Authoritarian Diasporas in Indonesia and the Philippines: Comparative Perspectives on Elite Survival and Defection

Abstract:

The article compares the political trajectories of authoritarian diasporas in Indonesia and the Philippines, namely the subset of former regime officials that disperse across the electoral space after a regime transition. The main finding is that after the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships collapsed in 1998 and 1986 respectively, Indonesia's authoritarian successor party (ASP) fared better than the ASP in the Philippines. However, the authoritarian diaspora did better in the Philippines than in Indonesia.

Engaging with existing scholarship on authoritarian successor parties and authoritarian diasporas, the article argues that the two variables shaping defection calculi are the prevailing levels of party institutionalization of both the authoritarian successor party and alternative parties as well as the type of reversionary clientelistic network available to elites in post-transition politics.

Keywords: Authoritarian Successor Parties; Authoritarian Diasporas; Clientelism, Democratization; Indonesia; Legislative Elections; Party Institutionalization, The Philippines
1. Introduction

Scholars interested in regime transition have had an interest in the causes and consequences of authoritarian residues in nominally democratic systems for some time.\(^1\) An important new contribution to this literature is the emerging scholarship on authoritarian diasporas, defined as the subset of former regime officials that disperse across the electoral space after a regime transition.

In this article, we compare the political trajectories of authoritarian diasporas in Indonesia and the Philippines. The main finding is that after the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships collapsed in 1998 and 1986 respectively, those members of the Indonesian authoritarian cohort who survived the regime transition did so mainly via the ASP, Golkar. The authoritarian diaspora was small and disappeared relatively quickly from national legislative politics. In the Philippines, however, the overwhelming majority of the authoritarian cohort defected from the ASP, the New Society Movement (KBL), after the regime transition. Not only was the authoritarian diaspora comparatively large but it was also more persistent across post-transition election cycles than in Indonesia.

What explains this variance in survival and defection rates of the authoritarian cohort between Indonesia and the Philippines? Engaging with emerging scholarship on ASPs and authoritarian diasporas, the article argues that the two variables shaping defection calculi are the prevailing levels of party institutionalization (of both the ASP and alternative parties) and the type of reversionary clientelistic network available to elites in post-transition politics. In Indonesia, the ASP was relatively well institutionalized compared to other parties that emerged after 1998. In addition, alternative vehicles for voter mobilization were unstable, as clientelistic
relations in Indonesia are transactional in nature. In this context, remaining loyal to the ASP was an attractive option for many in the authoritarian cohort.

In the Philippines, in contrast, the ASP was poorly institutionalized, as indeed were all other parties competing for power post-transition. Yet alternative vehicles for voter mobilization were relatively strong as clientelistic relations in the Philippines are relational in nature. Consequently, abandoning the ASP was the modal strategy among the authoritarian cohort.

2. Defining authoritarian cohorts and authoritarian diasporas

Following Loxton and Power (this issue) we distinguish between authoritarian cohort and authoritarian diaspora. For the purposes of this article, the authoritarian cohort consists of all members of a regime party who occupied a seat in the last national legislature before the collapse of a dictatorship. The authoritarian diaspora refers to the subset of the authoritarian cohort who defected after a regime transition to run for a seat in the national legislature on another party ticket.

These operational definitions raise two measurement issues and introduce a potential selection bias. First, bureaucrats, judges and members of the security apparatus who were directly affiliated with the regime but did not sit in the national legislature during the authoritarian period, but then decided to compete for a seat in parliament after regime transition, are not included in the authoritarian cohort. Second, our definition captures only those members of the authoritarian cohort who participate in national legislative elections. Members of the cohort who migrate to local party branches to compete in subnational legislative elections after regime transition are not encompassed by our definition. Conversely, elites who populated subnational layers of the authoritarian regime but then moved into national politics after
transition are external to our definition. Third, our focus on the terminal authoritarian legislature may introduce some selection bias. The cohort as measured in the final pre-transition national legislature may be significantly smaller than at the high-water mark of authoritarianism, and consequently could be qualitatively different in nonrandom ways. For example, incumbents in the pre-transition national parliament could be disproportionately hardliners or reformers, depending on context and regime trajectories. Finally, our way of measuring the authoritarian cohort may also inflate the size of the authoritarian diaspora in the Philippines when compared to Indonesia. The MPR in Indonesia in 1997 was a bicameral national legislature while the Regular Batasang Pambansa in the Philippines in 1985 was a unicameral national legislature. For the regime parties Golkar and KBL, we calculated the authoritarian diaspora as the number of MPs who occupied a seat for Golkar and the KBL in the final national legislature under authoritarianism but moved to another party or the upper house, namely the Regional Representative Council (DPD – Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) in Indonesia or the Senate in the Philippines, after regime transition. Since the Senate was introduced in the Philippines only after 1986, the chances that members of the authoritarian cohort join it are higher than in Indonesia, where many members of the authoritarian cohort could just “stay put” until 2004 when the upper house was revamped. However, this potential overestimate of the authoritarian cohort in the Philippines is minuscule since there were only 24 Senate seats up for grabs in the 1987 and 1992 elections, and 12 Senate seats in every election thereafter.

