

# Democratization

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20>

## Movement-voting nexus in hybrid regimes: voter mobilization in Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Movement

Brian C. H. Fong

To cite this article: Brian C. H. Fong (2022): Movement-voting nexus in hybrid regimes: voter mobilization in Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, *Democratization*, DOI: [10.1080/13510347.2022.2037566](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2037566)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2037566>



© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 23 Mar 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 57




View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

# Movement-voting nexus in hybrid regimes: voter mobilization in Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Movement

Brian C. H. Fong 

SOAS China Institute, SOAS University of London, London, UK

## ABSTRACT


The “movement-voting nexus” thesis highlights the impact of transformative social movements on shifting voting behaviour and electoral outcomes. However, existing studies have overwhelmingly focused on the context of democracies. This study goes beyond the existing literature by testing the applicability of “movement-voting nexus” in the context of hybrid regimes, using the voter mobilization in the Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Movement as a case study. The findings of this study are two-fold: The quantitative findings from a territory-wide telephone survey validated the thesis of “movement-voting nexus” in Hong Kong’s hybrid regime, statistically establishing the significance of “movement support” as a novel predictor of voting behaviour (vis-à-vis other predictors such as political partisanship) in times of transformative social movement, as in the case of democracies; the qualitative findings from extended interviews of survey respondents revealed that the “movement-voting nexus” was operating in the shadows of authoritarian electoral influence in the territory, reflecting the nuanced features of Hong Kong’s hybrid regime. This study contributes to extant literature by advancing the discussion from democracies to hybrid regimes, paving the way for future research across diverse political regimes.

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 16 September 2021; Accepted 28 January 2022

**KEYWORDS** Social movements; elections; voter mobilization; hybrid regimes; Hong Kong; Anti-Extradition Bill Movement

## 1. Introduction

For many decades, studies of social movements and elections have been conducted separately by scholars, with the former seen as a non-institutionalised form of politics and the latter considered as an institutionalised form of politics.<sup>1</sup> In recent years, scholars have increasingly recognised the theoretical significance of studying the relationship between social movements and elections, and a growing body of literature have surfaced to investigate their interactions. In this emerging field, studying the impact of “movement support” on voting behaviour is a recent area of focus.<sup>2</sup> However, the literature thus far has only focused on studying such a “movement-voting nexus” in

**CONTACT** Brian C. H. Fong  brian.fong@soas.ac.uk

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

the context of democracies.<sup>3</sup> This study goes beyond existing studies by examining the relationship between “movement support” and voting behaviour under hybrid regimes, using Hong Kong as a case study.

## 2. Research context

Traditionally, scholars paid little attention to the interactive relationship between social movements and elections. Until the 1990s, social movements and elections remained discrete areas of research in social sciences, with limited studies conducted to systematically specify how social movements affect elections and vice versa.<sup>4</sup> Such a striking divide only reflected the traditional scholarly bias of a clear, impermeable boundary between institutionalised politics (i.e. elections) and non-institutionalised politics (i.e. social movements). It ignored the fact that in modern democracies, established political parties often rely on social movement support to win elections, while social movements cannot succeed without the sponsorship of party politicians.<sup>5</sup>

In the 2000s, a growing body of literature has explored the relationship between social movements and elections.<sup>6</sup> Calling for a more integrated perspective to understand the reciprocal relationship between social movements and elections, Heaney pioneered a conceptual typology to study how “movements affect elections” and “elections affect movements”. The former category encompasses several research foci, namely movements’ pressure on democratising elections in non-democracies, movements’ push for the extension of citizen rights, movements’ transformation of party realignment, movements’ impact on electoral outcomes, and movement’s effects on the orientations of activists. The latter category comprises other research foci, including the impact of the timing of elections on movements’ opportunity structures, electoral participation as an inducement to cause conflicts within movements, elections as an incentive to moderate the positions of movements, electoral outcomes as a factor to change people’s motivations to participate in movements, and elections as a driving force to forge the identities of citizens.<sup>7</sup>

In this emergent study field of the reciprocity of social movements and elections, the impact of “movement support” on voting behaviour has attracted much scholarly attention.<sup>8</sup> The reason for growing attention is that scholars noted the transformative power of social movements in dramatically shifting electoral outcomes (and even inducing long-term political realignment) by influencing different electoral coalitions’ balance of support—When readily mobilizable movement supporters are cultivated to vote overwhelmingly for candidates affiliated with the movements.<sup>9</sup> In other words, for scholars that recognise the importance of the “movement-voting nexus” thesis, social movements signal the potential for voter mobilisation for specified candidates and pave the way for dramatic electoral outcomes.<sup>10</sup>

In recent years, a number of empirical studies were conducted to examine how such a “movement-voting nexus” had fuelled voter mobilisation, which shaped the electoral outcomes to different degrees in times of transformative social movements. To name a few prominent examples, Andrews examined the historical case of U.S. civil rights movements by studying county-level electoral outcomes in Mississippi from the 1960s to the 1980s. His analysis showed the positive impact of movement mobilisation on the number of Blacks registered as voters, votes cast for Black candidates, the quantity of Black candidates standing for elections, and the number of Black elected officials.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, Beyerlein and Andrews similarly studied the historical case

of U.S. civil rights movements, adopting a historical survey of Black Southerners in 1961 to demonstrate that Black participation in the movement incentivized their voting in the 1960 presidential election.<sup>12</sup> Madestam et al. analysed the impact of the U.S. Tea Party Movement, using election data to illustrate that counties featuring a higher number of Tea Party rallies were likelier to have a higher vote share for Republican candidates in the 2010 mid-term election.<sup>13</sup> Rudig studied the impact of the anti-Iraq war protests held on 15 February 2003 on the electoral outcomes of several countries, showing that the effect was strongest in Spain where the Socialist Party's 2004 electoral victory was powered by its alignment with the movement.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, Galais investigated the 15M anti-austerity movement in Spain in 2011, using a four-wave online panel survey to validate that 15M activists had a higher probability of voting.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, Mosca and Quaranta examined voting support for movement parties in Southern Europe, namely Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, and Left Bloc in Portugal. Using internet-based post-electoral surveys, they found that respondents who had participated in protests were more likely to vote for the parties supported by the movements in their respective countries.<sup>16</sup>

Although the existing studies have made a strong empirical case that “movement supporters” would have a higher probability of voting for “pro-movement candidates”, they focused overwhelmingly on established democracies. Whether and to what extent is the “movement-voting nexus” thesis applicable to hybrid regimes, despite the prevalence of authoritarian electoral influence in such regimes, where some form of elections exists but authoritarian influence prevails? This study addresses this research question through a case study of Hong Kong, with reference to the impact of the 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement on voting behaviour in the District Council election by adopting a mixed-method research strategy through a quantitative territory-wide telephone survey and qualitative extended interviews of survey respondents.

