

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADEN AND BRITISH RELATIONS
WITH NEIGHBOURING TRIBES, 1839-1872.

by

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A thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty
of Arts in the University of London,

May 1975.



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ABSTRACT

In January 1839, the British occupied Aden for a number of reasons. These reasons and the early British contacts with the peninsula are discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis.

During the period under study, Aden developed from a small poor village into a sizable town, a prosperous trading port, an important military and naval base and a vital communications centre. The factors and policies responsible for this development and the problems which had to be faced are dealt with in Chapters III-V.

The British had no desire to use Aden as a base for expansion and wanted to keep contact with the interior to a minimum. However, for geographical, economic and political reasons, they could not avoid becoming involved with the neighbouring tribes. The last three chapters trace the course of Arab-British relations and analyse the factors which governed them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

I wish to thank Dr. M.E. Yapp for his help and guidance; my wife for her assistance in research and typing; Mr. Farrokh Suntook for drawing the maps and for proof-reading; and Mr. George Adams for proof-reading.

ARABIC NAMES.

Many Arabic names in the sources are spelt in a number of ways, and sometimes even the same name appears in more than one form in the same source. In fact, certain names have been completely altered, e.g. "West" for "Ways", "Aloose" for "'Alawi" and "Urgli" for "'Awlaqi". In this work the author has tried his best to see that all names have been correctly given and transliterated.

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INTRODUCTION.

The peninsula of Aden, on the south-west coast of Arabia, lies 100 miles east of the straits of Bab al-Mandab at the entrance to the Red Sea. It has an area of 21 square miles, the greater part of which is uninhabitable, being covered by precipitous hills, the highest of which is Mount Shamsan, 1775 feet. These hills slope towards the sea, forming many spurs and valleys.

Aden is surrounded by the Arabian Sea on the east, west and south. To the north it is connected with the mainland by an isthmus, one and a half miles long and 1350 yards broad. It has been suggested that the peninsula was once an island, for until the British era the Isthmus was at one place almost covered by the sea at spring-tides. In 1868, the British built a causeway to carry the Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct and to facilitate trade with the interior.

The peninsula has two large bays, one on the eastern, and one on the western, side. Before the British occupation, the harbour was in Eastern or Front Bay. The British, however, built their harbour in Western or Back Bay, it being deeper, more extensive and well-sheltered. The new harbour lies between the peninsulas of Aden and Jabal Ihsan (Little Aden). It measures about seven miles east to west and four miles north to south. Eastern Bay had been silting up long before the British came, and in the 1860's the old harbour was abandoned.

On the eastern side of the peninsula, and open to the sea, is a plain, the crater of an extinct volcano. It is three miles in circumference and on it stands the town of Aden, or Crater, as it is often called. From the western side of the peninsula and from the interior there was until the 1950's only one way into the town except for rugged mountain paths. This road lies to the north of the town, and the British called it the Main Pass. The Little Pass (Ras Hujayf) is to the west of the peninsula and leads to Tawahhi (Steamer Point). The dry bed of a water-course runs down to the sea from the Tawilah Valley, dividing the town into two nearly equal parts.

Opposite to, and commanding, the town is Sirah Island, a triangular rock, 1200 yards long by 700 yards wide and 400 feet high. At low water it is connected to the peninsula. Two miles to the north-west of the town, and about half a mile to the north of the Main Pass, lies Mu'alla, in 1839 a fishing hamlet, but now a flourishing township. Here the coasting craft still anchor as in the past.

During the north-east monsoon or the trading season (from October to April), the temperature rarely rises above 80 degrees F. For the rest of the year, i.e. during the south-west monsoon, hot sandy winds coming, strangely enough, from the north prevail, and the temperature can exceed 100 degrees F. May and September are particularly unpleasant, being the months of the change of monsoon, when there is practically no wind and the air is oppressive.

Aden has no mineral wealth and produces nothing worthy of mention. Even for its water it is dependent on outside sources. Yet its strategic and commercial position made it a highly desirable possession. In August 1538, the Ottomans, under Admiral Sulayman Pasha, seized it with the intention of using it as a base for their operations against the Portuguese settlements on the west coast of India. Leaving a garrison behind them, the Ottomans proceeded to attack Diu. When they were repulsed, they returned to Aden, landed 100 pieces of artillery and strengthened the garrison. Then from Aden Sulayman went to Mukha and spread Ottoman authority along the coast of the Yemen. He eventually captured San'a and subjected the whole country.

In 1540, the Portuguese attacked Suez in retaliation, but were driven back. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Aden rose against the Ottomans, slaughtered the entire garrison and invited the Portuguese to take over. The Portuguese remained in control of the town until 1551, when an Ottoman fleet under Peri Pasha recovered it.

When Murad IV succeeded to the sultanate in 1623, the Ottoman Empire appeared to be on the point of collapse. In the Yemen, in 1595, the new imam, al-Qasim Ibn Muhammad, had rebelled against the Sunni Ottomans, he being a Shi'i and head of the Zaydi sect. Al-Qasim fought successfully until his death in 1620, and his son Muhammad continued the struggle unabated. Faced with this situation and with other difficulties in the Empire, Murad withdrew from the Yemen in 1635.

After the departure of the Ottomans, South Yemen, which was Sunni, asserted its independence. Aden, together with Lahj to the north and Abyan to the east, was seized by Husayn Ibn 'Abd al-Qadir, the Yafi'i. In 1644, the Imam Muhammad died and was succeeded by his brother Isma'il who, in the same year, annexed Aden and the two neighbouring districts. Before his death in 1676, Isma'il had subjected the rest of South Yemen except Hadramawt which fell to his

uncle and successor, Ahmad Ibn Husayn, in 1681.

The imams, however, could not control the south for long, and the term "Yemen" was soon to mean only the northern part of the country. In the south, the tribes, one by one, revolted and freed themselves from imamic rule. Their chiefs assumed different titles, the most common being that of "Sultan".

Fadl Ibn 'Ali, the chief of the 'Abdali tribe which inhabited Lahj, wanted to gain independence and annex Aden. For this purpose, he sought the assistance of Sayf Ibn Qahtan, the Sultan of Lower Yafi', and promised him in return half the revenues of the port; Sayf agreed. In 1728, Fadl declared his independence, and in 1735, the confederates captured Aden; but before six months had elapsed, Fadl broke his promise and expelled the Yafi'is from the town.

The Fadlis, the neighbours of the 'Abdalis to the east, invaded Aden in 1835 and 1836. In the latter year, they carried off property amounting to \$30,000 and demanded, for the future, one dollar per day. In the following year, the "Darya Dawlat" incident occurred and resulted in the occupation of Aden by the British.

CHAPTER I.

BRITISH CONTACTS WITH ADEN PRIOR TO 1837.

The first visit by an English ship to Aden was that of the "Ascension" commanded by Captain Alexander Sharpeigh of the East India Company. The "Ascension" anchored off the town on 7th April, 1609, and the Captain landed only to be detained. Rajab Agha, the Governor, promised to release him if he unloaded the vessel or paid the customs dues. Sharpeigh agreed to pay dues, not only for the goods on shore, but also for those on board. Thereupon he was freed, and two of his men were sent to the Pasha at San'a. The Pasha told them that if the Company desired to trade in the Red Sea, they should first get permission from the Ottoman Sultan. He added that trade should be carried on at Mukha, as Aden was a garrison town, a statement confirmed by Sharpeigh.¹

Contrary to expectation, the vessels of the E.I.C. visited Aden again. Sir Henry Middleton arrived there on 7th November, 1610, in command of three ships: the "Trades Increase" which was his own, the "Peppercorn" under Captain Nicholas Downton, and the "Darling". The merchants brought with them a small present and a letter of recommendation from King James I to the new Governor, Rajab Agha having been transferred to Mukha. In addition, they had a safe conduct from the Ottoman Sultan, as required by the Pasha of San'a, for trade in the Red Sea.² The safe conduct may have been obtained through the Levant Company.

The Ottomans did not permit the merchants to enter the town nor did they mention trade, but pretended that they were expecting daily a force of 30,000 men "which statement was plainly suggested by fear".³ Middleton then asked for a pilot to take the fleet to Mukha; but when none was supplied, he decided to depart. The Governor, however, requested that at least one ship be left behind to carry on trade. He went on to say that Aden had lost all its commerce owing to bad government and that he was anxious to restore it. If the three ships left without trading, the Pasha at San'a would put the blame on him.

Middleton was deceived and resolved to leave the "Peppercorn" behind. However, before he sailed for Mukha, he instructed her captain not to trust the natives by landing any cargo; business was to be transacted on board. If the people suspected his intentions, he was to exchange hostages with them; if they objected, he was to

follow him.

No sooner had Middleton left (13th November) than the Governor sent for the merchants of the "Peppercorn". When he learnt about their instructions, he grew furious and detained them, ostensibly for anchorage dues which he claimed to be 1500 golden Venetians. Downton did not have this sum without which he could not secure the release of his colleagues; and if he made no sale, he could not raise the money. Every two or three days he sent to enquire about the prisoners. The Ottomans treated his messengers with courtesy so as to create in them a feeling of confidence of which advantage might be taken later. However, only those chosen by the Governor were permitted to have any communication with the "Peppercorn" lest too much information be divulged to the strangers. Despite this restriction, Downton learnt that no trading vessels worthy of note called at Aden and no merchants of any importance were to be found there. The scarcity of money was particularly noticeable, a bad sign in a place where one hoped to trade.

More than once the Governor expressed his disappointment that no part of the cargo had been landed, and he often praised Sharpeigh for landing his goods. Downton was not influenced by these tactics and wrote to Middleton about the imprisonment of the merchants, hoping that he had made enough money to pay for their release. No answer was received, and for the "Peppercorn" the situation was to get still worse. On 12th December, the Governor gave permission for some of the crew to come ashore to make cordage. When they arrived, they were arrested and put in the stocks. In all, there were now twenty prisoners.

Having lost all hope of freeing the captives,⁴ and being worried about Middleton, Downton sailed for Mukha on 16th December. He arrived there five days later only to find that his commander had not been more fortunate than his men. Middleton had been attacked and made prisoner on 28th November. He remained in prison until 15th May, 1611, when he escaped with fifteen of his companions.⁵

The fact that Aden was a garrison, and not a commercial, town, together with the treatment experienced there by the English traders, caused the E.I.C. to leave it out of their sphere of interest. However, this did not mean that they left the Red Sea area. In 1612, Captain John Saris visited Mukha at the head of an expedition

consisting of three vessels. Saris was well received by Azhar Agha, the Governor of the town, who asked him to forget the cruelty suffered by Middleton at the hands of his predecessor, Rajab Agha. The Governor added that he had instructions from the Pasha of San'a to allow the Englishmen full freedom of trade at Mukha.⁶

In 1618, at the request of Sir Thomas Roe, the British Ambassador at the Moghul Court, Captain Shilling went to Mukha and succeeded in obtaining permission to establish there a factory for the E.I.C.⁷ The Dutch and French established their factories in 1620 and 1709 respectively. However, they abandoned them at the end of the Seven Years' War (1756-63), and the British were left alone in control of the Red Sea trade. In 1785, the Americans began to compete with them; and by 1800 they were the main exporters of the Yemen's most important product, coffee.

The decisive result of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France was that France lost her Indian possessions. The French could not forget their loss and were bent on revenge. For this purpose, they thought of occupying Egypt, not only to maintain their interests in the Near East, but also to threaten Britain's position in India.⁸

In April 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed Commander of the Army of the East. He was to secure Malta and Egypt, cut a channel through the Isthmus of Suez and obtain for his country full control of the Red Sea. However, the ultimate object of expelling the British from India was not to be forgotten. Napoleon took Malta in June and Egypt in July, but Nelson was in his wake. On 1st August, Nelson found the French fleet lying in Abu Qir Bay, and completely destroyed it.

Encouraged by the British victory, the Ottoman Sultan, Salim III, declared war on France (1st September) and prepared to reconquer his lost province. Napoleon then attacked Syria. He captured Gaza and Jaffa, but was repulsed at Acre and had to retreat to Egypt. The Ottomans sent an expedition to drive him out, but he defeated it on 25th July, 1799, and thus firmly established his control over Egypt.

These events in the Mediterranean directed British attention to Aden, now ruled by an Arab sultan, Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Karim. The first contact with him was not for commercial, but for diplomatic, reasons. In November 1798, Captain Samuel Wilson, British Resident at Mukha and Political Commissioner for the Red Sea, asked him to prevent the

French from being supplied in his territory and to pass on any information which he might have about their movements.⁹ In reply, the Sultan assured him of his full co-operation.¹⁰

Early in 1799, a naval force from England arrived in the Red Sea. It was commanded by Admiral John Blankett, and its duty was to prevent any communication between Napoleon in Egypt and Tippoo Sultan, his potential ally in India. Meanwhile, the Bombay Government received orders from the Secret Committee in London¹¹ to occupy the island of Perim in the straits of Bab al-Mandab. The island, strongly fortified, with one or more vessels of war in the straits, would enable the British to command the Red Sea route to India, thus making it impossible for the French to reach that country from Egypt. In its turn, the Government of Bombay sent letters to the Imam, his governor at Mukha, the Sharif of Mecca and the Ottoman Governor of Jaddah, asking for their collaboration in supplying the detachment, which was about to be sent, with water and wood.¹² Similar letters were sent by the Porte.

The detachment of 300 European and Indian troops, under Lieut.-Col. John Murray, occupied Perim on 3rd May. The British remained on the island until 1st September, when they went temporarily to Aden. Perim was evacuated for three reasons. The water supply provided by the chiefs in the area had been discontinued; the water on the island was not fit for drinking; and the straits could not be commanded by batteries on the island. The British did not go to Mukha, which was nearer than Aden and where they had a Residency, because Murray considered its people "insolent".¹³

In Aden, the British were treated with extreme kindness and courtesy. They had water in their camp, and for their supplies they were not dependent on the inhabitants. The port was practically theirs and the only thing needed to make it actually so was the hoisting of the flag.¹⁴

Sultan Ahmad, who had received a request from the Porte to assist the British force in the Red Sea, claimed no credit for his hospitality, and wrote to the Bombay Government: "The port of Aden belongs to Sultan Salim ... and I am his servant performing my duty."¹⁵ As will be seen, these words, which were only a flowery Arab compliment, made the British take the Porte into their calculations when considering the Sultan's offer.

In his conversation with Murray, the Sultan expressed his wish to hold his country under British protection in the same way that the Nawwab of Arcot held the Carnatic. Here, he was referring to the "Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Alliance and Security" signed with Muhammad 'Ali, the Nawwab of Arcot, in 1787.¹⁶ If the British agreed, the Sultan would provide them with as many men as they desired to fight on their side "in any part of the world". Murray told him that he had no authority to enter into such an important engagement.¹⁷

Then the Sultan sent to the Government of Bombay a draft treaty embodying his proposals. The British were to regard his enemies as theirs, and vice versa. The armies of the two parties were to be one and their ports were to be open to each other. The British were to have a settlement in Aden.

The motive behind the proposed treaty was frankly stated. "I ... have a great number of enemies, and many are envious. ... when you will be at my back, I shall be without dread."¹⁸ Significantly, in proposing this treaty, Ahmad made no mention of the Porte, underlining his actual independence.

The Sultan was also anxious to restore the commerce of Aden and asked that the British use their influence with the Indian merchants to this end. Murray favoured the idea and discussed it with two of them. The merchants shared the Sultan's aspirations and undertook to buy goods from India as soon as they arrived. The Colonel wrote confidently that trade, particularly with the East African coast, would grow rapidly.¹⁹ As regards the products of the country round Aden, he wrongly stated that the main ones were cotton and coffee, and that the coffee which was exported from Mukha was grown here.

Murray was greatly impressed by Aden. He wrote that it was nearly impregnable both from the land and sea. The roadstead (in Eastern Bay) was in every respect preferable to that at Mukha, and Western Bay was still better than Eastern Bay. It was almost enclosed by land, and ships could safely anchor there in either monsoon. There were wells only one and a half miles away (probably from Mu'alla) in which the water was "excellent and in profusion". The British fleet in the Red Sea area could be supplied at Aden with every necessary article. Admittedly the supply facilities were poor due to lack of demand, but this could be remedied.

While the French remained in Egypt, Aden could serve as a base for the British Navy. Its occupation would make the British independent of the other powers on the Arabian coast. Therefore, Murray recommended acceptance of the Sultan's offer and the stationing of the garrison at Aden. Perim, he asserted, would never be of any advantage, and only a small detachment should be kept there.²⁰

When Blankett arrived in Bombay (December 1799), the Governor, Jonathan Duncan, asked him to comment on the letters from Aden, emphasising that acceptance or rejection of the Sultan's offer must depend on the usefulness of the place as a permanent naval base commanding the route between Egypt and India, should the French remain in Egypt after peace had been concluded.²¹ Blankett agreed with Murray about the unsuitability of Perim as a naval base, but contradicted his evaluation of Aden point by point.

Western Bay Blankett simply dismissed as being "of little importance". Eastern Bay he described as "very bad". It was exposed to the wind from the south and subject to a very heavy swell. The shore was shallow and always covered with surf, which made landing always difficult and often impossible. Ships anchored four or five miles out. When the wind was blowing from the south, they might see the enemy in the offing and not be able to leave the anchorage to follow him. In brief, "no officer of common prudence would consider it as a proper station for a cruising squadron".

Blankett reported that the water was "brackish" and implied that Aden could not be a supply base; it had no trade or vessels attached to it. Commercially, it was "not calculated to be of any consequence to us".

Contrary to Murray, Blankett had nothing but praise for Mukha and its people. The roadstead was good, supplies were abundant and the inhabitants were peaceful and co-operative. Sometimes, up to three hundred of his men were on shore and no complaint was heard from them or from the natives. Every facility that the town could offer was as much at the disposal of the British as if they had been its actual masters. The commerce of Mukha was at the mercy of the British, and this could serve as security for the continued friendship of its people. In short, Blankett's argument was that the British had no need of Aden while Mukha met all their requirements.

Blankett thought that if the Sultan made public his "nominal dependence" on the Porte, he would incur the anger of his neighbours and of the Imam of San'a, all of whom suspected the Ottomans and considered the British too closely connected with them. Furthermore, he rightly doubted the Sultan's power to dispose of Aden. As an illustration of his limited authority, Blankett mentioned the occasion when he set out for Aden to meet a British captain, but his people, who were opposed to the meeting, forced him to turn back.

Commenting on the treaty proposed by Sultan Ahmad, Blankett wrote that most of, if not all, the Arab chieftains in the vicinity of Aden might be persuaded to enter into a temporary alliance with the British merely because such friendship would give them power. However, the British themselves would derive no benefit from such connections, and must trust to naval superiority for their security in the Red Sea. If the Government wanted to withdraw the troops from Aden, they could do so without embarrassment and, at the same time, keep the Sultan's friendship as long as it suited them.²²

The great difference between Blankett's report and that of Murray may have been due to several reasons. Blankett spent only three days in Aden, and could not have made a detailed study of Western Bay, hence his inability to appreciate it. Eastern Bay was not as bad as his description suggests. It was open all the year round, and ships anchored only a few hundred yards from the shore as the British force which occupied Aden in 1839 was to do. During Blankett's visit the weather must have been especially unfavourable, and he took the particular for the general. It is true that Aden was commercially unimportant, but its future was not as hopeless as he imagined. The town had once been a great commercial centre, and could and did become so again. The quality of water was not the same in all the wells, and this explains the different judgments passed on it by Blankett and Murray; the two men could not have drunk from the same source. The difference in the accounts about the inhabitants of Mukha and Aden can be attributed only to personal experience.

For the reason given by Blankett, any ruler in the area would have welcomed a permanent, and not only a temporary, alliance with the British. Blankett was also right in thinking that the British had to depend on their naval power in the Red Sea and that alliances with the chiefs were of no value.

Duncan, alive to the French danger from Egypt, was not influenced by Blankett's arguments. On 1st January, 1800, he wrote to Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of India, that the occupation of Aden and its re-establishment as "the grand mart between India and Arabia" would greatly harm the trade of Egypt, thus weakening the power of the French should they continue rulers of that country. The "Gulf of Arabia" (the Red Sea), and its eastern coast in particular, was completely dependent on Egypt for its annual supply of grain. Arabia exchanged the Egyptian grain partly for its own products and partly for those of India. From Egypt both Arabian and Indian goods were channelled to Europe and West Africa.

The interruption of this traffic would be a blow to the French, and it could be achieved by preventing Indian products from passing by sea beyond the port of Aden. The Governor, however, was not oblivious to the hazards of such a measure. If the plan were carried out, it would be mainly at the expense of the Company's subjects. The Company itself would lose financially, especially from customs dues at the port of Surat. The Imam of San'a and the Sharif of Mecca would immediately protest, as the restriction of trade to Aden would inevitably ruin their ports of Mukha and Jaddah. It would also have its effect on the pilgrims who went to Jaddah by merchant vessels, and from there to Mecca and Medina. For all these reasons, Duncan did not recommend the restricting of the Indian trade to Aden, but thought that the Company might do so should it finally become necessary to stop trade between India and Europe via Egypt.

Afraid that the Porte might resent the presence of British troops in Aden, Duncan, on 20th December, 1799, had asked Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador at Istanbul, to inform the Ottoman Government that the E.I.C. had availed itself of Sultan Ahmad's hospitality. This move on Duncan's part was precautionary, but not necessary. He wrote to Wellesley that the Porte was not aware of any allegiance due to it by the Sultan of Aden, although Ahmad had on one occasion avowed a dependence on it. However, even if the Sultan were truly subject to the Porte, the latter had ordered its dependants to assist any British force which might be sent to the Red Sea.²³

Wellesley accepted, unquestioningly, Blankett's evaluation of Aden and advanced arguments of his own against acceptance of the

Sultan's offer. Militarily, the importance of the place depended on the means which it could afford to bar the French from establishing themselves in Arabia should they entertain such an idea. However, it was doubtful whether the resources of Aden (should they be at the disposal of the British) would be of any advantage in this respect. Besides, the occupation of the place by a British force, instead of uniting the neighbouring tribes against the French, might create jealousy and alarm among them, in which case they would fight on the side of the enemy.

Politically, the British did not know enough about the Sultan's views or the nature of his government to enable them to form a correct judgment about how long their connection with him might last. At that time he wanted them to have an establishment in his country. However, since, in Wellesley's opinion, his reasons for giving them this concession were not clearly stated (which they were), they might be temporary. After the Sultan had accomplished his object, or discovered that the British could not or would not assist him in attaining it, his favourable disposition towards them might cease.

Other political objections to the occupation of Aden were the effect of such a measure on the Ottoman Government which might regard it as an encroachment on its territorial rights and the possible involvement of the British in disputes and hostilities with the neighbours of Sultan Ahmad. However, the strongest argument against the proposed occupation was its repercussions on the annual pilgrimage from India to the Hijaz. If the direct route to that country was closed, it was doubtful whether Aden could replace it. The additional expenses and other inconveniences which might attend the new route would prevent many Indian Muslims from performing their religious duty. The blame would fall on the British, and the Muslims would be convinced of the truth of Tippoo Sultan's accusation that the British wanted to eradicate Islam.

On Duncan's idea of restricting the Indian trade to Aden with a view to harming the French in Egypt, the Governor-General thought that such a step should be taken only after the British Government had been convinced that the enemy would be permanently established in that country. The time had not come for the Company to make great sacrifices in order to harm the French. For all the reasons given above, Wellesley directed Duncan to decline the Sultan's offer in conciliatory terms and to issue orders for immediate withdrawal from Aden.²⁴

The Governor-General gave his orders on 4th February, 1800, and the Governor of Bombay issued similar orders on the 7th of the same month, before Wellesley's letter reached him. The previous day, Blankett, who was still in Bombay, informed Duncan that he had received intelligence to the effect that about the middle of October an affray had occurred at Aden in which a British soldier was wounded. There had also been an attack on 'Abdali territory by a chieftain subject to the Imam because the Sultan had given hospitality to foreign troops. Blankett recommended withdrawal from Aden as being "indispensably necessary to prevent any disagreeable altercations with the Arab governments".²⁵ Duncan agreed, and the British withdrew in March.

In Egypt, Napoleon's victory over the Ottoman expedition on 25th July, 1799, complete as it was militarily, had no political significance. News from France convinced the General that his presence was needed there, and a month later he left Egypt, having appointed General Kleber to the command of the army.

In September 1800, Britain seized Malta. Then she threw into Egypt a large army including 10,000 sepoy from India. The French lost Alexandria in March 1801, and Cairo in June. Three months later, they agreed to evacuate Egypt which was restored to the Sultan. Thus the French threat to Arabia and, concomitantly, to India was removed.

As part of the operations in Egypt, Sir Home Popham was sent from England to the Red Sea in command of the "Romney", R.N. His mission, which was at the request of the Court of Directors of the E.I.C., had a twofold object: to help in transporting sepoy to Egypt and to revive the British trade in coffee,²⁶ now dominated by the Americans. In 1802, Wellesley appointed Popham envoy to "the states of Arabia" with full authority to conclude commercial treaties.

Naturally, Popham wanted to have his first treaty with the Imam of San'a who controlled the coffee lands, but in this he failed. He then turned to the Sultan of Lahj who again proposed an alliance with the British. His proposal was again refused, but Popham promised him help if the French attacked. The Sultan had no cause to fear the French; what he wanted was help against his neighbours. However, a treaty of friendship and commerce was made between the two parties.

The treaty, which was dated 6th September, 1802, stipulated that the port of Aden was to be open to British ships and that no port fees were to be charged. For the first ten years a duty of 10% was

to be levied on all goods exported from Aden. Thereafter, the duty was to be fixed forever at 3%. The raising of duty or the levying of anchorage or other fees would mean the loss of British friendship and commerce. Two pieces of land in Aden were given to the E.I.C., one for a factory, and the other for a cemetery.

Under the treaty, British subjects might claim the protection of the British flag. Disputes among them were to be referred to the British Resident, while disputes involving British and 'Abdali subjects were to be decided by the laws of the country. The British were not to be subjected to any indignities and could ride horses.²⁷ This concession was important; in Arabia, the riding of horses was a privilege reserved for Muslims.

The treaty between Popham and Sultan Ahmad remained ink on paper, which is not strange. Aden had no commerce to speak of, and in 1800 it had been dismissed as unpromising. The treaty may have been a courteous gesture or a precautionary measure should the French re-occupy Egypt. Sultan Ahmad, however, did not change his favourable attitude towards the British.

The next British visitor to Aden was Lord Valentia who called there twice in 1804 during his travels in the Red Sea area. During his first visit, in April, he had nothing good to say about Aden except that it had a fine back bay.²⁸ In July, during his second visit, he radically changed his opinion of the town. He wrote: "It is the only good sea-port in Arabia Felix, and has the great advantage over every harbour, within the straits, that it can be quitted at all seasons, while it is almost impossible to repass Bab-el-Mandeb during the S.W. monsoon."²⁹

Valentia found that the little trade Aden had was carried on by Banyans from Mukha and was mainly with Berbera on the Somali coast. The Somalis took their products of myrrh and gum to Aden where the Banyans bought them. The Sultan received a duty of 3%. In addition, he had a monopoly of the trade in bullocks.³⁰

In 1808, two years after his return to England, Valentia wrote in a report to George Canning, the Foreign Secretary, that Aden was "the Gibraltar of the East ... that at a trifling expense may be made impregnable". He recommended the building of a factory in the town, the repair of the old fortifications, and the garrisoning of Sirah Island by troops from India.

In Valentia's opinion, a strong British presence in Aden and an alliance with the Wahhabis and Abyssinians would be the best means of closing the Red Sea to any hostile power from the West. An alliance with Abyssinia would, moreover, increase trade between India and that country. Valentia wrote that the Sultan was willing to deny the use of his port "to all other powers" (France and the United States). This, Valentia mistakenly believed, would give the British a monopoly of the Red Sea trade. Valentia was afraid of a Wahhabi attack on Aden. Therefore, he advised his Government to send Sultan Ahmad ammunition and also money to help him increase his army by the purchase of slaves.³¹

The Foreign Office did not act on Valentia's recommendations, but in 1809 it sent to Abyssinia Henry Salt, his secretary and draftsman during the long voyage (1802-6), to report on the state of that country and cultivate friendly relations with the tribes on the Red Sea coast. Salt arrived at Aden on 3rd October, where he was hospitably received by the Banyans. The wretchedness of the town and its people was as obvious to him as to others, but he wrote favourably about its commerce. "Aden as a place of trade is still of some consequence. It is the chief mart for the gums ... and coffee of the best quality may be procured in considerable quantities, though not as expeditiously as at Mocha, owing to the want of a regular demand."³²

Salt reported that the anchorage in Western Bay was exposed and lacked the necessary protection. Any vessel at anchor might be attacked and denied aid from the shore. His fear that a British ship might experience such a danger at the hands of "a French privateer or pirate" or a United States vessel³³ prompted him to think of remedying the situation.

Salt privately suggested to Duncan that two pieces of cannon be sent as a present to the Sultan on the understanding that they should be placed near the tomb of Shaykh Ahmad where they would completely protect the anchorage. The plan, which was to be financed by the E.I.C., would not only benefit the British, but also "prove a just return for the alliance (friendship) of a chief who has, by repeated and substantial acts of kindness, evinced his attachment to the British interests".³⁴ Duncan did not act on this recommendation.

Salt visited Aden again in 1810, and on that occasion Sultan Ahmad suggested that the British should establish a factory there.³⁵ However, his suggestion was not considered, and Aden was forgotten until

circumstances forced the British to think of moving their factory from Mukha.

In 1817, after a quarrel between Lieut. Domincetti, the British Resident at Mukha, and the captain of a vessel under charter to the E.I.C., an Arab was detained at the factory. The Arab was soon released at the request of the town's governor, but hardly had he left the factory when it was stormed by three or four hundred soldiers and looted in the process. The sepoy and the captain of a British vessel who happened to be in the factory were severely beaten. The Resident, in addition, was dragged naked to the governor's house and imprisoned.³⁶ Afterwards he was set free and returned to India.

The Government of Bombay demanded an apology and reparation from the Imam. Two years went by without a satisfactory answer; and finally, towards the end of November 1819, the Government sent the Imam an ultimatum. He was required to punish the former governor of Mukha before the Company's broker, to pay adequate compensation and to give up deserters from British ships.

The Governor-General, Lord Hastings, who regretted that the Bombay Government had not taken any action until then, authorised them to send a squadron to Mukha to enforce their demands. Besides, he directed that measures should be adopted to guarantee the necessary respect for the British Resident in the future. The terms under which the British factory could continue should be made clear to the Imam and embodied in a treaty.³⁷

Before carrying out these instructions, Mountstuart Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, wanted to know what reaction such a procedure might provoke from Muhammad 'Ali, the Pasha of Egypt since 1805. In 1811, Muhammad 'Ali was ordered by Sultan Mahmud II to suppress the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. The Wahhabis, a puritannical Muslim sect, came on the scene in the middle of the 18th century, and by 1810 they had subjected Najd, the Hijaz, the coast of the Yemen and even raided up to the suburbs of Damascus. After three expeditions from Egypt, they were crushed in 1819; and for this service, the Porte rewarded Muhammad 'Ali by investing him with possession of the Hijaz. In San'a, the Imam, al-Mahdi 'Abd Allah, agreed to pay the Egyptian Pasha an annual tribute of \$100,000³⁸ for restoring to him the coast and other areas in the interior which his predecessors had lost to the Wahhabis.

This connection between the Imam and the Pasha made Elphinstone write to Henry Salt, now British Consul-General in Egypt, informing him that if the Imam rejected the ultimatum, the Bombay Government would blockade his port. If necessary, Salt was to obtain Muhammad 'Ali's permission for the blockade, and to assure him that no conquest of the Yemen was contemplated.³⁹

Salt answered that the Bombay Government need not fear the Pasha and that the intended blockade "cannot fail to produce the desired effect where the Country in any way depends upon commerce - and it is this which makes the Pasha himself sensible that he lies perfectly at our mercy as well as on the Indian side, as on that of the Mediterranean."⁴⁰ Yet Elphinstone's letter had special significance in that it was the first recognition by the Bombay Government of Egyptian interests in the Red Sea area and their first diplomatic contact with Muhammad 'Ali.⁴¹

When a whole year had elapsed without any response from the Imam, the British bombarded Mukha on 2nd December, 1820. On 6th January, 1821, the town authorities agreed to new demands made in the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions. These demands were incorporated in a treaty which the Imam ratified on 15th January.⁴²

The treaty guaranteed the desired respect for the British Resident and abolished the anchorage duty on British ships. It also fixed the import and export duty at 2½%. By it, moreover, all British subjects trading at Mukhawere to be under British protection.

Article 6 stated: "All the dependants of the factory of every denomination from broker downwards shall be wholly under the protection of the British flag and control of the Resident who shall alone possess the power of punishing them and redressing all complaints against them."⁴³

Early in 1822, the British discovered that the paragraph quoted above had been omitted in the Arabic translation. The Imam's attention was drawn to this omission, but he refused to listen. In its attempt to have the paragraph added, the Bombay Government suggested giving up its claims "to exemption from high duties in favour of its native subjects". Captain G. Hutchinson, the new Resident, was directed to inform the Imam that the Company would rather remove the factory from Mukha than see its dependants under the jurisdiction of his officers.⁴⁴ The Imam persisted in his refusal, and

Hutchinson went to Aden in March 1822 to discuss with the friendly sultan the possibility of transferring the factory to his port.

During Hutchinson's meeting with the Sultan, the latter disclosed that he had agreed to allow a "Turkish" (Egyptian) garrison of 200 men to build a small fort on Eastern Bay, provided it helped him against his enemies and rebellious subjects. Therefore, he could not give a definite answer until the stipulated period of five months had elapsed without the arrival of the "Turkish" garrison. The reason for this was his conviction that the English and the "Turks" could not live together, even though his troops were to control the gates, and he himself was to exercise civil and military authority. If, however, the "Turks" did not fulfil their part of the bargain, he proposed that the British should erect the fort and join forces with him. Hutchinson refused the offer and told the Sultan that his instructions were to enter into commercial, and not political, relations with the Arab chiefs.⁴⁵

On receipt of Hutchinson's report, the Bombay Government decided that the removal of the factory was inexpedient and expressed their hope that the Governor-General would ratify the treaty with the Imam as it stood.⁴⁶ Hastings did not ratify it, and the factory was not removed. The Egyptians did not send a force to Aden, and Muhammad 'Ali "missed his chance of obtaining full control of the Red Sea".⁴⁷

The Pasha himself revealed to Salt that the Ottoman Government had frequently asked him to occupy the Red Sea ports as far as Aden and that finally he might be forced to comply. Salt's comment was that it would be better for the Indian Government if the Arabian ports were under Ottoman control rather than under the control of the "barbarians" who possessed them. However, he thought that the British would object to seeing the Ottomans in possession of Aden because of its strength and proximity to Bombay. It would be dangerous to leave the peninsula in the hands of any first-rate power which might become Britain's enemy in the future. "The Indian Government has certainly in some late proceedings in the Persian Gulph⁴⁸ as also in the affair of Mocha made war out of its limits, and the same motives (the protection of British interests) may induce them, perhaps, to hazard as much for Aden, rather than see it in the hands of the Turks,..."⁴⁹

Salt's words came true, but not only for the reason he gave. In 1807, Robert Fulton built the first practical steam vessel on the

Hudson. The Bombay Government realised the value of this invention, and with a view to shortening the distance between India and England, directed the Bombay Marine (the Indian Navy from April 1830) to study the possibility of opening a communication through Egypt by means of steam navigation.⁵⁰ The Court, with the same object in view, encouraged the establishment of navigation by steam round the Cape of Good Hope. Lord Ellenborough, President of the India Board and later Governor-General of India, favoured the Red Sea route and wrote to the Court that such a communication, besides bringing them nearer to India, would eliminate or diminish many problems resulting from the dependence of that country upon the supreme authority in England.⁵¹

Steam navigation had other advantages for the E.I.C. The problems of monsoons, currents and calms were now overcome. The navigation of the Red Sea, with its many coral reefs and small islands, and the Persian Gulf, with the channels through the various straits in the passages to China, were made much safer and easier. The introduction of steam facilitated trade and gave security from pirates to vessels carrying merchandise. It halved the sailing time, which meant that troops and artillery could be rapidly transported to any place where rebellion broke out.⁵²

However, before the Red Sea line of communication with Europe could be considered established, a safe and convenient station was necessary between Bombay and Suez where steam vessels might refuel and carry out minor repairs. Col. Michael Bagnold, the British Resident at Mukha, recommended that Aden should be that station, as "it was the only port fit by nature for a depot (on the Red Sea route),..."⁵³ Bagnold made his recommendation after a careful survey of Aden which he visited in August 1827 on his way to Bombay.

Bagnold's visit was at the invitation of the new Sultan of Lahj, Muhsin Ibn Fadl. Muhsin wanted the British to help him revive the trade of Aden, an aim which his predecessor had also hoped to achieve with their assistance. The geographical position of the port, the anarchy in the Yemen and "the illiberal treatment" of British merchants at Mukha the Sultan put forward as factors in his favour. If the British desired to establish a residency in Aden, they would be welcome.⁵⁴ The Government thought that it rested with the merchants themselves to choose their ports. If more preferred Aden to Mukha, the factory would be moved there.⁵⁵

Without mentioning the current rates at Mukha or Aden, Bagnold wrote that the Sultan had offered to reduce the duty for British Indian subjects to 3% for the first two years, and after that not more than 5%. British-born subjects were to pay a duty of 2½%, as at Mukha.⁵⁶

Muhsin sent with Bagnold a letter to Elphinstone asking for two guns, two howitzers and ammunition. The Sultan wanted the arms to put down his neighbours, the 'Aqrabis, and was ready to pay.⁵⁷ However, he was told that British policy was against giving military aid to any chief in Arabia.⁵⁸ Sultan Muhsin did not accept this answer and repeated his request to the new Governor of Bombay, Maj.-Gen. Sir John Malcolm.⁵⁹ Malcolm discussed the subject with Bagnold who advised him to send the arms, as this would aid future communication with the Red Sea.⁶⁰ Malcolm accepted his advice and in December 1828 the guns were shipped to the Sultan, as a gift.

The following year it was decided to inaugurate the Red Sea line. Coal was deposited at Sirah Island for the use of the "Hugh Lindsay" (411 tons), the first steamship made in India and the first to navigate the Red Sea. The "Hugh Lindsay", which was built to carry five and a half days' fuel, left Bombay with coal for eleven days. Yet when she reached Aden, she had only six hours' fuel left. This showed that for a vessel of her kind the distance (1641 miles) was too great without an intermediate station.⁶¹ Besides, it was so hard to obtain labour at Aden that six and a half days were needed to take on only 180 tons of coal.⁶² Shortage of labour and distance from Bombay made the British abandon Aden in favour of Mukalla, on the Hadrami coast, 250 miles nearer to Bombay.

Mukalla in turn did not prove as satisfactory as had been hoped; steamers returning from Suez during the south-west monsoon could not touch there for coal. Moreover, the British were not satisfied with the co-operation which they received from the local chiefs. Now the island of Socotra, off the Horn of Africa, seemed to meet the requirements for a British depot. It was 200 miles nearer to Bombay than Mukalla; and if steamers were to run from Calcutta to Suez it would be essential.⁶³

Socotra belonged to the Mahara tribe whose capital was at Qishn to the east of Mukalla. In 1834, Captain Daniel Ross, Marine Surveyor at Calcutta, was sent to Qishn to negotiate an agreement by which the

British would be permitted to land coal on the island. After much haggling, the agreement was made, but the Bombay Government now wanted to buy the island, as this would give them full control over the depot and the inhabitants.

Ross, asked for his opinion, stated that the Maharas were poor and would be glad to sell. However, difficulties would have to be faced on account of the many chiefs who had to be consulted, as in the case of the agreement; but the chiefs feared the British, and it would be better to take advantage of this feeling than to negotiate with "many scarcely civilized persons, jealous of each other and often at variance". In other words, the British would pay for the island what they wanted, and the chiefs would have to accept or else face British power. The sum Ross suggested as a price for the island was between Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000.⁶⁴

The Government of Bombay was encouraged by Ross's opinion and recommended the purchase to the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck. Bentinck approved, but emphasised that the island should not be occupied until it had been ceded through negotiation. The man chosen to negotiate the deal was Lieut. Stafford Bettesworth Haines of the Indian Navy, and he was chosen because he knew the chiefs very well; he had been cruising in the Arabian and Red Seas since 1820. Haines was authorised to pay a maximum of £10,000 for Socotra, and the Governor-General expressed the hope that he would be able to get it for less.⁶⁵

Shortly after Haines left for Qishn, the Bombay Government, anticipating no difficulties, sent a detachment to take possession of Socotra. However, contrary to expectations, Haines' mission was a failure. 'Umar Ibn Tawari, the old blind sultan, while welcoming a British coal depot on the island, steadfastly refused to sell.⁶⁶

When the troops arrived at Socotra (5th January 1835), they landed because bad weather made it impossible for them to return to Bombay. In Calcutta, when the Governor-General learnt of the Sultan's refusal to sell, he proposed that negotiations for a lease for part or all of the island should start, and repeated that no force should be used. "... we should not be justified in retaining possession of the Island for a day longer than can be avoided in opposition to the will of those to whom it belongs."⁶⁷

Commander William Rose, I.N., was deputed to conduct the new negotiations, but he too did not succeed. Then he asked if the

British would be allowed two small depots, but the Sultan would give them only one which Rose considered useless in view of the monsoons.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the British found that the water on Socotra was bad, and the troops, whose camp was near a swamp, were dying of fever. These facts, coupled with the Sultan's unwillingness to co-operate, made the British abandon the island on 24th October, 1835.⁶⁹

When it became certain that the British were to leave Socotra, Haines visited Sultan Muhsin and conveyed to him a request from the Bombay Government to establish a trading post at Aden. The Sultan agreed, provided the Government gave him some ammunition and sent two vessels of war⁷⁰ to assist him in his attack on Shuqrah, the Fadli seaport and capital. The Government did not accept these conditions, their policy being one of non-interference in the affairs of Arabia.⁷¹

However, before his letter arrived in Bombay, the Sultan sent a special messenger with a present and another letter to the new Governor, Sir Robert Grant, repeating his request and adding that he would be willing to pay for the ammunition whatever it might cost. He asserted that "one of the conditions of the agreement entered into between me and the British Government is that we are mutually to assist each other,..."⁷² This was in reference to an agreement which seems to have been concluded between Bagnold and the Sultan in 1827,⁷³ but there is no evidence that it was discussed at Bombay. Nevertheless, the Government sent Muhsin the ammunition.⁷⁴

The British had no further contact with Aden until 1837. In that year, the "Darya Dawlat" incident provided them with a good excuse for occupying it.

The British first went to Aden for trade, but the town had no trade to offer, and they lost interest in it. However, interest in Aden was revived after the French invasion of Egypt, and that was mainly due to its strategic value. This value was enhanced in British eyes by the advent of steam navigation.

The British wanted a base in Aden, but on terms which precluded intervention in the affairs of Arabia. The 'Abdalis wanted an offensive-defensive alliance with the British, which necessarily required intervention in the interior. The result was that neither party achieved its aims.

CHAPTER II.

BACKGROUND TO THE OCCUPATION.

After his victory over the Wahhabis, Muhammad 'Ali directed his attention to more important projects. In 1820, he entrusted the conquest of the Sudan to his third son, Isma'il, who accomplished the task three years later. From 1824 to 1829, the Pasha concentrated his energies on Europe. Then, in November 1831, he sent his first son, Ibrahim Pasha, to conquer Syria, which he did before the end of June 1832.

The Egyptian victories greatly alarmed Sultan Mahmud II, and he decided to crush his rebellious vassal. In May 1832, he dispatched a large force against Ibrahim, but it was heavily defeated on 29th July in the Baylan Pass to the north of Aleppo. The Sultan then sent a second army, but it was no more fortunate than the first; it was routed at Konya on 21st December. From Konya, Ibrahim advanced to Kutahya, threatening the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

After his first defeat, the Sultan appealed to the European Powers for help, but only Russia was quick to respond. Austria and Prussia were anxious to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but neither could be of any assistance. France had a traditional interest in Egypt and sympathised with the aims of Muhammad 'Ali. Britain was in the midst of a domestic crisis over parliamentary reform. Her Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, was still occupied with the Portuguese and Belgian questions. In 1831-2, he paid little attention to Egypt. Neither in official nor in private correspondence did he give sufficient instructions to his subordinates with regard to Muhammad 'Ali.¹ Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at Istanbul, strongly urged his government to support the Sultan by sending a naval expedition to the Syrian coast. Palmerston, however, was not ready to risk a breach with Russia and France which might follow from unilateral action in the Levant.

Sultan Mahmud made effort after effort to get Britain's assistance; but when he failed, he accepted Russia's aid most reluctantly. A powerful Russian squadron anchored off Istanbul on 20th February, 1833. Britain and France were alarmed and put pressure on the Sultan to ask for its withdrawal. However, Tsar Nicholas I refused to withdraw it until the Egyptian army had recrossed the Taurus mountains. Muhammad 'Ali countered by demanding the cession of Syria and the district of Adana, and he would not instruct his son to retreat until

these demands had been met. In March, the Sultan agreed to the cession of Syria only, but the Pasha insisted on Adana as well.

The fears of Britain and France were to grow still greater when a second Russian squadron arrived in the Bosphorus and landed troops at Scutari. The arrival of this force may also have increased the Sultan's anxiety. A long conflict with Muhammad 'Ali seemed likely to result in a continued Russian presence in Turkey. Britain and France, therefore, urged the Pasha and the Sultan to come to an agreement. Finally, the Sultan gave way; and on 8th April, the Convention of Kutahya was concluded. By it, both demands of Muhammad 'Ali were conceded.²

The Sultan bitterly resented his humiliation at the hands of his vassal; and after April 1833, the expulsion of Muhammad 'Ali from Syria became his earnest desire. He threatened to attack by himself if Britain did not help him. Palmerston, however, repeatedly instructed Ponsonby, the new British Ambassador at Istanbul, to warn him against carrying out his threat. Ponsonby was to indicate to the Sultan that if he attacked, he would be repulsed; and that if he depended on Russia alone, he might lose his empire. He was advised to improve his army and wait. This advice was accepted, and the situation in the Levant remained quiet until the middle of 1839.³

In the Hijaz, while Ibrahim was preparing to invade Syria, four officers rebelled against his father's rule and imprisoned his governor, Khurshid Bey. Khurshid was replaced by one of the four officers, Muhammad Agha, surnamed Turkchi Dilmas. Sultan Mahmud welcomed the revolt, confirmed Turkchi in his position and promised him support. Turkchi was encouraged and captured the Tihama (the coast of the Yemen) in the name of the Porte.

Muhammad 'Ali, in turn, sent Ahmad Pasha, his nephew and a former governor of the Hijaz, to quell the rebellion. Ahmad recovered the Hijaz and occupied the Tihama in 1833. His brother, Ibrahim Pasha, who accompanied him was left as Governor-General of Egyptian-occupied Yemen, with headquarters at Hudaydah.

The Imam al-Mahdi 'Abd Allah, who had been paying tribute to Muhammad 'Ali since 1819, died in 1834, and was succeeded by his son 'Ali under the title of al-Mansur. Al-Mansur suspected his uncle, Sidi Muhammad, of conspiracy and imprisoned him. However, he escaped and took refuge at Ta'iz where he assumed the title of al-Hadi. Having no confidence in his ability to retain his position, he sold

the city to the Egyptians in 1837.

Soon afterwards, 'Ali al-Mansur was overthrown by 'Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad who proclaimed himself Imam under the name of al-Nasir and imprisoned his predecessor together with Sidi Muhammad. In November 1837, Muhammad 'Ali sent an embassy to the new Imam to negotiate the cession of San'a, and thus gain control over all the Yemen. The mission was received with great ceremony, but the Pasha's proposals were rejected.⁴

Muhammad 'Ali's successes in the Levant and Arabia were not viewed with indifference by Palmerston. After the attack on Konya, he became anxious to help the Sultan, but foreign involvements and the domestic situation did not allow him. The aim of Muhammad 'Ali, Palmerston wrote, "is to establish an Arabian kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be."⁵

Palmerston could not allow Turkey to be crushed between two empires, the Russian advancing from the north and the Egyptian from the south. It was easier to fight the Pasha than the Tsar. "But Mehemet Ali should still be left in possession of Egypt and if he wants to extend himself let him go up the Nile."⁶

Although Palmerston had, since the beginning of 1833, believed that the Pasha might be contemplating the control of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea routes to India through possession of Syria, Iraq and Arabia, it seems he did not think it necessary to check him then. All that Palmerston did was to warn him against declaring his independence of the Porte. The warning came in October 1834, after the Pasha had in the previous month confided that intention to the European consuls in Egypt.⁷ Besides, Palmerston did not think that Muhammad 'Ali, then probably 65, was likely to be of danger very much longer, for in the same year he wrote to Ponsonby, "Mehemet is an old man and what remains to him of life is nothing when set against the duration of an Empire".⁸

However, after 1834, Palmerston's hostility to Muhammad 'Ali grew steadily and he came to regard him as the major obstacle to the solution of the Eastern Question. Therefore, he made it his policy

to break down the power of the Pasha and to keep him in subordination to the Sultan.⁹ On 4th August, 1837, he wrote to Patrick Campbell, the British Consul-General in Egypt: "Reports having reached Her Majesty's Government that the Pasha of Egypt is about to send a force to take possession of the shores at the entrance and on the outside of the Red Sea I have to instruct you to take an early opportunity to mention the subject to the Pasha of Egypt, and to intimate to him, that such a movement of his forces would not be well looked upon in England or in India and might give rise to discussions between him and the British Government."¹⁰

The "reports" referred to by Palmerston originated with Captain James Mackenzie of the Bengal Light Infantry. Mackenzie, who was on leave during 1836-7, visited the Yemen, the Hijaz and Egypt while travelling to England. From his conversations with Egyptian officers in the three countries, he understood that after conquering or bribing the 'Asiris,¹¹ Muhammad 'Ali intended to advance on Aden and from there extend his power to Hadramawt, 'Uman and Masqat.¹²

On receipt of Palmerston's dispatch, dated 4th August, 1837, Campbell addressed a note on the subject to Boghos Bey, Muhammad 'Ali's vizier, requesting him to transmit it to the Pasha who was then in Crete. Muhammad 'Ali replied that he had never contemplated such an expedition, and Campbell believed him.¹³

However, reports about Egyptian military activity continued to alarm Palmerston. In December 1837, he instructed Campbell to inform the Pasha that "... reports have reached H.M.'s Government of movements of his troops in Syria and Arabia which seem to indicate intentions on his part to extend his authority towards the Persian Gulf and the Pashalic of Baghdad; and you will state frankly to the Pasha that the British Government could not see with indifference the execution of such intentions."¹⁴ Campbell delivered this warning early in February 1838, but Muhammad 'Ali denied that he had entertained such thoughts.¹⁵ However, subsequent events indicated the contrary.

While Palmerston's antagonism to Muhammad 'Ali had been growing since 1834, the Bombay Government was careful to maintain good relations with him. The Pasha controlled the Red Sea route, and the Government could not afford to lose his goodwill. The abandonment of

Socotra did not mean that a coaling station on the Red Sea was no longer necessary. A substitute was found in the island of Kamaran, to the north-west of Hudaydah.

This island was under Egyptian rule, and Grant wrote to the Pasha asking for permission to establish a coal depot there.¹⁶ Muhammad 'Ali agreed without hesitation,¹⁷ and this brought him the gratitude of the Foreign Office in London.¹⁸ However, the island was never used by the British. The day before Muhammad 'Ali wrote to Grant, there occurred an incident which was to be the direct cause of the British occupation of Aden.

The "Darya Dawlat", a Madras barque sailing under British colours, was freighted from Calcutta for Jaddah and back by an Arab merchant, Hajj Insaf. The ship had on board 30 crew, 27 pilgrims and a cargo valued at Rs. 200,000. At 3.00 a.m. on 18th February, 1837, she ran aground four miles from Aden. At daybreak, the supercargo, Bu Khaydar, made off to the town in the jolly-boat and sent men to clear the wrecked vessel of her cargo only. In the town, the cargo was divided into three shares, the Sultan taking two, and Bu Khaydar one.

The barque's captain followed the supercargo in another boat with ten of his crew, but they were drowned. Three others were also drowned attempting to save their lives. The rest reached the shore either on rafts or in a boat provided by Sayyid Zayn al-'Aydarus, the chief custodian of the 'Aydarus Mosque and the leading man in Aden. Once on land, they were stripped naked, male and female alike. The women were insulted in the most disgusting manner and underwent a revolting search for gold and money.

The 'Abdalis then dismissed their victims who began their weary march towards the town. Fortunately, Sayyid Zayn took pity on them, gave them food and supplied them with cloth to cover their nakedness. From Aden the survivors of the wreck sailed to Mukha in a boat belonging to a Muslim from Bombay, Shaykh 'Abd Allah Sufi, and there they related the story to Haines who was on a survey mission in the Red Sea.¹⁹

Haines went to Aden and found that the cargo of the "Darya Dawlat" was being sold at one third of its real value. He told the Sultan that the ship and her cargo were British and asked him to protect the recovered goods until a decision regarding them had been taken by the

competent authorities in India. He also informed him that the British Government would require an explanation for the plunder of the barque and the maltreatment of her passengers and crew.²⁰

The Sultan denied these accusations, and later wrote to the Governor of Bombay that normally whenever a vessel was wrecked on the Indian or Arabian coast, her cargo and the lives of the people on board were lost and nothing was recovered from the local chief. However, when he had heard of the wreck of the "Darya Dawlat", he had sent his son to Aden and ordered a boat to help the victims in landing.²¹

By 1837, the Bombay Government had obviously decided that Aden would be better than Kamaran as a coal depot. In 1829, the place had been abandoned because the distance from Bombay was too great for a small vessel like the "Hugh Lindsay" and because labour was scarce, but these problems were not insurmountable. The first had been solved by the building of larger steamers, and the second could be overcome by British occupation. However, it was not only as a coal depot that the British now wanted Aden; the other reasons will become clear as the chapter progresses.

The Bombay Government welcomed the "Darya Dawlat" incident as an excuse for acquiring Aden. On 17th August, Grant wrote in a private letter to Sir James Rivett-Carnac, Chairman of the Secret Committee and later Governor of Bombay, "... if we do not make ourselves masters and possessors of Aden, we ought at least not to lose the present opportunity, ... of humbling that robber (the Sultan) and compelling him to submit to the establishment of a convenient coal depot on advantageous terms at his port."²²

The same day Grant wrote another private letter to Sir John Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, in which he asserted that the British would be "fully justified in taking possession of the town and harbour of Aden".²³ Next to British possession of Aden, Grant would have liked to see it in the hands of the friendly ruler of Masqat whom he had heard was anxious to annex it.

Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, was officially addressed on the subject of the "Darya Dawlat" in September: "... the shameful outrage ... calls for prompt notice and effectual redress. ... should ample satisfaction be not obtained from the Sultan of Aden, this Government be authorised to enforce a demand for redress."²⁴

Then, on 23rd September, Grant outlined the advantages which Aden offered and the reasons which made its occupation imperative. The harbour of Aden he described as "excellent"; and with the past greatness of the town in mind, wrote: "It might again, under good management, be made the port of export for coffee, gums, and spices of Arabia, and the channel through which the produce of England and India might be spread through the provinces of Yemen and Hadhar-el-Mout (Hadramawt). The trade of the African coast would also be thrown into the Aden market."

To the Governor, there was no place on the Arabian coast which could compete with Aden as a coal depot. "It divides the distance between Bombay and Suez, and steamers may run into Back Bay during the night, and load and unload at all seasons in perfect security." The strength of Aden and the ease with which it could be defended, the reportedly good quality of its water and the salubrity of its climate were other advantages which presented themselves readily to his mind.

In Grant's opinion, the British had to occupy Aden for four reasons. The establishment of a monthly steamship service with Suez and the building of armed steamers demanded that the British should have a station of their own on the Arabian coast as they had in the Persian Gulf (at Ras al-Khaymah). The Americans were trying to acquire a place in or near Bab al-Mandab, and Grant was afraid that they might choose Aden. American merchants had already introduced their cotton goods into the Mukha market at 3% duty, while British merchants were charged 7% on similar goods.²⁵ The other two reasons were the possibility that Muhammad 'Ali might annex it, and the need to punish Sultan Muhsin.²⁶

James Farish, a member of the Bombay Council, supported the Governor, but expressed his fear of a collision with the Egyptian forces in the Yemen, since he, too, thought that Muhammad 'Ali had designs on Aden. Farish was afraid that the occupation of the place by the British might cause Muhammad 'Ali to deprive them of the facilities they had at Suez and Alexandria.²⁷

Grant replied that if the British did not take Aden soon, it would be too late to do so after Ibrahim Pasha had taken San'a. "Now he has no right to object to us punishing the Sultan of Aden, but if we do it later, he will interfere to protect him." This "interference",

the Governor explained, would result in the dreaded "collision".²⁸ 36.

The opinions of Grant and Farish were forwarded to Auckland. The Governor-General did not feel that the "Darya Dawlat" incident provided a sufficient pretext for the occupation of Aden. He answered "that satisfaction, in the first instance, be demanded of the Sultan of Aden for this outrage. If it be granted, some amicable arrangement may be made with him for the occupation of this port as a depot for coals and a harbour for shelter. If it be refused, the further measures may be considered; and in the meantime information may be collected of the political state of Aden and the neighbouring countries."²⁹

On receipt of this letter, Grant ordered that Haines, who was in Bombay, should proceed to Aden and demand redress from the Sultan for the outrage committed and the restoration of the "Darya Dawlat"'s cargo or the remittance of its value. The Governor also directed that he should keep in mind during the negotiations "the desirable object of obtaining consent to our establishing a coal depot at Aden".³⁰

The Bombay Government, however, also gave Haines instructions which went beyond those of the Governor-General. In a minute dated 26th March, 1838, Grant wrote: "On its being brought to our knowledge ... by the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, that, in the opinion of Captain Haines, the Sultan would willingly, and on very favourable terms, make over to us ... Aden, we conceived that the instructions of the Supreme Government would bear us out in obtaining such transfer. We therefore directed Captain Haines to enter into terms with the Sultan for that purpose,..."³¹ As in the case of Socotra, the Bombay Government felt it necessary to have complete control of the place where their depot was located.

Haines arrived off Aden on board the sloop-of-war "Coote" on 28th December, 1837, and had his first meeting with Sultan Muhsin on 4th January, 1838. At that meeting, he demanded the cargo of the "Darya Dawlat" or the sum of £12,000. The Sultan considered this demand unreasonable, since he claimed that what he had of the cargo was given him voluntarily. However, Haines told him that the sum was to be recovered from him "either by pacific or coercive measures". On hearing this, the Sultan returned what he had, amounting to \$7809, and signed a bill for the remainder to be paid within one year.³²

Then Haines gave presents to the Sultan and his sons, which they returned in the form of bullocks and sheep.³³ The Sultan also sent Haines a friendly letter in which he wrote: "You have asserted we are old friends; ... I wish to see it is truth;... If God pleases, my friendship shall be the same as my father's (predecessor's),³⁴ and a treaty shall be witness. We and the English are one."³⁵

Encouraged by this letter, Haines answered: "... I am empowered by Government to form a treaty with you for the purchase of Aden ...", and sent the Sultan a draft treaty for his perusal and comment. The draft protected the Sultan's religion; guaranteed him independence "though in alliance" with the British; gave him the right to reside in Aden and to continue in possession of his two houses. His trading vessels were to be protected and allowed to fly the British flag. The Sultan had only to name his price, and Haines expressed his confidence that he would not let such an opportunity pass.³⁶

However, Haines was not completely frank in his proposals. To Charles Malcolm, the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, he wrote: "All articles that would be necessary are not therein written; what I now forward being merely hastily written to give them satisfaction, from my knowledge of their character and wishes."³⁷

Meanwhile, he urged the Sultan to accept the draft treaty, pointing out the advantages which would accrue to him and to his country from it. The British would protect his territory by sea, and this would lead to commercial prosperity. "Some minor power" might soon try to take Aden, in which case it would become a source of trouble instead of an external defence.³⁸

At 9.00 p.m. on 13th January, the Sultan visited Haines on board the "Coote" to discuss matters relating to the transfer of Aden. With him he had his sons and Rashid Ibn 'Abd Allah, the chief merchant in the town. At first, Haines reported, the men were afraid of being disgraced in the eyes of their people if they sold the town, but this fear he soon dismissed, probably by restating the advantages which the 'Abdali tribe would derive from British occupation.

Haines' explanation for the Sultan's readiness to sell Aden to the British was his fear that the Egyptians might take it by force and pay him nothing. In return for the town, Muhsin asked that he be treated as an Indian nawwab and that his country be placed under British protection. He also made the familiar request for ammunition, this

time to be supplied from the "Coote"; the urgency was due to a truce with the Fadlis having come to an end. Haines' answer was that he had no authority to grant either request, but he undertook to write to the Government on the first, and advised the Sultan to address them personally on the second.

The Sultan promised to do so, and also to inform the Governor of the sum of money for which he would cede Aden.³⁹ He added that he would go back immediately to Lahj to consult with his chiefs and that all should be ready by 15th March, when the Government could send troops and guns to take possession of Aden. However, Haines told him that they would not do so until the final arrangements had been completed.

Before the Sultan left the "Coote", he had promised Haines all that he wished, and this Haines took to mean that all had ended well for the British. "The subject of our conversation that evening was conclusive,..." he wrote, and he even chose a spot for the coal depot. Earlier, he had drawn the line of British ground as far north as Khur Maksar, a creek at the head of the Isthmus.⁴⁰

The Sultan's promises, however, were not more sincere than Haines' treaty proposals. To Shaykh Tayyib Ibramji, the agent at Mukha,⁴¹ he explained: "... when I saw his (Haines') face so determined (on acquiring Aden), I endeavoured to escape him, and put it (the transfer question) off for two months while each held council."⁴²

In his letter to the Governor of Bombay, instead of naming his price for Aden, the Sultan firmly objected to selling it. "Let it be known ... that it is an Arabian adage, that 'Let the body be burnt, but do not let the wuttum⁴³ be pierced through'." Muhsin reminded Grant of the treaty which Ahmad 'Abd al-Karim had proposed to Duncan, and which he considered valid. Such a treaty, he added, would be acceptable to him. "If your Excellency have any business in Aden, whether for a long or short time, your ports and our ports are the same. Our and your friends and foes are the same. You should live under your own flag, and we under our own. Such an arrangement may be entered into.

"In case any aggression, whether by sea or land, be attempted upon us by our enemies, we shall trust in the Almighty and you; because the enmity of the tribes surrounding us will be increased;⁴⁴ whom we will not dread if you maintain a union with us, and act in conjunction with us."⁴⁵

On 18th January, the Sultan complained to Haines that the English had been seen on Mount Shamsan, and the people appeared "a little angry". They said that the land had been transferred without their knowledge.⁴⁶ Haines replied that it would be better if the people knew about the transfer negotiations. Should the land be ceded, they would not be surprised.⁴⁷

Having failed to get any ammunition from Haines, the Sultan asked him to prevent his enemy, the Fadli chief, from raiding his country.⁴⁸ Haines' answer was: "Promise me the transfer under your seal for any sum you may think requisite, and I can then prevent the encroachment of others by writing to them."⁴⁹

To speed up negotiations, Haines sent his Arabic interpreter, a Persian named Mulla Ja'far, to the Sultan to press him for a decision on the transfer and its price. The interpreter returned with two letters bearing the same date, 22nd January, 1838. In the first, which was sealed, the Sultan reminded Haines that he depended on Aden for his own support and for the stipends which he paid to neighbouring chiefs.⁵⁰ Then he renewed his promise to transfer the town after two months, i.e. in March. In the interim, Haines was to go to Bombay while the Sultan conferred with his elders. On Haines' return, in March, the British could start building forts or houses, or do what they wished; the town would then be theirs. The Sultan was not to be held responsible if they were attacked by sea or land.

Muhsin asked for half the customs dues; and if that would not be possible, then a monthly or annual stipend. He stipulated that his name be respected, and warned: "If you do not come between these months, and the Turks (the Egyptians in the Yemen) come and take the whole country by strength from me, or any other people, you must not blame me."⁵¹

The second letter, which was unsealed and which the Sultan dictated to Haines' interpreter, was more official, and Haines was supposed to return it with his seal affixed. This letter also gave Aden to the British; but required that the houses and guns of the Sultan should remain his, and that his control should continue over the town's population, Arabs and Jews.⁵²

The interpreter could not persuade the Sultan to put in writing the sum he wanted for Aden, the latter preferring the Government of Bombay to decide it, probably believing that they would pay more than

he would ask. However, under much insistence on the part of Mulla Ja'far, the Sultan suggested \$50,000 annually, claiming that that was what he received as customs dues from Aden.

This claim Haines described as "ridiculous", since according to him, the Sultan's revenue from the port amounted only to six or seven thousand dollars per annum, but he thought that the Government might pay him a little more.⁵³ Commenting on the two letters, he wrote to the Sultan: "... the sealed one was clear enough, but the other destroyed its decision. They (the Government) must first have (before building houses, forts, etc.) the transfer, and money for the same arranged, and concluded, under your seal."

The equal division of the customs dues was unacceptable to Haines on the grounds that though they were insignificant at that time, they might well increase after the British took over. Haines agreed that the Sultan should continue in possession of his personal property in Aden, and that he and his children should still enjoy princely status. However, he described as "ridiculous" his condition that the Arabs and Jews must continue to obey him after the transfer, as indeed it would have been if he had meant what he said.

Haines made it clear to the Sultan that if Aden were attacked, the British would undertake its defence, and pointed out that if the agreement had to wait until March, the transfer would be considerably delayed. During the south-west monsoon (May to September), the voyage from Bombay to Aden would take as long as two months. Therefore, he urged immediate transfer, advising in a threatening tone: "... give, while you have an opportunity, a decided answer."⁵⁴

The Sultan's reaction was an angry one. "I have given my seal that Aden is yours, and you must now give me yours as a security to me. if my letter with the seal does not please you, give it me back, and what I dictated to Jaffer give it to Reshid, who will give it my man and he will bring it to me."⁵⁵

Haines returned the unsealed, and not the sealed, letter for which the Sultan had asked. "I return the letter ... merely objecting to the part ... regarding the Jews, Banians and Arabs in the town."⁵⁶ To Malcolm he wrote: "The letter confirming Aden to the British I herewith enclose, with the translation of it,..."⁵⁷ This letter, however, was not sufficient to make the transfer legal. It was not countersigned, and the price, without which no transfer could have been made, was not mentioned. Besides, Haines himself

admitted that the unsealed letter had rendered null and void the sealed one.

On receipt of the unsealed letter, the Sultan, who was ill, dictated an answer to his eldest son Ahmad and sent it to Haines with Rashid Ibn 'Abd Allah. He wrote: "If God pleases, all on our side will be properly arranged."⁵⁸ By this he may have meant the conspiracy to which reference will soon be made. Rashid, besides, told Haines that "all was concluded", and the price for Aden was to be \$8700 annually. He also informed him that the Sultan's son, his son-in-law, Sayyid Muhsin Ways, and Hajj Muhsin, a rich Hadrami merchant of long residence in Lahj, were coming to Aden as witnesses to the transfer agreement.

Accordingly, Haines left in the Coote's pinnace, accompanied by two of the ship's officers as witnesses on the British side. However, no sooner had they landed than Haines was told by his interpreter, who was on shore, that there was a conspiracy to seize him and his papers, and, probably, to murder him. Whereupon the British immediately returned to their boat.

Haines had no doubt that the chief man behind the conspiracy was Sayyid Muhsin Ways whom he described as "a cunning crafty being, devoid of honour, honesty or integrity,..." The conspirators' aim, Haines thought, was to seize the promissory note in the belief that by the time it fell due, the old Sultan (then about 70) would have died and they would be required to pay. For his escape, Haines was grateful to Hajj Muhsin (who had been excluded from the delegation), Rashid and Mulla Ja'far.⁵⁹

Anxious to settle the transfer question before his return to Bombay, Haines ignored the conspiracy and asked Ahmad to state in writing the sum for which his father was ready to sell Aden.⁶⁰ Not knowing that the plot had been discovered, the young chief answered that he had come on his father's behalf to arrange matters, and requested Haines to come to the town alone because of the Sultan's desire that all should be secret.⁶¹

Haines replied that if Ahmad wanted secrecy, the "Coote" would be a better place, although there was no need for secrecy.⁶² In response, Ahmad wrote a strange letter which was a mixture of arrogance, insult and friendliness. In it he said: "If you wish to have Aden, the people of Aden are not willing to have you. No

one will go out of their houses until their deaths."⁶³

At this point, Haines revealed to Ahmad that he knew everything about the conspiracy and told him: "I have the bond for the transfer of the land and harbours we required, under your father's signature and seal; and what bond have you now from me? Had you acted honourably you would have received papers from me equally binding as the seal of your father for the transfer, and it is now not too late if you send me the sum you arranged for ..." Haines also advised Ahmad to apologise for his attempt to obtain by violence the documents given "in friendship" by his father.⁶⁴

Then, prior to his departure for Mukha, on 30th January, 1838, he sent a reproachful letter to the Sultan⁶⁵ and gave Damji, the agent in charge of the cargo recovered from the "Darya Dawlat", instructions regarding any coal that might arrive before he heard from the Government.⁶⁶

Thus Haines failed to buy Aden as he had failed to buy Socotra, but this time he would not admit failure. From Mukha he wrote to Ibrahim Pasha that Aden had been transferred to the British;⁶⁷ and although this was not the case, it was accepted as such.

Grant, who was determined to take Aden, wrote privately to Hobhouse on 20th March, 1838: "Perhaps we went too far in initiating ... the occupation. If so, blame, but confirm what we have done,..." The Governor of Bombay accused the British Government of not being fully alive to the dangers threatening India from Russia and France, and added: "I am tempted to address a stimulant to Palmerston; but what fruit will there be from my efforts, unless seconded by the Minister of India?"⁶⁸

On 26th March, Grant recorded a second minute advocating the occupation of Aden. This was longer and more strongly-worded than his first minute of 23rd September, 1837. In it, he explained in detail why the British must take Aden, stressing the dangers from Muhammad 'Ali, France and Russia. By so doing, he undoubtedly hoped to administer "a stimulant" to Hobhouse and Palmerston, an effort which was hardly necessary.

The Governor wrote that Muhammad 'Ali's aim was to build Egypt, Syria and Arabia into an independent kingdom, a belief expressed by Palmerston in 1833. France or Russia might help him achieve this goal, and then join him against Britain. "The establishment of a potentate

thus vigorous and violent at the head of a hundred thousand men, on a coast within easy sail of our shores, forms no very bright anticipation for the auture fortunes of India."

Grant was certain that Muhammad 'Ali had for years been contemplating the annexation of Aden, and therefore he would not be pleased if the British forestalled him. However, if they did, he would have no reason to accuse them of hostility towards him, since they would be seizing it from an independent chief who owed him no allegiance. On the other hand, if he took it first, his would be the prior claim, and the British could have no coal depot at any station on the Red Sea which was not under his control.

In 1838, Grant could see "no great evil" in British dependence on Muhammad 'Ali's goodwill for coaling facilities in the Red Sea; steamers were few, and it was in the Pasha's interest to maintain a friendly attitude. However, the Governor of Bombay could foresee significant changes which required the occupation of Aden. In a few years, Muhammad 'Ali would be the ruler of a vast independent kingdom, and "certain European powers" would form alliances with him. Moreover, the ships of the Indian Navy would all be propelled by steam. Under these circumstances, the last thing the British would want was to see "the key of our strength ... in the keeping of an Egyptian despot; devoid of feeling or principle and allied only to the impulse of a restless daring and insatiable ambition."

Grant had no fear that if the British took Aden, Muhammad 'Ali would cut off their communication with Europe via Egypt; the Pasha appreciated the benefits which his country derived from its geographical position between India and Europe. He was particularly mindful of the revenue which steam navigation indirectly brought to his treasury.

In Grant's opinion, there were other reasons for occupying Aden. France, who was extending her rule along the coast of North Africa (having captured Algeria in 1832) and building up her naval force in the Mediterranean, would naturally be tempted to retake Egypt and then attempt to recover her former possessions in India.

As long as Muhammad 'Ali lived, he would maintain his control over Egypt; but after his death, confusion would set in and power would be contested by opposing factions. At that point, France would intervene. Whether the British joined in the struggle for

Egypt or saw it turned into a French colony, the possession of Aden would be indispensable. "For the purpose of watching the progress of affairs it would be a secure observatory; if we found it necessary to collect a force it would afford a highly commodious station, and if the shores of the Red Sea were to pass under a French yoke it would become the Gibraltar of India."

If France occupied Egypt, she might agree with Russia to launch a joint attack on India, she by way of Egypt, and Russia by way of Persia. A more immediate apprehension was that Sultan Muhsin might cede Aden to France. At the time Grant wrote his minute, the French frigate "L'Artemise", commanded by "a most intelligent officer", was on her way to that port after a visit to Masqat.

Grant described the advantages which Aden offered as "greater than the sacrifice", meaning perhaps that it was worth fighting for. Of all the reasons which he put forward for its occupation, the need for a coal depot was foremost in his mind. "The advantage of occupying Aden as a station convenient for the steam navigation entered largely into the views of the Bombay Government,..." Grant expressed his hope that the competent authorities would ratify the measures which his government had taken and emphasised: "Aden is actually in our hands, and the question respecting it is one purely of retention not of acquirement."⁶⁹

In reply, Hobhouse wrote that some members of the India Board were against choosing Aden as a coal depot, but "now that Aden has been actually ceded to you they may sanction the measure".⁷⁰ The opposition at India House was won over, and on 30th May, 1838, the Secret Committee formally authorised the occupation in letters sent both to Grant and Auckland.⁷¹

News of the "transfer" reached Muhammad 'Ali in March, and on the 27th, Campbell wrote to Palmerston that the Pasha was greatly disturbed by it, not wanting the British too close to Mukha. He asserted that Aden was a dependency of the Yemen, and that he had undertaken his expedition to that country (1832-3) with the knowledge and consent of the British Government,⁷² implying that they recognised his jurisdiction over Aden. Yet Boghos Bey, who conveyed this message to Campbell, assured him verbally "that if it should be the desire of the British Government that Mehemet Ali should evacuate Yemen he would do so; and further that if it appeared that Aden did not

depend on the Imam of Sennaar (San'a) the Pasha himself would be happy to contribute all in his power to facilitating the cession of Aden to the Bombay Government."

Campbell described the Pasha's claim to Aden as "invalid" and added that the Bombay Government had a right to take possession of it without reference to him.⁷³ Later, in his dispatch of 17th April, he reported that he had told Boghos Bey that Aden was independent. Had this not been the case, its ruler could not have made the treaty of 1802 with Popham.⁷⁴ Campbell also reminded Muhammad 'Ali that in 1822 the British Resident at Mukha discussed with the Sultan of Aden the possibility of transferring the Residency to his port. In neither case had the Imam protested. Moreover, the succession to the Lahj sultanate was hereditary, and the Sultan did not acknowledge the overlordship of the Imam, nor did he even pay him tribute.⁷⁵

Afraid that the British might use Aden as an advance post against his forces in the Yemen, Muhammad 'Ali proposed, on 28th March, that the chain of mountains running parallel to the coast should be the boundary between the Egyptian and British spheres of influence. However, if the British wanted Aden only as a coaling station, it would be better for them if he occupied it. An Arab government could not render the services which they would require, while he would give them the same facilities which they had in other places under his control.⁷⁶

To Campbell's dispatch of 27th March, Palmerston answered on 12th May that Auckland had not informed the British Government of the occupation of Aden and added: "... as Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that if this has been done, it will have been done upon sufficient reasons, it is in that case also likely that the conduct of the Indian Government in that matter will be approved. As for the effect which the possession of Aden would have on the occupation of the Yemen by the Egyptians, it was up to the Pasha. But the British Government is not aware that any interest of Great Britain is promoted by the continuance of that occupation."

Regarding the Pasha's claim that he had British consent for his expedition to the Yemen, Palmerston wrote that the India Board did not think that such an expedition would harm British interests. He further pointed out that since Muhammad 'Ali had acted before receiving this consent, clearly it could not have influenced his plans.⁷⁷

Palmerston advised the Pasha to "respect the independence of the native chiefs in the vicinity of Aden,..." and threatened "that any attempt on his part to subvert their authority would not be viewed with indifference by the British Government".⁷⁸

Then, on 24th May, Palmerston replied to Campbell's dispatch of 17th April. This letter was very important because it defined the area on which Britain would permit no encroachment by any power in the north, be it Egyptian, Ottoman or native.⁷⁹ Campbell was instructed "to remind Boghos Bey ... that Great Britain could not see with indifference any attempt made by Mehemet Ali to invade or conquer the country lying at, and beyond the mouth of the Red Sea.

"With respect to the occupation of the Yemen by the Egyptian troops, you will say that the British Government has no desire that such occupation should continue; but, on the contrary, would be better pleased by any overt act which should show that the Pasha is engaged in improving the administration of the provinces confided to his govt, instead of employing the energies of his mind, and the resources of the countries he governs in aggressive expeditions against neighbouring districts."⁸⁰

Palmerston received the news of the alleged cession of Aden in June, whereupon he instructed Campbell to tell Muhammad 'Ali that it had been ceded to the British and would be occupied immediately.

"... therefore any hostile attempt of the troops of Mehemet Ali against Aden will be an attack upon a British possession and will be dealt with accordingly."⁸¹ In July, Palmerston instructed Campbell to tell Muhammad 'Ali not to occupy Aden; and if he had done so, to withdraw.⁸²

In May 1838, Muhammad 'Ali informed the European consuls in Egypt, for the second time, that he was about to declare independence from the Porte.⁸³ This news was received in England after the Pasha had subdued Najd⁸⁴ and at a time when Palmerston was occupied with a growing crisis in Persia.

In the late summer of 1837, Muhammad Shah of Persia advanced on Herat, the westernmost of the three main Afghan states, thus threatening the routes to Kabul, Qandahar and the Indian frontier. British officials at home and in India believed that the Persian conquest of this principality would give Russia an outpost for intrigues among the tribes and states bordering on India. Here it is to be remembered that the treaty of Gulistan (1813) gave Russia the right,

confirmed in 1828 by the treaty of Turkmanchai, to have consuls or commercial agents in any part of the Persian dominions where commerce made it necessary. Therefore, if the Persians took Herat, Russia's right would be extended to it. Britain had no such concession.

In March, John McNeill, the British Minister at the Persian Court, tried to persuade the Shah to give up the siege of Herat. Earlier, he had written to Palmerston and Auckland recommending the occupation of the island of Kharg off Bushehr, the principal port on the Persian side of the Gulf.⁸⁵

The intention of Muhammad 'Ali to declare his independence brought a strong reaction from Hobhouse, one of Palmerston's closest colleagues in the Cabinet. On 9th June, he wrote to Auckland: "We must take part with the Sultan, and assuredly have the power of doing so with more effect than any of the great Continental sovereigns. Not only the shores of the Red Sea, but the Pachalic of Baghdad is within reach of your Indian forces, and I think it by no means improbable that you will have to send troops both to one and the other. At any rate, you will, of course, occupy Aden at once. You have bargained for it, and it does not belong to Mahomet Ali, and, even before this letter reaches you, I trust either you or Sir Robert Grant will have taken measures to accomplish that object. I cannot help thinking that the necessity which this contemplated declaration of independence by Mahomet Ali might create, would justify also the occupation of Karrack (Kharg). The Viceroy of Egypt will, doubtless, follow up his declaration by an attack on the Pachalic of Baghdad; and we shall want a position for British troops in the Gulph of Persia, which may be found conveniently at Karrack."⁸⁶

With regard to Kharg, Auckland had acted forty days before Hobhouse sent him his instructions. On 1st May, he directed Grant to send a joint naval and military force to the Persian Gulf to be at McNeill's disposal. The expedition anchored off Bushehr Roads on 13th June. When the Shah refused to lift the siege of Herat, as requested by McNeill, the expedition landed on Kharg two days later.

However, a number of factors finally forced the Shah to raise the siege on 9th September. These were pressure from Palmerston, representations made to the Shah through the British mission in Teheran, the insinuation that Britain would not allow Persia to occupy Afghanistan, rumours that an army from India was already in Afghanistan

on its way to Herat and the repulse of the Persians in late June.

