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PREFACE  
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... with Muslim culture  
in the FACULTY of ARTS.

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MENTAL AND MORAL CULTURE IN MEDIEVAL INDIA

by

RASHID AHMAD, M.A. (LONDON), B.T., MUNSHI FAZIL.



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R. Ahmad  
Ph.D  
Philosophy  
1932

THESIS for the DEGREE of Ph.D. in PHILOSOPHY  
in the FACULTY of ARTS.

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
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RASHID AHMAD, M.A. (LONDON), B.T., MUNSHI RAJID.

16 NOV 35



P R E F A C E.

MANY books have been written on the history of Indian Philosophy but all the writers have taken Indian Philosophy to mean Hindu Philosophy. They have not taken notice of the fact that India came into contact with Muslim culture about twelve centuries ago and that the Muslims settled down in India and made it their home and that the two communities, Hindu and Muslim, have been living as neighbours for such a long time that it was not possible for the Hindus to shut out completely all foreign influence in their thought. Moreover, the writers on Islamic civilisation have confined their attention to Islam as they found it in Arabia and her neighbouring countries and Spain, and did not think of Islam in India.

My aim in writing this thesis is to trace the influence of Islam in the teaching of the various Hindu sects of medieval India, and to give some idea of Islam as it flourished in India. The sects in India are so innumerable that it is impossible to do full justice to every one in the short time at my disposal, and so I have selected only a few for a discussion here.

I have compared and contrasted the Indian thinkers with those of Europe, both modern and ancient, to make some of the problems more intelligible to a Western reader, and at the same time to show that similar problems have engaged the attention of the philosophers in different lands, and in many cases, the solution, though worked independently, was the same. Some of the Indian writers have made a passing reference to Western thinkers, but I have carried on the work in detail.

My views on Shankara are entirely different from those of orthodox Hindu writers. The same is the case

with/

with Gita. I have suggested a new theory as regards the date of its composition and I have tried to trace the theistic ideas in Gita to a foreign source.

In regard to Islam in India, I think I am the first to write anything about it in detail, from the point of view of philosophy. I have compared the Sufi views with those of the Christian mystics and have discussed Sufism on the basis of psychology. I admit that a few books have been written on the religious experience in the West, but they have taken mainly the Christian mystics as their basis of reference and not the Sufis.

In tracing the history of Islamic philosophy, I have dealt with only those who had some influence on Muslim thought in India. In this connection I have made use of the current literature on the subject.

I have added a chapter on the Persian poetry and ethical thought in Muslim India and this, I believe, has not yet been attempted by any writer. The same is the case with the pantheistic views of Dara Shakh.

In dealing with the Vaishnavite philosophers, I have tried to show how they were gradually drifting towards a partial acceptance of the Islamic views.

In the end I may say that I have followed the popular Indian method of writing the Sanskrit and Arabic words, though I fully realise that this method is defective and faulty, but out of consideration for the work of the typist, time is thus saved as otherwise the placing of marks and dots over and under the letters means the shifting of the paper upward and downward every time.

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the people of that time. It is believed that they  
 lived mainly on agriculture and were mostly vegetarians  
 in their diet, though meat was also used on certain  
 ceremonial/

# Chapter 1

## I N T R O D U C T I O N .

INDIA, a country as large as Europe with the exception of Russia, has been subject to foreign invasions from time to time. These invaders came mainly from the north-west and brought with them their own ideas and culture. We find that a race inhabiting the central part of Asia, being compelled by the struggle for existence to seek new places and new modes of living, entered the fertile valleys of the Punjab, forcing the original inhabitants of the land to beat a retreat or to declare their submission to the victors. Slowly and gradually they moved on and on till they occupied the whole of ~~the~~ northern India. They were called Aryans. Their early thoughts are set forth in the Sacred Books called the Vedas, namely, Rig Veda, Sam Veda, Yajur Veda and Athar Veda. Of these Rig Veda is the oldest. Its date of composition is estimated differently by various writers. Some go so far as to assign 4000 B.C. as the minimum date for the composition of its hymns, while the others came down to 1200 B.C. It is difficult to estimate correctly the exact date because the Hindus never kept a historical record of their literary composition and consequently in the early periods the Vedas were handed down orally from generation to generation. As the Vedas were composed when the Aryans were conquering the fertile parts of India, their hymns give us an insight into the social manners and customs of the people of that time. It is believed that they lived mainly on agriculture and were mostly vegetarians in their diet, though meat was also used on certain ceremonial/

ceremonial occasions. They were divided into tribes and each tribe had its own chief. These petty chiefs owed submission to a higher chief and kingship seems to be hereditary, though based on the goodwill of the people. Kaegi says,

"The hymns strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the realm of nature and that every wrong act, even the unconscious was punished and the sin expiated."

They believed that the world was created from the limbs of a fabulous monster - man or pursha. In this we find some resemblance to the old times prevalent in Europe. For instance, in the Norse legend the earth, the mountains, oceans are formed from the limbs of the giant Yamir. The same is the case with North America, Egypt and Greece.

As for life after death, it was believed that those who had done good deeds went to live with gods in the heaven.

"To the plain Elysian, where light-haired  
Radhamanthus doth dwell,  
Where restful is life and ever with men it  
goeth full well" - Frazer.

The home of the dead was in the third sky, where there was joy and delight a place of uncreated light.

But those who had done wicked deeds were cast into darkness from which they did not come out (Rig Veda VII. 104,3.)

The phenomena of nature were personified and worshipped by the people. Anything that could do them harm or was beneficial to them, was worshipped as a god. So the number of gods was greatly multiplied but of the exact number we are not certain. It is generally believed that they were 33 in number, though some (probably counting the lesser deities) go so far as to raise the number to 330 millions. The most prominent of the gods were Dyaus (sky) and Prithvi (earth). But any of the gods would take a prominent place according to the need of the people for the time being.

Max Muller does not like to call it polytheism and gives it the name of Henotheism.

"To identify Indra, Agni and Varuna is one thing, it is syncretism, to address either Indra or Agni or Varuna as for the time being the only god in existence with an entire forgetfulness of all other gods, is quite another; and it was this phase, so fully developed in the hymns of Veda, which I wished to mark definitely by a name of its own, calling it Henotheism"- Max Muller.

But it does not follow that if the bards were singing the hymns of one particular god for the time being, they did not believe in the existence of others. They assigned different functions to different deities and the deities were mainly independent of others in the performance of their functions. And sometimes it appears that two gods co-operated with each other in performing the same act and so we find a mention

of/

of dual-gods like Indra-Agni, Mitra-Varunan, Agni-Shoman. The idea of co-operation naturally leads to the conception of One Supreme Being, under whom the various agents do their separate works. Prof. Macdonell maintains that,

"Henotheism is an appearance rather than a reality, an appearance produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods and by the growing belief in the unity of the gods each of whom may be regarded as a type of the divine."

The idea of two gods performing the same act of <sup>one</sup> exercising his influence in the realm of others made the poets realise the necessity of a Supreme Being, without an equal. So they finally arrived at a conviction that there was behind all the gods that one of which the gods were but various names.

"He is one though sages call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan" - R.V.L. 164,46.

"The one breathed breathlessly by itself, other than it there nothing since has been" Muller. R.V.XI29,2.

Such a thought would naturally lead to pantheism. So the sages began to identify the One God, the Supreme Being with the manifold forms of existence.

This/

This thought finds its best expression in the *back* Upanishads. *all the world is identical with Atman,*

The connecting link between the Upanishads *etc* and the Vedas are called Brahmanas. *reality behind*

The Brahmanas (800-500 B.C.) **composed in** *ch have* **prose deal with the explanation of the sacrificial ceremonies, and so are not of any interest from our** *stan.* point of view. They were developed into Aranyakas - theosophical treatise<sup>s</sup> - and these were developed into Upanishads. In the Vedic period we find the people believing in everlasting peace after death, and with the exception of a couple of passages in the later part of Rigveda which describes the soul of the dead man going to the plants and the waters, we do not find any trace of the belief in transmigration of the soul at that time. Even these passages do not give us any definite idea of this belief. But later on we find them drifting towards a faith in metempsychosis or wandering of the soul from body to body according to the fruit of its work. The soul takes up not only the body of men and animals, but also those of trees, and as formerly there was a distinction between the soul of man on the one hand and the souls of animals and birds on the other, this distinction is now gradually disappearing and finally there results an absolute identification between the human soul and all that exists outside man. So the Upanishads declare that Brahma, the ultimate essence of the universe and Atma, the inmost essence in man are one and the same. The Brahma seems materialised in all the manifold existence of the universe; that

Brahma, which creates, sustains, and receives back into itself all the world is identical with Atman, the Self in a man. The Universalself, the Absolute and Eternal Spirit is the unchanging reality behind all appearances of the many finite selves, which have their being and life in the former. The oft-quoted words of Emerson give us a good insight into this system.

"If the red slayer thinks he slays,  
 Or if the slain thinks he is slain,  
 They know not well the subtle ways  
 I keep and pass and turn again,  
 Far or forgot to me is near;  
 Shadow or sunlight are the same;  
 The vanished gods to me appear;  
 And one to me are shame and fame.  
 They reckon ill who leave me out;  
 When me they fly, I am the wings;  
 I am the doubter and the doubt;  
 And I the hymn the Brahman sings."

This supreme reality is beyond all conditions of finite thought and can be described only in negations, not this, not that, etc. Brahma, the Absolute is indescribable. Only in inspired intuition, the soul can reach Brahma and thus becomes free from bonds of birth and rebirth.

Now I come to the systems of Hindu Philosophy. They may be divided into (a) Those which do not believe in the infallibility of the vedas like Buddhism and Jainism and Carvākism (b) the orthodox schools, six in number viz., 1 Sankhya, 11 Yoga, 111

Vedanta, IV Maimansa, V Naya, VI Vaisesika. Their dates of formulation are not known but it is generally believed that they appeared after the earlier Upanishads. Most likely they consisted of the sayings and oral instruction of the sages and someone later on collected them in a systematic form, with the addition of his own views and the collection bears his name. Of these maimansa cannot be called a philosophical system as it deals with the principles according to which the Vedas are to be interpreted. The system of Samkhya which is ascribed to Kapila seems to be the oldest one, and is said to have preceeded Buddhism. The original is lost. But Samkhya Karila edited by Ishva<sup>r</sup> Krishna in the 3rd century A.D. seems to be the oldest book of this school of thought. Gaudapada wrote a commentary on this probably in the 8th century. Samkhya Parvacna Sutra is a work of late date most likely of the 14th century. There is other literature of the school belonging to the 15th and 16th century. In the later periods it appears that the system has undergone a material change. This system recognises the dualism of soul and matter or ~~rather a number of souls and matter~~. There is no room for the existence of a creator or ruler of the universe. The universe develops according to certain laws out of primitive matter. Before the world came into being, the Prakriti or undeveloped matter was kept in equilibrium by the opposition of the three Gunas (Satva or intelligence stuff, Tamas or energy stuff and rajas or mass stuff). Somehow or other this equilibrium was disturbed and the world of manifold came into existence.

Professor/

Badha Krishna, following the later versions,

starts clear of this by assigning consciousness to

Partha/

Professor Radha Krishna sums it up thus:-

"The process of evolution consists in"  
 "the development of the differentiated "  
 "within the undifferentiated, of the "  
 "determinate within the undeterminate, of"  
 "the coherent within the incoherent. The order of"  
 "succession is neither from part to the whole, nor"  
 "from whole to the parts, but ever from a "  
 "relatively less differentiated, less determinate,"  
 "less coherent, to relatively more differentiated,  
 "more determinate, more coherent whole. When the"  
 "Karma (reaping of the fruits of the past deeds)"  
 of all souls collectively require that there should  
 "be no more experience, this manifold world returns  
 "to its quiescent state by the reduction of the"  
 "gunas to their elementary disintegrated state."

The Pursha or self is regarded beginningless, and has no cause beyond itself. "The self, (pursha) is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work this combination of Pursha and the other elements take place."

Das Gupta.

The Psychic Processes are merely mechanical processes of the internal organs that is of matter. But by themselves they would have remained unconscious had it not been for their combination with the soul. But if the soul had no germ or potentiality of consciousness it is difficult to explain how the combination of two <sup>uncon-</sup>scious factors can produce consciousness. But Professor Radha Krishna, following the later versions, steers clear of this by assigning consciousness to

Pursha/

Pursha.

"As its character is consciousness, it helps to bring the products of the evolutionary chain into self consciousness. It illuminates the whole sphere of thought and feeling....."

Samkhya denies to Pursha all qualities, since otherwise it would not be capable of emancipation.... The characteristics of Pursha and Prakrati are opposed in nature. Prakrati is non-consciousness while Pursha is consciousness. Prakrati is active and ever-evolving, while Pursha is inactive. Pursha is unalterably constant, while Prakrati is so alterably. Prakrati is characterised by the three gunas, while Pursha is devoid of the gunas; Prakrati is the object while Pursha is the subject."

As regards the relation of Prakrati and Pursha the Professor writes,

"The Samkhya says that mere presence of the Pursha excites Prakrati to activity and development."

To this it may be objected that the presence of Pursha cannot be neglected even when Prakrati is in a state of equilibrium and hence inactivity. So Professor Radhakrishna gives another explanation of this difficulty. He says,

"When the Pursha recognises its distinction from the ever-evolving and dissolving world of Prakrati the latter ceases to operate towards it. The efficient cause of Prakrati development is not the mere presence of the Purshas, for they are always present, but their non-discrimination."

The ultimate state of emancipation is called the Brahman state. It means either the absolute annihilation/

annihilation or characterless absolute existence. There is no consciousness in this state.

Yoga:- Yoga differs from Samkhya in maintaining the existence of an Intelligent Being, "Who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of harmony or order may be attained."

The Ishwara is never subject to ignorance, passions or afflictions, is pure Sattva, (Intelligence stuff). He is all-knowledge, all-power. He does not create Prakrati but disturbs the influence of Prakrati in its quiescent state. Then He helps Prakrati to follow an intelligent order.

This system mainly deals with practices for the Concentration of mind on God.

Kanada, (a nickname meaning atomist), is believed to be the founder of the Vaisheshika system. Kanada enumerates Six categories;- Substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity. To these was added another later on, namely, non-existence. These categories were again broken up into sub-divisions. For instance, under the motion substance fall earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell and touch; Water, colour, taste, touch, liquidity and smoothness; fire-- colour and touch; air-- touch only, and ether possesses none of these qualities.

Kanada not only gives a discussion of the categories but tries to solve the various problems of existence and of thought. He maintains that the world originated from atoms. The soul is

The system of (11.) will be discussed in

is eternal, beginningless and is not limited by time and space. The soul perceives the object of knowledge through the agency of "manas" or inner sense, which is an atom.

The Kanadas' doctrine was developed by Gautama in his system called nyaya. It is a treatise on formal logic and discusses at full length the doctrine of the means of knowledge, of syllogisms, fallacies, etc. A few details showing the line of thought of the nyaya are given below:-

The means of proof are four, viz:- perception, inference, analogy and testimony. Perception is defined as "uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects." Inference is of three

- kinds, viz:- (1) From cause to effect
- (2) From effect to cause
- (3) From common characteristics.

In discussing the question of Self, nyaya maintains that "each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathers together the different sense cognitions and produces the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense perceptions. Another argument for the admission of Soul is that infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy. Every creature is born with some desires. All attachment and desires are due to previous experiences and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experiences in previous existences." It also discusses the psychological problems like attention, repetition, association, etc. in a primitive form.

The system of Vedanta will be discussed in connection with the commentaries made by Shankra and others.

The system of Samkhya supplied material for Buddhism and Jainism, the chief theme of which is the belittlement of man's life. These two systems are very much alike. Though Buddhism lost its sway in India, Jainism can still count a considerable portion of the population as its adherents.

The founder of Buddhism was Prince Saki Muni Gantama, also called Siddhanta. He was born in 508 B.C. At the age of 19 he married his cousin Yasodhra and for many years lived a life of pleasure. In his thirtieth year he was greatly impressed by the sufferings of human beings and so he made up his mind to find out a way to true happiness. He fled from the town and first went to two Brahman teachers and became a disciple of theirs. Here he studied for seven years. Then he went to the Jungle and lived the life of a strict ascetic for six years. And now Gautama's great period of temptation came, which lasted for 24 hours and from which he came out victorious. When he rose after the temptation, he was Buddha, the Enlightened.

Buddha's teaching. Buddha argued that decay and death depended upon birth, which was due to previous existence. (He does not give any reason for this assumption.) All this was due to 'desire', which had its root in feelings connected with mind and body. (This is called the doctrine of the 12 links.) Mind's connection with the body makes a man subject to constantly unsatisfied desires. No form of pen-ance can overcome this because pen-ance punishes the body only. Even if a man tries to follow a virtuous path, a certain amount of evil is left

and so he is still entangled in the web of material life. A man can only be freed from suffering by annihilation.

"The mind released is like the extinction of flame."

The following are the four main points of Buddhist doctrine:

- (1) Misery invariably accompanies existence.
- (2) Every type of existence, whether of man or of animals results from passion or desire.
- (3) There is no freedom from existence but by the annihilation of desire.
- (4) Desire may be destroyed by following eight paths leading to Nirvana.

The eight paths are:- (1) right views, (2) right feelings, (3) right words, (4) right behaviour, (5) right exertion, (6) right obedience, (7) right memory, (8) right meditation.

An individual in his natural state takes birth again and again, and the chief aim of the individual should be to act in such a way in his present life as to do away with the necessity of rebirth. The only thing permanent is the individual's "Karma", (his actions and thoughts in this life which decide what form his incarnation shall take place in his next birth).

Budha does not believe in any substratum or centre of reality beyond this phenomenon. Moreover he does not say anything about the soul. When pressed by his disciples about eternity and definition of the ego he remarks,

"Why has not the Budha taught his followers whether the world is finite or infinite; whether the saint continues to live or not in the Beyond? Because the mere knowledge of these things does not

Mahabharata. Arjuna says,

lead to any progress in sanctity, because such knowledge does not necessarily conduce to spiritual peace and illumination. He teaches the truth about pain, the truth about the origin of pain, about the suppression of pain. Hence let that which has not been revealed by me remain unrevealed. The mind has come into existence by means of unfathomable mystery, and it is useless to try to discover what this mystery is. The monk who is striving to secure the safety of his soul has something else to do--"

Dhamma Pasha, Beal's translation.

In addition to the above systems of Philosophy I may mention the two schools of materialists, Dhurttā and Susiksita, commonly known as Carvakas Schools. The period in which they flourished is not correctly known.

"According to them there <sup>is</sup> no soul, life and consciousness <sup>are</sup> were the products of the combination of matter. There is no after-life and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice, Life is only for enjoyment."

They did not believe in the transmigration of the Soul, (Das Gupta.) According to them inference had no validity. If in any case an inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact.

An account of ancient Hindu philosophy will not be complete without mentioning Bhagwadīta, a poem in Mahabharata. William von Humboldt calls it "the most beautiful, and perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue."

It teaches the method of Bhakti or devotion. Krishna the God incarnate, addresses Arjuna when the latter is hesitating to fight in the battle of

Mahabharata/

Mahabhartas. Arjuna says,  
 "If to slay is to sin, it is a worse sin  
 to slay those to whom we owe love and  
 worship."

But Krishna removes these disquieting thoughts by  
 saying,

"Never the Spirit was born; the spirit shall  
 cease to be never,  
 Never was time it was not; end and beginning  
 are dreams;  
 Birthless and deathless and changeless remaineth  
 the spirit for ever,  
 Death hath not touched it at all, dead though  
 the house of it seems.

Sir Edwin Arnold's

translation.

The following lines will give an idea of the main  
 doctrine of Gita:

Much these teach,  
 From Veds, concerning the " three qualities"  
 But thou, be free of the "three qualities"  
 Free of the "pairs of opposites", and free  
 From that sad righteousness which calculates.

Let right deeds be  
 Thy motive, not the fruit which comes from them  
 And live in action! labour! make thine acts  
 Thy piety, casting all self aside,  
 Contemning gain and merit; equable  
 in good or evil

Unto pure devotion  
 Devote thyself; with perfect meditation  
 Comes perfect act.

If one  
 Ponders on objects of the sense, there springs  
 attraction.

Attraction; from attraction grows desire,  
 Desire flames to fierce passion, passion breeds  
 Recklessness; then the memory - all betrayed -  
 Lets noble purpose go, and saps the mind.

Only with him, great Prince  
 Whose senses are not swayed by things of sense -  
 Only with him who holds his mastery,  
 Shows wisdom perfect.

-----  
 But if one eats  
 Fruits of the earth, rendering to kindly Heaven  
 No gift of toil, that thief steals from his world.  
 -----  
 Thus, action is of Brahma, who is One  
 The Only, All-pervading; at all times  
 Present in sacrifice.

-----  
 All things are everywhere by Nature wrought  
 In an interaction of the qualities,  
 The fool, cheated by self, thinks, "This, I did".  
 -----

All's then God!  
 The Sacrifice is Brahm, the ghee and grain  
 Are Brahm, the fire is Brahm, the flesh it eats  
 Is Brahm, and unto Brahm attaineth he  
 Who, in such office, meditates on Brahm.

-----  
 By works the votary doth rise to saint,  
 And saintship is the ceasing from all works;  
 Because the perfect yogin acts - but acts  
 Unmoved by passions and unbound by deeds,  
 Setting result aside.

-----  
 He so vowed,  
 So blended, sees the Life - Soul resident  
 In all things living, and all living things  
 In that Life - soul contained.

-----  
 I make and unmake the Universe:

Than me there is no other Master, Prince!

No other Maker! All these hang on me

As hangs a row of pearls upon its string.

I am the fresh taste of the water; I

The silver of the moon, the gold of the sun,

The word of Worship in the Veds.

These am I, free from passion and desire;

for all those moods

Soothfast, or passionate, or ignorant,

Which nature frames, deduce from me, but all

Are merged in me - Not I in them! The World -

Deceived by those three qualities of being }  
 Wotteth not Me who am outside them all,

Above them all, Eternal.

My Being -

Creating all, sustaining all - still dwells

Outside of all

See! as the shoreless airs

Move in the measureless space, but are not in space

(And space were space without the moving airs)

So all things are in Me but are not I

By energy

And help of Prakrati, my outer Self

Again, and yet again, I make go forth

The realms of visible things - without their will

All of them - by the power of Prakrati

-----

I am the Prayer

I am the Funeral-cake set for the dead

I am the healing herb! I am the ghee

The Mantra, and the flame, and that which burns!

Seed and seed sower,

Death am I, and immortal life I am,

/Arjuna

Arjuna! Sat and Asat, visible life

And life invisible!

Now we pass on to Vedanta and the medieval philosophy.

