

Pope, Nicholas (2020) *Brokering an Urban Frontier: Milícias, Violence, and Rio de Janeiro's West Zone*. PhD thesis. SOAS, University of London. <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/34168>

Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners.

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.

Brokering an Urban Frontier:  
*Milícias*, Violence, and Rio de Janeiro's  
West Zone

Nicholas Pope

Thesis submitted for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2019

Department of Development Studies  
SOAS, University of London

## Abstract

This thesis examines the emergence and sustainment of *milícias* (militias) in the 1990s in the West Zone ‘margins’ of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It considers the rise of *milícias* as they coincide with urbanisation, economic liberalisation, democratisation, decentralisation and the rise of violent drug trafficking organisations. This thesis sets out to answer the following overarching research question: ‘How and why did *milícias* emerge in Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone since the 1990s and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?’ The analytical approach developed to answer this question draws on an historically situated political settlements framework to understand *milícias* as power relations within coalition formations and as facilitators of rent extraction and distribution. The framework introduces urban and political geography literatures on frontiers to advance a thesis that *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro are coercive brokers that mediate urban frontier zones. This study draws on ethnographic fieldnotes from direct and participant observation, in-depth interviews and oral histories, and extensive archival research of parliamentary documents. It argues that *milícias* emerged to provide temporary ‘solutions’ to address the violent inequalities, structural insecurities, and the threats and insecurities posed by drug trafficking organisations in the urban frontiers. They emerged through ‘bottom-up’ processes but were also seen as convenient to political and economic elites in the central state who were unable (or unwilling) to provide formal security in the West Zone. However, this thesis makes the case that there was a trade-off for the central state as paramilitaries, as accrued power in the urban frontier, they also attempted to reshape state institutions. Because of their roots in local communities, this thesis also recognises the dependency of *milícias* on legitimacy, ideas, beliefs and norms, and the power imbued in community relations. This study contributes to the literatures on *milícias* by accounting for their role as co-producers of (dis)order in the urban margins, the literature on political settlements by intertwining questions of violence and conflict with spatiality, and finally the Latin American literatures on local political order and governance by advancing a conceptualisation of armed groups straddling state and society and challenging conventional state/-non-state binaries.

## Resumo

Esta tese examina o aparecimento e estabelecimento das “milícias” nas periferias da Zona Oeste da cidade do Rio de Janeiro nos anos 90. Contemporâneo ao crescimento das “milícias”, como grupos paraestatais, considera-se a urbanização, a liberalização econômica, a democratização, a descentralização e o surgimento de organizações violentas de narcotráfico. A tese pretende responder á duas abrangentes questões de pesquisa: “Como e por que as milícias surgiram e se estabeleceram na Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro e qual é a sua relação com a gestão de (des)ordem?”. A abordagem analítica utilizada para responder a essa pergunta ancora-se no conceito de economia política de *political settlements* que, contextualizado historicamente, entende as forças paraestatais como relações de poder dentro das formações de coalizão, bem como facilitadores de extração e distribuição de *rents*. A partir de marcações teóricas provindas da geografia urbana e da questão de fronteira da geografia política, avança-se na tese o argumento de que os grupos paramilitares no Rio de Janeiro são intermediários coercitivos que mediam as zonas de fronteira urbana. O estudo utiliza notas etnográficas de trabalho de campo feito com observação direta e participante, entrevistas em profundidade, histórias orais e extensa pesquisa em acervos de documentos parlamentares. Argumenta-se que as “milícias” aparecem para oferecer “soluções” temporárias e combater as violentas desigualdades, as inseguranças estruturais e as ameaças impostas por organizações de narcotráfico nas fronteiras urbanas. Apesar de surgirem por processos *bottom-up* (de baixo para cima), essas forças foram convenientes para as elites políticas e econômicas do estado central, que não podiam (ou não queriam) fornecer segurança estatal na Zona Oeste. No entanto, esta tese defende que houve um *trade-off* (perde-e-ganha) para o estado central, pois os grupos paraestatais, na medida em que acumularam poder nas fronteiras urbanas, tentaram remodelar as instituições do estado. Por causa de suas raízes nas comunidades locais, esta tese também reconhece que esses grupos dependem de legitimação, ideias e normas, e que os poderes perpassam as relações comunitárias. Este estudo pretende contribuir assim para a ampliação da literatura sobre as “milícias”, explicando seu papel como coprodutores da (des)ordem nas margens urbanas, contribuindo também para a literatura sobre *political settlements* entrelaçando questões de violência e conflito com espaço relacional e, para as literaturas latino-americanas sobre a ordem política local e governança, promovendo assim uma conceptualização de grupos armados abrangendo o estado e a sociedade e desafiando os binários convencionais de estado/não-estado.

## Resumen

Esta tesis examina la emergencia y consolidación de las “*milícias*” (milicias), en las periferias de la Zona Oeste de la ciudad de Río de Janeiro en los años 90. Junto al crecimiento de estas “*milícias*” como grupos paraestatales, se considera la urbanización, la liberalización económica, la democratización, la descentralización y el surgimiento de organizaciones violentas de narcotráfico. La tesis pretende dar respuesta a una pregunta de investigación muy amplia: “¿Cómo y por qué surgieron las *milícias* en la Zona Oeste de Río de Janeiro en la década de 1990 y cómo y por qué se establecieron? ¿Cuál es su relación con la gestión de (des)orden?”. El enfoque de análisis utilizado para responder esta pregunta está anclado en el concepto de economía política de *political settlements* que, históricamente contextualizado, entiende las fuerzas paraestatales como relaciones de poder dentro de las formaciones de coaliciones, así como facilitadores de la extracción y distribución de rentas. Partiendo de marcos teóricos originados en la geografía urbana y la geografía política, esta investigación postula que los grupos paramilitares en Río de Janeiro actúan como intermediarios coercitivos (*coercive brokers*) que median en las zonas fronterizas urbanas. La investigación también utiliza notas etnográficas del trabajo de campo realizado a través de observación directa y participante, entrevistas en profundidad, historias orales y una extensa investigación de archivo con documentos parlamentarios. Se argumenta que las “*milícias*” parecen ofrecer “soluciones” temporales y combatir desigualdades violentas, inseguridades estructurales y amenazas que plantean las organizaciones de narcotráfico en las fronteras urbanas. A pesar de surgir de procesos *bottom up* (procesos de organización de base popular), estas fuerzas resultaron convenientes para las élites políticas y económicas del estado central, que no podía (o no quería) brindar seguridad estatal en la Zona Oeste. Sin embargo, esta tesis sostiene que esto implicó una pérdida también para el estado central, ya que los grupos paraestatales, en la medida en que acumularon poder en las fronteras urbanas, intentaron remodelar las instituciones estatales. Debido a sus raíces en las comunidades locales, esta tesis también reconoce que estos grupos dependen de la legitimidad, las ideas y las normas de la población, y que los poderes impregnan las relaciones comunitarias. Este estudio tiene como objetivo contribuir a distintas literaturas que analizan estos fenómenos. En primer lugar, contribuye a la literatura sobre “*milícias*” al explicar su papel como coproductores del (des)orden en los márgenes urbanos. En segundo lugar, a la literatura sobre *political settlements* que entrelazan temas de violencia y conflicto con el espacio relacional y, finalmente, para las literaturas Latinoamericanas sobre el orden político local y la gobernanza, promoviendo una

conceptualización de los grupos armados que abarcan el estado y la sociedad y desafiando las visiones dicotómicas convencionales de estado y no estado.



*Marielle Franco (27 July 1979 – 14 March 2018)*

## Acknowledgements

I'm thankful to all of the residents and friends in the communities where I had the privilege of spending time, who contributed to this study and shared their experiences with me willingly, and yet received nothing back in return. I cannot name you here for obvious reasons, but you have been the biggest inspiration in this process and the thesis was only possible because of your collaboration.

Many more have supported me through this project than I could mention individually, and if there are any glaring omissions then it's not intentional. But I do want to name a few. Firstly, Jonathan Goodhand, my mentor, supervisor and intellectual inspiration. I will always be grateful to Jonathan, who took a gamble on me, but who has always, impressively, had patience, challenged me to be better, and steered me in the right direction through some bumpy times. Thank you also to Zoe Marriage has always been there with words of encouragement, offering valuable comments and feedback, and demonstrating that academia can be a positive place to be. I look forward to joining you back in the *roda* soon! I've been lucky to have had the support of Uma Kothari who made time to listen, advise and offer comments in my final year of this project.

A number of academic colleagues, peers and friends have all offered constructive and thoughtful contributions to this process: Ellen van Holstein, Gabriel Malinowski, Tucker Landesman, Matthew Richmond, Phillip Ayoub, Charlie Livingston, and Marika Sosnowski. I've enjoyed all of our challenging chats and learnt from every one of you. To my committee supervisors, Chris Cramer and Jonathan di John: your early input and suggestions were invaluable. Alfredo Saad-Filho, thanks for the words of encouragement, advice and contacts along the way. To everyone at the School of Geography at the University of Melbourne for their warm welcome and collegiality during the time I spent with there. Thanks also to John Langmore whose kindness and academic gravitas I won't forget.

Thank you to all of those in Brazil who supported with data, advice and guidance me at various points: Robert Muggah, Orlando Zaconne, Sam Cowie, Simone Gomes, Sergio Ramalho, Vera Araújo, and Bernardo Ainbinder. Ignacio Cano and Michel Misse supported me institutionally and were also available to talk about my project and offer me advice when the fieldwork became challenging. Also to Manuel Thedim everyone at the Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade for the office space (with an incredible view!) and the intellectual stimulation.

To all of my friends across the world who have been there for me through it all. You've listened to my dilemmas, offered me moral support, let me stay on your couch and dragged me from my desk when I needed interventions. Karma will treat you well. Particular thanks to Matt, John, Laura, Andrea, Catherine, Emma, Carolina, Isabel and Kylie as you've all shared your homes and put up with me. My biggest supporter and believer through all of this has been my family: My mum's unconditional support has always kept me going, and her kindness and compassion for other people less fortunate than we are has inspired me since day dot. My dad's academic excellence, drive and ambition have always been a source of inspiration, offering me guidance and always helping me with my writing. And I am grateful to Marianne, my brother Chris, and my wider family for your support and your interest in what's going on out there in the world.



## Table of contents

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>Declaration.....</b>  | <b>2</b>   |
| <b>Abstract.....</b>   | <b>3</b>   |
| <b>Acknowledgements .....</b>  | <b>8</b>   |
| <b>Table of contents .....</b>   | <b>9</b>   |
| <b>Table of figures.....</b>   | <b>11</b>  |
| <b>Location maps .....</b>   | <b>13</b>  |
| <b>Introduction: Dying and Surviving in a Divided City .....</b>                                   | <b>17</b>  |
| A moment to reflect.....   | 17         |
| Brokerage, development and urban peripheries .....   | 19         |
| Challenges in the field .....  | 25         |
| Thesis outline.....  | 27         |
| <b>One: Political Order, Parastatal Armed Groups, and Urban Violence in Latin America .....</b>    | <b>29</b>  |
| Introduction.....  | 29         |
| Reshaping global violence.....   | 30         |
| Defining key terms of the study.....   | 33         |
| Explaining (parastatal) violence in the city .....   | 35         |
| Securing urban space: From narratives, to problems and possible solutions .....                    | 56         |
| Conclusions.....   | 63         |
| <b>Two: Political Settlements, Brokerage and Social Transformation in the Urban Frontier .....</b> | <b>65</b>  |
| Introduction.....  | 65         |
| Political settlements and the management of violence .....   | 66         |
| A spatial critique of political settlements .....  | 70         |
| Spatialising political settlements: Urban frontiers, opportunity and displacement .....            | 71         |
| Brokerage, emplacements and frontier mentalities.....  | 76         |
| Conclusions.....   | 83         |
| <b>Three: Ethics, Security and Method .....</b>  | <b>84</b>  |
| Introduction.....  | 84         |
| Positioning the research.....  | 84         |
| Defining the ‘field’ and selecting the case.....   | 89         |
| Research design .....  | 95         |
| Summary.....   | 108        |
| <b>Four: A Frontier History of Order, Violence, and <i>Resistência</i> in Rio de Janeiro.....</b>  | <b>110</b> |
| Introduction.....  | 110        |
| A history of extraction and racism.....  | 111        |
| Towards modernisation, independence and transformation .....                                       | 120        |
| A less-than-marvellous city .....  | 128        |
| Democratisation, liberalisation and violence.....  | 137        |
| Conclusions.....   | 145        |
| <b>Five: Local Responses to Insecurity and Violence .....</b>                                      | <b>147</b> |
| An urban security crisis .....   | 148        |
| Patronage, welfare, and legitimacy.....  | 159        |
| Building foundations of the <i>milícia</i> .....   | 166        |
| A perfect vehicle for expansion.....   | 169        |
| Another version of ‘the state’ .....   | 176        |

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| Conclusions.....  | 181        |
| <b>Six: The <i>Milícia</i> as the Means to an End.....</b>  | <b>184</b> |
| Introduction.....   | 185        |
| Emergence of ‘ <i>milícia</i> ’ as a device.....  | 186        |
| Expansion of parastatal organisations and contestation over urban space .....                                     | 192        |
| Attempts to dismantle parastatal power.....   | 200        |
| A crisis of legitimacy.....   | 204        |
| Deconstructing the ‘enemy’.....   | 214        |
| Conclusions.....  | 218        |
| <b>Seven: Encountering ‘<i>Milícia</i>’, Death and Alternative Futures .....</b>                                  | <b>220</b> |
| Introduction.....   | 222        |
| Santo Cristo: Individual histories of power, cooperation and survival .....                                       | 224        |
| Floresta da Campinha: Shared histories, <i>resistência</i> and utopian imaginings.....                            | 232        |
| Conclusions.....  | 244        |
| <b>Conclusions: Brokering Divisions, Parastatal Groups and Management of (Dis)order in the Urban Margins.....</b> | <b>247</b> |
| A summary of the findings .....   | 250        |
| The contributions of this study to the academic literature.....   | 257        |
| New research directions and areas for policy development .....  | 260        |
| <b>Appendix 1. Extended Audit Trail .....</b>   | <b>263</b> |
| <b>Appendix 2: <i>Carioca Milícia</i> Practices .....</b>   | <b>273</b> |
| <b>Bibliography .....</b>   | <b>278</b> |

## Table of figures

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Figure 1: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro State Location (Source: Author) .....  | 13  |
| Figure 2: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro Municipality Location (Source: Author).....  | 14  |
| Figure 3: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro Municipality and Urban Zones (Source: Author) .....  | 15  |
| Figure 4: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro's West Zone (Source: Author).....  | 16  |
| Figure 5: Front Pages of EXTRA Newspaper (Source: EXTRA Archive) .....  | 90  |
| Figure 6: Map of the Case Sites in the West Zone (Source: Author) .....   | 93  |
| Figure 7: Interviewees by Primary Social Title .....  | 102 |
| Figure 8: Church of São Gonçalo Built in 1625 (Source: Correa, 1936) .....  | 113 |
| Figure 9: Cais do Valongo and Cais da Imperatriz (Source: Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro (CDURP), 2014) .....   | 113 |
| Figure 10: Earle, A., 'Negroes Fighting, Brazil' (c. 1824) (Source: Wikipedia) .....  | 116 |
| Figure 11: Population of Rio de Janeiro (Source: Recenseamento Geral do Brasil (National Census) 1920) .....  | 118 |
| Figure 12: Jean Baptiste Debret, 'A Government employee leaving his house with his family' (1822) .....   | 119 |
| Figure 13: Map of the Parishes of Rio de Janeiro (Source: (Honorato and Mantuano, 2016)).....   | 122 |
| Figure 14: Map of the Triangle Group (Source: (Fróes and Gelabert, 2004)) .....   | 123 |
| Figure 15: Zones of Rio de Janeiro: Urban, Suburban and Rural from the Decree 1.185, 05/11/1918 (Source: (Weyrauch, 2015)).....   | 127 |
| Figure 16: Houses Demolished in the City Centre Because of the Pereira Passos Reform (Source: Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, Foto de Augusto Malta).....                                  | 127 |
| Figure 17: Favelas and Irregular Lots in Rio de Janeiro in 1969 (Source: Rio de Janeiro City, Secretariat of Urbanism, 2008).....   | 131 |
| Figure 18: Example of a Subdivisions of Land (Source: (Nascimento, 2005)).....  | 131 |
| Figure 19: Concentrations of Pedestrian Footfall Across Rio de Janeiro (Source: (Prefeitura, 2016)) .....   | 133 |
| Figure 20: <b>Comparison of development figures for different regions of Rio de Janeiro (2000) (Source: Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico, 2000; PNUD, IPEA and FJP; *national data for 2001)</b> ..... | 141 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Figure 21: Advertisement for Pre-Carnival Party organised by Jorge Babú (Source: WhatsApp flyer from a Santa Cruz residents' group).....   | 161 |
| Figure 22: WhatsApp invitation for a Samba Party (Source: WhatsApp message sent to me by a resident informant).....  | 161 |
| Figure 23: Jerônimo's Social Centre in 1997 (Source: Facebook <a href="https://www.facebook.com/jerominhoguimaraesoficial">https://www.facebook.com/jerominhoguimaraesoficial</a> ).....   | 165 |
| Figure 22: A contemporary example of a DPO with the text 'HERE THE TERRITORY IS OURS' (Source: Lei Seca Maricá website, <a href="https://leisecamarica.com.br/pm-retira-trailer-da-comunidade-do-risca-faca-em-inoa/">https://leisecamarica.com.br/pm-retira-trailer-da-comunidade-do-risca-faca-em-inoa/</a> )..... | 179 |
| Figure 23: 'The Sheriff that Changed the Routine of Itanhangá' (Source: <i>O Globo</i> Archive, 24/2/2002).....  | 187 |
| Figure 24: 'Police Create Milícias and Expel Drug Traffickers from Favelas' (Source: <i>O Globo</i> Archive, 20/3/2005).....   | 189 |
| Figure 25: Map of Locations of Favelas With (White) and Without (Black) Drug Trafficking (Source: <i>O Globo</i> Archive, 20/3/2005).....  | 189 |
| Figure 26: Graffiti with the League of Justice Symbol and a Message: 'We Are Coming' (Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482) .....  | 194 |
| Figure 27: A sign on a Gate of a Plot of Land in Santa Cruz: 'Dep. Jorge Babu: The Warrior of Rio' (Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482).....   | 194 |
| Figure 28: 'Police Support the Milicia in the War Over Space of the Traffickers' (Source: <i>O Globo</i> Archive, 10/12/2006).....   | 197 |
| Figure 29: Map of Milícia Locations from (Source: <i>O Globo</i> Archive 10/12/2006) .....   | 197 |
| Figure 30: Copy of Printed Flyer Distributed Around Rio de Janeiro (Source: Insanus blog) .....  | 198 |
| Figure 31: Front Page of <i>O Dia</i> Newspaper (Source: <i>O Dia</i> Archive 31/5/2008).....  | 206 |
| Figure 32: Differences in Numbers of 'Suspected' and 'Indicted' Militiamen (Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4477, p.717-728; CPI Relatório Final).....   | 209 |
| Figure 33: Quarry Entrance on Campinha Road (Source: Author) .....   | 220 |
| Figure 34: Fly-tip on Campinha Road with Vultures (Source: Author).....  | 221 |
| Figure 35: Map of Campinha Road Highlighting Floresta da Campinha, Santo Cristo and MCMV (Source: Author) .....  | 223 |
| Figure 36: Serginho's Preferences for 2018 Elections: 'Serginho Votes and Indicates...' (Source: Facebook <a href="https://www.facebook.com/sergioaguilar.aguiar.3">https://www.facebook.com/sergioaguilar.aguiar.3</a> ) .....  | 231 |

## Location maps




Figure 2: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro Municipality Location (Source: Author)




Figure 3: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro Municipality and Urban Zones (Source: Author)





Figure 4: Illustrative Map of Rio de Janeiro's West Zone (Source: Author)





## Introduction: Dying and Surviving in a Divided City

‘How many more need to die for this war to end?’

Marielle Franco, 13 March 2018<sup>1</sup>

### A moment to reflect

As I was drafting a chapter of this thesis early on the morning of Friday, 15 March 2018, I received a WhatsApp message, out of the blue, from a friend in Rio de Janeiro. She had received the news that Marielle Franco, an political activist, city councilwoman and someone who had contributed in various and significant ways to this research project, had been assassinated several hours earlier. In the hours before her murder, Marielle had been participating in an event entitled *Young Black Women Challenging Structures*. Minutes after leaving the event, Marielle and her driver, Anderson Gomes, were assassinated in an organised hit on the car they were in.

In August 2018, civil police began to investigate the possible involvement of an organised crime group known as the *Escritório do Crime* in the assassinations. Accused of participating in this group, one Military Policeman, Ronnie Lessa, and one ex-Military Policeman, Élcio Vieira de Queiroz, were arrested on 12 March 2019 and have been charged for carrying out her murder.

Since then, various pieces of information have led the blame to individual politicians who are suspected of *mandando* (ordering) the assassination, including the sitting president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro. However, these political connections and relations are obscure and opaque at the best of times, and the investigations have not yet resulted in any conviction at the time of competing this thesis. Human rights groups have articulated various criticisms of the Brazilian police and prosecutors involved in the investigation, suggesting that the case had been politically thwarted and influenced. However, the evidence suggests that the assassination was the work of Rio de Janeiro’s *milícia* groups (this translates directly into English as ‘militia’), of which the *Escritório do Crime* is one.

*Milícia* groups emerged during the 1990s across the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro (see fig. 3), in some of the most precarious and violent neighbourhoods of the city. They seemed to emerge, at first, offering ‘security’ for residents in marginal urban communities where many residents feared the threat posed by criminal and drug trafficking violence. They were legitimised by

---

<sup>1</sup> Franco, M. (2018). Twitter. Available at: <https://twitter.com/mariellefranco/status/973568966403731456?lang=en> (Accessed: 10 October 2019).

poor urban residents who sought out ways of defending themselves and creating a local sense of order, with local security actors executing roles as local vigilantes, security guards or protection groups. This mirrored broader trends across the city, and Latin America more generally, of a growing private security sector. Composed of off-duty policemen, firemen, army soldiers, and other security sector agents, these groups used their access to weapons control and monopolise local goods and services markets.

Marielle, the first black, feminist, bisexual, *favela* resident elected in 2016 to Rio de Janeiro's city council, had been directly involved in exposing the violence of the *milícias* for over a decade. In 2008, when she was a parliamentary assistant working for the Socialist and Liberty Party (PSOL) parliamentarian, Marcelo Freixo, she gathered and analysed evidence for the *Parliamentary Inquiry Commission of Milícias in Rio de Janeiro* (CPI). At this time, it was estimated *milícias* dominated 161 communities in the metropolitan area.<sup>2</sup> The CPI also highlighted some of the shadowy links between politicians and *milicianos* (militiamen) by exposing the political deals, vote farming, and gerrymandering practices across West Zone districts.

At the same time in mid-2008, Rio de Janeiro's bid for the Olympic Games in 2016 was shortlisted; and the 'Pacification Police Programme' (UPP) was established in several *favelas*. The narrative offered by the state government was that the UPP was intended to provide 'security' for residents. But tellingly, UPPs were installed only in *favelas* with active drug-trafficking organisations that were closest to the affluent beachside South Zone neighbourhoods,<sup>3</sup> the city centre or strategic points of interest for the Olympic Games, such as the international airport. The West Zone, where violent drug trafficking groups also had a stronghold and where many of the *milícias* operated, was broadly excluded from the programme.

It is no surprise that the police 'combat' of *milícias* was limited in Rio de Janeiro given that in a majority of cases *milicianos* were also police or they were linked into police networks. Similarly, many political and state elites were disinterested in tackling *milícias* because of the political support they provided for them to help them get elected into power; furthermore, the focus has firmly been on tackling drug criminality and violence. For these reasons, it is unlikely

---

<sup>2</sup> BBC News Brasil (2018) 'Investigadas pela morte de Marielle, milícias podem ser um problema maior que o tráfico no Rio', R7. Available at: <https://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/investigadas-pela-morte-de-marielle-milicias-podem-ser-um-problema-maior-que-o-trafico-no-rio-17042018> (Accessed: 20 November 2019).

<sup>3</sup> There is one unique exception in Batan following the torture of two journalists by *milícias*, which I discuss in chapter six.

that the exact political motivations behind Marielle's assassination will come to light any time soon, if ever at all.

However, on a broader level, it is clearer that the assassination of Marielle was because she had been seen as a threat to the hegemony and the established political order in Rio de Janeiro. When Marielle ran for office for the first time in 2016, she gained an extremely high level of public support, achieving over 46,000 votes. She was the fifth-highest voted candidate in the city from a selection of over 1,500. Marielle offered political representation to many of the marginalised communities in Rio de Janeiro – in a state where 52.6% of the population self-identify as black or mixed race;<sup>4</sup> but in a country where only 27% of the elected politicians identify themselves in this way.<sup>5</sup>

When Marielle had been on the city council, she had put forward debates and advanced discourses that had rarely been discussed in the chamber, such as on gendered violence, reproductive rights and improved rights for *favela* citizens. She had also chaired on the Women's Defence Commission that monitored and scrutinised the federal government's military intervention in Rio de Janeiro. The military had been deployed several months before her assassination to 'deal with' the high levels of insecurity and rising conflicts between drug trafficking factions across the city, in the year of an important election. On the day before Marielle was assassinated, she had raised concerns about the death of a black teenager who had been killed by military police in a Rio de Janeiro *favela* as a result of this intervention.

### Brokerage, development and urban peripheries

The thesis examines some of the processes that have led to these types of violent practice (and localised forms of ordering) that are common in the 'urban margins' of Rio de Janeiro. The specific region that I refer to, the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, is an large region of 885,74 km<sup>2</sup> making up 73.97% of the land formal part of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Previously known as the *Sertão Carioca*, or the 'Wild West', this region had a reputation for being wild and unruly. It was, for many years, a hinterland with small agricultural settlements governed by landed gentry and Jesuit monks. It was a 'backyard' and a site of food production for the bustling capital city. Throughout the history of this marginal(ised) region, there have been antecedents of structural, state, and non-state physical and symbolic violence.

---

<sup>4</sup> IBGE Censo (2010) 'Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010'.; In table 1.3.1 - População residente, por cor ou raça, segundo o sexo e os grupos de idade; 'Black' is defined by the IBGE as individuals that consider themselves black or mixed race.

<sup>5</sup> Krüger, A. (2018) 'Só 4% dos eleitos em outubro são negros', *UOL*, 20 November 2018. Available at: <https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/eleicoes/so-4-dos-eleitos-em-outubro-sao-negros-eram-107-das-candidaturas-em-2018/>.

The West Zone of Rio de Janeiro is particularly interesting setting for a case study because of the rapid population growth it experienced during the twentieth century. Initially, the region underwent a significant transformation during the post-World War II period, as decreasing profitability of agricultural products and urban migration from rural Brazil led to urbanisation, increased population size and greater diversity in the region. But then, rapid structural change and development processes linked to the end of military rule, democratisation, political decentralisation, and global economic liberalisations in the 1980s and 1990s had significant impacts in the West Zone. The region was particularly affected by market-driven urbanisation, as unregulated developers mopped up the land in the West Zone to maximise investments and returns.

Accompanying this wave of liberalisation and globalisation, urban growth and the expansion of informal economies led to significant changes in the daily lives of residents. The expansion of the global drug trade in the 1970s and the arrival of cocaine to Rio de Janeiro led to the expansion of drug trafficking organisations across the city. In the 1980s, as profitability of the cocaine market soared, the drug trafficking organisations broke up into different factions and began to compete with one another for territorial control over different *favela* communities across the city from where they based themselves to service domestic and international markets.

Violent conflicts began to characterise everyday life in the West Zone in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Without sufficient police resources across the region, local resident police and other state-linked security agents took upon themselves the responsibility of securitising the communities where they lived. These actors with the means to exert force provided protection for their families and friends, but they also attempted to eradicate drug traffickers, or *bandidos* ('criminal bandits'). Various massacres took place during this period as groups of police went into drug-trafficking controlled territories to execute the *bandidos*. These conflicts generated a spiralling set of revenge attacks between a variety of different actors and organisations – within, outside, and straddling the state system – who were all contesting urban land, legitimacy and power in the region. The focus of this study is on one of these little-understood phenomenon: Rio de Janeiro's *milícias*.

*Milícias* in Rio de Janeiro, or *Carioca milícias* ('*Carioca*' is the word used to refer to anything from the city of Rio de Janeiro city), vary considerably in terms of form and function. This makes it difficult to work with a clear and concise definition of them. However, the widely-used definition of the groups in the local literature, to date, has been driven by Cano and

Duarte's (2012) seminal five-point definition of *milícias*, suggesting they are (i) territorial, (ii) coercive, (iii) individually rationally-motivated, (iv) in positions within public security institutions, and (v) providers of security in return for informal taxation.<sup>6</sup> The sparse literature that exists on this phenomenon, in part due to the immense methodological, ethical, and security limitations in researching this phenomena, seems to settle on a definition of *Carioca milícias* as 'organised criminal organisations' fuelled by state corruption and motivated by profit.

When engaging with this literature before beginning this thesis study, my experience working in a local-NGO and dialoguing with community residents from *milícia*-dominated communities led me to believe that there were some conceptual and empirical limitations to how *milícias* had been represented and understood, so far. I had a hunch that *Carioca milícias* were much more complex than the profile of 'organised criminal groups' that the media and some academic discourse painted them to be. I wanted to explore the connection between this phenomenon and the West Zone and that they had emerged through; by situating them in the spatial and institutional scrambles that appear to be characteristic of these types of marginal urban spaces during a specific period of liberalisation and decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, due to the links these groups had with the state, I also felt that there seemed to be much more to say about the ways that (state) power played out in these marginal spaces, and, in particular, about the shadowy relationships between *milicianos* and decision makers and power holders rooted inside the state system.

The focus of my approach is therefore not only on the *milícias* themselves – their legal status, or in the individuals that compose them – but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, on the historically and spatial situatedness of *how* and *why* these groups attempt to maintain localised order within much broader and macro-level structures of power. It is also, generally speaking, about the specific relationships mediated between urban centres and margins, the negotiation of power through and around the state system, and the ways in which power is distributed and managed across urban space.

This thesis, therefore, seeks to understand and explain what has led to the emergence and sustainment of *milícias* in the West Zone since the 1990s. Specifically, this thesis addresses the central research question:

---

<sup>6</sup> This is an evolution of a definition outlined by Cano and Iooty (2008)

**CRQ: How and why did *Carioca milícias* emerge in Rio de Janeiro's West Zone since the 1990s and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?**

This is linked to a set of sub-questions:

**SRQ1. Why and how did *Carioca milícias* emerge?**

**SRQ2. What is the relationship between *Carioca milícias* and the underlying political settlement?**

**SRQ3. How do West Zone inhabitants and *Carioca milícias* interact and influence each other? And how does this, in turn, (re)shape the management of (dis)order?**

Given the broad acknowledgement that *milícias* are linked (in some way) to the state and are important players in the landscape of violence and disorder in urban peripheries, I initially approached this study through literature that speaks directly to these overarching themes.

The first is the literature on urban violence that attempts to unpack the different causes of violence in the city such as structural, political, institutional, economic and social violence, but that also understands violence in cities as the consequence of social tensions and conflict (Winton, 2004; Moser, 2004; Auyero, 2000; Moser and McIlwaine, 2014; Moser and Rodgers, 2012). One of the most influential aspects that emerged from this body of literature, that helped me steer this research, is the acknowledgement that violence is deeply embedded in processes of urban development, and that 'it is not going away [...] and is here to stay' (Moser and McIlwaine, 2014, 332). This has significant implications for the ways we think about development, the management and control of violence, and, ultimately about strategies of securitisation and ordering. However, it also opens the possibilities for new ways for marginalised and vulnerable populations to engage with and respond to violence.

The second body of literature deals with the phenomenon of armed groups, drug trafficking, non-state armed groups and criminal governance in Latin America (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014; Denyer-Willis, 2013; Leeds, 1996; Arias, 2009; Arias, 2017; Barnes, 2017; Rodgers, 2006; Misse, 2011b; Zaluar and Conceição, 2007). One of the central concerns of this literature is explaining the role of armed groups in creating and resolving political disorder whereby order is sustained through relationships (of corruption) between state and non-state actors; for example, between corrupt police or politicians and drug trafficking organisations. My primary contention with this literature is that its hypotheses do not help to explain the nuanced

positionalities of organisations and actors that do not fit neatly within Weberian inspired distinctions between state and criminality.

The third body of literature is related to broader discussions of paramilitaries, militias, and civil wars, both inside and outside of Latin America (Ahram, 2011a; Ahram, 2011b; Ahram and King, 2012; Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sanín, 2004; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008; Ballvé, 2013; Ballvé, 2017). A primary consideration of this literature is the relationship between paramilitaries and situation of fragmented or disputed sovereignty; which is typically understood as state ‘fragility’ and/or ‘weakness’. However, this literature, that is largely based upon empirical studies in rural settings, does not necessarily resonate with the empirical realities of the urban margins that sit geographically close to the levers of power centres. As a result, this literature underplays the importance of localised systems of order and non-state forms of governance for the development and evolution of states.

As I will argue in the literature review (chapter one) and conceptual framework (chapter two) that follow, these approaches, when combined, provide only partial explanations when applied to the *milícias* and the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where the urban periphery has a very specific set of characteristics and these groups have a very unique relationship with those holding power within the state system. They fail to account for the spatiality of urban peripheries that contribute to the emergence of localised violent orders, and they do not recognise the unique positionality of localised regimes of control that simultaneously straddle the spheres of state and society. Part of this deficiency lies in the fact that none of the literatures are sufficiently sensitive to questions of space, frontiers and marginality in urban environments in countries that are ostensibly ‘at peace’. Whilst the literature on urban violence demonstrates an interest in violence during ‘peacetime’, and the literature on paramilitaries considers violence in ‘wartime’, neither of these literatures explicitly consider the spatial aspect of violence, nor do they address the particular institutional arrangements, and their underlying structures of power, that emerge to manage or deploy violence in peripheral regions. Furthermore, they fail to address adequately how particular localised regimes of control are able to influence the shape of the state, advance a set of ideas that emerged from the margins, and let loose an political project that can contradict the current trajectory of state formation.

The limitations of these approaches, then, suggested to me that additional conceptual models were required to address my research questions. These limitations were also confirmed to me with empirical data when I first entered the field. My initial field site was one of the many remote *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (MCMV) social housing developments on the periphery of

the West Zone neighbourhood of Campo Grande. Several months before I arrived, the MCMV development had been in the crossfires of a territorial conflict between two rival *milícia* factions. I set out with the task of understanding what was special about that particular MCMV development for a conflict to have emerged. However, after several weeks, I realised that the dynamics of violence, governance and territoriality could only be explained through a much broader understanding of power relations, resources, and political coalitions that stretched far beyond the perimeter walls of the MCMV development. These dynamics were concerned with the control over resources and access to rents (from within and outside of the state system) in a region that was being subjected to the intense effects of urbanisation.

In light of my readings of the literature and my initial empirical reflections, this thesis advances a way of bringing together critical questions about space, power, and ‘the state’ that enable me to address my research questions. Specifically, I make sense of these questions by drawing on the literature on political settlements and political order (Khan, 2010; Tadros and Allouche, 2017; Khan, 2017; Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2018) and by bringing this into dialogue with the critical geography literatures (Massey, 2007; Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005; Harvey, 1973) and political geography literatures on frontiers (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018; McGregor and Chatiza, 2019). Woven together, these approaches facilitate thinking about how the spatiality of urban peripheries affects power relations in and around the state system, and how it contributes to the emergence of localised violent orders.

My initial reflections also compelled me to think further about the relationship between different scales and the ways that agency and structure interact, in an effort to make sense of the phenomenon through a nuanced reading of local practice. I turned to a resurgent literature on brokerage and the role of brokers who are known to act as go-betweens, mediating across borders, spaces and scales (Walton, Goodhand and Pollock, 2018; Meehan and Plonski, 2017; Anwar, 2014). I also examined how violence and order managed at the local level is interconnected with broader political coalitions on urban, regional, national and even global scales.

All of these approaches, when threaded together, retain important insights from the urban violence, Latin American criminal governance, and paramilitary literatures, that violence at the local level (amongst other insights) is embedded within different forms of governance and processes of ordering. However, at the same time, these approaches attempt to make a direct connection between everyday life and causal mechanisms by connecting spatial practice to political settlements. Through the a spatialised political settlements lens in which brokers are



situated within urban frontier zones, then, the events and activities of *milícia* groups in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro become spatially connected to political and economic dynamics at more macro levels.

### Challenges in the field

My methodological approach began with a critique of the existent literature on *Carioca milícias* that tend to adopt fairly positivist approaches (Cano and Duarte, 2012; Cano and Iooty, 2008; Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014), through their understanding that empirical observations are explanatory of material and social conditions in and of themselves. However, whilst there might be high probability in these types of causality, these methodological choices did not help me move any further forward when dealing with the ‘why’ or the ‘how’ components of my research question. To find answers to these questions, I needed to design a much more qualitative research study that enabled me to look for the underlying mechanisms, processes and dynamics, such as emergence.

I drew on insights from critical realism literature (Bhaskar, 2013) to set out framework for structuring the research methodology; this would also establish a logic for the separations of my empirical chapters. I used the critical realist ontological stratification as entry-points to look for answers to my research questions in chapter five, about emergence (SRQ1) (through the ‘real’ domain), chapter six, about the relationship between *milícias* and macro-political processes (SRQ2) (through the ‘actual’ domain), and chapter seven about *milícia*-society relations (through the ‘empirical’ domain). Although these domains are far from clear cut, and there is considerable overlap and divergence between and across them, I applied these different methodological perspectives to begin the journey to answer the SRQs.

It was apparent to me from an early moment in my fieldwork that some of the approaches I had conceived of during the research planning phase were unrealistic, as the ways the research actually unfolded did not at all subscribe to the neat and tidy ways I had imagined it would. Various situations during the research process encouraged me to rethink my methodological approach when in the field in ways that I had not previously anticipated. Questions of race, culture, gender and marginalisation, for example, emerged front and centre through my ethnographic research to such an extent that I realised they were fundamental to the analysis. As another example, it was also clear to me that my understanding of *milícia* was quite different from that of the residents; in fact, some residents did not even ‘see’ these ‘groups’ at all, never mind in the ways that I thought about them. These initial reflections helped me to redefine my

research plan and subsequently approach my fieldwork with a broader set of conceptual ideas that aimed to connect the political settlements literature with more specific sub-literatures, such as those by critical feminist geographers.

The research methods employed are a mixture of participant, non-participant and direct observations, opinions and perceptions, descriptions of the observations of others, descriptions of facts, narratives of other people's experiences of practices, oral histories, semi-structured interviews, documents and reports (i.e. planning processes, police documents, hospital records, legal documents, court cases and commission reports) and media reports. The data was collated during the course of an 18-month fieldwork period that built upon previous professional and social networks from former employment in a local NGO in Rio de Janeiro.

My analysis hones-in on three key bodies of primary data: Namely, (1) recorded field notes, (2) interviews and oral histories, and (3) classified documentary archives about the CPI from Rio de Janeiro's state parliament. I conducted one-hundred-and-twenty-four interviews and oral histories and I engaged with many more individuals informally through the observation methods. My informants were as varied as my research methods and included residents, police, firemen, militiamen, politicians, NGO leaders, community and civic leaders, activists, state functionaries, construction workers, utility workers (e.g. electricity and gas), service providers (e.g. mailmen), academics, journalists, researchers, judges, lawyers, witness protection officers, private security workers and organised crime task enforcement officers.

There is one final qualification related to the important ethical and security considerations in my research methodology given the illegal and sometimes violent nature of the contexts in which I was conducting my research. There were various issues and risks associated with access that forced me to reflect significantly on my positionality as a researcher. I attempted to mitigate any potential risks to the research and my research subjects by drawing on my ongoing processes of reflection and learning, as well as drawing on a growing body of literature that addresses these particular concerns in the field. Accessing the CPI documentation was particularly challenging, for example, and it raised significant ethical quandaries as they contained an abundance of resident testimonies and reports against alleged named militiamen, phone and financial records, and police and judicial reports. Whilst this is a problematic source and the experience of obtaining these documents is discussed later in the thesis, it marks an important empirical contribution to the existent research.

## Thesis outline

Following this introduction, the thesis is organised into seven further chapters and a set of conclusions.

In chapter one, I review the most relevant bodies of literature that engage with the topics of paramilitaries, urban violence, criminal governance, and policies to deal with violence in urban developing country contexts. Although I work with literature from across a variety of contexts, I gravitate towards literature focused on Latin America. This leads to a critical assessment of some of the dominant assumptions underpinning urban security policy, relating to the relationships among paramilitaries, the state and processes of development.

In chapter two, I set out a conceptual framework for understanding urban political relations. I begin by outlining a conceptualisation of power relations through the political settlements framework. I then engage in a constructive (and spatial) critique of this framework and offer some potential remedies for these critiques by incorporating critical geography readings of cities. Finally, I set up this conceptual approach in more specific terms by examining how brokers mediate power relations in the urban frontiers, in contexts of market and state expansion.

In chapter three, I set out my methodological approach and research design, how I decided on my case selections and the approaches I adopted when conducting my data collection. I outline my methodological framework and align this with my conceptual framework, regarding political settlements, brokerage and spatial practice. I explain how I approached each of the research questions as well as the approaches I took to data collection and analysis for each question. I also reflect on my positionality within the research process, and how this has affected the ethics and security aspects of the research.

In chapter four, the importance of history, temporality and spatiality are stressed, and I demonstrate how power, institutions, and localised systems for ordering ebb and flow over time and space. Specifically, I highlight the reoccurring racism, exclusion and violence that emerge, submerge and then re-emerge throughout Rio de Janeiro's history, and I highlight the different forms and functions they take. I examine how this has laid the foundations for deeply embedded institutional violence against urban poor communities in the city's peripheries. I also develop a reflection on how the region evolved rapidly during a few decades from an urban hinterland to a distinct and powerful region of the city with 2.37 million inhabitants.

In chapter five, I explore how generative structures and causal mechanisms of economic and political liberalisation led to a chain of reaction to take place in the 1990s in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro; which eventually gave rise to local security agents emerging as vigilantes to deal with rising levels of insecurity and disorder. Drawing on interview data, archival research and secondary sources, I account for some of the ways these actors seized on the political, economic and social opportunities available to them in the urban frontier. Specifically, this chapter explores the process of land privatisation and the management of an informal transport sector by paramilitaries.

In chapter six, I examine a crisis in the political settlement and the consequential relationships between elites in the central state and coalitions from the West Zone, and their associated behaviours. Through a detailed examination of classified archival documents from Rio de Janeiro's state parliament, I explore how the emergence of the *milícias* was a question deeply intertwined with competing cultures, ideas, ideologies and beliefs. Through an examination of bargaining processes and a reconfiguration of the political settlement, I reflect on the role of *milícias* in macro-level political processes.

In chapter seven, I explore the ways that *milícias* are experienced 'from the street-level'. I draw on ethnographic field notes, observations and life histories to explore the effects of different spatial practices, cultural norms and different world views within the West Zone. Specifically, I examine the interactions between two communities in the West Zone and the paramilitaries through the lens of their respective community leaders, to compare how ideas and norms through social brokerage can affect the legitimacy of paramilitaries.

In the conclusions, I draw together the various threads running throughout the thesis, address the overarching research questions and outline the empirical and conceptual contributions that this thesis offers. I finish by reflecting on some broader implications and areas for future research in this area.

# One: Political Order, Parastatal Armed Groups, and Urban Violence in Latin America

## Introduction

In recent decades, Latin American cities have become sites where multiple and interlocking forms of violence have concentrated and played out in new, unique and different ways (Carrión, 2008). The peculiarities and unfamiliar rhythms of urban violence in Latin American cities have provoked societal, economic, and political responses, often unfamiliar to those observing from outside the region. For example, urban planners have attempted to resolve the specific feelings and sensations of fear and the self-diagnosed need for ‘defence’ and security amongst urban populations, with new market-orientated logics and strategies of defence and protection, militarisation through surveillance, vanguard technologies, and policies that determine how resources are distributed in particular areas of cities.

These rhythms and processes, experimental and largely untested, have also meant that Latin American cities have become sites of intense scrutiny, mobilisation, and innovation where a diverse set of actors, social organisations and civil society movements have responded (and contributed) to the urban violence phenomenon. Localised systems of ordering, governance, and strategies for dealing with urban violence, nested within contradictory or complimentary scales, are common; but there also seems to be an inability to monopolise violence – in the traditional Weberian sense – during a moment that cities are increasingly populated, complex, and heterogeneous. This means that, at times, different groups and actors with compatible interests and objectives have had to learn to act in collaboration, in parallel with one another; and at times, challenge one another. This poses significant conceptual and analytical challenges to conventional state-centric ways of understanding violence, where ‘the state’ has typically been the sole claimant to the use of force.

Whilst there are numerous different types, causes and consequences of violence in cities, the objective of this chapter is to set out the focus of this thesis, ‘parastatal’ armed groups, in the urban setting, within a broader body of knowledge about urban violence and criminal governance. Specifically, this chapter engages with a vast body of literature that attempts to explain the mechanisms that securitise against urban violence, create local forms of order in cities, and simultaneously, co-produce new forms of violence.

On one level, this chapter considers urban violence literature in the broadest sense. However, my aim is to connect these global discussions to a more focused body on literature that draws on evidence from middle-income late developer countries, predominantly in Latin America. I therefore draw the Latin American literatures into dialogue with some of the global literatures on armed groups, parastatal activity, and civil wars in developing contexts.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I outline the key data and trends that qualify the importance of this study. In the second section, I set out the key definitions of paramilitaries and urban violence. In the third section, I explore the main bodies of literature that emerged to explain urban violence, the ways that citizens and states responded to it and the different types of violence based on broad motivations. This section is sub-divided and it reflects on the literature around criminal violence and the security responses to it. In the fourth section, before drawing my conclusions, I locate parastatal organisations within state-building processes to reflect on what might be behind this management and production of violence.

### Reshaping global violence

The focus of this study is part of a growing body of literature that is trying to make sense of the integral nature of conflict in everyday urban life. Urban violence, as a phenomenon, has caught the attention of Latin American scholars who have identified how the shape of violence at the global level is being reconfigured, and how this has led to a shift in the types of violence, and who its perpetrators and victims are (Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002; Moncada, 2016).

One of the key arguments in tension with this debate is the claim that global levels of violence are on the decline (Pinker, 2007; Pinker, 2011; Gleditsch *et al.*, 2013). This literature argues that there has been a long historical evolution towards non-violence due, in part, to the role of states as pacifying agents and creators of order, and that they have ushered in civilisation impulses that have contributed to broader shifts in the way that violence and conflict are perceived and understood. These impulses, they suggest, are underpinned by universalist concepts of human rights and international law, which have served to put a restraint on violence at many levels.

These encouraging claims resonate with the data if we limit our thinking about violence and conflict to battlefield deaths, inter-state war, international fighting, and, more broadly speaking, the ‘extraordinary’ representations of violence we see in films and news bulletins about ‘war’ contexts such as Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan. With this definition, absolute

numbers of deaths on the ‘battlefield’ are on the gradual decline,<sup>7</sup> and the share of battlefield deaths per 100,000 population is declining even faster, as a result of rapid population growth.<sup>8</sup> This is reaffirmed by the observation that occurrences of civil wars and interstate conflicts have been reducing since the 2000s (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).<sup>9</sup>

However, a closer scrutiny of global violence data reveals a different story. In the contemporary period, it is the nations that are conventionally classified as being in ‘peacetime’ (where there is no inter-state war) where there are the most incidents of fatal violence. Globally in 2017, for example, only 18% of all violent deaths took place in war zones, whereas an astonishing 68% of violent deaths were not related to ‘war’ and were recorded as intentional homicides.<sup>10</sup> Much of this violence took place in the Latin American region which was where roughly a third global registered intentional homicides took place, but in a region with only 8.42% of the global population.<sup>11</sup> The human cost of direct war deaths from major global war zones between 9/11 and 2019 is estimated to be between 770,000 and 801,000,<sup>12</sup> compared with 2,464,410 intentional homicides across the Latin American region between 2001 and 2017.<sup>13</sup> In just one example of such violence, news reports have shown how that last year as many as 16,000 people were killed by drug cartels in Mexico alone in a single year. Although the region only contains 8% of the global population, it accounts for 30% of global violence (Vilalta, Castillo and Torres, 2016). For this reason, conventional analytical distinctions between war- and peacetime can be misleading.

The spatial distribution of violence within these Latin American ‘peacetime’ settings also call for greater scrutiny as violence is not evenly distributed across space, nor is it randomised. Based on the murder rate in 2018, it was suggested that forty-six out of the fifty most violent cities in the world are not in situations of war (Muggah, 2014, 4). In many cities across Latin America, levels of violence can be much higher than they are in rural areas. In the city of San

---

<sup>7</sup> See Our World in Data project. Available: <https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace>

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Others have pointed out that there was a ‘relapse’ during the 2010s: Von Einsiedel, S., Bosetti, L., Cockayne, J., Salih, C. and Wan, W. (2017) ‘Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict’, *Occasional Paper*, 10.

<sup>10</sup> Mc Evoy, C. and Hideg, G. (2017) *Global violent deaths 2017: time to decide: report*. Small Arms Survey. p.20

<sup>11</sup> Data taken from World-O-Meters. Available: <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/latin-america-and-the-caribbean-population/#:~:text=The%20current%20population%20of%20Latin.of%20the%20total%20world%20population.>

<sup>12</sup> Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones, Afghanistan and Pakistan (October 2001 – October 2019); Iraq (March 2003 – October 2019); Syria (September 2014–October 2019); Yemen (October 2002–October 2019). Data available: <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/Direct%20War%20Deaths%20COW%20Estimate%20November%2013%202019%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network. Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 (GBD 2017) Results. Seattle, United States: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 2018.

Salvador in El Salvador, for example, the homicide rate is 193, compared to a national rate of 83 per 100,000 of the population (UNODC, 2019, 51).

Violence can also be highly localised *within* cities, where there are different ‘hotspots’ of violence identifiable by neighbourhood or street (Vilalta, Castillo and Torres, 2016). The shape of conflict within cities, especially in Latin America, has been persistent, and even increasing in some places (Vilalta, Castillo and Torres, 2016). For this reason, some have highlighted the importance of cities and certain spaces within them as our contemporary ‘battlefields’ (Graham, 2009), but also where much more ‘ordinary’, everyday and pervasive forms of violence are commonplace.

Because of this pervasive nature, urban violence, is gradually becoming a primary preoccupations of some academics, urban policymakers, analysts and planners, and development, peacebuilding, and humanitarian affairs practitioners (e.g. Gupte and Commins, 2016). However, these research and scholarly agendas do not exist in a vacuum. They connect to growing public and political concern about poverty, inequality and violence in the Latin American region.<sup>14</sup> This intensifies the narrative about the violent nature of urban space as our cities are often seen to harbour many of the risk factors that lead to violence, such as mass unemployment, gang violence, firearms proliferation and rising inequality (Frost and Nowak, 2014; Muggah *et al.*, 2016).

Violence in Latin American cities *appears* to be largely of a certain type. Demographically, for example, the perpetrators and the victims of these homicides are largely portrayed to be linked to the so-called ‘democratic youth bulge’, in which young males are presumed to engage in criminal and gang violence. One in four homicide victims, according to a recent UNODC report, is a young male between 15 and 29 years of age living in Latin America (UNODC, 2019, 34). Whilst approximately 60% of all violent deaths globally are now committed using firearms, with variations ranging from a low of 19% in West and Central Europe to a high of 77% in Central America.<sup>15</sup> These data help to sustain the image of gun-bearing, male teenagers, typically of a black or mixed-race background.

---

<sup>14</sup> This dwarfs global figures: Intensifying this narrative of violent cities is the assertion that in 2007 we began living in an ‘urban age’ with half of the world’s population residing in urban areas. See: Brenner, N. and Schmid, C. (2014) ‘The ‘urban age’ in question’, *International journal of urban and regional research*, 38(3), pp. 731-755.. By 2050, it is estimated that the figure will be closer to two-thirds of the global population. See: United Nations (2018) *2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects*: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs..

<sup>15</sup> Krause, K., Muggah, R. and Gilgen, E. (2011) *Global burden of armed violence 2011: lethal encounters*. Cambridge University Press. p.67



However, the story told so far raises important methodological questions about how the data that is available to us is collected, processed and presented. Although there is a wide array of data (albeit, much of it is problematic) on criminal violence and activity that contravenes particular forms of statecraft, there appears to be a blind spot within the data with regards to how violence is practiced by (or within?) states, and particularly, on behalf of them. Whilst there are empirical case studies and descriptive accounts of ‘anti-criminal’ actor groups in cities, such as vigilantes, self-defence groups and death squads, there appears to be a blind spot in the data with regards to the violence that is managed or created by paramilitaries in cities. Much of this type of violence appears to go under the radar (perhaps because it is seen by some in society as legitimate meaning that it goes unreported), or it can be obscured by official statistics offices as it can reflect state or institutional levels of violence.

The available data on the measures of police, institutional and ‘extra-legal’ violence in cities are perhaps the most indicative data that we have relating to state-linked militia or paramilitary activity, given that some of the actors involved are off-duty police officers and that there is a strong link between state security and militias or paramilitaries. However, this data is highly malleable and can be open to interpretation. Police violence can be omitted from homicide statistics, for example, because it can be justified as an act of ‘self-defence’ by police. However, levels of violence by state security agents can be quite striking. Brazil’s police, for example, killed more than 11,000 civilians between 2008 and 2013, averaging six people a day (Ceccato, Melo and Kahn, 2018, 521).

### Defining key terms of the study

Two key terms sit at the centre of this study: ‘urban violence’, and ‘parastatal armed groups’. Both terms are contested and fuzzy in their own ways. I now briefly define these two terms as I intend to work with them.

The first term central to this study is ‘**urban violence**’. Although a wide array of academic disciplines have engaged in the study of urban violence, there appears to be little consensus about a definition for the term. Pavoni and Tulumello argue that this is not surprising given that ‘violence’ and ‘urban’ are, in themselves, independently contested terms (2018). It is my understanding that the ‘violence’ in urban violence cannot, and should not, be reduced to homicidal and criminal data alone.<sup>16</sup> And the ‘urban’ aspect of the term cannot be isolated to

---

<sup>16</sup> This is supported by some broader institutional observations. The World Health Organisation, for example, estimates that for every fatal case of violence that there is, there are around eight non-fatal cases World Health Organisation, W. (2002) *The world report on violence and health*..

the formal-static boundaries of municipalities. Instead, it is much broader and encompasses a range of perpetrators and victims not always considered to be criminals or conventional victims of physical and/or direct violence.. I take my lead from critical thinkers in violence and urban studies to understand urban violence as a complex phenomenon containing multiple forms of violence (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004)<sup>17</sup>, such as structural and indirect violence, embedded within unfolding and inherently violent processes such as urbanisation and capitalist development (Rolnik, 2019).

The second term at the heart of this study is ‘**parastatal armed groups**’. This is due to the specific relationship that *milícias* have with the state system in Rio de Janeiro. Definitions of parastatal armed groups are notoriously difficult to pin down because the terminology used to describe them can be used interchangeably and meanings can vary depending on the context (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2005).<sup>18</sup> But broadly speaking, parastatal armed groups, similar to paramilitaries, tend to carry out ‘military’, or ‘police-like’ activities in local communities, but not necessarily officially, ‘of the state’ or in a formal capacity. I adopt the following definition of paramilitaries offered by Kalyvas and Arjona (2005), to ground my understanding of parastatal armed groups as:

Armed groups that are directly or indirectly linked with the State and its local agents, conforming with the State and being tolerated by it, but which are located outside the formal structures of it.<sup>19</sup>

This definition is broad enough to capture different types of organisations including, but not limited to, militias, vigilantes, self-defence groups, local guardians, paramilitary armies, extermination groups and death squads; as long as there is some link to the state.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> I have been particularly influenced by the insights of feminist scholars who continually question, ‘What violence we can’t see, and what forms of violence are neglected, silent and/or marginalised in public and scholarly accounts’ (see: Ackerly, B. A., Stern, M. and True, J. (2006) *Feminist methodologies for international relations*. Cambridge University Press.), to advance this thinking. Their methodologies encourage us to look beyond dominant narratives of violence and to unearth violences (plural) that are frequently overlooked, ignored or relegated (see: Watts, R. (2016b) *States of violence and the civilising process: on criminology and state crime*. Springer.). This includes but is not limited to domestic violence against women, physical aggressions against LGBTQ communities and racist verbal abuse. Thinking in terms of the ‘continuum’ of violence is particularly useful for locating these different forms of urban violence and plotting out how they interlock and link together.

<sup>18</sup> As Taussig noted in his reflections on the different communities he met during a field visit to Colombia in 2001, ‘[e]verybody had a different name for the killers’ (Taussig, M. (2003) ‘The Diary as Witness: an Anthropologist Writes What He Must’, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 50, pp. B12.). The so-called ‘self-defence’ forces in Mexico, for example, are known as the ‘*Autodefensas Comunitarias*’ by the formal authorities; but they were also known as the ‘Popular’ or ‘Rural’ police before they were absorbed into the state.

<sup>19</sup> My translation from Spanish.

<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, this definition also means that there is no limitation to the composition of paramilitary organisations which can be an assortment of individuals such as civilians, retired and former police, military or state security agents.

These two terms, when taken side by side and analysed at the point where they intersect, reveal a fertile ground for advancing our understanding of both literatures.

### Explaining (parastatal) violence in the city

The ways that different scholars have attempted to explain parastatal armed groups and urban violence, and the relationship between them, have developed in different directions over the years. Some attempts to understand the role of paramilitaries in the landscape of urban violence have been made before,<sup>21</sup> but they are few and far between. Instead, two strands of literature have developed relatively independently with a focus on drug trafficking gangs and criminal violence in urban settings, or a focus on paramilitaries in rural and civil war contexts. This section discusses these literatures and attempts to identify some places where they can overlap, contradict, and reveal new insights for one another. It also brings these literatures into dialogue with Latin American focused literature on criminal governance as a way of bridging the literatures.

I begin with a discussion of some of the early scholarship on violent groups and their practices in the city. The historical context through which scholars first began to ask questions about urban violence first arose in the 1930s, predominantly through Chicago School sociologists, during a period when urban migration from the surrounding rural regions coincided with rising levels of insecurity and criminal violence. As poorer and less educated populations migrated to urban centres in the face of down-turning agricultural economies, they were forced to reside in peripheral areas. High rates of violence, conflict, and criminality, and the emergence of mafias, gangs, and organised crime, became the subject of study for these sociologists. They tended to account for violence as a natural feature of human ecology in the urban setting (Thrasher, 1963; Wirth, 1938b; Wirth, 1927; Cressey, 1969).

Studies of urban violence re-emerged in the 1960s in the United States of America, with a much sharper focus on race relations. This was during a period in which the student protest movements, especially during 1968, highlighted the extent of social exclusions and societal racism. For example, some studies attempted to explain civil unrest and social disorder taking place in and around the ‘black ghettos’ of urban areas (Masotti, 1968)<sup>22</sup>.

---

<sup>21</sup> See for some examples: Mann, M. (1986) *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760-1986*. Cambridge University Press, Moore, B. and Mann, M. (1988) *The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*.

<sup>22</sup> This was a ‘Special Issue’ of *American Behavioral Scientist* in 1968 entitled ‘Urban Violence and Disorder’

Although not directly related to urban violence, parallel debates taking place during the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America attempted to make sense of related questions of national identity, social exclusion, citizenship, and the relationship between colonial pasts and the indigenous and *mestiço* (racially mixed) populations (De Holanda, Eulálio and Ribeiro, 1995; Ribeiro, 2015). Anti-colonial sentiments manifested during the 1960s when a group of Marxian political economists attempted to explain of historical development across the region. The ‘dependency theorists’, as they were known, engaged with questions of structure and power relations, and they articulated their concerns about the unequal distributions of resources across the world system; they argued that wealth, benefits, and rents flowed inwards from peripheries to centres (Saad-Filho, 2005; Prebisch, 2016; Nun, 1969; Quijano, 2001).

Although the dependency theories were not intended for this purpose, the thinking eventually helped to explain some of the violence that was taking place across Latin American cities, especially during the 1960s and 1970s when import substitution industrialisation policies replaced export-orientated ones across the region. Structural changes were most sharply felt on the edges of cities where most of the outward growth had taken place and attempts to explain these uneven processes of development at the ‘urban margins’, had already been made by Latin American modernisation structural theorists during the 1960s (Perlman, 1979; Roger Vekemans and Giusti, 1969). When rural populations began to migrate to the cities in search of labour and new sources of income, urban economies were unable to absorb the full supply of labour. Migrants from traditional agricultural backgrounds were then ‘marginalised’ as cities were unequipped to deal with the demands of this new labour force<sup>23</sup>.

Latin American theorists developed the concept to explain how the shift to an industrial macro-economic model in the post-World-War period forced more of the population into poverty and informality (Caldeira, 2009). They named this excess of labour supply the ‘marginal mass’ and they described it as ‘a permanent structural feature’ of the capitalist economy (Auyero, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes, 2015, 5; Nun, 2003). Some have argued that the type of marginality identified by the structuralists during the 1960s was the precursor to the ‘advanced’ form of marginality in the 1990s (Wacquant, Wacquant and Howe, 2008), which arose out of the neoliberal policies, restructured economies and labour market reforms.

---

<sup>23</sup> These characterisations merge with broader discussions in sociology that attempted to characterise the lives of those who lived in rural and urban spaces as more closely networked and conservative versus more progressive, globalised, and tolerant. In particular, see: Simmel, G. (2012) ‘The metropolis and mental life’, *The urban sociology reader*: Routledge, pp. 37-45, Tönnies, F. (1957) ‘Gemeinschaft und gesellschaft’, *Theories of society*, 1..

The urbanisation process, rapid demographic expansion and globalisation of large scale economic activities, therefore, was understood to be a trigger for new forms of violence and the restructuring of social and economic relations (Davis, 2015). This helped to reveal new aspects and conceptualisations of violence, such as poverty and inequality, which existed beyond formal markets and institutions (Perlman, 1979). Commerce expanded drastically through informal(ised) markets (De Alba and Lesemann, 2012; Auyero, 2000), as the supply of products increased due to the economic liberalisation and reduction of tariffs and barriers. However, this negatively affected informal vendors and street sellers as supply increased without demand necessarily increasing too. Research elsewhere during this period, in East Africa, Asia, Mexico, and in other places across Latin America, also corroborated these findings on a global scale (Meagher, 2003; Perlman, 2007; Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2010).

Discussions of underlying, indirect forms of violence are essential for understanding violence in the contemporary Latin American city. The idea of ‘informality’ became one of the key terms to describe the complexity of social relations in the poor regions of Latin America. This was especially true for large urban areas and mega cities where there was a growing social distinction between those with access to resources, and those without. This language attempted to describe a city that was carved up into more- and less-developed spaces, or those that were formal and legible to the state, and the informal ones that were not (Castells and Portes, 1989; Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989). This has fed into socio-spatial patterns of violence in Latin American cities that tend to concentrate in these spaces that have a history informality, unemployment, and economic inequality. These structural characteristics have established attributes such as the aesthetics of auto-construction, make-shift and improvised built environments, patchy community-led service provision, and long and drawn out battles about property rights. A wedge has been driven between residents of ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ spaces that reinforces inequalities, and pre-existing cycles of violence (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009).

This has affected the living conditions of the urban poor, which, as some have highlighted, has increased the chance that conflict, criminality and violence will surface (Vanderschueren, 1996). It is argued that in informal settlements, for example, where there are overcrowding and competition for scarce resources and where there are often insufficient state institutions to manage distribution, criminality and violence tend to emerge (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión, 2011). However, whilst there may be a relationship or even a correlation between urbanisation and direct violence, there is nothing at all inevitable about it. We cannot confidently argue that urbanisation is the *cause* of direct

violence. That said, whilst the changes provoked by urbanisation are structural by definition, the *experience* of urbanisation is undeniably direct and physical as it can negatively affect the everyday lives of individuals; disproportionately affecting urban poor populations (Springer, 2009; Goldstein, 2005). It has, for example, been argued that the restructuring provoked by urbanisation can be a *trigger* more direct and physical forms of violence (Winton, 2004).

Provoked by the restructuring of the global economy, urban restructuring led to more acute poverty in some of these ‘marginal’ urban spaces and greater inequality across the board, as some communities were valorised more, and others marginalised (Harvey, 2007). As Jeffrey Sachs explained, ‘Economic restructuring is accompanied by a growing social polarisation in occupational and income structure, and concomitant spiralling disparities between successful transnational elites and an increasingly destitute majority caught in the trap of relative territorial immobility’ (1993). A growing literature therefore began to frame studies violence in cities through the prism of inequality<sup>24</sup> (Brennan, 1999; Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1995; Moser, 2004; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión, 2011).<sup>25</sup> Discussions of inequality and violence in cities argue that when resources, power and access to markets are distributed unevenly across cities, differently in urban margins and centres, asymmetries of power lead to feelings of powerlessness. The grievances that these feelings generate are understood to be a driver of direct violence (Crawford and Naditch, 1970).

Coinciding with this scholarship, and helping to enhance its reading of poverty and inequality, was the literature on structural violence that emerged through peacebuilding debates in the 1960s and 1970s (Galtung, 1969). Structural violence, importantly, helped to think through how different types of constraints are imposed on marginalised populations in society as a result of political, economic and social institutions. This literature highlighted the invisible dimensions of violence that can be predicated upon asymmetries of power relations between aggressors and victims, or the powerful and powerless, where rules and institutions are unevenly distributed and accessed in different spaces, which strengthened the view of

---

<sup>24</sup> This view considers the different types of inequality, such as wealth inequality, income inequality and distribution of resources. See: Ooi, G. L. and Phua, K. H. (2007) ‘Urbanization and slum formation’, *Journal of Urban Health*, 84(1), pp. 27-34.; Access to basic social services, universal welfare (or lack thereof), but also access to protection by security services. For more, see: Vanderschueren, F. (1996) ‘From violence to justice and security in cities’, *Environment and Urbanization*, 8(1), pp. 93-112..

<sup>25</sup> Until the 1990s, many academics understood poverty in cities to be the cause of violence (Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. (2002) ‘Inequality and violent crime’, *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 45(1), pp. 1-39, Vanderschueren, F. (1996) ‘From violence to justice and security in cities’, *Environment and Urbanization*, 8(1), pp. 93-112.). However, this was later deemed too simplistic as a thesis to explain the multidimensional nature of violence; and weak correlations had emerged between crime rates and poverty levels (Enamorado, T., López-Calva, L. F., Rodríguez-Castelán, C. and Winkler, H. (2016) ‘Income inequality and violent crime: Evidence from Mexico’s drug war’, *Journal of Development Economics*, 120, pp. 128-143.).

dependency theorists about how power relations shaped the distributions of resources, goods, and services.

These findings contributed to a Latin American discourse on ‘divided cities’ during the 1970s and 1980s, which noted the fragmented and segregated nature of urban space (Ventura, 1994; Walton, 1976; Walton, 1979; Caldeira, 2000; Soares, 2000). Through this literature, urban space was presented as a dichotomy and it was described in terms of spaces dominated by ‘elites’ versus ‘slum dwellers’. These descriptions of the city and its power relations were proven to be problematic during the 1980s and 1990s, when structural adjustment programmes forced middle and working classes into unemployment, and democratisation processes made the categorisation of ‘poor’ more heterogeneous (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009). These new processes also encouraged scholars to think through the spatial dynamics of intertwined social exclusion and violence (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989; Castells and Portes, 1989; Caldeira, 2000; Rolnik, 1999). Exclusion was not just about urban poverty and inequality, but it was also about the intertwining of different socio-territorial spaces across cities.

### **Criminals emerge (when states fail?)**

One the key bodies of literature to emerge from these structural discussions of poverty, inequality, and divided cities was a vast literature on the emergence of criminal violence. This literature also coincided with the ‘failure’ and incompetence of states unable to mitigate the negative effects of structural changes.

It is widely argued that global market forces and the restructuring of states during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the growth of this ‘global criminal economy’ in illicit goods and services such as drugs, firearms, prostitution and extortion (Castells, 1997). Many of these activities attempted to sustain ‘illicit’, and ‘illegal’ markets (c.f. Heyman and Smart, 1999) and economic activities. Globalisation of illicit markets created opportunities for criminal actors to generate extraordinary revenues.<sup>26</sup>

Across Latin America, there was an expansion of cocaine production in coca plantation regions in the Andean mountains and drug trafficking organisations grew in size as a response to global demands. Plantations were initially concentrated in Bolivia and Peru (Bagley, 2004). However, when the US-led ‘war on drugs’ targeted these countries during the mid-1990s, many of the plantations were re-located to Colombia (Williams, 1994). The production and export of

---

<sup>26</sup> Although an analysis of criminal violence does not immediately appear to help us explain parastatal activity, it is important to set out the ‘criminal’ backdrop against which they emerge, as there are important empirical and analytical consequences from this period.

cocaine became a significant economy in Colombia. In 1999, the National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF) estimated that the total earnings from the economy amounted to \$3.5 billion. This was comparable to the export value of Colombian oil at \$3.75 billion (Villar and Cottle, 2011). Other illicit markets in Colombia also boomed during the 1990s, such as poppy cultivation to service US heroin markets (Kawell, 2002; Gootenberg, 2008).

One of the primary trade routes for illicit drugs from the Latin American continent was North from Colombia through Central America, Mexico, and on to the United States of America. Whilst Colombian drug trafficking organisations dominated trade routes during the 1990s, new trade routes and combat strategies emerged during the 2000s which led to Mexican trafficking organisations asserting greater control over new routes and becoming much more influential players in drug markets across the region.

Trade routes also emerged from West to East, as hub cities in Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro and Santos in São Paulo, became increasingly important sites for trafficking drugs to Western Africa before being transported to Europe. Mexico and Brazil, therefore, joined Colombia as important and complex sites for transnational networks and flows of illicit goods and money laundering. In 2007, estimates suggest that around 90 tonnes of cocaine entered Brazil every year, and approximately 40 tonnes of that were sent abroad (Shifter, 2007).<sup>27</sup>

Patterns of criminal violence tended to follow the trading routes. New sites of violence emerged around illegal and illicit markets where it was deployed to regulate and manage economies (Cockayne, 2018), which some have argued is a form of economic or criminal violence (Moser, 2004). In Colombia, for example, where much of the regional violence was concentrated, a mixture of cartel-state and cartel-cartel violence erupted, which was layered on top of the country's already long and protracted civil war (Lessing, 2017). Other countries across Latin America have experienced similar violence around illicit drug markets, such as Mexico, with an estimated hundreds of thousands presumed dead and many disappeared and their bodies never discovered<sup>28</sup> as a result of these conflicts, or Brazil.

The ways in which scholars have attempted to explain this violence as it emerged in the region pivoted to reflect the centrality of markets and networks to violent activities. The dominant narrative, as it appeared in media and some academic discourses, has been that all criminals

---

<sup>27</sup> This falls in line with findings from the World Drugs Report (2013) that the use of cocaine has been increasing in recent decades. See: UNODC (2013) *World Drug Report*, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. p.39

<sup>28</sup> Congressional Research Service (2020), *Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations*, R41576. Available: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>



behave in rational-economic criminal ways. As it relates to drug trafficking, individuals engage in drug trafficking activity because they believe that there are individual economic benefits to be gained that can improve their livelihoods (Cornish and Clarke, 2008). Although these motivations are geared towards personal enrichment, these individuals collaborate in drug trafficking organisations primarily because this is the only (or the most efficient) way that they (as individuals) are able secure relatively large benefits.<sup>29</sup>

Much of the popular media across Latin America and some academics, analysts and researchers argued that this type of criminality was a product of informality (Arias, 2006) and/or governance voids (Kruijt and Koonings, 2004). Through this lens, urban poverty and social exclusion were due to the failure of local government and the state to guarantee all citizens security or the rule of law. The emergence of violence, in this context, was framed as a failure of democracy and of formal institutions that were meant to keep a check on, and regulate rational-criminal behaviours. Zaluar has described this criminal behaviour as a ‘perverse integration’ (Zaluar, 2004) through the clandestine economy, as excluded drug traffickers seek to establish and enrich themselves through criminal activity and counteract dynamics of social exclusion.

However, a reading that only focuses on the economic opportunities/grievances thrown up through global economic restructuring as being provocative for rising levels of criminality and criminal violence fails to take note of some other important dynamics and processes. Political opportunities unearthed through democratisation processes and more liberal ways of doing politics mean that clientelist traditions and systems already in place (c.f. Diniz, 1982) can be expanded and made available to a wider array of actors. In Latin America, and especially in Brazil, this cultivated new types of relationships between criminal and state actors (Auyero, Burbano de Lara and Berti, 2014; Leeds, 1996; Koonings, 2012; Auyero, 2002; Burgos, 2002)

This emerging scholarship revealed the different varieties of partnerships, collusions, collaborations, and compromises that take place between states and criminal actors, and it offered a way in to understanding criminal organisations in a way that was not centred around deficiencies in the state. O’Donnell’s (1993) schematic of ‘blue’, ‘brown’, and ‘green’ spaces, for example, was seminal in this literature for highlighting how Latin American state presence can vary across urban space, in terms of how judicial and bureaucratic systems function, and

---

<sup>29</sup> There is overlap in the literatures on urban criminal violence and civil wars, which both resort to explaining motivations and behaviour in terms of economics incentives or ‘greed’ (c.f. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’).

also in terms of claims to the legitimate use of force. Specifically, in what he describes as the more fuzzy ‘green’ zones, state-linked forms of ‘personalism, familism, prebendalism, clientelism, and the like’ can typically emerge; which sit in contrast to the ‘brown’ zones where state is absent or local regimes of power exist, or the ‘blue’ zones where the state has a monopoly and is present (O'Donnell, 1999, 138).

These ideas were particularly useful for highlighting how states have tendencies to distribute resources and create order in uneven ways at the nexus between a restructuring global economy and reenergised clientelist networks (Zaluar, 1985; Burgos, 1998). Because of this scholarship, we can understand that the emergence of these groups may be much more complex than criminals simply emerging to fill a vacuum or plug a gap where states have failed.

