THE MBUNDU AND NEIGHBOURING PEOPLES
OF CENTRAL ANGOLA UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF PORTUGUESE TRADE AND CONQUEST
1482 - 1790

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The two major Bantu political groupings in West Central Africa centre on the Kongo kingdom and on the Luba-Lunda states. To the south of Kongo and east of Lunda live the Mbundu people who, from the end of the fifteenth century, developed contacts with the Portuguese and eventually became the main link between Western Bantu Africa and Europe. During most of the sixteenth century this relationship was based on trade in slaves. The benefits of this trade enabled the Mbundu to consolidate the small state of Ndongo, on the north side of the Kwanza River, into a moderately powerful kingdom. In the mid-sixteenth century Ndongo prosperity caused a migrant Lunda group called the Imbangala, who had camped on the eastern border of Mbundu country, to attack the Mbundu and make direct contact with the Portuguese.

From 1575 the Portuguese embarked on a programme of territorial conquest. This continued through most of the seventeenth century, the great period of the Angolan Wars. The Portuguese suffered many set-backs, the lowest ebb being from 1641 to 1648 when the Dutch temporarily captured and held Luanda. By 1671, however, the independent Mbundu monarch in Ndongo had been eradicated. Thereafter the main African trading states of the area were Matamba and Kasanje on the Kwango River. After the wars the Luanda slave trade declined, North European competition from Loango and Portuguese competition from Benguela caused a serious depression in Mbundu trade during most of the eighteenth century. Only after 1790 were there signs of a revival.

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PREFACE

This thesis is an attempt to look at the history of Angola as a chapter of African history rather than as an episode in the history of Portuguese imperial expansion. The records of European activity in Angola form an important part of the material used, but this material has been employed chiefly to cast light on the older established inhabitants. Much that could have been said about Portuguese policies and achievements has been left out on the grounds that although interesting and relevant to the European settlers, it did not particularly concern the Mbundu.

The second kind of material used in this study is the oral traditions of the Mbundu and other Bantu whose history is linked with theirs. By drawing together oral history, which only has a relative chronology, and the history of European activities, in which each event bears a date, a much fuller picture can be gained than by using either separately. On this basis a short history of the Mbundu from 1482 to 1790 has been written, and an attempt has been made to link this with the wider history of the Bantu in West Central Africa.

The Mbundu have been chosen as the focus of attention partly because of their relationship to several larger Bantu groups, and partly because of the continuity of their contact with the world outside Africa. A more detailed history of Kongo in the sixteenth century or of the Ovimbundu in the eighteenth would have been possible, but the Mbundu

played an important if fluctuating role throughout the first three centuries of European contact with West Central Africa. The neighbours of the Bundu who have been included are the Ndembu of southern Kongo, the Jinga of Matamba, the Imbangala of Kasanje, and the heterogeneous peoples of the south bank of the Kwanza River. All these peoples contain a strong element of Mbundu, many of them having been driven out of the central Mbundu areas by the Portuguese.

The Mbundu historical traditions used are those collected by Cavazzi in the 1660's and by Haveaux in the 1940's.¹ Although the former are traditions collected before the complete subjection of the Mbundu by the Portuguese, they may have been obtained from informants who had left the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo to settle in Matamba, further removed from the depredations of slave traders. The Mbundu traditions published by Haveaux were collected among the Pende, a people who were subjects of the Ngola, or king of the Mbundu, until the mid-seventeenth century. They then left Ndongo and migrated right out of the area of the slave trade to settle on the middle Kasai, near its junction with the Tshikapa. By escaping from Portuguese domination the Pende have preserved their traditions of origin and these can be compared both with the traditions collected by Cavazzi three hundred years earlier, and with the written records of Portuguese activity.

¹G. A. Cavazzi de Montecuccolo: Istorica Descrizione de tre regni Congo Matamba et Angola, Bologna 1687.

G. L. Haveaux: La tradition historique des Bapende Orientaux, Bruxelles, 1954.

The history of the Mbundu was deeply affected by an invading people from the east called the Imbangala. Two versions of the traditions of the Imbangala have been used. The first was collected by Neves in 1850 while on a military expedition to the Imbangala state of Kasanje on the upper Kwango.¹ The second version was published by Henrique Dias de Carvalho about 1898.² He probably collected the material during his expedition to Lunda in the 1880's.

In the process of linking the history of the Mbundu with that of Kongo, Lunda and Luba, a number of traditions of these latter peoples have been used. For Kongo the most important sources are two documents of the 1620's written by Portuguese clerics who worked in Kongo and recorded the oral traditions.³ These can be supplemented by the accounts of Montesarchio and Gallo, two Capuchins who were in Kongo in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.⁴ The traditions of the Lunda were recorded by Pogge in 1875,⁵ by Carvalho in 1884-1888⁶ and lastly and most fully by Duysters in 1925-1927.⁷ Finally some of the

¹A. R. Neves: Memória da Expedição de Cassange em 1850, Lisbon 1854.

²H. D. de Carvalho: O Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon ?1898 (or 1890).

³Anonymous: História do Reino de Congo c. 1620. In Felner: Angola, Lisbon 1933 and Letter from a priest to Manuel Rodrigues dated Kongo 1624. In Paiva Manso: História do Congo, Lisbon 1877.

⁴Jerome de Montesarchio cited in Cuvelier: L'Ancien Royaume de Congo, Bruxelles 1946 and Bernardo de Gallo cited in Jadin: Le Congo et la secte des Antoniens, Rome 1961.

⁵Pogge: Im Reich des Muata Jamvo, Berlin 1880.

⁶H. D. de Carvalho: Expedição ao Muatianvua, Vol. entitled Ethnographia et História tradicional da Lunda, Lisbon 1890.

⁷L. Duysters: Histoire des Aluunda, Bruxelles, 1958.

numerous and complex traditions of the Luba peoples were collected by Verhulpen.¹ In addition to these historical traditions minor references have been made to recent archaeological and linguistic research.

For the written records, Angola is extremely well endowed with collections of published documents. Among the earliest are the works of Lopes de Lima in 1846 and Paiva Manso in 1877.² These are followed by the Angolan archival review Arquivos de Angola,³ by the first volume of Albuquerque Felner's documents,⁴ by the first, and so far the only, volume of Jadin's Vatican documents concerning Kongo,⁵ and finally there is the collection compiled by António Brásio which has reached its ninth volume.⁶ This last work contains virtually all the Portuguese documents so far known which relate to Angola before 1600, and most of the important ones for the period 1600 to 1646. It also gives some coverage of the Spanish and Vatican documents over the whole period.

¹Verhulpen: Baluba et Balubaïses, Antwerp 1936.

²Lopes de Lima: Ensaio sobre a statistica das Possessões Portuguezas no Ultramar, Vol. III Angola e Benguella, Lisbon 1846.
Paiva Manso: História do Congo (Documentos) Lisbon 1877.

³Arquivos de Angola, Luanda. First Series 1933-1939, about 20 parts including index volume. Second Series 1943 to date continuing.

⁴Albuquerque Felner: Angola. Apontamentos sobre... Congo, Angola e Berguela, Lisbon 1933.

⁵Jadin and Cuvelier: L'Ancien Congo d'après les Archives Romaines 1518-1640, Bruxelles 1954.

⁶António Brásio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana. Africa Occidental, Lisbon 1952, IX Vols to date.

This extensive range of published documents is especially useful in view of the wide dispersal of the sixteenth century material relating to Angola. This is chiefly in the badly organised and inadequately catalogued collections of the Torre do Tombo, the National Library and the Kings' Library of Ajuda, all in Lisbon. Jesuit reports from Angola are scattered as far afield as Porto, Evora, Paris and the Vatican. Most of this material appears to have been published with the exception of the Jesuit letters in the Vatican, and these were briefly consulted in the photostat collection of Canon Jadin, at Louvain.

During the seventeenth century the pattern of distribution of the Angolan sources becomes clearer, and the main archive in which they are housed is the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino in Lisbon. The documents concerning Angola are of two kinds, the bound volumes of letters and orders to Angola, and the boxes of loose documents which include the correspondence from Angola. It is the latter series, containing 12 boxes for the seventeenth century and 28 for the eighteenth century to 1790, which has been used for this work. For the eighteenth century, especially the latter part, there is also a series of "disorganised papers". These were only sampled; they are mainly formal documents concerning such matters as petitions for arrears of pay, applications for jobs, and petty litigation. The "organised" boxes also contain many such documents of minor importance.

The Angolan archives in Luanda contain three volumes of letters

sent to Portugal before 1790. They cover the periods 1726 to 1732, 1746-1757, and more extensively the activities of Souza Coutinho from 1764-1771. The material is probably the same as that found in the Lisbon boxes, but a detailed comparison was not possible owing to the promised microfilms not proving available. More interesting than this external correspondence are five volumes of letters from the governors to officials in the interior. Each volume covers about two years within the overall period 1767 to 1790. Although most of the letters concern tythe-collection and other administrative matters, several refer to population movements and wars. Finally, but outside the scope of this thesis, Vol. 98 of the Luanda Archives is devoted to correspondence from the Portuguese governors to the indigenous rulers between 1798 and 1854.¹

In addition to the series in the AHU and the Luanda Archives, material on Angola after 1600 can presumably be found in four other sources. Two of these, Holland and Brazil, it has not been possible to investigate as yet. Some of the material which accrued in Spain during the Spanish domination of Portugal from 1580 to 1640 is published in Brásio's documents. Finally the library of the Propaganda Fide, in Rome, contains the records of the Capuchin mission which was active in Kongo, and to a lesser extent in Angola, from the 1640's. According to

¹For the history of Angola after 1790 the Luanda Archives are of fundamental importance. For the next hundred year period there are 70 volumes of external correspondence, and over 200 volumes of internal material. In Lisbon also the quantity of material on Angola increases dramatically after the year 1790.

Jadin this voluminous material contains little information about the interior of Angola, but refers chiefly to the administration of the mission headquarters in Luanda, and to activities in Kongo and further up the coast. The Capuchins did, however, evangelise to some extent in Ndongo, Matamba and Kasanje especially during the 1650's and 1660's. Cavazzi published an extensive account of this activity. Owing to the kindness of M. Jadin it was possible to look fleetingly through some of the Capuchin records for this period, which he has prepared for future publication.

Oral traditions, published documents, and archival collections have been supplemented by a few contemporary works. In addition to Cavazzi's "Historical Description" of Angola published in 1687, the major works of this kind are the "Adventures" of Andrew Battell,¹ the "History of the Angolan Wars" by Cadornega,² the "Description of Kongo" by Lopes and Pigafetta,³ and Silva Correia's "History of Angola".⁴ Other contemporary and post contemporary works referred to in the text will be found in the Bibliography.

When this work had reached an advanced stage, it became apparent that the importance of the Mbundu lay particularly in their activities

¹E. G. Ravenstein (ed): The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell, Hakluyt Society, Ed. London 1901.

²António de Oliveira de Cadornega: História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Luanda 1681. Ed. Lisbon 1940. 3 Vols.

³Duarte Lopez and Filipo Pigafetta, (ed) Willy Bal: Description du Royaume de Congo et des Contrées environantes 1951. Ed. Louvain 1963.

⁴Elias Alexandre da Silva Correia: História de Angola, C. 1792. Ed. Lisbon 1937. 2 Vols.

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In many ways, perhaps, this history would best have been concluded in 1684 when the kingdom of Ndongo had finally been crushed by Portuguese military action. The last chapter has ~~however~~ been included as originally planned, but should be considered in the nature of an epilogue. It discusses the activities of the Mbundu during a century of depression when they had ceased to be the main opponents of Portuguese conquest and the main purveyors of slaves, but before they became the Portuguese tool in establishing a modern colony with broad ramifications of government activity.

One of the reasons why this thesis has ranged rather widely beyond the immediate limits of the subject tackled, is the extreme paucity of historical writing for the whole western Bantu region. This branching-out has been valuable in opening up ideas for future research. Three major topics would appear to demand attention in the next instance. A history of Benguela and the Ovimbundu states of the plateau might be composed on the pattern of the present thesis, using similar materials and methods. The history of Loango has two outstanding aspects, the traditional history of the kingdoms which evolved in the region before the fifteenth century, and the history of the eighteenth century slave trade. The trade of this little known region, for which French, English, Dutch and Portuguese materials must exist, probably developed ramifications into the Teke country, and even as far afield as the Lunda empire. Finally, and perhaps most exciting of the three lines of approach suggested, the way is open for a history of the Lunda empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ORTHOGRAPHY

A.H.U.	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino. Lisbon. Cx. Caixa or Box.
A.P.F.	Archivo da Propaganda Fide. SRCG. Scritture Riferite dei Congressi Generali.
A.R.S.I.	Jesuit Archives. Rome. Lus. Lusitanian Series. (Portugal)
A.T.T.	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. Lisbon. CC. Corpo Chronológico.
B.M.	British Museum. Add. Additional Manuscripts.
B.N.L.	Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. CA. Coleção de Alcobaça. CP. Coleção Pombalina. FG. Funda Geral.
B.N.M.	Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid.
B.N.R.J.	Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro.
B.A.L.	Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.
B.V.	Bibliotheca Vaticana.
J.A.H.	Journal of African History.

An attempt has been made to spell Bantu names in a phonetic manner. Where this method involved a greater change from the Portuguese spelling than, for instance, substituting k for q or c, the original spelling had normally been included in a foot-note.

Chapter One

THE BANTU OF WEST CENTRAL AFRICA

West Central Africa consists of a broad belt of light woodland and patches of grassland which stretch over the African plateau from the Atlantic to the great lakes. In the north the region slopes down to the inhospitable equatorial rain forest of the northern half of the Congo basin. In the south it reaches the semi-desert fringes of the Kalahari. Most of the country's waterways run north into the Congo or south into the Zambezi. The Kwanza is the only river of any importance which reaches the coast between the Congo and the Cunene. It was along the northern bank of the Kwanza that the Mbundu lived and it was up the Kwanza that European missionaries, colonisers and traders sailed.

In pre-historic times this open country with perennial streams attracted a considerable stone-age population.¹ Some centuries before the arrival of Europeans on the coast, however, the whole region was infiltrated by iron-age Bantu immigrants, among whom were the Mbundu. These Bantu formed themselves into states and groups of states with distinctive types of political organisation. The two state-complexes which most affected the Mbundu were those of the Bakongo and of the Luba. The kingdom of Kongo, which was the first Bantu state to attract the attention of Europeans, was centred on the city of Mbanza Kongo, about a hundred

¹L. S. B. Leakey: Tentative Study of the Pleistocene climatic changes and Culture sequence in North-East Angola. Lisbon 1949.

miles east of the Congo River estuary. The older Luba civilization, of which Europeans have only become aware in the last century, was based on the agricultural wealth and mineral deposits of the area now known as Katanga.

The rulers of Kongo were close northern neighbours of the Mbundu, and frequently interfered directly in their affairs. A description of this monarchy which played so large a role in Mbundu history, is found in a Vatican document of the late sixteenth century. At the head of the kingdom was a powerful sovereign who was described as a supreme king and absolute master of his realm. No one could oppose him or limit the scope of his jurisdiction. In his house he had a great many unpaid servants. His compound was larger than any other and before entering it one had to pass by many paths and hedges like a labyrinth. The outside gate into a large open square was attended by guards and musicians with drums and ivory trumpets. The throne consisted of a platform covered with a mat of palm fibres. When the king wished to eat he had a large cauldron of boiled or roast meat placed in front of him. He ate with his fingers and distributed tasty morsels to his attendants who expressed their gratitude by clapping loudly. The queen had her own establishment in the same royal enclosure. She ate among her own entourage of ladies. When she travelled abroad she was always accompanied by her attendants who continuously clicked their fingers like castanets.¹

¹ Description of Kongo in the late sixteenth century in the Confalonieri Collection. Vatican Archives: Vat. Lat. 12516. Published in Cuvelier-Jadin: L'Ancien Congo d'après les archives Romaines, Bruxelles 1954, 132-133.

Under the monarch, the kingdom of Kongo was divided into six provinces, five of which had their own subordinate rulers. The central province of Mpemba was governed by the king personally and contained the royal city of Mbanza Kongo. This city lay on a well cultivated plateau surrounded by many small villages. Its population was sometimes estimated to be as high as 100,000 people. The surrounding provinces were Nsundi to the north, Mpangu to the north-east, Mbata to the south-east, Mbamba in the south-west, and Sonyo on the coast west of the capital.¹

Duarte Lopez, who went to Kongo in 1578 and spent five years there as a trader, returned to Europe and gave a description of the country to the Italian humanist Pigafetta. He said that the most powerful of the provinces was Mbata. This may have been, as Lopez said, because Mbata had been an important kingdom in the days before the Kongo clans spread their authority over the whole area from the Congo to the Dande Rivers. Although the governor of the province was chosen by the king of Kongo, he was always a prince of the old Mbata royal family. Unlike any other nobleman in the kingdom, the Mani Mbata had a right to eat at the same table as the king. Although the historical importance of Mbata may have been one reason for its power, another was obviously its strategic position on the eastern frontier of Kongo. Shortly before Lopez'

¹Willy Bal (ed.): Description du Royaume de Congo et des contrées environantes par Filippo Pigafetta et Duarte Lopez, 1591, ed. Louvain 1963.

visit to Kongo the Jaga had invaded the kingdom from the east and only been expelled at great cost. The king obviously found it expedient to strengthen Mbata to prevent such an event from occurring again.¹

The other important buffer-state of Kongo was Nsundi which lay closely round the north side of the capital and spread over both banks of the Congo River. Its chief military function was to keep out the Teke or Anzika² people who lived across the river. Nsundi was also an important trading province. In return for salt and small spiralled currency shells called nzimbus, the northern peoples came to the frontiers of Nsundi to sell palm cloth, ivory, pelts and iron. It is probable that Kongo also received copper from the deposits in the Teke country. Lopez had the impression that Nsundi was normally ruled by the heir to the Kongo throne, whom he thought to be the king's eldest son.³ Since the Kongo monarchy seems to have had an elective system based on the principle of matrilineal succession, there is not likely to have been a pre-destined heir. Since, however, Nsundi was a powerful province situated close to the capital, it is possible that its 'duke' not infrequently succeeded in being elected king.

¹Lopez-Pigafetta, 69-71.

²For a more detailed mention of the Teke-Anzika see the beginning of Chapter II.

³Lopez-Pigafetta, 66-67 and foot-note 87.

Mpangu was one of the remoter provinces of Kongo. The traditions of its people give an interesting insight into the way in which the Kongo clans spread out to dominate the whole area which they later consolidated into a centralised kingdom. These clans first settled in Mpemba where their numbers gradually grew until there was a shortage of arable land. The old mother of the tribe, Mpemba Nzinga, decided that one chief from each clan should emigrate with his entire family. The people of Mpangu were instructed to march in an east-north-easterly direction. Each morning during the march, when they broke camp, one of their number remained on the site while the others went on. For their long journey the people took with them millet, bananas, palm-nuts, kola, pepper, chickens, goats and pigs. Their clothes consisted of the loin-cloth (Mbari) and the cloak (Lubongo) made of raffia cloth. They carried cutlasses, knives, bows and arrows. The chief had a staff and a large mat upon which he spread a leopard skin for state occasions. He also carried the symbols of authority which were the "basket of the ancestors" and some bracelets of fine grass. The Mpangu eventually reached the Nkisi River valley beyond which lived a small people. They settled down and the women began farming while the men set out to hunt and fish. Specialised guilds of workers practiced crafts such as weaving, basket-making, iron-working and pottery and in time Mpangu developed into a prosperous community.¹

¹Traditions collected by Van Wing, Etudes Bakongo. Sociologie, Religion et Magie, 2nd Edition, Leopoldville, 1959.

The coastal provinces of Kongo were Sonyo and Mbamba. Sonyo in the north seems to have been of minor importance before the arrival of sea-borne trade. It may, however, have controlled some of the coastal salt deposits. Mbamba, on the other hand, was described by Lopez as one of the largest and especially one of the wealthiest of the Kongo provinces. The prince of Mbamba claimed suzerainty over the whole coast from the Mbi^{*}je River to the Kwanza River, and inland along the Mbundu frontier, another of the Kongo boundaries where war was endemic. The importance and richness of Mbamba probably lay partly in its control of the Luanda trade route. The main fishing ground for nzimbu currency shells was the island of Luanda where several villages of Kongo settlers were engaged in collecting them. Women waded into the sea and brought up baskets of sand from which they picked out the shells and graded them carefully according to their size and brightness. The governor of Luanda, who was appointed by the king, then dispatched the shells to the royal treasury.¹

The chief function of the complex administrative hierarchy of the Kongo kingdom, as indeed of the other Bantu kingdoms, was the raising of tribute. At the lowest level on the administrative scale was the village chief who collected the taxes which had to be paid by each indi-

¹Lopez-Pigafetta, 25-26.

^{*}Ambriz in Lopez' spelling. This is probably the river which reaches the sea at Ambrizette.

vidual or family. The system was described in the Vatican collection of Confalonieri mentioned above:

"The village chiefs have above all to take care to collect from their subjects the taxes which are due to the king, and which they each carry to the governor of their province. The governor presents himself twice in each year at the royal capital in order to pay in the tribute, and if the king is satisfied, he replies with the one word wote, which means 'you have done well'. In this case the governor esteems himself highly favoured and makes many clappings of his two hands. As a sign of joy he throws himself on the ground, covering his body with the dust. His servants do the same, and then take him on their shoulders, and go through all the city crying his praises... But if the king does not say this word wote, he retreats greatly discomfited, and another time he takes care to bring a larger tribute. The tribute is not fixed as to quantity: each brings as much as he can. But if the governor does not do better, the king addresses to him a strong reprimand, and takes away his post. Such a man then becomes as poor as the most miserable of all the blacks. The king does this because he is the absolute lord of all the kingdom: and whenever the desire so takes him, he takes away the offices and the inheritances and the goods of whomever he wills, and there is no one who can say him nay."¹

The same document goes on to describe the ordinary people of Kongo as they struck a sixteenth century European observer. The people were poor but seemed satisfied with a meagre level of subsistence. No free man would till the earth or allow himself to be employed by another. Such tasks were left to slaves. The most powerful men were those with the greatest number of slaves whom they had bought or captured in war. These slaves were often trusted to conduct commercial transactions and attend markets on behalf of their masters. The normal currency of Kongo

¹Confalonieri collection, Vat. Lat. 12516, Cuvelier-Jadin, 133-134.

was small coloured shells about the size of a pea, but some districts did not have these shells and cloth was commonly used instead as a means of exchange. Commodities such as salt and hens were sometimes exchanged by direct barter. One of the most important resources of the country was the palm tree from which oils were obtained both for cooking and for lighting. In times of famine palm kernels were eaten. Palms were tapped for their sap which made a highly esteemed alcoholic drink. The leaves and the bark of the palm tree provided fibres for weaving cloth. The best and longest fibres made a fine velvet-like material. Other produce grown in Kongo included very hot peppers, a variety of bananas, cola nuts which were widely held to make water taste sweeter, and yams which were the commonest food and could be eaten boiled or roasted. The most important grain was one which resembled radish seed and could be ground into a very white flour and baked into excellent bread. Kongo men commonly wore animal skins as clothing. Women dressed up by winding a piece of cloth round their shaven heads. Houses were made of stakes interwoven with grass and sometimes beautifully decorated with painted mats. Furniture consisted of sleeping-mats, wine calabashes and decorated pots for cooking. The villages, in which a few small live-stock usually ran, were mostly tucked away from the main thoroughfares to avoid having their food supplies requisitioned by passing armies or noblemen.¹

¹Confalonieri collection, op.cit.

One of the controversial problems of the history of Kongo has been the origin of its rulers. Various theories have been put forward to suggest the source of the political ideas which went into the construction of the kingdom. The most widely accepted hypothesis, and the one which seems most logical in terms of the westward spread of the Bantu, was that the founders of Kongo came from the east, across the Kwango. It would appear, however, from the traditions discussed below, that this theory was based on a faulty interpretation and that, although the most likely true origin of the Kongo kings must still lie in the east, the place from which the ruling Kongo clans came immediately before entering the Kongo area must be sought to the north of the lower Congo River.

The earliest and most important tradition relating to the northern origin of the kings of Kongo is found in an anonymous manuscript called the História do Reino do Congo in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa which was written about 1620. This document says that before the territory of Kongo was invaded by the clans which established the monarchy and were ruling in the fifteenth century, the country was divided up into a number of communities each ruled by its own independent and absolute chief. Among these rulers there was a religious chief called Mani Kabunga. After the conquest by the ruling Bakongo, the successors of Mani Kabunga became important in the new kingdom as rain-makers and authorities on the correct times of year to sow and reap crops. To the

north of the territory of Mani Kabunga and the other chiefs, on the far side of the Congo River, there was a small kingdom called Bunu or Vunu. The king of Bunu had so many sons that the youngest, Mutinu Mbene,* realised that he was unlikely ever to become king of Bunu. He decided therefore to cross the Congo River and conquer the chiefs who ruled to the south of it. In a few years Mutinu Mbene had dominated a large part of Kongo and had divided it among his captains, instructing them to marry the daughters of local chiefs. He himself married the daughter of Mani Kabunga and founded the dynasty of the Kongo kings. Only Mbata was not conquered but an alliance was made with its rulers which stipulated that all future kings of Kongo should marry a daughter of the Mani Mbata.¹

Confirmation of this tradition that the origin of the Kongo kings lay in Bunu, north-north-west of Mbanza Kongo, is given in three other sources. The first is a letter by a missionary priest written from Kongo in 1624, which mentions that Bunu^f had been destroyed by the 'Jaga' with the approval of the Loango king and that the king of Kongo had been upset about it because that was where his ancestors came from.² The second source is Jérôme de Montesarchio, who wrote that the first king of Kongo came across the Congo River from Kwimba^o and conquered the province of Mpemba. On his way south he stopped at Mpemba Kazi.^x

¹ ENL FG 8080 in Felner: Angola, 1933, 375 ff.

² Conego do Congo to Manuel Rodrigues, 1624. Evora Cod cxvi, 2-15, no. 7. In Paiva Manso: História do Congo (Documentos), Lisbon 1877, 177.

* Motinobene. ^f Bango. ^o Coimbra. ^x Npembacasi.

When he moved his capital further south to Mbanza Kongo he left a woman to rule at Mpemba Kasi who took the title 'Mother of the King of Kongo'.¹ Linguistic evidence shows that the region of Mpemba Kasi, and not that of Mbanza Kongo, is the central area of the Kikongo language.² A third tradition confirming the above account was recorded by Bernardo de Gallo. Mutinu was the son of a woman called Lukeni who lived in Kwimba* on the north side of the Congo River. It was he who led the Kongo ruling clans in their conquest of the country south of the river.³

The first king of Kongo is variously referred to in the traditions as Mutinu Mbene, Nimi Mutinu or Nimi a Lukeni. According to the letter of 1624 quoted above, Nimi Mutinu was succeeded by two nephews whose names had been forgotten, and then by his son, Nkuwu Mutinu.⁶ Nkuwu Mutinu's own son was the famous Nzinga a Nkuwu^x whom the Portuguese baptised as João I of Kongo on 3 May 1491.⁴ The fact that this king list is interrupted by two unremembered names is suspicious, and it is not unlikely that there was in fact a wider gap than the tradition suggests. The anonymous História do Reino do Congo said that there were

¹ Jérôme de Montesarchio cited in Cuvelier: L'Ancien Royaume de Congo, Bruges, 1946. Note 1, 251.

² This information, together with that about the Vili and Bembe languages below, was given by Professor Guthrie to the London University African History Seminar in 1961.

³ Bernardo de Gallo to the Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, Rome 12.12.1710. Arch. Prop., Scritture Rif. 1711 t. 576, fol. 316-340. In Jadin: Le Congo et la secte des Antoniens, Rome 1961, 467-468.

⁴ Letter to Manuel Rodrigues S.J. from Kongo. 1624. In Paiva Manso, op.cit., 174-175.

*Coimba.

6Encu a Motinu.

xNginga ancú.

six unremembered kings between Mutinu Mbene and Nzinga Nkuwu. It also said that the kingdom of Kongo had been founded about 350 years before the História was written circa 1620.¹ This evidence suggests that the Kongo clans probably invaded the region south of the Congo River, and set up the Kongo monarchy, in the fourteenth century.²

The first tradition which says that the kings of Kongo came from the east across the Kwango and stopped at Kongo dia Mulaza* before going on to conquer Kongo, was taken by Van Wing from an incomplete edition of Cadornega's chronicle. The full edition contains a foot-note by Cadornega himself saying that some opinions held that the conqueror of Kongo had come from another direction. Van Wing found some confirmation for this eastern tradition among the Mpangu. Most informants could only remember their migration from Mbanza Kongo but a few chiefs confirmed, or may even have volunteered, that they came from the Kwango before that. Rather more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that the Bankanu of Kongo dia Mulaza claim that their town was founded by the great Kongo chief. Moreover the Suku people, much further south on the Kwango, call their chief Mwene Kongo.³ The second source for the 'eastern hypothesis'

¹BNL FG 8080 in Felner, op.cit., 375 ff.

²This conclusion agrees with that recently arrived at by Vansina in a short article called "Notes Sur l'Origine du Royaume de Kongo", Journal of African History IV, 1963, 1.

³Van Wing, 27-28. Plancquaert: Les Jaga et Bayaka du Kwango, 48. Bruxelles 1932. Cadornega: História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Luanda, 1681. ed. 1940, Lisbon, III, 188.

*Congo de Amulaca. ^øMini Kongo.

was Cavazzi, a Capuchin Missionary, who, like Cadornega, never visited Kongo. His second hand account of the Kongo traditions of origin has been interpreted to place the events on the Kwango, which was known as the Upper Congo, instead of on the Congo River proper.¹

The ultimate origins of Kongo kingship are even more difficult to ascertain than the immediate source. Accepting that the latter was in the small group of kingdoms on the north side of the lower Congo, including Loango, Kakongo, Ngoyo and Bunu, does not necessarily involve concluding, as Vansina does in the article quoted above, that the founders of Kongo could therefore not have come from the Katanga-Kasai area. There is, after all, a waterway from the Lulua or the Sankuru to the Kasai and thence to Stanley Pool, while the country between the Pool and the Loango coast is not impenetrable.

The fact that the invasion of Kongo by its rulers came from the north, justifies a brief sketch of Loango, the best known of the northern kingdoms. Loango was probably founded earlier than Kongo and might yield some clue as to the remoter origins of the peoples who formed the Kongo state-complex on the fringe of which the Mbundu lived. At the same time the possibility should be kept in mind of influence from the almost unknown Teke states north-east of Kongo and Loango. It is not altogether impossible that the Teke, who lived in a stretch of savanna stretching

¹Van Wing, 27-28, citing Cavazzi. (See footnote page 29). Vansina: "Origines du Royaume de Kongo" JAH, IV, 1963, 1.

several hundred miles north from Stanley Pool, might even have controlled a means of access to the Kongo area from West Africa.

The king of Loango as described by Andrew Battell in about 1610 was another absolute ruler like the king of Kongo. He had a large compound in which his noblemen gathered round him. In an inner court he kept his wives. When the king wanted to drink he rang a bell and everyone fell on their faces. Anyone who saw the king drink was killed regardless of his rank or status. The king ate alone in a small hut, believing that he would die if anyone should see him eat. One of the king's major functions was that of rain-maker. When the rains were due, his people brought gifts to him and a great feast was held with drums and trumpets and a display of archery. Two leagues from Loango, in the direction of Bungu, was a place called Loangiri where lay the royal graves of the Loango kings. The place was surrounded by tusks of ivory stuck in the ground, possibly with one tusk for each grave.¹

The kingdom of Loango, like the kingdom of Kongo, was divided into provinces. The four provinces were ruled by the sons of the king's sister. They bore the title Mani Kaya, Mani Mbuku, Mani Selanganga, and Mani Kibanga.* When the king died the Mani Kaya succeeded him and the other three princes moved up in rank. A new Mani Kibanga was then appointed. The king's sons, who were usually extremely numerous, could never succeed. The king's sister, the mother of the princes of the realm, was an extremely

¹E. G. Ravenstein (ed): The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell in Angola and the adjoining regions. Hakluyt Society, London 1901. 42-52. Battell was an English trader who was captured by the Portuguese in South America and sent to Angola where he was a prisoner from about 1590 to about 1610.

* Manis Cay, Bock, Salag and Cabango in Battell's terminology.

important person and, according to Battell, bore the title Mani Lumbo.¹

Perhaps the most curious fact about Loango is that its people, the Vili, speak a language unrelated to the other languages of West-Central Africa. The only language akin to it is Bembe, a language spoken by a small group who live in the region formerly occupied by the kingdom of Bunu. According to Professor Guthrie these languages are more akin to eastern Bantu languages than to any western Bantu ones.²

The hypothesis which, at the moment, would seem best to fit this situation, is one of a migration from the east to Bunu. The king of Loango's eating and drinking habits have an East African appearance. The high importance of the queen-mother is a political trait which will be met again in the Lunda state of Luba origin. The matrilineal form of succession which would appear to preclude a Luba origin for the migrants, need only mean that they left the Luba home-land, if that is indeed where they came from, before the Songye invaded it and built a new patrilineal state in the series of Luba empires which had previously been matrilineal. It might even have been the Songye advance which made the migrants leave. If this were the case, the Vili and Bembe languages, with their eastern Bantu characteristics, could have come from the Luba area which is the westernmost of the districts speaking eastern Bantu languages.

¹Battell, 42-52.

²Information supplied by Professor Guthrie as mentioned above.

The preservation of the distinct characteristics of the Bembe and Vili languages may have been due to the fact that the immigrants settled in comparatively uninhabited country. This hypothesis might appear to be strengthened by the fact that the Mani Loango was his own rain-maker, whereas the invaders who went into Kongo chose one of the autochthonous chiefs as their rain-maker. These latter invaders also lost their language and apparently adopted that of the conquered people.

Although this study of Kongo has ranged rather far from the Mbundu, it provides a useful background against which to study Mbundu history. A similar survey of the other main western Bantu state system, that of the Lunda people and their Luba conquerors, will provide the eastern facet of the background against which, in the sixteenth century, the Mbundu developed a typical Bantu kingdom which the Portuguese destroyed in the seventeenth.

The Lunda were not a numerous people before they embarked on their imperial designs in the sixteenth century. They lived in families and small sparsely dispersed villages along the Kalagne River, a right bank tributary of the Bushimaie in western Katanga. Each community had an independent chief called the Kabungu. Their life was probably similar to that of the people of Kongo before the establishment of the monarchy. The men wove mats and made nets for catching game and more especially fish. They also knew how to fashion iron tools and weapons. The women made pots of baked clay and tended the crops. The Lunda had little contact with their neighbours, of whom the most important were the Kanioka

in the north-east and the war-like Akawanda or Bakete in the north-west. Before the Luba arrived in the sixteenth century to revolutionise their way of life, the only figure whom all Lunda respected was the senior Kabungu, who bore the name or title of Yala Mwaku. His insignia was a copper bracelet entwined with human nerves and elephant sinews which was called the Lukano or Kazekele.¹

The Luba who invaded Lunda in the sixteenth century came from the region of the upper Lualaba basin in Katanga where the concepts of Bantu monarchy had apparently been evolving for several centuries. Recent archaeological excavations at Sanga on the north shore of lake Kisale have revealed a huge grave-yard containing a wide assortment of pottery, tools and rich copper and iron ornaments. Although no royal tombs have so far been found, the size of the site suggests that it belonged to a large political unit of a people using advanced metallurgical techniques. Carbon-dating places this 'Kisalian' culture in the eighth or ninth century, six or seven centuries before the earliest traditional history so far recorded in the district.²

¹L. Duysters: "Histoire des Aluunda" in Problèmes de l'Afrique Centrale, Bruxelles, 1958. Duysters was a colonial district officer among the Lunda from 1925 to 1927. During that time he collected a traditional history of the Lunda. The manuscript was used by E. Verhulpen: Baluba et Balubaïsés, Antwerp, 1936. Duysters' original was not published until 1958. The other main source is Henriques Dias de Carvalho: Etnografia e História tradicional dos povos da Lunda, Lisbon 1890. The most important section is translated in Turner: "A Lunda love story and its consequences", Rhodes-Livingston Journal, 1955, No. 19, pp. 1-26. Carvalho led a Portuguese expedition to Lunda in 1884-1888. The Etnografia is one of eight volumes describing the expedition.

²Jacques Nenquin: "Notes on some early pottery cultures in northern Katanga" J.A.H., IV, 1963, 1.

Another reason for supposing that Katanga was of great importance for the early history of the Bantu, is furnished by linguistic research. When the Bantu began to disperse over the southern half of Africa, they spoke a common language. By collecting as many as possible of the words which are common to all Bantu languages today, a hypothetical 'proto-Bantu' vocabulary can be re-constructed. This exercise shows that the languages with the highest degree of correlation with 'proto-Bantu' are those of the Katanga grassland and the country stretching east and west from it.¹ From this evidence it is tempting to suppose that the Bantu may originally have dispersed mainly from this area, and that the Luba lived in a country which was throwing out migrations long before those of the sixteenth century which are the first for which firm oral records exist. The reason for these migrations would seem to be economic growth leading to overpopulation and the need for new lands and new resources. New game, including elephants to provide ivory, and new salt deposits may have been among the needs which emigrants from the upper Lualaba sought to satisfy.

The first state in the Luba region remembered in the oral traditions collected by Verhulpen, seems to have been a kingdom of the Bena Kalundwe on the Lubilash River. One account says that the Kalundwe were ruled by a chief called Tshifinga and others say that they were ruled by a woman called Tshimbale Bande or Bande Lumbale. This country was infiltrated by a people called the Songye who came from the north. The

¹Malcolm Guthrie: "Some developments in the prehistory of Bantu languages". J.A.H., III, 1962, 2.

Songye leader was called Kongolo. He was remembered for his great cruelty in amputating the noses and ears of offenders. He punished his brother for treason by leaving him up a tree to die. After Kongolo and his followers had infiltrated the Kalundwe country, the chief of the Kalundwe recognised them as rulers because of the superiority of their arms. One tradition says that Kongolo married Tshimbale Bande, thus legitimising his children both by the matrilineal line of the autochthonous peoples and by the patrilineal line of the invaders. The successors of Kongolo formed a Songye dynasty of whom notable rulers were Kongolo Mukulu, Kongolo Miketo and Kongolo Mwana. The empire expanded, particularly to the east, and formed new villages and subject states. Expeditions crossed the Lomami River in search of salt and palm oil. Eventually the capital of the empire was moved east to Muibele beyond the Lomami. At the height of its power the Luba-Songye empire probably spread from the Lubilash to the Lualaba and perhaps even further.¹

The date of the founding of the Songye dynasty and the length of time during which it ruled are unknown. If, as was very tentatively suggested, earlier, the founders of the Loango coast states were refugees from the Songye advance, then this advance could not have been later than the end of the thirteenth century. This would fit in with internal Luba evidence which tends to point to an even earlier date. The Kongolo dynasty

¹This reconstruction of the history of the Luba is drawn entirely from the complex and often contradictory traditions collected by Verhulpen. See especially pages 82-108 in Baluba et Balubaïsés.

of the Songye was probably overthrown in the fifteenth century,¹ and two centuries would seem to be the minimum reasonable time to allow for the rise and fall of an empire as powerful and influential as that of the Songye. During the Kongolo dynasty the pattern of government emerged for a whole generation of widely spread Bantu kingdoms, starting with the Luba successor state which replaced the Songye domination.

Between the Lualaba River and the north end of lake Tanganyika, in the area east of the Songye home-land, there were a number of related peoples called the Kunda, Kalanga, Lumbu and Bwi whom it will be convenient to refer to by the general name Kunda. These peoples seem to have been Bantu peasants with a less sophisticated culture than their Songye neighbours. Probably at a date some time after groups of Songye had begun to migrate southward along the Lomami, similar groups of Kunda began to move south on the eastern side of the Lualaba River. Their leader or leading clan, Bombwe Mbili, eventually founded a small Kunda state in the area east of Lake Kisale. From there small groups of hunters went out into the west. Some of them reached as far as the Lomami and Lubilash Rivers and settled down among the Kalundwe. By this process the Kunda gradually infiltrated the empire of the Kongolos.

The traditional story of the final overthrow of the Kongolo empire is as follows. One of the Kunda hunting expeditions across the Lualaba was led by Mbili Kiluhe, son or brother of Bombwe Mbili, the great leader

¹Evidence for this is adduced in Chapter Four.

of the Kunda. Mbili Kiluhe and his followers entered the Kongolo domains peacefully. Kongolo Mwana accepted their friendship and gave Mbili Kiluhe two of his sisters as wives. One of these, Bulanda, bore him a son called Kalala Ilunga. After this Mbili Kiluhe returned to his home-land in the east leaving his numerous followers without any political organisation. Kongolo attempted to incorporate them into his empire. A dispute arose, however, as to whether Kalala Ilunga, the nephew of Kongolo, was the heir to the kingdom according to Kunda matrilineal succession, or was not the heir in accordance with Songye custom. Kongolo became very jealous of Kalala Ilunga and determined to kill him. Kalala Ilunga was warned of a trap consisting of a pit full of poisoned arrows hidden by a mat, and fled across the Lualaba to the territory of his father Mbili Kiluhe. He hid the canoes to prevent pursuit. Kongolo tried to recall Kalala Ilunga on the drums and attempted to follow him on a raft, but failed. Soon afterwards Kalala Ilunga re-crossed the Lualaba with many of his father's men and conquered the empire. Before fleeing, Kongolo killed his own mother together with enough slaves to care for her in the after-life. He was caught by the invaders, however, and decapitated. During the subsequent wars between the followers of Kongolo and those of Kalala Ilunga, many Luba including the Bena Lulua and the Binji, fled from their homes. They founded a Luba colony on the Kasai which was never incorporated into the new Luba-Kunda empire.

Kalala Ilunga became the first 'Mulohwe' or ruler of the new Luba empire, which was to survive until the arrival of the Arabs and the Europeans in the nineteenth century. The laws and customs of the new state

combined those of the old Songye rulers with those of the Kunda invaders. The Mulohwe always ate and drank alone. As a mark of distinction he filed his front teeth into a point, unlike the Songye aristocrats who removed their incisors altogether. Among the royal insignia were a pair of sacred fire-sticks which had to be used to light all fires on which the Mulohwe's food was cooked. The ruler also possessed a double bell made of iron which was probably similar to the one later adopted by Lunda emperors. There is a suggestion that the Mulohwe made a practice of marrying his sister or niece. Such a practice would have ensured that succession could be carried down both through the male and the female line. When the Mulohwe died he was buried in a dry river bed together with wives and slaves. His spirit passed to a woman who received many lands and honours and was appointed to rule over his capital. She was never allowed to see the new Mulohwe who had to go and build another capital elsewhere. The empire was divided among provincial rulers who were responsible for levying tribute from the chiefs and forwarding it to the Mulohwe. Taxes might be imposed in the form of labour or of produce.

The overthrow of the Luba-Songye empire had direct repercussions on its neighbours, and in particular on the Lunda who lived only a short distance to the west of the Lomami. These repercussions were of two kinds. The first were caused by the supporters of the old order escaping from the invader. The Bena Lulua have already been mentioned in this context. It seems possible that the Jaga, a fierce, disoriented, cannibal people

who in the mid sixteenth century rampaged through west central Africa with great violence and temporarily overthrew the kingdom of Kongo, may have originated from the disintegration of the old Luba empire. The same may have been true of the peoples who carried out long-distance raids on the settlements of the east African coast. The second effect of the change in Lubaland, was the sending out of probing expeditions by the new government. It seems that one of these, led by Kibinda Ilunga, was responsible for establishing the concept of monarchy among the Lunda.

In about the first half of the sixteenth century,¹ while these turbulent events were taking place in Luba country, the Lunda were being peaceably ruled by the Yala Mwaku. The first sign of trouble is related in the oral traditions. One day Yala Mwaku² was weaving a mat and soaking the fibres in a bowl of clouded water to make them more manageable. His sons Kinguri and Kinyama came in and, thinking that the bowl contained palm wine, asked for a drink. The old man told them that it was only water but they refused to believe him and began to beat him. Their sister, Lueji, called for help and the old man was rescued. He survived long enough to curse and disown his sons and to make Lueji his heiress. The old ruler then died and was buried in the bed of the Kazanga stream at the spot where in later times a woman chief called Mwadiamuteba ruled over the tombs of the Lunda emperors. Lueji was then recognised as paramount

¹The dating of these events will be demonstrated in Chapter Four.

²Some sources say that this episode concerned Yala Mwaku's successor, Konde.

by the chiefs and received the Lukano insignia. This tradition would appear to serve the main purpose of showing that the right to transmit paramountcy among the Lunda was in the gift of a woman when Kibinda Ilunga, the Luba prince, arrived on the frontier of the Lunda country. Such an explanation might have been necessary later, once the rulers of Lunda had adopted a patrilineal form of succession. The fact that the narrators of the tradition were accustomed to a patrilineal form of succession might explain the otherwise strange and almost certainly false assumption that Yala Mwaku's natural heirs would have been his sons.

According to the most recent version of Lunda tradition, collected by Duysters, Kibinda Ilunga arrived in Lunda and said that he was a grandson of Mbili Kiluhe. When his father Kalala Ilunga had died, his brother Ilunga Liu or Ilunga Waelefu, had succeeded to the Luba throne. Waelefu was jealous of the hunting ability of Kibinda whose name meant the hunter. The king insulted him for not helping in the wars of conquest, so Kibinda gathered together his friends Tshibandama, Mwadi Mwichi and Mwadi Kalumbu and their families and set out, hunting as they went, through the uninhabited country west of the Lomami.¹

The older version of the Lunda tradition collected by Carvalho is substantially different. Mutombo Mukulu was the last ruler of the Luba. He had four sons, Kasongo,* Kanyuca,^ø Ilunga and Mai. When he was old,

¹Duysters, 83.