### 3. Research case background

#### 3.1. Hong Kong as a hybrid regime

Hong Kong is a former British colony (1841-1997) and became a Chinese Special Administrative Region in 1997 (1997-present). In the final decades of British colonial rule, Hong Kong went through a process of political liberalisation from the 1970s to the 1990s. Transforming from an authoritarian crown colony into a hybrid regime, the Hong Kong government, headed by the appointed British Governor, was increasingly checked and balanced by a number of semi-democratic institutions, including the partially elected legislature and district bodies, an independent judiciary, quasi-autonomous administrative watchdogs, a vibrant civil society, and critical media.<sup>17</sup> This hybrid regime was codified by Beijing through the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law as the constitutional foundation of the “One Country Two Systems” (OCTS) model, to be continued in Hong Kong after the handover of sovereignty on 1 July 1997.<sup>18</sup>

In the context of comparative democratisation studies, Hong Kong's political liberalisation in the past few decades was far from a full-fledged democratisation. Considering that the governors were appointed by London before 1997 and the chief executives were handpicked by Beijing through an election committee after 1997, the Hong Kong government remains non-popularly elected and institutionally unaccountable to the people of Hong Kong, with popular elections limited to the levels

**Table 1.** Hong Kong's limited popular elections.

|                             | Number of seats chosen by popular elections | Number of seats chosen by indirect elections/ex-officio appointments | Total number of seats | Percentage of seats chosen by popular elections |
|-----------------------------|---|--|-----------------------|---|
| Legislative Council (2016)  | 40 <sup>1</sup>                             | 30 <sup>2</sup>  | 70                    | 57.2%   |
| 18 District Councils (2019) | 452   | 27 <sup>3</sup>  | 479                   | 94.4%   |

<sup>1</sup>The 40 seats chosen by popular elections include the 35 geographic constituency seats and the 5 “Super District Councillor” functional constituency seats (only elected District Councillors who will be elected by registered voters based on universal suffrage are eligible to run for such seats).

<sup>2</sup>The other 30 seats of the Legislative Council are chosen by industry-based, indirectly elected functional constituencies.

<sup>3</sup>There are 27 ex-officio members, who are appointed based on their positions as chairpersons of Rural Committees in the New Territories.

Source: Electoral Affairs Commission's website at. Available online: <https://www.eac.gov.hk>.

of the Legislative Council and 18 District Councils (Table 1). Conceptually speaking, Hong Kong has been situated in what democratisation scholars have described a “political grey zone” between democracy and autocracy, and its transition from a hybrid regime to a full democracy is nowhere in sight.<sup>19</sup>

In the early 2010s, while the democrats still struggle to fight for the “double universal suffrage” for the Chief Executive and Legislative Council elections, Beijing has gradually exerted authoritarian-style electoral influence over Hong Kong. Democratisation scholars have long observed that some forms of competitive, multiparty elections are not uncommon in hybrid regimes worldwide, such as in Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, New Order Indonesia (1966-1998), and Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (1946-2000), but such elections often operate under systematic authoritarian influence.<sup>20</sup> Empirical studies indicate that systematic electoral influence have become increasingly prevalent in Hong Kong today, such as the disqualification of opposition candidates and legislators-elect, unequal resource competition, and gerrymandering.

For disqualification of opposition candidates and legislators-elect, since the 2016 Legislative Council election, the Returning Officers of the Hong Kong government have vetted the political biographies of candidates during the pre-election stage and have invalidated the nomination of those candidates whom they consider as not “faithfully upholding the Basic Law”, such as candidates who advocate self-determination and independence. Disqualification can also be found in the post-election stage, the prominent example being the disqualification of six legislators-elect by the Hong Kong courts in 2016 and 2017 for improper oath-taking, the judgments of which were based upon the National People's Congress Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law Article 104 on 7 November 2016.<sup>21</sup>

For unequal resource competition, in recent years, the pro-establishment parties have significantly expanded their voter support base through unequal resource competition. Supported by generous donations and sponsorships from pro-establishment businessmen, political parties such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong have established a clear resource edge over their pro-democracy contenders. They successfully establish strong constituency networks by

extensively distributing spoils to grassroots voters, such as free meals and gifts, boosting their electoral chances particularly at the level of District Council elections.<sup>22</sup>

For gerrymandering, redistricting at the level of District Council elections has become increasingly common in recent years, with constituencies of pro-democracy politicians more likely to be redistricted by the government-appointed Electoral Affairs Commission. Such practices have reduced the overall chances of re-election of pro-democracy District Councillors.<sup>23</sup>

In sum, the systematic application of authoritarian electoral influence in recent years has enabled the establishment camp to gradually gain ground in electoral arena—At the level of District Council elections, the establishment camp had already established a stable majority in the 18 District Councils in the 2007, 2011, and 2015 general elections; At the level of Legislative Council elections, the establishment camp had also eroded the traditional edge of the democrats in geographical constituencies and was already neck-and-neck with the democrats in terms of the number of seats and the popular vote share in recent general elections.<sup>24</sup> Featuring a combination of limited popular elections and authoritarian electoral influence, Hong Kong is a potential research site to test whether and to what extent the established theory of “movement-voting nexus” is transferable from democracies to hybrid regimes.

### **3.2. The Anti-Extradition Bill Movement**

The Extradition Bill, officially named the *Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019*,<sup>25</sup> triggered the most dramatic social movement in Hong Kong’s history. Introduced in February 2019, the Extradition Bill was justified by Carrie Lam as the only legal solution to manage the “Poon Hiu-wing murder case” that occurred in Taiwan.<sup>26</sup>

By establishing an ad hoc extradition mechanism to transfer fugitives to places with no extradition agreements with Hong Kong, including Mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau, the Extradition Bill triggered extensive concerns and opposition across society, even across the political spectrum from the opposition to establishment camps—that the existing firewall that separated the legal jurisdiction of Hong Kong from the Mainland will be removed.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, the legal controversies surrounding the Extradition Bill quickly developed into a full-blown panic about the future of the OCTS model in Hong Kong.<sup>28</sup>

On 9 June 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front initiated the “million people march” to oppose the Extradition Bill. It symbolically instigated the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, which was followed by a prolonged series of mass protest events that lasted for more than eight months until the global outbreak of COVID-19 in February 2020.<sup>29</sup> On the whole, the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement was marked by the strong solidarity between the moderate and radical wings of the movement.<sup>30</sup> Unlike most of the social movements which are often minority movements, the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement was by nature a “community-wide movement”, building upon a majority public support of diversified demographic backgrounds across gender, age, education level, class, and political partisanship.<sup>31</sup>


### **3.3. The district council election**

Re-elected every four years, the 2019 District Council election was scheduled to be held on 24 November 2019. Interestingly, the election day was gazetted by the Hong Kong

government on 15 March 2019, almost three months before the outbreak of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement.<sup>32</sup> Nobody could have expected that the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement would erupt in June 2019 and unfold across the District Council on election day.

Once the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement broke out in June 2019, the District Council election was put on the agenda of movement activists. During the “two million people march” held on 16 June 2019, a civil society group called Reimagine HK set up street booths along the rally route, mobilising protesters to register as voters so that they could vote against the establishment camp in the upcoming District Council election. It successfully distributed more than 12,000 voter registration forms on that day.<sup>33</sup> In the following weeks, different opposition parties, civil society groups, and netizens in the LIHKG Forum organised campaigns to encourage people to register as voters before the official deadline of 2 July 2019.<sup>34</sup> Finally, the total number of registered voters reached a record high of 4,132,977, with a marked increase of 318,659 newly registered voters from 2018 (Figure 1).