To summarize, our definition of the authoritarian cohort is anchored in a snapshot of national legislative politics in the final years of the outgoing regime.

3. The authoritarian cohort, authoritarian successor party, and authoritarian diaspora in Indonesia and the Philippines
Indonesia was under the control of Suharto’s New Order military dictatorship between 1965 and 1998. The Philippines were ruled by Ferdinand Marcos as a democratically elected president from 1965 until 1972 and then in a dictatorial manner between 1972 and 1986. Both authoritarian regimes relied on a combination of military and civilian power bases. This was reflected in the terminal national legislatures before these regimes collapsed.

3.1 Indonesia

The New Order regime dominated Indonesian politics between 1965 and 1998. Despite its authoritarian nature, it preserved certain institutions dating from Indonesia’s experiment with democracy between 1949 and 1957. Most important, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), the legislative branch of Indonesia’s political system, remained the supreme governing body. The MPR had to confirm the Indonesian president every five years as head of the executive branch of government.

The last MPR under the New Order consisted of 641 contested seats and 359 reserved seats. Three parties competed for the contested seats. The New Order dictatorship relied on Golkar, an assembly of different groups whose origins reach back to the period before the military came to power in 1965, as the civilian backbone of the regime. While de jure Golkar was not a party, de facto it was the regime party. In addition, the regime allowed a limited number of “opposition parties.” After 1973, there were two state-approved parties, namely the secular-nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI – Partai Demokrat Indonesia) and the Islamic United Development Party (PPP – Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). Contested seats were renewed every five years by elections, which were heavily rigged in favor of Golkar. Meanwhile, the national government appointed members to the seats reserved for the military
(ABRI – Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), Regional Representatives (UD – Utusan Daerah) and Group Representatives (UG – Utusan Golongan).³

In this context, the authoritarian cohort consists of members of Golkar, PDI, ABRI, UD and UG who occupied a seat in the last New Order MPR in 1997. We note that although the PDI was initially an opposition party, this changed during the final years of the Suharto dictatorship. The PDI became one of the two state-approved parties in 1973 through a compulsory unification of five secular-nationalist parties. Due to the forced nature of this merger, the PDI was immediately plagued by internal factionalism. These rifts became so pronounced that the New Order government eventually feared that PDI infighting would play into the hands of the other state-approved party, the PPP. In order to avert potential polarization between Golkar, the secular-nationalist regime party, and the more outwardly Islamic PPP, the New Order dictatorship began to cultivate the PDI.

PDI factionalism broke into the open when Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno, was elected party chairperson in 1993. The New Order regime refused to accept this result and brokered a new PDI party congress in 1996, during which PDI’s previous chairperson Suryadi was re-elected. Subsequently, supporters of Megawati occupied the PDI headquarter in Jakarta. On 27th July 1996 the government forcefully evicted Megawati’s supporters from the building, resulting in five fatalities and over 100 injuries. In the end, members of Suryadi’s PDI occupied seats in the MPR until the New Order regime collapsed two years later. This explains our inclusion of the PDI in our operational definition of the authoritarian cohort.
The final elections before the New Order collapsed were held on 29th May 1997, after which Golkar, PDI, ABRI, UD and UG occupied a total of 864 seats in the MPR (see Appendix 1).

3.2 The Philippines

In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos was elected president in 1965. In light of growing opposition to his rule, Marcos declared martial law in 1972. “After six years of unchecked personal rule, Ferdinand Marcos sought to institutionalize his new ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ by supplementing his powerful presidency with a weak but elected unicameral assembly, the ‘Interim Batasang Pambansa’.” The same year, Marcos established the New Society Movement (KBL - Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) to “compete” in the 1978 elections. Initially a coalition of different parties, the KBL became the official regime party. Sometimes characterized as a “one-man party”, it is more aptly described as an amalgam of local dynasts who had sided with Marcos, to which were added “government bureaucrats, members of the business community and the thousands of local leaders anointed by Marcos.”

After martial law was lifted in 1981, elections for the Regular Batasang Pambansa were held on 14th May 1984. Despite growing rifts within the KBL, the KBL participated in these elections as the regime party and retained this status until the fall of Marcos in 1986. Hence, for the Philippines, our operational definition of the authoritarian cohort consists of the 112 KBL members who won a seat in the Regular Batasang Pambansa in 1984 (see Appendix 2).

In the next section, we profile the members of the national legislatures in Indonesia in 1998 and the Philippines in 1986.
4. Data collection and analysis

After the dictatorships collapsed in Indonesia and the Philippines in 1998 and 1986 respectively, both Golkar and the KBL continued to compete in elections as ASPs. Hence, the authoritarian diaspora consists of all Golkar members who sat in the MPR in 1997 and all KBL members who sat in the Regular Batasang Pambansa in 1985 respectively, and who won a seat in the national legislature on another party label after 1998 (Indonesia) and 1986 (Philippines). Our shorthand for these two diasporas in the tables below is AD-Golkar and AD-KBL. However, since the authoritarian cohort in Indonesia consists not only of regime party Golkar but also satellite groups (PDI, ABRI, UD and UG) as explained above, we also created and tracked an “extended authoritarian diaspora” that includes MPR members sitting for the other four parties (AD – Extended). Our sources for data collection and classification of parliamentarians are explained in the online appendices.