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In making known his intention to declare independence, Muhammad 'Ali relied on the disunity of the European Powers to prevent any action against him. However, Palmerston reacted immediately because such a declaration might have resulted in war and brought the Russian fleet back to the Bosphorus. He wrote to Muhammad 'Ali that he was mistaken if he thought that differences among the Powers would "protect him from Britain's wrath". The Pasha was impressed and gave up the idea.

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In June, Campbell received a letter from Bombay, asking him to tell Muhammad 'Ali that no further steps would be taken in the negotiations for Aden without the instructions of the superior authorities. Campbell did so, and reported that the Pasha hoped "that the Indian Government would be persuaded that Aden formed a part of the Yemen, and, it was notorious, had formerly been part of the Turkish Empire;..." Muhammad 'Ali repeated that if he took Aden, the British could be sure of having a coal depot there without the expense of garrisoning it. The Pasha trusted that the Bombay Government would appreciate this and refrain from occupying the place.

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Campbell replied that the British would not authorise him to take Aden simply to obtain a coal depot free of expense. Great Britain was strong enough to take it at any moment if she so wished. However, she had made "an equitable agreement" with its ruler and would permit no interference from Muhammad 'Ali.

The Pasha then explained that his reason for wanting to be in Aden was not the possession of the place, but his fear that disputes might arise between his subjects in the Yemen and the people of Aden after they had become British subjects. He also asked Campbell to assure the British Government that he would not stand in the way of their occupying Aden, and added that it would probably be better if he withdrew from the Yemen.

The Consul's comment was: "... the dislike of the Pacha arises not from any collision between our subjects at Aden and the neighbouring people of the Yemen, but from his apprehension that from the equity and mildness of British rule the whole of the coffee trade of the Yemen would probably be diverted to Aden, and thus the monopoly which he now exercises in that article would be entirely destroyed."

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Campbell's argument would have been stronger if he had mentioned that there would be no likelihood of a collision between Egyptian and British subjects because Aden had no common border with Egyptian-occupied Yemen. The Consul, however, could not have referred to this fact due to lack of knowledge, as he himself later admitted.

To Palmerston's dispatches of June and July warning him not to occupy Aden, Muhammad 'Ali replied, through Campbell, that he had never entertained such an idea and that he now regarded Aden as a British possession. The mutual boundary, he repeated, was to be the chain of mountains running parallel to the coast. Campbell told him that he did not know what the boundaries of Aden were, but that he had simply to state "that the whole territory under the rule of the Sultan or Governor of Aden must in future be considered as a British territory and be respected as such."⁹¹ Marston suggests that Muhammad 'Ali chose the mountain chain as a boundary in order to ensure his continued control over the coffee-growing area in case the British had plans for expansion.⁹²

When the two months went by and Auckland did not comment on Grant's minute of 26th March, 1838, the Government of Bombay wrote to him again requesting instructions. The Governor-General replied that the establishment of a coal depot at Aden was necessary for steam navigation, but he felt that occupation was a matter to be decided by the Home Government.⁹³

Auckland's reply was dated 2nd July, and Grant died a week later. James Farish, his successor as Acting Governor, was not less enthusiastic about annexing Aden. On 25th August, he wrote to Auckland asking for permission to occupy it; and two days later, he wrote in answer to the Secret Committee's letter of 30th May: "It appears to be the wish of the Home Authorities that the port of Aden should be occupied by this Government without delay; indeed it seems to be their expectation that measures are already in progress to secure this important object; which, however, we beg to state is not the case."⁹⁴

Then, in a minute dated 1st September, Farish directed that Haines, who was in Bombay, should be sent immediately to Aden to conclude "the treaty". "This proceeding will have on the face of it an amicable character, and as he (Haines) should take 30 Europeans as an escort, their presence and the knowledge that a sufficient force is on its way to Aden to occupy it as a possession ceded to us will,

I have no doubt, prevent any shuffling on the part of the Sultan,..."

The reasons which Farish gave for his decision were firstly, his fear that if Muhammad 'Ali took Aden, the blame would fall on him as Governor. Secondly, he felt that time should not be allowed to elapse "without taking some measures to keep alive the claim we have established..."⁹⁵ Thirdly, the monthly steamer was scheduled to leave for Suez on 8th September,⁹⁶ and on her way back she would be able to bring news from Haines in Aden.

Before Haines left Bombay, the Government supplied him with a revised version of the draft treaty (which was not fundamentally different from the original),⁹⁷ a copy of Palmerston's letter to Campbell of 24th May, 1838, the promissory note and "the original deed of transfer". Besides his escort of 30 European soldiers, Haines was to take with him his interpreter and Shaykh Tayyib Ibramji, the former agent at Mukha, who was a close friend of the Sultan and whose influence with him, it was hoped, would be of benefit. Lieut. J. Western of the Engineers was also to go with Haines to report on the fortifications and on what would be necessary for the defence of the place after its occupation.

The Government instructed Haines that if he found Ibrahim Pasha in possession of Aden, he was to inform him officially that he had violated British territory and should evacuate. If Ibrahim refused, Haines was to write to Campbell that he might protest to Muhammad 'Ali and urge him to order his nephew to withdraw. Meanwhile, Haines was not to communicate with the Egyptian force, but to warn its commander "that all plunder or contributions levied on the town will be considered acts of aggression and redress demanded."

Haines was to assure the tribes in the vicinity of Aden that the British were their friends as long as they continued to be theirs. However, he was not to discuss commerce, as this would arouse the jealousy of Muhammad 'Ali and lead to unnecessary complications. Haines was empowered to bribe influential people in Aden and, if necessary, to increase the annual sum of £8700 rather than resort to force. If the Sultan refused to pay the promissory note but agreed to the transfer, the Government would pay the bill.⁹⁸ The Sultan was to be guaranteed protection under the terms of the proposed treaty, and told that as long as British rights and interests were respected, the British would not interfere in tribal quarrels unless their mediation was sought by both parties.

If the Sultan refused to cede Aden, Haines was to tell him that the reparation for the "Darya Dawlat" (£12,000) was not sufficient and would not have been accepted had he not promised to transfer Aden.⁹⁹ If he still persisted in his refusal, Haines was to remind him that the price for Aden (£8700 annually) had been agreed on and that the transfer had been actually made, but the agreement could not be formally ratified because of the conspiracy. If the Sultan now fulfilled "his engagement", the Government would be satisfied that no conspiracy was contemplated. If he broke "his pledged word", he would be considered guilty of the intended plot, and in the likely event of a force being sent to occupy Aden, he would get nothing from the Government.¹⁰⁰

Haines arrived off Aden on board the sloop-of-war "Coote" on 24th October, 1838. From the ship he wrote to the Sultan that he had returned to complete the arrangements for the transfer and invited him on board for discussions; but if he could not come in person, he could send whom he chose on his behalf.¹⁰¹ The Sultan answered that he could not come on account of pain in his legs and that he had entrusted the task of negotiation to his son Ahmad. He also expressed his hope that the affair would be settled to the mutual benefit of the two parties.¹⁰²

Ahmad did not go to meet Haines, but sent a man to get from him the letter which authorised him to conduct negotiations in the name of the Bombay Government.¹⁰³ Instead, Haines sent him the revised treaty and advised him to study it and see that he would get not only £8000 per annum¹⁰⁴ but other advantages as well.¹⁰⁵

Ahmad did not take Haines' advice, and on 31st October, his father decreed that the "Coote" should not be supplied from Aden. At the same time, he sent his boat, the "Choki", to the opposite Somali coast to prevent supplies reaching the British from that quarter. The British retaliated by blockading Aden and capturing the "Choki".¹⁰⁶ Their requirements of wood, water and other provisions were now met by Sultan Ahmad of the Fadlis, Muhsin's neighbour and enemy.

Haines urged the Sultan's son to fulfil the transfer agreement, and threatened that if the question of money was not settled before the troops arrived, the 'Abdalis would not get anything.¹⁰⁷ Then he advised his government to dispatch seven or eight hundred troops and

some vessels for the capture of Aden.¹⁰⁸ The chiefs, he wrote, were using dilatory tactics "until Government may give up all idea of the place, similar to Socotra which they know and speak of".¹⁰⁹ Therefore, he recommended that a letter be sent from the Governor of Bombay to the Sultan, telling him that the blockade would be strictly observed. Such a display of strength would prevent the actual use of force; if no supplies reached the town, the people would give in.¹¹⁰

On 20th November, the Arabs fired at the Coote's pinnace, but no one was hurt. Haines regarded this act as the beginning of hostilities and directed Commander W. Denton of the "Coote" to capture boats belonging to the Sultan or to any of the town's merchants without regard for life or property.¹¹¹ As a result, a number of skirmishes took place in the following fortnight.

Then the Sultan's son sent Rashid Ibn 'Abd Allah to enquire whether Haines was still willing to pay the £8000; Haines answered that the demand was not reasonable, because the 'Abdalis had attacked the British. The Sultan then requested a ten day truce, but Haines would agree only to a permanent peace preceded by the transfer.

Haines attributed the Sultan's desire for a truce to the severity of the blockade.¹¹² His obstinate resistance to the transfer, he thought, was due to his conviction that the British could not spare men for Aden owing to the unsettled state of the countries bordering on India, namely Persia, Afghanistan and Burma.¹¹³

Later the Sultan applied for two days' ceasefire, and Haines agreed, adding: "... but your answer must be decisive; and the only one I can receive to give a permanent peace is, that you immediately deliver up the land of Aden to the British,..."¹¹⁴ The Sultan answered that he was coming to Aden in a week's time.¹¹⁵ However, pain in his legs prevented him from fulfilling his promise.¹¹⁶

In Bombay, on 29th November, the Government acted on Haines' advice and decided to support his negotiations by a show of force. Such a decision was possible because the retreat of the Persians from Herat in September had eased the military situation for the Bombay Government. Besides, Madras had strengthened the Bombay Army by two regiments, one of infantry and one of cavalry.¹¹⁷

Farish wrote to the Sultan that troops were to be sent immediately to exact redress for the "Darya Dawlat" incident and to enforce the fulfilment of the transfer agreement. He advised him to consider the

consequences and to avoid them "by conceding immediately to the just demands of the British Government".¹¹⁸ Haines was instructed "to obtain hostages, should circumstances render such a measure practicable".¹¹⁹ After the arrival of the troops, Haines was to renew negotiations for the cession of Aden. If he failed, measures were to be taken for its occupation.¹²⁰

On 18th December, the coal vessel "Ann Crichton" anchored off Aden, a strong hint to the Sultan that the British were determined to take the peninsula whether he agreed or not. The Sultan ignored the hint, and Haines wrote to him, on 24th December, demanding the cession of Aden and an abject apology for past behaviour. He even sent him an example of the apology he was to make: "... I solicit forgiveness from the British Government, for the past conduct of myself and tribe, and throw myself on their mercy and forgiveness. ... for any remuneration the generosity of the British Government may be pleased to give, for the annual support of myself, family and tribe, I shall be thankful."¹²¹

The Sultan did not accede to either demand. Instead, he went to Aden and from there wrote to Haines that if he wished to see him, he was available. He challenged him to bring with him the letter which transferred Aden to the British. "If you have my letter (the sealed one) show it me; I shall then know it."¹²²

Haines, who had reason to fear going on shore, replied: "... I will not answer any letter you may send until I receive your application for forgiveness."¹²³ The Sultan then offered him half the town; and this having been refused, he suggested \$12,000 for the whole, the same sum Haines had demanded for the "Darya Dawlat", but Haines insisted that he should apologise prior to any friendly communication between them.

The Sultan disregarded Haines' letter and decided to enlist the support of his Fadli neighbour. On 1st January, 1839, a meeting was held between the two, but ended in failure. Then Muhsin enquired of Haines whether he would forgive him if he apologised. Haines' answer being in the affirmative,¹²⁴ the Sultan sent him with Sayyid 'Alawi Ibn Zayn al-'Aydarus what he considered a sufficient apology: "I give you to understand that I came from Lahedge to meet you, after Reshid Ben Abdulla had told me that my son Hamed (Ahmad) and Bedouins had done wrong, and that the English were very angry. They have done

wrong, and I am not willing for this, and never could be, for it is bad, their acting so towards Government or yourself. On this account, I send Syed Zain, Syed Aloose ('Alawi), and Reshid to you, to solicit pardon on my account and on account of my son and Bedouins. I shall be glad to be friends with you, and our hearts to be one. I wish it on account of old friendship - friendship of a very old date."¹²⁵

This was not the apology which Haines wanted, and he therefore returned it to Sayyid 'Alawi, declaring that "it is by war alone that the respect due to the British can be enforced".¹²⁶ To the Bombay Government he wrote: "... the Sultan appears determined not to deliver up Aden ... the sight of troops will bring him to his senses."¹²⁷

The troops arrived on 16th January, in two transports, accompanied by two ships of the Royal Navy, the "Volage" (28 guns) and the brig "Cruizer" (16 guns). The force, which was commanded by Major T.M. Bailie of the 24th Regiment, Native Infantry, consisted of 350 men of that regiment, 300 of the First Bombay European Regiment, 40 European and 60 Indian artillery men, together with pioneers.¹²⁸

The same day the force arrived, Haines addressed a letter to Sultan Muhsin and all the principal men of his tribe, requesting them to transfer Aden peacefully to the British before sunset and assuring them that resistance would be futile. Haines also asked the Sultan for three chiefs as hostages, and once more repeated his demand for an apology.¹²⁹ The Sultan replied that he needed six days to deliberate on the matter.¹³⁰

Haines did not return an answer, but directed Major Bailie, commanding the troops, and Captain H. Smith, commanding the naval force, to plan the attack. The plan completed, the British launched their attack on the morning of 19th January, 1839, and in less than three hours were in possession of Aden.

The British captured Aden when they did because Haines had received a secret message from Rashid Ibn 'Abd Allah to the effect that the inhabitants were preparing the guns for service and they needed only time to get more men. Besides, there was water enough only for a few days.¹³¹

The Bombay Government occupied Aden without permission from the Governor-General, and they could do so because they had the support of the Home Authorities. However, it must be added that under pressure from these authorities, Auckland sanctioned the occupation two days after the actual event.¹³²

The occupation of Aden was overshadowed by the Afghan War and hence it did not receive much publicity. It was not discussed in the House of Commons, and in the House of Lords there was only one question about it. The question was put by Lord Lyndhurst, formerly Lord Chancellor, to the Prime Minister, Viscount Melbourne. In reply, the Prime Minister laid before the House the correspondence relating to Aden.¹³³

By 1837 the Bombay Government had decided that possession of Aden was essential. They were afraid that a hostile power might seize it and use it as a forward base against India. The Government also thought that the peninsula would be a good observation post should the French re-occupy Egypt and a centre of operations against that country should the British decide to attack it. Another reason for taking Aden was its commercial potential, but the overriding factor was its value as a coal depot on the Red Sea route.

The British were determined to acquire Aden, and the "Darya Dawlat" incident was welcomed as a means of putting pressure on the Sultan to cede it to them on their own terms. Muhsin would have gladly given them a depot in return for an offensive-defensive alliance, but at no time was he ready to part with Aden. Even his sealed letter did not constitute a legal transfer, although the British chose to regard it as such. In the face of Haines' determination, the Sultan used dilatory tactics and laid down impossible conditions. The Bombay Government did their best to take Aden by diplomacy; but when they failed, they took it by force.

CHAPTER III.

THE GROWTH OF THE SETTLEMENT.

Before the 16th century, Aden was a prominent commercial centre due to its strategic position between India and Egypt, its harbour which provided good anchorage, and its natural strength manifest in the surrounding hills. Indian and other Eastern products bound for Europe were brought to Aden and then shipped to Egypt where they were channelled through Alexandria to the West. The town was also the entrepot for the trade of the East African coast and the southern Red Sea and the southern terminus of all caravan routes through Arabia. The Romans called Aden "Romanum Emporium".

The same factors which contributed to Aden's commercial importance also combined to render it an important military post, hence its fortification by the different rulers. The ruins which were still visible at the time of the British occupation showed how strong and extensive its defences had been. All the mountain passes had been fortified, and at every commanding point there was a fort, a tower or a turret. On the Shamsan range, overlooking the town, had been a wall four miles long, and other walls had been built on both the northern and the southern sides of the Main Pass. At Darb al-Hawsh, a gap on the northern side, there had been a gateway and breastwork. Sirah Island had been strongly defended with numerous works.

On the Mansuri range of hills which separated the town from the Isthmus was a ruined wall flanked at intervals by irregular bastions. Across the Isthmus itself, from shore to shore, was a wall which the Arabs called "Darb al-'Arabi" (the Arab Wall), and which the British, starting with Haines, called "the Turkish Wall" (believing it to have been built by the Turks), and they continued to refer to it as such even after they had replaced it with a new one. The ruins of the sea defences attested to their former strength.¹

The prosperity of Aden suggests that it had a sizable population. L'Engren writes that in 1276, the year of Marco Polo's visit, it had 80,000 inhabitants,² but he does not quote the source of his information. Marco Polo himself gives no figure, and there is nothing to suggest that he visited Aden. In any event, it is certain that he did not visit it in 1276.³ Whatever the population may have been, it is unlikely that it amounted to 80,000. The town was in the Crater,

which has an area of only three square miles, not all of it fit for building.

For water, the inhabitants depended in the first instance on wells. When a more reliable source became necessary, because of drought or heavy consumption, tanks for collecting rainwater were cut in tiers in the solid rock. When the uppermost was full, it overflowed into the next, and so on until they were all full.

It is not known when or by whom these tanks were built. Some attribute their construction to the Himyarites, and date them back to 1500 B.C. Others believe that they were built by the Persians during their second invasion of the Yemen about 600 A.D. Still others maintain that they were constructed by the Turks after their occupation of the Yemen in 1538. The first two theories are worth investigating, but the third is to be discarded. Ibn Battutah, the great Moroccan traveller who visited Aden in the 14th century, mentioned its tanks.⁴

The number of the tanks at the end of the 15th century is nowhere given, nor is there any indication as to their capacity and condition, but it is clear that there was not enough water in the town. To relieve this shortage, the sovereign of the Yemen, Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Tahir, built an aqueduct to bring water from Bir Hamid, a village eight miles away in what was later Hadli territory. In addition, water was brought from the interior in great quantities on camels.⁵

In 1498, the discovery of the sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope enabled European merchants to trade with that country direct, and Aden ceased to be an important entrepot between the East and the West. The Ottoman occupation in 1538 contributed still further to its decline; Aden became a garrison town, and Mukha soon replaced it as the centre of trade for the Yemen. Without giving a reference, Playfair writes that Aden's population in the 17th century was 30,000,⁶ implying that although it had greatly declined, it was still an important city. However, the accounts given by the merchants of the East India Company early in that century cast doubt on this figure.

What cannot be doubted is that in 1839, the year of the British occupation, Aden was but a small village. Lieut. J.R. Wellsted, I.N., who visited Aden with Haines in 1835, mentions in his book

"Travels in Arabia", published in 1838, that the inhabitants were not more than 800. Of these, a few were Banyans, between 250 and 300 were Jews and the rest were "descendants of Arabs, Somalis and offspring of slaves".⁷ Haines, who revisited Aden in 1837 and 1838, writes in his memoir, submitted to the Bombay Government in the latter year, that the population numbered 600: 300 Arabs, 250 Jews and 50 Banyans. Captain F.M. Hunter, Assistant Resident at Aden (1871-88), gives the population at the time of the occupation as 6000,⁸ which clearly could not have been the case. The mistake may have been due to a printing error or to the inadvertant addition of a nought by the writer himself.

Most of the Arabs gained their livelihood by fishing and supplying the pilgrim boats with water and firewood. Some Jews earned their living by distilling from raisins an intoxicating drink which they sold to the Arabs in great quantities. Some used their houses as shops where they sold grain and other articles of small value, while a number caught fish with nets along the beach. The Jews were also the porters, bricklayers and artisans of Aden and Lahj.

The Banyans were Hindu merchants who came from the Gujerat area, and for centuries had traded with Aden as well as with other Arabian ports. They monopolised almost the whole of the Red Sea trade in myrrh and gum. Aden's commerce, little as it was, was nearly all in their hands, and because of this monopoly they wielded great influence.⁹

The people lived in about 100 houses built mainly of baked mud. The largest and best was the one occupied by Sultan Muhsin when he was in Aden. Later, this house was acquired by Haines and remained his official residence until 1842.

There were several mosques in Aden, the oldest of which was the one where, it is said, the Fourth Orthodox Caliph, 'Ali, prayed. However, the only mosque kept in good repair was the one which contained the tomb of Shaykh 'Aydarus, the Wali (patron saint) of Aden. The shrine was supported by visitors to the town, and the descendants of the Shaykh, who were the custodians of his tomb, benefited greatly from the gifts.¹⁰

The tanks were all in disrepair, and some had even been concealed by sand and debris. The aqueduct was in ruins. The wells, estimated at 300,¹¹ were in a state of neglect. The streets were choked with

the rubble of fallen dwellings. Tombs, mounds and heaps of rubbish formed the landscape. The fortifications had all crumbled; drift sand had filled the breaches and covered the whole. Such was Aden when the British seized it from Sultan Muhsin, and the purpose of this chapter is to trace its growth under their rule in the light of the value set upon it.

Security against tribal attacks was the first concern of the new conquerors, and therefore Lieut. Western, now Executive Engineer, urged the temporary repair of the Turkish Wall. As a site for the military camp, he proposed the whole seafront in Eastern Bay where the occupying force had pitched its tents. One line of barracks was to be built at the northern end, and another at the southern, with quarters for the officers in the middle. The space behind the camp, in the direction of the 'Aydarus Valley, was to be a parade ground.

Western further suggested that the fishermen be moved to Bandar Huqqat outside the Southern Gate where they would not interfere with the camp. The rest of the inhabitants were to be settled in the Tawilah and 'Aydarus Valleys south of the town. The bazaar was to be near the Main Pass.¹²

The Bombay Government, who were more interested in the commercial, than the military, aspect of the town, did not sanction Western's plan for the camp because the site which he had chosen was the most convenient for trade. "The commercial advantages of Aden being of the highest importance with regard to that place, these must have primary consideration in the arrangement of the town and public buildings, and the Governor in Council (Farish) therefore requests that in planning out the town, and selecting sites for public buildings, this object be kept distinctly in view and strictly attended to."¹³

To draw up a new plan, the Government sent to Aden Captain R. Foster, Superintendent of Roads and Tanks, Konkan. He was to plan the defences of the Settlement against an Arab or European attack and "to lay out the town with reference to its becoming a place for great commercial resort".¹⁴

Foster arrived in Aden early in March 1839, and submitted his first report at the end of that month. By then, work on the Turkish Wall had started, and Foster agreed with Western that as a

temporary defence this was necessary. Furthermore, he recommended the repair of the old gateway and breastwork at Darb-al-Hawsh and the building, in the Crater, of a fort to command the approaches to the Main Pass, having a gun battery at either end and in front an open space of about 200 yards, i.e. out of matchlock range. Thus if any body of men succeeded in scrambling over the hills and descending into the Crater, it would be exposed to the fire; and if the guns were mounted on swivels, they could be brought to bear in any direction required.

For permanent fortifications against an Arab attack, the gateway and breastwork at Darb al-Hawsh in the Mansuri range were to be replaced by new ones, and the hills were to be scarped from that point to the sea. The fort was to be strengthened, and more guns were to be mounted. At night, the open space in front would be patrolled by a body of horse which would give warning of Arabs attempting to pass over the hills. By this plan, the Turkish Wall would be unnecessary. However, extensive fieldworks along its line would be necessary against a regular land siege by a large European force, for heavy artillery could fire shells into the town from the foot of the hills.

The land fortifications, with the addition of batteries on Sirah and along the seafront, would enable the garrison, then numbering 929, to defend Aden against a European naval force of from two to three thousand men. Against a larger naval force, heavy batteries on Ras Ma'ashiq would be required as well. In the first case, the cost would be \$200,000, and in the second, \$400,000.

Tawahi, where the coal depot was situated and the new harbour was being developed, was four and a half miles from the Isthmus and six miles from the Crater, too far for its defences to be connected with theirs. Therefore, Foster proposed that it should be protected by a blockship capable of holding 600 tons of coal and armed with guns covering the land and sea. As a precaution against an attack by a large European fleet, batteries on Ras Tarashan and Ras Marbat would also be necessary.

Foster's plan for the camp did not differ greatly from Western's. However, Foster thought that if the town were to become a great commercial port, the garrison could be concentrated in the centre of Eastern Bay, and the space on either side could be occupied by merchants. If the merchants required still more room, they could build

within the military limits, but this was a consideration for the future. At present there was sufficient space between the proposed military lines and the 'Aydarus Valley to the south and the Khusaf Valley to the north.

Western had intended to take a count of the wells and tanks which could be cleared out, but the rejection of his plan and the appointment of Foster to draw up a new one made his efforts unnecessary. Foster gave no number of wells or tanks, but reported that Aden appeared to have enough drinking water in the four wells then in use. The depth of water in these wells in the evening varied according to the demand during the day, but they generally recovered during the night. In addition, there were several other wells which contained sweet water, but were seldom used.

However, the great number of wells which were choked up, the many ruined tanks and the traces of the aqueduct which had once brought water from the interior all rightly suggested to him that Aden had suffered in the past from severe drought. Therefore, he felt that the British should guard against such a contingency by cleaning out and repairing all the promising wells and tanks, and by boring for more water in Western Bay.¹⁵

The Bombay Government approved of the defences proposed by Foster, but directed that only such works as were essential for the immediate safety of the town were to be carried out. The inner defences were not to be commenced until "higher authority" had been consulted, and no native was to build within their limits until the question regarding them had been settled. Wherever the town was built, it should be laid out to a regular plan.

Foster's plan for the camp was not sanctioned. Like that of Western, it allocated too much space to the garrison at the expense of a population which the Government believed would grow rapidly.¹⁶

The setting up of the camp meant initially the removal of several huts from Eastern Bay. Haines, who immediately after the occupation followed a friendly and conciliatory policy, deemed it correct to compensate the owners of these dwellings, although he acknowledged that the town was now British property.¹⁷ If Foster's plan was to be carried out, further expense would be incurred in paying compensation for the other houses to be demolished. Moreover, the Commander of the Garrison himself was of the opinion that the

military lines could be narrowed and still leave the troops with ample room. The Government marked the line within which the camp was to be confined;¹⁸ but in the absence of Foster's plan, it is not possible to tell what limits they set.

"Higher authority" (Lord Auckland) considered it sufficient for the time being to secure Aden against Arab attacks. Plans for defending it against a European enemy by land, valuable as they were, could be deferred. However, they should be kept on record and all improvements made with reference to them. The Governor-General did not think that an attack by sea was likely.¹⁹ The Secret Committee also agreed that for the present it would be sufficient to fortify Aden against Arab attacks only.²⁰

In May, a few weeks after his return to Bombay, Foster submitted another plan for the defence of Aden against a small European force, and its cost he estimated at \$100,000, only half of that of the first plan. He recommended that if Western Bay was healthy and water could be found there, it should be the site for the camp and for a new town. The defences which he thought would be necessary here were a martello tower and battery on both Ras Tarashan and Ras Marbat, a strong gateway at Ras Hujayf and a fieldwork running from the western end of the Mansuri range down to the sea.

In addition, the scarping of the range and the fortification of Darb al-Hawsh, Sirah and Ras Ma'ashiq would still be necessary. From the latter two positions, the British could command the old town; and if an enemy succeeded in storming it, he would not be able to hold it. In any event, the wealth would be in the new town where the merchants and other immigrants would have settled.²¹

In August Foster strengthened his argument in favour of abandoning the old town. During the north-east monsoon, the easterly winds "often"²² rendered Eastern Bay unsafe, while Western Bay was always calm. The coal depot was in Western Bay, and here all naval and merchant vessels would eventually come. Here too, therefore, the defences and garrison would be required.

If the camp were moved to Western Bay between the headlands of Tarashan and Marbat where the main batteries would be, the merchants would follow, not only for protection, but also for commercial reasons; they would be nearer the shipping, and thus be saved porterage expenses to and from the Crater. Then the old town would no longer be the

chief target for an attack. Therefore, nothing more should be done in the Crater other than strengthening the South Gate and connecting it with a battery for the protection of Huqqat and Duras Bays and for subduing the townspeople in the event of a rebellion.

Like Auckland, Foster did not think that Aden would be attacked by a large fleet. He argued that no European power would send its fleet to assault a settlement which had nothing but "a valuable harbour", passing by many rich colonies on the way. In any case, no large fleet could sail from Europe all the way to Aden without being detected. A surprise attack might be tried by a frigate or two based at a nearby station,²³ but this could be repulsed without extensive fortifications. Foster considered that a garrison of eight or nine hundred would be sufficient if supported by a body of from 75 to 100 horse.²⁴

Lieut. Western died of sunstroke on 4th June, 1840, and was succeeded by Lieut. J.A. Curtis. Curtis disagreed with Foster as to the wisdom of abandoning the Turkish Wall under any circumstances. He argued that it would be easier to defend the Wall than the Mansuri range since it was shorter and allowed better use of artillery. He also objected to cantoning the garrison in Eastern Bay for three reasons:-

1. Space was limited and the garrison had increased. In April 1839, it was 929, and on 1st October, 1840, it was 1890.
2. The town separated the camp from the sweet water wells in the Khusaf Valley. In case of hostilities by the inhabitants, the garrison might be cut off from the wells, if only temporarily.
3. Compensation would have to be paid for the rest of the buildings to be removed.

Curtis suggested that the garrison should be moved to the Khusaf Valley and be separated from the town by a palisade. The civil population would thus have the entire seafront, while the troops would have ample space and a never-failing supply of water. If the Turkish Wall was retained, there would be no people between it and the camp, and the garrison would be nearer the outworks, in a good position to quell any disturbance in the town.²⁵

By June 1840, only the defences most essential to repel an Arab attack had been temporarily repaired and their strength tested. These were the Turkish Wall, the Main Pass Gate and the wall on the

Mansuri range. Work on scarping the range had been started, and the blockship "Charger" had been positioned off the coal depot where she remained until 1847, when she was broken up.

The British presence in Aden was quick to attract immigrants and change the character of the town. People came from the interior of Arabia, the East African coast, India and other places. The peninsula had to be fortified, the town rebuilt, the harbour in Western Bay developed, the steamers coaled, the garrison fed and many other new requirements met. The British wanted workers, and many wanted work.

About six weeks after the occupation, the population²⁶ had risen to 1295, as shown below:

	Males	Females
Arabs	283	341
Jews	267	301
Somalis	26	37
Banyans	35	- - - 27
Egyptians	4	- - -

The Arabs and Jews came from the interior. The Somalis had for centuries traded with Aden, but now some started to bring their families and settle there. The Banyans, however, continued without families, and their houses, the only stone ones before the occupation, were mainly for business purposes. The Egyptians were deserters from Muhammad 'Ali's army in the Yemen.

At the beginning of a period of rapid immigration, one would expect the figures for men to be higher than those for women, but here, strangely enough, the reverse is the case. An explanation may be that the Arabs, Jews and Somalis all came from a short distance, and the company of their wives and daughters was not a great inconvenience. If necessary, a family, or part of it, could go back as easily as they came.

The population figures quoted in this work cannot be considered accurate. The Muslims did not give the right number of females in their households,²⁸ which served to decrease the actual figures. Other factors tended to increase them. Many Somalis and Arabs who went to Aden were not married or did not have their families with them. They lived in tribal groups, taking their meals in the eating-house and sleeping where they happened to be when night fell, in

coffee-shops or even in the open. Such itinerants, the idlers waiting to be hired, and the labourers who were continuously coming in and going out - all these could be counted more than once.²⁹ Thus the figures give only a general picture of the growth of the Settlement.

There is no mention in the sources as to the method used for taking a census, but it seems that at the time announced for one, efforts were made to count everybody who happened to be within British limits, residents and visitors alike. Race, religion, country of origin and occupation were all used for purposes of enumeration, with inevitable overlapping.

By September 1839, the population had increased by 1613, and the increase was as follows:

	Males	Females
Arabs	711	348
Somalis	274	203
Jews	46	6
Banyans	25	- - - 30

The increase in the civil and military population made necessary the drawing of new lines for the camp, and this task was entrusted to a committee from the Aden garrison headed by Captain E. Hallam. In carrying out their duty, the committee were to bear in mind the mercantile interest of the new Settlement. They, however, with the interest of the garrison paramount in their minds, proposed that the whole seafront in Eastern Bay be reserved for the European troops, and the space in the direction of the Main Pass for the sepoy, thus establishing in effect two separate camps. The inhabitants, they claimed, would still have ample space towards the 'Aydarus Valley.

For the reasons given by Foster, the committee believed that Western Bay, and not the Crater, would become the centre of trade once it had been made secure. The place was healthy and had such good sites for building that it would attract even Europeans. Water was the only problem; but if a good road were made from the Khusaf and conveyances provided, it could be transported very cheaply. Boring for water in Western Bay had started, and the committee recommended that it should continue.³¹

Haines, with commerce as his priority, objected to the committee's plan and made his views known to them and to the Government. To Hallam he wrote that under the proposed arrangement, half

the building ground in the Crater, the half which happened to be more convenient for trade, would be appropriated by the military. The area of the camp would be 114 acres, and the space separating the European troops from the sepoy would nearly double it. No civilian would build between the military lines, and the space would thus be wasted. The military would also want roads through the town to the wells in the Khusaf, and the civil population would require roads through the European camp to the beach, which would in both cases mean less space for building and more opportunity for friction.³²

In his letter to the Government, Haines pointed out the necessity of not building roads through the European camp and suggested that it should not extend southward further than the customs-house which was opposite Sirah mole. He wanted the space between the customs-house and the South Gate for the merchants and others. This arrangement would prevent any conflict between the military and civil populations and any interference with trade. Haines reminded the Government that the committee's plan was not different from that of Western which they had rejected for commercial reasons.³³

The Governor, Sir James Carnac, felt that if the military had their way, the commerce of Aden would suffer, and thus one of the objects of acquiring the peninsula would be thwarted. He therefore ruled that the Camp should not occupy the whole seafront,³⁴ and Lieut.-Gen. T. McMahon, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, agreed.³⁵ Thus Haines had his way.

In the first two years of the occupation, the town succeeded mainly in attracting labourers, and its failure to attract merchants was due to insecurity and lack of opportunity to build substantial houses. The tribes made three attacks and others were threatened. The authorities had, so far, failed to agree on a plan for the town, a plan which would unavoidably be connected with the defences. Under these circumstances, a settler was afraid to build lest the land might be required later for military purposes. Such cases were not unknown.

To remedy this situation, Haines recommended in 1840 that no ground rent should be levied before 1842,³⁶ and in 1842 he recommended that permanent fortifications should be erected to satisfy the merchants that their property was protected.³⁷ The second recommendation needed a long time to be carried out, but the first was acted on immediately.

The Government wrote that every inducement should be offered to people to reside permanently in Aden, and expressed their hope that the events at Mukha would foster immigration, as they actually did. In 1840, the people of Mukha, and the merchants in particular, were fleeing from the oppressive rule of Sharif Husayn of Abu 'Arish. who succeeded to the government of the Tihama after the Egyptian withdrawal in April 1840.

The Government authorised Haines to assign sites for building, but cautioned him that the town should not encroach upon the military limits or interfere with the defences. As regards the levy of ground rent, they agreed to its postponement and left Haines to fix the rate, but thought that it should be moderate to encourage new settlers.³⁸

In 1842, no ground rent was levied; and in the following year, at the suggestion of Haines, the Government decided that initially the rate should be one pie per square yard per annum. However, payment was continually postponed until 1855, and in 1860 the rate was doubled. Haines' argument for postponing the payment was always the same, it would encourage building.³⁹

This policy and the British success in repelling the tribes had the desired effect; merchants now settled in Aden in the knowledge that the British could protect them and their property. On 13th May, 1842, Haines reported that he had allocated ground for several large houses and 153 shops of stone, and many other shops of mat and bamboo.⁴⁰ The settler was to build within a given period, otherwise the land was to be taken from him and given to somebody else. If at a future date the Government found it necessary to demolish a certain building, it was to pay the owner a fair compensation and grant him another site.⁴¹

As a precaution against fire, Haines ruled that all houses built in the new town should be of stone. He allowed each a frontage of 75 feet and stipulated that it should be two storeys high and chunamed. When it was completed, the chunam (prepared lime) on the outside was to be coloured to minimise the glare of the sun. To ensure that regularity and level were attended to, the Executive Engineer himself was to mark out the lines of streets, houses, etc., and the actual building was to be supervised by a few of his overseers.⁴² The sites were granted to the applicants on condition that they should pay ground rent when called upon.⁴³

The people of Aden were mainly poor and could not afford to build stone houses. Therefore, the Khusaf was set apart for those who could only build dwellings of inflammable materials such as mat and reed. Here, there was no danger that a fire might spread to the other parts of the town because the wind blew up this valley. The 'Aydarus Valley was reserved for the wealthy inhabitants. The bazaar was placed in a central position at the town end of the Main Pass.⁴⁴ In the 1860's, there is mention of another bazaar to the south.

The population continued to grow rapidly until, in November 1842, it reached 16,587, as shown below:

	Males	Females
Arabs	8960	3270
Somalis	1430	620
Jews	590	480
Afghans	180	100
Egyptians	146	50
Portuguese	136	- - -
Sidis 45	180	- - -
Banyans	196	- - -
Borahs 46	111	- - -
Indian Shopkeepers	100	- - -
Parsis	38	- - - 47

By contrast with the census of March 1839, the males here heavily outnumbered the females, a pattern usually associated with a rapidly growing town. The new census also shows that the population not only increased in number, but also became greatly diversified.

In 1842, the Somali men worked chiefly as horsekeepers to the European officers, while the young women sold mats woven by their elder relatives and carried water from the wells for sale in the town. Parsis and Muslims from Bombay were selling in their shops goods of the latest fashion. The peasants from Lahj were the poorest of the inhabitants. They sought employment as weekly or day labourers.⁴⁸

The ratio of females to males among the Egyptians (one to three) suggests that when Muhammad 'Ali's army withdrew from the Yemen, some deserters went to Aden with their families, or married there and for census purposes their wives were counted as Egyptian. The Afghans may have been pilgrims on their way to or from the Hijaz. The Portuguese, too, were only passing through.

The plans submitted by Western, Foster and Curtis do not seem to have helped the Bombay Government in adopting a comprehensive system of defence for Aden. Now that the population had considerably

increased, it became necessary to devise "one complete and definite plan for the defences of the peninsula". This duty was entrusted to a special committee made up of Majors W. Jacob (Brigade of Artillery) and C.W. Grant (Corps of Engineers). The Committee were to keep in mind the plans drawn by Foster and Curtis and draw up one of their own by which Aden was to be made defensible against an Arab attack and a siege by a large European force. They were also to study Aden's sufficiency as "a civil depot" and the means of securing a supply of good water for the garrison, town and shipping.⁴⁹

Jacob and Grant arrived in Aden on 11th December, 1842, and were there for four months. Their survey made them reject Foster's plans. They objected to moving the town and garrison to Western Bay because no water had been found there, and they were against contact between the military and civil populations. Under their plan, the inhabitants were to remain in the Crater, and the main body of troops was to be moved to the Isthmus which would then become the key point of the land defences. Thus the garrison could be kept small and effective.

The Committee saw the need for a line of defence across the Isthmus and for the garrison to be stationed between it and the Mansuris. The slope of the hills facing the Isthmus was easy to scale, while that facing the town was precipitous. Therefore, Jacob and Grant had no fear of an attack on the garrison by the inhabitants and a revolt could be easily quelled by batteries on the heights. For communication with the town, the Committee proposed a ramp road from the Main Pass by the gap at Darb al-Hawsh, and this road was to be reserved for the military.

There were no wells at the Isthmus, but the Committee were confident that water could be found; the soil there was exactly like that at the nearby village of Shaykh 'Uthman where water was abundant. However, even if boring proved unsuccessful, water could be piped from the Khusaf. The upper part of this valley, where the wells were situated, was from 40 to 54 feet higher than the Main Pass, and there would be no difficulty in pumping water to the Isthmus. Iron pipes could run from a reservoir at the wells along the Main Pass and through the gap at Darb al-Hawsh to two reservoirs in the camp, one for the European troops and one for the sepoy. A third reservoir could be built on the shore to supply the shipping. The three reservoirs would have a total capacity of 7020 cubic feet.

Jacob and Grant believed that Aden would never experience a shortage of water. According to them there were in the Settlement, in 1843, 107 wells of potable water. Of these, 27 were in the Khusaf Valley, but only six were in working order. The water in them was generally better than that at Bombay, and their source appeared to be independent of local climatic conditions. They never failed, and the supply of water could be increased if more wells were cleared out.⁵⁰

In this, the Committee were not only confirming Foster's observations, but those of Haines as well. Answering a letter from them about Aden's water requirements, Haines wrote on 12th December, 1842: "Even with the increased expenditure of water consequent upon the rapidly increasing population, no diminution or want has taken place." Some wells had six or seven inches less water in them in the evening, but the supply was always replenished during the night.⁵¹

The Committee were against further attempts to find water in Western Bay, as they did not think it desirable that merchants should be encouraged to settle there. If a large town were to spring up next to the Isthmus, this would limit the recreational facilities of the troops; and if the troops were to mix with the inhabitants, they would have more opportunity to drink, and this would ruin their health. In other words, the benefits sought from separating the Camp from the town would be negated. However, they asserted that from a military point of view, a new town in Western Bay would not pose a threat to the Settlement while the garrison held the Isthmus position. From the sea, the town would be protected by batteries on Ras Marbat and Jazirat Shaykh Ahmad (Flint Island).

Majors Jacob and Grant stated that in peacetime Aden needed a garrison of 1186 men (1140 artillery and infantry and 46 cavalry). Their estimate of the force required to resist a regular European siege was 3593 men (3501 artillery and infantry and 92 cavalry). As for the cost of the land defences necessary to withstand European and Arab attacks, they calculated it to be Rs. 662,039.⁵²

It is clear from the records that on 11th June, 1844, the Committee submitted a report on the sea defences, but this cannot be traced and, as will be seen, it did not receive much consideration. Their report on the land defences quoted above was forwarded to Lord Ellenborough for his decision. The Governor-General expressed no opinion and sent it to the Court of Directors. "The question of

what fortifications there shall be at that place (Aden) can be disposed of as well in England as in India, and His Lordship suggests that the whole correspondence on the subject be referred to the Home Authorities for orders."⁵³ Lord Ellenborough himself, it must be noted, did not set a high value on Aden. He did not see in it more than a coal depot which could be protected at a small expense. If that was not possible, it might be better to abandon it.⁵⁴

In London, the Court approved of the Committee's plan. However, they asked Lieut.-Gen. Sir Henry Hardinge (later Lord Hardinge), the incoming Governor-General, to inspect the defences of Aden on his way to India and give his opinion on the recommendations of the Special Committee. Hardinge agreed with the Committee in principle, but thought that the defences had been planned on an unnecessarily large scale. Like Foster and Auckland, he saw no probability of Aden's being besieged by a large European force and asked where such a force was to come from. In his view, the distance involved and the lack of food resources in the surrounding country would make a siege impossible. His orders were therefore that the garrison and fortifications should be sufficient only to keep the population in check and to resist an attack by Arabs or by a small European force.

In Hardinge's opinion, Aden could be made secure against a land or sea attack by fortifying a distance of 1800 yards across the Isthmus and scarping another 1800 yards from Mount Hadid to the Main Pass. If a French danger threatened again from Egypt, or were to threaten from the Comoro Islands (in the Mozambique Channel),⁵⁵ additional works could be constructed. However, the British, in possession of Aden and with naval supremacy in the Red Sea, would have nothing to fear.

Hardinge did not share the general confidence as to the abundance of water in Aden, and recommended that more boring experiments should be made at the Isthmus and at Western Bay. He wanted the Isthmus reservoirs to contain 150,000 cubic feet (approximately 934,500 gallons), and not 7020 cubic feet (approximately 43,735 gallons). If a sufficient supply of water could not be provided, the troops should be located to the north of the Crater, between the town and the Main Pass, roughly as suggested by Curtis.

If water could be found in Western Bay, Hardinge, for the same reasons given by Foster, was certain that merchants would be attracted

to it and a new town would spring up. New settlers would be welcome as a counterbalance to the local Arabs who might rebel, and the customs dues from the increase in trade would partly re-imburse the Government for its expenditure on defences. However, the water situation might make necessary some restriction on immigration.

Hardinge asked the Committee to revise their plan in accordance with his observations.⁵⁶ This they did, effecting a saving of Rs. 146,133, only about a fifth of the original figure. The garrison was cut down to 1212 men in peace, and 1696 in war, with 23 horse to patrol always outside the Turkish Wall.⁵⁷

While making these reductions, the Committee still urged the adoption of their original plan, stressing that the works they had proposed were not larger or stronger than necessary, and that in the long run they would prove more economical. If Aden were strong, enemies would be discouraged from attacking it, while if it were weak, it would invite aggression. The defences should be strongly built from the beginning. If they were to be strengthened when the occasion demanded, it would be too late; workers, artificers and troops would all have to be rushed from Bombay.

In answer to Hardinge's question, as to where a large force would come from to besiege Aden, the Committee replied that it could come from as far as Egypt, and gave as examples the Egyptian expeditions to Arabia in 1818 and 1833. On both occasions, a large army equipped with heavy artillery had covered as great a distance as it would have done if it had come to Aden. If the Egyptians in the Yemen had wanted to march on Aden, there was nothing to stop them.

Now a siege could be laid to Aden by a force sent direct from Egypt, by an Ottoman force from the Hijaz, by the Imam of San'a, or by the chiefs of the great Yemeni tribes, such as the 'Asiris. In addition, the Committee claimed that French emissaries, dressed and living as Arabs, were active among the tribes, and it was possible for France to take Aden through Arab agency. They also reported a rumour current in Mukha that in the event of a European war, France would attack Aden by sea, and Sharif Husayn of Abu 'Arish with the 'Asiris would attack by land.

The Committee re-iterated that the wells had enough water, and all that was required was the building of larger reservoirs at the Isthmus holding a month's supply. A town on Western Bay would have

many advantages from a commercial point of view over one in the Crater, and it would also be easy to pipe water to it. However, there would be serious disadvantages. For their water, the inhabitants would be entirely dependent on the troops who would have control of the pipeline, and this dependence might arouse their suspicions. The town would separate the Isthmus Position from Tawahi, the troops would be deprived of space for recreation and it would be impossible to prevent them from mixing with the population.⁵⁸

Hardinge was not convinced by the Committee's reasoning. In March 1845, he wrote that the sea defences of Aden were of secondary importance,⁵⁹ and in May, he emphasised that Aden did not deserve special treatment. It was not more important than Singapore, Hong Kong or the island of Labuan at the mouth of the Borneo River. These places had the same function as Aden, being links along the sea route through Egypt to China. Singapore was practically defenceless, and Hong Kong and Labuan were to have only a few sea batteries.

Aden was less exposed to an attack by sea than any of these stations; and if in time of war an enemy wanted to interrupt Britain's steam navigation by seizing one of her naval bases, Aden would be the last choice. The enemy would not attack it, knowing that the British had large powerful steamers capable of carrying heavy guns and of transporting from Bombay 1000 soldiers at a time. The Governor-General asserted that in view of the distance to be covered, a siege by a force from Egypt was as improbable as one by a force from Europe. A long voyage or a long march by a large army with heavy ordnance could not be concealed. In seven days, the naval and military resources of India would be brought to bear upon Aden quickly and effectively.

Hardinge's argument had a number of weak points. By virtue of its position, half way between Bombay and Suez, Aden was more important than the other places he mentioned and also more exposed to an attack by sea. If the French had thought of attacking any British naval base outside Europe, it would have been Aden, and not distant Singapore, Hong Kong or Labuan. Judging by the slow administrative machinery of the E.I.C., Hardinge was unduly optimistic to think that a force from India could reach Aden in seven days. He also failed to comment on a possible attack from the Hijaz or the Yemen.

However, the Governor-General laid it down as a final and binding decision that the fortifications should be built on a reduced scale. As for the amount of water to be stored in the reservoirs at the Isthmus, he adhered to his instruction that it should always be 150,000 cubic feet to ensure the independence of the garrison. The supply to the town and the restriction on its population were questions to be decided when the results of boring were known.⁶⁰

The results proved negative, and Lord Hardinge ordered that the population should be limited to the available supply of water. He also recommended that the Bombay Government should request the Colonial Office, through the Court of Directors, for full information on the law by which the number of inhabitants of Gibraltar was regulated and on every other point which might be applied "to so important a station as Aden".⁶¹

The Governor-General did not feel that there was sufficient restriction on the building of houses, and he was afraid that private dwellings might interfere with the plans for fortifying the Settlement. For military reasons, he decided that no houses should be built too close to the Khusaf Valley and the Main Pass, and until the fortifications were completed, no building whatsoever should be allowed on Western Bay.

Now that Aden was "to be converted into a fortified place of some importance", Hardinge thought that the advantages and disadvantages of allowing a new town on Western Bay should be weighed. He himself argued that the commercial advantages would be very small compared with the military disadvantages, a change to the Special Committee's opinion. A large suburb on Western Bay would make difficult the defence of the Settlement in general and the harbour in particular; the troops would not be able to pass through it with ease and speed.

If Western Bay were to be inhabited by a multi-racial population as the Crater was, the British would have to face the same problems they were facing there. In an emergency, the loyalty of a mixed population could not be guaranteed; and in support of his argument, Hardinge reminded the Government of Bombay of how, in August 1846, when Sayyid Isma'il threatened to attack, many people had fled the town believing that he would succeed.⁶² Since the British must be prepared always "to a certain extent" for internal insurrection as well as external aggression, the population should be confined to the town in

its existing dimensions; this would facilitate the detection and suppression of any trouble.

Hardinge's argument against a town on Western Bay similar to that in the Crater was not without flaws. A multi-racial population in a colony is generally a safeguard against an uprising because the diverse elements composing it can hardly be expected to unite in a common cause. When Sayyid Isma'il attacked, the superstitious among the Arabs fled the Settlement, but no Arabs or non-Arabs seized the opportunity to rise against the British. The same was true at the time of the Mutiny in India. Yet this fear made the British develop Tawahi as a European township.

The Governor-General directed that houses already built outside the Main Pass should be valued. Improvements and additions made to them later were not to be taken into account if compensation was paid in the future. He therefore recommended that no building sites be granted outside the Main Pass without the express permission of the Bombay Government and that the power of resumption be clearly understood in each case. "In all probability, these matters have already been provided for, and I am not aware that any imprudent grants have been made or houses built (on Western Bay),"⁶³

The fact was that grants had been made and houses built. To encourage building outside the Main Pass and along Western Bay, Haines had suggested, and the Bombay Government had agreed in 1843, that the ground rent in these areas should be only half of that levied in the Crater.⁶⁴

In the mean time, the fortifications temporarily erected in the first seven years were gradually replaced by permanent ones on the principles laid down by Hardinge. The land defences formed a triangle. The first side was the line of fortification built in place of the old Turkish Wall; the second was the line of hills from Mount Hadid on the western shore to the Main Pass; and the third was the line of hills from the Main Pass to the eastern shore. The sea defences consisted of batteries on Sirah Island and Ras Ma'ashiq on the east, and on Ras Marbat and Jazirat Shaykh Ahmad on the west. When Hardinge inspected the defences on his way home in February 1848, he expressed general satisfaction, but thought that some works were larger than necessary.⁶⁵ Hardinge's recommendation that the garrison should always have in store 150,000 cubic feet of water was not put into effect until 1857, when three reservoirs were built at the Isthmus, each holding 50,000 cubic feet.

In contrast with the defences, no plan was ever drawn up for the town. In 1845, Haines was asked to submit one, but he answered that he could not do so until the position of the Camp had been decided.⁶⁶ The decision was not taken until 1853, and in the mean time the town continued to grow without a plan.

As years went by, the military and civil lines expanded and contracted with inevitable overlapping and conflict between the two authorities. Half the ground designated in 1841 as "military" was in 1853 occupied by public civil buildings, and half the ground designated as "civil" was occupied by troops. The result was that the army could not take any administrative decision in this latter military area except, as they said, "by sufferance or concession".

The reason for this situation was the uncertainty about the final location of the Camp. Officers complained, but nothing was done until 1850, when it was decided that the Camp should continue in the Crater and that new barracks should be built. Haines and the Commander of the Garrison, Brigadier T.R. Green, were asked to co-operate in redefining the civil and military limits. However, with Haines stressing the commercial aspect of Aden, and Green, the military, agreement was impossible.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, Lieut.-Gen. Lord F. FitzClarence, considered further discussion between the two men useless and asked the Government to intervene by laying down general principles for the guidance of the Political Agent. He himself suggested two:

1. The Settlement was held "solely in consequence of its military importance", and therefore "every measure concerning Aden should mainly be considered with reference to the perfect efficiency of the troops".

2. The Commander of the Garrison should have full control over the ground required for troops and followers and all military purposes.

In fact, FitzClarence would have had the whole peninsula of Aden, like Gibraltar, under one authority, military of course. However, since there were two authorities at Aden, all that he could do was to specify the parts which should be "under the sole and entire control of the military commandant Aden being held as a military post, when at any time the commanding officer may be called on to resist an European enemy, it is important that he should have entire, unquestioned

and habitual control over every portion open to attack, or required for the use of the troops,..."⁶⁷

The Government, under Lord Falkland, answered that Aden was not held "only" as a military post and that it was too late, after fifteen years, to ask whether the policy of encouraging its trade had been right or wrong. The fact was that there was now a flourishing town with a population of about 20,000 who looked to the British for protection. Therefore, the Government could not agree that "every measure concerning Aden should mainly be considered with reference to the perfect efficiency of the troops". The garrison and civil population were not opposed to each other, and consequently, the Government could not say that the interest of one party was more important than that of the other. The expediency of placing the civil and military authority at Aden in the hands of one man had been considered in 1847, but the Home Authorities had objected to the plan and it had been dropped.⁶⁸

FitzClarence agreed that the civil population was entitled to due consideration, but he was convinced that it was a mistake to have made Aden a commercial centre. This mistake should be corrected, and the Commander-in-Chief gave three reasons in support of his argument.

Had it not been for the townspeople, the troops would have had enough drinking water locally; but as it was, water for them had to be imported at a heavy cost to the Government. A further increase in the population could only be achieved by crowding the troops into a small space, and this increase necessarily demanded a proportionate increase in the garrison to keep the increased population in check. Therefore, owing to the shortage of space and water at Aden and "to the dangerous and treacherous character of its Arab population", the Commander-in-Chief thought that Aden could not be at one and the same time "a flourishing commercial and ... a strong military post".

If the Government decided to keep Aden as a military post, its commercial development should be secondary to its military security. For the troops to function properly, they should be healthy, and to be healthy they should have "good water and pure air". FitzClarence made a strong attack on Haines for encouraging the commerce of Aden, and expressed his opinion that unless he was clearly instructed that the needs of the garrison were to be considered more important than

commerce, and that the views of the Commandant, as the interpreter of these needs, were to be listened to with respect, no co-operation could be expected between the civil and military authorities.⁶⁹

The Government of Bombay gave way before these overstated arguments and wrote to Haines that the military importance of Aden should come before its commercial development.⁷⁰ Then a committee made up of officers from the Aden garrison, headed by the Commandant, Brigadier A. Clarke, assembled to draw up new lines which would give the troops more space and put an end to civil authority within the Camp.

This committee, like that of 1840, recommended that the military should have the whole seafront in Eastern Bay, and in addition Huqqat Bay, Siran Island and Ras Ma'ashiq.⁷¹ Haines protested strongly against these plans, using arguments reminiscent of those which he had used in 1840. He warned that if no consideration was given to the health and comfort of the merchants, they would not be induced to stay, and the troops themselves would be affected by shortages of supplies.⁷²

The committee answered that the proposed military lines would not affect the merchants and traders who would still be able to sell their merchandise and would have no reason to leave. The level of supplies was sufficient to meet the demands of the garrison and of "the limited foreign trade which Aden has hitherto enjoyed", a statement not in keeping with the facts. The officers strongly urged that the military authorities be given control over all the wells in Aden and echoed the doubts of FitzClarence about the policy of expanding the town and increasing its population which, they said, the garrison had always been taught to suspect.⁷³ This time the Bombay Government did not support Haines who was soon to be dismissed on a charge of peculation. The arguments of the military committee were accepted and their proposed limits sanctioned.⁷⁴

The civil-military conflict settled, the question now became the distribution of the troops. In 1855, the new Resident, Lieut.-Col. W.M. Coghlan, suggested that only the sepoy should remain in the Crater. The European troops should be three quarters at Tawahi and one quarter at the Isthmus.⁷⁵ After a long discussion involving all levels of authority, it was decided to keep the sepoy in the Crater and to have the European force equally distributed among the three positions.⁷⁶

Until then, detachments from the Crater, relieved periodically, manned the Isthmus defences. After the break-up of the blockship "Charger" in 1847, the defence of the harbour and coal depot was left mainly to the occasional presence of a vessel of war. The shore batteries were not manned except for the one at Ras Marbat. Haines and his successors persistently asked for a vessel of war to be stationed at Aden, but this was not to be.

During the first nine years, work on the fortifications went slowly. In Aden, the Arab attacks kept the British occupied in erecting temporary defences and the military and civil authorities were often at variance. Due to Arab hostility, the Bombay Government were at first not certain whether they wanted to keep Aden. They also took a long time to decide on a comprehensive plan for its defence, and were not forthcoming with money. Bureaucracy and the slow mail service were two other delaying factors.

In August 1846, the Arabs made their last attack, and in November of the following year Lieut.-Col. C. Waddington, the highest ranking officer to be given charge of the defences, arrived in Aden simultaneously with a letter from Bombay to Haines instructing him "that there should be no interference with the proceedings of the Superintending Engineer in the execution of his office".⁷⁷

These two factors accelerated the work on the fortifications. Soon the new Turkish Wall across the Isthmus was completed, and a tunnel cut through the hill which divided it. A line of scarp, defended by batteries and towers, was made along the Mansuri range to connect the two ends of the Isthmus defences, and thus enclose this military position. In the enclosure were the arsenal, magazine, barracks, reservoirs and condensers. In 1859, Playfair wrote that the Isthmus was "guarded by massive lines of defences, strengthened by a broad, deep ditch, bastions, demi-bastions, redans and casements, armed with heavy ordnance;..."

The sea defences comprised "strong, heavily armed martello towers, casemented and open batteries on the hills and a fleur d'eau as well as on the adjacent islands, together with piers of obstruction and other subservient works."⁷⁸ Later, to protect the harbour, heavy batteries were added at Tawahi, on Ras Tarashan and Ras Marbat.⁷⁹

The Abyssinian Campaign of 1867-8,⁸⁰ for which Aden was a supply base, led Sir Robert Napier, the commander of the expedition, to give thought to the defence of the Settlement. The garrison was stationed at three points; and if Aden were attacked at a time when no outside help was available, it would be difficult to move troops quickly to the point attacked. The difficulty would not only be one of distance, but the hilly nature of the ground and the intense heat of the climate would be two other disadvantages.

In 1868, Napier recommended that as a precaution, a railway system should form part of the defences of Aden, and suggested that a line be laid from Tawahi to the Isthmus Position. The railway plant which was used during the Abyssinian Campaign and was now at Kula, could be shipped to Aden for the purpose. Napier thought that, besides its military function, the railway might be of commercial value. All ships loaded and unloaded at Tawahi; and if the line were used for goods and passenger traffic, it would be a source of revenue.⁸¹

The Resident, Maj.-Gen. Sir E.L. Russell, agreed with Napier as to the military importance of the railway, but thought that civilian traffic could not maintain a train service for more than one hour a day, which did not justify the expense. Yet, he did not doubt that when the Suez Canal was opened, Aden's mercantile community would rapidly increase and the railway would become a necessity.⁸² The project was under discussion for three more years, but was finally dropped.

As for the strength of Aden's defences at the end of the period under study, it was not sufficient. Lord Mayo, who visited the Settlement on his way to India in 1869, wrote that it was defenceless against armed vessels; it was a fortress only against the Arabs of the interior and others who might attack it without the aid of siege artillery.⁸³

The apparent contradiction between Mayo's statement and the impression of great strength conveyed by Playfair's description in 1859 can be explained by the developments in artillery following the Crimean War.⁸⁴ What was considered heavy ordnance in the 1850's was not so a decade later. It should also be remembered that the sea defences never received the same attention as the land defences because the British, from the time of Blankett, trusted to naval power to keep control of the seas.

The defence picture completed, it is now necessary to go back and trace the physical development of the town from 1842, the growth of the population from 1846, and the efforts made from 1854 to solve the water problem.

The Town.

The town developed as slowly as the defences, but not only for the same reasons; water and fire were two additional ones. In Aden, years went by without any rain, but sometimes the fall was so heavy that it destroyed life and property. The water streamed down with great violence from the steep hills surrounding the Crater and on its way to the sea carried everything before it.

Such devastating rains visited Aden on 28th December, 1842. All roads were destroyed except the military one which ran from the town to Tawahi; this was damaged. The Political Agent's office was flooded and made insecure. The commissariat depots collapsed and so did houses and shops which had recently been built. Nine people and about 200 donkeys were swept into the sea.

Haines was glad that the Special Committee were in Aden to judge for themselves what was needed to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe.⁸⁵ They, however, did not give the subject any attention, and in 1845 Haines' fear that the town might again be damaged by floods made him recommend the embanking of the water-course which ran through its centre, to channel the flood water into the sea.⁸⁶ The Government agreed, and the work proceeded at the usual slow rate.

Before it had been completed, another deluge swept through Aden on 2nd May, 1846. The water poured into the centre of the new town, flooding the buildings, in some cases to a depth of five feet. Twenty-seven houses, most of which had been built within the previous two years, were destroyed and nearly as many became insecure. The main sufferers were the rice and grain merchants whose supplies for the hot season had just been put in store. The financial loss was estimated at Rs. 120,000.

Haines impressed upon the Government that the merchants should not be allowed to suffer such calamities as would tend to discourage their enterprising spirit which was vital for the development of the Settlement, and he again urged the building of embankments to take the flood water to the sea. Better still, he thought, was to store it in reservoirs on the mountains and in the ancient tanks in the

valleys after they had been cleaned out and repaired. High embankments along the water-course were built before long, but no tanks were restored until the following decade, and these were in the Tawilah Valley.

In the floods of May 1846 no lives were lost. However, cholera followed in spite of the preventive measures which the authorities took to light fires and clear away the great accumulation of filth deposited by the waters.⁸⁷ The victims of the disease were about 500, 20 of whom were European.⁸⁸

The next disaster befell Aden on 6th September, 1854, and it was caused by fire. The fire started in the quarter chiefly inhabited by Indian pilgrims. It claimed nine lives and destroyed nearly 400 huts, several stone houses and the entire lines of the sebundis.⁸⁹ The blaze spread because of a high wind; and the Resident, Lieut.-Col. James Outram, wrote that had the wind not changed direction, the whole town would have been in ashes.⁹⁰

The Resident recommended that houses of inflammable materials cleared by the fire should not be rebuilt. Moreover, the town police should live together in one place so as to be readily available in cases of emergency;⁹¹ nothing came of this recommendation.

In August 1856, Coghlan reported yet another major fire which brought about the total destruction of the bazaar, the quarters of seven companies of the 18th Regiment, N.I., and several of the officers' houses. The jail escaped damage through the exertions of the jailer, police and prisoners.

Coghlan repeated his predecessor's recommendation that no buildings of combustible material should be allowed in the town,⁹² and his Assistant, Lieut. R.L. Playfair, took two steps in this direction. In 1856, there were in the town 2600 Somalis living in huts, and they were moved to Mu'alla. The same year, the Khusaf Valley, Aden's chief source of water, was crowded with the huts of Indian workers and their families. For safety, as well as for health reasons, Playfair moved a portion of them to two sites outside the Crater, one at the Isthmus and the other just outside the Main Pass.⁹³ In the town, reed and mat huts were tolerated only in the quarter inhabited by fishermen and sweepers, whose occupations made their removal impracticable.

To encourage the building of stone houses in the town and in

Mu'alla, the authorities ruled that no repairs were to be carried out on the huts; when one collapsed, it was not to be rebuilt. This rule could not be enforced; the occupants, while not daring to carry out too obvious repairs, could easily, for instance, substitute a new post for a decaying one. Thus the huts remained in a bad state, but did not fall.

With the passage of time, they came to be surrounded by heaps of rubbish and filth, with the inevitable danger to public health. The authorities admitted defeat and offered the occupants small plots on which to build new huts, free from any restriction on repairs. The people welcomed the offer and agreed to pay the annual ground rent.⁹⁴

The destruction caused by the fires of 1854 and 1856 was limited and in a way beneficial. The case was very different when the town was visited by heavy rain on 30th April, 1859, and on 25th October, 1860. On the first occasion, the whole town was several feet under water and appeared almost a ruin. Several hundred houses either fell or were badly damaged. Tons of rocks and soil were washed down into the tanks, causing great harm. Nearly 30 men, women and children were reported drowned.⁹⁵

In October 1860, the high embankments of the water-course gave way under pressure at two points, and more than half the houses were partially or totally destroyed. The jail, the Native General Hospital, the Residency and the customs-house were considerably damaged. Five lives were lost.⁹⁶

After every heavy fall of rain, barriers were erected here and there without an overall plan. In 1864, the Resident, Lieut.-Col. W.M. Merewether, proposed a drainage system for Aden, but the Government replied that they had no funds and suggested that the money needed might be made available from local sources. "... as Aden is now a very considerable place, it may be practicable to provide for such works as that under reference from some sources of local income." They also asked what benefits were expected from the project.⁹⁷

Merewether replied that the drainage system would have great advantages. Wherever the torrents ran, they left loose stones and enormous holes, making the land unfit for building. People used the holes as latrines, and they could do so with impunity due to the small

police force in the Settlement. When the holes were filled in and waste ground levelled, good sites for building houses would be made available, and their occupants could be forced to observe standards of hygiene.

In 1863 when two and a half inches of rain fell one morning, not only did all the Tawilah Tanks overflow, but also they could have been filled once or twice again. The surplus water streamed uncontrolled into the sea, causing great damage on its way. The incident showed of what little value the tanks were in preventing floods. Large sums were spent on repairing roads and public buildings and in compensating individuals for flood losses. The money thus spent would have been enough to build the proposed drainage system.

In 1864, there was before the Government a project for storing more water in another ravine, the Khusaf, and Merewether wrote that even when that was carried out, there would still be an overflow to be channelled safely to the sea.

Commenting on the Government's suggestion that the drainage system might be built with money raised locally, Merewether wrote: "... Aden is only becoming a considerable place". Although it had a large population, the wealthy among them were few. Most of the inhabitants were Arabs who, he claimed, had been induced to settle in Aden with great difficulty, and care had to be taken not to drive them away by introducing a new tax, the purpose of which would be the building of a drainage system.

The Resident stressed that the money collected locally was hardly sufficient to meet the daily expenses of the town. Many vital projects, such as street lighting, could not be carried out due to a lack of funds.⁹⁸ Merewether's letter remained unanswered, and the drainage system is not mentioned again. However, there is mention of a destructive rainfall in 1870, which suggests that even then it was not in existence.

Two projects which were less costly than a drainage system, but also had sanitation as their object, were carried out in 1864. Until then, there were a number of small furnaces for burning rubbish. However, owing to the growth of the town, they became too central, and it was necessary to have them replaced by one large furnace outside the town. The second project was the building of three public privies;⁹⁹ others were added later.

Street lighting was introduced in 1870-71. On dark nights, the road from the town to Tawahi, a distance of six miles, was dangerous to travel on; there were many bends and highway robbers. With such hazards in mind, 27 iron lamp posts were erected in the town and along the road. Apart from their obvious usefulness, Captain W.F. Prideaux, the Assistant Resident, thought that they were "ornamental to a certain extent".¹⁰⁰

The British did what they could to make Aden a less sombre place. In 1845, "the only minaret and the last relic of ancient Aden" seemed on the point of collapse. Haines thought that it was worth preserving, and a private subscription was started for the purpose. The public donated Rs. 618, but the cost of repairs was estimated at Rs. 902. The Political Agent asked the Government for the balance, emphasising that "The minaret will be a most handsome ornament to the new town..."¹⁰¹ The Government responded, and the restoration work was completed in 1846.

Another project which the British carried out with a view to giving Aden a more pleasant aspect was a garden at the Tawilah Tanks. Flowers, vegetables and trees were planted in the garden, and the trees were reported to be "growing famously" as early as 1864, making it a good resort in the evening after the scorching heat of the sun.¹⁰² The vegetables, which were for sale, brought in little money, only three or four rupees per month during 1871. Nevertheless, Prideaux thought that the garden should be maintained, even at a loss, because "it is so great an ornament to Aden".¹⁰³

In Aden, easy communication was a prime necessity for both military and commercial reasons. Good carriage roads were built to link the different parts of the town with one another as well as to connect the town itself with the other two parts of the Settlement. More important than these roads was the digging, in 1859, of a tunnel under the Mansuri range of hills. Until then, to reach the Isthmus from the town, one had to go through the Main Pass and follow the road north along the seashore, a journey of about one mile. The tunnel reduced this distance to a mere 350 yards,¹⁰⁴ which speeded the movement of traffic, civil and military.

At the end of the period under study, the important parts of the town were:

Bazaar No. 1. Here nearly all the daily buying and selling was

carried on. Here, too, were all the eating-houses, food shops and general retailers.

Bazaar No. 2. This quarter was 600 yards long by 500 yards broad, and had seven streets, each more than 500 yards in length. Here all the Jews and almost all the rich non-European inhabitants lived - money-lenders, contractors, Parsi and Borah shopkeepers and Banyan and Arab wholesalers trading in precious stones, coffee, spices, gums, etc.

The Tawilah district. This was the vice area of Aden.

The fishermen's village. This consisted of about 200 houses.

Chukla. This adjoined the Tawilah and was the quarter of the washermen. ¹⁰⁵

The main buildings in the town were the Residency, the Court-House and Treasury Office. Two other buildings worthy of mention were a Catholic chapel (built in 1852) and a Protestant church (built in 1871).

Outside the Crater, the other portions of the Settlement were the village of Mu'alla and the township of Tawahi, both of which were fishing hamlets before the British occupation. Mu'alla was inhabited mainly by Somalis, and in 1872 most of the houses were still of reed and mat. Here a customs-house was built for the registration of trade and a landing pier constructed for the use of country craft.

The township of Tawahi grew up around the new harbour, and its growth was helped by the fact that it was cooler than the Crater. At first, only part of the garrison and those connected with the port and Government coal depot resided there. Then gradually private houses were built. The houses were all substantial stone buildings, most with two storeys and some with three, and were occupied almost exclusively by Europeans.

Shortly after the occupation, Haines built, at his own expense, a house on Ras Marbat where he lived away from the heat of the Crater. After his departure in 1854, the need for an official Residency at Tawahi was realised and eventually one was built on Ras Tarashan. In 1872, this Residency was the main building at Tawahi. At Tawahi also were the foreign consulates and the offices and houses of the agents of steam navigation companies. There were in addition two hotels, a post office, a hospital, a police court, a Protestant church and a Catholic chapel. ¹⁰⁶

Population.

In 1846, the Bombay Government asked the Court of Directors to obtain for them the rules and regulations which were in force at Gibraltar, that they might select those which could advantageously be applied at Aden. The Secret Committee sent them a paper entitled "Heads of Instructions for the Police Magistrate at..". The Bombay Government, in turn, sent a copy of this paper to Hardinge and asked him whether the instructions could be transmitted to Haines as they stood.¹⁰⁷ The Governor-General replied that only their substance should be communicated, whereupon the Bombay Government formulated what they termed "A Proposed Draft of Instructions for the Guidance of the Political Agent at Aden", and sent it to Haines.

The document laid down a number of principles for the administration of the Settlement, but here only two are relevant. Firstly, the Political Agent was to devise means by which he could obtain an accurate census of the population, showing the nationalities and the individuals composing it, the length of their residence and their occupation or mode of living. The census was to be forwarded annually to Bombay together with a return of births, marriages and deaths. Secondly, persons who were not citizens of Britain or subjects of the E.I.C. should not be allowed to enter or live in the peninsula without the permission of the Political Agent or his Assistant, and those who broke the law were to be expelled.¹⁰⁸

As regards the first rule, Haines wrote that no matter what he did, the constant changes in the population made any census necessarily imperfect. With respect to the second, he explained how difficult it was to put into practice. Arab traders, fishermen and labourers went in and out daily. During the trading season, Somalis visited Aden in large numbers. Vessels engaged in transporting Indian pilgrims to the Hijaz and back often anchored to the west of the harbour at an isolated point. Then, having landed hundreds of poor pilgrims, the captain surreptitiously sailed away with the passage money. Stranded, the pilgrims made their way into the town where they mingled with its people without attracting any attention, they being no different from the Indians there.

The Arabs and Somalis do not seem to have presented Haines with any problem. The Arabs were checked at three points:

1. The Barrier Gate in the Turkish Wall where they came in from the interior.

2. The customs-house just within the Main Pass, a little further south of the Barrier Gate. There, all men were searched for arms, and from 1845 a record was kept of all goods brought in by land.

3. The bazaar at the town end of the Main Pass. The Bazaar Inspector was present at the arrival of all caravans, and he reported any trouble to the Political Agent or his Assistant. In addition, the names of all entrants were kept here in a special register, and thus in times of trouble the Political Agent could expel members of any tribe which was hostile to the British.

Haines was satisfied with the system of checking land traffic and argued that new restrictions would discourage commercial activity. The Political Agent made no mention of the Somalis, most of whom went back at the end of the trading season.

The Indian pilgrims were the real problem. For them, Haines built huts which he did not make too comfortable "else the Settlement would be inundated with beggars". If employment was available, it was offered; and for as many as possible a free passage to India was arranged. To combat the pilgrim problem, Haines suggested strengthening the harbour administration.¹⁰⁹ The Bombay Government agreed, and in May 1847 decided that as soon as this was done, the culprit shipmasters should, in the likely event of their return, re-imburse the authorities for the money spent on accommodating the pilgrims.¹¹⁰ For many years to come, the harbour administration was not as strong as had been envisaged, and the evil practice continued.

The annual return of births, marriages and deaths asked for was never supplied. The Assistant Civil Surgeon was appointed Registrar of Marriages under Section 18 of India Act V, 1852, but no additional salary followed the appointment because the Bombay Government thought that it would be "a sinecure",¹¹¹ and so it would have been.

In September 1854, Outram reported that "following an increase of deaths from sickness",¹¹² he had started a register of deaths,¹¹³ but this register was never mentioned again. All Residents, including Outram, did not send in returns of deaths as such, but when they recorded floods, fires or epidemics, and when they reported on the hospital and prison, they gave figures of the dead. A population such as Aden's, changing and primitive in the main, was not the right one to provide the desired returns. In fact, the records do not even give annual figures for the population.

Consequent on the attempted murder of Delisser in March 1851,¹¹⁴ Haines issued a series of emergency regulations, only two of which are relevant here, and they concerned the Interpreter at the Barrier Gate:

1. Every Arab coming to Aden should be thoroughly searched, he and his baggage. If he had no weapons or prohibited merchandise, the Interpreter would give him a tin ticket of admission into the town which he should produce at the Main Pass where he would undergo another search. If the result was satisfactory, the Arab (man, woman or child) might proceed, merely showing the ticket to the clerk at the customs-house on the inner side of the Main Pass.

2. Every Arab who entered Aden in the morning had to leave by 3.00 p.m. of the same day, and he had to return his admission ticket to the Interpreter. In case of any deficiency, the Interpreter was to report the same to the police in order to ensure the expulsion of the person or persons concerned. No one was allowed to remain in the Settlement after the fixed time without the express permission of the Political Agent.¹¹⁵

In 1854, Outram reverted to these regulations to check the entry of Arabs, many of whom could find no work in the Settlement. Besides, the space available for occupation was limited, and sweet water was becoming a problem.¹¹⁶ These reasons for controlling immigration undoubtedly arose from the new official emphasis on Aden's military importance.

Under Coghlan, Outram's successor, efforts were made to restrict Somali immigration by sea, but not only for the reasons given above. Many Somalis who went to Aden with their families returned alone, having abandoned their wives and children in the Settlement. Consequently, the women had to support themselves and their children as best they could by taking service or by collecting firewood from the interior for sale in the town. Under economic pressure, they frequently rid themselves of their sons as soon as they could walk. Other Somalis took their wives and daughters back with them, but left their sons behind. The abandoned children, with no one to care for them, turned to thieving, and some of them became hardened criminals.¹¹⁷

In 1855, Playfair decided to register all Somalis in Aden, and not to allow in anyone who had no means of earning a living.¹¹⁸ The following year, the Bombay Government decreed that the commanders of

vessels carrying pilgrims or Somalis should report to the police office within six hours of their arrival. They were to declare the correct number of their passengers and if necessary obtain permission to land them. Any captain who landed or allowed such passengers to land without permission was to be fined up to ten rupees for every individual. Captains were also prohibited from taking any Somalis on board without a pass from the police, and failure to comply with this law entailed a similar fine.¹¹⁹ The purpose of this prohibition was to ensure that no Somali left behind him divorced women or unwanted children who would become a burden on the Settlement and a source of trouble to the authorities.

The regulation forbidding people with no work to reside in Aden was cancelled by Coghlan in 1862. His reason for so doing was the needs of trade and labour. The result was that by January 1863 hundreds of Somali idlers had flocked into the Settlement with the inevitable increase in theft.¹²⁰ In June, the Government wrote to the Resident asking for an explanation.

Merewether, who was Resident by then, defended the cancellation of the regulation and described it as "a wise measure". Aden, he wrote, was in need of labourers and would continue to be so for some time to come. He found it only logical that an increase in theft should follow a great influx of people into a place which previously had been closed to them. However, he added that as the Somalis and others found that they could be regularly engaged, they would give up thieving for honest work.¹²¹

This pious hope was not justified; the Somalis continued to steal. In addition, they still deserted women and children. In 1865, when the Bombay Government suggested that the latter practice might be checked by the re-imposition of stringent police controls, Merewether explained how difficult and unwise it would be to restrict the movement of inhabitants and visitors.

The police force at Aden (125 men) was inadequate to control the traffic. Those who wished to leave secretly could do so by taking a boat from any part of the peninsula and then joining a sea-going vessel outside the harbour. They might also proceed first into the interior and then journey home from any place on the coast. However, even if there were more policemen, the enforcement of stringent traffic regulations might only partially solve the problem,

but would certainly harm the trade of a rising settlement like Aden.¹²² Eighteen years earlier, Haines had expressed the same opinion, and four years later Russell echoed it: "To prevent the Somalis from entering Aden would be to check trade and the import of supplies."¹²³

In Aden, Haines outlawed slavery immediately after the occupation, but the Settlement did not become a centre for the suppression of the slave trade until the 1860's. Officers of the Indian Navy had no authority to seize vessels belonging to subjects of powers (chiefs or states) not bound by treaty with the British to ban the slave trade. Haines was directed in 1847 that if a slave vessel was brought to Aden, he should send the slaves to Bombay or elsewhere "according to their wishes". The vessel was at first made over to the chief, or the agent of the chief, whose subject the master was. If neither was possible, Haines was to take security from the master who was to report himself to his chief.¹²⁴

This procedure was suggested because there were no tribunals in Bombay competent to adjudicate in cases involving slave vessels. After these were set up, in 1849, captured ships were sent to Bombay. However, this arrangement was not satisfactory. Most of the slave trade in the vicinity of Aden was carried on by small craft which could reach Bombay only if towed by large vessels, and this could not always be done as and when required. The witnesses were always the naval officers who made the arrest, and they could not be spared from their duties.¹²⁵ In addition, the officers were disheartened at the idea of their prizes being sent to Bombay where they could not be sure of a conviction. They themselves admitted that, but for this, they would be more energetic in the suppression of the slave trade.¹²⁶

In 1856, Coghlan signed treaties prohibiting this traffic with the sultan of the Lower 'Awlaqi tribe and with the chiefs on the Somali coast. For dealing promptly with cases of slave trading, he asked in 1858 that the Resident and his First Assistant be made judges of a Vice-Admiralty Court.¹²⁷ The Government of Bombay, who saw an economy measure in this proposal, recommended it to the higher authorities, but it was not until 1861 that a Vice-Admiralty Court was instituted at Aden. By way of encouraging the officers of the Indian Navy to be more active in the suppression of the slave trade, a reward of Rs. 50 was paid for every slave freed.

