feat for readers to link these two general terms with the southern Han Chinese, because the phrase, ‘Wishing to make a profit, people from China proper often go abroad with rice and sell it [and even sell] their ships’ (II-8) indicates that the haizei or daozei were closely connected with the people of China proper, and because the phrase is followed by the emperor’s memories of his Southern Tours (II-9). The suspicion, which the emperor harboured at the Suzhou shipyard, that certain masterminds were financing these treasonous activities (II-10), also has something to do with the local elite when we consider a phrase in the memorial by the Guangdong General, the Governor-general of Fujian-Zhejiang Provinces, and the Governor-general of Guangdong-Guangxi Provinces, ‘To build a ship requires more than a thousand or thousands of money, and the shipowners are mostly retired officials, degree-holders, or rich people (shen jin fuhu 紳衿富戶) who operate the ships by employing others’.  

By looking at the phrases, ‘however, incoming foreign ships such as Dutch (Hongmao 紅毛) vessels will still be allowed’ (I-18) in Edict I and ‘[Incoming] foreign vessels are allowed to come freely’ (II-17) in Edict II, we also sense that the emphasis in both edicts is the same, namely not on foreign traders, but on the people of China proper. In fact, the target of Edict II is more clearly revealed due to the absence of any explicit mention of

多海中. (III-4) 東洋, 可往貿易, 若南洋, 商船不可令往, 如紅毛等國之船, 使其自來耳. (III-5) 若出南洋, 必從南澳, 海壇鎮過, 此處截住不放, 豈能便過. (III-6) 又, 沿海礮台, 足資防守, 自明季即有, 應令各地方設立. (III-7) 往年, 差往福建運米廣東, 所僱民船三四百隻, 合計便數千人, 此數千人聚集海上, 須為長久之策, 即臺灣之人, 爾等可加細問. (III-9) 今, 國家承平日久, 須要案不忘危.'

Zhongguo kexue yuan, Ming Qing shiliao, dingbian, vol. 8, 774b, ‘打造洋船, 每隻需用數千金或千餘金, 其船主多係紳衿富戶, 租人駕駛’.
foreign threats such as in the phrase (I-25) in Edict I. In addition, although the phrase, ‘I have always felt it difficult to deal with Han Chinese people because they cannot be like-minded’ (I-25) that explicitly illustrates the emperor’s concerns about the Han people does not appear in Edict II, the phrase by and large corresponds to ‘You now recommend Han Chinese candidates for the position of Governor of Guangdong, but official post(s) for seminal coastal areas are not open to Han Chinese people, only to Manchu people’ (II-21) 308 and ‘You Han people are always double-minded and thus indeed not like-minded’ (II-25) in Edict II. 309

Fundamentally speaking, the emperor’s retrospection about the Three Feudatories Rebellion and his assumptions over the hypothetical situation in which the Three Feudatories Rebellion and Galdan’s threat had been concurrent (II-19)—which led him to check the security of the southeast frontier before waging a war on the northwest frontier—, in fact, originated from none other than the southern Han population. Keum-sung Oh, for example, analyses the Qing state’s policies towards the local elite from the Shunzhi Reign to the early Kangxi Reign and reaches an interesting conclusion that the early Kangxi government’s series

308 One can imagine the awkwardness when the emperor said, ‘It is because [officials in these posts] are required to go out to battle very swiftly if there are military affairs. Manchu people carry their food and are mobile, but Chinese people cannot survive if they do not have two meals a day’ as the rationale for his exclusion of Han Chinese from the candidacy for the position of Guangdong Governor and, turning to his Han officials, asked the sudden question, ‘Can any of you lead the army?’ It seems that he equivocated and justified what he had just said since it could sound somewhat discriminatory to the Han officials. For the appointment of the Guangdong Governor, see Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 308-14. According to Guy, before the 1740s, when a Manchu Governor was rare, the first Manchu Governor for the southern provinces was appointed to Guangdong, after which Qing emperors appointed personal choices to the post. This appointment pattern seems to echo Qing rulers’ memories about relations between the regional Han elites and certain independent Han forces in the past—for example, the last Ming pretender’s and Shang Kexi’s governments.

309 The direct target of the emperor’s criticism seems to have been a group of Han officials, including Liu Yinshu 劉蔭樞 (1637-1723), the Governor of Guizhou, all of whom had a lukewarm attitude towards the campaign against Tsewang Rabdan. ‘Liu Yinqu’ in Perdue’s book should be corrected to read ‘Liu Yinshu’. (Perdue, China Marches West, 2005, 230-31).
of super hard-line measures against both the Jiangnan elite and the maritime forces were closely related to the Qing state’s experience in 1659 (SZ16) of the alliance between ‘the Han insiders’, i.e., the southern elites, and ‘the Han outsiders’, i.e., the maritime Zheng regime. According to Oh, it was to forestall any crisis similar to the incident in 1659, or in other words, to block Han forces both within and without, that in the early 1660s the Kangxi government carried out the Maritime Resistance Case, the Temple Lament Case, and the Statement of Account Case against the Jiangnan elite and, at the same time, the Coastal Evacuation (or Coastal Removal) Policy against the Zheng regime; and that, in addition, in the early 1670s following the outbreak of the Three Feudatory Rebellion, the government suddenly adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Jiangnan elite. In this regard, ‘the memory of the Three Feudatory Rebellion’, from the Kangxi emperor’s perspective, was inseparable from his ‘worry about possible treasonous alliances between Han forces both within and outside of the empire’ (tonghai 通海). Indeed, the Qing state’s major concern regarding Jiangnan from the Shunzhi Reign until the first half of the Kangxi Reign focused on anti-Manchu armed attacks by sea or waterway, as indicated by its ardent efforts to position xun 汛, lowest-level Green Standard Army guard posts, along the coast and around Lake Tai (Taihu 太湖).

In fact, the concern over ‘tonghai’ (being connected to the sea) was not influential merely during the Shunzhi and early Kangxi Reigns but lingered in the memories of both the Kangxi emperor and Jiangnan officialdom for the entire duration of the Kangxi Reign, including the period when the 1716 edict above was issued. For example, in a well-known mutual

310 Oh Keum-sung, Guofa yu shehui guanxing, 172-84.
impeachment case (hucan an 互參案) between Zhang Boxing, the Governor of Jiangsu Province, and Gali, the Governor-general of Jiangsu-Jiangxi-Anhui Provinces, the first allegation that Gali raised against Zhang was Zhang’s reluctance to chase ‘maritime enemies’ (haizei). 312 Although Gali’s accusation was likely simply retaliation against Zhang’s impeachment of him in his report on the 1711 examination fraud (1711.10.20)313—indeed the Ministry of Personnel concluded as such314—, Gali’s suspicions about Zhang’s connections with maritime enemies had in fact already been reported in a Manchu memorial to the emperor on the fourteenth of February 1711, much earlier than the 1711 examination.315 Independently of the mutual impeachment case, a charge of ‘tonghai’ against a Han Governor who cozied up to the Jiangnan elite had already been secretly reported to the throne by the Manchu Governor-general, and the emperor bore this in mind. This arouses a sense of déjà vu—in the 1650s, a bannerman official named Zhu Guozhi reported his suspicions of ‘tonghai’ amidst the Jiangnan elite, which led to a clash between the Qing centre and the Jiangnan elite.316 Moreover, Zhang, the victim of suspected ‘tonghai’, even used the same charge in his impeachment in July 1714 (KX53/5/24) against Mou Qinyuan 牟欽元, the Provincial Administration Commissioner. Although the Kangxi emperor officially criticised Zhang’s accusation as immoderate, he

314 The Kangxi emperor also noted that Gali had already reported about Zhang Boxing’s misdeeds. See QSL-KX51/10/5[yimao], ‘吏部議覆 … 至噶禮所參張伯行各款，既經穆和倫等審明，俱係從前舊案，不於彼時參奏，亦應議處 … 得旨 … 且噶禮屢次具摺參張伯行，朕以張伯行操守為天下第一，斷不可參，手批不准，諭旨現在噶禮處。’
315 KXMZZ, no. 1673, 703.
316 Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 251.
unofficially ordered Suzhou Textile Commissioner Li Xu 李煦 and Manchu Governor-general Hešeo to investigate the accusation and, at the same time, the public sentiment on the issue in Jiangnan; and afterwards, the emperor summoned Zhang to Beijing to ask in person about the accusation in detail.317

In this regard, ‘the memory of the Three Feudatories Rebellion’, which was recalled in the face of the war against Tsewang Rabdan, was in fact inseparable from ‘the memory of the treacherous Han people’. Thus, it is no coincidence that at each moment of his preparations for war with Tsewang Rabdan, the aged emperor recollected each moment of the war with Galdan,318 and Edict II included the terms ‘tonghai 通海’, ‘yanhai 沿海’, ‘Hanren 漢人’, and ‘Suzhou 蘇州’, the lexicon that the Kangxi ruler had earlier employed repeatedly during his series of hard-line measures against both the Jiangnan elite and the maritime forces in the past. Although the emperor was not likely to take Zhang Boxing’s report about rice smuggling seriously (I-13, I-14, II-5), Joseph Anne Marie de Moyriac de Mailla, SJ (Feng Bingzheng 馮秉正, 1669-1748)’s acute testimony in his letter (1717.6.5) emphasised Zhang’s report as one of the most important motives for the ‘second embargo’ and linked it to ‘the Chinese in Batavia’ (les Chinois qui demeurent à Batavia).319

317 Gugong bowuyuan Qing dang’an bu, Li Xu zouzhe, no. 208(KX53/6/9), 158-59; KXMZZ, no. 2549(KX54/2/22), 998. During the investigation of the 1711 examination, the emperor exhibited a very keen concern for Jiangnan public opinion. For example, see Gugong bowuyuan Qing dang’an bu, Li Xu zouzhe, no. 131(KX51/2/19), 104; no. 137(KX51/4/22), 109; Inami Ryoichi, ‘Kōki shinbō Kōnan kajō an’, 226-27.
318 Perdue, China Marches West, 229-30.
Chapter VI: The Han Elite and the Rites

Controversy

The Hans’ Wrath and the Manchus’ Worries

In the earlier chapters, we have already seen how de Tournon’s behaviour aggravated public sentiment in Beijing. This deteriorating sentiment can be sensed in particular from the incident in March of 1706 in which de Tournon trampled underfoot a petition submitted by certain Christian members of the Han elite; the resulting disturbances and the elite’s attempt to report de Tournon to the Ministry of Rites were barely dissuaded. Toward the end of July, by ‘pummelling’ a respected juren degree-holder with his fists, de Tournon once again caused widespread anger among the Han elite.¹ These two incidents were more than grave, not only because they were affront to the representatives of Beijing’s Christian community, but also a serious challenge to the Han elite’s prestige, which was sacrosanct in Chinese society. In such incidents, not only the assailant but the victim in particular was subject to severe reprimand from Chinese society at large, because, before aliens, they had abandoned the time-honoured dignity of the Confucian elite class that even the emperor could not disregard. Thus, after those incidents, the atmosphere in Beijing society became prominently anti-Christian, and overt denunciation of or derision at the Xiyang community and Christianity by officials, monks, and commoners became increasingly noticeable.²

¹ AP I, 554-61.
² AP II, 88-89, 229-30.
Anti-Christian sentiment, however, cannot be easily explained simply by de Tournon’s inappropriate behaviour, but rather, it is likely that volatile, hostile sentiments of this kind had lingered in Chinese society for some time. For example, in Fuzhou, in Fujian Province, which became an epicentre of the Rites Controversy due to Maigrot’s mandate, local people attacked Emeric de Chavagnac, SJ (Sha Shouxin 沙守信, 1670-1717) and his church in mid-1706 after they had seen de Chavagnac conversing with a local official. It was because the local people suspected that a recent tax increase by the official had been instigated by Chavagnac.³ In Zhejiang Province, where the power of the local elite was described as particularly strong,⁴ the local population attacked the Hangzhou church and Christians in 1671, although a merely two years previously, the emperor had demonstrated his great favour to Christianity in the area by meeting Prospero Intorcetta (Yin Duoze 殷鐸澤, 1625-1698) in person and visiting Intorcetta’s church in Hangzhou. In 1706, locals in Xiaoshan 蕭山 attacked the church when Mezzafalce, the Vicar Apostolic of Zhejiang, was away, summoned to Beijing. During his stay in the area, he had behaved so proudly⁵ that he even rejected seeing the Governor of Zhejiang Province, simply because the Governor did not open the main door and had Mezzafalce enter through another door with two Pro vincial Commissioners (buzhengshi and anchashi).⁶

The touchpaper of this volatile anti-Christian atmosphere, once lit by the Rites Controversy, led to numerous anti-Christian incidents in China proper after Appiani’s arrest in Yangzhou in late 1706 and the enforcement of the permit policy in Sichuan and Guangdong Provinces, and in particular once Chinese people clearly sensed a rift in the relationship

³ AP I, 334-35.
⁵ His proud behaviour was likely related to his audience with the emperor during the fifth imperial Southern Tour (XC, 192).
between the emperor and the Xiyang community through his imperial edict on the tenth of April 1707, in which the emperor demonstrated his full determination to defend Chinese culture, even to the extent of mentioning the death penalty for Xiyang individuals and a war against the Xiyang world. In Hangzhou, for example, immediately after hearing about the proclamation of the tenth of April edict and the expulsion of Herve and San Giorgio, the local population and officials began to attack Christians and Xiyang people in the area. Some locals even spread false rumours that local missionaries such as Bartolomeo Carvalho, François Montigny, Juan de Astudillo, and Tomás Cróquer had fled the region, which led the Qing officials to launch a countrywide manhunt. The individuals who had supported Zhang Penghe in the anti-Christian incident of 1691 also did not fail to seize this golden opportunity to attack Christians. Soon after, this persecution spread to other regions in Zhejiang Province, including Quzhou 衢州, Yanzhou 嚴州, Jinhua 金華, Lanxi 蘭溪, Jiaxing 嘉興, and Xiaoshan. Yamen labourers performed ardent searches of local churches and Christians’ houses for Xiyang missionaries, and as they did so, sealed off the churches, destroyed Christian items, and arrested and punished members of the Christian community.

Similar events occurred in other regions. For example, in all eight prefectures of Fujian Province, ‘local ruffians’ (guanggun 光棍) accompanied by yamen labourers attacked Christians and either closed down churches or changed them into public spaces. In Linqing 臨清, in Shandong Province, as soon as the Kangxi emperor departed after a short stay on his

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7 AP II, 577-78, 593-94.
8 Zhang Xingyao and others’ letter to missionaries (1707.5), ARSI Jap. Sin. 150: Ritus Sinici Liturgica 1622-1708, fol. 467b-468a (quoted from Han Qi, ‘Zhang Xingyao yu Qinming chuanjiao yueshu, 425-26); AP II, 626-27, 672.
way back to Beijing, locals went on the rampage in the church and tried to expel all Xiyang people from the locality. This disturbance was contained only after local officials arrived at the scene.\(^9\) In Hanzhong 漢中, in Shaanxi Province, when Gabriel Baborier SJ (Bu Najue 卜納爵, 1663-1727) returned to his church after receiving his permit to find that the church had been sealed off by the County Magistrate, and local scholars attempted to violently prevent him from entering the city.\(^10\) In Zhaoqing, in Guangdong Province, a local graduate who had harboured long-term, extreme hatred for the church, mustered local public opinion and petitioned a local official to pull down the church. In response to this request, the local official burnt the permits and knocked over the church’s altar and images.\(^11\) In Sichuan Province, the Governor attempted to get remove the church in the area.\(^12\)

With regard to the anti-Christian incidents following the imperial edict on the tenth of April, Stumpf pays attention to anti-Christian sentiment among officials, elites, and commoners, explaining them as follow:

(1) … the mandarins, either indulging their own ill feeling or conniving with the insolence of the people, were everywhere committing all kinds of outrages against the Christians and their churches, and permitting such acts by others (emphasis mine).\(^13\)

(2) As soon as the decree of the Emperor against the Fathers Hervé, San Giorgio, etc. had been promulgated in Nanjing, the gentiles began to take up arms against the flock of Christ and its pastors or suffragan pastors. Their boldness increased when they saw that many had already been banished from the Emperor’s presence in Hangzhou …

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9 AP II, 546.
10 AP II, 577, 677.
11 AP II, 747-49.
12 AP II, 513-14.
13 AP II, 578.
there began to appear throughout China orders both of mandarins and their lackeys, seeking out the missionaries in order to seize them, the ungodly populace took it that they had permission to **vomit out the dark hatred that for a long time they had held in their hearts**, and they began to do so. It was not only the general populace who did this, but also, and above all, the scholars, who sharpened their pens and took up bricks and stones against the followers of Christ and their churches (emphasis mine).  

Whose was the hatred that Stumpf witnessed, and against whom was it directed? Below, we will first examine several witnesses’ similar testimonies that echo Stumpf’s and will then attempt to verify them by considering several historical factors from the late Ming to the mid-Qing period, including the missionary strategic turn on the Christian side, the intellectual trend in Han elite society, and the Qing emperorship’s characteristics. Finally, but most importantly, we will examine how anti-Xiyang sentiments—or more precisely, anti-heterodox hatred—were transformed into anti-Manchuism. To address the latter aim, this chapter will analyse the Han elite’s attitude towards Tibetan Buddhism for the following reason: compared to Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism, which also had foreign origins, was more ‘marginalised’ in Han Chinese society—and thus could have elicited greater criticism on the part of the Han elite—but at the same time, the number of Tibetan Buddhist professional clerics and believers was

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14 AP II, 593-94.
15 For the Kangxi emperor’s concern about the Han elite during the same period, see Kang, ‘Manjuhwangje, Sŏyangin kŭrigo Hanin’, passim.
16 Until the early twentieth century, the difference between Tibetan Buddhism and ‘the Chinese tradition of Buddhism’ (which was mainly the Mahayana tradition adopted during the Han period and called ‘Hanchuan fojiao 漢傳佛教’ in modern Chinese) had been clear, and Chinese people living in China Proper, even including some Buddhists, had held negative perceptions of Tibetan Buddhism. See Tuttle, *Tibetan Buddhists*, 25-28, 68-72. This is likely because Tibetan Buddhism had not exerted Ricci-style efforts to accommodate the Han Chinese intellectual landscape and moreover, the Han elite remembered the Yuan regime’s attempt to make Tibetan Buddhism an alternative or competing ideology to Confucianism. For example, see Otosaka Tomoko, ‘Genshō ni okeru Chibetto bukkyō’, 301-13; Otosaka Tomoko, “Gen si tenka, hanmō o sö” no genzō”, 39-44.
incomparably high—and thus the issue of Tibetan Buddhism was more visible to the Han elite, and the Han elite’s thoughts on it are thus relatively ubiquitous in the existing historical materials; therefore, to borrow a metaphor from chemical kinetics, Tibetan Buddhism may be considered ‘a reactant with a high reaction rate’ that allows us to observe the Han elite’s anti-heterodox, anti-alien reactions more clearly and vividly.