*Cassongo. ^øCanhíuca.

he told his sons that he had nothing to leave them and that they must go out and find new lands and form states of their own. They should always co-operate to help each other in times of military danger. Kasongo and Kanyuca departed entrusting the Kimbwia*, the axe symbolic of royal authority, to Ilunga who took the title of Swana Mulopo or heir apparent. Ilunga and Mai stayed with the old Mutombo Mukulu until he died, and when they had buried him with the necessary ritual, Ilunga gathered his friends and set out for the west.¹ Pogge, the first European to record Lunda traditions, heard a version similar to that of Carvalho. He adds that Kibinda Ilunga, the old king's fourth son, had neither title nor rank and lived the free unfettered life of a huntsman.²

The significance of the Carvalho tradition is that it could be interpreted to mean that Kibinda Ilunga was the last of a dying line of kings. When all was lost he departed to the west carrying the chief symbol of royal authority, the axe Kimbwia. The Lunda would in that case take on the appearance of the direct successor state to the Songye empire of the Luba. This seems, however, to be a slightly less likely hypothesis than the one which emerges from the Duysters tradition, of Kibinda Ilunga, the son of Kalala Ilunga, being the representative of a young and virile state which was expanding from the old political centre on the Lualaba.

¹Henriques Dias de Carvalho, op.cit., 59-68.

²Pogge: Im Reich des Muata Jamvo, Berlin 1880. Appendix.

*Quimbuia.

When Kibinda Ilunga arrived on the Kasidishi stream he sent a present of meat to Lueji and said that he and his people were in need of salt. Lueji invited him to visit her mussumba or compound and offered him pumbe, a beer made from sorgum. In order that he should not be seen to eat or drink in public, Lueji had a hut built for him to retire into. Kibinda Ilunga settled in Lunda and taught Lueji's brothers how to hunt. In due course he obtained permission from the elders to marry Lueji, and the recognition that their children would be the rulers of the country. Kibinda sent the royal axe to his brother Kasongo saying that the lands of the Lunda queen were so rich that he never wanted to return east. Lueji exchanged presents with her brother-in-law Kasongo. At some later date Kibinda received the lukano, the Lunda bracelet, from Lueji and began to develop Lunda into a unified, monarchic state and to expand its frontiers.¹

Although most of the elders in Lunda accepted the transfer of power to a Luba chief, there were groups in the community which did not. Prominent among these were Lueji's brothers Kinguri and Kinyama. They indulged in attempts at subversion but eventually had to flee from Lunda finding that Kibinda had become too strong for them. They intended to build a new Lunda state further to the west from which they would return to conquer their old home-land. They travelled west founding several states until they came into contact with the Mbundu and with the Atlantic

¹The traditional story of the 'marriage' of Luba and Lunda is central to the historical traditions of all the many peoples who trace their decent back to Mussumba, the capital of the Lunda empire. See Duysters, Pogge, Carvalho.

sea-trade which had opened some years earlier. The refugees from Lunda apparently forgot all about returning to conquer the dynasty of Luba usurpers, and settled down to a commercial way of life in which riches unheard of in Lunda were to be gained.

Within this setting of the Bantu world, the Mbundu lived in the region bound to the north by the Dande River and to the south by the Kwanza River. They were the furthest south-west of the Western Bantu. Beyond the Kwanza River was a broad belt of sparsely inhabited country south of which lay the Benguela highlands inhabited by Southern Bantu pastoralists. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries Ovimbundu invaders drove out or dominated the old pastoralists and established a dozen or more small kingdoms of the now familiar Western Bantu type.

More important than the Mbundu's southern neighbours, were their immediate eastern and northern neighbours. The eastern neighbours were, however, the peoples about whom least is known. The first and most obvious reason for this lack of information is that this was the area furthest removed from the European activities which developed on the coast, and so least known to the early travellers who described the country. Another reason for the paucity of knowledge is that after 1570, the forests of the Kwango River were defended by the war-like Jaga peoples who had retired there after their defeat in Kongo. They formed an effective barrier to penetration east of Kongo which may have been the reason why, with the growth of the slave trade, the main trade routes from Kongo

and even from Luanda, were diverted northward to the country inhabited by the Mpumbu.¹ By the seventeenth century when the Portuguese tried to circumvent the Jaga to the south, they were already too late. The Lunda had reached the upper Kwango and founded the state of Kasanje which effectively prevented all European access to the inland trade-routes. This barrier prevented knowledge of the interior from being gained until the nineteenth century. What is known of the peoples beyond the eastern borders of the Mbundu and Kongo countries in the early sixteenth centuries, has to be gained mainly from oral tradition.

The most important people or state in this eastern region in the late fifteenth century was probably Matamba. Most of what is known about Matamba dates from the seventeenth century when it was conquered by Mbundu peoples escaping from Portuguese activities further west. The earlier Matamba was referred to by Afonso I of Kongo when he wrote to João III of Portugal in 1530 sending him two silver bracelets "which were sent to me by a nobleman of my country called Matamba".² Matamba may have been the home of the Batsamba people who later moved northward along the Kwango and were recognised by the Jaga escaping from Kongo, as the prior owners of the landsof the middle Kwango in which the Jaga settled.³ Matamba

¹The Mpumbu lived near the lower Kwango south-east of Stanley-Pool. The derived name pumbo came, in slave trading days, to mean a slave fair. The slave market of the Mpumbu specifically was referred to as Pombo de Okango, that is the pumbo of the Kwango. The people who went to trade in the pumbos were called pombeiros.

²Afonso I to João III, 28.1.1530, ATT CC-I-44-70. In António Brásio (ed): Monumenta Missionaria Africana - Africa Occidental, Vol. I, 540.

³M. Plancquaert, S.J. : Les Jaga et les Bayaka du Kwango, Bruxelles, 1932. Traditions published on pages 42-50.

may have been the furthest point south-east which paid tribute to the king of Kongo. Evidence that Kongo authority stretched so far is also to be found among the Suku, another old-established people of that region, since in 1535 the Kongo king signed himself with the title of 'master of Musucu'.¹ The ruler of the Suku was called 'mini Kongo'.²

In the north the Mbundu frontier met the Kongo province of Mbamba. It is not clear what the nature of the Kongo-Mbundu border was. According to one theory, the Mbundu, or at least the underlying strata of that people, were the same as the people of Kongo before the ruling clans conquered them. The Mbundu would therefore be, basically, those members of a comparatively homogeneous group existing between the Congo and Kwanza rivers, who had not been subjected by the Kongo invaders. This theory is, however, based partly on rather doubtful evidence that the word 'Mbundu' meant 'slave' in Kikongo.³ An alternative but similar theory suggests that the Kongo rulers might, indeed, have been trying to subject the Mbundu, but that the Mbundu were different from the peoples whom they had already subjected. Even this, however, is far from proved and it is possible that the offensive was going the other way. The Mbundu may

¹Afonso I to Pope Paul III, 21.2.1535. ATT CC-I-3-6 & CC-I-48-45, Brásio II, 38.

²Plancquaert, op.cit.

³See, for instance, Willy Bal (ed): Lopez-Pigafetta, op.cit. footnote 149.

have been invaders who were attacking the southern frontier of a kingdom which was already passed its prime.

The historical traditions of the Mbundu suggest that their original elements may have been influenced both by Kongo and by Luba, just as their later history was subjected to forces from both areas. The fullest traditions of early Mbundu history are those remembered by the Pende, a people who left Angola in the seventeenth century to settle on the Kasai and thus avoided the domination of the Portuguese. Kasanje,¹ the brother of the Pende chief of Tshikapa, and Mukunzu, a Pende historian, remember the origins of the Mbundu in the following manner.² The earliest ancestor of the Mbundu, Ngola Kilaji, lived at Tandji ni Milumbu, which was probably in the region of the upper Zambesi. Ngola's people were hunters and warriors who did not know how to smelt iron for their arrow-heads, but used only wooden arrows and spears. One day Ngola Kilaji decided to leave Tandji. He destroyed his camp and set out for the west, towards the sea. All along the route he left groups of men who settled and founded villages. When he reached the Kwanza he followed the course of the river down to the sea at Luanda. Ngola settled on the plains of Luanda and lived there happily for a long time. There he met the people of Bembo Kalamba, a blacksmith, who came to Luanda with all his followers and their cattle. He taught Ngola how to smelt and forge iron, and how to make pots and weave. The chief who held authority over the people of Bembo Kalamba was his wife, Ngombe dia Nganda. She taught agriculture

¹The Pende informant Kasanje has nothing to do with the Imbangala Kasanje.

²G. L. Haveaux: La tradition historique des Bapende Orientaux, Bruxelles, 1954, 35-37, 46-47.

and cattle rearing. The people of Ngola married the daughters of Ngombe who became mothers of the Mbundu clans. Together they lived comfortably and prosperously in the Luanda plains with their cattle, their crops, their banana trees and above all their salt marshes, until one day the Europeans arrived and drove Ngola away from his salt marshes with guns.¹

This Pende tradition is similar to the traditions collected among the Mbundu in the seventeenth century by Cavazzi. Cavazzi said that in earlier times the Mbundu had been divided up among a large number of autonomous chiefdoms. Their way of life was probably similar to that of the early inhabitants of Kongo and Lunda, but the Mbundu did not know the use of iron and only used stone and wood for their tools and weapons. A blacksmith called Mussuri, who had learnt to smelt iron, rose to prominence among them by bartering his iron wares for food. When a famine hit the Mbundu he shared out his wealth and in gratitude the people made him their king. Mussuri married a woman called Ngana Inene* who had no sons but bore him three daughters, Zunda ria Ngola, Tumba ria Ngola and a third whose name had been forgotten. When Mussuri was old he was killed by a slave who wanted to gain control of the kingdom. In time, however, the rights of Mussuri's daughter Zunda were asserted and she ruled over the Mbundu. She had no children, however, and the paramountcy passed eventually to her sister Tumba's husband. He was a great hunter and warrior

¹G. L. Heaveux: La tradition historique des Bapende Orientaux, Bruxelles, 1954, 35-37, 46-47.

* En-ganna-Iniene.

called Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba.* The son of this hunter, also called Ngola Kiluanji, started the dynasty of the Ngolas who founded and ruled over the kingdom of Ndongo which flourished in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.¹

These traditions suggest at least three component elements among the Mbundu people. The first were a people with no skill in iron working who may have been the same as the pastoral peoples ruled by the woman chief, Ngombe dia Nganda or Ngana Inene. The second group were the people with a refined iron-working technology led by the chief Bembo Kalamba or Mussuri. Finally the people who came from the hunting grounds of the east, and were probably the last to arrive, were led by Ngola Kilaji or Ngola Kiluanji. It was these latest arrivals who, despite their inferior technical knowledge, brought the concept of centralised kingship and founded a monarchy which ruled over the Mbundu. The kingdom of Ndongo which they established may have been founded before the first Europeans arrived on the west coast of Central Africa. Its growth, however, is closely linked with the beginning of European activities and the opening of the Atlantic slave trade.

¹G. A. Cavazzi de Montecuccolo: Istorica Descrizione de tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola, Bologna, 1687. 290-294.

* Angola Chilurangi Chiasamba.

Chapter Two.

THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 1482-1565.

The first contact between the Bantu and European worlds occurred about 1483 when three Portuguese caravels arrived at the mouth of the Congo river. In the previous year João II had succeeded to the Portuguese throne and had personally taken up the supervision of African coastal exploration. Since the death of Henry the Navigator in 1460, progress in this field had been only spasmodic, the greatest achievements being those of Fernão Gomes, discoverer of the Gold Coast. One of the first tasks undertaken by João II was to build Elmina castle on the Gold Coast. His ultimate aim was to claim all the "lands of the Negroes" as his dominions. To further this ambition he organised an expedition under the leadership of Diogo Cão charged with exploring the African coast beyond Cape St. Catherine which lay to the south of the Cameroons and was the furthest point discovered in the previous reign.¹

Diogo Cão and his men landed on the south side of the Congo estuary and were immediately struck by the number of people whom they met in contrast to the sparsely inhabited Gaboon coast which they had been following. The people who welcomed them belonged to the Kongo province of Sonyo. Although these people could not understand the African inter-

¹João de Barros: Asia, Primeira Decada, Coimbra 1932. Bk III Ch. III. For details of Portuguese advance north of the equator see J. W. Blake: European Beginnings in West Africa 1454-1578.

preters whom the Portuguese had brought from Guinea they succeeded in conveying that they owed allegiance to a powerful king whose capital lay several days journey inland. This was the ruler of the Kongo kingdom.¹ The exact date of this encounter is not certain. The widely accepted date of 1482 is based on the inscription on a pillar which Diogo Cão erected on Cape St. Mary, 80 miles south-west of Benguela.² A chronicle of 1497, however, gives the date as 1483,³ and Pacheco Pereira and João de Barros both give 1484.⁴ It is at least plausible that the expedition was prepared in 1482 (including the inscribing of the "Padrão" with which Portuguese claims were to be asserted) but did not actually reach its destination until 1483, returning in 1484.

Relations between the Sonyo people and the Portuguese opened on an extremely friendly footing. A delegation was sent by Diogo Cão to

¹Details of this encounter are found in the chronicles of Pacheco Pereira, Garcia de Resende, Rui de Pina, and João de Barros. Relevant extracts are in Brásio, I, 30-43.

²The inscription reads: "Era of the creation of the world six thousand VICLXXI, year of the birth of our lord Jesus Christ one thousand CCCCLXXXII years, the most high and excellent and powerful prince King Dom João II of Portugal ordered the discovery of this land and the placing of these pillars by Diogo Cão, valet of his chamber." Cited in Ralph Delgado: História de Angola, I, 55.

³Torre do Tombo Library, no. 852. Brásio, I, Doc. 6, 30-31.

⁴Barros, op.cit., 79. Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, written c. 1504, Hakluyt Society 1936. The editor of the Esmeraldo, G. H. T. Kimble, says that Pereira is one year out and that the Cão expedition to Kongo was in fact in 1483. (Footnote on p. 142.)

the court of the Mani Kongo, sovereign of the Kongo empire, to bear him presents of European manufacture. In the meantime Cão pushed his investigations to beyond Benguela before turning back. When the messengers who had been sent into the interior did not return within a reasonable time, it was decided to take hostages from Sonyo as guarantors for their security. Four of the noblemen who frequented the ships were seized and it was explained to their kinsmen that they would be brought back in fifteen moons.¹ On arrival in Portugal the captives were royally fêted as envoys of their king and shown the material wonders of European civilization. João II ordered Cão to take them back to Kongo as soon as possible and to offer presents to the king whose existence had been revealed to the European world. When they arrived in Kongo these erstwhile hostages were received with surprise and joy. The king of Kongo was told about the life of the Portuguese court and immediately ordered that presents of coloured palm cloth and carved ivory be sent to the Portuguese king.²

At the time the Kongo and Portuguese kings began this mutual investigation of each other's resources, Kongo was already a large and stable kingdom whose development had probably begun at least a century before as outlined in the first chapter. The king of Kongo who first welcomed the Portuguese envoys to his court was Nzinga Nkuwu. He accepted

¹Barros, op.cit., 80.

²Brasio I, 56-57 quoting Rui de Pina.

baptism on 3 May 1491 with the name João I, but before his death in 1506 he had renounced Christianity. The successors of Nzinga Nkuwu according to the list of the clan names of the kings of Kongo who reigned after the arrival of the Portuguese is given by Van Wing and Jadin as follows:¹

Nzinga a Nkuwu	(baptised João I on 3.5.1491, died c. 1506.)
Nzinga Mvemba	(Afonso I, son of João I, died c. 1543.)
Nkanga Mvemba	(Pedro I, son of Afonso I, fled c. 1545.)
Mpudi a Nzinga Mvemba	(Francisco I, until c. 1546 ?.)
Nkubi Mpudi a Nzinga	(Diogo I, grandson of Afonso I, died c. 1561.)
Nzinga Mvemba	(Afonso II, son of Diogo I, died c. 1561.)
Nzinga Mvemba	(Bernardo I, brother of Afonso II, died 1566 or 1567.)
Mpudi a Nzinga Mvemba	(Neriko, Henrico I, died c. 1568, last of Nzinga Mvemba line.)
Nimi ne Mpangu Lukeni lua Mvemba	(Alvaro I, died c. 1587.)
Nimi ne Mpangu Lukeni lua Mvemba	(Alvaro II, eldest (?) son of Alvari I, died c. 1614.)

¹Van Wing, 35; Cuvelier and Jadin, 16-26 and sources quoted there.

The death of Nzinga a Nkuwu in about 1506 was followed by a succession struggle between two clans which probably concerned the attitude which Kongo should take towards the Portuguese. The old king had rapidly become disenchanted with the Portuguese at his court. They probably behaved in an overbearing manner quite out of keeping with the tone of the Portuguese king's brotherly letters. According to a history of Kongo written by a priest in 1624, Nzinga a Nkuwu, disillusioned by the Portuguese, disowned his eldest son, Nzinga Mvemba, prince of Nsundi, and the electors chose his 'bastard' son, Nzinga Mpangu, as king.¹ A civil war apparently followed in which the senior clan in the line of succession favoured an extension of the profitable welcome hitherto accorded to the Portuguese, while the junior or illegitimate clan opposed foreign intervention in the affairs of Kongo. The victory went to the disowned elder son, Nzinga Mvemba, who was a convert to Christianity, under the name Afonso, and fully intended to co-operate with the Portuguese. This dynasty ruled Kongo from Afonso's accession in about 1506 until about 1568, by which time hordes of cannibal Jaga were crossing the Kwango and plundering the kingdom.²

The reign of Afonso I lasted over 30 years and saw the apogee of Afro-European co-operation. Then began the slow break-down of contact leading to the century-long Angolan wars. A brief survey of the effects

¹Paiva Manso, 174-175.

²Van Wing, 32-33.

of the establishment of commercial and political links between Kongo and Portugal during Afonso's reign will provide a useful background and source of comparison for the study of the sixteenth century rise of the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo. The economic stimulus needed to form a nation-state among the Mbundu, came, to a large extent anyway, from the opening of the Atlantic slave trade. The economic basis for the founding of Kongo could obviously not have come from overseas trade, but probably came from the country's natural agricultural richness and from the wealth of its coastal salt supplies. The slave trade only developed after Kongo was well established, but it nonetheless became the leading factor governing the kingdom's relations with Portugal. It was also one cause of the Kongo intervention in the affairs of the Mbundu.

The benefits which Kongo hoped to gain from its association with Europe were strangely similar to those sought by post-colonial Africa. Afonso did not want administrative advice and considered his own judicial system more humane than that of 16th century Portugal. What he needed was teachers and craftsmen to pass on the technical knowledge of Europe. He even tried to persuade the king of Portugal to let him have a ship so that he could trade on his own account, but this was totally contrary to Portuguese policy and even his less ambitious requests met with decreasing attention in Lisbon.¹

The aims of the Portuguese in exploring the African coast were not

¹The letters between Manuel and Afonso are published in Brasio, Vol. I. An interesting general discussion of this partnership is found in Basil Davidson: Black Mother, London 1961, 118 ff.

only a desire for empire, a quest for gold and spices, and the search for the sea route to India. They also hoped to make Christian converts and to find existing Christian kingdoms. They were attempting to break the encirclement of Western Europe by Islam. For this reason the kings of Portugal were delighted to find a powerful African ruler willing to be accepted into the Christian community of nations. The early letters of Manuel of Portugal, who had succeeded João in 1495, to 'our royal Brother' Afonso of Kongo are written in the friendliest terms. This effusiveness, however, did not last long and the concrete results were disappointingly few. As the horizons of the Portuguese empire widened to India and the Far East, the attractions of Kongo dwindled. A potential political ally might have been useful but was no substitute for gold and spices and the Kongo-Angola region was found to produce no such valuable commodities. The presents which the Mani Kongo had sent to Portugal consisted only of palm cloth and ivory.

A valuable, if less spectacular, commercial asset was found in Kongo. That was men. From very early in the relationship between Kongo and Portugal a slave trade grew up based on the Congo estuary port of Mpinda. The demand for slave labour came principally from two sources. In Portugal itself a very sparse population was being stretched to provide the administrative personnel for a widening empire, and the shortage of agricultural labour at home could only be met by importing outside help. From the beginning of Portuguese contact with Negro Africa slaves

were being sent to the home country, and Kongo came to be an especially important source of supply since the kings had a great thirst for European cloth and metal-wares but no commodity with which to pay for them other than slaves. Kongo also came to supply slaves to the settlers of São Tomé. When first discovered this island was uninhabited, which made it easier for the Portuguese to colonise, but meant that all labour had to be imported. From 1485, and especially after 1493, Jews and criminals in particular were sent to settle the island, and in order to encourage the natural growth of the population each one was given a slave girl from Kongo.¹ Sugar became the chief industry of the island and large supplies of slave labour were needed from Kongo for planting and cutting, and for operating the crushing mills. The trade in slaves was advantageous to the Portuguese crown, not only because it established a rich sugar economy in São Tomé, but also because it provided revenue from taxes on the trade.

As the trade grew the benefits of Kongo-Portuguese 'partnership' became increasingly one-sided. Not only did Afonso fail to get the advantages for which he hoped, but the flourishing empire which he had inherited was being undermined by the drain of man-power. One of the most debilitating aspects of the slave trade was that it took away the youngest and most vital elements of the nation's manhood. The 'peça da India' had to be of specified stature and youth. Although Afonso took part in the slave trade in order to buy European goods, he did succeed in keeping some control over its volume. After his death however the factor of São

¹ Lopes de Lima: Ensaio sobre as estatísticas das Possessões portuguesas no Ultramar. Vol. II S. Tomé. Part II, 4-5. Lisbon 1844.

Tomé wrote to Lisbon to say that the Kongo slave trade had become far brisker than it had ever been in the days of old Afonso.¹

Although the slave trade had a weakening effect on Kongo, the majority of the 4,000 to 5,000 slaves who were shipped each year from Mpinda by the 1530's, probably came from outside the boundaries of the Kongo kingdom proper.² They were obtained either by raids which the Kongo people conducted against their neighbours, or by trade with the kings of adjacent lands. The most important states with which Kongo had trading relations for the acquisition of slaves seem to have been those of the Teke and of the Mpumbu, Kongo's neighbours to the north-east.³ Slave raids, on the other hand, which the kings of Kongo organised with a varying degree of Portuguese participation, concentrated especially on the country of the Mbundu.

From very early in the sixteenth century the slave traders operating from Mpinda were on the look-out for new supplies. One reason for this must have been the lack of slaves in Kongo itself and the consequent need to travel even further overland at a high cost in time and mortality. The reluctance of the still powerful king of Kongo to allow an all-out

¹Jeronimo Coutinho to the King of Portugal. ATT CC III 17-16. Brasio II, 268.

²Manuel Pacheco to João III, Kongo 28.3.1536, in Paiva Manso, document xxxviii, 67, gives this estimate for the volume of trade exclusive of the large numbers of slaves who died in raids, during transit and while awaiting shipment at Mpinda.

³See Chapter Three for a description of the Mpumbu and Teke.

scramble for slaves must also have frustrated the foreign traders. Another draw-back to the Kongo trade was that export taxes imposed by the Portuguese kings reduced the profits. Finally the demand for slaves from Brazil, where, during the first half of the sixteenth century, a dozen or more captaincies were established by the Portuguese, outstripped the potential supplies from Kongo. For all these reasons the traders needed more plentiful supplies of slaves. The area to which they turned to seek them was the Angola¹ coast south of Kongo, because slaves were already coming from there by the difficult overland route. None of the other slave supplying areas, with the possible exception of Loango, was accessible by sea.

One of the earliest descriptions of the Angola coast was written by Pacheco Pereira about 1504. Two hundred miles south of the Congo river lay the rivers Dande and Bengo and beyond them,

"the coast forms a bay of a little more than a league, and at its mouth there are two small islands, low and level and sparsely wooded, called Ilhas das Cabras.² They are very near the mainland and the Negroes who inhabit them belong to the lordship of Maniconguo, the Conguo country extending even beyond them. The Negroes of these islands pick up small shells (of the size of pine-nuts in their shell) which they call 'zinbos'. These are used as money in the country of Maniconguo; fifty of them buy a hen and three hundred a goat and so forth; and when the Maniconguo wishes to confer a favour on one of his nobles or reward a service done to him, he orders him to be given a certain number of these 'zinbos'

¹The name 'Angola' will be used in its loose Portuguese sense of the country south of the Kongo kingdom. The name Ndongo applies to a more limited area over which the Ngolas gained control.

²Literally the 'Goat Islands' later known as Luanda Island.

... The country from Rio do Padram (the Congo River) to the Rio do Mondego (Bengo River) and the Ihlas das Cabras along the coast is flat and well wooded. ... Off these islands at thirty fathoms there is extremely abundant fishing."¹

Pereira goes on to describe the promontories and bays which sailors would meet along the coast. South of Luanda the coast was less wooded and beyond Cape St. Mary completely barren. The inhabitants lived entirely off fish and there was no prospect of profitable trade for the Portuguese. Migrant fishermen living a very poor existence were found as far south as Tiger Bay, 16° below the equator.

An interesting record of the early contacts between these sailors, whose probings Pacheco Pereira describes, and the inhabitants of the Angola coast is found in the traditions of the Pende, who, as seen in Chapter One, once lived there but have since migrated inland to the Kasai river. This oral history recalls very clearly the arrival of the first ship on the Luanda coast. At the time the Ngola and his people had been living for a long period on the plains behind Luanda where they raised cattle and crops and bananas. One day the 'Tukusunia Tungunga' (white men) arrived in ships with wings which shone in the sun like knives. They fought hard battles with the Ngola and spat fire at him. They conquered his salt-pans and the Ngola fled inland to the Lukala river. Some of his bolder subjects remained by the sea and when the white men came they exchanged eggs and chickens for cloth and beads.

¹Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, Hakluyt Soc. 1937. 145.

"The white men came yet again. They brought us maize and cassava, knives and hoes, groundnuts and tobacco. From that time until our day the Whites brought us nothing more but wars and miseries."¹

When introducing the new crops the Europeans taught a prayer which had to be said for the crops to succeed. This prayer, which was clearly once a Christian prayer, is still remembered by the Pende.

These Pende, before their emigration, formed part of the Mbundu nation whose country lay between the rivers Dande and Kwanza and from the sea to an unknown frontier in the east. This Mbundu territory would appear in some ways to have been a power-vacuum which attracted the Portuguese in their search for a new population because it would provide a better field for slaving activities than the more closely administered Kongo kingdom. It seems that the political ideas necessary for the forming of a powerful nation-state had taken root much more recently among the Mbundu, than in Kongo, and that at the time of the European arrival the kingdom of Ndongo was still taking shape. The subsequent history of the Mbundu became a race between the African forces of political organization and unity and the alien forces of subjection.

The earliest known documentary references to the Mbundu concern their relationship with the rulers of Kongo. In a letter of 1512 which the Manikongo wrote to Portugal about the Kongo succession dispute, he referred to himself as "... Dom Afonso, by His Grace king of Manicongo

¹Haveaux: La Tradition Historique des Bapende Orientaux, Brux. 1954, 47. Also 36-37 and 46 ff.

and Master of the Ambudos ..."¹ The next documentary reference to the Mbundu is in a letter of 1514 from Afonso I to the king of Portugal which illustrates the manner in which slaves were captured on the southern border of Kongo. The king informed his royal brother that he had received news that a Mbundu nobleman called Mūza had declared war on one of the sons of Kongo. The king immediately led a military expedition against the Mbundu, leaving a courtier and a Portuguese captain called Alvaro Lopes in charge of his capital. During the campaign the king quarrelled with the few Portuguese who accompanied him, as a result of which Diogo Bello and Manoel Cão abandoned the expedition and retired with 100 or more slaves. The captives were so badly guarded, however, that they succeeded in killing Manoel Cão and escaping. They roamed through Kongo burning villages and plundering markets until Alvaro Lopes ordered their re-capture and had them whipped. The Queen of Kongo ordered that those immediately responsible for the murder of Manoel Cão be executed. When the main body of the expedition returned they brought further consignments of slaves. João d'Estremós, one of the Portuguese participants in the expedition, brought 190 slaves and the king's official agents sent 410 'pieces' to the royal market. Of these Lopes chose the 320 finest specimens to be embarked at Mpinda, leaving 90 meagre and aged captives in the market.² During the next five years, until 1520, no

¹From Damião de Peres, *Brásio I*, 260.

²Afonso I of Kongo to Manuel I of Portugal, 5 October 1514. ATT - CC I 16 28. In *Brásio I*, 312-314.

known documents give any additional information about the Mbundu.

In Lisbon the Portuguese did, however, receive reports of the existence of a Mbundu state called Ndongo ruled by a king called the Ngola. Individual Portuguese had been trading along the Angola coast and possibly with Ndongo at least since 1504, in which year Manuel I decreed heavy penalties for traders sailing beyond the River Congo.¹ In 1520 a Regimento of royal instructions was drawn up at Evora ordering Manuel Pacheco and Balthasar de Castro to visit "el Rey dAngola", convert him to Christianity and prepare a full report on his country.²

The occasion for this royal embassy to Ndongo was a request for Christian missionaries sent by the Ngola via Kongo. Although this request was probably made on commercial and political grounds, a belief in Portuguese evangelical fervour may have made the Ngola think that it was on the religious plane that an appeal was most likely to be heeded. He presumably wanted to gain prestige for Ndongo by having European advisers resident at his court and may have hoped to open sea-trade links with Europe, if possible thus putting a stop to the slave raids from across his northern border. Just as the Ngola's appeal was presumably made on a false basis, the Portuguese alacrity to accept the invitation was more mercenary than idealistic. The third paragraph of the Regimento says: "Moreover we are informed that in the said

¹ ATT Llis 2-12. Brásio I, 203-204.

² Regimento de D. Manuel a Manuel Pacheco e Balthasar de Castro 16.2.1520. ATT: Livro de leys e Regimento de D. Manuel fl 1440 ff. Brásio I, 431-440.

Kingdom of Angola there is silver because we have seen it in some bracelets which came to us from the king of Kongo."¹ The ambassadors were instructed to find the source of this silver and give information on its value and accessibility. They were also asked to report on all other mines in Angola and on any other merchandise available. The lure of silver first noted in the Regimento of 1520 remained a powerful driving force of Portuguese enterprise in Angola. Even after the myth of the Cambambe silver mines was exposed a hundred years later, an enthusiastic belief in the existence of precious and other metals in Angola has periodically continued to affect Portuguese dreams and policies.

The Regimento's stress on the importance of Christianity is interesting. The chief ambition of the Ngola was to obtain European goods by opening direct trade links with the Portuguese. The Portuguese royal orders state clearly, however, that no hope of such trade was to be held out to the Ngola unless he accepted the Christian faith. Once the royal court had been converted the process of "redemptions" could begin. Redemption was the current euphemism for enslavement. 'Heathens' could thus be given the possibility of leading a Christian life in a country where they would not be subjected to the temptations of their old environment. Although they might be slaves they had gained the priceless privilege that their souls would not be condemned. The in-

¹Regimento, op.cit. 432.

structions also said that if the Ngola refused to co-operate with these evangelical ambitions and if Pacheco and Castro were unable to 'redeem' a full cargo, then the expedition was to continue southward towards the Cape of Good Hope until a load of slaves, ivory and copper had been obtained.¹

Detailed results of the 1520 mission to the Ngola are unfortunately not known. There was silence about Angola until Castro wrote from Kongo in 1526 saying that he had been a captive at the Ngola's court for the past six years and that in all that time he had seen no silver whatsoever.² It seems likely that in Ndongo, as in Kongo, there was a shifting balance of power between those in favour of admitting Europeans and those against it. The balance of these factions and the outside interference of Kongo, Portugal and the São Tomé traders, who were probably the main agents of the Brazil trade, were all important factors in the development of the Mbundu state.

Records of the growth of Mbundu kingship come mainly from oral traditions. By 1520 the Ngola was considered by the Portuguese to be the second most powerful ruler on the west coast of Central Africa, and important enough to receive a full religious and commercial mission. Although the Portuguese may have had a rather exaggerated idea of the

¹A post-script to the document orders the ambassadors to sail first to the Cape and then work up the coast to Angola. From a navigational point of view this would be much easier, following the Benguela current.

²Balthasar de Castro to João III 16.10.1526. ATT Gav. 20 4 21 Brásio I, 485-487. The assertion about the silver was either forgotten or disbelieved in Lisbon before the next Angola expedition in 1560.

Ngola's power at that time, Ndongo was certainly a growing kingdom. The first ruler in the Ndongo king-list remembered by Mukunzu, the Pende historian mentioned earlier, was a king or queen called Ngana Ngombe. He or she started the sale of slaves to the Portuguese and caused serious disorders in the country. The subsequent rulers of Ndongo in the king-list remembered by the Pende were as follows:¹

Ngola Inene Kiluanji

Ngola Ndambi Inene ia Ndjenge

Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba (who is indistinctly remembered)

Ngola Nzinga ia Bandji

Queen Njinga Pande (Nzinga Mbande)

Another and more detailed history of the early growth of Mbundu kingship was collected by Cavazzi. After describing the origins of the Mbundu he goes on to tell of the great reign of Ngola Kiluanji, the warrior before whom even the most powerful neighbouring chiefs gave way. Kiluanji's wife, Naria Ngola, had a son Naria Kiluanji, from whom descended the dynasty of Ngola Ayre* which governed Ndongo in the seventeenth century. Another wife, Kanika Kiluanji^ø, was the mother of the line of Ngola Kanini, chief of Mbaka and later king of Matamba. Kiluanji's successor as king of Ndongo was a cruel son called

¹Haveaux, op.cit., 48 and 10.

*Ngola Aarij. ^øCannica Chilugni.

Ndambi Ngola who killed all his brothers but for two who fled to Libolo and Matamba. Ndambi was succeeded by Ngola Kiluanji a great warrior who conquered wide territories and is said to have approached the coast to within eight leagues of Luanda. It is difficult to see how this ties in with the tradition that the Ngola lived on the coast until driven off by the Portuguese. Ngola Kiluanji died childless and was succeeded by Nzinga Ngola Kilombo kia Kasenda, son of Ngola Kiluanji kia Ndambi who was a 'nephew' of the original hunter Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba who came from the east. Nzinga Ngola's successor was Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji, father of Ngola Mbandi and of his sister Nzinga Mbandi. In tabular form this tradition gives a king-list as follows:¹

Ngola Kiluanji

Ndambi Ngola

Ngola Kiluanji

Nzinga Ngola Kilombo kia Kasenda (new dynasty)

Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji

Ngola Mbandi

Queen Nzinga Mbande

In comparing this tradition with that of the Pende, one interpretation might be to say that Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba, whose reign is avowedly unclear in the memory of Pende historians, is in fact an

¹Cavazzi, op.cit., 294-296.

amalgam of two reigns in between which a change of dynasty had taken place. Such an interpretation also implies that the Pende omitted the name of Ngola Mbandi, who ruled for a short while before, and under the influence of, his more famous sister. Another interpretation might be that the Pende list represents only the new dynasty to which Cavazzi refers.

Any attempt to provide even tentative dates for the reigns of the Ngolas is frustrating. The names in the lists are clan names or titles as much as proper names, and dated Portuguese references to the kings usually refer simply to the Ngola. If another name is used it is not necessarily significant. What is certain is that Queen Nzinga gained control of Ndongo about 1624. It is also fairly certain that a 'Ngola Inene' died in or shortly before 1557, and was succeeded by a 'Ndambi Ngola' which could equally be Mbandi.¹ Cavazzi said that it was Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji who received the Portuguese embassy of 1560 and had trouble with the invading Jaga or Imbangala. If this is the case a reasonable chronology could be drawn up as follows:

Nzinga Ngola Kilombi kia Kasenda - Ngola Inene Kiluanji

(who began Cavazzi's
second dynasty.)

(who asked for Portuguese
support but died c. 1557
before it came.)

¹Pero Rodrigues: (ed): Uma História da Residência dos Padres da Companhia de Jesus em Angola, 1.5.1594. A.R.S.I. Lus. 106 fls 29-39. Brásio IV, 546-581, p. 552.

Mbandi Ngola Kiluanji	- Ngola Ndambi Inene ia Ndjenge
(received Paulo Dias in
1560 and began the wars)	
(existence uncertain)	- Ngola Kiluanji kia Samba
Ngola Mbandi	- Ngola Kiluanji ia Bandji
(was Ngola by 1617)	
Queen Nzinga Mbandi	- Queen Njinga Pande
(1624-1663)	

After the first official Portuguese visit to the Ngola in 1520, the Mbundu slave trade developed rapidly. Although legally slaves could only be embarked in the Kongo port of Mpinda, an increasing number were fetched direct from the mouth of the Kwanza in Angola. The basis for the future Portuguese economy in Angola was thus laid in these years. Until the end of the nineteenth century the chief reason for Portuguese interest in this unhealthy land was as a means of providing labour for the rich plantations and mines of Brazil.

A large part of the supply of slaves undoubtedly came from the expansionist wars of the Ngolas. In a country that was probably more densely populated than Kongo, such wars may have provided a larger supply than could be obtained at Mpinda in Kongo. Moreover the Mpinda trade was controlled by royal agents of both Kongo and Portugal and traders there had to pay the requisite taxes and dues which could be avoided by trading further south. Attempts to prevent this extension of free-trading

activities were frequent but unsuccessful. The royal ban of 1504 on trade south of the Congo river has already been referred to. In 1532 the royal instructions drawn up for the new trade factor going out to São Tomé stressed that the Mani Kongo had been greatly scandalised by the direct trade with Angola which was being carried out to the detriment of his own ample supplies of slaves, ivory and copper. It was the royal wish that all cargoes be loaded in Kongo and never in Angola. Moreover, the Regimento added lamely, trading at the mouth of the Kwanza was dangerous because of the sand bar and the lack of adequate shelter.¹

Sixteen years later the Kongo king was still disturbed about Portuguese interloping on the Angola coast and João III of Portugal ordered an inquiry. São Tomé claimed that the supply at Mpinda was utterly inadequate and that ships were having to sail with a mere forty or fifty slaves on board. The Kongo reply, which was substantiated with a series of sworn testimonies, claimed that on the contrary there were far too few ships coming to Mpinda to collect the slaves available. No ship, they said, left with less than four hundred captives on board and the larger ones carried seven hundred. The shortage of transport meant that slaves had to be held over from one sailing to the next, resulting in very high costs to the suppliers both in food and in mortality. Cases were quoted of slaves who had had to wait five months for shipment and

¹Regimento do Feitor do Trato de S. Tomé, 2.8.1532. Brásio II, 14-15.

the implication was that the ships which should have been fetching them were engaged in illegal traffic on the Angola coast.¹

Despite the determined opposition of the kings of Kongo, contacts with Angola continued to grow. A letter from the trade factor at São Tomé in 1551 said that the Angola trade was quite permissible when the Kongo ports were not functioning, but goes on to admit that ships were visiting Angola although at the time trade with Kongo was flourishing.² Individual requests were made to the Portuguese king to allow trading trips to Angola. Jacome Leite applied for such a permit in 1553 subject to the consent of the king of Kongo and to the payment of the royal dues.³ At the Angolan end the trade was apparently more organised than its illegality would lead one to suppose. In 1556 the Portuguese king wrote to his counter-part in Kongo asking for permission to send a ship to Angola himself to fetch two Portuguese subjects who had been there as factor and clerk for the past six years.⁴ In the same year the Franciscans were planning to investigate the missionary field in Angola.

The result of this activity was the growth of a rivalry between the rulers of Kongo and of Ndongo. Both wanted to control the main

¹ Enquiry ordered by João III, 12.11.1548. ATT CC I 80 105 Brásio II, 197-206.

² From the secretary of the royal S. Tomé factory to the King. ? 1551 ATT CC III 17 16. Brásio II, 268.

³ Jacome Leite to King of Portugal, 8.8.1553. ATT CC I-90-126. Brásio II, 287-294.

⁴ King of Portugal to King of Kongo. August 1556, ATT. CSJ, Vol. 9, p. 61. Brásio II, 387-388.

outlet for the central African slave trade. Although the Portuguese officially backed the Kongo claim, they were also economically involved in Angola, possibly to an even greater extent. By about the 1550's the Dande seems to have become the recognised boundary between the two states. At the end of a period of economic and territorial expansion, the Ngola had emerged as a ruler of similar stature to that of Kongo. In part at least the growth of trade must have been responsible for this. In a Bantu state the king frequently held a monopoly of external trade, and if that trade was a slave trade he also controlled the supplies since he was responsible for all wars. By trading with the Mbundu, therefore, the Portuguese were themselves indirectly responsible for the emergence of a powerful unitary state in Angola, although it had been no part of their policy to promote such a development. The next stage of relations between the Mbundu and the Portuguese was the latter's attempt to curb the power of the Ngola, first trying to discover more about Ndongo and its new monarch.

The second official attempt by the Portuguese crown to make contact with the Ngola began in 1557. In that year some representatives of Ngola Inene arrived in Lisbon to ask for an embassy to be sent to the royal court of Ndongo. Antonio Mendes, one of the Jesuit mission which went out to Angola as a result of Inene's appeal, later wrote that the Ngola's deputation to Lisbon had been held up for nine years in São Tomé. He said also that it was only after that long delay that

the envoys had hit upon the idea of asking for Christian missionaries and saying that their king wished to be baptised.¹ He does not state what their original mission had been, but several causes might be suggested. It is possible that the Ngola was already being threatened by migrant groups of Jaga coming from the east and that he wanted Portuguese military aid. Another possibility is that in the economic struggle with Kongo the Ngola wanted armed protection in case his lands were invaded. The Ngola may have felt that he was now strong enough to try to have the official Portuguese slave trade transferred from the Kongo to Angola. This desire to try to increase his stake in the slave trade seems to be the most likely general cause for wishing to establish official contacts, although lesser but more specific and urgent reasons may have prompted the timing of the appeal.

The delay of nine years before Inene's embassy reached Portugal possibly reflected the hostility of São Tomé to any attempt on the part of the Ngola to make contact with the royal authorities in Lisbon. They would have been loath to see an extension of Portuguese royal influence to the coast south of Kongo. If the ambassadors really were delayed nine years they must have been sent out by Ngola Inene about 1548. If his reason for doing so was an urgent peril to the state, the probability is that the cause had passed by the time his appeal reached Lisbon. This may be one of the reasons why the reception afforded to the Portuguese

¹ Antonio Mendes S.J. to the General, 9.5.1563. B.N.R.J. I 5. 2. 38. Brásio II 497.

when they finally arrived was so cool.

The response of Queen Catherine to the Ngola's request was to organise a Jesuit religious mission with a lay leader who would act as her ambassador. Plans for sending this mission were being drawn up when, in November 1557¹ or at latest in mid-1558,² the news of Ngola Inene's death arrived in Lisbon. There was some delay while enquiries were made as to what the attitude of the new Ngola would be to such an enterprise. No real satisfaction seems to have been obtained but on 22 December 1559 the expedition nonetheless set sail in two ships. The leader was Paulo Dias de Novais, grandson of Bartholemeu Dias who was claimed to have been the first discoverer of Angola on his way to the Cape in 1488. The mission consisted of two Jesuit fathers and two lay brothers. The royal instructions given to Dias ordered him to make contact with the Ngola from the coast. If the Ngola consented to receive him he was to make his way up country and present his credentials to the court. The Jesuits would then open discussions on the possibility of converting his people to Christianity.³ The Bishop of São Tomé expressed great scepticism about the prospect of success in such an undertaking. He doubted whether any negotiation with the Ngola

¹Apontamentos sobre Paulo Dias. BNL CP Ms 647 Doc 6. Brásio II, 466.

²Trácio de Azevedo to Diogo Laínez, 19.8.1558. Brásio II, 415.

³Royal Instructions to Paulo Dias. 20.12.1559. B.N.L. CA Ms 308. Brásio II, 446-448.

could be begun until the ban on free trade with Angola had been lifted. He also complained of the importance which the Mbundu attached to their 'idols'. The carved statuettes and figurines which the Portuguese met in Ndongo were considered a powerful sign of the devil's hold on that country. The bishop's pessimism probably contained a true understanding of the commercial nature of the Ngola's desire for direct links with Europe. It was also however an opportunity to put in a word for the traders of his diocese who wanted the partially enforced ban on trade with Angola to be lifted, but did not want royal authority widened to include an agreement with the Ngola.¹

When Paulo Dias arrived at the mouth of the Kwanza on 3 May 1560 the new Ngola, Ndambi, was not sure what to do. It seems likely that he had European traders living at his court and since they represented the São Tomé 'free-traders' they probably advised him not to allow Dias to enter the country. On the other hand Ndambi knew that any embassy would be bringing substantial presents of cloth and other goods which he craved. Dias also was uncertain how to proceed. A Portuguese trader whom he met on the Kwanza firmly advised him not to sail up the river. Dias finally decided to send his kinsman Luis Dias with a message to the royal capital. Dom Antonio, the half-European sailor who had been one of old Inene's ambassadors to Portugal, acted as his guide. The

¹ Bishop of São Tomé to King Sebastian 20.2.1560. A.T.T. CC I 104-3. Brásio II, 459-461.

Ngola's reply to the first overture was that he had no interest in anything other than the gift which 'his brother' the king of Portugal had sent him. To this the Jesuits replied firmly that their only purpose in coming to Angola was to convert him and his subjects to Christianity and that the gifts which they brought were conditional upon his accepting baptism.¹

Negotiations dragged on over six months while the expedition camped at the mouth of the Kwanza. During this time many Portuguese, including one of the priests, died of fevers. The ruler of country north of the estuary was a chief called Mani Corimba who claimed to owe allegiance both to the king of Kongo and to the king of Ndongo because his lands lay between them. This chief sold food to Dias and his men and on one occasion even supplied them with three bullocks and some goats. Eventually Dias grew impatient with the delay and set out to visit the interior himself. It was said that he was being accused of cowardice in remaining on the seaboard. He sailed thirty leagues (probably about 120 miles if the estimate was accurate) up the river in a small boat with seven men. The bare country of elephants and palm-trees gave way to more populous regions with rich valleys and fresh-looking country. At the limit of navigation, probably near Massangano, the party was welcomed by one of the Ngola's tributary chiefs. They then marched several

¹This information together with nearly all the following description of Ndongo is taken from a letter of Antonio Mendes written on 9 May 1563 after he had returned to Lisbon. B.N.R.J. 1-5, 2, 38. Brásio II, 495-512.

days further on through some twenty villages to the royal city.