In 1869, Captain G.R. Goodfellow, Acting Resident, complained

of the increasing numbers of slaves brought to the Settlement and urged that it should be limited. The magnitude of the problem becomes clear with the help of the table below:

Year	Freed & Landed at Aden	Sent to Bombay
1865	249	57
1866	949	48
1867	231	221
1868	524	92
1869 (first half)	1044	106

During the four and a half years referred to above, 1046 liberated slaves returned to their country or died in Aden, and only 684 of those remaining in the Settlement found work. Some took service with wealthy Indian families, some were employed by the Harbour Department or at the depot of the Peninsular & Oriental Company, and others became sailors on board the many vessels which frequented the port. The rest (743) could find no jobs and had to be kept at great expense to the authorities.¹²⁸

The population of Aden grew slowly after 1842. According to Playfair, it was on 1st January, 1856, 20,738, including the military (troops and camp followers) whose number normally fluctuated between 3400 and 3600:

Muslims:			
Arabs	4812	(the original inhabitants being only 965)	
Africans	3627		
Indians	2557		
Others	<u>58</u>		11,054
Hindus			5,611
Jews			1,224
Christians			1,129
Parsis			61
Miscellaneous			1,659
			129

In 1872, the population was 19,289, excluding the military who were 3433:

Arabs		8241
Africans		5346
Indians:		
Muslims	2614	
Hindus	<u>854</u>	
Parsis	<u>121</u>	3589
Jews		1435
Europeans		208 (only 26 of whom were not British)
Miscellaneous		277
		130

The occupations followed by the different elements of the population were as follows:

I. Arabs. The second and third class merchants of Aden were generally Arabs. The former imported coffee from the interior and sold it to the first class merchants who were chiefly Europeans and Americans, with a few Indians. The third class merchants or petty traders went to the Somali ports during the trading season and from there sent back to Aden small shipments of merchandise and livestock in exchange for piece goods, rice, dates and other commodities.

Camel and donkey-drivers were all Arabs, and many came from the once great city of Mukha. Camels and donkeys were employed in conveying water. Besides, asses carried building materials and were hired out for riding. From Mukha, Aden also inherited its boat-builders.

The Arabs had a monopoly of dyeing, and their work consisted only in giving piece goods a blue colour. They formed the majority of butchers who, for religious reasons, were invariably Muslims. They were also shopkeepers, coal-coolies, day-labourers, sailors and firemen aboard steamers. The lower classes provided domestic servants.

Other occupations with which the Arabs were identified were water-carrying, portering, fishing, building, lime-burning and brokerage. Brokers or middlemen acted in almost every transaction, however insignificant. They got from both purchaser and seller a certain percentage which depended on the value of the purchase.

II. Africans. The great majority of the Africans were Somalis. Most Somalis stayed in Aden only for a short time; when they had made some money, they went back to their country. Their traders who dealt in sheep, cattle, ponies, ghee, gums, hides, etc. crossed over to Aden during the north-east monsoon when it was safe for their small craft.

Of the Somalis who settled in Aden, many were engaged as coal and cargo-coolies. They were also petty traders, boatmen, bumboatmen, domestic servants and shoemakers. Low-born Somalis and Jabartia (Ethiopian Muslims) together with the Akhdam, of whom mention will be made later, worked as sweepers.

The occupation of carriage-driver was most desirable to the Somalis, and Hunter attributes this to the great opportunity which

it afforded for dishonest dealing, since the owner had no check on his driver. In 1872, the trade was monopolised by members of the 'Iyal Ahmad tribe who succeeded in ousting all other drivers, be they Somali or not.

The Somali women went about selling bread, sweetmeats and buttermilk by the cup. They cleaned and sifted coffee like Sidi and Indian women. In 1872, as in 1840, they were still weaving excellent mats.

III. Indians. The Indians formed the majority of blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers and sweepers. The mechanics, few as they were, were generally Indians. The Indians were also shopkeepers, bricklayers, humboatmen and merchants of the three classes. Some were jewellers.

Most of the Indian Muslims came to be in Aden by force of circumstance, as has been explained. Some found employment with the police force, and many engaged themselves as masons. The poor worked as tailors or domestic servants. In 1872, many of the Borahs worked in tin, and the need for gallon measures was enough to keep them busy, since water was given or sold by the gallon.

The Banyans, who were the wealthiest among the Hindus, had in their hands the wholesale trade of Aden as well as the banking and exchange business. At the other end of the scale, most of the menial servants were Hindus. In contrast with the Banyans, the Parsis were mainly retail merchants.

IV. Jews. The Jews were chiefly artisans. Most of the jewellers and all the silversmiths were of their number. Silver ornaments were worn extensively by men, women and children of all communities. When it is also remembered that the Arabs had a great fondness for weapons richly decorated with silver, it becomes obvious how large a market there was for the silversmith's trade. The Jews did not only decorate weapons, but many of them were also engaged in their manufacture. Besides the Banyans, they were the only other people who changed and lent money, although on a small scale. The few bookbinders tended to be Jews.

The Jews were also spinners, weavers and masons. Mat and reed work, which had been one of their principal trades, was dying out towards the end of the period under study due to the discouragement by the authorities of the building of temporary huts of inflammable materials.

V. Europeans. Apart from the soldiers and government officials, the Europeans consisted of agents, managers and employees of mercantile firms and steamship companies. Some were mechanics.

VI. The Akhdam. In Playfair's table, the Akhdam¹³¹ are included under the head "Miscellaneous", which suggests that they did not belong to any of the religions mentioned, while the fact is that they were Muslims. The Akhdam occupied in South Arabia a position similar to that of the pariahs in India. They worked as roadsweepers, musicians in low coffee shops and followed other menial occupations. In Aden, as in other South Arabian towns, they had a quarter to themselves.

The origin of the Akhdam is obscure. According to local tradition, they were the descendents of the Abyssinians who ruled the Yemen from 525 to 575 A.D. In the latter year, the Arabs, with the help of the Persians, defeated the Abyssinians, and in their desire to perpetuate the memory of their victory, they condemned the remnant of the enemy to a life of servitude.¹³²

With the exception of the Government officials, there were no professional people in Aden. Some educated Eurasians, Parsis, Indians and Arabs were employed as accountants and clerks with commercial firms and in Government offices.¹³³

The Water Problem.

The increase in Aden's population and trade showed that the "never-failing" wells referred to by Haines, Foster and the Special Committee had but a limited yield of sweet water. More wells were dug or cleared out in the Crater with varying degrees of success. However, as in the past, the wells proved unreliable and ultimately well water had to be supplemented by water from the interior which was brought in on camels, sometimes up to 3000 gallons a day, and sold in the town at six to ten pice per five gallons.¹³⁴

The nearest place from which Aden imported water was called al-Hiswah. Al-Hiswah was a piece of ground situated on the northern or opposite side of the harbour in Western Bay. It was four miles long by one and a quarter miles broad. When heavy rain fell on the mountains inland, al-Wadi al-Kabir (the Great Valley), a branch of the Tiban River, flowed through the Lahj plain and into the sea at Aden Harbour. During the wet season the river irrigated the land around al-Hawtah and Bir Ahmad. Al-Hiswah itself became saturated,

and water was easily procured by digging to a depth of from six to sixteen feet. Here four wells were dug, and water was brought into the Settlement either in boats to the southern side of the harbour or on camels across the Isthmus. The shipping, naval and merchant, was supplied from the Khusaf wells until 1849. In 1850, the year Aden became a free port, it was decided that the shipping should be supplied from al-Hiswah, a more convenient arrangement now that an increase in trade was expected.

In 1854, the old fear of a long siege was intensified by the outbreak of the Crimean War, and a review of the water situation was considered necessary. The review was carried out by a committee from the Aden garrison presided over by Col. G. Hutton, of the 16th Madras Regiment, N.I., and this is a summary of their report.

The water in the Crater was of four kinds, and it improved the further one went from the sea. The wells on the beach and in the town were affected by the tide, and the water in them was not fit for drinking by man or beast. It was good only for spraying the streets, bathing, washing clothes and other domestic purposes. Such wells could be dug cheaply and to any number, the sea level being near the surface. The committee showed no interest in them.

Next came 95 wells which contained bitter water; the cattle drank from them, and so did men under pressure of need. Some were in house enclosures, some were attached to mosques, and the rest were privately or publicly owned. Due to the bad quality of their water, the committee confined themselves to enumerating them.

Then came the wells in the 'Aydarus and Tawilah Valleys, the water in which was only slightly brackish. They were fourteen in number, seven private, yielding 13,712 gallons a day, and seven municipal, yielding 9132. The yield of some of these wells was reported to be limited only by the method of drawing water.

Finally, there were the sweet water wells in the Khusaf Valley, 30 in number. Their users and daily yield were as follows:

User	No. of Wells	Yield
Municipality	1	4455 gallons
Banyan community	2	246 "
Private individuals	6	11,276 "
Jewish community	1	Being sunk
Military	15	6598 gallons
"	2	Dry, being deepened
"	3	Being cleared out

The number of wells in Aden, excluding the salty ones, had then increased from 107 in 1843 to 139 in 1854, those in the Khusaf from 27 to 30. The committee did not quote a price for water from the municipal wells, but reported that water from the private wells was sold at a price ranging from ten to twelve annas per 100 gallons.

The private wells in the three valleys were all held under grant from Haines, but in no case was the term of tenure specified. The committee recommended that the owners of the seven wells in the 'Aydarus and Tawilah Valleys be given new grants for three years, after which period the wells would lapse to the Municipality. Grants for new wells were to be for a fixed period, the Government reserving the right to appropriate them at any time. In both cases, compensation was to be paid.

The Jewish and Banyan communities, too, were to have the leases of their wells extended by three years, after which the wells were to be appropriated by the military. The same was to apply to two of the other Khusaf wells in private hands. The reason for the extension in these cases was that the people concerned had not had time to cover the expenses of sinking their wells.

The other four private wells and the one used by the Municipality were to be transferred immediately to the troops, giving them an additional 13,544 gallons a day. The total would then be 20,142 gallons, while the committee's estimate of the garrison's daily requirements was 16,858. The committee did not give the number of the garrison in that year, but fixed allowances for the members of each class composing it, with and without families, from officer downwards. The daily needs of the Indian Navy and merchant shipping the committee estimated at 2400 gallons and recommended that they should continue to be supplied from al-Hiswah.¹³⁵ Their plan gave the military all the good water in Aden; the civil population was to be content with water of inferior quality.

Outram agreed with the committee's recommendations, but thought that the municipal well in the Khusaf should not be taken by the military. This was the only civil well of really sweet water, and the Resident argued that the Government employees and townspeople were entitled to a ration of good water.¹³⁶

The Government did not comment on the committee's report, and in March 1856, Coghlan asked them to take a decision on it. He

himself shared Outram's views and strongly recommended the adoption of the committee's proposals. The water in Aden, he wrote, was sufficient if properly distributed, and justice would be done when all the wells came under Government control.¹³⁷ The Government authorised Coghlan to appropriate such wells as he wanted, paying a fair compensation.¹³⁸ However, he encountered difficulties in his attempt at appropriation,¹³⁹ and for reasons which will shortly become clear he may not have persevered.

Appropriation of the private wells would have ensured a more equitable distribution, but would not have solved the water problem. The wells did not have a constant yield and when drought lasted long, most of them dried up completely. When insufficient rain fell in the interior, the water did not reach as far as al-Hiswah, and thus the wells there proved as unreliable as those in Aden.

The realisation that the wells could not be depended on had in fact forced the authorities to look for other sources of water as early as 1854. In that year Captain W.S. Suart, the Executive Engineer, suggested the restoration of the old aqueduct, but relations with the tribes did not allow the execution of such a plan.¹⁴⁰ The authorities then directed their attention to the old tanks on the hills and in the Tawilah Valley.

Playfair mentions that all the tanks in Aden were about 50 in number and had an aggregate capacity of 30 million gallons.¹⁴¹ In 1854-5, three tanks high up in the hills were experimentally repaired by the Engineer Department. In restoring them, convict labour was used, and money to pay free labourers was obtained from ground rent and other local funds.¹⁴² Then the restoration work was entrusted to Playfair, the Assistant Resident, who tackled the Tawilah Tanks in 1856. The Tawilah Tanks were far larger than, and superior to, the Hill or Hanging Tanks. They were thirteen in number, running from the top of the valley to the bottom.

At first, Playfair thought that he could restore them without any expense to the Government, as had been the case with the Hanging Tanks. However, as work progressed, it became clear that this could not be done, and the Government agreed to finance the project.¹⁴³

From a letter to Lord Elphinstone dated 27th July, 1856, and written from Aden by one Mr. Adam who was en route to England, it is known that six tanks had been cleared out by then. Adam was confident

that when the other seven tanks were repaired, the Settlement would not need to import water from the interior.¹⁴⁴ Elphinstone welcomed the news and wrote to Coghlan: "I cannot congratulate you too warmly upon the success which has attended your exertions to place the water supply of Aden upon an efficient footing. Not the least gratifying part of it is the little expense (roughly Rs. 6000) which has been incurred. It would have been well worth while in my opinion to have expended lakhs of rupees upon what has been accomplished, or at least will shortly be accomplished, for a few thousands, for until Aden has an independent supply of water within its own limits, we must be in a great measure at the mercy of the neighbouring tribes and in the event of a siege we might be obliged to give in from this cause, notwithstanding the many lakhs that have been sunk upon fortifications."¹⁴⁵

In 1857, the number of tanks cleared out was twelve, and they had a capacity of 3,538,715 gallons. They were filled for the first time on 23rd October of that year.¹⁴⁶ However, their restoration was not completed until 1861, by which time the cost had amounted to three and a half lakhs of rupees, and the financial return to only Rs. 62,381, less than one-fifth of the outlay. The Government was disappointed at this result and decided to spend no more on the tanks despite assurances from Playfair that when the system was finished, it would bring in a great revenue.¹⁴⁷ This decision meant that the last and best tank in the Tawilah chain would not be restored.¹⁴⁸

The tank in question, called "Playfair", had a capacity of 4,179,915 gallons, i.e. larger than the other twelve tanks combined, and was in a better state of preservation. Coghlan was anxious to have it repaired, but he could not ask the Government for money. However, in 1863, three leading merchants, an Arab, Hasan 'Ali, and two Parsis, Kowasji Dinshaw and Edulji Manekji, offered to restore this tank and six of the Hill Tanks. Coghlan welcomed their offer,¹⁴⁹ and his successor, Herewether, gave them a contract for ten years.

By this contract, which was signed on 29th June, 1863, the "co-partnery" was to complete the restoration work "within two years, provided that no unforeseen circumstances prevent the completion within that time". At the expiration of the ten years, "Government, represented by the Political Resident, shall have the option of resuming possession of these works, or of renewing the lease for a limited period or in perpetuity as may seem expedient, but in case of taking possession Government shall pay a fair valuation of the outlay made by the co-partnery in the restoration herein promised."¹⁵⁰

In 1873, the lease was renewed for a further period of 30 years.

When the tanks were full, the Commissariat water bills were reduced by importing less water from the interior, and the authorities could realise some money from the sale of water. The rate charged was one rupee per 100 gallons. However, the tanks were more often empty than full. It did not rain annually in Aden, and much of the water collected was lost through evaporation. The thirteen tanks could hold 7,718,630 gallons.¹⁵¹ If it had rained annually, they, with the wells, might have been sufficient, under wise management, to meet the demand for drinking water, and there would have been no need to go on importing this vital commodity. Yet the situation being what it was, other means of increasing the water supply were necessary.

In 1858, Coghlan asked for several condensers, but the Government sent him only two old ones, and they were installed at the Isthmus. Four more arrived in the following ten years, and they were placed, two at Tawahi and two at the Camp in the Crater. The six condensers distilled 12,000 gallons a day, which was considered sufficient for the needs of the garrison, estimated in 1868 at 2000 men.

The condensers supplied all the drinking water to the garrison except when there was water in the tanks. Then, the troops at the Camp and the Isthmus were given half condensed and half tank water. The troops at Tawahi had only condensed water, since the cost of carriage from the Tawilah Valley would have made tank water as expensive as condensed.

In addition to the six military condensers, there were nine private ones owned by the Peninsular & Oriental Company, the European mercantile firm of Luke Thomas & Co., Edulji Manekji and Kowasji Dinshaw. The Peninsular & Oriental Company supplied their vessels only, while the others supplied the European civil population and the wealthy among the non-Europeans.¹⁵² In 1863, condensed water was sold at seven rupees per 100 gallons, and in 1870, from three to five rupees per 100 gallons.

Compared with the water in the wells and tanks, condensed water had the obvious advantage that its supply could be relied on. The element of failure was under human control, and with proper foresight and knowledge could be prevented. The only objection to the general use of condensed water was the cost involved.

To ensure a cheap and regular supply of water, Captain H. Pym,

the Executive Engineer, proposed to Merewether in 1863 the rebuilding of the old aqueduct as far as Shaykh 'Uthman.¹⁵³ The Resident agreed and recommended the scheme together with the damming of the Khusaf Valley. The area drained by this ravine was not as extensive as that drained by the Tawilah, but still it was considerable. As was the case with the Tawilah before the tanks were restored and the embankments of the water-course built, the water which rushed down from Shamsan into the Khusaf was not only lost, but also caused great damage on its way to the sea.

In support of the Khusaf project, Merewether argued that even if the Government derived no immediate profit, it would be repaid by the gratitude of the people who would be able to buy water at a low price.¹⁵⁴ The Government, who were unwilling to sanction both projects, asked Merewether which in his opinion would be the more useful. The Resident replied, in May 1864, that both were equally necessary.

In favour of the Khusaf project, he repeated that it would prevent damage and added that part of the water collected in the valley would percolate to the wells. The Aden rock was porous and covered only with a thin layer of soil. By means of the aqueduct, a large amount of water could be stored in the Isthmus reservoirs, and the garrison would not suffer if supplies were cut off from the interior during a siege. The Shaykh 'Uthman water could be sold at the same price as tank water, and thus Government would derive a steady income from the aqueduct.¹⁵⁵ The revenue which the 'Abdalis were to get would encourage them to identify themselves with the British.¹⁵⁶

Merewether examined the old aqueduct and found it useless except as a foundation. In some places, it was broken up for several feet, and in others covered with drift sand.¹⁵⁷ The water at Shaykh 'Uthman, Merewether wrote, was "very good" and "inexhaustible".¹⁵⁸ For bringing it to Aden, he proposed that an agreement should be made with the Sultan of Lahj in whose territory the village was. The agreement should state that:

1. When the aqueduct was completed, its maintenance was to be the responsibility of the Sultan.
2. The Sultan was to protect the wells and the aqueduct.
3. In return for the water and all that the Sultan had to do,

he was to receive half the amount realised from the sale of water in Aden.¹⁵⁹

The Bombay Government did not authorise the two water projects, as Merewether had hoped, and it was not until 1866 that they gave their decision in favour of the Shaykh 'Uthman scheme. The following year, while work on the aqueduct was in progress, Merewether wrote that its value could not be exaggerated. Aden would not only have a sure and plentiful supply of water, but the project would also prove to everybody that the British "would no longer consent to be deficient in the use of the natural resources of the country (the mainland), which are needed for the Settlement".¹⁶⁰ The "natural resources" were the sources of water in the interior beyond Shaykh 'Uthman.

The agreement which Merewether had recommended in 1864 was, three years later, incorporated in a convention signed by him and Sultan Fadl on 16th March, 1867. This convention fixed the price of water at one rupee per 100 gallons and laid down that the Sultan should build out of his profits a wide road to run from Shaykh 'Uthman to Khur Maksar alongside the aqueduct. The British, in turn, were to extend the road from their side of the border to the Isthmus reservoirs into which the aqueduct was to pour its water.¹⁶¹ The convention was ratified by the Government of India on 30th April, 1867, and the road was built two years later.

The aqueduct, which cost Rs. 296,933 to construct and could discharge 30 to 40 thousand gallons per day, was completed in December 1868. Its construction was a tacit acknowledgment on the part of the British authorities in Aden, Bombay and Calcutta that a cheap and continuous supply of water could not be obtained in the Settlement itself, and that they must go for it to the mainland. Russell, Merewether's successor, also considered the Shaykh 'Uthman water "very good" and decided that the Commissariat should be supplied with it. An Assistant Resident was to supervise its sale to the public.¹⁶²

The restoration of the tanks, the rebuilding of the aqueduct and the installation of condensers all made little difference to the general public. The cost of carriage and the price at which water from the aqueduct and the other two sources was sold, did not encourage the poor majority to buy it in any appreciable quantity, and the rich

minority did not need it. The result was that the sales of water from the new sources were not as great as had been anticipated by the authorities in Aden and Bombay.

The Arabs and Somalis who came to Aden only for work would drink from brackish wells rather than spend the little money which they had saved on buying expensive water. The Banyans and most other townspeople bought their water mainly from the Banyan and Tawilah wells owned by the Municipality. In 1870, the price of water from the former was eight and a half annas per 100 gallons, and from the latter two and a half annas per 100 gallons. After rain, the Parsis drew first on their Hanging Tanks, and then on the water stored in the Playfair Tank. Furthermore, Edulji Manekji had a very good well in the Khusaf Valley.

Attached to the Parsis was a large number of followers and servants who shared their water supply. The Parsis also competed with the Government in the sale of tank water. Although they charged the same price, purchasers were attracted to their tank at the mouth of the valley, nearer the town. Hasan 'Ali had a well of good water in the 'Aydarus Valley, and his acquaintances, including the Arab merchants, had the free run of the well. Also, Sayyid 'Alawi al-'Aydarus had two good wells.¹⁶³

Moreover, water continued to be brought in from the interior on the backs of camels, averaging in 1872 6500 gallons a day. Captain W.M. Ducat, the Executive Engineer, wrote that this water, although not much better than the aqueduct water, had to the townspeople the advantage that it was brought to their doors. The price varied with the demand, generally two rupees per 100 gallons, and in the hot season three rupees. According to Ducat, this price was equal to that of the Shaykh 'Uthman water, if not cheaper when the cost of carriage was taken into consideration.¹⁶⁴ This statement is inexplicable, for surely the Isthmus was nearer to the town than any point outside the Settlement, and consequently the cost of carriage from the Isthmus should have been less.

Water stored in the Isthmus reservoirs was also of small benefit to the other two military positions. The charge for carrying it to the troops at Tawahi and at the Camp in the Crater was in 1870 Rs. 3081 per month,¹⁶⁵ a considerable sum. To overcome this problem, it was suggested that the Isthmus and Tawahi be connected by a pipeline or a tram road; that the Harbour Department's steam barge be used

for conveying water from the Isthmus to Tawahi; or that two traction engines, each drawing a wagon, should daily take water to Tawahi, the Camp and the town.

All these suggestions were discussed at length, and faults were found in each of them. Finally, Tremenheere concluded, "The system of transport by means of donkeys and camels has to go on",¹⁶⁶ and it did go on for a long time to come. In 1875-6, 17,910 camel loads of water, i.e. three and a half million gallons, passed through the Barrier Gate.¹⁶⁷

After 1868, the garrison had no reason to complain of a shortage of water; but the fear that the Shaykh 'Uthman supply might be cut off for a long period made the authorities think of storing as much water as possible within British limits. To this end, in 1869, the Government of Bombay recommended to that of India the damming of the Khusaf Valley in addition to extending the Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct to the village of Zaydah on the 'Abdali-Hawshabi border, where the River Tiban branched out. The duct was also to be enlarged so as to deliver 120,000 gallons per day instead of only a maximum of 40,000.

Captain A.T. Mander, the Executive Engineer, estimated the cost of the new work at seven lakhs of rupees. On the basis of past experience, he argued that for a definite income, the 'Abdali and Hawshabi sultans would be glad to forego the water which irrigated their land. As with the Shaykh 'Uthman water, the new "mixture" was to be sold at one rupee per 100 gallons, and the two sultans were to receive half the proceeds of the sale after the deduction of running expenses. The water was tested in England and found fit for drinking and cooking.

Russell was opposed to the Zaydah scheme on a number of grounds. He could not countenance the idea that the land through which the river passed should cease to be cultivated, and if cultivation was to continue, the water supply to Aden would be scanty and irregular. Water from the mainland was always liable to be cut off by the Arabs or by a European enemy. The cost of the project Russell estimated at ten lakhs of rupees, and he predicted that the Government would get very little by way of revenue, only eight per cent.¹⁶⁸ The civil population would continue to use water from the wells and tanks nearer home. For all these reasons, he recommended the Khusaf scheme as being cheaper and more practicable.

The Bombay Government accepted Russell's arguments,¹⁶⁹ but in

the light of the experience with the Tawilah Tanks, the Supreme Government supported the Zaydah scheme and expressed their pious hope that the supply from the new source would be found sufficient for all purposes without affecting the land under cultivation. The Government of India added that if two years' supply of water were stored within British limits, the garrison would not suffer a shortage should the supply be cut off by the Arabs or any other besieging force. Yet they asked the Government of Bombay to reconsider the two schemes and submit plans for both or either of them.¹⁷⁰

The Zaydah scheme is not mentioned again until 1873, when there was a new Government in Bombay under Sir P.E. Wodehouse. This Government, for the reasons given by Russell, opposed the Zaydah project and a similar one by Ducat which envisaged a pipeline to Aden from a spring near al-Masna'a, a Sayyid village 43 miles away in Lower Yafi'. The Government, who do not seem to have acquainted themselves with the history of the water problem in Aden, considered the two plans "undesirable, until it has been proved that an adequate supply cannot be obtained within the limits of our own occupation".¹⁷¹

The Khusaf project was carried out, but was doomed to failure. In September 1877, when the dam was almost full, a pipe burst and much water was lost in a few hours. The rest seeped through the rocks in 24 hours.¹⁷² Even if the dam had been watertight, it would have been, like the Tawilah Tanks, more often empty than full, a fact which Russell and the authorities in Bombay failed to take into account.

The Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct was the only water project which proved efficient and reliable. It continued to be the chief source of supply for many years to come, and even today Aden's water is piped from artesian wells in and around Shaykh 'Uthman. The use of the tanks, condensers and wells was gradually discontinued.

The Bombay Government attached great importance to Aden's military and naval value, hence their plans for fortifying it against every possible danger by land or sea. The Supreme Government admitted the importance of the Settlement but did not consider it more valuable than other stations on the route between Egypt and

China. Consequently, they saw no justification for giving it special treatment. The Government of India thought it unlikely that the Settlement would face a major attack by sea. In any event, they were certain that if such an attack were attempted, the Navy would pre-empt it. This conviction and a reluctance to spend money resulted in the sea defences being built on a scale much smaller than Bombay had wished.

For obvious reasons, the land fortifications received greater attention, but even they, due to lack of money, were constructed with the modest objects of keeping the population in check and repelling an Arab attack or one by a small European force. At the end of the period, the defences were too strong for Arabs and too weak for Europeans.

The town was completely ignored by the military engineers and had little attention from the Government. As a result, it grew haphazardly, care being taken only that the streets should be properly laid out and the buildings should not encroach on the military limits. For its growth, Aden had to depend mainly on private enterprise and money raised from local taxes.

The development of the new possession required labourers, artisans, traders and others. Immigration was encouraged, and immigrants came from far and near. In 1846, Lord Hardinge expressed fears that a large population might endanger the security of the Settlement and exhaust the water supply. He therefore recommended restriction on immigration, but his recommendation was not acted upon.

In the first eight years, equal stress was laid on the military and commercial value of Aden. However, after two years in office, Hardinge started to put more emphasis on the military importance, but this did not affect the growth of trade. In 1853, the Bombay Government officially declared that the military value of the Settlement came before its commercial development, but no measures were taken to curb commerce. Haines' successors continued to encourage trade, and their superiors did not check them.

One result of the new emphasis was that restrictions were placed on immigration, but these were lifted when it was found that they adversely affected Aden's trade and labour supply. However, regardless of freedom or control of immigration, the population seems to have stabilised after 1842. In Aden, space was limited and water was

a problem, two factors which discouraged permanent settlement.

With regard to the water supply, the British faced the same old problems and for the most part tried the same old solutions with similar results. Desalination was the only new method which they used to increase the amount of sweet water in the Settlement. The authorities did not do anything to make drinking water cheaply available to the inhabitants although they expressed concern on this subject. They left resources which should have been used for the general good in the hands of wealthy private individuals who could easily have bought all that they required. The result was that the poor could not afford good drinking water, and the authorities did not derive from the water projects the profits which they had hoped for.

CHAPTER IV.TRADE.Customs Dues and Establishment.

At the time the British occupied Aden, its trade had dwindled into insignificance. Indeed, what commercial activity there was depended on boats which dropped anchor on their way to Mukha. Thus the 'Abdalīs were able to buy certain commodities which they badly needed. From Indian traders they bought spices, cotton cloths and small quantities of iron, lead and rice. Boats from the Persian Gulf landed dates, and others from the Somali country brought sheep. In return, the 'Abdalīs exported wheat, jowari (Indian millet), coffee and small amounts of copper.¹

As regards customs dues, Wellsted mentioned that on all imports and exports a duty of only 2½% was demanded. In addition, a small harbour due was required, and the Dawlah (governor) expected a trifling present from all boats touching at Aden.² For Aden's poverty, Wellsted put the blame on Sultan Muhsin who, by his extortion, forced certain men to flee his territory,³ and one can assume that these were wealthy merchants whose departure deprived the country of their capital.

Haines, who visited Aden with Wellsted in 1835, gave a completely different picture of what went on at the harbour. He wrote that a heavy duty was levied on each article of import and export regardless of its value. The Sultan charged one dollar for every bag of rice or dates, the original price being between two and three dollars. Without mentioning the price of a bag of coffee, Haines recorded that the Sultan levied a duty of between sixteen and eighteen dollars.⁴

The reason for the difference between the two accounts given by Wellsted and Haines may have been a deliberate attempt on the part of the latter to discredit the Sultan. When Haines wrote his account in 1838, he was negotiating the transfer of Aden. As the negotiations dragged on, the Sultan became his enemy, and adverse reports could be expected. This argument is borne out first by the brief statement of customs dues levied under Sultan Muhsin, and then by comparing the pre-occupation rates with those of the Bombay Customs Act, 1838. It is noteworthy that the pre-occupation figures were supplied by Haines himself.⁵

As for the income from the port, Sultan Muhsin said that it was

£50,000 annually. Haines, reporting this in February 1838, claimed that he had in his possession the customs accounts for the previous few years which showed that the figure was not more than £7000 per annum.⁶ However, in his memoir, submitted to the Government in August of the same year, he estimated the Sultan's regular revenue from customs dues at £12,000 a year, and added that the Dawlah increased this sum greatly by additional charges "adapted to the occasion". In fact, Haines accused him of "constantly defrauding" travellers.⁷ Wellsted, on the other hand, described the same Dawlah as being "a clever, hospitable man, and exceedingly attentive to Europeans".⁸

Besides the Dawlah, Aden had a customs master with one or two assistants. They collected duties, but did not issue receipts or keep regular accounts. After the occupation, Haines was directed to re-appoint the customs men.⁹ However, as they did not speak English, Haines asked for someone with a knowledge of that language to take charge of the customs-house.¹⁰ The Government answered that they could not comply with his request until the trade of Aden had justified the employment of such a man.¹¹

Encouraged by the steady rise in the customs receipts for the first three official years,¹² Haines asked again for a qualified customs master and explained the unsatisfactory situation in the customs establishment. The Arab customs master was a former governor of Aden, and the accountant was a Jew whose family had for many years been employed at the customs-house. Under the Sultan, they were adequate for the task; then, no receipts were issued or detailed accounts kept. Now these were necessary, and moreover they had to be written in English. Now also manifests arrived daily with goods; and as they were in English, the two men could not read them. Thus smuggling was made easy, and only an official with a knowledge of English could put an end to it. Besides the two chief employees, the customs establishment consisted of two writers (one at the Main Pass gate and one at the Southern Pass gate), one havildar, and eight peons. The peons' duty was to guard the whole seafront, the two passes mentioned above and the pass leading into Bandar Duras (Fishermen's Bay).

At Aden, there were no warehouses where goods could be put into bond. Merchandise landed at Tawahí had to be guarded by a peon all

the way to the customs-house in the Crater. Since there were not enough peons for this task, smuggling could not be avoided. As a remedy, Haines recommended the building of two warehouses, one at the Main or Northern Pass which led into the Crater from Tawahi, and another at the Southern Pass which led into the Crater from Huqqat Bay.

The Political Agent also recommended an increase in the salaries of the two writers, the customs master and the accountant. The latter two each received \$30 per month, and Haines insinuated that such a small salary might make them resort to fraudulent practices, especially as the customs master was "a merchant of some rank". Lieut. C.J. Cruttenden, the Assistant Political Agent, could not supervise their work as he should because of his other duties.¹³ The only time he could devote to the customs accounts was before or after office hours, i.e. before nine o'clock in the morning or after four o'clock in the afternoon.¹⁴

Haines' letter produced one positive result. The long-desired official arrived in Aden on 12th December, 1842, and he bore the title "Inspector of Customs". His office at the customs-house was a room in a dilapidated state. The building itself was "a mere ruin, neither wind-tight nor water-tight". Packages left there were exposed to plunder or damage. Haines, therefore, impressed upon the Government in July 1843 the necessity of having a proper customs-house to enable the Inspector to work effectively. He also reminded them that the two warehouses were still needed.¹⁵

The warehouses and the customs-house were not built, and when Aden became a free port in 1850, the need for them ceased. However, in 1864, a trade registration office was built at Mu'alla, on Western Bay, and as the old harbour in Eastern Bay was still used by a few vessels, a small office was built at the foot of Sirah, replacing the old customs-house which was within the precincts of the Camp.¹⁶

As to what customs dues were levied under the British, Haines, on assuming control, permitted the free import and export of merchandise, pending instructions from the Government.¹⁷ The Government did not approve and directed Haines to go on collecting dues according to the pre-occupation rates until a ruling on the subject was received from the Governor-General. With their letter they enclosed a copy of the Bombay Customs Act, 1838, and asked for two reports, one on the

effect which "exemption certificates"¹⁸ would have at Aden, and another on the current import and export duties.¹⁹

Lord Auckland thought that the Bombay Customs Act might be introduced at Aden provided it would not increase the existing rates. He continued: "It must be borne in mind that a main object of holding Aden will probably be that it may become in our hands the emporium of the import and export trade of that part of Arabia and that object will be entirely defeated unless the duties levied at Aden be more favourable to the importing and exporting merchant than at other ports of the same coast."²⁰

In a further letter, the Governor-General expressed his opinion that, like Singapore, Aden should be a free port; and to foster trade with the new Settlement, he suggested a light scale of tonnage dues on all vessels using the harbour. If, in consequence, Aden became the great emporium which it was hoped it would become, Auckland would expect a fair revenue from ground rent and from moderate duties on land trade.²¹

Regarding the customs duties to be collected at Aden, Auckland preferred not to give any instructions until he had received a report on the old rates.²² The report was provided, but, as will be seen, he never issued instructions on the subject; the matter was finally settled by Bombay.

Meanwhile, in Aden, the collection of customs dues according to the old rates started on 1st April, 1839, and Major Bailie, acting for Haines who was on sick leave, commented on the Customs Act. Its application, the Commander of the Garrison remarked, would raise the duties, "albeit slightly".²³ How "slight" this rise would have been is not easy to tell. Comparison between the pre-occupation rates and those set out in the Act is made difficult by the lack of uniformity in the system used for evaluation and by ignorance of current prices. However, it is clear that the Act generally increased import and export duties. This increase was obvious in the case of goods carried in foreign vessels. In all ports of the E.I.C. the duty on goods carried in foreign vessels was, in most cases, double that charged on goods carried in British vessels.²⁴ Under the Sultan, this distinction did not apply.

Commenting on the exemption certificates, Bailie wrote that they would have a beneficial effect in that they would relieve the Aden

merchants of the duty which they paid at ports within the Bombay Presidency. Bailie also recommended, as a measure to encourage the land trade, the abolition of transit dues between Aden and the interior.²⁵ His letter was sent back to Haines who had resumed his duties.

Haines abolished the transit dues which, anyway, formed only a very small proportion of the customs revenue for April (£402½) and May (£89½). Their abolition was intended to benefit Aden by encouraging the tribes to bring their produce for export.²⁶ Another benefit which Haines could have mentioned was that the flow of supplies for the garrison and the town would be increased.

Land Trade.

From the beginning, Haines' dream for Aden was to make it again what it once had been, a great commercial centre. In all his engagements with the inland chiefs he stipulated that no obstacles should be put in the way of trade, but his most important treaty in this respect was the one made with Sultan Ahmad of the 'Abdalis in 1848. Article 7 of this treaty dealt specifically with transit dues payable at al-Hawtah, these were:

Grain and coffee	6½%
Ghee (clarified butter)	30%
Fish	20%
Iron	10%
English piece goods	10%
Grass, <u>kirbi</u> (millet straw), wood and vegetables	6%-8%

Under the new treaty, the duties on the last four articles were removed entirely, as they were grown in the 'Abdali territory. The duties on the first five and all other articles were reduced to two per cent. Furthermore, the treaty gave the merchants of Aden the right to have a branch house at al-Hawtah, thus enabling them to monopolise the trade of the interior.²⁷

The needs of the Aden garrison and population, the cash prices offered for the produce of the interior and the great variety of foreign goods in the Aden market - all these factors led to an increase in traffic between the Settlement and the hinterland. In fact, the degree of interdependence between the two became so great as to warrant the saying "Aden is the head, the near neighbourhood the body, and one cannot exist without the other".²⁸

Further away in the Tihama, the rule of Sharif Husayn (1841-49) was detrimental to Aden's trade in coffee, the most important product of the Yemen. The Sharif saw in Aden's growing prosperity a threat to his port of Mukha, and this made him place a ban on trade with the Settlement. Merchants who dared defy it did so at the risk of having their property confiscated.

The Sharif also, to the detriment of the Settlement, gave the Americans preferential treatment. The American agent at, say, Mukha would store up as much coffee as he could, so that when the vessels arrived they would only have to load and sail away. All port and other charges were paid by the merchant who supplied the coffee, and thus there was no chance of a quarrel between the American shipmasters and the local authorities. Other reasons which discouraged the Yemeni merchants from taking their coffee to Aden were the proximity of the coffee-growing districts to the ports, the dangers which beset the overland journey to Aden and the money required by the different chiefs through whose territories the caravans passed.

Aden also failed to attract much coffee from Harar in Abyssinia. When tribal feuds broke out on the Somali coast (which was not uncommon), the coffee from Harar, instead of being shipped to Aden from Zayla or Berbera, was taken to Bulhar and from there shipped to Mukha, it being the nearest market.²⁹

Coffee from Harar reached Aden when there was peace on the Somali coast. Coffee and other products of the Yemen reached Aden mainly when the Yemen was in a disturbed state and the people could not reach the ports or boycotted them as a protest against high duties.

In 1849, an Ottoman force from the Hijaz under Tawfiq Pasha ousted Sharif Husayn and occupied the Tihama. Then the Ottomans became the only rivals of the British in South-West Arabia, with the coffee-growing districts near the ports under their control. To compensate for this disadvantage, Prideaux, the Assistant Resident, thought that the British should work for the abolition of all transit dues on inland trade. When this was done, these districts would be brought "commercially, if not geographically, nearer to us than to the ports which, notwithstanding nearly every conceivable drawback, except position still enjoy four fifths of the trade in the most valuable products of Arabia".³⁰

Prices of interior commodities in Aden were affected by a number

of factors. When there were hostilities between the tribes and the British or among the tribes themselves, the flow of supplies into Aden was interrupted. Three days' interruption doubled prices, five days' trebled them and ten days' caused panic.³¹ During disturbances, a chief might take upon himself the responsibility of seeing the supply caravans through, and the money he demanded for this service forced up the prices three times.³² When the 'Abdali sultan was at enmity with the British, and the tribes in the districts beyond Lahj wanted to trade with Aden without going through his territory, they made a detour which lengthened the journey by one day³³ and this also added to the price of commodities. Lack of rain in the interior led to a shortage of supplies and a rise in prices.

Sometimes, disturbances had the opposite effect. For instance, the 'Abdalis once feared an 'Awlaqi attack, and this fear made them hurry with their stores to Aden lest they would be plundered by the enemy. The result was that the price of hay fell from two or three rupees to eighteen or twenty annas a load, and the dollar, for which one could normally get seven or eight kaylahs of grain, now bought eleven.³⁴ Two other factors which brought prices down were competition and the abundance of rain in the interior.

In the first six years of the occupation no record was kept of Aden's trade with the interior. From 1845 onwards, data for interior trade was compiled from a daily register kept at the Police Office. In 1845-6 and 1846-7, the records give figures for imports only, the figures being in camel loads.³⁵ Import figures, when given, continue to be in camel loads up to 1858-9, and from then on the value in rupees is also shown. Figures for exports to the interior are available only from 1847-8 onwards, and they show the value of the articles exported as well as their quantity. However, since no single unit is used in measuring quantity, only the monetary value is shown here.³⁶

Aden's main imports from the interior were aloes, bajri (millet), beeswax, coffee, dyes, firewood, fruits, jowari, kirbi, lentils, potash, gat,³⁷ vegetables and wheat. The chief exports were cotton and cotton piece goods, silk and silk piece goods, dates, grains, metals, spices, sugar, tobacco and snuff.³⁸

The figures for land imports and exports cannot be considered strictly accurate. In 1850, Cruttenden wrote that piece goods and silk in bundles were smuggled inland to the extent of from Rs. 60,000

to Rs. 78,000 annually. The following year, he remarked that the statistics were compiled from the statements of the camelmen themselves, and not from any bona fide examination of the merchandise.³⁹

Market supplies from the interior were not brought only on camel back. In 1854, Haines reported that every day between 60 and 80 men and women came to Aden on foot, bringing fowls, eggs, etc.⁴⁰ Merchandise was taken into the interior principally by individuals and in small quantities. In theory, it was obligatory on all who came to Aden for trade to declare at the Police Office the nature, quantity and value of their goods, but this rule was constantly evaded, and there were not enough officials to enforce it.⁴¹

Attempts were made to give more accurate figures for the land trade. In 1855, Coghlan wrote that goods were valued at the current market price ; and in the absence of such a price, by the Government tariff. For forming an approximate idea about the quantity of merchandise coming from the interior, Lieut. G.E. Hancock, Assistant Resident, recommended in 1870 that a writer be stationed at the Barrier Gate with weighing apparatus to make random checks on camel loads.⁴²

Sea Trade.

When Haines abolished transit dues with the interior, he proposed some reduction in customs dues paid on goods imported and exported by sea. He was confident that the reduction would have the effect of increasing trade without diminishing the revenue.⁴³ The Government did not comment on his suggestion, but asked him for a comparative statement of the rates levied at various Red Sea ports and those which he intended to levy at Aden,⁴⁴ a request with which he eventually complied.⁴⁵ With two minor exceptions,⁴⁶ Haines' rates were sanctioned by Bombay, and the Government of India was informed accordingly.⁴⁷

Another step taken to encourage Aden's trade by sea was the treatment of country craft⁴⁸ as British vessels with respect to rates. To start with, the trade of Aden was mainly carried on by such craft; and if they had to pay the double duty imposed on foreign vessels, they would have been deterred from coming to Aden.⁴⁹

In 1848, the Government of India passed an Act abolishing duties on goods carried from port to port in the territories of the E.I.C. and equalising the duties on goods imported and exported in foreign and British ships.⁵⁰ This Act was of great benefit to Aden.

The abolition of duties referred to tended to encourage trade between it and India. The equalisation of duties on shipping had the effect of attracting more vessels to the harbour.

Haines did not welcome this equalisation because it meant great competition for the Indian merchants, especially from the Americans whose cotton manufactures were extremely cheap.⁵¹ Before the equalisation of duties, the Americans anchored off Aden only to make use of the Post Office. They avoided landing goods and consequently paying trans-shipment duty. Three vessels, one large and two small, would leave the United States with cargoes of piece goods. The small ones would proceed first to the Red Sea where they exchanged their cargo for coffee, gums, hides, etc. Then they joined the large vessel which had anchored off Aden, and the three went to one of the ports on the Red Sea, say, Mukha where they paid lower duties. There trans-shipment took place, and the large vessel returned home, while the other two remained to trade with the new supply of piece goods.⁵²

The most important decision which the Government took to foster Aden's trade was to declare the port free in 1850. Haines' dissatisfaction with the revenue from customs⁵³ made him recommend in 1847 that the port be opened for a limited period of five or seven years. The advantages which would follow, he argued, would outweigh any loss in revenue; Aden would become what its geographical position entitled it to be, the chief emporium for Arabian, African and Indian trade.⁵⁴ The Bombay Government agreed, but thought that there should be no time limit on this measure. If a time limit were fixed, the traders would think that after the specified period had elapsed, heavy duties would be imposed, and this prospect would deter them from trading with Aden or settling there.

Aden's revenue from customs duties was small. Many of the articles exported with a value greater than Rs. 20,000 contributed to the treasury of the E.I.C. since import duties were paid on them elsewhere, and many of those imported with a value greater than Rs. 20,000 were for the consumption of the garrison and no duties were paid on them. The abolition of customs dues would also reduce the price of goods passing through to the interior and the African coast which would diminish pro tanto the necessity of paying in cash for goods imported from there. As a result, the drain on bullion would be less.

In brief, the Government of Bombay argued that the advantages

which would accrue from the opening of the port would outweigh the loss of the small customs revenue, and in recommending the measure to the Supreme Government they asked whether there would be any political objections.⁵⁵ Lord Hardinge, who was about to vacate his post as Governor-General, replied that he would be making enquiries on the subject while in Aden on his way to England and that he would report his findings to the Home Authorities.⁵⁶ After his visit to Aden, he wrote privately to Sir G.R. Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, from his ship off Qusayr that he had no objection to making Aden a free port provided that it did not become "the resort of all the loose population of the Red Sea coast". In a military base such as Aden, the population should be strictly controlled.⁵⁷

Lord Dalhousie, Hardinge's successor, saw in Aden primarily a military base and a communications centre. He did not think it was necessary to make Aden a free port in order to encourage its trade. Trade could be encouraged by the levy of moderate duties, as was in fact the case, for it was not the policy of the Government "to attract by extraordinary advantages and indulgences, more commerce and immigration than would naturally flow to it, or than would be quite compatible with the defences of the place, and its occupation for the main purpose which the British Government has in view there, namely the communication with Europe".⁵⁸

Haines himself warned that if Aden were made a free port, the Americans, having equal rights with the British, would trade under great advantages; they would flood the Arabian and African markets with their goods to the detriment of British manufactures. Therefore, the Government should decide whether the port should be free to the vessels of all nations or to British vessels only.⁵⁹

The Court of Directors supported the proposal to make Aden a free port "having ourselves a strong inclination to add to the commercial importance of the place".⁶⁰ They therefore asked the Government of India to reconsider their decision. The result was that Aden was declared a free port by Act X, 1850, according to which no customs duty was payable on any goods carried by sea or land to or from Aden. The purpose of the Act was stated in its preamble, "... the trade between the western coast of India and the Red Sea and places thereunto adjacent will be improved by encouraging the resort of vessels of all nations to the Port of Aden..."⁶¹ By it,

Aden was excluded from the provisions and privileges of Act VI, 1843, and was thus treated as a foreign port.

As Haines had anticipated, when the port of Aden was opened, on 27th April, 1850, foreign traders were quick to make use of it in preference to Mukha, Hudaydah and other ports on the Red Sea. Now at Aden they could buy and sell more advantageously. They could also receive and send letters through the Post Office, a facility not to be had anywhere else in the area. An American shipmaster, for example, could receive letters direct from home by steam in 45 days and reply in the same period, speedy communication for those times. While the merchants were transacting their business, their vessels lay in a safe quiet anchorage where they could be refitted. The traders also avoided the wear and tear of the boisterous voyage up the Red Sea.

After Aden was declared a free port, American and French commercial activity increased considerably. The Americans bartered their cotton cloth with great profit, and the French vessels, after delivering their coal to the French depot (established in 1845), returned laden with goods bought at a cheap rate. Hardly any merchandise came to Aden from Britain, and trade between India and Aden was still subject to duty at the Indian ports.

In addition, the opening of the port deprived the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis of part of their income because some country craft now went to Aden in preference to the Arab bandars (roadsteads) to avoid customs dues. From 1850 to 1854, as will be seen, there was hostility between the British and these two tribes for reasons not connected with trade. However, in 1854, the Rev. G.P. Badger, the Protestant Chaplain to the Garrison and Outram's close adviser, recommended the re-imposition of customs dues at Aden. Their abolition, he claimed, had deprived the tribes of their revenue from the bandars and made them actively hostile to the British. The British themselves had derived no benefit from the opening of the port. The restoration of the customs dues, Badger argued, would cover the expenses of the Customs Department and bring in a small revenue. More important still, it would divert some trade to the Arab bandars and thus reconcile the chiefs to the British.⁶²

The Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, did not agree to consider the re-imposition of dues at Aden. He argued that

economically, such a measure would have a retrogressive effect on the commerce of the place. Politically, the Arab bandars should not be encouraged, so that the chieftains might identify their interests with those of Aden. Thus Aden would be the market where they could exchange their produce for whatever foreign goods they needed.⁶³

The abolition of customs dues at Aden harmed not only the Arab bandars in the vicinity, but also the Ottoman ports in the Yemen. Aden became a free port when there were great disturbances in the Yemen consequent on the re-occupation of the Tihama by the Ottomans. As was usually the case in times of trouble, much of the trade in Yemeni coffee was diverted to the British Settlement. Thus the Ottomans lost revenue from both customs and anchorage dues.


This apparent transfer of the coffee trade to Aden made Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Hudaydah, request that customs dues be levied on all merchandise entering Aden by land. Its free passage, he claimed, was "injurious to the Sublime Porte", and in time might deprive the Yemen of all revenue.⁶⁴ Merchandise from the Yemen continued to pass free into Aden, but its flow was not always as great as in the years immediately after the opening of the port, and the Yemen did not suffer the dreaded economic collapse.

The abolition of customs dues naturally led to an increase in trade; Aden once more became an emporium for India, East Africa and South Arabia, as envisaged by Act X, 1850. The only other places with which the Settlement had a two-way traffic before and after the opening of the port were the Persian Gulf, the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Hamburg⁶⁵ and Mauritius. Prior to 1850, France only exported to Aden; but after that date, she also imported from it.

Holland had trade relations with Aden only in the four years following the opening of the port. The year 1850-51 saw an exchange of goods with the Seychelles. In 1851-2, merchandise came from Spain; and in the following year, a Belgian ship took home a cargo of goods. In the last fourteen years, Suez, China and Australia became good trade partners with Aden.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 gave Aden its greatest commercial boost. The same year the Canal was opened, Trieste began trading with Aden, and Italy followed in 1870, the year of her unification. Prior to this date, Genoa was the only Italian city

0 100 200 300 400 500 MILES



Trade Routes.

shown to have imported goods from the Settlement (1861-2).

Two places which deserve special mention in connection with Aden's trade are Berbera and Bulhar. In the early years of British rule in Aden, the town of Berbera on the opposite Somali coast was of great commercial importance. It was the market where merchants from Africa, Arabia and India congregated during the north-east monsoon, i.e. from October to April. For its supplies of coffee, gums and resins, the Settlement was greatly dependent on Berbera's trade fair. When the fair was not held, Aden's trade suffered considerably.

In 1846, Berbera's trade began to decline owing to tribal quarrels. The Somali warring factions were liable to plunder vessels bound for Aden and India.⁶⁶ This state of affairs led Haines to write: "... eventually we may expect to draw the whole of the Berbera trade over and make Aden the annual rendezvous for both Indian and African merchants."⁶⁷

By 1863, the Berbera trading season had become a thing of the past, but this was not to Aden's benefit, as Haines had hoped. The merchants, instead, took their goods to Bulhar, a roadstead between Berbera and Zayla. Bulhar had formerly been almost unused, but in the 1860's it started to develop rapidly as a commercial port. This was due to the 'Iyal Yunus, the tribe inhabiting the town, who were better disposed than the 'Iyal Ahmad of Berbera.⁶⁸ However, towards the end of the decade, Berbera had re-established itself as a commercial centre, rivalling Bulhar, both trading with Aden.⁶⁹

There are no reports on the sea trade for the first three years of the occupation. Before the arrival of the Inspector of Customs, the Arab customs master kept his accounts in Arabic, and the Jewish accountant kept his in Hebrew, and they were afterwards translated into English. These accounts were not detailed enough to form the basis of trade reports.⁷⁰ The first official trade report, therefore, covered the period from 12th December, 1842, when the Inspector arrived, to 30th April, 1843, when the official year ended. Since the report in question does not cover a whole year, it has been disregarded.

From 1843-4 onwards there are annual trade reports. Up to 1862-3 they give quantity and value and after that, up to 1869-70, value only. The report for the last year, 1871-2, cannot be traced.

At this point, attention must be drawn to two facts. The first

is that up to 1862-3, for purposes of trade distribution, Suez was placed under the heading of "United Kingdom". The second is that the year 1865-6 had only eleven months, the official year having been changed from May-April to April-March.

Reasons for the fluctuation of trade are not always given; and when they are, they are mainly of a general nature such as supply and demand, stock in hand and changing market prices. The trade reports which attribute increase and/or decrease to specific reasons are few. For instance, the decrease in 1847-8 was principally in African trade which did not reach Aden from Berbera until May 1848-9, whereas in former years it always arrived in March and April. This decrease naturally occasioned a corresponding increase in the following year.⁷¹

Another year which deserves special mention is 1858-9, when a number of factors conspired against commerce in the Red Sea area. These were:

1. The Jaddah Massacre of June 1858. While in Jaddah harbour, the "Eranee" of Calcutta, a British-registered ship, hoisted the Ottoman flag. Her action was seen by Captain Pullen, of the British warship "Cyclops" which happened to be in the harbour at the time. Pullen immediately ordered the "Eranee" to be seized, the Ottoman flag hauled down and the British flag hoisted in its place.

The people of Jaddah interpreted Pullen's reaction as an insult to Islam. A mob attacked the British Consulate and killed the Vice-Consul, his interpreter and clerk. Then the mob attacked the French Consulate, killed the Consul, his wife and Arab servants, and wounded his daughter and a consular official. Twenty-two other Christians, mostly Greek, were murdered. The survivors of the slaughter took refuge on the "Cyclops".

Britain and France sent commissioners to seek redress, and this was finally obtained; the instigators of the trouble were executed. Months were required to settle the matter; and during that time, the trade of the Hijaz was at a standstill, the effect of which was felt by all Red Sea ports as well as Aden.

2. Trouble in the Yemen. Shortly after the Jaddah Massacre, there followed one of the many rebellions against the Ottomans in the Yemen. The uprising had the effect of cutting communication between the rich coffee districts and the Red Sea ports.

3. Outbreak of cholera. Hardly had trade recovered from the

effects of the Jaddah Massacre and the fighting in the Yemen when cholera broke out and ravaged both shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In the Settlement, 600 people succumbed to it.

4. Famine. The last disaster, and the one which affected Aden most directly, was a famine in the Yemen and East Africa whence much of Aden's merchandise was received. The ports which had sent cereals and other provisions to Aden were now supplied from there. The effects of the famine were felt in Aden less than in other places because its market was better supplied, but even there prices rose sharply.⁷²

Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the trade for 1858-9 shows a decrease of Rs. 1,863,637 in imports and exports as compared with the previous year. However, it must be emphasised that the year 1857-8 was the most prosperous up to that date, the Indian Mutiny notwithstanding.

The five main articles of sea trade were coffee, raw cotton, piece goods, grain and ivory. With regard to this trade, one cannot speak of a definite exchange of articles, as one can with the land trade. Here Aden played the same part in the circulation of goods as the heart does in the circulation of the blood; goods were imported only to be re-exported.

Up to 1862-3 the records give only the total value of the article imported and exported; beginning with 1863-4 they also show its movement. The value and movement of the five articles mentioned above are shown in Appendix 7E. The causes of their fluctuations in certain years are summarised in the following notes.

Coffee. As has been shown, Aden failed not only to monopolise, but also to attract, the coffee trade of the Yemen to any great extent. Most of Aden's coffee came from the hinterland and from East Africa. In 1845-6, the decrease in the coffee trade was caused chiefly by disturbances on the African coast. The coffee traders from Harar, unable to sell their commodity to the regular purchasers at Berbera, shipped off large quantities to Mukha. Besides, that year there was a poor crop of coffee in the Yemen, and the Americans bought most of it.⁷³ The decrease in 1859-60 was attributed to the failure of the coffee crop due to a plague which attacked the plants just as the berry approached maturity.⁷⁴

A careful look at the export figures for coffee⁷⁵ will show that they are invariably higher than the import figures. The explanation

for this lies in two facts. A considerable quantity of coffee was brought into Aden in husk; and after it had been cleaned, it acquired a higher market value. The figures for the land and sea imports, which together formed the sea exports, were not added together. If they had been, the discrepancy would have been greatly reduced.

Raw Cotton. The trade reports do not give explanations for the fluctuations in the cotton trade until 1861-2, and then they are only in terms of supply and demand. Cotton was principally imported from Kutch, Veraval and Porbandar. Small quantities were brought from Mukalla, Berbera and the Persian Gulf, having also come originally from India.

Piece Goods. Cotton piece goods came mainly from Bombay, the United States and the United Kingdom. From Aden, they were imported chiefly by the Yemen, the Hijaz and the East African coast. The American Civil War (1861-65) affected trade in this article to a large degree. A bale of American cloth which normally sold at \$70-75 cost in 1862-3 \$200; and in the following year, not less than \$350.

Until 1865, piece goods from Bombay were conveyed in country craft direct to ports on the Arabian and African coasts. From then on, they came regularly to Aden by the Bombay and Bengal Company steamers. This change made the Settlement to a far greater extent the entrepot of piece goods for the Red Sea area.

Silk piece goods were a less important item of merchandise, due to a lower demand and higher prices. They came mainly from Bombay, Calcutta and China, and were exported chiefly to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea ports. As with cotton, the sales of piece goods varied with the demand, and the trade reports do not refer to fluctuations in this article until 1862-3.

Grain. The records do not remark on the increase and decrease in the trade in grain until 1861-2. From the remarks made it is clear that the trade in this article was affected by drought and famine in Arabia, India and East Africa. In 1862-3, Aden exported large quantities of grain to India due to the famine in Gujerat and the North-West Provinces. In 1865-6, Aden had to import considerable supplies from India to meet the demands of the famine-stricken interior which normally supplied the Settlement with most of its grain. In the previous year, when East Africa suffered from lack of rain, Aden

imported enough grain to meet the needs of that area. The increase in the importation and exportation of grain in 1867-8 and 1868-9 was caused by the Abyssinian expedition and its aftermath.

Ivory. Ivory came mainly from Zanzibar and Massawa and went chiefly to Bombay and Europe. The trade in this article fluctuated according to demand, and the records comment on it for the first time in 1864-5.

Coal and treasure were Aden's chief items of import and export by sea, but since they were in a special class, they are dealt with separately. The first two trade reports⁷⁶ did not refer to either, but after reading the second report, the Government ordered that both should be included in the annual trade returns.⁷⁷ The Customs Department at Aden gave the order a retroactive effect. For the purpose of comparing 1843-4 with 1844-5, they added the two items to the former year, with import and export figures, and treated them as ordinary market commodities.

In 1848, Cruttenden rightly remarked that the import figures for coal were deceptive; they led one to believe that Britain had an extensive trade with Aden, which was not the case.⁷⁸ He also observed that showing as exports coal taken by steamers for their own consumption established a fictitious trade with places which never received it. Thus the Red Sea ports, Bombay, Bengal and even Britain appeared as having imported coal from Aden, simply because steamers coaled at that place en route. To correct this false impression, he decided to strike out coal export figures from the trade returns.⁷⁹ Accordingly, they were not shown in 1848-9 or 1849-50, and one could reasonably expect them not to appear again, but they did from time to time without any explanation.

Up to 1859-60, the occasional explanations for the fluctuations in coal imports and "exports" are given in terms of heavy demand and large stocks in hand. The great decrease in 1861-2 is attributed to the facility with which steamers could obtain a supply at Suez by the Egyptian railroad, thereby rendering it unnecessary to fill up at Aden for the double voyage to and from the Red Sea. The railroad from Alexandria to Cairo was opened in 1856, and in the following year it was extended to Suez through the desert.

Before the establishment of this line, steamers took on little or no coal at Suez, but now nearly as much was loaded there as at

Aden.⁸⁰ Notwithstanding, the increase in steam communication in the 1860's led to greater importations of coal for Aden. In 1865, the Bombay and Bengal Steamship Company started a fortnightly line of cargo steamers between Bombay and Suez calling at Aden. Until then, the other companies which coaled at the port were the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the Messageries Maritimes Imperiales, the Anglo-French Mauritius Steam Navigation Company and the European and Australian Royal Mail Company. The large imports in 1867-8 were due to the Abyssinian Campaign for which the Settlement was a supply centre. The increase in shipping consequent upon the opening of the Suez Canal inevitably led to an increase in coal imports.⁸¹

Treasure was treated as an item of merchandise until 1847-8, but from that year onwards it was shown separately at the end of the trade report, and then added to the total merchandise. In an entrepot like Aden, it was wrong to use treasure in determining the value of trade, since the greater part of the trade, especially in the early years, was carried on by barter. A considerable amount of bullion was brought from Arabian ports for the express purpose of remittance to India. The treasure which came from Bombay was used to pay salaries and to meet expenses; sometimes it merely passed through.

There are only three trade reports which explain fluctuations in treasure: 1855-6, 1858-9 and 1867-8. The great increase in the last year was attributed to the Abyssinian Campaign. The decrease in 1855-6 was due to three general causes. The political unrest in the Yemen prevented the circulation of goods and money between Aden and the ports of that country. Several vessels of the Indian Navy visited the ports on the Red Sea and took back money to Bombay which would otherwise have gone first to Aden. The value of Aden's imports from the interior was not less than that of the preceding year⁸² while the value of exports was less by Rs. 104,205. This meant that a corresponding withdrawal of specie must have taken place.

The treasury at Aden acted as a clearing bank; it was mainly supplied by money received from merchants in exchange for bills on Bombay, any deficiency being made up by importation. Up to 1857-8 these bills were granted at 30 days' sight, but this did not offer sufficient inducement to the merchants. In 1858-9, bills were granted at three days' sight, with the result that during that year, only one lakh of rupees was imported from Bombay. The movement of treasure is not shown until 1863-4.⁸³

The figures for sea trade, like those for land trade, cannot be considered strictly accurate. Prior to the passing of Act X, 1850, the merchants valued their goods as low as possible for the obvious reason that they paid duty accordingly. When the customs duties were lifted, they up-valued their goods whenever they thought that, by doing so, they could facilitate their passing. Also, certain articles, small in bulk but great in value, now for the first time appeared in considerable quantities. Previously they were smuggled. Wars (safflower), for example, was invariably exported in the middle of bags of jowari or flour and thus escaped detection.⁸⁴

After the abolition of customs dues, the harbour authorities no longer had the power to open, examine and appraise goods. The main object of the registration of imports and exports became the detection of fluctuations in trade. If the authorities found a decrease of imports from Britain or the territories of the E.I.C., and a corresponding increase in imports from foreign countries, especially the United States, they were to ascertain why foreign goods were preferred, and do something to make British goods more acceptable.⁸⁵ Reasons for trade fluctuations were not always given, and the trade reports never explained why foreign goods were preferred to British, but Haines indicated that they were cheaper.

Besides the reasons given for the unreliability of the trade figures, the changing prices and the absence of weights render them not as useful as they might otherwise have been. They therefore serve only as a guide to Aden's growing importance as a commercial centre. This importance can be more fully realised when one bears in mind the great trans-shipment trade which was carried on in the harbour, the value of which is not recorded. For 1876-7, Hunter estimated it at two million pounds.⁸⁶

Shipping.

The first two trade reports do not refer to shipping. However, the same Government letter of 1844, which requested Haines to include coal and treasure in future annual reports, also requested him to include a statement of the number and tonnage of vessels which called at the port, whether square-rigged or country craft.

Steamers were included with sailing vessels for the first time in 1858-9, and this explains the increase in the number of vessels which called at Aden in spite of the great decrease in trade that year. The records start to show steamers separately in 1863-4, when there

was an appreciable increase in their number due to factors already mentioned in connection with coal.⁸⁷ In 1871-72, 345 out of 586 vessels which carried on trade by the Suez Canal touched at Aden for coal, water and provisions,⁸⁸ and this shows how great a port Aden had become.

From the beginning the restoration of Aden's trade was a major goal of British policy. The E.I.C. which ruled the place until 1857 was essentially a commercial firm interested in promoting commerce. Hardinge and Dalhousie, it is true, emphasised Aden's importance as a military and communications centre, but did nothing to discourage its trade. Trade meant revenue which the Company hoped would offset its military expenses.

By a series of measures culminating in the opening of the port, the Settlement became what the British had intended, the emporium for India, South Arabia and East Africa. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was still to give it its greatest commercial boost.

The British, and Haines in particular, had hoped to monopolise the coffee trade, but for geographical and political reasons they failed. However, if Aden did not completely fulfil the commercial hopes entertained for it, it went a long way towards realising them.

CHAPTER V.
THE ADMINISTRATION.

Before discussing the administration of Aden, it is necessary to give an outline of the government of British India. Under the E.I.C., the country was divided into three main administrative units called Presidencies, each headed by a Governor. The Presidencies were Bengal, Madras and Bombay. The Governor of Bengal, who had his seat at Calcutta, was also the Governor-General of all India. He presided over an executive council composed of the Commander-in-Chief, another military officer and two civilian officers. Similarly, the Governors of Bombay and Madras each presided over an executive council or board of three members, the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency and two civilians.

The Government of India was highly centralised. The Governor-General in Council was the legislator for the whole country and the supreme authority whose sanction was required for every measure taken by the subordinate governments. Bombay and Madras, however, could correspond directly with the Home Authorities.

Above the Governor-General was the Court of Directors which operated from India House in London. The Court consisted of 24 members and had the power to appoint and dismiss officials throughout India, including the Governor-General with the consent of the Crown. The Court of Directors was in turn under the India Board, or the Board of Control, which was a department of the British Government. The six members of the Board were all Privy Councillors, and the President was a Cabinet Minister. In matters of high policy the Board took the final decision.

The Chairman and two senior members of the Court formed what was called the Secret Committee. This Committee was used by the Board and the Governor-General when they wished to communicate without the knowledge of the other Directors. Dispatches in the Secret Department were written by the President of the Board, and the members of the Secret Committee were compelled by Act of Parliament to sign and transmit them to India. The members could inform the President privately of their disagreement with a letter which they had signed, but this disagreement carried no weight.

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 resulted in the dissolution of the E.I.C and the annexation of India to the British Crown. The India House was

replaced by the India Office, and the last President of the Board became the first Secretary of State for India, with a seat in the Cabinet. In India, the Governor-General was given the additional title of Viceroy, but otherwise the government structure was not substantially changed. In 1861, however, the Indian Councils Act gave the minor Presidencies legislative councils with limited powers; for instance, they could not legislate on financial matters.

The Head of Administration.

The Bombay Government had originally intended to appoint for the administration of Aden an army officer who would combine in his person both civil and military authority. Therefore, when they occupied the place, they requested Haines "to assume temporary charge of the political and civil control of Aden", i.e. to act as Political Agent. Major Bailie, now Commander of the Garrison, was instructed "to attend to his requisitions".¹ Later, however, Haines was confirmed in his office as "the fittest person for the duties",² and thus the division of power was officially sanctioned. The Political Agent was directed to refer to Bombay for instructions "except in a case of great emergency".³

The co-existence of two independent authorities at Aden proved impossible, and conflict was unavoidable. Haines' vision for the Settlement was different from that of the military. The limits of the town and Camp expanded and contracted until 1854 as has been seen. Many civilians were employed by the garrison; and when they committed offences, it was not always clear whether they should be tried by military or civil law. All these were causes of friction underlined by the question of who was to do what.

Complaints from Haines and Bailie against each other reached Bombay in August 1839 and resulted two months later in Bailie's dismissal.⁴ Before his successor, Lieut.-Col. D. Capon, proceeded to Aden, he was announced in General Orders by Maj.-Gen. Sir John Fitzgerald, Commander of the Bombay Forces, as being appointed "to the command at Aden", while the Government intended that he should be appointed "to command the troops at Aden".⁵ Capon himself understood the announcement as placing the whole Settlement under his control.

In February 1840, the Political Agent complained that the military, under their new commander, wanted to proclaim martial law and prevent him from carrying out his governmental duties.⁶ Then he reported that

they were not confining themselves to the seafront as they were supposed to do, but were "daily extending their limits", and he enclosed a map (not shown) to support his claim.

Haines asked that Capon be instructed to consider the townspeople completely outside his jurisdiction and that the troops be kept within clearly defined limits. He reminded the Government that their order was that the military should not occupy the places most suited for commercial purposes and that the commercial advantages were "of the highest importance". The Political Agent warned that the encroachment of the army would prevent merchants from settling at Aden, and added that due to military interference with the civil population, the number of complaints reaching him had increased six times since Capon took office.⁷

Before Haines' complaints had time to reach Bombay, the Government, due to tribal hostilities, had already given Capon the power of assembling courts-martial and confirming the sentences passed, even extending to death under certain circumstances. Only Haines and his staff were excluded from military jurisdiction.⁸

Capon did not enjoy his new powers for a long time. When Haines' complaints reached Bombay, the Government reversed their decision giving Capon absolute authority at Aden. The Governor, Carnac, wrote that placing Aden under military law was suggested by the system introduced at Kharg which had the sanction of the Governor-General. Then he went on to show the inadvisability of doing so.

Kharg was an island with a small number of inhabitants, chiefly fishermen, and had little contact with the mainland. Aden, on the other hand, was a peninsula constantly in communication with the interior and it had a large and growing population for whose protection the British were responsible.⁹ Moreover, when the British occupied Aden, they assured the inhabitants that they would govern them according to their own laws and usages. To keep this pledge, the Government placed them under the Political Agent, and not under the military commandant.

Carnac continued by arguing that if control over the inhabitants were transferred from the civil to the military authority, Haines' political influence with the chiefs in the interior, which it was necessary to maintain, would be impaired. In the town, discontent and trouble would be inevitable. Therefore, the order placing the

entire possession of Aden under military law was cancelled, and Capon's powers were limited to the garrison and camp-followers only. In no way was he to interfere with the civil population except through representation to the Political Agent.¹⁰ The Secret Committee supported Carnac's decision and expressed the opinion that the Political Agent "should on all occasions unless especially interdicted, have the entire control over all functionaries, military as well as others".¹¹ This opinion was not conveyed to Aden, and the military authority remained independent.

Carnac's decision was embodied in letters to Haines and Capon, dated 23rd March, 1840. However, before the letters reached Aden, both men on the same day (31st March, 1840) made complaints to Bombay. Haines reported that misunderstandings between the civil and military authorities, for which the latter were to blame, occurred daily.¹² Capon, on the other hand, accused Haines of "magnifying every trifling disagreement into matters of the highest political importance", and protested that he could not carry on with him paper warfare on an equal footing because he was "not provided with an establishment of writers" like him.¹³ Therefore, Capon appealed to the Adjutant-General of the Army to support him.¹⁴

The Adjutant-General forwarded Capon's letter to the Governor who warned that it was necessary for the civil and military authorities to act in harmony, or else he would have no alternative but to appoint one supreme authority at Aden, much as he would regret to change the existing system.¹⁵ This warning did not produce the desired effect. Friction, varying in degree, continued between Haines and Capon and his successors. The result was that in May 1847, Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, proposed that a Governor be appointed for Aden, combining in his person the power and authority necessary to carry out the duties in all departments.

Sir G.R. Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, wrote that in putting this measure into effect the opportunity should be taken to declare Aden a British possession.¹⁶ The Governor thought that the change would strengthen the position of the British at Aden, make it easier for them to draw on the resources of the neighbouring lands and restore to the port its former trade.¹⁷

L.R. Reid, a member of the Bombay Council, argued that while Aden was an important fortress, it was also a place which the British hoped

would become an emporium of trade between the Red Sea and India. If this hope was realised, Aden would soon attract merchants from Europe and America as well as from the East. The management of such a heterogeneous population and the safety of the Settlement required that the head of administration should have great power to enable him to act without constant reference to Bombay. The powers of a Political Agent were less extensive than those of a Governor who would, besides commanding the garrison, perform all Haines' duties.

Regarding the title of the officer who was to head the administration, Reid thought that "Governor" would not be proper unless that officer was immediately under the Governor-General. However, if he were to be under the subordinate Government of Bombay, then "Lieutenant-Governor" would be more appropriate.¹⁸

J.P. Willoughby, another member of the Council, agreed that if harmony were to prevail at Aden, the civil and military authority should be united in one person. However, he objected to that person being given the title of "Governor", since this might lead him to expect a higher salary than the Government were willing to contemplate. Willoughby himself suggested "Political Agent and Commandant".

When the new officer was appointed, Willoughby wrote, it would become necessary to define his powers and the general principles on which the administration of the Settlement was to be based. The system in force at Singapore might be partially applicable here.¹⁹ With respect to the Governor's suggestion that Aden should be declared a British possession on the appointment of the new officer, he thought that the measure should be introduced with as little publicity as possible, as Aden was viewed by France "with the eye of jealousy and envy".²⁰

Commenting on Willoughby's remark that the change in the administration of Aden should be introduced quietly, Clerk wrote that the declaration and the change in the designation of the British representative need not be simultaneous. However, if Aden were not declared a British possession, it would sooner or later cause embarrassment. In any case, the final decision would be left to the Governor-General. As for the officer to be appointed, Clerk recommended Col. Bagnold, the former Resident at Mukha, subject to improvement in his health.²¹

Hardinge agreed that there should be a military officer as Lieutenant-Governor at Aden, responsible to the Bombay Government but

"with ample powers".²² The Governor-General, it must be noted, did not refer to the question of declaring Aden a British possession, nor is the subject mentioned again. In London, the Court of Directors did not consider that the friction between the two authorities at Aden justified a change in the administration. "The superior power rests with the civil functionary. It is his part to order the service to be performed. The choice of means to perform it is on the exclusive responsibility of the military authority."²³ This opinion of the Court ended temporarily the discussion on uniting the civil and military authority at Aden, but did not end the friction between the Political Agent and the Commandant, since it was not communicated to them.

When, early in 1854, the Bombay Government decided to dismiss Haines, the Governor, Lord Elphinstone, nephew of Mountstuart Elphinstone, thought that the opportunity should be seized to appoint at Aden a man who would unite in his person both civil and military authority. The measure, he felt, was particularly desirable in view of the impending Crimean War. "At such a crisis ... all authority both military and political at such an important isolated point should be centred in able and vigorous hands", and the man who had these hands, in his opinion, was Col. James Outram. "Not only does his rank enable him to hold the military command, but his reputation as a soldier gives him an undoubted claim to it, while his experience as a political officer, and the influence which he has never failed to acquire over wild and semi-barbarous people whenever he has been brought in contact with them, seem especially to point him out as the very man to place our relations with the Arabs upon a satisfactory footing."²⁴

As for the title which Outram was to bear, Elphinstone suggested "Political Resident and Commandant". This title would confer "weight and dignity" on the British representative, since "Resident" was superior to "Agent", and Outram already held it.²⁵ The appointment of Outram and the title suggested for him were both approved by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, and from that time on the title was borne by the head of administration at Aden, except for four years when Merewether was Resident.

The "Resident" referred to Bombay for instructions as constantly as the "Agent". The powers of the Resident, and the principles on

which the administration of Aden was to be based. continued, as under the Political Agent, without any legal definition until 1864. The main advantage which followed the vesting of civil and military authority in the hands of one person was the end of bickering between the two.

Administrative Assistants.

From the beginning, the Government of India laid down that the Assistant to the Political Agent should always be a naval officer since his duties would be mainly connected with the harbour.²⁶ The Government of Bombay stipulated that he should have a thorough knowledge of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden and should be fluent in Arabic to facilitate communication with the inhabitants.²⁷

The first Assistant Political Agent was Lieut. G. Jenkins who took up his appointment in November 1839. In September of the following year, he went to England on sick leave, and did not return. His place was filled by Lieut. C.J. Cruttenden who continued in the post until recalled to Bombay with Haines in 1854.

The duties of Cruttenden were many. He was in charge of the harbour, coal stores, depot ship, customs, police, Post Office, and he was to do any other work which the Political Agent assigned to him.²⁸ In December 1840, Haines complained of a staff shortage and asked that his Assistant be relieved of the command of the depot ship,²⁹ but his request was not granted. In May of the following year, Cruttenden himself asked to be relieved of the charge of the Post Office on account of his other duties and inability to do the work to his satisfaction.³⁰ His application, too, was rejected, and G.W. Anderson, the Acting Governor of Bombay, wrote: "It is necessary that these constant applications for increased establishment at Aden should be checked until something like a return is obtained from that place."³¹

Later, Haines was requested to report in detail what were his duties and those of his Assistant.³² He wrote back that besides having the treasury account, he attended to political and civil duties and replied to correspondence from all departments. In his own words, he was "the point of reference for all in Aden". Then he reminded the Government of his Assistant's duties quoted above, and added that from two to five hours daily were spent by him in settling complaints; if the case was an important one, it was heard before both.³³

The Government saw no reason for complaint regarding the Post Office, since they maintained that no work was involved except when the monthly mail steamers called, one coming from Bombay, and one from Suez.³⁴ In their opinion, the duties performed by Haines and his Assistant were no more onerous than those of other officers in similar positions. The opposite, in fact, was true, since no other agents of the E.I.C. had more onerous duties. However, the Bombay Government did not see sufficient justification for increasing the establishment at Aden and thereby adding to the very heavy charges incident to the occupation of that place.³⁵ Cruttenden was relieved of one duty in 1842 when the customs master was appointed, and of another in 1847 when the depot ship was broken up.

When the Bombay Government nominated Outram for the post of Resident at Aden, he expressed his wish to have as his Assistant Lieut. R.L. Playfair of the Madras Artillery, then at Aden.³⁶ Lord Dalhousie granted him his wish, and thus departed from the policy laid down by Auckland in 1839, that the Assistant should always be selected from the Navy. However, this departure became the new practice, and from 1854 onwards the Residents chose their Assistants from the officers of the garrison. Hormuzd Rassam was the only exception.³⁷

Up to 1857, Playfair was the only Assistant Resident. Then, as Aden grew in importance, another Assistant was appointed in 1858, and a third in 1868. The duties of the Assistants were assigned by the Resident, and they were not always the same. In 1859, for example, the First Assistant was in charge of criminal justice, the jail and conservancy of the town; the Second was in charge of the police. Sometimes one or two Assistants would be away on political duty. The rank of the Assistant was determined by the length of his service at the Residency.

An administrative post worthy of mention is that of "Native Assistant", although it existed only for five years. From the beginning Haines realised that he needed on his staff someone who was conversant in Arabic and English and had an intimate knowledge of the tribes surrounding Aden. The person who answered these requirements was Mulla Ja'far. Haines recommended his appointment as "Native Assistant and Interpreter to the Political Agent", and the Government agreed.³⁸ Besides his duties as Interpreter, Mulla Ja'far wrote and translated letters. When sultans and other dignitaries visited Aden,

he acted as "chief of protocol".

Ja'far was a man of strong personality and he used his power to the full. This fact, and the favour which he had with Haines, brought him into conflict with the military and aroused against him the hatred of the Arab inhabitants. Complaints about Ja'far's conduct reached Haines, but he dismissed them as unjustified.

In 1843, two serious charges were brought against Ja'far by members of the 'Aydarus family supported by Sultan Muhsin. The first was that he incited some 'Uzaybis to fire upon Lieut. Cruttenden's party on their way to or from al-Hawtah in July. The second was that the Native Assistant had been bribed by the Sultan to use his influence to reconcile him to Haines from whom he was estranged. The bribe was the balance still due on account of a boat purchased by Mullah Ja'far from the Sultan.

Haines investigated these charges and found them groundless. His conclusion was that there had been a conspiracy against Ja'far with the aim of discrediting him and having him removed. His accusers hated him because he brought to Haines' notice many matters highly detrimental to them, and because he was a Shi'i, while they were Sunnis.