The first witness is the Manchu Bordered Yellow Bannerman Heshiheng, who served as a liaison between the Kangxi emperor and Xiyang missionaries during de Tournon’s stay in China. On the fifteenth of June 1706, Heshiheng explained the Manchu emperor’s situation in Chinese society in the following way:

(a) Father [Appiani], are you aware that high officials, even viceroys, have presented memorials attacking your religion with the intention of exterminating it as something evil, and contrary to the character and laws of the Empire? (b) Do you know that this present Emperor of ours, after making an examination has answered them, affirming its goodness, that it is in accord with reason and with the fundamental laws of the Empire, that he permits it and that he pledges his confidence in it? (c) But if you were to teach in China today that Heaven or God whom you call Tianzhu is not to be venerated, for to us Heaven and God are identical, except that the more ignorant conceive of heaven in a material sense; that reverence is not be paid to a father or mother who has died; that our teacher Confucius is not to be venerated, (d) assuredly you will cause yourselves and all your people to be driven out of China; and (e) you will expose to hatred our Emperor who has stood surety for you. (f) My Lord will have no power at all to prevent the people from tearing you to pieces, for being teachers of the vilest doctrine. (g) If the Chinese came to know that you are abolishing the worship of Heaven, the veneration of parents, the commemoration of them in the tablets, and the customary veneration of Confucius, all of which the established wisdom of our ancestors has set as signs of filial obedience and due observance, (h) you will be considered more loathsome than any lawless brigands or
barbarians. (i) When you attack the sect of the bonzes and publish books opposing them, such as the book *Pi Wang*, even though the sect is very numerous, no one takes up arms against you; most read them and say nothing, or even laugh; the Emperor reads them and says nothing. (j) For this teaching is not the official teaching of the Empire. (k) There are also scholars among the Chinese who have criticised them and still criticise them, and no one starts a movement against them even though that teaching has a multitude of followers. (l) In very truth, if you only think about it, if you make an attack on the very character of the Empire and its fundamental laws, who will be able to defend you against the wrath of a people justly infuriated! What answer will you give to justify yourselves? (m) My Lord’s face will be covered in confusion, for it was with his consent that your religion was allowed, as being only minimally contrary to the laws so wisely established by lawgivers.17

The points of Heshiheng’s testimony can be summarised as follows:

(1) Since China (*Sina*) is the space in which the Chinese (*Sinae*) prioritise the Confucian teachings as uncompromising doctrine (j), only the teachings (*jiao*) that acknowledge the utmost and absolute supremacy of Confucian teachings can be tolerated in this space (i, k).

(2) In this space called China, only those civilised by Confucian teachings can be allowed to live, but anything that denies Confucian teachings cannot be allowed (d) since they are worse than barbaric (g)18.

(3) However, the Xiyang people’s teachings, i.e., the Christian teachings, have already moved beyond the limit of toleration (a).

17 AP I, 360-61.
18 ‘quibusvis rebellibus latronibus et Barbaris, magis abominabiles habebimini’.
(4) The main reason that the Christian teachings have been tolerated in Chinese society is the Manchu ruler’s protection of them from the hatred of the Chinese (b).

(5) If Christians now follow de Tournon’s stance and, by denying the core principles of Confucian teachings and their associated rites, challenge the utmost supremacy of Confucian teachings in Chinese society (c, g), the hatred of the Chinese caused by the Christians’ moves will surely be unprecedentedly harsh.

(6) Even the emperor will not be able to protect the Christian teachings from such levels of hatred, and moreover, if he tries to do so, he himself will be the target of the hatred (e^{19}, m).

Similar to Stumpf, Heshiheng was also seriously concerned about the hatred of Chinese society. If there was one difference, it was that Heshiheng foresaw the next target of the hatred, i.e., the Manchu emperorship which had sided with the Xiyang community and their religion.

The second witness is the first son of the Kangxi emperor, Yinti, who oversaw all Xiyang-related matters. Although his point of view was similar to that of Heshiheng, Yinti provides greater clarity about the people harbouring this hatred, whom Heshiheng merely described as ‘the Chinese’.

Surely there has been publication in Europe of all the difficulties your Li Madou (Father Ricci) experienced, and of how much hard labour was involved in introducing your religion into China? (i) Has no report yet reached Europe that Tang Ruowang (Father Schall von Bell) had been condemned, was going to be cut to pieces and how he was saved by us? Has no news arrived yet in Europe of tracts accusing the Christians, and of persecutions stirred up by certain people? … If you set about prohibiting such rites, I pledge my word to you this day, that within 20 years there will not be trace of Europeans

19 ‘et Imperatorem nostrum expones odio, qui pro vobis fidejussit’.
in China. My Father, notwithstanding all his Imperial power, will not be able to protect you from the Geli and the people of China. (ii) **The attachment of this nation to its customs is awe-inspiring.**[^20] (emphasis mine) 

A noticeable phrase in Yinti’s testimony is ‘(i) Has no report yet reached Europe that Tang Ruowang (Father Schall von Bell) had been condemned, was going to be cut to pieces and how he was saved by us?’, in which by differentiating them from ‘us’, he ‘otherises’ the people harbouring the hatred, whom Heshiheng had merely called ‘the Chinese’ (*Sinae*). Yinti adduces the incident in which Schall von Bell who kept to the position against Ming customs was attacked by a Han person and was sentenced to the death by slicing, as evidence of the awe-inspiring attachment of ‘the people of China’ (*Populum Sinicum*) to their customs (ii). Yinti emphasised that it was ‘us’ (*per nos*) who had saved Schall von Bell from the crisis.

The third witness is the Yongzheng emperor, who was the Kangxi emperor’s successor. On the twenty-first of July 1727 (YZ5/6/3), the Yongzheng emperor revealed his personal feelings about his father’s reign in a more concrete way:

(1) The Han 漢 Mingdi 明帝 and Tang 唐 Taizong 太宗 let in Indian monks and Tibetan lamas, respectively. (2) **Because of this, these two monarchs were in bad favour with the Chinese people** (*sont rendus odieux aux Chinois*). (3) My father’s reputation was also damaged because he built churches in provinces. (4) About this, I as a Manchu person made insistent objections. (5) Can I leave the buildings intact that damaged my father’s reputation? … (6) Tibetan Buddhism is the most like your teachings, but the literati’s teachings are far different from [your teachings] (emphasis mine).[^21]

[^21]: Gaubil, *Correspondance de Pékin*, 142.
As in Yinti’s testimony, the Chinese (*aux Chinois*) in the quotation above are also ‘otherised’ from the Manchu people. In other words, the Yongzheng emperor was concerned that the Kangxi emperor’s favourable treatment of Xiyang missionaries left room for the Han to remember him as the ‘culprit’ who brought alien teachings into ‘holy’ China (1, 2, 3). More interesting is the lexicon that the writer Gaubil uses. He describes the Yongzheng emperor’s concern over the Manchu regime’s fate by using the phrase ‘*sont rendus odieux aux Chinois*’, which reminds the reader of the lamentation by Jacob in Bible, ‘making me obnoxious to the Canaanites and Perizzites’. This phrase epitomises the worry by the leader of a minority alien group in Canaan, that his sons’ mistake left room for the natives of Canaan to recall the alienness of Jacob’s clan and thus generate xenophobia among the natives. Gaubil was reflecting the Manchu ruler’s nervous attitude onto the image of Jacob, the leader of an ethnic minority and an alien in Canaan.

Although all three emperors, Han Mingdi, Tang Taizong, and the Kangxi emperor, would be remembered as for introducing alien religions into China, the Han elite’s assessment of the Kangxi emperor would be harsher than of these two predecessors. This was because from the Han elite’s perspective, the Qing dynasty was an alien dynasty. A mistake that could be regarded as merely ‘the state’s misgovernment’ if made by a Han Chinese dynasty would be branded as ‘an alien regime’s intrinsic limits’ if made by an alien dynasty such as the Manchu ruler’s. Indeed, there are precedents in Chinese history. For example, towards the fall of the Mongol empire, the Han elite attributed the empire’s decline to its heterodox elements, like Tibetan Buddhism, although at the peak of the Mongol empire’s power, Han collaborators had

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22 *Genesis* 34:30.
interpreted the same heterodox elements as evidence of a ‘so holy emperorship that could not be damaged at all by any heterodox elements.’

‘Fan lama Xifang sengren youfang ji fanshi’ [For All Affairs about Wanderings or Crimes by Lamas and Western Monks], the title for the section that contained ‘the Edict of Toleration’ in Dingli quanbian [The Complete Collection of Substatutes], highly likely led contemporary readers to associate the favourable attitude to Xiyang missionaries of the Qing emperors with the same attitude to lamas (xiseng 西僧) by the Yuan emperors.

In fact, the Yongzheng emperor’s concern was not unfounded. On the nineteenth of July 1727 (YZ5/6/1), two days before the conversation above between the emperor and the missionaries, the emperor ordered the following imperial edict to be proclaimed across the country:

Recently, wicked people are making rumour: if one makes gossip, many follow and spread it; in the end, people become anxious, and thus the innocent are harmed. For example, there is rumour in the capital that the government selects xiunü 秀女 (beautiful girls) and gives them to the Xiyang people; and there is a rumour in Zhejiang that Haining 海寧 will be massacred. Such rumour should be made by evil people who do not repent, but rather regard my rule as strict. They disturb the people’s heart with devil’s tricks and try to threaten me to stop … You, innocent people in close or far regions, must believe that I do not want anything that could harm people … Make sure that the officials of the Shuntian Prefecture and the Five Wards and Governors and Governors-general inform Department and County magistrates of this [imperial edict] and

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24 Dingli quanbian, juan shou, 103a; juan 19, 49a.
order them to publish it to everywhere, even to the backwoods of a remote village (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{25}

In fact, behind the rumour in Zhejiang lay a series of imperial hard-line policies towards the area. In the Yongzheng 3rd year, the Yongzheng emperor arrested a Zhejiang scholar Wang Jingqi 汪景祺 (1672-1726, a native of Pinghu 平湖 County of Jiaxing 嘉興 Prefecture) and Cha Siting 查嗣庭 (?-1726, a native of Haining County of Hangzhou Prefecture) for defamation of the Kangxi emperor and anti-Manchu language; in October of the Yongzheng 4th year, an independent surveillance post called the Supervisor of Public Morality (guanfeng zhengsu shi 観風整俗使) was established in Zhejiang to monitor the activities of the local literati\textsuperscript{26}; towards the end of the 11th month, the Zhejiang County and provincial examinations were even suspended due to his deep distrust of the Zhejiang Confucian elite\textsuperscript{27}. It was against this background that from early on in the 5th year of the Yongzheng Reign, the rumour that Qing troops would soon arrive to massacre the locals who took root in Pinghu, Haining, and Qiantang 錢塘.\textsuperscript{28} Interestingly, at this time, namely, when the emperor was attacking the Jiangnan elite for their defamation of his father and a rumour against the Manchu regime was arising in the Jiangnan area, another rumour that the Manchu court were selecting girls as gifts to the Xiyang community was spreading in Beijing.\textsuperscript{29} This was the very reason that the emperor had to explain the recent rumours, officially and nationwide, on the nineteenth of July 1727.

\textsuperscript{25} QSL-YZ5/6/1[bingxu].
\textsuperscript{26} Yamamoto Eishi, \textit{Shindai Chūgoku no chiiki shihai}, 274-79.
\textsuperscript{27} Xia Weidong, ‘Yongzheng si nian ting Zhejiang xianghuishi’, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{29} According to Qijuzhu, the Prefect of Shuntian Prefecture arrested Liu Lao’er 劉老兒, who spread the rumour, and the Grand Secretaries intended to send him to the Ministry of Justice. However, not trusting the Ministry, the emperor ordered that Liu be instead sent to the Head of the Beijing Gendarmerie (bujun tongling 步軍統領) (FHA, \textit{Yongzheng chao Qijuzhu ce}, YZ5/5/12[dingmao], 1245.}

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This countrywide ‘excuse’ was issued exactly two days before the emperor’s ‘secret’ lamentation before the Xiyang missionaries alone, as we saw earlier, that his father’s favourable policy to the Xiyang people had revealed the Manchu regime’s alienness to the Han.

Indeed, during the Kangxi period, Xiyang-associated opposition often concerned Jiangnan, the Han elite’s ‘spiritual homeland’. Yang Guangxian, the main opponent in the Calendar Case, and the toughest challenge to Christians during the early Qing period, was a government school student (guansheng 官生) of the Xin’an 新安 Guard (wei) in the Huizhou 徽州 Prefecture of Anhui Province, which some scholars classify as within the Jiangnan area. Yang also sometimes introduced himself as a native of Yuyao 餘姚, in Zhejiang Province, as Yuyao had been his ancestral home. Yang also emphasised that the restoration of the Old Methods (jiufa 舊法) meant the restoration of the Yao-Shun period, and tried to take Guo Shoujing’s astronomical instruments from Jiangnan to the capital. Yang Jingnan 楊燝南 (1615-?), who once again attacked the Xiyang New Method using almost the same logic as Yang Guangxian, and insisted on the restoration of the Old Method, was also a native of Wujang 吳江, in Jiangsu Province. The incident of the Kangxi 26th year, in which a commentary on the Sacred Edict (shengyu 聖諭) branded Christianity as a heretical teaching, necessitating Verbiest to ask the emperor for the removal of the relevant phrase from the commentary, also has its roots in Songjiang 松江 Prefecture, in Jiangsu Province. Of particular note is the anti-Christian incident that occurred in Hangzhou, because it happened two years after the Kangxi emperor had met Prospero Intorcetta in 1689 (KX28) and despatched Zhao Chang to the Hangzhou

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30 Huang, ‘Yang Guangxian jiashi yu shengping kao’, 16.  
31 XC, 73, 80.  
33 Golvers, Letters of a Peking Jesuit, no. 112, 733-35.
church to bestow imperial gifts upon Intorcetta. This indicates that even the emperor’s great favour to Christianity could not save it from the hostility of the Jiangnan Chinese. The true sentiments of the Jiangnan Han population towards the emperor’s patronage of the alien teachings at that time is epitomised by the main opponent Zhang Penghe’s assertive remark during the Hangzhou anti-Christian incident that ‘the Kangxi emperor will not be able to intervene in this incident because if he ignores at all the fundamental principles of the empire in order to acknowledge teachings that are totally against the only Orthodoxy, that will surely cause ardent complaints from the Han people.’

After ascending the throne, the Yongzheng emperor, who, as we saw above, was worried about his father’s legacy, made significant attempts not to follow his father’s ‘mistake’. For example, for a decade or so after his enthronement, he refused to reveal his own religious propensity:

> Although I already was enlightened about the teachings of the nature axiom (xingzong 性宗) by focusing on the Buddhist scriptures (neidian 内典) during my princehood [before the enthronement], I have not mentioned it since the enthronement. It was not only because I was so busy that I even forgot food and sleep, but also because I was afraid that I left room for people to suspect that I revered Buddhism. [However,] I have thought that when all state affairs are settled, I will enlighten [people] for the cause of uniting the Three Teachings and disclose how harmful [it is for different teachings] to calumniate each other. Because it has now been ten years [since my enthronement], and

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I have become less busy in state affairs, I want to express my opinion and forerunners’ to those who learn the Way (dao) (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{35}

When the Yongzheng emperor ascended the throne, he also clarified his position on Christianity. After a period of discussion during his first two years, the emperor ordered that except for those with scientific or technological skills, all Xiyang people in China, regardless of permit status\textsuperscript{36}, be confined to Canton or Macao, and existing church buildings be made into public places.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, after Francisco de Cordes, SJ (Fang Yuzhang 方玉章, 1689-1768) was caught propagating Christianity in Canton in 1732 (YZ10), the emperor immediately withdrew his previous exceptive permission for certain missionaries to remain in Canton and ordered all missionaries, except those in Beijing, to be expelled to Macao.

Regarding Yongzheng emperor’s actions against the Xiyang missionaries, it is interesting to listen to Murao Susumu’s insightful explanation. He interprets the formation of the Canton system in terms of the Qing empire’s ideological policy and argues that one significant meaning of the Canton system lay in the creation of a ‘border space’\textsuperscript{38} that consisted of ‘the Canton Factory’ and Macao. According to Murao, the creation of this border space was closely

\textsuperscript{35} FHA, \textit{Yongzheng chao Hanwen yuzhi huibian}, vol. 3, no. 461, 286.

\textsuperscript{36} The emperor collected and repealed all permits issued by his father.

\textsuperscript{37} Although this persecution may appear to have been triggered by Gioro Mamboo (the Governor-General of Fujian-Zhejiang), the fact that the Yongzheng emperor privately corrected Mamboo and Huang Guocai 黃國材 (the Governor of Fujian)’s draft memorial before they submitted it through official channels allows us to assume that it was penned at the emperor’s initiative. Scholars have thus far mentioned several causes as the trigger for the persecution: (1) The Famin 法敏 (Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Rites)’s memorial (YZ1/2/10); (2) part of the policy to discipline local society; (3) the Yongzheng emperor’s antipathy towards Christianity; (4) part of the new emperor’s attempts to eliminate political opponents; (5) part of the anti-heresy policy; or (6) the increasing influence of anti-Christian officials in the capital. See Menegon, \textit{Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars}, 116-24; Murao Susumu, ‘Kenryū kibō’, 682; Zhang Xianqing, \textit{Guanfu zongzu yu Tianzhujiao}, 113-16.