One of the ideas that emerged in dialogue with this was the notion of ‘parallel polities’ (Leeds, 1996). On the face of it, this concept appears to indicate that ‘parallel’ sets of structures in informal spaces run side-by-side to the state (but do not overlap) and provide solutions and fixes where the state has failed. On a close reading, Leeds’ framework is much more nuanced than this. For Leeds, drug traffickers form relationships with state actors such as police and politicians as a way of maintaining their trafficking practices and securing more resources for the community and their organisations, and in turn, securing their local legitimacy (1996, 50). For Leeds, it is about forming intricate clientelist relations between states and non-state organisations as a way of advancing a set of interests.

Equipped with this analytical language, we can make sense of how drug traffickers evolved as a new types of political actors as they used their political position in poor communities by taking advantage (through a particular type of brokerage) of power and resources of the state. However, this, in turn, means that the relationship between criminal actors and the state is not as clear cut as it was once thought to be. As Arias argued in his study of social networks, illicit networks, and criminality, ‘clientelist approaches cannot adequately explain the roles of illegal networks because criminals cannot work directly and personally with politicians’ (Arias, 2006). Arias and others have also highlighted how drug traffickers are can be reliant on relationships with community leaders who function as brokers between criminal systems, state systems, and local populations (McCann, 2013; Leeds, 1996; Arias, 2006; Machado Da Silva, 1967)<sup>30</sup> revealing how clientelist relations are necessarily nuanced, subtle, and secluded so that

---

<sup>30</sup> This idea of local representation and co-governance were supplemented as a result of popularised participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (as an example, see: Ackerman, J. (2004) ‘Co-governance for accountability: beyond “exit” and “voice”’, *World Development*, 32(3), pp. 447-463.).

they can straddle both illicit and licit worlds. Arias and Goldstein (2010) have called this a ‘double patronage’ system, in which politicians, community leaders, and drug traffickers are involved in brokerage chains. However, the contextual and agential contingencies of these relations remain opaque.

What we learn from these discussions, when violence is factored into the equation, is that the violence that is experienced as a result of these clientelist relations is linked to how power is deployed and experienced *within* and *across* societies. Violence, therefore, is not (as proponents of the divided city discourse might suggest) a failure of the state. Instead, we learn that violence is an embedded feature of clientelist negotiations, brokerage, political projects, and the everyday ways that politics work through marginalised urban spaces in such unequal and historically shaped systems.

### **Localised ordering: armed actors and violence brokers**

The failed promises of the global wave of democratisation (Pearce, 2010), coinciding with global pressures to liberalise national economies and decentralise power, gave licence to local actors to take local authority into their own hands once many realised states could/would not work for them. Liberalisation created new expectations and demands by populations, which established new rhythms and patterns of insecurity as services provided by states rarely met expectations. Furthermore, the expansion of the illicit drug markets and related criminal violence provoked non-state responses and opportunities opened up for local actors to take matters into their own hands.

New localised security and protection responses emerged from a diversity of ‘non-state’ actors instead. These actors staked claims to local forms of order in response to aforementioned patterns of criminal violence. Many of these local actors had been linked to the state in some way, such as retired policemen, military officers or off-duty state security agents, so they had legal access to arms and may have had arms-craft training from the state (Davis, 2009; Cano and Iooty, 2008; Souza Alves, 2003; Rozema, 2008a). They acted independently as vigilantes or formed self-defence groups, lynch mobs, extermination groups, and civilian militias (Goldstein, 2005; Baker, 2002). They patrolled local communities and regions to ‘protect’ against the threat posed by criminal actors. But in assuming local sovereignty and claiming a local monopoly over the use of force, they also controlled, dominated, and had a say over local economic markets.

There are broadly two overlapping explanations that attempt to account for these non-state 'security' practices. The first draws on explicitly on 'criminal' economic assumptions to conceptualise these groups as part of the expansion of a privatising security market. This market expanded to counteract drug trafficking practices and the fear that these groups instilled in populations, linked to (real and imagined) practices, spread throughout Latin American cities during the 1990s (Paixão, 1991; Misse, 2011b). This overlaps neatly with a common economic hypothesis purported to explain militias in Rio de Janeiro, for example, that policemen were encouraged to moonlight (*bico*) from their formal employment because of the low salaries of policemen and the threats posed to their communities, and they were forced into private and informal security markets (Soares, 2019). However, other markets such as transport, can also be provided by these groups along a continuum between selling goods and services to coercion and extortion (Cano and Duarte, 2012).

The second is more of a moral explanation rooted in a claim of concern for the well-being of the local community under the constant threat from criminal violence (Silva, 2017). This has historical and spatial components, compounded by long regional histories of political violence, militarisation, civil war, and collective experiences of trauma and paranoia. Across the Latin American region, state intelligence and security services, paramilitary groups and ancillary police units with high levels of authority during the dictatorships and authoritarian periods dominated much of society and any counter insurgency attempts. Democratisation processes and official decommissioning of some of these groups led to actors with military background and training instituting alternative systems of violence. In Buenos Aires, for example, political violence and shared experiences of trauma had long been a defining characteristic of urban life, where state terror had dominated the population for decades (Robben, 2005). Although citizens had lived in fear of the state, these authoritarian legacies also had the effect of de-legitimising the state and justifying local-level defence mechanisms (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Pereira, 2016). These spatialities and temporalities establish particular sociabilities whereby daily routines and ideas are grounded in violence, fear, and the different ways of dealing with fear (Silva, 2004).

Through their training by the state and technical ability to exert coercion, these actor groups and individuals challenged the authorities of 'criminal' groups engaged in illicit practices and economies. Violence was no longer the primary preserve of state armies or political guerrillas fighting for political means (Kaldor, 2013). Instead, there was a shift towards privatised or 'democratised' violence (Rodgers, 2003; Kruijt and Koonings, 1999), which was increasingly

seen as a means through which citizens ‘pursue interests, attain power or resolve conflicts’ for themselves (Kruijt and Koonings, 1999).

Populations turned to local authorities, rather than relied on states that had proved themselves inadequate or incompetent (Pécaut, 2001; Sain, 2002). Trust in state authorities had eroded as a result of the difficult balancing act security agents of the state were forced to do in the climate of a rapid transition to democracy (Denyer-Willis, 2013). State agents often acted through anti-democratic objectives, often adapted to new democratic structures of accountability. This often resulted in practices, such as *autos de resistencia* and *gatillo facil*, which meant populations turned a blind eye to anti-democratic policing practices of the state, or practices that empowered parastatal or non-state groups combatting criminal violence (Huggins, 1991; Huggins, 2000). Their extra-legal violence measures resulted in entrenchment of patterns of inequality and social exclusion as the victims are typically those who had already been excluded. These practices, effectively, criminalised marginality further (Davis, 2015) and undermined basic democratic guarantees for the population (Huggins, 2000). This has been articulated elsewhere as the ‘penal state’ (Müller, 2013; Wacquant, 2009) and clientelistic forms of coercion (Auyero, 2002). The practice of ‘law enforcement’, therefore, ended up being a form of social cleansing.

Localised ‘protective’ forms of violence and ordering, therefore, not only sought to deal with criminal violence, but they also sought to deal with local-level political and social grievances that populations had with formal authorities and the state (Buur, 2006; Burgos, 2002). And when they were able to do so effectively and responding to local demands and needs, they managed to supplant the legitimacy of the state (Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Goldstein, 2005) by fostering their own legitimacy and take on functions of the state, such as welfare provision (Arias, 2009). By functioning in this way, they had as their unintended consequence a carving out of space for separate and more localised orders.

Although their practices may be informal and/or illegal through a state lens, they provided and enforced a legitimate form of customary law and set of justice institutions ‘from below’. Rather than acting in purely dominatory ways (c.f. Cano and Duarte, 2012), protection actors also looked after their local populations, but sat, simultaneously, on the ‘right’ side of the moral argument from urban drug lords or corrupt state agents due to their historical connections with communities. They were able to justify their violent actions with a specific set of moral reasons. Because of this, although they might be acting outside of the law, we should understand these actors as separate from drug trafficking ‘criminals’.

These justifications also extended into illicit practices. In Colombia, the FARC were only able to accumulate the resources they needed to challenge the status quo and create an alternative to the state because of the coca boom (Gill, 2009). These illegal markets empowered them to establish their relationships directly with society and the market. This is a broader phenomenon, as studies of insurgent groups show trends of how their engagement in criminal activity can be a means to financially support political goals (Saab and Taylor, 2009), rather than purely pursuit of the economic goals of ‘criminal’ groups (Barnes, 2017).

The literature demonstrates how it is common for local self-defence actors to establish extortion rackets to finance their activities and sustain their lifestyles. Tilly (1992) reminds us through his study of European states as protection rackets, that they do not start out as serving the public; through their pursuit of private interests they gradually become entangled in sets of institutions that ultimately become accountable to, and responsive to ‘the public’. The racketeering practices of the mafia are also useful to remember at this point as they also emerged through the enforcement of protection rackets to advance and enrich themselves (Gambetta, 1996).

As a result of the dominance of drug trafficking practices, economic accumulation, and associated ‘criminal’ violence in the Latin American region, the relationships between ‘non-state actors’ and the state have been typically seen through a functionalist, economic lens. However, a functionalist, rational-criminal lens runs into bumpy ground and assumptions about economic enrichment objectives become problematic when we consider self-defence and ‘non-criminal-non-state’ actors through this same analytical lens. Historical and ethnographic studies of these groups have challenged conventional readings of violent criminality that takes place ‘outside’ of the state, and this literature reveals more nuanced motivations that compel other local actors, such as vigilantes, including the drive for revenge and/or protection of friends, family and local communities.

In addition to this diversion, it is unlikely that any single model of human behaviour can credibly profess to explain the sentiments of entire groups and communities (Kalyvas, 2001; Barnes, 2017). Different actors from different viewpoints within the same group can be motivated to engage in particular activities for different reasons (Kalyvas, 2003). Motivations can also shift over time because of internal factors (such as different viewpoints within groups) or external factors (such as the relationship with the state).

Instead, ethnographic studies of self-defence activities emphasise the importance of legitimacy, and they force us to consider the role that local norms, ideologies and belief systems play in reducing violence and establishing systems of order. It is therefore impossible to omit non-rational motivations from an analysis of self-defence. A broader contextualisation is therefore required in order to understand the environment through which the norms, ideas and beliefs that lead to self-defence develop. Local actors that engaged in practices of self-defence, for example, have typically had close bonds with local communities and society. In Peru, for example, whilst the lynch mobbing of criminals were particularly violent, they were largely supported by local populations who lived under the shadow of the fear of criminal assault (Goldstein, 2005). Vigilante actors have been justified as ‘social bandits’ or ‘avengers’ as part of an ‘underclass revolt’ (Pawelz, 2018) with local endorsement to commit ‘understandable savagery’ (Godoy, 2004).

However, the authority and space given to these groups highlights how conventional ideas of citizenship, ‘the state’ and territory have become muddled. These contradictions highlight discrepancies in who is considered a legitimate authority and the different varieties of sovereignty. Many of these groups, for example, through their rooted histories and social ties, have adequate and mature connections with other residents, they understand the ways that local politics and conflict mediation work; and so they are able to protect residents *and* simultaneously undermine the power of the state (Arias, 2004). Additionally, due to the already stated histories and prolonged experiences of state neglect and impunity of state-sponsored violence, communities have often been unwilling to support formal systems and institutions of governance. This has meant that the formal state’s ability to apply formal policy and strategic planning procedures in marginalised spaces became significantly restricted (Davis, 2015).

These muddled landscapes have been confused further by political, state, and business elites, many of who have turned a blind eye to illicit and illegal practices that contravened the formal authority of the state (Moncada, 2013a). In the case of self-defence groups, they were often seen by political elites as convenient solutions to challenges that the central state could not, or did not want to, deal with, usually in marginal spaces (Huggins, 2000; Silke, 1998). States even decriminalised certain forms of parastatal activity as long as they broadly aligned with the state’s objectives to eradicate criminality (Misse *et al.*, 2013). We see from Mann’s study of European state formation, for example, how the role of paramilitary police forces worked as a reserve army to back up local police forces in cities in eighteenth-century France and London (Mann, 1986, 404).

States have therefore shown some tendencies to tolerate or even encourage these groups, by outsourcing some of their core functions and ‘dissolv[ing] the monopoly on violence in order to preserve it’ (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2005). Ahram, through his investigation of state-sponsored militias in Arab states, has described this Faustian bargain as a type of ‘violence devolution,’ as a deliberate and useful state-formation strategy and ‘an alternative to central control over the use of force’ (2011b, 8). Others have identified other, more functional benefits such as convenient scapegoats (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014) and coercive electoral influence (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2013) as being behind the strengthening of these groups. However, Hidalgo and Lessing make the case that, ‘we cannot infer state strategies and preferences from the presence of paramilitaries’ (2014). They argue that ‘Even if a state tolerates or fosters paramilitaries initially, it may do so myopically,’ underestimating their ‘state-weakening effects’ and therefore, ‘securing the long-run resilience of these groups’ (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014).

Many Latin American governments, local leaders and authorities, have embraced these *de facto* agreements and the coexistence with different nonstate actors who possess the means to violence and to challenge the state. Denyer-Willis has described this settlement as a set of informal rules, in the context of homicides in São Paulo by the *Primeiro Comando Capital*, as an informal ‘consensus’ about “who can die, where, and under what conditions” (Denyer-Willis, 2013, 31) between state and non-state actors. In the language of institutionalists and political economists, it is about setting common ‘rules of the game’. The condition for consensus, however, seems to be that an accepted consensus cannot, and should not constitute a threat or challenge to the hegemonic national political order (Kruijt and Koonings, 2004; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007). This idea offers a potential ‘way in’ for understanding a more complex notion of the state and state sovereignty, with ‘dual sovereignty’ (Denyer-Willis, 2013) contradicting conventional Weberian notions about the monopoly of the modern nation state.

However, this can also lead to auctioning-off of key state assets and resources, which can negatively impact some empowered political elites within the state system in economic terms. This is because these organisations also have bargaining power themselves due to their proximity to society. Whilst parastatal organisations *may* be aligned with the ‘anti-criminal’ objectives of the state, they are not always instruments of the central state, subservient to it, or under the full or partial, direct or indirect control of a state (Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015). Paramilitary organisations sometimes seek out ‘state-weakening rents’ – in terms of



the, ‘benefits of political office [for paramilitary groups], namely the use by an armed group of political power to reduce the state’s capacity to destroy it, or otherwise interfere with its illegal activities’ – which can, in the long run pose a threat to power within the state (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014). However, depending on the exact constellation of power, many of the decisions about which rents to distribute and auction-off tend to take place by political and state elites, which are often determined by a combination of politics *and* economics, and not just economics alone. Key decision makers within the central state, therefore, tend to have an upper hand and can therefore attempt to maintain control by regulating which rents are made available and when. In doing, the central state is able to set the agenda for the different parastatal organisations that co-exist in equilibrium and take their lead from the central state (this does not apply to some cases, such as in Colombia, where the practices of paramilitary groups have been to defend themselves against state violence (e.g. Medina Gallego, 1990)). The key takeout is that it can be problematic, in the first instance at least, to explain these relations solely through the rationally-determined lens of rational-economic rent-seeking.

Critical readings of state (and organised criminal?) power, therefore, pose a challenge to this analytical bind between what is considered ‘of the state’ and what is not. But they also, importantly, raise important questions around how power itself is conceptualised. The analytical division between state and non-state is notoriously problematic (Migdal, 2001). It is almost impossible to define and extrapolate when interrelations and the fabric of political and social order is full of interdependencies, negotiations, and distributions of rents that benefit different elites and social groups, simultaneously from within and outside of the state system (Pearce, 2018). Instead, it is more useful to think in terms of the various configurations of hybrid governance and limited statehood. Jaffe, for example, has shown how fluctuating agreements and coalitions between government officials and criminal actors, such as Jamaica’s *dons*, have made it difficult to separate formal state governance from criminal rule (Jaffe, 2015). Jaffe’s work highlights how that in order to begin to untie and make sense of these knotty arrangements it is necessary to turn to more complex readings of power and hybrid forms of governance that complex array of institutions that govern everyday life. More recently in debates on political order, collaborative assemblages of states and non-state organisations have provoked thinking about ‘fragmented security states’ (Pearce, 2018), which seek to break down these binaries. These advances in the thinking about political order and governance in Latin America echo assertions from the broader political geography literature, originating from empirical research in African countries (c.f. Boege *et al.*, 2008; Boege, Brown and Clements,

2009; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008), about the complex nature of governance and statehood.

Through this analysis, we realise that power, when it is thought about in terms of control over society, physical territoriality, the ability to extract rents and resources, and ‘*de facto* political prerogatives’ (Arias, 2017) *percolates* (and is not only exerted) through the fractured and decentralised means of violence. However, status and legitimacy within *local*/urban spaces are derived as a result of the position that actors/groups occupy within the system of coercion. Arias’ most recent work on micro-political orders (2017), an impressive comparative study of local order in four Latin American and Caribbean countries, facilitates an understanding of the different violent practices and order that exist in particular types of polities. Importantly, he relates this to the broader political system and macro-level political processes. Arias argues out that violence in Latin America is the result of complex political and social decisions that involve different groups of armed actors (11), rather than a reflection of a breakdown of more structural arrangements of power that can lead to conflict. Through this work, we understand how Latin American political systems are pluralist ones, and how they coexist with particular forms of violent order operating at different levels, including the local. Arias conceptualises local political constellations where state power is deployed and manipulated through civic and criminal relations. This deployment of power, according to Arias, is intended to deprive residents in certain sites of their basic rights.

This analytical framework is very useful for examination of criminal-state relations where there is a clear divide between different systems. However, the analytical framework becomes problematic when ‘criminal’ and ‘state’ systems are much more closely intertwined than when they are diametrically opposed ‘criminal versus state’ ones; when these spheres are indistinguishable or even the same – i.e. when criminal actors are simultaneously state actors. To be sure, it means that attempts to understand criminal and illicit practices by state agents, government officials, or elected politicians within the state system, tend to jar with the criminal governance framework, in as much as that illicit malpractices are considered through the same lens as relations between criminal actors and police or politicians, as forms of ‘corruption’. Similarly, it means that brokers who are on ‘the edge’ of the state system and in the intestacies between state and society, such as community/electoral brokers or translators, are automatically characterised as ‘criminals’.

Much of the empirical evidence used to develop the criminal governance framework was collected over long periods of time from contexts where drug trafficking organisations and global ‘criminal’ drug markets dominated the everyday lives of populations. This has meant that the role of militias and paramilitaries as protectors against criminal drug traffickers has been overplayed somewhat, and the connectivity and social ties between local residents and security agents, and the complex mix of motivations (as highlighted in the self-defence literature) has been overlooked somewhat. In Arias’ study of Rio de Janeiro’s militias, where there seems to be an exception, the analysis is wedded to a ‘criminal governance’ lens, and the data does not quite reflect the nuance of community-militia relations, the shared histories between residents and the vigilante actors, and the overlapping motivations; in ways that the historical and ethnographic studies of self-defence groups do, for example.

Furthermore, Arias claims to depart from a neo-Weberian set of assumptions about the state, complimenting this with more critical readings of the state (e.g. Hansen and Stepputat, 2006). Arias suggests that the state, as an entity, is made up from a complex array of actors that engage in a variety of practices to perform state sovereignty (Arias, 2017, 21). But even though he acknowledges the variance in the state as a system, analytically his conceptualisation of the state tends to resort to a more unitary one, meaning his understanding of state-militia relations remains grounded in a criminal governance framework, which resorts to attempting to draw distinctions between state and non-state. Others scholars, such as Hidalgo and Lessing, follow a similar suit by suggesting that Rio de Janeiro’s militias are ‘linked’ to police forces (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014, 3) – instead of recognising the reality that many of those in the armed militia groups are simultaneously policemen *and* local self-defence groups.

The existent readings of militia and paramilitary activity in Latin America represent a simplification of ‘the state’ and of organised criminal groups. They tend to overlook the different networks, clusters, and organisations of armed groups that percolate inside, outside, around, and that straddle the frontiers of the state system. They also struggle to capture how these different groups work with, alongside, and against one another. Arias attempts to breakdown his conceptualisation of the state by presenting variations of the state (Arias, 2017). However, this breakdown seems to be limited to a scale of cooperation and aversion between state and criminal actors. As mentioned earlier: not all actors working within the state system, nor all parastatal groups and formations, are facing the same way along a single axis; and different factions within the state and the parastatal system struggle for power and control in different directions and towards different means. Although he does not follow through on it

analytically, Arias alludes to this point when they note how Rio de Janeiro's militia is, "in some ways at odds with itself" (2017, 201). This suggests that there are different powers competing against one another around and inside 'the state', or, better, the state system, and there is continual competition for power throughout the spheres of state and society.

These observations are part of a growing consensus that political order(s) in Latin America fall outside of the binaries and challenge the binaries between state and society (Auyero, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes, 2015; Mazzaro, 2018; Pearce, 2018; Arias and Goldstein, 2010). They also highlight the importance of conducting deeper structural and relational analyses to slice through the analytical binaries of state and non-state, to go beyond and below the formal structure of the state, and to understand how different factions within paramilitaries/police, and different coalitions of power, function in relation to rents and resources. It is hoped that a more relationally sensitive analysis will illuminate some of these intricate and detailed relations, spanning state-criminal-parastatal networks and clusters, in which different actors can occupy one or more 'roles' simultaneously and normatively possess multiple and even contradictory identities. This raises important questions the process of factions evolving and forming, what the incentives and motivations for it are, and to what extent this is contingent on temporality and spatiality.

One potential way through this impasse is to recognise the importance of ideas and the ability of different groups to forge coalitions with like-minded actor groups where similar incentives are available. Although this contradicts dominant thinking, that "states and shadow networks exist simultaneously, each phenomenologically different, each representing distinct forms of authority and politico economic organization" (Nordstrom, 2000, 36), it is through this critique that a political economy analysis of violence and power becomes essential.

Drawing inspiration from critical theorists of the state, it is possible to shift our analytical starting point when we understand that power is not just exerted, but it is also relational and comprised of legitimacy (Bhaskar, 2014; Jessop, 1990; Jessop, 2007; Brenner *et al.*, 2008). This underscores the importance of a more historically situated analysis to recognise how these different groups emerged, many of them through the need to self-defend, protect, or simply survive in the face of structural violence. Having the appropriate analytical toolkits in place to recognise the complex nature of these local political orders can help us to make better sense of politics nationally, across Latin America and the Caribbean, and more broadly to make sense of conflict at a global level.

## Spatiality and everyday urban violence

Recent literature has highlighted the social embeddedness and inseparability of urban violence from social tensions and everyday life in cities (Moser and McIlwaine, 2014) with idea that social life (and urban life in particular because of the complexity of life in the city) is inherently conflictual with natural social tensions. The ‘tipping point’ concept (2012), for example, builds upon structural views of violence in which uneven development outcomes are interwoven with asymmetrical power relations between states, specific groups in societies and marginalised populations (Moncada, 2013b). For example, it has been argued that localised gang violence in urban Central America is part of a much broader social and economic phenomenon in society and is the result of violent exclusions, marginalisation, rapid social change and a lack of employment or (Jütersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009).

This marks a broader acknowledgement of the ‘symbiotic relationship between urban conflict and violence’ (Moser and McIlwaine, 2014) and a shift towards the ‘everyday’ common and persistent ‘prosaic forms of everyday violence’ (Fox and Goodfellow, 2016, 216) in cities. This signals a shift away from big, extraordinary, and larger-scale collective and civil war explanations of violence. As a result, there is more of an acceptance of the inherently conflictual nature of urban social life, and less priority is given to strategies that aim to ‘fix’ urban violence, as the ‘issues’ are understood to be much more *everyday*, structural, and embedded. This has instead provoked a turn in policy making spaces towards reconceptualising urban social tensions and managing conflict, rather than trying to eliminate it.

Earlier insights about how criminal groups are able to craft sovereignty and claim legitimacy by creating localised order (Arias, 2006; Rodgers, 2006; Hansen and Stepputat, 2006) become important again when we recognise how spatiality can impact the form that violence takes. Rodgers has noted how various forms of violence are rarely ‘new’, but are usually reinventions, continuations or relocations of previous manifestations of violence (2009), just that they manifest in different spaces in different ways. For instance, political and revolutionary contestations over political power can concede to more endemic violence in the city, which can be a result of different contexts and environments. In urban environments, for example, where there have been high levels of urban migration, there can be spatial effects on the types of violence that surface. In Uganda, where peasant rebellions used to be commonplace, the most frequent form of violence is now political violence in cities in the form of urban riots (Van Acker, 2018). This can also translate into a view of gender-based violence in the home that can

be influenced by more visible forms of violence in society, such as *machismo* (Moser and Rodgers, 2012).

The concept of ‘violence chains’ (Moser and Rodgers, 2012) can illuminate how violence connects different geographical sites and have complex spill-over and contagion effects. Through this concept, acts of violence can bleed into, feed and substitute one another over space and time. This resonates with the broader ‘conflict complexes’ identified by Elfversson and Höglund, of which urban violence is seen as a component; for example, as a conflict complex that stretches and has both urban and rural dynamics (2019).

Understanding that there is a spatial aspect to violence also raises important questions for how violence is managed and distributed within cities. In Mexico City, for example, four neighbourhoods account for more than one-quarter of all crimes, and in Caracas, only three municipalities account for over 50% of the homicides in the city<sup>31</sup>. Similarly, in Johannesburg, certain neighbourhoods are much more prone to violent crime than others (Palmary, Rauch and Simpson, 2014). Although there have been observations about spatial patterns of urban violence linked to distances from central areas, specific sites, or topographies of cities and the manifestations of divisions that run through it (Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel, 2016), correlations from these data have proved inadequate to draw substantial conclusions from (Vilalta and Muggah, 2014).

Unsurprisingly, manifestations and experiences of violence can be very different between different neighbourhoods. In Santiago, for example, Rodríguez et al. (2014) identified common city-wide tipping points for violence (i.e. the 1973 and 1990 coup d’états). However, the localized experiences of violence that bled out from these tipping points across different neighbourhoods were significantly different according to income group. Whereas exclusion and the inability to access employment and welfare were the main sources of violence in low-income neighbourhoods, theft and burglary were the primary forms of violence in the elite neighbourhood.

These different forms and manifestations of violence are also deeply linked to the different varieties and shapes of power and governance (Hoelscher, 2015). More complex conceptualisations of space/politics reveal how simplified ideas of territory and the state are insufficient for understanding how organised crime functions. Violence is embedded in, and

---

<sup>31</sup> UNODC (2019), *Global study on homicide: Homicide trends, patterns and criminal justice response*, UNODC, p.28. Available: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet2.pdf>

shaped by, the places in which it is enacted. Büscher, for example, notes how ‘the nature of socio-economic or political networks within urban neighbourhoods is often strongly connected to conflict dynamics on the national or regional level’ (Büscher, 2018, 194). For example, violence can be deployed strategically by different groups of elites to strengthen their bargaining positions, as Moncada shows about business elites in Colombia and the effect that they have had for shaping public policy (2013a). Specific groups of elites or militias might have significant power and autonomy within cities, which gives them further power to negotiate and extract rents and to resist efforts of the central state to centralise power (LeBas, 2013). Outside of Latin America, in Lagos, LeBas shows how relations between the Nigerian state and local militias saw a trade-off that led to greater political autonomy for the militias in return for economic benefits for the central state.

These examples demonstrate how more complex conceptualisations of politics of urban violence are helping to unpack and make sense of tensions, drawing into sharper focus the power relations that underpin conflict. This puts into sharp focus O’Donnell’s aforementioned schematic. Rodgers has taken O’Donnell’s schematic to task and has argued that should not be slicing space up into a typology of containers – i.e. ‘blue’, ‘green’, and ‘brown’ zones – but rather, by invoking his notion of ‘social sovereignty’, he has argued that conversation should be about ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ citizenship (Rodgers, 2006). Rodgers cites an example of police violently patrolling in slums and the state being physically present but not protecting the population, suggesting that this would be an awkward fit on O’Donnell’s schematic.

As highlighted in the previous sub-section, alternative ways of conceptualising the state and power are needed if we are to advance the discussion in any meaningful way. As Rodgers himself has admitted, “Although anthropology has proven itself to be very good at exploring the institutional ‘blurriness’ of states, it has not really proposed significant ways of thinking about the ‘blurriness’ of state action, particularly in terms of the political project that underlies this action” (Rodgers, 2006, 326-327).

Although the advances in understanding relations between the state and ‘criminal’ orders are promising. More needs to be said about *how* these political connections and relations play out spatially at local/*urban* levels, particularly when they take place in different scales, or when micro-level practices are linked to the macro-level processes. This leads to important questions about how tensions between different decision makers and elite groups – those calling the shots about how these relationships can and cannot take place – play out at the ‘street-level’; and importantly how this can be captured in the analytical language that we have. A sharper way

of conceptualising and articulating this might, then, be paramount for revealing how particular political projects are able to hijack and leverage particular rents and resources within the state system as a vehicle to advance a particular set of ideas or a political project in a determined space and time.

### Securing urban space: From narratives, to problems and possible solutions

The previous sections laid out the different bodies of academic literature that have sought to theorise criminality, self-defence forms of parastatal groups within urban space. Although there are nuanced discussions of these dynamics in the academic literatures, it is important to recognise how two meta-narratives have been particularly influential in shaping the broad discourses and policy debates on the topics.

The first is that we are living in an unstoppable ‘urban age’ in which our contemporary period is characterised by the dramatic movement of people from rural areas into cities. This has clearly been in motion in Latin America for several decades already with 80.87% of the region’s population living in cities, but it is only recently that we have passed an unstoppable global ‘tipping point’ in which a larger proportion of the global population now live in cities (Brenner and Schmid, 2014). Over half of the global population lives in urban areas (Patel and Burkle, 2012), 600 urban centres create over 60% of global GDP and 1.5 million new people join the urban populace every week (PwC, 2014). According to proponents of the urban age thesis, we are in a period that will be, and should be, dominated by what happens in cities.

These statistics justify an acute degree of ‘urban thinking’ and they help to reimagine the city as the site and scale of most importance, even overtaking the nation-state at times. During the last decade, the prioritisation of cities has become institutionalized with research labs and centres such as LSE Cities and Chicago University’s City Lab are becoming hugely influential in shaping and contributing to the debates on urban public policy. The establishment of the Global Parliament of Mayors in 2016 and the EU’s Covenant of Mayors in 2008 are also testimony to the increasing importance of cities. In his 2017 TED Talk, Robert Muggah suggests that we should, ‘stop thinking in terms of nation-states ... [and we should] think of the world as made up of cities,’ mirroring an increasing division between urban and rural, in terms of culture, politics and identity, especially when juxtaposed with national trajectories.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> The role of ‘urban sanctuaries’ in shaping discourses on immigration in the United States of America; or the importance of ‘Remain’ voting metropolises in the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom.



More Latin American focused research groups have also been established, such as LSE Favelas.

The second is that urban violence is inherent to cities and that all cities are, at some level, ‘fragile’ and susceptible to various forms of violence. This ties back into the previously noted idea that cities are inherently conflictual as sites of complex social relations. The Igarapé Institute, the United Nations University, the World Economic Forum, and 100 Resilient Cities launched a ‘Fragile Cities Global Map’ in 2016 of 2,100 cities with over 250,000 people. Urban fragility is measured through data such as crime rates, incidents of conflict and war, and incidents of natural disasters. Cities are given an index number linked to ‘extreme’, ‘high’ and ‘moderate’ risks of urban fragility (De Boer, 2015). However, an ominous footnote in the map warns the reader that, ‘All cities are fragile. Some cities are more fragile than others’.<sup>33</sup>

This association between cities and violence has become ubiquitous<sup>34</sup>. Violent representations of cities have arguably become, ‘a form of doxic common sense around which questions regarding the contemporary global urban condition are framed’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2014). On a positive note, these discourses have raised the importance of questions of urban violence within urban planning and governance agendas in ways that dominate debates about how to best govern and order cities (Davis, 2015). This demonstrates a significant shift from the priorities of policymakers during the post-Cold War period, who tended to overlook issues of urban violence because of a focus on inter-state and civil war. Parallel to this, peacebuilding and humanitarian agencies like International Committee of the Red Cross and Medicines Sans Frontieres have begun to develop ‘urban’ strategies and work streams where cities are the focus (Miklos and Paoliello, 2017). Cities are becoming the focus for securitisation and stabilisation agendas, ostensibly to ‘deal with’ high homicide and criminality in cities.

However, despite the inevitable empirical reality that populations in cities are increasing and that there are greater risk factors for violence in cities than elsewhere (due to the larger populations and heterogeneity of cities), there is concern within the academic literature that these narrations are having sensationalising effects (Davis, 2006). Particular discursive ideas

---

<sup>33</sup> As the live version of the map in 2020 does not contain this, a visualisation of the map from 2017 has been reproduced here: <https://vividmaps.com/urban-fragility/amp/>

<sup>34</sup> This association is not a new one. The idea that cities are inextricably linked to violence has been common in the social sciences since the early twentieth century. Research conducted in Chicago slums during the 1920s by Chicago School sociologists determined that the naturalisation of urban life (which included violence) was the result of a human ecological model. One of the primary arguments of the literature was that cities, through their complexity, heterogeneity and size, were natural sites for violence as they foster (and even encourage) a breakdown of social relations and social cohesion because, ‘the bonds of kinship, of neighbourliness, and the sentiments arising out of living together for generations... are likely to be absent or, at best, relatively weak’ Wirth, L. (1938a) ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’, *American journal of sociology*, pp. 1-24..

about urban space (Graham, 2009), such as ‘feral cities’ (Norton, 2010) or ‘urban fragility’ (Muggah, 2013) might, therefore, be shaping a discursive field through which research priorities are being set and policies are being constructed (Muggah and Krause, 2006).

### ‘Top-down’ security interventions in the city

The key bodies of academic theories and concepts discussed so far have highlighted the multiple and complex manifestations of urban violence as they relate to criminal violence and local forms of protection. Latin American policymakers have built on these literatures to identify strategies and interventions where they could mobilise resources, channel investment and advocate particular types of governance in order to deal with urban violence. Many of these strategies and interventions had the effect of strengthening, either directly or inadvertently, the power of local armed groups and formations. These strategies have helped to embolden armed groups and create the conditions for them to expand further in cities.

The first type of interventions is well-known because of their repressive and violent outcomes. The ‘iron fist’ (*mão duro* or *mano dura*) policies have been widely rolled out across Latin America. Brutal and repressive military operations have sought to ‘securitise’ urban spaces to eliminate criminality and drug trafficking violence (Felbab-Brown, 2011). These interventions that emerged around the turn of the millennium built on the legacy of authoritarianism and were based on the assumption that it was possible to eradicate violence in cities through repression. These policies broadly promoted a zero-tolerance approach to urban violence and criminality, and they led to the deployment of military and police patrols across cities. Public spaces were more tightly controlled. Draconian laws, such as the Mano Dura, Anti-Maras Act (2002) in El Salvador and Cero Tolerancia (2003) in Honduras, affected civil and political rights.

However, although military and police officers were the primary actors implementing these policies, there is evidence of death squads and extermination groups participating in these policies through formal police structures, for example, in the National Civil Police in El Salvador (Wolf, 2017, 44).<sup>35</sup> Although repression may have reduced violence in the short term (because the perpetrators of crime were disincentivised to carry out any violent acts), in the medium and long term these policies increased stigmatisation and exacerbated violence rather than reduced it (Jütersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009). Furthermore, such heavy-handed

---

<sup>35</sup> See also: Huggins, M. K. (2000) ‘Urban violence and police privatization in Brazil: Blended invisibility’, *Social Justice*, 27(2) (80), pp. 113-134, Huggins, M. (1991) *Vigilantism and the state in Latin America*. null.

approaches have also helped to transform non-violent and community-based security practices into violent ones. These effects are also replicated outside of Latin America in Narova, Turkey, for example, where draconian anti-terror laws that attempted to suppress ethnically and politically driven, community-based vigilantism actually forced the vigilantes to take up arms and resort to violence themselves (Yonucu, 2018).

The second type of interventions are police repression policies combined with strategies of 'integration' or 'normalisation' (e.g. Cano and Ribeiro, 2016) whereby non-state spaces were moulded into 'state spaces'. This usually entailed militarise strategies combined with socio-economic programmes, engagement with civil society, and public consultations in policymaking. In Costa Rica, for example, a national commission for implementing control over small arms and greater NGO and civil society involvement monitoring/surveillance programmes, risk education and monitoring of television advertisements and advocacy materials were established (Jütersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009). One sub-set of policies that falls within the group are 'pacification' or 'community policing' strategies, as they are known, which attempt to re-establish confidence within communities and build up the legitimacy of the state. However, these interventions can vary from context to context and be more and less inclusive of the community. The more progressive strategies attempt to work along the grain of citizens and community groups by involving the views of resident groups in decision-making processes (Muggah, 2012). However, other strategies rely to a greater extent on police force and coercion to 'occupy' the community.

There have been doubts about the effectiveness of these strategies (Jütersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009). In Rio de Janeiro, following the installation of the UPP in several *favelas*, there was a sharp decline in homicidal violence (Muggah and Mulli, 2012). However, the long-term effects for social tensions and conflict have not yet been fully understood. Although these policies do not have a direct relationship with paramilitaries, there are more indirect ones that serve to legitimise parastatal groups from the 'bottom-up'. For example, the state-produced narratives of 'pacification' and 'occupation' can be utilised by paramilitaries to justify their own existence, their clientelism and rent-extracting practices.

The third set of interventions are strategies that have attempted to improve social cohesion within and among communities to establish social bonds and ties that many believe help to 'gel' social fabric. These strategies are based on the assumption that criminality arises because of anomie, theorised famously by Durkheim. It is thought that greater social cohesion can help to empower and organise local communities politically so they can make more demands of the

state for themselves (Muggah, 2012) and therefore accumulate more social capital for themselves. However, some have warned about the ‘perverse’ face of localised social capital (Moser, 2004) because local armed actors, such as paramilitaries, can subvert this capital to exert local power, authority and institutionalise a set of local norms and behaviours that contradict the state. Drug traffickers have been relatively successful in doing this in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro in a way that has demonised the state in the minds of local residents (Dowdney, 2003; Leeds, 1996).

### **‘Bottom-up’ and ‘self-help’ securitisation in the peripheries**

In spaces where the state is contested, ‘absent’, ‘weak’, or ‘fragile’, unable or unwilling to act, such as in the urban peripheries, locally organised paramilitary organisations such as self-defence groups, informal vigilantes, private security groups, civilian militias and extermination groups have emerged as ‘surrogates’ of the state (Bejarano and Pizarro, 2004) They can function as ‘proxies’ acting on behalf of central states (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2005).

Strategies and policies of states can be shaped considerably by ‘bottom-up’ formations (Arias, 2017). In Mexico, for example, rural self-defence groups responding to drug trafficking organisations ended up clashing with state military forces. This resulted in high numbers of civilian deaths. As a result of this violence, the government was forced to formalise the vigilantes and incorporate them into the state structures (Felbab-Brown, 2016). This can be a risky strategy for states. Although paramilitaries can provide short term, temporary fixes to the problems of disorder, in the long term, they can also create new sets of problems of social impasses and contradictions (Guitierrez Sanín, 2019). As highlighted earlier, motivations can change and be influenced by different factors. However, once they are integrated into the state system, they have institutional influence (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2014). In Mexico, for example, the motivations of some vigilantes were questioned after some individuals were accused of economic links to drug trafficking organisations (Archibold and Villegas, 2014).

Some policymakers have argued that paramilitaries can be an existential threat to the state and that they pose a risk to the ‘softening of sovereignty and durable disorder’ (Kan, Kan and Pusca, 2019). Even if stability and an acceptable level of social order can be achieved by absorbing paramilitaries into the state system, there seems to be a narrow, if not impossible, path back to state hegemony. In scenarios where there have been formal links between the state and paramilitaries, processes of disarmament and the attempt to reclaim power for the state have risked generating a new environment of conflict and setting off different types of violence. In

a ‘successful’ example of disarmament, for example, that lead to the withdrawal of paramilitaries in Colombia, repercussions actually led to the emergence of new forms of violence through the consolidation of power of extra-legal combatants in criminal networks (Rozema, 2008b). The effect seems to be, therefore, the perpetuation and continual reinvention of a fragmented state, rather than its repair.

Alternative policy narratives frame paramilitaries as the lesser of two evils (Jones, De Oliveira and Verhoeven, 2012). Some go even further and argue that the ideal-type Weberian state monopoly is an abstract ideal and that we should abandon our ambitions of a hegemonic state (Ahram, 2011a). They argue that central states must try and co-opt, rather than eliminate paramilitary groups. Recent empirical literature on the role of paramilitaries in Colombian state formation, for example, demonstrates how paramilitary state-building has contributed to the overall state-building process (Ballvé, 2019b). The United Kingdom Government’s Stabilisation Unit attempts to build these ideas into a policy agenda known as the stabilisation and securitisation agenda. It advises policymakers that there are a variety of actors and social groups who can contribute to the stabilisation of a society; some of them are pro-state but some are more hostile to it (2018). Consolidation of state power and the state’s monopoly over the use of force is horse traded-in in return for stability and secure conditions.

Stabilisation strategies are not always as effective as the discourses suggest (MOD, 2009; Unit, 2018) and communities can experience greater violence because of stabilisation efforts. For example, studies of pro-government militias in contexts of civil war show how these partnerships can actually increase the risk of citizen repression and led to the practice of more varied types of violence (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014). In the case of the UPP in Rio de Janeiro, these strategies led to armed patrols and heavy enforcements of weapons that seemed like ‘security’, rather than community policing initiatives that were trying to maintain a delicate balance between the competing sets of interests (Cano, Borges and Ribeiro, 2012) and dealing with societal issues and tensions

This raises, therefore, a considerable number of questions about who these stabilisations and securitisations benefit (Costa Vargas, 2013). This is partially because there is not sufficient empirical data to make informed conclusions about the long-term effects of these strategies. But it is also because of what follows when these particular interventions are implemented. The mask begins to slip when we see how these same strategies in urban poor communities are

often swiftly followed by expansions of economic and liberal developmental institutions<sup>36</sup>. In the short term, stabilisation strategies can be popular with local communities as they can reduce levels of direct and physical violence. As Gaffney (2016) has shown in his study of pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro, pacification of the *favelas* in the city's affluent South Zone led to a boom of formal housing markets and real estate speculation where gentrification saw local residents priced out of their homes and displaced. Longer-term effects, such as rising prices on services and utilities, are often difficult to pin down. Similar outcomes were also seen in Colombia following the Alliance for Progress (1961-73), the Plan Colombia, and President Alvaro Uribe's 'democratic security' policy (2000-20007). These were stabilisation strategies that privileged the security of the state and its allies at the expense of the effective protection of the civilian population (Elhawary, 2010). Exclusion of citizens from urban space and adequate human security raises questions about the intended outcomes of securitisation strategies and the validity of claims made about 'security' for residents.

These observations chime with a growing literature tracking the rise and expansion of the 'penal state'. Müller, for example, argues that neoliberal urbanisation and associated forms of governance should be understood as a process of 'penal state formation' that manifests itself in the form 'urban revanchism' (2013). This expansion of a neoliberal state involves the use of coercive and repressive technologies to control 'factions of the working class that threaten the "neoliberal project"' (Ibid.). However (linking back to the earlier discussion), this is in some ways paradoxical given that neoliberalism has sped up the informalisation of the economy, which has, by itself, led to further marginalisation; the very dynamic that it sought to summon under control.

This becomes even clearer when critically assessing analytical frameworks such as the 'urban fragility index', which attempt to monitor trends and compare across cases. However, aside from their problematic methodological and conceptual frameworks, definitions and coding, they reproduce a fear of extraordinary violence in the city. And they perpetuate a 'talk of crime' (Caldeira, 2000) and a subsequent 'talk of security' (Marcuse, 1997) that justifies state-building strategies. These are the same narratives that argue that it is necessary to secure and stabilise space before any processes of development, such as poverty reduction or economic investment,

---

<sup>36</sup> There is also recognition that violence in cities negatively impacts economic development and citizen security Freier, A. (2017) 'Corporate security governance and the "intrinsic logic" of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo', *Colección*, (26), pp. 137-161.. In Guatemala City, for example, it was estimated that the direct costs of violence were \$2.4 billion in 2005, which equates to 7.3% of GDP. See: Marc, A. and Willman, A. M. (2010) *Violence in the City: Understanding and supporting community responses to urban violence*. World Bank. p.2.

can take place (Baranyi, Beaudet and Locher, 2011). This serves the purpose of making urban space and the individuals within it legible to the state and the private sector (Scott, 1998). The ultimate goal of urban securitisation and stabilisation policy, therefore, seems to be to create secure conditions for the state and market relations to function. As global surplus capital seeks out new opportunities through new frontiers (Rolnik, 2019), it seeks out new ways to generate rents and investment opportunities through the built space.

The emerging body of work on the political economy of violence in cities helps to make visible the regimes of power that underpin the violent socio-economic exclusions of cities (Rodgers, 2010). Pearce, for example, argues, '[o]ur concern here is not with how the "disadvantaged" are drawn into violence, but rather whether the "advantaged" might be generating the conditions for it' (2018). As Jütersonke et al. have argued one of the central concerns is that the strategies to address urban conflict must be supported by the political and economic conditions through which they have to function (2009).

This is perhaps most emphatically demonstrated by the 'successful' case of Medellín in the 1990s when there was an incredible reduction in homicidal violence (Moncada, 2016). Because the relations between state and society were reorganised and the interests of urban middle-classes were influential in the political coalitions that governed the city, breaking the elite-dominated model that had dominated for years.<sup>37</sup> This particular political configuration was forged at critical junctures, which culminated in the creation of institutions and generative engagement, with media and corporate backers (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2013). More participation in the political sphere, as well as the galvanisation on civic engagement channels was largely believed to be behind this 'metropolitan miracle' (Gutiérrez *et al.*, 2013).

## Conclusions

The objective of this chapter has been to situate my study within the broader bodies of literature on urban violence and parastatal armed groups. The review of the literature has highlighted several lines of inquiry I intend to develop further in the conceptual framework that follows in chapter two.

Firstly, the review has highlighted the role of parastatal armed groups as managers *and* co-producers of urban violence as a way of creating localised forms of order. They therefore pose a unique challenge to the Weberian readings the state and state monopolisation, which risk

---

<sup>37</sup> This is not to say that urban poor and working classes were included in the debates. It is important not to overplay this and further attention required to increase the accessibility of participation.

obscuring the complex nature of political order in the Latin American region. It is necessary, therefore, to conduct for a deeper structural analysis of the underlying configurations of power and to situate an analysis of these groups within the broader political economic shifts and patterns taking place.

Secondly, there are multiple overlapping and contradictory motivations underpinning why parastatal armed actors engage in the violent practices they do and simple rational choice motivations alone cannot explain why violent activity takes place. There are a variety of ideas, norms and beliefs that affect behaviours, and these must be taken into account in any analysis.

This leads into the third point, that the ‘criminal-rational’ analytical frame that has been applied widely across the Latin American literature is problematic when we try and apply it to parastatal armed groups. A critical assessment of these groups and their motivations reveals their unique positionality between state and society, on the edge of the state system, and their capacity to straddle different lifeworlds. This review has dialogued with the emerging consensus about how conventional notions of the state are proving themselves insufficient for conceptualising hybrid forms of governance.

Fourthly, there are different spatial and territorial dynamics than we previously assumed about violence and conflict that are larger and smaller than the nation-state, that cut through countries and borders, and which forge networks and connections. It is, therefore, necessary to set up a more explicitly spatial analysis and consider the *urban* dimension of violence. This sharpened analytical frame will reveal the spatial dynamics of power as they play out in different spaces within cities; and the contingencies that have a unique effect on the shape, form and function of violence.

Taken together, these observations reveal the need for a much more nuanced reading of how power circulates throughout urban political systems. A relational approach, which cuts through conventional analytical binaries of state and non-state, and which helps us to think more in terms of the political relations that underpin these dynamics.

The next chapter sets out an approach for thinking about how paramilitaries fit into these processes of urban politics, and specifically, the political relations through which local forms of order emerge in and through different dynamics.



## Two: Political Settlements, Brokerage and Social Transformation in the Urban Frontier

‘Who is the saviour? Who will protect me from that terror? Police, state, militia... Legal or illegal, I want you to protect me, I'm only going to complain if it's the same guy who protects me comes and does something with me or one of my people, but if in my head he's protecting me from this terror, anything goes’ (Interview with Civil Policeman, March 2017).

### Introduction

Building on the insights and the critiques of the literature discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter sets out the core concepts that will be applied throughout the rest of the thesis. The objective of this chapter is to set out an analytical framework that will be used to explain the emergence and persistence of paramilitaries, and their relationship with local forms of (dis)order. Specifically, it develops a political economy approach with a particular focus on political settlements to conceptualise the inherently political nature of the relations between different interest groups competing for power within the urban environment (Khan, 2010; Khan, 2017; Khan, 2018). However, it then attempts to extend this approach through a focus on space and scale (Massey, 2007; Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005; Harvey, 1973), urban frontiers (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018), as well as agency, and brokerage (Meehan and Plonski, 2017). In doing so, critical questions about ‘the state’ and power emerge, the management and distribution of resources, the creation and enforcement of laws, and the competition between different sets of ideas and factions within and around the state system.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. In the first section, I engage with the political settlements literature as a way of highlighting how violence and (dis)order in cities can be linked to the underlying balance of power, in terms of how rents are managed and distributed by elites. This section highlights the fragile nature of the state-criminal analytical binary. In the second section, I critique and extend the political settlements analysis, by foregrounding questions of space, scale and agency in the framework. In the following section, I set out a spatialised view of political settlements by embedding discussions of relational space. In the fourth section, I understand processes of restructuration and change in the urban margins through a heuristic of the urban frontier to understand the churn generated by processes of state-making and market expansion. In the penultimate section, before drawing some conclusions, I set out the ways that agency and brokerage in the urban frontier can lead to coercive and community forms of brokerage.

## Political settlements and the management of violence

This first section sets out the concept of political settlements as a way to conceptualise how power is distributed and violence is managed. Instead of limiting the analysis to formal institutional arrangements, this approach draws together a view of formal and informal institutions that can help to determine how resources (such as control over state resources, positions of power within the state, and access to rights, titles, and deeds) can be negotiated and distributed between different social groups (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018). The ways that these institutions are configured can be revealing for understanding how (dis)order is created and maintained.

The concept of political settlements has been widely adopted by development thinkers in recent years because of how it draws together issues of violence and conflict, institutions, and development (Tadros and Allouche, 2017; Schultze-Kraft, 2017; Kelsall and Seiha, 2014; Walton *et al.*, 2018; Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018; Lewis and Sagnayeva, 2019; Goodhand, 2017). I build on this body of literature in order to understand how different political coalitions and equilibriums of power can be distributed in the city.

Different interpretations of political settlements have emerged and points of contention have surfaced in recent years about how it should be used because of the different ways the concept has been applied by practitioners and academics (Khan, 2018; Kelsall, 2018). One interpretation that has been adopted by practitioners, development agencies and some development studies scholars is that of a description of inter-elite bargaining processes and the institutions that lead from these negotiations as fundamental to the distribution of power throughout society (Kelsall, 2018; Di John and Putzel, 2009, 15). Policies that follow on from this interpretation tend to prompt ‘more inclusive bargaining processes’ (such as the inclusion of gender and minority social groups in peace-building talks) imagined to take place in an explicit ‘negotiation’ among different actors at a negotiating table.

However, my approach tends to follow the conceptualisation of political settlements as it is set out by Mustaq Khan<sup>38</sup> who asserts that political settlements are a description of a balance

---

<sup>38</sup> Mustaq Khan is largely thought to have developed the political settlements concept during the 1990s in an evolution from new institutional economics and neoclassical political economy approaches. He developed it as a way of understanding the formation, assertion, and guidance of social, economic, and political institutions that shape, and are shaped by the dynamic bargaining processes between social organisations. See: Khan, M. (1995) ‘State failure in weak states: a critique of new institutional explanations’, *The new institutional economics and Third World development*: Routledge, pp. 85-100, Ingram, S. (2014) ‘Political settlements: the history of an idea in policy and theory’.; Khan, M. H. (2010) ‘Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions’, *London: School of Oriental and African Studies. July*. <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968..>

between the ways that institutions are organised and how power is distributed across different organisations in society (Khan, 2010, 20; Khan, 2018). The way that organisational power is distributed therefore defines the political settlement (Khan, 2017).

In this view, a political settlement is not the result of a consciously engineered agreement, but it is the outcome of interactive order and ongoing bargaining processes between elites and social organisations. The political settlement, then, emerges over time to reflect the dominant balance of power in society and it is determined by implicit and unspoken political and social dynamics as expression of how equally (or not) power is distributed across society (Khan, 2017).

Khan argues that the generation of a political settlement is down to ‘a disparate group of organisations [that come] together in a coalition to create institutions’ (2018). Importantly, power relations are network-based and power is derived relationally. The power of any one organisation is therefore not limited to the internal economic, political or military characteristics of that specific group (Khan, 2018), but it is relational and reliant on composites and coalitions.

It is from here that I understand the power of social organisations in the spirit of Timothy Mitchell who claims that the state ‘should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist’ (Mitchell, 1991, 94). This can be applied to coalition formations more broadly as a bricolage of socially embedded relational institutions where forms and practices are always emergent, contestable, and contingent (Jessop, 1990). The emergence and disappearance of coalition formations can be explained, therefore, by thinking of them as potentially unstable and as outcomes of ongoing socio-political struggles between opposing social forces.

There are many ‘fields’ in which social organisations can relate to one another, where different coalitions come together, and where power emerges. ‘The state’ is just one of those fields (Jessop, 1982). However, the political settlements framework offers a flexible reading of coalitions and the consolidation of power among social organisations as it allows us to move beyond elusive boundaries of state/society and to interpret the fuzziness of the boundaries that help us think beyond the analytical binary divisions of public/private, legal/illegal, and licit/illicit. Political settlements also help us to move beyond a single universal theory of power and to realise that power is never singular (Sayer, 1999, 10). It is multifaceted, always ‘complex and unresolved’ (Springer and Le Billon, 2016) constantly being reset, reshaped, and contested

by competing organisations (Lustick, 1993; Migdal and Schlichte, 2005) because of its endogeneity to social relations.

More often than not, these coalition formations are not dominated by a single order.<sup>39</sup> Instead, they are continually mediated and negotiated through compromise, violent contestation, and hybridity (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008). In these circumstances, elites or organisations with the greatest holding power can succeed over other organisations because they possess most coercive potential and are able to outlast their competitors in contests (Khan, 2017). In contexts where economic and political liberalisation erodes state institutions, for instance, informal and hybrid structures of authority, power and governance can emerge alongside, between, and adjacent to state structures. In Russia, for example, Volkov (2002) shows how the fall of the Soviet Union led to a period in which no central authority was able to dominate the use of force. During this period, a diverse collection of violence specialists, including former athletes and military officers, deployed violence to enrich themselves, but in so doing, over time, they established a new political settlement that ushered in the protection and enforcement mechanisms necessary for the consolidation of market relations. Parallels can also be drawn with the processes that unfolded in early-modern European state formation when pirates and bandits relied on violence to maintain order in dispersed territories (Tilly *et al.*, 1985, 173; Mann, 1986).<sup>40</sup>

Notwithstanding the differences between urban development in Latin America, post-Soviet transition in 1990s Russia, and early-modern European state-building, a point of continuity across all three cases is the foundational role of violence in bringing about new forms of political and economic order, linked to the expansions of states and markets. Political settlements analysis provides an entry point for explaining how and why elite coalitions emerge to manage violence and distribute rents and formal institutions emerge over time which are

---

<sup>39</sup> I define order as the formal and informal arrangement of governance that organise associational, political, and economic life. The origins of this definition can be found in a long tradition of classical state formation scholarship that suggests violence is an incipient part of the social being, and that can be kept in check through processes of control and order (see: Elias, N. 1939. *The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*, trans. E. Jephcott. Blackwell.[arVN], Hobbes, T. (1996) *Leviathan* (1651), ed. R. Tuck', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 108, pp. 16, Weber, M. (2009) *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. Routledge.). More recent understandings of order understand it as the control over violence and ability to facilitate social stability (see: North, D. C., Wallis, J. J. and Weingast, B. R. (2009) 'Violence and social order', *A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. New York.).

<sup>40</sup> This view of violence deviates from the classical state formation literature inspired by Hobbesian notions of power and domination (see: Easterly, W. (1999) *Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict?:* The World Bank, Knight, J. (1992) *Institutions and social conflict*. Cambridge University Press.), that presupposes violence reduction was achieved during the English capitalist transition through the consolidation of power over a patchwork of feudal territories under one centralised authority (see: Pinker, S. (2011) *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined.*).

broadly aligned with the underlying distribution of power. It also explains that violence can be managed in many contexts and that it is not reliant on state monopolies of violence, but that it is often through informal and implicit agreements between elites in which the means of violence is fragmented.

New structures of authority, cultures, and norms develop as a result of these coalitions and the trajectory of the state is reshaped. State formation, or the reshaping of the state system, can, therefore, take the shape of ‘shadow economies’ (Nordstrom, 2004) that straddle state/non-state binaries but that can constitute the resource base to support the political settlement (Schultze-Kraft, 2017). The Russian state, for example, ended up absorbing some of the institutional innovations of the violence entrepreneurs into its order (Volkov, 2002), forever reshaping the Russian state.

Broadly, it is assumed that when a political settlement forms, it leads to a reduction in violence that can positively affect citizens (Parks and Cole, 2010). This might be, perhaps, linked to the idea that a ‘settlement’, involves a once and for all deal. However, it is important to note that political settlements are not necessarily concerned with the elimination of violence; but rather they help to understand how violence is managed.

Stable political settlements tend to produce a political equilibrium which prevents major armed conflict; otherwise it would endanger the accumulation and distribution of rents enabled as a result of the dominant political coalition. However, even when there is a ‘settlement’, this does not mean other forms of violence are absent. Some forms of violence might even be intrinsic to the functioning of the political settlement. As noted by recent research, violence can be a continuing feature of, and deeply entangled in dominant political settlements (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018; Tadros and Allouche, 2017; Schultze-Kraft, 2017). Some of the conceptualisations of violence related to political settlements as noted in this literature (i.e. instrumental, ensuing, competitive, permissive) have already captured how it can be directly linked to the ‘success’ of the political settlement, or when there has been a failure to agree on a political coalition and a settlement fails; i.e. violence emerges because there is a misalignment between the formal institutions and the underlying configurations of power. They have also highlighted the ways in which critical junctures, moments of rupture, and the emergence of a new political settlement can create violence (Bell and Pospisil, 2017).

The Žižekian distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ violence (2008) provides a particularly useful lens for unpacking the different types of violence that are both addressed

by, but also embedded within political settlements. Importantly, this lens distinguishes between violence that is clearly inflicted by an identifiable agent of action ('subjective' violence), and the violence that has no perpetrator and that often sits in the background ('objective' violence). This distinction helps to draw some connections between 'big', visible, physical violence, such as murder and aggression, with more wide-ranging, drawn out, and secluded forms of violence. One of the primary advantages of integrating these conceptualisations of violence is an acknowledgment that violence can be embedded within the political settlements in diverse forms. There is an interplay between subjective and objective violence through the representation and perception of certain forms of violence in the social consciousness. Žižek's discussion of the 'tolerance' of political inequities or economic exploitation, for instance, demonstrates how structural and cultural violence can be intrinsic to the political settlement.

### A spatial critique of political settlements

Political settlement analysis tends to suffer from methodological nationalism (Meehan and Goodhand, 2018; Hickey, 2013), with its state centrism and its focus on national level elites and bargaining processes within the bounded territory of the nation state (c.f. Khan, 2017, 690). As such it renders invisible a number of important processes and insights.

First, by taking the nation-state as the analytical frame of reference, important transnational circulations of power are omitted from the analysis (Massey, 1991; Massey, 2007; Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Allen *et al.*, 2012; Graham, 1999). Scholars of political settlements highlight the need to capture the role of global flows and networks in shaping national political settlements (Hickey, 2013). Evidently political settlements are not defined by or limited to national boundaries, and are instead composites of power dynamics operating at the international, national and local levels (Meehan and Goodhand, 2018). Trade in global supply chains via the port of Buenaventura in Colombia, for example, has been shown to reproduce violence within the city at a local level (Jenss, 2020).

Second, the framework underplays the salience of local geographies and histories within political settlements because it tends to overplay the national dimension. Multiple geographies and histories in cities can shape bargaining processes and influence power dynamics at national and international scales in diverse ways (Brenner and Schmid, 2017; Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005; Massey, 2007). Increasingly scholars have recognised this and sought to understand how coalitions are formed and interact across the 'primary' and 'secondary' levels (Parks and Cole, 2010), 'the urban' (Gupte, 2016; Goodfellow, 2017b), borderlands (Meehan and Goodhand,

2018), and the ‘meso-level’ (Yanguas, 2017)<sup>41</sup>. However, this work is embryonic and there is scope for further empirical and theoretical work to unpack how these different geographies and histories are entwined within political settlements.

Third, because the political settlements concept subscribes to a deterministic and teleological understanding of temporality, it does not offer a full explanation of how and why change happens within a political settlement. Whilst there is acknowledgement of the historical and progressive nature of political settlements, moving on from one settlement to the next through “growth-enhancing changes” (Khan, 2010), there is no explanation for how or why these transitions take place beyond linear notions of path dependency and historical materiality (Bebbington *et al.*, 2018).

Fourth, because the political settlements’ framework prioritises a structural view of social relations it underplays the role of agency in shaping institutions and affecting developmental outcomes.<sup>42</sup> A more nuanced understanding of human agency as a process of learning, memories of prior actions, and formative discourses affecting future actions (Bebbington *et al.*, 2018; Bourgois, 2003; Bourdieu, 1993; Hickey *et al.*, 2015) and how it affects dynamics of social change and transformation within the political settlement is required to integrate further the potential of agency for shaping social transformation.

Fifth, the political settlements framework overplays the competitive, materialist, and rational motivations of individuals. A greater sensitivity to the role of ideas, norms, values, beliefs and legitimacy for shaping human behaviour would help to reveal how political settlements are not only shaped by rational, economic thinking, but are influenced by various motivations.

### Spatialising political settlements: Urban frontiers, opportunity and displacement

These limitations can be overcome through a closer engagement with literatures that explore how political relations and power function in relational space. Critical geography literatures (Soja, 1989; Harvey, 1973) can be integrated with political settlements thinking to reveal how political settlements are contingent on social relations.<sup>43</sup> A view of political settlements in

---

<sup>41</sup> Whilst there is a temptation to read political settlements through a determined scale, such as ‘the urban’, when one particular spatial dimension is emphasised, analyses and theorisation can become lopsided, static, or the particular scale can come to form the basis for the analytical frame, thereby chancing the possibility of provoking a new ‘turn’. A rational abstraction could also inadvertently perpetuate the fixing and narrowing of space. Choices by the researcher about which element to isolate, ‘carve up’, or lump together, tend to overlook its actual structure and form. Instead, it is possible to examine power relations within cities and understand how they are connected to politics at alternative scales. See: Varshney, A. (1993) ‘Introduction: urban bias in perspective’; and, Sayer, A. (1992) *Method in social science: A realist approach*. Psychology Press..

<sup>42</sup> This is connected to much larger debates in the social sciences about the relationship between individual responsibility, agency, and social structural constraint.

<sup>43</sup> A primary concern in bringing these frameworks together is in constructing something of a forced marriage across

relational space can offer a fuller and deeper comprehension of how social relations are managed through spatial structures across different scales and spatial dimensions, and through continual, contested processes of making and unmaking of institutional order. By recalibrating the ontological foundations of the political settlements framework in this way, it is possible to refocus the conceptual lens in order to capture spatial processes and insights that have previously been invisible.

Through this view of relational space, everyday site-specific interactions, institutions, behaviours, discourses and movements,<sup>44</sup> governed by moral, ideological, structural, institutional, and spatial boundaries, are connected to the larger processes of material transformation and power relations (Peluso and Watts, 2001) that make up the political settlement. This assertion, therefore, demands a fine-grained spatial analysis, but also an awareness of the broader political economic dynamics at play (Springer and Le Billon, 2020). This provides scope to connect across different scales ‘slow’ forms of objective violence in structural and cultural forms, with local level subjective and everyday violence.

More focused sub-literatures on global cities and urban margins provide scope to situate these power relations and the production of space globally and historically within cities and their margins (Auyero, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes, 2015; Perlman, 1979; Wacquant, Wacquant and Howe, 2008; Caldeira, 2009; McGregor and Chatiza, 2019; Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005; Massey, 2007). These literatures highlight that there are significant opportunities for elites in cities due to their centrality as sites of concentration and zones of consumption (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2012; Lefebvre, 1996; Brenner and Elden, 2009). However, the edges of cities can pose threats to established elites, as processes of capital accumulation become tired, overused and unproductive can be dispossessed and new ones take over (Harvey, 2007).

---

ontological boundaries that does not reflect reality. Furthermore, there is a challenge in bringing these elements together in an equitable framework that contributes as much to the study of space as it does to political economy. Fundamental questions stimulated by advances in academic fields towards disciplinarity suggest specialisation and liberalisation simultaneously broaden and fragment the field of knowledge (Jessop, B. 'From Localities via the spatial turn to spatial-temporal fixes: a strategic relational odyssey'. 2004, Moulaert, F. and Jessop, B. (2013) 'Theoretical foundations for the analysis of socio-economic development in space', *Urban and Regional Development Trajectories in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 18-44.). According to Khan et al. these isolated perspectives of space have “estranged theory from practice and especially reinforced the separation between the physical and social space” (Khan, A., Moulaert, F. and Schreurs, J. (2013) 'Epistemology of Space: Exploring Relational Perspectives in Planning, Urbanism, and Architecture', *International Planning Studies*, 18(3-4), pp. 287-303.). Instead, a problem-centred transdisciplinary approach must be employed and the appropriate frameworks selected to deal with a particular problem (Leavy, P. (2011) *Essentials of transdisciplinary research: Using problem-centered methodologies*. Left Coast Press.).

<sup>44</sup> This builds on De Certeau's definition of pragmatics as ‘the art of doing’ (this is linked to ‘practice’: see Lussault and Stock, 2010); see: Michel, D. C. (1984) 'The practice of everyday life', *Berkeley: U of California P.*



The edges of cities, or the ‘urban margins’, are where there has been least ‘development’ and where there is greater space to build on and potential for growth in relatively close proximity to the urban centre. Whilst the peripheries of Latin American cities might be typically ‘poor’ in terms of their economic wealth relative to the urban centre, the idea that they are ‘marginal’ perpetuates an agency-devoid and poverty-stricken image of them, which is a fundamental misreading and stereotyping of these spaces. Instead, the ‘urban margins’ should be understood as sites rich in production, transformation, consumption, and recreation where class formation, auto-construction, and citizenship mobilisation lead to contradictory experiences (Rolnik, 2019). Relegating these spaces to ‘marginal’ zones is to subordinate these spaces to a ‘centre’ and to overlook their creativity, innovativeness, and “signs of emergent articulations that take them (and us) beyond the entrapments of ‘advanced marginality’” (Caldeira, 2009, 852). This section builds on these critiques of marginality and it embraces a critical reading of the ‘urban margins’ as spaces of heterogeneity where the city is (re-)produced through formal and informal means.

To advance this further, this framework builds on the political geography literature about the dynamic concept of ‘frontier zones’ (Goodhand, 2005; Ballvé, 2019b; Rasmussen and Lund, 2018; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Hirsch, 2009). This is necessary to capture the dynamics of development within the urban margins, as spaces subjected to violent processes of capitalist urban development and state expansion where transformation, innovation, and experimentation take place. Specifically, the ‘urban frontier’ motif can be employed as a heuristic to think through the dynamics of these transformative processes, which are geographically and historically situated within capitalist urban development. The ‘urban frontier’ describes ‘the meeting point between savagery and civilization’ (Smith, 2005b, preface), and a *long-duree* process through which existing regimes of control and order are suspended and challenged in light of new and emerging ones (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018).

Much of the existing scholarship on ‘frontiers’ focuses on these zones at the national level in the borderlands of nation states. It is here where emerging authorities and insurgencies can coalesce around extractive economies and new resource opportunities (Ballvé, 2017; Goodhand, 2014; Bebbington *et al.*, 2018; Eilenberg, 2014). However, where rents might be extracted from ground in the form of minerals or tradable goods in the border regions of nation states or rural zones, in the urban margins, the tradable assets tend to be urban space, goods and products, and services that produce rents and generate interest (Sassen, 2013).

The discourse of the urban frontier generally projects an image of a wild frontier where there is ‘vacant or underexploited land, violence, lawlessness and opportunism’ (McGregor and Chatiza, 2019, 1557). However, the urban frontier is anything but ‘vacant’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2017; Merrifield, 2011). Rather, the urban frontier is a ‘hypercomplex social space’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 88) that is deeply political and has its own socio-spatial orders. To fully comprehend the complexity of the frontier, it is helpful to consider the two seemingly oppositional but co-productive forces playing out in the urban frontier zone. The first is the centrifugal effect of frontier dynamics that serve to de-territorialise and ‘dissolve existing social orders’ (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018). Historically speaking, in the peripheral spaces surrounding cities, small communities survived through subsistence or agricultural practices. These spaces had their own rural and local orders and agency, their own systems of property, political jurisdictions, rights, and social contracts (Massey, 2005). The urban frontier, therefore, serves to superimpose on these rural orders, nest within them, and interpenetrate their meaning with new order. In their place, the second force that emerges is a centripetal re-territorialisation and ‘reorder[ing of] space anew’ (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018). When global capital seeks out new assets, new resources and sites with potential for extraction are identified. The pre-existing rural ‘authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past [...] [are] challenged [with] new enclosures, territorialisation’s and property regimes’ (Peluso and Lund, 2011, 668). These two simultaneous processes are not parallel or sequential, but they are cyclical, symbiotic, and deeply dependent on each other. In the urban frontier, they are processes through which the “urban unfolds into the countryside just as the countryside folds back into the city” (Merrifield, 2011, 489).

The disorderly dynamics in the urban frontier do not, as the discourse might suggest, mean that the state that is absent, fragile, or collapsed. Rather, disorder should be seen a sign of everyday processes of authority-making and state-building (Ballvé, 2017; McGregor and Chatiza, 2019) and the precarious and unpredictable nature of political relations and bargaining processes in the frontier zone. The processes are deeply political, and they involve churn, struggle, and negotiation.

Much like a domestic form of Orientalism (Said, 1995), the urban frontier discourse can be particularly revealing for how these spaces are actively produced by ‘the centre’ through territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2008). This has the effect of ‘rationalising and legitimatising a process of conquest’ (Smith, 2005b, preface). Narratives of decline, vacancy, and ‘urban outlaws’, therefore, are part of a broader ideological onslaught on local populations

within the urban margins that intend to pave the way for expansion of capital and state-building. Expansions in urban frontiers, or the urbanisation process, are therefore seen by those in 'the centre' as helping to 'civilise' and create order in the frontier's wildness through the logic of the market and expansion of the state. Frontier discourses, imbued with imaginaries of disorderly violence and barbarism therefore matter because they sanction the dismantling and reordering of local and pre-existing territorial authority, meanings of place, land and property relations, and systems of legality (Barney, 2009, 146).

The making and unmaking of order in the urban frontier can be easily achieved because of cultures of fear and the sensations of insecurity that pervade in urban frontier zones, but also more broadly across cities. These fears and emotions can be amplified through public discourses that can link together broad discussions at the national and public levels, such as alarming crime and homicide statistics, to local-level gossip. Fears of violence can ratchet up the sensation of insecurity as narratives of crime and violence become 'contagious, fragmentary, and repetitive' (Caldeira, 2000) in marginal sites where violence can be encountered. It can also echo the random acts of violence that erupt sporadically and that can be difficult to pin-point, locate due to the churning conditions. They are then sometimes retold to populations via news media and popular culture.

States can deploy discourses of difference and barbarism to justify their state-building initiatives in specific marginal sites (Kothari and Wilkinson, 2010). And different interpretations and understandings of these discourses can simultaneously provoke further disorder and reproduce fear that can be exacerbated through the deployment of the media using fictional and political discourses (Barbero, 2003). Sensationalist or exaggerated treatments of violence in marginal spaces, for example, can result in fearmongering (Goldstein, 2005) that generate high levels of fear and vulnerability that might not always correspond to actual levels of violence (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999).

The representation of the frontier as a particularly unruly space can have the effect of strengthening political coalitions in the centre (Eilenberg, 2014). These representations can be deployed by powerful actors or coalitions of actors, such as media companies, governments, or private security firms in strategic and calculated ways, to enable the creation of more rent-seeking opportunities. This demonstrates how marginality is produced and it is not a given. For these reasons, the experience of the city can be a frightful one for everyone as most citizens have at least some exposure to these discourses, given the proximity of marginal and central spaces within the city. However, it is in the urban poor spaces in the urban margins where there

tends to be the highest number of incidents of violence and criminality where residents experience the greatest impact from violence and where it is the most emotional and frightful experience.

Urbanisation, and the advance of the urban frontier, can be exclusionary, deny citizens their political and civil rights and entrench violent exclusions and banishment (Rolnik, 2019). Reoccurring urban planning strategies, for example, with long colonial histories, have attempted to redefine how people relate to territories. They tend to prioritise a view of territory based on private property rights and they prioritise the role of the state as organisers of these rights (Smith, 2002). The urban frontier, therefore, has had the effect of eradicating, making illegible, and marginalising populations based on their inability to secure property rights, which tends to be linked to their ethnicity, race, gender or sexuality. It has cast many of these populations into 'spaces of exception' and in which they are subjected to 'bare life' (Agamben, 2005).

These acute processes of displacement take place on a major scale in urban frontiers and are linked to large-scale urban migration, urban crises, destructions of welfare systems, and intense processes of speculation over urban land (Rolnik, 2019). And although freeholders with property rights can be relatively protected, or at least integrated within these processes, through the deep connection between the state and market, those without rights to property tend to be excluded from civic life and condemned to 'transitoriness'.<sup>45</sup> Populations in the urban frontier therefore tend to be marginalised and vulnerable social groups that lack negotiating power or representation in a political settlement.