Tables 1 and 2 show the survival and defection percentages of the authoritarian cohort in Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively, using the several alternative operationalizations of both cohort and diaspora introduced above.

Table 1. Survival and defection rates of the authoritarian cohort in Indonesia, in percentage per election year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999(^8)</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC - Overall</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC - Golkar</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD - Golkar</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD -</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Table 2. Survival and defection rates of the authoritarian cohort in the Philippines, in percentage per election year

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC – Overall</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC – KBL</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD – KBL</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations based on Appendix 2.

AC – Overall: the total percentage of the 1984 Regular Batasang Pambansa authoritarian cohort that returned to the Batasang Pambansa in any given election year after 1986.

AC – KBL: the percentage of members of the authoritarian cohort that returned to the Batasang Pambansa for the KBL

AD – KBL: the percentage of the authoritarian cohort that returned to the Batasang Pambansa after 1986 on another party label

Comparing the survival and defection rates of the authoritarian cohort after regime transition in Indonesia and the Philippines allowed us to identify two distinct differences in the early years of democracy. One, fewer members of the authoritarian cohort survive the transition in Indonesia than in the Philippines. Two, those members of the authoritarian cohort who do
survive the regime transition mainly do so via the ASP in Indonesia, but as part of the authoritarian diaspora in the Philippines.

5. Differences in elite survival and defection in Indonesia and the Philippines explained

What accounts for these differences? We argue that a combination of party institutionalization and clientelistic networks available, amplified by post-transition regulatory frameworks, explain these variegated patterns in survival and defection rates between Indonesia and the Philippines. This is illustrated in stylized form in Table 3 below.

The degree of institutionalization of the ASP and other parties creates incentives for cohortians to remain loyal or abandon the authoritarian successor party respectively. For example, if the authoritarian successor party is well institutionalized compared to other parties, there are few incentives for members of the authoritarian cohort to abandon the authoritarian successor party. The institutionalization of the party system amplifies these incentives. If inter-party competition is stable and therefore predictable, members of the authoritarian cohort have few incentives to jump ship because not only do they know that the authoritarian successor party has the strongest capacity to win votes (party institutionalization) but that this is unlikely to change in future election cycles (party system institutionalization).

The Indonesian authoritarian cohort in 1998 faced a context in which the ASP (Golkar) was the most institutionalized party compared to all other parties. The party system too was relatively institutionalized after the regime transition. Golkar members of the authoritarian cohort could therefore be confident that Golkar was a comparatively strong electoral vehicle (party institutionalization) and would remain so in future election cycles (party system institutionalization).
At the same time, clientelistic networks in Indonesia are unstable and weak, meaning that members of the cohort lacked access to power bases outside party structures as well as suitable alternative vehicles for voter mobilization. The institutional framework for elections and political parties introduced after 1998 amplified this situation. Consequently, a comparatively small share of the Indonesian authoritarian cohort survived the regime transition in 1998. Those who did survive did so mainly inside the ASP, Golkar.

In the Philippines after 1986, in contrast, there was less variation in levels of party and party system institutionalization. The KBL was as weakly institutionalized as the other parties available. Likewise, the party system was poorly institutionalized. However, members of the authoritarian cohort had ample access to non-party power bases. Compared to their Indonesian counterparts, members of the Philippine authoritarian cohort could rely on far more stable clientelistic networks to compete in elections. Finally, the adoption of a more permissive institutional framework for elections and parties (as compared to Indonesia) amplified these dynamics further. Consequently, a comparatively large share of the authoritarian cohort in the Philippines survived the regime transition in 1986 and did so almost exclusively outside the ASP, the KBL.

Table 3. Determinants of survival and defection rates in Indonesia and the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clientelistic networks</th>
<th>Party Institutionalization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transactional</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relational</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To understand why party institutionalization and reversionary clientelistic networks are so different in post-transition Indonesia and the Philippines, one needs to begin with a comparison of the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships. The two regimes differed in three distinct ways, with important consequences for survival and defection rates among the authoritarian cohort.

5.1 Accumulation and circulation of power in the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships

First, the two dictatorships entrenched themselves politically in different ways. General Suharto consolidated his power after a military coup d’état in 1965 by forging a broad coalition of anti-Communist groups. He also attenuated traditional power centers situated outside the state by encapsulating the aristocracy within the ruling Golkar and by replacing popularly elected subnational officials with military officers and later—as his regime matured—with new civilian elites who owed their ascendancy to the New Order dictatorship. In short, when the first New Order elections were held in 1971, the political elite had already narrowed considerably, with alternative power centers situated outside the state all but extinct. This trend towards a concentration of power within the regime became even more pronounced in subsequent years.