When they arrived they were received by an official called Mani Dongo and accommodated in three straw huts. The king sent them chickens, goats, flour, fruit and many calabashes of palm wine.

This city was a large and well built African town which the Jesuits considered to be not much smaller than their own city of Evora in Portugal.¹ After waiting a few days as was customary, the Ngola sent word that he would like to speak to the envoys. The compound in which he lived was large and complex with a stout outer defence of trees and palms planted close together and interwoven with branches. The first courtyard was used on occasions when the king met the masses of his subjects or when he was passing judicial sentences on criminals. Beyond this were further inner courts and doorways until in the heart of the complex was a patee in which the king lived and received his closest advisers and nobles. When Dias and his Jesuit companions were ushered into this central square the Ngola was seated among his courtiers drinking palm wine out of a horn which he filled from a large calabash at his side. It was the greatest honour to be invited to drink wine with the king. As a mark of esteem the ambassadors were offered "a fruit which they value very highly and call cola but which we find bitter and disagreeable as they know full well".² The Ngola showed great appreciation

¹Letter from Francisco Gouvea SJ. 1 Nov. 1564. Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1883.

²Antonio Mendes, letter cited, Brásio II, 501.

of the blue materials, woollen cloth and other gifts which were presented to him and in return gave sheep, goats, flour, wine, fruit and two cows. When the Jesuits discussed the subject of proselytising, the king was less enthusiastic but eventually agreed that fifteen or twenty of his own and his courtiers' children should be taught the principles of Christianity.

Amicable relations did not progress from there but on the contrary deteriorated rapidly. The Portuguese blamed outside interference, notably from Kongo, but the inherent stresses of the situation were probably no less important. The commercial and perhaps also religious antagonisms were bound to be translated to a political plane in which rivalry turned to open hostility. The intervention of which Antonio Mendes accused the king of Kongo was not unexpected. The king was thought to have sent word to the Ngola that the Jesuits had come to see if Angola produced silver or gold which would make it worth while for the Portuguese king to conquer his lands. This was an earnest warning based on a sound understanding of Portuguese ambitions although its motives were the interests of Kongo rather than those of Ndongo. The king of Kongo through his official monopoly of the central African slave trade was the sole legal supplier of European goods to Ndongo; a Portuguese conquest of Ndongo or even regularised trade links would rob him of this rich commercial field.

The Ngola took the warning seriously and the children who were being educated were removed from the 'seditious' care of the Jesuits.

The belongings of the ambassador and of the missionaries were impounded. Thirty of the Portuguese who were at the court were sent down to the coast to get home as best they could and nine men, including Paulo Dias, Father Gouveia and Antonio Mendes, were kept as hostages. When the news of the Ngola's hostile attitude reached São Tomé a ship was sent to the Kwanza with an interpreter to try to rescue the prisoners. The Ngola determined to get hold of the goods which the ship carried without relinquishing the advantage of holding his Portuguese captives. He allowed Antonio Mendes to go and explain to the captain that the lives of Dias and Gouveia were in danger if he did not hand over all his merchandise to the Ngola's representative. The captain handed over the goods but refused to allow Mendes to return to the court and took him to São Tomé whence the bishop sent him to report to Lisbon rather than allowing him to return to such an unpromising mission field.¹

The action of the Ngola in 1561 marked the end of the period of 'co-operation' in Afro-Portuguese relations. The Ngola hoped to be able to squeeze further advantages out of the situation, but the Portuguese were turning towards the idea of conquest. Father Gouveia wrote from his captivity that the only way to convert the people of Angola was by forcible political subjection.² The Ngola kept Dias and Gouveia in his capital partly by promises to receive baptism and partly by enforced

¹Letter from Antonio Mendes, op.cit., Brásio II, 495-512.

²Ruela Pombo: Angola Menina, Lisbon 1944, p.9.

captivity until 1565. In that year Dias was sent back to Portugal to accompany an envoy from the Ngola. He took forty copper rings, thirty-five ivory tusks, forty pieces of valuable Kikongo dye-wood, and a number of slaves. In return he was to request "thousands of things" for the Ngola.¹ Gouveia remained in Ndongo as a prisoner and eventually died there in 1575 soon after Dias had returned to Angola as conquistador.

Although the mission failed in the attempt to open friendly contacts between Ndongo and Portugal, it was historically important for the information which it supplied to the outside world about the Ngola and his subjects and lands. Antonio Mendes said that he was a fearsome ruler and that his justice was harsh. On one occasion he witnessed the execution of eleven rain-makers who had failed to attract rain when the crops needed it. The Ngola's main concern apart from the administration of justice was the conduct of wars. He had a great number of vassal chiefs who had to take up arms and follow him with their subjects when he called upon them. His captains might lead armies of four or five or even ten thousand men. On one occasion the Ngola reviewed an army estimated at fifty thousand men who filed past on a great open plain before setting out to attack twelve important chiefs who had rebelled in their allegiance. All were captured together with their wives, sons, slaves and three thousand cattle and lesser stock.

¹ Father Gouveia from Angoleme, Ndongo, 19.5.1565. Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1883, 338-339.

The booty also included copper and ivory. On another occasion the Ngola personally led an attack on a 'King of Banguella' who was captured and killed. The conquered realm was then divided between two of the Ngola's 'sons' or subjects who in return were bound to pay an annual tribute. This they soon failed to do and the Ngola had to raise a new army and attack the province once more.¹ The Jesuits were not the only people to be struck by the cruelty and warlike abilities of Ngola Ndambi. The Pende remember Ndambi as a terrible chief who repressed revolts without mercy. Their tradition represents this cruelty by a well-known cliché. When Ndambi wanted to make a surprise raid on a village he raised himself up into the air on two spears which were planted on the chests of two slaves. When the spears pierced the heart, Ngola Ndambi disappeared on his raid.²

The country around the Ndongo capital was described as fertile and populous. Numerous palm trees produced wine, oil, and fruits as well as building materials for houses and compounds. While the men were at war the women were occupied in cultivating the land and rearing cattle, goats, sheep and chickens. The main crops were millets, beans, calabashes, yams, radishes and occasionally a few bananas. Eggs were greatly valued but milk was not used. Other food included honey, pigs and a small kind of dog which was eaten with much appreciation. Birds and hares, as well as smaller animals like rats and snakes were hunted and

¹ Antonio Mendes' letter d. 1563, cited above.

² Haveaux, op.cit., 49. An almost identical tradition relates to the cruelty of the Imbangala leader Kasanje. See Vansina J.A.H., Vol. IV, 3.

hippos and crocodiles, which were eaten, were caught in the Kwanza and Lukala Rivers. Very little fishing was done. Throughout the country daily markets were held for the exchange of foodstuffs. The universal currency of Ndongo was rock salt. This salt was brought from the mines in Kisama in square blocks about 3 span wide. Three of these blocks would buy a goat and fourteen or fifteen were the price of an ox or cow. Chickens sold for six to the block or three if they were capons.¹

The location of the capital city of Ndongo and the exact limits of the kingdom as a whole are not easy to define. It would appear that the Ngola no longer controlled Luanda which was considered to be part of the Kongo domains. He did however have some claim to suzerainty over the Mani Corimba at the mouth of the Kwanza and also as far north as the Dande river. The importance of cattle suggests that the heartland of Ndongo may have been on the edge of the plateau rather than in the wooded foothills of the lower Lukala. There was probably more than one royal city in the metropolitan area of Ndongo. Father Gouveia lived in Ngoleme, which he refers to as a city of five or six thousand houses with a strong outer wall. It was burnt down by a tremendous fire in 1564.² The Ngola then moved to another city called Kabasa.

The release of Paulo Dias from Ndongo in 1565 concludes the first stage of the history of European activity in West Central Africa. The

¹ Antonio Mendes.

² Father Gouveia 1.11.1564. Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Vol. for 1883, 303-304.

crucial new factor which had been introduced into the area was sea-trade. Earlier the states of the region had their backs to the sea and faced inland. The sea was only important for the salt deposits which formed on the coast. In itself it was of no value and only hindered further progress westward in search of new lands and riches. The coming of the Portuguese, the men from the sea, radically altered this outlook. A new source of riches, greater than any discovered before, was found to exist beyond the ocean. The effects of the new trade were twofold: the first was a weakening effect due to the drain of manpower and the second was a strengthening as those who controlled the slave trade gained wealth and power from the European goods which they obtained in return.

The first area in which the new trade operated was Kongo. Fairly rapidly however the emphasis shifted southward to the southern boundaries of the kingdom. The diverse reasons for this shift probably included the greater density of population in Angola, the easy access to the interior by the Kwanza river, the rapid growth in the demand for slaves and possibly the fact that Kongo, unlike Ndongo, was strong enough to impose its own terms on the trade. The volume of the Mpinda slave trade was estimated in 1536 to be between 4000 and 5000 slaves a year as mentioned above. The Kongo slave dealers who complained of a shortage of ships in 1548, said that each ship carried four hundred slaves but gave no indication of how many ships a year called at Mpinda.¹ The same account

¹Enquiry into São Tomé trade, 12.11.1548, quoted above, Brásio II, 197.

gives the impression that even by 1548 trade with Angola was considerable. It is perhaps unlikely, however, to have reached, by then, the volume achieved during the early years of the Portuguese conquest, when an average of about 3,000 slaves per annum were being shipped officially from Luanda.¹ This Portuguese conquest of Angola began to be considered as soon as Paulo Dias was released from the Ngola's capital and allowed to return to Portugal in 1565.

¹Abreu e Brito: Um inquérito à vida administrativa e economica de Angola e do Brazil, 1591. Published by Albuquerque Felner in Coimbra, 1931. p.30.

Chapter Three

THE BEGINNING OF THE PORTUGUESE CONQUEST OF NDONGO 1565 - 1603

The first phase of Portuguese activity in West Central Africa had been predominantly peaceful in that Europeans had not been intent on conquering any African state. The wars that had taken place had been the attacks of stronger African states against their weaker neighbours with the aim of obtaining slaves to sell. In particular the centralized kingdom of Kongo had attacked the smaller and less organised state or states of the Mbundu. Any Portuguese participation in these wars was in a secondary role. The second phase of European activity in the Kongo-Angola region was in marked contrast to this. The Portuguese made a conscious decision to attack with a view to territorial conquest. The decision to do this may have been precipitated by a crisis which arose in Kongo. This crisis was the invasion of the Jaga and the expulsion of the Portuguese from Kongo.¹

The Jaga invasion of Kongo took place during the late 1560's. In about 1569 they captured the city of Mbanza Kongo and the king had to flee to an island refuge in the Congo estuary. By February 1571 news of the disaster had reached Lisbon,² and an army of 600 European soldiers was rapidly raised under the command of Captain Francisco de Gouveia,³

¹The nature and origins of the Jaga will be discussed in Chapter IV.

²A.T.T. Chancelaria de D. Sebastião, liv. 25, fl 123. Brásio III, 122.

³Captain Francisco de Gouveia, leader of the Kongo expeditionary force of 1571-1576, should not be confused with Father Francisco de Gouveia S.J., Missionary to Ndongo 1560-1575.

former captain of the island of São Tomé, to go and help the king of Kongo. The expeditionary force sailed in March 1571 and on reaching Kongo combined with King Alvaro's refugee army.¹ They left the Island of Hippopotami in the Congo River and attacked the enemy on the mainland. Duarte Lopez, the chief source of information about the Jaga invasion, said that the noises of the old arquebuses was sufficient to put the Jaga to flight. Within eighteen months Alvaro had been restored to his capital and could begin to repair the damage.² In March 1574 the king of Portugal wrote to Gouveia saying that his mission had now been successfully completed and that he could return to Europe. Before doing so, however, he was to build a fort, at the expense of the king of Kongo, in which the king and the Portuguese residents at his court could take refuge in the event of a further attack by the Jaga.³ Gouveia finally arrived back in Lisbon in September 1577 and died shortly afterwards at the age of seventy.⁴ Several of his companions remained in Kongo where they became prosperous traders.⁵ Many of them established private armies to protect them from further attacks and also, undoubtedly, to assist in the acquisition of slaves.

¹Epitaph on the tomb of Captain Gouveia. Brásio III, 121-122.

²Lopez-Pigafetta, op.cit., 109.

³King of Portugal to Gouveia 19.3.1574. In Manuel de Santos: História Sebastica cited by Brásio, III, 120-121.

⁴Gouveia's epitaph. Brásio, III, 121-122.

⁵Lopez-Pigafetta, 110.

The Jaga invasion had a profound influence on the Portuguese. The shock of seeing the powerful kingdom of Kongo overthrown by a few hordes of nomads was long remembered. The name Jaga became synonymous with plundering and cannibalism. Apart, however, from the awe inspired by these invaders, there were hard practical considerations of an economic and political nature. Paulo Dias and many other Portuguese had already for some years been contemplating the possibility of a southward shift in the main Portuguese trading base from Kongo to the populous Mbundu country. It was suggested that armed force should be used to secure a firmer hold there than was possible in a country where Kongo sovereignty was recognised. There was now also a fear that if the Jaga could invade once, they could invade again. In addition to this the Teke, who had been attacking Kongo from the north in the 1560's and thus diverting the army just at the time when the Jaga were threatening the eastern frontier, might take advantage of the confusion to invade the Kongo kingdom again and with greater success than before. For these reasons the Portuguese position in Kongo now appeared highly insecure. It is significant therefore that within eight months of the news of the Jaga disaster reaching Lisbon, Paulo Dias received a charter allowing him to conquer territory in Angola. He had been lobbying for this charter for the past five years.¹

An important plea for the conquest of Angola was made by Father

¹Dias probably arrived back in Lisbon and began planning the conquest of Angola in 1565 or 1566. The news of the Jaga invasion arrived before February 1571. The charter was granted on 19 September 1571.

Gouveia the Jesuit missionary who was kept a captive at the court of Ngola Ndambi from 1560 until his death in 1575. In a long letter which he wrote to his superior in about 1563, he said that the only way seriously to convert a 'heathen' people to Christianity was by subjecting them to colonial rule. The example of Kongo had shown how weak and superficial Christianity became in a country which was not politically dominated by a Christian power. The refusal of the king of Ndongo to allow preaching in his lands was ample justification for the Portuguese to declare war and take away his kingdom. The Ngola should be punished at once for accepting presents from the Jesuit mission and then refusing to listen to the word of God.¹

To add economic incentive to his evangelistic plea for a holy war on Ndongo, Father Gouveia described the supposed riches of the country. These, he said, would soon repay the costs of the conquest. The first source of wealth was the Kissama salt mines to the south of the Kwanza River ten or fifteen leagues from the sea. Apart from being the normal currency of Ndongo, salt was a valuable commodity and traders from many nations in the interior came to the Mbundu markets to buy it. The Mbundu also had plenty of copper which they made into bracelets, necklaces and anklets. Father Gouveia was convinced that there were rich veins of silver in the mountains of Ndongo, especially in one near to the road leading from the Kwanza river port to the royal city. This

¹Report on Angola drawn from the letters of Father Gouveia and Paulo Dias de Novais. B.N.L. FG MS 8123 in Ruela Pombo: Angola Menina, Lisbon 1944. Also see Brásio II, 518-521. Dated 1563 by reference to 'three years captivity'.

mountain, owned by a chief called 'Ombe Amoguila', was probably the Cambambe Hill which the Portuguese eventually conquered at great cost. Gouveia maintained that the reason why the silver was never seen was that the king of Kongo had warned the Ngola that the Portuguese would conquer his country if they heard about it. If this happened, he said, the king of Kongo's trade might move to Angola and because 'his land is sterile, he would remain a sad king without trade'.¹ Another advantage put forward for conquering Ndongo was the alleged closeness of Moçambique and Sofala. Gouveia said that the 'Dambia Songe' who lived in a large kingdom seventeen days journey to the east of Ndongo, came to buy salt and copper² in the Kabasa market and talked of the eastern seaboard as though familiar with it. The prospect of quick access to the mines of Monomatapa without having to sail round the Cape must have had a strong appeal to the authorities in Lisbon, however unlikely it may appear in the light of later geographical revelations.

As a final shot to drive home his argument, Gouveia referred to the 'insolence' of the Mbundu in their treatment of white men. They lacked respect even for the ambassador of the great king of Portugal, whom they robbed even of his personal clothing. They accused him of spying and inferred that the Jesuits were a mere cover for his activities. They taunted the Portuguese by saying that if it were not for the sea

¹Ruela Pombo, op.cit., 11 quoting B.N.L. FG 8123.

²The reference clearly says that they came to fetch copper not to sell it.

they would conquer Portugal and help themselves to the riches to be found there. Gouveia stressed that the Portuguese king must give exemplary punishment to those who expressed such ideas and show once and for all that he was the real master of all 'Ethiopia'.¹

This strong plea for evangelisation by the sword also contains a short memorandum drawn from a letter written by Dias himself, probably while still a captive at the Ngola's court. He said that labour was very plentiful in Angola and that subjects would work for their king or overlord when their own crops had been sown. With such plentiful manpower the Portuguese would be able to build a civilization in Angola surpassing that of the Romans. There should be little difficulty in persuading Portuguese noblemen to emigrate with their vassals in return for the grant of a title or of a pension which could be drawn from the land conquered. With the help of people from São Tomé and a few noble leaders, Dias considered it possible to establish a white colony on the cool plateau behind the fever-ridden coast.²

These ambitions of the advocates of a new, active policy in Angola, received great stimulus from the Portuguese military intervention in Kongo. One result of Captain Gouveia's expulsion of the Jaga from Kongo was to demonstrate that European troops could operate effectively in tropical Africa. The success of a small army of 600 white soldiers must have given

¹Ruela Pombo op.cit., 5-16, quoting B.N.L. FG 8123.

²B.N.L. FG Ms 8123 drawn up from a letter of Paulo Dias. In Ruela Pombo, op.cit. 17-19.

great encouragement to Paulo Dias and his associates planning the conquest of Angola. Lopez had claimed that even the noise of fire-arms was enough to drive the Jaga out of Kongo. In later years the conquistadores were to discover that European troops were not as effective as they had supposed, and that the gun was not as superior to the bow as they had been led to believe. The conquerors came to rely on the ~~same~~ massive armies of bowmen that were used by the kings of Kongo. In the years 1571 to 1574, however, these developments were unknown, and the success of a few Europeans with guns against the Jaga greatly stimulated the grandiose and almost dream-like plans for conquest and white settlement in Angola which were being prepared with royal approval and Jesuit encouragement.

On 19 September 1571¹ a charter of donation was drawn up for Paulo Dias de Novais. Two theologians certified that military subjection would be beneficial in spreading the Christian faith. Dias was made hereditary overlord of the donataria, which was the territory south of the Kwanza, and governor for life of the colony between the Kwanza and the Dande River, which formed the boundary of Kongo. The southern limit of the donataria was thirty-five leagues south of the Kwanza and the eastern border could be pushed as far as the conquerors were able to go.²

The obligations which Dias took on were so heavy as to be almost absurd. The southern section, of which Dias became 'Lord-Proprietor',

¹Felner read the text as 'seix' (six) but Brásio read it as 'xjx' (nineteen).

²Carta de Doação à Paulo Dias de Novais, 19.9.1571. A.T.T. Chancelaria de D. Sebastião (Doações) Liv. 26, fl 295-299. Brásio, III, 36-51.

consisted of a stretch of barren coast with a sparse population and a rainfall of only about ten inches a year. On this coast he undertook to settle one hundred white, non-Jewish families with wives and children within the space of six years. He was to provide the farmers with plants and seeds. The crown would provide neither capital, nor loans, nor would it furnish arms, ships, food or ammunition. All costs were to be born by the donatario. The military obligations were no lighter. Dias was to take eight sea-going vessels to Angola and three fishing boats for fluvial navigation. He undertook that within twenty months of leaving Lisbon he would have 400 trained soldiers, 18 masons and builders, a physician and a barber in the colony. He was to take enough food for all his men for one year. From the six horses which he had to take he was to breed twenty within three years. In the first ten years he was to build three castles. One had to be at the chief port to ward off foreign attack. It was to be 40 fathoms wide and as many long, and the walls were to be nine feet thick and thirty high. The other two forts were to be built at suitable sites inland. To protect them from sudden attack by the Mbundu, when they arrived temporary fortifications of timber and earth were to be thrown up.

The attitude of the Church to the venture was interesting. It had progressed little since 1452, in which year the Pope wrote to the king of Portugal saying: "We grant you full rights to capture the Saracens, pagans and other infidels in your properties ... to subjugate them

and reduce them to perpetual slavery".¹ The Charter stated that before slaves were certified as true captives and shipped to the mother country, the 'necessary justifications' must be made in accordance with the orders of the Mesa de Conciencia. Although the importance of proselytising in Africa had been so strongly stressed in the original pleas for conquest, the Charter itself only mentioned ecclesiastical affairs in a post-script. This said that the expedition was to take three clergy to hear confessions and administer the sacraments to its members. The Donatario was to be responsible for building a church dedicated to Saint Sebastian and would provide all the necessary furnishings, ornaments and vestments at his own expense.

In return for his large out-lay, Dias was to receive all taxation in the donataria, and one third of the colony's taxes, especially those on slaves. He gained a monopoly of the *Nzimbu* shells which were fished up in Luanda and sent to Kongo to be used as currency. He was allowed to export 48 slaves per annum free of duty, but had to pay 1,600 reis tax on all others. He would own all water-mills and receive a half-tythe on all fish caught. Finally he was to take possession of all the salt mines, both inland and by the sea. It may have been from this last provision that Dias hoped to make a profit. The slabs of Kisama rock salt came from mines within the donataria, but Dias never conquered them nor any other part of his Kisama domains.²

¹Baião: História da Expansão Portuguesa no Mundo, Vol. II, 268. Lisbon 1939.

²Donation Charter, Brásio III, 36-51.

The ambitious plans laid down in the charter were never in fact carried out. The first reason for rapid failure was the high mortality rate among Europeans on the Angola coast. Although Dias should have expected this from his knowledge of the country, he was still defeated by it. Secondly the hostile opposition of the Africans was stronger and more organised than the architects of colonization had supposed. Thirdly the climate of the coast proved unsuitable for agriculture. Even drinking water was often scarce in Luanda and the rainfall was quite inadequate for most crops. Finally, ^{and} this was probably the most important factor of all, the slave trade dominated all other activities. Its supremacy is a theme which constantly recurs in the history of Angola. At least until the nineteenth century it undermined all attempts to diversify the economy of the country.

The colonising expedition left Lisbon towards the end of 1574,¹ three years after the granting of the charter. On December 17 it passed the Cape Verde Islands and a month later sighted the island of Annobon in the Gulf of Guinea. On 20 February 1575² the main body of the expedition arrived at Luanda. On Luanda Island the colonisers found forty Portuguese already settled. They were rich traders who had escaped from Kongo 'because of the Jacas, ferocious barbarians who nourish themselves on human meat'.³ There were also in the bay seven slave ships which had

¹Pero Rodrigues (ed), op.cit., gives 23.10.1574.

²Garcia Simões to the Provincial, 20.10.1575. B.N.L. CA Ms 308 fl. 215-220v. Brásio, III, 129-142. The alternative date of 11.12.1575 given by Rodrigues suggests that the expedition did not arrive all at the same time.

³Rodrigues, op.cit.

come from São Tomé to trade. Luanda Island's African population, which was estimated at 3,000, was mainly engaged in fishing nzimbu shells for currency.

Most of the information about the early years of the Portuguese settlement and the beginning of the Angolan Wars is obtained from the letters of the Jesuit fathers who accompanied Dias or who were sent out to join him later.¹ Father Simões gained a first impression of the country very different from the glowing accounts of Dias and Gouveia a few years before. He said that the people were cannibals and that shortly before his arrival in Luanda they had killed and eaten four white men in a nearby village. The kingdom of Ndongo was, he said, divided up among ten or twelve powerful chiefs who each had the right to sell or kill their subjects. Simões was decidedly unimpressed by Luanda and its environs. Food was scarce, the main crops being beans and millet. Occasionally a goat or some bananas were brought from the interior to barter. He did not like the local luxuries of palm wine and cola nuts. Water was in short supply and on the island could only be obtained by digging shallow pits in the sand and hoping that the water which seeped into them would not be brackish.²

When Dias arrived in Luanda, Ngola Ndambi may already have been dead. If he was dead then Ngola Kiluanji was a separate king as the Pende

¹The letters written from Angola during the governorship of Paulo Dias by the Jesuits were first published from Paris manuscript versions in the Boletim of the Lisbon Geographical Society for the year 1883. They were republished with some commentary by Gastão de Souza Dias in Relações de Angola, Coimbra 1934. They were republished again from Lisbon and Oporto manuscripts by António Brásio, Vol. III. The main reference is B.N.L. CA Ms. 308. Subsequent foot-notes will normally refer to these letters by the name of the author and the date only.

²Garcia Simões, 20.10.1575.

tradition tentatively suggests. Unfortunately there appears to be no record of his death, nor is there a clear record to assist in the matter of the name of the Ngola who watched the establishment of the Luanda colony from his capital beyond the Lukala River. It cannot even be stated for certain where the Mbundu capital city was at this time. The evidence is so contradictory that it must be assumed that within the metropolitan province of Museke, between the Lukala and the Kwanza, the Ngola had a number of capitals. One of these, which is clearly remembered by the Pende, was the rocky fastness of Pungu a Ndongo where the Ngola could withdraw in times of danger. Kabasa, a royal town which several early European visitors saw, seems to have been a short way south of the latter site of Mbaka.* One reference placed the Ngola's capital at 'Gloanga Loanba', 15 days journey from the coast.¹

As to the death of Ndambi there are two rather uncertain references in the correspondence of the 1560 Jesuit mission. In May 1563 Mendes said that the king was called 'Ngola Quiloange'.² Kiluanji was the name generally given to Ndambi's successor, but it may also have been a title applicable to any Ngola. Rather more interesting than this is a remark of Father Francisco de Gouveia. He wrote that he rarely

¹Garcia Simões 20.10.1575.

²António Mendes 9.5.1563.

* Ambaca or Enbaca.

saw the king but that his warder, 'Gongacinza', told him that this king had only recently begun to reign and assured him that later he would call upon the father to come and instruct him.¹ If he referred to Ngola Ndambi, the 'short time' would mean at least six years and perhaps longer. It is possible that, unbeknown to the captive Jesuit, a new Ngola had replaced the cruel Ndambi by 1564.

Whoever the Ngola was in 1575, it is certain that from his capital on the plateau he carefully watched the new developments on Luanda Bay. His opening move was to welcome Dias by sending an embassy down to the coast to greet him. The ambassador took four months over the journey and on his way levied 100 slaves and a great many cattle to present on the king's behalf. A grand reception was prepared by the Portuguese. The embassy arrived blowing ivory horns, ringing double bells and rattling calabash gourds. After the Ngola's credentials had been presented, Dias explained that he had been sent by his king to facilitate the activities of European traders and to help solve legal disputes. A bowl of cola nuts was then handed round as a gesture of good-will and friendship. The Ngola probably hoped to acquire a new load of presents from the Portuguese king by his friendly approach, while Dias was anxious not to do anything which might endanger the safety of Father Gouveia, who was still alive at the Ngola's court.²

¹Father Gouveia to Diogo Mirão 1.11.1564.

²Garcia Simões to the Provincial 20.10.1575.

The Portuguese attempt to dissimulate their military intentions did not succeed. Simões said that, as on the occasion of the previous Portuguese embassy, it was envoys from the king of Kongo who warned the Ngola that the white men had come to conquer his kingdom.¹ Alvaro I, however, strongly denied any complicity.² European traders at the Ndongo court who were opposed to the granting of a charter for Angola may have advised the Ngola of the military ambitions of the Dias expedition. This warning caused the Ngola to threaten the lives of all the Europeans at his court, including Gouveia. He took no action however, and soon after, Gouveia died of fever and from the deprivations of his fifteen years' captivity. Losing this hostage was a serious blow to the Ngola. He accused the Kongo envoys of witchcraft and sent them to Luanda to face trial by the Portuguese whose designs they had been trying to sabotage. It was believed in Ndongo that the presence of the priest had helped attract trade.

Before preparing for war, Dias tried to recall to Luanda all the European traders spread over Angola. At the time the trade was flourishing. Simões says that in 1576 14,000 slaves were bought by traders in Angola, although 4,000 of them died. This figure is difficult to reconcile with a later analysis of the slave trade made in 1591, which said that between 1575 and 1591 52,000 slaves in total were exported from Luanda.

¹Garcia Simões, 20.10.1575.

²Alvaro I to Garcia Simões 27.8.1575.

Various reasons could account for the wide divergence. The figure given by Simões may have been merely an optimistic estimate, and the later account would not have included the slaves smuggled to Brazil to avoid paying duty. The figure of 1591 refers to 'pieces of India'. Since all except young men slaves were counted as less than one 'piece', 52,000 'pieces' may have represented a much greater number of head of slaves. Another point is that in the pre-war days of friendly trading with the Ngola the quantity of slaves obtained may have been greater than it was after the outbreak of hostilities. Simões said, for instance, that nearly all the inhabitants of Ndongo appeared to be slaves of the king and that the usual form of punishment for crimes such as robbery or adultery was to be sold to the Portuguese.¹ This practice may have declined with the outbreak of war. Furthermore, in trying to relate these two figures it must be remembered that the first figure is for the number of slaves bought and the second for the number shipped overseas. In neither case do we know how many were kept as domestic slaves and as military auxiliaries.

In 1576 the settlers and their Jesuit companions moved from Luanda Island to the mainland, probably to a site near the present fort of São Miguel on a high promontory overlooking the bay. Until 1579 relations between the Mbundu and the Portuguese remained quiet and trade continued to flourish. There was a minor skirmish in the Spring of 1577 but war

¹Garica Simões, 7.11.1576.

did not break out and furtive prospecting for silver mines continued. A more serious problem than Mbundu hostility was the difficulty of enforcing upon the Portuguese the governor's claim to a monopoly of the slave trade on the whole coast. Traders continued to negotiate directly with the Congo River ports without his permission, and this seriously reduced the potential revenue of the colony. During these early years the Jesuits seem to have been more preoccupied with the depredations of leopards and elephants than with the serious problems of war and evangelisation. They also suffered from fevers and both Garcia Simões and a lay brother died and had to be replaced from Lisbon. The picture of the colony during these early years was one of fevers, frequent deaths and large-scale slave trading. The general gloom was only tempered by the dreams and hopes of riches to come and of souls to be saved.

Open war between the Ngola and the Portuguese appears to have broken out in 1579. In April of that year Pero da Fonseca, the Governor's representative at Kabasa, the royal capital, reported that a clash had occurred there between those Portuguese whose first loyalty was to the Governor, Dias, and those who recognised the Ngola as an absolute sovereign.² A Portuguese trader who had long been resident in Ndongo apparently told the Ngola to beware of the conquering ambitions of Paulo Dias. To the

¹Dias de Novais, 3.1.1578. B.M. add. Ms 20 786, fls 45-47. Brásio IV, 292-299.

²Testimony of Pero da Fonseca, 18.4.1579. B.M. Add. Ms 20 786, fl 145. Brásio IV, 308-309.

Portuguese this was treason. The Ngola took the warning seriously and consulted his most senior advisers, among them the Tendala and the Kitinga. They decided to take the initiative. Rumours of an imminent attack on Kabasa were spread and in the panic which followed, the thirty or forty Europeans at court were mobilised to help repel the fictitious enemy. Once outside the town the Europeans were killed by the soldiers who accompanied them. Other white traders dispersed over the country were also killed.¹ Frutuoso Ribeiro, a Jesuit priest, said that in addition to the thirty Portuguese, a large number of their Christian slaves were killed.

It seems that at this time Kabasa was the main staple for the slave trade. Traders and soldiers who could obtain credit, went to the city with loads of goods, especially cloth, which they gradually bartered for slaves. The ships which brought the goods waited meanwhile in Luanda for a return load of slaves. In 1579, when the Ngola killed all the Portuguese in his kingdom, the trade goods stock-piled in Kabasa were said to represent the cargoes of ten or twelve ships. These goods fell into the Ngola's hands without his having to pay for them since their owners were dead. The loss to the Portuguese was estimated at 20,000 cruzados (8 million reis) and several ships had to leave Luanda empty.

The Ngola followed up this challenge to the Portuguese by a direct

¹ Pero Rodrigues, op.cit.

military assault. An army of 12,000 Mbundu soldiers attacked the small fort of Nzele* which Paulo Dias had built some thirty miles inland from Luanda. The governor managed to hold out with sixty European and 200 African troops, but from then on all-out war was inevitable. Dias said that he would never trust the Ngola again or offer him peace terms should he ask for them. The Portuguese would fight all the way to the silver mines, using Kongo allies if necessary.¹

The Portuguese offensive began in September 1580. The plan was to follow the line of the Kwanza River inland as far as the supposed mines at Cambambe. Dias crossed the neck of land between Luanda and the northward bend of the Kwanza with an initial force of 300 European soldiers and 200 trained slaves. It was intended to recruit more followers as they advanced. Whenever possible the Portuguese used terrorist tactics rather than risking pitched battles.² Their main difficulty was obtaining food. No provisions could be carried since none were available at the coast. The army had therefore to live off the land, and raids on villages were often carried out primarily to obtain food supplies rather than to defeat the enemy.

The Portuguese army was at all times small in terms of European soldiers. Rodrigues says that Dias arrived with 700 men of arms³ but

¹Frutuoso Ribeiro, 4.3.1580. B.N.L. CA Ms 308 fls 221-223. Brásio III, 187-190. (Other MSS in Porto and Paris give this document the date 14 or 24 March 1580.)

²Balthasar Afonso, S.J., 4.7.1581. Father Afonso describes how the Portuguese burnt people alive in their huts and how disembodied heads were used to great effect to frighten adversaries.

³Pero Rodrigues, op.cit., 364-365.

*Anzelle.

Abreu put his army at 350, 'mainly rogues and cobblers', many of whom returned on the ships which had brought them.¹ The high mortality among Europeans on the fever-ridden coast meant that reinforcements were continually being demanded. In 1578 Antonio Lopez Peixoto arrived with 400 soldiers and much ammunition and trade cloth which had been sent by António Dias, the father and financial backer of the Governor. In 1579 Cardinal Henrique, temporarily king of Portugal, helped to finance a further force of 200 men. After Philip of Spain had 'bought, inherited and conquered' the Portuguese crown in 1580 he sent out three more batches of reinforcements. In 1584 João Castanho Velez led 200 soldiers who went to Angola with the new public treasury officials and experts on mining. In 1586 Jacome da Cunha sailed with 90 more and in the following year 350 Germans, Flemings and Castillians reached Angola. These last nearly all died of fever before seeing any military action. To summarise the situation, the Rodrigues document estimated that over two thousand soldiers went to Angola in the 20 years from 1575 to 1594. Of these three-fifths died of fever or left the country, 450 died in war and by 1594 a mere 300 still survived in the camps and garrisons of the colony.²

Because of this constant shortage of European troops, the army depended largely on African slave-soldiers and the private armies of allied

¹Abreu e Brito, op.cit.

²Pero Rodrigues, op.cit. 364-365.

or conquered Mbundu chiefs, or sobas as they were called. With one or two hundred European guns and several thousand African bowmen and lancers the Portuguese were usually willing to risk a battle, although they suffered several heavy defeats against the huge armies which opposed them. The quality of the guns sent to Angola was so bad that they sometimes killed the user instead of the enemy, but fire-power was nonetheless considered essential, so that when powder supplies ran low the Portuguese were confined to their forts.¹

During October 1580 Dias marched up the Kwanza from the settlements on the lower reaches. Palm oil, grain and cattle were the main booty taken. A salt depot was destroyed on the trade-route from the Ndemba mines in Kisama to the markets of Ndongo. The chief Mushima Kita Mborje* offered his subjection to the Governor and became a vassal of the king of Portugal. Early in November the party landed at Makunde a short way below the confluence of the Lukala with the Kwanza. They built a fortified camp and settled down to rest. The rains began and fevers took a heavy toll of the more recently arrived European troops. Foraging parties went out from Makunde into the provinces of Ilamba to the north and Kisama to the south. The Mbundu kept up guerrilla attacks and at least one sortie ended in disaster for the Portuguese. Unable to move, Dias waited for a relieving army from Kongo to come and help him to attack the Ngola. This Kongo army was said by Father Afonso to comprise 60,000

¹Balthasar Afonso, S.J. 19.1.1585.

*Mazima Quitambonge.

men, led by 50 European soldiers. It was however completely defeated by the Mbundu before it was able to reach Makunde and the Kongo warriors fled with heavy loss of life. This battle probably took place in the first half of 1581.¹

One of the main results of this defeat of Portugal's Kongo allies was that Mbundu Sobas who had defected to the Portuguese side, now feared that the Europeans would no longer be able to protect them against their former suzerain, the Ngola. Many therefore transferred their allegiance back to their fellow-countrymen.² 1581 and 1582 were dark years for the expeditionary army trying to force its way through the hostile and densely populated Mbundu country to the supposed silver mines of Cambambe. Towards the end of the latter year however Dias moved on again from Makunde and on 2nd February 1583 came face to face with a huge army which the Ngola had raised.³ The battle was fought at Tala Ndongo, the gateway to the king's country. Although the Portuguese claimed the victory, they were too exhausted to follow it up and fell back to a strong position at the confluence of the Lukala and Kwanza rivers. The site was named after Our Lady of Victory and the town of Massangano which grew up there became the focal point of Portuguese activity throughout the Angolan Wars. Smaller battles were also fought during 1583, and Father Afonso referred to one in which 619 noses were cut off as trophies by the Portuguese and

¹Balthasar Afonso, S.J. 4.7.1581 and Balthasar Barreira S.J. 31.1.1582.

²Barreira 31.1.1582.

³The absurd references to the army being one million strong is probably a misreading: 'hum conto' (one million) instead of 'sem conto' (without number).

to another in which a Soba was made to pay 100 slaves before his head was cut off.¹ In order to cause the greatest hardship to their enemies the Portuguese cut down the palm trees in the villages, thus depriving the Mbundu of palm wine, their main alcoholic drink.²

By the time João Castanho Vellez arrived in Luanda with his reinforcements in 1584, Massangano was desperately short of powder and shot. The new captain was sent almost immediately up country to launch a new attack on the Soba Kalunga in the province of Museke* beyond the Lukala. Museke was the rich country in which the Ngola lived and in which the mines were supposed to be. Velez attacked an army of people called 'Soasas' who probably belonged to the Impangala invaders discussed in the next chapter. This enemy was defeated but while the Portuguese were rejoicing and feasting on the spoils, the Soasas returned, ostensibly to ask for peace, but in fact to wipe out most of the unsuspecting Portuguese force. The survivors buried their guns, burnt their trade cloth and limped away under cover of the night while the Soasas killed the wounded who rested by the wayside. This defeat took place on Christmas Eve 1585. Meanwhile on the other side of the Lukala River André Fereira Pereira, who was later to govern the colony for a short while in 1591, had more success in resubjugating the sobas of Ilamba who had risen against

¹Afonso 3.10.1583.

²Afonso 19.1.1585.

* Moseque

the Portuguese as soon as the main force had moved towards Cambambe. A battle was fought in thick mist during which many of the leading Mbundu chiefs were killed. Pereira sent the heads of three of them to Luanda as trophies.

The small size of the European armies and the unreliability of the allied sobas meant that little progress was made in the year immediately after 1585. The Portuguese were more or less confined to Massangano. It was rumoured that the Ngola had fled from Kabasa. He had built a line of timber forts at intervals of one day's march by which he could retreat if the threat of his enemies came too close.¹ It was not until 1589 that the next major effort to capture Kabasa was made. Before the campaign began Dias himself died, probably on 9 May 1589.² In his will he appointed Luis Serrão to succeed him as governor. Serrão led his army along the Lukala to a site called Ngoleme a Kitambu* which may have been the Ngoleme at which Father Gouveia had been a captive in 1564. It was probably in the region of the later fort of Mbaka. / At this place Serrão was severely defeated on 28 December 1590 by a large army which, according to Abreu, was an alliance of the 'King of Matamba', some Kongo troops, the Ndongo army, the 'Guindas' and the 'Yagua Kings' who bordered on the kingdom of Angola.³ It must be suspected that Abreu

¹Diogo da Costa S.J. 20.7.1585.

²Sinopsis Analium Societatis Jesu ... 1540-1725 p. 151. Cited by Mathias Dalgado (ed) in Cadornega, I, 45.

³Abreu e Brito, op.cit., 41.

*Anguoleme Aquitambo.

/ Ambaca.

was trying to justify the Portuguese rout by listing all the powerful rulers he could think of as the united adversary.

The beaten Portuguese force comprised 125 European arquebus infantry, 15,000 African bowmen and three Portuguese horsemen.¹ The 'Matamba army', as Abreu called it, was composed of three sections which attacked frontally and then sent out wings which surrounded the enemy. Serrão decided to retreat as best he could and in fifteen days' march arrived in the vicinity of Massangano. The defeat was costly in terms of cash as well as in the number of lives lost. It was the practice for traders with their loads of trade-goods to accompany the army and buy slaves during the campaigns. When Serrão's army was routed he not only abandoned the army's baggage but also all the fazenda or trade cloth which the merchants had with them. This loss was serious even if Abreu's estimate that it represented the cargoes of twenty-four ships is an exaggeration.²

The death of Dias and the defeat of 1590 mark the end of the first stage in the Portuguese struggle for Angola. They also mark the end of the donataria which had already been challenged by the Spanish kings. The crown now took over all proprietary rights and responsibilities for Angola. Abreu e Brito was sent out to Angola to conduct a full investi-

¹Abreu e Brito, op.cit. 41.

²Ibid. Pero Rodrigues op.cit. Brásio IV, 574; Felner op.cit. 170, Abreu gives the date as the day of Innocents (28 December), 1590. Rodrigues gives 29 December 1589. The former date seems confirmed by a doc. B.N.L. CP Ms 644 fl 333 in Brásio III, 429-430 which refers to a split in Serrão's army following, on 26 Dec. 1590.

gation into the political and military situation and to form an opinion about the commercial prospects of the colony.

Abreu's report is particularly curious in its acceptance of all the old myths. It re-states the attitudes and ambitions of the donation charter written twenty years earlier. Angola is still 'the most populous country on earth' and its riches are still the silver mines and other minerals.¹ The aim was to conquer the Mbundu, and Abreu devotes most of his time to discussing how this should be achieved. His attitude is that adopted by the Jesuits, maintaining that it was intolerable impudence on the part of 'native' princes to resist the wishes of the king of Portugal.² The Portuguese clung to the conviction that for anyone to fight against them was 'rebellion', and that to oppose them was 'treason'. Abreu's case held that it was useless to send small reinforcements to Angola because they were just frittered away against the might of the Mbundu armies. A large army should be sent out which could settle the question once and for all. The noble sobas must be conquered and subjugated each in turn. The army must be seen to be ~~conquered and subjugated each in turn. The army must be seen to be~~ powerful enough to protect those who joined it against their own masters and suzerains. Once the governor had gained the support of a few powerful sobas, each with two or three thousand bowmen, the conquest would

¹ Abreu e Brito, op.cit. 6.

² Diogo da Costa S.J. 31.5.1586 for instance.

be easily completed.

To achieve this Abreu estimated the need for one thousand expatriate soldiers and fifty or sixty horses. There were about one hundred European traders in Kongo who should be called upon and they could bring with them the thousand armed slaves whom they maintained for their protection. More recruits could be obtained from São Tomé and a suggestion was made that five hundred criminal Mamelucos¹ be recruited from Brazil. The lesson of Serrão's defeat had to be learnt, and armies should not be allowed to conquer beyond a territory which they could defend. Abreu also gave detailed estimates of the cost of guns and uniforms for the new army. It would need seventy hundredweight of powder and a hundred of lead. To allay the doubts which Iberian kings always felt about incurring any expenditure in their colonies, Abreu continually stressed the richness of Angola just as Dias had done. The Mbundu fidalgos had estates like the greatest lords of Portugal which were full of cattle and ivory and people. The silver mines were better than those of Peru, and water power and slave labour were abundant. Adequate enterprise and skills would be forthcoming provided free access were given to the mines on payment of the royal fifth. Miners would provide their own equipment on this basis.

If Abreu was over-optimistic about the wealth of Angola, he was even more so about the prospects of reaching the gold mines of Monomotapa. Francisco Barreto's expedition to conquer Monomotapa from the Zambezi in

¹Mamelucos were the part-Amerindian and part-European people of Brazil.

the 1560's had been a more complete failure than the attempt to conquer Angola. The penetration of Angola therefore had the secondary attraction that it might prove possible to reach the gold mines from the west, seeing that it had proved impossible to get to them from the east. Abreu's calculation of distance was seriously wrong. He thought that the Soasos who lived east of Ndongo would be able to provide runners who could carry dispatches from India across Africa in fifteen days and so save the long and dangerous voyage round the Cape. His calculation reduced the thousand miles between Monomotapa and Ndongo to a mere one hundred.

The remaining sources of profit were the ones mentioned by earlier advocates of Angolan colonisation. The salt mines were said by Abreu to be so large that they supplied 'all of Ethiopia and parts of Persia'. He recommended that a fort be built on the site in addition to the chain of forts which was to link Luanda to the river-port and silver mines of Cambambe. The revenues from salt taxes could be made to equal the total revenue from all sources previously exploited. Great profit could also be drawn from the pitch lake which would provide admirable materials for caulking ships. Finally sugar could be grown in Angola, making the colony into a second Brazil. Its advantages over Brazil would be that the necessary labour was locally available to work on the plantations and operate the sugar mills.¹

¹Abreu e Brito, 1591, op.cit.