Chapter II

VEDANTA

Vedanta is composed of two words vede- anta

As regards the date of its composition the

historians differ, according to Keith, this book

It is not very clear why the author or authors put

is very creditable in this respect. Vedanta

1.

was meant as a guide for those who were most advanced in their intellectual attainments, and so that the secret doctrines were guarded against common

## Chapter II

of knowledge. **V E D A N T A.** encroachment. ~~As a matter of fact~~ the Sutras are unintelligible without the commentaries and the

commentators, chief of whom are Shankara, Ramamija, Madhava, Vallabha etc. differ materially in their meaning the end of the Vedas. The Vedanta Sutra views of the Sutras. "It seems likely that the is also called Brahma Sutra as it deals with the commentators expressed their views and tried to doctrine of Brahma and also Sariraka Sutra or the force the texts to bear testimony to the truth of their book of the Unconditioned Self. Vedanta is based on philosophical theories" - Radhakrishna.

on Upanishads, the concluding chapter or the end of the Vedas. Its authorship is ascribed to Badrayava, the work of Badrayaya stands to the Upanishads in the same relation as the Christian Dogmatic who is identified with Vyasa. Though authorities to the New Testament, it investigates their such as Ramamija, Vallabha admit that Vyasa was the teaching about God, the world, the soul, in its author of Vedanta Sutra, yet they do not identify conditions of wandering and of deliverance, removes Vyasa with Badrayaya.

apparent contradictions of the doctrines, binds them As regards the date of its composition the systematically together, and is especially concerned historians differ. According to Keith, this book to defend them against the attacks of opponents." - Deussen. was not composed later than 200 A.D. while the Indian

The philosophy of Vedanta is an attempt to writers assign to it a much earlier date i.e., from understand the nature of Reality underlying the 500 to 200 B.C. Frazer also agrees with the Indian world of manifoldness. It is the same problem which scholars (about 400 B.C.) Jacobi, however, has presented itself to the thinkers of the world considers that it is unlikely that the Sutra was in every age and for which various solutions have composed earlier than 200 A.D. and most probably was been made from time to time. For the student of the written between 200 and 450 A.D.

Western Philosophy it would be interesting to note The book has 555 Sutras consisting mostly of a that the thinkers in India do not lag behind the few words, which admit of different interpretations. Western philosophers in giving the world an explanation It is not very clear why the author or authors put of this problem and the position of the Vedantists them into so obscure a form. Most probably the book

is very creditable in this respect. Vedanta was meant as a guide for those who were most advanced in their intellectual attainments, and so that the secret doctrines were guarded against common encroachment. As a matter of fact the Sutras are unintelligible without the commentaries and the commentators, chief of whom are Shankara, Ramanija, Madhara, Vallabha etc. differ materially in their views of the Sutras. "It seems likely that the commentators expressed their views and tried to force the texts to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories." - Radhakrishna.

The work of Baydrayaya stands to the Upanishads in the same relation as the Christian Dogmatic to the New Testament, it investigates their teaching about God, the world, the soul, in its conditions of wandering and of deliverance, removes apparent contradictions of the doctrines, binds them systematically together, and is especially concerned to defend them against the attacks of opponents." - Deussen.

The philosophy of Vedanta is an attempt to understand the nature of Reality underlying the world of manifoldness. It is the same problem which has presented itself to the thinkers of the world in every age and for which various solutions have been made from time to time. For the student of the Western Philosophy it would be interesting to note that the thinkers in India do not lag behind the Western philosophers in giving the world an explanation of this problem and the position of the Vedantists

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is very creditable in this respect. Vedanta

discusses two very important questions: (1) "The theoretical determination of the nature of substance or reality underlying experience and of the origin of knowledge. (2) The ethical problem of duty and the ultimate ideal of human life."

There are four schools of Vedanta, viz. those of (1) Shankara (2) Ramanuja (3) Madhva and (4) Vallabha. Their corresponding types of interpretation are known as (1) Advaita. (2) Vishistadvaita (3) Dvaita and (4) Suddhadvaita.

*Chapter III*  
The Non-Dual (Advaita) Vedanta of Shankara  
advocated by Shankara is a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological

considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those ages. He was born in 788 A.D. and died in 820 A.D. forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the (Max Muller and Professor MacDonell). Telang thinks he lived in the second half of the seventh century, while Bhandarker considers the 8th century called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth and as the period of his life. Professor Keith also subtlety of speculation."

It is impossible to read Shankara's writings, in the ninth century.

packed as they are with serious and subtle thinking, He was born in a Brahman family at Kaladi in the Province of Malibar. Early in his life he became a pupil to Govinda who held a school at Kaladi. Shankara was possessed of great intellect and from his early boyhood was considered a great

Sacred Waters, who by his commentaries, has lemmed about, against all impurities or Time's jealousy,

genius. He had a wonderful memory and learnt quickly what others generally take a long time to master. He learned the Vedas at an early age and this impressed him so much that he gave up wordly pursuits and became a sawyasi. He wandered from place to place teaching to the people and holding discussions with those who differed from him in their views. During these travels he expounded the advaita system of philosophy which has given him an everlasting fame. Nearly all the Indian and some of the European writers of modern times are unanimous in their praise of Shankara. Thibaut says: "The doctrine advocated by Shankara is a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by Shankara, nor any of the non-vedantic system can be compared with the so called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation."

"It is impossible to read Shankara's writings, packed as they are with serious and subtle thinking, without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of a very fine penetration and profound spirituality."-- Radhakrishna.

"Is he (Shankara) not the Guardian of the Sacred Waters, who by his commentaries, has hemmed about, against all impurities or Time's jealousy,

first the mountain tarū<sup>n</sup> of the Upanishads, then the serene forest lake of the Bhagwadgita and last the deep reservoir of the Sutras; adding from the generous riches of his wisdom, lovely fountains and lakelets of his own, the Crest Jewel, the Awakening, the Discernment."- Johnston.

Shankara was not the first exponent of the Advaita vedanta. There were others before him such as Gaudapaya, Bhartrahri, who held similar views. But it was Shankara who brought it to a sublime height.

That was the age of conflicting creeds. Speculation had undermined the authority of the Vedas. The people had been led to scepticism. They did not know what to believe and what to reject. So a natural longing for the old faith was arising. Buddhism was giving way to Brahmanism. The people wanted a man who could reconcile the old faith with the new ideas. Shankara was the man for the purpose. Though his task was difficult he achieved it brilliantly. This is the root, the basic principle of all his efforts and he keeps it in view in all his works. But in spite of all the energy he threw into his work, he fell into serious errors, which make his works of very little value. I am of opinion that Shankara has been over-estimated and in the

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of recognised greatness, a Kapila or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it a more systematic fashion. He maintains following pages I will try to show how he falls short of the required standard.

(Note- The quotations in the following, where no reference is given, are taken from the translation made by Paul Deussen.) is in the thing, not transcendent. Neo-Platonism it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of preferred religion to Philosophy and maintained experiences for the sake of clearing up the question. that the knowledge of God could not be attained

THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

The Vedantist admits of three sources of knowledge - (1) Perception (2) Inference (3) Scriptures.

According to Protagoras, as Plato interprets him, knowledge is perception which is the result of of the meeting of movement within and movement without the sense organ. The process of perception, the thing perceived and the process of perceiving, are identical. For every man that which appears to his senses to be true or right is the only rule of truth or right. For Plato scientific knowledge is purely intellectual knowledge, often Forms or Ideas.

Knowledge does not count in impressions of Sense but in reasoning about them. Thinking is systematic reflection by which the soul contemplates universals in all things. We do not see and learn by the eyes and ears but through them. Aristotle carries out the fundamental insight of Plato in

of recognised greatness, a Kapila or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it a more systematic fashion. He maintains as well founded. Even here a sound foundation is the existence of intuitively known principles lacking, since even the recognised pioneers such as Kapila, Kanada and the like openly contradict each other. But he insists

that the universal (the object of knowledge) where it (the sense of Scripture) is doubtful is in the thing, not transcendent. Neo-Platonism it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of preferred religion to Philosophy and maintained experience for the sake of clearing up the question. that the knowledge of God could not be attained The knowledge of the Brahman is gained by the sense by reasoning. God was above human reason and was consequently unattainable by it. He was determined; it is not gained by other means of super-rational and his knowledge could only be knowledge, such as inference. But although it is got by revelation. So neo Platonism built up the Vedanta texts which inform us of the cause of a system of ancient oracles or myths.

Shankara does not attach much importance to that we have grasped their sense correctly, an perception and inference. He relies chiefly on inference which does not contradict the word of the Scriptures. "And, therefore, mere reflection Vedanta is not excluded as a means of knowledge." must not be quoted in opposition in a matter So reflection does not have any validity which is to be known by tradition; for reflections against the Scriptures. Does not the doctrine which, without tradition, rest only on the quoted above lead to dogmatism? The words of speculation of men, are untenable since this Deighton in reference to dogmatic assumption in a speculation is unbridled. For instance, the Western religion can be applied to the present case: reflections thought out by some experts after "The wise man will not be sure that he can be sure great trouble are recognised by others, still of anything except Scriptures (in his experience). more expert, as (merely) apparent, and those of He will guide his life wholly by probability. Like the latter in the same way by others. Therefore Cratylus and others, he will not pass judgments; he will one cannot rely on it, that reflections have not even wag his thumb." There is no standard of stability, because the opinions of men vary. of truth but scriptures. Experience counts for But, (it may be objected) when there is a man nothing. But a modern philosopher would say that mistake when some one tells him that it is a rope

of recognised greatness, a Kapila or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it as well founded. Even here a sound foundation is lacking, since even the recognised pioneers such as Kapila, Kanad and the like openly contradict each other."

"Where it (the sense of Scripture) is doubtful, it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of experience for the sake of clearing up the question. The knowledge of the Brahman is gained by the sense of the word of the Veda being considered and determined; it is not gained by other means of knowledge, such as inference. But although it is the Vedanta texts which inform us of the cause of the world coming into existence, yet to make sure that we have grasped their sense correctly, an inference which does not contradict the word of the Vedanta is not excluded as a means of knowledge."

So reflection does not have any validity against the Scriptures. Does not the doctrine quoted above lead to dogmatism? The words of Deighton in reference to dogmatic assumption in a Western religion can be applied to the present case: "The wise man will not be sure that he can be sure of anything except Scriptures (in his experience). He will guide his life wholly by probability. Like Cratylus and others, he will not pass judgments; he will not even wag his thumb." There is no standard of truth but scriptures. Experience counts for nothing. But a modern philosopher would say that

And not a snake, is not this authority based on the perception of someone else? the perception of someone else? different reactions of different individuals, it is the function of thought to formulate standards of truth. (By Truth is meant proportions that are objectively valid or valid for all normal-thinking beings under similar conditions of experience.)

How can we have standards of reference in all natural sciences, because we assume the uniformity of nature. Of course, we admit that knowledge does ultimately rest on assumptions. But having made these the most universal and the most fundamental working hypothesis we then proceed to learn to control nature.

We have standards of reference in all natural sciences, because we assume the uniformity of nature. Of course, we admit that knowledge does ultimately rest on assumptions. But having made these the most universal and the most fundamental working hypothesis we then proceed to learn to control nature.

What about propositions in pure logic and mathematics which are not based on Scriptures? Have they any validity?

Professor Sarkar in explaining the doctrine of the Vedanta says: "Perception should be held as the source of valid knowledge when it is not contradicted by subsequent experience. But as soon as the facts of perception are challenged, perception loses all value as a mode of knowing. And it is a common experience that knowledge acquired through perception is later on denied by authority - e.g. the illusory percept of rope-serpent."

It is not clear how this proves the validity of authority against perception. Does not subsequent experience have its basis in perception? Again, if a man, who mistakes a rope for a snake, realises his mistake when some one tells him that it is a rope

and not a snake, is not this authority based on the perception of someone else?

To the following objection is put in the mouth of an opponent " Yet one can, perhaps, come to a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a different way, for that there can be no well-founded reflection, ~~above~~, and because one reflection is false, the other need not also be false; the opinion that all reflection is unreliable, would make an end of all worldly action resting thereon."

at all in itself a  
law based on reflection  
above

To this objection Shankara partly gives way. He says: "Even though it appears that in many provinces reflection is well-founded, yet in the province here spoken of, reflection cannot be freed from the reproach of groundlessness; for it is impossible to know at all this extremely profound essence of being, without the sacred tradition, connected with liberation; for this subject does not fall within the province of perception because it is without form and the like, and therefore also not within the province of inference and the other, because it has no characteristics and the like." Compare this with Kant: "Since we can have no perception of God, of an act of freedom, or of an indivisible self, belief in the latter is based on faith." But in his Metaphysics of Ethics he maintains that the implications of our moral consciousness not only entitle us but require us to postulate or assume the

in music we attend to what the accredited great  
 reality of God, freedom and immortality." to  
 improve as regards the infallibility of the beauty.  
 In Scriptures, Shankara writes: "The Veda, as with  
 a resource of knowledge, is eternal; its subject  
 stands fast; the full knowledge of it formed  
 therefrom cannot be turned aside by all the  
 reflectors of the past, present and future. In  
 So by this the full validity of the Upanishad is proved  
 a teaching is proved. If there is agreement the  
 hypothesis again: "The followers of the Brahman or  
 do not investigate the being of the cause (of the world  
 by world) and the like, relying on the (sacred)  
 tradition, and it is not unconditionally necessary  
 for him to accept everything in accordance with  
 his perception. The same conclusion. Water, if  
 analysed Professor Sarkar writes: "When the  
 (Scriptures) deny empirical facts and establish  
 the oneness of Being, its finding should be  
 But accepted, though it is quite opposed to perception  
 in its denial of the manifold. "amount of certainty  
 as we go Professor Radha Krishan argues that "to  
 but accept 'Sutras' is to accept the witness of the  
 the saints and the sages. To ignore such is to  
 ignore the most vital part of the experience of  
 the human race. In matters of physical science  
 we accept what the greatest investigators  
 in those departments declare for truth; to determine  
 the nature and meaning of religious beliefs, find out

in music we attend to what the accredited great composers have written, and endeavour thereby to improve our natural appreciation of musical beauty. In matters of religious truth we should listen with respect to what the great religious geniuses, who strive by faith and devotion to attain their spiritual eminence, have given out."

But here the two processes are confused. In Science the facts are collected to prove or disprove a certain hypothesis. If there is agreement the hypothesis is confirmed, otherwise it is rejected or modified. The findings of science are not contradicted by the experience. The conclusions drawn are reliable, and the independant workers, following the same method and working under similar circumstances, will arrive at the same conclusion. Water, if analysed, will give us hydrogen and oxygen in a certain proportion and no more, or at least this conclusion has been true upto the present moment. But what about the sages and the saints? Are we justified in giving them the same amount of certainty as we give to the laws of science? Is it the business of Philosophy to accept them simply because they are claimed to be revealed? No. The aim of Philosophy is to find reasons for our beliefs and reject those beliefs that are inconsistant with facts or with well-grounded principles.

So it is the business of philosophy to determine the nature and meaning of religious beliefs, find out

world would not be grasped (with certainty). That is to say, the aspects regarding to their nature, have as carefully whether there is consistency in them or their object external things and not the Brahman. not, and find out their relation to the Principles of the Sciences and to other main interests of life world might be grasped as an effect connected with such as moral conduct, social order, art and culture. Brahman. Now, we only perceive the effect, so that Philosophy cannot take for granted what the scriptures (without revelation) it cannot be decided whether say without thoroughly investigating. And which the world is connected with Brahman (as cause), or scripture is to be taken as true when there are with something else (for the same effect can have apparent contradictions between the teaching of different religions? Nay, even in Upanishads there are passages that cannot be reconciled with one another. Authoritarianism has its value but has its limits as well. Here comes philosophy to our aid of providing *inspiration of what he says*, God and demonstrating and Shankara makes full use of it as will be seen in his sutras. From this bankruptcy of the natural light of reason he inferred the necessity of

But Shankara also suggests the possibility of Revelation. Denis Diderot held a somewhat similar bringing in reflection as an aid to authority in his position. He maintained that what was true in the following passage :- philosophy might be quite false in theology which "For in the investigation of the Brahman the left no room for philosophical dialectics. scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty, Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, made some the exclusive authority, but the authorities here are, a concession to philosophy, though he subordinated according to circumstances, the scripture and the natural to the theological knowledge in the sense perception and the like. For the knowledge of Brahman of making the former aid to the latter. This reaches its final point in perception, as far as it rendered possible a certain amount of independent refers to a really existing subject. But does not thinking as long as no reference was made to the the Brahman, so far as it is something really concepts of Christianity. Spinoza holds a different existing, alone belong to the province of other view of the Scriptures. "All scripture," he says, "was means of knowledge, and is not the consideration of written primarily for an entire people, and the words of the Vedanta consequently aimless? Secondly for the whole human race; consequently By no means the Brahman, for, as it is not an object of Sense, the (causal) connection with the

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world would not be grasped (with certainty). That is to say, the senses, according to their nature, have as their object external things and not ~~the~~ Brahman. If ~~the~~ Brahman were an object of Sense, then the world might be grasped as an effect connected with Brahman. Now, we only perceive the effect, so that (without revelation) it cannot be decided whether the world is connected with Brahman (as cause), or with something else (for the same effect can have different causes.)'

A similar tendency is found in the philosophy of the Middle Age in Europe. William of Occam maintained that philosophy was utterly incapable of proving the existence of God and demonstrating his attributes. From this bankruptcy of the natural light of reason he inferred the necessity of revelation. Duns Scotus held a somewhat similar position. He maintained that what was true in philosophy might be quite false in theology which left no room for philosophical dialectics.

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, made some concession to philosophy, though he subordinated natural to the theological knowledge in the sense of making the former aid to the latter. This rendered possible a certain amount of independent thinking as long as no reference was made to the concepts of Christianity. Spinoza holds a different view of the Scriptures. "All scripture," he says, "was written primarily for an entire people, and secondarily for the whole human race; consequently

its contents must necessarily be adapted, as far as possible, to the understanding of the masses . . .

Scripture does not explain things by their secondary causes, but only narrates them in the order and style which has most power to move men, and especially uneducated men, to devotion . . . its object is not to convince the reason, but to attach and lay hold of the imagination."

P E R C E P T I O N .

"Perception is the direct consciousness of objects discerned through the aid of senses obtained generally through the exercise of senses."

In external perception, as distinguished from internal or introspective perception, the internal organ -- the mind stuff -- goes through the sensory organs towards the object, assumes its form and cognises it. "As the water of a tank issuing through an aperture enters a field by a small canal and assumes the shape of the field, so the inner organ leaves the body through the eye or other sense organs, moves to the external objects and takes their form." It occupies the same position in space as the

object i.e. there is unity of the space position between the mind and the empirical object. This is the mark of a distinction between perception and inference. There is also a unity of time in the act of perception; that is why the remembrance of a past event is not a case of perception.

In contrast to this, Bergson says: "A perception is not something added to reality, nor is it something of the object projected towards the mind

Psychology of Perception. From the fragmentary  
nor something of the mind projected on the object."

According to Hume and Locke mind is passive, but Shankara agrees with Kant in assigning activity to the mind, though the form which this activity takes is different in each. Shankara takes no notice of the images which, according to Tichner supplement the group of sensations, to make up the percept. Moreover perception involves much more than can be described as direct apprehension of sense quality. In mature perception a vast amount is discerned through the aid of awareness of similar objects. He holds that sensations come as discrete psychical facts. Hume also maintains that constituents of experience are discrete minds. Against this theory James points out that Primitive Consciousness is not a duality but one confused mass of presentation in which the subject, the object, space, time and the categories are all rolled up together. All knowledge grows by dissociation among the elements of this consciousness. It is out of such a matrix that clear consciousness is evolved." - Ganguli.

Shankara also ignores will, interests which play an important part in perception. Bergson says: "It is vain to attribute to the cerebral substance the property of engendering representatives. Its function is selective, and those parts of the environments which it selects by its action are the content of perception."

"It is selection," says Prof. Wilson Carr, "which gives to perception its distinctness and individuality."

Shankara does not give a detailed account of the

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Psychology of Perception. From the fragmentary and meagre account which we find here and there we come to the conclusion that his theory of perception was rather crude. He says: "What we perceive depends upon the nature of the mode. If the mode takes the form of the weight, we perceive weight and so on." As to how this mode is determined and why is it that it takes this particular form of mode and not the other, he says nothing. As regards the perception of distance he says that we cannot perceive distant objects because the internal organ cannot come in contact with them. A modern scientist would say that they are too far to throw any image on the retina or that they cannot come in contact with the mind through their images. Shankara is correct in holding that perception of distance is mainly a matter of vision, but he ignores the action of the inner dialectic. Shankara recognises the relationless intuition state as a pure manifold of objects, convergence and divergence of the lenses of the eyes, and the help derived from other senses.

Perception depends <sup>on</sup> in the internal organ as well as the objects. If the objects are not fit to be cognised, no perception can take place. In inner perception i.e perception of desires, etc. virtue and vice are not cognised as they are not fit objects for cognition. He does not state the criterion that distinguishes the objects fit for inner perception from those that are not.

Perception as a function of many variables like position, light shade, movement is ignored. There is another objection (the distinction between the thing

mind takes the form of the object why is it that determined and the determining attribute ) and relationless intuition (that which does not enter into relation of concepts ). Conceptual knowledge is derivative and the relationless intuition is the original dictum. In the latter the attributes are there but they are left out and do not enter into any relation. No destruction exists between S and P as in the propositions "that art thou," "this is that Devdatte." According to Kant, though there is much divergence of view on this point, determinate perception is undeterminate in the form of a manifold of sense and it becomes determined when ordered by means of categories. According to Hegel the categories are not something foreign but something already there as an implicit form. The passage from the implicit to the explicit is the result of the inner dialectic. Shankara recognises the relationless intuition state as a pure manifold.

One may say that Shankara's theory of perception somewhat resembles that of Malebranche's, underlying which there is an implicit assumption that to know a thing, the mind must, in some sense, be that thing, "On such an assumption only an omnipresent being, 'which was at the same time one and all things,' could know everything in and through himself."--  
 --- Dialogues in Metaphysics (translated by Ginsberg).

Perception as a function of many variables like position, light, shade, movement is ignored. There is another objection to Shankara's theory. If the

mind takes the form of the object why is it that  
 no two persons see the same objects in the same  
 way? Why does it differ when seen from  
 different positions? Moreover this theory  
 violates the law of impenetrability of matter,  
 because the illustration of the water and the  
 field shows that the mind becomes one with the  
 object. How can two material objects occupy the  
 same space? In order to understand the position  
 of Shankara clearly it is better to consider what  
 he means by mind. The old distinction of  
 mind and matter is not maintained by him. Mind,  
 or rather internal organ, is a subtle matter.  
 It is not infinite in magnitude but has a limited  
 or measurable magnitude. It is not eternal. It  
 has the capacity of expansion and contraction  
 and is limitless in this respect, and so it can  
 take the form of anything, large or small. It is  
 not itself regarded as a sense, for then it would  
 not have direct perception of itself or its  
 modifications. It is transparent and reflects  
 objects, and this power is not innate in it but is  
 due to its relation with the soul. Internal organ  
 and soul are two different things. It undergoes  
 changes and modifications of forms, and is called  
 by different names according to these modifications.  
 It is called mind in the mode of indetermination  
 and understanding when it is determined.  
 So, according to this view, the internal organ  
 is the cogniser of things, but it is not intelligent.  
 It derives its intelligence owing to its proximity  
 two kinds according as (1) it gives us a knowledge  
 of the self (2) knowledge of states and processes

of consciousness. The former is again of two kinds  
in so far as it is a knowledge of limited self  
or Supreme self.

