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School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London

TURKISH PROSOPOGRAPHY

IN THE

DIARII OF MARINO SANUTO

1496-1517 / 902-923

VOLUME I

Dissertation submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Peter Mario Luciano Sebastian

1988



Abstract of thesis

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Title of thesis "Turkish Prosopography in the Diarii of Marino Sanuto"
1496-1517 / 902-923

..... Degree PhD

The fifty eight volumes of I Diarii are the product of the herculean efforts of the Venetian historian and politician Marino Sanuto and are a universal source for Venetian domestic and external affairs for the period 1496 to 1533. They embrace a massive cross section of sources, with many reports summarized or copied verbatim, and serve in effect as an archival collection rather than merely one man's diary of events and experiences. A significant proportion of the material in the Diarii concerns Venice's relations with the Ottoman Empire and as such refers to that empire's internal organisation and to the officials who ran it.

The purpose of this study is to attempt a critical analysis of the Turkish historical and prosopographical material in the first twenty-five volumes covering the period 1496 to 1517. The study identifies where possible the Ottomans mentioned in the text (over 200 are mentioned by name while there are scores of references to unnamed office-holders) and in so doing wrestles with some of the serious prosopographical problems of the period. The term 'prosopography' is thus used in the way understood by historians of the classical period, that is as a method of piecing together disparate information about an individual with the aim of drawing conclusions about the identity of that individual and his career pattern. The Diarii are a particularly valuable source for such a study, because Turkish sources for the same period are diffuse and threadbare so that the identification of even the most prominent officials is a hazardous enterprise in which one has to rely on tomb and mosque inscriptions, waqfiyye deeds, land registers and often unreliable chronicle accounts. The Diarii, as well as other archival material in Venice, not only act as reliable controls for these sources but also fill many gaps in our knowledge. Finally, the study offers some observations on the nature of the contacts between the Ottoman and Venetian empires.

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Peter Sebastian

London, November 1987

P R E F A C E

Venetian observers of the Ottoman state in the sixteenth century were not unlike Kremlinologists of the present day. They were Europe's leading Seraglio-watchers. The Venetian Republic's entire network of officials in the eastern Mediterranean was geared towards accumulating every scrap of information about the Ottoman empire. The product of all this intelligence-gathering poured into Venice where it was carefully read, assessed and filed, and determined to a large extent the Republic's maritime and commercial policy in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. The material in Marino Sanuto's Diarii relating to the Ottoman empire constitutes the very substance of this intelligence. On the one hand it enhances our understanding of Ottoman-Venetian relations. On the other it allows, through a process of collation of western with oriental sources, the construction of a unique picture of the men who ran the Ottoman Empire.

One Orientalist has observed that "when one is dealing with the early - and not-so-early - Ottoman state, the mere establishment of a name or a date is often a delicate question of collating Oriental and Western sources, so that the best final judgement must be qualified by an 'on balance, therefore'". I hope this book demonstrates just how 'delicate' a process the study of Turkish prosopography can be, and I hope the reader will consequently bear with me if I am at times overzealous with my use of 'possibles' and 'probables'. My wish to engender debate and encourage research must take precedence over any temptation to have the final word.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

(1) BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Twenty-five years ago, V.J. Parry highlighted the contribution of Renaissance historical literature to our understanding of the lands and peoples of the Near and Middle East. He outlined a number of categories of western historical literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as an illustration of the richness of the material available. For example, there are ambassadorial reports, diaries, travellers' accounts, reports of captives of war, pamphlets and periodical literature, collections of letters, descriptions of Ottoman institutions (Ordo Portae type literature), first hand accounts of specific events, histories of specific episodes, wars, battles; and the general histories of men like Paolo Giovio, Bishop of Nocera, whose Historia sui temporis was the subject of Parry's own special study.¹ Our continued dependence largely on partisan Turkish chronicles for the history of the Ottoman state in the fifteenth and early sixteenth AD / ninth and tenth centuries AH has perpetuated the importance of Renaissance historical literature, not simply as evidence of how the West viewed the East, but as a means of discovering what was actually happening in the East.

1. Parry(HME), p. 277ff.

I Diarii of Sanuto are unique as a historical source going far beyond any of the above in providing the raw material to write history. In themselves they are neither history nor chronicle, but a universal source amounting to an archival collection of documents. A significant proportion of the fifty-eight volumes of the Diarii is devoted to the Ottoman world, with reports relating to most aspects of the political and diplomatic. and to a lesser extent economic and social history of that empire between 1496 to 1533. The 40,000 pages hold, and at times one might almost say conceal, the names of scores of Turks (in the sense of subjects of the Ottoman sultan) of all political ranks and social positions, from sultans and viziers to obscure merchants and messengers.

The purpose of this study is to attempt a critical analysis of the material relating to these individuals in the first twenty-five volumes covering the period 1496-1517/902-923 in order to improve our understanding of the men who ran the empire. The principal objective of the study is to identify where possible these individuals (over two hundred are mentioned by name while there are many references to unnamed office-holders) and in so doing wrestle with some of the serious prosopographical problems of the period. The Diarii merit their own prosopographical study, partly because of the wealth of information they hold, and partly because Turkish sources for the same period are diffuse and threadbare. The identificat-

ion of even the most prominent officials is often a hazardous enterprise in which one has to rely on a disparate collection of tomb and mosque inscriptions, waqfiyye deeds, land registers and unreliable chronicles. The diaries as well as other archival material in Venice act as reliable controls for these sources and fill many gaps in our knowledge.

In building this prosopography, it is my hope that I shall unlock the information on these individuals and make the Diarii work for historians and researchers in a way not hitherto possible. By that I mean that there can be few historians who have not experienced frustration in trying to extract information from the diaries. Those who have rushed headlong into assuming that one Mustafa or Sinan in one report is the same man mentioned in another report have fallen into the quagmire of confusion which bedevils the study of Ottoman history in this period. I hope this study will go some way towards identifying the individuals mentioned in the text, placing them in the context of the events of the time.

The first twenty-five volumes span a period of immense political, economic and social change in the Ottoman world. Two sultans of contrasting natures, Bayezid II (1481-1512) and Selim I (1512-1520), coped in different ways with internal and external forces which threatened the cohesion of the empire. For both it was a period of almost continuous war - a usual feature of most phases of Ottoman history. While Bayezid was

reluctantly on the offensive in his wars against Venice, Poland and Hungary, and timidly on the defensive against Safavid Persia, Selim was aggressive in extending his empire eastwards, defeating the Safavids at Chaldiran (1514/920) and smashing and supplanting the Mamluk empire in Egypt, Syria and Arabia (1516-1517/922-923). Internally Bayezid's helplessness in the face of Shi'ite heresy and tribal rebellion (the Kızılbaş) in Anatolia was in stark contrast to its ruthless and bloody suppression at the hands of Selim. Civil war over the Ottoman succession always threatened to erupt in the last years of Bayezid's reign and eventually did, plunging the empire into crisis as brother fought brother. These were the momentous events² to which the Diarî were a witness through the multiplicity of sources which came to Sanuto's attention.

Moreover, these were the events over which Venetian officials interacted with their Ottoman counterparts. That interaction was galvanised by the birth and development of Ottoman naval power, which was a continuous theme throughout the period. Although that power was successfully deployed against the Venetian fleet in the Turco-Venetian war (1499-1503/904-908), the two powers were to find that it was in their mutual interest not to test their naval strength against each other again for a generation. Selim's preoccupation with

2. For narrative accounts of the period, see Parry(Cook), pp. 54-78, and Inalcik, Rise, pp. 295-323. I have included historical explanation in the individual profiles of the prosopography when necessary. See also the chronological table (Appendix (C)).

internal crisis and foreign conquests in the east on the one hand, and Venetian success in winning friends in high places in the Ottoman bureaucracy on the other, were at the root of this long phase of peace (see pp. 47-8). At one stage, when the Venetian Republic was experiencing its own crisis with the loss of its terraferma possessions during the War of the League of Cambrai, the two states were drawn together into a bond of non-aggression which amounted to an informal alliance. It is natural, therefore, that the Diarii should offer insights into the nature of contacts between Venetians and Ottomans. It is a further objective of this study to draw out these contacts in the course of discussing each profile.

(2) MARINO SANUTO AND I DIARII

Marino Sanuto

The fifty eight volumes of manuscript known as I Diarii are the product of the herculean efforts of the Venetian historian, chronicler and politician, Marino Sanuto.¹ Born in 1466 into one of the oldest but relatively poor Venetian aristocratic families, he exhibited in his boyhood strong intellectual powers and showed promise both as a historian and political figure. This promise never bore fruit in either sphere of activity. As a historian he suffered from an inability to synthesize, distracted too easily by detail and unable to produce a coherent narrative. Consequently none of his works was published in his own life. As a politician his abrasive personality and his purist, uncompromising political beliefs led him to take up positions of dissent from which he continually harangued and antagonised his political friends as well as adversaries. His intellect commanded great respect, particularly his knowledge of Venetian law, administration and history which were almost unparalleled by his contemporaries, but he lacked the political nous to get himself elected to office. Although a man of great ambition in the literary and political arenas, "Sanuto's was a pathetic career, characterized by a tremendous gap between ambition and achievement, capacity and accomplishment."²

Paradoxically it was this failure of his aspirations which left posterity with perhaps a greater legacy than he could have bequeathed had he fulfilled his ambitions. Unable to write successful narrative history, he became a chronicler, a recorder, a diarist; unable to achieve high office, he had fewer responsibilities to distract him from the enterprise. The result was the Diarii.

By 1496 the thirty-year old Sanuto, with a collection of histories in manuscript already behind him,³ embarked on collecting information for his Diarii. From 1496 until 1533, two years before his death, he gathered a mass of material amounting to 58 volumes or 40,000 pages of dense characters. Over ninety percent is in his own hand, the remainder being documents (usually letters and Relazioni) inserted at intervals, often at random. Sanuto's stated aim in this undertaking was not to chronicle events but to write a history of Venice.⁴ The Diarii was the fruit of his painstaking research. During some periods he would keep a day to day record, noting in the evening the reports he had heard or been shown during the day at the Ducal Palace. At other times he would return to the Diarii after an interval of several weeks to catch up on the events of the intervening period. He frequently copied out documents in full which he had managed to acquire, and references here and there in the text (e.g. ut in litteris) suggest that he knew where such documents were filed (probably in the Ducal Palace) and that he could have access to them again if necessary.

In other words, the Diarii were a filing system with cross references to materials he could consult again when he felt himself ready to embark on his history. However, this was a cumbersome filing system, set out chronologically, and in the end Sanuto must have found it impossible to retrieve the information in an orderly fashion. There is no evidence that he kept his own index of names or of subjects, which in any case would have been remarkable for his time. The history was never written and the Diarii became an end in themselves.

The manuscript

The autograph manuscript⁵ of the 58 volumes is housed in the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia. The manuscript led a very chequered history until Venice was united to the Kingdom of Italy in 1866.⁶ After Sanuto's death in 1535 the manuscript was seized by the Council of Ten and was subsequently 'forgotten' until the late 18th century when it was found through the research of the historian Francesco Donà.⁷ He had all the volumes copied at his own expense for his own personal use. This was to prove fortunate for Venetian scholars over the next century, because as a result of the cession of Venice to the Habsburgs by the Treaty of Campoformio in 1797, the Diarii were transported to Vienna. While other documents were returned to Venice in 1815, the Diarii were retained by the Austrian authorities because of their immense value. It was during the period after 1815 that Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall had access

to the manuscript in Vienna which he used when writing his celebrated Geschichte von Osmanischen Reiches. The manuscript was eventually returned to Venice in 1866.⁸ The work of five scholars in transcribing and editing the Diarri was begun in 1879 and was completed in 1903. The Diarri have therefore been widely available for historical analysis for a comparatively short period of time.

The Diarri as a source for Ottoman history

What makes the Diarri so special as a source? The crucial element is that they are not so much a diary of events or personal experiences as an archival and universal source in their own right, embracing a large cross-section of material: copies and synopses of personal letters, reports from colonial officials, government records, ambassadorial relazioni, accounts of debates and elections, and observations on life in Venice. Primarily the Diarri are a source for Venetian domestic history, but such is the nature of the work that the subject matter covers political, social, economic, religious and scientific developments from London to Cairo, from Spain in the West to the Safavids in the East and to the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. With the destruction of documents in fires during the sixteenth century, the importance of the Diarri, holding copies or summaries of such documents, has been increased

still further. They may not offer the complete picture, but our knowledge of the early sixteenth century would have been severely diminished without them.

There are an estimated 4,200 separate entries (i.e. summaries and copies of reports/letters/notes) devoted to the Ottoman Empire in the first twenty-five volumes alone. The entries cover a vast range of subjects. Although this thesis concentrates on the prosopographical material, some aspects of the historical and narrative material are included to make sense of the prosopographical references.

The proportion of writing on Turkish affairs varies from year to year. In periods of crisis, such as the Turco-Venetian war of 1499-1503/904-908, or Selim's campaigns against the Safavids in 1514/920 and the Mamluks in 1516/922 and 1517/923, as much as a third of Sanuto's effort was expended in recording Turkish affairs. At other times the proportion is considerably less: Venetian politics, not the Ottoman Empire, was his primary concern. Another factor which determined the depth of his reporting - on domestic as well foreign affairs - was the extent to which he was preoccupied with other business. There are two periods when his reporting on Turkish matters dropped off: sixteen months between 1501 and 1502 when he was treasurer (Camerlengo) in Verona, unfortunately co-inciding with a crucial stage in the Turco-Venetian war; and from 1503 to 1510 when the Diarii as a whole are somewhat thin, partly because Sanuto was distracted by family concerns.⁹

Of most significance to the study of Ottoman history is the inclusion of reports and letters from the eastern Mediterranean, usually synopses or copies, and sometimes the original documents themselves. Although many of the reports were written by Venetian officials in various outposts or by Venetians travelling abroad on business, their initial sources are invariably stated to help the recipient, and consequently the historian, to gauge the validity of the information. The sources were varied: travellers, merchants, slaves, prisoners of war, renegade turks, spies, accounts of personal meetings with turks (who were more often than not important office-holders such as viziers and sancakbeğis etc). In addition Sanuto copied a considerable number of Italian translations of letters from the sultan or Grand Vizier to the Doge, or from a sancakbeği to a Venetian official. A supplementary aim of this study is to collate and draw attention to this correspondence and therefore I have indicated in the course of the prosopography whether the Turkish originals still exist and where they can be found.

Sanuto himself never had a first hand picture of Turkish society. He never travelled in the East to gather material - in fact he avoided any travel outside Venice and refused to take up a minor office in the Levant.¹⁰ But he was active in Venice in interrogating eye-witnesses of important events in the Levant.¹¹ He had a wide circle of friends in colonial outposts who wrote to him directly or else allowed him access to letters which they had written to their families in Venice.¹²

He had contact with Ottoman ambassadors in Venice (he met at least six of the fourteen ambassadors/envoys sent to Venice between 1496 and 1517), though this seems to have given him an impression of Turkish arrogance rather than an insight into the society from which they came.¹³ Among his friends and contacts were Venetian chancellery secretaries, some of whom had gone on missions to the Ottoman Empire, and there is evidence to show that they were an important source of information for Sanuto.¹⁴ He definitely had contacts (as yet the degree of friendship is difficult to determine) with such secretaries as Zorzi Negro,¹⁵ Nicolo Aurelio,¹⁶ Marco Rizo,¹⁷ Gasparo della Vedova,¹⁸ Nicolo Ottoboni¹⁹ and especially Gian Giacomo Caroldo,²⁰ all of whom had been involved in one way or another with Ottoman affairs; and it is worthy of note that Negro, Aurelio, Caroldo, and probably Rizo, all had dealings with the Grand Vizier Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha(q.v.) in Istanbul. Moreover, in spite of a dismal political career, he still held sufficiently high office (e.g. Savio agli Ordini in the Collegio, member of the Senate, of the Zonta) to give him access to first hand reports as they arrived; and even before the Council of Ten permitted him to use its official papers, certain correspondence was passed on to him.²¹

As mentioned above, the Diarii were primarily a source for Venetian domestic history, and this at times took its toll on his reporting of Turkish material. There are occasions when Sanuto tempts us by indicating that he had in his hands a

document packed with names of Turks, yet he curtails his account with a frustrating "ut in litteris", suggesting that he could return to that document [probably housed in the ducal palace] if necessary, but that it did not merit further attention in the Diarii.²² Consequently a considerable amount of material has been lost altogether, since many of the original documents were destroyed in the sixteenth century fires.

Furthermore, despite his many other contacts, Sanuto was not friendly with Andrea Gritti,²³ who had a string of Turkish friends and contacts and whose experience of the workings of power and commerce in Istanbul were unsurpassed.²⁴ He was the man who could have furnished Sanuto with a mass of information on every aspect of the Ottoman Empire, including the leading men of state, but there is no evidence in the first twenty-five volumes that the two men ever chatted about the East. This is another indication that Sanuto could have done better had he been consumed with a desire to learn about the Ottoman State.

But this is more a lament about what was not recorded rather than a criticism about what was. The great advantage of Venetian sources and of the Diarii in particular over all other sources is that they are concerned about the personality of an Ottoman official. Not only do they record what rank an individual held, but also what he did, whom he met, where he was, how he felt, what he said to Venetians or to contacts of Venetians. To that extent they reveal a great deal about the character of the person, his political allegiances, ambitions,

fears, motivation, as well as performance in battle. They are about success and failure. The Diarii, therefore, tend to humanise the Ottomans. By recording contact between officials of the two empires, the Diarii provide glimpses of an Ottoman officials' friendship or enmity towards Venice, their generosity or venality, their intrigue or sad lack of political wit. The humanising effect of these sources, so valuable to historical analysis, even though it comes to us ultimately through Venetian minds, is virtually non-existent in Ottoman sources.²⁵

Reliability of the Diarii

Any appraisal of the reliability of the Diarii should be on two levels: Sanuto's own scrupulousness and accuracy, and then the reliability of his sources (and indeed his sources' sources).

The latter has itself to be taken in two parts. First, the reliability of the original source or sources, and secondly the reliability of the Venetian official reporting the information. Each report must be judged on its own merits in the light of whether any collateral exists for it; the accuracy of the most significant reports is discussed under individual profiles in the prosopography. On the whole, the difficulty is not in substantiating the freedom of bias of the Venetian officials, who on the whole reported faithfully the information they were told and who invariably recorded their sources and the nature of their access; it is in ascertaining the factual accuracy of the original information. We should not overlook the possibility

that some of the informants, particularly if they were Ottoman subjects or renegades, were tasked to volunteer information designed to mislead the Venetians. The latter, however, were no newcomers to the art of intelligence and were skilled in discerning the plausible from the implausible.

As for Sanuto's own reliability, I believe we can have some confidence. Sanuto himself was highly scrupulous in what he considered to be good source material. He always states his sources and the degree of access they had. He makes a point of stating when his information is merely rumour and hearsay or when his source is not very reliable.²⁶ The frequent gaps he leaves in the manuscript also indicate that he would not write down names or numbers or any information unless he was reasonably certain of their accuracy. Often he leaves a space of half a page or a page, with the intention - as he often informs us²⁷ - of returning to copy or summarise a particular letter once he had managed to see the letter for himself. The fact that some words or some passages are in a different coloured ink suggests that very often he did come back and fill in the spaces he had left.

Sanuto had no axe to grind about the Turks and was concerned above all to get the facts right so that the full measure of the Ottoman threat could be understood. Not concerned primarily with writing a history of the Ottoman Empire, Sanuto was, perhaps unwittingly, free from any bias in his reporting of Turkish affairs and his commentary on reports he received was negligible. This is one of the strengths of the Diarii in facilitating the study of prosopography.²⁸

With regard to Sanuto's accuracy in copying and summarising documents, I think one can say that on the whole he was very accurate. I have compared documents reproduced in the Diarii with the original documents, when available, in the Venetian Archives, and my conclusion is that the discrepancies are few. Although there are instances when he has omitted a name or even a line, these are few in number. Moreover, I have not yet discovered an instance when he has corrupted a name or the overall sense of a passage. What he has reproduced is therefore accurate. His few errors are ones of omission, not of corruption.²⁹

There are probably more errors of omission and corruption in the edition of the Diarii than in Sanuto's manuscript. The intrepid editors of the manuscript at the end of the nineteenth century performed an immense service to the study of history by tackling the fifty-eight volumes. Nevertheless, my verification of the Turkish material in volumes I to XXV of the edition with the autograph manuscript has revealed a number of errors. Volume II has many errors, including the omission of over twenty lines; and there is a high concentration of omissions (over forty lines on some thirty occasions) in volumes XVII to XXV. Many of these omissions are indicated in the documentary volume.

Sanuto's attitude to the Turks

Sanuto himself had a pragmatic and ambivalent attitude towards the Turks. On the one hand he mistrusted them while on the other he felt the need to co-operate with them when it was necessary. For example, he makes disparaging remarks about some of the Turkish ambassadors who came to Venice,³⁰ but he was strongly in favour of calling in Turkish aid during the war of the League of Cambrai. and failing that, of pushing ahead with recruitment of Turkish mercenaries.³¹ In 1517 when the Conquest of Egypt gave the Venetians cause for alarm that Cyprus might be the next victim of sultan Selim's ambition, Sanuto was adamant in his opposition to a motion calling for reinforcements to be sent to Cyprus, lest that might offend Selim.³² It was also Sanuto's basic conception that the quality of life in the Ottoman polity was inferior to that in the West: when it was reported that merchants had left Apulia to go and settle in Avlonya due to the hardships of Spanish rule in southern Italy, Sanuto commented that such hardships must have been severe if these merchants were willing to suffer Turkish rule.³³

Notes.

1. The most penetrating assessment of Sanuto's life, career and historical enterprise is Robert Finlay's Politics in Renaissance Venice, (1980), pp. 10-13, 14ff, and especially 251-280; see also Berchet's comprehensive treatment in his Prefazione ai Diarii, (Venice, 1903).
2. Finlay, op.cit., p. 273.
3. See bibliography for Sanuto's works, pp. 525-6.
4. Sanuto, VIII, 6; Berchet, op.cit., pp. 26-27, 52, 115.
5. Marino Sanuto, I Diarii (1496-1533), (autograph MS), BNM, Cod. It. VII. 228-286(9215-9273), ed. R. Fulin et al., 58 vols., Venice, 1879-1903.
6. Berchet, op.cit., pp. 118-123.
7. The Donà copy, which is in manuscript is at BNM, It. Cod. VII. 419-477(10065-10123).
8. Vol. I, part II, however, was missing, so a copy was made from the Dona copy. The missing part reappeared at some point during the 20th century, though the actual date of re-acquisition by the BNM is not known.
9. Finlay, op.cit., p. 252.
10. Finlay, op.cit., p. 21, 253.
11. Sanuto, III, 703; XXV, 34; XXV, 123-5.
12. Sanuto, XVIII, 359 ["Mostrarete la presente [lettera] a missier Marin Sanudo, al qual mi racomanderete."]; III, 1057-8; VI, 371; VIII, 30, 505-6; X, 162, 851; XIV, 193-4; XVI, 193-4; XVIII, 328; XXIV, 166-7. Note also VI, 240-1 where Sanuto says that he managed to see some Safavid coins which had been brought back from Istanbul by Antonio Marzello.
13. Sanuto, V, 746, and especially 851; XIV, 415; XXIII, 343, 344, 347-8, 361, 373-4; XXV, 72-3.
14. Neff, Secretaries, provides information on secretaries who went on missions to the Ottoman Empire. I am indebted to Dr Neff for passing to me several invaluable references in the Diarii to the secretaries and their contact with Sanuto.
15. Sanuto, II, 540.
16. Sanuto, III, 703: Aurelio assists Sanuto in the interrogation of Zaneto Draganello who had just returned from Modon (1 September 1500); III, 332.
17. Sanuto, III, 332.

18. Sanuto, II, 540.
19. Sanuto, XIII, 407.
20. Sanuto, XIII, 293; XVI, 193-4; XIX, 56-61, 221-3.
21. Sanuto, V, 871-5: "Di la Zefalonia più lettere, qual non fo lete ma date a mi a revederle - - -"; Sanuto, V, 1064: "Di sier Hironimo da cha da Pexaro - - - qual non fo lecte in Pregadi ma date a lezerle nel Consejo di X per le cosse di Coloqut, e tamen io le lexi"; Sanuto, XI, 210: "Dite letere non fo lete in colegio, ma Jo le lexi".
22. E.g. Sanuto, V, 16-17: "- - - Item, di armata che si lavorava lentamente, e [the secretary Freschi] scrive il numero di le velle potrà haver, ut in litteris."
23. Finlay, op.cit., pp. 255-6.
24. E.g. Davis, Shipping and Spying, pp. 97-109.
25. E.g. see p. 61 (Dukaginzade's inebriation), 75 (Hersekzade and the balas ruby), 171 (and note 56) (Ca'fer Pasha's inebriation), 431 and 433 (enmity between Hadim Sinan and Mustafa (B)).
26. Sanuto, XVIII, 413-4: Sanuto discounts the validity of news of Selim's defeat, adding, "se fusse vera, si aria per molte vie". Sanuto, XIX, 329; cf. also Berchet, op.cit., p. 27.
27. Sanuto, XII, 199: "- - - et, perchè questa nova è degna di farne nota, di soto più copioso scriverò il sumario di le letere, potendo averle"; Sanuto, XII, 549; XIII, 46-7; XVI, 651; and IX, 99: "- - - E bella lettera da aver la copia".
28. Compare this with Finlay's assessment of Sanuto's untrustworthiness on two counts in his reporting of Venetian politics: "First, he exaggerated his own importance - - -. Second, Sanuto's diary was not a secret enterprise, so he suppressed events that seriously embarrassed the government."
29. See Docs., p. 69C-1 for an example of Sanuto's careless copying. Mas Latrie (Traité de paix et de commerce - - -, Paris, 1866, p. xviii) has expressed some doubts about the integrity of some documents in the Diarii, and Wansburgh (pp. 178-9) shares these doubts in relation to Sanuto's text of one Mamluk-Venetian treaty. However, the latter concedes that it may not have been Sanuto's copying which is at fault. Moreover, Finlay, op.cit., p. 12; Pullan, Rich and Poor, p. 643; and Cozzi, "Marin Sanudo il Giovane," p. 353 have noted favourable experiences in checking the Diarii against archival records.
30. Sanuto, XXV, 72-3.
31. Sanuto, X, 355, 413, 414, 429.
32. Sanuto, XXIV, 237, 705.
33. Sanuto, X, 254-5.

(3) PROSOPOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY

Prosopography has long been used as a tool of historical analysis.¹ This study uses the term in the sense understood by historians of classical Greece and Rome, that is to signify collective biography with the emphasis very much on the basic groundwork of identification. In addition, some observations can be made about the nature and activities of political elites - or rather, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, administrative and military elites - and about the activities and motivation of individuals within those elites. Such observations, however, are made with considerable caution, because the information available is limited (see pp. 31ff).

Historians have already made extensive use of the Diarii for the study of many aspects of the history of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern states. For example, on the history of Venice, the diaries have been used with great effect by Robert Finlay and by Mary Neff who have applied prosopographical analysis to the material, the former in his study of the Venetian patrician class and the latter in her study of the Venetian Chancellery Secretaries.² Franz Babinger and Maria Nallino have surveyed the value of the diaries as a source for the history of the Safavids and the history of the Mamluks.³ Hammer, Fisher and Setton, among others, have used the diaries to work out basic events in writing their narrative histories of the Ottoman Empire.⁴ Moreover, the diaries are no stranger

to the study of Turkish prosopography. They have been used by Kissling and Heller in their biographical studies of individual Turks.⁵ Most recently there is Reindl's extremely useful *synthesis of primary and secondary works* concerning the leading men of Bayezid's reign.⁶ These studies have contributed immensely to our understanding of the leading men of the period, and have grappled with highly complex source material.

However, the Diarîi themselves have been handled somewhat unsystematically. The identity of some named Turks has occasionally been taken for granted, while some important information has been missed because unnamed Turks, referred to by rank alone, were ignored. The result has been to misinterpret some of the reports. Furthermore, no attempt appears to have been made to verify the Turkish material in the edition of the Diarîi with the autograph manuscript (see p.22).

My intention in this study has been to take account of every shred of information on individual Turks and to present for the first time a critical assessment of the prosopographical material in all the 4200 entries mentioned above. I have adopted the following methodology:

a) The first stage consisted of extracting the 4200 entries from the twenty-five volumes of the edition.

b) The second stage consisted of checking the entries extracted with the autograph manuscript in the Biblioteca Marciana for omissions or the corruption of Turkish names.

c) The third stage consisted of analysing the material, classifying the information under three main categories:

- (i) named individuals
- (ii) unnamed office-holders (i.e. unnamed Turks referred to by rank alone)
- (iii) subjects and themes.

The purpose of (ii) was to assist in the identification and elucidation of the activities of (i). For example, there are many instances when a prominent individual is only named once or on very few occasions. By tracing references to his office or rank which we know him to have held (from Ottoman sources, from elsewhere in the Diarîi or from other western sources), we can piece together a picture of his activities, even when he is not named or hardly ever named. It is always pointed out in the profiles when this method of analysis has been employed, in case future research indicates that this or that Turk did not after all hold the office of Beglerbeđi of Rumeli, sancakbeđi of Iskodra, Bostancı başı, Kapudan Pasha or whatever office it may have been. In that eventuality it will be possible to reconsider the Diarîi evidence with relative ease. This methodology has resulted in the uncovering of quite an extensive body of information about virtually every Turk in the prosopography; Iskender Bostancı başı and Ca'fer kapudan Pasha are striking examples of the results obtained.

The third category (iii) concerning subjects and themes is quite vast and only passing reference can be made to it here. I have included in the profiles some details about a wide variety of subjects mentioned in the Diarii whenever I have considered them to be relevant to the study of that individual's career. The following list of subjects, which is by no means exhaustive, illustrates the richness of the Diarii material on the period as a whole: the Turco-Venetian War, the Turco-Venetian peace and diplomatic relations, diplomatic missions, diplomatic protocol and ceremony, relations with European states; contrasting authority of Bayezid and Selim, their policy on various issues, their children, wives, brothers, sons-in-law; the organisation of the empire; the succession dispute, shipbuilding, fleet organisation, naval arsenals, Ottoman pirate policy; mustering of troops, the movement of troops, fortifications, artillery; natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, fires, plague); economic and commercial affairs (e.g. fairs, merchants, the grain and horse trade, the slave trade, salt works, salaries of officials, taxation, tribute, haraç, state revenues); the Safavids; the Mamluks; the Portuguese; local and formal religion; the rural population; the movement of populations; nationalities and minorities within the empire; gazi raiding parties. My purpose in including some of this material in this study has been to weave the careers of the Turks into the general backcloth of events and the fabric of the civilization of the Ottoman empire.

As a rule I have not attempted to give a comprehensive account of our current state of knowledge about the career of particular individuals. Other historians have contributed to that already. I have preferred to concentrate as much as possible on the Diarîi material, using other sources to control and assess it, and so to forge it into a workable tool which might assist in future research. That is why I have included some of the most obscure references in the hope that historians will pick them up and make sense of them in the course of their own research.

There are some notable omissions in the prosopographical section. Firstly, I have not dealt with the sons of Bayezid or with Suleiman (later the Magnificent), the son of Selim, because they form a coherent group which merits more detailed attention at a later stage. Secondly, I have omitted analysis of the material on two important men in Bayezid's reign, Firuz Beg (SB of Iskodra) and Iskender Pasha (SB of Bosnia): they have been the subject of very extensive study already (including some use of the Diarîi), but I intend to present a comprehensive analysis of the Diarîi material on them as well in due course.

Notes.

1. For an analysis of the term prosopography, "one of the most valuable and most familiar techniques of the research historian", see Lawrence Stone, The Past and the Present, Ch. 2.
2. See Finlay, Politics; Neff, Secretaries.
3. See Babinger, Şafawijja; Nallino, L'Egitto.
4. See Hammer, GOR; Fisher; Setton.
5. See Kissling, Iskender; Heller.
6. See Reindl; and Faruqi, Collective Biography.

(4) OTTOMAN SUBJECTS IN THE PROSOPOGRAPHY

Beyond the basic identification of the various Turks in the Diarîi, the process of analysis founded on a comparison of common elements between individuals with similar social, economic, religious and political backgrounds remains limited in this period (as in many periods) of Ottoman history. The information available is still insufficient to allow reliable conclusions to be drawn about the behaviour of a group and the individuals within it. The second stage of prosopographical analysis, that which makes for revealing generalisations across a period of history and over a generation of activity, is therefore still beyond our reach.

Nevertheless, it is important to try to make at least a few observations, if not reach concrete conclusions, about the people appearing in the hundreds of pages of the Diarîi, and to assess the picture of Ottoman administration and government presented by the Diarîi reports. To a certain extent, it is the same picture which the rulers of the Venetian Republic would have had of their oriental neighbour.

Appendix (B) offers a rudimentary typology of the leading officials of the reigns of Bayezid and Selim. Some of the information is derived solely from the Diarîi. All are mentioned in varying degrees by the Diarîi. The following is a brief outline of observations which can be made.

The Slave Institution

The great majority of the 232 individuals mentioned in the first twenty-five volumes are products of the Kul or 'slave' system on which the government of the Ottoman state was founded.¹ While there is mention of some members of the Religious Institution ('Ulemā) and of Muslim born elements who normally staffed the Ottoman bureaucracy (e.g. the Treasury and the Chancery), the Diarii reports are primarily concerned with the Kapıkulu ('slaves of the Porte') who constituted the military and administrative elite and who were the executive arm of the sultan. These were the men who had greatest political power and influence, particularly where the empire's external relations were concerned, and whom Venetian officials consequently needed to cultivate most. The Diarii reflect faithfully, therefore, and in accordance with Ottoman sources, the dominance of the kapıkulu in the government of the empire, both during the reign of Bayezid and the reign of Selim. For example, with the exception of Ibrahim Pasha (one of Bayezid's Grand Viziers) and Piri Pasha (one of Selim's Grand Viziers) who were Muslim born, all the Grand Viziers of the period were drawn from the Slave Institution.

The Diarii illustrate the roles played by the kapıkulu in the Inner Service (Enderun) and Outer Service (Birun) of the

1. For an account of the Kul system, see Inalcik, OE, Chapters XI, XII, XIII.

Palace; in the central administration, that is as members of the imperial council (Divan-ı hümayun); and in the provincial administration. The information on these areas varies enormously. On the whole, individuals only came to the attention of Venetian officials if they were members of the divan, and then usually only the Grand Vizier and the viziers rather than the defterdar, the kadılasker, the nişancı or their secretarial staffs in the bureaucracy. In the provincial administration it was the beglerbeğis, sancakbeğis, or voyvodas who had most contact with Venetian officials. The Diarii consequently lack information on those individual who worked in the Inner or Outer Service of the Palace unless they happened to rise at some point to a position in the Divan or to an important position in the provincial administration. There is one important exception: those officials from the Palace who served as ambassadors did come under Venetian scrutiny (see below).

Although the members of this Kul system were bound by a common status - slaves of the Porte - they came from varied backgrounds. Some came from famous aristocratic families who had ruled principalities and fiefdoms before falling to Ottoman conquest (individuals were Hersekzade Ahmed, Dukaginzade Ahmed, Mesih Pasha, Mehmed Ben Karlović and Mehmed Beg Obrenović). Some were eunuchs (Ali Pasha, Sinan Pasha, Cafer Pasha, Yakub Pasha, Firuz Beg), largely drawn from Bosnia or Albania. The majority were from the province of Rumeli. All appear originally

to have been Christians who had found themselves in the service of the sultan following capture in war, conscription as children through the devşirme, or, as in a few cases, having voluntarily offered their services. They were Bosnians (Hersekzade Ahmed, ?Ca'fer Pasha, ?Hadım Sinan, Hadım Ya'kub Pasha); Serbians (Mustafa B); Albanians (Dukaginzade Ahmed, Koca Da'ud, ?Hadım Sinan, Güveyi Sinan); Herzegovinans (Küçük Da'ud); Greeks (or possibly Italians) from the Morea (Iskender Bostancı, ?Ca'fer Pasha), from Siroz (Koca Mustafa Pasha), from Corfu (e.g. Ala-ed-Din), from Santa Maura (Ali Beg tercûman), from the Greek community in Trabzon (Fa'ik, Iskender Pasha), and Mesih Pasha from the Greek imperial family of Paleologi. Some were the personal slaves of Selim who had been in his household when he was a prince in Trabzon (Bıyıklı Mehmed, Sinan Kapıcı Başı). The Diarîi also record one Armenian (Ya'kub Beg, see p. 476).

The extent to which these men retained any loyalty towards the Christian communities which gave birth to them is intriguing. There is no doubt that they were first and foremost the 'slaves of the sultan', obeying his wishes and executing his commands with purpose and loyalty. However, the degree to which the Diarîi illustrate how some of them did maintain very strong ties with the Latin West and with Venice in particular (see p.43) suggests that it would be going too far to say that these kul elements 'severed all ties with their past'.² What cannot yet be concluded, however, is whether those slaves

2. See Inalcik, OE, p. 80, who makes this comment only about the boys recruited through the devşirme.

recruited through the devsirme were less likely to maintain links than those who were captured in war or volunteered their services.

What distinguished one slave from another in a system of government in which political power rested in the gift of the sultan? Proximity to the sultan's family and attachment to his personal household were both the reason for and the consequence of a successful career. The one probably nurtured the other. A large number of leading officials were related to the sultan's family, usually marrying the sultan's daughter or granddaughter. Marriage ties with the sultan's family seem to have been more important in Bayezid's reign, probably due to the large number of female offspring. Both sultans placed great trust in those officials who were attached to their personal households during their childhood as princes in the provinces. Teachers and officials were able later to wield considerable power. This personal relationship with the sultan was also one factor in wresting some power away from the members of the Slave Household, so that the latter did not have a monopoly of policy-making, but only in the implementation of policy. Ibrahim Pasha, who became Grand Vizier, was Bayezid's teacher and of Muslim origins. Hoca Halimî and Mehmed Hocasade, like Ibrahim members of the Religious Institution, were teachers of Selim; though not achieving high office in any formal sense, were reputed to be the power behind the throne. They shared that reputation with two members of the Slave Household: Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha

and Kapıcı Sinan Pasha, both of whom were in Selim's personal household in Trabzon. Another man very close to Selim who commanded great respect was Hemdem Pasha. The fate of the latter, however, illustrates that during Selim's reign one quality was supreme: the will to wage war. Hemdem was executed for being lukewarm about the Chaldiran campaign; Biyikli Mehmed on the other hand was one of Selim's most successful generals. Success in war was, therefore, important in Selim's reign. During Bayezid's reign, a number of his generals were consistently unsuccessful, yet this did not seem to affect their standing. The most striking example is Hadım Ali Pasha, who in spite of repeated failures became the most powerful Grand Vizier of the second half of Bayezid's reign. Mustafa (B), who performed miserably during the Turco-Venetian war, was not demoted or executed, because he was Bayezid's son-in-law. Selim had no time for failure. It is immediately noticeable that, while very high proportion of Bayezid's viziers and Grand Viziers died of natural causes during his reign, a high proportion of Selim's leading officials were executed.

Continuity

Two significant observations can be made about continuity in the personnel of government in the empire. First, there were several instances of radical changes in personnel in which members of the divan and other leading officials were suddenly stripped of office (e.g. 1498/99, 1504, March 1510, September 1511/January 1512, August 1515, April 1516), sometimes

on account of a janissary revolt, sometimes of the failure of the viziers to produce military success, sometimes, as in a Bayezid's reign, due to the illness or voluntary retirement of a senior official. However, rarely did these upheavals lead to the permanent demotion of an official. The hallmark of the government was the repeated transfer of individuals from one rank to another, from the central power to the periphery and back again. Beglerbeğis could find themselves sancakbeğis in the provinces one year and viziers in Istanbul the next. The geographical location of an individual's posting was equally varied. The result of this oscillation was that experience of government at many levels and in many parts of the empire was both wide and continuous: the periphery enriched the centre and vice versa. This had important implications for the Venetians, since the sancakbeği in Bosnia with whom they were dealing at one moment could suddenly be wielding greater power in the divan(see p.43).

Secondly, there was no radical change in the personnel of the central and provincial administration on Selim's accession. It is striking that Selim used, at least initially, officials who had held high office in Bayezid's reign or who began their careers under the Conqueror. Many officials with this pedigree fought and died in Selim's great campaigns, falling at Chaldiran, Marj Dabik and Ridaniyya. Selim even used Grand Viziers, viziers and Beglerbeğis who had held those offices under Bayezid. Nor did he discriminate against some officials who

had at some stage demonstrated their support for Prince Ahmed, his rival for the throne. Hersekzade Ahmed, Yunus Pasha, Hasan Pasha, Mustafa Pasha (B), Koca Mustafa (if he survived the janissary revolt of September 1511, see p. 340ff) and Piri Mehmed Pasha are some notable examples, but there are others (see Appendix (B)). The Diarîi indicate that Selim did gradually introduce new, young men (apart from those who had been in his personal household in Trabzon) who owed their elevation to him alone, but we are told very little about them (see p. 213).

The following brief notes are intended to be no more than a basic guide with which to approach the different categories of individuals in the prosopography and to assess the usefulness of the Diarîi.

The Central Administration

The Grand Viziers: The Diarîi are a major source for the chronology of the vizierate. On several occasions the Diarîi reports and Venetian archival records are crucial in determining whether an individual was Grand Vizier or not. For example, they are particularly important in establishing the identity of the office-holder in 1501/906 (Hersekzade's/Hadim 'Ali's tenure) (pp. 83, 122); in 1503/909 and 1503-1506/909-912 (Hersekzade's/Koca Mustafa's tenure) (pp. 82ff, 336); in 1511-1513/917-919 (Hersekzade's/Koca Mustafa's/Mustafa (C)'s/Mustafa (D)'s tenures) (pp. 340-345); in 1514/920 (Dukaginziade's tenure) (p. 63).

The Viziers: Referred to individually and collectively, the viziers receive considerable coverage in the Diarîi. It is not always clear which official was first, second or third vizier, and at times it is not even clear who were the viziers.

The Kapudan Pashas: Although not a member of the divan until the reign of Suleman the Magnificent, the office of Kapudan Pasha was gaining in importance in the early years of the sixteenth century as a result of the expansion of Ottoman seapower under both Bayezid and Selim. The Diarîi are a unique source for the careers of the Kapudan Pashas in these years. There is some confusion (in the late 1490s, during some months of the Turco-Venetian war, and in 1513) as to who exactly was the Kapudan Pasha (see pp. 188ff, 252ff). Otherwise the Diarîi reports plot the course of the office and its holders. The most notable Kapudan Pashas are Küçük Da'ud, Hersekzade Ahmed, Iskender Bostancı Bası and Ca fer Pasha. The contribution of the Diarîi to our understanding of the careers of the last two is immense. They are also a unique source on Hersekzade's tenure. Moreover, their contribution to the study of the building of the Ottoman fleet and of the Haliç Tersane (arsenal) in Istanbul is notable (see p. 254). The relationship of Venetian officials with these Kapudan Pashas is described elsewhere (see p. 47).

The Provincial Administration

The Beglerbeğis of Rumeli and Anadolu: They both feature prominently in the Diarîi reports. They reflect the picture gained from Ottoman sources that the Beglerbeği of Rumeli was the senior of the two and had a place on the divan. The Diarîi make a great contribution to our understanding of the movements and manoeuvres of the various beglerbeğis during the wars of these years, as well as on the identity of the office-holders.

The Sancakbeğis: These were the officials in the provinces with whom the Venetians had most contact. It was usually in their mutual interest to maintain friendly relations. The sancakbeğis were important sources of information, not just about affairs in their own sancak, but about developments in Istanbul, in the divan, and in the empire as a whole. The information in the Diarîi, although mostly about contact with the maritime sancakbeğis, are vital to the reconstruction of the sequence of office-holders for a number of sancaks.

The Voyvodas: Local lords, often of Christian origin, who acted as the sancakbeğis' executive arm, the voyvodas also feature prominently in the Diarîi. Some developed their own close relationship with the Venetians, but they were usually in the shadow of the sancakbeğis.

Others

Ambassadors: There are a large number of Turkish ambassadors to Venice mentioned in the reports. The Diarîi material is of immense value, presenting the ambassadors as men of considerable experience and confidence. The Diarîi in most cases is the only source for the reconstruction of the careers of such men as 'Ali Beg Tercüman(q.v.) and 'Ala-ed-Din(q.v.). Little, however, is recorded about the men who accompanied them. On the whole the ambassadors were men drawn from the Palace Service, particularly the Inner Service. For example, Qasim (p. 418) and 'Ala-ed-Din (q.v.) were silâhdar başı; 'Ali Beg was subaşı and cebeci başı. The Venetians themselves appear to have been highly conscious of the different ranks within the Palace Service and of the status they conferred. Sanuto is continuously commenting on whether this or that ambassador was 'da conto' or not.

Corsairs: Considerable space is given in the reports to the activities of the corsairs, not surprisingly given the damage they inflicted on Venetian shipping. The Diarîi provide information about Ottoman pirate policy: recruitment of corsairs at one moment, their annihilation at another. They reveal three levels of collusion with corsairs: first between them and the sultan (both Bayezid and Selim); secondly, between them and some Princes (sons of Bayezid) in the provinces; and thirdly between them and maritime sancakbeğis. In addition to supplementing information on the famous corsair Kemal Re'is, the Diarîi are unique in reconstructing some aspects of the careers of Kurd-oğlu, Karahasan, Karadurmuş and Oruç.

(5) VENETIAN-OTTOMAN CONTACTS IN THE PROSOPOGRAPHY

The following is not intended as a general survey of Venetian-Ottoman relations in the period. The aim is rather to point to various themes concerning links between the two states which are discussed in greater depth in the prosopography.

Venetian contact with the Ottomans as depicted in the Diarii reports mainly concerns communication between officials of the two states. Contacts were determined to a great extent by the Venetian government's concern to find out as much as possible about the nature of the people controlling the affairs of the empire which was a constant threat to the security of the Republic's maritime possessions in the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean and consequently to the prosperity of Venice herself. The government needed primarily to know the answers to three questions: what rank did an official hold? What was his standing? (i.e. what influence did he have with the sultan, the viziers, the janissary corps?); and was he sympathetic towards the Republic? The reports which Venetian officials sent home reflect these intelligence requirements and their attempts to meet them.

Official contacts were of two kinds: those with the powerful members of the central administration (e.g. the divan), and those concerning the empire's provincial administration (sancak-beğis, Beglierbeğis etc). The maintenance of good relations at local level was of vital importance, not only to preserve the

peace and foster the economic well-being of the Venetian colonial outposts, but also because the turnover of personnel in the central administration was so great that from one day to the next a beglerbeği or sancakbeği could find himself a vizier and vice versa.

It is striking how many friends the Republic had in Ottoman government, men who oscillated between the central administration and the provinces. The occasions when Venetian officials refer to an Ottoman official as "amico nostro", 'amicissimo nostro', or 'nostro gran amico' are by no means scarce. More importantly, the Republic knew its friends and its enemies, and who to approach for favours. One important element in the typology of the leading officials of the period [see Appendix (B)] is the degree to which they were friendly towards Venice. If there was a rule of thumb which governed which Ottoman would be sympathetic towards Venice, it was probably proximity to Venetians in blood relationship and to Venice in place of birth. Many if not most of the Republic's friends were either related to the Venetian patrician class or were born in Dalmatia. It is less straightforward to reach any conclusions about relations with Venice on the basis of membership of the Slave Institution or Religious Institution, since the Republic could count on members of both (Çandarlı İbrahim, Piri Pasha are examples in the latter). The Slave Institution provided most sympathisers, largely because many of them were born in Dalmatia and because they naturally dominated the divan

and the provincial administration, and these were the Venetian hunting grounds for contacts. On the whole, those who had relatives in Venice were friendly, partly for sentimental reasons, and partly to enable them to pull strings for their relatives in the West, even though the relatives were infidels. Such men had real influence in both empires. Ottoman officials of Kul status did not, therefore, sever all ties with their past. (p.34).

But what does 'friend of Venice mean'? It had a number of meanings. For example, throughout the period Venice had friends at the very top of the administration. Most of the Grand Viziers were sympathetic: Koca Da'ud, Çandarlı Ibrahim, Hersekzade Ahmed, Mesih Pasha, Hadim 'Ali Pasha, Yunus Pasha, Piri Pasha. Some - like the first four named - were more valued than others, but none could be counted on in all circumstances. They might try to influence affairs in Venice's favour, but once a decision had been reached, they performed as true 'slaves' of the sultan, to the point of prosecuting campaigns against Venice with vigour and energy. Moreover, if they perceived that Venice was responsible for some wrong-doing against them (e.g. what might appear to us as Hersekzade's pettiness over the balas ruby), they could just as easily be counted as enemies. However, on the whole there were many individuals who were described as longstanding friends.

Official contacts were exemplified by the Venetian's quest for military aid from the Ottomans in 1510 and 1514. The vast majority of leading officials expressed their support for the Venetian cause and claimed that they would do their best to persuade the sultan to send troops. None, however, was able to achieve anything. In 1510 the Venetian government was chiefly in contact with its great friend Hersekzade Ahmed (vizier), with Hadim 'Ali Pasha (Grand Vizier), with Hasan Pasha (Beglerbeği of Rumeli), with Koca Mustafa Pasha (vizier), with Mustafa Pasha (B) (sancakbeği of the Morea), and with Qasim Beg (sancakbeği of Hersek-Nova). All promised to help. Ludovico Valdrin, secretary to the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, stated emphatically that it was Hersekzade's appointment as vizier in 1510 that turned the balance in the divan in favour of Venice, so that Bayezid was willing to consider the possibility of giving aid. In 1514 Venice was again in contact with Hersekzade Ahmed (now Grand Vizier), with Dukaginzade Ahmed (vizier), with Mustafa Pasha (B) (vizier), with 'Ali Beg subaşı, with Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha, with Sinan Kapıcı Başı, and with either Hoca Halimi or Hoca-zade Mehmed Çelebi (see p. 239). The last four names mentioned were those of men who were very close to Selim. Again all expressed sympathy for the Venetian cause. Some may well have been opportunists: those with allegedly the greatest influence (Bıyıklı Mehmed and Kapıcı Sinan) with the sultan were also those who accepted offers of money from Venice. However, not all were opportunists: some offered practical help. For example, Mustafa Pasha (B) and Firuz Beg, sancakbeğis

in coastal sancaks, allowed Venice to recruit mercenaries in the areas under their jurisdiction, even though the sultan had not given permission. So desperate was Venice in 1514 to obtain Ottoman aid that they encouraged the Ottomans to mount a diversionary attack into southern Italy. Mustafa Pasha (B) was himself extremely keen on such a manoeuvre (see. 373).

As stated above, the distinction between relations with representatives of central and local power is blurred, since officials oscillated between the two or were promoted. There are many examples of good relations between Venetian and Ottoman officials at local, provincial level which indicate a measure of active co-operation as well co-existence. Support from Mustafa (B) and Firuz Beg mentioned above is one example. There were other examples, such as co-operation in countering the activities of corsairs (p. 232, p. 218-9) or unruly inhabitants like those of the Albanian Himare region (p. 367); co-operation concerning mutual commercial interests, such as the grain and salt trade (p. 303-4, 392, 425-6, 461-2); co-operation over the provisioning of Ottoman troops or repairing of Ottoman vessels (205ff), 234-5); co-operation in sharing intelligence (p. 111(merchant), p. 370ff(SB Morea)). Notable individuals who maintained friendly relations were Mustafa (B) as SB of the Morea; Fa'ik Pasha of Arta; Qasim Beg of Hersek Nova, and others. But, like the men at the centre, these men on the periphery were invariably the loyal slaves of the sultan, throwing themselves energetically into war against the Republic if that were the sultan's command.

The two sides tried to accommodate one another over damages inflicted on the other side by local subjects, or over problems over haraç payers. The Venetians on the whole were more accommodating, at times resorting to appeasement in order to keep the peace, but perhaps also to win friends in the right places. Even when the Venetians declared it was not their responsibility to provide compensation, they were still prepared to be conciliatory and offer some palliative.

One ploy to which Venice was willing to resort repeatedly was the use of largesse in order to win friends. This took different forms. It might be the more subtle form as in the case of Hersekzade whose nephew in Venice was granted a condotta (p. 70). Or it might be simply the promise of a sum of money if they succeeded in swaying the sultan on a specific issue [e.g. Kapıcı Sinan, Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha].

Venice's enemies seem to have been fewer in number, less important in status, and less relentless in their enmity. For example, Küçük Da'ud may have been a fierce enemy in the 1503 peace negotiations, but it was said of him that he could be bought; Ca'fer Pasha didn't like Christians, but he was friendly with the bailo, Lunardo Bembo, and above all hated the Knights in Rhodes; Koca Mustafa, the only Grand Vizier whose power the Republic feared, was too involved in political intrigue to pose a real threat. Most hostility seems to have been concentrated amongst some of the Kapuden Pashas and amongst the corsairs conscripted into Ottoman service: Iskender Bostancı, Ca'fer Pasha, Küçük Da'ud, Kemal Re'is and Kurt-Oğlu (but there were also friendly Kapudans, like Hersekzade; see also p. 190).

In general, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, while Venice's friends were useful in time of peace in providing a channel to the sultan and in obtaining and safeguarding commercial privileges, they were quite useless if the sultan decided that war was necessary; and they were quite useless in obtaining help for Venice at its times of crisis in 1510 and 1514, though there were good reasons for their failure, and it may not have been for the lack of trying. In 1511 Bayezid was too feeble to want to commit troops for such a venture; in 1514, the viziers themselves were powerless even to influence Selim against risky campaigns in the East which they opposed. There is little hard evidence that it was Venice's friends in these years who were instrumental in preserving the peace for a generation. There were many other factors, both internal and external, such as Bayezid's approaching death, the dispute over the succession, and war in the east, which can account for the Ottomans' desire to pursue a path of peaceful co-existence, even co-operation, with its chief maritime rival. However, while Venice's friends were prepared to throw themselves, apparently energetically, into war when the sultan's command came, there was no element of hypocrisy and the Venetians, who understood the realities of power, would not have expected them to have acted otherwise. To the extent that many of the sultan's leading officials did not press the sultan to wage war against the Republic, their friendship must be considered to have been real and of value to Venice. The Venetians themselves were in no doubt that it was preferable to have a friend in the divan than not, and they rejoiced whenever news was received that one of their friends was about to be appointed to that council.

(6) PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL

Documentation varies enormously in both quality and quantity for each individual. Although I have tried to maintain some uniformity in the format for each profile (e.g. Nationality and Background, Identification, Early Career, Later Career), presentation has largely been governed by the nature and volume of information in the reports. Consequently the profiles combine prosopography with straight narrative history, as well as textual criticism when the sense of the report may be unclear.

Profiles on leading figures like Hersekzade Ahmed, Hadim 'Ali Pasha and Koca Mustafa Pasha are purposely long, because their activities span the period and impinge on those of most of the other officials. It has been convenient, therefore, to use these individuals to act as anchors, with the result that cross references to their profiles are frequent in order to avoid too much repetition of basic narrative. Nevertheless, repetition cannot be wholly eliminated, because the individuals took part in the same events.

Notes on the format

1. The names in Venetian on the right of each entry are the Venetian equivalents of Turkish names of the people appearing in the Diarii. It is these equivalents which I have used to assemble the profiles.



2. When a Turkish name on the left of each entry is in square brackets, it means that the individual has not actually been named in the Diarri but that analysis of the information on ranks and offices indicates that the reports must be referring to this Turk named in square brackets.

3. References to Documentary appendix (A):

a) When "[Docs., p.]" appears after a Diarri reference, it means that only that one reference immediately preceding appears in the documentary appendix. When "[both Docs., p.]" appears after two Diarri references, it means that both those references appear in documentary appendix. When "[all Docs., p.]" appears after a string of Diarri references, it means that all those references appear in the documentary appendix.

4. The following abbreviations (in addition to the bibliographical abbreviations, see pp. 528ff) have been used to save space:

BB	Beglerbeği
SB	Sancakbeği
<u>prov.</u>	provveditore
<u>rett.</u>	rettore
DOI	Date of information
DOR	Date of report

PROSOPOGRAPHY

ABENGELABA - 'maistro of Selim' (1517/923) [sic]

Sanuto, XXV, 473-4 [Docs., p.544]: The form of the name could be of Arabo-Spanish and possibly Jewish origin since the Moors in Spain pronounced the 'ibn' as 'aben' or 'abn' or 'aven'.¹ His identity cannot be established, and the information provided in this report of Francesco de Ba xista² is the only reference to him as the 'maistro' of Selim. He and his brother are listed among those who died in Damascus in 1517/1518 (it is not clear precisely when) during the Mamluk campaign.

Notes

1. IA, vol. I, p.110. Hence Abendana, Abenatar, Avicenna etc.
2. For a comment on the date of the source, see p.313.

ABDU'LLAH - frontier lord [Abdula, Abdulla]

Background and identity

There is very little information which can help to identify ^CAbdu'llah. The Relazione of Jacomo Contarini tells us that he was a subject of the Ottoman Sultan in the first years of the sixteenth century on the frontiers of the Empire with the Safavids, and that he was extremely loyal to the Ottomans.¹ Whether he belonged to some independent dynasty is not made clear, but it would seem more likely that he was a local marcher lord under the overlordship of Prince Selim in Trabzon.² There is a possibility - though this must remain largely conjectural - that he is identical with the ^CAbdu'llah Pasha mentioned in Süreyya as one of Bayezid II's emirs who rose to the rank of Beglerbeği, and whose son ^CAbdülkerim çelevi became the defterdar of Aleppo after the conquest of the city.³

Contarini relates a very detailed story⁴ of how ^CAbdu'llah had a daughter of marriageable age whom his lord (most probably Prince Selim in this case) wanted to be given in marriage to the Safavid Shah Ismail (Ardevelli), probably as a means of strengthening his position as a contender for the throne.⁵ ^CAbdu'llah approached Shah Ismail in person and offered his daughter and invited him to come to his territory and take his bride. However, it seems that underlying this invitation was the sinister objective of assassinating the Shah. The latter, oblivious to this intrigue, accepted ^CAbdu'llah's offer and prepared to make the journey. In the midst of these preparations Ismail was alerted to the dangers awaiting him by one of his advisers who had become suspicious, and instead Ismail sent an ambassador accompanied by an entourage of five hundred men bearing presents for his prospective bride.

On arrival of the embassy, ^CAbdu'llah realised that his designs had been thwarted and pretended that he had just received an order from the Sultan himself to the effect that he was to give his daughter in marriage to one of the Sultan's sons and not to Shah Ismail. The ambassador was dismissed and the presents returned, but on his return journey he was attacked and killed by ^CAbdu'llah's men and the presents seized.

Shortly after this shameful episode Shah Ismail took his revenge and invaded and annexed ^CAbdu'llah's territory, forcing him to flee to Prince Selim in Trabzon where he found sanctuary.⁶ The striking feature of the case of ^CAbdu'llah is that he was unwilling to ally himself with the forces of Shi'i rebellion at a time when Eastern Anatolia was riddled with supporters of the heresy.

Notes

1. Sanuto, VII, 15-16 [Docs., p.545]]
2. Sanuto, VII, 21-22 [Docs., p.545]
3. Süreyya, III, p.362; see also Hammer, GOR, II, p.525 (Hist. IV, p.344)
4. Sanuto, VII, 15-16
5. This was not the first time that Selim had tried to form an alliance with Shah Ismail: see Sanuto: VII, 13-14.
6. Sanuto, VII, 21-22

[°ABDURRAHMAN MÜEYYEDZADE EFENDI KADI - °ASKER]

[Alescher Cadi;
chadilascher]

Background and identity

Although Sanuto only refers to the office of Kadi-°asker and never to him by name, we know that °Abdurrahman Müeyyedzade efendi held the post of Kadi-°asker of Rumeli in 1511/917¹ when the Diarii first mentioned him in conjunction with the events of the famous janissary revolt of 21 September 1511/27 Cumāda II 917².

Career³

1454-1483/860-888

°Abdurrahman was born in Amasya in 1454 or 1455/960. When Bayezid was governor of Amasya, °Abdurrahman was attached to his household. At some point during this period he travelled to Persia for the purpose of study, and in 1483/888 returned to the Ottoman Empire and to Istanbul.

1501/907

Kadi-°asker of Anadolu.

- 1505-1511/911-917 Kadi-^Casker of Rumeli, until his dismissal following the janissary revolt.
- 1512/918 Cadi of Kara-Ferye.
- 1513-1514/919-920 Reinstated as Kadi-^Casker of Rumeli for the second time by Selim. In 1514/920 he retired with a pension.⁴
- 1516/922 Death

The Revolt of the Janissaries, 21 September 1511/27 Cumada II 917 ⁵

^CAbdurrahman paid the price for giving his support to Prince Ahmed in the struggle for the succession in 1511/917.⁶ As a consequence he was among those singled out by the janissaries for punishment in their rebellion which amounted to a purge of the leading officials of the state. His house was sacked and the janissaries forced Bayezid to dismiss him from office. These events are covered fully in the Diarii.⁷

The Kadi-^Casker's relationship with Prince Ahmed appears to have been more than simply political. Judging by Domenego Formento's transactions with him over a consignment for silk, ^CAbdurrahman had been aiding Ahmed in economic transactions as well.⁸

Notes

1. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.120; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.570; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6; Danişmend, I p.422; Uğur, pt.I, pp.124-5 (KPZ defter IX, ff. 139v-140v); Hammer, GOR, II, p.361 (Hist IV, 116-7), Süreyya, III, p.310; Tansel, pp.289-291; see also Heller, p.66.
2. Sanuto, XIII, 186-7, 220-222, 357-8 [Docs., pp.547-9]
3. This basic outline of his life and career is drawn from Süreyya, III, 310; Hammer, GOR, II p.629n (Hist., p.413, n.xxvii).
4. Dismissed according to Hammer, idem.

5. There is some confusion regarding the date. Hammer, GOR, II, p.361 dates the event on 14 August 1511; Danişmend, I, p.422 gives 21st August 1511/26 Cumāda I 917; but Uluçay, (TD VII/10), p.120, Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6 and Tansel, p.290 agree that the revolt occurred on 21 September 1511/27 Cumāda II 917. This is the date exactly pinpointed in the Diarii, XIII, 220-222 [Docs., p.548]
6. The janissary revolt and the succession dispute are dealt with fully elsewhere (see pp.85-87, 126-128, 341ff).
7. See note 2.
8. Sanuto, XIII, 357-8 [Docs., p.549]

°ABDURRAHMAN CADI

[Abdurathman]

Background and identity

In spite of a rather confused translation,¹ the Turkish ('arabesco') original of which I have not succeeded in finding in the Venetian Archives, it would seem that the letter copied by Sanuto was written in 1514/920 by a certain °Abdurrahman who was cadı of Chinaso² and Casal Amur - almost certainly Anamur on the southern coast of Asia Minor at the point nearest to Cyprus in. The identity of the cadı cannot be corroborated by any other sources.

However, the letter is a revealing insight into the economic relations between Anatolia and Cyprus, in that the latter was able to supply the population of Asia Minor with grain. 1514/920 was an especially hard year for the inhabitants of Anatolia as a result of the huge requisitions which Selim had demanded for the Chaldiran campaign. °Abdurrahman is here requesting grain and barley, and his agent in this trade is a christian called Hannibal.³ The cadı shows a keen interest in trade with Cyprus and offers the protection of the sultan to the merchants of the island. This is in keeping with Anamur's longstanding and traditional role - especially in the Roman and Crusading periods - as an embarkation point.⁴

Notes

1. Sanuto, XIX, 325-6[Docs., p.550].
2. Probably a small village near Anamur.
3. See also Sanuto, XIX, 322 [Docs., p.550].
4. For a description of Anamur and the littoral, see Denham, pp.40-43.

ACHELMOSTAR¹ - possibly SB of Mostar (August 1499)

Sanuto, II, 1038, August 1499: according to the Venetian count of Sibenico, during the first campaigning season of the Turco-Venetian war, Achel Mostar advanced in August 1499 with 3000 men to a place called Ostrovice (Sivricehisar), 'lochi di quel territorio' of Sibenico. To meet this threat, the count armed two ships and two caravels. However, when news was received that the Turkish fleet had been mobilised soon after, these ships had to be withdrawn to join the main Venetian fleet in the Adriatic.

Notes

1. According to the MS, whereas the edition gives 'Achel mostrar'. The only references to the SB of Mostar in the Diarî are for 1503 (see p.304).

AHMED PASHA DUKAGINZADE (DUKAGINOĞLU)

[Ducagin bassa; Duchagin;

Duca Ginogli]

d. March 1515/Muharrem 921

Nationality and background

The predominance of the Slave Household is exemplified by the case of Ahmed Pasha of the famous Albanian family of Dukagjini. The Dukagjini were originally of French origin (the family of Duc Jean) who had migrated to Italy in the flush of crusading spirit. In the course of the 14th century one branch of the family had moved to Albania and established itself as a feudal and landowning power in the region around Iskodra and Leş.¹ With the onset of the Ottoman invasion under Bayezid I the Dukagjini were among the local lords who co-operated with the Turks and who became Ottoman vassals and timar holders, but by the mid fifteenth century one notable member of the family, Lekë Dukagjin, was playing a major part in the Albanian resistance to the Ottomans under Iskender beg, and was also the codifier of the body of Albanian customary law known as the Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit.² The local Albanian lords oscillated between Ottoman and Venetian or Aragonese suzerainty until the death of Iskender beg in 1468 and the final subjugation of the region in the last year of Mehmed II's reign.³ The feudal families were now more fully incorporated into the Ottoman timar system, and it was at this time that the Dukagjini bifurcated: one part of the family fled to Italy while another came to terms with their Muslim overlords. It was with this background of divided loyalties that Ahmed Pasha had made his decision to convert to Islam and to enter the service of the Sultan where his ambitions could achieve their fullest expression.

Not only does he exemplify the predominance of the Slave Household but also the political influence enjoyed by Albanians in the government of the empire: Ahmed was one of thirty Albanians to achieve the rank of Grand Vizier in the duration of the empire.⁴

Sanuto gives no new information about Ahmed Pasha's background, though he does mention him as being of Albanian origin and that at the time of his death he could still muster a substantial tribal following in northern Albania itself.⁵ Dukaginzade is first mentioned by name in 1514/920 when he was already one of the viziers.⁶ We know that by 1503/909 he had become the SB of Ankara⁷ and had married the granddaughter of Bayezid II, Ayşe Sultan, who was the daughter of Güveyi Sinan Pasha (q.v.) and Bayezid's daughter, also called Ayşe.⁸ Of this there is no mention in the Diarii.

Career: Rise to power/Succession Dispute, (1511-13/917-919).

It was with the succession dispute of 1511-13/917-919 and with the accession of the new sultan that Dukaginzade's career was to reach new heights by his appointment to the rank of BB of Anatolia.⁹ This occurred whilst Bayezid II was still in power - but following the great janissary revolt of 21 September 1511/27 Cumada II 917 when the supporters of Prince Ahmed in the key offices of state were replaced by those of Prince Selim. Dukaginzade was therefore instrumental in winning for Selim the power struggle which was being waged in Istanbul in his absence. When in April 1512/Safer 918 Bayezid abdicated in favour of Selim, Dukaginzade remained in his rank of BB of Anatolia and played a vital military role in the victory of Selim over Prince Ahmed at Yenishehir (15 April 1513/8 Şafer 919).¹⁰

Although Sanuto does not mention Dukaginzade by name during these years, there are several references to the activities of the BB of Anatolia who was prosecuting the war against Prince Ahmed.¹¹ We do know that Selim's vanguard suffered an initial defeat at Ermeni Derbend in the spring of 1513,¹² and it is possible that the beglerbeği in command of the 'antiguarda' described by Sanuto is Dukaginzade.¹³ If this is the case then according to the Diarîi this beglerbeği was also appointed vizier (bassâ) shortly before the battle of Yenishehir.¹⁴ At Yenishehir itself Dukaginzade's troops arrived in time to force Prince Ahmed into a trap,¹⁵ but the reports¹⁶ from the East in the Diarîi are very vague about the actual course of the fighting. Hammer states that it was Dukaginzade himself who captured Prince Ahmed, but he gives no source for this.¹⁷

Vizier; Aid to Venice; Chaldiran, 1513-14/919-920

Whether or not Dukaginzade had already been appointed one of the viziers at the time of Yenishehir in April 1513/Safer 919, as has been suggested above, he was undoubtedly holding this rank by the summer of 1513 and in the prelude to the Chaldiran campaign.¹⁸ His support for Selim throughout the succession dispute with Bayezid and later with Prince Ahmed catapulted the Albanian into the foremost political ranks of the state where he was involved in negotiations with Venice over the renewal of the peace of 1503/909 and over the question of providing the Republic with military aid in its war with the Emperor.¹⁹ The Anconan archives furthermore show that he was involved with the other viziers in the less sensational but equally significant business of attaining commercial privileges and concessions from Ancona for Turkish merchants of Yanina, Avlonya and Arta.²⁰

But by April 1514/Safer 920 he exchanged the subtle intrigues²¹ of the divan for the harsh campaigning season which led to Chaldiran. In a classic and amusing example of the unique contribution of Venetian sources to Ottoman studies, the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, Nicolo Zustinian, wrote to the Signoria of how he had taken advantage of Dukaginzade's inebriation while at one of their frequent drinking sessions and contrived to learn various interesting morsels of information.²² First, Dukaginzade said he blamed the Hungarian ambassador for inciting Selim to such a degree that he no longer thought it feasible to divert troops from Rumeli and the Hungarian frontier in order to aid Venice. Secondly, on the eve of his and the Ottoman army's departure for Anatolia, Dukaginzade revealed how he and the other viziers were unanimous in their disapproval of Selim's venture against Shah Ismail and that under no circumstances would they be willing to pursue the enemy forces into Iran, even though he was certain that Selim would demand it of his army. Dukaginzade and the viziers were well aware of the difficulties involved in acquiring food and water in the inhospitable terrain of eastern Anatolia and the Taurus mountains.²³ It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Safavid forces did withdraw into their own territory, the viziers strongly resisted Selim's strategy of hot pursuit.

At any rate, at the start of the campaign Selim put Dukaginzade in command of the vanguard comprising of 20,000 feudal (timarli) sipahis.²⁴ Unfortunately the Diarii shed no light on Dukaginzade's activities during the Chaldiran campaign, although all sources agree that the members of the divan took up positions next to Selim in the centre of the battle line at Chaldiran (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920).²⁵

Later when Selim had reached Tabriz, Dukaginzade was a member of the delegation which was sent ahead to accept the surrender of the city and prepare for Selim's arrival.²⁶

Janissary Revolts; Zenith and Nadir of Dukaginzade's Power/Grand Vizier

Almost immediately following Selim's entry into Tabriz (5 September 1514/15 receb 920) the military situation began to deteriorate for the Ottoman army. Even before Chaldiran itself the insubordination of the janissaries, who had been the backbone of Selim's support in the succession struggle, was becoming a serious problem for the sultan and there was even talk of overthrowing him.²⁷ The viziers intervened and appeased the discontent by distributing largesse.²⁸ However, as has already been said, the viziers themselves did not share Selim's enthusiasm for the war. When in Tabriz he called on them for counsel, they (the Grand Vizier Hersekzade Ahmed pasha (qv), Mustafa Pasha (B)(qv) and Dukaginzade Ahmed Pasha) pointed to the unrest of the janissaries and the lack of provisions and advised returning home to Anatolia and thence to Istanbul.²⁹ Selim, feeling that his honour was at stake, found this advice unpalatable, but eventually compromised by accepting the suggestion of Sinan Pasha, BB of Anatolia, [p.432] to winter at Anasya and to prepare for the following campaigning season.³⁰ The sultan's anger against the viziers could not be assuaged, however, and when local peasants came to him to complain about the depredations of the janissaries, he blamed this on the mismanagement of Hersekzade Ahmed and Dukaginzade Ahmed (Mustafa Pasha (B) had already been dismissed, see p.373) and immediately dismissed them with the ritual practice of having the

crests of their tents cut down (28 October 1514/9 Ramazan 920).³¹

However, by an extraordinary turn of fate - most probably brought about by the great influence which he enjoyed with the janissary corps - Dukaginziade was appointed to replace Hersekziade Ahmed as Grand Vizier.³² There is some confusion in the sources regarding the successor of Hersekziade as Grand Vizier at this time, in part caused by the fact that both he and Dukaginziade had been dismissed at the same time and for the same reason. As has been observed elsewhere³³ the name of Dukaginziade is omitted from most lists of Grand Viziers.³⁴ Sanuto, however, states very clearly that he was appointed Grand Vizier (at the end of 1514/920).³⁵ Selim could ill afford to antagonise the janissaries since he was planning a new campaign for the following March, and the appointment of Dukaginziade would have been a popular one. However, he soon outlived his usefulness when the janissaries proved to be too difficult to control and revolted in Amasya (22 February 1515/8 Muharrem 921), sacking the houses of the vizier Piri Mehmed Pasha and hoca Halimi çelebi (qv),³⁶ both of whom were favourites of Selim. The sultan believed Dukaginziade to be the instigator of the revolt, and when certain letters were found allegedly revealing a secret understanding between the Grand Vizier and 'Ala ad-Dawla, the Prince of Albistan, Selim personally stabbed Dukaginziade to death.³⁷

Dukaginziade's power-source had rested with the janissary corps. When the janissaries had revolted during the succession dispute (21 September 1511/27 Cumada II 917), he was an acceptable choice to them for the post of BB of Anatolia. Given the fact that a large number of his fellow Albanians were conscripted into the kapı kulu army through the devşirme,³⁸ it is not surprising that he was able to

command their loyalty and to direct it in favour of or contrary to the injunctions of the sultan. When on arrival at the Amasya winter-quarters (late 1514/late 920) it was rumoured that Selim wanted to kill Dukaginzade, the janissaries became highly agitated.³⁹ Eventually Selim's fear of deposition by the janissaries in favour of his son⁴⁰ drove him to take the drastic action of personally executing the man who commanded their greatest respect. It was a calculated risk which appears to have succeeded, although Selim was plagued by further janissary revolts in 1515/921, while news of the Grand Vizier's execution sparked off serious revolts among Dukaginzade's strong body of supporters in Albania round the family power-base in Iskodra, Leş and Croia.⁴¹

Notes

1. Elezović, i/1, pp.780-784, using Charles Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, Berlin, 1873, pp. 271 ff. and pp.334-5; also Danismend, II, p.16 and pp.424-5.
2. N. Inalcık, *Arnawutluk, EI²*, vol.I, p.652-655; Elezović, i/1, p.780.
3. Durazzo, Antivari and Dulcigno remained in Venetian hands, the former until 1501 and the latter two until 1571.
4. Inalcık, *op.cit.*, p.656b
5. *cf.*, note 41.
6. Sanuto, XVII, 537-9 [Docs., p.552].
7. Gökbilgin, *Edirne*, pp.474 and 475.
8. *Idem*, and Uluçay (TD X/14), p.120.
9. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.122, using TMA. doc. no. 6186 (undated). The date of the appointment, given by Uluçay as 6 January 1511/16 Şawwāl 917, should of course read 6 January 1512.
10. The discrepancy between 15 April and 24 April 1513 for the battle of Yenishehir is explained by the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars. 24 April 1513/17 Şafer 919, the date usually given, is used by Hammer, *GOR*, II, p. 387-8, *Hist.* IV,

- p.154; Parry (Cook), p. 69; Danişmend, II, p.4. Uluçay (TD VIII/11-12), p.197 uses the earlier date, that is 15 April 1513/8 Safer 919, which is the one given in the Diarii: Nicolo Zustinian's letter dated 15 April gives a description of the battle of Yenishehir and the capture of Prince Ahmed (Sanuto, XVI, 260-1), while the Relazione of Zuan Paolo Gradenigo states that Selim had his brother killed on 15 April (Sanuto, XVII,12).
11. Sanuto, XV, 26-7 (September 1512); XV, 287 (November 1512); XVI, 260 (May 1513). [all Docs., p.551]
 12. Parry (Cook), p. 69, and Hammer, GOR, II, p.387 (Hist. IV, p.153).
 13. Sanuto, XVI, 260 (see note 11).
 14. Idem.
 15. Uluçay (TD VIII/11-12), p.197; Hammer, GOR, II, 387 (Hist. IV, 153).
 16. E.g., Sanuto, XVI, 260-1; 327; 363; XVII, 10-13.
 17. Hammer, GOR, II, p.388 (Hist. IV, 154). He also relates an anecdote, which he says is drawn from the Diarii, in which Prince Ahmed is supposed to have offered Dukaginzade a plume worth 2000 ducats. The offer was turned down. (Hammer, GOR, II, p.388 n.f, Hist. IV, 154, n.2). However, no folio reference to the Diarii is given. The probable explanation to this anecdote is that Sanuto does refer to a certain 'Tocatogli sanzacho' who found Prince Ahmed trapped beneath his horse on the field of battle at Yenishehir and to whom Prince Ahmed offered a ring - not a plume - worth 2000 ducats which was also declined (Sanuto, XVII, 11-12). If it is accepted that 'Tocatogli' is a corrupt form of Dukaginzade/Dukaginoğlu/Duka-oğlu, as seems plausible (c.f. Elezović, i/1.p.770,n.2 (Tokagin ogli), then Hammer's contention that Dukaginzade captured Prince Ahmed at Yenishehir would appear to have some substance to it.
 18. Sanuto, XVII, 537-9 [Docs., p.552]; Alberi, Ser. III, vol.III, pp.45 ff. Relazione of Antonio Zustinian; Makusev, vol. I, p.180, doc. no. 11 and ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, Corresp. of Nicolo Zustinian (Venetian bailo in Istanbul) fasc. 24, 35-37, and fasc. 38 ff.2rv [all Docs., pp.552-555]. C.f. also Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.59, Danişmend, II, p.11 and Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.524-5 which show that he was definitely vizier in 1514/920.
 19. For the renewal of the peace of 1503, see Sanuto, XVII, 537-9 [Docs., p.552], For the colourful and extensive involvement of Dukaginzade in Venice's efforts to obtain military aid from Selim, see ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 24; fasc. 35-37; fasc. 38, f. 2rv , [all Docs., pp.552-555] according to which Dukaginzade exerted himself in Venice's favour. See also notes 21 and 23.

20. Makuscev, vol. I, p.180, doc. no. 11
21. E.g., ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 36, f. 1^r, [Docs., p.553], where Dukaginzade asks Zustinian to allow him alone, and not the other viziers, to be the one to inform Selim should the Venetian government authorize Zustinian to offer more than 10,000 ducats in exchange for military aid.
22. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 38, f. 2^{rv} [Docs., pp.554]. Zustinian concludes by assuring the Signoria that any information obtained from an Ottoman vizier under the influence of alcohol is most reliable. In vino veritas.
23. Idem.
24. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p. 59; Danişmend, II, p. 7; Hammer, GOR, II, p.406 (Hist. IV, p.183).
25. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), 65; Danişmend, II, p.11; Hammer, GOR, II, p.414 (Hist. IV, p.196) who wrongly calls Dukaginzade 'der Grosswesir' and Sanuto, XX, 48 [Docs., pp.556-7].
26. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.71; Danişmend, II, p.14 (6 September 1514/16 Reçeb 920); Hammer, GOR, II, p. 417 (Hist. IV, p.201). The other members of the delegation were the defferdar of Rumeli Piri Mehmed Pasha, the historian Idris Bitlisi, and the Sekban başı Balyemez Osman Aga.
27. Sanuto, XIX, 85-88 [Docs., p.555]
28. Idem.
29. Sanuto, XX, 47-49 [Docs., pp.556-7]; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), pp.73-74.
30. Sanuto, XX, 47-49. Sanuto, XIX, 349 [Docs., p.556] also describes how certain 'principalı turchi' had already made preparations to return to Istanbul.
31. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.74; Danişmend, II, p.16; Hammer, GOR, II, 421(Hist. IV, p.206), Heller, p.72. This ceremonial matter of their dismissal is faithfully reported in Sanuto, XIX, 440, [Docs., p.556]. Although Sanuto leaves a space for the name of the third vizier (as he does in XX, 95-6, see below, note 35), which he never returned to fill, there can be no doubt that this is a reference to Dukaginzade.
32. Danişmend, II, p.16, and pp.424-5 where he dates the appointment on 18 December 1514/1 Zülka'de 920; H. Inalcık, Arnavutluk, E1², Vol. I, p.656b.
33. Danişmend, II, p.16
34. He is not listed in 'Osmanzade's Hadikat al-wuzara', or in Zambaur. Süreyya, I, p.195 only refers to him as vizier; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.74, notes his reappointment to vizier (late 1514/late 920) but not to Grand Vizier.

35. Sanuto, XX, 95-6 [Docs., pp.557-8] and cf. note 31), and XX, 225 [Docs., p.558]
36. Hammer, GOR, II, p.422 (Hist. IV, p.207); Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.75; Danişmend, II, pp.17-18, who draws attention to one account according to which the house of Dukaginziade had also been attacked. Sanuto mentions janissary unrest in Amasia (XX, 225) but gives no specific information about the revolt of February. He does, however, include a report of how Selim later (August 1515) extracted from the Aga of the janissaries the names of those who had allegedly instigated the unrest.
37. Sanuto, XX, 225 [Docs., p.558]; Danişmend, II, pp.17-18 (4 March 1515/8 Muharrem 921); Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.75; Heller, p.73 n2.
38. Inalcık, Arnawutluk, EI(2), vol. I, p.656b.
39. Sanuto, XX, 47-49 [Docs., p.556]
40. Sanuto, XIX, 85-88; XX, 225. [Docs., p.555]
41. Sanuto, XX, 299 [Docs., p.558]. Sanuto appears to have extracted this information from Albanian eyewitnesses.

HERSEKZADE AHMED PASHA [Charzego;² Carzego; Charzegli; Chersotogli;
 @ HERSEKOĞLU AHMED Carzego; Chersegoli; Charzegoli; Cargegoli;
 @ AHMED BIN CABD al-HAYY¹ Chercegogli; Charzegolo; Carzicho;
 Arischogli; Carizolli; Gorcholi; Achmat;
 Achmet; Achmath; Achmeth, Achmach, fiol
 de signor Zuane da Castelnuovo; fiol di Arzith]

Nationality, Identity and Background

It would not be an exaggeration to say that Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha is the central Ottoman figure in the Diarri from 1496/902 until 1517/923. The Diarri open just before his acquisition for the first time of the rank of Grand Vizier - a position he was to hold five times in all - and until his death in 1517 gives more coverage of his activities than those of any other Ottoman official. In political terms he was the giant of his age, receiving his apprenticeship in the Slave Household under the Conqueror and then holding the highest offices in the bureaucracy under Bayezid II and Selim I.

As well as being the most frequently mentioned Ottoman in the Diarri, he is also well documented in Turkish sources, in the registers and files of the Venetian bureaucracy, in travellers' accounts and in the relazioni of the day. He thus poses very few problems of identification and has already been the subject of detailed research and study.³ My purpose here, as in the other profiles in this collection, is simply to identify, present, and examine all relevant material in the Diarri which relates to him and not to go over ground covered by other scholars in greater depth than would be possible or desirable here. In particular I shall examine the intriguing web of relationships connecting this most influential

of Ottomans with the Venetian Republic.⁴

A great deal has already been written about Hersekzade's origins. We know from Turkish and Slavonic sources that he was the youngest son of the great Bosnian Voivode or lord Duke Stjepan Vukčić Kosaca, Duke of St. Sava and that he was born in Hersek-Novı (Castelnuovo) in either May 1456⁵ or June 1455.⁶ On his mother's side he may have had Venetian ties as his mother Barbara is said to have been the daughter of the Duke of Paros, the island dukedom in the Aegean.⁷ Until 1472 or 1473/877 or 878 Ahmed remained in Hersek-Novı and was known by his Christian name, Prince Stjepan. At this point his life is shrouded in legend. Some accounts indicate that he quarrelled with his brother Vlatko, or his eldest brother Lladislao, or his father; left his native land and went to Istanbul where he embraced Islam and entered the service of the Conqueror. Other accounts offer the story that Ahmed Pasha was sent by his father to Constantinople as a hostage where he eventually converted to Islam and began his career as an Ottoman official through the Palace School.⁸

Various reports in the Diarii tell of Ahmed Pasha's Bosnian background: that he was the son of 'Duca Stefano di Castelnuovo'⁹ (Duke Stjepan) and that he was the brother of Ducha Ulacho/Vlaticho¹⁰ (Vlatko). It is through his brother Vlatko, who had remained a Christian and whom the Venetians described as 'zentilhomo nostro'¹¹, that one link can be traced between Ahmed and Venice.

Vlatko's wife, and therefore Hersekzade's sister-in-law, was remarried to Marco Loredan quondam Antonio¹² and thus into the Venetian patriciate. Loredan now became step-father to her son by Vlatko,¹³ and this son, known as Zuan Kosaca (Zuane Cosaca) was the nephew of Hersekzade¹⁴ and a citizen of Venice. This mixture of blood

ties and marriage ties was to have a significant effect on the course of Turco-Venetian relations in the prelude to the war of 1499-1503, and the whole network of relationships is thrown into relief by the curious 'affair of the Balas ruby' which has been the subject of a separate study.¹⁵

As for Zuan Kosaca, Hersekzade showed great interest in his career in the service of the Republic, and it was partly to please him that the Collegio granted Zuan a condotta or command of 80 men and an assured stipend on 3 July 1503.¹⁶ His condotta was increased to 100 men in 1509 at the time of the League of Cambrai.¹⁷ At all times in her dealings with Hersekzade, Venice stressed how well Zuan was being cared for.¹⁸

Apart from his links through marriage with the Loredan, Hersekzade was connected by similar ties with the Venetian family of Querini. Reports from Venetian ambassadors in Hungary in May 1500/Sawwal 905 speak of a certain "Ducha Piero di Santa Saba" who had arrived in Buda in the middle of the Turco-Venetian war with news that Bayezid wanted peace, that he was suspicious of certain Christian lords and that he wanted to remove his fleet from Lepanto. The ambassadors add that certain Christian subjects of the Turk - presumably the abovementioned 'Christian lords' - and in particular the Bosnians and Serbians were hoping for a Venetian victory. Piero is described as the nephew of Francesco Querini and nephew of Hersekzade Ahmed.¹⁹

Nine years later the despatches²⁰ of another Venetian ambassador to the King of Hungary enable us to tie together the loose threads of the report in the Diarii of 1500, and to work out the relationships. Three reports from 1509 to 1510 identify Piero as Piero Balsa²¹, Duke of St. Sava, who was either the son of the brother of the then

incumbent of the sanjakate of Bosnia²², or the son of the brother of a certain pasha at the Porte.²³ (The latter description would match Hersekzade's position as vizier in 1510 while there is no evidence that he was ever SB of Bosnia.) Piero also mentions²⁴ that the Venetians had given his grandfather, "duca della Bossina" (i.e. Duke Stjepan, the father of Ahmed Pasha), a house in Venice which had passed to his father, but had then fallen into the hands of the wife of Marco Loredan who had previously been the wife of the brother of his father. Since we know that Duke Stjepan had three sons and that Marco Loredan's wife was the widow of Vlatko, we can deduce by a process of elimination that Piero's father was Duke Stjepan's eldest son, Lladislav, who had co-operated with the Turks and thus saved a part of his patrimony for his descendants.²⁵ Piero's lands lay right on the frontier of Ottoman-Hungarian influence, with most of his castles coming under Hungarian suzerainty, yet he was eager to come to the aid of the Venetians in the War of the League of Cambrai because he considered himself to be "zentiluomo veneto". Although the Diarii rightly link Piero with the Querini, he was not the nephew but the son-in-law of Francesco Querini and the brother-in-law of Antonio with whom he was in communication.²⁶

This is a highly complex web of relationships. The conclusion which can be drawn is that there was a dynamic relationship between the Muslim and Christian branches of the family of Duke Stjepan: although Bosnia had come under Ottoman rule, the sons and grandsons of Duke Stjepan, whether holding high office under the sultan or rendering military service to the Republic or to the King of Hungary, all considered themselves in some sense to be part of the Venetian aristocracy. Duke Stjepan had after all been declared a Venetian

patrician together with all his descendents by the Council of Ten in 1455,²⁷ so their claims went beyond mere ties of marriage. Ahmed Pasha actually declared himself to be a Venetian nobleman,²⁸ and as for the Venetians themselves, they seem to have been in no doubt, as can be seen in countless reports throughout the first twenty five volumes of the Diarî, that Hersekzade Ahmed was in some sense Venetian: to them he was "zenthilomo nostro".²⁹

The Diarî are equally informative about Ahmed Pasha's Ottoman connections. As in the case of other leading officials, his successful rise through the Slave Household was acknowledged by the hand in marriage of the sultan's daughter. The Venetians were well aware that Ahmed was Bayezid's son-in-law,³⁰ though no mention is made of his wife Hundi Hatun.³¹ However, it is mentioned on several occasions that Ahmed Pasha was the brother-in-law of Prince Ahmed and Prince Mahmud.³² It was very sharp of the Venetian observers to have noted this relationship, since Bayezid had several sons all of whom could be described as brothers-in-law of Hersekzade, even though they were born of different mothers.³³ The observation is revealing of its accuracy since we do know that Prince Ahmed, Prince Mahmud and Hersekzade's wife Hundi Hatun were all born of the same mother, Bülbul Hatun.³⁴ The fact that Hersekzade was bound to Prince Ahmed by this special tie was to have important consequences in 1511-1512/917-918 when the crisis over the succession reached its climax.

Other reports in the Diarî also mention that Hersekzade was the brother-in-law of Mustafa Pasha (B) (q.v.), SB of Avlonya,³⁵ who himself was a son-in-law of Bayezid and who had a distinguished career; that he was the cousin of Sinan Beg (q.v.), Ottoman ambassador to Moldavia and Poland in 1503/909;³⁶ and that he was the father-in-

law of Cassumbeg Borovinich (s.v. Qasim Beg).³⁷ The report, however, is unclear; it could be interpreted to mean he was the father-in-law of the "homo di Cassumbeg" who is said to have replaced Iskender Pasha as SB of Bosnia in December 1503. The identity of this "homo" is not certain, since it was probably Firuz Beg who succeeded Iskender.³⁸

Early Career (to 1496/902)

1478/883 Mehmed II's standard-bearer (mir-i^Calem) on the Albanian campaign.³⁹

1481/886 BB of Rumeli at the time of Mehmed II's death.⁴⁰

1481-2/886-7 Lends his full support to Bayezid in his succession struggle against Djem and was a member of that group of officials from the Slave Household who were opposed to the party of the Grand Vizier Karamani Mehmed Pasha.⁴¹

1486/892 Now BB of Anadolu,⁴² Hersekzade was appointed C in C of the Ottoman army in one of a series of campaigns against the Mamluks in Eastern Anatolia. On this occasion the purpose was to avenge the defeat of the sultan's son-in-law Ferhad in the previous campaigning season. Due to the jealousy of the generals under his command, Karagöz Mehmed Pasha, who was BB of Karaman, and Hızır Beg ođlu Ahmed Pasha, he was forced to engage battle unsupported and as a result was wounded in the hand, defeated, captured and sent to Cairo where he remained an honoured prisoner until the following year.⁴³

1488/893 In yet another campaign against the Mamluks, this time under the direction of Hadım ^CAli Pasha(q.v.), Ahmed Pasha commanded the fleet in a manoeuvre on the rear of the Mamluk army in an effort to cut off its retreat.⁴⁴ His fleet, however, was destroyed in a storm and the Ottoman land army under Hadım ^CAli was defeated at

Agaçayırı (16 August 1488/8 Ramazān 893). It has been stated that Ahmed Pasha commanded the fleet in his capacity as Kapudan Pasha.⁴⁵ However, if he did hold this rank at this time, it would conflict with the generally held view that the Kapudan Pashalık was held continuously by Mesik Pasha (q.v.) from 1480 to 1491. Hersekzade, however, is noted as having retired to his timar in Gelibolu after the campaign until 1489⁴⁶ and this could associate him with the rank of Kapudan Pasha during this period.

1489/895 Appointed BB of Anadolu again.

1490/895 Takes part in his third Mamluk campaign again as C in C.⁴⁷

1491/897 Little is known about Hersekzade's activities in the early 1490s, but he is mentioned in one source as having taken part in the campaign of Sofia in this year, holding the rank of BB of Anadolu.⁴⁸ He may have held the rank until 1497.

Grand Vizier, 1497/903

By the age of forty Ahmed Pasha had risen through the Slave Household to attain the highest position in the state outside the Sultan's family.⁴⁹ His elevation to the Grand Vizierate in the spring of 1497 is recorded in the Diarii in a letter dated 4 May 1497 from the secretary Alvise Sagudino in Istanbul.⁵⁰ However, within a few months he was dismissed and replaced by Çandarlı Ibrahim Pasha (q.v.). Ahmed Pasha's political and military experience, his loyalty to Bayezid, which had been tested over a long period, and his bond through marriage with the sultan's family all made him an obvious choice to succeed Koca Da'ud as Grand Vizier. But with the death of Djem in 1495, Bayezid found himself having to concede more and more to

those war-hungry elements among his officials and marcher lords who believed that Djem's death had removed all constraints upon the sultan's freedom of action. In particular they believed that the sultan was free to wage war on the Christian states in the West with whom the Ottomans had been at peace since the early months of Bayezid's reign when Iskender Pasha had led his gaza raids northwards. At this point Hersekzade's Venetian heritage was a liability, for Bayezid now felt that his Venetian ancestry and current links with the Republic would not recommend him as the right man to prosecute a war as Grand vizier with the necessary zeal and conviction.⁵¹ The irony of Bayezid's decision has already been discussed elsewhere,⁵² and although the hallmark of Ahmed's career was his friendly consideration of Venice, this was the one occasion that he himself was hostile towards Venice and would have made a zealous campaigner as Grand Vizier. The cause of Ahmed's enmity - his intense desire to retrieve the balas ruby which had been taken by the wife of Marco Loredan (formerly his sister-in-law) to Venice - has been analysed in detail using the Diarii and Venetian archival records.⁵³ Though on the surface it seems a rather whimsical episode, so serious was Ahmed's determination to retrieve this object that he told Andrea Gritti in 1503 that he would have included the matter in the peace treaty itself were it not for the Council of Ten's efforts to locate, purchase and deliver the ruby into his hands.⁵⁴

Sancakbeği of Gelibolu/Kapudan Pasha, 1499/904

Although Ahmed was dismissed from the Grand Vizierate, his power and influence with the sultan appeared not to have been eclipsed in any way. The official rank he held following dismissal has already

been discussed in some depth by Heller, who argues that Hersekzade was holding the rank of vizier in 1499 and that during the campaign of Lepanto (August 1499) he fought in his capacity as Kapudan-ı Derya and consequently SB of Gelibolu.⁵⁵ If this were the case it would conflict with the view that Küçük Da'ud Pasha⁵⁶ held the rank of Kapudan Pasha from 1498 until 1502. Did Hersekzade hold the three positions of vizier, Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu in 1499? There can be no doubt that references in the Diarıi to the commission of Andrea Zanchani⁵⁷ in November 1498 and to a report of Alvise Sagudino⁵⁸ in April 1499 show that Ahmed Pasha held the post of second vizier from soon after his dismissal from the Grand Vizierate in 1498 until early 1499. Similarly other references appear in the Diarıi to the effect that Ahmed Pasha was the captain of the fleet or Kapudan Pasha.⁵⁹ Only one reference however actually links the post of Kapudan Pasha with that of SB of Gelibolu,⁶⁰ while several references show that there was some confusion in the minds of Venetian officials as to who exactly did hold the rank of Kapudan Pasha.⁶¹ Given this confusion, it could be argued that Ahmed Pasha held the rank of vizier and Kapudan Pasha but not that of SB of Gelibolu, and indeed in one report it is actually stated that Ahmed may have been Kapudan Pasha while also being a vizier.⁶² Finally, it should also be borne in mind that the Diarıi reports paint a picture of a Kapudan Pasha who was friendly towards Venice in 1497 and 1498 while early in 1499 similar reports describe him as an enemy of Venice (see pp. 192-3).⁶³

Turco-Venetian War: War-Monger

Ahmed's hostility towards Venice is evident from a number of reports from Venetian officials which have been discussed in detail

elsewhere.⁶⁴ From one report in particular (from an independent source) a picture of the balance of power within the divan can be constructed.⁶⁵ Shortly before the attack on Lepanto in August 1499 we are told of the arguments raging in the divan between the peace-party and the war-party. Apparently, Çandarlı Ibrahim Pasha, who had been brought in to replace Ahmed as Grand Vizier, was now urging peace, saying to Bayezid, "Lord, you have your reputation to consider, the whole world sends you ambassadors; this business (i.e. the declaration of war) could have grave consequences for you." Ahmed Pasha, however, supported the war-party and urged the sultan, "Lord, take and burn Corfu, and you shall be master of the Levant."

It was not just Ahmed's attitude that was inimical; his great energy in the first two years of the war, his participation and contribution to the campaigns of Lepanto,⁶⁶ Modon and Koron⁶⁷ and later his defence of Midilli⁶⁸ all indicate his devotion to his master and his hostility towards Venice. As for Ahmed's exhortation to attack Corfu, this plan appears to have been abandoned by early August 1499 at a consultative meeting between Bayezid and his viziers at Varda on account of the lack of time for such a campaign; it was decided instead to switch operations towards Lepanto.⁶⁹

Unfortunately we are given very little information in the Diarii concerning Ahmed's personal contribution to the campaigning, though a certain amount can be gleaned from looking at the joint activities of the viziers, assuming that it is accepted that he was a vizier during the war. We are told that Ahmed vizier ('vezier') joined the fleet at Salonica shortly before the campaign of Lepanto, thus confirming the account of his naval role in the campaign.⁷⁰ Otherwise the viziers as a group are mentioned mainly in connection with the movements of the

sultan whom they accompanied on campaign so that he could have access to them for counsel.⁷¹ This was in accordance with the traditions of the Near Eastern state. In some instances a 'bassa' (i.e. vizier)⁷² is mentioned going on campaign against Hungary, or recruiting in the Morea.⁷³

Turco-Venetian War: The Peace-Maker

The story of Hersekzade's role in the establishment of peace and the friendship which existed between him and Andrea Gritti and which acted as the channel of negotiation for the two empires is well-known and has been examined in some depth.⁷⁴ When the Venetian secretary Alvise Manenti arrived in Edirne for peace talks in February 1500/Receb 905, Hersekzade, in contrast to the Grand Vizir Mesih Pasha(q.v.), adopted a hard line and showed his anger at Venetian demands that Lepanto should be restored to the Republic.⁷⁵ A year later, however, the viziers, including Hersekzade, were in a mood for serious negotiations. The Turks had already tasted substantial spoils of war in the form of Lepanto, Modon and Koron, but the sudden rise of the charismatic Safavid ruler Shah Ismail in the East cast a shadow over further military involvement in the West and made the re-establishment of peaceful relations with Venice imperative.

In January 1501/Receb 906 Hersekzade entertained at dinner Valerio Marzello,⁷⁶ one of the Venetian merchants captured at Modon and held prisoner in Istanbul. Marzello, newly released and preparing to return to Venice, had been informed by Mesih Pasha (see pp.318-9) that the sultan was in a mood to discuss peace. Now Ahmed Pasha informed him that negotiations could begin through Ahmed's brother-in-law Mustafa Pasha (B) (q.v.), SB of Avlonya. Marzello noted that Ahmed appeared

to be in control of the situation⁷⁷ and that all correspondence passed through his hands. Six months later a vizier⁷⁸ - probably Ahmed - was trying to intercede on Andrea Gritti's behalf to obtain his release from prison where he and other Venetian merchants had been confined since the beginning of the war. Gritti had been the most influential member of the Venetian merchant community in Istanbul and had acted both as Venetian spy and unofficial ambassador to the Porte following the expulsion of the Venetian bailo in 1492⁷⁹. More importantly he had developed a close friendship with Hersekzade during his years in the Ottoman empire and was now strategically placed to convey to the Republic the sultan's peace terms.⁸⁰ In January 1502⁸¹ Gritti, along with the other Venetian merchants, was finally ransomed and by March 1502 had returned to Venice where he reported on the situation back in Istanbul.⁸²

By the summer of that year this first phase of the peace process initiated eighteen months before had reached a successful conclusion with the establishment of communications between the two powers.⁸³ It had been achieved by Hersekzade and Gritti. Clearly the fact Hersekzade trusted his friendship with Gritti was of paramount importance. Moreover Hersekzade confided in the Ragusan ambassadors visiting Istanbul not only that he was much in favour of making peace but also that he was motivated by his very strong feelings for Gritti.⁸⁴

A stream of correspondence between the two men ensued, much of which would appear to have survived in one way or another in the ASV and Diarii. This correspondence, which commences with Ahmed's declaration to the Doge of his desire for peace and extends over a period of fifteen months until the conclusion of Zaccaria de'

Freschi's⁸⁵ mission to Istanbul (December 1502 - March 1503), has been the subject of previous detailed study by Heller.⁸⁶ My own study of the correspondence suggests that of Ahmed's nine letters dealing with the peace (one to the Doge and eight to Gritti) which are known to have survived in the ASV, six are Greek originals and three are Italian originals. No letters appear to have been written in Ottoman. This is the single most important collection of diplomatic correspondence between officials of the two empires known to us during this period.⁸⁷

The correspondence prepared the way for Freschi's formal mission to Istanbul in December 1502/Şawwāl 909 by establishing the basic principles on which peace could be founded and which could be generally described as the Hersekzade-Gritti accords. However, the peace negotiations were immediately thrown into jeopardy by the Venetian conquest of Santa Maura (30 August 1502/25 Şafer 908)⁸⁸ which had in fact taken place even before Freschi had left for Istanbul and which therefore made his powerlessness to bring the island into the negotiations appear very suspicious to the Ottomans (see pp.139-140). Far more ominous was the effect on Ahmed's own credibility with Bayezid, for Santa Maura had been taken several months after Ahmed had opened the route to peace through his correspondence with the Doge and Gritti.⁸⁹ Bayezid was incensed by the news of Santa Maura⁹⁰ and when Ahmed endeavoured to persuade the Venetians that the island had to be returned unconditionally and with reparations for loss of life and damage to its defences,⁹¹ he was not only fighting to safeguard the peace negotiations, but also to save his own political skin. Rumours - later shown to be false but indicative of the tension within the divan - were already rife by February/March 1502 that Ahmed had been

replaced as Grand Vizier by (Koca) Mustafa Pasha,⁹² while Ahmed himself told Freschi in early December 1502 that he was having to keep a low profile due to the suspicion under which he was held by the sultan and the other viziers.⁹³ It was a measure of Ahmed's power and authority that Bayezid was still willing in January 1503 to consider the Hersekzade-Gritti accords as the basis of the peace treaty, provided Santa Maura was restored to Ottoman rule.⁹⁴ When Gritti himself arrived in Istanbul on 9 July 1503 to agree the final terms of the peace, Ahmed was still Grand Vizier and still chief negotiator.⁹⁵ The series of meetings between Gritti and the viziers and the assistance which Ahmed was able to give Gritti - somewhat limited due to the hostility of the other viziers - are extremely well documented.⁹⁶ The Venetians had realised that the capture of Santa Maura had not improved their already hopeless bargaining position and were now prepared to relinquish the island, not least because the indigenous population there had intermarried with the Turks and were eager to welcome back their old masters.⁹⁷ Gritti was therefore instructed to surrender Santa Maura on ratification of the peace treaty.⁹⁸ On 10 August 1503/16 Şafer 909 the peace treaty was ratified⁹⁹ and shortly after (31 August 1503/8 Rebīʿ I 909) Santa Maura was formally restored to the Ottomans.¹⁰⁰

Resignation from Grand Vizierate/SB of Gelibolu, 1503-1509/1510

Hersekzade had masterminded the peace and survived the precarious course of the negotiations. His power, however, had been draining away. Again it had been rumoured in March 1503 that he had been dismissed for trying to obtain grain sales for the Republic which the other viziers and Bayezid had opposed.¹⁰¹ Eventually his fall from

power was caused not by any favouritism he displayed towards Venice, but by his partisan behaviour in the succession struggle which from 1503 until the end of Bayezid's reign was to be the main preoccupation of the high officials of the state.

