

## **Religiously-Motivated Schools and Universities as ‘Moral Enclaves’: Reforming Urban Youths in Tanzania and Nigeria**

**Hansjörg Dilger**

**Marloes Janson**

It is very important to have schools that provide Islamic teachings. Many students come from homes where the parents are divorced or have died. Often, the students are not watched at home and watch too much TV. Only very few parents come to school and report if there are problems at home or if a student does not perform well. If we knew about these issues we would follow-up and provide counselling.

We expect the government to support us, but actually we are our own government. We send our children to school, but the public schools are so bad that we are going into debt to afford private education. Because NEPA [the National Electric Power Authority, which is popularly known as ‘Never Expect Power Always’] is unreliable, we buy our own generators. Since the government is not providing us with security, we secure ourselves by trusting God.

The first statement was made by the education officer of the *Africa Muslims Agency* (AMA) in Tanzania, which has established schools and other development-related projects in the country since the mid-1990s. Similarly to Nigeria, there is a widespread sentiment among the country’s population that government schools are no longer able to provide ‘good education’ to their students. At the same time, the statement by the AMA leader echoes the perception that religiously-motivated educational institutions are essential for the ethical self-formation of young people in urban environments, which are perceived as morally and economically challenging.

The second quote were the words preached by a pastor of *Mountain of Fire and Miracles Ministries* (MFM), one of the fastest growing Pentecostal churches in Nigeria, which is also present in Tanzania. His sermon reveals that religious organizations have stepped into the vacuum that was left by the eroding state, thereby resonating the words of the iconic Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie that ‘religion has become our [African] answer to a failed economy’ (*Guardian*, 19 February 2005; quoted by Gandy 2005: 51).

This chapter explores how the educational initiatives of new religious actors have become ‘enclaves’ of moral reform in the wake of privatization and class formation in urban Tanzania and Nigeria. Taking the two quotes above as a starting point, we argue that moral subject formation in Christian and Muslim institutions of secondary and higher education is inseparably

intertwined with the embeddedness of these organizations in translocal networks, their role in the reconfiguration and segregation of urban space, and the transformation of the postcolonial state from the 1990s onward.

By the mid-1990s, many of Africa's polities had lost their quality of 'state-ness' to the extent that international and national talk emerged of 'collapsed' or 'vacuous' states, today more generally known as 'fragile' or 'disabled' states (e.g. Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ferguson 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2014). Within this context of 'fractional' statehood, religiously-motivated organizations<sup>1</sup> began operating as alternative religious communities, equipped with all the necessary instruments – ranging from electricity, to health clinics, and educational institutions – of a functioning state.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, this 'new' type of development organization combined a focus on material progress with the fostering of spiritual and moral wellbeing among – and often attempted conversion of – their beneficiaries (Bornstein 2005; Thomas 2005: 233-242). In this context, Thomas (2005) speaks of a 'virtue-ethics' approach to development,<sup>3</sup> which provides an understanding of 'how Faith practices articulate the connections between "religious" and "economic" spheres of activity' (Coleman 2011: 33).

In this chapter, we focus on education, which is commonly regarded as the *sine qua non* of social change and economic development in Africa (e.g. Stambach 2006; Fichtner 2012), and which has opened up new opportunities for moral as well as political and market engagement by Christian and Muslim actors at all educational levels against the backdrop of liberalization and privatization since the 1990s (Dilger and Schulz 2013: 370). Whereas anthropology has largely treated education and religion separately (Stambach 2006: 4-8), our chapter studies them as interconnected, thereby shedding light on how educational interventions contribute to public life through moral modes of subject-formation (cf. Bornstein 2005; Stambach 2006; 2010). The case studies presented below – based on participant observation in classrooms and on campuses, qualitative interviews and informal conversations with students, parents and other relatives, teaching and administrative staff and management, and an analysis of curricula and other printed and online material – explore the implications of these recent religiously-motivated investments in the educational domain with regard to the socio-moral transformation of urban space. By means of a comparative ethnographic study of the missions of a range of Christian and Muslim educational institutions in urban Tanzania and Nigeria, we argue that in the context of compromised state education and inadequate infrastructure, religiously-motivated initiatives provide youths with the tools and material spaces to negotiate the socio-moral unpredictability of

urban living and to convert themselves into moral citizens according to the values of the religiously-motivated organizations that run these institutions, as well as civic virtues.

### **Studying Moral Enclaves Comparatively**

A comparison between Tanzania and Nigeria is particularly interesting as they are both former British colonies, characterized by high ethnic diversity and with similar ratios of Muslims and Christians, where, of old, religious organizations have played an important role in social service provision, including schooling (Reichmuth 1996; Stambach 2010). In both settings neo-Pentecostal churches and reformist strands of Islam have established schools and universities since the mid-1990s.<sup>4</sup> These religiously-motivated educational initiatives have in common that they combine secular education with the teaching and embodiment of moral (faith-specific) values – relating to issues of dress, comportment, gender, class, and discipline among others. However, there are also marked differences between the two settings. Although the history of both Tanzania and Nigeria demonstrate that religion has been used and understood as a function of politics, religion has become a destabilizing force in Nigeria, whereas in Tanzania the postcolonial state has aimed to be ‘religiously neutral’ (although particularly Muslim reformists have questioned this claim because they have been historically marginalized in their access to social services) (Loimeier 2007: 151-152; Dilger 2020).

The divergent political instrumentalization of religion in Tanzania and Nigeria had implications for their educational systems, which have multiple political, economic, social, and religious dimensions. In an effort to redress the Christian-Muslim inequality in education in Tanzania, all mission and private schools were nationalized with the implementation of socialist policies in 1969. Since privatization in 1995 the growing market of Christian and Muslim schools in the country has become a particularly urban phenomenon. Especially in the most populous city, Dar es Salaam, the increasingly commodified educational landscape is composed of a multitude of Christian and Muslim primary and secondary schools, which have become deeply embedded in – and drivers of – free market dynamics and social differentiation processes (though in highly unequal ways owing to the historical marginalization of Muslim schools in the country) (Dilger 2013). In contrast, in urban Nigeria – where since 1999 the ownership of higher educational institutions has been deregulated by the state – there has been a spectacular rise of universities funded by religious organizations who recognize tertiary education as key driver for national growth. Pentecostal organizations took the lead in this new development, to which

Muslim organizations responded by establishing their own universities. Complementing the typical image of a country being torn by religious violence, the upsurge of religiously-motivated universities in Nigeria's economic hub Lagos and its hinterland shows that religious difference does not automatically lead to violence; religious divergence could as well be the ground for mutual borrowing, competition, and religious entanglements (Janson and Meyer 2016; Janson 2021).