The Political Agent took no action, but forwarded the case to the Government for their opinion.³⁹ The Government, too, found no incriminating evidence against Mulla Ja'far, but suspected his integrity on the weak ground that he had financial dealings with the Sultan. Their judgment was that he was "a very unfit person to be continued in the service of Government (having served them for twenty years) and ... his remaining at Aden must be prejudicial to the public interest by proving a bar to the cultivation of a good and friendly understanding with the Sultan ..." Therefore, they ordered that he be discharged and sent to Bombay by the first steamer.

The post vacated by Ja'far was not to be filled, since both Haines and his Assistant were, according to the Government, "well versed in Arabic".⁴⁰ Haines and Cruttenden could undoubtedly converse in Arabic, but could not read it, let alone compose letters in it.⁴¹ After Ja'far's departure, the Arabic correspondence was handled by clerks for nearly eleven years, and they were paid from police funds. When Outram took office in 1854, he realised the need for an official Interpreter to the Residency,⁴² and Rassam was appointed. Rassam's successor as Interpreter was Saleh, the son of Mulla Ja'far.

The Administration of Justice.

1. Under the Sultan.

Before the occupation, all disputes were normally referred to the Qadi (judge), and the Dawlah carried out his sentences. When the Sultan, his heir-apparent or any other 'Abdali chief was in Aden, he superseded both the Qadi and the Dawlah.⁴³ In passing judgment, the Qadi was guided by Muslim law and local custom.

When the Government requested Haines to furnish a report on the judicial system in Aden at the time of the occupation, he gave, in summary form, the main laws which the Qadi applied;

"Theft:-	The loss of the hand, flogging and fine.
Murder:-	With death, but if the individual was shot when committing robbery, it was no offence.
For not saying prayers:-	Reprimanding and sometimes fine.
Breach of promise of marriage:-	Obligation to perform, or refund all money received.
Infidelity:-	Both culprits punished by flogging, and the wife and children discarded.
Period of marriage being legal:-	If a female without parents, not under fourteen years of age, but if the father lives, at any age he chooses to dispose of her.
Separation of man and wife:-	The father can take both male and female children.
If a husband and father die:-	His son receives two-thirds of his property, wife one-third; two-thirds to the male part of the family.
Parents' death without a will:-	One-third to the female; if the children are twins, one male, the other female, the former receives two-thirds.
For a marriage fee:-	According to the free will of the parties.
If a female child is left without any relative, and is possessed of money:-	The chief or cazee protects her until married, but if a male child, until manhood.
Debt:-	If the debtor has property, it was seized and sold, but if without the means of liquidating the debtor remained unmolested until he could pay, for confinement was prohibited.
Sale of spirituous liquors:-	Flogging and fine." ⁴⁴

The Government approved of these laws with the exception of mutilation for theft,⁴⁵ and directed Haines to re-appoint the Qadi and the other public officials. As before, all civil matters were to be regulated by Muslim law and local custom. The Political Agent was not to interfere more than necessary in minor disputes, but was to allow the inhabitants to settle them in their own way. Instead of introducing British laws, he was to keep and improve on what was good in the local judicial system; what was bad he was to reject.

Haines was instructed "to exercise civil and criminal authority",⁴⁶ but this authority was not legally defined. His judgments and proceedings were not subject to a court of justice, although no execution was to be carried out without the sanction of Bombay.⁴⁷ The Acts and regulations of the Indian Government were not to be enforced at Aden, but were to be used merely as guidelines.⁴⁸ This condition continued until 1864, when it was partly remedied by the Aden Act.

2. Under the British.

As before the occupation, the laws which were purely social or religious continued to be the concern of the Qadi. Similar laws among the Jews were administered by the Rabbi. Religious and caste disputes among the Hindu immigrants were referred to a punchayet (council) composed of their leading men. The law regarding murder remained unchanged, while the other laws were replaced by new ones, as shown below.

(a) The sale of spirituous liquor. The Political Agent discontinued flogging for this offence, but kept the fine, an unspecified amount under Rs. 50. When he found that the sum could be paid quickly by the offender's friends and clients, he increased the amount to Rs. 50 and added an undefined term of imprisonment.⁴⁹ This harsher penalty was also no deterrent. Distilling liquor from dates became widespread among the Jews who sold it to Europeans and others alike. The result was an increase in drunkenness among the civil population.⁵⁰ If they could not procure drink in the town, they smuggled it in from outside or bought it secretly from the military liquor contractor.

To deal with the problem, Haines imposed fines for drunkenness, two rupees for the first offence and five rupees with "slight imprisonment" for the second. However, he finally realised how difficult it was to prohibit drinking. When a Parsi arrived from Bombay with the

intention of opening a liquor shop in Aden, Haines asked the Government whether he could grant him a licence. He personally favoured the idea and argued that if liquor were sold openly in the town under strict supervision, it would be easier to control drunkenness. Also, he insinuated that the Government would benefit from the sale of the civil contract as they did from the military. For the latter they received more than Rs. 900 per month, which meant that the military contractor was making a large profit.⁵¹

The Government were convinced by Haines' arguments and envisaged the time when there would be more than one liquor shop within the civil limits. Their instruction was that the contracts were to be sold to the highest bidder as was the case in the cantonment. The licences were to be renewed annually and withdrawn for misconduct or breach of contract. Their number was to be fixed periodically with reference to the size of the population.⁵²

(b) Debt. Imprisonment became the punishment for this offence. Debtors were imprisoned if they could pay and did not, or if they could not pay at all, and the sums for which they were imprisoned did not generally exceed a few rupees. In 1871, 447 persons were imprisoned on decrees averaging seven rupees.⁵³ However, the number of debtors sent to prison was greatly reduced after the application, in 1873, of Section 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure.⁵⁴ Writing in 1877, Hunter mentions that the total number of debtors in the jail seldom exceeded fifteen or sixteen a year.⁵⁵

(c) Theft. Imprisonment, with or without flogging and hard labour, became the punishment for this offence.

3. The Qadi.

In June 1839, Haines complained that most of his time was occupied in settling trivial disputes, including a daily average of three cases involving money.⁵⁶ In answer, the Government advised him that if the Qadi was a man of good character, he should employ him in the administration of justice, especially in settling disputes among the Arab inhabitants,⁵⁷ and for his services he was to get a monthly salary of Rs. 30.⁵⁸ In October 1840, Haines accused the Qadi, 'Abd al-Razzaq, of causing strife and communicating with Sultan Muhsin, then an enemy. He recommended his removal from Government service,⁵⁹ and the Government agreed.⁶⁰

The following year, however, Haines requested permission to

appoint a new Qadi at the same monthly salary of Rs. 30, arguing that he would be of great help in settling minor quarrels and disputes. The Government saw no objection to the proposed appointment, but expressed their opinion that, as in other places, he should be remunerated by fees from people who made use of his services.⁶¹ This meant that the Qadi was no longer to hear civil cases, and his duties were confined to matters connected with the Muslim religion. Where money was involved, the Qadi was replaced by a council. Half the members were chosen by the plaintiff and half by the defendant, under the presidency of the Assistant Political Agent. An appeal from the decision of the council could be made to the Political Agent, as formerly with the Qadi.

In 1854, Outram applied for the re-admission of the Qadi into Government service, and his application was sanctioned. As before, the Qadi was to receive a monthly salary of Rs. 30 and to decide petty civil cases. Before action could be taken on this decision, Outram had left, and as his successor, Coghlan, had two Assistants, the need for the Qadi's services was not pressing.

The Government sanction remained a dead letter until 1860. In April of that year, the Resident, Coghlan, and his Second Assistant, Rassam, left on special duty and did not return until July of the following year.⁶² Thus Playfair, the First Assistant Resident, found himself performing the duties of their offices besides his own. With such an increase in work, he had no time for adjudicating trivial disputes.

The Qadi at the time was a man of great ability, integrity and intelligence who was respected by everybody. His name was Shaykh Ahmad 'Ali, and he came from the Yemen. Playfair had full confidence in him and gave him authority to judge cases involving sums up to Rs. 200. It was not obligatory for anyone to submit his case to the Qadi if he preferred Playfair to decide it, and an appeal against the Qadi's decision could be made to Playfair.

As the Qadi's salary (Rs. 30 per month) was not commensurate with his position, Playfair was afraid that he might resign, which would be a loss to Aden. To guard against such a possibility, the Acting Resident proposed that he be given the fees chargeable on small suits, namely four annas on every Rs. 50 or a fraction thereof awarded which he estimated at Rs. 30 per month. This arrangement would double the

Qadi's income with no additional expense to the Government.⁶³

The fees which Shaykh Ahmad received fell short of Playfair's estimate; they did not average Rs. 15 per month. The Qadi was disappointed and asked Coghlan to consider his case. Coghlan, who was also impressed by the qualities of Shaykh Ahmad and the general satisfaction he gave, recommended that his salary be doubled and that his fees be carried to the credit of the Government, a recommendation with which Bombay agreed.⁶⁴

Later, Russell thought it not proper that an official sitting as a judge and supposed to be in the position of "a native gentleman" should receive only Rs. 60, "less than the least Class 9 clerk". He impressed on the Government that in the year 1867-8 Shaykh Ahmad tried 2055 cases, and recommended that his salary be increased to Rs. 100. His recommendation was accepted.⁶⁵ The business of the Qadi's Court continued to increase, and in 1870-71, 4381 suits were filed. Of these, 2399 were settled out of court. This increase bears witness to the popularity of Shaykh Ahmad who "both in his public and private character is deservedly esteemed".⁶⁶

Shaykh Ahmad died on 20th March, 1873, and on the same day his Court was closed. The Registrar of the Resident's Court was then invested with the powers of a judge of a Small Cause Court under Section 40 of Act XI, 1865, to hear and determine suits not exceeding Rs. 20. The duties of the Qadi became again the settlement only of social and religious matters connected with the Muslim population.

4. The Aden Act.

The necessity of putting the administration of civil and criminal justice at Aden on a constitutional basis was recognised from time to time, but it was not until 1864 that the unsatisfactory situation was rectified by the passing of the Aden Act.⁶⁷ By this Act, the administration of civil justice was vested in the Court of the Resident which included the Court of any Assistant Resident. The Resident could hear and determine in the first instance all cases instituted in his Court, regardless of the nature and value of the property in dispute. If he desired, he could distribute these cases among his Assistants, which was generally the practice.

An appeal from the decision of an Assistant Resident could be made to the Resident in the case of a suit relating to immovable property or a claim exceeding Rs. 500. If the claim did not exceed

Rs. 500, no appeal could be made. However, the Resident could call for any proceedings of his Assistant at any stage of the case and give such directions as he might deem necessary.

There was no appeal from the decision of the Resident. However, if in suits involving less than Rs. 1000 "any question of law, or of usage having the force of law, or of the construction of a document affecting the merits of the decision" arose, on which the Resident was not certain, he might of his own accord, or at the request of the parties to the dispute, state the case and submit it with his opinion for the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The Resident could do that also if he had doubts about a legal point which might arise during the hearing of a suit involving more than Rs. 1000, and in fact he was bound to do so if requested by any of the parties concerned.

Cases referred to the High Court were heard by two or more judges. The parties to the dispute pleaded their case in person or were represented by a pleader. The High Court sent its decision to the Resident who disposed of the case accordingly. Costs of referring a case to Bombay were included in the costs of the suit.

If a suit tried in the first instance by the Resident was cognizable under India Act XLII of 1860,⁶⁸ the Resident was to have in such a suit the powers conferred on a judge of a Court of Small Causes within the Presidency of Bombay. The same could apply to any Assistant Resident with the approval of the Governor of Bombay in Council. Decisions taken by an Assistant Resident in his capacity as a Court of Small Causes were always open to appeal.

The proceedings in civil suits in the Resident's Court were to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and by any Act relating to it. However, in the administration of civil justice, the Court of the Resident was to be "guided by the spirit and principles of the laws and regulations in force at the Presidency of Bombay, and administered in the courts of that Presidency not established by Royal Charter, and in the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a court of appeal from those courts".

As can be seen from the position of the Qadi, Chaykh Ahmad, the Aden Act itself was not applied rigidly in civil matters. The power of the Qadi to try civil suits was abrogated by the Act which took no cognizance of him. Nevertheless, his court continued to function until his death.

The low scale of fees leviable in the courts (four annas per Rs. 50 or a fraction thereof) encouraged litigation, hence the great majority of civil cases were petty actions for debt in which the power of the law was invoked to enforce payment. In 1871, out of 1763 suits instituted in the Court of the Resident, 464 involved sums below five rupees, and 882, sums below ten rupees. The same year, 4720 suits were instituted in the Court of the Qadi, and most of them were for trifling amounts. However, about two-fifths of the 6351 cases were settled out of court, the summons having had the desired effect.⁶⁹

In 1872, to reduce litigation, Prideaux recommended the introduction of the Court Fees Act (India Act VII, 1870) into Aden, which meant that a written plaint should be presented before a summons could be issued.⁷⁰ This question had been discussed as early as 1861. After the passing of India Act XXXVI, 1860, (an Act consolidating and amending the law relating to stamp duty in the three Presidencies) which specified the stamp duty chargeable on law papers, the Bombay Government asked Playfair, then Acting Resident, whether there would be any difficulty in introducing the Act into Aden. Playfair replied that the Arabs and Somalis who formed the majority of the civil population could not read or write, nor could they see any need for presenting a written plaint on stamped paper. In Aden, there were no wakils (representatives). The plaintiff and defendant were confronted in court, each made his oral statement, and the case was decided in a few minutes.⁷¹ In short, Playfair implied that written plaints in Aden were unnecessary and would be difficult to introduce.

Written plaints were not made compulsory until the beginning of 1873. By then, there were more educated people in Aden, and it is probable that there was a writer at the entrance of the court to help the illiterate for a small fee. The effect of this measure was to reduce the number of civil suits by more than half.⁷²

The administration of criminal justice was also vested in the Court of the Resident. The Governor of Bombay in Council could give any Assistant Resident the powers of a magistrate of the first or second class, and the Assistant Resident was to exercise his power under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

If the punishment awarded by the Assistant Resident in a case

was imprisonment for more than six months, with or without a fine, or a fine exceeding Rs. 500, an appeal could lie to the Resident. However, if the punishment awarded was imprisonment for less than six months, with or without a fine, or a fine not exceeding Rs. 500, no appeal could be made. But as in civil cases, the Resident could call for any proceedings of his Assistant at any stage and give such orders as he might deem necessary.

The Resident was to exercise all the powers of a Court of Session as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure; and except in cases which he had to try as a Court of Session, he could, when he thought fit, exercise the powers of a magistrate. He was to hold periodic sittings for the trial of all persons who might be committed to appear before him as a Court of Session. The Resident had no power to try any European British subject charged with any offence punishable with death under the Indian Penal Code. Such a person was to be tried by the High Court in Bombay.

In criminal trials before the Resident as a Court of Session, a European (British or not), or an American, was to be tried by jury. The Resident should be satisfied that the jurors had the educational and moral qualifications necessary for the function, and military persons could be called upon to serve as jurors. At least half the jury was to consist of Europeans or Americans, if such a jury could be found.⁷³ A death sentence was not to be carried out until it had been confirmed by the High Court of Bombay who could commute it to transportation for life or for any period not less than seven years.

As in civil cases, no appeal could lie from any order or sentence passed by the Resident in any criminal case. However, a case could be reviewed by the High Court of Bombay if a point of law was referred to it by the Resident, or if the Advocate-General found that there was a legal error in the decision taken by the Resident, or that a point of law affecting that decision required further consideration. The proceedings in all criminal cases were to be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the High Court of Bombay had the power to issue general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of the Court of the Resident.

India Act II of 1864 was the only Act passed specifically for the administration of justice at Aden. Later, most Acts which were applicable to all India were enforced at Aden as were also some of

the Bombay Acts. In 1874, Aden was declared a "scheduled district" under the Bombay Presidency, which meant that the Government of Bombay could, by notification, declare what Acts should be applicable to Aden.

5. Police.

Pending the arrival of a regular police force from Bombay, Haines appointed eleven men (nine Arabs and two Indians) to keep order in the town.⁷⁴ The force (twelve Muslims and eight Hindus) arrived in May 1840, and it was agreed that they should have home leave every three or four years.⁷⁵

By 1841, the population of Aden had risen to 9000, and the twenty men were clearly not sufficient to control it. Haines asked that the police force be increased by twenty, but the Government sanctioned an increase of ten only.⁷⁶ The force was now composed of one jemadar, one duffedar (petty officer), one havildar and 27 peons.

In 1845, Haines asked for six more peons, and in support of his request he wrote that more than once policemen were injured while on duty because of their small number. Several times the whole police force had to turn out at night to suppress disturbances among the Sonalis. Due to the small size of the force they could not deal effectively with troubles caused by Europeans, and sometimes they were obliged to ask the military for assistance. When refractory seamen rioted at Tawahi, the police had to be sent down to control them, leaving the town without surveillance.⁷⁷ The Government gave Haines the six peons he had asked for, and in 1847, sanctioned a further increase of one havildar and twelve peons. The highest number that the police force attained was 160, and that was in 1855, during the Crimean War. The reason for this increase may have been the fear of an uprising in the Settlement at a time when the British were involved in a major war. As it happened, there was no uprising, and the police force was reduced.

In 1847, the Government directed that no policeman should hold an interest in any trade. Aliens were not to serve as policemen unless they had "peculiar qualifications, accompanied by exceptional character".⁷⁸ However, in 1855 the practice of recruiting police from India was discontinued, probably owing to the expense involved. The result was that the ranks had to be filled by aliens as well as British subjects, regardless of qualifications. The Bombay men were

replaced by Arabs, Somalis and Indian Muslims.

The need for European policemen grew with the increase of the shipping. When the refractory sailors found that they were face to face with policemen not of their colour, their behaviour grew worse. Therefore, in 1865, Merewether asked for three European constables: one to be stationed at Tawahi where European sailors continually caused disturbances, one in the town which they sooner or later visited, and one for relief.⁷⁹ The Government agreed, and three soldiers who were about to take their discharge were appointed constables.

For police purposes, the Settlement was divided in 1872 into two main parts, the town and Tawahi, and these were further divided into sections. For Tawahi, where most Europeans lived, a European was appointed Inspector. The official Inspector for the town was a Somali. However, another man, a European with the rank of Inspector, attended to the complaints of the Europeans residing in the town.

Lieut. F.M. Hunter, the Second Assistant-Resident who was responsible for these arrangements, expressed regret that the police in the Settlement had no legal status, since Bombay Act VII, 1867 (the District Police Act) had not yet been extended to Aden; later it was. Nevertheless, he tried to model the police force at Aden on the one at Bombay.⁸⁰

While there were always complaints about the size of the police force, from 1857 onwards there were also complaints about its quality. A good summary of these complaints was given by Prideaux in 1871. The Arabs were, as a rule, "honest and trustworthy, though not very bright". The Indian pilgrims looked on the employment as only temporary. They generally joined the police too late in life to be of much use, and they were addicted to ganja (cannabis) and opium. The Somalis were the most intelligent members of the force and were of great value as detectives, but they were not always to be trusted, since they were prejudiced in favour of their own tribes.⁸¹ The only factor which the men of the Aden police had in common was "complete ignorance of the duties into which they are at once called to enter".

In Prideaux's opinion, the two causes which reduced the efficiency of the police were age and debt. The men were admitted into the service regardless of their age, and the majority were deeply in debt. On joining the force, their financial situation did not improve;

a policeman's salary was thirteen rupees per month, and out of it he had often to pay five or more for rent. To remedy this situation, Prideaux ruled that no man should be enlisted if he was over thirty or if he was in debt, but it is not known how this information was to be verified. Prideaux also implied that police quarters should be set up.⁸²

6. Prison and Prisoners.

Under Sultan Muhsin, fines were preferred to imprisonment as a means of punishment, and the building which had once been a jail was at the time of the occupation in a ruinous state, surrounded by a low decaying wall. Under the British, a jail was a necessity, and the old compound was used again. At night, the prisoners were locked up in a long thatched shed which was closely railed, but an active man without irons had no difficulty in breaking loose.

In 1841, having reported an escape, Haines recommended that a new prison be built,⁸³ but no permission for building it was granted until 1853⁸⁴ and in 1855 it was still not marked out. The reason for this long delay was that the fortifications and other building projects were more urgently required.⁸⁵

The new jail was still under construction in 1863, and the same year, at Coghlan's recommendation, the Government decided to convert it into commissariat stores.⁸⁶ Thus the old jail continued to exist and to undergo minor repairs and alterations from time to time.⁸⁷

The prisoners were divided into five classes:

(a) Transported felons. As early as 1842, felons were sent from India to Aden where they were put to work on the fortifications and other projects. Haines recommended that a jail be built for them, but this was not done, and in 1862 the Government ceased to transport convicts to Aden. The cost of transporting a convict to Aden and keeping him there had risen sharply.

Transported felons were confined in a shed by themselves. They were locked up at sunset and a military guard was posted outside their shed. The best conducted among them were appointed monitors to see that order and silence prevailed during the night.⁸⁸ The men who were sent to Aden had been convicted of various offences, of which robbery with violence was the most common. When they had served their sentence, they were shipped back home. Indians convicted in Aden were sometimes taken to serve their term of imprisonment in their own country.

(b) Prisoners convicted in Aden. These were treated as the transported felons.

(c) Prisoners awaiting trial. They were confined in a shed used for the manufacture of carpets. The building was insecure, and escapes were frequent.⁸⁹

(d) European prisoners. These were merchant seamen who deserted their ship on arrival at Aden in order to join the Indian Navy which offered many advantages. For this, they were willing to undergo the prison sentence of twelve weeks prescribed by the Merchant Seaman's Act of 1844. The seamen knew that imprisonment in a makeshift jail, such as the one in Aden, could not be too harsh. In fact, they received better treatment than the other prisoners, and often served only part of their sentence.

In 1852, Haines complained that he did not know what to do with the seamen when they rebelled in the jail. The police peons could not control them, they could not be put to work on the roads in the heat like other prisoners, and there was no employment for them in the prison. In many cases, after they had served less than half their sentence, they were taken to rejoin their vessels, only to find that they had sailed or that the masters would not have them back. The remainder of the sentence would be remitted, and the seamen discharged.⁹⁰

Five years later, Playfair made it a rule to send every deserter back to his ship before she left the harbour. This rule, which meant that some seamen spent only a few days in prison, was hailed as "a great boon" to the merchant service.⁹¹ After 1857, there are no reports of seamen deserting their ships.

(e) Debtors and female offenders. During the day they did light work in the jail, and until 1868 they slept in the open, guarded by sebundis.⁹² In 1868, Russell hired a house at Rs. 25 per month to serve as a civil jail. The house had three rooms, one for the males, one for the females, and an upper room for the peon and constable who guarded the prisoners. Russell impressed on the Government the need for a proper civil jail which he hoped would be within the enclosure of the criminal jail when it was enlarged.⁹³ The criminal jail was not enlarged, and the same civil jail was there in 1877.⁹⁴

Under Haines, hard labour was mainly building, and light work consisted mostly of what might be termed "household duties". From 1847, the aged and infirm among the prisoners were put in charge of

the jail garden, a plot which supplied the prisoners with vegetables.⁹⁵

After Haines, hard labour was of two kinds, outside and inside the jail. Outside, the prisoners were employed as masons, carpenters, water-carriers, etc. Inside, they worked as carpenters, tailors, painters, printers, weavers, copyists, chik and mat makers and workers of rattan and coir.

The proceeds from the jail manufactures in 1857 paid half the jail expenses, and in 1859, the whole. The printing press was found especially useful and remunerative, and Playfair wrote proudly that it was worked "entirely by convict labour".⁹⁶ Samples of its work, in English and Arabic, were sent to Bombay where they received the commendation of the Government.

Playfair was eager to expand the jail industries as much as possible. In 1860, he introduced bookbinding and applied for a man skilled in paper-making to train the prisoners for a year.⁹⁷ The Government sent him a Malay convict. In 1861, Playfair reported that the indoor labour was making steady progress, and that the printing press was yielding a large profit.⁹⁸ After Playfair's departure in January 1863, the jail manufactures declined.

The jail was at first under the direct control of the police jemadar who was responsible to the Assistant Political Agent. When Playfair was appointed Assistant-Resident, he recommended that a European be put in charge of the jail, and this was done. In 1866, the jail came under the superintendence of the Civil Surgeon, as was the general practice in India. The Civil Surgeon in Aden was responsible to the Inspector-General of Prisons in Bombay.

Municipal Services.

1. The Post Office.

At first, Aden had only one post office, in the Crater, and the staff officer of the garrison was put in charge of it. Then it became one of the duties of the Assistant Political Agent. From 1855 to 1857, it was administered by Rassam. In the latter year, due to the establishment of the Indian Overland Troop Service⁹⁹ and the increase in the number of mail steamers calling at the port, another post office was opened at Tawahi as headquarters.

A postmaster for Aden was recommended as early as 1839, but this appointment was not made until 1857. The first two postmasters, Europeans from Bombay, did not stay long because of the small salary

(Rs. 100 per month). In 1859, this salary was increased to Rs. 250, and the postmaster who was to receive it came from London,¹⁰⁰ a measure which showed recognition of the growing importance of the Post Office.

In 1839, only two mail steamers called regularly at Aden every month, one on its way to Suez, and the other on its way to Bombay. Twenty years later, the regular monthly mails numbered 22, and the distribution of postal packets for the second half of 1858 was as follows:-

	<u>Letters Inward</u>	<u>Letters Outward</u>	<u>Papers Inward</u>	<u>Papers Outward</u>	
Bombay	11,877	8,974	2,844	800	
Calcutta	2,039	1,471	1,557	176	
Australia	157	143	129	17	
Mauritius	112	638	66	952	
Europe	5,585	10,898	5,316	536	101
Misc.	1,153	1,241	813	350	

During 1867-8, due to the Abyssinian Campaign, the Post Office did more business than ever before. It was calculated that at least 18,000 letters and papers passed through Aden on their way from England to Abyssinia. The number of customers who called at the Post Office was not less than 30,000, most of whom were British servicemen. In the same period, the office dealt with the following ocean mails:-

Europe:	Received	67	Dispatched	65	
Bombay:		78		76	
India, China, Australia, etc:		42		37	
Mauritius:		11		11	
Abyssinia:		54		68	102

Letters received at Aden were sorted into three classes: one for residents at Tawahi, one for residents in the town and one for non-residents. The mail was conveyed between Tawahi and the town on camels and horses. The arrival of a mail steamer was announced by a signal during the daytime or a gun at night. For coaling, a steamer normally required not less than six hours, and often from eight to ten, which gave people sufficient time to post their letters before the steamer left harbour.

The importance of Aden as a communications centre was further increased by the opening, in 1869, of the Suez Canal, and in 1870 by the completion of the telegraphic line from Suez to Bombay. Aden then became the station where all messages from East and West were received and passed on.

2. Health.

Aden was not a particularly unhealthy station, but a long stay tended to have a debilitating effect on Europeans and sometimes even on Indians. In 1841, Captain Mignon reported that in January of the same year, out of 1763 European and Indian troops, only 88 were sick. In May, out of 1932 men, only 86 were in hospital, and out of 53 officers, only one was under medical care. Commenting on these figures, Mignon wrote that they were smaller than the monthly returns for the healthiest station in the Bombay Presidency.¹⁰³

The two diseases most prevalent in Aden, especially during the hot season, were ulcers and scurvy. Ulcers were caused by malnutrition and bad water, while scurvy was caused by lack of fresh vegetables. Of the infectious diseases, smallpox was the most common.

In the period under study, there were three outbreaks of cholera in Aden. The first was in 1846 and was attributed to the great accumulation of filth in the town stirred up by the heavy rain on 2nd May. For want of proper drainage, the filth was not washed away, but settled in heaps among the houses. The disease raged for 33 days, from 3th May to 9th June, and it was not confined to the civil population, but spread among the military and the shipping in the harbour. The final death toll was 500, of whom twenty were Europeans.¹⁰⁴

This disaster moved the Government to make the Assistant Political Agent officially responsible for public health in Aden. He was to isolate all people suffering from infectious diseases and to see that the drains and streets were kept clean. Cleanliness was to be imposed throughout the town, especially in the poorer tenements which the Assistant himself was to inspect frequently.

For maintaining standards of hygiene, the Assistant was to appoint men who would report to him on the sanitary conditions in the different parts of the town. These men were not to be paid for their services. The Government thought that the best way of ensuring that all areas were regularly inspected was to set up a board, the members of which were to be British-born subjects, with the Assistant as president, in his capacity as magistrate.¹⁰⁵

Cholera broke out again in 1859 and 1865. On the former occasion 600 died, but on the latter the outbreak was not serious. The health of the town was generally good due to the infrequency of rain and the porosity of the rocky subsoil through which all moisture

percolated. The aridity and the heat of the climate were not conducive to the spread of germs.

For the most part, diseases were carried to Aden by the shipping and, sometimes, by the troops from India. To prevent, or at least to reduce, the chances of epidemics, the authorities maintained a small body called the Harbour Police. The duty of this body, one naique (corporal) and seven men, was to board all vessels as they approached the port in order to make sure that they were not admitted into the inner harbour unless they had clean bills of health from the ports of departure.¹⁰⁶

The first hospital to be built for the townspeople was the Civil Hospital. The date of its building cannot be fixed, but it was there in 1846. Its condition in 1860 was described by the Civil Surgeon, and the description could hardly be more nauseating. The hospital lacked proper ventilation and had no privies. It was filthy in the extreme due to a shortage of wardmen, washermen and sweepers. There was not an adequate supply of clean clothing for the patients, nor was there a mortuary. The so-called hospital was in fact a single ward which, when overcrowded (and this was always the case), held only 24. The ward had no provision for the separation of the sexes, which meant that women were deprived of such hospital care as was available.

The Civil Surgeon recommended the building of a new hospital with the necessary facilities and staff.¹⁰⁷ Playfair, then Acting Resident, called a public meeting at which the matter was discussed and a committee was formed to raise subscriptions for the new hospital. With the money donated and with a grant from the Municipal Fund, the hospital was built in 1862. It was situated in the centre of the town and had accommodation for 50 patients.¹⁰⁸

The other hospital in the town was the Smallpox Hospital, built in 1848 by the Government and situated in the Tawilah Valley. It contained twelve single rooms and five wards, each holding seven patients.¹⁰⁹ The two hospitals were free. The Civil Hospital served also as a public dispensary.

The British presence in Aden conferred medical benefits not only on the inhabitants of the Settlement, but on others outside it as well. People visited Aden for medical treatment from the coast of Africa, Yemen and Hadramawt. Two notable cases were Yusuf Agha, the Ottoman

Governor of Zabid, who came in 1856 to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in the bladder,¹¹⁰ and the son of Shaykh Qasim, the principal chief of the Sharjabi tribe, who came for medical advice in 1861.¹¹¹ In 1849, Dr. Vaughan, the Assistant Civil Surgeon, toured the 'Abdali territory for eight days "at his own expense", treating the sick and impressing on the tribesmen the value of vaccination.

Until 1855, the town's health services were the responsibility of a commissioned officer of the Indian Medical Department known as the Civil Surgeon, and this officer was subject to the Medical Superintendent of Bombay. In 1855, however, a separate superintendent was appointed for Aden.

3. Education.

In 1854, Sir Charles Wood, President of the India Board, presented to the Court of Directors a document which came to be known as "Wood's Education Dispatch". The document set out "a comprehensive scheme for the diffusion of practical knowledge, through the English and vernacular languages" to all classes in India.¹¹² The object of the new education policy was to improve the condition of the Indians and to equip them for government service. The Court signed the document on the 19th July, with a recommendation that the principal officers of every district in India should use their influence in furthering the cause of education.

In a circular to the political officers under the Bombay Government, Lord Elphinstone added: "... Government confidently trust that every servant of the State, whether European or Native, will ... regard the diffusion of Education as a chief part of his official duties,..."¹¹³

When Coghlan visited Lahj in December 1856, he acquainted the 'Abdalis with his intention of establishing a school at Aden. The sons and nephews of Sultan 'Ali welcomed the idea and expressed their readiness to attend the school when it was opened. Coghlan wrote: "If it were possible to give these boys a solid education in their own language and in ours, the influence for good they may exercise on the next generation is beyond calculation, by it we should instruct them in our system, and attach them by a link which would not be easily severed. Commerce would increase, we should hear no more of stoppage of the roads, and of the frequent paltry squabbles which having their

origin in ignorance and bigotry, would cease with the spread of knowledge amongst the people;..."¹¹⁴

The school was started in 1858, with the object of raising "a class of young men fitted for employment in the public service and possibly to attach our bigotted neighbours to us by the community of feelings and interests which must follow in the wake of a sound education". However, these hopes were frustrated, and the school was closed at the end of February 1860.¹¹⁵ The townspeople, and especially the Arabs for whom the school was founded, did not make much use of it. Most of the pupils were children of Indian soldiers and camp-followers, and these could have gone to the regimental schools.

At the time the Aden school closed, it had 68 pupils, 40 from the military lines and 28 from the town, only half of whom were Arabs. By way of encouraging the Arabs to send their children to the school, they were charged no fees, but this exemption was not a sufficient inducement. Hardly any Arab child attended for more than two weeks. Sultan 'Ali's sons and nephews did not attend.

The school did not give instruction in the Islamic faith, nor indeed in any other faith, and Badger attributed the Arabs' lack of interest in the school mainly to the absence of the Koran from its curriculum.¹¹⁶ The Arabs taught (and still teach) the Koran to their children along with the alphabet, if not before it.

In 1866, a new school was founded at the recommendation of Merewether. Unlike the old, the new school welcomed all children, be they from the town or the Camp, regardless of race or religion. The school had a headmaster¹¹⁷ and two teachers, an Arab and a Parsi. It was divided into two sections, elementary and secondary, and each had three classes.

The elementary section, like the old school, was intended primarily for Arab children, and to attract them, the Koran was taught besides Reading, Writing, Grammar and Arithmetic. Education was free, and the language of instruction was Arabic. The children admitted were aged ten and eleven. In 1866-7, the section was reported to be "well attended". In 1870-71, the highest monthly attendance was 186 and the lowest 150. Girls are mentioned for the first time in this year.

In the secondary section, the subjects taught were English,

Mathematics and Geography. The language of instruction was English, and boys promoted to this section were given an intensive course in that language before they started regular lessons. The ages of the pupils ranged from twelve to sixteen, and the fees were one and a half rupees per month. Pupils who came from regimental schools did not pay, and to encourage the Arab boys to further their education, those who moved up from the elementary section were charged only four annas per month. In 1866-7, the average daily number of boys who attended this section was 50, of whom five were Arabs. In 1870-71, the monthly attendance was never below 40, and once it rose as high as 73. There were six Arab pupils in this year.

The failure of the secondary section to attract many Arabs was due to several reasons. It was not free, it did not teach the Koran, and the subjects it taught were considered profane. Moreover, the language of instruction itself was regarded with "sacred horror".

One of the aims of the first school was realised by the second. In 1870-71, five boys found employment in the Government service: three in the Cantonment Magistrate Office, one in the Commissariat Office and one in the Engineer Office. It is not known to which races these boys belonged.

The main drawback from which the secondary section suffered was that members of the garrison, whether European or not, did not remain in Aden for more than two years. When they left, they took their children with them. The Abyssinian Campaign of 1867-8 also affected this section. Many of the traders who had children at the school went with merchandise to Annesley Bay, and took one son with them. The others, too, had to leave the school to attend to their fathers' business in Aden.¹¹⁸

Besides the Government School, commonly known as the Aden Residency School, there were in the Settlement in 1871 ten private schools for religious instruction, four Jewish attended by 70 boys, and six Arab attended by 107 boys and 13 girls.¹¹⁹ There was also a Catholic seminary at which Galla boys were trained as missionaries to work in their own country. It was run by French priests, and the boys, thirteen in number, were taught Arithmetic, domestic subjects, Latin, French and Galla.

The nuns of the Order of the Good Shepherd, who were British, had a school with two classes, one for European girls, and the other

for liberated slave-girls. The first class had ten boarders, six of whom were orphans, and a number of day pupils. They were taught English, Arithmetic, Geography, History, Needlework and Music. The second class was limited to ten, and they received a plain education in the English language, Needlework and domestic subjects.¹²⁰

Finance

Military and official expenses were met by the Government. Money for the day-to-day running of the town and for carrying out minor works came mainly from local taxes. At the time of Haines' departure in 1854, the following taxes were in force:-

Keeping for hire:	
Horse or donkey	Rs. 1½ per month
Camel	As. 4 " "
Boat	Re. 1 " "
Boat pass 121	As. 4
Arms pass 122	As. 4
Sweeping tax 123	As. 4 per month
Watering tax 124	As. 4 " "
Cost of summons 125	As. 10
Sale of water	No price given 126

As has been mentioned, ground rent was not collected until 1855, and then it and the other taxes were organised into a Municipal Fund. As years went by, more taxes were added and licences required.¹²⁷

The Municipal Fund was never large enough to allow Aden to develop as much as the Residents would have wished,¹²⁸ and no amount of taxation would have given the Settlement financial independence. The Bombay Government was not liberal towards the needs of the civil population, and therefore certain projects were carried out, sometimes partly by public subscription, and sometimes wholly by private enterprise.

In Aden, the Resident levied taxes and granted licences without reference to any law. When he increased the rates or the scale of licence fees, he did so by simple notification. However, the opening of the Suez Canal brought more European businessmen to the Settlement and, unlike other people there, Europeans were not used to paying taxes without being satisfied as to their legality.

In 1871, Tremenhoe complained that he was "in the very disagreeable position" of being questioned as to the legal basis of some taxes. Therefore, he recommended that an Act should be passed to define the position of the Resident, and to give him the necessary authority for levying rates and taxes.¹²⁹ Such an Act was not passed, and the Resident's powers continued absolute and undefined.

The administration of Aden had no constitutional basis and the authority of the chief administrative officer, Political Agent or Resident, lacked the necessary legal definition. This fact, in the first fifteen years, was the basic cause of the civil-military conflict and the main reason for the wide discretionary powers which the British representative exercised in local matters. The Aden Act went some way towards placing the judicial system on a legal footing, but even it was not rigidly applied.

The British were wise to introduce their laws slowly. By first adopting the existing system they later found it easier to bring about the changes which they wanted.

The administration suffered from a shortage of money and staff as well as from the slow government machinery. The E.I.C., and later the Imperial Government, expected the best service possible for the least possible expense, and both worked their men very hard. The Residents did their best with the limited resources at their command. They and their Assistants showed great initiative and enterprise in running the Settlement. In general, the administration was enlightened and patriarchal.

CHAPTER VI.
SULTAN MUHSIN.

The history of Aden in the period under study and beyond is essentially that of British relations with the neighbouring tribes, especially the 'Abdalīs and Fadlīs. In fact, the chiefs of the former tribe played such an important role in the annals of the Settlement that their names have been used as titles for this and the following two chapters. British relations with the interior were generally unstable, and for a better understanding of their course, some background information about the tribes is necessary.

The 'Abdalīs. The 'Abdālī territory, or Lahj, had an area of 264 square miles (33 by 8) and lay immediately to the north-west of Aden. To the east lived the Fadlīs, to the west the 'Aqrabis and Subayhis, to the north the Hawshabis and to the south was Ghubbat Saylan (Saylan Bay). The capital was al-Hawtah, also known as Lahj. Al-Hawtah was 21 miles to the north of Aden, in a fertile plain watered by the two branches of the Riber Tiban, al-Wādī al-Kabir (the Great Valley) and al-Wādī al-Saghir (the Small Valley). The Tiban rose in the Hawshabi territory more than 40 miles north of Zaydah, a village on the 'Abdālī-Hawshabi border, where it bifurcated. Nearly half the population lived in the plain, in and around al-Hawtah. With the capture of Aden, the 'Abdalīs lost their only port and were left with a shallow useless coastline, six miles long.

Four of the six main caravan routes leading to Aden traversed Lahj from north to south, and in the south they all converged at the village of Shaykh 'Uthman. The village was six miles from the Barrier Gate, adjacent to both the 'Aqrabi and Fadli districts, which meant that any one of the three tribes could prevent supplies from reaching Aden. Here water was sweet and plentiful. These factors explain why the British bought Shaykh 'Uthman in 1882 and why Lahj, as a whole, was to be of vital importance to the new Settlement.

All sources are agreed that the 'Abdalīs were the most civilized and the least warlike among the tribes. In 1838, Haines gave their number as 10,000 and put their fighting strength at 400. Sixteen years later, the Rev. G.P. Badger, the Garrison Chaplain of whom further mention will be made, wrote that they could muster 2000, but he did not give their total number. W.F. Prideaux, Assistant-Resident, estimated the 'Abdalīs in 1871 at 8000 and their warriors at 800. Of

all the chiefs in the interior, theirs was the only one who employed a regular force of mercenaries. The mercenaries were mainly Africans and formed a kind of palace guard. Their number in 1854 was 400.

The 'Aqrabis. The 'Aqrabi country was to the west of Aden. To the east the neighbours of the 'Aqrabis were the 'Abdalis, to the west and north the Subayhis, and to the south was the Arabian Sea. Their coastline extended from al-Hiswah on the northern shore of Aden Harbour to Ras 'Imran in the west. The tribe had only one large village called Bir Ahmad, about three miles inland and defended by a particularly strong fort, built of stone. Bir Ahmad had a bandar which gave it the advantages of a seaport. Caravans coming to Aden from the Subayhi territory had to pass through Bir Ahmad, and on this account the village assumed new importance after 1839. If they so desired, the 'Aqrabis could interrupt the flow of supplies into Aden.

The 'Aqrabis were originally a sub-division of the 'Abdali tribe and did not break away until the middle of the 18th century. At that time, 'Abd al-Rabb, the Chief of Hujariyyah, a district between Mukha and Ta'iz, rebelled against the Imam of San'a, and 'Abd al-Karim, the Sultan of Lahj, espoused the Imam's cause. The 'Aqrabi shaykh, Mahdi Ibn 'Ali, seized the opportunity to revolt and joined with 'Abd al-Rabb. In 1753, the allies occupied Lahj and besieged the Sultan in Aden for three months. The siege was lifted and 'Abd al-Rabb withdrew only after 'Abd al-Karim had paid him a large sum of money and ceded Bir Ahmad with its bandar to Mahdi. Mahdi now became independent and assumed the title of "Sultan". However, to ensure his continued independence, he agreed to pay the 'Abdali chief \$330 per annum.

In 1838, the male population of the 'Aqrabi tribe numbered 600. Their fighting strength in 1854 was given as 200, and in 1871 as 300. In 1839, their Sultan was Haydarah Ibn Mahdi.

The Fadlis. The Fadlis were to the east of Aden and had a seaboard of 100 miles, from the 'Abdali border in the west to the 'Awlaqi in the east. To the north were the Yafi'is and Hawshabis, and to the south lay the sea. The Fadli district was divided into two parts, the inland mountains and the coastal plain or Abyan. Shuqrah, 60 miles to the east of Aden, was the port of the district and its capital. The Yafi'is exported their coffee from Shuqrah when they were not at war with the Fadlis.

The Fadlis were the most warlike people in the vicinity of Aden. In 1838, they were estimated at 15,000, 4000 of whom were warriors. In 1871, Prideaux, without giving their total number, put their fighting force at 6700.

The Subayhis. The Subayhi territory lay to the west of Aden and extended from Ras 'Imran in the east to Bab al-Mandab in the west. To the east were the 'Abdalis and 'Aqrabis, and to the north the Hawshabis; to the west was Hujariyyah, and to the south the sea. The country was mainly desert and unlike the other tribes the Subayhis were nomads, living in tents. They were divided into many clans and had no paramount chief. Both in 1838 and 1854, they were estimated at 12,000.

The Hawshabis. The Hawshabi country was to the north of Aden and had an area of 1000 square miles. To the east lay Yafi', and to the west Hujariyyah; to the north were the 'Alawis and Amiris, and to the south the Subayhis, 'Abdalis and Fadlis. The chief village was al-Raha, and the Sultan in 1839 was Mani' Ibn Sallam.

The Yafi'is. The Yafi'i district was to the north-east of Aden. To the west lived the Amiris and Hawshabis, to the east the 'Awdhalis and Fadlis, and the Fadlis were also to the south; to the north lay Hadramawt. The country was divided into two parts, upper and lower, and each had its own sultan. The Settlement had relations only with Lower Yafi', the population of which was estimated at 20,000 both in 1838 and 1854. Its capital was al-Qarah, and the Sultan in 1839 was 'Ali Ibn Ghalib.

The 'Awlaqis. The 'Awlaqi territory lay to the east of Aden. The neighbours of the 'Awlaqis were the Wahidis to the east, and the Fadlis and 'Awdhalis to the west; to the north was Bayhan, and to the south the sea. Like Yafi', the 'Awlaqi country was divided into two parts, upper and lower, and again only the lower had relations with the British. The population of this part was estimated in 1871 at 15,000. The capital was Ahwar, and the Sultan in 1839 was Munassar Ibn Bu Bakr.

The 'Alawis. The 'Alawi country, or Suhayb, lay to the north of Aden, and had an area of not more than 40 square miles. To the south and west of this district were the Hawshabis, to the east the Zambaris, and to the north the Amiris. Prideaux in 1871 put the number of the tribe at 1500 and its fighting force at 500. The first figure must have referred to the males only because it is inconceivable that

one third of the tribe was warriors, since the women did not fight. The chief village was al-Qash'ah, also referred to as Suhayb, and the Sultan in 1839 was Hilal Ibn Sayf.



The Amiris. Dali', or the Amiri district (so-called after the title of its ruler), lay to the north of the 'Alawi territory. It was bounded on the east by Upper Yafi', and on the north and west by Imamic Yemen. In 1871, the population was given as 4000. The Amir in 1839 was Mus'ad Ibn Husayn.¹

The tribes could be distinguished by their accents, dress and the manner in which they carried weapons. The tribesman was so proud of his tribe that he considered it dishonourable to deny membership of it, even when expediency required it. However, to ascertain a tribesman's identity, questioning by a skilled interrogator was still necessary.

For weapons, the tribes had matchlocks, swords, spears and daggers. For their livelihood they were dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on agriculture, stock-raising, fishing, transit dues and plunder. They also hired themselves out as soldiers; the 'Awlaqis even took service with the Nizam of Hyderabad. The poorest tribes were the Subayhis, followed by the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis. The others were prosperous; and after the occupation, Aden was almost entirely dependent on them, and especially on the 'Abdalis. This dependence was the primary reason for the relations between the Settlement and the tribes.

The tribe was a social and political unit, composed of smaller units or clans, held together by the belief that they were descended from a common ancestor. Every clan had its own chief, and all the clan chiefs acknowledged the supremacy of one paramount chief. The Subayhis were an exception to this rule. The chieftaincy was hereditary, but the paramount chief's authority was far from absolute. He was subject to the laws of Islam and the customs of his tribe. If he acted contrary to them, his authority was challenged and his position threatened. In matters of importance, he had to consult the elders of the tribe, otherwise his decisions would not be supported.

If a tribesman killed a member of another tribe, his chief could not legitimately punish him, nor could the victim's chief demand justice. Such cases were considered private feuds and were left to be settled by the parties concerned. The next of kin could either



'Abdali, 'Aqrabi and Fadli Districts.

retaliate or accept diyah (blood money) which was considered full compensation for the murdered relative. The amount of money was fixed by a man of standing, such as a shaykh or sayyid. Yet such was the bedouin's love of vengeance that he rarely accepted diyah. If he could not lay his hands on the murderer himself, he killed any member of his family or tribe.

A private feud often led to war between the two tribes, and the chief of the murderer was bound to protect him. Failure to do so would cause internal strife and a revolt against his authority by the partisans of the murderer. However, fear or self-interest did sometimes move a chief to arrest or liquidate a murderer, but this was done in great secrecy; for if such an action became known, it would cause division and bloodshed.

If a man committed murder and sought refuge with another tribe, the chief of that tribe was under a moral obligation to give him refuge. He could not punish him, or deliver him up for punishment, but he could ask him to leave his territory.

A strong element in tribal politics was the sayyids. The sayyids played chiefly the roles of mediator and peacemaker. Few matters of importance were decided without their advice and consent. Their great influence was due to their superior learning and alleged descent from the Prophet. The sayyids had their own rules and customs and could be tried only by their peers.

It was with these tribes that the British had to cultivate good relations as speedily as they could. Aden was barren and could not exist without the hinterland. The hinterland was also necessary if the Settlement were to become a trading centre, as was hoped. The fortifications which were once impregnable were now in ruins and could afford no adequate protection. The force which stormed the peninsula, and now formed the garrison, was too small to withstand a combined attack by the tribes.

In addition, the British had no intention of using Aden as a base for aggression or expansion. Their desire was to live peacefully in their new possession. Therefore, Haines made friendly overtures to Sultan Muhsin and other chiefs in the interior. The response was encouraging; before the end of February 1839, engagements of peace and friendship were entered into with many, including a reluctant Sultan Muhsin. These engagements were short and simple, expressing

a desire for peace and uninterrupted traffic. However, bonds and treaties of a more definite nature were to follow.

Sultan Muhsin had paid from the port revenues specified sums of money besides grain and cloth to the tribes through whose territories the trade routes passed, and whose names will be given later. This he did to buy peace and to ensure the safe transit of merchandise, since the tribes in question were envious of his income from the port, small as it was, and could easily cause him trouble.

The loss of Aden to the British meant loss of income for Muhsin and the stoppage of stipends to the tribes. Haines was not slow to realise what the consequences might be. The 'Abdalis might adopt towards the British the same attitude which their neighbours had towards them when Aden belonged to the Sultan. The 'Abdalis now, like the others, could harm Aden's trade, and they could do so more effectively due to their geographical position. More important still, they could cut off essential supplies from their own country.

To avoid such consequences, Haines proposed that the British should not only assume the Sultan's obligations to other tribes, but also assume new obligations towards the Sultan himself. Muhsin should have the commercial advantages referred to in the draft treaty of January 1838. Moreover, he should be given £3000 per annum and his heir-apparent (his eldest son Ahmad) £1200. As pensioners of the Government, father and son would not be tempted to break the peace.

Two other men whom Haines recommended for an annual pension were Shaykh Rajab al-'Uzaybi and Sayyid Muhsin Ways. Rajab was the son of the 'Uzaybi chief who fell during the storming of Aden, leaving behind him thirteen other children, six of whom were girls. The 'Uzaybis were the strongest clan of the 'Abdali tribe, and their land separated the Fadlis from the British. By giving the young chief £800, Haines hoped to secure his friendship and keep open the road into the interior.

Muhsin Ways was a master of intrigue, as Haines had learnt from bitter experience. Besides being the son-in-law of the 'Abdali sultan, he had two other wives from the Hawshabi and Yafi'i tribes. These marriages and his standing as a sayyid gave him considerable influence in the interior. Haines proposed to buy his friendship for £1200 per annum, and to make him responsible for settling all demands previously made upon his 'Abdali father-in-law by the neighbouring

chiefs. For this purpose, Haines considered that £2000 a year would suffice.

The proposed allowances totalled £8200, and Haines maintained that although this sum might seem great, it would not prove so. If there were peace inland, trade would flourish and customs revenue increase.

An additional, but occasional, expense which the Political Agent thought necessary was presents to distinguished guests. When chiefs went visiting, they always took gifts with them and expected others in return. To smooth relations still further with the tribes, Haines deemed it wise to follow this custom.² Presents given to officials of the E.I.C. were sold by auction, and the proceeds credited to the Government.

James Farish, the Acting Governor of Bombay, supported the policy of granting stipends to the various chiefs, but felt that in no way should they exceed the sum offered by Haines under the proposed treaty of September 1838, i.e. £8000.³ The chiefs were to receive their subsidies only on condition that they remained loyal to the British and gave a written undertaking to this effect. Farish sanctioned the expense of presents, but urged economy.⁴ In a private letter to Hobhouse, he defended the stipendiary policy as being "material for the security of our position, and of the commercial intercourse with the country;..."⁵

G.W. Anderson, a member of the Board, does not seem to have informed himself about the new acquisition. He opposed the granting of allowances on the ground that "the chieftains" did not cede Aden peacefully, implying that all the neighbouring chiefs were to blame for its forcible occupation. The fact is that only one chief was to blame, the former ruler of Aden. The same mistake occurs in the Board's letter to Haines of 22nd February quoted below.

Two other reasons for Anderson's opposition were firstly, that the payment of stipends would be an admission of weakness. Secondly, there was no guarantee that the tribes would not attack if they felt that they could succeed, a fear which was before long justified. Anderson proposed that if the chiefs stopped trade with Aden, then, and only then, should the British negotiate with them and pay them a certain sum instead of "dues or customs".

Aden was a British possession, and therefore the British had no

customs or dues to pay. When they finally paid the tribes, it was only for the safe transit of trade as the Sultan had done before them. Anderson agreed that suitable presents should be made to the chiefs, but nothing that could be considered as a tribute.⁶

J.A. Dunlop, another member of the Board, supported the stipendiary policy, but agreed with Anderson that it should be made clear to the chiefs that the payments they received were not to be taken as a tribute. He thought that the 'Abdali stipends should be reduced to make more money available for the others.⁷

The Board took no decision, but referred the question to Lord Auckland. To Haines they wrote, on 22nd February, that if "the chiefs" asked for their stipends, they should be told that they had forfeited their right to such a consideration. However, if they wished, their request would be forwarded to the Supreme Government.⁸

As it happened, the chiefs had asked for their stipends before the letter from Bombay arrived, and Haines reported, on 7th March, that he had told them that he could not grant their request without Government authority. They were not satisfied with this answer and considered that the British had harmed them by taking Aden from Sultan Muhsin. In the same letter, Haines expressed his fear that it would be difficult to keep them from harassing Lahj or the Settlement.⁹

Sultan Muhsin himself visited Aden for the first time since its capture on 9th March and was there until the 14th. The purpose of his visit was ostensibly to ingratiate himself with the British. He blamed what had happened on his tribe whom he said he could not control, and again expressed his desire to be treated as an Indian nawwab or rajah. By this he meant that the British should take his country under their protection and give him a stipend. Haines replied that it was not in his power to decide such important questions and advised him to write direct to the Government. Muhsin did so on 13th March and ended his letter by repeating the old wish for an offensive-defensive alliance.¹⁰

In Bombay, the Government directed the Persian Department, which handled also Arabic correspondence, to send the Sultan a polite, but non-committal, reply.¹¹ Meanwhile, in April, the Supreme Government reached a decision on the question of granting stipends to Sultan Muhsin and others. Indeed, the decision may have taken longer had it not been for disturbing news from Aden. Twice tribesmen crept up to the Wall by night and fired at the sentries; a European who had unwisely

ventured outside the fortifications was murdered; and marauders were making the roads dangerous.¹² Also the Government of Bombay reminded the Governor-General of the chiefs' reaction to the occupation of Aden as reported by Haines in his letter of 7th March and urged him to take a speedy decision on the subject of subsidies.¹³

Auckland agreed to the payment of stipends and concurred with Farish that they should not exceed £8000 per annum. With reference to the events reported above, he instructed the Bombay Government that the stipendiary chiefs should be made answerable for the acts of their men, and damage should be made good from their allowances.¹⁴

When Haines reported the firing at the sentries (4th March), he recommended that a body of cavalry be added to the garrison, a recommendation which was repeatedly made in connection with the defence of the Settlement. The horsemen would pursue attackers and keep safe the plain in front of the Wall. Auckland, instead, suggested that the chiefs who did not receive subsidies should be conciliated by employing some of their relations as horse patrols or in some other capacity. Thus they would be induced to identify themselves with the British in the preservation of order instead of being plunderers.¹⁵

It happened that when the instructions of the Governor-General reached Bombay, Haines was there on sick leave. He had fallen ill on 15th March, sailed for the Presidency on 1st April and returned to Aden on 20th May.

Back in Aden, Haines worked out a new scale of allowances in the light of "further experience". He fixed the stipend of the 'Abdali sultan at £6500 per annum, but gave no subsidy to his heir-apparent, since he felt that this would lead to quarrels among the sons who were by different mothers.

When Haines was in Bombay, Muhsin Ways had stirred up trouble between the 'Abdalis and Hawshabis which resulted in the death of thirteen men.¹⁶ Also the Governor-General had expressed his doubts as to the desirability of putting too much power into the hands of one man.¹⁷ Therefore, instead of giving Ways a lump sum of £2000 to be distributed at his discretion among the other chiefs, Haines gave four of them the sums they had been accustomed to receive from Sultan Muhsin: the Fadli £364½, the Amiri £50, the Yafi'i £250 and the Hawshabi £628. The 'Alawi, who had previously been paid in kind only, was now to receive £60 as well.¹⁸ He and the Amiri do not seem

to have signed treaties as required by the Government of chiefs receiving stipends.

The treaties negotiated with the other tribes, excluding the 'Abdalis, were identical in content. They all stipulated that the chiefs should keep the peace and see that their followers committed no depredations in Aden, Lahj or on the roads. Failure to comply with these terms meant stoppage of the stipends.¹⁹

Sultan Muhsin visited Aden for the second time on 15th June, 1839, to conclude the bond under which he was to get his stipend. The Sultan seems to have considered himself still entitled to the original £8000, although he had lost Aden in a military encounter. He was also reluctant to sign any bond which would make receipt of the money subject to the good behaviour of himself and his tribe as stipulated by the Government. When Haines made it clear that the payment would be made on no other terms, the Sultan asked for a promise that the British would fight on his side if he were attacked by his neighbours. In other words, he would now be content with a defensive treaty. Haines refused to give such a promise, but said that he would use "strong persuasive arguments to prevent such a breach of faith on their part".²⁰ The Sultan then signed the bond (18th June), which inexplicably bound him with the British in what amounted to a defensive alliance.

Under this treaty:

1. The Sultan made himself answerable for outrages by his people on the roads.
2. He and his children pledged themselves not to offer any opposition to the British.
3. The interests of the contracting parties were to be "identical".
4. The British undertook to pay the stipends formerly paid by the Sultan to his neighbours.
5. The Sultan and his heirs in perpetuity were to receive from the British an annual stipend of £6500.
6. The British boundary was fixed at Khur Maksar, as proposed in the draft treaty of 1838.
7. "In case of any attack upon Laheje or the Abdellee tribe or upon Aden or the British troops, we (the Sultan) and the British shall make a common cause."
8. When in Aden, the Sultan's people were to be subject to British

laws; and when in Lahj, British subjects were to submit to the Sultan's authority.

9. The Sultan and his family were to be exempt from customs dues.²¹

The Government of Bombay, under the new Governor, Sir James Rivett-Carnac, approved of this bond, but they deemed it desirable to add the following clause: "... the engagement should become null and void, in the event of the British Government ever seeing fit to relinquish the possession of Aden."²² The addition may have been due to doubts about the long term value of the Settlement.

The bond was forwarded with the addendum on 14th September for the ratification of the Governor-General, and on 24th October it was ratified, but without the proposed addition. The Government of India gave no reason for ignoring the clause, and it is possible that it was an oversight. Bonds with other stipendiary chiefs were less formal and were only countersigned in Bombay.

The allowances to the chiefs totalled \$7853, a little below the \$8000 limit set by the Government. They were to be paid in six-monthly instalments, in arrears, commencing from February 1839. The 'Abdali stipend was to be paid to the Sultan's agent, and the Fadli, to 'Alawi, the eldest son of Sayyid Zayn al-'Aydarus. The other stipends were to be paid through Muhsin Ways.

In addition to the stipends, Haines recommended salaries and life pensions, the purpose of which was, like other measures, to secure British interests and win the friendship of the people. The personal qualities of Muhsin Ways and his tribal connections made Haines appoint him British agent for the protection of trade in the interior. For his duties, Ways was granted \$60 a month. The distribution of grain and other minor articles Haines left in the hands of Sultan Muhsin's vizier, Hasan Ibn 'Abd Allah al-Khatib. For his services, Haines paid him \$40 a month.²³ Payment in kind was not mentioned in any treaty with any tribe, and it seems to have been discontinued after Hasan's death in 1840.

In February, Haines had recommended that Rajab al-'Uzaybi be given \$800 per annum on humanitarian and political grounds. He now recommended an annual pension of \$360. The reason for this reduction was that the clan had divided, and Rajab was the chief of only one division.²⁴ Haines now also proposed the pensioning of two other

shaykhs who were disabled during the assault on Aden. One, aged 40, was to receive £240 per annum, and the other, aged 24, £120.²⁵

The salaries and pensions amounted to £1920 per annum, but this sum was not paid regularly for any length of time. Hasan was killed in May 1840, and Muhsin Ways was dismissed in December 1841. Rajab's pension was stopped on account of his part in the first attack on Aden (11th November, 1839), but it was resumed three years later. The stipends to the chiefs continued, with interruptions to some; and as years went by, some allowances were raised and more chiefs were added to the list. In the stipends lay the genesis of the later protectorate.

After Haines had settled the question of stipends, he engaged, as a camel patrol, twenty 'Abdalis under the Sultan's son Ahmad at a monthly salary of £150. The employment of 'Abdalis for this task was contrary to the recommendation of the Governor-General, but it was a sensible decision. The 'Abdali territory bordered on the Settlement and controlled the approaches to it, and the 'Abdalis would not have permitted members of other tribes to patrol in their territory. The appointment of Ahmad as head of the mounted troop had the apparent safeguard that he was responsible to his father who was in turn responsible to the British. Besides, the arrangement was more economical than importing cavalry from India, and more acceptable to the people inland.²⁶

Haines thought it unlikely that the Arabs would try to retake Aden. He argued that if the 'Abdalis attacked on their own, they would certainly lose, and hatred among the tribes would prevent the formation of any coalition. Yet, even as early as 28th February, he recommended the strengthening of the Isthmus defences and of the garrison in order "to command respect and deter thoughts of recapture".²⁷ Work had, in fact, already started on a line of temporary defences on the ruins of the old Turkish Wall, and in April, 314 troops were added to the garrison, bringing its strength up to 1050.

Another "defence" which Haines built was an efficient spy system. Many of the accountants and cashiers of the inland chiefs were Jews whose families lived in Aden. By virtue of their occupation, they had access to reliable information, and because their homes were in the Settlement, their interests were with the British. Moreover, they could write in Hebrew, a language which the Arabs did not read. All

these facts made the Jews Haines' best spies.

Haines had Arab spies as well, but he did not place much confidence in their reports as "they tend to exaggerate".²⁸ Excepted from this generalisation in the first three crucial years of British rule were Muhsin Ways and Hasan al-Khatib. In addition, these men were in a better position to supply secret information than even the Jewish cashiers and accountants.

The Political Agent was careful that his agents should come and go without attracting attention. For instance, he had a Jew who would leave al-Hawtah and proceed as far as a wood which was a few miles to the south. There he would hand his dispatches to another Jew who would come to Aden by sea. Thus, the first would not arouse suspicion by being absent one night from al-Hawtah, and the second by being seen too often on the road.²⁹ When Haines wanted to be absolutely certain about the truth of a rumour, he would have it checked by several spies at different times, each acting without the knowledge of the others.

Haines was prudent to take these precautions. The 'Abdalis could not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of Aden, and for years nourished the hope of retaking it. In fact, from the outset, their Sultan started to make plans to this end. The treaties which in Haines' opinion may have reduced the likelihood of a tribal attack meant nothing to the 'Abdali and Fadli sultans. In August, after all the treaties had been signed and the first instalments of the stipends paid, Haines must have learnt with great disappointment that an attack was being planned by the Fadlis and 'Uzaybis, with the knowledge of Sultan Muhsin and his son. If the attack was not possible, they were determined to close the roads.

The Political Agent explained this hostility solely in terms of economics; the 'Abdali chief derived no benefit from the British presence in Aden, and the Fadli could foresee trade being attracted away from his bandar.³⁰ In the author's opinion, more important than economics was the fact that the new masters of Aden were both foreigners and "infidels", a fact which was repeatedly to serve as a pious excuse for attacking the British Settlement and murdering British persons.

Acts of hostility were committed as early as March, but Haines may have thought that they were isolated incidents which would cease once the chiefs were made pensioners of the British. Now, however,

when the policy of reconciliation seemed to have failed and the stipends to have no restraining effect, he advocated counter-measures. Dates were (and still are) the staple food of the bedouin during the hot season, and the tribes obtained their annual supply of this commodity from the Persian Gulf during the cool or trading season. If the tribes stopped communication with Aden, Haines proposed first to warn them; and if his warning went unheeded, to retaliate by not allowing dates to reach them from Aden, Bir Ahmad or Shuqrah.

For the measure to be fully effective, he recommended a blockade of the 'Aqrabi and Fadli ports. Furthermore, he proposed to keep the Fadlis occupied by intriguing with their neighbours, the 'Awlaqis to the east and the Yafi'is to the north.³¹ The Government authorised the blockade if the tribes carried out their plan, but their general instruction was that Haines' measures should be "purely of a defensive nature, but not aggressive".³² The contemplated intrigues provoked no comment.

Early in September, murder and plunder were committed on the roads. As a result, Haines threatened Sultan Muhsin with the loss of his stipend. He also decided to withhold the monthly pay of the patrol under his son until the plundered property was restored and the culprits punished. This was done, and the patrol received their pay.³³ Soon after, Muhsin and his son had a quarrel over relations with the British. The quarrel ended in the father's withdrawing the patrol, leaving the roads open to plunderers.

Muhsin then appealed to all the neighbouring chiefs for assistance in retaking Aden. Haines counteracted by directing his two agents in the interior to frustrate his efforts, and this they did by bribery. The Fadli chief, however, could not be bribed, and on 8th October, the two sultans met at al-Hawtah. The Fadli agreed to assist the 'Abdali in recapturing Aden, and for his support he was given £1500 and promised a similar sum when Aden fell.

Haines thought that Sultan Ahmad was not sincere in his intentions, but wanted only the money. His opinion was undoubtedly based on the traditional enmity between the two chiefs, but he forgot how volatile tribal politics could be. While he was still writing his report, he learnt that Ahmad had already mustered 600 men and was expecting reinforcements daily.

"Activity and firmness" were now needed, Haines wrote. Muhsin

should be punished, and he suggested three ways of punishing him. Firstly, by stopping his stipend; secondly, by securing two of his sons as hostages for his good conduct; thirdly, by invading his territory and capturing him with his family, after which the British could dictate their own terms.

At the time Haines wrote this letter (October 1839), the mountain passes were not yet scarped, and the Turkish Wall, which was far from impregnable, was Aden's only defence. The garrison had been reduced by sickness and death. For carrying out the second punishment, Haines recommended that the garrison be brought up to full strength, i.e. to what it was in April, with the addition of 30 irregular cavalrymen and their horses,³⁴ now that the Arab patrol had been disbanded. The best time for inflicting the third punishment would be when a portion of the garrison was relieved and the force thereby temporarily increased.³⁵

The Government saw the need for reinforcing the garrison, but not for sending the cavalry: "... the less you have to do with the interior, the better." However, if Haines thought that the horse were extremely necessary, he should "trust to his own resources", but resources he had none.

Bombay ruled out the third alternative for punishing the Sultan. "... the only coercive measure which should be adopted in case of necessity ought to be by blockading the ports of the maritime disaffected chiefs, and this even should only be resorted to in the event of negotiation and remonstrance being found to be fruitless." The other two alternatives were authorised, but the second could only be effected by stratagem, since Haines was not allowed to make incursions inland.³⁶ This prohibition, and the fact that the Sultan had no port to be blockaded, meant that Haines could only stop his stipend.

Before the letter quoted above was received in Aden, indeed even before it was written, the 'Abdalis and Fadlis had acted. At 4.30 a.m. on 11th November, a combined force, estimated by the Commandant at 5000, attacked, but was beaten back with heavy losses. In the months since the occupation, the British had consolidated their position and with better weapons in their hands had no difficulty in repulsing the tribesmen. If the Arabs had made their attack immediately after the occupation they might well have succeeded.

Prior to the assault, Sultan Muhsin gave nominal charge of his

people to his son Ahmad, probably in order to appear blameless and not to lose his stipend on the grounds of violating the June bond.³⁷ Haines was not deceived. The 'Abdali and Fadli stipends were stopped. Banning members of hostile tribes from Aden was considered, but was not found advisable; the Settlement needed their produce, and Haines needed information.³⁸ In Bombay, the Government suspended the June treaty with the 'Abdalis, and on account of subsequent events it was never put into operation.

The defeated chiefs held, on 1st December, a council of war at which they decided to make another effort to recapture Aden a week later, after Ramadan was over. Each was to collect as large a force as possible, in the simple belief that the greater the number, the surer the victory. Sultan Muhsin once again applied to his other neighbours for support, but without success. The Fadli chief appealed to the Muslim population of Aden to join in the coming battle, describing Haines as "the enemy of Mahomet, and of all Mahometans".

Ramadan ended, but the allies did not attack Aden. Instead, they intensified their efforts to prevent supplies from reaching it, with the purpose of making life so difficult for the British that they would be forced to leave. The measure was not successful; some caravans fought their way through, and Haines did not remain inactive.³⁹ He retaliated by blockading Shuqrah on 17th December, and not by intriguing with the Yafi'is and 'Awlaqis as he had once proposed. The blockade had a useful, but temporary, effect. The Fadlis withdrew to their country, the roads were re-opened, and Muhsin sent a deputation to sue for peace.

Haines made peace conditional on Muhsin's asking for pardon personally in Aden and giving two of his sons as hostages.⁴⁰ Instead, on 5th January, 1840, the Sultan abdicated in favour of his son Ahmad, giving age and infirmity as reasons. The Fadli chief, meanwhile, wrote to him urging a second attack on Aden or else he would attack Lahj. Muhsin replied that the tribe was now in the hands of his son, whereupon the Fadli carried out his threat.

On becoming "Sultan", Ahmad denounced his father's policy and declared that he intended to form an alliance with the British. To Haines he wrote that he was the servant of the Government and that he wanted peace and friendship. Haines was pleased with this letter, but insisted that peace could only be made on his own conditions, i.e. an

ample apology and two brothers as hostages. By way of inducing the young chief to accept his terms, Haines, perhaps unwisely, held out to him the prospect of help against the Fadlis. "... the Foutheli insult you, and murder and plunder in your territory daily which could easily be prevented."

It is difficult to guess how Haines could have checked the Fadlis. An expedition inland was out of the question; Shuqrah was already under blockade; and "strong persuasive arguments" could not have been more effective than the blockade. For his part, Ahmad understood from Haines' letter that the Political Agent was prepared to use military force against the Fadlis, and he wrote to him that he would go to Aden to negotiate peace only after they had been put down. Haines insisted that peace should first be made, and on his own terms. Ahmad, finding that there was nothing to be gained from Haines, came to terms with the Fadlis.

Haines himself reported that Ahmad did not want to be hostile to the British, but he was forced into this position by his father, by the Fadli sultan and by Ibrahim Pasha.⁴¹ Haines' allegation regarding the Egyptian Commander in the Yemen was based on two letters from the British agent at Mukha, an Indian Muslim by the name of 'Abd al-Rasul.

The first letter was to the effect that Muhammad 'Ali had sent an envoy to the Imam, with a promise of men, money and ammunition and an offer to withdraw from his country if he undertook to drive the British out of Aden. The Imam had answered that he was not strong enough to attack the British, nor did he wish to do so.⁴² The second letter had spoken of messengers from Sultan Muhsin to Ibrahim Pasha, requesting assistance against the British. Ibrahim had replied that he could not grant it without the authority of Muhammad 'Ali, but he promised to write to his uncle and suggested that Muhsin should do the same, an answer similar to that which Haines had more than once given to the 'Abdali chief. According to 'Abd al-Rasul, letters were sent to Egypt, but no reply had been received.⁴³

From this it is clear that the Egyptians in the Yemen did not give any active support to the tribes, nor did they even promise them help. Yet Haines accused them of constantly intriguing against Aden and perpetually frustrating his efforts to reach a settlement with his neighbours. He wrote that as long as the Arabs entertained hopes of Egyptian assistance, they would not make terms with the British.⁴⁴

As will be seen, the Egyptians withdrew from the Yemen in April 1840, but the 'Abdalis and Fadlis did not cease hostilities,

When Haines failed to make any headway with Ahmad, he recommended, for the second time, that Lahj be captured and the old chief and his family be taken to Aden as hostages. For administrative purposes, the territory might be held at small expense if a fort were built and guarded by British troops. Even this expense could be avoided by giving the government to Muhsin Ways under guidance from the Political Agent. However, the best plan was that Ahmad should be reinstated and a new treaty concluded with him. "Our treaty should be offensive and defensive, in fact his acts whether for peace, war or commerce should depend upon the will of the British." For the observance of the proposed treaty the rest of the family should remain in Aden as hostages, and the young chief should be guided by a native agent or consul under direction from Aden. Haines' "offensive and defensive treaty" was clearly one-sided, and the whole arrangement would have amounted to a protectorate over Lahj.

For the capture of Lahj, Haines required two or three troops of cavalry, horse artillery for four or six guns and 3000 infantry, half of them European.⁴⁵ Haines' request for a large number of European troops was made on the ground that the Arabs feared them on account of their muscular strength, while they looked down on the Indians as inferiors.⁴⁶ The expedition was to be financed partly from the Sultan's treasury and partly from the revenues of his territory, in half-yearly instalments.

Haines' justification for a show of strength was that the peaceful attitude of the British was interpreted by the tribes as weakness; they said that the British dared not venture beyond the Wall. Firm action was also necessary if Aden was to flourish as a trading post.⁴⁷

The Bombay Government responded by restating their policy of non-interference in even stronger terms: "... you should confine yourself to the occupation of Aden; and, on no account to enter upon any offensive operations beyond that place, until otherwise directed ... if Aden cannot be made a valuable acquisition without entering into an aggressive warfare with the Arab chiefs in the interior, the sooner the place is abandoned or surrendered for a consideration, the better."⁴⁸

The Supreme Government and the Secret Committee approved of Bombay's instructions, and the latter authority wrote direct to Haines:

"While you resolutely resist every attack on you, we trust that you will cautiously abstain from all aggression on any portion of the Arab tribes."⁴⁹ The Secret Committee was against the occupation of Lahj, and showed understanding of the tribes' attitude: "The hostility of the Arab tribes is natural and might have been expected and we do not think that our possession of Lahedge would reconcile them to our dominion."⁵⁰

The Secret Committee doubted Carnac's wisdom in going so far as to suggest that it might be better to abandon Aden.⁵¹ Carnac himself had long thought that Aden would be "a troublesome and unprofitable acquisition", and he expressed this opinion to Lord Palmerston before he (Carnac) left for India, probably in April 1839.⁵² After the November attack, in a private letter to Hobhouse, he described the annexation of Aden as "a bad move", and predicted that the Settlement would be "a constant source of expense and trouble", partly on account of Muhammad 'Ali who would not easily forgive the British their seizure of Aden. Therefore he added: "I should be glad if you ordered us to give it up, making due arrangements for our steam purposes."⁵³

Hobhouse did not agree with Carnac, and Palmerston was confident that Aden "will prove ... a most valuable possession, and ought to be defended at any cost". Palmerston was very surprised that Carnac did not appreciate Aden, and this made him doubt "whether he entirely deserves the high reputation for good judgment which he has acquired".⁵⁴ Carnac, however, changed his opinion on Aden in the light of events in the Near East: "It will, I admit, be a possession of great value now we find affairs so unsettled in Egypt, and it may become of considerable commercial importance; but it has cost us loads of money nevertheless."⁵⁵ In the mean time, Hobhouse also became convinced that Aden would be a source of trouble, but he did not see how the British could withdraw from it before settling their differences with Muhammad 'Ali.⁵⁶

Egypt's unpopular rule in Syria encouraged Mahmud II to launch the attack which he had been entertaining since 1833 and from which he had been dissuaded by Palmerston. In April 1839, he sent a large force to reconquer Syria, but it was completely destroyed on 24th June near Nusaybin on the Syrian frontier. Subsequently, news came that Admiral Ahmad Pasha had carried off the Ottoman fleet to Alexandria and surrendered it to Muhammad 'Ali.

Sultan Mahmud died on 30th June and was succeeded by his son

'Abd al-Majid, a boy of sixteen. The young Sultan immediately started negotiations with Muhammad 'Ali who demanded the hereditary government of both Syria and Egypt. 'Abd al-Majid was willing to agree, but Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria sent him a collective note requiring the suspension of the negotiations, and this the Sultan gladly did.

Then in London, on 15th July, 1840, the Four Powers concluded with the Porte a convention for the pacification of the Levant. Under it, the Sultan agreed to confer upon Muhammad 'Ali the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and for his life the administration of southern Syria. The Pasha refused these terms and applied to France for protection.

Palmerston had already taken the precaution of ordering the Mediterranean squadron to prevent communication between Egypt and Syria. Then a force of British and Austrian marines defeated Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad 'Ali's son, and the Egyptians lost Syria. After that, the British fleet proceeded to Alexandria, but Muhammad 'Ali yielded to the will of the Powers and there were no hostilities. In return for the Pashalik of Egypt, he agreed to surrender the Ottoman fleet and to evacuate Syria, Arabia and Crete. Muhammad 'Ali had in fact already withdrawn his forces from Arabia in anticipation of an attack on Alexandria.

On 1st June, 1841, Sultan 'Abd al-Majid issued a firman confirming Muhammad 'Ali in the government of Egypt with hereditary succession. The Egyptian Question was now settled, and on 13th July, a second treaty was concluded in London. This treaty confirmed the earlier one and had the signature of France besides those of the other Four Powers. With this Muhammad 'Ali's star set,⁵⁷ and the British continued in possession of Aden.

During the blockade of Shuqrah,⁵⁸ a few skirmishes took place between the British and the Fadlis. Lieut. R. Ethersey, commanding the "Euphrates", one of the two vessels which took part in the blockade, could not ascertain what damage or casualties his cannonading had inflicted, but he wrote to Captain R. Oliver, Superintendent of the Indian Navy, that reports reaching Haines spoke of 80 killed or wounded.⁵⁹ The Government deplored the news and asked Haines for a detailed report.⁶⁰ Haines wrote that in fact only one camel and two slaves were killed. In addition, the sultan's castle, the customs-house and some palm trees were destroyed.⁶¹ This explanation satisfied the

Government, for it showed that "nothing occurred but what is inseparable from the evils of war".⁶² The Secret Committee, too, were satisfied with the explanation, but did not see the necessity for the blockade in the first place.⁶³

Haines' own comment on the blockade was that it brought respect for the British, quietened the tribes and ended "the superstition that the Foutheli Sultan was invincible",⁶⁴ but this effect was not to last long. Frustrated in their attempt to dislodge the British, the 'Abdalis and Fadlis seem to have thought that if they got rid of Haines, Aden would become an easy prize. To this end, they twice conspired to murder him, and twice they failed. Then the 'Abdali sultan resumed the reins of government, and the two tribes decided to make their long-postponed attack on the Settlement. Jihad was preached among the other tribes,⁶⁵ but once again the 'Abdalis and Fadlis had to take the field alone.

About 2.00 a.m., on 21st May, a joint force, also put at 5000, attacked. The force was repulsed within 90 minutes, but not before plundering some army tents.⁶⁶ After the retreat, the spoils were exhibited to other tribes by way of inducing them to join in future attacks. The Fadli sultan also displayed letters written to Haines by Muhsin Ways and Hasan al-Khatib which had been intercepted by his mounted guard, and it was decided that the two men should be executed. Hasan was killed, but Muhsin saved his life by calling into his castle a guard of Hawshabis.⁶⁷

Carnac was now convinced by Haines' argument that the British should carry the war into the enemy's territory, but practical considerations prevented him from authorising such action. If the British advanced into the interior, it would be impossible to know where to stop. Besides, an expedition should not be hazarded except with an overwhelming force which would be difficult and costly to equip. In 1840, the Company's forces were involved in Afghanistan, China and Sind, a drain on the financial and human resources of British India, especially the Presidency of Bombay. The Governor, therefore, reluctantly adhered to the policy of defending Aden without leaving the fortifications.⁶⁸

Auckland, too, thought it no longer wise to restrict the defence of Aden to the fortifications. This policy, he wrote, would encourage the tribes to persist in their hostility, motivated by "national feeling and the hope of plunder". However, he left it to his subordinate

in Bombay to decide whether the capture of Lahj, as recommended by Haines, could be carried out advantageously.⁶⁹

The day before Auckland wrote his letter, the 'Abdalis and Fadlis made their third unsuccessful attack (5th July).⁷⁰ Prior to the July attack, Sultan Muhsin ordered the confiscation of all property in Lahj belonging to inhabitants of Aden and to the family of the late Hasan al-Khatib. The result was that the merchants alone lost nearly \$15,000, and the Khatib family sixteen houses. The Jews bore the brunt of the Sultan's wrath because they spied for the British.