### Brokerage, emplacements and frontier mentalities

The section that follows draws from the literature on brokerage (Meehan and Plonski, 2017; Anwar, 2014; Goodhand, Klem and Walton, 2016; Jeffrey, 2002) to examine the role of intermediation and agency in producing new forms of order and shaping moments of change within the urban frontier. This literature sets out a way of understanding how and why brokers are able or willing to respond in the urban frontier.

Urban frontiers are particularly conducive environments for brokers to emerge because of the 'incompleteness and complexity' (Sassen, 2017) of these spaces. Through the fragmented environment, 'patchwork landscape' (Zedner, 2009) and continual churn, the urban frontier creates both a demand and a necessity for intermediation because of the synapses and frictions

---

<sup>45</sup> From a paper on 'The Transitory' given by Teresa Caldeira at RC21 Urban Studies conference, Delhi, 17/9/2019.

that prevent states and markets from operating directly in these spaces. As spaces of speculation, accumulation, and destruction, the urban frontier creates opportunities, uncertainties, and new possibilities where experimentation and innovation lead to new forms of rents, risks, and ambitions.

In light of these complex ecologies of constraint and opportunity, different forms of intermediation can emerge at critical junctures to deal with the structural complexities. The notion that individuals rely on personal relationships to survive, achieve, and produce through these conditions has been observed across the world through a long lineage of studies in the social sciences in which ‘intermediaries’ are required to negotiate and broker on behalf of populations (Tilly *et al.*, 1985; Auyero, 2000). Clientelism is the most widely applied concept in this regard and has long been helpful for thinking about these relationships (Auyero, 1999; Aspinall, 2014). However, because of its extensive usage across a variety of contexts the concept has lost some of its analytical clarity and some scholars have called for a deeper understanding of different ‘varieties of clientelism’ (Goodfellow, 2017c).

A focus on the role of brokers in the urban frontiers can help to sharpen the analytical discussion. Defined structurally by their positionality between ‘competing centres of power’ (Meehan and Plonski, 2017), the broker acts as a ‘network specialist’ with an ability to straddle different types of spaces, structures, and institutions (Ibid., p.2). In some cases, the broker might mediate between the state system and local communities, or between different sources of capital and local level resources. It is through this unique positionality that brokers can attempt to create temporary fixes to the tensions, impasses, and problems of the urban frontier, without ever fully resolving the problem (otherwise their role would become redundant). I therefore understand brokerage as a social relation of intermediation that brokers power between different spatialities, such as between global circuits of capital and local demands, or between the resources of the central state and local communities.

On a descriptive level, brokers can take a variety of forms and fulfil different functions. Brokers can be directly linked to the state and be ‘representative’ of it, be ‘embedded’ within society and communities, or they can fall in between states and societies acting as ‘liaisons’ between the two (Ibid., p.40). We can also think in terms beyond individual brokers and more in terms of the ‘brokerage’ through organisations, groups, chains, and links that involve a series of different brokers. These chains can be structured and hierarchical organisations, as in the case of political rent-seeking and gangs in Bangladesh (Jackman, 2019), or more diffuse, nebulous and undefined brokers such as the First Capital Command in São Paulo (Feltran, 2008).

That representative brokers can be employed or deployed by states to ‘deal with’ disorder is particularly insightful for an analysis of the urban frontier, where processes of economic, political and social transformation make populations feel they are ‘in need’ of authoritative ordering forces when the state is not present. In certain frontiers where particular resources are discovered and captured, brokers can be deployed by central states and political elites to protect and secure the space surrounding the resources and marshal the extraction of rents (Bebbington *et al.*, 2018; Peluso and Lund, 2011). In urban frontiers, brokers can also be functional in the management of new resources and services linked to new populations, such as transport, housing, and land distribution (Anwar, 2014; Goodfellow, 2017a).

In the urban frontier, where there tends to be market-driven urbanisation, consolidated state services and resources do not usually reach marginalised migrants and these populations are forced to ‘muddle through’ and ‘make do’. Continual cycles of displacement, eviction, migration, transition and unsettlement that prompt different and unpredictable practices and activisms that unfold into social life in messy and highly localised ways (Simone, 2018). To deal with market expansion, brokerage emerges through innovation and creativity to generate ‘solutions’ to find ways around collective action problems and address (but not resolve) the problems with temporary plugs and work-arounds (Gambetta, 1996; Volkov, 2002). In Jamaica, for example, Dons were able to secure significant support from the inhabitants of Kingston because of the ways they offered social welfare and employment (Jaffe, 2012).

Because the reach of the formal state in urban frontiers is only partial, a great deal of power rests in the hands of brokers who determine how power is exercised through localised informal sovereignties (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006). As a result of this, co-dependence emerges between local brokers and the state that allows both of them to maintain their (partial) authorities within the space (Wenner, Schlitz and Poerting, 2016). Brokerage functions as a channel through which the state represents, makes and assert itself (even partially) in the frontier zone. But it can also be the survival mechanism of the urban poor ‘to enter the domain of urban life to survive it [... and as] a catalogue for the poor to access the system’ (Anwar, 2014, 76). This ‘brokerage fix’, as Meehan and Plonski (2017) have described it, highlights the influential role of the broker in the frontier for state-making (Ballvé, 2017).

There are different ways that local actors and their interests engage with these dynamics and there are significant variances of brokerage across space and time. These dynamics are highly localised and the ways that capital interacts with cities and connects with local actors and their interests vary (Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005). The complexity of cities, with their rich and

diverse populations with heterogeneous ethnic and racial compositions, means that their histories of migration, flows, connections, people, cultures, ideas and practices create multiple geographies that can affect how capital interacts with local spaces (Lefebvre, 1996; Massey, 1994). Studies have examined the agency of brokers and how dynamic interests can influence the actions of brokers and affects social transformation and change (Stokes *et al.*, 2013; Roseberry, 1989). They have also shown how agency can be shaped at the fulcrum between macro political and economic pressures and particular localised constellations of power (Murray Li, 2002). Communities and the sense of place that they generate are packed with agency because physical proximity and sustained social interaction generates bonds of trust, shared political subjectivities and spatial identities (Miller and Nicholls, 2013; Agnew, 1989). Even in the face of global capital, local agency ‘creates new synergies and ends up challenging the world to a rematch’ (Santos in Melgaço and Prouse, 2017, 26).

This recognition of the power-shaping effects of agency demonstrates how urban frontiers can be also extraverted, as well as subjected to the forces of global capital (Bayart and Ellis, 2000). With this agency, brokers are able to take advantage of new opportunities presented by global capital. But they are also capable of creating socially meaningful practices and cumulative, unplanned processes through which global capital is translated and adapted into new landscapes, livelihoods, and social relations.

Brokerage, therefore, is not simply a question of ‘transmitting’ or ‘transferring’ power. But the broker also inserts their own autonomy, motivations, and agency into the process (Meehan and Plonski, 2017). If we are to fully understand the nature of these historically and globally situated dynamics, it is essential to reflect on the underlying ideas, interests and motivations that compel brokers. Brokers can be motivated by a sense of place and the desire to protect and provide for family, friends and neighbours in the face of particular issues, such as food shortages or cash flows. Brokers can also help to deal with issues such as the insecurities and fears that arise out of rapid and bewildering structural changes (Giddens, 1991; Goldstein, 2005). This reading of brokerage is particularly illuminating for an understanding of *how* local-level actors can react to, and engage with, the ‘big opportunities’ of global capital and create local temporary fixes.

At this point, it is necessary to return to discussions of paramilitaries and self-defence ideologies as they can offer insights for thinking about the different motivations, functions and forms of brokerage in the urban frontier. The literature on social bandits and peasant rebellion, for example, highlight the connections between ‘small motivations’ and ‘big opportunities’.

Brokers can exploit these opportunities to generate additional rents for themselves. In the urban frontier, where territory is particularly contested, brokers can emerge where the rules of the game are to be unclear. It is possible to understand how these brokers use coercion to create protection rackets, extort, and extract through the process of capital accumulation (Tilly *et al.*, 1985). But also how objective forms of violence help to create the structural and cultural violences through which coercive brokers can justify deploying more direct and physical forms of violence.

Coercive brokerage can usher in the demolition of pre-existing social orders and facilitate the construction of new ones. As noted earlier, the Russian mafia played a key role in brokering the consolidation of the Russian state and capitalist expansion through their protection rackets (Volkov, 2002). Similar processes took place in Sicily with the coercive practices of the mafia helping to control the peasantry and protect the property rights of the landed elites through processes of primitive accumulation (Blok, 1974).

These dynamics have a strong centre-periphery dimension. Anton Blok has shown, for example, how attempts were made by the central Italian state in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to consolidate and institutionalise patterns of uneven development across Italy. The objective was to centralise state power in the hands of 'bourgeois dominations' from the north of Italy (Gramsci, 1995, 29) and to exploit and extract labour and resources from Calabria. In Sicily, the mafia, as private violence entrepreneurs with the means of coercion, were called upon to protect the property rights of landed elites against the rural peasantries. They ultimately mediated the expansion of the state through processes of primitive accumulation of land. Through their role as inter-mediators between traditional systems of order and the encroaching systems of state and market, the Sicilian mafia helped to consolidate state and market relations in rural spaces at this 'distinct stage of development reached by Italian society' (Blok, 1974, xxvi, xxvii).

State-linked coercive brokers can have an ambiguous 'frontiersman' role, simultaneously fortifying and fragmenting state authority (Marten, 2012). As Ahram and King note about warlord brokers in Burma, there is little incentive for coercive brokers to facilitate centralisation of governance for the central state (2012). Instead, these coercive brokers may co-opt the powers of the state and market for their own benefit (Watts, 2016a).

Coercive brokers are only able to function in this way, accumulate their own power, and challenge the central state's power because they can have a hand simultaneously inside and outside of the state system. Paramilitaries, for example, can be part-time agents 'of the state',



while at the same time acting as part-time paramilitaries (Agade, 2015; Huggins, 2000; Cruz, 2016). Through these different roles they can have access to resources, arms, uniforms, and knowledge of the state system and its bureaucracies, while at the same time possess local knowledge and social connections. The long-term effects of this trade-off by the state can end challenging its very existence. In the 1960s, for example, the Colombian government legalised paramilitary groups in the context of the Cold War and a growing FARC insurgency through the ‘national security’ discourses; but in 1987 these same groups were declared illegal as soon as the national security threat decreased. However, in the post-1987 period, these paramilitaries used the power they had accrued to expand territorially and position themselves as a national self-defence organisation (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*). Despite legal sanctions against them, the state was unable to control them due to their expansions (Rozema, 2008b).

Furthermore, because they can be acting on behalf of states, paramilitary brokers can mobilise legal or discursive frameworks for their own purposes with consequences for the legitimacy of the state (Ahram and King, 2012). In Indonesia, for example, Orma vigilantes adopted inclusive state-building discourses and cited national laws to justify their actions, even though they did not apply to them (Bakker, 2015). In Colombia, paramilitaries were able to subvert state development discourses to advance their own objectives (Ballvé, 2013).

As state representatives, paramilitary brokers can act on behalf of states as long as they subscribe to the strategies and ideas of the central state. However, in liaison with the state or as ‘bottom up’ embedded brokers, paramilitaries are also capable of asserting their own objectives and articulating their own strategies (Ballvé, 2019b). This places them in a uniquely privileged position in relation to the state that is different from other armed actor groups, criminal groups, or agents of the state. Paramilitary brokers simultaneously command access to state resources and have a tendency towards differentiation, political autonomy and centrality. An unintended consequence of this process is a propensity towards consolidation and extraction that ends up setting paramilitary brokers on a new trajectory with a different vision of politics and the state. Through the decentralisation of state-society relations, therefore, paramilitaries can be a part of the processual, spatial and unpredictable state-formation process that takes place in the urban margins.

Although there might be a propensity to centralise, this does not always mean that there will be a central ruling body or hierarchy. Coercive brokers can function as a collection of dispersed and fragmented organisations (Watts, 2016a) that are drawn together by their common interests, motivations, cultures, and shared experiences. Their autonomy from central

authorities comes through their unique ability to broker between the state and the society, collude with the state institutions, rules, and discourses, but also manage to cut themselves loose from them (Watts, 2016a). But it is also linked to the ‘degree of stable central control over the means of physical force’ (Blok, 1974, xxx, xxvii) in the space in which they operate.

The urban frontier can also generate non-coercive forms of brokerage for social brokers who do not have the access to the means of coercion. This type of brokerage can provide the pathways for individuals to express, request, contest, and resist hegemony, where certain groups who are disenfranchised or unrepresented can find the means and develop the appropriate strategies to “speak truth to power” (Meehan and Plonski, 2017). It is usual that these brokers are ‘embedded’ within communities and play important roles in mediating between local residents and external actors from the state and the market.

Social brokers might be acutely aware of structural imbalances of power relations in the urban frontier, such as their marginalisation by race, class or gender (Simone, 2018). And the act of channelling collective demands through a social broker can weaken collective agency and alternative possibilities as they cooperate with and benefits from (rather than challenge) the underlying causes of inequality (De Wit and Berner, 2009). They may know how to ‘play the system’ and fit in between more coercive forms of brokerage regardless, as this is preferable to going without resources (Meehan and Plonski, 2017).

Reflecting on the lives of social brokers can be revealing in terms of understanding the local norms, values, and practices, as well as the local understandings of leadership and legitimacy. This is because these norms are typically influenced by individual and collective experiences, of which the social broker is a part.

Social brokerage can challenge, co-opt, and influence political settlements through the subversion and transformation of the rules and institutions that govern everyday life (Wenner, Schlitz and Poerting, 2016). This form of brokerage can also help to advance insurgent forms of citizenship, counter hegemonies, and contestations of power that can generate more violence and revolution through conflict and the occupation of space (Holston, 2009). But these practices can also be more subtle, through quiet encroachments of everyday practices, everyday forms of resistance, collectivised modes of production, and subversions of power (Bayat, 2013; Scott, 1990; Chatterjee, 2004). Yet, because these brokers occupy dangerous synapses, and can be seen to encroach on the rentable opportunities for coercive brokers, social brokers are frequently targeted with violence and rarely have the means or the specialisms to protect

themselves from violence. Whilst these brokers might not play a defining or a direct role in shaping national level political settlements, they can have an impact on the conditions of possibility for states and market actors because of their fluidity and illegibility of frontier spaces and their function as translators and navigators of these churning spaces.

## Conclusions

This chapter has laid out a conceptual framework to conceptualise how power is mediated in marginal space, how space can affect political relations, and why and how agency can affect these relations. The objective of the chapter has been to move beyond the approaches set out in chapter one, and to set out a framework to understand paramilitaries as coercive brokers embedded within the urban frontier. It has engaged with the literature on political settlements to set out how violence and (dis)order in cities can be managed and linked to the underlying configurations of power. Through a spatial critique of political settlements, this chapter has brought critical geography discussions of relational space into dialogue with the political settlements analysis to enable a view of spatial dimensions that are otherwise overlooked. The chapter has also introduced a discussion of the urban frontier into the conceptual framework, and highlighted how brokerage can emerge in frontier to provide temporary fixes to the structural churn of the frontier zone.

## Three: Ethics, Security and Method

### Introduction

This study explores the evolution, emergence and persistence of *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro's West Zone since the 1990s. The central research question is:

**CRQ: How and why did *Carioca milícias* emerge in Rio de Janeiro's West Zone since the 1990s and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?**

Insights into *how* and *why* *milícias* operate in Rio de Janeiro involve identifying how different actors from these organisations relate with their networks and employ specific practices. They also entail mapping the institutional and spatial structures that shape the behaviours of those actors, as well as the varying degrees of agency they hold.

The following sub-questions were developed to unpack the central research question:

**SRQ1: Why and how did *Carioca milícias* emerge?**

**SRQ2: What is the relationship between *Carioca milícias* and the underlying political settlement?**

**SRQ3: How do West Zone inhabitants and *Carioca milícias* interact and influence each other? And how does this, in turn, (re)shape the management of (dis)order?**

This chapter outlines my methodological approach to answering these questions.

It proceeds in four sections. The first section outlines the positioning of the research and researcher in relation to policy-making spaces and the research industry in Rio de Janeiro. In the second section, I outline my approach to defining the field and selecting a research site. In the third section, before drawing some conclusions, I explain my research design, discuss the methods and data collection approaches I employed, as well as outline the security and ethical issues I faced.

### Positioning the research

#### The political economy of research in Rio de Janeiro

Researchers from 'developed' contexts considering conducting social research in Rio de Janeiro for the first time are confronted with an overwhelming amount of literature on any number of topics. Since the 1990s, the city of Rio de Janeiro has been a 'destination' field site

for researchers and journalists alike, particularly for those with ‘voyeuristic interest in poverty and danger’ (Williams, 2008). In the more accessible *favelas* that cling to the iconic steep hillsides in the affluent South Zone of the city, there is a well-established political economy of brokers, fixers and translators that participate and benefit economically from a thriving information economy. Indeed, I was employed in Rio de Janeiro during 2013 and 2014 by an non-governmental organisation that specialised in brokering relationships between foreign researchers, journalists and local communities, so I benefited personally from this political economy.

There is an equally large interest by Brazilian researchers and journalists in engaging in issues related to *favelas*, violence and poverty. There is also a large public appetite for this information. There are numerous prime-time television programmes that document shootouts, robberies and gang fights. This serves to normalise the effects of violence and shapes attitudes towards it. There are numerous research institutes, think tanks and NGOs that have been founded in recent decades in the name of studying *favelas* and the way of life of *favelados* (the people who live in *favelas*). With some exceptions,<sup>46</sup> most of the institutes are based on the *asfalto* (which translates as ‘tarmac’, the way to describe non-*favela* spaces) in the affluent South Zone, yet they maintain their fascination with the violence, inequality and poverty of the urban environment.

Certain *favelas*, particularly in the South and North Zones of the city, are saturated with researchers. This is perhaps because these areas are most easily accessible by the underground metro and this enables researchers to commute from middle-class neighbourhoods to their research sites. One of the standing jokes in these *favelas* describes the archetypal *favela* family composed of the father, mother, three children and the ethnographer. However, the effect of research saturation raises more serious ethical considerations to the point where local residents have claimed that everyday life in the *favela* has been affected (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2013; Clark, 2008). During informal conversations with residents, activists and friends from these *favelas* during my time working with the NGO, there was a clear sense of research fatigue.

In addition to raising important ethical concerns, this imbalance in the spatial distribution of research across Rio de Janeiro has also created thematic imbalances in the production of knowledge in terms of what we know about some urban poor spaces, but also what we do not know about others. Whilst there has been a vast production of knowledge about a variety of

---

<sup>46</sup> *Redes da Maré* and *Luta Pela Paz* are two of the better-known NGOs based in *favelas*.

questions related to the social sciences in studies of Rio de Janeiro's *favelas*, these seem to be concentrated within a handful of *favelas* compared, to the total number of *favelas* across the city and the broader metropolitan area.

Comparatively little is known about neighbourhoods in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, such as Santa Cruz or Campo Grande (fig. 4). It is only in very recent years that a small number of researchers have begun to investigate certain aspects of the region (e.g. de Oliveira, 2017; da Silva Ribeiro Gomes, 2017; Cortado, 2018; de Sá Siqueira, 2013). It is not a 'convenient' research site, being some 60 kilometres away from Centro (the city centre). There is also the terrible quality and speed of inter-zonal public transport to contend with. Sometimes it can take up to two or even three hours to arrive at a destination in the West Zone from the South Zone, depending on the location.

Whilst it may be inconvenient for researchers not living in the West Zone to research the region, this physical distance, division and detachment of the periphery from the centre of the city is exactly one of the reasons why the West Zone deserves a much deeper level of inquiry. The West Zone is a comparatively unknown landscape, even for many *Cariocas* that do not live in the region. It is an urban frontier in more ways than one. In fact, it is unlikely that middle- and upper-class *Cariocas* living in the South Zone or Centro have ever been to Campo Grande or Santa Cruz. One friend and resident of Lagoa in the South Zone admitted to me that he has been to Miami more times than he has been to Campo Grande.<sup>47</sup>

This was a positive aspect for the research as I was not confronted with such an established political economy of brokers, fixers, and gatekeepers that I had to wade through. Access was (presumably) much harder than it would have been in, say Vidigal in the South Zone, but the relationships that I developed were not transactional or based around established norms and expectations of an information economy. This research builds upon the limited academic knowledge that does exist about the West Zone and it also engages the conceptual characterisation of the space as a frontier zone. It reflects on the significance of this lack of interest in the region and how this has informed (or, perhaps, disinformed) the production of public policy.

### Circumventing a '*milícia*' discourse

*Carioca milícias* are not only under-researched in the academic community, but they are also overlooked within state institutions. Despite recent media estimates that two million inhabitants

---

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Antony, Lagoa resident, April 2017.

in Rio de Janeiro are living in communities influenced by *milícias*,<sup>48</sup> data on *milícias* is scarce and the state does not offer any clear or systematic data on their activities. A federal law was passed in 2012<sup>49</sup> defined the status of paramilitaries as illegal, but little has changed since then.

There are data sets of official data from Rio de Janeiro State Government regarding police violence, homicides and disappearances; however, it should be treated critically. This data gives some indication about the types of violence conducted by paramilitaries in the particular spaces that they are known to control. There is the possibility of plotting this data out spatially, making it easier to draw some correlations between territories where drug trafficking organisations or *milícias* are known to exist. However, this territorial data is not currently public and it is not particularly accurate given the sporadic ways that armed groups move around and sell off territories, negotiate, establish pacts and function in different capacities across a variety of territorial spaces. The reliability of this data is also highly questionable given the ways that data reporting on issues of criminality and violence is conducted in Rio de Janeiro (Zdun, 2011).

One of the consequences of the sparseness of data for the under-researched topic is that narratives about these topics rely on piecing together small nuggets of information that can be based on inaccurate assumptions. For example, since 2005, these groups in the West Zone have been known as *milícias* (militias, in English) through public discourse, and this has tended to shape the ways in which these groups are understood more broadly. In the first instance, this name emerged in the mainstream news media in 2005 and it has informed much of the knowledge production in recent years. The genesis of this term is discussed in more depth in chapter six. However, *milícias* are typically portrayed as centralised and hierarchical criminal-rational organisations driven by economic motivations, which is one of the problematic assumptions that I set out in chapter one.

Cano, Duarte and Iooty's seminal studies on *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro (Cano and Iooty, 2008; Cano and Duarte, 2012) highlight the methodological complications in studying this phenomenon, as there is no precise definition for it and the 'traditions' tend to vary. Cano and Iooty tend to rely on newspaper coverage from mainstream titles such as *O Globo* and *O Dia*, data from the *Disque Denuncia*,<sup>50</sup> interviews with residents and state enforcement agents, and

---

<sup>48</sup> See: Grandin, F., Coelho, H., Antônio Martins, M. and Satriano, N. (2018) 'Franquia do crime: 2 milhões de pessoas no RJ estão em áreas sob influência de milícias', *GI*, 14 March 2018. Available at: <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/franquia-do-crime-2-milhoes-de-pessoas-no-rj-estao-em-areas-sob-influencia-de-milicias.ghtml>.

<sup>49</sup> Federal Law Number 12,720 passed on 27 September 2012.

<sup>50</sup> The Disque Denuncia (Crime stoppers Hotline) is the largest database available on 'milícias'. I visited the Disque Denuncia headquarters in 2017 and I accessed all of the 38,975 records (from when they began until my visit) containing the

police reports of missing persons. These datasets are extremely useful for exploring the twists and turns of public discourse in relation to '*milícias*', but they are not as informative for understanding the emergence of paramilitary groups in the 1990s, given that the term '*milícia*' only came into popular use in 2005 (again, this is discussed in chapter six).

In the 1990s before journalists first began reporting on *milícias*, and before the term even appeared in the *Disque Denuncia* database, similar practices of extortion and control over illegal markets existed, but they were not discussed in any systematic way in public debate spaces such as the mainstream news media. The key point is that whilst many of these practices were not new, a common language had never been established with which to talk about them. This reflects the varieties of *milícia* forms and practices as they developed over space and time. Due to these varieties, there is no single clear and concise definition or typology for *milícias* that encompasses the diversity of their relationships with society and the state.

Furthermore, these data tend to focus on the extraordinary forms of violence specifically linked to the *milícia*, and they are prone to overlooking the more subtle, protected and everyday forms of violence and ordering that take place in less obvious and dramatic ways.

Cutting through these various interpretations, discourses and assumptions was one of the first obstacles for this research process. José Claudio de Souza Alves's historical approach to researching extermination groups in the Baixada Fluminense was a particularly useful inspiration for this line of thinking. He suggests that the *milícia* is part of the same phenomenon as the extermination groups that he researches (Alves, 2008; Souza Alves, 2003). Marcelo Burgos' sociological study of Rio das Pedras is also insightful as the study described the types of social relations linked to the phenomenon in the community, linked to authority and power, before discussion of the *milícia* reared its head (2002). Considering this, during the research process I tried to be critical of data linked to *milícia* terminology and attempted to think more broadly about the practices, experiences and representations with caution and caveats about other colloquialisms and names. This was especially important given that my first sub-question about emergence of these groups focuses on the 1990s while *milícia* terminology only emerged in 2005.

For this reason, from this point on, I refer to the subjects of this study as 'parastatal groups' rather than '*milícias*' unless it is in discussion about the discourse that surrounds *milícias*.

---

word '*milícia*'. All of the records contain information on the date of report, address, and a text description of the report including practices and names.



## Defining the ‘field’ and selecting the case

When I was designing my research methodology before arriving in the field, I set out with the idea of using a conventional case study approach. When I arrived in the field, I selected a clearly defined and bounded ‘field site’ around which I constructed my research design. I drew my initial inspirations when planning the research from a series of articles in *EXTRA* newspaper published in March 2015 about paramilitary and drug trafficking organisations dominating the federal government social housing programme ‘Minha Casa Minha Vida’ (MCMV) in Rio de Janeiro. The journalists, Luã Marinatto and Rafael Soares, led with a story that claimed, ‘all of the sixty-four MCMV developments in Rio de Janeiro’ municipality were dominated by some kind of criminal organisation (fig. 5). Many of these criminal groups were paramilitaries (Marinatto and Soares, 2015b; Marinatto and Soares, 2015a).



Figure 5: Front Pages of EXTRA Newspaper (Source: EXTRA Archive)

Left (27 March 2015):

**CRIME DEALS THE CARDS IN 64 HOUSING ESTATES:** *Traffickers and milícia expel families, give apartments to ‘bandits’ and even have a meeting with residents*

Right (23 March 2015):

**FEDERAL POLICE WILL CARRY OUT OPERATIONS IN ‘MINHA CASA MINHA VIDA’:** *Justice Minister José Eduardo Cardoso calls for immediate action in estate controlled by drug traffickers*

Soares and Marinatto presented a territorial-physical depiction of the parastatal groups, delimiting their control by the physical walls of the housing development. This conceptualisation would work neatly with a single case study framework, which is how I designed the research before arriving in the field.

However, shortly after these stories were published, and two months before beginning my fieldwork, I went on a reconnaissance visit to Rio de Janeiro in 2015 and I participated in a workshop run by the World Bank and the Federal Government's Ministry of Cities. The workshop, entitled *Strategies and Methodologies for Confronting Violence and Conflict in Social Housing and Urban Development Programmes*, was largely a response by the Ministry of Cities to the negative media coverage from *EXTRA* as it had begun to raise public concerns about the presence of criminal organisations in a social housing programme, funded by federal taxes.

During the workshop, there were various discussions and debates between urban planners, academics and policy makers about the different approaches the authorities could use to deal with the increasing violence and conflict in MCMV. Most agreed that not enough had been done during the planning stages of MCMV to factor in aspects that could lead to social tensions, such as assisting the residents with the transition from informal to formal housing. Moreover, they indicated that 'security' should have been integrated much more widely into the urban planning process when the initial master plan for MCMV had been created.

During the workshop, this approach was laid out by the Director of the Ministry of Cities, Júnia Santa Rosa, as one of the primary ways she saw for 'fixing' violence in MCMV. She advocated change in the planning process at the federal level such as transport services, access to local commerce, and local medical support. During an interview with Santa Rosa in February 2016 at the Ministry of Cities headquarters in Brasilia, Santa Rosa elaborated on her position. She attributed much of the violence to poorly managed, unfettered and overly rapid urban development processes and felt it was the result of different scales of government with different objectives not working together.<sup>51</sup> Although Santa Rosa noted that urbanisation processes were linked to broader questions of insecurity and inequality, she made it clear that she did not see the presence of parastatal groups in MCMV as an issue that could be fixed by the Ministry of Cities.

---

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Santa Rosa, J. February 2017, Brasilia.

This was one of the early signs that to me that there was a methodological issue with my approach of selecting a single case study. The boundaries of a single case study are always subjected to the processes and dynamics at urban, regional, national and even global scales (Allen, Massey and Pryke, 2005). Such a narrow and neatly defined space would have been problematic as it would have confined the study to contrived physical boundaries. It took me some time to realise this in the field, and I spent the first three months of my fieldwork conducting research in an MCMV complex along the Mendanha road in Campo Grande (fig. 6).

However, on realising this issue, I broadened the scope of my fieldwork to encompass the surrounding area – the West Zone – to be able to register for the effects of urban development processes that could only be explained with a broader perspective over the field. Furthermore, the more data I gathered, the more I realised the paramilitaries were now dominating the MCMV developments necessarily because they were MCMV developments, but because they were in territories already dominated by paramilitaries and it provided a new opportunity for them. In fact, during the early stages of my fieldwork, one resident explained to me that the paramilitaries had already ‘moved in’ to stake a claim on the site whilst it had still been under construction and that they had not even waited for the residents to arrive.

This reflective and evolving methodology did not concern me as it is common to develop new thinking during the research process itself (Gerring, 2004; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Indeed, reflecting critically like this can contribute towards a more robust theoretical and methodological position.

In the first instance, I expanded my case study approach to an ‘N of one plus some’ case study method (Mukhija, 2010). This meant including the study of other secondary cases in other parts of the West Zone (marked in fig. 6). Although a single case study would be beneficial for an intensive investigation, this approach simultaneously allowed less detailed examinations of a small number of other similar cases. I was enabled to gain a wider understanding of the main case and draw some relational links between the primary and secondary cases. This approach provided the opportunity for triangulation and application of knowledge from the primary case to the secondary ones and vice versa.

Ethnographers have increasingly turned to more complex interpretations of ethnography in order to dislocate themselves from the physical-spatial, Cartesian defined, ‘single-site’ ethnographies of convention (Landesman, 2016). The emergence of thinking around global

multi-sited ethnography (Burawoy *et al.*, 2000) and institutional ethnography (Campbell *et al.*, 2006) are representative of these transgressions beyond this static thinking about space as a container and more in terms of the networks, places, scales and territories that make up various spatial dimensions. The task of defining my ‘case’ was therefore established on the grounds of mapping social relations and exploring the dynamics of interactions that produce and are produced between the local and macro levels of social space and institutional fields (Smith, 2005a).

I decided to focus on the small geographical area of Campinha that incorporated different settlements, an MCMV development and other formal housing developments. I selected two communities in close proximity to each other through which I have drawn some comparisons and made some contrasts (fig. 35). This decision was inspired by Ward’s (2008) comparative approach to studying cities, which helped me to engage with my final research question about explaining the relationships between different communities and parastatal groups.



Figure 6: Map of the Case Sites in the West Zone (Source: Author)

I conceptualised the communities of Campinha as a site interconnected to the institutional and spatial structures, and therefore of the political and economic dynamics of the broader city. This provided me with a local frame of reference, but it also allowed me to situate the research in an historically and globalised and networked environment. By looking at the multiple sites

within the Campinha area I was able to draw comparisons between the different communities and their sets of social relations, as well as the formal state presence and housing project through the MCMV development which all fit within the broader political economic dynamics.

### Linking micro to macro

One of the founding feature of this methodology was inspired by a critique of the already existing studies parastatal groups in Rio de Janeiro. The seminal studies of Carioca paramilitaries adopt relatively positivist approaches (Cano and Duarte, 2012; Cano and Iooty, 2008) and they tend to suggest that empirical observations of activity are explanatory of material and social conditions in and of themselves. However, whilst the likelihood of a set of conditions leading to parastatal activity might be high, the logic of this type of causality is, I would argue, atheoretical and it does not necessarily help us to address for the *why* or the *how* in my research questions.

Given that my central research question seeks to understand questions of both *why* and *how*, I incorporated different methodological approaches to gather evidence of causal mechanisms rather than make inferences based on correlations. However, this was not a simple task. Causal mechanisms are not necessarily directly observable, which can make it difficult to locate data. As a solution, I expanded the scope of my data collection and also observed the practices and events that take place as a result of *milícia* activities, that affected other actors such as residents, policemen, or politicians; so it was not only practices of and by *milicianos* themselves.

I drew on the critical realist ontological framework (Bhaskar, 2013) to work with the assumption that ‘reality’ exists prior to being interpreted. This approach involves a stratified ontology for dealing with this composed of the *empirical*, the *actual*, and the *real*. The *empirical* is where observers directly encounter experiences and observations, yet it is the tip of the iceberg and a mere representation of what actually exists. The *actual* is where events occur that may not always be seen by the observer, or they may be interpreted differently by some compared to others. A process of interpretation is therefore involved in the process bridging the empirical and the actual. Events that take place in the actual, and that are observed in the empirical, take place as a result of mechanisms that operate in the real.

I used these different stratum to set out the logic for my empirical chapters. Chapter five looks at the phenomenon initially through some of the causal mechanisms, such as economic and



political liberalisation. Chapter six looks at the events that occur as a result of these causal mechanisms, i.e. the reconfigurations of the political relations and, ultimately, the political settlement. Chapter seven begins with the experiences of these relations, as they exist at the local, empirical level.

Through this ontological framework it is possible to sketch out how practices at the local, empirical level are linked to the underlying structures, causal mechanisms, and power relations that compose processes at the macro-level (Sayer, 1992).

## Research design

### Mixed methods & interdisciplinarity

The rather diverse set of practices, relations, forms and functions of parastatal groups demanded an eclectic range of methods to gather the required data. The breadth of methods used partially depended on issues of access, given the subject matter, which will be discussed below. Whilst my focus on the more macro-level processes focuses on data collection through semi-structured interviews and archival data from formal political institutions, my understanding of local level practices, representations and experiences depends on ‘deeper’ methods of data collection such as direct observation, informal conversations and life histories. Throughout the thesis, I also fold official quantitative and spatial data such as census and crime data into the discussion.

I acknowledge that such a broad range of methods spanning different disciplines might be controversial for some social scientists, especially for some disciplines that may adopt more purist approaches to research, such as anthropology. For this reason, I am not claiming to have produced ‘an ethnography of...’, or, specifically, an archival study of this subject. However, for interdisciplinary research especially in the field of development studies, I looked to methodologies in interdisciplinary research frameworks (Tobi and Kampen, 2018) to help me grapple with the complex and multifaceted nature of contemporary issues in the globalised world that monodisciplinary approaches can at times struggle to come to terms with. Indeed, some of the key methodological, conceptual and analytical contributions of this study are indebted to its interdisciplinary approach.

### Access and positionality

As I noted with my case site selection discussion, social relations are not limited to single physical sites. They are subjected to stretching and bending across different times and spaces.

Examples of different sites include local community resident associations, state presence in local communities, the state parliament and social spaces in the affluent South Zone where elites, policymakers and influential analysts live and socialise. This study therefore demanded that I did not limit myself to a single scale or space.

In practical terms, all the formal and political spaces, such as meetings with politicians or police officers, I tried to gain access to were typically available to the public, usually by appointment or prior arrangement. The West Zone was also largely accessible by train, the Bus Rapid Transport system or the vast network of informal vans. I also had two bicycles – one in the West Zone and one in the Centre – that I used as my primary modes of transport when I was in each of the regions.

Whilst there were rarely any physical restrictions on the places I could go for my research, there were certainly psychological ones in terms of particular fears of spaces that I knew, or had heard, were ‘dangerous’. I was warned on several occasions about the difficulties of research on parastatal groups in Rio de Janeiro by journalists and other researchers through my personal and professional network who have themselves been warned off by the *milicianos* from investigating the subject. Most of those warning me cited a case of torture of two *O Dia* journalists in 2007 (I discuss this in more detail in chapter six), which was an important element of the constructed narrative and the production of a fear of violence. This certainly contributed to a culture of terror (Taussig, 1992) and an ominous atmosphere of fear (Pavoni and Tulumello, 2018).

This made me particularly cautious (and slow) in the early months of my research. I was cautious about many of the new relationships I made, all the people I met for the first time, and all the people who had seen me come and go every day. I tried to imagine who was behind the blacked-out windows every time a car drove past me in the West Zone (this is a common security feature of cars in Rio de Janeiro) and where all the security cameras were wired up to. Who was watching me and would any one ask what I was doing there? However, reflecting on these politics of fear I realised that situating myself in the middle of this environment, reflecting on it and writing about it in my fieldnotes, had been invaluable for me for understanding how control and domination worked in the West Zone.

This tied in with the reading I had done on the experiences of social science researchers and ethnographers investigating illegal activities or those in conflict-affected environments (Goodhand, 2000; Scheper-Hughes, 1995; Nordstrom and Robben, 1995; Jones and Rodgers,



2019). Building on their experiences, I recognised the importance of continually reflecting on the research process when I was entering the field to balance the tensions between my desire to conduct empirically 'brave' research and be on the vanguard, address the research question, and ensure the safety of my informants and myself. This was even more problematic in an unfamiliar environment where I was not native as the rules, codes and norms were not always clear to me. It was also not always clear to me, at least in the beginning of the research process, what was dangerous and what was not. I overcame this through close dialogue with trusted gatekeepers who were better informed than I was.

I adapted the way that I introduced myself to new people and situated myself in the research context according to the environment. In some situations, it was advantageous that I was a foreign researcher from a British university, especially in spaces where status, power and my SOAS business card mattered. Examples of these spaces include the offices of elected politicians in the state parliament, the swanky restaurants where I met with lawyers and business leaders in the city, or at the hillside mansions of influential analysts and intellectuals in the South Zone.

In these situations, where formal/semi-structured interviews were the primary method of data collection, I typically contacted the informant via email or phone by providing a top-line description of what my research entailed and what kind of contribution they could make for this research. Although I used formal introductions, letters and permissions from governmental and police departments, I did not rely solely on this method of communication as this is not at all in keeping with the culture of Brazilian state bureaucracies and it would have limited the relationship and likely prevented any relationship from taking place. I utilised my personal connections and networks to acquire phone numbers. In the cases where this was not possible, I relied on direct messaging through Facebook Messenger and Twitter, which proved very effective.

I usually attempted to snowball at the tail end of these interviews and meetings in order to ask the interviewee for further contacts they thought might be useful for the research. As expected with all snowball sampling (Browne, 2005), much of the success of this method depended on the strength of my relationship with the informant or between the informant and my gatekeeper. For this reason, I ensured I was as grounded in the context as possible to meet a wide range of people, attend a wide range of forums and events and meet a variety of people that I would then be able to follow up with later and arrange meetings.

Despite these strategic approaches, there were still some spaces I could not gain access to. Some politicians, policemen or intellectuals simply would not talk to me. Presumably this was because of the illicit and illegal nature of parastatal group practices and the threat this might pose to their positions of power, assuming they, or their networks, were involved or related in some way. Furthermore, some of those who would talk to me only gave me the information that they wanted me to hear and publish. This was a part of a complex information economy that I was forced to sypher through and make sense of.

An interview with a high-ranking civil police officer who had been castigated by the police for exposing a severe and tragic case of police violence inspired me to seek ‘the truth’ in harder to reach places. However, the shadowy, opaque and difficult-to-see nature of illicit activities and practices made this a particularly challenging task. Many of my research methods sought out data that others wished to keep secret. This was necessary to ‘get to the bottom of it’ through a realistic and objective understanding of what was actually going on (Ballvé, 2019a).

Although my university credentials were beneficial in certain spaces, access was much more difficult to negotiate in the West Zone. When I was conducting exploratory visits around Campo Grande, I encountered the area of Campinha. On one day at the start of my fieldwork whilst I was cycling along some of the rural roads, I encountered a man walking down the street. He spotted me taking a break outside the Floresta da Campinha community centre and asked me what I was doing. I explained that I was a researcher and I was out exploring the region. He then explained he was a social worker in the local youth group in the *Centro de Referencia e Assistencia Social* (CRAS, Social Assistance and Referral Centre). He took me to meet the local community leader, Marcela, and her daughter, Denise, who was also a social worker at the CRAS. Some scholars note that those individuals most closely linked to mainstream institutions, such as state institutions, are most alluring to conduct research with because of their high visibility and accessibility (Ellard-Gray *et al.*, 2015) and they suggest that these actors are not representative of the vulnerable and less visible social groups. This was not the case in the Campinha region.

Denise invited me to attend the local youth club with teenagers that attended from the neighbouring MCMV development. By doing this, I met many of the residents from the local community. They invited me to attend community events, resident meetings, and outings with the youths. There was also a strong activist network within the community and which linked into broader activist networks across this city; there was much to talk about. Many opinions were exchanged during informal discussions at Marcela’s local bar.

As a qualified English teacher, I volunteered three days a week to teach English classes to the local teenagers. Once the word spread locally about my English classes, the neighbouring community of Santo Cristo asked me to teach in their residents' association for a younger group of children and to some adults. A similar process of socialisation unfolded through these connections and I became close to some of the residents in a similar way to what I had done in Campinha.

It was through my time teaching English in the communities that I developed a relationship with Pamela, the community leader, who introduced me to various other families within the community. I was then invited to barbeques, birthday parties and other informal social gatherings where I fortified these relationships. Although some scholars may question these methods of engagement on the grounds that they interfere with social relations and everyday life, getting up close to the research phenomenon in this way allowed me to look beyond the 'bigger picture' and understand the experiences of individuals from the 'street-level' (Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997; Moser and McIlwaine, 2014). Socialising with the teenagers and offering help during local events also enabled me to establish relationships with the parents. This provided me with a primary source of data for direct observations, interviews and oral histories.

There were some uncomfortable moments during the first months in the field. Participants sometimes questioned my motives for being there (see Text Box 1) and this created tension. This was felt most acutely in Floresta da Campinha where some of my research subjects were radical black feminist activists. This was not a new experience for me. I had experienced open and frank criticisms towards foreign researchers (myself included) when I had attended debates about the gentrification processes in South Zone favelas in 2014. Local activists had stated in a public meeting that they felt like 'rats in a lab experiment'.

These experiences highlight the importance of reflexive relationships in the process of 'embedding' myself in the field. I tried to avoid the 'godtrick' (Haraway and Teubner, 1991) and present my research activities through a more modest lens. I positioned myself as a social being (Hervik, 1994) rather than a researcher trying to 'extract' data from the people. This type of positionality required an understanding of myself. As Rose points out, this can be extremely difficult to do (1997).

To realise this, I looked at the numerous axes that make up our multiple identities (that we all possess) and I assessed the difficulty in making sense of these dynamic and constantly moving

elements.<sup>52</sup> Although my race, gender and class identities were considerably different from the women of Campinha, I drew upon my own queer identity and I related my own experiences of exclusions to theirs in the best way I could. This made the research process a much more comfortable experience for all involved, and it was also beneficial for the research. As Rodgers reminds us through his acceptance as a '*broder*' in Nicaragua (2007), there are benefits to being more on the inside of the research as it grants access to knowledge, processes and tactics that one might otherwise not obtain.

With such a broad range of research sites and methods, my positionality had to be agile in terms of the way I acted, related to people, dressed and talked. For example, I was only able to access the state parliament with trousers and formal wear. However, these clothes were inappropriate for visiting the Campinha area in the West Zone where the majority of residents dressed in beachwear and flip flops. On the days when I had a meeting or an interview in the state parliament in the morning and I was in teaching in Campinha in the afternoon, I took a change of clothes with me in my backpack. I changed between the Centre and the West Zone. Through my positionality as a researcher between these two worlds, like a broker, I too was experiencing what it was like to oscillate between different spaces, norms, and cultures.

---

<sup>52</sup> Katz (Katz, C. (1994) 'Playing the field: questions of fieldwork in geography', *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1), pp. 67-72.) suggests that reflexivity takes place in a conscious state, whilst England (England, K. V. L. (1994) 'Getting personal: Reflexivity, positionality, and feminist research\*', *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1), pp. 80-89.) suggests reflexivity is a 'self-discovery process'.

### *Text Box 1: Identity in Question*

*During the first months of my fieldwork in Campinha, Denise questioned my identity. We had had a conversation the week before in which she had told me about the ex-paramilitary bosses still living in Campinha. Because she had been so forthcoming with the information, I had asked some questions about them. I had even interpreted this exchange as a key moment in our relationship in which she demonstrated trust by opening up to me with information that she knew I would be interested in. However, as we were sitting at the local bar one afternoon after the youth club meeting, she told me that I came across like a journalist in the way I approached things. She told me it was because I was ‘always listening and watching, and curious about what is going on’. She suggested that I had ulterior motives and that she was worried she might have said too much. I initially felt surprised and even offended by what she had said. I wasn’t sure if it was a positionality issue or if perhaps my researching skills weren’t up to scratch.*

*However, after reflecting on the conversation, it began to make sense to me why she had reacted like this. I had arrived to Campinha out-of-the-blue, with no links and no introductions. It must have been a strange experience to suddenly have a foreigner in her life, in the way that I was, in a place so remote, and far removed from the gaze of most researchers and journalists. I sensed there were also tensions around my being a researcher ‘looking in’ on her environment, and ‘mining data’.*

*In the months that followed, Denise gradually accepted me into the community. She was obviously conflicted because of the meaning that my privilege brought.*

*I was accepted more easily in the neighbouring community in Santo Cristo through my relations with Pamela, a community leader, who had fewer suspicions about me.*

*My objective was never to ‘become’ the research subject in the ethnographic sense (distance is inevitable) – these distances are not problematic, and they can even be beneficial for the research. Rather than trying to resolve this distance by imitating the research subject, reconciliation can take place by reflexively asking critical questions about the constitution of difference. Social theories can then be used to explain these differences.*

### **Data collection**

This fieldwork was conducted in Rio de Janeiro for roughly four days per week during October 2015 and April 2017. I developed a research plan in advance of reaching the field to address each of the research questions (this is set out in the Extended Audit Trail in Appendix 1). The data collection process produced three key bodies of data from which I have primarily drawn from throughout this thesis. The three key bodies of data making up the main substance of my analysis are:

1. Interviews and oral histories
2. Field notes and participant observations
3. Parliamentary Inquiry Commission archives

In addition to these bodies of data, I also worked with news media reports from the archives of Rio de Janeiro's mainstream newspapers, online blogs, data from the *Disque Denuncia* and WhatsApp and Facebook group messages from security and police interest groups.

I now discuss each of the key bodies of data in turn.

### Semi-structured interviews and oral histories

I conducted 124 semi-structured interviews and oral histories with a range of participants from across the city (fig. 7). I have categorised the interviewees based on their primary social title. There is no 'militiaman' category as none of my interviewees self-identified their primary social title as militiamen.

Figure 7: Interviewees by Primary Social Title

| Primary social title                  | Number     |
|---------------------------------------|------------|
| Resident                              | 31         |
| Community Leader                      | 3          |
| Military Policeman                    | 6          |
| Civil Policemen                       | 14         |
| Civic leader                          | 12         |
| Analyst / Academic                    | 12         |
| State Bureaucrat / Official           | 14         |
| Journalist                            | 4          |
| Public Prosecutor / District Attorney | 9          |
| Politician / Lawmaker                 | 16         |
| Judge                                 | 3          |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>124</b> |

I conducted the semi-structured interviews with actors typically at the more 'macro' levels or in positions within the state system. For interviews with politicians, police and prosecutors, judges, and public prosecutors, I identified specific actors with links to militias or with experience 'combatting' them. Different groups of elites and key figures in the political and business institutions of the city, either social groups or individuals, were typically a focus for the research. Many of these actors, such as politicians, wealthy families, large business owners, political party leaders, prominent congressmen, significant landowners, church pastors, had high levels of influence over political and economic outcomes.

Based around broad interview question topics related to the specific research question I was trying to answer (I also outline these in Appendix 1), I tailored my interviews for each

informant, especially if they had a specific role that I wanted to understand more about. The interviews improved significantly as I worked through them and my ability to engage in the semi-structured format and get the best out of the interviewee increased. As I became more experienced with the interviews, I also learnt to adapt to the conditions I found myself in. Conditions were not always ideal for conducting an interview, as there was often noise and interruptions.

I conducted oral histories with some key informants where I was able to develop an adequate level of trust. These long-format interviews were sometimes three or four hours long and were often conducted over two or three sessions. In these interviews, I gave small prompts and asked open-ended questions to guide the answer. However, I aimed to give the participant as much time as they needed to engage in a lengthy and in-depth discussion of their life history. Most of the life histories I conducted were with residents, community leaders and a small number of police.

My focus on the stories of individual actors within communities led to occasions of clashing accounts of events and experiences between actors as some actors had tendencies to exaggerate certain information. Because of this, and the difficulty in gathering data in the conditions, it was at times difficult to verify some data. Triangulation was therefore crucial to ensure robust and reliable data. This made it even more important to reflect critically on all data sources and their compositions.

### **Fieldnotes and participant observation**

Whilst the interviews were important for identifying key moments and markers in the data, field notes and observations functioned for better understanding the dynamics of the field context from the ‘street level’ (Beek *et al.*, 2017). I conducted a mixture of participant, non-participant and direct observations throughout my whole time in the field, filling field journals with handwritten notes and then digitising them. Most of these observations were in the West Zone during my time with the local communities, however, there are also observations from the time I spent in the South Zone and central areas of the city where elites circulate.

These data helped me to describe the experiences and observations of the research subjects, so they emerge through the research as real and identifiable human beings, rather than abstract individuals. When relying on interviews that might focus on overly structural approaches, this can portray individual actors as ‘pawns’ of larger structural forces (Bourgois, 2003) rather than as agential actors able to shape their own futures.

### Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) archives

The CPI data was a key body of data from which I draw and analyse widely throughout the thesis and analysis of this data represents a significant empirical contribution to the local literature on *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro. It is a collection of over 30,000 pages of documents including police reports, political letters, testimonies, intelligence reports, administrative notes and letters, financial records, phone records, property and land titling deeds, business ownership deeds, tax records, court documents, citizen reports and official minutes and agendas from meetings within the commission. This is a highly contested body of data that has been shaped and instrumentalised by political actors in the story of the CPI and *milícia* combat for political gain.

After 18 months of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, persistence and negotiation (a description of the problems in accessing this data is outlined at the start of chapter six), I was granted access to these archives which proved to be a trove of information. I was initially confronted with seventeen boxes full of paper documents, photocopies, reports, receipts, CDs, and photographs! However, I was able to obtain digitised versions of these documents which I processed through an Optical Character Recognition (ORC) software to make the textual data processable in analytical software. Whilst I was not able to analyse this data in significant depth given the time and resource restrictions of the Ph.D. project, I draw on it frequently and in systematic ways to address key issues and themes within the thesis, frequently calling on the data for triangulation purposes. This data should form the basis for further research.

It was important to approach this data through a critical lens. Most of the data that exists in the archives, police reports and commissions focus on particular individuals operating in specific spaces due to the way that public prosecutions are conducted, and the political choices made. This does not disqualify the data, but it does mean there is a need to be continually reflexive about the research process and question how the data have been influenced by value judgements, political biases and broader discourses. As Thomas reminds us, ‘We are simply forbidden to submit value judgments in place of facts or to leap to “ought” conclusions without a demonstrable cogent theoretical and empirical linkage’ (1993). There is an ethical obligation to realise the potential of a critical perspective, in the knowledge that research, as a contribution to knowledge, will be carried forward, used, and applied elsewhere. As a result, the research will be unethical if it is laden with value judgements.



### Data coding

I imported all the raw data into NVivo data management software which allowed me to conduct appropriate identification and coding of nodes, identification of trends, conceptualisation and case classifications. It also enabled me to conduct qualitative exploration of the data through word frequency, word stems and word search tools to drill further into the data. I approached the coding using a thematic approach once I had all of my data gathered, building out broad thematic areas and then adding to them as I worked through the data. I was also able to intersect this coding with case-relevant coding.

### Ethics and security

There were important ethical and security considerations with this study given the violent, illegal and conflictual nature of the subject. My research questions, in particular, required me to examine paramilitary practices that are at times illegal, illicit or unethical. Practices include extortion, illegal taxation, monopolies of markets, kidnapping, killing, drug trafficking and illegal use of arms, yet my role as a researcher is not to police and report illegal activities but to observe and attempt to explain them. This is not to say that if I witness a serious episode of violence that I can do nothing about it, but I have to use my judgement about what constitutes 'serious', and weigh this up against the repercussions for the research, my security and the security of other subjects. There was no rule of thumb for these unpredictable situations, but they depended on my personal judgement.

I was, however, cautious not to fall into the trap of fetishizing the illicit or illegal. Goodhand (2000, 15), for example, warns against a 'conflict fetish'. These fetishes tend to lead to narratives equating urban poverty with violence and conflict, and they reinforce structural violence and can exacerbate inequalities. I attempted to reconcile these tensions by conceptualising violence across a broader spectrum of power relations, social practices and structural conditions. I did not want this study to be about violent paramilitary practices *per se*, but about the social relations and practices that underpin them and that produce social (dis)order.

My attempt to understand the emergence of paramilitaries and their violent and illegal practices against drug traffickers and urban poor communities should not be misconstrued as an effort to justify, rationalise or even romanticise the phenomenon. Any of these forms of violence is indefensible. However, as Hobsbawm demonstrates in his discussion of primitive rebels

(2017), it is important to acknowledge the subjugated nature of the social political histories of this urban frontier and of those social beings that inhabit them.

Furthermore, I want to emphasise that these forms of violence should not be seen in isolation from the state in an in-/out-law binary, but in conjunction with the state system, with one foot inside and outside of the system, as part of a process of consolidation and exertion of power. The emergence of parastatal groups across the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, and more widely, the growing trend of increasing strength of paramilitaries across Latin America as a whole, should be understood as a response to the structural, symbolic and direct forms of violence and inequalities that disadvantaged marginalised populations, particularly along the cleavages of race and class.

As Cano and Iooty (2007) note, residents from communities in the West Zone dominated by *milícias* are less inclined to engage in research and interviews than those in favelas dominated by drug traffickers because of a sense of distrust. Many fear that what they say will be relayed to the *miliciano*. My approach to researching violence had important ethical implications as it meant that because my research was not necessarily about paramilitary activity, I avoided having to ask any direct questions about paramilitaries when in local communities in the West Zone. The way I conducted my interviews and oral histories, for example, avoided direct clashes and confrontations with issues of parastatal organisations or actors (Abah, Okwori and Alubo, 2009). As a result, I focused my discussions on much broader and indirect topics related to everyday life (of which parastatal groups are a huge part of anyway) and if the informant felt comfortable talking to me directly about the topic, then they did so voluntarily.

Whilst departing from conventional methodological approaches, such as looking through the state and illegal/legal lenses, was important, I realised that my personal sense of judgement and communication skills were equally as important for getting the ethical balance right (Justino, Leavy and Valli, 2009). It was necessary to negotiate my own safety with that of the informant, as well as balance their confidentiality. I guaranteed absolute confidentiality and anonymity throughout the research process for the vulnerable participants in this research, insofar as identification to the general public. This has involved changing interviewee names, place names, and distorting community locations on maps. However, due to the depth of the data, it is possible that some participants could be identifiable to others involved in the study (Allmark *et al.*, 2009).

However, in some cases I have not been able to guarantee anonymity for the powerful, such as named and known political or high-ranking public sector actors, politicians, police chiefs or heads of police divisions. Anonymising the names of the powerful though pseudonyms would not be sufficient to ensure some identities were protected (Neal and McLaughlin, 2009). Vanio (2013, 693) has argued that when selecting data and information, researchers should always be ‘identifying information that is not relevant from the perspective of theory and research questions should be excluded when describing the participants’. In thinking about my data through the lens of my research questions, the positions of power and the relations between specific individuals were important analytical points for considering how political settlements were negotiated and rents distributed. Although there might be implications for powerful individuals as a result of the research, it is important to note that these individuals are not conceptualised as vulnerable (Lancaster, 2017). For subjects that I interviewed, and if I recorded the interview, I always reminded them they could tell me to turn the recorder off if there was something they wanted to voice ‘off the record’. However, for subjects of the research where I did not have any contact, I relied on publicly available data, CPI data, or data from government archives.

Although it is legal for me to use the CPI documents because I am not reproducing any of the classified documents in full,<sup>53</sup> I have still been very selective about which data I cite and which specific reference I quote. I have, in some cases redacted the citation to protect certain names and locations. Whilst it may be legal to use this data, it does not mean that it is ethical. I continue to maintain high levels of anonymity in order to protect individuals’ security.

With permission from the interviewees, I used a recorder to capture most of the interviews, the majority of which were conducted without taking notes so as not to be distracting. Interview recordings were saved immediately onto the Evernote cloud with a two-stage security authentication required to access the files. I contracted transcription services from professional transcription services in Portugal and in other far-away Brazilian states (namely Bahia and Mato Grosso do Sul). All the transcribers completed non-disclosure agreements and I obtained their social security numbers and addresses for my records.

That said, it was neither practical nor feasible to inform everyone all the time about my research, so extra attention was given to ensure the confidentiality, anonymity and privacy of my informants. This points towards the delicate balance between security and ethics. It may

---

<sup>53</sup> I am grateful for the advice from the Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism

have been more secure to conduct certain research activities, such as observation of practice, without presenting myself outright as a researcher and disclosing the full subject of my research from the beginning of the interaction. Full disclosure would have resulted in the blocking of access and/or a security risk to informants or/and me.

The Federal Government's Foreign Office and the Brazilian Consulate in London were made aware of my research (a requirement for the visa application), I did not inform the Rio de Janeiro state authorities about my research agenda due to the threat posed by the network-based form of the parastatal groups.<sup>54</sup> As a sponsor of my visa and research project, Professor Ignacio Cano at the Rio de Janeiro State University's Laboratory of Violence Analysis was also made broadly aware of my research plan.

Throughout all my visits to the field, I informed friends and colleagues as to my plans and always sent a GPS location map of my whereabouts when I arrived in the field site with an expected return time. Several gatekeepers from within the Rio de Janeiro state security system, whom I considered allies, friends and confidants, were always available, contactable and prepared to help in the event of any emergency.

## Summary

In this chapter, I set out my methodological approach to answering my research questions and I described some of the key decisions I made in shaping the fieldwork process. The aim of the chapter was to set out a methodological framework that looks beyond the conventional single case study approach in which social phenomena are thought to be bounded to space and it considers the broader social relations encountered in a diverse array of spatial dimensions. I also discussed the challenges I faced in selecting a field site, and the realisations I had about the study of different sites as part of broader material, social and symbolic systems.

The methods I chose deal with different aspects of paramilitary domination. The interviews and discussions with actors linked to the state system or the CPI archival documentation reveal something about underlying bargaining processes. The observations, oral histories and other ethnographic methods are more sensitive to the everyday practices of individuals within the communities. This varied approach to methods is supported theoretically through the

---

<sup>54</sup> One politician involved in the CPI told me about how he went to the West Zone to investigate a gas mafia as part of the investigation. Six months later he was stopped in a roadblock in the South Zone neighbourhood of Leblon and when the police officer read his name on the licence, and the police officer recognised him as 'the guy who did the dirt in Santa Cruz'.

discussions of the critical realist approach to methods, which attempts to link causal mechanisms to the experiences and everyday practices at the local level.

In the next chapters, I turn to the empirics of the study. In chapter four, I outline the historical evolution of the West Zone as a site of difference, examining how the region featured in the political mechanics of the city. I follow this discussion with an introduction to the West Zone as a space on the frontier of urban development, and a site of production, creativity and potential. In the following three chapters I adopt different entry points to the research subject, examining the emergence, bargaining and everyday experiences of paramilitaries.

## Four: A Frontier History of Order, Violence, and *Resistência* in Rio de Janeiro

### Introduction

The story of the discovery, colonisation and development of Brazil's 'wild and savage lands' has been recorded and recounted in many ways (e.g. Corrêa, 1936; Langfur, 1999; De Holanda, Eulálio and Ribeiro, 1995). But one common theme that has emerged ever since the Portuguese settlers first claimed sovereignty over indigenous lands on April 22, 1500, is one where various localised forms of violent domination, control, extraction, territorialisation, and enclosure have taken place over the years.

The story of Brazil's evolution can best be understood by analysing the balance of power between different power holders at local levels, the dynamics of globalisation, the mobilised masses, chattel slavery, and elites struggling to maintain order of the population. Throughout Brazil's history there have been consistent tensions between localism and globalism, liberalism and conservatism, order and disorder, which remain as relevant today as they did five centuries ago. These tensions have led to fragmented institutions, exploited populations and limited access to resources as well as the political and civic rights of large segments of the population. However, unlike many countries experiencing change and revolution, the majority of Brazil's changes did not occur because of social movements, violent protests or civil wars (De Holanda, Eulálio and Ribeiro, 1995). Instead changes took place through more protracted forms of localised violence, domination, and coercion that facilitated bargaining and redistribution of rents between elite groups competing between one another. Various actors and groups can be seen as different manifestations of this endemic violence.

In this chapter I draw out some of the key moments of rupture during the previous two centuries in Rio de Janeiro, that have shaped, and been shaped by the churning temporal, political and economic structures of the urban frontier space. I account for some of the openings and closings of the urban frontier, and the economic, social, and political booms and busts and I explain how these relate to some of the localised forms of ordering in Rio de Janeiro, through which institutionalised, indirect, pervasive and persistent forms of violence were reproduced and layered upon one another.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> A historical reading of violence is therefore central to this analysis if we are to understand the formation of Brazilian society and its effect on social relations (see: Velho, G. (2000) 'O desafio da violência', *Estudos Avançados*, 14(39), pp. 56-60.).

Specifically, this chapter lays down the foundations to address the first research question, ‘how and why *Carioca milícias* emerged in the West Zone during the 1990s?’, by peering through the historical ebbs and flows of the political settlement that underpinned the emergence of parastatal groups in the 1990s. Through a historical analysis of key moments of rupture and change in the political settlement, I reflect upon reconfigurations of power, uneven processes of change, and the emergence of ‘new’ or competing political settlements, underpinned by localised processes of ordering. Whilst there is not space for a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Rio de Janeiro’s entire history and all of its localised forms of ordering – nor is it necessary – this chapter focuses on isolated moments during reorganisations of the political settlement that help us understand the foundational structures leading to the emergence of parastatal groups in the West Zone in the 1990s. By engaging the conceptual approach lens outlined in chapter two, it is possible to look *through* Rio de Janeiro as a complex meeting point for multiple geographies and histories (Massey, 2005), overlapping flows of capital, and global and local networks; and make the case for why parastatal groups emerged at this moment in Rio de Janeiro’s history.

This chapter is organised into five sections. In the first, I highlight the importance of a political settlement first defined by chattel slavery and Brazil’s violent history of race relations; arguably the single most important factor that underscores this thesis. I follow this with a discussion about the transition to independence and its effects for pluralising the political settlement and consolidating power in rural spaces, in particular in the region now known as the West Zone. In the third section, I explore how the authoritarian turn of the 1960s and transition into a military dictatorship led to new forms of state-sponsored violence. In the fourth section, before drawing some conclusions, I describe how processes of economic and political liberalisation led to uneven distribution of power, a rising sense of insecurity, and reactive forms of policing, security and clientelist politics.

### A history of extraction and racism

Portuguese settlers founded Brazil as a colony during the 16<sup>th</sup> century through the violent enslavement of indigenous populations as a source of labour and the extraction and export of brazilwood as a resource. During the following two centuries, Portuguese settlers began to import slaves from Western Africa to cultivate and export sugar cane in the North East of the

country. It was not until the 18<sup>th</sup> century that the settlers discovered valuable stocks of gold and diamonds in the southeast of the territory.

A gold and diamond rush attracted large numbers of Portuguese investors and mining elites to Brazil from all over the empire looking to capitalise on the minerals. Whilst much of the rush occurred inland, and rich colonial towns such as Ouro Preto were built to house many of these elites, Rio de Janeiro became the port through which the raw materials were exported to Portugal. It therefore grew dramatically during this period. In 1763, the capital city was transferred from Salvador in the northeast (nearest to the sugar plantations) to Rio de Janeiro in the southeast, which had overtaken Salvador in terms of economic importance.

Whilst there were high levels of exports to the rest of the empire, an emerging class of landed oligarchs began to accumulate significant amounts of wealth and retain it within Brazil, and specifically in Rio de Janeiro where many of them lived. Wealth in the empire gravitated towards Brazil and the country soon became more economically important, and even richer, than Portugal itself, with one minister from the Portuguese Court declaring, ‘Portugal without Brazil is an insignificant power’ on 17 June, 1783 (Maxwell, 2004).

Shifting power within the Portuguese empire played out most visibly in Brazil in Rio de Janeiro where mercantile, mining and agricultural elites, who were capitalising on the shipment and export of raw materials, invested in property, infrastructure and land across the city. They determined much of the political, economic and social affairs of the city through a close relationship with the Portuguese aristocrats. This also affected how the society was organised as the value of land in the city’s rural hinterlands increased. In 1759, the Jesuit monks who had been living on the surrounding lands and providing a localised form of governance for small-scale farmers for over two centuries (example in fig. 8) were expelled, and the land was taken over by the Portuguese crown (Carvalho, 2015).





Figure 8: Church of São Gonçalo Built in 1625 (Source: Correa, 1936)



Figure 9: Cais do Valongo and Cais da Imperatriz (Source: Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro (CDURP), 2014)

Building on labour customs already established in the northeast, the Portuguese began to import slaves from Western Africa to Rio de Janeiro where they were forced into labour to extract and transport raw materials. However, due to the quantity and the value of the materials, Rio de Janeiro's experience of slavery was significantly different to anywhere else in the world. The city was home to the largest slave-trading markets in Latin America. Although data about the size of the slave market varies considerably, the estimated number of slaves that arrived from Western Africa to south eastern ports in Brazil ranges from between 2.6 to 4 million slaves. As much as 90% of this volume passed through Rio de Janeiro's main wharf, *Cais do Valongo* (fig. 9)<sup>56</sup>.

By 1821, Rio de Janeiro's population was large compared to other cities in Brazil. According to the census data, the total population was 24,383.<sup>57</sup> Due to the scale of the slave population and the violent relationship between slave owners and the slaves, episodes of violence in Rio de Janeiro were thought to be much greater than in any other city. According to Rose, the Portuguese treated slaves differently to the British, the Dutch or any of the other colonial powers. They were said to be particularly harsh and merciless because of their cultural norms, attitudes and violent temperaments (2005).

The areas where slaves were kept in the city were typically policed by unorganised military units and private armed guards (Holloway, 1993). However, policing structures changed significantly in 1808 when the Portuguese court set up temporarily in Rio de Janeiro after Pedro I fled the Napoleonic invasion of Portugal during the Peninsular War. Centralised policing structures from Lisbon were replicated in Rio de Janeiro to ensure the King's properties were guarded. This also suited the landed oligarchies who had been demanding greater protection and security for their own properties and investments from the rapidly expanding population.

One of the most significant changes was a decree signed by Don Pedro I on 1 May, 1808, that authorised the formation of a centrally organised police force to absorb and organise the *ad hoc* security system (Holloway, 1993). However, as a result of poorly defined rules and definitions when passing this decree, many of the informal codes and practices of social control were institutionalised rather than eradicated. Ultimately, the decree empowered policemen to judge and punish minor transgressions themselves with the ultimate objectives of protecting ruling elites and their property rights and maintaining social order and decorum in public

---

<sup>56</sup> For a comparison of scale, of an estimated 1,876,992 slaves transported globally between 1801-1825, 1,160,601 were transported to Brazil, 283,959 to Great Britain, and 109,545 to the USA. Slave Voyages (2019) 'Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database'. Available at: <https://www.slavevoyages.org/> (Accessed.

<sup>57</sup> EDG, D. E. D. G. (1920) 'Recenseamento Geral do Brasil 1920', *Rio de Janeiro*.

places. According to Leal, ‘As there are crimes that require no punishment other than some correction, the intendant may in such cases arrest such persons as deserve correction, keeping them imprisoned for a time judged by the intendant as proportional to the disorder committed, and as seems necessary for correction’ (Leal, 1999)

However, whilst the police officers were permitted to use their discretion, much of what was deemed ‘unacceptable’ was determined by the ruling elites who appointed the chiefs of police and held them directly to account. As a result, the role of police expanded and they acted beyond the scope of controlling crime. They sought to impose a moral order that, more often than not, was shaped by racial identity (Bretas, 1997).

By 1840, Rio de Janeiro’s slave population was more than 50% of the city’s population (Queiroz, 2018). Given that the population was too large to control through physical force alone, racism played a fundamental role in producing effective strategies of control over the slave population. Portuguese settlers mobilised a medieval logic of ‘othering’ to claim superiority over other groups of ethnicities and cultures, which had the effect of forcing indigenous and slave populations to internalise their own ‘inferiorities’ (Shecaira, 2002). Whilst there was a significant use of coercive force by police of the period, these strategies of symbolic control, reinforced by religious discourse, were also key for forcing slaves to obey commands (Holloway, 1993). An acknowledgement of these sentiments of fear is fundamental for understanding how and why the approaches of police controlling slaves were broadly accepted by Portuguese society.

One of the behaviours considered most unacceptable and anti-social by local elites was a form of knife fighting known as *capoeira*.<sup>58</sup> *Capoeira* was practiced by groups of ‘rebel’ slaves who were organised in *malts* (groups) and who tended to occupy the streets around the port and surrounding *Cais do Valongo*. Through this association of violent street gangs, the term was also appropriated to describe low-class non-slave youth gangs engaging in public episodes of violence between rival gangs or between gangs and police (Guizardi, 2012).

The territorial boundaries of *capoeiras* were defined by the formal boundaries of the Catholic parishes in which they lived, and which defined the administrative areas of the city. Water fountains dotted around the different parishes were the meeting points where the *capoeiras* would meet and stage fights among one another (Almeida, 1854). Whilst *capoeira* fighting was not specifically outlawed until the 1890s, at the command of local elites, police did not tolerate

---

<sup>58</sup> Note that this is a different meaning to the ‘*capoeira*’ that is now practised as a dance-fight.

the groups. To attempt to control them, *capoeiras* were often subjected to ‘shrimp suppers’, a name given to ‘the bloody sessions of whipping to which the *capoeiras* and vagrants found were subjected’ to by the police (Soares, 2002).

In a radical attempt to curb street violence, Eusébio de Queiroz, Rio de Janeiro’s Police Chief (1833-44) ordered the city’s Justices of the Peace and police patrols to ‘search all blacks on the street and dissolve their gatherings, whether in the streets or in taverns, and to take action against tavern keepers who permit such meetings’ (Holloway, 1989). Many of the *capoeiras* resisted repressions, and conflicts with police emerged across the city (fig. 10). In retaliation, the governor expanded Rio de Janeiro’s police force to cope with the increasing frequency of the threats. However, the scale of this expansion was limited. By the 1872, the city’s population had reached over 247,679 but its police force had only 600 officers.



Figure 10: Earle, A., ‘Negroes Fighting, Brazil’ (c. 1824) (Source: Wikipedia)

Despite attempts to repress the *capoeiras*, their growing size, strength and popularity meant that their influence and role in urban politics had become more pronounced during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, the way that the electoral system was organised with non-secret ballots meant that *capoeiras* could use their reputation and means of violence over the local parishes where they practised to bargain with political parties to exchange votes for protections and pardons for themselves. The two main *capoeira maltas* offered their support to the two main political parties. In one part of the city, the *Guaiamuns malta* supported the



Liberal Party and in another parish, the *Nagoas malta* supported the Conservative Party (Capoeira, 2012). Residents eligible to vote in these parishes were expected to vote for the party aligned with their *capoeira* (Barros de Castro, 2011). It is also thought that *capoeiras* intentionally created social disorder during election periods to influence voting behaviour and generate fear.<sup>59</sup>

*Capoeiras* acted predominantly in cities. However, security complaints by landed gentry and agricultural and mining elites about ‘savages’ and escaped slaves in rural regions compelled authorities to create mechanisms for policing rural regions as well. Institutional mechanisms to account for rural militias local to municipal parishes were established and formally acted as auxiliary forces to the national army (Holloway, 1993). They played a key role in maintaining order and continuity with the broader project of state consolidation (Mugge, 2016).

However, how control was executed in rural areas was not defined by class or race in the ways that defined it in the urban environment, presumably because of the smaller, more dispersed populations. The figure of the *capitão do mato*, for example, was important in this regard.<sup>60</sup> This figure was typically an former slave themselves, and worked directly for the landowning or *fazenda*-owning (farm-owning) elites to either recapture escaped slaves or steal slaves from other *fazenda* owners. Slaves were frequently found or taken by the *capitães do mato* and they were hidden for days in order to avoid fees charged by the state.

Other figures, such as *jagunços* (armed bodyguards) were hired by the *fazendeiros* (farm owners) as mercenaries and they were used to combat threats from indigenous populations and escaped slaves. Because the landed gentry and *coroneis* (local political chiefs) acted largely autonomously, and they rarely acted in horizontal collaboration, they used *capangas* (private security guards) as hired body guards, or ‘private police’ to protect themselves from competition. This meant that weaker estates and coalitions between *fazendeiros* and their *capangas* attempted to eliminate the competition.

A rapidly growing suburban population (fig. 11) meant that it was increasingly important for political elites in the central state to establish some way of controlling these more distant spaces and the rivalries between the *fazendeiros*. Whilst most of the high ranking and qualified officers of the militias and national army were white and of Portuguese descent, these officers recruited

---

<sup>59</sup> Political links with the *capoeiras* remained strong until 1888 after the signing of the Áurea Law. In support of the monarchy and Princess Isabela, the *capoeiras* formed a militia called the Guarda Negra and targeted the abolitionists.

