A. Introduction

Since the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 there has been recognition within international institutions that there is a link between women, peace, and security. This chapter examines the links between women, peace, and security in the activities of international institutions, such as the UNSC, and well beyond institutional settings. I draw on a range of feminist approaches to mark a shift towards gender (rather than women) and security and a need for further expansion of the field to acknowledge plural feminist approaches. The latter is demonstrated through an incorporation of indigenous feminisms, an analysis of gendered security at sea, and the impact of the politics of austerity within Western democracies.

I follow Duncanson’s definition of gender as functioning as an individual identity and a symbolic system, that requires attention to the embodied realities of gendered lives and the nexus to larger power relations. Approaches to women, peace, and security articulate gender as an individual identity in the sense of responding to women as a named group that experiences discrimination and who can be identified by virtue of a commitment to the gender binary. Within feminist writing such an approach has limited value as it tends to write out women’s diversity or any mode of gender fluid and gender diverse lives, while legal outcomes tend towards liberal feminist framings focused on rights and the individual, the production of quotas for participation and limited means to address heteronormativity. Addressing gender as a symbolic system opens gender analysis to deployment in the analysis of systems and structures of meaning as well as institutions. Duncanson’s further incorporation of both the embodied

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1 Claire Duncanson, Gender and Peacebuilding (Polity 2016) 7.
3 Carol Cohn (ed), Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures (Polity 2013).
modes through which gender is experienced and the relation of gender to other sites of power relations draws from the work of postcolonial and intersectional feminist thinking to challenge the production of gender as monolithic, stagnant, or disconnected from other sites of discrimination and harm. I use Duncanson’s understanding of gender as a symbolic system, invested in the embodied experiences of gendered individuals and intimately connected to adjunct power discourses, to examine the existing regime on women, peace, and security and to analyse potential future framings of gendered security in this chapter.

1. Women, Peace, and Security

Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) is a thematic UNSC resolution described as a ‘landmark’ in the work of the institution due to its recognition of the potential impact of engaging women in peace and security and the impact of security on women.4 Prior to Resolution 1325, the Council had only made the link between women and security in Resolution 1214 on the situation in Afghanistan and the gender apartheid under Taliban rule in the late 1990s.5 Security Council Resolution 1325 emerged after a speech to the Council from the representative for Bangladesh in March 2000. The Bangladesh representative’s provocation in the Council led to the drafting of Resolution 1325 by key civil society actors, including Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).6 The subsequent text, notably leaving out WILPF’s anti-militarist approach, incorporated four pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery. The resolution has been widely recognized as encompassing a broad vision of the relationship between women, peace, and security and, although subject to persistent critique from various feminist spaces, is credited with changing institutional, local, State, and academic practice.7

In the subsequent two decades, the UNSC has produced nine additional resolutions on women, peace, and security and developed provisions on related gender issues within some situation-specific resolutions, as well as adjunct resolutions on the regulation of sexual exploitation and abuse within UN missions.8 Of those additional nine resolutions, five resolutions—1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2103 (2013), and 2467 (2019)—focus on conflict-related sexual violence while the remaining four resolutions—1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2493 (2019)—are closer to the tem-

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plate of the original Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, and articulate a general approach.\(^9\) Critiques of the resolutions extend from concerns with regard to the overemphasis on conflict-related sexual violence,\(^10\) the use of the word ‘gender’ without sufficient recognition of the gendered nature of men’s lives,\(^11\) an investment in a heteronormative gender binary across the resolutions,\(^12\) and a disciplining role for gender in the resolutions that produce ‘civilizing’ regulations that are imposed on post-conflict States. Civil society actors have questioned the manner in which donor funds have used the language of women, peace, and security such that local feminist needs and agendas have been displaced, as well as the failure of the resolutions to develop an intersectional understanding of the operation of gender in diverse communities.\(^13\) For Madhok, there is a need to ‘supplement intersectionality with coloniality’; that is, to see intersectionality as an important feminist analytic tool that should not be severed from the geographic and temporal making and reconstituting of empire.\(^14\)

2. Addressing Everyday (In)security

The ten resolutions on women, peace, and security have, in many ways, come to dominate international discourse on gendered security. However, despite the wide-ranging nature of the resolutions, the development of the field has been piecemeal and in no way comprehensive in the sense of building robust governance mechanisms for the implementation of change in relation to gendered security. For example, Resolution 2242 includes, in paragraph 5, the requirement that the UNSC itself:

\textit{Recognizes} the ongoing need for greater integration of resolution 1325 (2000) in its own work in alignment with resolution 2122 (2013), including the need to address challenges linked to the provision of specific information and recommendations on the gender dimensions of situations on the Council’s agenda, to inform and help strengthen the Council’s decisions…\(^15\)


\(^12\) Jamie Hagan, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security’ (2016) 92 International Affairs 313.