Abreu e Brito's report strongly influenced the policy which the Spanish monarchy¹ adopted towards Angola, its new Crown colony. Conquest by private charter had not been particularly successful, and the crown decided to take the matter up seriously and try to do better. An all-out effort was to be made to reach the silver mines which were still believed to exist at Cambambe, the ferocious resistance of the Ngola to Portuguese advance on Cambambe being interpreted as a sure sign of its value. It was not recognised that because Cambambe was on the threshold of his capital, the Ngola would naturally not want to see an enemy camped there.

Dom Francisco de Almeida, the first royally-appointed governor of Angola, arrived in Luanda in about June 1592, bearing the title 'captain-major and governor of the conquest and other provinces of Angola'.² He brought with him an army later estimated to have been 600 strong.³ Despite the size and importance of the expedition which Almeida led, his tenure of office was short and disturbed. He immediately found himself in conflict with the Jesuits, who were probably the most powerful political and economic force in the settlement. They had had a great deal

¹Strictly speaking, of course, it was the Portuguese king, Philip I, who directed overseas policy. He did so, however, from Madrid where he was better known as Philip II of Spain.

²A.T.T. liv. 23, Filipppe I, fl 38v in Lopez de Lima, vol. III, p. xviii. See also documents in Luciano Cordeiro: Questões Historico-Coloniâes, I, 217.

³Pero Rodrigues, op.cit., Brásio IV, 565.

of autonomy under the rule of the conquistadores and were probably strongly opposed to the extension of effective colonial government. They may even have hoped to establish a Jesuit theocracy in Angola.

The issue on which Almeida clashed openly with the Jesuits was the allocation of Mbundu chiefs as 'serfs' to white masters. This practice had especially benefitted the Jesuits who had become the overlords of many sobas and expected them and their families and subjects to work on the Society's estates. Paulo Dias and his successors, Luis Serrão and André Fereira Pereira, had also rewarded many of their army captains by the gift of a chief together with his lands and subjects. A description of this method of conquering and allotting Mbundu sobas is given by Battell:

"The Portugals make war against the negroes in this manner. They have out of Congo a nobleman, which is known to be a good Christian and of good behaviour. He bringeth out of Congo some one hundred negroes that are his followers. This Macicongo is made Tandala, or general over the black camp, and hath authority to kill, to put down Lords and make Lords, and hath all the chief doings with the negroes. And when any Lord cometh to obey he first cometh to the Tandala and bringeth his present, as slaves, kine and goats. Then the Tandala carrieth him before the Portugal Governor, and bringeth two slaves for the Governor's page, before he goeth in. Then he must have a great gift for the governor, which is sometimes thirty or forty slaves, besides cattle. But when he cometh before the Governor he kneeleth down and clappeth his hands, and falleth down with his face upon the ground, and then he riseth and saith: 'I have been an enemy, and now I protest to be true, and never more to lift my hand against you.' Then the Governor calleth the soldier, which hath deserved a reward, and giveth the Lord to him. This soldier seeth that he have no wrong; and the Lord acknowledgeth him to be his master, and he doth maintain the soldier and maketh him rich. (...)

So that there is no Portugal soldier of any account,
but hath his negro sova, or Lord."¹

Almeida arrived in Angola with a royal order to abolish this system which was much abused. All Mbundu chiefs were to be restored to their autonomy with direct allegiance to the Portuguese crown. An attempt to withdraw such lucrative benefits and privileges met with the combined resistance of the conquistadores and the Jesuits. After less than a year in office Almeida withdrew to Brazil.² The army which he had brought from Portugal only took part in one campaign, and that was abandoned because of fever.³ The governor's brother, Dom Jeronimo de Almeida, took over the government and calmed the violence of the army and clergy by suspending the order to withdraw the sobas from their white masters.⁴

The military career of D. Jeronimo was an active one. In June 1593 an army of 160 men and 18 horses joined forces with the garrison from Massangano and crossed into Kisama where they defeated a ruler called Songa with much arson and killing. The governor then marched to the Ndemba salt mines, about thirty miles from the river, where he built a fort and garrisoned it with 100 men and 4 horses. By thus controlling the salt mines he hoped to cripple the Ndongo economy and make a substan-

¹Battell, 64-65.

²Probably on 8 April 1593, see Cordeiro I, 217.

³See Catalogo dos Governadores de Angola, Lisbon Academy of Science 1825, ed. Arquivos de Angola, Vol. for 1937 and Silva Corrêa, História de Angola, for unconfirmed reports of this campaign.

⁴A.R.S.I. Lus 79, fl. 57 v. 10.6.1593. Brásio III, 466.

tial profit for the Portuguese colony. Salt was the chief commodity for buying slaves inland and was noted already as the normal currency in the Mbundu markets.¹ This fort only survived for a short while however and was later reported to have been abandoned by its garrison who fired it and left two wounded soldiers to their fate.² During the campaign twenty-six minor Kisama chiefs were subjects. A more powerful chief, Kafushe Kambare*, had not yet been attacked by the time D. Jeronimo fell ill and retired to Luanda. Balthasar de Almeida de Sousa was left in command and after entrenching one half of his army he went in search of Kafushe with the remainder. Kafushe met the challenge with guerrilla tactics and wiped out all but a handful of Sousa's army in April 1594.³ Kafushe thus continued to control the south bank of the Kwanza and a century later Cadornega described him as having been the most powerful ruler in Angola next to the Ngola himself.⁴

The second royal governor to be sent out to Angola was João Furtado de Mendonça. He arrived with his large army probably on 1 August 1594.⁵ The Catalogo dos Governadores de Angola, published by the Lisbon Academy of Science in 1825, gave some details of Mendonça's career which

¹Pero Rodrigues: História, op.cit. Ch. 7, Brásio IV, 570-571.

²Arquivos de Angola Ser. I, Vol. III, p. 75, Luanda 1937.

³Battle fought on 22.4.1594. Pero Rodrigues, op.cit., Brásio IV, 576.

⁴Cadornega III, 248-249.

⁵Lopes de Lima Bk. III, p. xxi.

* Cafuxe Cambare.

are mostly confirmed by Battell. His first campaign up the Bengo was undertaken in the rainy season and was seriously undermined by fevers. His second campaign, probably in 1596, took him up the Bengo and into Ilamba. It was probably to this campaign that Battell referred when he said that the army consisted of 400 Europeans and 15,000 Africans who were recruited during the campaign. Battell was especially struck by the lush, green country and the fresh water to be found inland. The campaign finally resulted in the defeat of 20,000 bowmen of Ngombe who were unable to face the Portuguese guns. The 'lord of Gombe' submitted with a great fanfare of drums and trumpets, and enriched the governor with many presents.¹

While the Governor was in Ilamba, the Ngola besieged Massangano. Balthasar Rebello de Aragão was sent to relieve the place. On his way back down the Kwanza afterwards he stopped to build a new presidio at Mushima. This fort had the triple aim of re-inforcing the line of communication to Massangano, imposing greater control on Kisama and was optimistically intended to replace to some degree the lost fort of Ndemba.² The building of Mushima and, less certainly, the fortifying of Luanda against foreign enemies, were the most lasting achievements of Mendonça's governorship. In later years it was remembered as a time of peace and prosperous trading.

¹Battell, 13-16 and xiii-xiv. Also Catalogo, 469-471.

²Aragão, Terras e Minas Africanas, in Cordeiro, op.cit., I, 222. See also Catalogo, 469-471.

When Mendonça returned to Portugal in 1601 or 1602 to pursue his political career, his place was taken by João Rodrigues Coutinho, a former captain of Elmina on the Gold Coast.¹ As well as being governor, Coutinho held the Angola slave contract, which, according to Battell, had been sold to him on the understanding that he would build three Ports, at the Ndemba salt mines, Cambambe, and the Bay of Cows.² This contract was sold by the crown for a fixed number of years in return for an annual fee. The contractor could then sell slave export licences to individuals. In 1601 Coutinho sold 400 such licences to Jorge Rodrigues Solis for forty ducats each.³ In the years 1603 to 1607, Coutinho's brother and heir sold a total of 15,768 licences to take slaves to the Spanish Indies.⁴ This was rather less than the figure of 4,250 slaves per annum which Coutinho had contracted to send.⁵ It is not clear whether the contractor was normally a trader on his own account or whether he was purely a 'tax farmer' who bought from the crown the right to levy all export duties and make as much profit as he was able over and above the price he paid for the contract.

After the contracto had passed out of the Coutinho family it was

¹A.T.T. Chanc. de Filipe II, liv. 7, fl 174, 30.1.1601. Brásio V, 60.

²Battell, 36.

³Brásio V, 29-31, quoting George Scelles: La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille, I, 811.

⁴A.G.S. Secret Provinc. (Portugal) liv. 1499, fl. 46. Brásio V, 487-488.

⁵Coleção de tratados de Borges de Castro, 1856, II, 44-45, cited in Felner, op.cit., 186.

sold for eight years to Duarte Dias Henriques for 25,000,000 reis per annum. A large proportion of the purchase price was to be paid out on the administrative expenses of the colony. A small amount was to be paid to the Portuguese captain in Kongo, and the balance spent according to royal instruction, part of it at least in the mother-country.¹ Among the items which the contractor was especially responsible for were the governor's salary and the army's uniform, the value of which had to be paid to the administration in cloth at fixed intervals. The governor's salary was comparatively low, about 800,000 reis per annum, so long as he was allowed to supplement it by trading. When, in the eighteenth century, the governor was debarred from trading on his own account, his salary was enormously increased to about 6,000,000 reis per annum. It became a heavy burden on the contractor and some governors were worried lest the taxes should prove inadequate to pay their remuneration.²

When Coutinho arrived in Luanda, probably in late 1601 or early 1602, he found the colony at a low ebb. All the Mbundu sobas had apparently reasserted their independence; the Cambambe mines were still out of reach and the Ngola remained unconquered. Furthermore it was rumoured that Kongo had been aiding and abetting the Ngola. The new governor immediately prepared for a new war with the large army of re-

¹B.A.L. Ms 52-VIII-58, fls 256-257v. Brásio VI, 174-177.

²Consulta of the Lisbon Overseas Council, 12.9.1721. A.H.U. Angola G.15.

inforcements which he had brought. He marched to Tombo on the north bend of the Kwanza and sailed up stream to land at Songo or Kakulu kia Kimone ka Songa.*¹ From there Coutinho sent for the best soldiers from Massangano and marched to 'Machimba' (possibly Mushima), 'Malombe' and 'Angoykayongo'. Here the Portuguese defeated an army of 60,000 men and settled in the pleasant town, capturing all the women and children and eating Angoykayongo's cattle and grain. After being there eight days Coutinho died of fever.²

The temporary governor who took over command was Captain Manuel Cerveira Pereira, a man of great energy but erratic temper. He was a forceful campaigner but his cruelty made him unpopular with his soldiers, many of whom deserted.³ According to Fernão Guerreiro and the Catalogo, his first action was to attack and defeat an old enemy, Kafushe. This resounding victory inspired such awe into the Mbundu that many sobas hastily made peace with the Portuguese lest they, too, should be destroyed.⁴ There is however some doubt as to whether Pereira did in fact defeat Kafushe. Battell, who had been made a sergeant in the Portuguese army, makes no mention of such a battle, and says that after spending two months

¹Battell, 37, refers to Songo, 60 miles from the sea. In a foot-note Ravenstein identifies this landing place with the one mentioned in the Catalogo.

²Battell, 37.

³Battell, 38.

⁴Fernão Guerreiro, in Brásio V, 54. Also Catalogo, 472.

at Angokayongo, Pereira marched in three days to Cambambe where he crossed over to the north bank of the river.¹ This suggestion that Kafushe was not beaten is strengthened by the complaint later made against Pereira that when he and an African ally, Langere, were about to attack Kafushe, Pereira desisted on receiving a bribe of forty slaves.² The document said that this was particularly culpable since Kafushe had been guilty not only of killing two hundred Portuguese, but of eating them as well.

About 1603 Pereira at last reached Cambambe, the fabulous mountain of silver which the Portuguese had been seeking for almost a century. In spite of the warning of Balthasar de Castro, in 1526, that there was no silver in Ndongo, the Portuguese had struggled on. Their bitter disappointment on not finding silver or mines of any sort at the hill of Cambambe may have been partly responsible for the viciousness of the governor's temper, and for the fact that he spent the next twenty years trying to prove that there really was important mineral wealth in the Angola and Benguela copper mines. Having reached Cambambe, Pereira was unable to march any further with his depleted army and one of the accusations later levelled against him was that he had failed to make any real effort to conquer Ndongo even when he had got so close.³ In-

¹Battell, 38.

²Bartholemeu Roiz Lucas, B.N.L. Reservados Seccão Pombalina, Ms 526 fl 294, Impresso. In Felner (1933) op.cit. 423-424.

³Battell, 38. Felner (1933), 421-422 of doc. quoted above.

stead Pereira negotiated with a delegation which the Ngola sent to Cambambe. The Ngola later sent an impressive embassy to the governor when he was re-established in Luanda. The king of Ndongo offered presents of silver and offered to open the road from Cambambe to Kabasa.¹ He apparently hoped to retain his freedom by friendly means since it was beginning to seem unlikely that his army would be adequate for the job. He also undoubtedly wanted to trade.

After the Portuguese had suffered their great defeat of 1590, three governors were sent out to Angola by the crown. Each one took a large army, but, owing chiefly to their inexperience of African conditions, not one of them made any notable progress in the conquest. During the four years in which Captain Pereira acted as governor, the Portuguese did make one step towards Ndongo, but it was only to meet with a major disappointment. The silver mines which had lured them on for thirty years did not exist. Having reached Cambambe fruitlessly, the Portuguese tried to turn their costly advance to some effect by concentrating their attention on the conquest of Ndongo. In so doing they became increasingly aware of the fact that they were faced not with one African people, but with two. Behind the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo were the people of Lunda whose tentacles reached right into Angola.

¹Fernão Guerreiro, in Brásio V, 55-56. Also B.M. add 20. 786 fls 325-325v. Brásio V, 60-62.

Chapter Four

THE LUNDA-IMBANGALA INVASION

OF NDONGO c.1550-1603

European activities in Kongo-Angola and the opening of the Atlantic slave trade soon began to have repercussions beyond the pale, in the regions outside the sphere of European knowledge. These repercussions took the form of attacks on the comparatively wealthy states of Ndongo and Kongo. These attacks, or some of them, might be interpreted as crude attempts to benefit from the wealth derived from overseas trade. The three main invaders were the Teke, who came from the north and had little or no direct effect on the Mbundu, the Jaga who came from the east and invaded Kongo, and the Imbangala, also from the east, who invaded Ndongo.

The attacks of the Teke or Anzica and of the Jaga were in some ways so similar as to be confused by several observers. Both were ferocious and probably cannibal nations of warriors. There were, however, major differences between them. The Teke came from an organised state system with highly developed metal and cloth industries and a sound knowledge of trade organisation.¹ Such organisation was not apparent among the Jaga who were content to plunder and destroy for immediate

¹See Lopez-Pigafetta on the Teke or Anzika. The identity of the Anzika with the Teke seems to be proved by Pacheco Pereira's description of the spiral-shaped facial scars which are peculiar to the Teke today. (Pacheco Pereira, op.cit. 144 and Placquaert, op.cit. 13.)

gain without caring for trade or political structures. Moreover the Jaga migrated bodily, eating their way through the country-side. The Teke on the other hand conducted raids and then withdrew to their home-land. The sixteenth century chronicles of João de Barros and Pacheco Pereira refer to Teke^{*} raiders and to their great king the Makoko^Ø.¹

The kings of Kongo were preoccupied with a Teke war in the 1560's when the Jaga began to infiltrate the kingdom. Duarte Lopez described the latter as tall, ugly cannibals who attacked their enemies with bravery and cruelty. He compared their nomadic plundering to the depredations of the Arab tribes. Their arms were javelins, knives and shields. It is interesting to note that Lopez does not mention bows and arrows which were the chief weapon of the Imbangala. It is possible that the Jaga, like the nineteenth century Ngoni, found fighting at close quarters with a knife and a shield more effective than long-range shooting. By the time the Jaga overran Mbata, the eastern march, and caused panic in the kingdom of Kongo, they were said, already to have travelled over great distances and conquered many countries.²

Perhaps the most likely hypothesis as to the origin of the Jaga bands is the one mentioned in the first chapter, that is that the Jaga

¹ João de Barros: Asia, Dec. I. Bk III, Ch. 9. Pacheco Pereira, 144.

² Lopez-Pigafetta, Book II, Chapter 5.

* Mundiquete.

Ø Emcuqua-anzico.

were Luba escaping from the destruction of the Songye-Luba empire. It is known from the Luba traditions that when the Kunda attacked the Songye dynasty, many Luba fled westward to the Kasai-Lulua confluence where they formed the nation of the Bena Lulua or Kasai Luba. If any of these refugees had gone another 200 miles due east in their flight they would have crossed the Kwango into the Kongo province of Mbata. It seems not improbably that that is what the Jaga did and that their origins are therefore Luba, and more specifically Bena Lulua.

The number of the Jaga invaders was probably small. As they advanced they probably recruited support from the peoples whom they overran. It seems likely that by the time they were expelled from Kongo in about 1572 a large proportion of the so-called Jaga were in fact Bakongo. When they were driven out of Kongo the Jaga recrossed the Kwango and settled on the right bank of that river. There they undoubtedly formed an important element of the Yaka nation which emerged in that region. A century or more later these Yaka suffered an invasion of Lunda who founded the dynasty of Kasongo.

The third outside invader to come upon the Kongo-Angola scene was the Lunda or Imbangala group. The entry of the Imbangala would appear, at first sight, to have been more unobtrusive than the invasions of either the Teke or the Jaga. This, however, is misleading. The difficulty in assessing the history of the Imbangala invasion is that nearly all con-

temporary observers confused them with the Jaga. In fact they were a quite distinct people and the confusion arose from the similarity of their methods and from the fact that to the settled peoples of Kongo and Ndongo one invader was much like any other invader. Because of the cloak of anonymity which the Jaga lent to the Imbangala, their presence among the Mbundu in Angola was not extensively reported until Andrew Battell started trading along the coast south of the Kwanza about 1600. The date of the Imbangala invasion was calculated to be circa 1610 in the most recent study of the question by Vansina.¹ A new look at the records and traditions, however, makes it clear that the Imbangala invasion in fact took place about half a century earlier. This reassessment is of fundamental importance to all Bantu history.

Battell's trading expeditions were undertaken on behalf of João Furtado de Mendonça, the governor of Angola. On his first trip he visited the Ndombe at the Bay of Cows near the modern city of Lobito, and bought cattle, sheep, copper, beans and cereals. On his second trip Battell went to buy slaves and it was then that he met the Imbangala at the mouth of the Kuvu River. The Imbangala sold slaves "so cheap that many did not cost one real which were worth in the city twelve milreis, 12,000 real(s)".² Battell said that these people called themselves 'Imbangolas' but that the Portuguese called them the Jaga and said that

¹Vansina: "Kasanje", op.cit.J.A.H., 1963, 3.

²Battell, 16-20.

they had passed through the city of Kongo and travelled round the great city of Angola called Ndongo, before they had reached the Benguela coast. Their leader was called Imbe Kalandu or Kalandula*.¹ The assumption that these people were the same as the Jaga who had been expelled from Kongo a quarter of a century earlier is certainly wrong.

Battell's description of the Imbangala is interesting. They lived in a 'mighty camp' on the south side of the Kuvu River. These camps were elaborately built and fortified. Each section had its own leader and its own exit from the peripheral wall of timber and thorns. The way of life of the Imbangala was entirely unproductive. They never stayed in one place long enough to raise a crop but lived a semi-nomadic existence in which they moved on to new conquests when they had eaten all the food they could find in one place. They were not notable hunters, nor did they raise domestic animals. Their most striking characteristic was that they ate human flesh as a matter of course and apparently found it palatable, as well as being more readily available than any other. Their chief luxury was palm wine and the wanderings of the Imbangala were strongly influenced by the availability of palm trees. They tapped the wine by the wasteful method of cutting the tree down and drawing the juice until it ran dry, rather than by the Mbundu system of tapping the top of the live tree.

¹Battell, 19-20, 28, 31, 84.

* Calando or Calandola.

To enable them to be more mobile in their campaigns the Imbangala did not rear any children. Although the leading chief had many wives, all their children were killed at birth. To increase their ranks the troops adopted the adolescents from among the peoples whom they conquered. These 'apprentices' wore a collar, as a sign of slavery, until they qualified for the title of soldier by presenting the severed head of an enemy to their leader. The troop of Imbe Kalandula only had about a dozen original 'Jaga' warriors. The rest of its estimated sixteen thousand members were recruits who had been picked up as the troop moved about the country. Before attacking an enemy the Imbangala normally camped on the edge of the territory they proposed to overrun. They then undermined the opposition's morale by a series of human sacrifices and other ceremonies. Battell witnessed their attack on Old Benguela, on the north bank of the Kuvu, after he had ferried them over the river for the assault. For five months Kalandula and his followers lived off the livestock, the granaries and even the ^{rice}populous of Old Benguela. At the end of this time they exhausted the supply of wine and moved away.

When the Imbangala left Old Benguela to attack a chief called Mbala*, a group of fifty Portuguese and Mulattoes decided to follow and continue their profitable trade with them. Two days' journey from the coast they were stopped by a chief named 'Mofarigosat' whose lands had been burnt by the Imbangala. He compelled the Portuguese to use their

*Bambala.

guns to assist him in a war he was conducting. The Portuguese eventually escaped only by offering Battell as a hostage in guarantee of their return. Battell escaped also, however, and reached the large and well planned town of 'Cashil' whence he was taken to the new Imbangala settlement of 'Calicansamba'. After five months there they moved on to 'Calango' for six months feasting on the north bank of the Longa River. They then marched to the Kwanza in the vicinity of Ndongo. They burnt the sumptuous Mbundu city of Shilla Mbanza*, belonging to an uncle of the Ngola, and then moved westward past Cambambe. When they entered Kisama they were attacked by Kafushe and a great battle was fought but without decisive result. The Imbangala fortified a camp and the war continued for some months, with Battell effectively using his musket in support of Kalandula against Kafushe.

Soon after this war between Kalandula and Kafushe Battell escaped from the Imbangala with some pombeiros from Massangano who had come to buy slaves from them. He rejoined the Portuguese. After his escape Battell gave a vivid portrait of Kalandula, the leader of this Imbangala troop with which he had been travelling for eighteen months.

"The great Gaga Calando hath his hair very long, embroidered with many knots of Babba shells, which are very rich among them, and hath about his neck a collar of masoes, which are also shells that are found upon that coast and are sold among them for the worth of twenty shillings a shell: and about his middle he weareth landes, which are beads made of the ostrich eggs. He weareth a palm-cloth about his middle, as fine as silk. His body is carved and cut with sundry works,

* Sillambansa.

and every day is anointed with the fat of men. He wear-eth a piece of copper cross his nose, two inches long and in his ears also. His body is always painted red and white. He hath twenty or thirty wives, which follow him when he goeth abroad; and one of them carrieth his bows and arrows; and four of them carry his cups of drink after him. And when he drinketh they all kneel down, and clap their hands and sing.

Their women wear their hair with high trompes full of bamba shells, and are anointed with civet. They pull out four of their teeth, two above and two below, for a bravery. And those that have not their teeth out are loathsome to them and shall neither eat nor drink with them."¹

The Imbangala, whom Battell called the Jaga, were in fact Lunda invaders who had migrated to Angola after the establishment among their fellow-countrymen of the Luba dynasty of the hunter Kibinda Ilunga.²

The name Imbangala or Bangala survives as the name which the Portuguese apply to the people of the kingdom of Kasanje which was established on the upper Kwango by Kasanje, one of the leaders of the Lunda exodus.

The most detailed account of this exodus is contained in the traditions of the Kasanje state which were collected there by a Portuguese soldier called Neves in the mid-nineteenth century. This tradition can be supplemented with the Lunda tradition collected by Duysters.³

The fusion of Lunda and Luba ideas to form a new, vigorous hybrid nation is traditionally remembered by the marriage of the Lunda princess Lueji to the Luba prince Kibinda Ilunga.⁴ Many of the Lunda subjects

¹Battell, 31-32.

²See Chapter I.

³See Chapter I.

⁴See Chapter I.

did not accept the new regime. Chief among its opponents was Kinguri, the brother of Lueji. Rather than submit to a foreign 'dynasty', he decided to leave with his followers. After crossing the Luisa and Lulua Rivers he stopped in the hope of being recalled by his compatriots. When no call came he proceeded westward across the Kasai, Kayila, Luembe, Lulueji, Lufiji, Tshimhumbu, Luatschimu, Tshikapa and Kwango Rivers to the region of the Luando river, just east of the elbow of the upper Kwanza.¹ The Neves tradition takes the story up and says that Kinguri kya Bangela² took with him the chiefs Ndonga, Kakengo*, Kibonde^Ø, Mbandi-Mbumba,[≠] Kinda,[×] Kahete-ka-Kinzunzu,[↓] Ngunza a Bangela[×] and Kalanda^{*}. After being settled for some time in his new home, he was joined by Munjumbu-a-Kafushe, Kapenda-ka-Mulemba, Bumba-a-Tumba, Kambunje-ka-Tembu, Mushi, Ndumba-a-Tembo, Ndumba-a-Peso, Malundu and Songo[̄]. From this country between the upper Kwango and the Luando Rivers, Kinguri sent out hunters to explore the regions to the west and see if any good land was to be found.³

While Kinguri was settled on the Luando, he heard from his chief Songo that there were white men in the Mbundu country. These white men

¹Duysters, *op.cit.*, 84. All these rivers except the Kayila can be found on a map of Angola.

²Quingure-Quiabanguella. Banguela is probably the origin of the name of Imbangala.

³A. R. Neves: Memoria da Expedição a Cassange em 1850, Lisbon 1854, 97-98.

*Canguengo. ^ØQuibonde. [≠]Pande-ambumba. [×]Quinda.

[↓]Cahete-caquinzunzu. [×]Ginza-abanguella. ^{*}Calanda (or Calandu).

[̄]Mussongo.

had beautiful wares and fire-arms which the Lunda did not know about. Kinguri moved nearer to the Portuguese and settled at Bola Kas~~ashe~~ on the other side of the Kwanza from Pungu a Ndongo. The traditional account of Kinguri's death is a cliché which said that the ruler of this country, Sungwe a Mboluma, grew tired of Kinguri's great cruelty. He therefore conspired with the macotas or courtiers to build a strong hut in which Kinguri would be immured in his sleep. The old man was unable to break out of this prison and died there.

The tradition continues, in Neves' words:

"When Kinguri-ka-Bangela^{*} was dead, the macotas elected a new ruler, Kasanje-ka-Imba^x or Kasanje-ka-Kulashingo^f who, spurred on by a desire for pretty goods, resolved to seek out the white men. He and his courtiers and some of his people travelled down the Kwanza but could not present themselves to the Chief of the Portuguese because he was still on the island of Luanda which was then called Mushima-a-Lunda. The ruler of the Mbundu, [whom the Kasanje traditions always refer to as the 'Queen of the Jinga' regardless of sex and name,] was on the site where Luanda is to-day and thus Kasanje was unable to speak to the Portuguese."¹

Kasanje was not strong enough to attack the Mbundu king. He gradually overcame the obstacle by recruiting allies among the dissatisfied Mbundu sobas. The Ngola was driven back to Milembo-aka-Ngola^o, now called Teba. Kasanje then presented himself to the 'Portuguese Chief' and invited him to settle on the mainland. The Portuguese replied that the Mbundu were still too close and that they would only come to the mainland if the Mbundu were driven further back. In a joint campaign

¹Neves op.cit., 99-100.

* Quinguri-cabangu ella.

^xCassange-caimba.

^fCassange-Caculaxingo.

^oMilemba-achangolla.

Kasanje and the Portuguese drove the Mbundu back through Cacuaco, Kifa-Ndongo, * Muju-a-Prata^f, Kalukembu^ø, to Nganga-Mboa^x, now called Pungu a Ndongo.¹

The meeting of Kasanje with the Portuguese was very ceremonious. The Portuguese chief gave the Imbangala chief two flags, a golden picture (presumably an ikon), a uniform, some cloth and some fire-water[?], in recognition of his services. The Portuguese then wanted to brand Kasanje to show that he was a true vassal of the King of Portugal. Kasanje declined this honour, however, and suggested that the markings be put on his flag instead, which was done. There is no mention in the tradition of the gift of any fire-arms to the Imbangala.²

This would appear to be a straightforward tradition of the advance of Kinguri kya Bangela and his successor Kasanje ka Kulashingo from Musumba, the capital of the Lunda empire to Luanda the main port used by Portuguese traders. The tradition finds confirmation, either from oral or from written sources, at all its stages.

The departure of Kinguri kya Bangela from Lunda and his march to the Luando River where the dispersal of the Imbangala took place, is told in the traditions collected by Henrique de Carvalho. Kinguri refused

¹ and ² Neves, 100-101.

* Quifandongo. ^f Mujo-aprata. ^ø Calunguembo. ^x Gamga-amboa.

to pay homage to Kibinda Ilunga and organised a seditious opposition. Persecution and fighting grew in intensity until Lueji began to fear for the safety of her Luba husband. In the end, however, Kibinda received support from his brother, Kassongo, the ruler of the Luba, which caused Kinguri to flee to the west. He intended to build a new Lunda state from which to return and overthrow the Luba invaders. He travelled in a west-south-westerly direction living by hunting and by plundering the peoples who barred his way. After several years Kinguri came to the upper Kwanza and crossed into Libolo. There he settled down in the territory of a chief called Ngongo whose sister he married.¹

The story of the dispersal of the Imbangala from their first stopping place in the Luando valley, before Kinguri crossed the upper Kwanza, is told in the traditions collected by Cavazzi in the 1650's and 1660's. It would seem from Cavazzi's evidence that while the Imbangala were settled in the Luando valley region between the upper Kwanza and the upper Kwango, they incorporated a certain number of Jaga. This would help to explain the confusion between Imbangala and Jaga in the minds of contemporaries. Unfortunately Cavazzi himself was apparently unaware of the distinction and the history which he records is therefore difficult to unravel.

The great leader of the Jaga or Nga Njiagi* in this tradition, is

¹Henrique de Carvalho: O Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon, 1898 (?) 27-30.

*Engangiaghi.

Zimbo. Cavazzi attributes the mid-sixteenth century raids on the coastal settlements of both East and West Central Africa to the followers of Zimbo. One of the successors of Zimbo was called Donji* . Donji and his wife Mussassa conquered a province of the upper Kwango region which they called Donji. Their allies conquered provinces called Dumba and Kandonga. Donji was succeeded by his daughter, Temba Ndumba, a very cruel woman. It was she that the tradition held responsible for introducing the 'Kishili Laws', the customs of infanticide and human sacrifice which came to be so feared by the enemies of the Imbangala. Temba Ndumba was eventually killed by a soldier called Kulemba who ruled the followers of Donji until they were conquered or absorbed by a 'local ruler' called Kinguri.^f If Donji and his men were 'true' Jaga, as seems likely, it would appear that they arrived in the region between the Kwanza and the Kwango after Kinguri had settled there since they described Kinguri as a local chief.¹

Cavazzi went on to describe the second stage of the advance of the Imbangala, from the Luando valley towards the sea. Kinguri invaded Ndongo and fought like a lion. He died still fighting and the chiefs chose Kulashingo as his successor. He proved to be a poor and weak leader, however, and was soon assassinated. After that time the Imbangala did not have one leader but broke up into about thirty bands, of which the most famous were led by the chiefs Kasanje, Kayomba^ø, Kabuku,^x Kasa^ō

¹Cavazzi, 182-186 and 204.

* Dongij. ^f Chingurij. ^ø Cajomba. ^x Cabucco. ^ō Casa.

and Kahete^{* 1}.

It is at this point in the progress of the Imbangala that the first documentary references begin to appear. In 1563 Antonio Mendes described a major campaign which Ndambi, the Ngola of Ndongo, had conducted in person against the 'King of Banguela'. This king was killed and the Ngola appointed two of his sons or subjects to govern the country. This arrangement did not work and by 1563 the Ngola was having to organise a new campaign against this enemy. It seems highly probable that this 'King of Banguela' was Kinguri kya Bangela.² Cavazzi confirms that Kinguri died fighting the Ngola. Cavazzi's traditions also recall that it was Ngola Mbandi - alias Ndambi - who first suffered from Imbangala depredations, although Cavazzi, of course, called the invaders Jaga. Mbandi called for help first from Kongo and then from the Portuguese, with the result that the mission of Paulo Dias arrived at his court. It was argued in Chapter II that Mbandi or his predecessor might have sent off an appeal for help to the Portuguese as early as 1548. If this were the case the Imbangala colony of Lunda refugees must have been settled in the Luando territory beyond the upper Kwanza by that time, and already have begun to send probing raids into Ndongo.³

¹Cavazzi, 205.

²Antónia Mendes, 9.5.1563. Quoted in Ch. II. Brásio II, 509.

³Cavazzi, 296. See Chapter Two.

*Caetté.

The last stage of the Imbangala advance brought them, according to Neves' version of Kasanje tradition, to the sea at Luanda. There is clear evidence that Kasanje ka Kulashingo did in fact reach Luanda and was not stopped by the Portuguese further up the Kwanza as Vansina supposed in his article on the history of the kingdom of Kasanje.¹ It would even appear that some of the Imbangala settled down and formed a small state called the Nsaka de Kasanje not far to the east of Luanda. This state caused the Portuguese a great deal of trouble during the first part of the seventeenth century.² Confirming that the meeting of Kasanje and the Portuguese really did take place at Luanda, the tradition says that the Mbundu were driven back beyond Cacucaco, which is a salt-producing village twelve miles along the coast north-east of Luanda. This coincides well with the Mbundu's own traditions, as remembered by the Pende, which claim that their first grievance against the Portuguese was that they stole the Mbundu salt pans.³

The Imbangala tradition claims that Kasanje invited the Portuguese to come and settle on the mainland. If this is true, Kasanje must have arrived at Luanda before 1576, the year in which Paulo Dias and his settlers moved to the mainland with the traders who had been living on Luanda Island for some years. Since the tradition says that Kasanje had to

¹Vansina: "The founding of the Kingdom of Kasanje", J.A.H. IV, 1963, 3.

²See for instance Cadornega: História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Luanda 1680, (ed.) Lisbon 1940, Vol. I, pt. 1, Ch. 10.

³Haveaux, op.cit., 35-37.

undermine the Mbundu opposition to his meeting with the Portuguese by gaining the support of individual Mbundu chiefs, it might be supposed that Kasanje was in the neighbourhood of Luanda for some years before 1576.

From the beginning of the Portuguese conquest of Angola the Imbangala were at least as much an obstacle to progress as the Mbundu. The followers of Dias, however, do not seem to have been particularly aware of the differences between people whom they all considered to be barbarous black adversaries. The first brush took place in 1575 when João Castanho Velles took 80 soldiers to attack an enemy called 'Caçanze' who must surely have been Kasanje. The entire force was captured, twenty men were killed and the remainder ransomed. This Caçanze is referred to as an enemy of Kongo, which suggests that Kasanje may have been interrupting the trade-route by which Kongo received its supplies of nzimbu shell currency.¹ There is evidence from a rather late source, André Velho da Fonseca writing in 1612, that 'Mani Cassanje' attacked the Portuguese after they were settled on the mainland and forced Dias to abandon the 'City of Sebaste'. As a result of this the Portuguese on their return to the mainland, built the fort of Luanda.² Duarte Lopez, who visited Luanda in 1578, was another to mention 'Cazzanzi' as one of the chiefs established in the Luanda area.³ All these references seem to

¹Pero Rodrigues, op.cit., Brásio, IV, 571.

²A. V. da Fonseca, 28.2.1612. Arquivos de Angola, Ser I, Vol. III, 67-77.

³Lopez-Pigafetta, 50.

indicate without much doubt that one branch, at least, of the Imbangala had reached the coast of Angola before 1575.

The other Imbangala leaders spread out in various directions while Kasanje was camped near Luanda. Songo*, one of Kinguri's original followers and the captain who first reported the presence of the Portuguese while Kinguri was still beyond the upper Kwanza, was probably the same as the Songo† who settled in the westernmost tip of Kiszama. This chief was at one time defeated by the Portuguese, but later given presents and baptised with Paulo Dias as his god-father. A close eastern neighbour of Songo was Kafushe with whom the Portuguese fought many hard battles. He too was one of Kinguri's followers as listed in the Neves tradition. Kalanda, or Kalandula, was a late arrival on the Kwanza front, as is shown by Battell's evidence given at the beginning of this chapter. He attacked Kafushe, with the help of Battell and his musket, in an attempt to take over the trading advantages which earlier groups of fellow Imbangala had gained from being near to the Portuguese slave markets. When this endeavour failed, Kalandula appears to have attempted to make closer contact with the Portuguese and gain a special relationship with them which other Imbangala, who encouraged Portuguese trade but opposed Portuguese conquest, did not have.

The establishment of an alliance between Kalandula, a late Imbangala arrival, and the Portuguese, would appear to be the event recorded in the

* Mussongo.

† Songa or Cassonga.

second half of the Carvalho tradition. This account says that when 'Kinguri' arrived on the south bank of the Kwanza the Portuguese were fighting the Mbundu on the north bank. The fort of Massangano had apparently been established, but not yet that of Cambambe. The Portuguese were also fighting the peoples on the south side of the river in Kisjama. Kinguri forded the Kwanza and presented himself to the Portuguese captain saying that he was seeking 'Mwene Puto', the king of Portugal, and that he had come from very far off. He was taken to Massangano and then to Luanda where he was presented to the governor whose name was Dom Manuel. The governor accepted Kinguri's offer to help with the conquest of Ndongo. He gave him fire-arms and powder and allocated lands on the Lukala River where he and his people could settle and plant the crops which the Portuguese assumed they would want to plant.¹ In fact, it later turned out, these Imbangala did not settle down, but within two years were on the move again.²

Since the original Kinguri had been killed by the Mbundu quite early in the last phase of the Imbangala advance, it must be assumed that this was some other Imbangalachief who had adopted the name or title Kinguri for prestige reasons or whom Carvalho confused with Kinguri. The probability would seem to be that the story relates to Kalandula. The first governor to be called Manuel was Manuel Cerveira Pereira who

¹Henrique de Carvalho: O Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon, 1898 (?) 27-30.

²See Chapter Five.

governed from 1603 to 1607 and built the fort of Cambambe. He was therefore governing when Kalandula arrived on the Kwanza, an event dated by the chronology of Battell's adventures. Carvalho may have obtained the tradition from followers of Kalandula who became incorporated into the complex nation of Kasanje which the heirs of Kinguri, Kulashingo and Kasanje built from Imbangala and Mbundu peoples who retired to the upper Kwango in front of the Portuguese advance. Carvalho may alternatively have obtained the tradition from some other Imbangala group which retained its own identity in nineteenth century Angola.

The kingdom of Kasanje whose foundation will be discussed in the next chapter, seems to have been only the last of a series of kingdoms in the Angola region which were built by the Imbangala, that is the Lunda who left the Kasai region under the leadership of Kinguri'kya Bangela together with the peoples whom they recruited. Mention has been made of some of the notable chiefdoms of the Luanda district, Nsaka de Kasanje, Songo, Kafushe, and probably also Mushima since Mushi was a follower of Kinguri. There were also a number of states or peoples to the east of the upper Kwanza, in the region in which Kinguri first settled before he heard about the Portuguese, which probably owe their formation to Lunda-Imbangala political concepts. Balthasar de Aragão, a Portuguese captain who attempted to cross Africa in about 1608, found four major states to the east of Ndongo which, he said, spoke languages ~~which were~~ akin to each other and to that of the peoples who stretched far into the

east. These states were Matamba, Malemba, Shinje*, and Songo¹. Shinje and Songo still exist and are normally classified as peoples related to the Lunda. Malemba is harder to define. It is interesting to note that Matamba, after being conquered by Kongo rulers in the fifteenth century, and before being overrun by Mbundu peoples escaping from the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, appears to have been invaded in the sixteenth century by the Imbangala. The fact that Matamba was still sending tribute to Kongo in 1530 suggests that the Imbangala invasion of Matamba did not take place before that date.² Cavazzi's traditions would appear tentatively to suggest that Matamba was one of the first places which they conquered.³ Finally the report by Abreu on the great battle of the Lukala in 1590 suggested that the main partner in the alliance which defeated Luis Serrão and the Portuguese was the 'King of Matamba'. It seems not at all implausible that it was the Imbangala, and not the Mbundu, who were chiefly responsible for routing the Portuguese on that as on other occasions.⁴

The history of the Imbangala invasion of Angola is interesting not only for itself, but also for the link which it furnishes between the written records of coastal activity, with an absolute date ascribed

¹Balthasar Rebello de Aragão, Bal Ms 51-viii-25 fl. 42-44v. ? 1618. In Luciano Cordeiro: Questões Histórico-Coloniâes, I, Lisbon 1935.

²King of Kongo to João III, 28.1.1530. A.T.T. CC 1-44-70. Brásio I, 540.

³Cavazzi, 182.

⁴Abreu e Brito, op.cit.

*Massinge.

†Massongo.

to each event, and the oral records of the Bantu of central Africa which are only dated by relative chronology. Past attempts to study this link have mistakenly supposed that Kalandula-cum-Kinguri's meeting with 'Dom Manuel' indicated the first arrival of the Imbangala. They have, moreover, tended to identify 'Dom Manuel' with Dom Manuel Pereira Forjaz, and not with Manuel Cerveira Pereira. This has led to the assumption that the Imbangala first made contact with the Portuguese circa 1610.¹

In view of the re-appraisal of the Imbangala invasion it must now appear that the Luba invasion of Lunda took place not towards the end of the sixteenth century as had been supposed, but more probably towards the beginning of that century. From this new date it might be possible to infer the date of the Kunda infiltration into the empire of the Songye-Luba. If the time-lag between the establishment of the new regime and the sending out of migrations to form new states was as long in the Kunda-Luba state as it was in the Luba-Lunda state (that is over a century) it might be supposed that the Kunda overthrew the Kongolo dynasty early in the fifteenth century and that they had been infiltrating Lubaland during the fourteenth century.

The Imbangala migration of Kinguri kya Bangela seems to have been the first of two such migrations out of Lunda. The second phase of the exodus was led traditionally by Kinyama, the 'brother' of Kinguri and Lueji. In fact the departure of the Kinyama wave of peoples might have

¹See for example Verhulpen, op.cit. and Vansina, J.A.H., 1963 (3) op.cit.

been some considerable time after the departure of the Imbangala, possibly in the seventeenth century. The Kinyama migrations never reached the Mbundu country, nor did their leaders ever make contact with the Portuguese as far as is known. For these reasons this is not the place for a detailed study of the traditions relating to Kinyama. It should however be noted that this second wave of 'refugees' from Lunda was at least as important as the first. One branch resulted in the Lwena peoples who are sparsely but widely scattered over the north-west of the upper Zambesi basin in eastern Angola. The other branch led to the forming of the Tschokwe peoples whose nucleus lay on the upper Tshikapa River. From that point the Tschokwe spread out widely and in the nineteenth century eventually overran the Lunda capital of the Mwata Yamvo himself. Finally it seems possible that Lunda of the second wave, together perhaps with Lunda of the first wave and Mbundu refugees, might have played a part in the founding of the Ovimbundu kingdoms of the Benguela plateau country.

After the departure of the Imbangala and the Tschokwe, the Lunda appear to have settled down to organising their new Luba-type kingdom. Duysters gave a list of the main officials of the government of the new state. The king took the title of Mwata Yamvo. One of the key symbolic figures was the Lukonkeshia who was the Queen Mother. The two main officials were the Swana Mulopwe (Swana means heir, and the Swana Mulopwe was supposed to be a descendant of the first Mwata Yamvo or Mulopwe) who

was the chief minister, and the Sanama who lived in, and governed, the southern conquests of Lunda and was often the heir to the Mwata Yamvo. The Kanapumba were two officers who commanded the rear-guard while Swana Mulopwe guarded the flanks of the army. The advance-guard was led by the Kalala. The Mutie were judges and the Mwanate were the guardians of the traditions. The Tubungu, who were the Lunda chiefs before the Luba invasion, became the guardians of the ancestors and the 'owners of the land'. Finally the Swana Mulunda was the symbolic mother of all the Lunda and the heir and representative of Lueji.¹ Although the Lunda retained their matrilineal form of succession, the Mwata Yamvo was apparently succeeded normally by a son in the male line.

After the departure of Kinguri and Kinyama the Lunda country was for a time even more sparsely populated than before. The hunting, on the other hand, was even better and the Luba were quite content. Lueji had no children, so she gave Kibinda a second wife called Kamonga Luaza who bore him a son called Naweji. He took the title Mwate Lusenge. Kamonga Luaza was the first Lukonkeshia or queen-mother. It was Naweji who was traditionally responsible for the establishment of the powerful and complex military and political hierarchy of the Lunda empire. It seems likely however that Naweji was not one man but represents a whole period in Lunda history, possibly stretching from the mid-sixteenth century until the late seventeenth century. The first Lunda ruler to be remembered

¹Duysters, 76.

as an individual was Yavo Naweji. It was he who inaugurated the title of Mwata Yamvo.¹

Yavo Naweji began a second series of migrations from the Lunda country. These migrations were very different from the first ones of Kinguri and Kinyama. Instead of being led by chiefs who wanted to get away from Lunda, the migrations of Yavo Naweji were composed of peoples sent out from the central government to explore the surrounding regions, found vassal states, and exploit new resources of wealth for the Mwata Yamvo. Thus it was that in the eighteenth century the Lunda once again came into contact with the Mbundu, this time not as immigrants, but as traders. In the mean time, however, the Portuguese had been advancing up the Kwanza valley repelling the Mbundu and Imbangala as they went.