Apart from voter registration campaigns, a group of netizens organised a campaign called “Campaign for Preventing Uncontested Elections”, aiming at mobilising protesters to run in uncontested constituencies long occupied by the establishment camp.<sup>35</sup> Another group of netizens from the LIHKG Forum organised a platform called “Freedom Group” to mobilise netizens to stand for District Council elections.<sup>36</sup> Coordinated by the democrats’ electoral platform the “Power for Democracy”, all the 452 directly elected District Council Constituency Areas (DCCAs) were filled with opposition candidates.<sup>37</sup> On the eve of the District Council election in mid-November 2019, all the democratic opposition legislators announced a joint declaration calling for making the District Council election a “referendum of the Five Demands”—“Five Demands, Not One Less!” was the most well-known, representative slogan of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, it included the formal withdrawal of the Extradition




**Figure 1.** Number of registered voters, 2003-2019 Source: Official voter registration website. Available online: <https://www.voterregistration.gov.hk>.




Bill, retraction of the “riot” characterisation, offer of an amnesty for arrested protesters, the setting up of a commission of inquiry into police brutality, and implementation of dual universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and Legislative elections.<sup>38</sup>

The voter registration drive and the salience of “Five Demands, Not One Less!” as an electoral issue both signalled the potential of how voter mobilisation under the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement may shift the balance of support to the favour of the opposition camp in the 2019 District Council election, an electoral arena that the establishment camp had exhibited a clear advantage since the 2007 general election. Finally, the District Council election was held as scheduled on 24 November 2019 with an unprecedented high voter turnout rate of 71.23% (Figure 2). The exceptionally high voter turnout was decisive in securing a landslide victory for the opposition camp, or the “pro-movement candidates”, that is, the traditional democrats and the newly emerged localists. In the 2007, 2011, and 2015 District Council elections, the establishment camp made use of its resources advantage to cultivate and mobilise grassroots voters, successfully securing a stable majority in the 18 District Councils.<sup>39</sup> In the 2019 District Council election, the establishment camp had actually progressed in terms of the total number of votes gained, increasing its vote share by more than 418,256 from 788,389 in 2015–1,206,645 in 2019. Still, the historic voter turnout had voted overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition camp, almost tripling its vote share from 581,058 in 2015–1,673,834 in 2019 (Figure 3). As the District Council election is operated on the single-constituency majoritarian system, such tremendous voter engagement enabled the opposition camp to capture 386 out of the total 452 DCCAs and secure majorities in 17 out of the 18 District Councils (Figure 4). Is the dramatic shift of balance of support between the opposition and the establishment camps a result of the operation of the “movement-voting nexus” in the hybrid regime context of Hong Kong? The interaction between the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and the 2019 District Council election in Hong Kong provided a suitable site to test the thesis of “movement-voting nexus” in the hybrid regime context.




**Figure 2.** Voter turnout rate at District Council elections since the handover Source: Electoral Affairs Commission at <https://www.eac.gov.hk>.





**Figure 3.** The vote share of opposition and establishment camps in 2015 and 2019 District Council elections Source: The Stand News', 2019. District Council election website: <https://dce2019.thestandnews.com> (in Chinese only).



**Figure 4.** The partisan distribution of 18 District Councils after the 2019 election Source: Adapted from 2019 (Mingpao, 2019). The numbers in the horizontal bars denote the numerical number of seats held by the establishment and opposition camps, respectively.

## 4. Research design

### 4.1. Mixed methods research

To test the “movement-voting nexus” thesis in the hybrid regime context of Hong Kong, this study adopted mixed methods research to examine whether and to what extent “movement supporters” demonstrate a higher probability to overwhelmingly vote for “pro-movement candidates”, in the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and District Council election.

Following an explanatory sequential design,<sup>40</sup> this study triangulated qualitative and quantitative research methods by conducting quantitative analyses in the first stage (through a territory-wide telephone survey) and qualitative interpretation of this quantitative data in the second stage (through extended interviews of survey

respondents). Such a mixed methods research strategy helps paint a more comprehensive picture of the impact of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement on voting behaviours in the District Council election.

## 4.2. Territory-wide telephone survey

### 4.2.1. Hierarchical regression analysis

The established empirical studies on “movement-voting nexus” generally indicated that “movement supporters” are likelier to overwhelmingly vote for the “pro-movement candidates”, thus changing the balance of support between different electoral coalitions and shifting the electoral outcomes to different degrees.<sup>41</sup>

To better test whether and to what extent the “movement support” variable is a novel predictor of voting behaviour in the dramatic context of the 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and District Council election, a hierarchical regression analysis will be adopted. In statistical analysis, hierarchical regression is often used to measure the significance of a focal independent variable on a dependent variable after accounting for all other independent variables. It will build several regression models by adding independent variables to previous models according to a specified, theoretically-based sequence, so that researchers can assess whether and to what extent the newly added independent variables can better explain the variance in the dependent variable by comparing the several regression models.<sup>42</sup>

By adopting a hierarchical regression analysis, this study endeavours to test whether “movement support” explains the voting behaviour above and beyond those traditional predictors, such as age, education, social class, and political partisanship. For this purpose, a three-stage hierarchical regression analysis will be conducted:

Model 1: voting behaviour = demographic variables

Model 2: voting behaviour = demographic variables + political partisanship

Model 3: voting behaviour = demographic variables + political partisanship + movement support

### 4.2.2. Operationalization

For Model 1, numerous demographic factors were included, including gender (1 = “male”, 2 = “female”), age (range = 18-86), education level (“1” primary school or below, “2” secondary school, “3” undergraduate student, “4” undergraduate degree, and “5” master degree or above), place of birth (1 = “Mainland China and other places”, 2 = “Hong Kong”), parentage (“1” Both father and mother are not born in Hong Kong, “2” Either father or mother is born in Hong Kong, and “3” Both father and mother are born in Hong Kong), local living experience (which is operationalised as the number of years as a resident in Hong Kong; range = 2-86), and social class (which is operationalised as level of family income; “1” 1. HK \$4,999 or below, “2” HK\$5,000-9,999, “3” HK\$10,000-14,999, “4” HK\$15,000-19,999, “5” HK\$20,000-29,999, “6” HK\$30,000-39,999, “7” HK\$40,000-49,999, and “8” HK\$50,000 or above).

For Model 2, “political partisanship” is operationalized as responses to the following question. Identifying with either the “democrats” or “localists” is coded as 3 (i.e. “identifying with the opposition camp”); identifying as an “independent” is

coded as 2 (i.e. “independent”); and finally, identifying with either the “pro-China leftists” or “industrial merchants” is coded as 1 (i.e. “identifying with the establishment camp”).

- What is your political partisanship? Will you identify yourself with the “democrats”, “localists”, “pro-China leftists”, “industrial merchants”, or “independents”?

For Model 3, “movement support”, meaning the level of support to the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, is the focal independent variable of this study. It is operationalized as respondents’ level of support to the “Five Demands”. Given that the “Five Demands” was at the core agenda of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and the 2019 District Council election was “seen as referendum on pro-democracy movement”,<sup>43</sup> measuring the public’s level of support of the “Five Demands” is a reliable indicator of their level of support to the movement as a whole. Responses to this variable were collected by calculating the average scores of respondents’ answers to the following five questions, which were designed based on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly support). Respondents who attained an average score of 3.01 or above are coded as “movement supporters”, while those who got an average score of 3 or below are coded as “non-movement supporters”.