On 10 March 1504/21 Ramazān 909 Ahmed wrote¹⁰² to Gritti informing him that he had voluntarily resigned the Grand Vizierate and had been appointed to the kapudanlık and the sanjakate of Gelibolu. He emphasised that this had been his own decision in accordance with long-held wishes to retire to which Gritti was privy. However, in March 1504 Sanuto gives an account¹⁰³ of an incident which had occurred three months before the despatch of Ahmed's letter to Gritti. It appears that Ahmed had sent five letters (and Iskender Bostancı Başı (q.v.) two letters) to the corsair Kara Durmuş (q.v.) ('Caradormis') warning him that Bayezid was sending a force against him. These letters were discovered by Bayezid's men in Kara Durmuş's possession at his stronghold in Seferihisar ('Sovrasari') and this incriminating evidence was now in the hands of the Ağa of the Janissaries who it was said was personally going to deliver the letters to Bayezid. The report goes on to say that Ahmed had given orders to the Ağa that, were Kara Durmuş to be caught, he was not to be brought back alive, thus reinforcing the suspicion that Ahmed did not want the corsair to implicate him in treasonous activities. More was at stake here than mere collusion with undesirable piratic elements: Kara Durmuş was highly favoured by one of Bayezid's sons, Mahmud,¹⁰⁴ who was governor of Manisa and who also happened to be brother-in-law to Ahmed Pasha.¹⁰⁵ Mahmud saw in Kara Durmuş's base at Seferihisar a valuable source of sea power which could aid him in the imminent struggle for Bayezid's throne. Ahmed's warning to Kara Durmuş was therefore probably

motivated by a desire to preserve Mahmud's access to Istanbul from the sea. There is no evidence that Bayezid was shown the five incriminating letters, and indeed it would seem that Bayezid never got to know about the whole affair since, having accepted Ahmed's resignation, he immediately appointed him sancakbeği of Gelibolu. Nevertheless, the power struggle between Ahmed and Koca Mustafa had been brewing for some time and Ahmed made a timely exit from the centre of affairs before his political credit with the sultan had entirely evaporated.

It has already been noted elsewhere (see pp.121-122) that it was Hersekzade and not ^CAli Pasha who succeeded Mesih as Grand Vizier in 1501/906. He was undoubtedly Grand Vizier in January 1502. Given that the Diarii first refer to Koca Mustafa as Grand Vizier in September/October 1503, (see pp.336-7)¹⁰⁶ - and it is noteworthy that this is contemporaneous with the discovery of the above mentioned five letters -it can be deduced with some confidence that Ahmed's second term as Grand Vizier ended in late 1503, not 1506 as some Turkish sources state.¹⁰⁷

The Venetian bailo Lunardo Bembo confirmed Ahmed's letter to Gritti of 10 March 1504 with news of his new appointment¹⁰⁸ and there is sufficient evidence to show that Ahmed held the post of kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu continuously until the spring of 1509.¹⁰⁹ The Venetians had lost their most influential ally in the divan and they were quite conscious of the loss. In 1506/912 Jacomo Contarini observed¹¹⁰ that he was the Republic's only friend, and when it was rumoured that he was about to be appointed a vizier, the whole of the Venetian community in Istanbul was overjoyed. However, Contarini also observed that Ahmed himself did not want the post since he had given himself up to hedonistic pursuits.¹¹¹ We actually know very little about his activities in these years, except that he was sent by

Bayezid in 1507/913 to fortify the Dardanelles against the threat of a Safavid offensive.¹¹² We are also told that he was gravely ill in January 1508/Ramāzān 913 when the bailo Bembo reported that Ahmed had come to Istanbul, his life hanging in the balance.¹¹³

Third Vizier, 1510/915

It may have been illness or his value as an adviser to the sultan, or both, which brought Ahmed to Istanbul in 1508 or 1509. Andrea Foscolo noted his arrival in Istanbul in a report of 10 May 1509 saying that he had been SB of Gelibolu but that he had returned to be a vizier.¹¹⁴ In Istanbul he was able to follow the major current events, in particular the succession dispute, which was reaching its climax, and the Republic's problems in the war of the League of Cambrai. He expressed concern to the Venetian bailo Andrea Foscolo in May 1509 about Venice's plight, adding that Venice's misfortune was also the sultan's.¹¹⁵ When therefore Yahya Pasha (q.v.) died from fever in December 1509, Ahmed was the natural choice as his successor and he was duly appointed third vizier (March/April 1510).¹¹⁶

Military Aid to Venice, 1509-1511/915-917

No sooner had Ahmed taken his seat in the divan than he was approached by Lodovico Valdrin, the secretary of the new Venetian bailo Nicolo Zustinian, both to congratulate him on his promotion and to seek his support in Venice's quest for Ottoman military aid against her enemies in Europe.¹¹⁷ Ahmed was eager to offer his services. All the viziers and the Grand Vizier Hadim ^CAli Pasha himself¹¹⁸ had been approached and their co-operation solicited, and all had expressed a degree of willingness to intercede on the Republic's behalf, but

Valdrin observed that prior to Hersekzade's elevation to the divan Bayezid had been unwilling to consider providing military aid, but that Ahmed had converted him to the idea.¹¹⁹ In spite of Ahmed's efforts, however, and the close relationship he formed with Zustinian during the course of many meetings,¹²⁰ Hungarian belligerence and Ottoman financial problems proved to be insurmountable.¹²¹

The Succession Dispute and the Revolt of the Janissaries

Hersekzade anyway now had his own survival to worry about. Bayezid's life was drawing to an end and a solution to the succession had to be found. Prince Ahmed and Prince Selim were the two main contenders. In common with the other viziers and Bayezid,¹²² Hersekzade supported Prince Ahmed who happened to be his brother-in-law¹²³ and it was said had engineered Hersekzade's appointment to the divan.¹²⁴ Although Hersekzade was a strong supporter, he nevertheless maintained a low profile and allowed the Grand Vizier Hadım ÇAli to be most closely associated with Prince Ahmed's cause. This was to prove a shrewd policy, for with the sudden and unexpected death of ÇAli at Gokçay at the hands of Shah Kuli (2 July 1511/5 Rebî' II 917), Prince Ahmed's chances of success were drastically reduced.¹²⁵ Shortly afterwards when Prince Selim advanced from Edirne towards Istanbul with the intention of seizing the throne from Bayezid. Hersekzade wisely declined to lead the sultan's army into battle against so likely a successor, and he was able to excuse himself with impunity on the grounds of ill health.¹²⁶ When therefore it was Selim rather than Bayezid who was defeated at Çorlu (3 August 1511/8 Cumāda I 917), Hersekzade had jeopardized his position neither with Bayezid nor with Selim.

Although most historians have accepted that Hersekzade was appointed Grand Vizier for the third time after Hadım ĆAli's death,¹²⁷ there is some confusion over whether he did hold this office from July 1511.¹²⁸ The Diarîi are not very clear as to who may have been Grand Vizier during this period. The confusion surrounding the Grand Vizierate from 1511 to 1513 is dealt with under Koca Mustafa Pasha and the whole question of the identity of the Mustafa Pashas in 1511 and 1512¹²⁹. When the janissaries revolted in September 1511, they addressed Hersekzade as "Vui seti adesso el mazor bassa", which could mean that he was Grand Vizier; but this could also merely refer to the fact that he was the senior vizier now that the janissaries had sacked the houses of the other viziers.¹³⁰

The Janissary revolt of 21 September 1511/27 Cumāda II 917)¹³¹ was the most severe test of Hersekzade's political acumen. Selim's defeat at Çorlu now rekindled Prince Ahmed's hopes for the succession.

Although Hersekzade had counselled Bayezid to postpone any decision about the succession and to advise Prince Ahmed to exercise patience,¹³² the other viziers and leading men of state - Koca Mustafa Pasha, Hasan Pasha BB of Rumeli, CaĆfer Ćelebi the NisanĆı and the Kadi-ĆAsker ĆAbdurrahman Müeyyedzade Efendi - all urged Bayezid to call Ahmed to Istanbul in preparation for handing over power.¹³³ Prince Ahmed decided to follow this advice and approached Istanbul on the pretext that he was coming as a son to kiss the hand of his father.¹³⁴ When news of this reached the janissary corps, who were solid in their support for Selim, there was pandemonium and a spontaneous revolt. They immediately made for the houses of these leading supporters of Prince Ahmed and sacked them.¹³⁵ Hersekzade had remained aloof from this intrigue aimed at bringing Ahmed into the

city. This, coupled with his nerve in personally facing the janissaries at his front door, saved his life, his house and his political skin. Sanuto actually includes a document which gives the dramatic dialogue between Hersekzade and the janissaries.¹³⁶

Although Hersekzade had taken charge of the political situation at the time of the janissary revolt and had distributed gold as a palliative for these troops,¹³⁷ in the short term he found himself dismissed from office while Mustafa Pasha, traditionally thought to be Koca Mustafa who paradoxically had been the main conspirator in the September plot to enthrone Prince Ahmed, was elevated to the rank of Grand Vizier.¹³⁸ It is not explicit in the Diarii that Hersekzade had been dismissed, though the fact that he disappears from the reports until the following year is a strong indication that his power had been temporarily eclipsed.

Accession of Selim (24 April 1512/7 Safer 918)

Hersekzade must have had some role to play within the divan, however, for Bayezid was still very much under his influence in the early months of 1512 when Selim's accession seemed highly likely. Hersekzade was now firmly and openly behind Selim's candidature,¹³⁹ and was instrumental in persuading Bayezid that he had to declare Selim his successor. Unfortunately there are no reports at all in the Diarii referring to Hersekzade's part in the political intrigue of these months. He is only mentioned again in June 1512, well after Selim's accession, as one of the viziers who did not accompany Bayezid into exile but remained in Istanbul with Selim.¹⁴⁰ In other words his support during the previous six months was being acknowledged by Selim who did not conduct a wholesale purge of the bureaucracy on taking

power. According to the Diarî Selim actually made a deal with the viziers that he would not dismiss them from office and would reward them financially if they succeeded in persuading Bayezid to abdicate in his favour.¹⁴¹

Selim: The First Twelve Months

One year almost to the day after Selim had assumed power, he delivered the final blow to Prince Ahmed's ambitions when he defeated him in open battle at Yenishehir (15 April 1513/8 Safer 919). Although it has been said above that Selim did not conduct a systematic purge of the bureaucracy, there is considerable confusion surrounding the events of his first twelve months in power and the key individuals of his divan, including the incumbents of the Grand Vizierate. In a letter of 15 May 1513 - that is after the battle of Yenishehir - Nicolo Zustinian, the ballo gives a revealing picture of the divan and in the process offers a glimpse of the sort of questions that Venetian observers were asking about the reign of the new Sultan. He states that Selim had four viziers and that of these, Hersekzade and Mustafa Pashas were viziers from his father's reign and were also friends of Selim, while Yahya and the Bostancı başı (Iskender Pasha) (q.v.) were new men.¹⁴² In another report of 26 April 1513 written by a source inside Anatolia to the Venetian regiment in Cyprus, Hersekzade is described as the second vizier who used to be "gran bassa (Grand Vizier) et capitano del campo tutto", whereas Mustafa Pasha would seem here to be the Grand Vizier.¹⁴³ These two reports - quite independent of one another - cast doubt on the generally accepted view¹⁴⁴ that Ahmed Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier at some point in 1512 following the execution of Koca Mustafa Pasha (q.v.),

since it is shown that Ahmed was only second vizier until at least half way through 1513. Furthermore I have argued elsewhere¹⁴⁵ that there is strong evidence in the Diarii to suggest that Koca Mustafa was not succeeded by Ahmed but by yet another Mustafa Pasha (Mustafa (C)).

In fact it was not until September 1513 that there is evidence to show that Ahmed had become Selim's favourite vizier.¹⁴⁶ In June 1513 Zustinian had written that there were only two viziers holding office, one was Ahmed Pasha and the other Hasan Pasha [p.225]. The latter enjoyed greater favour with Selim, because it was said that he had been responsible for the sultan's victory over Prince Ahmed.¹⁴⁷ All through 1513 Hersekzade was working hard to endear himself with the new sultan. Following Selim's victory at Yenisehir in April 1513/Şafer 919, Ahmed threw a sumptuous dinner in the sultan's honour at Gelibolu.¹⁴⁸ At the dinner Selim distributed largesse to commemorate the victory, Ahmed receiving gold plates and other gifts to the value of 25,000 ducats. However, at one point the dinner almost turned into a disaster for Ahmed when Selim fell with his horse into muddy water and was covered in mud. Ahmed threw himself at his feet, crying and cursing fortune. Ahmed had to deal with another problem at the dinner, for petitions flooded in to Selim complaining about the corrupt practices of Iskender Pasha, the Bostancı Başı. Hersekzade endeavoured to intercede on Iskender's behalf,¹⁴⁹ but Selim was intent on bringing him to book. However, the final outcome of the dinner and of his efforts to ingratiate himself with Selim was successful. When the Venetian ambassador Antonio Zustinian arrived in Istanbul in August 1513 he was received by three viziers: Hersekzade, Mustafa (B) Pasha (q.v.) and Ahmed Dukaginade (q.v.), with the

implication in Zustinian's Relazione that Hersekzade was the senior.¹⁵⁰ This would not, however, make him necessarily the Grand Vizier, while the possibility of a Mustafa (D) (see pp.344-5) as Grand Vizier in 1513 cannot be discounted. Nevertheless, if Mustafa (D) was Grand Vizier, why did he leave negotiations with Zustinian to Hersekzade?

Grand Vizier (fourth term): Turco-Venetian Peace 1513/919)

Military Aid to Venice (1513-14/919-920)

Zustinian's mission had the dual purpose of delivering the Republic's congratulations to Selim on his accession and of renewing the peace treaty of 1503. Ten years after the formulation of that treaty Hersekzade was once again Grand Vizier and chief negotiator, a remarkable feat given that a very different man was now sultan. On this occasion there were no serious problems to be tackled. Selim was already intent on maintaining peaceful relations with Venice so that he could pursue a war against the Safavids. His viziers - Hersekzade, Mustafa (B) and Dukaginzade Ahmed - were therefore allowed a free hand in dealing with Zustinian.¹⁵¹ Only two additional articles were requested by the Ottomans, both of which reflected Selim's preparations for war with the Safavids. One concerned the provisioning of the Ottoman fleet in Venetian possessions (c.f. p.108); the other concerned a general declaration that the Sultan's enemies were also the Republic's. The Venetian Senate was willing to accept the former, but wisely, the latter was not formalised in the treaty. The Ottomans also asked that Venice should pay a tribute of 10,000 ducats a year to the sultan as had been the custom during the reign of the Conqueror. Zustinian pointed out that that payment had never been considered to be a tribute and had been a special payment to pay off a

debt. The viziers accepted the explanation and withdrew the request.¹⁵²

Hersekzade was the only high ranking Ottoman official who had taken part in the 1509-1510/915-917 discussions over providing formal military aid to Venice, when Bayezid could not be convinced. Now as Grand Vizier he endeavoured once again to win the new sultan over to the idea. However, he had no more success with Selim on this occasion in achieving his goal than the other viziers.¹⁵³ Real power was already beginning to slip from his hands as new men were gaining influence with Selim.¹⁵⁴

Chaldiran (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920); Dismissal

Hersekzade and the viziers Dukaginzade Ahmed and Mustafa Pasha (B) were in fact out of step with Selim's grand designs. All had viewed with scepticism the Sultan's plan to march on the Safavids.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless the ageing Hersekzade found himself as Grand Vizier and as C in C of the Ottoman army leading a force of 120,000 men against Shah Ismail.¹⁵⁶ Apart from this and Ahmed's presence in the centre of the battle line next to Selim at the battle of Chaldiran,¹⁵⁷ we know very little about his activities during this campaign. He remained half-hearted in his attitude to the whole military adventure, especially with the discontent of the janissaries increasingly a serious problem.¹⁵⁸ When he and the viziers advised and urged Selim to withdraw from Tabriz, since the Safavids were retreating into their hinterland and avoiding battle, Selim reluctantly accepted their advice. However, he lost no time in finding a pretext on which he could ignominiously dismiss them, and in the case of Hersekzade and Dukaginzade, used the ritual practice of having the crest of their tents cut down (28 October 1514/9 Ramazān 920).¹⁵⁹

Grand Vizier: Fifth and last term

A year later (8 September 1515/29 Receb 921)¹⁶⁰ Hersekzade was back again in the office of Grand Vizier for the fifth and last time. In the previous twelve months the Grand Vizierate had witnessed a stormy period, first in the hands of the luckless Dukginzade who had been stabbed to death in March 1515 by Selim himself, and then as a result of being left vacant for six months, with the vizier Hadim Sinan (q.v.) acting as de facto Grand Vizier from July 1515. Once again Hersekzade's experience and authority made him a valuable adviser to Selim in spite of previous differences. Characteristically, Hersekzade, who had been forewarned by the viziers Sinan Pasha and Piri Mehmed Pasha of Selim's intent to appoint him Grand Vizier, tried to excuse himself on the grounds that he was infirm and gouty. However, this only served to anger Selim and make him suspicious that his viziers had leaked information on deliberations which had taken place in the divan and increased his resolve that Hersekzade should take up his new appointment.¹⁶¹

There is little information about Ahmed's fifth tenure in office except that it was short and ended almost fatally. Selim was a capricious master to serve. Friction between Selim and his viziers had already been reported in February 1515 when the sultan had banned them from attending the counsel for an indefinite period.¹⁶² Consequently when it was reported that Shah Ismail had captured a quantity of artillery from an Ottoman army which the viziers had advised Selim to despatch to the Safavid frontier, the sultan immediately blamed Ahmed and the vizier Piri Mehmed (q.v.), had them bound and ordered their execution. Were it not for the intervention of Hadım Sinan Pasha, they would have been executed, but instead they

were only dismissed after a short imprisonment (April 1516)
(see p.409).¹⁶³

The Mamluk Campaign, 1516-17/922-3; Death

Given Ahmed's propensity for survival, it is not surprising that his career did not end in ignominy but in the execution of his duties. Other men Selim had had killed, personally stabbed to death or ruined in one way or another. Ahmed, however, although dismissed from the divan, continued to be muhafiz of Bursa (a post he had probably held since 1514/920¹⁶⁴) and in 1516 he may even have been conferred with some sort of viceregal powers as governor in Edirne during Selim's absence on the Mamluk campaign.¹⁶⁵ As regards that campaign, Ahmed is said to have been in favour of it.¹⁶⁶ Though at first he had no active part to play, by the spring of 1517 he too was called to muster an army of 10,000 men and 2,000 sipahis and to march towards Syria to reinforce the Ottoman army.¹⁶⁷ Hersekzade carried out his master's wishes with his customary loyalty and zeal. Lunardo Bembo, bailo in Istanbul, was impressed that two sipahis were cut down for refusing to obey the call to mobilise.¹⁶⁸ Although it has been stated that Ahmed went to Cairo to congratulate Selim on his victory against the Mamluks,¹⁶⁹ and although the newly returned Venetian consul in Alexandria, Tomaso Venier, told Sanuto that a certain 'Amet bassa' was with Selim in Alexandria in late 1517,¹⁷⁰ it seems unlikely that Ahmed got further than Aleppo. Bembo states that Hersekzade set off on his journey on 4 June 1517/13 Cumāda I 923.¹⁷¹ Since it is accepted that he died on 21 July 1517/2 Receb 923¹⁷² near Aleppo,¹⁷³ he would hardly have had the time to reach Cairo and start back.

Notes

1. Ménage (Stern), p.114.
2. See Heller, p.37, n.3 for a comprehensive list of variations of Hersekzade's name in Italian sources.
3. Heller, Erdmute, Venedische Quellen zur Lebensgeschichte des Ahmed Paşa Hersek-oghlu, 1961 dissertation, Munich, 96 pp, (reviewed in REI, 38 (1970) pp.194-5). Although Heller uses the Diarîi and some other Venetian sources as well as Turkish and Slavonic material, her use of the Diarîi and of the ASV is a little haphazard. The same can be said for Reindl, pp.129-146. See also H. Šabanović, 'Hersek-zade Ahmed Pasha', EI(2), vol. II, pp.340b-342a. Heller, Reindl and Šabanović are the most recent comprehensive studies on Ahmed Pasha and provide an extensive bibliography of secondary as well as primary literature, including edited documents relating to him.
4. Peter Sebastian, 'Venice and the Turks', 1480-1517 (typescript submitted with this thesis and accepted for publication by the Society for Mediterranean Studies) has already dealt with some aspects of his link with Venice.
5. Šabanović, op. cit., p.341b.
6. Heller, p.10.
7. Šabanović, op. cit., p.341b, but this is in conflict with Heller, pp.9-10 who says that Barbara was a German princess.
8. For an analysis of the differing accounts, see Sebastian, p.17, notes 10, 11, 12.
9. Sanuto, V, 459-60, but see also II, 542-3 [Docs., p.559] where it is presumably Ahmed's father who is referred to as "Zuane da Castelnuovo". Sanuto, II, 600 refers to Ahmed's father on this occasion as "Arzith ducha". [Docs., p.559].
10. Sanuto, II, 139, 600 [Docs., p.559]; III, 190 [Docs., p.560] and II, 700.
11. Sanuto, II, 700.
12. Sanuto, III, 190-1; IV, 860; V, 57, 452 [Docs., p.562] Note also IV, 860 [Docs., p.561] where it is stated that a certain friar called Alexander is the relative of Hersekzade and of the wife of Marco Loredan. Cf. with V, 452 [Docs., p.562]: "Item, disse di uno frate di San Beneto, che pol assa' con Achmat bassà."
13. Sanuto, V, 57, 452 [Docs., p.562]; VIII, 16, XVII, 159-160.
14. Idem.

15. Sebastian, op. cit.
16. Sanuto, V, 57, 452 [both Docs., p.562].
17. Sanuto, VIII, 16. Zuan was still reported to be in Venice in 1513 by Sanuto himself (XVII, 159-160).
18. ASV, MADM. filza 132, Commission of Zaccaria de' Freschi, 13 September 1502, Art. XXI; BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652), fasc. 1, Copialettere of Andrea Gritti, ff. 38rv, 5 August 1503 [Docs., p.564]; BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652), fasc. 2, Commission of Andrea Gritti, 1503, f. 7v.
19. Sanuto, III, 365-6 [Docs., p.560]
20. Ljubić, Ch. VI, pp.113-114, p.118 and p.122, Despatches of Pietro Pasqualigo, 1509-1512 [Docs., p.563-4].
21. Ibid., p.118, 1 March 1510.
22. Ibid., pp.113-4, 27 December 1509.
23. Ibid., p.122, 9 July 1510.
24. Ibid., pp.113-4.
25. This would appear to be buttressed by the fact that Piero named his own son Lladislas (Ibid., pp.113-4). For an analysis of the link between Ahmed Pashā and the historian Théodore Spandouyn Cantacasin (Spandugino) through Lladislas the elder, see Sebastian, op. cit., n. 10.
26. Ibid., pp.113-4.
27. Heller, p.26 and n. 3.
28. Malipiero, pt. 1, p.196 [Docs., p.564]. See also Ahmed's reference to his ancestral ties with Venice during the peace negotiations, ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, nos. 2, 3, 14 (see note 87).
29. Sanuto, II, 139, 600 [Docs., p.559], and II, 700, 791; III, 179; XVII, 537-9.
30. Sanuto, I, 644 [Docs., p.619]; II, 600, 690, 695-6 [Docs., p.560-1] and II, 700; V, 459-460.
31. Uluçay, (TD X/14), pp.121-122 and Šabanović, op. cit., for details of Ahmed's children. For Hundi Hatun's mülk (estates), see Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.387.
32. Sanuto, V, 458-9 (Narrazione of Caroldo) [Docs., p.562]: this degree of accuracy and detail is indicative of Gian Giacomo Caroldo's erudition. See also Sanuto, XI, 55 and XII, 507 [Docs., p.562]. Note also IX, 12.

33. Uluçay (TD X/14), pp.09ff.
34. Ibid., p.106 and no.6 and p.122.
35. Sanuto, III, 1555 [Docs., p.561].
36. Sanuto, IV, 805 [Docs., p.561]. See pp.455-7.
37. Sanuto, V, 614-4.
38. There are other references which refer to a change of sancak beği in Bosnia at this time: Sanuto, V, 353, 657, 720, 804.
39. Heller, pp.17-18; Babinger, p.362.
40. Tekindağ, (TD X/14), pp.86-7.
41. Tekindağ, (TD X/14, pp.86-7; Danişmend, I, pp.370 ff and p.376 ff; Heller, pp.18-19; Giovio, Commentario, f. 12r; Sansovino, Annali, f. 93v; Fisher, Civil Strife, p.455; Šabanović, op. cit., p.341a.
42. Süreyya, I, p.195.
43. Tekindağ, (Bell. XXXI), p.355; Danişmend, I, p.386; Tansel, p.102; Heller, pp.21-22; Hammer, GOR, II, p.293-4 (Hist. IV, p. 19). See also Kreutel, Oruc, pp.40ff; Giovio, Commentario f. 13v; Sansovino, Annali, f. 97r; Šabanović, op.cit., p.341a. Fisher, p.38.
44. Tekindağ, (Bell. XXXI), p.362; Danişmend, I, p.388; Tansel, pp. 108-9; Heller, pp.23-4; Fisher, pp.39-40; Šabanović, op.cit., p.341a; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.297-8 (Hist. IV, p.25).
45. Šabanović, op. cit., p.341a, and Süreyya, I, p.195. Süreyya would have Ahmed Pasha hold the rank of Kapudan Pasha shortly before 1488, since in 1488 he states that Ahmed was again appointed BB of Anadolu. That he fought the campaign of 1488 in the rank of BB is in agreement with Kreutel, Oruc, p.49.
46. Heller, p.24, using Truhelka, p.93.
47. Heller, p.24; Šabanović, op. cit., p.341a; Danişmend, I, pp.391-2; Tansel, p.113.
48. Kreutel, Oruc, p.55. See also Tansel, pp.172-3 who uses Kemal Pashazade to show Hersekzade's participation in the campaign, and Reindl, p.139.
49. Hammer, GOR, II, p.310 (Hist. IV, p.43); Šabanović, op. cit., p.341a; Heller, pp.25-6; Danişmend, I, p.429; Osmānzāde, p.16; Süreyya, I, p.195.
50. Sanuto, I, 644 [Docs., p.619]; his elevation is also mentioned in a letter dated 12 June 1497 (Sanuto, I, 707) [Docs., p.620].

51. Hammer, GOR, II, p.332; Heller, p.27; Kissling, Gonzaga, p.56.
52. Sebastian, op. cit., p.5.
53. Ibid., pp.5-10.
54. BNM, Copialettere, fasc. 1, ff 38rv.
55. Heller, pp.27-28; Šabanović, op. cit. also states that Ahmed was appointed SB of Gelibolu and Kapudan-ı derya. 'Osmanzade, p.16 gives him the title 'Kapudani' at the conquest of Lepanto.
56. See pp.188-9 for an analysis of the serious prosopographical problems concerning the post of Kapudan Pasha at this time, and Reindl, p.139.
57. Sanuto, II, 139 [Docs., p.559]; and MCC, Cod. Cicogna, no. 2269, Commissioni no. 30, 20 November 1498, f. 1r.
58. Sanuto, II, 600 [Docs., p.559].
59. Sanuto, II, 542, 690, 695-6 [Docs., pp.559-560].
60. Sanuto, II, 695 [Docs., p.560].
61. Sanuto, II, 738, 740, 791, 841.
62. Sanuto, II, 738.
63. Sanuto, II, 542-3 [Docs., p.559] and II, 972-3.
64. Sebastian, op. cit., pp.5-6. For the references concerned: Sanuto, II, 939; III, 11-14, 180, 181, 190-1, 558-9.
65. Sanuto, II, 939, 20 July 1499, Deposition of Vola Lendari, a Greek citizen of Corfu. He appears to have obtained this information from a meeting with Mustafa Pasha (B), SB of Avlonya.
66. Tansel, pp.194-5; Heller, pp.30-32; Šabanović, op. cit., p.341a; Kreutel, Oruç, p.116ff; 'Osmanzade, p.16; Hammer, GOR, II, p.317 (Hist., IV, 55).
67. Heller, p.32; Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.241, 259.
68. Tansel, pp. 221-2; Heller, p. 32; Danişmend, I, p. 409; Šabanović, op. cit., p. 341a; Hammer, GOR, II, p. 327 (Hist. IV, 69); Spandugino, p. 327, n. 1; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p. 545, n. 20 citing various Ottoman sources. Sanuto's reports (see IV, 242-3) on the siege of Midilli do not mention Ahmed's role.

69. Sanuto, II, 1127-8 [Docs., p.629].
70. Sanuto, II, 972-3 [Docs., p.564-5].
71. Sanuto, II, 1127-8, 1144; III, 1404-5.
72. Sanuto, III, 419: in this case 'bassa' may not necessarily signify a vizier.
73. Sanuto, III, 304-5.
74. Heller, pp.37-58.
75. Malipiero, pt. I, pp.193ff; Sanuto, III, 179, 180, 181 [Docs., p.565].
76. Sanuto, III, 1555 [Docs., p.561].
77. *Idem.* "lui Charzego, sapeva il tutto; havia le so letere, e tutto passava per le man sue, ---."
78. Sanuto, IV, 72-3 [Docs., p.565].
79. Davis, p.101ff.
80. Heller, pp.37ff.
81. Davis, p.105.
82. Sanuto, IV, 244; Davis, p.105.
83. Sanuto, IV, 285-6; ASV, CX Misti, re.29,f. 69v, 11 June 1502.
84. ASV, Misc. Gregolin, Busta I, fasc. 4, no. 7, 1501, 4 July [Docs., p.556].
85. Neff, Secretaries, pp.49ff.
86. Heller, pp.40-55 and appendix.
87. The present location of these nine documents (as opposed to the references given by Heller in 1960) is as follows: (1) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 3, 20 January 1502, Ahmed to Doge; Greek original; contemporary translation (trans) at ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 7; transcription in M and M III, p.340, no. XXX; regist in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 21. (2) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 4, 25 April 1502, Ahmed to Gritti; Italian original; regist in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 22. (3) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 2, 5 July 1502, Ahmed to Gritti; Italian original; regist in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 23. (4) ASV CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 3, 5 July 1502, Ahmed to Gritti; Italian original; regist in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 24. (5) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 7, 5 July 1502 (acc. to M and M III, p. 342), Ahmed to Gritti; Greek original; transcription in M and M, III, p.342, no. XXXII. (6) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 9, 5 July 1502, Ahmed to Gritti; Greek original;

transcription in M and M III, p.343, no. XXXIII, trans. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 8. (7) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 14, 21 December 1502, Ahmed to Gritti; Greek original; summarised in Sanuto, IV, 646-7; transcription in M and M III, p.351, no. XXXVI; regest in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 31. (8) Another Greek original, dated 21 December (1502) and almost identical to no. (7), differing only in the use of vocabulary and traditional formulas, can be found at ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 2; also mentioned in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 32a. (9) ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 5, 24 March 1503, Ahmed to Gritti; Greek original; trans. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 10; transcription in M and M III, p. 341, no. XXXI; regest in ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 34 and ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no. 1545 and Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, p. 65, no. II; another trans. in ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 76v. M and M III wrongly date this document for the year 1502. For mention of this correspondence in the Diarii, see Sanuto, IV, 302, 319-320, 494, 532, 646-7, 652, 669, and more contemporary translations can be found in ASV, MADM, filza 89 and 132. A list of Ahmed Pasha's letters in Greek are also in Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica, I, pp.208-9. References to Andrea Gritti's letters to Hersekzade are too numerous to be given here concisely and can be located quite easily in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis; in MADM, filza 89 and 132 and ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 39, and in the Diarii (e.g. IV, 494, 532, 652).

88. Sanuto, IV, 313-318.
89. Sanuto, IV, 402-3.
90. Sanuto, IV, 480, 481, 511, 518-9.
91. Sanuto, IV, 645-6 and especially ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, nos. 2 and 3 (see note 87).
92. Sanuto, IV, 242, 479-80, 481, 564-5, 584-5, 704-5.
93. Sanuto, IV, 645, 651-2.
94. Sanuto, IV, 751-2.
95. Sanuto, V, 63, 449, 456.
96. Sanuto, V, 272-3, 431; Relazione of Andrea Gritti in Sanuto, V, 449-455 and in Alberi, Ser. III, volume III, pp.1-43; Narrazione of Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Sanuto, V, 455-468 and BNM, Cod. It. VII, 882 (8505) (Caroldo's autograph MS) (see Sebastian, n. 63); also BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652) for Gritti's Copialettere of the mission; Heller, pp.50ff.
97. Sanuto, IV, 781, 787-8.
98. Sanuto, V, 450.
99. Sanuto, V, 77.

100. Sanuto, V, 84, 85.
101. Sanuto, IV, 870-1. Sanuto points out that this information did not come from a reliable source, but this rumour was another indication of the dangers involved in Ahmed's support for Venice (see note 92).
102. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 8, 10 March 1504, translation in Italian from Greek; other translations also in ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 93v and ASV, Libri Comm. XIX, f. 44v. Regests in ASV, Indice Bombaci, no. 46; ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no. 1560; Predelli, comm. reg., VI, p.73, no. 48. For Gritti's reply, see ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 14rv 26 April 1504.
103. Sanuto, V, 973-4 [Docs., pp.566-7]: Zuan di Tabia, Venetian Consul in Candia, 1 December 1503. Tabia states that all the information in his letter had been obtained by his brother Tomaso from the Aga of the Janissaries himself.
104. Sanuto, V, 465-6: the "zelebey di Mangressia" (Çelebi of Manisa) referred to here is Bayezid's son Mahmud.
105. Sanuto, V, 458-9 (see note 32).
106. Sanuto, V, 255 [Docs., pp.576-7].
107. Süreyya, I, p.195; Danişmend, vol. V, p.12; Hammer, GOR, II, 346-7 (Hist. IV, 95); Šabanović, op. cit. p. 341a; ^COsmanzade, p.16. But note that according to a deft̄er in Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.476 Ahmed was installed as SB of Gelebolu in March 1504.
108. Sanuto, VI, 15. See also ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 12r, 15v.
109. Sanuto, VI, 308-9, 461(1506); VII, 11-12(1506); VII. 168(1507); VII, 286-7, 569(1508); X, 202(1510); and especially VIII, 367 (May 1509). See also ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 12r, 15v
110. Sanuto, VII, 11.
111. Cf. Sanuto, IV, 667-9(reference to Ahmed and 'his women').
112. Sanuto, VII, 168
113. Sanuto, VII, 286-7; also X, 668-9 (suffering from gout)
114. Sanuto, VIII,367
115. Sanuto, VIII, 367
116. Sanuto, X, 21, 202, 342, 431, 551, 667-8; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg.43, f. 35r, May 1510.
117. Sanuto, X, 342 and ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib reg. 43, f. 35r, 17 May 1510; also Sanuto, X, 342-3, 499, 552; XI, 55, 295. See also

- ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci(Const), Busta I, fasc. 20, October 1510.
118. For ^CAli's part in this matter and for a fuller analysis of these negotiations over aid, see pp.125-6 and notes.
 119. Sanuto, X, 499.
 120. Sanuto, X, 716, 801-2, 868-9 and especially XI, 292-4.
 121. See p.125.
 122. Sanuto, XII, 507ff [Docs., p.567].
 123. See note 32. Note that Hersekzade had shown similar support for his other brother-in-law, Prince Mahmud, in 1503.
 124. Sanuto, XII, 507 [Docs., p.567].
 125. See p.127.
 126. Sanuto, XII, 515-6.
 127. Hammer, GOR, II, p. 361(Hist. IV, 116); Uluçay, (TD VII/10), p.119; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6; Danişmend, I. p.422, 446; Heller, p.61; Šabanović, op. cit, p.341a; ^COsmānzāde, p.16; Süreyya, I, p.195.
 128. Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.30, states that Koca Mustafa was Grand Vizier.
 129. See p.340ff.
 130. Sanuto, XIII, 186-7 [Docs., p.547].
 131. See p.55-6.
 132. Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.570.
 133. Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.570; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6.
 134. Sanuto, XIII, 185; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.570.
 135. Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.571-2; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24). p.6; Danişmend, I, p. 422; Hammer, GOR, II, p.261(Hist. IV, 116). Sanuto, XIII, 185, 186-7, 220-222, 357-8 [Docs., pp.547-9].
 136. Sanuto, XIII, 186-7 [Docs., p.547]. Some accounts state that Ahmed Pasha's house was also sacked, but this is not reflected in the Diarîi (see Šabanović op. cit., p.341b; Tansel, p.291, n. 194, using Sa'deddin and Müneccimbaşı; Danişmend, I, p.422).
 - 137 Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6.
 138. See pp.341-2

139. Tekindağ, (Belg. 17), p.37; see also Giovio, Commentario, f. 16v; Sansovino, Annali, f. 102v; Hammer, GOR II, p. 362. (Hist. IV, 118).
140. Sanuto, XIV, 463-5.
141. Sanuto, XIV, 245-6 [Docs., pp.567-8].
142. Sanuto, XVI, 375-6 [Docs., p.568].
143. Sanuto, XVI, 437-8 [Docs., p.568]. See also Koca Mustafa, p.352 notes 115 and 116).
144. Süreyya, I, p.195; Danişmend, II, p.424; Šabanović, op. cit., p.341b; Heller, p.69; ^COsmanzāde, p.17; Hammer, GOR, II, p.384 (Hist. IV, 147-8); Reindl, p.144.
145. See p.340ff.
146. Sanuto, XVII, 159-160.
147. Sanuto, XVI, 588.
148. Sanuto, XVI, 375-6 [Docs., p.568]; XVI, 547-8, 588; XVII, 38.
149. Sanuto, Idem., and Sanuto, XVII, 12-13.
150. Sanuto, XVII, 537 [Docs., p.552]; and Alberi, Ser. III, Vol. III, pp.45 ff, Relazione of Antonio Zustinian.
151. Sanuto, XVII, 537; Alberi, op.cit., p.48.
152. Idem. See [p.143 and 149, n.37].
153. For details and references to the 1513-14 negotiations, see pp.142-144, 372-3.
154. See p.296.
155. See p.61.
156. Sanuto, XIX, 66, 88.
157. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.65; Danişmend, II, p.11;
158. See p.62: the viziers distribute largesse to the janissaries.
159. For the background to his dismissal, see p.62-3.
160. Šabanović, op. cit., p.341; Danişmend, II, p.21; Heller, pp.74-5. This date is definitely corroborated by Sanuto, XXI, 250-1.
161. Sanuto, XXI, 250-1, quoted by Heller, pp.74-5 and Hammer, GOR, II, pp.432(Hist. IV, 220-1).

162. Sanuto, XX, 66. According to this report, when Selim eventually did call them back, they refused to obey.
163. Sanuto, XXII, 276-7, 338-9; Šabanović, *op. cit.*, p.341b; Danišmend, II, p.23. (26 April 1516/23 Rebt^c I 922); Heller, pp.75-6.
164. Süreyya, I, p.195, however, according to Hammer, GOR II, p.463 (Hist. IV, 263) using Sa'deddin, Ahmed had been appointed muhafız shortly before Selim's departure for the Mamluk campaign.
165. Sanuto, XXII, 348-9.
166. Hammer, GOR, II, p.462(Hist. IV, 260-1).
167. Sanuto, XXIV, 456, 480, 480-1, 506, 648-9; Heller, pp.79-83.
168. Sanuto, XXIV, 480-1.
169. Šabanović, *op. cit.*, p.341b, and implied in Heller, p.81.
170. Sanuto, XXV, 124: "Item, che Achmet bassa [MS: Amet bassa] quando el Consolo nostro si andò alegrar de la vitoria dil Signor da parte de la Signoria nostra, come soi boni amici, lui el vardò dicendo, amici di subditi dil Grand Signor e non sui amici. ----" This somewhat hostile attitude would have been inconsistent with Hersekzade's friendship for Venice.
171. Sanuto, XXIV, 480-1
172. Heller, p.81; Šabanović, *op. cit.*, p.341b.
173. Idem., and Sanuto, XXIV, 659 and XXV, 153, "et Carzego bassà, --- ---e morto in itinere poco lontan di Aleppo, ----." Also, Hammer, GOR II, 526 (Hist. IV, 346).

AHMED - SB of Ponti (1510/916), formerly voyvoda of Iskodra

[Achmet]

Sanuto, X, 679: This is an intriguing passage, reflecting the closest of ties between an Ottoman official and his Venetian neighbours. In July 1510 Sanuto noted the arrival in Venice of the emissary of the SB of Ponti¹, bringing with him letters from the Venetian count of Trau, Alessandro Viaro, dated 20 June. The letters amount to an intercession on the part of Viaro on behalf of the SB of Ponti, who was named Ahmed and who had just been promoted to the post

of SB having previously been the voyvoda of the SB of Iskodra. Viaro tells the Signoria that Ahmed is a great friend of the Republic and praises him as a neighbour. Moreover, it seems that Ahmed had gone to Trau to take a woman (whether as a bride or as a slave is not clear) who had been born in Trau. Viaro wrote to Venice to obtain authorisation, and the Collegio duly granted it, provided that the parents were happy with the arrangement; apparently they were. Viaro adds that Ahmed was the son of a certain Piero Centon. The previous SB of Ponti (or at least the man who was SB in 1504) was in contrast to Ahmed very hostile towards Venice.²

Notes

1. An area near Trau. There are several references to the SB of Ponti or Ponte (Sanuto, V, 804, 1051 and X, 679) and several to the voyvoda (Sanuto, III, 1615; V, 657, 1051, and X, 679 and ASV, Sen. sec. Delib reg. 40, f71v to 72v). Ponti may be synonymous with the sancak of Mostar (see Sinan, voyvoda of Mostar, p.457).
2. Sanuto, V, 804, 1051.

AHMED BEG - defterdar and SB of Carasar [?Karasi-eli]
 - SB of Negroponte 1510 [Achmat Bei]

Sanuto, X, 342: Lodovico Valdrin, the secretary to the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, noted on 10 April 1510 that a certain Ahmed Beg had been appointed the new SB of Negroponte and that he had formerly been defterdar and SB of Carasar.¹ If he held the position of defterdar, it may explain why Valdrin refers to this Ahmed as 'magnifico'. If by defterdar Valdrin means the Ottoman chancery's baş defterdar and not simply a finance officer in the localities, then this Ahmed Beg may be Fenzarizade Ahmed Celebi who was baş defterdar from around 1499 to 1502² and possibly at some point before that as well.³

Notes

1. Carasar in the MS, Carasan in the edition. This may refer to the sancak of Karasi(-eTi) in north western Anatolia by the sea of Marmara.
2. Danişmend, V, p.243.
3. Süreyya, I, p.194, and IV, appendix, pp.811-812.

AHMED BEG SB of Bosnia(1499/905)

[Achmagbei/Achmach Bei]

According to two reports from Francesco Querini, provveditore at Cattaro, this Ahmed Beg was SB of Bosnia during the early stages of the Turco-Venetian war in 1499/904. He and the neighbouring SB of Iskodra, Firuz Beg, were involved in the general mobilisation of Ottoman forces in the offensive led by Iskender Pasha, against Venetian possessions in Dalmatia.¹ These are curious reports: other reports in the Diarii at this time are in agreement with Ragusan sources that Iskender Pasha took over as SB of Bosnia in the early months of 1499;² and, moreover, Querini himself stated in a previous report dated 16 July 1499 that the SB of Bosnia was Iskender.³ It seems strange that a man with Querini's access to information could have made such a mistake. One explanation may be that Querini was absent-mindedly thinking of Iskender's predecessor, who may have been this Ahmed, since it is by no means clear from whom Iskender took over in Bosnia.

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 1143 and 1155: Reports from Querini from Cattaro, dated 6 and 12 August 1499.
2. Reindl, p.253.
3. Sanuto, II, 972-3, [Docs., p.564].

AHMED BEG [VRANJESEVIĆ] - SB of Herseknova (1500/906)

[Acmathbego sanzacho de Castel Novo]

Two independent reports identify Ahmed Beg as the SB of Castelnuovo(Herseknova) in the year 1500/906.¹ This tallies with information in the Ragusan archives indicating that from June 1497 to October 1500 the SB of Herseknova was Ahmed Beg Vranjesević.²

Both Venetian reports refer to the Ottoman mobilisation against Hungary at that time. According to one, Bayezid consulted Ahmed Beg, once news that Hungary had entered the war on the Venetian side had reached him,³ because Ahmed was described as 'homo vechio e reputato, e consulto assai'.⁴ While Bayezid continued with his campaign against Modon in the south, Ahmed Beg was amongst the SBs sent to meet the Hungarian threat. The second report, based on information from a man living near Iskodra and who had recently passed through Sofia,⁵ indicates that Ahmed Beg and other SBs had been investing a Hungarian fortress called Idbin [? Vidin] on the Danube, when the Ottoman forces were repulsed and Ahmed Beg was wounded three times. If he were incapacitated by such wounds, it may explain why, in accordance with Regusan sources, he lost his position as SB in October 1500.

Between June 1499 and October 1500, the possible parameters of Ahmed Vranjesević's tenure as SB of Herseknova, there are several reports referring to an unnamed SB in this post, and also to an SB of 'Terra Nova' - probably also Hersek-Nova. These show that the office-holder had not yet gone to camp on May 1499, but was awaiting orders;⁶ that he was involved in raiding against Zara in July 1499;⁷ and that he had been sent by the sultan to invest the newly established Venetian stronghold of Narenta in May 1500.⁸

Notes

1. Sanuto, III, 457-8 (Zuan Paulo Gradenigo, provveditore in Cattaro based on intelligence received from an 'explorator', June 1500); and Sanuto, III, 1076-7 (Andrea Michiel provveditore in Dulzigno, October 1500).
2. Popović, p.93. See also Elezović, i/2, p.253, no.70.
3. Hungary opened a new front against the Ottomans by attacking Serbia in 1500; though a formal alliance with Venice, which included Pope Alexander VI, was not concluded until May 1501.
4. Sanuto, III, 457-8.
5. Sanuto, III, 1076-7.
6. Sanuto, II, 861-2
7. Sanuto, II, 889.
8. Sanuto, III, 279, 366, 969.

REIS AHMED - (1512/918)

[Rais Amet/Raisamet]

Sanuto, XIV, 502: Turkish captain of the Mamluk fleet in spring of 1511 when he brought from Istanbul many 'instrumenti' for the 'armada de India'. He was also captain of their fleet when it was sailing for Istanbul in April 1512 to collect timber and rendezvous with Ottoman ships and also Suleiman Reis (p.464).

AHMED SARI - (1507/913)

[Sari Achanet]

Sanuto, VII, 266-7: son-in-law of Bayezid and in the Ottoman camp at Ankara in the campaign against Shah Ismail.

ALĀ-ED-DĪN SCHITÓZ-ODA - ambassador (1517/923)

[Schitozoda Aladin]

A rich vein of reports from several officials provided Venice

with information about the mission of 'Alā-ed-Dīn to Cyprus and about the fascinating background of the ambassador himself. He arrived in the port of Famagusta around 4 July 1517 with four ships (fuste) and a large retinue and was honoured with a gun salute.¹

There was speculation about the purpose of his mission (e.g. that Selim wanted Famagusta as winter-quarters for his fleet, then in Alexandria,²) but in fact 'Alā-ed-Dīn had come to demand the five annual tributes which the Venetians were meant to pay the Mamluks for Cyprus.³ A summary of Selim's letter⁴ to the locotenente of Cyprus indicates that the registers of the Mamluk sultan Ghānṣū al-Ghūrī had been examined and showed that the tribute had not been paid in five years amounting to 40,000 ducats.⁵ Now that Selim had overthrown the Mamluk empire, he wanted to receive the tribute, including the arrears. 'Alā-ed-Dīn, who had come to collect the tribute, said that Selim was prepared to accept payment in kind, because he had so much money that 'it was flowing like water in a river'.⁶

After some deliberation, the locotenente replied that they could pay four years' worth of tribute in goods - they had wanted to send three but 'Alā-ed-Dīn had insisted it should be four. The fifth would follow shortly, and henceforth Selim would receive the tribute on an annual basis.⁷

The Venetians clearly had great respect for this particular ambassador. Almost every report describes him as a man of very high status⁸ and in later reports he is referred to as the 'protojero de li selitarj' with between 2000 and 6000 'schiavi' under him.⁹ This is almost certainly the silāhdar or 'keeper of the sultan's sword' who accompanied the sultan with his sword. This would be commensurate with his status as one of the 'primi' of the sultan and it would

account for the 'oda' in Schitizoda', since the silâhdar was one of the officials within the has oda or Privy Chamber, the organ of government closest to the sultan. It is a measure of the importance of the mission to Cyprus that Selim sent such a man: ʿAlā-ed-Dīn would have been one of the élite in the Slave Household and the Venetians were clearly able to assess his importance.

ʿAlā-ed-Dīn is described as a good friend of the Republic and a great admirer and friend of Andrea Gritti.¹⁰ His affinity for Venetians may in part be explained by his origins: he was born on the Greek mainland opposite Corfu and still had relatives ("carissimi parenti") on Corfu called Stamati da Monolassi and Nicolo Logna.¹¹ Nicolo had been pardoned from exile by the Council of Ten at the request of the ambassador [Süleiman Çavuş (q.v.)] who had brought news about [the defeat of] ʿAlā-ed-Dawla.¹² Later the Venetian ambassadors Contarini and Mocenigo were to write at his request to ask the Signoria for safe-conduct for his nephew, Marco Stini, who had been fifteen years in banishment for a misdeed committed in Venice.¹³ ʿAlā-ed-Dīn was a man not without influence in both empires. He was of extremely handsome physical appearance and of above average intelligence.¹⁴

When it chanced that Contarini and Mocenigo crossed paths with ʿAlā-ed-Dīn in Cyprus on their way to Selim in Cairo, he was extremely pleased to see them, and suggested that they should travel together to Selim in Cairo (largely for his own protection against Rhodian attack). Again he expressed his warm regard for the Republic and declared that he had supported the Republic in counsels of war and against the greed of the many Turkish sea-captains, and of Kurt-Ođlu(q.v.) himself, who were urging Selim to allow them to plunder and

raid. He was sure that the arrival of the Venetian ambassadors would strengthen the cause for peace between the two empires.¹⁵

In spite of these expressions of friendship and support, ʿAlā-ed-Dīn was not averse to returning the present which the Regiment of Cyprus had sent him [presumably because he did not think it was good enough], and the ambassadors had to give him two scarlet and one crimson garments of their own to keep him happy.¹⁶

When the ambassadors arrived in Cairo on 15 August they were soon tackled by the defterdar. He had been checking the Mamluk fiscal registers and claimed to have discovered all manner of irregularities and fraud regarding the matter of the tribute - the meaning is not explicit. He then completely contradicted ʿAlā-ed-Dīn, insisting that the tribute was to be paid in cash, not the camlets (zambeloti) and cloth which they had brought with them.¹⁷ Contarini was forced to return to Cyprus to sell the goods with the promise that within three months he would send Selim the money.¹⁸ However, the volteface may have been due to the whim of the defterdar, who was aggressively scornful of the Venetians, rather than to ʿAlā-ed-Dīn's incompetence, for in the end the tribute was paid largely in barley to cater for the needs of the army.¹⁹

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXIV, 635-6, 648-9, 649-650.
2. Sanuto, XXIV, 594-5, 599-600, 607, 635-6 (See p.90)
3. Sanuto, XXIV, 649-650 [Docs., p.569]. (See p.145)
4. Sanuto, XXIV, 651-2 (the original letter written in 'francho')
5. Sanuto, XXIV, 650.
6. Sanuto, XXIV, 651-2.

7. Sanuto, XXIV, 650-1.
8. Sanuto, XXIV, 594-5, 599-600, 607, 649-650 [Docs., p.569], 651-2; XXV, 52-3.
9. Sanuto, XXIV, 649-650; 650; XXV, 52-3.
10. Sanuto, XXIV, 649-650 [Docs., p.569].
11. Sanuto, XXV, 52-3.
12. Idem.
13. Sanuto, XXV, 54.
14. Sanuto, XXIV, 649-650 [Docs., p.569]; XXV, 52-3.
15. Sanuto, XXV, 52-3
16. Idem.
17. Sanuto, XXV, 148-151.
18. Sanuto, XXV, 79-80
19. Sanuto, XXV, 114-115, 379.

AL CHIXAIDE TURCHO - merchant (1511/917)

[Al Chixaide]

Sanuto, XII, 207-210: this is the original document dated 14 April 1511. It is an account of an interview which the Venetian garrison in Crete conducted with Al Chixaide, a Turkish merchant from Pera, and with Karagöz (p.264) a Turk from Gelibolu who was the captain of the galleon on which Al Chixaide was travelling. As such this document epitomises the routine intelligence gathering of Venetian officials in their attempts to gain a better understanding of events in the eastern Mediterranean. According to this report, the galleon had left Alexandria eleven days before and had been forced by bad weather to seek shelter in Candia. Little is revealed about the activities of Al Chixaide or Karagöz. However, the nature of the questions put to Al Chixaide and the answers he gave indicate the extent of his knowledge and experience of trade in Mamluk territory

and of the attitude of the Mamluk sultan towards Venetian merchants.

ALEXA, count - voyvoda of Montenegro (1504) [Alexa conte]

The report¹ of Hironimo Foscarini, provveditore of Cattaro, is the only occasion² on which the conte Alexa is mentioned by name as the voyvoda of Montenegro (also called Negusi in the report) in 1504.

There are several reports in the years before 1504 concerning the unnamed voyvoda of Montenegro, but it seems more likely that these refer to Sinan who was named as the voyvoda up to September 1499,³ and to Bali who was named as the voyvoda from September 1499 to January 1501.⁴ Confusion between Bali and Alexa is particularly acute in late 1503/early 1504: according to Foscarini's above mentioned report, Alexa was awaiting the return of Firuz Beg's messenger from Istanbul where he had gone to obtain permission for Firuz to travel to the Porte, whereas according to a previous report of Foscarini⁵ and to a despatch from Freschi⁶ it was the voyvoda of Montenegro himself whom Firuz had sent to Istanbul. Since Foscarini had personally met Alexa in Cattaro in February 1504 and the latter had clearly not been to Istanbul,⁷ it could be interpreted that it was the previous voyvoda (that is ? Bali) who had originally been sent, but that there had been a change of voyvoda in the meantime. Foscarini, however, makes no mention that Alexa was the new voyvoda, which would have been usual for him to report. The most likely explanation is that the reporters themselves had conflicting information about whom Firuz Beg had actually sent. One point clearly emerges from the reports, and that is that while Sinan was hostile to the Republic, Alexa was considered a friend.

Notes

1. Sanuto, V, 955-6, 7 February 1504, Cattaro [Docs., p.570].
2. Someone named Alexa is mentioned in Sanuto, III, 1051 (November 1500) as the brother of a certain Bersaicho.
3. See pp.458-460.
4. See pp.157-8.
5. Sanuto, V, 895, 29 January.
6. Sanuto, V, 669-670, 17 December [Docs., p.570].
7. Sanuto, V, 955-6 (see note 1).

ALEXIO ÇAVUŞ - ambassador of Bayezid II, 1500/905 [Alexio Zaus]

When Alvise Manenti, secretary to the Council of Ten, returned to Venice from Istanbul on 30 March 1500 having failed to establish a basis for a peace treaty, he brought with him an ambassador from Bayezid called Alexio. Manenti was ordered to lodge Alexio and his entourage of five in his own house as was often the custom.¹

The handful of references² in the Diarii to Alexio are of great interest, since they indicate how the Ottomans used officials of European origin to act as go-between with the Christian states. The envoys may well have been chosen not so much for their linguistic skills in formal audiences (since protocol demanded the presence of an interpreter regardless of necessity), as for their ability to gather informal intelligence. There are many parallels between Alexio and Ali Beg Tercüman (q.v.) Both had very close ties with Venice before entering the sultan's service.³ Alexio's nationality is unclear. He knew Greek and Latin and he was formerly a stipendiary ('provisionato') of the Venetian state in Padua under the command of 'signor Ruberto' (almost certainly the condottiere Roberto di San Severino), receiving 20 ducats a month. Sanuto himself describes

Alexio as a çavuş, which is in keeping with the role of the çavuşes in the Outer Service of the Slave Household as couriers and members of embassies. There is no indication that Alexio was the çavus başı (Chief Çavuş). He was less an ambassador and more a courier: Alexio had brought with him a letter from Bayezid. Priuli⁴ refers to him as a former Christian and as a slave, but his account is rudimentary by comparison with that of Sanuto who was in a far better position to report: in his capacity as Savio agli Ordeni, Sanuto himself met and escorted Alexio while he was in Venice. On 3 April he went by boat to Manenti's house to accompany Alexio to his first audience with the Doge in the Collegio.⁵ In accordance with protocol, Teodoro Paleologo acted as interpreter, despite Alexio's linguistic skills. Asked if he knew the contents of the sultan's letter, Alexio said that he did and that he had no instructions to add anything orally. His entourage was dismissed from Collegio and the letter read out. We do not know the precise contents of this letter since it is not to be found in the Diarii, in spite of Sanuto's note that he would include copy.⁶

Most significantly, Alexio provided the Venetians with valuable information about the internal politics of the Divan: he said that, of the three viziers, two were friends of the Republic. This was crucial intelligence at a time when the Venetians were hoping to conclude a peace treaty. As a point of courtesy and perhaps as an indication of the reliability of his testimony, he also acknowledged the Republic's former claims of loyalty on him by stating that he had once 'manzà il pam di questa Signoria'.

On the following day Sanuto again accompanied Alexio to an audience with the Doge, who handed the envoy a letter sealed in gold, in reply to that of Bayezid, and explained its contents. Alexio

replied that he would convey the Doge's words to the sultan, but advised that a Venetian messenger should accompany him to Istanbul - advice which was ignored. He was given 100 ducats and a gold brocade robe.

Notes

1. Sanuto, III, 171. Priuli, I, p.286 adds that Alexio was under heavy guard so that no one could speak to him.
2. Sanuto, III, 171, 181, 190-1, 192-3, 194 [all Docs., pp.571-2].
3. See especially p.138 and also p.148, notes 18 and 19.
4. Priuli, I. p.286: 'el qual hera christiano et poi fo facto turcho et hera di pocha reputatione, et uno schiavo' (in the sense that Ali Beg and all entering the slave household were 'slaves').
5. Idem. Priuli entirely missed this first audience, reporting only on the final one given on 4 April. He also missed the point that Alexio had once been in Venetian service.
6. Sanuto often intended to include the copy or original of a document at a later date but would either forget or was unable to obtain it.

HADIM ʿALI PASHA bin ʿAbd al-Hayy¹ [ʿAlī bassā; Allī bassā; Halī bassā
 (ʿAlī Pasha the Eunuch) Aly; Mamucho bassā; Monucho bassā;
 Bassā Eunucho, Heunucho, Monuco]
 d. 2 July 1511/5 Rebi^c II 917

Nationality and Background

The literature on Hadim ʿAlī is fairly extensive.² Although a member of the group of the Ak ağaları³ (the white eunuchs of the Sultan's Palace who were given charge of the training of the Christian boys levied through the devşirme⁴), his ethnic origins are unclear. A source in Sanuto describes him as a Turk, which could indicate a Circassian background, while Spandugino and Giovio call him an Albanian, while another source says he was Bosnian.⁵ At any rate his rise to power was almost certainly through the Slave Household. He was the first eunuch in Ottoman history to reach the position of Grand Vizier, and was also the first Grand Vizier to have died in the field of battle.⁶

Career.

Reign of Mehmed II Ak Ağası (see above)

Reign of Bayezid II

1481/886 SB of Konya⁷ and lâla of Prince ʿAbdu'llah, eldest son of Bayezid.⁸

1482/887 BB of Karaman, defeated by Kasım Beg, Prince of Karaman and claimant to his ancestral lands, and now ally of Djem Sultan. (June/Cumāda I and II) ʿAlī bravely defends Konya against the combined forces of Kasım and Djem.⁹

1484-5/889-890 SB of Semendre.¹⁰

1485-6/891 BB of Rumeli. Campaign against the voyvoda of Moldavia¹¹ 1486-7/891-2 BB of Rumeli. Campaign against Mamluks to avenge capture of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.): ^CAli embarks at Gelibolu and crosses to Anatolia to join forces with the Grand Vizier Dā'ūd Pasha (q.v.) who was C in C.¹²

1488/893 Vizier. C in C in campaign against Mamluks in Cilicia, leading to ^CAli Pasha's defeat at Ağaçayırı (16 August 1488/8 Ramažān 893) and the withdrawal of his forces.¹³

1491/897 Vizier.¹⁴ He was not SB of Semendre at this time as is stated by Hammer who wrongly attributes to Hadim ^CAli the defeat of the Pass of the Red Tower (1492/898). The defeat should be attributed to ^CAli Beg Mihaloğlu.¹⁵

1493/899 Sends one of his relatives as an envoy to Rome with certain proposals to the Pope, "which will be to the convenience and satisfaction of his Holiness and to the great benefit of Christendom".¹⁶

1496/902 Vizier.¹⁷

1498/904 Vizier(?) probably until the autumn of 1498/904, when he was dismissed and replaced by Ya^Ckub Pasha (q.v.).¹⁸ The events for ^CAli's life for this year are rather confused: various western sources state that he led an expedition into Dalmatia as far as Zara, burning and plundering the region as a prelude to full scale war.¹⁹

SB of Morea (1499-1506/905-912) and War with Venice

1499/905 SB of Morea. He must have been the successor in this position to Halil Pasha (q.v.) who had been killed in October

1499/Şafer-Rebî I 905. By December 1499/Cumada I 905 CAli was already styling himself "signor de la Morea et de tutta Albania per terra et per mare".²⁰ He had also been granted in October 1499 the timar of which CÖmer Beg (q.v.) had been divested and it is reported that in this month CAli left Edirne for this timar. Unfortunately its location is not specified, but it would seem to be in the vicinity of Lepanto. The evidence however is not conclusive.²¹ Nevertheless, it is clear that CAli had undergone a short period in disgrace since his dismissal from the rank of vizier in 1498 until his re-emergence as SB of the Morea late in 1499/905. This would explain why no sources refer to CAli's participation in the campaign of Lepanto (August 1499/Muħarrem 905).

As SB of Morea, however, CAli found himself in the front line of both diplomatic and military operations. In January²² 1500/Cumāda II 905 he met Alvise Manenti at Patras. Manenti, who was secretary to the Council of Ten and was travelling to Edirne for peace talks (see pp.209, 317-8) was faced with a very difficult mission since Venice was left with very little bargaining power following the loss of Lepanto. CAli Pasha welcomed him warmly.²³ Only Malipiero, however, gives in such great detail an account of what was said at this meeting. Manenti asked CAli to help him, presumably in his efforts to obtain favourable peace terms. CAli reassured Manenti of his strong friendship for Venice, claiming that during his tenure of power in the Divan he had always opposed any proposal of warring with the Republic. He explained that it was due to the influence of the 'giovani' at the Porte that hostilities had begun and they had furthermore diverted the expedition from Rhodes to the Venetian

possessions in the Morea. He promised to continue to exert himself on the Signoria's behalf and to endeavour to influence the viziers likewise; but he warned Manenti that Bayezid was a changed man, that he was preparing to mobilize again in April/Şa^Cbān (1500/905). The secret to peace, according to ^CAli, lay in the establishment of friendly relations between the Venetian rectors and their neighbouring sancakbeğis. In spite of his profession of friendship, however, he made Manenti pay a high price for the purchase of horses which were required to enable him to continue his journey to Bayezid in Edirne.²⁴

Manenti's mission ended in failure and hostilities were resumed. Ya^Ckub Pasha (q.v.) had been despatched with a force even before Manenti's arrival. ^CAli Pasha himself, still in his capacity as SB of the Morea²⁵, played a leading role in the campaigns against Modon, Koron, Navarino and Nauplia (Anabolu). The large number of references in the Diarii reflect ^CAli's great energy in the campaigning on the landward side.²⁶ He was also involved in the enslavement of former inhabitants of Lepanto who had escaped to the Morea,²⁷ in the reconstruction of Modon,²⁸ and in the interrogation of captives.²⁹ In the middle of these events (October 1500/Reb^CI and II 906) he fell gravely ill, struck by the same influenza which had afflicted Bayezid, and ^CAli's life hung in the balance.³⁰

However, he survived the war having distinguished himself by virtually destroying Venetian presence in the Morea.³¹ He now distinguished himself in the peace by his stubborn negotiation with the Venetian secretary Alvise Sagudino over the last remaining Venetian strongholds in the Morea, in particular over the lines of demarcation for Anabolu and Monemvasia and the question of sovereignty

over three castles on the Anabolu peninsula, Damala, Kastri and Thermisi.³² In addition to a dispute over injuries done to certain timar holders of the sultan,³³ the main problem revolved around the issue of whether to confirm boundaries which had existed at the time of Mehemmed II or whether to establish new ones. Sagudino had orders to adopt the former stance in the negotiations while ĆAli was ordered to pursue the more aggressive latter line.³⁴ There was an added complication in that it appears that ĆAli was in receipt of an annual income of 8000 aspri (equivalent to 150 ducats according to Sanuto) from the inhabitants of Damala and consequently was naturally reluctant to surrender this prize.³⁵ Sagudino, probably in response to orders from Andrea Gritti, now Venetian ambassador in Istanbul,³⁶ offered ĆAli Pasha an annual income of 200 ducats (150 from Damala and 50 from Venice herself) in return for an agreement that Damala should remain a Venetian possession.³⁷ When this was rejected Sagudino increased the offer to a lump sum of 800 ducats in addition to the 200 ducats per annum in perpetuity. Even this was refused by ĆAli who was intent on taking possession of Damala and had the troops at hand to do so by force of arms.³⁸ In October 1503/Cumāda I 909 Damala, unable to defend itself against superior forces, surrendered and was placed under Ottoman administration.³⁹

The reason for ĆAli's adamant stance (and the hard line taken by the Porte on this issue⁴⁰) was a desire to deprive the Albanian stradioti, soldiers in Venetian service, of access to cultivable land and so compel them to leave the area.⁴¹ It was not simply that they posed a military threat. They were also an economic problem in that they competed with the Ottomans over the limited resource of peasants to work a surplus of arable land. The stradioti were in the habit of

drawing away the Ottoman peasants ('tymarati') and thus depriving the state of both labour and tax-revenue.⁴² In the fifteenth century, when the population of the empire was sparse, there was intense competition even amongst Ottoman timar-holders for possession of peasants or the re^cāyā (in this sense the farming tax-paying subjects) and it is noteworthy that this economic problem should be reflected in the Diarîi as well as in the obstinate line taken by ^cAli Pasha.⁴³

Shortly after settling the boundaries for the territory of Anabolu, ^cAli Pasha and Sagudino met in Monemvasia to settle the boundaries for that Venetian base (late October 1503/Cumāda I 909). In this instance Sagudino was able to extract some concessions, but although the Italian and Greek inhabitants of Monemvasia were given permission to cultivate the lands of Ottoman timar-holders provided they paid the tithe, the Albanian population was once again penalized as a result of the alleged thievish reputation it had earned.⁴⁴ While in Monemvasia Sagudino consulted a certain Mehmed Çelebi, who is described as the nephew of ^cAli Pasha, in order to ascertain whether the Pasha could be swayed by offers of money so as to fix more favourable boundaries at Anabolu. Mehmed explained that ^cAli's orders came directly from the sultan and that they could not be disregarded.⁴⁵ Correspondence available to us in the Diarîi and in the ASV shows that the Venetians believed that nothing had been finalized between ^cAli and Sagudino over the boundaries of Anabolu, and a year later (September 1504/Reb^c II 910) local relations between ^cAli Pasha and the proveditors of Anabolu were highly explosive as a result of the continued cultivation of disputed lands.⁴⁶

The traditionally held view⁴⁷ that ^cAli Pasha's first term as

Grand Vizier was from 1501/907 to 1503/909, succeeding Mesih Pasha (q.v.) who died towards the end of 1501/907, has been challenged in the past on the basis of reports in the Diarîi.⁴⁸ It now seems more likely that CAli served only one term in this position, that is from 1506/912 to 1511/917, and that Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) held the Grand Vizierate from 1501/907 to 1503/909 and Koca Mustafa Pasha (q.v.) from 1503/909 to 1506/912. It should be reiterated that the Diarîi are very thin, especially on Turkish affairs, between April 1501 and September 1502 - coinciding with the period of Sanuto's term of office as Camerlengo in Verona - and consequently there is indeed a gap in our information on CAli from July 1501/Muḥarrem 907 to October 1502/RebT^C II 908.⁴⁹ We do, however, have enough information on Hersekzade Ahmed to tell us that he had greatest influence with Bayezid in the two years following the death of Mesih. We also know that CAli was still deeply involved in military operations in the Morea in June 1501.⁵⁰ Then in May 1502 it is reported that the 'bassa di la Morea' (SB of the Morea) was in the plain before Anabolu with 700 troops,⁵¹ and in October 1502 we are clearly told that CAli Pasha 'flambulo di la Morea' was directing a ferocious siege against Anabolu which had still not been relaxed in December when the main articles of the Turco-Venetian peace had actually been signed.⁵² If one accepts that the 'bassa di la Morea' referred to in May 1502 was in fact CAli Pasha, who had continued in the rank of SB of the Morea since June 1501, it can be concluded that not only did he not succeed Mesih as Grand Vizier, but that he suffered six miserable months of humiliation by failing to force the surrender of Anabolu. This must be considered as a very serious failure in his career. It is also evidence that, contrary to standard narrative accounts of the war,⁵³ the Ottomans did

attempt to capture Anabolu.

It would now seem probable that ^CAli Pasha's term as SB of the Morea lasted from 1499/905 until 1506/912. There is one report which states that he had been appointed a vizier in December 1502/Cumāda II 908, but the source itself is regarded with suspicion and must be discounted.⁵⁴ Furthermore, references abound to ^CAli's activities as SB of the Morea from the end of 1502/908 to 1506/912. We have already noted the depth of his involvement as chief negotiator in the Morea with Sagudino in 1503-4/ 909-910. For the remainder of his term of office in the Morea he concerned himself with the strengthening of defences in his province and with the provision of skilled workmen for the shipbuilding yards of Avlonya farther north,⁵⁵ whilst continuing the war of attrition against the Venetians in Anabolu in an attempt to bring about the depopulation of the city.⁵⁶

Grand Vizier 1506-1511/912-917

Turkish and Venetian sources agree that ^CAli Pasha was Grand Vizier from 1506/912 until his death in battle in 1511/917. ^CAli's reputation had soared during his seven years as SB of the Morea, and when Bayezid eventually called him to the highest office in the empire, he journeyed to Istanbul with a massive entourage of 5000 men and his camp consisted of over 200 tents. He was honourably received and he distributed largesse profusely.⁵⁷ Although the Diarîi first mention his new appointment in August 1506/Reb^İC II 912, there appears to have been some delay from the time he left the Morea to when he actually took up his duties as Grand Vizier.⁵⁸ But by January 1507 he had assumed full powers.⁵⁹

^CAli Pasha had come to power at a time when the autonomy and

power of the Grand Vizierate were at their greatest during the reign of Bayezid. It has often been said that growing ill-health and habitual pusillanimity forced Bayezid in the last years of his reign to surrender the control of affairs of state to the viziers, and in particular to the Grand Vizier.⁶⁰ This development is in fact reflected in the Diarii where it is made clear that Bayezid was in the habit when in good health to attend the meetings of the Divan, but that this ceased with the approach of old age and illness - to which Sanuto also adds that Bayezid was worn out by the attentions of two slave girls.⁶¹ Furthermore, the view that ^CAli was called by Bayezid to counter the corruption of his viziers can find some substance in the Diarii in that we are told of the corrupt practices of Koca Mustafa Pasha and Yahya Pasha, viziers at the time of ^CAli's appointment, and also of Iskender Bostancı başı (q.v.).⁶² No other man, not even Hersekzade Ahmed whose main distinction lies in the fact that he was able to hold high office in the reigns of three sultans, could rival Hadım ^CAli as regards the influence he enjoyed with Bayezid and the power he succeeded in wielding in these years. The conduct of all the important affairs of the time (relations with Venice, the League of Cambrai, the succession dispute and the Safavid threat) came directly under his management.

Relations with Venice at the start of his term as Grand Vizier were somewhat strained as a consequence of the stormy years he had spent pressurizing the remaining strongholds of the Republic in the Morea. Furthermore, ^CAli had been highly aggravated by Venetian actions against his shipping, in particular by the piratic act of Simatecolo in sinking several of his ships and by Venetian plunder of his grain ships. His first step on coming to power was to insist on

compensation.⁶³ Both on this and on the issues of restitution of certain black slaves who belonged to ĆAli and who had been traced to Venice herself,⁶⁴ the Signoria went out of her way to comply with the Grand Vizier's demands; it was fortuitous for ĆAli that Venice's misfortunes in Europe enabled him to take the upper hand in his relations with the Republic. But these incidents are not merely an illustration of relations between states; they are a penetrating insight into ĆAli's shipping, mercantile and slave-holding activities at this time.⁶⁵

Military Aid to Venice 1509-1511/915-917

Venetian endeavours to accommodate the Grand Vizier over these claims were to prove invaluable in recruiting him as a supporter in her first attempts to enlist Ottoman military aid in the War of the League of Cambrai.⁶⁶ In the long discussions between Nicolo Zustinian and ĆAli,⁶⁷ the prospect of Turkish support at times appears to have been imagined rather than real, but specific details were discussed at great length about the numbers and the mode of transport to the Italian theatre of war.⁶⁸ In the end the uncertainty of Hungarian intentions towards the Ottomans⁶⁹ and the latter's insistence that Venetian financial support was inadequate for the scale of the operations⁷⁰ (both factors were again to prove insurmountable problems in the negotiations at the start of Selim's reign) prevented the sending of any official military aid. ĆAli, however, did show considerable satisfaction that at least unofficial aid in the form of Turkish mercenaries from Bosnia was getting through to Venice.⁷¹ In all these discussions the Venetians were impressed by ĆAli Pasha's intelligence of the political and military situation in Italy. His evaluation of the alliance of the

League of Cambrai against Venice was that it had been formed when the King of Spain was in Naples, and he had advance knowledge of the raising of the papal interdict over Venice.⁷² He was considered by the Republic to be the main channel to Bayezid, and for his support and that of the other viziers the Venetians were prepared to pay well.⁷³

The Succession Dispute and War with Shah Kuli, 1511/917: Death of Āli

Of all the Grand Viziers in the reigns of Bayezid and Selim, the death in battle of Āli Pasha at the apogee of his power and influence was to be the most dramatic and the most portentous in terms of the shift in the political balance of the empire. From the commencement of his Grand Vizierate Āli had never disguised his support of Prince Ahmed in the struggle for the succession, and as the ailing Bayezid grew weaker in mind and body, so Āli championed the cause of Prince Ahmed against his brothers Korkud and Selim.⁷⁴

Although the complexities of the succession struggle were known in minute detail to the Republic, judging from the quality of reports in Sanuto,⁷⁵ the Diarii surprisingly make no mention of Āli's deviousness in removing Prince Korkud as a serious contender for the throne. He achieved this by expropriating Korkud of certain has properties which had been traditionally assigned to Grand Viziers in the past but which they had never claimed out of respect for the princes in the provinces. As a consequence of this dispute with Āli, Korkud was transferred in 1507 from the governorship of Saruhan to that of Teke, that is to say, further away from Istanbul and therefore from the centre of power.⁷⁶ This in turn precipitated Korkud's celebrated flight to Egypt in 1509/915 to seek the support of the Mamluk Sultan. By the time Korkud returned in 1510/916, Āli Pasha could well afford to put

on a pretence of mediation between himself and Bayezid,⁷⁷ for by now Korkud was no longer a serious threat. In 1509/915 Ragusan intelligence sources reported that Bayezid had taken his viziers' advice and called Prince Ahmed to the palace as his successor.⁷⁸ So strong did ĆAli's position as Grand Vizier appear to be, that in that same year he took the considerable risk of leaving Istanbul and going on pilgrimage to Mecca.⁷⁹

ĆAli's next task was to counter the far more serious problem of the nascent power of Bayezid's youngest son, Selim, whose strength was rooted in the support of the janissary corps and his alliance through marriage with the Tartars of the Crimea. Events reached a climax in 1511/917 when Bayezid was caught between the newly arrived forces of Selim in Rumeli and Kızılbaş rebels of Shah Kuli in Anatolia.⁸⁰ When news reached Istanbul that Shah Kuli had defeated and killed the beglerbeği of Anatolia Karagöz Pasha (q.v.),⁸¹ ĆAli was immediately despatched with a force of 4000 janissaries to avenge the defeat. Sanuto's details of the campaign of numbers involved, of the union of ĆAli's forces with those of Prince Ahmed and of ĆAli's disagreements with the janissaries over tactics, all tally in the main with the standard accounts of the manoeuvres⁸² which culminated in the battle of Gökçay on 2 July 1511/5 Rebī^c II 917, in which ĆAli was struck by an arrow and killed.⁸³ With his death the hopes of Prince Ahmed in the succession dispute were dashed and Selim's forces near Edirne now seemed poised for victory. However, the janissaries for the time being decided to remain loyal to the old Sultan, and as a result it was Selim and not Bayezid who was defeated at Çorlu on 3 August 1511/8 Cumāda I 917. (see pp.85-6, 222-3). The chronology of the summer campaigning shows that ĆAli Pasha could not possibly have had any part

in Selim's defeat at Çorlu in August 1511 since he had fallen at Gökçay a month earlier. Yet this is one example of confusion, for Hammer gives a long account of how ĆAli exhorted Bayezid before the battle to take the initiative and attack Selim who had come to usurp the throne.⁸⁴ Other modern accounts echo Hammer and state that ĆAli himself defeated Selim at Çorlu.⁸⁵ The Diarii on the other hand make it clear through Andrea Foscolo's report of 21 July 1511 that while Bayezid did recall ĆAli from the campaign against Shah Kuli in order to lead the army against Selim, it was already too late because ĆAli had been "cut to pieces".⁸⁶

Hadım ĆAli Pasha's Western Contacts

During his term of office as SB of the Morea, ĆAli developed a wide range of Venetian and Christian contacts so that when he came to be Grand Vizier his knowledge of the Christian West was fairly extensive. In addition to those customary contacts already mentioned which relate to claims against damages or meetings with western emissaries (e.g. Alvise Manenti, Nicolo Zustinian and Andrea Foscolo), several 'westerners' were in ĆAli's service or collaborated with him in some way; Pietro Carossi and his family⁸⁷; Paolo Styliano⁸⁸; a certain Christian called Canani is described as the 'canzelier' of ĆAli,⁸⁹ while the pasha personally wrote to Dimitri Paleologo inviting him to enter the Sultan's service.⁹⁰ In September 1503 ĆAli pardoned a certain Michali who had been sentenced to death for murder and robbery,⁹¹ though such good will was on the whole rather rare; both sides guarded their position with care, especially on such matters as nationality and transfer of citizenship where it was vital not to concede a precedent.⁹²

One of the most interesting documents on the question of Āli's knowledge of the Christian West relates to the spy network which he seems to have had at his disposal.⁹³ On 22 and 23 July 1501 the rectors of Anabolu extracted a confession under torture from Marco di Antivari, a balestriere (cross bowman) on the galley of Lorenzo Loredan. A record of three separate occasions on which torture was applied was sent to the Signoria. Marco confessed to having escaped to Argos while his ship was docked at Anabolu and that from Argos he was sent by some Turks to the SB of the Morea (Āli Pasha). The Pasha was very interested in Marco due to the latter's knowledge of Turkish, Slav and Albanian, and an agreement was struck that in return for an annual pension of 5000 aspri Marco would make his way to Mantua to make contact with a certain Alessio - described as a leading man of the Marquis of Mantua - with the purpose of gathering information about the Kings of France, of Spain and about Venice herself. In addition, Marco was to ascertain the fate of another spy whom Āli had sent four months earlier and from whom nothing had been heard. A lead ring with a motif of arms was to be the agreed mode of recognition between Marco and Alessio, the latter apparently being a great friend of Āli Pasha.⁹⁴ This example not only discloses details of Āli's spy network; it is indicative of the obscure and almost intangible web of personal relations between officials of the Christian West and those of the Dār al-Islām.

The Diarii must be considered a major source of information on Hadim Āli, for apart from minor errors of identification,⁹⁵ the material reflects the vast array of his interests. His greatest skills were to be found in matters of political intrigue, diplomacy and the handling of economic concerns as well as the direction of an

intelligence network of which only a fraction is known to us. Lastly, the Diarîi reflect again and again what was ironically his greatest weakness, that is, his military incompetence.

Notes

1. For the patronymic, cf. Ménage(Stern), p.114 and 115, using Kraelitz, p.102 and IÜ6 and Elezović, p.491 et alia. For details of Hadım ^CAli's waqf, see Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.394-403.
2. Reindl, pp.147-161; R. Mantran, EI(2), vol.I, p.396a, and Reşad Ekrem Koçu, IA, vol, I, pp.331a-332a. The latter two articles contain chronological and factual errors (see notes 13, 84, 86).
3. Mantran, op.cit., Koçu, op.cit.; Ohsson, VII, pp.56-58; Süreyya, (appendix), IV, p.723. Sanuto almost always refers to him as eunuch (monucho, mamucho, eunucho etc.), but only one report describes him as one of the "eunuchi di dentro", i.e. of the Enderun or Inner Service of the Palace. This is found in the Narrazione of Gian Giacomo Caroldo, the most detailed and learned account of Ottoman institutions in the Diarîi (cf. Sanuto, V, 463, [Docs., p.573]).
4. For the functions of the Ak ağaları, see Inalcik, pp.79-80,82.
5. Sanuto, I, 397-8, 398-400 [Docs., p.573]; Giovio, Commentario, f. 14rv; Spandugino, pp.324-6. Danişmend, I, p.410 states that he was a devşirme conscript, though he seems less certain on p.430.
6. Danişmend, II, p.23; Hammer, GOR, II, pp 358-9 (Hist. IV, p.113).
7. Süreyya, III,, p.495; Fisher, p.25
8. Danişmend, I, p.365; Hammer, GOR, II, p.259.
9. Idem; cf. also Parry (Cook), p.56; Fisher, p.25; Tansel, p.39, pp.117-8.
10. Hammer, GOR, II, p.289; Süreyya, III, 495.
11. Hammer, GOR, II, p.290; Mantran, op. cit; (see also Süreyya, III, 495); Tansel, p.79ff.; Kreutel, Oruç, p.38,
12. Hammer GOR, II, pp.293-4; Tekindağ (Bell, XXXI), p.359; Tansel, pp.104-5; Kreutel, Oruc, p.42.
13. Tansel, pp.106ff, esp. p.109 and pp.128-9; Parry (Cook), pp.59-60; Tekindağ (Bell. XXXI), pp.361-70, (esp. p.364 for Ağa Cayırı) who miscalculates 8 Ramażan 893 for 17 August 1488 instead of 16 August; Danişmend, I, pp.388-9; Hammer, GOR, II,

- pp.297ff., (Hist. IV, pp.24ff); Kreutel, Oruç, pp.45-47. All these agree that ^CAli held the rank of vizier in 1488; Süreyya, III, 495 dates his appointment in 1487/892, whereas Koçu, op.cit (IA) and Mantran,, op.cit. (EI(2)) state that he was vizier from 1486. However, they are not very accurate on these events: both erroneously give 1492 as the date for Ağa Çayırı which is then described as a victory for ^CAli. For a western version of these events, see Sansovino, Annali, f.97rv (although the chronology here is confused). The battle of Ağa Çayiri is also described (and dated 15-16 August 1488) in a letter of the Grand Master of Rhodes, Pierre d'Aubusson to the Pope, 6 September 1488 (Lamansky, I, pp.279-80).
14. Kreutel, Oruç, p.55.
 15. Hammer, GOR, II, p.305 (Hist. IV, p.36). The origin of the misunderstanding may lie with Spandugino, pp.324-5 who makes the same error. Hammer's misidentification was first brought to light in Kissling (Iskender), p.131.
 16. Setton, II, p.439 and n.82, using Lamansky, I, 254-55. The proposals in question are not disclosed.
 17. Sanuto, I, 397, 399 [Docs., p.573]; Süreyya, III, 495 (but with no precise date); Kreutel, Oruç, p.105.
 18. Sanuto, II, 139, 20 November 1498 [Docs., p.573] refers to a certain "Aliagu" as the third vizier in his summary of the Commission of Andrea Zancani, ambassador to the Porte. However, the actual Commission of Zancani (MCC, Cod. Cigogna, no.2269, Commissioni no.30, also dated 20 November 1498 f. 1v) refers to the third vizier as Ya^Ckub who had recently been promoted to that rank. The discrepancy would seem to reflect unfavourably on Sanuto, but it is possible that Ya^Ckub had just succeeded ^CAli Pasha. Cf. also Sanuto, III, 179, [Docs., p.573] which shows that the Venetians were aware that ^CAli (SB of the Morea) had recently been dismissed as vizier.
 19. Giovio, Commentario, f. 14rv; Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.223; Spandugino, pp.324-6. See also Hammer, GOR, II, p.315 (Hist. IV, p.52) who quotes Sanuto as a source, but ^CAli is not mentioned by name in any of the references to raids in the Diarii for 1496-98.
 20. Sanuto, III, 431 [Docs., p.574]. It should be noted that in this document 'Hali' refers to ^CAli and not to Halil who is invariably referred to as 'Calil' or 'Chalul'. See also Kreutel, Oruç, p.119. ^CAli's tenure as SB of Morea is not mentioned by either Mantran, op.cit. (EI²) or Koçu, op.cit (IA).
 21. See p.395 and [Docs., p.669-70].
 22. On the basis of Sanuto, III, 118, the meeting must have taken place in January 1500, but according to Malipiero, pt. I, pp.191-2 the meeting took place in December 1499.

23. Sanuto, III, 127, 179 [Docs., p.573-4]; Malipiero, pt. 1, pp.191-2.
24. Malipiero, pt. I, pp.191-2. It was not ^CAli who accompanied Manenti to Edirne, as is stated by Fisher, p.71, but ^CAli's protoiero or secretary. See also Setton, II, p.520.
25. Hammer, GOR, II, p.324 (Hist. IV, p.64) is mistaken in stating that ^CAli was Grand Vizier at this time. The confusion is accentuated when Hammer later says that ^CAli only became Grand Vizier on the death of Mesih (q.v.) (Hammer, GOR, II, pp.327-8 (Hist. IV, p.69).
26. The following are references to ^CAli's campaigning during the war, giving details of his movements and the size of his forces. Some references are to ^CAli by name, others to the office of SB of the Morea. Sometimes he is called simply 'pasha'. Sanuto, III, 183, 442-3, 446, 488-9, 502, 518, 519 [Docs., p.630], 727 [Docs., p.574], 873-4, 896, 964, 1272-4, 1344-6, 1457-8, 1501-2, 1559, 1561-2, 1563, 1578, 1626-7 (March 1501); IV, 83-4 [Docs., p.575], 85, 259 (April 1502), 390-1, 402-3, 505-6, 604, 786-7, 609 (October 1502). In conjunction with these events see Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.244, 245ff, 260; Kreutel, Oruc, 119, 120, 133, 139, 149; Kreutel, Hannivaldus, pp.250-254; Tansel, 202-5 (fall of Modon); 212-215 (fall of Koron); 216-7 (fall of Navarino); Fisher, p.75, Priuli, Vol. II, p.92; and Gökbilgin, Registre (1499), pp. 84, 90.
27. Sanuto, III, 177-8.
28. Sanuto, III, 972-4 [Docs., p.574].
29. Sanuto, III, 1501-2. For this incident in which ^CAli interrogates Dimitri de Ferigo in Koron about Venetian intelligence, see ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 301 (Hironimo Pisani, provveditore of the fleet to Capi CX), fasc. 2, 29 January 1501 (1500 m.v.), which must be the original document summarized by Sanuto.
30. Sanuto, III, 903, 1223.
31. According to Süreyya, III, p.495 and to ^COsmānzāde, p.20, he was renowned for his conquests in the Morea, but their chronology is inaccurate.
32. Sanuto, V, 242-3 and 243 [Docs., p.575]; 255 [Docs., p.576]; 337, 597, 727-8, 761-2, 852-3, 863-5. For a further analysis of these negotiations based on Sanuto, see Fisher, p.87. For collateral to Sanuto, see BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652), f. 28v, 35r and 36r [Docs., p.577], 71r-72rv, 73rv, [Docs., p.577-8].
33. BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652), f. 35r and 73rv [Docs., p.577-8]; Sanuto, V, 242-3.
34. Sanuto, V, 242-3 [Docs., p.575].

35. Idem
36. BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878(8652), f. 73rv [Docs., p.577-8]. The Collegio was said to be annoyed at Sagudino's offer (Sanuto, V, 242-3.
37. Sanuto, V, 242-3 [Docs., pp.575-6].
38. Sanuto, V, 255 [Docs., pp.576-7], 852-3.
39. Sanuto, V, 337, 852-3 [Docs., p.578].
40. Sanuto, V, 761-2. The viziers were highly unco-operative in this matter. See also Sanuto, V, 727-7 and 852-3 (note 45) for Bayezid's attitude.
41. Sanuto, V, 852-3 [Docs., p.578].
42. Idem "Tymarati" in this context applies to the peasants working the land rather than to the timar-holder.
43. For analysis of the competition over the re^cāyā and for a discussion of the rights of peasant and sīpāhī over the land, see Inalcık, pp.110-113.
44. Sanuto, V, 727-8 [Docs., p.579].
45. Idem., and V, 852-3 [Docs., p.578].
46. Sanuto, V, 864, 864-5 (Correspondence between Āli Pasha and the provveditori of Anabolu, November 1503/Cumada I and II 909, for which I have found no collateral in the ASV buste); also ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, Loose Documents at the end, nos. 2 and 5 [both Docs., pp.579-80], September 1504/Rebi^c II 910. An exact copy of no. 2 can be found in the ASV, Liber Graecus, ff. 95v - 96r, (identical even to the point of the original archival countersign) and at ASV, Libri Comm. XIX, f. 45v. For regests of Nos. 2 and 5 see Predelli, Comm. reg., VI, 68, 77; ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 55 and 57 (wrongly dated 1506). No.2 is also listed in ASV, MADP, Busta 47, no.1527. For the Signoria's instructions to the rectors of Anabolu, see ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 56v (26 October 1504).
47. Süreyya, III, 495; Danişmend, I, p. 410; Zambaur, p. 162; Mantran, EI(2), vol. I, p.396a; Koçu, IA, vol. I, p.331; Āsmānzāde, p. 20; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.547, n.26; for the confusion in Hammer, see note 25.
48. Heller, pp.59-60; Reindl, p.157-158.
49. Sanuto, IV, 83-4 (July 1501) and IV, 390-1 (October 1502).
50. Sanuto, IV, 83-4 [Docs., p.575].
51. Sanuto, IV, 259 [Docs., p.581].

52. Sanuto, IV, 390-1, 505-6 [Docs., pp.581-2].
53. Inalcık, Rise, p.312.
54. Sanuto, IV, 584-5 [Docs., p.582]. The reliability of the source is rightly doubted here by the Captain General since we know that 'Charzego' (Hersekzade) was appointed SB of Galipoli at this time.
55. Sanuto, V, 967; VI, 327, 343-4, 374 (July 1506), 388, 398-9, 399, 432, 434, 469, 488-9. For other references to 'Ali's tenure as SB of the Morea until 1506, see ASV, CX, Camerlengo (Notatorio) reg. I, 13 February 1506, f. 35r; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 173rv, 5 August 1506; f. 178rv, 24 August 1506.
56. ASV, Senato Mar, Reg. 16, ff. 108-110, 27 June 1506, published in Sathas.
57. Sanuto, VI, 519 and VII, 12 [both Docs., p.583].
58. Sanuto, VI, 388, 432, 434, 469, 488-9 [all Docs., pp.582-3].
59. Sanuto, VI, 519, 530-1; ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 11, 12 January 1507 [Docs., p.584].
60. Uzunçarşılı (Bel. XXX), p. 549; Tansel, p.247.
61. Sanuto, VII, 10 569; VIII, 503.
62. Danişmend, I, 412; Sanuto, VII, 9-10. The Relazione of Jacomo Contarini (VII, 9-22) is especially demonstrative of the growth of vizierial powers. (See also pp.338-9, 471).
63. Sanuto, VI, 432, 469, 488-9; VII, 259-260, 538, 666, 711, 724 [Docs., p.584]. See also VII, 162, 231 [both Docs., p.585], 232, [Docs., p.583].
64. Sanuto, IX, 397, 421; X, 50-1, 142, 498-9, 551, 626, 650, 706 [all Docs., pp.585-6].
65. With regard to shipping involvements, see also Sanuto, VII, 12 [Docs., p.583], where 'Ali is said to possess a galleon of 400 botti (1 botte or bota = 0.6 metric ton = 1000 kg. but for an exhaustive explanation of this complex problem of ship tonnage see Lane, Venetian ships, appendix I, pp. 245-251, and Lane, Venice, pp.479-480 and his "Tonnes, Medieval and Modern", in EHR, Second Series, XVII (1964), 213-233). With regard to slave-holding and trading, see also Sanuto, VI, 398-9 [Docs., p.584]
66. The first phase of attempting to elicit Ottoman aid was from 1509-1511/915-917; the second phase was at the start of Selim's reign (see e.g. pp.90-1).
67. Sanuto, IX, 76, 336, 527; X, 85-6, 139, 139-40, 198-9, 211, 499, 551-2, 552, 668, 675-6, 716, 801-2, 868-9; XI, 292-3, 293-4, 294-5, 417, 418; XII, 123.

68. Sanuto, X, 139-140 [Docs., p.587]; XI, 292-3, 293-4 [Docs., p.589]. Venice asked for 10,000 mounted troops to journey to Italy by way of Bosnia and the Dalmation coast from where Venetian ships would transport them. In return Bayezid would be offered 12,000 ducats per annum in perpetuity, to which ^CAli replied that the sultan deserved 100,000 ducats for such support.
69. Sanuto, X, 198-9 [Docs., p.587], 211, 499, 668, 716, 801-2.
70. See above, note 68.
71. Sanuto, X, 675-6 [Docs., p.588]; see also IX, 336 [Docs., p.587] and XI, 294-5.
72. Sanuto, IX, 76 and 336 [Docs., p.587]; X, 551-2, 552 [Docs., p.588]. On the question of the papal absolution in the context of the League of Cambrai, see Gilmore, pp. 158-9. On intelligence gathering, see note 93.
73. Sanuto, X, 139, 868-9 [Docs., p.589]. See also ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 43, f. 167r, Commission of Alvise Arimondo, (ambassador to the Ottoman Empire), 28 December 1510, where details are given of the sums of money promised to the viziers: ^CAli would receive a lump sum of 2000 ducats and 1000 ducats per annum in perpetuity, and the viziers would receive a lump sum of 1000 ducats and 1000 ducats per annum in perpetuity, but only on condition that aid was forthcoming.
74. Sanuto, XII, 507 [Docs., p.590-1]; Tansel, p.259.
75. The following make up a tiny fraction of the total amount of information on the subject: Sanuto, XII, 170, 273, 343-4 [Docs., p.589], 433 [Doc., p.590], 458-9, 507 [Docs., p.590-1], 514-5 [Docs., p.592]; XIII, 114-7 [Docs., p.591] 520-1; XIV, 50-1, 162, 193-4. A full exposition of the succession dispute using the Diarii will be the subject of another publication.
76. Hammer, GOR, II, pp. 346-7 (Hist. IV, pp. 95-6); Tansel, pp. 261-2 Danişmend, I, p.415; Tekindağ (Belg.17), p. 36; Parry (Cook), p.66; and for a very clear and detailed account of this episode, Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), pp.545-6 and pp.549-50.
77. Tekindağ (Belg. 17), p.37; Danişmend, I, p.416.
78. Sanuto, VIII, 503.
79. Sanuto, VIII, 574.
80. Parry (Cook), pp.67-68.
81. Sanuto, XII, 199 [Docs., p.589] most probably refers to the defeat of Karagöz rather than that of ^CAli since these reports are dated 2 and 5 May whereas ^CAli was killed in July 1511.
82. Reports from Andrea Foscolo, baylo in Istanbul, describe the campaign in detail: Sanuto, XII, 244-5, 507-516 and XIII, 114-

- 117 [Docs., pp.590-592]. See also XII, 273, 343-4 [Docs., p.589] 432-3 [Docs., p.590], for other accounts. See Fisher, pp.98-99 for a collation of all these references into a well-ordered narrative account. Cf. Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), pp.4-5; Uluçay, (TD, VI/9), pp.70, 72; Uzunçarşılı (Bell XXX), p.568; Danişmend, vol. I, pp.419-420; Sohrweide, pp.153-155; Hammer, GOR, II, 357-9 (Hist. IV, 111-113).
83. Sanuto, XII, 343-4, 432-3; Tekindağ (XXIV/24), p.5. But cf. Sanuto, XII, 433 [Docs., p.590], which introduces the possibility of death by poison, though it should be said that this source cannot be verified.
84. Hammer, II, 355-6 (Hist. IV, 109-110).
85. Mantran, EI(2), vol, I, p.396a; Koçu, IA, vol. I, p.331b.
86. Sanuto, XII, 515-6 [Docs., p.592].
87. Sanuto, III, 431 [Docs., p.574].
88. Sanuto, III, 1397-8 [Docs., p.592].
89. Sanuto, III, 126-7; IV, 604.
90. Sanuto, III, 431 [Docs., p.574].
91. Sanuto, V, 487-8.
92. Sanuto, V, 967.
93. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 294, fasc. 2 and 3. See also note 72.
94. This could be a reference to either Alessio Beccaguto or to Bernardino da Alessio, both of whom were emissaries of the Marquis of Mantua to the Ottoman empire and whose missions have been discussed in Kissling, Gonzaga. Alessio Beccaguto was the second Mantuan emissary to be sent to the Porte when he arrived in Istanbul with presents for the sultan in 1492/898. While in Istanbul he made friends with a number of Ottoman officials, above all Koca Mustafa Pasha (q.v.), later Grand Vizier. Although there is no evidence to link Beccaguto with ^CAli, the two must have met since ^CAli was a vizier at this time. In 1494/900 Beccaguto was sent to Avlonya and in 1495 to Antivari in Albania (Kissling, Gonzaga, pp.38-9, 42-3, 45, 49, 55). Bernardino de Alessio was despatched to see Firuz Beg (q.v.), SB of Iskodra in 1499/905, two weeks before the outbreak of the Turco-Venetian war (Kissling, Gonzaga, p.57). Sanuto, II, 500, March 1499, states that the Marquis of Mantua was sending someone by the name of "Alexio" with presents to Bayezid ("----- il signor mandà Alesio suo a Constantinopoli con presenti"), but as Kissling points out there is no confirmation that this Alessio ever arrived.
95. Sanuto, IX, 564-5: a report which lists ^CAli as third vizier rather than Grand Vizier in 1510.

ĀALI BEG SUBAŐI TERCÜMAN

[Ali bei, Ali beg, Ali beg
turziman; dragoman, Ali beg
subasi]

Nationality and Background

We are forced to rely entirely on the Diarii and on some manuscript sources in order to form a picture of the life and career of a man who, according to Hammer, was the first interpreter (dragoman) of the Porte to have been mentioned in history.¹ His importance during this period stems not only from his role as interpreter and diplomat but also from the close personal ties which he formed with various Venetians.² He led several diplomatic missions to Venice, and had first hand knowledge of the city and some of its major institutions.

Very little can be gleaned from the sources about his background and his life before 1500/906, the main period of his professional activity being from the late 1490s until 1518. The Venetians were not particularly clear about the social distinctions between one Ottoman official and another. On the whole, 'schiavo' is used in the Diarii to refer to officials from the Slave-Household, while 'zenthilomo di la Porta' is used to refer to sipahis and free, Muslim born elements.³ Usually ĀAli is described as "Ali beg Turziman"⁴ or "dragoman di la Porta", but confusion is caused when Sanuto describes him both as "schiavo" and "zenthilomo".⁵ However, there is little doubt that ĀAli beg was a Christian born official of kul status: the fact that he is also often referred to as "subasi" and was made cebeci baŐı (see page p.141) indicate that he rose through the ranks of the Slave-Household; and he is specifically described as 'kulum (my slave)

in a letter of Bayezid II to the Doge of 5 August 1503/II Şafer 909.⁶ Any further doubt is completely dispelled when Sanuto tells us in a personal memorandum - fifteen years after ĆAli first appears in the Diarîi - that he was the son of the brother of a certain Leonardo da Santa Maura,⁷ thus establishing not only his Christian origins but also his Venetian ties.⁸ This corroborates the traditional assertion that the early dragomans were Christians of European origin.⁹

It is not surprising therefore that ĆAli Beg was not only highly competent in Italian¹⁰ but also knew Latin.¹¹ It is quite feasible that a document in Italian in the ASV - a document purporting to be a letter from ĆAli Beg to Andrea Gritti - is in fact a copy of the original written in Italian by ĆAli Beg (23 March 1503/22 Şawwāl 908), and not a contemporary translation from the Turkish.¹² Here ĆAli Beg signs himself "Alibei dragoman del grandissimo gran [sultano]." Unfortunately there is no patronymic here to help us any further.