The upsurge of religiously-motivated educational institutions in Tanzania and Nigeria needs to be studied against the backdrop of what Beaumont (2008a) calls 'neoliberal urbanism'. The 'religious entrepreneurs' – leaders who act partly with a charity agenda, and partly as market leaders on the religious marketplace (Lauterbach 2016; Lanz and Oosterbaan 2016)<sup>5</sup> – who run these schools and universities have heavily invested in religious infrastructure, thereby transforming urban space. Here it should be noted that urban space refers not only to Tanzanian and Nigerian urban centres. Owing to a shortage of land in the urban centres and a tight real-estate market, schools and universities have bought land in urban hinterlands as well as at the centres' margins, which, in line with the expansionist missions of the religious traditions that they represent, have become part of the sprawling metropolis. To chart the spatial and socio-moral implications of the educational investments in (semi)urban infrastructure, we have coined the notion of a 'moral enclave', which we conceive as an educational space in the city and the sprawling suburbia where students are being trained as moral subjects by new religious actors. Our notion of the moral enclave draws on what is called 'enclave urbanism' in urban studies. AlSayyad and Roy (2006) argue that new patterns of urban citizenship are marked by emergent enclaves that rest upon protectionism and increased segregation (both perceived as well as physically manifest) of atomized communities in the urban realm. In a similar vein, the educational spaces that we discuss in this chapter set themselves apart explicitly from their highly fluid and, in their students, their families, and staff's eyes, 'immoral' urban environments. Because of these educational institutions' tendency towards boundary maintenance through exclusionary and regulatory practices of moral subject formation, education can be understood here as a practice of enclaving for the building of moral communities constituted by good citizens trained to lead a moral life.

As pointed out by Sivan in his essay on fundamentalist religious movements, the enclave places the morally defiled outside society in contrast to the community of virtuous insiders: 'A sort of "wall of virtue" is thereby constructed, separating the saved, free, equal (before God or

before history), and morally superior enclave from the hitherto-tempting central community' (1995: 18). Although the schools and universities that we studied ban drinking, smoking, and premarital sexual relationships, and censor dress and their students' leisure activities, the boundary between 'inside' and 'outside' is not impermeable. Religiously-motivated schools and universities as moral enclaves are not just 'local' or demarcated spaces. Rather, they are also a motor of urbanization and globalization processes with regard to class formation, urban reconfiguration, and the building of moral capital that becomes relevant in the students and teachers' lives beyond their educational institutions. Moreover, they are entwined with the formation of translocal networks by maintaining ties with North America and the Arab Middle East to secure funding – and where such financial ties do not exist, they appeal to students' desire to be integrated in the global community of Muslims, the *umma*, or in world Christianity. Thus, while the focus in urban and development studies is primarily on spatially contained enclaves,<sup>6</sup> our emphasis is on outward-looking and globally-oriented enclaves. In brief, the concept of the moral enclave prompts us to rethink the interplay between religion, urban space, and globalization (cf. Burchardt and Becci 2013; Dilger et al. 2020), thereby providing a better understanding of how religious entrepreneurs 'make place' on various scales from the local to the global (Massey 1992), and how religion 'takes place' (Knott 2005: 43) through the mutual shaping of socio-moral relations 'between people and things, people and places, people and symbols, and the imagined relations between these' (ibid.: 21) in urban Tanzania and Nigeria today.

In line with the co-constitution of religious engagement and urban space, a second focus in this chapter is the increasingly privatized and marketized public sphere in urban Tanzania and Nigeria. In their mission to convert both souls and public space, Christian and Muslim schools and universities compete not only with state institutions but also among themselves and other private educational institutions, thereby becoming implicated in an 'increasingly competitive educational market' (Dilger 2013: 454). This is true even for those institutions that are run mainly as charity projects and cater specifically for the less well-off segments of the urban population (as in the example of the *Africa Muslims Agency's* seminary below). However, while other religiously-motivated schools and universities are often registered as non-profit organizations as well, they often charge considerable tuition fees and therefore appeal more to the emergent middle classes,<sup>7</sup> thereby distinguishing themselves explicitly from the older, more 'charitable' Christian and Muslim organizations (Beaumont 2008b: 2023) and perpetuating social inequalities

(Collins 2009) through their market orientation. Competition on the educational market manifests not only in tuition fees, but also in entry criteria. Whereas state institutions screen their applicants for academic qualifications, religiously-motivated schools and universities pride themselves that they also screen for ‘character’.

This brings us to the third and final focus in this chapter: religiously-motivated schools and universities occupy their own niche in the educational market by bidding on morality. Unlike what their label suggests, beyond providing secular education they do not (only) teach religious subjects but instead create spaces for the embodiment of religiously-informed moral values. As part of their mission to educate ‘good citizens’, the schools and universities that are central in this chapter engage in moral and bodily surveillance of their students. For example, they have wardens on ground to ensure that students do not engage in illicit behaviour, and have implemented codes of conduct that restrict students’ off-campus mobility, ensure their compliance with regulations for dress and bodily care, and limit male-female interactions. Our case studies illustrate that by shifting the emphasis from religiosity to religiously-informed morality, these novel educational institutions aspire to cater for the needs of the various segments of the emerging middle classes in urban Tanzania and Nigeria, who by means of their moral disposition aim to distinguish themselves both from the ‘morally lax’ students of state educational institutions, and the ‘backward’ mindset of students attending religious education (e.g. in Qur’anic or Bible Schools). This reaffirms Simpson’s conclusion that ‘the desire for education [in his case mission schools] becomes a desire to be different, to become Other – and, indeed, Chosen Other’ (1998: 220). This ‘Otherness’ is reflected in the material infrastructure of religiously-motivated schools and universities: compared with the lack of facilities in many state educational institutions, and despite their struggle to obtain funding, most of the schools and universities in our case studies attempt to look ‘modern’ with their freshly-painted classrooms and lecture theatres, computer facilities for staff and students, and ‘corporate’ dress code. As a result, many Tanzanians and Nigerians consider the modern space of religiously-motivated schools and universities a proper site for the formation of the new middle class.