ERRONEOUS PERCEPTION  
to the soul, just as an iron gets magnetised under  
the influence of a magnet. But why should we call  
the internal organ, which is material, a cogniser?  
Why should we not give this title to the soul itself?  
But according to the Vedantists the soul does not  
take part in cognition at all. It is just like  
calling the brain the cogniser of objects.

Shankara writes: "Between the Atman (self)  
and the organs of sense a connecting link is necessary.

If we do not admit the internal organ, there would  
result either perpetual perception or perpetual  
non-perception, the former when there is the  
conjunction of the Atman, the sense and the object,  
the three constituting the instrument of perception.  
If, on the conjunction of these three causes, the  
effect did not follow, there would take place  
perpetual non-perception. But neither is the fact.

We have therefore to acknowledge the existence of  
an internal organ on whose attention and non-attention  
perception and non-perception take place." This  
means that Atman lacks the power of attention or  
non-attention, which will make it inactive.

If the internal organ derives its power of  
reflection from the Atman, it is not clear how  
this power of volition can be held to be innate in it.  
External perception is of five kinds corresponding  
to sight, touch, etc. Internal perception is of  
two kinds according as (1) it gives us a knowledge  
of the self (2) knowledge of states and processes

of consciousness. The former is again of two kinds in so far as it is a knowledge of limited self or Supreme self.

ERRONEOUS PERCEPTION

According to Shankara illusion is not a case of unconscious judgment, nor an inference, nor a memory image. He asks why it is we mistake a shell for silver. The answer is that the internal organ in going out through the eye affected by some disease or disorder and coming in contact with the object, is modified in the form of this object and its glitter.

It is due to the force of a mysterious entity called avidya that we see silver in place of the shell. This avidya (ignorance) is aided by the residual traces of the past cognition of silver, revived by the quality of brightness common to both silver and shell. So we have two mental modes, one of "thisness" and the other of apparent silver. They are both unified by the same 'Chaitanya' which is thus connected with both -- what is true and what is false. The fusion of true and false gives rise to error. Illusory silver has for its substratum consciousness particularised by the object. An illusory object is not nothing, for in that case no illusion can arise. We may call it relatively real. Compare this with what the neo-objectivism or Relativistic objectivism maintains: It accords a physical objective status to real and unreal objects alike, but admits the relativity to the percipient self. But when the so-called real silver is cognised

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individual of all perceivable objects. It explains all errors in physical terms by relating the objects to a brain rather than to a mind or consciousness. Again, the <sup>nayayika</sup> ~~Nanjayikas~~ hold that a silver perceived elsewhere may be the object of the present false apprehension. Shankara replies "that in order to be an object of apprehension though illusory, it must be immediately present, and hence a piece of silver perceived elsewhere at a different time cannot be the object of present perception. The <sup>nayayika</sup> ~~Nanjayika~~, in order to defend his position, holds that though in an illusion there is no direct sense contact with the object, yet there is some mediated contact called non-sensuous contact. The Sankarite replies that in that case inference cannot be established as a separate entity, since fire, which is a matter of inference, can be held to be an object of perception through mediated and indirect contact." It is also objected that on the Shankarite principle it is impossible to distinguish between the real silver and the illusory silver. The Vedantist says that though real silver is not absolutely real yet there is a difference between the so-called real silver and illusory silver. The perception of the latter has an element of subjectivity. My illusion of silver is cognised by me while the empirically real silver may be cognised by all. It is just like my perception of pleasure and pain which is closed to the other selves. Like pleasure and pain illusory silver is imposed on the self. But when the so-called real silver is cognised

X

The first are due to a kind of automatic excitation by all, why apply the prefix "so-called" to it?

The great defect of Shankara's theory of illusion is that it takes notice of the factor of prescution and ignores representation. It assumes that illusion consists in the experience of something indiscribable. He calls illusion an error of perception, while it is an error of inference. When we look at a rope and mistake it for a snake we do not perceive all its qualities necessary for right cognition, but we perceive some of the qualities and then infer that it is a snake.

Modern psychology defines illusion as a misinterpretation of experience. It is the result of misconstruing some real sense stimulus or stimuli. Something is actually there to stimulate the senses. So far Shankara is correct, but the illusion arises owing to established habits of rapid association to the temporary set of the mind, by which the observer mistakes the thing for something different. Inshort, the mind either fails to analyse and determine the data correctly or it may fail to set the data in the right connection with the items of reality. An illusion no doubt in itself seems to be objective as any true perception and it is only by ascertaining its relation to what is external to it, i.e. its interaction with the totality of the thing, that we can find whether it can claim that reality or not.

Shankara does not take notice of this psychological fact. As regards the theory that illusion is purely subjective, it does not

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The first are due to a kind of automatic excitation of the cerebral regions, especially in the case of explain the optical illusions, where everyone has those clearly arising from the occupations or the same illusion under similar circumstances. Sensations of the day or the hours immediately preceding the dream. To the same cause is jugglers and hypnotists.

D R E A M S

Shankara agrees with the modern psychologists in adopting the

It will not be out of place here to give the representation theory of dreams but he makes no theory of dreams. In a dream the self is not subject to the limitation of sense. The word impossible, which to waking mind seems unavoidable in many cases, has no meaning in a dream. The dream world seems real to us though its existence passes off like vapour when we wake up. How are it may give rise to terrible dreams. The common dreams caused ? Shankara bases his theory on Prasna Upanishad. It holds that a dream involves a new construction, a new grouping spontaneously woven out. "What is seen over and over again, he sees once more in a dream. What is heard over and over again he hears once again . . . What is seen

and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he experiences all."

Shankara does not regard the dream world as objectively real, but as relatively real like the waking world. He calls it maya (illusory) : "Dream world is not a creation of the Self but a reproduction (in new construction) of the

General Remarks :

residuum of waking -- presentation left in consciousness.

Modern researches divide dreams into classes viz. Representative dreams and Presentative dreams.

the knowledge of reality by which Shankara means the first are due to a kind of automatic excitation of the cerebral regions, especially in the case of those clearly arising from the occupations or sensations of the day or the hours immediately preceding the dream. To the same cause is attributed the recalling of images apparently long since forgotten. " So Shankara agrees with the modern psychologists in adopting the representation theory of dreams but he makes no mention of the presentative factors in dreams, i.e. the real sensations that more or less arise from the state of internal organs and similar other causes. If a man takes heavy food, he may experience nightmares or if the heart is not working satisfactorily that God is and he is the Creator of all. These of it may give rise to terrible dreams. The common logical belief that all facts belong to a system and sensation of flying is mostly due to the irregular beat of the heart caused by indigestion. Moreover the awkward position of the limbs or the pressure of the hand on the chest lead to dreams of a similar kind. A dream may also be due to the action of external stimuli on the organs of sense.

So Shankara does not discuss why in a dream one particular grouping of images takes place and not the other, and how this grouping is caused. It appears that he did not base his theory of dreams on the observation of facts, but relied mainly on the testimony of scriptures.

General Remarks .

It is better here to explain the distinction made by Shankara between higher knowledge and lower knowledge. Higher knowledge is absolute truth. It is

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the knowledge of reality by which Shankara means oneness of Atman, the higher Brahman. It cannot be acquired by empirical means. Reality cannot be grasped by means of logical tools. Shankara discusses the so called proofs for the existence of God and refutes them one and all:—Saadi, the well

(i) Logical proof. There must be a perfect subject, with the whole existence related to him as an object. The universe seems to be a system in which the events are interconnected. This is confirmed by everyday experience. But there are many things which do not enter one's experience and one's knowledge is imperfect. "Only a complete apprehension of reality as a whole can justify the hypothesis that God is and he is the Creator of all. The logical belief that all facts belong to a system and express the mind of God is only an idea."—Radhakrishna.

(ii) Cosmological argument. There must be an uncaused cause of this world, Shankara says that we can only infer a finite creator from a finite world. The first cause, must be a unity of the same order of being as the objects of experience, since the latter are brought into relation with it. If Ishwara is the cause of the world he must be within the space time framework, a vastly magnified man, whose self-consciousness is defined by the instrumentality of a body and mind analogous to our own. If such a being exists, no foreseeable extension of our knowledge could enable us to determine his nature and existence. We cannot admit within the world of Phenomena an

uncaused cause. The question of an absolute absoluteness. The attempt to conserve the beginning of the phenomenal series is a self characters of personality and absoluteness seems contradictory one. " to be well nigh impossible for logic."- Radhakrishna.

(3) Moral argument. -- This world shows the workmanship of a benevolent God- (Saadi, the well-known Persian poet, says: "Every leaf of a green tree is a book of knowledge of God for a reason i.e. the universal validity of the principle intelligent perceptient.")

Shankara holds this argument to be unsatisfactory. Aristotle gave us the idea of the "unmoved mover."

"However the matter be turned, in a real world the responsibility for sin and evil falls on God.

If, to relieve him of the authorship of evil, we become actual. The universe, which is in constant motion, moving towards pure form as actuality of

make Satan responsible for it, then the oneness of the potential, must have some source for it beyond God disappears and we reinstate a dualism between

itself and this source is God, who is not aware of the existence of the universe. Thomas Aquinas

God and Satan. Again, if the soul is a part of God, God must feel the pain of soul also, even

as when one member of the body suffers, the whole body suffers with it. It follows that the

sufferings of God are much greater than those of the individual soul, and it is better for us to

remain self-enclosed individuals with our limited sufferings than rise to the level of God and

(1) Anything which is moved is moved by some other thing. This series of the moved and the mover cannot go on infinitely, for in that case there would be no first source of movement and consequently

(2) We cannot rest content with an indefinite series of causes and effects, because if there is no first cause there can be no last effect. (3) Every

his satisfaction. If it said that the world is possible existence must have a necessary existence

for his enjoyment, then God is no God but only a Samsarin. If we say that God has determinations,

gunas, like personality, perfection, etc. it is difficult to conceive how these can exist with

(4) Things are 'more' or 'less' good, true, etc. This points to something 'greatest' i.e. most true,

time. But neither of these vague propositions has

absoluteness. The attempt to conserve the characters of personality and absoluteness seems to be well nigh impossible for logic."- Radhakrishna.

Western philosophers have discussed the point fully in their systems of philosophy. Plato demonstrated the existence of God on the basis of reason i.e. the universal validity of the principle of causality and the regularity of cosmical motions. Aristotle gave us the idea of the "unmoved move."

The motion and change of the world were explained to us as due to the world's struggle to become actual. The universe, which is in constant motion, moving towards pure form as actuality of God's existence in an ontological argument, first formulated by Anselm, in the words: "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" which Thomas Aquinas derives the existence of God from the idea of - gives five proofs for the existence of God: -

- (1) Anything which is moved is moved by some other thing. This series of the moved and the mover cannot go on infinitely, for in that case there would be no first source of movement and consequently no movement at all. So there must be an unmoved move.
- (2) We cannot rest content with an indefinite series of causes and effects, because if there is no first cause there can be no last effect.
- (3) Every possible existence must have a necessary existence as its ground, and this necessary existence must be necessary in itself, hence the idea of God.
- (4) Things are 'more' or 'less' good, true, etc. This points to something 'greatest' i.e. most true,

time. But neither of these vague propositions has

most good, etc. (5) The unconscious object does not tend towards an end unless directed by an intelligent and conscious being.

Hume and Kant struck a great blow to these arguments. Though Hume interpreted cause and effect in a different light, yet it appears that he did not wholly abandon the conception of First Cause. Kant based his idea of existence of God on moral necessity. There is a great difference of opinion as regards the teleological end of the world. Some thinkers like Leibnitz maintain that this is the best of all possible worlds, while the others hold a different view. Descartes based his idea of the God's existence in an ontological argument, first formulated by Anselm, in the words: "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," which derives the existence of God from the idea of God, since this includes perfection and existence is a perfection. This argument has also been rejected by many, especially by Kant. He points out the fallacy of treating existence as a merely additional quality. The premise that asserts that existence is a perfection, is false. A world with God appears more perfect than a world without a God. But existence implies a relation with the totality of other things, and to make this argument valid one would have to show that (i) a perfect being would be more consistent with the totality of things than an imperfect being, and (ii) that such consistence is equivalent to existence in space and time. But neither of these vague propositions has

...the knowledge of Brahman, though still when he meditates on him, but this state is far ever been proved. ... it is by his heart beyond that.

Then again the argument from values in For Spinoza the knowledge of Reality could be general maintains that our apprehension of obtained by intuition. This is the state of mind value leads us to the conception of an absolute where the individual realises himself as a part of value, viz. a complete Truth, a perfect Good etc. God, where he feels his very heart throbb and where As these values are not opposed to one another in the the distinction between himself and the Living end, they may be taken as the attributes of our Universe lapses. But Spinoza (also pragmatic, intuitive, universal Supreme value i.e. God. *Consent + Dr. Hink's arguments*) different from Shankara's Absolute. Though

So, according to Shankara, the Real cannot Spinoza identifies God and nature, but for him be known by logical means which have validity only nature means the active and vital processes in the world of experience. "The reality of God underlying the material contents of this world. The universal laws of nature and the eternal well as comprehending, only if we resort to the decrees of God are one and the same thing. That spiritual insight of seers as recorded in the the laws of circles are to all circles. God is to scriptures can we be certain of God." Study the world. Moreover, for Spinoza the intuitive of vedanta only leads us to the higher knowledge stage is only possible after one has been through the of the real. The mind should suppress itself so rational stage. Intuitive vision is not a substitute that the veil may be lifted. Here the distinction for thought or different from it. When one is so of the subject and object are obliterated. "It is thoroughly absorbed in a train of thought that he the ineffable experience beyond thought and speech begins to identify himself with the object of thought, which transforms our whole life and yields the he reaches the stage of highest knowledge. certainty of a divine presence. It is the state of "The object of intuition is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the strips himself of all finite conditions, including knower. It is a real object, by which is unaffected by our apprehension or non-apprehension of it, though individual himself is face to face with the Reality. its reality is of a higher kind than that of a particular object of space and time which are himself is the Reality. Shankara thinks that this involves in a perpetual flux and cannot therefore be is not an idealised fancy, because one cannot regarded as strictly real. experience unreal objects though we can & meditate on them. Now can one contest the fact of another on them. In the beginning a yogi sees God when

possessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still when he meditates on him, but this state is far beyond that.

For Spinoza the knowledge of Reality could be obtained by intuition. This is the state of mind where the individual realises himself as a part of God, where he feels his very heart throb and where the distinction between himself and the Living Universe lapses. But Spinoza's God is quite different from Shankara's Absolute. Though Spinoza identifies God and nature, but for him nature means, <sup>according to one interpretation</sup> the active and vital processes underlying the material content of this world. The universal laws of nature and the eternal decrees of God are one and the same thing. What the laws of circle are to all circles, God is to the world. Moreover, for Spinoza the intuitive stage is only possible after one has been through the rational stage. Intuitive vision is not a substitute for thought or different from it. When one is so thoroughly absorbed in a train of thought that he begins to identify himself with the object of thought, he reaches the stage of highest knowledge.

"The object of intuition is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the knower. It is a real object, by which is unaffected by our apprehension or non-apprehension of it, though its reality ~~is~~ is of a higher kind than that of a particular object of space and time which are involved in a perpetual flux and cannot therefore be regarded as strictly real.

How can one contest the fact of another

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possessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still in the body, vouched as it is by his heart's conviction." All faith and devotion, all study and meditation, are intended to train us for this experience. Intuition of self, however, comes only to a mind prepared for it. It does not come out of the blue. It is the noblest blossoming of man's reason. It is not a mere fancy which refuses to make an appeal to man's intelligence. What is true is true for every intelligence that can apprehend it. There is no such thing as a private truth anymore than a private sun or a private science. Truth has an intrinsic and general character which depends on no individual, not even God. The process of apprehending reality may be private or singular, but not the object apprehended. The real cannot be real now and then, here and there, but always and everywhere."

In these emphatic words Prof. Radhakrishna tries to establish the truth of vedantist's integral experience. But the difficulty is that each individual that has this experience of reality does not interpret it in the same way. Of course, he is interpreting what he has experienced and so the difference in interpretation cannot be unreal. If the individual correctly experiences reality and if the reality is not manifold, how is it that the interpretations differ? Surely the contradictory interpretations cannot be correct and then the question arises which of them is correct. Should we believe the vedantist who sees reality as his

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own self or someone else who sees it in a different light as something transcendental? Again the Professor writes : "Those who have no direct insight into reality are obliged to take on trust the Vedic views which record the highest experiences of some of the greatest minds who have wrestled with this problem of apprehending reality. The vedic testimony is superior to the evidence of the senses or the conclusions of reasons."

It may be noted here that in the West, too, religious experience has been advanced as an argument for the existence of God. "Though it is open to the critic to dismiss the whole religious experience of humanity as based on illusion and mistake, such a drastic rejection of a universal type of consciousness is hard to justify. If we base our knowledge of the universe on experience, religious experience has a claim to be included. If further we find that our the religious experience tends to pass from obviously inadequate forms to forms which lend themselves to rational presentation, we shall be justified in regarding the later and higher as the nearest approximations so far to adequate discriminations of the Object with which all religious experience is concerned." Prof. Mathews.

If religious experience is presented in an adequate form and can be analysed by a scientific method, it would be a folly not to accept it. But Prof. James in his Varieties of Religious Experience

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empirical knowledge and that of animals is only that  
writes: "Modern psychology has only recently begun  
to realise the importance of a careful study of the  
contents of a mystic consciousness and we are not  
yet in possession of a really effective scientific  
method to analyse the contents of a non-rational  
mode of consciousness." I do not wish to minimise the value of religious  
experience but I maintain that it should not be  
accepted merely <sup>in</sup> authority. It may be pointed  
out here that I am not discussing the subject  
from the point of view of religion and so I am  
not attacking the faiths and doctrines held sacred  
by the people as followers of particular religions.  
I will take up the subject of religious experience  
again in connection with Hajwairi.

Lower knowledge or empirical, lower knowledge  
has its validity in the world of phenomena. It is  
inadequate to express Reality as it is not free  
from the distinctions of subject and object which  
according to Shankara do not apply to Reality.  
Considered from the point of view of Reality this  
knowledge is false and has its <sup>base</sup> ~~base~~ in ignorance  
as will be explained later on, but in the realm of  
phenomena its truth cannot be denied. Shankara  
compares man's knowledge to that of the animals:-  
"For this reason also" (~~world~~ worldly and vedic  
knowledge belong to the province of ignorance)  
because (thereby) no difference is made between  
man and animal. For just as the animals, for  
instance, a sound strikes their ears, in case the  
perception of sound is disagreeable to them, move  
away from it, and in case it is agreeable move

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empirical knowledge and that of animals is only that towards it -- as when they see a man with an upraised stick before them, thinking: "He will strike me" they try to escape, and when they see one with a handful of fresh grass, approach him, so men also whose knowledge is more developed, when they perceive strong men of terrible aspect, with drawn swords in their hands, turn away from them, and turn towards the contrary. -- Thus with reference to means and objects of knowledge, the process in men and animals is alike. Of course, in the case of animals perception, and the like, goes on without previous judgment; but as can be seen by the resemblance even in the case of spiritually developed men, perception and the like for the time (of false knowledge) is the same; and if according to the spiritual canon the performance of works is permitted only to one who has gained insight, and not to one who has not recognised the connection of the soul with the other world, yet for this permission it is not imperative that one should have recognised the truth concerning the soul freed from the samsara, to be taught by the vedanta, which leaves behind hunger and the other desires, and turns away from the difference between Brahmans, warriors and the rest. For this truth is not implied in the injunction (of the work of sacrifice), but is rather in contradiction to it. And while the canon of ordinances is valid only for this degree of knowledge of the soul, it does not rise above the province of ignorance. "The more we reflect on

Thus it shows that the difference between

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empirical knowledge and that of animals is only that of degree and not kind. The former is only on a higher level of evolution. It lends itself to the egoism which makes us seek the satisfaction of our desires either in this world or the coming rebirths. But vedanta has passed far beyond the regions of desire and so the knowledge given by it is really true. "All those laws of empirical knowledge and action are valid for us only so long as we are influenced by the Ignorance, resting on a false transference which nature imposes on us, of which it is said in conclusion: " Thus it stands with its beginningless, endless, innate transference, which in its essence is a false assumption, producing all the conditions of doing and enjoying (or suffering) and forming the natural standpoint of all men. To remove this the root of evil, and to teach the the knowledge of the unity of the soul, -- this is the aim of all the texts of the vedanta." -- translated by Johnston.

For Kant the object of empirical knowledge was phenomena and not noumena, but Hegel rejected this assumption in toto. A reality is reality in and for mind or self-consciousness. Thought and Reality are identical.

In explaining Shankara's point of view as regards the inadequacies of empirical knowledge to reach Reality. / Prof. Radhakrishna writes: "It is difficult to know precisely how far our knowledge of the external world which science investigates is objective. The more we reflect on the matter, the more impossible it seems to assert

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that the world known to us under the conditions  
of empirical knowledge is the real in itself. The  
man with five senses knows more than the blind man.  
May not the real exceed the empirical conception of  
it, even as the world known to sight exceeds that  
known to touch? May not a state like that of  
brahmanubhāṣā or what Tennyson has called "a last  
and largest sense" enlarge our own knowledge of  
reality, as the gift of sight would enlarge that of  
a race of blind men? "

Here the Professor gives way to scepticism  
and denies the possibility of knowledge at least in  
our present state. The underlined words show that  
he does not believe that the world as known to us  
is real, because knowledge gained through more than  
one sense exceeds that obtained through one sense  
only. But does this argument justify our rejecting  
in toto the knowledge gained through one sense or  
say through all senses? It is true we know reality  
in part but we are capable of knowing it more fully.  
But to say that we have no knowledge of reality and  
that the world known to us under the condition of  
empirical knowledge is unreal is to take a very bold  
step. For knowledge works in the world. In the only  
world with which we have anything to do we find that  
knowledge does function effectively. When I look at  
the electric lamp before me am I to believe that all  
knowledge of electricity, of physics, etc. is false?  
Take the case of astronomy. Do not the events  
predicted occur at the exact time and position? If  
we do not believe in it we find ourselves nowhere but

of the Again the Prof. writes: "All thought processes in scepticism . Someone would say: How do we know to that we know only phenomena, if we do not know the real? The lapidariste says of a certain specimen handed to him, "this is a sham diamond." Such a pronouncement is impossible unless there be a knowledge of real diamonds, of which it is an appearance. How do we know that there is a veil between us and reality if we have never known what what is on the other side of the veil. Reality is not something hidden behind the veil. Reality is what is or may be experienced or what may be inferred from experience .