Career

ĆAli Beg's career from 1499 to 1518 consisted of his activities as interpreter in Istanbul between visiting dignitaries and the Porte and as ambassador on several occasions to Venice. However, from the very start it is clear that he was more than an interpreter; he often went beyond the strict duties of his office and executed the functions of master of protocol and intermediary between Venetian ambassadors and the remote but all pervasive power of the sublime Porte, thus forshadowing the role to be played by the Greek dragomans of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, his position as subaşı and cebeci başı in the Outer Service of the Slave Household took him on campaign,

increasing his value to the Venetians as a source of information.

1499/904-5

The first mention in the Diarif of ^çAli Beg and of his role as dragoman of the Porte is in April 1499/Ramazān 904, with no indication being given as to the year of his appointment to this office. Without exception the attention he receives is in connection with the diplomatic mission of Andrea Zancani to Istanbul in early 1499/904, and the references demonstrate the function of ^çAli Beg as intermediary as well as interpreter.¹³ This enabled Zancani, as well as other Venetian ambassadors, to develop a personal relationship with him, with the result that it was sometimes possible to extract information from him about the disposition of the Ottoman fleet and the intentions of the viziers.¹⁴ It could equally be argued, however, that ^çAli was employed by the Divan in order to feed foreign ambassadors with misleading information. There is also a rather cryptic reference to ^çAli's relationship with Hersekzade Ahmed (q.v.), but whether the meaning conveyed is that ^çAli owed a special loyalty to Ahmed is not plain.¹⁵

1503 - 4/909-910 Turco-Venetian Peace; First Mission to Venice,

1503/908

^çAli Beg played an important diplomatic role in the conclusion of the peace treaty which was ratified on 10 August 1503/16 Şafer 909. On this occasion, during the negotiations leading to ratification, ^çAli Beg was to work closely with the Venetian secretary Zaccaria de'Freschi,¹⁶ who had arrived in Istanbul in December 1502 to commence negotiations. The fall of Santa Maura shortly before Freschi's

departure from Venice and the lack of instructions in his commission to empower him to cede Santa Maura conspired to detain the secretary in Istanbul until March 1503. ¹⁷ Āli Beg was in constant communication with Freschi during this period in his capacity as interpreter and intermediary between him and the Porte, and it appears that the two men had several private conversations of their own. Unfortunately Sanuto pays scant attention to them.¹⁷ Perhaps as a result of the close relationship developed between them, and since Āli was familiar with the minutiae of the peace treaty, Bayezid chose him to accompany Freschi back to Venice with the aim of obtaining Venetian approval of the peace terms. Āli Beg's skills as interpreter were of secondary importance in his choice as ambassador since another tercūman¹⁸ was attached to the mission.¹⁹

Āli and Freschi arrived in Venice on 26 April 1503/28 Şawwāl 908 with an embassy of six, and Āli was given lodgings in the house of the Correr. The secretary Marco Antonio Zambon was assigned to guard him and to prevent anyone having access to him.²⁰ On 28 April 1503/1 Zū'l-ka'de 908 Āli was given his first audience²¹ with the Doge at which he presented a letter²² of Bayezid II and drafts of the peace treaty²³ in Greek and Turkish. It should be emphasized that Āli was in no way empowered to negotiate with the Venetians, but merely to witness the Republic's approval of the peace terms by means of a "solemn oath on the sacred Christian gospels"²⁴ On 20 May 1503 Āli Beg and his entourage, clad in ceremonial attire,²⁵ witnessed the signing of the treaty by Doge Loredan. His commission executed, Āli was given leave to return to Istanbul in the company of Andrea Gritti who had been appointed Venetian ambassador for the purpose of obtaining the final ratification of the treaty in Istanbul. On 21 May

the two men sailed from Venice.²⁶

From the moment of disembarcation in Istanbul, ^CAli maintained constant communication with Gritti and was privy to all the private conversations which the latter had with all the viziers.²⁷ No other man, either on the Venetian or Ottoman side, was in a position to obtain such a complete view of the peace process as ^CAli. In recognition of his services to the conclusion of the peace, Bayezid conferred on him the office of cebeci başı (Chief armourer) in the Outer Service which would have been in keeping with his title of subaşı in the Provincial Administration.²⁸

Second Mission to Venice, 1504/910

There is conclusive evidence that ^CAli Beg was sent on another mission to Venice in the year following the signing of the peace. All secondary sources have overlooked this in their analysis of the diplomatic scene in the aftermath of the peace.²⁹ Sanuto notes the visit of a Turkish ambassador in June and July 1504/Muḥarrem and Safer 910,³⁰ but it is only through the registers of the Senate that we are able to identify him as ^CAli Beg.³¹ Bayezid sent him on a special mission, the sole purpose of which was to secure compensation for the damages inflicted on the sons of ^COmer Beg Turhanbegoğlu (q.v.) at the hands of Venetian privateers. This matter was of great concern to the Divan and it is natural that a man of ^CAli's expertise should have been chosen to deliver the Sultan's letter expounding the problem and stating the compensation required.³² The Venetians responded by taking immediate action and by eventually arranging for reparations to be paid.

While ^CAli Beg was still in Venice, another matter was brought to

his attention regarding a certain Da'ud who had arrived in Venice with three case-loads of possessions. The Venetian authorities strongly suspected him of being a runaway slave of the Grand Vizier Mustafa pasha and of absconding with some of the latter's goods. ʿAli had not been informed by the Divan about this affair, but the Venetians, anxious to curry favour with the Grand Vizier, requested ʿAli to inspect the goods and to draw up an inventory in Turkish. Both the inventory and the hapless Da'ud were consigned to ʿAli who was to present them to Mustafa Pasha.³³

Mission to Mecca, 1510/916 / Succession Dispute, 1511-12/917-8

ʿAli Beg's activities between 1504 and 1513 remain obscure. In 1510/916 he re-emerges in the Diarii on a mission to Mecca where he had been sent to bring back a physician for the ailing Bayezid. In the following year he appears to have been involved in the succession dispute between Bayezid and his sons and was actually present at the battle of Çorlu (3 August 1511/8 Cumāda I 917) when Selim was heavily defeated by his father.³⁴

Reign of Selim I: Third mission to Venice, 1514/920

The accession of a new sultan did not curtail ʿAli's public career but enhanced it further. Once again his extensive experience in diplomatic circles qualified him for the task of undertaking the mission to Venice in order to confirm the peace of 1503. He was duly despatched³⁵ in January 1514 by Selim who had already sworn to maintain the peace treaty in the presence of the Venetian envoy Antonio Zustinian. This embassy was an extremely elaborate affair - ʿAli's entourage consisted of 80 people, 24 of whom were apparently

high dignitaries - and the Venetian populace as well as the Signoria itself considered the successful conclusion of the mission to be of utmost importance.³⁶ Ostensibly, the chief purpose of the mission was to confirm the peace of 1503³⁷, but there was also a matter of fundamental importance to the Venetian state, that is the question of whether to try to elicit the sultan's military assistance in the War of the League of Cambrai which had dealt a crippling blow to Venetian aspirations in the terraferma. ^CAli was the linchpin of the discussions over aid between the Porte and Venice. During the course of his stay in Venice he was given no less than three secret audiences with the Council of Ten:³⁸ given the wealth of documentary evidence³⁹ about the mission and about ^CAli's special instructions concerning the possibility of Ottoman aid, it is almost certain that the purpose of these secret audiences was to discuss the question of Turkish military aid. So secret were these proceedings (an element of security had already been ensured by the fact that ^CAli was able to execute his task without an interpreter⁴⁰) that Sanuto was totally unable to obtain any information about the actual substance of the talks by virtue of the total seclusion from his Venetian friends⁴¹ to which the ambassador was subjected. The Council of Ten was seriously split over whether to allow a Turkish force to land on the Italian peninsular⁴², but it was eventually decided to test the Sultan's willingness to provide material help. To this end, all Venetian hopes were centred on the good offices of ^CAli Beg himself who was rewarded by the Ten for his efforts with 500 ducats in gold and with the promise of a further 200 ducats for every year he remained at the Porte should the Sultan actually send a force.⁴³

However, in spite of ^CAli's strong recommendation that troops

should be sent, the volatility of the Hungarian frontier and, above all, the severe threat from the Safavids on the eastern borders of the empire were ultimately responsible for Selim's decision not to divert his forces to the Italian front but to prepare for the campaign against Shah Ismail.⁴⁴

The Chaldiran Campaign (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920)

No sooner had ĆAli returned from Venice than he left to join the army on the eastern front for the Chaldiran campaign on which Selim had embarked in April 1514/Rebī^c I 920. The most revealing aspect of this interlude in his life is that he maintained a correspondence during the campaign with the Venetian bailo in Istanbul and with Hironimo Bidelli, a Venetian official in Corfu, to whom he sent reports on the course of the war.⁴⁵ His description of the battle for Chaldiran itself appears to be no more than propaganda - a fact of which the bailo was aware - since he omits to mention the death of Hasan, the beglerbeği of Rumeli, and a sizeable portion of his troops, as well as giving the false impression that Shah Ismail had been totally routed.⁴⁶

But in spite of this, even ĆAli found it impossible to conceal the immense hardship and deprivations which he as well as the Ottoman troops themselves had to endure, both before and after Chaldiran.⁴⁷

Fourth Mission to Venice, 1517/923

It is indicative of ĆAli Beg's function as Cebeci başı and subaşı that he was on campaign with Selim both against the Safavids (1514/920) and against the Mamluks (1516-17/922-923) and it was from the victorious battlefield of Marj Dabik (24 August 1516/23 Receb 922)

that ʿAlī was sent yet again to Venice to proclaim formally the valourous deeds of his master.⁴⁸ Also on the agenda was the more serious business of the tribute of Cyprus (formerly paid to the Mamluks but now to be paid annually to the Ottomans) (see pp.108ff), an agreement over haraḡ payers and the problem of settling the debts amassed by the former bailo in Istanbul, Nicolo Zustinian.⁴⁹ ʿAlī had arrived in Istanbul in December of 1516/Ṣawwāl 922 on his way to Venice, but even though he delayed his departure, he did not reach Venice until October 1517/Ṣawwāl 923, largely as a result of having been sent by way of Poland where he fell ill and was caught in the middle of the Polish-Moscovite war.⁵⁰

ʿAlī's reputation as an able diplomat who enjoyed great influence with Selim was by now well established with the Signoria,⁵¹ and as usual he was accorded great honour. In addition to his mission, which was smoothly executed to the mutual satisfaction of both the dragoman and the Signoria, he also asked for three graces or concessions: that three prisoners be freed (not Turks but Latins for whom ʿAlī had been petitioned to seek pardon, in return for which he was offered the promise of payment). He also asked that a member of the Barbaro family, whom he claimed to be his nephew, might be made podestà.

ʿAlī Begi and his Venetian Friends

Sanuto himself had ambivalent feelings towards the dragoman whom he viewed with admiration but also with great suspicion that he had come to spy.⁵³ The somewhat amusing Campanile incident is given to us in full which demonstrates not only ʿAlī's arrogance but also his powers of observation.⁵⁴ Nevertheless ʿAlī had a wide range of Venetian connections with whom he developed long-standing friendships.

Most of them were formed in the course of diplomatic exchanges, but there is clear evidence that ^CAli frequently went beyond the exigencies of his official brief in order to cultivate a more personal relationship. Such was the case with Andrea Zancani⁵⁵, the secretary Zaccaria de' Freschi⁵⁶; Andrea Gritti⁵⁷ (later Doge); Andrea Foscolo⁵⁸; Francesco Contarini and Francesco Gradenigo⁵⁹; Nicolo Zustinian⁶⁰; Hironimo Bidelli⁶¹; Lunardo Bembo⁶²; Piero Zustinian (son of Marco and brother of Nicolo) with whom a very special friendship existed⁶³; the secretary Nicolo Aurelio who became one of ^CAli's closest friends⁶⁴; Antonio Zustinian⁶⁵; and the Malipiero family whose household on the Giudecca became his normal place of residence on his missions to Venice⁶⁶.

In some cases ^CAli passed on important information about major political developments in the Ottoman state: the fleet (1499)⁶⁷; the succession dispute (1511)⁶⁸; the Chaldiran campaign (1514)⁶⁹. But it is also true that on many occasions the information was provided so as to produce a somewhat misleading picture of the situation.

According to Hammer, ^CAli Beg was succeeded as chief dragoman of the Porte by the Sipahi Yunus Beg⁷⁰. ^CAli is undoubtedly one of the key men in Ottoman diplomacy of the first quarter of the sixteenth century. To describe the office of tercüman as 'intepreter' would be to limit the importance of the career of a man who carried immense influence with both Bayezid II and Selim I - his value was appreciated by the latter to the extent that he was able to survive several palace purges - and whose knowledge and experience of international as well as domestic affairs was unrivalled by any other Ottoman official.

Notes

1. Hammer, GOR, II, p.330 and note on p.614. The education and provision of official interpreters was still in its infancy in this period in both the Venetian and Ottoman states. Whilst Venice took some tentative and inadequate steps to rectify this situation during the course of the sixteenth century (see Preto, Ch.3/I, 'La conoscenza della lingua turca a Venezia', esp. p.104) the Ottomans were to rely on renegade Christians acting as dragomans of the Porte until the reforms of Selim III in the nineteenth century (see Lewis, Emergence, pp.60-61, 87, and p.88, n.26 for a bibliography on dragomans.)
2. See pp.145-6.
3. E.g., Sanuto, V, 869, 'spachi, zoe zenthilomo di la Porta' (c.f., Yā^ckub Beg, p.476ff). Compare this with Sanuto, V, 757-8, where we are told that a certain ambassador (cf., Mustafa Beg, p.386ff and commonly referred to as 'schiaivo') of the turk 'è di nacion grecha e di bassa condition.'
4. 'Turziman' is the Venetian form of the Arabic 'tercüman' or 'terceman' which gradually evolved into the westernized form 'dragomanno' or 'dragoman'. (cf. OED).
5. Sanuto, V, 26 April 1503 [Docs., p.593]; V, 25-26
6. Published in Mélikoff, pp.140-145. The original Turkish document can now be located in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, doc. 2(b) between fasc. 8 and 9, (and see doc.2(a) for a contemporary translation). See also ASV, Indice Bombaci (chron), no.35
7. Sanuto, XVII, 522, February 1514, [Docs., p.593].
8. ^cAli also claimed in 1517 that a member of the Barbaro family was his nephew (Sanuto, XXV, 73) (See note 52). As early as 1503, Andrea Gritti had referred to the possibility that ^cAli Beg was of Venetian origin (see Gritti, Relazione, in Alberi, Sev. III, vol. III, p.43).
9. Lewis, Istanbul, p.93; Emergence, pp.60-1, and above, note 1.
10. Sanuto, XVII, 522, 523-4, 538; 566-7 [Docs., p.593].
11. Sanuto, XVII, 529-530 [Docs., p.594]; XXV, 72.
12. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 11. See also ASV, Indice Bombaci(chron), no. 33.
13. Sanuto, II, 599; 611 [Docs., p.594].
14. Sanuto, II, 625 [Docs., p.594].
15. Sanuto, II, 700 [Docs., p.595]. ^cAli was also privy to Hersekzade Ahmed pasha's problem of the balas ruby (see p.70 and p.95, n.15).

- On a later mission to Venice in 1514 (pp.142-4), ^CAli was looking for a diamond to buy the pasha (Sanuto, XVII, 567).
16. For an analysis of the involvement of Freschi in the peace negotiations, see Neff, Freschi.
 17. Sanuto, IV, 645, 645-6, 651 [all Docs., p.595].
 18. Sanuto, V, 26 [Docs., p.593]. This tercūman was Jacomo di Rimano whose own activities as interpreter during these years would make an interesting study. Although early references in the Diarii tend to indicate that he was in Ottoman service (Sanuto, V, 26, 36), the picture becomes confused when we find him acting as Venetian tercūman on behalf of Zacharia de Freschi on his mission to Istanbul in 1502/3 (ASV, CX, Parti Misti, Filza 15, f. 74, 1503 and reg. 30, f. 165); on Andrea Gritti's mission to Istanbul in the autumn of 1503; on Alvisè Arimondo's mission to Istanbul in 1511; and as ^CAli Beg's counterpart for Ottoman envoys visiting Venice (see Sanuto, V, 450, 746, 802, 835, 1022; XII, 173; XIII, 220-222). For information on another tercūman in Venetian service in this period (Theodoro Paleologo), see Sanuto, II, 573, 1323; III, 177, 179, 192-3, 672; XII, 521-3; XVII, 521-2, 543; XXIV, 290-2; XXV, 52-3, 151-3, 155-7, 274-5, 630. It can be concluded from an analysis of these two interpreters that the functions of Venetian and Ottoman tercūman were strikingly similar, with the important difference that Venetian tercūman were never accredited with ambassadorial status. See also note 50 and Neff, Freschi, p.39, n. 26.
 19. That ^CAli's interpretative skills were overshadowed by his ambassadorial qualities is further buttressed by the fact that on a later occasion (Sanuto, XVII, 522, [Docs., p.593]), it is pointed out that he conversed with the Doge through an interpreter for reasons of protocol even though he knew Italian. Ottoman envoys were no more chosen for their linguistic talent than were their Venetian counterparts (see Neff, Freschi, p.39, n. 26).
 20. Sanuto, V, 25-6. This was standard protocol both in Venice and Istanbul.
 21. Sanuto, V, 27.
 22. The letter was dated 14 December 1502/13 Cumāda II 908 and is given in translation in Sanuto, V, 41. For the original in Turkish, see ASV, CDT, Busta VI, fasc. I, no. 3, published in Mélikoff, pp. 132-136 with translation, transcription and commentary. For contemporary translations, identical to the version in Sanuto, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 4, no. 8 and fasc. 10, and ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 75rv. For regests, see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 30; Predelli Comm. reg., XIX, no. 9; and ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no. 1542. Note that in the actual documents the hegira date is given as 24 of the sixth month, 908. The letter outlines the purpose of ^CAli's mission, which is to witness the confirmation of the peace treaty.
 23. For the draft of the treaty (capitolazioni) in Turkish, see ASV,

- Firmani Turchi, no. 3. Contemporary translations of the Turkish draft can be found in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 27 and fasc. 12, no. 2. Both translations are the work of Jacomo di Rimano (see above, note 18). For the Greek draft of the treaty, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, loose document in roll. For the transcription of the original Greek, see M and M III, pp.344-350; for a contemporary translation from the Greek, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 12, no. 1. The full text of the treaty in Italian is also given by Sanuto, V, 42-47, and this version is identical to the one found in ASV, Libri Commem., XIX, f. 9r-10v. (A fragment of this same version is also located in MCC, Cod. Archivio Morosini-Grimani, Busta 533, fasc. IV/24, ff. 45r-46r). For a regest of the treaty, see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 28.
24. See document referred to in note 22, and Sanuto, V, 48.
 25. Sanuto, V, 36 [Docs., p.596].
 26. For references to the journey to Istanbul, see Sanuto, V, 71, and BNM, Copialettere, f. 1r, 2v.
 27. BNM, Copialettere, ff. 15r-17r; 18v-19r; 20v; 23v where ^CAli was present at a secret audience which Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha gave to Gritti; Sanuto, V, 362, 449.
 28. Sanuto, V, 463 [Docs., p.596].
 29. Ignorance of ^CAli's 1504 mission is largely responsible for the erroneous attribution of the date to the Turkish document relating to the act of piracy against the Turhanoglu (see p.399, n.22).
 30. Sanuto, VI, 29,30, 38, 39, 44 (June and July 1504).
 31. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 31v-32v, 35v-36r, 37r, 44v.
 32. For details of the letter of 7 April (1504) presented by ^CAli to the Signoria, see p.399, n.22.
 33. ASV, Sen. Sec. reg. 40, f. 44v [Docs., pp.596-7].
 34. Sanuto, XI, 417-8; and XIII, 116 [Docs., p.597].
 35. Sanuto, XVII, 451 [Docs., p.598].
 36. Sanuto, XVII, 471; 504-5; 507; 509; 510; 521-2 [Docs., p.598]. Cf. Preto, p.122.
 37. See pp.90-1. The confirmation of the peace was a fairly straightforward matter apart from some minor disagreements on either side. For the original text of the treaty of 17 October 1513/17 Saban 919, see ASV, CDT, Busta I, fasc. 3. For regests cf. ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 59(a) and Indice Bombaci (Box), Busta I, fasc. 3; also Predelli, Comm. reg., VI, Bk. XX, p.131, no. 12. The preamble to the treaty is given in Sanuto, XVII, 539-540. Regarding the question of minor disagreements, cf. a ferman of

Selim to the Doge of 25 October 1513/25 Şābān 919. The Greek original is located in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no. 4, with a contemporary translation in Busta XVIII bis, document between fasc. 6 and fasc. 7. For a transcription, cf. M and M III, pp.360-1, no. XLIII; for regests, cf. ASV, Indice Bombaci, (Chron), no. 59; Indice Bombaci, (Box), Busta XVIII, no. 35; and Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, Bk. XX, p.130, no. 9.

38. February 2, 6 and 18, 1514 (Sanuto, XVII, 525, 529 and 566-7) [all Docs., pp.598-9].
39. References to ^CAli's role as mediator and chief negotiator over the issue of Ottoman military aid abound in the confidential records of the Council of Ten, records to which Sanuto would not have had access at this time. Cf. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, Corresp. of Baīlo Nicolo Zustinian (1514), fasc. 26-32 (^CAli's instructions) [Docs., p.599-600]; fasc. 34 (^CAli is awaited in Istanbul) [Docs., p.600]; fasc. 35, f. 1r (^CAli briefs the viziers and the Sultan on the situation in Italy and advises them to give Venice aid) [Docs., p.601]; fasc. 36, 1r (^CAli translates the letter of the Ten requesting aid) [Docs., pp.552-4]; fasc. 38, f. 2r (He is in Selim's presence when the latter almost decides to make a concrete offer of help) [Docs., pp.554-5]. Cf. also ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 36 (1513-14), ff. 96v-98r, 6 February 1514 (^CAli's meeting with the Ten); f. 99r, 6 February 1514 (^CAli expounds his commission to the Ten and communicates the Sultan's fervent desire to aid Venice) [Docs., p.602]. Note that the date (6 February) of this oral communication corresponds to that of the second secret audience (see note 38); 100rv (the Ten informs ^CAli about the situation in Italy and the war); 101v (the Ten acknowledge that hopes for Ottoman aid rest in the hands of ^CAli beg) [Docs., p.602]; 103r; 103v-104r; 104v; 107r; 110rv; 121v-122r (^CAli described as one of the chief organisers of aid) [Docs., pp.601-2]. Sanuto himself does show some knowledge of ^CAli's involvement in this business when on 7 February 1514 (Sanuto, XVII, 538) [Docs., p.599] he records in the Relazione of Antonio Zustinian (the Venetian ambassador who had just returned from his mission to Istanbul), that ^CAli Begi is mentioned as the man who was familiar with events in Italy and who was in Venice to speak on behalf of the viziers. Cf. also Alberi, Serie III, Vol. III, p.49 for the same relazione drawn from the Diarii.
40. Sanuto, XVII, 523 [Docs., p.598].
41. Sanuto, XVII, 525 [Docs., p.598]. The Heads of the Ten specifically forbade Francesco Contarini and Francesco Gradenigo any access whatsoever to ^CAli. Cf. Preto, p.124, n. 17.
42. Sanuto, XVII, 535.
43. ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 36, f. 99r and 101v [Docs., p.602].
44. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci, Busta I, fasc. 35, f. 1r (see note 39) and fasc. 38, f. 1rv; ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 37, 22 May, 1514, f. 13rv. For this document and others relating to Ottoman aid, see Lamansky, vol. II, p.768n and 769n. On his return journey to

Istanbul, one of ^CAli's slaves - a Hungarian by birth - was either abducted by, or escaped to, certain Franciscan friars at Liesna. This incident angered ^CAli immensely and Sanuto (XVIII, 61) gives a vivid account of the dragoman's volatile character and behaviour. He deeply resented the affair and despatched a messenger, Mustafa, to Venice to complain (p.390). However, this does not appear to have affected his representations to the Sultan regarding aid, (Cf. Sanuto, XVIII, 61, 98, 115, 155, 205-6, 444-5, XIX, 440, and ASV, Capi CX, Busta I, fasc. 40, f. 1v; ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 37 (1514), f. 13rv), and indeed he himself claimed in his letter to Piero Zustinian (21 April 1514, Sanuto, XVIII, 205-6) that it was the Safavid threat and not any failing of his which had upset all the negotiations.

45. Sanuto, XIX, 224, 287-8, 440 [Docs., p.603], and XVIII, 115, 155.
46. Sanuto, XIX, 287-8 [Docs., p.603].
47. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Corresp. of Bailo Nicolo Zustinian, Busta I, fasc. 44, f. 1v (31 May 1514); Sanuto, XIX, 440 [Docs., p.603].
48. Sanuto, XXIII, 346; and 385-6 [Docs., p.604].
49. Idem., and Sanuto, XXV, 69, (also XXV, 47, 48 and 157 for more Information on harac). Regarding Zustinian, see also p.413.
50. Sanuto, XXV, 49; 52. Hironimo Zivran acted as interpreter (on Zivran, see Sanuto, XX, 553; XXIII, 361, 373-4; XXV, 52).
51. Sanuto, XXV, 47, [Docs., p.604].
52. Sanuto, XXV, 73-4. Only one of these prisoners was granted a pardon. There are other examples of such petitions being made by visiting Ottoman ambassadors, cf., Preto, p.122, n. 13.
53. Sanuto, XXV, 73. "È homo sagaze, cativo, et dove el va fa officio da spion dil Signor". Sanuto, however, tended towards paranoia over alleged spying activities of visiting dignitaries (Preto, p.122 for another example).
54. Sanuto, XXV, 73, also described in Finlay, Politics, p.164.
55. Cf., notes 13 and 14.
56. Cf., note 17.
57. Cf., note 27, for dealings in Istanbul (autumn 1503); Gritti also took ^CAli to visit the market place (marzaria), 5 May 1503 (Sanuto, V, 30), and Sanuto XVII, 509, 526, 551 [all Docs., pp.604-5].
58. Cf., note 34: ^CAli dines with Foscolo and informs him of developments in the succession dispute.

59. Cf., note 41, and Sanuto, XVII, 509 [Docs., p.604].
60. Sanuto, XI, 418 (September 1510); and cf. notes 45 and 47.
61. Cf., note 45.
62. Sanuto, XVII, 509, 543, 551 [all Docs., pp.604-5]; XVIII, 206.
63. Sanuto, XVII, 529-30 [Docs., p.594]; XVII, 543, 551 [Both Docs., p.604-5]; especially XVIII, 205-6.
64. Sanuto, XVIII, 205-6 especially; XXV, 75; and XXVI, 264 where it is noted that ^CAli would like Venice to send Nicolo Aurelio to Istanbul.
65. Sanuto, XVII, 541; XVIII, 206.
66. Sanuto, XVII, 504; XXV, 49.
67. Cf., note 14 (to Andrea Zancani).
68. Cf., note 34 (to Andrea Foscolo).
69. Cf., notes 45 and 47 (to Nicolo Zustinian).
70. Hammer, GOR, II, p.529.

TUR ^CALI BEG MALKOÇ - SB of Silistre (1514/920)

[Juralibech Malchozent]

Sanuto, XIX, 185-6: Killed at Chaldiran, along with his brother ^CAli Beg (or Mehmed Beg according to Sanuto)¹. He is also known for his pursuit of Prince Ahmed in 1512/918.²

Notes

1. See Mehmed Beg Malkoç-ođlu, p.307.
2. Süreyya, III, p.495; Tekindađ (TD XVII/22), p.68; Hammer, GOR, II, p.383, 642 (Hist. IV, p.146, 432); Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.139; Uđur, part I, pp.109, 113-4.

ALI BEG - Timar holder (1500/905)

[Ali bei timarato]

Sanuto, III, 519 [Docs., p.630]: In June 1500, the castellan and the provveditore of Koron, then still a Venetian possession, captured four Turks during a skirmish. One of these was ^CAli Beg, a timar holder from a place called Grebeni in the Morea. A report was despatched to Venice with information extracted (how is not stated) from ^CAli Beg about the disposition of the Ottoman forces. ^CAli displayed a wide knowledge, providing information on the activities and whereabouts of the BBs of Anatolia and Rumeli, three unnamed SBs and Bayezid himself. In the opinion of ^CAli, Fa'ik Pasha (q.v.) was the cause of the war.

ALI BEG - service of SB of the Morea (c1501/906)

[Ali bey]

Sanuto, III, 1501-1502: Involved in January 1501 in the interrogation of Dimitri de Ferigo, one of the leaders of the residual Christian community in Koron after its fall to the Ottomans. ^CAli was trying to establish whether the Venetians were plotting to retake the town. He is simply referred to as 'uno Ali bey'. From context he was clearly in the service of the SB of the Morea, Hadım ^CAli Pasha.

ALI (? MALKOÇ) - Voyvoda of Iskender Pasha (1499/905)

[Alia Milich]

Sanuto, II, 1078-9: Mentioned in the Relazione of Giacomo Lepori (August 1499) as voyvoda and one of the 'primi e principali' of the men of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia.

ĀALI BEG MALKOĀ OĀLU - see Mehmed Beg Malkoc-oglu.

ĀALI - man of Firuz Beg (1504/909)

[Ali]

Sanuto, V, 1037: Sent by Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra, in February 1504 to deliver a letter to the provveditore of Les and to receive the latter's reply concerning Ottoman demands that the Venetians hand Les back to the Ottomans.

ĀALI BEG - voyvoda (1499/905)

[Alibech voyvoda]

Sanuto, II, 394-5: The provveditore of Veglia in January 1499 reported that an 'Alibech voyvoda' was stationed with 20,000 men on the Ottoman-Wallachian border to counter any attack from Stephen of Moldavia while the main Ottoman forces numbering 140,000 marched northwards towards Poland with the aim of occupying various castles. Bayezid made peace with Poland in April 1499 so that he could open a single front war against Venice.

ALOGIOSIS - 'almadaro' (1499/905)

[alogiosis]

Sanuto, II, 426-7: 'Almadaro' [lit: collector/agent = ami] of the sultan; mentioned in one of the letters of Bayezid to the Doge which were brought to Venice by the prototiero of the Morea. Alogiosis, probably a Greek, had been in Parenzo and had escaped (presumably to Venice) from prison. Bayezid wanted him to be sent to the Porte, together with two other 'almadari', Vatazi and Ulixes, also Greeks.

ÇALI ÇAVUŞ - from Alexandria (1517/923)

[Zaus Allı]

Sanuto, XXV, 61-2 [Docs., pp.613-4]: When on 12 August 1517/24 Receb 923 Ca^Cfer Pasha (q.v.) left Alexandria with the Ottoman fleet to return to Istanbul at the end of the campaign against the Mamluks, he brought with him 1300 Alexandrine and Cairo families to be resettled in Istanbul and Anatolia. 'Zaus Allı di Alexandria' and his entire extended family were among the families to be resettled.

ÇALI PASHA - ?Vizier (1510/916)

[Halı]

Sanuto X, 268 [Docs., p.632]: One of Bayezid's officials ['bassa'] reported to have been decapitated in early 1510 (see pp.221-2). This is clearly not Hadım ÇAli Pasha (q.v.).

AMECH - Avlonya (1499/904)

[Amech/Amech bassa]

Sanuto, II, 658: News from Istanbul via Nicolo Gondola in Ragusa dated 27 March about the huge fleet which the Ottomans were building. The 'capitano electo' (presumably kapudan Pasha?) was said to be 'quel di Vallona Amech'. Since the SB of Avlonya at this time was Mustafa Pasha (B) (q.v.), the source must be confused. It is not clear who the Kapudan Pasha was at this time (pp.188ff, 357): since Hersekzade Ahmed has been mentioned as a candidate for the post, it is possible that 'Amech' should read 'Ahmed'. On the other hand, 'Amech' could also refer to Gedik Ahmed Pasha whose exploits as SB of Avlonya twenty years earlier and his capture of Otranto were long remembered, and on several occasions his identity was merged with that of Hersekzade.

Further confusion arises when news from Sebenico in June 1499 (Sanuto, II, 897) mentions an 'Amech bassa' as taking part in Iskender Pasha's raiding in Dalmatia.

ANTONELLO - Ulak (1503/909)

[Antonello ulacho]

Sanuto, V, 764-5, January 1504: Mentioned in the letter¹ (23 October 1503) of Bayezid to the Venetian Regiment at Corfu as an example of someone who had sold Turkish slaves from Santa Maura to the Venetians after the Turco-Venetian peace treaty had been declared. He had sold a mother and her two daughters. Bayezid demanded the return of these slaves in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

Notes

- i. There is no trace of this document in ASV or BNM, and it is not recorded in any indices.

ARSINA¹ - corsair (1498/904)

[Arsina corsaro]

Sanuto, II, 18-19, October 1498: A corsair operating against shipping in Cypriot waters around Famagusta.

Notes

- i. According to the MS, but 'Arsine' in the edition.

ASPROGIRACHA - (1503/909)

[Asprogiracha]

Sanuto, V, 914: One of the 'men' of Mehmed Beg, the SB of Argirokastron in October 1503. See p.300.

BABA - Iskodra (1517/923)

[Baba]

Sanuto, XXIV, 45-47, [Docs., pp.606-7]: Nephew of the SB of Iskodra (March 1517). The Venetian provveditore of Cattaro, Pietro Zen, became friends with the SB's nephew who was called 'Baba' by the 'Mori' [Turks in this case]. Baba was in some unspecified way related to the Zernovich family.

BALI - voyvoda of Firuz Beg (1499-1501/905-907)

[Bali/Baly/Bally]

He is described in various reports¹ between 1499/905 and 1501/907 as the voyvoda of Firuz Beg (SB of Iskodra) and as his second-in-command/agent ('vice gerente').² One report³ also describes him as the "subsalacho [Scalco = steward] di Monte Negro, e di tuto el teritorio dil signor Zorzi Zernoich," which again is consistent with his position as Firuz Beg's voyvoda, since the Ottomans took over the Montenegrine lands of George Cernovich in the neighbourhood of Cattaro. It seems likely, therefore, that Bali was voyvoda of Montenegro. Since Sinan (p.458) was last mentioned in the Diarii as voyvoda of Montenegro in August 1499, and since the first reference to Bali as voyvoda is in that month, it is possible that Bali took over from Sinan, and that he continued in that position until at least January 1501 when he is last named.⁴ He may have held that office right up until 1503/1504 when conte Alexa (q.v.) is named as the voyvoda.⁵

Bali took part in some of the ferocious raiding against Venetian possessions and subjects under the overall direction of Iskender Pasha

during the Turco-Venetian war. In July 1499 he gathered a force of 4,000 men in order to ravage the county of Dulcigno.⁶ However, an attack on this occasion did not materialise.⁷ In June 1500 he led 2,000 men in an attack against Antivari, but the Antivarini lay in wait and killed 100 of his men.⁸ However, the Republic found itself over-stretched and unable to provide adequate protection for its Christian subjects in Dalmatia, with the result that the inhabitants of Petrovač ('Pastrovichi') and some of the surrounding areas rebelled against Venice, deciding to throw in their lot with Bali and the Turks:⁹ in this way they sought the status of dhimmis, rather than face enslavement as well as subjugation at the hands of Bali who by this time had embarked on another assault against Antivari. The account of the five hour long bloody conflict resulting in the remarkable victory of 500 Antivarini over Bali's force of 5,000 is described in detail in the Diarii.¹⁰ The last mention of Bali is in January 1501 when in conjunction with Firuz Beg he was again amassing his forces for an attack on Cattaro or Antivari.¹¹ However, it seems likely that the reports mentioning the unnamed voyvoda of Montenegro in 502 refer to Bali (see p.459).

Clearly a gazi warrior of Turkish origin, there is nothing in the Diarii to link him with the famous Bali Beg Malkoç-oğlu, the great gazi based in the Danubian marches who carried out raids into Polish territory.

Notes

1. Sanuto, III, 457-458; III, 1377-79.
2. voyvoda, like subaşı, was the agent of a sancak beği.
3. Sanuto, III, 491.
4. Sanuto, III, 1377-79.

5. See conte Alexa, p.112 for this prosopographical problem.
6. Sanuto, II, 1156.
7. Sanuto, II, 1219.
8. Sanuto, III, 457-458.
9. Sanuto, III, 457-8, 491-2, 494 (June/July 1500).
10. Sanuto, III, 491 and 491-2 (reports from Antivari).
11. Sanuto, III, 1377-79 and 1455-56.

[BALI BEG] MALKOÇ-OĞLU - SB [of Silistria] (1500/905)

[Malchozi/Mauchoz/Marcozi]

Taken together, the three reports which may be referring to this Bali Beg produce a confused picture for the year 1500/905-6. The first, based on Polish information, clearly relates to him as he is described as 'uno capetanio dil turcho, homo famoso, nominato Mauchoz, qual mo do anni fu verso Polona con zente, et vene per monti asprissisimi': i.e. a reference to Bali Beg's famous campaign against Poland in 1497-8 which ended in a difficult retreat. According to this report (dated 21 April 1500),¹ Bayezid now wanted to execute 'Mauchoz' who, not wishing to go to the Porte, had taken refuge in a fortified place. However, according to a report from a Corfuan sea-captain (dated 21 May 1500), 'Malchozi' was one of the 'primi flambulari' (SBs) of the sultan and had gone to Lepanto with 80 men.² A third report from the bailo of Durazzo (dated 11 September 1500) notes that 'uno turco, nominato Marcozi' was coming to lay waste that region.³ (For Bali Beg's two sons Tur ^CAli Beg and ^CAli Beg/Mehmed Beg, see p.152 and p.307).

Notes

1. Sanuto, III, 288, quoted in Babinger, Malqoç-oghlu, p.361, n.3.

2. Sanuto, III, 336 (see also Mihaloğlu, p. 315).
3. Sanuto, III, 969-70.

BARBETA, Beneto - renegade (1497-1500/903-906) [sic]

Sanuto, I, 702-3, 729-731; II, 1055; III, 1224, 1556, August 1497-March 1501: Christian ship-pilot from Crete who turned renegade and fought in the service of the sultan.¹ He also indulged in piracy. In July 1497/902 he and the corsair Erichi (see 'Oruç') attacked and burnt the Venetian pilgrim vessel 'Zaffo' in the waters round Cerigo.² In the summer of 1499/905 during the campaign of Lepanto, he was pilot of a galeas of 1,000 botte carrying 600 men in the Ottoman fleet. The captain of that galeas was the Ağa of the Janissaries. Towards the close of 1500, Barbeta was impaled at Salonika because he was opposed to the burning of the galeas (precise context unclear).

Notes

1. On 27 January 1495, the Council of Ten planned to assassinate Barbeta who was described as a Venetian. He was an expert in maritime matters and a recent defector to the sultan, eventually converting to Islam ['becoming a Turk']. The Council accepted the proposal of Jacobus de Venetis to poison Barbeta, and promised to provide a monthly allowance of 5 ducats in perpetuity on successful completion of the task.
2. Also in Malipiero, I, p.156.

BAY PASHA - second vizier (1509/915) [Bay bassa]

Sanuto, IX, 564-5: Account of the earthquake in Istanbul of 10 September 1509 and of the damage caused. Bay Pasha is described as 'secundus consiliarus caesaris' and his losses in the disaster as 'de familia sua innumerabiles amisit, et ex jumentis similiter'. It is not clear who this Bay vizier could have been. The report seems unreliable since it states that Mustafa was '--- primi consiliarii

caesaris' whereas Hadim ^CAli was Grand Vizier at the time.

KARA BAYEZID - messenger (1510/916) [Chara Pajasit]

Sanuto, X, 476-7: Mentioned as the bearer of a letter (undated) from Sinan, the voyvoda of Imotski, to the provveditore of Almissa.

[For content of letter, see pp.461-2]

BERGIT VOYVODA - 1500/906 [sic]

Sanuto, III, 1062: On 30 October 1500 he led a Turkish raid into the Venetian territory of Zara and south towards Vrana from where he took away with him 3,000 people.

BISICH - (1500/906) [sic]

Sanuto, III, 540-541: According to Domenego da Mosto, Bisich was the son of Iskender Pasha. Da Mosto here describes the attack mounted by Bisich in command of 4,000 men against the Venetian outpost of Nona in June 1500, and how its inhabitants resisted valiantly. There is no record of Iskender Pasha having a son called Bisich.

BONDONAL/BORDONELLI - sea captain (1510/906) [sic]

Sanuto, X, 162; XI, 209-210: Described as 'capitano di l'armata turchesca' in the early months of 1510. He was killed in the course of a fight with a Genoese ship in the straits of Negroponte on 15 April 1510. His name suggests that he was an Italian renegade.

KARABORNA RE'IS - corsair (1503/909)

[sic]

Sanuto, V, 973-4: Corsair hunted down by a force sent by the sultan in late 1503 as part of general policy against piracy after the Turco-Venetian war. His hideout appears to have been at Urla.

BRONZUS - corsair (1517/923)

[sic]

Sanuto, XXV, 265-6 [Docs., p.684], 275-6 [Docs., p.616]:
According to the Venetian ambassador to Selim, Alvise Mocenigo, the sea captains Bronzus, Piri Re'is and Tachialis Sūleiman rebelled against the sultan, apparently having been part of Kurt-ođlu's (قو) contingent in the Ottoman fleet returning from Alexandria in 1517/923. Their combined forces numbered 24 ships. They were able to land 800 men at Chios and to seize a castle there as well as 400 of the sultan's subjects (their fate is not specified) and a transport vessel (palandaria). Presumably these captains were corsairs who had temporarily been brought under the control of Selim I but who preferred to reclaim their independence. Mocenigo, who is the only source of this information, said that these three planned to intercept the ship on which he was travelling back from Istanbul. Consequently his return to Venice was delayed.

CAACHAT** - voyvoda (1499/905)

[sic]

Sanuto, II, 1078-79: Mentioned in the Relazione of Jacomo Lepori in August 1499/Muharrem 905 as voyvoda of Creg, an area just outside Ragusa. He mustered his troops and went to join his 'bassa' [i.e. his SB, Iskender Pasha of Bosnia], presumably in preparation for one of Iskender's major offensives during the Turco-Venetian war.

** this is the form in the MS; the edition gives 'Choachat'.

Ca^CFER PASHA - Kapudan Pasha

[Zafer Aga/Capitano di Gallipoli/
capitano di l'armada/capetano e l
Munucho/lo Eunucho/Manuco]

d. 1520/926

Identity and Background

Ca^Cfer is only once mentioned by name in the reports and letters collected in the Diarii.¹ However, it is possible to construct a picture of his activities from 1516/922 when he was appointed Kapudan Pasha by tracing those references which mention the "capitano di Gallipoli/armada" or "Eunucho" (Ca^Cfer having been Chief White Eunuch in the Imperial Palace prior to his appointment to Kapudan Pasha).² We cannot be certain about Ca^Cfer's nationality. The Grand Master of Rhodes, writing to Pope Leo X, refers to him as a eunuch of Bosnian origin,⁴ but this is contradicted by the Duke of Naxos, who, in a letter describing the captain of the Ottoman fleet - a description matching Ca^Cfer Pasha - says that he was from Monemvasia (Malvasia) in the Morea.⁵ The Duke of Naxos, being near Monemvasia, may be nearer the truth. At any rate Ca^Cfer was a product of the Slave Household and Palace School.

Like Koca Mustafa in Bayezid's reign, so too Ca^Cfer in Selim's succeeded in earning for himself a black and sinister reputation. But whereas Mustafa Pasha was devious, Ca^Cfer was cruel, sadistic and foul mouthed.⁶ "Bloody Ca^Cfer (Kanlı)" as he was known is quite vividly portrayed in the Diarîi and is thus easily identifiable even when not mentioned by name. The Diarîi refer both to some of his cruel acts and to his insolent and arrogant manner. He incarcerated the dragoman of the Venetian bailo Lunardo Bembo for not responding promptly enough to his summons and would have beaten him had it not been for the intervention of Piri Pasha (q.v.).⁷ Ca^Cfer's wrath had been incurred because he had been forgotten in the customary distribution of presents made to leading Ottoman officials by the new bailo, Lunardo Bembo, who had arrived in Istanbul on 9 July 1516.⁸ The whole affair caused Bembo some embarrassment and consternation, because at one point he described Ca^Cfer as his friend,⁹ a relationship Bembo may have formed when he was first bailo from 1503 to 1508; and before that he had been one of the Venetian merchants imprisoned by Bayezid during the 1499-1503 war. Yet Bembo had not brought Ca^Cfer a gift due to objections which had actually been raised in the Collegio back in Venice.¹⁰ Ca^Cfer's reputation had clearly gone before him, and on several occasions different western observers tell of his "pessima et bestia natura" and that as a man he was "superbo et crudelissimo".¹¹ He terrorized the inhabitants of Chios, committing acts of violence and plunder against them,¹² but his most bitter hatred was reserved for the Grand Master of Rhodes and the Knights of St. John. In his letter to the Grand Master in the summer of 1517, when Rhodes was a potential threat to the Ottoman fleet acting as the lifeline for Selim's troops in Egypt, Ca^Cfer referred to the Grand Master as a

"mangy dog" and to the Pope and King of France as "greater dogs than you, sons of dogs".¹³

Kapudan Pasha 1516-1520/922-926

The view¹⁴ that Ca^Cfer Aga succeeded Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha in 1511/917 as Kapudan Pasha has already been rejected on the basis of Haydar Çelebi's Ruzname.¹⁵ The reports in the Diarii are in agreement with the latter in showing that Hersekzade was succeeded by Iskender Ağa Bostancı Başı who was succeeded by Sinan Beg Kapıcı Başı for a few months in 1513. The only discrepancy is that, according to the Diarii, Iskender Aga (q.v.)¹⁶ was appointed in 1510 and not in 1511 while Sinan Beg (q.v.) was appointed in 1513 and not 1514. Iskender may have been succeeded a second time in 1514 by Kapıcı Sinan (q.v.) or Küçük Sinan until the appointment of Ca^Cfer in 1516.¹⁷ The first mention of a Kapudan Pasha whose description most conforms to that of Ca^Cfer is in July 1516/Cumāda II 922 when Lunardo Bembo arrived in Istanbul and was greeted and congratulated by the Kapudan on his appointment as bailo. This was also the occasion when Ca^Cfer demanded that he should receive a present from Bembo (see above).¹⁸ His aggravation at not receiving a gift may have been exacerbated, because it was customary for the Venetians, as well as other foreign powers, to send presents to newly appointed Ottoman officials in the key offices of state. His annoyance would thus be understandable if he had recently been promoted to the Kapudanlık.¹⁹

The Istanbul Arsenal, the fleet and the Conquest of Egypt

Ca^Cfer's claim to fame lies in his role in the preparation, armament and mobilization of the Ottoman fleet for the Egyptian

campaign of 1516-17 and in successfully ensuring the safety of the sea routes during the campaign. These activities are fully documented in the Diarii.

Although it has been said that the Haliç Tersane (Istanbul, Galata or Golden Horn Arsenal) was begun in 1515/921 when Ca^Cfer was Kapudan Pasha,²⁰ it has already been shown that it is unlikely that Ca^Cfer was appointed to this office until 1516/922 when most of the work had been completed. However, it was left to him to supervise the construction of the fleet in the new arsenal.

Selim's main military preoccupation in 1516/922 had been with a new campaign against the Safavids, and it was to this end that the Ottoman military machine had been geared. However, by the summer of 1516/922 Selim had decided instead to turn and face the Mamluk Sultan who had arrived with a large army near the Ottoman-Mamluk frontier. At Marj Dabik (24 August 1516/25 Receb 922) Selim smashed the Mamluk forces. It was only after Marj Dabik that Ca^Cfer received orders from Selim to prepare the fleet for a voyage to Alexandria²¹ (though construction of the fleet had continued since completion of the Istanbul arsenal and had been accelerated in the Spring of 1515).²² At first Selim's policy following his victory was to offer peace terms to the new Mamluk sultan Tuman Bay. When this initiative was met with the dispatch of ten thousand men to conquer Gaza, Selim's ambitions in the region grew proportionately and he therefore ordered Ca^Cfer in September 1516/Şa^Cbān 922 to prepare the fleet for mobilisation so that Ottoman lines of communication could be safeguarded.

In the event the Mamluk Sultanate fell to Selim well before Ca^Cfer had left Istanbul, for although Bembo had found Ca^Cfer in

Nicomedia (İzmit) supervising the building of new ships in July 1516/Cumada II 922,²³ it had soon become clear that the armada could not be mobilised before March 1517/Safer 923,²⁴ two months after Selim's conclusive victory at Ridaniyya (23 January 1517/29 Zū'l-ḥicca 923). Ca^Cfer faced an immense task. His initial orders were that he should assemble, equip and arm some fifty or sixty ships,²⁵ but by December 1516 the requirement had increased to forty great galleys (galie grosse), forty light galleys (galie sotil) and twenty huge transport vessels (palandarie),²⁶ one hundred ships in all. This was the figure quoted by Bembo as the number of ships in the Galata (Istanbul) Arsenal in February 1517,²⁷ but he later recorded that when the fleet left Istanbul on 30 March 1517/7 Rebī^C I 923, the Galata armada numbered ninety ships ("Sono galie grosse numero 20, sotile 4, fuste 10 grosse, fuste sotil 6, palandarie 10 et nave 4 con vituarie, monition et feri, scarpe etc. suso, in sum vele 90).²⁸ Ca^Cfer first set course for Gelibolu to join forces with the Gelibolu armada which numbered twenty vessels ("- - - galie grosse 10 et sotil 10); when the fleet under the command of the corsair captain Kurt-Oğlu (q.v.) is included, the Ottoman armada which embarked for Alexandria was said to number some 160 ships.²⁹ The figures for the Galata and Gelibolu fleets are credible given that they very nearly tally with the numbers quoted by Ca^Cfer Pasha himself in his report to Selim in May 1517/Cumāda I 923 on the state of the Ottoman navy.³⁰ According to Bembo this was "una superba et grossa armada"; Ca^Cfer its commander was "superbo et crudelissimo".³¹ But it was not just the fleet that was magnificent. Its cargo of horses, provisions and especially firearms and ammunition to reinforce the Ottoman troops, which had been on campaign for some ten months with overextended lines of

communication, was priceless.³² It had been Ottoman firearms which ultimately had brought victory at Marj Dabik and Ridaniyya and which were to prove conclusive in the establishment of Ottoman rule in the lands of the Mamluk Sultanate.

However, two perennial problems still dogged the Ottoman navy. One was the lack of trained captains,³³ and this deficiency was partially solved by the normal practice of employing corsairs. The other was the lack of transport vessels to carry the munitions. Historians have noted that the financial basis of the Ottoman state was such that a merchant marine was never developed on the lines of those created by western states whose economy depended on investment in long distance maritime trade.³⁴ Consequently Selim found that he lacked the vessels capable of transporting massive loads on what by Ottoman standards was to be a longer than average journey. The solution to this problem was the requisitioning of those Venetian ships which happened to be in Istanbul at the time. Bembo recounts how he visited Ca^Cfer on several occasions to discuss the whole business, the Venetians rightly claiming that the Kapudan's forcible requisition was contrary to the terms of the peace treaty.³⁵ Ca^Cfer seems to have responded by playing a cunning game. On 3 December 1516 he assured Bembo that the ships would be released,³⁶ but by 4 January 1517 Bembo was warning Venice yet again that Ca^Cfer could not be trusted, because he had gone back on his word and was now seeking to requisition all Venetian ships available: for Bembo he was "una persona diabolica".³⁷ By the end of February 1517 Bembo was writing that he had in fact obtained the release of the ships,³⁸ yet on 26 March, four days before the departure of the armada, three Venetian ships were still being held.³⁹ On 2 April Bembo noted that four ships

loaded with munitions had left with the armada,⁴⁰ and it was later reported that the ship of the Venetian merchant Pantaloneo Coresi had also been taken. In fact Ca^Cfer was not to order the release of the Venetian ships until his departure from Alexandria in August 1517. He left a command that the ships should be given leave five days after the fleet had left port, but eight days had elapsed and still his orders had not been put into effect, because the Ottoman governor of Alexandria had been told by an informer that one of the ships had brought ten thousand ducats as tribute for the Mamluk Sultan,⁴¹ and this caused further complications and delays. It was not only Venetians who had suffered from requisitioning: one report states that Ca^Cfer had left behind in Alexandria twenty-five ships belonging to Venice, Crete and other Latin states, including Genoa and Ragusa.⁴²

What is clear from all this is that Ca^Cfer had found the task set for him by Selim quite formidable. He knew he could not embark for Alexandria before the spring of 1517 and even then he was planning to rely on some western shipping for the transportation of essential materials of war. While still in Istanbul he had received news of the victory of Ridaniyya which had been achieved without his support and participation. When Ca^Cfer arrived in Alexandria therefore on 22 May 1517/1 Cumāda I 923⁴³, he wrote a report of his actions and of the state of the fleet, explaining in addition that his departure had been delayed by unusually bad weather.⁴⁴ There is no evidence in the Diarî to substantiate this excuse, but it seems plausible since Selim could have obtained verification quite easily. In any case Selim does not appear to have been annoyed or surprised. Ca^Cfer was summoned to a meeting with him on the Nile,⁴⁵ and was then given leave to return

to Istanbul.

Return to Istanbul

On 12 August 1517/24 Receb 923⁴⁶ Ca^Cfer left Alexandria with a fleet comprising of 110 ships: 31 great galleys, 21 galie bastarde, which had previously formed part of the Mamluk fleet, 45 light galleys, and 13 bastardelle.⁴⁷ In addition there were 15 palandarie and various other smaller craft. His cargo on the return journey was no less important than on the outgoing one. Apart from transporting the specie of the Mamluk treasury, Ca^Cfer was given charge of some thirteen hundred Alexandrine and Cairo families⁴⁸ who were to be resettled in Istanbul and Anatolia in accordance with traditional Ottoman and Near Eastern governmental practice of acquiring and resettling urban populations from vanquished territories.⁴⁹

No sooner had Ca^Cfer returned to Istanbul than he set to work again in the Galata Arsenal. Not only did he refit the ships he had just brought back with him, but he also equipped other ships freshly out of dry dock. Alvise Mocenigo, who had visited Selim in Cairo in his capacity as Venetian ambassador in 1517/923 and whom Selim had sent home via Istanbul, relates in September 1517/Ramāzān 923 how he was astounded by the vast number of ships that had been collected, something he would have thought quite unbelievable were it not that he had seen most of them with his own eyes.⁵⁰ Cannons, basilisks,⁵¹ and all manner of weapons were being cast in huge numbers, day and night.⁵² It was not immediately obvious to the Venetians or to anyone else what would be the object of all these preparations. Every year since the accession of Selim they had witnessed a heavy military build-up before each campaigning season. Selim had effected and won three

major offensives: one internally against his brother Ahmed; the second against Shah Ismail and the third against the Mamluks. Mocenigo notes that there were rumours among Turks of some stature that Selim's efforts might now be directed against the Italian peninsula (in spite of the Turco-Venetian agreement of 17 September 1517 which Mocenigo himself had negotiated). A few others "of sound judgement" were of the opinion, however, that the island of Rhodes - a longstanding thorn in the Ottoman flank - was to be the next victim.⁵³ That the last two years of Selim's reign were given to this massive military build-up and that the objective may have been the conquest of Rhodes are both points which have been noted before.⁵⁴ For the time being, however, Selim preferred to conceal his true purpose and preferred to express positive signs of friendship towards the Knights of St. John.⁵⁵ This policy, however duplicitous, was anathema to Ca^cfer whose hatred of the Knights has already been mentioned. Towards Venice he felt some degree of friendship, however grudging, as can be discerned from his remarks, spoken under the influence of alcohol,⁵⁶ to the Venetian secretary Daniel di Lodovici and the tercüman Theodoro Paleologo. Ca^cfer claimed that he had told Selim at their meeting in Egypt in the summer of 1517 that the Venetian ships which had accompanied him had done so with the consent of the Venetians themselves and had not been requisitioned by force. He thus claimed that he had protected the interests of Venetians to whom he had been and still was a friend even though they had not shown him the same good will.⁵⁷ The Knights of St. John, however, were a different matter, and his enmity towards them may have contributed to his imminent downfall.

Although by February 1518 Ca^cfer was left in sole charge of the

construction of the fleet, whereas previously there had been three others who shared a supervisory role with him,⁵⁸ and although he moved his residence to Pera where he could be as near as possible to the work in hand,⁵⁹ he gradually began to fall from favour during the course of 1518. Perhaps Ca^Cfer's enthusiasm to prosecute a war with the Knights was trying Selim's patience and was jeopardising his longer term strategy. Hammer describes an incident in which Selim was enraged that Ca^Cfer had launched a great galley without his permission, commenting that the sultan was worried lest his viziers push him into a premature war.⁶⁰ Perhaps his sinister and dark reputation for cruelty had become too embarrassing even for Selim. One report of early March 1518 actually states that Selim had ordered Ca^Cfer's death, but the source cannot be considered reliable since it also speaks of the execution of Piri Pasha, yet neither Ca^Cfer nor Piri was executed by Selim. However, execution was not far off. Having survived the caprice of Selim, Ca^Cfer was sentenced to death by the new sultan Süleiman in 1520/926 following the mounting tide of atrocities he had perpetrated. These atrocities were compiled in a defter by his Kethuda.⁶¹

Notes

1. "Zaffer Aga", Sanuto, XXV, 275 [Docs., p.616]. Sanuto records the title-head of this letter of Mocenigo to Ca^Cfer but not the letter itself; I have found no trace of this letter in the ASV.
2. Danişmend, II, p.436.
3. Idem.
4. Sanuto, XXIV, 437-9 [Docs., p.608].
5. Sanuto, XXIV, 387-8 [Docs., p.612].
6. Tekindağ, (Belg. 7), p.70; Hammer, Hist. V, p.9ff; Danişmend, II, p.436.

7. Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6, 286 [both Docs., pp.609-610] .
8. Sanuto, XXII, 472-3.
9. Sanuto, XXII, 546 [Docs., p.609].
10. Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6 [Docs., p.609-610].
11. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, Correspondence of Lunardo Bembo, fasc. 49 [Docs., p.611]; Sanuto, XXIV, 161 (Bembo), 387-8 (Duke of Naxos) [both Docs., pp.611-2], 437-9 (Grand Master of Rhodes), [Docs., p.608].
12. Sanuto, XXIV, 387-8 [Docs., p.612]; see also Philip Argenti, The Conquest of Chios, Cambridge 1958, vol. I, p.316.
13. Sanuto, XXIV, 440-1 [Docs., pp.612-3]; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.532-3 (Hist. IV, 355).
14. Süreyya, II, p.69 and IV, pp.784-5; Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.66. using Râmiz Pashazâde Mehmet İzzet, Harita-i Kapudânân-i deryâ, İstanbul 1285, p.25.
15. Danişmend, II, p. 436.
16. Sanuto, X, 202 [Docs., p.608].
17. Sanuto, XVI, 587-9 [Docs., pp.608-9]. For the possibility that Hasan Pasha was SB of Gelibolu for a few weeks in early 1512, see p.224.
18. Sanuto, XXII, 546, 546-7 [both Docs., p.609].
19. For a list of the presents which were eventually given to Ca^Cfer, see Sanuto, XXIII, 548-9 [Docs., p.610] and especially XXIV, 203-4.
20. Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.66. In fact it was begun sooner under the direction of İskender Bostancı Başı, p.254-6.
21. Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6 [Docs., pp.609-610].
22. Sanuto, XXI, 385: the essence of the sultan's 1515 instructions was missed in the edition: "Item, che l'î a Constantinopoli di comandamento et hordine di Signor [MS: hordine di Signor: si accelerava molto a far l'armata et il Signor - - -".
23. Sanuto, XXII, 546 [Docs., p.609].
24. Sanuto, XXIII, 549 [Docs., p.610]; ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 47 [Docs., p.611].
25. Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6 [Docs., pp.609-610], 286.
26. See note 24.
27. Sanuto, XXIV, 161 [Docs., p.611-2], and ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 52 [Docs., p.617].

28. Sanuto, XXIV, 205-6. Bembo's estimate is smaller and more realistic than those given by sources from Corfu and Naxos (Sanuto, XXIV, 331-2, 387-8 [Docs., p.612].
29. Idem.
30. Tekindağ (Belg. 7), pp.68-9 publishes a reduced facsimile of the Ottoman document together with transliteration and commentary from Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arş. Nr. 6608. (Galata fleet: 82 ships in all; Gelibolu fleet: 24 ships in all). For the thorny problem of Turkish-Italian equivalents in naval terminology, see Soucek, pp. 233ff. Although Soucek makes no mention of *palandarie* in his analysis, these vessels [described by Bembo as "galie grosse per condur cavali e artelarie" (Sanuto XXIV, 161 [Docs., p.611]), and "quelli gallioni da cargar artellarie et cavalli, le qual sonno come galler grosse" (ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 52 [Docs., p.617] are most probably the equivalent of the Ottoman *mauna* or *mavna* used in Cafer's report. According to Soucek, these vessels were the equivalent of the Venetian *galere grosse da mercato* (Soucek, p.236). Alvise Mocenigo also: "Palandarie --- da cargar cavali at artellarie, che sono de portada et grandeza de galie grosse" (Sanuto, XXV, 145 [Docs., pp.614-5]).
31. Sanuto, XXIV, 161 [Docs., p.611].
32. Idem., and Sanuto, XXIV, 205-6, ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 50, 52; Tekindağ (Belg. 7), pp.68-9 (see note 30).
33. Idem.
34. Soucek, p.246.
35. Sanuto, XXIII, 608; XXIV, 161, 203, 205-6, 298; ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), fasc. 50, 52.
36. Sanuto, XXIII, 608 [Docs., p.611].
37. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 50 [Docs., p.616].
38. Sanuto, XXIV, 161 [Docs., p.611] and ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 52 [Docs., p.617].
39. Sanuto, XXIV, 203.
40. Sanuto, XXIV, 205-6, 298.
41. Sanuto, XXV, 38-9.
42. Sanuto, XXV, 61-62 [Docs., pp.613-4].
43. Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.69 gives 6 Cumāda I 923.
44. See note 30. "- - - amma şimdiye kadar uygun rüzgâr olmadığından, deryaya çıkılmağa imkân bulunmadı, şimdi mübarek Rebi'ü'l-evvelin üçüncü günü, perşembe gün Allahın

inâyeti ile İstanbuldan yelken açtırılıp deryaya çıkıldı, - - -." (Tekindağ (Belg. 7) p.68).

45. Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.70.
46. Sanuto, XXV, 38-9 and 61-2 [Docs., p.613], both independent sources, give the date of departure as 12 August 1517 (24 Receb 923), but Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.70 using Haydar Çelebi gives 5 Cumāda II 923/21 June 1517 (should be 25 June).
47. Bastarda is a larger type of galley like the mauna. For this and its parent romance word bastardella (lit: a 'hybrid' ship), see Soucek, p.237-8.
48. Sanuto, XXV, 61-62 [Docs., p.513]. Also Danişmend, II, p.436 who states that Ca^Cfer transferred the wounded of the Ottoman army back to İstanbul.
49. H. Inalcık, 'The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy', in Cook, Studies, p.207.
50. Sanuto, XXV, 145-6 [Docs., p.614]: 100 great galleys; 120 light galleys; 30 palandarie and countless fuste and galliots.
51. A large cannon, generally made of brass, and throwing a shot of about 200 pounds weight (OED) (Ven: basilischî).
52. See note 50; also XXI, 147, 274.
53. Sanuto, XXV, 146.
54. Parry (Cook), p.77, 79; Tekindag (Belg. 7), p.70.
55. Sanuto, XXV, 58-9, 61-2, 94-5.
56. Sanuto, XXV, 155-6 [Docs., p.615]. "Bevuto" in this context can I think be taken to refer to alcohol, especially since Ca^Cfer's speech here is noticeably rambling. Cf. Dukaginziade Ahmed, p.61
57. It should be noted that Ca^Cfer and Piri Pasha (q.v.) were quick to respond positively to Mocenigo's petitions concerning compensation for damages done to Venetian property.
58. Sanuto, XXV, 364-5, 365-6.
59. Sanuto, XXV, 365-6.
60. Hammer, GOR, II, pp.532-3 (Hist. IV, p.355).
61. Tekindağ (Belg. 7), p.70; Süreyya, II, p.69; Danişmend, II, p.436; Hammer, Hist. V, pp.9ff. Tekindağ adds that in spite of his misdeeds Ca^Cfer was loved by the people and a mountain and promenade in Kasımpasa quarter were named after him.

[TÂCÎ-ZÂDE CA^CFER ÇELEBI] - kadi-^Casker (1515/921)

[Chadilascher di la Turchia]

This famous kadi-^Casker of Anadolu in the reign of Selim and equally famous nişancı under Bayezid¹ is not mentioned by name anywhere in the Diarii. However, two reports do refer to the execution of the kadi-^Casker of Anadolu by Selim on charges of being one of the instigators of the janissary revolt of 22 February 1515 (pp.408-9).² Three years earlier Ca^Cfer had himself been the victim of the janissary revolt of September 1511 when his house was sacked - once again only the unnamed nişancı ['miscazi bassi/Mostazi bassa'] is mentioned in the Diarii (p.86).³

Notes

1. Gökbilgin, IA, III, pp.8-10; Süreyya, II, 68-9; IV, 792.
2. Sanuto, XXI, 160-2, 238.
3. Sanuto, XIII, 220-222, 357-8 [both Docs., pp.548-9].

KARA CA^CFER - janissary leader (1518/924)

[Caragiafor]

Sanuto, XXV, 476-9: He and Chroya are described as 'capi' [?Aga] of the janissaries on campaign with Selim in Egypt and Syria. In a letter dated 24 January 1518 from Francesco de Batista in Cairo to Marco Dandolo, capitano of Crete, Kara Ca^Cfer and Chroya were reported to have been sent by Selim from Damascus to Hayrbech, the recently appointed governor of Cairo, with instructions that the latter send 400 'janizari grezi, zoe zilebi' to Selim in Damascus. Kara Ca^Cfer and Chroya were also instructed to search out 500 janissaries (and any sipahis) who had deserted Selim's army and bring them to Selim. By the time of their return journey on 15 February 1518 they had found very few, and those they did find were unwilling to return, fearing

Selim's wrath. Nevertheless, with those newly recruited from Cairo forming the bulk of the numbers, they were able to take with them 1,300 janissaries and 1,500 sipahi horsemen.

CHROYA - janissary leader (1518/924)

[sic]

See Kara Ca^Cfer.

CAPLICI - corsair (1496-99/901-904)

[Caplici/Caplanci/

Coplici]

Sanuto, I, 83-4, 136, 204; II, 379, 600 (March 1496 to April 1499): Turkish corsair who raided shipping in the company of the corsairs Karahasan (q.v.) and Oruç (Erichi) (q.v.). When in March 1496 the BB of Anadolu was sent out with a brief to deal with piracy, these three corsairs fled to Finike from Balat. Nevertheless, effective action by the BB shortly after led to the loss of two of Caplici's ships; he and Oruç sought shelter in Negroponte. By June 1496, however, the BB had scored some successes in rounding up corsairs operating in the Aegean. Oruç and Caplici [Caplanci] were among those captured. In November of the following year, however, two of Caplici's vessels were seen at Rhodes (? operating again), while a few months later, on the eve of the Turco-Venetian war in April 1499, Sanuto noted on the basis of information received from Alvise Sagudino who had recently returned from the Porte, that Caplici was one of the four corsairs who had been recruited into the sultan's fleet (see Kemal Re'is, Oruç and Karahasan, and Sanuto, II, 600, [Docs., pp.559-60]).

CARINAS MAGEVA - gazi (1501/906)

[sic]

Sanuto, III, 1366, February 1501: 'capo' of a Turkish raiding party in the region of Zara (January 1501).

CARTA BEG - Morea (1501/906)

[sic]

Sanuto, IV, 84-5, July 1501: Left by Hadım^CAli Pasha (q.v.) at Anabolu in May/June 1501 with a large number of timar-holding troops to try to seize that Venetian stronghold. The attempt ended in failure, and Carta Beg himself barely escaped capture. He had the status of 'vice flambulo' (i.e. SB standing in for Hadim ^CAli)

CHABLASI - corsair (1500/905)

[sic]

Sanuto, III, 492, DOR: 13 May 1500: Chablasi was with Kara Durmuş (q.v.) with ten ships (fuste) and 380 men at Lemnos and they were preparing to attack the island.

CHARAFA - sea captain (1497/903)

[sic]

Sanuto, I, 744: Head of "l'armata turchesca" consisting of ten ships and sailing passed Chios on their way to Istanbul (August/September 1497). Charafa had seized a ship of Domenego Venier from Candia, which was also heading for Istanbul, killing 32 men.

CHIECHOSI - corsair (1498/904)

[sic]

Sanuto, II, 291-2, DOR: 8 November 1498: On 29 October [1498] a corsair called Chiechosi with two ships seized a Genoese ship (nave) of 200 botte in the Straits of Negroponte. The report also states that he was to enter the service of the sultan ['conzarsi col Signor'].

? CERI BASI = the title "commander of troops" (1501/907)

[Cerit bassa]

Sanuto, IV, 187: He and Iskender bin Da'ud were captured in skirmishes with Hungarian troops in late 1501/907.

? CEMAL PASHA - ?Vizier (1517/923)

[JAMEL]**

Sanuto, XXV, 278: According to the Venetian ambassador Bortolo Contarini, writing from Tripoli in December 1517, Selim's viziers, Beglerbeğis and the Ağa of the janissaries were all young men. 'Jamel bassa', whose office is not given, was said to be the oldest at thirty-five years.

** [MS: Iamel]

CHARZEGOLI - corsair (1516/922)

[sic]

Sanuto, XXII, 141: Corsair recruited by Selim in early 1516.

CLYMA CHIEVAM - voyvoda (1510/916)

[sic]

Sanuto, X, 406, DOR: 30 April 1510: Described as the voyvoda of "Primor and Euscopia",¹ and as one of the leaders of a Turkish raid into the county of Spalato in April 1510. 300 men on horseback and 300 on foot took part in the raid, abducting 120 men, women and children as well as taking much booty.

Notes

1. This conflicts with information in the copy of a letter of Hasan Beg, SB of Herseknova, in which it is stated that the SB's slave and messenger was Piero Ferdivich, the voyvoda of "Primoria" (see Sanuto, X, 476).

DA'UD PASHA BIN ʿABD al-WADŪD¹

[Thaut bassa/Daut bassà]

@ BIN ʿABD ALLĀH @ KOCA

d. 1498 or 1499/904 or 905

@ DA'UD PASHA (A)

Nationality and Background

Koca Da'ud Pasha, Grand Vizier from 1483/888 to 1497/902, is one of the great figures of the reign of Bayezid II and undoubtedly a dominating force in the Ottoman state's relations with Venice in the first half of that reign when the two powers enjoyed a relatively long period of peace. No other man was to hold power for so many consecutive years again until the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. Yet in spite of his stature and in spite of the literature² (extensive by comparison with that written about other individuals in this period) existing on him, we have only a comparatively bare outline of his life and career. Unfortunately, Sanuto's Diarii add little new. Da'ud's career had almost run its course when Sanuto began his work, and even the retrospective Vite dei Dogi does not abound in illuminating references.

Da'ud Pasha was an Albanian - a fact of which the Venetians were aware³ - and a product of the devşirme and the Palace School of the Conqueror. In time his power and influence were given further recognition in the form of the marriage of his son Mustafa to one of the daughters of Bayezid II.⁴ In other words his career was a paradigm for the great majority of the leading officials who were trained under the Conqueror but who reached the height of their power under his son Bayezid.

Career⁵

1472-3/876-8 BB of Anadolu. Campaigns against the Akkoyunlu: in 1472/876 he campaigned against Yusuf Mirza, nephew of Uzun Hasan; in 1473/877-8 he commanded the vanguard at the battle of Otluk beli against Uzun Hasan himself.

1476/881 BB of Anadolu(?). Moldavian and Hungarian campaigns.

1478/883 Appointed BB of Rumeli. Albanian campaign and Da'ud's siege of Iskodra.⁶

1481/886 Death of Mehemmed and accession of Bayezid II (May). Da'ud found himself at the centre of the power struggle between Bayezid and his brother Jem. As a product of the Palace School, Da'ud's loyalties were with the Kul or "slave" elements who supported Bayezid and against the Grand Vizier Karamani Mehmed Pasha and the party of the Ulema who supported Jem. If western sources are to be believed, Da'ud's most notable contribution in this succession dispute was his and Ishak Pasha's initiative in proclaiming Prince Korkud sultan so as to "reserve" the throne for his father Bayezid who had not yet arrived in Istanbul.⁷ After Bayezid's accession Da'ud was appointed vizier. Until then he had been BB of Rumeli, not BB of Anadolu as is stated by Hammer.⁸ (Although Giovio refers to him as vizier even before the arrival of Bayezid in Istanbul, it is very difficult to know what weight to give to that evidence). Furthermore it now seems likely that Da'ud never served in the rank of SB of Bosnia in 1480/885.¹⁰

Grand Vizier 1483-1496/888-902

In 1483/888 Bayezid appointed Da'ud Grand vizier in place of

Ishak Pasha.¹¹ His appointment marked the end of two years of instability and intrigue at court and from Venice's point of view heralded a period of peace. Da'ud himself was only directly involved in two campaigns as Grand Vizier.

1487/892 C in C of the Ottoman army in the counter-offensive against the Mamluks in Eastern Anatolia following the defeat and capture of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha in the previous year. Da'ud himself advanced with 4,000 janissaries and 10,000 azeps and concluded a successful campaign with the re-occupation of Adana and Tarsus and by receiving the homage of the Warsak begs.¹²

1492/897 Albanian campaign.¹³

Dismissal 1497/902

When Alvise Sagudino returned to Venice from his visit to the Porte in late 1496/902, he referred to Da'ud as one of the viziers without clearly singling him out as Grand Vizier.¹⁴ Indeed it could almost be inferred from Sagudino's Relazione that shortly before his arrival in Istanbul there had taken place a power struggle between the viziers and that Iskender Pasha whom he describes as "de mazor auctorità de tuti questi", had fallen from grace. The period following the death of Bayezid's brother Jem in Italy in 1495 brought instability into the politics of the Divan. The "peace party" of which Da'ud had been the most notable protagonist was losing credibility and although the aggressive Iskender had not succeeded in toppling the aged Da'ud, the latter's position was precarious. The end came in 1497/902.

Although some sources say that the cause of Da'ud's fall was his

negligence in allowing the Akkoyunlu Göde Ahmed Beg, grandson of Mehmed II, to flee to Tabriz,¹⁵ a report in the Diarii - on this occasion describing Da'ud as "el mazor de tutti i bassà de la Porta" - expresses a degree of bewilderment and shock and states that the reason for his dismissal was not known.¹⁶ The report also states that Da'ud had been dismissed on 31 March 1497/27 Receb 902 after Friday prayers,¹⁷ and not on 3 March 1497/28 Cumāda II 902 (also a Friday)¹⁸ or 8 March 1497/4 Receb 902 (Wednesday),¹⁹ dates given for the event in various accounts.

The report, however, echoes other sources in describing how Da'ud had in fact been dismissed on a pension of 300,000 aspri per annum and ordered to retire to Dimetoka. As Hammer points out, he was the first Grand Vizier to be pensioned off with the favour of the sultan.²⁰ He was succeeded by Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.)²¹ though the report speculates that Bayezid had sent for Da'ud's old rival, Iskender Pasha, thus reinforcing the view that palace intrigue may have contributed to his fall from power.

Friend of Venice

The element of shock in the report may well have been due to the sheer dismay at the dismissal of a Grand Vizier who had proved himself to be a friend of the Republic. As a "slave" of the sultan he had prosecuted with great energy the siege of Iskodra in 1478/883 against Venice.²¹ But if the presence of Jem in the West was an important factor in the maintenance of peace between the two polities for twenty years, Da'ud was a Grand Vizier who could live with a state of peace in a way which, for example, Iskender Pasha could not. It is not surprising therefore that the report in the Diarii laments his fall by

emphasising his peaceful nature and his friendship for Venice, and by intimating that the consequences for Venice would be damaging.

("- - - È da saper, chome questo Daut bassà era amicissimo di la nation nostra et homo molto pacificho, la qual casatione ne sarà di danno.")²³ Da'ud died two years later on the eve of a new war with Venice.²⁴

Notes

1. For a discussion of Da'ud's patronymics as found in documents, see Ménage (Stern), pp.112-114, 114 nn. 11, 12 and p.100. Although Da'ud styled himself "Bin ^CAbd Allāh" in 1478/883 when he was BB of Rumeli, as Grand Vizier he styled himself "bin ^CAbd al-Wadūd", thus, it is argued, conforming to the pattern according to which Muslim converts adopted one of the "beautiful names" (al-asmā' al-ḥusnā) in place of the name of God (^CAbd Allāh). (See also p.469). For the use of "Koca", see Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.405.
2. Reindl, pp.162-176; I.H. Uzunçarşılı, IA, Vol. III, pp.496b-498a; M.T. Gökbilgin, EI, (2) Vol. II, p.184ab; ^COsmānzāde, p.15; Süreyya, II, p.323-4; Dānişmend, I, p.380, 401 et al; Hammer, GOR II, 285-6, 293-4, 302, 309 (Hist. IV, 9, 19ff, 31, 42); Elezović, i/1, p.277 n. 1; Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.405-412 for Da'ud's waqf.
3. Sanuto, I, 397, December 1496, Relazione of Alvise Sagudino, [Docs., p.618]; Spandugino, p.84 [Docs., p.619].
4. Hammer, GOR II, p.302 (Hist. IV, p.31) using Sa^cd al-Din; Süreyya, II, pp.323-4; Uzunçarşılı, IA, III, p.496a.
5. Only a bare outline will be given here based on the bibliography at note 2; for further information see the works cited.
6. Ménage (Stern), pp.111-2 for a fascinating reconstruction of events connected with the siege.
7. Giovio, Commentario, f. 12rv: "- - - si trovavano allhora in Constantinopoli Isach Bassa, et Dauth Bassa visir tutti duoi, di summa reputatione, essi per sedar li tumulti, et per poter meglio governar'il tutto feceron' Imperadore Soltan Corcuth figliulo di Bayazetto di eta di xiii anni fin che'l padre ritornasse perchè gia s'intendea come zizimo (i.e. Jem) venea congran zente per volersi far Signore - - - el fece tanto ch'el buon fanciullo gli renuncio l'imperio el fu posto in sedia promettendogli di restituir' la signoria quando sarebbe il tempo, - - -." Also Sansovino, Annali, f. 93v.
8. This point is made by Uzunçarşılı, IA, p.497a. Cf. Hammer, GOR,

- II, pp.285-6 (Hist. IV, p.9). The error is repeated in Fisher, p.27.
9. See note 7.
 10. See Kissling, Iskender, p.132 (and Kissling, Personalpolitik, p.110), where he discusses the confusion of names.
 11. Hammer, GOR, II, 285-6 (Hist. IV, 9), Danişmend, I, p.429 prefer 1482/887, but Uzuncarsılı, IA, III, p.497a, Gökbilgin, EI(2), II, p.184a, Süreyya, II, pp.323-4 and ^cOsmānzāde, p.15 prefer 1483/888.
 12. Uzunçarşılı, IA, III, p.497a; Gökbilgin, II, EI(2), p.184a; Tekindağ (BelT. XXXI), pp.358-361; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.293-4ff., (Hist. IV, pp.19ff); Tansel, pp.103-6, 121-2; Sansovino, Annali, f. 97r.
 13. Gökbilgin, EI(2), II, p.184a; Kreutel, Oruc, p.55.
 14. Sanuto, I, 397-8, 398-9 [both Docs., p.618].
 15. Uzunçarşılı, IA, III, p.497b; Gökbilgin, EI(2), II, p.184a
 16. Sanuto, I, 624-5, 640 [both Docs., pp.618-9]: "- - - la caxon non se intende."
 17. According to the Wüstenfeld-Mahler tables, 31 March 1497 is indeed a Friday.
 18. Hammer, GOR, II, p.309 (Hist. IV, p. 42); Danişmend, I, p.401.
 19. Uzunçarşılı, IA, III, p.497b; Gökbilgin, EI(2), II, p.184a.
 20. Hammer, II, p. 309 (Hist. IV, p. 42).
 21. Confirmed by Sanuto, I 644 [Docs., p.619].
 22. See note 6(a).
 23. Sanuto I, 624-5, 644 and also Gökbilgin, EI(2), vol. II, p.184a.
 24. There is some uncertainty as to the exact year of his death: see Süreyya, II, pp.323-4 and Gökbilgin, EI(2), II, p.184a (20 October 1498/4 Rebī^c I 904) which is disputed by Uzunçarşılı, IA, III, p.497b (October 1499/RebT^c I 905).

KÜÇÜK DA'UD PASHA - Kapudan Pasha/vizier [Taut/Daut/Thaut/Dauth]

@ Da'ud Pasha-ı sānī @ Da'ud Pasha (B)

Identity

Apart from the Grand Vizier Koca Da'ud Pasha (q.v.),¹ some secondary sources² note the existence of two other Da'ud Pashas who flourished in the reign of Bayezid II: Küçük Da'ud Pasha and Kara Nişancı Da'ud Pasha Çelebi (q.v.). Distinguishing between the last two has proved to be a problem, both in analysing the Turkish material in the Diarii and in the study of Turkish prosopography in general in the documents of the period. The confusion begins with the premise that the career of Küçük Da'ud, a product of the Slave Household, was characterised chiefly by his tenure as Kapudan Pasha, while that of Kara Da'ud, perhaps - and this is not at all clear - a member of the ulema, is marked by his tenure as nişancı. The problem of identification is then compounded by three contentions: that both served as Kapudan-ı derya for consecutive terms (that Kara Da'ud was the incumbent for a few months in 1502/908, and that Küçük Da'ud served for two terms immediately before and after Kara Da'ud Pasha); that Kara Da'ud became vizier but Küçük did not; and that both are supposed to have died between 1505 and 1506.³ Reindl's recent study, for example, unfortunately does not address the problem that they might be two different people and fuses their careers under Küçük Da'ud, though she does accept the existence in 1502 of a man she names as "Da'ud B" (but without suggesting he is Kara Da'ud).⁴

The Diarii reports, taken with other Venetian sources, are ambiguous. The identity of Küçük is confirmed as the kapudan pasha at the battles of Lepanto (1499) and Modon (1500), and this Da'ud is also

described by Caroldo as coming from Hersek-Novi and was therefore a countryman of Hersezkade Ahmed.⁵ This is the only clue in any of the sources to his origins. However, while the Venetian reports refer simply to a "Da'ud" as vizier between 1502 and 1504, Venetians who were in Istanbul in effect describe two types of personality for Da'ud vizier: one who was very friendly towards Venice and one who was very hostile. Moreover, at the time when one Da'ud is referred to as vizier, another Da'ud is reported to have been appointed Kapudan Pasha. Could it be, therefore, that there is some substance to the view of the existence of a Kara Da'ud as well as a Küçük Da'ud? On the face of it, it seems strange that Küçük Da'ud, clearly a product of the Slave Household, should have been nişancı, as Reindl suggests, when that position was usually filled by members of the ulema.

Küçük Da'ud's Career

1482/888 Süreyya registers Küçük Da'ud as Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu for a few months in this year,⁶ but this has been disputed and must be discounted if it is accepted that Mesih Pasha (q.v.) was Kapudan Pasha continuously from 1480 to 1492. Süreyya's reliability is in question since he adds that on his dismissal in the same year Da'ud was appointed "BB of Inebahtı" which is altogether meaningless given that Inebahtı was Venetian.

Kapudan-ı Derya

According to Süreyya, Da'ud was appointed to this office in 1491 or 1492/898.⁷ Whether he held this post continuously until 1502/908 as is stated in general histories⁸ is not clear. On the one hand it has been argued that Güveyi Sinan (q.v.) was Kapudan from 1492 to 1497

(and without doubt the chronicle of Oruç refers to Sinan as SB of Gelibolu in 1495-6/901) (see p.441, 446, n.14). On the other hand, it has been suggested that Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) was appointed to the Kapudanlık and to the sanjakate of Gelibolu in 1498/904 after having been dismissed from the Grand Vizierate.⁹ The diaries themselves present a rather confused picture of the Kapudanlık between 1496 and 1502. For instance there is no mention of a Da'ud Pasha holding this office until 1502/908, while other reports in the diaries make it clear that some Venetians were indeed under the impression that Hersekzade Ahmed was Kapudan even in the early months of 1499/905.¹⁰ This could account for the fact that the Kapudan Pasha is referred to as the son-in-law of the sultan¹¹ which would apply to Hersekzade but not, as far as one can tell, to Küçük Da'ud. I have argued elsewhere that Hersekzade may indeed have held the post of Kapudan Pasha in 1499, but not that of SB of Gelibolu (see p.76). This may be a possible explanation which would mean that Küçük Da'ud may have been Kapudan Pasha from 1492 to 1497 and may then have been reappointed SB of Gelibolu in 1498 while Hersekzade would have been the Kapudan Pasha. By 1499/905 during the campaign of Lepanto Küçük Da'ud was once again holding both positions concurrently as was normal practice. In 1502 there was another suggestion that perhaps the practice that the SB of Gelibolu should have the title of Kapudan Pasha was not being adhered to strictly (see below, p.193). Finally the possibility that Koca Mustafa Pasha may have been Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu in 1497-98/903-4 has also been discussed elsewhere (see pp.330, 357).

Whoever did hold that office in the years before the Turco-Venetian war - and it may well have been Küçük - the Diari do furnish us with information on the activities of the unnamed office-holder of

the kapudanlık ("Capitano di l'armata") and on his relationship with Venice. For example, in June 1497 the Venetian consul in Chios, Zuan di Tabia, was able to negotiate directly with the Kapudan Pasha in order to obtain the release of a ship which had been seized by the corsair "Camensa" (?Hamza) (pp.218-9). The Kapudan Pasha handed the vessel over to the consul, but cautioned him not to let the sultan hear of this.¹² It was also from the Kapudan Pasha that the consul obtained information that Bayezid had despatched janissaries to Moncastro and Licostomo in the middle of 1497. On another occasion, in January 1498, Andrea Gritti wrote from Istanbul that it was the Kapudan Pasha who had freed the luckless Venetian ship known as the Zaffo¹³ - the abduction of which was one of the short term causes of the Turco-Venetian war. In other words the Kapudan Pasha maintained good relations with Venice, even during this phase of escalation. This state of affairs would not have been in keeping with the stance of war-monger which Hersekzade was holding at this time.

However, as war drew nearer, so the Kapudan's energies were directed towards the strengthening of the fleet, either by the forcible recruitment of corsairs to provide sea-faring experience as in the case of the Kapudan's capture of Kara Hasan (q.v.) and his co-pirates,¹⁴ or by closely supervising the building of new ships.¹⁵ The Kapudan Pasha was to continue this close supervision of shipbuilding in Istanbul and Gelibolu for most of the war.¹⁶ At this time Ottoman ship design came heavily under the influence and direction of the western shipwright, Andrea de Re, who was in the service of the sultan following his capture in August 1500 by Kemal Re'is. De Re was sent to Istanbul specifically to put in use his expertise in the building of great galleys (galie grosse). Most of

his work was done in Gelibolu.¹⁷ Although de Re was receiving a pension from the sultan for his services, he later claimed in 1506, when he was seeking repatriation to Venice, that he had been a prisoner and a slave and had been coerced into building ships under ~~prisoner and a slave and had been coerced into building ships under~~ the supervision of Da'ud Pasha. Da'ud, however, had just died so that now de Re was without a master and would be able to ransom himself, if Venice could provide the money. His importance was such that Venice did indeed vote him the money and de Re returned to the Republic in 1507.¹⁸ De Re related how Da'ud had been wont to send for him and when the two men were alone, Da'ud would produce a navigational map and question de Re on all the Venetian ports and staging posts in the Adriatic, paying particular attention to Zara.¹⁹

Küçük Da'ud is best known for his role in the Turco-Venetian war, especially for the events of 1499/905 and 1500/906 when the Ottoman fleet and the land army acted in unison to bring about the fall of Lepanto,²⁰ Modon and Koron.²¹ He may also have played a leading role in the Ottoman relief of the island of Midilli.²² As has been stated, Sanuto does not mention Da'ud by name during the war, but an Ottoman register of campaign expenses for Lepanto²³ shows that a Da'ud Pasha was the SB of Gelibolu in 1499/905 and therefore possibly Kapudan Pasha.

Third Vizier (1502-?1505/908-?911)

Although according to Süreyya and Danişmend it was Kara and not Küçük Da'ud who became vizier,²⁴ the Venetian evidence seems to weigh in favour of Küçük, though I shall argue below that it is possible that both may have been viziers. The Süreyya and Danişmend versions

make Kara Da'ud Kapudan Pasha for a few months in 1502/908 until his appointment as vizier that year, while Küçük Da'ud's further tenure as Kapudan Pasha is meant to have lasted from 1502/908 until 1506/912. First, Venetian sources prove conclusively that Küçük could not in any case have been Kapudan Pasha after 1504 because Hersekzade appears in the documents in that office and as SB of Gelibolu from April 1504/Zulka de 909 onwards.²⁵ Secondly, the reports of Freschi, Gritti and Caroldo, who were in Istanbul carrying out peace negotiations at various stages between December 1502 and late summer 1503, all point to Küçük Da'ud as the third vizier.²⁶ On more than one occasion the third vizier is referred to as the man who was Kapudan Pasha at the time of Lepanto (*i.e.* Küçük).²⁷ We cannot be sure when Küçük became vizier. I have discussed elsewhere (see p.484, n.20) why Kemalrashazade's account that he succeeded Ya'kub Pasha in August 1502/Muħarrem 908 cannot be trusted.

During the peace negotiations, Da'ud Pasha is meant to have been the most hostile of the viziers towards Venice, though even here the reports are muddled. Caroldo's Narrazione describes him as "de assa bon inzegno et governo, magnifico et liberale et ben voluto da la corte".²⁸ This description suggests a certain admiration for the man, perhaps stemming from his goodwill towards Venice. On the other hand, most reports (in the Diarii,²⁹ in Gritti's Relazione,³⁰ and in Gritti's Copialettere³¹) concerning audiences with the viziers during negotiations indicate that the third vizier Da'ud was the least cooperative. At one point Gritti complained that were it not for the support he had received from Hersekzade, and had Da'ud had as much influence as Hersekzade with Bayezid, Venice would have been forced to accept an ignominious peace settlement. According to Gritti, "Daut è

malissimo affetto verso tutti i cristiani e in particolar verso Vostra Serenità", but added that he was so venal that he hoped Da'ud could always be bought.³² If this description really does apply to Küçük Da'ud, then perhaps it militates against the possibility discussed above (see p.190) that Küçük was the Kapudan Pasha who according to the Diarii reports was very friendly towards Venice in the period before the Turco-Venetian war.

There are several loose ends in this prosopographical problem, which for the sake of convenience I shall examine here rather than under Kara Da'ud.

First, according to oral evidence from an ulak whose information dated from mid August 1502, Bayezid had appointed a certain "Taut beî" as Kapudan Pasha. Taut [Da'ud] was described as "era flambularo di Galipoli, homo di anni 40, valenhomo."³³ "Era flambularo" suggests either that this Da'ud was once Kapudan Pasha, or that at the time of his appointment he was SB of Gelibolu but not Kapudan Pasha, which is possible. Could this have been Kara Da'ud, Küçük Da'ud, or someone else? Taut's age - 40 in 1502 - would tend to disqualify both of them given their careers to that point as Kapudan and Nişancı, while it may have been Küçük Da'ud who had a son of 30 years [see below]. On the other hand, the ulak reported that Taut had great influence with Bayezid in naval matters, and that [like Mesih Pasha (q.v.)] he had advised Bayezid to replace all his nave grosse (the round ships commanded by Kemal Re'is (q.v.)) in the fleet with galie grosse (great galleys) and galie sotil (light galleys). Bayezid apparently followed this advice. Such expertise in shipping suggests that this is the same Da'ud [=?Küçük Da'ud] who was the master of the

shipbuilder Andrea de Re (see above, p.190-1).

Secondly, in his Relazione at the end of 1503, Gritti reported that there were three viziers when he was in Istanbul in July/August 1503: Hersekzade the Grand Vizier; [Koca] Mustafa the second vizier, and [Küçük] Da'ud who was the third. He added that the Kapudan Pasha ("capitano del mar") would soon (i.e. end of 1503) be appointed fourth Vizier.³⁴ This man was very much respected by men of the fleet, even though his experience of maritime affairs was limited, and he enjoyed Hersekzade's favour. Who then was the Kapudan Pasha who was about to be made a fourth vizier at the end of 1503?

Thirdly, on 31 December 1502 Freschi reported that the 30 year old son of the third vizier, Da'ud, had died.³⁵ Since Küçük Da'ud was probably the third vizier, this may be his son, although there is no conclusive evidence that it was Küçük who lost a son in 1502.³⁶

There are no satisfactory answers to these questions and there is no satisfactory solution to the Küçük/Kara Da'ud problem.

Küçük Da'ud is thought to have died in 1506.³⁷ A report in the Diarî in July 1505 mentioning the death of a "Taut bassa" may apply to Küçük,³⁸ though it could equally well apply to Kara Da'ud who, according to Süreyya, died in 1505/911.³⁹ At any rate, we know from information provided by the shipbuilder Andrea de Re that his master, [Küçük] Da'ud, had died by 1506.⁴⁰

Notes

1. Historians of Venice have understandably confused Küçük Da'ud Pasha with the Grand Vizier Koca Da'ud. E.g. Lane, p.152 describes [Küçük] Da'ud, Kapudan-ı derya and C in C at the battle of Zonchio (1499/905), as a "former Grand Vizier"; Alberi, Ser III, vol. III, p.41, n. 2 describes the same Da'ud, who in his capacity as vizier in 1502 met Andrea Gritti in Istanbul, as "albanese capudan pascia, è nuovamente vezir - - -. Celebre è la moschea da lui fatta murare, che ne porta tutavia il nome. Il terreno ov' essa s'innalza è campo militare, e il punto di

dipartenza delle truppe ottomane quando vanno a guerreggiare in Europa". Clearly this is a grotesque picture, for both are descriptions of Koca Da'ud (q.v.), the Albanian dismissed from the Grand Vizierate. It was he who built the mosque in the quarter of Istanbul which bears his name and after whom was named the famous camping-ground or point of departure for the Ottoman army.

2. Süreyya, II, p.324; Danişmend, I, p.445, 446, 463.
3. Idem.
4. Reindl, pp.177-189.
5. Sanuto, V, 460 [Docs., p.625].
6. Süreyya, II, p.324.
7. Süreyya, II, p.324 and IV, appendix, p.785.
8. Danişmend, I, p.445 and implied in Süreyya, IV, pp 784-5.
9. Sabanović, H, EI(2), vol. II, p.341a.
10. Sanuto, II, 542-3, 690, 738, 740, 791.
11. Sanuto, II, 695-6 [Docs., p.621].
12. Sanuto, I, 756-7 [Docs., p.620].
13. Sanuto, I, 916 [Docs., p.620].
14. Sanuto, I, 994 [Docs., p.621].
15. Sanuto, II, 598-9, 695-6 [both Docs., p.621].
16. Sanuto, III, 1520, 1522-3 [both Docs., p.622].
17. For the shipbuilding activities of de Re, see Sanuto, III, 1520 [Docs., p.622], 1613; IV, 667-9; V, 451, 465; V, 995.
18. Sanuto, III, 950; V, 995; VI, 137; VII, 19-20 especially, 701 [de Re returns to Venice].
19. Sanuto, VII, 19-20.
20. Tansel, pp.186-7; Kreutel, Oruc, pp.113ff; Danişmend, I, p.405; Fisher, p.68; Hammer, GOR, II, 317-8 (Hist. IV, pp.54-56); Reindl, p.180-184.
21. Tansel, pp.191, 202, 207; Kreutel, Oruc, pp.127, 131, 132; Hammer, GOR, II, p.324 (Hist. IV, p.64); Da Lezze (Angio-Iello), p.261; Reindl, p.184.
22. Sanuto, IV, 242 [Docs., pp.622-3]; Danişmend, I, p.405; Reindl, pp.185-6.

23. Gökbilgin, Registre, p.84, 85, 90, 91.
24. Süreyya, refs. cit.; Danişmend, refs. cit.
25. Sanuto, VI, 308-9, 461; VII, 11, 569; X, 202; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 12r, 15 April 1504 and f. 15r, 26 April 1504 (see pp.81ff).
26. Sanuto, IV, 511, 518-9, 645, 651-2; V, 449, 450, 453-4, 460, 597-9.
27. Sanuto, IV, 645, 651-2; V, 460.
28. Sanuto, V, 460.
29. Sanuto, V, 449, 450, 453-4.
30. Alberi, Ser. III, vol. III, Relazione of Andrea Gritti, pp.30, 33-40.
31. BNM, Copialettere, f. 15r-17r (10 July 1503), f. 22ff (22 July 1503), f. 25v (23 July 1503), f. 28r-29v (29 July 1503).
32. Alberi, op. cit., pp.40, 41. With regard to 'buying' Da'ud's support, Gritti wrote to Da'ud Pasha [vizier] in April 1504 apologising for the delay in sending the articles of clothing for which Da'ud had asked (ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 14v, April 1504).
33. Sanuto, IV, 609-10 [Docs., p.623]; IV, 480 [Docs., p.623]; see also Reindl, p.187, n. 46.
34. Alberi, op. cit., pp.25, 41-42. Alberi himself (p.42, n. 1) suggests that this prospective fourth vizier was Sinan Pasha (unspecified) but this seems unlikely, since there is no evidence of a Sinan Pasha being Kapudan immediately before or at the time of Gritti's mission.
35. Sanuto, IV, 668 [Docs., p.625].
36. Cf. Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.476: according to Gökbilgin's index, the Dā'ud Pasha mentioned in this document is "Kapudan-ı derya, Kara Nişancı, vezir".
37. Süreyya, II, p.324; Danişmend, I, p.446.
38. Sanuto, VI, 218.
39. Süreyya, II, p.324, but see pp.197-8.
40. Sanuto, VII, 19-20.

KARA DĀ'ŪD NİŞANCI PASHA - Nişancı/Kapudan/vizier

© Kara Da'ud Celebi

© Da'ud Pasha (C)

Identity

The problems of identification and the possible course of his career have been discussed under Küçük Da'ud Pasha (see pp.187ff). It has already been commented that, in spite of Danismend raising the possibility that he may have been conscripted through the devşirme and trained in the Slave Household,¹ it seems unlikely that a man who held the nişancılık for several years would have been drawn from the Slave Household. According to Süreyya, he was one of Mehmed II's personal servants.²

1488-1502/893-908 Nişancı³

Last years (see pp.191-3 and 193-4 for the possibility that he was Kapudan Pasha and vizier). The question of his death has been touched on elsewhere (p.194). He may have died, as Süreyya states,⁴ in 1505/911 and the Venetian Bailo did report in July 1505 the death of a "Daut bassa".⁵ However, I have already noted that this could equally apply to Küçük Da'ud.

Given that both Küçük and Kara are meant to have died in either 1505 or 1506, it is hard to know what to make of Lunardo Bembo's Relazione on conclusion of his term as Bailo in Istanbul when he states that one of the viziers in July 1508 was called "Taut".⁶ Another document describing the Ottoman army units at Ankara in the campaign against Shah Ismail in 1507/913 lists a Da'ud Pasha -possibly a vizier - as being in command of 4,000 men.⁷ If we accept that Küçük

Da'ud was Andrea de Re's master, and if we accept de Re's testimony that his master had died by 1506 (p.191), could it be that it was Kara Da'ud who did not die in 1505/911 but continued in the rank of vizier until at least July 1508/rebi^c II 914? Or, is the Da'ud described as vizier in 1507 and 1508 yet another Da'ud [=Da'ud (D)]?

Notes

1. Danişmend, I, pp.445 and 463.
2. Süreyya, II, p.324.
3. Danişmend, I, p.463. Süreyya, II, p.324 and IV, appendix, p.792 indicates only that he was nişancı at some point between 1483/888 (possibly from 1493/899 (II, p.324)) and 1497/903 when he states that Da'ud was appointed a sancakbeği.
4. Süreyya, II, 324.
5. Sanuto, VI, 218 [Docs., p.625].
6. Sanuto, VII, 569 [Docs., p.626].
7. Sanuto, VII, 266-7, corrected from the original in the ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288, Doc. no. 291 [Docs., p.690-1].

DA'UD PASHA (D) - ?vizier (1507-1508/913-914) [Taut/Daut]

Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [Docs., pp.690-1], 569 [Docs., p.626]: See Kara Da'ud Pasha (C).

KARA DA'UD - sea captain and merchant (1504/909)

[Chara Daut patron]

Sanuto, V, 761, 762, 763-4: His ship was attacked by three Venetian galie as he was about to load grain at Negroponte. He went in person to the Porte to petition Bayezid to seek compensation on his behalf, and in particular to try to obtain the 25,000 aspri which had been taken. Bayezid included Kara Da'ud's petition in the mission to

Venice of his envoy Mustafa Beg who managed to extract the money from the Republic.¹

Notes

1. For details and for the ferman from Bayezid to Venice on Kara Da'ud's behalf, see pp.386-7.

DA'UD BEG - SB of Hersek-Nova (1509/915)

[sic]

- SB of Iskodra (1510/916)

Sanuto, X, 342: Valdrin reported in April 1510 that the 'magnifico Daud Bei' had been appointed SB of Iskodra, and that the previous year he had been 'sanzacho a Choza', [i.e. SB of Hersek-Nova]. Valdrin also describes him as the man who had refused the sancak of Tırhala [date unspecified].

In 1509 the SB of Hersek-Nova was indeed a Da'ud Beg who according to Ragusan records held that position from May 1509 to February 1510, thus confirming Valdrin's information.¹ However, I have been unable to find any information to throw light on Valdrin's comment that Da'ud had once been offered the sancak of Tırhala, and I cannot link this Da'ud with any other, unless 'magnifico' suggests an erstwhile exalted status, perhaps as vizier, see Kara Da'ud p.197.

Notes

1. Popović, p.94.

DA'UD PASHA - ?BB of Rumeli* (1507/913)

[Daut]

* Error in MS: See Kara Da'ud Nişancı Pasha, pp.197,198, n.7, and especially Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [Docs., pp.690-1].

? EMİR-İ AHUR - envoy (1499/904) [Cha Magacur/Mirachi Bixnach]

Sanuto, II, 519: Cha Magacur¹ is the 'schiavo' and messenger of Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra. In March 1499 he brought four letters of Firuz to Venice concerning various wrongs committed by Venetian subjects against the sultan's subjects. This messenger is almost certainly identical with the man called Mirachi Bixnach.²

Notes

1. 'cha magacur' in the MS, 'Magacur' in the edition. It may well refer to the rank of emir-i ahur (master of the horse) rather than to a name.
2. Sanuto, II, 538, March 1499.