\textsuperscript{38} According to Murao, this space corresponds, in terms of maritime customs administration, to \textit{Shengcheng daguan} 省城大關 (the main customs house) and \textit{Aomen zongkou} 澳門總口 (the customs station) areas, and in terms of maritime defence, to \textit{Guangzhou Zhong lu} 廣州中路 (the central sector of the military division). See Murao Susumu, ‘Kenryū kibō’, 679, note 2.
associated with the Yongzheng emperor’s intention to arrange ‘the reality of the Qing Empire’ out of sight of the Han elite. Although the emperor ambitiously proclaimed the absolute control of Hua and Yi and Inner (zhong) and Outer (wai) under the Qing emperorship and thus the ‘abolition’ of any discrimination between the four in Dayi juemi lu 大義覺迷錄 [Record of the Righteous Way for Enlightening the Misguided], this ideal was actually far from the reality. From the Han elite’s perspective, alien or heretical things such as the Xiyang and their religion were not under control under the Qing state, even in China proper, where ideal rule was expected to be realised as a first priority. China proper was a symbolic space where the Chinese emperor’s virtuous rule was expected to enlighten all alien and heretical elements. The Yongzheng emperor had to shift the ‘inability’ or reality of Manchu rule of China beyond sight of the Han elite, and therefore designed this artificial spatial structure in Canton: the Han elite could only witness the tributary rituals conducted by loyal tributaries such as Siam at the Hall for Cherishing Guests from Afar (Huaiyuan yi 懷遠驛); while uncontrollable yi such as the Xiyang people and their religions were confined to a separate space, i.e., the Canton Factory and Macao, and were thus invisible to the Han elite.39

The Historical Background of the Wrath

In fact, Manchu concern over the wrath of the Han Chinese was not unfounded. For this, first, it is worth considering the intellectual landscape from the late Ming to the mid-Qing period. According to Kai-Wing Chow, the Han elite of the early Qing, who had experienced the disorder of the late Ming period and the dynasty’s subsequent fall, attributed the core cause of those crises to the collapse of Confucianism in Chinese society and thought that this resulted

from the introduction of heterodox elements, such as Buddhism or Daoism. Thus, the elite’s response was to emphasise Confucian purism by erecting clear boundaries between Confucian and heterodox teachings and to insist on Confucian ritualism by restoring Confucian rituals as concrete and external norms and rejecting impractical Neo-Confucian discussions on *li* (principle) or *xing* (nature). This intellectual tendency was reinforced as the elite underwent Manchu conquest.\(^\text{40}\) If, as Chow describes, the intellectual orientation during the early Qing period came down to ‘Confucian purism’ and ‘Confucian ritualism’, it is understandable that the Xiyang missionaries’ attempts to deny Chinese rites caused such negative responses among the Han Chinese. However, for a more precise understanding of the situation that Chow described, I will borrow ‘a zoom lens’ from Timothy Brook, who examined the relationship between the Confucian elite and Buddhism during the same period.

Brook describes the process whereby the late Ming and early Qing elites embraced Buddhism as comprising four phases. The first phase was initiated by Wang Yangming 王陽明 in the early sixteenth century and features the occurrence of a shift in intellectual orientation within Neo-Confucianism. The second phase, during the late sixteenth century, saw the start of a radical reformation of the relationship between Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, whereby Buddhists challenged the conventional supremacy of Confucian teachings in Chinese society by attempting to equate the status of Buddhist teachings with that of Confucianism. The third phase began at the turn of the seventeenth century, during which, as a reactionary move, the Confucian elite insisted on a return to pre-Ming Confucianism and denied any complementarity between Buddhist and Confucian teachings. By the mid-seventeenth century, however, a negotiation process was evident between extreme pro-Buddhists and anti-Buddhists, and in this

\(^{40}\) Chow, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism*, passim.
final stage, the ‘accommodative’ or ‘centralist’ position became dominant. Eventually, Buddhism was tolerated as ‘a separate tradition’, and Confucian elites were free to read Buddhist books and pay respect to Buddha on the condition that Buddhist teachings should submit to the absolute supremacy of Confucian teachings and should not be merged or equated with these.\(^{41}\)

The similar roles played by the elite in the spread of Buddhism are also evident in the spread of Christianity. During the early seventeenth century, the elite took a leading role in paving the way for the Christian mission in most key areas in China, especially in Jiangnan.\(^{42}\) According to Nicolas Standaert’s periodisation of the Christianity mission during the late imperial period, the development during the fourth phase (1621–30) was facilitated by the Christians who had converted during the first three (1570–95, 1596–1610, 1611–20) and moved to new locations to assume new official posts or returned to their home regions.\(^{43}\) All regions that were key in the first three phases (i.e., Guangdong, Nanchang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Beijing) except Beijing were under the purview of the ‘Southern Paper’ provinces\(^ {44}\) during the Ming period, which were well-known for their high ratio of successful candidates in the civil examinations.\(^ {45}\) The composition of Chinese Christian society also indicates the active role of the elite in the early seventeenth century because, by analysing a record for the year of 1636,

\(^{41}\) Brook, *Praying for Power*, 54-88.
\(^{42}\) Tang Kaijian and Zhao Dianhong, ‘Mingmo Qingchu Tianzhujiao’, 133-36.
\(^{43}\) Standaert, ‘Creation of Christian Communities’, 549.
\(^{44}\) This is based on the 1427 quotas. See Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China*, 94-95; Danjo Hiroshi, ‘Mindai kakyo kaikaku’, 508, 513.
\(^{45}\) For example, if we count the number of *jinshi* degree-holders, who were the most likely of the three degree-holder levels to become officials, the figure for those four provinces and the capital (the Shuntian Prefecture) accounted for 50.4% of all *jinshi* degree-holders during the entire Ming period. See Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations*, 696, Table 2.6 and Table 5.8, 656, 696.
we can conclude that Christian society had far more Confucian elites than an average community in China.\footnote{The percentage of degree-holders accounts for 0.85\% of all members of the Christian community and is far higher than the contemporary percentage (0.4\%) for the total of all officials and degree-holders in the whole population of China. See Martini, *Brevis Relatio*, XI-XII; Oh Keum-sung, *Chungguk kínse sahoegyôngjesa yǒng'gu*, 40, 48-49, 53, 54.}

However, just as the Confucian elite played a leading role in the spread of Christianity, the counterattacks on Christianity also came from the elite. For example, the post-1615 period witnessed a significant decline in Confucian elites’ tendency to contribute prefaces to books authored by missionaries\footnote{Dudink, ‘Sympathising Literati and Officials’, 477-80. For Confucian elites’ criticism of Buddhism, Daoism, and Christianity and the latter three’s responses during the seventeenth century, see Okamoto Sae, ‘Shindai kinsho’, 210-14.}; in 1607, twenty-seven shengyuan degree-holders appealed to the Confucian elite’s ‘consciousness of kind’ against Christianity; according to Álvare de Semedo, SJ, fifty-four anti-Christian incidents occurred before the more serious event at Nanjing; ultimately, during this Nanjing Incident (1616–17), Shen Que 沈淵 (1565–1624), the Vice Minister of the Nanjing Ministry of Rites, impeached missionaries, and on February 3, 1617 (WL44/12/28), the Wanli emperor decided to banish the missionaries from China.\footnote{Oh Keum-sung, *Mao yu dun de gongcun*, 130-31, 141-43, 145-47; Semedo, *The History of That Great and Renowned Monarchy of China*, 172-74; Xu Changzhi, *Shengchao poxie ji*, 81.}

Despite such parallelism between Christianity and Buddhism in the course of late imperial Chinese history, we sense a contrasting divergence between the two from the mid-seventeenth century, which, as Brook described, featured a negotiation between the Confucian elite and Buddhists. Although during this period, the Confucian elite, with a more ‘accommodative’ or ‘centralist’ attitude, acknowledged Buddhism as a separate tradition, and in return for this guarantee, Buddhists also accepted the inarguably dominant status of the Confucian teachings in Chinese society, Christianity proceeded in a completely opposite direction to the negotiation between Confucianism and Buddhism.
After the Nanjing Incident, the environment became favourable for the Catholic Church. Shen Que, the incident’s key player, lost his position because of his connection with the notorious eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢, and Xu Guangqi, a well-known supporter of Christianity, became the Minister of Rites and the Grand Secretary of the East Hall; Schall von Bell submitted to the Chongzhen emperor his *Chongzhen lishu* 崇禎曆書 [Calendrical Treatises of the Chongzhen Reign], and the emperor bestowed on him a tablet bearing four honorific characters, ‘*Qin Bao Tian Xue* 欽褒天學’ (Imperially Commended Heavenly Studies). Against the background of this favourable environment, the Xiyang and Christian communities began to challenge the Confucian hegemony in Chinese society. During this period, hoping for a more secure status for Christianity, Xiyang missionaries also depended more on imperial protection than on the support of the Confucian literati. Now, the Xiyang missionaries placed greater emphasis on their identity as the Chinese sovereign’s legitimate subjects than as ‘Western Confucian scholars’. They also tended to present their religion as a legitimate ‘Chinese religion’ rather than as a complement to Confucianism. Schall von Bell occupied a seminal position in this change because he personally and vividly experienced the significance of the imperial voice in Chinese society. From his experience, it was imperial power that prohibited him from entering China proper during the Nanjing Incident, and it was also imperial power that supported his mission in making remarkable progress in China.

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49 When Schall von Bell arrived in Macao in 1619, he could not enter China proper because the Wanli emperor’s imperial edict (1617.2.3) resulting from the Nanjing anti-Christian incident remained in effect.
This strategic change became clearer during the Qing period. Schall von Bell plainly wrote ‘According to the Xiyang new method’ on the title page of the new calendar for the new empire. He also tried to exclude Han Chinese experts from his calendrical project. In August 1644 (SZ1), for example, he questioned the conventional practice of listing the names of the Directorate of Astronomy officials on the yearly calendar. Consequently, Dorgon ordered that Adam Schall’s name be the first in the list, even before the Director of the Directorate of Astronomy.

Adam Schall’s assured attitude can also be observed in his memorial on the eighteenth of September 1644 (SZ1/8/19):

To print calendars is within the remit of the Directorate of Astronomy, and thus at the end of the year, by directing workers, two Managers of the Calendar (sili 司曆) and one Senior Official on duty (guannian tangduan 管年堂官) should take charge of producing [calendars]. However, [the officials of the Directorate] are now suddenly attempting to shift their responsibility to me. What are the jobs of the more-than-110 students at the Directorate? Moreover, it has been long since Your Majesty sent to [the Directorate of Astronomy] the form of the popular calendar (minli 民曆) that I had submitted. They should have stayed up all night to finish the assigned task … I am merely a prim scholar from the West Ocean (Xihai) who tries to learn the Way (dao). Although by imperial order, I was summoned to the Inner Court several times, I have never been in government service at the Directorate. I had determined not to marry and not to enter government service … If [the officials of the Directorate] summon again but do not show me proper

50 Ad Dudink also observes that a seminal turn occurred in Christians’ strategy during the seventeenth century. Unlike the preceding century, when they depended on ‘the help of sympathising literati’, from the 1630s, missionaries in the capital, in the imperial court, and in the provinces began to focus more on lower officials or commoners. Dudink named this turn ‘a double shift’. See Dudink, ‘Sympathising literati and officials’, 481-82.
51 QSL-SZ1/7/19.
courtesy, I, this servant from a far (yuanchen 遠臣), as a tired elderly man, simply cannot afford this hard work, but also will not able to gratify [our] Sacred Dynasty’s lofty cause that by respecting the Heavenly Way (tiandao 天道), granted a favour to this person from a far (yuanren 遠人). I feel too ashamed to establish a principle (changfa 創法) that can be handed down to posterity and to help you to build the Great norm (judian 鉅典) for the Prosperous Age!}

Adam Schall’s ‘bluff’ in the memorial above sounds rather rude when we consider the recipient was the highest ruler of a new burgeoning empire who had spared Schall von Bell’s life only three month previously.\(^5^3\) However, in December (SZ1/11), Dorgon appointed Schall von Bell to the post of Director of the Directorate of Astronomy\(^5^4\), one of few exclusive posts for Han Chinese (zhuanshe Hanguan 專設漢官),\(^5^5\) and he officially started this new job in January 1645 (SZ1/12/7).\(^5^6\) He was the first Xiyang person who became a seal-holding official in China.

Under Qing rule, the Xiyang people did not cling to the image of ‘a Western Confucian scholar’. In 1650, on land bestowed by the Shunzhi emperor, Schall von Bell built a grand

\(^{52}\) QZXT, vol. 1, no. 1, 4-6.
\(^{53}\) After receiving Adam Schall’s memorial, Dorgon ordered, ‘Calendrical calculation ought to be based on the New methods. [Besides] making a calendar is the Directorate of Imperial Astronomy’s task. How can their responsibility be shifted to others! Let the Ministry of Rites inform [the concerned office(s)] of this order as soon as possible’. The Qing conquerors’ early rule in Beijing was not as peaceful or favourable as described in Qing official documents, including Qing Shilu or the Manchu archive in the Inner Court of Historiography (Nei guoshi yuan 內國史院). When turning our eye on private sources like the Chosŏn Prince Sohyŏn’s Simyang ilgi 瀋陽日記 [Shenyang Diaries], we conclude that the situation facing the Qing conquerors was very urgent. Under such a situation, creating a new and more accurate calendar was critical for the Qing ruler to justify their Manchu rule over China. See QZXT vol. 1, no.1, 1; Park Minsu, Ch’ŏng ŭi ipkwan gwa kiin’, passim, 89-96.
\(^{54}\) Huang, ‘Yesuhuishi Tang Ruowang’, 161; Vät, Johann Adam Schall von Bell, 159.
\(^{55}\) DQHD-KX, juan 3, libu 1, guandi 1, Qingtianjian, 131.
baroque-styled church called the West Church, which stood out among the surrounding Chinese-style buildings. This move was in stark contrast to that of his Ming predecessor, Matteo Ricci, who had built his church in the Chinese style.\textsuperscript{57} During the Calendar Case, Schall von Bell, to defend Christianity, Schall von Bell highlighted his status as a legitimate subject of the multi-ethnic Qing Empire, and claimed an impartial status for his religion, as Lamaism was also guaranteed in the empire.\textsuperscript{58} This contrasts with the way in which his Ming predecessors during the Nanjing Incident had emphasised their identity as Western Confucians and described Christianity as a complement to Confucianism. Pingyi Chu also demonstrated how Qing Christians relied on imperial authority in interpreting the significance of the South Church stele inscription.\textsuperscript{59} It was against this backdrop that from the early Kangxi period, by publishing \textit{Xichao ding’an} [The Verdicts of Gracious Reign] and regularly supplementing it, Christians tried to remind Chinese people of previous emperors’ imperial approval of the Xiyang people and Christianity. During the Rites Controversy, a similar strategy was employed by Hangzhou Christians, who published \textit{Zhaodai qinchong Tianjiao zhi Hua xulue} 昭代欽崇天教至華敍略 [Brief Account of the Introduction of the Heavenly Teaching to China] and \textit{Qinning chuanjiao yueshu} 欽命傳教約述 [Brief Account of the Imperial Order to Spread Christianity] to remind the Chinese population of their Qing rulers’ favourable attitude to Christianity.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Väth, \textit{Johann Adam Schall von Bell}, 166-69; Chu, ‘Jinshimeng’, 390-93.
\textsuperscript{58} QCXCMDY, 39-40.
\textsuperscript{60} XCW, 4-14, 416-32. We also need to pay attention to Zhang’s argument that ‘Catholicism transcends Confucianism’ in his \textit{Examination of the Similarities and differences between Catholicism and Confucianism} (\textit{Tianru tongyi kao} 天儒同異考). Although some interpret his understanding as still in line with his predecessors’ \textit{buru} rhetoric, which emphasised ‘Christianity as a complement to Confucianism’, it is undeniable that from the Qing period, somewhat bold and ‘provocative’ opinions can begin to be seen regarding the relations between Christianity and Confucianism. An argument such as Zhang’s was indeed rare during the Ming period. See Mungello, \textit{The Forgotten Christians of Hangzhou}, 101-2; Sheen, \textit{Religious Hybridization}, 101-2.
Regarding this strategic turn on the Christian side, we should also consider the Qing rulers’ particular worldview. In 1705, for example, when the papal legate attempted to remove from churches tablets that bore *Jing Tian* [To Revere the Heaven] characters, the Kangxi emperor said as follows:

People under your Christian law say *jing tianzhu*, worship the Lord of Heaven …; the Chinese people say *jing tian*, worship Heaven. Although the expressions are different, their meaning is one and the same.\(^61\)

His successor, the Yongzheng emperor, expressed almost the same intent but extended its logic in his Manchu edict on the third of May 1727 (YZ5/run3/13):

The Lord of Heaven (*le Seigneur du Ciel*) is the same Heaven. Is there anyone who does not venerate the Heaven? Our empire has a temple for honouring and worshipping the Heaven. We Manchu people have *tiaoshen*\(^62\) and every first day of a new year, burn incense and paper, and that is to honour the Heaven. We Manchu people have our own rituals to honour the Heaven; and the Mongols\(^63\), the Chinese (*Chinois*), the Russians, and the Europeans etc. also each has their own rituals to honour the Heaven.\(^64\)

If the Kangxi emperor compared the way the Chinese (*Sinae*) honoured the Heaven with that of Christians, the Yongzheng emperor compared between the ways of honouring the Heaven by Han, Manchu, Mongol, Russian, and, Xiyang peoples.\(^65\) From the Yongzheng emperor’s

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\(^{62}\) Gaubil’s footnote: ‘Ceremony specific to the Tartars with which I am not familiar’. (161).

\(^{63}\) Gaubil’s footnote: ‘Western Tartars’ (161).

\(^{64}\) Gaubil, *Correspondance de Pékin*, no. 43 (1727.10.4), 152-53, 161.

\(^{65}\) Although it is not clear whether ‘the Chinese’ in the Kangxi emperor’s remark refers to all *Qing subjects* or *Han people only*, ‘the Chinese’ in the Yongzheng emperor’s is clearly targeted at Han people.
perspective, there was no fundamental difference between Manchu Shamanism, Tibetan Buddhism, Russian Orthodoxy, or Xiyang Catholicism.