\(^13\) Sophie Richter-Devroe, ‘“Here it’s not about Conflict Resolution—We can only resist”: Palestinian Women’s Activism in Conflict Resolution and Non-Violent Resistance’ in Nadje Al-Ali/Nicola Pratt (eds), \textit{Women and War in the Middle East} (ZED Books 2009).


A quick survey of resolutions immediately after 2242, namely Resolutions 2243 through to 2250, shows limited incorporation of the substance of this provision.16 A reference to conflict-related sexual violence appears in the preamble of Resolution 2243, on the situation in Haiti. In the next three resolutions, Resolution 2244, Resolution 2245, and Resolution 2246, all on the situation in Somalia, no provisions relate to either women or gender. In Resolution 2247, on Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no reference to women, peace, and security issues, nor in Resolution 2248, on the situation in Burundi or in Resolution 2249, on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (a response to the terrorist attacks in Paris, France in November 2015). The latter absence is notable, given the additional links made between the Council’s counterterrorism work and the women, peace, and security agenda in Resolution 2242.

It is only in Resolution 2250, a general resolution on the maintenance of international peace and security and with a thematic focus on youth participation and youth initiatives relevant to security, that there is reference to CEDAW (paragraph 5), women (paragraph 16, amongst a list of groups to be empowered) and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (paragraph 7). The latter reference is interesting because it is phrased as follows:

Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take the necessary measures to protect civilians, including those who are youth, from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence.

This is a wider framing of the responsibility of States parties to armed conflict than the women, peace, and security resolutions articulate.17 The use of the phrase ‘take the necessary measures’ does invoke the language usually deployed by the UNSC to frame authorizations of military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,18 while the adjunct framing in the context of protecting civilians links to the shift within peacekeeping mandates to broaden the scope of missions through the language of the protection of civilians.19 Furthermore, paragraph 7 of Resolution 2250, although invoking the protection of youth, does address all civilians and articulates a need for protection from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence (emphasis added). This is a potentially wide framing of the women, peace, and security focus, which has increasingly narrowed to conflict-related sexual violence, while in Resolution 2250 is inclusive of all forms of sexual and gender-based violence. As such, the failure to incorporate the Council’s directive in Resolution 2242 in the subsequent seven resolutions is then, confusingly,
picked up in Resolution 2250, but in a manner ultimately inconsistent with the existing
women, peace, and security resolutions because of the link to enforcement action and
the potential expansion of the women, peace, and security framework embedded in this
resolution.

This short analysis opens up a range of issues that are yet to be tackled or addressed
sufficiently within the wider women, peace, and security agenda that I take up in the
remainder of this chapter. First, the framing of ‘all forms of sexual and gender-based
violence’ in Resolution 2250 is extremely wide. Resolution 2250 seems to be both inclu­
sive of wider feminist analysis of how gendered security norms produce complex forms
of insecurity for women within communities and yet exclusive in the tying of gendered
security to the production of direct forms of violence against specific gendered bodies.
On the one hand, the very failure of the UNSC to address or include any aspects of
women, peace, and security in the seven resolutions between Resolution 2242 and
Resolution 2250 demonstrates a failure to abide by its own pronouncements in thematic
resolutions, such as Resolution 2242. At the same time the framing of paragraph 7 in
Resolution 2250 as directed at all parties to an armed conflict ignores the persistent fem­
inist refrain that gendered security moves well beyond the need for militarized modes of
security to articulate an understanding of everyday security to produce a transforma­
tion away from the status quo.20