- Protesters of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement made the “Five Demands”. We would like to know your view of these demands. The first demand is the formal withdrawal of tradition bills. Do you strongly support, support, half-support, oppose, or strongly oppose this demand?
- The second demand is the retraction of the “riot” characterisation. Do you strongly support, support, half-support, oppose, or strongly oppose this demand?
- The third demand is the offer of an amnesty for arrested protesters. Do you strongly support, support, half-support, oppose, or strongly oppose this demand?
- The fourth demand is the establishment of a commission of inquiry into police brutality. Do you strongly support, support, half-support, oppose, or strongly oppose this demand?
- The fifth demand is the implementation of dual universal suffrage for the chief executive and legislative elections. Do you strongly support, support, half-support, oppose, or strongly oppose this demand?

The focal dependent variable, namely “voting for the pro-movement candidates”, are expressed as responses to the question that follow. Voting for either the “democrats” or “localists” is coded as 3 (i.e. “voting for the pro-movement candidates in the 2019 District Council election”); voting for “independent” is coded as 2 (i.e. neutral); and finally, voting for either the “pro-China leftists” or “industrial merchants” is coded as 1 (i.e. “voting for the establishment camp in the 2019 District Council election”).

- In the 2019 District Council election, which political camp did you vote for? Candidate who are “democrats”, “localists, pro-China leftists, industrial merchants, or “independents”?

### 4.2.3. Data collection

A territory-wide telephone survey was conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, from 16 November 2020–4 December 2020.

The sample size was 1,054, and the respondents were randomly generated by a computer. The target population included Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong who were 18 years old or above, and the survey was conducted in Cantonese. The response rate was 41.0%, and the standard error was less than 6% (at a 95% confidence level; the sampling error of all percentages was less than  $\pm 3.0\%$ ). Figures were rim-weighted according to data obtained from the Census and Statistics Department on the gender-age distribution of the Hong Kong Population figure of mid-2019.

### 4.3. Extended interviews of survey respondents

When conducting the territory-wide telephone survey, interviewers asked the respondents to indicate whether they were willing to conduct extended interviews with the research team, and if they responded “yes”, to provide their salutations and telephone numbers for future contact.

Among those respondents who agreed to participate in the extended interviews, 89 were coded as “movement supporters”. To qualitatively study the mechanism of “movement-voting nexus”, the extended interviews focused on these “movement supporters”. Therefore, the research team first incorporated all these 89 “movement supporters” into a main list, then randomly selected the potential interviewees and sent out interview invitations. Finally, a total of 12 extended interviews were conducted in March 2021 (Table 2).

All the extended interviews were conducted semi-structurally according to a set of guiding questions, which were principally designed to qualitatively assess the quantitative data of the telephone survey questions. All interviewees provided informed consent. To protect the identities of the interviewees, the interviews were not recorded on video or audio. The interviewers recorded the main points of the discussion in writing for further analysis.

## 5. Research findings and discussion

### 5.1. Quantitative findings and discussion

The descriptive statistics (Table 3) reaffirmed the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement as a majority movement rather than a minority movement, with a majority of respondents reporting that they supported or strongly supported the Five Demands (the levels of support/strongly support for the first demand to the fifth demand stood at 59.4%, 54.8%, 48.3%, 75.7%, and 66.5%, respectively). Those who had voted for the “pro-movement candidates” (34.2% voted for candidates from the democrats while 11.3% voted for candidates from the localists) also formed significant numbers.

The three-stage hierarchical regression analysis [Table 4] quantitatively validated the thesis of “movement-voting nexus” in the hybrid regime context of Hong Kong. For Model 1, it was statistically significant ( $R^2 = 0.06$ ,  $F(7, 586) = 5.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and explained 5.7% of the variance. In this model, “age” ( $\beta = -0.435$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) is most negatively significant in predicting people’s “voting for the pro-movement

**Table 2.** Profiles of Interviewees (Percentage of Interviewees) [N=12].

| Gender                                       |        |
|--|--------|
| Male   | 75.00% |
| Female                                       | 25.00% |
| Age  |        |
| ≤ 20   | 0%     |
| 20 to 39                                     | 41.67% |
| 40 to 59                                     | 25.00% |
| ≥ 60   | 33.33% |
| Education level                              |        |
| Primary or below                             | 16.67% |
| Secondary                                    | 16.67% |
| Undergraduate                                | 0%     |
| Bachelor degree                              | 33.33% |
| Master degree or above                       | 33.33% |
| Occupation                                   |        |
| Working people                               | 58.33% |
| Unemployed                                   | 0%     |
| Retired                                      | 33.33% |
| Students                                     | 0%     |
| Others                                       | 8.33%  |
| Place of birth                               |        |
| Hong Kong                                    | 91.67% |
| Mainland China                               | 8.33%  |
| Others                                       | 0%     |
| Number of years living in Hong Kong          |        |
| ≤ 10   | 0%     |
| 10 to 19                                     | 8.33%  |
| 20 to 29                                     | 16.67% |
| 30 to 39                                     | 25.00% |
| 40 to 49                                     | 8.33%  |
| 50 to 59                                     | 8.33%  |
| ≥ 60   | 33.33% |
| Place of birth of parents                    |        |
| Both of parents are born in Hong Kong        | 25.00% |
| Either Father or Mother is born in Hong Kong | 0%     |
| Both of parents are not born in Hong Kong    | 75.00% |
| Family income                                |        |
| ≤ HK\$4,999                                  | 0%     |
| HK\$5,000 to 9,999                           | 0%     |
| HK\$10,000 to 14,999                         | 0%     |
| HK\$15,000 to 19,999                         | 16.67% |
| HK\$20,000 to 29,999                         | 0%     |
| HK\$30,000 to 39,999                         | 16.67% |
| HK\$40,000 to 49,999                         | 8.33%  |
| ≥ HK\$50,000                                 | 50.00% |
| Unstable income                              | 8.33%  |

candidates”, meaning that the younger the age, the higher the probability of voting for “pro-movement candidates”. Meanwhile, Model 2, by adding “political partisanship”, accounts for an additional 21.7% of variance, with  $R^2$  increased to 0.28,  $F(8, 585) = 27.67$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . In this model, “political partisanship” is most positively significant in predicting people’s “voting for the pro-movement candidates”, meaning that people who have identified themselves as democrats or localists are likelier to vote for “pro-movement candidates”.

Model 3, by adding the “movement support” variable into the analysis, explains an additional 23.5% of variance, with  $R^2$  increased to 0.51,  $F(9, 584) = 67.45$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . Under this model, “movement support” is most positively significant in predicting