We often encounter in the Yongzheng emperor’s remarks the same perspective of religions that despite their different forms, the substance of honouring the Heaven remained the same. On the eighth of June 1727 (YZS/4/19), for example, the Yongzheng emperor emphasised the fundamental oneness between Manchu shamanism and Christianity:

Wu’erchen 烏爾陳, Su’erjin 蘇爾金, and Ku’erchen 庫爾陳 did not revere the Manchu right Way (Manzhou zhi zhengdao 滿洲之正道) but followed the Xiyang teachings (Xiyang zhi jiao 西洋之教). I ordered them to repent and tried to enlighten them by sending princes and grand ministers. However, they are insisting on their own thought and are saying they will not repent. What is the difference between such idiots and brutes? … Let them be handed over to Aqitu 阿齊圖, the Chief Official of the Beijing Metropolitan Police Headquarters, and let him detain them in a specific place so that they can study the Xiyang Way (Xiyang daoli 西洋道理) thoroughly. If they reach true understanding of the Xiyang teachings regarding honouring the Heaven, they will naturally say to me that they will repent.66

On the twenty-first of July 1727 (YZS/6/3), before the Xiyang members of the court, the Yongzheng emperor also compared Christianity with other religious practices such as Buddhist and Manchu rites:

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66 FHA, Yongzheng chao Hanwen yuzhi huibian, vol. 7, 83.
Buddha is the Heaven, that is, as you say, the Lord of Heaven (le maître du Ciel). Buddhism has, like yours, [the concepts of] incarnation and transmigration. Those are ridiculous. Is the [spirit] pole that we Manchu people erect during our ceremony, less ridiculous than your cross?67

The imperial edict on the twenty-eighth of May 1727 (YZ5/4/8) is particularly attention-grabbing:

Until now, Buddhists and Taoists have slandered Christianity (Xiyang jiao 西洋教); Xiyang people have also slandered Buddhism and Daoism. The two parties call each other heterodoxy (yiduan). This way of thinking is like this: one regards the other as the right way (zhengdao 正道) if one is similar to the other; and one brands the other as heterodoxy if one is different from the other … Regardless of the origin of the teachings, whether from China or from a foreign country, if the teachings’ practice (yong) causes harm to the worldly principle (shidao 世道) and the human mind (renxin 人心), [we should regard] the teachings as heterodox. For example, as Xiyang people (Xiyang ren) honour the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu), indeed the Heaven is the Lord (zhuzai 主宰) because through yin, yang, and five phases (wuxing), the Heaven brings into being all things and raises them. From antiquity, has there been anyone who did not know that one should honour the Heaven? Have there been any teachings that disregarded honouring the Heaven? What is so different about the way of honouring the Heaven in the Xiyang teachings (Xiyang jiao)? … A Confucian is respected as an example by commoners only when he keeps the Way of the previous sage-kings and reads the books of the sages. If there is a Confucian who uses the Books of Songs and History (Shi Shu 詩書) as a way to gain his own position or fame; uses the civil examinations as a channel to form and spread his own factions; makes

67 Gaubil, Correspondance de Pékin, no. 42 (1727.7.21), 142-43.
any seditious rumours or bad words to disturb others; and writes any wicked phrases or songs to stir others’ minds, [such behaviour] should be heterodoxy within Confucianism (ru zhong zhi yiduan 儒中之異端) … Therefore, whether one is different from the other does not matter, but what matters is whether one is right (shi) or wrong (fei) and heretical (xie) or right (zheng) … Considering the fact the Mongols venerate Buddhism and follow whatever it teaches, if you want to control Mongol people, the lama’s teachings (lama zhi jiao 喇嘛之教) should not easily be thrown away either.68

In this imperial edict, the Yongzheng emperor not only makes clear his belief that all religious teachings are the same in essence, but also argues that even Confucian teachings can be heterodox if there are problems with their practice (yong). According to the emperor, right, wrong, orthodoxy and heresy are not intrinsic in the teachings, but the practice of the teachings determines whether the teachings are right, wrong, orthodox, or heretical. From his perspective, the doctrine of teachings is not taken that seriously, but what matter most is the practice. Interestingly, if this way of thinking is extended further, it could reach an intolerable conclusion—especially for Han elites—that if the practice of any teachings is acceptable in the sight of the Manchu ruler, the teachings are allowed to challenge or, sometimes even, substitute the matchlessly dominant status of Confucianism in Chinese society.

Regarding the Qing rulers’ worldview, it is meaningful to refer to a series of studies that shed light on the linkage between Qing rule and the Qing rulers’ emphasis on the value of loyalty (zhong) to the throne. For example, Christopher P. Atwood’s study that tracked the

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68 Gaubil, Correspondance de Pékin, no. 43 (1727.10.4), 156; FHA, Yongzheng chao Hanwen yuzhi huibian, vol. 9, 106-7; Dergi hese jakün güsa de wasimbuhangge, hüwalityasun tob i sunjaci aniya, 31a-36b.
semantic changes of the Mongol word, ‘kesig’ and David Brophy’s that examined the Qing Empire’s policy towards Muslims, revealed how much Qing rulers emphasised the value of loyalty when ruling the diverse constituents of the Qing Empire.⁶⁹ In the meantime, Norman Kutcher also shed light on Qing rulers’ high prioritisation of loyalty, while examining ‘the parallel concept of society’, the concept that devotion to filial duty (xiao) led to devotion to the value of loyalty.⁷⁰ While Atwood and Brophy do not mention it, Kutcher in particular spotlights Qing rulers’ emphasis on overriding ‘loyalty to the sovereign and service to the state’ or ‘absolute loyalty’, which lay before the value of filial duty, as a key characteristic of the Qing in comparison to the Ming.

That Qing rulers prioritised loyalty over any other Confucian values is also revealed by, as Millward points out, the Qianlong emperor’ ideology of the Great Unity (datong) in his preface to Xiyu tongwen zhi [Imperially Commissioned Unified-Language Gazetteer of the Western Regions]:

Now, in Chinese, ‘Heaven’ is called tian. In the language of our dynastic house it is called abka. In Mongolian and Zungharian ‘Heaven’ is tngri. In Tibetan it is nam-mkhah. In the Muslim tongue it is called asman … the Han knows tian and venerates it, and the Muslim knows asman and venerates it. This is the Great Unity (datong).⁷¹

As the Qianlong emperor understood it, the Great Unity does not guarantee Confucian dominance, but rather means a pluralist, paralleled and equal configuration of diverse ethnic constituencies under the Qing imperial house. In the Great Unity, each constituent practices

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⁷⁰ Kutcher, Mourning in Late Imperial China, 95-104.
⁷¹ The translation is quoted from Millward, Beyond the Pass, 199.
their own culture in their own language as long as the constituent ensures Qing imperial dominance.

The particular emphasis on loyalty, in fact, does not necessarily have to be explained within a Confucian framework. It is likely that under Qing emperorship, the position for ‘orthodoxy’ was open to other teachings as long as imperial authority was guaranteed and maximised. This is in line with a series of studies that emphasise the Qing Empire’s Inner Asian connection by highlighting the Qing emperorship that pursued ‘simultaneity’ and tried to make constituencies parallel and tied at the top.\textsuperscript{72} Such emperorship beyond the Confucian frame is also analogous to Kubilai Khan’s, in which heterodox elements like Tibetan Buddhist rites were intentionally intermingled with Confucian rites and thus Mongol emperorship became maximised as Confucian supremacy became diluted.\textsuperscript{73}

How about the Qing officials’s perspective? For example, in his record written in the early eighteenth century, a Manchu bannerman described that churches, using the same term for the Xiyang people’s religious temple (‘tianju tang miyoo’), were part of Russian Orthodox Christian life.\textsuperscript{74} A Russian Orthodox missionary was referred to as a ‘lama’ who practised the

\textsuperscript{72} Millward, Beyond the Pass, 197-203; Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 11-12, 36-52; Perdue, ‘Empire and Nation’, 301-3. Citing Abe Takeo’s study (‘Shincho to Ka I shiso’[The Qing Dynasty and the Hua-Yi Discourse], Jim bun Kogaku 1-3, 1946), Crossley points out that loyalty was a greater priority during the Qianlong period than the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods (89).

\textsuperscript{73} Otosaka Tomoko, ‘Genshō ni okeru Chibetto bukkyō’, 301-10.

\textsuperscript{74} Tuližen, Lakcaha Jecen-de takūraha babe ejēhe bithe, 156, 166, 204, 236, 250, 264, 274, 282, 288, 380, 402, 406, 414, 430, 450-453, 458, 474, 484, 498, 728. Especially, See 498, ‘niyalma jafara de jala be baıtalamba, gaiha inenggi tiyan ju tang miyoo de genefi, ging hūlafi teni holbombi, bucore manara oci hoho bi, gemu miyoo I dolo benefit umbumbi,’
Buddha’s teachings (‘oros i fucihi tacihiyan be yabure lama’); Muslims were also referred to as serving Buddha.\(^{75}\)

As another example, in a conversation between a Han scholar and a Mongol bannerman that presumably took place in the late eighteenth century, a Mongol bannerman expresses his view of the Qing Empire and its emperorship.\(^{77}\)

[A Han scholar] asked, ‘If that is the case, is it compatible with [Han] Wengong’s opinion that every house of you Mongol bannermen reveres Buddha?’ [The Mongol bannerman] said … ‘Do you know the Heaven (abka)? The Liji reads “the Heavenly Way was the highest teaching” … The saints who the Heaven had brought into being in the world, established the highest teaching according to the Heavenly Way and have gradually enlightened [people] within the Four Seas (duin mederi dorgi) … However, because there is no place that the heaven cannot cover and the earth cannot hold up, a people in a place (ineku niyalma) can establish customs according to their own understanding about [the Heavenly Way] even though the saints’ enlightenment has not yet reached the place. [For example] in Mongol and Tibetan (tanggūt) areas, Buddhism emerged in its own way, and thus all people there relied on Buddhism and have gradually been ruled by this Way. [For them,] this is their own Way (doro) … [Han] Wengong’s

\(^{75}\) Tulišen, *Lakcaha jecen-de takūraha babe ejehe bithe*, 302.

\(^{76}\) Tulišen, *Lakcaha jecen-de takūraha babe ejehe bithe*, 384-386, ‘gemu hotong ... oros tacihiyan de dosikakv niyalma be tuaci, banin muru gemu hoise de adali, uju fusihabi, ajige mahala be etuhebi, ulgiyan yali jeterakv. ce enculeme fucihi doboho sembi,’

\(^{77}\) It is hard to estimate the exact time that this conversation took place, but *Emu Tanggū Orin Sakda-i Gisun Sarkiyan* dates Song Yun 松筠 (1752-1835)’s preface as written on the 12th of January 1790 (QL54/11/27) and Furentai’s 富倫泰 as written on the 2nd of June 1791 (QL56/5/1). The extant *Emu Tanggū Orin Sakda-i Gisun Sarkiyan* is Furentai’s edition. It seems that the book was not printed but circulated in the form of a manuscript only among bannermen. Tatsuo Nakami, ‘Inaba Iwakichi hakushi to Hyakuni rōjin goroku’, 41-45; Tsai Ming-che, ‘Manwen shu Baier laoren yulu’, 122-28.

\(^{78}\) Han Yu 韓愈.
words like “make the [Buddhist] people sane humans; burn the [Buddhist] books; and turn the [Buddhist] temples into residences” aimed at people of the Chinese Country (dulimbai gurun i niyalmai) … Our Holy Country (enduringge gurun) unified all outer tribes (tulergi aiman), and thus all [peoples] outside the Four Seas (duin mederi tulergi elengge yooni) have become the Holy Lord’s subjects. Now, they come as tributaries to [meet our Holy Lord] but cannot live if their own Way (kooli) is changed at all. Therefore, [our Holy Lord] has allowed them to live according to their own nature and customs. Who can dare to say that such is not [the situation in which] the Heavenly Way is the highest teaching [as The Liji reads]?\textsuperscript{79}

From the Mongol bannerman’s view, the Heavenly Way (abkai doro) is not necessarily the Confucian teachings, but rather beyond them. According to him, because the Heavenly Way in China (dulimbai gurun) was revealed in the form of the saints’ Confucian teachings, but in the area for Tibetans or Mongols, it was revealed in the form of Buddhism, and specifically Tibetan Buddhism, there cannot therefore be any superiority or inferiority between Confucianism and Tibetan Buddhism. In the conversation, therefore, a subtle tension is palpable between one view that the Qing Empire is confined to part of the Chinese world and another that the former lies beyond the latter. To the Han scholar’s indirect provocation by mentioning Han Yu’s 韓愈 Essentials of the Moral Way (Yuandao 原道), the byword for anti-Buddhism, the Mongol bannerman retorted that in his Holy Country, not like a Chinese Country, Tibetan Buddhism also had a legitimate place that was no different than that of the Confucian teachings.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Stary, Emu Tanggu Orin Sakda-i Gisun Sarkiyan, 346-47.
\textsuperscript{80} Stary, Emu Tanggu Orin Sakda-i Gisun Sarkiyan, 346-47.
Indeed, the status of the Confucian teachings in the world that Qing rulers considered desirable differs considerably from the conclusion that the Han elite had reached towards the mid-seventeenth century—that is, as Brook describes, ‘the utmost dominance of the Confucian teachings was inviolable in Chinese society, and any philosophical or religious systems were only tolerated on condition of their absolute submission to Confucian dominance’. For instance, during the Shunzhi-Kangxi period, when Confucian purism and ritualism prevailed, from the Han elite perspective, the ‘heterodox alien’ teachings from Xiyang likely prospered under the shelter of the ‘alien’ Manchu regime. The Kangxi emperor’s favourable attitude towards Xiyang people was no less than his father’s. In 1669, for example, the Kangxi emperor rehabilitated those who had been involved in the Calendar case. In January 1671, the Canton confinement was officially withdrawn, and in September, missionaries confined to Canton began to return to their own mission fields. In 1675, the emperor visited the South Church in person and bestowed on the Beijing missionaries his handwritten calligraphic work that bore the Jing Tian characters, and the missionaries publicised this imperial favour to all the empire’s subjects by having all missionaries in China hang tablets that included the same imperial words in their churches. In 1687, the emperor also ordered local officials to remove the phrase, ‘The Christian teachings are the same as Bailian 白蓮 teachings or plotting treason’ from circulated commentaries about the imperial Sacred Edict.\(^81\) During each of his Southern Tours in 1684, 1689, 1699, 1703, and 1705, the emperor also bestowed his favour on the Xiyang missionaries before the Han Chinese population. Moreover, in March 1692, he proclaimed the so-called ‘Edict of Toleration’ across the empire and, the following year, even allowed Xiyang missionaries to build the North Church within the Imperial City.

\(^81\) Le Gobien, *Histoire de l'edit de l'empereur de la Chine*, 22-26; QJZ-KX-1, 1617.
In fact, it is unlikely that previous literature has shed light on the ways in which Qing rulers’ attitudes to the Xiyang missionaries influenced public sentiment in each Qing constituency. This may be simply because scholars are unaware of the degree to which the relevant information circulated in Chinese society and was shared by local elites, and more fundamentally, because very few accounts of Xiyang missionaries remain in existing Qing documents that were produced during the Shunzhi-Kangxi period, the most active for Xiyang missionaries in China. Setting aside the question of why the Shunzhi and Kangxi governments left scant records about Xiyang missionaries, which, I believe, the reader will be able to answer by reading the last section of this chapter, I simply wish to point out that information on Qing rulers’ attitudes to the Xiyang missionaries was not totally absent from the contemporary Han elite’s information network.

In late imperial China, the Peking gazette (jingbao) or the editions of it that were produced for local officials or literati (dichao) were an important channel through which Chinese local elites had access to information about the Qing centre’s attitude to Xiyang missionaries or Christianity. Despite the paucity of remaining materials on the subject, there are some clear accounts that indicate how gazettes disseminated information on the Qing centre’s seminal decisions regarding the Xiyang missionaries. The spread of the 1669 decree and the 1669 decision by the Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials is described by Adrien Grelon, who was in Canton at the time, in a letter of 1669:

But as soon as I finished writing the above, a sad piece of news came to us from the Court by the gazettes, not by the letters of our Peking Fathers—because it has been a long time since we received [a letter from them].^82

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The account clearly shows that Grelon had obtained information about the Qing central government’s decision not only through a letter from the Beijing Jesuits, but also through the gazettes, which must have been not unfamiliar to the Xiyang missionaries since such government-published periodicals were common in contemporary Europe.\textsuperscript{83} According to Grelon, the 1669 edict was published throughout the whole empire and displayed on the door of his residence for three days.\textsuperscript{84}

The gazette also delivered the Kangxi emperor’s Declaration (30 November 1700) on the Rites Controversy throughout the empire. This Declaration, as an authoritative statement by the emperor, the supreme arbiter of Chinese society, was issued by the Kangxi emperor in response to the Beijing Jesuits’ request,\textsuperscript{85} and was composed of the Jesuits’ memorial containing their interpretation of the Confucius and ancestral rites, the tablets for the deceased, and the designation of the Christian God, and the emperor’s approving answer to that interpretation. The Declaration was originally written in Manchu, but its Chinese translation was published in a slightly abbreviated form in the gazette throughout the empire. Regarding its proclamation in Chinese society, we can glean seminal information from a debate between Maigrot and the Beijing Jesuits over the Declaration. While Maigrot denied the legal character of the Declaration by pointing out that it had not been proclaimed in the form of an affixing notice, the Beijing Jesuits insisted that the Declaration should be regarded as a rightful and legally binding law merely by the fact that a document in the name of the emperor—precisely

\textsuperscript{83} Harris, \textit{The Peking Gazette}, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{84} Bosmans, ‘Documents Relatifs A Ferdinand Verbiest’, 61.
\textsuperscript{85} On the thirty-first of December 1700, this Declaration reached Fuzhou with Antoine Thomas’ letter that promised ‘fuller and clearer information’ in the following year. The Declaration and Thomas’ letter were submitted to the Pope by Louis Le Comte in Rome on the eighteenth of November 1701.
speaking, a Chinese translation thereof—was contained in the gazette. Although the two sides had opposing points of view about the legal character of the emperor’s Declaration, neither doubted the fact that it was published in the gazette throughout the provinces. In around February 1701, indeed, Maigrot saw the gazette version of the Declaration at first hand.86

Similarly, ‘the Edict of Toleration’ did not lie beyond the realm of the elite’s information network. ‘The Edict of Toleration’ refers to both the Ministry of Rites’ answer to Pereira and Antoine’s memorial (2 February 1692)87 and the Kangxi emperor’s approval (‘yiyi 依議’) of the Ministry’s answer (22 March 1692),88 its gist being that since the Xiyang missionaries had contributed to the Qing Empire and their teachings did not contain harmful elements, the hitherto enforced ban on Christianity should be lifted. Interestingly, this seminal edict has apparently not yet been found in Qing materials such as Qing shilu, Qing shigao 清史稿 [Draft History of the Qing Dynasty]. Qijuzhu, or documents from the First Historical Archives of China or the Taiwan National Palace Museum, although the Edict can easily be found in contemporary Western sources.89 However, considering that privately published compilations of the Current Regulations (xianxing zeli) which circulated among officials and legal experts

87 This date is when the Beijing Jesuits submitted their memorial through the official channel after obtaining approval to do so from the emperor. In fact, they had already memorialised him privately around the twenty-first of December in 1691 (KX30/11/3).
89 Standaert, ‘The “Edict of Tolerance”’, 308, 313-20. The Edict could be found on both Pereira’s tombstone and the western stele in the South Church in Beijing, but precisely speaking, they fall into the category of Western materials. Pereira’s tombstone is not extant in the Zhalan cemetery, but its rubbings remain (BTST, vol. 65, 3). Although the stele in the South Church remains, the front part (in Chinese) of the text is illegible and the back part (in Manchu) is hidden by masonry. Fortunately, a transcript thereof can be found in one (2751 xiang, 7 bao, 48450 hao) of the Grand Council documents archived in Taiwan's National Palace Museum (Zhuang Jifa, ‘Qingchao zongjiao zhengce’, 214) and is now available in the National Palace Museum's digital archive (https://www.npm.gov.tw/exh100/kangxi/en/en_03.html).
during the Kangxi period contained ‘the Edict of Toleration’, it can be concluded that the Edict indeed lay within the elite’s information network.