In the Philippines, in contrast, Marcos was elected president in 1965 and then served nearly two terms under conditions of decentralized democracy before declaring martial law in 1972. Both as constitutional president and as an autocrat from 1972 onward, Marcos depended on local bosses, dynasts, and businessmen whose political and economic power pre-dated Marcos’ election to the presidency in 1965. Differently from the New Order regime, the Marcos regime was essentially a network of preexisting networks.
Second, once established, the two regimes differed sharply in their internal logics of elite circulation and power accumulation. In Indonesia, Suharto constantly rotated military and civilian personnel to prevent local power bases from emerging. Officers and bureaucrats alike were also required to retire at a certain age.\textsuperscript{16} In the Philippines, in contrast, there was no equivalent system of oxygenation. Rather than the constant \textit{circulation} and \textit{rotation} of elites as in Indonesia, the \textit{accumulation} of power and wealth in the Philippines occurred within a stable group of local bosses and “overstaying” military generals.\textsuperscript{17}

Third, the relationship between national and subnational politics was different in the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships. In Indonesia, the majority of governors, district heads and mayors were military officers who were rotated in and out of these subnational jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{18} Even when the share of military officers declined in later years, the civilians who replaced them were also outsiders to constituencies over which they ruled. If these figures then joined the national legislature as members of Golkar, ABRI, UG, or UD, they did so without a local power base to fall back upon. In the Philippines, in contrast, most KBL members in the Regular Batasang Pambansa were from the area they represented in the national legislature, spoke the local language, and had business interests and landholdings in their respective electoral districts. While the electoral and party system changed in 1972, the elites undergirding the Marcos dictatorship looked very similar to the figures in place prior to authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{19}

These differences between the Suharto and Marcos dictatorships are intertwined with different clientelistic networks prevalent in the two countries.

\textbf{5.2 The economic roots of transactional and relational clientelism}
Not all clientelistic networks are alike. Aspinall and Hicken distinguish between the “transactional clientelism” dominating in Indonesia and the “relational clientelism” prevalent in the Philippines. Transactional clientelism is built on ad hoc relations and usually unstable. In contrast, relational clientelism is rooted in more durable social relations that often last for decades.  

While differences in clientelistic networks in the Philippines and Indonesia are well described, their origins are not well explained by Aspinall and Hicken. To understand why transactional and relational clientelism dominate politics in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively, one needs to analyze key differences in the local political economy. Existing literature on clientelism has shown that a relatively equal dispersion of economic resources results in more ephemeral clientelistic networks, while a high concentration of material resources creates durable clientelistic structures and “locked-in” electorates.

This insight sheds considerable light on the contrasting forms of clientelistic networks in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia, concentration of landownership is lower than in other Southeast Asian countries. In areas where there is an above-average concentration of land in the hands of a few players, these pockets of land concentration are too small to enable domination of the local electorate. Other local economic assets that could potentially be monopolized to gain leverage over voters, such as manufacturing or industrial activities, are sparse or absent in most parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Hence, compared to neighboring countries the economic autonomy of Indonesian voters is relatively high. Consequently, clientelistic networks are transactional and unstable.
In the Philippines, in contrast, Anderson showed that a concentration of landholdings outside the reach of the state during the colonial period subsequently gave birth to durable local political monopolies. These landholdings created “locked-in” electorates that could easily be coerced to vote for their landowners. These land-based elites then used the electoral institutions introduced during US colonial rule (1898-1946) to secure power over the state, from where they manipulated the legal framework in order to cement their economic monopolies. Over time, these processes institutionalized stable networks of relational clientelism.

In short, if politicians depend on privileged access to state resources and rely on the discretionary enforcement of state regulatory authority, they will struggle to establish enduring clientelistic relationships. This is the case in Indonesia, where the local electorates may be poor, but also (relatively) independent. Clientelistic relationships remain transactional. In contrast, where politicians manage to establish economic monopolies that are based on secure property rights, proprietary wealth, and the private legal realm of the market, “pliable populations” emerge—namely, voters who depend economically on local elites. In this context, politicians are well-positioned to establish enduring clientelistic networks of the kind that pervade the Philippines.

5.3 Post-transition institutional reforms

Post-transition institutional reforms have amplified the dynamics described above. A few months after the demise of the Suharto regime, Law No. 2/1999 on Political Parties, Law No. 3/1999 on General Elections and Law No. 4/1999 on the Composition of the National and Local Representative Bodies introduced free elections in Indonesia. Political parties were woefully unprepared for this newly competitive environment, as they had no financial capacity to organize
and mobilize the Indonesian mass electorate in any meaningful way. This environment favored candidates who could finance their own campaigns, had access to societal networks to organize the mass electorate, and had the personal charisma to woo voters on election day.\textsuperscript{33} It was to such formidable figures that garden-variety New Order apparatchiks (i.e. nondescript regime figures who had occupied a seat for the Golkar party in the 1997 MPR) lost ground immediately upon regime change in 1998. Many members of the Golkar authoritarian cohort had neither the money, the local networks, nor the personal charisma needed to have a fighting chance. Consequently, they were not nominated as candidates, or if nominated, lost the elections.