KARADURMUŞ RE'IS - corsair (1498-1506/903-912)

[Caradormis/Caratornus/Caradamis/
Charatormis/Saradormis]

Brother of the corsair Kara Hasan (q.v.),¹ Kara Durmuş was the scourge of both Venetian and Ottoman shipping for several years. Although his brother, along with several other corsairs, was drawn into the service of the sultan to help man the expanding Ottoman fleet, Kara Durmuş appears to have maintained his independence throughout. Bayezid did try to recruit him in April 1500, as did Sinan Pasha in March 1502, but these attempts were unsuccessful.² Safe in his base at Seferihisar, he was able to threaten Venetian and Ottoman shipping traversing the archipelago, particularly merchant ships carrying grain and wine from Crete to Venetian possessions in Greece and through the Straits to Istanbul itself.

A collation of various reports offers some indication of the extent of Kara Durmuş's power and piratic activities.

Date	Kara Durmuş' ships	Area	ships attacked	whose ships	nos. killed	ships dest'ed	ships taken
1498 1 Oct	7 fuste	?Lep- anto	2 nave	Venice			2
			cargo: wine				

[Sanuto, II, 147]

1499 Oct	12 fuste	Urla -	Kara Durmuş was the 'capo' of these ships seen in this corsairs' haven.				
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[Sanuto, III, 127-8, eye-witness report]

1499 Oct	5 fuste	Seferihisar -	Kara Durmuş's 5 ships were destroyed by a force of 12 ships of one of Bayezid's sons. He and his crew escaped to the shore.				
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[Sanuto, III, 128, eye-witness report]

(see below)

1500 May	18 fuste + brigantines	Tenedos -	Kara Durmuş reacting to the manoeuvres against him ordered by Bayezid.				
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[Sanuto, III, 448]

1500 May	10 fuste	Lemnos -	Kara Durmuş is here accompanied by the corsair Chablası.				
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[Sanuto, III, 492-3]

1503 Oct	22 fuste	Seferihisar -	Causes much damage in archipelago to Venetian and Ottoman interests: a) ravaged and burnt the town of Melos. b) attacked the island of Miconos. c) abducted people from Kastri (Morea); and captured ships.				
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[Sanuto, V, 465-6, Narrazione of Caroldo]

[Copialettere, ff 8v-11r, 22 June 1503: Gritti reports 26 fuste and one galliot, and that 160 people were abducted from Melos].

1506 Nov	several fuste	Candia -	attacks Candia, taking 60 animals and a boy.				
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[Sanuto, VI, 502]

By comparison with other corsairs, Kara Durmuş was able to count on a considerable number of ships to support him. This may in part account for his total independence. It may also be explained, however, by the support he enjoyed of Prince Mahmud, one of Bayezid's sons, and also perhaps of the Grand Vizier Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha, who was Mahmud's brother-in-law. Mahmud, who as governor of Manisa was only a stone's throw from Seferihisar, may well have valued the sea-power afforded by Kara Durmuş, particularly in any race to Istanbul which would secure the succession to the throne (see pp.82-3). The Venetian secretary Caroldo certainly speculated as much.³ However, Kara Durmuş's reputation as 'homo de questo zalabi de Mangnisia' [Prince Mahmud Çelebi] also brought its own problems for the corsair: rivalry between Mahmud and another one of Bayezid's sons⁴ provoked an attack by the latter on Kara Durmuş in October 1499, the first of three recorded occasions when he was forced to flee and seek the relative safety of the shore.

Bayezid for his part did all in his power to curb the activities of Kara Durmuş. He tried to recruit him; he sent the BB of Anadolu to capture him;⁵ he then sent direct orders to the 'pasha' of Mahmud in May 1500 that he was personally to destroy him;⁶ he armed ships in 1503 to escort grain ships and if possible gun him down.⁷ In January 1504 Bayezid at last succeeded in disarming him and burning his house: Kara Durmuş, however, escaped, leaving his mother to burn.⁸ Finally, Bayezid used Kemal Re'is to hunt him down. Kemal Re'is was reported to have captured him in June 1505.⁹ However, in November 1506 Kara Durmuş was again reported to be active, ravaging Candia (see chart above).¹⁰

Venice also considered him to be a serious problem. Andrea

Gritti raised the matter with the viziers,¹¹ and the deliberations of the Senate illustrate the concern about his deprivations, particularly with regard to the number of Venetian subjects taken into captivity and slavery.¹²

Notes

1. Süreyya, II, p.118. Hammer, GOR, II, 346 (Hist. IV, 95), who says he was born at Seferihisar.
2. Sanuto, III, 373-4; IV, 242-3.
3. Sanuto, V, 465-6, Narrazione Caroldo.
4. Sanuto, III, 128. The Çelebi at Domosli is mentioned, but it is not clear which of Bayezid's sons this is.
5. Sanuto, I, 83-4, 136, 204.
6. Sanuto, III, 448.
7. Sanuto, V, 465-6 (Narrazione Caroldo); V, 451 (Relazione Gritti); Copialettere, ff 35v, 31 July 1503; 39r, 5 August 1503. Hammer, op. cit. referring to Sa'd el-Din, says that Bayezid sent 10 galleys in 1503 to destroy him. Hammer also says Kara Durmus submitted in about 1508 or 1509.
8. Sanuto, V, 597-8.
9. Sanuto, VI, 195, 198.
10. Sanuto, VI, 502.
11. Copialettere, f. 29r, 29 July 1503.
12. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff 93v-94r, 15 May 1505.

FACHASI AĜA - BB of Anadolu (1517/923)

[sic]

Sanuto, XXIV, 204-5: Alvise di Quarto, tercūman of the bailo in Istanbul, reported on 4 March 1517 that Fachasi Aĝa had been appointed BB of Anadolu ['Turchia'].

FA'IK PASHA

[Fait bassa; Fayt bassa]

Nationality and Background

Fa'ik pasha is one of the more shadowy figures in the Diarii, but his identity can be clearly substantiated.¹ There can be no doubt about his importance both as a sancakbeĝi in the western marches of the empire and as one of the key points of contact between Venice and the Ottomans. He appears to have maintained excellent relations with Venetian possessions in Greece and Albania, and according to Sanuto was of Christian origin and was born in Trabzon.² He was therefore probably of Greek origin. It is clear from several references that his main area of operations was in Epirus and southern Macedonia, embracing the towns of Kastoria and Argirokastron in the north and those of Vonitsa and Preveza in the south, with his permanent base at Arta, a former Byzantine provincial city and bishopric and the administrative centre of an Ottoman sancak. In the last years of the fifteenth century, therefore, Fa'ik Pasha was the SB of Arta (Narda),³ not SB of Morea as is sometimes stated.⁴ That his chief area of operations was in Epirus is furthermore established by examination of Fa'ik Pasha's waqfiye which shows that he founded an imaret, a mosque (cami) and a school in Arta, and a mosque and school in Cephalonia,⁵ all of which were supported by waqfs in Arta, the sancak of Karlı-ili

and places as far east as Vardar - Yenicesi and Salonica. Other foundations include a mill on the Narda river and a mill, vineyard and fish weir (dalyan) in Karlı-ılli.⁶

Career: Relations with Venice; Turco-Venetian War: Shipbuilding

Information about Fa'ik Pasha's early career is rather fragmented. He rose to become one of the great emirs of Bayezid's reign,⁷ and like many of his contemporaries first came to prominence in the reign of Mehmed II. Assuming my identification of Sanuto's Fa'ik with Gökbilgin's Fa'ik is correct, Fa'ik Pasha was appointed to the rank of vizier in the last years of Mehmed's reign. He had become highly influential and was assigned numerous large hass.⁸

In the last years of the fifteenth century he was involved in very close relationships with the Venetians in his capacity as SB of Arta, and with the aid of the Diarî a more coherent picture can be formed of his activities at this time. Towards the end of 1498/904 he began to covet the Venetian port of Parga (in Epirus) over which he claimed jurisdiction.⁹ This was most probably motivated by the presence there of a large number of carpenters who were involved in shipbuilding and who were a commodity highly prized by the Ottoman authorities, engaged as they were in frantic efforts to construct a large fleet.¹⁰ Both Turkish and Venetian sources¹¹ agree that Fa'ik had been ordered to build and arm a certain number of ships as part of the war effort, and Venetian facilities and expertise in Parga would have made a vital contribution. Indeed, if my interpretation of Sanuto is correct, Fa'ik was actually making use of these facilities to repair certain ships which he had had brought there,¹² and this revealing act of co-operation with the Venetians may have whetted his

appetite for annexation.

Having control over a maritime sancak, Fa'ik was thus deeply involved in the Ottoman fleet preparations. He was highly suspicious of Bayezid's policy of recruiting corsairs to captain the fleet.¹³ When shortly before the fall of Lepanto the Ottoman fleet was both caught in unfavourable winds and pinned down by the Venetian fleet,¹⁴ Fa'ik, who had been called to give counsel, criticised Bayezid's choice of captains and accused the corsairs (in particular Kemal Re'is (q.v.) and Oruç (Erichi) (q.v.) of being 'ladri'.¹⁵ According to Fa'ik it would have been more sensible to have appointed sancakbeğis to be his captains. This shows something of his professionalism as a shipbuilder and sailor, but it was a quality which was in very short supply among Ottoman commanders at this time.¹⁶ After the fall of Lepanto Fa'ik continued with his shipbuilding activities,¹⁷ but his death in 1500 and the successes of the newly appointed Venetian captain general Benedetto Pesaro in capturing Cephalonia, Santa Maura and in penetrating the Gulf of Arta and capturing the ships which were being built there, permanently ended all Ottoman hopes of creating a naval base and arsenal (on the lines of those at Gelibolu and later in Istanbul) in the Ionian Sea.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the ships Fa'ik had been constructing did cause some problems to the Venetians.¹⁹

There are many instances of the peaceful and often extremely courteous relations which existed between Fa'ik and his Venetian neighbours. On 10 February 1499/28 Cumāda II 904 the protoiero of the Morea was given an audience in the Collegio in Venice where he presented five letters which were effectively petitions from the Sultan. One of these asked that five Turks, who had been imprisoned in Venice, should be released. The Signoria's reply was that the five

deserved to die but that they had already been released "per amor di Fait bassà".²⁰ On another occasion, as late as May 1499/Şawwāl 904, shortly before the commencement of the naval actions that were to lead to the fall of Lepanto (26 August 1499/19 Muḥarrem 905), Fa'ik Pasha sent letters to the captain general Antonio Grimani petitioning for the release of some Turks who were being held prisoner in Corfu, asking that whatever misdemeanours they may have committed should be overlooked for the sake of the peace ("la bona paxe") which existed with the Sultan. The peace was shortly to be shattered, but Grimani replied that he would comply.²¹

Far more significantly, Fa'ik seems to have provided Grimani with intelligence about fleet preparations. In the above mentioned letters, delivered to Grimani by a certain Manoli (q.v.) who was Fa'ik's friend, Fa'ik actually warned of the size and the power of the Ottoman fleet and of its imminent mobilization at the start of the following (Islamic) month ("ussirā la luna nuova"). He could not inform Grimani of its destination, but warned him that it would move against Venice if her own fleet were not expanded. Whether or not this was a ruse on Fa'ik's part, Grimani gave this information little credence.²² Perhaps there was justification in the captain general's suspicion, but his disregard of Fa'ik's warning may have cost Venice Lepanto and Grimani the dogeship.²³ Indeed another report from a source²⁴ close to Fa'ik goes as far as to say that the pasha was indignant at Bayezid's decision to mobilize, and that he wanted to see the destruction of the Ottoman fleet so that his master would not be so powerful.²⁵

This was possibly strange behaviour for a man who appears to have had the authority and confidence to criticize Bayezid in front of

other counsellors on the weakness of his naval strategy;²⁶ who was focal point in Ottoman shipbuilding activities in Rumeli; and who played no small part in the campaigning against Venice in 1499/905.²⁷ One account even suggests that Fa'ik was the main cause of the entire war,²⁸ and it should not be forgotten that it was to Fa'ik that Bayezid entrusted the administration of the newly acquired Lepanto.²⁹

Against this, however, must be balanced the many local contacts he had with Venetian subjects, Latins and Greeks, and especially with the inhabitants of Corfu. There are other examples in addition to those mentioned above. In June 1499/Zū'l-Ḳa^cde 904 he sent his Kapıcıbaşı to Corfu to bring back a doctor; presumably Fa'ik was the patient and may have been seeking treatment for a condition which was to lead to his death by the following year.³⁰ The Corfuan family of Sofiano seems to have had very close dealings with Fa'ik, and the Venetians acquired a great deal of information from them about Fa'ik's activities and intentions.³¹ Nicolo Sofiano was protoiero in Arta and in the course of his business travelled between Arta, Yanina and Corfu.³² But perhaps the most striking example of Fa'ik's relations with his Venetian neighbours was his conversation with the Venetian Archbishop of Lepanto, Marco Saraco, whom he had allowed to go free and return to Venice after the fall of Lepanto.³³ Here Fa'ik gives a detailed exposition of the causes of the Turco-Venetian war, bringing in the European and in particular the Italian dimension to the diplomatic intrigue which preceded the hostilities. Moreover he provides an insight into the disposition of the viziers and the advice they gave to Bayezid (see pp.242-3). There is no doubt that his knowledge of the European background to the war was comprehensive and accurate.

Earlier references to his reluctance to go to war with Venice are

again echoed here by his declaration to Saraco that he was displeased with the conquest of Lepanto and that it would have been far more advantageous - in which way we are not told - had the town remained in Venetian hands. This is significant coming from the man to whom Lepanto had been entrusted.³⁴ But Saraco's relazione also shows that Fa'ik was ready to defend Bayezid against any charge that he had broken the peace agreement arranged with Andrea Zancani in 1498/904, according to Fa'ik, Bayezid's decision to go to war was entirely in response to Venice's alliance with France and to the threat which this alliance was posing.³⁵

Among the last western contacts which Fa'ik was to make was that with the secretary of the Council of Ten, Alvise Manenti, who met the pasha in Lepanto in January 1500/Cumāda II 905 en route to Edirne for peace talks (see pp.118, 317-8),³⁶ and by all accounts Fa'ik welcomed the secretary with great honour.³⁷ There is a strong indication that Fa'ik had actually been responsible for initiating this peace effort, but there is little information on which to rely.³⁸ Whatever Fa'ik Pasha's involvement may have been, he died shortly after the meeting with Manenti:³⁹ if Fa'ik did initiate the peace process of 1500/905, its failure may in part be due to the pasha's untimely death.

Notes

1. References in Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.44, 45, esp. 413 and p.(284) no. XIX, and Gökbilgin, Registre (1499), pp.86, 93 lead one to conclude that Sanuto's Fa'ik/Fayt bassa is in fact Fa'ik Pasha (see below). He is not mentioned in Hammer, GOR, in Süreyya, Danismend or Tansel. He should not be confused with the Fa'ik Beg who was defeated by Nur ^CAli and the kızılbaş forces near Tokat in 1512/918. cf., Savory, p.83; Tekîndâg (XVII/22), p.51; Uğur, pp.124-5 and Tansel, p.257.
2. Sanuto, II, 781 [Docs., p.627], for a unique reference to Fa'ik's nationality.
3. Sanuto, II, 781-2, 939 (for Arta; esp. 939: "Fait bassa a l'Arta"); II, 710 (for Kastoria); II, 264-5, 1004-4 (for Yanina). Cf. also n. 19.
4. Fisher, p.62, n. 94 and p.68. On p.71 Fisher says that it was Hadim ^CAli Pasha who was SB of the Morea.
5. Cephalonia was in Ottoman possession from 1485 to 1500 when it reverted to Venetian control.
6. Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.413 and (284)ff.
7. Idem., p.413.
8. Idem., pp.44-45. According to one document discussed in Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXVII), p.39 and p.41, Fa'ik Pasha was at one point SB of Niğbolu. Uzunçarşılı also says that Fa'ik was appointed Beğlerbegi, in Mehemed's reign, p.39, n. 11.
9. Sanuto, II, 233-4 [Docs., pp.627-8].
10. For carpenters in Parga, cf. Sanuto, II, 233-4 [Docs., pp.627-8]. For Ottoman shipbuilding in general, cf. I, 397-400, 552, 644; II, 233-4, 290-2, 542-3, 568-70, 597-8, 599; III, 337, 364, 448-9, 492-3; IV, 22, 480, 519, 609-10, 667-9. Cf. also Lane, pp.149-150; Fisher, p.67.
11. Gökbilgin, Registre (1499), pp.86 and 93. In this register of Bayezid's expenses during the campaign of Lepanto in 1499, the expenses for the month of Cumāda I 905/4-3 December 1499 include 4,000 aspers to defray the travel costs of forty carpenters and artisans sent to Fa'ik from İnepazar. This ship-building activity is reflected very accurately in the Diarif: Sanuto, II, 542-3 [Docs., p.628]; II, 781 [Docs., p.627]; II, 939.
12. Sanuto, II, 233-4 [Docs., p.627-8]. This is not a very clear passage. It could read equally well that Fa'ik pasha had had the Venetian carpenters (rather than the ships) brought to Parga, which would then explain why Turkish carpenters had to be brought from İnepazar the following year once the war had started (Cf. note 11) and Venetian labour was no longer available.

13. Cf., p.266; and Imber, p.24: fleets were often reinforced by as many as 40 or 50 corsairs. See also pp.284-5.
14. Lane, p.150; Fisher, p.68.
15. Sanuto, II, 1128 [Docs., p.628]; Fisher, p.68. Fa'ik was probably called to give counsel at Vardar where Bayezid had called together his viziers and sancakbeğis (Sanuto, II, 1127-8, [Docs., p.629]). Cf. also Tansel, p.190 which states that the Rumelian and Anatolian armies united at Vardar.
16. In fact the Ottoman administrative concept of the navy made no distinction between soldier and sailor (Imber, pp.109-110, 28, 30).
17. Sanuto, III, 55 [Docs., p.629]. Cf. also Sanuto, III, 182-3: Fa'ik's voyvoda works to complete the ships (fusti) begun by Fa'ik. Also Sanuto, III, 489-90, 520.
18. Lane, p.165.
19. Sanuto, II, 879 [Docs., p.629]. This passage describing a skirmish between Venetian and Ottoman ships also provides details of the size of Fa'ik Pasha's ships. In this instance Fa'ik is referred to as the pasha of Avlonya (and again at II, 930-1) which is clearly an error of the original despatch and must be discounted, given the weight of evidence saying that he was SB of Arta. Cf. n. 3 (Cf. also Mustafa Pasha (B), SB of Avlonya at this time).
20. Sanuto, II, 426-7 (February 1499). This same business is discussed in the Commission of Andrea Zancani (MCC, Cod. Cicogna, no. 2269, Commissioni no. 30, 20th November 1498), f. 4v, which refers to certain messengers despatched by Fa'ik in order to ask for the release of some Turks imprisoned in Venice. The Commission notes that the Turks deserved death for having engaged in piracy, but that they had been consigned to the messengers. It is further noted that Venice enjoyed excellent relations with Fa'ik ("cum quo tenemus optimam vicinitatem").
21. Sanuto, II, 782 [Docs., p.627]. I have found no trace of the original or copy of this letter in the ASV.
22. Sanuto, II, 781 [Docs., p.627].
23. Lane, p.153: Grimani was a candidate for the dogeship.
24. Nicolo Sofiano, the protoiero of Fa'ik Pasha, see below.
25. Sanuto, II, 1127-28. [Docs., p.629].
26. Cf. note 15.
27. Sanuto, II, 867 [Docs., p.668] for Fa'ik's mobilization; Sanuto, II, 930-1 [Docs., p.629].
28. Sanuto, III, 519 [Docs., p.630].

29. Sanuto, III, 14 (see note 34).
30. Sanuto, II, 838-9. Sancakbeğis in the western marches were in the habit of calling on the expertise of Christian physicians (cf. Iskender Pasha), especially when death seemed imminent. The doctors, as in this case, were often reluctant to treat a patient whose death could lead to their own.
31. Sanuto, II, 1004-5, 1128 [Docs., p.629]; IV, 644 [Docs., p.630], 751.
32. Sanuto, II, 624-5, 1004-5, 1127-28, 1128 [Docs., p.629].
33. Sanuto, II, 11-14 [Docs., p.631]. If my interpretation is correct, Saraco, who was the castellan of Lepanto and a member of the Ca' da Canal family, was allowed to go free at a cost of one hundred ducats (III, 14).
34. Sanuto, III, 14. It is stated here that Fa'ik was the son-in-law of Bayezid, but I can find no other source to corroborate this.
35. The Relazione of Marco Saraco is also mentioned by Malipiero, part I, pp.183-4 (which also gives an account of the causes of the war) and in Priuli, Vol. I, pp.204-5. Neither can compare with the detail in Sanuto. Priuli, vol. I, p.209 refers to a peace proposal put to Saraco by two viziers in Lepanto ('duo primi bassa') and which Saraco presented to the Signoria on his return. However, the Signoria put little faith in the proposal. Neither Sanuto nor Malipiero mention this matter (Cf. Priuli, vol. I, p.209, n. 1). (But cf. note 38).
36. Sanuto, III, 118.
37. Sanuto, III, 125, 162.
38. Sanuto, III, 179, Relazione of Alvisè Manenti, 1 April 1500. "-- --. Prima, chome fo mandato di hordine di questo excel-lentissimo conseio [Council of Ten] al capetanio zeneral, per li avisi di Fait bassà, voleva far far la paxe col turcho. - - --". Perhaps something had been arranged after all through the offices of Saraco.
39. Sanuto, III, 179, and also 177-8, 182-3, 304. According to the last reference he was replaced by Mustafa Beg (see p.385), the son-in-law of Iskender Pasha.

FARAESAR BEG [=? Kara ^CIsa Beg] - BB of Rumeli (1517/923) [sic]
 - Muhafiz of Istanbul (1517-18/923-4)

Sanuto, XXV, 281: The Venetian consul in Chios reported on 31 December 1517 that a certain 'Faraesarbey' had replaced Piri Pasha as muhafiz ['locotenente'] in Istanbul in Selim's absence on campaign

(see p.414). Faraesarbeg is described as son-in-law of Selim, married to the daughter who had once been the wife of the Bostancı başı executed by Selim [i.e. Iskender Bostancı başı q.v.]. Since earlier references¹ to the successor of Piri as muhafız is to the BB of Rumeli (also described as married to Selim's daughter and the former wife of the bostancı başı), it can be concluded without reservation that Faraesarbeg was that BB of Rumeli who was appointed muhafız. Both the BB of Rumeli and the BB of Anadolu, who had been on the Mamluk campaign with Selim, were sent on ahead of Selim who made his winter-quarters in Syria.² Faraesarbeg must have been young to hold such responsibilities, if Bortolo Contarini is to be believed when he reported in late December 1517 that all of Selim's 'capitani', including the beglerbeğis, were young men, the eldest, Jamel, being no more than thirty-five years old. Bembo praised the new muhafız (presumably for showing favour toward the Republic), adding that he was 'homo da ben'.³ Clearly he was under instructions to maintain good relations with Venice. On 24 February Bembo reported that when the Venetian ambassador, Alvise Mocenigo, had been detained in Negroponte, the muhafız ('quel bassa è al governo di Constantinopoli') had sent four galleys, four galliots and two fuste to provide him with an armed escort.⁴ However, his new role was shortlived, for at some point early in 1518 he was recalled to join up with Selim (probably for the new campaigning season) and was in turn replaced by Sinan Pasha (see pp.454-5).⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXV, 239, 240 [Lunardo Bembo to Venice, December 1517].
2. Sanuto, XXV, 239, 240, 273-4.

3. Sanuto, XXV, 286. On the matter of a gift for the beglerbeği on the occasion of his instalment as muhafız, Bembo asked the Signoria to send two small, hairless dogs as the beglerbeği had expressed a desire to have them.
4. Sanuto, XXV, 364-5.
5. Idem.

FERCHIBA - protiero of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) [sic]
(May 1510/Şafer 916)

Sanuto, X, 667-8.

FERDIVICH, Piero - voyvoda (1510/916) [sic]

Sanuto, X, 476: Voyvoda of Primoria and of Qasim Beg, SB of Hersek-Nova (see pp.421ff).

FOREAT PASHA - dies in Damascus (early 1517/923) [sic]

Sanuto, XXV, 473-4.

FIRUZ BEG BIN ^cABD al-HAYY - SB of Iskodra [Firuz]
HADIM FIRUZ - SB of Bosnia

See Introduction, p. 30.

GINI - (1503/909)

[sic]

Sanuto, V, 914: One of the men of Mehmed Beg, the SB of Argirokastron in October 1503 (see p.300).

GIO ACHA PASHA - (1501/906-7)

[Gio acha bassa]

Sanuto, IV, 84-5: Name given to a pasha stationed with one sancakbeđi in Modon in the summer of 1501/906-7. The fact that he is in a sense supported by the sancakbeđi suggests that he is more senior, though his precise status is unclear. He was charged with responsibility for rebuilding Modon's fortifications.

HABINAT BEG - (1501/906)

[Habinat Bog]

Sanuto, III, 1623 [Docs., pp.685-6]: One of seven commanders ('septem duces') in Bosnia under the overall command of the SB Iskender Pasha during the Ottoman campaign in northern Dalmatia of 1501/907. Habinat was married to Iskender's daughter.

HALIL PASHA - SB of the Morea (1499/904)

[Calil, Chalul]

Halil's career during the reign of Bayezid has already been pieced together to some extent by Reindl.¹ A product of the Palace School, from the accession of Bayezid to Halil's death in 1499, he held the offices of Saray Ağası, Kapıcı başı, BB of Rumeli, SB of Ohri and finally SB of the Morea. The Diari refer only to his tenure in the last mentioned sancak (and then only briefly), a post he held until his death in the autumn of 1499.

References to the office-holder² of SB of the Morea between 1497 and 1499, a period when Halil probably held that office, indicate involvement in a number of activities. In July 1497 the provveditore of Lepanto reported that the SB had mustered his men and set off for the Porte to take part in a counter-offensive against [Poland's] incursions into Moldavia.³ A year later he was reported to have despatched an envoy to the Republic to seek its mediation in conflict between Albanians and Turks outside the Venetian possession of Antivari.⁴ In early 1499 he sent an envoy (Ibrahim Beg (q.v.)) to Koron to demand the return of those haraç payers who had moved into Venetian territory.⁵ At the commencement of the Turco-Venetian war he was ordered to take part in the expedition against Lepanto and to take

his orders from Ömer Beg (q.v.);⁶ but there is virtually no information on his participation in the war, except that in June 1499 the SB of the Morea may have been stationed at Salonica.⁷

It is not until the summer of 1499 that he is actually mentioned by name.⁸ In June Halil Pasha, 'signor di la Morea', wrote two letters to Simon Guoro, provveditore of Anabolu, concerning raids by Albanians [stradioti] into Ottoman territory, raids which, according to Halil, had been sanctioned by the Guoro. He warned that these raids should cease, reminding him that Bayezid's army was mobilised and that it was not clear where it was heading - the implication being that Anabolu might provoke an Ottoman attack against itself. These letters were despatched to Venice by the provveditore of the fleet with an explanation that Guoro was stricken with fever and stradioti had entered his territory.⁹ It would appear, therefore, that he had momentarily lost control over their activities; hence the possible source of Halil's admonition in one of the letters that the Albanians were taking advantage of Guoro and could not be trusted.

The only other reference to Halil is in February 1500 when Sanuto recorded letters from Zuan de Tabia written between October and November 1499 which state that Halil had been killed in a skirmish at sea.¹⁰

Notes

1. See Reindl, pp.200-204, 'Halil, Kara' for all sources used. He is also recorded in Süreyya, II, p.283, albeit briefly.
2. Reindl makes no use of references to the unnamed office-holder of the sancak of the Morea between 1497 and 1499: although there is no guarantee that these relate to Halil, they are nevertheless worth mentioning.
3. Sanuto, I, 740. This offensive seems to be the Ottoman's initial reaction to defend Moldavia, and not the famous counter-offensive

into Podolia and Galicia led by Bali Beg in 1498 (see Parry (Cook), p.61).

4. Sanuto, I, 1095-6.
5. Sanuto, II, 577.
6. Sanuto, II, 289-90.
7. Sanuto, II, 979-80.
8. Sanuto, II, 980, 981. I have found no record of these letters (the originals of which were written in Greek) in the ASV or BNM. Note the editorial error on II, 980: 'hora aduncha intendemo che havete dato licentia a li albanesi et di Stagno [MS: ogni di stano] per ruinar el logo del gran Signor - - -.' The two letters are cited in Hammer, GOR, II, 317 (Hist. IV, p.55), though he mistakenly gives the destination of the letters as Napoli di Malvasia rather than Napoli di Romania (Anabolu). See also Mehmed, Halil Pasha's voyvoda at Corinth, p.309.
9. Sanuto, II, 979-80.
10. Sanuto, III, 128.

HAMZA BEG - SB of Karaman (1507/913)

[Giam Sabeg]

Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [[Docs., pp.690-1] for original document]: He is mentioned as the 'signor de la Caramania' in command of 10,000 infantry and cavalry stationed at Akseray as part of the Ottoman mobilisation against Shah Ismail in the summer of 1507/913). The document also describes him as the sultan's first born, but there is no record of any son of Bayezid named Hamza.

HAMZA - corsair (1497/903)

[Camenssa]

Sanuto, I, 756-7: A corsair based in the pirate base of Foca near Izmir. In a letter to Venice from the consul in Chios (25 June 1497), Hamza's attack on a Venetian merchant vessel carrying wine to Istanbul is described. The vessel, belonging to Domenego Venter from Crete, was attacked by Hamza's six ships (four fuste and two

schierazi). Following a bloody struggle in which 80 Turks were killed, as well as Venier's entire crew, with the exception of two small boys, the merchant vessel was seized and taken to the safe-haven of Foca. This gruesome act of piracy occasioned a revealing case of co-operation between the Venetian consul and the Turkish kapudan Pasha (see pp.190 and 401).

HAMZA VOYVODA - (1499/905)

[Camisa]

Sanuto, II, 1260-1261: He and the voyvoda of Montenegro, Sinan (p.458), were reported to have written to the inhabitants of Petrovać ('Pastrovichii') to express their wish to maintain good relations, and that they would not harm them in any way. This attempt to woo Venetian subjects appears to have borne fruit: the following summer the 'Pastrovichii' rebelled against Venice and sought the 'protection' of the Ottomans as dhimmis (see p.158).

HASAN PASHA - Ağa of Janissaries, BB, Vizier (?-1514/920)

@ Hasan Pasha (A)

[Chassam/Hasan/Hasan/

Casa/Safan/Sasan/Cassam/

Cassan/Caxan]

There is little to indicate that all the Diarii reports mentioned below refer to one and the same Hasan Pasha. Nevertheless, I have drawn together various reports using the career pattern of Hasan Pasha traced elsewhere,¹ although I remain sceptical about the conclusiveness of the evidence that the various elements of the pattern apply only to one Hasan.

The Diarii first make reference to Hasan Pasha in January 1504 when there was a round of major new appointments to the chief posts: 'Chassam Aga', described as a former Ağa of the Janissaries, was appointed BB of Anadolu.² According to this report, this Hasan Ağa was not well liked; he was also the 'bassa' [sancakbeği] of Bayezid's son who was based at Kastamonu [i.e. Mehmed]. This account clearly fits the description of the Ağa mentioned, but not named, in the Narrazione of Caroldo who obtained his information over the summer of 1503 in Istanbul. According to this, the Ağa of the Janissaries had recently been deposed following a janissary revolt sparked off by the Ağa's action in beating the child of one of the janissaries; the real reason, however, appears to have been some deeper grievance. Caroldo states that, because the Ağa was a great favourite of the sultan, as well as expert in warfare, Bayezid made him SB of Kastamonu, in place of his son Mehmed Çelebi who had been transferred to Manisa following the death of Alem shah.³ Although Süreyya does not record a Hasan in his list of Ağas of the Janissaries, Caroldo's account is reliable,⁴ while Gökbilgin cites a document referring to a Hasan as Ağa of the Janissaries in the first half of 1503.⁵

Hasan is not named in any other reports until the very end of Bayezid's reign. We are told nothing about his activities as BB of Anadolu as there are no references even to unnamed post-holders of that begler beğlik between 1503 and 1505. Moreover, no mention is made of his appointment as BB of Rumeli, a position he held from 1505 onwards. Although the bailo's report of 9 July 1505 does note that Yahya Pasha was replaced as BB of Rumeli, Sanuto unfortunately [?must have] missed the name of his replacement as he never returned to the entry to fill the space he had left in the text.⁶ Nevertheless, the

Diarii do refer to the unnamed BB of Rumeli in connection with the Safavid campaign against the Ottomans in 1507. Two separate sources report that the BB of Rumeli was among those who had mobilised to meet the threat in Anatolia.⁷ The third and most important source is a report listing the components of the Ottoman forces gathered at Ankara.⁸ Uncharacteristically, Sanuto made an error in copying the report so that he recorded a Da'ud Pasha as the BB of Rumeli at the head of 30,000: in fact the original document (which I traced in the ASV) actually records that 'Cassam bassa' [i.e. Hasan] was the BB of Rumeli in question.⁹

With the death in December 1509 of the vizier Yahya Pasha, the BB of Rumeli, presumably still Hasan, is named as a possible replacement.¹⁰ In acknowledgement of his position of power, the bailo and vice bailo tried to enlist his support in the Republic's bid to obtain Ottoman military assistance in Italy: the bailo reported in March 1510 that (like many other leading officials at that time), the BB promised to do all he could on the Republic's behalf.¹¹

However, in April 1510 the Venetian ambassador in Hungary reported that he had heard that 'Hasson bassa di la Romania' was one of several high ranking officials recently decapitated by Bayezid.¹² No reason is given for what was allegedly an extensive purge which included the execution of both the beglerbeğis and suicide by several cadis fearing execution. Given that the report reached Sanuto at third or even fourth remove, via Hungary, it must be viewed with caution. No other source suggests a purge took place at this time, the purges associated with the succession dispute occurring the following year. Nevertheless, the report does have some value in confirming that a Hasan was BB of Rumeli in 1510. It is also an

illustration of the political upheaval at the end of Bayezid's reign. As a known supporter of Prince Ahmed, Hasan was not to escape this upheaval the following year when he was deeply involved in the struggle for the succession which erupted over the summer months: both Selim and Ahmed made bids for the throne.

In early spring of that year the Venetian ambassador Alvise Arimondo reported that he was presented to the BB of Rumeli as well as [i.e. on an equal footing with] the viziers on his arrival in Edirne on 26 March 1511 - this was standard practice.¹³ Shortly after, when Selim marched south from Kaffa to Edirne with a large army to confront Bayezid over the succession, Hasan was sent with 15,000 men to face Selim.¹⁴ According to Ottoman sources, however, Hasan, whose intention was simply to intimidate Selim, drew back from a full scale battle, thus forcing the sultan personally to join his army. Rather than do battle with his own son, Bayezid preferred to compromise. Hasan was despatched to Selim to mediate between father and son, and did so successfully with the promise that Bayezid would not abdicate in favour of Ahmed and that Selim would be given the sancak of Semendre.¹⁵ In the end, however, a bloody test of strength could not be avoided, and Bayezid's victory over Selim at Çorlu on 3 August 1511, following the dashing of Ahmed's own hopes with the death of his key supporter, the Grand Vizier Hadım ÇALI, at Gökçay in July (see p.127), maintained the status quo for a little longer.

The Diarii do document, through the reports of the bailo Andrea Foscolo, the part played by the (unnamed) BB of Rumeli in facing Selim's forces.¹⁶ Written several weeks after Çorlu, however, Foscolo's reports tend to telescope the chronology of events.¹⁷ Nevertheless Foscolo does note that it was the BB who was first to be

sent against Selim. Unable to achieve anything and faced with the defection of some of his men to Selim's side, the BB called on Bayezid to come in person. The uncertainty among and volatility of the sultan's forces is illustrated by the BB's alleged exhortation before Corlu to his sancakbeğis that they should make up their minds: either they should attack Selim, or let Selim become sultan, as the current muddle could not persist. According to Foscolo the BB's sancakbeğis did in fact give way during the battle, allowing Selim's forces to break through, though he also makes it clear that in the end Selim failed because he had been betrayed by the sancakbeğis who had led him to believe that they would accept him as sultan.¹⁸ At the last minute their loyalty to Bayezid held, but Foscolo's intimation of potential treachery supports other information from an Ottoman source that the BB of Rumeli Hasan Pasha had written to Selim declaring that all the forces of Rumeli were at his command¹⁹ - were it not for Foscolo's account, this would be difficult to believe given Hasan's known support for Ahmed. In his final report,²⁰ Foscolo states that the BB had been abandoned in battle by his men, an indication that he himself had remained loyal to Bayezid. Whatever the truth, Hasan was in an impossible position, trying perhaps to ensure that he would ultimately find himself on the winning side in order to survive.

He was not to survive for long. The Janissaries caught wind of the September plot to bring Ahmed into Istanbul, and, as one of those implicated, Hasan's house was sacked and he was dismissed from office.²¹ There is disagreement over whether he was BB of Rumeli or a Vizier at the time of his dismissal,²² but according to two of Foscolo's reports he was definitely Vizier.²³ He may have been both. In the aftermath of the revolt, in early January when there was a

general purge of the executive, Hasan may have been offered the sancak of Semendire, but according to an Ottoman source he did not accept on the grounds that he wished to go to Gelibolu for three months, there prepare to go on pilgrimage in the Spring and die.²⁴ There may be some truth in this story, at least as far as his sojourn in Gelibolu is concerned, since Foscolo reported on 28 March 1512 that among fresh janissary demands was a call for the dismissal of the Hasan Pasha, SB of Gelibolu [and Kapudan Pasha, "capitano de Galipoli"], who had been appointed just one month before. Foscolo clearly identifies him as the man whose house had previously been sacked.²⁵ Although Iskender Bostanci Başı (q.v.) was Kapudan Pasha from 1510 to 1514, he fell from grace on a number of occasions, when he was temporarily replaced,²⁶ and it is not inconceivable, therefore, that Hasan replaced him for a few weeks in early 1512. It is understandable that the janissaries should have wanted Hasan dismissed from such a key office as Kapudan Pasha - having control over the Straits - in advance of Selim's final bid for the throne. The janissaries' demand may be connected with Zustinian's reports of mid March 1512 in which it is mentioned that Selim had asked Bayezid for two of his officials ['bassa'], and Bayezid had apparently been content to give him the SB of Gelibolu.²⁷ It is difficult to know how to interpret this. Iskender Bostanci Başı was known to be Selim's man, so it is possible that this request was for the kapudanlik to be restored to Iskender.

On the other hand this report could refer to pre-abdication negotiations between father and son: since Bayezid was about to abdicate, in April 1512, Selim may have been asking that certain counsellors should stay on. This could account for Hasan's radical change of allegiance on the accession of Selim, for he became a strong

supporter of the new sultan, if indeed we are dealing with the same Hasan (see above, paragraph 1). His new allegiance is amply illustrated by Zustinian's report of 30 June 1513 in which he wrote that there were only two Viziers at that time: Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) and 'uno Cassan' who was in greater favour with the sultan as it was he who gave him victory over Prince Ahmed [presumably at Yenisehir in April 1513].²⁸ No other records to my knowledge indicate that Hasan was Vizier at this time.

Whatever part he may have played in the establishment of Selim's rule, Hasan is known to posterity for his valiant death at the battle of Chaldiran in August 1514, when as BB of Rumeli he was in command of the Rumelian forces on the left wing of the battle line. He died during Shah Ismail's successful initial attack, concentrated on the Ottoman left wing.²⁹ There are several reports in the Diari to Hasan's role in the campaign. In one he is specifically named as the BB of Rumeli who died in the battle. Six named Rumelian sancakbeğis under his command also perished, together with 30,000 azebs.³⁰ The ultimate source of this report was news brought by two ulaks from Prince Süleiman: it is a measure of the quality of Sanuto's sources that the toll of deaths in the report tallies quite closely with Kemal-Pasha-zade's list of those who 'found martyrdom' in the battle.³¹

Notes

1. Reindl, pp.205ff, and Süreyya, II, p.119.
2. Sanuto, V, 1034-35 [report of the vice bailo]. For an earlier (but inaccurate) reference in January 1501 to a 'Cassambri' [Hasan Beg], son-in-law of Bayezid described as BB of Anadolu and BB of Rumeli, see p.447, n.45.
3. Sanuto, V, 462.

4. For Caroldo's Narrazione, see pp.99, n.96.
5. Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.478.
6. Sanuto, VI, 218 [Docs., p.688].
7. Sanuto, VII, 152, 263-4 [Docs., pp.688, 690].
8. Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [Docs., pp.690-1].
9. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288, Doc. No. 291 [Docs., pp.690-1].
10. Sanuto, X, 21.
11. Sanuto, X, 139-140.
12. Sanuto, X, 268 [Docs., p.632].
13. Sanuto, XII, 147: the unnamed BB is presumably Hasan; see also Inalcik, p.94.
14. Hammer, GOR, II, p.354 (Hist. IV, 107); Tekindağ, (TD XXIV/24), p.3 (using Selimname); Uluçay, (TD VI/9), p.86.
15. Idem.
16. Sanuto, XII, 46-47 (24 August), 114-117 (27 August), XIII, 220-222 (26 September). See also pp.127-8.
17. For example, Foscolo omits to mention Hasan's mediatory role, but he was certainly aware of the terms on which Hasan had mediated with Selim, since he reports that on 24 August 1511 the janissaries asked Bayezid not to forget his promise made to them in Edirne (i.e. the same made to Selim) that he would not appoint a new sultan (i.e. Ahmed) in his own lifetime.
18. Sanuto, XIII, 114-117.
19. Uluçay (TD VIII/11-12), p.187 and p.185, n. 54.
20. Sanuto, XIII, 220-222.
21. See pp.86-87 and Sanuto, XIII, 187-8, 220-222, 357-8 [all Docs., pp.547-9]. Fisher, p.109, who bases his account of the revolt on the Diarii reports, omits to mention that Hasan's house was also ransacked.
22. Hammer, GOR, II, 359 (Hist. IV, 116) calls him Vizier, but other accounts refer to him as BB, e.g. Uzunçarşılı (Bell XXX), p.570; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6; Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.120ff; Reindl, pp.209-210.
23. Sanuto, XIII, 220-222 [Docs., p.548]: Hasan Pasha ['Casa bassa' in the MS rather than 'Cosa bassa' in the edition] described as "qual questo anno era sentato": the usual phrase used for holding the rank of vizier is 'sentar bassa'; and Sanuto, XIII, 357-8 [Docs., p.549]:

the janissaries no longer wished "Cassan bassa debia più sentar bassa".

24. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.120, n. 11 (TMA, Evrak no. 6186).
25. Sanuto, XIV, 291-3. Foscolo's reporting from 26 September 1511 to 28 March 1512 tends to overshadow another source (Sanuto, XIII, 186-7, from ? Zustinian) which reports that Hasan [MS: al Sasam/Safan bassa] had been found dead after the revolt and that he was replaced by Firuz Beg [?as vizier].
26. See p.253.
27. Sanuto, XIV, 162.
28. Sanuto, XVI, 587-9.
29. Hasan's role is well documented in Ottoman, Persian and western sources: Hammer, GOR, II, 404, 414, 416 (Hist. IV, 177, 196, 198); Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.59, 65, 68; Uğur, part I, p.95, 110-111, 113-114; Savory, p.89; Giovio, Commentario, f. 19v-20r; Sansovino, Annali, f. 115v; Penia, p.7.
30. Sanuto, XIX, 185-187 [Docs., pp.633-4] [Zulian to Gritti]. The other references are to the unnamed BB of Rumeli and add nothing more to our knowledge (Sanuto, XIX, 129-130, 183, 231-2, 317-8; XX, 47-49).
31. Uğur, part I, pp.113-4 (Text of Defter IX of Kemal-Pasha-zāde's chronicle, f. 134v-135r). See [Docs., p.634] for a comparison of this text with Zulian's report to Gritti (Sanuto, XIX, 185-7) (see note 30).

HASAN BEG - BB of Rumeli (1501/906)

[Cassambri]

Sanuto, III, 1551-2 [Docs., p.657-8]: See Güveyi Sinan, p.447, n.45, with whom 'Cassambri', son-in-law of Bayezid, is probably here confused. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that a Hasan Beg was a son-in-law of Bayezid: this was Güzelce Hasan Beg, husband of Fatima Sultan (known as 'Sofu').¹

Notes

1. Uluçay (TD X/14), p.120.

HASAN - Ulak (1503/909)

[Casson]

Sanuto, V, 286, 287: Bearer of Bayezid's ferman to Mehmed, SB of Mostar, and Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia ordering them to take action to redress grievances of Venetian subjects whose property had been attacked after the conclusion of the peace.

HASAN BEG - mercenary (1510/916)

[Assanbech]

Sanuto, X, 545: Turkish mercenary in Venetian service in the war of the League of Cambrai. He arranged for 90 other Turkish mercenaries to enter Venetian service via Avlonya.

HASAN BEG - SB of "AZA" (1510/916)

[Chasambeg]

Sanuto, X, 343: possibly SB of Özü (Oczakow) on the north-west Black Sea coast.

HASAN - voyvoda of Montenegro (1511/917)

[Cassan]

Sanuto, XII, 153: Grants safe-conduct to Alexandro Francio. The copy of the translation from Turkish of the safe-conduct is dated 23 April [1511] in Xabiacho [=Zabljak].

HASAN PASHA - Vizier (1517/923)

[Cosan/Osan]

[= Hasan Pasha (B)]

Sanuto, XXIV, 203: Selim had him strangled prior to the battle of Ridaniyya on 23 January 1517. He was replaced by Sinan [Yanul] Pasha (q.v.) as Vizier.1 No explanation is given, though this is

surely the Vizier Hasan Pasha who according to Hammer was executed during the Mamluk campaign for offering Selim unpopular advice.² Another report refers to Hasan's ['Osan'] death before the battle, though there is no mention of strangulation.³

Notes

1. See p.452, regarding the evidence that Sinan was appointed Vizier. It is not explicit from this passage.
2. Hammer, GOR, II, p.535.
3. Sanuto, XXIV, 204-5.

HASAN VOYVODA - (1503/909)

[Canson/Casom]

Sanuto, V, 273-4, 275, November 1503: Voyvoda of Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra. He attended a meeting between Freschi and Firuz in October 1503 to settle the boundaries of Cattaro/Zupa salt-works as part of the overall peace settlement. According to Freschi's account, Canson was originally 'franco o trentino' and had a sister in Otranto.

At this meeting, Cansom also protested to Freschi about a missing haraç payer who had fled to the Venetians, and that no peace negotiations were possible until the haraç payer was returned. Canson attended an interrogation of certain individuals to discover the whereabouts of the man, who was eventually found and sent back. Canson's Italian connections may have recommended him to Freschi as the right man to be sent to Venice with news of the eventual settlement over Zupa (Sanuto, V, 275), but there is no record that he was actually sent.

KARAHASAN - corsair (1496-1513/901-919)

[Caracassam/Carachases/Caramassan/
Caracossam/Carachassam]

One of the most ruthless and powerful corsairs of the period, inflicting damage to both Venetian and Turkish shipping, he is listed in Süreyya¹ as the brother of Kara Durmuş (q.v.), another famous corsair. Reports show that the Venetians too were aware that the two men were brothers.²

He first appears in reports in the Diarii in 1496 as one of those corsairs whose activities in the Aegean Bayezid wished to curtail. He 'hunted' in the company of Erichi, Comazoti and Caplici (q.v.).³ Although apparently apprehended by the BB of Anadolu in June 1496 during his campaign against corsairs,⁴ Karahasan appears in the reports the following October, attacking Venetian shipping in the Aegean.⁵ In March 1498 Gritti reported that the sultan was trying to woo Karahasan into going to the Porte, providing him with safe-conduct, as part of Ottoman policy of bringing corsairs into the Ottoman fleet which was lacking in experienced sea captains (see also p.266).⁶ In May 1498 Karahasan of his own accord entered the Bosphorus with the intention of going to the Porte, leaving his brother Kara Durmus with instructions to head for Seferihisar to await a message from him that he too should enter the Straits.⁷ Although at first he and his company were thrown into chains by the SB of Gelibolu, they were released on arrival at the Porte, and given a provision of 20 aspri per day.⁸

Collation of the various reports offers some indication of the extent of Karahasan's power and piratic activities:

Date	Karahasan's ships	Area	ships [attacked]	whose ships	nos. [killed]	ships [dest'ed]	ships [taken]
1497 Oct	3 fuste 1 caravela [Sanuto, I, 811]	Legena	2	Venice	7	1	1
1498 Jan	2 fuste 1 caravela 1 schierazo 1 bregantino [Sanuto, I, 910]	Tenedos	No details				
1498 March	'benissimo in hordine' [Sanuto, I, 916-7]	Pera	1	Portuguese merchantman with 1700 cases of sugar from Madeira		1	
1498 Oct	2 fuste 1 barza [Sanuto, II, 112]		1	Cretan (Venice)	Men on board killed		
1499 April	6/7 fuste [Sanuto, II, 601, 607, 630-1, 701, 783, 1055]	Chios	Chios itself	Genoese	harm to 200 people, old people killed		
1499 June	14 navilii [Sanuto, II, 1013]		to join up with the main Ottoman fleet presumably for the campaign of Lepanto				
1501 April	'con numero di fuste' [Sanuto, IV, 40]	Leyche	depopulates the borgo di Naxos				
1501 Sept	16 fuste 1 schierazo [Sanuto, IV, 144-5]	Kyrenia, Cyprus	plunders the land, causing damage to inhabitants and taking animals				
1513 June	'con certi navilii' [Sanuto, XVI, 418-9]	Corfu waters	plundering				

The most striking feature of this collation is that Karahasan's

power, in terms of the number of ships at his disposal for piratic activities not connected with the manoeuvres of the Ottoman fleet, appears actually to have increased after he had been lured into the service of the sultan.

A report from a citizen of Gelibolu states that Karahasan was killed by a bombarda towards the end of 1499.⁹ That the citizen was misinformed is clear from Karahasan's subsequent activities, but the fact that the next report of his piracy is not until April 1501 (see above) suggests that he may have been badly wounded.

After the Turco-Venetian war, Bayezid was more concerned to stem the proliferation of piracy than to man his fleet with corsairs. Diarii reports show that from 1505 both the Ottomans and the Venetians made concerted efforts to put an end to Karahasan's activities, who by now was presumably no longer serving the sultan now that the war was over. Bayezid even used the corsair Kemal Re'is to track down Karahasan, but only succeeded in apprehending his brother, who had never been lured into Ottoman service.¹⁰ In late 1505 the provveditore of the fleet was in hot pursuit of corsairs, including Karahasan, and by the middle of 1506 he was able to report that the work of flushing them out of the Aegean was done, and that the only remaining corsair was karahasan himself.¹¹

There is no record that Karahasan ever was caught. He was ruthlessly resourceful in evading capture. When in June 1513 there was a spontaneous combined operation against him by two ships from Crete (Venetian) and three from Koron (Ottoman), Karahasan beheaded some one hundred slaves on board his ship in order to make it lighter, and thus facilitate his escape. When that measure proved inadequate, he abandoned his ships near Grisi (Morea) and fled into the mountains.

The report from Corfu bearing this news exclaimed what a great honour it was for the Cretan galleys to have done this against 'si famoso corsaro'.¹²

Notes

1. Süreyya, vol. II, p.118.
2. Sanuto, I, 977; III, 127-8.
3. Sanuto, I, 83-4, 204.
4. Sanuto, I, 204.
5. Sanuto, I, 811.
6. Sanuto, I, 916-7.
7. Sanuto, I, 977.
8. Sanuto, I, 994 [Docs., p.621]; II, 572, 600.
9. Confusingly, Süreyya, II, p.118 reports him killed in 1493/899, even though it is also noted that he fought in the campaign of Lepanto (i.e. in 1499).
10. Sanuto, VI, 195, 198.
11. Sanuto, VI, 223, 449.
12. Sanuto, XVI, 418-9, 433 [Docs., p.635].

KARAHASAN, Andrea - (1510)

[Carabassam]

Sanuto, X, 406, May 1510. One of the leaders of a raiding party into the county of Spalato in April 1510.

HAYDAR AĞA - (1501/907)

[Aidar Aga]

Sanuto, III, 1522-3: In the spring of 1501, during the Turco-Venetian war, he was ordered by Bayezid to mobilise in the company of Kemal Re'is (q.v.) and Oruç [Enrigi] (q.v.) with 40 galleys and 10 fuste. The objective was not known. This may well be the same Haydar Aga who held the position of subaşı of Gelibolu in 1499/905 and who

led the vanguard of the fleet in the prelude to the battle of Sapienza.¹

Notes

1. Tansel, pp.191-2.

HAYDAR¹ - voyvoda (1510/916)

[Hadar]

Sanuto, X, 476-7: Mentioned in a letter of Sinan, voyvoda of Imotski (q.v.), as one of the voyvoda of Hasan Beg, SB of Herzek-Nova.

Notes

1. The name 'Hadar' is omitted from the edition.

HAYDAR AĀA - ambassador (1516/922)

[Cheder Aga mustazi bassa/
constanzi bassa]

Sanuto, XXIV, 16-18, DOR: 26 December 1516: According to a report from the Regiment of Cyprus, Haydar AĀa arrived in Cyprus on 15 December 1516 as Selim's ambassador.¹ He is described as 'mustazi bassa' and 'costanzi bassa', that is Bostancı başı in the Outer Service of the Slave Household; and as the son-in-law of Selim's 'bassa grando' [?Grand Vizier] who was beheaded - possibly a reference to the Grand Vizier Koca Mustafa (q.v.) or to Iskender Bostancı başı if 'bassa grando' means simply a 'great pasha'). His entourage consisted of fifteen: eight 'schiavi' and seven members of his family. Their stay in Cyprus lasted two months.

Haydar brought with him a letter from Selim to the Regiment ordering it to provide 20,000 (Ottoman) bushels [moza = moggio] of barley (28,000 Venetian), ten thousand steers and one thousand oxen.

All this was to provision Selim's army on campaign in Egypt and Syria, and was to be paid for by the ambassador. The Regiment replied by accounting for the shortage of such commodities in Cyprus at that time, but did reach a compromise: the Venetians sold him 20,000 (Venetian measure) bushels of barley at a rate of 11 bushels per ducat. The ambassador hired a Venetian vessel from Cyprus to transport the barley to Syria. The Regiment found the ambassador's company congenial and for his part the ambassador appears to have been well pleased with the deal and distributed presents to the Regiment.

Notes

1. In a report of 7 March 1517 (Sanuto, XXIV, 221-2), the Regiment described the same embassy. On this occasion Haydar was not mentioned by name, but was referred to as the 'Costanzi bassa'. My account here is an amalgam of the two reports of 26 December and 7 March.

HAYDAR BEG - subaşı (1497/902)

[Cadar Beg]

Sanuto, I, 678-9: Mentioned in the correspondence between Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra, and Marchio Trevisan, the captain-general da mar, in July 1497 as the emissary of Firuz to Trevisan concerning the dispute over the salt mines of Zuppa. He is described as a subaşı.

HAYDAR ED DIN _ çavus (1504/909)

[Adradin zaus]

Sanuto, V, 1006-7: çavuş of Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra; he was the bearer of Firuz's letters to the count and captain of Dulzigno.

?HAYRAN - corsair (1501/907)

[Chiaran]

Sanuto, IV, 108-110: attacked Venetian shipping in the summer of 1501 in the company of ?Hayvan re'is (q.v.).

?HAYVAN - corsair (1501/907)

[Chiavin]

Sanuto;, IV, 106, 108: attacked Venetian shipping in the summer of 1501 in the company of ?Hayran re'is (q.v.).

HAYREDDIN BARB ROSSA - corsair/Kapudan Pasha

[Barbarossa/

Rugio/Caraïdîn]

1483?-1546

The son of Ya^ckub Aga, a sipahi from the Morea, Barbarossa was born in Midilli around 1483. His claim to fame is in his activities as a corsair in the western Mediterranean. His power and skill as an admiral were recognised by Suleiman the Magnificent who appointed him his Kapudan Pasha in 1531 in the struggle with Austria and in 1538 conferred on him the Beğlerbeğlik of Algiers where Barbarossa had been an effective ruler since 1518. When in 1538 Barbarossa defeated the armada of Andrea Doria of Austria, his control of Mediterranean waters was undisputed.¹

These major events of Barbarossa's life lie outside the scope of the Diarii's first twenty-five volumes, which contain only six references to him, covering the years August 1515 to August 1518.² They deal with Barbarossa's piracy in the western Mediterranean, two instances in conjunction with Kurtoglu corsaro (q.v.), and in a third concerning his capture of Algiers from Spain.

NOTES

1. There is an extensive bibliography on Barborossa: see E Z Karal, 'Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa, Gazi (1483?-1546), in IA, vol. II, pp.311-315. Also, Süreyya, vol. II, p.315.
2. Sanuto, XX, 579; XXII, 279-280, 306, 572, 680-1

HAYR BEG - voyvoda (1500/906)

[Hierebi]

Sanuto III, 1033-4: one of three chiefs ('capi') of a raiding party of 2000 turks attacking the county of Zara in October 1500.

HAZINEDAR BASI - (1500/906)

[Asnatar bassa]

Sanuto, III, 969-970: rumoured to have become SB of Avlonya, (but see p.363). According to this report (11 September 1500) from the baïlo and captain of Durazzo, 'uno Asnatar, bassa di una villa si chiama Iluxi (?Ilica near Üsküp) was 'di vil condition et eunucho'. The fact that he was a eunuch suggests that the interpretation of 'asnatar bassa' as 'hazinedarbaşı' is reasonable, since the hazinedar başı was the title given to the second assistant to the chief of the Black Eunuchs or the fourth officer of the white eunuchs.¹

Notes

1. Schefer's explanation of Spandugino's 'casnatarbassy' (Spandugino, pp.65-6 and Schefer, pp.119-120: 'Le Casnatarbassi est le grand tresorier general lequel recoit tous les deniers de tout le revenu de l'Empereur') applies to the hazinedar ağa rather than to the hazinedar başı.

HEMDEM PASHA BB of Karaman (1514/920)

[Erabdembassa]

Sanuto, XIX, 224-5: Hironimo Bidelli, soprastante di biscotti in Corfu, who had been receiving reports of the Chaldiran campaign, wrote on 15 September 1514 that it had been reported that Selim had beheaded

('fato apichar per la gola') 'Erabdem bassa suo capitano de lo exercito, il qual fu quello che dette in le man de ditto Signor turco (Selim) suo fradelo Achmath (Prince Ahmed).' No reason is given.

This brief reference to what is clearly Hemdem Pasha, BB of Karaman (1512-1514), is all there is concerning Selim's well known childhood friend and notable victim of Selim's ambition.¹ The viziers and sancakbeğis who had been opposed to Selim's advance into Persian territory and who were worried about disaffected janissary elements, chose Hemdem to advise Selim to turn back, probably believing that his lifelong friendship would protect him. It did not and Hemdem was executed as an example to the troops on 24 July 1514. He was replaced by Zeynel Pasha.

It seems strange that the Diarii do not contain more material on Hemdem. His great valour in battle and his intimacy with Selim captured the imagination of later western writers who dwelt at great length on his role in the succession struggle and his death at Selim's command.² Although no other sources, Turkish or western, reflect Bidelli's report that it was Hemdem who found Prince Ahmed and brought him to Selim, they do acknowledge his vital role in the defeat and capture of Prince Ahmed.³ Bidelli's source may have confused Hemdem with Dukaginzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) who according to Hammer was the captor of Prince Ahmed.⁴

Notes

1. Hammer, GOR, II, 409, 535 (Hist. IV, 189; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.61; Dañışmend, II, p.9.
2. Sansovino, Annali, f 110r-112v goes into this in great depth; also Penia, pp.2-5; Giovio, Commentario, f 25v; Spandugino, p.339.

3. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.136 and (TD VIII/11-12), p.195; Uzunçarşılı (Beil XXX), p.588.
4. See p.60, and p.65, n.17.

HIECEBI - voyvoda (1500/906)

[sic]

Sanuto, III, 1033-4: one of three chiefs ('capi') of a raiding party of 2000 turks attacking the county of Zara in October 1500.

HOCA - Hoca (1517/923)

[coza]

Sanuto, XXV, 148ff, esp. 151 [Docs., p.648]: the Venetian ambassadors in Cairo, Mocenigo and Contarini, refer in a report of 5 September 1517 to a 'Coza' who, they said, along with the emir-i ahur (see Biyikli Mehmed) and the Kadi-Casker of Rumeli were the only officials whose counsel Selim would listen to. This 'Coza' is either Hoca-zade Mehmed Celebi (q.v.) or Hoca Halimi¹, both of whom were said to be Selim's most important advisers during the Mamluk campaign.² The bailo noted in 1514 that the 'Coza' of Selim was highly trusted by Selim and was playing an important part in the decision making connected with the Republic's request for military aid from the Ottomans in the war against the League of Cambrai.³

Notes

1. Süreyya, II, p.241; Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.489 (mülk), p.523 (imaret). See also p.63.
2. Hammer, GOR, II, 462-3, 517, 527 (Hist IV, 262, 335, 347); Süreyya, IV, p.108 (Mehmed), II, p.242 (Halimî).
3. ASV, CX Misti, reg 36 (1513-1514), ff. 121v-122r, 15 March 1514; Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. no.34, 8 April 1514 (Corresp. Nicolo Zustinian) [Docs., p.645-6].

[HOCA HALIMÎ ĆABD AL HALIMÎ EFENDI] - hoca and teacher of Selim I

[see Hoca]

HUSEIN AĜA - (1503/909)

[Chosain]

Sanuto, V, 597-9, DOR: 20 October 1503: According to this report from Lunardo Bembo to Andrea Gritti, Husein Aĝa interceded with the viziers to try to obtain the early release of those Venetian subjects held prisoner in Istanbul. Although the sense is unclear (and not clarified by the editor's attempt to improve the grammar¹, it seems that a certain 'aga' had been asked by Bembo to go to the Porte and negotiate the release of the prisoners. Husein is then mentioned as the man who actually went to the Porte, so it seems likely that Husein and the 'aga' are one and the same. At first he could not obtain an audience, but he was then able to make some headway through Hersekzade Ahmed (q.v.).

One can conjecture that Husein Aĝa is identical with the man of that name who, according to Süreyya, became the Chief of the White Eunuchs of the imperial palace in 1506/912.²

Notes

1. the MS version ('li scrisse che i vedesse che la ga di far andasse a la Porta a dir come - - -') was amended in the edition to read: 'li scrisse che i vedesse di far che l'aga andasse a la Porta a dir come - - -'.
2. Süreyya, vol. IV, appendix, p.723

ÇANDARLI İBRAHİM PAŞA BIN HALİL (Imbrai; Embraim, Embray; Ibraim)

833/1429 - 905/1499

Nationality and background

As a member of the famous ulema family of Çandarlı, which dominated the Grand Vizierate for five generations, Ibrahim's Muslim and Turkish background is well documented,¹ and was known to the Venetians themselves.² He was the only Grand Vizier of Turkish and Muslim origin to hold that rank during the reign of Bayezid II.

Career

Details of his career during the reign of Mehmed II until his death in 1499 are also well known.³

1453/9857 Cadi of Edirne. This was the year in which his father, Halil Paşa, was disgraced and executed by Mehmed II.

Although some Ottoman sources describe Ibrahim's own disgrace and deprivation following the death of this father,⁴ it has now been substantiated that Ibrahim remained cadi of Edirne until 1465.⁵

1465/869 Appointed Kadi-^Casker.

1473/878 Vizier and lala of Prince Bayezid (later Bayezid II). It is interesting to note that Sanuto also recorded this fact, thus establishing an early connection between Ibrahim and the future sultan.⁶

1484/889 Accompanied Bayezid II on the campaign of Kili and Ak-kirman.⁷ Later appointed lala to Prince Ahmed, one of the sons of Bayezid.⁸

1485/890 Appointed Kadi-^Casker of Rumeli.

1486/891 Appointed Vizier.

1487/893 Second Vizier.

1491/897 Vizier and accompanies Bayezid II on the abortive campaign against Belgrade.⁹

1498/903 - 1499/904 Grand Vizier/Turco-Venetian war/Death:

Sanuto records that Ibrahim held the position of Vizier at the time of Alvise Sagudino's mission to Istanbul in 1496.¹⁰ Two years later there is unanimity in the sources that Ibrahim was appointed Grand Vizier in place of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) whose first period in office had lasted no more than a few months. The reason for Ibrahim's appointment was most probably connected with the prospect of war with Venice: the sultan considered Ahmed Pasha's Christian and Venetian background as a potential liability in a war, whilst Ibrahim's Turkish and Muslim background, as well as his illustrious family heritage, must have made Ibrahim an attractive choice as a leader.¹¹ However, like his father Çandarlı Halil Pasa before him, who had opposed Mehmed II's assault on Constantinople in 1453,¹² Ibrahim identified himself with the peace party, at least prior to and during the early stages of the conflict.¹³ Indeed the Venetians considered him as a friend of long-standing.¹⁴ Behind the façade of obstinacy over the sovereignty of Cattaro (Kotor) and Zupa,¹⁵ Ibrahim attempted to de-escalate the situation: whilst the viziers favoured bloody reprisals on Venetian subjects in the county of Cattaro, he argued against this.¹⁶ Once war seemed inevitable and diplomacy had broken down, he procrastinated, hindered naval preparations and cautioned prudence.¹⁷

However, it eventually became clear that his political authority was an illustration of the suffering as a result of his lack of

enthusiasm for the war and to counterbalance this he gave his support to the war-party.¹⁸ Nevertheless Ibrahim still remained a moderate and his main efforts were directed at deflecting the main Ottoman naval thrust from Corfu to Lepanto. It is a measure of his authority with Bayezid as well as his moderation that he was able to achieve this objective against the opposition of the war-party¹⁹ and especially against the belligerence of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha.²⁰ He displayed further favouritism towards Venice when he intervened to save the life of Andrea Gritti whom Bayezid had sentenced to death after a messenger of his had been captured whilst travelling from Istanbul to Corfu -presumably with secret dispatches to Venice.²¹ Ibrahim's role in these events provides a new insight into the course of the Turco-Venetian war of 1499-1502. The loss of Lepanto in August 1499 was a bitter blow to the Christian powers, but had Corfu been captured instead the situation would have been far more critical.

Perhaps Ibrahim was not really interested in maintaining good relations with Venice. It seems more logical to suggest that he was guided, again like his father before him,²² by very serious considerations of international power politics: the Ottomans had been extremely suspicious of the Franco-Venetian alliance shortly before the outbreak of the war.²³ This had had the initial effect of driving several Italian states into the arms of the sultan, but Ibrahim's great fear had been that a large scale war might unite the Italian states and the other Christian powers. When it became clear that Venice would receive no support from any Italian power, Ibrahim threw his entire weight behind the war-party.²⁴

Ironically Ibrahim chose an unfortunate moment to urge aggression; he encouraged Bayezid against his will to mobilize the

fleet with the disastrous result, according to Sanuto, that thirty ships were lost in a storm. The remainder of the Ottoman fleet shrank from offering battle to an approaching Venetian flotilla and retreated to Porto Longo where it was besieged. On receipt of the news of this setback Ibrahim was fearful of the imposition of the death sentence and soon after died of grief.²⁵ All sources agree²⁶ that Ibrahim did die either during or shortly after the campaign of Lepanto, but none describe so vividly the tragic circumstances which led to the death of the last Candarlı to hold the rank of Grand Vizier.

Far more tragic still is another account of Ibrahim's death, which might seem to nullify the version given above and raise a question mark over the value of the Diarii as a reliable source on this matter. According to this account, Ibrahim committed suicide after he had been implicated in a serious scandal involving fraud and embezzlement. The scandal of the haraç payers involving Ibrahim and Ömer Turhanbegoğlu has been described elsewhere²⁷ and if accepted is an indication of the power and influence which Ibrahim had acquired as Grand Vizier. It should be said in defence of the Diarii as a source that the two accounts of the death of Ibrahim are not of necessity mutually exclusive.

It is also interesting to note that Alvisé Sagudino's Relazione²⁸ informs us that Ibrahim was seventy-five years old in 1499 - the year of his death - which would mean that he was born in 1424/829. This conflicts with the standard accounts that he was born in 1429-30/833.²⁹

Notes

1. Reindl, pp.213-222; I.H. Uzunçarşılı in IA, vol. III, pp.356-7; V.L. Ménage in EI(2) (Djandarlı); Süreyya, I, p.92; Kraelitz, p.104, n. 1; Danişmend, I, p.429; Osmanzâde, pp.17-19.

2. Sanuto, I, 397, Relazione of Alvise Sagudino (December 1496); and II, 600, April 1499 [Docs., p.636], where we are given further information received by Sanuto from Sagudino, (not from Andrea Zanchani as stated by Heller, p.27).
3. See note 1.
4. E.g. Osmanzade, p.18. The legend is elaborated in Danişmend I, p.403. See also Süreyya, I, p.92, who states that in the aftermath of his father's fall from power, Ibrahim was appointed mütevellî of the waqf of sultan Bayezid I; then muhtesib of Bursa, eventually becoming cadi of Amasya, not Edirne.
5. V.L. Ménage, op. cit.; Uzunçarşılı, op. cit., III, p.354; Danişmend, I, p.403; Reindl, pp.214-215.
6. Sanuto, II, 700, May 1499, Relazione of Andrea Zanchani [Docs., p.636]. See also KPZ, pp.363-4.
7. Uzunçarşılı, op. cit., p.356
8. Süreyya, I, p.92.
9. Kreutel, Oruc, p.55
10. Sanuto, I, 397, December 1496, Relazione of Alvise Sagudino. [Docs., p.636].
11. Sebastian, p.5, Heller, pp.26-27.
12. Inalcık, OE, p.26.
13. Fisher, p.66, is wrong to use Sanuto as evidence that Ibrahim was a war advocate. Ibrahim threw his weight behind the war effort only after he saw his authority as Grand Vizier begin to wane.
14. MCC, Cicogna no. 2269, Commissioni no. 30, Commission of Andrea Zanchani, (ambassador to Istanbul) 20 November 1498, f. 1r. Zanchani is directed, in keeping with diplomatic convention, to convey Venetian assurances of friendship, 'subiungendo sepeate Imbraym bassa primo in ordine et iam longo tempore in ipso officio et dignitate sempre nos habuisse Magnificentiam suam in specialem amicitia Status nostra, - - -'. Given Ibrahim's extraordinary behaviour in hindering preparations for war, this passage must be considered as going beyond mere conventions of cordiality. For a summary of Zanchani's commission, see also Sanuto, II, 139, November 1498.
15. Sanuto, II, 700, May 1499, Relazione of Andrea Zanchani. [Docs., p.636]. Dispute over the lands of George Cernović was one of the short term factors which precipitated the war.
16. Sanuto, II, 504-5, March 1499. [Docs., p.636]
17. Sanuto, II, 626, April 1499. [Docs., p.637].

18. Idem.
19. Sanuto, II, 930-1; July 1499; II, 1128, August 1499 [Docs., p.637].
20. Sanuto, II, 939, July 1499 [Docs., p.637].
21. Sanuto, II, 1128, August 1499. [Docs., p.637]; Malipiero, Part I, p.173, is more detailed and clarifies the ambiguity in Sanuto. Cf. also, J.C.Davis, pp.97-108 for an admirable account of Gritti's spying activities in Istanbul at this time and his imprisonment during the Turco-Venetian war, and especially p.103 where Ibrahim's intervention on Gritti's behalf is discussed in detail.
22. Inalcik, OE p.20-22, and 23. The similarity between the political approaches of father and son is striking.
23. Parry(NCMH), p.62; Inalcik, Rise, p.311.
24. Sanuto, III, 13, October 1499, Relazione of Marco Saraco. [Docs., p.638].
25. Idem.
26. Ménage, op. cit.; Süreyya, I, p. 92; ^COsmānzāde, p.18; Hammer, GOR, II, 320; Uzunçarşılı, op. cit., p. 357; Danişmend, I, p.407.
27. See p.396, 399, n.16.
28. Sanuto, II, 600, April 1499 [Docs., p.636].
29. Ménage, op. cit.; Reindl, p.213.

(?)IBRAHIM BEG - Morea (1499/904)

[Braibei]

Sanuto, II, 577: Sent by the SB of the Morea [Halil Pasha] (q.v.) to Koron to complain, 'con grande arrogantia', that many harac payers of the sultan had gone over to the Venetians and that they should be returned.

The question of the migration to Venetian territory of payers of haraç (a poll tax levied on non-Muslims in Islamic states) was one of some concern to the Signoria as well as the sultan. An illustration of this is the commission (November 1498) of the ambassador Andrea Zanchani which shows that he was told to apologise to the sultan and to offer the excuse that it was not possible to recognise

who were the sultan's haraç payers.¹

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 139. The Diarii as a whole offer some valuable insights into the relationship between haraç payers and the Ottoman state in this period (Sanuto, II, 139, 181-2, 421, 426-7, 573, 743; III, 127-8, 129-130, 332-3, 333, 490, 1459-60, 1627-28, 1637-38; IV, 22, 167-70, 206, 258-9; V, 243, 273-4, 274-5, 304, 453, 454, 464, 487-8, 761-2; VI, 377-8, 388-9, 446; VII, 9; VIII, 172; X, 202; XII, 514-5; XVI, 344-5; XVII, 542; XXIII, 549, 595; XXV, 47, 48. Note also that in February 1499 the protoiero of the Morea arrived in Venice to discuss haraç matters, including the return of certain peasants of the sultan paying haraç who had moved to Venetian lands (Sanuto, II, 421, 426-7).

IBRAHIM - VOYVODA (1510/916)

[Imbraim]

Sanuto, X, 406, DOR: 30 April 1510: described as the voyvoda of the province of 'Rama' and as one of the leaders of a Turkish raid into the county of Spalato in April 1510. ([see Clyma Chievam].

[ÇANDARLI ÇISA PASA BIN IBRAHIM]

[fiol de Ibraim bassa]

Identification, Nationality and Background

The only information we have in the Diarii about Çisa Pasha, who is not mentioned by name, is that he was the son of a certain Ibrahim Pasha, that he had once been nişancı, and that he was killed at the battle of Chaldiran (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920).¹ We do know that the post of nişancı in 1512/918 had been held by Candarlı Çisa Paşa bin Ibrahim (i.e. son of Çandarlı Ibrahim, Bayezid's Grand Vizier). We also know that shortly afterwards, in 1513/919, he had been appointed Beğlerbeği.² This accords perfectly with the reference in Sanuto, though we are not informed of the rank of Ibrahim Pasha's son

at the time of his death.

However, the hitherto accepted accounts of ^CIsa Pasha's life state that he died as late as 1543-4/950 as Beglerbegi of Damascus.³ Given that Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha (q.v.) was around seventy when he died in 1499, it is not improbable that ^CIsa Pasha could have died in 1514/920, some thirty years earlier than the accepted date. If my identification of the "fiol de İbrahim bassâ" is correct, Sanuto's anonymous casualty at Chaldiran was ^CIsa Pasha of the famous Turkish and Muslim family of Çandarlı.⁴

Notes

1. Sanuto, XIX, 186-7, October 1514: "uno fiol de İbrahim bassâ, che fo prima Nesangi bassâ". This reference appears in a document listing the casualties at Chaldiran. The text here is ambiguous since the meaning could signify that it was İbrahim who had been nişancı; however, the fact that the son of Çandarlı İbrahim had been nişancı only two years before Chaldiran serves to support the alternative interpretation of the grammar.
2. Danismend, I, pp. 464-5, who points out that Süreyya is mistaken in stating that ^CIsa was appointed nişancı in 1534-35/941. ^CIsa was the last nişancı in the reign of Bayezid and the first in the reign of Selim. He must have been an acceptable choice for the position to the janissary corps which had been responsible for the dismissal of his predecessor in that office, (cf. Tâci-zâde Ca^Cfer Celebi). See Hammer, GOR, II, p.361 in connection with this appointment. See also the Çandarlı family tree in Uzuncarsılı, IA, vol. III, p.356.
3. V.L. Ménage, EI(2) (See Djandarlı, p.444); I.H. Uzuncarsılı, IA, vol. III, p.357. See also Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.525.
4. See p.241.

KARA CISA BEG - BB of Rumeli (1517/923).

[See Faraesar Beg]

ISKENDER - voyvoda (1502/908)

[Scander]

Sanuto, IV, 797-8, DOR: 7 February 1503: one of the foremost voyvoda of Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra. He was Firuz Beg's messenger to the provveditore of Cattaro to announce that, in accordance with the sultan's orders, Firuz had commanded the cessation of attacks against Venetians and their property. Iskender expressed himself in highly deferential terms.

ISKENDER BEG - (1518/924)

[Scander]

Sanuto, XXV, 474: one of the three 'bassa turchi naturali' whom Selim had sent to Turchia' to gather troops. (see Mehmed Beg, p.314-5, and p.315, n.1)

ISKENDER BIN DA'UD (1501/907)

[Schander piccolo]

Sanuto, IV, 187: captured in skirmishes with Hungarian troops in late 1501/907. He may be son of the Grand Vizier Da'ud(q.v.).

ISKENDER PASHA BIN CABD al-Gaffar

- SB Bosnia
- Beglerbegi
- Vizier

[Scanderbassa]

See Introduction, p. 30.

ISKENDER PASHA - SB Negroponte/Bostancı Başı
 - SB Gelibolu/Kapudan Pasha
 - Vizier

d.1515/921

[Mustazi/Constanzi/Bostanzi
 Mostanzi/Capizi/Mustazi
 vazi/Scanderbei]

Background and Identity

Iskender is mentioned by name on only three occasions but by piecing together all the references to the offices we know him to have held, and to the title of Bostancı başı, which was applied to him even after he ceased to hold that position, it is possible to build a picture of his important career.¹

The Diarii tell us little about his background, other than that he was the son-in-law of Selim I, and may have originally come from the Morea.² He married Selim's daughter Hanım Sultan in 1509/915 and had three sons (Mehmed, Osman Sah, Suleyman Bey) and one daughter (Nefise Hatun)³ He was founder of the Galata Mevlevi-hane.⁴ According to Süreyya he was considered to be stupid. The Diarii, at any rate, show that he was corrupt and venal, vices which were eventually to lead to his downfall. His understanding with Turkish corsairs may even suggest origins in piracy. The evidence at any rate indicates that his career followed the standard paradigm: rise through the Slave Household, marriage into the sultan's family.

Early Career: SB of Negroponte/Bostancı Başı

Although secondary literature, much of it based on Ottoman sources, provides a fragmentary record of his activities from 1509/915

until his death in 1515/921, we know very little about his earlier career. To some extent the Diarii and the Venetian Archives fill the gap. The Archives show conclusively that Iskender styled himself Bostancı Başı in March 1504 and that he held this position concurrently with the office of SB of Negroponte.⁵ It is not clear when he actually became SB here. One report indicates that the SB of Negroponte was executed in 1501/906 and the post was thus vacant.⁶ This does not mean that Iskender would necessarily have been the new incumbent, but by the autumn of 1503 the then incumbent was ordered to find and hand back all Venetian subjects abducted in time of peace on pain of death: abduction of infidel subjects, or turning a blind eye to their abduction would have been typical of Iskender's behaviour.⁷ When Jacomo Contarini visited the Ottoman Empire in 1506, he observed that the SB of Negroponte had five ships (fuste) which he continued to use to harass the vulnerable (even though hostilities with the Republic were officially over).⁸ By the end of his period as SB of Negroponte, there are more indications of the Iskender's corrupt practices: a report explains how in October 1509 the SB (flambular) had accepted four slaves and other presents from the corsair Kurt-Oğlu (q.v.) in exchange for which the SB turned a blind eye to the corsair's plundering of a village on the neighbouring island of Andros and abduction of 88 people. The same report also adds that the fleet (armata) of 'Bostanzi bassa, flambular di Negroponte', the captain of which was Süleiman (q.v.), had seized three Catalan ships (galie) in Barbary waters and in late December 1509 had brought them to Skiathos, 'benissimo in hordine'.⁹

With regard to references to the office of Bostancı Başı before 1509/1510,¹⁰ it seems quite likely that Iskender is the unnamed

'bostanzi bassa' in question who in 1503 sent two letters to the corsair Kara Durmuş warning him that the sultan had sent a force against him¹¹: perhaps more evidence of Iskender's collusion with piratical elements. On one occasion in 1504, Iskender was the injured party when a Venetian galleas was responsible for attacking one of his ships in the port of San Pietro in Skiros. The ship, (which was carrying salted fish and about to take on a cargo of grain at Negroponte) had been caught in a storm and sought refuge at Skiros. He petitioned for compensation through Bayezid,¹² but more significantly he also wrote directly to Andrea Gritti, with whom it appears from his letters he was acquainted, to work on his behalf.¹³ The Republic eventually arranged to pay him 2300 ducats in compensation,¹⁴ even though according to the registers of the Senate¹⁵ the Bostanci's ship had been attacked by a Rhodian ship. Nevertheless, since the deed had been done in Venetian waters, and in order to keep the peace, Venice was prepared to make reparation.¹⁶

SB of Gelibolu and Kapudan Pasha

On 27 March 1510/16 Zul-hicca 915 Lodovico Valdrin, secretary of the Venetian bailo, reported that Bayezid had appointed Iskender as Kapudan Pasha at Gelibolu.¹⁷ No explanation is given, though it coincided with a general change in personnel at high level including the appointment of Hersekzade (q.v.) as vizier. It has been noted¹⁸ that Iskender was known to be a supporter of Selim in the succession dispute - all the more so after becoming his son-in-law in 1509 - and that Selim used his influence to get Iskender appointed Kapudan Pasha so that the fleet could be used at a crucial point in the race for the throne to prevent Prince Ahmed from crossing to Istanbul from

Anatolia. Later reports from Valdrin and from the bailo show that Prince Ahmed was extremely annoyed at the appointment and wanted Iskender dismissed.¹⁹ When in June 1511, prior to the battle of Corlu and again in 1512, Selim brought his own fleet from Kaffa to blockade the Straits and impede Prince Ahmed's crossing, the probable co-operation of Iskender - Selim's man - in such a powerful position may have been crucial to Selim's accession.²⁰

The four years during which Iskender was Kapudan Pasha were characterized by corruption in government, piracy and imprisonment (facing execution) on the one hand, and supervision of shipbuilding and construction of the Haliç Tersane (Istanbul Arsenal) on the other.

It seems that Iskender continued his corrupt practices (manzarie) into Selim's reign. Bayezid was perhaps powerless after 1510 to deal with him; but as a stream of petitions poured in to Selim telling of his many crimes and outrages, so Selim became increasingly irate. Not even the entreaties of Iskender's wife (Selim's daughter) could move the sultan, apparently, and in May/June 1513 Iskender was thrown into prison with a sentence of execution hanging over him. However, it is not clear what ensued, because less than a year later, Iskender was reported by the bailo to be supervising work on the arsenal.²¹

One report indicates that at the time of his arrest Iskender was one of four viziers: two (Hersekzade and Mustafa) had served as viziers under Bayezid, but 'Mustazi' and Yahya Pasha (see Yahya vizier, 1513, pp.475-6) were newly created by Selim.²² It does not seem unreasonable that Iskender should have been raised to this rank, and his sudden fall from grace is a measure of the severity of his crimes.

Haliç Tersane and Fleet Construction

In spite of his manzarie, Iskender was Kapudan Pasha at a highly critical period for Ottoman sea-power. A large part of the Ottoman fleet sent out under Kemal Re'is in 1510 to supply the Mamluks with artillery to use against the Safavids and the Portuguese was shipwrecked in a storm.²³ Bayezid's fleet was consequently in need of review. The Venetians were keen observers in matters related to fleet construction. In November 1510 reports from Istanbul stated that Bayezid wanted to build one hundred galie to help the King of Tunis against Spain.²⁴ In March 1511, one year after Iskender had been appointed Kapudan Pasha, he conducted a review of the sultan's fleet: there were in all seventy ships, but only fifty were sea or battleworthy.²⁵ A month later Bayezid was reported to be planning to build fifty galie, and by the summer that he was building 'potente armada'.²⁶ Fleet preparations for the following months were subsumed into the general chaos of the end of Bayezid's reign, but the initiative conceived by the old sultan was to be continued and advanced by the new one. Selim had already shown considerable understanding of the value of a strong fleet, and between his accession and his victory at Yenishehir against his brother in April 1513, the resources of the empire were harnessed to shipbuilding.²⁷ After his victory at Yenishehir, Selim's ambitions were expanded, with reports showing that he was thinking in terms of between 200 and 300 galie.²⁸ More significantly, he had ordered, by June 1513/Rebî'II 919, the building of two new arsenals, one at the original site in Gelibolu, and the other at a completely new site at Pera in Istanbul. Both were to have 100 vaults (volti) with the capability to build 200 galie, all at a cost of 200,000 ducats. The Istanbul arsenal was to

be totally under cover.²⁹ By September 1513 five vaults had already been completed.³⁰

The reports in the Diarii about the Halıc Tersane are remarkable in that they challenge the previously accepted view³¹ that it was begun in 1515/921 and that it was either Ca^Cfer Pasha or Piri Mehmed Pasha who were largely responsible. In fact the arsenal was Selim's very first consideration after Yenishehir and it was begun when Iskender Bostanci was Kapudan Pasha. However, Iskender's implication in manzarie and temporary imprisonment must have taken him away from the project, though by May/June 1514/Reb^T-II 920 the Diarii as well as other Venetian records link him unambiguously with the construction of the arsenal.³² It was not until 1514/920 that real work on the arsenal began, that is during the period when Selim had left Iskender in charge of government in Istanbul in his absence on the Chaldiran campaign.³³ In his report of 12 June on Iskender and the arsenal, the bailo Zustinian marvelled that fifty vaults had been built in one month, and that 150 vaults were planned: it was to be 'un bellissimo arsenal' and all under cover.³⁴ Writing from Edirne at the end of July 1514/early Cumāda II 920, Zustinian said that 100 vaults had been completed, that Iskender ('quel capizi bassa') was supervising the work and that it was planned to build two galie in each vault (conforming to Selim's original design in the summer of 1513 (see p.254)³⁵ An independent source, reporting in September 1514, confirmed that Selim had left Iskender ('Constanzin bassa') behind in Istanbul, together with Prince Süleiman; that they were supervising construction of the arsenal; and that 101 vaults had been completed; moreover, Iskender had been ordered to supervise the construction of a similar arsenal with 100 vaults on the Gelibolu site (and in the

meantime Iskender was also building galie across the Sea of Marmara at Izmit).³⁶

Muhafiz of Istanbul / Chaldiran Campaign

It can be concluded from the above reports, substantiated by others,³⁷ that Iskender had been left behind in Istanbul as Muhafiz ("vice signor"), in the same way as Selim was to appoint Piri Pasha (q.v.) muhafiz of Istanbul during the Mamluk campaign. He was tasked on the one hand to oversee naval matters, but in the latter half of 1514, he was also responsible for the muster of troops for Selim's reinforcement. It was speculated that the 30,000 men he had assembled were to be transported by the fleet,³⁸ but it seems unlikely that the fleet would have been ready in time. Another source stated that Selim towards the end of 1514 (it is not clear exactly when) ordered Iskender to bring the 50,000 men he had collected, with himself as commander of the force.³⁹ This would support the view⁴⁰ that Iskender was at the head of 40,000 men during the Chaldiran campaign, but that he did not actually join Selim's armies until after the battle itself.⁴¹

Vizier 1514-1515/920-921

There is nothing in the Diarii to substantiate the view, stated in Süreyya,⁴² that Iskender was BB at some point before his appointment as vizier. In January 1515 the bailo reported that Iskender ('Costanzi bassa, suo [i.e. Selim's] zenero') had been appointed vizier in the aftermath of the fall from grace and dismissal of Dukaginzade, Hersekzade Ahmed and Mustafa (B) in October 1514/Ramazan 920 (see p.91). The order in which the names of the new

viziers appear in the bailo's report tends to suggest that Iskender was made second vizier, and that Piri Mehmed third vizier.⁴³

Iskender's position in the divan lasted only a few months. By August 1515 a number of reports from different sources show that Iskender had been beheaded by Selim.⁴⁴ The letters of the bailo support Ottoman sources in describing how Iskender found himself implicated in the blame for the janissary revolt in Amasya of 22 February 1515/8 Muḥarrem 921 (see pp.408-9).⁴⁵ Selim had delayed taking action until August 1515/Receb 921, having waited until his return to Istanbul. The Relazione of Alvise Mocenigo three years later gave the main reason for his execution to be the corruption in which he had indulged.⁴⁶ This would hardly be surprising given his record. As for the Venetian view of Iskender, he was seen as an enemy of Venice and of all Christians.

Notes

1. February 1510, Sanuto, X, 202; May 1510, Sanuto, X, 668-9 and September 1515, Sanuto XXI, 238. That the Venetians used 'Constanzi, Mostanzi, Mustazi' etc. to refer to the office of Bostancı başı can be seen from various reports (e.g. Sanuto, XXV, 239, 240, 281 among others) and especially from ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 24; ASV, Liber Graecus, 89v ('Scanderbei Constanzibassi del signor'); see also Spandugino, p.339.
2. He is often referred to as 'zenero' e.g. Sanuto, X, 668-9, 716; XIV, 490-1, XVI, 375-6, 587-9; XVII, 10-13, 35-6, 37-38, 159-160; XVIII, 421, 444-5; XXI, 142-3, 160; XXIV, 16-18, 439-440. After Iskender's execution, Selim gave his wife in marriage to the BB of Rumeli (Sanuto, XXV, 239, 240, c December 1517) (see pp.212-4 Faraesar). See also Spandugino, pp. 164-5. For Iskender's Morean origins, see Sanuto, XIX, 66 [Docs., p.639]: the sense is ambiguous.
3. Uluçay (TD X/14), p.116; Uzunçarşılı (Bell XL), p.470-1.
4. Süreyya, I. p.345.
5. ASV, Liber Graecus. ff. 87rv and ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis,

- (fasc. 6, no. 25), Italian translations of Bayezid's letter to Doge, 24 April 1504 (see note 12).
6. Sanuto, III, 1638.
 7. Sanuto, V, 762, 864-5.
 8. Sanuto, VII, 17-18.
 9. Sanuto, X, 44-5. See also XIX, 463-4 about the measures taken by the Grand Master of Rhodes to put a stop to the damaging activities of Kurd-oğlu who had the co-operation of the Bostancı Başı.
 10. Sanuto, IV, 88, 242, 309-310, V, 463, 973-4; VI, 134; VII, 7, 12-13.
 11. Sanuto, V, 973-4: see pp.82-3.
 12. For a contemporary Italian translation (in spite of what Bombaci (p.298) says, I have been unable to find the Greek original in the ASV) of Bayezid's ferman to the Doge, dated 24 April 1504/9 Zul-ka^cda 909, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 25; also in ASV, Liber Graecus, 87rv and ASV, Libri Comm., 42r. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 53; Predelli, VI, p.76, no.61, and Bombaci, p.298. Priuli, vol II, p.347 (June 1504) refers to the arrival of the sultan's envoy bringing the firman
 13. For the Greek original of Iskender's letter of 27 March 1504/7 Sawwal 909 to Andrea Gritti, see ASV, Firmani Turchi, no.6. For contemporary Italian translations, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 24; also in ASV, Liber Graecus ff. 89rv and ASV, Libri Comm. f.43r. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron) no.47; Predelli, VI, p.76, no.62 and Bombaci p.229. For a translation of another letter to Gritti (undated), see ASV, Liber Graecus, 88rv.
 14. Sanuto, VI, 134. Iskender sent a letter of thanks to Venice (dated 15 October 1504/6 Cumada 910): ASV, CDT, Busta, XVIII bis, loose documents at back, no.1; ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 97r; ASV, Libri Comm., 46r. For regests, ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 56; Predelli, VI, p.78, no.70 and Bombaci p.299. I have not found the original in ASV in spite of what Bombaci (p.299) says.
 15. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 11v, 13v, 31v-32v, 44rv, 68v-69v, 71v-72r (April-December 1504, referring mainly to the commission of Georgi Negro, the Venetian secretary sent to Skiathos to investigate the whole affair.
 16. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 95r (May 1505: letter to the Grand Master of Rhodes).
 17. Sanuto, X, 202 [Docs., p.608]. For his appointment, see also Danişmend, V, p.178; Uzunçarşılı (Bell XL), pp.469-470; and Spandugino, pp.164-5. Süreyya omiṣ him from his list of Kapudan pashas.

18. Parry (Cook), p.66; Fisher, p.106.
19. Sanuto, X, 668-9 (31 May 1510); X, 716 (9 June 1510). Valdrin also reported (Sanuto, X, 551, 25 April 1510) that the 'capitano di l'armada' had been killed by janissaries on the fleet, but it is quite possible this refers to another sea-captain of lesser rank than kapudan. It may refer to Bondonal (q.v.).
20. Sanuto, XII, 509-510; XIV, 463-5. Later Iskender is thought to have used the fleet to prevent Prince Korkud's escape (Giovio, Commentario, f. 18v; Sansovino, Annali, f. 106v).
21. For references to this episode, see Sanuto XVI, 375-6, 547-8, 587-9, 651, 658; XVII, 10-13, 35-6. Although XVI, 587-9 and 651 refer to a 'capizi bassa [usually taken to mean the office of kapıcı başı] suo [i.e. Selim's] cugnado [brother-in-law, rather than son-in-law which would apply to Iskender], era capitano a Galipoli [Kapudan Pasha]' and that the 'capizi's' wife was the sister [rather than wife] of Selim, it is clear from the other references, as well as from later reports (XIX, 24; XXV, 239, 240, 439-440), that 'capizi' was being confused with 'bostanzi'/'costanzi', possibly because Iskender may have been succeeded by Kapıcı Sinan Başı (q.v.) for a brief period. Iskender is therefore the person being imprisoned. One report goes further and states that Selim had him asphyxiated in July 1513 (Sanuto, XVII, 35-36).
22. XVI, 375-6
23. Sanuto, VII, 535; X, 801-2; XI, 661, 704-5, 736-7, 825-6.
24. Sanuto XI, 759.
25. Sanuto, XII, 7-8 (bailo, March 1511).
26. Santuo, XII, 113, 246-7.
27. Sanuto, XIV, 519-520; XV, 26-7, 324; XVI, 260-1.
28. Sanuto, XVI, 260-1, 327, 390, 657-8; XVII, 398-9: fleet to consist of galie (between 100 and 160), fuste (about 100) and palandarie (about 100) to carry artillery.
29. Sanuto, XVI, 587-9, 657-8; XVII, 159-160.
30. Sanuto, XVII, 159-160.
31. Tekindağ (Belg.7), p.66; Parry (Cook) p.77; c.f. Piri Pasha, p.407 and Cafer Ağa pp.165ff.
32. Sanuto, XVIII, 421 [Docs., p.639]: 'fa lavorar a furia l'Arsenal' and ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 44, 31 May 1514. Both references are to letters of Nicolo Zustinian.
33. Idem

34. Idem
35. Sanuto, XIX, 24.
36. Sanuto, XIX, 83-5, 223-4 (Hironimo Bidelli in Corfu).
37. Sanuto, XIX, 88, 305-6 and especially XIX, 66 [Docs., p.639]
38. Sanuto, XIX, 305-6.
39. Sanuto, XIX, 377.
40. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.60.
41. Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XL), p.469-470.
42. Süreyya, I, p.345.
43. Sanuto, XX, 95-6 [Docs., p.673]; see also Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XL), p.469 who gives the date of appointment as December 1514/Zül kade 920 and styles him second vizier in place of Mustafa (B); Danişmend, V, p.178; Süreyya, I, p.345; Uzunçarşılı, p.263, n.2.
44. Sanuto, XXI, 142-3 (Corfu); XXI, 160-162 (Istanbul); XXI, 238 (Zante); XXI, 336 (Hungary). See also later reports: XXIV, 16-18; XXV, 240, 439-440. Sanuto himself seems to have been following events with interest (XX, 247-8) (see note 47).
45. Sanuto, XXI, 160-2; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.76; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XL), p.470; Danişmend, II, p.20 and Hammer, GOR, II, p.427 (HİS. IV, p.214).
46. Sanuto, XXV, 439-440. See also Giovio, Commentario, f.25v.
47. Sanuto, XX, 247-8 ('Mustazi bassa che gran nemico nostro': this appears to be Sanuto's own comment); XXI, 238.

JAMICHOZCHI - ??Vizier (1510/916)

[sic]

Sanuto, X, 268 [Docs., p.632]: one of Bayezid's officials ('bassa') reported to have been decapitated in early 1510 (see p.221).

KARAGÖZ PASHA

(Caragos bassa)

d. April 1511/Muḥarrem 917

Identity and background

There were at least two and possibly three individuals by this name flourishing in the reign of Bayezid II: Karagöz Mehmet Pasha BB of Karaman who was executed in 1488/894 for this unco-operative conduct in the campaign of 1486/892 against the Mamluks¹; Karagöz, Aga of the Janissaries²; and Karagöz, BB of Anatolia, who is known to posterity for his violent death by impalement at the hands of Shah Kuli in 1511/917.

Of those only the latter is of interest to us here. He is the only one to be mentioned by name in the Diarî and then only once³. We can piece together a picture of his activities by tracing the references to his rank as BB of Anatolia⁴.

The identification of the Karagöz pashas has been the subject of a considerable amount of confusion and unfortunately the evidence available in Diarî does not shed any new light on the problem. The first Karagöz, BB of Karaman, is clearly identifiable and belongs to an earlier phase of warring in Anatolia - against the Mamluks. However the events associated with Karagöz Ahmed could possibly relate to two Karagöz Pashas who have sometimes been merged together as one person or confused⁵.

Beğlerbeği of Anadolu

As BB of Anadolu Karagöz was involved in two major campaigns. 1507/913 Turkish sources⁶ refer him to in connection with the mobilisation of the Ottoman army in 1507 to meet the threat posed by

Shah Ismail's victory over ÇAla ad-Daula, Prince of Albistan, on the frontier of the Ottoman Empire⁷ and he is also specifically mentioned in a report in the Diarîi⁸, while in other reports there are references to the unnamed BB of Anatolia⁹. According to all these reports Karagöz was in command of 20,000 men¹⁰ and some 18 sancakbeğis. Bayezid's orders, however, were that battle should be avoided at all costs and that the Ottoman forces should simply monitor Shah Ismail's movements. Consequently Bayezid disbanded the army when Shah Ismail returned to his own territory on the approach of winter.

1511/917 Kızılbash Revolt and Shah Kuli Karagöz was not to evade a major battle four years later when the Kızılbash revolt erupted in Teke province. Details of the campaigning have been given in several publications all of which vary somewhat in their accounts¹¹. The common theme of these accounts, however, is that Kuli, having plundered and ravaged the region, eventually arrived to confront Karagöz Pasha at his headquarters at the stronghold of Kutahya. Battle commenced on 22 April 1511/23 Muḥarrem 917. Initially Kuli was successfully repulsed and driven into full retreat. However, on seeing that Karagöz Pasha had allowed his men to join in the general plunder and looting, leaving the pasha exposed and unprotected, Kuli turned back to deliver a crushing blow. Karagöz was captured, impaled and roasted over a fire¹².

The Diarîi reports¹³ do not mention the specific manoeuvres of the two sides, nor do they mention Kutahya by name, but we are told that the Kızılbash forces tried to storm a castle (presumably Kutahya) but were forced to withdraw due to lack of artillery; the Ottoman troops then counterattacked whereupon the rebels turned to fight and

won the day¹⁴. The reports also tell of Karagöz Pasha's cruel death and of the magnitude of the defeat¹⁵, as well as the great shock waves which reverberated through the empire once news of the rout became known. Revenge was required, and to effect this end the Grand Vizier Hadim ^CAli Pasha was immediately despatched (see pp.126-8).

Notes

1. Tansel, pp.99-100; Tekindağ (Bell. XXXI), pp.350, 353-5, 366; Reindl, pp.262-266. Hammer, GOR, II, 291, 292-3, 299 (Hist. IV, 16, 18-19, 27-8); Danişmend, I, pp.385, 386, 389; Fisher, pp.36-8, 40.
2. Hammer, GOR. II. 327-8 (Hist. IV, 69) says that this Karagöz was involved in the Galata fire of 1500 or 1501 (see Mesih Pasha, p.319), but he does not appear to have been killed. Süreyya, IV, p.60 on the other hand describes him as sekban başı rather than Ağa of the janissaries, but states that he was killed in the Galata fire. However, elsewhere (s.v. Ceşm siyah Pasha = black eye Pasha, IV, p.93), Süreyya refers to him as sekban başı, as Ağa of the janissaries and as SB of Kastamonu.
3. Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [Docs., pp.690-1].
4. Sanuto, VII, 166-7, 263-4, 266-7; X, 268; XII, 199, 507ff., 510, XIII, 512-3.
5. E.g., Kreutel, p.293 (Biographical index) lists the Karagöz who was killed by Shah Kuli as having been Ağa of the Janissaries in 1500 and SB of Kastamonu in 1502 (cf. Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.483 where a Karagöz beg is mentioned as being SB of Kastamonu in 1503 but who cannot be positively connected with the Karagöz who died in 1511). The picture is therefore one of total confusion. Reindl, (p.267-272) also merges the careers of the two Karagöz pashas, but it is not clear why.
6. Tansel, p.242 using Kemal Paşa Zāde. (see also Yahya Pasha, p.472). Karagöz is described as BB of Anatolia: 'Anadolu memalikinin Melik-ül-ümerası Karagöz Pasa.'
7. Parry (Cook), p.65; Fisher, pp.95-6 for a narrative account of Ottoman mobilisation based on the Diarii; Tansel, pp.239-246, largely using Kemal Paşa Zāde and Sa'adeddin.
8. Sanuto, VII, 266-7 [Docs., pp.690-1].
9. Sanuto, VII, 166-7; 263-4 [both Docs., pp.640-1]. See also G. Rota, Vita, f. 10r, 4 August 1507, 'Littere date da Napoli de Romania: De novo a xvii del passato El Sofi stava tre giornate solo del paese del Signor Turcho tamen ogni giorno le gente sue correivano su gli confini del dicto signor Turcho facendo grandissimi danni: per el

che Chierse bascia (?Karagöz Pasha) fu facto Bellibarbei del la nataglia [Anadolu] per confirmation de quel paese et cognoscendo lui el periculo grande refuto dicendo non voler andare et mese gli pena della vita dovesse assumere questa impresa. Constrecto se mese in ordine co grandissimo exercito facendo passare la gente in nella Nataglia: tamen ad tale impresa va molto mal voluntiere.'