¹Duysters, 84-85.

Chapter Five

THE EXPULSION OF THE NGOLA FROM NDONGO 1603-1641

During the first half of the seventeenth century the slave trade continued to be the major activity of the peoples of Angola. The chief participants were the Portuguese and the Mbundu. The Kongo share in the trade was apparently declining, while the Imbangala participation was on the increase. The territory covered by the trade was being extended but still remained mainly within the regions known to the Portuguese. The peoples beyond the Portuguese sphere of knowledge probably only later in the century began to feed many slaves into the Angolan network of trade routes, and only in the eighteenth century did long-distance caravans come to contribute a major part of the slave supply. In the seventeenth century, and especially in the first half of that century, slaves came predominantly from the Mbundu and their immediate neighbours.

The Portuguese had three main methods of obtaining slaves. The first was as tribute which subject chiefs paid either to a Portuguese master or to the governor representing the crown. The second was by direct warfare, a method officially discouraged, but much favoured by governors who wanted to make the maximum personal profit from their short tour of duty in Angola. Such wars sometimes had official objects, such as the conquest of the supposed silver mines, but were often conducted with the primary aim of capturing slaves to sell. Common excuses for

war were the recovery of run-away slaves, or the punishment of tax-defaulters. The third, and probably the most important means of filling the slave ships, was by trade with the chiefs. This trade was organised through markets in the Mbundu country to which the pombeiros went to buy slaves.¹ The system depended to a greater or lesser extent on the co-operation and goodwill of African rulers, and in particular of the Ngola who seems to have alternately, and perhaps even simultaneously, fought and traded with the Portuguese.

In the early seventeenth century much of the slave trade was conducted in two stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well as European trinkets and beads were used to buy palm cloth from the peoples of the forest regions to the north and east of Kongo. In the second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as well as being the most widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for slaves. Pombeiros were sent to 'Congo de Batta' (or Gongon and Batta in Battell's terminology) to buy the cloth. According to Pedro Sardinha this trade had expanded enormously in the first decade of the seventeenth century.²

Sardinha described the differing sizes and qualities in which these panos, or pieces of palm cloth, were made. The best sort was called 'painted cloth' and cost 640 reis a piece. It was probably dyed or had coloured strands woven into it. Twelve to fifteen thousand of these cloths were brought to Luanda each year at a cost of about eight

¹ Although the earliest pombeiros were Europeans, the high mortality among them soon led the Portuguese to use mestiços and trusted African slaves as pombeiros.

² Sardinha, A.H.U. Cx 1. Brásio VI, 52-56, ? c. 1611 (Brásio's estimate).

million reis. The second quality cloth, called 'songa', was priced at 200 reis a piece and forty or fifty thousand were bought every year at a cost of nine million. A further thirty or forty thousand pieces of the cheapest cloth, worth 100 reis, were also bought. In addition to these cloths from beyond Kongo, a number of cloths called 'exfula' were imported from the Loango coast. Each year two or three small vessels went there to fetch cargoes of six or seven thousand pieces. A rarer and more valuable Loango cloth was the 'ensaca' of which only about 300 were obtained each year costing 1,200 reis apiece. Battell visited Loango at about the same time as Sardinha wrote his report, and saw 'a great store of palm cloths of sundry sorts'.¹

Accurate estimates of the numbers of slaves exported from Luanda in the first half of the seventeenth century are difficult to obtain. Not until the eighteenth century were there annual trade reports from the governors. Before that the only records, in so far as records existed, were probably kept by the contractor. André Velho da Fonseca, writing to the King of Spain in 1612, estimated that 10,000 or more slaves were being shipped from Angola each year.² About the same time the licences to export slaves to the Spanish Indies alone amounted to about 4000 per annum.³ A figure drawn from the estimated tax values suggests that

¹Battell', 43-44.

²André Velho da Fonseca to the King, 28.2.1612. Arquivos de Angola, Ser. I, Vol. III, 71-90.

³A.G.S. Secret. Prov. (Portugal) liv. 1499, fl 46, Brásio V, 487-488.

about 13,000 may have been leaving each year towards 1620.¹ When the Dutch captured Luanda in 1641, their estimates for the annual export of slaves ranged from 13,000 to 16,000.² A population drain of this magnitude inevitably had far-reaching consequences for the population of Angola. One incidental effect of the trade was the growth of a rivalry between the old Mbundu middlemen and the more recently arrived Imbangala. This clash became especially violent in the second half of the seventeenth century.

Manuel Cerveira Pereira, the acting governor of Angola from 1603 to 1607, had advanced nearer to Ndongo than any previous governor had done, and had built the presídio of Cambambe on the fringe of the Ngola's territory. For a few years after this there was a lull in hostilities during the governorship of Pereira's successor Dom Manuel Pereira Forjaz who arrived in Angola in 1607. This lull was followed, however, by renewed wars which grew in scope and intensity. This may at first have been part of a policy of trying to get closer to the source of slave supplies. It

¹ According to Antonio Diniz, writing c. 1622, (Luciano Cordeiro: Questões Historico Coloniaes, I, 316-324) the export tax for Brazil-bound slaves was 4,000 reis and for others 7,000. A survey of the Angola slave contract made in 1624 by António Bezerra Farjada (B.A.L. Ms 51-viii-25, fls 29-32, 24 Feb. 1624. Brásio VII, 205-214) suggested that the actual value of the contract was 60-80 million reis per annum although it was being sold for much less. If one supposed that half the slaves were paid for at the cheap Brazilian rate, this figure would indicate an export of about 13,000 slaves per annum. If, as seems possible, more than half were paid for at the cheap rate (regardless of true destination) the number exported would be higher.

² A Little Forraine Newes, London 1641.

later degenerated, however, into an attempt to increase the numbers of slaves available by fostering warfare. The state of chaos in Angola was heightened by the presence of an unknown number of Imbangala armies in and around the Mbundu territory.

The King of Spain issued Forjaz with a regimento of instructions concerning the policy which he was to carry out. The most important matter was the slave trade. Because the military effort involved in attempting to mine silver at Cambambe had disrupted the trade and given little return, mining was to cease. To prevent any rebellion in Angola which might be injurious to the trade, a new policy of peace and justice was to be embarked upon with regard to the Mbundu. The defences of the colony were to be strengthened so that both African armies and foreign navies could be repelled should they try to capture Luanda. Above all the buying of Africans had to be encouraged and increased so as to swell the tax returns to the royal treasury. Only after stressing these safeguards to the slave trade, did the regimento say that the prime function of the colonial administration was, of course, the spreading of Christianity.

The document went on to elaborate on relations with the Mbundu. The governor was to draw up a list of Mbundu sobas, both the 'peace-loving rulers' and the enemy chiefs. A renewed attempt was to be made to enforce the ruling that all sobas would in future owe allegiance direct to the crown and not to the individuals to whom Paulo Dias and

other governors had allocated them. Tribute which had previously been paid to the Ngola would now be paid to the royal exchequer and never to private masters who might abuse their position. Only peaceful methods were to be used to bring the sobas to offer allegiance to the Portuguese crown. Forjaz should try to make peace with the Ngola who had been alienated by warlike action, especially Pereira's destruction of the town of Shila Mbanza.¹ If possible an embassy should be sent to the Ngola's capital, Kabassa, bearing a letter from the King of Spain, and seeking permission to spread the gospel in Ndongo. In spite of the peaceful co-operation envisaged, all the citizens of Luanda were to be given military training on Sundays and saints' days. The magnitude of the task of bringing the Mbundu under peaceful Portuguese domination was revealed by the fact that in 1607 no soba paid tribute of any kind either to Portuguese individuals or to the crown.

An important proviso in the regimento was that no white man should ever be allowed to go to the feiras, the inland slave markets, to buy slaves or even to administer justice. Europeans who frequented these markets were in the habit of sending their pombeiros along the supply routes to snatch slaves. This practice reduced the supplies and raised the prices. In the markets African traders could usually buy more cheaply than Europeans. Forjaz was also encouraged to investigate the trade potential of the Benguela coast where Battell had traded so profitably on behalf of Mendonça.

¹ Axilla Ambanza. In fact it was the Imbangala Kalunda who destroyed this city and not Pereira as his Portuguese critics claimed.

The idea of mineral wealth from Angola was not abandoned. Although mining at Cambambe was to cease, prospecting was to continue elsewhere. The silver mines were reported by Pereira to be just a little further inland, near to Kabas~~fa~~ and at various other places. Copper, lead and iron were all alleged to be plentiful. The possibility of building another fort on the site of the Ndemba salt mines was considered. Finally all land grants which had been made in Angola were to be reviewed to make sure that the conditions under which they were made had been carried out. Agricultural development was to be encouraged, especially in cotton and sugar. Work on public buildings and on a water supply were to continue in Luanda.¹

Forjas arrived in Angola probably in August or September 1607. He governed for four years during which time he did not apparently lead any major expedition against the Mbundu.² This was probably not so much from a desire to conform with the pacific policy laid down in his instructions, as from a reluctance to deplete the garrison of Luanda at a time when the Dutch, who had started trading at the Kongo port of Mpinda, were an increasing military threat. An additional explanation for the absence of campaigns may have been that the slave trade was flowing well at that time.

¹A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 1. The regimento is published in full in Brásio V, 264-279.

²Catalogo, op.cit. 473-474 and note 15.

The comparatively peaceful government of Forjaz came to an end with his death on 15 April 1611. His place was taken by the conquistador Bento Banha Cardoso who was elected governor the next day.¹ The four years of Cardoso's government marked the beginning of a phase in which the Ngola was driven out of Ndongo. According to the Catalogo Cardoso immediately launched an active campaign against the Ngola. The powerful Mbundu soba Kilonga was captured and beheaded and three of his courtiers were hanged. Mbamba Tungu,* a chief who had once been a Portuguese ally, was also put to death. Cardoso then established a new fort at Hango à Kikaito[†] on the lower Lukala. This brought the Portuguese even closer to the Ngola's capital at Kabasga. The Mbundu retaliated strongly and almost succeeded in forcing an entry into the fort of Cambambe before finally being driven off.²

André Velho da Fonseca, writing in 1612, was harshly critical of Cardoso's actions. He said that the building of a new fort at Hango on the Lukala was risky. It was sited too near to the Ngola's capital and stood open to attack. In addition it could only be adequately garrisoned by withdrawing soldiers from the other three forts which were already undermanned.³ Fonseca was also critical of the way in which cam-

¹A.T.T. CC Maso 319 pl 2. Doc. 144. Felner, 433. Catalogo 542.

²Catalogo 474.

³The forts which survived at this time were Mushima, about 80 miles from the sea on the south bank of the Kwanza, Massangano 30 miles beyond and Cambambe 40 miles above that, both on the north bank.

*Bamba Tungu.

[†]Hango Aquicaito.

paigns were conducted. He said that a force of 200 European soldiers was inadequate for penetrating a hostile country. If sobas who had once been 'pacified' by Portuguese arms, saw that any 'rebellion' inevitably led to destructive reprisals on their villages, they would soon learn that it was futile to try to resist Portuguese rule. Although advocating a strong deterrent force, Fonseca was outspoken in his criticism of the cruelty and greed of the captains of the army who terrorised the chiefs and bullied them into making frequent gifts of slaves. Many rebelled against this arbitrary extortion and preferred to pay the fixed annual tribute which the Ngola levied on his chiefs. On the vexed question of whether peace or war was the more advantageous to the slave trade, Fonseca was firmly in favour of peace.

After his war against the Ngola, Cardoso had to fight off an invasion of the Portuguese territory by Nambu-a-Ngongo, a Ndembu chief from southern Kongo who marched almost to the gates of Luanda in search of food.¹ There was apparently a year or two of peace after that, and in 1614 Cardoso wrote from Luanda to say that all was quiet in Angola and the slave fairs were flourishing. The chiefs in the neighbourhood of the new presídio of Hango were beginning to pay allegiance to the Portuguese crown. It was fortunate, Cardoso said, that peace persisted, because the colony was extremely short of gunpowder and would therefore be unable to mount an expedition in the event of a rebellion in the in-

¹Cardomene, I, 78.

terior. The governor was worried, however, about unrest in Kongo and felt the need for military supplies so that action could be taken there if necessary.¹

While Cardoso was acting governor in Angola, Manuel Cerveira Pereira was in Europe defending himself against the accusations that had been brought against his four year term of office. He cleared his name with King Philip III and persuaded that monarch to found a new Portuguese West African colony in Benguela with Pereira himself as governor. A letter-patent to this effect was issued on 14 February 1615 and in the autumn of the same year Pereira returned to Luanda with authority to take over the government of Angola from Cardoso while he made preparations for the conquest of Benguela.² Despite his preoccupation with this new venture, Pereira appears to have had time for a new war against the Mbundu. He defeated some 'rebellious' chiefs in the vicinity of Hango fort and then attacked the soba Kakulu-ka-Hango* whom he accused of giving refuge to run-away slaves from Luanda.³ After eighteen months Pereira's preparations for the Benguela venture were completed and he left Luanda in the charge of Antonio Goncalvez Pita, one-time captain

¹Bento Banha Cardoso 28.6.1614. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brásio VI, 178.

²A.T.T. Chan. de Filip II, liv. 35, fls 32-33. 14 February 1615. Brásio VI, 195.

³Catalogo, 476.

*Cacullo Cahango.

of the Portuguese in Kongo.¹ A few months later, in August 1617, Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos arrived to take up the governing of the colony in earnest.

It seems possible that the old Ngola, who the Portuguese called Kiluanji and who may have been Ndambi, died about this time. Although there may have been a reign in between, it seems likely that this was the Ngola who had been fighting and trading with the Portuguese ever since the first wars of Paulo Dias in 1578, forty years earlier. The evidence that it was in 1617 that young Ngola Mbandi succeeded to the throne is tenuous. This is the date of Mbandi's succession according to the Catalogo, an account apparently based on Cavazzi, although the latter gives no date for the event.²

At the time of his death, Kiluanji, the old Ngola, is traditionally alleged to have had one 'legitimate' son whose claims were passed over because he was an infant and because his mother was in prison for adultery. He also had a son by a 'slave' wife and three daughters. His son, Mbandi, rallied his supporters and was elected king of Ndongo. He put several of his rivals to death including his brother and also the son of his sister Nzinga. His three sisters Nzinga, Mukambu, and Kifunji were spared.³ Mbandi then turned his attention to resisting the attacks of

¹Cadornega I, appendix by Mathias Delgado says that Pita governed 1.4.1617 to 27.8.1617.

²Haveaux, 49; Catalogo, 477; Cavazzi, 295-296. Matias Delgada (Cadornega I, 49 fn. 1) also assumes that 'Ngola Kiluanji', who was Ngola in 1575, died in about 1617 but he says that this was unimportant and of no relevance whatsoever to the history of Angola!

³Cavazzi 296-297; Catalogo, 477.

the Portuguese led by Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, governor since 1617, and his son João Mendes. By the time of Mbandi's death in 1624, however, Portuguese military authority in Ndongo had been greatly increased owing to the efforts of Vasconcelos, and the Ngola's resistance had failed. Cadornega's chronicle described these wars as a most glorious feat of Portuguese arms. Three centuries later, however, Cadornega's editor, Matias Delgado, called Vasconcelos one of the most pernicious governors that Angola ever had.¹ Contemporaries were divided on the issue. Some praised his military achievements while others condemned the extortion and brutalities which were practiced in order to squeeze slaves from the territories he overran.

One of Vasconcelos' first actions on arriving in Luanda was to write a strong indictment of his predecessors and deplore the run-down state to which Pereira had reduced the colony. Pereira was accused of having taken 50,000 cruzados from the treasury and most of the available soldiers, ammunition and powder, to conquer Benguela. Whereas Cardoso, in 1614, reported a flourishing trade, Vasconcelos found three years later that trade was almost at a standstill and the feiras, which had been moved to new sites, had almost ceased to function for lack of slaves. Many of the chiefs who normally supplied slaves had been destroyed by Pereira during his short second term as acting governor. Gonçalves Pita had led an army into the Mbundu territory to tell the chiefs that they were now direct subjects of the king and must pay tribute to him, as governor, and

¹Cadornega I, 83-98, two chapters on Vasconcelos. Editorial comment: 98 fn 1.

not to their private European masters. Vasconcelos promised that all slaves which had been acquired in this manner would be confiscated and sold for the sole benefit of the royal treasury.¹

In the same letter Vasconcelos bitterly denounced his predecessors' use of 'jaga' auxiliary troops. To have introduced these cannibal brigands into the colony, he said, was a great disservice to both God and king. Governors and settlers had used them like hunting dogs but they had eaten more slaves than they had delivered alive, in Vasconcelos' opinion. Old residents tried to persuade the governor that it would be impossible to maintain the colony without the 'jaga' troops but Vasconcelos persisted in believing, for a few weeks at any rate, that the depredations which these allies caused were liable to depopulate the colony as they had depopulated other areas. The accusations which Vasconcelos levelled at his predecessors in this matter were confirmed by a complaint which Dom Alvaro III of Kongo sent to pope Paul V in 1617. He said that far from helping the kings of Kongo, as the kings of Portugal had ordered, the governors of Angola had invaded Kongo as though it were enemy territory. To make matters worse they had united with the 'Jaga' nation, who ate human flesh.²

When he first arrived in the colony Vasconcelos promised to restore order and free-flowing trade. He felt that many settlers and the two

¹Vasconcelos to King of Spain 28.8.1617. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brásio VI 283-285.

²D. Alvaro III to Paulo V, 25.10.1617. B.V. Cod Vat Lat 12516 fl 66. Jadin, 348-352. Also Brásio VI, 288-291.

previous governors, deserved to be sentenced to death for the way they had acquired slaves by robbing, capturing and killing, with a complete disregard for the interests of the crown. Under the new regime all people who had been unjustly captured as slaves would be freed. All traders who were marauding in the interior would be called back to Luanda. Peace and justice would be enforced and trade in the markets would replace recruiting.

Vasconcelos soon found, however, as his predecessors had done, that these aims were incompatible; once again, as always before, the requirements of commerce took precedence over the establishment of justice and peace.¹ It was not long after his arrival in Luanda that Vasconcelos set off to campaign in the interior. Under the pretext of subduing a chief called Kaita Kalaba Langa* who had revolted against the Portuguese, the governor recruited all the available settlers, soldiers, 'jagas', subject chiefs, slaves and 'quimbares' or free African soldiers. It was soon obvious that he was not leading a small punitive expedition but was intent on marching straight to Ndongo to attack the Ngola.² The governor's eldest son, Francisco Luis de Vasconcelos, was left in charge of the administration in Luanda. The younger son, João Mendes de Vasconcelos accompanied the governor and the army which marched to Tumbo and sailed

¹Vasconcelos to King, 28.8.1617. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brásio VI, 283-285.

²Bishop Manuel Baptista to King, 7.9.1619. A.H.U.

* Cayta Calaba Langa.

up the Kwanza, attacking a few Kisama villages and visiting the fort at Mushima. When they arrived in Massangano they began, with the help of the local garrison, to plan the conquest of Ndongo.

The sequence of events in the campaign is not easy to establish. It would seem, however, that Vasconcelos began by removing the fort of Hango on the lower Lukala, and marched up that river to a point north of Kabasa, the Ngola's capital, where he planned to rebuild the fort. Mbandi was acutely worried by this move and appears to have sent an ally, 'Gaita', who may have been the leader of one of the Imbangala camps, to attack the Portuguese.¹ The latter retaliated by crossing the Lutete River, a southbank tributary of the Lukala, and attacking the Ngola. The Ngola's huts, magnificently built and sumptuously decorated with peacock feathers, were burnt to the ground. Many prisoners were captured. The Portuguese army then entered the abandoned city of Kabasa and settled down for the rainy season, probably that of 1618 to 1619. The white soldiers suffered severely from the fevers of that winter. The governor tried to negotiate but Ngola Mbandi refused to discuss peace while the Portuguese were camped in his territory. The governor then withdrew northward to the upper Lukala and built the fort of Mbaka* on the site where his work had been previously interrupted, retiring after-

¹Matias Delgado (Cadornega I, 89, fn.) says that Gaita was probably the Jaga Caiete or Caita. Neves (p. 97) mentions Cahete as one of the followers of Kinguri, hence the suggestion that this may have been an Imbangala army which Ngola Mbandi sent to attack Vasconcelos.

* Ambaca.

wards to Luanda to recover his health, leaving his son to lead the new season's campaign.¹

João Mendes seems to have successfully campaigned in Ndongo. According to Faria he captured and beheaded ninety-four chiefs, including Gaita. Sending half his army to Mbaka, he set out with the other half to attack the 'Mani Cassange'.² According to Cadornega, who is far from lucid about these events, which had taken place twenty years before he himself arrived in Angola, João Mendes also had orders to attack two 'jagas' - that is probably Imbangala chiefs - called Domgo and Kasa. These were former allies of the Portuguese who had turned against them.³ Cadornega goes on to relate how João Mendes marched into Matamba, further than any previous Portuguese captain had ever gone. On his way he defeated several chiefs such as Kijilu, Kiteshi, Kiluanji ka Kongo, Kilamba Bamba a Kwanza and Ndala Mdanji.* He finally destroyed the compound of Queen Mulundu a Cambolo of Matamba, and put her army to flight.⁴

Faria, who is less voluble but possibly more accurate than Cadornega, reported that João Mendes was less than successful in his campaign against Kasanje. Kasanje remained hidden in the bush and sniped at the

¹Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. Cadornega I, 88-89 fn, and Brásio VI.

²Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. Cadornega I, 89 fn.

³Matias Delgado (Cadornega I, 155, fn) suggests that this campaign took place in 1618, but this date does not seem as likely as 1619.

⁴Cadornega, I, 93-95.

* Quijilo, Quitexi, Quiloanji ka Congo, Quilamba Bamba Quanza, Andola Andangi.

Portuguese. When they decided to retreat Kasanje captured their baggage train. The captain then returned to Luanda, but was soon sent back to the front. From Mbaka he launched a new attack on Ngola Mbandi with conspicuous success. The king's mother and wives were captured by the Portuguese and the king himself had to flee and take refuge on the islands in the Kwanza River.¹ He was still there when João Correia de Souza arrived in Luanda to take over the government in October 1621.² Faria's last word on the campaigns of Vasconcelos was one of despair. He could not see what gain could be had from so much carnage. The Mbundu were already suffering severely from a four year drought and a pointless war crowned their misery. It was not even as if the Portuguese wanted the lands which they conquered: all they cared for was trade and preaching the gospel. War did nothing to further either pursuit.³

With the arrival of the new governor, João Correia, attempts were made to renew friendly contacts between the Mbundu and the Portuguese. It seems that the Portuguese were coming to realise that the Ngola and the leading Mbundu chiefs played an important role in the slave trade. If they chose, they could block the trade routes and close the slave

¹Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. in Cadornega I, 89, fn.

²Report by Fernão de Souza, 2.3.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 30. Brásio VIII, 156.

³Manuel Severim de Faria, op.cit. in Cadornega I, 90, fn.

markets. It was probably for this reason that Correia sent Manuel Dias and Father Dionizio de Faria Barreto, an African priest, to encourage Ngola Mbandi to leave the Kwanza island and re-settle in Ndongo. Mbandi laid down three conditions before he would return to Kabasa. First of all the fort of Mbaka, which was only one day's march from Kabasa, should be withdrawn to its old site on the lower Lukala. Secondly, the Portuguese should help the Ngola to expel Kasanje from Ndongo. Lastly the governor should restore to the Ngola all the chiefs and subjects who had been captured in the last of Vasconcelos' campaigns. Manuel Dias was sent to Luanda to lay these conditions before the governor. The governor, advised by the Luanda Municipal Council, agreed to accept them, and dispatched Bento Rebello to carry his answer to Mbandi.¹

To cement this new friendship Mbandi sent his sister Nzinga to Luanda as ambassadress. This remarkable woman is believed to have been born in 1582. From 1620 until her death in 1663 she was the most important personality in Angola.² According to Cavazzi she arrived in Luanda while João Correia de Souza was still governor. He gave her an audience, but since he supplied her with no chair upon which to sit in his presence, she seated herself on the back of one of her maids-in-waiting. During the interview she persuaded the governor to recognise Mbandi as an allied king of equal status to other independent monarchs, and not as a subject

¹Report by Fernão de Souza, 2.3.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 fl 30. Brásio VIII, 156-157.

²There is a full-length biography of Queen Nzinga written in Flemish. Mgr. J. Cuvelier: Koningin Nzinga van Matamba, Brugge 1957.

of the Portuguese crown. She was afterwards baptised by the name of Dona Ana de Souza and the governor became her god-father.¹ Fernão de Souza, in his account of 1632, made no mention of the baptism of Nzinga. He said, however, that since João Correia, who left Luanda in 1623 after a quarrel with the Jesuits, departed before carrying out his promises, Nzinga went to Luanda to obtain satisfaction from his successor, Captain Pedro de Souza Coelho. Perhaps Nzinga went on two missions to Luanda, or perhaps she was in Luanda when Correia made his precipitate departure.²

Although Correia worked for a peaceful settlement in Ndongo, he carried on active warfare in other directions. Not far from Luanda in a district known as the 'Nsaka de Kasanje',^{*} there was a small army, the leader of which called himself Kasanje, and which may have been a remnant of the Lunda invaders of Angola. They subsisted by frequent pillaging expeditions to the outskirts of Luanda and to the Bengo valley farms from which they could retreat rapidly to their territory of thick undergrowth and small lakes. Their depredations had apparently been going on for half a century since the arrival of Paulo Dias in Luanda. When Correia took over the government they were seriously hindering trade from going in or out of Luanda. Correia ordered the army to surround the area and then close in, cutting the bush as it advanced. The

¹Cavazzi - Labat V, 35-40.

²Report from Fernão de Souza, 2.3.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 fl 30. Brásio VIII, 156-157.

^{*}Ensaka de Cassange.

leader, Kasanje, was captured trying to escape across the Bengo.

He was brought before the Governor who admired his courage and leadership but nonetheless had him and his two lieutenants executed. The rest of his chiefs were then rounded up and deported to Brazil.¹

The Portuguese government were very disturbed about this, possibly fearing that free Negroes in Brazil might lead a slave revolt. The governor of Brazil was instructed to send any of the deportees who wished it back to Angola at João Correia's expense.²

Having rid Luanda of its most immediate threat, Correia sent his army to attack Nambu a Ngongo*. It seems that the governor's main aim was to coerce the chief into supplying him with slaves. The most valuable perquisite of the governor was the opportunity to manage campaigns so as to gain from selling prisoners-of-war. Correia, however, was rather foolhardy in his choice of victim, because Nambu a Ngongo was a subject of Kongo and had the backing of the 'Duke' of Mbamba and the 'Marquis' of Mpemba. When Nambu a Ngongo refused to submit to threats, the Portuguese and their 'jaga' allies were forced to attack him and had orders to capture the chief together with Mbamba and Mpemba. The Kongo army attacked first however, and scattered the auxiliary troops. They were unable to overcome the core of arquebuses however and Mpemba and Mbamba were killed. The Jesuits reported that

¹ João Correia de Souza to Marquis of Freilha, 3.6.1622. A.H.M. 9-1-6/B-4, fls 130-133. Brásio VII, 17-24.

² King of Spain to Governors of Portugal, 9.12.1622. A.H.U. Cx 1 Brásio VII, 64-65.

* Namboangongo.

they were even eaten by the 'jagas'. Nambu a Ngongo was captured and sent in chains to Brazil. The main result, however, from the point of view of the Portuguese, was disastrous. Those who traded in Kongo, estimated to be a thousand strong, bore the brunt of the retaliation. Traders living in Mbamba, in particular, were killed with their wives and families. Those living elsewhere who survived did so through the intervention of the Kongo king.¹

After this diversion into Kongo, organised by João Correia, the new governor, Pedro de Souza Coelho, returned to trying to establish the Mbundu trade markets on a regular and friendly footing. He agreed to expel Kasanje, (that is the Imbangala leader of eastern Ndongo, and not the chief near Luanda,) from Ndongo by force.² Before Coelho took any action, however, he was superseded in the government by Simão de Mascarenhas, the newly arrived Bishop who disembarked at Luanda about 9 August 1623.³ Mascarenhas ordered Coelho to continue with the planned campaign, but Ngola Mbandi specified that he should march up the line of the Lukala River rather than through Ndongo where the Mbundu were just beginning to resettle after the Vasconcelos wars. Coelho disliked being ordered about and instead of obeying his instructions he retired

¹ Report by Mateus Cardoso S.J. 1623. A.R.S.I. Lus Cod 55 fl 51-54v. Brásio VII, 176-193.

² F. de Souza 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 157.

³ Mascarenhas, 3.2.1624. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brásio VII, 199-203.

to Mbaka where apparently he died in January 1624.¹ Still nothing had been done to re-open the markets and satisfy Ngola Mbandi, who became so distrustful of the Portuguese that Father Dionizio, the African priest at his court, had to escape hastily.²

While the Portuguese were doing very little to help Ngola Mbandi, the Imbangala armies were apparently causing serious damage in Ndongo. Two of them, referred to in a letter by Mascarenhas as 'jagas', destroyed the Mbundu villages around Cambambe and impeded what trade movement there was. Lopo Soares Lasso was sent to drive them off. He also defeated and captured two other 'jagas', Zenza and Bangobango.³ Kasanje, however, still remained unchecked, when in June 1624 a new and effective governor arrived in Angola in the person of Fernão de Souza.⁴

By the time Fernão de Souza arrived in 1624 it must have become obvious that an effective slave trade required a co-operative African state through which to work. The old trade had been conducted through Ngola Kiluanji. With his death the trade had faltered and although Vasconcelos had tried to get it moving again by massive military action, he had only succeeded in destroying the old Ndongo and had been sent home to Portugal in disgrace. Correia had made a wild excursion into

¹Mascarenhas, 3.2.1624. A.H.U. Cx 1, Brásio VII, 199.

²Fernão de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 158.

³Mascarenhas, 3.2.1624. A.H.U. Cx 1, Brásio VII, 199-203.

⁴B.A.L. 51-vii-30, fl 472. Brásio VII, 243.

Kongo in the hope of finding a new source of slaves, but with little success. Souza, the new governor, tried to revive the Ndongo monarchy and get the trade flowing through Mbundu agencies in the old way. Not succeeding in this he later made an attempt, heavily censured afterwards in Portugal, to establish a new Mbundu monarchy.

Ngola Mbandi probably died shortly before Fernão de Souza arrived in Luanda. He had entrusted his son to the care of the 'jaga' Kasa, expecting him to give the boy a military training and to protect him from any attempt on his life by his aunt Nzinga, whose son Mbandi had killed a few years earlier to consolidate his power. This move failed and after Mbandi's death Nzinga successfully bribed Kasa into handing over her nephew. It was believed that she killed him and ate his heart. Bento Rebello, who was in Ndongo at the time of Mbandi's death, accused Nzinga of having poisoned Mbandi. She had been opposed, Rebello said, to his policy of conciliation with the Portuguese.¹ Since Nzinga had been the chief instrument of this conciliation she is unlikely to have been totally opposed to it. She may, however, have poisoned Mbandi in order to gain absolute power in Ndongo for herself. Fernão de Souza, writing from Luanda in 1624, thought that Mbandi committed suicide in a fit of despair.²

¹Fernão de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 158.

²Fernão de Souza, 15.8.1624, B.A.L. 31-viii-30, Brásio VII, 248-250.

Nzinga was now undisputed queen of the Mbundu although she lived in exile on the Kwanza Islands in eastern Ndongo. To stimulate trade, which was almost at a standstill, she wrote to Fernão de Souza once more offering a settlement. If the governor would withdraw the Mbaka presídio Nzinga would leave her hide-out on the Kwanza islands. She would also re-establish the slave market of Kisala (Quiçala) and instruct the Mbundu to sell their slaves there. Souza strongly recommended that this offer be accepted but decided that he could not act without royal permission.¹ Nothing more seems to have been done for about a year. The governor, meanwhile, was preoccupied with strengthening the seaward defences of Luanda against the Dutch threat. He also organised the collection of taxes and tribute among the chiefs who had remained loyal to the Portuguese, but he did nothing to extend the area under Portuguese control. The levying of the baculamento or tribute was hard work. Many of the chiefs were so impoverished by the relentless extraction of slaves by previous governors and captains, that they were unable to pay their quota. Alternatively they sent young boys or old men instead of the regulation Peça da India - a young adult slave. Some tribute was even paid in palm cloth instead.²

The fierce pressure to supply slaves which was exerted on those Mbundu chiefs who were under the domination of the Portuguese forts

¹F. de Souza, 15.8.1624. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 298-299. Brásio VII, 248-250.

²F. de Souza, 13.8.1625. A.H.U. Cx 2. Brásio VII, 348.

began to drive many of them away to the eastern part of Ndongo where they joined forces with Nzinga. The Queen thus slowly built up an armed force hostile to the Portuguese. She also gave shelter to runaway slaves from Luanda. This caused particular concern to the settlers some of whom claimed to have lost up to 150 men in this way. To make matters worse a number of the Portuguese war-slaves, who formed the bulk of their army, went to join Nzinga. The settlers and traders, wanting to get their refugee slaves back, demanded a war on Nzinga, but the governor's instructions said explicitly that he might only declare war for defensive purposes or in the event of a rebellion.¹ Souza sent two Jesuit fathers to negotiate with Nzinga over the return of slaves who had unquestionably escaped from Portuguese captors. They had no success however and returned to Luanda. Nzinga sent an embassy to Luanda to discuss the re-opening of the trade but her ambassadors made no progress and were accused of encouraging chiefs under Portuguese domination to abandon the white man's cause and join Queen Nzinga.²

In 1625, when negotiations with Nzinga seemed to be leading nowhere, Fernão de Souza made an alliance with a Mbundu chief close to Nzinga's camp. The soba Ayre Kiluanji, chief of the rock enclosure of Pungu a Ndongo, was friendly towards the Portuguese. He asked to become a vassal of the Portuguese crown and was ordered to present himself at the fort

¹F. de Souza, 22.8.1625. A.H.U. Cx 2. Brásio VII, 359-364.

²F. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 158-161.

at Mbaka. There he was asked to find out what Nzinga planned to do. It had been reported by a soldier who had spent four years with the Mbundu fighting against the Portuguese, that a general rebellion against the Portuguese was being planned.¹ When Nzinga heard that Ayre had been to Mbaka, she immediately declared war on him. He appealed for Portuguese protection and thus gave the governor the legal right to declare war on Nzinga in defence of a subject of the Portuguese crown.²

Early in 1626 the captains, municipal councillors and officials of the justice and treasury departments were called to a council of war in Luanda and agreed to launch a full-scale attack on Queen Nzinga. It was necessary to establish a new and loyal king in Ndongo who would be a vassal of the Portuguese crown. The army set out on 7 February 1626 with the old conquistador Bento Banha Cardoso in command.³ Nzinga was driven out of the Kwanza islands and the war was successfully concluded by the time Ayre Kiluanji died, probably towards the end of 1626. Cardoso chose another Ayre as his successor with the approval of the chiefs and captains accompanying him. This new chief was made Ngola of Ndongo.⁴ In the Spring of 1627 he was baptised as Dom Felipe and his queen as

¹This soldier was called Manuel Fernandes Ladroal and was presumably a Portuguese.

²Fernão de Souza, 21.2.1626. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 329-330. Brásio VII, 417-420.

³F. de Souza, 21.2.1626. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fl 329-330. Brásio VII, 417-420.

⁴F. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 162.

Dona Guyomar. Their son was sent to Luanda and took the baptismal name of Francisco.¹ The new puppet-Ngola agreed to pay tribute to the Portuguese of one hundred slaves per annum. He also permitted the Jesuits to build a church at Pungu a Ndongo.² Ngola Ayre agreed to re-open the trade fairs. That of Mbumba a Kisansu* was once more functioning by March 1627 and the Mbundu chiefs were instructed to send all pombeiros there rather than trade with them privately.³ In the following year a captain was despatched to the eastern border of Ndongo to open a new fair at Ndala Kissuba.⁴ He was instructed to explain his mission to Ngola Ayre as he passed Pungu a Ndongo and make sure of ^{the} Ngola's co-operation. The chief of Ndala Kissuba was to be thanked for the assistance he had given to some pombeiros who had had to flee from Nzinga. An offer of Portuguese military assistance was to be made to him if he would agree to open a new slave market and allow traders to pass freely through his lands.⁴ This new trade centre was temporarily established and flourished for a while in the latter part of Fernão de Souza's government.⁵

¹F. de Souza, 30.1.1627 and ? 1627. B.A.L. 51-vii-30 fl 235 and 244. Brásio VII, 497-499 and 524-525.

²F. de Souza, 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 162.

³F. de Souza to Ngola Ayre, 27.3.1627. B.A.L. Ms 51-viii-30 fl 242-242v. Brásio VII, 506-507.

⁴Fernão de Souza to Capt. F. de Castro, 8.4.1628. B.A.L. 51-viii-31 fl 171v. Brásio VII, 549-550.

⁵F. de Souza, 23.2.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 19-29. Brásio VIII, 140.

*Bumba Aquizanzo. / Andalla Quissuba.

In constructing a new and amicable Ndongo monarchy, Souza had to contend not only with the inevitable enmity of Nzinga but with the suspicion of the chiefs. The latter complained that Ngola Ayre was the son of a 'slave' and that they therefore could not obey him. An important function of the Ngola was that of rain-maker. The Mbundu had suffered a long drought during the time when Ngola Mbandi was a refugee from the attacks of Vasconcelos, and were convinced that unless they recognised the true leader, they would suffer many more such hardships. They asked that one of the sisters of the late Ngola Mbandi be made Queen. In the meantime many chiefs were abandoning Ndongo to live elsewhere. The Bishop of Luanda recommended that Ayre be deposed in favour of a more acceptable candidate, but the Jesuits and others supported Ayre's claim since he paid the tribute which he had promised. Souza referred the matter to the King in Madrid with a recommendation that if Ayre was to be replaced with one of Mbandi's sisters, it should not be Nzinga but rather a young sister, 'Maria Camfo', probably *Mukambu*.¹

Nzinga's opposition to Ngola Ayre took a military form. She returned to the Kwanza islands from which she had been driven by Bento Banha Cardoso, possibly with the support of the 'jaga' Kasa. Her chief lieutenant had gone to Luanda to negotiate with the Portuguese and had been executed for spying in December 1627.² She attacked the Portuguese

¹F. de Souza, 23.2.1632. B.A.L. 51-viii-31, fl 19-29. Brásio VIII, 138-141.

²F. de Souza, 1627. B.A.L. 51-viii-30 fls 247-247v. Brásio VII, 526-528.

a second time but was defeated by Payo de Araujo de Azevedo who had succeeded Cardoso. Nzinga herself fled to ~~Mako~~^{*}, south of the Kwanza River, or to the Songo country east of Ndongo, but her sisters were captured and taken to Luanda. The army was prevented from following Nzinga by an outbreak of small-pox.¹ According to Fernão de Souza she then joined forces with the Kasanje army which could put 80,000 bowmen in the field. For the second time she returned to the Kwanza islands and persuaded the Mbundu to close the new fair at Ndala Kisuba and block the trade routes. By the time Souza left Angola there were therefore growing demands from the trading interests to give in to Nzinga's pressure and allow one of her sisters to become Queen of Ndongo.² The attempt to establish a new monarchy was already seen as a failure. In the reports which he wrote in 1632 on the Angolan situation, Fernão de Souza stressed, perhaps unjustly, that the ill-fated idea had come from Bento Banha Cardoso, now dead, and not from himself.³

The mention of Kasanje in Fernão de Souza's report of 1632 would appear to refer, perhaps for the first time, to a state beyond Ndongo near the Songo country. The kingdom of Kasanje was founded during the retreat of the Imbangala from the Portuguese frontier which followed their

¹Cavazzi - Labat V 72-73.

²F. de Souza 2.3.1632. Brásio VIII, 162-163.

³Ibid. Brásio VIII, 162.

* Oacoe.

invasion into Angola. Although no contemporary document seems yet to have come to light describing the founding of the Kingdom of Kasanje, the oral traditions of the Imbangala do give an account of the events which led up to their establishment in the wide plain between the Tala Mugongo Mountains and the winding upper Kwango River.

The aim of the Imbangala in moving eastward seems to have been to get away from the Portuguese military influence which dominated the peoples within range of the forts. At the same time they wanted to remain close enough to carry on trade with the Europeans. This movement seems to have spanned approximately the first third of the seventeenth century. Although the Imbangala were normally referred to by the Portuguese as 'jagas' and although they maintained the traditions and the customs of the old Lunda leaders, the majority, at least, were of Mbundu origin by the time they had been in Angola for a generation. This was an inevitable consequence of their custom of infanticide. The Pende, the Mbundu people who left Angola during the early seventeenth century to emigrate to the Kasai, said that the 'Imba-Ngola' were their brothers and that Kasanje was the son of an Imbangala woman.¹ This 'Kasanje', who founded the Imbangala kingdom on the Kwango, was probably not the same as the Kasanje who took over the leadership of some of the Imbangala invaders on the death of Kinguri. He was probably an Imbangala leader connected with the troop of Kalandula who arrived at Maxangana about 1603.

¹Haveaux, op.cit. 49.

According to the Imbangala traditions, Kasanje gave military assistance to the Portuguese when he arrived at Massangano. In return they offered him lands near their forts on which to settle. Kasanje however declined such a doubtful privilege and asked for a territory a little further afield at Lukamba on the Lukala River, near the future site of the fort of Mbaka. Kasanje settled down there and was joined by some followers of Kinguri who had settled at Bola Kasash^{*} in Libolo during the last stages of the Imbangala advance into Angola. According to the tradition Kasanje stayed at Lukamba for two years and attempted to grow a crop. This was a long stay by the standards of Imbangala armies, and to attempt to grow their own food was an entirely new departure.

After two years an elephant came and destroyed Kasanje's crops. He sent his hunters out and they followed it right across Bondo to Kilamba where the chief gave them tobacco and salt, commodities for which his country was famed. The hunters returned with such glowing accounts of the fertile country which they had seen that Kasanje decided to leave Lukamba where soils were poor and wood scarce. He sought permission to emigrate from the Portuguese 'chief', Miguel. This permission was given on condition the Imbangala sent back frequent embassies with presents and tributes. It has been suggested by Vansina that this Miguel may have been Roque de São Miguel who was commander of the fort of Hango

* Bola Cassache.

a Kikaito from 1611 until some time before 1617.¹ If this hypothesis is accepted, as seems reasonable, then Kasanje probably took his leave from the Portuguese between 1611 and 1617. The date can be further narrowed because the Portuguese were fighting the Ngola in 1611 and again after 1615, it is only between 1612 and 1614 that they are likely to have allowed an ally to move away from the colonial frontier. This is obviously weak evidence, but a small clue that Kasanje had at least not left the Portuguese and founded his new kingdom long before this is given by Balthasar Rebello de Aragão who in 1607 described the kingdoms which lay to the east of Ndongo, and made no mention of a state of Kasanje.²

Kasanje's migration away from Lukamba was probably much slower than the tradition would suggest. When Battell travelled with an Imbangala army, he found that it settled for six months at most of the localities to which it came. It seems likely that Kasanje's advance towards the Kwango was of a similar nature. It will be remembered that in 1618 or 1619 Kasanje was attacked by João Mendes de Vasconcelos. The exact location of this battle is not known but it was probably on the frontier between Ndongo and Matamba and is unlikely to have been much further inland towards the region of the Kwango tributaries. The next mention of Kasanje was made in 1621 when the Ngola agreed to a peace

¹Vansina, J.A.H., 1963, 370-371 and sources quoted therein.

²See Chapter Four.

with the Portuguese after the Vasconcelos wars on condition that the new governor, João Correia de Souza, would help him to expel Kasanje from Ndongo. Vansina had assumed that Kasanje had by this time been to the Kwango, founded a kingdom, and returned to attack Ndongo.¹ This suggestion seems doubtful. One objection is that it probably took the Imbangala a long time to change from the concept of a self-sufficient roving army, to that of a settled state from which an army could be sent out leaving the basic state structure behind. It seems much more likely that the Imbangala found a site on which to settle and evolve a kingdom after 1623 rather than before 1621. When the Ngola appealed to the Portuguese between those years to help him to expel Kasanje from his territory, it seems probable that the Imbangala were still in the process of moving out of Ndongo, and not attacking it from a base on the Kwango.

The suggestion that the founding of the kingdom of Kasanje did not begin before the later 1620's instead of a decade earlier, is strengthened by the oral tradition of the Pende. The Pende remember a defeat of Queen Nzinga by the Portuguese as an event which took place before their departure from the Mbundu homeland. That defeat may even have been one cause of their departure. When the Pende fled they went to Musenge Kihunda near the Lui River salt pans. They were joined there by 'Kasanji ka Kingudi'. Kasanje imposed harsh levies on the

¹Vansina, J.A.H. 1963 (3), 371.

Pende and eventually drove them away towards the Kasai.¹ The Carvalho version of the Imbangala traditions records a similar story. The Imbangala migrated towards the north-east from Ndongo over a period of several years. As they went they continually drove other peoples in front of them until they came to the salt pans in the country of the Holo people. There they settled down with the intention of working the salt deposits.² From these traditions it would seem that the Pende left Ndongo before the Imbangala did. Since the Pende remember Queen Nzinga, they are unlikely to have left before 1624 when she came to power, and possibly did not do so until she was expelled from Ndongo after a battle with the Portuguese in 1626. If it be supposed that the Pende left Ndongo in 1626 and that the Imbangala followed them for several years towards the Lui River, it is unlikely that the conquest of the Imbangala's final settling place began before about 1630 and not, as Vansina suggested, about 1614. Such a date is compatible with Nzinga's negotiations with Kasanje in the 'wilderness' of Ganguela, in about 1630 to close the trade fair of Ndala Kisuba.

When Kasanje arrived on the Lui River, he had to set about conquering the territory in which he wanted to settle. He was helped by Ngonga Mbandi, a Mbundu general of Queen Nzinga who had attached himself to Kasanje with a number of his troops. Their first enemy was Kilamba

¹Haveaux, op.cit. 49-50.