That what I dream may not be real but my dreaming itself cannot be false. So in this we have something which is known and known with certainty.

We admit that all appearance is a partial reality. Wholeness of reality involves a systematic unity. A stick placed in water looks bent, but it is not felt crooked. "When images fail to fit in within the one portion of space-time with veridical sensations, they are distinguished as being only images" - Alexander. Every departure from the constancy of character of an object indicates appearance. A scientist would say that by comparison of the appearances in different relations and by eliminating the perceptual errors by means of different mechanism we have a knowledge which approaches certainty, which is brought about by its satisfactory working in practice. Or in other words the knowledge of effects (i.e. appearances) gives us the knowledge of the cause ( reality ).

of the Again the Prof. writes : "All thought struggles to know the real, to seek the truth, but unfortunately a post that it is either a post or a man or something else it can attempt to know the real only by relating the real to something other than itself. The real is neither true, nor false. It simply is. "

To this one would reply that Truth is Reality. Among the Western thinkers those who distinguish Reality is that which does not contradict itself. It must exclude any form of self-contradiction. We may think away anything but we cannot think away being or existence. Being is therefore truth. But once it is taken for granted that this world is not real, then of course we are attempting to know the real by

relating it to something unreal. Whether the world is real or unreal will be considered later.

Criterion of Truth:- Climbing down to the field

of empirical knowledge Shankara discusses a few problems of knowledge. He maintains that thought is nothing but true. We cannot think what is not true, since any standard of truth that we can apply to any problem will lose its intrinsic virtue, because it itself will be a product of thought and will thus be subject to the uncertainty of thought. But how to account for error? "Error is only privation due to the passions and interests of men which cloud the intellect." What does it mean? If we get rid of passions and interest we cannot have but a true thought. But whether we can get rid of interest and feeling in thinking is a question which does not occur to Shankara. In order to find out the error in thinking we have to apply certain tests. "The question a specific type of being who belongs to a certain class

of the reality of a thing does not depend upon human notions. It depends upon the thing itself. To say of a post that it is either a post or a man or something else is not to give its truth. That it is a post is alone the truth, since it answers to the nature of the thing."

Among the Western thinkers those who distinguish between truth and existence maintain that the test of truth regarding things is their correspondence with the nature of the things, though to justify this theory they do not think it necessary to formulate the precise kind of correspondence involved.

Some maintain that knowledge that is not contradicted is true and that which is self contradictory or is contradicted by subsequent experience is false. What we see in a dream is contradicted by our waking experiences. So the former is not true.

Moreover, in knowledge there must be an element of novelty in addition to its being original and primary, if there is to be any real advance. To say that a post is a post or a man is a man or A is A does not take us any further. This reminds me of the Socrates and Plato, the great thinkers of the world. Socrates held that to know the essence of a thing you must consider it as distinct from everything else, you must define it; by defining it you demarcate it from what it is not and so present the thing before you in its essence. Plato laid great stress on the capacity of the self to grasp universals without which no thought was possible. What do I mean by dog, man, or bear? By man I mean a specific type of being who belongs to a certain class

DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN.

The best known position of Descartes' <sup>ok</sup> distinct from dogs and that this class is distinguished by certain characteristics. Should we classify a bear that walks like a man as man? No. There must be a body of typical ways of behaviour present before we classify the object as man. This means that there is no knowledge without the systematic ordering of things we have knowledge about. Shankara rejects the class concept and the relation of inherence. This philosophy supersedes the theory of genera and species for they never exist independent of each other. He discusses this point vaguely and it is difficult to ascertain his views so as to class him with nominalists.

In the theory of knowledge Shankara did not go so far as his western predecessors did, Of course, when he was proving the unreality of this world it did not concern him much to go into the details of the empirical knowledge which was after all based on the wrong conception of reality.

of the expressions ether etc. require a proof, because they are not assumed as known of themselves. But the self is the basis of the action of proving and consequently it is evident before the action of proving. And since it is of this character, it is therefore impossible to deny it. For we can call into question something which comes to us (from outside) but not that which is our own being. For it is even the own being of him who calls it into question; fire cannot call its own heat in to question. And further when it is said; "It is

Cont. of Br. 1.  
DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN.

I who now exists, it is I who know the past, and what was before the past, it is I who know the future. The best known position of Descartes' Philosophy is Cogito, ergo sum, taken not as an inference but as an intuition. It was another form of old formula, "know thyself" though it was so differently interpreted by the early Greek philosophers. To them it was essentially practical. Descartes makes knowledge of the existence of the self to be the bases of all knowledge, it is the ground of absolute certainty; whatever it distinctly proclaims must be true.

Similarly Shankara tries to find out whether there is anything of which I can be certain and naturally comes to the conclusion that I am certain of my own existence. He says, "It is not possible to doubt the Self. For one cannot establish the Self (by proof) in the case of anyone because in itself it is already known. For the Self is not demonstrated by proof of itself. For it is that which brings into use all means of proof such as perception and the like, in order to prove a thing which is not known. For the objects of the expressions ether etc. require a proof, because they are not assumed as known of themselves. But the self is the basis of the action of proving and consequently it is evident before the action of proving. And since it is of this character, it is therefore impossible to deny it. For we can call into question something which comes to us (from outside) but not that which is our own being. For it is even the own being of him who calls it into question; fire cannot call its own heat in to question. And further when it is said; "It is



Book of B<sup>n</sup>  
3.

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Though we know that self is we don't know what it is. We don't know whether it is finite or infinite, knowledge is like one ring or one among others like itself, a man either enjoys or neither - R.K. Shankara envisions it a mistake to apply the qualities of the object to the subject :- "Subject and object knowings their province the presentation of the

or interpret an "immediate presentation" without focussing attention on it. An immediate presentation without interpretation merely indicates unconsciousness. "Thou" (Not-I) and the "I" are of a nature as opposed as darkness and light. If it is certain that the being of the one is incompatible with the being of the other, it follows so much the more that the qualities of the one also do not exist in the other. Hence it follows that the transfer of the object, which has as its province the idea of the "Thou" and its qualities, to the pure spiritual subject, which has as its province the idea of the "I" and conversely, the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the object is logically false-- yet in mankind this procedure resting on false knowledge of pairing together the true and untrue (that is subjective and objective) is inborn, so that they transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other, not separating object and subject, although they are absolutely different and so saying for example, "This am I," "That is mine." This is the fundamental point in Shankara's philosophy and must not be overlooked in his further statements. Hegel has been often compared with Shankara but I think they are poles apart from each other. To Hegel, subject and object are identical, thought is the Thing, Being and non-being are the same. Thesis anti-thesis and synthesis constitute the formula and secret of all development and reality. The movement of thought is the same as the movement of things. The distinction between phenomena and noumena is illogical. Reality is the systematic whole of inter-related qualities. Reality is to be interpreted in terms of experience. God is the Absolute mind for whom the whole organised system

of things exists. He is Absolute in which all opposites are resolved into unity, that great sum of being in which matter and mind, subject and object good and evil, are one. God is the system of relationships in which all things move and have their being. In man the absolute rises to self-consciousness and becoming the Absolute Idea-- that is thought realising itself as part of the Absolute and therefore, transcending individual limitations and purpose and catching, underneath the universal strife, the hidden <sup>my</sup> harming of all things. So Shankra distinguishes the true self (Atman) from the object. "What is truly real is what has being in itself and for itself so that to affirm the reality of Atman or the permanent self is to affirm the reality of an eternal Brahman"- Radhakrichna. So Atman is identical with Brahman or rather Higher Brahman (for Brahman has two forms higher and lower as we shall see later).

Brahman is spaceless and timeless. Time and space have no meaning as far as Brahman is concerned. It is relationless. Relation has meaning with reference to something else, hence is inapplicable to Brahman. For Bradley too the Absolute is neither a sum of finite minds, nor a self-conscious mind, for the former implies external relations and the latter internal relations and the point about reality is that it is non relational, requiring nothing outside of it to complete its being. Brahman is not also the cause for the same reason. Brahman has nothing similar to it nothing different from it. It is non-dual (advaita) not one (ekia). It is not the creator and sustainer of the World and not an enjoyer, because all this implies activity which is to be denied of Brahman. It is free from growth, decay, development and manifestation and all kinds of change. "Brahman is what is assumed as fundamental though it is

in no sense a substance"- R.K. In short whatever quality, attribute or property can be named or thought of is to be denied of Brahman. "It is a thing of which we know nothing; it is indescribable"- Vivedi.

"It is unknowable by any logical process formal or transcendental"- Prof. Bhattacherya.

"Its nature is inexpressible; one may speak about it, though we cannot describe it adequately or have any logical knowledge of it"- R.K. Is it a mere abstraction, a group of letters, a non-Being? Shankara says, no.

In spite of the previous statement of Shankara that "we do not know what it is, whether finite or infinite, Knowledge or Bliss" and that it is devoid of attributes and that it is unknowable he gives a positive definition of Brahman. Brahman is Being, intelligence and Bliss.

"Vidya equates Brahman with the attributes of consciousness, intelligence and Bliss" R.K. There logic comes to the aid of Shankara. Brahman is not non-being, because absolute non-being is inconceivable, negation of a portion is possible but cannot be applied to Being in its integrity and universality. "In the inmost nature of our self, we cannot make any distinction

between our being and our consciousness. Consciousness is our being. Being is identical with consciousness. How are we to understand the thing-in-itself. Is it a conscious or unconscious existence? It cannot be any

thing else, for a real must be either of the two alternatives. If it is unconscious in the sense of an existence totally different from and contradictory to consciousness, we have the unwarrantable hypothesis of metaphysical dualism - that two absolute substances can coexist. It (Brahman) must necessarily be conscious"

Sirkar -(we are not concerned with the nature of dualism for the present but we want to see how far this is applicable to Brahman)

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Brahman is consciousness. "Brahman is of the nature of ultimate consciousness and yet it knows nothing"- Radhakrishna. "It is of the nature of non objective consciousness" R.K. (It is consciousness without consciousness of anything!). "It is not self consciousness because self and not self are not <sup>in</sup>manent in and compatible with the absolute"- Sirkar. It is not conscious of itself  
Brahman is intelligence. On this topic Shankara answers a few objections which will incidentally throw light on the above question.

(1) First objection:- An eternal Cognitive<sup>n</sup> in Brahman would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the action of cognition: To this Shankara replies, "To begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual, and not a potential cognition, satisfied<sup>d</sup> the demands of omniscience. A cognition of this kind does not take away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun also, although it continually gives forth heat and light, we say, 'it warms', 'it shines' and thereby indicate that it does this of itself, of its own accord; that is to say, the following out of the law of its own nature does not take away the freedom of a being.

(2) Second objection: A cognition is only possible, if there is also an object of perception, which was not the case before creation.

Answer:- As the sun also shines when there is nothing for it to shine <sup>on</sup>, so Brahman might know without having an object of cognition. Yet one existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-c<sup>o</sup>smic object?- It is the names and forms which are neither to be defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not evolved, but striving towards evolution, "the names and forms " of the world' hovered before the spirit of the

way (probably on the basis of biological creator/

feeling.)

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He writes: "The consciousness of existence, the perfection of existence.

(3) Third objection:- Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc.,

Answer - Because Cognition inheres in Brahman as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end like the individual soul. In regard to answer No.1, Shankara seems to suggest that Brahman gives out knowledge as the sun light. In this case there can be no freedom of action, for freedom implies a choice between two alternatives: whether one should do a thing or not. This also means that the subject has the power of Willing. But Brahman is denied of any such power. In fact no activity can be applied to Brahman. But the question of freedom in itself here is not relevant. If Brahman at any time is not cognisant, He cannot be called 'Brahman'. A God without the power of cognition actual or potential is no God, As for the question no.2 that a cognition is not possible without the object of cognition, Shankara's illustration is not appropriate. But Shankara supplies the object of cognition in 'names and forms' and makes the Absolute Consious of 'names and forms'. This is not consistent with the position he held formerly in making Brahman a "non-objective Consciousness."

Brahman as Bliss. If this means pleasant feelings it is difficult to see what connection has bliss with Brahman. The Absolute must be indifferent to pleasure or pain, because pleasure and the outcome of the gratification of desires, in <sup>is</sup> ~~activity~~ <sup>actualy</sup> or imagination, and pain is caused by their frustration. We cannot attribute desires to the absolute because desire implies want hence deficiency.

But Professor Sirkker explains this in a different way (probably on the basis of brological theory of feeling.)

He writes; "The consciousness of existence, because it is absolute, is the perfection of existence. And because it is perfection, it is bliss, for bliss is the indication of amount of being. In finite self-conscious experience we are clearly conscious that, with the gradual growth of our inmost being, we have the invariable expansion, fulfilment and perfection of ourself, with the unfailing accompaniment of delight consequent upon the sense of expansion. The absolute, since it is the ultimate existence, is also the perfection of being, and consequently is identical with bliss. We read in the Sruti

"What is great and limitless is bliss there is no bliss in littleness and limitation."

We cannot accept the ordinary theory that pleasure (bliss) is consequent upon stimulus agreeable to us, and pain, upon stimulus disagreeable to us, surely this is playing with words. Pleasure is, no doubt, an agreeable feeling. But why is one stimulus agreeable and other, disagreeable? It is only because one is in harmony with one being and paves the way for its expansion, while the other retards the process. A stimulus by itself is indifferent. It has no absolute character. It has an acquired virtue."

To this I would say that it is not perfection or expansion but the gratification of the desire for perfection that gives <sup>us</sup> pleasure or bliss. In every-day life we desire the perfection of our being, it is an ideal towards which we are striving and the more we are satisfied with our progress in this direction, the more have we a feeling of pleasure. But pleasure and pain have no reference to the absolute which is perfect and which has no desire to

be fulfilled, no want to be satisfied. I think, by bliss Shankara simply means absence from pain, <sup>or</sup> rather the state in which pain and pleasure have no meaning, and this meaning seems to be more probable when we find that in Shankara's system feeling and cognition are not ascribed to the Absolute. Shankara's Absolute as has been said before is inactive. Willing and feeling are conspicuous in this system by their absence at this stage. It may be called an intellectual system, not because it attaches more importance to cognition at the expense of the feeling and cognition but because the latter has no existence in it at the present stage of our discussion.

In connection with the positive characteristics of Brahman it would be interesting to quote Deussen, who is of opinion that Bliss is counted by Shankara among the negative limitations as freedom from suffering:-

"This compound (Sac-cid-ananda. Existence, Intelligence and Bliss) is nowhere found in Shankara's commentary, and appears to be as yet unknown to our author. It is true that he repeatedly explains that where Brahman is spoken of as Bliss, this limitation refers to Esokric, attributeless Brahman, but here in strictly exoteric part, this is not spoken of, perhaps, because Shankara counts it among the negative limitations as freedom from suffering; thus besides existence, as the only positive quality of the exoteric Brahman, remains intelligence." The scripture explains, that the undifferentiated Brahman is pure intelligence free from all that is different from it, for it says, 'as a block of salt has no (distinguishable) inside or outside, but through and through consists only of salt taste, so this Atman has no (distinguishable) inside and outside but consists throughout altogether of intelligence. That is, this Atman is throughout nothing

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nothing but intelligence; intelligence is its exclusive nature as the salt taste is of the lump of salt"

As regards the relation between existence and intelligence Shankera's remarks,

"Brahman cannot be Existence without Intelligence, because this contradicts the passage of Scripture and because otherwise he would not be the self of the individual soul, which is by nature intelligent ; not Intelligence without Existence either, because this is impossible; and just as little existence and Intelligence in their separate characters, because this would give rise to a plurality, which cannot exist in the case of Brahman; it therefore only remains that Existence is the same as Intelligence, and Intelligence the same as Existence." It is true

Shankra. *deussen*  
Before going any further we may here consider Shankera's statement that the Absolute is unknowable, and that even though its existence were known, we cannot know anything about its nature, because thinking involves comparison and there is nothing outside the Absolute with which to compare it. This argument is based on the application of the principle of relativity of knowledge. This theory assumes that in order to know the Absolute we must separate it from other things and set it side by side with these things and note the difference. *It is true*

*that*  
*A.T.O*

*M.V.N.*

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~~So that between the two there is no mutual exclusion,"~~  
~~Deussen remarks,~~  
*Deussen remarks about the identity of existence & intelligence*  
"We may, however, point out in connection with this, that both ideas in the End are resolvable into that of Force. All existence, in its essence, is nothing but a manifestation of Force and all knowledge may be considered as a reaction against the crowd of impressions, and therefore as an activity of Force." This makes the reality to be dynamic, and I do not think, Shankara had any such idea of a dynamic reality when he was explaining his theory of the Absolute. On the contrary the Brahman is devoid of all activity. Advaita does not recognise this world as a manifestation of energy or even mysterious Vital force, hence the idea of the Absolute as Force or Energy is not preached by Shankara. ~~and hence takes it as abstraction, without any~~  
real. Before going any further we may here consider Shankara's statement that the Absolute is unknowable, and that even though its existence were known, we cannot know anything about its nature, because thinking involves comparison and there is nothing outside the Absolute with which to compare it. This argument is based on the application of the principle of relativity of knowledge. This theory assumes that in order to know the Absolute we must separate it from other things and set it side by side with these things and note the difference. *It is true*

*that*  
- P. T. O

MAYA/



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so thin as that which divides God from nothing and such is the eagerness of the soul, in its flight Godwards, that it constantly breaks through and plunges into the abyss on the other side, when once philosophy has reached the point of conceiving God as the only Real, the moment has come for thought to return upon itself, not a step further can be taken, and the warning to turn back is peremptory. If thought neglects this warning and tries to refine once more its last refinement .... it passes the boundary line between thought and nothing, and enters the realm from which there is no return."

As regards the second point that the Absolute is not self-conscious, because it does not have anything from which to distinguish or discriminate itself. This theory is based on the analogy of human consciousness, which means a feeling of limitation and impression imposed upon the self from outside. But this also has its root in considering the Absolute in the Abstract, apart from the World of relative things. The Absolute as containing the relative within itself has the required material for discrimination and self consciousness. So Shankra makes the mistake of not calling the Absolute as Universal Consciousness, which includes the Conscious feelings and thoughts of finite beings, but which at the same time transcends and differs in kind from the human consciousness. Its self-awareness must be awareness of its own activity, purpose and products i.e. the world of finite things.

~~Now we shall see how Shankara explains the world of experience.~~

Now we shall see how Shankara explains the world of experience.

... with the doctrine of Brahmin set

... is explained in the vedanta in the following ways :-  
"Maya"

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MAYA.

Shankara has described the Self as qualityless. Moreover, he says that Atman (the self) is Being and intelligence. Is there anyone in this world who is qualityless; who possesses no attributes, and is there anyone who is perfect intelligence, who is all-knowing, who is free from all suffering? If not, how can we say that "I" is identical with Atman or Brahman? To explain this, Shankara introduces the idea of "Maya." This is a crucial point in his philosophy and with this his system stands or falls.

The conception of Maya, according to Dr. Shartri, is as old as Rigveda, but the word "Maya" was later on interpreted as "illusion" and this interpretation first occurs in Svetasvatra Upanishads. In rigveda, the word means a "mysterious will-power. In Upanishads it comes to mean as

- (1) Illusion and (2) Appearance.

In varanra Sustras, this word occurs only in one of the Sutra, where it means "illusion" (dream-world is an illusion). Shankra's <sup>Co</sup> Ammentary on Brahma Sutra or Seriraka Bhasrya it means "illusion".

As regards the etymology of the word it has been said that it is derived from "ma", to measure, to know, to build, to show e.g. to measure the immeasurable Brahman. Some say that it is a compound of ma - ya that which is not, but this interpretation is not based on the principle of etymology.

So from the above, we see that "mayā" means "illusion" and it is in this <sup>S</sup> sense that it is used by Shankra.

In connection with the doctrine of Brehmin "maya" is explained in the vedanta in the following ways :-

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"Maya" which is without beginning and without end - is that, on account of which or by means of which, Brahma, whose nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, becomes the omniscient and omnifotent creator of the world; "maya" is again that, on account of which or by means of which, the Alma of man becomes ignorant of its true nature, which is simply Brahma whose nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, - and mistakenly assumes itself to be, or to have the characteristics of, that which is not Alma; "maya" is further that, by means of which or on account of which Brahma, which is pure and absolute unity without any difference whatever, comes to be full of multiplicity, division and difference; "maya" is also that, by means of which or on account of which, the <sup>Alma</sup> of man perceives multiplicity, is also division, distinction and form, where there is none

<sup>Sankar</sup>  
-Desai, Professor <sup>Sankar</sup> Sankar remarks,

"Maya" may be <sup>regard</sup> regarded as the principle of individuation, a force, a power, revealing the world of forms and modes. It has two forms; the will to manifest, to preserve, and the will to destroy. Will has thus been the original cause of the empirical world.)

"Shankara" has the tendency to regard "maya" as the principle of individuation inherent in Brahman" (But I do not find any such tendency in Shankara.)

"The self is associated with certain power called "maya" or cosmic illusion. It is due to this power that the appearance of the material world with the individual self is projected and the individual self appears to be enveloped in conditions or upadhis". - Ganguli.

Under reality there is nothing else besides Brahman. Under/

"Under the spell of Cosmic illusion, the self manifests itself in a peculiar way and becomes subject to a set of Upadhis (attributes) and thus appears to individualise itself"-Ganguli.  
individuals, this depends upon Avidya"- Deussen.

"The principle of the universe of forms (Maya) is beginningless as the self is eternal. The relation between the two is admitted. But Maya is no substance, being a mere illusion, which is simply the means by which variety is lent to self manifestation and self realization"-Gupta.

"The Divine power or Shakti, the Will of Ishura, making the universe manifest, is called Maya, Maya is inseparable from Ishura. Their unity is like that of the moon and the moonlight and that of the fire and its power to burn. While inseparable from the Lord, when turned towards Him, Maya is called supreme knowledge, she is also called Avidya when turned away from Him"-

Vedar It is better here to explain another term which is closely connected with Maya. It is avidya, literally it means "not knowledge" or absence of true knowledge.

"Avidya is either absence of knowledge or doubtful or erroneous knowledge. It is not simply negative but is also positive in character" R.K. Shankara does not argue about the existence of Avidya but takes it for granted, because everybody has the feeling that he does not know everything. "The evidence for its existence is universal

in scope, since all finite minds share the deficiency." But absence of knowledge is not error of knowledge and Shankara is not justified in his conclusion. Knowledge or non knowledge are contradictory terms. A judgment may be true or false but it is still a judgment.