The followings are the records of the Edict that are included in Dingli cheng’an hejuan [Combined Engravings of Regulations and Leading Cases] (hereafter D), Dingli quanbian [Complete Collection of Substatutes] (hereafter E), Liubu zeli quanshu [Comprehensive Book on the Regulations of the Six Ministries] (hereafter F), Li’an quanji [Complete Collection of Substatutes and Cases] (hereafter G), and the most complete version of the Edict (hereafter H) that is archived in Archivio della Congregazione per l’Evangelizzazione dei Popoli ‘De Propaganda Fide:

Table 6: Current Regulations during the Kangxi Reign that contains the ‘Edict of Toleration’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>The records of ‘the Edict of Toleration’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong> Dingli cheng’an hejuan juan 11, 5b.</td>
<td><em><strong>康熙三十一年二月，各處天主堂，俱照舊存留，凡進香供奉之人，仍許照常行走，不必禁止.</strong></em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> Dingli quanbian juan 19, 49a.</td>
<td><em><strong>凡天主堂，三十一年定，各處天主堂，俱照舊存留，凡進香供奉之人，仍許照常行走，不必禁止.</strong></em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> Liubu zeli quanshu juan xia, 88a-88b.</td>
<td><em><strong>康熙三十一年二月，禮部題准，議得，西洋人仰慕聖化，由萬里航海而來，見今，治理曆法、造火炮、軍器，並無為惡亂行之處，又並非左道惑眾，喇嘛、僧、道等寺廟，尚容人燒香行走，相應將各處天主堂，仍照舊存留，凡進香供奉之人，仍許照常行走，不必禁止.</strong></em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong> Li’an quanji juan 14, 8b-9a.</td>
<td><em><strong>禮部為欽奉上諭事，會議得，西洋人仰慕聖化，萬里航海而來，治理曆法、造火炮、軍器，差往阿羅素，誠心效力，勞績甚多。各省居住西洋人，並無為惡亂行之事，又並非左道惑眾異端生事，喇嘛、僧、道等寺廟，尚容人燒香行走，西洋人並無違法之事，反行禁止，似屬不宜，相應將各...</strong></em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Compared with (H), the other four share the Edict’s core contents despite some omissions or modified expressions for abbreviation, and (F) and (G) in particular are almost identical to (H). The presence of the Edict in Qing private legal compilations indicates that the Edict remained in the landscape of the Qing elite’s legal knowledge at least until the late Kangxi period. When we consider (F) was compiled by an incumbent Provincial Governor, it can also be concluded that the Edict lay within the purview of Qing officials as well. In particular, the fact that (D) and (G) were compiled by private legal advisors from Suzhou and Shaoxing 绍興, respectively,
and were published in Suzhou and Nanjing, respectively, shows that the Edict lay within the Jiangnan elite’s information network.\(^90\)

**Table 7: Information on the Current Regulations employed in this dissertation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dingli cheng’an hejuan</td>
<td>Dingli quanbian</td>
<td>Liubu zeli quanshu</td>
<td>Li’an quanji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>Sun Lun</td>
<td>Li Zhen</td>
<td>E’hai (Ohai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about the editor</td>
<td>Bookseller, the owner of on Rongjin tang at Liulichang</td>
<td>Governor-General of Sichuan and Shannxi Compilation started from the Kangxi 36(^{th}) year</td>
<td>Private legal secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of the editor</td>
<td>Suzhou Linchuan 臨川</td>
<td>Manchu Bordered White banner</td>
<td>Shaoxing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of publication</td>
<td>Prefaced in the Kangxi 46(^{th}) year / Printed in the Kangxi 54(^{th}) year</td>
<td>Prefaced in the Kangxi 55(^{th}) year</td>
<td>Prefaced in the 61(^{st}) year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^90\) The table below is based on the preface of the compilation of each regulation and Ting Zhang, *Information and Power*, 83-94.
Anti-Lamaism

The concern expressed by Manchu witnesses, particularly the Yongzheng emperor, that rampant heterodox or alien elements (e.g., Xiyang or Christian) should gradually awaken the Han elite’s deep-rooted anti-heterodox or anti-alien sentiments and that their ultimate target should be the Manchu regime was not ostensibly ‘realised’ while the Manchu empire thrived. However, once the Manchu ruler’s favour for a certain heterodox or alien element waned or justification for blaming the element emerged so that even the Manchu ruler could not provide protection, the Confucian elite vented their anti-heterodox or anti-alien anger. Indeed, this was the case for the situation during the Rites Controversy, as we saw in the first section above.

The same applies to the Han elite’s attitude to Tibetan Buddhism, which was also considered heterodox or alien. However, as mentioned above, Tibetan Buddhism served as ‘a reactant with a high reaction rate’ that allowed us to more clearly and vividly observe the Han elite’s anti-heterodox, anti-alien reactions. Compared to Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism was more marginalised but nonetheless had a high number of clerics and believers and thus left more relevant records. To contextualise the Xiyang (or Christianity) issue in Qing history, we will trace the Han elite’s attitude to Tibetan Buddhism, with particular attention to how their anti-heterodox, anti-alien sentiments gradually transformed into anti-Manchuism.
Above all, a significant diminution in harsh voices is evident in Qing materials, although Ming elite attitudes towards Tibetan Buddhism were uncompromisingly harsh. *Da Ming lü*, the Ming dynasty’s *Corpus Juris*, clearly prohibited the Chinese population from converting to Tibetan Buddhism,\(^91\) and in *Ming Shilu* 明實錄 the dynasty’s official history, we also encounter anti-Lamaist remarks.\(^92\) However, the tone with regard to Tibetan Buddhism moderated significantly in *Qing Shilu*, and readers seldom encounter official Qing criticisms of Tibetan Buddhism. Local gazetteers compiled before the late Qing period seldom contain negative accounts of Qing lamas, although they are critical of Ming lamas.\(^93\) Considering that Manchu emperors built numerous lama temples in the capital, honoured lamas participated in Tibetan Buddhist rituals at court, and even identified with the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, it seems stranger that the Qing elite, in contrast to the Ming elite, fail to mention a single issue with Qing lamas. The Qing Confucian elite’s attitude also contrasts starkly with that of their late Yuan counterparts, who ardently condemned the presence of Tibetan Buddhist temples in Beijing as a sign that the Mandate of Heaven had been lost.\(^94\)

One vivid difference between the two periods is the frequency of the appearance of the word ‘fanseng’ in *Ming Shilu* and *Qing Shilu*. While ‘fanseng’ appeared 964 times in *Ming Shilu*, it appears only 47 times in *Qing Shilu*; ‘lama’ appeared 34 times in *Ming Shilu* and 1,909

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\(^91\) DMLH, 459.

\(^92\) For example, see MSL-CH23/11/14; MSL-Hongzhi 1/7/22; MSL-Hongzhi 15/6/30; MSL-Zhengde 9/10/5.

\(^93\) I used the Erudition Database of Chinese Local Records (*Airusheng Zhongguo Fangzhiku*) chuji and erji.

\(^94\) Otosaka Tomoko, “‘Gen si tenka, hanmō o sō’ no genzō”, 43-44.
in *Qing Shilu*.\(^5\) According to Xie Shenglun 謝聖綸, a Fujian native and editor of the *Gazetteer for Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces* (*Dian Qian zhi lüe* 滇黔志略), by the time of the Qianlong 28\(^{th}\) year, ‘fanseng’ was still used as a less honorific designation for a Tibetan Buddhist monk while ‘lama’ was a more respectful, or at least neutral, designation.\(^6\) In this regard, it is interesting that the frequency of the less honorific designation, which appeared 964 times in the official record of the Ming Dynasty, decreased significantly to a mere 47 times in the official record of the Qing Dynasty, and that the frequency of ‘lama’ increased from 34 to 1,909 times during the same period.

It may appear that the Qing Confucian elite was determined to keep silent about not only Tibetan Buddhism but also other heterodox elements, except shamanism.\(^7\) According to Okamoto Sae, eighty per cent of the books ‘banned and burned’ (*jinhui* 禁燬) by Qing rulers were written in the seventeenth century, a period of ardent debate among the Confucian elite on the issue of heterodoxy in Chinese history.\(^8\) Okamoto argues that during the Qing period, debate on heterodoxy was itself criticised as a heterodox activity and prohibited.\(^9\) By contrast, during the Ming period, Confucian elites had expressed strong views against not only Tibetan Buddhism, but also other heterodox elements, including even ‘the Chinese tradition of Buddhism’, which had become inculturated into Chinese society for more than a thousand years. For example, Li Shilu 李仕魯 (?-1383), the Chief Minister of the Court of Judicial

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\(^5\) These figures are based on the Ming and Qing Veritable Records (http://silkok.history.go.kr/mc/main.do) online.
\(^6\) Xie Shenglun, *Dian Qian zhi lüe*, juan 14, 163.
\(^7\) Sutton, ‘Shamanism in the Eyes of Ming and Qing Elites’, 209-16.
\(^8\) Okamoto Sae, ‘Shindai kinsho’, 208-31.
\(^9\) These materials, branded as heterodox during this period, would receive favourable reappraisals from the nineteenth century. Okamoto Sae, ‘Jūshichi seiki ni okeru Chūgoku no itan’, 61-62.
Review during the Ming Taizu period, argued vociferously against Buddhism, incurred Taizu’s anger and was ultimately executed. During the first year of the Xiaozong emperor’s rule (1489), Sima Yin 司馬埜 (1439–?), the Investigating Censor, argued that all Daoist and Buddhist temples in China should be closed. During the 18th year of the Xiaozong emperor’s rule (1505), Liu Jian 劉健 (1433–1526), the Grand Secretary, also memorialised the throne that Buddhism and Daoism should be completely banned.100

In comparison not only with its Ming predecessor but also with the contemporary Chosŏn dynasty, the Qing elite indeed demonstrated quite ‘generous’ attitudes to heterodox elements. There is an interesting episode that indicates the degree of hostility amidst the Chosŏn Confucian elite to heterodox elements. In the 45th year of the Qianlong emperor’s reign (1780), the Chosŏn government sent envoys to the Qing Empire to honour the emperor’s seventieth birthday. During their stay in the empire, the envoys enjoyed exceptional treatment by the Qianlong emperor and were invited to Jehol, where they met Panchen Lama XI (or III) and were gifted statues of Buddha. When King Jeongjo received a report from the envoys about the event, he predicted that the Chosŏn elite would criticise the envoys’ acceptance of the statues and despatched an urgent notice, ordering ‘Never bring them into Seoul’. At the king’s orders, the envoys sent the statues to Mount Myohyang 妙香 before their arrival in Seoul. However, when the embassy reached Seoul, the already-infuriated Confucian students of the Central Confucian Academy (Sŏnggyun’gwan 成均館) rallied against the envoys’ receipt of ‘such heretical and dirty materials (saye ji mul 邪穢之物)’.101

While anti-Tibetan Buddhist sentiment among the Han Confucian elite trailed off considerably during the Qing period, these voices did not wholly disappear from Qing society.

100 Mingshi, juan 139, 2820; MSL-HZ1/12/8; MSL-HZ18/11/9.
101 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi, Chŏngjo 4/11/8, 12.
Some materials, particularly those left by individuals who enjoyed a greater degree of freedom from the charge of anti-Manchu sentiment, provide several clues that indicate, albeit indirectly, anti-Tibetan Buddhist, anti-heterodox, and anti-alien sentiments among the Han elite during the Qing period. For example, in a letter penned by the Kangxi emperor to the crown prince Yinreng 胤礽 during his third imperial expedition against Galdan in 1697, the Kangxi emperor worried that the Han Chinese would not tolerate the crown prince’s visit to a heterodox space although that visit was to pray for his father’s safety. On hearing of the prince’s visits to Buddhist temples, the emperor, although in Mongolia, far away from Beijing, warned his son by letter that he should be cautious of ‘nikasa i leolen’—the public opinion of the Han Chinese. In fact, as if the prince were also already prepared for this eventuality, all locations that he visited (i.e., Ma. gwang ming diyan 大光明殿, guwang ji si 廣濟寺, and jan tan sy 旃檀寺) were located within the Inner City, the space for the Manchu people.\(^\text{102}\)

The Han Confucian elite’s anti-Tibetan Buddhist sentiment is also evident in an episode from the ‘secret’ correspondence\(^\text{103}\) in Manchu on the eighteenth of December, 1723 between the Yongzheng emperor and Nuomin 諸岷 (?-1734), a Manchu bannerman who was Governor of Shanxi Province. Three elements of this episode merit particular attention. First, by its very

102 NPM, Gongzhong dang Kangxi chao zouzhe, vol. 8, 828. The Da Gwangming dian was located inside the Xi’an Gate. Two temples named ‘Guangji’ were located in Beijing: the Hongci Guangji si 弘慈廣濟寺 inside the Fucheng Gate and the Beiguangji si 北廣濟寺 close to the Xinjie kou 新街口 of the Xidashi jie 西大市街. Both temples were located within the Inner City. Two temples in Beijing were named ‘Zhantan’: one on the west side of Beihai inside the Imperial City and the other on the east side of the Shuangguandi miao 雙關帝廟 outside the Imperial City and inside the Inner City. See Wang Yanglian, Wanping xian zhi (Kangxi), 48-49; Ji Luoyuan, ‘Kangxi Wanshou shengdian chu ji’, 49-51; Xu Pingfang, Ming Qing Beijing cheng tu, 171

103 For this episode, see FHA, Yongzheng chao manwen zhupi zouzhe quanyi, no. 942, 522-23; Wang Bingtao, Wutai xianzhi (c.1780), juan 5, 6b-7a, 19b; Xu Jiyu, Wutai xinzhi (c.1883), juan 3, 9b-11a, 53a-56a; Chu Dawen et al., Shanxi tongzhi (1734), juan 82, 62b.
nature, the issue was becoming a conflict of lamas versus the Han population. For example, Lu Zhanghua 陸長華, the Jiangsu-born Han magistrate\(^{104}\), attempted to stand up for the local Han Chinese by gathering evidence of the lamas’ misdeeds. Lu, however, had not yet reported these to his superior because the local lamas, under the head lama (jasagh dalama)’s protection, were powerful, threatening to behead the magistrate. The Han elite (shenjin 紳衿), who had suffered from the lamas’ misdeeds as much as the commoners, began to muster their forces and awaited the right opportunity. When the recently enthroned Yongzheng emperor asked his Beijing officials for their opinions on current social problems, in his capacity as Examining Editor of the Hanlin Academy, Zheng Yi 鄭嶸, a Wutai native, reported the problems arising from the lamas’ misdeeds and the illegal imposition of tax in Wutai and received the emperor’s approval to investigate the issue. This was the background against which Lu mustered the courage to openly report what he had garnered regarding the lamas’ misdeeds, thus enabling his report, as mentioned earlier, to finally reach the Governor of Shanxi Province.

Second, the Yongzheng emperor adopted a quite ambiguous attitude towards the lama issue. In public, he ordered an investigation of the issue upon receiving Zhang Yi’s memorial, and thus, Nuomin, taking the emperor’s reaction as a clear desire to resolve the issue, worked actively to provide solutions as well as more detailed information about the lama issue as it stood, particularly regarding a lama’s attempted rape of a Han woman, leading to her suicide. However, the emperor, who had expressed interest in the issue when he ordered the investigation, now gave a lukewarm response in his secret correspondence with Nuomin. The emperor hoped to avoid escalating the problem and ordered Nuomin to monitor the issue and punish a small number of key culprits. However, although concern over a backlash from the

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\(^{104}\) Lu’s hometown is Taixing 泰興 County in Jiangsu Province.
Mongol population forced the emperor to stop short of attempting to eradicate the lama issue, he could not help but consider the Han population. Thus, caught between the two ethnic groups, the emperor was obliged to wait and monitor the situation (‘Thus, let’s see after reining in such affairs by first punishing some obviously wicked ones … This is for your ears only. Do not tell this to anybody else’).

Third, it was not until the late Qing that accounts about Lu Zhanghua’s achievement first emerged, although he had taken the lead in resolving the issue. The most vivid accounts of the lama issue might be expected to have been recorded in the Qianlong-era edition (the issue appeared in the Qianlong and Guangxu editions) of the local gazetteer for Wutai County, the Qianlong edition only briefly mentioned of Lu’s achievement. Detailed and more complete accounts then appeared in the Guangxu edition (compiled in the Guangxu 9th year). Although the community’s elderly members ‘still vividly remembered these events into the very moment of compiling the gazetteer’, that is, into the early Guangxu reign, ‘more than one hundred years after the incident’, the Qianlong edition failed to include certain details, such as the Kangxi emperor’s favours for the lamas as a significant historical factor behind the incident105, the concrete charges against the lamas—particularly concerning Confucian core principles—the local Han elite’s role in resolving the issue, and the local population’s admiration for the native Southern official.106

105 The problem with the Mount Wutai lamas was closely related to the Kangxi emperor’s pro-lama policy.
106 My perusal of local gazetteers and writings suggest that negative accounts of the Qing-era lamas most likely did not appear in local gazetteers and writings until the late Qing period.
From Anti-Heterodox to Anti-Manchu

Further information on the Han Chinese voice against heterodox elements, such as Tibetan Buddhism, can be found in the novel entitled *A Country Codger’s Humble Words* (*Yesou puyan* 野叟曝言)*107*, written by Xia Jingqu 夏敬渠 (1705-87), a native of Jiangnan (Jiangyin County, in Changzhou Prefecture) and a shengyuan degree holder. His novel is set during the Xianzong 憲宗 and Xiaozong 孝宗 periods of the Ming Dynasty, and the protagonist, Wen Suchen 文素臣, who is called ‘a Master Scholar of Confucianism’ is also a Jiangnan native (from Wujiang County in Suzhou Prefecture). The narrative mainly concerns a series of attempts by Wen and his party to eradicate heterodox elements, such as Buddhism (in particular Tibetan Buddhism), Daoism, Islam, and Christianity from both within and outside of China and, ultimately, from the world. Throughout the novel, Xia Jingqu describes Wen and his party’s efforts through military campaigns against the Miao and Mongol peoples, Japan, Tibet, and India. Regarding this chapter’s subject matter—anti-heterodox sentiment among the Han elite—the most arresting episode in the novel is a cruel, bloody massacre of Tibetan lamas. Wen’s son kills the incarnate lama and hangs his head on the city walls to show that the incarnate lama is merely a charlatan bereft of any mystical power. In the novel, Xu consistently describes Tibetan lamas as beasts, fools, or sexually depraved.*108*

107 The book’s title can be translated as ‘a country codger’s exposing words’, ‘a country codger’s humble scorching words’, or ‘a country codger’s advice to the emperor’. See McMahon, ‘A Case for Confucian Sexuality’, 37.