Those members of the authoritarian cohort who \textit{did} survive did so predominantly within the ASP (Golkar), as it was the most consolidated vehicle for voter mobilization available to them. Golkar had been the regime party for 32 years before the New Order collapsed. Not only did the party become intertwined with the state during this time, but Suharto also took various measures to prevent individuals from becoming too strong within the party.\textsuperscript{34} Consequently, in its rapid transition to ASP, Golkar was a party that had “neither dynastic traditions nor presidentialist leaders.”\textsuperscript{35} The comparatively high degree of institutionalization that Golkar offered compared to other parties competing for a seat in the post-1998 MPR\textsuperscript{36} made Golkar the least bad option for members of the Golkar authoritarian cohort after 1998. The fact that there were few other viable options available for members of the authoritarian cohort in post-1998 Indonesia is also shown by the fact that some members of the extended authoritarian cohort migrated \textit{into} Golkar prior to the 1999 elections, as shown in Appendix 3.

Similar dynamics also explain why PDI veterans (part of the extended cohort) did not fare well at the ballot box in 1999. Due to the co-optation of the PDI by the New Order regime and the assault on Megawati supporters in 1996, support for the party had already taken a big hit
in the 1997 elections. However, the utter obliteration of PDI veterans from the national MPR within only a few years after regime change can be explained by the fact that PDI-origin diasporans were left with few options after Megawati established the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) just prior to the 1999 elections. While a few diasporans with PDI roots were able to hold on to their seats in 1999, they had all disappeared from the MPR by 2004 due to a lack of money, local networks to mobilize voters, and PDIP support.

The marginal presence of the authoritarian diaspora in the post-transition MPR in Indonesia is also due to institutional constraints. Concretely, independent candidacies for the national legislature are prohibited in Indonesia: all candidates must be formally nominated by a political party. This provides party leaders with considerable leverage over MPs as well as aspirants. Furthermore, Article 12 of Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties states that MPs who switch parties during a legislative period can be withdrawn from the national parliament by the party leadership. In addition, in Indonesian politics crossing the floor is taboo: “Politicians who switch parties are generally referred to as kutu loncat, or small jumping insects that feed on blood.” Consequently, the majority of members of the authoritarian cohort who switched parties (i.e. our definition of diasporans) lost in the elections, as shown in Appendix 1.

Finally, members of the Indonesian authoritarian cohort faced stringent territorial requirements for new party accreditation. In 1999, political parties already needed to have a presence in 50% of Indonesian provinces and 50% of the districts and municipalities in these provinces. Subsequent laws expanded these requirements both horizontally and vertically so that by 2004, political parties in Indonesia needed to have a presence in 50% of all provinces, 50% of the districts and municipalities in these provinces and 25% of the subdistricts in these districts.
and municipalities. These regulations essentially outlaw local or provincial parties in Indonesia. In this context, establishing a political party in Indonesia is a tremendous financial and logistical undertaking that is far beyond the means of most individual legislators. These daunting rules and regulations—alongside a lack of viable alternative parties, considerable authority of party leaders over the candidate selection process, and the intricacies of Indonesian political culture regarding party switching—help to explain why the authoritarian diaspora remained comparatively small in post-New Order Indonesia.

The poor post-1998 performance of veterans of ABRI—the group housing military elites—also has its origins in the New Order period. Suharto constantly rotated military commanders throughout the archipelago to prevent them from establishing local power bases, as explained above. Hence, none of these figures possessed an independent power base to which they could retreat after the collapse of the New Order in 1998.

While military factionalism never really threatened Suharto’s rule until the very end, it became noticeably more pronounced just prior to the 1997 elections. Suharto’s advanced age, his poor handling of the PDI crisis in 1996, and the regime’s declining capacity to quell violent anti-government protests forced military officers to reassess their political allegiances in a way that “would neither threaten their position in the regime nor exclude them from participation in a possible post-Suharto government.”

Inside the barracks, a debate ensued as to whether the forces should support the regime party Golkar in the first democratic elections. Suharto allies such as then army chief of staff General Hartono, “a close confidant of Suharto’s daughter and leading Golkar politician Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana” sought tighter connections to Golkar in the month prior to the elections.
It was not least because of loyalist military that Golkar was able to win another election in 1997, despite mounting opposition, especially by Megawati and the PPP the previous year. After the collapse of the New Order regime, these “hawkish” military generals were replaced by officers such as Wiranto who had shown willingness to compromise with regime opponents prior to 1998 (and were also quicker to abandon Suharto when it became clear that his regime would not survive). After the regime transition, it was this new army leadership that was in charge of appointing military personnel to the reserved seats in the DPR. Arguably, many members of the ABRI authoritarian cohort that had been appointed by the New Order regime were now flushed out as a result of these changes to the military brass.