3. Intersectional and Postcolonial Feminisms

To think differently about gender and about security in this chapter, I use the women,
peace, and security resolutions to deploy Duncanson’s model of gender as a symbolic
system. Building on the analysis, above, of the schizophrenic outputs of the UNSC,
which both attest to a series of commitments about its own development of gender
initiatives in its thematic outputs and limited incorporation into situation-specific outputs,
I use postcolonial feminisms to situate gendered security as constrained by the institu­
tional frames it is produced within and through. This forms Section B of the chapter. In
Section C, I return to the notion of everyday (in)security to look outside the expected
frames of gender security. First, through an analysis of the nexus between sites of know­
ledge, environmental security, and legacies of colonialism, followed by a framing of
security at sea as an additional site where security is imagined in extremely narrow
terms to illustrate the necessity of developing intersectional feminist tools within security
scholarship. I then examine how gendered insecurity occurs within peacetime States
through the twin effects of the policies of neo-liberal States on austerity and the rise of
populism. The chapter concludes by asserting that the UNSC has been a limited place

Fummi Olonisakin et al, ’The Convergence and Divergence of Three Pillars of Influence in Gender
Justice (Routledge 2013).
for challenging gendered (in)security, not only for its selective action but also through the nexus to militarized security that does little to dislodge forms of everyday gendered insecurity. As such, I assert a postcolonial and intersectional feminism that moves and shifts in new ways to imagine human and environmental security for the future.

B. UNSC Resolution 2467 and Beyond

In this section, I provide a gender analysis of UNSC Resolution 2467 (2019). This resolution was drafted by Germany, who held the presidency of the UNSC in April 2019 and took the role of penholder. The draft proved controversial with Russia, China, and the United States all objecting to elements of the resolution. This was in contrast to previous women, peace, and security resolutions that have tended to pass with unanimous support from States and, via the arria formula, receive unqualified endorsement from a wide range of States. Resolution 2467 focuses on conflict-related sexual violence and although it still continued an agenda for supporting punitive measures—sanctions and prosecutions—the draft introduced a reproductive health response to this form of gender-based violence. The draft underwent considerable re-writing before it was agreed to by Member States. In particular, the US objected to and challenged the health provisions in the draft, while China and Russia urged for caution in widening the UNSC’s remit beyond a narrow focus on conflict-related sexual violence in armed conflict and the framing of gender-based violence as potentially incurring sanctions. The interventions of Russia and China are interestingly in tension with earlier language, already endorsed by the Council in Resolution 2250 on youth and security. However, rather than situating my analysis within the text of the resolution itself, in this section I look beyond the resolution to the role of UN institutions in shaping gender law reforms within international law.

Work on sexual and gender-based crimes within international institutions does not sit only within the outputs of the UNSC. As such, a study of gendered security benefits from an analysis of how institutional norms evolve and the different arenas where legal reform has been pursued. Chinkin and Rees describe Resolution 2467 as having enhanced legal value in part because of the cross-institutional parallels between UNSC, International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Committee on the Elimination of

The ‘Arria-formula meetings’ are ‘very informal, confidential gatherings which enable Security Council members to have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible procedural framework’ and ‘provide interested Council members an opportunity to engage in a direct dialogue with high representatives of Governments and international organizations—often at the latter’s request—as well as non-State parties, on matters with which they are concerned and which fall within the purview of responsibility of the Security Council’: UNSC, ‘Working Methods Handbook’ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/background-note> accessed 10 January 2020.
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) outputs. Similarly, O'Rourke argues that it is through the cross-institutional development of norms and practices that gender law reform has become an entrenched element of the international legal system with a robust structure for checks and balances across the various institutions. In this section, I question what role this continually expansive area of work plays in the eradication of gendered (in)security. In particular, I am interested in the convergence of carceral and punitive feminist agendas that appear to be the constant across international institutions. Importantly, a carceral and punitive set of gender law reforms, whether focused on sanctions against States or prosecution of individuals, remains within the format of the institutions it emerges from. As such, attempts to address the gender symbols and structures within those institutions remain unlikely as the punitive legal model dictates not only crisis thinking but a commitment to identifying perpetrators and rogue States rather than forging a model for working in concert.

The CEDAW General Recommendation No 35, on violence against women, provides an interesting example of this cross-institutional development. While wider in scope and drawing on a specific commitment to an intersectional understanding of gender-based harms, the recommendation flags armed conflict as a type of special circumstance that might compound violence against women, referencing General Recommendation No 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations. Paragraph 42 of Recommendation 35 identifies ‘high rates of criminality and pervasive impunity, which may increase in situations of armed conflict or heightened insecurity’. As such, although conflict-related sexual violence only appears in the footnote text of the recommendation, the reference here to crime and impunity implicitly invokes international criminal law where the focus of gender strategies has predominantly developed in relation to sexual violence. From a symbolic perspective, what is invoked and understood across these institutional outputs is gender-based violence and violence against women as channelled through the issue of sexual violence and regulated through a crime control model.