To sum up, by taking the dialectic entanglement between urban space, moral subject formation, and social class formation as our starting point, this chapter explores how the cityscape has mediated new forms of religiously-inflected infrastructure through the building of educational moral enclaves in urban Tanzania and Nigeria. This novel infrastructure provides a

fresh perspective on education as both a provider of development and a venue for the disciplining of a new generation of moral citizens striving for upward social mobility.

### **St. Mary's International Primary School and Al-Farouq Islamic Seminary for Boys in Urban Tanzania**

St. Mary's International Primary School was founded by the late Dr. Gertrude Rwakatare, the former leading pastor of a popular neo-Pentecostal church in Dar es Salaam, in the mid-1990s and is today part of one of the largest privately owned (primary and secondary) school networks in Tanzania.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Rwakatare (*St. Mary's Mirror* 2002-3: 3) described that the founding of St. Mary's International Primary School was closely connected to Tanzania's poor educational situation at the time, and that she felt 'touched' when she 'saw buses taking [Tanzanian] students to Kenya and Uganda to acquire quality education' (ibid.: 3). In her endeavour to establish her school network, she received support from the US-based NGO Christian Working Woman as well as several members of her own Pentecostal church, which counted around 10,000 members in 2010. She also drew on her political connections, especially since she was appointed Special Seat Member of Parliament in 2007; a position that allowed her to draw attention to the needs and challenges of Tanzania's (private) educational system at a political level.

The establishment of the network's first school in Dar es Salaam in 1996 was linked closely to the selling of urban land to private investors after the official ending of the socialist *Ujamaa* project in 1985. Under these conditions, new religious entrepreneurs like the late Dr. Rwakatare established their educational projects primarily on the margins of the city that had not yet been densely populated. St. Mary's International Primary School was built in a neighbourhood on the former outskirts of Dar es Salaam that until the 1980s had been used for agricultural purposes. Later, Dr. Rwakatare purchased the former grounds of the Tanzanian National Insurance Company in the immediate neighbourhood of St. Mary's International School, where she established an orphanage that provided shelter and education to about 700 children in 2006.

In the context of the economic hardship faced by many in the city, some of the new religious entrepreneurs like Dr. Rwakatare became targets of suspicion among the urban public. There were persistent rumours in the immediate community – but also among students and teachers – that the land on which St. Mary's International Primary School was built was haunted by spirits (*majini*) (Dilger forthcoming). Some of Dilger's interlocutors ascribed the presence of these *majini* to the backgrounds of the pupils themselves, who allegedly brought them from their

rural homes, either for protection or because these spirits had followed them maliciously (see below). Other staff members and students claimed that Dr. Rwakatare herself had forged an alliance with evil forces as a way of getting rich – a not-uncommon allegation against both male and female neo-Pentecostal pastors in the city who had accumulated significant amounts of wealth over relatively short periods of time.

[Figure 9.1 here]

Figure 9.1 St. Mary's International Primary School's courtyard with school-owned buses (2009, photo by H. Dilger)

In the early 2010s, the International Primary School was attracting significant numbers of students from the (partly upper) middle classes whose parents were able and willing to pay the comparatively high school fees in order to secure good education for their children. School fees for the day school in 2009 were set at TZH 1,080,000 per year (about 355 GBP); this included school buses, meals, and supplies excluding textbooks. In contrast, attending a public primary school in Tanzania has been 'free' since 2001, except for the often considerable costs for uniforms, textbooks, and transport. The 1800 (day and boarding) students and their families from mostly Christian, and sometimes Muslim, backgrounds appreciated the fact that the school was employing English as language of instruction consistently<sup>9</sup>; that its teachers allegedly 'worked harder' than at government schools; that its buildings and classrooms had comparatively high aesthetic and material standards; and that it had its own computer room and transport system. Furthermore, the school's reputation derived from the fact that it was perceived as providing 'moral education' and training 'well-adjusted, knowledgeable and responsible citizens' (Dilger 2017: 520). The morning assemblies in particular were a key site for instilling discipline and moral values in the students, for instance by singing the national anthem and the so-called 'patriotic song',<sup>10</sup> and also by screening the pupils' bodies for compliance with the school's rules for dress and hygiene (ibid.). Students were also encouraged to help enforce discipline by running for one of the offices in the student governing body (so-called 'monitors' and 'prefects') who were responsible for taking attendance and maintaining silence in class, among other tasks. In the *St. Mary's Mirror* (2002-3), students described how such positions trained them for becoming 'academic giants' (ibid.: 12f.) and 'leaders in the future' (ibid.: 31).

While the school was sometimes perceived as a 'Christian school' owing to its linkage with the late Dr. Rwakatare and her church, students and teachers disputed such a categorization,



based on the somewhat diffuse status of the teaching of religion in the school's curriculum and the fact that students of highly diverse Christian and Muslim backgrounds were enrolled. Under these conditions, the school's Christian, and more specifically Pentecostal, orientation became central for the students' and teachers' moral self-formation in rather implicit ways. This focus became visible not only in the religious imagery displayed in the school buildings and the use of prayers and religious songs (which were equally popular in Dr. Rwakatare's church) in everyday interactions in the space of the school, but also in spiritual healing from malevolent spirits, as is common in neo-Pentecostal churches in the city. At the time of Dilger's research in 2008-10, female Muslim students from wealthy backgrounds were said to be especially vulnerable to the potentially 'harmful' impact of spirits.<sup>11</sup> One teacher explained:

I usually see [the possessed students] lying down, beating [themselves], crying and making a lot of noise. Maybe (...) this is an Arabic problem. (...) It is [common among] rich people. This student [who was possessed] came from a rich family. I think that her ancestors did something wrong.<sup>12</sup>

The dynamics of class formation and the desire for the learning and teaching of moral values were also central to the Al-Farouq Islamic Seminary for Boys, established in 1997 and located in the immediate vicinity of St. Mary's International Primary School (though it has no further relationship with Dr. Rwakatare's school). Its founding organization, the *Africa Muslims Agency* (AMA), is based in Kuwait and has been involved in proselytization (*da'wa*) and the building of wells, health institutions, and educational facilities in Tanzania since 1994 (Ahmed 2009: 428). At the time of Dilger's research in 2010, the AMA headquarters in Dar es Salaam were run mostly by Tanzanian nationals, some of whom had pursued – in the same vein as the teachers at Al-Farouq – educational opportunities abroad, including in Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, the development organization depended heavily on funding from Kuwait, and central administrative decisions were made by the headquarters abroad.