<sup>60</sup> See: Soares, Luiz Carlos. "O roubo de escravos no Rio de Janeiro e o tráfico interno paralelo: 1808-1850." *Revista de História* 120 (1989): 121-133.

many former slaves, *mulatos*,<sup>61</sup> lower classes and foreigners, and even some individuals with close links to the *capoeiras* to be soldiers in the rural militias.

**Figure 11:** Population of Rio de Janeiro (Source: **Recenseamento Geral do Brasil (National Census) 1920**)

|                    | <b>Suburban</b><br><i>(including rural)</i> | <b>Urban</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|--------------------|---|--------------|--------------|
| <b>1821 – 1838</b> | 6,542                                       | 17,841       | 24,386       |
| <b>1883 – 1872</b> | 4,602                                       | 133,292      | 137,894      |
| <b>1872 – 1890</b> | 48,388                                      | 199,291      | 247,679      |
| <b>1890 – 1906</b> | 90,496                                      | 198,296      | 288,792      |

The Brazilian emperor replaced the militias several years after he created them and legislated a new decree on 18 August 1831,<sup>62</sup> to create a National Guard that gave local political chiefs the right to form their own armed forces. Officers were initially elected into the National Guard by local populations. However, in 1837 further legislative changes<sup>63</sup> meant that local political chiefs could appoint their own colonels, majors and captains according to social positions, networks and in all likelihood, their race and social class.

<sup>61</sup> *Mulato* is the word to describe someone of racially mixed ancestry.

<sup>62</sup> Império do Brasil, C. d. L. (1831) *Legislação Informatizada - LEI DE 18 DE AGOSTO DE 1831 - Publicação Original*. Available at: [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei\\_sn/1824-1899/lei-37497-18-agosto-1831-564307-publicacaooriginal-88297-pl.html](https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei_sn/1824-1899/lei-37497-18-agosto-1831-564307-publicacaooriginal-88297-pl.html) (Accessed: 1 November 2019).

<sup>63</sup> Império do Brasil, C. d. L. (1837) *Legislação Informatizada - DECRETO DE 15 DE OUTUBRO DE 1837 - Publicação Original*. Available at: [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret\\_sn/1824-1899/decreto-36969-15-outubro-1837-562324-publicacaooriginal-86258-pe.html](https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret_sn/1824-1899/decreto-36969-15-outubro-1837-562324-publicacaooriginal-86258-pe.html) (Accessed: 1 November 2019).



Figure 12: Jean Baptiste Debret, 'A Government employee leaving his house with his family' (1822)

This tension between rural-urban spaces was symptomatic of tensions around race relations during much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The global progression towards slave trade abolition had attempted to force the Portuguese to adopt steps towards abolition. However, the Portuguese continued to import slaves from Western Africa decades after signing the 'Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship' with the English in 1810. Aristocratic elites struggled to understand how they could conserve their power whilst simultaneously 'freeing' black and indigenous slaves.

However, because of the liberalising perspectives on race relations and the fact that there was a demographic deficit of white Portuguese women in Brazil, some of the Portuguese men began to mix with different ethnic and social groups (fig. 12), primarily the black female slaves in what has come to be known as *mestização* (miscegenation) (Ribeiro, 2015). *Mestização* gave black populations greater voice and visibility than they had previously experienced. Portuguese authorities attempted to repopulate white ethnic groups in Brazil, such as Southern Europeans from Italy, by importing immigrants from white backgrounds, with the incentive of free transport and lodging in return for a new life (Rose, 2005).

By 1831, pressure from the English had resulted in the first Brazilian law, the Diogo Feijó Law, that prohibited all slave traffic and stipulated that all slaves who entered Brazilian ports were to be considered 'free' (Shecaira, 2002). In Rio de Janeiro, social relations fragmented in the

urban centre as a result of this law and freed slaves sought new lives in the labour market. Police authorities struggled to maintain social order because black and indigenous populations were more socially 'integrated' than they had ever been before. As a result, the ruling elites were forced to rethink their use of force and violence to maintain the order of working classes and slaves. However, in spite of these advances, complex racial dynamics set the stage for a political settlement defined by racial tension and contradictions, memories of the violence of enslavement, and racial hierarchies.

### **Towards modernisation, independence and transformation**

After thirteen years in Rio de Janeiro, Don Pedro I returned to Lisbon and left his son, Prince Pedro, as head of state in Brazil. On September 7, 1822, Prince Pedro declared independence from Portugal at the request of the republican elite, formed a new government and ordered the seizure of Portuguese assets as well as the expulsion of the Portuguese monarchists who did not accept the country's declaration. Several conflicts emerged between the Brazilian army and armed groups loyal to the Portuguese crown, mainly in the north and northeast of the country.

Outside of the protection of the Portuguese empire, Rio de Janeiro was much more exposed to global financial markets. The declining price of sugar on global markets, together with the £1.4 million indemnity that Brazil paid to the Portuguese and the English, left Brazil in a weak economic position. In Rio de Janeiro, in particular, global and local forces clashed and played out in contradictory and violent ways.

In national politics, for example, a series of economic and diplomatic sequences saw the Brazilian state strengthened and shaped in a more globalised and liberal fashion. It was led by Dom Pedro II who had progressive political views. For instance, he supported the legalisation of women's rights and the 'freeing' of children born to female slaves (Martin, 1921). However, the ultra-conservative landed oligarchies, who had enriched themselves through investments in coffee plantations, resisted these socially liberal changes. Through horizontal alliances with military elites, they exercised the threat of overthrowing the central government. These coalitions attempted to maintain the economic and political hegemony that they had accumulated from resource extraction and agrarian exports.

They shifted their political allegiances from Dom Pedro II when the Golden Act was signed to mark the abolition of slavery in 1888. By 1889, these conservative elites, who were supported by the plantation owners, withdrew their support from the monarchy and formed an alliance



with the military. They staged a coup d'état against the emperor and a constitutional democracy was formed, led by the landed oligarchs.

Whilst a formal constitution was established in 1891, much of the power in Brazil was negotiated through informal unwritten agreements between *coroneis* (local bosses in rural regions<sup>64</sup>), the local oligarchies, and the state governors through formal and informal arrangements. As remnants of the earlier militias, *coroneis* were not part of the formal political-bureaucratic state but were an auxiliary and subordinated powers that served at a distance and concentrated on the local aspects of life. They were part of an amalgamation of forces representative of the will of local citizens against the assertion of the power of the great landowners (Leal and Leal, 1977). *Coroneis*, isolated from the great centres and the interests that were being debated in them, exercised their domination over populations without disturbing or being disturbed by the central government. However, this did represent a compromise between a stronger state and local political leaders' reduced social influence.

A negotiated political settlement emerged between the *coroneis*, landed oligarchs, the state governors and the central government to prevent the central government from interfering in the activities and local-level power of the land-owning elite and the *coroneis*. It was intended to be a temporary agreement to rebalance the uncertainties and reassure local governors during the initial stages of the first government of the Republic.

The 'Politics of the Governors' (1889-1930) was the outcome of political bargaining between President Campo Sales and the governors and presidents of the independent states, themselves brokering with the *coroneis* and the local landowning elite. The *coroneis*, together with the intellectual administrative elite, known as the *bacaraeis*, decided between them who the next governor of the state would be. The governors then, in turn, appointed the President of the Republic. The compromise, in this tightly engineered political settlement, was that the president would not interfere in the regional politics in return for executive control over the national congress. This settlement allowed the continuation of oligarchical organisations in the states and it brokered a new balance of power between central and regional elites.

---

<sup>64</sup> *Coronelismo* is a form of rural clientelism based around the *coronel* (a local boss), with the name taken from the militias of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.



‘would not submit to the force of the police and that they had the independence to react against them’ (Ibid.), signifying how there were tensions between the rural and urban areas.




Figure 14: Map of the Triangle Group (Source: (Fróes and Gelabert, 2004))

Due to the strength of their political settlement, the Triangle Group were frequently elected into influential positions in the municipal and federal governments (de Oliveira, 2017). According to one local historian, the positions they occupied were more than a mere, ‘local political game of exchange of favours, it was a strategic nucleus in the composition of Carioca political institutions’ (Freire, Sarmento and Motta, 1999).

Vasconcellos was the natural political leader of the group of the three. Because of his political capital he was given a role as the meat supply manager for the city, one of the most important and prestigious social titles available. Red meat was a staple part of the Carioca diet and an essential item for nearly every household. Due to its location in the rural region of the city close to agricultural lands, the municipal slaughterhouse became one of the most important institutions of the rural region and it was the focus of political activity (da Silva Santos, 2018). This influential position allowed Vasconcellos to influence and control the urban centre by regulating the supply of red meat coming into the city. When a new slaughterhouse was built in Santa Cruz in 1881 after the construction of the city’s first trainline between São Cristóvão in Rio de Janeiro’s industrial region and Santa Cruz, it galvanised even more power and control over meat supply from the rural region.

The deaths of the original Triangle members led to a succession of new members called Pires, Mello and Barroso. Known as the ‘King of the Triangle’ during the 1930s, Melo used the construction of a medical clinic for Campo Grande residents in 1915 and continued control over the slaughterhouse and meat supply chains (de Moraes Ferreira, 2015) to retain the political influence of the Triangle Group. Mello’s obituary in a local rural newspaper describes his close relationships with local communities:

‘He took care of everything in the lives of his constituents; he received them on the threshold of existence and kept them tied to his affection for the past tense, patiently and paternally solving their most intimate problems by conquering them with political solidarity through a series of personal favours. He crossed the dusty streets of distant neighbourhoods daily, with the iron and medicine case tied to the donkey's *garapa*.’<sup>67</sup>

This demonstrates that despite widespread allegations from his political opponents of corruption, voter fraud and coercion, locally Mello was remembered in a positive light. However, whilst newspapers from Campo Grande painted a positive picture of the Triangle Group, more ‘mainstream’ newspapers from the centre of Rio de Janeiro denounced the clientelist and ‘backwards’ practices of the Triangle Group against the emerging cosmopolitanism of urban society (Freire, 2010). One of the opposition’s spokespeople, José do Patrocínio, was a journalist, editor of *Cidade do Rio*, former abolitionist leader and politician: he published reports about ‘illicit relations’ between the Triangle Group and the slaughterhouse in Santa Cruz (Ibid.).

Although there are few studies of violence brokers in Rio de Janeiro during this period, we can draw on insights from studies in the north east of Brazil (Singelmann, 1975) to make some sense of the violence that shrouded the politics of the *coroneis* during the First Republic. During this period, public militias and *capangas* became much more closely aligned to the *coroneis* after land was redistributed and political centres shifted away from the state and national level, and towards the municipality.

During this period, the increasing political strength of the *coroneis* meant that most of the decisions as they related to municipal police were taken as a result of political decision. The “submission of the police to the vested interests of the *coroneis*” (Singelmann, 1975, 75), meant that the police turned into a semi-private police force, where it was often difficult to

---

<sup>67</sup> Text translated from: Soares, L. (2012) ‘O Triângulo Carioca nos anos 30 e 40’, *JornalZO*. Available at: O Triângulo Carioca nos anos 30 e 40 [2019].

distinguish between the police and their joint actions with the *capangas*. and the *cangaceiros*<sup>68</sup> (Chandler, 1978). Some have even struggled to draw empirical and conceptual differences between the police and the *cangaceiros*, with the only difference being that the police act under the guise of legality, whilst the *cangaceiros* do not (Singelmann, 1975). As a result, state governments struggled to control the *cangaceiros* and the *coroneis* in the North East.

Whilst there has been less documented about this in Rio de Janeiro, similar dynamics seem to have played out in the city's West Zone. Divisions between the Triangle Group and the political and economic elites in the state and national government were exacerbated during the first decades of the Republic because of different ideas about the path that Brazil should take. The Triangle Group and other rural elites were broadly in favour of the monarchy and against decolonialisation; many of their successes had emerged as a result of the protections of their rural interests by the empire. In contrast, the more cosmopolitan political and economic elites from the urban centre were more supportive of the abolition movement and envisaged an expansion of urban-orientated economies and professions creating a greater distance from Brazil's rural past.

These different visions of Brazil unfolded in various ways. At the federal level, the urban political elite created a plan to transfer the federal district and capital city of Brazil from Rio de Janeiro to the interior of the country where, in theory, it was detached from regional and local interests and could become a new hub of federal powers.

At the city level, major urban development plans known as the 'Pereira Passos Reform' aimed to 'civilise' the city (de Azevedo, 2018). One of the most significant transformations was the reformation of the port area and the burial of the Cais do Valongo in 1911, suggesting an attempt to reimagine Rio de Janeiro and erase 'the memory of the Empire' (de Oliveira, 2017). In its place, many of the spaces and aesthetics were modelled around Parisian ideals (Needell, 1983), more 'modern' and 'progressive' contexts from the global north, and the European notion of civility.

The Pereira Passos reform divided the city into three subzones (fig. 15): urban, suburban and rural. The principal objective of these reforms was to change the purpose of Rio de Janeiro's centre from a mixture of residential buildings to a commercial-financial hub that could integrate with global capitalist modes of production (Peixoto, 2006). However, in addition to

---

<sup>68</sup> *Canangueiros* (a north eastern term for social bandits) were seen as 'honest robbers' as they simultaneously stole from the rich, but oversaw and monitored elections.

physical changes, these reforms had the political effects of reducing the rural region's political powers and fortifying those in the urban centre. They also had the social effects of creating a 'modernising' agenda.

Economically, new taxation boundaries were established around the city. In the centre of the city (pink) the land tax was 2%, whilst it was 0.3% in the rural (white) areas, which led to '*Bota Abaixo*' (knock-it-down) demolition (fig. 16). This saw a reduction in the number of houses in the urban centre from 3,401 in 1906 to 2,967 in 1920 and only 1,047 in 1945 (Outtes, 2005). Most significantly, this affected the relationship between the citizens and the land.

Financial institutions bought up large swathes of land across the rural region, forcing inhabitants of the region, many of them farmers and peasants, to leave their homes. In a passage from the period (Corrêa, 1936) a historian describes how a 'caretaker' of the bank used violence to appropriate land from rural dwellers:


'Caetano do Camorim, a true captain of the bush, who, with the complicity of a soldier from the Vargem Pequena post, named Severino Marques da Silva, aka "Four Eyes", practices the greatest barbarities [...] A long time ago, a poor man, Domingos Rodrigues Sotello, a tenant of bank land, broke his leg in a train wreck and was then admitted to the hospital and his poor partner Ernestina Rita Campos was left alone; One night she was barbarously evicted by the caretaker Caetano and "Four Eyes", placed their furniture and utensils outside under a bamboo stick, where they lived for several days, just because the besieger was not up to date. Other times they burn houses for residents to leave their homes and places<sup>69</sup>.'

Land appropriations, in rural and urban environments, were deeply violent, exclusionary and they ended up displacing, banishing and incarcerating poor populations, typically black and former slaves, and replacing them with a white, modern, 'civilised' buildings in urban centres (Rolnik, 1989; De Carvalho, 2019; Alves, 2014), or more profitable agricultural and land development in rural lands.


---

<sup>69</sup> Corrêa, A. M. (1936) *O sertão carioca*. Imprensa nacional. p.14





**Figure 15: Zones of Rio de Janeiro: Urban, Suburban and Rural from the Decree 1.185, 05/11/1918 (Source: (Weyrauch, 2015))**



**Figure 16: Houses Demolished in the City Centre Because of the Pereira Passos Reform (Source: Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, Foto de Augusto Malta)**

This division of territory established a pattern of social and spatial inequality that reinforced class, race and gender divisions. At the same time, the political power once held by the rural elites was drained away as political power was reconfigured based on the new levels of taxation.

These dynamics echoed transformations of the political settlement at the national level. The first decades of Brazil's republic were marked by various revolts against the oligarchies and the *café com leite*<sup>70</sup> (coffee with milk) style of politics. A liberal coalition led by Getúlio Vargas staged a military coup d'état in 1930 to overthrow the power of the oligarchies with the promise of a more democratic political system with and greater federalisation.

The Triangle Group, together with conservative and rural caucuses, resisted the progressive movement and held onto significant amounts of power in the rural spaces, marking a significant rift in the rural-urban divide. By 1932, the new government had passed progressive legislation such as boundary restructures<sup>71</sup> and new election laws allowing women the vote, the secret ballot and a registration age of eighteen years of age which stripped away much of the political power of the rural elites, marking a continued demise of power for rural elites.

The transition to a Republic, during a period where urban life was becoming increasingly dominant in Brazilian society, therefore had the effect of strengthening horizontal linkages between urban elites and weakening those of increasingly powerless rural ones. Furthermore, these political processes served to reinforce racial hierarchies as urban elite coalitions increasingly looked towards European and 'white' models of urbanisation.

### A less-than-marvellous city

During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Rio de Janeiro was economically prosperous and it attracted significant levels of capital investment (Lessa, 2001, 237). Because of its prosperity, an imaginary emerged in public discourse and popular culture that described the city as *a cidade maravilhosa* (the marvellous city). This was a reference to its iconic hillsides covered in tropical rainforest with white sandy beaches along the coast. By the 1950s, proud middle-class

---

<sup>70</sup> This is a reference to the dominance of politics by landed gentries of coffee plantations from São Paulo state and dairy farms from Minas Gerais state.

<sup>71</sup> Decree 2.087 from 19 January 1925; In the decree of 1.185, only Guaratiba was rural, and the rest of the West Zone was in the suburban region. However, a second decree was signed in 1925 that categorised almost the entire West Zone as rural with small nuclei of suburban spaces along the trainline. See: Santos, R. F. d. (2012) 'Situação atual e perspectivas de desenvolvimento da Área de Planejamento 3 da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro', *Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro*.



Cariocas embraced the *cidade maravilhosa* discourse and cultural elites, artists and popular movements such as Bossa Nova music experimented with the concept in different ways.

For many Cariocas, Rio de Janeiro was in a ‘golden age’, and as the ‘heart and the brain’ of the country, Rio de Janeiro’s success was reflected throughout the country. Everyday urban life was imagined by some parts of society as non-violent (Ventura, 1994), modern and civilised. For example, in January 1950, the *Jornal do Brasil* announced only four robberies across the entire city (Costa, 1998), demonstrating a low level of perceived violence<sup>72</sup>

However, this imaginary began to change when Kubitschek was elected president in 1956. He began his term by fulfilling his campaign promise to build the new federal capital in the centre of Brazil. As soon as he entered office, he established a new agency to focus on the construction and by 1960 the Plaza of the Three Powers had been built and the federal capital of Brasilia inaugurated.<sup>73</sup> The transfer of the federal state from Rio de Janeiro had widespread institutional ramifications (Osorio and Versiani, 2013). There was an erosion of economic and social institutions during this period in Rio de Janeiro which coincided with a global and macro-economic slowdown.

At the same time, there were attempts to invigorate the macroeconomy as a result of low productivity in the agricultural sector and the resistance of the landed elites to political and technological change (Baer, Kerstenetzky and Villela, 1973; Mueller and Mueller, 2016). The government introduced import substitution industrialisation, which some have argued had an urban bias and disadvantaged the rural populations (Baer, 2001). This led to a large transfer of national income to the urban-industrial sector as productive capacities increased. However, it also reorganised the national geographies of labour as import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies forced a large wave of migration from rural regions to the urban margins as labour opportunities emerged in industrial work on the peripheries of cities, specifically São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

Through this urban migration wave, formal housing was lacking and *favelas* began to expand across the urban landscape. Arrivals into urban informal settlements reached peak levels of a 62% increase in 1950 (Ribeiro, 1996; Leite, 2001), which was stimulated by the promises of the federal government to migrants from poorer regions in Brazil in regard to welfare, employment and social mobility. However, a lack of basic infrastructure in *favelas* and

---

<sup>72</sup> The Civil Police only started systematic data collection of criminality in 1985. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish between unreliable data and perceptions.

<sup>73</sup> Law No. 2,874 from 19 September 1956

informal settlements meant that many *favela* residents experienced extremely precarious conditions.

Although much of the literature on urban development in Rio de Janeiro focuses on the *favela*, the settlements in the expansive regions of the rural west of the city go relatively undiscussed (fig. 18). However, they add an important dimension for understanding the extent of urban poverty and uneven processes of development during the period given how widespread they were. The decline in agriculture meant that the value of land in the rural region had slumped and was sold off for low prices to property developers who subdivided the land typically without sanitation, water or infrastructure, putting pressure on the governments to build the necessary infrastructural supports. There was a steep rise in the number of formal subdivisions – between 1906 and 1946 there were 176 subdivisions in the rural area of the city, but between 1947 and 1957 there were 1,561 (Abreu, 1987, 111). The subdivisions were thought of as part of the solution to the growing populations of Rio de Janeiro due to the low cost of the land (fig. 17).




Figure 17: Favelas and Irregular Lots in Rio de Janeiro in 1969 (Source: Rio de Janeiro City, Secretariat of Urbanism, 2008)



Figure 18: Example of a Subdivisions of Land (Source: (Nascimento, 2005))

Whilst the data cited by Abreu (1987) refers to formal subdivisions, many subdivisions were also sold without formal land titles and deeds. Many issues emerged as a result of these informalities such as not being able to access the bureaucratic channels to legalise their land as a result of not having access to the correct documentation (de Sá Siqueira, 2013). Informal property developers bought land without any real legal claim to the land. One property manager summarised the situation in the 1960s and 1970s as, ‘An idiot surveyor drew it up for an idiot owner. The idiot owner bought off a corrupt official, in the time when the mayor was an imbecile’ (McCann, 2013, 29).

The public transport market also informalised as a result of macroeconomic changes during the 1980s, which led to shortages of the mechanical parts required to fix the buses, provoking social unrest as the population protested a shortage of bus services. The Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Moreira Franco, privatised the bus companies and it provoked significant changes in the ways that West Zone residents were able to access collective and public forms of transportation. After the privatisations were complete, immediate cost-saving measures were implemented to attempt to recuperate profits for the companies. These involved slashing services between the West Zone and the Centre and services within the West Zone that spanned large distances and were costly to run and did not generate high revenues.<sup>74</sup>

Few regulations were put in their place to protect marginalised communities in the West Zone and many communities were left without any transport services.<sup>75</sup> The services that did remain were overcrowded, difficult to get onto, and were disproportionately expensive compared with other routes across the city. Inhabitants of the West Zone were frequently charged for two or three tickets because of the number of interchanges they had to make over large distances. This made living in the West Zone disproportionately expensive in terms of transport when compared with the rest of the city closer to Centro.

After the privatisations, a ‘vacuum was created and there was simply no transport in the West Zone’, according to one District Attorney.<sup>76</sup> West Zone residents depended on collective transport more than most from other parts of the city because of the large distances and scale of the region. There was one train line between Santa Cruz and Centro. In Centro and the South Zone particularly, but also in the North Zone, there were many more buses, a more

---

<sup>74</sup> Interview with Jorge Felipe, President of the Rio de Janeiro City Council, January 2017.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with District Attorney B, April 2016.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

comprehensive train network and residents could even walk between their place of work and home (fig. 19).




Figure 19: Concentrations of Pedestrian Footfall Across Rio de Janeiro (Source: (Prefeitura, 2016))

Although the privatisation of public transport had immediate implications for the West Zone, the broader wave of privatisations had much more fundamental impacts as many public sector workers from state owned enterprises (SOEs) were made redundant or were offered voluntary dismissal. This reshaped the geography of the urban labour force significantly as many of the working-class residents in the West Zone who had worked in the SOEs based in Centro no longer had a reason to travel into the city centre. As a result, a significant marginal mass emerged in the West Zone during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>77</sup>

These informalisations of urban space contradicted the imaginary of a modernist and prosperous *cidade maravilhosa*. Instead, a divided city was reimagined with urban poor communities emerging across the urban landscape. Due to their precarity and makeshift aesthetics of the communities where predominantly black or *mestiço* residents lived, these spaces were associated with ‘backwardness’ and ‘barbarism’. As a result, there was an increase in prejudice and discrimination towards the urban poor, embraced by large segments of middle and wealthy classes (Leite, 2005).

By June of 1951, two new newspapers, *O Dia* and *Última Hora*, stimulated an ‘eruption of great popular journalism of sensationalist character in the Brazilian press’ (Hons and Seguin,

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Rodolfo, Civil Policeman, September 2016.

1982) that articulated some of the feelings of insecurity felt by middle- and upper-classes from living in close proximity to the black urban poor communities.

Economic insecurities heightened the sense of insecurity that was felt by middle- and upper-classes in affluent neighbourhoods of the city as the developmentalist economic policies implemented by the government during the 1950s led to high inflation and price rises; which ultimately posed a threat to property rights. These factors led to a breakdown of social order as supply chains, networks and flows of goods were disrupted provoking road blockages and riots. Staple groceries such as meat, rice, beans, pasta, canned goods and sugar were absent from the shelves of many markets and there was an increasing number of reports of street robberies and criminality.

This increase in the sensation of insecurity combined with the breakdown of social order provoked local business elites in peripheral neighbourhoods of the city, especially in the rural region, to request the protection of commercial violence brokers, typically made up from off-duty police and military officers, to protect their stores and disincentivise looting (Misse, 1999). In addition to informal solutions to these insecurities, the federal government and municipal administrations responded with increasingly repressive tactics. Civil society organisations such as the Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro put pressure on the Chief of Police, Amaury Kruehl, to step up security in the city with an elite police squad known as the Special Diligence Service (SDE) in 1958 (Ventura, 1994) to deal with the escalating disorder.

Against this climate of social disorder, insecurity and increased repression, with the support of economic elites, the military staged a coup d'état against the Goulart government in 1964 and installed an authoritarian military government. The primary aim of this temporary regime was to restore order and redefine the Brazilian state in rational-legal terms (Mainwaring, 1986). The regime exercised extreme force and brutality which culminated in several ominous 'years of lead' in which criminals, political dissidents, and pro-democracy activists were tortured, murdered, imprisoned and disappeared.

The dictatorship government formed alliances with death squads and extermination groups<sup>78</sup> whose purpose was to catch and kill 'undesirables'. Political activists and political dissidents were some of the victims, however, there was a disproportionately high number of young black men from poor communities killed who were accused of being criminals. Many of these deaths were even legitimised with a 'self-defence' law for police, *Autos de Resistência*, passed in

---

<sup>78</sup> Examples include Scuderie Le Cocq and Homens de Ouro



1969,<sup>79</sup> which protected police officers from prosecution in the event of the officer killing someone if they claimed it was ‘self-defence’.

Another group of violence actors, the *polícia mineira*, used similar tactics to control neighbourhoods in the West Zone and Baixada Fluminense areas using intimidation and murder. The name is thought to come from the name of the police from the neighbouring state of Mina Gerais, whose residents are called *mineiros*, who were notoriously violent and who came into Rio de Janeiro looking for criminals that had escaped. However, unlike the extermination groups and death squads, *polícia mineira* tended to be made up from local residents who were known to the residents of the communities in which they lived.

However, it is worth noting that the terminology used to describe death squads, *polícia mineira* and extermination groups, and other groups that sought to create order in the neighbourhoods, is often used interchangeably. This is because the empirical distinctions between the different types of actors tend to be tenuous, fuzzy, and sometimes temporary. Distinctions are asserted through folklore, oral histories, and memories, and empirically there are very few distinctions made. I have heard the *polícia mineira* in some West Zone neighbourhoods also being referred to as *cangacueiros*, for example, by urban migrants from the North East of Brazil living in West Zone neighbourhoods. The conceptual distinctions are unclear and the terms used throughout this thesis, are sometimes even used interchangeably because the activities and practices of the different groups are very similar, and the identities of individuals partaking in the practices are often simultaneously within and outside of the law.

Despite the high levels of direct and indirect state violence, these diverse practices were legitimised by a swell of popular support for the repressive militarised tactics that was spearheaded by support from political elites and their media and corporate backers, as they sought to protect their property rights and hold onto power. Killings by death squads and extermination groups and this acceptance of more authoritarian tendencies could be justified, according to one policeman, ‘in order to calm the media and satisfy society’.<sup>80</sup> Public support across the state had been growing in favour of the death penalty during the dictatorship years with 14% of the public responding to a survey conducted by *Veja* magazine in 1970 suggesting they support death squads as a way of dealing with crime.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> Ordem de Serviço n.º 803, de 02/10/1969 e publicado no Boletim de Serviço do dia 21/11/1969 do Estado da Guanabara

<sup>80</sup> Interview with Rodrigo, Military Police Sergeant, April 2017

<sup>81</sup> Magazine *Veja*, Editorial, 29 July 1970, p.30

Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Security (1975-77), Oswaldo Ignacio Domingues, stated publicly that repression techniques and the construction of barriers between urban poor and the rest of the population were the best methods for controlling crime. Domingues was even heralded a model officer by the elite classes after he told them that his primary responsibility was to protect the property-owning classes from the urban poor and that suspects were the same as convicted criminals (McCann, 2013).

The policemen and military involved in the death squads and extermination groups received praise from the government and local populations after killing a criminal. The reports were often recounted in the newspaper and portrayed them as heroes. This public support meant that the death squads could ask for favours from politicians and high-ranking individuals within the state system such as impunity, pardons or even ammunition. During this period, journalists also developed working relationships with the death squads that entitled them to tip-offs so that individual journalists could claim a scoop.

This ultimately had the effect of exacerbating sensationalism. As part of the pact, journalists built in the narrative that the death squads were helping to 'combat crime' in the city and 'keep citizens safe'. Nicoll has even suggested that one of the most discussed and debated vigilante groups of the period, *Mão Branca* (White Hand), was not a realistic reflection of events, but that it was a semi-fictional vigilante character who emerged through popular culture and media narratives in the *Última Hora* newspaper by a journalist and her editor using anagrams of individual paramilitary actors to create stories (2005).

By the mid-1970s, there was growing uncertainty about the suitability of the military regime to govern Brazil in an increasingly globalised world. This led to challenges to the military's grasp on power. Within urban poor communities, civil society and marginalised groups mobilised through networks of *favela* associations demanded a greater say in political life. Various forms of associationism and civil society began to emerge with interest groups, such as local samba schools, asserting their power. Teachers and doctors were amongst the first to establish a 'new unionism' with mass strikes grinding Rio de Janeiro to a halt. By 1979 the dictatorship granted amnesties to political and cultural exiles to return to Brazil (many to Rio de Janeiro) which further mobilised the progressive political base. This continued breakdown of order affected public priorities and by the end of the 1970s, violence and public security led as the population's most important concern, more than health, unemployment and education (IBOPE, 1979 cited in Soares and Sento-Sé, 2000).



## Democratisation, liberalisation and violence

The shift towards more coercive and authoritarian strategies of control during the middle of the twentieth century were a signal that state and political elites were attempting to maintain a sense of public order and guarantee the continuation of economic development and capital accumulation. However, when political pressure forced the democratisation of municipalities and states in 1982, it forced new dialogues and political conversations about more wide-spread decentralisation and democratisation.

However, whilst most Brazilian states continued to elect parties allied to the dictatorship, Rio de Janeiro was one of the exceptions. Despite efforts by the central government to thwart the pro-democracy movement, the socialist candidate Leonel Brizola, for the Democratic Workers Party (PDT), an outspoken critic of the dictatorship and a recently returned political exile, was elected state governor of Rio de Janeiro. Brizola was a left-wing populist who had built up his base by promising pro-poor, affirmative action policies. More widely, the PDT candidates were elected on health, education and sanitation reform agendas and attempted to offer a break in the current climate of authoritarian discipline and order, using dialogue and consultation with urban poor communities to widen their base. However, the PDT received many criticisms due to alleged connections with the powerful gambling mafia, the *jogo do bicho*, that was highly influential across much of Rio de Janeiro's suburban and inter-state regions.<sup>82</sup>

Despite these set-backs, democratisation seemed inevitable and the military elites knew that their rule was temporary. Some of the momentum towards democratisation emerged 'from below' through left-wing political parties, galvanised trade unions, social movements and pro-democratisation organisations within Brazil. As scholars have argued about transitions from dictatorship to democracy in other contexts (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), the threat of a breakdown in social order and the possibility of revolution provided the incentive to national elites to negotiate a political settlement with mobilised masses. However, pressure from global financial institutions to liberalise politically forced the regime to manage the transition to democracy.

Although dialogues within the military regime about democratisation began during the mid-1970s (Mainwaring, 1986), the process was not complete until democratic presidential elections took place in 1988. Years were spent conducting extensive negotiations of the

---

<sup>82</sup> For an insightful history and discussion of the '*jogo do bicho*' (the animal game gambling mafia), see: Vaz, M. (2011) *The Jackpot Mentality: The Growth of Government Lotteries and the Suppression of Illegal Numbers Gambling in Rio de Janeiro and New York City*. Columbia University.

different elements of the constitution that involved many social organisations, political factions and interest groups that met in formal and informal meetings, forums, public audiences and consultations. Whilst the democratic movement seemed inevitable and had been accepted by the ruling military and oligarchical elites, the military, conservative right and centre-left political forces (Reich, 1998) all had their own ideas about how best to manage resources, distribute power (Ribeiro, 2009) and whom to allow to access the markets.

Despite the strength of the left-wing coalition, the coalition between military and rural elites who had ruled since 1964 ensured that their interests were protected throughout the bargaining process. With access to arms and an ability to threaten violence, this coalition held the balance of power, continually using the threat of reinstating military rule as a bargaining chip to advance negotiations in favour of a coalition with the conservative right (Reich, 1998). Ruling elites were able to favour and overrepresent their interests in legislation. They were also able to secure immunity for military personnel, and reappointments for key roles in key secretaries and ministries. Whilst the conservative right coalition aimed to reduce the size of the state and specifically tried to eradicate corporations and key ministries not conducive to market growth (such as labour rights and welfare), the bargaining process revealed that informal institutions and clientelism was never fully eradicated and that institutions and benefits for ruling elites were strengthened.

After the democratisation process, the military were also able to hold onto power in local communities where they had dominated previously. The constitution allowed members of the military police and armed forces with more than ten years of service to vote in elections and put themselves forward as candidates.<sup>83</sup> Because of this, many of the state security actors that had worked as state violence and commercial violence brokers in the rural regions of Rio de Janeiro, in parallel with the authoritarian military regime, were elected into political office as parliamentarians by leveraging anti-criminal discourses and heroic and protector roles popularised in culture and media.

One of the defining features of the Brazilian transition to democracy that differentiates it from other democratising countries is how the cleavage of racial identity affected (or failed to affect) the negotiated political settlement which has had significant implications for the civil rights of a significant minority of Brazilians. By 1990, following democratisation, descendants of Afro-

---

<sup>83</sup>Article text from the Constitution: Art 14 § 8º: *The enlisted military officer is eligible, provided the following conditions are met: I - if he has less than ten years of service, he shall withdraw from the activity; II - if he counts more than ten years of service, he will be aggregated by the superior authority and, if elected, will automatically pass, at the time of the diploma, to the inactivity.*

heritage or those who self-identify as black made up 47.5% of Brazil's population (IBGE Censo, 2010). In the 2010 census, this figure passed 51.7% and it now represents a small majority (Ibid.).

Unlike other racially divided countries with colonial pasts, such as South Africa, there were no mainstream formal political parties organised around race. As a result, many of the demands for rights were class based, and those with regard to race were considered secondary. During the negotiation process, the issue of race was only advanced by black social movements and a handful of individual black politicians from different parties. However, the consultation process with civil society was fraught with different opinions.

The initial drafts of the constitution contained basic acknowledgement of race in the democratisation process in the form of a bill of rights enshrined in the constitution that prohibited discrimination 'without distinction whatsoever'<sup>84</sup>. However, black social movements criticised the initial inclusion of race as a homogenous, Eurocentric and exclusionary process. The right-wing coalition proposed that the issue of race could be solved by integrating it into a class-based society and they deployed a discourse of 'racial democracy' (Twine, 1998).

The left-wing coalition, on the other hand, recognised the inadequacies of this approach but it was fearful that a more explicit identification of race in the constitution could split the working-class along a race divide. Black social movements proposed that this issue could only be solved through affirmative action (Gomes and Rodrigues, 2019), and they succeeded in part in promoting articles about the criminalisation of racism and protection of the historical *quilombo* sites<sup>85</sup> in the constitution. However, as Gomes and Rodrigues have argued (2019), inclusions in the constitution are not enough without reliable and accountable representations or social organisations within the political settlement.

For these reasons, I would observe that a very particular type of democracy emerged in Brazil that was deeply discriminatory in nature. It was an electoral form of democracy, but in no way was it social, civil or liberal.<sup>86</sup> The political logic of this process in Brazil determined that the negotiated political settlement would always benefit the ruling rural and military elites and secure their property rights (Reiter, 2008), and it would also secure the political rights of the

---

<sup>84</sup> Article Five of the Brazilian Constitution. See: Biblioteca Digital da Câmara dos Deputados (2010) *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, Câmara dos Deputados. Available at: <http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner2019/brazilia.pdf>.

<sup>85</sup> *Quilombo* is the name given to hinterland settlements in Brazil of escaped slaves.

<sup>86</sup> See: Rodrik, D. and Mukand, S. (2019) 'The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy'.

mobilised masses who ruling elites feared. However, a large minority of marginalised blacks and urban poor communities who were not particularly mobilised did not directly benefit from the process and were, in effect, largely excluded from the negotiated political settlement.

In fact, the constitution seems to have entrenched racist institutions and led to *greater* marginalisation. As Teresa Caldeira and James Holston (1998) have argued, ‘The protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of elite social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words, appreciated as common rights of citizenship.’

The emerging democratic political settlement created the space for the election of president Fernando Collor in 1988 who led his campaign on a set of promises about economic reform spurred on by ‘the effects of the economic crisis that started at the end of the first half of the 1970s’ (Soares and Sento-Sé, 2000). The growing global debt crisis led to external debt inflation and a devaluation of the Brazilian currency (Amoedo in McMahon and Morales, 1996, 113) which Collor attempted to deal with through neoliberal economic ‘shock’ reforms including trade liberalisation, privatisation of SOEs and tariff reductions.

One of the key strategies of reform implemented by Collor was a privatisation programme that intended to raise revenue and improve public finances (Ayres, 1995). In 1990, the federal government published its National Privatisation Programme that consisted of thirty-four companies from the state productive sector and thirty-two minority interests (Marques Gomes, 2014). Between 1990 and 1992, a further fifteen enterprises were privatised. However, these strategies were not able to reconcile with deeply entrenched state corporatism and clientelism that effectively limited the access of public resources to certain social organisations whilst it gave privileged access to others. Elites made timely investments to ensure they captured certain parts of the state apparatus, whilst they opened other parts of it to the market. This meant that certain social groups, typically marginalised ones, were unable to access redistributive programmes (Crisp and Kelly, 1999), whilst certain groups of elites benefited directly from the privatisation reforms.

It is essential to disaggregate the data spatially in order to understand how these economic reforms affected some groups and privileged others. For example, figure nineteen demonstrates how levels of development vary significantly across the different neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro. Through this spatial analysis we can see how Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, which

were part of the ‘West Zone’ of Rio de Janeiro<sup>87</sup> (and the geographical focus of this thesis), compares with more affluent neighbourhoods in the South Zone and with national level data.

One of the most striking differences between the South Zone and West Zone neighbourhoods is the difference in the unemployment rates and median incomes. By 2000, Santa Cruz had an unemployment rate of 22.1% and a median income of R\$209 compared with 8.5% unemployment in Lagoa and a median income of R\$2,222. All the neighbourhoods improved their HDI scores, but there were significant differences between the West and South Zones.

Figure 20: Comparison of development figures for different regions of Rio de Janeiro (2000) (Source: Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico, 2000; PNUD, IPEA and FJP; \*national data for 2001)

|                   |                            | Unemployment | HDI   | Median income | % of upper class | % of lower class |
|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------|-------|---------------|------------------|------------------|
|                   | <b>National</b>            | 9.89%        | 0.684 | 506*          | n/a              | n/a              |
|                   | <b>Rio de Janeiro city</b> | 15.9%        | 0.716 | 1187          | n/a              | n/a              |
| <b>South Zone</b> | <b>Lagoa</b>               | 8.5%         | 0.975 | 2222          | 59.7%            | 30.9%            |
|                   | <b>Botafogo</b>            | 9.1%         | 0.962 | 1499          | 54.5%            | 30.1%            |
| <b>West Zone</b>  | <b>Campo Grande</b>        | 19.9%        | 0.792 | 302           | 13.2%            | 74.7%            |
|                   | <b>Santa Cruz</b>          | 22.1%        | 0.747 | 209           | 8.1%             | 82.5%            |

It has been argued that these differences in inequalities emerged because the experience of urban peripheral regions, such as the West Zone, of de-industrialisation and privatisation of SOEs was remarkably different to central parts of the city (Soares, 2008). Residents of Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, many of them working-class, had been reliant on public sector employment in the city centre. However, once many of the SOEs were privatised, a marginal mass emerged that created less mobility between the centre and the West Zone.

Precarity and the sensation of insecurity increased as public goods and services were liberalised, and safety nets rolled back. As Marcelo Burgos has suggested about the context of Rio das Pedras, a West Zone *favela* (2002) rapid restructuration left many residents, especially those in urban poor neighbourhoods particularly affected by the rollback of state apparatus,

<sup>87</sup> The terminology of the ‘West Zone’ was initially used to describe planning areas in the city in 1976, previously known as the ‘Rural Zone’. See: de Oliveira, M. A. S. A. (2017) ‘Zona oeste da cidade do rio de janeiro: Entre o rural e o urbano’, *Illuminuras*, 18(45).

feeling like they were in a world that did not make sense anymore and that seemed unfamiliar to them.

The reorganisation of labour markets and power during the 1980s and 1990s in Rio de Janeiro led to the emergence of new flows and networks, orientated around new sub-urban ‘centres’ in peripheral neighbourhoods like Campo Grande and Santa Cruz (do Lago, 2016). Many West Zone residents started to rely on informal provisions of goods and services. But they also benefited through the demands of labour in sectors such as the construction, transport or street selling sectors. This reconfiguration of social relations had incredibly productive effects in peripheral spaces. However, at the same time, it had the effect of hollowing out the urban centre.

Coinciding with the transformations was an increase in homicidal violence. Whilst understanding the causal links between restructuring and physical violence is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to point out that criminal violence and homicides did increase around this period. Data from the *Mapa da Violencia* (Waiselfisz, 2016, 20), for example, demonstrates that the period that Collor came into power and introduced liberalising policies coincides with the transition to democracy and a steep rise in the rates of homicides. In 1983 the national homicide rate was 9.3 per 100,000.<sup>88</sup> By 1994, in Rio de Janeiro it had reached 73.9 per 100,000.<sup>89</sup>

Some of the major protagonists of this violence were drug traffickers. Although drug trafficking of cocaine had been prevalent in and through Rio de Janeiro since the 1970s, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the economy expanded significantly when trade routes from Colombia to Europe (via Western Africa) were carved out through Brazil. The city’s primary drug trafficking organisation, the *Commando Vermelho* (CV), Rio de Janeiro’s primary organised criminal organisation was the ‘bastard child’ of the dictatorship’s attempt to repress armed political deviance (Penglase, 2008)<sup>90</sup>. During the 1980s, the organisation became more involved with the illegal drug trade to finance its activities.

The CV capitalised on Rio de Janeiro’s salient proximity to a large shipping port with direct trading routes to Europe via western Africa. It also took advantage of the booming domestic

---

<sup>88</sup> Brasil, Ministério da, S. and Secretaria Nacional de Ações Básicas de, S. 1988. Subsistema de Informação sobre mortalidade. Estatística de mortalidade: Brasil, 1985. Centro de Documentação do Ministério da Saúde Brasília.

<sup>89</sup> PRODERJ (2016) *Serie Historica Estado e Regioes*. Centro de Tecnologia da Informação e Comunicação do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Available at: [http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp\\_imagens/uploads/SerieHistoricaEstadoRegioes.pdf](http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/uploads/SerieHistoricaEstadoRegioes.pdf) (Accessed: 12 December 2019).

<sup>90</sup> The Commando Vermelho, formerly known as the Falange Vermelha, was formed by armed political dissidents who self-organised in the Ilha Grande jail during the military dictatorship.

drug market made up of cosmopolitan middle- and upper-classes amongst which cocaine use had become fashionable. A sharp rise in demand in the 1980s put the CV at the centre of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro, leading to exponential growth over a very short period and creating tensions within the leadership of the CV about its strategic direction. Some of the leadership favoured continuing in the commercial direction of the drug trafficking industry, whilst others wanted to stick to the political origins. The CV split up into factions in the 1980s which led to the eruption of violent turf wars between factions (Gay, 2017). A breakdown in the established order proceeded, which resulted in a centrifugal escalation of violence.

Conflicts among drug trafficking factions and interventions by police fuelled a growing sense of unsettlement in Rio de Janeiro. By the mid-1990s, Cariocas had become used to robberies, kidnappings, shootouts, stray bullets, muggings, prison riots, commercial shutdowns and shutdowns of schools and hospitals, and the everyday practices of urban life were only possible through a ‘fog of violence’ (Leite, 2005). As a result, citizens demanded greater protection, yet, formal police were neither equipped nor sufficiently resourced to handle the demands.

Whilst much of the violence can be attributed to conflicts among drug trafficking factions, violence can also be attributed to police and those in public office. Between January 1993 and July 1996, for example, state security forces killed 1,194 citizens (Penglase, 2008, 120), many of whom were either linked to drug trafficking organisations or fitted the profile of teenage black boys and men. However, the rising levels of unemployment, a growing sense of insecurity and powerlessness to confront the deepening divide in society legitimised and justified these violent *mão dura* (iron fist) responses from state security and legitimate security actors such as death squads and extermination groups. State violence was broadly legitimised by citizens to repress criminal behaviour is an expression of anger and despair in a context of rapidly changing structures.

Many of these repressive strategies translated directly into state security policy. Governor of the state, Marcelo Alencar, was elected on the promise of a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to organised crime in 1992. One of his first acts as governor was to legislate a ‘Wild West Bonus’ offering financial rewards to military police for so-called ‘acts of bravery’ (Barbassa, 2015) in an attempt to incentivise police and suppress violence. However, the bonus actually increased violence as whoever killed more also earned more and this policy ended up doubling the rates of

lethal violence in confrontations with police<sup>91</sup>. Furthermore, incidents of *autos de resistência* increased by 160% between 1993 and 1996 (Misse, 2011a, 8).

Alencar also built an alliance with the federal government and the army was brought in to occupy the streets. The state government saw drug trafficking violence as an opportunity to ratchet up the use of force and intensify police repression of drug traffickers across the city, launching Operation Rio in November 1994. This was Rio de Janeiro's largest-ever assault on drug trafficking gangs. The outcome of these policy shifts was that, by the mid-1990s, state security forces in Rio de Janeiro began killing, on average, one thousand citizens each year (Gay, 2017).

'Zero tolerance' discourses were not only limited to the formal state apparatus. Through these escalating cycles of violence, state violence and local protection brokers grew increasingly prominent, and levels of extra-judicial killing increased. Massacres such as Vigário Geral, where twenty-one youths were executed by police in 1994, Acarí, where eleven youths were murdered by police in 1990, and Candelária, where eight homeless youths asleep in a square outside a church were assassinated by military police in 1993, provide tremendous insight for understanding the escalating environment of insecurity, the support amongst the middle-classes for social cleansing and the license this gave to authorities to use extra-legal force to deal with criminality. They also highlight the extent to which trained officers believed it was their duty to 'clean up' the streets of the city under the auspices of 'citizen protection', but with the effects of criminalising urban poverty and discriminating against young black males.

Although there was considerable support for police repression amongst the ruling elites, there were deep divisions in some segments of the urban poor population due to the evasions of state security and authority and abuses of power in urban poor communities. As Rivaldo Barbosa, the Chief of the Homicides Police Unit explained during a recent meeting, 'The power of the police, necessarily comes, legitimized by the... By who? By society itself. And when the police kill, it loses its strength'<sup>92</sup>.

There was intense criticism of the state-led violence and resistance emerged from social movements from across *favela* networks. As a result of this, citizens of urban poor communities

---

<sup>91</sup> Da Escóssia, F. (1998) 'Rio acaba com bônus da polícia por bravura', *Folha de São Paulo*, 26 June. Available at: Rio acaba com bônus da polícia por bravura.

<sup>92</sup> This is taken from a lecture given by Rivaldo Barbosa at the People's Palace event on Public Security in Rio de Janeiro, March 2017.



increasingly turned to informal and local sources of authority, such as trusted figures within the community, to provide protection for them.

These heightened levels of insecurity during the 1990s provoked renewed clientelist relationships between popular classes and local bosses or politicians, as individuals sought out alternative ways to feel more secure (Burgos, 2002). One of the most successful political coalitions to emerge through this period was the ‘clientelistic political machine’, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) (Von Lieres and Piper, 2014, 187). Although the PMDB had been a relatively weak political party in *Carioca* politics, with only a small handful of state parliamentarians, it emerged in the 1990s with a mixed political agenda due to the two-party system. It attracted politicians from the left, centre and right-wing of the political spectrum (Lameira and Peres, 2015). The successes of the PMDB during the mid-1990s signalled a new type of politics built upon the sensation of insecurity and the need for protective, patrimonial relationships between citizens and politicians.

## Conclusions

The objective of the chapter has been to set out the histories and geographies upon which the subsequent three empirical chapters build. To do this, this chapter has explored key moments of transition with Brazil’s, and specifically Rio de Janeiro’s, spatial and relational biography that led have to the emergence of a political economy of inequality, violent exclusion, and vulnerability. At each stage in this shifting and transforming political settlement, different types of endemic violence and coercive actors have emerged to defend and protect the interests of particular elite groups. These moments of transition and change, shaped by inter-elite bargaining and contestation, gave rise to new political settlements that privileged particular social organisations but excluded others.

What has become clear through a focus on these groups and actors throughout this chapter is the integral nature of violence as part of political process in Rio de Janeiro. Though this historical assessment, it is clear that the different violent actor groups, such as *cangaceiros*, *coroneis*, *policia mineiras*, death squads, and extermination groups (amongst others), are just a few manifestations of endemic violence. These groups survived, mutated, and reproduced themselves in different forms and functions as a result of the evolving political settlement; but more importantly, precisely *because* they are political themselves in, and by, their nature. The exact form and function of these brokers, therefore, is shaped by the social, political, and economic realities that they face. Yet the varieties of these groups, in their forms and functions,

is representative of the variety of relations and linkages that these groups have with different power holders, political bosses, elites, communities, decision-makers in the state system, state governors, in both vertical and horizontal directions.

Several continuities and recurring patterns have emerged through this historical assessment that have set the scene for the empirical discussion that follows. Firstly, how different relations between the urban centre and the periphery have been mediated through different types of coercive and violent brokerage and intermediation. It is clear that, given that central states refrained from entering the West Zone, these spaces were entrusted to local forms of authority to create and maintain order and contribute, in some form, to ensuring the conditions that enabled certain elite groups to continue with their grasp over power.

Secondly, the urbanisation process collided with long and repetitive histories of urban migration, continual cycles of displacement, banishment, and transitoriness, which led to a continually hybrid and churning population. This produced complex geographies where makeshift settlements and auto-constructed dwellings were produced in unplanned, improvised and precarious ways. This precarity has been controlled and ordered through institutionalised brokerage and intermediation.

Thirdly, endemic violence and racism have been a consistent feature in the way that order has been maintained, and disorder managed. There are clear rhythms of violence in the urban frontier of Rio de Janeiro that emerged through the persistence of violence brokers as caretakers in the production of urban space. But this chapter has also shown how insurgencies of societal resistance and agency can challenge hegemony of certain elite groups in the state system and encroachment of the market.

The next three empirical chapters will explain how the most recent manifestation, the '*milícias*', emerged and persisted in Rio de Janeiro since the 1990s. Chapter five explores the emergence of these parastatal groups through this period of transformation and change. I demonstrate how they emerged through a variety of forms and functions to create fixes and solutions to the challenges of the urban frontier. Chapter six explores the bargaining processes taking place at the elite level. Whilst chapter seven explores the role of social brokerage in the successes and failures of the domination by these groups.

## Five: Local Responses to Insecurity and Violence

### Introduction

In the previous chapter, I described how resources, rents, rights and citizenship had been unevenly distributed as shifting political settlements opened up and blocked off opportunities for different social groups, political coalitions, and interests groups. Throughout these shifting configurations, violence was consistently deployed by brokers – continually reshaping and mutating in form and function – to maintain the grasp of elite groups over power.

I located the process of urban expansion in the global shift towards economic liberalisation, which led to erosion of the state welfare, labour rights and investments in public goods and services. As a result of dispossession and accumulation processes, individuals without property rights were displaced, banished and excluded from urban space and they were forced to turn to markets to access goods and services. This provoked an rise in labour informality, particularly amongst low-skilled youth from marginalised communities; many of these individuals turned to more lucrative global illicit drug markets to secure an income.

This chapter picks up where the last one left off. It looks for answers to *how* and *why* parastatal groups emerged in the West Zone, by situating them in the ebbs and flows of violence that seem to characterise the Brazilian political process. The argument that unfolds is that local bosses, the *donos* and *chefes* of West Zone communities, many of them current or former officers of the police or military, attempted to provide antidotes to the insecurities felt by local residents. But by doing so, they were forced to turned to extractive, racketeering and revenue-generating practices to finance their protection activities.

Throughout this chapter I highlight the conditions of possibility unique to this moment in history and this region, that enabled the emergence of this unique form of localised ordering. I argue that the emergence of parastatal groups in the West Zone was a gradual and synchronous process, driven in part from reactionary, intuitive processes stemming from the ‘bottom up’. Due to the very localised nature of these processes, each one was slightly different from the next as they emerged in multiple sites across the urban periphery, each with its own unique temporal and spatial memories.

In this chapter, I examine five different types of brokerage in the formation of these organisations, which should be considered in a non-linear fashion. Firstly, I explore how structural and criminal violence created reactions for local *donos* to act as vigilantes and in

self-defence; I also analyse how the new economic structures facing them led them to practices of extortion and racketeering to finance their lives. Secondly, I explore how *donos* established legitimacy with the communities where they lived and worked, and how social capital is cultivated through patronage with local communities and social dependencies are established. Thirdly, I discuss how land is dispossessed, occupied, parcelled up and resold or donated across the West Zone by the *donos*, as a way of entrenching these relations deep into the histories and social fabric of communities. Fourthly, I look at how the informal transport market enabled *donos* to expand these social relations *across* the region by piggy backing on already wide-reaching and intricate transport networks. Fifthly, I analyse how these groups came together with state and political elites to provide a different version of the state in the West Zone. In the final section, I draw some conclusions.

### An urban security crisis

The 1990s gave rise to intense chain-reactions of conflicts between drug trafficking factions, police, *policia mineira*, extermination groups and death squads across Rio de Janeiro with violence levels reached an all-time high in 1994. Coinciding with this period were significant cuts to police numbers, disruptions to labour market geographies, a reshaping of the welfare state system, and an expanding private security market. Public security was one of the key sectors affected by the economic and political changes. Robert Gay estimates, for example, that in 1985, there were three policemen for every private security guard in the city; but by 1999, this ratio had been reversed.<sup>93</sup>

This had significant effects for those living and working in *favelas* and low-income neighbourhoods across the West Zone as this was a key region where many of these conflicts played out.<sup>94</sup> A social worker from a West Zone community during the 1990s described the intensity of the violence to me. 'Everyone was violent!', she explained,

‘and then the police arrived with *more* violence, you know, the police always arrived. Then the police arrived with more violence and so, the place I worked ... it was, it was a war zone... It should have been a declared war zone, it looked like Syria.’<sup>95</sup>

Because police were involved in many of the West Zone conflicts, residents felt unable to turn to police to deal with the violence for them. This stood in contrast with *Cariocas* living in

---

<sup>93</sup> Gay, R. (2017) 'Of Criminal Factions, UPPs, and Militias', *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, and Clientelistic Networks*, pp. 75.

<sup>94</sup> Misse, Grillo, Teixeira (2013) demonstrate how the greatest number of *autos de resistência* are in the West Zone of the city. See: Misse, M., Grillo, C. C., Teixeira, C. P. and Neri, N. E. (2013) *Quando a polícia mata: homicídios por "autos de resistência" no Rio de Janeiro (2001-2011)*. Necvu.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker.

affluent neighbourhoods, predominantly in the South Zone and Centro neighbourhoods, and from middle- to upper-class backgrounds and with stable incomes; who were able to rely on a basic level of state security to police the streets, protect their property and maintain order.<sup>96</sup> In instances where state police did not fulfil their duties in these neighbourhoods, populations were able to turn to private security companies, hire doormen, or install surveillance systems and technologies to protect themselves and make themselves feel safer.

These persistent patterns of conflict across the West Zone generated popular support for increasingly heavy-handed and imaginative ways of dealing with conflict and violence, such as those systems of ordering established by violent *policia mineira*, extermination groups, and death squads. These levels of support were intensified by sensations of fear and insecurity that were often whipped up by sensationalist reporting in the news media.<sup>97</sup> Catarina, a resident from Floresta da Campinha described one of the most popular news channels to me during the 1990s:

‘You turned on the TV it was just: ‘they kill, they kill, they kill, they kill, they kill, they kill, they kill, when it is not corruption and death, until yesterday I put on the news, I can’t stand talking about corruption anymore, please *Jornal Nacional*, change the subject.’<sup>98</sup>

These feelings of fear and being threatened provoked a range of individuals and local groups of policemen, firemen and military officers, self-organised across the West Zone neighbourhoods<sup>99</sup> where they lived<sup>100</sup> to protect and defend themselves, their neighbours, friends and families from the threat (perceived and actual) from violence. Marcus, a Military Policeman that I interviewed, explained: ‘We were the cops that lived in that region, we wouldn’t let anyone steal, sell drugs, because we were the locals, we had our own interests in the community.’<sup>101</sup>

Some of these actors had already been known locally in their communities as informal ‘go-to’ figures for residents when they needed someone to intervene in everyday life, such as to mediate a family conflict or to help them when their house had been burgled. Others had acted

---

<sup>96</sup> Interview with Antonio, Military Policeman, September 2016

<sup>97</sup> Interview with Marco Antônio Roxo da Silva, Professor of Media, UFF, April 2016.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Catarina, resident of Floresta da Campinha.

<sup>99</sup> Although it was difficult to acquire reliable and robust data about where police live, a study by LAV-UERJ collected police postal codes for a different study with different objectives provided me with data to map postcodes to provide some indication about the spatial distribution of the police residences. This demonstrates the concentration of police residences in peripheral regions. Data from: Cano, I. (2015), ‘Perfil, Trajetória, e Treinamento dos Policiais Militares do Rio de Janeiro; FAPERJ.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with Antonio, Military Policeman, September 2016.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Marcus, Military Policeman, April 2017.

in more established ‘formal’ roles during previous decades, participating in death squads or other capacities. Although one commonality is that much of the authority that the *donos* held seems to have been down to their social title and their affiliation with the police or the security services. As one resident explained to me:

‘With the power they already hold as police, just imagine, the resident already accepts the rules, just imagine, the military police, that sense of discipline that they carry with them<sup>102</sup>.’

Their status as police or members of security services within or linked to the state system also granted them legitimate access to arms, information and knowledge from inside the state system, and a legal way of deploying violence.<sup>103</sup>

Three short vignettes now provide an opportunity to reflect on the emergence of *donos* and their intentions to manage disorder in the communities where they lived.

First, I describe the emergence of two *donos* in Cosmos, a favela in the centre of the West Zone on the outskirts of Campo Grande (fig. 6) during the 1980s and 1990s at a time when Cosmos was at the centre of a ‘turf war’ between competing drug trafficking factions. The community had been under the control a drug trafficking organisation since the 1970s, whose main focus was on selling marijuana. During the 1980s, the *chefe* of the group, Carlinhos, married Djanira Metralha (or Lili Cabrini), the leader of an organised crime group famous for robbing banks. Djanira moved to Cosmos to live with Carlinhos in the 1980s,<sup>104</sup> and the two criminal groups merged together and expanded their markets and begun trafficking cocaine.

As the soaring revenues from cocaine markets began to cause tensions and competition between traffickers within the ranks of the CV, the organisation began to break up into different factions. This led to violent outcomes. Cosmos was given a nickname by local residents: the *Caminho do Céu* (‘Stairway to Heaven’) because of the intense levels of violence in the community. Rival factions used violence against one another as they competed for territory. Many members from the gangs were killed, including Djanira’s son, Almir.<sup>105</sup> As Andrea described to me, ‘there was so much conflict, so much conflict, that they also started to break up into several subdivisions, for example, the 3rd Command had 3 divisions in the faction: Third Hole ... then there were other names, then it started to divide a lot.’<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, November 2016

<sup>103</sup> Interview with André, Military Policeman, June 2016.

<sup>104</sup> Moura, T. (2007) *Rostos invisíveis da violência armada: um estudo de caso sobre Rio de Janeiro*. 7Letras.

<sup>105</sup> *O Globo*, 21 November 1982, Matutina, Rio, p.36

<sup>106</sup> Interview with Andrea, Cosmos resident.

During the 1990s, extermination groups, *policia mineira*, and death squads, many of whom were employed by local businesses, and claiming to be linked to *Mão Branca* (this is discussed in chapter four)<sup>107</sup>, attempted to intervene and deal with these conflicts between the different drug trafficking factions. According to a District Attorney in Santa Cruz during the 1990s, one of the sources of the conflicts came from a group of policemen in Santa Cruz and Campo Grande, organised by Beto Baxinho, a West Zone *dono*,<sup>108</sup> who established an extermination group and slaughtered a group of drug traffickers in the Rola *favela* in 1994, as they believed that much of the conflict stemmed from this community. Newspaper reports from the period describe how this set off an unpredictable and spectacular chain reaction of revenge violence between drug trafficking factions, extermination groups, *policia mineira*, and vigilantes across the West Zone.<sup>109</sup> In one of the most significant and high-profile assassinations, the son of the CV's *chefe* in Cosmos was murdered.

Residents of Cosmos described to me how they felt more insecure during the 1980 and 1990s than they had ever done before.<sup>110</sup> According to Angela, a resident in Cosmos until the mid-1990s,

‘The police wouldn't come in, nobody would come in, it was a very brutal time, very brutal indeed’, meaning that residents were left to the mercy of the trafficking groups and the luck of not being struck by a stray bullet. Furthermore, she explained, ‘as a result of all of this, government services were not accessed, there were not even any schools’.<sup>111</sup>

Uncomfortable with the escalating violence in the community, two residents and former policemen, Aldemar Almeida dos Santos and Ricardo Teixeira de Cruz, patrolled the streets of Cosmos to deter rival trafficking factions from entering the community and fighting on the streets. Aldemar used to come to armed to pick-up his niece from the local creche every day because he feared for her.<sup>112</sup> After some time, Maria, now an former Cosmos resident, described how Aldemar and Ricardo eventually took over the community. She described how they ‘invaded’ (*invadido*) to describe how they took it out of the hands of the drug traffickers and took control of it for themselves:

---

<sup>107</sup> Interview with Maria, Sepetiba Resident, November 2016.

<sup>108</sup> Interview with District Attorney, Santa Cruz.

<sup>109</sup> Nicácio, J. (1995) ‘Grupo armado invade hospital e mata 1 no Rio’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 23 April.

<sup>110</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, September 2016.

<sup>111</sup> Interview with Angela, former Cosmos resident

<sup>112</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, September 2016.

‘The shootouts were wild at the time. I lived there already, but they never got in our way, I never got involved with anyone ... Then the majority died ... The militiamen invaded ... Batman and Robin and that lot... They invaded, and then they killed a lot, others were arrested, others... Disappeared ... And then, today it’s commanded by a militiaman<sup>113</sup>.’

This vignette highlights the complex nature and evolution of authority in Cosmos, and how parastatal groups responded to violent conflicts in the region. It also highlighted how locals were welcoming of the protection that these actors gave to their families and friends.<sup>114</sup>

The second vignette describes the emergence of a violent *policia mineira*, or a group of *cangaçeiros* (as some residents described them), or even an extermination group (as it was called in a Civil Police report),<sup>115</sup> in Rio das Pedras (fig. 6). Unlike Cosmos, Rio das Pedras was a community where there had been very few signs of drug trafficking.

The *policia mineira* emerged under the leadership of a community leader known as Otacílio in the late 1970s. Otacílio was a local resident who worked as a technician in the armoury of the Military Police cleaning and caring for the weapons. He was highly respected by police from across the region because of his ‘skilled and dedicated work’<sup>116</sup>. Due to the respect he commanded in the police and his community, Otacílio was seen as a natural community leader and a ‘go-to’ authority figure.<sup>117</sup>

When violence began to escalate across the city and drug traffickers moved in to neighbouring communities, such as Rocinha, Otacílio assembled the *policia mineira*, made up from police and former police residents in the community. They attempted to ‘clean up’ the community of any ‘undesirables and vagabonds’<sup>118</sup> with violent tactics. Otacílio’s friend, Zelito, for example, ‘used to kill in the Country Club’ where he ‘cut up the bodies’<sup>119</sup> and then disposed of them.

Despite the violent tactics that they used against ‘outsiders’, residents claimed how Otacílio used to wander the streets of the community, listen to the concerns of residents and attempt to deal with their problems. He did this, according to one resident, because ‘he had grown up in the community and he cared about the residents’<sup>120</sup>. From the few recorded accounts that exist about Otacílio, and from a small number of residents I spoke with that remembered him, it

---

<sup>113</sup> Interview with Maria, Sepetiba Resident, November 2016.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, September 2016.

<sup>115</sup> Rio de Janeiro Civil Police, Testimony Report, Number 044/04, Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz, 24/01/05

<sup>116</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File P4481., p.421-428

<sup>117</sup> *O Dia*, 25/11/2009, City Edition, p.6.

<sup>118</sup> Transcript from Closing Meeting of CPI of the Milícias, 13/11/2008.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.



appears that he was genuinely concerned with the welfare of the community residents. According to one resident, ‘Those that could help him [financially] did, but it would be from the heart. If you couldn’t then you wouldn’t suffer repression or anything of the sort. The worker and the “good citizen” were respected in the area’<sup>121</sup>. However, by the mid-1980s, individual drug traffickers began to sell drugs in isolated points around the community. One resident report described the community as a place where there was ‘rotten fruit in the middle, criminals, drug traffickers, and every type of [...] bad seeds, infiltrated amongst the working class’<sup>122</sup>. As the levels of violence intensified, Otacilio was killed when he tried to prevent drug traffickers from ‘invading’ Rio das Pedras.<sup>123</sup>

By the mid 1990s, Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz, or ‘Nadinho’, had taken over as the *dono* community and violence became much more central to the way he ran the community. Documentation from the CPI archives demonstrate that as early as 1994 economic incentives drove the way he managed the community. In one example, they describe how Renato, the Secretary of Commerce in Rio das Pedras, was assassinated by Nadinho in 1994 over a conflict about informal security taxes.<sup>124</sup>

The third vignette comes from outside the West Zone, in the neighbouring town of Duque de Caxias in the Baxiada Fluminense. It describes how Rogério, a policeman at the time, established a self-defence group with his colleagues 1994. He described some of the ‘insecurities and demands from the community’<sup>125</sup> and how residents began to feel increasingly threatened by violence and fear from the psychological effect of living in close proximity with the drug trafficking groups in neighbouring *favelas*.

Rogério explained how a local bar owner encouraged him and his police colleagues to hang out and socialise in the bar so that they could deter any criminal behaviour and violence in the streets. This benefited the bar owner and its customers at the same time:

‘I lived as a resident, I moved there in ‘92, ‘93 then, ‘94, that World Cup, in ‘94 Brazil was the champion. I had gone somewhere to have a beer and watch the game, we watched the games there with the fucking guys, my colleagues arrived, the police arrived.

‘Then we... the bar owner, always supported us, set up a little cash box for us to drink a beer... so we could stay there in his bar... It was good for him, that we would hang

---

<sup>121</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File P4481., p.421-428.

<sup>122</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File P4481., p.421-428.

<sup>123</sup> Rio de Janeiro Civil Police, Testimony Report, Number 044/04, Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz, 24/01/05.

<sup>124</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File P4481., p.421-428.

<sup>125</sup> Interview with Rogério, Militiaman and Former-Military Policeman, Duque de Caxias.

around, there would be no “confusion”, there would be no ruffraff, no one leaving without paying, etc.

‘So it became known like this, the “militia bar” is the one there, we are watching a television, watching the games, we are, we are drinking a beer they say [...] there was his safety and people wanting or not wanting it, we already gave him security there [...] He gives us beer, let's get one, a barbecue too, some meat also with him, then there was this business, we started to like but there were police in my time, who never got involved.’<sup>126</sup>

There was no ‘decision’ by any ‘group’ to install themselves in the bar – instead it was a more gradual and natural emergence linked to self-defence, which challenges some of the more ‘rational’ explanations for parastatal groups that we see elsewhere.

Rogério describes how very little was planned, but this social formation was very clearly about the protection of a market (the bar) and maintaining everyday sense of order for those living in the neighbourhood. As a central and visible point in the community, the bar helped to socialise the policemen and consolidate relations between the local police officers and the community; it established a physical centre around which residents felt more secure. Furthermore, economic incentives generated by the money box encouraged the policemen to stay at the bar, demonstrating how the market was simultaneously part of the incentive to find a solution and part of the solution.

All three of these examples demonstrate different manifestations of gradual and ‘bottom-up’ responses to widespread sensations of insecurity. They demonstrate how subtle these evolutions and formations are, emerging in response to local contexts, relations, and specificities. However, juxtaposed with an ‘outsiders’ view, these emergences and installations are often so gradual that residents sometimes do not even question or even notice them. This is illustrated through an account given in an interview by a Judge from Santa Cruz:

‘When I went to visit a friend of mine at his condo - It was a middle-class condominium, with a pier -, it was in the process of just being occupied by the militia; nobody knew very well what it was, because today it seems that they issue bank receipts, they force their way into the residents' association and issue these slips and people innocently go there and pay.

But I went there by car, and stopped at the gate of his condominium, and a person in normal clothes came so, asking where I was going. Then I thought to myself, ‘is it the doorman?’, ‘what does this guy want?’ Then I decided that I'm not going to go to my friend's house and I started calling him; because I didn't know what was going on. This

---

<sup>126</sup> Interview with Rogério, Militiaman and Former-Military Policeman, Duque de Caxias.

friend of mine innocently didn't know that this was a militia, and what the militia could do and he said: 'No, no, ignore this guy and come here!'

I was a little suspicious of what that would be, but I politely addressed the guy, and I went to my friend's house, and I ended up passing him, but that was the militia occupying the condominium, I mean a person in front wanting to put some authority in, not to put an appearance of the entrance there in that condo was controlled ...

I think the residents at that time didn't know that the militia was occupying it there, but nowadays they certainly know and some and most must even think that it is a good thing to pay the association fee there to have security, but in fact people don't know what it is, or at least they have no idea of the seriousness of what you are ... what they are going through.'<sup>127</sup>

At the start, the emergence of these individuals and groups seem to be subtle and a welcome feature in the landscape of insecurity and fear. However, as the Judge acknowledged, the economic rent-seeking aspect of the *milícia* tends to be played down.

However, it is possible to see how economic incentives can become an important – if not dominating – part of the process. As Jorge, a resident from Cosmos explained,

The militia wants to earn money from the community. It has nowhere else to take money from, so what happens? The militia arrives in a new community, at the very least it imposes a condition that you are OBLIGED to pay membership... Let's suppose... Let's think about the reasoning. [...] AT LEAST, six hundred families paying R\$10 equals R\$6,000 – so the militia eats a little [using the money]. And they eat a little bit more, they get used to eating, and then the families HAVE to pay, you get me?<sup>128</sup>

As militiamen dedicate more of their time to occupying space in the communities, they began to expect and rely on the economic incentives and income, such as payments from the residents' association or the money box in the local bar. Economic expectation is one of the defining features of *milícias* already noted in the local literature (Zaluar and Conceição, 2007; Cano and Duarte, 2012).

However, there is also a spectrum from private security and protection, which can rapidly evolve into extortion.<sup>129</sup> This is exemplified by a Coronel from the Military Police, who explained to me that:

'When militia first dominate an area they say they go around to all of the commercial owners and offer their protective service, and that many of the owners will accept.

---

<sup>127</sup> Interview with Santa Cruz Judge, September 2016.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Reginaldo, Community Leader in West Zone, June 2017.

<sup>129</sup> This is also an observation made by Cano and Duarte (2012).

Those that do not accept, the militia will say, “well.... you know... if something happens to your business, then there’s not much we can do about it”<sup>130</sup>.

This is also illustrated through a less extortive and threatening expectation that the bar owner would pay for, or finance the drinks and food of Rogério and the militiamen in Duque de Caxias, in exchange for the notion that their presence was a ‘necessity’ for the bar owner to open his bar. Similarly, when Aldemar and Ricardo began to charge a ‘protection’ tax in Cosmos, they did so by claiming they were ensuring businesses could continue trading in the community by providing security so that residents would feel comfortable walking in the streets.<sup>131</sup>

That said, even without coercion, many business owners and residents seemed willing to make a contribution because of the high levels of fear and the respect held by residents for the *donos*. A pattern emerged about the social status of these actors throughout the fieldwork, that seemed to guarantee the legitimacy and authority of *donos*. It was common to hear residents from across all of the field sites refer to the *donos* as ‘Him’, ‘the chief’, and even, ‘God’:

‘They respect me because if they don’t, we don’t trust them [...].

If our trust decreases, it would be different; but he is there, and we are here, when we have to talk to him, we get close and talk; we go to God, we go to God, then we talk to God, and it’s done, then it is over.’<sup>132</sup>

With this distinction made, birthnames are rarely used. In Cosmos, for example, Aldemar and Ricardo were known by some of the women in their community as ‘Guardian Angels’ once they started patrolling the community and regulating who came in and out. A Civil Police Station Chief explained to me that even though they position themselves as protectors,

there will still be a gun around the waist, and there will still be good vibes with them in the community; the men end up winning the will of women, because women in the community like the bad guys, and they end up going that way.<sup>133</sup>

This demonstrates how legitimacy and status of these actors is interwoven into questions of masculinity and gender, in the context of fear and violence from outsiders. Aldemar and Ricardo, for example, were known by local residents as ‘Batman’ and ‘Robin’, in reference to the heroic image that some of the female residents had of them. These mythical-heroic-religious statuses seemed to enable the *donos* fluidity to take on different positions of higher

---

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Coronel Goulart, Intelligence Unit of the Military Police, May 2016.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, March 2017.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Anna, Resident of João XXIII, December 2016.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with Renato, Civil Policeman, January 2017.

positioned authority according to the demands of the community in what was a dynamic field of shifting power relations.