**Table 3.** Descriptive statistics (percentage of respondents) [N = 1054].

| INDEPENDENTS VARIABLES  |       |
|---|-------|
| <i>Gender</i>   |       |
| Male  | 51.7% |
| Female  | 48.3% |
| <i>Age</i>  |       |
| ≤ 19  | 2.9%  |
| 20 to 39  | 34.0% |
| 40 to 59  | 40.3% |
| ≥ 60  | 20.8% |
| Refuse to answer  | 2.0%  |
| <i>Education level</i>  |       |
| Primary or below  | 6.2%  |
| Secondary   | 37.3% |
| Undergraduate   | 5.4%  |
| Bachelor's degree   | 39.4% |
| Master's degree or above  | 11.4% |
| Refuse to answer  | 0.4%  |
| <i>Place of birth</i>   |       |
| Hong Kong   | 77.5% |
| Mainland China  | 19.4% |
| Other   | 2.8%  |
| Refuse to answer  | 0.3%  |
| <i>Local living experience (number of years as a resident in Hong Kong)</i>                                 |       |
| ≤ 9   | 1.5%  |
| 10 to 19  | 6.4%  |
| 20 to 29  | 16.8% |
| 30 to 39  | 21.1% |
| 40 to 49  | 22.8% |
| 50 to 59  | 14.7% |
| ≥ 60  | 15.7% |
| Refuse to answer  | 1.1%  |
| <i>Parentage (place of birth of parents)</i>  |       |
| Parents are born in Hong Kong   | 26.8% |
| Either father or mother is born in Hong Kong (while the other one is born in the Mainland or another place) | 19.4% |
| Parents are not born in Hong Kong   | 48.9% |
| Refuse to provide the place of birth of father or and mother  | 4.9%  |
| <i>Social class (family income)</i>   |       |
| ≤ HK\$ 4,999  | 2.0%  |
| HK\$ 5,000 to 9,999   | 2.7%  |
| HK\$ 10,000 to 14,999   | 4.2%  |
| HK\$ 15,000 to 19,999   | 4.6%  |
| HK\$ 20,000 to 29,999   | 12.2% |
| HK\$ 30,000 to 39,999   | 15.9% |
| HK\$ 40,000 to 49,999   | 9.0%  |
| ≥ HK\$ 50,000   | 38.0% |
| Unstable income   | 3.8%  |
| Refuse to answer  | 7.6%  |
| <i>Political partisanship</i>   |       |
| Democrats   | 12.8% |
| Localists   | 21.2% |
| Pro-China leftists  | 2.7%  |
| Industrial merchants  | 1.3%  |
| Independents  | 56.8% |
| Other   | 0.0%  |
| Do not know / Refuse to answer  | 5.2%  |
| <i>Movement support (the first demand)</i>  |       |
| Strongly support  | 41.3% |
| Support   | 18.1% |
| Half-support  | 18.7% |

(Continued)

**Table 3.** Continued.

| INDEPENDENTS VARIABLES                        |       |
|---|-------|
| Oppose  | 6.7%  |
| Strongly oppose                               | 10.1% |
| Refuse to answer                              | 5.1%  |
| <i>Movement support (the second demand)</i>   |       |
| Strongly support                              | 36.4% |
| Support                                       | 18.4% |
| Half-support                                  | 20.1% |
| Oppose  | 7.9%  |
| Strongly oppose                               | 13.1% |
| Refuse to answer                              | 4.1%  |
| <i>Movement support (the third demand)</i>    |       |
| Strongly support                              | 28.0% |
| Support                                       | 20.3% |
| Half-support                                  | 24.4% |
| Oppose  | 8.8%  |
| Strongly oppose                               | 15.7% |
| Refuse to answer                              | 2.8%  |
| <i>Movement support (the fourth demand)</i>   |       |
| Strongly support                              | 61.4% |
| Support                                       | 14.3% |
| Half-support                                  | 11.4% |
| Oppose  | 3.8%  |
| Strongly oppose                               | 6.2%  |
| Refuse to answer                              | 2.9%  |
| <i>Movement support (the fifth demand)</i>    |       |
| Strongly support                              | 48.3% |
| Support                                       | 18.2% |
| Half-support                                  | 21.6% |
| Oppose  | 3.7%  |
| Strongly oppose                               | 4.4%  |
| Refuse to answer                              | 3.8%  |
| DEPENDENT VARIABLE                            |       |
| <i>Voting for the pro-movement candidates</i> |       |
| Democrats                                     | 11.3% |
| Localists                                     | 34.2% |
| Pro-China leftists                            | 6.0%  |
| Industrial merchants                          | 1.6%  |
| Independents                                  | 16.2% |
| Other   | 0.0%  |
| Abstained                                     | 18.6% |
| Do not know / Refuse to answer                | 12.1% |

people's "voting for the pro-movement candidates", meaning that "movement supporters" are likelier to vote for "pro-movement candidates". In particular, when "movement support" is added, "age" has become insignificant in predicting people's voting behaviour ( $\beta = -0.030$ ,  $p = n.s.$ ), while the coefficient of "political partisanship" has been greatly reduced ( $\beta = 0.200$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), meaning that "movement support" explains the voting behaviour above and beyond all other predictors ( $\beta = 0.593$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). In other words, those who voted for "pro-movement candidates" are not necessarily associated with their political partisanship. In fact, a significant number of "movement supporters" are neither democrats nor localists and they have cut across the divide of "political partisanship" to vote for the "pro-movement candidates"—This underscored how the voter mobilisation had dramatically shifted the balance of support to the favour of the opposition camp in the 2019 District Council election, contributing to their landslide electoral victory and quantitatively



**Table 4.** Hierarchical regression analysis.

|                         | Voting for the pro-movement camp (N = 594) |          |          |
|-------------------------|--|----------|----------|
|                         | Model 1                                    | Model 2  | Model 3  |
| <i>Block 1</i>          |  |          |          |
| Gender                  | 0.004                                      | -0.005   | -0.035   |
| Age                     | -0.435***                                  | -0.211*  | -0.030   |
| Education level         | 0.083                                      | 0.053    | 0.017    |
| Place of birth          | -0.136*                                    | -0.077   | -0.037   |
| Local living experience | 0.256*                                     | 0.102    | 0.057    |
| Parentage               | 0.012                                      | 0.001    | 0.016    |
| Social class            | -0.058                                     | -0.058   | -0.029   |
| <i>Block 2</i>          |  |          |          |
| Political partisanship  |  | 0.479*** | 0.200*** |
| <i>Block 3</i>          |  |          |          |
| Movement support        |  |          | 0.593*** |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.057                                      | 0.275    | 0.510    |
| R <sup>2</sup> change   | 0.057                                      | 0.217    | 0.235    |

Note. Cell entries are standardised beta coefficients; \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

validating the “movement-voting nexus” thesis in the hybrid regime context of Hong Kong.

## 5.2. Qualitative findings and discussion

The extended interviews with survey respondents, all of whom were “movement supporters”, provided both expected and reflective qualitative findings. As expected, the vast majority of interviewees confirmed that they had heeded the calls from the opposition camp about making the District Council election a “referendum of the Five Demands” well before the election day. Thus, they felt highly motivated to vote for the “pro-movement candidates” in their DCCAs to demonstrate their support for the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and the Five Demands. Many of them mentioned that the nearer the election day drew, the more mobilisation messages they received through different pro-movement media, such as Apple Daily and Stand News and different Telegram channels. One interviewee, mentioned that “My strong support for the Five Demands motivated me to vote for pro-democracy candidates in my DCCA ... I voted according to this political orientation, and I voted as such because I do not want the establishment candidate to win.” Another interviewee revealed, “I supported the movement and therefore I will not vote for a candidate who held a different position”.

Echoing the quantitative findings that “movement support” explains the voting behaviour above and beyond all other predictors including “political artisanship”, some interviewees said that they were long-term supporters of either the democrats or the localists; while some interviewees disclosed that they had always identified themselves as “independents” and were not voters of the opposition camp before, they only switched to vote for the opposition camp owing to the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement. One interviewee, for example, mentioned that “I am a long-term supporter of democrats and have voted for them every time since I have registered as a voter. In the 2019 District Council election, I voted for the democrats again, not only because I am their long-term supporter, but also because I wanted to vote for a candidate that had aligned with the Five Demands”. Another interviewee opined that “I consider

myself an independent, therefore in the past I often voted according to the merit of individual candidate and not according to political partisanship. In the 2019 District Council election, I voted for a localist candidate in my constituency, because I wanted to use my vote to register my support for the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and the Five Demands”.