While paragraph 5 of Resolution 2242 calls for greater cross-resolution incorporation of the women, peace, and security framework, and the analysis, above, shows the limited ways in which this has been rolled out, the key space where convergence across institutional activities does emerge remains sexual violence. The commitment of the UNSC, the CEDAW Committee and the International Criminal Court to develop the law on sexual violence, in particular conflict-related sexual violence, therefore requires further

scrutiny. A commitment to disrupting gendered (in)security would be specifically concerned with the symbolic elements of these agendas, the way power is configured and how different women’s security is imagined via these legal developments.

Thinking through the way gender is deployed in UNSC Resolution 2467, in conjunction with larger gender law reform, articulates the ongoing imagining of a vulnerable, sexualized female victim and her specific insecurity in conflict and post-conflict situations. While the same institutions build spaces of agency through notions of gender expertise, for elite women in global forums and networks, a two-tiered representation of gender is built into security discourse. The prompt for action is continually configured as a vulnerable woman in economically weak States and those States suffering the impact of armed conflict on their territories. The space for action is imagined as occurring within the institution where the inclusion and expansion of gender advisers and gender experts becomes the solution. The two-tiered model ignores the insecurity of women in the global North and outside of conflict zones while exacerbating forms of victim feminism that are more often imposed and directed towards women in the global south. The CEDAW recommendations attempt, at some level, to disrupt such a thin account of feminist praxis, through the wider focus on violence against women and its larger remit outside of conflict zones, an element of which is the cross-referencing of human rights in the preamble of women, peace, and security resolutions since 2013. However, this post-2013 trend towards incorporating specific links between human rights and the women, peace, and security agenda does more to narrow the former than broaden the latter. Ultimately, a postcolonial feminist analysis of the carceral mode, the global inequalities, and the use of gender as a civilizing tool warrant a feminist agenda that looks beyond existing legal tools.

C. Contemporary Developments

‘One way forward is to refocus international law on issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life.’

If the institutions of international law are replete with a narrow understanding of gender security, this section inquires as to the potential avenues for a transformative agenda. I introduce three mechanisms for reframing the international institutional approach to gendered (in)security that builds on ‘footholds’ already carved into existing law while attempting to actively think beyond the crisis politics of the UNSC. I explore the possibility of feminist and security scholarly commitment to new frames of knowledge that embed and embrace postcolonial feminist accounts and an intersectionality methodology

beyond that currently framed in the CEDAW recommendations.\textsuperscript{28} The three mechanisms are short provocations into an existing system of gendered security that ignores indigenous voices, the complexity of security outside of traditional land-based armed conflict, and the impact of economic policy on the production of gendered insecurity in peacetime States. I have described the section as ‘contemporary developments’ as, although looking outside existing provisions on women, peace, and security, I draw on contemporary feminist writing from a whole host of settings that offer alternatives to the status quo—outside of the existing institutional apparatus.

\textbf{1. Indigenous Security}

\textit{‘you stand for power, white people, but we stand for our land and the sea’}\textsuperscript{29}

There are many different indigenous knowledge traditions. As a preliminary provocation, I discuss the knowledge traditions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia in this section to sample and evidence the types of strategies that allow alternative praxis with regard to gendered security. My argument is not that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples hold the (magic) key to a reimagined security, rather that analysis of tradition knowledge can help expose the poverty of existing institutional structures and thus provide a frame for addressing the complexity of insecurity in diverse places.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples understand law as implicated in their larger knowledge structures that incorporate a relation to land, kin, and ancestors.\textsuperscript{30} As such, the security of individuals is connected to the security of the community, the land, and the continuation of traditions that connect to storytelling and remembering. Across the Australian continent, Aboriginal lore varies amongst the many different groups (nations) that lived on the territory prior to the arrival of the British colony. The creation of the Australian State after colonization and the designation of the land as \textit{terra nullius} rely on a number of myths to ensure the perception of the territory and property that currently dominates Australian governance structures. Within the origin myths of women, peace, and security, gendered security is imagined as something that is ensured through law and thus largely constitutes part of an agenda for Australian peacekeeping and military missions abroad, in the sense of being a deliverable that accompanies Australian actors overseas rather than an issue of internal concern to the State. Settler colonies, like Australia, thus continue the project of imposing and delivering security elsewhere while denying the insecurity of first nations communities on their own lands.