These imaginaries also helped to co-construct collective imaginations of communities, linking the authority of the *donos* to a higher and inexplicable power, extending to spiritual and mythical spatio-temporalities where they also gained legitimacy. This can help to explain why there was so little resistance to violence. Through hierarchical ordering and subordination, residents situate themselves in relation to others and create meaning for themselves by understanding the world in a relational sense to god.<sup>134</sup> Residents regularly referred to ‘protection’ and the ‘will of God’ in determining their fate and future. Authority was therefore more than a projection of rules upon a population and the use of violence as a form of discipline. It was a historically entrenched process with cultural registers of belonging, divinity and legitimacy.

Other social imaginaries were also projected onto the *donos*. These were informed, partially at least, by the historical terminologies and colloquialisms such as *cangaçeiros*, *policia mineira*, or extermination groups. However, these imaginaries were told and retold through oral histories and everyday discussions, which took the shape of a local folklore.

Although these imaginaries can tap into emotions and affections, they ultimately have the effect of hyping-up emotion and securing a particular role in the community for the local group or individual. Benice described an episode to me in the development where she lived in Rio de Prata in which other residents and her neighbours were also involved in the story itself:

‘One of the families said they stayed all night long with the bandits. But nobody saw it. Nobody proved anything. And then I went to a residents’ meeting - just for you to see the level - I went to a meeting and my husband couldn’t go to that one - on the day of the meeting, there were 28 people there. 28 men in the house of that person who was robbed and they decided that the militia would take care of the condominium.

I was voted down, I was the only person who voted against it [...]

The person that we hired, that the condominium hired, is called Edu Caveira [Skull]. What do you think of this person who has a name like that?! The person who apparently suffered the robbery brought him into the meeting.<sup>135</sup>

Atmospheres of fear (perceived or real), and the social imaginaries that are crafted to deal with them, have had the effect of idealising these characters and obscuring their violent characteristics and practices. This has been specifically *against* ‘drug traffickers’ and in favour

---

<sup>134</sup> See: Walker, R. B. J. (1990) ‘Security, sovereignty, and the challenge of world politics’, *Alternatives*, 15(1), pp. 3-27.

<sup>135</sup> Interview with Benice, Social Worker, March 2017.

of the *cidadões do bem* ('good' residents). This ideology of fear<sup>136</sup> also had substantial social consequences, as it generated cyclical mistrust and stimulated additional conflict with individuals with drug trafficker profiles, typically, young black males.

This is further compounded by a widespread fear about the connections and alliances of the *donos* inside the police institution, meaning that residents had no other authority they could report violence to. This therefore entrenched structural and racial inequalities further. Local leaders depended on imaginaries of themselves as violent and ruthless to create terror and fear in the minds of criminals, but as heroic pacifiers to make residents feel more secure. This closer examination of practices within the community reveals how local leaders are whitewashed in public discourses, with little perspective on their violent practices. However, their exercise of violence undeniably and disproportionately affected marginalised minorities.

Socially constructed imaginaries of the *donos* and their communities not only obscured the violent practices of *donos*, but they also obscure the shadowy and illicit alliances they forged within the communities themselves. In Cosmos, for example, Aldemar and Ricardo were expelled from the police for wrong-doing,<sup>137</sup> but during the late 1980s, they also collaborated with the CV and even sold illicit drugs themselves,<sup>138</sup> demonstrating how discourses of security, protection and legality are deceiving in nature (especially when justified with anti-drug rhetoric). At the same time, they can be deployed to disseminate and legitimise a private form of security free from the checks and balances of the state.

Herein sits an important theoretical and empirical twist. Whilst professing to protect against violence and harm more widely, local security practices in the West Zone have also evolved through their own structural, every day, institutionalised and symbolic forms of violence. As Marielle Franco explained to me during an interview:

'They appear with a discourse of organisation - of organisation of spaces - they arrive with a discourse of valorisation, protection, moralism.'

---

<sup>136</sup> Araújo da Silva (2017) describes a 'fear of living in fear' compelling residents not to object to domination. See: Silva, M. d. A. (2017) 'Houses, tranquility and progress in an área de milícia', *Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology*, 14(3).

<sup>137</sup> Aldemar was imprisoned for drug trafficking, corruption, and carrying weapons. He was released from prison in 1991. Ricardo was arrested during an armed cargo robbery and expelled from the police in 1990. After their expulsion from the military police during the 1990s, the pair continued to carry out armed robberies on armoured vehicles transporting cash and valuables across the city.

<sup>138</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482, Testimony, 4 July 2008.

But everything is very subtle at first, it has aggressiveness, but it still isn't violent, it's very subtle; let's say it's a more symbolic violence than that of the drug traffickers who points the gun at people's heads.'<sup>139</sup>

These old and new forms of violence, therefore, are layered on top of one another in messy, deceiving and disorientating ways. *Donos* simultaneously embody the role of protectors and violators, with one lurking in the shadows and the other visible. As protectors, the emerging *milícias* take on state-like characteristics as protectors of citizens and enforcers of violence through an illusory social contract, or an illusion of exchange<sup>140</sup>.

### Patronage, welfare, and legitimacy

Although some of these *donos* tended to emerge through tensions of security and violence, the means of violence and self-defence were only a part of the role that they played in the community. Their moral role and demonstration of community interests also played a fundamental role in establishing their relationships with residents.<sup>141</sup> As one policeman I interviewed explained to me about the *milícias* and the *dono*, they have 'two hands': with the right hand, 'I strike you and I have a gun'. But with the left, 'I'm affectionate, I've got blessings, can provide assistance, a place in the school for your child, a pass to jump the queue in the hospital, safety and security'<sup>142</sup>.

It is well documented that many West Zone *donos* and politicians from peripheral neighbourhoods have built social centres and provided free access to local residents for particular goods and services<sup>143</sup>. According to Luis Eduardo Soares, these groups found legitimacy in 'popular support because they "cleaned up" the area, distinguishing the worked from the criminal; the workers felt valued, recompensed, and protected.'<sup>144</sup> Machado da Silva even suggested that it is essential for these groups to gain support from the local population; if they don't do this, then there is a chance the residents will turn to drug traffickers for support.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>139</sup> Interview with Marielle Franco, Politician, March 2016.

<sup>140</sup> See: Penglase, B. (2009) 'States of insecurity: Everyday emergencies, public secrets, and drug trafficker power in a Brazilian favela', *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 32(1), pp. 47-63.

<sup>141</sup> Araujo importantly argues that the moral claim of 'milícias' is what justifies their use of force: Silva, M. d. A. (2017) 'Houses, tranquility and progress in an área de milícia', *Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology*, 14(3).

<sup>142</sup> Interview with Antonio, Civil Policeman, June 2016.

<sup>143</sup> See for example: de Sá Siqueira, R. A. (2013) *A política no loteamento: um estudo sobre mediação na zona oeste carioca*. Sociology, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, de Sá Siqueira, R. A. (2008) "'Vestindo a Camisa da Zona Oeste": análise da construção de vínculos sociais entre um vereador da cidade do Rio de Janeiro e sua "base eleitoral"', Mendonça, T. (2014) 'Batan: tráfico, milícia e "pacificação" na Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro', Vieira, W. D. S. 'MEMÓRIA E IDENTIDADE DOS MOVIMENTOS SOCIAIS NA ZONA OESTE CARIOCA', Ribeiro, P. J., Oliveira, R., Blickman, T. and Jelsma, G. (2010) 'The impact of militia actions on public security policies in Rio de Janeiro', *Crime and Globalisation March*.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with Luis Eduardo Soares, Intellectual, November 2017.

<sup>145</sup> Interview with Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, Sociologist, April 2016.

The fact that residents in urban poor communities did not have the resources or abilities to access the goods and services they needed, such as opticians, medical doctors or even hairdressers, opened up opportunities for *donos* to provide solutions to the residents. The relationship between local residents and the *dono*, therefore, was not only about physical protection from violence; it was also about patronage, stability and survival.

This logic is also applied to ‘non-essential’ goods and services such as entertainment and events, which are also supported and sponsored and provided by parastatal groups. Many of the local *casa de shows* (performance spaces) or *carnivals* (carnivals) that take place at the end of the summer are produced and financially supported by local parastatal groups and their political donors, such as Jorge Babú in Santa Cruz (fig. 21). Through the majority of their revenues tend to be made from other more profitable markets, these groups have subsidised concerts of famous *funk* artists (a style of music that originated in the *favelas*) and *pagodes* (a sub-genre of *samba*) who they invite to come to the communities where they live and play for local residents. As the artists are subsidised heavily, women are charged as little as R\$5 and the men around R\$15. Marta, a resident from Sepetiba, suggested to me that this was their way of ‘giving back to the community’ and to show to residents that they can also be a positive force.





Figure 21: Advertisement for Pre-Carnival Party organised by Jorge Babú (Source: WhatsApp flyer from a Santa Cruz residents' group)



Figure 22: WhatsApp invitation for a Samba Party (Source: WhatsApp message sent to me by a resident informant)

On an November evening in 2016, I attended one of these parties in the João XXIII complex (fig. 22). Some notes from my field journal from the morning after that night describe some of the most prominent and memorable moments:

*Marco took Marta and I into the main square of the complex. There was a big marquee in the middle of the square and armed security guards dressed in black and spaced all around the outside of the square.*

*Marco explained there was a big concern for security given the enclosed nature of the square. If there was an attack from a rival milícia or drug trafficking organisation, for example, then there were few escape routes for the bosses. And this was where many of the bosses of the milícia came to party on a Saturday night; apart from the main boss, Fiel, who is currently in the police and is unable to show his face because of his political and police connections.*

*When we walked into the square, Marco indicated to the security guards I was with him and they let me in. He explained to me that they trusted him because they've known him since he was a kid. They all grew up here together. They searched everyone's backpacks and pockets, before allowing us to walk past. Marco explained that they were checking to see if I had any weapons on me, or alcohol that hadn't been purchased from them.*

*We walked up to the bar. They only sold buckets filled with ice and out-of-date alcohol, or alcohol that Marta told me was typically acquired through cargo robberies on the nearby highway.*

*Most of the residents started arriving into the square around 1am and then the whole area suddenly was packed. The donos had their own VIP areas which was cordoned off, guarded, and none of the residents entered.*

*When the music eventually started, it was loud and crowds of residents flooded to the centre of the square where the sound booth and speakers were to dance. There was a well-known DJ playing from the neighbouring favela of Antares, which was currently run by the Commando Vermelho.*

*This presumably meant there was an alliance between this milícia and the CV, as they had previously been in conflict with one another. I asked Marco about it, and he said that these alliances come and go.<sup>146</sup>*

---

<sup>146</sup> Fieldnotes from 15 November 2017.

By producing these events and parties, parastatal groups continually re-establish their connections and social bonds with the communities where they live. There seems to be fewer reasons to question their authority if they have free (or subsidised) parties and celebrations on their doorsteps. It also provides an opportunity for the *donos* to make themselves more visible to the community, which was an important strategy for securing legitimate support from communities.

According to local resident testimonies, in the Mendanha region of Campo Grande, brothers and former policemen Natalino and Jerônimo Guimarães followed the protection-security model by initially offering protection to businesses in the neighbourhood before beginning to expect that business owners contribute to a 'security fund'. The brothers had become Civil Policemen in 1979 but were subsequently expelled for misconduct. Both had a relatively low profiles in the region and were not particularly well known by local residents. However, at the time they started to engage in the provision of local security in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Natalino began to be known by local residents as a result of his connections with the Evangelical Church. He made a name for himself and the Guimarães family when he started selling CDs of gospel music that he had composed in the doorway to the church after mass.<sup>147</sup>

Within a few years, the Guimarães brothers began to be known across Campo Grande and the brothers opened their first social centre in 1991 in the neighbourhood of Mendanha, where they lived. At the social centre, residents could access free 'medical, dental and gynaecological services, as well as physical activity classes for seniors and other welfare activities'<sup>148</sup>. Riding on the wave of the reputation the brothers gained from managing and funding the social centre, Jerônimo put himself forward as a political candidate in the municipal elections of 1996 for the National Labour Party (PTN) where he won an impressive 10,813 votes,<sup>149</sup> even though it was not enough to be elected.

By 1997, the Guimarães brothers had expanded their social programmes and work across Campo Grande to other parts of the neighbourhood. During the 1990s, they had established a security alliance with a *dono* from Magarça, Josimar José da Silva, known as 'Mazinho', who was also an ex-policeman. Between them, the *donos* had reached an agreement to form a local

---

<sup>147</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File (Ação Penal Pública (Originária) No.2008.068.0004, Testimony of Driver and Assessor of Cabinet of Councilman Jerônimo), P8842., p.84

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Sandra, Resident of Campo Grande, March 2016.

<sup>149</sup> Data from the Regional Electoral Tribune of Rio de Janeiro (TRE/RJ).

coalition and to share resources and information with one another, rather than compete against one another for territory.

Sandra, a former resident of Magarça, explained to me that prior to the pact that the Guimarães brothers had made with Mazinho, life was extraordinarily difficult in Magarça and that residents had been trying to resolve some simple issues for many years without any success. For example, the residents had made repeated requests to the state authorities to tarmac the muddy roads around the neighbourhood, but no officials had ever responded. ‘This made the tracks inaccessible during the rainy months and authorities were unable to access and collect rubbish, which made my children sick’, she told me<sup>150</sup>. Residents, she explained, largely felt powerless when it came to making demands of the state. Furthermore, Mazinho had no interest in investing in the community in the way that the Guimarães brothers had done in Mendanha. Sandra speculated that this was because the practices of Mazinho’s group were less profitable than the Guimarães’ and he had less cash to invest in the community.

Residents therefore benefited from patronage relations with brokers such as Jerônimo to survive and maintain a basic quality of life, often where state governance disappointed. Jerônimo opened a social centre in Magarça as a result of this coalition with Mazinho (fig. 20). According to a testimony from one of Jerônimo’s workers, they were able to loan trucks, machines and equipped a voluntary workforce to retarmac the roads around the community through their contacts, local networks, and access to resources across the West Zone. They also invested in street lighting and staffed the community centre to run free art and computer lessons for local residents<sup>151</sup>.

---

<sup>150</sup> Interview with Sandra, Resident of Campo Grande, March 2016.

<sup>151</sup> Facebook post by Carlos Airam, from 15<sup>th</sup> October, 2016

<https://www.facebook.com/carlos.airam.3/posts/1125077997560340> [accessed 15th March 2018]



Figure 23: Jerônimo's Social Centre in 1997 (Source: Facebook  
<https://www.facebook.com/jerominhoguimaraesoficial>)

There is some evidence to suggest that these practices had a positive effect on the expansion of Jerônimo's political visibility and influence in the neighbourhood. By 1998, Jerônimo increased his vote in the state elections to 18,152 votes and even extended his vote share to other regions outside of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. In the electoral zone where Magarça is located, Jerônimo secured a further 673 votes<sup>152, 153</sup>.

What seems to have distinguished Jerônimo from other *donos*, such as Mazinho, is his willingness to place himself at the centre of the requests and demands made by local residents and address the deficiencies that the state and municipal government should have been providing, according to a conventional social contract. The following Facebook post, written by a friend and collaborator of Jerônimo reminiscing about this period, demonstrates the extent of the social activities and the depth of meaning that it had for the community:

I remember over 10,000 social visits in a month.

I remember the streetlighting we put up across various communities.

I remember the paved streets! Especially the ones where we had to borrow the machines and trucks and we did it ourselves, and voluntarily, because City Hall didn't put down the asphalt in Magarça, where we asphalted more than 20 streets.

I remember the UPA [local health clinic] next to the West Shopping mall that the councillor [Natalino] dedicated himself to and asked mayor César Maia [the City Mayor] to donate the land even in those days it was impossible! And he demanded that it be there because the other side [of the West Zone] already had the Rocha Faria [hospital].

<sup>152</sup> Data from the Regional Electoral Tribune of Rio de Janeiro (TRE/RJ).

<sup>153</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File (Ação Penal Pública (Originária) No.2008.068.0004, Testimony of Driver and Assessor of Cabinet of Councilman Jerônimo), P8842., p.84.

I remember people going to their [Natalino's and Jerônimo's] house to ask for help, even with family problems.

I remember stopping the car on the street and talking to a friend without taking the key out of the ignition and without closing the doors.

I remember Campo Grande almost without any robberies.

I remember being welcomed into the communities, almost like a hero, drinking coffee with the locals and patting the heads of little ones.

I remember a neighbourhood without pretend police roadblocks and without drug traffickers.

I remember drinking coffee with biscuits on the porch.

I remember everyone singing to the guitar.

I remember the longing for my friend Jerônimo and my friend Natalino.

I remember respect.

I remember friendship.<sup>154</sup>

These memories demonstrate the positive, and even romanticised views that some local residents held towards Jerônimo, helping to explain what might have led some of the local residents to vote for him.

Although clientelist relationships do not appear front and centre in this text, the post also reveals some of the blurry relationships between Jerônimo and elected politicians, such as the mayor of Rio de Janeiro at the time, César Maia. Although many of the services were provided directly by the brothers and were independent of the formal state government, other aspects, such as land titles, were clearly depended on the state and were negotiated through state officials and politicians. Some of these negotiated rights will be discussed in the next subsection. This suggests that although Jerônimo was acting in independent terms in the local area, paradoxically, some of his success emerged through his ability to negotiate access and resources from the state government to deliver on his promises of services and protection. This underlines the asymmetrical nature of the power relations with the state and its ultimate authority over the way that power and order is generated at the local level.

### Building foundations of the *milícia*

As a result of the high levels of urban migration arriving in Rio de Janeiro, as discussed in chapter four, West Zone land became more valuable during the second half of the twentieth century. Developers from across the city began to buy, sell, grab, occupy and claim land to

---

<sup>154</sup> Public Facebook post by Carlos Airam, from 15<sup>th</sup> October, 2016  
<https://www.facebook.com/carlos.airam.3/posts/1125077997560340> [accessed 15th March 2018].

subdivide and resell for themselves. Many formal property developers took advantage of the emerging market and divided the land up into smaller, saleable plots. However, this had the effect of marginalising many in urban poor populations who were unable to access capital or finance to purchase land. As a result they were denied formal land to live on.

Such exclusions marginalised populations which provoked a national landless movement spearheaded by organisations such as the Landless Workers' Movement (MST), which were accompanied by left-wing and pro-democracy movements, rural local politicians, civil society organisations and a radical left faction within the Catholic Church. Organisations such as the Federation of the Residents' Associations of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) played an important role advocating and lobbying at the state level on behalf of residents' associations at the local level to try and influence policy and guarantee legal changes that would open up access to land titles and urban infrastructure.

Informally, and illegally, large areas of undeveloped land were parcelled up and sold off into plots for low prices, without sufficient infrastructure (below legal regulations) and at huge distances from central areas.<sup>155</sup> These subdivisions were seen as quick and cheap solutions for dealing with the urban housing crisis.<sup>156</sup> Discourses established by the landless movement helped to justify the illegal subdivisions, land invasions, squatting, 'occupations' and the illegal sale of land across the West Zone.

*Donos* coordinated illegal 'invasions' of landless, homeless or renting occupants from across the region. According to Claudio Ferraz, the former Director of *Delegacia de Repressão às Ações Criminosas Organizadas* (Delegacy of the Repression of Organised Crime) (DRACO), 'We had records at the time [...], of land occupations for certain groups that claimed their own house and everything, and after establishing the domain of that region, the associations of residents dominated by these groups were created as well'.<sup>157</sup>

In the Campinha region of Campo Grande, for example, Wellington, the *dono* of the area, organised a succession of occupations with families from across the neighbourhood during the mid-1990s, according to local residents. Two occupations in the Campinha region are discussed in more detail in chapter seven. In the Santo Cristo occupation, dozens of families gathered on a Saturday evening and cut down the overgrowth through the night with machetes and

---

<sup>155</sup> *Plano Diretor de Rio de Janeiro* (2006), Rio de Janeiro City Council.

<sup>156</sup> Lago, L. C. (1992) 'Política urbana e a questão habitacional: novas tendências face à crise econômica brasileira', *Cadernos IPPUR/UFRJ, Ano VI*, (1), pp. 41-47.

<sup>157</sup> Interview with Claudio Ferraz, Former Director of DRACO, December 2016.

hacksaws to claim land for themselves<sup>158</sup>. In the Floresta da Campinha occupation, Wellington built himself a house in and amongst the residents.

By coordinating and organising the ‘invasions’, Wellington positioned himself as a moral leader and a protagonist in the ‘pro-poor’ landless struggle and a catalyst to achieving the redistribution of land for local residents. He worked closely with individuals in civil society organisations, such as Belinda who was the Director of FAMERJ at the time, but who is now an elected state parliamentarian with established links with parastatal groups.

Irene, an elderly resident of Floresta da Campinha, now in her late 60s, told me that Wellington and Belinda helped her during a difficult period of her life when she was in a state of destitution. She had no money or means to pay her rent or buy food. She explained to me how they helped her secure a plot of land where she still lives today on the bank of the creek:

‘They took the land and they gave it to the poor people like me... Because they took it. And they invaded. And then they took care of the people who paid the rent or those who didn’t have anywhere else to live’<sup>159</sup>.

Similarly, Ana, a female occupant from Floresta da Campinha, in her late 50s, explains how at the start of the occupation, Wellington said to her:

‘[Ana is paraphrasing Wellington:] We can make our homes here [...] It’s an occupation. We’re not “invading”. We’re not stealing anything from anyone because it’s ours [...] if it’s the government’s, then it’s ours ... So, when they do [eventually] come, we’ll pay what we have to, and then that’s it, it’s over’<sup>160</sup>.

This excerpts demonstrate how, at the start, the *donos* fronted the occupations on behalf of the residents. They knew the processes required to enable the transfer of the land from an irregular plot to a claiming ownership and so they used this knowledge to cultivate relationships with the residents. When conducting my fieldwork, over twenty-five years after the lands were first occupied by Ana and Irene, these processes of negotiating with the state were still on-going for both residents. This highlights how there is an incentive to prolong these negotiation processes as it is through the occupations and the process of making populations more legible to the state that *donos* are able to help and facilitate a sense of belonging, meaning and identity to a population otherwise abandoned, in transitoriness, and unable to claim any form of citizenship. It is through these process that they are most useful to the residents. Whilst the construction of

---

<sup>158</sup> Interviews with Sandra, Maria, Pamela, André at various moments.

<sup>159</sup> Interview with Irene, Resident of Floresta da Campinha, March 2017.

<sup>160</sup> Interview with Maria, Resident of Floresta da Campinha, March 2017.



these new communities, on the face of it, opened up a possibility for a future of self-determination, the eventual outcome was one that was intertwined with dependencies.

Whilst formal institutions and laws were created to deal with the subdivision process, local customs of informal parcelling and division of land in the West Zone were particularly resilient to change or evolution. The persistence of informal ways of managing and navigating the land reaffirmed the importance of the *donos* in the local system of governance. Without the networks and connections of the *donos*, for example, acquisition of urban space would have been almost impossible for residents such as Ana and Irene to fathom out alone due to their lack of contacts, connections, and knowledge of bureaucratic processes. Selling and reselling practices depended on networks, bargaining power and agency, highlighting the limited nature of the access order.

Furthermore, the concepts of individual ownership and property rights were particularly challenging ones for residents who were not initially able to make sense easily of the unfamiliar distinctions between what the state classifies as ‘public’ and ‘private’. Local populations in the occupations depended highly on the patronage of the *donos* to help them navigate these differences and languages. Because many of the occupants, including Irene and Ana, were illiterate and unable to process formal state bureaucracies, the *donos* helped them to navigate state bureaucracies to acquire land titles and claim citizenship rights. Wellington, for example, had worked in the police but was also a local resident, so he could speak both languages and translate and interpret between these two worlds.

### A perfect vehicle for expansion

One of the markets through which this phenomenon expanded most rapidly was through the network of informal transport that serviced the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro.<sup>161</sup> In Campo Grande around 1988, small Volkswagen minibuses<sup>162</sup> that carried between ten and fifteen passengers began to emerge around the region, the West Zone, and in other peripheral neighbourhoods, to plug the gap of the reduced bus services (discussed in chapter four). The minibuses, or ‘vans’, were typically driven by locals who lived in the communities that had been affected by the privatisations. They initially started to transport neighbours, friends and

---

<sup>161</sup> Adler, D. (2014) 'A Regulação dos Transportes Urbanos no Rio de Janeiro: Ônibus'.

<sup>162</sup> The vans were nicknamed *cabritinhos* ('little goats') for their ability to climb steep hillsides and access roads larger vehicles could not

community members, especially elderly residents, to restaurants, shopping malls and events. Often, these individuals had used their redundancy pay-out to invest in the vans.<sup>163</sup>

At the time, these informal modes of transport were championed by urban planners, politicians and policy analysts as ‘grassroots solutions’ to deal with the changes affecting the West Zone. They were seen as a natural corrective to the deficiencies of the formal market<sup>164</sup> that provided an inexpensive, agile and convenient mode of transport and that serviced a greater number of communities that had been previously inaccessible to formal buses. Competition among the van routes rapidly increased as West Zone population density began to increase and revenues increased.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, the price of bus fares rose by 273% between 1994 and 2000, which was much higher than the rate of inflation.

The politics of the informal transport system was particularly pronounced given that many, especially from lower-income classes, depended heavily on public transport. Pro-poor politicians who had their electoral base in the West Zone and peripheral communities began to link pro-poor, pro-democracy discourses with the informal van networks during the 1990s when the vans emerged as a symbol of productivity and creativity of marginalised populations; instead of private interests.

Populist left-wing politicians, in particular, adopted and deployed these discourses and used them to challenge the powerful privatisation discourses. They claimed that, in setting the privatisation agenda through the democratisation process, the ruling political coalition of the centre-right political parties, namely the PMDB and its allies, prioritised property rights and the generation of profits for capital wealthy economic elites over the access to transport services for working-class populations in peripheral communities.

One of the most prominent pro-poor politicians in this regard was Anthony Garotinho from the PDT, who emerged as a front-runner in the 1994 governor elections in Rio de Janeiro state. As a candidate from Campos dos Goytacazes, an agricultural city in the north of Rio de Janeiro state (three hundred kilometres from Rio de Janeiro city), Garotinho emerged with significant popular support. Initially, he was not taken seriously, because he was a rural outsider to Rio de Janeiro’s political elite. However, through his populist approach and particular skill in politicising and assigning meaning to issues important to peripheral communities, such as

---

<sup>163</sup> Interview with van union worker, July 2016.

<sup>164</sup> Mamani, 2016 Mamani, H. A. (2016) 'Transporte urbano e informal: quadros da Associação Nacional de Transportes Públicos', *Novos Cadernos NAEA*, 19(3).

<sup>165</sup> For example: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, RO No.036-05112/2007-01, P4482. p.336

transportation, he became a formidable force in *Carioca* politics. He positioned himself within the pro-poor discourses as an ‘anti-establishment’ politician who was representative of the poor. One of the main pledges of his campaign for state governor, for example, was his support for the informal transport system after recognising the importance of the van services to the everyday lives of West Zone residents and more remote communities.

Garotinho even weaponised the debate about the informal transport sector to attack his political opponents. By highlighting the campaign donations between the formal transport sector (which staunchly opposed any expansion of the informal transport sector and advocated for repression of it) and the commercial body representing the sector (Fétranspor), and Garotinho’s opponent, Marcelo Alencar<sup>166</sup>, Garotinho attempted to show that this ‘political establishment’ did not have the interests of urban poor populations at heart.

Although Garotinho lost the 1994 election, he was elected in 1998 when he ran again for governor of the state. He won on a similar populist agenda and again he prioritised the informal transport sector as one of the central planks of his campaign.

When he took office in January 1999, there were significant tensions within the government between the different political coalitions of the executive and legislative branches of the state. Whilst Garotinho had been elected into executive office, Rio de Janeiro’s political elite continued to hold the power in the legislature: Sérgio Cabral from the PMDB, supported by Jorge Piccianni, was in the presidency of the ALERJ and commanded the support of a majority of lawmakers.

In the first few weeks of his term, Garotinho gave a speech to his cabinet that it would be necessary to ‘bring down’ Sérgio Cabral, Jorge Piccianni, and the PMDB in order to ‘break the backbone of corruption in Rio’<sup>167</sup>. In part, Garotinho was referring to the alliance between the centre-right coalition and the business elites in control of the formal transportation sector.

Within six months, Garotinho attempted to enact some of his campaign pledges such as the reduction of bus fares in the formal transport sector by 15%<sup>168</sup>. As soon as he had announced his plans, he received a phone call from an advisor speaking on behalf of Fétránspor who

---

<sup>166</sup> Garotinho even claimed one of his opponents in the gubernatorial race, Luis Paulos Correa da Rocha, was financed by Fétránspor and was responsible for the increase in state repression of the informal van drivers in the West Zone (O Globo, 20 July 1998, Matutina, O País, p.5).

<sup>167</sup> Gaspar, M. (2017) ‘O Rei do Gado’, *Piauí* (March edn).

<sup>168</sup> State decree: 11,983 14 August 1997.

attempted to bribe him to withdraw the legislation proposals<sup>169</sup>. Publicly, Garotinho accused Cabral and Picciani of backroom deals with Fétranspor.

Politicians from the centre-right coalition resisted and accused Garotinho of a conflict of interest by trying to break up the formal bus transport companies so he could award a transport contract to a personal friend. In the following weeks, Picciani and the state parliament approved legislative amendments that favoured formal bus companies, including a 90% reduction in the state sales tax for formal bus companies.<sup>170</sup>

These tensions came to a head when Rio de Janeiro's mayor at the time, Luiz Paulo Conde, passed a municipal law making the informal vans illegal and promising not to allow the vans to stop in Rio de Janeiro city.<sup>171</sup> In response, Garotinho proposed a parliamentary inquiry (CPI) to investigate an alleged bribe money scheme involving bus companies and state deputies. When Cabral put the CPI proposal to a vote in ALERJ, it was defeated by a significant margin of forty-nine to sixteen votes.

These political battles between different political coalitions and layers of government attempting to assert their dominance over the state system had implications for individuals and workers at the local level. For example, in one of his blog posts, Garotinho claimed that the Director of Rio de Janeiro state's Department of Road Transport of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Rogério Onofre, had received bribes from Fétranspor amounting to R\$44m as an incentive to put additional resources into repressing the informal vans.<sup>172</sup> During the first years of Garotinho's term in office, hundreds of informal vans were impounded, and their drivers were left without a means of income. At the same time, formal bus services continued to circulate around the city with incorrect licence plates and out of date registrations.

In response to the structural changes taking place in the economy and labour markets, van drivers began to organise themselves into co-operatives. This helped to create structures and order around their working practices; but it also facilitated greater organisational capacity among the drivers to engage in collective bargaining and to retaliate to repressions from the state. The co-operatives, typically organised according to the neighbourhoods they were based in, also helped to mediate tensions in the organisation of the vans, as they determined which

---

<sup>169</sup> Gaspar, M. (2017) 'O Rei do Gado', *Piauí* (March edn).

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> *O Globo*, 07 June 1999, Matutina, Rio, p.13.

<sup>172</sup> Garotinho alleged that Rogério Onofre, the ex-President of DETRO, Rio de Janeiro's Department of Road Transport, received R\$44m in bribes from Fétranspor in order for DETRO to focus on repression of the informal sector whilst turning a blind eye to formal sector buses without correct licences and MOTs. See Garotinho's blog: Garotinho, A. (2017) 'Rogério Onofre: Um mafioso foragido'. Available at: <http://www.blogdogarotinho.com.br/lartigo.aspx?id=24684>.

drivers serviced which routes, and when. This also provided a direct channel for politicians, like Garotinho, to strengthen and organise their grassroots support with different unions and directors of the cooperatives.

In return for promises to the cooperatives and the unions to campaign for the legalisation of the informal networks, the cooperative directors pledged electoral support to Garotinho. This had a huge effect given the geographical reach of the van networks across marginalised communities, and the West Zone in general. Most of the residents of the West Zone used the van network, and drivers spread the support for particular candidates linked to Garotinho and the PDT. These political connections have been a recurring theme through the past two decades. As Claudio Ferraz pointed out,

Eduardo Paes is the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, after the mayor met with the van cooperative, run by the *milícias* for a long time, and we put our mouths on the trombone, it became a newspaper headline, he recoiled, of course, but he did it because the guys supported his candidacy. But then, of course, you have to pay the bill when you turn the government over.<sup>173</sup>

This observation was also corroborated by workers of the van union who were present at that meeting. In addition to repression by the alliance between business and political elites through the formal-legal state apparatus, the vans had been targeted from the mid-1990s by parastatal actors looking to steal the large sums of daily cash takings and the vehicles from the drivers.

To protect themselves, individual van drivers and cooperatives paid the *donos* of the communities they passed through to provide them with protection when the vans were stationary and at their most vulnerable in popular pickup and drop off points.<sup>174</sup> In Cosmos, for example, drivers paid Aldemar and Ricardo a daily fee to guard the petrol station forecourt where the vans regularly stopped, changed drivers, and picked up new passengers.<sup>175</sup>

At first, these practices were isolated and contained to the communities where passenger traffic was highest and where the vans spent the greatest time being stationary. However, as the sensation of insecurity continued to increase in the second half of the 1990s, van drivers and co-operative directors asked the policemen and former policemen who were guarding the stops to ride inside the vans with them to evade the threat of being hijacked or robbed in transit. This began to generate conflict among the different groups of policemen, who, until this point, had

---

<sup>173</sup> Interview with Claudio Ferraz, Former Director of DRACO, November 2016.

<sup>174</sup> Interview with van union worker, September 2016

<sup>175</sup> Interview with Maria, Resident of Floresta da Campinha, March 2017.

been able to provide protection for the communities in which they lived defined by a fixed territorial boundary – usually the perimeter of the community or limitations of specific streets. However, because the van routes traversed large distances, threading through different communities across the West Zone, when security actors began to travel inside of the vans it challenged the territorial logic of the *donos* in the communities. For the first time, dispersed groups of policemen and extermination groups came into competition with one another as they competed for security contracts on the van lines. According to one policeman,

‘There was a mutation of these death squads to the so-called *milícia*, and then they started not to “be organized”, but to have some elements of organization, to dominate a much larger area and to exploit’<sup>176</sup>.

These tensions initially led to conflicts among the different groups of policemen, as they contested territorial control over the different van lines. One District Attorney explained to me, ‘Where there is money and no legalization, it becomes the law and survival of the fittest’, highlighting how it was the group with the strongest holding power and ability to exercise violence that was able to dominate the region. As the Director of a van workers’ union, explained to me:

‘The guy has a van, starts riding on that line providing a differentiated service to the people, he takes a line there in Sepetiba and comes to Campo Grande then he passes in the territory of so and so ... there is a [Military Police] Battalion here, the PM here starts to make a buck here comes a guy the Sheriff here, “who owns this one?” to pass there you have to donate a basic food basket and then extortion begins, the guy loses, when he loses, then the violence starts.’<sup>177</sup>

The consequence of the high cost of violence was a shift in the *modus operandi* of the different groups of policemen, who operated under similar logics and with similar objectives. For example, Aldemar and Ricardo in Cosmos formed an alliance with Natalino and Jerônimo in Mendanha and Campo Grande in order to share the organisation of the different lines and the profits among them. Gradually, the dispersed commercial violence brokers were absorbed into an emerging network that saw interconnections among highly localised regimes of power.<sup>178</sup> Meanwhile, the cooperatives provided ready-made structures for these actors to organise and order themselves within.

Simultaneous to these processes, the form of protection started to morph into extortion and monopolisation of the markets through a gradual process that led to the centralisation of power

---

<sup>176</sup> Interview with Rivaldo Barbosa, Chief of the Homicide Division, Civil Police.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Director of a van workers union, June 2016.

<sup>178</sup> Interview with the former District Attorney for Campo Grande, June 2016.

in the hands of the *donos*. These emerging groups gave continuity to the fear-making discourses that were already prevalent across the city and that suppressed and manipulated local populations. They extracted taxes directly from the van drivers, who, in turn, raised fares on the local residents. When one van driver asked if the security agents (in their police uniforms) had a warrant to tax them in return for protection, for example, the officer replied, 'My warrant is my rifle.'<sup>179</sup> This form of domination was reaffirmed in an interview with a Detective from the Civil Police in the Campo Grande region:

Interviewer: So does driver work for the group directly?

Civil Policeman: He ends up being submissive, obliged to work that way, before they took all the van cooperatives, it's all mine, everyone goes out, whoever doesn't want to leave us take it hard and take it all.<sup>180</sup>

These violent processes of capital accumulation further empowered militiamen, as they accumulated a large amount of financial resources and were able to access more weapons.<sup>181</sup>

Some of these processes of centralisation and attempts to monopolise were more violent than others. In Campo Grande, for example, Natalino and Jerônimo attempted to take over many of the cooperatives in the neighbourhood of Campo Grande via a variety of strategies. In the first instance, they approached the cooperative director and made them a financial offer, in some cases offering up to R\$80,000 for specific van routes.<sup>182</sup>

If that failed, they used threats to coerce the directors into selling the cooperatives. If a financial incentive did not work, the *donos* resorted to public violence to take over the co-operative. In one case, a cooperative Director, Emília, was assassinated publicly in daylight with forty bullets through her body in the entrance to the local shopping mall in Campo Grande. Following the assassination, Jerônimo's son, Luciano, along with Ricardo, used this assassination as a threat to other cooperative directors. In a subsequent takeover in Santa Cruz, Luciano told the director, 'If he doesn't [hand over control] ... the same will happen to them what happened to Emília at the shopping centre'<sup>183</sup>.

In the last instance, and if there was no co-operative to take over, the *donos* tended to set up co-operatives themselves to front their activities:

He created a cooperative, he exploited the alternative transport system, but he created a façade cooperative, then he had some vehicles that were not part of the cooperative,

---

<sup>179</sup> CPI of the Milícias (2008), p.116.

<sup>180</sup> Interview with Renato, Civil Policeman, April 2017.

<sup>181</sup> Interview with Antonio Da Silva, Civil Policeman, September 2016.

<sup>182</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, Testimony Ação Penal Pública (originária) No. 2008.068.00004, P8842., p.165

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

but he always had this cooperative to show, not here, it is legal, but in fact most of vehicles did not even enter the cooperative's accounts.<sup>184</sup>

The reasons for going to such lengths to acquire and set-up shell co-operatives is the extremely high returns on the vans. Given that most residents of the West Zone use these services, it 'makes the most money [...] a lot of money, that's why they keep killing themselves, because the amount of money is very high, the main top profitable money is the van, by far.'<sup>185</sup> An interview with Claudio Ferraz, who was working in a task force for the Municipal Government to combat clandestine vans when I interviewed him in 2017, suggested in an interview,

I am working on a situation, that approximately in the way of 3,000 vans circulating just in the AP5 [the administrative district of the West Zone], which is the distribution of the planning areas of the city hall, which takes, Bangu, Realengo, Campo Grande, Santa Cruz, Sepetiba, Guaratiba, and that region. About 3,000 vans ... they are paying an average of R\$ 500 per week, just to get around, per van! Today, yesterday... I heard that there are certain more profitable lines, which pay a week to run, R\$ 1,300! [...] So these groups, their goal is to have as many irregular vehicles as possible, without the state defining the itineraries, so that they have the power to define where you will run... and the collection of this is a millionaire, if you put R\$ 500 on average for 2 thousand vans... it is much higher, this gives you a lot of money per week, where is that money going?<sup>186</sup>.

### Another version of 'the state'

When Garotinho was elected as the governor of Rio de Janeiro, he attempted to reshape the state system by inviting political allies into decision-making positions. He was able to cultivate support from urban poor populations by siding with them and their practices, such as their reliance on informal transport networks, in a way that previous political classes from Rio de Janeiro's urban centre could (or would) not.

At the same time, by politically prioritising local and informal (and sometimes illegal) practices, he created competition with business and economic elites who had benefited from the status quo for some time. This led to tension that played out within the state system between these contending coalitions, as they attempted to shore up control over the resources of the state and access to markets.

Although the news media and their corporate owners were forced to support Garotinho throughout 1999 due to his wide-spread popularity,<sup>187</sup> rising levels of violence and a downturn

---

<sup>184</sup> Interview with Director of a van workers union, June 2016.

<sup>185</sup> Interview from van union worker, July 2017

<sup>186</sup> Interview with Claudio Ferraz, Former Director of DRACO, November 2016.

<sup>187</sup> Malin, M. (2007) 'Debate busca raízes da violência 2'. Available at: <https://www.acessa.com/gramsci/?page=visualizar&id=699> [2017].



in the economy during his administration created discomfort with his political agenda towards the end of 1999. It was a sign that there was cultural resistance towards Garotinho and his populist way of doing politics and his direct dialogues with urban poor classes. By March 2000, political and economic elites, and the media, found a public reason to finally ‘turn’ against Garotinho and withdraw their political support: Garotinho dismissed his Coordinator of Security and Citizenship, Luiz Eduardo Soares, a prominent and popular intellectual in Rio de Janeiro, in a live television interview<sup>188</sup>.

Growing discontent about Garotinho’s government, combined with scathing media attacks, helped to shift the political landscape during the October 2000 municipal elections. Garotinho and his party lost many of the candidates they supported in favour of candidates from a number of parties from across the political spectrum, including the centre-right parties, the PMDB and the Liberal Front Party. As a result of these elections, a new technocratic centre-right coalition began to emerge. One of those councillors was Jerônimo, who was finally elected to the city council, with 20,560 votes. Following the loss of political support at the municipal level, Garotinho was forced to reshuffle his cabinet<sup>189</sup> and the balance of power between the centre-right coalition and Garotinho’s centre-left populist coalition shifted away from Garotinho’s control and towards that of politicians such as Jerônimo.

However, in spite of these tensions, by early 2001 there were signs that a new coalition between Garotinho and the PMDB was emerging. In April 2001, for example, Jerônimo nominated Garotinho’s Security Secretary, Josias Quintal, for the highly respected municipal Pedro Ernesto Medal of Achievement.<sup>190</sup> By 2002, when Garotinho resigned from office to run for the national presidency, his wife, Rosinha, succeeded him as governor and she established even stronger alliances with popular PMDB politicians, including Sérgio Cabral, who was running for the national senate. This alliance crystallised in 2003 when Garotinho and Rosinha joined the PMDB.

---

<sup>188</sup> Garotinho argued that Luiz Eduardo Soares publicly defended João Salles, a famous director and documentary filmmaker in Rio de Janeiro, who was believed to have been financing a fugitive drug trafficker.

<sup>189</sup> Despite these losses in the city council, Garotinho maintained his executive privileges. Four weeks after the elections he appointed his ally, Álvaro Lins to be the new chief of the civil police. This appointment was highly controversial, with many claiming Lins was the leader of The Astral Group faction within the civil police, known for violent and extra-judicial policing practices such as bribery, extortion and kidnapping. However, this was part of Garotinho’s electoral strategy to appear tough on crime and for him to maintain favourable relations with the elite who were in favour of more ‘iron fist’ approaches to dealing with criminality.

<sup>190</sup> Rio de Janeiro City Council, ‘Conferir a Medalha de Mérito Pedro Ernesto ao Coronel PM Josias Quintal - Secretário de Segurança do Estado do Rio de Janeiro’, 19/6/2001, 4381.

In 2004, Rosinha suffered the same criticism as her husband for failing to implement successful security policies and deal with the rising levels of criminality, violence, and insecurity. Many of the occupations and developments built during the 1990s were victims to this violence.

During an interview with Elizabeth, a resident from João XXIII, in the back yard of her house, she explained how the high walls surrounding us with broken glass cemented into the tops of the walls were built in the early 2000s to deter intruders. They were not there when she first moved into the house in the 1990s:

Elizabeth: When I came to live here, at first it was bad because these houses here, none had a wall

Interviewer: It was open here?

Elizabeth: It was, EVERYTHING was open, these houses here all, there were only houses. Then some started building the wall, the other building the wall, then it became a kind of dangerous place, but then, here it is a / very good [...] after about three years I was here, because the difficulty is / I lived alone, with my children, I was separated from my husband, so I was not able to do it like that, then I went to do it after three years, I did it [...] at the beginning there was tremendous banditry, which I don't know if anyone has told you about?<sup>191</sup>

These rising levels of insecurity and violence amongst the population led Rosinha to appoint Marcelo Itagiba, also from the PMDB, as her new Security Secretary. His brief was to take a tougher stance on law and order, partially in response to growing criticism from political opponents about the lack of successful security policies and rising levels of violence and insecurity.

One of his flagship policies for tackling drug trafficking crime and violence was to build Military Police Deployment Units (DPOs) (fig. 22), or community policing stations, in urban poor communities across the state.<sup>192</sup>

Whereas previous community policing strategies had involved communities and resident participation, the DPO strategy prioritised ideas from the political right. It attempted to elevate the role of police who were already residents in the communities, rather than the community-inclusive strategies previously tested. This was an attractive strategy for many resident police

---

<sup>191</sup> Interview with Elizabeth, Resident of João XXIII, April 2017.

<sup>192</sup> Similar strategies had been trialled previously in small areas of Rio de Janeiro during the 1980s and 1990s to try and 'pacify' violent drug trafficking faction conflicts, such as Cantagalo *favela* in the South Zone. Nazareth Cerqueira, Chief of Military Police during Brizola's governments (1983-87 and 1990-94) attempted to alter the way the police dealt with the favelas by introducing community policing methods. However, the strategy was wider-reaching than any previous attempt to embed this model of policing and police were much more mobilised and engaged in the initiative.

who approved of a way they could re-establish social order in the communities where they lived with their families, neighbours and friends.



Figure 24: A contemporary example of a DPO with the text ‘HERE THE TERRITORY IS OURS’ (Source: Lei Seca Maricá website, <https://leisecamarica.com.br/pm-retira-trailer-da-comunidade-do-risca-faca-em-inoã/>)

DPOs were offered to local clusters of police during a time when drug traffickers were expanding significantly across much of the West Zone. Police officers living in the community told me how they used to fear living there.<sup>193</sup>

They used to get dressed into their uniforms at work so that they could leave and return home without worrying about attracting unwanted attention from the local drug trafficking group. A Civil Police Station Chief explained how,

they used to use a lot of police in the beginning, just to show that there was a parallel with the state, they really wanted to show legitimacy, so they wanted to say that they were a force of the state, so they said: I am a police I work for the state, but I want to work for the community here too, so they insisted on the presence of the police, to show that they were kind of a parallel action by the state, which is an action that can be confused with state action.<sup>194</sup>

During an interview, Marcelo Itagiba, one of the architects of the DPO strategy explained this to me in a different way. He suggested that:

‘At one point [in João XXIII] [the police] organised themselves so that they would not have to flee anymore, maybe because the state was unable to combat them. Because sometimes when you have many enemies you have to list what is causing the most

<sup>193</sup> Interviews with Rogério and Alan, Police and militiamen from João XXIII, November 2016.

<sup>194</sup> Interview with Renato, Civil Policeman, November 2017.

damage at that moment. We set up a large community policing booth [DPO] to try to make sure the cops could stay with their families in their homes.’<sup>195</sup>

Although Itagiba’s description of the construction of the DPO seems to suggest that the police self-organised to expulse the traffickers, Marco, a resident from João XXIII explained to me how the ‘invasion’ by the police had seemed to be coordinated by the Security Secretary. There was a set day for the police operation and, ‘once the police had ‘re-taken’ the community, then the construction of the DPO base would soon follow’.

Even though this strategy was an alternative to funding new police stations and recruiting more police, the offer of funding the construction of a DPO in the local community was appealing for many police residents, given the absence of policing apparatus in their local communities. Parastatal actors appeared to genuinely believe that their purpose as trained police and protectors of the state was to establish order in these spaces where the state’s authority had lapsed or been absent and where drug trafficking and criminality had taken over.

Many of the motivations of police came from their experiences of the distribution of resources, as it provided the opportunity for police officers to create a safer and more ordered living environment for themselves and their families. Shared histories and experiences with a network of community residents, friends and family shaped police actions.<sup>196</sup> The DPO became the physical headquarters and meeting point for the police (and parastatal actors) and a site where the police were able to consolidate their power, expel and eradicate drug traffickers from the community and monopolise the means of violence.

In part, because the state did not pay police additional salaries for their practices in their communities, one of the by-products of these securitisation and protection activities eventually encouraged them to pursue informal tax collection that gradually, over time, started to allow these groups to centralise, differentiate themselves establish political autonomy for themselves.

In this context, the distinction between what is police and what is parastatal is almost rendered redundant. It was less important whether the individual has a uniform on, or not, and more important what meaning was attributed to that individual. As one resident from Sepetiba explained to me:

---

<sup>195</sup> Interview with Marcelo Itagiba, former Policeman and Federal Lawmaker, January 2017

<sup>196</sup> For instance, one Military Policeman described his experience of moving to a new community and not being accepted into the group of local police: ‘This person is from the area and has an affinity with that person, and then they graduate together, they’re both there at the same place of work, they know that they’re both from here too, so it creates an affinity. Now, I, as an outsider come in and I don’t get invited ... Affinity is established either in the work or in the place they live. But I, who come from the outside, I’ve no affinity at all.’

Nicholas: And there police here?

Carolina: There are police here, they're all the same.

Nicholas: What do you mean?

Carolina: The police here have all done deals with the *chefes*, it's all the same shit.

Nicholas: Are they the same people?

Carolina: If there's a fight here, for example, we can't call, nobody calls the police, we call the guys.

Nicholas: I see.

Carolina: Understand? It's worse. And there are several inmates here.

Nicholas: Do you have inmates?

Carolina: Yes, there are 4 or 5. There are police, everything is all connected.<sup>197</sup>

This is underpinned by endemic distrust in the formal state system following years of neglect and marginalisation by state and political elites from the Centro and South Zone. Furthermore, the presence of police acted as a symbol of violence and repression and the presence of the police created a 'us-them' dynamic with the community. Rodolfo, a Military Police Sargent from a UPP station in Complex de Alemão, and a resident of Campo Grande, explained to me how these dynamics played out in a drug trafficking favela:

The relationship with residents in the community [and the police] has always been terrible, generally it has a history since when it was founded, in the time of the colonies, *quilombos*, they never liked the police, the police were always repressive, so when they put the UPP there, they endured, they supported the police there, it was always a love-hate relationship, they endured because they had nowhere else to go, but in return, they stayed in their communities, they had communities that were closer.

But this was much more complex in communities dominated by parastatal groups, especially newer ones in the West Zone where there have been much shorter histories of occupation, and where drug trafficking was never a central part of the community's economy. In these communities, there has been more of an aversion to drug trafficking groups and criminal violence. For the reason the police and the parastatism are more accepted.

## Conclusions

Situated within a long history of violence and opportunistic boom and bust dynamics, the fundamental character of violence in the West Zone shifted during the 1990s because of structural shifts of democratisation and economic liberalisation. This chapter has demonstrated how the violent groups in question emerged through this fulcrum of urbanisation, liberalisation,

---

<sup>197</sup> Interview with Anita, Sepetiba Resident, December 2016.

and local structures of patronage, during an urban frontier moment in which elites (in the margins and in the centre) were forced to rethink their strategies of control over peripheral spaces.

These processes led to a retraction of the formal state, in terms of public goods and services, which, in turn, opened the flood gates for an expansion of diverse informal economies, including illicit drug markets and informal goods and services. Thus, the democratisation process did not automatically mean that roles of patronage and clientelism (and *coronelismo*) disappeared, as old political structures were supposedly dismantled. In fact, the economic and political processes combined seemed to intensify and help to embed the local authority of *donos* within the community as power became decentralised.

A set of twin and intertwined processes then established the foundations for the emergence of parastatal groups. Firstly, the dependence of some urban poor communities on illegal drug trafficking and other illicit economies for their primary source of income led to violent territorial wars; criminal organisations competed with one another for control over urban territories upon which to conduct their trade with global markets and extract rents from domestic ones. Underpinning this was an unstable political settlement where there was fierce competition for resources and rents; in which high-stakes competition forced different organisations to deploy violence and coercive force to secure space and manage rent extractions.

Secondly, due to the encroaching threat of violence and conflict from drug trafficking groups, there was a growing demand from local communities to address disorder and criminal violence and deal with collective action problems, much like with the *coroneis*, *cangueueiros*, and *policia mineira* of previous centuries. Local *donos*, ex-state security agents linked to these communities rose to the challenge and deployed violence to establish local order for populations. However, without the traditional forms of patronage from landed gentry and elite sponsors, these actors were forced to turn to informal economies, such as the informal transport sector, land sub-division market, and provision of social welfare, in order to secure economic and social security for themselves to guarantee their own survival.

Political and state elites, conscious of these emerging provocative and reactive processes, allowed them to take place during the 1990s because they were beneficial to the re-stabilisation of an urban political settlement. This led to reduced levels of violence, which meant that markets could function without disruption. Although it meant distributing resources through

an uneasy coalition with powerful groups in marginal spaces, it also meant that there was a settlement that avoided the need to spend valuable resources on protecting resources and space from drug traffickers.

Once political and state elites eventually helped to institutionalise, legalise, and absorb these groups into the state system, these processes helped to redistribute power and resources across the urban landscape; aiding a deepening of coalitions between parastatal groups in the urban frontier and elites from the centre; which inadvertently helped the ‘periphery’ to invert into its own ‘centre’ through dynamics of co-production.

As we see in subsequent chapters, this response established new contradictions, social impasses, and challenges to state and political elites in control of the state system; as parastatal groups established new structural, every day, institutionalised and symbolic forms of violence which ultimately threatened the hegemony of the established elites within the state system. In this sense, *Carioca* paramilitaries should be understood as a form of violence created as a result of the imbalanced distribution of resources, services and goods in the frontier space; but also as a force that has been ravaged by influence of global capital compelled to violently extract and accumulate.

## Six: The *Milícia* as the Means to an End

*The Parliamentary Commission Inquiry of the Milícias (CPI) was published as a final document in December 2008 and it describes a parliamentary inquiry into the ‘milícias’ in Rio de Janeiro. When I was reading the final CPI report, a strong narrative was clearly present about what the ‘milícia’ actually was.*

*According to the CPI, the milícia was a criminal organisation made up of corrupt and violent state agents and politicians, purely seeking to advance their economic interests and accumulate more power.*

*A friend and colleague in the civil police who had had his own issues with the political, police, military, and state elites, had informed me that thousands of pages of documentation used to write this report had been filed in the archives of the Rio de Janeiro State Parliament (ALERJ).*

*After some investigation I lodged a Freedom of Information (FOI) request in the ALERJ request in January 2016 to access the archives. It was rejected on the grounds that my application was not clear, didn’t have the right information, and hadn’t been sent to the right place.*

*Over the following 12 months I lodged five more FOI requests in the ALERJ and also with the Federal Government’s FOI centre. They were all rejected for a range of reasons ranging from administrative errors to denial that the data even exists.*

*Marcelo Freixo, the President of the CPI, helped me with some of the requests, but he was only able to grant me access to some of the documents.*

*I made formal and informal requests directly to the President of the ALERJ, Jorge Piccianni (PMDB) and Head of the Executive Board (Mesa Director).*

*All my communication went through Marquinhos, Piccianni’s Chief of Staff. He delayed my requests, ignored my calls, ‘lost’ my paperwork and refused to see me every time I turned up at his office. It got to the stage that I went weekly to his office and sat for several hours at a time waiting to speak with him. When I persisted and was able to*



*talk to him in the corridor or car park, he offered me excuses about 'administrative errors', it being someone else's fault, and false promises.*

*By May 2017, one month before I was due to finish my fieldwork, Piccianni took a leave of absence from ALERJ due to an unfortunate cancer diagnosis. The Deputy President of the ALERJ, André Ceciliano who was from the Workers' Party (PT), in opposition to Piccianni's PMDB, took over Piccianni's position temporarily.*

*Through my activist networks and connections with the PT, I arranged to speak with André Ceciliano directly and request access directly from him. He approved my request to access the documentation immediately. Perhaps he had political motivations for doing so.*

*With my letter of approval in hand, I went directly to Marquinhos' office and asked to access the documents. He was frustrated and interrogated me about my motives. After ten minutes of arguing and walking around his office he said to me: 'You do whatever you want! Go! At the end of the day you're not going to find my name in there, not in any of the CPIs, not anywhere, so I'm fine!'*

*I reached the archive room deep in the basement of the ALERJ and the archive manager took my approval letter and handed over seventeen boxes of documents totalling over 30,000 pages.<sup>198</sup>*

## Introduction

The fieldnote above detailing my experience attempting to access classified information demonstrates the extent to which power relations, technologies of social ordering, and constructive obstruction were, and continue to be, a significant part of the political settlement in Rio de Janeiro.<sup>199</sup> In this chapter I look through the lens of political relations in order to peer through the tensions and reorganisations of the political settlement that took place in Rio de Janeiro. I do this in order to examine the role of parastatal groups in *Carioca* political processes. Specifically, I unpack these shifts in the political settlements through a critical assessment of 'milícia' as a discourse.

---

<sup>198</sup> This is a collection of fieldnotes to create a vignette.

<sup>199</sup> As Bhaskar notes, for example, "[e]xperiences, and the facts they ground, are social products", of the mechanisms in the real domain Bhaskar, R. (2013) *A realist theory of science*. Routledge..

The objective of this chapter is to address my second research question: ‘What is the relationship between *Carioca milícias* and the underlying political settlement?’ I answer this by exploring how the formation of coalitions between parastatal actors in the West Zone and political and state elites from the centre (as I articulated in chapter five) provoked a crisis around the form of governmentality and the ideas and norms that circulated within the political settlement. The key argument is that parastatal groups, and the power they brokered in the West Zone, enabled them to contest, re-shape, and influence hegemony within the urban political settlement. These processes affected the trajectory and shape of the state system. New contradictions and social impasses emerged as a result of these processes when these groups attempted to embed their own security practices, political ideas, and strategies for ordering urban space within the state system. Furthermore, when parastatal groups attempted to rebalance power, so that more rents were available to them and their political backers in the urban peripheries, it provoked political elites from the urban centre retake control of state hegemony.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. In the first section I discuss the consolidation of parastatal coalitions in territories adjacent to affluent areas of the city. In the second section I explore an unsettled period in which parastatal groups began to advance across the city and the response of drug traffickers who attempted to curb the power of parastatal groups through large-scale conflict. The third section describes how political elites from the central state attempted to dismantle the political power of parastatal coalitions once they recognised the threat that they posed to the overall shape of the political settlement. In fourth section I examine a legitimacy crisis of the paramilitaries and how this enabled central political elites to mobilise a sophisticated and violent ‘combat’ strategy to expel the paramilitaries from positions of influence within the political settlement. Finally, before drawing some conclusions, I reflect on how paramilitaries were recast as barbaric and violent, and the inhabitants of the West Zone as occupants of a far-flung land in need of civilisation, state-building, and formal market expansion.

### Emergence of ‘*milícia*’ as a device

As a result of greater tolerance towards parastatal groups and the DPO strategy, greater numbers of police across the West Zone began to provide protection and security in their communities during the first half of the 2000s. Vera Araújo, a journalist from the national *O Globo* newspaper, who has a focus on reporting on crime and police violence in Rio de Janeiro, explained to me how she first came to report on these practices. In 2002, she interviewed Police

Sergeant from the *favela* of Morro do Banco, Itanhangá’<sup>200</sup>, who local residents called ‘The Sheriff’ after he had taken on the role of protecting locals from the rising threat of drug trafficking in a *favela* community. He was elected by residents to be the president of the residents’ association of Morro do Banco.

Vera published an article entitled, ‘The Sheriff that Changed the Routine of Itanhangá’ (fig. 23), in which she described the *dono*’s role of protecting the residents from drug traffickers in the local community. The article suggests that these practices were so successful that another four neighbouring communities adopted similar approaches. The way these practices were presented echoed some of the language from other newspapers and popular culture in which the protection and securitisation practices of death squads, extermination groups and vigilantes throughout the 1980s and 1990s<sup>201</sup> were seen as a solution to insecurities.



Figure 25: ‘The Sheriff that Changed the Routine of Itanhangá’ (Source: *O Globo* Archive, 24/2/2002)

Vera explained how she had heard about these kinds of stories with increasing frequency in the Jacarepaguá region for the years following this article. Because she was writing more frequently about all these different activities, Vera explained how she had worked with her editor to create a term to articulate these practices for the frontpage the newspaper that was published in 2005 (fig. 24):

‘I couldn’t say it was simply an “extermination group”, because they weren’t just working here ... besides, it was not going to work to write “extermination group” as a headline. It’s a huge name for a newspaper headline [...] I couldn’t use “extermination group”, because

<sup>200</sup> Morro do Banco is sandwiched between the Barra da Tijuca and the Tijuca forest on the perimeter of the West Zone. Barra da Tijuca has been a site of intense real estate speculation.

<sup>201</sup> There was very little consensus between communities about how to best describe the practices police, security agents, civic leaders and citizens across the region. Different terms were used to describe these groups and their practices such as ‘extermination groups’, ‘death squads’, ‘paramilitary groups’, ‘vigilantes’, ‘local bosses’, ‘chiefs’, ‘moonlighting police’, ‘sheriffs’, ‘security agents’, ‘*polícia mineria*’, ‘self-defence groups’ and ‘*cançangueiros*’, to name a few. Some of these practices are discussed in chapter six. A more complete summary can be found in Appendix 2.

they're not there just to kill. They're also there to make money. They're the mediators. They're ... they're entrepreneurs, criminal entrepreneurs.

So, I started to do some research. Then I told my boss, my ex-mentor, at the time we were finishing up these articles, in 2005. I said, "We cannot say that it is *policia mineira*. We can't say that it's an 'extermination group', because the *modus operandi* is different. They are in the business of death, it's the business of ... They only want to know about profit, of money".

Finally, I said, "Why not *milícia*?" If we search for *milícia* in the dictionary and do a search, I do not know exactly, but it's a thing that ... they are people that ... they're there, being hired or doing business, so it's a different thing. So, I guess from there it led to where we go to, and then the name stuck, *milícia*, and we put it in the headline. And my editor said, "Yep, I think you're right, we are going to use *milícia*, we can call it that name." And it stuck.<sup>202</sup>

---

<sup>202</sup> Interview with Vera Araújo, Journalist from *O Globo*, June 2016.



Figure 26: 'Police Create Milícias and Expel Drug Traffickers from Favelas' (Source: *O Globo* Archive, 20/3/2005)




Figure 27: Map of Locations of Favelas With (White) and Without (Black) Drug Trafficking (Source: *O Globo* Archive, 20/3/2005)

Although practices of protection against drug traffickers, extortion and domination had been in existence for several years, there had been no unified way of describing them until this point in time. This is important when we acknowledge that the description of these groups surfaced during the early 2000s specifically in relation to a small geographical area of *favelas* in the region surrounding Barra da Tijuca, Recreio and Jacarépagua (fig. 25). Yet, little attention had been given to the similar practices that had been underway in various guises in Campo Grande and Santa Cruz during the early 1990s. It suggests that there was a growing awareness amongst the property-owning classes of Barra da Tijuca, Recreio and Jacarepaguá, middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods, about the rising power and influence of the parastatal groups in the surrounding communities.

That said, when discussion of the '*milícia*' first emerged, the sentiment was broadly positive. The definition of *milícia* ('militia') even has a positive slant<sup>203</sup>, as it suggests that there is a line of citizen protection against an enemy. In this case, the enemy is the drug trafficker and the criminal. However, this terminology is inaccurate, as it describes a civilian force, rather than a para-state force that is composed of police and military violence specialists who are, in some way, linked into the state system. And whilst the term '*milícia*' touches on the theme of security and protection, it does not necessarily describe the diverse array of illicit and illegal practices these groups have engaged in across the West Zone, for example, control over transport, gas and land markets.

In spite of these deficiencies in the terminology, '*milícia*', as a term to describe these practices, became popularised in popular culture and mainstream news media, where the term was embraced, and the idea even romanticised. Popular politicians even declared their public support for the groups as the 'lesser of two evils'. Ex-mayor César Maia accoladed the 'community self-defence' groups in 2006<sup>204</sup>; whilst Eduardo Paes, who won the mayoral elections in 2008, praised the actions of the *policia mineira* in a televised interview as he suggested they helped to combat drug traffickers and deal with crime.<sup>205</sup>

This imaginary of securitising *milícias* was even popularised in one of Brazil's infamous soap operas by TV Globo in a show called *Duas Caras*. *Duas Caras* told the story of a *milícia* in a fictional Carioca *favela* in which Juvenal Antena protected the community from the threats of drug traffickers and criminal violence. The depiction of the *favela* was particularly notable for

---

<sup>203</sup> This has also been acknowledged by Cano and Iooty (2008).

<sup>204</sup> See: Cano, I. and Duarte, T. (2012) *No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (2008-2011)*.

<sup>205</sup> O Globo (2006) 'Eduardo Paes elogia ações das milícias de PM em Jacarepaguá', *O Globo*, 15 September. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/eleicoes-2006/eduardo-paes-elogia-acoes-de-milicias-de-pms-em-jacarepagua-5000337>.

its absence of crime and violence in comparison to other *favelas*. The leader of the *milícia* even fell in love with a middle-class white girl from a South Zone.

There was a broad consensus in state, political and economic elite circles that the *milícia* was a good thing for society. These ideas permeated many of the state institutions, such as the public prosecution and the judiciary, which were largely located in the city centre, far from the neighbourhoods where paramilitaries dominated. Claudio Ferraz, the director of the civil police Organised Crime Division (DRACO) unit between 2007 and 2012, told me:

‘There was no awareness in the Public Ministry (Public Prosecution), or with anyone, especially here at [DRACO] headquarters. There we still had the idea that the militia was a very good thing that supported the police, supported the police, as a self-protection system, community self-defence ... That kind of thing ... It was seen in the imagination of the police with good eyes.’

Middle- and upper-class Cariocas often drew parallels between their own experiences of the private security protections they contracted in their private streets and gated communities, and the provision of additional security for marginalised communities in the West Zone. They idealised these practices as a ‘grassroots’ solutions to deal with the problem. Alexandre Capote, ex-director of the Organised Crime Division of the civil police, confirmed this common view of residents of middle- and upper-classes in the South Zone:

‘I was finishing up from being on duty. I arrived late at a barbecue at a friend’s house, and they said, “Why are you late?” and I replied, “Ah, I was on duty and giving out some warrants to arrest militiaman”.

“Wait, you’re authorising their imprisonment?” (These were people who weren’t in the police, people from other life paths) ... “You’re not arresting a militiaman, are you?”. This was in 2006.

“No, don’t do that, they kill the bad guys. Leave them alone, don’t do it, no”. So, most people supported it, they adopted it.’<sup>206</sup>

Whilst this view understands the function of *milícias* as limiting the violent and criminal behaviours of drug trafficking organisations in the West Zone, it also simplifies the experiences of West Zone residents and it erases the complexities of these spaces and the ways that they are governed and ordered.

This discourse, therefore, places a spotlight on the structural and geographical divisions and lack of understanding that there is between the urban centre and the periphery. It is not surprising, therefore, that policymakers and political elites, many of them residents of the South

---

<sup>206</sup> Interview with Alexandre Capote, former Director of DRACO, November 2016.



Zone's middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods, have a limited understanding of everyday life and the experiences of urban poor communities in more peripheral parts of the city.

Whilst I found no evidence to suggest that the *milícia* term had been used in the West Zone in any sustained or systematic way before Vera had used it in 2005, we can make a fairly reasonable assumption that the term was at least popularised and disseminated (if not created) in *Carioca* discourse, at least, as a result of publications and dissemination in the mainstream news media, such as *O Globo*.

By attempting to move beyond this smokescreen that obscures the everyday experiences of urban poor communities, it is useful to reflect on the role of this discourse. The discursive politics surrounding the *milícia* are informed by contradictions and tensions that obscure unequal and unjust power relations within the underlying power regime of the city. They help to maintain the ways that state resources are distributed, in terms of centre and periphery, by justifying the informal practices of paramilitaries.

### Expansion of parastatal organisations and contestation over urban space

One of the ways we can look through the smokescreen is to re-anchor the discussion in the practices and try to understand how the *milícia* discourse converged with these spaces. During the time that these practices in the communities surrounding Barra da Tijuca, Recreio, and Jacarepaguá attracted the attention of *O Globo* newspaper and its readership, the practices of paramilitaries in Campo Grande had been expanding and had started to become more violent. The various paramilitary groups continued to consolidate and centralise, and they attempted to establish themselves as autonomous and political organisations in their own right. Inter-parastatal group violence escalated, and turf wars broke out among groups competing over access to resources, territory and markets.

'The League of Justice' was the largest group in Campo Grande and it was led by Natalino, Jerônimo, Ricardo (Batman) and Aldemar (Robin). They branded themselves with the Batman symbol which was seen all over the neighbourhood (fig. 26). Other groups also created their own brands such as the 'Mazinho Group'<sup>207</sup> and 'Babu: The Warrior of Rio'<sup>208</sup> (fig. 27).

The informal transport network was the most lucrative market and conflicts over the different van routes were incredibly violent. They used increasingly physical violence against actors with important social titles as community leaders or van cooperative directors when they would

---

<sup>207</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482 p.718

<sup>208</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4483 p.80



not cooperate with them. In addition to the violence exercised against cooperative drivers and directors, once the parastatal groups had control over a cooperative, they would war against other paramilitaries for control over new routes and cooperatives. Tensions among groups frequently resulted in open shootouts and homicides in broad daylight across the West Zone.<sup>209</sup>

---

<sup>209</sup> In April 2005, Mazinho and his group attempted to assassinate military policeman Alcirlei de Freitas from The League of Justice in order to secure control of a van route; other conflicts emerged around the van lines; see CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, Testimony Ação Penal Pública (originária) No. 2008.068.00004 P8842, p.165



Figure 28: Graffiti with the League of Justice Symbol and a Message: 'We Are Coming' (Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482)



Figure 29: A sign on a Gate of a Plot of Land in Santa Cruz: 'Dep. Jorge Babu: The Warrior of Rio' (Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482)

However, because of these expansionist strategies, the parastatal groups did not command the legitimate social connections in new communities to control residents. In order to sustain their expansionism, they turned to violent means to hold onto territory and suppress any resistance from residents within the communities. The groups terrorised residents and staged symbolic acts of violence to create theatricality around violence and establish a sense of fear. However, many residents were too fearful to report the violence to the police, knowing that many of the police were in the parastatal networks or allied in some way. This coincides with broader data across the state demonstrating how that although homicides decreased gradually between 2002 and 2008, yet the number of disappearances increased significantly.<sup>210</sup>

At the command of the Security Secretary, the Military Police were sent to ‘combat’ parastatal involvement in the van network in Campo Grande<sup>211</sup>. However, in a testimony by a Military Policeman, Coronel Cony, who was sent to lead the operation, alludes to a faction war between different police stations linked to their alliances with different parastatal factions and organisations.<sup>212</sup> Furthermore, other testimonies highlight that politicians from within the government had aligned themselves in this faction war with The League of Justice.<sup>213</sup>

The ways that these tensions in Campo Grande were framed (and overlooked) in the news media are particularly revealing. Despite the use of the *milícia* term to describe the Military Police ‘Sheriffs’ near Barra da Tijuca one month prior, in the same newspaper, journalists of *O Globo* described a separate episode of violence in Campo Grande in April 2005 as a conflict among different factions of ‘corrupt’ police: ‘SHOOTOUT BETWEEN POLICEMEN KILLS THREE’, read the headline.<sup>214</sup> Interestingly, these tensions were portrayed as conflicts between warring factions within the police, rather than among *milícia* groups.

This is significant because *milícia* discourse only seems to have been deployed for specific spaces and specific audiences. This is notable when we consider how a sustained increase of parastatal-related violence was framed during December 2006. On 10 December of that year, *O Globo* ran a front-page story about the rising number of *favela* communities dominated by *milícias* in Rio de Janeiro (fig. 28). The paper led with a report based on a leaked Municipal Government report from the Military Cabinet claiming that forty-two *favelas* out of the seven

---

<sup>210</sup> UFRJ (2009) *Segurança pública na Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro*, Instituto de Economia. Available at: [https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/1449191104\\_magicfields\\_arquivo\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/1449191104_magicfields_arquivo_1_1.pdf).

<sup>211</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482, p.58

<sup>212</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, Testimony in Ação Penal Pública (Originária No 2008.068.0004), P4482., p.700

<sup>213</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4482, p.79-82, p.142

<sup>214</sup> Gúsmão, F. (2005) *Extermínio: policiais brigam por caça-níqueis e vans* O Globo. Rio de Janeiro: Globo. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/exterminio-policiais-brigam-por-caca-niqueis-vans-4562989> (Accessed: 2/12/2017 31 de agosto).

hundred and sixty-three officially recognised *favelas* in the city were now under the control of *milícias* (fig. 29). Another leak from the Intelligence Unit of the State Security Secretariat around the same time suggested that the figure was even bigger, at ninety-two *favelas*.<sup>215</sup>

There are clues to be found about the underlying power relations in the *O Globo* headline that suggests there was a ‘War Over Space’. This seems fitting when we consider that the middle- and upper-class readership of *O Globo* tend to be based in more affluent city neighbourhoods.<sup>216</sup> The awareness that seemed to surface in 2005 of the dominance of parastatal groups in the spaces surrounding them, seems to have shifted into a much more serious concern about the territorial advance of parastatal groups, their ability to control space and the effect this might have had for urban politics and the shape of the state in Rio de Janeiro more broadly.

---

<sup>215</sup> *O Globo*, 10 December 2006, Matutina, Rio, p19; A report from the Sub Secretary of Intelligence (SSI) is frequently cited in newspaper reports, in reference to 92 communities dominated by paramilitaries. This report has not been publicly available

<sup>216</sup> I am grateful to Professor Marco Roxo for a discussion about this.