Overall, the extended interviews qualitatively confirmed the overall mechanism of the “movement-voting nexus” in the context of Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and District Council election. However, the extended interviews provided new reflective qualitative findings. Unlike established democracies, the “movement-voting nexus” in Hong Kong was operating in a quite different context in which the shadows of authoritarian electoral influence prevail, revealing that there are more nuances behind their decisions as “movement supporters” to vote for “pro-movement candidates”.

Interviewees commonly cited four types of authoritarian electoral influence that overshadowed them during the time. First, most interviewees said that during the time they had been quite worried about the postponement of the whole District Council election. Since the outbreak of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in June 2019, there were occasional calls from the establishment camp that the District Council election should be postponed. In October, the Carrie Lam administration formally responded to such calls by setting up an “election crisis management committee”.<sup>44</sup> Under such circumstances, most interviewees said that they had felt more motivated to vote, as they had not wanted to miss the chance. For example, one interviewee expressed, “I was quite worried that the election would be postponed and psychologically got ready for it. But I have a strong feeling that if the government does not allow me to vote, I would only be more eager to vote for the democrats; when the government is partial toward some parties, I would only be more motivated to vote for the democrats”.

Second, interviewees commonly cited a concern that until the announcement of the nomination results in late October, they were quite worried that the “pro-movement candidates” running in their DCCAs would be disqualified by the Returning Officers of the Hong Kong government. Many interviewees said they were very relieved when it turned out that the nominations of all “pro-movement candidates”, except for the most high-profile activist, Joshua Wong, was finally validated<sup>45</sup> and therefore felt more motivated to vote for their preferred candidates. One interviewee, for example, mentioned that “the disqualification of candidates is an unfair practice. We need to oppose such an unfair practice, so we must get out to vote and I felt more compelled to vote for the pro-democracy candidate in my DCCA”. Furthermore, an interviewee indicated, “When disqualification of candidates is becoming a normal routine, I feel that if I do not cast my vote now, I do not know whether I will have the chance to vote again in the future”.

Third, several interviewees stated that their strong motivation to vote was partly strengthened by the unequal resource competition in their DCCAs. Many of the interviewees mentioned that over the years, the establishment candidates in their DCCAs actively offered various kinds of free gifts, meals, and tours in their neighbourhoods, and the scale had been enlarged near the election day. Overall, the interviewees were quite aware of the unequal resource competition in their DCCAs and they generally felt obliged to counter such practices by getting-out-to-vote for the “pro-movement candidates” in their DCCAs. For example, an interviewee said that the

“showering of bread and circuses by the establishment camp is an unfair practice ... the democrats do not have the same number of resources to do it, so it is unfair to them. I do not want this unfair practice to continue, so I voted for the democrats hoping that such unfair practices would be stopped”. Similarly, an interviewee expressed that “the practice of showering bread and circuses only made me more determined to vote for democrats and localists to counter such an unfair practice”.

Fourth, a few interviewees said that their DCCAs had been significantly adjusted in the Electoral Affairs Commission’s massive redistricting exercise in July 2018, which redrew the boundaries of 128 DCCAs and creating 21 new DCCAs. Many of the incumbent District Councillors from the opposition camp complained that their DCCAs had been significantly redrawn.<sup>46</sup> The extended interviews indicated that such practices had somehow consolidated their support to the “pro-movement candidates”. For example, an interviewee said, “The practice of redistricting only aimed at making the democrats lose. However, if many people vote to demonstrate their real support to the democrats, the democrats can still win the election. Therefore, such an unfair practice had only made me more determined to vote”.

To sum up, both the quantitative telephone survey and the qualitative extended interviews pointed to the overall applicability of the “movement-voting nexus” thesis in Hong Kong as a hybrid regime, as in established democracies. Yet, the qualitative extended interviews of “movement supporters” revealed that in Hong Kong the “movement-voting nexus” was operating under the shadows of authoritarian electoral influence, with “movement supporters” casting their votes under a mix of unease and rebellion. The findings of this study indicate that there is a similar positive relationship between “movement support” and voting behaviour under Hong Kong’s hybrid regime, as in the case of democracies, but such a relationship was operating under a more nuanced context of authoritarian electoral influence.

### ***5.3. Epilogue: the last election of Hong Kong as a hybrid regime?***

At the time of writing, Hong Kong is undergoing the most dramatic and extensive political change since the handover of sovereignty. In response to the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, Beijing decided to overhaul the OCTS model in Hong Kong. Through the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee, within a few months, Beijing enacted the National Security Law (in June 2020), postponed the legislative council election by an entire year (in July 2020), disqualified several pro-democracy legislators (in November 2020), and revamped the legislative council electoral system by reducing the percentage of popularly-elected seats and putting in place a rigorous mechanism for screening candidates (in March 2021).<sup>47</sup> Major opposition politicians, both democrats and localists, were also arrested by the Hong Kong government on 6 January 2021 under the National Security Law over their organisation of the primaries for the Legislative Council election originally scheduled to be held in September 2020.<sup>48</sup>

It goes beyond the scope of this study to predict and discuss the future of Hong Kong as a hybrid regime. After all, one of the features that distinguished hybrid regimes and democratic regimes is that it is often inherently unstable and could be democratically backslide or democratically progressed to different degrees within a short period of time. In other words, the future application of “movement-voting nexus” thesis in the context of Hong Kong will depend very much on the trajectory of its political transition. For example, if the decades-long semi-democratic institutions

in Hong Kong—including the partially elected legislature and district bodies, an independent judiciary, quasi-autonomous administrative watchdogs, a vibrant civil society, and a critical media—has been significantly undermined in future, such a democratic backsliding may restrict the room for the opposition camp to meaningfully organise any social movements, not to say riding on it to mobilise voters' support in elections. At the time of writing, there are preliminary evidence that Hong Kong may move towards this direction.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, if the semi-democratic institutions in Hong Kong have been somehow re-instated, probably incentivized by a change of Beijing's policy towards Hong Kong, the opposition camp may regain the room to organise social movements and mobilise voters' support in elections. In sum, the unstable nature of hybrid regimes shall inject a great deal of uncertainty over the application of “movement-voting nexus” thesis, when compared with the case of rather stable democratic regimes.

## 6. Conclusion

This study tests the “movement-voting nexus” thesis in the context of hybrid regimes, using the case study of Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and District Council election in 2019. It contributes to the literature by extending the application of the theory from democracies to hybrid regimes. The quantitative findings of this study illustrates that the theory of “movement-voting nexus” did apply in Hong Kong's hybrid regime as in the case of democracies, with “movement supporters” mobilised to vote overwhelmingly for “pro-movement candidates” and the balance of support between the opposition camp and establishment camp dramatically changed accordingly; Meanwhile, the qualitative findings also show that the “movement-voting nexus” was operated under a quite different context of authoritarian electoral influence, reflecting the nuanced features of Hong Kong's hybrid regime.

However, there are two important limitations of this study, indicating the directions for future research. First, this study only focuses on the operation of “movement-voting nexus” in one round of election in Hong Kong, namely the 2019 District Council election. Limited by its dataset and scope of research, this study is unable to offer a historical-political perspective about the impacts of waves of social movements on post-1997 Hong Kong's elections, such as the impacts of the 2010 Anti-Express Rail Link Movement and the 2014 Umbrella Movement. For studying places like Hong Kong where successive waves of social movements broke out from time to time, future scholars should consider adopting a longitudinal approach so that they can better observe the operation of the “movement-voting nexus” over a longer period of time. Second, the mixed-method research strategy of this study could be strengthened if a larger, more diversified pool of interviewees could be developed. If “movement supporters” with different voting choices and “non-movement supporters” could be interviewed, the qualitative analysis could much better inform the quantitative analysis. Future scholars should develop a more comprehensive mixed-method analysis by interviewing more diversified survey respondents.