In deference to the opinion of the Governor-General, Carnac considered the possibility of an expedition against Lahj, with the purpose only of taking revenge for the attacks on Aden.⁷¹ However, he found it impossible to equip a force of the strength and type considered necessary and thought that the idea should be abandoned for the time being,⁷² an opinion with which Auckland readily concurred.⁷³ Earlier, he wrote to Hobhouse, "... we have already enough to do..."⁷⁴

In October 1840, a gat vendor, a Sunni subject of the Imam called Faqih Sa'id, claimed that he was a prophet and assumed the lofty titles "al-Mahdi al-Muntazar" (the Guided and Expected One) and "Sultan al-Barr wal-Bahr" (Lord of the Land and Sea). He even had silver coins of his own struck with these titles on either side. As his lieutenants, he appointed three shaykhs each styled "Commander of the Faithful". Faqih declared that he intended to rekindle the religious fervour of all believers and to recover the Yemen from the hands of "infidels and sectaries", i.e. the British and the Shi'i Zaydis.

The "prophet" promised his followers immunity against sword or bullet and pledged that when the Yemen fell under his control, he would abolish all taxes.⁷⁵ Soon many ignorant and superstitious people flocked to Faqih's banner. With them, he captured Ta'iz and several hill forts which he allowed them to destroy for their amusement.

This success, coupled with his own revengeful feelings towards the British, made Sultan Muhsin apply to the "Mahdi" for help, not knowing that he, too, wanted to expel the "infidels" from Aden. Faqih wrote to Muhsin and the other chiefs in the interior, commanding them to meet him with their followers at Bir Ahmad after 'Id al-Fitr (late November) for the purpose of attacking the Settlement.⁷⁶ Sultan Haydarah of the 'Aqrabis, who had until then been friendly to the British, now felt it his religious duty to turn against them; and on 24th November,

Haines received a letter from him saying that he had been honoured by a command from the Mahdi to join his force "for the extermination of Christians from the Land of the Faithful".⁷⁷

Before taking Aden, Faqih wanted first to establish his rule in the Tihama. From his village of Danwah, near al-'Udayn, he wrote to Sharif Husayn (then at Zabid) and to his brother Hamud (then governor of Mukha), ordering them, under penalty of death, to hand over control to him before the end of Ramadan. Sharif Husayn cunningly answered that, as a Muslim, he could not disobey and asked the rhetorical question, "Would it not be more appropriate for 'the Regenerator of the True Faith' first to recover Aden from the infidels?" This question made Faqih give immediate attention to Aden.⁷⁸

Haines thought that Faqih presented no danger. The chiefs were disunited, and many of them would not take seriously "a character so lately sprung into notice".⁷⁹ As it happened, Faqih never came near the Settlement. Early in December, when he was about to march with his army of 12,000, he found that he had to cope with a threat from the rear. The Imam, who saw in him a danger to his own position, had collected a force of 20,000 and marched south from San'a until he reached Yarim where he encamped to prepare for an attack on Danwah.

However, before he was ready, Faqih, on 16th December, sent a detachment of Dhu Muhammad and Dhu Husayn tribesmen to attack his outpost. Instead, when these Saydis reached Yarim, they renewed their allegiance to the Imam. They then returned to Danwah and engaged a portion of Faqih's troops, killing 150. Two other engagements followed, on 19th and 21st December, with equal success for the Imam's men, which encouraged the Imam to advance on Danwah. There, on 25th December, a fierce battle took place in which several hundreds of Faqih's followers were slaughtered, but it is not known whether Faqih himself was among the dead or succeeded in escaping.⁸⁰ As far as the British were concerned, the Mahdi's defeat removed another threat to the Settlement and once again frustrated Sultan Muhsin's hopes for its recapture.

By April 1841, the British had been in Aden for over two years, maintaining an expensive garrison. Every attack or disturbance was followed by cessation of the land trade, and at night marauders would approach near enough to fire at the sentries. Such a state of affairs not only made life difficult for the garrison and inhabitants, but also

prevented merchants from settling in the town and made the British look very weak.

Auckland, therefore, thought that it was high time for the British to decide whether they should continue to occupy Aden as a beleaguered town or take action against the marauders, thereby protecting their subjects and giving such confidence to their friends "as will render Aden the prosperous seaport which its position so well fits it to become". To keep the neighbourhood clear of marauders, the Governor-General was willing to sanction the expense of a small body of horse, if the Government of Bombay deemed it necessary. However, on no account were the Aden authorities to use the horse for "any aggressive expedition" without permission from Bombay. The horse should be regarded as mounted police, and not as a military force. It would be possible to strike at al-Hawtah when the time for relieving part of the garrison came, a suggestion made by Haines as early as October 1839. The strike, Auckland was confident, would change permanently, and for the better, the policy of Sultan Muhsin and his ally, the Fadli chief.⁸¹

The same month Auckland wrote his letter, the ever hopeful Muhsin wanted to make another attack on Aden with the help of his Fadli neighbour, but Ways persuaded him not to join. The Sultan then imprisoned "all Jews" in Lahj, and for their release demanded an unspecified sum of money which he stipulated should be equal to what he formerly received from the port of Aden. By arrangement with the 'Aqrabi chief, he also stopped all caravans of coffee and other non-perishable articles proceeding into Aden, and channelled their export through Bir Ahmad. The perishable goods which he could not sell elsewhere, he allowed to enter the Settlement, but levied on them at Shaykh 'Uthman a duty which he designated "the Aden tax". This was in addition to the duty which he normally collected at al-Hawtah, and his receipts from it averaged two to three thousand rupees a month,⁸² at least twice the amount of his stipend for the same period.

The Political Agent despaired of ever making a permanent peace with the 'Abdali sultan and he thought that the British should not negotiate with him except on the conditions formerly stipulated, i.e. an apology and two sons as hostages.⁸³ Meanwhile, Bir Ahmad should be blockaded in retaliation.⁸⁴ Auckland approved on 19th July, 1841, but repeated that such a measure should only be carried out if remonstrance failed.⁸⁵

Before Haines received Auckland's instructions, Ahmad 'Aydan, the Interpreter at the Barrier Gate, had been assassinated (29th July). The Fadlis, who agreed not to join the 'Abdalis in another attack on Aden, were nevertheless glad to join in annoying them. A body of chieftains of the two tribes enticed 'Aydan to come out to them, a distance of about 120 yards, and then they murdered him. Haines thought that this murder could have been avoided if he had had the cavalry for which he had continually been asking since March 1839. "We are too confident in ourselves and we do not consider that we have subtle and daring enemies to cope with."⁸⁶

The Interpreter's murder moved Anderson, now Acting Governor of Bombay, to ask the Supreme Government for horse,⁸⁷ but for various reasons the troop, which was recruited at Poona, did not reach Aden until early January 1843. In the mean time, the 'Abdali, Fadli and 'Aqrabi chiefs decided to prevent all supplies, perishable and non-perishable, from reaching Aden. However, as before, the other tribes did not submit to their will and sometimes fought their way through. Even the 'Aqrabi and 'Abdali tribesmen did not apply the "economic siege" strictly. In return for protection money, the 'Aqrabis escorted caravans into the Settlement.⁸⁸ At Shaykh 'Uthman, the 'Abdali guards allowed supplies to go through for a substantial bribe.⁸⁹ Thus Aden survived, thanks to disunity among the tribes.

Haines, however, thought that his three neighbours should be punished. On 21st September, without reference to Bombay, he again ordered the blockade of Shuqrah, and again the Fadli chief left the neighbourhood of Aden to protect his own territory. Haines also ordered that the Fadli fishing boats be secured if possible. Their crews had occasionally volunteered, for money, to land saboteurs at unfrequented spots, with the intention of committing murder or arson. If capture seemed imminent, the saboteurs would mix with the labourers or hasten to their boats.⁹⁰

There is no evidence that the 'Aqrabi bandar was blockaded. Perhaps no vessel of war could be spared for the purpose, and in any case the closeness of the bandar to Aden made it easy for the British to keep a check on it if they desired.

As for punishing Sultan Muhsin, there was nothing that Haines could do without Government authority. Therefore, he again recommended an attack on al-Hawtah, but the Government continued to oppose the idea.

However, they now felt that an attack on a place nearer to Aden could be made, and left it to Haines to decide whether it would check the Arabs or increase their hostility.⁹¹ Haines decided that it would check them, and "erase the opinion that they have formed that fear, or want of courage prevents us ever marching beyond the outworks of Aden to punish their audacity".

What made Haines take his decision was the occasion of the annual relief of part of the garrison. He chose not one, but two targets for his attack, Shaykh 'Uthman and Bir Hamid. At Shaykh 'Uthman, after the November attack of 1839, Sultan Muhsin had built a tower where he stationed the guard who stopped caravans and exacted taxes from them. Bir Hamid was a village in the Fadli territory eight miles from Aden. It was the site of Nawbat Shaykh Mahdi, the stronghold of Shaykh Mahdi, one of the fiercest of the Fadli chiefs. It had become the rendezvous and supply centre for the hostile tribes, and all attacks were planned there.

At 10.00 p.m. on 5th October, a force consisting of 500 infantry and 80 artillery, with one gun, left Aden for Bir Hamid, arriving there just before daybreak. The force blew up the stone fort and on its way back destroyed the tower at Shaykh 'Uthman. Both buildings were deserted, warning having been given of the British advance. The only British casualties were five wounded from sporadic fire between the two villages. The success of this operation made Haines more eager than ever to attack al-Hawtah, the "fountain's head" of trouble.⁹²

The British attack on Nawbat Shaykh Mahdi, coupled with the blockade of Shuqrah, forced the Fadlis into submission. Towards the end of November, a relation of the Sultan came to Aden and offered himself as a hostage until peace was made with his tribe. This was accepted, the blockade of Shuqrah lifted, and caravans ceased to be molested.⁹³

When Sultan Muhsin heard that the Fadli chief intended to visit Aden to make peace with the British, he asked him to postpone his visit until 9th December, that both might go together. Meanwhile, he went to Aden alone on the 2nd. On his arrival, the Fadli sultan heard a rumour intentionally spread by the 'Abdali party in Aden that their chief was bound in irons and that Captain Haines had sworn to murder every Fadli once within the walls. When Haines heard this, he sent Sayyid 'Alawi Ibn Zayn, now head of the 'Aydarus family, and others to

assure the Fadli sultan that the rumour was false and invited some of his men to see the truth for themselves. The truth was that the 'Abdali sultan was not imprisoned as rumoured, but when the Fadli visitors went to tell the news to their chief they found that he had retired to Shaykh 'Uthman for the night.⁹⁴ Sultan Ahmad did not go back to Aden, nor was he ever to visit it.

Sultan Muhsin returned home on 14th December, without agreeing to Haines' terms for peace, i.e. an apology, two sons as hostages and the restoration of all property seized in 1840 from inhabitants of Aden, with special reference to the family of Hasan al-Khatib.⁹⁵ The Sultan was under no immediate pressure to come to terms with the British. He did not feel the loss of his stipend, since he could repay himself twofold by the increased taxes on supplies entering Aden. Unlike the Fadli chief, he had no port to be blockaded,⁹⁶ nor did he see any prospect of the British marching on his capital.

The only outcome of the Sultan's visit was Haines' discovery that Muhsin Ways was open to bribery, a fact which should not have caused Haines much surprise. Ways had agreed to persuade Haines to drop his second demand for peace with the Sultan. In return, the Sultan had promised to give two of his daughters in marriage to two of the Sayyid's sons, together with the first payment of his stipend after peace had been made. There was also the astounding accusation by the Sultan that Ways had connived at Hasan al-Khatib's murder. On these grounds Haines dismissed Ways as British agent.⁹⁷

Muhsin was still determined on revenge, but as usual he needed outside help. His heir was married to the sister of the Hawshabi chief, and he thought that if he (Muhsin) abdicated in Ahmad's favour, his son might, as Sultan, prevail on the Hawshabis to join the 'Abdalis in an attack on Aden. Accordingly, he "abdicated" again in February 1842; but when the stratagem failed, he resumed government.⁹⁸

The same month, Haines recommended that the Fadli chief should have his stipend restored now that he had made peace, although he had not visited Aden. Lord Ellenborough, Auckland's successor, thought that more time should pass to allow the chief to prove his good faith.⁹⁹ However, Sultan Ahmad grew impatient. In July, he sent agents to tell Haines that Muhsin had offered him £7000 if he renewed his hostilities against the British, and he threatened to accept.¹⁰⁰ Haines, in turn, threatened him with a third blockade of Shuqrah, which made him

decline the offer.¹⁰¹ Then Muhsin offered Ahmad \$12,000 and an annual allowance if he joined him, but Ahmad still refused.¹⁰² In November, the Bombay Government, under Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Arthur, agreed to restore Ahmad's stipend backdated to 1st December, 1841, when he sued for peace.¹⁰³

By this time, the wars in China and Afghanistan had been concluded, and Haines was encouraged to repeat his request for British power to be demonstrated by the capture of Lahj, now that troops could be spared. He also repeated his old demand for two of Muhsin's sons as hostages.¹⁰⁴ The Bombay Government wrote back that if the demand for hostages was the only obstacle to peace, it should not be insisted upon.¹⁰⁵

Fortunately for Aden, late in 1842 and early in 1843, a number of factors combined to force Muhsin to sue for peace. His son Ahmad was anxious to treat with the British that he might have their support against his half-brother 'Abd Allah should their old father die suddenly. Reports of British victories in China and Afghanistan reached the interior and, according to Haines, awakened in the tribes "a more lively sense of our merits".¹⁰⁶ A blood feud had broken out between the 'Abdalis and the Fadlis, and the presence of the 50 irregular horse had already made itself felt.¹⁰⁷

On 11th February, 1843, Muhsin and Haines signed a new treaty which superseded that of 1839. Clauses 1, 6 and 9 of the old bond were incorporated in the new, but significantly Clause 7 (the mutual defence clause) was omitted. The new articles were:

1. The Sultan agreed to restore to the family of Hasan al-Khatib the property confiscated from them in 1840.

2. He also agreed to make restitution to others with similar claims.

3. The rate of transit duty was to be fixed, a moderate export duty levied, and the Sultan was not to put obstacles in the way of trade.

4. British subjects were allowed to visit Lahj for commerce and their religious practices, with the exception of cremation, were to be tolerated.

5. British subjects committing an offence in Lahj should be sent to Aden for punishment, and vice-versa.

8. Subjects of the E.I.C. and those of the Sultan could hold

tenure of land in either territory.

10. Restoration of the Sultan's stipend was to be left to the discretion of Haines and the Government.¹⁰⁸

The stipend was not restored until a year later, and in that time the Sultan showed little regard for the treaty. He did not make restitution to the Khatib family, nor did he return to Aden, for trial, Hindu subjects of the E.I.C. who fled to Lahj and there changed their religion to Islam.¹⁰⁹ Yet he seemed anxious that the treaty should be upheld after his death. In July, when he fell sick and thought that his hour had come, he invited Cruttenden to visit him, that the treaty might be re-affirmed in front of his heir-apparent and other children. During this visit, the first to be paid to Lahj by an Assistant Political Agent, the Sultan insinuated that he wanted his stipend back.¹¹⁰

When he did not get it, he started intriguing with the Fadli chief and others to annoy the British. However, nothing came of his scheming; but Haines, afraid that something might eventually materialise, suggested that his subsidy be restored, as this would "quiet his mind and check further intrigue and also convince him that peaceable and friendly measures with the British are far more prudent and beneficial than the course he had hitherto adopted".¹¹¹

The Government agreed; but before paying the Sultan his stipend, Haines required him to sign a document pledging himself to adhere to the 1843 agreement. This the Sultan did on 20th February, 1844; and, as earnest of his good faith, he paid the Khatib family \$2000 and promised to restore all their property.¹¹² He was then granted his stipend backdated to 11th February, 1843; and he was in future to be paid monthly, on the 11th of each month. Peace made with the British, the Sultan pledged not to attack any of his neighbours for a whole year.¹¹³

As it happened, peace lasted not only for one year, but for two and a half, and what disturbed it was an outside element. In August 1846, Sayyid Isma'il, a zealot from Mecca claiming supernatural powers like Faqih before him, arrived in the vicinity of Aden with the avowed intention of dislodging "the Feringhis from the stronghold of Moslems". The Sayyid had with him about 3000 men, and was confident that he could take Aden within half an hour.

Sultan Muhsin, who was still unable to reconcile himself to the

British presence in Aden, thought that his moment had at last come. His excitement at the arrival of the Sayyid was so great that he abdicated in his favour and augmented the Sayyid's force by 1000 men. The other tribes were at first unwilling to join in the venture. They did not forget the episode of Faqih and preferred to go on trading with Aden. However, they were finally won over to "the holy cause" by Sayyid Muhsin Ways, now the sworn enemy of the British, and showed their enthusiasm by increasing Isma'il's force. The Fadlis sent 500 men, the 'Aqrabis 60, and the Hawshabis 300. Until then the Hawshabis had been faithful to the British and on more than one occasion had not allowed men to pass through their territory to join in attacks on the Settlement.

In Aden, belief in Isma'il's superhuman powers and fear of the cataclysm that was to come caused about 1400 people to flee. The Sayyid made three attacks on Aden, on the 17th, 26th and 27th August, and three times was beaten back. Quarrels then broke out among his followers who rapidly dispersed. The Sayyid himself was given refuge by the Fadli chief.¹¹⁴

The immediate result of the August hostilities was that the stipends of the 'Abdali, Fadli and Hawshabi chiefs were stopped; the 'Aqrabi chief received no subsidy. As a further punishment, Haines once again suggested the blockade of the 'Aqrabi and Fadli bandars during the trading season, which was about to start, and the destruction of the chiefs' castles, which necessitated an expedition inland.¹¹⁵ In a vain attempt to prove to the tribes that Aden did not need them, Haines asked the Government for supplies from Bombay.¹¹⁶

As was only to be expected, the Board in Bombay, now headed by Acting Governor L.R. Reid, sent no supplies, but sanctioned the blockade on their own responsibility and agreed to the expedition inland, subject to the approval of Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General.¹¹⁷ Hardinge did not approve of the expedition, being afraid that any defeat or indecisive conflict might endanger the Settlement. "The success of raising the investment is not an advantage of so much value as to be purchased by a severe loss of men."¹¹⁸

The blockade commenced on 5th October, and its immediate effect was that the Fadli chief withdrew to defend Shuqrah as he had done on former occasions. Two other results were that the 'Aqrabi chief sued for peace and the merchants in the interior sent all their exports

through Aden. The customs duties paid more than offset the cost of the blockade.¹¹⁹

The closure of Shuqrah was severely felt by Sultan Ahmad; and on 4th November, through the 'Aydarus sayyids, he applied for a three months' truce and suspension of the blockade. Haines did not agree, but proposed a permanent peace on three conditions; an apology, non-interruption of traffic to and from Aden, and the expulsion of Sayyid Isma'il. The Fadli sultan complied,¹²⁰ and Haines expressed his hope that Sultan Muhsin would follow suit.¹²¹

Sultan Muhsin, instead, attacked a Fadli caravan on its way back from Aden, and some lives were lost.¹²² Then he tried to detach the Fadli chief from the British by offering him a sum of money equivalent to his curtailed stipend,¹²³ but nothing came of this offer.

The Hawshabi sultan withdrew to his country immediately the fighting was over. He did not apologise for his part in the hostilities, nor did he approach Haines for his stipend. However, Haines was certain that he would ask for pardon as soon as he heard that the Fadli chief had been forgiven. In such a case, Haines wrote, it would be in the British interest to accept his apology. Four of the principal caravan routes passed through his territory, much of the grain consumed in Aden came from his fields, and the fewer enemies the Settlement had, the better. Therefore, in February 1847, Haines recommended the restoration of his stipend as well as that of the Fadli chief.¹²⁴

The Government, now headed by Sir G.R. Clerk, agreed, and payment was to be made from the date Haines received the chiefs' overtures for peace.¹²⁵ The Fadli sultan had made overtures in November 1846, but the Hawshabi chief did not. To keep him quiet, Muhsin, and then his son Ahmad, paid him his stipend until the Government agreed to its restoration in April 1848 at Haines' request.¹²⁶

The country round Aden remained peaceful until 8th June, 1847, when a caravan was plundered by 'Abd Allah Ibn Muhsin assisted by some 'Aqrabis and Subayhis. Haines protested to the Sultan, but he replied that his people did not listen to him and that he had no salary from the Government, implying that it was not his responsibility to protect the roads. Haines repeated his protest, and this time the Sultan promised to do all he could, but he reminded Haines that he was poor

and his people did not respect him.

Haines commented that the Sultan was not as poor as he would wish others to believe, having more than a lakh of dollars; he was only anxious to get his stipend back, and Haines recommended its restoration. This he did on the old grounds that its payment would ensure peace and quiet and enable the Sultan to maintain his authority over the minor chiefs. Besides, his knowledge that the allowance would be stopped for any breach of good faith would act as a check upon his conduct.¹²⁷ Clearly, this argument was not born of experience, but was dictated by expediency.

The Government thought that Muhsin deserved no consideration, but found it convenient to agree with Haines' argument. However, they stipulated that before his stipend was restored, he should go to Aden and ask pardon for his offences. If because of age or infirmity he was unable to go, then his son was to represent him. Muhsin was to be left in no doubt that if he ever again acted against the British, his stipend would be irrevocably forfeited. The agreement of 1843 was to be renewed, and Article 3 implemented.¹²⁸ Before the Governor-General authorised the payment of the allowance (4th December), the Sultan had died (29th November), and with his death ended a difficult period for the British in Aden.

The two main aims of British policy after the occupation of Aden were retention of the new possession and a guaranteed flow of supplies. In pursuit of the first aim, the Settlement was refortified and a spy system established. In furtherance of the second, the British adopted a conciliatory policy towards their neighbours, and the stipends were its most significant expression.

The tribes which were not in the immediate vicinity of Aden simply changed paymasters, and their relations with the Settlement were purely commercial. The Hawshabis were the only tribe which departed from this rule, and that was only in 1846. The relations of the British with their nearest neighbours fluctuated between active hostility and reluctant peace. The stipends failed to win the friendship of the 'Abdali and Fadli chiefs; they made little difference to their income, and when in abeyance they served only as a source of trouble.

Sultan Muhsin was not sincere when he offered to place his country under British protection, but it was not because of this that the British turned down his offer; it was because they were against territorial expansion in the interior. However, for geographical and economic reasons, they sought from the beginning a special relationship with the 'Abdali tribe. The mutual defence clause in the treaty with Sultan Muhsin and the stipulation in the treaties with the other chiefs that they should not commit depredations in Lahj or in Aden were the clearest manifestations of this desire.

The British hoped to use the 'Abdalis as intermediaries with the other tribes, but this hope was frustrated by the enmity of Sultan Muhsin who could not reconcile himself to the loss of Aden. The Fadli chief, for religious reasons, bitterly resented the presence of the British in the area and, with Muhsin, tried all in his power to evict them. Yet, in spite of this hostility, the British did not give up Aden because of its value to them.

British policy was mainly defensive, with caution as its guide. Sometimes the authorities had problems more important than Aden, and they were always restrained from advancing into the interior by financial considerations and by the fear of becoming too deeply involved with the tribes. Haines was allowed only one expedition, and that did not take him far from the Settlement. In contrast, blockade was sanctioned without hesitation because it could be carried out cheaply and did not bring the British into direct contact with the Arabs.

The British were jealous for their honour and were anxious that the tribes should respect them. This explains their persistent demand for a public apology before concluding peace and the constant advocacy of force by Haines and, on occasion, by his superiors. In fact, Haines criticised the higher authorities for their reluctance to use force, but his criticism fell on deaf ears. Unable to pursue his strong-arm policy, he resorted to diplomacy.

The Settlement's dependence on the interior for its supplies and Haines' dependence on Bombay for instructions were great drawbacks. However, they were compensated for by British military strength and Arab weakness. The British retained Aden, and trade with it never ceased for any great length of time, thanks to disunity among the tribes.

CHAPTER VII.SULTAN 'ALI.

Sultan Muhsin was succeeded by his son Ahmad, and what was formerly required of the father was now required of the son. Ahmad came to Aden on 29th February, 1848, and on 8th March concluded with Haines a treaty similar to that of 1843. The only two new articles were 7 and 8. Article 7 implemented Article 3 of the 1843 treaty. By it, the transit duty on all goods passing through Lahj was fixed at 2%, and no duty was payable on the produce of the territory itself. Under Article 8, the Sultan promised to encourage the cultivation of European and local vegetables. Article 2 in the new treaty was a restatement of Article 4 in the former one, with the addition that British subjects could now visit Lahj for pleasure as well as for commerce.

After the signing of the treaty, Ahmad asked that the following articles be added:

1. That he should have a house in Aden to symbolise his friendship with the British and give him prestige among his neighbours. Haines approved and recommended that a house costing not more than Rs. 10,000 be built for him at the Government's expense in consideration of his having foregone a large part of his revenue under the new treaty.

2. That a surveyor be sent to al-Hawtah to plan and supervise the walling in of the town and the construction of a small fort on which six guns were to be mounted; the Sultan was to meet all expenses. Haines favoured the project and argued that, connected as Lahj was with Aden, it was necessary to afford security to merchants' property at al-Hawtah.

3. That the Government should give him six twelve-pounder guns with carriages and ammunition. Haines did not comment on this request.

4. That all stipends, excluding that of the Fadli chief with whom he preferred to have no dealings, be paid through him, as this would give him greater control over the roads. Haines saw in this suggestion a great convenience to the British representative who had been paying the stipends since the dismissal of Muhsin Ways at the end of 1841. Besides, acceptance of this responsibility by the Sultan would make him "solely and wholly answerable for the general tranquillity of the neighbourhood". For these reasons Haines recommended the suggestion.

5. That he and his territory be placed "under the protection and advice of the British Government". If Lahj was invaded, the British should assist him in repelling the invasion, and in return, he would help them "in every way". Haines' opinion was that if the Sultan walled in his capital and mounted a few guns on the fort which he proposed to build, it would not be possible for his neighbours to trouble him. The Imam of San'a would then be the only power that he would have reason to fear. The request, Haines remarked, was tantamount to an offensive-defensive alliance,¹ and he could have added "not like the one I suggested in 1840", i.e. one-sided.

The Government of Bombay declined the third request without any comment and turned down the first as inexpedient. The fourth they acceded to, provided that the stipends were distributed as originally intended and the Sultan had no power to withhold payment without authorisation. They agreed to the second request without any provisos, and the fifth they thought should be brought to the special attention of the Home Authorities, "for our relations at Aden seem ... to depend as much upon contingencies in Europe as in India".²

The Supreme Government were in complete agreement with that of Bombay. On the fifth article they commented, "... while friendly terms with this neighbouring chief are desirable, all engagements which would involve the British Government in his quarrels or difficulties are most objectionable".³ The Home Authorities took the same view.⁴

Ahmad lived only to express his great disappointment at the reception of his proposals, for he died of smallpox on 18th January, 1849. His successor was his brother 'Ali, aged 29. 'Ali repeated the request for an offensive-defensive article to be added to the new treaty, on the ground that the treaty was "entirely in favour of the English". This was refused, and after some days of negotiation Haines had his way; the treaty was signed in duplicate on 7th May, and was ratified by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, on 30th October.

None of the articles proposed by Ahmad was included in the treaty, but the Sultan of Lahj was entrusted with the payment of stipend money to the other chiefs, with the exception of the Fadli who continued to be paid through Sayyid 'Alawi. By this arrangement, the special relationship between Aden and Lahj was further emphasised, and the pre-eminence of the 'Abdali sultan acknowledged. The British now began

the practice of dealing with the other tribes through the Sultans of Lahj.

Relations between Aden and the neighbouring tribes remained amicable until 29th May, 1850. In the evening of that day, a boat belonging to the E.I.C.'s steam frigate "Auckland" crossed to the northern shore of the harbour, and the unarmed crew of seven, very unwisely, landed to pick up shells. A group of 'Aqrabis, led by one al-Baghi Ibn 'Abd Allah, fired on them, killing a seaman and wounding a boy. The wounded boy and a companion escaped death by running along the shore until they came to the Barrier Gate, while the others swam to a water-boat which was nearby.⁵ The abandoned boat was plundered.

Sultan Haydarah approved of the murder and helped al-Baghi to escape to the Subayhi territory. Moreover, he took the murderer's dependants into his own castle for protection. Haines retaliated by declaring the 'Aqrabi bandar closed to shipping, and this declaration had for over four years the effect of an actual blockade. In addition, Haines decided to ignore the independence of the 'Aqrabi sultan and from now on he referred to him merely as "Shaykh". The pretext for "demoting" him was that he paid "tribute" to the 'Abdali sultan. In fact, the money which Haydarah paid was not tribute. It was no different from what the 'Abdali sultan himself had formerly paid to the other chiefs or what the British were now paying him and others. In all these cases, payment of money did not constitute vassalage, but was meant to ensure peace.

Haines wanted to make Haydarah subject to 'Ali because for some time he had been hostile to the British, while 'Ali had been friendly, and naturally Haines wished to see the 'Aqrabi territory in friendly hands. When he reported the "Auckland" incident, the circumstances were favourable for the 'Abdalis to regain possession of Bir Ahmad. The 'Aqrabis had for a few months past been dissatisfied with their Sultan's conduct, and the chief's sons themselves had been openly at enmity with their father.

Having decided that Haydarah was subject to the 'Abdali sultan, Haines demanded that 'Ali should remove him and appoint another in his place. The new shaykh should be "a man who will not only inculcate the respect due to British subjects, but check and punish plunderers". Haines also required that 'Ali should arrest al-Baghi and hand him over. 'Ali, who had no authority over Haydarah, was flattered at

Haines' request that he should punish him, for he (and later his brother Fadl) saw in it recognition of 'Abdali sovereignty over the 'Aqrabis.

The 'Abdali sultan went to Bir Ahmad with 800 men to seize al-Baghi. When he found that he had fled, he demanded and obtained hostages for his recapture. 'Ali made no attempt to dismiss Haydarah, and Haines excused him to the Government by stating that it was difficult to find a successor.⁶

Haydarah resented 'Ali's action and retaliated by closing the Hiswah wells, a source of 'Abdali income. Immediately 'Ali heard this, he proceeded with 900 men to the hamlet of Zaylah, and from there sent twenty horsemen to Bir Ahmad, presumably to warn Haydarah. A skirmish followed in which Haydarah's brother-in-law and two others were killed. Haydarah himself narrowly escaped and took refuge in the castle.

'Ali knew that he could not take the castle with his own means, and therefore he tried to secure Haydarah by bribery.⁷ When he failed, he asked Haines for two guns and a few gunners to destroy the castle, but Haines told him that for this the sanction of "superior authority" was necessary.⁸ Then 'Ali asked the Hawshabis and Yafi'is for assistance, while Haydarah called in the Subayhis.

After a series of daily attacks on Bir Ahmad, Haydarah offered peace terms, but these were declined, and the roads to the village were blocked.⁹ Fadl, 'Ali's brother and successor, burnt a few huts on the fringe of Bir Ahmad and the hamlet where al-Baghi had lived. The inhabitants, who were suffering from a scarcity of food, sued for peace on 24th August, but their offer was rejected until the murderer was delivered up.¹⁰ The murderer was in the Subayhi country and could not be delivered up.

'Ali was still determined to subdue the 'Aqrabis, and his belief in the victory of numbers made him persuade the Fadlis to join his already large army. On 4th January, 1851, nearly 3000 men in his pay besieged Bir Ahmad. The following day, leading a force of more than 1000 'Abdalis with two old guns,¹¹ he took up position three or four hundred yards from the castle, and firing started. The castle was partly damaged; and while the force was preparing to storm it, Haydarah and his men surrendered. The loss on 'Ali's side was four men, and on Haydarah's eight, including a brother. 'Ali exacted from

the 'Aqrabis an indemnity of \$1800 and made them supply his army with food for the time it was at Bir Ahmad (4th-9th January).

The 'Abdali sultan sought Haines' advice as to what he should do next, and Haines advised:

1. That he allow the unoffending inhabitants to return to their homes after they had sworn allegiance to him.

2. That he permit them to trade freely with Aden and all neighbouring villages.

3. That he destroy the 'Aqrabi castle and not allow another to rise in its place.

4. That he take Haydarah and his nearest relations as prisoners to Lahj and keep them there until al-Baghi was surrendered.

5. That he build a tower at al-Hiswah and place guards in it.

The Sultan took back with him to al-Hawtah eight 'Aqrabi chiefs, but not Haydarah himself.¹² He did not destroy the castle at Bir Ahmad, but he built a fort at al-Hiswah in August 1852. When Cruttenden visited him early in March 1851,¹³ he discussed with him the situation at the 'Aqrabi village. The Sultan told the Assistant Political Agent that the 'Aqrabis were now reunited with the 'Abdalis and that Haydarah had been deposed in favour of his son Fadl. Significantly, however, the Sultan could not vouch for their continued submission.

Cruttenden was of the same opinion and intimated that the 'Aqrabis were reconciled to their position only because Haydarah was "no longer of sound mind" and his son was too young to be an effective leader; Fadl's age was not given. When Cruttenden asked 'Ali why he did not destroy the castle, he replied that it was not an Arab custom to destroy a fort once its garrison had surrendered.¹⁴

From what 'Ali said and did it is clear that he was not willing (and for good reason) to go as far as the British would have wished in punishing the 'Aqrabis. The 'Abdalis were divided, and Haydarah's imprisonment might have created for the Sultan troubles with his own and other tribes. The writer, in fact, doubts that Haydarah was removed; 'Ali could not remove him even if he was one of his clan chiefs. In Arabia, it was easier to kill a chief than to remove him. It is true that Haydarah was old, but there is no evidence that he suffered from senility or any other mental disorder. When the opportunity presented itself, he seized it and re-asserted his independence.

The tribes' hatred of the Christians manifested itself again in 1851. On 2nd March of that year, a party of officers from the garrison, which was in Lahj for a few days' hunting, retired to Waht, a village inhabited entirely by sayyids, where the Sultan had put a house at their disposal. In the party was the Deputy Assistant Commissary, Captain G.J.D. Milne, and the house was near that of one Sayyid Husayn.

The Sayyid was not at home when the officers arrived. When he came back in the evening, he felt insulted that "infidels" were given a house near his. At night, while the officers were asleep, after unwisely dismissing their guard, Husayn attacked them with his dagger, killing Captain Milne and wounding two others.

Husayn fled to the Hawshabi country where Sultan Mani' imprisoned him, probably intending to return him to Sultan 'Ali. However, the Sayyid, who was not chained, escaped to the Fadli territory where Sultan Ahmad gave him asylum. This act of the Fadli chief ended four years of good relations with the British and started a period of hostility which was to last until 1855.

As Sayyid Husayn was an inhabitant of Lahj, Haines asked Sultan 'Ali to secure him and deliver him up for punishment; if that could not be done, he was to arrest any member of his family. Accordingly, the Sultan imprisoned four inhabitants of Waht, two of whom were distant relations of the Sayyid,¹⁵ and charged the rest with the responsibility of bringing back their kinsman. A delegation of twelve then went to the Fadli sultan and implored him to hand over the murderer to them, but he refused. 'Ali did not execute the four prisoners as he had threatened. They, and the 'Aqrabi hostages before them, were probably detained for a while and then set free. The Sultan knew well the dangers of becoming involved in a blood feud.

Haines, with the two murders in mind, asked permission to destroy the castle of Bir Ahmad and every building in Waht with the exception of the mosque "as a memento of our vengeance". He asserted that "nothing else will suffice to instil the necessary dread into the minds of such a people as those bordering on Aden". He argued that similar crimes might be committed if the Government persisted in "too lenient a policy towards men unable to comprehend other than brute courage and the force of arms, and it does, I respectfully point out appear to me wiser to offer a summary instance of our displeasure than subject ourselves to be termed cowards to their rising generation..."¹⁶

The Political Agent had occasion "to offer a summary instance of his displeasure" before March was over. Sultan Ahmad's brother, Salah, and Sultan 'Ali's half-brother, 'Abd Allah, and brother-in-law, Sayyid Muhsin Ways, once British agent in Lahj, had conspired to kill Haines. To carry out their plan, they chose one Salim Ibn Sa'id. Salim succeeded in smuggling his dagger into Aden; and on 26th March, he saw the Political Agent driving with his wife on the road from Tawahi to the town; but as Haines was armed, he did not attack. Then another officer, who was also armed, passed that way without being attacked.

The following morning Lieut. Delisser of the 78th Highlanders was riding unarmed from the town to Tawahi. Salim beckoned to him as if he had a message to convey. Immediately the officer stopped, Salim secured the reins of his horse and stabbed him in the back and arms. Delisser however dismounted, grappled with his assailant and killed him with his own weapon.

By 1846, most of the horses which were sent from India had died. In 1847, both the Political Agent and the Commander of the Garrison gave it as their opinion that the cavalry troop could be safely withdrawn, as they expected no further trouble. Now when Haines reported the attempt on Delisser's life, he asked that a body of 30 or 50 horse be sent to Aden for the same reasons which he had given in 1841 after the murder of the Interpreter. The Political Agent also informed the Government that as a warning to would-be assassins he had hung Salim's body in chains just inside the Barrier Gate, where it was seen by all people coming from the interior.¹⁷

In Bombay, Willoughby condemned Haines' action as being against "the spirit of the age".¹⁸ The Governor, Falkland, and D.A. Blane, too, did not agree with it, but recommended the Military Department to consider Haines' request for horse in the light of the reported incident.¹⁹ Nothing came of this recommendation, and the question was not revived until the middle of 1855, as will be seen.

On the subject of destroying Bir Ahmad and Waht, Falkland did not share Haines' revengeful feelings: "Had the assassin been abetted and employed by the inhabitants of those places, there might be some colour for such an act of vengeance; but to visit a deed of one execrable wretch upon the heads of numbers who in this matter at least must be held to be perfectly innocent would not, I conceive, be defensible in

justice or sound policy."²⁰ The Governor considered the Sultan of Lahj blameless, but since the Sayyid was his subject, Haines was to demand that he should either deliver him up to British justice or execute him himself. If the Sultan failed to co-operate, he was to be treated as an enemy.²¹

Dalhousie, too, was not for collective punishment. In answer to Haines' fear that the new generation of Arabs would grow up believing that the British were cowards if such a policy was not adopted, he wrote on 21st April: "To visit these people with fire and sword, under such circumstances, would be unjust and savage. His Lordship does not believe that even an Arab tribe would regard our abstinence from such a proceeding as a proof of cowardice. But if they should do so, it will be infinitely more for our honour and for the power of our name that we should submit to be unjustly suspected of cowardice, than that we should convict ourselves of injustice and cruelty."

The Governor-General did not think that the Sultan was required to hand Husayn over to the British, but he thought that 'Ali himself should execute him within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Governor of Bombay, and with the knowledge of the Political Agent. If this was not done, the Sultan's stipend should be withdrawn, friendly relations with him broken off, and he should be informed that the Government would take whatever additional measures they might deem necessary.²²

For the execution of Husayn, Falkland, on 3rd May, fixed a period of two months, and he left it to circumstances to determine whether the period should be extended.²³ The 'Abdali, Hawshabi and Fadli stipends had been suspended by Haines immediately after the murder of Captain Milne; the 'Abdali, to hasten the capture of the murderer;²⁴ the Hawshabi, because Sultan Mani' had allowed the murderer to escape; and the Fadli, because Sultan Ahmad had given him shelter.²⁵

On receipt of India's letter dated 21st April and Bombay's dated 3rd May, Haines acquainted Sultan 'Ali with their contents. 'Ali replied that Husayn was in the Fadli territory, and there was nothing he could do. Haines then wrote to the Fadli chief demanding the surrender of Husayn to 'Ali. Ahmad, who by the middle of May was also harbouring al-Baghi, answered that to deliver up a fugitive was against Arab laws and customs, and this he could not possibly do.²⁶

In view of Ahmad's refusal to comply with British demands, the

Governor-General, now knowing that his stipend had already been stopped, ordered its suspension. If he retaliated by force, "British power must be put forth for his punishment. We have acted with justice and moderation in this matter; but having been compelled to resort to arms, we are now justified in using them in such a manner as shall be intelligible to barbarous tribes. ... His Lordship conceives that the Government should not be content with levelling a tower or two near the coast; but that it should direct its officers to carry fire and sword into the lands of the Foutheli tribe, and to inflict upon them the utmost severity of punishment in their persons and property, which may not be inconsistent with the dictates of humanity."²⁷

In the light of Dalhousie's opposition to violence and collective punishment in the case of Waht, one may be tempted to think that the quotation above represented a change of attitude. The fact is that it was a reaction to a different situation. The people of Waht were not involved in the murder and this Dalhousie recognised. In Ahmad's refusal to surrender the murderer, he saw a defiance which he could not understand or tolerate.

Dalhousie left the details of the campaign to his subordinate in Bombay and expressed his opinion that the interests of Sultan 'Ali would make him an ally.²⁸ Falkland directed Haines to make on the Sultan the impossible demand that he should secure both murderers and surrender them to the British, or punish them himself in a manner fitting their crime. Without saying how, he instructed Haines to support 'Ali in his efforts if necessary and, at the same time, to warn him that the Government "will not suffer him to remain neutral".

If 'Ali replied that he was willing, but unable, to comply with the request, the men being in the Fadli territory, Haines was to demand the same from the Fadli sultan, making it clear that the British were determined on revenge. If Ahmad showed that he would rather resort to violence than do what he was asked, it was Haines' duty to weigh and consider, with the Garrison Commander, what the next step should be. Haines was to give the Commander all the information available on the fighting strength of the enemy, the points where he could best be attacked, the extent of the country to be traversed and its food resources. If it was thought that a detachment could be spared to make an expedition inland, it should be undertaken immediately.

If that was not possible, Haines was to inform the Government what he required for the expedition and when it could be made. If reinforcements were necessary, they would be sent to Aden when the north-east monsoon set in (in October).²⁹

Before Haines had time to carry out these instructions, two more European seamen were murdered. At sunset on 12th July, 1851, the "Sons of Commerce", a merchant vessel carrying coal from England, ran aground twelve miles to the east of Aden, in Fadli territory. In the morning, the crew of sixteen took to the boats and having rowed for three hours in the direction of Aden, beached them, presumably in 'Abdali territory. The captain and four men made their way to Aden on foot, leaving the chief officer and the rest of the crew to guard the stores. A band of 'Uzaybis led by one Salah al-Sumali attacked them, killing the chief officer and a sick seaman; the remainder fled to Aden.

Haines immediately reported the incident to Sultan 'Ali and demanded that he should secure the culprits and inflict upon them the punishment they deserved.³⁰ 'Ali secured the ringleader, and on 23rd July his agent came to Aden to tell Haines that Salah was under guard, but that his punishment would bring the Sultan into collision with his most powerful clans, the 'Uzaybis and Sallamis, the prisoner being a man of consequence. Haines replied that the murderer's importance was beside the point; he cared only to see justice done.

When the two months fixed for the surrender of Sayyid Husayn and al-Baghi expired, Haines asked Sultan 'Ali whether he was willing to comply with the Government's demand or not. As expected, 'Ali answered that he was, but the men were in his enemy's territory and he could not attack the Fadlis because he was not certain of the loyalty of some divisions of his own tribe. Haines again requested Sultan Ahmad to deliver the murderers to Sultan 'Ali for trial, but again he refused.³¹

Subsequently, Haines suggested to 'Ali that the 'Abdalis should march with the British against the Fadlis, but 'Ali did not agree; his tribe was disaffected, and the British could not tell friend from foe. Haines replied that a badge could be worn as a distinguishing mark but left the matter there, as he was not ready to negotiate further until he received from the Sultan a signed document stating to what extent he was prepared to assist in the punishment of the Fadlis.

The Sultan wrote that he was prepared to supply the expedition

with camels, bullocks and jowari - all at a fair price. He also undertook to keep the roads safe and to send to Aden all Fadlis who might flee to Lahj during the fighting. Haines did not answer because he had heard, and believed, that Sayyid Husayn had recently spent two days in Waht, with the knowledge of the Sultan who had made no effort to secure him.³²

As for the expedition inland, in July Haines wrote a hurried letter stating that he and the Commander of the Garrison, Brig. D. Forbes, were agreed that it could not be mounted immediately. The country to be traversed was sandy, the heat was intense and only a very small portion of the garrison could be spared for immediate action due to poor health among the troops.³³

On 11th August, the Political Agent sent a detailed report on the subject. The earliest possible date for the attack would be the first week in November, by which time the weather would be cool and reinforcements would have arrived. The troops would be transported by sea to the Fadli country. Having punished the Fadlis, they would return to Aden for a brief rest and then march inland to al-Hawtah, if by then the Sultan had not fulfilled the British demand. In such a case, however, the Government must remember "that two thirds of our supplies are furnished by them (the 'Abdalis) and that in desolating their country we are inflicting a heavy punishment on ourselves". The Government must also bear in mind that great care would be necessary to see that the punishment was felt as lightly as possible by the poor peasants, hundreds of whom were British subjects, having come originally from India as labourers, and then settled in Lahj as they were allowed to do under the treaties of 1843 and 1849.

With regard to Waht, Haines now recommended only the destruction of Sayyid Husayn's house and the one where Captain Milne was murdered. The 'Aqrabi castle, he thought, must be destroyed.³⁴ The fighting strength of all the neighbouring tribes he estimated at 116,000, a highly inflated estimate.³⁵

In Bombay, the members of the Board wrote separate minutes on Haines' report and all expressed satisfaction that the Fadli chief had not committed any hostile act in spite of the stoppage of his stipend. Falkland did not think that Sultan Ahmad would resort to violence and hoped that he would deliver up the murderers to 'Ali, and that 'Ali would execute them. If this happened, the affair would be

brought to a satisfactory conclusion and all cause of conflict removed.

The Governor was anxious for a peaceful settlement because he interpreted Dalhousie's instructions as requiring him to send an expedition against the Fadlis, not only if they interrupted traffic with Aden, but also if they refused to surrender the murderers. As for 'Ali, Falkland thought that if he was playing the British false, a force similar to that of 1841 could be sent to al-Hawtah, and he agreed with Haines as to what this force should do. In the mean time, the garrison should be permanently strengthened to deal with any possible contingency, such as internal insurrection, external aggression or stoppage of supplies.³⁶

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Grey, the Commander-in-Chief, differed with Falkland in his interpretation of the Governor-General's instructions. He understood that force was to be used against the Fadlis only if they interrupted the flow of supplies into Aden. In refusing to deliver up the murderers who sought his protection, Sultan Ahmad was simply following a time-honoured custom, and this did not justify an attack on him. However, if he resorted to violence, he should be punished, but not before all efforts of diplomacy had failed.

Grey gave a number of reasons why no attack should be made on the Fadlis if it could be avoided. In Aden, the British were surrounded by "half-savage tribes" able, according to Haines, to turn out 120,000 fighting men.³⁷ In spite of their feuds, they would unite when "their national or fanatical prejudices" were roused, as they might be by an attack on the Fadlis. Haines did not think that the tribes would meet the British face to face in the plain, and it was out of the question to follow them into the hills. In the event of a confrontation, the Fadlis would have little to lose. The British could destroy their rude towers and miserable villages in the plain, but Cruttenden, whom Grey described as "an officer of great Arabian experience", believed that this would have a negligible effect.³⁸ The trouble which the tribes could cause in return might force the British to give up Aden as being too expensive.

Grey took Sultan Ahmad's quietness as a proof that he did not intend hostilities, and insinuated that he could be won over by financial inducements. With regard to Sultan 'Ali, his punishment presented no great problem. His district was near to Aden; and if

it became necessary to march against him, no large force would be required. Unlike the Fadli chief, he had a wealthy town which he knew the British could destroy. This knowledge and the stoppage of his stipend might make him, out of consideration for his own interest, co-operate in bringing the murderers to justice.

The Commander-in-Chief did not agree with Falkland that the garrison should be increased. He quoted Haines as having no fear of an internal insurrection and argued that the arrival of reinforcements might arouse the suspicions of the tribes and provoke them into acts of hostility.³⁹

The other two members of the Board, Blane and A. Bell, agreed with Grey that no increase to the garrison was necessary.⁴⁰ All thought that there was no urgency in preparing for the expedition in view of the prevailing quiet. Their decision was that they should wait for Haines' next report and further instructions from the Governor-General.

The instructions were never issued, for soon letters arrived from London putting an end to any thought of an expedition. The Secret Committee, i.e. Hobhouse (now Lord Broughton), in a letter dated 6th August, opposed any military action against the Fadli sultan except "under circumstances of extreme necessity" and considered the stopping of his stipend sufficient punishment.⁴¹

In private letters to both Dalhousie and Falkland, dated 7th August, 1851, Broughton repeated his official instructions and gave reasons for the cancellation of the expedition. In his letter to Dalhousie, he disclosed that he did not trust the Bombay Government or Captain Haines with the operation, fearing that they would go too far. Haines, he wrote, was "a respectable officer, but I should not like to trust him with any service requiring great discretion, or to allow him to command in chief during a little war in Arabia".

Like Grey, Broughton showed understanding of the Fadli chief's refusal to surrender the men who had sought refuge with him.⁴² He thought that in addition to stopping the chief's stipend, members of his tribe should be banned from Aden. The "circumstances of extreme necessity" under which force could be used were defined in both letters. Force was to be used only if the Fadli chief committed aggression within British limits or against the Sultan of Lahj. In his letter to Falkland, Broughton was careful to point out that the Cabinet

agreed with him as to the inexpediency of military operations against the Fadlis.⁴³

The letters from London were a great disappointment to Dalhousie who was eager to send a force against the Fadlis. Before he received the Bombay minutes and the London letters, he repeated privately to Falkland that the force "should do all the mischief they can, however, consistent with humanity. With such gentry (the Arabs) you must deal according to their notions rather than ours".⁴⁴

Now Dalhousie wrote resignedly, "... we must obey orders",⁴⁵ and later he described these orders as "weak and unwise".⁴⁶ The stoppage of the chief's stipend, he thought, would only increase his hostility.⁴⁷

In September, Dalhousie wrote privately to Broughton that the Fadli chief had shown signs of submission, but he doubted that the policy of "quiescence" would succeed.⁴⁸ In November, Broughton answered that he did not consider the murder of Captain Milne as sufficient reason for "a costly scuffle with the ragamuffins in Arabia No great harm will ensue if the unavenged death of poor Captain Milne prevents officers indulging their fondness for field sports at the hazard of their lives."⁴⁹ Broughton suggested to Dalhousie that he could not possibly have meant to wage a war against the Fadlis in order only to avenge Milne's death, and added: "We do not want another Kafir war - one is quite enough."⁵⁰

When it became known in Aden that the expedition had been cancelled, Haines recommended, as the wisest policy, the continuation of friendly relations with the Sultan of Lahj. Thus the roads would remain open and prices stable.⁵¹ With respect to al-Baghi and Husayn, he continued to press for their execution or surrender, but to no avail. The men were in the Fadli territory, and the Fadli chief was not willing to execute them himself or hand them over to be executed by others.

By comparison, the case of Salah was simple. He was in the hands of his own sultan; and reluctant as 'Ali was to execute him for fear of the consequences, he finally did so (22nd October),⁵² under pressure from Haines and motivated by his own interests. 'Ali had Salah killed secretly after he had bribed some influential chiefs to overlook the deed, but Haines was told that the execution was public. The 'Uzaybis, Salah's clan, had no doubt why and by whom their kinsman was killed. Efforts to convince them that he was not murdered by the Sultan were

were in vain, and they retaliated by killing a man from al-Hawtah, probably of 'Ali's clan, the Sallamis.

As was to be expected, the whole 'Abdali tribe was soon involved in a great conflict which resulted in the loss of seventeen lives. The Sultan himself was forced to spend a great amount of money to strengthen his authority which had been weakened by his submission to the demands of "infidels".⁵³ The "infidels" themselves greatly appreciated what 'Ali had done, and rewarded him by restoring his stipend and giving him, as a present, a small three-pounder gun. At the same time, payment of the Hawshabi stipend was resumed.

Another murder attempt on British ground was made in June 1852. A sepoy who happened to be outside the Barrier Gate was attacked and wounded by a man of the 'Aqrabi tribe. Haines reported the incident to 'Ali⁵⁴ who enquired what help he could expect if he were to attack the 'Aqrabis and destroy their castle.⁵⁵ Haines gave no answer, but referred the subject to the Government of Bombay who directed him to find out what kind of help the Sultan needed without raising his hopes.⁵⁶

The Sultan asked for a gun, ammunition and a number of artillery-men without specifying whether they should be British or Indian. However, Haines took it for granted that they should be British, and advised against their going into the interior because they could not be safe on account of their being Christian. Some tribesmen might also like to avenge their relatives who were killed in the attacks on Aden.⁵⁷ The murder of Captain Milne must have been uppermost in Haines' mind at the time.

'Ali's desire to take extreme action against the 'Aqrabis was not prompted by the attempt on a sepoy's life, but by Haydarah's decision to stop paying him the annual sum of £330. The 'Aqrabi chief, who had been subdued for over a year, now rebelled with the assistance of Sultan Ahmad. Later it transpired that the Fadli chief had agreed to protect the 'Aqrabis in return for half the revenue of their bandar when it was re-opened.

In 1853, the Subayhis joined the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis in annoying the British and their allies the 'Abdalis, using Bir Ahmad as their headquarters. 'Ali begged Haines for help against them and reminded him of the now established fact that "Aden and Lahedge are equally bound up in each other's interests".⁵⁸ Haines knew that, but was

powerless to help. He thought that the whole matter could be settled if 'Ali gave Ahmad a sum of money.⁵⁹ However, 'Ali refused to pay blackmail.

On 21st May, in conjunction with the 'Aqrabis, Ahmad attacked the fort at al-Hiswah with a view to occupying it. His bombardment breached it in three places, and its guard, whose supply of powder was nearly exhausted, were in a difficult position. They made a spirited defence in the hope that assistance from al-Hawtah was on its way to them, but no assistance arrived. There was treachery within the 'Abdali tribe and the Sultan's African guard refused to march with him on the ground that they were supposed only to protect the capital.

The loss of al-Hiswah to the Fadlis would have been a great disgrace to 'Ali, and more significantly from the British point of view, it would have enabled Ahmad to cut off the water from the garrison and shipping in the harbour, a contingency which Haines feared and was determined to prevent. Fortunately for him, the schooner "Mahi" and the sloop of war "Elphinstone" happened to be at Aden. He sent the schooner and two boats from the sloop across the harbour to protect the watering place. The Fadlis shot at the vessels and the vessels returned the fire, driving the tribesmen back with the loss of six killed and fifteen wounded. Thus the 'Abdali guard were saved, in time, the humiliation of surrender, and the British averted a possible danger.

The Fadlis did not disperse after their repulse, but remained in the area, and the "Mahi" was detained as a precaution which proved necessary. On 24th May, they made another attack, but a few roundshots from the schooner sent them away. Meanwhile Sultan 'Ali approached his Yafi'i counterpart for assistance. The Yafi'i sultan, now Ahmad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Ghalib, sent him 600 men.

The Fadli sultan, realising that he could not take al-Hiswah, and fearing that the Yafi'is might take Ja'walah which he had wrested from them twenty years earlier, moved with the main body of his force to 'Imad, on the 'Abdali border. From there he hoped to defend Ja'walah and at the same time to indulge in aggressive activities against Lahj. However, the Yafi'is reached the village and retook it on 27th May, while he was still marching to 'Imad. When he heard this news, Sultan Ahmad retreated in great anger. Then, at the instigation of the sayyids and moved by the spirit of Ramadan, the 'Abdalis and Fadlis

concluded a month's truce which took effect from the middle of June and was observed by the other tribes as well.⁶⁰

Hardly had the truce terminated when the Yafi'is made a foray into the Fadli territory, and the 'Awlaqis threatened to sweep through it in the direction of Lahj. 'Ali welcomed this threat; and to encourage the 'Awlaqis to maintain their hostile attitude, he paid them \$1000. With the help of the two tribes he hoped to weaken the Fadlis to such an extent that in the future the 'Abdalis could chastise them on their own.⁶¹

In July, the Yafi'is strengthened their garrison at Ja'walah by 150 men and dispatched a large force southward close to the Fadli border. The 'Awlaqis were congregating as if for action. The Fadli sultan was alarmed by these movements and decided to make peace with the 'Abdalis. For this purpose, he requested the sayyids of his tribe and Sayyid 'Alawi of Aden to meet him at 'Imad. When the news reached 'Ali, he called his sayyids for a conference at al-Hawtah. The 'Aqrabis, apprehensive as to the outcome of the discussions between the two big tribes, took the precaution of enlisting the support of the Subayhis.⁶²

Negotiations between the 'Abdalis and Fadlis were held at 'Imad from 2nd to 6th August, with Sayyid 'Alawi as mediator. Sultan Ahmad argued that if the 'Aqrabis were to be reunited with the 'Abdalis, as 'Ali and Haines had been demanding, he would lose a potential source of income. To forego it, he required that 'Ali should pay him a lump sum of \$700 and resume payment of his stipend. 'Ali did not agree to either demand. Nevertheless, the two tribes agreed on a truce of twelve months, three months being allowed for settling the Bir Ahmad question.⁶³

At the end of September, the Fadli sultan again demanded his stipend from 'Ali. 'Ali sent his agent to ask Haines for advice, and Haines advised that he should keep his neighbour quiet by procrastination until his tribe had gathered in their crop towards the end of December and then he could tell him what he pleased. Meanwhile, he should prepare himself to protect his own villages.⁶⁴

Late in October Salah the Fadli arrived at Shaykh 'Uthman with 100 men, and from there sent a messenger to Sultan 'Ali to remind him that the three months were nearly over and that his decision on the question of Bir Ahmad was awaited. The 'Abdali sultan immediately

wrote to Sayyid 'Alawi to negotiate with Salah on his behalf, which he did. Sayyid 'Alawi used dilatory tactics, the 'Abdali sayyids gave Salah a small present, and the question of Bir Ahmad was not settled.⁶⁵

In November, the Fadli sultan made it known to 'Ali that he intended to interrupt trade with Aden if his claims were not met. The sayyids tried to make peace between the two sultans, but they failed; 'Ali refused to pay. Haines, not for the first time since the Hiswah affair, urged him to come to terms with his enemy. The Political Agent was certain that 'Ali could not win. His tribe was disunited, and his African guard would not fight outside al-Hawtah. If he were to hire soldiers from other tribes, he would have to pay them and feed them while in his service and give them presents on their departure. The mercenaries would not be able to beat the Fadlis, and thus 'Ali would ultimately have to pay their chief. The fighting would diminish 'Ali's revenue by interrupting traffic, which must have worried Haines more than anything else.

Notwithstanding, 'Ali was determined to resist; and to assist him in case of a Fadli invasion, he engaged a division of the Yafi'i tribe.⁶⁶ As it happened, in mid-December the Fadlis invaded the 'Abdali territory with the intention of cutting down the grain. A combined force of 'Abdalis and Yafi'is challenged them and succeeded in holding them at bay. Then news reached the Fadli sultan that the 'Awlaqis intended to make an inroad into his territory, and this news changed the aspect of affairs. Sultan Ahmad with 150 men marched to Bir Ahmad, and the rest, under his brother Salah, returned to protect their country. Thus the 'Abdali crop was saved, and Haines' predictions were proved wrong.

'Ali was encouraged and decided to press home his advantage. He asked Haines for a steamer to take 500 of his men to Shuqrah, but Haines told him that he could not grant him his request, that the 'Abdalis could gain nothing by war and that peace was the best policy. In the mean time, Fadl, a brother of Sultan Ahmad, wrote to 'Ali guaranteeing the safety of caravans going to Aden. 'Ali sent the letter to Haines for his comments. The Political Agent thought that it could be a good move towards a truce, and 'Ali's advisers were of the same opinion.⁶⁷

A truce was agreed upon for eleven days, during which the sayyids

were to arrange a more permanent peace. This they failed to do; and on 11th January, 1854, after the truce was over, a meeting took place between Fadl Ibn Muhsin and Haines, at which the former made his brother's wishes known. Fadl said that as long as the castle of Bir Ahmad stood to shelter the Fadlis and Subayhis, there would be no peace. Therefore, his brother wanted the British to destroy it or to lend him a gun and the services of a few artillerymen for the purpose, a request which he had made in 1852. If the British did not help, 'Ali would be blameless if the roads were closed. Fadl reminded Haines that his brother had already spent \$30,000 in his attempt to keep the roads safe and to bring the murderers to justice.

'Ali's excuse for not destroying the castle himself was very weak. He said, "The Arabs ... would not march against walls or break stones;..." All that the 'Abdalis could do to the 'Aqrabis was to burn their stores of wood or kirbi. "The Arabs" in 1851 did, under 'Ali's own leadership, "march against walls" and were successful. In 1854, 'Ali's two big guns may not have been operational, and he may have been unwilling or unable to hire a large mercenary force as he did in 1851. Besides, he now had the Fadlis to contend with as well as the 'Aqrabis.

Haines, not unexpectedly, told Fadl that British assistance for the destruction of Bir Ahmad required the sanction of "superior authority", and that he would forward his request to Bombay. He advised against burning wood and kirbi, as this would only harm the poor, increase feuds and interrupt traffic.

With Fadl's consent, the Political Agent sent for the 'Aqrabi chiefs in an attempt to persuade them to break their alliance with the Fadlis and submit to the 'Abdalis. A number of them, not including Sultan Haydarah, arrived in Aden on 24th January, 1854, and Haines conferred with them on the following two days. The chiefs expressed their readiness to reunite with the 'Abdalis and to acknowledge 'Ali as their sultan. Their difficulty was, however, how to free themselves from the agreement which Haydarah had entered into with Sultan Ahmad in 1852. Finally, it was decided that 'Abd al-Karim, Haydarah's son-in-law, should visit the Fadli chief and obtain from him a document which would annul the agreement.⁶⁸ It is not known whether 'Abd al-Karim discussed the subject with the Fadli sultan, but it is known that the agreement was not annulled.

At this point, it is necessary to go back to the subject of the

murderers, Sayyid Husayn and al-Baghi. In November 1852, Haines was told that Husayn had been poisoned in the Fadli territory, presumably on orders from Sultan Ahmad.⁶⁹ The Political Agent reported this to the Government as fact; but as will be seen, the information was false. In the middle of 1854 it came to light that the Sayyid was still alive. Here it is enough to say that Haines believed, or for convenience' sake chose to believe, that Husayn was dead.

On 29th January, 1854, the Political Agent asked for permission to restore Sultan Ahmad's stipend if he delivered up al-Baghi and renewed his promise of 1839 not to commit depredations in Lahj or on the roads leading to Aden.⁷⁰ The Government, under Lord Elphinstone, agreed in a letter dated 18th February, but stipulated that these peace moves should be conducted with the knowledge and consent of Sultan 'Ali. They added that the Sultan had lately been at enmity with the Fadli chief on account of the British, and that relations with Ahmad would not be renewed except on this understanding.⁷¹

Before Haines could act on this letter, he had been recalled to Bombay to answer a charge of peculation.⁷² With him went also his Assistant Cruttenden and the rest of the civil administration. As for Aden's three immediate neighbours, they proclaimed, on 14th February, two months' truce during which they were to consult and settle all their differences.⁷³

In Haines' place, the Government appointed, as Acting Political Agent, Col. A. Clarke of the Madras Army, the Commander of the Garrison since May 1853. Clarke assumed office on 9th March, when British relations with the 'Abdalis were at their best, and with the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis at their worst. No sooner had Sultan Ahmad learnt of the new appointment than he wrote to Clarke, complaining of what he saw as the favour shown by Haines to the 'Abdali sultan and begging for the re-opening of the 'Aqrabi bandar, closed since 1850, and the restoration of his own stipend, stopped since 1851. If his requests were not granted, he threatened that hostilities would be resumed at the end of March, two weeks before the expiration of the truce.

Ahmad's requests were not granted, and he did not attack. The truce made in February was allowed to run its full term; and after its expiry, uneasy peace continued until June, when, again thanks to Ramadan, the truce between the three tribes was officially renewed for six months.

In the mean time, on 31st March, 1854, Clarke pleaded the Fadli cause to the Government. He wrote that Sultan Ahmad had never been to Aden nor had an interview with Haines. "... the excluded chief ... should have at least an opportunity ... of making his wishes or claims known in person, and further that he may be convinced that the door of justice and of right dealing is open to him, if he chooses to avail himself of it, as well as to others." The Acting Political Agent added that there was a strong party in Aden adverse to Sultan Ahmad and favourable to Sultan 'Ali, and every decision regarding the Fadli chief was influenced by it. Clarke was reluctant to act on the Government's letter of 18th February, but the Government's instructions were to be obeyed.

In refutation of Clarke's pro-Fadli arguments, it must be emphasised that there was no ban against Sultan Ahmad's coming to Aden and his meeting with the Political Agent. He himself had taken an oath never to set foot in the Settlement, and as will be seen immediately, he remained faithful to his oath. The "door of justice" was as open or closed to him as to others. It is possible that many people in Aden were on the side of the 'Abdali sultan, but it is difficult to see what influence they could have exercised on his behalf.

To redress the balance, as he saw it, at the beginning of a new regime, Clarke invited both the 'Abdali and Fadli sultans for discussions. The Fadli declined to enter Aden, but expressed his willingness to meet Clarke anywhere else. Clarke, in turn, could not agree to a meeting outside the Settlement, and decided to hold no further communication with him until he surrendered al-Baghi, as the Government had instructed Haines.

The 'Abdali sultan evaded the invitation and sent his agent instead. The agent asked Clarke the significant question, "Do you want the roads open or closed?" "Open, naturally", Clarke answered. Then the agent revealed that 'Ali had an agreement signed by Haines to the effect that if the 'Aqrabi chief did not break his alliance with the Fadli sultan and swear allegiance to him before the truce expired in mid-April, Haines would be prepared to destroy his castle. Now 'Ali wished to know whether Clarke was willing to fulfil this agreement.

Clarke answered that he must first see the document and expressed

his desire to have a meeting with 'Ali. He said this because he thought that the document did not exist and that the lie was occasioned by his invitation to Ahmad to visit Aden. Therefore he asked the agent to assure 'Ali that no peace would be made with Ahmad without his knowledge and concurrence, as required by the Government.

The agent came back with the agreement and told Clarke that if he countersigned it, the Sultan's brother would visit him. Clarke found himself in a great dilemma. On the one hand, he was not willing to discredit his predecessor lest this would create an unfavourable impression on the mind of the friendly chief, and on the other, he could not possibly countersign an agreement which he considered unwise and unjustified by the existing state of affairs.⁷⁴

Clarke sent a translation of the agreement to Bombay where it was shown to Haines for his comments. Haines denied any knowledge of it, but there are reasons for believing that in this he was not honest.

Firstly, he was most anxious to see the 'Aqrabis reunited with the 'Abdalis.

Secondly, Clarke recognised his signature and did not doubt its authenticity.

Thirdly, the reason why no copy of the agreement could be found in the Political Agent's office was that Haines "kept no English or native register of letters received or dispatched";⁷⁵ if he did, he must have destroyed them when he knew that he was leaving, for Clarke wrote that Haines handed him "only a very few miscellaneous letters".⁷⁶ From the beginning, Haines was secretive about his dealings; when he went to Bombay on sick leave in April 1839, he took his files with him,⁷⁷ and even when he left Aden for good, he had official papers with him.⁷⁸

Fourthly, Haines did not attack 'Ali or accuse him of forgery, as one might have expected; on the contrary, as will be seen, he spoke of him in favourable terms.

Fifthly, Haines was already charged with a criminal offence, and understandably he did not want to incur political censure as well.

Having denied that he made any agreement with 'Ali, Haines summarised his long experience with the Arabs and criticised Clarke's policy towards the chiefs. The Arabs were "... most difficult to control and manage Our European ideas of equity and politics will not be comprehended by the Arabs. they must be defeated

with their own weapons, by quietly letting them know that you perceive their intentions, before they are prepared to carry them out and let them feel that you are their superior in tact, intellect, judgment, and activity of purpose, that their secret thoughts are known to you, that your information is sure, secret and correct and that you are prepared to counteract their designs; this united with frankness, firmness, decision and consistency will secure an Englishman his point, and he will have moral power over them and be respected and feared, and they will afterwards give him little trouble. Goodwill, kindness and respect, will ... do more than even the bayonet can in Arabia."⁷⁹

Haines' last remark cannot but strike one as strange in view of his frequent advocacy of force. He often resorted to blockade which was authorised. If he had the authority and the means, he would not have hesitated to make as many attacks inland as he felt necessary. As it was, he often found himself forced to fall back on diplomacy.

The former Political Agent disagreed with Clarke's approach to the chiefs. By entering into correspondence with the Fadli, he had insulted the 'Abdali, and this might have serious consequences. The Fadli might be encouraged to dictate his own terms. "... he is a snake in the grass⁸⁰ that will bite as opportunity offers, and his acquaintance is by no means desirable;..." The 'Aqrabis, Haines thought, would not be peaceful until they were reunited with the 'Abdalis.⁸¹

The Government accepted Haines' denial of the agreement without question and instructed Clarke to continue the policy of his predecessor pending the arrival of the permanent Resident. For his guidance in the interim, they sent him a copy of Haines' letter quoted above.⁸² Clarke himself, on 27th April, wrote a second letter in favour of the Fadli sultan. In it he attacked Haines for interfering in the tribes' feuds, and he cited as an example the Hiswah affair on 21st May, 1853.

Clarke wrote that the loss of life on that day alienated the Fadlis more than the stoppage of their stipend, and the 'Aqrabis more than the closure of their bandar. The British should not care whether they received their supplies, including water, through the Fadlis or the 'Abdalis. The important thing was that they were supplied. Water was a profitable commodity, and the Fadli sultan would not have closed the Hiswah wells had they fallen into his hands,

as Haines had feared. The tribes should be left to fight their own battles, and the Aden market should be open to free competition. Thus tribes who were less wealthy and industrious than the 'Abdalis, such as the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis, might benefit from "the non-intervention system" by giving up their predatory habits and adopting a more productive and settled way of life.

As long as Sultan 'Ali felt that he could get British aid when he needed it, he would use it to retaliate against any attack made by the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis on his territory or people on the roads. He might even create occasions for claiming British help to show his enemies that he had influence with the British which they did not have.

It was "humiliating" that after fifteen years the British were still uncertain as to their supplies, the regularity of which depended on the hostility of "a predatory chieftain", not so much to the British, but to a tribe in alliance with them. To set matters right, Clarke asked for authority to carry out to the letter the principle of non-interference by sea or land, as it was "politic and just".⁸³ The Government did not comment on his letter, but again instructed him to continue his predecessor's policy.⁸⁴

Clarke's letter of 27th April, as well as that of 31st March, shows that he had not acquainted himself with the facts, and hence his assessment of the situation was not correct. The only occasion on which Haines did manifestly and imprudently interfere in the affairs of the tribes was in 1850, when he decided to end the independence of

the 'Aqrabis. When he defended al-Hiswah, it was because the avowed intention of the Fadlis was to cut off the water with which the naval and commercial vessels in the harbour were supplied. The Fadlis and 'Aqrabis were already in open hostility to the British, and their attack on al-Hiswah was the active expression of this enmity.

The British received their supplies from whomever was ready to supply, but it happened that Lahj was fertile, well-cultivated, abounded with water and bordered on Aden - all good reasons for greater commercial activity between the 'Abdali tribe and the Settlement. The Fadlis and 'Aqrabis could not possibly compete with the 'Abdalis, not because of any interdiction against them, but because of their own circumstances. Their land was poor, and there were not many cultivators among them. The 'Aqrabis had the added disadvantage of a small population and a small territory.

Sultan 'Ali was entitled to great influence with the British, a fact which the Government recognised. The Sultan was responsible for keeping the roads open, and the Settlement was greatly dependent on the produce of his country. For these reasons, it was good policy for the British to give him all the support they could, but in this they often failed.

Clarke greatly underestimated the enmity of the Fadli sultan towards the British. If the wells at al-Hiswah had fallen into his hands in 1853, he would, in all probability, have cut off the water because money was not the object of the attack. It may have been "humiliating" for the British to be dependent for their supplies on the goodwill of the tribes, but it would have been dangerous if they had abandoned their ally who had exerted himself to ensure that supplies reached Aden and whose interest, with regard to the Hiswah affair, was identical with theirs.⁸⁵

The man appointed to succeed Haines, Lieut.-Col. James Outram, took over on 23rd June, 1854, as Political Resident and Commandant. Prior to that, he was Resident at Baroda, and it was hoped that his appointment to Aden would be the answer to all its problems, current and anticipated. Outram felt that Sultan 'Ali was justified in not dealing with Clarke personally. Clarke's tenure of office was temporary, and he did not recognise the agreement allegedly signed by Haines. He had made friendly overtures to Ahmad with whom 'Ali was at enmity on account of the British, and against whom Haines made many threats, but could carry out none.

In spite of this, Outram decided not to contact the Sultan, believing that it was 'Ali's duty to contact him first. "... for we ought to impress the Arabs with an idea of our superiority which too apparent an anxiety to conciliate is not calculated to do."⁸⁶ 'Ali did write first. His letter was received on 13th July, and he would have written even earlier had it not been for a rumour that, like Clarke, Outram had sent a friendly letter to Ahmad, inviting him to Aden.⁸⁷

In a review of British relations with the tribes subsequent to the murder of the "Auckland" seaman in May 1850, Outram made a strong attack on British policy. "... a policy more just and energetic in principle and purpose, more vacillating and pusillanimous in its execution, and more futile and mischievous in its results, is ... without a parallel in the whole cycle of our Indian history."

The demands for the execution or surrender of the murderers were made in a way which took no account of Muslim law and Arab customs by which the tribes were guided. If the British were not ready to enforce their demands to the letter, they should not have threatened reprisals for non-compliance, for this led only to contempt of their power.

Outram, who was formerly Political Agent in Sind, compared the Arabs to the Baluchis, and his relation to the Sultan and Lahj and other chiefs in the interior he compared with his former relation to the Khan of Kalat. Then he went on to say that at his request the Khan always executed his own tribesmen for the murder of British subjects, but this he would not have done without the excuse to his people of foreign pressure upon him. If there had been no British army to protect him, the Khan would not have dared put anyone to death, nor would Outram have expected him to do so.

The Resident praised Sultan 'Ali for having executed Salah al-Sumali, especially since his action was an infringement of Muslim law and Arab customs on behalf of "infidels". Outram also recognised the enmity which the Sultan invited from his tribe and others as a result, and urged the Government to give him in the future all the support that could "conveniently" be given.

With regard to the immediate situation, the Resident recommended that strong measures should be taken against the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis. The castle of Bir Ahmad should be destroyed to deprive the Fadlis of

of its use as a refuge in the heart of the 'Abdali territory and compel the 'Aqrabis to reunite with the 'Abdalis, a continuation of Haines' policy. If the acts of the Fadli sultan in the future merited chastisement, he should be chastised, and if he attacked Lahj, as he was likely to do when the current truce expired at the end of the year, the British should assist Sultan 'Ali to the best of their ability as they were bound to do "by treaty", meaning that of 1839. If the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis made advances, having as their object the restoration of their stipend and the re-opening of their bandar, Outram would reject them on the basis that the murderers had not been surrendered.

Then Outram proceeded to outline the policy which he would follow in the future. He would hold the chief of a place where a British subject was murdered responsible with, and not for his tribe, as Auckland had directed in 1839. The murderers of British subjects and the plunderers of British property would be speedily and amply punished. British intercourse with Arabia was limited to the coast; hence, any outrage would be committed on the coast, and the villages which would harbour the offenders would be within easy reach from the sea.

In the first place he would demand redress from the chief in whose territory the incident occurred. Then, with great secrecy and celerity, he would transport troops to the village at or before daybreak and surround it to prevent the escape of the inhabitants. The villagers would be called upon to give up the offender; and if the place were within the jurisdiction of a friendly chief, as in most cases it would be in that of the Sultan of Lahj, the chief would be summoned and asked to persuade his people not to resist. If the offender was not surrendered, a further period would be allowed to enable non-combatants to leave the village, after which it would be destroyed with its defenders.

In such circumstances, Outram thought, resistance would be highly unlikely. The village elders would know that the surrender of the criminal was the only way to preserve the lives and property of their people, hence they would not regard the act as a dishonour. The chief, instead of resenting the measure as an infringement of his authority, would be grateful to the British for relieving him of the embarrassing duty of himself enforcing the criminal's surrender. To his people,

he would appear as an intercessor, rather than an instrument in the hands of the foreigner.

If the Government deplored the loss of life, they would have the consolation that British lives and property would be more respected, and a repetition of the offences which called for the punishment less probable. If the British had reacted in this way to the first murder, the other murders would not have taken place, an echo of Haines. It was unlikely that the Arabs would avenge a murderer executed by the British or relatives slain in battle. Execution by a foreign power and death in battle did not place on the kinsman the duty of taking revenge, as did the murder by an individual. However, even if the Resident were in danger of assassination in consequence, Outram was convinced that a great power should not be deterred from executing justice by any such consideration.

Similar measures could also be adopted to ensure safety on the roads and to protect the watering place, aims which would not be served by the non-interference system - approval of Haines' intervention in the Hiswah affair. Yet Outram advised against any expedition inland, as it could not be undertaken without troops and equipment which could not be provided from Aden and might involve the British in operations greater than originally contemplated. The Resident asked for discretionary power to act immediately if any new occasion arose, and he assured the Government that he would use it to the best of his judgment and ability.⁸⁸

To his review, Outram appended a long report by the Rev. G.P. Badger. This supported Outram's conclusions and recommended the adoption of his policy.

Badger was Protestant Chaplain to the Aden garrison from 1847 to 1859. He studied Arabic in Beirut and lived in Iraq for many years. Of the four books he wrote, two are worth mentioning here, "An English-Arabic Lexicon" and "Muhammad and Muhammadanism". Badger came to prominence after Haines' departure, when his knowledge of Arabic and Islam were utilised. In fact, he acted as an unofficial adviser to Outram and Coghlan. Haines did not consult Badger because during his term of office the civil and military branches of administration were separate and often at variance. However, from Badger's report, it is clear that the Chaplain had no high regard for the Political Agent.

The policy which Outram formulated and Badger supported was

basically the same as that repeatedly advocated by Haines, i.e. offences against the British should be punished swiftly and effectively by the British themselves. At first glance, Outram's policy appears convincing, but in fact it was impracticable and would have had no chance of success. When one remembers how short the 'Abdali coastline was, it is obvious that only a small percentage of the incidents of plunder and murder could have taken place in the friendly 'Abdali territory. Besides, there was no guarantee that the 'Abdali sultan would always be friendly.

The offender, regardless of the tribe to which he belonged, would not have gone back to his village and waited for the British to come and take him, or for his people to hand him over. No matter how quickly the British arrived at the scene of the crime, they could not ensure the arrest of the offender. By the time the news of the offence reached Aden, and the British reached the spot, no matter how near it was, the culprit on his camel or horse could be miles away probably in the interior, and for good reason, Outram himself, like others before him, advised against advances into the interior. The chief would not have given up his offending subject gladly, even if he knew where he was. Given the chance, an Arab would avenge a kinsman executed by a foreign power or slain in battle, and it was for this reason that Haines advised against lending Sultan 'Ali some European artillerymen in 1852.

Outram wrote confidently that if his policy had been adopted after the first murder, the other murders would not have taken place. However, he unwittingly destroyed his own assertion by stating that the Khan of Kalat always executed murderers of British subjects. From this one cannot but infer that the punishment for the first murder did not prevent the occurrence of others, despite the presence of a large British force in Baluchistan.

In South Arabia, there was no British force outside the Settlement, and the Aden garrison, which rarely numbered more than 1800, had no freedom of movement beyond the walls. Besides, the 'Abdali sultan, as well as the other chiefs in the interior, was not the equivalent of the Khan of Kalat; the Arab chiefs were politically independent, and the Settlement was economically dependent on them. In brief, the situation in Baluchistan was not comparable to that in Aden, and if Outram's policy had been followed, the British would

have succeeded only in destroying mud huts and killing unarmed or poorly armed people, proceedings which would have merely served to increase the hostility of the tribes.