[Figure 9.2 here]

Figure 9.2 Plaques on the AMA buildings show that they were built with support from various local and international donors, most notably the Kuwait-based development organization *Direct Aid* (here: the library) (2010, photo by H. Dilger)

Unlike St. Mary's, Al-Farouq Islamic Seminary – which is run on the ordinary and advanced secondary level and admits only boys from a Muslim background – is not directed at Dar es Salaam's (upper) middle classes, but rather the city's working- and lower-middle classes who usually have only modest expectations of becoming socially upwardly mobile. In 2009, the majority of the parents of the 365 registered students worked as small-scale traders, low-ranked government employees, or in one of the blue-collar jobs in the city.<sup>14</sup> While most of them paid annual school fees ranging from TZH 300,000 (for the day school, about 100 GBP) to TZH 650,000 (about 214 GBP for the boarding school), several students and teachers received educational grants and/or free treatment at the AMA-owned dispensary; some of the sponsored students were orphans who resided in a separate boarding section on the AMA premises. The students and teachers' impression that Al-Farouq was less competitive than other – private as well as some high-performing government – schools was reinforced by its weak material infrastructure (as manifested by the poorly equipped library and laboratory) as well as the high turnover of teachers owing to the school's low salaries. Furthermore, the students were well aware that their educational situation was generally worse than that of their peers in the more costly Christian schools in the city. As one student emphasized, these schools provided private buses for their students whereas Al-Farouq students had to use public transport (*daladala*):

In [Christian] schools the students are brought home after school, but we ride the *daladala*. They are often too crowded. I leave school at 2:30 p.m. and often have to wait half an hour for transportation. In some *daladalas* you have to stand up the whole way home. By the time you get home your whole body aches.<sup>15</sup>

Despite their criticism, the students and teachers at Al-Farouq appreciated their school because of its strong focus on teaching morality and its perceived ability to turn their pupils into 'good Muslims.' In conversations, most of them described Dar es Salaam's urban environment as 'risky' and claimed that it held many 'moral temptations' especially for young men of lower social status, including the use of drugs and the risk of getting infected with HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases. In this context, the headmaster explained, parents expect Al-Farouq's management and teachers to provide a strong religious and moral formation for their children so that they 'become good members of society' and would not 'join bad groups of people'.<sup>16</sup> In this regard, the school management found it necessary that the Al-Farouq secondary school continued as a unisex school. As Mr. Ahmed, the school's education coordinator,

remarked: ‘The mixing of [male and female] students can lead to negative implications as far as Islamic teachings are concerned.’<sup>17</sup>

As part of their moral-religious education at Al-Farouq, the students attended Islamic Knowledge and Arabic classes as well as the noon prayers at the on-site mosque. They were also punished heavily when they performed poorly in class or when they transgressed the school’s rules, for example by coming late to class, making noise in the classroom, violating the school’s dress code or regulations against entering into illicit relationships.<sup>18</sup> In contrast to St. Mary’s primary school, discipline was enforced mostly by the teachers and management themselves, and there was no visible student governing body during Dilger’s research. Furthermore, while St. Mary’s had a strong commitment to nation-building and the formation of ‘good citizens,’ this aspect was much less pronounced at the Islamic seminary. Instead, the belonging to the global community of Muslims – the *umma* – was emphasized informally, for instance by greeting each other with ‘*salaam aleikum*’ or addressing each other jokingly as ‘*mashehe*’ (sheikh). This mutual reassurance about their shared faith was particularly important for some of the students and teachers who felt discriminated in their everyday interactions with non-Muslims in the city. Thus, one teacher explained that Muslims were treated differently in their everyday encounters with Christians and other people in Dar es Salaam: ‘Sometimes you sense that they greet you differently because you are a Muslim – for instance, when they shake hands with you.’<sup>19</sup> Some students put it more dramatically, claiming that the public perceived Islamic schools as training grounds for ‘future terrorists.’<sup>20</sup> At the same time, this did not preclude their feeling of belonging to Tanzania’s ethnically and religiously highly diverse society, as one student put it:

[Being with other Muslims] helps me to recognize that we Muslims are supposed to be as one, how we are supposed to be and live. We learn the life that we are going to live later. And this is not only for the Muslims – all human beings are one, only their beliefs are different.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, while the sense of being a distinct religious and moral community in the wider urban context was more pronounced at Al-Farouq than at a religiously-mixed Christian school like St. Mary’s, the value of living together well in a pluralistic society was also part of the moral self-formation at the Islamic seminary (Dilger forthcoming). Hence, Muslim students became knowledgeable and confident about their faith by living in a diverse society, in which they engaged with people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds on an everyday basis and

simultaneously longed to lead a morally ‘pure’ and ‘clean’ life in a spiritually and socio-economically challenging environment.

To sum up, both the neo-Pentecostal primary school and the Islamic seminary function as moral enclaves which enforce the embodiment of religiously-informed values through a wide range of disciplinary practices that aim at character-building and improving educational performance. The sense of being a distinct socio-moral community of students and teachers – which is tied to notions of academic excellence in the case of St. Mary’s, and to perceptions of socio-economic deprivation in the case of Al-Farouq – is enhanced by the architecture of the schools, which is shaped by the divergent quality of their buildings and their being closed-off from the urban environment by high walls. At the same time, however, both schools foster the connections beyond the confinements of their educational institutions, and thus have become embedded in Dar es Salaam’s booming, and rapidly transforming, educational marketplace in highly specific ways. At St. Mary’s, these connections include the strong commitment to the education of a future societal, and internationally-oriented elite, as well as the ties with the government and religious and secular partner organizations in the USA and Europe. At Al-Farouq, they comprise the cultivation of the students’ awareness of belonging both to the global *umma* of Muslims and Dar es Salaam’s multi-cultural and -religious population, as well as the ties with sponsors and development organizations in the Arab World and a range of Islamic educational centres in East and Northeast Africa.