In sum, this study has successfully applied the “movement-voting nexus” in the context of hybrid regimes. It lays the foundation for future application of the theory to a larger number of hybrid regimes and paves the way for comparative studies across diverse political regimes. Democratisation scholars have much to do in this direction.

## Notes

1. See Goldstone, “Bridging institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics”; McAdam and Tarrow, “Ballots and barricades”; McAdam and Tarrow, “Social movements and elections”.
2. Vann, “Movement-counter-movement dynamics”.
3. See Andrews, “The impacts of social movements”; Beyerlein and Andrews, “Black voting”; Galais, “Don’t vote for them”; Madestam et al., “Do political protests matter”; Mosca and Quaranta, “Voting for movement parties”.
4. McAdam and Tarrow, “Ballots and barricades”; McAdam and Tarrow, “Social movements and elections”.
5. Goldstone, “Bridging institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics”.
6. McAdam and Tarrow, “Ballots and barricades”.
7. Heaney, “Elections and social movements”.
8. Vann, “Movement-counter-movement dynamics”.
9. Heaney, “Elections and social movements”; Goldstone, “Bridging institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics”.
10. Vann, “Movement-counter-movement dynamics”.
11. Andrews, “The impacts of social movements”.
12. Beyerlein and Andrews, “Black voting”.
13. Madestam et al., “Do political protests matter”.
14. Rudig, “Boon or burden?”.
15. Galais, “Don’t vote for them”.
16. Mosca and Quaranta, “Voting for movement parties”.
17. Kwan and Lau, “Between Liberal autocracy and democracy”; Fong, “In-between Liberal Authoritarianism and Electoral Authoritarianism”.
18. Ip, *Hybrid Constitutionalism*, 13–15.
19. Ma, *Political Development in Hong Kong*, 221–227.
20. Schedler, “The menu of manipulation”; Schedler, The logic of electoral authoritarianism, 1–23.
21. For an account, see Ma “China’s influence on Hong Kong’s elections”.
22. For an account, see Wong “Resources disparity and multi-level elections” and “Mass production of individualized services”.
23. For an account, see Wong “Gerrymandering in electoral autocracies”.
24. For an account of how the authoritarian electoral influence has changed the balance of power between the democrats and the establishment camp in the electoral arena, see Ma “China’s influence on Hong Kong’s elections”.
25. For full text of the Extradition Bill, see the website of the Legislative Council: <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/bills/b201903291.pdf>
26. For a legal analysis of the “Poon Hiu-wing murder case” and the Extradition Bill, see Chan (2019).
27. Purbrick, “A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests”.
28. Chen, “A perfect storm”.
29. For a full archive of the major protest events and statistics of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, see the ANTIELAB Research Data Archive: <https://antielabdata.jmsc.hku.hk>
30. Lee, “Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill movement”; Ku, “New forms of youth activism”.
31. Centre for communication and public opinion survey, *Research Report on Public Opinion*, 104.
32. For the official gazette notice, see: <https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20192311/egn201923111939.pdf>
33. Apple Daily, “Immediately registering as voters”.
34. Apple Daily, “To repay the bloody debt”.
35. Apple Daily, “Campaign for Preventing Uncontested Elections”.
36. Apple Daily, “30 ordinary people plan to run”.
37. Apple Daily, “Referendum for the five demands”.
38. For an account of the protest slogans of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, see Hong Kong Free Press (2020). For a full-text of the joint declaration released by the democratic opposition legislators, see Hong Kong In-media (2019).
39. Ma, “China’s influence on Hong Kong’s elections”.
40. Ayoub, et al., “Triangulation in social movement research”.

41. Andrews, “The impacts of social movements”; Beyerlein and Andrews, “Black voting”; Galais, “Don’t vote for them”; Madestam et al., “Do political protests matter”; Mosca and Quaranta, “Voting for movement parties”; Rudig, “Boon or burden?”.
42. Hahs-Vaughn and Lomax, *Statistical Concepts*, pp. 540.
43. Financial Times, “What Hong Kong’s local elections mean”.
44. Hong Kong Free Press, “Hong Kong gov’t forms election crisis committee”.
45. Hong Kong Free Press, “Hong Kong bans activist Joshua Wong”.
46. For an account, see Hong Kong Free Press (2018).
47. For legal analysis of all these decisions and legislations, see NPC Observer: <https://npcobserver.com/tag/hong-kong-basic-law>.
48. For an account of the arrest, see The New York Times “Hong Kong Police Arrest Dozens of Pro-Democracy Leaders”.
49. For an account of Hong Kong’s democratic backsliding in recent years, see Fong, “Practicing Autonomy” and “Exporting Autocracy”.

## Disclaimer

This study seeks to offer scholarly, descriptive analyses of actors, events, forces, and trends relating to Hong Kong’s democratization. It does not express the author’s personal, prescriptive view on the constitutional development of Hong Kong.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## Notes on contributor

Dr *Brian C. H. Fong* is Research Associate, SOAS China Institute, SOAS University of London. Dr Fong was previously Associate Professor of Department of Asian and Policy Studies and Associate Director of Academy of Hong Kong Studies, The Education University of Hong Kong. Specialized in great power politics, democratization, and identity politics, He is also the founding editor of Hong Kong Studies Reader Series, associate editor of *Social Transformation in Chinese Societies*, and lead editor of several comparative politics books such as *China’s Influence and the Centre-periphery Tug of War in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific* and *Routledge Handbook of Comparative Territorial Autonomies*.

## ORCID

Brian C. H. Fong  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2537-0249>

## REFERENCES

- Andrews, K. T. “The Impacts of Social Movements on the Political Process: The Civil Rights Movement and Black Electoral Politics in Mississippi.” *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 5 (1997): 800–819.
- Apple Daily. Immediately registering as voters, to punish the establishment camp (即場做選民 嚴懲建制派 *Jí chāng zuò xuǎnmín yánchéng jiànzhì pài*) [in Chinese]. 17 June. Available online: <https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20190617/20706113> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019a.
- Apple Daily. To repay the bloody debt by voting, kicking out the establishment camp (血債票償 誓踢走保皇黨 *Xuèzhài piào cháng shì tī zǒu bǎohuáng dǎng*) [in Chinese]. 19 June. Available online: <https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20190619/20707862> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019b.