Judgment and false judgment are not contradictory. Why do we call it avidya or false knowledge? Because, in reality there is nothing else besides Brahman alone.

belief that ignorance which is nothing can imagine

If we imagine that we perceive a transformation of him into the world, a division of him into plurality of individuals, this depends upon Avidya"- Deussen.

Shankara uses avidya and <sup>in</sup>Maya indiscriminately, though we find a distinction between these two in the later Advaita. According to Professor Radhakrishna "the <sup>5</sup>Atman which is pure knowledge somehow lapses into Avidya, just as Brahman, which is pure being, turns aside into space and time - cause world. Why there is this universal and primeval turning aside or perversion is more than we can say, yet we must hold that neither <sup>one</sup> logical mind nor the world which it apprehends is an illusion.

(It is not clear why Prof. Radha Krishna does not interpret Maya as illusion here). A phenomenon is not a phantasm. "Even as Brahman and Atman are one, so are Maya and Avidya one" R.K.

Modern Hindu Philosophers have tried to save Vedantism by interpreting the terms Maya and avidya in the light of modern knowledge and to show that this system is as sound as any advanced by the modern Philosophers of the West.

The question arises, "Is this principle inherent in Brahman". Professor Sirkar calls it transcendental because it is revolting to the nature of Brahman as "intelligence". But if Maya is outside Brahman and is eternal with Brahman, we have <sup>a</sup>duality, instead of non-duality like the Zoroastrian Principles of "Light" and "Darkness". But the vedantists to come out of this difficulty interpret it in a different way. They say that the world is false because it is imagined by ignorance, but this ignorance is itself false because it is also ignorance imagined i.e. ignorance imagines itself to exist. Can a mind assent to the

belief/

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belief that ignorance which is nothing can imagine itself to exist. If ignorance is not nothing but something positive, the soul cannot be ever pure and intelligent. If it be pointed out here that the vedantists argue for distinct kinds of existence not the various modes of existence and that one is true existence and the other is untrue existence, just as a man in hallucination sees a crowd of people in the room, where there is none, still it will not save the situation, This question has already been discussed in connection with Shankaras theory of knowledge. Moreover Monism will stand only if the vedantists equal false existence with non-existence but by simply calling it false existence they do not escape the verdict of duality, because this false existence is not dependent on true existence. Shankara altogether differs from the Western Philosophy in their conception of the world. They either take the singularistic or pluralistic view of the universe. As regards the former we can side with Spinoza in saying that there is one all inclusive Substance, "Sub quāam specie aeternitatis" All that is finite and temporal is the necessary expression of the infinite or eternal. The true being of man consists in seeing himself as part of the One. Or we may affirm the Hegelian doctrine that there is one All-inclusive Spirit of Individual. Inorganic and organic, mind and body, self and society, finite and infinite, God and the world are inter-related in the whole which is an organic system. As for pluralism, we can say that there are many separate and mutually independent beings, which taken in the aggregate, make up the world, do not call it a universe but multiverse.

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This is how the Universe is explained by the singularists and pluralists, but Shankara denies pluralism and also denies the above views of singularism in which the principle of individualism can work. He denies that the world is a manifestation or transformation or expression of Brahman. To make his point of view more clear, the name, forms, attributes, qualities, etc., do not belong to Brahman which is qualityless and their relation to Brahman is due to Avidya. But as (according to Shankara) there is nothing else but Brahman, <sup>it must be admitted</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>that</sup> the physical world ~~must~~ <sup>is</sup> be either identical with Brahman or a manifestation, transformation or expression of Brahman. If none of these cases is true, are we justified to conclude that the physical world has no existence? To this Shankara replies: "The whole empirical reality with its names and forms, which can be defined neither as being nor non-being rests upon Avidya, while in the sense of highest reality, Being persists without change or transformation. A change resting merely on words can alter nothing in the all individuality of the real." "By that element of ~~there~~ plurality which is the creation of Avidya characterised by name and form which is evolved as well as ~~not~~ time evolved which is not to be defined either as existing or non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire changing world, while in its true real nature it remains unchanged beyond the phenomenal universe." Shankara explains it by quoting an illustration, ~~instance.~~ "A man may in the dark mistake a piece of rope for a snake and run away from it, frightened and trembling. Thereon another man may tell him, "Be not afraid it is only a rope not a snake, he may then dismiss the fear <sup>caused</sup> by caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. <sup>ers.</sup> But all the while the presence and the subsequent

/absence

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absence of his erroneous notion as to the rope being a snake makes no difference whatever to the rope itself."

Shankara gives many other examples like "Silver and Shell" which need not be quoted here.

On this point Professor Radhakrishna says: "The Magician produces a tree before us from out of nothing. The tree is there, though we cannot explain it, so we call it Maya." But there is a difference between the Magician and Brahman. The Magician has the power of producing a tree or at least making us believe in the existence of a tree, while the Brahman has no such power. This power is outside Brahman. Dr. Shastri strikes a similar note. He compares Brahman to a Magician that appears in different forms. This analogy does not apply to Brahman. The Magician is under no false belief as to his identity, while Brahman is under the influence of Avidya, believes the forms to be real.

To sum up the arguments of this chapter, we have a positive entity, which Shankara calls Brahman or the absolute, and which is qualityless and lacking in all kinds of activity and energy. Along with this, there is another mysterious entity called maya, which Shankara considers both positive and negative at the same time. This entity is beginningless and endless like Brahman. I call it endless because it never comes to an end as a whole, for Ishwara is never qualityless like the Absolute. In the case of an individual, I consider it endless, because we have no proof of its non-existence. In a man's life, there is not a single moment when he does not possess the energy, potential or actual, to be translated into actions. A mere belief in a man that he does not possess such an energy is contradicted by his own experience and by the experience of others.

/Moreover

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Moreover we have no positive proof that such an experience in itself amounts to nothing. We have also no proof of the cessation of the influence of Maya after death. If Maya is beginningless and endless like upon Brahman, are we justified in calling it non-existent? Brahman for the creation of this world depends upon possible Maya, which is outside Brahman. Is it not lowering the position of Brahman to a dependent Being? If Maya is nothing, it cannot produce anything, so this world must be considered as non-existent. If Maya is a positive entity, it produces a kind of duality of Vidya between Brahman and Maya. If it be said that from the point of view of Brahman Maya is nothing, we have no valid ground for this assumption as far as human path, true knowledge is concerned, because we do not know of any human being, who has been qualityless and identical all his with the Absolute. From the point of view of the states, individual it is not clear how and why ~~and~~ Brahman came under the influence of Maya. One thing should be borne in mind, Shankara assumes the existence of Maya, but does not give any reason for this assumption. world, He does not prove his statement that there is nothing else but Brahman and that this world is the product of an error on the part of human beings. He takes it for granted on the authority of the Upanishads and then tries to explain it <sup>on</sup> in the analogy of the rope and the snake. But this analogy proves nothing. When I see a rope and mistake it for a snake, my experience is not unreal. Similarly the Absolute, which under the influence of Maya sees the multiplicity of the world, cannot be said to have an unreal Brahman is experience. If this experience is real, the Absolute comes down from its position of Absolute intelligence.

/Think

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"All Think as hard as we can, we do not find any valid yet do not ground for the assumption of Maya." again, they know it not; whether What are the consequences of this theory? be The, that the world is merely a dream, a shadow falsely imposed upon the self by Maya or Avidya. As in a dream we findking ourselves subject to various kinds of experience, possible or impossible, and in that state consider that all such the experience is real, so in this world all that we see, hear, feel, is nothing but a dream, though it looks real.

Vidya makes us realise our mistakes, and this waking would become a dream-world as compared with the world of Vidya Kamin which we subsequently find ourselves. A man struggles to gain a mastery over the brute forces of nature, ep?"

"It struggles to remove the obstacles that beset his path, tries to carry on his existence in the best possible way, simply to find himself awakened to the illusory nature of all his efforts and struggles. What about the laws, the states, and the institutions that man builds. It is hard to say anything more on this point. way back to individuality.

If a Shankara tries to show that an individual can get rid of Avidya, or that Avidya is possible in this world, it by stating that in a dreamless sleep man's individual soul is one with Brahman. In Uphamshads there are the contradictory theories as regards the resting place of sleep and the soul, but Shankara tries to reconcile these by

saying, "not at choice into one or into the other, but simultaneously does the soul enter into deep sleep into the place mentioned (heart, veins, etc.,) otherwise we have to deny the partial denial of the surtis quoted when above." "Where the soul is said to be resting in the veins, we must suppose that an entrance into Brahman is

sought through the veins-" Sirkar. When the soul

(3) On account of the text of Scripture,

passes into Brahman in deep sleep it is not touched by

evil. But when a man wakes up the soul returns again.

if Br 22<sup>23</sup> 82

(4) On accounts of the precepts as to knowledge and "All these creatures go day by day into Brahman and yet do not discover it. When they come out again, they know it not; whether they are tigers here, or lions, wolves or bears, that they become again." If the individual does not know that he has been into Brahman<sup>a</sup>, what grounds are there for making such an assumption? Surely not the human knowledge. Such a state does not mean liberation, because in that case the soul would not return. It is only a temporary liberation.

In other countries we also find similar beliefs in the souls leaving the body in sleep. "I asked one of the Kumai" (native race of Australia), relates Mr. Howitt, "whether he really thought his "Yambo" could go out during sleep?" "It must be so," was the answer, "for when I sleep I go to distant places, I even see and speak with those that are dead."

An objection is raised against this theory; "How is it possible if deep sleep is a complete union with Brahman, that each soul on awaking finds its way back to individuality. If a drop<sup>u</sup> water is poured into a body of water and a drop taken from it again, it can hardly be the same drop. Is it a different soul that awakes in its place? This theory

To this Shankara replies, "He who awakes can neither be another soul nor God and must be the same who went to sleep and that for the following reasons:-

(1) On account of works - It cannot be said that a work begun in the evening and completed in the morning is divided between two different souls.

(2) On account of remembrance - for one remembers when one wakes, 'I said this and this yesterday and I am so and so.

(3) On account of the text of Scripture.

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(4) On accounts of the precepts as to knowledge and works which in the absence of personal identity would become invalid; for otherwise deep sleep would mean complete liberation and what would become then of the works that still remain and have to be atoned for and of the lower knowledge? The comparison with the drop, which cannot be recovered from the body of water does not agree with the facts; for the distinguishing cause is wanting in this case, but in the case of the Soul it is present namely in the shape of works and knowledge. There does not exist an individual soul different from Brahman, distinguishing from the Existent like a drop of water from a body of water, but the Existent itself is, in consequence of the connection with the <sup>upa</sup>lipedhis (limiting adjuncts) termed individual soul in a metaphorical sense."

(From the above it is clear that individuality does not belong to the soul. Then it must belong to <sup>upa</sup>lipedhis but <sup>upa</sup>lipedhis are only a mechanical apparatus, in themselves dead, which are alike an attribute of all. Deussen thinks that individual character is discoverable in a tertium quid, which is moral determination and is characterised by knowledge, works and previous experience.) This theory seems to us to be based on transmigration of soul, otherwise No.2. above would make us think that it belongs to upadhis if not to the soul because after death when the upadhis are changed the soul has no idea of its personality in the previous birth.

From the above it is evident that the soul in dreamless sleep does not become identical with Brahman, because it is still distinguished by limiting adjuncts. It is not clear in what sense it is made to enter Brahman in dreamless sleep. As to why in dreamless sleep the soul may be considered to have passed into Brahman Shankra

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replies that there is nothing strange in it. We do not mean to say that in waking state the soul is not one with Brahman. It is Brahman in whatever state it is but in waking state, being in contact with the upadhis, Atma remains ignorant of its real nature, <sup>while</sup> which in a deep sleep these restrictions being removed it knows its true nature. This is another dogmatic assumption. We have no reason to believe that the Soul knows its true nature in dreamless sleep. In dreamless sleep there is no cognition. ~~Then there may be another objection that in a deep sleep the individual has no cognition.~~ To this Shankra replies that "Atma is not conscious during sleep of anything that it knows during waking life, not because it ceases to be intelligent, but simply because it ceases to be in contact with the senses and other limiting adjuncts - which are Atma's instruments of knowing things in this world and therefore, these things cease to be the objects of Atma's knowledge during sleep. And so far from ceasing to be intelligent during what we call dreamless sleep, Atma knows itself to be identical with Brahma." - Desai.

A modern Psychologist would consider the deep sleep as a state in which there is a complete depression of nervous activities - a state which is subjectively described as unconsciousness. But according to Shankra this is the state of real consciousness because the soul is one with Brahman which is pure consciousness. He considers it to be different from empirical consciousness. We admit that divine consciousness must be different from empirical consciousness but it is hard to believe that the Soul is one with Divine consciousness in Sleep. Maya is beginningless like Brahman. Is it endless too. According to the Desais interpretation of Shankra it is not able to impart to a thing of a certain origin /endless an

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altogether different nature." The nature of Brahma may not  
endless in general but comes to an end in the case of every  
individual. Does it not mean that Brahma is never free  
from Maya? Then how can we say that Brahma is qualityless?  
Moreover Shankra says "In deep sleep ----- the soul freed  
from all Upadhis enters Brahman" Now the subjection of  
Atma to Upadhi is due to Maya' (Desai). As long as Maya  
exists there is no freedom from Upadhis. Freedom from  
Upadhis means freedom from Maya. So in deep sleep the soul  
or Brahman is free from Maya. But all the individuals are  
not in deep sleep at one and the same time, liberation.

The same is the case with the individual <sup>liberation.</sup> So the question  
arises, "Is Brahman affected with Maya and unaffected at the  
same time?"

Or <sup>a</sup> part of Brahman is affected and the other part  
unaffected? To a similar objection Shankra replies as  
follows:- "Brahma cannot in itself possess a double nature,  
For on account of the contraction <sup>die</sup> implied therein, it is  
impossible to admit that one and the same thing should by  
itself possess certain qualities, - Such as form etc., - and  
should not possess them".

To the second question he replies that Brahma cannot  
have parts, because what is composed can be decomposed.  
In that case Brahma will not be eternal. But how to get  
out of this difficulty? Shankra suggests that Brahma has two  
forms "Are there two forms of Brahma one higher and the  
other lower? Quite so. Brahma is known to have two forms.  
Under one of these forms Brahma is connected with Upadhi,  
while under the other form it is absolutely free from all  
Upadhis. But we must remember that this connection with  
Upadhi does not, and cannot, change the original nature of  
Brahma. For even the connection with the limiting adjuncts is  
not able to impart to a thing of a certain original nature an

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altogether different nature." The nature of Brahma may not change but still the objection remains unexplained. Brahma has two contradictory forms at the same time or Brahma is connected with and unconnected with Upadhis at the same time.

Besides the presence of Upadhi is due to Avidya. We get the real explanation of the difficulty when we learn that Brahma is regarded as having one form or the other according as it is the object of right knowledge or misconception, Desai.

From the above it is clear that this Physical world owes its existence to misconception. When the misconception is removed the Physical world is no more. Again if Brahma is affected with Maya, it is the whole Brahma that is so and not any of its parts. Then Brahma which is the object of right knowledge does not exist and consequently cannot be known. To this objection Shankara replies, "His view is not open to any objection whatever (much less to the present objection). For the alleged break in the nature of Brahma is a mere figment of Avidya. By a break of this nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double. It is by the element of plurality-which is the mere fiction of Avidya-that Brahma becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes etc, while in its original and real nature, it, at the same time, ever remains unchanged, lifted above perceptible world. And as the distinction of names and forms, -the fiction of Avidya- original<sup>a</sup> is entirely from speech (and has no ground in reality) it does not militate against the fact that Brahma is without parts." But the difficulty is not removed when we take into consideration the individual soul which is Brahma linked with Maya and Avidya (Ignorance). When the individual soul attains liberation, it merges into Brahman, it becomes one with the /absolute.

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absolute. It is then either linked with Maya or not. If it is, then there is no absolute Brahman. If it is not, then Brahman is at the same limited and unlimited (because there are other souls that have not yet attained their freedom). Can this difficulty be removed by denying all connection with the Upadhis and to consider the whole universe as illusory? Still the fact remains that Brahman as individual Soul considers itself to be connected with Upadhis while as an Absolute it is free from such belief. The same Brahman believes and does not believe in a certain fact at the same time. Is it not self-contradiction?

Again Shankre continues, "What objection is there if we suppose that unity and manifoldness are both real?" To this he answers, "The doctrine that the individual Soul has Brahma for its essential nature, if once understood, does away with the independent existence of the individual Soul. But if the independent existence of the individual vanishes, the entire perceptible world, -which has its source in the individual soul, and for the establishment of which alone an element of manifoldness as real is to be assumed in Brahma all this perceptible world also vanishes. Hence manifoldness is due to wrong knowledge and therefore does not require a real element in Brahma to explain it"- Desai. As we stated before Maya is beginningless and endless in general (vide Desai on Shankre) or Brahman is inseparable from Upadhis (vide Vivedi on Shankre) and Upadhis are neither identical with Brahman nor have any other relation with it, is not Shankra proving the dualism of Brahman and matter, while his object is to show non-duality. To avoid this dualism one has to deny either

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the being of Upadhis or Brahman or to consider Upadhis as an illusion or Creation of mind. Professor Radhe Krishna repudiates the latter view. He says, "The world, seen, felt, tasted and touched is as real as the being of man, who sees, feels, tastes, and touches. The mind and its <sup>Categories</sup> ~~categories~~ on the one side, and the world which it construes through them hang together." Here it may be objected that the world and the mind are both Upadhis. What is the connection between the world and the mind on one hand and the Brahman on the other? To this the Professor says, "For Shankre the question is an illegitimate one and so impossible to answer. When we intuit the absolute Brahman, the question of the nature of the world and its relation does not arise, for the truth which disarms all discussions is seen as a fact. If we take our stand on logic, then there is no pure Brahman, which requires to be related to the world. For an imaginary difficulty there cannot be any real solution."

In other words when we intuit the Brahman, the world disappears and when we take to reasoning, the Brahman is no more. This is the way in which Shankra avoids the dualism between Brahman and matter! But it is hard to say whether intuition does give us Shankra's Brahman.

Let us now consider what Shankra thinks of this world, this present world, the world which is the result of Brahman's being affected with Maya. He has given a very interesting account of the laws that are valid in this world, of the problems of soul and body and above all, that of <sup>a personal</sup> ~~material~~ God. We will first begin with Time, Space and Cause.

TIME, SPACE AND CAUSE.

Shankra considers that what is limited by space is not real, because it is divisible. As regards the origin of space, he refutes Kanada's theory. Kanada maintains that space can have no origin because

there is no causal relation between space as an

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DREAMLAND.

substance from which, as inherent cause, together with  
In our dreams we have various kinds of experience, the union of the same (that is of its particles), as non-both pleasant and unpleasant. Sometimes we find our inherent cause, space could originate. And if this does desires so easily satisfied, our objects so quickly not exist, much less can we think of an existing efficient attained, that what seems impossible in the waking world cause for space.

becomes possible as if there had been nothing to thwart  
(b) If space be considered as created, there must be our wishes, nothing to place any restraint on our time before creation, but in the case of space this is activities. In short, we become the monarch of all we conceivable.

survey. On the other hand, sometimes we are in such a  
(c) Space is different in nature from earth because terrible distress, in such agonizing pain and bodily it penetrates all things.

discomfort that one shudders to have even any remember-  
(c) Scriptures also bear testimony to this. ance of it. All objects, both animate and inanimate,

seem to be conspiring to check our desires no matter  
Sp space must form an all-penetrating formless unity with Brahman like milk and water.

how legitimate they are, or how entitled we are to see  
To this Shankra replies that water and milk them fulfilled. But all our pleasures and pains differ essentially in their nature though mixed, and evaporate away like mist when we wake up. We then find he proceeds further in this way: - out that it was only a dream. Similarly, our waking world,

(1) "The cause need not be necessarily homogeneous,  
our present world, is nothing but a dream as compared with for the threads and their combination need not be our existence as the Absolute or Brahman.

homogeneous and still less the efficient cause, the loom.  
Let us now consider what Shankra thinks of this Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause dreamland, this present world, the world which is the only? That cannot be maintained unconditionally, for a result of Brahman's being affected with Maya. He has single cord is twisted out of yarn and cowhair. Further, given a very interesting account of the laws that are the cause need not be manifold. It is not necessary that valid in this world, of the problems of soul and body the cause should consist of personal factors, for the and above all, that of a personal God. We will first effect can also be the result of transformation, since a begin with Time, Space and Cause.

substance passes into a different condition and is then  
called TIME, SPACE AND CAUSE.

Shankra considers that what is limited by space is  
not real, because it is divisible. As regards the origin of space, he refutes Kanada's theory. Kanada maintains that space can have no origin because space had

(a) there is no causal relation between space as an  
effect and its cause, because it possesses qualities

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which "Now for space there is no homogeneous and manifold substance from which, as inherent cause, together with the union of the same (that is of its particles), as non-inherent cause, space could originate. And if this does not exist, much less can we think of an existing efficient cause for space."

(b) If space be considered as created, there must be time before creation, but in the case of space this is inconceivable. The division of space is, however, shown

(c) Space is different in nature from earth because it penetrates all things.

(c) Scriptures also bear testimony to this.

So space must form an all-penetrating formless unity with Brahman like milk and water.

To this Shankra replies that water and milk as a differ essentially in their nature though mixed, and he proceeds further in this way: -

(1) "The cause need not be necessarily homogeneous, for the threads and their combination need not be homogeneous and still less the efficient cause, the loom. Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause only? That cannot be maintained unconditionally, for a single cord is twisted out of yarn and cowhair. Further, the cause need not be manifold. It is not necessary that the cause should consist of several factors, for the effect can also be the result of transformation, since a substance passes into a different condition and is then called an effect."

(2) As regards the time before the creation, one may say that space with all bodies is there now and that nothing was there before.

(3) It does not hold good, either, that space had no origin, because it is different in essence from the earth and other elements because it possesses qualities

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which are not everlasting and is itself not everlasting, therefore we must not postulate a beginning for it."

(5) Space is said by the scriptures to be immortal, in a relative sense.

"Whenever we see anything that has originated through transformation whether it be pitchers, pots and pans or bracelets.....we see division also in the world. On the contrary, a thing without origin can never be thought of as divided. The division of space is, however, shown by the earth (that is in space), therefore space must also be a transformation.

He does not show any difference between the perceptual and conceptual space. Moreover, he does not take space in the sense of relations. Shankra differs from that modern standpoint which considers space as a type of order that belongs to all the parts of the physical world as the latter is perceived, i.e., space is not something in itself. Shankra holds an opposite view that he why he gives it an origin and thinks that space is created.

It appears to me that Shankra considers space as something of subtle matter or material ~~and not as a type of order that belongs to all the parts of the physical world as the latter is perceived.~~ His point of view seems to be allied to the "Intuitionist theories" which explain space as a reality given "direct perception - Something that we directly see and feel outside of us, without supposing any such process of gradual construction by experience and memory. . But it differs from "A priori" theory which assumes that space is a form under which we must represent things in our mind's eye, in order to be liable to conceive, understand and think about them.