108 The oldest extant version of *Yesou puyan* is the manuscript copied in the Tongzhi 11th year. There remain two printed editions of *Yesou puyan*, one published at the Piling Huizhen lou 毗陵滙珍楼 in the Guangxu 7th year; the other prefaced by Ximin Shanqiao 西岷山樵 in the Guangxu 8th year—the former corresponds to the Tongzhi 11th manuscript. Regarding anti-Lamaism, the Guangxu 8th year version has explicit and more detailed descriptions—especially, see chapters 134-38—but much of those chapters
Some say *Yesou puyan* was written in the Kangxi period, but according to Wang Qiongling 王琼玲, it was written when Xia Jingqu was aged between sixty-three (1767, QL32) and sixty-nine (1773, QL38) years.\(^{109}\) The novel was not published during Xia’s lifetime owing to his ‘lack of money’. It was only after Xia’s death that transcripts began to spread and became so popular that in 1838 (DG18) it was included among the 116 banned books announced by the Surveillance Commissioner of Jiangsu, Yu Qian (1793–1841). The novel’s emphasis on Chinese cultural supremacy ensured its increasing popularity as China lost its imperial dominance under the influence of Western powers during the late nineteenth century.\(^{110}\)

During the late Qianlong period, interestingly, close to the *Yesou puyan* era, Qing official documents began to reveal the outlines of the Qing elite’s opposition to Tibetan Buddhism, which had almost never been covered in official documents. In one incident, in 1785 (QL50), on his way back to Tibet, a lama of the Tibetan envoys to Beijing lost his luggage around the Lugou 卢溝 Bridge. The incident in itself turned out to be insignificant,\(^{111}\) but while dealing with it, the Qianlong emperor became aware of a more serious underlying problem: despite such incidents’ frequent occurrence, officials, conscious of the Manchu ruler’s favourable attitude towards Tibetan Buddhism, regularly compensated the lamas out of their own pockets and never reported such incidents to the throne. Lama emissaries also took advantage of this practice.

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\(^{110}\) Wang Qiongling, ‘Cong yubo huicheng wangyang’, 215.


This incident was initially suspected to be a case of theft but turned out to be merely a chance event, which occurred while carters were looking for a pack mule that had escaped.
The Qianlong emperor’s response—a repeated, public declaration about the Manchu regime’s stance on Tibetan Buddhism—was noteworthy. After the aforementioned incident, the Qianlong emperor issued almost identical open edicts on the May 27 (QL50/4/19) and 28 (QL50/4/20); June 6, 1785 (QL50/4/29); January 22, 1791 (QL55/12/18); and January 18, 1792 (QL56/12/25). In late 1792 (QL57/10), the Qianlong emperor also authored a comprehensive thesis entitled *Pronouncement on Lamas* (*Lama shuo* 喇嘛說) concerning the nature of Qing policy towards Tibetan Buddhism. Moreover, the emperor ordered that the *Pronouncement* be inscribed on a memorial stone in four different languages—Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese, and Tibetan—to be erected at the Palace of Harmony (*Yonghe gong* 雍和宮) in Beijing. In early 1793 (early QL58), he also sent the *Pronouncement* to officials in Xinjiang.  

What made the Qianlong emperor repeatedly defend himself and his Manchu regime? His edict on May 27, 1785 may offer a clue:

(a) In the past, foreign emissaries always distressed Han Chinese people in China proper. That made the Han Chinese fear [foreign emissaries] as they feared tigers. For this reason, [the Han Chinese felt] just fine if nothing happened. In numerous instances, however, [this kind of attitude] led to [worse] consequences. … The bestowal of many gifts upon [the lamas] came from my benevolent heart alone. [My favourable attitude to them] is never [the same as] that of the late Yuan Dynasty, when [Mongol rulers] sided with the lamas (fanseng) and anyone who swore at a lama had their tongue cut out or their hand cut off if they hit a lama. [However,] misunderstanding my [true] intention, local officials have simply wanted to avoid punishment and have unofficially [and privately] compensated lamas for their damage. … (b) it makes ignorant people believe this Dynasty

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112 QSL-QL50/4/19; 50/4/20; 50/4/29; 55/12/18; 56/1/13; 56/12/25; 57/4/19; 58/4/19; The memorial by the Governor of the Henan Province, Muhelin on February 15, 1791 (QL56/1/13), 04-01-30-0432-015, *Zhupi zouzhe, Gongzhong quanzong*, FHA; Zhao Lingzhi et al., *Yonghe gong Manwen dang’an yibian*, 1302, 1305-7, 1312.
is following in the footsteps of the late Yuan Dynasty by venerating lamas. … If lamas continue their greedy and absurd behaviour, it will not be at all difficult to punish them. (c) [My attitude to] Xiyang Christianity can be a clear example. [If I have been so determined towards that relatively newly subjected religion,] how easier will it be [to punish] those who have already long been subject [to Qing rule]! (emphasis mine)\textsuperscript{113}

The emperor’s special concern about the Han population’s ‘misunderstanding’ is noteworthy. According to the emperor, Qing officials’ excessive kindness to lamas might evoke terrible memories of the Yuan dynasty among the Han Chinese, another period of alien rule that preceded the Qing conquest, and may lead them to associate the Manchu regime’s currently favourable policy towards Tibetan Buddhism with previous Mongol rulers’ preoccupation with it. To resolve this ‘misunderstanding’, the emperor is even willing to call the lamas ‘fanseng’, the unusual and less honorific designation for lamas during the Qing period. His concern over the Han population’s ‘misunderstanding’ and his justification for the resolution of the ‘misunderstanding’ are reiterated in the other four edicts and the \textit{Pronouncement on Lamas}.

Who were the ‘ignorant people’ mentioned in part (b)? First, the victims of the lama incidents were mainly people in ‘China proper’, and the emperor directly mentions the ‘Han Chinese’ when he exemplifies the popular attitude towards foreign emissaries before the Qing period. The Qing emperor’s use of this ethnonym for the population residing in China proper is unusual because Qing rulers generally preferred more ethnically neutral designations, such as ‘\textit{neidi ren} 内地人’ or ‘\textit{minren} 民人’, in referring to this segment of the population. The emperor’s unusual lexical selection indicates that the main target of this imperial edict was

\textsuperscript{113} QSL-QL50/4/19; FHA, \textit{Qianlong chao shangyu dang}, vol. 12, 1542-43.
likely to be the Han, although he simply refers to them as ‘ignorant people’ and gives no further information about them. In his edict of June 6, 1785, part (a) is recorded more negatively:

There is plenty of evidence that the Han Chinese population’s isolationist attitude has caused unrest in border areas and eventually brought about serious troubles.

In the same edict, part (b) is paraphrased as follows:

… will the ignorant people who are outside not doubt that this Dynasty also excessively venerates lamas, and does the same as the Mongol [rulers] during the Yuan period, cutting out one’s tongue if one swears at a lama, or cutting off one’s hand if one hits a lama?114

This paraphrased section is comparable to the following excerpt from the Manchu version of the Pronouncement of 1792:

Moreover, if you [want to] decide that a certain thing is right or wrong, that is possible only after you learn and grasp it. Without learning the Tibetan Buddhist scriptures (Ma. tanggūt nomun), [how] can I say [anything about] it? When [I] started to learn [the scriptures], some Han Chinese (Ma. nikasa) told me that [I] was venerating Buddha’s teachings to an excessive degree. [However,] if I had sought empty reputation by simply following Han scripture (Ma. damu ceni nikan bithei songkoi), could I have made new and old Mongols fear the Qing Empire’s authority, made them give thanks for [the Qing emperor’s] favour, and made [the world] peaceful for dozens of years? Above all, [the Qing Empire] has immediately punished by law the disruptive lamas from Back Tibet (Ma. amargi dzang). Did the [Mongol rulers] ever take such [a determined measure] during the Yuan period? (underlining marked in the original source)115

114 QSL-QL50.4.29; FHA, Qianlong chao shangyu dang, vol. 12, 604.
115 Beijingshi, Beijing diqu Manwen beikey tapian zongmu, 506-07.
The Pronouncement clarifies that during the Qianlong period, the Han Chinese population criticised the Manchu regime for ‘venerating Buddha’s teachings to an excessive degree’, and thus, the ‘ignorant people’ in the edict of May 27, 1785, who are described as ‘thinking that this Dynasty also does the same as the late Yuan Dynasty by venerating lamas’, is none other than the Han Chinese population.

More interesting is the Chinese version of the same part in the Pronouncement. While the Manchu version clarifies that the critics were Han Chinese (Ma. nikasa), the Chinese version, ‘When [I] started to learn [the scriptures], if certain people’s argument that I am helping the Buddha’s teachings to thrive excessively, had made me cling to a transient, empty reputation\textsuperscript{116} does not mention anything about the Han Chinese. Furthermore, in the Manchu version quoted above, which is the original Manchu draft, the Qianlong emperor provides a ‘guideline’ by underlining certain controversial Han Chinese-related remarks, including ‘some Han Chinese’ and ‘by simply following Han scriptures’.

How successful in resolving the ‘misunderstanding’ were the emperor’s measures and the grounds he provided in his defence? The answer can be found at the end of this section, but first, let us examine the last line (‘[My attitude to] Xiyang Christianity can be a clear example.’) of the edict of May 27, 1785, which is the most relevant aspect of our current topic. It is highly likely that this remark about Christianity referred to ‘the Great Persecution’ that began around the end of September 1784. Unlike his confident remark about his resolute attitude towards Xiyang Christianity, however, during the persecution, he merely punished the Chinese individuals involved—precisely, those in China proper. Although six of the Xiyang

\textsuperscript{116} Zhou Runnian, ‘Beijing Yonghegong yuzhi Lamashuo beiwen’, 87, 92-94.
people involved died in prison unexpectedly, all others were exempted from the death penalty by an imperial edict on the second of May 1785 (QL50/3/24) and were finally released from prison by another imperial edict on the sixth of November 1785 (QL50/10/8). In this regard, we cannot help but have certain doubts about the emperor’s argument that his resolute attitude towards Xiyang Christianity attests to his determination to stand against heterodox or foreign elements. This was not the first time that the Qianlong emperor saved Xiyang missionaries from a crisis. Looking beyond the Qianlong period to include the Shunzhi, the Kangxi, and the Yongzheng periods, Chinese Christians were almost always the only victims, but the Xiyang missionaries concerned were simply expelled to Canton or Macao. The five Xiyang missionaries who were involved in the Fu’an incident in April 1746 and the two in the incidents that occurred around Suzhou and Jiaxing in early 1748, who were ‘executed’ constitute notable exceptions. The driving force behind those decisions was a Han official’s persistent requests that Xiyang missionaries, as the main culprits, should be punished more severely than Chinese Christians, who were merely accessories; and a push by local officials to expedite the execution of the Xiyang missionaries, especially after an attempt in November 1747 (QL12/10) by Don José Pasarín, captain of the San Andrés, to repatriate Joaquín Royo’s body and rescue the four surviving missionaries.

The background against which the Qianlong emperor repeatedly defended the Manchu regime against possible attacks by the contemporary Han elite on the Qing regime’s legitimacy by recalling the Han elite’s attitude against heterodoxy and foreign elements during the late Yuan was not unrelated to the rage of Wen Suchen, a member of the Jiangnan elite, against

119 QZXT, vol. 1, no. 58, 88-89; no. 75, 115-16, 118-21; no. 95, 160.
120 QSL-QL1/run7/7; QZXT, vol. 1, no. 96, 163; Krahl, China Missions in Crisis, 52-57; Zhang Xianqing, Guanfu zongzu yu Tianzhujiao, 131.
China’s infestation with heterodox, foreign elements, such as the Miaos, the Mongols, Tibetan Buddhism, Muslims, and Christianity, as depicted in the novel by another Jiangnan elite Xia Jingqu in the 1760s to 1770s, as mentioned above. It is a ‘coincidence’ that the heterodox, foreign elements that the Jiangnan elite sought to criticise using the voice of another member of the Jiangnan elite were among the Manchu regime’s achievements. As if Yesou puyan was a ‘book of prophecy’ for the coming ten to twenty years, any discerning member of the Han elite or official alive in the 1780s to 1790s must have associated its descriptions with the contemporary Manchu empire, which was plagued by the outbreak of the Salar Muslim uprisings in 1781, the ‘Great Persecution’ of Christianity in 1784, the lama problems during the mid-1780s, the series of uprisings by heterodox and heretical believers, including the Wang Lun (1774) and Lin Shuangwen (1787–88) uprisings, as well as the Miao minority’s uprising in the mid-1790s.

However, almost no specialists in the Yesou Puyan have highlighted the link between the novel and historical context in which it was written. In Anglophone academia, for example, Yesou Puyan had been examined mainly by R. Keith McMahon, Martin Huang, Maram Epstein, and Zheng Huili, but none of these have seriously considered the novel’s historical background. Their studies merely mentioned the emergence of Confucian sexuality or autobiographical literature in eighteenth-century China or highlighted the anti-monk atmosphere of the novel’s times. At best, the elite’s desire for their active role in society was acknowledged. Although the most recent study, by Zheng Huili, attempted to highlight the link between the Qing intellectuals’ awakening of Self and Other and the times in which they lived, Zheng also did
not seriously consult historical studies, except to refer to Philip Kuhn’s study on the ‘soulstealers’ incident of 1768, as did Epstein.121

This tendency is even more pronounced, or likely ‘intentional’, in Sinophone literature. Attempts by a minority of researchers to link *Yesou puyan* to its times met with strong opposition. Fang Jiling 方驥齡, for example, faced strong criticism from Chen Xiang in 1955 as soon as Fang attempted to relate the novel’s anti-heterodox sentiments to anti-Manchu movements of the novel’s period.122 Since then, approaches similar to Fang’s have been flatly rejected by Chinese-speaking scholars, including Wang Qiongling—currently the most active authority on *Yesou puyan*. Sinophone literature includes little serious analysis or mention of the Han population’s anti-Manchuism. Rather, Chinese studies repeat almost the same conclusion that anti-Manchuism has not existed in harmonious, multiethnic China since the high Qing. They assert that even towards the end of the Qing period, during which anti-Qing slogans were prevalent in China, these slogans did not necessarily reflect anti-Manchu sentiment but merely the Chinese people’s unified opposition to the *ancien régime* of the last traditional dynasty; if any anti-Manchuism was employed at all, it was merely a temporary inevitability to mobilise the public and was soon replaced by the slogans of the ‘Republic of Five Peoples’ (*wuzu gonghe* 五族共和) and the ‘Unified Polyethnic State’ (*tongyi duo minzu guojia* 統一多民族國家).123 A recent study by Liu Xiaomeng 劉小萌, a specialist in the Manchu people during the Qing period, also highlights the consistent intellectual tendency towards ‘a Unified Polyethnic State’

122 Fang Jiling, ‘*Yesou puyan* xin pingjia’; Chen Xiang, ‘*Yesou puyan* shoubuqi xin pingjia’
123 See Zarrow, ‘Historical Trauma’, 70-76.
throughout Chinese history and regards anti-Manchuism as a mere temporary aberration. He also praises the multiethnic harmony of the mid-Qing period as a bridge to the birth of the ‘Chinese nation’.

However, Yesou puyan indeed reflects its times, or more precisely, the anti-Manchu sentiment of Xia’s contemporary Han elite society. First, the novel, as if it were ‘a book of prophecy’, predicted future decades when ‘heterodox’ groups Manchu rulers had supported would cause a series of uprisings in China. Second, Yesou puyan’s author, Xia Jingqu, who likely projected himself onto the novel’s protagonist, a Jiangnan elite with an ardent Confucian and anti-heterodox ideal, was not unconnected with anti-Manchuism. In addition to the worldview that he reflects in Yesou puyan, his ancestral background was also deeply imbued with anti-Manchu sentiment, because Xia had several forebears who had ardently resisted Manchu rule and died for the Ming dynasty during the Ming–Qing transition. Indeed, Xia himself knew better his anti-Manchu pedigree than anyone. Third, it is also doubtful that Yesou puyan, which would have offended the emperor had he read it, was not published merely due to ‘lack of money’, because it would be disseminated underground in the form of a manuscript and would become one of the Qing period’s most popular novels.

Were there no other figures such as Xia Jingqu or Wen Suchen during the Qing period? If we envision the Han Confucian elite under Manchu rule, an epitomising image might be ‘the one who, with his forehead shaved, had to read the well-known phrase, ‘[Our] body, hair, and skin are received from our parents, so not to dare to allow them to be injured is the beginning of filial piety’ of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing). Although the Qing Confucian elite encountered the Confucian ideal on an everyday basis through books and daily rituals and

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125 Wang Qiongling, ‘You Jiangyin Xiashi zongpu kan’, 163-67. Interestingly, Wang interprets Xia’s Ming loyalist ancestry as evidence of his assumption that Xia was loyal to the Qing Dynasty.
longed for this ideal, they had no choice but to bear a definite symbol of heterodoxy (i.e., the shaved forehead) on their own bodies. The natural question that arises is, how could the Qing Confucian elite manage this discrepancy between the ideal and the reality? The answer seems to concern the following two extreme approaches to adjustment.