Outram's review was dated 10th August, 1854, and on the previous day the Court of Directors in London wrote to the Government of Bombay that the combination of civil and military authority in the person of the new Resident should not lead to any change of policy towards the tribes.⁸⁹ Later, on 22nd August, Sir Charles Wood, the new President of the India Board, wrote privately to Outram: "Conciliate the Arabs if you can, for I do not wish to be involved in hostilities with them if we can avoid it."⁹⁰

Elphinstone was convinced by Outram's analysis of the situation and the need for a change in policy as recommended by him. In a private letter to Wood he praised the Resident for his understanding of "wild races" and added that if the British had treated the Arabs from the beginning as Outram proposed, relations with them would have been different. To keep at peace with the tribes, the British submitted "to great indignities"; they threatened, but did not carry out their threats.⁹¹

In view of this enthusiasm for Outram's policy, the Court's letter of 9th August was a great disappointment to Elphinstone and his colleagues. The Governor regretted that after fifteen years of British presence in Aden, relations with the Arabs were "far from satisfactory". No Englishman was safe outside the fortifications, and enmity to the British still existed in spite of the benefits which their presence in Aden conferred upon the tribes.⁹²

Pending instructions from the Governor-General, the Government of Bombay wrote to Outram, conveying the Court's directive, but giving him authority to use his discretion in supporting 'Ali if Ahmad broke the peace before the arrival of specific instructions. His support, however, was not to extend to the use of force,⁹³ which rendered it meaningless. With this official letter went a private one from Elphinstone. In it, the Governor expressed his appreciation of Outram's report and assured the Resident that had it not been for the Court's directive, the Government of Bombay would have authorised him to carry out his policy.⁹⁴

Dalhousie, too, approved of Outram's policy and in a private letter he assured the Resident of the unanimous support of the India Council.⁹⁵ The Governor-General blamed the Secret Committee for the

failures which Outram's report had exposed. He asserted that if they had allowed him to dispatch a force against the Fadlis in 1851, British interests in Arabia would now be secure and British power respected.⁹⁶ Privately, he urged Wood to withdraw the prohibition of 1851.⁹⁷

In an official letter to Bombay, Dalhousie expressed his hope that when the Secret Committee read Outram's report, they would rescind their orders and allow the authorities in India to do what seemed right to them. In the mean time, and in defiance of standing orders, he gave Outram wide discretionary powers which did not rule out the use of force in defence of Lahj if proved necessary. This he justified by invoking the mutual defence clause in the treaty of 1839 which, in his opinion, "imposes obligations upon the Government of India ... higher and more authoritative than even the orders of the Secret Committee". Dalhousie was firmly convinced that "the plighted faith of the British Government" made it imperative that they should help the Sultan in whatever way they could.⁹⁸

When Wood read Outram's report, he wrote privately to Elphinstone that he, too, was convinced of "the folly" of British policy in the past and was inclined to think that the British should act as Outram proposed. "But I hate the notion of engaging in hostilities with these petty tribes out of which so little comes beyond irritation and reasons for future quarrels."⁹⁹

Before the Government of Bombay had time to transmit Dalhousie's instructions to Aden, Outram had left and been replaced on 26th October by Lieut.-Col. W.M. Coghlan. Coghlan was an artilleryman. He had served in Afghanistan and Sind (1838-43) and was present at the capture of Kalat (November 1839). Outram described him as "one of my oldest and most intimate friends".¹⁰⁰ At the time of his appointment, Coghlan was in Belgaum, Mysore.

Outram was appointed Acting Resident at the Court of Lucknow when the Resident, Col. Sleeman, was given sick leave for fifteen months. Coghlan, in turn, was sent as Acting Resident to Aden. Both men were confirmed in their posts after fifteen months when it became certain that Sleeman's health would not allow him to resume office. Outram's transfer to Lucknow came when he was considering a change due to ill health.¹⁰¹

The choice of Outram's successor was a difficult one. The two officers whom Elphinstone considered most suitable were abroad on

leave. Of the officers available, none combined political experience with the rank necessary to command the garrison. Elphinstone first offered the post to Col. Waddington, Chief Engineer at Bombay and formerly at Aden, but he declined it. Lord F. FitzClarence, the Commander-in-Chief, proposed Lieut.-Col. J. Holland, the Quarter Master General, but Elphinstone did not consider that his experience qualified him for the duties at Aden. The choice was then between Coghlan and Major John Jacob of the Sind Horse.

Elphinstone thought that in making the final decision, some consideration should be given to the policy which the new Resident was to carry out. If Outram's recommendations were to be adopted, Jacob would be the man. However, if the old policy was to be continued, then "a less brilliant officer would be a fitter instrument".¹⁰² Dalhousie chose Coghlan, on the grounds that his rank was higher than that of Jacob and that Jacob was needed where he was on the Sind Frontier.¹⁰³

Coghlan was given the same discretionary powers as Outram and was instructed to destroy Bir Ahmad if it became once again the centre for operations against the Sultan of Lahj. The destruction of the village and its fort would be the best way for "permanently" strengthening the Sultan, for securing free access to the wells at al-Hiswah and for increasing the safety of communication with Lahj.¹⁰⁴ As to how and when Coghlan was to destroy Bir Ahmad, Elphinstone left it to him, although he suggested that the best time would be December, when the garrison would be relieved.¹⁰⁵

The Resident agreed with Elphinstone as to the time for the attack, but hoped that the Sultan would not ask for help. However, if he did, Coghlan assured the Governor that he was ready to help him and to deal with any situation that might arise. If al-Hiswah were attacked, or even threatened, it would be defended immediately. If the attack were made from Bir Ahmad, the village could be razed without any difficulty. If the Fadli chief stopped traffic on the road from Lahj, the British could safely advance as far as Shaykh 'Uthman, and with the help of steamers could bombard the Fadli coast. Yet, Coghlan advised against a march into the interior.¹⁰⁶

After discussing the subject with Badger, Coghlan revised his strategy. Now he suggested that if the Fadli chief attacked, the best thing would be to bring the 'Awlaqis on the side of 'Ali or at least

secure their neutrality. An alliance between the 'Awlaqis and 'Abdalis would save the British the necessity of interfering directly in tribal quarrels. Instead of destroying Bir Ahmad, Coghlan now recommended, as Haines had done before, that the British should take it and give it to the Sultan of Lahj, the 'Aqrabis being originally a sub-division of his tribe.¹⁰⁷

This course of action must have been warmly welcomed in Bombay, Calcutta and London. The instructions given to Coghlan had greatly alarmed the Secret Committee, and they wrote to him direct ordering their cancellation. The Committee explained that the British were not obliged to give military assistance to the Sultan of Lahj under the treaty of 1839 as had been erroneously supposed by Outram and Dalhousie. That treaty was "cancelled by subsequent events" and the British were now bound only by the treaty of 1849 which "carefully avoided all stipulation for mutual defence. On the general question of the policy to be observed with regard to the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden, you will receive instructions from the Government of Bombay; and you will clearly understand that neither on the present, nor on any future occasion, are you to engage in any inland military operations without specific orders ..."¹⁰⁸

The Secret Committee sent similar letters to Dalhousie and Elphinstone. Their letter to Dalhousie contained also "the policy to be observed with regard to the Arab tribes". This "policy" was nothing more than a set of instructions dealing only with the punishment of outrages committed against British subjects on the coast, and it merely re-iterated Outram's recommendations.¹⁰⁹

In private letters to Coghlan and Dalhousie, Elphinstone regretted that the Home Authorities had not sanctioned the use of force against the Fadlis.¹¹⁰ In a further letter to Coghlan, he wondered how the treaty of 1839 could have been abrogated when there was no clause to this effect in the treaty of 1849. He rightly concluded that the former treaty had been breached by "the Sultan", but added that he did not know of such a breach and asked Coghlan if he had any explanation.¹¹¹

Coghlan answered that he had none. "The Sultan" did not violate the treaty of 1839, and hence he could not understand what was meant by "subsequent events". Coghlan was certain that the mutual defence clause could not have been omitted without careful consideration, and

that Dalhousie, who ratified the treaty of 1849, could not have done so without reading the correspondence on the subject.¹¹²

The "subsequent events" referred to by the Secret Committee were the attacks and hostile acts carried out by Sultan Muhsin in 1839 and 1840. Coghlan and Elphinstone, like Outram before them, believed that the relations with the 'Abdalis had always been friendly, not knowing what happened when 'Ali's father was chief of this tribe. Elphinstone took office in December 1853 and Coghlan in October 1854, while Sultan Muhsin died in November 1847. If the authorities in Bombay and Aden had consulted the early records, they would have found no difficulty in understanding what the Secret Committee meant by "subsequent events". Furthermore, they would have discovered that the treaty of 1839 was not superseded by that of 1849, but by that of 1843 which also contained no mutual defence clause.

In contrast, Dalhousie, who ratified the 1849 treaty, knew the early history of Aden, but chose to cling to the letter rather than to the spirit of the law, since this suited his policy. He wrote privately to Elphinstone: "I think the present Secret Cee., i.e. Sir C. Wood, are as wrong-headed as the former Secret Cee., i.e. Sir John Hobhouse, about Aden. ... But of course they must be obeyed."¹¹³ Accordingly, he transmitted the Committee's instructions in an official letter to Bombay, adding that he did not object to the re-opening of the 'Aqrabi bandar and the restoration of the Fadli chief's stipend if this would bring peace and friendly co-operation.¹¹⁴

The truce which was to expire at the end of 1854 was extended by three months, the occasion being the death of a brother-in-law of the Sultan of Lahj. However, before the end of January 1855, the Subayhis, at the instigation of the Fadli and 'Aqrabi chiefs, made raids into the 'Abdali territory. The aim of these raids was to divert traffic to Bir Ahmad and thus deprive Sultan 'Ali of his revenue.

The Sultan enquired casually of Coghlan whether the British would compensate him for his financial loss. Coghlan answered that his treaty with them did not guarantee his revenue, and this he said with great reluctance for his sympathy was with 'Ali. "The Sultan has incurred much odium and suffered no inconsiderable pecuniary loss in consequence of his faithfulness to us, he has been stigmatized by his more fanatical neighbours as the friend and ally of 'infidels'..."

In January 1855, Sultan Ahmad concluded a treaty for mutual assistance with the Upper 'Awlaqis¹¹⁵ who were estranged from the other branch of the tribe and at enmity with the 'Abdali sultan. Coghlan feared that the treaty heralded an invasion of Lahj, and as a precaution, he opened communication with the Lower 'Awlaqis. The Lower 'Awlaqis were friends of Sultan 'Ali; and in the event of a Fadli attack on his territory, they could be of help by attacking the Fadlis from the rear or by sending a force by sea to al-Hiswah to join the 'Abdali army. Therefore, Coghlan asked them to settle their differences with their brothers and detach them from their alliance with the Fadlis, which was done.

Coghlan asked for permission to buy the assistance of the Lower 'Awlaqis for two or three thousand dollars. The Resident realised that he might be setting a dangerous precedent, but he promised not to take this step except as a last resort.¹¹⁶ The Government sanctioned the grant of money, but warned that it should not be construed as a precedent.¹¹⁷

In April, the cousin and heir-apparent of Sultan Munassar visited Aden to discuss assistance to the 'Abdalis against the Fadlis, and in May, Coghlan sent his Interpreter, Hormuzd Rassam, on a mission to the Lower 'Awlaqis. When Rassam returned, he wrote a highly favourable report about them and recommended an alliance with them. Their sultan showed himself anxious to fight the Fadlis, but pleaded poverty. If the British gave him money, lead and powder, he would sign any bond which they might require. Coghlan sent lead and powder, but no money and made no reference to a treaty.¹¹⁸

The Bombay Government were against an alliance with the Lower 'Awlaqis, but authorised the Resident to present their chief with \$2000 in recognition and appreciation of his readiness to co-operate with the British.¹¹⁹ The Supreme Government thought that if a treaty was to be signed with the 'Awlaqi chief, the Fadli stipend should be transferred to him. The treaty should bind Munassar to act against the Fadlis when the British required it, but not vice-versa.¹²⁰ Elphinstone made the transfer of the Fadli stipend to the 'Awlaqi chief conditional on Munassar's "punishing" Sultan Ahmad and keeping the roads open to Aden.¹²¹ In practice, this would have meant the occupation of all or part of the Fadli territory.

In the mean time, 'Ali sent a sayyid to the Fadli chief to

negotiate a new truce. Ahmad refused and threatened that if his stipend was not restored, and the 'Aqrabi bandar re-opened, he would attack Lahj and close the roads to Aden. Shortly afterwards, he did attack an 'Abdali caravan on British ground, captured four camels and retreated.

To counteract, Coghlan gave Sultan 'Ali some ammunition and made three proposals to the Government. Bir Ahmad had been nominally blockaded; now he proposed to enforce the blockade by stationing the "Elphinstone" off the northern shore of the harbour, which would also protect al-Hiswah. The Fadli country produced only cattle, reeds and other building materials. For grain and all other essential supplies, including lead and gunpowder, the Fadlis were dependent on the surrounding tribes and Aden. A blockade of Shuqrah, with the help of the "Mahi", would cause them great hardship. Further, Coghlan proposed to prohibit the Fadlis from entering Aden, a measure entertained by Haines, but not put into effect. Surrounded by hostile tribes, with their coast and that of their allies effectually blockaded, and with the Aden market interdicted to them, they would be forced to make peace.¹²²

Elphinstone approved of Coghlan's measures and wrote privately to Wood that if they failed, he would want official permission to destroy Bir Ahmad and Shuqrah.¹²³ When he wrote this, he had good reason for believing that such permission would be granted, for Wood had written to him privately: "Do not commit yourselves to inland operations. Burn or deliver over to him of Lahedge if you please Bir Ahmad or any sea coast town, but do not involve yourselves in the quarrels and feuds of the Arab chiefs."¹²⁴ However, before Elphinstone's letter reached London, Wood had been replaced by R. Vernon Smith.

When the isolation of the Fadli sultan did not change his attitude towards Lahj and Aden, Coghlan put his measures into effect, and 'Ali sent his brother Fadl to ask the Resident what he should do. Coghlan showed Fadl that the time was opportune for crushing his enemy. The 'Abdalis should attack Bir Ahmad while the 'Awlaqis invaded the Fadli territory from the east. This move, coupled with the British blockade, would leave Sultan Ahmad with no choice but to accept any terms which might be dictated to him.

Fadl agreed with Coghlan's reasoning, but pointed out that the

difference between Arab and British warfare was very great. The British troops were disciplined and would go through fire if so ordered, while his troops were "undisciplined rabble". With reference to the castle at Bir Ahmad, Fadl told Coghlan, as he had told Haines, that the Arabs would not attack walls, and urged him to capture it. The Resident replied that he could not do so, and reminded him of what he had already done to weaken the Fadlis.

To the Government Coghlan wrote that the return of Bir Ahmad to the 'Abdalis seemed the only way to restore safety to the roads between Aden and al-Hawtah. If 'Ali could not take it, the British should and then give it to him.¹²⁵ Coghlan personally was convinced that circumstances could not be more favourable for 'Ali to take Bir Ahmad, "... but he is a most provoking fellow. ... when everything is ready for him, he hesitates to strike..."¹²⁶

In May, Sultan Ahmad said that he wanted peace, and Coghlan agreed to a meeting with his representative, a sayyid. The day the sayyid arrived, the Resident was too busy to receive him, and on the following day, the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis attacked Shaykh 'Uthman. Thus it became clear that the sayyid's mission was a piece of deceit, and Coghlan refused to see him.

As soon as Sultan 'Ali heard the news of the attack, he marched on Shaykh 'Uthman. However, Sayyid 'Alawi persuaded Sultan Ahmad to accept a two months' truce, mainly on account of Ramadan, and Sultan 'Ali, who had not been consulted, had reluctantly to agree. Coghlan protested to the 'Abdali chief about what had happened, and he would have intervened had it not been for the hot weather.¹²⁷

Elphinstone wrote to Vernon Smith that if, after the truce was over, the Fadli chief attacked Shaykh 'Uthman or al-Hiswah, he would order the destruction of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad. He advised that the British should give the 'Awlaqi chief arms and ammunition and encourage him to invade the Fadli territory, but should not enter into a treaty with him.¹²⁸

In July, at a meeting at al-Hiswah between Coghlan and 'Ali, it was agreed that if the 'Awlaqis invaded the Fadli territory from the east, the 'Abdalis would invade it from the west. Coghlan also promised to write to the Government for permission to capture Bir Ahmad and either annex it or give it to the Sultan of Lahj.¹²⁹ The Government of Bombay were sympathetic and suggested to the Governor-General

that they should make it clear to the Fadli chief that if he did not stop interrupting traffic and deliver up the murderers, the British would enforce their demands. The Government also recommended that the assistance of the 'Awlaqis should be accepted.¹³⁰

After the truce was over, Sultan Ahmad resumed hostilities. His attacks were centred on the junction of the three roads from the Fadli, 'Aqrabi and 'Abdali districts near Shaykh 'Uthman, a mile or two from British limits. The roads were closed, and supplies in Aden became scarce. When none of his enemies was willing or able to do anything about the situation, Coghlan lamented the fact that he had no irregular horse at Aden, unlike every frontier station in India. He recommended that he be sent 100 cavalry and argued that if he had them, closure of the roads would be unknown. The horse would be more useful than all the alliances which the British could make,¹³¹ a return to Haines' policy.

Coghlan stressed this point in a private letter to Elphinstone. A British company, he wrote, could fight the whole Fadli tribe, but the Fadlis would not meet the British face to face. As soon as the British advanced, they would "fly" on their camels and the infantry "would find no enemy to engage except the sun and the sandhills". The garrison was therefore helpless, and Sultan 'Ali, the ally of the British, was of no help. This situation Coghlan described as "mortifying" to British pride.¹³² The Government of Bombay recommended that a troop of cavalry be raised locally as this would be more economical and would not go against the Secret Committee's prohibition to take offensive action.¹³³

In urging the adoption of Coghlan's proposals, Elphinstone wrote to Smith that it was obvious that something should be done to keep the roads to Aden clear, and he advocated the destruction of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad which could be attacked without a march inland. Elphinstone warned Smith that he should not be "too sanguine about Col. Coghlan's being able to prevent our coming to blows with some of his neighbours..."¹³⁴

Dalhousie was still strongly in favour of more active measures against the Fadli sultan and declared that he entirely approved of Coghlan's proposals. However, under the Secret Committee's prohibition, he could not authorise them, but he had written to the Home Authorities urging that strong measures should be allowed.¹³⁵ This appeal was

reinforced by Elphinstone in a private letter to Smith, in which he regretted the fact that action had not been taken five years earlier, and once more asked that Coghlan be given permission to destroy Bir Ahmad and Shuqrah.¹³⁶

Meanwhile, in August, the Fadli chief decided to make peace with 'Ali and the British. His conditions were that the blockade of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad be lifted, that his people be allowed communication with Aden, and that his stipend be restored. Coghlan was agreeable, and told Elphinstone that in return he would demand that the Fadli sultan should expel the murderers from his territory and preserve peace for the future. The Resident, probably on Badger's advice, did not insist on what was not possible for an Arab to do, to deliver up a guest.¹³⁷ The demand for the expulsion of the murderers, rather than their surrender or execution, was a compromise on the part of the British and not incompatible with Arab ideas of honour and hospitality.

In September, Sultan 'Ali and the Fadli sultan's brother, Salah, held a peace conference at Shaykh 'Uthman under the chairmanship of Sayyid 'Alawi. Before the Sayyid left for the conference, Coghlan told him his terms for a settlement with Ahmad. Ahmad agreed to them and on 20th September he wrote to Coghlan that he had expelled the murderers. The Resident then lifted the ban on the Fadlis' entering Aden, ended the blockade of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad, and recommended the restoration of Sultan Ahmad's stipend with arrears.¹³⁸

The Government agreed to the restoration of the stipend from the date the murderers were expelled, but not to the payment of arrears; otherwise, British prestige would be lowered in the Sultan's eyes and in the eyes of the other chiefs. As regards the Fadlis' allies, the 'Aqrabis, the Government thought that if they submitted, Coghlan could give them a "written assurance" of British protection during their good behaviour.¹³⁹

The news of the peace was welcomed in Bombay, but Elphinstone warned Smith in a private letter that the British should not be lulled into security and postpone the formation of a small troop of cavalry.¹⁴⁰ Smith, too, was pleased at the turn of events and described Coghlan as "a clever fellow", but expressed his fear that he and other agents might be "too active in mischievous interference in order to magnify their own importance".¹⁴¹ On a former occasion, he had expressed his

hope that Elphinstone would keep Coghlan "quiet" at Aden.¹⁴²

Before Bombay's letter authorising the restoration of the Fadli stipend reached Aden, Coghlan had left on a visit to the Lower 'Awlaqis and some tribes on the African coast with whom he concluded treaties banning the slave trade. At Ahwar, Coghlan gave Sultan Munassar Rs. 2500 and presents to the value of Rs. 1500, the total being the ₹2000 which the Government had authorised him to give to the Sultan. The 'Awlaqis told Coghlan that they wanted to attack the Fadlis, but he advised against such action, and his advice was accepted.¹⁴³ They also told him that the Fadli chief had not expelled the murderers. Coghlan believed them readily and suggested that he should withhold his stipend and for the third time urged the Government to send the irregular horse, as he anticipated renewed hostilities.¹⁴⁴

The Bombay Government requested their Commander-in-Chief to send the horse as soon as possible,¹⁴⁵ and in a private letter to Smith, Elphinstone wrote that in view of the urgency, he was sending volunteers from Jacobs Horse.¹⁴⁶ In June 1856, only fourteen troopers arrived, but the rest never joined them. They went first to Bushehr where they took part in the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-7, and then they were drafted back to India when the Mutiny broke out.

With regard to the 'Awlaqi rumour that the Fadli chief had not expelled the two murderers, the Bombay Government wrote to Coghlan that if the rumour was true, and the Fadli sultan resumed hostilities, he was to warn him that failure to expel the murderers within seven days would cause him the irrevocable loss of his stipend. If this warning had no effect, Coghlan was to transfer the Fadli stipend to the 'Awlaqi chief and to reimpose his punitive measures. If he saw fit, he could also blockade the Fadli port.¹⁴⁷ Dalhousie, still eager to take revenge on the Fadlis, again recommended a military expedition.¹⁴⁸

In November 1855, 'Ali, fearing a Fadli attack from Bir Ahmad, signed with Sultan Munassar an agreement whereby he would pay him ₹5000 for taking the 'Aqrabi castle and giving it to him. 'Ali was to pay half the sum in advance and the balance after the fort had been captured. If the 'Awlaqi chief failed, he was to refund the advance.¹⁴⁹ Later, however, 'Ali broke the agreement, and Munassar decided to take Bir Ahmad himself and then give it to one of his tribesmen who was in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Coghlan supported Munassar's decision, as he liked to see the fort in the

hands of a capable man friendly to the British as Munassar was.^{235.}
¹⁵⁰

Elphinstone thought that this arrangement might lead to a coalition between the 'Abdalis and Fadlis, the results of which would be serious. The British would be hemmed in by enemies, and Bir Ahmad would be only a detached outpost from which nothing could be hoped, not even the safety of the roads. However, he admitted that it was not possible for him to know as much about the matter as Coghlan who was on the spot and had Badger and Rassam to advise him.¹⁵¹

Fears of Fadli aggression proved groundless, and the country continued peaceful. In December 1856, Coghlan was able to pay a four day visit to al-Hawtah, accompanied by his two Assistants, eight officers and sixteen soldiers.¹⁵² The visit was of particular importance in that it was the first by the British representative at Aden to Lahj, and as such it could not but be taken as an index of the amicable relations between the 'Abdalis and the British.

By March 1857, the Fadli chief had been quiet for twenty months, but he did not ask for his stipend to which he was clearly entitled if he had expelled the murderers. Coghlan was, therefore, confirmed in his belief that he had not expelled them. In the mean time, Sultan 'Ali's half-brother, 'Abd Allah, and Shaykh 'Ali of the 'Uzaybis, approached the Fadli sultan and urged him to make peace with the British over their chief's head. 'Abd Allah was hostile to 'Ali as he was to Ahmad before him; the Shaykh had a personal grudge against him.

Sultan Ahmad responded and on 30th March he came to Bir Ahmad where he held a conference with the two men and the 'Aqrabi chief, now 'Abd Allah Ibn Haydarah, the old man having recently abdicated. The purpose of the conference was to work out how best to approach the British, and when it ended, on 5th April, Sayyid 'Alawi was summoned and given a long message for Coghlan. The murderers were not in the Fadli territory. Al-Baghi fled after he had killed a woman; and although a native of Bir Ahmad, he dared not go there; none knew where he was. With respect to Sayyid Husayn, the Fadli chief said that since he sought his protection, he could not execute him or deliver him up. When Coghlan demanded his expulsion in September 1855, the Sultan expelled him, and he took refuge on the border with the Yafi'i country.

The rest of the message was a poor attempt at explaining why the

Fadli chief had not contacted the British in the last twenty months, although he had complied with their demands to expel the murderers. Sultan Ahmad accused 'Ali of working against peace and said that he could not communicate with the British through a man whom he considered his inferior. He protested that he was misrepresented, complained that he had not been rewarded for his services to the British in 1838, and asserted that he was not so mad as to struggle with the English. Then he pledged himself to protect persons and property wrecked on his coast, and in token of his sincerity he sent his own horse as a present to Coghlan.

Coghlan was pleased at the turn of events and paid Ahmad his stipend backdated to September 1855, when Sayyid Husayn was expelled.¹⁵³ The 'Aqrabi chief submitted on 12th April, 1857, and a new treaty bearing the same date was signed with him, thus recognising his independence. The new treaty was not different from the one of 1839 except that now the British could visit Bir Ahmad "for recreation".¹⁵⁴

The peace which the British made with the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis without 'Ali's consent greatly offended him. The measure was contrary to the Government's instructions and had the effect of reducing his importance. The 'Abdali sultan retaliated by levying a tax of five annas on every camel load of water brought from Shaykh 'Uthman. Coghlan protested that he could not legally do so, and warned that the British would not allow anyone to take advantage of their need for this vital commodity.¹⁵⁵

The Sultan answered by raising the tax to six and a half annas which was nearly 25% of the selling price in Aden. Coghlan demanded that the tax should not exceed one anna per camel load, and he was determined to enforce his demand. He had already entered into negotiations with the 'Uzaybis for support against their tribal chief. However, on 5th July, at a meeting between 'Ali and Rassam at Shaykh 'Uthman, the Sultan agreed to the demand, and this relieved the Resident greatly. He did not have enough troops to take Shaykh 'Uthman, and he was spared the need to employ one tribe against another which he described as "an expedient of the last resort".¹⁵⁶

'Ali, however, continued to annoy the Fadlis and the British and in January 1858, the uneasy peace which had prevailed for two and a half years was finally broken. Early that month, the Fadlis occupied part of Lahj, and the 'Abdalis retaliated by attacking their allies,

the 'Aqrabis, but were repulsed.¹⁵⁷ 'Ali accused Coghlan of violating the treaty of 1849 by supporting his enemies and acting unjustly towards him. He also threatened to prevent his people from trading with Aden "until the Government shall come to its senses". Coghlan, in turn, complained that 'Ali had detained a messenger from the Imam on his way to Aden, that he had the murderer al-Baghi in his employ at al-Hiswah, and that he had allowed Sayyid Husayn to return to his native Waht. Early in February, Ahmad lodged three complaints with Coghlan against 'Ali concerning murder and plunder on the roads. Also, 'Ali Bu Bakr, an inhabitant of Aden and the water contractor at Shaykh 'Uthman, protested that Sultan 'Ali had seized a consignment of coffee belonging to him, valued at Rs. 6000, on its way to Aden.¹⁵⁸

Coghlan's hostility towards Ahmad was now transferred to 'Ali. Therefore, cementing relations with his enemies and detaching other tribes from him became the two objects of his policy. With these objects in mind, he wanted to visit Shuqrah and Ahwar, but his duties did not allow him. He therefore sent Rassam with a letter and a present to each of the two sultans; the Interpreter left on 25th January, accompanied by Sayyid 'Alawi. Rassam went first to Shuqrah, and then to Ahwar; but finding Sultan Munassar absent on an expedition, he left him Coghlan's letter and present.

During the discussions at Shuqrah, Sultan Ahmad blamed the recent troubles on 'Ali and complained that the British had not checked him. The chief told Rassam what must have delighted Coghlan and made his scheming unnecessary. All the tribes were now against 'Ali on account of his double dealing. The Hawshabis had made a treaty with the Fadlis to keep the roads open to Aden. The Lower 'Awlaqis had quarrelled with the 'Abdalis because of 'Ali's attempt to sow discord among them, and the result was that they entered into an offensive-defensive alliance with the Fadlis, their former enemies. The Upper 'Awlaqis were the sworn enemies of the 'Abdalis.¹⁵⁹ Even the 'Uzaybis and Sallamis, the largest sub-divisions of the 'Abdali tribe, were dissatisfied with 'Ali's policy.

When Rassam returned early in February, he recommended an alliance with the Fadlis, describing it as "most desirable", and that on account of their exceptional prowess. In the eight months previous to his visit, they had successfully fought the 'Abdalis, the Yafi'is and even the Lower 'Awlaqis who were numerically stronger than themselves.

Rassam regretted that dissensions among the tribes led to temporary or partial stoppage of supplies into Aden, and he thought that the situation would not improve as long as Sultan 'Ali could stir up trouble with impunity.¹⁶⁰

Coghlan agreed, and in a private letter to Elphinstone he unjustly accused the Sultan of being responsible for all the troubles of the past seven years. He wrote that 'Ali had deceived him, as he had deceived both Haines and Outram. It was he who told the murderers to take refuge with the Fadlis and the 'Aqrabis, and then he charged these tribes with giving them shelter. Later he himself protected them, and they were still in his territory. While all other chiefs were doing their best to keep the roads clear, 'Ali was plundering.¹⁶¹

'Ali did not tell the murderers to take refuge with any tribe. Sayyid Husayn fled, on the spur of the moment, first to the Hawshabi country and then to the Fadli. Al-Baghi fled first to the Subayhi territory and then he, too, sought refuge with the Fadli chief. No-one took refuge in the 'Aqrabi territory. Sayyid Husayn may have gone back to his village after wandering for some time, but there is no evidence that he did. Al-Baghi, as will be seen, was given asylum by 'Ali only after the British had made peace with his tribe, the 'Aqrabis.

The 'Abdali sultan may not have been honest in all his dealings, but at the same time he was not responsible for all the troubles of the British, as Coghlan made out.¹⁶² Relations between him and the British deteriorated only after Coghlan had made peace with the Fadli chief without consulting him. The purpose of Coghlan's private letter was to prepare the Governor for any action which he might take against the Sultan.

Coghlan proposed to stop 'Ali's stipend; and if he broke off commercial relations with Aden, to occupy Shaykh 'Uthman and continue in its occupation until he had made reparation for his past hostility. The surrender or expulsion of the murderers was to be part of the reparation. Coghlan was convinced that only force could make 'Ali submit to the will of the British. "Hitherto, diplomacy has been our only resort, and its best efforts have failed to remedy the evil of ever-occurring embarrassments with petty tribes, who have grown overbearing by long immunity, and have learnt to regard our kindness and forbearance as proofs of inferiority and weakness."

The circumstances were favourable for an attack on Shaykh 'Uthman. The Fadlis and 'Aqrabis were at feud with the 'Abdalis. According to Coghlan, the Hawshabis and 'Awlaqis might even co-operate with the British if requested, but Coghlan would ask only for their neutrality. However, the most important factor which would facilitate the attack was that the 'Abdalis themselves were disunited, and it was highly unlikely that they would unite in support of their sultan.

If the Government agreed to his suggestion, Coghlan asked that they should send him the troop of horse and bring the European part of the garrison up to its former strength of 500.¹⁶³ In 1857, the European members of the garrison were reduced; some were sent to Perim which the British re-occupied in January of that year,¹⁶⁴ and others to India during the Mutiny.

Coghlan stopped 'Ali's stipend as from the 1st March, 1858. The Sultan retaliated by prohibiting the export of food supplies to Aden and by directing his people to plunder on the roads. Consignments of grain and coffee belonging to Aden merchants were confiscated after transit duty had been paid. The other tribes' answer was to go to Aden by a detour which added one day to their journey, but enabled them to avoid the 'Abdali territory.

Coghlan was afraid that the Sultan might stop trade completely with Aden by occupying Shaykh 'Uthman in force. If he did, the Resident made it known that he would evict him from it. Shaykh 'Uthman, with its commanding position, could be held by a detachment from the Aden garrison until the arrival of the troop of horse which would then effectually protect it and the roads leading to it.¹⁶⁵

What Coghlan had feared came to pass. The Sultan's brother, Fadl, occupied Shaykh 'Uthman in force, and filled in all the wells except one which he kept for the use of his men. Furthermore, to stop traffic with Aden, 'Ali resorted to bribery where he could, and where bribery failed, to force. He even sent large parties to patrol outside the British defences.

The new situation made Coghlan elaborate on the necessity of capturing Shaykh 'Uthman. As long as it was held by an enemy no supplies could come to Aden by land except under a strong escort from the other tribes who would have to force their way through, and this they might be reluctant to do unless heavily bribed, for they could justifiably say that the quarrel was not theirs. The hot weather would

soon set in, the stock of water at Aden was rapidly diminishing, and the Sultan might close the Hiswah wells. The British reputation was also at stake. Coghlan again asked for the troop of cavalry, affirming that if it had been at Aden, the Sultan would not have dared to defy the British in such a manner.¹⁶⁶

The Fadli chief offered to open the roads for a price which immediately suggested to Coghlan that his neutrality or even co-operation might easily be purchased by Sultan 'Ali, the only chief then hostile to the British. To prevent a possible coalition between the two, the Resident acted on his own responsibility.

Early in the morning of 18th March, he proceeded to Shaykh 'Uthman with a force of 500 infantry, 50 artillery with two guns, 40 seamen and his small body of cavalry, now reduced to eleven. After an hour's fighting, three chieftains came forward and solicited, on the part of the Sultan, that hostilities should cease and negotiations begin. Coghlan agreed on condition that the 'Abdalis abstained from closing the roads and interrupting supplies in the future. The chieftains pledged that the roads would be open the following day and they showed willingness to visit Aden to settle all remaining differences, which they eventually did.

The chiefs expressed their hope that the British would withdraw, and Coghlan agreed for two main reasons. Sultan 'Ali had been taught a severe lesson. His belief that the British would never leave their fortifications had been shattered, and about 40 of his men had lost their lives. This loss would create resentment among his clans who considered that in his hostility to the British, he was motivated by private interests rather than by the welfare of his people.

The more important reason was that a survey of the village convinced Coghlan that it was not feasible to occupy it as an outpost garrisoned by a small detachment of infantry with a couple of guns. When the 'Abdalis felt like it, they could easily besiege the small force, harrass it with continuous skirmishing and oblige the British to go out to relieve it.

To effect the object which Coghlan had originally contemplated, Shaykh 'Uthman must be converted into a fortress with a strong resident garrison and with half a troop of light cavalry, without which even heavy artillery would not prevent its being surrounded and perhaps cut off from all communication with Aden. The British,

therefore, blew up the fort and returned to Aden the same day without a single casualty.¹⁶⁷

Coghlan's proceedings were approved in Bombay. "The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council (Elphinstone) ... was with reluctance about to sanction the adoption of the measures of coercion suggested by you; when the receipt of your subsequent letter (reporting the success of the expedition) ... has only rendered it necessary for Government to record its full approval of your proceedings." The Government promised to strengthen the garrison and send the cavalry as soon as possible. They agreed that there was no need to establish an outpost at Shaykh 'Uthman; the Sultan could be "kept in order" by operations from Aden itself.¹⁶⁸

In London, when Ellenborough, Smith's successor, heard of the preparations which Coghlan was making, he wrote to Elphinstone: "Brig. Coghlan rather alarms me. I have no doubt you have written to him and cautioned him, so I did not write at all."¹⁶⁹ Two months after the expedition, Elphinstone wrote to Ellenborough that he, too, had been startled when he heard that Coghlan had in mind to occupy the village of Shaykh 'Uthman and wrote to warn him against such a step, but before his letter was received Coghlan's good sense had made him abandon the project. Elphinstone assured Ellenborough that Coghlan had acted for the best and that he (Ellenborough) need have no worries on his account.¹⁷⁰

After the attack, things went back to normal. The Sultan returned the coffee to 'Ali Bu Bakr, but he did not explain why he detained the Imam's messenger and harboured al-Baghi. Coghlan did not make an issue of the messenger's detention, but insisted on the expulsion of al-Baghi from Lahj. His remaining at large would neutralise the "good" effects of the Shaykh 'Uthman campaign and would be "most derogatory to British honour and most detrimental to British interests."¹⁷¹ Strangely enough, Coghlan made no reference to Sayyid Husayn.

'Ali blamed the hostilities on misunderstanding and misrepresentation. He denied detaining any messenger from the Imam and described the report as "false".¹⁷² As for al-Baghi, he had assumed that Coghlan had forgiven him after making peace with his tribe; but since this was not the case, he promised to expel him. 'Ali seems to have vindicated himself to Coghlan's satisfaction, as Ahmad had done the year before, and his stipend was restored as from 19th March, 1858,

£285 having been deducted as compensation for the plunder committed by his people.¹⁷³

Relations improved steadily, and on 1st July, 1858, the two men met at al-Hiswah. 'Ali expressed his regret for what had happened and vowed to be friendly in the future.¹⁷⁴ In March of the following year, Coghlan spent three days at al-Hawtah as guest of the Sultan; and four months later, Rassam, now Second Assistant-Resident, acted as mediator between 'Ali and some members of his family.

The Government did not send the cavalry for which Coghlan had asked, but instead, they decided to send camelmen from Lower Sind. Yet, as it were to justify their action, they asked Coghlan whether, in view of the peaceful relations with the tribes, there was any need for maintaining an "expensive" troop of horse.¹⁷⁵ Coghlan answered that there was no need now that British relations with the tribes had materially changed, and there was reason to believe that peace would continue.¹⁷⁶ The eleven horsetroopers were sent back to Bombay, and the five remaining horses were sold by auction. The Indian camelmen, 61 in number, arrived on 9th December, 1859, but it was found that they were no match for the masters of the camel, and they were disbanded in September 1860.

In the previous April, Coghlan was sent to Masqat and Zanzibar on special duty. He took with him Rassam and Badger and left Playfair as Acting Resident. By the time he returned to Aden, in July 1861, he was due a furlough of fifteen months. In September he left for England with the intention of retiring at the end of his holiday.

The Government of Bombay offered the Residency to Col. Kemball, the agent at Baghdad, but he declined it. They then appointed as Acting Resident Col. G.H. Robertson of the 25th Regiment Native Light Infantry. Robertson took up office in November 1861, but died in January of the following year and was succeeded as Acting Resident by Maj.-Gen. R.W. Honner who arrived in Aden in April 1862. However, Playfair, who had been First Assistant-Resident since 1854 and who had had charge of the Residency for over a year, found it difficult to work under him. He expressed his wish to leave Aden, and the Government of Bombay appointed him Acting Political Agent at Zanzibar.

Honner was appointed when Clerk was Governor of Bombay, but the new Governor, Sir H.B.E. Frere, did not consider him suitable. He

wrote privately to Wood that Honner "is not a man I would ever have placed in a position where any kind of diplomatic or administrative ability is required". Frere believed that the Resident should be a man of political experience, and not only a good soldier as Honner was. He admitted that it would not be easy to remove him, but suggested, as the most amicable solution, that Coghlan should return to Aden temporarily. This would give the Government time to choose a new Resident.¹⁷⁷ Coghlan returned on 3rd January, 1863, and Honner went back to Bombay. Sultan 'Ali died three months later, with peace still prevailing between the British and all the surrounding tribes.

After Muhsin's death, relations between the British and the 'Abdalis took a dramatic turn for the better. The British acknowledged the pre-eminence of the 'Abdali sultan and made him their channel of communication with the other chiefs, thus putting into effect their original policy of working through Lahj. The 'Abdali sultan, in turn, pledged to keep the roads open and started to consult the Resident on all important matters.

Demands that murderers of British subjects should be tried and publicly executed brought about a collision between the European concept of justice and Arab customs and traditions. In consequence, the 'Abdali sultan found himself in the classic dilemma of the colonial intermediary, at the centre of a conflict of laws.

As a de facto British agent, he had to appear to co-operate with the British; but as an Arab ruler, he had to comply with tribal laws. The British would not give him active support in carrying out their wishes, but at the same time they could harm him if he did not act at their behest. In meeting British demands, 'Ali went as far as he safely could and in the case of Salah even further. On that occasion he almost destroyed himself. Under these circumstances, the policy of working through Lahj had but a limited success, a fact which gave rise to criticism.

At first, the British wanted to impose their own morality, but ultimately they found that they had to compromise. They accepted the expulsion of the murderers from the territories of their protectors as a substitute for their execution. Continuing the practice of adapting themselves to Arab customs where possible, the British now made use of their local sayyid in negotiating with the tribes.

A cavalry troop continued to be the Residents' answer to their troubles with the Arabs, but their wish was not granted. Official policy against expeditions inland and intervention in the affairs of the tribes remained constant; force was to be used only in defence of Aden. This restriction was severely criticised by the Residents and their superiors in India.

Deprived of the means of taking offensive action in the interior, the Residents often found themselves compelled to counsel peace or admit inability to act. On one occasion, Haines used the 'Abdalis to punish the 'Aqrabis, an action which proved to be a great political blunder. Coghlan believed in the principle of playing the tribes off against each other, but only as a last resort. More than once he prepared to put this principle into practice, but his schemes either failed or were rendered unnecessary.

Blockade and the stoppage of stipends continued to be employed with little effect. The new device of banning hostile tribes from Aden was not more successful. In their desire to achieve quick and concrete results, the Residents on rare occasions defied official policy and took direct action against the tribes. As they were successful, their action was approved.

CHAPTER VIII.SULTAN FADL.

'Ali should have been succeeded by his eldest son Fadl, a youth of twenty; but the responsibility of government daunted the young man and he did not assume the leadership of his tribe. He did not draw his stipend nor did he pay the subsidies to the shaykhs of his clans. More important, he did not meet a claim by the Fadli chief on his father.¹ The chief therefore declared war on Lahj, and with the 'Uzaybis committed plunder and murder on the roads.

In the midst of this confusion, Major W.L. Merewether replaced Coghlan on 19th June. Merewether served under General Jacob of the Sind Horse² from 1844 to 1859, when he succeeded him as Commander of the Sind Frontier Brigade, the largest of its kind in India. He remained in that post for three years and in 1861-2 he acted as Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay. Merewether distinguished himself as a soldier in the Sind War of 1842-3 and the Punjab wars of 1845-9. His remarkable qualities were officially recognised by Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, and others.

In 1863, as in 1854, the Bombay Government suffered from a shortage of available officers who united political experience with high military rank. The Governor, Sir H.B.E. Frere, valued the importance of the two branches of administration at Aden very highly. The military responsibility he placed next only to that of the Commander-in-Chief, and he thought that the political duties were too great to be left to an inferior man. His wish was that Aden should continue under an officer who was both Resident and Commandant, and in his opinion Merewether was "altogether the best officer at our disposal".³ W.E. Frere, the Governor's brother, and J.D. Inverarity, the other civilian members of the Board, agreed with him.

Unfortunately, in spite of his brilliant record, Merewether did not have the necessary army rank to qualify him for the command of the garrison. Frere, therefore, asked Sir William Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief, whether Merewether could be given local rank to enable him to be Commandant as well as Resident.⁴ Mansfield answered that to give an officer local rank in time of peace was contrary to army practice. Besides, there were three lieutenant-colonels already at Aden who would be offended if Merewether was promoted over them. Under these circumstances, Mansfield suggested that the command of

the garrison could be given to Col. J.A.R. Raines of H.M. 95th Foot which was due to go to Aden, and he did not foresee any trouble between the two men.⁵

Merewether was formally appointed Political Resident on 29th May, and an application for his promotion was made to Calcutta and London. In the mean time, Raines was sent to Aden as Brigadier-General and was asked to co-operate fully with Merewether. "... Major Merewether, having the title of Resident, is, to all intents and purposes, a Governor, and must be treated as such ... that is to say, that his final decision must be law to you, pending a reference to superior authority."⁶

The Supreme Government approved of the instructions given to Raines, but they and the India Office both agreed with Mansfield that there was no justification for bending army rules in Merewether's favour. Merewether was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1864 as a matter of course. However, this promotion was not sufficient to give him the command of the garrison. Raines continued as Commandant, and there is no indication that relations between him and Merewether were anything but amicable.

The first problem that faced Merewether as Resident was that of the 'Abdali succession. In an attempt to settle the question, he invited Fadl and his four uncles for discussions.⁷ Fadl and his uncle of the same name did not go, while the other three uncles accepted the invitation. After talks lasting nearly a month, the three offered the turban to their brother Fadl.⁸

Merewether had his first meeting with the new Sultan at al-Hiswah on 6th October, 1863. Fadl asked the Resident for help in resolving, by force, a quarrel between him and his troublesome half-brother, 'Abd Allah. Merewether pointed out to him that British policy was to abstain from armed intervention in the affairs of the mainland. Furthermore, British assistance at the outset of his reign would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on his part. The majority of the people were on his side and he should be able to punish his refractory brother himself.⁹

In February 1864, Merewether paid a three day visit to al-Hawtah. His party included two European ladies, the first ever to be seen in the interior, a sign of the general peace then prevailing. A few months earlier, the Sultan had set aside a piece of ground for the

growing of European vegetables. The seeds had been supplied by Merewether who was now delighted at the success of the experiment and greatly impressed by the cultivation of the plain surrounding al-Hawtah.¹⁰

A more tangible sign of friendship towards the British by the 'Abdalīs and Fadlīs was the protection afforded to ships which were grounded on their coasts. On 10th December, 1863, the Peninsular & Oriental Company's steamer "Rangoon", which was coming from Calcutta, ran aground four miles to the east of Aden on the 'Abdali coast. The brother of Sultan Fadl and the nephew of Sultan Ahmad guarded the steamer until she was refloated two weeks later.¹¹ In January 1864, the British ship "Statelie" on her way to Bombay ran aground 30 miles to the east of Aden on the Fadli coast. She was protected, from 15th to 22nd January, by Sultan Ahmad himself, "acting in accordance with the friendly feeling he has of late years evinced to any and everything British". Merewether acknowledged this service by "a suitable present".¹²

The years 1863-65 were years of famine in the interior. Little rain fell, murrain afflicted the cattle and, in 1864, locusts visited the area. Late that year, most unexpectedly, the Fadli chief decided that he had been long enough at peace with the 'Abdalīs and the British and it was high time that he fought them again. He urged the other tribes to join him, and reviled Fadl for allowing "infidels" to wander about Lahj, meaning Merewether and his party. Merewether himself thought that the real reason for the Sultan's change of heart was, as rumour had it, his belief that he was entitled to £40,000 salvage for the "Statelie", instead of only a small present.

When Fadl heard that Ahmad intended to invade Lahj and destroy what the locusts had spared, he discussed the threat with Merewether at al-Hiswah on 3rd November, 1864. The Sultan proposed an alliance with the 'Awlaqīs, and for this purpose, he requested a loan of £15,000 to be repaid out of his profits from the Shaykh 'Uthman project then under discussion. Merewether sanctioned the loan, believing that the Government would not object, having agreed to such a plan in 1855, but he forgot that this was not meant to be a precedent.

In the Resident's opinion, the best way of helping the 'Abdalīs in their distress was to give them employment and put more money in their hands. To this end he recommended the early execution of the

Shaykh 'Uthman scheme; it would pay for itself a hundredfold by benefiting the people apart from increasing the water supply to the Settlement. This plan the Resident described as "sound policy as well as a humane procedure".¹³

Frere did not agree to the loan and instructed Merewether to withdraw from the arrangement. "It is not our business ... to aid one tribe in attacking another, especially when the tribe attacked is nominally at peace with us." The Government approved of the Shaykh 'Uthman project in principle, but added that they did not have the means to carry it out.¹⁴ If the money had been paid, some other means of repayment would have to be found, or the money could be given as a gift to the Sultan for any service other than attacking his neighbour.¹⁵

Merewether conveniently answered that the arrangement with the 'Awlaqis had been abandoned due to sickness and other unforeseen circumstances. He added that he had already given Fadl £5000 and asked that this sum be considered as a gift in token of the Sultan's goodwill and friendship.¹⁶ The Bombay Government agreed, and so did the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, but the latter warned that in future the Resident should not give pecuniary assistance at his own discretion.¹⁷

In December 1864, the Fadlis attacked a caravan near Shaykh 'Uthman, wounded six men and stole 40 camels laden with supplies. Merewether complained to Sultan Ahmad and warned him that if the stolen property was not restored, his stipend would be stopped.¹⁸ Sultan Ahmad answered by closing the road between al-Hawtah and Aden for two days, and the closure would have lasted longer had it not been for Sultan Fadl's move against him.¹⁹

Ahmad did not restore the plundered property, and Merewether stopped his stipend and banned his tribe from entering Aden.²⁰ The chief then attacked Lahj, and for three days no supplies reached the Settlement from the interior.²¹ Off Shuqrah, his men plundered two buggalows; the first, loaded with grain from Sind, put in for water; and the second, from Berbera, ran aground during bad weather. To punish Ahmad, Merewether suggested an attack on al-'Asala, four miles from the sea. Many rich merchants lived there, and the Sultan depended on them for his money.²²

Like Coghlan and Haines before him when faced with disturbances on the roads, Merewether asked for a troop of 100 horse with a small

Arab levy attached to act as scouts and guides,²³ on the model of the Sind Horse with whom he had spent eighteen years. Lawrence, who was against a forward frontier policy in India, opposed the sending of cavalry to Aden. The cavalry would cost the Government Rs. 70,000 per annum and would likely embroil the British with the tribes, since conflict with marauders would bring reprisals. Like Auckland before him, Lawrence trusted that economics would be a sufficient inducement to make the tribes act in a friendly way towards the British. "The Arab tribes have a certain interest in maintaining friendly relations with the British Government owing to the good market which Aden affords, and we must trust to this motive exercising a proper influence over their minds."²⁴

In a private letter to Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State, the Viceroy elaborated on his objections to a cavalry troop at Aden. A force of 100 men would be too small for the work expected of it. Once the British started putting down plunderers, they would find themselves in need of more and more men and would be forced to interfere more and more in Arab affairs. Whatever good the force might achieve, the cost would be out of proportion to it. Besides the regular annual outlay for the troop, barracks would have to be built and other expenses met.²⁵

Merewether was not satisfied with this answer and begged for a reconsideration of his request. He argued that the cavalry would not prove expensive. The cost of maintaining the garrison had been increasing annually due to the steady rise of food prices. More recently, the situation was made worse by famine and limited agricultural activity in Lahj on which the British were greatly dependent for their supplies. The 'Abdalis were afraid to cultivate the land to its full extent again lest the Fadlis would come and destroy the harvest. To remedy this situation, it was necessary that order and security should prevail in the immediate vicinity of Aden. The cavalry would provide the peace desired, the land would be cultivated, and prices would come down.

The Resident went on to argue less convincingly that the cavalry would not involve the British with the tribes or bring reprisals upon them. The cavalry would only be stepping in to stop disorders and put an end to the reprisals which were going on among the tribes and which were causing much inconvenience to Aden. If, with the help of horse,

Gen. Jacob could bring peace to Baluchistan where the tribes were more powerful and predatory than the Arabs, the British could do the same more easily in the vicinity of Aden where the "largest" tribe²⁶ was "heart and soul on our side". In short, Merewether believed that the cavalry would provide the economic and political answer to Aden's difficulties, and to strengthen his case he quoted a personal letter from Coghlan in London. Coghlan wrote that the cavalry would preserve peace within a hundred-mile radius, and the Arabs could not oppose it.²⁷

Merewether based his argument regarding the cavalry on his Sind experience, but the situation in Aden was not the same as in Sind. Sind was under British rule, and it was the duty of the British to preserve law and order. Outside the peninsula of Aden the British had no jurisdiction, and the cavalry could not possibly have acted as a police force without involving the British with the tribes, as they were to do on a future occasion.

The Government of Bombay were sympathetic to Merewether's proposals and asked the Supreme Government to reconsider them. However, the latter were not impressed and stood by their decision.²⁸ Wood, too, for the reasons given by Lawrence, was against sending cavalry to Aden. In a private letter to Merewether he wrote that at Aden the British had a natural boundary in the Isthmus beyond which they did not need to go except for the occasional punitive expedition which circumstances might force them to carry out. However, it would be better if they could avoid leaving their limits altogether. Wood preferred the principle of "divide and rule" to direct intervention: "... I infinitely prefer playing the chiefs off against each other. ... I should have thought that any of them, with the assistance which you can give in arms and money would be more than a match for his neighbours."²⁹ This was a private letter, and did not become official policy.

Meanwhile, the Fadlis continued to terrorise the vicinity of Aden. In July 1865, they plundered and murdered two 'Abdalis only two miles from the Barrier Gate.³⁰ In September, they plundered a caravan on the British side of the Khur Maksar, about one and a half miles from the Barrier Gate. Merewether repeated that if the cavalry had been at Aden, such an insult would not have been offered.³¹

Then, like his predecessors when they had trouble with one or

more tribes, he vehemently attacked the British policy of granting stipends and what seemed to him appeasement. His attacks were contained in letters to the Government of Bombay and the Secretary of State for India. The following quotation from his letter to London is a good summary of his criticism. The policy, he wrote, "... had totally failed to do what was of most material importance to us, viz. to improve the condition of the people of the country, so that we need be in no fear of scarcity, at any time, of supplies, or to create such wealth and contentment amongst them as would have made our continued presence here their chief object."³²

Since the Government of India did not sanction his proposal for a body of horse, Merewether suggested that a force with the same duties be provided by the 'Abdali tribe. Article 6 of the treaty of 1849 stipulated that the Sultan should protect the roads as far as it lay in his power,³³ but his stipend did not enable him to carry out his obligation. Therefore, Merewether proposed that a monthly sum of Rs. 5500 be given him to maintain a patrol of 200 camelmen and 50 horsemen. If the Sultan failed to guarantee the safety of the roads, the money would be withheld.³⁴

In a letter dated 9th December, 1865, Lawrence showed himself favourably disposed towards this idea, but thought that the camel corps should be raised, trained and commanded by the British. The Arabs would be armed and equipped in the manner to which they were accustomed and would be operating among their own people. Having men of their own tribes in this corps, the chiefs would have a vested interest in maintaining peace and order, an argument reminiscent of Auckland's. A camel corps would be cheaper than a troop of horse sent from India, and no expense would be required on account of reliefs and furloughs. If the plan failed, the corps could simply be disbanded. An additional advantage was that in an emergency a camel could carry, besides its own rider, an English soldier or sepoy.

Before a final decision was taken on the subject, the Governor-General wanted to know whether reliable men could be found for the service and whether the scheme in general stood a chance of success. In any case, he made it clear that the British should concern themselves only with the defence of the Settlement and its immediate approaches. "Under all circumstances, the principle of refraining from interference with the neighbouring tribes and abstaining from

any concern with their internal quarrels, must be vigorously maintained. The course of action, also, hitherto observed of maintaining our relations beyond the walls of Aden, not by direct operations on our part, but by operating through friendly chiefs, must still be considered the paramount obligation."³⁵

In a private letter to Wood, Lawrence explained why he wanted the camel corps to be under British, and not 'Abdali, control. The Sultan "will take all he can get, but I doubt his will, or his power to help us effectively".³⁶

Merewether still wanted to punish the Fadli sultan, and for his punishment he asked for a vessel of war to help in the capture of al-'Asala. Its destruction or ransom would teach Ahmad a severe lesson.³⁷ The Viceroy answered, on 9th December, that for the time being it was sufficient to blockade Shuqrah, and for this purpose he authorised the sending of the vessel. The same vessel, he insinuated, might be used in an expedition.³⁸

Twelve days later, he wrote that if the blockade failed, an expedition would be considered, and he asked Merewether for his plans.³⁹ However, even before the first letter reached Aden, Merewether had already made his expedition. On 13th December, Muhammad, a brother of the 'Abdali sultan, came to Aden to inform the Resident that the Fadlis were collecting a force with the intention of marching on Lahj and destroying the crops which were ready for harvest. The chief asked for help; and as Merewether was certain that the 'Abdalis would not be able to repulse the threatened attack, he ordered that a force be held in readiness to proceed into the interior as soon as it became known that the Fadlis were on the move.⁴⁰

News of their movement having reached Aden, an advance party of 200 left early in the morning of 21st December for Shaykh 'Uthman to strengthen the 300 'Abdalis who had been stationed there for the past year under Muhammad. The rest of the force⁴¹ followed on the 22nd. The Fadlis, 1000 strong under Sultan Ahmad himself, had camped at Bir Sa'id, eight miles from Shaykh 'Uthman in 'Abdali territory. The British took them by surprise there and forced them to flee. In the engagement which lasted only 45 minutes many Fadlis were killed or wounded; the only British casualties were seven injured.

A force under Sultan Fadl reached Bir Sa'id half an hour after the fighting had ended; and although his horsemen killed a few

fugitives, they did not penetrate deeply into enemy territory.⁴² For this reason, Merewether decided that the "Arabs" in the vicinity of Aden could not be relied on to form the camel corps originally proposed by him.⁴³

The troops returned to Shaykh 'Uthman where they spent three days and on 27th December they left the village to attack the Fadli chief in his own country. On this occasion, the British force was augmented by 1500 'Abdalis under Muhammad. At Ja'wala they captured seven guns, at al-'Amudiyah and al-Kawr they destroyed the towers and at al-'Asala they demolished the houses. The Yafi'is returned to Ja'wala which they had abandoned to the Fadlis a short time previously to avoid constant friction. The troops were back in Aden on 9th January, 1866, having subdued the Fadli country, but not the Fadli chief.

The day before, Merewether wrote privately to Wood that the Fadli spirit was completely broken and that the tribe would never again constitute a serious threat to British communications. Small numbers might try to plunder, but this could be prevented if the Home Authorities authorised the sending of cavalry to Aden.⁴⁴

Merewether attacked the Fadlis without Government permission, but he justified his act by stating that the least delay would have been fatal. In a few days, the crops would have been destroyed throughout Lahj and the 'Abdalis, as well as the people of Aden, would have had to face another famine. If the Fadlis had been allowed to remain at Bir Sa'id, the roads would have been closed and all vital supplies cut off. "It was now clear that further forbearance would be a crime - that a prompt and severe blow must be immediately administered..."⁴⁵ The Government of Bombay approved of the campaign, and expressed their confidence that it would have a beneficial effect on the future conduct of the Fadlis and other tribes.⁴⁶

Wood, too, congratulated Merewether on the success of his campaign, and expressed his hope that it would be a lasting lesson to the Fadlis.⁴⁷ However, the demands for cavalry did not cease. In a private letter to Wood, Merewether wrote: "Had we had them, the tribe would have been annihilated, instead of being able to escape into the hills, and the old chief ... must have been captured or killed."⁴⁸ In other words, Merewether implied that there was still a need for cavalry. Frere was of the same opinion and wrote to

Lawrence that without them the British might run great risks.⁴⁹ 254.

Lawrence, however, thought that Merewether's success proved that there was no need for cavalry at Aden.⁵⁰ Wood also had not changed his opinion. "I am rather afraid of giving a body of horse to the Resident at Aden, he would I am afraid always be meddling with the Arab tribes and we should be gradually led to assuming a protectorate and embroiling ourselves in Arab politics."⁵¹ This fear was realised, and the British ultimately assumed a protectorate over the area.

Contrary to expectations, the effects of the Fadli campaign were of very short duration. On 22nd February, a party of horsemen under Sultan Ahmad's brother Fadl attacked, near Shaykh 'Uthman, a caravan bound for the interior, killed four men and carried off 25 camels.⁵² The Sultan himself returned to Shuqrah with 800 or 900 men after the British had withdrawn, and plundered a boat belonging to Mukalla which bad weather drove on shore.

Merewether felt that Sultan Ahmad needed another lesson, and accordingly a British force consisting of 351 officers and men left on the evening of 14th March on board the "Victoria". They took with them the 'Abdali sultan, his brother Muhammad, some of the elders and Sayyid 'Alawi. When they arrived at Shuqrah they found only twenty armed men, the Sultan and the rest of his force having left. The British destroyed the village on 16th March, and were back in Aden on the 17th.⁵³

In May, Merewether went home on leave determined that Aden should have a cavalry troop. By then, Wood, who was against the idea, had been replaced as Secretary of State for India by Lord de Grey and Ripon (February 1866). Merewether submitted his case to him; but before a decision could be taken, a change of government brought Viscount Cranborne (later Marquis of Salisbury) to the India Office in July.

Cranborne agreed that a troop of horse was most desirable, but thought that it should be raised locally. Horsemen from India would have to be relieved periodically and their efficiency would be reduced by being far away from home. In sanctioning the formation of a cavalry troop, the new Secretary of State was influenced by Sir Robert Napier, then Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, who supported the idea and to whose opinion, Cranborne wrote to Lawrence, "great weight may properly be attached".⁵⁴

The Government of India gave orders for the formation of the new troop in March 1867. However, the troop was not raised locally as recommended by Cranborne, but was recruited from the Sind Horse, presumably in the light of Merewether's unfavourable testimony about the "Arabs" following the engagement with the Fadlis on 21st December, 1865.

The new troop was to act as a police force. It was to keep open communications with the interior; to protect caravans coming to Aden; to give security to the friends of the British; and to punish plunderers. The same rules which Lawrance had formulated for the camel corps were now applied to the cavalry troop.

Merewether returned to Aden in December 1866. In the previous September, after a short period of hostility between the Fadlis and the Yafi'is, the two sultans had concluded peace. The Yafi'i chief also took on himself the responsibility of making a two-year truce between the Fadlis and the British. Sultan Ahmad seemed agreeable and asked what terms would be acceptable. G.R. Goodfellow, Acting Resident (8th May-14th December, 1866), answered that he or one of his sons should come to Aden and arrange matters.⁵⁵ Instead, Sultan Ahmad sent one of his sons to the Ottoman governor of Hudaydah to complain against the British and to swear allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan.⁵⁶

Nothing came of these overtures, and in May 1867 the Fadli chief sent his eldest son Haydarah to surrender formally in his name and in that of his tribe. By then he was about 100 years old, crippled and blind but still mentally alert. He died on 3rd February, 1870, and was succeeded by Haydarah who had for some time acted on his behalf.

The Fadli surrender in 1867 was followed by a new treaty, bearing the date 27th May. The only article worthy of mention in this treaty is Article 4. It stipulated that a son, or another close relative of the reigning sultan "shall reside in Aden to be near the Resident and to transact business relating to the tribe".⁵⁷ In other words, the British wanted a hostage, and the only hostage to reside in Aden was Yahya Ibn 'Abd Allah, probably a brother of the old chief.

In January 1868, Maj.-Gen. Sir E.L. Russell succeeded Merewether as Resident and Raines as Commandant. Like Merewether, Russell served with the Sind Horse, and During the Sind Campaign of 1842-3 he was

Adjutant of the force. He, too, acted for one year as Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in 1856. Russell had no political experience.

When the Fadli hostage died, on 1st August, 1870, relations with the Fadli tribe were at their best, and Russell suggested that no replacement should be made "to mark our sense of the sincerity and goodwill shown to us by the present chief, Sultan Haidara ...". Perhaps more important, the Government would save the monthly sum of £100 paid for the maintenance of the hostage.⁵⁸ The Government agreed.⁵⁹ Earlier, in October 1867, the good relations between the British and the Fadlis had been marked by an increase to the Sultan's stipend from £364½ to £1200 per annum.⁶⁰

The peace which the British concluded with the Fadlis had its positive results. For the Aden Troop to operate successfully, the co-operation of the 'Abdalis and Fadlis was indispensable, and now obtainable. An Arab levy of 33 was raised and entered Government service on 1st July, 1867. The levy was made up of 'Abdali and Fadli tribesmen; the 'Abdali portion was stationed in its own territory at Shaykh 'Uthman, and the Fadli in its own territory at 'Imad. Recruitment from the Sind Horse started in 1867. The number of men required to form the Aden Troop was 100, and in April 1868 the first contingent of 55 arrived with their horses.

With the consent of the chiefs, the Aden Troop with members of the levy were soon patrolling in the 'Abdali and Fadli districts, and in 1872 they started patrolling in the Hawshabi and 'Alawi territories where no European had ever been before. Parties from the levy were continually on the move in their own territories. If they found men collecting for looting or such purposes, they reported them to the nearest patrol of the Aden Troop which proceeded immediately to the place in question and thwarted the plans of the marauders. Other parties from the levy accompanied the patrols as guides and interpreters. In short, the levy performed the same function as the Baluch Guides on the Sind Frontier, and the Aden Troop as the Sind Horse.⁶¹ The free movement of the Troop in the interior was a sign of the changing circumstances.

Peace with the Fadlis had another positive result. One of the reasons for the British occupation of Aden in 1839 was the fear that the French might take it and use it as a base for operations against

India. Once in Aden, the British made it their policy to prevent other nations from establishing themselves in their vicinity.

In 1862, the French bought the port of Abokh on the Danakil coast for \$10,000. The port was of some strategic importance, but of no commercial value. Therefore, the French then cast an eye on Jabal Ihsan, a peninsula in the 'Aqrabi territory with an area of fifteen square miles. The 'Aqrabi chief told Honner that they had offered him \$30,000 for it.

Jabal Ihsan had an anchorage for three or four vessels, but as a harbour or military base it could not be compared with Aden. To the British it was of no use, but in the hands of an enemy it could have been dangerous. Materials for a siege could have been collected there, and a short easy march would have brought the enemy in front of the Isthmus defences.

The peninsula was of no great value to the 'Aqrabi chief either, but the temptation of selling it for a huge sum of money was too great, and Honner urged the Government to buy it to prevent its sale to the French, it being on the opposite shore of Aden Harbour. He was confident that he could get it for less than the reputed French offer.⁶²

The Government of Bombay were against the French being so close to the British Settlement, but they were also against buying Jabal Ihsan at any price. Instead, they proposed that they should subsidise the chief of Bir Ahmad as they had other neighbouring chiefs. By this arrangement, they would not only gain influence over the 'Aqrabis, but also prevent their chief from selling territory to the French or any other power.

The idea of granting the 'Aqrabi chief a stipend originated with Sir William Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief. In a minute dated 7th December, 1862, Mansfield wrote that if the French established themselves at Jabal Ihsan, they would cause great inconvenience and even constitute a danger by stopping supplies from reaching the garrison. If war broke out, they would be well placed to lay siege to Aden, or arm the Arabs to attack it. The Arabs were not favourably disposed towards the British, and the French could win them over by money. Mansfield added that when he was in Aden on a tour of inspection in November 1862, he heard that the French had promised to help the 'Aqrabi chief against his enemies if he sold them Jabal Ihsan, and this

might make their offer more attractive. British policy, on the other hand, was against embroilment with the Arab chiefs.⁶³

On 12th December, the Government instructed Coghlan, who was on his way back from England, to subsidise the 'Aqrabi chief for the reasons given above. In their letter to London, which quoted extensively from Mansfield's minute, they pointed out that the occupation of Jabal Ihsan by the French would in no way add to the facilities which their ships had at Aden; it would only be harmful to British interests and a source of jealousy, dispute and conflict. If the French had actually offered to buy Jabal Ihsan, the Home Authorities should remonstrate with the French Government against such a move.⁶⁴

With this official letter Frere sent a private one to Wood, in which he strengthened his argument against buying Jabal Ihsan. An extension to British territory would weaken control over Aden itself and involve the British in interminable troubles with their neighbours. The British would not only offend the Ottoman Government, but also "all the great European powers". It would be cheaper to strengthen the defences of Aden than to enter the market against the French.⁶⁵

The Secretary of State was for the purchase of Jabal Ihsan. When he received Honner's report he wasted no time and on 24th December wrote direct to Coghlan, who was on his way back to Aden, authorising him to arrange for the cession of Jabal Ihsan to the British Government.⁶⁶ The Foreign Office, too, thought that the purchase was "desirable".⁶⁷

Later, in a private letter to Frere, Wood reassured him that the Government had no intention of occupying Jabal Ihsan, but at the same time they did not want anybody else to do so.⁶⁸ To the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, he wrote: "We have authorised buying Little Aden, to keep our friends, the French, out. ... We do not propose to settle it, or occupy it, but to be able to exclude inconvenient neighbours."⁶⁹

Coghlan arrived back in Aden on 3rd January, 1863, and found Bombay's letter of 12th December waiting for him. Before he could arrange a meeting with the 'Aqrabi chief, he received London's letter of 24th December. Coghlan wanted to buy Jabal Ihsan as instructed by the Secretary of State, but the chief now said that he would not sell his land to Britain or to any other power. However,

to show his attachment to the British, he expressed himself willing to give a written promise not to alienate Jabal Ihsan without their previous knowledge and consent. A bond to this effect was executed with him on 23rd January, and in return he received an immediate payment of \$3000 and a monthly stipend of \$30.⁷⁰ Thus, by force of circumstance, Bombay's proposal was carried out, and the 'Aqrabi chief became the seventh stipendiary of the British Government. Wood regretted that an outright purchase had not been made, but approved of the transaction.⁷¹

The French were not deterred by the bond signed with the British; and fearing that the 'Aqrabi chief might succumb to the temptation of money, Coghlan made another attempt to purchase the peninsula outright. This time 'Abd Allah was willing to sell,⁷² but the purchase could not be effected and had to be deferred until 1869.

The Fadli sultan protested against the proposed transaction, which made it impossible for the 'Aqrabis to sell or for the British to buy. His protest was based on the agreement of 1852, whereby he was entitled to half the revenue of the 'Aqrabi bandar. From 1864-67, the Fadlis and the British were at war, and when peace returned, Merewether found himself occupied with the Abyssinian Campaign. He left Aden in January 1868, and it fell to his successor, Russell, to carry out the deal.

In November of the same year, the Fadli sultan sent his son Haydarah to renew his claim on Jabal Ihsan and to lay others against the 'Abdali chief.⁷³ Russell settled them all in March 1869 by a payment of \$2000.⁷⁴ Then, after ten days of haggling with the 'Aqrabi chief, a deed of sale was signed on 2nd April. The British paid \$30,000 and agreed to add a further \$10 to the original monthly stipend as compensation for the dues which the 'Aqrabi chief received from the bandar in Jabal Ihsan. In turn, 'Abd Allah agreed not to sell any portion of his territory (Ras 'Imran was mentioned in particular) except to the British.⁷⁵

The Sultan of Lahj protested against the deal, on the pretext that the 'Aqrabis were his subjects, and therefore, the sale was illegal. Goodfellow, officiating for Russell, dismissed his claim⁷⁶ and the Sultan renounced it, but said that he wished to submit his case in person to the Governor of Bombay, Sir W. Fitzgerald. As will be seen, his desire to visit India was not connected with Jabal Ihsan.

Here, however, it is enough to say that Russell welcomed the Sultan's idea of visiting Bombay and gave it his support. He stated that since Fadl came to power, he had been a true friend of the British; he liked them and was willing to learn their way of government. A visit to Bombay would increase his respect and friendship.

The same month Fadl went to Bombay (February 1870), Russell, not knowing the real motive behind his visit, advised the Government not to recognise his claim on Jabal Ihsan and to acknowledge the 'Aqrabis as an independent tribe. He advanced the false argument that when, in 1850, Haines requested Fadl's brother to attack the 'Aqrabis, it was his duty as a friend of the British Government to do so. All chiefs were expected to take action against plunder and closure of the roads. Yet Russell recommended that the Sultan be given \$2500 in acknowledgment of his tribe's co-operation on that occasion.⁷⁷ Bombay referred the matter to the Supreme Government who acted on Russell's recommendation, emphasising the fact that Haines had committed a deliberate mistake in 1850.⁷⁸ From that time on, the 'Abdali sultans could not claim sovereignty over the 'Aqrabis.

When Sultan Fadl was in Bombay, he asked the Governor for an increase in his transit dues and for other concessions. If the British did not agree, he suggested that they should take his territory in return for "a sufficiency" for himself and his dependants, an old 'Abdali wish. The Bombay Government preferred the second alternative and set out their case in a memorandum dated 5th July, 1870.

By then, the Suez Canal had been opened; and as a result, the authorities in Bombay feared a challenge to Britain's supremacy along the route from Suez to Bombay. They wrote that the nations of Europe would now try to acquire stations on the Red Sea coast, and they could have cited, as an example, the attempt of a French company to establish a coal depot on the bandar of Shaykh Sa'id, in the straits of Bab al-Mandab, not far from Perim. This attempt failed due to Turkish pressure.

The British had in Aden the best position along the Red Sea route, but according to the Government it had a number of disadvantages. It was difficult to obtain water and fresh provisions from the mainland. The excessive heat made necessary the relief of Indian troops every two years, and of European troops every year. The landward fortifications were not strong enough to withstand a European attack, and to

strengthen them a large expenditure would be required. The troops were still, after 30 years, cooped up behind the walls in a position which encouraged insult and aggression. It was not safe for a soldier to leave the fortifications alone, and this state of affairs was not calculated to earn respect for the British.

By accepting the Sultan's offer, the British could ensure a continuous supply of fresh provisions and build permanent water works. The greater part of the garrison could be quartered in the hills where the climate was cooler. The landward fortifications would not need to be strengthened, and British prestige would be enhanced in the eyes of the tribes inhabiting the Arabian and East African coasts.

Optimistically, the Government of Bombay went on to reassure the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, that far from creating complications for the British, the occupation of Lahj would extend British influence and bring peace to the tribes. The British would attach the tribes to their interests by employing their men as irregular troops and police. With the money the tribesmen earned they would improve their land. This argument cannot fail to remind one of Auckland's in 1839.

The tedious negotiations for Jabal Ihsan and the high price paid for it showed how difficult it was to purchase territory. The Government argued that every year this difficulty would become greater as the competition of European nations to acquire stations on the Red Sea coast increased and taught the natives the value of their land. "The province of Lahej nominally extends along the sea coast from the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb on the west to about 80 miles east of Aden", and it was unnecessary to elaborate on the advantages which the possession of such a territory would bring.⁷⁹

The Government of Bombay did not submit their memorandum to the Supreme Government immediately. They first called for comments from Merewether, now Chief Commissioner in Sind, and his former Assistant, Goodfellow, now in the Political Department of the Bombay Staff Corps, Poona. Strangely enough, they did not ask for the opinion of Russell, their man at Aden.

In a memorandum dated 23rd October, 1870, Goodfellow, too, supported the idea of annexing Lahj, but thought that if the Government feared complications, they could give the scheme a trial. He himself believed that the Sultan, his elders and people would welcome British occupation, as it would improve their condition and relieve them of

many anxieties. The advantages he foresaw were the same as those envisaged by the Government, but he warned that they should not be expected immediately.

Goodfellow regretted that although the British had been in Aden for such a long time, they had little reliable information about the neighbouring country. Like the Government, he was under the false impression that the Sultan had suzerainty over the Subayhis and other tribes between Jabal Ihsan and Bab al-Mandab. Therefore, he hoped that through Fadl, the British would be able to extend their influence in that area. Goodfellow "doubted" whether there were hills near enough to the Settlement where the greater part of the Aden garrison could be quartered. However, he thought that a camp could be established on the mainland where the European troops could go during the cool season; in the hot season fever might be prevalent in the interior. This arrangement would benefit their health and test the reaction of the people to the presence of British troops.⁸⁰

Nerewether disclosed that Fadl had more than once made the same proposal to him, but he had not reported it because he thought that the Government would not consider it. The former Resident had no doubt that the offer was genuine, and now set out his reasons for accepting it in a memorandum dated 24th November, 1870. The Sultan had financial difficulties and was tired of the cares of state. His stipend was divided between himself and his brothers, some of whom were proving troublesome. The transit dues, Fadl's only other source of income, were small.

Lahj had rich soil, sufficient water and an abundance of wood. However, due to a lack of efficient government and proper utilisation of the natural resources, the land was not as productive as it could be. Under British rule these resources would be properly developed, and the population would increase through immigration. Abolition of the transit dues and good relations with the tribes further in the interior would result in greater trade with Aden. The demand for water was yearly becoming more pressing as the Settlement grew. With Lahj in British hands, the Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct could be extended northwards to the River Tiban at Zaydah. The extension would not only decrease Government expenditure on water, but the increased supply would enable the authorities to sell water at a cheaper rate, and thus ensure a steady revenue.

Merewether agreed with the Government that the importance of Aden to Britain had increased with the opening of the Suez Canal, and no foreign power should be allowed a foothold near it. Meanwhile, Merewether was careful to correct some false notions held by the Government. Since the expeditions against the Fadlis in 1865-6, the troops were not forced to remain behind the walls all the time. However, they did not venture beyond them because they did not make the effort to acquaint themselves with the language and habits of the people. If Lahj came under British authority, communication between the soldiers and the inhabitants would be established and both would learn to understand each other better.

With regard to stationing the troops in the interior, Merewether stated that the greater part of the garrison must always remain at Aden. However, in the mistaken belief that there were hills in the north of Lahj, he wrote that the Government could build a camp there to give the troops a spell in a cooler climate, which would be of great benefit to their health.

The former Resident noted that the district of Lahj was not as large as the Government of Bombay supposed, and he gave a reasonably correct picture of its extent. Its boundaries, he added, could now be easily defined. The Aden Troop had been for some time patrolling in Lahj, and its commander could make an exact map without arousing any suspicion.⁸¹

The Government of Bombay did not revise their memorandum in the light of those submitted by their officers, but forwarded the three documents to Calcutta under a covering letter dated 13th March, 1871. In the previous eight months certain developments had taken place and the Government used them to strengthen their case for the annexation of Lahj. Sultan Fadl arrived back from Bombay in May 1870, and in August, news reached him that Naqib Qaid Ibn Husayn Abu Ras, the principal chief of the Dhu Muhammad tribe, was planning to invade Lahj. The Dhu Muhammads were a large and powerful tribe of the Zaydi sect who inhabited the greater part of western Yemen where much coffee grew.

The direct reason for the intended attack was the assistance given by the Sultan to a Dhu Muhammad clan which rebelled against Qaid, but more important were the transit dues levied in Lahj. The Naqib considered the levying of dues contrary to the tenets of his faith and a hindrance to his people's trading with Aden. He himself,

consistently enough, did not exact dues from caravans passing through his territory, but at the same time he had no scruples about attacking small tribes and exacting tribute from them.

In September, the Sultan visited Aden and asked Russell for some shot and powder to help defend his country. Russell granted him his request on condition that the ammunition would not be used "for aggressive purposes". In justification of this gift, he argued that if Lahj were attacked, the hinterland would be disturbed and supplies to Aden interrupted.⁸² Both the Bombay Government and the Supreme Government were convinced by his argument and endorsed the small assistance. Another measure which Russell took was to order the Aden Troop to patrol in the vicinity of Lahj, but not to take part if fighting broke out. The Resident hoped that the presence of the Troop and the knowledge that Sultan Fadl was prepared to defend his country might deter the Dhu Muhammads.⁸³

In November, Russell reported that the Naqib had arrived in the Subayhi country, immediately to the west of Lahj, and that he was collecting tribute from this tribe who had also assisted his rebellious clan.⁸⁴ The Subayhis agreed not to oppose the Naqib in his attack on Lahj, provided that he did not pass through their territory for the purpose. The Hawshabi chief, who had lost the important frontier village of Zaydah to Fadl in 1868, as will be recounted, not only granted the Dhu Muhammads permission to pass through his territory, but also agreed to march with them on Lahj.⁸⁵ However, for no obvious reason, the Naqib did not attack Lahj as was expected, but instead attacked the Athwaris, a small tribe to the north-west.⁸⁶

The Viceroy's attitude towards the dreaded attack was that the British should not interfere by force of arms, and the Resident was advised to seize any opportunity for reconciling the differences between the two tribes by "friendly mediation".⁸⁷ Russell had, on his own initiative, undertaken this task from the beginning. He urged Fadl to abolish the transit dues, but Fadl answered that they were the principal source of his income and moreover the British had agreed to them in the treaty of 1849.