²Carvalho; O Jagado de Cassange, Lisbon 1898? 31.

who was so successful in resisting the Mbundu-Imbangala aggression that he managed to capture the person of Kasanje himself. In order to rescue him, Kasanje's wife, a girl from Libolo, called on her three brothers to help Ngonga Mbandi. Kikata kya Hango and Huava Hango came to the rescue and successfully destroyed the Kilamba chief by inviting him to discuss peace terms and then catching him in a hidden pit underneath the seat of honour. The people of Kilamba fled after the death of their ruler and Kasanje was rescued. In gratitude for the help of his associates Kasanje laid down, according to the tradition, that the succession to the throne should go in turn to a member of the Kulashingo family of Kasanje himself, then to a Ngonga and finally to a member of the Kalunga dynasty to which Huava Hango belonged. Kikata kya Hango was styled Kasa and made ruler of a large province of the new kingdom. He was also made an elector and became very influential in the choice of a new king.¹

After the conquest of Kilamba the new kingdom grew easily. Many small chiefs from the surrounding country came to pay homage to Kasanje for fear of being attacked by him. The capital was moved from Kilamba on the excuse that the camp was continually being disturbed by lions. Kasanje went to the lands of two chiefs Kisongo kya Paso and Kanga rya Ndungo a little further to the south. It is possible that the real reason for this move was to open a new and more southerly trade route from Kasanje to the Portuguese. During the 1630's Nzinga was conquering Matamba and

¹Neves, 103-106.

the old route across that country to the Lukala may have been closed. The last important resistance to the Imbangala settlers came from Use a Nzingwe who lived on a well defended hill, but he too was eventually overcome. One and a half years later Kasanje died and was succeeded, though not without a struggle, by Kasanje ka Kulashingo who claimed to be the last of Kungir's nephews. The centre of the Kingdom of Kasanje remained in the region in which Kasanje died until the mid-nineteenth century when Neves visited it.¹

This conquest completes the story of the Lunda-Imbangala invasion of Angola, the progressive 'Mbunduization' of the Imbangala armies, and the retreat of one of them to found a new kingdom between the Lunda empire and the Portuguese colony. According to the interpretation given here these events were spread over more than half a century and were not in a rapid sequence as might be supposed from the oral traditions. Kasanje developed into an important trading kingdom in the second half of the seventeenth century and will be frequently referred to in the next chapters.

While the Imbangala were conquering the plain between the Tala Mugongo and the Kwango River and establishing the kingdom of Kasanje, the Portuguese were trying to increase the prosperity of their colony. On 4 September 1630 Fernão de Souza was replaced as governor by Dom Manuel Pereira Coutinho.² By this time the Portuguese must have been

¹Neves, 106-108.

²Matias Delgado: Cadornega I, appendix.

aware of the fact that they had over-exploited the Mbundu slave supplies. To establish a strong Mbundu dynasty willing to trade in slaves would not now solve the problem caused by the serious depopulation of Ndongo. In 1633 Father Gonalo de Souza reported a situation very different from the optimistic account of Ferno de Souza shortly before. Very little trade was being conducted and the fairs had dried up. One cause of this to which Father Gonalo pointed was the wars, especially those of Nzinga and the Imbangala, whom he referred to as the 'cannibal jagas'. Another reason was that the burden of the slave tax was driving sobas away to the hinterland of Ndongo. Pombeiros were having to travel several months journey to buy slaves. This was costly both in time and in the numbers of slaves who died on the road. It also meant that pombeiros travelled beyond the limits where their Portuguese masters could effectively control them. Some settled down to trade on their own account with the goods which had been entrusted to them. This was a heavy loss to their owners in the impoverished town of Luanda.¹

Portuguese action in Ndongo at this time was hampered by the constant threat of a Dutch attack on Luanda. The governor dared not leave the capital unprotected for very long to indulge in military exchanges with Nzinga and Kasanje. This Dutch threat, although not new, was an increasing hazard. In 1623 and 1624 two attacks on Luanda had been beaten

¹Father Gonalo de Souza, 6.7.1633. A.H.U. Cx 1. Brsio VIII, 241.

off, although not before several Portuguese ships had been burnt. Dutch traders were especially active in Loango and Kongo and sometimes waylaid Portuguese merchant vessels on their way to Luanda and relieved them of their cargoes of trade good.¹

The Dutch threat and the depopulation of Ndongo were probably the main reasons why Coutinho turned his attention to the Ndembu country of southern Kongo when he wanted to activate the slave trade. This region was not far from Luanda, so that the army could be recalled quite rapidly if necessary. It is also possible that this region had been less extensively exploited than Ndongo because it was part of Kongo, nominally a friendly kingdom allied to Portugal. A campaign was launched against the Ndembu chief Mbwila on the old pretext that he had been harbouring run-away slaves. Antonio Bruto commanded the white troops and the tendala, or African captain, Antonio Dias Musungu led the black 'guerra preta'. The tendala's chief insignia was a large iron bell without a clapper which he beat to give instructions to the 'jaga' or Imbangala troops. This bell was held in great awe by them and it is perhaps significant that a similar bell was the chief insignia of the Mwata Yamvo of Lunda. Cadornega dismissed this respect as mere superstition on the part of the 'jaga'.²

In the fighting Bruto captured many slaves but also suffered heavy

¹For a detailed analysis of Dutch activities in Angola and the reason for them at this time see C.R.Boxer: Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686. London 1952.

²Cadornega I, 178-180.

losses owing to the unexpectedly large number of fire-arms which Mbwila could muster. The war was still progressing when Coutinho was replaced, in 1635, by Francisco de Vasconcelos da Cunha. Mbwila's rocky stronghold was tightly besieged at this time and the Ndembu asked the new governor for peace, promising to return all refugee slaves and to become a vassal of the crown. The governor accepted the terms and ended the Ndembu campaign. He may have been influenced by the news of a Dutch squadron which lay up-wind from Luanda. When that alarm was over, he organised a new campaign, this time in the direction of Kisama where a chief called Kimbambala was accused of harbouring slaves from the settler estates of Cambambe and Massangano.¹

While the governors were preoccupied in the regions close to Luanda, Nzinga had been active on the eastern side of Ndongo. According to Cavazzi, who was at one time a missionary at her court and was in a position to have learnt Nzinga's history from the best sources, the Queen, after being expelled from Ndongo, adopted the way of living and of fighting used by the Imbangala. Cavazzi called this the 'law of the jagas' or the 'Kishi' Laws' whose brutality he contrasted to his own laws of Christianity. Nzinga may have recruited followers from among Imbangala hordes, but for the most part she probably imposed upon her existing followers a discipline which was akin to that of the Imbangala. The cannibalism which she practised was strongly ritualistic rather than

¹Cadornega, I, 181-182, 190-192.

a normal way of feeding as it had been among the early Imbangala troops. She also adopted the Imbangala custom of infanticide.¹ By building up a hardened corps of followers with a strong religious element in their political association, Nzinga was able to conquer new territories as effectively as Kasanje had done.

Nzinga's second return to the Kwanza islands in about 1629 or 1630 was to recruit followers among the many Mbundu who were migrating eastward away from Portuguese oppression. Nzinga intended to conquer Matamba and then turn on Ndongo to expel the Portuguese and Ngola Ayre. The old king of Matamba, Matambo Kalombo, was dead and the country was being ruled by his daughter, Muongo, whom Nzinga defeated, captured, and branded as a slave. Queen Muongo did not survive long after her defeat, but her daughter outlived Nzinga and was baptised in 1667.² This campaign probably took place in the period from 1630 until 1635 or even later. Nzinga had then founded the second kingdom of peoples who had migrated away from the Portuguese colony. Matamba and Kasanje now began to develop as the main rivals in supplying the slave trade. Once her authority in Matamba had been consolidated, Nzinga turned her attention to Ndongo as planned. She entered the lands of Ngola Ayre (Dom Felipe) and approached the fort of Mbaka. The governor sent his nephew, Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos da Cunha, to defend both the Portuguese and the Ngola.³ Nzinga, however, had to return hastily to Matamba

¹Cavazzi - Labat, V, 51-54.

²Ibid. 73-75.

³Cadornega, I, 193-194.

when Kasanje took advantage of her absence to invade it, causing widespread destruction and carrying off slaves and cattle. He was, however, able to escape behind his own border before Nzinga reached him.¹

At about this time Pedro Cezar de Menezes arrived in Luanda as governor, on 18 October 1639. He brought the first European troops to be sent to Angola since Bento Banha Cardoso had fetched re-inforcements in 1625. The most famous of these soldiers was Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, who wrote a chronicle of the Angolan Wars and personally witnessed many of the campaigns of the next forty years.² Menezes immediately opened negotiations with Nzinga on the question of returning slaves to their masters. The Queen sent him an embassy carrying presents for himself, the chief justice and the bishop, as well as a few run-away slaves who were so old that no one knew who their masters had been. It was thought that Nzinga's motive in sending this delegation was to obtain first hand intelligence of the strength of the new white troops. She sought this information to supplement the reports which her sister, Kifunji, was believed to be sending to Matamba from her captivity in Luanda.³

¹Cavazzi - Labat, V, 75-76.

²Cadornega, I, 205 and 207.

³Cadornega, I, 209.

The governor sent Gaspar Borges Madureira to try to arrange a trade agreement or a peace with Nzinga.¹ Cavazzi believed that the scope of the mission was wider, seeking to prevent any rapprochement between Nzinga and Kasanje unless the Portuguese were included as a third party.² Cavazzi was probably right in his assessment of the importance which Kasanje was attaining. The Portuguese had failed to build a serviceable trade state in Ndongo and their relationship with Nzinga was precarious as always. The new Imbangala kingdom, however, might already have begun to provide a new source of supply, or at least some traders may have realised that it was a potential substitute for Ndongo. If the Portuguese were going to co-operate successfully with Kasanje they did not want Nzinga to interfere in the arrangements beforehand.

Madureira was only partially successful in his mission. Kasanje was willing to sign a peace treaty with the Portuguese and even to forget his alleged claim to Matamba. He was not, however, prepared to adopt Christianity. Nzinga was less accommodating. She claimed that if she became a Christian she would lose all her 'jaga' following. She also said that she would never forgo the fruits of victory and stood by her claim to Ndongo. After six useless months in Matamba Madureira returned to Luanda where he accused Nzinga of having tried to poison him.³

¹Cadornega, I, 210.

²Cavazzi-Labat, V, 76.

³Cavazzi-Labat V, 77-80 and Cadornega, I, 221.

Having failed to make an agreement with Nzinga, Pedro Cezar de Menezes called all the notables of Luanda to a council of war. It was pointed out that the king of Kongo had been having treasonable dealings with the Dutch, Nzinga was more treacherous than ever, and the Ndembu chiefs were preventing pombeiros from trading in southern Kongo. In view of the seriousness of these problems it was agreed to establish a standing army under the command of Antonio Bruto.¹

Before these decisions could be put into effect, however, the situation in Angola was radically altered. On 25 August 1641 the Dutch captured Luanda.

¹Cadornega, I, 222 and 227.

Chapter Six

THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF NDONGO. 1641 - 1684.

During the mid-seventeenth century Angola was a pawn in several international struggles. These included the struggle between the Vatican and the Portuguese crown for control of the mission field, the struggle between Dutch and Portuguese for control of the slave trade, the struggle between Spain and Portugal for sovereignty over the whole Portuguese empire. The most important of these struggles as far as the Mbundu were concerned, was the Dutch attempt to gain control of Angola in order to supply slaves to those Brazilian colonies which Holland had captured. The importance to the Mbundu of this challenge to Portuguese rule was that when the Dutch conquered Luanda they provided alternative trading and military alliances to those offered by the Portuguese. Before this the buying of slaves had been virtually a Portuguese monopoly which had put the Mbundu sellers in a weak position.¹

When the Dutch entered Luanda the Portuguese beat a hasty retreat. Before dawn on 26 August 1641 they marched out of the city to the Bengo River, about twenty miles away, where the Jesuits and other residents had their agricultural estates. Here they settled down to plan a campaign.

¹For the causes and details of the Dutch attack on Angola and the history of Brazil of which this episode forms a part, see Boxer: Salvador Correia de Sa and the struggle for Brazil and Angola, London 1952; and Silva Rego: A dupla Restauração de Angola, Lisbon 1948.

Their first concern was to isolate the Dutch and try to insure that they gained no African support. In this they were largely unsuccessful. The Portuguese domination and trading monopoly had been almost universally unpopular and the refugees on the Bengo soon discovered that only forceful coercion would retain the loyalty of vassal chiefs. The first test case arose when the governor Pedro Cezar de Menezes, received reports that a Ndembu chief of southern Kongo called Nambu a Kalombe* was negotiating with the Dutch. Captain Antonio Bruto was ordered to administer severe punishment to deter other Ndembu and Mbundu chiefs from treating with the enemy. Nambu a Kalombe was defeated and the captain built a cairn with the skulls of the prisoners of war whom he executed.¹

The small rulers in the vicinity of Luanda were not the only potential allies of the Dutch. The Portuguese believed that the king of Kongo, whose predecessors had been in correspondence with the Dutch in Brazil for several years, had ordered the governor of Luanda Island, a Kongo dependency, to give assistance to the invader.² A few months after the Dutch arrived, Garcia II of Kongo wrote to Prince Maurice of Nassau offering facilities to trade and build forts. He asserted that he was disenchanted with the evil and ambitious Portuguese who had planned to conquer

¹Cadornega, I, 260-262.

²Bonaventure de Taggia, Bahia 30.11.1641, refers to a Kongo embassy to the Dutch four years earlier. A.P.F. S.R.C.G., Vol. 110, fl. 194-194v. Brásia, VIII, 547-581. Cadornega, I, 267-268.

* Namboa Calombe.

his kingdom under the guise of friendship. He stressed, however, that he would remain a catholic and that although willing to trade with the Dutch, he would receive no missionaries, ambassadors or settlers from them.¹ In the following year Garcia wrote again to the Dutch saying that he was worried by the continued presence of a small pocket of Portuguese in the interior of Angola. He obviously, and rightly as it proved, feared a vengeful return of the Portuguese.²

When he realised that he was surrounded by hostile states, Pedro Cezar de Menezes decided that his camp on the Bengo was dangerously open to attack. He therefore organised a strenuous march of the exiled citizens of Luanda up country to the fortified town of Massangano. On the march he tried, but with little success, to persuade the chiefs of Ilamba to support the Portuguese in their fight to maintain domination of the Mbundu. When they arrived in Massangano they were able, however, to gain the support of two important allies who later helped them in most of the major campaigns. The first was the 'Jaga' Kabuku Kandonga whom Cadornega claimed to be a direct descendent of the Lunda invaders. Kabuku had a Kilombo* or mobile camp consisting of warriors and a few women but no children. The other loyal ally on whom the Portuguese were able to rely was Ngola Ayre, the king of Ndongo who had been established by Portuguese

¹ Garcia II to Maurice of Nassau, 12.5.1642. *Algemeine Rijksarchief Congo* 1642-1645, Ie W.I.C., Brazilië, No. 58. Brásio VIII, 584-587.

² Garcia II to Dutch governor of Brazil, 20.2.1643. *Ibid* Brazilië No. 59. Brásio IX, 13-16.

* Quilombo.

force of arms during the government of Fernão de Souza. With the help of these two allies and the possession of the three garrisoned forts of Mbaka, Cambambe and Massangano, the Portuguese were able to maintain some control at least over the Western Mbundu of the lower Lukala and middle Kwanza valleys. Elsewhere their authority became negligible.

Pombeiros were killed in the Ndembu states, and Kakulu Kahenda expelled a Portuguese representative. To try to recover the position, the governor sent Antonio Bruto in 1642 to attack Nambu a Ngongo,* one of the most powerful of the Ndembu chiefs. In the optimistic hope of a profitable victory, Bruto took a large number of slave shackles. He was, however, easily overcome by Nambu a Ngongo who had the help of 200 Dutch troops.¹

In Matamba Queen Nzinga immediately realised the advantages of the Dutch presence in Luanda and began to use them to her own commercial and political benefit. In order to get closer to the coast without meeting any Portuguese obstacles, she sent her army commander, Nzinga Amona, to infiltrate the Ndembu country and by-pass the Mbundu lands. Such was the old queen's fearsome reputation that most of the Ndembu chiefs gave way rather than resist her war-hordes. When Kiteshi ka Ndambi^f tried to oppose Amona's advance, the Dutch sent 100 troops to crush the resistance. Nzinga formed an alliance with the Dutch and established her kilombo on the Dande River where she was strategically placed to send caravans to

¹Cadornega, I, 274, 278, 286-7, 290-293.

* Namboangongo.

^fQuitexi Candambi.

Luanda and to conduct short campaigns against the usurper of Ndongo, Ngola Ayre, and his Portuguese supporters.¹

The Portuguese meanwhile were finding conditions in Massangano extremely arduous. Food had become very scarce and clothing was unobtainable. Since the African kingdoms all around them were hostile, they decided to negotiate a truce with the Dutch. They succeeded by the end of 1641 and trade relations were established between Luanda and Massangano. The Dutch sent cheese, sugar, butter, cloth and other goods up country in return for slaves and silver bullion. The Portuguese apparently had considerable reserves of silver which they had presumably accumulated before the Dutch invasion by selling slaves to the Spaniards to work in the mines of Peru. Once a truce with the Dutch had been agreed, the Portuguese decided to leave Massangano and return to their farms on the Bengo where food was more plentiful. They may also have hoped to re-open independent trade routes overseas and be closer at hand to receive any assistance which might come to them from Portugal or Brazil. Their second sojourn on the Bengo was short however. On 17 May 1643 the Dutch broke the truce and attacked the settlement. They may have been seeking to capture the Portuguese silver reserves, but it is probable that they also hoped to remove the Portuguese from Angola altogether. If this was the aim the attack was unsuccessful. Although they captured the governor, Pedro Cezar de Menezes,

¹Cadornega, I, 293-294 and 326-327.

a number of survivors under the leadership of Antonio de Abreu de Miranda marched back to Massangano over the hundred miles of dry savannah. There they negotiated a new truce and re-opened trade relations on the old basis that the Dutch would tolerate the settlement and even provide it with food so long as the Portuguese would sell them slaves. After a few months captivity in Luanda, Menezes escaped and returned to the colony at Massangano, which he ruled until a new governor arrived from Portugal with fresh troops to attempt to recover Luanda.¹

The Dutch had come to Angola exclusively to obtain slaves. They expected to find an export trade of up to 16,000 slaves per annum.² Their negotiations with the African states to obtain slaves were similar to those of their Portuguese predecessors. Queen Nzinga was especially anxious to sell them any prisoners of war whom she could capture. It was probably with the major intention of obtaining slaves that she sent an army estimated by the king of Kongo to consist of 80,000 bowmen, to invade the neighbouring duchy of Wandu* in south-east Kongo.³ By making the Portuguese dependent on the sale of slaves for survival, the Dutch had reduced Massangano to a position similar to that of many small Mbundu

¹ Cadornega, I, 296-298, 299, 303, 307, 317-321, 336-340.

² A Little Forraine Newes, London 1641.

³ Report from Portuguese ambassador to Holland. Souza Coutinho. 6.9.1643. A.T.T. Ms 1341 (Livreria) fl 13. Brásio IX, 64.

* Oandu.

chiefdoms. The Portuguese were forced to pay exorbitant numbers of slaves to obtain European goods which they wanted even more urgently than the Mbundu chiefs did. From being the masters and regulators of the slave trade, the Portuguese had become its most servile participants, conducting raids wherever the risk of defeat seemed smallest. One such campaign was conducted in Libolo where the local chiefs appealed to the Portuguese for help against the Imbangala or 'jaga' army of Lulembe. Lulembe was defeated and driven out of the province, but the Portuguese army stayed on to recruit slaves among those whom they pretended to help.¹

Apart from the raids and skirmishes conducted mainly for commercial purposes, there was a more fundamental war going on in Angola which led to several major campaigns. This was the war between Nzinga and the Dutch on one side and Ngola Ayre and the Portuguese on the other. The first of these campaigns probably took place in 1644. A chief called Ngoleme a Kaita* attacked the Portuguese-dominated chiefs around the fort of Mbaka. The Portuguese sent both black and white troops together with their ally the 'Jaga' Kabuku to attack Kaita, who appealed to Queen Nzinga for help. She sent her general, Nzinga Amona, who overcame and destroyed the Portuguese army. Kabuku was captured and his kilombo was forced to elect a new leader, Funji Amusungu or the new Kabuku. Another captive was the chief of Mbaka, Ngola Kanini, known to the Portuguese as João Gutterres. He was a relative of Nzinga and she forgave him for having

¹Cadornega, I, 317-321, 326-327, 344-345.

* Angoleme Acaita.

worked for Muene Puto, the king of Portugal, and gave him the title of Muene Lumbo, the Lord Chamberlain of her court. The Portuguese strength at Massangano was still further reduced by this defeat.¹

In 1645, before attempting to recover their losses, the Portuguese at last received re-inforcements from outside. The first relief column which had attempted to reach them had met with disaster. Domingos Lopes de Sequeira had sailed from Bahia with 260 men on 8 February 1645. He had landed on the Benguela coast at the Kikombo River mouth on April 12 and with 100 men attempted to march overland to Massangano. Seven days after crossing the Kuvu River he ran into an Imbangala encampment, possibly the one which the Portuguese had driven out of Libolo in the previous year. In the ensuing battle Sequeira and all but four of his army were killed. Those four took the news of the encounter back to the coast where Francisco de Sotto Maior, the new governor of Angola, had meanwhile arrived with a second re-inforcement of 300 men. From the fort which he built on the Kikombo, Sotto Maior moved up the coast in October 1645. At Cabo Ledo he landed and marched through the Songa country to the Kwanza River, avoiding the fort which the Dutch had built to bar the entry to the river mouth. He then went up the river to take command of Massangano.²

The main task which the new governor set himself in 1646 was to attack Nzinga. She had been raiding the Ndongo territories of Ngola Ayre and it

¹Cadornega, I, 349-355.

²B.N.M. Ms 8.187 Relações Mss de Portugal desde o anno 1641 ate 1646. Fls 61-65v and 57-60v. Brásio IX, 332-344 and 398-411.

was feared that she might gain Dutch support to destroy the fort of Mbaka, the Portuguese stronghold in Ndongo. Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos da Cunha led the Portuguese troops, Ngola Ayre commanded the Ndongo army and Amusungu supported them with the Kabuku troops. Soon after they had forded the Dande, they were attacked by Nzinga Amona, Ngola Kanini and a few Dutch soldiers. Nzinga's army, although well equipped with guns supplied by the Dutch, was unable to resist the Portuguese who drove it back and entered the Queen's compound. They captured the Ndembu chief Kakulu Kahenda and for the second time made a prisoner of Nzinga's sister Mukambu, or Lady Barbara as Cadornega called her. Their main disappointment was that all Portuguese prisoners of war had previously been transferred to the Ndembu Kiteshi ka Ndambi. Among Nzinga's papers the victors found a letter from Garcia II of Kongo congratulating Nzinga on her previous victory over the Portuguese. They also found intelligence reports on all the Portuguese activities sent by Nzinga's younger sister Kifunji (Lady Grace) who had been a captive for many years first in Luanda and then in Massangano. Although the battle was an important victory for the Portuguese, some of them were realistic enough to realise that their success had been to some extent due to the support of Ngola Ayre and that if ever Nzinga ceased to threaten his right to the Ndongo throne, he would have little interest in supporting the Portuguese in their campaigns.¹

While these wars were going on, the power of Kasanje was growing on

¹Cadornega, I, 404-428.

the Kwango. The new state may still have been more like an army than a kingdom, but it was becoming rooted in its definitive location. In 1645 or 1646, when the Portuguese felt their plight to be desperate, they sent João Pinhão on an embassy to Kasanje to ask for help in fighting Nzinga. There is no direct evidence as to who the ruler of Kasanje was at this time, but it may have been either Kasanje ka Kulashingo who probably became king of Kasanje in the early 1630's, or Kalunga ka Kilombo who was killed in 1655 by the third of old Kasanje's successors.¹ In return for the military assistance which he would give the Portuguese in fighting Queen Nzinga, the ruler who received the embassy was offered the title of Gola Ambole or Kiambole, that is Captain General in the army of His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal. The king of Kasanje accepted the proposed alliance and became a firm ally of the Portuguese. This alliance survived, through mutual economic advantages, for several generations.²

By 1646 the Dutch were seriously worried by the continued presence of the Portuguese in Massangano. Previously they had considered them only a minor military threat and a major commercial asset. When the Portuguese smuggled a large army of re-inforcements up the Kwanza, defeated Nzinga, and made an alliance with Kasanje, the Dutch came round to the opinion of Kongo and Matamba that the presence of any Portuguese in the interior

¹Neves, op.cit., 108. Carvalho: Cassange, 33. Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 374-398. More details about the rulers of the kingdom of Kasanje will be found later in this chapter.

²Cadornega I, 429.

was dangerous. They began to prepare for the suppression of Massangano. The Portuguese meanwhile were in disarray. The governor, Sotto Maior, had died in mid-1646 and three interim governors had been elected in his place. The Dutch roundly defeated a Portuguese army with a disunited leadership on the western side of the Lukala not far from Massangano. The Portuguese recovered some ground in a later skirmish near Mushima, but their position was still serious. To make matters worse, Nzinga, with the support of 500 Dutch soldiers, was planning an attack to recapture her sister Kifunji. Nzinga also gained the support of several Mbundu chiefs who considered her the rightful ruler of Ndongo and opposed the Portuguese and their nominees. The battle was fought on the north side of the Lukala. Gaspar Borges and Kabuku were defeated and the Portuguese survivors withdrew rapidly to defend Massangano. An order was given for all canoes on the lower Lukala to be broken up to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. To make sure that Nzinga would not recapture her sister the princess Kifunji was drowned in the Kwanza. This also ensured that she did not give treasonable support to the enemy.

The attack was not pressed home immediately. A new Dutch army was prepared in the middle of 1648 to try finally to solve the problem of Massangano. The Portuguese suffered their third consecutive rout and Dom Francisco, son of Ngola Ayre, was killed in the battle. The Kongo-Matamba-Dutch alliance would probably have overcome the last of the Portuguese resistance at this time if it had not been for the arrival of fresh Portuguese

support. On 12 August 1648 Salvador Correia de Sá e Benavides appeared off Luanda and by 24 August he had recaptured the city for the Portuguese. The small colony at Massangano had held on just long enough.¹

When Salvador Correia arrived, he found the Dutch almost as ill prepared for an attack from the sea as the Portuguese had been in 1641. Over 200 Dutch soldiers were up-country helping Nzinga in her effort to destroy Massangano. The Dutch in Luanda were further weakened by the flight of their two main ships with fifty soldiers on board. On the other hand it was the Dutch who had been victorious in the battle on the Lukala and they were more likely to receive support from the interior than were the invaders. The fact that despite this potential advantage, the Dutch commander surrendered with little more resistance than the Portuguese had offered seven years before, is something of a mystery.²

With Luanda recovered, the main tasks facing the Portuguese were to consolidate their hold on the area of central Angola which they had once conquered and to negotiate or fight out settlements with the surrounding states. These tasks occupied them during the thirty years following the spectacular arrival of Salvador Correia. It is a period of Angolan history which Ralph Delgado has called the fall of the black monarchies. The Portuguese steadily increased their military domination of Angola at the expense of the neighbouring kingdoms. This military power was used

¹Cadornegao, I, 490-528.

²For details of the reconquest see Arquivos de Angola Ser II, Vol. V, 1948. Especially the letter from Antonio de Couto, 5.9.1648 in B.A.L. 51-vii-48 fl 24lv-253. See also works cited by C. R. Boxer and A. da Silva Rego.

not only to consolidate a political hold over their dominions, but also to speed up the slave trade. Later, when the chief burden of capturing slaves had shifted further inland, the role of the Portuguese and even of the Mbundu became predominantly concerned with the transport of goods up-country to the staples and the marching of slaves down to the port. In the years after the reconquest, however, direct military action was still an important means of supplementing the supply of slaves.

The Portuguese began their task of re-imposing their control on the colony by punishing the chiefs who had helped the Dutch. Several of these whose lands were near to Luanda had joined forces under the leadership of Panji Ndonga,* reputed to be a descendant of the old Kasanje who had lived in the bush not far from the city. Vicente Pegado da Ponte was given the command of the Portuguese army which was to attack Ndonga. Although he found the enemy well supplied with fire-arms and gun-powder left to them by the Dutch, they were unable to resist the new and confident Portuguese troops. Panji Ndonga himself was killed and his people fled to the reed marshes of the Dande River where they were surrounded and eventually starved out.¹

From the Portuguese point of view the defeat of Panji Ndonga was a good beginning to the re-subjecting of the Mbundu. A more important issue, however, was the attitude of Kongo to the return of the Portuguese.

¹ Cadornega, II, 25-31.

* Pangni Andona.

The king of Kongo had, as mentioned already, been well disposed towards the Dutch. In addition to this reasonable sentiment, he had received a Capuchin mission which had been sent under Vatican and Spanish auspices and without the approval of the new monarch in Lisbon. Garcia II decided that he had better make his peace with the Portuguese as best and as quickly as he could. He did so through the intermediary of the Capuchin missionaries. The peace terms offered by Salvador Correia were severe. They included a contribution by Kongo towards the cost of the reconquest of 900 basketfuls of palm cloth worth about 1,000 slaves; a mutual defence pact; a peace treaty from which the three powerful Ndembu chiefs, Nambu a Ngongo, Mbwila and Mutemu a Kingengo* would be excluded; the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty south of the Dande; the cession of any gold mines in Kongo to Portugal, and the temporary transfer of Luanda Island and its nzimbu fisheries to the Portuguese as a guarantee for the supposed mines. This last provision concerning the gold mines was deleted by João IV who lightened the burden of the treaty before he approved it. In later years, however, the governors acted towards the kings of Kongo as though the treaty had been ratified in full. Minor provisions in the treaty concerned the exemption from river tolls of Portuguese traders, the sending of royal hostages to Luanda, an exclusion clause in the mutual defence pact whereby Portugal would not help Kongo in its war with Sonyo, and a provision allowing the building of a Portuguese fort on the

*Motemb Aquingengo.

Congo River estuary.¹

By October 1650 Salvador Correia felt that he was in control of the colony and could write, perhaps a little optimistically, to the king that Kongo was now subdued, Kasanje was friendly, Ndongo remained loyal, Kisama had been pacified, Loango was allowing trade with the Portuguese, Nzinga was lying low for the time being and Benguela had been restored to Portuguese sovereignty.² The army was currently occupied in Libolo. There was no longer any immediate military threat to Angola, and the Libolo campaign had the dual function of revenging the death of Domingos Lopes de Sequeira and his army who were destroyed in southern Libolo in 1645, and of obtaining prisoners of war for the Luanda slave market. The open excuse for the campaign was that the sobas and 'jagas' of Libolo had been molesting pombeiros and hindering the ivory and slave trades. The Portuguese defeated Kiteki ka Banguela and then crossed the Longa River into the lands of a pastoral people. They captured several corrals of cattle and inflicted defeats on those whom they considered responsible for crushing the army of 1645. The captain wanted to go further south beyond the Kuvu to the lands of the Sumbi and the 'Quimbundus' or Ovimbundus, but the foot-sore army refused to follow him any farther and the expedition eventually returned.³

¹Arquivos de Angola, Ser II, Vol. II, 169-189. Cadornega II, 34.

²Salvador Correia to João IV, 6.10.1650. A.H.U. Angola Cx 3.

³Cadornega, II, 43-46.

Two other military expeditions were made while Salvador Correia was still governor. One was part of the perennial skirmish with the Kisama chiefs whom the Portuguese were never able to subdue and who constantly threatened the safety of the Kwanza River navigation. The other was against the powerful Ndembu chief Mbwila who had been hostile to the Portuguese when they were shut up in Massangano and was accused of actively supporting Nzinga in her wars, for which reasons he had been excluded from the peace treaty signed with his suzerain, the king of Kongo. He was also accused of relieving both white and pombeiro traders of their goods when they passed through his territories, and of sheltering Portuguese-owned slaves who had run away from their plantations. Antonio Teixeira de Mondonça marched to Mbaka where he recruited the support of Ngola Ayre and of several Mbundu and Imbangala auxiliaries as well as troops of free and slave African soldiers. They then marched northward across the Zenza (or upper Bengo), the Dande and the Lifua to reach Mbwila with the tacit permission of Mbwila's main rivals, Kiteshi ka Ndambi and Ndambi Ngonga.* The attack was made difficult by the thick undergrowth of the southern Kongo bush and by the strength of Mbwila's defences. Mendonça's force was largely ineffective and when Mbwila sent an ambassador to Luanda to ask for peace, the Portuguese accepted the offer and retired.¹

¹ Cadornega, II, 53-62.

* Dambi Angonga.

During the early years of the reconquest the slave trade did not develop as fast as the Portuguese would have liked. In 1652 Teixeira de Saldanha, the chief magistrate of Luanda, wrote that the only wealth which Angola had was the slave trade and that it was in a very poor way. Obtaining slaves by direct warfare was forbidden, officially at least, and buying slaves in the pombos was proving difficult and slow. Many Africans had preferred dealing with the Dutch and hated the Portuguese. Teixeira de Saldanha was not nearly so optimistic as Salvador Correia had been in 1650 and said that the Mbundu country was surrounded by hostile and unsubdued nations, Kongo to the north, Matamba to the east and the Kisama states to the south. He recommended a serious war to open the trade routes, to strengthen the Portuguese hold on Angola, to stimulate the capture of slaves and thereby increase the royal revenue from the slave taxes which had recently been raised from 4,000 to 7,000 reis a head.¹

Apart from the direct needs of Portuguese Brazil, a lucrative business with the Spanish American colonies was being encouraged on the basis that slaves bought to work in the silver mines would be paid for in silver. Spanish ships would be welcome in Luanda on condition they came direct from the New World, but not if they came from metropolitan Spain and carried wines and European goods which would merely compete with Portuguese produce. Despite this policy a certain amount of Spanish wine does

¹Teixeira de Saldanha, 13.7.1652. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

seem to have found its way to Angola and was placed high on the list of desirable trade goods. In return for good wine chiefs could sometimes be persuaded to sell even their own domestic slaves.

The inadequacy of the slave supply deplored by Teixeira de Saldanha demonstrated once again that it was almost impossible to conduct the trade satisfactorily without the help of one, and preferably more than one, powerful African state. One of the chief reasons for the sluggishness of business was probably the withdrawal into the interior of Queen Nzinga. After her failure of her ambitious scheme to oust the Portuguese, recapture Ndongo, dominate the whole Mbundu territory, and establish the Dutch as the major commercial power in Angola, Nzinga retreated from the Dande to Matamba and apparently kept quiet for several years. In March 1652 Rodrigo de Miranda Henriques arrived with new military supplies of men and materials to take over the government from Salvador Correia. He had instructions to get the colony moving again, to increase the trade, and to start levying the old annual slave tribute which all Mbundu chiefs under Portuguese domination were forced to pay to the Portuguese crown.

Henriques died barely a year after his arrival in Luanda and so achieved little. In his place Bartholemeu de Vasconcelos da Cunha was once again elected acting governor and it was he who began to open up the trade and made the first, very indirect, contact with Nzinga. It was reported in Luanda that Kabuku Kandonga, the main Portuguese ally, had been negotiating with Nzinga. Diogo Gomes Moralles was sent to Mbaka to

investigate the rumour. If it were true he was to attack Kabuku and capture the maximum number of prisoners. Moralles called Kabuku and his chiefs to a conference in Mbaka. They all came except Kalandula who made an excuse to stay away. Kabuku was accused of treason and he and his companions were imprisoned and sent to Luanda. The Portuguese then attacked his kilombo and captured a number of his subjects. Kalandula, however, was warned in advance and escaped to Matamba with his followers. According to Chicorro, a later governor, Kabuku was sent to Brazil, but Cadornega says that he was allowed to return to Mbaka and lead his army in the Portuguese cause.¹

The Portuguese were anxious to make contact with Nzinga and open a trade route to Matamba. Nzinga was undoubtedly equally keen to trade and would do so with the Portuguese if no other buyer were available. She also wanted to obtain the return of her surviving sister Makamba (or Barbara) who was still a prisoner of war. Negotiations opened with the arrival of the new governor, Luis Mendes de Souza Chicorro, in October 1654. Chicorro had explicit instructions from the king that he was not to embark on any war unless there was a genuine cause involving some new crime such as interfering with traders or missionaries. The king did not subscribe to Teixeira de Saldanha's view that a war on Matamba was necessary to extend and protect the trade.² Soon after Chicorro

¹Cadornega, II, 75-78. Chicorro, 17.2.1655 quoted by M. Delgado in Cadornega II, 498, Note 30.

²King to Chicorro, 16.9.1653. A.H.U. Angola Cx 6.

arrived Nzinga sent him a present of slaves and an embassy.¹ The governor accepted the offer of peace negotiations and sent Manuel Peixoto to the Matamba capital.² Nzinga's response was to write to the governor on 13 December 1655. She offered, in return for a peace settlement and the release of her sister, to open trade fairs on the border of the Portuguese dominions and to send a powerful army to help the governor conquer Kisama, a feat which no previous governor had managed to achieve. She also promised to give up the 'jaga' customs used in her war camp, especially the killing of new born children, and to adopt a settled way of life. Her subjects would increase and work on the land instead of being a recruited band of foreign mercenaries and conquered peoples. She finally agreed to the envoy's request that Kabuku's sub-chief Kalandula should be sent back to the Portuguese.³

Strongly divergent opinions were expressed about the advisability of accepting such terms or of negotiating with Nzinga at all. The Luanda municipal chamber were resolutely opposed to releasing Princess Mukamba and allowing her to return to Matamba. The councillors reminded Chicorro of the harm which her brother Ngola Mbandi had done to the slave trade in the 1620's and of the bitter hatred for the Portuguese which her sister

¹Cadornega II, 82.

²Chicorro to King 17.9.1655. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

³Nzinga to Chicorro, Matamba 13.12.1655 (Copy by Bento Baptista)
A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

Nzinga had always expressed. They also felt that any encouragement to Nzinga would be harmful to the faithful ally Ngola Ayre who should be considered the rightful ruler of Ndongo.¹ The Overseas Council in Lisbon, on the other hand, took the view that the security of the colony would best be guaranteed by peace settlements with the most powerful surrounding kingdoms. They therefore approved Chicorro's action in negotiating with Nzinga on the basis of the return of her sister Makambu.² On 12 October 1656 the peace treaty was signed at the court of Matamba. The main provisions concerned the establishment of a Capuchin mission in Matamba, a guarantee that Nzinga would help in Portuguese wars, the free flow of trade and the handing over or at least expulsion from Matamba of Kalandula. Nzinga also agreed to pay a ransom of 130 slaves for her sister Makambu.³ Two days later Chicorro wrote to the king that ninety-nine of the ransom slaves had already been paid.⁴

While Chicorro had been negotiating with Nzinga on the eastern frontier, he had also been conducting one of the series of indecisive Kisama campaigns. The Municipal Council had originally recommended such a campaign, but when it dragged on they petitioned for a withdrawal on the grounds

¹Camara to Chicorro 28.7.1656. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

²Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, 31.10.1656. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

³Peace Treaty signed in Matamba 12.10.1656. (Copy) A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

⁴Chicorro to King, 14.10.1656. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

that Luanda was being left dangerously open to the possibility of a renewed Dutch attack.¹ On 28 July 1656 they complained to the king that Chicorro was wasting resources by keeping the largest army that had been seen in recent years, 400 Portuguese and 16,000 African troops, fruitlessly engaged in Kisama.² Although the Portuguese had the support of Ngola Ayre, the forces of Kafushe, Kimbambala* and Mulumba a Kambo⁴ were too strong for them. They also had to fight a 'jaga' army equipped with powerful long-bows which had come up from south of the Longa River. After the exceptionally long spell of one and a half years on the field, Chicorro recalled his army. He decided to concentrate his attention on the third of Angola's frontiers, that with Kongo in the north.³

During the government of Chicorro the strained relations between Kongo and Luanda resulted in the outbreak of intermittent warfare which continued for ten years until the great battle of Mbwila in 1665. The peace settlement between Garcia II and Salvador Correia had settled none of the fundamental problems. These were that Kongo would not tolerate any infringement of her sovereignty by Europeans and that she preferred to trade with the Dutch rather than the Portuguese. The Dutch won trade from their rivals by commercial means, paying better prices and using

¹Citizens petition to Chicorro and his reply, 30.3.1656. A.H.U. Angola Cx 4.

²Camara to King, 28.7.1656. Cx. 4.

³Cadornega, II, 87-127.

* Quibambala. ⁴ Mulumba Acambolo.

better quality goods, whereas the Portuguese gained trade by military means, imposing a monopoly and trying to exclude competition. The peace settlement had merely avoided an immediate conflict between Kongo and the Portuguese in 1648 and ensured that the Capuchin Mission, which was largely instrumental in the negotiations, would be permitted to stay in West-Central Africa although its establishment had not been previously authorised by the Portuguese.

In the tension resulting from the conflict of interests between Kongo and the colony, Chicorro complained that Garcia II was breaking the treaty by stopping traders from entering Kongo, by imposing river tolls from which Portuguese subjects should have been exempted, and by welcoming runaway slaves, particularly ones who could help him in his conflict with Sonyo. Chicorro also maintained that Garcia II was trying to kill the duke of Mpemba who claimed to have a better right to the throne and had asked for Portuguese support.¹ When these complaints were presented to the Portuguese King, João IV, he advised caution in declaring war on Kongo but agreed that such a course might be necessary if the leading citizens and missionaries of Luanda advocated it.² A council of war in Luanda decided in favour of a war but apparently without the concurrence of the missionaries.³ The army probably set out in the dry season of 1657,

¹Cadornega II, 131-132.

²King to Chicorro, 27.9.1656.

³Queen Regent to João Fernandes Viera, 29.11.1657. A.H.U. Angola Cx 6. João had died on 6.11.1656.

and attacked a small southern Kongo chief called the Marquis of Mbumbi between the Dande and Loje rivers. Mbumbi was defeated and driven north of the Loje into Mbamba. The captain wanted to follow but his men feared to cross the Loje, claiming that white men who did so never returned.¹ The army was forced to withdraw to the Angola border and soon afterwards Chicorro was replaced by Viem who arrived to take up the government on 18 April 1658.

While the Portuguese were dealing with the threats of neighbouring states, they were tending to overlook a serious danger in the centre of Angola. This was the discontent in Ndongo. In 1653 Ngola Ayre wrote to João IV asking for military help to repel Nzinga who was threatening to invade Ndongo. He also complained of his treatment by the Portuguese. He had become, he said, a king in name only. Antonio de Teixeira de Mendonça had stolen as many as 10,000 of the Ngola's subjects to make them work on his estates. This was most unjust treatment for a ruler who had helped the Portuguese loyally throughout the Dutch occupation. Hewas also continually being bullied into supplying carriers to head-load trade goods up to the pombos, which was a very hard duty to impose on an ally.² The Overseas Council in Lisbon reviewed Ayre's complaint and decided that the Ngola's subjects should be returned to him, that a proper

¹Cadornega II, 133-134.

²Ngola Ayre to João IV, 8.4.1653. A.H.U. Angola Cx 5.

price be paid for carriers who were recruited in his jurisdiction, and that military assistance should be supplied when Nzinga threatened Ndongo. The king accepted the first two points but refused to sanction military aid for Ngola Ayre in his struggle with Queen Nzinga.¹ The provision relating to the return of Ndongo subjects was later reversed by the Queen Regent in 1661 when Mondonça's widow complained that her slaves were being taken away by Ndongo.²

In or about 1658 Serafim de Cortona wrote a report on the state of the Angola missions and found Ndongo in a lamentable condition. He estimated that three-quarters of the country became uninhabited when Nzinga was driven out. Those Mbundu who remained were seriously oppressed owing to the fact that they lived on the main routes to the trade centres of Kasanje and Matamba. The kingdom had suffered badly from drought and disease and the Capuchin father was distressed to find numerous life-sized statues built to protect the country from these scourges. At the capital of Pungu a Ndongo he found no sign of missionary influence but on the contrary plentiful evidence of human sacrifices and other signs of the political and social decay in Ndongo. In contrast to this he reported that missionary work was proceeding well in the flourishing trade centres of Matamba and Kasanje.³

¹Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino 24.4.1654. King's comment 16.6.1654. Cx 5.

²Consulta of 2.9.1661. Queen's opinion, 7.11.1661. Cx 5.

³Letter from Serafim de Cortona, n.d. arrived in Lisbon by December 1658. On 25.1.1659 the Overseas Council authorised the sending of six more missionaries.

João Fernandes Viera, the new governor of Angola who took over in 1658, and his successor, André Vidal de Negreiros, were Portuguese from Brazil who were appointed to the governorship of Angola in payment for their services in the war against the Dutch in Brazil. They were perhaps even more blatant than other governors in aiming to make the maximum profit from their period of office. This ambition brought them into conflict with the settled residents of Luanda who wished to place their prosperity on a more long-term basis. The governors were in favour of direct military action and of sending their appointees into the interior to obtain slaves by force, or purchase them at whatever prices they found expedient. The residents on the other hand were anxious to avoid military disturbances and wished to cultivate the trade by keeping prices down and avoiding competition between themselves. In this conflict official policy was on the side of the settlers. The maximum profit would be got out of the African colonies if slaves were bought cheaply even though rather more slowly. The governors' anxiety to make their profit in three to four years meant that they acted against official rulings that white men should not enter the interior and visit the trading states and that wars should not be fought except for sound military and political reasons. Since the governor was the man with authority on the spot, his orders were normally obeyed and he rarely had to account for his actions until after he had left the colony.