### **Redeemer’s University and Fountain University in Urban Nigeria**

Similar to Dar es Salaam where religiously-oriented schools function as moral enclaves in a highly pluriform and allegedly morally corrupt urban landscape, we see a similar shift towards ‘moral education’ in religiously-motivated universities in Lagos and its urban hinterland. These universities mushroomed to put an end to Nigeria’s ‘crisis in tertiary education’ (Anungwom 2002). University College Ibadan (UCI) was the first university to open its doors in Nigeria’s third largest city Ibadan in 1948, heralding Nigeria’s ‘University Age’ (Livsey 2017). After a successful start, in the late 1960s public universities – as major centres of domestic and foreign investment – became embroiled in ethno-political rivalries and the university age started to dwindle. In an attempt to turn the tide and revive Nigeria’s earlier university age, the ownership of higher education institutions was deregulated from the state in 1999. This resulted in the

creation of private universities, including those associated with Pentecostal churches and, more recently, reformist Muslim organizations.

The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) is the largest Pentecostal church in present-day Nigeria. In 1983, Pastor Adeboye received a divine call summoning him to establish a ‘City of God’ to redeem the ‘Sin City’ that was Lagos, resulting in Redemption City (Ukah 2013). This massive prayer camp along the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway signifies RCCG’s prosperity gospel, which propagates the value of succeeding professionally. In order to raise its congregants into well-educated professionals, Pastor Adeboye – who holds a PhD in Mathematics and worked as a university lecturer before being ordained RCCG’s General Overseer (G.O.) – established Redeemer’s University Nigeria (RUN) in 2005. When RCCG needed space for its proposed three-by-three kilometre auditorium, the university moved from Redemption Camp to its permanent site in Ede, a town in Osun State some 200 kilometres southwest from Lagos, in 2014. The real estate market is tight and land scarce in Lagos State. Land is more affordable in neighbouring Osun State. Moreover, unlike in Lagos – an alleged node for drug-traffickers, smugglers, and fraudsters – in smaller urban centres such as Ede inhabitants are less exposed to night life, gambling places, and beer parlours, making it a proper site for a university teaching ‘morality’. Despite its distance from Lagos, Ede is well located for both private and public transport. With its modern buildings and its facilities like shops, hostels, restaurants, and a bank, the architectural style of the campus in Ede resembles that of RCCG’s Redemption City in Lagos, as a result of which it is considered an annex of the latter, suggesting that worship and running a university are part of the same mission. Underscoring Pentecostal churches’ modern architecture, a Muslim interlocutor told Janson: ‘These days you don’t know whether you are entering a church or bank: they all look the same with their glass facades and high-tech architecture.’<sup>22</sup>

Redeemer’s University’s acronym is RUN and this is also part of its motto: ‘Running with a vision’. Its vision is to become ‘the foremost institution for producing graduates who combine academic excellence in the practice of their profession with God-fearing attributes’. According to its online prospectus, in 2017 RUN enrolled around 2,400 students who pursued degrees in 30 programmes in six colleges. That same year RUN won the UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) Nigeria National Quality Gold Award, and in the 2018 the Southwest Outstanding Private University of the Year award. Other than becoming a top teaching institute, in line with its mission to ‘march on to change the world for God’, RUN strives to become one of Africa’s most renowned research institutes. In 2014 it won a World Bank grant to fund the

African Centre of Excellence for Genomics of Infectious Diseases, which is involved in research on the containment of the Ebola virus and Lassa fever, and to establish a postdoctoral fellowship training programme. Despite its (inter)national reputation, RUN has difficulties in securing funding. Janson was told by colleagues from state universities that in an effort to generate income, Pentecostal universities, including RUN, even deduct tithes from staff's salaries, which made them criticize these universities as 'prisons' that try to control their staff.

[Figure 9.3 here]

Figure 9.3 Redeemer's University's goals (2017, photo by M. Janson)

Opposite Redemption City along the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, popularly known as 'the Spiritual Highway' (Janson and Akinleye 2015), the prayer camp of *Nasrul-Lahi-L-Fatih Society of Nigeria*, which translates as 'There is no help except from Allah' and is abbreviated to NASFAT, is located. Since its establishment in 1995, NASFAT has grown into Nigeria's largest Muslim organization of contemporary times. According to its Mission Statement, NASFAT aims to 'empower Muslims spiritually as well as economically'. The avenue to economic empowerment is good education. In line with its mission, NASFAT established primary and secondary schools and, in 2007, Fountain University (FU). According to its prospectus, FU had a student body of about 1,000 in 2017 and offered fourteen programmes in two colleges. Janson was told by FU's senior management that compared with RUN's students, FU's students were from less wealthy backgrounds. Still, they can be considered to be belonging to the new middle class: their parents often work as university lecturers, engineers, or business people. While the tuition fees of an undergraduate degree at RUN were around 693,000 Naira per term (depending on the programme), that is, approximately, 1,460 GBP, with 390,000 Naira (around 825 GBP) tuition fees per term, FU was one of the cheapest private universities in Nigeria in 2017. Still, compared with the tuition fees charged by Lagos State University of 25,000 Naira, 390,000 Naira is an extraordinary amount for the average Nigerian, whose monthly income is 75,000 Naira.<sup>23</sup> Although tuition fees are high at RUN and FU, their management emphasized that their primary motif is not 'earning money'. According to RUN's Deputy Registrar: 'Daddy G.O. didn't establish a university to make profit. Our mission is to impact lives and to improve the moral standard of our students. In order to achieve our goal, we must fight the moral decadence of this current generation.'<sup>24</sup>

Elucidating FU's establishment, a NASFAT official said:

Because of the Pentecostal syndrome that keeps Nigeria firmly in its grasp, we decided to establish our own university. All big Pentecostal churches have a university, so we thought we also needed one. You can compare our mutual competition to that between MTN and Glo, or Coca Cola and Pepsi (Janson 2021: 102).<sup>25</sup>

FU is located in Osogbo in southwestern Nigeria. The choice for this location can be explained by NASFAT's self-proclaimed mission of competing with RUN: Osogbo and Ede are neighbouring towns. Furthermore, Osogbo has a long history of Islam: it was one of the earliest commercial centres in the region, attracting Muslim traders (Ogungbile 2011). FU's management told Janson: 'We selected our environment with the greatest of care, because environment is the mental feeding ground out of which the food that goes into our minds is extracted.'<sup>26</sup>

During her visit to FU's campus in 2017, Janson was welcomed by a dried-up fountain at the gate. FU's emblem is the fountain, representing a pool of knowledge. The dried-up fountain can be seen as symbolizing the fate of several private universities in Nigeria, with a crumbling infrastructure and difficulties in recruiting qualified staff and students. Aware that they had not yet reached the same level as Pentecostal universities, such as RUN, a member of FU's management said: 'You can't compare a sprinter with a runner. Pentecostal universities are sprinting and we are running behind them; the gap is still wide.'<sup>27</sup> To close the gap, FU has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with four universities in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Sudan. The benefits of this international collaboration for students and lecturers are yet to be seen.