The first type of Confucian elite interpreted their submission and loyalty to the Manchu regime as ‘the Chinese man’s burden’ to civilise all barbarians worldwide. For example, Gu Sili 顧嗣立 (1665–1722)—who, as a Jiangnan native (from Changzhou County, in Jiangsu Province)—entered Manchu government service during the Kangxi period, praised Yao Shu 姚樞 (1203–80), the defector to the Mongol Yuan regime, as a hero who prevented any interruption in the continuity of Chinese culture, on the grounds that by sparing Zhao Fu’s 趙復 (fl. 1230–60) life and sending him to the Yuan capital during the 1235 war between the Yuan and Southern Song, Yao played an important role in transmitting Cheng-Zhu’s Confucian teachings to the Mongol regime. Gu also celebrated Qubilai Khan’s reunification of China.126 During the Qing period, ‘Twice-serving officials’ (erchen) like Gu tended to believe that the presence of a talented man, in itself, demonstrated Heaven’s will to save the world from turbulent times, and thus the highest responsibility of a talented man was to save the world by exhibiting his entire talent, regardless of whether his loyalty was to the Ming or the Qing. They also regarded themselves as remnants (yilao) of the Ming Dynasty who, to lead transitional China in the right direction, endured insults and criticisms and risked their lives.127 For these Confucian elites, the heterodox or foreign elements that infested the Qing Empire could be reinterpreted as achievements of the Great Unity (datong), in which all people under Heaven lived harmoniously without distinction between barbarians and civilised people, because

Chinese culture had already civilised the barbarians. Therefore, the heterodox and foreign symbols on their bodies, that is, the Manchu-style forehead, could also be reinterpreted as physical evidence of the Great Unity, in which no difference existed between the Hua, the Yi, the Inner, and the Outer.

By contrast, a mid-1760s anecdote describes a member of the Han elite whom Hong Dae-yong 洪大容 (1731-83), a Chosŏn envoy, encountered in the Qing Empire. When Hong expressed his desire to go to Qufu to meet descendants of Confucius, the Han elite, touching his shaved forehead, said to Hong, ‘since they have become like this, you don’t need to meet them.’ This member of the Han elite might well illustrate another type of Confucian elite, who lived with a sense of shame, helplessness, and rage under Qing rule. They were well aware of the fiction that underlay rhetoric such as ‘the Hua and the Yi are one family’ or ‘the Inner and the Outer are one family’. For these Confucian elites, Manchu rule and heterodox, foreign elements, such as Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism, and Manchu shamanism, that infested the Manchu empire, were omens of ruin, and the heterodox, foreign symbols on their bodies, such as their shaved foreheads, became a trauma that continually reminded them of their frustrated ideals and the loss of their true China. This image of the Confucian elite, however, is barely noticeable in historical materials produced during the mid-Qing period, which included abundant eulogies to the Manchu regime; such an image, if any, could be exposed through outsider’s records, such as that of the Chosŏn envoy above.

The two types were not clearly distinct but rather mixed in practice throughout Qing history. However, the second type, which the Yongzheng emperor was worried his father’s legacy encouraged, would become more prominent as the Han Chinese elite witnessed the Qing

128 Hong Daeyong, Damheon yeongi, Songgŏin 宋舉人, QL31/1/4 [1766.2.12].
state’s increasing inability to control undesirable elements in China, such as economic depression, floating populations, various uprisings, religious sects, and the increasing influence of the European powers. What we have observed thus far in this chapter was a foreshadowing of what would happen during the Qing Empire’s later periods, when the mixture of pent-up shame, helplessness, and rage in the second type of Han elite erupted unchecked. In fact, the Han Chinese elite’s rage against the Manchus—not only the Manchu ruler, but also all Manchus—did not manifest itself all of a sudden at the end of the Qing Dynasty. Rather, this eruption was an ‘expected’ explosion of deep-rooted Han Chinese ‘Hua-Yi’ discrimination that was based on their ‘racial consciousness’. The more Han elites paid attention to yi (i.e., Christianity) and thus awakened their deep-rooted, pent-up anger towards yi, the more their anger towards another, more tangible yi (i.e., the Manchu conquerors) were awakened. In this regard, the Xiyang issue during the mid-Qing period was an important factor that advanced this awakening.
Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation was to grasp the status and significance of the Xiyang people (the people referred to using the ethnonym ‘Xiyang’) in the context of the early Qing Empire beyond the East (China)-West (Europe) or foreign relations frameworks. The temporal focus was on the period from 1644, the year of the first official encounter between the two, to 1724, a watershed in the history of Christianity in China.

Part I, which consists of Chapters I, II, IV, and IV, analysed the Xiyang people’s status in the Qing Empire and examined how the Qing Empire’s heterogeneity influenced the Xiyang people’s presence in ‘China’. In Chapter I, by focusing on the relations between the early Qing Empire and Schall von Bell during the Shunzhi and the early Kangxi periods, the dissertation queried how the Qing Empire’s origin and experience in Inner Asia influenced the Xiyang people’s status in the Qing Empire. Originating from eastern Eurasia, the Qing Empire burgeoned by incorporating peoples who had belonged to various political entities in east Eurasia. In the incorporation process, the Qing ruler granted them a new identity as ‘Qing people’ while, at the same time, allowing them to preserve their own cultures. The Qing Empire applied this approach to the Xiyang people as well.

Chapters II, III, and IV examined the Xiyang people’s status, especially from a legal perspective. The dissertation examined the Calendar Case, and in particular, the specific accusations against the Xiyang people and their religion; the Qing state’s final judgement of the accusations; the interconnectedness and interaction of the Calendar Case with the Qing general religious policy; the Beijing missionaries’ legal struggle to recover the legal privileges that they had enjoyed during the Shunzhi period; and, in the end, the 1669 ban on Christianity as a very disappointing conclusion following the legal struggle. The dissertation also dealt with the Xiyang people’s misunderstanding, or distortion, of their status in the Qing Empire,
especially by analysing the Xiyang people’s interpretation of the Council’s Conclusion reached in 1669. Despite the Xiyang people’s admiration for the Qing state, the Council intended to adhere to the empire’s longtime religious policy and prescribe the Xiyang people’s religion, alongside the limitations that all Qing religions had been required to observe. Contrary to the Xiyang people’s appreciation, it was only due to the Shunzhi emperor’s favour that during his reign period Christians were able to enjoy the collective practice of their religion (i.e., Mass), as an exception to the strict legal boundaries prescribed by law at that time.

Part II addressed how the Xiyang people's presence in ‘China’ influenced Qing heterogeneity, particularly the relations between the Manchu and Han peoples, the two major constituents of the empire. Chapters V and VI analysed the historical factors, up to the early eighteenth century, influencing the harsh response by the Han Chinese to the Xiyang people and other alien—thus heterodox—elements in the Qing Empire. Consequently, these chapters focused on the Manchus’ worries and the Han elite’s anger towards them. The analysis suggested that the Xiyang people’s presence in the Qing Empire advanced the awakening of deep-rooted Han Chinese ‘Hua-Yi’ discrimination, which was based on their (newly found) ‘racial consciousness’ and unearthed the long-buried trauma Manchus had inflicted during the Ming–Qing transition. In fact, anti-Manchuism did not suddenly emerge at the end of the Qing period but rather was something that had recurred in Chinese history before expectedly re-emerging in the late Qing period. What we glimpsed in the last two chapters was none other than the silhouette of this ‘something’, which most modern Chinese scholars argue has not existed in their history.
## Appendix 1: Charges during the Calendar Case

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<td>The letter written to Xu Zhitian on the twentieth of April 1664 (Y-III)</td>
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<td>Zhai miu shi lun (Y-1)</td>
<td>Xuanze yi (Y-2)</td>
<td>Zhongxing shuo (Y-3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 邪教, 邪黨, 造傳妖書惑眾, 谋叛, 不軌, 論，依律正法</td>
<td>- 邪教, 妖書, 妖言惑眾, 明背本國, 抗君, 谋大清, 寸斬, 刽, 剖胸, 論</td>
<td>- 邪教, 左道, 謂理叛道, 謂禍(concerning Ricci), 謂跨奴國, 論</td>
<td>- 邪說, 左道</td>
<td>- 異端, 妖言, 悪人, 賊理叛道, 論</td>
<td>- 妖書妖言, 悪理叛道, 論</td>
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<td>- 謀反</td>
<td>- 謀反, 論, 邪教, 論, 正法, 反貶</td>
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<td>- 不軌</td>
<td>- 論, 論反, 正法, 妖人</td>
<td>- 正法</td>
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<tr>
<td>謀叛</td>
<td>(1) Schall von Bell entered China illegally.</td>
<td>○ (Y-I-b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Xiyang people and their Chinese followers have been building churches across key cities, and the Xiyang people have resided in those key cities.</td>
<td>○ (Y-I-d)</td>
<td>○ (Y-III-f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>議叛</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Xiyang people have occupied Macao and, by using Macao, have been connected with maritime forces.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>(Y-I-e)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>(Y-III-g)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>議叛</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>During the Ming period, Ricci let the Xiyang people into China, leading them to occupy and fortify Macao.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>議叛</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Using the opportunity of residing in Beijing, Schall von Bell has been engaged in espionage for foreign countries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
<td>(Y-I-f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>議叛</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Schall von Bell and his followers wrote the phrase, ‘Following the Xiyang new methods’, on the Qing Calendar cover in order to claim that the Qing Empire is under the authority of a Xiyang country (or countries).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
<td>(Y-I-g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>議叛</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>That Li Zubai obtained a history book of Judea written in Chinese means Li has already betrayed his own country and has been serving Judea.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
<td>(Y-III-b)</td>
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<th>諍反</th>
<th>(8) That Ricci conspired to attack Japan during the Ming period shows Xiyang or Christian people's natural inclination to invade other countries.</th>
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<tr>
<td>謀叛, 大逆</td>
<td>(9) Describing the Shunzhi emperor as a seeker or a proponent of Christianity is the same as resisting the sovereign, and betraying their own country and serving a foreign country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>禁止, 師巫邪術</td>
<td>(10) Succession to the Way (daotong 道統) was interrupted by the Xiyang new methods, and this serious situation corresponds to what the Wangzhi 王制 section of the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記) described, 'Those who give false reports about spirits, dates, and divination so as to bewilder the multitudes are put to death.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Content</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>議反</td>
<td>(11) The reason they prepared the calendar only to cover two hundred years was that they wished the Qing Empire a short life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大逆</td>
<td>(12) The Christian teachings disregard the Heaven, the Earth, the ruler, the father, and the teacher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>造妖書妖言,謀反</td>
<td>(13) Jesus was the leader of heretical traitors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>造妖書妖言</td>
<td>(14) Judged by its contents, Tianxue chuangai is a book on sorcery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>造妖書妖言</td>
<td>(15) Christianity is sorcerous and heretical teachings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>造妖書妖言</td>
<td>(16) They say that all ancient saints’ teachings came from Christianity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>禁止師巫邪術</td>
<td>(17) The Xiyang teachings are heterodox (zuodao zhi xue 左道之學), and their theory and practice all contradict the Principle and the Way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大逆</td>
<td>(18) Since they argue that the first human was created by the Heavenly Lord and was the ancestor of all sovereigns and subjects in the world, they make their lord and fathers descendants of the heretical teachings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大逆</td>
<td>(19) There was a wicked intention behind their wrong selection of the inauspicious tomb direction and burial time for Prince Rong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大逆</td>
<td>(20) The Old Methods are correct, and the New Methods are wrong.</td>
</tr>
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Appendix 2: Comparisons between the Accounts in *Acta Pekinensia* and Qing Sources

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<td>The Beijing Jesuits</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>#4</td>
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<td>The emperor</td>
<td>Heshiheng</td>
<td>AP I, 15[6]; QCXCMDY, 285(3-1)</td>
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¹ There were many questions and answers between Heshiheng and the Beijing Jesuits because of the emperor’s edict (#2). See QCXCMDY, 284(11-6), 285(3-8).
² The underline means ‘from the bottom’.
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<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>#11</td>
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<td>1706.1.1</td>
<td>a) The emperor’s order to select an official from the Imperial Household Department to accompany Bouvet and Mariani; b) the Imperial Household Department’s answer with a list of candidates, including Bursai; c) the emperor’s order to select Bursai from the candidates and to also choose an official from the Ministry of War.</td>
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<td>Before 1706.1.3</td>
<td>To inform Bursai of what he should do in the company of Bouvet and Mariani: a) to help Bouvet and Mariani to embark in Fujian if there is a ship for Rome in Fujian; b) to help them to embark in Macao if there is no ship in Fujian; c) Bursai should return to Beijing as soon as the mission has boarded a ship; d) if there is no ship in Macao, Bursai should return to Beijing soon after having Bouvet and Mariani wait for another ship at a church in Canton under the Guangdong Governor’s supervision.</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
<td>Heshiheng</td>
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<td>#14</td>
<td>KX44/11/19</td>
<td>1706.1.3</td>
<td>To appoint Bouvet as the imperial envoy: a) to approve Bursai’s request to make Bouvet as an interpreter accompany the mission; b) to order Bursai to return to Beijing after guiding them to Fujian; c) to order Bouvet to accompany the mission all the way to Xiyang in order to deliver the emperor’s gift to the Pope; d) to reiterate that there is no other reason for the emperor to send Bouvet to Rome.</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
<td>Bouvet, the Pope</td>
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<td>#15</td>
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<td>1706.1.3</td>
<td>The Imperial Household Department’s request to the Ministry of War: a) to deliver the emperor’s edict (#13) to the Ministry; b) to request means of transport such as horses or carts for the imperial gifts to the Pope.</td>
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<td>#16</td>
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<td>1706.1.4</td>
<td>An urgent dispatch (<em>huopiào</em> 火票) to order all relevant local officials to provide Bouvet and Mariani with means of transport and their necessities.</td>
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<td>1706.1.4</td>
<td>The legate’s first letter to the Pope (produced on the third of January; translated in the early morning of the fourth). After reading this letter on the verge of his departure for Zunhua 遵化, the emperor leaves instructions with his officials, including the instruction that the order between Bouvet and Mariani described in the letter should be modified.</td>
<td>de Tournon</td>
<td>the Pope</td>
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<td>#18</td>
<td>c.KX44/12/25</td>
<td>c.1706.2.8</td>
<td>Heshiheng visits de Tournon to monitor the latter’s every movement; de Tournon has not yet revealed one of the purposes for this visit, namely to inspect the Xiyang missionaries and Christian communities in China.</td>
<td>Heshiheng</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#19</td>
<td>c.KX44/12/25</td>
<td>c.1706.2.8</td>
<td>Heshiheng visits de Tournon to monitor the latter’s every movement; de Tournon has not yet revealed one of the purposes for this visit, namely to inspect the Xiyang missionaries and Christian communities in China.</td>
<td>Heshiheng</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>#20</td>
<td>c.KX45/1/11</td>
<td>c.1706.2.23</td>
<td>Heshiheng visits de Tournon to monitor the latter’s every movement; de Tournon has not yet revealed one of the purposes for this visit, namely to inspect the Xiyang missionaries and Christian communities in China.</td>
<td>Heshiheng</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>#21</td>
<td>KX45/5/11</td>
<td>1706.6.21</td>
<td>The Beijing Jesuits are ordered to produce and translate this edict while under detention from 6.00 am to 6.00 pm. The contents are as follows: a) the legate has a definite purpose for this visit although he has said that he has no other purpose than to express thanks for the emperor’s protection for the Xiyang people thus far; b) the Beijing Jesuits have no special status in the empire but are no more than workers or technicians; c) it is customary in this empire for the behaviour and movements of anyone from outside the empire to be closely monitored; d) de Tournon should be conscious of the Chinese population of the empire and behave prudently; e) the legate should not mention anything about political issues, except where these relate to religion.</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
<td>de Tournon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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3 Similar situations can often be observed in Acta Pekinensia. For example, on the twentieth of March 1706 (KX45/2/6), although Heshiheng visited de Tournon to garner more information regarding the latter’s purpose of this visit, Heshiheng was unable to gain any meaningful information (AP I, 212).
| #22 | KX45/5/12 | 1706.6.22 | De Tournon’s response to the emperor’s edict (#21): a) to ask if the rumour that the emperor appointed Bouvet as the sole imperial representative is true; b) to criticise the strife among the Xiyang missionaries and accuse the Portuguese as the source of said strife. | de Tournon | The emperor | AP I, 374-77[198-200] |
| #23 | KX45/5/12 | 1706.6.22 | A document produced by Heshiheng to inform Yinti of the contents of de Tournon’s response (#22) in advance before the translation thereof was finished. | Heshiheng | Yinti | AP I, 377[200] |
| #24 | KX45/5/12 | 1706.6.22 | The emperor’s first response to de Tournon’s response (#22): a) Mariani should have given way to Bouvet because the emperor appointed the latter as envoy on behalf of the Qing Empire; b) Bouvet should also have yielded to Mariani to a certain degree in honour of the fact that Mariani was a guest from afar. | The emperor | de Tournon | AP I, 382[202-3] |
| #25 | KX45/5/12 | 1706.6.22 | The emperor’s second response to de Tournon’s response (#22): a) to criticise de Tournon for the remark that he wanted to inform the emperor of a secret about the imperial family; b) Mariani as a foreign envoy cannot simultaneously serve as a Qing envoy; c) regarding the leadership position in the mission, Bouvet and Mariani should have made mutual concessions; d) to ask de Tournon if both Bouvet and Mariani should be returned to Beijing immediately; e) the emperor’s answer to de Tournon’s accusation against the Portuguese; f) the Xiyang community in the Qing Empire should live together in the same place and observe the empire’s principles. | The emperor | de Tournon | AP I, 383-84[203-4] |
| #26 | KX45/5/12 | 1706.6.22 | De Tournon’s response to the emperor’s answer (#25): a) to thank the emperor for the edict; b) to apologise for the strife between Bouvet and Mariani; c) to ask that the mission to Rome not be suspended because the Pope has already been informed that the mission is on its way. | de Tournon | The emperor | AP I, 385[204-5] |
| #27 | KX45/5/13 | 1706.6.23 | The emperor’s response to de Tournon’s answer (#26): a) the emperor does not have anything more to say; b) to ask de Tournon if both Bouvet and Mariani should be returned to Beijing immediately because of strife between the two; c) regarding other issues, to discuss at a later date upon the emperor’s return from Jehol. | The emperor | de Tournon | AP I, 387[206]; KLGW(no. 1), 7 |
| #28 | KX45/5/14 | 1706.6.24 | The edict the emperor ordered to be revealed to de Tournon if the latter wondered about its contents: a) there are many false Xiyang missionaries in the empire; b) henceforth, anyone wishing to enter the Qing Empire should observe the empire’s principles; c) only those who give up returning to Xiyang will be permitted to stay in China proper; sojourners will be denied entry; d) Xiyang merchants cannot enter China proper; e) all Xiyang people, regardless of their home country or religious order, must live together in an allotted place. | The emperor | de Tournon | AP I, 391-92[208]; KLGW(no. 2), 9-10 |