As regards the Ontological question regarding space he seems to side with the Realist who maintains that

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extension in space is a real attribute of things, and that space itself therefore is without the presence of a cow. The effect persists something real containing all other things in it, but before its manifestation, namely, as cause. The itself independent of them, so that if things were annihilated, space would still remain the same.

The same is the case with time. "It is real in the world of experience, within the world of experience time has universal scope. But the unending duration of the world is not self sufficient."-R. K.

The search for casual connections is native to the human being. Even in very early ages, when people saw an event, they wanted to find out the cause of that. A man cannot rest satisfied unless he finds out something to explain the event under observation.

In primitive ages the people believed that the natural phenomena behaved like human beings. To them Nature was alive, so they considered many natural phenomena to be the outcome of supernatural causes or magic. With the advance of civilization this view changed. People in different ages have put forward different views to explain the problem of causality, and even in these days philosophy largely revolves about the problem of the relations of mechanism and finality, as one of its main issues. It would, therefore, be interesting to see what Shankra thinks of this problem: )

*According to Shankra* The cause persists in the effect. Take the case of a vessel made of clay. The clay persists in the vessel. You cannot take out of a thing that which it does not contain. Oil cannot be pressed out of sand. The agent only changes the cause into the form of the effect. Moreover, the cause and the effect are continuous. They are not distinct from each other. So cause and effect are not different. In things which are different the perceptibility of the one is not conditioned by the

persistence/  
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From the above it would be clear that he takes into consideration only the material cause. Causes and without the presence of a cow. The effect persists effect for him is simply the transformation of things, before its manifestation, namely, as cause. The in which a thing takes up a different form. He does not difference between the effect before manifestation and take up the question where one thing produces a change in after is a relative one. They are merely two aspects of another thing or transforms power or motion from one thing of one thing and are really of one nature.

"Manifestation, like the springing of plants from seeds, is complex - it consists of a number of conditions each of which is only a part of the cause. Moreover, he says nothing as to how we obtain the idea of causality. particles; and in the same way dissolution is a becoming invisible, caused by the disappearance of the same particle. In one respect he comes very near some of the modern thinkers, who consider that in a temporarily continuous series we cannot say when the cause ceases and the effect to existence in them, and from existence to non-begins. For if the empty time elapses between the two, existence, then embryo would be other than the sub- cessation is an unmeaning miracle. Since no time subsequently born man, the youth would be other than the elapses and the full presence of causal conditions is greybeard he becomes and the father of the one would not simultaneously the effect, the temporal distinction be father of the other. A thing is not changed by a change in outward appearance." The effect is pre-

figured in the cause. "Substances themselves persist. e.g. milk through its existence as sour milk, etc. They take the name of effect and we cannot think of effect as different from cause even if we tried for a hundred years. As it is the original cause which, up to the last effect, appears in the form of this or that effect like an actor in all possible parts, it is thereby logically proved that the effect exists before its manifestation and is identical with the cause."

Here Shankra gives an illustrative example:

"So long as a cloth is rolled up, we cannot see whether it is a cloth or something else, if it be seen that it is a cloth, its real length and breadth are still unknown; if, however, it be unrolled, we perceive what it is, and how long or broad it is; as the rolled up and unrolled cloth are identical, so are cause and effect."

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From the above it would be clear that he takes into consideration only the material cause. Causes and effect for him is simply the transformation of things, in which a thing takes up a different form. He does not take up the question where one thing produces a change in another thing or transforms power or motion from one thing to another. We may say that he neglects the view that a cause is complex - it consists of a number of conditions each of which is only a part of the cause. Moreover, he says nothing as to how we obtain the idea of causality.

In one respect he comes very near some of the modern thinkers, who consider that in a temporarily continuous series we cannot say when the cause ceases and the effect begins. For if the empty time elapses between the two, causation is an unmeaning miracle. Since no time elapses and the full presence of causal conditions is simultaneously the effect, the temporal distinction between cause and effect is arbitrary.

For these modifications and effects are names only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names they are untrue ---- We understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effect of Brahman, maintained that the effect of these three elements have no existence apart from Brahman. ----- whose purpose is to in fact, the effect of Brahman. Any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known. We must, therefore, adopt the following view:-

In the same way as these parts of ethereal space which are defined by jars and water pots are not really different from the ethereal space, and as the wholes of a hinge is not

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Brahman AS THE COURSE OF THE WORLD.

Shankara writes, "The effect is this manifold world, consisting of ether and so on, the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non different from the cause i.e. has no existence apart from the cause. How so? On account of the scriptural word origin and others. The word origin is used in connection with a simile in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known viz. Chand: Up; Vl, 1.4" As O ~~good~~ one ! by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is a claymerely, thus" ek. The meaning of this passage is that if there is known a lump of clay, which really and truly is nothing but clay, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay such as jars, dishes, pails so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications and effects are names only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names they are untrue ---- We understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effect of Brahman, maintains that the effect of these three elements <sup>has</sup> ~~have~~ no existence apart from them. Other sacred texts also whose purpose is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here in accordance with ~~the~~ <sup>those</sup> ~~others~~ of the Sutra. One any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the Knowledge of one thing everything becomes known. We must, therefore, adopt the following view:-

"In the same way as these parts of ether<sup>al</sup> space which are limited by jars and water pots are not really different from the universal ethercal space, and as the <sup>water</sup> ~~whites~~ of a mirage is not

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Brahm as 2

really different from the surface of the desert-for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature- So this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers, etc., has no existence apart from Brahman..... The entire complex of phenomenal existence is answered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper awakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he, rather in consequence of this ignorance, looks on mere effects as forming part of and belonging to his self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the self of all. Hence as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of Secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man, who in his dreams sees manifold things and up to the moment of waking is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be merely an <sup>one</sup> ~~apparent~~ <sup>ide.</sup>"

With this reservation, the problem of the causality of Brahman will be considered.

(Definition) - "The cause from which (proceeds) the origin or subsistence, and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruits of works specially /determined

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determined according to space time and cause, or world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even for the spirit, this omniscient, omnipotent cause is the Brahman." "Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the origin, persistence and passing away of the world." Here by Brahman Shankra does not mean Brahman the Absolute, but Brahman, associated with Maya, also called Ishura. So Brahman is the material cause of the world and the whole universe springs from Ishura. The Akasha, or ether comes first. It is an all penetrating space consisting of very subtle matter. Modern atomists also believe that the vibration of atoms takes place in an ethereal space. Professor Radha Krishna is of opinion that Shankra believed in Cosmic Vibratory motion. If it is true, it brings him very near the modern theories of energy, which form the basis of important developments in the modern Mechanical Science. Coming, again to our point, Air comes out from ether and from this, fire, and from fire, water. These five elements are called subtle elements and are distinguished by certain qualities. Sound belongs to Akasha, Air has the quality of energy; fire, heat and light; water, taste; and earth smell. Shankra does not tell us how he finds out these qualities in the elements named above. Here he differs from modern scientists. Water is now considered tasteless and as far as energy is concerned it belongs to everything material. Moreover, he makes no mention of other qualities like colour, as a matter of fact the question whether the qualities belong to the objects or not has been fully dealt with by the Western philosophers while in the Vedanta philosophy it has not been considered of

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any consequence. It is also held by Shankra that each successive element is not produced by the one preceding it but by Ishura himself who takes up the form of that element. And so at the time of dissolution when the whole world returns to Ishura, a reverse process is carried on. In their gross form, these elements not only exhibit the qualities belonging to them but also the qualities of the elements preceding them. For example the earth shows Sound, energy, heat, light, taste and smell. The relation of the properties to the elements is one of seed to plant. The Sound-essence gives rise to Akasa, which in its turn, produces the outer form of Sound. "So we see that the whole universe is the product of Sound." This would seem strange to the modern world. They would consider the whole material world to spring from energy and they consider sound also as a manifestation of energy. But Shankra derives energy from Sound. Most probably by sound he means expression of Ishura's will, the speech, the word or in gross forms "Logos as Oratio." In this connection Ishura's word is the beginning of the whole universe. Compare the above with the doctrine of Creation in Islam, God said, "Be and it became." So it is the manifestation of Ishura's will to create. The following passage from Chandogya Upaushad may be quoted in support of the above:- "Now it is the Ether from which all these beings arise, and into which they return, the Ether is older than them all, the Ether is the highest goal. This most excellent of all is the lidgitha (Song), it is the endless. So this Song is Ishura's song of creation

So we find that Shankra has made an addition of one element to the four elements of the early western

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natural  
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serve to further the given aims of man, for example, houses  
Physicists. Moreover he considers matter as animate, alive,  
palaces, beds, seats, piscinarias and the like are  
though he admits a continuous gradation of life and  
contrived in life by intelligent artists, in the time for the  
materiality between mind (Subtle matter) and matter. He writes  
purpose of obtaining pleasure and averting pain. It is  
"As in the series of beings which descends from man to blade  
exactly the same with the whole world. For when the tree  
of grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power and  
now, for example, the earth serves the end of the enjoyment  
so on is observed-although they have the common attribute  
of the fruit of the manifold works, and now, again, the  
of being animated so in the ascending series, extending from  
body within and without by possessing a given arrangement  
man up to Hiran gerbba, a gradually increasing manifestation  
of parts, suited to the different species and categories  
of knowledge, powers takes place," Plants are places of  
in detail that it may form the place of enjoyment of the  
enjoyment and possess living Souls, which have entered into  
fruit of manifold works. . . . How should this arrangement  
them in consequence of impure deeds." "In material object  
proceed from the non-intelligent Pradhana. . . . They, also  
consciousness does not die but lapses."

He may be compared with the Hellenic Hylozoists, who  
believed that every particle of the substance of things had  
the germ of life in it. Why does Shankra hold this opinion?  
Because Ishura is the material cause of the world and  
Ishura is "Consciousness" linked with "Maya", These two  
factors constitute the whole material world and they are  
inseparable. So they must be present in an inorganic  
object as well, though in a different degree and the result  
is clear. The trees in India are considered sacred,  
because they are the abode of the living Souls. When a tree  
is cut, the Soul departs to find its place in some other  
object according to its previous deeds.

An objection is raised. Why should not prakra<sup>ti</sup> (atoms)  
world and Ishura are not totally different.  
be considered the cause of the world? To this Shankra  
Another objection- at the time of dissolution when  
replies, "Prakra<sup>ti</sup> is unconscious and so it cannot be the  
cause of this conscious world. The regularity with which  
the impurities of the world.  
the things move lead us to infer a conscious director. In  
Shankara replies, "when the effects return to their  
the world no non-intelligent object without being guided by  
cause, they lose their specific qualities and merge in their  
an intelligence brings forth from itself the products which  
cause as when gold ornament returns to gold". Then to

another subjective as to why the world should go out again

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serve to further the given aims of man, for example, houses  
palaces, beds, seats, pleasure gardens and the like are  
contrived in life by intelligent artists, in due time for the  
purpose of obtaining pleasure and averting pain. It is  
exactly the same with this whole world. For when one sees  
how, for example, the earth serves the end of the enjoyment  
of the fruit of the manifold works, and how, again, the  
body within and without by possessing a given arrangement  
of parts, suitable to the different species and determined  
in detail that it may form the place of enjoyment of the  
fruit of manifold works. . . . how should this arrangement  
proceed from the non-intelligent Pradhna? . . . clay, also  
for example, is formed as experience teaches, to different  
shapes only so long as it is guided by another intelligent  
power! In the above example Ishwra is taken as an efficient

But what is the motive for creation? Or Ishwra  
cause of the world. Now the question arises how can  
Ishwra be a material cause as well as an efficient cause,  
because the material cause generally does not possess  
world without any external motive. Just as a prince, who  
knowledge. To this Shankra replies, "It is not necessary  
that it should be here the same as in experience; for this  
subject is known by revelation, not by inference".

Another objection-If Ishwra is the material cause of  
the world then it must be of the same material as the world.  
Shankara's answer: unconscious objects frequently spring  
from conscious objects, such as hair and nail from man; and  
vice versa as the dung beetle comes from dung, moreover the  
world and Ishwra are not totally different.

Another objection-At the time of dissolution when  
the world returns to Ishwra, will not Ishwra be defiled by  
the impurities of the world.

Shankara replies, "When the effects return to their  
cause, they lose their specific qualities and merge in their  
cause as when gold ornament returns to gold". Then to  
another objective as to why the world should go out again

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when it has lost its specific quality in its absorption in Ishwra, Shankara replies, "As the soul in deep sleep and meditation returns into its original unity, but on waking from these, starts, and returns to its individual existence so long as it is not free from Avidya, so also it is with the return into Ishwra".

Shankra here contradicts himself. At first he says that the effect loses its specific qualities when it merges into its cause. According to this the individual soul must lose Avidya, its specific quality, its impurity, before coming into Ishwra. But in the answer to the next question he points out that the Individual Soul goes out again because it still retains Avidya.

But what is the motive for creation? Or Ishura proceeded to create at random. Shankra does not ascribe any motive for creation to Ishura. He created this world without any external motive. Just as a prince, who has ~~he~~ got all that he requires, may undertake something just for the sake of fun, Similary Ishura created this world as "Lila" (Sport) Though in the case of a man a slight motive may be taken for granted for sport or fun, yet for God we need assume nothing of the sort, for the Scripture does not permit us to attribute any desire or motive to Him.

To the question whether Ishura requires any instrument for creation, Shankara replies that "creation takes place by the specific quality of the substance in much the same way that the change of milk into curd or water into ice takes place without exterior instruments.

Certainly warmth assists in turning milk sour, still the milk follows nothing but the laws of change inherent in itself. Were the power to become sour not already in the milk, the warmth could not help it to change. It is true

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that milk and curd are unintelligent substances and we see that beings with intelligence like potters etc., call in the aid of instruments." But Shankra quotes the examples of Rishis and Saints, that create many bodies without any external instruments. Or in other words the Saints work miracles. So Brahman does not, in creating, use any outward means to assist himself.

*Thus*  
So Ishura transforms himself into manifold world by his great powers. It is his nature to create; or change himself in names and forms. There is no motive behind it, just as it is the nature of man to breathe in and out. It is spontaneous activity that finds expression in creation. Shankra considers this world as eternal in which there are periods of creation and dissolution. This world is beginningless and endless, and only goes in and comes out of Ishura at different periods. "The past and future world period are measureless." The combination of these cycles of creation and dissolution is due to the consequences of man's deeds. As the consequences of his deeds are not exhausted he is to be recreated to suffer the penalty or reward. This question will be taken up again.

So according to Shankra, Ishura transforms himself into the Physical object Ishura that is conscious energy gives rise to this world of manifoldness. But by this theory the so called ~~in~~animate object (according to Shankra all object have life) must have some germ of consciousness in them. And this is not denied by some of the modern Indian Writers who maintain that there is a series of gradation from the highest to the lowest, from Ishura to the inanimate objects, the former being perfect consciousness, while in the latter consciousness is not absent, but cannot exercise itself. But it is difficult to say how we can assume

*inanimat*

the presence of consciousness in ~~material~~ objects if we but a particle of matter carrying a negative electrical charge. Force or energy never acts without any material medium. We must not confuse the material vehicle with partly unconscious in changing himself into the universe. force, energy or electricity. The modern researchers As the physical objects consist of matter, dead or alive, have only proved that an atom which was considered indivisible can be divided into smaller particles called ions. These ions may show electricity but they never taken as material, he cannot be infinite but must be disappear. The future may probably prove the electrons classed as finite, because no sum-total of finite objects consisting of still smaller particles. In short can reach infinity. Take the series:  $\frac{1}{a} + \frac{1}{2a} + \frac{1}{4a}$  --- to infinity. The total is always finite.

If it be said that according to the views of the modern Scientists, matter is only another form of energy and so Ishura who is energy constitutes this universe, still it does not solve the problem. Modern Science considers an atom as composed of many units called ions or electrons. They revolve about one another and about a common centre and thus hold each other in equilibrium. Though they are comparatively stable, yet this stability is modified by eternal influences and the atoms get partly or wholly disintegrated. Hence it is considered that matter is not indestructible. But I hold a different view on this point. To make myself clear I shall quote a passage on Electrons from the Encyclopaedia Britannica; "The Cathode rays therefore appears to consist of negatively charged particles much lighter than the atoms of any element, They can be obtained from different kinds of matter, and must therefore be constituents of the ordinary matter-----Since matter contains these electrons it is natural to suppose atoms are built up out of them and positive electricity." So an electron is not energy

but/

but a particle of matter carrying a negative electrical charge. Force or energy never acts without any material medium. We must not confuse the material vehicle with force, energy or electricity. The modern researches have only proved that an atom which was considered indivisible can be divided into smaller particles called ions. These ions may show <sup>elasticity</sup> ~~electricity~~ but they never disappear. The future may probably prove the electrons consisting of still smaller particles. In short Shankara's theory that conscious energy can be changed into material particles still remains unproved. Material particles can carry energy but are themselves different in nature from energy.

Again Shankara's argument that unconscious objects spring from objects that are conscious such as hair from body does not carry much weight.

In the system of Shankara there is no place for teleology or purpose. The world is merely a product of blind necessity. Ishura as a whole seems to be powerless against the workings of Kama. He is indifferent to the moral advancement of the human beings. He works like a machine. He awards punishment just as the blind forces of nature inflict punishments on the animate objects, who in anyway violate the laws of nature.

What a great difference between Christianity and Vedantism.

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Poss: Atman linked with Maya or Brahma in contact with the internal organ is the individual soul. The individual souls are different from one another, and are considered as parts of Ishwra. The difference between the individual soul and Ishwra is this:- The individual soul is subject to avidya, while Ishwra is not subject to avidya and knows his true nature, but is still limited by Upadhis or Maya. The Upadhis of Ishwra are perfect, and those of the individual soul are imperfect. But as individual souls are parts of Ishwra as sparks are parts of fire., Ishwra cannot be the sum total of individual soul, for in that case Ishwra will not be free from avidya. So it follows that Ishwra is individual souls plus something. But it seems that Shankra when speaking of Ishwra means only the part unaffected by ignorance, and not the other part. Here Shankra considers Maya as something different from ignorance. As to the nature of Maya in this sense he says nothing except that it is false. The individual soul as identified with the material body is called "Jiva". The individual soul is regarded as immortal, that it survives after death, which is merely a separation of body and soul. Against the materialists who do not believe in the immortality of soul, Shankra advances the following arguments:-

- (1) Soul persists beyond the body because its existence does not depend upon the existence of the body. There are certain qualities that do not persist, even though the body does (i.e. after death) so they do not belong to the body. Moreover, the qualities of the body like shape etc. are perceptible while the qualities of the Self are not.
- (2) We can prove the existence of the qualities of the self from the existence of the body in a living state, but the reverse cannot be proved; for "there is always the  
(possibility)

possibility that whenever the body perishes the qualities of the Self persist by entering another body".

(3) The origin of consciousness can not be derived from the elements. If the opponent says:-

"Consciousness is the perception of the elements and the products. Consciousness has the latter as its object and consequently cannot be a quality of them. The fire cannot burn itself; if consciousness is a quality of the elements and their products, the elements and their products cannot be objects of consciousness. If the existence of the elements and their products is concluded from the fact that they are perceived, so the conclusion must also be drawn that this perception is different from them and the proper nature of perception is soul".

The soul is an externally intellectual being, because it is the Highest Brahman disguised by the Upadhis. In an objection that if soul is eternally intellectual how is it that it is not so in the case of sleepers, fainting persons etc.

Shankra replies that the soul does not cease to exist as such in the above cases. The soul does not perceive, not because perception is wanting, but because the gateways of perception are closed.

Another objection:- If individual soul is a part of Ishwra and etc., does it not follow that God also suffers when the individual soul suffers, God will be more miserable than any of us, and to seek a connection with God would be to attain a state in which we would be more miserable than we are now. To this objection Shankra replies that pleasure and pain belong to Upadhis and not to the individual soul. When we hear of the death of a friend we are sorry because we think he belongs to us; we feel pleasure and pain because we think that the body

belongs to us. This is ignorance, avidya, God is free from avidya. To quote the words of Shankra

"Ishwra does not feel the pain of the ~~Sausse~~ state as the individual soul does. The individual soul, while engrossed by avidya, identifies itself as it were with the body and other limiting adjuncts, and imagines itself to be afflicted by the experience of pain which is thus due to avidya, and which really belongs to Upadhis. Ishwra on the other hand, neither wrongly identifies himself with the Upadhis, nor, therefore, imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. Besides the pain experienced by the individual soul is not real, but due to avidya, and the consequent non-discrimination between itself and Upadhis which is itself due to avidya. For these reasons there is no ground to suppose that Brahma as Ishwra is affected by the pain to which the individual soul is liable..... Two things being admitted, namely that the experience of pain is due to misconception and that right knowledge prevents this misconception even while we are in the ~~Sausse~~ (this world) state, is it necessary to point out that Atma, when it is conscious of nothing else except itself with its nature of pure external intelligence, must be free from all pain, and that therefore perfect knowledge is not useless".

Again he writes:-

"Pain is consequently a delusion which arises from our not distinguishing the self from the limitations, such as body, senses etc..... Pain depends only on a mistaken idea".

But how is pain caused? A Physiologist would say that in the skin there are special nerve endings, with appropriate paths in the spinal cord, whose service is to

transmit painful sensations, which are referred to and appreciated in consciousness at the site of actual injury. Is there any way of stopping the entry of painful sensations into consciousness. To this an ordinary man would say that much depends upon the power of <sup>stimulus</sup> stimulus and the ideas already occupying the consciousness.

Shankra says that it can be stopped by right knowledge.

~~"One must take as real the pain which one feels? By no means, for the feeling of pain like the entire body, is based on illusion.....;. For like the body, all feeling of pain lies outside the spirit; wherefore also it ceases in deep sleep, while the activity of spirit is not interrupted."~~

<sup>by</sup> By knowing that the body does not belong to the self; by believing that pain is illusory! How powerful the <sup>stimulus</sup> stimulus may be, it will cause no pain to the man who considers that he is one with Brahma, who is not subject to avidya. Such a man would be called <sup>i</sup>Jowan Mukta<sup>a</sup>, or one who has attained liberation in life. But the difficulty is that <sup>i</sup>Jowan Mukta<sup>as</sup> are of two kinds. (1) A class indifferent to all concerns of life, and hidden in the mood of thought of Atman. (2) A class actuated by a universal sympathy. They are busy in helping others. In the case of the first it may be said that there is nothing else in their consciousness but a thought of Atman, and that they are not subject to external stimuli, though this state cannot last long with the living beings. As for the second, if they are sensitive to external influences, it is difficult to see how they can be free from the feeling of pleasure and pain. If the soul is nothing but Atman, how is it that the works of various people do not intermingle? To this two replies are given:-

(1) The soul that is one with Atman is not the acting or enjoying soul, because it is conditioned by Upadhis. As

the Upadhis are not all pervading, the individual soul is not so either. Therefore there is no confusion of works etc. infinitely large soul is impossible. In Scriptures where (2) The individual souls are only phantoms of the highest soul, just as there are various images of the moon in the water, and when one image quivers the others do not. So the deeds and fruits of one soul do not concern the others. Moreover, these phantoms and their deeds all depend upon ignorance. thereby perceives throughout the body. Later

What is the connection of the soul with Buddha<sup>hi</sup> (Intellect)? The Atman becomes an individual soul by uniting itself with the Upadhis of Buddha<sup>hi</sup>. This connection lasts as long as the state of Sansara lasts, which can be removed by perfect knowledge.