- Apple Daily. Campaign for Preventing Uncontested Elections, to fight against the establishment (反自動當選運動 削建制力量 *Fǎn zìdòng dāngxuǎn yùndòng Xuē jiànzhì lìliàng*) [in Chinese]. 30 June. Available online: <https://hk.appledaily.com/local/20190630/6VG7FDZSD2NG2NHD4UVKMISEY> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019c.
- Apple Daily. 30 ordinary people plan to run for District Council election, criticizing Carrie Lam (30素人擬戰區選 批評林鄭無貢獻 *Sānshí sùrén nǐ zhànkū xuǎn pīpíng lín zhèng wú gòngxiàn*) [in Chinese] (Accessed 13 Aug). Available online: <https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20190813/20748057> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019d.
- Apple Daily. Referendum for the five demands (五大訴求公投 *Wūdà sùqiú gōngtóu*) [in Chinese] (Accessed 18 Nov). Available online: <https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20191118/20808612> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019e.
- Ayoub, P. M., S. J. Wallace, and C. Zepeda-Millán. "Triangulation in Social Movement Research." In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by D della Porta, 67–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Beyerlein, K., and K. T. Andrews. "Black Voting During the Civil Rights Movement: A Micro-Level Analysis." *Social Forces* 87, no. 1 (2008): 65–93.
- Centre for communication and public opinion survey. Research Report on Public Opinion during the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong. Available online: <http://ccpos.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos-7>, 2020.
- Chan, J. "Ten Days That Shocked the World: The Rendition Proposal in Hong Kong." *H.K. Law J* 49, no. 2 (2019): 431–445.
- Chen, A. H. Y. "A Perfect Storm: Hong Kong - Mainland China Rendition of Fugitive Offenders 2019." *SSRN Journal* 49, no. 2 (2019): 419–430.
- Financial Times. What Hong Kong's Local Elections Mean For The Protests (Accessed 21 Nov 2019). Available online: <https://www.ft.com/content/eced16fc-0c15-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84> (Accessed 27 Febr 2021), 2019.
- Fong, B. C. H. "Practicing Autonomy Within a Communist State: Hong Kong's Autonomy from Handover to Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, 1997 to 2019." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 53, no. 4 (2020): 68–90.
- Fong, B. C. H. "Exporting Autocracy: How China's Extra-Jurisdictional Autocratic Influence Caused Democratic Backsliding in Hong Kong." *Democratization*, 28, no. 1 (2021): 198–218.
- Galais, C. "Don't Vote for Them: The Effects of the Spanish Indignant Movement on Attitudes About Voting." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 24, no. 3 (2014): 334–350.
- Goldstone, J. "Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics." In *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by J Goldstone, 1–26. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.
- Hahs-Vaughn, R., and R. Lomax. *Statistical Concepts: A Second Course (5th ed.* New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Heaney, M. T. "Elections and Social Movements." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by D. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans, and D McAdam, 391–394. Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.
- Hong Kong Free Press. Pro-democracy district councillors accuse electoral body of gerrymandering in 2019 election redistricting plan (Accessed 24 Jul 2018). Available online: <https://hongkongfp.com/2018/07/24/pro-democracy-district-councillors-accuse-electoral-body-gerrymandering-2019-election-redistricting> (Accessed 27 Febr 2021), 2018.
- Hong Kong Free Press. Hong Kong bans activist Joshua Wong from standing in district election race (Accessed 29 Oct 2019). Available online: <https://hongkongfp.com/2019/10/29/breaking-hong-kong-bans-activist-joshua-wong-standing-district-election-race> (Accessed 27 Febr 2021), 2019a.
- Hong Kong Free Press. Hong Kong gov't forms election crisis committee in case of last-minute delay due to disruption (Accessed 25 Oct 2019). Available online: <https://hongkongfp.com/2019/10/25/hong-kong-govt-forms-election-crisis-committee-case-last-minute-delay-due-disruption> (Accessed 27 Febr 2021), 2019b.
- Hong Kong Free Press. Explainer (Accessed 25 Jun 2020). Available online: <https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/25/explainer-from-five-demands-to-black-cops-to-independence-the-evolution-of-hong-kongs-protest-slogans> (Accessed 27 Febr 2021), in: 'five demands' to 'independence' – the evolution of Hong Kong's protest slogans, 2020.
- Hong Kong In-media. Declaration for the District Council Election by Democrats: Referendum on the Five Demands (民主派區選宣言: 五大訴求一起公投 *Mínzhǔ pài qū xuǎn xuānyán: Wūdà sùqiú*)



- yīqǐ gōngtóu) [in Chinese] (Accessed 17 Nov). Available online: <https://www.inmediahk.net/node/1068731> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019.
- Hsin-Chi, K., and L. Siu-Kai. "Between Liberal Autocracy and Democracy: Democratic Legitimacy in Hong Kong." *Democratization* 9, no. 4 (2002): 58–76.
- Ip, E. C. *Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Politics of Constitutional Review in the Chinese Special Administrative Regions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Ku, A. S. "New Forms of Youth Activism – Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in the Local-National-Global Nexus." *Space and Polity* 24, no. 1 (2020): 111–117.
- Lee, F. "Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong." *Critical Asian Studies* 52, no. 1 (2020): 18–32.
- Ma, N. *Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society and Civil Society*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007.
- Ma, N. "China's Influence on Hong Kong's Elections: Evidence from Legislative Council Elections." In *China's Influence and the Center-Periphery Tug of War in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific*, edited by B.C.H. Fong, J.M. Wu, and A.J. Nathan, 91–104. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Madestam, A., D. Shoag, S. Veuger, and D. Yanagizawa-Drott. "Do political protests matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128, no. 4 (2013): 1633–1685.
- McAdam, D., and S. Tarrow. "Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship Between Elections and Social Movements." *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (2010): 529–542.
- McAdam, D., and S. Tarrow. "Social Movements and Elections: Toward a Broader Understanding of the Political Context of Contention." In *The Future of Social Movement Research: Dynamics, Mechanisms, and Processes*, edited by J. Stekelenburg, C. Roggeband, and B. Klandermans, 325–346. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
- McVeigh, R., D. Cunningham, and J. Farrell. "Political Polarization as a Social Movement Outcome: 1960s Klan Activism and Its Enduring Impact on Political Realignment in Southern Counties, 1960 to 2000." *American Sociological Review* 79, no. 6 (2014): 1144–1171.
- McVeigh, R., D. J. Myers, and D. Sikkink. "Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social Movements." *Social Forces* 83, no. 2 (2004): 653–690.
- Mingpao. New landscape for the District Council (區會新版圖 *Qū huì xīnbān tú*) [in Chinese] (Accessed 26 Nov). Available online: <https://news.mingpao.com/pns/要聞/article/20191126/s00001/1574707686398/區會新版圖> (Accessed 25 Febr 2021), 2019.
- Mosca, L., and M. Quaranta. "Voting for Movement Parties in Southern Europe: The Role of Protest and Digital Information." *South European Society and Politics* 22, no. 4 (2017): 427–446.
- The New York Times. Hong Kong Police Arrest Dozens of Pro-Democracy Leaders (Accessed 6 January 2021). Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-national-security-law.html> (Accessed 12 Nov 2022), 2021.
- Purbrick, M. "A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests." *Asian Affairs* 50, no. 4 (2019): 465–487.
- Schedler, A. "The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 36–50.
- Schedler, A. "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism." In *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by A. Schedler, 1–23. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 2006.
- Vann Jr., B. "Movement-counter-movement Dynamics and Mobilizing the Electorate." *Mob* 23, no. 3 (2018): 285–305.
- Wong, S. H. W. "Resource Disparity and Multi-Level Elections in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Hong Kong." *Electoral Studies* 33 (2014): 200–219.
- Wong, S. H. W. "Gerrymandering in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Hong Kong." *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (2019): 579–610.
- Wong, S. H. W., K. Ho, and H. D. Clarke. "Mass Production of Individualized Services: Machine Politics in Hong Kong." *Elect. Stud* 26, no. 1 (2019a): 57–88.