10. Fisher, p.95 n.41 gives the total figures involved on the Ottoman side in the campaign. His numbers are based on Sanuto, VII, 266-7, the original of which I have found at ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288, Doc no. 291 [Docs., pp.690-1].
11. For Topkapı Saray sources see especially Unuçarşılı (Bell. XXX), p.567; Uluçay (TD VI/9), pp.65-68 and Tansel, pp.248ff. For various Selim-name and chronicle accounts of the episode, see Uğur, pt. II, pp.19-22.
12. Uzunçarşılı *op. cit.*, p.567; Uluçay, *op. cit.*, p.68; Tansel, p.251. Also, Hammer, *GOR*, II, p.355, 357 (*Hist.* IV, 108, 111) and Fisher, p.97.
13. Sanuto, XII, 199 [Docs., p.641]; XII, 507 [Docs., pp.590-1]; XII, 510, 512-3.
14. Sanuto, XII, 199 [Docs., p.641]. Giovio, *Commentario*, f.15rv actually mentions Kutahya: 'Lo essercito de Persiani era tumultuario, ma crescea ogni di più, di modo che furno alle mani con Caragius Bassa, et fu morto et impalato, dalli Sophiani appresso a la città de Cuttia, a la coda de quali andò subito Haly Bassa, con tagliardo essercito, et - - -.'
15. Only Sanuto, XII, 199 refers to his impalement. Sansovino *Annali*, f. 100v, says that he was impaled only after Hadım ^CAli had arrived and killed some of Kuli's men. All the reports cited vary in the number of sancakbeğis who were said to have fallen in battle: XII, 199 quotes a figure of ten, while the others quote between eighteen and twenty.

KARAGÖZ - sea captain (1511/917)

[MS: charagoxai]

[Ed: charagoxa]

(see Al Chixaide, p.111)

KEMAL RE'IS - corsair (1496-1511/901-917)

[Camallii]

d. 1511/917

Nationality and Background

Kemal Re'is, the most famous corsair in the reign of Bayezid, is the subject of a relatively extensive body of literature, both primary and secondary¹. His fame rests as much on his period in the service of sultan Bayezid as on his role as the scourge of Venetian and Christian shipping in general. While undoubtedly a corsair, he was also, perhaps like Kurt-Ođlu (q.v.), a sea-ghazi. Sources indicate that he was of Turkish origin, originally from a Karamanian family, that he was born either in Gelibolu or Karaburun and that he was brought up in Gelibolu.

Of more relevance to this study and indication of the attention paid to him by the Republic, Kemal Re'is is one the main figures of the Diarii, mentioned as often as such important individuals as Hersekzade and Hadım ^CAli. Little use has been made of this rich source of information (amounting to some 200 reports), which corroborates much of the chronicle source material and adds considerably to our understanding of his activities during these years. It does not, unfortunately, reveal much about his origins or early career. Diarii reports do, however, record that he had a wife in Tripoli (North Africa)², that he may have married again in 1506, this time to the wife of a Tunisian³, that he had sons in Corfu⁴ and a son-in-law acting as a spy in Venice.⁵ In general, the reports in the Diarii can be analysed in three stages: recruitment; Kemal's part in the Turco-Venetian war; and his activities after it.

(1) Recruitment

The very first reference in the Diarii to Turks is to Kemal Re'is himself, when in January 1496 Sanuto recorded that in the previous month 'Camali turcho nephandissimo' was apprehended in Negroponte. Bayezid immediately dispatched fifty janissaries to escort him and the ships under his command to Istanbul. The janissaries delivered him to Bayezid, having persuaded the Venetian provveditore of the fleet, Bartolomeo Zorzi, who encountered them at Lemnos on 6 December 1495, not to take Kemal into his custody as he would have liked to do (for damages done to Venetian subjects). Many letters of recommendation on Kemal's behalf were sent to Bayezid, pleading for his life and asserting that he was a stalwart of the faith ('mantignador di la fe', i.e. a qazi)⁶

But Bayezid had already intended to recruit him. It was Bayezid's dual policy in the last years of the 15th century to eliminate some corsairs and to embrace others into his service: either way piracy would be curbed and the Ottoman fleet's store of experience would be enhanced for the purpose of foreign conquests and the control of piracy. This was not the first time that Kemal had served a sultan: he had served in some capacity at various times during the 1470s and 1480s. In 1487/892 he was the chief of the (sea)azebs⁷. His service was interspersed with periods of outright piracy directed largely against Venetian interests. When Kemal arrived at the Porte on 18 February 1496, he was honoured but ordered not to engage in piracy any more. He was provided with a stipend of 20 aspers per day and made captain of one of the two nave grosse which Bayezid was building. For his part, Kemal presented Bayezid with ten Christian slaves⁸.

Kemal Reis had been recruited primarily to clear the Aegean of other corsairs. The following table outlines Kemal's activities against piracy in the period leading up to the Turco-Venetian war.

Date	no. and type of Kemal's ships	Nature of the activity
Oct 1496 DOI	5 galie 5 fuste 1 barza of botte 1500 1 barzota	KR is said to be mobilising against corsairs. The Venetians don't believe this is the reason for mobilisation and consider Taranto to be the true objective
Sanuto, I, 387		
Dec 1496		Alvise Sagudino, returning from from Istanbul, said that KR was the captain of some ships which had been 'armed' and would be directed against Rhodes and the corsairs
Sanuto, I, 399		
Jan 1497 DOI		Having mobilised from the Straits, KR attacked Venetian shipping in the gulf of Negroponte. The archipelago was in chaos
Sanuto, I, 462-3		
Jan 1497 DOI		KR encounters a pirate vessel at Montecastro; abandoned by the pirates, KR took the vessel (barza) to Lemnos and then to Tenedos to await Bayezid's orders.
Sanuto, I, 552		

July 1497	2 nave	These ships were being refitted in Istanbul and KR was expected to to set sail in them
DOI	of botte	
	700 and 400	

Sanuto, I 730-1

April 1498	6 galie	KR made captain of these ships which were 'armed' with <u>bombarde grosse</u> . KR had apparently <u>told the sultan</u> that he wanted to head for Malta and Sicily.
DOR	12 fuste	

Sanuto, I, 977

Comment: According to Malipiero (part I, p.160), in around March 1498 KR in command of 25 velle had landed at Naxos and tortured people before killing them. When news of this reached Venice, the provveditore of the fleet was given instructions to hunt KR down.

May 1498	2 nave grosse	KR suspected by the Venetians of despoiling the silver in the church of Santa Maria at San Sydro near Sythia.
DOR	4 galie	
	8 fuste	

Sanuto, I, 1009

4 June 1498	5 galie	KR arrives at Rosetta with presents for the Mamluk sultan from Bayezid. Whilst there, he engages in a bloody battle with a Portuguese corsair: 250 killed on the Turkish side alone
DOR	2 barze	
	6 fuste	

Sanuto, I, 1032-33

Comment: The source of this information - the capelan of Alexandria, states that it was said that KR had been given orders not to antagonise the Venetians, Florentines, Genoese and the Knights of Rhodes. This contradicts Ashikpāshāzāde's account which states that KR took several Christian ships while he was there, bringing the booty to the Beg of Alexandria.

20 June 1498
DOR

The Venetian nave di Syria are kept back in Cyprus for fear of KR who was believed to be in those waters

Sanuto, I, 1064

19 June 1498 19 navilii
DOR

KR in Egyptian waters

Sanuto, I, 1070-71

11 Sept 1498 10 galie
DOR 4 nave

KR about to embark with these ships under his control

Sanuto, II, 119, 120, (same source)

6 Oct 1498
DOR
29 Sept 1498

KR in Istanbul - very upset about a schierazo sunk by the provveditore of the fleet near Midilli. Believed that KR would not mobilise that winter; fleet preparations in Istanbul continue; shortage of gun powder

Sanuto, II, 130

(2) The Turco-Venetian War

With the onset of hostilities, Kemal Re'is's efforts were entirely directed towards fighting the Venetian fleet. As early as January 1499 it was reported that Kemal's orders were that he was to take (his part of) the fleet and assist Ömer Beg (q.v.), the principal commander at Lepanto on the landward side¹⁰. In February 1499 Kemal was involved in supervising the building of the fleet in Istanbul¹¹. When the fleet eventually embarked on campaign, Kemal Re'is was responsible for a flotilla of nave¹². Kemal himself commanded one of the three largest

ships in the Ottoman fleet - a nave (Turkish: Kuke) weighing 3000 botte with some 700 men on board¹³.

A measure of his authority is the suggestion in one report that while he knew the destination of the armada, the janissaries on board were kept in the dark¹⁴. Indeed, Bayezid's reliance on Kemal and on other corsair elements antagonised some members of the 'establishment'. For example, Fa'ik Pasha (q.v.) heavily criticised the sultan for trusting these 'ladri' (i.e. robbers), even going so far as to say that 'solum Camalli governa'¹⁵.

Surprisingly little mention is made in the Diarii reports about Kemal's role in the campaign of Lepanto itself, though his skill is acknowledged at Portolongo (Sapienza) where the Ottoman fleet erroneously believed itself to be under siege by the Venetians. This was a critical moment in the whole campaign¹⁶. With the fall of the Lepanto in August 1499, Kemal and the BB of Rumeli were left in charge of the ships which were left at Lepanto¹⁷.

At the start of the campaigning season of 1500, Kemal was involved in fleet preparations in the gulf of Lepanto where 15,000 men were carrying out repairs¹⁸. One report suggests that by June of that year, Kemal Re'is was one of the commanders in Lepanto of a fleet of some 250 velle latine, including 20 nave and 3 galeaze¹⁹. In August he was reported at sea with possibly 100 velle, possibly heading for Anabolu²⁰.

But as in the previous year's reports, there is little more, perhaps indicating Kemal's ability to evade the Venetian network of intelligence. It is interesting, however, that in the context of intelligence, Kemal revealed some details to a prisoner (Constantin de Michali from Corfu) who subsequently escaped and reported to the Venetian authorities about the fall of Modon and Koron²¹. It was also

rumoured that Kemal had arrived (in August) at Vaiussa to help end the Venetian blockade there. Although a report in Priuli indicates that Kemal had set off in the direction of Vaiussa, there is no confirmation that he actually helped the marooned fleet of Mustafa Beg (B) (q.v.)²².

By the end of November 1500, Kemal had returned to Istanbul - his nave grosse, in poor condition, was the last vessel in the fleet to return to port²³. Kemal had in fact brought home two prizes which were of significant value to Ottoman shipbuilding. De Michali had reported how on 24 August near Sapienza Kemal had captured the Mosta, a galia grossa, having first sunk another galia grossa, the Laza²⁴. When the Mosta was taken to Istanbul, its size and construction were greeted with amazement. Bayezid immediately ordered all the best shipwrights in Istanbul to go to Sinope and build 30 identical ships²⁵. The work of shipbuilding was also facilitated by Kemal's second prize, the capture of the Venetian shipwright Andrea De Re who had been on the Mosta²⁶.

1501 was a very active year for Kemal Reis. The first half was taken up with his fleet mobilisation which led to the fall of Navarino (Zonchio) to him (and to land forces) in ten hours on 26 May; at that point he commanded 14 fuste and 5 galiole²⁷ but reports indicate that during the preceding months he commanded between 10 and 50 fuste, including some galie²⁸. Other activities included his fortification of the fortress at Tenedos in March 1501²⁹; and a possible (but, as in the previous year, unconfirmed) journey to Vaiussa and Avlonya in May 1501 to break the Venetian blockade there³⁰. One of his last acts in the eastern Mediterranean, before embarking on an expedition to the Barbary coast which was to preoccupy him for the rest of the campaigning season, was a successful surprise attack on the Venetian fortress at Lessina (Legena). The huge number of two thousand people were reported to have

been captured and transported to Negroponte,³¹ indicating the sort of damage suffered by Venice during the war.

From late July there was a trickle of reports reaching Venice of Kemal's Barbary expedition. His fleet was reported to be composed of 6 galie, 8 fuste and 3 barzoti, sighted on 22 June at Kelibia near Tunis.³² The inspiration for this enterprise appears to have been a Christian native of Catalonia Georgi Andero, who in February 1501 had gone to Pera to find Kemal Reis and urged a fleet to be prepared to go the Barbary coast and then to Jeviza where there were 1500 slaves - Turks, Moors and Jews - who were working the mines. Andero predicted that the arrival of a Turkish fleet at Jeviza would provoke an uprising amongst the slaves who would hand the fortress there over to the Ottomans³³. Although Andero was Kemal's pilot on the expedition, here is no information about whether Kemal even attempted to go to the Spanish coast. What is clear is that Kemal's expedition in the west brought him into conflict with the Geneose. In July he seized Genoese ships and then sailed for Tripoli to take booty (and where it was said he had a wife) and to seek out the Venetian galie di Barbaria.³⁴ Two reports, however, indicate that at some point in July, Kemal had suffered a setback at the hands of the Venetian captain-general. It appears that the latter had captured some of his fuste when Kemal had entered the archipelago following a raid in Sardinia during which 1050 people had been captured.³⁵

During 1502, Kemal was largely preoccupied with assisting in the defence of Midilli and in the Ottoman counterattack on Santa Maura which had fallen to the Venetians on 30 August. Reports indicate that the galie and fuste under his command at various times were between 12 and 60.³⁶

But in spite of his efforts, his reputation by the end of the war appears to have sunk a little. Both Gritti and Caroldo state in their respective reports on the peace negotiations that Kemal had lost favour with the viziers³⁷. Perhaps this was due to the viziers' jealousy and fear of a potential rival, or it may be because Kemal may have been debilitated during 1503 by an illness which affected him from the end of 1502.³⁸ Reports later in 1507 again indicate that he lacked the support of the viziers, but that nevertheless he was able to gain favours through shrewdness.³⁹

(3) 1504-1511/909-917

Indeed, Bayezid still needed him and from 1504 until his death in 1511, Kemal would continue to perform valuable and loyal service on important missions at sea. In 1504 he was involved in operations against Rhodes because of the Knight's attacks on Ottoman grain shipments into the Straits⁴⁰. This unofficial grain war took up much of Kemal's time in the ensuing years. As well as taking the offensive (in the summer of 1505 he raided in Sicily and took three grain ships (1 Ragusan and 2 Sicilian)⁴¹, he also provided protection for ships transporting grain to Istanbul⁴². In July 1505 he escorted 2 galie and 3 fuste from Modon to Istanbul⁴³, and was used against the corsairs Kara Hasan (q.v.) and Kara Durmuş (q.v.) with some success⁴⁴.

A further campaign in the western Mediterranean absorbed Kemal's energies in 1506. It is not clear what inspired ~~during~~ this expedition, but towards the end of 1505 an envoy from the Moors of Djerba arrived in Istanbul seeking aid from Bayezid against Spain and requesting Kemal Reis to be their leader ('capo')⁴⁵. Whatever the reason, Kemal 'armed' 11 legni and headed for the West in early 1506⁴⁶. By June two reports

refer to Kemal being in the waters round Sicily with 22 velle under his command (including 3 galie grosse and 11 fuste)⁴⁷. His presence in the west caused the Venetians considerable alarm over the security of their galie di Barbaria and reinforcements were despatched for their protection.⁴⁸ By late August Kemal was reported to be at Djerba with 4 galie sotil, 4 fuste and the richly laden nave of the Genoese Procurator Matio di Prioli q Francesco which Kemal had captured probably as early as in April.⁴⁹ According to the provveditore of the fleet whom Kemal had met near Cerigo in late September/early October on his way back to Istanbul, Kemal claimed that he wanted to have good relations with Venice, and that he had in fact taken the nave Prioli from a corsair. Kemal Re'is later told the bailo in Istanbul that he had been well received by the provveditore.⁵⁰

By 9 October 1506 at the latest, Kemal was back in Gelibolu, and later that month he presented Bayezid with 100 slaves (teste) and the viziers with "between 25 and 60 each". According to the bailo (Lunardo Bembo), it was revealed that Bayezid was going to appoint Kemal a vizier when a vacancy next arose.⁵¹ Although this appointment never materialised, possibly due to vizierial opposition, perhaps an important precedent had been set which later allowed for the appointment of Barbarossa to the vizierate.

Speculation in 1507 about the mobilisation of a giant fleet of over 100 velle under Kemal's command and about its intended target⁵² ended when in August 1507 Kemal left Istanbul on an important mission to Alexandria. The small number of ships under his command⁵³ were carrying copper (8,000 miera di rami) and 50 artillery [pieces] to the Mamluk sultan. Bayezid's aim was to provide the Mamluks with the wherewithal to build a fleet and furnish it with artillery in order to impede

Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean.⁵⁴ In addition, Zuan Moresini in Damascus noted that a common fear of the Safavid threat had bound the Ottomans and Mamluks together and had prompted Bayezid to send Kemal Re'is to Alexandria with arms and craftsmen in order to manufacture artillery and passavolanti.⁵⁵ By September Kemal had arrived in Alexandria,⁵⁶ and by October, having unloaded his cargo, travelled inland to see the Mamluk sultan in Cairo.⁵⁷ The sudden arrival of cheap Ottoman copper had an unintentionally devastating effect on Venetian trading in the metal: Kemal had undercut the Venetian price, selling his copper at 7 ducats [presumably per miera] compared to the Venetians' 18 ducats. Even though the Venetian Consul in Alexandria, Marin da Molin (who reported this problem to the Signoria), dropped the price down to 14 ducats, the sultan was still unwilling to buy at that price.⁵⁸

In 1508 Bayezid again turned his attention to the constant menace to his grain shipments from the Knights in Rhodes and from privateers sheltering there. Some 60 navilii with their cargo of grain bound for the capital had apparently been intercepted.⁵⁹ In April 1508 he sent Kemal Reis out with some 12 fuste, including 4 galie sotil, to provide protection for the grain convoys.⁶⁰ During the summer there were also Venetian reports that Kemal had gathered a force of 60 velle and that the newly created Mamluk fleet would join up with Kemal's: the objective was not clear, some believing Cyprus to be the most likely, while there was also mention of Andros and of a joint expedition to Syria.⁶¹ However, Kemal appears to have spent the whole of the summer carrying out his protection duties.⁶² Simultaneously Kemal was dabbling in his Florentine galeaza with a rich cargo. In spite of Bayezid's appeals to return the vessel, Kemal refused to part with it.⁶³

From the end of 1508 until June 1510 the reports more or less dry

up. In June 1509 he was reported to have left the Straits in the direction of Negroponte with 40 velle;⁶⁴ and in December 1509 Bayezid was said to be 'arming' him to deal with corsairs again.⁶⁵ In fact Kemal was largely involved in preparations for yet another expedition to Alexandria. The Mamluk fleet was in Istanbul in the summer of 1510 to collect timber and artillery for further shipbuilding. Bayezid had provided the Mamluk envoy with all assistance, and by July the fleet was ready to return to Egypt.⁶⁶ Kemal Re'is had been chosen to accompany the fleet. Reports suggest a number of reasons why Kemal was making the journey: partly to deliver money to Korkud, Bayezid's son who had sought refuge with the Mamluk sultan, and partly to deliver Bayezid's annual contribution to Mecca.⁶⁷ Nicolo Zustinian also believed that Kemal had been asked to captain the Mamluk fleet against the [Portuguese] at Coloquut.⁶⁸ Although Kemal was transporting materials for what was described as the building of a Mamluk fleet 'for India', Kemal himself had been given orders to sail on to the Barbary coast once he had delivered his cargo, in order to give support to the King of Tunis, thus detracting from Zustinian's version.⁶⁹ Kemal was unable to fulfil any of his brief, however, for [as is also reported in Turkish sources] his fleet of 27 velle and 13 scapolade was caught in a storm off the island of Samos.⁷⁰ Kemal Reis himself was drowned. Estimates of the number of ships wrecked vary from 2 galie and 2 fuste to the 'greater part' of the flotilla. The Mamluk fleet escaped the storm.

Almost every year since his recruitment in 1496, Kemal had been involved in some major offensive or expedition. His contribution to Ottoman sea power had been great and can be measured by the extent to which the Republic tracked his movements and directed the Venetian merchant fleet to steer clear of him.

Notes

1. Burski, Kemal Reis, Bonn 1928; İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Kemal Reis, IA, Vol. 6, pp.566-569; J.H. Kramers, Kemal Reis, EI(1), vol. II, pp.853; Nejat Göyünc, Kemal Reis, EI(2), vol. IV, pp.881-882; Danişmend, I, pp.388, 404, 405; II, pp.271-435, and J.H. Mordtmann, Lebensgeschichte. For a bibliography of Turkish chronicle sources on Kemal, see entries in EI(1) and (2), and IA.
2. Sanuto, IV, 106.
3. Sanuto, VI, 300.
4. Sanuto, III, 860.
5. Sanuto, IV, 267.
6. Sanuto, I, 10.
7. Süreyya, IV, p.78; EI(2), op. cit., pp.881-2; IA, op. cit., p.566. The implication in the Diarii is that Kemal was recruited in December 1495 and that he was not already in Bayezid's service from 1494 as is suggested in IA. However, elsewhere (Sathas, VI, p.242) Alvise Sagudino indicates that Bayezid wanted to use Kemal and Oruc (q.v.) as early as the first quarter of 1495. He wanted to provide them with galleys to avenge the disgrace accorded to the Ottoman ambassador Qasim Beg (q.v.) who was robbed by the Prefect of Sinigaglia (near Ancona).
8. Sanuto, I, 10, 83-4, 136, 624-5; Malipiero, part I, p.151. For further information on the size of his stipend, see Kissling, Kemal Reis, p.158 and EI(2), op. cit., p.882.
9. IA, op. cit., p.853. Kemal's mission as the bearer of Bayezid's gifts to the Mamluk sultan would seem to contradict Kramer's tentative remark that 'at this time therefore he [Kemal] probably was not serving the Sultan.'
10. Sanuto, II, 289-290 [Docs., p.668], the Relazione of Alfonso Alicusebei. Since the campaigning season had not yet begun, this may indicate a considerable degree of planning in advance.
11. Sanuto, II, 421.
12. Sanuto, II, 695-6, 710, 740, 790, 839; Priuli, I, p.168 (navilii grossi).
13. Sanuto, II, 1054-55, 1063, 1065; see also Tansel, p.187. For an analysis of the opposing fleets, see Lane, pp.148-150.
14. Sanuto, II, 1063.
15. Sanuto, II, 1128 [Docs., p.628].
16. Sanuto, III, 11-14. For an account of the various naval actions of 1499 (Sapienza, Navarino, Lepanto), see Lane, pp.150 ff.

17. Sanuto, III, 129, 181 (autumn of 1499).
18. Sanuto, III, 181, 397.
19. Sanuto, III, 442.
20. Sanuto, III, 731-2, 732.
21. Sanuto, III, 949-952.
22. Sanuto, III, 763-4; Priuli, II, p.45.
23. Sanuto, III, 1222-4.
24. Sanuto, III, 949-951.
25. Sanuto, III, 950.
26. See pp.190-1.
27. Sanuto, IV, 47-48. According to Priuli, II, p.140, Kemal entered the port of Navarino with 28 velle.
28. Sanuto, III, 1548, 1556, 1557, 1559, 1585-6, 1589; IV, 21, 22, 38-9, 43. Forty velle seems to have been the average size of his flotilla, though one report from the Bailo of Corfu refers to Kemal in Gelibolu in early February with 100 velle (Sanuto, III, 1592). This latter report is confirmed by information from the provveditore of the fleet, Giacomo Venier, who believed the Ottoman target were the Venetian galie da Baruto (Priuli, II, p.116).
29. Sanuto, IV, 43.
30. Sanuto, IV, 57-8, 74. The Captain General also reported a rumour (Priuli, II, p.147) that Kemal had gone to Vafussa by land, but when the General went to Vafussa himself, he found nothing to substantiate this information.
31. Sanuto, IV, 83. Sanuto adds that this information was not that reliable.
32. Sanuto, IV, 71, 84, 84-5 ('4 galie and many fuste'), IV, 106 ('3 galie and 16 fuste'), IV, 111.
33. Sanuto, IV, 88-89. Andero is described as 'uno catelano christiano, vechio, grando de persona, un poco gobo', and a 'citadin e gentilhomo di Jeviza' who had given himself over to piracy.
34. Sanuto, IV, 71, 106.
35. Sanuto, IV, 105-6, 106. Both are eye-witness reports. IV, 105 states that Kemal's 19 fuste were captured, which broadly tallies with the total number of ships under his command. See Kissling, Kemal Reis, for analysis of Kemal's activity in the western Mediterranean in 1501.

36. Sanuto, IV, 242-3, 250-1, 259, 277-8, 279, 402-3, 403-4, 322-3, 393, 394, 479, 479-80, 641, 679, 804-7.
37. Sanuto, V, 465, 451.
38. Sanuto, IV, 641, 679 ('mal conditionato e mal franzoso').
39. Sanuto, VI, 554, VII, 52. One source even suggests that Iskender Bostancı Başı (q.v.), who was said to be jealous of Kemal, had some part in his eventual death by arranging for him to sail in an unsound ship (see IA, op. cit., p.568b).
40. Sanuto, V, 835; VI, 137, 151, 162, 163, 180, 190, 275. About 37 fuste and 3 galie were under his command; also IA, op. cit., p.568b.
41. Sanuto, VI, 230.
42. See below, note 60.
43. Sanuto, VI, 218, 223, 277.
44. Sanuto, VI, 195, 198.
45. Sanuto, VI, 277.
46. Sanuto, VI, 300.
47. Sanuto, VI, 368, 369-70.
48. Sanuto, VI, 370, 489, 426.
49. Sanuto, VI, 426, 427-8, and also VI, 334-5.
50. Sanuto, VI, 449, 530-1.
51. Sanuto, VI, 519.
52. Sanuto, VI, 548, 554; VII, 52, 78, 127.
53. Sanuto, VII, 168: 1 barza, 1 schierazo grosso, 2 fuste grosse.
54. Sanuto, VII, 152, 164. The copper came from Kastamon, well-known for its export of metals.
55. Sanuto, VII, 535: this seems to be an original document inserted in the Diarri.
56. Sanuto, VII, 164, 172-3.
57. Sanuto, VII, 181-2; IA, op. cit., p.568a.
58. Sanuto, VII, 252-3, 271.
59. Sanuto, VII, 538: the period is not specified.

60. Sanuto, VII, 440, 476, 538.
61. Sanuto, VII, 580, 607, 630.
62. Sanuto, 628, 630, 649, 658.
63. Sanuto, VII, 674, 676, 676-7, 710, 711, 767-8.
64. Sanuto, VIII, 505-6.
65. Sanuto, IX, 486.
66. Sanuto, XI, 164, 294, 589, 620-1.
67. Sanuto, XI, 164, 589, 620-1.
68. Sanuto, X, 868-9.
69. Sanuto, XI, 620-1.
70. Sanuto, XI, 661, 663. Two independent sources at the beginning of 1510 prematurely reported his death (X, 162, 254-5).

[KONTO KARACA] - envoy (1504/909-910)

[Condo caragia]

His nationality is not clear, but his name suggests he may have been a Greek. Although not named in the Diarii, his mission to Venice in May-June 1504 as Mustafa (B)'s envoy is noted,¹ and his name is recorded in the registers of the Senate.² The Venetian government must already have been aware of his background, for he was described in the deliberations of the Senate on 18 May 1504 as an enemy of Venice.³ Eighteen months later in November 1505 Karaca appears to have been sent on a second mission to Venice on Mustafa (B)'s behalf.⁴ On this occasion Gritti and the Signoria (both recipients of letters from Mustafa (B) borne by Karaca) were convinced of double dealing on Karaca's part. Gritti wrote to Mustafa (B), by now SB of Niğbolu, explaining that his envoy had not been serving him faithfully and, moreover, that he had refused the decent lodging offered him, preferring instead to mix with people of low reputation and to denigrate the Venetian state.⁵ So

concerned was the Council of Ten about his behaviour, that on 7 November 1505 it debated the question of arranging his death.

Notes

1. Sanuto, VI, 23, 26, 38. For details of the mission, see pp.367-8.
2. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 26r-28r, 8 June 1504.
3. Idem., reg. 40, ff. 22v-26r, 18 May 1504: '- - - et questo suo nuntio hom de pessimo qualità et inimco nostro el qual se po render certi faria mal offitio nonostante alcuna iustification se li potesse addur.'
4. Idem., reg. 40, f. 129r-130v, November 1505.
5. Idem., reg. 40, f. 129r: '- - - che dovesse dechiarir ala Signoria Vostra (i.e. Mustafa) et etiam per li sinistri et mali modi servati per esso condo cum pocho honor suo,- - -'
6. ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 30, f. 225r, 7 November 1505, as cited in Lamansky, vol. I, p.34.

KORKUD - Turkish mercenary (1510/916)

[Curchut]

Sanuto, XI, 127, DOR: 14th July 1510: a Turkish mercenary fighting on the side of Venice in the war of the League of Cambrai in July 1510.

KURT-OĞLU RE'IS - corsair (1509-1518/915-924)

[Cortogli/Curtogli/Cartugli/Curtugli/
Cartegolli/Cortogolus/Corgogli/Chartagli/
Carazoli/Caragoli/Cargoli/Cortuli/Curtoli/
Curtogoli/Crustogoli/Curteulli/Cuortogoli]

With the exception of Kemal Re'is, Kurt-oğlu is the most active and most powerful corsair figure in the first half of the Diarii.¹ The Diarii first mention him in November 1508,² from when he is reported to have played havoc among Christian merchant shipping, particularly

Venetian, and (like Kemal Re'is) won the favour of Selim who recruited him into his newly expanded fleet to assist in conquest in the East. A measure of the importance with which he was viewed by the Venetians are the numerous references in the Diarii to him by name, for which there are many variations.

A collation of the many reports offers some indication of the extent of his power and the range of his attacks.

Date	No. and type of K's ships	Area	Nature of damage caused
1509 Sept 24	9 fuste	Andros	Attack by night on a village inhabited by Albanians: 4 killed, 12 wounded, 87 women and children, and 1 man abducted. 3 turks killed and a number wounded.

Sanuto, X, 44-45

1510 May		Capo Malio	Took three <u>gripi</u> with men on board, and took 5 people at Kea, 80 at Firminia, and killed 5.
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Sanuto, XI, 209-210

1510 Sept	6 fuste	Chios	Took 100 inhabitants of Chios. They were subsequently ransomed by the people of Chios for 100,000 aspers and returned after four days.
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Sanuto, XI, 704-5

No reference is made to Kurt-Oglu in the Diarii until November 1514.

1514 Nov	5 vele 1 barza of 200 botte	Aegean	Said to be in the archipelago.
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Sanuto, XIX, 305-6

1515 Summer	18 fuste 4 galliots		He came from the Barbary coast. Unable to take in provisions from the Ottoman lands, he landed at Chios where he replenished himself and then attacked four islands: Mykonos, Syros, Siphnos and Melos. He was repulsed in each case and returned to the Barbary coast.
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Sanuto, XXI, 141-2

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 1515
Aug
Sanuto, XXI, 342-3 | 11 fuste
3 galliots | Attacks the <u>nave</u> of Francesco Foscari. |
| 1516
Feb
Sanuto, XXI, 518 | 5 ships | Five ships spotted near Corfu, and it is understood that these are his ships who until then had been on the Barbary Coast. |
| 1516
Apr
Sanuto, XXII, 200 | 27 fuste | Joint operation with Barbarossa against island of Elba. |
| 1516
cMay
Sanuto, XXII, 290 | 40 vele | According to the Venetian consul in Naples: Kurt-Ođlu now has over 40 ships and had taken a Sicilian <u>nave</u> of 800 <u>botte</u> on its way back to Sicily from <u>England</u> and <u>via</u> Genoa. |
| 1516
Aug
Sanuto, XXII, 541, 547 | 15 vele | Filippo Marangon from Calabria tells the Bailo of Corfu that Kurt-Ođlu had attacked Calabria, and was expecting to be joined by another 15 ships. The Bailo feared that perhaps Corfu's defences were inadequate. |
| 1516
July
Sanuto, XXII, 615-6 | 22 vele | Ragusa News to Ragusa from Taranto, that Kurt-Ođlu was at Capo Santa Maria with 22 ships, including four galie, causing havoc. He had taken a <u>schierazo</u> from Zante with <u>merchandise</u> and had taken two <u>fuste</u> from the papal and French fleets. |
| 1516
Aug
31
Sanuto, XXII, 662-3 | 3 galliots
6 fuste
3 unspecified ships | Sighted at Capo Santa Maria. Shortly before 31 August he had sacked Soprasana near Otranto, where he had taken prisoners and agreed 1,200 ducats ransom. |
| 1516
Sept
Sanuto, XXIII, 78, 109-110 | | Letters from Corfu, Crete and Cyprus tell of the damage he is doing. He had been to Candia and taken many ships (gripi). The Venetian Marin Falier had been intercepted on his way back to Venice and was forced to ransom himself for 3,000 ducats. He also ransomed others. Those who could not pay were killed. |

1516	Corfu	Bailo there says that Kurt-Ođlu had
Sept		taken five ships (<u>navili</u>) and caused
		damage in the area.

Sanuto, XXIII, 110

1516	Anabolu	He had taken 70 people from there.
cNov		Nicolo Lipomano, rettor and prov there,
		blamed the removal of <u>stratioti</u>
		earlier on.

Sanuto, XXIII, 262.

1516		He went to his home in Anatolia.
Oct		

Sanuto, XXIII, 298

The most striking feature of this collation, apart from the sizeable fleets which Kurt-Ođlu was able to muster, is Kurt-Ođlu's practice of seizing individuals for the purpose of ransom. Like other corsairs, his favoured haunt was the Aegean archipelago which he invariably ravaged during the summer months, returning to the Barbary coast (and to Djerba³) for the winter season. It seems he was originally from Anatolia and that he may well have been of Turkish background.⁴

The Venetians viewed him as one of their greatest enemies and expended considerable effort in trying to track him down and destroy him, but were singularly unsuccessful.⁵ The Knights at Rhodes as well as the Pope were also intent on putting an end to this menace.⁶ However, by the time the Christian forces had decided to take action, Kurt-Ođlu had secured the support of the sultan: Selim, realising the power he could harness, recruited him in late 1516 and his flotilla into the Ottoman armada⁷ which was to go east under the overall command of Ca'fer Pasha (q.v.) to meet Selim in Cairo and assist in the conquest of the Mamluks.

The Ottomans had already demonstrated their tolerance of his

activities and paid scant regard to the sufferings of Christian merchants. In October 1509 the SB of Negroponte, Iskender Bostancı Bası, had accepted a bribe from Kurt-Oğlu in exchange for turning a blind eye to his plundering.⁸ When in January 1516 the ballo Nicolo Zustinian complained to the viziers about him, they responded that he was not under their control and ^{they} were powerless to help.⁹ Piri Pasha was no more sympathetic when Zustinian's successor, Lunardo Bembo, sought his help in October 1516.¹⁰ In December of that year, and while he was in the service of Selim, Kurt-Oğlu ravaged the countryside near Rethymon, provoking the garrison there to institute expensive defensive measures.¹¹ In February 1517 the situation deteriorated still more, for, according to Bembo, Kurt-Oğlu had executed 150 of his Christian slaves, amongst whom were Venetian subjects: Bembo suggested that Mocenigo and Contarini, who were about to go on an embassy to Selim, should include Kurt-Oğlu's atrocities in the agenda of their Commission.¹² This, however, would place them in an awkward situation, since Kurt-Oğlu was in Selim's service.

When in March 1517/Rebī^c I 923 the 160 strong Ottoman fleet under the command of Ca^cfer Pasha left Istanbul for Egypt, Kurt-Oğlu's contribution consisted of some thirty-five ships.¹³ His intended function was to play a central role in the provisioning of Selim's army on campaign. In orders despatched by ulak from Selim in January 1517, he was specifically instructed to transport victuals to the army in Syria. He was firstly to sail to Chios and pick up biscuit, of which the Maonesi had been ordered to prepare 200,000 kantars; he was then to sail along the southern Anatolian coast, collecting provisions on the way for delivery at Tripoli.¹⁴

Receiving intelligence of the journey, the Knights of Rhodes

decided to intercept Kurt-Oğlu as he sailed between Rhodes and the Anatolian mainland near Marmaris. On the evening of Friday 6 March, the two fleets engaged each other. In a three hour battle, the outnumbered Rhodian fleet of 17 ships (including two nave grosse) was given a severe battering by Kurt-Oğlu's armada of 35 ships which, using artillery, sank the nave grosse, forcing the remainder to limp back to Rhodes. Kurt-Oğlu's losses were three galleys, but he was free to continue his journey to Syria.¹⁵

There is no further information about his journey to Syria, but reports show that he arrived in Alexandria towards the end of May (the same time as the arrival of Cafer Pasha with the main fleet), where it appears he immediately began to threaten Christian and in particular Venetian shipping interests and to counsel Selim to take a hard line against them.¹⁶ Selim must have held Kurt-Oğlu in high regard, since the latter was said to be the helmsman of the brigantin which in June 1517 ferried Selim round an inspection of his newly arrived fleet.¹⁷ Kurt-Oğlu then sailed up the Nile to Cairo with some 25 ships where he remained until September 1517,¹⁸ continuing to counsel Selim against Venetian interests and urging him to allow as much plunder as possible for the troops.¹⁹

Around 20 September, Kurt-Oğlu embarked for Istanbul, leaving Damietta with 32 ships. Accompanying the flotilla in a Venetian galley and in Kurt-Oğlu's overall charge were Alvise Mocenigo, one of the Venetian ambassadors (see p.109, 170, 414, 466), and his secretary Daniel di Lodovici, in compliance with Selim's direct orders. Five hundred janissaries were also said to have embarked, and it was rumoured that the flotilla was carrying some of Selim's most valued acquisitions.²⁰ On 6 October Kurt-Oğlu passed through the Straits of Rhodes.²¹ He temporarily parted company with Mocenigo, allowing him to

go on to Chios alone, while some eighty miles away he attended to some business (unspecified).²² On 22 October Kurt-Ođlu and Mocenigo arrived in Istanbul.²³ Not only had Mocenigo encountered rough weather, but he complained in a letter to Venice about the uncouth language and manners of Kurt-Ođlu all the way from Damietta to Gelibolu.²⁴

Although the picture is by no means clear, Kurt-Ođlu's return to Istanbul marked the end of his service for Selim. According to one report, he had been discharged from the fleet by 2 October and given a pension of 80 aspers a day,²⁵ but this would conflict with the reports which show that he was still accompanying Mocenigo to Istanbul until 22 October. Nevertheless Kurt-Ođlu had always shown that he was a law unto himself. When referring to a two year truce between Selim and the Grand Master of Rhodes, his view was that, whatever Selim's actions, no truce had been made with him.²⁶ Christians were his sworn enemies. Such an uncompromising attitude was not always acceptable to the sultan, and now that Kurt-Ođlu's mission had been completed, Piri Pasha (q.v.) found it more politic than before to pay some attention to Venetian petitions put to him by Mocenigo.²⁷ One report in January 1518 even states that Kurt-Ođlu had been thrown into prison in Istanbul at the request of Mocenigo.²⁸ It is not clear from the reports what was Kurt-Ođlu's personal participation in various raids against Venetian possessions in the Aegean archipelago after his return from Egypt. However, as had been feared, the return of his flotilla and of the corsairs who sailed with him did herald a renewed and increased threat from piracy to both Venice²⁹ and the Ottomans with one report stating that the nephew and son-in-law of Kurt-Ođlu were at the head of a force of 31 ships which were attacking shipping in the archipelago in December

1517.³⁰ Worse still, a formidable force of 24 ships had been formed by the rebellion of three erstwhile captains of Kurt-Oğlu: Bronzus (q.v.), Piri Re'is (q.v.) and Tachialis Suleiman (q.v.) had declared themselves rebels and returned to piracy.³¹

Notes

1. N.B: Record of his activities continues in Diarii reports after 1517. Guglielmoti, vol. I, pp.5-6 cites him as one of a number of famous corsairs who rose from the 'criminal strata of the mob...', to become in the 16th century 'sovereigns' of this or that island or port enclave in the Mediterranean.
2. Sanuto, VII, 767-770.
3. Sanuto, XXII, 290-1.
4. Sanuto, XXIII, 289.
5. Sanuto, XXI, 518; XXII, 548; XXII, 662-5: According to Sebastian Moro, the provveditore of the fleet, Kurt-Oğlu was 'inimico de tuta la christianità, et praecipue de Vostra Sublimità (i.e. of the Doge); XXIII, 109-110, 248; XXIII, 548-9: Fear of Kurt-Oğlu among Venetian merchants had upset the trade of wine from Candia to Istanbul, thus disrupting the business of the baillagio.
6. Sanuto, XIX, 463-5; XX, 316.
7. Sanuto, XXIII, 547-9 (reports dated 28 November 1516).
8. See p.251.
9. Sanuto, XXII, 9.
10. Sanuto, XXIII, 384-5.
11. Sanuto, XXIV, 147.
12. Sanuto, XXIV, 101-2.
13. See Ca^Cfer pp.167ff; and Sanuto, XXIII, 608 [Docs., p.611]; XXIV, 125, 172-3, 205-6.
14. Sanuto, XXIV, 157-8. According to ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 49, 22 December 1516, Bembo thought he was also to transport munitions.
15. Sanuto, XXIV, 154-5, 164-7, 172-3.
16. Sanuto, XXIV, 456, 494, 506 and Ca^Cfer, p.169.
17. Sanuto, XXIV, 599-600.

18. Sanuto, XXIV, 604-5; XXV, 37-38, 38-39.
19. Sanuto, XXV, 52-3, see p.109.
20. Sanuto, XXV, 71-2, 79-80, 131-3, 143-4, 265-6 [Docs., p.684].
21. Sanuto, XXV, 94-5.
22. Sanuto, XXV, 153-4. See also p.466.
23. Sanuto, XXV, 153-5.
24. Sanuto, XXV, 153, 154-5.
25. Sanuto, XXV, 61-2.
26. Sanuto, XXV, 71-2.
27. Sanuto, XXV, 239.
28. Sanuto, XXV, 247.
29. Sanuto, XXV, 273-4, 275, 276.
30. Sanuto, XXV, 247.
31. Sanuto, XXV, 265-6 [Docs., p.684].

LUCHIS - ulak (1515/921)

[sic]

Sanuto, XX, 242-3, DOR: 6 March 1515 [Docs., p.643]: Luchis, an ulak ('corier'), arrived in Iskenderun ('Scandalorum') with a command from Selim that no ships should depart for Syria, the implication being that they were required for Selim's impending mobilisation.

MAGNUT - voyvoda of Argos (1502/908)

[sic]

Sanuto, IV, 608-9, DOR: 12 October 1502: The rettori of Anabolu reported that Magnut, voyvoda of Argos, had defected to them. They described him as a man of 28 years, very rich, 'di bona reputation' second in importance to the sancakbeği [presumably of the Morea] himself, and nephew of Count Xarco. A reference to the unnamed voyvoda of Argos in February 1499 indicates that the voyvoda had written to Bayezid outlining the weaknesses and requirements of the fortifications at Argos, whereupon the SB [of the Morea] was ordered to take measures to fortify the place. This may have been Magnut.¹

His defection provided the Venetians with up to date intelligence about the Ottoman-Safavid conflict;² Bayezid's reaction to the Venetian capture of Santa Maura; and Bayezid's failure to attend the Divan ('non ha tenuto Porta') or see his viziers for ten days.

The extent to which the Collegio considered his defection a prize is demonstrated by the massive majority (146 to 2) with which it voted to award him a condotta (military commission) and a stipend of 20 ducats per month.³ He was sent to Friul, having [?re-]converted to Christianity.

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 597-8. For a later reference to the unnamed voyvoda of Argos, but unconnected with Magnut, see Sanuto, X, 374.
2. See Yahya Pasha, p.470, 474, n.20.
3. Sanuto, IV, 631. Sanuto was among those who voted in favour.

MALBOCHELVICH - (1501/906)

[sic]

Sanuto, III, 1623 [Docs., pp.685-6]: One of the seven commanders ('septem duces') in Bosnia under the overall command of Iskender Pasha during the Ottoman campaign in northern Dalmatia of 1501/906.

MANOLI - tercüman (1499/905)

[sic]

Sanuto, II, 703, 781-2: Manoli, described as 'turciman liarino'¹ voluntarily converted to Islam ['se fece turcho'] in February 1499 and was showing particular enmity towards Venice. In June 1499 a certain Manoli [probably the same man] was reported to have delivered letters to the captain general of the sea from Fa'ik Pasha (see p.207) with whom he was friendly.

Notes

1. 'liarino' according to the MS, 'homo' in the edition.

MANOL - vizier (1518/924)

[Manuel]

Sanuto, XXV, 688-9: Manuel is the only vizier [bassa]¹ to have returned with Selim from campaign in Egypt in the summer of 1518. He is described as 'zovene di età anni zerca 30 et monstra esser gentil persona'.

Notes

1. It is clear from context that 'bassa' is not simply an expression of rank but should be translated as 'vizier'.

MARMARA - scrivani (1499/904-5)

[sic]

Sanuto, II, 981-2: 'scrivani' or secretary mentioned in the letter of Mehmed, voyvoda of Corinth, as the bearer of letters from Halil Pasha, SB of Morea (q.v.), to the provveditore of Anabolu.

MARZUZ-OĞLU - SB (1513/919)

[Marzuzoglia/Marzuzogli]

Sanuto, XVII, 10-11 (Relazione Zuan Paul Gradenigo, locotenente in Cyprus) [Docs., p.659]: Marzuz-oğlu intercepted the letter sent by [?Koca] Mustafa (see p.351, n.113) to Ahmed offering support against Selim, who was the master of both Marzuz-oğlu and Mustafa. Marzuz-oğlu abandoned the siege of Amasya to take the letter to Selim in Bursa. This action led to the execution of Mustafa Pasha.

BIYIKLI MEHMED PASHA[Machmech Bech/Buclime Hemet/Mirachor/
Miriacur/Miracur/Imbracor/Imbriacor]Identity and Background

Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha is only once referred to in the Diarii by his full name¹ and then only in the well-known letter of the Kadi-Casker on the war with the Mamluks, the translation of which Sanuto copied into the Diarii.² For the most part, therefore, I have identified Bıyıklı through the Venetian variations (i.e. mirachor, imbracor etc., see above) of emir-i ahur or Master of the Horse, the rank he held for most of his career.

His rise to power was directly linked to the position he held as

emir-i ahur in the household of Prince Selim during the latter's governorship in Trabzon. When Selim succeeded in his bid to become Sultan in April 1512/Şafer 918, Bıyıklı profited from his master's changed circumstances and now found himself in the rank of emir-i ahur of a sultan.³ Although the Diarii do not mention the longstanding connection between Bıyıklı Mehmed and Selim, other Venetian sources explicitly refer to the intimacy of their relationship and to the fact that Bıyıklı Mehmed was a slave in Selim's personal household and that he had accompanied Selim from Trabzon.⁴

Career

1500/906 Little is known of his early career, although he appears to have played a part in the military operations of 1500 against the Venetians.⁵

20 July 1512/6th Cumāda I 918 (?) Bıyıklı defeats kızılbaş forces at the bloody battle of Göksu, but there is some dispute⁶ as to whether the kızılbaş general was Nur ^CAlı and as to whether the latter was killed in this battle.

Late 1512/Razan 918 Bıyıklı forms part of the vanguard forces of Selim, harassing Prince Ahmed and preventing him from regrouping his men.⁷

14(?) April 1513/7(?) Safer 919 He and the BB of Anatolia lead Selim's vanguard against Prince Ahmed in an attempt to gain control of the road to Bursa from Mount Olympus (Keşişdağı), but they are outnumbered and defeated with heavy losses at Ermeni Derbend.⁸ Ahmed, however, did not take advantage of this early success and was finally defeated by Selim at Yenishehir on 15 April 1513/8 Şafer 919.⁹

War with the Safavids (Phase 1) (1514-1516/920-922)

After Selim's victory at Chaldiran and entry into Tabriz, followed by his withdrawal to Amasia to set up winter quarters, Bıyıklı played a decisive role in consolidating the Ottoman conquests in the eastern marches.

Bayburd (October 1514/Şa^cbān-Ramāzān 920). After a bitter struggle the fortress of Bayburd and other castles in the region fell to Bıyıklı who was rewarded by Selim with the appointment of BB of the newly formed province of Erzincan to act as a buffer against Safavid expansion.¹⁰

Kemah (19 May 1515/5 Reb^t II 921). Bıyıklı was then ordered to assail the castle of Kemah, but its conquest was only achieved on the arrival of Selim himself to exhort the besiegers.¹¹

Diyarbakir (October 1515/Ramāzān 922) Bıyıklı's next task was to raise the Safavid siege of Diyarbakir which he succeeded in doing in October 1515, forcing the Safavid general Karakhan to withdraw.¹²

Kochhisar (May-June 1516/Reb^t II and Cumāda I 922). Safavid resistance continued, however, until the following campaigning season when Karakhan was defeated and killed by Bıyıklı Mehmed at the battle of Kochhisar. This victory led to the surrender of other castles in Kurdistan which had not hitherto recognised Ottoman rule.¹³

While Bıyıklı Mehmed was engaged in these strenuous but highly successful campaigns, the viziers were on the receiving end of Selim's wrath for their advice that the whole campaign against Shah Ismail should be abandoned, and the janissaries were rioting in Amasia in protest against the hard rigours of the war (October 1514-February 1515/Ramāzān 920-Muḥarrem 921).¹⁴

War with the Mamluks

At this point Bıyıklı Mehmed was caught up in the conflict with the Mamluks. During the spring of 1516/922 relations between Selim and Kānshūh al-Ghaurī had deteriorated largely as a result of the destabilization of the buffer zone between the three states - Ottoman, Mamluk and Safavid - which had been caused by Bıyıklı's conquests aimed at consolidating the gains of the Chaldiran campaign. As al-Ghaurī mobilized his army northwards, Selim took the decision (4 August 1516/ 5 Receb 922) to divert his forces from a renewed assault on Persia and instead to turn south to meet the Mamluks. At the ensuing battle of Marj Dabik (24 August 1516/25 Receb 922) Bıyıklı was in command of the Kurdish contingent on the left wing of the Ottoman army.¹⁵

Our information on Bıyıklı during the rest of the Mamluk campaign is limited. After Marj Dabik he accompanied Selim into Aleppo where according to the reports of Nicolo Moro, a Venetian merchant, he appears to have abused the hospitality offered by the resident Latin (or Frankish) community there by requisitioning their houses for his sojourn (September 1516/Şa^cbān 922). Otherwise the Latin merchant community in Aleppo was unaffected by the substitution of Mamluk for Ottoman administration in the city.¹⁶

War with the Safavids (Phase 2) (1517-18/923-924)

It is not clear whether Bıyıklı Mehmed remained by Selim's side for the remainder of the Mamluk campaign (the final and conclusive battle - Ridaniyya - was fought on 23 January 1517/29th Zū'l-ḥicca 923), but by September 1517/Ramāzān-Şawwāl 923 when Selim began his return journey from Cairo to Istanbul, Bıyıklı was already back on the north-eastern front fighting another bitter campaign against Shah Ismail. This period

of his career is the most fully documented¹⁷ in the Diarîi which tell of his penetration into Safavid territory as far as Baghdad and Mesopotamia,¹⁸ and it was largely due to his efforts that the provinces of Mosul and Raqqa were united to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ In spite of serious difficulties - at times he sent urgent requests to Selim for aid²⁰ - he was able to bear the full brunt of Safavid resistance until the arrival of the Grand Vizier Piri Pasha with reinforcements.²¹ By June 1518/Cumāda II 924 the eastern marches had been secured.

Influence and Authority; loyalty to Selim; aid to Venice

Bıyıklı Mehmed's authority - and the fact that he survived as long as he did when others met untimely deaths - not only rested in his proven ability to win battles but also in that he was totally the personal "slave" of the sultan and had always been permanently attached to his household since Selim's days in Trabzon. This had the effect of making him one of the most trusted of Selim's counsellors. Venetian diplomats knew from 1513-14/919-920 that he and not the viziers was one of the main channels to the Sultan and they first sought to win his support in their efforts to obtain Ottoman military aid in their wars in Europe.²² Although Nicolo Zustinian was assured of his support and good will, fortified as it was with a payment of 1,000 ducats on behalf of the Venetian Republic,²³ Selim's preoccupation with his impending campaign against the Safavids was overwhelming and no aid was forthcoming. However, Bıyıklı's loyalty was such that, unlike the viziers,²⁴ he did not oppose his master's grandiose designs and fought indefatigably to promote them. When in late 1517 the question of the tribute to be paid for Cyprus was under discussion, the Venetian ambassadors Mocenigo and Contarini remarked that only he, the Kadi-

Casker of Rumeli and the Sultan's Hoca (q.v.) were reputed to carry any weight with Selim.²⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXV, 651-669 [Docs., pp.649-650]; col. 653: "Buclime Hemet" which I take to mean Bıyıklı Mehmed. On one other occasion he is referred to as "Machmech bech" (XXII, 462 [Docs., p.646]).
2. For the original manuscript of the translation (but probably not the version from which Sanuto made his copy since Sanuto's version has a short additional paragraph at the end), see BNM, Cod. It. VI, 276 (8398), 24r-44v.
3. Süreyya, vol. IV. p.109, and appendix, p.732.
4. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, Corresp. of bailo Nicolo Zustinian, fasc. 34, ff. 1r-2r: "L'è de qui el maistro de la Stalla del gran Signor et il suo capici bassi nominato Sinambeï --, i qual sono schiavi proprii de la Excellentia del Signor et venuti cum lui de Trapesunda - - -." [Docs., p.645-6].
5. Tansel, p.202 and n. 167. There is no trace of Bıyıklı in the early volumes of the Diarîi.
6. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.130 puts forth the argument that Nur ^CAli was killed at Göksu and that there is a "very strong probability" that his vanquisher by the name of Mehmed was in fact Bıyıklı the emir-i ahur. However, Sohrweide, p.160, no. 418 strongly opposes this view pointing to other sources which state that Nur ^CAli did not die until 1515/921. Tansel, p.257 refers to Uluçay, stating that Nur ^CAli was killed at Göksu in 1512/918.
7. Uluçay (TD VII/10), pp.137-8 and 139.
8. Uluçay (TD VIII/11-12), pp.193, 195 n. 73 and n. 74 (letters of Bıyıklı on campaign) and 197 (defeat); Hammer, GOR, II, p.387 (Hist. IV, 152). Sanuto refers to the defeat of Selim's vanguard, but only mentions the BB of Anatolia (XVI, 260-1).
9. See p.59.
10. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.74; Hammer, GOR, II, 420-1 (Hist. IV, 205-6); Danişmend, II, p.16; Parry (Cook), p.71. Cf Sanuto, XXII, 462 [Doc., p.646]: "- - - in protectione et custodia dil qual loco havevimo lassato per beglerbeg el nostro schiavo Machmeci bech [MS: Machmech bech] - - -." Also Sanuto, XXV, 651-669 (col. 653): "- - - et lo bergiarbei de lo paese conquistato de Agimia nominato Buclime Emet [MS: Buclime Hemet] - - -." See also Süreyya, IV, p.109.
11. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), pp.75-6; Hammer, GOR, II, p.421 (Hist. IV, p.211); Parry (Cook), p.71; Danişmend, II, p.18; Besim Dârköt, IA, p.560 ('Kemah'). Sanuto does not refer to this episode.

12. Hammer, GOR, II, 436-7 (Hist. IV, 225-6); Danişmend, II, pp.22-3; Parry (C^ook), p.71.
13. Hammer, GOR, II, 445-446 (Hist. IV, 238-9); Danişmend, II, pp.23-4; Parry (C^ook), p.71. Cf. Sanuto, XXII, 462 [Docs., p.646]:
"- - -Et con lo ajuto de Dio i nostri hanno superato quelli et hanno tajato la testa dil capitano general suo, nomine Charachan, et di altri desdoto (i.e. eighteen) signori, et similiter tuto lo exercito spazono per fīt di spada, che anima di loro non è scapulà."
14. See p.62.
15. Hammer, GOR, II, p.474 (Hist. IV, p.276-7); Parry (Cook), p.74; Danişmend, II, p.28. However, according to the letter of the Kadi-asker on the campaign against the Mamluks, Bıyıklı was on the right wing (Sanuto, XXV, 651-669, 653, [Docs., p.649-50]), and this is also stated in Angiolello (Uzun), f. 76r.
16. Sanuto, XXIII, 327-8, 328-9 [both Docs., p.647].
17. Sanuto, XXV, 143-6 [Docs., p.648], 153-4, 273-4 [Docs., p.648], 278-9 [Docs., p.649], 299-300, 365-6, 473-4, 475-6; 552-3 and 554 [both Docs., p.649].
18. Sanuto, XXV, 143-4 [Docs., p.648].
19. Hammer, GOR, II, p. 452 (Hist. IV, 248), and GOR, II, p.456 (Hist. IV, 253).
20. Sanuto, XXV, 299-300 and 475.
21. Sanuto, XXV, 552-3 and 554 [both Docs., p.649].
22. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Op. cit., ff. 1r-2r [Docs., p.645]
23. Idem.
24. Cf. Dukaginzade Ahmed, p.62.
25. Sanuto, XXV, 148ff [Docs., p.648], and Alberi, Ser. III, vol. III, p.59 (Relazione of Bartolomeo Contarini): 'Laltro che practica col detto Signor è uno chiamato Imbrevert, era uomo di anni...., e stava spesso col Signor; si dice bevevano insieme e stavano a'piaceri, ma allegramente. Altri bassà, nē bilarbei poteano; - - -.'

MEHMED BEG [İSA BEG-OĞLU] - SB of Elbasan, of Karlı-eli,
of Hersek-Nova, and of Gaza.

[Mechmeth Bei]

Sanuto, V, 913-4: In a letter dated 10 October to the provveditore of Cephalonia, Nicolo Marzello, a certain Ahmed Beg styled himself "Mechmeth Bei flamburaro di Angelocastro, Santa Maura, and tutto el

dispotato". This is almost certainly Mehmed Beg bin ^CIsa Beg bin Ishak Beg.¹

Styling himself in these terms suggests he was SB of Karlı-eli ('tuto el dispotato', i.e. the old despotate of Epirus, comprising Arta and Angelocastron²) and there is some evidence in Ottoman sources that he held that position in 1503/909.³ Even though most accounts indicate that during the Turco-Venetian war he was SB of Elbasan, a little further north, and was responsible for the capture of Durazzo in 1501,⁴ it is quite possible that he relinquished that sancak in favour of that of Karlı-eli by 1503. According to Oruç, a Mehmed Beg was campaigning in the Turco-Venetian war in 1500 as SB of Karlı-eli,⁵ while Mehmed Beg ^CIsa-Beg-oğlu is mentioned in connection with the campaign against Durazzo in 1501,⁶ but significantly he is not described as SB of Elbasan. It is hard therefore not to draw the conclusion that there is only one Mehmed in question, and that he was SB of Karlı-eli, and that perhaps his bailwick extended further north to Elbasan in Albania.

As SB of Karlı-eli - the mainland sancak immediately opposite Santa Maura - he would have been the natural choice as the man to whom Bayezid would wish the Venetians to consign the island in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty. And indeed, there is conclusive evidence - Andrea Gritti's reports to the Signoria in July 1503 - both that Mehmed ^CIsa Beg-oğlu was SB of Karlı-eli in 1503, and that he was the man designated by Bayezid to receive Santa Maura from the Venetians: Gritti explained the protocol with which the Signoria was to follow in handing over the island to 'Mehemeth bey fio de Essebeg [i.e. ^CIsa-beg-oğlu] sanzacho del paese del quondam Duca Carlo' [i.e. Karlı-eli].⁷ The Diarii confirm this when in early 1503 the provveditore of the fleet reported that he had handed over Santa Maura to the [unnamed] SB of

Angelocastron:⁸ consequently Mehmed was able to style himself 'SB of Santa Maura' in his letter to Marzello in October.

The letter itself concerns Mehmed's complaint about the theft of four horses from his men (Gini, Asprogiracha and Stamati Malachia) by some Cephalonians. Mehmed threatened that if the horses were not returned, he would bring the matter to the attention of the sultan and take retaliatory action himself. Marzello explained in his report to the Signoria that the horses had been taken in time of war. However, in order to maintain the peace, as it seemed to him that Mehmed was looking for trouble, Marzello returned three horses. Marzello added that he had received letters from other SBs as well [presumably concerning similar business] and wanted instructions from the Signoria on how he should react.

Although Ragusan records⁹ show that Mehmed was also SB of Hersek-Nova between March 1507 and April 1509, and again between March 1513 and October 1515, there are no references in the Diarri to either a Mehmed or a SB of Hersek-Nova during these periods. Indeed it can be said that the Diarri are conspicuously lacking in information on Mehmed's terms as SB whereas most other SBs of Hersek-Nova receive some mention.

Later, in the aftermath of Selim's victory at Marj Dabik, Mehmed was despatched with 2,000 cavalry to take possession of the town of Gaza where he subsequently became the first Ottoman governor.¹⁰ The Diarri make no mention of his role in this campaign.

Notes

1. Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.333, 334; Elezović, i/1, p.129; Süreyya, IV, p.107.
2. Ostrogorsky, p.440.
3. Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.481; Elezović, i/1, pp.271, n. 2, 657.

4. Süreyya, IV, p.107; Hammer, GOR, II, 328-9 (Hist. IV, p.71); Danişmend, I, p.410; Tansel, p.218; Parry (Cook), p.63.
5. Kreutel, Oruc, pp.135ff.
6. Idem, pp.141ff. The Diarii offer no information on Mehmed's period as SB of Elbasan (nor is the SB of Elbasan as such mentioned) or on his role in the fall of Durazzo.
7. BNM, Copialettere, ff, 34v-35r, Gritti to Doge, 31 July 1503, Constantinopoli; and f. 35r, Gritti to Sagudino, 31 July 1503, Constantinopoli.
8. Sanuto, V, 84, 85. Two other reports from the provveditore indicate that he was also involved in negotiations with the SB of Angelocastron/Santa Maura over the return of various Turkish slaves who had escaped to Corfu (Sanuto, V, 159-160, 219-220).
9. Popović, p.94.
10. Hammer, GOR, II, 481, 493 (Hist. IV, 286, 302); Süreyya, IV, p.107; Danişmend, II, pp.30-31; AngioTello, f. 76r.

MEHMED BEG [OBRENOVIĆ] - SB of Hersek-Nova (1500-1504/906-910)

(1510-1511/916-917)

SB of Iskodra (? -1510/916)

[Maumeth bei/Machmet/Mechmethego/

Mechemeth/Methmeth Beg/Mehmeth/

Demech Melbego]

There are several references to a Mehmed Beg in the area of Hersek-Nova in 1503. If we accept the evidence of Ragusan records¹ indicating that the SB of Hersek-Nova from October 1500 to July 1504 was Mehmed Beg Obrenović [Obren-Oğlu],² then it is possible to piece together a picture of his activities by collating references in the Diarii between the two dates to Mehmed Beg and to the SB ('sanzacho') of Hersek-Nova. At no point is Mehmed Beg referred to as Obrenovic in the Diarii.

The first occasion when the Diarii mention a Mehmed Beg by name as the SB of Hersek-Nova is in December 1500, only two months after Ragusan records state that he had been appointed to that sancak.⁴ Piero

Trivisan, the Venetian count of Spalato, reported the arrival in Hersek-Nova ('ducado, fu di Carzego') of a SB who had been born in Poliza (near Spalato) and who still had relatives there. Later in the same report the SB is identified as Mehmed Beg ('nome Demech Melbego [= nome de Mechmetbego = by name of Mehmed Beg], patron del paese de Carcego). Trivisan reported that Mehmed had written to two local nobles in Poliza - count Marian Gregolich and count Juanis Nenadovich - declaring his good intentions and inviting them to join him in the war against Venice. Earlier, in October 1500 the provveditore of Cattaro had reported that the SB of 'Castelnovo' was threatening some Venetian strongholds.⁵ Information then dries up completely about Mehmed's role in the Turco-Venetian war until October 1502, when it was reported from Ragusa that when Bayezid heard the news of the fall of Santa Maura and of Venetian fleet's raids on Salonica, he immediately ordered the SB of the 'paese dil Charzego' to return to guard Castelnuovo.⁶

In December 1502, the capitano dil golfo reported that the SB of Terra Nova was one of three SBs at Durazzo where they had amassed 2,000 infantry and 400 cavalry; with the objective, he believed, of attacking Alexio.⁷

It is not until hostilities had ceased that Mehmed is mentioned again by name as the SB of Hersek-Nova (Charzego): in January 1503 a report from Ragusa stated that Mehmed Beg [Machmet bei] and Iskender Pasha had recalled their men, it seems partly fearing a Hungarian offensive, but had then demobilised them. Iskender returned to Bosnia and Mehmed Beg returned to Castelnuovo, while peace was being negotiated between the Turks and the Venetian-Hungarian alliance.⁸ From this point onwards there are several references to Mehmed Beg as SB of Hersek-Nova, all in connection with the re-establishment of peaceful relations.

The ensuing correspondence between Mehmed Beg and the provveditore of Cattaro, Sebastian Contarini, only a few miles away, is preserved to a limited extent in the Diarii. Mehmed Beg's letter to Contarini dated 16 January 1503 (taken to Cattaro by Zuan Radizo, a Christian and friend of both men) expresses friendship and asks that envoys be sent to Hersek-Nova.⁹ A safe-conduct document was also sent in case the offer was accepted by Contarini.¹⁰ The letter also suggests that Mehmed had been kept informed of the progress of peace negotiations back in Istanbul, since he informed Contarini that the Venetian emissary [Freschi] was at the Porte. It is also worthy of note that Andrea Gritti wrote to Mehmed asking him to provide an ulak to forward a letter from Gritti to Hersekzade Ahmed as quickly as possible to the Porte.¹¹

On 18 January 1503 Contarini sent Trifon Zaguri, a local noble, and two others as envoys to Hersek-Nova to thank Mehmed and offer reciprocal good wishes.¹² This marked the forming of a local truce in advance of the signing of the peace treaty. At the heart of this truce was a desire on the part of the Ottomans to re-establish the trade in salt through Risano by encouraging Venetians to join with Ragusans in trading in that commodity through the Ottoman possession of Risano. It appears this move was motivated by a desire to compensate for a temporary shortage of home-produced salt. In connection with this matter, both Mehmed Beg and his emin wrote to Contarini proposing the idea and setting out the terms of trade.¹³

During the summer of 1503, Bayezid sent fermans to various maritime SBs expressing anger that slaves had been taken from Venetian areas, such as Sebenico, after the signing of the peace treaty, and ordering the SBs to ensure that they were returned immediately and the wrongdoers

punished. The fermans received by Mehmed Beg,¹⁴ unlike those sent to Iskender Pasha and other SBs, contained a stern warning that he would forfeit more than just his sancak if there were any repetition of such injury to the Republic. Bayezid's orders were clearly the result of petitions brought before him by Gritti, who, as he made his way down the Adriatic to Istanbul in the summer of 1503, had heard the complaints of the people of Sebenico and Trau about damages to persons and property after a truce had been agreed. Mehmed appears to have been particularly negligent in policing the peace, and in June 1503 Gritti wrote to him a polite but firm letter from Ragusa indicating that it was his men who were the chief perpetrators and that compensation was expected.¹⁵ It seems that Bayezid's warnings did little to prevent further raiding: in October 1503 raiders in the county of Trau took away 50 people and a large number of animals, but when Gritti confronted Mehmed Beg with this, he denied that his men were involved but placed responsibility on the shoulders of Iskender Pasha of Bosnia, even naming some of Iskender's men he believed took part.¹⁶

In the correspondence as reproduced in the Diarii¹⁷ and other Venetian archival sources concerning both the salt trade and the return of slaves, Mehmed Beg is described in various ways: 'signor dil paese de Charzego', 'sanzacho de Bosina', 'Mehmeth aga sanzach bey de Mostar, sive del paese de Charzego Bossina bassa' [i.e. lower Bosnia], 'sanzacho de Mostar'. In this case, all descriptions would seem to apply to the same person, Mehmed, and to the same sancak, Hersek-Nova.

According to Ragusan sources,¹⁸ Mehmed Obrenovic was again SB of Hersek-Nova between August 1510 and December 1511. According to Lodovico Valdrin writing from Edirne in early April 1510,¹⁹ the sancak of Hersek-Nova had been given to the 'magnifico' Mehmed Beg [MS: Mehet

Bei; ED: Mehemet Bei] who was then SB of Iskodra,²⁰ while the sancak of Iskodra had been given to the 'magnifico Daut Bei' who had been SB of Hersek-Nova the previous year. This sequence in the changeover of personnel tallies precisely with that in Popovic, and the Diarii also refer to Mehmed Beg's immediate predecessor at Hersek-Nova as Qasim Beg (q.v.),²¹ again in agreement with Popovic. The discrepancy in the starting dates (August 1510 according to Ragusan records, April 1510 according to Valdrin) may be explained by the likelihood that Mehmed was appointed SB of Hersek-Nova in April 1510 but would probably not have taken up his new office until several months after news of it was circulating at the Porte in Edirne. Indeed it is not until August that the provveditore of Cattaro first noted the arrival of the new SB in the area, describing him as 'homo cativo';²² and the provveditore had previously heard that the new incumbent had been provided with an income 200,000 aspers over and above the normal amount due.²³ Moreover, Ragusan records show that Da'ud Beg relinquished his post as SB of Hersek-Nova in February 1510 (p.199), just before Valdrin noted Mehmed's appointment to the sancak.

Notes

1. Popović, pp.93-94; Elezović, i/1, p.330, n. 2, i/2, p.104.
2. Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.407, 408.
3. In this collation I take 'Castelnuovo', 'paese dil charzego', 'duchato', 'Terranova', 'Coza' and 'Castro Novo' to refer to Hersek-Nova.
4. Sanuto, III, 1377. (Note also: a report in November 1498 [Sanuto, II, 247-8] refers to the SB of 'Terra Nova' as Maumeth [MS: Maumech] bei, which, if taken to mean that the SB of Hersek-Nova at that time was a Mehmed Beg, would conflict with the Ragusan evidence indicating that Ahmed Beg Vranjesević (q.v.) was SB at that time. Further research is required).
5. Sanuto, III, 969.

6. Sanuto, IV, 474.
7. Sanuto, IV, 617.
8. Sanuto, IV, 649-50.
9. Sanuto, IV, 656-7. I have been unable to find in my researches in the ASV and the BNM the originals of the documents cited in notes 7-10. Although each document is described as a 'copia', the nature of the language suggests that these are copies of translations rather than of original documents in Italian.
10. Sanuto, IV, 657, 789.
11. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 3, no. 6, Gritti to Mehmed Beg, 8 December 1502: for the significance of the Gritti-Hersekzade correspondence, see pp.79-80; BNM, Copialettere, f. 2v, 4v ('mechmethbey sanzacho de Coza').
12. Sanuto, VI, 656, 649-50.
13. Sanuto, IV, 790, 798, 799; Fisher, p.87, using same source.
14. Sanuto, V, 286-7, 455. For a (?)Venetian copy (without tughra) of the Turkish (?)original, see ASV, CDT, Busta I, fasc. 2, no. 2, and for exact copies of the Italian translation in the Diarii, see ASV, CDT, Busta I, fasc. 2, no. 1; ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 78v; ASV, Libri Comm, XIX, f. 18r; for regests, ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no. 44; Bombaci, p.298, no. 49; Predelli, Comm reg. VI, p.71, no. 37. For exact archival copies of V, 455, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 9, no. 7; ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 79v; ASV, Libri Comm, XIX, f. 37r; for regests, Bombaci, p. 298, no. 52; Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, p.72, no. 41.
15. BNM, Copialettere, ff. 2v-3r, Gritti to 'Mechmethbego, sanzacho del payse del charzegno', Ragusa, 2 June 1503. Gritti also wrote to Contarini explaining his plan of action (Ibid., ff. 3v-4r).
16. BNM, Copialettere, ff. 81r-82r.
17. Sanuto, IV, 669-70, 798, 799; V, 286-7, 455 (Relazione of Gritti), 463 (Narrazione of Caroldo).
18. Popović, op. cit., p.94.
19. Sanuto, X, 342.
20. Mehmed's position as SB of Iskodra tallies with Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.408.
21. Sanuto, X, 202 (Valdrin), 208-9 (prov. of Cattaro).
22. Sanuto, X, 460.
23. Sanuto, X, 471.

MEHMED BEG - SB Terra Nova (1498/904)

See Mehmed Beg [Obrenovič], p. 301.

MEHMED BEG MALKOC-OĞLU - SB of Sofia (1514/920)

[Machmet Bei Malchozent]

Sanuto, XIX, 185-7: In a report of Jacomo de Zulian to Andrea Gritti of 17th October 1514, he is described as SB of Sofia and one of the SBs of Rumeli who were killed in the battle of Chaldiran; and as brother of Tur ĆAli Beg Malkoç (q.v.) who was also killed in the battle.

Although clearly a member of the famous gazi family of Malkoc on the northern Rumelian frontier, I cannot identify him in Ottoman records. This is obviously not the "Mehmed Beg sin Ali bega Malkoç oglje, sandzak hercegovacki" in 1523.¹ According to Ottoman narrative sources, the two Malkoç brothers who were killed at Chaldiran were Tur ĆAli Beg, SB of Silistre, and ĆAli Beg (rather than Mehmed Beg), SB of Sofia.² Süreyya records three Mehmed Beks who were killed at Chaldiran, but none match conclusively Sanuto's 'Machmet'.³ On the other hand, in keeping with Ottoman sources, he records that an 'ĆAli Beg Malkoc Ođlu', SB of Sofia, was the older of the two brothers killed at Chaldiran.⁴ Sansovino echoes the Diarîi report in referring to the death of the brothers, calling them Tur ĆAli and Mehmed.⁵ It seems that Italian and Ottoman sources are divided on the identity of one of the brothers, but given the greater accuracy of one Ottoman source in particular which follows closely Zulian's report, it seems very likely that Tur ĆAli's brother is Ali Beg and not Mehmed Beg.⁶

Notes

1. Elezović, i/1, p.484, n. 1; and Popović, p.95 records a 'Mehmed Beg' as SB of Hersek-Nova from March 1522 to June 1523.
2. Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.68 and note 69; Hammer, GOR, II, p.642 (Hist. IV, p.432); Ugur, part I, pp.109, 113-4.
3. Süreyya, IV, 107, 109.
4. Ibid., III, p.495.
5. Sansovino, f. 117v: 'valore di due fratelli Malcocij, Turabeo et Maomette, i quali di nation Turchesca per nobiltà di sangue pari alla casa Ottomana rappresentavano la grandezza d'animo e'l vigore di Malcocio loro padre capitano illustre - -'.
6. See p.225, p.227, n.31.

MEHMED BEG KARLOVIĆ - SB (1514/920)

[Machmet Bey Carlo]

Sanuto, XIX, 185-7 [Docs., pp.633-4]: One of the Rumelian SBs who were killed at Chaldiran. He is described as 'Machmet bey Carlo,¹ sangiacho di Oxunda'. Although I cannot identify the sancak, this Mehmed is probably 'Rumeli Kethüdası Mehmed bey bin Karlı',² and according to Kemal Pasha-zade, the Rumeli Kethudasi was one of those killed at Chaldiran.³ This 'Machmet Bey' may also be identical with the Mehmed listed in a salary defter for 1508/914 as one of Bayezid's sons-in-law.⁴

Notes

1. The MS has 'Carlo', the edition 'Carlovich'. In the MS there is a small space between Carlo and Sangiacho. The report adds that a brother of Mehmed who was an SB and 'pur Carlovich' [written in full this time] was also killed.
2. Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.482: 'Mehmed Beg bin Karlı za'im Istanbul ki kethüda-ı vilāyet-i Rūmeli - - -' (25 Cumāda I 909), and p.478, 'Mehmed Beg bin Karlı ki za'im Istanbul' (5 Rebī^c I 909).
3. Uğur, part I, pp.113-114 [Docs., p.634].
4. Uluçay (TD X/14), pp.118-9.

MEHMED PASHA - (?)SB, Dalmatia (1496/901)

[Mauth]

Sanuto, I, 16: In January 1495 a horse and blanket arrived in Venice from a 'pasha' called 'Mauth' as a sign of friendship. Although not stated, it seems likely that Mehmed was a Dalmatian SB.

MEHMED HASSAN - voyvoda (1499/905)

[Maumethi Cassam]

Sanuto, II, 1078-9: Mentioned in the Relazione of Jacomo Lepori in August 1499/Muharrem 905 as one of the 'primi e principali' and voyvoda of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia.

MEHMED BEG - voyvoda (1499/905)

[Mechmet beg]

Sanuto, II, 1078-9: Mentioned in the Relazione of Jacomo Lepori in August 1499/Muharrem 905 as one of the 'primi e principali' and voyvoda of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia.

MEHMED - voyvoda of Corinth (1499/904-5)

[Mechemeth]

Sanuto, II, 981-2: Voyvoda of Corinth and of the SB of the Morea, Halil Pasha (q.v.); author of letter dated 28 June 1499 to Francesco Bragadin, provveditore of Anabolu, in which he warns that Bragadin must ensure that his people make no incursions into Ottoman territory. In his letter Mehmed appears to be amplifying admonitions which Halil Pasha was sending in his own letters which were being passed to Bragadin via Mehmed. I have not found the original of Mehmed's letter, or any copies or translations, in the ASV or BNM. There are two further references to the position (but Mehmed is not mentioned by name) of the voyvoda of

Corinth, both illustrating his role in providing military service to the SB of the Morea. In September 1500 the SB wrote to the voyvoda ordering him to mobilise with 500 horsemen - an indication of Mehmed's personal power;¹ in January 1503 the 'vayvoda de Coryntho' was included as an addressee of the SB's general orders to all his voyvodas to cease hostilities against Venetian subjects.²

Notes

1. Sanuto, III, 838-9.
2. Sanuto, IV, 857-8 [Docs., p.575].

MEHMED ÇAVUŞ - envoy (1516/922)

[Jaus Machmeth]

Sanuto, XXIII, 254-5: Bearer of Selim's letter (dated 27 August 1516 in Aleppo) to the governors of Chios announcing his victory over the Mamluks. I have not located this letter in the ASV.

MEHMED BEG SIPAHI - envoy (1516/922)

[Mahumeth bei]

Sanuto, XXIII, 361, 397-8, 442-3:¹ Envoy of Selim to Venice bearing the sultan's letter (in Greek and dated 7 August 1516) announcing his victory over the Mamluks.²

Mehmed left Istanbul on 7 October 1516 for Venice, stopping off at Corfu and Avlonya. Arriving in Venice on 24 December with a retinue of eleven, he was met by a party of sixteen, including Sanuto himself. At an audience on 27 December, Mehmed told the Doge that it was three months since he had left Selim in Aleppo, that he had been present at the battle of Aleppo [i.e. Marj Dabik] and that he had left on his mission to Venice four days after Selim had entered that city.

Sanuto himself describes him as nephew of Sinan Pasha (?Hadim Sinan (q.v.)). He was young and 'homo da ben'. Selim's letter to the Doge refers to him as 'Muchemeto Spachi oĝlan' [sipahi oĝlan]. Sanuto also notes that he was having trouble with one eye - a case of cataract. During his stay in Venice he was seen by several doctors, but no treatment could be found.³ Apparently one reason for his trip to Venice was to receive medical attention. He was given lodging in the family house of Giovanni Dario and provided with a daily expense allowance of 5 ducats.

Mehmed left Venice on 9 January 1517 and was back in Istanbul by the end of April. No reason is given for why it took him so long to make the journey. He brought with him letters from the Signoria to Selim (congratulating him on his triumphs), and to Piri Mehmed Pasha (q.v.).

Notes

1. These three entries name the envoy as Mehmed, but there are also other references to an unnamed envoy in Venice at this time which undoubtedly apply to Mehmed and on which I draw here: Sanuto, XXIII, 286, 343, 344, 373-4, 409, 423, 426, 442-3; XXIV, 337-8.
2. Sanuto, XXIII, 397-8. I have not located the original or any copy of this letter in the ASV or BNM.
3. The edition's 'impossibel a venir' reads in the MS: 'impossibel a varir' [i.e. guarir=cure].

MEHMED BEG - Çulak (1517/923)

[Machmeth]

Sanuto, XXIV, 645-6: Bearer of the letter of Prince Suleiman to Chios inviting the Chioti to rejoice with him in his father's victories over the Mamluks.

MEHMED/MEHMETIS PACHMOGAM - envoy (1514/920) [Mechanet Is Pachmogam]

Sanuto, XIX, 317-8:¹ Envoy of Selim to Venice bearing the letter of Selim (in Greek and dated 3 September 1514) announcing his victory over the Safavids at Chaldiran.²

He arrived in Venice on 3 December 1514 on a Venetian galley. His retinue numbered eighteen and lodging was provided in the family house of the Barbaro in San Stefano. Sanuto was involved in organising his stay in Venice. There is little information on the envoy's background, other than that he was perhaps a sipahi.³ Sanuto also remarked that his appearance was unbecoming. At an audience with the Doge and the Council of Ten on 5 December, he presented Selim's letter. Mehmed was also granted a restricted audience with the Heads of the Ten, a departure from normal practice according to Sanuto, since such envoys were usually received by the full assembly of the Collegio. No reason is given for this special treatment.

Although initially given a daily expense allowance of 6 ducats, Mehmed was unhappy with the provision and in order not to displease him, he was voted a further 200 ducats so that his total allowance came to 300 ducats. The Collegio was keen to be rid of him as soon as possible.

On 24 December he was given leave by the Doge to return home to deliver the Signoria's letter of congratulation to Selim. When offered a gift of 400 ducats, he refused it on the grounds that the previous envoy had been given 1,000 ducats which was the amount he now wanted. He delayed his departure until 9 January 1515, partly in the hope of receiving the 1,000 ducats, and partly because he was stunned by the news that Selim may have suffered a defeat. He eventually took the 400 ducats, returning discontented, but the Collegio, which was by this time annoyed with him, took the unusual step of writing to the bailo in

Istanbul, instructing him to complain about Mehmed to the viziers.

Notes

1. This entry names the envoy as 'Mechanet Is Pachmogam', but there are also other references to an unnamed envoy in Venice at this time which apply to this Mehmed and on which I draw here: Sanuto, XIX, 282-3, 287-8, 300, 307, 309, 316, 317-8, 330, 331, 339, 357-8, 366.
2. Sanuto, XIX, 317-8. I have not located the original or copies of this letter, or archival references to it, in the ASV or BNM.
3. Sanuto, XIX, 287-8.

MEHMED BEG ABRINOVA - ? SB (1514/920)

[Mechmet bei Abrinova]

Sanuto, XIX, 185-7: The report merely states that his nephew, 'Yus bei' (see Üyeys/Vüs Beg, SB of Kaysari), a SB in Anadolu, fell at Chaldiran. [See Mehmed Obrenović (?Abrinova)].

MEHMED PASHA - vizier (1517-18/923-4)

[Mahumech bassa]

Sanuto, XXV, 151-3: In September 1517 the Venetian ambassadors Mocengo and Contarini met and spoke with him in Cairo and reported him to be one of the 'bassa' [viziers] with Selim in Egypt. A separate report from Cairo dated 19 February 1518 from Francesco de Batista¹ states that a 'Machumech bassa', who was one of the 'zente del signor turco' [i.e. from context, a vizier], had died in Damascus. While there is no conclusive evidence that the two 'Machumech bassa' are the same person, the possibility cannot be discounted.

There is also the possibility that one or other (or both) of these references applies to Hoca-zade Mehmed Çelebi Pasha, who had been appointed to the vizierate in February 1517, and who until then had been nişancı since 1514/920.² Although some accounts state that he died in

mid August 1518/Şa^cbān 924³ or 1519/925⁴, thus conflicting with the slightly earlier date of "Machumech bassa's" death in de Batista's report, Süreyya⁵ adds to the general confusion by saying that his death came in either 1517/923 or 1519/925.

There are few references in the Diarii to the post of nişancı, so it is not possible to build up a picture of his tenure in that office between 1514 and 1517. For the possibility that Hoca-zade Mehmed is the 'Coza' mentioned in Venetian sources, see Hoca.

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXV, 473-4 [Docs., p.544], da Batista to Marco Dandolo, capitano of Crete, dated 19 February 1517 (sic in MS as well as edition): The content of the document and the fact that the document immediately following is another letter of Batista's dated 12 March 1518 indicate that Batista's first letter must have been written in 1518 and not 1517.
2. Hammer, GOR, II, pp.462-3 (Hist. IV, 262); Danişmend, V, pp.317-8; Ugur, part I, pp.124-5; Süreyya, IV, p.108.
3. Hammer, GOR, II, p.527 (Hist. IV, 347).
4. Danişmend, V, p.247.
5. Süreyya, IV, p. 108.

[HOCA-ZADE MEHMED ÇELEBI] - see Mehmed Pasha vizier (1517/925)

(see p.313)

MEHMED ÇELEBI - nephew of Hadım ^CAli Pasha (see p.121).

MEHMED BEG (1518/924)

[Mamet bei]

Sanuto, XXV, 474 (see p.313, n.1, for a note on date of source): According to Francesco da Batista writing in Cairo in February 1518, 'Mamet' was one of three 'bassa turchi naturali' whom

Selim had sent to 'Turchia' to gather troops for a possible attack on Monastir or Cyprus. There is no collateral and the information is thin and confused (see also Iskender Beg, p.249).¹

Notes

1. But see Angiolello (Uzun), f. 75v-76r, Selim's forces, on his return to Amasya in 1515 after the Chaldiran campaign, were divided in two under the command of Iskender (Scander) and Mehmed Beg (Mamet Bei).

MEHMED/MEHMETIS - Turk (1498/904)

[Mehmetis]

Sanuto, II, 422: Turk who went to the Porte to complain that his two sisters and his niece had been taken by the Venetians as slaves. Bayezid sent a letter to Doge Agostino Barbarigo dated 24 August 1498 demanding the return of these slaves.¹

Notes

1. I have not found the original or copies of, or archival references to, this letter in the ASV or BNM.

MIHALOĞLU - (1500/905)

[Michaloghri]

Sanuto, III, 336: In a confused passage, a Corfuan sea-captain, who had been in Lepanto, reported:

"Item, vene Malchozi, uno di primi flambulari, con 80 persone, e [MS: E] il fiol di Michaloghri si dicea veniria con 70 milia persone, et vene solum con otanta cavali li a Nepanto."

It is unclear which member of the famous Mihaloğlu gazi family this may be. Iskender Beg Mihaloğlu, a likely candidate for such raiding activity, had already died in 1496. 'Malchozi' is a reference most probably to the famous gazi Bali Beg Malkoç (q.v.).

Notes

1. Kissling, Iskender, p.130, n. 3.

MESIH PASHA BIN ^CABD al-HAYY¹

[Missit/Missith/Mesich]

Nationality and Background

Much has been written about the origins of Mesih Pasha. Turkish sources and historians relying on Turkish sources have tended to favour the view that he was a member of Mehmed II's Slave Household and that he may have been conscripted through the devşirme.² Hammer pours scorn on the view commonly held by most western contemporary sources that Mesih was a Greek renegade of the imperial family of the Palaeologi.³ But there is a substantial body of scholarly opinion that favours such a view, or at least admits to the possibility.⁴ To this must be added the single, but important, reference in the Diarii to his Palaeologan background.⁵ The evidence is on the whole inconclusive, but it is clear that Venetians and other Europeans at the time considered Mesih as a member of the former imperial family. There is furthermore the interesting possibility that he may have been related to the Venetian patriciate through his connections with Paolo Contarini.⁶

Career

Mesih pasha rose to prominence during the reign of Mehmed II, reaching the ranks of beğlerbeği of Anadolu, kapudan pasha⁷ and vizier.⁸

1479-80

He is most famous for his part in the siege of Rhodes and for his failure to take the island from the Knights of St. John.⁹ Following this débacle he fell into disgrace and was demoted to the rank

of SB of Gelibolu and was deprived of his status of vizier with three horse-tails (tug).¹⁰ Some sources, however, show that as SB of Gelibolu he also held the position of kapudan pasha,¹¹ though this would not of itself have required vizierial status in this period.¹²

1480/885-1491 or 1492/897 Kapudan pasha for this entire period, but on the accession of Bayezid II in 1481, his political fortunes revived and he also held other posts concurrently: vizier (1481/886)¹³, vizier (1483-4)¹⁴. His most notable undertakings in the early years of Bayezid's reign were his leading role in the negotiations with Rhodes over a long term peace and over the custody of Jem sultan (1482/887),¹⁵ and his participation in the campaign of Kilia and Ak-kirman against Stephen of Moldavia (1484/889).¹⁶ Some sources say that after this campaign he was dismissed from the post of vizier and retired to Filibe, but this conflicts with the view that he continued to be kapudan pasha until 1491-2.¹⁷

1492/898 Appointed Beğlerbeği of Rumeli.¹⁸

1496/902 SB of Silistra.¹⁹

1497/903 SB of Ak-kirman.²⁰ However, Sanuto has Mesih playing a very different role in this year: one can either conclude that Mesih was appointed vizier following the change of personnel on the dismissal of the Grand Vizier Da'ud pasha,²¹ or that he may even have been SB of Gelibolu and Kapudan Pasha,²² or both.

Grand Vizier

1499/905 Replaces Ibrahim Pasa as Grand Vizier, and then goes on pilgrimage to Mecca.²³ It is not clear from Sanuto whether Mesih was Grand Vizier when he undertook the journey to Mecca in the spring and summer of 1499,²⁴ but he certainly held that office by December 1499.²⁵

His main concern at this time was the prosecution of the war with Venice and, in his capacity as GV, was chief negotiator with the Venetian secretary Alvise Manenti who arrived in Edirne for peace talks²⁶ on 17 February 1500/17 Receb 905 (see p.118). Negotiations, however, were shortlived because both sides demanded too high a price for peace, but of the viziers, Mesih appears to have been the most cordial and friendly.²⁷ Following the breakdown of talks, Mesih threw himself into the task of building up the Ottoman navy for the impending assaults on Modon and Koron. His experience as kapudan pasha must have been an asset to him as can be seen from the interest he showed in the technicalities of naval warfare and shipping.²⁸ Although we have very little information about his military activities in the campaigning season of 1500, there is clear evidence that he and other members of the Porte accompanied the sultan on campaign.²⁹ He was in Edirne on 6 April 1500/17 Ramazān 906, most probably in Serez later that month,³⁰ then Vardar, Salonika, La Vadia,³¹ via Larisa (June 1500/Zū'l-Ḳa'de 905),³² then Corinth, Argos,³³ finally reaching the vicinity of Modon and Koron in late July 1500.³⁴ After the fall of these two key Venetian strongholds (Modon on 9 August, Koron on 15 August), Mesih tried to enlist the collaboration of his Venetian relative, Paolo Contarini, who was castellan of Anabolu and who was in Koron at the time of its surrender, to bring about the surrender of Anabolu, but this plan came to nothing.³⁵

During the second half of 1500 Mesih continued to gather intelligence about the course of the war.³⁶ But when by the end of that year both sides considered the cessation of hostilities desirable, Mesih initiated the peace process: he informed Valerio Marzello, (a Venetian soracomito who had been captured at Modon and enslaved, but who had been ransomed and was about to return to Venice in January 1501), that the

Sultan wanted peace, but that Ottoman naval power meant that the Sultan would be negotiating from a position of strength.³⁷ Mesih played no further part in the peace process with Venice, for in March 1501 he was despatched with an army to quell the Karamanid revolt.

1501/907

Karaman Campaign With the exception of the account in Hammer,³⁸ all accounts agree that this campaign was fought against the last Karamanid claimant, Mustafa beg Hacı Hamza-zade, over the spring and summer of 1501.³⁹ The exact size of the army led by Mesih is not clear, but there is no doubt that it was substantial. During the summer of 1501 Mesih won a complete victory largely due to desertions among Mustafa Beg's allies. Those who continued to support Mustafa were dealt with brutally.⁴⁰ Mustafa beg himself escaped, but while some sources state that he escaped to Aleppo where he was imprisoned by the Mamluks, Sanuto informs us that Mustafa had escaped and taken refuge with Shah Ismail, who was himself about to challenge the Ottomans for supremacy in Anatolia in 1502.⁴¹ Nevertheless, Mesih Pasha had finally destroyed any residual aspirations of a Karamanid revival.

1501 or 1502/907 Death/Galata Fire

The standard version of the death of Mesih is that he died from a wound inflicted by falling debris from the burning baruthane (gunpowder mill) in Galata which had been struck by lightning. Mesih was supervising the extinguishing of the fire when the fateful rocks struck him.⁴² This event is supposed to have occurred in the second half of 1501 after Mesih's return from the Karaman campaign, and most probably in November 1501/Cumāda I 907.⁴³ There is, however, no mention in Sanuto of either a fire in Galata at this time, or to the death of Mesih

as a result of such a fire. According to Sanuto, Mesih was executed by Bayezid, (cNovember 1501), together with the Bostancı başı (who apparently was shot through with an arrow by Bayezid in person).⁴⁴ Sanuto does not know the exact reasons for this, but he does reveal two possibilities: firstly, that Bayezid was annoyed with Mesih and the Bostancı başı for having delayed in bringing to his attention information about the arrival of the Christian fleets for the attack on Midilli;⁴⁵ secondly, that his wrath had been caused by their failure to report the presence in Rhodes of the son of Jem Sultan. The only other account which can to a certain extent parallel and corroborate this story is found in the chronicle of Oruç,⁴⁶ where we are told of a scandal in which Mesih was involved: Mesih was struck on the head by Bayezid with a bow for withholding information about the arrival of the French fleet at Midilli. But whereas Sanuto speaks of execution, Oruç states that Bayezid cursed Mesih and wished misfortune upon him, and that this misfortune materialised in the form of the Galata accident. The chronicler does not give much credence to the story, but the comparison with Sanuto's account is quite remarkable.

Relations with Venice

Whatever the reality of Mesih's Palaeologan background and his blood relationship with the Venetian patrician class may have been, it can be argued that Mesih did have a special understanding with Venice for most of his career. The Venetians clearly considered him to be a friend of the Republic and of the Christian West.⁴⁷ Some authors have cast doubt over his loyalty to the sultan. There are various examples of disloyalty and duplicity; his alleged proposal to the Council of

Ten during the peace negotiations of 1471 that he would hand over the Dardanelles and the Turkish fleet to Venice in return for 40,000 ducats;⁴⁸ his ambiguous behaviour at the siege of Rhodes in 1480; the supposedly soft line taken by him in negotiations with Rhodes and the custody of Jem Sultan in 1482/887; evidence of collusion with Venice regarding the recovery of Jem in 1483;⁴⁹ his failure to notify Bayezid of the arrival of the French fleet at Midilli. However, against this must be placed Mesih's alleged devoutness to the Islamic faith;⁵⁰ his resolute performance in strengthening the Ottoman fleet in 1500/906; and his thorough handling of the Karamanid revolt the following year. Like Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha, Mesih's ties with Venice counted for little during the Turco-Venetian war.⁵¹ He is wholly representative of the membership of the Divan in this period, remaining an enigmatic figure and the beneficiary of two cultures and two social systems.

Notes

1. Ménage (Stern), p.114
2. Danişmend, vol. 1, p.444; Süreyya, vol. IV, p.368. In his appendix (vol. IV, p.723), Süreyya, lists a certain Mesih Pasha as having held the rank of chief eunuch in the reign of Mehemed II. In this context it should be noted that Sanuto refers to a 'capetanio Monuco bassa' (i.e. Eunuch) as leading the assault on Rhodes in 1479 (Sanuto, IV, 325).
3. Hammer, GOR, vol. II, p.557 n. It is argued here that it was probably the corruption of the name of 'Mesithes' or 'Misach' by western writers that led to the contention that he was a member of the Palaeologi. This in itself is insufficient to disprove Palaeologan connections, and Hammer himself has no grounds on which to suggest that western forms of the name may be corruptions of 'Mikhalogli'. However, it should be said that no mention of his Palaeologan past is mentioned in Kreutel, Oruç; Osmanzade, p.19; or Tansel. The waqf of Mesih (Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.439) gives no further clues.
4. Reindl, p.279 most recently; N. Beldiceanu and I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 'Un Paléologue inconnu de la région de Serres', Byzantion, XLI, 1971, p.13, n.2, where he is referred to as "le frère de Hass Murad paşa de la maison impériale des Paléologues."

- Babinger, p.398, describes Mesih as 'Palaeologus'. Schefer, p.xlv: "Messih pasha, issue di la famille des Paleologues et qui avait embrassé l'islamisme, -----". Spandugino, p.313: "descendu des empereurs de Constantinople". Schefer, p. xlv, also states that Mesih was a relative of Spandugino, who was a member of the family of Kantakouzenos and that Mesih provided Spandugino with much of his material. There is little evidence to substantiate this claim. For an objective analysis of some western sources on Mesih's Palaeologan connections, see Setton, vol. II, p.348.
5. Sanuto, III, 559, 29 July, 1500, (Oral report to the Doge of the French ambassadors, or 'araldi', who were returning to France after visiting the Porte in Edirne). They relate how they were ushered into the presence of two viziers, one of whom was 'il paleologo'. [Docs., p.652]
 6. Sanuto, III, 901, October 1500. Paolo Contarini, who was the castellan of Anabolu (Nauplion/Napoli di Romania), fell into Turkish hands on the surrender of Koron (15 August 1500). Here he describes how he was summoned by Mesih who is described as a relative of Contarini on his mother's side. Mesih is here trying to enlist Contarini's help in bringing about the surrender of Anabolu. Contarini eventually escaped, and the city remained a Venetian stronghold. [Docs., p.653]
 7. N. Beldiceanu and I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, op.cit., p.13, N.2.
 8. Süreyya, vol IV. p.368.
 9. The most comprehensive recent analysis of the siege and of Mesih's own ambivalent role is Setton, pp.348 ff. see also Danişmend, I.348-9, and Hammer, GOR, vol. II, 197, 206 and 226-7. For an interesting narrative account, see Schwoebel, pp.121 ff and 382. It should be noted that on some occasions, western sources, including Sanuto (III, 182, April 1500) [Docs., p.652], have associated the siege of Rhodes with Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha and not with Mesih.
 10. Hammer, GOR vol. II, 226-7; Babinger, p.399.
 11. Süreyya, IV, p.368; Danişmend, I, pp.444-5; Imber, p.62
 12. Imber, pp.62-65
 13. Danişmend, I, pp.444-5. There are various alternative accounts about the duration of Mesih's tenure as Kapudan pasha, and whether he held the post of vizier during some of the years in question, (see note 14), but Danişmend himself concludes that Mesih held the post in question for 12 years.
 14. Süreyya, IV, p.368; according to Süreyya, Mesih did not hold the posts of kapudan pasha and vizier concurrently, but was kapudan in 1480-1/885-6, and from 1484-1491/889-897, and that he was vizier in the intervening period. See also Hammer, GOR, II, p 265, where Mesih is referred to as vizier in 1481.

15. Hammer, GOR, pp.265-6; Tansel, p.47-48; ASV, CX. Misti, reg. 21, ff 54v, May 1483, shows furthermore how Mesih was at the very heart of negotiations between Bayezid and Venice through which Bayezid hoped that Venice could be persuaded to take possession of his brother Jem.
16. Tansel, p.73; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.288-9.
17. Kreutel, Oruç, p.36 and 38, Hammer, GOR, II, 289, who states that Bayezid dismissed the second vizier Mesih Pasha and invested him with Filibe where Mesih retired. Note also, ASV, CX, Misti, reg.21, f.55, May 1483: "Misich bassa, che è uno del bassa et consieri del Signor Turco ----"
18. Süreyya, IV, p.368, Babinger, p.399, (1493)
19. Kreutel, Hannivaldus, p.213.
20. Kreutel, Oruç, pp.91 ff.
21. Sanuto, I, 624-5, May 1497: "Se dice ha mandà a chiamar Scandar bassà zoè quello era bassa im prima et etiam Misich bassà." Süreyya, IV, p.368, does say that Mesih was vizier in the 1490s, but gives no precise date.
22. Sanuto, I, 640, May 1497: "Si dice à chiamato Schander bassà in loco suo, qual prima era bassà. Etiam, che Misit bassa ha mandato fuora 4 fuste de Galipoli per bisogni di Stalimini e altre insule circostante." ^COsmānzāde, Hadīkat, p.19 also says Mesih was SB of Gelibolu at this juncture.
23. ^COsmānzāde p.19 Hammer; GOR, II, p.320; Zambour, p.162; Danişmend, I, p.430; Süreyya, IV, p.368 and Babinger, p.399; all agree that he became GV in 1499/905, but whereas the first four sources say that he took office on the death of Çandarlı Ibrahim Pasha, Süreyya and Babinger both state that he only became GV after his return from his pilgrimage to Mecca. Kreutel, Oruç, only acknowledges Mesih to be a vizier, and ascribes the post of GV to Ya^Ckub Pasha Hadım for a few months in 1500 (see below, pp.482, 484, n.19)]. It is quite possible Mesih was temporarily replaced after Manenti's departure.
24. Sanuto, II, 784, June 1499; II, 1040, 1042-3, August 1499, [all Docs., p.651]. It also appears that he was accompanying one of Bayezid's sisters on this pilgrimage and it may have been her entourage which was annihilated by some rebellious Arabs.
25. Sanuto, III, 131; 179; 182 [all Docs., p.652]
26. Sanuto, III, 179-181 [Docs., p.652] Malipiero, pp.191-196. See also Fisher, p.71; Setton II, p.520; and Tansel, 200-201. For an earlier visit of Manenti to Mehmed II's court, see Ménage (Stern), p.112
27. Sanuto, III, 181, April 1500 [Docs., p.565] (Relazione of Alvise Manenti): "----Et de li tre bassa, Charzego (p.76ff) e Jacut sono nostri nimici.--"

28. Sanuto, III, 197, April 1500 [Docs., p.652]. Although stated here that Mesih was to accompany the fleet to Corfu, this manoeuvre did not materialize. See also Lane, p.162, for a discussion of Ottoman as well as Venetian fleet preparations in 1500.
29. Sanuto, III, 448, 558-9, 901-3, 935-6; Da Lezze (Angiolello), pp.259-60 [all Docs., p.652-3]
30. Sanuto, III, 337.
31. Sanuto, III, 425.
32. Sanuto, III, 450.
33. Sanuto, III, 481; 502; 503.
34. Sanuto, III, 504-5.
35. Sanuto, III, 901-3 and 935-6 [both Docs., p.653] (see note p.316 and p.322, n.6).
36. Sanuto, III, 948.
37. Sanuto, III, 1554-55.
38. Hammer's account of Mesih's activities during the Turco-Venetian war is very confused: he describes the death of Mesih in the Galata fire in 1500 (GOR, II, pp.327-8), and then has him leading an army against the Karaman rebels in 1502 (pp.329-330).
39. Kreutel, Oruç, pp. 137-8; Tansel, pp.124-5; Danişmend, pp.408-409; Sanuto, IV, 38-9 [Docs., p.654]. Note that Süreyya makes no mention of the Karaman campaign.
40. Tansel, p.124; Danişmend, I p.408; Sanuto, IV, 105 [Docs., p.654] also ASV, Miscellanea Gregolin, Busta 1, fasc. 4, No.7a [Docs., p.655]
41. Sanuto, IV, 309.
42. Süreyya, IV, p.368; Kreutel, Oruç, pp. 145-6; Danişmend, I, p. 410; ^COsmanzāde Ahmed, p.19; also Schefer, p. XLVI, n.1. See also note 38.
43. Süreyya, IV, p.368 and Kreutel, Oruç, p.145 both agree on November 1501/Cumāda I 907, and the latter specifies 6 Cumāda I 907=17 November 1501.
44. Sanuto, IV, 242 [Docs., p.655].
45. Evidence available does show that help was late in arriving from Istanbul for the relief of Midilli, See Tansel, p.219.
46. Kreutel, Oruç, pp.145-6.
47. Sanuto, III, 131 [Docs., p.652] and note 27.
48. Babinger, pp.289-290

49. ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 21, f. 55, 22 May 1483 [Docs., p.656]. For a full transcription, see Lamansky, vol. I, pp. 203-4).
50. Danişmend, I. p.407.
51. Sanuto, III, 559 [Docs., p.652]

MESIH BEG/PASHA - SB of Bosnia (1500/906) [Miset Bassa]

Sanuto, III, 778: According to the podesta of Capo d'Istria, Mesih was "bassa di la Bossina". In August/September 1500 he arrived in Bosnia and within three days was ready to mobilise with 20,000 'turchi' to raid. There is no other record of Mesih being SB of Bosnia at this time [see Mostaluch].