Russell admitted the justice of the Sultan's case and suggested two alternatives for settling the dispute. The first was that the Sultan should abolish the transit dues and that the British should

compensate him for the loss of revenue, which the Resident estimated at Rs. 1100 a month. Russell proposed an addition of £500 to his monthly stipend. The second alternative was to recompense the Naqib for the expense he had incurred in suppressing his clan, but Russell did not explain how the sum was to be determined.

Of these two alternatives, the Resident strongly advocated the first as being more beneficial and permanent. Yet, if the Government did not agree to either, the Sultan should go on collecting duty, and the Zaydis had no right to enforce their religious principles on other people. If they were allowed to set such an example, others might follow and the result would be general chaos.⁸⁸

Qaid's son-in-law and representative visited Aden in December and had an interview with Captain Prideaux, the Assistant-Resident. He told him that Qaid was determined "to make clear all roads to Aden", i.e. to sweep away the transit dues. Russell commented that if the Naqib did not desist and attacked Lahj, the Government must send a force to defend it. The political and economic circumstances made such a step indispensable.⁸⁹ December was the month of harvest, a favourite time for raiding with the tribes. If the Dhu Muhammads attacked Lahj in that month, the consequences for Aden would have been very serious.

At this point (mid-December), Russell left Aden to take command of the northern division of the Bombay Army. His successor was Maj.-Gen. C.W. Tremenheere. In 1847, Tremenheere was Assistant Executive Engineer at Aden, and when he was appointed Resident, he was Chief Engineer at Bombay. Tremenheere had no political experience.

The first communication the new Resident had from the Naqib was to the effect that he agreed not to attack Lahj for eight months. Tremenheere thought that this breathing space should be used to settle the question of traffic through Lahj once and for all, otherwise the British would have to face the same danger again. He supported Russell's suggestion that a fair compensation be given to the 'Abdali chief for the dues levied by him, which he estimated at £800 a month. Abolition of the dues would bring more trade to the port, add to British prestige among the tribes and reduce the price of some supplies for the garrison.⁹⁰

Qaid died on 9th January, 1871, and the Government thought that his son might carry out his threat and attack Lahj at the end of the

eight months. In such a case, the policy of non-interference would lead to general disturbance in the country, and such a state would be most undesirable. The ground of the trouble with the Dhu Muhammads was the transit dues which were "alike opposed to the general policy and to the local interests of Government". If the British did not accept the cession of Lahj and themselves abolish the transit dues, they would have to grant compensation to the Sultan. The Government had no doubt that the first alternative was better both economically and politically. Here it is necessary to add that the feared attack by the Dhu Muhammads did not materialise.

To strengthen their argument for the annexation of Lahj, the Government of Bombay emphasised the role of the Suez Canal in the transport of troops and cited as an example the force sent recently to Hudaydah direct from Turkey to suppress an 'Asiri rebellion. Previously, the Ottoman Sultan would have asked his viceroy in Egypt to put down a revolt in Arabia, but now 15,000 men were sent through the Canal with five vessels of war. The presence of such a force in the Yemen would be a serious challenge to Britain's position as the paramount power along the Red Sea coast. The annexation of Lahj was necessary to prevent its acquisition by any other nation.⁹¹

At or about the same time the Bombay Government sent their letter with its enclosures to Calcutta, they received a letter from Aden which, if it had arrived earlier, might have made them hesitate before recommending the annexation of Lahj. The letter was dated 23rd February and contained revelations which Sultan Fadl had made to the Resident. In 1869, anarchy seems to have broken out in the rich coffee-growing district between Ta'iz and Ibb in the Yemen. For no obvious reason, the local chiefs turned to Sultan Fadl as the only man able to restore law and order to their disturbed country. In return, they offered him the government of the district and as a sign of their good faith, they sent him hostages.

Fadl was attracted to this proposition and discussed it with Russell. Russell advised him against it, but did not report it to the Government. The Sultan was not discouraged and started to plan his expedition. The necessary money had to be borrowed, and it happened that the Sultan had a wealthy 'Awlaqi friend in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The 'Awlaqis in Hyderabad, of whom there was a large number, kept in close touch with events in South-West Arabia

and tried to influence them. Fadl thought that his friend, Jemadar Muhsin, would be interested in the venture and lend him some money. When he was in India, he discussed his plan with him. Muhsin approved of it and agreed to lend Fadl two and a half lakhs of rupees, or \$125,000, half the amount which he required. There and then the Jemadar advanced the Sultan \$20,000, and the balance was to be sent later.

The balance arrived in January 1871, eight months after the Sultan's return from Bombay. On 22nd February, Fadl had an interview with Tremenheere in which he revealed his plan and tried to interest the Resident in it. He spoke at length about the natural resources of the Yemen and the importance of its being under strong rule. He argued that it would be to the advantage of the British if peace prevailed there, and he urged the Resident to take the necessary measures to bring this about. "If 500 British troops were marched into the interior the whole country would willingly submit to the rule of the British Government and hail its establishment as an inestimable boon." "The whole country" could only have meant the district in question, and in making such a proposal the Sultan could not have been serious, unless he hoped that the British would allow him to rule under their protection. At any rate, Tremenheere told him that the British could not give the slightest consideration to this idea.

Fadl then said that if the Government lent him Rs. 300,000 to be used in financing his proposed campaign, he would in return give them annually \$50,000, half the revenue of the district. Tremenheere rejected this proposal also, and in any case, here again the Sultan could not have been serious when he made it, for there was no reason why he should continue to pay this sum after three years when the debt would have been repaid.

Then Fadl enquired whether the Government would oppose his undertaking the occupation of that district on his own. He added that his arrangements for the expedition were fairly advanced when the Ottomans beat the 'Asiris at Hudaydah towards the end of 1870. This Ottoman victory made him suspend his preparations, but he was ready to proceed with them immediately if Tremenheere could assure him that neither the Ottomans nor the French (at Shaykh Sa'id) would interfere. Tremenheere could give him no such assurance and tried

to dissuade him from his "wild notions". Instead of conquering new territory, the Resident advised him to improve his own, but the Sultan replied that his country was poor and his income was not enough to meet his rising expenses.

Tremenheere was certain that the Sultan was bent on his venture and predicted that no good would come out of it. His tribe was not warlike, and the mercenaries whom he would be forced to hire might turn against him once the country had been taken. In fact, Tremeneheere suspected the 'Awlaqi jemadar of having an ulterior motive in making the loan, since the bulk of the mercenaries would probably come from his tribe who, if the venture succeeded, would keep the larger part of the district. The Resident urged the Government to send Fadl a friendly letter to the effect that they would view with great displeasure any attempt on his part to conquer new territory because this would disturb the peace prevailing in the area.⁹²

Tremenheere's letter was forwarded to Calcutta, as was usual, and it may have arrived there at or about the same time as the three memoranda enclosed with Bombay's letter of 13th March. With all these documents before him, the Viceroy turned down the annexation proposal. The Sultan's desire to acquire new territory made Lord Mayo doubt the sincerity of his offer. The writers of the three memoranda were not in agreement as to the geography of Lahj, and the Viceroy himself was naturally not better informed. Therefore it was understandable that he gave ignorance of the exact boundaries of the district as another reason for rejecting the Sultan's offer. He argued that it was difficult to foresee what disputes the British might have with the surrounding tribes or with what Ottoman claims of sovereignty they might find themselves in conflict.⁹³

In transmitting the relevant papers to London, the Viceroy simply signified his "entire disapproval" of the annexation proposal.⁹⁴ The India Office, then headed by the Duke of Argyll, did not comment on the subject, being presumably in agreement with the Viceroy.

Lord Mayo believed that the objects sought might be secured by negotiation with the Sultan without any addition to British territory. If there was any portion of his country, the acquisition of which by a foreign power was undesirable, he might perhaps be induced to agree not to sell it without British consent, as the 'Aqrabi chief had done. At the same time the opportunity might be taken to reach an agreement

with him for the abandonment of the transit dues which were the main motive for the quarrel with the Dhu Muhammad tribe.⁹⁵

The Viceroy asked the Resident to comment on the points raised in his letter. Tremenheere agreed that there was no need to add Lahj to Aden for the desired objects to be achieved, and he, too, thought that the Sultan could not have been sincere in his offer. He then went on to correct mistakes made by the Bombay Government in their memorandum of 5th July, 1870. There was no lack of fresh provisions at Aden. However, prices could be reduced and traffic increased by the abolition of transit dues. The Sultan of Lahj and other chiefs would accept a monthly sum in lieu of dues which were unpopular and regarded by some as contrary to their faith. The sources of water were in the immediate vicinity of Aden and might be considered secure unless the area was occupied by a European force. If more water works were decided on, matters could easily be arranged with the Sultan as in the case of the Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct.

There were no hills or highlands in Lahj which could provide cooler quarters for the troops. The whole district lay in the plain and its climate was not better than that of Aden.⁹⁶ If found desirable, troops could patrol in Lahj during the cool season, but this might be regarded by the distant tribes as an unusual display of force, and therefore it was not necessary to discuss the location of troops in the Sultan's territory.

Far from having an extensive coastline, the 'Abdalis had a shallow shore only six miles long. Apart from the strip of land on the northern shore of Aden Harbour, from al-Hiswah to Khur Maksar, there was no spot which a foreign power could turn to advantage, and even this strip was useless since there was no access to it except through the harbour which was British. Therefore, there was no need to negotiate with the Sultan on this subject either, unless the British wanted to secure possession of that strip, thus obtaining access by land to Jabal Ihsan entirely through British territory. Tremenheere was confident that the Sultan would be willing to cede as much land as was needed for the purpose.⁹⁷

Now that the annexation of Lahj was no longer a subject for discussion, the Bombay Government commented only on the transit dues. They considered their abolition in Lahj as most important since the territory was the closest to Aden and the dues were the main cause of

the quarrel with the Dhu Muhammads. However, they expressed their fear that the abolition of dues by one tribe might only make other tribes increase theirs. Nevertheless, they asked the Resident to make enquiries and submit a report showing what payment would be required for each tribe concerned to forgo its right to the collection of transit dues and whether such payments might be met in part by a moderate toll levied on the goods when they entered Aden.⁹⁸

No answer to the Government's request can be found, and this may have been due to one of two reasons. The danger of an attack on Lahj by the Dhu Muhammads had passed, and the British authorities in Aden, as well as in India and England, were soon to have a more pressing problem caused by the intention of the Ottomans to annex the hinterland. Yet the policy of compensating tribes for the abolition of transit duties had already begun.

In May 1871, Tremenheere signed treaties to this effect with three of the Subayhi clans (the Mansuris, the Makhdumis and the Ruja'is) for a total monthly sum of £95.⁹⁹ The treaties resulted from an incident in March which had brought the Aden Troop into collision with the tribesmen. A party composed mainly of Mansuris seized two camels laden with gat from unarmed boys on their way to Aden. Tremenheere wanted to protest against this incident, but did not know to whom,¹⁰⁰ since the Subayhis had no paramount sultan. Finally, he asked the 'Abdali chief to use his influence with them, but Fadl replied that they had harassed his own subjects, and that he could do nothing other than close his territory to traffic, a reply which did not satisfy the Resident.

The Mansuris, who were not punished for their offence, soon committed another. On 4th April a caravan of eleven camels passed through their territory, and was stopped three times along the route, each time paying transit dues. A sayyid who was travelling with it was beaten and his belongings were plundered. Tremenheere feared that if the Mansuris were allowed to go on with their acts of aggression, others might join them and trade would be interrupted. Since Fadl had admitted that he could exercise no influence over the Subayhis, the Resident decided to take direct action. He instructed Captain Stevens, the Commander of the Aden Troop, to make a sudden march into the Subayhi territory, take the Mansuris by surprise, seize their principal men and bring them prisoners to Aden.¹⁰¹ The Troop came upon the

Mansuris and called on them to surrender. They refused and fired on the Troop. The Troop returned the fire, several Arabs were killed and others captured.¹⁰²

The Bombay Government described Tremenheere's instructions to Captain Stevens as "highly injudicious",¹⁰³ while Lord Mayo condemned the incident as being in violation of the Supreme Government's directions of 9th December, 1865. The Troop had penetrated 40 miles into the interior and had not limited its duties to patrolling the approaches to Aden. The British had taken direct action and had not settled the matter through friendly chiefs as they were supposed to do. Mayo considered this expedition as interference in the internal affairs of the tribes and requested that the Resident "should be strictly enjoined to abstain in future from such enterprises ... and to confine the employment of the Aden Troop to those patrol duties for which they were originally raised."¹⁰⁴

Fadl was disappointed that Tremenheere had not consulted him before sending out the cavalry. In an interview on 2nd May, the Sultan told the Resident that if he had sought his advice, he would have sent with the Troop men to parley with the Subayhis, and the affair would have been settled without bloodshed. Fadl then arranged for the Subayhi chiefs through whose territories trade passed to go to Aden for discussions with the Resident. The discussions led to the signing of the treaties abolishing transit dues.

The Sultan's successful mediation convinced Tremenheere that Fadl had great influence with the Subayhis, but had refrained from using it when first approached. The Resident went on to accuse him of exercising his influence to bad effect. When the roads through the Subayhi country were unsafe, they were so at his instigation or with his connivance. Like Coghlan before him, Tremenheere thought that conducting affairs through the 'Abdali sultans was "the most fertile source of our complications", and added that it was with great reluctance that he had availed himself of Fadl's services in dealing with the Subayhi chiefs.¹⁰⁵

The Mansuri affair showed that the British policy of working through Lahj still had its limitations. Fadl naturally wanted to avoid trouble with his neighbours, but if the Resident had warned him that he intended to send out the Troop, he would probably have made a special effort to settle the matter peacefully.

More important than the abolition of dues in the Subayhi territory was their abolition in the Fadli country. In May 1872, as a result of a dispute between the Fadlis and the Yafi'is in which transit dues loomed large, the Fadlis agreed to abolish them for an additional \$80 to their monthly stipend.¹⁰⁶ No quick decision could be taken on the 'Abdali case because a large sum of money was involved.

In May 1868, after a dispute between the 'Abdali and Hawshabi chiefs, the latter attacked Lahj. Fadl struck back and defeated 'Ali Ibn Mani'. In July, the two came to terms. As reparation for the damage he had caused, the Hawshabi sultan ceded Zaydah to the 'Abdali in a formal deed signed by himself and his elders. Later 'Ali claimed that he had signed the bond under duress while a prisoner of Fadl, and wished to retake Zaydah. Zaydah was a border village with a never-failing stream of water, and from time to time the Hawshabis diverted this stream to the detriment of Lahj, but it is not known whether the quarrel in question was on this account.

'Ali again raided the 'Abdali territory, but again was repulsed. Then he started to incite the hill tribes in the Yemen to join him. Fadl asked Russell for advice, and the Resident told him that if Zaydah was legitimately his, he should warn the Hawshabi chief not to reoccupy it. Russell also wrote to Ibn Mani', warning him that if he persisted in his hostile attitude, he would incur the enmity of the British. If his advice had no effect, and the hill tribes came to the aid of the Hawshabis, Russell felt that the British could not allow Lahj to be plundered. For their supplies of food and water they were dependent on it, and Sultan Fadl was a great friend of theirs. If there was a real danger to Lahj, they would have to forgo their policy of non-interference,¹⁰⁷ as they had done on former occasions when their supplies were threatened.

Fortunately for the British, their armed intervention was not necessary. 'Ali came to Aden on 22nd November, expressed his regret for what had happened, and promised to disperse his men on the understanding that the Resident would reconcile him to Fadl.¹⁰⁸ The two sultans met at Aden on 15th December and left seemingly reconciled, Zaydah still remaining in possession of Fadl. Russell himself was particularly glad at the apparent success of his efforts, because at the time the authorities were considering the extension of the Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct to Zaydah, and therefore it was necessary that all

rights to the village should be established.¹⁰⁹

Later it became known that the two sultans had only agreed not to fight for six months, but the question of Zaydah was not settled. When the six months expired, 'Ali plundered two caravans and warned all travellers to keep clear of his territory. Goodfellow (then Acting Resident) advised Fadl to make concessions for the sake of peace, impressing upon him that it was up to him to make a reconciliation with 'Ali, for 'Ali's quarrel was with him, and not with the British. At the same time Goodfellow threatened 'Ali that his stipend would be stopped if he did not restore the plundered property. Fadl did not heed Goodfellow's advice, and 'Ali did not reply to his letter, although he stopped plundering on the roads.¹¹⁰

The peace in the neighbourhood of Aden was threatened in 1870, but was not disturbed until 1872, when the Ottomans decided to bring all the Yemen, as constituted in the 16th century, under their control. To this end they occupied San'a and the rest of the country under the Imam. Then, through the Imam, they sent letters to the different chiefs in the vicinity of Aden, ordering them to declare their allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. The Hawshabi chief was the only one who showed any readiness to comply, and that was in the hope that the Ottomans would help him recover Zaydah from the Sultan of Lahj.

However, the Ottomans failed in their venture, and 'Ali's hope was frustrated. The events and the diplomatic activity which ended Ottoman proceedings in South-West Arabia are beyond the scope of this work. Here it is sufficient to say that these proceedings led to the extension of the stipendiary system and the establishment of the Protectorate.

The years covered by this chapter witnessed a great improvement in British-'Abdali relations. However, as before, the Sultan was cautious in acting at the Residents' behest, and the Residents were critical of the policy which required them to work through Lahj. They also criticised the principle of non-intervention and the ban on military action in the interior. In fact, Merwether defied official policy when he carried war into the Fadli territory.

The higher authorities had always been averse to giving the Resident a cavalry troop lest he would use it as a means of aggression.

When they finally agreed to give him the troop, they made it clear that it should be used only in defence of the Settlement. Tremeneere, however, used it far beyond Aden, thus justifying the fears of the authorities. In general, the need for peace and regular supplies continued to guide British policy towards the hinterland, and the stipendiary system was extended to meet this need.

When it became known that the French wanted to buy Jabal Insan, the British found it necessary to depart from their principle of no expansion beyond Aden. They bought the peninsula to deny a foothold in the area to any other power. The geopolitical facts created by the opening of the Suez Canal made the Bombay Government also give serious consideration to Fadl's offer of his territory.

At the end of the period under study, the British in Aden were accepted by all their neighbours. The Aden Troop moved freely in the interior and received co-operation from the two main tribes. The Resident served as an arbiter in local disputes and assumed an almost patriarchal role. When the Ottomans threatened to annex the hinterland, all the chiefs, with the exception of the Hawshabi, appealed to him for protection, and by so doing demonstrated their preference for the British.

CONCLUSION.

This thesis falls into two main parts. The first (Chapters III-V) traces the development of Aden, and the second (Chapters VI-VIII) deals with its history. Most of the material in the first part has never been used before, and never before has anybody discussed in depth the factors and policies responsible for the Settlement's progress or the problems which the British faced.

The official material in the second part, and in Chapter II, is found in other works, but the private material is completely new. The latter source has been of great help in understanding the real reasons for some official decisions and in showing the kind of relationship which existed between the different people in authority.

It is regrettable that there are no primary sources in Arabic on the early history of the Settlement of Aden. The little material available in that language has been translated from English. The only book which deals at length with the whole period covered by this thesis is "Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878" by Thomas E. Marston. This work, however, contains many inaccuracies and does not treat fully a number of important points. In general, it shows a lack of thorough research which, in some cases, has led to wrong conclusions.

"Sultans of Aden", by Gordon Waterfield, is another book to which reference must be made. This volume covers Haines' term of office with special emphasis on the relations between the Political Agent and Sultan Muhsin, i.e. the first nine years of the period treated in this thesis. The book is, on the whole, well researched, but it is more a work of journalism than of history. Like Marston, Waterfield makes no effort to understand the motives for the tribes' behaviour, and like him, he overpraises Haines.

The present writer has brought to light new material, has given a new interpretation to British-Arab relations and has shown that some accepted views are mistaken. The results of his research and thinking are summarised in the following pages.

Britain occupied Aden for several reasons. It was feared that Muhammad 'Ali or France might take it and turn it into a base of operations against India. A French re-occupation of Egypt after the Pasha's death presented itself as a distinct possibility, and the Bombay Government argued that in such an event the peninsula would be

useful as an observation post or a forward position should the British decide to attack Egypt. The British hoped that possession of Aden would enable them to break the American domination of the coffee trade of the Yemen and re-establish the town as a great market. However, the strongest reason for the occupation was Aden's harbour and its location midway between Bombay and Suez, which made it an ideal place for a coal depot and communications centre.

Fears of a major attack proved groundless, and, perhaps fortunately for the British, the permanent fortifications were not put to the test. As a result of events in the Levant, the danger from Muhammad 'Ali was removed shortly after the occupation. France made no hostile move towards Aden or India, although the British continued to suspect her intentions.

The French did not re-occupy Egypt, and the Settlement was not used as a forward base against that country. However, it was used as such, to good effect, during the Abyssinian Campaign. Aden's value as an observation post was undoubtedly very great. From the Settlement, the Residents watched French activity in the Red Sea and provided the Government with information on current affairs in Arabia and East Africa.

During the first eight years of the occupation, the value of Aden's commerce was stressed by all concerned except Lord Ellenborough. Half-way through his term of office, Lord Hardinge began to think of the Settlement primarily as a military base, and his successor, Lord Dalhousie, regarded it in the same light. Nevertheless, further measures were taken to encourage Aden's commerce, the most important being the opening of the port in 1850.

Between 1839 and 1853, the Bombay Government laid equal emphasis on the Settlement's value as a military base and as a commercial centre. Falkland's order in the latter year that Aden's military importance should come before its commercial development was given under pressure, and did not result in the decline of trade, as Jacob claims in his book "Kings of Arabia". Haines' successors continued to foster commerce, and the higher authorities did nothing to discourage their efforts. Elphinstone even refused to consider the re-imposition of customs dues, describing the step as commercially retrogressive.

While Falkland's decision had no adverse effect on the growth of trade, as is clear from the figures, neither did it result in an

increase to the garrison or a strengthening of the defences. The appointment of army officers as Residents did not imply greater emphasis on the military aspect of Aden, as Marston suggests. From the beginning, the Government had intended to put the political and military duties at Aden in the hands of an army officer, but they later decided to leave Haines in charge of the political duties. The question of uniting the civil and military authority was discussed more than once prior to 1854, and after Haines' dismissal in that year, the Government seized the opportunity to combine both branches of the administration.

An argument in favour of appointing a Resident was that he would not need to refer to Bombay as often as the Political Agent. In fact, the position did not change, and the Resident's recommendations carried no more weight than those of the Political Agent. Only in local affairs did the Resident exercise greater powers since he also commanded the garrison.

The appointment of Major-Generals Russell and Tremenheere, following the Abyssinian Campaign, was not an indication of Aden's growing military importance. Maj.-Gen. Honner had been Resident at Aden long before that Campaign, and Tremenheere was succeeded by a man of lower rank, Col. J.W. Schneider. The prime qualification of the Resident was that he should have sufficient military rank to command the garrison.

Although the British failed to monopolise the coffee trade, they succeeded in re-establishing Aden as the entrepot for South Arabia, East Africa and India. This new market was important not only economically, but also politically; it played a great part in making the Arab tribes identify their interests with those of the Settlement. In it they sold their produce at a good price, and from it they bought what they needed of foreign merchandise. As far as the Government was concerned, the Settlement's prosperity meant more business and increased revenue from customs dues at Indian ports. In contrast, Aden had hardly any military role to play, and the garrison was a heavy financial burden. Contrary to what Marston says, the Settlement's ultimate value was commercial rather than military.

Aden more than fulfilled the function for which it had primarily been occupied, namely that of a coaling station midway between Bombay and Suez. This is shown by the number of steamship companies which made a base of the port and by the number of steamers which coaled there. These steamers did not only ply between Bombay and Suez, but

touched at Aden en route to and from places as distant as Australia and Peru.

Being at the centre of this traffic, the Settlement naturally developed as a communications base, and the volume of mail handled by its post office illustrates the important role which it played in this respect. The opening of the Suez Canal and the establishment of the telegraph line between Suez and Bombay were to increase its communications value still further. Aden's usefulness to the British was never more clearly demonstrated than at the time of the Abyssinian Campaign when all its services were called upon, and were not found wanting.

Before the occupation, the two-fold fear of complications with the Ottomans and involvement with the tribes had made the British adopt a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of South-West Arabia. In line with this policy, they had sought only commercial relations with the 'Abdalis and repeatedly turned down their proposals for offensive-defensive alliances. After the occupation, the British decided to maintain the principle of non-intervention and to adopt two new ones. The first banned territorial expansion and the second ruled out expeditions into the interior.

The British would have liked to adhere to these principles and to restrict their relations with the hinterland to commerce; but for geographical, economic and political reasons that was not possible. The British were dependent on the interior for their food and water supplies, hence peace with the tribes and among the tribes themselves was of vital importance to the Settlement.

For the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the area, the British found it necessary to establish relations with the neighbouring chiefs and to assume the responsibility of paying them stipends. Still, to avoid embroilment in the interior, they chose the 'Abdalis to be their intermediaries with the other tribes. However, Muhsin could not forget the loss of Aden, and his hostility forced them to abandon temporarily the idea of working through Lahj.

The Residents strongly criticised the policy of non-intervention, describing it as too lenient and as detrimental to British interests. They wanted freedom to march inland whenever they felt it was necessary; hence their persistent demand for a troop of cavalry. The higher authorities, as a rule, were apprehensive of getting entangled with

the tribes, and this explains their reluctance to provide the Residents with the horse which they thought would be used as a means of aggression. When they finally sanctioned the troop, they placed strict limitations on its use.

The principle of "divide and rule", which according to Jacob and Marston was successfully applied by Haines and others, had little or no effect on the course of events. In the first place, the tribes were not united, and in the second, the British did not want to rule the interior. What they wanted was peace among the tribes, an object which would not have been served by setting them against each other.

When the Residents' requests for action were not granted, they fell back on diplomacy or promoted tribal alliances which came to nothing. In cases of emergency, they made expeditions into the interior and also intervened in support of their allies when the Settlement's supplies of food and water were threatened.

The British continued to rule out expansion beyond their border until 1862, when the French showed interest in buying Jabal Ihsan. Jabal Ihsan was useless to the British, but its possession by a potential enemy was considered dangerous. To prevent such a contingency, they bought it themselves. For the same reason, the Bombay Government supported the annexation of Lahj. Thus the British departed from their three original principles, but this departure did not mean that they had abandoned them.

If the British failed to work through Lahj under Nuhsin, they succeeded to a certain extent under his sons. 'Ali and Fadl co-operated with them, but only as far as they safely could within the limits of tribal laws. The Residents, whose freedom of action was restricted by official policy, could not always give the 'Abdalis the support they needed. This situation caused ill-feeling on both sides and made the Residents criticise the policy of working through the 'Abdalis. They would have preferred to deal directly with the other tribes.

In the long run, British policy succeeded for several reasons. The British did their best to be acceptable to the tribes, and where they could they adapted themselves to their customs. In spite of initial failure, the stipendiary policy achieved its aim, and the general prohibition against interference in the tribes' internal affairs must have saved the British many problems.

Despite the advocacy by certain individuals of coercive methods, the British were restrained in the use of force, which was wise. If the higher authorities had sanctioned every demand for military action, they would have found it necessary to occupy the whole hinterland and in the process would have alienated the tribes which were friendly or neutral. As it was, they extended their influence by more peaceful means, and when they finally assumed direct responsibility for the area, after the Ottoman attempt to annex it, it was at the request of the tribes.

FOOTNOTES

List of Abbreviations.

Adj. Gen.:	Adjutant General
Admin.:	Administration
ARR:	Aden Residency Records
BEP:	Bombay Educational Proceedings
BMP:	Bombay Military Proceedings
BPP:	Bombay Political Proceedings
BPWP:	Bombay Public Works Proceedings
BRP:	Bombay Revenue Proceedings
Br. P.:	Broughton Papers
BSP:	Bombay Secret Proceedings
Com.:	Committee
Dal. P.:	Dalhousie Papers
Dept.:	Department
Doc.:	Document
Elph. P.:	Elphinstone Papers
enc.:	enclosing
encs.:	enclosures
ESLB:	Enclosures to Secret Letters from Bomba.
Ex. Eng.:	Executive Engineer
Fin.:	Financial
FO:	Foreign Office
FR:	Factory Records
Gen.:	General
Govt.:	Government
I.N.:	Indian Navy
I.O.:	India Office
Jud.:	Judicial
LA:	Letters from Aden
LAM:	Letters from Aden and Muscat
LAMZ:	Letters from Aden, Muscat and Zanzibar
LAZ:	Letters from Aden and Zanzibar
L.B.:	Letter Book
Law. P.:	Lawrence Papers
Mil.:	Military
Min.:	Minute
Misc.:	Miscellaneous
nd:	no date
Pol.:	Political
Parl. P.:	Parliamentary Papers
PW:	Public Works
Q.M.G.:	Quartermaster- General
Rep.:	Report
Res.:	Resolution
Rev.:	Revenue
Sec.:	Secret
TDR:	Territorial Department Revenue
TDFin:	Territorial Department Finance
W.P.:	Wood Papers

Notes.

In references for all Bombay Proceedings, except the BSP, the first number is that of the Range, the second that of the Volume, and the third number or date is that of the Consultation. The early volumes of the BPP have no Consultations. BSP references have no Range number.

In ARR references, the first number is that of the Volume and the second that of the Letter in the relevant Department.

In FO references, the first number is that of the series, the second that of the Volume and the third that of the Dispatch.

In all other official references, the first number is that of the Volume and the second that of the Letter or Document.

In the Broughton, Clerk, Dalhousie and Lawrence Papers, the reference is the Volume number. In the Elphinstone Papers, first comes the Box number, and then the Folder number. In the Wood Papers, for outgoing letters the number is that of the Letter Book; for incoming letters the first number is that of the Correspondent and the second that of the Volume.

Chapter I.

1. Markham, The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster..., pp. 121-9.
2. Birdwood & Foster (Editors), The First Letter Book of the East India Company, 1600-1619, p.354.
3. Markham, op. cit., p.168
4. Playfair says that they were detained for some time, which suggests that they were finally released. History of Arabia Felix, p. 108.
5. Markham, op. cit., pp. 166-180.
6. Playfair, op. cit., p. 108.
7. *ibid.*, p. 110.
8. Marriott, The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, p. 168. See also Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, p. 25.
9. Wilson-Sultan: 10 Nov. 1798; BPP 381/1.
10. Sultan-Wilson: 18 Nov. 1798; BPP 381/2.
11. For the government of the E.I.C., see Ch. V, p. 130.
12. Bombay-Wilson: 23 March 1799; BPP 381/2.
13. Murray-Bombay: 4 Oct. 1799; BPP 381/7. See also Playfair, op. cit., pp. 122-3.
14. Murray-Bombay: 4 Oct. 1799, ut supra.
15. Sultan-Bombay: nd, rec'd 18 Sept. 1799; BPP 381/6.
16. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. V, pp. 333-8.
17. Murray-Bombay: 4 Oct. 1799, ut supra.
18. Sultan-Bombay: nd, rec'd 15 Dec. 1799; BPP 381/7.
19. Murray-Bombay: 6 Oct. 1799; BPP 381/7.
20. Murray-Bombay: 4 Oct. 1799, ut supra.
21. Duncan-Blankett: 17 Dec. 1799; BPP 381/7.
22. Blankett-Duncan: 19 Dec. 1799; BPP 381/9.
23. Bombay-India: 1 Jan. 1800; BPP 381/9.
24. India-Bombay: 4 Feb. 1800; BPP 381/10.
25. Blankett-Duncan: 6 Feb. 1800; BPP 381/9.
26. Low, History of the Indian Navy 1613-1863, Vol. I, p. 219.
27. Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 133-6.
28. Valentia, Voyages and Travels to India..., Vol. II, pp. 11-13.
29. *ibid.*, pp. 86-7.
30. For the July visit, see *ibid.*, pp. 86-90.
31. Memo. on the Trade in the Red Sea, dd 13 Sept. 1808; FO 1/1.
32. Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia ..., p. 106.
33. At the time Salt was writing, Britain was at war with the United States and France. The American ships were, on the whole, stronger than the British merchantmen.
34. op. cit., p. 111.
35. Salt-Strangford (British Ambassador at Istanbul): 16 Aug. 1822; BPP 385/52.
36. Playfair, op. cit., pp. 134-5.
37. *ibid.*, pp. 135-6.
38. For the value of the dollar, see Appendix 1, "Coins, Weights and Measures".
39. Elphinstone-Salt: 8 June 1820; FR, Egypt and the Red Sea, Vol. 7.
40. Salt-Elphinstone: 19 Nov. 1820; *ibid.*
41. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878, p. 38.

42. Bruce-Salt: 20 Jan. 1821; FR, Egypt and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, and Playfair, op. cit., pp. 136-9. Wm. Bruce, Resident at Bushehr in the Persian Gulf, conducted negotiations with the Mukha authorities.
43. Bruce (at Mukha) to Salt: 16 Jan. 1821, enc. treaty; FR, Egypt and the Red Sea, Vol. 7.
44. Lombay-Hutchinson: nd, enc. Hutchinson-Salt: 25 Jan. 1823; BPP 385/52.
45. Hutchinson-Bombay: 27 March 1822; *ibid.*
46. Bombay-Hutchinson: 31 May 1822; FR, Egypt and the Red Sea, Vol. 7.
47. Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, p. 147.
48. Referring to the British occupation, in 1820, of Ras al-Khaymah in order to suppress its pirates who were harrassing shipping in the area.
49. Salt-Dart (Secretary, East India House): 26 March 1823, enc. Salt-Strangford: 16-17 Oct. 1822; FR, Egypt and the Red Sea, Vol. 7.
50. Bombay-Court: 31 May 1823; Marine Misc. Records, Vol. 562.
51. Ellenborough-Court: 28 July 1829; *ibid.*
52. Ross, A Treatise on Navigation by Steam, pp. 131-2.
53. Jacob, Kings of Arabia, p. 29, quoting from Bagnold's diary.
54. Bagnold (at Bombay) to Govt.: 27 Sept. 1827; BPP 386/29/40.
55. Govt.-Bagnold: 8 Oct. 1827; *ibid.*
56. Bagnold (at Bombay) to Govt.: 27 Sept. 1827; *ibid.*
57. Sultan-Bombay: 27 Aug. 1827; BPP 386/30/42.
58. Govt. to Persian Dept. for translation: 18 Oct. 1827; *ibid.*
59. Sultan-Bombay: 29 Sept. 1828; BPP 386/42/43.
60. Min. by Governor: nd, *ibid.*
61. Low, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 527 and 531.
62. Jacob, op. cit., p. 28, quoting Haines.
63. Sir Charles Malcolm, Superintendent, I.N.-Govt.: 3 March 1835; BPP 387/71/3.
64. Ross-Malcolm: 26 July 1834; BPP 387/65/41.
65. India-Bombay: 26 Aug. 1834; *ibid.*
66. Malcolm-Govt.: 3 March 1835, forwarding extract from Haines' journal; BPP 387/71/8.
67. India-Bombay: 18 March 1835; BPP 387/73/14.
68. Malcolm-Govt.: 27 Nov. 1835, enc. Rose-Malcolm: 24 Oct. 1835; BPP 388/7/48.
69. cf. Hoskins, British Routes to India, pp. 188-9 and 195-6; also Jacob, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
70. Sultan-Bombay: nd, rec'd 21 Sept. 1835; BPP 388/5/40.
71. Res. by Govt.: 31 Oct. 1835; BPP 388/6/43.
72. Sultan-Bombay: 14 Sept. 1835; BPP 388/8/50.
73. Jacob, op. cit., p. 29, quoting Bagnold's diary.
74. Res. by Govt., 17 Dec. 1835; BPP 388/8/50.

Chapter II.

1. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, Vol. I, p. 278.
2. Marriott, The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, pp. 232-5; also Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, pp. 78-83.
3. Webster, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 596-7 and 604-5.
4. Playfair, History of Arabia Felix, pp. 140-6.
5. Palmerston to W. Temple (British Minister at Naples): 21 March 1833; Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, p. 145.
6. Palmerston-Granville (British Ambassador, Paris): 6 Nov. 1832; Webster, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 282.
7. Kelly, "Mehemet 'Ali's Expedition to the Persian Gulf 1837-1840 (Part I)", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I, July 1965, No. 4, p. 352.
8. Palmerston-Ponsonby: 16 Nov. 1834; Webster, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 340, quoting Palmerston Papers.
9. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 607.
10. Palmerston-Campbell: 4 Aug. 1837; FO 78/3185/15.
11. The 'Asiris, who helped the Egyptians against Turkchi, wanted to keep their acquisitions, but this they were not allowed to do. They rebelled, but were brought into subjection by Ibrahim Pasha in 1838.
12. Sir Alexander Johnston (Chairman of Correspondence, Royal Asiatic Society) to Palmerston: 4 July 1837, enc. Mackenzie's Report on the State of Arabia and Egypt: London, 1 June 1837; FO 78/3185.
13. Campbell-Palmerston: 23 Sept. 1837; FO 78/3185/51.
14. Palmerston-Campbell: 8 Dec. 1837; FO 78/318/25.
15. Campbell-Palmerston: 7 Feb. 1838; FO 78/342/5.
16. Campbell-Palmerston: 23 Feb. 1837, enc. Grant-Muhammad 'Ali: 15 Dec. 1836; FO 78/3185/9.
17. Muhammad 'Ali-Grant: 19 Feb. 1837, enc. in the above.
18. F.O.-Campbell: 3 April 1837; FO 78/3185/7.
19. Parl. P. 40, Docs. 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11.
20. Haines (Surveying brig "Palinurus" at sea) to Sir Charles Malcolm: 6 July 1837; Parl. P. 40/3.
21. Sultan-Bombay: 15 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/47.
22. Grant-Carnac: 17 Aug. 1837; Br. P. 841.
23. Grant-Hobhouse: 17 Aug. 1837; ibid.
24. Bombay-India: 15 Sept. 1837; Parl. P. 40/15.
25. Haines protested to the Governor of Mukha against this favouritism, but the Governor told him that it was not in his power to change the duty.
26. Min. by Grant: 23 Sept. 1837; BSP 92/26.
27. Min. by Farish: 25 Sept. 1837; ibid.
28. Min. by Grant: 26 Sept. 1837; ibid.
29. India-Bombay: 16 Oct. 1837; Parl. P. 40/19.
30. Grant-Malcolm (for Haines): 25 Nov. 1837; Parl. P. 40/20.
31. Min. by Grant: 26 March 1837; BSP 96/13.
32. Sultan-Bombay: 15 Jan. 1838, ut supra.
33. Haines-Malcolm: 20 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/21 and BSP 95/8.
34. Ahmad 'Abd al-Karim was not Muhsin's father, but his cousin.
35. Sultan-Haines: 11 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/22.
36. Haines-Sultan: 11 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/23 and 25.

37. Haines-Malcolm: 20 Jan. 1838, ut supra.
38. Haines-Sultan: 11 Jan. 1838, ut supra.
39. The latter part of the promise was never fulfilled.
40. Haines-Malcolm: 20 Jan. 1838, ut supra.
41. The Residency was abolished in 1828 for economic reasons.
42. Sultan-Ibramji: nd, rec'd by Haines 18 Nov. 1838; Parl. P. 40/88.
43. Watan, meaning homeland.
44. After a treaty had been signed with the British.
45. Sultan-Bombay: 15 Jan. 1838, ut supra.
46. Sultan-Haines: 18 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/29.
47. Haines-Sultan: 19 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/30.
48. Sultan-Haines: 20 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/31.
49. Haines-Sultan: 21 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/32.
50. See Ch. VI, p. 167.
51. Sultan-Haines: 22 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/33.
52. Sultan-Haines: 22 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/34.
53. Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838; BSP 95/8.
54. Haines-Sultan; Parl. P. 40/35. This letter is dated 24th, but should be 23rd January, 1838. The Sultan's reply is dated 23rd.
55. Sultan-Haines: 23 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/37.
56. Haines-Sultan: 24 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/38.
57. Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838, ut supra.
58. Sultan-Haines: 26 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/39.
59. Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838, ut supra.
60. Haines-Ahmad: 28 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/40.
61. Ahmad-Haines: 28 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/41.
62. Haines-Ahmad: 28 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/42.
63. Ahmad-Haines: 29 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/43.
64. Haines-Ahmad: 29 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/45.
65. Haines-Sultan: 30 Jan. 1838; Parl. P. 40/46.
66. Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838, ut supra.
67. Haines-Ibrahim Pasha: 6 Feb. 1838; BSP 95/8.
68. Grant-Hobhouse: 20 March 1838; Br. P. 841.
69. Min. by Grant subscribed to by Board: 26 March 1838; BSP 96/13.
70. Hobhouse-Grant: 10 May 1838; Br. P. 838.
71. This is clear from a letter sent from the Govt. of Bombay to the Sec. Com., dated 27 Aug. 1838; see Parl. P. 40/52.
72. Campbell-Palmerston: 27 March 1838, with encs.; FO 78/342/15.
73. Campbell-Palmerston: 27 March 1838, ut supra.
74. Campbell-Palmerston: 17 April 1838; FO 78/342/21.
75. Campbell-Palmerston: 7 July 1838; FO 78/343/45.
76. Muhammad 'Ali-Boghos Bey: 28 March 1838, enc. in the above.
77. Palmerston-Campbell: 12 May 1838; FO 78/342/15.
78. Palmerston-Campbell: 14 May 1838; FO 78/372/13.
79. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878, p. 60.
80. Palmerston-Campbell: 24 May 1838; FO 78/342/17.
81. Palmerston-Campbell: 8 June 1838; FO 78/343/18.
82. Palmerston-Campbell: 25 July 1838; FO 78/384.
83. Campbell-Palmerston: 29 May 1838; FO 78/342/36.
84. Where the Wahhabis had recovered power in the 1820's.
85. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 356-7.
86. Hobhouse-Auckland: 9 June 1838; Br. P. 838.
87. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 357-9.
88. Webster, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 608-10.
89. Campbell-Palmerston: 9 June 1838; FO 78/343/38.

90. Campbell-Palmerston: 7 July 1838; FO 78/343/45.
 91. Campbell-Palmerston: 1 Sept. 1838; FO 78/343/60.
 92. Marston, op. cit., p.59.
 93. India-Bombay: 2 July 1838; Parl. P. 40/51.
 94. Bombay-Sec. Com.: 27 Aug. 1838; Parl. P. 40/52.
 95. Min. by Farish subscribed to by Board: 1 Sept. 1838; BSP 99/37.
 96. Bombay-Sec. Com.: 7 Sept. 1838; Parl. P. 40/59.
 97. Parl. P. 40/56.
 98. They did pay it after the occupation.
 99. The question of the "Darya Dawlat" was in fact settled before the subject of the transfer was raised.
 100. Min. by Farish: 1 Sept. 1838, ut supra. Most of these instructions were suggested by Haines himself in his letters to Malcolm dated 3 Feb. and 22 Aug. 1838 (Parl. P. 40/27 and 54).
 101. Haines-Sultan: 24 Oct. 1838; Parl. P. 40/63.
 102. Sultan-Haines: nd; Parl. P. 40/65.
 103. Ahmad-Haines: nd; Parl. P. 40/68.
 104. After deducting £700 from the sum instead of adding to it, as Farish had instructed.
 105. Haines-Ahmad: 31 Oct. 1838; Parl. P. 40/69.
 106. Haines-Bombay: 9 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/105.
 107. Haines-Ahmad: 4 Nov. 1838; Parl. P. 40/71.
 108. Haines-Bombay: 6 Nov. 1838; BSP 101/49.
 109. Haines-Bombay: 7 Nov. 1838; Parl. P. 40/77.
 110. Haines-Bombay: 6 Nov. 1838, ut supra.
 111. Haines-Denton: 20 Nov. 1838; Parl. P. 40/91.
 112. Haines-Bombay: 13 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/100.
 113. Haines-Bombay: 13 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/101.
 114. Haines-Sultan: 14 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/103.
 115. Sultan-Haines: 16 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/106.
 116. Sultan-Haines: nd, rec'd 24 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/111.
 117. Min. by Farish subscribed to by Board: 29 Nov. 1838; BSP 101/49.
 118. Farish-Sultan: 1 Dec. 1838; ibid.
 119. Bombay-Haines: 2 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/82.
 120. Bombay-Haines: 21 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/85.
 121. Haines-Sultan: 24 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/112 enc. 113.
 122. Sultan-Haines: 24 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/114.
 123. Haines-Sultan: 25 Dec. 1838; Parl. P. 40/115.
 124. Haines-Bombay: 9 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/105.
 125. Sultan-Haines: 7 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/121.
 126. Haines-'Aydarus: 8 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/122.
 127. Haines-Bombay: 10 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/123.
 128. "A Descriptive and Historical Notice of Aden, lately captured by the British", United Service Journal, 1840, Part II, p. 9.
 129. Haines-Sultan: 16 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/129.
 130. Sultan-Haines: 16 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/130.
 131. Haines-Bombay: 25 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/128. For an account of the battle and the events leading to it, see "Officer in the Queen's Army", Historical and Statistical Sketches of Aden..., pp. 54-7, or Low, History of the Indian Navy 1613-1863, Vol. II, pp 118-125.
 132. India-Bombay: 21 Jan. 1839; Parl. P. 40/124.
 133. Hansard, 46, 11 March 1839.

Chapter III.

1. Haines' Memoir, Bombay Marine Proceedings, 412/65, and Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, Vol. II, pp. 388-9.
2. See article on "'Adan" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Ed. 1960.
3. The Travels of Marco Polo, Everyman's Edition, Introduction p. viii and pp. 401-2.
4. Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354, Translated and selected by H.A.R. Gibb, p.109.
5. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs..., pp. 8-9.
6. *ibid.*, p. 8.
7. Wellsted, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 393-4.
8. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, p. 26.
9. Wellsted, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 393-5.
10. Haines' Memoir, *ut supra*.
11. "A Descriptive and Historical Notice of Aden, lately captured by the British", United Service Journal, 1840, Part II, p. 11.
12. Western-Bailie: 25 and 28 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8.
13. Bombay-Haines: 2 March 1839; BSP 108/9.
14. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
15. Foster-Bombay: 30 March 1839; BSP 111/15.
16. Govt.-Foster (now in Bombay): 15 April 1839; *ibid.*
17. Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8.
18. Govt.-Foster: 15 April 1839; *ut supra*.
19. India-Bombay: 20 May 1839; BSP 114/24.
20. Memo. by Political Secretary, Bombay: 14 Jan. 1840, quoting letter from Sec. Com. dd 7 Sept. 1839; BSP 129/6.
21. Foster-Govt.: 15 May 1839; BSP 119/33.
22. "Sometimes" would have been more accurate.
23. Foster had in mind Socotra for which, it was rumoured, "some foreign power" was bargaining.
24. Foster-Govt.: 23 Aug. 1839; BSP 119/33.
25. Curtis-Bombay: 3 Nov. 1840; BMP 361/45/27 Jan. 1841.
26. Unless specifically mentioned, the figures given for the population do not include the military.
27. Haines-Bombay: 5 March 1839; BSP 110/12.
28. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp. 13-14.
29. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
30. Haines-Bombay: 13 Sept. 1839; BSP 121/37.
31. Rep. by Mil. Com. (Aden): 29 Aug. 1840; BMP 361/45/27 Jan. 1841.
32. Haines-Hallam: 26 Aug. 1840; BMP 361/38/23 Sept. 1840.
33. Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug. 1840; *ibid.*
34. Min. by Carnac: 25 Oct. 1840; BMP 361/45/27 Jan. 1841.
35. Memo. by McMahon: 13 Nov. 1840; *ibid.*
36. Haines-Bombay: 31 March 1840; BSP 134/19.
37. Haines-Bombay: 15 Oct. 1842; BSP 196/49.
38. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 15 April 1840; BSP 134/19.
39. Haines-Bombay: 19 April 1842; ARR 25/34 (Sec.).
40. Haines-Bombay: 13 May 1842; ARR 25/5 (Sec.).
41. Haines-Bombay: 24 Nov. 1842; BSP 197/45.
42. Haines-Bombay: 19 April 1842; ARR 25/34 (Sec.).
43. Haines-Bombay: 13 May 1842; ARR 25/5 (Sec.)
44. Curtis-Haines: 27 Oct. 1841; BSP 184/13.
45. In Aden, the word "sidi" (from Arabic "sayyid", "lord" or "master") was jocularly applied to non-Somali Africans, most of whom were former slaves.

46. The term "borah" or "bohora" ("trader" in Gujerati) records the occupation of the first Hindu converts to Islam, but not all Borahs were Muslims. The Muslim Borahs were either Shi'i or Sunni. The Shi'i Borahs were Isma'ilis and were by far the larger group. They were townspeople essentially devoted to trading and money-lending. They lived mainly in Surat, Burhanpur, Ujain, etc. The Sunni Borahs were traditionally peasants who lived chiefly in the Northern Konkan and Gujerat. The Borahs who went to Aden must have been mostly Shi'i.
47. Haines-Bombay: 24 Nov. 1842; BSP 197/54.
48. Mignon, "A Short Camp Residence in the Valley of Aden...", pp. 10, 15 and 12.
49. Memo. by Bombay Govt.: 25 Nov., 1842; BMP 362/10/2 Dec. 1842.
50. Rep. by Special Com.: 23 Sept. 1843; BSP 214/48.
51. Haines-Special Com.: 12 Dec. 1842; Appendix to Special Com.'s Rep. of 23rd Sept. 1843, ut supra.
52. Rep. by Special Com.: 23 Sept. 1843; ut supra.
53. India-Bombay: 28 Dec. 1843; BSP 217/5.
54. India-Bombay: 9 April 1843; BSP 204/19.
55. In 1843, the French had occupied one of these islands, Mayotte.
56. Memo. by Hardinge: 7 July 1844; BMP 362/39/7 Aug. 1844.
57. These reductions were not put into effect. The garrison was rarely less than 1696; and when the Settlement had horse, it was never less than 50.
58. Special Com.-Mil. Board: 26 Sept. 1844; BMP 362/42/23 Oct. 1844.
59. India-Bombay: 14 March 1845; BSP 234/13.
60. India-Bombay: 13 May enc. Memo. by Hardinge: 10 May 1845; BSP 236/20.
61. India-Bombay: 21 Sept. 1846; BSP 246/32.
62. See Ch. VI, p. 191.
63. India-Bombay: 14 Oct. enc. Memo by Hardinge: 30 Sept. 1846; BSP 247/35.
64. Haines-Bombay: 19 June and Min. by Governor subscribed to by Board: 12 July 1843; BSP 209/29.
65. Rep. by Hardinge (written off Qusayr): 10 Feb. 1848; BMP 363/46/29 March 1848.
66. Bombay-Haines: 24 April 1845, referring to letter from Haines dd 5 March 1845; ARR 44/2009 (Pol.).
67. Lieut.-Col. J. Holland, Q.M.G., Poona (for FitzClarence) to Bombay: 17 Aug. 1853; ARR 117.
68. Govt.-Holland: 14 Sept. 1853; *ibid.*
69. Holland-Govt.: 27 Sept. 1853; *ibid.*
70. Bombay-Haines: 26 Oct. 1853; BPP 394/50/24; cf. Jacob, Kings of Arabia, pp. 64-6.
71. Rep. by Mil. Com.: 21 Nov. 1853; BMP 364/64/15 April 1854.
72. Haines-Bombay: 25 Nov. 1853; *ibid.*
73. Rep. by Mil. Com.: 2 Dec. 1853; *ibid.*
74. Govt.-Mil. Board: 8 Sept. 1854; BMP 364/70/13 Sept. 1854.
75. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 Feb. 1855; Elph. P. 6D/11.
76. Res. by Govt.: 1 Dec. 1855; BMP 365/15/12 Dec. 1855.
77. The letter, dated 23 Oct. 1847, was quoted in a report by Waddington: 7 Aug. 1857; BSP 315/17.
78. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, p. 13.
79. cf. Playfair, *op. cit.*, p. 13, and Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-3.
80. For the Abyssinian Campaign, see Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878, Chs. XVI-XX.
81. Napier-I.O.: 2 May 1868; ARR 473.

82. Russell-Bombay: 5 April 1869; ARR 492/102 (Mil.).
83. Jacob, op. cit., p. 63.
84. Frere-Wood: 22 Oct. 1862; W.P. 88/4.
85. Haines-Bombay: 1 Jan. 1843; ARR 31/1 (Sec.).
86. Haines-Bombay: 6 May 1845; ARR 50/27 (Pol.).
87. Haines-Bombay: 8 May 1846; ARR 58/25 (Pol.).
88. Haines-Bombay: 15 June 1846; ARR 58/35 (Sec.).
89. Troops used for police duties without being fully trained for them.
90. Outram-Bombay: 13 Sept. enc. Outram-Sec. Com.; 9 Sept. 1854; BSP 292/30.
91. Outram-Bombay: 27 Sept. 1854; ARR 130/137 (Jud.).
92. Coghlan-Bombay: 24 Aug. 1856; BSP 301/16.
93. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 20 Jan. 1857; ARR 197/9 and 1 (Jud.).
94. Tremenneere-Bombay: 27 June, enc. Admin. Rep. for 1871-2; 31 May 1872; ARR 572/127 (Pol.).
95. Coghlan-Bombay: 30 April and 1 May 1859; LAZ 37.
96. Playfair-Fuller (Ex. Eng.): 27 Oct. 1860; ARR 282 (PW), and Playfair-Bombay: 1 Nov. 1860; ARR 287/167 (Pol.).
97. Bombay-Merewether: 12 Aug. 1864; ARR 394/1480 (PW).
98. Merewether-Bombay: 24 Nov. 1864; ARR 394/113 (PW).
99. Conservancy Rep. for 1864, Merewether-Bombay: 14 Feb. 1865, enc. Goodfellow-Merewether: 13 Jan. 1865; ARR 418.
100. Frideaux-Tremenneere: 22 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part I)/72 (Gen.).
101. Haines-Bombay: 12 Nov. 1845; ARR 50/20 (Pol.).
102. Merewether-Bombay: 14 Feb., enc. Conservancy Rep. for 1864: 13 Jan. 1865; ARR 418/26 (Gen.).
103. Frideaux-Tremenneere: 22 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part I)/72 (Gen.).
104. Reps. on Public Works by Ex. Eng. for 1859-60 and 1860-61: 1 and 13 May respectively; ARR 306.
105. Goodfellow-Russell: 28 Jan. 1869; ARR 495.
106. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 7-9.
107. Bombay-India: 12 Jan. 1847; BSP 249/2.
108. Bombay-Haines: 13 March 1847; BSP 249/12.
109. Haines-Bombay: 15 April 1847; BSP 251/21.
110. Min. by Governor concurred in by Commander-in-Chief Sir W. Cotton and L.R. Reid: 5 May 1847; BSP 251/21.
111. Bombay-Haines: 17 March 1852; ARR 105/1212 (Pol.).
112. No epidemic was reported that year, and Outram himself did not elaborate.
113. Outram-Bombay: 26 Sept. 1854; BSP 292/32.
114. See Ch. VII, p. 201.
115. Haines-Bombay: 6 April 1851, enc. Emergency Regulations; BSP 272/9.
116. Outram-Sultan: 21 Sept. and Outram-Bombay: 26 Sept. 1854; BSP 292/32.
117. Merewether-Bombay: 15 July 1865; ARR 418/99 (Jud.).
118. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 1 April 1855; ARR 151/56 (Jud.).
119. Aden Port Regulations, Unconnected with Customs Laws, Bombay: 6 March 1856; ARR 173.
120. Coghlan-Bombay: 17 Jan. 1863, enc. Judicial and Conservancy Rep. for 1862; ARR 370/6 (Jud.).
121. Merewether-Bombay: 8 July 1863; ARR 370/51 (Jud.).
122. Merewether-Bombay: 14 Oct. 1865; ARR 418/152 (Jud.).

123. Russell-Bombay: 20 April 1869; ARR 495/122 (Jud.).
124. Bombay-Haines: 25 Nov. 1847; ARR 61/4511 (Pol.).
125. Coghlan-Bombay: 2 Nov. 1858; ARR 232/151 (Sec.).
126. Playfair-Bombay: 27 Sept. 1861; ARR 318/159 (Pol.).
127. Coghlan-Bombay: 2 Nov. 1858, ut supra.
128. Goodfellow (in charge of Residency) to London: 13 July 1869; LA 44.
129. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp. 13-14.
130. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 26-7.
131. Plural of "Khadim", "servant" in Arabic.
132. For additional information on the Akhdam, see Arnaud, "Les Akhdam de l'Yemen", Journal Asiatique, Vol. XV, pp. 376-86, and Von Maltzan, Keise nach Sudarabien ..., pp. 182-92.
133. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp. 14-16, and Hunter, op. cit., pp. 27-36 and 79-86. See also Von Maltzan, op. cit., pp. 159-181.
134. Mil. Board Bombay-Q.M.G., Poona: 12 July 1853, quoting letter from Haines; ARR 117/3052 (Mil.).
135. Outram-Bombay: 9 Oct. enc. Rep. by Com. on Wells: 30 Sept. 1854; ARR 134/143 (Pol.).
136. ibid.
137. Coghlan-Bombay: 11 March 1856; BFWP 365/20/10 May 1856.
138. Bombay-Coghlan: 28 April 1856; ibid.
139. Res. by Governor subscribed to by Malet: 7 Aug. 1856, quoting letter from Adam; BFWP 352/66/21 Aug. 1856.
140. Outram-Bombay: 9 Oct. enc. Rep. by Com. on Wells: 30 Sept. 1854, ut supra.
141. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs ..., p. 7.
142. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 July 1855; ARR 153/93 (Mil.).
143. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs..., p. 11. cf. "Reminiscences", Chambers Journal, 6th Series, Vol. II, No. 56, Dec. 24, 1898, p. 50.
144. Res. by Governor subscribed to by Malet: 7 Aug. 1856; BFWP 352/66/21 Aug. 1856, quoting letter from Adam. This letter is given as "anonymous" in Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs..., p. 18, and in Norris and Penhey, An Archaeological and Historical Survey of the Aden Tanks, pp. 13-14.
145. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 3 Oct. 1856; Elph. P. 9A/4.
146. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs..., p. 8.
147. Playfair-Bombay: 15 July 1861; ARR 134/116 (Pol.).
148. Bombay-Playfair: 17 Aug. 1861; ARR 134/4349 (PW)
149. Coghlan-Bombay: 17 Feb. 1863; ARR 369/16 (PW).
150. ARR 369.
151. Hunter, op. cit., p. 12.
152. Rep. by Captain W.M. Ducat, Ex. Eng.: 18 May 1872; ARR 573. Also Hunter, op. cit., p. 15.
153. Pym-Merewether: 28 Aug. 1863; ARR 369/505 (PW).
154. Merewether-Bombay: 15 Sept. 1863; ARR 369.
155. One would have expected Merewether to suggest a lower price for the Shaykh 'Uthman water because he had expressed sympathy with the poor and because the water was of inferior quality. However, he may have felt that such a price would induce the Government to sponsor the project.
156. Merewether-Bombay: 14 May 1864; ARR 394/38 (PW).
157. Merewether-Pym: 23 Oct. 1863; ARR 369/417 (PW).
158. Merewether-Bombay: 2 Nov. 1863; LA 40.
159. Merewether-Bombay: 1 April 1864; ARR 394/23 (PW).

160. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Feb. 1867; ARR 456/26 (PW).
161. Merewether-Bombay: 16 March 1867; ARR 456/37 (Pol.).
162. Russell-Bombay: 18 Dec. 1868; LA 44.
163. Prideaux-Ex. Eng., Aden: 13 Oct. 1870; ARR 534/1066 (Ml.).
164. Ducat's Rep., ut supra.
165. Prideaux-Ex. Eng.: 13 Oct., 1870, ut supra.
166. Tremeneere-Bombay: 11 April 1872; ARR 614/72 (PW).
167. Hunter, op. cit., p. 10.
168. It is not known how he arrived at this figure.
169. Bombay-India: 9 July 1869; ARR 534/PW.372-MW.1682. The opinions of Mander and Russell were reported by the Government.
170. India-Bombay: 6 Oct. 1869; ARR 534/1050 (PW).
171. Res. by Govt.: 3 Sept. 1873; ARR 614/338-MW.2022.
172. Hunter, op. cit., p. 17.

Chapter IV.

1. Haines' Memoir, Bombay Marine Proceedings, 412/65.
2. Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, Vol. II, p. 397.
3. *ibid.*, p. 411.
4. Haines' Memoir, ut supra.
5. See Appendices 2 and 3.
6. Haines-Malcolm, Superintendent, I.N.: 3 Feb. 1838; Parl. P. 40/27.
7. Haines' Memoir, ut supra.
8. Wellsted, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 397.
9. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
10. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
11. Bombay-Haines: 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 118/30.
12. See Appendix 4. The official year ran from 1st May to 30th April until 1866-7, when it was changed to run from 1st April to 31st March.
13. See Ch. V, p. 136.
14. Haines-Bombay: 28 May 1842; ARR 25/8 (TDR).
15. Trade Rep. 1842-3, Haines-Bombay: 4 July 1843; BRP 374/22/27 Sept. 1843.
16. Trade Rep. 1863-4, Merewether-Bombay: 9 June 1864; ARR 398/47 (Rev.).
17. Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8.
18. Certificates by which the merchant was exempted from export duty at any port in the Bombay Presidency.
19. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
20. India-Bombay: 20 March 1839; BSP 111/15.
21. India-Bombay: 25 March 1839; *ibid.*
22. *ibid.*
23. Bailie-Bombay: 4 April 1839; BSP 112/18.
24. See Appendix 3.
25. Bailie-Bombay: 4 April 1839, ut supra.
26. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; ut supra.
27. Haines-Bombay: 12 March 1848; enc. treaty; BSP 255/14.
28. Haines-Bombay: 14 June 1853; BSP 284/18.
29. Trade Rep. 1845-6, Haines-Bombay: 10 Sept. 1846; BRP 375/38/28 April 1847.
30. Trade Rep. 1870-71, Tremeneere-Bombay: 8 June 1871; ARR 561 (Part I)/129 (Pol.).

31. Haines-Bombay: 11 Jan. 1854; BSP 289/6.
32. Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug. 1841; BSP 168/59.
33. Coghlan-Bombay: 6 March 1858; LA 36.
34. Haines-Bombay: 21 March 1847; BSP 250/14.
35. In 1846, Haines put the average value of the camel load at one and a half dollars, and in 1856, Playfair put it at four and a quarter rupees.
36. See Appendix 5A.
37. Qat is a shrub, the leaves of which, when chewed, act as a stimulant.
38. For the three main articles of import and export, see Appendix 5B and C.
39. Trade Rep. 1849-50, Haines-Bombay: 20 Aug. 1850; BRP 377/9/11 Sept. 1850, and Trade Rep. 1850-51, Haines-Bombay: 13 Aug. 1851; BRP 377/47/15 Oct. 1851.
40. Haines-Bombay: 11 Jan. 1854; BSP 289/6.
41. Trade Rep. 1855-6, Coghlan-Bombay: 17 May 1856; ARR 173/71 (TDR).
42. Aden Trade Returns, 1867-70.
43. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
44. Bombay-Haines: 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 118/30.
45. See Appendix 6.
46. Wood for building was made free, and cloth manufactured in Britain or any British possession was reduced from 5% to $3\frac{1}{2}\%$.
47. Bombay-Haines: 13 March 1840; BRP 373/13/19 March 1840.
48. Craft from the Persian Gulf, Zanzibar, Abyssinia and the Red Sea coast.
49. Haines-Bombay: 24 Jan. 1843; ARR 31/2 (TDR).
50. India Act VI, 1848; India Acts, Vol. 3.
51. Haines-Bombay: 24 Aug. 1848; ARR 74/25 (TDR).
52. Haines-Bombay: 13 Oct. 1845; ARR 50/9 (TDFin).
53. See Appendix 4.
54. Trade Rep. 1846-7, Haines-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1847; BRP 375/50/15 Sept. 1847.
55. Bombay-Haines: 10 Feb. 1848, enc. Bombay-India: 3 Dec. 1847; ARR 70/381 (TDR).
56. India-Bombay: 15 Jan. 1848, enc. in the above.
57. Hardinge (off Qusayr) to Clerk: 13 Feb. 1848; Clerk Papers 3B.
58. Bombay-Haines: 17 Oct. 1848, enc. India-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1848; ARR 70/6254 (TDR).
59. Haines-Bombay: 24 Aug. 1848; ARR 74/25 (TDR).
60. Court-Bombay: 30 May 1849; Rev. Letters to Bombay 790/11.
61. India Acts, Vol. 3.
62. Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854, enc. Postscript to Part 2 of Appendix by Badger, dd 21 July 1854; BSP 291/28. See also Ch. VII, pp. 197-233.
63. Min. by Governor: 6 Sept. 1854; BSP 291/28.
64. Haines-Bombay: 29 May 1852; ARR 110/31 (Pol.).
65. In the first fourteen years coupled with Eremen.
66. Haines-Bombay: 9 Feb. 1847; BSP 249/12.
67. Trade Rep. 1845-6, ut supra.
68. Merewether-Bombay: 5 May 1866; ARR 433/65 (Pol.).
69. For the growth and distribution of the sea trade, see Appendix 7A, where the period has been divided into four seven-year blocks for purposes of comparison. Note especially the seven years before and after the opening of the port.

70. Trade Rep. 1843-4, Haines-Bombay: 24 June 1844; BRP 374/39/28 Aug. 1844.
71. Trade Rep. 1847-8, Haines-Bombay: 24 July 1848; BRP 376/14/6 Sept. 1848, and Trade Rep. 1848-9, Haines-Bombay: 4 Aug. 1849; BRP 376/50/26 Sept. 1849.
72. Trade Rep. 1858-9, Coghlan-Bombay: 18 May 1859; ARR 254/62 (TDR).
73. Trade Rep. 1845-6, ut supra.
74. Trade Rep. 1859-60, Playfair-Bombay: 24 May 1860; ARR 284/78 (Rev.).
75. See Appendix 7E.
76. The partial report for 1842-3 and the full report for 1843-4.
77. Bombay-Haines: 27 Aug. 1844; ARR 37/2837 (TDR).
78. Trade Rep. 1847-8, ut supra.
79. Trade Rep. 1848-9, ut supra.
80. Trade Rep. 1861-2, Honner-Bombay: 17 May 1862; ARR 342/83 (Rev.).
81. For coal imports and "exports", see Appendix 7C.
82. According to Playfair. The Trade Report for 1854-5 gives no figure for land imports. See Appendix 5A.
83. See Appendix 7D.
84. Trade Report 1850-51, ut supra.
85. Bombay Customs Dept. to Bombay Govt.: 22 Dec. 1855; ARR 137/1910 (TDR).
86. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, p. 90.
87. See Appendix 8D.
88. Tremenhoe-Bombay: 27 June 1872, enc. Admin. Rep. for 1871-2; ARR 572/129 (Pol.).

Chapter V.

1. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
2. Min. by Board: 9 Sept. 1839; BSP 119/33.
3. Min. by Board: 19 Nov. 1839; BSP 123/43.
4. For the differences between Haines and Bailie, see BSP Vols. 119 and 122.
5. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 16 March 1840; BSP 131/13.
6. Haines-Bombay: 18 Feb. 1840; *ibid.*
7. Haines-Bombay: 22 Feb. 1840; BSP 132/14.
8. Bombay-Haines: 28 Feb. 1840; BSP 131/11.
9. It is surprising that Carnac did not make the point that Kharg was occupied as a temporary measure only, to force the Shah to withdraw from Herat. Aden, on the other hand, was occupied as a permanent possession.
10. Min. by Carnac: 16 March 1840, ut supra.
11. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 20 May 1840; Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India, 12/609.
12. Haines-Bombay: 31 March 1840, with encs.; BSP 134/19.
13. Nor did Haines have "an establishment of writers". At the end of 1840 he had only one permanent writer.
14. Capon-Bombay: 31 March 1840; BSP 135/22.
15. Min. by Governor subscribed to by Board: 15 April 1840; BSP 134/19.

16. Aden was never officially declared a British possession, although it was internationally regarded as such.
17. Min. by Governor: 10 July 1847; BSP 252/30.
18. Min. by Reid: 20 July 1847; *ibid.*
19. The head of administration at Singapore was a military officer having the title of Lieutenant-Governor and responsible to the Governor-General. He commanded the garrison and had undivided authority over every branch of the public service.
20. Min. by Willoughby: 22 July 1847; *ibid.*
21. Min. by Governor subscribed to by Board: 23 July 1847; *ibid.* Jacob writes that in 1838 Grant offered Bagnold the command of the expedition sent to capture Aden, but he declined due to poor health. (Kings of Arabia, p. 29)
22. India-Bombay: 26 Aug. 1847; BPP 392/56/24.
23. Court-Bombay: 19 Jan. 1848; Political Letters to Bombay, 480/1.
24. Outram had been Political Agent at Mahi Kanta and in Lower and Upper Sind. He had also been on a number of diplomatic missions and had distinguished himself in fighting against Indian and Afghan tribes. In Elphinstone's opinion there was no difference between these tribes and the Arabs in the vicinity of Aden.
25. Min. by Governor: 17 April 1854; subscribed to by Warden and Lunsden in separate minutes; BSP 290/17. Outram had formerly been Resident at Baroda, the highest position under the Bombay Government until it came under the Government of India in 1854.
26. India-Bombay: 25 March 1839; BSP 111/15.
27. Pombay-India: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
28. Bombay-Haines: 28 Nov. 1839; BSP 124/44.
29. Haines-Bombay: 23 Dec. 1840; BSP 153/4.
30. Haines-Bombay: 1 June, enc. Cruttenden-Haines: 30 May 1841; BSP 165/30.
31. Min. by Anderson, nd; *ibid.*
32. Bombay-Haines: 14 July 1841; *ibid.*
33. Haines-Bombay: 19 Aug. 1841; BSP 169/41.
34. Naval and passenger vessels also took and brought mail.
35. Bombay-Haines: 23 Sept. 1841; BSP 169/41.
36. Min. by Governor: 17 April 1854, *ut supra.*
37. See Appendix 10.
38. Haines-Bombay: 8 March and Bombay-Haines: 9 April 1839; BSP 111/14.
39. Haines-Bombay: 13 Oct. 1843, with encs.; BSP 218/13.
40. Bombay-Haines: 17 Feb. 1844; *ibid.*
41. Badger's Rep., Appendix B to Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854; BSP 291/28.
42. Outram-Bombay: 20 July 1854; BPP 395/24/11.
43. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
44. Appendix A to Haines' letter of 9 June 1839, *ut supra.*
45. Dombay-Haines: 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 118/30.
46. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
47. *ibid.*
48. Bombay-Haines: 14 Aug. 1841; BSP 165/30.
49. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
50. Haines-Bombay: 2 Aug. 1839; BSP 119/32.
51. Haines-Bombay: 18 April 1841; BSP 161/24.

52. Bombay-Haines: 20 May 1841; *ibid.*
53. Prideaux-Tremenheere: 21 May 1872; ARR 572/100 (Jud.).
54. See Appendix 11.
55. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, p. 131.
56. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839, *ut supra.*
57. Bombay-Haines: 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 118/30.
58. India-Bombay: 12 Aug. 1839; BSP 119/33.
59. Haines-Bombay: 27 Oct. 1840; BSP 148/49.
60. Bombay-Haines: 30 Nov. 1840; *ibid.*
61. Haines-Bombay: 20 May and Bombay-Haines: 16 June 1841; BSP 161/26.
62. On the death of Sa'id Ibn Sultan, the ruler of Masqat and Zanzibar in October 1856, a dynastic dispute arose regarding the position of Zanzibar. The British decided to intervene and settle the quarrel. In March 1860, Coghlan was commissioned to inquire into and report on the matter. He left Aden on the 19th April, accompanied by Rassam and Badger, visiting first Masqat and then Zanzibar. In December, Coghlan submitted his report to the Government of Bombay, and it was on the basis of this report that a settlement was concluded in April 1861. Coghlan returned to Aden on 28th July, 1861. See Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, pp. 14-37.
63. Playfair-Bombay: 9 Jan. and 4 April 1861; ARR 315/7 and 61 (Jud.).
64. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 Feb. and Res. by Govt.: 30 June 1863; ARR 370/16 and 1761 (Jud.).
65. Russell-Bombay: 24 Sept. and Res. by Govt.: 28 Nov. 1868; ARR 476/119 and 3918 (Jud.).
66. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871, enc. Admin. Rep. for 1870-71; ARR 561 (Part I)/129 (Pol.).
67. India Act II, 1864; India Acts, Vol. 9.
68. For the establishment of Courts of Small Causes beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of Judicature established by Royal Charter. See Appendix 12.
69. Prideaux-Tremenheere: 21 May 1872; ARR 572/100 (Jud.).
70. *ibid.*
71. Playfair-Bombay: 4 April 1861; ARR 315/61 (Jud.).
72. cf. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
73. It is not indicated how many members were to be on the jury, nor is it mentioned how the number was to be made up.
74. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
75. Superintendent of Police, Bombay, to Govt.: 30 March 1840; BSP 132/14.
76. Haines-Bombay: 27 July and Min. by Governor: 23 Aug. 1841; BSP 167/36.
77. Haines-Bombay: 17 May 1845; ARR 50/2 (Gen.).
78. Bombay-Haines: 13 March 1847; BSP 249/12.
79. Merewether-Bombay: 14 Feb. 1865; ARR 418.
80. Hunter-Tremenheere: 29 May 1872; ARR 572/104 (Gen.).
81. Former Assistant-Residents gave nearly the same assessment of the three races.
82. Prideaux-Tremenheere: 22 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part I)/71 (Jud.).
83. Haines-Bombay: 27 March 1841; BSP 159/18.
84. Govt. of Bombay to Mil. Dept.: 13 Dec. 1853; ARR 114/5169 (Jud.).
85. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April 1855; ARR 151/56 (Jud.).
86. Res. by Govt.: 18 July 1863; ARR 369/1378 (PW).
87. See Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

88. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 1 April 1855; ARR 151/56 (Jud.).
89. *ibid.*
90. Haines-Bombay: 30 March 1852 (Crime Rep. for 1851-2); ARR 110/7 (Jud.).
91. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan; 20 Jan. 1857; ARR 197/9 (Jud.).
92. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 1 April 1855, *ut supra.*
93. Russell-Bombay: 8 Jan. 1869; ARR 495/18 (Jud.).
94. See Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
95. Haines-Bombay: 24 May 1847; BPP 392/24/29.
96. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 20 Jan. 1857, *ut supra.*
97. Playfair-Bombay: 1 Oct. 1860; ARR 283/144 (Jud.).
98. Playfair-Bombay: 1 June 1861, Admin. Rep. for 1860-61; ARR 306.
99. Whereby troops were transported between England and India via Suez, and not via the Cape of Good Hope.
100. Leighton (Officiating Postmaster-General, Bombay) to Coghlan: 25 Feb. and 19 Aug. 1859; ARR 260/406 and 1521.
101. Waller (Postmaster, Aden) to Playfair: 11 March and Coghlan-Bombay: 16 March 1859; ARR 260/16 and 164 (Gen.).
102. Postmaster to Abbott (in charge of Residency): 1 April 1868; ARR 475.
103. Mignon, "A Short Camp Residence in the Valley of Aden...", pp. 18-19.
104. Haines-Bombay: 15 and 31 May 1846, with encs. from Civil Surgeon; BSP 245/17; and Haines-Bombay: 15 June 1846; BSP 245/18.
105. Bombay-Haines: 13 March 1847; BSP 249/12.
106. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 March 1872; ARR 576(Part1)/49 (Marine).
107. Playfair-Bombay: 31 Aug. enc. Civil Surgeon to Playfair: 31 Aug. 1860; ARR 280/127 (Pol.).
108. See Playfair's letter above and Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
109. Rep. from Medical Superintendent to Coghlan: 28 April 1856; ARR 170.
110. Coghlan-Bombay: 26 Sept. 1856; BSP 302/18.
111. Coghlan-Bombay: 1 Aug. 1861; LA 39.
112. Moore, Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy, 1853-66, p. 108.
113. Bombay-Coghlan: 17 May 1855; ARR 149/Circular 1732 (Gen.).
114. Coghlan-Bombay: 25 Dec. 1856; BSP 306/2.
115. Admin. Rep. 1859-60, prepared by Playfair: 1 June 1860; ARR 306.
116. Coghlan-Bombay: 14 Jan. enc. Badger-Coghlan: 12 Jan. 1860; BEP 352/44.
117. First a European, and then a Parsi.
118. Admin. Rep. 1866-7, Merewether-Bombay: 5 June 1867; ARR 457. See also McKnight (Headmaster) to Sir A. Grant (Director of Public Instruction, Bombay): 1 April 1868; ARR 475, and Sorabji Pestonji (Headmaster) to Hancock (First Assistant-Resident): 14 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part 1).
119. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871, enc. Admin Rep. for 1870-71; ARR 561 (Part 1)/129 (Pol.).
120. Alphonsus (Catholic Chaplain at Aden) to Tremenheere: 19 May 1871; *ibid.*
121. To permit country craft to leave their ordinary grounds and proceed to sea.

122. Persons entering Aden with arms had to leave them at the Barrier Gate. When they collected them, they had to pay four annas, and a further six annas were charged towards the cost of hiring a donkey for a police escort to see them safely out of the town. This tax was abolished in 1854.
123. Paid by shopkeepers.
124. Paid by shopkeepers in certain parts of the town where the streets were watered.
125. The police received four annas for serving summonses. This was also abolished in 1854.
126. Outram-Bombay: 20 July, enc. Dansey (Acting Assistant Political Agent) to Clarke (Acting Political Agent): 22 March 1854; BPP 395/24/11.
127. See Hunter, op. cit., pp. 132-5.
128. At the end of the year, the Municipal Fund was either in debt or had only a small balance in hand, as shown by the table below:-

	<u>1865-6</u>	<u>1866-7</u>	<u>1867-8</u>	<u>1868-9</u>
Receipts	Rs. 36,446	38,647	40,926	44,646
Expenditure	Rs. 35,640	37,742	42,777	41,576
Balance:	<u>Rs. 806</u>	<u>905</u>	DR <u>1,851</u>	<u>3,070</u>

129. Tremenheere-Bombay: 25 April 1871; ARR 570/89 (Gen.).

Chapter VI.