Figure 30: 'Police Support the Milícia in the War Over Space of the Traffickers' (Source: *O Globo* Archive, 10/12/2006)



Figure 31: Map of Milícia Locations from (Source: *O Globo* Archive 10/12/2006)

As well as raising concern in public discourses amongst property-owning classes, this tension about the access to and control over urban space also led to territorial conflicts with drug trafficking organisations, who were being displaced by the parastatal actors. Shortly after *O Globo* ran the front-page story about *milícias*, a series of ‘extraordinary’ episodes of violence erupted on the streets of Rio de Janeiro with attacks targeting police stations, DPOs, military fire-fighter quarters, monuments, public buildings, buses and cars. Levels of violence reached a peak on 28 December when a coach with twenty-eight passengers traveling on Rio de Janeiro’s main highway to São Paulo was flagged down by masked gunmen and set on fire. Nine people were killed and twelve more were injured.

During these episodes, thousands of photocopied flyers were found scattered around the city streets with the following text (fig. 30):



**“ROSINHA AND GAROTINHO”**

**SUPPORT THE MILÍCIA  
AGAINST THE POOR FAVELA  
RESIDENTS**

**THE MILITIA MASSACRES THE  
POOR FAVELA RESIDENT AND  
THE RESPONSE IS**

**‘RIO DE SANGUE’ (*RIO DE  
BLOOD*).’**

Figure 32: Copy of Printed Flyer Distributed Around Rio de Janeiro (Source: Insanus blog) <sup>217</sup>

Whilst it is not clear exactly where the flyers came from, the narrative that emerged in local resident circles through gossip and discussions with neighbours attributed the flyers to an alliance of drug trafficking organisations that had worked together to thwart to the advancing territorialisation of parastatal groups across the West Zone.

<sup>217</sup> The text and the image was verified by Investigators in the Civil Police. The source of the digital flyer is: [http://www.insanus.org/novacorja/archives/2006\\_12.html](http://www.insanus.org/novacorja/archives/2006_12.html)

César Reubens Monteiro de Carvalho, Cabral's appointee to the State Secretary of Penitentiary Administration in January 2007, also articulated this view:

'In that moment of violence outbreak, it was evident that the phenomenon of expansion of armed groups, supposedly integrated by military, municipal guards, police, firefighters, prison guards, informants, community leaders and even politicians, now called "*milícias*", was getting in the way of the "business" of criminal factions in this state. Once they had invaded the communities, killing and/or expelling the local traffickers and their families.'<sup>218</sup>

The news media embraced this narrative and framed the events as a territorial war between drug traffickers and *milícias*.<sup>219</sup>

These territorial conflicts also took place at a time in which the Federal Police arrested a large arm of the slot machine and gambling mafias who had controlled much of the West Zone and wider metropolitan area. On 14 December 2006, forty-five arrest warrants were issued for the slot machine and gambling mafias and a police gang called the '*inhos*' who provided protection to them.<sup>220</sup> These groups had long-standing *pax mafiosas* with the drug trafficking organisations, and they shared territories with different factions across the West Zone. However, their activities did not compete with or contradict each other and so the two types of organisations co-existed, to some degree. However, the Federal Police operation led to the dispossession of space and it opened up new opportunities for parastatal organisations to claim territories for themselves and expel 'criminal drug traffickers'.

For Civil Policemen like Itagiba who did not necessarily see this as an 'opportunity' to conquer space for themselves personally, they viewed the advance of police (and parastatal groups) in these spaces as a genuine exercise to eliminate organised crime and reorder society. Because police and parastatal groups were working alongside each other, and were often the same people, it was relatively simple to project these territorial claims as 'state-building' activities in spaces where the formal arm of the state had previously struggled to reach.

The discourses of police, parastatal groups and their sympathisers help to reveal the motivating ideas and beliefs that underpin many of their actions. Itagiba, for example, ran as a candidate to be a Federal Lawmaker in the 2006 election, and his campaign literature defined three 'truths' around which he made his proposition to voters. These 'truths' demonstrated his beliefs

---

<sup>218</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4479, p.91-99

<sup>219</sup> In his last few days in office, Rosinha's Secretary of Security, Roberto Precioso refuted this narrative and suggested the violence was motivated by the prospects of a hardening disciplinary regime in the prison system under Cabral's new administration.

<sup>220</sup> The case led by the federal police was set up by Marcelo Itagiba when he was State Security Secretary, but it was handed to the federal police when Itagiba left the state government to run as a candidate in the federal elections as a lawmaker.

in the legitimacy and necessity of a state monopoly and the role of police for enforcing that. Firstly, he states, 'Police cannot be criminals'; secondly, 'Communities do not have owners'; and thirdly, 'Criminals were born to be in prisons'. These three points demonstrate some of the common defences of police that promote the idea that society should depend on police to protect them. Through these justifications, the violent by-products of that result from police (or paramilitary) territorialisation are thereby portrayed as a legitimate means to an end and an important part of the state-making process.

### Attempts to dismantle parastatal power

In 2006, several politicians were elected into office with support from West Zone voters; including Itagiba and Natalino.<sup>221</sup> Many of these politicians had either been *donos* themselves, sympathisers of parastatal activities or in the police force. However, despite the role that parastatal groups played in securing urban space and establishing state-linked order, there was a backlash amongst political and economic classes from the South Zone who were uneasy about the popularity and electoral successes of parastatal actors.

An Advisor to the new Security Secretary of the state government, José Beltrame, told me how Beltrame was embarrassed when Natalino and Jerônimo had sat next to him at a restaurant table next door to the state parliament, weeks after Natalino had been elected. Beltrame knew that the brothers were linked to (or in charge of) The League of Justice and he found the experience of meeting them 'inappropriate'.<sup>222</sup>

Much of the discomfort, the Advisor told me, derived from the types of politics practiced, beliefs held and cultures ported by these actors, which many in the political class believed to be a throwback to the days of the military dictatorship. Furthermore, the presence of these actors within 'their' spaces signalled that the balance of political power in Rio de Janeiro was in motion and that something would have to give.

During 2007, when in office, Natalino and Jerônimo used their positions of power to introduce and influence legislation. They were able to divert resources to West Zone spaces as local elites argued for investment in local development, such as better road surfacing, water supplies or the legalisation of informal transport.<sup>223</sup> But some debates also openly intend to empower local holders of power with legislation, such as the bill tabled by Natalino to legalise 'community

---

<sup>221</sup> Marcelo Itagiba was elected into the Federal Parliament with 70,057 votes.

<sup>222</sup> Interview with Claudio Ferraz, Former Director of DRACO, November 2016.

<sup>223</sup> Law number 1258/2007; law number 1205/2003; law number 1270/2003; law number 1577/2003.



police squads' composed of retired police and servicemen,<sup>224</sup> or the legislation Jerônimo attempted to amend to allow Municipal Guards to carry weapons.<sup>225</sup>

Although Sérgio Cabral had campaigned alongside Natalino and Itagiba in the West Zone during the 2006 elections,<sup>226</sup> once he was elected governor the electoral pacts he had made quickly unravelled. There was a moment in which the political classes, including Cabral, knew that they had to react. As one District Attorney described it to me:

'The parliamentarians [Cabral, etc.] began to realise that those people [the *milícias*] who had previously attracted votes for them, began to take the votes for themselves. That is to say, the *milícia* was becoming political.'<sup>227</sup>

It was clear that the *cabos eleitorais* (paid canvassers) of the politicians were starting to accumulate their own voters and political capital, which detracted from their own. Furthermore, political elites recognised the electoral advantage that the West Zone had over the rest of the city given its population size and the electoral boundaries.

The way the electorate voted in the West Zone had significant implications for the electoral outcome of the city, and even the state. As another District Attorney explained:

'When a candidate for governor, deputy, governor or whatever it is, goes into a community and does a deal with the militia, the militia and faithful, they manage to elect a governor in the state. They arrive there in Campo Grande, how many voters there are there, let's say 1 million? I don't know exactly how many, but it's a lot. In that area around there, Santa Cruz, Bangú, and Campo Grande. In that West Zone there, if a large militia there does a deal with a governor, they elect that governor! I already know of story there where a governor went there to request a vote for the militia. I know of stories of deputies that were elected by militias. So, this is a big problem, because they do deals with people who have the power of law making, the power to say what goes, and what doesn't! And they even elect their own people, like Natalino and Jerônimo.'<sup>228</sup>

To respond to this, Cabral built up an infrastructure to 'combat' and extract *donos* and paramilitary sympathisers from political office. In the first major development during this administration, Beltrame appointed Claudio Ferraz as the Director of DRACO and he was instructed to transform the division into a '*milícia combat*' unit<sup>229</sup>. Ferraz was briefed to pay

---

<sup>224</sup> Draft law: *Rules of the Creation of Community Police in Rio de Janeiro 214* (Legislative Statement No. 214/2007).

<sup>225</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4486, p.671

<sup>226</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4482, p.77

<sup>227</sup> Interview with District Attorney for Duque de Caxias, June 2016.

<sup>228</sup> Interview with District Attorney for Centro, July 2016.

<sup>229</sup> Until 2007, the activities of DRACO were limited to combatting 'pit boys' (organised fight groups), the slot machine mafia, and targeted raids on homosexual nightclubs. See: Ferraz, C. A. (2012) *Crime Organizado: Diagnóstico e mecanismos de combate*. Escola Superior de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro..

special attention to ‘a specific group’ in the West Zone<sup>230</sup>, presumably ‘The League of Justice’ given the media and political attention this group was receiving at the time.

However, this project was problematic for several reasons. Firstly, at the time, there was no specific law in Brazil that defined what ‘*milícia*’ actually was, making it difficult to determine DRACO’s exact focus. Setting up a police unit around this fuzzy phenomenon was, therefore, perhaps, intentional. Secondly, investigations involving police were resisted because many of them had trained together in the police academies. It was acting against ‘one’s own’, and it, ‘went against the collegiality of the police academy and training’, as one DRACO officer told me.<sup>231</sup>

However, DRACO was different in that it was not accountable to the Police Chief nor the police institutions. Although it functions as a police division, it is directly accountable to the Security Secretary (and the State Governor, by default), and is therefore not subjected to the scrutiny or influence of formal institutions, such as the Police Ombudsman. It operates as a quasi- ‘parallel’ police unit that is intricately connected to the political system. Because of this, many have criticised DRACO for being overtly political in the ways that it investigates on behalf of the governor or the security secretary. I asked one DRACO officer how easy it is to investigate links between the State Parliament, City Council, and the parastatal groups, and he explained, ‘I wouldn’t do that. They’re my bosses and they might post me on a mission, hours away on the other side of the state!’

In the second noteworthy change during Cabral’s administration, Antonio Da Silva was appointed as the Chief of the Campo Grande Civil Police department with a brief to ‘combat’ The League of Justice ‘laterally’.<sup>232</sup> Da Silva had a reputation within the police community for ‘shadowy’, illicit practices, and had been associated with torture and with collaborations with the slot machine mafias in the past.<sup>233</sup> One *miliciano* in Campo Grande explained to me that they knew they would be in ‘hot water’ when they heard that Da Silva was being sent to take charge of the Campo Grande station.

When he was in his post, Da Silva collaborated with a Military Policeman, Francisco César Silva Oliveira, with a nickname ‘Chico Bala’ (Bullet Boy), who was in a parastatal organisation, but as a competitor of The League of Justice. Even though this collaboration was

---

<sup>230</sup> Interview with Claudio Ferraz, Former Director of DRACO, November 2016.

<sup>231</sup> Interview with Antonio, Civil Policeman, December 2016.

<sup>232</sup> Interview with Antonio Da Silva, civil policeman, June 2016.

<sup>233</sup> Interview with Mateus, Civil Policeman, December 2016.

illegal, in constitutional terms (the two branches of the police are separate and not allowed to work together in this way), Beltrame and the Chief of the Civil Police at the time, Gilberto Ribeiro, approved the approach. Da Silva gave Oliveira and his group access to Civil Police resources and asked him to ‘collaborate’ on the investigation with him. He loaned them a Civil Police squad car, gave them access to high calibre weapons, and even dressed them in their uniforms. Da Silva even invited Oliveira to participate in other Civil Police operations<sup>234</sup> and allowed him to walk armed inside the station (again, this is illegal).<sup>235</sup> Oliveira, for all intents and purposes, was acting as a Civil Policeman.

Da Silva engineered a collaboration with Oliveira specifically because he knew Oliveria had a personal vendetta against Jerônimo and Natalino. Oliveria used to work for Jerônimo and Natalino, managing one of their van lines, but when he took it for himself and went to work for a *dono* in Santa Cruz<sup>236</sup>, members of The League of Justice travelled to Oliveira’s home and tried to assassinate him. However, the assassins missed the shot and instead they killed Oliveira’s pregnant wife.<sup>237</sup>

However, it seems that the case was defined not by gathering evidence to launch a legal case against participants of The League of Justice, but by Oliveria and his informal group of Military Policemen using Civil Police resources to regain control over the van networks across Campo Grande.<sup>238</sup> One report from a resident even accused Da Silva of being the ‘leader of Chico Bala’s *milícia*’ and that they were using the Campo Grande Civil Police station as their headquarters from where they ran their *milícia*.<sup>239</sup> In one episode, for example, a conflict erupted out on the street between two men – one from the The League of Justice and the other from Oliveira’s group. Oliveira’s group was dressed in Civil Police uniforms and they publicly shamed The League of Justice group in front of local residents, attacking them for being ‘*milicianos*’.<sup>240</sup>

These approaches taken by the state to ‘combat the *milícia*’ highlight the flexibility and performativity of what is and what is not ‘the *milícia*’, ‘the police’ or ‘the state’. As political elites from the centre attempted to reassert their control over hegemony, they selectively

---

<sup>234</sup> Public Ministry Process Number 0016538-09.2009.19.0205.

<sup>235</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, Testimony of Natalino (071938-1035/2008), P4479, p.279.

<sup>236</sup> Interview with Mateus Souza, Civil Policeman, December 2016.

<sup>237</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4479, p.319.

<sup>238</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4481, p.400.

<sup>239</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File.

<sup>240</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2008; 068942-1035/2008, P4479, p.341.

targeted distinct paramilitary groups and strategically reframed the *milícia* discourse to eliminate their competitors from socio-political and physical-territorial spaces.

### A crisis of legitimacy

Although Natalino and Jerônimo, the leaders of The League of Justice, had both been imprisoned by July 2008,<sup>241</sup> the broader structures of The League of Justice remained intact and were functioning. Furthermore, similar structures were beginning to surface in other regions of the city, conventionally out of reach to the parastatal groups.

Paramilitary security practices began to encroach into South Zone neighbourhoods. In one example, a flyer was posted in the foyer of a residential building in the leafy street in the middle-class neighbourhood of Botafogo in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. The flyer read:

To the Building Manager, or whoever it may concern,

For each apartment, we invite all residents from this block from number 15-25 to a meeting of Building Managers whose subject matter is security in this block.

We have been providing services for more than ten years to other parts of the street.

We have previously made several proposals to this block, but no one has been interested.

Now we're going to be more objective about this future decision.

Kind regards,

*Apoio alternativo* (Alternative support)

Meeting day: June 03, 2008

Time: 7:30 pm<sup>242</sup>

Although residents of middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro had become accustomed to the idea of private security, this 'alternative support' posed a threat to residents and it was a subtle form of domination<sup>243</sup> that contradicted what middle-classes had come to recognise as liberal notions of security and their associated imaginaries of safe spaces. This concern about these encroachments was not only about security practices and where their protection came from, but it was a fundamental concern about the shape of the state and the ideas and beliefs about how the individual within society should be imagined, organised and governed.

---

<sup>241</sup> With the approval of the Attorney General to annul their legal immunities as parliamentarians, Jerônimo was arrested on 26 December 2007 and Natalino was arrested on 22 July 2008.

<sup>242</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, RO No.010-03575/2008, P4484, p.663.

<sup>243</sup> Bayat might call this a 'quiet encroachment'.

In spite of these encroachments at this very local level, widespread public opinion about *milícias* as reflected in public discourse was still largely tolerant of parastatal organisations and their practices, partially because a greater threat to society was perceived in the form of drug trafficking violence.

However, during May 2008, an ‘extraordinary’ episode of violence erupted that sparked off a legitimacy crisis for the parastatal groups. A journalist, a photographer, and a driver from the *O Dia* newspaper were kidnapped in Batan, a West Zone *favela*, when they went into the community as undercover reporters to investigate the control and governance of the community by a parastatal group.

On one of the evenings, while they were undercover in Batan, the photographer left the local bar where he had been watching the football game and walked back to their rented apartment. He phoned his editor on the way back to ask for more time on the project as he felt like they were close to ‘a scoop’ on connections between the parastatal groups in Batan and their political patrons.

Shortly after the phone call finished, six masked men approached the photographer in the street, and they told him that they knew he was a journalist. They kidnapped him and demanded to know what evidence he had about the group. They threw him into the back of a car before collecting the female journalist from the apartment. The men then blindfolded them and drove them to a nearby warehouse where they were tortured for hours. The group demanded the email addresses and passwords of the journalists where they found photographs of meetings between police officers and local leaders. The couple was released beaten and blindfolded on the highway several hours later.



# TORTURE

## WEST ZONE MILITIA KIDNAP AND TORTURE JOURNALIST, PHOTOGRAPHER AND DRIVER FROM *O DIA*

SESSION OF HORROR WITH  
RUSSIAN ROULETTE, ELECTRIC  
SHOCK AND SUFFOCATING WITH  
PLASTIC BAG, THE TEAM THAT  
WERE REPORTING ABOUT THE  
LIVES OF RESIDENTS FROM  
COMMUNITIES DOMINATED BY  
PARAMILITARY GROUPS

Figure 33: Front Page of *O Dia* Newspaper (Source: *O Dia* Archive 31/5/2008)

The story was published by *O Dia* on 31 May 2008 in a dramatic, sensationalising front page (fig. 31). The story featured in national and international news and talk about the parastatal activities in Rio de Janeiro spiralled.

Although there had continually been direct pleas for help from residents to politicians and the media to protect them from the violent territorial expansions of the parastatal groups, state authorities, politicians, and the media had not given the matter any serious attention.<sup>244</sup> Despite decades of violence and repression against marginalised black residents from urban poor communities across the West Zone, a crisis only seemed to emerge when white, middle-class journalists were dominated and violated.

This suggests that the media and political discourses, which are inextricably linked to public opinion, regard the violence committed against white, middle-class journalists as more serious and ‘newsworthy’ than the violence committed against blacks from urban poor communities. The practices, ideas and beliefs of parastatal groups from the West Zone were not suddenly feared by middle- and upper-class South Zone residents simply because they existed. They

<sup>244</sup> There are many cases of this. One example of this can be found in an email denunciation from a resident from 18/3/2008, in which they plead for help from the newspapers and Public Ministry because the police and state government turned a blind eye following a paramilitary ‘invasion’. Source: CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4485, p.416.

were feared because they represented an expression of power that was capable of reaching into spaces (and affecting bodies) that had previously been inaccessible to them.

This increased concern about *milícias* triggered a crisis about the legitimacy of these groups within the West Zone and it provided justifications that political elites needed to ‘combat’ the wider paramilitary structures and extract them from the political settlement.

On 8 June 2008, Jorge Picianni, the president of ALERJ, approved a vote on the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission of the *Milícias* (CPI). Although the author of the CPI proposal, lawmaker Marcelo Freixo, had filed the CPI proposal fifteen months earlier after the ‘Rivers of Blood’ violence and the assassination of his brother by an extermination group, it was only now, following the *O Dia* story, that Picianni approved it.

On 31 July 2008, the Vice-President of the CPI, the lawmaker Paulo Ramos, resigned from his position stating, ‘The complexity of the CPI of the so-called *milícias*’, and the ‘various manifestations and manipulations, depend on the power eventually held by those who are interested in producing certain results,’<sup>245</sup> had forced him to withdraw from the Commission. When I interviewed Paulo, he went further and stated, ‘I realised there was a big agreement (*acordo*), a deal, to protect the rulers and governors. The blame could only get to a certain level, and from there on in, it couldn’t go any further.’<sup>246</sup> Ramos essentially claimed that the outcome of the CPI had already been rigged before it had even got going.

The mainstream news media, specifically *O Globo*, *O Dia*, and *EXTRA* newspapers, but also *TV Globo*, played an influential role in shaping and framing the discourses that ‘tended to produce results that culminated in further criminalisation of poor communities’.<sup>247</sup> The president of the CPI, Marcelo Freixo, and his Chief of Staff, Mateus Souza, confirmed the importance of the news media throughout the CPI process. Souza put it to me quite plainly:

‘We made a big deal (*grande acordo*) with the mainstream media of Rio de Janeiro, and the media supported and collaborated a lot with historical research, with dissemination of the stories. It was great... We needed support, support in civil society, support in the police, in the Public Ministry. We couldn’t carry this CPI alone! We went to the major newspaper publishers at the time, *O Globo*, *O Dia*, *Extra*, who all gave their support.’<sup>248</sup>

---

<sup>245</sup> *O Dia* (2008) ‘Rio: Paulo Ramos pede desligamento da CPI das Milícias’, *O Dia*, 31 July 2008. Available at: <http://noticias.terra.com.br/eleicoes/2008/interna/0,,OI3042465-EI11830,00-Rio+Paulo+Ramos+pede+desligamento+da+CPI+das+Milicias.html>.

<sup>246</sup> Interview with Paulo Ramos, April 2016. At the same time, Paulo Ramos was running for mayor for the Democratic Labour Party (PDT)

<sup>247</sup> Interview with Paulo Ramos, April 2016.

<sup>248</sup> Interview with Mateus Souza, Civil Policeman, December 2016

Despite Marcelo Freixo's personal politics and opposition to the centre-right political parties and elites (Freixo has a long and commendable history of working with issues of human rights in urban poor communities), he was forced to cooperate with the media interests and feed their sensationalism of organised criminal activity in order to maintain their support. He explained:

'The media was important for us not to be boycotted [in the Parliament]. The media was a means, not an end. Involving the media was important for the CPI not to die because if it were up to a few of the lawmakers, the CPI would not have reached the final report stage... We managed to keep the pressure on Parliament until the end.'<sup>249</sup>

Representatives of the news media were invited into most of the CPI hearings and Freixo was regularly available for comment on its progress.

One of the primary foci for the news media was a list of two hundred and eighteen named individuals who were 'indicted' as '*milicianos*'. Although this was not a judicial inquiry, many of the 'indicted' individuals on the list were subsequently investigated, prosecuted and tried in a court of law. However, this final and published 'indicted' list was substantially different from a list of 'suspected' individuals that was compiled at the start of the CPI.<sup>250</sup> But whereas the 'suspected' list had contained fourteen politicians and it was made a classified document, the published 'indicted' list ended up with just one politician (fig. 32).<sup>251</sup> There were also reductions of indictments amongst most of the individuals with social titles linked to the state, (with the exception of military policemen); yet, the number of civilians, typically residents of urban poor communities, increased significantly.

---

<sup>249</sup> Interview with Marcelo Freixo, Lawmaker and Politician, April 2017.

<sup>250</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, P4477, p.717-728

<sup>251</sup> Álvaro Lins was the highest voted parliamentarian for the PMDB in 2006 and would have likely been the candidate for the 2008 mayoral election. Some interviewees suggested this was part of an attempt to stop him running for the mayorship.



**Figure 34:** Differences in Numbers of ‘Suspected’ and ‘Indicted’ Militiamen (Source: CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4477, p.717-728; CPI Relatório Final)

| Person type             | Suspected | Indicted | +/- change |
|-------------------------|-----------|----------|------------|
| <b>Politician</b>       | 14        | 1        | -13        |
| <b>Civil police</b>     | 13        | 8        | -5         |
| <b>Military police</b>  | 63        | 67       | +4         |
| <b>Military fireman</b> | 5         | 3        | -2         |
| <b>Prison guard</b>     | 3         | 2        | -1         |
| <b>Armed forces</b>     | 3         | 2        | -1         |
| <b>Civilian</b>         | 83        | 130      | <b>+47</b> |

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to ‘investigate’ these cases. However, the general trends in terms of who the CPI touched and in what capacity most are notable. A reflection on a small number of key individuals, however, will help to demonstrate how the power dynamics underscoring the CPI resulted in the occlusions of *milícia* practices by some individuals, but resulted in the victimisation and calling out of others.

#### Coronel Jairo and the snack-foods factory

During the torture of the journalists in Batan, the photographer referenced the ‘Coronel’ (Colonel) and the ‘Coronelzinho’ (Little Colonel) when they were deciding what to do with captives. This was a reference to State Parliament Lawmaker Coronel Jairo and his son, Jarinho, a City Councillor. Other reports corroborate this claim as they state that the photographer heard Jairo’s voice present.<sup>252</sup>

Although Jairo’s name was largely avoided in news media reports in relation to the Batan kidnapping, rumours and gossip were circulating around the West Zone about Jairo’s involvement. An anonymous report from a school principal in the West Zone, for example, claimed that Jairo was a key figure in the paramilitary group in Campo Grande, and that Jairo worked closely with Natalino and Jerônimo.<sup>253</sup>

<sup>252</sup> G1 (2008) ‘Jornalistas torturados reconheceram suspeitos, diz polícia’, *G1*, 4 June. Available at: <http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Rio/0,,MUL589764-5606,00-JORNALISTAS+TORTURADOS+RECONHECERAM+SUSPEITOS+DIZ+POLICIA.html>.

<sup>253</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4418, 20<sup>th</sup> June 2008, p.458.

As soon as the *O Dia* story broke, Jairo attempted to distance himself from the Natalino and Jerônimo. He called a meeting with all of the public-school leaders in the West Zone claiming that he wanted to discuss an administrative agenda. A school Principal, who submitted a report to the CPI, and which I discovered in the archival documentation, described how Jairo used the meeting to distance himself from the rumours about his involvement:<sup>254</sup>

‘The deputy claimed, using various arguments and justifications, that he would never have had any involvement whatsoever with the parallel power or *milícia*. In reality, this meeting was meant to intimidate the education professionals ... Here in Campo Grande everyone knows about the involvement of the noble deputy with the *milícias*<sup>255</sup> and his involvement with the Coordinator of Education.’<sup>256</sup>

The Principal cited Jairo’s involvement in a factory that makes school lunches, as evidence of his participation. According to the Principal, Jairo also maintained close relations with the State Government’s Director of Education – who he in fact nominated for the position – and he was able to negotiate a price cut of any of the contracts the snack factory negotiated in return for the company being able to monopolise contracts from schools, hospitals, and other state institutions in the region.

The Principal described a sequence of actions designed to pressure her into signing a contract with them. She described four phases of violent domination used against her to secure the contracts, ranging from (1) friendly phone calls from the State Education Department Administrator, then (2) the same from the State Education Director, then (3) visits to the school by factory ‘employees’ (*milicianos*) to ‘strongly encourage her’ to accept the offer; and then, finally, (4) threats to the Principal about losing her job.

Despite Jairo’s name appearing in various resident reports, these claims against him, and also several times in resident interviews conducted by Professor Ignacio Cano in 2007 for his academic research about *milícias*,<sup>257</sup> Jairo was never invited to contribute to the CPI and his name features only once in the published CPI report.<sup>258</sup> In addition to this, in December 2008, after the CPI had been completed and presented to the State Parliament, Jairo was appointed to be the new Vice-President of the Parliament.

---

<sup>254</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4482, p.531: letter to Vereadora Andréia Gouveia Viera on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2008.

<sup>255</sup> Reports from residents across the West Zone confirm the principal’s claim: CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4482, p.531.

<sup>256</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4478, p.458.

<sup>257</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4478, p.19.

<sup>258</sup> CPI of the *Milícias*, Archive File, P4478, p.162; In fact, Jairo’s name was only mentioned once in the final report of the CPI in the context of a denunciation by a city councillor who it is likely would have had the power to call the validity of the report into question if it were not published.

### Marcelo Itagiba, vote concentrations and manipulations

Jairo's absence from the CPI makes an interesting point of departure for a discussion about interpretations of the political practices for different politicians who were either allied to those elites with historical influence (as part of the 'establishment') within the central state; or for those seen as enemies to them.

The practice of campaigning in specific communities controlled by different 'criminal' organisations or parastatal groups has been common in Rio de Janeiro for some time. Jorge Babu (formerly of the Workers' Party) gave the following explanation about his high vote share in a particular community. He explains how these types of political relations are necessary and they are part of the everyday language of politics in informal, peripheral communities:

'[O]n the political question, we [politicians], who work mainly in vulnerable communities...

As deputy Gilberto Palmares put it, deputy Cidinha, and I believe that Pedro Paulo, also, and even deputy Marcelo Freixo himself... Will ask what [control] there is inside the community to be able come in and practice our politics, for you to walk in and talk to the residents. You will ask, if it's a drug trafficking community, which faction is it; if it's militia, or if it's not?

I, for example, have the habit of going into all the communities that I can. I have a habit of working with as many communities as I can. Now, I find it difficult to ask. We work for the people, and not work for drug traffickers, not for the *milícia*, we don't work for anything like this.'<sup>259</sup>

Although localised pacts and agreements between politicians and *donos* seem to be the established way of 'doing politics' in these communities, the discretion, ambiguity and negotiability that is required to conduct these political relations and agreements leave them wide open to being twisted and reshaped by different manipulations and interpretations.

In Rio das Pedras, Marcelo Itagiba appears to have conducted similar political campaigning practices to many politicians in the same community; including the highly powerful *Carioca* politician, Domingos Brazão. Brazão's 'political influence' is treated as a relatively staple and necessary political practice, for example<sup>260</sup> However, Itagiba's vote distribution was a key

---

<sup>259</sup> Transcription from the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting, Testimony of Jorge Babu, 7/10/2008.

<sup>260</sup> Throughout the CPI process, many politicians were discussed in terms of their 'political influence' and one of those was Domingos Brazão. Despite the fact that Brazão was on the suspected list, there is little data in the CPI documentation that relates to Brazão, and he was not invited to give a testimonial. Nadinho, a community leader and politician from Rio das Pedras cited Brazão in his testimony of the CPI as having campaigned in Rio das Pedras during several elections. Pedro Pinho, a policeman, also confirms this in his testimony.

focus for the CPI. In their final report, they highlighted how 5.83% of Itagiba's votes (4,085 votes) in the federal elections of 2006 came from Rio das Pedras.<sup>261</sup>

Responding to the accusations by the CPI that he was connected to the Rio das Pedras parastatal activity, because of his high vote share there, in an interview with me, Itagiba explained:

'In order to understand how impertinent the spurious statements made about my vote in that electoral zone are, please go to the website of the Regional Electoral Tribunal and note that, in the same election, in the same 179<sup>th</sup> electoral zone, Rodrigo Maia [the son of the mayor, Cesar Maia] received more than three thousand votes and that in the election of 2002, Eduardo Paes [the subsequent mayor] achieved nine thousand votes; and no one considered the hypothesis of a connection between candidates and criminal traffickers or militiamen. In fact, in my campaign, I didn't have exclusive access to any area, having disputed the democratic space, always, with several candidates [including Brazão].'<sup>262</sup>

In addition to the CPI's focus on the geography of Itagiba's votes, Itagiba was cited twenty-eight times in the final CPI report, more than any other politician. Without explicitly accusing him of being a *miliciano*, Itagiba's name appears in the final report placed next to headings such as 'ACCUSED OF COMMANDING MILÍCIAS' and there was a specific Appendix in the archival files attributed to him.

The emphatic focus on Itagiba in the CPI can be partially explained by analysing the rebalancing of power that started in the early 2000s, and continued throughout 2007, and throughout the CPI process. By reflecting on these tensions, it is possible to identify the ways in which the CPI attempted to extract some parastatal coalitions from the state system by targeting individuals they believed to be responsible for their establishment and formation.

In the closing meeting of the CPI, Cidinha Campos, a member of the Commission stated:

'My opinion is that Marcelo Itagiba is largely responsible for everything that happened in the police. He did no investigation and benefited from the vote of the *milícia* area.

We have photos with his name, placed in places ... No, no! Deals with *milícia*; parties promoted by the *milícia*. I mean, I intimately know that he is responsible for growing the *milícia* during the Garotinho government and in the Rosinha government. This is my opinion.'<sup>263</sup>

That 'police' and '*milícia*' are referred to interchangeably by Cidinha is revealing in itself, in how these accusations are intended to frame a set of practices in a particular way and influence the interpretive process. Furthermore, these framing devices raise questions about the

---

<sup>261</sup> ALERJ (2008), CPI das Milícias, p.108

<sup>262</sup> CPI of the Milícias, Archive File, Ofício No 104/2008, P4477, p.287.

<sup>263</sup> Transcript from the 'Closing Meeting' of the CPI.

underlying cultures and sets of ideas, beliefs, and politico-ideological intentions that underpin these frames to eliminate or to neutralise opponents from political space.

However, the desire to extract Itagiba from the coalition was not straight forward because of his powerful base of supporters and political support within the PMDB; the ruling party in the Legislature and Executive, and the same party of the then President of the Parliament, Jorge Picianni. For this reason, when the CPI attempted to include Itagiba on the published ‘indicted’ list, Picianni refused to approve it; seemingly because it risked damaging the brand of the PMDB. The Commission was forced to remove Itagiba’s name from the formal ‘indicted’ list. Working around this, Mateus Souza, Marcelo Freixo’s Chief of Staff, described how the Commission engineered an ‘informal indictment’ against Itagiba without having to formally include him on the list:

‘We’re not going to indict him. But at the same time, we *are* going to...

I’m going to put in [a set question] against Itagiba in the report, so he does not appear formally indicted, but when you read the report, in fact, the informal indictment against him is more severe than the formal one!’<sup>264</sup>

The commission inserted thirty-five descriptive questions into the Report about Itagiba’s alleged participation with parastatal groups, including involvement in a child prostitution ring, his lack of focus in dealing with these groups when he was the State Security Secretary, the creation of DPOs (discussed in chapter five) and his ability to campaign in *milícia*-controlled areas. Souza explained to me as follows:

‘Those questions without his answer are sensational! Because they are questions that answer themselves! So [the report] was approved. It passed! My tactic worked.’<sup>265</sup>

In spite of the ‘success’ of this ‘informal indictment’ against Itagiba, the CPI continued to pursue the incrimination of Itagiba. They compiled a dossier of information about him, and they took it to the national newspapers in the hope that they would run a story about it. Souza explained the reaction when they tried to publish something:

‘It was at the business level. The business owner [of the media], the Jewish communities, had it stopped, you can’t touch him!... [he had] the protection of the Jewish community above him, Itagiba is married to a ... his wife is from the Jewish elite, he married a girl of the Jewish elite, these relations ... They are very strong ...

---

<sup>264</sup> Interview with Mateus Souza, civil policeman, December 2016.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

You can already understand the level of Itagiba's relations, both political and economic, they go way up, way up there.'<sup>266</sup>

These uncomfortable undertones help to reveal some problematic power tensions that might help explain why some of the political elite might have been so set on expelling Itagiba. Rather than legal assertions of criminal practice, the focus on Itagiba seems to have been primarily grounded in his politics, ideology, beliefs, race and even religion, rather than any objective notion of criminal practice.

Whilst my intention is not to defend Itagiba's actions nor question his innocence/guilt, there does appear to have been a lopsided pursuit of Itagiba, when compared with other political actors such as Brazão and Jairo. This highlights the deeply ideological characteristic of the political settlement. As a political commission inquiry, rather than a judicial one, the CPI appears to have served, in at least one sense, to rebalance the distributions of power within the political settlement to favour political elites in the urban centre.

This clash of ideas, tensions between different views in society, and the assertion of the political elite to regain hegemony revealed itself again when Itagiba explained to me that he believed one of the reasons political elites had an aversion to him was because he wanted to eradicate drug trafficking in the *favelas* and urban poor communities. He explained that this caused discomfort, and that many of the South Zone elites were quite comfortable with the *status quo* because of their proximity to the supply of cocaine, but that the violence and insecurity that accompanied these illegal markets could be broadly contained to the *favelas* and they could protect themselves with private security.<sup>267</sup>

### Deconstructing the 'enemy'

After the CPI was closed in December 2008 and the final report published, judicial and political processes began to imprison paramilitary *donos*. Their power and influence were diminished significantly. Operation Témis was a major police operation in 2009 that led to the arrest of 114 'militiamen', including twenty-six military policemen and five civil policemen. With the political arm of the parastatal groups dismantled, economic and political elites from the centre attempted to reassert their control over the hegemony.<sup>268</sup>

---

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Interview with Marcelo Itagiba; see also an article published by Itagiba in *Jornal do Brasil*, 27 February 2007

<sup>268</sup> One example of such practices involves the creation of the Pacifying Police Unit police as a form of security governance in *favelas* during the Olympics and World Cup.

Through these political, judicial and discursive processes, many *Carioca* parastatal groups were distanced from the state and reimagined as organised criminal organisation, marking a contrast to the depiction of the '*milícias*' in *Duas Caras*, for example. One of the most notable representations of this in popular culture was the 2012 Brazilian blockbuster *Tropa de Elite 2: O Inimigo Agora é Outro* (Elite Squad 2: The Enemy Within). The film accounts for the emergence of the *milícia* in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro and the intimate relations between corrupt law enforcement officers and politicians. As the highest box office earner in Brazilian cinematic history so far, and with many more having seen it through informal channels, this film was viewed by a substantial part of the population, even in the urban peripheries.<sup>269</sup>

Initially written as a book by a small group of intellectuals, high-ranking policemen and security analysts from Rio de Janeiro's state security institutions, including Luiz Eduardo Soares and Claudio Ferraz, the narrative is modelled around an interpretation of parastatal groups through their lens.

The film is narrated through the diegetic voice of a high-ranking police officer, Roberto Nascimento, who becomes the Sub-Secretary for Public Security, in the film. The main plot is centred around Nascimento's discoveries of corruption and parastatal activities by police and politicians and the ways they use the state security system to generate revenue for themselves. The film offers a commentary on the political power of parastatal groups within the state system. However, in keeping with some of the established understandings of *Carioca milícias*, voices and perspectives of West Zone residents are limited to plot supplements and supports to the overarching narrative.

In one scene, for example, Nascimento narrates a story about how parastatal groups first emerged in the *favela* and he describes economic exploitation, without accounting for the structural processes of violence exclusion that led to criminal activity in the first place:

'*Favela* residents like to watch cable TV. They like to drink water. They go online. They use cooking gas. They take out loans.

Every *favela* is a powerful market of many things bought and sold. Rocha [a militiaman] discovered that it was better to earn from the whole *favela* than a bunch of drug dealers [through pay-outs].

---

<sup>269</sup> One resident from a West Zone community tells me how DVD copies of the film were 'sold cheaply on every street corner' and everyone was talking about it, with an estimated eleven million people having seen it before the film was even released in the cinema because of pirate copies.

If money changed hands, then Rocha charged a fee. Criminals' fees. Commission of Military Police, sons of a bitch! The pretext? Defend the slums from criminals. The reality was quite different.<sup>270</sup>

Furthermore, this culturally essentialist depiction of 'the *favela*' and the '*favela* resident' obscures the heterogeneity of these communities. It also represents the socio-economic disparities of the city through a clichéd lens of race and class, reproducing a spatial imaginary of urban socio-economic hierarchy in terms of place and value. Without their own voice, in this regard, these imaginaries are imposed upon the inhabitants of the West Zone.

The rare insights the film does offer about the West Zone tend to imagine the region as far-flung land distant from the centre, in keeping with the frontier discourse.<sup>271</sup> The urban poor are framed and reframed in peripheral, powerless spaces and they tend to be stripped of their agency. These spaces are associated with drug traffickers, barbarism and violence and by promoting this narrative, the film normalises the city's spatial segregation and stigmatisation, depicting social and cultural distinctions between the West Zone and Centre as unbridgeable. This has the effect of culturally disconnecting the West Zone from the Centre, echoing the processes of political extraction that took place through the CPI.

Beyond these representations, the inhabitants of the West Zone have their own universes linked to their own discourses, practices and ideas that they can relate to more directly. A succession of two interviews in April 2017 over two days documented in my field notes demonstrates this point with additional clarity.

On the Thursday, I interviewed one of the authors of the *Tropa de Elite 2: O Inimigo Agora é Outro*, Luiz Eduardo Soares, for this study. Soares is a progressive intellectual, a Brazilian anthropologist, the former Sub-Secretary of Security in the State Security Secretariat, and the former National Security Secretary in Lula's government. We talked in great detail about his experience working inside the governments and his views on *milícia*.

The following day, I interviewed Carlos Oliveria, a former policeman and someone who had been imprisoned on charges of arms trafficking, involvement with parastatal groups and who was accused of leading a group in Campo Grande.

I am not writing necessarily reflecting on the content of the interviews here – I have recorded and transcribed that and those insights have informed my thinking throughout the thesis –

---

<sup>270</sup> Transcribed from *Tropa de Elite 2 – O Inimigo Agora é Outro* (2012)

<sup>271</sup> I am grateful to Professor Alfano de Albuquerque for the insightful discussion about this.



rather, the note that follows is a reflection on the context in which two interviews took place, my experiences conducting them, and how they fell into my broader research that week:

*On Thursday I interviewed Luiz. I met him at his house. He lives in an impressive mansion on the hillside of São Conrado in Rio de Janeiro's South Zone. The house has spectacular views overlooking a surfer's paradise beach. Over coffee and some homemade biscuits, Luiz kindly shared his experiences and insights with me and contributed to my thinking. His main hypothesis about the milícias is based on the low salaries of state police during the 1990s and their need to earn additional money by moonlighting.*

*My experience at Soares' house contrasted, juxtaposed, with a meeting I had the following day – and it left quite an impression.*

*I met Carlos on Friday. Carlos is a former policeman who had a successful career in the military and then in the civil police in Rio de Janeiro. He was prominent as one of the few black policemen to hold senior office.*

*Carlos lives in a middle-class, residential part of Campo Grande. He picked me up in his 4x4 at the meeting point, the supermarket carpark, that we had agreed on. He drove us to the other side of Campo Grande, some forty minutes from where he had picked me up, to a restaurant where we sat down for several hours and chatted.*

*He told me about his career in the police from when he had started out as a military policeman and then retrained as a civil policeman. He was sent to New York to discuss policing strategies with the NYPD and he brought back ideas to test out in Rio de Janeiro. He is a smart and ambitious man. In 2009, he was put in charge of the strategic planning for a major police operation, Operation Témis, which led to the largest arrest of state security agents (or milicianos) at the time, including many indicted from the CPI of Militias, such as Ricardo (Batman).*

*Following this, Carlos was arrested by the federal police during Operation Guillotine. They accused him of supplying weapons to drug trafficking groups and milícias across Rio de Janeiro.*

*He claims he was collateral damage from a political spat between the Director of DRACO, Claudio Ferraz and the Chief of Police, Alan Turnowski. The chief of police, according to Carlos, threw him under the bus to save himself.*

*However, as Carlos was retelling his story, it struck me that Luiz had told me specifically about Carlos and his situation the day before when speaking about a black miliciano policeman. Carlos and Luiz knew each other from when Luiz was in government and Carlos was in the police force. Luiz told the same story in completely different terms. In his eyes, Carlos was corrupt and looking to make himself rich.*

*Carlos explained how he was caught up in the middle of a war of factions inside the police and that it became political and involved a corruption scandal with Claudio Ferraz.<sup>272</sup>*

The juxtaposition of these two encounters, coincidentally from one day to the next, is a powerful metaphor in itself. The spatialities of these two meetings, with the different ways that issues of race and class played out in each space, demonstrates that these are two divided and detached worlds competing with one another for space, power and survival. The socio-political tensions articulated by both interviewees, that manifested within the police and the security institutions, are representative of the social tensions between the West Zone and the South Zone, as competing ideas and beliefs about security, politics and governance wrestle with one another to maintain relevance.

The urban centre is where power extends from, is accessed, and from where policy is made and deployed. However, policy-makers, decision-making political elites (and even script-writers) are far removed from everyday experiences in the West Zone. As such, this has produced ‘security’ policies that conceptualise *Carioca milícias* as violent criminal-territorial actors in similar terms to drug traffickers, without accounting for the underlying causes that led to their emergence.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that it is possible to trace shifts in Rio de Janeiro’s political settlement through an analysis of cultural tensions, discourses, and practices, as they relate to *milícias* organisations in the urban margins and political elites in the centre. This chapter has built on assertions grounded in chapter five, that through the 1990s, as Brazilian politics became more pluralised in the wake of democratisation processes and social programme expansions under the national PT government, the urban political settlement became increasingly decentralised and fragmented. It had the effect of including new political actors in it, such as West Zone *milícia* coalitions. However, once political elites from the centre realised

---

<sup>272</sup> Fieldnotes from 27 November 2016.

that there was a trade-off between power and maintaining order in the urban margins, they reacted by attempting to expel parastatal networks from the state system.

I have argued that an analysis of a *milícia* discourse, as a moral-ethical language, can be used as a lens to unpack these tensions between the centre and the urban frontier. It can also be used to demonstrate how different ways of consolidating power, influenced by diverse sets of ideas and beliefs, can be contested and challenged. This approach is a particularly interesting way to reveal these tensions and it illuminates different formations of power, differences in world views. It also reveals the different struggles over power and resources as a way of shoring up the political settlement, harnessing wealth and asserting control when alternative, and sometimes radically different worldviews threaten hegemony.

## Seven: Encountering 'Milícia', Death and Alternative Futures

Fieldnote entry 10 March 2016



**Figure 35: Quarry Entrance on Campinha Road (Source: Author)**

*On a hot autumnal afternoon in October 2016, I set out by bicycle to familiarise myself with some of Rio de Janeiro's West Zone. I cycled along Campinha Road, a windy road tracking the boundary between Campo Grande neighbourhood and the Mendanha National Park, a green peripheral region on the outskirts of the city.*

*Small, sleepy, land occupations rested on the roadside with barely a person in sight. Residents of these communities had self-built their homes in the 1990s on top of old, abandoned and overgrown orange plantations, most of which had gone into decline in the 1950s during the global economic recession when the plantation owners had gone out of business.*

*I cycled past a quarry that seemed abandoned (fig. 33). The rolling hills behind it, once covered in deep mid-Atlantic rainforest, are now covered in patchy grass with the odd brown, burnt treetop. I later found out that the owner of the quarry purposely lit bush fires in the protected forest so he could mine the land. The quarry now digs into the hill, sitting quiet, calm and deserted at the bottom of the mountain. However, the high walls, barbed wire and watchtower with embrasures signalled that there are tensions.*

*I continued my journey along the Campinha Road, and I passed a grassy side bank where a fly-tip with tyres, household rubbish, rusty oil cans and animal carcasses had been dumped (fig. 34). Preying vultures pecked through the trash looking for food. I cycled quickly away from the stench of rot and decay until I reached a small cluster of 40-50 irregular shacks and houses some 200 metres down the road.*

*When I told the residents that I was out cycling on my bike, many of them didn't know what to say and told me to be careful. They told me stories about the Campinha Road, that it was a source of fear for them. As they said it, they nodded down the road to the direction I had come. 'It so damaging for the environment', Ana Maria told me. She told me how the quarry owner had been in court several times for mining without a licence and not following regulations. Of course, he was never held to account, she told me. Andrea told me how she had developed asthma in her forties because of the fine dust from the quarry that covers everything in sight. On rainy days she has uncontrollable coughing fits.*



**Figure 36: Fly-tip on Campinha Road with Vultures (Source: Author)**

#### Fieldnote entry 19 June 2016

*Today I discovered something important about the quarry. Three residents told me about their experiences along the Campinha Road and, specifically, in relation to the quarry. According to Irene, the owners of the quarry are heavily involved with the parastatal groups. They told me that on the day in 2008 that Batman, a well-known*

*militiaman from Campo Grande, escaped out of the front gates of the Bangú prison, the quarry owner had thrown a party with fireworks and music to celebrate.*

*But not only that. The fly-tipping site, full of tyres and trash (fig. 34), has been the local site where vigilantes, militias, and extermination groups have carried out their killings for decades. It is an isolated, derelict, and unpopulated space that residents in nearby communities drive past quickly if they must, but they never stop. They speed up and close the car windows to block out the smoke from the smouldering rubbish. It's a fitting setting for executions. It is secluded and private, but also accessible and discoverable.*

*'Bodies are left burning and smouldering on the side of the road with blood still pulsating from the corpse', Ana told me. Other residents describe how they regularly hear the echoes from gunshots bouncing off the quarry walls through the darkness at night. Several hours later, flashing lights from a police car appear because a rare driver passing by reports seeing a corpse on the roadside.*

## Introduction

These two vignettes set the scene and foreground the developing nature of my experiences along Campinha Road. They highlight how violence can only be understood through a reading of individual and shared geographies, emplacement and local signification.

Discourses circulating at the macro-level, like the '*milícia*', may be seductive and powerful. However, reliance on these discourses to explain and account for violence can lead to dehumanising effects and a process that strips the individual of their power and agency. I focus on the everyday experiences of urban violence<sup>273</sup> as a way of slicing through these top-down narratives of urban poverty that often overlook more protracted forms of violence and can lead to deeper marginalisation and exclusion. Through a 'street-level' view of everyday experiences of space, institutions and praxis, we can disarm these discourses become more sensitive to the different ways that individuals experience violence, domination and social (dis)order.

This chapter addresses the third sub-question, 'How do communities and Carioca *milícias* interact with and influence each other? And how does this, in turn, shape the management of (dis)order?'. This chapter explores the effect of urban geography on brokerage dynamics within the paramilitary ecosystem and the broader political settlement. I argue that actors with different degrees of power can influence the political and social dynamics of the bargaining

---

<sup>273</sup> I build upon: Moser and McIlwaine Moser, C. O. N. and McIlwaine, C. 2014. New frontiers in twenty-first century urban conflict and violence. SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England.



process and that the experiences and practices of these actors are embedded and imbricated with local histories and social networks. These, in turn, have the potential to shape, deflect or contest the political settlement.



**Figure 37: Map of Campinha Road Highlighting Floresta da Campinha, Santo Cristo and MCMV (Source: Author)**

To address the research question, I reflect on ethnographic data from two communities along Campinha Road: Floresta da Campinha and Santo Cristo (fig. 35). I examine the forms of brokerage in these two communities and attempt to understand how and why stark social and political differences occur in two communities that are only 150 metres apart.

In seeking to understand how and why individuals engage with parastatal groups in the ways they do, I analyse the strategies of Pamela and Marcela, the community leaders from Santo Cristo and Floresta da Campinha, respectively. I examine their practices and inter-relations as they mediate and broker among the different opportunities and barriers they face. I reflect upon their social practices, ideas and values, and seek to understand how they create the everyday rhythms that contribute towards shared understandings of identity, spatiality and culture within their communities. These are the parameters that help define how community residents negotiate, navigate and deal with everyday assertions of power, domination and violence; but also, how they respond to moments of change and chart their pathways to their imagined futures. Looking through this everyday lens to read the production of space through and by the political settlement reveals a much more radical potential for trajectories of development and alternative futures.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I draw on the experiences of Pamela and other residents in Santo Cristo. I attempt to understand how their common ideas, values and cultures correspond with those of parastatal groups and the dominant regime of power in the West Zone. I argue that common notions of space and time across a network of community residents, community leaders, paramilitary groups and politicians reinforce structural insecurity which justifies the need for paramilitary security governance. In the second section, I explore the experiences of a community leader, Marcela, and other residents in the community of Campinha Forest. By reflecting on their experiences of violence and power through their memories and everyday practices, Marcela and the women of Campinha Forest produce alternative spaces of resistance to contest the ideas and paramilitary coercive use of force. I conclude by arguing that paramilitary security governance structures obscure unjust processes of socio-economic urban development and I highlight the importance of critical readings of space for recognising the potential for alternative trajectories of development.

#### *Santo Cristo: Individual histories of power, cooperation and survival*

Pamela was raised in a community on the north-eastern side of Campo Grande. Now in her mid-forties, she remembers the ‘idyllic and structured’ life she had. One of her more prominent memories is from when she used to play on the swings with her friends in the *praça* (square) in front of her house. However, this all changed when she was fifteen.

She remembers the day that a shoe seller stopped outside her front gate and started talking with her mother. The seller told her mother about a planned occupation taking place the following weekend on the other side of Campo Grande. She jumped at the chance of a new start and rent-free living for the family at the time, due to the rising cost of living. The following Saturday, the family walked for two hours to the other side of Campo Grande to the Campinha Road. As dusk fell, the families gathered from diverse communities across the region and started hacking back the overgrowth.

Because Pamela and her new-born baby, mother and family were among the first families to arrive, they had the first choice on selecting a plot of land. The family lived under a tarpaulin for the first few months before they began to cobble together a make-shift structure from salvaged materials. However, the structure barely weathered the wet and stormy conditions during the winter. Pamela remembers how they had to deal with flooding and sickness, snakes, mud, bugs and frogs. As they had no formal infrastructure, Pamela was forced to bathe her baby in a popcorn cart using the water from the single tap that served the whole occupation.



Once most of the residents were living in a basic structure, they started to build a residents' association hut. One resident, Catalina, describes to me how they built it through the spirit of *mutirão*.<sup>274</sup> On Saturday afternoons, someone from each of the plots would come to help build the residents' association hut. They contributed time and what little resources they had to the project. These routine interactions and moments in time facilitated social bonds, a common sense of purpose, and they produced a local sense of place.

### Security-protection and friendship in Santo Cristo

After a year of slow progress, a group of local *donos*, were invited in by one of the occupants. They offered to help organise the growing community, they mediated some of its internal social tensions and alleviate some of the residents' financial hardships. The *donos* were part of a network of local leaders in nearby communities, and most of the locals knew who they were by name and sight. However, one of the ways they entered was by co-opting the discourses of *mutirão* and offering services, resources and money and the chance to be a part of the collective project. They contributed towards the residents' association building by employing a stonemason and paying for the raw materials. The intervention from the *donos* undeniably increased the pace of construction, but it simultaneously shifted some of the organising power into the hands of the *donos*.

The *donos* assumed leadership roles in the community and residents turned to them as authority figures. They took on the roles of local vigilantes claimed to protect the residents from the threat of drug trafficking, criminality and violence; according to Catalina, 'they had [their] best interests at heart'.

One *dono* in particular, Wellington, was a policeman who took a special interest in the community and oversaw the division and administration of the plots. Catalina even told me how he helped her navigate the state bureaucracies so she could apply for her formal land titles. She recalls how Wellington used to stay up all night and patrol the occupation, regulating who went in and out. However, she also told me how few people knew him as a person: 'He was always in the background, but never actually there.'

The first two presidents of the residents' association in Santo Cristo were good friends of Wellington. They formed close relationships with him, and they relied on him as a patron for the community. However, over time Wellington and his group moved on to other places; while

---

<sup>274</sup> This is a Tupi word, but that developed into a Brazilian concept to describe collective mobilisation without hierarchy. See: NAVARRO, E. A. *Método Moderno de Tupi Antigo*. Terceira edição. São Paulo: Global, 2005. p.422.

some of them were killed. Wellington himself was killed along the Campinha Road in 2005 in a shooting with a rival group over a territorial dispute.

When Pamela was elected in 2012 by the residents to be the president of the residents' association, Lucas, a former resident of Santo Cristo, came to her and told her that she could count on him for any support she needed. Lucas works part-time in a local tyre factory but is also part of a local parastatal group where they protect/extort and control local markets.

Having grown up in the community, Lucas was much more familiar with the residents than Wellington had ever been. Pamela described him as a 'true friend'. They developed a friendship through their shared experiences growing up alongside each other, building the residents' association hut together, and socialising after school. 'He's one of the good ones', she told me, before explaining that he really cares about the residents. One of the reasons, she told me, is that his father lives next door to her. These types of close, friendly and trusting relationships between residents and parastatal groups are common. In several of the other communities where I conducted fieldwork, where vigilantes and leaders had been residents for decades, social connections and relationships based on trust were incredibly strong due to shared histories, memories and experiences.

However, parastatal groups are not necessarily confined to a single territory and they can be organised spatially through networks. Lucas, for example, lives in a formal housing estate 500 metres along Campinha Road from Santo Cristo. From his home, Lucas coordinates with the other participants via WhatsApp Messenger. There are no headquarters, offices or single territory from which they control their group.

They create 'contracts' with different communities through personal connections. In Santo Cristo, for example, because of his relationship with Pamela, Lucas was sent to convince Pamela to let them 'take care' of the community. Lucas's group began operating in Santo Cristo in 2012 soon after Pamela became president. Their entry was negotiated on an offer to provide security and protection from the *bandidos*.

The entry of Lucas's group in Santo Cristo was welcomed by residents as there had been a gap of several years since Wellington had stopped looking after the community. Many of the residents felt abandoned and without patronage. However, there was a sense from residents that the security provided by Wellington had somehow been different. Like Otacílio in chapter five, most residents believed that Wellington had not done it for personal gain: 'Things were different when Wellington was around', Catarina told me. Even though, 'now and again a dead

body appeared', she pointed out apathetically, 'When [he] was around, everything was safer than it is now and there weren't any *bandidos*, because he kept everything in order, didn't he?'

Residents told me how they have felt more insecure in recent years, since the entry of Lucas's group into Santo Cristo. This can perhaps be explained by the difference between Wellington acting as a protection broker, whereas Lucas acts more as a security broker. He's dependent on extortion and protection rackets for their continuation.

As a security broker, Lucas and his group benefit from fears and feelings of insecurity. In fact, they capitalised on the experiences of residents following the construction of a MCMV social housing development on the plot of land adjacent to Santo Cristo in 2010. Once families started moving into the development in 2011, residents from Santo Cristo felt a sudden change with a sense of insecurity in the Campinha Road area. Many of the new residents were from low-income or unemployed families, and most had come from dispersed communities across the city. Many had been affected by landslides, flooding or had been removed as a result of Olympic infrastructure constructions.

Residents from Santo Cristo speak negatively about their neighbours. Although many of their complaints revolve around disruptions to services, utilities and commerce in the area (such as additional pressures on transport, education and healthcare services), tensions are aggravated by the broader mentions of the '*bandido*'. Even though many residents from Santo Cristo had arrived at the occupation in 1996 with little more than a bag of clothes, I sensed a distinct attempt by residents to distance themselves from the residents of MCMV.

Residents in Santo Cristo regularly referred to 'those types of people' in MCMV and spoke of frequent criminal, disorderly and violent behaviour within the walls of the development and surrounds. Pamela, for one, claimed that since MCMV had been built, there had been significantly more incidents of assault, rape and prostitution in the Campinha area than ever before. She told me:

'When I go in there, I feel like I'm stepping out of this world and into another one. It seems like I go into a capsule and that at any moment some harm will come to me. I don't like going in there.'

The imaginaries of the place, through which the MCMV space is portrayed as a criminal's paradise, are laden with discrimination and unequal power relations. However, this process of othering seems to legitimise the relationship with Lucas and his group and the 'security' measures that go with it.

Specifically, this sense of difference justifies the need for Lucas's group. The parastatal organisation is, in this sense, a form of insurance to protect against a collision between different cultural symbols, beliefs, modes of interaction, ideologies and values between the different 'worlds'. As well as protecting against direct and physical forms of violence, it can divide, keep separate and protect from the different cultures and ideas.

Despite the fear that these parastatal groups generate, they continue to be socially legitimised within the context of the greater fear of drug trafficking and criminality. If the resident from Santo Cristo is on the right side of this divide and is a *cidadão do bem* (a good citizen), then it appears that they have nothing to fear. In Pamela's view, the parastatal groups do not use violence in the neighbourhood. 'On the contrary', she tells me, '[they] keep it in order'.

'I once had an issue here with a boy smoking pot down the street there. He was in such a state. So, [Lucas] came, then he went, and then he sent a car down into the street. The residents saw the cars, they did nothing, everybody went inside, and nobody said anything, get me?'

Some of the groups' authority derives from the fact that they lurk in the shadows and are not particularly visible, even to the knowledgeable eye. Lucas reassures Pamela that they are stepping up their measures by paying undercover lookouts in houses along the Campinha Road in panoptic-type surveillance. This serves as a stark reminder that what can appear to be absent can also be a signifier of a presence.<sup>275</sup>

Pamela understands how the deployment of fear and insecurity can work to shape behaviour and shore up power. When I arrived one afternoon at Pamela's house, she looked flustered and upset. She told me that her son, Antonio, who had left home several years earlier, had broken into her house, stolen money and ransacked it. She told me that he was retaliating to a family argument.

Later that week, Lucas walked into the residents' association where I was interviewing Pamela and he asked her about the situation:

Lucas:                   And Antonio, how's it all going?

Pamela:               He is okay, but what can I do...? You should go over there today! I'm so annoyed with that guy, man. Lucas, how can we arrange it so we can give him a... scare? ((laughs)).

*[Lucas looks over to Pamela's house]*

---

<sup>275</sup> This draws on some thinking about graffiti in Northern Ireland, and the links it reveals about paramilitary domination: Bush, K. (2013) 'The politics of post-conflict space: the mysterious case of missing graffiti in 'post-troubles' Northern Ireland', *Contemporary Politics*, 19(2), pp. 167-189.

Ah, he's not here, he's somewhere else.

Lucas: We can fix *anything* Pamela. The thing is that you can't regret it afterwards. You just have to be sure of these things.

Pamela: Ah, but it's my personal life.

Lucas: I know that Pamela, the thing is that you can't regret it afterwards.

Pamela: I'm kidding, I'm not going to do *that*.

Lucas: We can do anything; the thing is to be sure.

Pamela: No, no, no, no. I'm messing, I'm kidding.

Lucas: Just like the woman over there... Her husband beat her up. She called me and Rafael, that little nigga. We sat there together. She was there too. 'Oh, my husband...' I said, 'are you sure...?' And she was.

By discussing the use violence and fear as a way of dealing with social tension and regaining control, we can see how Pamela, as a community leader, local resident and mother, endorses and participates in these regimes of control and decisions of local sovereignty about who can live and who can die.

However, these extra-legal practices are not solely controlled by Pamela, or even by Lucas at the micro-level. By depending on the security and protection of Lucas's group, Pamela is subjugated to the rules, regulations and consensus of broader interlocking and nested networks of parastatal groups dispersed across the West Zone. Whilst the networks are decentralised and not necessarily well 'organised' (in terms of being centralised and hierarchical), there is a sense of continuity, identity and place that is organised through the territorial effect of social practice.

### **Organisation and political settlements within and beyond Santo Cristo**

These organisations vary in size, scale and reach. Lucas's group, for example, is a franchise of a larger and more powerful paramilitary in Margarça, some kilometres south of Campinha. The leader of the Margarça group, Mazinho, a slot-machine mafia boss and a former policeman, competes with other networks for access to communities, markets and resources. In the view of the local paramilitary groups, like Lucas's, alliances with the larger and more powerful groups are crucial as they enable local groups to access resources, weapons, economies of scale and knowledge of the state bureaucracies that they would not otherwise have.

Complex relationships exist among the different groups and networks and a variety of political actors, some of whom are within the state system. In return for electoral and campaigning support, political candidates offer parastatal groups and community leaders access to resources, services and goods.

In the months after Lucas and his group started providing security in Santo Cristo, he introduced Pamela to Serginho, a politician from Margarça. During that period, the roof of the residents' association in Santo Cristo had been damaged in recent storms and Serginho offered to pay for the roof if Pamela agreed to support him politically. Through this offer, Pamela entered into a political pact with Serginho. Pamela explained to me:

‘[Serginho] gave us presents for the children, meat for the residents’ barbeques, a supply of gas for the residents, he can help feed a family if they can’t afford food or the cost of a burial of a resident... It’s easier for Serginho because he’s a militiaman. He has everything within reach. He gets what he wants, doesn’t he? His brother-in-law is the militia boss, you get me? So, the weekly grocery basket, the gas bottle, it comes from them. The shops can’t sell gas over there because of the militia.’

The connection between the struggle in these spaces and the more macro-level political power is very visible here. Although Pamela and the residents of Santo Cristo have gained improved access to resources, services and goods, there was a trade-off and Pamela’s hands are now tied. She is expected to electioneer for him during campaigns and all of the residents are expected to vote for him.

Serginho ran several times as a candidate in municipal and state elections. In the 2014 election, Pamela delivered hundreds of votes for him, but, although ‘he didn’t get elected this time, it could have been the difference between his election, or not’, she tells me. With the ability to generate votes, Pamela is aware of her influential role in organising power and uses it to negotiate and bargain with different militia groups and politicians.

During 2017, she deliberated at length about who to make the next electoral pact with, reluctant to be forced into it and wanting to take her time: ‘I’m going to take a stroll, look over some proposals and I’ll see how they go, if they’re any better’, she told Lucas in front of me, as he tried to try to convince her to *fechar* (do a deal) with one of his other political patrons for the state elections (Serginho was not standing in that election). Despite Pamela and Lucas’s friendship, the informal and trusting nature of their relationship was intertwined with business-like rigor and behaviours.



Figure 38: Serginho's Preferences for 2018 Elections: 'Serginho Votes and Indicates...' (Source: Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/sergioaguilar.aguiar.3>)

Although Serginho did not run in the 2018 elections, he used his support from local residents and his name to endorse other politicians and encourage vote transfers (fig. 36). In a Facebook post, he wrote: 'Good morning my friends! The big day is arriving! The day of change and renovation. I count on the help of all of you'<sup>276</sup>.

Whilst these public declarations are easy to locate, the political nature of these connections and endorsements are difficult to pin down. However, it is clear that there were some political and financial connections between politicians in the state and federal parliaments and Serginho. For example, according to the records from the Regional Electoral Courts of 2014, Leonardo Picciani contributed R\$44,612 to Serginho's campaign. In that same campaign, the Electoral Commission discovered fraud involving campaign materials for Serginho and Leonardo<sup>277</sup>. Although this is in no way conclusive, it is clear that shadowy economic and political links with broad base, mainstream, and national level politicians, which could be called 'corruption', are a part of the everyday practices and functioning of the parastatal ecosystem.

Despite this, Pamela and Lucas expressed strong opinions to me on the topic of corruption and slush funds. This was because a news story about Jorge Picciani (Leonardo's father) and Sérgio Cabral (the former governor of Rio de Janeiro) showed that they had been arrested in a major

<sup>276</sup> Serginho da Pastelaria (2018) *Facebook Post*. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/SerguinhodaPastelaria/photos/a.954941398048586/954941384715254/?type=3&theater>.

<sup>277</sup> Gm M (2015) *TRE/RJ apura fraude eleitoral em gráfica que presta serviços à Prefeitura do Rio e ao Governo do Estado*. Jusbrasil. Available at: <https://gerry.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/133049838/tre-rj-apura-fraude-eleitoral-em-grafica-que-presta-servicos-a-prefeitura-do-rio-e-ao-governo-do-estado> (Accessed: December 20 2019).

anti-corruption probe, *Lava Jato* (Operation Car Wash) at this time in April 2017. Lucas and Pamela described them as ‘rich crooks’. However, during the same conversation, Lucas lamented how *Lava Jato* has made ‘doing politics’ much more difficult for him in the local area. He commented how ‘politics is in such a bad way’, because of this investigation and said, ‘[the politicians] are now scared of being investigated so they won’t do any deals’. This is one of the reasons, they told me, that Serginho decided not to run as a candidate in the 2018 elections.

Despite undeniable similarities in their practices of clientelism and informal brokerage, Lucas and Pamela lambasted Jorge Picianni and Sergio Cabral for their corruption, yet at the same time see their brokerage practices as a necessity for making do. At the local level, practices that straddle legal and illegal spheres are conducted in order to ‘do’ politics. They are understood as a form of survival and a licit form of entrepreneurialism, culturally explained as a *jeitinho brasileiro*.<sup>278</sup>

Although these practices are framed at the national and public spheres as criminality and corruption, more nuanced readings of brokerage and the discourses that frame them highlight how the ethics of rent-seeking can be re-shaped in favour of a mostly simplistic cultural relativism that can obscure our view of the power relations that underpins them. These contrasts highlight the deep contradictions between everyday practices of informal brokerage and broader geographies of corruption, reinforcing the importance of understanding the situatedness of ethics, historical dynamics and power relations embedded within discourses of corruption.

#### *Floresta da Campinha: Shared histories, resistência and utopian imaginings*

Marcela was born in the 1950s into a community in a remote region of Uganda. She was the second-born daughter from her father. Because of customary laws requiring her mother to produce a second-born male, she was outcast as a baby and sent to live in a neighbouring community with local elders. When she was eight, Marcela was brought back into the tribe and forced into marriage.

Marcela’s mother knew well the violence, mutilation and abuse Marcela would face as a young woman in the community and she did not want to put her daughter through it. Her mother plotted their escape from the tribe the night before the marriage. As dawn broke on the morning

---

<sup>278</sup> This can be translated roughly as the ‘Brazilian way of doing things’.



of the marriage, Marcela's mother bundled up her daughter, and set out across the savanna before the elders awoke.

They walked for days until they reached a town where they stayed with a family who gave them clothes, food and somewhere to rest. In the following years, Marcela and her mother journeyed through Uganda, South Sudan and across Sub-Saharan Africa before crossing the Atlantic by boat to Mexico. Marcela's mother had her sights set on Brazil as she thought it would be easiest to assimilate amongst the racially diverse population with strong connections to the African continent. Seven years after leaving Uganda, they arrived in Rio de Janeiro.

When she was seventeen, Marcela began to earn money by singing on the street corner in the Baixada Fluminense. She soon became known in the neighbourhood for her voice and was invited to join a jazz band with two professional musicians. She married one of them and they had three children together, but then her husband went to Europe to pursue his music career and left Marcela saddled with his debt. After the courts repossessed the apartment she lived in with her children, she was evicted onto the streets. She found a job as a domestic employee for a wealthy family in Campo Grande who agreed that she could build a make-shift home on the riverbank at the end of their land.

### **Balancing gender and power**

During the winter of 1996, Marcela's neighbour from across the other side of the river told her about a planned occupation for women, children and the elderly that was organised for later that week. Marcela jumped at the opportunity of a chance to build a permanent home for her family. On the night of the invasion, Marcela joined fifty or so other women to cut through the barbed wired fence along the side of Campinha Road. Burning tyres to guide themselves, they beat down the forest through the night.

Marcela told me how proud she had been from the beginning of the occupation of the sense of community and optimism that had been developing in Floresta da Campinha amongst the women. However, even though I knew it was the case from the accounts of other residents, there was a sense that Marcela was trying to erase the fact that local donos had organised and coordinated the invasion. They had directed the women, subdivided the land and claimed the most desirable plots for themselves.

Marcela chose to tell me about how the women had started with a voluntary collection of five reals every week to buy building materials for a new residents' association hut, and those who were not able to contribute financially offered their labour, time, and skills instead. One female

resident, for example, taught herself stone masonry skills and set about building the association hut, teaching other residents the skills she had learnt.

However, whilst the women were working the land around the site for the residents' association, they came across skeletal remains inside the tangled root formations of a giant fig tree that hung over the community. The women assumed that they were remains from slaves who had worked on the plantations. Marcela explained how it had been a stark reminder of her own background. The women had cut down the tree and buried the skeletons and this opened up light into the community. Marcela presented this as a symbolic, transformative and generative moment in the community marking a departure from the histories of death, domination, and subordination. Nowadays, there is a vast hollow in the ground where the roots of the fig tree once were, and it is where the residents' association hut sits.

The women reclaimed and repurposed the space, setting out their own imaginations of community, space and time. In the residents' association, for example, Marcela opened a crèche to look after the young children from the community – something she had dreamt about for years – whilst the other mothers in the community worked and earned an income. She taught the children music, English and Spanish and told them stories from her travels. Marcela also facilitated collective meals every Friday evening on the riverbank where residents would gather and socialise. Marcela sang and the residents took it in turns to cook food for the others using produce from the community vegetable garden. Through these interactions, the residents established and constructed close bonds by sharing stories, experiences and connections.

The other residents appreciated Marcela's energy and admired her proactive approach to looking after the community. 'Every day I donated my body to the universe to go and take care of the vegetables for the benefit of the community', Marcela told me. One resident told me how Marcela had not only transformed the aesthetic of the streets of Floresta da Campinha, but she had helped to change how residents felt about living there. Marta, a friend and neighbour of Marcela, suggested to me that the women were living in their 'own world' that they had constructed for themselves.

However, there was always an uneasiness and tension in the relationship between the women and the donos. Because the occupants were women, and many of them had children, there were natural divisions along gender lines. But these unequal distributions of power and wealth manifested in clear spatial inequalities, such as the expensive materials, skilled workforce builders and high walls surrounding the plots that the donos used to build their homes. On the

other hand, most of the women had built their homes from scrapped and salvaged materials. The women generally felt disrespected by the donos, who used to sit on the street corner opposite the site where the women laboured over the association building, drink beer and comment on the women's work.

Over time, tensions escalated between female residents and the donos. Once the women had finished building the association hut, for example, the donos used the building for their own private meetings, barbeques and parties. They installed an iron gate around the building and padlocked the entrance so no one else could use it. One resident, Andrea, described how their frustrations reached a tipping point when they found out that one of the donos, supposedly the treasurer of the residents' association, had stolen money from a donation to the community from the local church. Enraged, the women called a residents' meeting to discuss the issue and they voted on a motion to remove the treasurer from his position and hold fresh elections for a new president and administration.

Many of the residents saw Marcela as the natural leader of the community and called on her to put herself forward. She was shy at the prospect as she did not think she was qualified for it. 'I had no political proposals and not even an administrative team to help me with the duties,' she told me. Eventually, though, she was persuaded, and she put herself forward. She wrote a manifesto that described a project that involved creating 'radical change' in the community. She read it aloud during one of the residents' meetings. She told me how she had pledged to help build a community 'where good people live surrounded by goodness in the greenness of nature, and where the whole neighbourhood will be healthy, educated, cultured and where the elderly and children will have their place in this space'.

Although one of the donos stood against her thinking he would win, Marcela won the votes from community residents by a landslide. In the weeks that followed, the power of the donos seeped away, and the women reclaimed important spaces in the community for themselves, such as the residents' association hall.

### **Death, fear and everyday life around Floresta da Campinha**

Strong social bonds developed among the women over the following years. However, these bonds were not always epiphenomena of encouraging and positive experiences. Some of the most unifying experiences the mothers shared were the tragic losses of their sons. Regrettably, this is not an uncommon occurrence in Brazil, especially for black families from poor urban communities. Black teenage boys are disproportionately affected by violence in Brazil. The

*Atlas da Violencia*, for example, demonstrates that there were 46,271 homicides of black males in 2017 out of a total number of 56,101 nationally (de Castro Cerqueira and Pires Guedes, 2019). These are not isolated events and there are undeniable racial and gendered trends. During my 20 months of research in Campinha, a teenager ‘disappeared’ at least every few weeks.