Moreover, institutional changes introduced after 1998 emplaced additional obstacles to ABRI veterans in post-transition Indonesia. With no independent power bases outside the state, the ABRI authoritarian cohort was highly susceptible to post-transition reform initiatives. Not only was the number of reserved seats for military personnel in the 1999-2004 national parliament reduced by half, but military personnel also had to step down from active military duty if they intended to stand as candidates for the national legislature. The result was that ABRI participation in the MPR fell dramatically after 1998.

Finally, the high drop-out rate for UD and UG cohortians can be explained by a 10% and 33% reduction of UD and UG seats, respectively, in the 1999-2004 MPR compared to the New Order. New rules transferred the responsibility for the selection of the UD and UG seats in the 1999-2004 MPR from the national government to local parliaments and the newly created national election commission (KPU – Komisi Pemilihan Umum). After 1998, each parliament of the then 27 Indonesian provinces had to elect five regional representatives. Meanwhile, the group representatives were chosen by the KPU, which “determined which groups in society…were
under represented, which organization(s) were legitimate representatives of these group interests, and how many MPR representatives each organization was entitled to. These newly empowered local party branches and parliaments that were now in charge of electing UD members frequently opposed national level party networks. Likewise, the new electoral management body enjoyed real authority regarding the appointment of UG representatives, as compared to the New Order era when such decisions were made by the executive. Eventually, reserved seats for the military in the DPR and indirectly elected UD and appointed UG seats in the MPR were abolished prior to the 2004 elections. This explains the high pre-election drop-out rates for these groups in 2004 and subsequent election cycles.

In short, the authoritarian cohort was unusually vulnerable to institutional reforms introduced after 1998 because their power had rested very much within the state, which was now being reformed. With no individual power bases (i.e., “portable political capital” as defined by Loxton and Power, this issue) available to them, the majority of the authoritarian cohort disappeared quickly after the regime collapse in 1998.

In the Philippines, in contrast, members of the authoritarian cohort were much better prepared to survive in the newly democratic environment after the collapse of the Marcos regime in 1986. Many members of the KBL authoritarian cohort came from local dynasties and therefore enjoyed power bases independent from the state. While the Marcos family made enormous sums of money available to KBL members prior to the 1984 elections, many members of the authoritarian cohort had been using their own personal networks to compete in elections throughout the Marcos period. After the fall of the dictator in 1986, these local oligarchs simply continued to leverage their longstanding machines.
Concretely, the authoritarian cohort abandoned the KBL after the first post-transition election and did so permanently, as shown in Table 2 above. This is because as a party, the KBL in the Philippines was never as institutionalized as Golkar in Indonesia. Deep rifts within the KBL were already visible during the Marcos regime, often following the lines of rivalries between local dynasties. These disputes became so intense that Marcos eventually had to publicly declare that KBL candidates were allowed to run against each other.47 After Marcos had been flown to Hawaii during the February Revolution, the KBL “began cracking like a mirror from side to side…[and]…the KBL’s political machinery…[was] gradually being eroded by the defection of its leaders.”48 In short, the weakly institutionalized KBL had little to offer to members of the authoritarian cohort once the dictator had fled. The strength of personal political machines compared to the KBL apparatus is further shown by the fact that the post-transition government of Corazón Aquino introduced the appointment of Officers in Charge (OICs). This allowed for the unceremonious ouster of the incumbents from the Marcos era and their replacement by those closely connected to Aquino, with obvious implications for the mobilization of the vote in the 1987 elections. Arguably, the greater portion of the authoritarian cohort returning to office in the Philippines compared to Indonesia is all the more impressive given this kind of discretionary purge (which has no direct equivalent in Indonesia).

In addition to the weak institutionalization of the successor party and the strength of clientelistic networks available, there were also fewer regulatory obstacles for KBL veterans to defect to other parties. Unlike in Indonesia where party leaders retained considerable authority over the candidate nomination process after 1998 party leaders in the Philippines have little leverage over the selection of candidates. Politicians can create new parties relatively easily or run as independent candidates.49 Finally, party switching is a common occurrence due to the
The highly personalized nature of Filipino politics and the generalized weakness of party labels. Hence, party switching does not seem to be shunned or to depress the election chances of political turncoats.50

In summary, the size, success, and resilience of the authoritarian diaspora were far lower in Indonesia than in the Philippines. We attribute this to variations in the level of institutionalization of the respective ASPs, and the type of clientelistic networks available to members of the authoritarian cohort. Institutional changes regarding candidate selection and independent candidacies, barriers to entry for new parties, and key differences in the political culture of party switching in the two countries amplified the variations in party institutionalization and the type of clientelistic networks available.

6. Situating our findings in the broader literature

Our overarching claim in this article—that a combination of party institutionalization and the type of clientelistic networks available determines survival and defection rates of authoritarian cohorts in the context of post-transition institutional reforms—engages with both the literature on authoritarian successor parties and authoritarian diasporas.