Viera conducted three campaigns during his term of office, probably

during the three dry seasons. His first attack, against a chief called Ngoleme a Kaita, was a full scale military offensive with 400 white troops and the armies of Ngola Ayre and Kabuku. The area overrun was quite close to Luanda on the Bengo and Dande rivers.¹ Viera was later accused of having destroyed the subject chiefdom of Ngoleme, and of having sent its inhabitants to work on his own private sugar estates in Brazil.² Vier's second campaign was against the Ndembu chiefs, Ndambi Ngonga* and Kiteshi Kandambi, after the Municipal Council had petitioned him in April 1659 to do something to prevent their slaves running away to southern Kongo from which they could not be retrieved.³ There was a great deal of fighting without obvious outcome during this campaign. It can, however, be reliably assumed that a considerable number of the black contestants eventually found themselves in the New World.⁴

Viera's third campaign turned to the south and the open spaces of Libolo and Hako, between the Ovimbundu highlands and Ndongo. The flow of trade from a southerly or south-easterly direction was apparently increasing in importance at this time either from the Ovimbundu states or from further east, beyond the upper reaches of the Kwanza. The importance of

¹Cadornega II, 141-149.

²Report by Barth. Paes Bulhão, 16.5.1644. Cx 6.

³Camara petition, 29.4.1659. Cx 5.

⁴Cadornega II, 150-156.

*Dandi Angonga.

both slaves and ivory from these sources was stressed by Cadornega. Viera sent his army to try to increase the security of the routes in that direction which were subject to attacks by roving Imbangala armies as well as by the local Libolo chiefs. The attempt was not successful however and the Portuguese army was heavily defeated deep in the Hako country.¹ For a time the affairs of the country south of the Kwanza were left to one side as almost insoluble, at least as far as the Portuguese ambition to impose control on the area was concerned. Negreiros arrived in the Spring of 1661² to replace Viera and he devoted nearly all his attention to the affairs of Kongo.

Relations with Kongo were still strained, in contrast to the friendly contacts which had been established with other states. Cadornega suggests that Garcia II had been trying to improve them by returning to their owners most of the slaves who had escaped from Luanda and gone to Kongo.³ At about the time of Negreiros' arrival, however, Garcia II was replaced on the Kongo throne by Antonio I Mani Mulaza, the first king of a new Mulaza dynasty which replaced the old lines of Nzinga Mvemba and Lukeni lua Mvemba.⁴ It is not clear what activities Negreiros undertook in 1662, but in 1663 he became involved in a Ndembu war which led his army

¹Cadornega II, 157-160.

²M. Delgado suggests on 10.5.1661.

³Cadornega II, 181.

⁴Cadornega II, 204. Jadin, op.cit., 30-31. Van Wing, op.cit., 33-36.

into Kongo.

In August 1663 Kakulo Kahenda had died and his chiefdom had been claimed by Dom Francisco Cheques and by Dom Francisco Joannes. Nambu a Ngongo and Ngombe a Mushama* recognised Joannes whom they said had been rightfully elected successor. Antonio I later recognised him also. The Portuguese on the other hand had backed Cheques, partly it may be suspected, because Negreiros wanted to become involved in a war. In October he obtained the approbation of the Jesuits, Carmelites and Franciscans who certified that a war against Nambu a Ngongo would be just.¹ The governor's version of the story was that he defeated Joannes and had him deported to Brazil. He then established Cheques as the rightful heir to the chiefdom of Kakulo Kahenda. In doing this he had removed the danger of a war on the fringes of Portuguese territory which could have been dangerous to Luanda itself.² Bulhão wrote a report on the campaign in which he saw things differently. He complained bitterly about wars which neither spread the faith nor re-inforced the authority of the Portuguese crown. The chief result of the campaign which he noted was the capture of 2,000 slaves of whom 500 were allotted to the governor and his captain major, while the rest were distributed among the European and African troops.³

¹Public Enquiry into the Namboangongo War. 4.3.1664. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 6.

²Negreiros to the King justifying the war. 30.4.1664. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 6.

³Report by Bulhão on post-Dutch governors' activities. 16.5.1664.

* Ngombe Amuchama.

After this success against the Ndembu, Negreiros planned an attack on the kingdom of Kongo itself. The excuse for hostilities was that Antonio I refused to hand over the gold mines which his predecessor had promised to the Portuguese in the peace treaty which he had signed with Salvador Correia. The fact that the clause concerning the supposed mines had been deleted from the treaty by João IV does not seem to have been taken into consideration.¹ These mines were supposed to be in or near the Province of Wandu, a part of south-east Kongo over which the king had little control. Antonio I sent his army into Wandu from which the ruler fled asking the Portuguese for help in reasserting his rights. This gave Negreiros a good cause to support. In addition he felt able to go to war against Kongo on the grounds that once Antonio had invaded Wandu, the Portuguese fort at Mbaka was in danger. The outbreak of war was delayed from 1664 to 1665 while the officials in Luanda waited to see if a threatened Castillian attack on Luanda materialised. It did not, and eventually the campaign could begin.²

Luis Lopes de Sequeira was chosen as commander of the force. He had 200 Portuguese troops, 150 Portuguese settlers from the city and inland posts, 100 African musketeers and 3,000 bowmen. The location of the campaign was in Mbwila where the Portuguese wished to protect Dona Izabel, the queen-regent, from Antonio I who threatened to follow up his invasion

¹Arquivos de Angola, Ser II, Vol. II, 172 and 187.

²Cadornega II, 204 and notes 56 and 57.

of Wandu with an attack on the adjacent Mbwila. The gold mines were believed to lie between the two. Both the Portuguese and Kongo claimed the suzerainty over Mbwila. The Kongo force was said to comprise 100,000 men including 190 musketeers and 29 Portuguese settlers who served on the Kongo side under the command of Pedro Dias de Cabra, a mulatto captain. Early on the morning of 29 October 1665 the Mbwila force which was loyal to Izabel, joined up with the Portuguese. At dawn on the same day the Kongo army attacked. The assault came in several waves, the last of which was led by the king himself. It was of such force that some, if not most, of the African auxiliaries on the Portuguese side deserted. The remainder of the force was able, however, to use their guns to great effect despite the heavy rain which Antonio had relied upon to make gunpowder unusable. The Kongo king was wounded, captured and decapitated. The battle ended after eight hours fighting with the death of many of the leading Kongo noblemen. Owing to the desertion of part of the guerra preta, the Portuguese were only able to make a disappointing number of captives from which to add commercial profit to the glories of victory.¹

The king's head was pickled and taken to Luanda as a trophy together with his crown and sceptre. The Kongo monarchy had suffered a defeat from which it never truly recovered. The result was not that the Portuguese gained control of the country - far from it - but that no one else was in full control of it either. Kongo was no longer a serious threat to the

¹ Relação da mais gloriosa e admirável victoria que alcançarão as armas de el Rey D. Affonso VI neste Reino de Angola contra el Rey de Congo governando o Senhor André Vidal de Negreiros. B.M. Add Mss 20953, fls 227-229. Ed. C. R. Boxer. Museu de Angola 1960 No. 2.

Portuguese domains in the Mbundu country, nor could it any longer be reckoned a potential strong ally for Portugal's European rivals in Africa. In addition to this, although the victors of Mbvila may not have been fully aware of the fact, Kongo was probably a better field for slave recruiting when disorganised than when united under a strong monarch. The relationship between Kongo and Angola after 1665 was in some ways the reverse of what it had been one hundred and fifty years earlier. In the sixteenth century Kongo had been a strong unified kingdom which had raided for slaves among the disunited petty states of the Mbundu. In the latter part of the seventeenth century it was Angola which was united and comparatively strong under a colonial administration. Kongo on the other hand was breaking up among several rival claimants to the throne and a number of autonomous or semi-autonomous small states. The opportunities for slave trafficking among disorganised, disunited states had thus shifted from the Mbundu to Kongo.¹

When the threat of Kongo had been removed, the Portuguese in Angola were still faced with three important Mbundu and Imbangala kingdoms, Ndongo, Matamba and Kasanje. The most dangerous of these in the past had been Matamba and the powerful armies of Queen Nzinga. Since the signing of the peace treaty between Nzinga and Souza Chicorro in 1656, however, relations between Nzinga and the Portuguese had been cordial. When the Queen's sister and heir, ~~Mukambu~~ or Barbara, arrived back in Matamba from captivity,

¹For a summary of the history of Kongo after the battle of Ambuila see L. Jadin: Le Congo et la secte des Antoniens. Rome 1961. Extract from the Bull. de l'Inst. Belge de Rome.

Nzinga had wanted to marry her to the Mani Lumbo, Ngola Kanini, who also had a good claim to succeed Nzinga on the throne of Matamba. The Capuchins forbade this, however, on the grounds that Kanini had contracted a Christian marriage already at the time when he was chief of the Mbaka region. ~~Makamba~~ therefore had to marry another of the powerful leaders of the kingdom, Nzinga Amona, the captain-general of the army.¹

Under the terms of the treaty, Nzinga was under obligation, once ~~Makamba~~ had returned to Matamba, to hand Kalandula over to the Portuguese together with the 1,000 soldiers who had fled with him to Matamba. It was rumoured that the queen asked him to leave her lands quietly before she was forced to take action. Kalandula refused to move however and prepared to defend himself. Nzinga therefore attacked and although some of Kalandula's people escaped, Kalandula himself was killed and 1,500 prisoners were captured. This campaign probably took place from December 1657 to March 1658.²

On 17 December 1663 Queen Nzinga eventually died at the reputed age of 81 years.³ In electing a successor her followers passed over the claims of Ngola Kanini and, possibly out of fear of the army, chose the captain-general, Nzinga Amona, and his wife ~~Makamba~~ as sovereigns. Amona immediately

¹Cavazzi-Labat, V, 146-151.

²Cavazzi-Labat, V, 165-170.

³Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 297.

began to consolidate his hold by executing potential rivals, but Ngola Kanini managed to flee the country.¹ The new king's greatest problem was the authority of the Portuguese captain-major at the court of Matamba. The capital of Matamba was growing as an important trade centre. It had a small resident colony of pombeiros who negotiated for slaves and ivory on behalf of their masters in Luanda. To keep a watchful eye on trading, the governor appointed a Portuguese captain to act as peace-keeper and chief justice. His position was invidious, however, in that he was at one and the same time responsible for defending Portuguese interests and for impartially settling disputes. When there was a disagreement over the relative prices of cloth and slaves, the captain decided the issue and, if necessary referred the matter to the king for action to be taken. The captain also had to ensure that no buyer paid more than the authorised rate for slaves, and had the authority to punish offending pombeiros.²

This partial diminution of sovereignty through the powerful authority vested in the Portuguese captain was obviously irksome to Nzinga Amona. He did not oppose it strongly while Matamba was alive, but when she died on 24 March 1666, his hostility to foreigners became open and he began to persecute the missionaries.³ This growing opposition to their presence in Matamba, made the Portuguese willing to support any other ruler who

¹Cadornega, II, 219-223.

²Cadornega, II, 257.

³Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 343. (Cavazzi 607) ?.

might replace Nzinga Amona and prove more amenable to their wishes. A first challenge, from the Ayre dynasty which the Portuguese had installed and maintained in Ndongo, came to nothing when Ngola Ayre's son, Diogo, was defeated and killed by Nzinga Amona while he was ostensibly on a hunting expedition to the Kindonga Islands.¹ A second challenge to Amona's authority came from Ngola Kanini. Kanini was supported by several Matamba notables who invited him to expel the 'tyrant'. The enterprise was successful and Amona fled but was not defeated. A civil war followed in which the Portuguese backed Kanini who, with the help of Antonio de Figueiredo de Souza and some white troops, was firmly placed in control of Matamba while Nzinga Amona went into exile.²

Ngola Kanini did not survive long on the Matamba throne. At his death, probably between 1667 and 1670, the electors chose Dom Luis as king. He was selected for his soldiering ability, but he proved unable to resist an attack from Nzinga Amona despite the Portuguese support which he commanded. Amona regained control of Matamba, killing several Portuguese soldiers in the process.³ Among the chiefs who opposed the return of Nzinga Amona was one called Dom Francisco Gutterres who was favoured by the Portuguese. He claimed to be a son of Ngola Kanini, whose European name had been João Gutterres. The Portuguese recognised him as king

¹Cadornega II, 250-251.

²Cadornega II, 255-256.

³Cadornega, II, 295-297.

of Matamba. There apparently followed a war between this Ngola Kanini and Nzinga Amona. Probably in about 1672 or 1673 the Portuguese set out to enforce Ngola Kanini's claim and called for the assistance of their ally Kabuku to deal with Nzinga Amona. Amona was finally caught and killed, leaving Ngola Kanini II as sole claimant to Nzinga's conquest state of Matamba. The Portuguese had thus, after several years of spasmodic civil war, succeeded in imposing a king of their choice on Matamba just as they had put Ngola Ayre on the throne of Ndongo in the previous generation. They did not have the same leverage on Matamba however and their influence only survived while it was mutually beneficial. Ngola Kanini II accepted the presence of a Portuguese captain as being good for trade, and apparently received Gaspar dos Reis as the representative of Ayres de Saldanha who became governor in 1676. He still maintained his freedom of action however and not long after this felt strong enough to reject the Portuguese economic domination at his court altogether.¹

While the struggle for control of Matamba which underlay these succession disputes was being fought, there had also been trouble in Ndongo. Ngola Ayre had died about 1664 and been succeeded by a son called Dom João or Ngola Ayre II. This new Ngola proved as hostile to Portuguese tutelage as Nzinga Amona had been in Matamba. The two rulers were also hostile to each other, both claiming the rightful sovereignty over all the Mbundu both eastern in Matamba and western in Ndongo. Ayre II began his reign by asserting his independence of action and attacking Ngoleme a Kakombe, a

¹Cadornega, II, 313, 354-355, 378 and 402 ff.

chief who controlled the trade route to Hako and the south-east. His father had once been reprimanded by the Portuguese for attempting to extend his authority in that direction, but Ayre II proceeded regardless of Portuguese interests and defeated and killed Ngoleme a Kakombe.¹ In an even more direct affront to the colonial authorities, the new Ngola sent a brother to attack the soba Dumbo Apebo in the reginn of Mbaka. The Luanda council which, in the temporary absence of a governor, administered the colony from February 1667 to August 1669, sent an army led by João Soares de Almeida to defend the soba and to order the Ngola to place his army under the Portuguese banner. The Ngola refused and prepared to resist any Portuguese encroachment on Ndongo.²

In the rock fortress of Pungu a Ndongo, Ngola Ayre thought himself to be invincible and freely flouted the Portuguese. He raided caravans on the route to Kasanje and welcomed Mbundu who had escaped from Portuguese slavery. He so interfered with the free movement of trade that the colonial authorities finally decided that it was essential to re-conquer Ndongo. They also feared that the Ngola would recruit sufficient support successfully to attack Mbaka and reimpose independent Mbundu royal authority over the whole kingdom. Luis Lopes de Sequeira was chosen to lead the assault on Pungu a Ndongo after his success in the battle of Mbwila. In order to meet the attack, the Ngola had moved all the available food into his fortress,

¹Cadornega, II, 224-225.

²Cadornega, II, 245-251.

both to deprive the enemy of local supplies and to feed the Mbundu in the event of a long siege. The new governor, Francisco de Tavora, made elaborate preparations for the campaign, bringing new troops from Rio de Janeiro and Bahia. The besiegers suffered one early set-back when a Ndongo prince made a dashing sortie, scattered the guerra preta, and set fire to the stores and quarters. After several months, however, the besiegers gained entry to Pungu a Ndongo on 29 November 1671. Ayre fled to Libolo with his wives and sons. The town was sacked and the inhabitants captured. The royal fifth of the slaves caught was valued at over 700,000 reis, which probably represented a capture of several hundreds of slaves. Sequeira followed up the victory by capturing Ayre II in Libolo and having him beheaded. His brother and son fled to Matamba where Ngola Kanini, who was relying on Portuguese support in his struggle with Nziga Amona, handed them over.¹ The son, Dom Philip, was shipped to Portugal with several other Ndongo royalty, and the Portuguese Prince Regent ordered that he be sent to the monastery of Alcobaça.²

This defeat of Ngola Ayre II, or Dom João as the Portuguese called him, marked the end of the western branch of Mbundu kingship. The monarchy had grown powerful with the opening of the Atlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century it had split in two, one branch under the redoubtable Queen Nzinga moving eastward to try to escape from European domination and the other remaining in the west, strongly allied to the Portuguese. Now, in the late seventeenth century, this west-

¹Cadornega II, 298-325.

²Order by the Prince Regent 9.5.1673. A.H.U. Angola Cx 8. Also Cadornega, II, 325-328.

ern kingdom had proved less acquiescent than the Portuguese had wanted and was therefore crushed altogether. In its place a new Portuguese fort was built at Pungo a Ndongo to impose direct instead of indirect authority over the central areas of Ndongo. The split in the Mbundu became more marked as the western peoples, sometimes called Ngolas, came increasingly under the influence of the Portuguese while in Matamba the eastern Mbundu, also known as Jingas after Queen Nzinga, maintained an independent kingdom in which direct European authority, which had never become very strong, dwindled even further.

By the time Ndongo was extinguished as an independent kingdom, Kasanje had grown to be one of the most powerful states in West Central Africa. Cadornega wrote a description of it in about 1680. The king was called the Jaga of Kasanje and was the absolute ruler of several 'jaga' hordes who lived mainly by warfare. Silva e Souza, the governor of Angola from 1680 to 1684, still described the ruler of Kasanje as the general of an army rather than the king of a settled state.¹ This ruler dressed in rich clothes of silk and linen and wore expensive ornaments. When he left his compound he was escorted by numerous courtiers and musicians carrying the royal double bell and other instruments. His bodyguard consisted of musketeers, riflemen and bowmen. Inside his compound he kept many wives, all of whose children had to be born outside the city limits. Although the bulk of the Imbangala population of Kasanje, and indeed the ruler him-

¹Silva e Souza to King. 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 9.

self, were of Mbundu origin, many Lunda customs were retained despite the protests of the missionaries who accompanied traders to the kingdom. The ruler's sons had no right to the succession which Cadornega says was decided by election among the most capable military leaders.¹ The traditions add that the election was complicated by the need to choose one ruler from each of the three founding clans in turn.²

The area under the influence of the Kasanje armies was said by Cadornega to be extremely large, and the capital, he claimed, had a population of 300,000 although this must have been an exaggeration. The conquest territories stretched far up the Kwanza and Kwango rivers towards the Ovinbundu states and over the Ngangela province to Songo. Imbaŋgala traders knew the country to the east of the Kwango as well, although they never allowed Europeans to visit those regions. The Kasai was known and referred to as the Great Kwango since the Kwango was already believed to be its tributary. The Lunda state was known and Lunda traders came to Kasanje to buy salt in particular. They brought their palm cloth to the right bank of the Kwango and made smoke signals to show that they had arrived and were ready to trade. The king of Kasanje was reported to have occasionally killed and eaten Lunda envoys but this had not stopped the flow of trade. Kasanje was by this time almost certainly the largest of the inland slave trade centres. A majority of all trade cloths and wines sent to Angola found their way to this 'staple'. In view of this it is

¹Cadornega III, 215-221.

²Neves, op.cit., 105-106.

curious that Cadornega makes no mention of the Mwata Yamvo, the ruler of the Lunda Empire, sending slaves for sale. He merely refers to salt and European cloth being bought by the Lunda with their palm cloth. This omission may be an oversight on Cadornega's part, but it may mean that up until 1680 the Kasanje slave supply came predominantly if not entirely from its own military campaigns and that there was not yet a slave caravan route of any great importance from the Lunda empire.¹

The order of succession of the kings of Kasanje would appear to have been as follows. First of all, according to the Neves tradition, Kasanje ka Kulashingo succeeded Kasanje the founder of the kingdom. The list then gives Kalunga ka Kilombo, Ngonga-nbande and Kiluanje kia Ngonga as the second, third and fourth rulers.² Cavazzi reported that a king called Kalunga ka Kinguri* ruled in Kasanje until 1655. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that this was in fact the same Kalunga, and that ka Kinguri was merely added to show legitimate succession from Kinguri. Cavazzi then goes on to say that Kalunga was succeeded by a Mbundu captive called Ganga who had been born near Mbawa in 1608 and had risen through the ranks of the Kasanje army. It is tempting to suppose that this Ganga, who took the title Kasanje ka Kinguri and was baptised with the name Dom Paschoal Machado, was the same as the Mponga Nbande of Neves' list.³

¹ Cadornega, III, 215-221.

² Neves, op.cit., 108.

³ Cavazzi-Labat, IV, 381-398.

* Calunga Conquinguri.

It was this Dom Paschoal who prospered especially from the slave trade which had been developing since Kasanje and the Portuguese had made their alliance during the Dutch occupation. Kasanje had shown more success than Ndongo or Matamba had done in maintaining its autonomy while at the same time trading with Europeans. It did not fail however to attract the jealousy of rival trading kingdoms. In particular Ngola Kanini II, once firmly installed on the throne of Matamba, rejected the restrictive influence of the Portuguese who had put him there and decided to challenge Dom Paschoal of Kasanje, thus breaking a tacit non-aggression pact which had apparently been kept in later years between Nzinga and Kasanje. Kanini's first attempt was unsuccessful. His army, on approaching the kilombo of Kasanje, was deterred by the three battalions raised in its defence. Dom Paschoal warned the king of the Jingas that if he wanted to expand his kingdom he would have to look elsewhere. As an alternative Kanini then offered Kasanje an alliance against the Portuguese but this was rejected as Dom Paschoal preferred not to endanger his profitable alliance with them.¹

In or shortly before 1680, Ngola Kanini II found a second opportunity to challenge the trading dominance of Kasanje when Dom Paschoal died. The death of a king always led to serious disturbances in Kasanje. The roads in and out of the metropolitan area were immediately closed, both to prevent foreign invasion and to stop those destined to be sacrificed on the tomb from fleeing. At the same time pombeiros were in danger of

¹Cadornega, II, 402-403.

losing their trade goods, especially spirits, as part of the celebrations. To try to avoid too heavy a loss, if for no other reason, the Portuguese captain in Kasanje at the time, Antonio de Figueiredo, tried to get a new king chosen as quickly and painlessly as possible. His choice was Kitamba a Kaita,* another native of Ndongo. Although this nominee was accepted by some of the electors in Kasanje, it was challenged by the ruler of Bondo, Kingwanga. This dissenting chief was captured however and Kitamba a Kaita handed him over to the captain-major to be sent to the governor at Luanda. In fact the chief only got as far as Figueiredo's private estates at Massangano. The challenge to the new king at Kasanje, who had taken the same name as his predecessor, Dom Paschoal, was maintained by Kingwanga II who attacked pombeiros and disrupted the trade route which led through his territory of Bondo to Kasanje. Saldanha, the governor, wrote to Dom Paschoal ordering him to punish this troublesome vassal and restore all the plundered trade goods. The new king attempted to do so but was unable to make any headway in the conquest of Bondo.¹

From Matamba, Ngola Kanini II grasped the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Kasanje and made an alliance with Kingwanga. Together they exploited the dissatisfaction of several of the Kasanje leaders. Towards the end of 1680 or early in 1681 they attacked Kasanje, killed Dom Paschoal and put Kingwanga in control of the kingdom. The conquerors then plundered large quantities of cloth from the pombeiros and set free

¹ Silva e Souza to the King, 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.

* Quitamba Acaita.

a number of slaves who had already been bought and paid for. As the most important of the Portuguese staples, Kasanje had large stores of trade goods which were lost. Many traders in Luanda were ruined and others had their working capital seriously reduced by this sack of Kasanje. The royal exchequer also suffered a serious loss of export duty.¹

Kingwanga was unable to maintain his command over Kasanje, even if he had thought of attempting to do so. He retired to Bondo, and the electors chose Kinguri kia Kasanje as the next king. The chief blame for the sack of Kasanje was laid at the door of the Jinga king, Ngola Kanini II. Kinguri sent an embassy to the governor, Silva e Souza, and offered to provide support to any punitive expedition which might be sent against Matamba. The governor decided to take action for two main reasons. Firstly because he feared that unless he punished those responsible for stealing goods which had been sent on credit to the slave markets of the interior, there might be other outbreaks of plundering. Secondly he feared that the whole Mbundu nation might rise up against the Portuguese and adopt Ngola Kanini as their national leader. He therefore began raising a large army.

The expedition against Matamba was led by Luis Lopes de Sequeira. His prestige was now very great having already defeated the king of Kongo in open battle and destroyed the independent power of Ndongo. His force

¹Silva e Souza to the King, 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.

consisted of over 500 Portuguese soldiers, many of whom were probably brown or even black, fifty horsemen, and an auxiliary troop estimated at 40,000 African bowmen. They left Mbaka on 2 August 1681 and a month later camped at Katole, six leagues from Kanini's capital. At dawn on September 4 the Matamba army attacked the expeditionary force before it had woken. The munitions dump was fired almost at once and the Portuguese were nearly defeated before they were aware of what had happened. Sequeira belatedly organised a token resistance and was himself killed fighting. His deputy decided to retire with the loss of 100 Portuguese lives rather than attempt an advance, and the army returned to Luanda soundly beaten.¹ When Silva e Souza reported on the battle he claimed it as a victory, albeit a costly one, because, he said, Ngola Kanini II had been killed by a lucky shot and Portuguese honour had been avenged. Luis Lobo da Silva, however, reported differently on the matter. He said that the king of Kasanje, who had suffered as much loss as the Portuguese by the sack of his capital, defeated and killed Kanini II after the Portuguese had failed to do so. Kanini II was succeeded on the throne of Matamba by his sister, Dona Veronica Gutterres.²

The new Jinga queen, Veronica, decided to re-establish friendly relations with the Portuguese. Silva e Souza negotiated a treaty with her laying down in some detail the manner in which future trade between the

¹Silva e Souza. 18.3.1682. A.H.U. Angola, Cx 9.

²Luis Lobo da Silva. 25.11.1684. A.H.U. Angola, Cx. 10.

Portuguese and Matamba should be conducted. The Queen would make sure that neither she nor any of her subjects impeded or delayed pombeiros going to her kingdom. Trade negotiations would be carried out as expeditiously as possible and all trade cloth would be measured in the Portuguese cubit of three palms and the ell of five palms and in no other measure. Permission must also be given, and this was perhaps one of the most important provisions, allowing pombeiros to travel beyond Matamba to trade with the kingdoms of 'Sonso, Quiacas, Puriamujinga, Sundi (or Cundi), Casem (or Caseu), and Damba'. These peoples, in so far as they can be identified, would appear to have been peoples of the eastern and north-eastern parts of Kongo. The reference to trade with the 'Quiacas' is especially interesting as they were almost certainly the Yaka or Jaga of the Kwango valley. Puriamujinga and Casem cannot be identified. The implication of this provision of the treaty is that the Portuguese were opening a new route to the slave markets of north and east Kongo which they had previously exploited via San Salvador and which had become increasingly inaccessible owing to the hostility of the Ndembu and the civil wars in Kongo. These reserves of slaves were probably beginning to be tapped by non-Portuguese traders through Mpinda and Loango.

There were several lesser provisions in the treaty. All debts owed to pombeiros who had been in Matamba should be paid off at once. Pombeiros who committed adultery with chiefs' wives should not be fined from their masters' trade goods, because chiefs encouraged their wives to commit these offences in order to make a profit. Instead the pombeiro should be

punished by having his ears cut off, but only if the wife had her ears cut off first. All run-away slaves, and more especially all captives who were made in the battle of Katole and the sack of Kasanje, should be returned to their owners at once. The Queen would also have to accept a Christian mission in Matamba. Another provision required Matamba to make a contribution of 200 slaves towards the cost of the expedition which the colonial government had been forced to mount to punish the queen's brother and predecessor. These would be paid in four annual instalments of fifty slaves each. With regard to Kasanje, the Portuguese stressed that it was a completely independent kingdom and that any claims which Matamba might have made to its territory were false and unjust. In future peace and friendship should be maintained between the two kingdoms.

The eighth and last paragraph of the treaty revealed a new and important facet of the slave trade east of Ndongo. It said that there was a general complaint among the Portuguese that a people called the Mubires^{*} were trading in the kilombo of the Jinga queen. They brought forbidden trade goods, especially fire-arms and gun-powder from non-Portuguese traders who visited the Loango coast. Dona Veronica was ordered to expel all such Mubins from her kingdom at once and never allow any of her subjects to trade with them under any circumstances. This clause of the treaty is interesting in that it shows that by 1683 there was a new outlet for slaves from the region of Matamba and Kasanje which went across Kongo and was completely independent of Portuguese control. It also meant that

* Mubins or Mubino.

fire-arms were finding their way into African hands despite the strict ban on their sale imposed by the Portuguese authorities. This new route set the pattern for the trade struggle between the northern ports and Luanda which dominated the history of Angola in the eighteenth century.¹

By 1684 when João de Silva e Souza handed over the government of Angola to Luis Lobo da Silva, the Portuguese appeared to have reached the peak of their authority. Kongo had been reduced to a state of chaos, Ndongo had been crushed and a Portuguese fort had been built on the site of its old capital, Matamba and Kasanje were being kept content with lucrative trade agreements. In the future the Portuguese needed to play a much less active military role in Angola. They organised the final purchase and shipment of slaves, but the actual capturing passed out of their hands for the most part. Although they had the colony well organised and the supply lines were determined, the trade did not develop as easily as they had expected after their successful campaigns of the 1660's and 1670's. The new problem which arose to challenge them was hinted at in the last clause of the Matamba treaty. It was the competition of the English and the French who joined and then superseded the Dutch as the main 'interlopers' on a coast which the Portuguese considered to be their national preserve. Having overcome, as they thought, most of the African problems involved in the slave trade, the Portuguese now had to turn round and keep the Europeans out of what was becoming one of the most fruitful and well organised slave producing regions of Africa.

¹ This treaty, dated 6 September 1683, is published in full in Ralph Delgado: História de Angola, IV, 70-74. A copy exists in A.H.U. Angola, Cx 10 bearing the date 24 November 1684.

Chapter SevenTHE DECLINE OF THE MBUNDU SLAVE TRADE1684 - 1790

After the Matamba peace and the Kasanje succession in 1683, the history of Portuguese activities in the Mbundu country becomes less flamboyantly military. The Mbundu resistance to European advance had been finally crushed. Whereas during most of the seventeenth century governors had embarked almost every year upon some military enterprise, from 1684 these exploits became less frequent and some eighteenth century governors never organised any wars at all. They concerned themselves with municipal architecture and with litigation rather than with warfare. The country nonetheless remained fairly turbulent as was perhaps inevitable in a slave-producing colony. Moreover the area of turbulence spread in widening circles. Among the Mbundu Portuguese military activity was limited to a constant pressure on chiefs to supply carriers and labourers and to pay taxes. There were only very occasional punitive campaigns. In the Caconda region behind Benguela, on the other hand, the Portuguese were involved in a series of important wars in the process of conquering a trade route to the Ovimbundu highlands in a manner similar to that in which they had conquered the Kwanza route in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹

¹See Chapter Three.

During the course of the eighteenth century the focal point of the slave supply in West Central Africa gradually moved east from the Mbundu country to centre on Matamba and Kasanje in the first half of the century and on the Lunda empire in the second half. The Mbundu country and the Kwanza valley changed from being a generating point to being a corridor through which the slaves captured during the Lunda wars of expansion reached the sea. At first, when the Lunda trade was only beginning, Kasanje was probably the most important and perhaps even the only gateway to the coast. In time, however, competitive routes developed, by-passing and eventually superseding in importance the Kasanje-Mbundu line of communication. Lunda trade began to pass to Benguela through the agency of the Ovimbundu and to Loango through Kongo, and later possibly also through Teke, channels.

In 1684 when Luis Lobo da Silva arrived in Angola as governor, he found the colony was in serious economic decline. Foreign ships were openly trading at Luanda, and the settlers were demoralised by their defeat in the battle of Katole.¹ One cause of trouble was the new-found authority of the king of Kasanje. He had proved his strength by defeating Matamba where the Portuguese had failed to do so, and now treated the Portuguese in a high handed manner. He imposed his own commercial terms to the disgust of the traders. He altered the rates of exchange, put arbitrary limits on the flow of goods and ignored the governor's reminder

¹The Provedor to the King, 7.11.1684. Cx 10.

that previous rulers of Kasanje had always seen fit to do as the Portuguese bid them. The king of Kasanje also refused to have a Portuguese captain-major at his court.¹

When Lobo da Silva left Angola four years later he reported that trade relations with Matamba and Kasanje had much improved.² His successor, however, D. João de Lencastre, did not find this to be the case. The king of Kasanje had discovered that trade wines were being so badly adulterated that he had banned the import of wine to his kingdom altogether and put guards on the frontier to prevent traders from bringing it in. This was a serious blow to the traders since wine was one of the commodities most widely used for buying slaves in the late seventeenth century. In addition to this ban on wines, the king of Kasanje continued to impose his own prices, to the general indignation of the Portuguese who assumed that any indigenous ruler would accept whatever they gave him for his slaves. They claimed that the king's action was fraudulent and disloyal and felt more urgently than ever the need for a captain at his court who would adjudicate in their favour.³ The dispute seems finally to have been settled in mutually agreeable terms and in 1696 Manuel de Oliveira de Figueiredo was sent to the Kasanje capital where he remained captain-major for seven years.⁴

¹ Luis Lobo da Silva to the King, 25.11.1684. Cx. 10. Letters from the governor are normally addressed to the King in the first part of the eighteenth century and to the Secretary of State in the latter part unless another recipient is indicated in the foot-note. Cx means Caixa and refers to the Box number in the series of Angolan papers in the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon.

Kasanje's independence of action was imitated by Veronica, the queen of the Jingas of Matamba. In about 1688 she attacked Kahenda, an important ruler in the Mbaka region, and a loyal vassal of the Portuguese. With the help of disloyal Kahenda subjects she captured the chief and destroyed some of his villages and crops. To avenge this insult a council was called in Luanda which decided that a punitive war against Matamba would be permitted by the royal instructions given to the governor. A preliminary force of 140 men was sent to Mbaka late in 1688 while other troops were sought from the presídios and from Brazil. Adequate support could not be raised, however, and the campaign never materialised. By October 1690 peaceful co-existence had been restored between Matamba and the colony.¹ From then on trade from Matamba to Luanda seems to have flowed without major hindrance until the 1730's when the Portuguese caused a major upheaval by trying to push their supply lines further east at the expense of Matamba.

The Matamba attack on Kahenda was followed in 1691 by a revolt against Portuguese authority by the Ndembu chief Mbwila. He expelled the captain and other Europeans from his state, burnt down the church and requisitioned goods valued at 20 million reis, about the equivalent of one thousand slaves.

(cont.)

²Luis Lobo da Silva, 28.8.1688. Cx 10.

³D. João de Lencastre to the King, 11.1.1689. Cx 10.

⁴Camara to the King. 3.8.1703. Cx 13.

¹Letters from Lencastre dated 11.1.1689, 23.2.1689, 28.10.1690. Cx 10.

He barred all roads and trade came to a standstill. The new Portuguese governor began preparations for war.¹ A column of about 800 soldiers with fire-arms supported by an estimated 40,000 bowmen, entered Mbvila and put the army to flight. They did considerable material damage to villages but were continually hampered by rains and fevers and had to retire.² Mbvila continued to bother the Portuguese periodically but the inactive Luanda governors did not begin to take serious steps to deal with the menace until 40 years later.

Apart from occasional campaigns in Kisama and an alarm in 1709 during another short war between Matamba and Kahenda, there were no important colonial wars in Angola until the 1730's. The main trouble which ruffled the life of the colony round the turn of the century was the old trade dispute between officials who came to Angola for a tour of duty and settlers who were there for life. Throughout the seventeenth century it had been illegal, in theory at least, for white men to trade in the interior either on their own account or on behalf of anyone else. Trade had to be conducted through the intermediary of pombeiros. It was frequently the case, however, that governors used officials and army officers to trade for them in the back-country where their forceful methods of obtaining slaves disrupted the system of more or less peaceful negotiation used by

¹Costa de Menezes to the King, 28.11.1691. Cx 11.

²Same, 25.4.1692. Cx 11.

the pombeiros.

To combat this abuse the Luanda municipal councillors took advantage of the death in 1703 of Bernardino de Tavora, a particularly hated governor, and sent a petition to Lisbon. They said that for years the governors had been entrusting goods to people whom they called captain-majors and whom they sent inland to buy slaves. Each of these captains caused havoc in the region to which he was sent. The Mbundu chiefs became so exasperated by their excesses that they revolted thus giving the governor the opportunity to use more force and gain even more slaves for his personal enrichment. To try to stop this method of 'trading' the council issued a decree ordering all white men and mulattoes to return to the coast and abolished the post of captain-major except in the forts. Anyone not obeying within four months could be punished.¹ This ruling seems even to have applied to the captain-major at Kasanje who arrived back in Luanda after seven years in that kingdom on the Kwango.²

This decree by the Municipal Council in Luanda was only a temporary measure and did not limit the disruptive effects of the activities of future governors. The case had been so strongly presented to the Overseas Council in Lisbon, however, that by 1721 a more radical solution was introduced. A law was passed forbidding all governors from participating in the slave trade. They were to be compensated for this loss by a five-fold

¹Order by the Camara, 26.1.1703. Letter to the King, 22.4.1702. Cx.13.

²Camara to the King, 3.8.1703. Cx 13.

increase in salary to 6 million reis per annum. Antonio de Albuquerque de Coelho de Carvalho, the first governor to be appointed under the new regulations, was worried lest the new export tax on slaves should not prove adequate to pay this colossal salary. He was assured however that in that event the balance would be paid from Bahia out of taxes imposed on slaves from the Mina coast of West Africa.¹

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century the total number of slaves exported from Angola each year seems to have been very small compared to the volume of the traffic in the middle of the seventeenth century. In 1710, one of the earliest years for which the records provide statistics, the total number of registered exports was only 3,549. Over the next twenty years the volume rose fairly steadily, as the following table shows, but never approached the exports of 10,000 and 15,000 slaves per annum of a century before.²

1710	3,549	1721	5,378
1711	4,158	1722	5,062
1712	4,188	1723	6,744
1713	5,617	1724	6,108
1714	5,581	1725	6,726
1716	-	1726	8,440
1717	-	1728	8,542
1718	6,747	1729	-
1719	6,886	1730	-
1720	7,213	1731	5,808

¹Consulta of the Lisbon Overseas Council, 12.9.1721. Cx 15.

In the years 1711 to 1713 the Camara complained repeatedly to the Overseas Council about the low level of trade and said that not enough ships were coming to Luanda to take away even those slaves which were available. Freight space to Brazil was being competitively sold at inflated rates to the detriment of the traders.¹ One reason for the decline in exports from Luanda would appear to have been the growing competition from other parts of the coast. About 1717 the governor Henrique de Figueiredo complained that the non-Portuguese traders on the Loango coast were chiefly responsible for reducing the Luanda trade.² The growth of the Benguela trade probably also had an adverse effect on Luanda.

The Portuguese had been aware since 1683 at least that slaves from Matamba were being taken by traders called Mubires to the Loango coast. These Mubires appear to have been a Kongo people living half way between Loango and Matamba. During the eighteenth century the Portuguese tried several ways of limiting this competition by physical means. What they hardly attempted to do was to outbid their rivals by economic competition. The Portuguese attitude was that they alone had a right to trade in slaves on the coast from Gaboon to the Namib desert. Any other nation trading there were pirates and should, if possible, be kept out. They were well

(cont.)

²The slave trade figures quoted in this chapter are taken from a large number of documents in the A.H.U.; some are annual reports on trade by the governor, and some are six-yearly reports on the slaves exported during a particular term of the slave contract.

¹Consulta of the Overseas Council on a Camara petition, 21.2.1716. Cx 15.

²Henrique de Figueiredo, n.d. (c. 1717). Cx 15.

aware that the success of these 'pirates' arose from the fact that they paid more for slaves, and especially for ivory, and that their trade goods were of a better quality. It would seem, however, that at least in the first half of the eighteenth century the Portuguese did nothing to raise their prices in order to attract trade back to Luanda.

The main trade goods used by the pombeiros who plied through the Mbundu country to the ponbos of Matamba and Kasanje were rock salt from the Kisama mines, cloth, and to a lesser extent china and enamel-ware, brought from India, tobacco and gerebita, probably a coarse rum-like spirit, brought from Brazil, and wines, brandy, knives and European cloth from Portugal.¹ Indian goods went first to Portugal where they were made up into lots with the inferior European produce which otherwise had little to commend it. Metal goods such as brass basins were apparently scarce and those used seem often to have been bought from foreigners based in Loango. In addition to legal trade goods, it would appear that illegal fire-arms were used in growing numbers by Portuguese caravans who smuggled them out of Luanda.²

In Angola the Portuguese ivory trade was very depressed. A royal monopoly precluded free trade in ivory and only the contractor could buy it and then only at fixed and very low rates. The result of this was that

¹The Ouvidor to the King, 20.2.1731. Cx 18. Governor, 3.6.1723. Cx 16.

²The Provedor da Fazenda, to the King, 7.4.1727. Cx 17.

it was not worth carrying ivory to Luanda unless it was already near to the coast. In addition to this four different rates applied rising with the size of the tusk. This meant that even the best tusks were abandoned if they were under the minimum weight for each grade. Foreigners, on the other hand, paid much higher prices for ivory and the contractor was allowed to sell his ivory to foreigners on condition he did so in return for slaves. This was a means of acquiring more slaves for Brazil and at the same time saving their souls from the heretics. Figueiredo suggested about 1717 that since very few foreign ships came to Luanda, permission be given to traders to take ivory to the 'free coast of Loango' and sell it there for slaves who would otherwise be lost to the Protestant nations. This would increase the slave trade and at the same time stimulate ivory production. The crown would benefit from the export duties levied on ivory before it went to Loango.¹

The response to Figueiredo's suggestion does not appear to have been favourable. During the 1720's the ivory export from Luanda continued to be small, always less than one thousand tusks a year paying an export duty equivalent to only about 2 per cent of the slave taxes. The English continued to trade through the Mubires with the Luanda hinterland and even went so far as to fortify the port of Cabinda². Small English ships visited the Kongo coast right down to the Dande and carried off slaves who had been

¹Figueiredo, n.d. (c. 1717) Cx 15.

²Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho, 13.6.1722 and 15.6.1722. King of Ngoyo to Albuquerque, n.d. (? 1722) Cx 26.

diverted there from the Mbundu route to Luanda. Figueiredo's successor, Antonio de Albuquerque, suggested another way of undermining this competition. He said that Brazilian tobacco was an essential item in any trade lot used for buying slaves. The Mubires from Loango bought their tobacco from the Portuguese. A ban on the sale of tobacco to any foreigner would therefore be an effective way of limiting their ability to trade.¹ Sound though the idea was, the authorities had so little control over even their own national traders that no such ban could ever be effectively imposed. It is possible for instance that Portuguese traders obtained some of their vitally important fire-arms from the Loango traders in return for tobacco.

The English sale of fire-arms and gun-powder, whether direct to African chiefs or to Portuguese dealers, was probably the most important single aspect of the Loango trade.² Officially Portuguese traders were banned from supplying guns to the chiefs. This was because the Portuguese had territorial and military stakes in Angola and did not want to increase the resistance which they met in their campaigns. The embargo was, however, being undermined by traders in Loango who had no territorial interests and to whom increased warfare was likely to prove beneficial rather than otherwise by increasing the number of captives in the market. Once guns were available in the interior they soon reached the hands of the Kisama peoples who were a serious threat to the traders using the Kwanza River trade-route.³

¹ Antonio de Albuquerque to the King. 12.9.1722. Cx 26.

² Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque to the King, 26.9.1727. Cx 17.

³ Rodrigo Cezar de Menezes to the King, 20.12.1734. Cx 20.

To try to limit this spread of arms Paulo Caetano issued the rather naïve order that the captain-majors should confiscate all fire-arms found in African hands.¹

While the Portuguese were losing an increasing proportion of the Mbundu and Kongo slave trade, they were making up their exports with slaves from the hinterland of Benguela. A reconstruction of the history of the Portuguese conquest of Benguela and the plateau would be as long a study as the history of the Portuguese penetration of the Mbundu country. By the eighteenth century however this new colony, founded in 1617, had grown so that its sphere of influence overlapped with the trading sphere of the Mbundu. From the latter part of the seventeenth century onwards a series of fierce campaigns had been fought around the presídio of Kakonda which had been established on the plateau edge about 1682.² A growing area of the densely populated Ovimbundu country came under the influence of the Portuguese slave traders. One reason why this area had not been penetrated earlier from the Kwanza valley may have been the presence of Lunda-Imbangala armies in Kisama and Libolo. Once this source of supply had been found by penetrating from the south-west, the caravans went out by two routes. One led to the port of Benguela whence the slaves were shipped to Luanda by coastal vessels. The other, which probably developed later, went northwards

¹Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque to the King, 26.2.1728. Cx 17.

²Delgado; História de Angola, IV, 61.

to reach the Kwanza at a new market called Dondo between Massangano and Cambambe. In 1729 João V wrote to Paulo Caetano to ask him to open or re-open this land route. He said that a powerful chief was blocking it to the detriment of the slave trade. It was particularly important to increase the trade at that time because of the great shortage of slaves being experienced on the Mina coast.¹

In 1727 the inhabitants of Luanda complained that ships were sailing direct to Brazil from Benguela instead of calling first at Luanda. The traders said that this trade had the major drawback that it was now possible for pombeiros to buy a chain of slaves with goods entrusted to them by their masters in Luanda and to sell them in Benguela without having to account to anyone. This dishonesty was ruining Luanda.² When a protest was made to Lisbon the Overseas Council forbade all direct sailing from Benguela. They were not, however, wholly convinced of the need for this rule, for two years later an 800 berth slaver took on a cargo in Benguela with instructions from the Overseas Council itself to sail direct to Bahia.³ The shortage of shipping space in Luanda became more acute than ever.⁴

¹João V to the Governor. 19.5.1729. Cx 18. (Copy)

²Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque, 17.4.1727. Cx 17.