However, to understand the full consequences of these deaths, beyond the homicide statistic and the immediate loss of life, we must also pay attention to the indirect, and overlooked effects of domination and control over the mother and her female body.

Maria, one of Marcela’s neighbours and friends, asked if I had ever imagined what it would be like to lose a child or how it felt to not be able to bury my child. I replied that I obviously could not begin to imagine it. Maria’s son had been murdered in a ‘microwave’ – a torture and killing technique where a victim is put in the centre of a stack of tyres and burnt alive. Her voice cracked as she told me about it. She progressed the conversation and shared experiences of other mothers in Campinha with me, demonstrating solidarity with other mothers who had had similar experiences. ‘We’ve got fifteen or so mothers here, who, through similar scenarios, have lost their sons, who’ve had their sons killed, and whose sons have disappeared... They killed Marcela’s son just over there’, she said, as she pointed to a small hatch across the street. It was Marcela’s bar.

The day before it happened in 2011, the residents had been enjoying a birthday party at the residents’ association hall, barbequing and drinking beer. Around midnight Joaquim, Marcela’s son, had arrived at the party and had eaten something with the crowd. Soon after, he had said goodnight to everyone and had gone to bed in the family home. Half an hour later Maria had noticed two cars parked with their full beams glaring in the direction of the residents’ association. They were parked on the street corner next to Marcela’s house. Commenting on how strange it was, the women decided it was time to finish the party, pack up for the night and head home.

The next morning, Joaquim had left early for work and Marcela had gone into Campo Grande centre. When Joaquim had arrived home for lunch, he had sat in his mother’s kitchen and eaten the meal she had left out for him. Whilst he had been eating lunch, two cars had pulled up on the street corner and eight men had poured out. They blocked off the street entrances and told everyone in the street to go inside their houses. They forced their way into Marcela’s house where Joaquim was and told him to get up. Marcela’s neighbour overheard Joaquim shout, ‘No

man, not here! If you want to kill me, then not here...! Take me somewhere else, please!’ The gunmen yelled at him, ‘Get down! Lie on the floor and you’re going to die!’ After several loud shots the gunmen left. Neighbours ran into the house and found Joaquim’s dismembered body. Maria recalled graphic details as if they had been etched in her mind. ‘His brains, the soles of his feet, his thighs... Every fucking piece of him came out. You saw inside his head’, she recounted. The neighbours rang Marcela immediately. ‘Where are you Marcela? You have to come back! They’ve just killed your son.’ She arrived soon after.

Though no one can say with absolute certainty, the women are confident the gunmen were from a parastatal group. However, the exact identities of parastatal actors are rarely known, unless they are embedded in a community, like Lucas. One hypothesis offered to me by a neighbour was that Joaquim, who had worked as a driver for a local van cooperative, had got on the wrong side of the parastatal groups who had demanded that he pay a security and access tax to carry out his work. However, another resident claimed that it was because Joaquim had made an enemy in the parastatal organisations through the notoriously violent Flamengo football supporters’ club. Marcela later found out that Joaquim had been involved in a fight with a *milicianos* son after a football match and the son had sworn that he would find out where Joaquim lived and get revenge. Marcela believes that four of the eight are now dead or in prison for other crimes. No one was ever arrested for Joaquim’s murder. Of course, none of this was ever reported in a newspaper, or to the police.

These experiences of death and violence shaped everyday life for the mothers. For most of the women in Floresta da Campinha, the space where they live shapes and controls multiple aspects of their lives and everyday practice. These spaces are deeply gendered in the way they affect the women. Not only for mothers who have lost their sons from assassination by male parastatal actors, but it also impacts on everyday life for many women affected by a fear of violence. For example, women employed in domestic work typically need to leave home early and return late at night in the darkness. Irene, for example, shaped her daily routine around her fears. She used to take two extra buses to get to her workplace in order to avoid walking down Campinha Road on her own at night. It added three hours onto her journey every day. However, she tells me that when she arrived in the community, she felt safe, even though it was night-time. The women expressed more fear of the night than of the day, and these fears shape their rhythms of everyday life. However, these fears are not necessarily to do with darkness and poor visibility, but more to do with the regimes of coercion, domination, masculinity and control that govern the space and attempt to exert control over their bodies.

Stories about death and violence are continuously narrated as if an endless replay and analysis of events can help residents deal with and make sense of the arbitrary nature of violence. However, the opposite appears to take place as histories repeated seem to reinforce fear, insecurity and tumult. The narration of violence fuels a cycle in which fear is dealt with and reproduced simultaneously, and in which violence is counteracted, but also amplified. The stories of the women tended to gravitate towards the quarry and the killing site I discussed in the opening vignette of this chapter. However, their stories are simultaneously diffuse, disconnected and without any strong centre. In abstract terms, Campinha Road can be understood as an intersection where old and new geographies juxtapose against one another, embedded in complex and layered histories of violence<sup>279</sup>. It is not the object of space itself that provokes imagination and memory, but the violent social practices, recollections and narrations that create the meaning.

The violated and affected bodies of the women became politicised bodies. The practice of violence, therefore, reinforced the structural conditions that led to it in an endless cycle of imitation and representation<sup>280</sup>. As victims and narrators of violent practice, residents are themselves directly involved in the production of spaces of fear as subjects of the spatial expressions of power. This cultural formation of violence links locally imagined forms of social order and hierarchical structures of subordination, simultaneously reinforcing the positionality of those in positions of power and discriminating against victims in positions of weakness. After countless stories of environmental violations, alongside more discreet and deeply troubling stories of assassination, rape and torture, for me as a researcher (as highlighted through my opening vignettes), the meaning of the space around Campinha evolved significantly over time from my first to my most recent experience.

The experiences of violence, death and fear profoundly shaped the political subjectivities of the women of Campinha. They developed resistance against discourses, cultures and ideas which manifested through the spatial practices, narratives and discourses of the women in Bosque dos Campinha. One of the most blatant strategies of resistance is practiced by mothers such as Maria who marched into the favela where her son was executed and demanded the return of his body so she could bury him to mourn his death. Her experience as a black woman,

---

<sup>279</sup> Massey might have called this an “open, hybrid meeting place” Massey, D. (1992) 'Politics and space/time', *New Left Review*, pp. 65-65.

<sup>280</sup> This is reminiscent of the "circularity of violent mimesis": Feldman, A. (1991) *Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern Ireland*. University of Chicago Press.

forced into this confrontation with the militia, led me to think about the black gendered spatial praxis provoked as a result of experiences of death, trauma and loss.

This is also true of Marcela and her experiences of violence as a child in Uganda where she was rejected, subjected to torture and then inserted into patriarchal structures. Whilst the Campinha Road, and the broader West Zone, is dominated culturally, exploited economically and much of the territory has been dispossessed through violent control over the subjugated body, it has also led to contestable politics and alternative spaces of resistance. Experiences of violence and death as a result of a particular regime of power can stimulate social struggle and leads to an activism and radicalisation that attempts to occupy, deploy and create alternative spatialities from those through oppression and exploitation.

### **Anti-politics, resistance and alternative futures in Floresta da Campinha**

‘Africa is very different from Campinha. Here the women dominate’, Marcela tells me. From an early age, Marcela made the link between patriarchy and violence, and her experiences helped her recognise her own agency. Their individual and shared histories and geographies led to the women to reject the violent structures of control and domination of parastatal groups and emancipate themselves from ideas of gender in which mothers and women are subservient to men and are destined to care for the home and family. In recognising their agency, the women engaged in spatial practices that attend to the needs of the community rather than coalescing around hegemonic structures of control and domination.

Parastatal groups have attempted to ‘take over’ Floresta da Campinha on several occasions in recent years. Each time, they walk up to Marcela’s bar and make her an offer. According to Maria, Marcela politely refuses. ‘She knows how to dialogue, how to talk their language. She’s good with that kind of thing’, she tells me. ‘Oh, maybe not right now, we don’t need it, but perhaps in the future...’, Maria paraphrases Marcela’s response. The *milícias* seem to respect Marcela and the work she does.

That said, this doesn’t stop the *milícias* from trying to interfere in community and social life. They’ve told Marcela that she should charge much more for use of the residents’ association, for example. Marcela charges R\$50 to residents, of which R\$20 pays a cleaner and R\$30 contributed towards the electricity, gas and water bills. She charges \$R100 to non-residents. On finding out the rates, the *donos* came in told her that she should be charging at least R\$200 for everyone, then she might make some money.

The power within Floresta da Campinha does not necessarily rest within the means of violence, but it is also about the organisational power of the community, the means to mobilise support and social energy. Throughout the years, the residents' association has been an important site in the formation of alternative spaces, ideas and identities. The women run regular workshops with a West Zone women's collective where they share their knowledge, experiences and understanding with local residents. Marcela's daughter, Denise, expressed concern that when Marcela dies that the community would be more vulnerable to the parastatal organisations.

However, this approach that goes against the grain has had consequences for the women who have excluded themselves from the dominant political discourses. Pamela's leverage and ability to negotiate access to resources and services for Santo Cristo from the state is much greater than Marcela's. This is visible in the communities. Whereas there are pavements, tarmacked roads, street gutters and drains in Santo Cristo, the Floresta da Campinha continues with dusty, muddy tracks that flood when it rains. Although Marcela does have an agreement with a local city councillor to help her with the basic requests, and he had promised her before the last three elections that someone would come to do the roads, he is not as influential as Serginho and has been unable to secure the resources.

Marcela's daughter, Denise, whom I met and ate lunch with on my first day in Floresta da Campinha, now runs daily youth clubs in the residents' association building where the work that Marcela started with the crèche now continues. A banner hanging outside the residents' association reads: 'WELCOME TO EVERYONE! THE AGROECOLOGY YOUTH CLUB OF CAMPINHA', demonstrating the porosity and fluidity of the boundaries of Floresta da Campinha.

On my first day in Campinha, Denise invited me into a youth club meeting. Whilst most of the children in Floresta da Campinha are now grown up, Denise works closely with the youth from the neighbouring MCMV where she recognised 'potential for to work with the youths, build new relationships, friendships and creating positive change'. As I walked into the residents' association building for the first time, I noticed the brightly coloured paintings on the walls inside with images of dancers, students and children reading and flying kites. The children were from different races, backgrounds, genders and ages.

Denise explained to me that the youth club project, called the 'Living and Bonding Service' (SCFV) is a project funded by the Municipal Secretary of Social Development (SMDS) and managed by the Social Assistance Reference Centre (CRAS). One of the pre-requisites for



attending the CRAS is registration on the federal government's cash transfer Bolsa Familia programme. However, despite their funding coming from the state, the content discussed in the programme is decided locally. There are broad themes given to the various SCFV social workers across the city, but these are interpreted and worked with at a local level.

Posters and placards hung on the walls of the residents' association building and they politicised issues of malnutrition and food poverty. On the table at one end of the room, for example, one of the 'snack packs' delivered weekly for the youths by the CRAS, consisting of sugary snacks and plastic cartons with sweet drinks, had been deconstructed on the table with labels to highlight its sugar and trans-fat content. Other stickers highlighted that the packaging was non-recyclable. By deconstructing the food products given to them by the state in this way, the youths have critiqued the state institutions whilst continuing to remain within them. They also displayed letters they had written to the SMDS to put forward proposals for healthier and more sustainable alternatives.

That afternoon, Daniela, an activist from a local NGO, led a discussion on 'environmental racism' and explained to the youths how the Campinha region had been neglected, discriminated and exploited. Marina told the group, 'If affluent white men lived here, then there's no way the quarry would be allowed to put dust and burn down the forest'. She asked the youths for examples of environmental racism. Felipe, a 16-year-old boy from MCMV put his hand up and he described an encounter when two armed men had stopped him on a remote section of Campinha Road. They had claimed that they were policemen, but they had no identification to prove it. Felipe assumed they were parastatal organisations. They had ordered him and his friends to stand against a wall while they were searched. The teenagers had asked to see the identity cards of the policemen, but the men had told the boys they didn't have them with them. Another girl described how her sister had been attacked walking along the Campinha Road one night the previous week on her way home from work. All the youths agreed that these were forms of racism that were enhanced by the rural setting.

The content of these discussions, with their focus on violence and structural racism, was surprising to me at first. The façade of the residents' association was welcoming and inclusive with its focus on horticulture. Beyond the politics of healthy eating and sustainability, there were no obvious manifestations of racial activism.

I asked Denise about this. She alluded to how their marginalisation on the peripheries of the city facilitated these kinds of discussions. On the one hand, whilst there were huge

opportunities to engage with in terms of land use, food sovereignty and a close relationship with nature, on the other, there are more structural issues to consider including important aspects of violence, racism and inequality.

Denise showed me the community garden where the youths tended to the garden at least once a week. In it, the women and youths had planted a variety of vegetables and herbs such as lettuce, cabbage, broccoli, parsley and medicinal plants. The garden supplied fresh, organic produce for the residents in Campinha, but it was also shared within the MCMV developments to the resident families. They traded seeds with their network of gardeners whenever they wanted to eat something different.

I observed how the youths treated the garden as a safe meeting place where they could come and relax, socialise and discuss their experiences with the women, at the same time as planting, repotting and weeding. The ways that these individuals tended to the garden was suggestive of the generative role of place in bringing together individuals and communities in new, politicised and collectivised modes of production that seemed to be an attempt at carving out spaces for themselves, and even commoning them.

There were some creative subversions of power and inventive political manifestations, such as the repurposing of the non-recyclable, single-use plastic water cups from the snack packs that they use to plant and grow seedlings. The teenagers took these seedlings to grow at home with their families, many of them on small windowsills. In doing so, this had the effect of politicising some family members who have become curious about the project and have subsequently become involved. The intentions seem to have been to critique the state and market from within the broad structures of it, to piggyback it and subvert it through their own political imaginaries.

This also extends across broader networks of solidarity that come together at city-wide organic, community markets of urban produce, where producers of produce from across diverse communities meet and discuss the processes that are taking place in their communities.

These networks also allow the youths to reimagine Campinha in different ways, to reflect on their experiences and continually develop and stretch the ways they imagine their own identity. They are everyday acts of resistance and a networked form of territory.

In addition to the evolution of these spatial structures, these slowly shifting local codes and practices have the effect of forging social organisations with the potential to shape and influence political settlements on a much wider scale. By occupying space and reclaiming control and power over land, these activities help to reshape urban space by reimagining the

territories. Communities can construct new social relations to empower individuals, invigorate communities, demercantilise space and resist certain forms of domination and control. However, there are also more concrete effects in the ways that formal state institutions can be shaped through anti-politics and acts of resistance. Incremental pressures, political acts and expressions of local perspective by voices from the network in formal political spaces have contributed to sanctioning a new law that protects urban and peri-urban agriculture<sup>281</sup>.

Through these discussions, and during the 12 months that followed where I conducted ethnographic research in Floresta da Campinha, the complexity and ingenuity of Denise's role as an intermediary emerged as an important feature in this process of social transformation. As an employee of the state, she has the access and power to acquire certain resources. An employee of CRAS, her salary comes directly from the municipal government that enables her to spend significant amounts of time with the youths from MCMV and build relationships with them, at least three or four days per week. However, she is also a community leader and has influence, together with her mother, in shaping the events and activities in the Floresta da Campinha. Alongside all of this, Denise is a radical feminist and activist, engaging in political debates and meetings. Denise is also a mother as well as being a friend to many of the residents in the community.

Denise, therefore, has several roles and her ability to pivot among them is fundamental for understanding how these activities are reproduced in the community. She is also responsible for weaving together all the different networks and spaces that she is linked into through her varying brokerage roles. It is perhaps the story of her mother's history of being in a transitory state and the skills she has learnt from her mother, that have made her so flexible and agile in these circumstances.

Spatial consciousness has become an intrinsic part of the women's strategies for urban survival and resistance in these tightly controlled spaces.<sup>282</sup> Spatial consciousness has influenced spatial praxis in a variety of ways such as the ways that the women protest and articulate their political imaginaries in the Campinha region. When I went to one political demonstration outside the

---

<sup>281</sup> Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (2019) *Witzel sanciona lei para incentivar produção agrícola no estado*. Available at: [http://www.rj.gov.br/NoticiaDetalhe.aspx?id\\_noticia=3072&pl=governador-sanciona-lei-para-incentivar-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-agr%C3%ADcola-no-estado&fbclid=IwAR3kkVMN-YiQKLr9oLhG9Etj77DxRDhu2VcM9YdqTS6jb8aFheL82MD4u0E](http://www.rj.gov.br/NoticiaDetalhe.aspx?id_noticia=3072&pl=governador-sanciona-lei-para-incentivar-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-agr%C3%ADcola-no-estado&fbclid=IwAR3kkVMN-YiQKLr9oLhG9Etj77DxRDhu2VcM9YdqTS6jb8aFheL82MD4u0E) (Accessed: December 2019).

<sup>282</sup> For how civil society groups in the West Zone are forced to adopt different strategies as 'normal' to circumvent limitations posed upon the women and teenagers, see: da Silva Ribeiro Gomes, S. (2017) *Oportunidades políticas e estratégias militantes em contextos de violência rotinizada: uma comparação entre a Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro (Brasil) e Guerrero (México)*. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro..

MCMV development to mark International Women's Day, the women were subdued and were engaged in quiet conversations with residents, without drawing too much attention to themselves. This was in stark contrast to a demonstration several weeks prior in the city centre when the women had handmade banners and had chanted demands outside the parliament building.

The women are situated, but also situate themselves, as political and spatial subjects in Campinha. They are engaged in the continual construction of an imagined and utopian community for themselves through their own, reclaimed version of *mutirão* based on their own understandings of gender, race and ethnicity. Their everyday acts of resistance and claims to the city forge an assemblage of resistance in which new significations are assigned to space, bodies and the roles of women. By identifying these women's practices, we understand how they have asserted their spatial agency to 'deal with' the politics of space and cut through narratives of oppression in which women are depicted as lacking in agency and mere passengers in the making of time. Instead, they imagine an alternative future in which women, blacks and youths are not judged by their skin, gender, age or social backgrounds.

## Conclusions

This chapter sought to challenge the 'top-down' narratives about the urban margins as wild and savage frontier zones by examining the practices that take place in the spaces within and around political settlements. Specifically, I examined the experiences of two sets of brokers through two different communities to understand how brokerage dynamics can influence and shape the political settlement.

I demonstrated how there is explanatory power to be found in relational interpretations of space in which the contingency of social relations on cultural norms, values and ideas can demonstrate how and why power functions and circulates. I was able to highlight how different experiences, ideas, values and cultures led to different types of relations with parastatal actors and organisation; particularly, whether there was collaboration or rejection. Through this lens, it is possible to recognise that the power of paramilitary regimes of control is not just about opportunism and extraction, but they are also about legitimacy, patronage and ideological understandings of the world, norms and beliefs.

Through this lens, this chapter argued that a study of brokerage is fundamental for understanding how political relations are shaped, power is mediated, and how different trajectories of development are determined. Much of the explanation for these differences can

be found in the personal and shared human geographies and histories of different brokers within and linked to the communities. By examining how the power regime is organised through this historical and geographical approach, it helps to break down the conventional view of parastatal organisations as repressive, top-down criminal groups only seeking out profit. Instead, this additional level of nuance and complexity, understanding power as a negotiated and brokered relation, demonstrates that it can be extremely variable and is contingent on different moments and places in time. It can also be about survival and the art of muddling through complex and challenging situations while trying to hold onto space and security in an environment where there is arbitrary violence.

In following this line of thinking, this chapter highlighted how different expectations, imagined futures and degrees of agency can affect the actions and reactions of individuals. This has consequences for the overall shape of the political settlement as an interactive type of order. Brokerage illuminates these processes of power negotiation between local structures and political elites. Brokers seem able to force political elites to go with the grain of local structures in order to maintain relevance, legitimacy and even a basic degree of power; and they function as both the entry points and the gatekeepers to local spaces, mediating which structures succeed and which do not. Without this chain of brokerage and complex set of social interrelations, external players do not possess the information, networks or relationships to be legitimate in local communities.

Globally and historically, notions of hope and imaginations about the future are intertwined with the ways that territory, security and politics are imagined in these spaces. In parastatal dominated communities, residents live under the shadow of the fear of violence, and the hope that is imbued within a dependence on security governance. Residents hope for a life without direct and physical violence but where there is always a ‘secured’ environment for them to live in. Holding onto this hope provides a form of escapism and it legitimises the presence of parastatal groups. But the ‘here-and-now’ bundled up in the instincts to survive simultaneously compresses the future into the present and it submerges the possibility of thinking through alternative hopes, such as inclusion and acceptance.

However, power is not only about the means to violence. Different forms of social energy, public action and mobilisations (spontaneous and organised) can also produce holding power, alternative futures and insurgent forms of citizenship. Through this chapter I have demonstrated how the West Zone is a site of productivity, experimentation and contestation where new social configurations and dynamics lead to creative processes of social

transformation. Social relations in Floresta da Campinha demonstrate that modes of production that are not always driven by the capitalist logic, but that look to other logics, can also succeed. As a communing space where alternative strategies of accumulation, such as the processes of exchange (in which seeds, plants and knowledge are traded) are given the space to play out. In this sense, culturally relevant, geographically specific and historically informed political and social dynamics are not always subservient and there are opportunities to challenge the dominant sets of ideas within any political settlement.

The rules of the game can fluctuate and be destabilising and disorderly in the West Zone. An unstable mixture of old and new institutions, forms of order and understandings about the relationship between state and society can generate unexpected outcomes. These discoveries suggest that there are alternative hopes that retain a more radical dimension, and which do not have to be repressive, but that can be transformative and mobilising for residents.

## Conclusions: Brokering Divisions, Parastatal Groups and Management of (Dis)order in the Urban Margins

The persistence and evolution of violence in cities has been well documented. However, in recent decades, the shape of global violence has been changing. The globalisation of illicit and illegal markets during the 1980s, and the growth of drug trafficking organisations and other criminal networks, have created particular pressures on groups of political elites within central state government systems to act, protect citizens, and manage these new forms of violence. However, in marginal urban spaces where the central state has tended to demonstrate an inability (or an unwillingness) to act, more *local* forms of protection and self-defence (re-)emerged during the 1990s (with the support from central state and political elites). They provided continuity for local inhabitants and attempted to control urban spaces so they could live, survive, and maintain a basic sense of order; whilst simultaneously ushering in the expansion of (sometimes illicit, informal, and illegal) markets and economic forms of ordering.

This thesis explains the emergence of *Carioca milícias* and their systems of localised violence and (dis)order in Rio de Janeiro's West Zone during the 1990s; and how these systems have been sustained since. The research has sought to explain the *milícias*, or parastatal groups, that emerged during this period, as reactions to dynamics of structural change and transformation in urban margins, and to understand how (dis)order and (in)security can be linked to these brokerage dynamics. It does this by situating these groups within macro-level political processes – as integral to local, urban, state-wide and national political settlements – as ways of advancing and entrenching powerful interests, simultaneously in the centre and in the margins. The thesis makes the case for thinking about parastatal brokerage activity above, below and beyond the realms of 'criminal governance' by situating it in the interstices between contrasting lifeworlds, spaces, and spheres. By situating these groups spatially and temporally, the research reveals *milícias* are one of the latest manifestation in the ebbs and flows of local forms of governance, (dis)ordering, and violence in urban marginalised in Rio de Janeiro.

The analytical approach I developed that helped me arrive at my conclusions draws upon, and brings into dialogue historical political economy, critical geography and political geography literatures, in order to understand processes underpinning the formation of political coalitions, elite bargains and brokerage in the urban margins. I argue that local forms of order, governance, and violence take on particular forms and dynamics in urban frontiers and at particular points in time. These urban frontier zones are experimental, dynamic and churning spaces which

generate opportunities, and to an extent depend on, brokerage to mediate between urban centres and the peripheries, national and local scales, and between state and society.

Conceptually, this study builds upon, but also challenges a well-established discourse about frontiers that portrays them as being at the ‘edges’, ‘margins’, or ‘peripheries’ of cities and as characteristically unruly, illegal, dangerous and unregulated (McGregor and Chatiza, 2019; Rasmussen and Lund, 2018). The urban margins are often represented and imagined as dystopian, wild and unpredictable zones; lying in stark contrast to the ‘developed’ and ordered governance of urban centres where everyday life functions more efficiently and tends to be more legible to the state.<sup>283</sup>

However, this ‘territorial stigmatisation’ (Wacquant, 2008) linked to narratives of decline, degradation, and underdevelopment is frequently deployed strategically by architects, business entrepreneurs, and the creators of urban development and security policies, in order to justify and legitimise new forms of (state) intervention (Ballvé, 2017). Governmental strategies aim to stabilise by ‘taming’ and ‘civilising’ peripheral spaces and addressing violence. These governance strategies have become common in many urban peripheral spaces, particularly in Latin America in recent years. Interventions such as the community security programmes in Port Au Prince, Haiti or the Pacifying Police (UPP) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil are exemplars of governmental efforts to ‘stabilise’ and ‘re-order’ fragile contexts that are of strategic importance. But these efforts are also paralleled by other more ‘non-liberal’ and ‘bottom up’ interventions and/or reactions, such as the *Autodefensas Unidas* in Colombia, or the *Policia Popular* in Mexico.

The imaginaries that these ‘civilising’ strategies promote by ‘securing’ urban space are a part of governmentalising strategies intended to reduce violence and pave the way for market relations and property rights to function more efficiently. In some respects, this *could* be understood as being part of ‘state-making’, and the production of space in marginal spaces where states and markets can expand. But given the long history of this phenomenon pre-dating any strategy of central state consolidation, it is more fitting to assume that these strategies go below and beyond any formal state structures and are part of a comprehensive strategy to shore up (political and economic) power; be it inside, outside, or straddling the state system.

---

<sup>283</sup> This is not to say that violence and disorderly things do not happen in city centres. Especially since 2001 and the rise of the ‘War on Terror’, social research has sought to provide clarity and explanation to the rising sensation of fear in cities and threats posed by terrorism. The focus has been on where capital is located. City centres have become more securitised, ordered as a result. However, further from the centres of power, the urban margins are less understood.



However, the narratives and policies linked to these strategies are both inaccurate and deeply problematic. They render invisible important connections and interdependencies between ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’, state and non-state actors, the ways in which order is generated (and brokered) through complex sets of alliances and coalitions and the shifting relationship between different forms of violence and order. Furthermore, attempts to regulate violence, based on a ‘stabilisation’ agenda, have paradoxical effects. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, although the number of homicides decreased by 50% between 2003 and 2013, during the same period, the number of disappearances increased by 29%.<sup>284</sup>

The starting point of this study has been to scrutinise and not to take at face value official discourses about the urban frontier, and to deconstruct dominant policy approaches that attempt to ‘deal with’ these spaces. Therefore, one of the central problems this study addresses is why, on the face of it, ‘securitisation’ strategies might appear to establish order in the urban peripheries, in spite of a persistent and cyclical sense of insecurity and fear in cities. But as Kalyvas et al. (2008), note “much of what we identify as order is simply violence in disguise”. This reminds us that strategies that appear to install a sense of order is actually an effective form of perpetual violence – its threat or its actual deployment – in disguise.

There is also a spatial division in terms of how some centres and peripheries are ruled and managed. In the centre, violence is more heavily disguised, and spaces are ruled through infrastructural power, which is direct and institutionalised (Mann, 1984). However, in the margins, the exercise of power is more experimental, overt, ‘despotic’, raw, it goes unchecked by central states, and instead it is mediated through intermediators or brokers. It is, therefore, in these urban peripheries where the true, unbridled nature of power reveals itself.

This study builds on an historical understanding of embedded leitmotifs of racial violence, exclusions, and divisions persistent through Brazil’s colonial history, pathway to independence, and oscillations between authoritarian and democratic forms of governance. The forms of control and ordering that are in question pre-date ‘the state’ and are not new as a form of ordering. However, they do submerge and re-emerge in Rio de Janeiro’s peripheries at a unique moment in time and they take advantage of the structural opportunities available to them. I have built the arguments upon the recurring themes of control and the devolution over the rights to violence in chapter four, to situate the argument that unfolds temporally and spatially. I show how historical institutions of discrimination and violent exclusion have been

---

<sup>284</sup> OABRJ (2013) *Desaparecidos no Rio sobem 29% em 10 anos*. Available at: <https://oab-rj.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/100650681/desaparecidos-no-rio-sobem-29-em-10-anos>.

sedimented on top of each other. More recently, during the military dictatorship, the means to create (dis)order was sub-contracted to state-sponsored death squads and informal extermination groups at various moments when it was not profitable or feasible for the central state to manage urban peripheries. For ruling military and political elites in the urban centres, these devolved forms of governance that could stabilise the marginal spaces and that also facilitated consolidation of ‘the state’ in more central regions, were preferable to the complete breakdown or the takeover of the state, and they depended on the legitimacy of central authorities.

Following on from this, it is also in these frontier spaces that the true nature of ‘state-making’ agendas can emerge through the margins with the effect, and even the explicit aim, of radically restructuring the political economy, fusing with parts of the state system, and eventually reshaping society. Securitisation interventions in the urban margins thus have the potential, even if it was never intentional, to reshape the state system and influence the future of state-society relations. There is a co-productive relationship between the centre and the margins, through which strategies of rule and power and different forms of experimentation can have a lasting, and even a permanent, blowback effect on the central state.

Situated in the context of a period of growing insecurities of drug trafficking violence and structural violence, I developed the following central research question:

**CRQ: How and why did *Carioca milícias* emerge in Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone since the 1990s, and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?**

### [A summary of the findings](#)

This thesis presents three key findings that directly address my secondary research questions.

### **SRQ1: Why and how did *Carioca milícias* emerge?**

Through an analysis of historical data, observed from oral histories and archival documents, I have highlighted the ways that parastatal groups emerged synchronously across different locations in the West Zone in various forms and guises. I find that because of democratisation, economic liberalisation, and decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s, structural shifts took place that played out in unique ways in the urban margins.

In the Rio de Janeiro’s urban frontier, specifically, rapid and unregulated urbanisation and market-driven policies affected the everyday lives of individuals in very direct and physical

ways. On the one hand, they produced a political economy characterised by vulnerability, inequality, violent exclusions, demonstrated by low availability of public services and goods. On the other hand, this political economy created windows of opportunity in the urban frontier for wealth extraction and social advancement, which different individuals and organisations seized upon as opportunities. In general, there was a turn to informality, illegal and illicit markets, in the search for livelihoods and safety nets during this time of transition. In particular, drug trafficking organisations and other ‘criminal entrepreneurs’ took advantage of these conditions. When violence was deployed to manage these markets, it led to rising levels of insecurity (perceived and actual) as criminal actors and violence specialists attempted to install criminal forms of governance (Arias, 2017) so that they could benefit economically.

Political and state elites inside the state system faced a set of pressing new challenges as a result of political and economic liberalisations. Without the explicit strategies of the authoritarian state and its extermination groups to turn to for managing order, society was thrown into a disarray and disorder, particularly in these urban marginal spaces. At the same time, local urban populations made increasing demands on the state – or at least of the actors that represented it – to step in and provide antidotes to rising insecurities.

However, different ad-hoc systems of violence and order emerged in the urban frontier to re-establish systems of order across the region. These systems were organised by local state-linked self-defence groups and individual vigilantes that carried with them authority from ‘the state’ – like Otacílio who worked in the armoury of the military police, or Wellington who was an ex-civil policeman – and who responded directly to demands by local communities, family, and friends about the rising levels of violence, criminality and drug trafficking. These insecure, fluid, and continually changing environments, together with the lack of formal state security and protection in West Zone poor communities together with ‘state-like’ authority carried by these individuals and groups, justified and legitimised their protection practices.

There were many similarities in the practices of these vigilantes and self-defence groups because their skills, reactions, and routines were all shaped by their training of military logics. However, these groups excelled because they were able to situate themselves in the interstices between state and society, the centre and the margins, and broker resources, rents, and rights for West Zone residents; although never fully solving the problems. Although there were no formal structures in place to facilitate these relations, these brokerage practices were highly convenient for decision makers in the urban centre who counted on the vigilante parastatal organisations and individuals to keep drug traffickers’ power in check. In return, vigilante

groups were rewarded with access to state resources, arms, impunity, and authority at the local level – benefiting themselves personally, and their groups. These exchanges, both implicit and explicit, echoed the long histories of patrimonialism, clientelism, and personalistic form of politics that has long characterised Brazilian politics.

Dedicating more and more time to these practices, these actors began to impose protection rackets in their own communities to finance their activities, collecting taxes on local business owners and residents. By doing this, it cultivated a dependency between residents and the security brokers – such as Jerônimo – who replicated the role of the state and provided goods and services for residents.

However, the political and social capital that emerged through this (inter-dependency), together with the demands made upon them of the market, also emboldened them to dominate other markets, such as the informal transport sector or the land distribution market. They then leveraged their control over markets and the power this allowed them to territorialise even more physical spaces. Furthermore, they put themselves forward as candidates in elections. Eventually, these actors consolidated their power, centralised, and emerged as semi-autonomous set of parastatal brokers. They then began to seek more rents, contest and reshape the state through their own sets of ideas.

Ultimately, much of the analytical tension in this thesis rests in the ways in which these brokers sought to take control over, and shape the forces that guided ‘bottom up’ processes of ordering from the margins. Their strategies for managing urban space in the margins coincided with the interests of elites from the centre; however, they also sit in stark contrast to the more technocratic solutions in the urban centre, where central government, police and UPPs, together with private and corporate partners, coordinated a very different and a more refined form of governance. To be sure, it is only because the strategies of securitisation in the urban margins were so despotic and make-shift that brokerage was central to the management of (dis)order in the urban frontier.

However, it is notable that whilst the centrally managed UPP is almost considered a ‘failed project’ and is unable to secure a source of sustainable funding, *Carioca* parastatal groups continue to be the dominant form of (security) governance in the West Zone and they have even expanded and strengthened since the CPI. However, it is no coincidence that these groups have managed to sustain order in these spaces. There does not appear to be an intention, or even a strategy, in place to ‘close down’ and territorialise these urban margins, suggesting a

set of implicit ‘settlements’ between the local elites that organise these groups and decision-makers calling the shots within the state system. Despite this continued relationship of co-production between the centre and the margins, and the uncomfortable coalition this creates, it appears to be in the interests of the centre to maintain the liminal, illicit frontier spaces indefinitely as ringfences their zone of experimentation.

## **SRQ2: What is the relationship between *Carioca milícias* and the underlying political settlement?**

The second finding draws extensively on documentation from the CPI, media narratives, and interviews with elites and police to understand the informal networks and inter-elite bargaining processes that underpin formal institutions, relations between paramilitaries and the formal state and the underlying political settlement. These data help to highlight some of the elite bargains and implicit agreements linked to the sharing of rents, as well as the violence that shaped these relationships.

Specifically, I find that West Zone parastatal organisations emerged through a period of instability when the political settlement, ‘state territory’, and the legitimacy of ‘the state’ in the urban peripheries was under threat because of extreme levels of drug trafficking and criminal violence. Indirectly linked to this, local coalitions and networks made up of police, politicians, *donos*, and elites established themselves in the urban peripheries and exerted control over the territories in which they lived and frequented, helping to entrench aspects of the state system in these obscure and hard to reach areas.

Political elites located within the central state system tolerated and even empowered these coalitions by granting them access to weapons, vital resources, information, and other material goods. These emergent coalitions, along with their media and corporate backers, were emboldened through the production and deployment of supportive and sympathetic narratives that helped to fudge the boundaries of their illegal practices and legitimise their practices. Local parastatal and political elites from the West Zone were thus integrated into an urban political settlement.

However, this was an uncomfortable coalition that entailed competing and contrasting ideas and norms, and political elites from within the central state system were faced with constantly new contradictions and social impasses. Through the continuous support and legitimisation of these coalitions, West Zone parastatal groups were able to advance territorially and without constraint, with public legitimacy, and without a real threat of repression by formal state police.

In addition, parastatal actors began to put themselves forward as candidates in the municipal and state elections and were relatively easily able to accumulate votes to be elected into political office themselves (often with some of the highest vote shares in the entire city). In some instances, candidates linked to the groups, or at least sympathetic to them, began to displace the political elites from within ‘the establishment’ that had held office for years.

By the mid-2000s, when the PT government’s developmental and social inclusion agenda was well underway, there was a shift in the balance of power from a more centralised and exclusive political settlement to more decentralised, inclusive but fragmented ones. When parastatal leaders were elected into the city, state, and federal parliaments, their large network across the West Zone increased their political share of power and influence significantly. They began to take steps to entrench themselves and institutionalise their ideas within the state system. Natalino and Jerônimo, for example, both proposed new legislation and amendments to old legislation in order to cement their ideas about security practices in law.

These parastatal coalitions, when they started to take office, began to challenge the logics and ideas of the established political elites in the urban centre. A relationship that has been founded on indirect relations, to maintain order in the distant peripheries, suddenly involved very direct and physical relationships with parastatal elites circulating in central elite spaces. This created contradictions in that although these groups were needed to temper drug trafficking activity and usher in the state-building process in the urban peripheries, it involved folding a variety of actors engaged in the parastatal coalition into the state system who had different cultures, set of ideas, and visions for the shape of the state, the trajectory of government, and its overall relationship with society.

This also became visible in the spaces of the urban centre where political elites frequented. This had important impacts for the everyday lives of South Zone residents who were affected by the imposition of non-liberal ideas and beliefs, and their spatial manifestations, such as the encroachment of ‘West Zone’ solutions/approaches to security into affluent South Zone neighbourhoods, as discussed in chapter six. These conflicting processes of ordering were an intrinsic part of the ebbs and flows of political process in Rio de Janeiro, and more widely across Brazil.

As a heuristic device, the ‘*milícia*’ discourse allows us to see at what point these groups became powerful, centralised, and established their own political autonomy. This discourse framed these practices, ideas, and beliefs in different ways, and it was symptomatic of the tensions in

the relationships between local elites in the West Zone and political elites in Centro. A crisis in the hegemony of ideas, beliefs, cultures, and competing modes of production was triggered when the *O Dia* journalists were kidnapped. Political elites and economic elites in the centre reframed the '*milícia*' discourse with the help of media and corporate backers, to criminalise the West Zone elites and *milicianos*, curb their power, and reassert hegemony within the political settlement.

Political settlements spanning and incorporating urban frontiers are therefore best understood as interactive orders; they are rarely imposed or consciously 'designed' from the top down. My analysis highlights the churning, unsettled nature of political settlements in which elites are reacting to events and 'muddling through', constantly trying to keep a foot in the game, but rarely shaping it. The ways in which parastatal actors and organisations function as brokers in the urban frontiers are therefore more responsive and reactive.

**SRQ3: How do West Zone inhabitants and *Carioca* *milícias* interact and influence each other? And how does this, in turn, shape the management of (dis)order?**

The third and final finding draws on ethnographic fieldnotes, observations, and life histories to explore the effects of different spatial practices, cultural norms, and world views on political and social order. Contrary to some academic and popular media depictions of *Carioca* parastatal groups, legitimacy is fundamental for these groups to sustainably secure rents and territory within the political settlement. Without this legitimacy, parastatal groups are dependent on the exercise of raw, despotic and coercive force to dominate and territorialise spaces, which is not sustainable in the medium- or the long-term. These groups, like governments and the ways that states are shaped, have to, at least to an extent, work along with the grain of societal norms, worldviews and institutions. They have to 'fit in' with the established norms and ideas of the locality, appease the collective experiences of community residents, and be seen to support and 'deal with' the violent exclusions and vulnerabilities of individual emotions and fears.

However, legitimacy is not only a strategy that these groups employ so that they can continue their project. But it is also built into the relationships and connections that local residents have with the broader networks of informal governance and systems of ordering.

Parastatal groups can mediate with social brokers that represent their communities. However, the complex and multiple overlapping histories and experiences that make up the community are not always embraced in full by the social broker – whether it is or not is highly dependent

on the social agency of that broker, their own ideas and norms, and their relationships with other community residents; and how they ‘match up’, or not, with those of the parastatal group and its members.

But brokers are rarely completely transparent, and their Janus-headed role sometimes demands of them that they have to operate as a gatekeeper and a go-between for different types of power that is brokered. Where the norms and ideas of the community, the social broker and the paramilitaries are compatible, then the paramilitaries are likely to secure legitimacy in the community. However, if the norms, ideas and beliefs within the community do not fit in some way with the *milicianos*, or the social broker manages to convince residents of the community that they do not, then there is less likelihood that these groups will be able to sustain legitimacy with residents.

Because coercive brokers depend on fear and insecurity to justify their existence and management of (dis)order, the different ways that residents are fearful, feel insecurity, and interpret the ‘other’ are important. In Santo Cristo, for example, most residents ‘bought in’ to the spatial othering of the residents in the neighbouring MCV. This partially justified the arrival of Lucas’ paramilitary. Whilst in Floresta da Campinha, many residents ‘saw through’ the othering of urban poor residents, were able to sympathise with their situation, and chose to engage with the newness and difference of the MCMV residents. The politics of fear or the politics of hope that circulate in specific communities can therefore make a difference to the ways that violence is deployed.

It was because of their own experiences of marginalisation, migration, and violence that the women of Floresta da Campinha were able to disarm the spatial othering of the MCMV residents and therefore negate the justification for paramilitaries to directly manage their community. However, once again, the agency of the social broker is fundamental to shaping these politics and influencing the beliefs of residents. However, it is important not to overplay the ability of the social broker to ‘resist’ and reject paramilitary domination: as residents along the Campinha Road and the West Zone more broadly, all residents continue to live within the broader set of parastatal-determined rules, regulations, and expectations.

The brutal killing of Marcela’s son, the disappeared teenagers from the youth club, and the assassination of Marielle Franco are testament to the danger implicit in these roles of social brokerage, political activism and social leadership.



## The contributions of this study to the academic literature

This study makes several key contributions to the academic literature.

The first contribution is a simultaneously empirical and conceptual. Despite ‘*milícias*’ featuring frequently in news media and popular culture over the last fifteen years, there has been little attempt at a systematic analysis of their genesis or evolution in academic scholarship. Furthermore, whilst there are several hypotheses that attempt to explain their role as violent specialist, there has not been a sustained attempt to understand *how* they fit into the broader political economy of urban Rio de Janeiro.

‘*Milícias*’ have typically been characterised as non-state ‘grassroots’ correctives to the failure, breakdown, or inability of the state to govern (Misse, 2011b; Zaluar and Conceição, 2007; Cano and Iooty, 2008). They have been depicted as separate entities from the state and there has not been any serious attempt to conceptualise their heterogeneity or their relationship *with* the state beyond orthodox readings of ‘corrupt’ state practices.<sup>285</sup>

These readings of the *Carioca milícias* have had profound impacts for security policy, but also state thinking more broadly, in relation to the West Zone, which echo some of the state/non-state conceptualisations that were articulated by O’Donnell in the 1990s.

In order to illustrate this point, I describe a brief encounter with an employee of Rio de Janeiro’s Public Security Institute (ISP), a state-run data centre and research institute, in April 2017. When I visited the ISP, a geo-spatial researcher showed me the mapping project he had been working on. It was a geo-spatial mapping of all the different ‘criminal’ organisations and their territories across Rio de Janeiro. It was an incredibly complex project. The map plotted the territories of different drug trafficking factions across the different favelas and communities.

Mapping data about the territories of drug trafficking organisations were collected by police officers at the request of the ISP using a digital mapping application on their smartphones. ‘*Milícia*’ territories were plotted out using information from interviews with policemen in the local police stations. I found this spatial mapping of ‘*milícia*’ problematic because of the way parastatal groups were thought about and the way their control over ‘*teritório*’ (territory) was

---

<sup>285</sup> There are some notable exceptions which attempt to steer away from this. In particular, see: Silva, M. d. A. (2017) ‘Houses, tranquility and progress in an área de milícia’, *Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology*, 14(3), Araujo, M. (2019) ‘Urban Public Works, Drug Trafficking and Militias: What Are the Consequences of the Interactions Between Community Work and Illicit Markets?’, *Journal of Illicit Economies and Development*, 1(2), Souza Alves, J. C. (2003) ‘Dos Barões ao extermínio: uma história de violência na Baixada Fluminense. Duque de Caxias, RJ: APPH’, *CLIO*, 197p, Alves, J. C. S. (2008) ‘Milícias: mudanças na economia política do crime no Rio de Janeiro’, *Segurança, tráfico e milícias no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Justiça Global, Fundação Heinrich Böll*.

represented as homogenous black shapes across the digital map. There was also a selection of other colours representing the different drug trafficking factions.

However, there has been a failure to account for the intricate relationships between local parastatal brokers and the state system, and the ‘particular forms of violent localised authority [...] embedded within the social, political and economic dynamics’ (Arias, 2006), and all the activities that contributed to the creation of localised systems of dis/order. However, from the perspective of the ISP, conceptual and analytical binaries dominate thinking about ‘criminality’, ‘governed,’ and ‘ungoverned’ spaces in the West Zone in ways that do not reflect the everyday practices and experiences. As Arias highlights, “The particular forms of violent localised authority are not generalised across the region but, rather, are embedded within the social, political and economic dynamics operating in discrete places” (2006). However, the view of the ISP (and many of the political and state elites) overgeneralises and mischaracterises the margins by presenting a caricature narrative of everyday life.

Drawing together troves of archival, interview, and ethnographic data helped me form an understanding of these groups through a different spatial vantage point, by linking micro to the macro, and by traversing physical and social understandings of space, and by deconstructing non-state/criminal binaries. I unmasked a diverse set of parastatal actors with a unique positionality on the cusp of the state system – neither in, nor outside of it –, with the ability to broker between state and society, to connect the dots between the centre and the margins, and to, in turn, use this unique positionality to their own advantage. I therefore argue that *milícia* is not, as some might suggest another version of ‘criminal governance’ (Arias, 2006; Arias, 2017). Instead, breaking conventional analytical boundaries, it is a result of localised form of ordering that attempts to consolidate and make productive power relations in a complex and challenging frontier space.

Clarification in this conceptualisation of what the ‘*milícia*’ is, is important for further thinking about the phenomenon specifically in Rio de Janeiro as it can help to establish policy priorities and ‘combat’ strategies to deal with the causes as well as the symptoms that are as present within the state system (and not just another form of ‘corruption’) as they are outside of it.

My findings also have some implications for broader academic debates on the political economy of conflict, the relationships between political settlements and non-state/para-state specialists in violence and specifically the role of coercive brokers outside of the regional Latin American literatures on the phenomenon.

The next contribution I made is to the literature on paramilitaries (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2005; Kalyvas, 2006; Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013). Whilst these literatures have been undeniably important for guiding this study, much of this literature draws from data about situations of inter-state civil war between insurgent groups and pro-state paramilitaries, policing groups, and counterinsurgent groups. Furthermore, much of the data comes from conflicts largely located in rural areas where there is a limited or a contested state presence. This study offers an addition to this literature through a discussion of paramilitaries in an urban context in a situation that is not considered to be at 'war'. It builds on the critical readings of violence in the political settlement to argue that the management of order (and violence) by paramilitaries in urban peripheries is complex and multi-layered. Whilst it can be difficult to pin point, discuss, and measure, violence in cities in 'peacetime' contexts can be as destructive and pernicious as battlefield deaths in contexts of civil war.

The conceptual contribution of this study is importance of spatiality for the political settlements literature, and the insights that a view of relational space can bring for understanding questions of agency, motivations, ideas and norms. Although scholars have challenged the historical materialism of political settlements by incorporating ideas and beliefs into the bargaining process (Hickey, 2013; Mehta and Walton, 2014), this does not explain variances across geographies and temporalities at the sub-national level sufficiently. Furthermore, the discussion primarily focuses on economic objectives, such as whether to pursue a particular ideological position on economics (i.e. a laissez-faire pro-growth approach) (Kelsall and Heng, 2014). However, by mobilising a brokerage lens within the political settlements' literature, it is possible to accentuate the view of 'ideas and beliefs' for shaping human interaction and social transformation. We can gauge how embodied, personal, and shared geographies also matter. The decision and actions of individuals can be linked to their experiences of the past and their imaginations for the future. In turn, this can lead to a variety of practices, behaviours, and discourses that can affect how brokers engage with and produce space, negotiate and bargain for resources, relate to other brokers, or 'hold out' in moments of conflict and tension. These diverse geographies hold the potential to produce different modes of production and alternative economic frameworks.

This research also contributes methodologically to the literature on research in conflict zones and illicit practices. I was cautioned in advance of conducting this study, on several occasions, because of the security and the ethical risks of researching this phenomenon in Rio de Janeiro. However, this study has demonstrated that research on 'milícias', although challenging, is

possible. A broad mix of methods, creative forms of triangulation, a robust set of ethics, and deeply reflective positionality has been necessary to conduct this research.

### New research directions and areas for policy development

At least three avenues for further thinking emerged from this research. It was never my intention to devise ‘proposals’ or ‘solutions’ out of this study, and nor would it have been realistic or appropriate to do so. However, these are pathways as they relate to the broader direction of travel towards new research avenues and policy thinking that I suggest are important for understanding and dealing with urban violence and paramilitaries.

The first is in relation to notable shifts in Brazilian politics since the completion of my field work in 2017 and the consistent thematic of anti-democratic practice and violence of the Carioca paramilitaries. The tendencies of authoritarianism by the Brazilian state have brought into question the political modalities and state-society relations that this study has highlighted. The election of president Jair Bolsonaro, Rio de Janeiro governor Wilson Witzel and mayor Marcelo Crivella demonstrate a distinct shift in Brazilian politics to authoritarianism and the political right. The rise of Bolsonaro, in particular, and the populist right has led to the erosion of civic, political and democratic rights, with attacks on the free press and erosions of workers’ rights. To illustrate this point, in the months leading up to the submission of this thesis in December 2019, numerous threats had been made from the Bolsonaro government about the reinstatement of Institutional Act Number 5, the constitutional act that enabled the military dictatorship of 1968 to take control of the government. Whilst political and economic elites in Rio de Janeiro’s urban centre rejected the encroachment of paramilitaries and the ideas and beliefs they represented during the 2000s (discussed in chapter six), many of these same political and economic elites have adopted a very different position to these ideas less than a decade later. Ideas of coercion and suppression ideas are now embraced by many of these groups of elites – most emphatically demonstrated through the impeachment (or the political coup) of President Dilma Rouseff – in what has been described as ‘neoliberal authoritarian’ turn in Brazil, understood as the best, and only way to guarantee economic continuity and the reorganisation of social relations that best facilitate free market relations (Jessop, 2019; Bruff, 2014; Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine, 2018).

*Carioca milícias* could therefore be understood, historically, as a continuation of the legacies of the authoritarian state. But this study could also be understood as foreshadowing the emergence of this contemporary neoliberal authoritarianism (Boffo, Saad-Filho and Fine,

2018). Broadly, this raises important questions about the future of the Brazilian state and its relationship to societies and markets. What is the struggle that is taking place? Is it a struggle in which political order is reshaped in a process of resolving mostly immediate collective action problems (Duncan, 2014)? Or is it a more fundamental reconfiguration that is taking place that characterises a takeover of the state by capital (Bruff, 2014)? Perhaps some insight can be established by revisiting Poulantzas' claimed that authoritarian statism was becoming the normal form of the capitalist state (Hall, 1980). Given recent developments in the political economy, and the rising frequency of danger posed to social brokers, such as Marielle Franco, in marginal spaces, it is likely that the authoritarian state will now try and assert its power, once again, in the urban frontier. It appears that coalitions between political elites and paramilitaries might, once again, become more centralised, exclusive, and even more repressive.

Although the phenomenon has broadly been seen as a State- or Municipal-level issue, given that much of the political relations are limited to Rio de Janeiro State, the next avenue that follows on from this is the role that macro- and national level politics play into this. Whilst I do not have the data to investigate this in sufficient depth, an exploration of the role of the social programmes of the PT administration under Lula's presidency, and the ways in which these policies and programmes, especially *Minha Casa Minha Vida* and *Bolsa Família*, impacted *milícia*-society relations will be an interesting path to investigate. Furthermore, the role of contemporary political order at the national level, and the links between the presidency and Rio de Janeiro's *milícias*, such as the recent payment of R\$89,000 between Quieroz, a *miliciano* thought to be involved in the assassination of Marielle, and Michelle Bolsonaro, the First Lady of Brazil, highlights how these processes have most recently migrated to different scales. This is alarming for national level politics and the current balance between authoritarianism and democracy.

The second relates to brokerage, which offers a rich potential terrain for future research for asking questions about urban frontiers, violence, and the urbanisation process. Developing a brokerage lens can open up new perspectives for thinking about state-making, market expansion and uneven processes of development, that otherwise might be missed. As such, further theoretical development is needed to evolve this literature. Critical spatial engagements with brokerage as a concept and a more profound engagement with the life histories of coercive and social brokers, including how these histories affect how brokers negotiate, resist, and shape power are essential. Through a closer focus on brokerage, it may be possible to develop new avenues for policy formulation, practice, and new knowledge.

The third is more practical and it is related to reducing levels of violence. It is that cities can help us reflect on alternatives to the dominant ways of thinking about violence prevention and reduction. Managing urban violence and social tensions is about much more than implementing the good urban governance agenda or the good management of urban politics. It is necessary to shift the ways of our thinking from these top down, technocratic ideas of consensus building, and that we look to the continual and contentious processes of bargaining at the urban and local levels in the political settlement. It is important to ensure these tensions are managed and manipulated to ensure that there is a healthy expression that emerges in non-violent ways. As my spatial analysis of the political settlement in Rio de Janeiro has demonstrated, this is not necessarily about creating the conditions where multiple parties and political elites can access the political space at the 'urban' level. But it is about recognising the importance of urban politics across the political landscape, institutionalising the voices of public life, civil society, marginalised communities, and marginalised identities.

It is possible to move beyond the 'stabilisation' and 'securitisation' rhetoric and think about more 'local' forms of state building within peripheral spaces that safeguard citizens. Cities, in particular, as sites of centrality, are where there is likely to be most potential for conflict. But cities are also where there is most possibility to coalesce around shared interests between different identities and socio-economic profiles, such as access to public goods. Institutionalised channels for civic engagement would allow citizens greater visibility and allow them to demand more from the state, more effectively, rather than relying on brokers and patronage to resolve collective action problems for them. As a unique consequence of the urban environment, these institutions would facilitate a culture of citizenship, civil rights, and autonomy.

## Appendix 1. Extended Audit Trail

The following section unpacks my initial set of research questions that I developed before I entered the field. This helps to explain, in very practical ways, how I approached each research question. I developed this during the planning stages of my fieldwork, and so, whilst this does help to broadly outline the approach that I planned to take, there were obvious necessities where I had to adapt my approach once I entered into the field. The research questions, for example, evolved as I progressed through the research project. However, despite the development of the research questions, many of the same principals, interview questions, methods, and fieldwork strategies applied.

**Sub-question 1:** What is the historical-geographical setting in which paramilitaries operate?

*Objectives of this question:*

- Examine the spatio-temporal structures that make up the social setting in which paramilitaries operate.
- Sketch out the social “settings and scenes of everyday life” (Agnew, 1987, p. 5).

*The specific questions I will investigate:*

Social relations with the state

- What are the resources and provisions available, and how are they distributed?
- How is wealth redistributed?
- What is the effect of overlapping local, regional, and federal political powers for the local constituency?
- Where is the state present and in what form?

Political boundaries:

- Where are the political demarcations and delineations of boundaries?
- How did these boundaries arise and who demarcated them?
- What was the effect of the move of the capital city from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia?

Access to communications and technology

- What is the extent of infrastructure (roads, rail, public transport, public health)?

- What is the level of public goods provision and how is it allocated?
- What is the use of cyber communication and how does this affect social networking?

#### Social division of labour

- What are the opportunities for employment and labour?
- What is the distribution of skills, investment, input sources and markets?

#### Capital flow

- Where are the circulations of capital, where are their roots, and where do they go to?

#### Social class, ethnic, and gender divisions

- What are the class, ethnic, and gender divisions that are fostered at the local level, and how are they upheld through narratives and discourse?
- How are these divisions organised in local and cyber worlds?

#### Micro-geography of everyday life in MCMV

- What are the localised settings in which patterns of social interaction and social group formation are realised?
- What characterises local distinctiveness and is this tied to a sense of ‘predetermination’?

I will conduct interviews with the following respondents:

| Genre   | Respondent   | Method  |
|---|--|---|
| Residents who currently live in the MCMV site | Residents will have been in the site for a maximum of six years (the programme is six years old) and so the questions will likely invite answers that are relevant both to the case site and previous communities where they used to live. | I will conduct life histories as a way of capturing historical descriptive depth, the events, and the changes. By conducting oral histories I will be able to capture information about the process of inscription into MCMV and relocation – all residents have been through this. |



|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| Actors with significant local knowledge and experience | Local academics, researchers, analysts, NGO workers, journalists that have likely had 'field' experience working, living or originating from Rio or paramilitary dominated areas.   | I will interview respondents with semi-structured interviews.  |
| Residents of other West zone communities               | Not all of the current residents will be from the West zone so it will be important to gather knowledge from other residents of nearby communities who have longer standing histories and living and working in the local area. | I will conduct life histories as a way of capturing the historical descriptive depth, the events, and the changes. |

**Sub-question 2:** What strategies do paramilitaries employ to emerge and sustain themselves?

*Objectives of this question:*

- Build upon existing knowledge of discourses, practices, representations, and performances to develop a spatially and temporally delimited knowledge of paramilitary strategies relevant to a specific case site.
- Generate descriptive knowledge about the human interactions with militias and an array of actors including residents, citizens, police, firemen, residents, death squads, community leaders, drug traffickers, politicians, and business elites.

*The questions I will investigate:*

Authority: What do paramilitaries do to establish/maintain their authority?

- What are the signs that militias are in control of the territory and who are the main actors?
- Are there signs of conflict during disputes of territory?

- Which gender, class, ethnic divisions are employed in discourse to justify paramilitary control and influence legitimacy?

Regulation, rules, and enforcement: What are the rules and how are they enforced?

- What the rules and institutions implemented by paramilitaries, and how are they enforced?
- What methods do militias use to communicate rules, and how are divisions used in discourse to bolster rule setting?
- What is the nature of the formal rules set out in the MCMV planning document, and how do paramilitaries fit within these rules?

Boundaries

- Where are the boundaries set by paramilitaries and how are they demarcated?
- What are the physical and material forms that delineate militia territory?
- Imaginary and social boundaries

Political practice

- What are the conditions paramilitaries set during and out of municipal electoral campaigning periods?
- What influence do paramilitaries have over voting behaviour?

Access to resources: What resources do paramilitaries have access to?

- What natural, state, private, or information resources do paramilitaries have access to?
- Who are the main actors/groups that paramilitaries negotiate with?

Taxation/extortion: How do paramilitaries finance themselves?

- What informal/formal taxes are collected, what does the taxation system look like, and who pays taxes?

Brokerage and negotiation: Do brokers facilitate paramilitary power?

- What does the channel of communication between resident and paramilitary look like?
- What is the role of the condominium manager in the paramilitary?

Conflict mediation

- What is the role of the paramilitary in mediating conflict between residents or with competing paramilitaries and armed groups?

*Data sources/informants:*

| Genre   | Source/informant   | Method   |
|---|--|--|
| <i>Secondary data</i>                               |  |  |
| Newspaper, documentary reporting, and citizen media | Globo, O Dia, RioOnWatch, Crimenews, Favela Voz, Zona Oeste News.  | I will use newspaper reports to map the evolution of militia invasions and strategies over time. I will go back 8 years in the newspaper archives and code the reports according to geographical location of the activity, details of the strategy employed, but also conduct discourse analysis on the report.  |
| Cyberdata   | Facebook groups (e.g. SOS Policias), blog sites.   | I will identify key profiles that post comments, commentary, blogs, and conversations regarding militias in Facebook groups and chart this data over time. I will request anonymous data from the last 8 years directly from Facebook, and code the data according to online location and sentiment.   |
| Official/state reports                              | Ministry of Cities, housing department, 2008 CPI, Caixa Economica, the Disque-Denuncia.                                  | I will use the data collected for official/state purposes to develop knowledge and background about militia strategies. I will also be able to map the networks of interest groups in paramilitaries and those that research/study them. I will combine this with the data from the newspaper/documentary reporting to create a geographical mapping over time |
| <i>Primary data</i>                                 |  |  |
| Interviews from workers and residents first-        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Residents</li> <li>• Condominium manager</li> <li>• Drug traffickers</li> </ul> | I will conduct oral histories, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews. Many of the informants that I will interview will also be able to provide me with secondary data or  |

|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| hand accounts and experiences                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Journalists</li> <li>• Construction workers</li> <li>• Local police officers</li> <li>• Residents in neighbouring communities</li> <li>• Politicians</li> <li>• State functionaries</li> <li>• NGO workers.</li> </ul> | advice on where to find it, or vice versa – e.g. I expect state functionaries or NGO workers I interview will also be able to provide access to important secondary data.  |
| Interviews with critical experts with field experience | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Academics</li> <li>• Analysts</li> <li>• Historians</li> <li>• Researchers.</li> </ul>   | I will conduct semi-structured interviews.   |
| Interviews with paramilitaries                         | Paramilitaries.   | Where possible, I will conduct oral histories and semi-structured interviews with militiamen. This will be the most difficult, but it might be possible to gather data about satellite sites or sites that are no longer militia dominated. It may be possible to access incarcerated paramilitaries or ex-paramilitaries that are no longer involved in militia activity. |
| Observations   | Empirical observations.   | I will employ direct and participant observation methods to collect data about visible strategies. It is expected these will be mostly apparent during election campaigning periods.   |

**Sub-question 3:** What is the role played by paramilitaries in the political settlement, and how do (institutional and spatial) structures manage their behaviours?

*Objectives of this question:*

- Identify the role of paramilitaries in upholding or contesting power in the dominant political settlement.
- Identify the institutions that are linked to militias and facilitate their operations.
- Analyse the reciprocal relationship between (spatial and institutional) structures and paramilitaries.
- Assess the potential of agency in affecting structure-militia relations.

*Mapping the political settlement:*

I will identify elite actors with links to paramilitaries and the case site by seeking out key political, social, and economic actors. The elite groups with interests will be key figures in the political and economic institutions of the city, either social groups or individuals with high levels of influence over the political and economic outcomes such as politicians, wealthy families, large business owners, political party leaders, prominent congressmen, significant landowners, church pastors, etc. To identify these actors I will:

- Refer to newspaper, documentary evidence, and police reports to discover reports of links between specific elites and paramilitaries.
- Speak to analysts, academics, researchers, journalists, NGO workers, and civil society leaders who all have knowledge about militias and public security in Rio de Janeiro.
- Review the paramilitaries CPI document prepared by Deputy Marcelo Freixo (2008) that contains references to a number of newspapers, academic departments, and public security consultants solicited to (re)produce information about paramilitaries and the context in which they operated. This document is a key starting point and will provide names and contacts of the majority of experts in the field.
- Review voting histories of politicians in the municipal and state chambers on issues related to paramilitaries, security, and housing.
- Review campaign funding of politicians.
- Speak to those with knowledge about local networks and power holders such as the state functionary in the housing department responsible for PMCMV, the politician who is elected for the constituency in which the case site is located, the private

constructors involved in the building of the site, local business owners, and political lobbyists.

- Trace flows of capital, income, and investment flows seek out contracts and deals involving politicians and private contractors, and map commercial and property interests alongside strategic sites earmarked by the state housing department.
- Solicit the Freedom of Information law to gain access to some state documentation.

Once I have identified the key actors, I will group these actors by their interests (rather than their organisational affiliations) to deduce which actors are a part of the dominant political settlement and which are part of 'outer' and 'challenger' coalitions.

Having understood the nature of the political settlement I will then be able to decipher who the beneficiaries of the particular political settlement are, who is capable of blocking certain changes in the political settlement, and who participates in elite bargains.

I will request interviews with some of the elite actors. There is limited risk in making these requests as these actors, even if they are directly linked to the paramilitaries or have had dealings with them, usually have a role in a publicly visible position as a politician, businessman, policeman, or community leader. Therefore the request for the interview and the specific questions of the interview can be orientated towards that position.

#### *Mapping the institutions:*

I will interrogate the relationship between paramilitaries and the dominant political settlement by hypothesising that paramilitaries are relational to the institutions of the political settlement in the following ways:

- a) Paramilitary domination is a function of existing institutional structures.
- b) Paramilitary strategies are mediated by existing institutional structures.
- c) Institutions produced by paramilitary strategies have the ability to manipulate existing institutional structures.
- d) Paramilitary practice, discourse, and representation can be institutionalised over time and become part of the institutional framework.

It is necessary to focus on visible events and outcomes of behaviours, systems, and things as they take place in order to 'read' these institutions. Methodologically and conceptually, by reading institutional changes across ruptures in time and space, we can understand how the reconfiguration of institutions is a projection of the political settlement. I will therefore seek

data about the role that paramilitaries have played in reconfigurations and changes in political settlements such as democratic elections, social movements and protests, coup d'état's, democratisation, changes of territoriality, boundary changes, and federalisation. I outline a list of potential events that serve as initial foci:

- a) Transition from Imperial Brazil to the republic (1889)
- b) Coup d'état by the Vargas dictatorship (1930)
- c) Transition to the second republic (1945)
- d) Relocation of the capital city from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia (1961)
- e) Coup d'état of the military dictatorship (1964)
- f) Democratisation (1986-9)
- g) Pan-American Games (2007)
- h) Olympic Games construction (since 2008)
- i) Municipal elections (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016)
- j) General elections (2014, 2010, 2006, 2002, 1998)
- k) Militia torture case (2008)
- l) Olympic Games (2016)
- m) Shootouts, battles, eruptions of violence (various dates)
- n) Other micro-events since 2008 that I learn about during the mapping process

*The questions I will investigate:*

- How were paramilitaries implicated, affected, disrupted, benefited, or used before/during/after these events?
- What were their relationships to those driving the changes, and to those who held the power?
- What is the extent and nature of control that political settlement has over the paramilitaries as a coercive tool?
- Do paramilitaries use coercion to influence voter behaviour during election campaign and voting periods?
- What is the extent of the threat of armed opponents to the paramilitaries and their control over an electoral bailiwick?
- What is the historical nature of the paramilitaries' relationship with the dominant political settlement and how did the paramilitaries come to support the dominant group?
- Were the paramilitaries given rents and included in the political settlement at any point?

- What are the accepted ‘rules’ that apply to political competition and economic activity?
- To what extent are these rules shaped by the dominant coalition? What limits are there on elite behaviour?
- What are the motivations of the dominant elite coalition for establishing and complying with the institutions?
- What has been the role of paramilitaries in capturing productive assets and establishing secure property rights?
- What is the role of militias in redistributing economic benefits to powerful groups?
- What is the role of militias in securing the political power of powerful groups?

*Sources of data/informants:*

| <b>Genre</b>                               | <b>Source/informant</b>  | <b>Method</b>   |
|--|--|---|
| Historical and archival data               | Libraries, state archives, cultural centres, local information centres.          | I will use archive research methods to gather data about historical events beyond living memory.  |
| Newspapers, documentary, and citizen media | Globo, O Dia, RioOnWatch, Crimenews, Favela Voz, Zona Oeste News.                | I will use coverage of ‘events’ from national, local, and citizen media to source data. I will carry out a discourse analysis on the media texts, using the seven stages of Foucauldian discourse analysis presented by Rose (2007).  |
| Retelling experiences                      | Others that experienced these events.  | I will conduct life histories and semi-structured interviews with citizens, residents, or perpetrators who experienced events that took place in living memory.   |
| Interviews with scholars/experts           | Historians, academics, researchers, and analysts who specialise in these events. | I will conduct semi-structured interviews. Given that many features of institutions are so ‘normal’ that those directly involved of affected by them might not even be aware of them. Moreover, the way that institutions work and the unwritten ‘rules of the game’ that govern them are so often ingrained that the |



|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
|  |  | idea of change may be so inconceivable for those on the inside. My ‘outsiderness’ is therefore advantageous in being able to see institutions that other may not be able to, but also the perspectives of critical ‘insiders’ are useful. |
|--|--|---|

## Appendix 2: Carioca Milícia Practices

The following table provides a descriptive overview of some of the different types of paramilitary practices that I discovered during the course of this project. It is by no means definitive or extensive. Furthermore, the practices of paramilitaries are continually evolving and are subject to change as a result of the pressures of the state, local residents, or other paramilitary groups.

| Practices   | <i>Modus operandi</i>   |
|---|---|
| <b>Sale of gas</b>  | Paramilitaries monopolise the sale of cooking gas canisters in West Zone communities. As a result of a local 'tax', locals are forced to pay higher gas prices than in other parts of the city. Local residents are not permitted to purchase from other sources.   |
| <b>Taxation on alternative transport</b>                  | The local militia requires vehicle owners to pay a weekly fee per vehicle to allow them to provide the transport service through certain territories across the West Zone.  |
| <b>Control over slot machines</b>                         | Although there are more profitable practices for the paramilitaries, they own many of the slot machines across the region. The machines are located in bars or clandestine gambling houses where the slot machines are owned by the paramilitaries. A portion of the revenue from the machines is given to those who keep the machines in their establishments, whilst the rest is taken by the paramilitaries. |
| <b>Sale of ‘gatonet’ (pirated broadband and cable TV)</b> | It is well known that in certain areas of the city the internet and cable TV services are not available through formal providers. Paramilitaries use sophisticated technologies to divert broadband internet and decode cable TV signals, either via wireless or cable,   |

---

|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | and redistribute it to these areas for much cheaper costs. In return, they charge monthly fees for such services and are able to monopolise the market without competition.   |
| <b>Local forms of 'justice'</b>            | For individuals that violate established norms and local 'rules', they are subjected to group sanctions that are judged in kangaroo courts.   |
| <b>'Security fee' for local businesses</b> | Marginal areas of the city are considered 'at risk' because of the probability of the threat of criminal violence. As a result, the paramilitary provides 'security' to companies and businesses based in these areas in exchange for monthly taxes. The company that chooses not to submit to the payment inevitably suffers some sort of militia sanction or extortion, thus being forced into making payments.     |
| <b>Contract killing</b>                    | People outside the paramilitary can 'contract' the violence specialisms of members of the paramilitary, provided they are properly paid for by the militia, and the paramilitary are in agreement with the proposal to murder the target.   |
| <b>Reselling of subdivided land</b>        | Clandestinely the militia conducts the 'subdivision' of areas of land (typically disused or unclaimed). They resell the land onto businesses and private individuals, often falsifying deeds and documents, or using backhanded channels to secure the correct ones.  |
| <b>Rental and sale of real estate</b>      | There is the advantage that certain areas also have free land, without owner or registration with the city, thus clandestinely building buildings, which will own apartments and will be rented or sold. There is also the exploration of the properties that are owned by the group, and require the transfer of monthly fee for each rented property or, in the case of sale, the fee for the sale of the property. |
| <b>Fraud of MCMV</b>                       | The paramilitaries can evict some residents from MCMV developments for not contributing to the residents' fund (local informal 'tax'); once they have done this, then they can often sell   |

---

---

|   |  |
|---|--|
|   | the MCMV house or apartment illegally through local classified adverts or posters in the neighbouring areas.   |
| <b>Parties and events</b>                           | The parties take place to raise money for the paramilitaries, which makes a profit from selling tickets, drinks and food. It is not uncommon for illicit drugs to be sold and used in the parties. Often, famous DJs, musicians, bands, and performers are contracted to bring in large crowds to the parties. The parties are typically surrounded by paramilitary security who can frisk people as they come in. |
| <b>Taxation on water</b>                            | Paramilitaries have been known to intercept water supplies and fit additional taps and gauges in order to charge additional fees to residents. This fee is collected locally by the paramilitaries.  |
| <b>Employment within the militia</b>                | Civilians, typically outside the Armed Forces, state security or police, can become 'employed' by the paramilitaries. Typically they are residents of the community where they are working, due to their proximity to the local social networks.   |
| <b>Loans and loan sharks</b>                        | Informal loans with extremely high interest rates above the market rate. Failure to pay the debts off can lead result in violence, torture, and death.   |
| <b>Sale of 'basic baskets'</b>                      | 'Basic baskets' are sold with essential weekly items for the family. As with gas sales, the paramilitaries buy these items from wholesalers, or they obtain them through more profitable channels, and they charge a higher price than the market rate for these items. Local residents are not permitted to purchase from other sources.  |
| <b>Investment and ownership of local businesses</b> | As a way of expanding their investments, paramilitaries buy up profitable local businesses such as bakeries, pharmacies, kiosks, and supermarkets. Because there is little competition, these businesses are able to charge higher than usual prices to local residents.   |

---

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Real estate investment in rich barrios</b>    | As a way of spending and investing their large profits, paramilitaries invest in local real estate, residential developments, and warehouses and they rent these out to make an income.   |
| <b>Laundering of money</b>                       | It is not uncommon for paramilitaries to purchase fully functioning shops and businesses, complete with employees and all kinds of tradable products. All of the money that is acquired by extortion and informal taxation is used to buy products for the shop; the illegal money therefore can enter into legal circulation.        |
| <b>Residents association fees</b>                | Residents' associations are used by paramilitaries to run their operations from and they can be a place for meetings.   |
| <b>Prostitution houses and brothels</b>          | Clandestine brothels set up across the region are typically run by active police from within the paramilitaries, or who are linked to them. This makes it particularly difficult for state authorities to dismantle them because there are few local officers willing to investigate these brothels.                                  |
| <b>Mining and quarries</b>                       | In some areas the paramilitaries have taken control and possession over mines for gravel extraction. Other raw materials are also capitalised on.   |
| <b>Deforestation</b>                             | Some regions have been deforested illegally in order that that paramilitaries can take the land, sell it, or develop it for residential neighbourhoods that they can build and have complete control over.  |
| <b>Carnival production and sponsorship</b>       | In the part, carnival street parties in the region were sponsored by the City Hall. Currently, the sponsorship is done by the militia where they impose a monopoly over the beverage brands that are be sold (many of these are falsified). These sponsorships also help to build popular support for the leader of the paramilitary. |
| <b>Trafficking and sale of illicit drugs</b>     | Illicit drugs are sold at local parties organized by the paramilitaries. They are typically sold by the security guards of the parties.   |
| <b>Creation of electoral cables to win votes</b> | Some candidates are supported in their campaigns by the paramilitaries in return for political favours or information from within the state system.   |

---

**Mediation of conflicts**

Paramilitaries are typically called on by residents or community leaders to mediate conflicts between residents.