[Figure 9.4 here]

Figure 9.4 FU's dried-up fountain (2017, photo by M. Janson)

Somewhat ironically for a religiously-motivated university, FU does not offer religious education. In contrast, RUN expanded its curriculum with Christian Religious Studies in 2016. However, because it recruited only one student, RUN's management decided that it was not lucrative to continue the programme. A concerned father told Janson that he was unwilling to 'invest hundreds of thousands of Naira for my children to become religious functionaries'.<sup>28</sup> To meet parents' wishes of their children finding a 'good job' upon graduation, RUN and FU's curricula reveal their strong professional and secularist self-understanding. Hence, the division

between religious educational institutions and religiously-motivated universities such as RUN and FU can be summarized in terms of Chidester's (2006: 67) divide between the teaching *of* religion and the teaching *about* religion. Whereas Bible Colleges and Islamic Seminaries teach religion, RUN and FU do not teach religious subjects but embrace a teaching philosophy that encompasses integrity, decency, and virtue – moral values that are considered to be part of both a Christian and Muslim understanding of religion, as well as good citizenship. Elucidating RUN's teaching philosophy, a staff member lectured Janson: 'Our degree is awarded on the pedigree of Loyalty, Integrity, Faithfulness, and Excellence, which means LIFE to us. We are guided by a strong commitment to run with our vision by producing morally sound and high-quality graduates.'<sup>29</sup>

NASFAT's National Education Secretary described 'moral education' as follows: 'We instil ethics in our students by training them to show respect for their parents, teachers, and classmates, to show punctuality, and to look after their body by not eating fast food and dressing modestly.'<sup>30</sup> Underlining that 'moral education' involves more than teaching religious subjects, RUN's deputy Registrar explained to Janson:

Religion is not just reflected in our curriculum, but more in our rules and regulations. We don't allow smoking and drinking: students using alcohol or drugs are expelled. This is written in black and white in our student handbook. We don't allow trousers for ladies, except for during sports activities, and we don't allow them to expose their bodies. Male students must dress corporately, which means a jacket and tie. We have many rules and regulations, also regarding hairstyle, music choice, internet use, watching television, and the use of mobile phones. Our students are allowed to watch television only in their hostels' common room, where wardens censor the programmes they watch. Students can browse the internet only in designated areas. The moral standard for staff is even higher than for students. Their letter of appointment contains a clause about dress and mandatory participation in church programmes.

In line with RUN and FU's emphasis on moral education, students are expected to show 'good character', as expressed in their conduct and apparel. Prospective students at RUN are screened via an interview, and female students even have to undergo a pregnancy test as a response to the widespread discourse in Nigeria regarding the 'moral laxity' of public educational institutions where 'teenage mothers' are believed to be a common problem.<sup>31</sup> Prospective students at FU need a reference on 'good character' from an imam or religious community leader. Once admitted at RUN and FU, students must dress 'modestly and corporately', which means a jacket and tie for men and a skirt (at least below the knees) and a cap or *hijab* (covering the chest) for women. Furthermore, during term time RUN and FU students are not allowed to leave



campus; should they have an emergency appointment outside the campus, they must first seek permission from both their parents and the Head of Department. All FU students carry a 'Temporary Exit Card'. Before the holidays start, they must document where they are travelling to and when and at what time they will return to campus. If they return late, they face suspension.

RUN and FU deploy various measures for disciplining students. The provost of the Redeemed Christian School of Missions (RECSOM) told Janson proudly that in 2013 he introduced a programme in collaboration with RUN to 'rehabilitate erring students'. Those students who are suspended from RUN for engaging in 'sinful' activities such as drinking, smoking, or engaging in love relationships are interned for half a year at RECSOM, which the provost described as 'a mission school where the soldiers of Christ are being trained in a military way', to participate in its harsh regime of non-stop 'prayer marathons' and fasting.<sup>32</sup> If after six months they have 'recovered their destiny', they are allowed to resume their studies at RUN. FU operates an integrity point system: at the beginning of the semester, a student is credited with 100 points, which s/he progressively loses if s/he commits offences against the regulations. For example, running late for on-site mosque programmes (which are mandatory for Muslim students and optional for Christian students) results in a deduction of 15 points, 'indecenty' is punished by a deduction of 30 points, and the possession of charms leads to expulsion. 'Indecency' includes, among other things, students' love relations. Except for mixed classrooms – where female and male students sit separately – interaction between male and female students outside the classroom is kept to a minimum at both RUN and FU. The only interaction between male and female students at RUN is over lunch and dinner in the cafeteria, to which students, because of the possibility of intermixing, referred as 'Love Garden'.

Because RUN and FU enact morality rather than religiosity, it is not uncommon to find Muslim students at RUN and Christian students at FU. For instance, Janson interviewed two female Muslim students at RUN who had a Muslim father and a Christian mother and who told her that their parents had selected RUN because of its 'high standard' and because they wanted to 'instil discipline' in their daughters. A male student confided to her that he had converted to Islam in his first year at RUN: 'As long as you follow the rules, you're cool here. I'm used to go to church since my mum, who is an accountant and pays for my tuition, is a Christian.' A male Christian student applied to FU when, for the fourth time, he was not admitted at the University of Lagos. A female Christian student had more ideological reasons for applying to FU. At school

she had many Muslim friends and by studying at FU she wanted to adjust the negative stereotyping around Muslims: ‘I want to show that not all Muslims are into Boko Haram.’<sup>33</sup>

Parents’ rising quest for moral higher education seems to be class motivated. During her field research, Janson heard several parents from the emerging middle class exclaim: ‘Secular education is not enough for our children!’ At the same time, they associated religious education with a ‘traditional mindset’, unable to secure their children positions in the lucrative private sector of the Nigerian economy. Against this background, religiously-motivated universities such as RUN and FU cultivate an education-based middle-class identity, stressing not only the civic virtues of education but also its role in building a moral community composed of virtuous citizens who act as what RUN’s management described in terms of ‘arrow heads of national development’.<sup>34</sup>

### **Conclusion: Religiously-Motivated Education and the Formation of Moral Enclaves**

Drawing on Althusserian (1971) notions of governmentality that conceive of the school as the ideological tool of the (secular) nation-state, education remains identified in much anthropological scholarship as state driven, laying the foundation for secular-modern citizenship, thereby reproducing the ingrained religion-education dichotomy (Stambach 2010: 24). As our case studies demonstrate, religion and education have become increasingly conflated in urban Tanzania and Nigeria. The Christian and Muslim schools and universities that have been established in these countries since the mid-1990s combine their secular curricula with the mission to educate students into moral citizens. Many of our interlocutors are seeking to negotiate the relationship between being (or becoming) moral subjects and good citizens, and education serves as a means to reconcile the two. Taking this course, studying religiously-informed moral practice and education as co-constituted opens up a conceptual locus for analyzing how the public domain is being transformed through socio-moral interventions, and how new governmental regimes and infrastructures have emerged in urban Africa.