MESIH BEG - ambassador (1500/906) [Misit Bei]

Sanuto, III, 560: Accompanied the two French emissaries (araldi) to the sultan back to France in the summer of 1500. (see p.334)

MORO - corsair (1517/923) [sic]

Sanuto, XXIV, 596, 597, 608, 675-6: Turkish corsair based in Avlonya, pursued and challenged by the soracomito Zuan Contarini, August 1517.

MOSTALUCH* - SB of ? Bosnia (1500/906) [sic]

Sanuto, III, 916: SB in region round Spalato who planned to take the castle of Narenta (September 1500). [see Mesih Beg/Pasha above]

*in the MS, but Mostalch in edition.

MURACH ÇELEBI - gazi (1501/906)

[Murach Celebia]

Sanuto, III, 1366, February 1501: 'capo' of a Turkish raiding party in the region of Zara (January 1501).

MURAD AĞA - (1501/906)

[Murataga/Maradaga]

Sanuto, III, 1627-28: copy of a translation of Bayezid's letter (the original in Turkish) to Murad Ağa about the brutal torture inflicted on Bayezid's harac collector by the men of Stephen of Moldavia ['Carabogdam']. The letter is in response to Murad Ağa's own missive to the Porte about the affair, and here Bayezid orders Murad to find out what is going on and whether 'Carabogdam' is refusing to pay the haraç which was in accordance with custom.

MURAD VOYVODA - mercenary (1510/916)

[Murat Vayvoda]

Sanuto, X, 609: Turkish mercenary fighting on the Venetian side in Count Vanissa's company. Murad and two other Turkish mercenaries addressed the Collegio on 22 June 1510 asking for permission to return home. In the end they were persuaded to remain a little longer in Italy. Sanuto calls Murad a "valente homo".

Several months later the Republic was embarrassed by the action of certain Venetian subjects in Dalmatia, led by Piero Novacovich, who attacked Turkish mercenaries on their return home to Dalmatia in November 1510. They attacked this same Murad and two of their 'capi', Seremet and Nasuh (q.v.) together with their 42 men and 13 horses. Murad and Nasuh were taken prisoner; Seremet and his adopted son died, and the remaining Turks and their belongings scattered. The

perpetrators gave as the reason for the attack their conviction that these Turks had been the ruin of those parts.

HAS-MURAD PASHA - BB of Rumeli (1514/920)

[Chasmurath]

Sanuto, XIX, 59: mentioned in Donado da Lezze's letter to Caroldo as the 'bassa de la Romania' drowned during a military encounter at a river crossing during the Chaldiran campaign.

KARA MUSA RE'IS - corsair (1505/911)

[Caramusa]

Sanuto, VI, 190, 238 he controlled five ships in June 1505 in activities against Rhodes at a time when Kemal Re'is was similarly involved. Sanuto comments that in this way there were these two 'corsari turchi famosi' at sea. When in September the Venetians had seized one of Kara Musa's ships, the SB of the Morea demanded its return on the grounds that Musa was not a corsair.

KOCA MUSTAFA PASHA BIN ʿABD al-MUʿĪN ¹ [Mustafa bassa; Mustafa bei]
@ KAPICI BAŞI

Nationality, Background and Identity

Of all the great state officials of Bayezid's reign Koca won for himself the most notorious reputation. This was largely due to the sinister role he was alleged to have played in the death of Bayezid's brother Prince Djem. Mustafa's origins, however, are not well understood. Western sources refer to him as a Greek renegade. Giovio's description is often cited: "Era Mustafa della terra di Seres appresso Ansipoli, nato di un Sacerdote greco, uomo d'ingegno acuto, malizioso e sempre vendibile, le quali infirmità d'animo esso mostrava bene; nella maligna quarta dura e negli ochi torti." ² The Diarii do not throw any new light on this question of his background. On the one occasion when his nationality is mentioned - not surprisingly in the erudite Relazione of Gian Jacomo Caroldo - he is described in derogatory terms: "avaro, anzi sordidissimo; de ingegno greco, maligno et versatile", ³ but whether by this Caroldo thought him to be of Greek origin is not entirely clear. ~~Andrea Gritti describes him as the most arrogant turk (in the sense of Ottoman) in greco, maligno et versatile", ³ but whether by this Caroldo thought him to be of Greek origin is not entirely clear.~~ Andrea Gritti describes him as the most arrogant Turk (in the sense of Ottoman) in Istanbul in 1503. ⁴ Nevertheless, the Diarii are an invaluable source on his later career. This analysis takes account of reports both in which he is named and in which he is called Kapıcı or by the other ranks he is known to have held.

Early Career

Mustafa's recorded career begins with the accession of Bayezid II. Originally a barber, he was a product of the Slave Household during the Conqueror's reign and served Bayezid when Prince in Amasya.⁵ His early career is particularly memorable for his famous mission to Rome in 1490. Mustafa, who by now was holding the rank of kapıcı başı,⁶ arrived in Rome on 30 December 1490 and was given an audience by Pope Innocent VIII to whom he delivered a letter from Bayezid II concerning the question of the payment of pension for Bayezid's brother Prince Djem.⁷ The sultan proposed that, now that Djem had been transferred to Italy and to papal custody, the same terms should be agreed between Pope and sultan as those which had existed formerly with the Grand Master of Rhodes. Mustafa was said to have taken with him 120,000 ducats, that is the equivalent of three years' pension for Djem. Just what part Mustafa may have played in the eventual death of Djem in February 1495 in Naples is very uncertain. Western and Ottoman historians agree that Djem was poisoned, but there is agreement neither as to the method nor to the perpetrator of the deed.⁸ Ottoman sources have pointed to Djem's barber, Mustafa, as the guilty party, a Greek renegade who was said to have been later rewarded for this action by promotion to the Grand Vizierate, but doubt has already been cast on the possibility that he and Koca Mustafa were one and the same person.⁹ It should be noted, however, that the Council of Ten in Venice was highly suspicious of Mustafa's intentions during his 1490 mission and considered the real purpose of the embassy to be directed against the life of Djem.¹⁰ Later in 1494 it was the turn of the Grand Master of Rhodes to be suspicious and to warn the Pope, now Alexander VI, that Mustafa, the erstwhile envoy, was stationed at

Durazzo where he was thought to be plotting against the life of the Prince.¹¹ The only reference in the Diarii to Mustafa in these years is again in the Relazione of Caroldo where it is stated that Mustafa was "ambassador a Roma al tempo de Glem soltan."¹² Significantly no mention is made of his complicity in the death of the prince. At this point Mustafa's presence at Durazzo presents another problem with respect to his identity during these early years of prominence, for it has been argued that Mustafa was appointed SB of Ohri (the sancak inland from Durazzo and therefore a logical base from which Mustafa could direct operations against Djem in Rome).¹³ However, it has been argued elsewhere that Mustafa was not at this time SB of Ohri but of Avlonya, a location even better suited to Mustafa's alleged machinations than the Ohri-Durazzo axis,¹⁴ and that soon after in 1497/8 he was appointed SB of Gelibolu.¹⁵

Beğlerbeği of Rumeli

Whatever the posts in which Mustafa served may have been, and whatever the sequence in which he filled them, there is no doubt that his political stature by the end of the 1490s was sufficiently great for him to be appointed BB of Rumeli during 1498/904,¹⁶ certainly before November of that year. Both on the first occasion when Mustafa is mentioned by name in the Diarii in November 1498 and again later in March/April 1499, the implication is that Mustafa had been only recently prompted to his new rank.¹⁷ Indeed the Venetian government was well aware of his influence with Bayezid, and the ambassador Andrea Zanchani had been instructed prior to his departure for Istanbul in November 1498 to visit Mustafa as well as the viziers and to pay him the customary courtesies; he was also to congratulate him

on his promotion.¹⁸

When Zanchani arrived in Istanbul on 27 February 1499¹⁹ he found Mustafa as expected attending the meetings of the divan with the viziers.²⁰ This was a crucial period in Turco-Venetian relations. Zanchani had a clutch of issues to bring before the sultan and his counsellors; these concerned the political balance in Italy as well as frontier relations between the two powers. But the fundamental purpose of the visit was to re-affirm the peace which had lasted since Bayezid's accession. Zanchani's mission was a total failure and had been doomed from its inception, executed as it was in the background of massive Ottoman rearmament and fleet construction. The war party in the divan had gained ascendancy with the sultan, and Koca Mustafa, given his record of hostility towards the West, must have played a central role in the political intrigue at this time. Unfortunately Zanchani discloses little about Mustafa or his general attitude towards Venice. He may not have had very much contact with Mustafa due to the latter's reported bad state of health in these months.²¹ All we are told are two morsels of information: one, supplied by ^CAli beg dragoman (q.v.), was that Mustafa greatly admired Firuz Beg, himself one of the chief protagonists in the Cernovich affair over the salt works at Zupa ²² (the affair which in part precipitated the Turco-Venetian war); the other was his admonition to Zanchani that the Republic's construction of a castle on the island of Zante was contrary to the articles of the peace (of 25 January 1479).²³ We also know from the Liber Graecus and the Diarii that in his capacity as BB of Rumeli Mustafa was engaged in correspondence with Venice.²⁴

Turco-Venetian War: Military Manoeuvres

As BB of Rumeli, Mustafa is only mentioned by name a total of nine times in the Diarii from November 1498 to January 1501 when he was appointed vizier.²⁵ However, there are numerous references to the activities of the BB of Rumeli during this period, and since it is almost certain that Mustafa held this position, it is possible to collate the references and so to reconstruct his movements during the early first phases of the Turco-Venetian war. The chronology of his own campaigning is as follows.

1499/905 Campaign of Lepanto

1499/905

- | | | |
|--------|----------|--|
| May | Mid | BB leaves (presumably his own <u>sancak</u>) for Istanbul. ²⁶ |
| | Late | BB has gone to Ipsala. ²⁷ |
| | c24 | BB has left for Gelibolu. ²⁸ Bayezid was preparing to leave Istanbul for Edirne in three days. |
| June | Early | BB of Rumeli and BB of Anadolu join forces. ²⁹ |
| | Mid | BB is in Serez with his <u>sancakbeğis</u> . ³⁰ |
| July | Mid/Late | BB is with the main camp at Vardar with 18 or 19 <u>sancakbeğis</u> and with 35,000 to 40,000 men. He awaits Bayezid's orders. The objective is Lepanto. ³¹ |
| | 26 | BB sets off for Lepanto. ³² |
| August | c6 | BB arrives at Lepanto. ³³ |
| | Early | The Ottoman army is divided into three camps: that of the BB of Rumeli, BB of Anadolu and of Bayezid himself. ³⁴ |
| | 26 | Surrender of Lepanto. ³⁵ BB Supervises the |

building of the castle on the mountainous Rhion promontory while the BB of Anadolu supervises the building of a castle on the Antirhion promontory for the defence of the straits.^{35a}

October Late BB and Kemal Re'is (q.v.) have been left in charge of the ships left at Lepanto.³⁶

1500/906 Campaign of Modon and Koron

1500/906

- March One BB is in Prevesa and the other in Yanina.³⁷
- April General mobilisation of Ottoman forces for second campaigning season.³⁸ BB in charge of vanguard.³⁹
- April 29 to BB (most probably of Rumeli) is at Vardar.⁴⁰
- May 18
- May/June Army moves into the Morea (Megara and Anabolu).⁴¹
- June 3 BB camps near Corinth.^{41a}
- June BB encamps at Lepanto in support of the fleet; Bayezid is at Anabolu; the third camp at Modon.⁴²
- June BB is in command of 20,000 men at Lepanto, Bayezid orders him to accompany the fleet with the land army along the coast.⁴³
- June BB accompanies the fleet with his land forces along the coast.⁴⁴
- June 5 Bayezid sends a BB to Patras to mobilise the fleet.⁴⁵
- June 16 BB joins Bayezid in camp at Modon, having brought the fleet.⁴⁶
- June 18 to
- July 25 Bombardment and siege of Modon.⁴⁷

- August 8 Fall of Modon.
- August 15 Fall of Koron.
- August 18 BB enters Koron with the viziers.⁴⁸
- August 26 BB arrives with a huge army at Argos.⁴⁹
- November Bayezid leaves the two BBs to continue the siege at Anabolu.⁵⁰
- November 26 Bayezid leaves Edirne for Istanbul and sends the BB to Sofia in reaction to the movements of the King of Hungary who was said to be advancing with a large army, plundering en route.⁵¹

Vizier 1501-1504/906-909 / Peace Negotiations

Throughout the war Mustafa had not only served in his capacity as Beğlerbeği, but had also rendered service as one of Bayezid's close advisers. He had attended the negotiations with Zanchani in February 1499 and he continued to attend subsequent meetings held with foreign diplomats. In February 1500 he was involved in the negotiations with Alvise Manenti⁵² and in July with the French ambassadors (araldi);⁵³ and soon after the fall of Modon he is reported by Andrea Balastro, camerlengo of Modon and whom Mustafa appears to have known, to have been standing in for the third vizier.⁵⁴ Indeed Mustafa was playing a fascinating game of intrigue with Manenti at this time, if the account in Malipiero is to be believed where a fairly close understanding between the two men is suggested. Mustafa had apparently tried to contact Manenti three days before his arrival for talks in Edirne so as to instruct him on the manner in which he should conduct himself in the negotiations; Manenti was not to reveal Mustafa's complicity or draw attention to him, otherwise he would be

forced to turn enemy. However, Mustafa's protoiero, who had been entrusted with the message, had been unable to penetrate the cordon of security surrounding Manenti.⁵⁵ Later, after the failure of the mission, Mustafa was able to pass some very valuable information to Manenti about Ottomon military objectives in the forthcoming campaigning season: Mustafa revealed that Bayezid had sworn to take Anabolu, Modon, Koron and Malvasia (as he was in fact to attempt to do but with only partial success);⁵⁶ he also revealed on the basis of diplomatic correspondence to which he had access that the King of France was not well disposed towards the Republic.⁵⁷

The fact that Mustafa knew both Manenti and Balastro is an indication of Mustafa's Latin contacts which in itself would have been an important qualification for an astute counsellor of the sultan. Given his experience it is not surprising, therefore, that in January 1501 he was formally promoted to the vizierate in place of the ailing Ya^ckub Pasha (q.v.) (see p.484, n.20).⁵⁸

Although Mustafa is hardly mentioned in the Diarii again by name until the peace negotiations with Freschi and Gritti, we do know that in the intervening period the viziers were involved mainly in trying to secure the release of the Venetian merchants imprisoned since the start of the war and in laying the foundations for peace talks.⁵⁹ In neither endeavour did Mustafa play as prominent a role as the other viziers. With Freschi's arrival in Istanbul to open formal negotiations in December 1502, Mustafa attempted to impress upon Freschi his friendship for the Republic,⁶⁰ but in spite of Mustafa's purported close relationship with Manenti in 1500, Freschi was not impressed.⁶¹ The Venetian government had been suspicious of him since the premature death of Djem and, when Hersekzade - whom the Republic

considered to be a true friend - had been censured and silenced in the divan by Mustafa and Da'ud (B) for his conciliatory stance towards Venice, this was evidence enough of Mustafa's duplicity.⁶² Similarly when Gritti conducted the final negotiations in July 1503, Mustafa and Da'ud (B) were the greatest obstacles to any peace settlement which could be considered favourable towards Venice.⁶³ Mention has already been made above of Gritti's and Caroldo's unflattering description of Mustafa.

Grand Vizier, first term, 1503-1506/909-912

Several months before Hersekzade Ahmed's resignation from the Grand Vizierate it had been rumoured that Mustafa had already replaced him in that office.⁶⁴ Although these ^{rumours} were false, they were an expression of the power struggle which had been raging within the divan since the forcible retirement of the Grand Vizier Koca Da'ud Pasha (q.v.), and it is indicative of the scope of the Diarii that they reflect rumour and hearsay as well as established fact. Mustafa's climb to power, like that of most of his contemporaries, had been slow but steady; it was characterized above all by intrigue and deception. When Hersekzade resigned towards the end of 1503/909, Mustafa was the natural successor. The traditional view of the Grand Vizierate in the early years of the sixteenth century has been challenged in the past with particular reference to the successor of Mesih Pasha in 1501/907 using reports in the Diarii⁶⁵. Similarly it can be established through the Diarii and through Venetian archival sources that Mustafa did not serve one but two terms as Grand Vizier and that the first term lasted from 1503/909 until 1506/912, thus cutting into what was thought to have been Hersekzade's second term of

office. It is the reliable observer and Venetian secretary Alvise Sagudino who first refers to Mustafa Pasha as 'primo' or Grand Vizier in late September/early October 1503 (Cumāda II 909).⁶⁶ From late 1503 Mustafa is named in Venetian records in conjunction with the main business dealings of the day⁶⁷ and in July 1504 a letter from the Venetian government to Mustafa addresses him as Grand Vizier.⁶⁸

One can conclude therefore that Mustafa was appointed Grand Vizier immediately after the conclusion of the peace with Venice, a peace successfully achieved through Hersekzade's close relationship with Andrea Gritti. But it was left to Mustafa to oversee the settlement of those aspects of the peace treaty on which specific agreement had yet to be reached. These included the fixing of boundaries,⁶⁹ agreement on compensation for damages inflicted on Ottoman subjects⁷⁰, the recovery by the Ottoman of slaves,⁷¹ the release of Venetian prisoners,⁷² and, most important of all, Venetian restitution of Alessio to the sultan. These issues encompassed a wide range of business in his three years in office during which he pursued a very tough policy towards the Republic, especially over the establishment of boundaries at Anabolu and Monemvasia.⁷³ The Republic endeavoured to satisfy Mustafa in all her dealings with him and was prepared to go to quite considerable lengths to ingratiate herself with him,⁷⁴ as was so vividly exemplified by the apprehension of the unfortunate slave Da'ud (see p.142).

In spite of the co-operation he received from the Venetian government, these years were not characterized by great success for Mustafa as Grand Vizier. Domestically the political situation was marked by instability engendered by Bayezid's uncertain state of health which could have precipitated a succession crisis at any

moment. The chief consequence of this state of affairs was to make the janissary corps the paramount political catalyst in the capital. In the summer of 1503 and again in the spring of 1505 there had been serious disaffection within their ranks,⁷⁵ and they had already posed a threat to Mustafa's security. In the summer of 1506 unrest among the janissaries was provoked by Bayezid's absence from public view for several days. When he eventually did show himself from a window, his worn and weary appearance only served to confirm the belief that his death was imminent.⁷⁶ Turkish as well as Christian merchants immediately hid their wares in an attempt to escape the consequences of the breakdown of law and order.⁷⁷ Bayezid was able finally to conciliate the janissaries with a gift of 300,000 aspri and so convince them that his authority was still intact.⁷⁸ One source of great concern and consternation for Bayezid was Mustafa Pasha's well known propensity for corruption which, according to the reliable and detailed account of Jacomo Contarini, led to Bayezid's absence from the public eye for a period of forty days. This was occasioned by a colourful but serious incident during Bayezid's attendance at the mosque when an anonymous, written entreaty was tossed from a balcony and in which it was stated that Mustafa was a corrupt and fraudulent official and that he resorted to violent measures without just cause.⁷⁹

Indeed observations have already been made on the mismanagement of the empire during these years.⁸⁰ In the summer of 1506 Contarini described Mustafa, still Grand Vizier, as an extremely sagacious man but renowned for his venality and poorly regarded by Bayezid.⁸¹ It was also held that he belonged to the sect of the Safawijja as early as 1506; Mustafa's support for Prince Ahmed during the succession dispute would eventually confirm his membership of this

subversive sect which was anathema to both Bayezid and later Selim.

These adverse qualities, coupled with and magnified by similar behaviour on the part of the vizier Yahya Pasha (q.v.), would have sufficed to bring about Mustafa's demotion. When the disastrous news of the results of the negotiations with Venice over the cession of Alessio became known, Mustafa's first term as Grand Vizier was at an end; for although the actual negotiations were successfully concluded in the sultan's favour and the Republic finally agreed to cede the town in May 1506,⁸² the inhabitants reacted by burning Alessio,⁸³ thus denying the Ottomans the prize they had worked so hard to obtain since the conclusion of the war.

Contarini observed that Bayezid was at a loss as to how to move against Mustafa after the embarrassing incident in the mosque.⁸⁴ When eventually Hadım Āli (q.v.) was brought in to replace him and to place the government on a more stable footing, Mustafa was only demoted to the rank of vizier, thus retaining for himself a place in the divan and demonstrating the power and influence which he was still able to wield.

Vizier 1506-1511/912-917; Military Aid to Venice, 1510/916

Mustafa held the post of vizier from late 1506 until the middle of 1511, that is contemporaneous with Hadım Āli's term as Grand Vizier.⁸⁵ We have little knowledge of his activities or those of the viziers at this time. Concern about Bayezid's health continued, the corollary of which was restlessness and insubordination amongst the janissaries over whom neither Bayezid nor the viziers could exercise proper control;⁸⁶ The breakdown of the sultan's authority eventually led to the sacking and looting of Jewish households in

Istanbul.⁸⁷ Meanwhile Kemal Reis' own piratical and uncontrolled excesses may have provoked the viziers' jealousy of him.⁸⁸ As regards relations with Venice, the viziers continued to work for the release of those Venetian merchants still in captivity since the conclusion of the war,⁸⁹ but the main issue between the two powers was the question of Ottoman military aid for Venice in her European wars.⁹⁰ In this Mustafa, like the other viziers, was ostensibly sympathetic towards the Republic and appears to have made some effort on her behalf.⁹¹ However, at a later stage in the discussions over aid, Hersekzade revealed to Nicolo Zustinian that Mustafa showed some sympathy in this matter but was not that enthusiastic.⁹²

The Mustafa Problem:

The Grand Vizierate, 1511-1513/917-919 and the Succession Dispute.

The life of a vizier towards the end of Bayezid's reign was highly precarious. Only a man with the character and personal stature of a Hersekzade (q.v.) (pp.85-6) could play successfully the political balancing act of supporting both leading contenders for the throne - Prince Ahmed and Prince Selim - yet simultaneously giving loyal service to the sultan. Similarly only a man of Hadım ÇAli's power could commit himself totally to one claimant with any prospect of success, and in the event it was only his untimely death at the hands of Shah Kuli which thwarted his ambitions. Mustafa had neither the magnetism of Hereskzade nor the authority of ÇAli. His gamble for survival only resulted in ignominious death.

It was with the death of Hadım ÇAli in July 1511 at Gökçay that the race for the throne became once again an open contest, for with the loss of ÇAli, his champion, Prince Ahmed lost the initiative,

while a month later, Prince Selim also suffered a serious setback at Çörlü (p.85). Unfortunately it is also with the death of ^CAli that our picture of Ottoman political history over the following two years becomes highly confused, even more than is usually the case in this field of study.

There are two problems. The first concerns the sequence of Grand Viziers in this two year period, and in particular, Hadım ^CAli's successor as Grand Vizier. It is pointed out elsewhere ⁹³ that on the whole historians accept that Hersekzade succeeded ^CAli in July 1511 and that he was Grand Vizier at the time of janissary revolt of September 1511, though there is by no means a consensus. There is a suggestion in the Diarî reports that Koca Mustafa was Grand Vizier, but the evidence is not conclusive. Two accounts from different sources⁹⁴ dwell on the question of Mustafa's successor after the janissary revolt to the almost total exclusion of other officials. In other words, it was Mustafa's rank that was the important one. The implication that he was Grand Vizier is even more sharply suggested in Angiolello's account.⁹⁵

The second problem concerning the confusion over the identity of several Mustafa Pashas is considerably more complex. The following is the traditionally accepted account ⁹⁶ of the last year of Koca Mustafa Pasha, which will serve as a basis for comparison with information in the Diarî.

Mustafa, a staunch supporter of Prince Ahmed, was deeply implicated in the September 1511 plot to put Ahmed on the throne. The plot was discovered and Mustafa's house was ransacked in the ensuing janissary revolt of 21 September, but he was able to escape injury to his person. Paradoxically, although the janissaries demanded his

dismissal and that of the other instigators - Hasan Pasha (BB of Rumeli/vizier), Ca^Cfer Çelebi (Nisancı) and the Kadi-^CAsker Abdurrahman Müeyyedzade Efendi - in the aftermath of the revolt, Mustafa not only survived the purge but was appointed Grand Vizier. He continued in this office until the end of Bayezid's reign, again succeeded in surviving the abdication of his former master to become the new sultan's first Grand Vizier in April 1512/Şafer 918. However, unable to expurgate himself of the taint of his earlier support for Prince Ahmed, he earned the unfortunate distinction of becoming the first Grand Vizier to fall prey to the caprice of Selim and to die a violent death in November 1512 following the discovery of his alleged collusion with Prince Ahmed.⁹⁷ Selim's suspicions had already been aroused after Mustafa had counselled him to withdraw to Bursa during the campaign against Prince Ahmed and after Mustafa had proceeded to disband the troops, with the consequence that Ahmed was soon after able to swoop down on Amasya and take the city.⁹⁸ So runs the traditional story of his last years.

Evidence in the Diarîi in part corroborates this account, but also points to certain problems of identification which, viewed in conjunction with other evidence, could present an altogether new picture.

Although Koca's partisanship in the succession dispute shortly before Selim's defeat at Corlu in August 1511/Cumāda I 917 (when Bayezid was searching frantically for a general to lead his army against Selim)⁹⁹ is somewhat unclear,¹⁰⁰ the Diarîi do show him to have been a supporter of Prince Ahmed. Selim was not popular among the leading state officials and the implication is that Mustafa, as one of the viziers, must have been consulted by Bayezid on the

question of sending ships to meet Prince Ahmed and bring him to Istanbul in September 1511¹⁰¹ His involvement in this September plot, though never explicitly described, is nevertheless implicit in the Diarii account of the janissaries' sacking of Mustafa's house¹⁰² and the violation of the womenfolk of his household¹⁰³ during the revolt of 21 September.

Where the Diarii offer a radically new version of events is in the aftermath of the janissary revolt. Here we are told that Koca Mustafa - and the source¹⁰⁴ actually specifies that it is the Mustafa whose house had been sacked by the janissaries - was "found dead on the road." More strikingly, we are told that Mustafa had been replaced (presumably as Grand Vizier) by a certain "Mustafa bei sanzacho di Romania", referred to earlier in the same source¹⁰⁵ as "Mustafa bei sanzaco di la Morea" and by a different source¹⁰⁶ as "Mustafa bassa bei sanzaco di la Grecia". These last two references must surely point to one and the same person. At first sight this individual would seem to be Mustafa Pasha, the son-in-law of Bayezid who was SB of the Morea and formerly SB of Avlonya [henceforth known as Mustafa (B)]¹⁰⁷. Closer scrutiny, however, indicates that we may be dealing with an altogether different Mustafa [henceforth Mustafa (c)] who has eluded detection hitherto.

Shortly before his accession in April 1512/Şafer 918, Selim had asked that he should be given two of Bayezid's leading officials (as counsellors): a certain Mustafa Pasha and Iskender Bostancı Başı (q.v.).¹⁰⁸ Soon after his accession we are told that Mustafa Pasha and Hersekade Ahmed viziers stayed behind in Istanbul with Selim and did not accompany Bayezid into retirement.¹⁰⁹ We are also told that the Mustafa Pasha who was SB of the Morea had only just (i.e. around

June 1512) been appointed one of the viziers.¹¹⁰ In other words, the Mustafa who succeeded Koca Mustafa after the janissary revolt of September 1511 could not have been Mustafa (B), the SB of the Morea since the latter was not even created a vizier until June 1512. Who then is this other Mustafa [i.e. Mustafa (c)] and was he the Mustafa who stayed behind in Istanbul with Selim?

Towards the end of 1512 the Diarii echoed¹¹¹ the traditional story described above of the execution of Mustafa¹¹² in November 1512 for collusion with Prince Ahmed and for having advised him to retreat from Ankara to Bursa. This is reinforced by another document filed in the Diarii a year later (September 1513), which more or less describes the same execution.¹¹³ Apart from a divergence in the description of the manner of his death,¹¹⁴ the two passages can be taken to refer to one and the same event and one and the same person. In other words there is strong evidence that a Mustafa Pasha was executed in November 1512, but this need not necessarily be Koca Mustafa: it could equally well be Mustafa (C).

But there is yet more confusion, because the Diarii unequivocally speak of a Mustafa Pasha who was Grand Vizier during the course of 1513,¹¹⁵ and this appears to be confirmed by an Ottoman source which has been brought to my attention.¹¹⁶ We therefore have to discover the identity of a Mustafa Grand Vizier [henceforth Mustafa (D)] in 1513 who it is implied in the Ottoman source, died of plague in the spring of 1514/920. It cannot be Mustafa (B), because he lived to fight at Chaldiran later in 1514; but it might be Mustafa (C) if he was not the Mustafa executed in November 1512.

This highly confusing situation poses certain questions then. Was it Koca Mustafa's body which was "found dead on the road" after

the September 1511 janissary revolt? If it was, what is the identity of Mustafa (C) who replaced him as Grand Vizier and may be the man who was subsequently executed in November 1512? Who is Mustafa (D)?

In other words, do we have three Mustafa Grand Viziers [Koca, Mustafa (c) and (D)], or if Koca did not die in September 1511 but survived into Selim's reign to face execution in November 1512 (as is traditionally accepted), do we have two Mustafa Grand Viziers [Koca and Mustafa (D)]?

There are no satisfactory answers to these questions. The Diarii indicate that the Mustafa who was executed in November 1512 was the man who had put Selim on the throne.¹¹⁷ As for the Mustafa (D) of 1513, all we are told is that he was a friend of Venice,¹¹⁸ and that he and Hersekzade Ahmed were 'men and friends' of the previous sultan.¹¹⁹ All that can be said with any confidence is that whoever the unknown Mustafa or Mustafas may have been, the Mustafa Grand Viziers of 1511-1513 all met their deaths before Chaldiran in August 1514: Koca in the janissary revolt of September 1511 or executed in November 1512; Mustafa (C) executed in November 1512 or dying of plague in the spring of 1514; or Mustafa (D) dying of plague in 1514. We can at least eliminate Mustafa (B) (q.v.) from the puzzle, since he is reported to have fought at Chaldiran, and the likelihood of his ever having replaced Koca Mustafa as Grand Vizier has already been rejected on other grounds discussed above.¹²⁰

Although not providing any answers, the Diarii do at least pose some important questions which point to a degree of turmoil in the highest echelons of government during the first year of Selim's reign. There may have been continuity in Selim's selection of many of his counsellors, but the position of Grand Vizier appears to have been in

a state of dislocation.

Notes

1. Ménage (Stern), p.118 n. 38 using Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.441, where the patronymic is given.
2. Reindl p.302; Hammer, GOR II, p.636, (Hist. IV, p.422 n. 7) and p.332; Tubero, p.34: ("Et quoniam Mustapha Graecis parentibus ortus erate, ----."); Elesović, i/1.p.500; Danişmend, I, p.430 states that he was of Greek or French origin; Kissling, Gonzaga, p.43 says he was a renegade Greek.
3. Sanuto, V, 460 [Docs., p.625].
4. Alberi, Ser. III, vol.III, p.41.
5. See Reindl, p.302 for notes on early career.
6. Ménage (Stern), p. 118, n.38; Tansel, p.61
7. For an analysis of the 1490 mission based on western sources, see Setton, II, pp.418-422. See also Hammer, GOR, II, 274-5 (Hist. IV, 368), and Fisher, p.45. Another valuable source is Makuscev, vol. I, p.556, doc. no.16
8. Hammer, GOR, II, p.227 (Hist. III, 371-2)
9. Hammer, GOR, II, p.626 (note for p.367) (Hist. III, n. xx). For a fuller discussion of his alleged role in the death of Djem, see Danişmend, I, pp.397-8.
10. ASV, CX, vol.24, f.182, 23 September 1490 (Lamansky, vol. I, pp.236-7): " ---- unus eius orator nomine Mustafabey, vir magna auctoritatis et gratiae apud ipsum Turcum ---, cuius adventum firmiter accepimus esse sub simulatione et pretextu practicandi et firmandi quandam compositionem cum Beatitudine prefato, sed vera causa est, ut praticet, operatur et agat, quantum eo sit, contra vitam suprascripti Zen. ----"
11. Lamansky, vol. I, pp.290-1 (Pierre d'Aubusson, Grand Master of Rhodes, to Pope Alexander VI, 26 April 1494).
12. See note 3.
13. Kissling, Gonzaga, pp.43-44.
14. Fleming, Avlona, pp.310-312. Note also Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.525 where a 'Mustafa Beg bin Abdullah' is mentioned as 'Avlonya Mirlivası': bin Abdullah could have been Koca Mustafa's early patronymic (see Ménage(Stern) p.118).
15. Idem. and see Mustafa (B) (see p.357) for a discussion of the likelihood of Koca's appointment as SB of Gelibolu.

16. Süreyya, IV, p.371; Kreutel, Oruç, pp.111ff.
17. Sanuto, II, 139, [Docs., p.573], II, 570.
18. MCC, Cod. Cicogna, no. 2269, Commissioni no. 30, f. 1v.
19. Sanuto, II, 598: "Da Costantinopoli, di sier Andrea Zanchani orator. -----; a di 20 [February 1499] arivò a li Dardanelli dove lassò le ditte tre galie [MS: tre galie. Et a di 24 zonse a garipoli et a di 27 a Constantinopoli con la Galia] ben in hodrene, fu ben visto -----." (The line underlined was omitted from the edition).
20. Sanuto, II, 598-9, II; 600 [Docs., pp.559-560]; II, 700.
21. Sanuto, II, 598-9. By July 1498 (Sanuto, II, 1019) we are told that the BB of Rumeli ('Grecia') had been ill but was now cured.
22. Sanuto, II, 611.
23. Sanuto, II, 700
24. ASV, Liber Graecus, 70v, 17 March (1499), written after Zanchani's departure from Istanbul and requesting compensation for damages against 'his brother Gasim' ('mio fradelo Cassimbei'); see also Sanuto, II, 101 where letters of the BB of Rumeli are being taken to Venice (November 1498).
25. Sanuto, II, 139, 570, 598-9, 600, 611, 700; III, 179, 1551-2; IV, 22.
26. Sanuto, II, 781-2 ('Malar bei, homo reputado, esser partito et andato verso Constantinopoli'); II, 829.
27. Sanuto, II, 834, 871.
28. Sanuto, II, 838.
29. Sanuto, II, 920.
30. Sanuto, II, 972-3.
31. Sanuto, II, 1065, 1066, 1073-4. See also II, 1126-7 [Docs., p.657]
32. Sanuto, II, 1127-28
33. Sanuto, II, 1144, 1148, 1154, 1214. Danişmend, vol. I, p.405; Tansel, p.190 and notes.
34. Sanuto, II, 1332-3.
35. Sanuto, IV, 327; Tansel, pp.196-7 and notes. According to Hammer, GOR II, p.317 (Hist. IV, 54), Lepanto was surrendered to Mustafa Pasha; Tubero, p.34 refers to him as the besieger of Lepanto. See also Nodilo, (ARA), p.82; and Gökbilgin, Registre (1499), pp. 84 and 90 for Mustafa's expenses in the campaign.

- 35a. Tansel p.198; Hammer, GOR, II, 319 (Hist. IV, 58); Reindl, p.331 and n.46
36. Sanuto, III, 129.
37. Sanuto, III, 236
38. Sanuto, III, 256, 282, 285, 292; III, 304-5 [Docs., p.657]
39. Sanuto, III, 304-5 [Docs., p.657], 319-320.
40. Sanuto, III, 332-3, 333, 337, 338, 362, 445
41. Sanuto, III, 445-6(29 May/3 June), 446-7 (31 May).
- 41a. Sanuto, III, 503-4 and especially 729-230.
42. Sanuto, III, 480, 498.
43. Sanuto, III 499-500; also Priuli, vol. II, pp.9-10; he gives the BB's forces as 10,000. See also Sanuto, III, 504.
44. Sanuto, III, 501.
45. Sanuto, III, 519, 729-730.
46. Sanuto, III, 602, 729-730; Cf. Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.247.
47. Sanuto, III, 729-730.
48. Sanuto, III, 935-6
49. Sanuto, III, 901
50. Sanuto, III, 1060-1
51. Sanuto, III, 1522-3, 1523.
52. Sanuto, III, 179
53. Sanuto, III, 559
54. Da Lezze (Angiolello), pp.259-260 (11 August 1500) Mustafa apparently knew Balastro who is reported here captured by the Turks. For his imprisonment and eventual ransom, see Sanuto, III, 1491, 1625, IV, 160, 258; XX, 250.
55. Malipiero, part I, p.192.
56. Idem., part I, p.195.
57. Idem., part I, p.196
58. Sanuto, III, 1551-2 [Docs., pp.657-8]; IV, 22 [Docs., p.658] Süreyya, IV, p.371 (who gives no date). Kreutel, Oruc, p.144 still refers to Mustafa as BB of Rumeli in the autumn of 1501/907 which the Diarî clearly

contradict. Although Sanuto, IV, 242 indicates that Mustafa may have been made a vizier only after the death of the Grand Vizier Mesih Pasha (q.v.) in November 1501, the exact significance of the passage is not clear and may refer merely to a false rumour that he had been appointed Grand Vizier.

59. Sanuto, III, 1520; 1554-5.
60. Sanuto, IV, 645; 651-2 [Docs., pp.624-5]; 667-9.
61. Sanuto, IV, 667-9.
62. Sanuto, IV, 645.
63. Alberi, Ser. III, vol. III, pp. 30ff, esp. 35ff; and Sanuto, V, 449ff; BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (8652), fasc. I, ff. 15r -17r, 22r ff, and especially ff. 28r-29v.
64. See pp.80-81.
65. For the traditional view, see pp.81ff, 121-122.
66. Sanuto, V, 255 [Docs., pp.576-7]
67. Sanuto, V, 597-99, 762, 1002-3; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 42v, 15 July 1504.
68. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 44v, 15 July 1504 [Docs., pp.596-7] ("primo vesir").
69. See pp.119-121.
70. Sanuto, V, 587-99, 762, 1002-3 (referring to the silâhtarbaşı Qasim Beg.(q.v.)); V. 760 (referring to Kara Da'ud (see pp.198-9); V, 761-2 (referring to the sons of Omer Beg (q.v.))
71. Sanuto, V, 597.
72. Sanuto, V, 597-9, 1002-3.
73. Sanuto, V, 255 and note 69. Mustafa instructed Hadim ^CAli to take a hard line.
74. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 44v, 15 July 1504 [Docs., p.596]. See also ASV, CX, Misti, 1503-5, reg.30. f. 213r, 19 April 1504 (the Commission of Zorzi Negro) where Negro is told to tell Mustafa that Venice had not forgotten Mustafa's kindness from former times and to pacify him if he complained that Venice took Hersekzade's mediation in the peace negotiations rather than his own.
75. This disaffection was the result partly of serious conditions of famine (Sanuto, V, 452 (1503); VI, 164 (1505) and partly of the beating received by the son of a janissary from their Aga (Sanuto, V, 462, and BNM, Cod. It, VII, 878, (8652), fasc. I, ff. 38v-39r.

76. Sanuto, VI, 374.
77. Sanuto, VI, 374; VII, 7.
78. Sanuto, VII, 8.
79. Sanuto, VII, 6-7.
80. See [pp.123-4, 471].
81. Sanuto, VII, 9-10.
82. Sanuto, VI, 334.
83. Sanuto, VI, 380-1, 410,; VII, 20-1. The viziers were at their wit's end as far as finding a way of breaking the news to Bayezid.
84. Sanuto, VII, 6-7
85. Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.132, 235, 379 (for 1507 and 1508); Uğur, part I, p.39 (KPZ, defter VIII, f. 196v); Sanuto, VI, 519; IX, 527; X, 139-140, 801-2; XI, 292-3, 293-4, 417-8. According to one document (Sanuto, IX, 564-5), the reliability of which is not attested, and which lists the losses of the viziers from the earthquake which struck Istanbul on 14 September 1509, a certain 'Mustafa bassa' is described as Grand Vizier, while a certain 'Aly bassa' is described as third vizier, a picture clearly at variance with all other evidence. The content of the document is cited by Hammer, GOR, II, p.349 (Hist. IV, p.99) but without citing Sanuto as the source.
86. Sanuto, VII, 129-130, 441-2, 676-7, 680; VIII, 12, 503; XI, 417-8
87. Sanuto, XI, 293-4, 294
88. Sanuto, VI, 519, 554.
89. Sanuto, VI, 519
90. For a full analysis of this, see pp.84-5, 125-6.
91. Sanuto, IX, 527; X, 139-140, 801-2; XI, 292-3, 293-4, 417-8.
92. Sanuto, XI, 292-3
93. See p.86.
94. Sanuto, XIII, 186-7 and 221-222 [both Docs., pp.547-8].
95. Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.270: "andarono alla casa di Mustafa Bassa, qual era uno delli consiglieri et, sentendo il detto Bassa il romore, se ne fuggì nel serraglio. Andarono detti Giannizzari da Carzegoli pur (my italics) Bassa, il quale con buone parole l'acquietò. Messero a sacco la casa di Mustafa et alcuni altre case li vicine -----."

96. Uluçay (TD VII/10), pp.120-122; Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p.6; Uzunçarşılı (Bell. XXX), pp. 570-72; Hammer, GOR, II, 361 (Hist IV, 116); Ménage (Stern), p.118, n.38; Danişmend, vol I, p.422. ^cOsmānzāde, p.21
97. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.142; (Ménage (WZKM), p.35. n. 14; Elezević, I, i, p. 501; Danişmend, II, p.2-3; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.384, 384 note. For sixteenth century western accounts of the same story, see Giovio, Commentario, f. 18rv; 25v; Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.274; Menavino, pp.226-228. Almost all of the above refer to Mustafa's collusion with Prince Ahmed in terms of the letter the former was alleged to have sent to the Prince (Cf. Sanuto, XVII, 10-11 and note 113).
98. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p. 142; Danişmend, II, pp.2-3
99. See pp.85, 222.
100. Sanuto, XII, 515-6 [Docs., p.592].
101. Sanuto, XIII, 185.
102. Sanuto, XIII, 185 (Nicolo Zustinian to Venice, 23 September 1511); XIII, 186-7 (News received from a courier from the Ottoman court by way of Ragusa, 15 October 1511); XIII, 220-222 (Andrea Foscolo, bailo in Istanbul to his brother Piero in Venice, 26 September 1511). Note that information regarding Mustafa was obtained by Sanuto from three independent sources. [Docs., pp.547-8].
103. Sanuto, XIII, 185.
104. Sanuto, XIII, 185-6 (see note 102). According to this Mustafa was caught up in some financial deal with Selim, but the sense is unfortunately not clear.
105. Idem.
106. Sanuto, XIII, 220-222 (see note 102).
107. See pp.353ff.
108. Sanuto, XIV, 162 (March 1512).
109. Sanuto, XIV, 463-4 (June 1512).
110. Idem: 'et à fato novo visiero sanzacho di Morea Mustapha Basi'.
111. Sanuto, XV, 512 [Docs., p.658].
112. Traditionally thought to be Koca Mustafa.
113. Sanuto, XVII, 10-11 Relazione from Cyprus, [Docs., p.659]. This gives greater detail than XV, 512 (see note 111), providing an alleged transcript of the letter which Koca Mustafa was said to have sent Prince Ahmed. In the letter Mustafa clearly set out his plan to set Ahmed on the throne by disbanding the Ottoman troops and so

leave Selim exposed and unprotected in Bursa. If authentic, this is a remarkable document. Unfortunately my manuscript reading verifies that the Relazione and the information contained within it are undated. Since the practice of entering documents out of sequence is not uncommon in the Diarii, it is quite possible that XVII, 10-11 refers to the events of November 1512 (XV, 512).

114. Sanuto, XV, 511 (November 1512) states that Selim had Mustafa strangled, while XVII, 10-11 states that Selim personally shot him through with an arrow.
115. Sanuto, XVI, 176-177 (February/March 1513) [Docs., p.658]; XVI, 375-7 (May 1513) [Docs., p.568], and especially XVI, 437 (April 1513) [Docs., p.568]. Professor V.L. Ménage has already drawn our attention to the possibility of the existence of another Grand Vizier Mustafa in 1513 (Ménage (WZKM), 68(1976), p.35, n.14) through his own reading of Sanuto (see note 116).
116. I am grateful to Professor V.L. Ménage for the following communication: "There is a further Ottoman source which seems to support the suggestion (which I made in WZKM, 68 (1976), p.35 and n.14) that some other Muştafâ Paşa was Grand Vizier for a few months between the execution of 'Koca' Muştafâ towards the end of 1512 and the re-appointment of Hersekzâde Ahmed. This is the Paris manuscript, Bibliothèque Nationale supp. turc 1183, which I described in Neshri's History of the Ottomans, London 1964, pp.54-7 and 82-4: it is an abridgement of Neşrî with a continuation, by an unidentified redactor, covering the years 891/1486 to 923/1517. At fol. 84b the continuator records the execution of a Muştafâ Paşa in the words: '[Sultân Selîm] Muştafâ Paşayı Allâh emrine bir töhmetle gönderdi' -- the töhmet presumably being the suspicion of clandestine dealings with Prince Ahmed. There follows the account of the execution of Korkud and then of Ahmed, of the flight of Ahmed's sons ^CAlâeddîn and Süleymân to Egypt (where both died of plague) and of Murad to Persia (where, 'it is said', he was killed). In Rebî^C II 920 May-June 1514 Selim set out against Shah Ismâ^Cîl: 've bu mezburde tâ^Cün eşeri belürdi. Andan Muştafâ Paşa ölicecek, Ahmed Paşa vezîr-i a^Czam olub ve Muştafâ Paşa ve Tukagîn-oğlı vezîr oldı' (fol.85b). The text is not explicit, but it implies that this second Muştafâ died of plague".
117. Sanuto, XVII, 10-11 [Docs., p.659]
118. Sanuto, XVI, 176-77 [Docs., p.658]
119. Sanuto, XVI, 375-6 [Docs., p.568]
120. For a final note, replete with irony, I venture to observe that if Süreyya (IV, p.371) is correct in saying that Koca was executed in 919/1513, there may after all have been only one Grand Vizier Mustafa between 1511 and 1513. Fortunately Süreyya is not noted for the accuracy of his dates.

Identity and Background

Given the complexity of identifying the Mustafa Pashas of the period, it is not surprising that Mustafa (B)'s background is obscure and his career has often been confused with that of other Mustafa Pashas. He has been primarily confused with Koca Mustafa Pasha (q.v.), but he has also been linked with Mustafa Da'ud Pashazade, the son of Bayezid's great Grand Vizier Da'ud bin 'Abd al-Wadūd (q.v.).¹ Kreutel refers to Mustafa Da'ud Pashazade as SB of Avlonya from 1500 to 1502, that is during the period for which we have ample documentation to show that Mustafa (B) in fact held this sancak,² while there is very strong evidence to show that Da'ud Pashazade was SB of Yanina in these years, a neighbouring sancak.³

Nevertheless there is further possibility of conflation due to the fact that Mustafa (B) is frequently referred to as the son-in-law of Bayezid II⁴, while it has hitherto been thought that Mustafa Da'ud Pashazade was most probably the only Mustafa to be Bayezid's son-in-law.⁵ A decade later their paths clearly divide when in 1512/918 Da'ud Pashazade, who was first SB of Köstendi⁶ and shortly after SB of Amasya as Selim's supporter during the succession dispute, surrendered Amasya to Prince Ahmed and became his vizier;⁷ Mustafa (B) on the other hand became one of Selim's first viziers (see pp.372-3).

The Diarii offer various morsels of information which may be used to identify Mustafa (B). Apart from the frequently cited connection with Bayezid as his son-in-law, he is also referred to as the brother-in-law of Hersekzade Ahmed (whether through their wives or through their sisters is not clear);⁸ it is also possible to deduce that

Mustafa (B) was of Serbian origin⁹ and that he was at Otranto during the campaign of 1480.¹⁰ The Venetian government recalled longstanding and cordial relations with him stretching back to the missions of Giovanni Dario (see p.368). It can be concluded, therefore, that Mustafa (B)'s career was well under way by the 1480s, perhaps after having been taken as a slave from Dalmatia, possibly, Serbia. By the late 1490s he found himself in the position of SB of Avlonya (see p.355) until his transfer to the sancak of the Morea in 1506/912. He may have been briefly SB of Nicopolis (Niğbolu) just before this (p.369). Shortly before the death of Bayezid he was raised to the rank of vizier, a position in which he was confirmed by Selim. He fought at Chaldiran in 1514 as vizier and subsequently survived into the reign of Suleiman.

Some of the particulars gleaned from the Diarî tally with information on other Mustafas. Perhaps the most striking convergence of identifying particulars is with Mustafa Pasha Jurisević about whom very little is known, but who has been linked elsewhere with Mustafa (B).¹¹ Jurisević may have been BB of Rumeli in the 1480s (a position not inconsistent with Mustafa (B)'s earlier role at Otranto), and he was of Dalmatian origin. One Mustafa described by Süreyya¹² was also 'damad' (son-in-law) and also BB of Rumeli early in his career, later becoming a vizier and rising to become vali of Egypt in 1522/928. Finally Danişmend has connected the Mustafa who was serdar during the Rhodes campaign of 1522 with the one who fought at Chaldiran in 1514 as vizier, that is with Mustafa (B).¹³ If all these threads are drawn together, then Mustafa (B), perhaps known as Mustafa Jurisević, may have had a spectacular career spanning over forty years during which he held important office, was posted to key sancaks, and fought in most of the major campaigns of the period. These threads cannot be

drawn together, however, until further work is carried out on the later volumes of the Diarîi. Nevertheless, the prospect of confirming this speculation should be a spur for further research in this area.

SB of Avlonya (?-1506/912) : Prosopographical problems.

We are fortunate that Mustafa's position as SB of Avlonya, and later of the Morea, afforded him frequent contact with neighbouring Venetian outposts. Consequently Venetian officials sent numerous reports concerning him to the Venetian government, and these reports then found their way, in copy, into the Diarîi.

The question of when Mustafa was first appointed SB of Avlonya is, however, a prosopographical problem which is not solved by the Diarîi or by Venetian sources I have examined, and draws us into the first area of conflation between him and Koca Mustafa. The other serious area of conflation between the two concerns the office of Grand Vizier during the succession dispute of 1511-12/917-918 (p.341ff).

It has been argued elsewhere that Koca Mustafa may have been SB of Avlonya from about the mid 1490s until his possible appointment as SB of Gelibolu in 1497 or 1498/903 or 904.¹⁴ The first occasion on which the SB of Avlonya is referred to by name in the Diarîi is in November 1498¹⁵ when 'Mustafa Bei' is described as SB and son-in-law of Bayezid. As early as October 1496, however, there is mention of a Mustafa Beg SB of Bosnia, also described as son-in-law of Bayezid.¹⁶ There is no trace of a Mustafa having been SB of Bosnia in this period,¹⁷ so perhaps this may have been an error in the report or in the manuscript. The Mustafa best known as the man who was both son-in-law of the sultan and a sancak holder in the general area of Dalmatia was Mustafa Da'ud Pashazade, (see above, p.353) while at the same

time it cannot be ruled out that Koca Mustafa (q.v.) may be the man referred to in the November report as exchanging emissaries and presents with the Duke of Milan.¹⁸

What can be said is that the few references in the Diarîi to the office of SB of Avlonya before November 1498 (the date when that SB is first named as Mustafa Beg and from when Mustafa (B)'s career can be positively traced in the Diarîi) indicate that the office-holder was involved in activities similar to those in which Mustafa (B) was involved after November 1498. The implication is, therefore, that Mustafa (B) may have held the office of SB of Avlonya from at least 1496. For example, on two occasions before Mustafa (B) is first named, we are told that an emissary from the SB of Avlonya had been sent to collect the body of Prince Djem, Bayezid's brother, from the King of Naples.¹⁹ In January 1499, after the naming of Mustafa (B), another emissary is reported setting off from Avlonya and arriving in Brindizi on his way to the King of Naples to execute the same mission.²⁰ It could be argued that the latter emissary was not necessarily sent by the same SB who had despatched the first, but further evidence tends to suggest that one SB is involved here and not two. The reasoning for this as follows:

Andrea Gritti noted in a letter to the Venetian secretary Zacharia de' Freschi in late September 1498 (just before the naming of Mustafa (B)) that a Mustafa Beg had gone to Istanbul to obtain permission to embark for Apulia in Southern Italy with an invasion force.²¹ In the Relazione of Antonio Lanzi (the date of information probably being at about the same time as Gritti's letter to Freschi) the 'SB of Avlonya' is reported to have gone to the Porte seeking and receiving permission to invade Apulia.²² The Mustafa of

Gritti's letter is therefore the SB of Avlonya of Lanzi's Relazione. Furthermore, in Gritti's letter, Mustafa is described as the "pasha who was at Otranto", and in June 1499 a completely different source also describes Mustafa, the SB of Avlonya, as the pasha who was in Otranto and who killed Count Julio.²³

At the very least therefore, the Diarii show that Mustafa (B) was SB of Avlonya from around the summer of 1498 and that he may very well have been in that post for some time before that.

SB of Gelibolu and Kapudan Pasha : Prosopographical Problem.

Another prosopographical problem related to the one described above is the question of who was Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu in 1498/904. Although Küçük Da'ud (q.v.) and Hersekzade Ahmed (q.v.) are the most likely contenders,²⁴ it has been suggested that Koca Mustafa may have filled this dual post in 1498.²⁵ References in the Diarii suggest two things: first, that the SB of Avlonya succeeded the SB of Gelibolu in June 1497 on the transfer of the latter to the beğlerbeğilik of Anadolu.²⁶ Secondly, that a certain Mustafa was 'capitano zeneral di l'armata', a fleet numbering over 160 ships in November/December 1498.²⁷

The possibility that Koca Mustafa was indeed Kapudan Pasha cannot be ruled out, since evidence to show that Mustafa (B) was SB of Avlonya before 1498 is, however strong, still inconclusive. On the other hand, there are other references²⁸ in the Diarii which show that Mustafa (B) was captain of the large fleet which was being constructed in the Ottoman shipyards of Avlonya, Castelnovo and Kanina along the Adriatic coasts. This fleet, however, did not number 160 ships, so the title 'capitano zeneral di l'armata' may indeed refer

to the position of Kapudan Pasha rather than to a more localised sea-admiral like Mustafa (B).

Few prosopographical problems are quite as complicated as those concerning the Mustafa Pashas, and the analysis presented here requires further study and investigation. There can be no doubt, however, that from the end of 1498/904 until 1506/912, all references in Venetian sources relating to the office of SB of Avlonya are to Mustafa (B). What was the nature of his activities during these years?

SB of Avlonya: Shipbuilding, War and Failure, Plans to invade Southern Italy, 1498/904-1502/908

As part of Bayezid's rapid expansion of the Ottoman fleet in the late 1490s, Mustafa was involved in a large-scale programme of shipbuilding in the Ottoman strongholds of Dalmatia and Albania. There was probably no clear objective at first, other than to prepare for what was coming to be seen as the inevitable resumption of hostilities with the Christian powers. By 1498 it was becoming clear that Venice was to bear the weight of Ottoman aggression. Mustafa, who had been supervising fleet construction at Avlonya (on the river Vojussa = Vijosë near Avlonya) and Preveza went in person to Istanbul in the late summer or autumn of 1498/904 to ask Bayezid's permission to invade southern Italy.²⁹ Almost certainly Mustafa's objective was to attack the Apulian cities of Otranto, Brindisi and Trani which had been recently acquired by Venice in 1495/6 as part of her dual strategy of maritime expansion and territorial consolidation on the Italian peninsula.³⁰ It has been noted elsewhere³¹ that in 1498 the Ottomans were primarily concerned about Venice's alliance with Louis

XII of France. This coupled with the fact that Brindizi and Otranto were already supplying Venice with manpower for her galleys,³² thus posing a threat to the sultan's ambitions along the Dalmatian coast and in the Adriatic, must have been potent factors in convincing the Ottomans of the need to strike in Apulia. Bayezid granted Mustafa permission to attack.³³ He returned to his sancak to muster men and materials. Twenty years earlier a previous holder of the sancak of Avlonya and Mehmed II's influential counsellor, Gedik Ahmed Pasha, led the invasion force which captured Otranto. It has already been noted that, according to the Diarii, Mustafa Beg took part in that campaign: the experience gained then must have carried some weight with Bayezid in approving the new invasion plan.³⁴ It is also noteworthy, in the context of the continuity of relations between officials of the two empires, that the Venetian secretary Alvise Sagudino, who had been sent to take possession of Otranto, Brindisi and Trani in January 1496³⁵, had himself been involved in an earlier Venetian attempt to expand into Apulia in 1484.³⁶

Mustafa's preparations in and around Avlonya for the invasion fleet during the course of 1498/904 and 1499/905 are well documented by Sanuto. Mustafa was engrossed in the detail of organising the construction of ships and the fortification of Ottoman strongholds in the area. For these operations he enlisted the help of the local population.³⁷ In November 1498/Rebī^c II 904 it was reported that Bayezid was sending him 3000 janissaries, 2000 azebs and 5000 cavalry for the invasion fleet.³⁸ By March 1499/Şa^cbān 904 a report from Corfu noted that there were 25 to 30 ships in Avlonya of which ten could be refitted; seven had already been launched.³⁹ Mustafa at this time was located near Corfu and had ordered an unspecified

number of timar holders to proceed to Avlonya and await his arrival.⁴⁰ He also sent 500 azebs to Argirokastron and similarly ordered them to wait for him there.⁴¹ At this point, however, reports concerning mobilisation dry up. The nature of Mustafa's movements and role in the war during the remaining campaigning months of 1499 become unclear. There are some indications that in the spring of 1499 he was involved in various engagements in Albania. One report in May 1499/Şawwāl 904 states that Mustafa had taken part with Firuz Beg, SB of Scutari in operations to bridge Albanian rivers, while some shipbuilding was still continuing in Avlonya.⁴² Another report indicated that on 25 May 1499/14 Sawwāl 904 his force of 1500 cavalry and 500 infantry suffered a defeat (at whose hands we are not told) at a place called Porocalamo in Albania where four of his lieutenants were killed.⁴³

From May 1499 Mustafa and the resources at his disposal seem to have been diverted to support the fleet under construction in Istanbul and the main body of Bayezid's army. Two reports from Ragusa show that Mustafa had sent forty-five of his galley commanders (soracomiti) to Istanbul to man the galleys.⁴⁴ By June 1499/Zū'1-ka^cde 904 Mustafa himself (as well as Firuz Beg, Fa'ik Pasha (q.v.) and most probably other sancakbeğis) had gone to Istanbul, also to board the fleet.⁴⁵ An independent report at about the same time notes that when the Ottoman fleet was at Salonica (June 1499), Mustafa SB of Avlonya was to embark there.⁴⁶ In fact shortly after, a reliable source reporting in late July 1499/Zū'1-ḥicca 904 states that Mustafa was in Bayezid's camp at Manastır.⁴⁷ The likely explanation for why Mustafa was deflected from the invasion of Apulia is that the Ottomans were overextending themselves. Shortage of experienced

captains of galleys was a perennial problem for the Ottomans, and the simultaneous mobilisation of two major fleets on two fronts - one in the east from Istanbul and Gelibolu, and the other in the west from the Avlonya and Preveza - would have been difficult. Sancakbeğis from the western Balkan littoral and forty-five galley commanders were consequently ordered to Istanbul. In addition, there was still considerable uncertainty in Ottoman official circles even as late as July 1499/Zū'l-hicca 904 about military objectives and whether the main thrust of Bayezid's armies should be northwards towards Durazzo and Cattaro, southwards against Venetian possession in the Morea, or eastwards against Corfu or Apulia via Avlonya.⁴⁸ Mustafa Beg was privy to the controversy which was raging within the divan at this time, as is revealed by his conversation with the Greek citizen of Corfu Volia Lendari.⁴⁹ Eventually Lepanto was selected for the main attack.

We know nothing of Mustafa Beg's part in this campaign, nor of his activities during the rest of 1499. By the start of the following year's campaigning season, however, Mustafa's Apulian expedition was once again in the forefront of Ottoman strategy. Successes against the Venetian fleet the previous year had clearly boosted Bayezid's confidence in the effectiveness of his fleet. Mustafa's armada was ready. He had gathered together 15,000 men and was apparently waiting for their numbers to be swelled to 25,000 before crossing to Apulia; by April 1500, 120 master caulkers had arrived in Avlonya.⁵⁰ The fleets at Avlonya/Vojussa and Preveza would soon be ready to embark simultaneously.⁵¹ The Vojussa fleet (the only one for which we have apparently reliable figures) numbered 21 light galleys (galie sotil), ten great galleys (galie grosse) and seven fuste.⁵² 8,000 azeps⁵³

arrived in Vojussa to man the fleet. These were described as inexperienced, but were preferred to Christian galley slaves.⁵⁴ Nevertheless 2000 of the latter, referred to as 'vexed' ('Angarizati') also arrived in the gulf, as well as 500 janissaries.^{54a}

But at this point (June/early July 1500/Zū'1-ḥicca 905/Muḥarrem 906) disaster struck. The Venetians had of course been fully aware of the Ottomans' activities along the litoral, and spies, informers and reconnaissance missions⁵⁵ had been providing a constant flow of intelligence about the state of readiness of the armada. In an effort to thwart the exit of the Vojussa fleet, the Venetian provveditore of the fleet Hironimo Pisani blockaded the mouth of the river with rocks; in late June.⁵⁶ When Mustafa himself attempted to force an exit, on the captured galia Pagana, he was wounded.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, Mustafa's hitherto good relations with his father-in-law the sultan rapidly deteriorated. First he had been sent an order by Bayezid to attack the Venetian ships in the mouth of the gulf; later he received another order that under pain of death he was to ensure that the fleet set sail⁵⁸. When all Mustafa's efforts failed, Bayezid sent him a black cloak, the traditional sign of a sultan's displeasure and the symbol of impending execution⁵⁹. Mustafa was running out of time.

Meanwhile Bayezid was beginning to take a direct interest in the problems in the gulf of Vojussa. He sent an ulak there, arriving on 10 August/14 Muḥarrem, to assess the situation for him and to assist in taking soundings of the sea-bed in the mouth of the estuary.⁶⁰ He came under fire from Venetian ships and withdrew, wounded, to make his way back to Istanbul and report to Bayezid. Sappers also arrived to try to deepen the waters through excavation.⁶¹ Simultaneously Bayezid issued his second command to Mustafa to break out of the gulf:

according to Venetian reports Bayezid was particularly anxious at this juncture for the fleet to be extricated since he expected the fall of Modon shortly (it fell on 9 August 1500/13 Muḥarrem 906) and planned for Mustafa's fleet to link up with the main fleet and head for Corfu.⁶²

However, luck was against Mustafa. Although he had succeeded in building and launching the whole Vojussa fleet,⁶³ the exit remained blocked, while Mustafa began having difficulties with the ships' crews. Although one report states that Bayezid himself had ordered the 8,000 azebs to withdraw when it became clear that the fleet would not sail,⁶⁴ most reports indicate that many azebs were deserting and others dying.⁶⁵ Mustafa now had to resort to recruiting the local peasantry (we are not told for what exactly, but as substitutes for 'azebs they would have served as oarsmen/galley slaves) who until then had only been used for felling trees for the construction of the fleet. The fact that the local rural population was hardly ever used to man galleys is a measure of Mustafa's desperation and also possibly of the degree to which Ottoman military resources were stretched at this time.

Faced with mounting problems and having failed to execute the sultan's commands, Mustafa had no alternative but to go, as ordered, to Istanbul to face execution towards the end of August/early September. 1500. But in the hope of obtaining the sultan's mercy, Mustafa sent his wife (Bayezid's daughter) and children on ahead. Bayezid decided to spare him for her sake, but on condition that he try to extricate the fleet the following season.⁶⁶ One report that Mustafa had been replaced by the ?hazinedarbaşı [Asnatar bassa] from Iluxi (?Illica near Üsküp) see p.237) was thus untrue, and Mustafa

remained in his post as guardian of the fleet which had been pulled into dry dock for the winter.⁶⁷ Mustafa was now left with 500 azebs and 500 janissaries on the Vojussa, the other azebs having been disbanded.⁶⁸

This was effectively the end of the Ottomans' second attempt to gain a foothold in Italy. It ended in dismal failure and disappointment: Mustafa himself was stricken with grief and, had it not been for his wife, would have lost his life.⁶⁹ In spite of strenuous attempts the following year and subsequent years (he was still involved in digging out the fleet in 1504⁷⁰) to free his ships, progress was slow and military objectives had to be abandoned.⁷¹ First rate Venetian intelligence and skilful blockading of the Vojussa averted a major threat to Italy and to Europe, the seriousness of which has been largely underestimated and ignored by historians.

Our picture of Mustafa's activities during the rest of the war are incomplete, not least because of the gap in the Diarii caused by Sanuto's absence from Venice when he was appointed camerlengo in Verona. At any rate it was a highly inauspicious period for him. Towards the end of 1500 or early in 1501 (at about the time when he succeeded in liberating 11 galleys and five fuste,⁷²) his wife died, thus adding to his personal grief but more significantly depriving him of essential influence with the sultan.⁷³ Nevertheless, Mustafa's standing with Bayezid must have been high, since in spite of his disgrace he continued to play an important role in Ottoman military and diplomatic strategy concerning the Christian West. Although much of his time was taken up with problems at Avlonya and with continued shipbuilding under Bayezid's orders,⁷⁴ it appears that he was able to devote some attention to the planning, if not the execution, of attacks on Durazzo⁷⁵ (January 1501/Receb 906) and

Butrinto⁷⁶ (November-December 1502/Cumāda I and II 908). More significantly he was also involved in the valiant Ottoman defence of Midilli (August 1502/Şafer 908) during which he commanded a cavalry force of 800 men. (According to one report, later shown to be without foundation, he was fatally wounded.⁷⁷)

Peace Negotiations and Relations with Venice

Channels of communication between the sultan and the Republic through which the peace process might flourish remained open even during the midst of hostilities. Various attempts⁷⁸ were made in the course of the war to re-establish peace, and Mustafa himself was to some extent involved in the initiative which ultimately led to the signing of a formal peace treaty. On his release in January 1501, Valerio Marzello, the Venetian merchant held prisoner in Istanbul, was informed by Herekzade Ahmed (see pp.78-9) that the Signoria could open peace negotiations through Mustafa Pasha at Avlonya. Nine months later, during a period of little diplomatic activity and while Andrea Gritti was still a prisoner in Istanbul (see p.79), Venetian records show that Mustafa had sent letters to the provveditore of Corfu concerning the launching of a peace initiative.⁷⁹ The initiative, the linch-pin of which were the Hersekzade-Gritti accords, survived the turmoil of the controversy sparked off by the Venetian capture of Santa Maura in the summer of 1502/908, so that by September/October 1502 (RebT^c I and II 908) Mustafa was once again playing a part in arranging negotiations: on 24 October 1502 Marco Antonio Contarini, capetanio al golfo, sent to Venice a letter he had received from Mustafa informing him that the ulak, which Mustafa had sent to the Porte on 20 September, had now returned with the reply

that Bayezid was content that envoys from both sides should rendezvous at Eno (from where they should head for Istanbul).^{79a} Mustafa had already written to Andrea Gritti via Contarini shortly before,⁸⁰ and the despatch of an ulak to Istanbul may have been a result of an exchange of communications between the two men. At the very least Mustafa and Contarini were acting as the conduit through which the two sides sounded out one another.⁸¹ Indeed it was through Mustafa Beg that Venice had sent letters to Zacharia de' Freschi giving him new instructions about how to handle negotiations over Santa Maura.⁸² By the time of Andrea Gritti's mission to Istanbul in July 1503/Muḥarrem 909, it was written into his commission that he should visit Mustafa in Avlonya; but as Gritti explained in a letter to Mustafa, 'Ali Beg Tercüman's (q.v.) great haste to return to Istanbul had rendered this impossible. He did, however, promise to visit Mustafa on the return journey and in the meantime asked him to seek the release of some Corfuans captured by the men of the subaşı of Delvina.⁸³ The two men finally met, most probably for the first time, in November 1503 when Gritti was homeward bound.⁸⁴

Establishment of Good Relations

Mustafa Beg seems to have impressed Gritti considerably, as Venetian records show. In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the peace treaty on 10 August 1503/16 Şafer 909, relations between the two powers became more cordial. Bayezid issued a ferman to thirteen sancakbeğis in coastal sancaks, including Avlonya, that any repetition of recent attacks on Venetian persons or property would be severely dealt with;⁸⁵ Mustafa himself issued at Avlonya a document of safe-conduct to Florentine and all other merchants.^{85a} On the

Venetian side Marino Sanuto himself was the author of a letter which the Republic sent to Mustafa Beg assuring freedom of navigation in the Adriatic.⁸⁶ When Gritti met Mustafa in November 1503, the latter expressed his desire to mobilise against the 'enemies of Venice'.⁸⁷ These expressions of good will on both sides were to be tested in the ensuing months and shown to have substance to them.

In December 1503, for example, Mustafa paid compensation to a Venetian merchant whose ship had been attacked by Turkish vessels in Apulian waters.⁸⁸ Later, in February 1504, the Venetian government asked Mustafa to control the activities of a number of inhabitants of the Himare (zimarioti) along the Albanian coast, well-known for the piratical acts, and within Mustafa's area of jurisdiction.⁸⁹ In the exchange of letters⁹⁰ with the provveditore of the fleet Hironimo Contarini, it is clear that the zimarioti were failing to render obedience to Mustafa. Mustafa suggested a joint operation against them, the Venetians by sea and he by land. However, at this point Contarini backed away. Rather than be impressed by this apparently genuine offer of co-operation, he was unwilling to embark on an operation which would lead to casualties among the innocent as well as the guilty.⁹¹

For its part the Venetian government was prepared to go to great lengths to safeguard good relations with Mustafa. On several occasions Venetian records speak of the long and friendly relations which had existed with Mustafa, and how the Signoria's esteem had risen all the more as a consequence of Gritti's most favourable report on Mustafa (following the November 1503 meeting between the two).⁹²

The relationship was put to the test when Mustafa's envoy Konto Karaca (q.v.) arrived in Venice on 18 May 1504 to seek compensation

for the sinking of one of the sancakbegi's ships (fusta) with all hands on board in Ragusan waters by the Venetian galia Arbesana.⁹³ Karaca presented two letters, one to the Doge and the other to Andrea Gritti, described as 'amico nostro carrissimo', outlining for good measure the same grievances.⁹⁴ The Signoria had already been made aware of the problem in April 1504; while the government was keen not to upset Mustafa, neither was it willing to pay compensation for an act which, according to the records of the Senate, was carried out justifiably following provocation. It was decided to send a Venetian envoy to Mustafa to try to smooth things over, and the man chosen was the secretary Alvise di Piero.⁹⁵ Di Piero was chosen for a reason. He had been Giovanni Dario's secretary on his mission to Istanbul in 1487,⁹⁶ and he was instructed now to remind Mustafa of the mediatory role played by Dario on that occasion in causing the Republic to drop its displeasure towards Bayezid.⁹⁷ Di Piero was also instructed that, if he was led to believe that the matter could be resolved through some payment, he could negotiate such a deal using no more than 1000 ducats in silks, wool or gold.⁹⁸ The official line taken, therefore, reinforced by Gritti's own reply to Mustafa,⁹⁹ was to disclaim responsibility but to offer presents as a sign of continued good faith. Although di Piero undoubtedly went on his mission,¹⁰⁰ it is not clear whether the matter was resolved satisfactorily, for three years later (January-March 1507) Mustafa, now as SB of the Morea, sent another envoy to Venice in connection with the loss of the same ship.¹⁰¹

Whatever the outcome, relations between the two powers by June 1504 were such that Bayezid could write and ask the Republic that all assistance and safe passage (i.e. a maritime safe conduct) be given to

the Ottoman ships in Avlonya which he had now ordered to sail to Istanbul.¹⁰² The Venetians immediately complied and instructed garrisons in its colonies to allow the fleet to pass.¹⁰³ Mustafa was thus finally relieved of the millstones round his neck.

SB of Niğbolu (Nicopolis) 1505-1506/910-911

The registers of the Senate, unsupported by the Diarii, indicated that Mustafa was appointed SB of Nigbolu for a few months before his transfer to the sancak of the Morea. I have found no evidence elsewhere to act as collateral, but the conclusion seems unavoidable. In May 1505 Gritti wrote to Mustafa as SB of Avlonya concerning the mission to Venice of Mustafa's Jewish slave Isaac,¹⁰⁴ still trying to get Gritti to intercede on his behalf over the fusta which had been sunk. However, by November 1505, Gritti was writing to Mustafa Beg as SB of Nicopolis, and referred to a letter from Mustafa to him dated 26 August 1505 and written in Nicopolis.¹⁰⁵ It is clear, therefore, that Mustafa must have made the move between May and August 1505. Furthermore, in a letter from Gritti to the Venetian bailo in Istanbul in November 1505, Konto Karaca is referred to as the envoy of the "Magnifico Mustafabey, olim sanzacho dela Valona, al presente de Nicopolis ----."¹⁰⁶ This may not be that surprising since there was a reshuffle of personnel in the aftermath of the Turco-Venetian war. Firuz beg, for example, had expressed a desire to exchange sancaks with Mustafa, and in January/February 1504 had sent a messenger to the Porte to obtain Bayezid's permission to go ahead.¹⁰⁷ However, nothing came of this.

SB of the Morea (1506/912 to 1510/916 or to 1512/918)

By October 1506/Cumāda I 912 Mustafa had been appointed SB of the Morea replacing Hadım Āli Pasha (q.v.).¹⁰⁸ One can speculate that he was given what was effectively the Ottomans' most important maritime sancak in recognition of his good understanding with the Republic. We have little information about his activities in this period though one report acknowledges that Mustafa's reputation was not as great as that of his predecessor¹⁰⁹ - hardly surprising given Mustafa's misfortune in the war and Āli's recent elevation to the Grand vizierate. He seems to have been involved in continuing attempts by the Ottomans to suppress piracy in 1506/7,¹¹⁰ But most of his energies must have been channelled into the massive Ottoman mobilisation against Shah Ismail in the campaign of 1507/913.¹¹¹ Mustafa returned from campaign towards the end of 1507/mid 913 and was preparing for another campaign the following season, but this did not materialise. The hallmark of Mustafa's tenure in the Morea was the continuation of his warm relations with Venetian officials. He shared information with them which he had received about events in Europe.¹¹² In March 1509 the provveditore of Anabolu, Domenico Malipiero, reported that relations were good and that grain had been bought from Mustafa to provision Candia and ther places.¹¹³ In July 1509 the inhabitants of Anabolu again bought grain and barley from him.¹¹⁴ In August 1509 the provveditore of Zante, Antonio da Mulla, sent an envoy to take up Mustafa's offer of grain and barley sales. Although Mulla described him as 'nostro gran amico', he also reported that Mustafa was seeking a higher percentage in commission than was normal: the SB recognised that his relationship with Venice could bring considerable personal profit.¹¹⁵

However, the Republic undoubtedly considered him to be a friend.

Most notable was Mustafa's support for Venice in her efforts to recruit men in the Balkans in her struggle against the League of Cambrai. In April 1509 Mustafa allowed her to recruit stradioti in the Morea.¹¹⁶ In July 1509 Mustafa wrote to the provveditore of Anabolu expressing his friendship towards the Republic and commiserating over the alliance of Christian powers against her. Sanuto's own comment was 'è bella lettera da aver la copia'.¹¹⁷ In August 1510 Mustafa sent an envoy to Venice with a letter to the Doge in which he expressed again his sadness at Venetian losses in the war in Europe. He said that he had allowed horses from the Morea, and as many stradioti as were willing, to be sent to Venice.^{117a} He also said that he had not written to the sultan on Venice's behalf for fear of being 'suspected' (presumably as a Venetian sympathizer). This may have been simply an excuse, but Sanuto noted that he was 'grande amico di la Signoria nostra'. The Venetian officials clearly had a working relationship with him. When, for instance, news of defeats in the European war reached the provveditore of Corfu, Marco Zen, in February 1510, he informed his neighbouring sancakbeğis and immediately wrote to 'Mustafa bei, sanzacho di la Morea lî vicino, qual è amico nostro, ---.'¹¹⁸ Again in March 1510 Malipiero reported that Mustafa was inclined towards supporting Venice;¹¹⁹ in August 1510 da Mulla in Zante, on his return to Venice from his tour in Zante, declared that 'Mustafa bei, sanzacho di la Morea, ch'è homo da ben, con el qual à ben convicinà.'¹²⁰

With so many references to his friendship for Venice, it is hardly surprising that, when it was first reported in February 1510 that Mustafa was about to be appointed Vizier, Malipiero suggested that it was worth preserving his friendship, though he added with

customary Venetian perspicacity, that he was greedy and avaricious.¹²¹ Just how sincere Mustafa was is hard to say, but he was no stranger to 'western' non-Islamic customs as was exemplified by his entourage. This consisted of a Greek secretary (Zuan Zernota)¹²², an Italian physician from Padua (Andrea Rosso)¹²³, and (?) Greek (Konto Karaca) and Jewish (Isaac) trusted envoys.¹²⁴

Vizier Mustafa's first experience of the divan came as early as 1509. Before July of that year Hadım Āli, the Grand Vizier, went on pilgrimage to Mecca leaving one of the viziers to replace him temporarily. That vizier was in turn temporarily replaced by Mustafa who still retained the sancak of the Morea.¹²⁵ The rumour of February 1510 (see previous paragraph) that Mustafa was about to be appointed vizier on a permanent basis must have been started in the aftermath of the death of vizier Yahya Pasha (q.v) in December 1509/Şawwāl 915. The Diarii clearly show that Mustafa remained SB of the Morea until at least August 1510/Cumāda I 916.¹²⁶ Thereafter the question of when exactly Mustafa joined the divan becomes highly problematic and has been the subject of discussion elsewhere.¹²⁷ My own analysis of the 'Mustafa problem' (pp.322-328) suggests that it was not until June 1512/Rebī I and II 918 that he joined the divan as vizier.¹²⁸

What is certain is that from the middle of 1513/Cumāda II 919 Mustafa was a vizier alongside Hersekzade and Dukaginzade. This triumvirate was to hold together for the next year until Chaldīran. From Venice's point of view this was an opportune period for her to negotiate with the Ottomans since all three men were sympathetic towards her and her plight against the Christian League. Antonio Justinian arrived in Istanbul in August 1513 to negotiate renewal of

the 1503 peace with the new sultan, and also to seek Ottoman military assistance in Italy.¹²⁹ Mustafa himself seems to have taken a great interest in the Republic's proposal that the Ottomans should mount a diversionary attack against the King of Spain by invading Apulia, a design which had always been close to Mustafa's heart. In the Council of Ten's letter to the bailo Nicolo Zustinian on 20 February 1514,¹³⁰ Zustinian was admonished for having exaggerated the power of the King of Spain and the risks of an attack in the course of his conversations with Mustafa.¹³¹ He was told in effect to go back and tell Mustafa that the passage from Avlonya to Apulia was clear, and that Southern Italy was left undefended. However, Selim's plans for a campaign against Shah Ismail rendered any diversionary attack impracticable in spite of the efforts of the viziers and of ^CAli Beg (q.v.) on the Republic's behalf. It is noteworthy that Mustafa had not lost his appetite for an invasion of Apulia and Venice's proposal was not entirely forgotten. In a report from Corfu to Venice about Selim's campaign against Ismail (written on the day of the battle of Chaldiran (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920) but before the news of the Ottoman victory had reached him), Hironimo Bidelli stated how it was hoped Selim would be defeated in the East because it was understood that Mustafa Pasha, 'qual altre volte era a la Valona (Avlonya)' was urging Selim to assemble a fleet and was promising to 'give him Apulia'.¹³²

Chaldiran (23 August 1514/2 Receb 920) / Dismissal

Little is known about Mustafa's participation in the Chaldiran campaign. He, like the other two viziers, had opposed the whole venture from the outset.¹³³ As for the actual battle, a report from

the above mentioned Bidelli in Corfu, dated November 1514 and therefore long after the battle, states that it had been confirmed that twenty sancakbeğis had been killed and that only one vizier - Mustafa, 'che solea star a la Vallona' - had survived the battle.¹³⁴ This was clearly not the case since the other two viziers also survived. They had been positioned in the centre of the Ottoman battle line together with Mustafa, the sipahis, the silâhdars and the ulufecis.¹³⁵

However, the viziers' unco-operative attitude and their advice to Selim to withdraw from Tabriz quickly led to their demise.¹³⁶ As the army retreated in September 1514 and was in the neighbourhood of Erivan, Selim dismissed Mustafa after first having humiliated him before his men by having the saddle of his horse cut from under him, causing him to fall amid the booing of the soldiers.¹³⁷ Hersekzade and Dukaginzade were the subjects of equal ignominy. He was replaced by Piri Mehmed Pasha (q.v.).¹³⁸ Just a few months later, however, in March 1515, Bidelli in Corfu was reporting that Selim wanted Mustafa Pasha (almost certainly Mustafa (B)) to return to his post as vizier.¹³⁹

Notes.

1. The two have been connected, perhaps unintentionally, in Kreutel's Der fromme Sultan Bayezid, Verlag Styria, 1978, on p.296 of the short prosopographical summary at the back.
2. See notes p.358ff.
3. Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.144, 474, 476
4. Sanuto, I, 371 [Docs., p.660]; III, 875-6, 1059-60
5. Uluçay, ID X/14, p.118; Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.474; though note that Süreyya, IV, p.713 mentions Mustafa Dukaginzade Pasha as another son-in-law, and Schefer, p.LIV, n.1, quoting Adelman ob Ade, mansfelden* records an eighth daughter of Bayezid married to

* "De origine, ordine et militari disciplina magni Turca", s.l, n.d, folio 3v.

- another "Mustafabegh qui preses Chrussenze."
6. Ménage (WZKM), p.40
 7. Uluçay (TD VII/10), pp.137, 139, 142; Hammer, GOR, II, p.384 (Hist. IV, p.147); Danişmend, II, p.2; Uluçay, TD VIII/11-12, p.191; Süreyya, IV, p.371.
 8. Sanuto, III, 1555 [Docs., p.561]
 9. Sanuto, XVII, 537
 10. Sanuto, II, 136-7 [Docs., p.661] and II, 972-3 [Docs., pp.564-5]
 11. Hammer, GOR II, p.636, note for p.384 (Hist. IV, p.423, n. IX), citing Tubero, p.271 (see also p.55) See also Truhelka, p.128 and Elesovič, i/1, p.659.
 12. Süreyya, IV, p.372
 13. Danişmend, II, pp.11, 54, 60 et al.
 14. Flemming, Avlona, p.312; see also p.330, p.346, n.14.
 15. Sanuto, II, 233-4 [Docs., pp.661-2]
 16. Sanuto, I, 371 [Docs., p.660]
 17. Kisling, Personalpolitik, pp.110-113; Bašagič-Redžepašič, p.177.
 18. Sanuto, I, 371 [Docs., p.660]: Mustafa, SB of Bosnia and son-in-law of Bayezid, sends an envoy to the Duke of Milan in return for the duke's present of dogs, which, the report stresses, were sent to Mustafa and not to the Sultan. The said Mustafa's envoy was knighted by Maximilian.
 19. Sanuto, I, 42, 1007 [Docs., p.660]
 20. Sanuto, II, 436
 21. Sanuto, II, 136-7 [Docs., p.661]
 22. Sanuto, II, 289 [Docs., p.662]
 23. Sanuto, II, 972-3 [Docs., pp.564-5]
 24. See pp.188ff.
 25. See note 14.
 26. Sanuto, I, 707 [Docs., p.660]. See also pp.441-5.
 27. Sanuto, II, 233-4 [Docs., pp.661-2] where it should be noted that 'zeneral' has been omitted from the edition).

28. Sanuto, II, 247-8 [Docs., p.662]
29. Sanuto, II, 136-7, 289 [Docs., pp.661-2]. The account is also told by Fisher, pp.59-60 (using Sanuto), and by Tansel, pp. 183ff using Fisher.
30. Lane, Venice, p.242; Sanuto, I, 12.
31. See pp.208-9.
32. Lane, Venice, p.242.
33. Sanuto, II, 289 [Docs., p.662]. For Apulia as the target of Mustafa's preparations, see Sanuto, II, 574; II, 247-8 [Docs., p.662] II, 756-7, [Docs., p.663] III, 427 [Docs., p.663].
34. See notes 21 and 23.
35. Sanuto, I, 12.
36. Neff, Secretaries, Appendix, s.v. Alvisè Sagudino. Cf. Parry (Cook) pp.87-8: In 1537 Süleiman I was to march to Avtonya to attempt a crossing to Apulia.
37. Sanuto, II, 380, 382, II, 247-8 [Docs., p.662]; II, 542-3 [Docs., p.628]; II, 580).
38. Sanuto, II, 247-8 [Docs., p.662].
39. Sanuto, II, 596-7.
40. Idem. Mustafa was at Cochino Lithari near La Bastia.
41. Sanuto, II, 624-5.
42. Sanuto, II, 690 [Docs., p.560].
43. Sanuto, II, 828.
44. Sanuto, II, 738 and 789.
45. Sanuto, II, 789.
46. Sanuto, II, 972-3 [Docs., pp.564-5].
47. Sanuto, II, 1073-4 [Docs., p.663].
48. Sanuto, II, 1073-4 [Docs., p.663]; II, 972-3 [Docs., pp.564-5].
49. Sanuto, II, 939 [Docs., p.637] See also p.77
50. Sanuto, III, 427, [Docs., p.663]; III, 332-3.
51. Sanuto, III, 489.
52. Sanuto, III, 489, with collateral source III, 767-9. Another

source (III, 628) reports 31 light galleys, and Priuli (vol. II, p.33) gives 37; both seem exaggerated estimates.

53. Sanuto, III, 490.
54. Idem and Sanuto, III, 467-8. For mistrust of Christian levies, see also, III, 177-8, 182, 337; and V, 466.
- 54a. Sanuto, III, 450, 500-1.
55. Sanuto, III, 467-8, 490, 494.
56. Sanuto, III, 467-8 and III, 450. Reports in the Diarî have been used by Fisher to examine Ottoman difficulties on the Vojussa (Fisher p.72 and n.49)
57. Sanuto, III, 494. For the Pago, see III, 425.
58. Sanuto, III, 531, 638.
59. Sanuto, III, 678-9.
60. Sanuto, III, 731, 768.
61. Sanuto, III, 697 [Docs., p.664].
62. Sanuto, III, 697, 709.
63. Sanuto, III, 767-9.
64. Sanuto, III, 679.
65. Sanuto, III, 875-6, 969-70. The background to the use of azebs for the galley fleets is discussed in Imber, pp. 85, 89. There were three classes of oarsmen in Ottoman galley fleets: a) Foreign prisoners of war, b) convicted criminals, c) Kürekçi azeb, men raised by annual levy (according to Katib Çelebi, it became annual practice only after 1502) from Asia Minor and the Balkans and condemned to the galleys as a punishment. Mustafa's azebs were most probably from this class. According to one report Bayezid was assembling 80,000 azebs from Anatolia and Europe to act as oarsmen in 1500 (Sanuto, III, 182). Sanuto made a note to himself (III, 425) that azebs were oarsmen.
66. Sanuto, III, 794-5 [Docs., p.664]; 875-6.
67. Sanuto, III, 960, 969-70.
68. Sanuto, III, 875-6, 969-70.
69. Sanuto, III, 1059-60.
70. Sanuto, VI, 53-4.
71. Mustafa managed to extricate 11 galleys and 5 fuste by January 1501 (Sanuto, III, 1457, [Docs., p.665] and III, 1586-7) and 15 galleys by August 1504 (VI, 53-4). See also Sanuto, III, 1346-7,

1347, 1348-50, 1460: IV, 614; V, 725-6, 726; VI, 58-9 for references to freeing the fleet and renewed shipbuilding activity from 1501 to 1503 in Avlonya. See also Priuli, II, p.201.

72. See note 71.
73. Sanuto, III, 1457 [Docs., p.665], III, 1555 [Docs., p.561]
74. See note 71.
75. Sanuto, III, 1460: the Venetian captain of the gulf, the source of the report, was not convinced Durazzo was the objective.
76. Sanuto, II, 614, 617, 618-9. Durazzo fell in the summer of 1501 to Mehmed Beg. See pp.298-9.
77. Sanuto, IV, 313, 315, 318 [all Docs., pp.665-6]; all different sources.
78. For details of peace initiatives and negotiations, see pp.78ff., pp.119ff., p.318.
79. ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 29, 71r, 29 November.
- 79a. Sanuto, IV, 450 (20 September 1502). I have found no trace of this letter in Venetian records.
80. Sanuto, IV, 337 (4 October 1502). I have found no trace of this letter in Venetian records.
81. See Sanuto, IV, 393, 585, 617, 637 for Contarini's role in forwarding letters from Mustafa concerning peace negotiations. Unfortunately only references to the existence of these letters have survived, and I have not found the originals in the ASV. Sanuto IV, 607 and 614 refer to letters from Contarini to Mustafa.
82. Sanuto, IV, 532-3.
83. BNM, Cod. It. VII. 878(8652), fasc. 1, ff. 5v-6r, 7 June 1503, Andrea Gritti to Mustafa, in Corfu.
84. Idem., f. 80v, 29 November 1503, Andrea Gritti to Doge.
85. Sanuto, V. 288, November 1503. The document is undated, as is the same version of the Italian translation in ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 79r.
- 85a. Sanuto, V, 615. The letter is dated 21 October, in Avlonya.
86. Sanuto, V, 693, January 1504: 'Fo scritto per Colegio, me autere, una bona lettera al sanzacho di la Vallona ----'.
87. Sanuto, V, 453, Relazione of Andrea Gritti.
88. Sanuto, V, 726.
89. Sanuto, V, 939, 989-990.

90. For Mustafa's letter in copy to Contarini, see Sanuto, V, 1021-2, dated 16 February in Avlonya. I have not found the original in the ASV. [Docs., p.666].
91. Sanuto, V, 1058.
92. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40 f. 13v-14r, April 1504.
93. Sanuto, VI, 32; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 22v-23r, 18 May 1504.
94. The two documents, both originals in Italian, can be found in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, loose documents at end, nos. 6 and 7. The pence on each reads: 'Mustafa bin Da'ud'. For copies in Italian of the letter to the Doge, see: ASV, Liber Graecus, f.86r and ASV, Libri Comm., f.42r; for regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no.51; Predelli, Comm. reg., XIX, no.59; ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no. 1561. For copies in Italian of letter to Grietti, see: ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 86v and ASV, Libri Comm., f. 42r. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no.52; Predelli, Comm. reg., XIX, 60; ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no. 1562.
95. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40 ff 13v - 14r, 26r - 28r, 28v; Sanuto, VI, 26. Sanuto hardly touches on this affair.
96. Neff, Secretaries, Appendix, s.v. Alvise di Piero. In addition, Dr. Neff's profile documents Piero's two missions to Istanbul (1487 and 1510-11) and one to Cairo in 1490 (a second mission there was aborted in 1505). This suggests a solid though not overwhelming background in oriental affairs.
97. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff 26r - 28r: "----- l'opera facta neli anni passati per la Signoria nostra la qual mediante el quondam Zuan Dario secretario nostro fo contenta extinguer la indignatione concepta per el suo gran signor."
98. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 22v - 23r, 26r - 28r, 35r (May/June 1504).
99. Idem., f. 28v, 16 June 1504.
100. The reference in Neff, op. cit., to CX, Misti, fil. 28, c. 144v is to a petition made by di Piero in 1511 and as such is a record of achievement.
101. Sanuto, VII, 30-31.
102. For an Italian translation of Bayezid's letter to the Doge, (dated 22 June 1504) see Sanuto, VI, 58-9, and exactly the same translation, possibly the one used by Sanuto himself, can be found in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 26. Translations can also be found in ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 91r and in ASV, Libri Comm., f. 44r. The original (dated 28 June 1504) in Greek is in Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no.13. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron), no.54; Predelli, Comm. reg., no. 65 Bombaci, p.298, no.58.

103. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff 45 rv, 30 July 1504.
104. Idem., reg. 40, f. 99r, 29 May 1505.
105. Idem., reg. 40, f. 129r - 130r, 9 - 15 November 1505. For content of letters, see Konto Karaca, pp.280-1.
106. Idem., reg. 40, f. 130 rv, November 1505.
107. Sanuto, V, 955-6.
108. Sanuto, VI, 488-9
109. Sanuto, VI, 519.
110. Sanuto, VI, 526.
111. Sanuto, VII, 286 [Docs., p.667], 440 and see p.472.
112. Sanuto, VI, 526-7.
113. Sanuto, VIII, 12.
114. Sanuto, IX, 9.
115. Sanuto, IX, 106.
116. Sanuto, VIII, 210.
117. Sanuto, IX, 99. I have not succeeded in finding this letter in Venetian records.
- 117a. Sanuto, XI, 86. The letter was in Turkish. The change from Mustafa's previous practice of writing in Greek and Italian perhaps reflects changes taking place in Ottoman chancery procedure.
118. Sanuto, X, 50.
119. Sanuto, X, 374.
120. Sanuto, XI, 69-70.
121. Sanuto, X, 289.
122. Sanuto, X, 374.
123. Sanuto, XI, 86.
124. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 99r et al.
125. Sanuto, VIII, 574 [Docs., p.667].
126. See note 120.
127. See pp.340-346.

128. See pp.343-4.
129. For details and references to the 1514 negotiations, see pp.60, 90-1, 142-4.
130. ASV, CX, Misti, reg. 36, p.107, 1513/4 20 February, as cited in Lamansky, II, p. 768n-9n. The Republic's first formal request of a diversionary attack in Apulia and in Friul came on 15 February on the understanding that the attack on Friul should come first to give Venice time to assemble her own ships which would form part of the joint Turco-Venetian armada against Apulia.
131. For the bailo's report (dated 27 December 1513, Edirne) on these conversations, see ASV, Capi X, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 24. Mustafa had in fact told the bailo that he considered such an attack easy.
132. Sanuto, XIX, 83-5.
133. See pp.61-2, 91.
134. Sanuto, XIX, 302.
135. Tekindag (TD XVII/22), p. 65; Hammer, GOR, II, p.414 (Hist. IV, p.196).
136. For details, see pp.61-2, 91.
137. Tekindağ, op. cit., pp.73-4; Hammer, GOR, II, p.420 (Hist. IV, p.420), giving the date of dismissal as 22 September 1514. The Diarii do not recount this colourful story, but reports do state that Mustafa was dismissed for advising Selim to retreat from Tabriz, and also for inciting the janissaries to revolt (see note 136): Sanuto, XIX, 326, 377-8, 440 [Docs., p.556], XX, 95-96 [Docs., p.557].
138. As for note 135 and Sanuto, XX, 95-6 [Docs., p.557].
139. Sanuto, XX, 134-5. Mustafa is described as the vizier who had previously been stripped of office by Selim.

MUSTAFA PASHA (C)

Grand Vizier 1511-1512?

See pp.340-346.

MUSTAFA PASHA (D)

Grand Vizier 1513-14?

See pp.340-346.

MUSTAFA PASHA ISKENDER PASHAZADE [Mustafa/fiol di Scander bassa]
 b. 1483
 d. 1525/932

Identity and Career

Mustafa is only once mentioned by name in the Diarii¹ but there are in addition several references to the 'fiol di Scanderbassa'. Although Mustafa is believed to have had a brother called Hurrem Pasha,² the context in which these references are made lead me to conclude that the 'fiol' must be Mustafa and not Hurrem. It is possible, therefore, to piece together something of his career.

A little is already known about him,³ but mainly concerning the latter part of his career when he achieved high office. He was one of the Ottoman emirs during the conquest of Egypt and at about that time was appointed governor of Tripoli in Syria. He was later made Beğlerbeği of Birecik near Aleppo, in which office he was killed during the Karacayir campaign of the Kalender rebellion in the reign of Suleiman.⁴ He was son-in-law to Selim I.⁵

Almost all the references in the Diarii are to his activities during the 1499-1503/904-908 war against the Veneto-Hungarian alliance. In August 1499/Muħarrem 905 Mustafa is reported to be the sixteen year old son of Iskender Pasha whom he was accompanying in the region around Zara while learning the art of warfare.⁶ By August 1500/Safer 906 Mustafa was preparing to raid into Corbavia (Southern Croatia), while Iskender himself was about to raid into Friul.⁷

The following year in July 1501 Mustafa was at the head of 10,000 Turks near Modrusa preparing to raid into Friul,⁸ and a separate source reporting at the same time stated that Iskender's son was at

the head of 6000 Turks and Bosnians who had arrived near Castelnuovo.⁹

Priuli also noted in July 1501 that Iskender's son had ravaged Croatia with 3000 cavalry and plundered and looted. This must have been an advance guard for Iskender's main force, for the latter followed his son with 20,000 cavalry in the general direction of Castelnuovo.¹⁰

The campaigning season of 1502/908, however, brought a setback for Mustafa. Reports in July 1502/Muħarrem 908 indicate that as Mustafa was engaged in besieging Jajce, a Hungarian captain (Zuan Terceich), on his way to provision Jajce, engaged the Turks and defeated them, killing 500 and capturing 36. Mustafa himself was forced to retreat into the mountains. Iskender tried to reinforce him on hearing the news, but was himself forced to turn back.¹¹ In August 1502/Šafer 908 Iskender went in person to besiege Jajce in order to restore the honour of his son.¹²

The only other reference to Iskender's son comes in a report from the Venetian bailo in Istanbul in July 1514/ Cumāda I 920 in which it is said that Selim had sent 15,000 cavalry to the Hungarian border under the command of 'fiol di Schander Bassa', almost certainly to protect his rear during the Chaldiran campaign in the East.¹³ It is logical therefore that he should have been appointed SB of Bosnia in October 1514 as successor to Yunus Pasha.¹⁴ However, it seems somewhat unlikely that he is identical with the Mustafa (E) whom the Diarii record as SB of Bosnia in 1517 and 1518 given that Mustafa Iskender Pashazade went on campaign to Egypt.¹⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 1078-9.
2. Danismend, II, p.47.

3. With regard to Mustafa's identity as some of Iskender Pasha, see Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.432-3 and 524 for his waqfiyye in Bosnia. See also Priulozi, vol. II, pp.95 - 6 for an Ottoman inscription of Mustafa in Sarajevo of 1518/924; and Süreyya, vol. IV, p.371 and Appendix, p.713.
4. Süreyya, vol. IV, p.371; Danişmend, vol. II, p.47; Hammer, GOR, II, p.481 (Hist. IV, p.286).
5. As for note 4. According to Uluçay (TD X/14), p.110, however, Iskender Pashazade Mustafa Bey, described as SB of Midilli, was son-in-law to Prince Ahmed, Selim's brother.
6. Sanuto, II, 1078-9.
7. Sanuto, III, 675.
8. Sanuto, IV, 83.
9. Sanuto, IV, 85-6
10. Priuli, vol. II, p.148.
11. Sanuto, IV, 283-4, which suggests Mustafa's forces numbered 3000 cavalry, and IV, 284-5 suggesting 6000 cavalry and 4000 infantry.
12. Sanuto, IV, 299-300, 432. Hammer (GOR, II, 329 (Hist. IV, 71)) says he was responsible for taking the castles of Lofça and Brusça in Bosnia in 1502 as part of Bayezid's drive to compensate for the loss of Caphalonia.
13. Sanuto, XIX, 24.
14. Ménage (WZKM), p. 38 refers to a 'Mustafa' in Ottoman records (Haydar Çelebi) and Ragusan records (Truhelka, 209) as the new SB in October 1514. Bašagić-Redžepašić list Mustafa Skenderpasic as SB of Bosnia in 1515/921. See also p.492.
15. See Mustafa (E), pp. 392-3. Ménage (WZKM), p.38 and n.29, observes that Yunus Pasha as SB of Bosnia naturally did not take part in the Chaldiran campaign, since "it was the practice in this period that Bosnian forces should remain on their home ground to hold the frontier against a threat from Hungary"; he refers us to Menavino, apud Lonicerus, Chronica Turcica, Frankfurt 1578, ii, 84v: 'castra Impertoris nunquam sequuntur, sed Ungaris oppositi eorum fines infestant.' Mustafa Iskenderpashazade could not then have been both SB of Bosnia and an emir in the Mamluk campaign.

MUSTAFA PASHA ISKENDER PASHA DAMADI - voyvoda

- SB of Arta

- SB of Niğbolu

[Mustafa/Mustafa vayvoda]

Two reports in August 1499/Muharrem 905 both state that Mustafa was the son-in-law of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia. One states that he was at a place in Serbia called Medeo which came under Iskender's jurisdiction.¹ The other states that he was voyvoda of a place called 'Julie', 'el qual è vizin de la Servia e de la Bossina', and that he and his whole entourage had gone to the Porte leaving the 'bassa' (presumably Iskender Pasha) to govern his lands.² In March 1500/Şa'ban 905 a third report indicates that Bayezid had appointed him to replace the recently deceased Fa'ik Pasha (q.v.),³ who had been SB of Arta (Narda) in Epirus. This may well have been the case since on 17 November 1503 in a letter written by Andrea Gritti to Iskender Pasha (asking him to intercede on behalf of a Venetian patrician who had fallen into the hands of "Mustafa, son-in-law of Iskender") Mustafa was described as 'sanzacho del paese de Carlogli' (i.e. probably SB of Karlı-eli), very close to Arta.⁴ In Ottoman sources Mustafa is recorded as the son-in-law of Iskender, but is given the office of mirliva of Niğbolu on the other side of Rumeli. It is most likely that he held this office much later in his career.⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 1078.
2. Sanuto, II, 1078-79. 'Juliesi' as given in the edition should read 'quel vayvoda de Julie sie zenero del ditto bassa'.
3. Sanuto, III, 304. However, Sanuto, III, 177-8 indicates that Fa'ik had been replaced by the SB of Negroponte. Is it possible that Mustafa held this sancak shortly before succeeding Fa'ik?