Under this connection the Atman is called individual soul, but from the point of view of the highest reality, the individual soul does not exist at all. But death does not terminate the connection of the soul with the Buddha<sup>hi</sup>. Death only means separation from the body. Therefore the connection persists till the awakening of the consciousness of unity with Brahman. Moreover, a link is considered necessary between the soul and the organs of sense. If there were no link between the soul and the senses, there would be either a continuous perception or no perception at all, for the soul is unchangeable, and as for senses, why should they be one time active and then inactive? Therefore, a connecting link is necessary on whose attention or inattention depend a perception or non-perception. This connecting link is mind or manas. As to the necessity of this connecting link, we have given our views in the chapter on Perception.

Shankra refutes the arguments of Jainas that the soul is as large as the body. In that case it could not migrate into another body. Is the soul infinitely large?

No, because in case of transmigration motion for an infinitely large soul is impossible. In Scriptures where soul is described large, omnipresent, infinite, it refers only to the highest, not the individual soul. Then it must be minute. If this is the case, how can it perceive throughout the body. Shankra replies that the soul, whose seat is in the heart, is in contact with the sense of touch, and thereby perceives throughout the body. Later on he refutes this argument, and says that the sense of touch is not sufficient to explain the minuteness of the soul. As a matter of fact, Shankra is not consistent here about this Deussen writes:-

*upadhis*

"Our author's inconsistency in first disputing the possibility of a sense of feeling throughout the body for the minute soul, and then himself admitting the minute size of the soul in the state of Sansara is self-evident..... The fact is, arguments and counter arguments are thrown together in such confusion that the assumption of a fusion of different <sup>x</sup>texts is in the highest degree probable."

The Scriptures pre-suppose that the soul is an agent, otherwise the commands and prohibitions will have no meaning but activity is not a part of its real nature, however, but one which is founded on ignorance.

"Is the activity of the soul which from the standpoint of ignorance is conditioned by the Upadhis dependent upon God or not?"

To this Shankra replies:-

God causes the soul to act, but in so doing he has regard to the efforts made by it towards good or evil. The good and evil done by the soul is unequal: having regard to this, God divides the corresponding fruit unequally, for He, like the rain, is only the efficient cause. But can this regard to the efforts made by the

Upa-

"When now, oh dear one, man departs hence, speech enters into Manas, Manas into Pranas, Prana heat, heat into the highest Godhead".

Shankra holds that only the functional activity of the Manas etc. perishes with the death. The organs of soul exist together with the dependence of all activity on God? Certainly! For though the activity depends upon God, it is only the soul that acts, and as He, now causing it to act, pays regard to former acts, so too, He in causing it to act formerly, had regard to still earlier effects; for Samsara is without beginning".

*(A table showing the Upadhis is given at the end of this chapter)*

*Upadhis*

A brief description of some of the important items of will suffice here. The ~~systems~~ <sup>systems</sup> of conscious and unconscious life are those which the soul puts <sup>in</sup> out during life, and withdraws with itself at death. These consist of five senses, five organs of action, Manas, and the Mukhye Prane with its five branches. They accompany the soul even if it enters a plant, but in that case, Manas and indrya are unable to unfold themselves. What is the connection between the organs of action that accompany the soul, and the material parts that bear their names?

To this Shankra replies:-  
"The functions (Vriti) go with the soul, not the organs. When a man dies, the will to hear, see etc. persists with the soul. The relation between the two is that of a seed and developed plant.. Similarly, subtle body which accompanies the soul is the seed of the gross body".

TRANSMIGRATION OF SOUL

Shankra is often confusing in this part of his work, but we will try to describe briefly the way in which the departing soul leaves the body, and what happens to it afterwards. In commenting on the following text Chand

Up:-

When now, oh dear one, man departs hence, speech enters into Manas, Manas into Pranas, Prane into heat, heat into the highest Godhead".

Shankra holds that only the functional activity of the Manas etc. perishes with the death. The organs of conscious and unconscious life enter into the soul. As the soul has to get out of the body, it needs some sort of material vehicle, for without any such material basis no living thing can move or stand. This basis is the subtle body "the five parts of the elements (earth, water etc which form the seed of the body" Clothed with these Upadhis the soul leaves the body. Where does it go after death? To this Shankra replies that it all depends upon the works done by a man in his previous births. Those who have done good works, their soul goes to the moon to enjoy the fruit of their pious deeds, by being the Companion of God, who inhabit the lunar sphere. But those who have done evil deeds are taken to a place of punishment where they undergo different kinds of torture at the hands of Jama. Shankra also mentions a third place but it is not clear for whom this place is meant. However, from the above it is evident that in addition to the elemental substratum, the soul is also accompanied by a moral substratum. The soul stays in the above places as long as it has to suffer to enjoy the fruit of its deeds. But in the retribution of works in these places, a residue is still left for which the soul comes down to the earth to take another body. It is not clear why this residue is left. Probably Shankra thinks that there are two kinds of works, one of which requires retribution in the upper regions, and the other in this world, but he does not state what are the distinguishing marks of these works. But, however, the soul in its descent first passes into Akasha, then through the air, smoke, cloud and rain.

it comes into the plants, and passes as food into the male body as seed and then into a womb to emerge finally into a new embodiment. While the soul passes through all these mediums, it does not share in their nature, but is entertained by them just like a guest. In its stay in the plant, the soul must be distinguished from the plant soul which has taken up the body of the plant, and as a retribution of its past deeds. So when a plant is cut, the plant and soul leave the plant to take up another body (of a man, animal or plant according to its deeds), but the guest-soul remains with the plant, till it is eaten by the living being, through whom it has to come to the world. (Compare with it the modern Physiological and evolutionary view of life, i.e. - the theory of living germs. The deeds done in one birth exert their influence not only in the next birth, but sometimes in many successive births. The soul, as well as the organization with which it is clothed is unchanging, the covering persists till the soul attains liberation.

MUKTI....(LIBERATION)

In Shankra's philosophy Mukti is only to become one with Brahman. As mentioned before, it does not mean that the soul was not identical with Brahman. It even is, but its wrongly believed, in the duality of soul and non-soul and liberation means the removal of this false belief and the attainment of right knowledge. Shankra holds that liberation is not attained by good deeds, or by moral improvement, but solely by means of right knowledge. This is an important point in his philosophy. One may question whether the attainment of right knowledge is not in itself an activity of mind. Shankra replies in the negative. He holds that an action depends upon the will of the Agent or doer, but knowledge depends upon the quality of the object known.

"When it is said man is a fire, this is an undertaking

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to conceive of man or woman as a fire and its realisation depends upon the choice of the conceiver. On the contrary, the knowledge of actual fire as such depends not upon any invitation or action of man, but only upon the object which lies before the eyes, and thus it is, knowledge and not action."

But attainment of knowledge means an activity <sup>of</sup> the part of the self and hence may be classed as a good deed or a bad deed and consequently must lead to some kind of reward or punishment. Even with right knowledge, one has to suffer the consequences of his actions. But Shankra maintains that knowledge does not arise by any effort whatsoever of our will. It arises when it does arise, how, why, whereby it arises, remains an unsoleable problem".

Here we come to the doctrine of grace of God. Professor <sup>Sarkar</sup> Gerttar writes:-

"The Shankra school does not accept the theory of grace Vedankism cannot lend its support to such a doctrine, for it sees clearly that the bondage is self-creation, to be destroyed by the seeker himself by a clear, penetrating and discriminating consciousness"

It is difficult to reconcile this passage with what has been described above. If the bondage is to be destroyed by the seeker himself, who in the state of avidya is the individual soul, it means that it can only be destroyed by the seekers' efforts. But Shankra holds that knowledge does not arise by any effort whatsoever of our will. Moreover, the following passage from Shankra gives a different view:-

"For the individual soul, which is impotent, in the condition of ignorance, to distinguish (from the soul) the aggregate of the organs of activity (appearing as the body) and is blind through the darkness of ignorance from the highest soul, the overseer of the work, the

onlooker dwelling in all being, the Lord who is the cause of spirit, from him, by his permission comes the Sansara, consisting in the state of doing and enjoying (suffering) and through His grace is caused knowledge and through this, liberation". "Granted that the soul and God are related as the part and the whole, yet it is evident that the soul and God are of different character. How stands it then, with the identity of God and the soul? Does it exist or does it not? In truth it exists, but it is hidden, yet when a creature thinks on and strives toward the highest God, just as the faculty of sight in one who has become blind after the darkness, shaken off by the power of remedies, in him who<sup>m</sup> grace of God perfects it, does it become manifest, but not naturally in any being whatsoever. Why? Because through him, through God as cause, the binding and loosing of the soul are accomplished, binding when it does not recognise the essence of God, and loosing when it does".

So it is clear that man may think on and strive towards the highest God, but it is only through the grace of God that he may be able to see the light of true knowledge. By God is here meant Ishwra who is free from avidya. Individual souls are part of Ishwra. It is the whole that brings about the liberation of some of its parts. But in this case it is difficult to say how Ishwra as a whole can be said to be completely free from avidya, when some of its parts are still in the grip of ignorance. So Shankra is of opinion that the performance of works does not bring about the release of the self from the bondage of ignorance. Works may be either good or bad, and in each case they demand their retribution in the next birth.

"It is impossible to avoid all works throughout an entire existence so long as the natural disposition

"Mukti is attained by means of the study, (of)

of the soul <sup>5</sup> attraction and enjoyment persists, for its  
 actions continually come forth afresh from this inborn  
 nature, through causes which are always potentially  
 inherent in the soul, just as much as its natural  
 disposition to action" for fruit. (Is not a desire for  
 liberation. However, Shankra holds that:- Vedant is undertaken a  
 desire "As it cannot be shown that there is any connection  
 between Mukti and action, it is impossible that Mukti  
 should in any way depend upon action" - Desai. So we

" must avoid all kinds of works in order to obtain real  
 liberation which is a state of bodilessness. But such a  
 state of inactivity is impossible. So Shankra suggests  
 that works should be performed without any desire for  
 fruit. Works should be done for the sake of duty. There  
 is some slight resemblance here between Shankra and Kant.  
 For Kant the only thing unqualified good in this world is  
 a goodwill - the will to follow the moral law regardless  
 of profit or loss to ourselves. He would say, never mind  
 your happiness; do your duty. as Mukti (liberation in life)

"Morality is not properly the doctrine how we make  
 ourselves happy, but how we make ourselves worthy of  
 happiness" Practical Reason p.227. does not only take

But this view does not help Shankra much. A man may  
 renounce all claim for reward, but the bad deeds must be  
 atoned for in the next birth. So he <sup>5</sup> gives up a desire for  
 fruit does not relieve us of the cycle of births. he

However, Shankra maintains that the performance of such  
 works is not necessary for the attainment of liberation.  
 But it is worth while to notice that though it is the  
 optional to a man whether to become a Grihastha or not,  
 yet if he chooses to become a Grihastha without entertaining  
 the desire for their fruit, still he cannot attain Mukti  
 until he gives up the <sup>Samsara</sup> Samsara state and all that that state  
 involves, and resort to asceticism" Desai. Again he writes:

"Mukti is attained by means of the study, consisting

potter's wheel to support it, so liberation requires a  
 of reading, understanding and reflection, of the Vedant<sup>a</sup>  
 philosophy." Desai. Moreover, a life in confirmation <sup>with</sup> to the  
 rules of morality is necessary preliminary for the study  
 of Vedant<sup>a</sup> and so cannot be given up. But this life must  
 be lead without any desire for fruit. (Is not a desire for  
 liberation for which the study of Vedant<sup>a</sup> is undertaken a  
 desire for fruit?) Muckti can also be attained in one's  
 life. How is it possible when Muckti implies bodilessness.  
 To this Shankra replies:-

"If you maintain that bodilessness is only attained  
 after the dissolution of the body, not during life,  
 then we do not admit this, because being clothed with  
 the body depends (only) upon false cognition".

Again Shankra writes:-

"When once Brahman is known, sin committed is  
 annihilated and further sins cannot cleave to such a  
 one..... Annihilation and non-cleaving apply equally  
 to good works and evil"

As Shankra believes in Jiwan Mukti (<sup>liberation</sup> liberation in life)  
 such a person according to the above must have no body,  
 because if he has a body he is not liberated. That is why  
 Shankra believes that bodilessness does not only take  
 place after death, but even in this life, because this  
 belief depends upon false cognition. Then how can we  
 account for the body that we actually see before us. This  
 point is difficult for Shankra to explain, and so he  
 changes his position. He writes:-

"Knowledge does not destroy those works whose seed has  
 already germinated, that is, those from which the  
 present life, serving as basis for dawning knowledge,  
 has been fashioned"

So the body exists for the retribution of those works.  
 He gives two reasons for this:-

(1) As the vessel which is being formed requires the

potter's wheel to support it, so liberation requires a life as a substratum; and as the potter's wheel continues for a time to revolve, even after the vessel has been completed, so also life continues after liberation, since it contains no cause to check the impetus already gained. -----

(2) As when a man suffering from eye disease continues to see two moons, even after he has attained the conviction that there is only one moon there, owing to the force of the impression, so too the impression of the sense world persists, after a man has attained the knowledge of its non-existence".

Now we have to consider the question whether right knowledge gives us release and salvation. Bondage is due to the soul's connection with the Upadhas and as long as the Upadhis lasts there can be no release. In this world the soul is connected with the body. By merely deceiving ourselves that the soul has no connection with the body, and that when we take our meals, go about our daily work, come home at night and go to sleep, we are doing nothing of the kind, and that it is all illusion, a mistake, we cannot sever our connection with the body. It still persists. Even after death, according to Shankra, our connection with Manas and Upadhis is not completely broken and when we merge in Ishwra this connection still remains, though in a potential state and makes us take birth again in the next world cycle. So where is the release, for which we have so great a longing? It is only a temporary relief, because the world will never come to an end. After one cycle, another cycle begins. So the so-called release is merely a kind of make-believe.

We do not find any trace of the belief in Transmigration of the soul in the Vedas. It is in later writings that this theory is explained. Some people are, therefore,

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of opinion that the Arjans derived this belief from the original inhabitants of India, who believed in the survival of the soul after death in the form of some bird. A similar belief is found in many other countries of the world. But this is quite different from the transmigration theory. Most probably, the belief in transmigration sprang up from the reluctance of man to face death. No one in this world likes to leave those who are near and dear to him. Even if the world does not present any attractive feature still the man wants to live in the hope of future prosperity. But if one is given the idea that one is simply changing the form and can have the hope of being near the objects of his affection, to some extent this mitigates the pangs of separation. Upon this foundation it was easy to build a superstructure of works, for a man likes to take birth again as a man, for <sup>which</sup> his good deeds are necessary, and this acts as a motive for good actions. As for the idea of release by annihilation, it is only of interest to philosophers. Common people in their daily lives are quite indifferent to it.

#### CONCLUSION

What is the sum total of Shankra's teaching? It can be expressed in the word Deception. Objects of senses deceive us. They are not what they appear. They have no existence independent of our imagination which in itself is false. We turn away from the material world in repugnance to look into our own selves. Here again we meet the same fate. Our bodies, our limbs, eyes, ears, nose, hands, and feet etc. are not ours. We wrongly consider them our property. In haste we look upwards to find some consolation in the existence of Ishwra. But we find that He is worse than we are. He is himself in the grip of Maya. He knows his true nature, but is powerless to free Himself from Maya. At least there is one consolation for us. We do not know our own nature. "Where ignorance is bliss it is folly

to be wise". We look for Pure Brahman in vain. Pure Brahman is non-existent for Ishwra is never free from Upadhis, whatever they may be. But in spite of all this, Shankra teaches us to believe in Pure Brahman. The belief is <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ raise us at least to the rank of Ishwra if not to that of Brahman. And this belief is enough to ~~relieve~~ <sup>relieve</sup> us ~~from~~ our miseries. Actions do not play any part in our life. They do not help us to attain liberation. Good deeds are useless they do not carry us any further. Even the wicked deeds do us no harm because with right knowledge our soul is disconnected with the body, though it may still inhabit the latter. And when the soul is not connected with the body, it cannot be held responsible for the actions, because actions belong to the body and not to the soul. The liberated man may not be willing to do any harm to any other person, but willingly or unwillingly, nature asserts itself. To err is human. But he must rest assured he cannot be required to answer for his actions, because he holds a belief in non-existence of connection between body and soul.

Again, there is no release for a married couple unless the partners leave their homes and take to asceticism. Imagine the fate of children and dependents under such a system. Either a man should leave his dependents to their fate, or wait for release till they grow up and take care of themselves. In the latter case, a man must not study Vedante, for if liberation comes early, he will have to bid adieu to his children. What can be the consequences of such a system on the society?

That which the soul leaves after death. i.e. course body.

**Changing part.**

**Moral determination.**

The subtle portions of the elements which make up the seed of the body.

**System of conscious life.**

Five organs of sense. i.e., sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, correlated with manas.

That which accompanies the soul after death.

**Unchanging part.**

The life organs. i.e. vital breaths, spirit (Pranas) or manas, budhi indriyus Karma Indrya.

**System of unconscious life.**

Mukhya Pranas. (Chief breath of life.

Five organs of action. i.e., speech, hands, feet, organs of generation and excretion.

Pranas in Apana, (inhaling) the strictest sense. (exhaling)

Samana Idana. A faculty which brings about the passing out of the soul at the time of death.

When breath is held for great effort.

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Chapter IV

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY.

At the time when <sup>the</sup> Vedantists were engaged in and metaphysical speculations, a new movement was going on in the countries lying to the north west. In the sixth century of the Christian era, Arabia, another which was to play an important part in the civilization of the west, was herself in utter degeneration. The grossest of the evils, which mankind ever experienced, idolatry, infanticide, polyandry, in short the germs of every disease that can undermine the moral growth of a nation were to be found in that country. But shortly afterwards Mohammed was born (570-632) to deliver the message of God, which so transformed the whole country that instead of jealousy and hatred, the people were united in cultivating the good habits of toleration and peaceful living. This made them so powerful that they not only freed themselves from the nominal sovereignty of Persia but became themselves the masters of that country. In a short time Persia, Syria and Egypt all fell into the hands of the Arabs. But this wave of conquest did not stop here. In the year 712, in the reign of Caliph Walid, Mohammed Karim, a young general, appeared on the Coast of Sindh with a small army and stormed Daibul, the great medieval port of the Indus Valley. After taking the town he marched on Mooltan and this expedition laid the whole of this valley, which was as large as England, at the foot of the conqueror. Here for the first time the new civilization of the Arabs came face to face with the ancient culture of the Hindus. But as the Province was not perfectly subdued, the Caliph <sup>S</sup> did not derive any political advantage from this. /this

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At this time, the Muslims had been gradually increasing the extent of their empire, till at the time of the Moghals, they were The province was left to take care of itself and the Moslem settlers founded independent dynasties and ruled the country for more than two hundred years. But the real conquest of India was to begin from another side. From the north west, through the mountain passes, Sabuktigin, who ruled Afghanistan, led his army to attack the ruler of the Punjab. Shortly after his death his son, Mahmud, carried on the work left unfinished by Sabuktigin. Between the years 1000 and 1026, Mahmud made at least 16 ~~district~~ campaigns and annexed Punjab to the Kingdom of Ghazni. When his descendants were expelled from Ghazni by the Ghoris they ruled the Punjab for a short time, but the latter drove them away from this part also. Shahab uddin Ghoris overran the Country up to Kanauj and left his general Kutb uddin as a governor of his India Provinces, of which Delhi was the Capital. Kutbuddin became ~~an~~ independent <sup>under</sup> after the death of Shahab uddin and formed a dynasty known as the Slave dynasty which ruled over this part of India for about 84 years. In 1290 on the death of the last King of this dynasty, Jalal uddin Khalji, an Afghan or probably a Turk ascended the Throne of Delhi. The Khalji dynasty, after a reign of 30 years gave way to Tughlaks, who in their turn were succeeded by Sayyids and Lodhi till in 1526 Babar, who being driven from his Kingdom in Central Asia had established himself in Afghanistan, marched with a strong army of Turks and Afghans and laid the foundation of the Moghal Empire which lasted for nearly three centuries. During all

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this time, the Muslims had been gradually increasing the extent of their empire, till at the time of the Moghals, they were rulers of nearly the whole of India.

Such is the brief history of India under the Muslims. From the above it will be clear that the Moslems in India were in constant communication with their brethren in other countries. In fact the Moslem Rulers in India derived their strength from the <sup>de</sup>herds of Turks and Persians who emigrate <sup>to</sup> in India search of fortune. Persia was the court as well the literary language of all the Indian Muslims. They shared the beliefs, manners and customs of the Muslims of the other countries. Even the Moslem rulers of India nominally derived their Authority from the Caliph of Bagdad. In short as far as culture is concerned, Moslem India formed a single whole with the other Moslem countries of ~~the~~ <sup>Asia</sup> Asia.

As far as Philosophy is concerned there was no distinct advance on the thought reached by the early Moslem Philosophers. But what has <sup>d</sup>been achieved was not allowed to be lost. A Muslim's education in India was not considered complete as long as he was not master of the Philosophical works of Muslim pro-Greek Philosophers and Ahrairas. Just as in these days a man ignorant of Shakespeare cannot lay any claim to the knowledge of English literature, similarly a Muslim of that period was deemed <sup>un</sup>fit to move in the Society of men of letters unless he knew Islamic Philosophy. There were frequent discussions among the people <sup>on</sup> the subjects discussed by Avicenna and Farabi. As in Persia, there were two main schools of Philosophy, so in India there were <sup>partisan</sup> Parhsans of either Pro-Greek or Anti-Greek Philosophers. The noble men of these times encouraged Philosophical discussions in their Durbars.