The gradual withdrawal of the state from the economy throughout Africa – and the simultaneous weakening of state education due to the emergence of global initiatives for universal access to education (Dilger 2013: 454, 565) – has generated a new public sphere evolving around private enterprises, including religious organizations. According to past World Bank president James Wolfensohn, ‘half the work in education and health in sub-Saharan Africa is done by the church’ (quoted by Wodon 2015: 90). Similarly, a report by the United Nations

Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA 2009) stated that ‘there is clearly an important parallel faith-based universe of development, one which provides anywhere between 30-60% of healthcare and educational services in many developing countries’ (ibid.). As a result, the novel public sphere that has emerged in both urban Tanzania and Nigeria is increasingly governed by religiously-informed rules and values.

The new religious entrepreneurs who have stepped into the vacuum that was left by the withdrawing state invested heavily in education – a ‘high density’ sector in which the postcolonial state’s presence has long been most visible (Olivier de Sardan 2014: 405). Because land is expensive in the urban centres of Tanzania and Nigeria, they have moved out of the megacities, converting semi-urban landscapes into what could be defined as ‘moral enclaves’: settings at the margins of the megacity – regarded as godless and dystopian – but close enough to the urban centres where capital is concentrated and from where the majority of students are recruited. What we see here is that (semi)urban space, rather than providing a conventional kind of unruliness and anonymity that permits freedom of behaviour, creates a context for the disciplining of students into moral citizens. According to AlSayyad and Roy (2006: 3), this ‘doubleness’ of spatial formations as simultaneously ‘free’ and ‘protected’ is a valuable analytical tool for examining contemporary urban moral geographies.

Drawing on Garbin and Strhan (2017), the abovementioned illustrates that centre-periphery dialectical dynamics are interwoven in the contemporary religious landscapes of urban Tanzania and Nigeria, thereby affirming Sassen’s argument that ‘the city, a complex type of place, has once again become a lens through which to examine major processes that unsettle existing arrangements’ (2007: 99). The resulting urban-religious configurations, and the moral enclaves that they contain, are not just localized: they are connected to North America and partly to Europe (in the case of St Mary’s in Tanzania and RUN in Nigeria), Northeast Africa and the Arab Middle East (in the case of Al-Farouq in Tanzania and FU in Nigeria), and global funding agencies (in the case of RUN in Nigeria). By shedding light on the translocal spatial strategies of religious educational actors, moral enclaves could thus deepen our insight into the complex, and affectively highly charged, interplay of religion, globalization, and the city (Burchardt and Becci 2013; Lanz 2013; Garbin and Strhan 2017; Dilger et al. 2020).

Exploring recent educational missions, our case studies have addressed the question of what constitutes ‘good education’ in relation to specific urban settings in Tanzania and Nigeria. The comparative perspective not only involved primary and secondary religiously-motivated

education in Tanzania versus tertiary education in Nigeria, but also a comparison between (Pentecostal) Christian and (reformist) Muslim initiatives in the increasingly commodified and diversified educational market. These competitive, religiously-motivated missions aim at realizing educational goals that ultimately will bring about wider socio-economic and moral transformations in the two countries' cityscapes. The case studies illustrate that the establishment of new Christian and Muslim schools and universities has become part and parcel of a larger process of moral (self-)formation, and of providing new avenues for the cultivation of moral values among urban youths. Because of their emphasis on morality, these educational establishments are also respected in the wider society; many parents, who do not necessarily affiliate with the religious traditions that the schools and universities that are central in this chapter represent, noted that if they had the financial means they preferred sending their children to a religiously-motivated school or university, where 'proper morality' is being trained and embodied, than to a public educational institution.<sup>35</sup>

Apart from their 'moral laxity', in both urban Tanzania and Nigeria there is a widespread discourse regarding the dwindling educational standard in state schools and universities, as reflected by their poor infrastructure, lack of educational material, and teachers with low qualifications. Along with the perception of the allegedly impoverished and 'immoral' urban environment in both sites, this discourse explains why 'good education' has become a strongly valued social, economic, and moral asset among students, their families, and the wider public. In the religiously-motivated schools and universities that we studied, moral education and social class formation go hand in hand, thereby laying the foundation for a range of education-based class identities, whereby education is no longer seen as a 'public good' but rather widens and sharpens social inequalities (Collins 2009; Dilger 2013).

At a time when a public school diploma and even a degree from a state university are no longer sufficient to secure upward social and economic movement with the promise of a more successful life, many families are preoccupied with advancing their young relatives' social position (and with that also their own position). From our conversations with students, their parents and relatives, and teachers, it appeared that 'good education' not only entails a strong performance in a high-quality institution that teaches consistently in English, which is believed to be essential for securing a well-paying job in the future, but also moral education that makes graduates stand out by their exemplary behaviour. This attitude explains the need to probe the subjective dimensions of education, that is, the moral values and ideals that are associated with

and embodied in new educational settings (Simpson 1998; Fumanti 2006; Dilger 2017). Thus, while the emerging African middle classes are usually defined in terms of their varying economic and income-based positions, a truer depiction of their class formation is socio-cultural, as expressed through education and morality, thereby reinforcing Bourdieu's (2006) idea of education as a marker of both personal distinction and social class. In the moral enclaves that are religiously-motivated schools and universities, students go through a process of subjectivation in the Foucauldian sense (1983) – which is realized through what Mauss (1973) calls 'techniques of the body' including a dress code and a code of conduct – moulding them into moral citizens and lifting them out of the urban environment perceived as 'sinful' into a higher social and moral order.