4. BNM, Cod. It. VII. 878 (8652), fasc. 1, ff. 81r-82r, Andrea Gritti to Iskender Pasha SB of Bosnia, 17 November 1503.
5. Most likely perhaps due to the lateness of the granting of Mustafa's vakf: see Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp.440-441 [Cf.pp.351-2]

MUSTAFA BEG - envoy (1504/909)

[Mustafa bei orator]

Background and Identity

Mustafa arrived in Venice on 21 January 1504/3 Şābān 909 on a mission to reclaim a slave who had been carried off by the Venetians after their conquest of the island of Santa Maura in August 1502/Şāfer 908. I have been unable to identify this Mustafa bei, but the Diarif offer some clues to his background for future research. He was of Greek nationality, of low status, and with an entourage of five.¹ Priuli explains further that Mustafa was not really 'ambasator' but rather Bayezid's 'schiavo, venuto solamente per trovar li schiavi tolti et facti prexoni ----.'² Leonardo Bembo, the Venetian ballo in Istanbul praised him, and described him as 'homo dil magnifico nesanzibasi' (i.e. the Nişancı başı in Istanbul).³ Sanuto himself makes no comment whatsoever about his background or his character even though he, as one of the four Savii agli Ordeni had received him in Venice, escorted him to his lodgings as was the custom,⁴ and accompanied him throughout the festivities of the 'festa della caccia' to which Mustafa had been invited by the Collegio.⁵

Mission

There were two parts to Mustafa's mission. First, he was to reclaim all the slaves taken by Venetians from Santa Maura,⁶ in accordance with article 2 to the Turco-Venetian peace.⁷ Secondly, Mustafa was to seek restitution of 25,000 aspri taken from Kara Da'ud

(q.v.), a sea captain and trader, by three Venetian galie in the waters of Negroponte.⁸

Mustafa was carrying with him three letters to the Doge and Signoria: one from the Venetian bailo explaining the background to the mission and stressing the sultan's resolve to obtain the lost slaves⁸; one from Bayezid demanding the return of the slaves⁹; and one from Bayezid demanding the restitution of Kara Da'ud's 25,000 aspri.¹⁰ A fourth letter,¹¹ from Bayezid to the Venetian regiment in Corfu demanding the return of Santa Mauran slaves taken there, had already been delivered on Mustafa's outward journey. Although he was principally concerned to make investigations in person in Corfu and Venice, his sources of information were such that he arranged for enquiries to be made in Candia and Ancona.¹²

Reports show that he was particularly insistent that all the slaves from Santa Maura in Venice should be handed over to him. Although on the surface he appeared conciliatory to those slaves who had converted to Christianity and did not want to return with him,¹³ insisting only that they should be brought before him so that he could judge for himself, this may in fact have been a ruse since of the 54 slaves which were eventually gathered in Venice, virtually all have Christian names.¹⁴ It is not clear from the sources just how many slaves the Ottomans were looking for, though Mustafa came to Venice armed with a catastrophic survey of the island.¹⁵ Mustafa claimed to be dissatisfied with the results in spite of the Signoria's insistence that no more slaves could be found. With regard to the matter of Kara Da'ud's money, Venice paid Mustafa the full 25,000 aspri. He left Venice on 5 March 1504. When the Venetian secretary Zorzi Negro arrived in Istanbul on diplomatic business in May 1504, he was handed

by the sultan's envoy, most probably Mustafa, a list of 26 missing slaves, mainly women.¹⁶

Notes

1. Sanuto, V, 757-8: 'El qual nontio è di nacion grecha e di bassa condition, ma assai parisente, con famegli 5, ----'.
2. Priuli, II, p.337-8 and 339.
3. Sanuto, V, 761-2. It was apparently the nısanrı bası who had given Mustafa this mission.
4. Sanuto, V, 750. Sanuto was accompanied by Jacomo di Rimano, the tercuman (see p.148, n.18).
5. Sanuto, V, 851, 15 February 1504.
6. Sanuto, V, 747, 750.
7. Sanuto, V, 760.
8. Sanuto, V, 760-2. For Bayezid's wrath concerning Santa Maura, see pp.80-1.
9. For the original in Greek of Bayezid's ferman dated 29 October 1504/Cumāda I 910, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2, no.12, transcribed in M and M III, p.344 no. XXXIV. The contemporary translation in Italian is in Sanuto, V, 762-3; ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 4, no.3; ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 81r; ASV, Libri Comm. f. 37v. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Box), Busta XVIII, no.22; Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, p.68, no.23; Bombaci, p.297, n.45; ASV, MADP, Busta 48, no.1552.
10. For the original in Greek of Bayezid's ferman, dated 4 November 1504/25 Cumāda I 910, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 2 no.10, transcribed in M and M III, p.388 no. XXVIII. The contemporary translation in Italian is in Sanuto, V, 763-4; ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 9, no.3; ASV, Liber Graecus, ff. 83v-84r; ASV, Libri Comm. f. 39r. For regests see ASV, Indice Bombaci (Chron) no. 39; Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, p.69 no. 24; Bombaci, p.297, no.46.
11. Sanuto V, 764-5. I have not found the original or any reference to it in the ASV.
12. Sanuto, V, 757-8, 802, 835.
13. Sanuto, V, 835, 858, 899.
14. This list can be found in Italian in ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, loose documents at back, nos. 4c and 4d. The list is reproduced in ASV, Liber Graecus, ff. 83r-83v; and in ASV, Libri Comm. XIX,

38v. For regests, see ASV, Indice Bombaci (chron), no.49; Predelli, VI, p.74, no. 52; and Bombaci, p.294. The list is interesting from the point of view of seeing who held slaves in Venice and what kind of slaves they were. Sanuto (V.947) says Mustafa took with him fifty slaves.

15. See Bayezid's firman, note 9.

16. For this list, the names of the slaves still missing being predominantly Turkish, and mainly children with a 'Mustafa' patronymic, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, loose documents at back, no.4a (most probably an Italian translation). This is reproduced in ASV, Liber Graecus, ff. 95rv; and in ASV, Libri Comm., XIX, 45v. For regests see Predelli, VI, p. 79, no.75; Bombaci, p.303; and ASV, MADP, Busta 47, no.1526. The Ottomans prepared another, more limited list in Corfu: ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, loose documents at back, no. 4b, (in Greek, and which according to Bombaci, p.302, may be a transcription from the original Greek). For Italian translations, see ASV, Liber Graecus, f. 83r; ASV, Libri Comm., XIX, 38v. For regests see Predelli, VI, p.72, no.43; Bombaci, p.302.

MUSTAFA ÇAVUŞ - envoy (1516/922)

[Mustafa schiavo
chiaus/zaus]

Envoy of Selim I to Venice, arriving on 22 August 1516/ 21 Receb 922 via Ragusa, and lodged in the house of Giovanni Darfo. It had been two months since his departure from Selim in Konya.¹ Probably of Greek origin given the need for a Greek interpreter for his audience with the doge.² He brought a letter from Selim to the Doge inviting him to join in the festivities for the Ottoman victories over the Safavids.³ He also brought with him the head of one of Shah Ismail's captains called 'Gasbin'. This was also a fact-finding mission, since he inquired on Selim's behalf about the Republic's fortune in the Italian wars.⁴ Sanuto notes that he was given a tour of the Arsenal.⁵ He returned to Istanbul in May 1517/Rebî^c II 923 after an illness lasting three months and which afflicted him on the journey. On arrival he paid a visit to the Venetian ballo.⁶

Notes.

1. Sanuto, XXII, 454-455.
2. Sanuto, XX 460.
3. Sanuto, XXII, 462 [Docs., p.646]: copy of the letter, translated from Greek and dated 2 July 1516. (See pp.294, 298, n.13).
4. Sanuto, XXII, 460.
5. Sanuto, XXII, 468.
6. Sanuto, XXIV, 203-4.

MUSTAFA - envoy (1514/920)

Sanuto, XVIII, 115, 155: Envoy of ^CAli Beg Tercüman (q.v.) in March 1514/Muḥarrem 920 (presumably from Selim's army on the Chaldiran campaign) to Istanbul.¹ It seems that the Venetian baïlo was able to obtain information through him about Selim's campaign.

Notes

1. See p.144 and p.150, n.44.

MUSTAFA - mercenary (1510/916)

[Mustafa turco]

Sanuto, X, 819, 845, July 1510: A Turk in the service of Venice in Padua, described by the voyvoda Vanissa as 'homo cativo e scandoloſo'.

MUSTAFA - merchant (1514/920)

[sic]

Sanuto, XIX, 66 [Docs., p.639]: Merchant from Iskenderun (Scandelorum). Provides information to the Venetian locotenente in Cyprus, Zuan Paulo Gradenigo (c June 1514/ RebT^o II 920), confirming that the ships which were said to have left Istanbul in order to attack various rebellious Karamanian local lords, numbered 25.

Gradenigo comments that Mustafa had departed from Isanbul one month before (and presumably stopped off in Cyprus on his way to Iskenderun).

MUSTAFA RE'IS - sea captain (1518/924) [Mustafa rais di la Vallona]

Sanuto, XXV, 461, 469, 519-521: commander of seven ships from Avlonya which on 30 May 1518/20 Cumāda I 924 plundered a village called Rogoniza near Trau in revenge for an attack on Turks the previous year by the inhabitants of Scardona. The Venetians took immediate measures to obtain compensation and an explanation of what they considered to be an extraordinary act originating in Avlonya. Ottoman records confirm the existence as well as the piratic activities of Mustafa Re'is at this time.¹ It is possible, however, that he was acting under orders of the SB of Avlonya.²

Notes.

1. See Elezović, 1/2, pp.980-982: a ferman of Selim I to the Cadi of Avlonya shows that "Avlonyalu re'is Mustafa nam kimesne" had taken possession of an 'infidel' ship, and that inquiries were to be made about the rightful owners. The event took place along the Dalmatian coast.
2. Sanuto, XXV, 63-4, where a certain SB, possibly of Avlonya, intended to seize Scardona, and had armed 5 fuste in Avlonya. Mustafa re'is' seven ships consisted of 5 fuste and two brigantini.

MUSTAFA PASHA - SB of Larissa (Yenishehir, in Rumeli) (1517/923)

Sanuto, XXIV, 331-2: A Venetian called Nicolo, son of Hironimo de Piero, had been destitute in the house of Mustafa Pasha 'sanzacho' in Larisa (Lerises). This Nicolo reported in May 1517/Cumāda I 923 that Mustafa had been killed by some of the most prominent men in his entourage.

MUSTAFA BEG - SB of Argirokastron (1514/920)

Sanuto, XIX, 83-5: 'Mustafa bei qual sta ad Angilo Castro' (Argirokastron); participated in the Chaldiran campaign; reported in October 1514/Şa^Cbān 920 to have been defeated with three other sancakbegis by the forces of Shah Ismail. There were Christians among Mustafa's troops, most of whom died.

MUSTAFA PASHA - SB of Bosnia (1517-1518/923-924)

@ Mustafa (E)

An envoy from Mustafa Pasha, SB of Bosnia,¹ arrived in Venice on 26 August 1517/7 Şa^Cbān 923. He brought presents to the Doge from the SB and a letter in Turkish. His mission² concerned the debts incurred by the former bailo in Istanbul Nicolo Zustinian. When Piri Pasha had failed to resolve the problem,³ the SB of Bosnia must have sent his own envoy to Venice to obtain satisfaction, but the Venetian government again disclaimed all responsibility. Apparently Mustafa had sold Zustinian grain and had yet to receive 1400 ducats in payment. Mustafa was angered by the Republic's response and consequently was unwilling to co-operate fully when in March 1518 Venice tried to obtain the safe return of some of her subjects abducted by Turks in raids. In the autumn of 1517 it was reported that the SB of Bosnia had arrived in the neighbourhood of Scardona with a large force of cavalry and infantry to restore two Turkish castles.⁴

Notes.

1. There is no question that all the reports in the Diarif indicate that this Mustafa was was SB of Bosnia. There is no record in Bašagić-Redžepasić of a Mustafa as SB in Bosnia in 1517-1518/923-

924 (which lists instead "Michael-ozlu Mehmed Beg (1517/924) and Yahya-Pashazade Gazi Bali Beg" (1518/925) as SB of Bosnia), though Mustafa Pasha, son of Iskender Pasha, was SB of Bosnia in 1515/921. It seems unlikely that Mustafa (E) and Mustafa Iskenderzāde are identical, since the latter was an Ottoman emir in the Mamluk campaign. There is the possibility, however unlikely, that this Mustafa in the Diarii is Mustafa Beg, SB of Herzegovina, who held that post from February 1517/Safer 923 until May 1518/Cumāda I 924 (See Popovič, p.95). The dates certainly match.

2. For all the references in the Diarii concerning this mission, see Sanuto, XXIV, 608, 611, 638-9, 640; XXV, 293.
3. See p.413.
4. Sanuto, XXV, 461-462.

MUSTAFA PASHA

Sanuto, XIX, 447, DOI: December 1514: this report, tells of the defeat of a Mustafa Pasha and his 70,000 men by the forces of Shah Ismail.

MUSTAFA PASHA - BB of Anadolu (1517/923)

- BB of Rumeli (1517/923)

In March 1517 a report of the tercüman Alvise di Quarto to the bailo in Istanbul gave details of the changes in personnel which Selim made in the aftermath of his victory over the Mamluks (i.e. following the battle of Ridaniyya). Mustafa beg, who was BB of Anadolu, and possibly also the nışancı başı, had been appointed BB of Rumeli in place of Sinan Pasha who had been made vizier.¹ This Mustafa is most probably the one referred to as the 'capo' of the 'esercito de Natolia' in the account of the Kadi-Casker of Selim's Mamluk campaign.² His valour on the field of battle at Ridanniyya described here is already well-known, together with his role in the pursuit of the Mamluk Sultan Tuman Beg.³

Notes.

1. Sanuto, XXIV, 204-5
2. Sanuto, XXV, 661-2, 666, 668-9
3. Hammer, GOR, II, 501 (Hist. IV, 313); Giovio, Commentario, f. 21v-24v; Angiolello, f. 77r-78r; Sansovino, Annali, ff. 121r-123r.

MUSTAFA PASHA - BB of Anadolu (1510/916)

Sanuto X, 268: one of Bayezid's officials [bassa] reported to have been decapitated in early 1510 (see p.221-222).

?NASUH OSCHADAMOVIĆ - mercenary (1510/916) [Nasuf Oschadamovich]

Sanuto, X, 413 765-7, 777; XI, 652-5: Turkish mercenary in Venetian service in Italy (see p.326).

Identification and Background

There is no specific identification by Sanuto of Ömer Beg as the son of Turhanbeg, the famous gazi of the reign of Murad II, but a connection has been made in the past between the events in which Sanuto's Ömer Beg was involved and Ömer Beg Turhanbegoğlu.¹ If this identification is valid, then there is no doubt that Ömer Beg was of Muslim and Turkish origin.

Career.

Ömer Beg was a sancak-holder and prominent emir during the reign of Mehmed II.

1458/863 SB of the Morea;² Mehmed II orders him to seize Athens, which is eventually surrendered to him by the Italian Duke Franco Acciajuoli, who is given safe-conduct out of the city together with his treasury.³

1459/864 Deprived of his sancak.⁴

1462/867 Takes part in Walachian campaign.⁵

1463/868 Takes part in Bosnian campaign.⁶

1463-4/868-9 War with Venice, Ömer Beg invades Venetian territory round Lepanto; campaign against Jacomo Barbarigo.⁷

1473/878 Takes part in campaigning against the Akkoyunlu.⁸

1477-79/882-884 SB of Bosnia(?).⁹ War with Venice: warring on the Isonzo and raiding in Friul;¹⁰ campaigning in the Morea.¹¹

1488/894 Takes part in Hadım Ali Pasha's campaign against the Mamluks.¹²

1499-1500/905-906 War with Venice: SB of Tirhala; he is ordered to mobilize for the campaign against Lepanto, and because Cömer Beg was the oldest general, Bayezid appoints him commander-in-chief.¹³ No other accounts of the Turco-Venetian war give this much prominence to Cömer Beg. Sanuto's sources on this point are highly varied and all indicate Cömer's great involvement and authority in the military operations of 1499-1500¹⁴ Not only did Bayezid entrust him with important functions, but the population of Lepanto also identified him as the man to whom that city might be surrendered.¹⁵

It was not only old age that finally brought his career to a close, but a serious charge of extortion. After the fall of Lepanto it soon became clear that its citizens had been regularly paying haraç to Cömer Beg, and that this had been done, according to Cömer, with the knowledge and consent of the Grand Vizier Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha (q.v.), but without the knowledge of Bayezid. Revelations of this fraud soon led to Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha's suicide and to the punishment of Cömer Beg: he was stripped of his timar (its location is not specified) which was granted to Hadim ÇAlı Pasha (q.v.) (October 1499/Şafer 905). Only Sanuto and Malipiero refer to this affair.¹⁶ Perhaps this incident, however, did not wholly eclipse his military involvement in the war, because he still had a role to play in the preparations for the attacks on Modon and Koron in 1500.¹⁷

It is not clear when Cömer Beg died, but Sanuto refers to him as being deceased by November 1503.¹⁸ It is possible that in June 1501 he was still in active service and stationed with his son at Koron which they were fortifying.¹⁹ But it was only after his death that references to Cömer and his sons begin to abound in Venetian government records. This was as a result of certain damages suffered

by the sons of CÖmer at the hands of Venetian privateers from the islands of Skiathos and Skyros (in the Sporades) in the twilight period of the war. CÖmer Beg's sons petitioned²⁰ the Sultan on this matter and the whole affair soon became a test-case for the workability of the peace which had been signed on 14 December 1502/13 Cumāda II 908 and ratified on 10 August 1503/16 Şafer 909.²¹

The Divan took the whole matter extremely seriously: Venice was notified of the act of piracy and of her commitment under the terms of the peace to compensate the sons of CÖmer. The most explicit demand for reparations appears in the letter of Bayezid to the Doge of 7 April 1504.²² In her turn Venice gave the Sultan her assurance of full compensation.²³ As promised, the secretary Nicolo Stella was despatched to the islands of Skyros and Skiathos to reprimand the rectors there; at Skiathos he was to do all in his power to recover the stolen goods; at Skyros he was to deal with the matter of the four abducted janissaries, two of whom had been imprisoned and two had been sold into slavery.²⁴ The Venetian authorities rejected the excuse given by the rector of Skiathos that the act of piracy had been committed during the time of war, since both Venice and the Ottomans accepted 14 December 1502/13 Cumāda II 908 as the true commencement of the peace and not May of the following year when the peace treaty was brought to Venice by Zaccaria de Freschi and CAli Beg dragoman (q.v.) for confirmation by the doge.²⁵ On his return from the islands, Stella presented his report to the Senate on the outcome of his mission;²⁶ a substantial portion of the goods were recovered and compensation had been arranged for all losses.

This affair is of interest, not only as an indication of the extent to which Venetians and Ottomans were willing to go in order to

co-exist peacefully, but also for two reasons concerning the stature of CÖmer Beg and the Turhanoğlu. First we are given more than a glimpse of the commercial interests of the Turhanoğlu in Thessaly and of the nature of that commerce;²⁷ and secondly, the success of the sons of CÖmer in these proceedings is a measure of their power and influence with the sultan.

Notes

1. Akrweiler, p.158. Mme. Akrweiler's identification is plausible but it is not conclusive. Ottoman sources shed no light on the later career of CÖmer beg Turhanbegoğlu. Süreyya, III, p.583 merely mentions him as the son of Turhan Beg and as the grandfather of another CÖmer Beg who died in 1553/961. Mme. Akrweiler states that CÖmer Beg was SB of Tırhala in 1503, but no source is given, and her reference to Gökbiğin, p.342 relates to a very early waqf inscription. However, the CÖmer Beg in Sanuto is an old man with substantial military experience, and this would seem to buttress Mme Akrweiler's identification (see notes 13, 14).
2. KPZ, p.124; Hammer, GOR, II, p.37; Danişmend, I, p.2484.
3. KPZ. p.124-5; Danişmend, I, p.284.
4. Hammer, GOR, II, p.40.
5. KPZ, p.210, Hammer, GOR, II, p.64, 66.
6. KPZ, p.229; Hammer, GOR II, p.75.
7. Hammer, GOR, II, pp.80, 84.
8. KPZ, p.344.
9. Hammer (French ed), Hist, III, p.215, n.1.
10. Hammer, GOR, II, 151 ff., 157; Danişmend I, p.339.
11. KPZ, pp.460-463.
12. Hammer, GOR, II, 298-9; Fisher, p.39, n.69.
13. Sanuto, II, 289-290, January 1499 [Docs., p.668]. The allusion here to the failure of earlier ventures in Syria on account of squabbles amongst the leadership most probably refers to the Ottoman campaigns against the Mamluks in the 1480s in which CÖmer Beg himself took part.

14. Sanuto, II, 289-290; 757; 867; 1127-8; III, 109; 500-501 [all Docs., pp.668-9].
15. Sanuto II, 757, May 1499 [Docs., p.668].
16. Sanuto, III, 127-8, Malipiero, part I, p.189 [both Docs., pp.669-670]. Hammer, GOR II, p.319, note g., also refers to this report of extortion in Sanuto, but Hammer's interpretation that ^COmer's timar was granted to Hadim^AAli only after ^COmer's death is erroneous and wholly unsubstantiated by the text in Sanuto and Malipiero.
17. Sanuto, III, 500-501.
18. Sanuto, V, 761-2; 1002-3 [both Docs., pp.670-1].
19. Sanuto, IV, 84, but the sense is not wholly clear [Docs., p.670].
20. Sanuto, V, 761-2; 1002-3; 1003-4 [all Docs., pp.670-1].
21. Sanuto, V, 77; Inalcık, OE, p.213.
22. ASV, CDT, Busta X, fasc. 8 (Greek Original, 7 April, no year); ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc. 6, no. 23 (Italian trans., 7 April, no year); cf. Bombaci, Liber Graecus, p.298, no.55, (7 April 1504); Predelli, Comm. reg. VI, p.75, no.56 (7 April (1504)), and ASV, Indice Bombaci (chron), no. 50, (7 April 1503). See Arhweiler for the transcription, translation, historical analysis and facsimile of this document. I disagree with Mm A weiler's dating of the year. The Liber Graecus and the Libri Commemoriali have marginal notes giving the year as 1504. Both the Indice Bombaci and Mm A weiler give the year as 1503. A weiler's conclusion is based on two arguments. First, that this letter only refers to the peace negotiations conducted by Zaccaria de' Freschi in Istanbul from December 1502 to April 1503 (Cumāda II 908 to Şawwāl 908) and not to those conducted by Andrea Gritti from July to September 1503 (Muḥarrem to Rebī^C I 909); secondly, that the mission to Venice of the Ottoman ambassador ^CAli Beg (when he could have carried this letter with him) took place in late April and May 1503 (Zū'l-ka^C'de and Zū'l-ḥicca 908), and not in 1504. In response to the first argument, it should not be overlooked that the bulk of the peace negotiations were between Freschi and the Ottomans, and that Gritti's mission was of secondary importance. It should also be remembered that Bayezid had already drawn up the peace treaty, which Venice was eventually to accept almost in toto, by 14 December 1502/24 Cumāda II 908 (Cf. ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, roll doc., Greek original; transcribed in M and M, III, pp.344-350, no. xxxv), that is within days of Freschi's arrival in Istanbul. It was this agreement which Freschi and ^CAli Beg took with them to Venice in April 1503. It is, therefore, not so surprising that Bayezid's letter should refer back to the Freschi rather than the Gritti negotiations. In response to the second argument, there is ample evidence (e.g. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 35v-36r, 30 June 1504 and f.44v [Docs., p.671 and 596-7] to show that ^CAli Beg undertook a further mission to Venice in June 1504 (Zū'l-ḥicca 909) when he could easily have

delivered this letter of 7 April (1504). (see p.141). Finally, Stella's mission to Skiathos and Skyros did not take place until mid summer of 1504: the Venetian authorities would not have allowed a whole year to elapse before responding to Bayezid's letter.

23. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff35v-36r, 30 June 1504 [Docs., p.671].
24. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff43r-44r, 17 July 1504, Commission of Nicolo Stella, [Docs., p.672]. For other references to this affair, see Idem, reg. 40 ff. 37v-38r; f. 39r; ff. 41v-42r, and Sanuto, V, 1034-35, 1057-58; VI, 43 [Docs., p.672]; VI, 160.
25. See Commission of Nicola Stella [Docs., p.672]. This corroborates Ahweiler's deduction that the actual act of piracy occurred between December 1502 and May 1503 (Ahweiler, p.157).
26. This is given in full in ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, ff. 168v-169r, July 1506; see also ff. 168r.
27. See the Commission of Nicolo Stella [Docs., p.672], for the most detailed account of the wares which the sons of Cömer Beg were sending to Istanbul.

CÖMER BEG - (1501/906)

[Homar]

Sanuto, III, 1623 [Docs., pp.685-6]: one of seven commanders ('septem duces') in Bosnia under the overall command of the SB Iskender Pasha during the Ottoman campaign in northern Dalmatia of 1501/906.

ORUÇ RE'IS - corsair (1496-1501/901-907)

[Erichi/Enrichi/Richi

Ganbasat Erichi]

Erichi - most probably Oruç - was an active corsair at the end of the fifteenth century, engaged in acts of piracy in the Aegean arcipelago in the company of the corsairs Kara Hasan (q.v.) and Caplici (q.v.)¹. He appears to have been of Turkish origin² and to have been based in the pirate strongholds of the western and southern Anatolian coast (e.g. Finike, Palatia). Following action taken against

him by the BB of Anadolu in April/May 1496, he fled with Caplici to Negroponte, but was eventually captured and taken to Istanbul.³ In accordance with Bayezid's pirate policy (see p.266), Erichi was one corsair who was deemed worthy of recruitment: by May 1497 he was reported to be stationed in Istanbul, along with Kemal Re'is (q.v.), on a stipend of 15 aspers per day and as the captain of one of the three galeazza grossa in the Ottoman fleet.⁴ In April 1499 Sanuto noted that he was one of the four corsairs at the Porte.⁵

He was to remain in Bayezid's pay until his death in 1501, carrying out a number of missions. In August 1497 he was sent with 10 ships and accompanied by the Ağa of the Janissaries and 300 Janissaries to track down corsairs in the area of Saloncia.⁶ Over the summer of 1497, Erichi was also used by the captain of the Ottoman fleet at sea in the Aegean (?Kapudan Pasha) in what appears to have been an operation to recover a Venetian ship which had been seized by Camensa (see p.218) from Domenico Venier, a Venetian subject, and taken to Foca.⁷ Although unsuccessful, the attempt was indicative of the use made by the Ottoman state of corsairs as policemen in countering piracy. Indeed, such was his value to the Ottoman fleet that when in July 1497 he and the renegade Beneto Barbeta (q.v.) attacked and burnt the 'Zaffo', a Venetian vessel carrying pilgrims back from the Holy Land, thus causing considerable consternation in Venetian relations with the Porte, he was not punished by Bayezid.⁸ On the contrary, Andrea Gritti, writing from Istanbul in January 1498, complained that Erichi, the cause of all the trouble, was growing in wealth and stature at the Porte, while not only was the divan unconcerned about the incident, but the Kapudan Pasha ['capitano di l'armata'] had been rebuked for failing to bring the ship to Istanbul.⁹

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In the autumn of 1498 Gritti noted that Oruç was captain of the galleys escorting an Ottoman ambassador to the Mamluk sultan.¹⁰ But with the advent of war with Venice in the spring of 1499, Oruç was back in Istanbul and in command of a ship (nave) of 300 botte,¹¹ notwithstanding Fa'ik Pasha's advice to Bayezid that he should not have employed robbers ('ladri') such as Oruç and Kemal Re'is to command the fleet.¹² In the summer of 1500 he mobilised with 14 ships (fuste) in the direction of Zante; and for the new campaigning season of 1501 he was ordered by Bayezid to mobilise jointly with Kemal Reis and Haydar Ağa to form an armada of some 40 galleys and ten fuste.¹³

Oruç's luck ran out sooner than that of his contemporary privateers. In a colourful passage, Sanuto noted that the secretary (scrivan) on the ship of Bortolo da Mosto, had returned from the archipelago and on 3 December reported to the Collegio that Oruc had been captured, together with all his men, following the shipwreck of his three ships on the island. He had been betrayed to the islanders by his pilot. Oruç apparently offered to betray Kemal Re'is in return for his own life.¹⁴ But with the arrival of the Venetian captain general, Oruc was roasted alive on 9 December using an oar as a spit. In his report, the Captain General noted that Oruç's ordeal lasted

three hours until he died. Four others including the pilot were also executed, with the remaining 30 turks being handed over to the Duke of Naxos to use them as oarsmen or set them to work in some way.¹⁵ The manner of death had been determined by Oruç's own treatment of the Venetian noble Ambrosio Contarini (di Francesco, quondam Priamo), from whom Oruç had been receiving protection payments. While Contarini had been loading grain at Salonica, he was accused by sailors of wanting to capture Oruç. This led to lengthy combat between the two men, during which Contarini was wounded, captured and roasted alive by Oruç. This episode is described in what appears to be one of Sanuto's asides.¹⁶ It is also stated here that Oruç had done great harm to Venetian interests as well as to the sultan's haraç payers. In the light of the reliability of the above information from three separate sources in the Diarii (as well as the account in Priuli) about the death of Oruç, it seems unlikely that any credence can be given to information contained in the letter dated 5 January 1503 (1502 m.v.) that 'Erichi' had embarked from the Straits with 25 ships (fuste) to harass Venetian subjects, even though the source of this information is Sinan Beg (q.v.), the Ottoman ambassador to Moldavia and Poland.¹⁷

Notes

1. Sanuto, I, 83-4.
2. Idem.
3. Sanuto, I, 83-4, 135-6, 204.
4. Sanuto, I, 624-5 [Doc., p.618], 640, 916.
5. Sanuto, II, 600 [Docs., pp.559-560].
6. Sanuto, I, 707. Cf. Malipiero, pt I, p.153-4: '----- A 26 Mazo, è uscito de Constantinopoli 10 vele, una barza de 300 bote, una caravela, do galie e 6 fuste, e vanno cercando corsari; ha Capitano Erichi corsaro, el qual ha con esso 300 gianizzeri e 8

bombarde; e va verso Salonichi.'

7. Sanuto, I, 756-7 [Docs., p.620].
8. Sanuto, I, 702-3; Malipiero, pt 1, pp.154-158.
9. Sanuto, I, 916-7 [Docs., p.620].
10. Sanuto, II, 292.
11. Sanuto, II, 1055.
12. Sanuto, II, 1128 [Docs., p.628] (see p.206).
13. Sanuto, III, 1522-3, 1589; IV, 48.
14. Sanuto, IV, 178. In the same passage Sanuto adds that the news of Oruç's capture was confirmed by Toma Duoda, a Venetian captain who arrived in Venice via Melos on 6 December 1501 and who had seen Oruç and his 27 men imprisoned in Melos Castle.
15. Sanuto, IV, 205-6: according to the captain general, Oruç had been returning from the Barbary coast ("Barbaria") when a storm had shipwrecked him and his 132 men. He and 34 were taken alive, the remainder having either been drowned or killed by the islanders.
16. Sanuto, IV, 206; see also Lane p.165 and Fisher, p.46 using same source: the incident increased the reputation of Benedetto Pesaro, the captain general; Priuli, vol. II, p.191.
17. Sanuto, IV, 806

ORUC - corsair (1503/908)

[Erichi]

Sanuto, IV, 806: see p.403.

[OSMAN BALLYEMEZ] SEKBAN BASI -(1515/921) [Seguman Pasha/Simin Bey]

Sanuto, XXI, 160-2, 238: executed by Selim on charges of being one of the instigators of the janissary revolt of 22 February 1515.

His identity is well documented (see p.66, n.26, and pp.408-9).

According to Süreyya (III, p.415, IV, 770-1) he succeeded Yunus Ağa as sekban başı.

PIRI MEHMED PASHA

[Peri bassa; Peri zilebi; Piri bassa]

Nationality and Background

As a Muslim born Turk, Piri Mehmed's rise to become Grand Vizier in January 1518/Muharem 924 was a rare occurrence in a period in which the Grand vizierate was dominated by men who had served their apprenticeship in the Palace School and who had been recruited in the main through the devşirme. The last Grand Vizier to have come from a similar background was Çandarlı İbrahim Paşa (q.v.) and he had held office for no more than one year (1498-9/904-5). İbrahim, moreover, came from a Turkish family with a long tradition of service in the Grand Vizierate. Piri owed his success to his talent as an adviser in whom Selim could trust, though he did come from an old Anatolian family which traced its descent back to the famous Celal al-Din of Akseray.¹ The first twenty-five volumes of the Diarî contain no reports or information of any kind which could indicate that Sanuto or the Venetian government were aware of Piri's background.

Early Career

Piri Mehmed trained as an âlim in Amasya and on the accession of Bayezid went to Istanbul. During Bayezid's reign he was cadi, first of Sofia and then of Silivri, Serez and Galata, and was then appointed mütevelli of the imaret of Mehmed II. Towards the end of Bayezid's reign he left the hierarchy of the Ulema and his legal career and was appointed to the treasury (defterdarlık)². In 1511 he was promoted to the rank of baş defeterdar.³ When Selim acceded in 1512/918 Piri continued to hold this post. Although he is not mentioned by name in the Diarî in these years, there is one reference

to the office of defterdar. Apparently soon after his assumption of power, Selim questioned the defterdar about the fact that the treasury was almost empty, whereupon the defterdar⁴ replied that Bayezid had spent the money and distributed it to whomsoever he chose. Although Selim would obviously have been dealing with his own baş defterdar, this report may be seen as an amplification of the picture provided by one Selīm-nāme⁵ where we are told that Piri was one of Selim's closest advisers from the very start of his reign. The report here is dated 1 May 1512 and Bayezid abdicated on 24 April 1512. Piri may have been telling Selim what he wanted to hear, or perhaps it really was the truth, but it is significant that in spite of presiding in a sense over the depletion of the treasury, Piri himself was not dismissed by the new sultan.

Battle of Chaldiran: Rise to Power

It was with the battle of Chaldiran that Piri Mehmed's meteoric rise to power began. Still in his capacity as baş defterdar he attended Selim's council of war prior to the great battle. Here the viziers counselled Selim to rest the troops for twenty four hours after their long journey and not to send them into battle the following morning. Piri alone advised him to attack at dawn for he feared that any delay might give time for disaffection to spread among the akıncı troops in the army who were of Alawi and shi'i background and therefore susceptible to propaganda from the Safavid side. Selim was impressed by this advice and immediately ordered the army to prepare for battle the next day.⁶ When on 23 August 1514/2 Receb 920 the Ottoman forces could claim victory at Chaldiran, Piri's position was vindicated and Selim honoured him by sending him with the advance

guard to accept the surrender of Tabriz.⁷ Greater honour still came later that year when, with the unceremonious dismissal of the vizier Mustafa Pasha (q.v.) and the equally ignominious departure of Hersekzade Ahmed (q.v.) and Dukaginzade Ahmed (q.v.), Selim appointed Piri Mehmed third vizier (September 1514/Şa'bān 920).⁸ Sanuto describes this dramatic change of government personnel and it is from this time that Piri becomes one of the most important Ottomans in the Diarii.⁹

The Istanbul Arsenal/Vizier.

Piri's most notable contribution as vizier was his role in the building of the Haliç Terseane or Istanbul Arsenal and the expansion of the Ottoman fleet. Hammer¹⁰ recounts the story of how Selim had been concerned about the lack of an adequate navy and arsenal, and that after a night of insomnia had called his most trusted counsellor, Piri, and confided in him. Piri was able to suggest a coherent policy by which the fleet could be expanded - that is the establishment of a large Arsenal - and he was also able to select the site for its construction. The work, which was supposed to have begun in 1515, was said to have been completed the following year, largely as a result of Piri's immense energy in organising the procurement of the requisite raw materials. Once the arsenal had been completed the actual construction of the fleet could begin and this was supervised by the Kapudan Pasha Ca'fer (q.v.). The Diarii do not reflect this story of Piri's involvement in the building of the Haliç Tersane, whereas they conclusively link its construction from as early as 1513 with Iskender Bostancı.

In spite of the confidence which Selim had in him and in spite of

the wise counsel he had been able to provide, Piri's term as vizier was fraught with problems of political survival.

On three separate occasions in a period of fifteen months (February 1515 - May 1516) Piri was either dismissed or his life put in danger. The first occasion followed the Janissary revolt of 22 February 1515/8 Muḥarrem 921 in Amasya when his house and that of Hoca Halimî Çelebi, another favourite of Selim, were sacked.¹¹ Here was an example of the intense friction between the devşirme or kul elements (supported by the jannissaries) and the ulema hierarchy. Selim used that occasion as a pretext to dismiss and personally execute his Grand Vizier Dukaginzade Ahmed (q.v.), but the political climate was such that he could not yet be replaced by Piri. The janissaries first had to be purged. By August 1515 Selim judged the situation to be opportune for a purge of those who had caused the sedition in Amasya that February.¹² He delivered an ultimatum to the Ağa of the Janissaries that those janissaries responsible for the revolt were to be handed over. After the Ağa had conferred with his men, it was decided to tell Selim that the troublemakers within the corps had already been weeded out and posted at the extremity of the empire on the Persian frontier. The Ağa however was willing to provide the names of the leading instigators of the revolt, as opposed to the perpetrators. The Venetian bailo's report concerning the purge is interesting in that amongst those accused (Iskender Ağa the Bostancı başı, Taci-zade Ca'fer Çelebi the Kadı-Asker of Anadolu, and the Sekban başı Balyemez Osman) was Piri Mehmed himself.¹³ On 18 August 1515/8 Receb 921 Selim held Porte again, which had been in abeyance since the start of the enquiry, and ordered the accused to be brought to him with their hands bound. It is significant that while the

sultan was prepared to accept that the others were implicated, he was intent on protecting Piri who had been the victim rather than the organiser of the February revolt. The Bostancı başı, the Kadi-Casker and the Sekban başı were all executed,¹⁴ but Piri was released, though temporarily dismissed from office. According to one account Selim ordered him to retire to his farm in Silivri, but his disgrace was over after only three days. On 22 August 1515/12 Receb 921 he was re-appointed vizier.¹⁵

Piri was to have only a short respite for by September 1515 he encountered his second crisis when he and Sinan Pasha alerted Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha that he was about to be appointed Grand Vizier. In doing this, they leaked information of deliberations which had taken place in the divan and so incurred Selim's wrath; no serious repercussions ensued on this occasion.¹⁶

It was the third crisis which occurred the following April 1516 which was to be the most terrifying for Piri. It has already been noted (p.92) that when news arrived that the Safavids had captured seventy pieces of artillery and 2000 men with guns (schiopetieri) from an army which the viziers had advised Selim to send to the Safavid border, the sultan flew into a rage, ordered Hersekzade and Piri to be bound and executed. At this point Sinan Pasha(q.v.) interceded on their behalf and their lives were spared, but they were thrown into Yedi kule prison. Soon after they were released and dismissed.¹⁷

Once again disgrace was to be shortlived. Selim had been preparing for another campaign in the east and he required experienced administrators to look after the government in his absence. With this in mind he reinstated both Hersekzade and Piri to positions of power in late May 1516, with Piri holding the senior post of Muhafız or

Kaymakam of Istanbul.¹⁸ In this capacity he was responsible for supervising the day to day running of government while Selim could concentrate on the military campaign.

Muhafız of Istanbul (May 1516 - January 1518/Rebī^cII 922-Muḥarrem 924)

From his appointment in May 1516 until his elevation to the Grand Vizierate in January 1518, the Diari are a unique and a comparatively rich source of information on his management of affairs in Istanbul. Owing to the nature of the sources - most of our information comes from the letters and reports of the newly appointed ballo Lunardo Bembo - we are only given an insight into Piri's dealings with Venice rather than into any game of power politics which may have been taking place in Istanbul in Selim's absence.

Bembo arrived in Istanbul on 9 July 1516/8 Cumāda II 922¹⁹ little knowing the difficulties which were awaiting him. Piri was reasonably friendly towards the Republic and had been acquainted with Andrea Gritti at some earlier point,²⁰ He also intervened to save Bembo's dragoman from a beating at the hands of Ca^cfer Pasha.²¹ However, the muhafızlık of Istanbul was a serious responsibility at a time when the sultan's personal authority - vital to the efficient functioning of Ottoman government - was neither immediate nor evident. It was essential therefore that any hint of anarchy should be treated seriously. It seems likely that it was the fear of anarchy which made Piri a tough negotiator with Bembo over the question of danni or damages to life and property; similarly the knowledge of Selim's absence may have been the cause of the proliferation of danni perpetrated by Venetian subjects on Ottomans. Petitions flooded into Istanbul, too many of them to be adequately covered here.²² The most notorious perpetrators were the

Venetian islanders of Skyros and Skiathos, already the cause of concern and consternation to the Republic some fifteen years before when their activities nearly jeopardized the peace negotiations of 1502-3 and necessitated the dispatch in 1504 of the secretary Nicolo Stella to the Aegean to punish the wrongdoers and compensate the wronged. (see p.397).

In October 1516/Ramāzān 922, Piri gave Bembo four months by which time he was to obtain satisfaction from the Venetian government. Bembo needed time to discover the truth about the allegations, and in order to prevent the whole matter reaching the very highest levels, prevailed upon Piri not to send the petitions to Selim who might take reprisals against Venetian subjects.²³ However, Piri's four months had expired and neither compensation nor the prospect of it was forthcoming. By contrast Piri had acted swiftly²⁴ in dealing with danni perpetrated by Ottoman subjects against Venetians, though with what effect is not clear. Piri could no longer restrain the petitioners who had come to Istanbul to press their case, and, supporting them in their disdain of Bembo's assertion that Venice had dispatched the provveditore of the fleet to punish those responsible, now threatened to send the petitions to Selim himself (March 1517/Şafer 923).²⁵ When a month later Bembo was still trying to offer excuses (12 April 1517/20 Rebī' I 923) over the allegations against Skiathos, claiming that ships from Rhodes had been responsible, Piri felt compelled to send the petitions.²⁶ At this point Bembo appears to have bribed Piri's protoiero²⁷ - whom Bembo had previously blamed for Piri's intransigence²⁸ - so that he would not write to Selim. By June 1517 the situation had reached its climax for Selim's son Süleiman in Edirne had now been approached by a petitioner and he in turn had written to Piri demanding action. Piri summoned Bembo and accused him and the Venetian government of mocking

and insulting behaviour; over a year had passed since the petitions had been brought before the bailo yet nothing had been done: were he to write now to Selim as he ought to, two pages would not suffice for all the danni committed and the petitions received. Reparations had to be made, particularly those concerning prisoners and money taken by the Skiathos islanders; the bailo had two months in which to achieve all this.²⁹ It was not until 4 September 1517 that the Venetian government finally took definitive action in authorising the provveditore of the fleet to proceed to Skiathos, the Archipelago and Candia where he was to punish and replace those rectors, past and present, who were responsible for damages inflicted against the sultan's subjects, as well as arrange the necessary compensation. It was also decided to write to the bailo that he might inform Piri Pasha of the measures being taken and to explain that the damages inflicted had been contrary to the wishes of the Republic.³⁰

This was not entirely the end of the matter. Piri had been tough with Bembo, but he had also shown remarkable patience and restraint. It is not known whether he had eventually sent the petitions to Selim, but it is clear that Selim did get to know of the whole problem. For it was later revealed to the Venetian ambassador Alvise Mocenigo, who had been sent to Cairo to congratulate Selim on his victories and to renew the peace of 1513 and 1503, that the real reason why Selim had insisted that the ambassador should return home via Istanbul was not so much to be honoured as to ascertain the extent of the danni and to see to compensation, since the bailo had proved himself to be unreliable.³¹ By the time Mocenigo arrived in Istanbul (October 1517/Şawwāl 923), the Venetian government's deliberation of 4 September was already in force and so he did not in fact have to do

anything, thought he did discuss the matter with Piri.³² On one occasion Piri explained to Mocenigo that he had been forced to take a hard line with Bembo, otherwise the petitioners would have taken their grievances to Selim himself.³³

Bembo's official duties were complicated and his freedom of action restricted by the terrible financial state of the office of the bailo (Ven: baylazzo/bailaggio) and the low esteem in which it was held by the Ottomans at this time. This was largely due to the activities of Bembo's predecessor Nicolo Zustinian who had become entangled in legal proceedings which had resulted in the humiliation of a beating of ten strokes ordered by Selim himself.³⁴ Moreover, Zustinian had incurred serious debts³⁵ which Piri insisted were the responsibility of the Venetian government, because the money had been spent in the service of the Venetian state.³⁶ As in the case of the danni, the question of the repayment of these debts dragged on for a period of eighteen months at the end of which the Venetian government disclaimed all responsibility in the matter since there was evidence to show that Zustinian had borrowed the money in connection with his mercantile interests and not in his capacity as bailo.³⁷

When Bembo arrived in Istanbul in July 1516 he wrote that Venetian prestige had deteriorated drastically.³⁸ Later that year (October 1516) his despatches reveal an additional factor in the problems of the bailaggio, that is the increasing confidence of the Ottomans following Selim's victories against the Mamluks.³⁹ Venetian interests were not being well represented in Istanbul at this time, as exemplified by the requisitioning for the Ottoman fleet of four Venetian ships and that of Coresi to carry munitions to Selim's army in Egypt⁴⁰. In response to Bembo's complaints, Piri merely shrugged

his shoulders and effected to express his powerlessness to help.⁴¹ The bailo was struggling to survive. Even as a western 'window' on the Ottoman state, the bailo was finding it difficult to function since Piri had cautioned Bembo not to write anything concerning the Ottoman fleet after certain letters of the bailo had been intercepted.⁴²

Grand Vizier

It was while the ambassador Mocenigo was in Piri's presence taking his leave on 4 November 1517, that an ulak arrived from Damascus with letters from Selim appointing Piri Grand Vizier. The letters had been written in Damascus from where it had taken the ulak fourteen days to reach Istanbul.⁴³ As Hammer points out this proves that Piri was appointed Grand Vizier two months after the death of Yunus Pasha in September 1517.⁴⁴ On 26 November 1517 Piri set off from Istanbul to meet Selim in the east.⁴⁵ In spite of various rumours that Piri had committed suicide on the journey having learnt of Selim's intention to kill him, or that Selim had indeed executed him on arrival,⁴⁶ the two men met by February 1518 at the very latest and most probably by late January - and Piri took up his duties as Grand Vizier.⁴⁷ Surviving Selim and remaining Grand Vizier for three years under Süleiman, Piri's term was to be one of the most famous in the history of the Grand Vizierate.

Notes

1. The secondary literature on Piri Mehmed is quite extensive; Şerafettin Turan, IA vol. IX, pp.559a-561b, "Piri Mehmed Pasha"; Franz Babinger, "Piri Mehmed pasha" EI(1), vol. III, pp.1069b - 1070a; Süreyya, vol. II, p.43; ^COsmānzāde, pp.22-3; for additional references to his family background, see Danişmend, II, 425-6. Turan's is by far the most comprehensive and recent account of Piri's life and career and, unless stated otherwise, much of the information presented here on his early life and career is taken

from this biography. For Piri Mehmed's waqf, see Gökbilgin, Edirne, pp. 489-494.

2. Gökbilgin, Edirne p.106 (911/1506) and p.132 (914/1508).
3. Danişmend, II, 441. It is an unfortunate error that Babinger states that Piri became baş defterdar at the start of Bayezid's reign rather than at the end of it.
4. Sanuto, XIV, 287, (Report of Nicolo Zustinian, ballo in Istanbul, 1 May 1512): 'Et che [Selim] havia dimandato a quel vi era sopra dito thesoro diti danari, e voleva intender dove i fosse; qual ha ditto el Signor so padre li tolse e dispensò a chi li parse.'
5. See Kerslake, Selīm-nāme, pp.43-44 especially. Note, however, that Dr. Kerslake does counsel caution in accepting Celal-zāde's version at face value.
6. Turan, op. cit., p.559; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.412 (Hist. IV, pp.193-4); Danişmend, II, p.11; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.65. Piri is not mentioned in the Diarii in connection with this incident.
7. Turan, op. cit., p.559; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.417-8 (Hist. IV, p.201); Danişmend, II, p.14; Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.71.
8. Turan, op. cit., p.559 (15 October 1514/25 Şa'bān 920); Hammer, GOR, II, p.420 (Hist. IV, p.205) (28 September 1514/7 Şa'bān 920); Danişmend, II, pp.14-15 (15 October 1514/25 Şa'bān 920); Tekindağ (TD XVII/22), p.74 (September 1514); Uğur, pt. I, pp.124-5 (KPZ defter IX, f. 139b-140b); Babinger, op. cit., p. 1069 uses Hammer. Sanuto, XX, 95-6 reports his appointment too late to be of any use in determining the date.
9. Sanuto, XX, 95-6 [Docs., p.673].
10. Hammer, GOR, II, pp.430-432 (Hist. IV pp. 219-220); Tekindağ (Belg.7), p.66; Danişmend, II, p.21.
11. Turan, op. cit., p. 559 (22 February 1515/8 Muharrem 921); Danişmend, II, p.17; Hammer, GOR, II, 422 (Hist. IV, 207); Tekindağ (TD XXII/22), p.75.
12. Sanuto, XXI, 160-2: "In litteris baylo Costantinopolis", 24 August 1515. Although the Diarii do not specifically mention the janissary revolt of February 1515, this report alludes to it in describing Selim's measures to punish the instigators.
13. Idem.
14. Idem and Turan, op. cit., p.559b.
15. Turan, op. cit., p.560a (22 August 1515/12 Receb 921). Note how this date tallies with the report in the Diarii that Selim had convened the Porte on 18 August 1515 to announce his judgement.

16. Sanuto, XXI, 250-1, report of the bailo Nicolo Zustinian of 18 September 1515, is the only source for this incident. The passage is quoted in Hammer, GOR, II, 432 (Hist. IV, 220-1).
17. Sanuto, XX, 276-7, 338-9. A degree of friction between Selim and his viziers had already been reported from the previous February. When Selim had banned them from attending the counsel (Sanuto, XX, 66). See also Turan, op cit. p.560a. The capture of the artillery must have been in connection with the Safavid siege of Diyarbekir.
18. Sanuto, XXII, 348-9 [Docs., p.673] "I'altro [Piri] restava a Constantinopoli in locho del Signor" This is confirmed by Sanuto, XXII, 472-3. The first report (XX, 348-9) of Piri's appointment is dated 27 May 1516 which indicates that his reinstatement must date from late May; Turan, op. cit. p.560a and Danismend, II, p.24 have suggested 31 May 1516/28 Reby^C II 922 as a possible date. See also Hammer, GOR, II, p.463 (Hist. IV, 263); Giovio, Commentario, f. 25r; Sansovino, Annali, f. 123v; Süreyya, vol. II, p.43.
19. Sanuto, XXII, 472-3.
20. Sanuto, XXII, 546 [Docs., pp.673-4]. Piri inquires about Gritti.
21. See p.164, Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6, 286.
22. Sanuto, XXII, 546-7 (31 July 1516); XXIII, 384-6 (24 October 1516); XXIII, 548-9 (28 November 1516); XXIV, 101-2 (15 February 1517); XXIV, 188-9 (16 March 1517) [Docs., pp.674-5]; XXIV, 337 (12 April 1517) [Docs., p.675]; XXIV, 337-8 (29 April 1517); XXIV, 626-8 (18 June 1517) [Docs., p.676]; XXIV, 633 (4 September 1517); XXV, 158 (5 November 1517); XXV, 614 (7 November 1517) [Docs., pp.676-7]; XXV, 273-4 (19 November 1517); XXV, 239, 7 and 8 December 1517). See also XXV, 157, 275 and 439-440. These passages refer to the petitions and discussions connected with danni for the period July 1516 until the end of 1517.
23. Sanuto, XXIII, 384-5, 385-6. See also Sanuto, XXIII, 548-9 where Bembo expresses to the Venetian government his suspicions about the validity of all the allegations.
24. Sanuto, XXIII, 548-9 (November 1516); for danni committed by Turks in Dalmatia in 1517, see Sanuto, XXIV, 337-8.
25. Sanuto, XXIV, 188 [Docs., pp.674-5].
26. Sanuto, XXIV, 337 [Docs., p.675].
27. Idem.
28. Sanuto, XXIV, 188 [Docs., pp.674-5].
29. For a colourful account of their dialogue, see Sanuto, XXIV, 626-8 [Docs., p.676].

30. Sanuto, XXIV, 633. For information on deliberations in the Venetian Senate concerning the danni, see ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib, reg. 47 (1516-1519), ff. 151, 153, 159.
31. Sanuto, XXV, 614 [Docs., pp.676-7].
32. Sanuto, XXV, 143-6, 154-5, especially XXV, 157 and 439-440 (Piri informs Mocenigo of the five issues causing difficulties).
33. Sanuto, XXV, 157.
34. Sanuto, XXI, 505-6; XXII, 9. Zustinian was lucky to escape with his life.
35. Sanuto, XXII, 40-1, XXIII, 116, 286; XXIV, 101-2, 188-9, 337-8, 481, 638-40; XXV, 69, 157, 439-440.
36. Sanuto, XXIV, 188-9, 337-8.
37. Sanuto, XXIV, 638-9, 640; XXV, 69.
38. Sanuto, XXII, 546.
39. Sanuto, XXIII, 384-5.
40. See p.168.
41. Sanuto, XXIV, 480-1: Piri's remark was "Che voi ch'io fazi?" It had earlier been thought (Sanuto, XXIV, 102) that Piri had obtained the release of these ships.
42. Sanuto, XXIV, 481 and 626-8 [Docs., p.676].
43. Sanuto, XXV, 147, 158, 278, 281, 286, 473-4.
44. Hammer, GOR II, p. 669-70 (Hist. IV, 471); also Danişmend, II, p.46.
45. Sanuto, XXV, 240.
46. Sanuto, XXV, 237, 490, 490-1. See also XXV, 688.
47. Sanuto, XXV, 365-6.

PIRI RE'IS - corsair (1517-923)

[sic]

Sanuto, XXV, 265-6: see Bronzus corsair.

QALAM BEG - (1504/910)

[Calambeï]

Sanuto, VI, 58. According to Zorzi Negro, writing in Istanbul in July 1504, 'Calambeï' had been defeated by Shah Ismail. He was a supporter of Bayezid II.

QASIM BEG - envoy and silâhdar başı (1494/900 and 1503/909)

[Chasim bei, chasin bei, Asim bei]

In late December 1502 we are informed by the secretary Freschi, who was in Istanbul at the time, that Qasim Beg had been appointed ambassador [orator] to the King of Hungary. Freschi adds that Qasim was the man who, as sultan's emissary to Sinigaglia, had been 'seized' with 40,000 ducats.¹

This clearly identifies him as the Qasim Çavuş who was the sultan's envoy to Francesco II Gonzaga of Mantua in 1493, when his mission may have been to co-ordinate a conspiracy involving Gonzaga against Bayezid's brother Djem who was then in the custody of Pope Alexander VI.² Later, in the autumn of 1494, Bayezid was panicked into action by news that Charles VIII of France was planning to wrest custody of Djem from Pope Alexander VI and to use him against the Ottomans: Bayezid despatched Qasım to Rome in the company of the papal envoy Giorgio Bucciardo, apparently to ensure, with the help of financial inducements papal support in preventing Djem from falling into Charles's custody. However, when Qasım and Bucciardo arrived in Sinigaglia, they were intercepted [rather than Freschi's word 'seized' / (preso')] by the Prefect of the city who was the brother of Giuliano della Rovere, the well-known opponent of the Pope, and were stripped of all their possessions. Qasım was able to make his escape to Mantua via Venice. Prior to Qasım's return to Istanbul, Gonzaga wrote to

Bayezid to vouch for Qasım's integrity, promising to try to recover the stolen money. Qasım embarked on his journey back to Istanbul on 9 January 1495 to face the sultan. However, news of Djem's death in February 1495 transformed the political situation, and, rather than receive Bayezid's wrath at the failure of his mission, Qasım was appointed kapudan of the fleet in Avlonya.³

Qasım was therefore both an experienced traveller and negotiator in Europe when chosen to go to Hungary. He was due to embark on his journey in about mid February 1503,⁴ and was expected to arrive in Buda in early March with a retinue of 150 horsemen.⁵ Nothing more is reported about the embassy or its objectives until a report of Andrea Gritti on 29 September 1503 notes that on that day an ulak had returned from Hungary with news that peace had been concluded with Hungary and that the envoy (presumably Qasım), about whom nothing had been heard for many months, was returning to Istanbul with the ambassador, or, in Gritti's estimation, most probably the 'messenger' of the King of Hungary.⁶

It was perhaps Venice's assistance in helping him escape from the clutches of the Prefect of Sinigaglia in 1494 which earned him the description 'friend of Venice' when Lunardo Bembo met Qasım on his return from Hungary in October 1503.⁷ Bembo asked Qasım to intercede on the Republic's behalf with the new Grand Vizier (Koca] Mustafa Pasha in the implementation of the peace settlement.⁸ For his part Qasım was ready to use his influence with Mustafa. But his main concern was to gain compensation for the theft of his personal possessions by the Prefect almost ten years before. The Republic itself had at an earlier stage arranged to pay Qasım 1000 of the 3000 ducats which Alvise Sagudino had got him to accept as the total value

of goods stolen. Qasım was now keen to receive the remaining 2000 ducats, if not from the Prefect himself who by then had died, then from his son.⁹

Qasım's cause had the sultan's support, for when Bayezid sent his envoy Ya^ckub Pasha to Venice at the end of 1503 to confirm the peace treaty, he was also instructed to ask about Qasım's missing 2000 ducats.¹⁰ The Republic was keen to accommodate Qasım who since his return from Hungary had been referred to as sılâhdar başı ['salitarbassi'],¹¹ in other words, a member of the has oda (Privy Chamber) and therefore very close to the sultan. Venetian policy was guided by the desire to win friends in high places. Qasım was known to be close to the Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha.¹² Indeed, Mustafa had on two occasions written to urge Venice to seek compensation for 'mio fradello Cassimbei', once when BB of Rumeli¹³ and once when Grand Vizier.¹⁴ When Zorzi Negro, therefore, was despatched to Istanbul in the spring of 1504, he was instructed to inform Qasım that the heirs of the Prefect were under the protection of the Pope, and that nothing more could be gained. Nevertheless, the Republic itself was prepared to step in again and offer Qasım the 2000 ducats outstanding as a gift.¹⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, IV, 668.
2. Kissling, Gonzaga, p.39-44.
3. Kissling, Gonzaga, pp.46-49, 51-52. For his position in Avlonya, see Flemming, Avlona, pp.312ff. Fisher, p.48, mistakenly describes Giuliano himself as the Prefect.
4. Sanuto, IV, 668.
5. Sanuto, IV, 830.
6. Sanuto, V, 362.

7. Sanuto, V, 597-599.
8. Idem., and p.337.
9. Sanuto, V, 597-599, 760, 762. In 1495 Qasım had returned to Istanbul in the company of Sagudino (Setton, II, p.451).
10. Sanuto, V, 995, 1002-3. See note 13.
11. Sanuto, V, 760, 762; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, 2 April 1504, f. 10r.
12. Sanuto, V, 1002-3, Qasım 'è afficionado di la Signoria nostra et è stretto con Mustapha bassa'.
13. ASV, Liber Graecus, f70v, Mustafa to Doge, 17 March [no year, but since Mustafa styles himself BB of Rumeli (a post he held between 1498 and 1501), and since the letter is addressed to Doge Agostino Barbarigo (who died in 1501), the year lies within the parameters 1498 to 1501, probably written in 1499, i.e. before the Turco-Venetian war. A letter of Bayezid dated 21 January 1499 to Barbarigo also sought compensation on Qasım's behalf (ASV, Liber Graecus, f.69rv).
14. Sanuto, V, 762.
15. ASV, Sen. Sec., op. cit.

QASIM BEG - SB of Hersek-Nova (1510/916)

[Cassi, bei, Cassum bei, Hasumbech]

The identity of this Qasım Beg is unclear. The Ragusan archives¹ record him as SB of Hersek-Nova from February to July 1510, which tallies with the Diarii reports, but no patronymic is available to help piece together other periods of his career.² I have found nothing to connect this Qasım with any of the notable Qasım Beg/Pashas of the period.

On 27 March 1510 Lodovico Valdrin reported that 'Cassim bei' had become the new SB of Hersek-Nova, but somewhat confusingly adds that Bayezid had then appointed this same 'Cassi bei' to be the vizier ['visier'] of his son stationed in Amasya [i.e. Prince Ahmed].³ On 4 April 1510 a separate source, Pollo Valeresso, the provveditore of Cattaro, who had complained to the local SB (i.e. of Hersek-Nova)

about an attack by a Turk against the Venetian captain-general, received a letter from 'Casum bei, signor dil paese di Carzego' [i.e. Qasim, SB of Heresk-Nova]. The letter stated that the Turk would be punished as well as anyone else reported to him for similar behaviour.⁴

All sources indicate that Qasim was a valued friend of the Republic. Alvise Capello, the provveditore of Almissa (north of Cattaro and at the other extremity of Qasim's bailiwick), reported on 8 April how the newly arrived [unnamed] SB of Hersek-Nova ['sanzacho dil paese di Carzego'] - clearly Qasim - had sent word to him that he wished to have good relations and that he wanted to return those inhabitants of Poliza who had been abducted in two raids - some 30 people and a sizeable number of animals.⁵ Furthermore, as a measure of his sincerity, this SB took a force in early April and burned more than 200 houses of the Turkish malefactors responsible. While involved in this action, he received a missive from the sultan immediately calling him away northwards to reinforce Ottoman forces under pressure on the frontier. Capello expressed regret at the departure of this SB whom he described as a friend of Venice.⁶ The Diarii also provide a copy/translation of a letter of Qasim, SB of Hersek-Nova ['Hasumbech signor dil paese dil ducato'], to Capello [c April 1510] in which sentiments of friendship and assurances of the security of Venetian merchants are expressed.⁷

Yet another source, again in early April 1510, reported that the [unnamed] SB of Hersek-Nova ['governador di Castel-nuovo'] - again Qasim - asked for news of Italy [i.e. with regard to the War of the League of Cambrai], expressing his concern for the well-being of the Republic. Moreover, the SB himself had received intelligence from one

of his spies that the French and Spanish fleets were about to unite: he was passing this information on to the Republic to hold its own fleet in readiness and he had also informed the sultan of the situation.⁸

It is not clear whether Qasım returned to Hersek-Nova after being summoned north, but on 17 April 1500 the provveditore Vallaresso⁹ stated that the [unnamed] SB of Bosnia ['sanzacho di Bossina'], who had only recently arrived to take up his position [i.e. Qasım], had departed having been appointed to the service of one of the sultan's sons ['deputato al governo di uno suo fiol']. This SB is described as 'homo da ben' whom everyone held in high regard because he was just and fair. Vallaresso's report, therefore, corroborates Valdrin's comment that Qasım had been appointed [Prince Ahmed's] vizier; and his early departure explains why it was at about this time that Mehmed Beg Obrenović (q.v.) was appointed to replace him but that he did not in fact arrive to take up his duties until September 1510. In the meantime, according to Vallaresso, the sancak of Hersek-Nova had been entrusted to Firuz Beg, SB of Bosnia ['Verbossana'].

Notes

1. Popović, p.94 ('Kassum-beg'). This source also lists 'Kasumbeg Mihaljbegović' as SB of Hersek-Nova from May 1512 to March 1513 and 'Kasum Pasha' from May 1518 to August 1520 with no indication of any connection with the 'Kasumbeg' of 1510.
2. So far I have not found any reference in Turkish material to a Qasım Beg as SB of Hersek-Nova in 1510/916.
3. Sanuto, X, 202.
4. Sanuto, X, 208, 208-9. Although in his reports to Venice the provveditore describes this local SB [i.e. SB of Hersek-Nova] as the SB of Bosnia, this is probably explained by the not uncommon practice of referring to Hersek-Nova as lower Bosnia: in translations of his letters to a previous provveditore of

Cattaro, a previous SB of Hersek-Nova in 1503 styled himself SB of Bosnia (see Mehmed Beg Obrenović, p.304, p.306, n.17). See also Sanuto, V, 286 ['Mehmeth aga sanzach, bey de Mostar, sive del paese de Charzago Bossina bassa'], and Sanuto, X, 471, ['sancacho di Castelnuovo e Bossina']. With regard to Qasım's letter itself, I have found no trace of it in the ASV or BNM, either in translation or the original document: the Diarîi consequently provide the only version.

5. Sanuto, X, 207.
6. Sanuto, X, 207, 207-8.
7. Sanuto, X, 476-7. I have found no record of this document in ASV or BNM: we are again reliant on the Diarîi for the text.
8. Sanuto, X, 218. see below, p.424, Qasım Beg, SB, 1510(916).
9. Sanuto, X, 262 and see note 4.

QASIM BEG BOROVINIĆ - Bosnia area (1503/909) [Cassum Borovinich]

Sanuto, V, 614-5; son-in-law of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.)

QASIM BEG - SB of ? (1510/916) [Cassibei]

Sanuto, XI, 418-9: an ulak of this SB arrives at the Porte on 30 August 1510 with news that Venice had made peace with all [her erstwhile enemies] forming a league against France. Sanuto left a gap [i.e. Cassibei, sanzacho de] in the hope that he would be able to remember/discover the name of the sancak. It is possible that this is the Qasım Beg who was SB of Hersek-Nova in April 1510 who in spite of having been appointed 'vizier' of Prince Ahmed in that month, was not in practice replaced as SB until August 1510 by Mehmed Beg Obrenović. Qasım's spies were feeding him with information about the war in Italy see p.422-3.

QASIM BEG - SB [of İçel/Karaman] (1507/913)

[Nassim]

Sanuto, VII, 286: on 26 December 1507, Lorenzo Zustinian, the locotenente in Cyprus, reported that 'Nassim bei' was the new SB in the coastal region of Anatolia directly north of Cyprus ("a) governo di quelli lochi dil turcho a le marine"). On his arrival he sent the Regiment of Cyprus a present of some horses.

No further mention is made of Qasım in the Diarii, but correspondence between Qasım and Zustinian, and Zustinian and Venice, preserved in the archives of the Heads of the Council of Ten reveal more about relations between Venetian Cyprus and Qasım. The correspondence indicates that Qasım had sent his envoy Yusuf to Cyprus to deliver his three letters¹ to Zustinian which deal with the matter of the return of 40,000 aspri to a certain priest called Zuan who been in some way deprived of the money by two brothers, Andrea and Bernardino of Santa Maura. Qasım had been ordered by the sultan to ask the Regiment of Cyprus for the money, because the two brothers had bought merchandise with the money and moved to Cyprus. The sultan had approached the bailo for payment, who then wrote to the Regiment asking to arrange the compensation. The bailo's two letters (which have not survived) with instructions were apparently brought to Zustinian by Yusuf. Qasım added that he would have sent the sultan's letters of command as well but that he did not think Zustinian could read them.

On 22 January 1508 Zustinian wrote to Qasım thanking him for this presents.² Replying to his letters, Zustinian wrote that the Regiment had looked everywhere for the two brothers, but they could not be found. A reliable source had reported that Andrea was in Rhodes. Under the circumstances the Regiment could hardly be expected to pay

the 40,000 aspri but they would remain vigilant in case the debtors and the priest's goods surfaced.

Zustinian then addressed the other requests relating to trade which Qasım had made in his letters. Qasım had asked for barley, castrated horses (geldings) and three Cypriot fishermen with experience of mending fishing nets, because Qasım's nets were in need of repair. Zustinian explained that, while there was a shortage of barley on the island that year, he had given Yusuf 200 bushels of barley, along with 200 geldings and 2 falcons as a present to Qasım and as a sign of the Regiment's friendship. As regards the three fishermen, Zustinian explained that [Nicosia, the seat of government] was not near the sea, so he had therefore written to Famagusta and other coastal towns in the hope that men with such experience could be found, but he could not guarantee success.

Finally, Zustinian wrote to the Heads of the Ten on 20 February 1508, referring to his [the Diarii]report of 26 December, and explaining the affair of the 40,000 aspri.³

In this correspondence Qasım either styles himself or is addressed as 'sanzacho della Caramania'/'sanzacho de izelich [ʔIçel] flamburario in la Caramania'. In one of his letters he states that he had returned to the place where he was before, perhaps suggesting a previous term as SB.⁴

Notes

1. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288 (Cipro), doc. no. 292. Two letters are dated 7 December 1507; the third is undated.
2. Ibid., Busta 288, doc., no. 292 (cont).
3. Ibid., Busta 288, doc., no. 290.

4. Ibid., Busta 288, doc., no.292: "et semo vegnuti qui al loco dove eramo prima".

?QASIM BEG - SB of ? Montenegro

[Nassim]

Sanuto, VI, 190: mounts a surprise attack with 6000 men in the area of Montenegro against disobedient subjects of the sultan, many of whom were killed and 500 taken prisoner.

RACHAS VOYVODA - (1499/905)

[sic]

Sanuto, II, 1078-9: voyvoda of Semendire.

RAIS - corsair (1501/906)

[sic]

Sanuto, III, 1589: in service of Bayezid.

SAP BEG - (1518/924)

[Sap Bei]

Sanuto, XXV, 474: one of three 'bassa turchi naturali' whom Selim had sent to "Turchia" to gather troops.

SEREMET - mercenary (1510/916)

[sic]

Sanuto, XI, 652-5: Turkish mercenary in Venetian service in Italy (see Murad Ağa p.326).

HADIM SINAN PASHA

[Sinan/Synan bassa]

@ SINAN ED DIN YUSUF¹@ SINAN bin ^CABD al-ḤAYY²Background and Identity

The literature on Sinan Pasha, most of it based on Ottoman chronicle sources, is extensive, but it is confined to the last five years of his life when he held high office³. Similarly, although the Diarii offer glimpses of his earlier career, the material there covers the years 1511/917 to 1517/923.

Sinan was a member of the group of Ak ağaları (white eunuchs, see Hadım Ali p.116) and at some point became Ak Ağası (Chief of the White Eunuchs).⁴ A product of the devşirme,⁵ his origins are nevertheless unclear. He was most likely a Christian, possibly a Bosnian.⁶ One report in the Diarii in 1515 - the only time Sinan's origins are mentioned - describes him as 'Albanese'.^{6a}

He was the second eunuch, after Hadım ^CAli, to become Grand Vizier, and like Hadım ^CAli, died in battle.

Career

<u>Reign of Bayezid II (?)</u>	<u>Ak Ağası (see above)</u>
<u>(?) 1490s</u>	SB of Bosnia ⁷ (/Herzegovina)
<u>July 1504/Safer 910 to</u>	SB of Herzegovina ⁸
<u>March 1507/Zū'l-ḩa^Cde 912</u>	
<u>(?) 1507/912 to</u>	SB of Semendire ⁹
<u>(?) September 1511/Receb 917</u>	
<u>September 1511/Receb 917</u>	Appointed BB of Rumeli ¹⁰ following the janissary revolt of 21 September 1511/27 Cumāda II 917 and the

dismissal of several of the sultan's leading officials (see pp.85-7, 341ff.) Sinan was appointed BB within a few days of the revolt, judging by Andrea Foscolo's letter,¹¹. This was very probably the highest office he had held up to that time. He was chosen because he was not associated with Prince Ahmed and was therefore acceptable to the janissaries. It is not clear, however, how strong a supporter of Selim he was at this stage. It is also unclear how long he remained in the office of BB of Rumeli. According to an Ottoman source,¹² Yunus Pasha became BB of Rumeli on 6 January 1512/16 Şawwāl 917, and a certain "Sinan Bey" became a vizier. Although Reindl¹³ takes this to mean that it was Hadım Sinan who was appointed vizier, there is nothing in the document to link "Sinan Bey" with Hadım Sinan. That the two may be one and the same person is possible. There is no mention of a vizier Sinan in the Diari until the following year when a report in April 1513 speaks of a 'Senan bassa' as third vizier, without indicating how long he had held the office.¹⁴ This Sinan is described as the man who killed Prince Korkud: as far as we know, the Sinan who killed Prince Korkud was Kapıcı Sinan Aga (q.v.). There is nothing else to suggest that Kapıcı Sinan did become vizier at any stage in his career, but it cannot be discounted that it was he, rather than Hadım Sinan, who became vizier in January 1512 as stated in the Ottoman source.

Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that Hadım Sinan did not become vizier in January 1512, it seems indisputable, on the basis of the Ottoman document, that he was replaced as BB of Rumeli in that month by Yunus Pasha. What might have happened to him if he did not become vizier? It is very difficult to say without further research; but perhaps it is not outside the bounds of possibility that he

returned to Semendire: that would explain the timing of his letter to Yunus in late 1512. (see p.437, n.9) He may even have become BB of Anadolu by 1513, since according to Paolo Giovio's description of the battle of Yenishehir in April 1513, 'Sinan Bassa Eunucho' was 'Bellerbey di Natolia'. This would make sense, since one would have expected Hadim Sinan to have played a leading role in the defeat of Prince Ahmed.¹⁵

November 1513/Ramazān 919

SB of Bosnia. Hadim Sinan

replaced Yunus Pasha (p.491) at about this time,¹⁶ but he held this position only until April 1514 when he was appointed BB of Anadolu. Sanuto does not mention him by name as SB of Bosnia during these few months, though a bailo's report of June 1515 describing him as BB of Anadolu, does say that he had been SB of Bosnia beforehand.¹⁷ Unfortunately, with no references in the Diarii to the SB of Bosnia from September 1513 until November 1514, it is not possible to piece together a picture of Sinan's activities in Bosnia during his brief term as SB. In September 1513 the Turkish frontier gazis were heavily defeated in Croatia by the local vassal lords of the King of Hungary, with reportedly 3000 killed or captured. The SB of Bosnia was expected to mount a counter-attack within, it was said, 20,000 cavalry.¹⁸ It is not clear what ensued, but Sinan would have taken over as SB at a time of strained relations with his Christian neighbours in the north. By February 1514 the mobilisation of troops, which was ultimately to be directed against Shah Ismail, was interpreted by some to mean war with Hungary, or possibly an attack into Friul. One report suggested that 25,000 troops had been prepared in Bosnia.¹⁹ But it was not until late 1514, however, when Sinan was long gone and had been replaced by Yunus Pasha, that the Turks took their revenge against the vassal lords.²⁰

BB of Anadolu/Chaldiran Campaign 1514/920

On 20 April 1514 Sinan was promoted to the post of BB of Anadolu,²¹ at the start of Selim's Chaldiran campaign. In fact Selim had originally tried to appoint him vizier: in a fascinating passage in a report of the bailo Nicolo Zustinian, Sinan expressed to Zustinian the great enmity which existed between him and the vizier Mustafa Pasha (B), and that when Selim had wanted to appoint him vizier in April 1514, Sinan refused saying that he would never serve under Mustafa (B) as Selim had ordered. By 10 May Zustinian wrote that Sinan had been content to accept the post of BB of Anadolu.²² This is an example of how Venetian sources can penetrate Ottoman affairs and politics which tend to appear faceless in Ottoman records. But that Sinan should have refused an order of Selim yet still have been promoted to such a key position as BB is indicative of his value to the sultan (and perhaps of the debt owed to him in aiding Selim in the struggle for the throne).

The role of Sinan in the battle of Chaldiran itself is well documented in both Ottoman chronicle and in western sources.²³ The reports in the Diarii reflect the same view of the battle, though we are not enlightened about his role in manoeuvres leading up to the battle. While Hasan Pasha, the BB of Rumeli (q.v.), took the force of Shah Ismail's attack on the left wing of the Ottoman battle line, Sinan was on the right facing Ustaclu Mehmed Han. Hasan Pasha was killed in the Safavid attack, but Sinan brought victory by falling back, thus drawing the enemy forces into the line of artillery fire.²⁴ A letter describing these battle scenes was read before the

Venetian Senate in March 1515.²⁵ The letter echoes other sources in describing the devastating effect which the Ottoman guns had on the janissaries themselves, who, unaware of Sinan's ploy, threw themselves into the fray (and consequently the line of fire) in an attempt to bolster Sinan's position and stop the retreat. The reports in the Diarii tend to stress that casualties were heavy on both sides, and that Selim's claim to be the victor was largely propaganda. There is no doubt that the carnage was great on both sides, but Sinan was to a large extent responsible for making Chaldiran a turning point in the history of Ottoman-Safavid relations: Shah Ismail's westward expansion into Anatolian lands under Ottoman suzerainty had been finally checked.

Having won Selim's respect for battle tactics, Sinan was to win still greater favour as a result of his views on strategy. His chance came after Chaldiran when the Grand Vizier Hersekzade, and the viziers Dukaginzade and Mustafa (B) had all fallen into disgrace as a result of their advice to Selim to abandon Tabriz and withdraw to Istanbul. The letter read to the Senate in March 1515 explained Sinan's compromise on strategy: he advised Selim to withdraw only as far as Amasya where he should make his winter quarters. Selim found this solution acceptable.²⁶ Although by the autumn of 1514 all the viziers had been dismissed, Sinan did not replace Hersekzade as Grand Vizier as some authors have suggested.²⁷ Paradoxically Selim appointed Dukaginzade Grand Vizier in spite of having incurred the sultan's wrath (see p.63, 92).

BB of Rumeli

In the meantime - and according to some sources, on 25 August

1514/4 Receb 920²⁸ - Sinan was appointed BB of Rumeli in place of the dead Hasan Pasha. There is no record of this change in the Diarii, nor are there any references to the BB of Rumeli in the months after Chaldiran to enable us to reconstruct Sinan's activities in detail.

Although Sinan had not replaced Hersekzade as Grand Vizier in October 1514, his power was growing. His 'enemy' Mustafa Pasha (B) had for the time being been discredited along with the other viziers, and even though Dukaginzade had succeeded Hersekzade as Grand vizier, Selim soon tired of him and he was executed. The divan at this point went through a period of turmoil (see p.92). No one was appointed successor to Dukaginzade, and the Grand Vizierate remained vacant for the next six months.

However, in June 1515/Rebī'ī 921, following the conquest of Kemah by Bıyıklı Mehmed in May 1515 (see p.294), Sinan Pasha was chosen to lead an army against Dulkadir-oğlu Ala ad-Dawla, Prince of Albistan, who had refused to support Selim when ordered during the Chaldiran campaign.²⁹ Sinan at the head of 10,000 troops (15,000 according to the Diarii³⁰), and supported by Ala ad-Dawla's nephew Shahsuvaroğlu Ğali, routed the forces of the Prince and killed him and his four sons.³¹ The account of the campaign is given in two documents in the Diarii, one a report from the bailo Zustinian dated at the end of June 1515, the other a letter from Selim to the Doge announcing the victory.³² In the latter, Sinan is referred to not as BB of Rumeli as one might have expected, but as vizier.³³ It is possible that Selim was referring to Sinan by his new rank, since the letter was written on 15 June 1515 and the battle took place around 11 June: most sources agree that Sinan was BB of Rumeli at the start of the campaign, but that he was appointed vizier following his victory.

Moreover, Sinan was given the Grand Vizierial seal of office.³⁴ Between June and September 1515, when Herske-zade was appointed Grand Vizier for the fifth term (see p.92), Sinan Pasha was Grand Vizier in all but name. Sinan had been rewarded for his loyal support for Selim in the latter's ambitious, and to many, foolhardy ventures, in sharp contrast to the other leading state officials. By counselling retreat they had fallen from grace. Sinan's power on the other hand had grown, particularly after his victory in Albistan. Shortly after his elevation to the vizierate when he was de facto Grand Vizier, four more high ranking officials fell from grace. According to one account one of the four, Tâcî-zâde Ca^cfer Çelebi (q.v.) fell victim to the lies of Hadım Sinan. Three of these officials, including Tâcî-zâde, were executed (see p.408-9).³⁵

Nevertheless, the sultan's caprice was such that Sinan's position could not be considered safe. By September 1515 he fell into temporary disfavour, that is according to the Venetian baïlo in Istanbul. Selim had suspected that his secret intention to appoint Herske-zade Grand Vizier had been leaked to the latter by Sinan and Piri Pasha; he was angered that secret deliberations of the divan had been divulged and when he summoned Sinan to the Porte, threatened him with a sword. Sinan and Piri escaped, with Sinan taking refuge in a mountain hide. Selim sent ulaks after him to tell him to return and 'a sentar' (i.e. take up his vizierial office). Sinan eventually returned, though it is not clear when. On 8 September 1515/29 Receb 921 Herske-zade became Grand Vizier (see p.92).

Grand Vizier, 1516-1517/922-923/Campaign against the Mamluks

We know very little about Sinan's activities between September

1515 and April 1516 when he was appointed Grand Vizier in place of the ageing Hersekzade.³⁷ Only one report in the Diarii deals with the actual changeover in personnel within the divan in the spring of 1516,³⁸ and this is somewhat confused with no clear indication of the new personalities involved. The most striking aspect of the report, written by the bailo in the first week of May, is that it reveals that the men brought into the divan were 'new men' ('schiavo' and 'di bassa condition'), in other words men who owed everything to Selim (it seems unlikely that any of the descriptions given here, however, fit Sinan Pasha).

Sinan was appointed Grand Vizier with probably one aim in mind: that he should lead a new offensive against Shah Ismail. Most of what we do know about his tenure as Grand Vizier is associated with his part in this offensive which, diverted southwards, led within a matter of months to the conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate, and to Sinan's dramatic death. Unfortunately it is precisely Sinan's absence from Istanbul on campaign for much of the time that accounts for the dearth of reports about him in the Diarii. From 28 April 1516/25 Rebt^c I 922 when Selim sent Sinan into Anatolia at the start of the campaign,³⁹ he is not mentioned again (except on one occasion when it was wrongly rumoured that he had been killed in battle with the Safavids⁴⁰), neither in connection with his mobilisation of forces in Anatolia, nor with regard to his part in the battle of Marj Dabik (24 August 1516/25 Receb 922).⁴¹ He is not even mentioned in the letter of Selim to the Doge announcing the victory of Marj Dabik and explaining his motives for attacking the Mamluks. According to Sanuto himself, the letter was brought to Venice by Sinan's nephew, Mehmed Beg Sipahi.⁴²

There are a few reports on the rest of the campaign, but they

throw very little light on Sinan's activities. A report from Beirut on 22 December 1516 records that Sinan was sent with 10,000 men to Gaza from Damascus. This was confirmed by another report of the Venetian consolo in Damascus on 11 December.⁴³ Sinan had been sent to counter the threat posed by the despatch to Gaza of Janberdi al Ghazali at the head of a force to attack the Ottoman garrison there. The famous rout of the Mamluks by Sinan on 21 December 1516 near Gaza is not reported in the Diarif. The only other information about Sinan is that he was killed during the battle of Ridaniyya on 23 January 1517/29 Zū'l-ḥicca 923.⁴⁴

Notes

1. Süreyya, III, p.105; IA, X, p.661, 'Sinan Pasha' (I.H.) (using a variety of Ottoman Chronicles); Babinger, Sinan Pasha, EI(1), IV, p.433.
2. Ménage (Stern), p.114: Sinan appears as a witness to Hersekzade Ahmed's vakfiye of 1511/917.
3. IA, op. cit., X, pp.661-666; EI(1), op. cit., IV, p. 433; Osmanzāde, pp.21-22, and all standard histories of the reign of Selim. None contains details of his background or early career.
4. Ohsson, VII, pp. 56-58.
5. Danişmend, V, p.15.
6. IA, op. cit., p.661.
- 6a. Sanuto, XX, 47-49 [Docs., pp.678-9]. The source of this report was Ragusan (see note 25 and also Docs., pp.556-7). How well-placed the source was to know about Sinan's background is impossible to say.
7. We know that a Sinan beg was SB of Bosnia at some point during the 1490s (see Kissling, Personalpolitik, pp.110 and 113). 'Sinan Bascia Eunuchum' was also active in the area round Sebenico in 1493: in Alvise Sagudino's Commission of 1493 for his mission to Istanbul of that year, he was instructed to deal with the matter of the 170 houses burnt by 'Sinan Pasha' in the district of Sebenico (Hammer, Hist, IV, p.391, no. xxx). Hammer gives the source of this as the 'Austrian Archives (Venetian Section)'. This of course is a reference to that part of the Venetian Archives taken to Vienna in 1815. Hammer's source can

now be found in ASV, Senato Secreta, reg. 34, ff. 188v-189r, reference to Sagudino's Commission as cited in Neff, Secretaries, Appendix, p.532. For mention of Sinan Pasha who was SB of Bosnia in 1499, see p.461.

8. According to Popović, p.94, a Sinan Beg was SB of Hersek-Nova between the two dates given: Reindl, p.73, note 167 cites Truhelka, p.128, 129, 211, 218-220 as evidence that Hadım Sinan was SB of Herzek-Nova from 1504-1506. I can find no reference whatsoever in the Diarii to a SB of Herzegovina/Hersek Nova etc. between November/December 1504 and March 1510. A reference to a 'sanzacho di Coza' (i.e. probably Hersek), made in letters from Sebenico to Venice in late November 1504, may concern Hadım Sinan if Truhelka is correct. Here, the two emissaries which the people of Sebenico sent to the SB to seek the return of those subjects abducted in raids by the Turks, met with rough treatment: one was beheaded, the other detained, and preparations for further raids by the SB begun. I can find no justification for Reindl's conclusion (p.73, n.167) based on Sanuto, IV, 805, that Hadım Sinan is Sanuto's 'Sina bei' reported to be cousin of Hersekzade and to have been sent on a mission to Poland in 1502-3/908 (see p.455-6). A link between the two Sinans is certainly possible, but remains speculative at present.
9. Reindl, p. 73, note 167 also uses Truhelka to show that Hadım Sinan held the post of SB of Semendire at about this time. I have found one reference in the Diarii which mentions him as a former SB of Semendire (Sanuto, XIII, 222) [Docs., p.548]. The fact that Andrea Foscolo, bailo in Istanbul, reports in September 1511 Sinan's appointment to the Beğlerbeğilik of Rumeli, adding that 'e per avanti era sanzacho in Samandria', suggests that he may have held this sancak immediately prior to becoming BB. This would seem to be confirmed by a letter written by Hadım Sinan as SB of Semendire to the then SB of Bosnia Yunus Pasha (Ménage (WZKM), p.40 using BM, Or 11194). Unfortunately, since Yunus was not SB of Bosnia until the end of 1512, and yet Sinan was appointed BB of Rumeli in September 1511 (see note 10), we are presented with a problem of timing. It is possible, however, that Sinan returned to be sancakbegi of Semendire in the course of 1512.
10. According to Süreyya, III, p.105 and Reindl, p.73, n.167, he was first BB of Anadolu and then BB of Rumeli. Reindl cites Sanuto, XIII, 222 as evidence that he was appointed BB of Anadolu in the autumn of 1511. In fact this passage clearly states that he was appointed BB of Rumeli: '- -- Sinan bassa che hora e fato bilarbei di la Grecia' (Foscolo, 26 September 1511). This is buttressed by Sanuto, XIII, 521: '- - - Item, Sinan bassa era bilarbei di la Grecia' (Foscolo, 20 January 1512). Babinger, op. cit., E1(1), p.433 supports the version of events as set out here based on the Diarii.
11. See note 10.
12. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.122 citing TMA, doc. no. 6186 (undated).

13. Reindl, p. 73, no.167.
14. Sanuto, XVI, 437-8 [Docs., p.568].
15. Giovio, Commentario, f. 18v.
16. Ménage (WZKM), p.38, n. 27; Bašagič-Redžepašić, p.177; IA, op. cit., p. 661; Truhelka, p.187, 209. See also note 18.
17. Sanuto, XX, 472.
18. Sanuto, XVII, 71-72 (Relazione, 17 September 1513).
19. Sanuto, XVIII, 31-32 (February 1514); also, XVIII, 65.
20. Sanuto, XIX, 281-2 (November 1514), 410-413 (December/January 1514/1515); (see Yunus Pasha, pp.491-2).
21. Tekindaž (TD XVII/22), p.58; Hammer, GOR, II, p.404 (Hist. IV, 177; IA, op. cit., p.661).
22. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta I, fasc. 40, 21 April 1514, Zustinian to Doge; and fasc. 42, 10 May 1514.
23. Hammer, GOR, II, 414ff (Hist. IV, 196ff); Tekindaž (TD XVII/22). p.65, 68; Savory, p.89; Danišmend, II, pp.11-12; Uğur, Part I, p.95, 108; IA, op. cit., p.661ff. For representative western accounts, see Giovio, Commentario. ff. 19v-20r; Angiolello, f. 75; Sansovino, Annali, f. 115v; Penia, p.7.
24. Of five reports concerning Sinan's role in the battle, three (Sanuto, XIX, 185-7, 231-2; XX, 47-49) are separate and independent sources, and two (Sanuto, XIX, 216-7, 317-8) are propaganda letters of Selim to announce his victory, one to the state of Ragusa, the other to Venice. There is a degree of confusion over whether Sinan was on the right or the left of the Ottoman battle line (c.f Sanuto, XIX, 231-2, Giovio, Commentario, 19r, Savory, p.89, Tekindaž (TD XVII/22), p.65; Hammer, op. cit., and IA op. cit., p.661, all say right wing. Sanuto, XX, 47-49 and Sansovino, Annali, f. 115v say left wing.
25. Sanuto, XX, 47-9 [Docs., pp.678-9; also 556-7]. The original document is inserted here in the Diarii. The letter was written by 'uno di Ragusi' (see XX, 42-3) and forwarded to the Republic via Sebenico. The date of the letter is 10 February 1515 (not 1513 as shown in the edition).
26. Idem.
27. Hammer, GOR, II, p.421 (Hist. IV, p.206); Babinger, op. cit., p.433; ^cOsmanzāde, p.22; Süreyya, III, p.105. Danišmend, II, p.16 and IA, op. cit., p.662 have already discussed the unlikely story that Sinan became Grand Vizier at this juncture.
28. IA, op. cit., p.662 (using Ibn Kemal, Celalzāde, and Feridun Bey); also Uğur, part I, pp.115-116.

29. Sanuto, XVIII, 343 (6 June 1514) describes Ala ed-Dawla's refusal of help; he was also unwilling to provide food, and he had fortified himself with 30,000 men in a mountain fortress.
30. Sanuto, XX, 472, 556-7.
31. Hammer, GOR, II, p. 426 (describing Sinan as Grand Vizier); Savory, p.91; IA, op. cit., p.662.
32. Sanuto, XX, 472, 556-7: battle was joined on 11 June 1515.
33. Sanuto, XX, 556-7. I have found what must be the original Italian translation which Sanuto accurately copied into his Diarii, in ASV, Misc. Gregolin, Busta I, fasc. 2, no. 31. I have not found the original Greek, nor any reference to it in any of the usual reference works.
34. IA, op. cit., pp.662-663.
35. Danişmend, II, p.20. This is not mentioned in Hammer or in the Diarii.
36. Sanuto, XXI, 250-1. Hammer, GOR, II, p. 432 (Hist. IV, p. 220-1) also quotes this passage, but with the wrong date: 26 August instead of 18 September 1515.
37. For the circumstances of his appointment and support for Hersekzade and Piri, see pp.92-3.
38. Sanuto, XXII, 276-7 [Docs., p.679]. In fact, apart from references in the letter of the Kadi-Casker (see Sanuto, XXV, 651ff.), Sinan is described as Grand Vizier only once in the Diarii (XXIV, 222-223: 'Sinan bassa, suo primo homo molto grande').
39. Sanuto, XXII, 276-7.
40. Sanuto points to two contradictory reports he had received (XXII, 413, para D and para E).
41. For an outline of the campaign, see p.166ff., p.295. See also IA, op. cit., pp.663-6; Parry (Cook), pp.74-5; Danişmend, II, pp.24-5; Hammer, GOR, II, p.462 (Hist. IV, p.261-2.)
42. Sanuto, XXIII, 397-8 (and also 361, 373-4).
43. Sanuto, XXIV, 19-20, and XXIV, 20. In the latter, the figure of 10,000 has been omitted from the edition. Hammer, GOR, II, p.492 (Hist., IV, p.301) gives only 5,000; IA, op. cit., p.664b gives 4,000. Letter of the Kadi-Casker (Sanuto, XXV, 655-6 gives 15,000 men.
44. Sanuto, XXIV, 203, 204-5, 222-223, 223-224. I do not include the letter of the Kadi-Casker about the Mamluk campaign amongst 'reports' in the Diarii, even though Sinan's role at every stage of the campaign is covered. The narrative is well-known, with the valour of Sinan as its focus.

GÜVEYI SINAN PASHA

[Suram bassa, Sinaref, Senon bassa;

Sinan; Synan]

d. 1504/909

Background and Identity¹

Sinan, nicknamed 'Arnavud', was rightly reported by the Venetian secretary Caroldo to be of Albanian origin.² A product of the Palace School during the reign of Mehmed II, he rose to the position of Ağa of the Janissaries by the end of the Conqueror's reign and soon after was appointed BB of Anadolu. As in the case of other great men of state, Sinan was brought into the immediate family of the sultan through marriage to Bayezid's daughter Ayşe.³

There is the possibility that Güveyi Sinan's identity has been conflated with that of another Sinan who may have been active in the 1480s. The Güveyi Sinan, who was son-in-law of Bayezid and who fought during the Turco-Venetian war of 1499-1503, has been linked with the Sinan who was BB of Anadolu at the time of Bayezid's accession in 1481 and who was instrumental in helping Bayezid win the throne against Prince Djem.⁴ However, one source suggests that this latter Sinan was killed as early as 1488 in the course of the Ottoman campaign against the Mamluk general Uzbek.⁵ The confusion is compounded when some accounts state that this Sinan was not the son-in-law of Bayezid but his brother-in-law,⁶ while according to Danişmend he was the father-in-law of the sultan.⁷ However, recent accounts make no mention of the death of Sinan on campaign in 1488 and Reindl herself does not raise the question of possible conflation. It should be noted, nevertheless, that according to one document in Sathas,⁹ Sinan Pasha, son-in-law ('zenero') of Bayezid, was appointed

in 1481 SB of Avlonya (and therefore not BB of Anadolu). Thus the possibility that the early career of Güveyi Sinan is not linked to that of Sinan, the BB of Anadolu of the 1480s, cannot be discounted. Indeed, although Süreyya links Güveyi Sinan's early career as Kapudan Pasha with the Sinan who was BB of Anadolu around 1500 and who died in 1504/909, at no time is the connection also made with the Sinan who was BB of Anadolu during the 1480s.¹⁰ The Diarî themselves offer very little information about his background, merely indicating that he was of Albanian origin¹¹ and the son-in-law of Bayezid.¹²

Early Career

If, for the sake of argument, we accept the view that Güveyi Sinan can be identified with the BB of Anadolu of the 1480s, then on the basis of Reindl's analysis, Sinan's career would have taken the following pattern:

<u>1480 or 1481/885</u>	Ağa of the Janissaries
<u>1480 or 1481 - 1482 / 885-886</u>	BB of Anadolu ¹³
<u>1482-1486 / 886-892</u>	Kapudan Pasha
<u>1486-1489 / 892-894</u>	BB of Anadolu
<u>1489-1492 / 894-897</u>	? Kapudan Pasha
<u>1492-1497 / 897-902</u>	Kapudan Pasha

That Sinan held the office of Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu from 1492 until 1497 (and even from 1489) is highly speculative and conflicts sharply with the view that the Kapudanlık was dominated in these years by Küçük Da'ud Pasha.¹⁴ Nevertheless, since it is clear that Güveyi Sinan was BB of Anadolu in the late 1490s (and no sooner than 1497),¹⁵ and since, according to one report in the Diarî,¹⁶ Hersekzade Ahmed (q.v.) was replaced as BB of Anadolu in 1497 by the

SB of Gelibolu (and thus probably the Kapudan Pasha), it is possible to conclude that Güveyi Sinan held the office of Kapudan Pasha and SB of Gelibolu immediately before becoming BB of Anadolu in 1497, if only for a short time.

Last Years / The Turco-Venetian War

There are actually very few references¹⁷ to Sinan by name between the start of the Diarî in 1496 and the death of Sinan in 1504. However, more information can be gleaned from the Diarî about Sinan by piecing together references to offices we know him to have held between 1496 and 1504 (namely the offices of the BB of Anadolu and BB of Rumeli). Most of the material relates to Sinan's part in the Turco-Venetian war. The first reference in the Diarî to an unnamed BB of Anadolu who is very probably Güveyi Sinan occurs in July 1499, that is during the first campaigning season of the war.¹⁸ An analysis of the material provides the following picture of Sinan's activities during the war:

1499/905 Campaign of Lepanto : Sinan as BB of Anadolu¹⁹

June	early	BB of Anadolu and BB of Rumeli join forces ²⁰
July	early	BB of Anadolu is four days from Corfu ²¹ /is in Üsküp ²²
July	early	BB of Anadolu is at Vardar ²³ (he has with him 8,000 men and 10,000 <u>azeb</u> troops ²⁴)
July	mid	BB of Anadolu is accompanying the sultan ²⁵
July	late	While the BB of Rumeli is at Vardar, BB of Anadolu is 12 miles away (probably near the coast of Salonica) awaiting the arrival of the fleet; and he

has 'swept clear' the highways leading to Corfu and to Neapolis.²⁶

- August The sultan and an unnamed BB (probably Sinan) are at Salonica.²⁷
- August Sultan is moving towards Lepanto with both BBs.²⁸
- August 26 Surrender of Lepanto. BB of Anadolu supervises the building of a castle on the Antirhion promontory for defence of the straits of Lepanto.²⁹

1500/906 Campaign of Modon and Koron and Anabolu

- March One BB is in Prevesa and the other in Yanina.³⁰
- April General mobilisation of Ottoman forces.³¹
- April early BB of Anadolu passes with his troops by Gelibolu.³²
- May/June Ottoman army moves into the Morea (Megara and Anabolu).³³
- Mid May to At this point there is a degree of confusion in the Diarîi reports about the whereabouts of the BB of Anadolu. Some reports³⁴ have him on campaign on the Ottoman-Hungarian border in preparation for a Hungarian offensive the purpose of which was to relieve pressure off Venice. However, this offensive did not materialise. Other reports (see below) show that he was taking part in the campaign of Modon and Koron. It is perhaps possible that Sinan had been sent to the Hungarian front in May but returned soon after to join the main offensive in the Morea.
- May late BB of Anadolu went to Lepanto with 30,000 cavalry

- to accompany them into the Morea.³⁵
- June 4 Arrival of BB of Anadolu in the Morea.³⁶
- June 6 BB of Anadolu leaves Corinth and arrives at Argos, near Anabolu.³⁷
- June 11 Makes camp at Nicli.³⁸
- June 15 He leaves Nicli and moves to the vicinity of Modon and Koron.³⁹ Also
- June Mid/Late He leaves Leondari and goes towards Modon with the SB of the Morea (Ali Pasha) with about 12,000 men.⁴⁰
- June 18 to) Bombardment and siege of Modon.⁴¹
- July 25)
- August 8 Fall of Modon⁴²
- August 15 Fall of Koron
- September early BB of Anadolu arrives before Anabolu and besieges it with 10,000 men.⁴³
- Late October/ The sultan has left for Edirne and Istanbul,
Early November leaving the two BBs at Anabolu with 7,000 men to continue the siege.⁴⁴
- 1500/906 SINAN, BB OF RUMELI
- December Late Appointed BB of Rumeli in place of Koca Mustafa Pasha.(q.v.)⁴⁵
- 1501/907
- August early(?) Sultan is in Istanbul: he has sent BB of Rumeli against Hungary. The sultan is due to go to Edirne on 10 August.⁴⁶
- Autumn Sinan sent with the fleet to fortify Midilli,⁴⁷
(under attack from Venetian and French fleets).

1502/908

August early Shah Ismail advancing on one side and the King of Hungary, it is said, on the other. BB of Rumeli has already been sent to Edirne to face the Hungarian threat.⁴⁸

By July 1503/Şafer 909 when Andrea Gritti arrived in Istanbul to conclude the Turco-Venetian peace, it was noted that the BB of Rumeli was sitting along with the three viziers at the Porte, a reflection of contemporary protocol.⁴⁹ But Sinan's moment of glory was short-lived. A few months later, on 6 January 1504, Sinan died of plague.⁵⁰

Notes

1. A recent analysis of his career can be found in Reindl, pp.319 ff. Her basic source is Kemalpashazade. My profile concentrates on the period of his career covered by the Diarii. For the extent of his waqf, see Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.453. For basic details see also Süreyya, III, p.104.
2. Sanuto, V, 460. Narrazione of Gian Giacomo Caroldo.
3. Uluçay (TD X/14), pp.118-119.
4. Reindl, op. cit.; Kreutel, Oruç (see Index, p.296, s.v. Sinan der Arnaut).
5. Giese's Anonymous Chronicle as cited in Fisher, p.40, n. 77.
6. Sa'd ed Din, Tadj al Tawarikh, as cited in Schefer's commentary to Spandugino's history, p.44. (According to Spandugino, however, the BB of Anadolu was the sultan's son-in-law). Hammer, GOR, II; 251 (Hist. IV, p.339) also describes him as brother-in-law.
7. Danişmend, I, p.358 and V, p.177.
8. e.g Tekindağ (Bell. XXXI), p.361-370.
9. Sathas, vol. VI, p. 223, 'Evenments historiques en Grece (1479-1497): Extraits d'un recueil sous le nom Stefano Magno. (Manuscrit du Britisch Museum N. 8586, pl. CXXI. H; collationné à celui de Museo Civico de Venise N. 3533).'