\textsuperscript{30} Irene Watson, \textit{Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law} (Routledge 2015).
and the role of the legal system in consolidating and entrenching insecurity.\textsuperscript{31} For indigenous feminisms, this requires a linking of land, community, health, spiritual, and environmental (in)security to the existence of the nation State which denies Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander knowledge as a form of governance.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition, the women, peace, and security structure in the deployment of a narrow range of feminist approaches, largely liberal, radical, and cultural in their modes, limits the potential for an indigenous worldview, let alone multiple indigenous worldviews across first nations peoples, to be incorporated at the level of knowledge production and normative framings.\textsuperscript{33} On the one hand, this is indicative of a larger challenge with regard to the assumptions about knowledge that construct international institutions, including the UNSC. Nevertheless, this should be of specific concern in the development of responses to gender and security because of the generally widespread feminist commitment to intersectionality.\textsuperscript{34} This, by definition, asks for a response to gender and security that is plural in the modes of feminism offered as a solution to insecurity and thus inclusive of indigenous feminisms.

Key security concerns within Australian indigenous communities include the specific, deathly insecurity for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women caused by high rates of domestic violence in remote Australian communities and high rates of incarceration for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women across Australia.\textsuperscript{35} Likewise, environmental insecurity across the continent is addressed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lore that both cultivates and cares for the environment in a responsible and sustainable manner. For example, while Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander land management gained increased recognition during the horrific bushfires over the summer of 2019, indigenous practices of controlled (prescribed) burning have previously been identified as a means to reduce emissions while providing increased environmental and human security.\textsuperscript{36} Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander knowledge of country seems distant from the UNSC, and from the women, peace, and security agenda, in part because the knowledge sources this stems from are largely untranslatable in the context of an international institution that deploys military violence as the ultimate enforcement


\textsuperscript{34} Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Human/Women’s Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics’ in Myra Marx Ferree/Aili Mari Tripp (eds), Transnational Feminisms: Women’s Global Activism and Human Rights (NYUP 2006) 275.


mechanism.\textsuperscript{37} Similarly, contemporary feminist initiatives within global governance are not able to mobilize diverse sites of women's knowledge that might have a holistic understanding of gendered security: that is, integrated into a worldview that holds environmental security as a necessary element. Drawing on the transcript from the \textit{Gumana} case, quoted above, this is a knowledge that stands ‘for land and sea’.\textsuperscript{38} However, even the conjoining of land and sea in security discourse has yet to occur, and certainly not land, sea, and gender as a way of thinking differently about when and where insecurity lies.\textsuperscript{39}

### 2. Gendered Security at Sea

Picking up on the indigenous relation to both land and sea, a significant silence in women, peace, and security discourse is flagged— that is, analysis of security at sea through a gendered lens. Although naval forces are incorporated into standard security discourse and analysis, thus far there has been little, if any, analysis of how gendered security happens at sea. The oceans have always been an important component of inter-State defence and security, with the naval might of the Dutch and British embedded in the history of international law and colonialism.\textsuperscript{40}

The obvious neglect of gendered insecurity at sea is apparent in contemporary women, peace, and security discourse. For example, human rights abuses at sea amongst fishing communities form a very specifically gendered mode of insecurity. These predominantly male communities have been identified as often operating under conditions of modern slavery, with the inaccessibility of vessels to enforcement bodies and the inaccessibility of land to victims, exacerbating the greed and violence that characterizes large numbers of seafaring communities. Poor mechanisms for the guarantee of labour rights further contribute to the conditions for the large numbers of victims of egregious human rights abuses at sea.\textsuperscript{41} However, in the absence of direct State regulation of vessels, due to the inept model of registration, and any other form of effective regulation on the high seas, these are vast communities of predominantly men experiencing insecurity in a highly gendered exploitation of labour and via the desire for mobility through labour.