As scholars of religion, we are urged to scrutinize how well our concepts and analytical categories account for 'the fluid and mutating nature of religion' (Burchardt and Becci 2013: 18). The scrutiny of ingrained conceptual schemes prompts us to a decompartmentalized study of religion, which crosses boundaries and blurs sharp distinctions between religion and education, Christianity and Islam, religion and economy, as well as public and private (see also Janson and Meyer 2016; Janson 2021). In the interlocking of these various domains, education is more than a tool for individual achievement, social class formation, and national development; it is first and foremost a 'moral disposition' (Stambach 2010: 12), which has significant repercussions for the formation of the highly diversified and fragmented public sphere in contemporary urban Africa.

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<sup>1</sup> We prefer the term 'religiously-motivated organizations' over 'faith-based organizations' (FBOs). The former is more in line with emic perspectives: rather than faith and belief, our interlocutors privileged the performative power of religious practice that helps them confront the moral and socio-economic contingencies of urban life. As such, 'faith-based' is a much too narrow label for these institutions that are motivated by (religious) morality – and often political and market-driven agendas – but are not based on faith alone.

<sup>2</sup> But even in the context of the so-called 'disabled state' in Africa, in Tanzania some 80 per cent of educational provision remains in the hands of the government (Dilger 2017: 516n5), and in Nigeria the government is still regarded as the ultimate regulator or guarantor of education (de Sardan 2014: 401).

<sup>3</sup> Drawing on philosopher MacIntyre's (1981) social theory, Thomas (2005: 238) argues that faith-based communities bond the virtues and practices of religious traditions with civic virtues as part of development. What is distinctive about this so-called virtue-ethics approach is the place it allows for religious organizations in building what theologian Hauerwas (1981) has called 'communities of character' as a part of aid policy.

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<sup>4</sup> Because of space, we cannot address the role of mainline churches and established Muslim organizations whose educational facilities have longstanding (colonial and postcolonial) histories in both countries. Similar to present-day religiously-oriented schools and universities' mission to create moral citizens, colonial missionaries believed in the transformative power of education for it 'modernized' and 'civilized' students, equipping them for elite advancement and entry into the higher echelons of administration (e.g. Simpson 1998; Fumanti 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Entrepreneurialism refers here both to proselytization and to the enmeshment of religious and business-oriented aspirations. This notion links with the educational marketplace where schools and universities compete for students and funding.

<sup>6</sup> Throughout Africa, a trend of enclave style development has been established for elitist conspicuous consumption (Beall et al. 2002), resource extraction (Ferguson 2006: 37), and development interventions (Sullivan 2011: 203).

<sup>7</sup> Rather than the Africa Development Bank's economic definition of middle class, we employ a broader definition that includes social status, educational background, professionalism, and moral behaviour, thereby affirming that middle class is 'a multi-dimensional concept that refers to a socio-economic category, a cultural world, and a political discourse' (Lentz 2016: 46).

<sup>8</sup> Dr. Rwakatare died in April 2020, at the time when the Covid-19 pandemic started to spread across the world.

<sup>9</sup> In Tanzania, Kiswahili is the language of instruction at the primary level, and it is even used in most public secondary schools where the use of English is supposed to be mandatory.

<sup>10</sup> The song '*Tanzania Tanzania Nakupenda Kwa Moyo Wote*' (Tanzania Tanzania I love You With All My Heart) is sung in schools all over the country. Its exact history is unknown.

<sup>11</sup> While the phenomenon of Muslim girls' possession exposed religious and ethnic differences in the school, the relations between Christian and Muslim students and teachers were not necessarily tense. For instance, there were explicit efforts to accommodate Muslim students' religious needs by creating separate spaces for prayer.

<sup>12</sup> Interview conducted in Dar es Salaam on 16 April 2010.

<sup>13</sup> AMA maintained close ties with some of these international Islamic educational centres, especially in Northeast, but also in East Africa (Zanzibar).

<sup>14</sup> Data from a survey conducted by Dilger in 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Interview conducted in Dar es Salaam on 7 October 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Interview conducted in Dar es Salaam on 9 October 2009.

<sup>17</sup> Interview conducted in Dar es Salaam on 22 October 2009.

<sup>18</sup> The most severe punishment at Al-Farouq was caning, which is officially forbidden (or at least strongly restricted) in Tanzanian schools. While the practice was criticized by most students and teachers, others found it necessary to discipline students.

<sup>19</sup> Group discussion with teachers in Dar es Salaam on 20 September 2009.

<sup>20</sup> Informal conversation conducted in Dar es Salaam on 30 January 2009.

<sup>21</sup> Interview conducted in Dar es Salaam on 6 October 2009.

<sup>22</sup> Interview conducted in Lagos on 29 July 2010.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/nigerias-middle-class-how-we-live-and-what-we-want-from-life/12563/>.

<sup>24</sup> Interview conducted at RUN on 12 April 2017.

<sup>25</sup> MTN and Glo are two competing telecommunication companies in Nigeria. Interview conducted in Lagos on 14 December 2011.

<sup>26</sup> Interview conducted at FU on 11 April 2017.

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<sup>27</sup> Interview conducted at FU on 13 April 2017.

<sup>28</sup> Interview conducted in Lagos on 17 March 2017.

<sup>29</sup> Interview conducted at RUN on 12 April 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Interview conducted in Lagos on 24 April 2017.

<sup>31</sup> Janson was told during her field research that the first and most popular Pentecostal university, Covenant University (affiliated with Winners Chapel), went as far as introducing mandatory virginity tests for female students.

<sup>32</sup> Interview conducted at RECSOM on 13 April 2017.

<sup>33</sup> Focus group interviews conducted at RUN and FU on 11 and 12 April 2017.

<sup>34</sup> Interview conducted at RUN on 12 April 2017.

<sup>35</sup> In both Tanzania and Nigeria there are widespread rumors and media reports about sexual abuse in public schools and universities, where female students allegedly sleep with teachers in return for high marks. Drawing on Mbembe (1992), Nyamnjoh and Jua argue that low salaries and material hardship have contributed to African educational systems' becoming part of the postcolonial 'phallocracy', where 'pride in possessing an active penis has to be dramatized' by male teachers seeking the 'unconditional subordination of women to the principle of male pleasure' (2002: 5).