10. Süreyya, III, p.104.
11. Sanuto, V, 460, see note 2.
12. Sanuto, IV, 22; V, 460, 1034-35.
13. According to Kreutel, Sinan was BB of Anadolu from 1481 to 1488 (see note 4).
14. See Küçük Da'ud, p.188. Reindl's (p.329) sources are inconclusive and her reasoning conjectural. Kreutel, Oruç, p.82 refers to Sinan as SB of Gelibolu in 1495 or 1496/901, but it is not clear how long he had held the position. According to Sureyya, III, p.104 he was Kapudan Pasha in 1491 or 1492/897 but was dismissed in 1492/898. Presumably Süreyya is the source of Danişmend's (vol. V, p.177) similar observation.
15. Kreutel, Oruç, p.111ff; Süreyya, III, p.104 (states 1501); Reindl, pp.330-333; Hammer, GOR, II, 319 (Hist. IV, 58).
16. Sanuto, I, 707 [Docs., p.620]: news from Pera via Chios.
17. Sanuto, III, 1522-23; IV, 22, 242, 259; V, 460, 1034-5. In fact Sinan is never specifically mentioned as BB of Anadolu, though III, 1522-3 strongly suggests that he held this position ('Item, a dì 6 novembrio [1500] fo cridà la coraria contra l'ongaro, e mandà [i.e. the sultan] olachi su la Turchia a Senon bassa, che si aparechiasse; tamen fin ora non è mosso').
18. Sanuto, II, 886 [Docs., p.680]. There are two references to an unnamed BB of Anadolu in 1496 (I, 83-4 and 136), but these are unlikely to be linked with Sinan. That a Sinan Pasha was BB of Anadolu ('mir-miran-i Anatoli') in the Lepanto campaign in 1499 is confirmed by Gökbilgin, Registre (1499), pp.85, 86, 91, 92.
19. For a collation of the military activities of the BB of Rumeli, Koca Mustafa, during the campaigns of Lepanto, Modon and Koron, see p.332-4.
20. Sanuto, II, 920 [Docs., p.680].
21. Sanuto, II, 930-1 [Docs., p.680].
22. Sanuto, II, 886 [Docs., p.680].
23. Sanuto, II, 939 [Docs., p.681].
24. Sanuto, II, 1127 [Docs., p.681].
25. Sanuto, II, 972 [Docs., p.681].
26. Sanuto, II, 1066 [Docs., p.681].
27. Sanuto, II, 1142.

28. Sanuto, II, 1154.
29. See p.333 and p.348, n.35a.
30. Sanuto, III, 236.
31. See p.333.
32. Sanuto, III, 256 [Docs., p.681].
33. See p.333.
34. Sanuto, III, 357 (sultan sends the BB against Hungary with 30,000 men); III, 443 (sultan unwilling to move the BB from Hungarian border); III, 450 (BB is in Semendire with 20,000 men).
35. Sanuto, III, 446-7.
36. Sanuto, III, 729-730. (See also Sanuto III, 498, 503, 504, 518, 519).
37. Idem.
38. Idem.
39. Idem.
40. Sanuto, III, 518. See also Reindl p.331 note 49.
41. See note 36.
42. According to Ottoman sources Sinan led the attack against the walls of Modon and breeched the walls. The sultan praised his valour and that of the janissaries (Hammer, GOR, II, 324 (Hist, IV, 64); Reindl, p.331; Spandugino, p.51).
43. Sanuto, III, 901-3, 904-5, 972-4.
44. Sanuto, III, 1060-61.
45. Sanuto, III, 1551-2 [Docs., pp.657-8]. Although this report (dated 23 January 1501) refers to the new BB as "Cassambri zenero", another report (dated 10 February) from the same source refers to a 'Suram bassa, suo zenero, era bilarbei di la Natolia' [i.e. was formerly] (Sanuto, IV, 22, [Docs., p.658]. Consequently the new BB of Rumeli must have been Sinan, and, according to the date of the source's information, was probably appointed around December 1500. Reindl (p.333, note 57) uses Sanuto, III, 259 to show that Sinan's appointment came in 1502: not only does she disregard the aforementioned two reports (III, 1551-2 and IV, 22), but III, 259 would seem to be a retrospective view of changes in government from information obtained from a merchant, Francho Larcario, who had lived in Manisa for ten years. Nevertheless, another report (IV, 242), used by Reindl (p.333, note 56), states that Sinan was BB of Anadolu when sent to fortify the island of Midilli in the autumn of 1501. Our knowledge of the office of the BB of Anadolu is therefore incomplete (see p.470 for further details).

46. Sanuto, IV, 161.
47. Sanuto, IV, 242 (see note 45).
48. Sanuto, IV, 322-3 (News from Pera via Chios).
49. Sanuto, V, 449, Relazione of Gritti: ' _____ poi la domenega vene do aga con cavali 150 per condurlo (i.e. Gritti) a la Porta, dove erano sentati li 3 bassa, videlicet Achmat, Mustafa et Thauth e il bilarbei di la Grecia'. Also, Sanuto, V, 456, Narrazione of Gian Giacomo Caroldo: ' _____ Facte el giorno adriedo Te visitation a tuti tre li magnifici bassa et el beglarbey de la Gretia, che al presente se atrova de qui, cum li presenti a zescadun distribuiti, _ _ _ '
50. Sanuto, V, 1034-35 (news from Istanbul) and V, 1036-7 (news via Les).

[SINAN] KAPICI BAŞI - Kapudan Pasha (1513/919)

[Chapizi]

Between the end of Iskender Bostancı Başı's and the beginning of Ca^cfer Pasha's terms as Kapudan Pasha (i.e. from 1513 to 1516), K^üçük Sinan is believed to have been appointed to that position.¹ During this three year period (see p.165) there is only one reference to the office-holder of the kapudan pashalik in the Diarîi: Nicolo Zustinian, bailo, reported on 30 June 1513 that Selim had appointed to that office "the man who had captured Korkud", Selim's brother and rival for the throne.² This man was described as "infimo e di bassa conditione", and the appointment was reward for his deed in ridding the sultan of Korkud. All sources agree that the captor and executor of Korkud was Sinan Kapıcı Başı.³ In an earlier report dated 4 January 1513, Zustinian actually refers to the unnamed Kapıcı's

commission, stating that he had been sent with 15 galleys and 15 fuste against Korkud.⁴

Zustinian was well-acquainted with the identity of the Kapıcı başı. The two men were on familiar terms: as early as July 1510 Zustinian had had a meeting with him (referred to simply as "chapizi" but very probably Sinan) on the question of Ottoman aid to Venice (see p.84-5, 126-7) and the Kapıcı had briefed him on the course of the (Ottoman) discussions on that issue.⁵ Given this familiarity, it seems unlikely that Zustinian would apply the description "the man who had captured Korkud" to the wrong Sinan when speaking of the new appointment to the Kapudanlık. Even though another source⁶ refers to a "Senan bassa" (also described as the man who had killed Korkud) as third vizier as late as 25 April 1513, it is quite possible that he was appointed Kapudan Pasha after having been third vizier.

In April 1514 Zustinian sent a report (but not reproduced in the Diarii) about another meeting with the Kapıcı, this time actually named as "Sinabei capici bassi".⁷ On this occasion more information is provided: Kapıcı Sinan had captured Korkud; he was one of Selim's personal slaves ("schiavi proprii") who had accompanied him from Trabzon, as had Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha (see pp.292-3); Sinan and Mehmed were two of Selim's most trusted advisers, and far exceeded the influence which the viziers were able to wield. Once again the meeting between Sinan and Zustinian concerned Ottoman aid to Venice, of which the latter was again in need (see pp.61, 90-1, 296, 363), and according to Zustinian, Sinan declared his friendship towards Venice and agreed to the offer of 500 ducats from the Republic in the event of Selim agreeing to give aid. Although in this letter Zustinian notes Sinan's great influence, he does not say that he was Kapudan Pasha. This

makes sense, since Sinan would have replaced Iskender Bostancı for only a short period, during the latter's imprisonment from May/June 1513 for corruption (see p.253). Iskender survived and returned, presumably as Kapudan Pasha again, to supervise the building of the haliç tersane from 1514. Although I have found no record of it in the Diarii or other Venetian records, it is possible that Kapıcı or Küçük Sinan succeeded Iskender again when the latter was promoted to vizier in the late 1514/early 1515 (see p.256) and remained in office until succeeded by Cafer Pasha in 1516.

This is a complex prosopographical problem and poses certain questions: either Kapıcı and Küçük Sinan are two different individuals, with perhaps the former being Kapudan Pasha in 1513 and either of them from 1514 to 1516; or they are one and the same person. Both conclusions seem possible. Apparently Küçük Sinan went on to become BB of Rumeli and as such took part in the Mamluk campaign, commanding the Ottoman troops on the left wing at Marj Dabik.⁸ Given that Sinan Kapıcı başı, as Garib Yiğitler Ağası, was one of those sent to pursue the fleeing Mamluk sultan Tuman Bay in March 1517,⁹ it is not inconceivable that he may have been identical with the Küçük Sinan also involved in the campaign.

We should also consider the possibility that that Sanuto's Sinan Yanul Pasha (see p.452), who was appointed vizier in 1517 having been BB, probably of Rumeli, may be identical with Küçük Sinan/Kapıcı Sinan.

If Sinan Yanul, Sinan Küçük and Sinan Kapıcı are all one and the same Sinan (and I stress that this must remain conjecture), then the career of this Sinan might have been as follows: the Sinan [Kapıcı] who killed Korkud (and Sinan Kapıcı was also charged with the task of

strangling Prince Ahmed) in early 1513 was Kapudan Pasha from June 1513 until early 1514; he [Kapıcı/Küçük] may have been Kapudan Pasha again from the end of 1514 to 1516; he [Küçük] was BB of Rumeli during the Mamluk campaign of 1516, and then vizier in March 1517 after having [Kapıcı] been involved in the pursuit of Tuman Bay; and then in late summer of 1517 he [Yanul] was entrusted with the task of accompanying shiploads of Cairo families for resettlement in Istanbul (see Yanul, pp.452-3).

One final conjecture: it cannot be ruled out that on his return from Egypt, Sinan [Yanul] was appointed Muhafız of Istanbul in early 1518 (see Sinan Pasha p.454).

Notes

1. Danişmend, V, p.178.
2. Sanuto, XVI, 587-9 [Docs., pp.608-9].
3. Hammer, GOR, II, 385-6, 388-9 (Hist. IV, 154); Uzunçarşılı (Bell XXX), p.589; Tekindağ (Belg 17), p.37; Uluçay (TD VIII/11-12), p.197; Uğur, part I, pp.76-77; Danişmend, II, 4-5, 39, 124; Menavino, p.232 - Spandugino, pp.332-333.
4. Sanuto, XV, 547.
5. Sanuto, XI, 292-293.
6. Sanuto, XVI, 437-8 [Docs., p.658]. See p.429 for a discussion of this report.
7. ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const), Busta no 1, fasc. 34, ff 1r-2r, 8 April 1514 [Docs., pp.645-6].
8. Danişmend, II, p.28.
9. Ibid., II, pp.39, 124.

SINAN YANUL PASHA - Vizier (1517/923)

[Sinan Janul Bassa]

There is only one reference to Sinan Yanul Pasha in the Diarifi: a report from the Venetian bailo in Istanbul to Venice dated 26 March 1517 notes that this Sinan had been appointed a vizier [bassa] of Selim in place of Hasan Pasha (see pp.228-9) who had been executed by strangulation.¹ Since this reference is after the death of Hadim Sinan at the battle of Ridaniyya in January 1517/Zū'l-ḥicca 923, there is no possibility of confusing the two Sinans. The source of the bailo's information must have been Alvise de Quartro, his tercūman in Tripoli, for he had written a letter to the bailo² on 4 March 1517 in which he stated that Sinan Beğlerbeği (it is not stated of what, but by a process of deduction from the information in the passage, it seems he had been BB of Rumeli) had been made vizier (NB: he was not named Sinan Yanul in the letter but simply 'Sinan').

Towards the end of 1517 there are two reports which may also refer to Sinan Yanul. In the relazione of Michelin Balbi from Alexandria dated 18 September, it is reported that a Sinan Pasha had left Alexandria with eight ships loaded with families from Cairo bound for resettlement in Istanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire.³ This may well be Sinan Yanul who as Vizier may have been charged with this responsibility. According to Sanuto's own summary of news from Egypt and Syria contained in letters of 23 October 1517, this Sinan had left Egypt with 12 ships and navili grossi and, as well as families from Cairo, transported Egyptian peasantry ('homeni dil paexe') to populate Ottoman lands.⁴ There is a fair amount of

material in the Diarii from various sources in the eastern Mediterranean concerning the well established Ottoman policy of forcible resettlement of populations⁵. There are several informative reports on the resettlement of 1517. According to these reports some 1500⁶ of Cairo's most wealthy families were uprooted and transported by ship to Satalia and from there by land to Istanbul.⁷ Ninety of these families were Jewish, and also included in the party was a son of a former Mamluk sultan (not specified).⁸ Selim's objective was clearly to gather all those in Cairo who represented wealth, trade and talent to enrich life in Istanbul, much the same as the Conqueror's policy after 1453. According to one Venetian merchant who had spent five years in Alexandria, there were no more merchants remaining in Cairo and Alexandria, because they had been sent to Istanbul: this may well apply in particular to the ninety Jewish families.⁹ Another Venetian in Cairo reported that artisans, wealthy Jews and 400 Mamluk families and anyone with skill or talent had been taken by Selim.¹⁰ (see also Sinan Kapıcı Bassa, p.451]

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXIV, 203.
2. Sanuto, XXIV, 204-5.
3. Sanuto, XXV, 38-39.
4. Sanuto, XXV, 118-119.
5. Sanuto, III, 1344-5, 1559, 1561, 1562; IV, 51-2, 564-65 (Koron and Christians in the Morea, 1500-1501); IV, 309-310, 312-3 (Kızılbaş in Anatolia, 1502); VII, 531 (Kızılbaş, 1507).
6. Sanuto, XXIV, 599-601, 607 and XXV, 13 give 1500 families; Sanuto XXIV, 506 gives 500; Sanuto, XXIV, 604-5 gives 1000; Sanuto, XXV, 61-2 gives 1300.

7. Sanuto, XXIV, 607, XXV, 13.
8. Sanuto, XXV, 13.
9. Sanuto, XXV, 123-5.
10. Sanuto, XXV, 133-134.

SINAN PASHA - muhafiz of Istanbul (1518/924) [Synar, Synam bassa]

Sanuto, XXV, 286, 293: on 4 January 1518 the bailo Lunardo Bembo wrote that the then muhafiz ['locotenente'] [see Faraesarbeg] of Istanbul was expecting his replacement 'Synar bassa', at any time. In March the bailo was given permission to spend upto 300 ducats for a present for 'Synam bassa' who was due to arrive.

When Selim returned to Istanbul on 26 July 1518, it was rumoured ['vien dito'] that he was going to appoint a certain Sinan to the vizierate: this Sinan is described as being at the time in Istanbul ['che se ritrova de li a Constantinopoli', i.e. the muhafiz] and who on previous occasions had been vizier ['bassa']. Sinan, however, was trying to excuse himself from this responsibility on the grounds of poor health, though it was widely said that the real reason for his attitude was fear of Selim's temperament which was feared by all.¹

There is insufficient material here to identify this Sinan, though it is possible to hazard a guess about his links with earlier and contemporary Sinans particularly Sinan Yanul Pasha (pp.452-3) who was due to return from Alexandria at about the time of Bembo's letter of January 1518. Sinan Yanul had also previously been vizier.

The Diarii offer two glimpses of Sinan's activities during his incumbency as muhafiz between circa March and July 1518. In May the bailo reported that the [unnamed] muhafiz had despatched six galleys,

four fuste and two brigantines against corsairs.² In June the [?] bailo reported³ that a Portuguese had arrived in Istanbul and shown the muhafiz ['magnifico bassa'] a map of the islands and outposts in India in Portuguese possession, asking to be given 40 galleys with which he and a certain Süleiman Re'is would capture these outposts for Selim. The Portuguese also spoke of events in Christendom, of a truce signed in Rome between the Christian princes and of the latter's desire to form a league against Selim. Inquiring what the size of the combined Christian fleet would be, the muhafiz was given an estimated muster of between 1500 and 2000 ships [barze].⁴ Unwilling to take any decision without consulting Selim, the muhafiz threw the Portuguese into prison to await Selim's arrival, while a spy had already provided information that the Portuguese was himself a spy.⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXV, 689.
2. Sanuto, XXV, 461.
3. Sanuto, XXV, 552.
4. Idem. This information was missed from the edition: for the missing three lines, see Sanuto, XXV, 552 [Docs., p.682].
5. Sanuto, XXV, 552.

SINAN BEG - ambassador to Moldavia and Poland (1502-3/908)

[Sinan befi]

In his letter to the Doge of 5 January 1503, Matheus Murianus, a Venetian doctor then in Moldavia, reported that Sinan was Bayezid's ambassador to the King of Poland. This is the only reference to this Sinan in the Diarii.¹ He arrived on 28 December 1502 in Moldavia.

According to Murianus he was the cousin of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (see p.72). Murianus explained how he had sent Nicolo Leondari, an old friend whom he had encountered accompanying a Russian embassy in Moldavia and who was conversant in Russian, Greek and Turkish², to speak privately with Sinan with the aim of extracting information about the state of affairs back in Istanbul. Sinan was more than forthcoming and supplied very useful information to Leondari which was then passed to the Doge by Murianus.

Sinan displayed a particularly full grasp of the political military and economic predicament of the Ottoman state during the Turco-Venetian war. He explained how Bayezid was experiencing serious problems in Anatolia as a result of the activities of Shah Ismail who had sent an army of 60 or 70,000 cavalry and had defeated one of Bayezid's generals sent against him. The sultan was also having to deal with aggression from Karaman and from the Circassian emperor, while the populations of Istanbul and Edirne had been afflicted by plague, with over 200 people dying every day. In the western marches the sultan was unhappy about the security along the Hungarian border, and was in the process of re-establishing peace with Venice. Sinan was himself on his way to confirm a peace treaty with the King of Poland. Apparently in the preceding days a Polish embassy had arrived in Istanbul bearing presents and seeking to establish peace with the sultan. Sinan explained to Leondari that the sultan had decided to make peace for two reasons. First, he feared the possibility of a Polish-Moldavian alliance against him; secondly, Bayezid hoped that the King of Poland would attack the King of Hungary, thus relieving Hungarian pressure on the border with the Ottomans.

In spite of these difficulties on all fronts, and although Santa

Maura had also been lost to the Venetians, Bayezid was not entirely beleaguered. Sinan told Leondari that he was assembling a huge armada which was expected to number 300 galleys, 500 vessels in total including troop and supply ships. The full force of this fleet was to be thrown against Corfu.

Although Bayezid was indeed developing his fleet, Corfu was to escape Ottoman attentions for some time to come. Nevertheless, Sinan's knowledge of shipbuilding was sound, since he stressed to Leondari that only great galleys and light galleys were being constructed, rather than 'nave grosse' (see pp.190-1, 193-4).

Notes

1. Sanuto, IV, 804-7 [Docs., p.561].
2. Idem. Leondari also had a wife and children in Venice and many relations in Istanbul. He was therefore in an excellent position to act as the interface between the two empires.

SINAN VOYVODA - Voyvoda of Mostar, Herzegovina. [sic]

Sinan was voyvoda of Mostar in Herzegovina during the Turco-Venetian war and probably sooner. He was under the suzerainty of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia, and joined with him in carrying out the great Ottoman raids into Croatia and Friul during the war. In June 1499/Zü'1 Ka^cde 904 Sinan was reported to be at the head of 1000 Turks ('turchi') moving towards Sebenico, and Iskender Pasha had been given permission to raid in Dalmatia together with the voyvoda of Mostar, named Sinan.¹ At about this time another report indicates that Sinan had raided in the county of Trau with devastating effect, plundering livestock and abducting between 30 and 40 of the inhabitants.² He continued raiding into August against Venetian outposts and settlements in the same region.³ With one exception,⁴ there are no

further reports about him in the Diarii until March 1501 when the Narrazione of Francesco da Ponte describes how Sinan had captured da Ponte, castellan of the Dalmatian fortress of Laurana, along with 1500 others. It is not clear when this occurred, but most probably during the campaigning season of 1500.⁵ By March 1501 Sinan was dead. During a counter raid against him by Paulo Sterbaz Kosul, the latter's son brought Sinan down from his horse and decapitated him.⁶

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 972, 972-3.
2. Sanuto, II, 974.
3. Sanuto, II, 1106, 1137.
4. Sanuto, III, 916: the count of Crayna visited the voyvoda of Mostar (unnamed).
5. Sanuto, III, 1557-8, 14 March 1501. Da Ponte was taken to see Iskender Pasha and was eventually ransomed in Istanbul for 10,000 aspri, returning to Venice in March 1501 (Sanuto, III, 1554-58, 1579).
6. Sanuto, III, 1614, and also III, 1613 and 1615. For Paulo Sterbaz, see Sanuto, III, 1352 and index to edition.

SINAN VAYVODA - Voyvoda of Montenegro (1499-1503)

[sic]

Sinan is mentioned only once in the Diarii reports as voyvoda of Montenegro, in August 1499.¹ In the same way that Sinan voyvoda of Mostar (q.v.) came under the suzerainty of Iskender Pasha of Bosnia, so Sinan of Montenegro came under that of Firuz Beg, SB of Iskodra.² In fact Sinan was used by Firuz Beg to conduct business with the Porte to some extent, as well as subjecting him to his own policy towards relations with Venice. In June 1499, for example, the unnamed voyvoda

of Montenegro (?Sinan) visited Alwise Sagudino in Cattaro and told him that he had been ordered by Firuz to maintain good relations with the Venetians, and according to Sagudino, the two of them got on well.³

By August 1499, however, in the middle of the first campaigning season of the war, Francesco Querini, the provveditore of Cattaro, reported that the voyvoda was mobilising his troops as part of the general offensive of Firuz Beg and Iskender Pasha against Venetian outposts and subjects in Dalmatia.⁴ There was considerable plunder and looting, but according to Querini, it was not the Ottoman subjects of Montenegro who were responsible but the voyvoda himself who through greed for booty had forced them to carry out these acts of violence.⁵

In December 1502, the unnamed voyvoda of Montenegro, who by this time was probably Bali (see pp.157-8) but may still have been Sinan, was continuing to raid against the inhabitants of Budua and Petrovač (the Pastrovici).⁶ This raiding continued into January 1503, even though the sultan had ordered hostilities to cease. The new provveditore of Cattaro, Sebastiano Contarini, decided to write both to Firuz Beg and to the voyvoda asking that the attacks should be stopped. This action re-established peaceful relations.⁷ However, in November 1503 reports from Cattaro show that the Venetian subjects there were experiencing new problems of co-existence with the voyvoda, who had appointed a subaşı in Zupa for the first time, and who had been given the responsibility of collecting the haraç from Cattaro.⁸ Although Contarini's petition to Firuz Beg at first proved fruitless, an amicable agreement was reached in the end with regard to how the haraç was to be collected.⁹

In November/December 1503 the voyvoda had been sent by Firuz Beg to Istanbul to seek advice about drawing up borders in his area, about Zupa, and to seek permission for Firuz to travel to the Porte. In his absence, Firuz asked the Venetians that his voyvoda should receive a prebend from the people of Budua, who had apparently already set it aside for him.¹⁰

Notes

1. Sanuto, II, 1260.
2. Sanuto, II, 849; IV, 797-8; V, 669-70, 895-6. At Sanuto, II, 1155 he is described as the voyvoda of Iskodra (Firuz's sancak) as well as of Montenegro.
3. Sanuto, II, 849.
4. Sanuto, II, 1137, 1143, 1155, 1260.
5. Sanuto, II, 1143.
6. Sanuto, IV, 615.
7. Sanuto, IV, 797-8.
8. Sanuto, IV, 797-8: V, 432, 612-3.
9. Sanuto, V, 612-3.
10. Sanuto, V, 669-70, 895-6.

SINAN SCHIAVO - slave of Mustafa Pasha (1515/920)

[sic]

Sanuto, XIX, 357-8: Sanuto notes on 5 January 1515 the arrival in Venice of a Turk whom he describes as the slave of Mustafa Pasha whom Selim had had decapitated, along with his slaves. This slave Sinan, however, had managed to escape to Cairo, then making his way to Venice via Cyprus. Wanting to return to Istanbul, he had gone to stay at the

residence of the Ottoman ambassador MehanetIs Pachmogon (see p.312) who was in Venice at the time. However, he died there, and his possessions were then claimed by the ambassador in the name of the sultan. Sinan is described as of Hungarian nationality, 'bel homo, piccolo di statura, era a Syo(Chios)'.

SINAN PASHA - SB of Bosnia (1499/905)

[Sinan bassa]

Sanuto, II, 600 [Docs., pp.559-60]: In a memorandum of Sanuto dated 9 April 1499, giving detailed information about the Ottoman State and obtained from the secretary Alvise Sagudino recently returned from his mission to Istanbul, it is noted that the SB of Bosnia was a certain Sinan Pasha. The existence of a Sinan Pasha who was SB of Bosnia and the possibility that this may have been Hadim Sinan Pasha (q.v.) is discussed on p.428 and p.436, n.7.

SINAN BEG - SB of Gelibolu (1504/909)

[Sinan bei]

Sanuto, V, 1034-5, [Docs., p.687]. A Sinan beg is mentioned briefly in a letter of Lunardo Bembo, the vice bailo in Istanbul, dated 18 January 1504. It is not impossible that a Sinan Beg could have held the post of SB of Gelibolu and Kapudan Pasha in late 1503 or early 1504 immediately before the appointment of Hersekzade Ahmed (see pp.81-2).

SINAN PASHA/SUBAŞI - Voyvoda of Imotski (1510/916)

[Synan subassa]

Sanuto, X, 476-7. At various points in his letter (undated) to the Venetian provveditore of Almissa, Alvise Capello, Sinan styles

himself 'bassa', 'subassa' and 'vayvoda de Imochi'. The letter provides the only trace of this Sinan in the Diarii. It shows him to be under the suzerainty of Hasan beg, SB of Herzegovina (q.v.) ('duchato'), and provides a glimpse of commercial relations between Venetian and Ottoman subjects in the region. Here, Sinan notifies Capello that all commercial privileges of Venetian merchants and subjects in general will be respected, and their safety assured.

SINAN GAZI - intimate of Shah Ismail (1507/913)

[Sagi Sinam]

Sanuto, VII, 267-8: According to this one reference in the Diarii, a report of developments in the Ottoman-Safavid campaign of 1507/913 and dated 20 December 1507, Sinan Gazi was in some way closely connected with Shah Ismail, either a blood relative or in his personal service.¹ Bernardin Zipello, the author of the report, noted down information passed to him by Sinan about the size of the Safavid army.

Notes

1. The word used by Sanuto in his copy of Zipello's report to describe the closeness of Sinan's and Shah Ismail's relationship is 'in el churbai'. The original document, which I have found in the ASV (Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288, Doc. no. 291, [Docs., p.690-1], and from which Sanuto undoubtedly made his copy, has in fact 'in nelchurbasi', which is an interesting compound of the Italian 'in el', the Arabic 'Kurb' (intimacy), and the Turkish indefinite izafet '(s)i'. Ottoman terms of this sort are extremely rare in the Diarii, but it is understandable that a man like Zipello, who must have been a frequent traveller in Anatolia and reported regularly to the Venetian rettori in Cyprus, should have been used to this sort of language.

SINAN

[Sinan schiavo]

Envoy ('orator') of Bayezid to Venice. He arrived in the city on 2 June 1504 remaining there until 18th July 1504.¹ Sanuto merely notes his presence and does not appear to have met him. The purpose of his mission was to bring a letter from the sultan asking that safe-passage be given to ships in Avlonya which Bayezid had ordered to be transferred to Istanbul.² The mission was successful.

Notes

1. Sanuto, VI, 29, 30, 38, 39, 44, 58-59; ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f. 45rv.
2. See pp.368-9, 379, n.102.

SUFI ISMA^CIL - voyvoda (1500/906)

[Sophisma11]

Sanuto, III, 1033-4: one of three chiefs ['capi'] of a raiding party of 2000 turks attacking the county of Zara in October 1500.

SÜLEIMAN - voyvoda (1499-1501)

[Soliman]

Sanuto, II, 899; III, 1363-4, 1384-5: voyvoda of Iskender Pasha, SB of Bosnia, and involved in raiding between Zara and Spalato [c.f. Da Lezze (Angiolello), p.262].

SÜLEIMAN BEG - SB of Pirzerin (1514/920)[Suliman bei sangiaco
de Riserin]

Sanuto, XIX, 185-7 [Docs., pp.633-4]: one of the Rumelian SBs killed at Chaldiran (see p.225, 227, notes 30, 31, and Süreyya, III, p.78).

SÜLEIMAN ÇAVUŞ - ambassador (1515/921)

[Suleiman Zaus]

Sanuto, XX, 472, 550, 553, 556-7, 582; XXI, 6: arrived in Venice on 23 August 1515 bringing with him a letter of Selim dated 15 June announcing his victory over Ala-ed-Dawla.¹ Sanuto observed that Süleiman was not of high status ["non è da conto"] and his retinue numbered only seven.

Notes

1. Sanuto, XX, 566-7 (original in Greek). I have found the Italian translation from which Sanuto copied his Diarfi entry in ASV, Misc. Gregolin, Busta 1, doc. 31. Sanuto missed one line out [Docs., p.683].

SÜLEIMAN RE'IS - captain (1515-6/921-2)

[rais Soliman/Suliman]

Sanuto, XXI, 284; XXIII, 452-4; XXIV, 136; XXV, 481, 552: Since the last years of Bayezid's reign the Ottomans had been assisting the Mamluks to build up and modernise their fleet to face Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean. Kemal Re'is (pp.274, 276) and then Ahmed Re'is (p.107) had at various times played their part even to the point of captaining the Mamluk fleet. In the summer of 1515 Süleiman Re'is was appointed captain of the Mamluk fleet for a campaign against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.⁴ However, when war broke out between the Ottomans and Mamluks in 1516, Suleiman made the 1000 Mamluk soldiers on board disembark en route and then used the fleet and its artillery to acquire his own conquests in India during 1516. However, by December 1518 Süleiman found himself the prisoner of Khairbech in Cairo, and on 19 February 1518 was sent in chains to Selim in Damascus. He had been incarcerated very soon after Selim's departure from Cairo. It was thought that Selim would not hurt Süleiman, who was unaware of the reasons for his detention, and who is

described as an extremely rich man having amassed treasures in India.

In about June 1518 a Portuguese man arrived in Istanbul and approached the muhafiz with a plan to wrest the possessions of the Portuguese king away in India. He required forty ships from Selim and 'Suliman rais' [as captain] to fulfil this plan. The muhafiz's response was to lock him up in prison until the arrival of Selim, but in any case the Portuguese had been discovered to be a spy on a mission to gather information about Ottoman armaments. Perhaps he was also trying to find out if Süleiman remained a potential threat to Portuguese interests. (see also p.455).

1. See Inalcik, OG, p.126: 'admiral Selman'.

SULEIMAN TACHIALIS - corsair (1517/923)

[sic]

Sanuto, XXV, 265-6: see Bronzus corsair.

STAMATI MALACHIA - Argirocastro (1503/909)

[sic]

Sanuto, V, 914: one of the 'men' of Mehmed Beg, SB of Argirokastron in October 1503 (see p.300)

TALISMAN - (1501/907)

[sic]

Sanuto, IV, 192: a Turk, captured and executed by Safavids.

TALISMAN RE'IS - sea-captain (1518/924)

[Talaisman/Talasinan

Talasumano/Thalasinano rais]

Sanuto, XXV, 265-6 [Docs., p.684], 275, 276, 462: sea-captain who commanded the ship which escorted the ambassador Mocenigo from Egypt to Istanbul in January 1518. Mocenigo describes him as "capitano uno di primi homeni di la Porta da mar". On their journey they were threatened by corsairs near Skiathos, but managed to find shelter in Negroponte. Talisman went on ahead to Istanbul to get help, while Mocenigo wrote to Selim expressing his thanks that he had been provided with such an able bodyguard. By the end of April 1518, it is probably this same Talisman Re'is who had been given command of 6 galleys, 3 galliots, and 6 fuste with instructions to eradicate piracy wherever he found it.

In November 1518, writing in Istanbul, Mocenigo reported that Talisman Re'is had been assigned to accompany him back to Venice for protection against pirates.¹ This does appear to be the same man previously mentioned in his reports, except that Mocenigo says they had got to know each other in Cyprus where [Talisman] was the captain of four fuste, without any mention of their earlier journey to Istanbul together. Such an omission is uncharacteristic of Mocenigo, though again he praised Talisman's abilities, describing him as a man of sharp intellect, penetrating all the secrets of the Ottoman court.

Notes

1. Sanuto, XXV, 614 [Docs., pp.676-7].

TULESE MARIS - sea-captain (1514/920)

[sic]

Sanuto, XIX, 66 [Docs., p.639]: embarked in June 1514 from Istanbul with 25* ships (including 6 galleys) with orders to hunt down rebels in Karaman ("signoroti di Caramania").

* [MS has both 15 and 25]

ÜVEYS BEG/VÜS BEG - SB of Kayseri (1514/920)

[Vus bei]

Sanuto, XIX, 186-7 [Docs., pp.633-4]: one of the Anatolian SBs killed at Chaldiran; described as nephew of Mehmed Abrinova [= ?Mehmed Beg Obrenović(q.v.)]. Üveys Beg's identity - he was SB of Kayseri in 1514 - and his death in the battle are well documented.¹

Notes

1. Uğur, part I, pp.113-4 [Docs., p.634]; Hammer, GOR, II, 642 (Hist. IV, 432); Elezović, i/2, p.424.

ULIXES - see Aliogis

VATAZI - see Aliogis

VÜS BEG - see Üveys Beg

YAHYA PASHA BIN ʿABD al-ḤAYY[Jachia; Achia; Achaia; Zachia
Gaja; Achaja; Jachaja]

d. December 1509/Sawwal 915

Identity and Background

One of the prosopographical problems concerning Yahya Pasha - the matter of his patronymic - has already been the subject of detailed discussion.¹ Yahya would appear to conform to the pattern² according to which Muslim converts who achieved greatness were in the habit, from the reign of Bayezid II onwards, of discarding their "bin ʿAbd Allah" patronymic and replacing it with one incorporating a "beautiful name" - in Yahya's case, "bin ʿAbd al-Ḥayy" which he may have adopted in 1505/911 on becoming a vizier.³

It is clear that Yahya was a Muslim convert, therefore, and although his nationality is uncertain, Gian Jacomo Caroldo states in 1503/909, when Yahya was BB of Anadolu, that he was of Albanian origin.⁴ He rose to prominence through the Slave Household and, like so many others who wielded power in the reign of Bayezid, first received his apprenticeship in government under the Conqueror.⁵ By the time of his death in 1509/915 his power was reflected furthermore in the blood ties he had formed: he was the son-in-law of Bayezid⁶ and may have been the father-in-law of Mustafa Pasha(B)(q.v.)⁷

Career

1481-2/886-7 BB of Rumeli at the end of Mehmed II's reign, but dismissed by Bayezid II in 1482/887.⁸

1482 (Sept)-1483 (March)/887 (Şaʿbān)-888 (Safer) Possibly his first term as SB of Bosnia.⁹

1487-1492/893-897 BB of Rumeli again.¹⁰ As a participant in

Bayezid's abortive campaign against Belgrade, Yahya himself is sent with an army to Manastir (1492/897).¹¹

1493(?) - 1501(?) / 899(?) - 907(?) SB of Bosnia for the second time.¹²

1496/902 SB of Niğbolu (?).¹³

1501/907 Appointed BB of Anadolu.¹⁴

The Diarii are confused about the identity of the holder of this office at this time. According to one report the position of BB of Anadolu was vacated in December 1500/Cumāda II 906¹⁵ but in March 1502 Sanuto notes an eyewitness report¹⁶ of the previous November 1501/Cumāda I 907 that the incumbent was Sinan Pasha "Sinarei bassa" (see p.447, n.45), even though a year earlier another report stated that the same Sinan ("Suram") was the BB of Rumeli.¹⁷ At any rate Caroldo¹⁸ names Yahya as the BB of Anadolu in the middle of 1503/Şafer 909 and in the light of other sources¹⁹ it is reasonable to conclude that he held this office from late 1501/mid 907 or early 1502/late 907 until he was appointed BB of Rumeli in 1503/909 (see below).

1502/908 Mobilisation Against Shah Ismail (1)

The Ottomans had already been fighting a two front war since 1501/907 when Mesih Pasha (p.319) fought a successful campaign against the Karamanid claimant Mustafa Beg Hacı Hamza-Zade. In 1502/908 the main threat to the Ottoman Empire came from nascent power of Shah Ismail. In his capacity as BB of Anadolu, therefore, it was Yahya Pasha who was the unnamed "bilarbei di la Natolia" mentioned in Sanuto as having been sent by Bayezid to Ankara to maintain order in the eastern marches in the face of kızılbaş unrest fomented by Shah Ismail.²⁰ Eventually Ismail retired and open conflict was avoided,

but the danger of heretical rebellion in the empire remained so strong that Bayezid was compelled to embark on a policy of open persecution and deportation of known heretical elements and those who looked to Shah Ismail for leadership.

1503 (December)/909 (Receb) Appointed BB of Rumeli for the third time.²¹ According to a report of 6 January 1504/17 Receb 910 the Diarî show that Yahya had earlier been appointed BB of Rumeli in place of [Güveyi] Sinan Pasha (q.v.) who had died of the plague.²²

1505 (June/July) / 911 (Muḥarrem/Şafer) Appointed Vizier.²³ On his return from Istanbul in September 1506, Jacomo Contarini gave a vivid account of Yahya Pasha at this time, describing him as an extremely large and fat man of venal character with prodigious and indiscriminate appetites. He had succeeded in concealing his corrupt nature from the sultan, but the merchants of Venice and other western merchants had apparently had good experience of it. Contarini relates that on the occasion when the Venetian bailo and he, along with other Venetians in Istanbul, went to congratulate Yahya on his appointment to the vizierate, they were refused audience, because they had arrived without any gifts. They returned several days later armed with presents which Yahya accepted with almost boyish glee, offering his services in return.²⁴ This picture of Yahya Pasha as a grafting and corrupt official is of particular importance given the contention that in the last years of Bayezid's reign the affairs of state were being mismanaged and that government was being left more and more in the hands of the viziers.²⁵

1507/913 Mobilisation against Shah Ismail (2)

It was in the middle of his term as vizier that Yahya was called for the second time to direct operations against Shah Ismail who was posing a renewed threat to the Ottomans following his victory over Ala ed-Dawla, Prince of Albistan, in Eastern Anatolia.²⁶ The Diarif are undoubtedly a major source for this campaign and the reports show just how seriously Bayezid considered the Safavid threat.²⁷ From wherever Venetian officials were in local contact with Ottoman administration in Rumeli, reports reached the Signoria that a massive mobilisation of troops was taking place - on the Hungarian frontier, in Albania along the Himara coast, in the Morea and around Cattaro, Castel Tornese and Üsküb.²⁸

Yahya was despatched with 4500 - 6000 janissaries and 400 gun-carriages,²⁹ but the janissaries were extremely reluctant to leave without Bayezid himself.³⁰ Once in Anatolia, Yahya wrote to Bayezid asking him to come and lead the Ottoman troops in person, because he feared mass desertions to the Safavid cause.³¹ However, Bayezid did not leave his capital and instead asked Yahya to avoid at all costs any engagement with Shah Ismail and merely to shadow his movements.³² This policy similar to that pursued five years earlier, proved successful and the large army assembled at Ankara under Yahya did not have to be used.³³ The threat of Safavid invasion, however, remained the dominant consideration in Ottoman policy for the remainder of Bayezid's reign and in 1511/917 Karagöz Pasha (q.v.), who had been one of Yahya's generals in 1507/913, was to suffer the consequences of the sultan's earlier caution in the campaigns of 1502/908 and 1507/913.

Yahya's last years

Yahya remained in the office of vizier until his death from fever in December 1509/Şawwāl 915.³⁵ One of the major problems the viziers were faced with at this time was the restlessness of the janissaries who were anxious about the state of Bayezid's health and consequently about the succession.³⁶ Yahya's death, however, prevented him from seeing the worst excesses of janissary rebellion and the civil strife amongst Bayezid's sons. He died at the highpoint of vizierial as well as Grand Vizierial power in the reign of Bayezid. His place in the Divan was taken by Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha.³⁷

Notes

1. Ménage (Stern), pp.116-7
2. Ibid., p.116.
3. Ibid., p. 17 and especially p.117, notes 31 - 33 giving references to sources in Gökbilgin, Edirne and Elezović.
4. Sanuto, V, 460 [Docs., p.685].
5. Reindl, p.336; Süreyya, IV, p.632; Ménage (Stern), p.116; Danişmend, II, p.346.
6. Uluçay (TD X/14), p.118 (using a salary defter of 1503/909); Süreyya, IV, p.632 (1501/909); Danişmend, II p.346 (see here also for his sons and family, and Elezović i/1, pp.209-210 Süreyya, IV, p.710); Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.475: "Bayezid'in damadı idi ki, zevcesinin Ayşe Hatun, veya Güzelce Hasan beyin eski zevcesi olması da mümkündür".
7. Sanuto, X, 289 [Docs., p.685].
8. Ménage (Stern), p.116. (This and all subsequent references to Yahya's career in Ménage (Stern) are drawn from Sa'ad al-Din); Kreutel, Oruç, pp.33,35.
9. For a discussion of Yahya's tenure of office as SB of Bosnia, see Kissling, Iskender, p.134 and Kissling, Personalpolitik, pp.110-115, esp.111 and 113, where it is argued that he held this post on two occasions and not one as has been thought formerly. Kissling, Personalpolitik is a very detailed and invaluable analysis of the considerable problem of the identity of the incumbents in the office of SB of Bosnia, and updates previous lists of office-holders, e.g. Başağič-Redžepašič, and those analyses of Skarić and Truhetka (see Personalpolitik, p.109, notes 5 and 7.

10. Ménage (Stern), p.116 (1487-1491/893-897); Süreyya, IV, p.632 (1487/893); Kreutel, Oruç, p.50 (1489/895) and p.55 (1491/897); Tansel, p.112 (1488/893); Reindl, p.338.
11. Kreutel, Oruç, p.55; Elezović, i/1, p.737; Reindl, p.338.
12. Kissling, Personalpolitik, see note 9; Ménage (Stern), pp.116-7 (SB until 1501/907); Kreutel, Oruç, p.73 (SB in 1493/899); Reindl, p.339. Süreyya makes no mention at all of Yahya as SB of Bosnia. Sanuto, III, 1623 [Docs., p.685] shows the copy of a letter to the King of Hungary from the inhabitants of Jajce asking for help against an impending Turkish attack. Among the leaders or "septem duces" who had gathered in Bosnia to prepare for campaign was a certain "Jiahia" who may be Yahya Pasha. His position is unclear and he is confusingly described as "bassae filius" which in this context can only mean the son of Iskender Pasha, reported to be C in C. If Yahya Pasha was stationed in Bosnia in 1501/907, it is likely that he was only a deputy of Iskender Pasha who is generally considered to have been SB of Bosnia at this time.
13. Kreutel, Oruç, p.86 and Reindl, p.340; Cf. Gökbilgin, p.457. But see Tansel, p.110 who mentions a Yahya Pasha as SB of Nigbolu in 1488/893.
14. Reindl, p.341; Ménage (Stern), p.117; Süreyya, IV, p.632.
15. Sanuto, III, 1551-2 (see p.447, n.45).
16. Sanuto, IV, 242-3.
17. Sanuto, IV, 22 [Docs., p.658].
18. Sanuto, V, 460 [Docs., p.685].
19. See note 14 and Sohrweide, p.141.
20. Sanuto, IV, 318-9, 390, 432 [all Docs., pp.686-7]; IV, 608-9; IV, 704-5 [Docs., p.687]; Sohrweide, p.141, Fisher, pp.92-3.
21. Ménage (Stern), p.117; Süreyya, IV, 632.
22. Sanuto, V, 1034-35 [Docs., p.687], and substantiated by Gökbilgin, Edirne, p.475 (5 Zū'l-ḥicca 909/20 May 1503). The Diarii date the appointment a few months earlier than thought hitherto (Reindl, p.341, places it in early 1504).
23. Ménage (Stern), p.117; Elezović, i/1, pp.384-5; Süreyya, IV, p.632 (from 1504/910). According to the Diarii his appointment was probably from July 1505/Şafer 911 (Sanuto, VI, 218, [Docs., p.688].
24. Sanuto, VII, 9-10 [Docs., p.688].
25. See p.124. There is no hint in the Diarii reports at this time that Yahya may have been appointed Grand Vizier for a short period, as suggested by Kemalpashazade (see Reindl, p.341-2).

26. Sohrweide, p.142; Tansel, p.242-244 and p.244, n 90; Parry (Cook), p.65; Kreutel, Hannivaldus, pp.237-239.
27. Sanuto, VII, 152, 154, 164, 167, 171 172-3 [all Docs., pp.688-9]; VII, 187, 233; and VII, 259-60, 263-4, 265, 266-7, 529 [all Docs., pp.690-1]. These references, which specifically mention Yahya, do not feature in Reindl's synthesis, pp.343-4.
28. For references to Ottoman mobilisation in addition to those specifically mentioning Yahya (note 27), see Sanuto, VII, 136-7, 149, 150, 154, 157, 177, 184, 266, 286, 300, 440, 441-2, 468, 612-3, 659, 676-7, 238, 243-4, 259-260.
29. Sanuto, VII, 164, 263-4 [Docs., p.690].
30. Sanuto, VII, 167 [Docs., p.689].
31. Sanuto, VII, 171, 265 [Docs., pp.689-90]. Fisher stresses this in his analysis of references in the Diarîi to the 1507 campaign.
32. Sanuto, VII, 529 [Docs., p.691].
33. Sanuto, VII, 266-7 gives details of the mobilisation and battle line. See [Docs., pp.690-1] for the original document at ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori), Busta 288, Doc. no. 291. See also Fisher, p.95, n. 41.
34. Sanuto, VII, 259-260 [Docs., p.690].
35. Sanuto, X, 14, 21, 22 [all Docs., p.692] and X, 289 [Docs., p.685]. Süreyya, p.632, states that he died in 1506/912, but this is unlikely given the evidence that he was on campaign against Shah Ismail in 1507/913.
36. Sanuto, VII, 129-130, 441-2, 676-7, 680; VIII, 12, 503.
37. Sanuto, X, 431-2 [Docs., p.693] and ASV, Sen Sec. Delib. reg. 43, f. 35r [Docs., p.693].

YAHYA PASHA - ?Vizier (1510/916)

[Yahî]

Sanuto, X, 268 [Docs., p.632]: one of Bayezid's officials

['bassa'] reported to have been decapitated in early 1510 (see p.221).

This is clearly not Yahya Pasha bin ʿabd al Ḥayy(q.v.).

YAHYA PASHA - Vizier (1513/919)

[Achaia bassa]

Sanuto, XVI, 375-6 [Docs., p.568]: the bailo Zustinian reported

on 15 May 1513 that Selim had four viziers, two (Hersekzade and Mustafa - see pp.89-90) who had served under Bayezid and two ('Mustazi' = Iskender Bostanci (q.v.) and 'Achaia' who were completely new to office. Although normally reliable, Zustinian later reported on 30 June 1513 that there were only two viziers at that time: Hersekzade and HasanPasha.¹ In Zustinian's defence, it should be borne in mind that one of the original four, Iskender Bostanci had fallen from grace in May/June 1513.

Notes

1. Sanuto, XVI, 587, and see p.89.

YAHYA PASHA - ambassador (1516/922)

[Jacafia]

Sanuto, XXV, 652: he and the Kadi-^casker of Rumeli were sent by Selim to the Mamluk sultan Ḳānsūh al-Ghaurī to enquire why he had moved northwards with his army to the Ottoman frontier - the action which provoked the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk empire.

YAC^cKUB AGA - SB (1500/906)

[Jacob Aga]

Sanuto, III, 1060-1: among those SBs left by Bayezid to besiege Anabolu with 7,000 men.

YAC^cKUB BEG - sipahi/ambassador (1504/909)

[Jacubei]

The various reports provide a reasonably full picture of Ya^ckub's background. Sixty years old and of Armenian origin, he was a sipahi at the Porte, and formerly subaşı in Bursa and ambassador to Hungary. 'Homo degno' and 'persona di ben', accompanied to Venice by a retinue

of 20, including four ulufecis, Bembo, the bailo, nevertheless commented 'non è homo di condition, perchè il Signor [Bayezid] non ha voluto". However, he adds that he was a sipahi and it was a good idea to honour him.¹

Ya^Ckub's mission to Venice between 13 March and 22 April 1504 was part of a series of missions between the two capitals directed at finalising the peace agreement (see pp.78-81, 139-141, 334-6). On his arrival he was accorded the customary honours and on 15 March was granted an audience with the Doge.³ Ya^Ckub presented gifts⁴ and a letter from Bayezid.⁵ The letter explained the purpose of the mission: Bayezid wanted to ensure that both sides had the same version of the peace treaty, and Ya^Ckub was to take back with him a copy of the Venetian document. There was nothing unusual about this.

However, an equally important part of his mission was to demand the return of Alessio (see p.337, 339). On 17 March Ya^Ckub presented the Doge with another letter at the same time stating the case orally.⁶ He said that Bayezid had made concessions on trade and acceded to the appointment of a bailo; now Venice had to reciprocate by returning Alessio. The Doge was adamant that Alessio would remain Venetian as had been agreed in the treaty even before the Republic had made one concession by returning Santa Maura [see p.81]. Ya^Ckub could make no headway, but the Doge did promise to send an envoy to the Porte regarding the matter.⁷ The inclusion of the issue of Alessio in Ya^Ckub's brief must have been either a well-kept secret or a last minute decision; it was certainly a surprise for the Venetians, because when Bembo wrote in advance from Istanbul to brief the Signoria about Ya^Ckub's mission, he did not mention Alessio, and went as far as to say that "non ha el ditto orator cossa di momento in commission".⁸

Ya^Ckub also had an oral brief to fulfil: to inquire about the money taken from Qasım (q.v.) by the Prefect of Sinigaglia (see p.418); to complain about damages done by the inhabitants of Skiros and Skiathos (see pp.396ff.); and, at the request of the viziers, to mention that Baptista Sereni owed money to an Ottoman subject. However, we only know, from Bembo's despatches,⁹ of Ya^Ckub's intention to raise these subjects, since Sanuto does not refer to them in his accounts of two audiences with the Doge and Collegio. They may have been raised when Ya^Ckub was given an audience with the Signoria on 11 April, from which Sanuto was excluded and when he commented that he did not know what Ya^Ckub wanted.¹⁰

Ya^Ckub had been given an important and difficult mission, which he appears to have taken seriously. After his initial and short audience with the Doge on 15 March, Sanuto commented: "va con gran gravità"; and in spite of 100 ducats given by the Collegio to his entourage for expenses, they only ate at night because they were observing the month of Ramazan ("quaresema").¹¹ Apart from this, and details about the manner of his dress,¹² little more is said about his stay of over one month in Venice. It seems that Sanuto himself did not meet him, though he was present at the two audiences.

However, Sanuto notes that Andrea Gritti, recently ambassador in Istanbul, did visit him in his quarters,¹³ and it is clear from the registers of the Senate that Gritti was a point of contact for Ya^Ckub who had brought the former a letter from Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.);¹⁴ and Gritti entrusted him with a letter for Da'ud Pasha [?Küçük](q.v.) and with various articles of clothing which Da'ud had asked for.¹⁵

Notes

1. Sanuto, V, 869, 991, 995, 1002-3.
2. Sanuto, V, 947, 969, 980.
3. Sanuto, V, 977, 980, 981, 990, 991.
4. Sanuto, V, 993 for a list of presents which Sanuto said were not worth much.
5. Sanuto, V, 991, 993-4. for the original in Greek dated 22 December 1503, see ASV, Firmani Turchi, no. 2, with its spectacular tugra, or "la testa di Signor" as Sanuto calls it! For a translation in Italian, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc 4, no 10; for regest, Bombaci, Liber Graecus, p.297, no. 48; for Greek transcription, M and M, III, p.356.
6. Sanuto, V, 1001-2: Sanuto gives only the document heading, with the rest of the page left blank. He did not manage to obtain a translation. However, this is undoubtedly the letter dated 20 December 1503, Bayezid to Doge, in Greek, at ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis fasc 2, no. 11. For translation in Italian, see ASV, CDT, Busta XVIII bis, fasc 9, no 6; for regest, see Bombaci, Liber Graecus, p.297, no 47; for Greek transcription, M and M, III, p.350-1, no. xxxv.
7. The envoy chosen was Zorzi Negro (see Sebastian, Venice/Turks p.8, p.20, notes 37, 38 and Neff, Secretaries, pp.486-88): Ya^ckub is mentioned in his Commission (ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib, reg. 40, f 8r, April 1504).
8. Sanuto, V, 995 (December 1503), and especially 1002-3 (February 1504).
9. Idem.
10. Sanuto, VI, 11.
11. Sanuto, V, 991.
12. Idem.
13. Idem.
14. ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib. reg. 40, f 14rv, April 1504.
15. Ibid., reg. 40, f 14v, April 1504.

?YAC^cKUB PASHA - ?Vizier (1510/916)

[Jagu]

Sanuto, X, 268 [Docs., p.632]: one of Bayezid's officials ['bassa'] reported to have been decapitated in early 1510 (see p.221). This is clearly not Yackub Pasha Hadım (q.v.).

YAC̣KUB PASHA HADIM[Iacut/Jacob/Yacub/
Mamucho/Monucho]

Ya^ckub Pasha's Bosnian origins, his attachment in Mehemmed II's reign to Prince Bayezid's household in Amasya, where Bayezid made him his equerry (Iç Ağası), and the great trust in which he was held by Bayezid (largely as a result of their common inclination towards sufism) both as Prince and sultan, have already been collated and documented.¹ I shall here confine myself to a brief resumé of his career and to an assessment of how the Diarii contribute to our understanding of his later career. The Diarii in fact record disappointingly little about his personal life. The one potentially interesting piece of information moreover is clearly wrong: in a personal memorandum of Sanuto based on information apparently provided by the Venetian secretary Alvise Sagudino, it is stated that Ya^ckub was one of Bayezid's sons-in-law.² No other sources, Ottoman or western, make mention of this which is not surprising given that Ya^ckub was a distinguished eunuch, a fact which Sanuto later did record when recounting Andrea Zanchani's Relazione; here Sanuto also records that Zanchani considered him to be 'una bestia e presentuoso'.³

Career⁴Reign of Mehemmed IISucceeded Hadım ^cAli Pasha as AkAğası, Chief White Eunuch. Iç Ağası of Prince Bayezid (see above)1481-2/886-887Mîr-i alem1482 - ?/887- ?BB of Rumeli.⁶1485/890Sent as BB of Rumeli against the Mamluks in defence of ^cAla ed Dawla. After an initial victory he

narrowly escaped death during a Mamluk counter attack. He was demoted to the post of SB of Aydin.

1486/891-2 SB of Aydin: took part in the ill-fated campaign of Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (q.v.) against the Mamluks.

1488/894 BB of Karaman, succeeding Karagöz Pasha. He took part in the battle of Agaçayırı (17 August 1498/8 Ramazān 893) under the command of Hadım ĆAli Pasha (q.v.), again suffering defeat.⁷

1492-94/898-900 Appointed SB of Bosnia,⁸ in spite of serious defeats. In 1493/898 he took part in the large-scale Ottoman offensive against the bans of Croatia to avenge the humiliating defeats of Villach, the pass of the Red Tower in Transylvania, and Szoreny during the previous year's massive raiding into Hungary, Croatia, Styria, Carniola and Carinthia. YaĆkub's campaign resulted in a resounding victory at Adbina where the Croatian nobility was almost annihilated (9 September 1493/27 Zūl-kaĆde 899).⁹

1494/900 Appointed BB of Rumeli, possibly due to pressure from Iskender Pasha on Bayezid.

1497 August/902 Zūl-hicca Involved in Turco-Polish war and in repelling Polish offensive in Moldavia.

1498/903 Vizier. According to Oruç, the Beĝlerebeĝi (presumably YaĆkub) replaced Hadım ĆAli Pasha in the divan on 12 Zūl-kaĆda 903 (2 July 1498). Sanuto recorded that YaĆkub was a vizier in October 1498,¹⁰ and that he was third vizier when Zancani visited Istanbul in March 1499.¹¹

Turco-Venetian War

The few references there are to YaĆkub in the Diarîi are largely confined to his activities during the war. That he replaced Hadım

Ali in the Divan is an indication that YaCkub probably belonged to the war party, (though he appears to have been non-committal in deliberations over military strategy, according to a report of Vola Lendari¹²). In April 1500 Alvise Manenti referred to him as one of the Republic's enemies,¹³ and Malipiero similarly records his attitude towards the Christian west.¹⁴ It was natural therefore for Bayezid to rely on YaCkub to command the Ottoman naval forces which were sent to lay siege to Modon in the spring of 1500.

At some point soon after Manenti had arrived in Istanbul for peace talks in mid February 1500/Receb 905, YaCkub had been despatched to the gulf of Lepanto with a force of 4000 men, 200,000 ducats and 600 'veste' to join the fleet.¹⁵ Although Manenti's Relazione refers to him as 'capetanio di l'armata' as well as third vizier, YaCkub's status was less that of kapudan pasha¹⁶ than of vizier in command of land forces on board the fleet. It is likely that he served as C in C¹⁷ of the seaward forces during the campaign of Modon which fell to a massive concentration of Ottoman forces from land and sea on 9 August 1500/13 Muharrem 906 after a siege and bombardment lasting five weeks.¹⁸ There is no suggestion anywhere in the Diarii that YaCkub was Grand Vizier for a short time in the spring/summer of 1500/906, as is stated in some Ottoman sources,¹⁹ the report that a eunuch was in overall command at Modon (at least on the seaward flank) coming closest to it. It seems unlikely that an acute observer like Manenti would have been mistaken in his belief that YaCkub was third vizier when he embarked on the Modon campaign, and Mesih Pasha was clearly Grand Vizier during negotiations with Manenti in February 1500. It is possible, nevertheless, that YaCkub was briefly Grand Vizier after Manenti's departure.

In spite of his resounding victory at Modon, Ya^Ckub's career was almost at an end. Shortly after his return from campaign towards the end of 1500, reports from Chios state that Bayezid dismissed him from office as a result of an unspecified mental affliction, and replaced him with Koca Mustafa²⁰. It is perhaps worth mentioning that according to one uncorroborated report,²¹ the janissaries expressed a strong preference for Ya^Ckub in place of Hersekzade to lead them on a campaign (unspecified), thus suggesting that he commanded significant respect until his illness cut short his term of office. Turkish sources state that he ended his days in retirement on a pension in Salonica, where he died in 1510/916.²²

Notes

1. Reindl, pp.346ff. I can find no justification for Fisher's linking of this Ya^Ckub with Djem's steward, the son of Aschtin, who betrayed his master by switching sides at the battle of Yenisehir in 1482 (see Fisher, pp.23 and 34).
2. Sanuto, II, 600 [Docs., p.694]. Uluçay (TD X/14), pp.118-119 makes no reference to such a relationship. Nevertheless, Sanuto is clearly talking about Ya^Ckub Pasha in this passage, since he describes him as the man who defeated the Hungarians (i.e. at Adbina in 1493). The passage itself is corrupt, with the suggestion that Ya^Ckub and Hersekzade Ahmed, who was Bayezid's son-in-law, were being confused.
3. Sanuto, II, 695-6 [Docs., p.560].
4. Unless stated otherwise, the resumé draws from Reindl, pp. 346ff.
5. Süreyya, IV, p.647 and appendix, p.723.
6. Süreyya, IV, p.647, and Reindl, op. cit.
7. Tekindağ (Bell. XXXI), p.364; Reindl, op. cit.; Hammer, GOR, II, p.297 (Hist. IV, p.25).
8. Reindl, p.349 for sources, and also Bašagić-Redžepašić, p.183, and Kissling, Personalpolitik, pp.113ff. There is also a reference to Ya^Ckub Pasha, SB of Bosnia, in ASV Sen. Sec. Delib. reg 34, f 188v.

9. Reindl, p.350, n. 16 for references; also Tansel, p.155ff and notes; Fisher, p.34; Hammer, GOR, II, pp.305-7 (Hist. IV, 37-39); Giovio, Commentario, f13v-14r; Spandugino, pp.324-6; Da Lezze (Angiolello), pp.192-195; Tubero, p.45; Sansovino, Annali, f.98r.
10. Sanuto, II, 234-5 [Docs., p.694].
11. Sanuto, II, 600 [Docs., p.694] See also p.117.
12. Sanuto, II, 939 [Docs., p.637]. Alvise Manenti in 1500 described Ya^Ckub as one of Venice's enemies (Sanuto, III, 181, [Docs., p.695].
13. Sanuto, III, 181 [Docs., p.695].
14. Malipiero, part I, p.192 (" - - - Costui è perfido nemico de Christiani, et specialmente nostro; homo leggier, furioso, et sempre consiglia 'l peggio dei Christiani').
15. Sanuto, III, 179 [Docs., p.565], and 180 [Docs., p.695]; and III, 292. Sanuto's account at III, 180 is corroborated by Malipiero, part I, p.192. Also Hammer, GOR, III, p.323 (Hist. IV, p.63); N. Bees, 'Mora' in IA, vol. VIII, p.424.
16. See pp.188ff. where the office of kapudan pasha at this time is discussed.
17. Sanuto, III, 442-3: according to a Michiel d'Ancona, who had been a prisoner of the Turks. 'Alimech bassa è capetanio di l'armata, et sopra di lui è Mamucho bassa (? Ya^Ckub the eunuch), et etiam è Camali li con la sua nave.'
18. See pp.333-4, 443-4.
19. See Reindl, p.354, and especially Kreutel, Oruç, pp.121ff, see above p.323, n.23.
20. Sanuto, III, 1551-2 and IV, 22 [both Docs., pp.657-8]. See also Süreyya, IV, p.647: Ya^Ckub was afflicted with pain in the joints (veci^C mefāsile mübtelâ olub), though Sureyya dates this in 903/1498 four months after becoming vizier. The evidence of these Diarii reports, which I believe is conclusive, clashes with the version in Kemalpashazade (see Reindl, p.356) according to which Ya^Ckub's tenure as vizier lasted four years from 1498 to July/August 1502/Muḥarrem 908 when Da'ud Pasha (B) is meant to have succeeded him. Reindl (p.356, n. 34) mistakenly uses Sanuto III, 1551-2 (which she unfortunately renders as III, 1512) as proof that Ya^Ckub's dismissal came at the end of 1501: Malaverti's letter from Pera is dated 28 December 1500, not 1501.
21. Sanuto, III, 1638 [Docs., p.695].
22. Reindl, p.357; Süreyya, IV, p.647.

YUNUS PASHA - Grand Vizier

[Janus/Zunis bassa]

Background

Little is known about the background, racial origins or early career of Yunus Pasha. A product of the Palace School¹ and possibly a native of Dalmatia.² Like many great officials of the time, he was linked to the sultan's family through marriage to one of the granddaughters of Bayezid. Selcuk Hatun, Bayezid's daughter was his mother-in-law. The Diarii furnish no personal details on him. However, Venetian officials who had personal contact with him regarded Yunus as friend of Venice.⁴ The Diarii also contribute to our understanding of Yunus's role in the last years of the reign of Bayezid as well as his rise to become Grand Vizier, in which position he was executed by Selim in 1517.

Career

From what has already been pieced together from Ottoman records,⁵ we can have some confidence in the following picture of Yunus's career from 1504 onwards. The Diarii add substantially to our knowledge.

1504/910Kapıcıbaşı⁶1509/915

Aga of the janissaries, in which capacity he won credit for supervising the rebuilding of Istanbul after the great earthquake.⁷ Although he is not mentioned by name, the role of the Aga of the janissaries in this enterprise is recorded in Diarii reports. The Venetian bailo praised him for his expeditious management of the reconstruction, and apparently his appointment al governo (presumably muhafız) in Istanbul during Bayezid's period of

absence in Edirne was highly popular. Bayezid himself commended him and valued him greatly.⁸ Clearly this was a man who carried great weight with the sultan and with his peers.

By the last day of May 1510/22 Şafer 916 reconstruction of the city walls had been completed.⁹ According to various reports (including that of the bailo Nicolo Zustinian writing five days after the disaster), the earthquake, which occurred on 10 September 1509/25 Cumāda I 915, at 4.00am. was the worst in memory. More than 1500 houses had been destroyed in Istanbul and Pera, leaving 4000 dead and more than 10,000 burnt. The greater part of the walls of the city on both the seaward and landward sides was destroyed down to the foundations; most of the mosques had suffered a similar fate, and all the houses in the city which had been left standing were deemed to be unsafe. The Venetian community in Pera had escaped injury but their houses were unsafe. Between 60,000 and 80,000 builders and 5000 carpenters were assembled to carry out reconstruction.¹⁰ Such was the scale of the problem which Yunus had to face.

Ağa of the Janissaries

It is not clear when Yunus was appointed Ağa of the Janissaries. The Diarii are not very helpful in establishing the date with any accuracy, but they do offer some interesting indications. There may have been a change in the office of Ağa in January 1505/Şa'bān 910 when Hasan Pasha, the then incumbent, was appointed BB of Anadolu.¹¹ by August 1506/Rebīʿ I and II 912,¹² Jacomo Contarini noted that the incumbent was a man who wielded much power and exercised great authority over the 8000 janissaries under his command, adding that this was in contrast to the fortunes of his predecessor who had been

deposed by the janissaries. If we accept that Contarini's description of the Aġa in August 1506 applies to Yunus, as seems likely (see below), it would appear that there was at least one other incumbent of the office between Hasan Pasha's and Yunus Pasha's tenures.

That Contarini's description of the August 1506 Aġa might apply to Yunus can be argued not only because it was noted that he had great authority, but also because he is described as a great friend of Venice: at one stage the Venetian bailo was under his protection.¹³ Contarini also noted that he was young in age, which corresponds to the description of Yunus, as one of Selim's three viziers, given by the Venetian ambassador Bartolomeo Contarini who met the viziers in 1517.^{13a}

Another report, this time from an inhabitant of Ancona who had lived in Istanbul, strongly suggests that Yunus may have been Aġa in early 1508. When in March 1508 the janissaries revolted against a strict ban on wine imposed by Bayezid four days earlier, the Aġa (not named) stepped in and persuaded them to postpone their agitation. He then petitioned the viziers to revoke the ban, which was immediately granted with Bayezid's authority. The Anconitano said that he had never seen such disobedience to the sultan in his twenty-one years in Istanbul.¹⁴

These were critical years for any incumbent of the office of Aġa of the janissaries, who were constantly on the point of revolt due to the uncertainty surrounding the succession and due to Bayezid's ailing health. Rumours that Bayezid was dead or dying, or his failure to appear 'in public' for any period of time sparked off spontaneous revolts.¹⁵ The earthquake and a plethora of other natural disasters in Bayezid's last years fired their superstitions and fears of

impending doom which were commonplace at the close of a reign. One such revolt occurred in the summer of 1510/916 when the janissaries noticed that the sultan had not returned to Istanbul even though rebuilding of the city had been completed. The Ağa was forced to petition Bayezid, who was in Edirne, to distribute largesse: 80,000 aspri were handed out to the janissaries, together with three robes for the corps commanders.¹⁷

Succession Dispute

Yunus Pasha's position in the last two years of Bayezid's reign became very precarious. On the one hand he was loyal to the sultan who favoured Prince Ahmed as his successor. On the other hand he was the Ağa of a corps which, faced increasingly with the necessity of lending their weight to a strong candidate for the throne, favoured Prince Selim. Yunus himself was suspected of being a supporter of Prince Ahmed.¹⁸

It is not clear precisely when Yunus ceased to be Ağa.¹⁹ According to one Ottoman source he was still Ağa in July 1511.¹⁹ In May or June of that year Bayezid called the Ağa to Edirne with 5000 Janissaries, according to the bailo Andrea Foscolo. The purpose of this summons is not entirely clear, since ĆAli pasha had not yet fallen at Gökçay and consequently the necessity mobilisation to meet the forces of Selim at Çorlu would not have become apparent yet. It is possible that Bayezid was testing the waters, in the knowledge that his own position was becoming increasingly untenable: for when the Ağa arrived in Edirne, the sultan asked him and the janissaries whether they were content with the policy which he was pursuing with regard to the succession.²⁰ This cryptic question, if indeed it was

posed in this form, may have been an allusion to Bayezid's support for Prince Ahmed. Although both the Ağā (presumably Yunus Pasha) and the janissaries as a whole proclaimed themselves to be the slaves of the sultan and swore total allegiance to him, irrespective of the course of events, the janissaries, if not the Ağā, must have been torn between their loyalty to the person of the reigning sultan and their desire to ensure the accession of their choice to the throne. In the event the janissaries demonstrated their loyalty when Bayezid was forced to meet Selim's forces in battle and defeat them at Çorlu in August 1511. However, they did not shrink back from revolting when in September 1511 they became convinced that a plot to bring Prince Ahmed into Istanbul was in the process of being executed. On 21 September 1511 the janissaries rioted, and it has been suggested²¹ that Yunus Ağā may have been one of the sultan's top officials whose houses were ransacked (see p.86). The line was finally drawn.

1511-1512/917 BB of Anadolu

Whether or not Yunus was the object of his own troops' aggression, his access to power was unaffected, and in one sense the sultan needed his services all the more. In the aftermath of the revolt, Yunus was appointed to the post of BB of Anadolu, which had remained vacant since the death of Karogöz Pasha (q.v.) at the hands of Shah Kuli at the battle of Kütahya in April 1511.²² Virtually nothing is known about his activities as Beğlerbeği of Anadolu. Professor Ménage draws to our attention Paolo Giovio's remarks that Yunus took command in Antolia after the death of ^CAli Pasha, defeated and drove out 'Techellis' (=Teke-li, Sahkuli) and hunted down his supporters. Ménage notes that there is no hint of this in the Ottoman

sources, but suggests that there may be a ring of truth in this account. Although the Diarii offer little collateral, there is one report²⁴ from Nicolo Zustinian in Istanbul which speaks of the routing of some of the forces of 'sophi Ysmael' (=Shah Ismail rather than Shah Kuli, but they represent the same heresy) by the BB of Anadolu'.

1512/918 BB of Rumeli He was appointed to this office in the general reshuffle of high ranking personnel which took place on 6 January 1512 once the janissaries seemed to have become quiescent.²⁵ Nothing is known about his activities as BB of Rumeli other than that he held this office over the last weeks of Bayezid's reign. On 24 April 1512/7 Şafer 918 Bayezid was forced to abdicate and Yunus went into retirement with his master²⁶ (according to one source, as his vizier²⁷). This also marks the first occasion in the Diarii when Yunus is actually referred to by name.²⁸ When Bayezid died on 10 June 1512/25 RebT^c I 918 on the way to his place of retirement in Demotika, Yunus brought his body back to Istanbul for burial.²⁹

Service in the Reign of Selim

Yunus had been too closely associated with Bayezid to be immediately acceptable to the new sultan for high office. Soon after returning to Istanbul, an Ottoman source records that he was a SB in Rumeli.³⁰ As has been suggested already, this was clearly Bosnia, since letters Yunus wrote at this time were composed by his divan Katibi (secretary), the dissolute poet Mesihî, who had also been the divan katibi of the previous SB of Bosnia, Firuz Beg who had died on 8 June 1512.³¹ Some of these letters,³² are appeals from Yunus to be recalled from Bosnia to the centre of affairs.³³

Yunus served (at least) two terms as SB of Bosnia. The first term was from late 1512 until November 1513 when he was replaced by Hadim Sinan for a few months.³⁴ His second term lasted probably from April 1514 (when Hadim Sinan (q.v.) was promoted to the post of BB of Andadolu) until 1515. There are no references in the Diarî to Yunus as SB of Bosnia during his first term as SB,³⁵ but three reports from Venetian officials in Dalmatia referring to the unnamed SB of Bosnia do offer a glimpse of Yunus Pasha's activities during both terms as SB.

The first report indicates that at the end of his first term the Turkish frontier gazis were heavily defeated in Croatia by the local vassal lords of the King of Hungary, and the SB was reportedly mobilising 20,000 troops to launch a counter-attack.³⁶ The other two reports refer to events at the end of his second term: the SB of Bosnia (presumably Yunus), angered by recent raids into Bosnia by the Hungarian marcher lords, mobilised between 3000 and 4000 men, together with artillery and 1000 schiofetieri, with the objective of destroying the castles of the marcher lords. The reports described in some detail the manoeuvres of Yunus's forces, which began in mid November 1514, and which concentrated on the area to the north and east of the Venetian county of Zara (i.e. Novigrad, Karin, Nadin and north to Perusić). A number of castles (Auri Castello, Marin, Morlatović, Perusić, Ostroviza and Bigne) were reduced, and about one thousand inhabitants taken captive. The SB had issued strict orders that, due to the peaceful relations which existed between Venice and the sultan, under no circumstances were his men to raid into Venetian territory. However, the gazi spirit being difficult to control, 300 horsemen raided the county of Zara, ravaging, pillaging and abducting some

Venetian subjects before being thrown back.

It has been suggested that correspondence at about this time between Yunus Pasha and his neighbouring sancakbeğis, particularly ^CIsa-Beg oğlu Mehmed of Hersek-ili, appears to relate to a single mobilization; and that a report (arznāme) of Yunus to the central authorities and a letter to him from the SB of Izvornik seem also to refer to the same emergency, that is of a threatened Hungarian attack.³⁸ Although the absence of dates on these documents renders a conclusion difficult to reach,³⁹ it is possible that this Ottoman documentation relates to the states of emergency and consequent Ottoman mobilisation which the above-mentioned Diarii reports indicate occurred both at the end of 1513 and 1514.

Return to Centre of Affairs

It was not until the very end of 1515/921 that Yunus was recalled to Istanbul, apparently in order to facilitate a settlement with Hungary.⁴⁰ He was succeeded by Mustafa (probably Iskender Pashazade (see pp.383, 384, n.14), and he returned to Istanbul on 14 December 1514/8 Zū'1-ka^Cde 921.

Vizier/Campaign against Mamluks, 1516-1517

At about the time of his return to Istanbul Yunus was apparently appointed BB of Rumeli again⁴¹. His position at the centre of Ottoman affairs had been fully restored under the new sultan. A few months later on 26 April 1516/23 Reb^{1C} I 922 he was promoted to the rank of vizier.⁴² No reports specifically refer to this appointment, but one report⁴³ does indicate that there was a changeover in personnel within the divan in April 1516 when Hersekzade and Piri Mehmed Pasha

temporarily fell from grace. The report's description of Selim's 'new man' does not, however, corresponded to Yunus.

His appointment to the divan came at a time when Selim was about to embark on a fresh campaign against the Safavids. Two days after Yunus's appointment, the new Grand Vizier Sinan set off into Antolia at the start of the new offensive which within months would lead instead to the fall of the Mamluk Sultanate.⁴⁴ Unfortunately the Diarii offer little information on Yunus's role in the campaign. Western sources indicate that following the victory at Marj Dabik (24 August 1516/25 Receb 922), Selim ordered Yunus to pursue with part of the forces of a Rumeli the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, Khair beg (who, as a result of divisions within the Mamluk ruling élite, had withdrawn his forces from the field of battle at Marj Dabik), and the governor of Damascus, the emir Janberdi al-Ghazzali. While al-Ghazzali fled to Cairo, Khair beg surrendered to Yunus, promising to swear fealty to the sultan.⁴⁵ A report from the ballo in September 1516 alludes to some of these events: Yunus had been sent with 20,000 men and artillery towards Damascus after Marj Dabik, where it was thought the Mamluk sultan's son was positioned.⁴⁶ No mention is made of Khair beg's surrender.⁴⁷ At Ridaniyya (23 January 1517/29 Zū'l-ḥicca 923) Yunus as vizier commanded the left wing of the Ottoman army, commanding the forces of Rumeli.⁴⁸ Paolo Giovio refers to his part in the gruesome four days of street fighting for the control of Cairo (27-30 January 1517) which Yunus is said to have first entered with the artillery and with a detachment of janissaries and cavalry.⁴⁷

The extent to which Yunus carried some weight with the sultan in this period is demonstrated by two episodes. The first in the summer

of 1516 shows how Yunus interceded on behalf of the Mamluk Sultan Kansu al-Ghauri's ambassador who had been sent to Selim with peace proposals. Selim ordered him to be beheaded, but Yunus, according to the story, threw himself at the feet of Selim and beseeched him to respect the right of ambassadors to safe-conduct. Selim revoked his decision.⁵⁰ The second episode occurred soon after the fall of Cairo to Selim and is reported, albeit somewhat obtusely, by Alvise di Quarta, turciman of the bailo. According to this source, the Mamluk sultan Tuman Bay, who had fled after defeat at Ridanniyya and Cairo, had petitioned Selim to grant him safe-conduct. Selim had refused, but Yunus prevailed on him to grant it.⁵¹

These two episodes, while indicating Yunus's standing, also perhaps provide an insight into his political stance vis à vis Selim's whole Egyptian venture and into the reasons behind Yunus's eventual execution. (see p.496).

Grand Vizier, 1517

However, after the death at Ridanniyya of the Grand Vizier Hadim Sinan Pasha (q.v.). Yunus must have been the natural choice to succeed. He was formally appointed Grand Vizier on 3 February 1517/11 Muharrem 923.⁵² The scant information available for Yunus's last few months is very confused. It seems that he was left in charge of affairs in Cairo,⁵³ while Selim advanced to Giza where he finally routed Tuman Bay on 2 April 1517. Yunus seems then to have been appointed the first Ottoman governor of Egypt, but the evidence for this requires careful examination.⁵⁴ The Diarî sources reflect what must have been two likely rumours of events which were given circulation at the time. On the one hand some Diarî reports,⁵⁵ from a

variety of sources, state that Yunus had been left in Cairo with about 10,000 men and that Selim himself had set off or intended to set off with the army towards Aleppo for an offensive against Shah Ismail. That the Venetian authorities must have considered this to be a hazy picture can be seen from a comment of the ballo who noted on 18 June that it had been two and a half months since ulaks had brought news to Istanbul from Cairo.⁵⁶ On the other hand, several reports, again from a variety of sources but despatched later in the year, suggest that there might be some truth in the popular story⁵⁷ that Yunus was executed on 22 September 1517 while on the return journey with Selim from Cairo at a place on the Egyptian-Syrian border (thence known as Khan Yunus). Most revealing of these reports⁵⁸ is a letter dated 15 October from the Venetian ambassador to Selim, Alvise Mocenigo, which states that four days' journey out of Cairo, Selim put Yunus and the defterdar to death. This would tally with the legendary location of Yunus's burial place, and almost tally with the alleged date of execution.⁵⁹

Two facts are clear: first that Yunus was executed some time in September 1517; secondly, that Khair beg, the erstwhile Mamluk governor of Aleppo, was appointed governor of Egypt.⁶⁰ Why did Selim execute his Grand Vizier? Various reasons have been given: that he was arrogant;⁶¹ that he was angry that Selim had chosen Khairbeg as governor instead of him, and had arranged for a rising of the janissaries after Selim's departure to discredit Khairbeg. However, Selim was said to have discovered this ruse.⁶² The theory that Yunus may have been involved in a plot to discredit Khairbeg and possibly take Egypt for himself cannot wholly be discounted, since Diarii reports suggest that Selim was worried about Yunus's popularity and

suspected him of wanting to become 'signor' (governor rather than sultan). Consequently Selim replaced Yunus with Khairbeg.⁶³ Another report indicates that about 200 people were executed by Selim, as well as Yunus, the defterdar and the Kadi^Casker, thus suggesting the discovery of a major plot (with the involvement of janissaries?).⁶⁴ With regard to the traditional story that Yunus was executed, because he had never given his full support to Selim's Mamluk venture and criticised him for it on the return journey,⁶⁵ there seems to be no hint in the Diarii of dissatisfaction on that score. Some consideration should nevertheless be given to the two occasions on which Yunus had interceded on behalf of the Mamluks (see above p.494). One Diarii report puts forward the view that Yunus was killed because he was a friend of Venice.⁶⁶

However, the Venetian ambassador Alvisè Mocenigo, suggested more practical reasons for the fall of the Grand Vizier: former insults and new transgressions were at the root of the problem,⁶⁷ and there were three reasons in particular. First, Selim was wary of Yunus because of the large following he enjoyed and because he distributed much largesse. Secondly, Yunus had failed to pay the janissaries two aspri extra each as he had been ordered to do; and thirdly, four mules loaded with the sultan's money "had been found" (presumably traced to Yunus).⁶⁸

Notes

1. Danişmend, V, p.15.
2. The evidence is extremely thin, but it is possible that the fact that he held the post of sancak beği of Bosnia on two occasions may point to Dalmatian origins, particularly since we have a record that a letter from him as SB of Bosnia to Venice, dated as late as 25 September 1514, was written in Slavonic, when Ottoman

would have been more usual (See ASV, Misc. Gregolin, busta I, fasc. 4, no. 15, Italian translation from Slavonic).

3. Uluçay (TD X/14), p.123, and also p.119; and Ménage (WZKM), p.35 where Yunus is noted to have written a letter to his mother-in-law. Yunus married Selcuk Hatun's daughter in 1510/910.
4. Sanuto, XXV, 123-5 (see note 66); XXV, 133-4.
5. Ménage (WZKM), pp.35-38.
6. There are no references in the Diarii to this office between 1499 and 1510.
7. Ménage (WZKM), p.37.
8. Sanuto, X, 667-8.
9. Sanuto, X, 668-9.
10. Sanuto, IX, 260-262, 338, 563-4, 564-5; X, 138-9, 142, 208, 262; XI, 293-4.
11. Sanuto, V, 1034-5.
12. The date of Contarini's Relazione (Sanuto, VII, 11).
13. Idem.
- 13a. Alberi, Ser. III, vol. III, p.58 (Relazione of Bartolomeo Contarini (10 March 1519): 'Etiam II bassa e bilarbei erano giovani, ne ha visto nel suo (Selim's) campo uomini vecchi da governo, come avea il padre, e di esperienza'.
14. Sanuto, VII, 441-2.
15. Sanuto, VI, 374 (July 1506); VII, 167 (August 1507); VII, 676-7, 680 (Autumn 1508); VIII, 12 (February 1509); VIII, 503 (Summer 1509); XI, 55-6 (Summer 1510).
16. Sanuto, X, 208, 667-8; XI, 293-4, 348-50; XII, 7-8, 273.
17. Sanuto, XI, 55-56.
18. See Ménage (WZKM), p.37 and note 21.
19. Ménage (WZKM), p.36 referring to Çaşıq Çelebi.
20. Sanuto, XII, 507ff.
21. Ménage (WZKM), p.37 and note 21.
22. Ménage (WZKM), p.37 and note 22, referring to Rūhī.
23. Ménage (WZKM), p.37, note 22.

24. Sanuto, XIV, 50-51: 'item, che alcuni dil sophi Ysmael, quali si tirono su la montagna, come scrisse, unde per fredì non potendo più star, è ritornati per partirsi; e ch'el bilarbei di la Turchia li havia dā rota di certa quantità di loro, ut in litteris, e per questo lī, a Constantinopoli, era stā fato festa per contento di populi - - -.' The report is dated 23 February 1512, after Yunus had ceased to be BB of Anadolu in January 1512, but it may well refer to events which occurred at the end of 1511.
25. Uluçay (TD VII/10), p.122. See pp.85-7, 341ff., 428-9 for the reshuffle. Sanuto leaves us with a tantalising reference to this change of personnel. When summarising the letters of the bailo Foscolo of 29 January 1512, he noted: 'Item, il Signor à fatto bassa novi,' and infuriatingly adding 'ut in litteris', to which we now have no access. In the same summary it is noted that Sinan (Hadım) was the former BB of Rumeli and that a new one had been appointed. Yunus is not named.
26. Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), pp.9-10; Hammer, GOR II, 365 (Hist. IV, 123). He was also accompanied by the defterdar Qasım Çelebi.
27. See Ménage (WZKM), p.37, n. 24 using Paris, Bibl. Nat., MS. supp. turc 1183 (= 'Neşrī', Pb), f. 84r. Sanuto may provide some collateral for this. A letter of the abbot of the island of Meleda near Ragusa to Antonio Grimani in Venice (Sanuto, XIV, 463-5) describes those accompanying Bayezid as follows: "Signor vechio dicono à menato con lui Sigumbeg visier, el qual era nostro vicino sanzacho, et altro basi de Romani. .'. This may refer to one man only, that is Yunus Pasha: 'Sigumbeg' may be a corruption of segban or sekban başı, (keeper of the sultan's hounds), a position which Süreyya (IV, p.677) says Yunus held during the reign of Bayezid. Although this is somewhat vague, it is not that farfetched given the close connection between that office and the janissaries. The reference to 'visier' could be rendered to be his vizier, while 'el qual era nostro sanzacho' is quite plausible given Yunus's later (and perhaps earlier?) associations with Bosnia. 'et altro basi de Romani' accurately refers to Yunus's tenure as BB of Rumeli in 1512.
28. Sanuto, XIV, 491: 'Da Constantinopoli ancora è questo aviso [from the bailo, June 1512]. Come Janus bassa è andato col Signor vechio.' He is not mentioned again by name until 1516.
29. Tekindağ (TD XXIV/24), p. 10.
30. Ménage (WZKM), p.38 and note 26.
31. Op. cit., pp.35, 36, 38.
32. Idem, and pp.39-40, for a description of the letters.
33. Op. cit., p.35, notes 13 and 14; p.38.
34. See p.430.

35. It should be noted, however, that a despatch from Cairo in 1517 refers to Yunus, who was then governor of Egypt, as having formerly been SB of Bosnia (Sanuto, XXV, 133-4): the Diarii thus plainly connect him with Bosnia. Also ASV, Misc. Gregolin, Busta I, fasc. 4, no. 15 (see note 2) is a letter from Yunus Pasha SB of Bosnia to Venice, dated 25 September 1514.
36. Sanuto, XVII, 71-2 (see p.430).
37. Sanuto, XIX, 281-2 and 410-413.
38. Ménage (WZKM), p.40.
39. Ménage (WZKM), p.39 states that most of the letters can be roughly ascribed on internal evidence to the years around 1512.
40. Ménage (WZKM), p.38 and n. 30, referring to Haydar Çelebi apud Feridun, i, 470.
41. Idem.
42. Idem.
43. Sanuto, XXII, 276-277 [Docs., p.679]. See also pp.434-5, 409-410.
44. See pp.166ff., 295, 434-6 for the campaign.
45. Angiolello, f. 76f, which is almost identical to the version of events given in the letter of the Kadi-Casker and produced in translation in Sanuto, XXV, 655. Yunus does not feature again in the letter of the Kadi-Casker. Hammer GOR, II, 475 (Hist. IV, 278) produces a gist of Angiolello's story.
46. Sanuto, XXIII, 115-6.
47. Though his treachery is reported some time later (Sanuto, XXV, 94-95).
48. So says Hammer, but without quoting his source (GOR, II, 496 (Hist. IV, 305)); repeated by Danişmend II, pp.33-35.
49. Giovio, Commentario., ff. 23v-24r (repeated in Sansovino, ff 122v-123r) and Hammer GOR, II, 497 (Hist. IV, 307). The 'bassa' in Sanuto, XXIV, 606 is also probably a reference to Yunus Pasha's difficult position in Cairo.
50. Hammer, GOR, II, 464 (Hist. IV, 264).
51. Sanuto, XXIV, 204-5.
52. Hammer, GOR, II, 497 (Hist. IV, 307). See Sanuto, XXV, 118-9, 123-5, 145 for references to Yunus as 'primo homo/bassa' and 'primario bassa'.
53. Hammer, GOR, II, 502 (Hist. IV, 315): Yunus is meant to have had 40,000 men with him.

54. Sanuto, XXIV, 604-5, 505-6, 456, 434; XXV, 13, 79-80, 114-115, 133-4; Hammer, GOR, 518 (*Hist. IV*, 335) and Danişmend, II, p.41 (giving 10 April 1517) as date of appointment), both without citing sources: and Süreyya, IV, 677.
55. Sanuto, XXIV, 434 (27 June), 456 (25 June), 505-6 (18 June), 604-5 (19 May); XXV, 13 (20 and 27 August). Some, but not all, of these reports (the date of information is given in parentheses) seem to express intent on Selim's part rather than the fact of his departure from Cairo, which did not take place until 10 September 1517 (see Holt, p.41).
56. Sanuto, XXIV, 505-6.
57. Giovio, *Commentario*, f24v. See also Hammer, *GOR*, II, 523-524 (*Hist. IV*, 342-3) and Holt, p.45, n. 1.
58. Sanuto, XXV, 118-119 (23 October), 121 (24 October), 145 and 153-4 (15 October), the latter from Mocenigo. All the reports also mention the death of the *defterdar*, while XXV, 118-9 states that the executions took place on the journey.
59. Since Selim left Cairo on 10 September 1517 (see note 55), Yunus, according to Mocenigo, would have been executed on 13 or 14 September. The *Diarii* offer a third version which merits mention because of the accuracy of the chronology of the report: according to information which had been brought to Venice by the *locotenente* of Cyprus, Selim had departed Cairo for Aleppo with 20,000 men on 9 September in order to meet the threat posed by Shah Ismail who had advanced towards Aleppo with 70,000 troops and had captured three castles near the city. Moreover, having decided to leave Yunus Pasha al governo di Cayro per soldan (i.e. vali of Egypt), Selim became jealous of his popularity and, before leaving, sent Yunus a poisoned robe which was fatal (Sanuto, XXV, 79-80).
60. Holt, pp.43-44.
61. Spandugino, p.339.
62. Giovio, *Commentario*, f. 24v.
63. Sanuto, XXV, 79-80 (source is the *locotenente* in Cyprus, see note 59). Süreyya, IV, 677 states that Yunus was dismissed (as opposed to executed) on 11 Şa^cbân (923)/29 August (1517) which suggests that Yunus might have been governor for a short period and therefore supports this *Diarii* report.
64. Sanuto, XXV, 114-115, 118-119, and also note 54 for the dissatisfaction of the *javissaries*.
65. See note 57, and also Hammer, *GOR*, II, 500 (*Hist. IV*, 312-3)
66. Sanuto, XXV, 123-5 (the view of Tomaso Venier, consul in Alexandria).

67. Sanuto, XXV, 153-4 ('ne erano inurie antique e offensione nove').
68. Sanuto, XXV, 439-440: Mocenigo's Relazione to the Collegio, 4 June 1518 (reproduced in Alberi, Ser. III, vol. III, pp.53-55) See also note 54, Relazione of Contarini.

YUNUS LABUTI TURCOMAN - (1516/922)

[Janus Labuti# Turcoman]

Sanuto, XXIII, 420-22: in Damascus on 25 September 1516 there were public disturbances against merchants, particularly against Jews. Venetians were forced to barricade themselves in the residence of the Venetian consul. Yunus, formerly in the service of the dead Mamluk sultan, Ḳānsūh al-Ghaurī ("era tutto del signor Soldan morto"), arrived to call for calm and he visited the consul making various promises and assurances in the name of his new master, sultan Selim.

Could this perhaps be Yunus Beg, the Mamluk muhafiz of Ayntab who went over to the Ottomans on 18 August 1516?¹ He was of Circassian origin, which tallies with Sanuto's 'Turcoman'.

Notes

1. Süreyya, IV, p.676; Hammer, GOR, II, 464, 473, 651n (Hist. IV, 264, 276, 445n); Danişmend, II, pp.27, 33-4.

Sabuti in edition

ZERNOTA Zuan - secretary of SB (1510/915-6)

[sic]

Sanuto, X, 374: Greek secretary of the SB of the Morea, sent to Anabolu to sort out problems about boundaries. Riota [Vita, f 10v-11r) also records 'Cernota' in July 1507 as secretary to this SB and a Christian.

ZANNE (?YUNUS) ÇAVUŞ - ambassador (1512/918)

[Zanne Sius/ruis]

[Zauns Symix]

Although Sanuto met Zanne personally, he does not provide any details about his background.¹ His mission between 21 June and 14 July 1512 was to announce officially the accession of Selim.² At an audience with the Doge on 23 June, Zanne presented Selim's letter dated 4 May announcing that Bayezid had of his own volition chosen him as successor, and declaring himself a friend of Venice.³ Selim had lost no time since Bayezid's abdication on 24 April in notifying Venice of his accession and his friendship, most probably to ensure peaceful co-existence on his exposed western flank while he turned to face his brother Prince Ahmed in Anatolia. This placed Venice in a difficult situation. Well aware that the Selim's position was not yet secure, and not wishing to annoy Prince Ahmed who remained a powerful force, it was decided to send a letter of congratulation to Selim with Zanne but to delay the sending of a formal embassy of felicitation.⁴ Venice had her own troubles on her western flank in Italy, and this was a particularly delicate diplomatic interlude as she hoped to obtain military aid from whoever ultimately succeeded Bayezid.

Both sides took the mission seriously. Zanne was at pains throughout his stay to demonstrate his and Selim's support for Venice in her war in Italy.⁵ Sanuto recorded that he was present at a chance encounter between Zanne and di la Roxa, a representative of the King of France who was in Venice at the time. Zanne told Roxa that he should persuade his King to make peace with Venice, because the Republic's friends were the sultan's, and her enemies also his own. He also beseeched the Frenchman to secure the release of Andrea Gritti, now a prisoner of the French, whom he praised, like so many

Ottoman ambassadors to Venice before him.⁶

For their part the Venetians accorded Zanne great honours: forty patricians, all members of the Collegio and all dressed in scarlet as was the custom on such occasions, were sent to escort him to the ducal palace on the occasion of his first audience with the Doge;⁷ and when Zanne asked to be shown the state jewels, he was granted the privilege, which Sanuto noted was quite unprecedented for a Turkish ambassador.⁸

Notes

1. Sanuto, XIV, 415.
2. Sanuto, XIV, 303-4, 405, 478-9.
3. Sanuto, XIV, 410-11, 414-5.
4. Sanuto, XIV, 456: XV, 251-2.
5. Sanuto, XIV, 405.
6. Sanuto, XIV, 415.
7. Sanuto, XIV, 410-11.
8. Sanuto, XIV, 415.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

CONSPECTUS OF MANUSCRIPT SOURCES CONSULTED(A) Documents generated by the Ottoman stateArchivio di Stato, Venezia (ASV)

The Turkish documents in the ASV are grouped in two collections:

(i) Collezione di documenti turchi (CDT)

This is the main body of Turkish documents and Italian translations of Turkish documents in the ASV. For a description of the collection, see Alessio Bombaci, "La Collezione di documenti turchi dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia" in RSO XXIV (1949), pp. 95-907; and Sebastian, Indice Bombaci, pp. 497-510 for a recent account of the location of documents. See also Gökbilgin, M.T, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve bizimle ilgili diğer belgeler", Belgeler, V-VIII, 9-12 (1968-71), pp. 1-13; and Belgeler, I, 2 (1964), pp. 119-220 (reviewed by Mahmut Şakiroğlu in Studi Veneziani, XII (1970), pp. 665-671).

The CDT consists of:

- a) Buste I to XVIII, XVIII bis, XIX.
- b) Filze 2,3,4,5,7.

Regests of the documents in both the Buste and the Filze are given in the Indice Bombaci which is located in CDT Busta XX. For a description of the Indice Bombaci, see Sebastian, Indice Bombaci, p. 501.

(ii) Firmani Turchi, ex-Sala Regina Margherita, ser. LXXXI.

See bibliographical references under CDT for description of contents (particularly Sebastian, Indice Bombaci, p. 503). Regests of documents in this archive are also provided in the Indice Bombaci (see above). This collection consists of 48 documents, mainly fermans and Grand Vizierial letters, covering the period 1480-1813.

(B) Records generated by the Venetian State**Archivio di Stato, Venezia****Consiglio dei Dieci (CX)**

Misti, Registers 21, 22, 28 to 40.
Filze 14, 15.

Camerlengo del CX. Notatorio, Register 1 (1503-1509)

Proclami, Busta 1 (1457-1517).

Benedetto Soranzo, Arcivescovo di Cipro, secolo XV.

Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci (Capi CX)

Dispacci degli ambasciatori (Constantinopoli) (1504-1550)
[ASV Index 96]

Busta 1, Dispacci di Alvise Arimondo (oratore), Lunardo Bembo (bailo), Andrea Foscolo (bailo), Nicolo Zustinian (bailo), Lodovico Valdrin (segretario al bailo).

Dispacci, lettere di rettori, e di altre cariche [e.g. provveditori, capitani general], ai capi [ASV Index 95, part III]

Busta 255	Consoli e altre cariche (1500-1622)
Busta 274	Almissa, Antivari, Budua (1500-1793)
Busta 275	Castelnuovo (1501-1796), Cattaro (1500-1601)
Busta 278	Dulcigno (1500-1556), Liesina (1498-1782)
Busta 280	Sebenico (1501-1791)
Busta 281	Spalato (1500-1791), Trau (1501-1750)
Busta 282	Veglia (1501-1795)
Busta 283	Zara
Busta 284	(1500-1793)
Busta 285	Alessio (1504), Candia (1505-1573)
Busta 286	Candia (1517-1666)
Busta 287	Cefalonia (1504-1752)
Busta 288	Cipro (1493-1529)
Busta 291	Corfu (1500-1559)
Busta 294	Napoli di Romania (1500-1539, 1710), Nola (1500)
Busta 296	Zante (1506-1749)
Busta 301	Capitano general da mar (1500-1691)
Busta 302	Albania (1500-1655), Provveditori General
Busta 305	Capitani general d'armata (1513-1637) Capitani in golfo (1510-1747)
Busta 306	Sopracomiti (1500-1588)
Busta 307	Condottieri e genti d'arme (A-0)
Busta 308	Condottieri e genti d'arme (P-Z)

Senato

Secreta, Deliberazioni, Registers 31 - 47.

Miscellanea di Atti Diplomatici and Privati (MADP)

[ASV Index 243]

Busta 45 [contains the Liber Graecus]

Busta 47, 48, 49.

Miscellanea Codici. Nuovo Ordinamento [ASV Index 238]

Ser. I, Registers 60, 74, 77, 78, 128, 129, 131, 132,
144, 145, 146, 147.

Ser. II, Registers 65, 67, 74.

Ser. III, Registers 18, 19, 20.

Miscellanea Gregolin [ASV Index 246]

Buste 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 12a, 12 bis.

Miscellanea Atti. Diversi Manoscritti (MADM)

Filza 132

Liber Graecus

Busta 45 of MADP

Libri Commemorativi della Repubblica di Venezia

Books XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI in conjunction with Predelli's
Regesti, vol. VI.

Duca di Candia [ASV Index 62]

Buste 1, 2, 3.

Procuratori di San Marco (PSM)

The spectacular find of seven Ottoman documents by John Wansburgh in PSM, Misti, Busta 161, 'Commissaria di Angelo Malipiero, capitano de galere di Barbaria' (published by V.L. Menage in Stern, ed., Documents from Islamic Chanceries, 1965) prompted me to examine carefully this particular archive. Unfortunately my efforts were unrewarded, but I list below for the information of other historians those Buste which I examined.

PSM, Misti.

Buste 5, 6a, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 76a, 78, 86, 92, 97, 103, 104,
104a, 111, 115, 115a, 141, 142, 144, 147, 149, 152, 154, 154a,
164, 168, 170a.

PSM, Citra.

Buste 6, 68, 68a, 78, 86, 96, 97, 104, 123, 124, 125, 126, 142,
144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 154, 154a, 155, 161, 162, 163,
164, 165, 182, 207.

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Relazione di Andrea Foscolo bailo a Constantinopoli, 1507-1511, BNM, It. Cod. VI, 277 (=5806).

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Copialettere di sier Andrea Gritti, (concerning Gritti's mission to Istanbul in 1503), BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (= 8652), ff. 1-60.

Commissione di sier Andrea Gritti, (concerning Gritti's mission to Istanbul in 1503), BNM, Cod. It. VII, 878 (=8652), fasc. 2, ff. 1r-12r, 19 May 1503..

Narrazione of Gian Giacomo Caroldo, (Caroldo was Gritti's coadjutor on the mission to Istanbul in 1503), BNM, Cod. It. 277 (= 5806), ff. 120-127. This is identical with respect to handwriting and watermarks to the document inserted in Sanuto's Diarii at V, 455-468 (211v ff in MS). A third draft (BNM, Cod. It, 882 (= 8505) differs from the the previous two in handwriting and watermark. According to Zorzanello's commentary under its BNM reference, this third draft is the Caroldo autograph.

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ASV	Archivio di Stato, Venezia
ASV, <u>Firmani Turchi</u>	ASV, <u>Firmani turchi</u>
ASV, <u>CDT</u>	ASV, <u>Collezione di documenti turchi</u> (Buste and Filze)
ASV, <u>Indice Bombaci</u> (chron)	Bombaci's chronological index-cum-regesta (in ASV, CDT, Busta XX) of Turkish documents in the ASV.
ASV, <u>Indice Bombaci</u> (Box))	Bombaci's index-cum-regesta (in ASV, CDT, Busta XX) listed according to location of document in the ASV, CDT (Buste or Filze) or in the ASV, <u>Firmani Turchi</u> .
ASV, <u>Liber Graecus</u>	<u>Liber Graecus</u>
ASV, <u>Libri Comm</u>	<u>Libri Commemoriali</u>
ASV, CX	<u>Consiglio dei Dieci</u>
ASV, Capi CX	<u>Capi di Consiglio dei Dieci</u>
ASV, Sen. Sec. Delib.	<u>Senato, Secreta, Deliberazioni</u>
ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Const)	Capi CX, Dispacci di ambasciatori
ASV, Capi CX, Dispacci (Rettori)	Capi CX, Dispacci di Rettori
ASV, <u>MADP</u>	<u>Miscellanea Atti Diplomatici e privati</u>
ASV, <u>MADM</u>	<u>Miscellanea Atti. Diversi Manoscritti</u>
<u>Misc. Gregolin</u>	<u>Miscellanea Gregolin</u>
ASV, CX, <u>Camerlengo</u> (<u>Notatorio</u>)	Camerlengo del CX, (Notatorio)
BNM	Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana
BNM, <u>Copialettere</u>	BNM, Cod. It. VII. 878 (=8652) <u>Copialettere di Andrea Gritti</u>
MCC	Museo Civico Correr

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Journals and Collections: abbreviations

<u>Belgeler</u>	<u>Belgeler(Türk Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi), Ankara, i (1964)-</u>
<u>Belleten</u>	Türk Tarihi Kurumu, <u>Belleten</u> , Ankara, i, (1937)-
<u>BM</u>	British Museum (British Library)
<u>BSOAS</u>	<u>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</u>
<u>CHI</u>	<u>Cambridge History of Islam</u>
<u>EHR</u>	<u>English Historical Review</u>
<u>EI(1)</u>	<u>The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4 vols. and supplement, Leiden-London, 1913-1938.</u>
<u>EI(2)</u>	<u>The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), Leiden-London, (1954)-</u>
<u>IA</u>	<u>Islâm Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, (1940)-</u>
<u>NCMH</u>	<u>New Cambridge Modern History</u>
<u>TMA</u>	<u>Topkapısarayı Müzesi Arşivi</u>
<u>REI</u>	<u>Revue des Etudes Islamiques</u>
<u>RSO</u>	<u>Rivista degli Studi Orientali</u>
<u>WZKM</u>	<u>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, xxix (1915).</u>