6.1 Contributions to the literature on authoritarian successor parties

Our findings recommend a rethinking of some recent hypotheses about how electoral institutions and the cohesion of other parties shape defection rates after regime change. Both Riedl and LeBas argue that if post-transition opposition parties—i.e. those that compete for seats with authoritarian successor parties—are cohesive and well consolidated, fewer members of the authoritarian cohort will defect from the ASP.51 This configuration creates a strong “incumbent versus opposition” divide that is difficult to overcome for party switchers. In contrast, “[i]f the
party system is volatile and inchoate, this creates frequent opportunities for party-switching and lessens the incumbent/opposition divide,” in the words of Riedl.52

However, our findings do not support these hypotheses. In Indonesia, the authoritarian cohort remained loyal to the ASP precisely because no other party was consolidated enough to offer a viable alternative in terms of financial or mobilizational capacity in the immediate post-transition years. In the Philippines, parties were poorly consolidated across the political landscape in 1986, similar to Riedl’s depiction of a volatile, inchoate party system. However, defection rates were high not so much because of the fluidity of a weakly institutionalized party system (Riedl’s party-switching hypothesis), but because of the availability of stable and durable clientelistic networks exogenous to the party system. The correlation between socially defined clientelistic networks and personalistic party fragmentation—temporarily depressed during the KBL years—rose sharply again after the fall of Marcos.

Our focus on a combination of party institutionalization and the type of clientelistic networks available is also relevant to emerging scholarship on the relationship between ASPs and local particularism. A recent debate between two Africanists is instructive. Riedl hypothesized that regime parties that incorporated local clientelistic networks into the party hierarchy during authoritarian rule are less likely to see post-transition defections than equivalent parties that substituted local power brokers with state-based patronage.53 After a regime transition, integrated local power brokers will be more loyal to the sponsoring party than marginalized brokers. In contrast, LeBas argues that African authoritarian regime parties that relied on local power brokers to mobilize the electorate face higher defection rates after a regime transition than regime parties that did not. According to LeBas, many politicians leveraged their
personal ethnic or tribal networks to compete in post-transition elections, thereby abandoning ASPs with relative ease.\textsuperscript{54}

Both Riedl and LeBas claim that post-transition defection rates are explained primarily by the relationship between the regime party and local brokers. Yet neither of their arguments well accounts for our findings on Southeast Asia’s two largest democracies. In Indonesia, the Golkar party relied on state patronage during the New Order dictatorship, yet faced comparatively low defection rates after 1998 compared to the Philippines, which had relied on the financial and mobilization capacity of local power brokers to a much larger degree. Riedl’s broker-incorporation hypothesis, in short, cannot explain differences in the defection rates in Indonesia and the Philippines after 1998 and 1986. LeBas’ focus on ethnicity is also of little help, since neither in Indonesia nor in the Philippines does ethnicity play much of a role in voter mobilization.\textsuperscript{55}

Our findings suggest that different defection rates from Golkar (post-1998) and the KBL (post-1986) were determined not so much by whether these parties had incorporated or substituted local clientelistic networks, but by what \textit{kinds} of networks were available to members of the authoritarian cohort after regime change. If only transactional networks are available, politicians may be reluctant to defect from an ASP, irrespective of whether these networks were subsumed into the regime party prior to the transition. If the more stable and durable relational clientelistic networks are available, members of the authoritarian cohort have more of an incentive to abandon the ASP. In essence, clientelistic networks based on enduring social structures are a safer bet than networks based on the allocation of state resources—access to which can be easily lost via democratic elections.
6.2 Contributions to the literature on authoritarian diasporas

Our findings also contribute to emerging scholarship on authoritarian *diasporas*. Loxton and Power (this issue) hold that emerging diasporas emerge in part because of preexisting factionalism within the authoritarian ruling party. They also attribute causal weight to crisis and exogenous shocks: their “sinking ship” hypothesis states that politicians abandon crisis-ridden regimes in order ensure their individual, post-regime survival.

However, the Indonesian case shows that such a combination of internal regime party rifts and exogenous shocks may not necessarily create a large authoritarian diaspora. Golkar saw a high level of infighting before the New Order collapsed in the context of the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Yet, the authoritarian diaspora that emerged after 1998 was minimal.

Rather than rifts within the regime party or external shocks creating incentives for defections, the degree of party institutionalization in combination with the type of clientelistic networks available shaped the post-transition trajectories of Indonesian diasporans. One of the many reasons for why the post-New Order diaspora remained small was that there were no viable alternatives available for the authoritarian cohort. The overwhelming majority of the more than one hundred parties that emerged after 1999 had its “roots in the air” and was poor. In other words, they had no grassroots and no money to mobilize local networks. Territorial requirements for new parties introduced through various reform laws after 1999 created additional hurdles for members of the authoritarian cohort contemplating defection. The most promising strategy to remain in national politics was to stick with the ASP Golkar, which was better consolidated and financed than most other parties. In the Philippines, weakly institutionalized parties in *combination* with stable and durable clientelistic networks were the
reason for why a comparatively large authoritarian diaspora emerged despite the lack of an exogenous shock.