³Same, 20.12.1729. Cx ?

⁴José Carvalho da Costa, 8.6.1725. Cx 16.

Although the Luanda merchants complained that their slave supply was being diverted to Benguela, a later governor, Rodrigo Cezar de Menezes, realised that the truth was rather different. In fact the bulk of the slaves coming to Luanda were originating in the Benguela hinterland rather than being diverted there from the Mbundu country. The profits being made in Luanda were the commission on slaves which came there from Benguela before being shipped to Brazil. What the Luanda traders were protesting about was that their profitable but non-essential role of middlemen between Benguela and Brazil was being cut out.

The two lines of competition from north and south which partially squeezed out the Mbundu-Luanda participation in the slave trade, probably interacted on each other. So long as the Luanda traders were able to tap Benguela supplies they were not over worried at the failure of the supply from Matamba and Kasanje to increase in volume. It was only when the Luanda traders began to lose the Benguela supplies to other Portuguese competitors that they concentrated once more on the Mbundu routes after several decades of comparative neglect.

The renewed interest in the Mbundu country eventually led to war. After 1733 the total exports rose to over nine thousand slaves in most years and even reached twelve thousand in 1736. The figures given below probably do not include between one and two thousand slaves that were

legally exported each year direct from Benguela. Neither, of course, do they take any account of the unknown numbers which were illegally exported from both Benguela and Luanda.

1731	5,808	1740	8,484
1732		1741	8,693
1733		1742	10,130
1734	9,962	1743	
1735	9,257	1744	8,849
1736	12,250	1745	
1737	9,900 (?)	1746	
1738	8,809	1747	10,112
1739		1748	11,592

One of the major hindrances to the Mbundu trade continued to be the powerful Ndembu chief Mbwila. He caused serious trouble by giving refuge to slaves who had escaped from Portuguese custody, and then allowing them to form bands which went out from his capital to rob caravans. He also controlled, or at least had a hand in, the busy trade route which led northward through the divided territory of the old Kongo kingdom to Cabinda and Loango. The Portuguese accused him of having stolen from them the majority of the slaves and ivory which he sent in that direction. In return he received from Loango excellent north-European cloths and fire-arms. To combat this Cezar de Menezes proposed in 1734 the building of a new presídio at an easily defensible point only

five days march from Mbwila's capital. A garrison at that point would be able to serve the dual function of closing the trade-route to the north and of making east-west trade-routes much safer. The cost of the enterprise would easily be off-set by not having to defend the pombeiros from robbers and murderers.¹ The effectiveness or otherwise of a remote garrison in the thick bush of southern Kongo was debated with even less speed than was usual in the ponderous Portuguese colonial system. It was twenty years before any action was taken on Menezes' suggestion.

As part of their policy of intensifying the trade through the Mbundu country in the 1730's, the Portuguese became more active in the direction of the upper Kwango. They attempted to penetrate further inland than the rulers of Matamba and Kasanje had previously permitted them to do. Cezar de Menezes considered the 'King of the Jingas' in Matamba to be the most dangerous of the indigenous rulers and the one who constituted the gravest threat to the outlying Portuguese forts. This ruler maintained a very firm hold on the trade to all points east and north of his territory just as his southern neighbour, Kasanje, was complete master of trade to the east and south-east of the Mbundu. This complete barrier to Portuguese penetration of the interior caused a war with Matamba in the years 1739 to 1744.

The immediate cause of the war seems to have been the activities of a Portuguese trader called Francisco Roque de Soutto. He had been operating

¹Rodrigo Cezar de Menezes to the King, 30.1.1734. Cx 20.

at Kasanje where his methods included the use of violence against his rivals.¹ His aim, it seems, had been to travel beyond Kasanje. He later claimed that in so doing he had been acting on instructions from the governor.² Roque failed to get through Kasanje and so tried to bypass it and reach the Holo people via Matamba. On the road he was stopped by Dom Afonso Alvares who claimed to be the 'King of Ndongo and Matamba' and was reputedly the son and successor of Queen Victoria (Veronica) Gutterres. This king wrote and told the captain of Mbaka that he had arrested Roque who was trying to reach Holo to sell guns and powder which were illegal goods. He wished to know whether Roque was a criminal or had a permit to carry these goods.³

Francisco Roque seems to have escaped from Matamba custody and reached the Holo country. By August 1739 he was back in Luanda with eleven men who claimed to be ambassadors from the king of the Holo people. They said that their master wished to become a vassal of Portugal and to trade direct with the Portuguese. Previously the Holo had been in continual conflict with Matamba and Kasanje who controlled all trade with the Portuguese and paid the peoples from beyond the Kwango a much smaller price for their slaves than they themselves received from the white men.

¹João Jaques de Magalhães, 24.9.1739. Cx 21.

²Consulta of the Overseas Council in Lisbon, 4.9.1742. Cx 22.

³King of Matamba to Francisco Xavier, Captain-Major of Mbaka, n.d. (? 1739)
Captain Major of Mbaka to the Governor, 5.7.1739. Cx 21.

The Portuguese in Luanda realised that an opening with the Holo could be advantageous but that it might involve raising, and paying for, an army large enough to fight Matamba. They were also a little cautious lest the embassy should not be genuine but merely a cover to hide other illegal activities by Francisco Roque. The matter was reported to Lisbon where the Overseas Council advised that trade with the Holo would be advantageous and that an attempt should be made to obtain peaceful permission for it from Matamba and Kasanje.¹

An attempt to open trade with the Holo was apparently made in 1742. A caravan of slaves guarded by 130 freemen sent by the Holo king, set out for the Portuguese dominions. It never got through Matamba, however, but was attacked by the queen's army, which killed the guards and captured the slaves. It is not clear what had happened to Dom Afonso and whether this was a new queen or whether the old Queen Veronica, now as aged as her predecessor Queen Nzinga had once been, was in fact still alive and in control of Matamba. Whoever she was, this queen had delivered a blow to Portuguese prestige which João Jaques de Magalhães felt it necessary to avenge lest other peoples, seeing it as a sign of Portuguese weakness, should defy them also. At the same time he hoped to stop or limit the active trade to the Loango coast which the Mubires were conducting from the whole of the region east of Ndongo.²

¹Report on the embassy from Holo, 16.8.1739. Letter from J.J.Magalhães, 24.9.1739. Marginal comments. Order for an investigation, 25.9.1739. Cx 21.

²João Jaques de Magalhães, 13.4.1744. Cx 23. The Catalogo assumes that the queen of Matamba was still the same one and says she was aged 60. In fact she would, by 1744, have reigned for sixty years if she were alive.

Before the Portuguese had taken any action, the queen of Matamba delivered an even more serious blow to their trading system. Her army advanced right into the Mbundu territory, which the Portuguese had claimed to be theirs for generations, and on 4 February 1744 attacked the great fair near Cambambe. They carried off slaves and goods to a total estimated value of 500 head of slaves. This was a complete and final breach of the peace which had lasted somewhat uneasily since 1683. The governor examined the old treaty and found that in addition to taking hostile action, the queen had failed to comply with its provisions relating to free trade beyond Matamba, and had never paid more than one third of the indemnity of 200 slaves which had been promised after the war of 1681. A punitive war therefore seemed essential.¹

The campaign was fought during the dry season of 1744 under the leadership of Bartholomeu Duarte de Sequeira. His army consisted of some 600 'Portuguese' soldiers, 500 white or so-called white civilians, 2,000 well-armed slaves and a guerra preta of 20,000 bowmen.² Sequeira first of all raided the fertile islands in the Kwanza above Pungu a Ndongo which were believed to belong to Matamba. From there he marched northward destroying and pillaging villages and driving the queen's army back until he entered the capital of the Kingdom. It was the first time that a Portuguese army, as opposed to Portuguese traders and missionaries, had

¹João de Magalhães, 13.4.1744. Cx 23.

²J. J. Magalhães, 15.5.1744. Cx 23.

penetrated so far inland. By the time they reached the Matamba capital, however, the rains were beginning and the army decided to negotiate a peace rather than march further and risk dying of fever. A treaty was signed on 25 October 1744 with terms similar to those of 1683. Access to Matamba and beyond it to the Yaka, and presumably also to the Holo, was to be given to traders and missionaries, and an indemnity for the war was fixed at 2,949,840 reis, about the value of 100 slaves, but probably less than the campaign had cost.¹ Sequeira arrived back in Luanda with his army to meet widespread criticism of his conduct of the war. It was alleged that the campaign had not been carried far enough, and that the queen's escape had been due to negligence on the part of the commander. It was also claimed that the royal fifth of captured slaves had not been justly allocated and branded according to custom. Finally the treatment meted out to soldiers, allies, friendly chiefs and the guerra preta by the Portuguese officers, was reported to have been tyrannical.²

After the defeat of Matamba, Magalhães, who governed Angola from 1738 until his death in Luanda in 1748, concentrated his attention on the problem of Kisama. The population of Kisama was a mixture of Mbundu who had fled from the Portuguese wars, slaves of varying nationalities who

¹Treaty signed by delegates of the Jinga Queen at the court of Matamba, 25.10.1744. Cx 23. J. J. Magalhães, 31.8.1745. Cx 74

²Terms of reference of commission of enquiry, 18.3.1745. Cx 24.

had escaped from Luanda or from caravans on their way there, and of the old sixteenth century Lunda-Imbangala invaders. The fact that it was such a close refuge for slaves from Luanda and that it lay along-side the Kwanza trade route made the Portuguese especially anxious to dominate it. Magalhães conducted campaigns against several of the leading chiefs, Kimone, Katala, Mushima, and Kisua but the effect was no more lasting than previous efforts to control the Kisama chiefs had been.¹

Dom Antonio Alvares da Cunha, who arrived in Luanda as governor in July 1753, described Angola as a rotten, vicious and corrupt colony. It was desperately short of war materials and soldiers for its defence. The only white inhabitants in evidence were the slave traders, men without consciences who feared neither God nor the law and who terrified the Mbundu chiefs into selling their subjects. Such scandalous behaviour, the governor said, amply justified the royal order prohibiting white and mulatto men from entering the hinterland. He issued an order to arrest all white men in the interior and appealed to Lisbon for horses to build up a cavalry capable of enforcing the order and controlling illicit trade.² To illustrate his point the governor later sent a letter from the captain of Pungu a Ndongo describing how a jealous trader had mutilated and eventually killed a son of the chief Kabuku.³

¹ Letters from Magalhães to the King, 4.12.1745, 15.3.1746, 3.8.1747 and others. Cx 24.

² D. Antonio Alvares da Cunha to Secretary of State, 29.10.1753. Cx 25.

³ J. F. de Araujo, Pedras de Pungu a Ndongo, 16.11.1754. Cx 26.

In an attempt to remedy the situation in which criminals went illegally to the fairs to trade and caused serious disturbances, the Lisbon government decided to adopt an entirely new policy and one quite contrary to Alvares da Cunha's advice. On 11 January 1758 it lifted the ban on white men trading direct with the pumbos and legalised freedom to trade in the hope of minimising the troubles. The next governor was not happy about this freedom since the majority of the white population of Angola were deported convicts from the Lisbon prisons who did not make the best free agents.¹ Three years later he wrote to say that since by no stretch of the imagination could it be thought that a royal decree would have been made with the intention of benefitting 'Jews, Gypsies and other depraved peoples' the governor had excluded them from any right to trade.²

Souza Coutinho, who took over the government in 1764, approved of the new regulation and thought that traders would be more correct in their dealings with chiefs and states where there was no Portuguese military establishment. If traders had to rely on themselves for their safety they would be less prone to committing atrocities than if they knew that there was a presídio garrison to protect them from reprisals. Their more cautious approach to African rulers and their freedom to range through the country would make them better able to compete with the

¹Antonio de Vasconcelos, 13.1.1749. Cx 28.

²Same, 6.5.1762. Cx 29.

traders who came from the Loango coast.¹

Another problem which continued to exercise the minds of successive governors, was the import of fire-arms. The possession of fire-arms by African rulers made their opposition to Portuguese traders dangerous and effective. There had been a 'revolt' by Kalandula, and the Ndembu chiefs had prevented Portuguese entry into Nkoje.* The Queen of Matamba had attacked traders going to Holo and Kasanje and it had been necessary to send a troop of 300 'native recruits' to re-open the trade and avenge the death of several pombeiros.² In 1759 the governor Vasconcelos pointed out that it was wrong to suppose that foreign traders were chiefly responsible for providing the peoples of Angola with guns. The majority of both fire-arms and gun-powder were in fact obtained illegally from Portuguese traders. Vasconcelos was not convinced, however, that the gun trade was as detrimental to Portuguese interests as had been supposed. Most of the Portuguese guns were of such poor quality that they fell to pieces at the first shot. Of 4,000 trade guns which he had examined only 200 were serviceable. To try to stop this trade would be both impracticable and harmful to commercial interests.³

When Souza Coutinho succeeded Vasconcelos he came out in favour of allowing a controlled trade in arms. He said that it was an illusion to

¹Souza Coutinho. 9.5.1756. Cx 30.

²Antonio Alvares da Cunha, 23.3.1755. Cx 26 and 22.1.1756. Cx 27.

³Vasconcelos, 18.3.1759, Cx 28 and 19.5.1759, Cx 29.

*Encoge.

suppose that Europeans could impose their terms on the trade and bully African merchants into disadvantageous bargains. Since marching slaves was a comparatively cheap form of transport, the middlemen were willing to send them long distances to find the highest prices and seek the goods currently in greatest demand. If the Portuguese did not reap the benefit of selling arms, other nations would and the slaves would be permanently lost to the Portuguese while the Africans got their guns nonetheless.¹ In 1759 Souza Coutinho obtained permission to allow a limited legal trade in fire-arms. He announced to a gathering of merchants that he would authorise the sale of 1,500 guns and 200 barrels of powder each year. The traders welcomed the prospect but asked that the goods be shared out so that first-comers did not take the entire quota. Souza Coutinho thought this a reasonable request to prevent a small number of traders making profits far above the normal level of 100 to 150 per cent.²

The old ambition of the Portuguese to open a route across Africa to join Angola with the Sena Rivers province on the Zambesi, was revived by Alvares da Cunha in the 1750's. His uncle, Dom Luis da Cunha, had commissioned a report on the feasibility of such a project from the French royal cartographer, D'Anville, in 1725.³ The chief obstacle was the king

¹Souza Coutinho, 30.16.1765. Cx 30.

²Report on the meeting and letter from Souza Coutinho, 19.12.1767. Cx 31.

³One version of this Ms is in the Lisbon Geographical Soc. Mss. Res. I-B-64.

of Kasanje who carefully prevented any European from even seeing the Kwango which lay one day's march beyond his capital. The Portuguese, however, bought slaves from beyond the Kwango who told them that the chiefs there would willingly trade direct with Europeans since Kasanje paid them only one third of what he received. Although Alvares da Cunha had no success in breaking through the Kasanje trade barrier, he did hear that beyond the Kwango there were rulers called 'Cabaço', 'Cafuxy', 'Muhetu' and 'Haguinby' who obeyed a great king called 'Quiconba Acoassa' or 'Cabonda' living at 20 days' journey from the Kwango.¹ Alvares da Cunha's informants probably referred to the Mwata Yamvo, ruler of the Lunda empire, of whose existence D'Anville had apparently been unaware thirty years earlier. There is perhaps even an outside chance that 'Quiconba' might be 'Tshikombe', who was probably the great-grandson of the first Lunda ruler to adopt the title Mwata Yamvo.²

The major factor in the history of Angola during the half-century before 1790 was the arrival of the Lunda empire at the peak of its trading power. A brief account has been given of the nursery of political institutions which existed in Katanga before the European arrival in Africa, and of the manner in which a Luba dynasty implanted itself on the Lunda peoples. The Lunda areas then threw out migrations of peoples escaping from the process of consolidating the new state between the

¹D. Antonio Alvares da Cunha, 4.12.1754. Cx 27.

²Duysters, op.cit., 89.

Lulua and the Lubilash.¹ Once Lunda had been consolidated and had evolved its complex and characteristic administrative system, the new state embarked on a programme of imperial expansion until it came into contact with overseas traders who were reaching into Africa both from the Indian Ocean and from the Atlantic.

An exact chronological account of the expansion of the Lunda empire is hard to construct. The fullest version of the oral tradition of the Lunda, that collected by Duysters, gives little indication of the length of time which elapsed between the establishment of the first Luba settlers in Lunda territory, and the beginning of the Lunda expansion, when the Mwata Yamvo started sending his relatives and officers to found new Lunda states in the peripheral areas of the old Lunda country. It would appear that the process of internal consolidation lasted from the mid-sixteenth century until about the mid-seventeenth century when the exploitation began. Kazembe, the most famous of the Lunda off-shoot states, was established on the Luapula in the first half of the eighteenth century. It was not, according to Duysters' tradition, a late stage of the Lunda expansion, seeking to satisfy a demand for slaves from the west, ^{but rather one of the early states} resulting from late seventeenth century explorations. The satellite states which were set up as a consequence of these explorations were all bound to send tribute to the Mwata Yamvo.

One of the important westward probings from Lunda was led by Muke-

¹See Chapters One and Four.

longe Mutombo and Mai Munene who imposed their control over the Pende. According to Pende tradition, the Pende themselves arrived on the Kasai in about 1700 to 1730, and the Lunda came and conquered their new homeland soon after they arrived there.¹ This suggests an early eighteenth century westward expansion by Lunda. An off-shoot of Mai Munene's migration went westward under the leadership of Kasongo who founded a Lunda dynasty among the Yaka on the middle Kwango. He took the title of Mwene Puto Kasongo because of the trading association he formed with Mwene Puto, the King of Portugal. Plancquaert published an extract from a document in the Vatican archives, dated 1724-1730, which refers to 'Mano Pota' and would appear to suggest that the Yaka-Lunda kingdom was founded before that time.²

The Pende traditions give some account of the activity on the lengthened trade-routes into the interior. Both the Imbangala of Kasanje and the Songo, their southern neighbours, travelled to the Pende-Lunda state at the confluence of the Kasai and the Tshikapa to buy slaves in return for salt and cloth. Trade was facilitated by the similarity of their languages.³ Some traders settled in the Pende country and organised a second trade network stretching into the Bashilanje and Kuba country.

¹Haveaux, 26-27. The date is established on the basis of twelve initiation periods of 18-20 years each before the mid-twentieth century.

²Plancquaert, 84-87.

³The Imbangala of Kasanje and the Pende of Tshikapa both had Mbundu ancestors.

Even the mulatto traders reached the Pende markets. This trade was quite unlike the direct Portuguese activities from which the Pende had suffered so severely in Angola. It was well organised and controlled by the chiefs who determined what volume of trade the country's economy could stand.¹

It seems from this evidence that large-scale Lunda participation in the Atlantic slave trade was not an immediate consequence of Kinguri's contact with the Portuguese at the end of the sixteenth century. On the contrary, the peoples who first left Lunda stayed in Angola to trade on their own account and it was only a century or more later that Lunda emerged as a trading empire. The Lunda expeditions of the early eighteenth century seem to have brought the people of the Mwata Yamvo into close trading contact with Europeans. They were thus seeking to partake in a trade which was growing more rapidly than ever and which reached its height during the latter part of the eighteenth century.

During the 1750's the Portuguese revived the twenty-year-old project to limit the loss of trade to the north by building a fort at Nkoje in the Ndembu territory of Mbila. Delays in executing the plan were caused by a shortage of men and arms, by fear of a French attack on Luanda, and by a season of especially bad fevers. Action was eventually taken in 1759,² and on 18 August the army reached Nkoje and began to fortify it at once.³

¹Haveaux, 27-28.

²Letters to Alvares da Cunha, 24.2.1756, Cx 28, 10.3.1757, 26.5.1757, Cx 27.

³A. de Vasconcelos, 6.5.1760. Cx 28.

Although their aim was to impose Portuguese authority over a wide area of southern Kongo, the critics of the scheme were cynical and said that a remote and inaccessible fort would be of very limited benefit. It soon appeared, however, that the fort may in fact have had considerable effect on trade.

Two years after the fort at Nkoje was established, a people called the Hungu* entered Portuguese territory and attacked the Capuchin hospice of Kahenda east of Mbaka. This was apparently an invasion by an entire people, including chiefs, soldiers, women and children. Their leader, called Mushinda^f, said that they were fleeing from the persecution of the 'Melúes' who were probably the 'Moluas' or Lunda. To repel the invaders a small army set out from Pungu a Ndongo and recruited the assistance of Kalandula. During the winter of 1761 the Hungu were defeated, but the Portuguese force was too small to control many captives so the surplus were killed or maimed. The total Hungu loss of dead and captured was estimated at 15,000 of whom 803 head of slaves were allocated to the 'royal fifth'. Mushinda himself was killed in battle.¹

The claim of the Hungu that they were being driven on by the 'Melúes' might suggest that they were the spear-head of an attempt to clear the trade route from the upper Kwango to Loango. It is possible that the Nkoje fort was proving more effective than its critics had allowed for

¹Vasconcelos, 12.6.1762. Cx 29.

*Maungos.

^fMoxinda.

and that after 1759 trade became bottled up on the Kwango leading to an explosion of which the Hungo invasion was the first symptom. The check imposed on the progress of the Hungo by the Portuguese was only temporary. After failing to get past Kahenda, they apparently withdrew and tried circling the Portuguese position further to the north. On 7 April the Hungo defeated some Portuguese and successfully blockaded Nkoje. Trade to Luanda from this area, which was rather improbably alleged to have amounted to 5,000 slaves, was all but stopped. The Marques of Zombo imposed his control on the route and sent the slaves which he received in tribute to Loango for sale. Vasconcelos sent detachments of cavalry in 1762 and in 1763 to try to reinforce Portuguese authority, but they were wiped out by fevers. During his first year in office Souza Coutinho also sacrificed men trying without success in revive the Nkoje trade which had by then completely dried up.¹

In 1765 the governor decided that the situation called for a major war. The Hungu and the Sosso, a people with whom the Hungu were apparently associated, were crowding in on the peoples under Portuguese dominion. They were reported to have made an alliance with the Ndembu chief Mbwila (or Mbwela)* and were preparing an attack on Portuguese trade centres. Souza Coutinho described the Hungu as wandering landless peoples. They built villages surrounded by three stockades of woven branches coated with clay.² They were in some ways, perhaps, similar to the sixteenth

¹Souza Coutinho, 4.3.1766. Cx 31.

²Souza Coutinho, 18.12.1765. Cx 30.

*There would appear to have been two chiefs in close proximity called Mbwila and Mbwela.

century Jaga and Imbangala invaders, though of a more mellowed nature. Their line of invasion appears to have been similar to the route followed by the Imbangala two hundred years earlier. Unlike the Jaga, the Hungo were not expelled by the Portuguese and still remain an important ethnic group of about 60,000 people in southern Kongo. They appear to be similar to the Yaka and have preserved their language and customs to a degree only paralleled by the Yaka.¹

The Portuguese army which was directed against the Hungo met its first resistance on the Dande River where Mbwila held the crossing with a force well equipped with guns. The Portuguese eventually reached the north bank, however, and marched on Nkoje, although suffering from heavy losses. Using the fort as a base, the Portuguese army destroyed a number of Hungu kipakas or fortified encampments. At the same time the Sosso were defeated with the help of the Queen of Wandu* whose territory they had invaded. The chiefs Mujinga a Teka and Mujinga Bunga were driven north, beyond Nkoje. For the first time in 80 years the Portuguese were able to trade with Kongo chiefs called Kina[†] and Mkusu[‡].² Souza Coutinho hoped that this campaign had instilled sufficient terror into his enemies to ensure a durable peace.³ During 1766 the Sosso began

¹Guy Atkins: "An outline of Hungu grammar", Garcia de Orta, Lisbon, Vol. II, No. 2.

²Souza Coutinho, 4.3.1766. Cx 31.

³Souza Coutinho, 2.4.1766. Cx 31.

* Hoando

† Quina

‡ Incusu

to settle down after their migration. The Mani Sosso, Mujinga Bunga,* and his 40,000 followers offered, as Souza Coutinho understood it, to become vassals of Portugal.¹

The Portuguese plan to increase trade with the eastern markets by blocking the route to the north would appear to have met with a limited degree of success after the Hungo and Sosso invasions. On 8 July 1765 Souza Coutinho initialled a trade treaty with the Holo which was ratified by the Holo king and sent back to Luanda a year later. Souza Coutinho was particularly anxious to send missionaries to the Holo on the assumption that if Africans became Christian, they would be more apt to apply Christian standards of honesty to their trading than if they followed the example of Portuguese traders.² He was also anxious that Portuguese traders should learn to set a better example.³ To further improve trade, Souza Coutinho also signed a treaty with the Jinga of Matamba in 1765, and in July 1766 he could report that Angola was enjoying profound peace and that justice was being administered unperturbed.⁴ During this peace the governor kept in close touch with the peoples of the expanded northern frontier. In August 1767 he wrote to the captain of Nkoje asking him to impose stability on the Ndembu people of Kingengu⁺

¹Souza Coutinho, 28.11.1766 and 5.12.1766. Cx 31.

²Souza Coutinho to Secretary of State, 18.7.1766, and to Holo missionary, 18.7.1766. Cx 31. Same to Escrivão of Holo and Jinga lands, 9.9.1767. Luanda Archives, Offícios para of interior, Vol. 85, 38v-39.

³Souza Coutinho, to Captain of Nkoje, 28.10.1767. Luanda Vol. 85.

⁴Souza Coutinho to Sec. of State, Cx 31.

* Dom André Muginga Bunga Mane Mossoso. ⁺Quinguengo.

who changed their ruler almost daily, and to force the subjects of Nambu a Ngongo to elect a ruler of whom the governor could approve. The governor also said that the chief of the Mubires, Dom Francisco, had died and should be replaced.¹

Towards the end of 1767 the peace of which Souza Coutinho spoke was shattered by what appears to have been a Lunda attack on the barrier of trading states along the upper Kwango. Both the Portuguese and the Lunda seem to have been fully aware that these states which acted as middlemen were more of a barrier to trade than a vehicle for it. Souza Coutinho's first report on this attack said that the 'Quizûa' (or Lunda), a people whose country stretched almost to the far side of Africa, had launched a cruel and barbarous attack on Kasanje, Holo, Jinga and Muketu. The victims immediately appealed to the Portuguese for help. Souza Coutinho refused them assistance on scant grounds of previous misdemeanours, and wrote to Lisbon ~~that~~ he was in fact delighted to see these peoples being tamed and destroyed by their own kind. He obviously hoped that the Kwango barrier would be removed without the need for Portuguese military intervention. Colonel Duarte Sequeira was sent up-country to help to defend the presídios of Mbaka and Pungu a Ndongo from the 'barbarians', but received instructions not to proceed any further inland.² When Souza Coutinho's letter was received in Lisbon his inaction was warmly approved.

¹ Souza Coutinho to Captain of Nkoje, 12.8.1767. Luanda Vol. 85, 29v-30v.

² Souza Coutinho to Sec. of State, 16.12.1767, Cx 31. To Duarte Sequeira 25.11.1767, Luanda Vol. 85, 63.

The council was pleased at the increased security which would result from the destruction of some of the colony's nearest neighbours. It also anticipated that the war would result in a profitable crop of prisoners-of-war.¹

When the situation cleared in January 1768, it appeared that the chief victim of the attack had been Matamba. The king of Kasanje wrote that there was no longer any danger to his kingdom.² In Matamba on the other hand, the queen had been overthrown and replaced by a nephew who killed all her sons. One daughter escaped to the Kindongo Islands near the Kwanza bend. Souza Coutinho wrote to offer this princess asylum in the colony if she were to come unarmed and would agree to adopt Roman Catholicism.³ He also wrote to the nephew and successor of the old queen, Kaluete ka Mbande, King of Ndongo and Matamba,* and welcomed his succession to his aunt's throne. The governor later arranged for the new king's baptism.⁴ Souza Coutinho seemed to think that this Matamba revolution was a spontaneous rising by the Jinga but it seems more likely to have been associated with the Lunda attack. The fact that it was Matamba, north of Kasanje, which suffered most might indicate either that the Lunda were more interested in the north-east trade-route than in the

¹ Marginal comment in S.C.'s letter, n.d. (1768).

² Souza Coutinho to Regente of Mbaka, 22.1.1768. Luanda Vol. 85.

³ Souza Coutinho to Sec. of St. 16.12.1767. Cx 31. Same to Captain of Pedras de Pungu a Ndongo, 7.1.1768 (?) Luanda Vol. 85, 74.

⁴ Souza Coutinho to King of Matamba, 26.2.1768, Luanda Vol. 85. Same to King of Matamba and to mission at Mbangu a Kitamba (Bango Aquitamba) 25.11.1771.

*Dom Calluete Cambande.

route to Luanda, or that Kasanje was strong enough to resist and Matamba was not.

The turmoil on the Kwango did not quieten down immediately. Early in 1768 Kasanje was again threatened. The governor seems inexplicably to have adopted an entirely new attitude, and instead of welcoming the challenge to the august ruler of Kasanje, he worried about the danger of losing the trade goods which were stock-piled in the Kasanje staple. In March 1768 he sent out a military expedition to rescue the goods and thereby save the Luanda merchants from ruin. Before the troop had got very far, however, the invader withdrew and Souza Coutinho was able to call his men back.¹

After an initial impetus this period of war seems to have had an adverse effect on Luanda trade. The export figures dropped steadily from 1766 to 1769 to reach the lowest that they had been since the early 1720's. If both the Hungu invasion and the Lunda attack on Matamba were attempts deriving from the Mwata Yamvo's capital to re-open a trade-route across Kongo which had been closed in 1759, it would appear from the export statistics that the end was achieved and by 1766 slaves again began to be syphoned off northwards from the Luanda route as they were before the establishment of Nkoje.

The official statistics for the slave exports from Luanda and Benguela in the third quarter of the eighteenth century are as follows. The

¹Souza Coutinho, 15.10.1768. Cx 31.

figures from which the table is compiled contain minor inconsistencies arising from the fact that some reports do and some do not include the 5-15⁰/o of children who embarked for America but did not pay full taxes.

	<u>Luanda</u>	<u>Benguela</u>
1754	8,807	2,787
1755	9,220	2,137
1756	10,151	2,541
1757	10,764	1,461
1758	10,038	2,419
1759	10,152	3,192
1760	-	-
1761	-	-
1762	-	3,924
1763	-	3,423
1764	7,500 (?)	3,821
1765	11,064	6,183
1766	9,330	5,160
1767	8,926 (?)	6,584
1768	7,214 (?)	5,643
1769	5,651	5,531
1770	7,519	4,726
1771	7,214	5,276
1772	7,528	5,021
1773	-	5,363
1774	7,935	4,321
1775	7,795	5,739

Souza Coutinho, who governed Angola from 1764 to 1772, put great energy into trying to expand and diversify the economy of Angola. His colonial legislation, however, was apparently no more successful than his wars on the Kwango front and in southern Kongo. Although he opened new markets in the interior, the slave export from Luanda dropped from 10,000 to 7,000 per annum during his government and stayed at that level. In Benguela, on the other hand, the figures rose from 2,000 to 5,000 so that the overall Portuguese exports remained fairly constant. A scheme for allowing ships returning from India to call at Luanda and sell Indian wares was tried for a time, and expensive tea-sets, dinner services, tea-pots, enamel vases, silks and satins came into Luanda. There was fierce opposition to this scheme however because the high quality Indian goods undermined the market for the inferior Portuguese wares, and because some of the goods were smuggled to Brazil instead of being used in Angola. The scheme had to be dropped. Souza Coutino persuaded the Lisbon government to administer the slave trade direct and abolish the contract which took twenty per cent of the total slave taxes which amounted to about 100 contos (million reis). Finally the aspects of Souza Coutinho's work on which greatest emphasis has been laid by Portuguese historians such as Delagado, were his attempts to start an iron foundry, a leather factory, a salt monopoly, and various agricultural schemes which would have made Angola as desirable a colony to settle in as was Brazil. All his endeavours came to nothing, however, and the only effect on the Mbundu was

an increase in labour service, and possibly a more effective collection of tithes.¹

Souza Coutinho left Angola in 1772. In a summary of the history of Angola written 70 years later, Lopes de Lima said that between Souza Coutinho's departure and the arrival of Manuel de Almeida Vasconcelos in 1790, nothing important happened and Portuguese Angola sank back into its lethargic routine.² Although Lopes de Lima was overstating the case, there was a degree of truth in his assessment, especially in so far as the Mbundu country was concerned. Any activities which the Portuguese did undertake were on the Loango coast in the north and in the Ovimbundu country in the south, where in 1774 to 1776 they fought the important Bailundu War. The old hinterland of Luanda was comparatively quiet, although important numbers of slaves continued to pass through it.

Between 1772 and 1790 the Portuguese concentrated mainly on coastal control to limit foreign trade. By abandon|ing their attempts to dominate the inland trade routes, they may have been recognising their ultimate failure in Kongo and on the upper Kwango in the 1760's. Attempting to control the ports which foreigners visited was not a new idea. Souza Coutinho had garrisoned Novo Redondo, near Old Benguela, to try to prevent the English and French from buying slaves there. Similar activity was now concentrated on the Loango coast, and especially on the port of

¹To do justice to the vigorous ideas and actions of Souza Coutinho and to study the Portuguese colonial policy involved, see three articles by Ralph Delgado in Studia nos. 6-10. Many documents on the Portuguese aspects of Coutinho's work have been published in Arquivos de Angola.

²Lopes de Lima, III, page xxxvi.

Cabinda, which apart from its own trade, was the outlet for Sonyo, the most powerful of the coastal states, but one which would allow no direct access to Europeans.

Portugal's concern over the Loango trade was based on her claim that Loango was her domain. The Portuguese also complained that slaves sold there often came from the Luanda hinterland, and that foreign traders based in Loango used small vessels to visit the Kongo coast as far south as the outskirts of Luanda. A more fundamental but probably unrealised cause for the prosperity of Loango and the decline of Luanda, may have been the establishment of a direct link between Loango and Mussumba, the capital of the Lunda empire, by-passing Angola and Kongo altogether. At the same time trade was being increased by supplies of slaves coming to the Atlantic sea-board from as far afield as the Lunda kingdom of the Kazembes in the Luapula valley. A hint of these developments, which increased the slave trade but cut out the Portuguese more completely than ever, is given in a report received by Lacerda when preparing his expedition to Kazembe. Manuel Caetano Pereira, who had visited Kazembe, reported that cloth, mirrors, tea-pots, plates, glasses, beads, cowries and woollen goods were reaching Kazembe from 'Muropóe', the Mwata Yamvo, who lived 60 days to the east. In return Kazembe sent slaves which were taken from the kingdom of 'Moropóe' to the sea in canoes.¹ If slaves were taken from Lunda to the coast by canoe, they cannot have been going to the old staples

¹Lacerda e Almeida: Travessia da Africa, Lisbon 1936, 389-390.

of Holo and Kasanje but only northwards along the Lulua to the Kasai and Stanley Pool and hence, presumably, to the Loango coast.

In the 1770's an expedition sent from Luanda to investigate foreign trade reported that it had not been allowed to land at the mouth of the Dande, a mere 25 miles from Luanda, because the people there carried on a very profitable business with the north and would have nothing whatsoever to do with the Portuguese. On the Loango coast itself the expedition found 17 ships, 9 French, 4 English and 4 Dutch, and heard that six others had recently sailed. The report estimated the volume of the trade to be about 20,000 slaves a year.¹ Although this report is undated, it might have been prepared after the outbreak of the war of American Independence which gradually reduced Anglo-French activities in the southern slave trade. Another report, also undated but possibly written a few years earlier, described an even brisker foreign trade and said that as many as 23 ships might be seen in Cabinda alone at any one time and that at least a dozen more would be found in the bays farther north.²

In July 1783 an expedition of nearly 400 Europeans and 150 African artisans set out from Luanda to build a fort at Cabinda. The aim was to keep out rival Europeans and either trade there themselves directly or force the suppliers to revert to the old Mbundu routes. The timing of the expedition was based on José Gonçalo da Camara's report of 1780 that for the past sixteen months no foreign ships had been seen and that if the

¹Report on trade in the northern ports. N.d. Cx 38.

²Report on trade in the northern ports. N.d. Cx 37.

fortifying of Cabinda was to be successful it must be undertaken before the peace was settled in Europe and the English and French returned to the south Atlantic trade.¹ When the Portuguese had signed a treaty establishing their factory at Cabinda, they discovered that trading there was not so easy as it had been in the almost monopoly conditions of Angola. In Loango if the European buyer did not offer the desired goods, trading was suspended. Rum for instance was preferred to brandy and gun-powder formed an essential item in any transaction. The factory fared very badly. The garrison was weakened by disease, and it was soon realised that controlling one bay would have very little effect on the trade since rivals could easily go to Kolembo or elsewhere. In the end the experiment failed ignominiously when in June 1784 two French frigates sailed into Cabinda Bay and forcibly ejected the sick and dispirited Portuguese garrison.²

Soon after the Cabinda fiasco the Baron of Mossamedes arrived to take over the government of Angola. He found the colony in a very run-down condition. Before leaving Brazil to take up the post he had heard that the unprecedented number of 24 ships were queueing up in Luanda for cargoes of slaves.³ The acting governors had attempted to raise revenue by gaining control of the Kisama salt mines but their army had had to

¹Doc. from Cabinda (?) 15.8.1783 (?). Cx 40.

²The A.H.U. boxes for Angola in the 1780's and beyond contain a great many documents with details of the Cabinda episode.

³Mossamedes, from Rio de Janeiro, 12.6.1784. Cx 40.

withdraw beaten.¹ To add to their discomfiture, the trade through Bondo had become notoriously unsafe and traders were continually being attacked, robbed and even killed. Mossamedes did little to change the routine of government. The main functions of his administration were to collect tithes and to punish highway-men on the paths to Kasanje and Matamba. A great deal of time was devoted to petty squabbles and litigation. The life of the colony was stirred up in particular by a feud between the bishop and the governor. Mossamedes' one constructive action was to investigate the southern coast between Benguela and the Cunene River. The scheme to trade in the north had failed completely and Mossamedes wanted to acquire any slaves which might be available in the south. It was reported that English and French slavers often picked up slaves at Cape Negro while on their way to Cabinda. Mossamedes' efforts did not amount to more than an exploration, however, and it was more than half a century before the settlement bearing his name was established in the vicinity of Cape Negro.

At this time, when Angola was at its lowest ebb, Elias Alexandre da Silva Correia wrote a description of the colony attempting to explain the general state of ruin. The royal monopoly in ivory meant that the price offered would not cover the cost of transport from places as far afield as Kasanje. The profit on beeswax, an export of growing importance, was very slight. The insatiable greed of the slave traders meant that they would not spend money on erecting new buildings in Luanda nor even on repairing the old ones. The trade suffered from the absence of police to

¹Azewedo e Vasconcelos, Luanda, 3.10.1784. Cx 39.

ensure the safe transit of goods to and from the interior. The life of a merchant was unhealthy, risky and rough whether he stayed in Luanda or went up-country.

In describing the appalling spectacle of a degraded colony, Correia referred to the constant pressure of indebtedness, to the manner in which soldiers and officers were forced to supplement their pay by trading, and to the degenerating influence of the liquor trade. Many traders were convicts and the violent insults and punishments which they administered to the Mbundu met with reprisals which disrupted trade. Shortage of food supplies often meant expensive delays to ships otherwise ready to sail. Correia recommended that taxes, like freight rates, should only be paid on slaves which were delivered alive in Brazil. The ship on which Correia himself left Angola carried 400 slaves of whom 100 died on the voyage. When a big shipment of trade goods arrived in Luanda the traders scrambled to get to the pumbos first and to impede the progress of their rivals. This competition, and the shortage of slaves, inflated prices. This inflation was accentuated by the excess of trade goods being sent from Lisbon. In particular the introduction of luxury goods spoilt the market for poorer quality cotton materials. Two shiploads of Lisbon goods a year would have sufficed, Correia said, to supplement the commodities sent from Brazil, but in 1786 six ship-loads arrived from Lisbon. Last of all Correia was opposed to the school of thought which argued that powder and guns must be sold, despite the risk, so as to assist the ultimate producers of slaves in capturing their victims in the remotest regions of Africa.¹

¹Elias Alexandre da Silva Correia: História de Angola, c. 1792, published Lisbon 1937. 27-57.

The gloom which reigned over the Mbundu and their colonial masters in 1790 makes a sharp contrast with the energy which drove both peoples forward in the sixteenth century. When the Portuguese^s first reconnoitred Angola they were guided by idealistic schemes to bring the Negro races into the Christian community of nations and to educate them in European knowledge and techniques. They drew up bold plans for colonization and settlement and dreamt of thriving agricultural and mining communities.

The Mbundu also embarked with zest on this new phase of their history in which the Europeans on the coast overshadowed their giant Kongo neighbour. A monarchy developed which put the Mbundu in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis European traders. The Ngola became powerful enough not only to impose terms on the captains of slave vessels, but later even to resist the first waves of Portuguese military expansion in Angola. By the end of the sixteenth century however the profits of trading were undermining what idealistic zeal there was and the relationship between Portuguese and Mbundu was becoming a hostile political rivalry.

While the opponents were vying with each other to gain the upper hand in their commercial transactions, a third force came on the scene. The Lunda-Imbangala invaders from the east attacked both the Mbundu and the Portuguese and maintained a state of almost continuous warfare. The degeneration of Angola set in rapidly once the Imbangala armies were established there. A cordon of restlessness encircled the Portuguese-conquered territory and produced a continuous flow of slaves. The profits of slave trading

on the African side began to shift from the Mbundu to the Imbangala. The latter were used by the Portuguese to hunt slaves.¹ The optimism and idealism of the Ngolas and of the Portuguese drained away in the century-long Angolan Wars.

In the three cornered struggle for mastery of the slave trade it was the Mbundu who went to the wall. They were crushed as between the upper and the nether millstone. The followers of Kasanje undermined the power of the Ngola from the east until the Portuguese were able to penetrate the heartland of Ndongo from the west in the 1620's. Some Mbundu withdrew to Matamba, in the north-east, and established a new Mbundu-ruled kingdom which was far enough inland to be almost immune from Portuguese attack, and which was strong enough to resist Imbangala encroachment. The Mbundu who remained in Ndongo came increasingly under the influence of the Portuguese until by the eighteenth century they were in the sorry state described by Silva Correia.

The Imbangala also withdrew from close proximity of the Portuguese and founded the trading kingdom of Kasanje in a strategic position between the Portuguese colony and the Kasai basin. The slave trade evolved in several stages. In the seventeenth century the Kwango states gradually took over, ^{from} the Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo as the last link in the chain. In the eighteenth century another link was added with the development of the Lunda slave trade. As Lunda became the major slave producing area, the authority of the Mwata Yamvo spread out to a radius of four hundred miles

¹ The analogy between hunting and the Angolan Wars was made by a Jesuit observer. A.R.S.I. Lus. 57. fl 194-197. 1.12.1685.

east and west of the capital. The middle links in the chain, Kasanje and Matamba on the upper Kwango, held firm until the end of the eighteenth century and prevented the Portuguese and the Lunda from trading directly with each other.

After 1790 there was a revival of Portuguese activity in Angola. A Benguela trader led a series of expeditions far inland to the Barotse plains on the Zambesi.¹ A few years later, in 1808, the Mwata Yamvo managed to by-pass the Kwango barrier and send an embassy to the Portuguese governor. The Lunda ruler at last discovered that the terrible tales about Europeans with which the king of Kasanje had dissuaded Lunda subjects from seeing white men, were political trickery. The governor sent friendly letters to the Mwata Yamvo, to his wife and to the mother of the Lunda people.² At about the same time, two pombeiros went right across the continent to Mozambique and returned to their master in Angola. The Portuguese seemed to be on the threshold of a new expansionist phase in which they would reach the heart of Africa both from their western base in the Mbundu country, and from their east coast settlements. That nothing came of these probings was probably due to the gradual decrease in the intensity of the competition for the slave trade during the first half of the nineteenth century.

¹Report on a Journey to Lovar, 1794. Felner: Angola, 1940, Vol. I, 236.

²Antonio de Soldanha da Gama to the Mwata Yamvo, his wife and his mother. 22.1.1808 and 5.12.1808. Luanda Archives, Vol. 98, 60-61 and 69-70v.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

ARCHIVES

Unpublished material was taken from two major archives. The Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino in Lisbon is the chief source of material on Angola from about 1600 onwards. The material used here was in the series Documentos Avulsos de Angola of which the boxes numbered 1 to 40 cover the period 1600 to 1790. The main headings under which these documents can be classified are letters from the governor to the central government, minutes of the Overseas Council, petitions from individuals to governments and papers concerning litigation. Only the first three boxes are catalogued. The classification is an approximate and often badly disrupted chronological order.

The most important papers for this study in the Arquivo Provincial de Angola in Luanda are the Ofícios para o Interior of which volumes 85 to 90 cover some of the years between 1767 and 1790. These are letters and instructions from the governors in Luanda to their officers spread over the Portuguese-conquered section of Angola.

The three remaining important archives in Lisbon are inadequately organised and catalogued but most of the documents concerning Angola which they have yielded so far appear to have been published. The Biblioteca Nacional has three main series of documents. The Fundo Geral, the catalogue of which indicates nothing of importance concerning Angola, ~~but which~~ nonetheless contains several important manuscripts, ^{which} have been published. The Colecção Pombalina has a published catalogue containing

a few minor references to Angola. The Colecção de Alcobaça contains some published Jesuit letters from Angola. (See next section.) The Torre do Tombo contains many of the documents relating to the Portuguese empire before the seventeenth century. Brásio's collection of published documents has been relied upon for these. The Biblioteca da Ajuda suffers from utterly inadequate staffing and cataloguing but it would seem that Brásio was able to publish the most important documents relating to Angola which have so far been discovered there.

Several other archives from which one or more documents have been consulted either published or in manuscript are listed below:

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M A P S

West Central Africa

Central Angola

CAMEROONS

CENTRAL ANGOLA

0 50 miles