As a gendered security concern, modern slavery at sea raises important questions with respect to how security is understood (via States as victims) and responded to (via military means) and how distinctions between civilians and combatants is gendered, such that a large, global threat to male communities via gross violations of human rights is not perceived as a space of insecurity and not recognized as a specifically gendered form of insecurity. An intersectional feminist analysis might dislodge the fixation on

\textsuperscript{37} Morphy (n 29).  
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Gumana} case (n 29).  
\textsuperscript{40} Norrie Macqueen, \textit{Colonialism} (Routledge 2014) 9, 15.  
\textsuperscript{41} Ian Urbina, \textit{The Outlaw Ocean: Journeys Across the Last Untamed Frontier} (Knopf Doubleday 2019).
women as the primary victims in the current women, peace, and security framework through a recognition of how intersectional privilege functions. Attention to the intersectional nature of privilege thus allows for recognition and response to how some men abuse and exploit other men and that the dominance of some men (and women) in international institutions is not indicative of a global male privilege but rather an intersectional male privilege.42

At a macro-level, in the post-millennium security environment, new spaces for collective security enforcement mechanisms, new threats, and provocations have emerged at sea. The violence and hostility of rogue actors off the Somali coast led to the authorization by the UNSC of the use of force in Somali territorial waters: a previously unprecedented form of collective security.43 The coastal communities labelled as pirates include both male and female identifying actors, although the response to pirates as male actors remains prevalent.44 Similarly, in other areas where security interests play out at sea, any gendered dimensions have remained suppressed by traditional approaches to security that ignore the existence of the women, peace, and security framework. This would include the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) enforcement mission in Lebanon which requires a Maritime Task Force to police the territorial waters under a mandate that supports the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related materials by sea into Lebanon,45 and the North Korean launching of missiles over Japan into the oceans, described as tests and with destinations in the high seas, which have been regarded by the US as hostile acts that subsequently escalated tensions between the two States. In the area of international law on collective security, the existing legal instruments for the most part only encompass the use of force on land and certainly no application of the women, peace, and security framework has been extended to the ocean. The gendered nature, and consequences, of the use of force on land have increasingly gained attention in the period subsequent to UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security.46 However, as yet no study of the application of the women, peace, and security resolutions to forces at sea has been undertaken, whether those forces be regular navies in peacetime, peacekeeping operations or enforcement missions, or actions against rogue actors at sea.

3. Gendered Security and Austerity Politics

In this third intervention, I look at an alternative perception of gendered security through a focus on austerity politics within peacetime States, in particular the UK.

42 Heathcote (n 2). 43 UNSC 1846 (2008); UNSC 1851 (2008).
45 This was established under UNSC Res 1701 (2006). At the time of writing Brazil held the command role for the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.
46 Heathcote (n 18).
I argue that there is a need for responses to gender and security that look beyond the spaces of armed conflict to see how gendered insecurity emerges within repressive State agendas in a manner that frames and consolidates other forms of insecurity.

Since 2011, and arguably before, the UK conservative government has endorsed and constructed an economic agenda to implement a policy of austerity, in line with other Western liberal democracies in the early twenty-first century. A key concern of austerity agendas has been the retraction of baseline public services—including funding for health and education—as well as the imposition of increasingly restrictive policy to access State benefits, particularly for non-citizen residents within the State. The gendered consequences of this approach have been well documented and the impact on the delivery of key services to women, including responses to sexual and gender-based crimes, has meant the imposition of dangerous constraints on a previously robust civil society structure supplementing welfare, health, and education.47 Scholars identify the nexus between the withdrawal of services and benefits to women as interlocking with the retraction of State support to disabled residents and to foreign nationals residing in Britain.48 An intersectional feminist analysis not only asks how different types of harms are inflicted on different bodies but how those harms are magnified at the intersection of gender and race, gender and disability, or gender and sexuality.49 Moreover, an intersectional feminist account interrogates how the construction of gendered harms via macro-level decisions intersects and is underpinned by racialized, homophobic and cis-phobic policies as well as the production of ableism as a normalizing force.50

The intersectional construction of power and privilege is as much about the maintenance of the status quo as it is about the embodiment of individual identities.51 Consequently, when assessed and deployed in the international sphere, intersectionality engages a series of provocative questions about gendered security. First, it illustrates how attention to gender in isolation from other sites of insecurity is often used to underpin and maintain privilege, where gender becomes a disciplining tool that imagines and frames gender disadvantage as elsewhere: for example, in conflict and post-conflict spaces. Secondly, and following on from the latter, a gender analysis of security that lacks an intersectional framework in locating gendered insecurity as ‘elsewhere’ to the West ignores how in States, such as the UK, gendered insecurity is felt most severely by racialized communities, in genderqueer and LGBTI lives, and in the intersection with disabled experience of harm and vulnerability. Austerity in the UK is thus a reminder that notions of insecurity cannot be measured or studied away from the everydayness of privilege. Gendered insecurity is global in its manifestations, linked to macro power dynamics—both within and across national contexts.