1. For information about the tribes see:
 - a) Haines' Memoir, 1838 (Bombay Marine Proceedings 412/65).
 - b) Badger's report on the tribes and their relations with the Settlement, 1850-54 (Appendix B to Outram's letter dd 10 Aug. 1854; BSP 291/28).
 - c) Prideaux's report on the tribes, 10 Jan. 1872 (Enc. in Tremenheere-Bombay: 21 Jan. 1872; Official Publications, Aden Admin. Reports, Vol. 1).
2. Haines-Bombay: 5 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
3. Not ₹8700 as stated by Waterfield in Sultans of Aden, p. 94.
4. Min. by Farish: 18 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
5. Farish-Hobhouse: nd, probably April 1839; Br. P. 841.
6. Min. by Anderson: nd; BSP 108/8.
7. Min. by Dunlop: 19 Feb. 1839; *ibid.*
8. Bombay-Haines: 22 Feb. 1839; *ibid.*
9. Haines-Bombay: 7 March 1839; BSP 110/13.
10. Haines-Bombay: 15 March 1839, enc. Sultan's letter which wrongly appears under date 16 March 1839; BSP 111/15.
11. Res. by Board: 12 April 1839; *ibid.*
12. Haines-Bombay: 4, 6 and 8 March 1839; BSP 110/12.
13. Min. by Farish and Anderson, dd 10 March 1839. This date must be incorrect because letters from Aden normally required a fortnight to reach Bombay. The date of the consultation is 3 April 1839. *Ibid.*
14. India-Bombay: 11 April 1839; BSP 112/18.
15. India-Bombay: 18 April 1839; *ibid.*
16. Haines-Bombay: 11 June 1839; BSP 115/29.
17. India-Bombay: 11 April 1839, *ut supra.*

18. Haines-Bombay: 5 Feb. 1839 (Appendix); BSP 108/8, and Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1839; BSP 118/31. See also Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. VII, pp. 121-63.
19. Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 121-63.
20. By the 15th June, 1839, the Yafi'i and Hawshabi chiefs had already bound themselves by treaty not to attack Lahj, and Muhsin's great enemy, the Fadli chief, was to do the same on 8th July.
21. Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1839, ut supra, and Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 137-8.
22. Bombay-India: 14 Sept. 1839; BSP 120/34.
23. Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1839, ut supra.
24. Haines-Bombay: 11 June 1839, ut supra.
25. Haines-Bombay: 2 Aug. 1839; BSP 119/32.
26. Haines-Bombay: 11 June 1839; BSP 115/29, and Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1839; BSP 118/31.
27. Haines-Bombay: 28 Feb. 1839; BSP 110/12.
28. Haines-Bombay: 28 April 1845; BSP 236/19.
29. Haines-Bombay: 2 March 1840; BSP 132/14.
30. Haines-Bombay: 23 Aug. 1839; BSP 119/33.
31. *ibid.*
32. Bombay-Haines: 11 Sept. 1839; *ibid.*
33. Haines-Bombay: 13 Sept. 1839; BSP 121/37.
34. The horses in the vicinity of Aden were too small to carry a fully armoured man.
35. Haines-Bombay: 20 Oct. 1839; BSP 123/43.
36. Bombay-Haines: 21 Nov. 1839; *ibid.*
37. Haines-Bombay: 12 Nov. 1839; BSP 123/43.
38. Haines-Bombay: 15 Dec. 1839; BSP 123/5.
39. *ibid.*
40. Haines-Bombay: 30 Dec. 1839; *ibid.*
41. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840; BSP 130/10/470A. The last number is that of the letter, and it is necessary to add it since three other letters, which have also been used, appear under the same date in the same consultation. See below.
42. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840; enc. letter from 'Abd al-Rasul; BSP 130/10/740.
43. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840, enc. letter from 'Abd al-Rasul; BSP 130/10/743.
44. Haines-Sec. Com.: 7 Feb. 1840; BSP 132/14.
45. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840; BSP 130/10/737.
46. Haines-Bombay: 22 May 1841; BSP 161/26.
47. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840; BSP 130/10/737.
48. Bombay-Haines: 26 Feb. 1840; BSP 130/10.
49. Sec. Com.-Haines: 30 April 1840; Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India, 12/609.
50. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 27 March 1840; *ibid.*, 12/589.
51. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 30 April 1840; *ibid.*, 12/608.
52. Carnac-Hobhouse: 31 Jan. 1840; Br. P. 842.
53. Carnac-Hobhouse: 26 Nov. 1839; *ibid.*, 841.
54. Palmerston-Hobhouse: 14 Dec. 1839; *ibid.*, 839.
55. Carnac-Hobhouse: 27 April 1840; *ibid.*, 842.
56. Hobhouse-Carnac: 4 April 1840; *ibid.*, 839.

57. Marriott, The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, pp. 238-45. See also Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, pp. 95-106.
58. Which started in December 1839, and may not have been lifted until the south-west monsoon set in at the end of April, when the bandar became unserviceable.
59. Ethersey-Oliver: 1 Feb. 1840; BSP 131/11.
60. Min. by Farish and Carnac: 24 Feb. 1840; *ibid.*
61. Haines-Bombay: 25 Mar. 1840; BSP 133/17.
62. Min. by Farish: 11 April and Min. by Governor subscribed to by Board: 13 April 1840; *ibid.*
63. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 2 July 1840; Board's Drafts of Secret Letters to India, 13/631.
64. Haines-Bombay: 25 March 1840, *ut supra.*
65. Haines-Bombay: 31 March 1840; BSP 134/19.
66. Haines-Bombay: 21 and 25 May 1840; BSP 137/25.
67. Haines-Bombay: 2 June 1840; BSP 137/26.
68. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 24 June 1840; *ibid.*
69. India-Bombay: 6 July 1840; BSP 141/32.
70. Haines-Bombay: 9 July 1840; BSP 142/34.
71. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Farish: 1 Aug. 1840; BSP 141/33.
72. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 10 Oct. 1840; BSP 145/42.
73. India-Bombay: 9 Nov. 1840; BSP 148/49.
74. Auckland-Hobhouse: 18 Sept. 1840; Br. P. 842.
75. Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. 1840; BSP 149/52.
76. Haines-Bombay: 9 Nov. 1840; BSP 148/49.
77. Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. 1840, *ut supra.*
78. Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. 1840; BSP 149/52, and Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. enc. Cruttenden-Haines: 23 Nov. 1840; BSP 149/53. Cruttenden obtained his information while on a visit to Mukha.
79. Haines-Bombay: 9 Nov. 1840; BSP 148/49.
80. Haines-Bombay: 29 Dec. 1840; BSP 153/3.
81. India-Bombay: 12 April 1841; BSP 160/22.
82. Haines-Bombay: 30 April 1841; BSP 161/24.
83. Haines-Bombay: 18 May 1841; BSP 163/28.
84. Haines-Bombay: 28 May 1841; BSP 161/24.
85. India-Bombay: 19 July 1841; BSP 167/35.
86. Haines-Bombay: 2 Aug. 1841; BSP 167/35.
87. Min. by Anderson; 24 Aug. 1841; *ibid.*
88. Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug. 1841; BSP 168/39.
89. Haines-Bombay: 25 Sept. 1841; BSP 172/48.
90. Haines-Bombay: 2 Oct. 1841; BSP 171/46.
91. Res. by Governor subscribed to by Board: 18 Sept. 1841; BSP 169/40.
92. Haines-Bombay: 10 Oct. 1841, with encs.; BSP 171/45.
93. Haines-Bombay: 2 Dec. 1841; BSP 174/51.
94. Haines-Sec. Com.: 10 Dec. 1841; BSP 180/4.
95. Haines-Bombay: 4 Jan. 1842; *ibid.*
96. Haines-Bombay: 31 May 1842; BSP 189/26.
97. Haines-Bombay: 4 Jan. 1842, *ut supra.*
98. Haines-Bombay: 4 March 1842; BSP 183/21.
99. India-Bombay: 28 April 1842; BSP 186/19.
100. Haines-Bombay: 29 July 1842; BSP 191/35.
101. Haines-Sec. Com.: 10 Aug. 1842 and Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug. 1842; BSP 192/3.

102. Haines-Sec. Com.: 9 Sept. 1842; BSP 194/44.
103. Bombay-Haines: 21 Nov. 1842; BSP 196/49.
104. Haines-Sec. Com.: 11 Nov. 1842; BSP 197/50.
105. Min. by Governor and Board: 14 Dec. 1842; BSP 197/53.
106. Haines-Sec. Com.: 11 Nov. 1842, ut supra.
107. Haines-Bombay: 3 Feb. 1843; BSP 201/9.
108. Haines-Bombay: 28 Feb. 1843; BSP 202/14, and Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 138-40.
109. Once a convert had declared his Islam, under no circumstances was he returned to be tried by "infidels".
110. Haines-Bombay: 29 July 1843; BSP 210/34.
111. Haines-Bombay: 1 Jan. 1844; BSP 217/3.
112. Haines-Bombay: 2 March 1844; BSP 219/13.
113. Haines-Bombay: 30 March 1844; BSP 220/17.
114. Haines-Bombay: 15 Aug. 1846; BSP 245/25, and Haines-Bombay: 17, 26 and 30 Aug. 1846; BSP 246/28. For a detailed account of Sayyid Isma'il's attacks, see "Officer in the Queen's Army", Historical and Statistical Sketches of Aden..., pp. 63-70.
115. The Fadli sultan had recently built a new castle eleven miles from the beach out of range of gunfire from the sea.
116. Haines-Bombay: 30 Aug. 1846; BSP 246/28.
117. Min. by Reid subscribed to by Board: 9 Sept. 1846; *ibid.*
118. India-Bombay: 21 Sept. 1846; BSP 246/32.
119. Haines-Bombay: 16 and 30 Oct. 1846; BSP 247/34.
120. In March 1847, Sayyid Isma'il left for Hadhramawt and was killed in a brawl two years later.
121. Haines-Bombay: 16 Nov. 1846; BSP 247/36.
122. Haines-Bombay: 25 Nov. 1846; *ibid.*
123. Haines-Bombay: 2 Dec. 1846; BSP 247/37.
124. Haines-Bombay: 16 Feb. 1847; BSP 249/12.
125. Bombay-Haines: 15 March 1847; *ibid.*
126. Haines-Bombay: March 1848 and Bombay-Haines: 15 April 1848; BPP 392/45/14.
127. Haines-Bombay: 16 June 1847; BSP 252/27.
128. Min. by Willoughby and Board: 27 Sept. 1847; BSP 253/38.

Chapter VII.

1. Haines-Bombay: 12 March 1848; BSP 255/14.
2. Min. by Willoughby, concurred in by Governor: 7 April 1848; *ibid.*
3. India-Bombay: 6 May 1848; BSP 256/23.
4. Bombay-Haines: 14 Aug. enc. extract from dispatch by Sec. Com. dd 2 June 1848; BSP 256/24.
5. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, p. 169.
6. Haines-Bombay: 12 June 1850; BSP 266/11.
7. Haines-Bombay: 27 June 1850; *ibid.*
8. Haines-Bombay: 14 July 1850; BSP 267/13.
9. Haines-Bombay: 14 Aug. 1850; BSP 267/14.
10. Haines-Bombay: 27 Aug. 1850; *ibid.*
11. Presented to his father by the Bombay Government in 1828; when he failed to get ordnance from Haines, they were overhauled and carriages were built for them.
12. Haines-Bombay: 14 Jan. 1851; BSP 271/3.
13. The visit was at the request of the Sultan who was sick and wished to settle the question of succession in case of his death.

14. Haines-Bombay: 10 March, enc. Cruttenden-Haines: 5 March 1851; BSP 271/6.
15. Haines imprisoned another kinsman in Aden.
16. Haines-Bombay: 10 and 13 March 1851; BSP 271/6.
17. Haines-Bombay: 27 March 1851; BSP 271/7, and Haines-Bombay: 6 April 1851; BSP 272/9.
18. Min. by Willoughby: 14 April 1851; BSP 271/7.
19. Min. by Falkland and Blane: 11 April 1851; *ibid.*
20. Min. by Falkland: 30 March 1851; BSP 271/6.
21. Bombay-Haines: 3 April 1851; *ibid.*
22. India-Bombay: 21 April 1851; BSP 272/9.
23. Bombay-Haines: 3 May 1851; *ibid.*
24. Haines-Bombay: 17 April 1851; BSP 271/7.
25. Haines-Bombay: 9 May 1851; BSP 272/12.
26. Haines-Bombay: 24 May 1851; BSP 272/13.
27. India-Bombay: 10 June 1851; BSP 272/13.
28. *ibid.*
29. Bombay-Haines: 28 June 1851; *ibid.*
30. Haines-Bombay: 13 July 1851; BSP 272/18, and Haines-Bombay: 19 July 1851; BSP 272/19.
31. Haines-Bombay: 24 July 1851; BSP 272/19.
32. Haines-Bombay: 11 Aug. 1851; BSP 272/23.
33. Haines-Bombay: 25 July 1851; BSP 272/18.
34. Haines-Bombay: 11 Aug. 1851, *ut supra.*
35. This figure was given by Haines to Forbes and appears in Forbes' letter to the Q.M.G., 13 Aug. 1851, BSP 272/23.
36. Min. by Falkland: 26 Aug. 1851; BSP 272/23.
37. Haines' estimate was 116,000.
38. In April 1851, Cruttenden was on leave in Bombay and wrote a memorandum on the subject of the murders. BSP 271/6.
39. Min. by Grey: 27 Aug. 1851; BSP 272/23.
40. Mins. by Blane and Bell: 27 Aug. 1851; *ibid.*
41. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 6 Aug. 1851; BSP 272/24.
42. Broughton-Dalhousie: 7 Aug. 1851; Br. P. 860.
43. Broughton-Falkland: 7 Aug. 1851; *ibid.*
44. Dalhousie-Falkland: 3 Sept. 1851; Dal. P. 81.
45. Dalhousie-Falkland: 18 Sept. 1851; *ibid.*
46. Dalhousie-Falkland: 23 Oct. 1851; *ibid.*
47. India-Bombay: 20 Sept. 1851; BSP 273/27.
48. Dalhousie-Broughton: 24 Sept. 1851; Br. P. 857.
49. Broughton-Dalhousie: 8 Nov. 1851; Br. P. 860.
50. Broughton-Dalhousie: 6 Oct. 1851; *ibid.*
51. Haines-Bombay: 15 Oct. 1851; BSP 273/31.
52. Haines-Bombay: 27 Oct. 1851; BSP 273/32.
53. Badger's Rep., enc. in Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854; BSP 291/28.
54. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1852; BSP 279/18. Hunter dates this incident 1851, and he copied from Playfair.
55. Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1852, enc. 'Ali-Haines; nd; BSP 279/24.
56. Bombay-Haines: 12 Aug. 1852; *ibid.*
57. Haines-Bombay: 23 Sept. 1852; BSP 279/32.
58. Haines-Bombay: 17 April, enc. 'Ali-Haines, rec'd 15 April 1853; BSP 284/16.
59. Haines-Bombay: 26 April 1853; *ibid.*
60. Haines-Bombay: 24 and 28 May 1853; BSP 284/17, and Haines-Bombay: 14 June 1853; BSP 284/18.
61. Haines-Bombay: 26 July 1853; BSP 284/21.

62. Haines-Bombay: 22 July 1853; *ibid.*
63. Haines-Bombay: 13 Aug. 1853; BSP 285/22.
64. Haines-Bombay: 12 Oct. 1853; BSP 286/26.
65. Haines-Bombay: 30 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1853; *ibid.*
66. Haines-Bombay: 10 Dec. 1853; BSP 287/30.
67. Haines-Bombay: 27 Dec. 1853; BSP 289/3.
68. Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1854; BSP 289/8.
69. Haines-Bombay: 14 Nov. 1852; BSP 280/37.
70. Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1854, *ut supra.*
71. Bombay-Haines: 18 Feb. 1854; BSP 289/8.
72. The reasons for Haines' recall and his subsequent humiliation and death in Bombay are beyond the scope of this work, but if the reader is interested, he is referred to Waterfield, Sultans of Aden, Chs. 21-25.
73. Haines-Bombay: 28 Feb. 1854; BSP 289/12.
74. Clarke-Bombay: 31 March 1854; BSP 290/16.
75. Madras-Bombay: 17 Feb. enc. Clarke-Madras Govt.: 23 Jan. 1855; BSP 294/2.
76. *ibid.*
77. Bombay-Haines: 13 April 1839; BSP 111/15.
78. Waterfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-7.
79. Haines (in Bombay) to Govt.: 13 April 1854; BSP 290/18.
80. The Arabs gave Haines the same description fifteen years earlier.
81. Haines-Govt.; 13 April 1854, *ut supra.*
82. Bombay-Clarke: 28 April 1854; BSP 290/18.
83. Clarke-Bombay: 27 April 1854; BSP 290/19. In this letter, al-Hiswah is incorrectly referred to as Bir Ahmad.
84. Bombay-Clarke: 9 May 1854; *ibid.*
85. *cf.* Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854, Appendix A to letter; BSP 291/28.
86. Outram-Bombay: 12 July 1854; BSP 291/25.
87. Badger's Rep., *ut supra.*
88. Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854; BSP 291/28.
89. Court-Bombay: 9 Aug. 1854; ARR 146/21 (Pol.).
90. Wood-Outram: 22 Aug. 1854; W.P., L.B.VI.
91. Elphinstone-Wood: 30 Aug. 1854; Elph. P. 8B/1.
92. Min. by Elphinstone: 6 Sept. 1854; BSP 291/28.
93. Bombay-Outram: 11 Sept. 1854; *ibid.*
94. Elphinstone-Outram: 11 Sept. 1854; Elph. P. 9A/1.
95. Dalhousie-Outram: 4 Oct. 1854; Dal. P. 86.
96. Min. by Dalhousie: 30 Sept. 1854; *ibid.*, 38.
97. Dalhousie-Wood: 4 Oct. 1854; *ibid.*, 63.
98. India-Bombay: 17 Oct. 1854; BSP 292/33.
99. Wood-Elphinstone: 25 Oct. 1854; Elph. P. 8A/2.
100. Outram-Elphinstone: 25 Oct. 1854; Elph. P. 6B/7.
101. Outram-Elphinstone: 11 Sept. 1854; *ibid.*
102. Elphinstone-Dalhousie: 15 Sept. 1854; Elph. P. 8D/1.
103. Dalhousie-Elphinstone: 27 Sept. 1854; Dal. P. 117.
104. Bombay-Coghlan: 4 Nov. 1854; BSP 292/33.
105. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 29 Oct. 1854; Elph. P. 9A/1.
106. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 Nov. 1854; Elph. P. 6D/11.
107. Coghlan-Bombay: 4 Dec. 1854; BSP 294/1.
108. Sec. Com.-Coghlan: 9 Dec. 1854; BSP 294/1.
109. Sec. Com.-India: 9 Dec. 1854; W.P., 38.
110. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 10 Jan. and Elphinstone-Dalhousie: 11 Jan. 1855; Elph. P. 9A/2 and 8D/1 respectively.

111. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 17 Jan. 1855; Elph. P. 9A/2.
 112. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 11 Feb. 1855; Elph. P. 6D/11.
 113. Dalhousie-Elphinstone: 30 Jan. 1855; Dal. P. 117.
 114. India-Bombay: 8 Feb. 1855; BSP 294/2.
 115. Coghlan-Bombay: 27 Jan. 1855; BSP 294/1.
 116. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 Feb. 1855; *ibid.*
 117. Bombay-Coghlan: 27 Feb. 1855; *ibid.*
 118. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 May, enc. Rassam-Coghlan: 10 May 1855; BSP 295/10.
 119. Bombay-Coghlan: 10 Sept. 1855; BSP 296/16.
 120. India-Bombay: 24 Oct. 1855; BSP 297/20.
 121. Elphinstone-Smith: 16 Nov. 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 122. Coghlan-Bombay: 27 Feb. 1855; BSP 294/2.
 123. Elphinstone-Wood: 19 March 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 124. Wood-Elphinstone: 9 Feb. 1855; Elph. P. 8A/2.
 125. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April 1855; BSP 295/10.
 126. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 March 1855; Elph. P. 6D/11.
 127. Coghlan-Bombay: 27 May 1855; BSP 295/10.
 128. Elphinstone-Smith: 25 June 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 129. Coghlan-Bombay: 10 July 1855; BSP 296/13.
 130. Bombay-India: 28 July 1855; *ibid.*
 131. Coghlan-Bombay: 24 July 1855; BSP 296/14.
 132. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 July 1855; Elph. P. 6D/11.
 133. Min. by Governor and Board: 16 Aug. 1855; BSP 296/14.
 134. Elphinstone-Smith: 12 Aug. 1855; Elph. Papers 8B/2.
 135. Dalhousie-Elphinstone: 7 Aug. 1855; Dal. P. 117.
 136. Elphinstone-Smith: 29 Aug. 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 137. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 24 Aug. 1855; Elph. P. 6D/11.
 138. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Sept. 1855, with encs.; BSP 297/18.
 139. Bombay-Coghlan: 12 Oct. 1855; *ibid.*
 140. Elphinstone-Smith: 17 Oct. 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 141. Smith-Elphinstone: 22 Nov. 1855; Elph. P. 8A/3.
 142. Smith-Elphinstone: 7 Sept. 1855; *ibid.*
 143. Coghlan-Bombay: 8 Nov. 1855; BSP 297/22.
 144. Coghlan-Bombay: 28 Oct. 1855; BSP 297/20.
 145. Res. by Board: 14 Nov. 1855; *ibid.*
 146. Elphinstone-Smith: 16 Nov. 1855; Elph. P. 8B/2.
 147. Bombay-Coghlan: 15 and 16 Nov. 1855; BSP 297/20.
 148. India-Bombay: 31 Dec. 1855; BSP 299/2.
 149. Coghlan-Bombay: 23 Nov. 1855; BSP 297/23.
 150. Coghlan-Bombay: 26 Feb. 1856; BSP 300/6.
 151. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 19 March 1856; Elph. P. 9A/3.
 152. Coghlan-Bombay: 25 Dec. 1856; BSP 306/2.
 153. Coghlan-Bombay: 10 April 1857; BSP 309/8.
 154. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 April 1857; *ibid.*, and Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. VII, p. 150.
 155. Coghlan-Bombay: 25 May 1857; BSP 310/12.
 156. Coghlan-Bombay: 9 July 1857; BSP 313/15.
 157. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 Jan. 1858; LA 36.
 158. Coghlan-Bombay: 24 Feb. 1858; *ibid.*
 159. In January 1858, Coghlan received a friendly letter from the chief, Sultan 'Awad.
 160. Coghlan-Bombay: 16 Feb. enc. Rassam-Coghlan: 4 Feb. 1858; LA 36.
 161. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 16 Feb. 1858; Elph. P. 6D/11.
 162. See also Playfair, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-3.

163. Coghlan-Bombay: 24 Feb. 1858, ut supra.
 164. There they built a lighthouse to aid steamers passing through Bab al-Mandab, and garrisoned the island with a detachment of 50 men.
 165. Coghlan-Bombay: 6 and 7 March 1858; LA 36.
 166. Coghlan-Bombay: 16 March 1858; *ibid.*
 167. Coghlan-Bombay: 18 March 1858; *ibid.*
 168. Bombay-Coghlan: 7 April 1858 (two letters appear under this date); ESLB 133/43.
 169. Ellenborough-Elphinstone: 1 April 1858; Elph. P. 8A/5.
 170. Elphinstone-Ellenborough: 19 May 1858; Elph. P. 8B/5.
 171. Coghlan-Bombay: 3 April 1858; LA 36.
 172. A messenger from the Imam arrived in January 1859.
 173. Coghlan-Bombay: 30 April, enc. 'Ali-Coghlan; nd, rec'd 29 April 1858; LA 36.
 174. Coghlan-Bombay: 4 July 1858; *ibid.*
 175. Bombay-Coghlan: 15 Oct. 1859; ARR 258/4361 (Pol.).
 176. Coghlan-Bombay: 4 Nov. 1859; ARR 258/138 (Pol.).
 177. Frere-Wood: 22 Oct. 1862; W.P. 88/4.

Chapter VIII.

1. The claim was never specified, but in all probability it was some kind of protection money.
2. In 1839, Lieut. (later General) John Jacob raised what came to be known as the Sind or Jacobs Horse to subdue the hill tribes of the Upper Sind frontier. By 1852 this force numbered 1600.
3. Frere-Wood: 25 April 1863; W.P. 88/6.
4. Min. by Governor: 8 April 1863; Encs. to Military Letters from Bombay, 1945/64.
5. Min. by Mansfield: 10 April 1863; *ibid.*
6. Adj. Gen. to Raines: 4 Aug. 1863; Encs. to Military Letters from Bombay, 1945/79.
7. Merewether-Bombay: 2 July 1863; LA 40.
8. Merewether-Bombay: 1 Aug. 1863; *ibid.*
9. Merewether-Bombay: 17 Oct. 1863; *ibid.*
10. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Feb. 1864; LAMZ 41.
11. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Dec. 1863; LA 40, and Merewether-Bombay: 1 Jan. 1864; LAMZ 41.
12. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Jan. and 2 Feb. 1864; LAMZ 41.
13. Merewether-Bombay: 17 Nov. 1864; LAMZ 41.
14. For the Shaykh 'Uthman project, see Ch. III, pp. 102-3.
15. Bombay-Merewether: 5 Jan. 1865; ARR 413/30 (Pol.).
16. Merewether-Bombay: 28 Jan. 1865; ARR 413/14 (Pol.).
17. India-Bombay: 5 May 1865; ARR 413.
18. Merewether-Bombay: 3 Jan. 1865; LAM 42.
19. Merewether-Bombay: 17 Jan. 1865; *ibid.*
20. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Feb. 1865; *ibid.*
21. Merewether-Bombay: 2 April 1865; *ibid.*
22. Merewether-Bombay: 17 June 1865; *ibid.*
23. Merewether-Bombay: 28 Jan. 1865; *ibid.*
24. India-Bombay: 5 May 1865; *ibid.*
25. Lawrence-Wood: 21 Dec. 1865; W.P. 133/9.

26. Implying the 'Abdali, which was not.
27. Merewether-Bombay: 24 June 1865; LAM 42.
28. India-Bombay: 31 Aug. 1865; ARR 413.
29. Wood-Merewether: 9 Oct. 1865; W.P., L.B.22.
30. Merewether-Bombay: 1 Aug. 1865; LAM 42.
31. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Sept. 1865; *ibid.*
32. Merewether-London: 30 Oct. 1865; ARR 432.
33. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. VII, pp. 141-4.
34. Merewether-Bombay: 17 Oct. 1865; LAM 42.
35. India-Bombay: 9 Dec. 1865; ARR 432.
36. Lawrence-Wood: 21 Dec. 1865; W.P. 133/9.
37. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Sept. 1865; LAM 42.
38. India-Bombay: 9 Dec. 1865, *ut supra.*
39. India-Bombay: 21 Dec. 1865; ARR 432.
40. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Dec. 1865; LAM 42.
41. The total force, under Col. J.D. Woollcombe, was composed of 58 artillery (26 European with 2 guns and 32 native with 2 howitzers), 203 native infantry and 302 Grenadier Guards.
42. Merewether-Bombay: 21 and 23 Dec. 1865; LAM 42.
43. Merewether-Bombay: 16 Jan. 1866; LAZ 43.
44. Merewether-Wood: 8 Jan. 1866; W.P. 74.
45. Merewether-Bombay: 16 Jan. 1866; LAZ 43.
46. Res. by Board: 13 Feb. 1866; ARR 432.
47. Wood-Merewether: 3 Feb. 1866; W.P., L.B.22.
48. Merewether-Wood: 31 Jan. 1866; W.P. 74.
49. Frere-Lawrence: 12 Feb. 1866; Law. P. 45.
50. Lawrence-Frere: 12 Feb. 1866; Law. P. 47.
51. Wood-Frere: 19 Feb. 1866; W.P., L.B.22.
52. Merewether-Bombay: 5 Mar. 1866; LAZ 43.
53. Merewether-Bombay: 17 Mar. 1866; *ibid.*
54. Cranborne-India: 31 Oct. 1866; ARR 432 (Part 3).
55. Goodfellow-Bombay: 17 Sept. 1866; LAZ 43.
56. Goodfellow-Bombay: 2 Oct. 1866; *ibid.*
57. Merewether-Bombay: 28 May 1867; LA 44, and Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 148.
58. Russell-Bombay: 17 Aug. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/155 (Pol.).
59. Res. by Govt.: 15 Sept. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2).
60. Russell-Bombay: 6 May 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/84 (Pol.).
61. Russell-Bombay: 26 Feb. 1869, *enc. Lieut. Meyers (Commanding Aden Troop) to Goodfellow*; 23 Feb. 1869; ARR 490 (Part 1)/64 (Pol)
62. Honner-Bombay: 23 May and 18 Nov. 1862; LA 39.
63. Min. by Mansfield: 7 Dec. 1862; ESLB 146.
64. Bombay-London: 12 Dec. 1862; *Secret Letters from Bombay*, 36.
65. Frere-Wood: 10 Dec. 1862; W.P. 88/4.
66. London-Aden: 24 Dec. 1862; *Letters to India, etc.*, Vol. 1.
67. Wood-Frere: 31 Dec. 1862; W.P., L.B.11.
68. Wood-Frere: 18 Jan. 1863; W.P., L.B.12.
69. Wood-Elgin: 9 Jan. 1863; W.P., L.B.12.
70. Coghlan-Bombay: 23 Jan. 1863; LA 40 and Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 151.
71. London-Aden: 26 Feb. 1863; *Letters to India, etc.*, Vol. 1.
72. Coghlan-Bombay: 18 May 1863; LA 40.
73. Russell-Bombay: 19 Nov. 1868; LA 44.
74. Russell-Bombay: 3 March 1869; *ibid.*
75. Russell-Bombay: 5 April 1869; *ibid.*, and Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 152.

76. Goodfellow-Bombay: 25 Aug. 1869; LA 44.
77. Russell-Bombay: 22 Dec. 1869; LA 44, and Russell-Bombay: 16 Feb. 1870; LA 45.
78. Res. by Board: 31 Oct. 1871, enc. India-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1871; ARR 560/5287 (Pol.).
79. Memo. by Wedderburn, Political Secretary to Govt.: 5 July 1870; ARR 560.
80. Memo by Goodfellow: 23 Oct. 1870; *ibid.*
81. Memo. by Merewether: 24 Nov. 1870; *ibid.*
82. Russell-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 1)/192 (Pol.).
83. Russell-Bombay: 1 Oct. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 1)/193 (Pol.).
84. Russell-Bombay: 11 Nov. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/223 (Pol.).
85. Russell-Bombay: 12 Nov. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/236 (Pol.).
86. Russell-Bombay: 18 Nov. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/239 (Pol.).
87. India-Bombay: 29 Dec. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2).
88. Russell-Bombay: 2 Dec. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/251 (Pol.).
89. Russell-Bombay: 10 Dec. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/257 (Pol.).
90. Tremenheere-Bombay: 31 Dec. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/284 (Pol.).
91. Bombay-India: 13 March 1871; ARR 560.
92. Tremenheere-Bombay: 23 Feb. 1871; ARR 560/40 (Pol.).
93. India-Bombay: 2 June 1871; ARR 560.
94. India-London: 9 June 1871; Foreign Letters from Government of India, 15/95.
95. India-Bombay: 2 June 1871, *ut supra.*
96. In actual fact, Lahj was cooler than Aden. Although situated in the plain, it had water and vegetation. Besides, there were no rocks to absorb the heat of the sun during the day and give it out at night.
97. Tremenheere-Bombay: 25 Aug. 1871; ARR 560/187 (Pol.).
98. Res. by Govt.: 25 Oct. 1871; ARR 560/5124 (Pol.).
99. Tremenheere-Bombay: 18 May 1871; ARR 560/109 (Pol.), and Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 158-9.
100. Tremenheere-Bombay: 24 March 1871; ARR 560/66 (Pol.).
101. Tremenheere-Bombay: 7 April, enc. Tremenheere-Stevens: 5 April 1871; ARR 560/73 (Pol.).
102. Tremenheere-Bombay: 14 April 1871; ARR 560/79 (Pol.).
103. Res. by Govt.: 19 May 1871; ARR 560.
104. India-Bombay: 4 July 1871; ARR 560.
105. Tremenheere-Bombay: 4 May 1871; ARR 560/103 (Pol.).
106. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 May 1872; LA 46, and Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 148-9.
107. Russell-Bombay: 19 Nov. 1868; LA 44.
108. Russell-Bombay: 22 Nov. 1868; *ibid.*
109. Russell-Bombay: 18 Dec. 1868; *ibid.*
110. Goodfellow-Bombay: 18 Nov. 1869; *ibid.*

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX 1.Coins, Weights and Measures.Coins.

Before the occupation, the two main coins in circulation in South Arabia were the dollar and the mansuri. The dollar was the Maria Theresa thaler, referred to also as the German crown or real. Its value depended on the silver content; and until 1851, it was at par with the American dollar (Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878, p. viii). In 1877, Hunter quotes \$100 as being equal to Rs. 212, which puts the dollar at a little over 4/- Sterling (An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, p. 76). Hoskins puts the value of the dollar in 1838 at 15/- Sterling (British Routes to India, p. 200), which is clearly incorrect. Perhaps the figure 15/- is a misprint for 5/-.

The mansuri may have been named after one of the imams of the Yemen, and its value in 1839 was given by Haines as equivalent to As. $4\frac{1}{2}$. In 1859, Coghlan described this coin as "a thin, shapeless piece of copper, without any impression and its intrinsic is much less than its current value." (Coghlan-Bombay: 7 Jan. 1859; ARR 250/7 (Vol.))

After the occupation, the Indian currency was introduced into Aden. The standard coin of the Anglo-Indian monetary system was the rupee which was equivalent to 2/- Sterling. Its divisions were the anna, $\frac{1}{16}$ th; the pice, $\frac{1}{4}$ of an anna; and the pie, $\frac{1}{12}$ th of an anna. Rs. 100,000 made a lakh.

The rate of exchange in 1839 was as follows:-

German Crowns	100	-	Rs. 217.406
"	"	1	- Rs. 2.3
"	"	1	- 140 pice
"	"	1	- 160 mansuris
Re. 1		-	64 pice
Re. 1		-	73 mansuris
Anna 1		-	4 pice
" 1		-	$4\frac{1}{2}$ mansuris
" 1		-	12 pies

(Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26)

Weights and Measures.

- a) Farsalah. An Arabian weight equal to 30 ratls.
- b) Ratl. An Arabian weight equal to 17 oz.
- c) Kaylah. An Arabian weight which differed according to the article measured. A kaylah of grain was roughly 16 lbs.
- d) Kandi. A weight which differed from one part of India to another. In Aden, it varied according to the article measured; for example, a kandi of ghee was about 35 lbs., while a kandi of firewood was about 600 lbs.
- e) Maund. The weight of the maund also differed from one part of India to another. The maund used in Aden was the Bombay one, which was equal to 28 lbs. There were 40 seers in the Bombay maund.

APPENDIX 2.A Statement of Customs Duties Levied at Aden
Under Sultan Muhsin.

Imports.

Dates (first quality)	-	₹ $\frac{1}{4}$ per bag.
Dates (common)	-	₹ $\frac{1}{8}$ per bag.
Fuwah (madder)	-	As. 12 per 20 lbs.
Rice	-	₹ $\frac{1}{4}$ per bag.
Iron and all other articles whatsoever	-	5%.

Besides the import duty, there was levied at the Outer or Northern Gate a charge of ₹ $\frac{1}{4}$ on every camel load (or 600 lbs) of Indian goods, and only 1 mansuri on Arabian goods, which the 'Aqrabi tribe received.

Exports.

Jowari and coffee	-	On every camel load (or 600 lbs.), As. 12 paid at the Customs House, and 1 mansuri levied by the 'Aqrabis at the Northern Gate.
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(Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8.)

APPENDIX 3.A Comparison between the Aden Rates under Sultan Muhsin,
and the Bombay Rates fixed by Act I, 1838.Note

The comparison is limited to rates on articles which appear in both the Act and the statement provided by Haines.

<u>Article</u>	<u>Imports.</u>		<u>Under Sultan</u>
	<u>Act I, 1838</u>		
	<u>British Vessels</u>	<u>Foreign Vessels</u>	
Cloves	10%	20%	5%, plus handling charge of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$.
Pepper	10%	20%	Ditto
Tobacco	Re. 1 As. 8 per maund (Same rates for British and foreign vessels)		Ditto
Coffee	$7\frac{1}{2}\%$	15%	12 farsalahs - $\text{₹}1$.
Cotton and Silk Piece Goods, Cotton Twist and Yarn, the produce of the U.K. or of any British possession	$3\frac{1}{2}\%$	7%	Cotton - 5%, plus $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ paid by the customer. SILK - 5% plus handling charge of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$
Do., the produce of any other place	7%	14%	
Grains & Pulse		Free	Jowari - 52 pice per camel load of 12 farsalahs. Rice (Bengal) - $\text{₹} \frac{1}{4}$ per bag. Rice (Malabar) - 20 pice per bag. Wheat - 5%, plus handling charge of 4 pice per farsalah.
Livestock		Free	Horses - $\text{₹}1$ each Sheep - 5% Bullocks & Asses - 3%
Metals, wrought or unwrought, the produce of the U.K. or any British possession	3%	6%	
Metals, do., excepting tin, the produce or manufacture of any other place.	6%	12%	Metals - 5% plus handling charge of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$.
Tin, the produce of any other place than the U.K. or any British possession.	10%	20%	

<u>Article</u>	<u>Exports.</u>		<u>Under Sultan</u>
	<u>Act I, 1838</u>		
	<u>British Vessels</u>	<u>Foreign Vessels</u>	
Aloes	3%	6%	7½%
Coffee	"	"	5½%, plus handling charge of 2½ reals per cent. In husk, \$ 5/8 per bag of 10 farsalahs.
Cotton	"	"	\$5½ per 4 bales of about 33 cwts.
Currants	"	"	Free
Dyes	"	"	5%
Ghee	"	"	25 pice per kandi.
Gum	"	"	3%
Jowari	"	"	5%

APPENDIX 4.Customs Revenue, 1839-1850.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Total</u>
1839-40			Rs. 4,500
1840-41			12,314
1841-42			15,196
1842-43	Rs. 12,927	Rs. 2,110	15,037
1843-44	17,705	1,092	18,797
1844-45	19,440	1,936	21,376
1845-46	20,806	1,657	22,463
1846-47	28,287	2,087	30,374
1847-48	21,083	2,495	23,578
1848-49	29,468	3,869	33,337
1849-50	27,510	4,263	31,773

Note

The figures for the first three years are given in the first trade report, 1842-43. For this, and other trade reports see Appendix 9.

APPENDIX 5.Land Trade.

A. Annual Totals.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
1845-46	*CL 82,162	- - - - -
1846-47	81,775	- - - - -
1847-48	94,868	Rs. 56,902
1848-49	99,955	124,136
1849-50	108,018	110,020
1850-51	104,895	153,090
1851-52	- - - - -	301,888
1852-53	113,213	246,321
1853-54	- - - - -	210,515
1854-55	- - - - -	182,320
1855-56	87,910	78,115
1856-57	- - - - -	132,191
1857-58	- - - - -	214,743
1858-59	52,783	254,664
1859-60	Rs. 1,206,532	477,429
1860-61	1,083,223	1,333,416
1861-62	1,635,755	1,320,252
1862-63	1,621,914	2,021,320
1863-64	1,654,903	3,166,893
1864-65	1,597,782	3,942,985
1865-66	1,348,098	4,399,107
1866-67	1,253,772	3,941,798
1867-68	1,361,322	4,463,091
1868-69	973,333	1,013,282
1869-70	1,253,581	844,591
1870-71	1,352,598	838,736

B. The Main Articles of Import.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Coffee</u>	<u>Jowari</u>	<u>Wheat</u>
1845-46	*CL 421	CL 2,164	CL 1,205
1846-47	389	3,752	1,052
1847-48	388	8,203	2,379
1848-49	393	11,365	2,375
1849-50	482	9,669	2,070
1850-51	2,184	7,664	3,061
1851-52	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1852-53	4,016	4,675	2,308
1853-54	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1854-55	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1855-56	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1856-57	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1857-58	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1858-59	4,633	6,920	2,457
1859-60	Rs. 557,100	Rs. 101,264	Rs. 71,340
1860-61	354,500	179,776	70,680
1861-62	479,860	115,776	67,710
1862-63	658,170	136,976	135,090
1863-64	677,160	209,888	136,350
1864-65	615,330	169,952	219,840
1865-66	716,490	98,128	59,160
1866-67	600,660	135,424	61,200
1867-68	521,460	109,296	39,870
1868-69	197,200	44,320	21,945
1869-70	342,780	115,476	36,180
1870-71	323,300	188,760	84,881

C. The Main Articles of Export.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Raw Cotton</u>	<u>Piece Goods</u>	<u>Tobacco & Snuff</u>
1847-48	Rs. 26,217	Rs. 635	Rs. 12,733
1848-49	83,700	4,490	19,720
1849-50	48,465	3,906	35,750
1850-51	52,650	20,000	35,960
1851-52	110,664	66,940	31,429
1852-53	101,652	41,335	35,738
1853-54	120,384	39,563	14,397
1854-55	102,996	40,660	15,239
1855-56	44,256	13,999	8,140
1856-57	54,596	42,769	11,853
1857-58	144,008	23,202	17,174
1858-59	93,656	45,480	67,764
1859-60	230,850	41,742	71,120
1860-61	877,885	53,713	269,704
1861-62	550,684	69,396	485,037
1862-63	636,597	87,910	907,695
1863-64	1,031,652	86,526	608,227
1864-65	920,340	99,001	2,335,276
1865-66	751,005	95,705	2,881,539
1866-67	692,290	88,602	2,515,745
1867-68	909,043	100,086	2,729,008
1868-69	122,742	96,426	223,224
1869-70	128,352	82,715	131,115
1870-71	2,731	381,795	147,003

*CL = Camel loads.

APPENDIX 6.A Comparison between Customs Duties at Arabian Ports,
and those proposed for Aden.

A. Customs Duties at Arabian Ports.

The customs duties at Mukha and Hudaydah were as follows:

Persian Tobacco	-	12%
Cloth	-	8%
Coffee	-	8%
Fine Rice	-	₹ $\frac{1}{2}$ per bag
Other grains	-	8%
Surat goods and other articles	-	8%
Bullion	-	1%

At Mukalla, the customs duty on all articles was 5%, and at Jaddah 10%.

B. Customs Duties Proposed for Aden.

Imports

- 5% - Cardamoms, cinnamon, cloth, cloves, coconuts, cotton, cumblies (blanket, usually worn as a cloak by Indians), fuwah, ginger, metals, musk, myrrh, pepper, kishmish (raisins), saffron, sandlewood, sandlewood oil, silk, sugar, tobacco, wheat.
- 3% - Coffee, frankincense, building wood.
- 2% - Gum.
- Dates - 10, 20 or 30 mansuris per bag, depending on quality.
- Dates, dry - 40 mansuris per bag.
- Ghee - 12 mansuris per kandi.
- Jowari - 40 mansuris per camel load.
- Livestock - No duty.
- Rice - 12 to 24 mansuris per bag, depending on quality.

Exports

- 5% - Fuwah, gums and resins, jowari, sabr (aloes), wars (safflower).
- 3% - Coffee
- Cotton cloth - ₹ $\frac{3}{4}$ per 4 bales weighing about 336 lbs.
- Ghee - 12 mansuris per kandi.

(Haines-Bombay: 20 Nov. 1839; BSP 129/6. See also Appendix B to Haines' letter of 9 June 1839 (BSP 115/26), where he had made proposals on the same subject.)

APPENDIX 7.Sea Trade.

A. Growth and Distribution.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u> <u>1843/44-1849/50</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u> <u>1850/51-1856/57</u>
Bombay	Rs. 3,909,545	Bombay	Rs. 4,482,964
Africa, ex. ports on Red Sea	1,160,446	Africa, ex. ports on Red Sea	2,537,773
Bengal	344,418	Ports on Red Sea	1,774,761
Ports in the Red Sea	323,897	Kutch, Veraval & Porbandar	1,481,993
Malabar	170,258	U.S.A.	1,267,859
Arabia, ex. ports on Red Sea	155,344	Arabia, ex. ports on Red Sea	763,259
Kutch, Veraval & Porbandar	139,500	Bengal	510,396
Persian Gulf	138,237	Persian Gulf	319,462
U.S.A.	110,125	Malabar	205,974
United Kingdom	73,130	United Kingdom	190,994
Singapore	9,425	Singapore	137,470
France	2,100	France	20,858
Hamburg & Bremen	1,624	Madras	19,360
Mauritius	1,264	Spain	16,398
		Holland	8,362
		Hamburg	6,235
		Mauritius	6,012
		Seychelles	1,450
	<u>Rs. 6,539,403</u>		<u>Rs. 13,856,580</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Exports</u> <u>1843/44-1849/50</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Exports</u> <u>1850/51-1856/57</u>
Africa, ex. ports on Red Sea	Rs. 766,522	Ports on Red Sea	Rs. 2,618,696
Bombay	753,114	Africa, ex. above	2,001,727
Ports on Red Sea	279,335	Bombay	1,455,631
U.S.A.	163,126	Arabia, ex. ports on Red Sea	1,037,321
Arabia, ex. ports on Red Sea	72,598	France	767,099
United Kingdom	19,933	U.S.A.	645,745
Kutch, Veraval & Porbandar	14,440	Persian Gulf	335,217
Bengal	8,832	Kutch, Veraval & Porbandar	215,302
Persian Gulf	6,528	Hamburg	123,046
Malabar	2,225	Belgium	68,500
Hamburg & Bremen	1,502	United Kingdom	54,039
Mauritius	1,050	Bengal	26,651
		Malabar	6,087
		Singapore	5,741
		Madras	2,408
		Seychelles	1,306
		Holland	748
		Mauritius	423
	<u>RS. 2,089,195</u>		<u>Rs. 9,365,687</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u> <u>1857/58-1863/64</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u> <u>1864/65-1870/71</u>
Bombay	Rs. 8,064,933	Bombay	Rs. 16,958,952
Arabian Gulf & Red Sea	4,637,600	Arabian Gulf & Red Sea	8,016,750
Africa, Coast of	3,249,146	Africa, Coast of	5,163,202
Kutch	2,447,843	United Kingdom	2,104,364
Bengal	1,021,042	U.S.A.	1,847,860
U.S.A.	742,106	Calcutta	1,642,709
Persian Gulf	469,400	Persian Gulf	1,422,876
Malabar	350,994	Kutch	1,087,266
United Kingdom	301,486	Malabar	309,364
Mauritius	59,889	Suez	254,417
France	52,695	Singapore	242,591
Singapore	49,434	France	219,458
China	48,300	Australia & China	170,662
Suez	43,095	Mauritius	126,522
Madras	3,665	Trieste	53,634
		Madras	10,514
		Italy	6,458
	<u>Rs. 21,541,628</u>		<u>Rs. 39,637,599</u>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Exports</u> <u>1857/58-1863/64</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Exports</u> <u>1864/65-1870/71</u>
Arabian Gulf & Red Sea	Rs. 5,698,186	Arabian Gulf & Red Sea	Rs. 17,248,414
Bombay	4,407,453	Bombay	4,738,981
Africa, Coast of	2,577,654	Africa, Coast of	3,871,622
France	1,384,137	United Kingdom	1,256,197
U.S.A.	1,034,818	U.S.A.	1,072,190
Persian Gulf	370,549	Suez	941,866
United Kingdom	303,438	France	659,962
Kutch	273,002	Kutch	389,484
Suez	210,294	Persian Gulf	360,410
Genoa	195,000	Calcutta	194,704
Mauritius	147,145	Australia & China	102,805
Australia	58,966	Singapore	79,190
Bengal	46,556	Mauritius	44,544
Singapore	21,609	Trieste	19,282
China	14,990	Malabar	14,013
Madras	2,185	Italy	13,075
Malabar	500	Madras	9,330
	<u>Rs. 16,746,482</u>		<u>Rs. 31,016,069</u>

B. Annual Value

<u>Year</u>	<u>Import</u>	<u>Export</u>
1843-44	Rs. 606,407	Rs. 117,511
1844-45	986,638	227,926
1845-46	1,107,409	322,950
1846-47	898,845	329,648
1847-48	853,179	261,607
1848-49	1,098,485	411,153
1849-50	1,198,687	421,299
1850-51	1,293,689	698,176
1851-52	1,830,675	1,034,213
1852-53	2,071,117	1,462,094
1853-54	1,668,713	1,332,694
1854-55	1,903,910	1,451,487
1855-56	2,248,558	1,453,208
1856-57	2,848,243	1,920,490
1857-58	3,353,098	2,836,374
1858-59	2,614,910	1,710,925
1859-60	2,862,493	1,969,127
1860-61	2,946,768	1,815,641
1861-62	2,975,191	2,174,273
1862-63	2,911,904	2,592,813
1863-64	3,879,267	3,645,324
1864-65	3,489,310	2,996,416
1865-66	4,926,032	3,474,303
1866-67	4,970,976	4,104,876
1867-68	6,370,619	4,855,669
1868-69	6,717,092	5,653,048
1869-70	5,659,383	4,250,882
1870-71	7,504,187	5,680,865

C. Coal

The figures in this Appendix represent the value of coal imported from the United Kingdom only. After the French were allowed to have their own coal depot in 1845, coal for the use of the Messageries Maritimes Imperiales was brought from France, but these imports are not recorded.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
1843-44	Rs. 261,787	Rs. 234,146
1844-45	276,408	264,195
1845-46	358,785	407,655
1846-47	532,500	436,050
1847-48	444,613	468,027
1848-49	280,048	- - - -
1849-50	300,696	- - - -
1850-51	269,148	- - - -
1851-52	416,220	2,500
1852-53	623,246	2,500
1853-54	1,234,100	- - - -
1854-55	1,077,955	- - - -
1855-56	1,064,524	- - - -
1856-57	1,402,228	- - - -
1857-58	1,425,579	- - - -
1858-59	1,570,323	- - - -
1859-60	2,987,909	1,960
1860-61	2,847,795	45
1861-62	754,136	- - - -
1862-63	1,348,900	- - - -
1863-64	2,863,126	- - - -
1864-65	1,470,582	3,150
1865-66	2,523,314	- - - -
1866-67	2,168,730	- - - -
1867-68	2,995,504	- - - -
1868-69	5,337,590	- - - -
1869-70	2,091,449	- - - -
1870-71	2,097,152	6,310

D. Treasure.

<u>Year</u>		<u>Imports</u>		<u>Exports</u>
	Rs.		Rs.	- - - - -
1843-44		369,618		- - - - -
1844-45		210,297		- - - - -
1845-46		91,341		20,000
1846-47		123,617		9,000
1847-48		231,780		124,280
1848-49		285,125		98,045
1849-50		350,000		99,000
1850-51		462,182		194,182
1851-52		1,059,860		688,760
1852-53		1,100,665		614,275
1853-54		1,107,908		827,586
1854-55		1,325,248		1,005,930
1855-56		992,054		855,135
1856-57		1,636,150		1,017,714
1857-58		2,241,798		1,598,674
1858-59		1,761,123		1,411,763
1859-60		1,065,397		953,950
1860-61		1,374,466		1,010,275
1861-62		1,238,978		1,116,978
1862-63		1,157,359		906,289
1863-64		1,399,726		1,043,766
1864-65		1,712,592		1,646,999
1865-66		2,107,905		1,836,694
1866-67		1,557,603		1,469,747
1867-68		7,528,147		5,881,529
1868-69		1,897,940		1,678,046
1869-70		1,731,113		1,810,194
1870-71		1,561,577		1,419,513

Movement of Treasure

Country	1863-4	1864-5	1865-6	1866-7	1867-8	1868-9	1869-70	1870-1
United Kingdom	Import	Rs. 18,500	-	1,500	47,990	-	1,140	-
	Export	-	2,060	-	15,500	-	-	7,917
Africa, Coast of	Import	Rs. 7,400	11,102	5,906	10,000	-	27,043	65,615
	Export	29,268	23,758	17,185	-	48,760	200,519	24,499
America	Import	-	-	-	-	Rs. 36,900	-	-
	Export	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arabian Gulf & Red Sea	Import	Rs. 782,091	1,232,232	1,533,273	1,141,450	1,418,420	1,246,658	1,135,657
	Export	279,822	366,244	307,636	313,555	481,750	280,671	224,070
China	Import	Rs. 2,810	8,560	-	52,228	-	10,525	-
	Export	-	8,400	29,050	5,700	11,400	-	-
France	Import	-	-	Rs. 16,009	32,000	10,000	9,000	40,240
	Export	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	Import	Rs. 39,230	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Export	1,335	7,749	29,775	10,585	-	102,560	27,760
Singapore	Import	Rs. 17,450	-	-	-	66,476	223,722	139,194
	Export	9,300	-	-	-	9,200	18,444	22,678
Persian Gulf	Import	Rs. 3,000	-	-	-	-	-	8,200
	Export	11,000	9,400	10,596	-	17,000	30,715	500
Suez	Import	Rs. 429,245	457,340	493,876	235,939	145,479	155,310	165,971
	Export	700	3,310	-	20,000	31,000	10,034	51,598
Calcutta	Import	-	3,358	400	4,800	-	-	-
	Export	Rs. 6,520	43,425	76,157	19,300	42,130	8,400	5,600
Madras	Import	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Export	-	-	-	-	Rs. 6,800	-	-
Bombay	Import	Rs 100,000	-	17,350	50,000	1,128,245	54,125	6,700
	Export	705,021	1,181,953	1,366,295	1,085,307	1,023,266	1,158,851	1,054,891
Kutch	Import	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	-
	Export	Rs. 800	700	-	-	5,300	-	-
Trieste	Import	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 1,090	-
	Export	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note
The movement of treasure is not recorded until 1863-64.

E. The Five Main Articles of Sea Trade.
(Value in Rupees)

Imports.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Coffee</u>	<u>Cotton</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Ivory</u>	<u>Piece Goods</u>	
1843-44	32,526	33,746	78,913	488	114,338	
1844-45	59,868	39,970	118,786	7,322	128,699	
1845-46	14,808	53,830	180,467	9,584	284,823	
1846-47	17,944	44,244	99,609	15,507	315,673	
1847-48	5,031	51,543	83,320	3,666	244,545	
1848-49	57,463	109,653	127,346	734	317,890	
1849-50	44,886	76,932	122,726	16,724	346,087	
1850-51	39,867	31,259	73,712	11,597	375,069	
1851-52	93,029	119,674	134,166	24,838	578,105	
1852-53	182,742	123,834	158,075	13,803	847,020	
1853-54	149,965	113,145	152,139	49,442	511,522	
1854-55	161,176	109,845	89,469	29,268	773,472	
1855-56	136,072	80,208	180,450	13,642	1,005,301	
1856-57	451,276	70,297	227,639	111,430	1,185,500	
1857-58	613,929	159,905	234,291	339,535	971,789	
1858-59	118,621	162,571	191,485	123,050	1,188,810	
1859-60	142,682	254,212	394,618	152,125	922,589	
1860-61	250,613	208,163	296,394	112,619	955,978	
1861-62	364,138	133,243	269,324	131,580	1,048,865	
1862-63	281,706	194,355	232,941	127,281	858,192	
1863-64	135,770	165,786	184,811	76,367	C 1,802,262	S 50,168
1864-65	14,528	141,574	423,159	217,717	1,220,450	82,185
1865-66	115,257	87,058	686,145	210,992	2,082,178	29,961
1866-67	361,609	102,396	262,699	146,985	2,435,623	48,592
1867-68	297,056	203,667	253,505	233,437	3,128,881	73,371
1868-69	296,485	43,135	634,214	517,770	2,890,401	43,111
1869-70	104,423	96,930	406,579	341,056	2,342,420	84,517
1870-71	631,502	179,326	304,274	430,551	3,430,659	138,795

C = Cotton
S = Silk

Exports

<u>Year</u>	<u>Coffee</u>	<u>Cotton</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Ivory</u>	<u>Piece Goods</u>	
1843-44	74,430	1,771	4,214	- - - -		29,946
1844-45	66,042	- - - -	10,208	7,247		45,603
1845-46	23,432	4,630	13,502	64		111,822
1846-47	29,824	7,272	15,757	150		152,149
1847-48	17,900	4,745	13,971	4,672		118,257
1848-49	63,890	18,810	44,246	887		168,654
1849-50	51,961	12,672	33,581	14,623		151,563
1850-51	118,007	2,686	32,719	10,227		230,477
1851-52	272,545	16,368	32,592	25,254		352,423
1852-53	385,005	9,171	38,065	11,505		602,868
1853-54	423,261	30,113	44,000	55,922		395,161
1854-55	369,595	15,888	36,274	20,854		626,125
1855-56	404,330	7,808	32,010	20,043		604,929
1856-57	636,131	- - - -	90,456	108,115		700,964
1857-58	1067,905	3,697	58,561	368,675		794,301
1858-59	538,771	1,900	46,678	187,975		553,742
1859-60	453,448	101,445	71,288	218,648		562,463
1860-61	438,028	92,670	45,172	278,070		501,316
1861-62	857,337	30,065	43,198	236,267		571,358
1862-63	799,312	203,090	64,333	199,425		715,280
1863-64	844,998	135,526	44,224	220,434	C 1,477,265	S 5,150
1864-65	308,289	26,595	174,729	310,810	1,174,397	12,230
1865-66	501,740	23,690	224,644	148,374	1,548,485	10,680
1866-67	640,322	47,044	114,762	151,085	2,170,071	18,245
1867-68	551,396	88,751	222,239	269,910	2,107,179	12,100
1868-69	474,679	20,273	591,467	400,820	2,800,676	12,900
1869-70	426,926	10,980	288,159	367,422	1,727,192	12,165
1870-71	909,660	36,725	273,793	460,273	2,442,732	28,580

Movement of the Five Articles from
the first year the movement of goods

1863-64,
is shown.

COFFEE IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
Africa, Coast of	Rs. 72,029	8,018	47,713	55,684	35,442	171,855	45,400	154,285
America	-	-	-	-	150	-	-	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	62,036	6,270	62,292	305,925	256,364	101,688	44,607	474,372
China	-	-	-	-	100	1,200	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,740	400
Persian Gulf	-	-	-	-	-	4,500	250	-
Calcutta	-	240	-	-	-	2,700	1,200	-
Malabar	175	-	-	-	-	3,770	2,850	600
Bombay	1,530	-	202	-	5,000	10,772	8,376	1,845
Kutch	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-

COFFEE EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	Rs. 20	90	1,640	31,390	197,405	115,592	79,280	276,362
Africa, Coast of	3,426	-	850	15,393	71,730	2,330	2,418	8,494
America	9,795	13,975	14,100	36,342	18,390	52,046	22,800	121,580
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	159,662	109,201	84,948	120,076	123,953	117,137	210,137	122,011
China	-	-	-	-	2,520	-	-	1,000*
France	300,000	-	244,700	278,000	-	-	12,658	116,682
Mauritius	6,830	2,176	1,540	-	1,890	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	-
Persian Gulf	3,755	2,648	1,150	9,500	39,700	2,879	2,393	239
Suez	34,586	18,837	52,412	48,074	46,965	18,896	49,647	87,625
Calcutta	-	6,900	1,610	510	7,320	-	500	-
Malabar	-	-	-	-	175	100	-	-
Bombay	326,219	153,617	98,325	100,827	40,382	165,279	40,273	162,198
Kutch	705	845	465	210	966	420	730	734
Trieste	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,590	2,005
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,732

COTTON IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
Africa, Coast of	Rs. 15,770	5,630	-	4,037	-	570	-	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	149,666	48,055	60,208	41,014	7,903	37,830	30,610	36,990
Persian Gulf	350	3,709	5,900	8,245	14,239	375	13,995	2,350
Bombay	-	48,300	-	24,250	7,200	1,500	1,000	48,986
Kutch	-	-	20,950	24,850	174,325	2,860	51,325	91,000

COTTON EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	-	-	-	10,500	-	-	-	-
Africa, Coast of	-	-	-	80	600	-	-	1,030
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	8,880	26,595	18,226	36,464	88,121	20,133	10,980	35,695
France	300	-	464	-	-	-	-	-
Malabar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombay	126,346	-	5,000	-	-	65	-	-
Kutch	-	-	-	-	-	75	-	-

*China & Australia

IVORY IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
Africa, Coast of	2,917	6,242	4,097	7,608	83,891	134,170	24,010	11,876
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	73,450	211,475	206,895	139,377	149,446	383,600	279,255	418,675
Persian Gulf	-	-	-	-	-	-	37,800	-
Kutch	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-

IVORY EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	40,000	800	8,682	1,928
Africa, Coast of	50	-	-	800	30	-	-	-
America	-	-	-	8,170	-	-	-	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	35	-	130	15	-	-	-	200
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Singapore	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persian Gulf	900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Calcutta	-	30,700	319	-	-	-	-	-
Malabar	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-
Bombay	217,673	277,590	147,600	142,100	229,130	393,245	358,330	457,390
Kutch	776	2,520	325	-	650	2,275	410	715

GRAIN IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
Africa, Coast of	135	829	9,385	2,645	6,161	31,704	11,560	5,545
America	-	-	3,050	9,200	3,995	-	-	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	12,096	5,890	24,892	68,699	51,734	44,687	104,255	23,605
Mauritius	-	-	1,000	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,188	-
Persian Gulf	10	2,300	85,113	29,382	16,830	72,166	103,781	6,595
Calcutta	104,240	265,166	222,383	86,285	155,635	256,587	136,488	173,046
Malabar	16,125	13,000	12,463	5,230	-	4,042	-	41,128
Bombay	50,705	122,549	319,914	40,673	730	156,442	48,532	53,225
Kutch	1,500	13,425	7,945	20,585	18,420	68,586	775	1,130

GRAIN EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
Africa, Coast of	18,373	9,481	13,769	59,010	127,874	213,127	136,455	81,539
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	16,959	157,914	206,052	48,738	75,679	357,691	115,460	136,633
China	-	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persian Gulf	1,388	50	2,150	360	305	4,945	7,612	6,383
Suez	60	-	-	269	9,150	-	-	8
Calcutta	-	-	-	380	1,920	-	-	-
Malabar	-	-	-	-	111	1,136	-	-
Bombay	960	25	-	5,965	6,126	480	551	3,294
Kutch	6,484	6,059	2,673	40	1,074	14,088	28,081	45,936

COTTON PIECE GOODS, IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	83	40	-	17,180	238,991	354,555	298,140	758,230
Africa, Coast of	1,418	11,405	4,400	8,121	7,536	22,178	34,268	40,195
America	4,500	24,000	32,244	246,648	348,583	357,400	194,950	347,400
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	187,408	105,181	105,907	198,059	245,125	199,558	182,357	162,534
China	38,230	12,350	14,580	1,367	20,220	1,225	240	-
France	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	5,570
Singapore	8,475	-	-	-	-	400	28,421	18,360
Persian Gulf	3,650	3,450	25,090	14,088	7,273	1,620	11,501	1,520
Suez	-	-	-	-	600	1,000	1,800	6,582
Calcutta	4,565	15,300	24,604	11,349	5,665	12,500	1,600	3,725
Madras	-	-	-	-	50	18	-	-
Malabar	1,350	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombay	1,489,013	1,001,099	1,848,238	1,887,768	2,222,218	1,890,182	1,557,198	2,064,185
Kutch	63,570	47,625	27,238	51,023	32,000	49,765	29,345	18,912
Trieste	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,600	3,200
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	246

COTTON PIECE GOODS, EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	120	-	226	-	-	-	-	240
Africa, Coast of	352,571	256,599	191,026	274,755	532,579	398,001	326,363	464,235
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	1,120,424	902,098	1,356,483	1,849,958	1,535,996	2,380,588	1,386,917	1,953,897
China	100	-	-	150	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,720	-
Singapore	400	-	-	-	-	480	-	-
Persian Gulf	2,000	-	-	190	419	947	750	620
Suez	400	1,400	200	-	-	-	1,000	-
Calcutta	-	-	-	-	1,300	-	-	-
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,500
Malabar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bombay	1,250	14,200*	500	45,018	36,450	14,770	4,952	19,800
Kutch	-	100	50	-	435	4,520	1,390	440

SILK PIECE GOODS, IMPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	350	200	-	-	-	-	4,140	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	-	200	-	500	2,500	-	600	140
China	300	4,200	2,044	4,988	4,730	4,830	6,475	3,820
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	1,325	1,500	2,200
Persian Gulf	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
Suez	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	-
Calcutta	1,400	2,200	6,200	6,360	11,391	2,500	3,400	6,650
Bombay	48,118	75,385	21,717	36,744	54,750	34,056	67,402	125,985
Kutch	-	-	-	-	-	400	560	-

SILK PIECE GOODS, EXPORTS

Country	1863-64	1864-65	1865-66	1866-67	1867-68	1868-69	1869-70	1870-71
United Kingdom	-	-	-	70	-	-	-	-
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea	4,550	12,230	9,180	16,675	62,780	90,000	72,000	55,900
Mauritius	600	-	-	-	1,000	-	-	-
Madras	-	-	-	-	5,000	-	-	-
Bombay	-	-	1,500	1,500	-	-	-	1,500
Kutch	-	-	-	-	-	340	-	-

APPENDIX 8.Shipping

A. Country Craft

<u>Year</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1844-45	383	7,880
1845-46	643	15,065
1846-47	577	14,388
1847-48	814	20,310
1848-49	679	22,358
1849-50	726	23,436
1850-51	763	23,919
1851-52	- - - -	- - - -
1852-53	895	28,836
1853-54	932	18,206
1854-55	992	20,084
1855-56	1,013	26,450
1856-57	1,074	26,706
1857-58	1,120	24,841
1858-59	1,069	31,035
1859-60	941	37,578
1860-61	970	111,232
1861-62	950	37,857
1862-63	929	35,237
1863-64	804	30,210
1864-65	745	27,014
1865-66	819	28,395
1866-67	674	22,160
1867-68	1,043	44,630
1868-69	1,697	72,706
1869-70	1,688	64,402
1870-71	906	33,206

B. Square-rigged Ships and Steamers
from 1844-45 to 1862-63.

Year	British No.	U.S.A. No.	French No.	Hamburg No.	Swedish No.	Prussian No.	Dutch No.	Peruvian No.	Arab No.	Russian No.
1844-45	52	5	1	200	-	-	-	-	-	-
1845-46	74	12	-	-	1	126	-	-	-	-
1846-47	87	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1847-48	65	10	-	-	2	312	-	-	-	-
1848-49	78	8	3	468	-	-	-	-	-	-
1849-50	71	11	2	202	-	-	-	-	-	-
1850-51	61	9	7	2,015	-	-	-	-	-	330
1851-52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1852-53	84	13	1	342	-	330	-	-	6	2,893
1853-54	54	5	2	457	-	318	-	-	3	944
1854-55	51	8	3	3,049	-	405	-	-	4	1,463
1855-56	59	10	3	686	-	286	-	-	4	644
1856-57	88	12	5	1,762	-	566	-	-	4	1,772
1857-58	121	12	14	5,357	1	1,104	-	-	6	3,315
1858-59	233	11	10	2,894	-	793	-	-	2	1,274
1859-60	253	21	8	3,098	-	1,232	-	-	4	2,294
1860-61	240	6	2	711	1	107	-	-	2	1,175
1861-62	150	4	2	724	-	-	-	-	1	575
1862-63	166	4	16	22,079	-	-	-	-	-	-

Year	Bremen No.	Norwegian No.	Turkish No.	Belgian No.	Spanish No.	Italian No.	Sardinian No.	Egyptian No.	TOTALS No.
1844-45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58
1845-46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88
1846-47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
1847-48	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79
1848-49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89
1849-50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84
1850-51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80
1851-52	-	2	1	166	-	-	-	-	115
1852-53	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	67
1853-54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73
1854-55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
1855-56	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	112
1856-57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	161
1857-58	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	268
1858-59	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	1,213	295
1859-60	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1,649	261
1860-61	1	2	3	2,228	-	-	-	-	158
1861-62	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	187
1862-63	1	684	-	-	-	280	-	-	185

C. Square-rigged Ships
from 1863-64 to 1870-71.

<u>Year</u>	<u>British</u>		<u>U.S.A.</u>		<u>French</u>		<u>Hamburg</u>		<u>Swedish</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	61	47,637	18	15,602	1	516	1	1,021	-	-
1864-65	55	48,207	3	2,001	3	519	-	-	-	-
1865-66	85	70,729	4	3,644	1	516	-	-	-	-
1866-67	61	58,559	6	4,120	5	2,197	-	-	-	-
1867-68	86	66,751	16	10,911	3	1,342	-	-	-	-
1868-69	136	107,697	19	16,103	5	1,146	-	-	-	-
1869-70	70	60,912	4	2,420	1	543	-	-	2	1,453
1870-71	64	58,866	6	3,893	3	1,247	-	-	-	-

<u>Year</u>	<u>Dutch</u>		<u>Arab</u>		<u>Russian</u>		<u>Bremen</u>		<u>Norwegian</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	-	-	1	575	-	-	1	763	-	-
1864-65	-	-	1	220	-	-	-	-	-	-
1865-66	-	-	5	2,473	-	-	-	-	-	-
1866-67	-	-	1	350	1	844	-	-	-	-
1867-68	1	764	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1868-69	1	1,146	2	683	2	1,449	2	673	1	602
1869-70	-	-	1	650	1	543	-	-	-	-
1870-71	-	-	2	1,213	1	897	-	-	-	-

<u>Year</u>	<u>Portuguese</u>		<u>Austrian</u>		<u>Belgian</u>		<u>Italian</u>		<u>German</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1864-65	1	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1865-66	3	1,380	-	-	1	620	-	-	-	-
1866-67	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1867-68	2	349	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1868-69	2	151	-	-	-	-	1	898	-	-
1869-70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1,866
1870-71	-	-	2	132	-	-	-	-	-	-

<u>Year</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	83	66,114
1864-65	63	51,036
1865-66	99	79,362
1866-67	74	66,070
1867-68	108	80,117
1868-69	171	130,548
1869-70	81	68,387
1870-71	78	66,248

D. Steamers from 1863-64 to 1870-71

<u>Year</u>	<u>British</u>		<u>French</u>		<u>Arab</u>		<u>Austrian</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	124	128,675	25	36,260	-	-	-	-
1864-65	127	142,643	38	47,103	-	-	-	-
1865-66	160	157,422	48	50,977	-	-	-	-
1866-67	148	154,131	41	43,829	-	-	-	-
1867-68	158	165,351	44	49,399	-	-	-	-
1868-69	172	212,433	46	53,820	-	-	-	-
1869-70	226	273,553	50	58,941	1	1,168	2	1,523
1870-71	348	403,734	59	71,730	6	5,742	11	7,817

<u>Year</u>	<u>Italian</u>		<u>Russian</u>		<u>Dutch</u>		<u>Turkish</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1864-65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1865-66	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1,076
1866-67	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1867-68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1868-69	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1869-70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1870-71	13	10,027	2	2,859	1	164	-	-

<u>Year</u>	<u>"Foreign"</u>		<u>TOTALS</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1863-64	-	-	149	164,935
1864-65	-	-	165	189,746
1865-66	-	-	210	209,475
1866-67	-	-	189	197,960
1867-68	-	-	202	214,750
1868-69	-	-	218	266,253
1869-70	4	1,785	283	336,970
1870-71	-	-	440	502,073

APPENDIX 9.Sources for Annual Trade Reports, including Shipping.

- 1842-43: Haines-Bombay: 4 July 1843; BRP 374/22/27 Sept. 1843.
 1843-44: Haines-Bombay: 24 June 1844; BRP 374/39/28 Aug. 1844.
 1844-45: Haines-Bombay: 20 Aug. 1845; BRP 375/9/2 Oct. 1845.
 1845-46: Haines-Bombay: 10 Sept. 1846; BRP 375/38/28 April 1847.
 1846-47: Haines-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1847; BRP 375/50/15 Sept. 1847.
 1847-48: Haines-Bombay: 24 July 1848; BRP 376/14/6 Sept. 1848.
 1848-49: Haines-Bombay: 4 Aug. 1849; BRP 376/50/26 Sept. 1849.
 1849-50: Haines-Bombay: 20 Aug. 1850; BRP 377/9/11 Sept. 1850.
 1850-51: Haines-Bombay: 13 Aug. 1851; BRP 377/47/15 Oct. 1851.
 1851-52: Haines-Bombay: 26 July 1852; ARR 110/11 (TDR).
 1852-53: Haines-Bombay: 24 June 1853; Board's Collections, No. 171,660, Vol. 2647, 1855-56.
 1853-54: Clarke-Bombay: 8 June 1854; *ibid.*
 1854-55: Coghlan-Bombay: 4 July 1855; *ibid.*
 1855-56: Coghlan-Bombay: 17 May 1856; ARR 173/71 (TDR).
 1856-57: Coghlan-Bombay: 13 May 1857; BRP 379/33/22 July 1857.
 1857-58: Coghlan-Bombay: 15 May 1858; Collections to Revenue Dispatches from Bombay, 11/23.
 1858-59: Coghlan-Bombay: 18 May 1859; ARR 254/62 (TDR).
 1859-60: Playfair-Bombay: 24 May 1860; ARR 284/78 (Rev.).
 1860-61: Playfair-Bombay: 17 May 1861; ARR 323/83 (Rev.).
 1861-62: Honner-Bombay: 17 May 1862; ARR 342/54 (Rev.).
 1862-63: Coghlan-Bombay: 20 May 1863; ARR 371/35 (Rev.).
 1863-64: Merewether-Bombay: 9 June 1864; ARR 398/47 (Rev.).
 1864-65: Merewether-Bombay: 26 May 1865 ; Collections to Revenue Dispatches to Bombay, 845/8.
 1865-66: Merewether-Bombay: 5 May 1866; ARR 433/62 (Rev.).
 1866-67: Merewether-Bombay: 5 June 1867; Collections to Revenue Dispatches to Bombay, 849/6.
 1867-70: Aden Trade Reports (published separately, and found in both the British Museum and the India Office Library).
 1870-71: Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871; ARR 561 (Part 1)/129 (Pol). The returns form part of the Administration Report for that year.

Note

The reports for the years 1851-52 and 1856-57 have no schedules attached to them. The figures for these years have been obtained from the comparative statements for the years following.

APPENDIX 10.Rassam.

Ormuzd Rassam was born in 1826 of a Chaldean Christian family in Mosul, Iraq. In 1845, he became assistant to A.H. Layard who was then excavating at Kuyunjik which he identified as the site of ancient Nineveh. Two years later, Rassam accompanied Layard to England where he studied at Oxford until 1849. Meanwhile, Layard had gone to Istanbul, and from there back to Kuyunjik. In 1849, the British Museum sent Rassam to assist him in his work; and when Layard returned to England to enter Parliament in 1852, Rassam took over from him. The excavation continued until 1854, when Rassam returned to London to join the British Museum.

When Outram was appointed Resident at Aden, he felt the need for an efficient and able interpreter at the Residency. He asked the Court of Directors whether he could have Rassam whom he had met in London. The Court was agreeable, and the British Museum raised no objections. Rassam arrived at Aden on 29th December, 1854, two months after Outram had left.

It was not long, however, before Coghlan, Outram's successor, perceived that Rassam's abilities were not those of an ordinary interpreter. "His intimate knowledge of Arab character and manner is of great advantage to me in all my communications with these tribes (in the vicinity of Aden) whether personally or by letter, and I find him, not a mere interpreter and master of ceremonies, but a man of excellent judgment and untiring zeal, while his personal character and demeanour, are calculated to demand the respect and esteem of all classes." [Coghlan-Bombay: 1 May 1855; BSP 295/9.]

From 1855 to 1857, Rassam performed gratuitously the functions of postmaster and magistrate in addition to his other duties. In one year, he tried no less than 1100 recorded civil suits. Impressed by his ability, Coghlan proposed in 1858 that he should be made Assistant-Resident, and the Government agreed.

When Playfair left in January 1863, Rassam became First Assistant, and for some time he was Acting Resident. Rassam was sent on a number of diplomatic missions to various Arab chiefs, but his most important mission was to King Theodore of Abyssinia in 1864. He was in Abyssinia for four years, the last two of which he spent in prison. On his release, in April 1868, he returned to Aden, and after a short time there he left for England.

From 1876 to 1882, Rassam was in Iraq, carrying on archaeological work. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Foreign Office sent him to look into the affairs of the Christian communities in Asia Minor, Armenia and Kurdistan. Rassam died at Hove in 1910.

APPENDIX 11.

Section 273 of India Act VIII, 1859,
"An Act for simplifying the Procedure of the Courts of
Civil Judicature not established by Royal Charter."

"Any person arrested under a warrant in execution of a decree for money, may, on being brought before the Court, apply for his discharge on the grounds that he has no present means of paying the debt, either wholly or in part; or, if possessed of any property, that he is willing to place whatever property he possesses at the disposal of the Court. The application shall contain a full account of all property of whatever nature belonging to the applicant, whether in expectancy or in possession, and whether held exclusively by himself or jointly with others or by others in trust for him (except the necessary wearing apparel of himself and his family, and the necessary implements of his trade) and of the places respectively where such property is to be found, or shall state that, with the exceptions above mentioned, the applicant is not possessed of any property, and the application shall be subscribed and verified by the applicant in the manner hereinbefore prescribed for subscribing and verifying plaints."

[India Acts, Vol. 6.]

APPENDIX 12.Suits Cognizable by Courts of Small Causes.

The following were the suits cognizable by Courts of Small Causes:

"... claims for money due on bond or other contract, or for rent, or for personal property, or for the value of such property, or for damages, when the debt, damage or demand does not exceed in amount or value the sum of five hundred rupees. Provided that no action shall lie in any such Court on a balance of partnership account, unless the balance shall have been struck by the parties or their agents; or for a share or part of a share under an intestacy, or for a legacy or part of a legacy under a will; or for any claim for the rent of land, or any other claim for which a suit may be brought before a Revenue officer; or for the recovery of damages on account of an alleged personal injury, unless actual pecuniary damage shall have resulted from the injury." [Act XLII, 1860; India Acts, Vol. 7.]

This Act was replaced by Act XI of 1865. The suits cognizable by Courts of Small Causes remained the same. However, under the new Act, the local government could extend the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes to suits involving sums not exceeding Rs. 1000. The local government could also invest the Registrar of a Court of Small Causes with power to try suits not exceeding Rs. 20, and he was to exercise this power under the general control of the Judge. [India Act XI, 1865; India Acts, Vol. 10.]

APPENDIX 13.Heads of Administration.

Political Residents, Aden.

Captain S.B. Haines, I.N. (Political Agent)	19 Jan. 1839	-	9 March 1854
Col. A. Clarke (Acting Political Agent)	9 March 1854	-	23 June 1854
Lieut.-Col. James Outram	23 June 1854	-	26 Oct. 1854
Lieut.-Col. W.M. Coghlan (first time)	26 Oct. 1854	-	September 1861
Col. G.H. Robertson (Acting)	November 1861	-	January 1862
Maj.-Gen. R.W. Honner (Acting)	April 1862	-	January 1863
Lieut.-Col. W.M. Coghlan (second time)	January 1863	-	19 June 1863
Lieut.-Col. W.L. Merewether	19 June 1863	-	11 Jan. 1868
Maj.-Gen. Sir E.L. Russell	11 Jan. 1868	-	December 1870
Maj.-Gen. C.W. Tremenheere	December 1870	-	17 July 1872

Governors of Bombay.

Sir Robert Grant	17 March 1835	-	9 July 1838
James Farish (Acting)	11 July 1838	-	31 May 1839
Sir James Rivett-Carnac	31 May 1839	-	27 April 1841
G.W. Anderson (Acting)	29 April 1841	-	9 June 1842
Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Arthur	9 June 1842	-	5 Aug. 1846
L.R. Reid (Acting)	6 Aug. 1846	-	23 Jan. 1847
Sir G.R. Clerk (first time)	23 Jan. 1847	-	1 May 1848
Lord Falkland	1 May 1848	-	26 Dec. 1853
Lord Elphinstone	26 Dec. 1853	-	11 May 1860
Sir G.R. Clerk (second time)	11 May 1860	-	24 April 1862
Sir H.B.E. Frere	24 April 1862	-	6 March 1867
Sir W.R.S.V. Fitzgerald	6 March 1867	-	6 May 1872
Sir P.E. Wodehouse	6 May 1872	-	30 April 1877

Governors-General of India.

Lord Auckland	4 March 1836	-	27 Feb. 1842
Lord Ellenborough	28 Feb. 1842	-	22 July 1844
Lord Hardinge	23 July 1844	-	11 Jan. 1848
Lord Dalhousie	12 Jan. 1848	-	28 Feb. 1856
Lord Canning	29 Feb. 1856	-	31 Oct. 1858

Governors-General and Viceroys.

Lord Canning	1 Nov. 1858	-	11 March 1862
Lord Elgin	12 March 1862	-	20 Nov. 1863
Maj.-Gen. Sir Robert Napier (Officiating)	21 Nov. 1863	-	1 Dec. 1863
Col. Sir W.T. Dennison (Officiating)	2 Dec. 1863	-	11 Jan. 1864
Sir John Lawrence	12 Jan. 1864	-	11 Jan. 1869
Lord Mayo	12 Jan. 1869	-	8 Feb. 1872
John Strachey (Officiating)	9 Feb. 1872	-	22 Feb. 1872
Lord Napier of Merchistoun (Officiating)	23 Feb. 1872	-	2 May 1872
Lord Northbrook	3 May 1872	-	11 April 1876

Presidents of the Board of Control.

Sir John Hobhouse (first time)	29 May 1835	-	September 1841
Lord Ellenborough (third time)	September 1841-		October 1841
Lord Fitzgerald & Vesey	28 Oct. 1841	-	11 May 1843
Earl of Ripon	17 May 1843	-	June 1846
Sir John Hobhouse (later Lord Broughton; second time)	July 1846	-	February 1852
John Charles Herries	28 Feb. 1852	-	December 1852
Sir Charles Wood (first time)	30 Dec. 1852	-	February 1855
R. Vernon Smith	February 1855	-	March 1858
Lord Ellenborough (fourth time)	March 1858	-	May 1858
Lord Stanley	May 1858	-	31 Oct. 1858

Secretaries of State for India.

Lord Stanley	1 Nov. 1858	-	June 1859
Sir Charles Wood (second time)	18 June 1859	-	16 Feb. 1866
Lord de Grey & Ripon	February 1866	-	July 1866
Lord Cranborne	July 1866	-	February 1867
Sir Stafford H. Northcote	2 March 1867	-	December 1868
Duke of Argyll	December 1868	-	1874

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