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4 This is the date that the edict was proclaimed, but it had already been prepared at least on the twenty-third of June (AP I, 387).
Although KXMZZ, no. 949, 448 records this answer as dated the ninth of September 1706 (KX45/8/3), the date seems to be the date that the answer was delivered to the emperor, not the date that Bouvet sent it to Beijing. This is because Bouvet received the emperor’s instruction (#29) on the twenty-eighth of July (KX45/6/19) and sent a letter, to Gerbillion, with the letter (#30), on the thirty-first of July (KX45/6/22). According to Acta Pekinensia, Bouvet’s answer reached Beijing on the eighth of September, and the emperor received it on the tenth or eleventh (AP II, 132[414]).
| #33 | KX45/5/25 | 1706.7.5 | The edict sent by the emperor during his journey to Jehol: a) the emperor’s position regarding de Tournon’s plan to visit Xiyang missionaries and Christian communities in China; b) regarding de Tournon’s recommendation of Borghese, whom he left behind in Beijing; c) the emperor wishes to read de Tournon’s visit report to the Pope; d) to order his third son (huang sanzi 皇三子) to provide de Tournon with food regularly; e) an analogy between the emperor’s shoe and the ancestral tablet; f) the emperor laughs at the list submitted by Maigrot; g) Chinese law focuses more on governing the state than on private issues; h) to ask why Maigrot does not explain the reasons he believes the Chinese texts in his previously submitted list contradict the Christian teachings; i) the emperor’s position on de Tournon’s criticism regarding the emperor’s Temple of Heaven (tiantan 天壇) rituals. |
| #34 | KX45/5/27 | 1706.7.7 | De Tournon’s response to the emperor’s edict (#33). |
| #35 | KX45/6/6 | 1706.7.15 | The emperor criticises Maigrot’s answer regarding the contradictions between the Confucian and Christian teachings. |
| #36 | KX45/6/7 | 1706.7.16 | The legate’s second letter to the Pope. |
| #37 | KX45/6/24 | 1706.8.2 | The emperor’s first edict regarding the meeting with Maigrot in Jehol: a) to criticise de Tournon for his recommendation of Maigrot as an expert to the emperor; b) to criticise Maigrot’s unfounded criticism of the Chinese rites; c) the emperor’s explanation of the term ‘jing tian’ and the rites concerning Confucius, the ancestral tablets, and the ji ritual; d) to criticise the five thousand Chinese who are said to follow Maigrot in Fujian; e) to criticise Maigrot’s lie that all of these five thousand followers are from lower socio-economic groups who cannot... |
| #38 | KX45/6/25 | 1706.8.3 | The emperor’s second edict regarding the meeting with Maigrot in Jehol: a) to criticise Maigrot’s poor knowledge of the Chinese language; b) to criticise de Tournon for his obstinacy based on Maigrot’s poor knowledge of Chinese culture and language; c) to criticise the Xiyang people divided over the issue regarding the Chinese rites; d) to declare future punishments on Xiyang individuals who teach against the Chinese rites; e) to reiterate that de Tournon must inform the Pope without disguise of the emperor’s position on the Chinese rites; f) to threaten that the emperor himself will make all relevant facts public in Xiyang if de Tournon hides anything from the Pope; g) to cancel his previous approval of de Tournon’s countrywide visits; h) only to permit limited visits in so far as the entire Xiyang community are gathered in a single venue. | The emperor | de Tournon |
| #39 | KX45/7/6 | 1706.8.13 | De Tournon’s attitude when he receives the emperor’s edicts (#37, #38). | Heshiheng | The emperor |
| #40 | KX45/7/8 | 1706.8.15 | The emperor’s response to Heshiheng’s report (#39): the emperor orders Heshiheng to report in greater detail after further investigation. | The emperor | Heshiheng |
| #41 | KX45/7/9 | 1706.8.16 | Heshiheng’s answer (regarding his conversation with de Tournon in the early morning of the sixteenth of August) to the emperor’s edict (#40): a) Heshiheng asks de Tournon why the latter visited Heshiheng’s residence the previous day (1706.8.15); b) Heshiheng criticises de Tournon for his inappropriate behaviour thus far in Beijing; c) de Tournon answers that he will surely inform | Heshiheng | The emperor |

The conversation between Heshiheng and de Tournon on the sixteenth of August is described in AP I, 604-10[333-37] and Heshiheng’s report based on this conversation is included in AP I, 598-603[329-32].
<p>| #42 | KX45/7/13 | 1706.8.20 | The emperor’s edict regarding Heshiheng’s report (#41): to order Heshiheng to report again in more detail after further investigation with Zhao Chang, whom the emperor has just sent from Jehol. | The emperor | Heshiheng | KXMZZ no.913, 435(12). |
| #43 | KX45/7/14 | 1706.8.21 | De Tournon’s initial answer to the emperor’s edict (#43): a) to appreciate the emperor for providing him with the opportunity to be persecuted on behalf of Christ; b) to deny that he has ever done anything wrong; c) to apologise for his recommendation of Maigrot to the emperor. | de Tournon | The emperor | The situation under which the edict (#43) was proclaimed before de Tournon is described in AP I, 627-30[347-49], and de Tournon’s written response to this edict is included in AP I, 635[352-53]. De |
| #44 | KX45/7/13 | 1706.8.20 | The emperor’s answer to the reports (#39, #41): a) to criticise de Tournon’s answer that even the Pope cannot make the Xiyang community live together; b) to complain that de Tournon’s qualification as papal legate has not been verified, not only because he has not shown any official proof of his status but also because he has demonstrated appropriate behaviour worthy of his alleged qualification; c) because of Tournon, from now on, all missionaries wishing to visit China must undergo an investigation process before being allowed to enter the empire; d) to criticise de Tournon’s inappropriate behaviour thus far; e) to inform that the mission to Rome would shortly be suspended and Bouvet and Mariani recalled. | The emperor | de Tournon | AP I, 625-27[346-48]; KXMZZ no.914, 435(16-26). |</p>
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<td>The emperor’s official edict to de Tournon’s revised answer (#45): a) the emperor will continue to protect the Xiyang community in China as before, not because of de Tournon’s request but because of the emperor’s own will and benevolence; b) henceforth, the emperor will punish any Xiyang individual who do not observe Chinese law; c) anyone who fears punishment should not even come to China; d) the emperor allows de Tournon’s request in the previous letter that he wants to send his regards (qing’an 請安) to the emperor, but does not allow de Tournon to use that opportunity to raise any other issues; e) to order de Tournon to leave Beijing as promised.</td>
<td>de Tournon</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
<td>AP I, 670[374-75]. For the circumstances in Jehol regarding this edict, see AP II, 120-23[408-10]; KXMZZ, no. 3880, 1578(13-10).</td>
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<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>AP II, 406-7[572-73]; QCXCMDY, 319(1)-20(2)</td>
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<td>The edict sent by the emperor to the Beijing Jesuits after he becomes aware of de Tournon’s proclamation of a decree in Nanjing.</td>
<td>The emperor</td>
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<td>Hervé, Biandrate, Governors-general, Governors, other</td>
<td>AP II, 419-22[579-81]</td>
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⁶ Although this date is written in the edict, Stumpf is sure that this edict was prepared at least before the twenty-third of September (AP II, 127[412]).
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<td>Early or mid-April (at least before mid-May)</td>
<td>Regarding receipt of the permits.</td>
<td>The emperor; Manuel Mendes, SJ, (Meng Youyi 1656-1741) and eight missionaries; AP II, 417-18[578-79]; KLGW, no. 4, 13-14; QZXT, no. 7, 12; <em>Atti Imperiali</em>, no. 67, 202-4; Rosso, <em>Apostolic Legations to China</em>, 242</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>Arrived in Beijing on KX46/3/24</td>
<td>Arrived in Beijing on 1707.4.26</td>
<td>To coach the Beijing Jesuits on the contents to be included in their letter to de Tournon.</td>
<td>The emperor; The Beijing Jesuits; AP II, 435[594-95], 460-62[606-7]; KLGW, no. 3, 11-12; KXMZZ, no. 1082, 497.</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Arrived in Beijing on KX46/4/10</td>
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<td>1707.8.31</td>
<td>Regarding the Beijing Jesuits’ request for a permit on behalf of the Apostolic Vicar of Jiangxi.</td>
<td>The emperor; The Guangdong Governor; AP II, 630[718], 674[747], 732[787]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>KX46/8/10</td>
<td>1707.9.5</td>
<td>To ask the emperor for a further copy of the select documents regarding the Rites Controversy.</td>
<td>The Beijing Jesuits; The emperor; AP II, 732[787]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>c.KX46/10/15</td>
<td>c.1707.11.8</td>
<td>To order the translation of all the letters from Xiyang into Manchu.</td>
<td>An unknown messenger from the palace; The Beijing Jesuits; AP II, 732[787]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Texts Related to the Council’s Conclusion

R-I

(R-I-1) 湯若望等建造天主堂，供獻天主，係伊國之例，不無誘人作惡結黨亂行之處。只因供獻伊國原供獻之天主緣由，將湯若望官職並所賜嘉名革去 (R-I-2) 又因入教捐銀作序情由，將許纘曾等革職，俱屬冤枉。(R-I-3) 且所賜湯若望通微教師之名，因通曉天文曆法賜給，應將湯若望通微教師之名復行給還，該部照依原品級賜恤。(R-I-4) 其許纘曾、許之漸等應令該部查明，給還原職。(R-I-5) 至于阜城門外堂及房屋，工部具題變賣，無容議，所賣原價，並將空地工部取還給南懷仁等。(R-I-6) 因天主教緣由解送廣東西洋人粟安當二十五人，應行該督撫差官驛送來京，候到日，該部請旨。(R-I-7) 關係西洋人書籍銅像及天學傳概書板，前已焚毀，無容議 … (emphasis mine).¹

R-II

該臣等會同再議得，惡人楊光先捏詞控告天主教係邪教，已經議覆禁止。今看得，供奉天主教並無為惡亂行之處，相應將天主教仍令伊等照舊供奉 … 其湯若望通微教師之名復行還給，該部照伊原品賜恤。其許纘曾等應令該部查明原職給還。其伊等阜城門外堂及房屋，工部具題變賣，所賣之人拆毀，其所賣原價工部取給，將空地還給南懷仁等。因天主教緣由解送廣東西洋人粟安當等二十五人，行令該督撫差人驛送來京，俟到日，該部請旨。又李祖白

¹ XC, 77-80.
等各官，該部請照原官恩恤，其流徙子弟取回，有職者各還原職，俱應照前議 … 杨光先倚附惡黨，誣诬陷是实，前因潘盡孝傳散銅像等物情由革職之處冤枉，潘盡孝所革之官應行給還 … (emphasis mine).²

**R-III**

欽此. (R-III-a) 該臣等會同再議得，(R-III-b) 惡人楊光先捏詭控告天主教係邪教，已經議覆禁止，今看得供奉天主教並無為惡亂行之處，相應將天主教仍令伊等照舊供奉， (R-III-c) 其伊等聚會，散給天學傳概、銅像等物，應仍行禁止， (R-III-d) 其湯若望通微教師之名，復行還給，該部照伊原品賜恤，其許纘曾等應令該部查明原職給還，(R-III-e) 至于阜城門外堂及房屋，其所賣之價、空地，還給南懷仁等，(R-III-f) 因天主教緣由解送廣東西洋人二十五名，行令該督撫，差人解送來京，俟到日，該部請旨， (R-III-g) 又李祖白等各官，該部照原官恩恤，其流徙子弟有職者各還原職 (R-III-h) 等處，(R-III-i) 今楊光先倚勢奸情，已經皇上天察楊光先惡處，奪其監職，復用南懷仁管理曆法，可見楊光先前日之诬告，實權奸鳌拜使為他等語。楊光先倚附惡黨誣陷是實，(R-III-j) 又光先將奉旨所留天主教龕座碑記，自行拆毀等，(R-III-k) 今為冤枉參人多款，(R-III-l) 又為已上诬告等款緣由，(R-III-m) 將楊光先仍即行處斬，妻子流徙宁古塔可也³ (emphasis mine).

² XC, 81-82
R-IV and R-V

查得，康熙八年，議政王貝勒大臣九卿科道會議，以天主教丼無為惡亂行之處，(R-V) 伊等聚會，散給天學傳概、銅像等物，應仍行禁止。其天主止令西洋人供奉等因具題。奉旨：天主教除南懷仁等照常自行外，恐直隸各省或復立堂入教，仍着嚴行曉諭禁止，餘依議。欽遵在案。又查康熙二十六年，治理曆法加工部右侍郞南懷仁疏稱：臣等所奉天主教，祈照康熙初年未曾誣造之前，任隨其便，不阻其門，以斷絕妄指之誹謗等語。工部會同臣部議，以康熙八年利類思、安文思、南懷仁等具呈，經議政王貝勒大臣九卿科道會議，(R-IV) 寺廟聚會，永行禁止。其伊等聚會，散給天學傳概、銅像等物，仍行禁止。天主教係伊等從來供奉，應止令西洋人供奉。具題，已經奉旨，其南懷仁具題之處毋庸議等因具題。奉旨：依議。今地方官間有禁止條約，內將天主教同于白蓮教謀叛字樣，着刪去。欽此欽遵4 (emphasis mine).

R-VI

和碩康親王傑書等議覆。南懷仁、李光宏等呈告：‘楊光先依附鰲拜，捏詐陷人，將歷代所用之洪範五行，稱為滅蠻經，致李祖白等各官正法，且推曆候氣，茫然不知，解送儀器虛縻錢糧，輕改神名，將吉凶顛倒，妄生事端，殃及無辜，援引吳明烜，謊奏授官，捏造無影之事，誣告湯若望謀叛’，情罪重大，應擬斬，妻子流徙寧古塔。至供奉天主，係沿伊國舊習，並無為惡實跡。湯若望復通微教師之名，照伊原品賜卹，還給建堂基地。許續曾等

4 XC, 183-84.
復職。伊等聚會，散給天學傅槇及銅像等物。仍行禁止。西洋人栗安黨等，該督撫驛送來京。李祖白等，照原官思卹，流徙子弟取回，有職者復職。李光宏、黃昌、司爾珪、潘盡孝，原降革之職，仍行給還。5

R-VII

此內有通曉曆法的著取來京，與南懷仁等同居。其不曉曆法的，准其各歸本堂。除伊教焚修外，其直隸各省一應人等不許入教，仍著遵前旨禁止6

R-VIII

楊光先，理應論死。念其年老，姑從寬免。妻子亦免流徙。 (R-VIII-a) 栗安黨等二十五人，不必取來京城。 (R-VIII-b) 其天主教，除南懷仁等，照常自行外， (R-VIII-c) 恐直隸各省復立堂入教，仍著嚴行曉諭禁止。 (R-VIII-d) 餘依議。7

5 QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol. 1, 555-56
6 Rougemont, Innocentia Victrix, 39b-40a.
7 XC, 81-83; QSL-KX[xinwei], 417; QSL-KX8/8/11[xinwei]; Donghua lu, vol 1, 556.
Abbreviations

The Qing Reign Abbreviations

TM Tianming 天命
TC Tiancong 天聰
CD Chongde 崇德
SZ: Shunzhi 順治
KX: Kangxi 康熙
YZ: Yongzheng 雍正
QL: Qianlong 乾隆
JQ: Jiaqing 嘉慶
DG: Daoguang 道光

   December 1705-August 1706

AP II: *The Acta Pekinensia or Historical Records of the Maillard de Tournon Legation, Vol. II:*
   September 1706-December 1707

BDY: *Budeyi 不得已*

BDYF: *Budeyi (fu er zhong) 不得已 (附二種)*
BTST: *Beijing tushuguan cang Zhongguo lidai shike taben huibian* 北京圖書館藏中國歷代石刻拓本匯編

CHC *Cambridge History of China*

CWSL: *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*

DMLH: *Mingdai lüli huibian* 明代律例彙編

DQHD-KX: *Da Qing huidian* 大清會典 (the Kangxi Edition)

DQHD-QL: *Da Qing huidian* 大清會典 (the Qianlong Edition)

DQHDSL-GX: *Da Qing huidian shili* 大清會典事例 (the Quangxu Edition)

DQHDSL-JQ: *Da Qing huidian shili* 大清會典事例 (the Jiaqing Edition)

DQHD-YZ: *Da Qing huidian* 大清會典 (the Yongzheng Edition)

DQHDZL-QL: *Da Qing huidian zeli* 大清會典則例 (the Qianlong Edition)

DQLJF: *Da Qing lü jijie fuli* 大清律集解附例

FHA: *First Historical Archives of China, Beijing*

FV: *Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688): Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat*

HCC I: *Handbook of Christianity in China 1: 635-1800*

KLGW: *Kangxi yu Luoma shijie guanxi wenshu* 康熙與羅馬使節關係文書

KXMZZ: *Kangxi chao Manwen zhupi zouzhe quanyi* 康熙朝滿文硃批奏摺全譯

LE-C: ‘Sulin shenfu guanyu 1692 nian “Rongjiao zhaoling” de baogao’

LEC-J: *Iezusu Kaishi Chūgoku Shokanshū* イエズス会士中国書簡集

LEC-O: *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des missions étrangères*

LE-O: ‘Libertas evangelium Christi annunciandi et propagandi in Imperio Sinarum, solemniter declarata anno Domini 1692, die 22 Mensis Martii, et Europaeorum notitia descripta. Autore
P. Josepho Suario Lusitano Societatis Jesu Missionario Sinensi, Collegii Aulici Pekinensis Rectore’

MBRT: Manbun rōtō

MEP: Missions Étrangères de Paris

MSD: The Manchu Secret Documents

MSL Ming shilu

NPM: Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院

OJM: Ordo Fratrum Minorum [Order of the Minor Friars = Franciscans]

OP: Ordo Praedicatorum [Order of Preachers = Dominicans]

QCLCMDY: Qingchu Xiyang Chuanjiaoshi Manwen dang’an yiben 清初西洋傳教士滿文檔案譯本


QLL Qing shilu

QZN: Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao

QZXT: Qing zhongqianqi Xiyang Tianzhujiao zai Hua huodong dang’an shiliao 清中前期西洋天主教在華活動檔案史料

SJ: Societas Jesu [Society of Jesus = Jesuits]

TDWX: Wu Xiangxiang (ed.), Tianzhujiao Dongchucan wenxian xubian 天主敎東傳文獻續編

WLCC 1: Western Learning and Christianity in China: The Contribution and Impact of Johann Adam Schall von Bell, S.J. (1592-1666), vol. 1
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