Not surprisingly, attempts to expand the women, peace, and security agenda beyond conflict and post-conflict settings has seen some pushback from States, as is noted, above, in the Russian and Chinese responses to Germany’s original drafting of Resolution 2467. Despite the potential different agendas prompting China and Russia to act in this way to block this expansion of women, peace, and security, this is a good outcome if it is recalled that UNSC engagement is connected to its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: military force and measures short of force, such as sanctions. As such, the broadening of UNSC engagement with gendered insecurities need not move outside of conflict or post-conflict spaces: rather, recognition of the intersectional and global power inequalities that play out via gender inequality might be the key to recognizing a need to move beyond militarized and carceral agendas towards challenging and arresting everyday violence. Nevertheless, feminist actors working to lobby States for new resolutions and new provisions within women, peace, and security would do well to question the convergence of Chinese and Russian agendas here. It is likely that the pushback on recognizing the gendered insecurity emerging from an approach to everyday insecurity would draw attention to a range of internal conflicts in which these States are engaged.

D. Conclusions

In 2019, when Germany held the pen for the drafting of UNSC Resolution 2467, thus attesting to a commitment to global reproductive justice, via the Council, national politics within Germany saw a rise in populism, nationalism and far-right political parties. Although by no means a development limited to Germany, the specific agenda of the German far-right group Alternative für Deutschland (‘AfD’), outlined in the party manifesto, is a good example to question the external and internal dissonance on gender politics for States. While Germany juxtaposes itself against the US Trump administration via UNSC Resolution 2467, nationally the electoral gains of AfD demonstrate tolerance of a repressive, racist, homophobic party that directly opposes both women’s rights and gender law reform, including an approach to reproductive justice that is anti-women. The nexus between populism, austerity, and racialized violence in Europe becomes a space of increasing insecurity for many and, when understood through the lens of intersectionality, demonstrates how gendered insecurity must be understood as implicated in forms of violence that cannot be addressed by solely looking at women’s lives. Furthermore, military solutions to gendered insecurity are unlikely to reduce patterns of insecurity produced by the rhetoric—and actions—of those committed to violent nationalisms.

The overview of gender and security in this chapter offers a space for rethinking how knowledge on gendered insecurity might be understood. It does not propose that the UNSC, as it currently exists with great power privilege knitted into its operations, be a space for articulating an indigenous feminist understanding of environment, community, and dispossession (although I sometimes wonder what that would look, sound, and seem like) or that the women, peace, and security agenda might be used to end the horrendous labour exploitations at sea, or that austerity practices in States in the global North, such as the UK, might be challenged through an expanded operation of international norms. I use each of these examples, instead, to configure and draw out the limited mechanisms available to feminists who wish to engage with the UNSC to challenge insecurity, as equally as the limitations of the UNSC as a forum to address such issues.

To conclude, this chapter is ultimately a plea for attention to plural feminisms. That is feminisms that operate both inside and outside of the UNSC: indigenous feminisms, environmental feminisms, masculinity studies, political economy feminisms, postcolonial feminisms, intersectional feminisms, and so on; and feminisms that attend to insecurity in peacetime States, conflict States, and post-conflict States but which do not build new sites of colonial interventions and which do not assume gender as a shorthand for women or that gender operates in a single mode. Feminisms that can respond to environmental insecurity, everyday insecurity, and the nexus between violent nationals and violent States need to be recognized and heard. Ultimately, from the perspective of plural feminisms, the UNSC remains a limited place for challenging gendered (in) security, through its select spaces of addressing women, peace, and security and through the persistence of militarized modes of security that are, by definition, unable to address everyday insecurities in peacetime or conflict States. As such, I advocate for postcolonial and intersectional feminisms that move and shift in new ways to imagine human and environmental security for the future. Plural feminisms are open to a diversity of voices and to an understanding of gender relations that could engage the complexity of a diversity of knowledge structures for future responses to gender and security.