**Investment in training and education of professional services**

Looking at the possible need to hire professionals to defend their interests, it is common for the militia to invest in the education of people who will serve in the future, such as lawyers, military, administrators.

## Bibliography

- Abah, O. S., Okwori, J. Z. and Alubo, O. (2009) 'Participatory theatre and video: Acting against violence in northern Nigeria', *IDS bulletin*, 40(3), pp. 19-26.
- Abreu, M. d. A. (1987) 'Evolução urbana no Rio de Janeiro'.
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. 2006. Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A. and Santos, R. J. (2013) 'The monopoly of violence: Evidence from Colombia', *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(suppl\_1), pp. 5-44.
- Ackerly, B. A., Stern, M. and True, J. (2006) *Feminist methodologies for international relations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ackerman, J. (2004) 'Co-governance for accountability: beyond “exit” and “voice”', *World Development*, 32(3), pp. 447-463.
- Adler, D. (2014) 'A Regulação dos Transportes Urbanos no Rio de Janeiro: Ônibus'.
- Agade, K. M. (2015) 'Changes and challenges of the Kenya Police Reserve: the case of Turkana County', *African Studies Review*, 58(1), pp. 199-222.
- Agamben, G. (2005) *State of exception*. University of Chicago Press.
- Agnew, J. (1989) 'The devaluation of place in social science', *The power of place*.
- Ahram, A. I. (2011a) 'Learning to live with militias: Toward a critical policy on state frailty', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 5(2), pp. 175-192.
- Ahram, A. I. (2011b) *Proxy warriors: the rise and fall of state-sponsored militias*. Stanford University Press.
- Ahram, A. I. and King, C. (2012) 'The warlord as arbitrageur', *Theory and Society*, 41(2), pp. 169-186.
- Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. (2007) 'Beyond the territorial fix: regional assemblages, politics and power', *Regional studies*, 41(9), pp. 1161-1175.
- Allen, J., Cochrane, A., Henry, N., Massey, D. and Sarre, P. (2012) *Rethinking the region: Spaces of neo-liberalism*. Routledge.
- Allen, J., Massey, D. and Pryke, M. (2005) *Unsettling cities: movement/settlement*. Routledge.
- Allmark, P., Boote, J., Chambers, E., Clarke, A., McDonnell, A., Thompson, A. and Tod, A. M. (2009) 'Ethical issues in the use of in-depth interviews: literature review and discussion', *Research Ethics*, 5(2), pp. 48-54.
- Almeida, M. A. d. (1854) 'Memórias de um sargento de milícias'.

Alves, J. A. (2014) 'From necropolis to blackpolis: Necropolitical governance and black spatial praxis in São Paulo, Brazil', *Antipode*, 46(2), pp. 323-339.

Alves, J. C. S. (2008) 'Milícias: mudanças na economia política do crime no Rio de Janeiro', *Segurança, tráfico e milícias no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Justiça Global, Fundação Heinrich Böll*.

Anwar, N. H. (2014) 'Urban transformations: brokers, collaborative governance and community building in Karachi's periphery', *South Asian History and Culture*, 5(1), pp. 75-92.

Araujo, M. (2019) 'Urban Public Works, Drug Trafficking and Militias: What Are the Consequences of the Interactions Between Community Work and Illicit Markets?', *Journal of Illicit Economies and Development*, 1(2).

Archibold, R. C. and Villegas, P. (2014) 'Vigilantes, once welcome, frighten many in Mexico', *The New York Times*, 25.

Arias, E. D. (2004) 'Faith in our neighbors: Networks and social order in three Brazilian favelas', *Latin American politics and society*, 46(1), pp. 1-38.

Arias, E. D. (2006) 'The dynamics of criminal governance: networks and social order in Rio de Janeiro', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, pp. 293-325.

Arias, E. D. (2009) *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security*. Univ of North Carolina Press.

Arias, E. D. (2017) *Criminal enterprises and governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Cambridge University Press.

Arias, E. D. and Goldstein, D. M. (2010) 'Violent pluralism: Understanding the new democracies of Latin America', *Violent Democracies in Latin America*, pp. 1-34.

Arriagada, I. and Godoy, L. (1999) *Seguridad ciudadana y violencia en América Latina: diagnóstico y políticas en los años noventa*. Cepal.

Aspinall, E. (2014) 'When brokers betray: Clientelism, social networks, and electoral politics in Indonesia', *Critical Asian Studies*, 46(4), pp. 545-570.

Auyero, J. (1999) "From the client's point (s) of view": How poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism', *Theory and society*, 28(2), pp. 297-334.

Auyero, J. (2000) 'The hyper-shantytown: Neo-liberal violence(s) in the Argentine slum', *Ethnography*, 1(1), pp. 93-116.

Auyero, J. (2002) 'Clientelismo político en Argentina: doble vida y negación colectiva', *Perfiles Latinoamericanos: Revista De La Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales, Sede México*, 10(20), pp. 33-52.

Auyero, J., Bourgois, P. and Scheper-Hughes, N. (2015) *Violence at the urban margins*. Oxford University Press.

Auyero, J., Burbano de Lara, A. and Berti, M. F. (2014) 'Violence and the State at the Urban Margins', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 43(1), pp. 94-116.

- Ayres, R. (1995) 'Privatization and distributional equity: the case of Brazil', *International Journal of Social Economics*, 22(12), pp. 36-48.
- Baer, W. (2001) *Brazilian Economy, The: Growth and Development: Growth and Development*. ABC-CLIO.
- Baer, W., Kerstenetzky, I. and Villela, A. V. (1973) 'As modificações no papel do Estado na economia brasileira'.
- Bagley, B. (2004) 'Globalisation and Latin American and Caribbean organised crime', *Global crime*, 6(1), pp. 32-53.
- Baker, B. (2002) 'When the Bakassi boys came: Eastern Nigeria confronts vigilantism', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 20(2), pp. 223-244.
- Bakker, L. (2015) 'Illegality for the general good? Vigilantism and social responsibility in contemporary Indonesia', *Critique of Anthropology*, 35(1), pp. 78-93.
- Ballvé, T. (2013) 'Grassroots masquerades: Development, paramilitaries, and land laundering in Colombia', *Geoforum*, 50, pp. 62-75.
- Ballvé, T. (2017) 'Frontiers: Remembering the Forgotten Lands', *Other Geographies: The Influences Of Michael Watts*, pp. 169-183.
- Ballvé, T. (2019a) 'Investigative Ethnography: A Spatial Approach to Economies of Violence', *Geographical Review*.
- Ballvé, T. (2019b) 'Narco-frontiers: A spatial framework for drug-fuelled accumulation', *Journal of agrarian change*, 19(2), pp. 211-224.
- Baranyi, S., Beaudet, P. and Locher, U. 2011. World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Taylor & Francis.
- Barbassa, J. (2015) *Dancing with the Devil in the City of God: Rio de Janeiro on the Brink*. Simon and Schuster.
- Barbero, J. M. (2003) 'Laberintos Urbanos del Miedo', *Universitas Humanística*, 56(56).
- Barnes, N. (2017) 'Criminal politics: An integrated approach to the study of organized crime, politics, and violence', *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(4), pp. 967-987.
- Barney, K. (2009) 'Laos and the making of a 'relational' resource frontier', *Geographical Journal*, 175(2), pp. 146-159.
- Barros de Castro, M. (2011) 'Gangues do Rio de Janeiro imperial', *Revista História Viva*, 88.
- Bayart, J.-F. and Ellis, S. (2000) 'Africa in the world: a history of extraversion', *African affairs*, 99(395), pp. 217-267.
- Bayat, A. (2013) *Life as politics: How ordinary people change the Middle East*. Stanford University Press.



BBC News Brasil (2018) 'Investigadas pela morte de Marielle, milícias podem ser um problema maior que o tráfico no Rio', *R7*. Available at: <https://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/investigadas-pela-morte-de-marielle-milicias-podem-ser-um-problema-maior-que-o-trafico-no-rio-17042018> (Accessed: 20 November 2019).

Beall, J., Goodfellow, T. and Rodgers, D. (2013) 'Cities and conflict in fragile states in the developing world', *Urban Studies*, 50(15), pp. 3065-3083.

Bebbington, A., Abdulai, A.-G., Bebbington, D. H., Hinfelaar, M. and Sanborn, C. (2018) *Governing extractive industries: Politics, histories, ideas*. Oxford University Press.

Beek, J., Göpfert, M., Owen, O. and Steinberg, J. (2017) *Police in Africa: The street level view*. Oxford University Press.

Bejarano, A. M. and Pizarro, E. (2004) 'Colombia: The Partial Collapse of the State and the Emergence of Aspiring State-Makers', *States-Within-States*: Springer, pp. 99-118.

Bell, C. and Pospisil, J. (2017) 'Navigating inclusion in transitions from conflict: The formalised political unsettlement', *Journal of International Development*, 29(5), pp. 576-593.

Bhaskar, R. (2013) *A realist theory of science*. Routledge.

Bhaskar, R. (2014) *The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences*. Routledge.

Biblioteca Digital da Câmara dos Deputados (2010) *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, Câmara dos Deputados. Available at: <http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner2019/brazilia.pdf>.

Björkdahl, A. and Buckley-Zistel, S. (2016) 'Spatializing Peace and Conflict: An Introduction', *Spatializing Peace and Conflict*: Springer, pp. 1-22.

Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010) 'Civil war', *Journal of Economic literature*, 48(1), pp. 3-57.

Blok, A. (1974) *The Mafia in a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs*. Basil Blackwell.

Boege, V., Brown, A., Clements, K. and Nolan, A. (2008) 'On hybrid political orders and emerging states: State formation in the context of 'fragility''.

Boege, V., Brown, M. A. and Clements, K. P. (2009) 'Hybrid political orders, not fragile states', *Peace Review*, 21(1), pp. 13-21.

Boffo, M., Saad-Filho, A. and Fine, B. (2018) 'Neoliberal capitalism: The authoritarian turn', *A World Turned Upside Down*, pp. 247-271.

Bourdieu, P. (1993) *The field of cultural production: Essays on art and literature*. Columbia University Press.

Bourgois, P. (2003) *In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio*. Cambridge University Press.

- Brasil, Ministério da, S. and Secretaria Nacional de Ações Básicas de, S. 1988. Subsistema de Informação sobre mortalidade. Estatística de mortalidade: Brasil, 1985. Centro de Documentação do Ministério da Saúde Brasília.
- Brennan, E. M. (1999) 'Population, urbanization, environment, and security: a summary of the issues', *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, 5(4), pp. e14.
- Brenner, N. and Elden, S. (2009) 'Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory1', *International Political Sociology*, 3(4), pp. 353-377.
- Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M. and Macleod, G. (2008) *State/space: a reader*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. and Mayer, M. (2012) 'Cities for people, not for profit: an introduction', *Cities for people, not for profit*: Routledge, pp. 13-22.
- Brenner, N. and Schmid, C. (2014) 'The 'urban age' in question', *International journal of urban and regional research*, 38(3), pp. 731-755.
- Brenner, N. and Schmid, C. (2017) 'Planetary urbanization', *The Globalizing Cities Reader*: Routledge, pp. 479-482.
- Bretas, M. L. (1997) *A guerra das ruas: povo e polícia na cidade do Rio de Janeiro*. Ministério da Justiça, Arquivo Nacional.
- Briceño-León, R. and Zubillaga, V. (2002) 'Violence and globalization in Latin America', *Current Sociology*, 50(1), pp. 19-37.
- Browne, K. (2005) 'Snowball sampling: using social networks to research non-heterosexual women', *International journal of social research methodology*, 8(1), pp. 47-60.
- Bruff, I. (2014) 'The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism', *Rethinking Marxism*, 26(1), pp. 113-129.
- Burawoy, M., Blum, J. A., George, S., Gille, Z. and Thayer, M. (2000) *Global ethnography: Forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world*. Univ of California Press.
- Burgos, M. B. (1998) 'Dos parques proletários ao Favela-Bairro: as políticas públicas nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro', *Um século de favela*, 5, pp. 25-60.
- Burgos, M. B. (2002) *A utopia da comunidade: Rio das Pedras, uma favela carioca*. Edicoes Loyola.
- Bush, K. (2013) 'The politics of post-conflict space: the mysterious case of missing graffiti in 'post-troubles' Northern Ireland', *Contemporary Politics*, 19(2), pp. 167-189.
- Buur, L. (2006) 'Reordering society: vigilantism and expressions of sovereignty in Port Elizabeth's townships', *Development and Change*, 37(4), pp. 735-757.
- Buvinic, M. and Morrison, A. R. (2000) 'Living in a more violent world', *Foreign Policy*, (118), pp. 58.
- Büscher, K. (2018) 'African cities and violent conflict: the urban dimension of conflict and post conflict dynamics in Central and Eastern Africa', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 12(2), pp. 193-210.

- Caldeira, T. P. R. (2000) *City of walls: crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo*. Univ of California Press.
- Caldeira, T. P. R. (2009) 'Marginality, again?!', *International journal of urban and regional research*, 33(3), pp. 848-853.
- Campbell, M. L., DeVault, M. L., Diamond, T., Eastwood, L., Griffith, A., McCoy, L., Mykhalovskiy, E., Pence, E., Smith, G. W. and Turner, S. (2006) *Institutional ethnography as practice*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Cano, I., Borges, D. and Ribeiro, E. (2012) 'Os donos do morro: uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro'.
- Cano, I. and Duarte, T. (2012) *No Sapatinho: A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (2008-2011)*.
- Cano, I. and Iooty, C. (2008) 'Seis por meia dúzia? Um estudo exploratório do fenômeno das chamadas "milícias" no Rio de Janeiro', *RIBEIRO, C.; DIAS, R.; CARVALHO, S.*
- Cano, I. and Ribeiro, E. (2016) 'Old strategies and new approaches towards policing drug markets in Rio de Janeiro', *Police Practice and research*, 17(4), pp. 364-375.
- Capoeira, N. (2012) *Capoeira: Roots of the dance-fight-game*. North Atlantic Books.
- Carey, S. C., Mitchell, N. J. and Lowe, W. (2013) 'States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(2), pp. 249-258.
- Carrión, F. (2008) 'Violencia urbana: un asunto de ciudad', *EURE (Santiago)*, 34(103), pp. 111-130.
- Carvalho, M. P. (2015) 'A expulsão dos jesuítas da América colonial ibérica: um estudo comparado dos Colégios de Córdoba e do Rio de Janeiro', *História Unisinos*, 19(1), pp. 59-69.
- Castells, M. (1997) *End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
- Castells, M. and Portes, A. (1989) 'World underneath: The origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal economy', *The informal economy: Studies in advanced and less developed countries*, 12.
- Ceccato, V., Melo, S. N. and Kahn, T. (2018) 'Trends and patterns of police-related deaths in Brazil', *The Palgrave Handbook of Criminology and the Global South*: Springer, pp. 521-550.
- Chandler, B. J. (1978) *The bandit king: Lampião of Brazil*. Texas A & M University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (2004) *The politics of the governed: reflections on popular politics in most of the world*. Columbia University Press.
- Cheng, C., Goodhand, J. and Meehan, P. (2018) *Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict*, London: UK Stabilisation Unit.
- Clark, T. (2008) 'We're Over-Researched Here!' Exploring Accounts of Research Fatigue within Qualitative Research Engagements', *Sociology*, 42(5), pp. 953-970.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002) 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'.

Cornish, D. B. and Clarke, R. V. (2008) 'The rational choice perspective', *Environmental criminology and crime analysis*, 21, pp. 21-47.

Corrêa, A. M. (1936) *O sertão carioca*. Imprensa nacional.

Cortado, T. 2018. À beira da cidade: política e poética da urbanização no Jardim Maravilha, “loteamento proletário” da Zona Oeste carioca. Université Fédérale de Rio de Janeiro, Musée National Rio de Janeiro.

Costa, M. (1998) 'São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro: a constituição do Esquadrão da Morte', *Anais do XXII Encontro Anual da ANPOCS. Caxambu/Minas Gerais*.

Costa Vargas, J. H. (2013) 'Taking back the land: Police operations and sport megaevents in Rio de Janeiro', *Souls*, 15(4), pp. 275-303.

Crawford, T. J. and Naditch, M. (1970) 'Relative deprivation, powerlessness, and militancy: The psychology of social protest', *Psychiatry*, 33(2), pp. 208-223.

Cressey, D. R. (1969) *Theft of the nation: The structure and operations of organized crime in America*. Transaction Publishers.

Crisp, B. F. and Kelly, M. J. (1999) 'The socioeconomic impacts of structural adjustment', *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(3), pp. 533-552.

Cruz, J. M. (2016) 'State and criminal violence in Latin America', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 66(4), pp. 375-396.

Da Escóssia, F. (1998) 'Rio acaba com bônus da polícia por bravura', *Folha de São Paulo*, 26 June. Available at: Rio acaba com bônus da polícia por bravura.

da Silva Ribeiro Gomes, S. (2017) *Oportunidades políticas e estratégias militantes em contextos de violência rotinizada: uma comparação entre a Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro (Brasil) e Guerrero (México)*. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro.

da Silva Santos, L. (2018) 'Terceiro Distrito, carne verde e matadouro', *Fronteiras: Revista Catarinense de História*, (19), pp. 73-94.

Davis, D. E. (2009) 'Non-state armed actors, new imagined communities, and shifting patterns of sovereignty and insecurity in the modern world', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30(2), pp. 221-245.

Davis, D. E. (2015) 'Socio-spatial inequality and violence in cities of the global South: Evidence from Latin America', *Cities and Inequalities in a Global and Neoliberal World*: Routledge, pp. 89-105.

Davis, M. (2006) *Planet of slums*. London; New York: Verso.

De Alba, F. and Lesemann, F. (2012) 'Informalidad urbana e incertidumbre.¿', *Cómo estudiar la informalización en las metrópolis*.

de Azevedo, A. N. (2018) *A grande reforma urbana do Rio de Janeiro: Pereira Passos, Rodrigues Alves e as ideias de civilização e progresso*. Mauad Editora Ltda.

De Boer, J. (2015) 'Resilience and the fragile city', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 4(1).

De Carvalho, J. M. (2019) *Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi*. Editora Companhia das Letras.

de Castro Cerqueira, D. R. and Pires Guedes, E. (2019) 'Atlas da Violência', Atlas da Violência. Available at: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/atlasviolencia/> (Accessed: 10 September 2019).

De Holanda, S. B., Eulálio, A. and Ribeiro, L. G. (1995) *Raízes do brasil*. Companhia das Letras São Paulo.

de Moraes Ferreira, M. (2015) *Rio de Janeiro: uma cidade na história*. Editora FGV.

de Oliveira, M. A. S. A. (2017) 'Zona oeste da cidade do rio de janeiro: Entre o rural e o urbano', *Illuminuras*, 18(45).

de Sá Siqueira, R. A. (2008) "'Vestindo a Camisa da Zona Oeste': análise da construção de vínculos sociais entre um vereador da cidade do Rio de Janeiro e sua" base eleitoral".

de Sá Siqueira, R. A. (2013) *A política no loteamento: um estudo sobre mediação na zona oeste carioca*. Sociology, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro.

De Wit, J. and Berner, E. (2009) 'Progressive patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and the limits to slum dwellers' empowerment', *Development and Change*, 40(5), pp. 927-947.

Denyer-Willis, G. (2013) *The Killing Consensus: Homicide Detectives, Police the Kill, and Organised Crime in São Paulo, Brazil*. PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts.

Di John, J. and Putzel, J. (2009) 'Political settlements: Issues paper'.

Diniz, E. (1982) *Voto e máquina política: patronagem e clientelismo no Rio de Janeiro*. Paz e Terra.

do Lago, L. C. (2016) 'O mercado de trabalho na metrópole do Rio de Janeiro: a "periferia" que virou "centro"', *Anais*, pp. 1-21.

Dowdney, L. (2003) *Children of the drug trade: A case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro*. 7 letras.

Duncan, G. (2014) 'Drug trafficking and political power: oligopolies of coercion in Colombia and Mexico', *Latin American Perspectives*, 41(2), pp. 18-42.

Easterly, W. (1999) *Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict?*: The World Bank.

EDG, D. E. D. G. (1920) 'Recenseamento Geral do Brasil 1920', *Rio de Janeiro*.

Eilenberg, M. (2014) 'Frontier constellations: Agrarian expansion and sovereignty on the Indonesian-Malaysian border', *Journal of peasant studies*, 41(2), pp. 157-182.

Elfvérsson, E. and Höglund, K. (2019) 'Violence in the city that belongs to no one: urban distinctiveness and interconnected insecurities in Nairobi (Kenya)', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 19(4), pp. 347-370.

Elhawary, S. (2010) 'Security for whom? Stabilisation and civilian protection in Colombia', *Disasters*, 34, pp. S388-S405.

Elias, N. 1939. *The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*, trans. E. Jephcott. Blackwell.[arVN].

Ellard-Gray, A., Jeffrey, N. K., Choubak, M. and Crann, S. E. (2015) 'Finding the hidden participant: Solutions for recruiting hidden, hard-to-reach, and vulnerable populations', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 14(5), pp. 1609406915621420.

Enamorado, T., López-Calva, L. F., Rodríguez-Castelán, C. and Winkler, H. (2016) 'Income inequality and violent crime: Evidence from Mexico's drug war', *Journal of Development Economics*, 120, pp. 128-143.

England, K. V. L. (1994) 'Getting personal: Reflexivity, positionality, and feminist research\*', *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1), pp. 80-89.

Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. (2002) 'Inequality and violent crime', *The journal of Law and Economics*, 45(1), pp. 1-39.

Felbab-Brown, V. (2011) 'Bringing the State to the slum: Confronting organized crime and urban violence in Latin America', *Brookings Institution*, December.

Felbab-Brown, V. (2016) 'The Rise of Militias in Mexico: Citizens' Security or Further Conflict Escalation?', *Prism*, 5(4), pp. 172-187.

Feldman, A. (1991) *Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern Ireland*. University of Chicago Press.

Feltran, G. d. S. (2008) 'Fronteiras de tensão: um estudo sobre política e violência nas periferias de São Paulo'.

Ferraz, C. A. (2012) *Crime Organizado: Diagnóstico e mecanismos de combate*. Escola Superior de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro.

Fox, S. and Goodfellow, T. (2016) *Cities and development*. Routledge.

Franco, M. (2018). Twitter. Available at: <https://twitter.com/mariellefranco/status/973568966403731456?lang=en> (Accessed: 10 October 2019).

Freier, A. (2017) 'Corporate security governance and the “intrinsic logic” of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo', *Colección*, (26), pp. 137-161.

Freire, A. (2010) 'Liderança e localismo na I República brasileira', *Ler História*, (59), pp. 49-63.

Freire, A., Sarmento, C. E. and Motta, M. S. d. (1999) 'O Rio de Janeiro em três perfis: trajetórias individuais e o campo político carioca'.

Frost, E. and Nowak, M. (2014) 'Policy Paper', *Geneva Declaration*.

Fróes, J. N. D. S. and Gelabert, O. R. E. (2004) 'Rumo ao Campo Grande: por trilhas e caminhos', *Rio de Janeiro: sem editora*.

- G1 (2008) 'Jornalistas torturados reconheceram suspeitos, diz polícia', *G1*, 4 June. Available at: <http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Rio/0,,MUL589764-5606,00-JORNALISTAS+TORTURADOS+RECONHECERAM+SUSPEITOS+DIZ+POLICIA.html>.
- Gaffney, C. (2016) 'Gentrifications in pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro', *Urban Geography*, 37(8), pp. 1132-1153.
- Galtung, J. (1969) 'Violence, peace, and peace research', *Journal of peace research*, 6(3), pp. 167-191.
- Gambetta, D. (1996) *The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection*. Harvard University Press.
- Garotinho, A. (2017) 'Rogério Onofre: Um mafioso foragido'. Available at: <http://www.blogdogarotinho.com.br/lartigo.aspx?id=24684>.
- Gaspar, M. (2017) 'O Rei do Gado', *Piauí* (March edn).
- Gay, R. (2017) 'Of Criminal Factions, UPPs, and Militias', *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, and Clientelistic Networks*, pp. 75.
- Gerring, J. (2004) 'What is a case study and what is it good for?', *American political science review*, 98(02), pp. 341-354.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford university press.
- Gill, L. (2009) 'The parastate in Colombia: Political violence and the restructuring of Barrancabermeja', *Anthropologica*, pp. 313-325.
- Gizewski, P. and Homer-Dixon, T. (1995) 'Urban growth and violence. Will the future resemble the past?'
- Glaeser, E. L. and Sacerdote, B. (1999) 'Why is there more crime in cities?', *Journal of political economy*, 107(S6), pp. S225-S258.
- Gleditsch, N. P., Pinker, S., Thayer, B. A., Levy, J. S. and Thompson, W. R. (2013) 'The forum: the decline of war', *International Studies Review*, 15(3), pp. 396-419.
- Gm M (2015) *TRE/RJ apura fraude eleitoral em gráfica que presta serviços à Prefeitura do Rio e ao Governo do Estado*. Jusbrasil. Available at: <https://gerry.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/133049838/tre-rj-apura-fraude-eleitoral-em-grafica-que-presta-servicos-a-prefeitura-do-rio-e-ao-governo-do-estado> (Accessed: December 20 2019).
- Godoy, A. S. (2004) 'When “justice” is criminal: Lynchings in contemporary Latin America', *Theory and Society*, 33(6), pp. 621-651.
- Goldstein, D. M. (2005) 'Flexible justice: neoliberal violence and ‘self-help’ security in Bolivia', *Critique of Anthropology*, 25(4), pp. 389-411.
- Gomes, N. L. and Rodrigues, T. C. (2019) 'Resistência democrática: a questão racial e a Constituição Federal de 1988', *EDUCAÇÃO & SOCIEDADE*, 39(145).

- Goodfellow, T. (2017a) 'Double Capture' and De-Democratisation: Interest Group Politics and Uganda's 'Transport Mafia', *The Journal of Development Studies*, 53(10), pp. 1568-1583.
- Goodfellow, T. (2017b) 'Seeing Political Settlements through the City: A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Urban Transformation', *Development and Change*, 49(1), pp. 199-222.
- Goodfellow, T. (2017c) 'Taxing property in a neo-developmental state: The politics of urban land value capture in Rwanda and Ethiopia', *African Affairs*, 116(465), pp. 549-572.
- Goodhand, J. (2000) 'Research in conflict zones: ethics and accountability', *Forced Migration Review*, 8(4), pp. 12-16.
- Goodhand, J. (2005) 'Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 5(2), pp. 191-216.
- Goodhand, J. 'States, frontiers and conflict: Development of a collaborative research programme (conference pack)', SOAS.
- Goodhand, J. (2017) 'Getting the politics right: beyond 'good governance' in Afghanistan', *Afghanistan—Challenges and Prospects*: Routledge, pp. 93-110.
- Goodhand, J., Klem, B. and Walton, O. (2016) 'Mediating the margins: the role of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Council in Sri Lanka's post-war transition', *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, 1(6), pp. 817-836.
- Gootenberg, P. (2008) *Andean cocaine: The making of a global drug*. Univ of North Carolina Press.
- Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (2019) *Witzel sanciona lei para incentivar produção agrícola no estado*. Available at: [http://www.rj.gov.br/NoticiaDetalhe.aspx?id\\_noticia=3072&pl=governador-sanciona-lei-para-incentivar-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-agr%C3%ADcola-no-estado&fbclid=IwAR3kkVMN-YiQKLr9oLhG9Etj77DxRDhu2VcM9YdqTS6jb8aFheL82MD4u0E](http://www.rj.gov.br/NoticiaDetalhe.aspx?id_noticia=3072&pl=governador-sanciona-lei-para-incentivar-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-agr%C3%ADcola-no-estado&fbclid=IwAR3kkVMN-YiQKLr9oLhG9Etj77DxRDhu2VcM9YdqTS6jb8aFheL82MD4u0E) (Accessed: December 2019).
- Graham, S. (1999) 'Global grids of glass: on global cities, telecommunications and planetary urban networks', *Urban Studies*, 36(5-6), pp. 929-949.
- Graham, S. (2009) 'The urban 'battlespace'', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(7-8), pp. 278-288.
- Gramsci, A. 1995. *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Derek Boothman. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Grandin, F., Coelho, H., Antônio Martins, M. and Satriano, N. (2018) 'Franquia do crime: 2 milhões de pessoas no RJ estão em áreas sob influência de milícias', *GI*, 14 March 2018. Available at: <https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/franquia-do-crime-2-milhoes-de-pessoas-no-rj-estao-em-areas-sob-influencia-de-milicias.ghtml>.
- Rules of the Creation of Community Police in Rio de Janeiro 214* (Legislative Statement No. 214/2007).
- Guitierrez Sanín, F. (2019) *Clientelistic Warfare: Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia (1982–2007)*. Peter Lang.



Guizardi, M. L. (2012) 'De norte a sur: mestre pantera y la capoeira como cultura urbana y migratoria en la periferia de Río de Janeiro', *Papeles de trabajo-Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios en Etnolingüística y Antropología Socio-Cultural*, (23), pp. 41-58.

Gupte, J. (2016) 'Rethinking Approaches to Peace-Building and Political Settlements in an Increasingly Urbanised World'.

Gupte, J. and Commins, S. (2016) *Cities, Violence and Order: the Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of Security Provision in Cities of Tomorrow*: IDS.

Gutiérrez, F., Pinto, M., Arenas, J. C., Guzmán, T. and Gutiérrez, M. (2013) 'The importance of political coalitions in the successful reduction of violence in Colombian cities', *Urban Studies*, 50(15), pp. 3134-3151.

Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2008) 'Telling the difference: guerrillas and paramilitaries in the Colombian war', *Politics & Society*, 36(1), pp. 3-34.

Gúsmão, F. (2005) *Extermínio: policiais brigam por caça-níqueis e*

*vans* O Globo. Rio de Janeiro: Globo. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/externio-policiais-brigam-por-caca-niqueis-vans-4562989> (Accessed: 2/12/2017 31 de agosto).

Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D. (2010) 'Negotiating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa', *Development and Change*, 41(4), pp. 539-562.

Hall, S. (1980) 'Nicos Poulantzas: state, power, socialism', *New Left Review*, 119, pp. 60-69.

Hansen, T. B. and Stepputat, F. (2006) 'Sovereignty revisited', *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.*, 35, pp. 295-315.

Haraway, D. and Teubner, U. (1991) *Simians, cyborgs, and women*. na.

Harvey, D. 1973. *Social justice and the city*, Athens. The University of Georgia Press.

Harvey, D. (2007) *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Hervik, P. (1994) 'Shared reasoning in the field', *Social experience and anthropological knowledge*, pp. 59.

Heyman, J. and Smart, A. (1999) 'States and illegal practices: An overview', *States and illegal practices*, pp. 1-24.

Hickey, S. (2013) 'Thinking about the politics of inclusive development: towards a relational approach', *ESID Working Paper Series*.

Hickey, S., Abdulai, A. G., Izama, A. and Mohan, G. (2015) 'The politics of governing oil effectively: A comparative study of two new oil-rich states in Africa', *Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper series*, (54).

Hidalgo, F. D. and Lessing, B. (2014) 'Endogenous State Weakness: Paramilitaries and Electoral Politics in Rio de Janeiro'.

- Hirsch, P. (2009) 'Revisiting frontiers as transitional spaces in Thailand', *Geographical Journal*, 175(2), pp. 124-132.
- Hobbes, T. (1996) 'Leviathan (1651), ed. R. Tuck', *Cambridge, Cambridge University Press*, 108, pp. 16.
- Hobsbawm, E. (2017) *Primitive rebels*. Hachette UK.
- Hoelscher, K. (2015) 'Politics and social violence in developing democracies: Theory and evidence from Brazil', *Political Geography*, 44, pp. 29-39.
- Holloway, T. H. (1989) "'A Healthy Terror': Police Repression of Capoeiras in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, pp. 637-676.
- Holloway, T. H. (1993) *Policing Rio de Janeiro: repression and resistance in a 19th-century city*. Stanford University Press.
- Holston, J. (2009) 'Insurgent citizenship in an era of global urban peripheries', *City & Society*, 21(2), pp. 245-267.
- Holston, J., Caldeira, T. P. R., Agüero, F. and Stark, J. 1998. Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America. North-South Center Press chapter Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions ....
- Honorato, C. and Mantuano, T. (2016) 'A economia da região portuária do Rio de Janeiro (1870-1900)', *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Nouveaux mondes mondes nouveaux-Novo Mundo Mundos Novos-New world New worlds*.
- Hons, A. S. d. and Seguin, A. 1982. Os diários do Rio de Janeiro: 1945-1982. Rio de Janeiro, dissertação de mestrado, IFCS/UFRJ.
- Huggins, M. (1991) *Vigilantism and the state in Latin America*. null.
- Huggins, M. K. (2000) 'Urban violence and police privatization in Brazil: Blended invisibility', *Social Justice*, 27(2 (80)), pp. 113-134.
- IBGE Censo (2010) 'Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010'.
- Imbusch, P., Misse, M. and Carrión, F. (2011) 'Violence research in Latin America and the Caribbean: A literature review', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, 5(1), pp. 87-154.
- Império do Brasil, C. d. L. (1831) *Legislação Informatizada - LEI DE 18 DE AGOSTO DE 1831 - Publicação Original*. Available at: [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei\\_sn/1824-1899/lei-37497-18-agosto-1831-564307-publicacaooriginal-88297-pl.html](https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei_sn/1824-1899/lei-37497-18-agosto-1831-564307-publicacaooriginal-88297-pl.html) (Accessed: 1 November 2019).
- Império do Brasil, C. d. L. (1837) *Legislação Informatizada - DECRETO DE 15 DE OUTUBRO DE 1837 - Publicação Original*. Available at: [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret\\_sn/1824-1899/decreto-36969-15-outubro-1837-562324-publicacaooriginal-86258-pe.html](https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret_sn/1824-1899/decreto-36969-15-outubro-1837-562324-publicacaooriginal-86258-pe.html) (Accessed: 1 November 2019).
- Ingram, S. (2014) 'Political settlements: the history of an idea in policy and theory'.

- Jackman, D. (2019) 'Violent Intermediaries and Political Order in Bangladesh', *The European Journal of Development Research*, 31(4), pp. 705-723.
- Jaffe, R. (2012) 'Criminal dons and extralegal security privatization in downtown Kingston, Jamaica', *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 33(2), pp. 184-197.
- Jaffe, R. (2015) 'From Maroons to dons: Sovereignty, violence and law in Jamaica', *Critique of Anthropology*, 35(1), pp. 47-63.
- Jeffrey, C. (2002) 'Caste, class, and clientelism: A political economy of everyday corruption in rural North India', *Economic Geography*, 78(1), pp. 21-41.
- Jenss, A. (2020) 'Global flows and everyday violence in urban space: The port-city of Buenaventura, Colombia', *Political Geography*, 77, pp. 102113.
- Jentzsch, C., Kalyvas, S. N. and Schubiger, L. I. (2015) 'Militias in civil wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(5), pp. 755-769.
- Jessop, B. (1982) *The capitalist state: Marxist theories and methods*. Martin Robertson Oxford.
- Jessop, B. (1990) *State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place*. Penn State Press.
- Jessop, B. 'From Localities via the spatial turn to spatial-temporal fixes: a strategic relational odyssey'. 2004.
- Jessop, B. (2007) *State power*. Polity.
- Jessop, B. (2019) 'Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Periodization and Critique', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 118(2), pp. 343-361.
- Jones, G. A. and Rodgers, D. (2019) 'Ethnographies and/of violence', *Ethnography*, pp. 1466138119839088.
- Jones, W., De Oliveira, R. S. and Verhoeven, H. (2012) *Africa's illiberal state-builders*. Refugee Studies Centre.
- Justino, P., Leavy, J. and Valli, E. (2009) 'Quantitative methods in contexts of everyday violence', *IDS bulletin*, 40(3), pp. 41-49.
- Jütersonke, O., Muggah, R. and Rodgers, D. (2009) 'Gangs, urban violence, and security interventions in Central America', *Security dialogue*, 40(4-5), pp. 373-397.
- Kaldor, M. (2013) *New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Kalyvas, S. and Arjona, A. (2005) 'Paramilitarismo: una perspectiva teórica', *El Poder Paramilitar*.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2001) "'New" and "old" civil wars: a valid distinction?', *World politics*, 54(1), pp. 99-118.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2003) 'The ontology of "political violence": action and identity in civil wars', *Perspective on Politics*, 1(03), pp. 475-494.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2006) *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.

- Kalyvas, S. N., Shapiro, I. and Masoud, T. E. (2008) *Order, conflict, and violence*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
- Kan, P. R., Kan and Pusca (2019) *The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence*. Springer.
- Katz, C. (1994) 'Playing the field: questions of fieldwork in geography', *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1), pp. 67-72.
- Kawell, J. (2002) 'Drug economies of the Americas', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 36(2), pp. 8-12.
- Kelsall, T. (2018) 'Towards a universal political settlement concept: A response to Mushtaq Khan', *African Affairs*, pp. 1-14.
- Kelsall, T. and Heng, S. (2014) 'The political settlement and economic growth in Cambodia'.
- Kelsall, T. and Seiha, H. (2014) *The political settlement and economic growth in Cambodia*: BWPI, The University of Manchester.
- Khan, A., Moulaert, F. and Schreurs, J. (2013) 'Epistemology of Space: Exploring Relational Perspectives in Planning, Urbanism, and Architecture', *International Planning Studies*, 18(3-4), pp. 287-303.
- Khan, M. (1995) 'State failure in weak states: a critique of new institutionalist explanations', *The new institutional economics and Third World development*: Routledge, pp. 85-100.
- Khan, M. (2017) 'Political settlements and the analysis of institutions', *African Affairs*, 117(469), pp. 636-655.
- Khan, M. H. (2010) 'Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions', *London: School of Oriental and African Studies*. July. <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968>.
- Khan, M. H. (2018) 'Power, pacts and political settlements: A reply to Tim Kelsall', *African Affairs*.
- Knight, J. (1992) *Institutions and social conflict*. Cambridge University Press.
- Koonings, K. (2012) 'New Violence, Insecurity, and the State: Comparative Reflections on Latin America and Mexico', *Violence, Coercion, and State-Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico*, pp. 255-278.
- Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (2007) 'Fractured cities, second-class citizenship and urban violence', *Fractured cities: Social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America*, pp. 7-22.
- Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (2009) *Megacities: the politics of urban exclusion and violence in the global south*. zed books.
- Kothari, U. and Wilkinson, R. (2010) 'Colonial imaginaries and postcolonial transformations: exiles, bases, beaches', *Third World Quarterly*, 31(8), pp. 1395-1412.
- Krause, K., Muggah, R. and Gilgen, E. (2011) *Global burden of armed violence 2011: lethal encounters*. Cambridge University Press.

Kruijt, D. and Koonings, K. (1999) 'Introduction: violence and fear in Latin America', *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*, Zed Books, London, pp. 1-30.

Kruijt, D. and Koonings, K. (2004) *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America*. null.

Krüger, A. (2018) 'Só 4% dos eleitos em outubro são negros', *UOL*, 20 November 2018. Available at: <https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/eleicoes/so-4-dos-eleitos-em-outubro-sao-negros-eram-107-das-candidaturas-em-2018/>.

Lago, L. C. (1992) 'Política urbana e a questão habitacional: novas tendências face à crise econômica brasileira', *Cadernos IPPUR/UFRJ, Ano VI*, (1), pp. 41-47.

Lameira, R. F. and Peres, P. (2015) 'O lugar do PMDB na política brasileira: o limite das tipologias partidárias', *1º Seminário Internacional de Ciência Política: Estado e democracia em mudança no século XXI*. UFRGS, Porto Alegre.

Lancaster, K. (2017) 'Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in elite interviewing: conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 20(1), pp. 93-103.

Landesman, T. (2016) 'Remaking Rio de Janeiro through "favela integration": the politics of mobility and state space'.

Langfur, H. (1999) 'Myths of pacification: Brazilian frontier settlement and the subjugation of the Bororo Indians', *journal of social history*, pp. 879-905.

Leal, V. N. and Leal, V. N. (1977) *Coronelismo*. Cambridge University Press.

Leavy, P. (2011) *Essentials of transdisciplinary research: Using problem-centered methodologies*. Left Coast Press.

LeBas, A. (2013) 'Violence and urban order in Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 48(3), pp. 240-262.

Leeds, E. (1996) 'Cocaine and parallel polities in the Brazilian urban periphery: constraints on local-level democratization', *Latin American Research Review*, pp. 47-83.

Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The production of space*. Oxford Blackwell.

Lefebvre, H. (1996) 'The right to the city', *Writings on cities*, 63181.

Leite, M. (2005) 'Violência, insegurança e cidadania: reflexões a partir do Rio de Janeiro', *Observatório da Cidadania*, pp. 66-70.

Leite, M. d. S. P. (2001) 'Para além da metáfora da guerra: Percepções sobre cidadania, violência e paz no Grajaú, um bairro carioca'.

Lessa, C. (2001) *O Rio de todos os Brasis: uma reflexão em busca de auto-estima*. Editora Record.

Lessing, B. (2017) *Making peace in drug wars: Crackdowns and cartels in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

- Lewis, D. G. and Sagnayeva, S. (2019) 'Corruption, Patronage and Illiberal Peace: Forging Political Settlement in Post-Conflict Kyrgyzstan', *Third World Quarterly*, pp. 1-19.
- Lustick, I. (1993) *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*. Cornell University Press.
- Machado Da Silva, L. A. (1967) 'A política na favela (reedição)', *Dilemas: Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social*, 4, pp. 699-716.
- Mainwaring, S. (1986) 'The transition to democracy in Brazil', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 28(1), pp. 149-180.
- Malin, M. (2007) 'Debate busca raízes da violência 2'. Available at: <https://www.acessa.com/gramsci/?page=visualizar&id=699> [2017].
- Mamani, H. A. (2016) 'Transporte urbano e informal: quadros da Associação Nacional de Transportes Públicos', *Novos Cadernos NAEA*, 19(3).
- Mann, M. (1984) 'The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results', *European Journal of Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie*, 25(2), pp. 185-213.
- Mann, M. (1986) *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*. - 1986. Cambridge University Press.
- Marc, A. and Willman, A. M. (2010) *Violence in the City: Understanding and supporting community responses to urban violence*. World Bank.
- Marcuse, P. (1997) 'The ghetto of exclusion and the fortified enclave: new patterns in the United States', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 41(3), pp. 311-326.
- Marinatto, L. and Soares, R. 2015a. Na Zona Oeste, milícia domina 38 conjuntos do 'Minha casa, minha vida' e até pinta seu símbolo nos condomínios. Extra: Globo.
- Marinatto, L. and Soares, R. (2015b) *Todos os condomínios do 'Minha casa, minha vida' no Rio são alvos do crime organizado*. Minha Casa Minha Vida. Extra Globo: Globo. Available at: <http://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/todos-os-condominios-do-minha-casa-minha-vida-no-rio-sao-alvos-do-crime-organizado-15663214.html#ixzz3WtbfTEhk> (Accessed: 22nd March 2015).
- Marques Gomes, L. H. 'Thirty years of privatizations in Brazil: a critical appraisal', *International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy*.
- Marten, K. (2012) *Warlords: Strong-arm brokers in weak states*. Cornell University Press.
- Martin, P. A. (1921) 'Causes of the Collapse of the Brazilian Empire', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, pp. 4-48.
- Masotti, L. H. (1968) 'URBAN VIOLENCE AND DISORDER-PREFACE', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 11(4), pp. 1.
- Massey, D. (1991) *A global sense of place*. na.
- Massey, D. (1992) 'Politics and space/time', *New Left Review*, pp. 65-65.

- Massey, D. (2005) *For space*. Sage.
- Massey, D. (2007) *World city*. Polity.
- Massey, D. B. (1994) *Space, place, and gender*. U of Minnesota Press.
- Maxwell, K. (2004) *Conflicts and conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808*. Routledge.
- Mazzaro, K. (2018) 'Crime and the construction of political order in Latin America', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 60(4), pp. 113-122.
- Mc Evoy, C. and Hideg, G. (2017) *Global violent deaths 2017: time to decide: report*. Small Arms Survey.
- McCann, B. (2013) *Hard Times in the Marvelous City: From Dictatorship to Democracy in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. Duke University Press.
- McGregor, J. and Chatiza, K. (2019) 'Frontiers of urban control: lawlessness on the city edge and forms of clientalist statecraft in Zimbabwe', *Antipode*.
- McMahon, G. and Morales, J. A. (1996) *Economic policy and the transition to democracy: the Latin American experience*. Springer.
- Meagher, K. (2003) 'A back door to globalisation? Structural adjustment, globalisation & transborder trade in West Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(95), pp. 57-75.
- Medina Gallego, C. (1990) *Autodefensas, paramilitares y narcotráfico en Colombia*. null.
- Meehan, P. and Goodhand, J. (2018) 'Spatialising Political Settlements', *Accord*, (4), pp. 14-19.
- Meehan, P. and Plonski, S. (2017) 'Brokering the margins: A review of concepts and methods'.
- Mehta, P. B. and Walton, M. (2014) 'Ideas, interests and the politics of development change in India: capitalism, inclusion and the state', *Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Center, Working Paper*, (36).
- Melgaço, L. and Prouse, C. (2017) *Milton Santos: a pioneer in critical geography from the Global South*. Springer.
- Mendonça, T. (2014) 'Batan: tráfico, milícia e “pacificação” na Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro'.
- Merrifield, A. (2011) 'The right to the city and beyond: notes on a Lefebvrian re-conceptualization', *City*, 15(3-4), pp. 473-481.
- Michel, D. C. (1984) 'The practice of everyday life', *Berkeley: U of California P.*
- Migdal, J. S. (2001) *State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*. Cambridge University Press.
- Migdal, J. S. and Schlichte, K. (2005) 'Rethinking the state', *The dynamics of states: the formation and crises of state domination*, pp. 1-40.

- Miklos, M. and Paoliello, T. (2017) 'Fragile Cities: a Critical Perspective on the Repertoire for New Urban Humanitarian Interventions', *Contexto Internacional*, 39(3), pp. 545-568.
- Miller, B. and Nicholls, W. (2013) 'Social movements in urban society: The city as a space of politicization', *Urban Geography*, 34(4), pp. 452-473.
- Misse, M. (1999) 'Malandros, marginais e vagabundos', *A acumulação social da violência no*.
- Misse, M. (2011a) 'Autos de resistência": uma análise dos homicídios cometidos por policiais na cidade do Rio de Janeiro (2001-2011)', *Relatório Final de Pesquisa-Núcleo de Estudos da Cidadania, Conflitos e Violência Urbana. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Mimeo*.
- Misse, M. (2011b) 'Crime organizado e crime comum no Rio de Janeiro: diferenças e afinidades', *Revista de sociologia e política*, 19(40).
- Misse, M., Grillo, C. C., Teixeira, C. P. and Neri, N. E. (2013) *Quando a polícia mata: homicídios por "autos de resistência" no Rio de Janeiro (2001-2011)*. Necvu.
- Mitchell, N. J., Carey, S. C. and Butler, C. K. (2014) 'The impact of pro-government militias on human rights violations', *International Interactions*, 40(5), pp. 812-836.
- Mitchell, T. (1991) 'The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics', *American political science review*, 85(1), pp. 77-96.
- MOD, M. o. D. 2009. Joint Doctrine Publication 3–40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution(JDP 3–40).
- Moncada, E. (2013a) 'Business and the politics of urban violence in Colombia', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 48(3), pp. 308-330.
- Moncada, E. (2013b) 'The politics of urban violence: challenges for development in the Global South', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 48(3), pp. 217-239.
- Moncada, E. (2016) 'Urban violence, political economy, and territorial control: Insights from Medellín', *Latin American Research Review*, 51(4), pp. 225-248.
- Moore, B. and Mann, M. (1988) 'The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760'.
- Moser, C. and Rodgers, D. (2012) 'Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: global policy report', *Urban Tipping Point Project Working Paper No, 7*.
- Moser, C. O. N. 2004. Urban violence and insecurity: an introductory roadmap. Sage Publications Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Moser, C. O. N. and McIlwaine, C. 2014. New frontiers in twenty-first century urban conflict and violence. SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England.
- Moulaert, F. and Jessop, B. (2013) 'Theoretical foundations for the analysis of socio-economic development in space', *Urban and Regional Development Trajectories in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 18-44.



- Moura, T. (2007) *Rostos invisíveis da violência armada: um estudo de caso sobre Rio de Janeiro*. 7Letras.
- Mueller, B. and Mueller, C. (2016) 'The political economy of the Brazilian model of agricultural development: Institutions versus sectoral policy', *The quarterly review of economics and finance*, 62, pp. 12-20.
- Muggah, R. (2012) *Researching the urban dilemma: Urbanization, poverty and violence*. International Development Research Centre Ottawa.
- Muggah, R. (2013) *Fragile Cities Rising*. <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/07/fragile-cities-rising/>; IPI Global Observatory (Accessed: 23/02 2015).
- Muggah, R. (2014) 'Deconstructing the fragile city: exploring insecurity, violence and resilience', *Environment and Urbanization*, pp. 0956247814533627.
- Muggah, R., de Carvalho, I. S., Alvarado, N., Marmolejo, L. and Wang, R. (2016) 'Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America', *Strategic Paper*, 20.
- Muggah, R. and Krause, K. (2006) 'A True Measure of Success-The Discourse and Practice of Human Security in Haiti', *Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel.*, 7, pp. 129.
- Muggah, R. and Mulli, A. S. (2012) 'Rio tries counterinsurgency', *Current History*, 111(742), pp. 62.
- Mugge, M. H. (2016) 'Senhores da Guerra: elites militares no Sul do Império do Brasil. Comandantes superiores da Guarda Nacional (1845-1873)'.
- Mukhija, V. (2010) 'N of one plus some: An alternative strategy for conducting single case research', *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 29(4), pp. 416-426.
- Murray Li, T. (2002) 'Local histories, global markets: cocoa and class in upland Sulawesi', *Development and Change*, 33(3), pp. 415-437.
- Müller, M.-M. (2013) 'Penal statecraft in the Latin American city: assessing Mexico city's punitive urban democracy', *Social & Legal Studies*, 22(4), pp. 441-463.
- Nandhakumar, J. and Jones, M. (1997) 'Too close for comfort? Distance and engagement in interpretive information systems research', *Information systems journal*, 7(2), pp. 109-131.
- Nascimento, E. (2005) 'Geoprocessamento aplicado ao mapeamento e análise das áreas de uso e ocupação irregular da terra urbana em Ponta Grossa (PR). 2005, 142 f', *Monografia (Bacharelado em Geografia)–Setor de Ciências Exatas e Naturais, Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa, Ponta Grossa*.
- Neal, S. and McLaughlin, E. (2009) 'Researching up? Interviews, emotionality and policy-making elites', *Journal of Social Policy*, 38(4), pp. 689-707.
- Needell, J. D. (1983) 'Rio de Janeiro at the Turn of the Century: Modernization and the Parisian Ideal', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 25(1), pp. 83-103.
- Nicoll, M. (2005) 'Mão Branca teria sido obra de ficção da imprensa', *FAPERJ*. Available at: <http://www.faperj.br/?id=663.2.3> [2018].

- Nicácio, J. (1995) 'Grupo armado invade hospital e mata 1 no Rio', *Folha de São Paulo*, 23 April.
- Nissanke, M. and Thorbecke, E. (2010) 'Comparative analysis of the globalization-poverty nexus in Asia, Latin America, and Africa', *World Development*, 38(6), pp. 797-802.
- Nordstrom, C. (2000) 'Shadows and sovereigns', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 17(4), pp. 35-54.
- Nordstrom, C. (2004) *Shadows of war: Violence, power, and international profiteering in the twenty-first century*. Univ of California Press.
- Nordstrom, C. and Robben, A. C. G. M. (1995) *Fieldwork under fire: Contemporary studies of violence and culture*. Univ of California Press.
- North, D. C., Wallis, J. J. and Weingast, B. R. (2009) 'Violence and social order', *A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. New York.
- Norton, R. J. (2010) 'Feral Cities: Problems Today, Battlefields Tomorrow?', *Marine Corps University Journal*, 1(1), pp. 51-77.
- Nun, J. (1969) *Latin America: the hegemonic crisis and the military coup*. Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Nun, J. (2003) '1969. La teoría de la masa marginal', *Marginalidad y exclusión social*, pp. 178-236.
- O Dia (2008) 'Rio: Paulo Ramos pede desligamento da CPI das Milícias', *O Dia*, 31 July 2008. Available at: <http://noticias.terra.com.br/eleicoes/2008/interna/0,,OI3042465-EI11830,00-Rio+Paulo+Ramos+pede+desligamento+da+CPI+das+Milicias.html>.
- O Globo (2006) 'Eduardo Paes elogia ações das milícias de PM em Jacarepaguá', *O Globo*, 15 September. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/eleicoes-2006/eduardo-paes-elogia-acoes-de-milicias-de-pms-em-jacarepagua-5000337>.
- O'Donnell, G. (1993) 'On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: A Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries', *World Development*, 21(8), pp. 1355-1369.
- O'Donnell, G. A. (1999) *Counterpoints: selected essays on authoritarianism and democratization*. Kellogg Institute Series on Democracy and Development.
- OABRJ (2013) *Desaparecidos no Rio sobem 29% em 10 anos*. Available at: <https://oab-rj.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/100650681/desaparecidos-no-rio-sobem-29-em-10-anos>.
- Ooi, G. L. and Phua, K. H. (2007) 'Urbanization and slum formation', *Journal of Urban Health*, 84(1), pp. 27-34.
- Osorio, M. and Versiani, M. H. (2013) 'O papel das instituições na trajetória econômico-social do Estado do Rio de Janeiro', *Cadernos do Desenvolvimento Fluminense*, (2), pp. 188-210.
- Ottes, J. (2005) 'Urban Reforms and the Birth of City Planning in Rio de Janeiro and Recife (1904-1945)', *Diálogos Latinoamericanos*, (10), pp. 0.
- Paixão, A. L. (1991) 'Segurança privada, direitos humanos e democracia: notas preliminares sobre novos dilemas políticos', *Novos Estudos Cebap*, 31, pp. 131-141.

- Palmary, I., Rauch, J. and Simpson, G. (2014) 'Violent crime in Johannesburg', *Emerging Johannesburg*: Routledge, pp. 117-138.
- Parks, T. and Cole, W. (2010) 'Political Settlements'.
- Patel, R. B. and Burkle, F. M. (2012) 'Rapid Urbanization and the Growing Threat of Violence and Conflict: A 21 st Century Crisis', *Prehospital and disaster medicine*, 27(2), pp. 194-197.
- Pavoni, A. and Tulumello, S. (2018) 'What is urban violence?', *Progress in Human Geography*, pp. 0309132518810432.
- Pawelz, J. (2018) 'Hobsbawm in Trinidad: understanding contemporary modalities of urban violence', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 18(5), pp. 409-432.
- Pearce, J. (2010) 'Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America', *Democratization*, 17(2), pp. 286-306.
- Pearce, J. (2018) 'Elites and violence in Latin America: logics of the fragmented security state'.
- Peixoto, F. C. (2006) 'Ordenamento territorial e a zona oeste do município do Rio de Janeiro: um breve olhar sobre a construção do território carioca durante a primeira metade do Século XX', *Oculum Ensaios: Revista de arquitetura e urbanismo*, (5), pp. 1.
- Peluso, N. L. and Lund, C. (2011) 'New frontiers of land control: Introduction', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(4), pp. 667-681.
- Peluso, N. L. and Watts, M. (2001) *Violent environments*. Cornell University Press.
- Penglase, B. (2008) 'The Bastard Child of the Dictatorship: The Comando Vermelho and the Birth of "Narco-culture" in Rio de Janeiro', *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 45(1), pp. 118-145.
- Penglase, B. (2009) 'States of insecurity: Everyday emergencies, public secrets, and drug trafficker power in a Brazilian favela', *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 32(1), pp. 47-63.
- Pereira, A. W. (2016) 'Is the Brazilian State "Patrimonial"?', *Latin American Perspectives*, 43(2), pp. 135-152.
- Perlman, J. E. (1979) *The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro*. Univ of California Press.
- Perlman, J. E. (2007) *Globalization and the urban poor*. WIDER Research Paper.
- Pinker, S. (2007) 'A history of violence', *New Republic*, 236(4809), pp. 18.
- Pinker, S. (2011) *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*.
- Portes, A., Castells, M. and Benton, L. A. (1989) *The informal economy: Studies in advanced and less developed countries*. JHU Press.
- Prebisch, R. (2016) 'Theoretical and practical problems of economic growth', *ECLAC Thinking, Selected Texts (1948-1998)*. Santiago: ECLAC, 2016. p. 109-128.

Prefeitura 2016. Plano de Mobilidade Urbana Sustentável da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro: Transportes.

PRODERJ (2016) *Serie Historica Estado e Regioes*. Centro de Tecnologia da Informação e Comunicação do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Available at: [http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp\\_imagens/uploads/SerieHistoricaEstadoRegioes.pdf](http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/uploads/SerieHistoricaEstadoRegioes.pdf) (Accessed: 12 December 2019).

PwC (2014) *Price Waterhouse Cooper analysis of United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*.

Pécaut, D. (2001) *Orden y violencia: evolución socio-política de Colombia entre 1930 y 1953*. Editorial Norma.

Queiroz, C. (2018) 'An ambivalent mayor', *Pesquisa FAPESP*. Available at: <https://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/en/2018/08/06/an-ambivalent-mayor/> [2019].

Quijano, A. (2001) 'Colonialidad del poder, globalización y democracia', *Utopías, nuestra bandera: revista de debate político*, 188, pp. 97-123.

Raeymaekers, T., Menkhaus, K. and Vlassenroot, K. (2008) 'State and non-state regulation in African protracted crises: governance without government', *Afrika Focus*, 21(2), pp. 7-21.

Rasmussen, M. B. and Lund, C. (2018) 'Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The territorialization of resource control', *World Development*, 101, pp. 388-399.

Reich, G. M. (1998) 'The 1988 Constitution a Decade Later: Ugly Compromises Reconsidered', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 40(4), pp. 5-24.

Reiter, B. (2008) 'Negotiating democracy in Brazil: The politics of exclusion'.

Ribeiro, D. (2015) *O povo brasileiro: a formação e o sentido do Brasil*. Global Editora e Distribuidora Ltda.

Ribeiro, L. C. d. Q. (1996) 'Rio de Janeiro: exemplo de metrópole partida e sem rumo', *Novos Estudos Cebap*, 45, pp. 167-182.

Ribeiro, P. J., Oliveira, R., Blickman, T. and Jelsma, G. (2010) 'The impact of militia actions on public security policies in Rio de Janeiro', *Crime and Globalisation March*.

Ribeiro, P. T. (2009) 'Decentralization of governmental action in Brazil in the 90s: challenges of the political-institutional environment', *Ciencia & saude coletiva*, 14(3), pp. 819-828.

Robben, A. C. G. M. (2005) *Political violence and trauma in Argentina*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Rodgers, D. (2003) 'Dying for it: gangs, violence, and social change in urban Nicaragua'.

Rodgers, D. (2006) 'The State as a Gang Conceptualizing the Governmentality of Violence in Contemporary Nicaragua', *Critique of Anthropology*, 26(3), pp. 315-330.

Rodgers, D. (2007) 'Joining the gang and becoming a broder: The violence of ethnography in contemporary Nicaragua', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 26(4), pp. 444-461.

- Rodgers, D. (2009) 'Slum wars of the 21st century: gangs, mano dura and the new urban geography of conflict in Central America', *Development and change*, 40(5), pp. 949-976.
- Rodgers, D. (2010) *Urban violence is not (necessarily) a way of life: towards a political economy of conflict in cities*: Working paper//World Institute for Development Economics Research (9292302558).
- Rodriguez, A., Rodriguez, P., Saborido, M., Segovia, O. and Mires, L. (2014) 'Visible and invisible violence and inequality in neoliberal Santiago', *Environment and Urbanization*, 26(2), pp. 359-372.
- Rodrik, D. and Mukand, S. (2019) 'The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy'.
- Roger Vekemans, S. J. and Giusti, J. (1969) 'Marginality and ideology in latin american development', *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)*, 5(11), pp. 221-234.
- Rolnik, R. (1989) 'Territórios negros nas cidades brasileiras: etnicidade e cidade em São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro', *Revista de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*, 17, pp. 1-17.
- Rolnik, R. (1999) 'Exclusão territorial e violência', *São Paulo em perspectiva*, 13(4), pp. 100-111.
- Rolnik, R. (2019) *Urban Warfare*. Verso Trade.
- Rose, G. (1997) 'Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics', *Progress in human geography*, 21(3), pp. 305-320.
- Rose, G. (2007) 'Researching visual materials: Towards a critical visual methodology', *Dies., Hg., Visual Methodologies. An Introduction to Interpreting Visual Materials*. London: Sage, pp. 1-32.
- Rose, R. S. (2005) *The unpast: elite violence and social control in Brazil, 1954-2000*. Ohio University Press.
- Roseberry, W. (1989) 'Peasants and the World', *Economic Anthropology*, 108, pp. 127.
- Rozema, R. (2008a) 'Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks in Medellín, Colombia', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40(3), pp. 423-452.
- Rozema, R. (2008b) 'Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks in Medellín, Colombia', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40(03), pp. 423-452.
- Saab, B. Y. and Taylor, A. W. (2009) 'Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(6), pp. 455-475.
- Saad-Filho, A. (2005) 'The rise and decline of Latin American structuralism and dependency theory', *The origins of development economics: how schools of economic thought have addressed development*, pp. 128-45.
- Sachs, I. (1993) *Transition strategies towards the 21st century*. Interest Publications [for] Research & Information System for the Non ....
- Said, E. W. (1995) 'Orientalism: western conceptions of the Orient. 1978', *Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin*, 115.

- Sain, M. F. (2002) *Seguridad, democracia y reforma del sistema policial en la Argentina*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Santos, R. F. d. (2012) 'Situação atual e perspectivas de desenvolvimento da Área de Planejamento 3 da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro', *Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro*.
- Sanín, F. G. (2004) 'Criminal rebels? A discussion of civil war and criminality from the Colombian experience', *Politics & Society*, 32(2), pp. 257-285.
- Sassen, S. (2013) 'When the center no longer holds: Cities as frontier zones', *Cities*, 34, pp. 67-70.
- Sassen, S. (2017) 'Cities Help Us Hack Formal Power Systems', *Architecture and the Social Sciences*: Springer, pp. 3-11.
- Sayer, A. (1992) *Method in social science: A realist approach*. Psychology Press.
- Sayer, A. (1999) *Realism and social science*. Sage.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (1995) 'The primacy of the ethical: propositions for a militant anthropology', *Current anthropology*, 36(3), pp. 409-440.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. and Bourgois, P. (2004) 'Introduction: Making sense of violence', *Violence in war and peace: An anthology*, 4.
- Schultze-Kraft, M. (2017) 'Understanding Organised Violence and Crime in Political Settlements: Oil Wars, Petro-Criminality and Amnesty in the Niger Delta', *Journal of International Development*, 29(5), pp. 613-627.
- Scott, J. C. (1990) *Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts*. Yale university press.
- Scott, J. C. (1998) *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. Yale University Press.
- Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008) 'Case selection techniques in case study research a menu of qualitative and quantitative options', *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), pp. 294-308.
- Serginho da Pastelaria (2018) *Facebook Post*. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/SerguinodaPastelaria/photos/a.954941398048586/954941384715254/?type=3&theater>.
- Shecaira, S. S. (2002) 'Racism in brazil: a historical perspective', *Revue internationale de droit pénal*, 73(1), pp. 141-153.
- Shifter, M. (2007) 'Latin America's drug problem', *Current History*, 106(697), pp. 58-64.
- Silke, A. (1998) 'Motives of paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland', *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, 7(2), pp. 121-156.
- Silva, L. A. M. d. (2004) 'Sociabilidade violenta: por uma interpretação da criminalidade contemporânea no Brasil urbano', *Sociedade e estado*, 19(1), pp. 53-84.
- Silva, M. d. A. (2017) 'Houses, tranquility and progress in an área de milícia', *Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology*, 14(3).

- Simmel, G. (2012) 'The metropolis and mental life', *The urban sociology reader*: Routledge, pp. 37-45.
- Simone, A. (2018) 'The Urban Majority and Provisional Recompositions in Yangon: The 2016 Antipode RGS-IBG Lecture', *Antipode*, 50(1), pp. 23-40.
- Singelmann, P. (1975) 'Political structure and social banditry in Northeast Brazil', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 7(1), pp. 59-83.
- Slave Voyages (2019) 'Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database'. Available at: <https://www.slavevoyages.org/> (Accessed).
- Smith, D. E. (2005a) *Institutional ethnography: A sociology for people*. Rowman Altamira.
- Smith, N. (2002) 'New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy', *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 427-450.
- Smith, N. (2005b) *The new urban frontier: Gentrification and the revanchist city*. Routledge.
- Soares, C. E. L. (2002) *A capoeira escrava e outras tradições rebeldes no Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1850*. Editora Unicamp.
- Soares, G. A. D. (2008) *Não matará: desenvolvimento, desigualdade e homicídios*. Editora FGV.
- Soares, L. (2012) 'O Triângulo Carioca nos anos 30 e 40', *JornalZO*. Available at: O Triângulo Carioca nos anos 30 e 40 2019].
- Soares, L. E. (2000) *Meu casaco de general: 500 dias no front da segurança pública do Rio de Janeiro*. Companhias das Letras.
- Soares, L. E. (2019) *Desmilitarizar: segurança pública e direitos humanos*. Boitempo Editorial.
- Soares, L. E. and Sento-Sé, J. T. (2000) 'Estado e segurança pública no Rio de Janeiro: dilemas de um aprendizado difícil', *Relatório final do projeto reforma do Estado e proteção social*.
- Soja, E. W. (1989) *Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory*. Verso.
- Souza Alves, J. C. (2003) 'Dos Barões ao extermínio: uma história de violência na Baixada Fluminense. Duque de Caxias, RJ: APPH', *CLIO*, 197p.
- Springer, S. (2009) 'Violence, democracy, and the neoliberal "order": The contestation of public space in posttransitional Cambodia', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 99(1), pp. 138-162.
- Springer, S. and Le Billon, P. (2016) 'Violence and space: An introduction to the geographies of violence', *Political geography*, 52, pp. 1-3.
- Springer, S. and Le Billon, P. (2020) 'Violence', *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. and Brusco, V. (2013) *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.



- Sukarieh, M. and Tannock, S. (2013) 'On the problem of over-researched communities: The case of the Shatila Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon', *Sociology*, 47(3), pp. 494-508.
- Tadros, M. and Allouche, J. (2017) 'Political settlements as a violent process: deconstructing the relationship between political settlements and intrinsic, instrumental and resultant forms of violence', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 17(3), pp. 187-204.
- Taussig, M. (1992) 'Culture of terror—space of death: Roger Casement's Putumayo report and the explanation of torture', *Colonialism and culture*, pp. 135-174.
- Taussig, M. (2003) 'The Diary as Witness: an Anthropologist Writes What He Must', *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 50, pp. B12.
- Thomas, J. (1993) *Doing critical ethnography*. Sage.
- Thrasher, F. M. (1963) *The gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago*. University of Chicago Press.
- Tilly, C. (1992) *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992*. Blackwell Oxford.
- Tilly, C., Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (1985) *War making and state making as organized crime*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tobi, H. and Kampen, J. K. (2018) 'Research design: the methodology for interdisciplinary research framework', *Quality & quantity*, 52(3), pp. 1209-1225.
- Twine, F. W. (1998) *Racism in a racial democracy: The maintenance of white supremacy in Brazil*. Rutgers University Press.
- Tönnies, F. (1957) 'Gemeinschaft und gesellschaft', *Theories of society*, 1.
- UFRJ (2009) *Segurança pública na Zona Oeste do Rio de Janeiro*, Instituto de Economia. Available at: [https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/1449191104\\_magicfields\\_arquivo\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/1449191104_magicfields_arquivo_1_1.pdf).
- Unit, S. 2018. The UK's government's approach to stabilisation. A guide for policy makers and practitioners. London: Stabilisation Unit.
- United Nations (2018) *2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects*: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
- UNODC (2013) *World Drug Report*, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- UNODC (2019) *Global Study on Homicide: Homicide, development and the Sustainable Development Goals*, Vienna.
- Vainio, A. (2013) 'Beyond research ethics: Anonymity as 'ontology', 'analysis' and 'independence'', *Qualitative Research*, 13(6), pp. 685-698.
- Van Acker, T. (2018) 'From rural rebellion to urban uprising? A socio-spatial perspective on Bujumbura's conflict history', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 12(2), pp. 310-328.



- Vanderschueren, F. (1996) 'From violence to justice and security in cities', *Environment and Urbanization*, 8(1), pp. 93-112.
- Varshney, A. (1993) 'Introduction: urban bias in perspective'.
- Vaz, M. (2011) *The Jackpot Mentality: The Growth of Government Lotteries and the Suppression of Illegal Numbers Gambling in Rio de Janeiro and New York City*. Columbia University.
- Velho, G. (2000) 'O desafio da violência', *Estudos Avançados*, 14(39), pp. 56-60.
- Ventura, Z. (1994) *Cidade partida*. Companhia das Letras.
- Vieira, W. D. S. 'MEMÓRIA E IDENTIDADE DOS MOVIMENTOS SOCIAIS NA ZONA OESTE CARIOCA'.
- Vilalta, C. and Muggah, R. (2014) 'Violent disorder in Ciudad Juárez: a spatial analysis of homicide', *Trends in Organized Crime*, 17(3), pp. 161-180.
- Vilalta, C. J., Castillo, J. G. and Torres, J. A. (2016) 'Violent Crime in Latin American Cities', *Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank*.
- Villar, O. and Cottle, D. (2011) *Cocaine, death squads, and the war on terror: US imperialism and class struggle in Colombia*. NYU Press.
- Volkov, V. (2002) *Violent entrepreneurs: The use of force in the making of Russian capitalism*. Cornell University Press.
- Von Einsiedel, S., Bosetti, L., Cockayne, J., Salih, C. and Wan, W. (2017) 'Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict', *Occasional Paper*, 10.
- Von Lieres, B. and Piper, L. (2014) *Mediated Citizenship*. Springer.
- Wacquant, L. (2008) 'Territorial stigmatization in the age of advanced marginality', *Symbolic Power in Cultural Contexts*: Brill Sense, pp. 43-52.
- Wacquant, L. (2009) *Punishing the poor*. duke university Press.
- Wacquant, L., Wacquant, L. and Howe, J. (2008) *Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality*. Polity.
- Waiselfisz, J. J. (2016) *Mapa da violência 2016: homicídios por armas de fogo no Brasil*. Secretaria de Governo da Presidência da República, Secretaria Nacional de ....
- Walker, R. B. J. (1990) 'Security, sovereignty, and the challenge of world politics', *Alternatives*, 15(1), pp. 3-27.
- Walton, J. (1976) 'Creating the Divided City', *Northwestern University*.
- Walton, J. 1979. From cities to systems: recent research on Latin American urbanization. JSTOR.
- Walton, O., Goodhand, J. and Pollock, L. (2018) 'Living on the Margins: The Role of Borderland Brokers in Post-War Transitions'.

- Walton, O., Plonski, S., Yousef, Z., Goodhand, J. and Meehan, P. (2018) 'Borderlands and Peacebuilding:: A view from the Margins'.
- Watts, M. J. (2016a) 'The mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860–1960; a study of violent peasant entrepreneurs, by Anton Blok', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 43(1), pp. 67-91.
- Watts, R. (2016b) *States of violence and the civilising process: on criminology and state crime*. Springer.
- Weber, M. (2009) *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. Routledge.
- Wenner, M., Schlitz, N. and Poerting, J. (2016) 'Ruling an unruly space: “Petty sovereigns” and challenges to state sovereignty in Darjeeling/India', *Geographien Südasiens*, (5), pp. 25-28.
- Weyrauch, C. S. (2015) 'De Mar a Modernidade e Tradição: Cidade e Campo no Rio de Janeiro'. Available at: <http://urbecarioca.com.br/artigo-de-mar-a-mar-modernidade-e-tradicao-cidade-e-campo-no-rio-de-janeiro-de-cleia-schiavo-weyrauch/>.
- Williams, C. (2008) 'Ghettourism and Voyeurism, or Challenging Stereotypes and Raising Consciousness? Literary and Non-literary Forays into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 27(4), pp. 483-500.
- Williams, P. (1994) 'Transnational criminal organisations and international security', *Survival*, 36(1), pp. 96-113.
- Winton, A. (2004) 'Urban violence: a guide to the literature', *Environment and Urbanization*, 16(2), pp. 165-184.
- Wirth, L. (1927) 'The ghetto', *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1), pp. 57-71.
- Wirth, L. (1938a) 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', *American journal of sociology*, pp. 1-24.
- Wolf, S. (2017) *Mano dura: The politics of gang control in El Salvador*. University of Texas Press.
- World Health Organisation, W. (2002) *The world report on violence and health*.
- Yanguas, P. (2017) 'The role and responsibility of foreign aid in recipient political settlements', *Journal of International Development*, 29(2), pp. 211-228.
- Yonucu, D. (2018) 'Urban Vigilantism: A Study of Anti-Terror Law, Politics and Policing in Istanbul', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 42(3), pp. 408-422.
- Zaluar, A. (1985) *A máquina ea revolta: as organizações populares eo significado da pobreza*. Brasiliense.
- Zaluar, A. (2004) *Integração perversa: pobreza e tráfico de drogas*. FGV Editora.
- Zaluar, A. and Conceição, S. (2007) 'Favelas sob o controle das milícias no Rio de Janeiro', *São Paulo em Perspectiva*, 21(2), pp. 89-101.
- Zdun, S. (2011) 'Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 5(1), pp. 188-199.

Zedner, L. (2009) 'Fixing the future? The pre-emptive turn in criminal justice'.

Žižek, S. (2008) 'Violence: Six sideways reflections'.