Furthermore, our research also engages with Loxton and Power’s emphasis on the importance of elite and voter behavior to understand survival and defection rates. They focus on the strategizing of ambitious politicians, and speculate that voters will want to use the “regime cleavage” to reward or punish diasporans. While this may explain some variance in the size and dispersion of authoritarian diasporas, our findings show that a focus on individual-level elite behavior and on electoral accountability may overlook other important predictors. In Indonesia, for instance, pre-election drop-out rates for the authoritarian cohort were over 80% in every post-transition election cycle after 2004, as shown in Appendix 1. In other words, the overwhelming majority of the authoritarian cohort disappeared from national legislative politics before Indonesian voters were able to have their say. This suggests that we should take structural and contextual factors, of the kind we introduced above, much more seriously.

7. Conclusion

We showed that the size of the Indonesian authoritarian cohort that successfully competed in post-transition elections was smaller but more loyal to the ASP than in the Philippines. There, defection rates from the ASP were higher and the authoritarian diaspora more durable than in Indonesia. We showed that a combination of party institutionalization and the type of clientelistic networks available, amplified by post-transition institutional changes, explains the variance in survival and defection rates of the authoritarian cohort in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively.
If members of authoritarian successor parties are confronted with weakly institutionalized alternative parties compared to the ASP and unstable transactional clientelistic networks, the best option is to remain loyal to the ASP. This was the case in Indonesia. If members of the ASP are confronted with weak alternative parties and stable relational clientelistic networks, there are higher incentives to defect from the ASP. This was the case in the Philippines.

We also showed that party institutionalization and the type of clientelistic networks available as alternative vehicles for voter mobilization are the result of political and economic conditions that formed during or even before the authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines came to dominate politics.

We believe that the context in which elites are embedded shapes their options. Political and economic processes that unfold over time create this context. We therefore believe that elite behavior is important and ought to be studied but that it can only be fully understood if situated in the historically conditioned context in which elites interact. Many causes for post-transition dynamics between political elites may therefore be found in the authoritarian period. Hence, rather than focus on post-transition electoral dynamics and voter behavior, scholars need to take a longer view of the lineage of authoritarian diasporas.

References


However, we checked whether members of the authoritarian cohort won posts as governors, district heads and mayors (see Appendices 1 & 2).

3 Holtzappel et al., Decentralization, 52.

4 Landé, Post, 123.

5 Kessler, Politics, 1211.

6 Cullinane, Patron, 180.

7 Timberman, A changeless land, 94.

8 In 1999 the percentage figures for AC-Golkar, AD-Golkar and AD-Extended do not add up to AC-Overall because there were ABRI members who returned to ABRI seats in the 1999-2004 national parliament (see Appendix 1). They are therefore included in the category AC-Overall.

9 Drawing on Levitsky we understand party institutionalization as the routinization of rules and procedures within political parties (Levitsky, Transforming, 15). Drawing on Mainwaring, we defined party system institutionalization as stability in inter-party competition and therefore predictability for both candidates and voters regarding the number and type of parties that constitute the system (Mainwaring, Party systems, 23).

10 Tomsa, Party, 253.

11 Liddle, The Islamic, 620.

12 Magenda, The Surviving.

13 Malley, Resources, 165.

14 Slater, Ordering, 8.

15 Ibid., 165.

16 Sidel, Macet.

17 Villegas, The Philippines, 127.

18 Crouch, Patrimonialism, 44.

19 Coronel et al., The Rulemakers.

20 Aspinall and Hicken, Guns; See Sidel, Capital, 140-154 for an earlier version of this argument.

21 Ibid.

22 McMann, Economic; Buehler, The Ephemeral.

23 Scott, Corruption.

24 Rist et al., The Livelihood, 1112.

25 Pincus, Class Power; Hart, Power, 192-212.

26 Aspinall, Small-Scale. One of the anonymous reviewers pointed out that our findings are a “striking negation of modernization theory.” However, it is not so much the presence or absence of industrialization but whether or not the type of economic development lends itself to monopolization (one-factory towns) or not (many small- and medium sized enterprises) that determines whether political elites gain political leverage over local electorates.

27 Anderson, Cacique.

28 Sidel, Capital.
Magaloni’s concept of “punishment regimes”, namely the resources available to politicians to prevent voter defection, is a potentially promising avenue to compare voter behavior in Indonesia and the Philippines in future research. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to us. See Magaloni, *Voting*.

The same dynamics may explain why party switchers irrespective of whether or not they are members of the authoritarian cohort have a low success rate in Indonesian legislative elections. See Buehler and Nataatmadja, *A research agenda*, 10.

Aspinall, *Democratization*. Indonesia and the Philippines are two of the most ethnolinguistically diverse countries in the world, with more than 700 languages spoken in Indonesia and 170 in the Philippines.

The expression is borrowed from Steffen, *The Shame*, 75 who used it to describe unstable political machines in 19th century America.