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Chr. They encouraged the men of learning by means of handsome rewards, sometimes amounting to thousands of pounds. Of course Philosophy was never separated from Theology and this has been the case everywhere in the East. Philosophical thought arose from the needs of theology. There is a close similarity between the Medieval Muslim East and Medieval Christendom. But as long as philosophy is fettered to religion there cannot be much real progress. Of course philosophy and religion can supplement each other. What is revealed can be verified by reason. However, in India these theological-philosophical discussions did not produce any new systems. But they helped to modify the current views of the Hindu Philosophers. In order to see how this modification was brought about, we must have some knowledge of Islamic thought. Instead of giving a summary of Muslim Philosophy I will try to trace briefly the development of thought, which will make it easy to grasp the subject matter thoroughly, reserving my comments to tracing the effect of Islam on Hindu thought in a later part of the book. To be as brief as possible I will not discuss the Philosophers of Spain. *A Christian missionary* Islamic thought says, "In regard to his religion the latter (Hindu) is a born Philosopher and the former (Moslem) is by all reasonable men understood to be a born fanatic. It is impossible to give thoughtful attention to the religious system of the Hindus without feeling that the <sup>e</sup>man who made it in the first instance were earnest, great and wise. But the study of the religious system of Muhammadens awakens no such sentiment." Professor Erdmann is of opinion that a syncretism like that of Islam, moreover a reactionary attempt <sup>instigated by the</sup> /such knowledge of the contemporary Sciences. As there has been a distinct advance in sciences so we think that

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such as is its view of the world ~~over~~ against the Christian view, contains no seed of development nor does the philosophy of those who belong to it." We may also quote Professor MacDonald, "The Moslem reasoner deals with ideas as if they were blocks of wood, solid things in your possession as to which there was no question what they were. You could handle them as you please and move them this way or that way." So then writers tell us that what is called Moslem Philosophy is merely Greek Philosophy in another form. In this connection it would be interesting to quote Mr. Kingsland, "It is open to question whether either in Philosophy or religion -----it is possible to state anything which is fundamentally or substantially new. Old or forgotten truths may reappear like jewels which have lost their setting and lustre, or which have lain in neglect or obscurity owing to the changing fashions of men's thoughts and interests. They do but require to be reset in appropriate form, to shine once again in all their pristine and inherent beauty--- It is scarcely possible to find any modern statement of root principles which had not been previously formulated at some period or other of the world history---Even pragmat<sup>ism</sup> according to some authorities (J. A. Stewart) is not new; it is to be found in Plato." If the above statement is true, then Moslem Philosophy stands in the same position as any other system of Philosophy in the world. But I understand that there has been a continuous development of thought in the world. The problems are the same, but the solution differs according to the light shed by the knowledge of the contemporary Sciences. As there has been a distinct advance in sciences so we think that

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there has been a distinct advance in Philosophy too, ~~Philosophy~~ <sup>Philosophy</sup> cannot be separated from the Sciences. Both go together. So Islamic Philosophy has kept pace with the Sciences of the time and the solution offered corresponds with the knowledge of the Sciences of the age. The difficulty is that the substances and summaries of the authors lose much of their charm. To form an estimate of the Islamic Philosophy it is better to study the complete works of the authors. But there is no need to be disappointed by the above extreme views. <sup>But</sup> Again <sup>st</sup> these we may quote a writer in Islamic Cyclopaedia, Who admits that "Islam had a Philosophy of its own among its theologians." Major Leonard writes, "Is it possible that Europe is <sup>e</sup>unmindful of, and has the ingratitude to ignore, the splendid services of the Scientists and Philosophers of Arabia? Are the names of Abn Osman, Alberuni, Albeithas, Avicenna, the great Physician and Philosopher, Averroes of <sup>C</sup>Ardova, Ibn Bajja (Avempace) besides a host of others, but dead letters? ----- Do we owe no tribute to a great thinker such as Ghazali, who in speaking of his attempts <sup>to</sup> detach himself from his youthful opinions <sup>1</sup>says, "I said to myself, my aim is simply to know the truth of things; consequently it is indispensable for me to ascertain what is knowledge." So it would also be worth while to study Moslem Philosophy even if we have no other reason except that of tracing the influence of Greek thought on the Moslem world and how the Greek Philosophy was transmitted to Europe through the Moslems and how the Moslems commented on the Obscure passages in Aristotle and Plato. It is true that some of the Moslem Philosophers based their systems of Philosophy on Aristotelian Writings but this does not mean that

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All the Moslem Philosophers (a special name for

they were mere imitators or stated the old in the new form and had no original ideas of their own. The Moslems devoted a long period to studying Aristotle and Plato but in their study their aim was not so much blind imitation but to differentiate between truth and falsehood. There are men like Avicenna, Averroes, Ghazali and others who can be reckoned among the Philosophers of merit and to say that Islam did not produce any Philosophy at all, cannot stand the test of historical research. Commenting on the defects of the Aristotelian Philosophy The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics "has the following:-

"There is a duality of matter and God. There is no comprehensive view of the whole universe under some monistic conception. The critical theory of Knowledge is interpenetrated by strong realistic tendencies and put forward in a lame manner. He gives no origin of "forms" God is pure intelligence without any voluntary activity. He moves the whole universe as an object of love and not as cause efficiense. He takes no notice of individuals. But in Moslem Philosophy the great notion of contingency brings into unity the total of the actual. It is the light that explains the individual problems and allows them to be examined under the widest points of view. In the things of the world being and existence are quite different. The two are not internally and necessarily connected. Existence must thus be imported to things by a self existant Being and must be permanently maintained in them. The universe is a stream of being which emanating from an inexhaustible source extends to all that is not God.

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All the Moslem Philosophers (a special name for certain Moslem thinkers) have formulated anew this idea with the exception of Averroes".<sup>7</sup> Again it would be interesting to study how the School of Ashaira especially <sup>h</sup>Ghazali, tried to find out the defects in the Aristotelian Philosophy and how they advocated their own ideas on the subject.

Was Islam opposed to philosophical thought? To answer this question we have to look to the Quran. Islam asks its followers to believe in revelation but it maintains at the same time that what is revealed though the prophet can be verified by reason. It lays great stress on the study of nature so as to come to a knowledge of what is beyond nature. The proper study of mankind is not only by man but all things animate and inanimate. "Acquire learning, though you have to travel to China," is one of the sayings of the prophet. Islam asks the believer not to accept anything without rational thinking. According to the Quran, the prophets were sent to teach wisdom to the people (philosophy means "love of wisdom"). How can a man learn wisdom if he assumes that all knowledge is communicated from above and nothing is left as an object for search or investigation? In fact the verse that "there is great material in the Quran for one who thinks" will be meaningless if the man is not to exercise his power of rational thinking. Man is asked to believe in the Unseen but how is he to know that he is on the right path? The Quran says, "by the aid of reason". As the result of a careful study of the Quran various problems presented themselves to the Moslem thinkers. Moreover they had to answer the objections of Jews and Christians, who could

attributes of action' (Shakristais)  
 not be silenced by merely relying on the authority of revelation. Thus the Moslems were led to study critically the teaching of the Quran and the following problems in the forefront:- (1) The nature and attributes of God (2) The Freedom of the Will: (3) Relation between Faith and Actions: (4) Reason versus Revelation and the doctrine of the ' Logos'.

As regards the nature of the Ultimate Reality certain passages in the Quran led to various interpretations. The development of thought in this respect may be traced as follows:-

(1) God is a person-- a subsisting (Alqayyum) nature that is rational and intelligent. But personality is not ascribed to God in an analogical and supereminent way. He is considered to be corporeal having hands and feet like man. He encompasses the whole universe both in his knowledge and person. God created the Universe out of nothing and in a way may be said to have limited himself. (God appears to be finite but has unlimited powers). God is absolutely independent, self-existent, ~~and~~ eternal, whereas the world has derived its existence from God and is therefore created, temporary, and conditional. The world will again lapse into nothing with the exception of the Souls that have beginning but no end. But the world will be created again in a new form.

(2) God is corporeal ~~and~~ but his body is not like man. He pervades the whole universe and is unlimited and infinite.

(3) God is corporeal and the words used in the Quran are to be interpreted metaphorically. He is all powerful, all knowing, etc., but these attributes are distinct from His Essence. (Sifatist), "They made no distinction between the attributes of essence and

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According to Calvin 'man is born in sin. Man, in his fallen state, can do nothing but sin.'

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attributes of action" (Shapristain<sup>h ni</sup>)

(4) God is Pure Being and the world is an emanation from Him in descending order.

(5) God is the unique Substance, absolute and void of all phenomena and all multiplicity, but viewed from the aspect of plurality, He is the whole created universe. The universe before it was evolved to outward view was identical with the Real; - and the Real after this evolution is identical with the Universe (Jami)

According to Calvin "man is born in sin. man, in fact being a perished being in original transgression, can do no right".

The problem of the Free Will early attracted the attention of the Moslems, and they were naturally divided into two opposing groups; Jabriah believed in the predestination while Kadriah upheld the doctrine of Free Will. It was just like the struggle between Calvinist and Arminian in the middle ages in Christianity. *He derived predestination from the following* Just like the passage in the Bible.

"Then shall <sup>he</sup> say also unto them on the left hand,

"Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels". There are

passages in the Quran which led to this controversy among the Moslems; -

"No accident befalls in the earth or in yourselves, but it was in <sup>the Book</sup> his book before we created them

(Surat ul Hadid (VII 22)

"And God's ordering is in accordance with a determined decree"

"Verily, God accomplishes what he ordains - he hath established for everything <sup>x</sup> fixed decree."

"God guides into the right path whomsoever He <sup>w</sup> will."

In fact the Arabs of Pre-Islamic days were fatalists and this tendency was <sup>continued</sup> contained even after the rise of Islam. They believed that each and every thing was predestined and preordained. Man had no power

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to choose his own path. In the words of Mohammed Al Berkevi we find an expression of what the people thought in those days;-

"It is necessary to confess that good and evil take place by the predestination and predetermination of God; that all that has been and all that will be was decreed in eternity and written on the "Lahmahfues" (preserved tablet); that the faith of the believer, the piety of the pious and their good actions are foreseen, willed and predestined, decreed by the writing on the preserved tablet produced and approved by God; that the unbelief of the unbeliever, the impiety of the impious and bad actions come to pass with the foreknowledge, will, predestination and decree of God but not with his satisfaction or approval."

This must not be confused with the Christian idea of Sin. According to Christianity "man, sinful through participation in the original transgression", falls short of the standard. "Man is born in sin corrupt in his nature and in the actions which must follow from his nature. Salvation can only be the work of God, man himself can contribute nothing to it." It is through the sacrifice of Christ that he is saved, Christ took away man's sin. According to the Islamic determinists man is not sinful by nature.

"A child is born good by nature" is the saying of the prophet. When questioned as to whether this makes God the author of the evil the determinists would reply, that there is nothing evil in this world. We look at things from our own point of view. If we could look at things sub specie aeternitatis we should see that everything is right and good in its place. Man regards everything evil which is inconvenient to him. His point of view is limited. He cannot see the events as a part of the whole and that is why he

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falls into the error of pronouncing all those things evil that do not in any way help in the furtherance of his own pursuits. To quote <sup>al</sup> Birkevi again, "Should a man ask why God willeth and produceth evil, we can only reply that He may have wise ends in view which we cannot comprehend." But what about moral responsibility? If a man has no power to do good or evil, and his actions are simply the conformation of God's eternal decree why should he be punished for his evil deeds? To this the Jabriahs have made no reasonable answer. Soon a revolt-against-the Jabriahs began in right earnest. In fact even before the Jabriahs there were people who believed in the free will <sup>of man</sup> ~~finan~~. Ali, the Son-in-law of the prophet in explaining the <sup>se</sup> ~~vera~~ of the Quran,

"God directs him whom He chooses, and leads astray him whom He chooses" says,

"This does not mean that He compels men to evil or good, that He either gives direction or refuses it according to His Caprice, for this would do away with all responsibility for human action; it means on the contrary that God points out the road to truth and lets men choose as they will." - Amir Ali. Imam

Jafar Assadiq in refuting the doctrine of Jabr (compulsin or predestination) says,

"Those who uphold Jabr make out God to be a participation <sup>or</sup> in every sin they commit and a tyrant for punishing those sins which they are impelled to commit by the compulsion of their being. This is infidelity." Similar other passages can be quoted from other writers. But this problem was taken up in great earnestness by the Mutazalites (dissenters) who are called the Nationalists of Islam. We ought, therefore, to give an account of this Sect.

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MUTAZALITES.

They also held *many* attribute which could be ascribed to the *Reality*. *They* founder of this Sect. He was born in 699 and died in 748. He was the disciple of Imam Hasan Basri, but differed from the Imam on the question of a religious dogma and founded a new school called Mutazalites (*disseminers* ~~deserters~~). The Mutazalites styled themselves the "people of monotheism and justice." Some people call them scholastics of Islam, but it is better not to call them by this name, because in Moslem theology the dogma to be explained was only the Unity of God. On all other points the religion allowed a great latitude of judgment. For several centuries his school exerted a great influence upon the minds of the Moslems. The later Mutazalites were well versed in Greek Philosophy, as by that time the translations of Greek books were readily accessible to the Muslims. Among the Mutazalites themselves there was great difference of opinion on certain points, but their main teaching is given below: -

They maintained that there are two sources of knowledge, viz., experience and Reason. The latter only gives the true knowledge, and the knowledge gained by experience is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation by Reason. Moreover, reason can give us knowledge of the supersensible as well. So we can have a knowledge of God as well as any other entity. This is opposed to Sifaties (and Kantians) who denied any such authority to Reason. The Sifaties also believed that Revelation was the only source by which a knowledge of the Almighty could be obtained. Reason also provides a criterion for distinguishing between the true and the false, and so cognition of good and evil is also within the province of reason.

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They also held that the only attribute which could be ascribed to the Ultimate Reality was eternity. They were strictly opposed to anthropomorphic conceptions. No finite quality was applicable to God. Though various attributes could be applied to God by way of analogy, yet these attributes were not something distinct from His Essence. His attributes constituted His essence, or were various aspects of His essence. His being is a unity indivisible, but man separates in thought what is one in reality, because he regards each aspect in the abstract and apart from the others. God is omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., but knowledge, power, life, etc., are His essence and not attributes. There is only One power and these are the various ways of looking at that power. His <sup>h</sup>learning and <sup>ing</sup>knowledge are not different. They are one and the same thing. So they denied the existence of any eternal attributes as distinct from <sup>His</sup> ~~this~~ <sup>attribute</sup> nature, because they maintained that such an ~~attribute~~ would be an eternal entity co-existent with God, which would be a contradiction to His unity. An eternal divine Wisdom would be another God like the persons of the Christian Trinity. The resemblance of some of Mutazalite theories to certain Christian Trinitarian speculations is obvious, but we cannot say whether or not it was a mere coincidence.

So according to Mutazalites God is the only Reality. All else is change and has no reality of its own, though a dependent reality is assigned to it. They also maintained that all laws regarding human activities are the results of growth and development. Justice is the animating principle of human actions and is itself the dictates of reason.

Again, man has perfect freedom of Will. They reasoned that if man's actions were determined, it

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They thought that the original in heaven (written on  
 would be unjust in God to punish him for them. As  
 God is just, freedom of will cannot be denied to man.  
 Man <sup>is</sup> responsible for his actions. No moral evil  
 can be referred to God. In everything that God does  
 He has the best interests of His creatures in view,  
 and everything that befalls us, seen from His point  
 of view, which comprehends all is for the best.  
 Here we find some affinity to the Stoic doctrine.  
 Our finite minds cannot go beyond our selfish interests  
 and so we cannot see the whole of the truth as it is.  
 The world as a whole is good. By predestination  
 they mean trial and deliverance, adversity and  
 prosperity and other doings of God, exclusive of  
 moral good or evil. which they particularly emphasised.

How are we to know the distinction between the  
 right and wrong? By revelation? The Mutazalites  
 held that man, by reason apart from revelation, but  
 recognises some actions as good and right and others  
 as bad and wrong. This difference is independent of  
 God's will, He does not make a thing good by command-  
 ing it, but He commands it because it is good.  
 Revelation that contradicts reason is itself false.  
 Was the Quran, the Word of God, uncreated and  
 eternal? The Jews believed that the Law existed  
 before the creation of the world, not as an idea in the  
 mind of God, but as a <sup>re</sup>supersensible reality and it was  
 created. Christians spoke of an uncreated and  
 eternal Word of God, (Logos). It seems probable that  
 of the Moslems were led to the discussion of this problem  
 by the Jewish and Christian doctrines. Thus some of  
 them believed that Quran as an eternal Word of God was  
 uncreated. But the Mutazalites maintained that this  
 gave the Quran an independent existence in conflict  
 with the fundamental dogma of the Unity of God.  
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They thought that the original in heaven (written on the Preserved Tablets) was created in time. The Korans in men's hands are produced by men, though they correspond with the original. This was the most burning controversy of the time. In this, the Mutazalites have violated their own principle of interpreting the ~~revelate~~ hidden metaphorically. Here they ascribe a material existence to Laup (preserved tablet) while they interpret the paradises figuratively. Some of them, no doubt, admit that every one will find the kind of heaven he is capable of appreciating. Even with this the existence of a material 'Laup' cannot be maintained reasonably.

Now I give some of the views in which they differed from one another or which they particularly emphasised.

Annazzam maintains that God does not possess the capacity of doing wrong. As His nature is good, no evil can flow out of Him. God is All powerful, but His omnipotence is confined to what He does. -

Willing in man implies need, so we cannot ascribe will to God in this sense. The Will of God means the Divine Agency itself. He denied that the created reality exists from all eternity, but he maintains that the primitive substance was created in a moment by the Divine Will and one thing emerges from another by a continued process of differentiation and integration. Here we find a germ of a theory of evolution. Again, he denies the theory of atoms. The bodily substance is composed of accidents instead of atoms, or in other words, he substantialises accidents. An accident is either a substance itself, or part of a substance. The warmth is latent in the wood and appears when its opposite cold disappears. So he does not believe in quantitative change in a substance but only a change of motion or transposition.

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Modern Science also interprets quantitative change as a change in motion or vibration, though in a different way. The soul of man is a subtle body and has the same form as the body which it pervades.

ABU HUZAIL (died in the middle of the 9th Century.)

He maintains the eternity of attributes, but they have reference to the world which was afterwards created. The Absolute Word of Creation (Kun) is midway between the Creator and the Created. But the Declaration of the Divine Will are not personal spirits. They are more like immaterial powers. Moreover, there is also a distinction between the Absolute Word of Creation and the Accidental Word of Revelation, (Quran). The latter is significant only for this world and not for the next world, in which there is no freedom of Will. Everything there is absolutely determined by God. He does not believe in the resurrection of the body.

MUAMMAR Ibn-i-Abbad Assalami.

He was an advocate of the platonic theory of 'Archetypes' and consequently his followers are called idealists. He maintained that every accident subsists in a subject by virtue of some idea in the human mind. Accidents have merely intellectual or ideal existence. The Soul, as the true essence of man, is an Idea.

Thus, the Mutazalites may be called the Rationalists of Islam. There is a close similarity between Mutazalites and Fatimides (the descendents of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and their followers). According to them, God was not like any object that the human mind can conceive. No attribute can be ascribed to Him which bore the least resemblance to any quality of which human beings have

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perception from their knowledge of material objects.  
 GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM.  
 The perfection of piety consists in knowing God. The perfection of knowledge is the affirmation of His verity and the perfection of verity is to acknowledge His unity in all sincerity; and the perfection of sincerity is to deny all attributes to the Deity. He who refers an attribute to God believes the attribute to be God, regards God as two or part of one. He who asks where God is, assimilates Him with some object. God is the Creator, not because He Himself is created; God is existent, not because He was non-existent. He is with every object not from resemblance or nearness. He is outside of everything, not from separation. He is the Primary Cause, not in the meaning of motion or action. . . . He has no relation to place, time, or measure. God is Omniscient because knowledge is His Essence; mighty because power is His Essence; loving because love is His Essence. . . . not because these are attributes apart from His Essence. "Taqqid" construed by the followers of the 'Salaf' to mean predestination meant 'weighing', 'probation', 'trial'. (Imam Jafar Sadiq quoted by Amirali.)

The Fatimids were not acquainted with Greek Philosophy but the Mutazalites were. We will now see how the Greek wisdom was rendered accessible to Moslems. . . . as well as the 'Almagest' of Ptolemy and the books of Euclid were translated into Arabic.



The Caliph Mamun founded an Academy in Baghdad and the work of translation was entrusted to this . . . In a short time the whole of Aristotle and . . . was accessible to the Muslims in Arabic.

Now we come to Muslim thinkers who are commonly called "Philosophers", because they derived mainly Greek/

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their ideas from Greek Philosophy. To them Plato  
GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM.  
and Aristotle were divinely inspired and their  
systems. The Hellenistic learning flowed to the East  
through Syria. The Syrians had embraced Christian-  
ity. For a time the new religious beliefs filled their  
minds, uninterruptedly, but they were soon destined to  
face the attacks of Philosophy. In order to ward off  
these attacks the Christian theologians had to make  
themselves acquainted with Philosophy and so they had  
to take up the study of Greek learning and philosophy.  
In this way the Greek books were translated into  
Syriac, but it was simply a work of translation and no  
more. In some cases even the translation was not  
correct.

The period of Syriac translations extends from the  
4th to the 8th century. Then came the Muslims on the  
scene. They established a powerful Caliphate under  
Muaviyah, who founded the <sup>Umayyad</sup> ~~Umayyid~~ dynasty that lasted  
from 661 to 749. They were succeeded by the  
Abbasids, who were great patrons of learning. It  
was in this period that the great work of rendering  
Greek philosophy into Arabic was performed.

The first important person to begin the work of  
translation was Ibn-ul-Muqaffa (died 759 - 760) who  
lived in the reign of Mausur, when several treatises  
of Aristotle as well as the 'Almajesta' of Ptolemy  
and the books of Euclid were translated into Arabic.

- - -

The Caliph Mamun founded an Academy in Baghdad  
in 832 and the work of translation was entrusted to this  
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Now we come to Muslim thinkers who are commonly  
called "Philosophers", because they derived mainly  
their/

Farabi

FARABI, (870 - 950)

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their ideas from Greek Philosophy. To them Plato and Aristotle were divinely inspired and their system of thought the best possible in the world. They did not take the trouble of ascertaining how far the works ascribed to Plato and Aristotle were genuinely their work and moreover, in their writings these Muslim thinkers do not show how far they are indebted to Greek Philosophy, whether they took anything from other sources and what were these sources. We will give an account of a few important philosophers of this period.

No Mussal-man ever reached the same position in Philosophy as he, and it was by the study of his works and the imitation of his style that Avicenna attained proficiency and rendered his work so useful. He is chiefly noted for his commentaries on Aristotle. Garra De Vaux credits him with clearly expounding the theory of active intellect as a pure form separate from matter. He writes, "Farabi is a really powerful and singular personage more fascinating than Avicenna more impetuous and daring in his intellectual flights, more agile in his retorts. His thought usually attains to the elevation of the lyric; his logic is keen, clever and bold and he gives expression to a flow of profound speculation in language that has the rare merit of simplicity and consciousness." He studied De Anima 200 times and the Physics 70 times, but he was more interested in logic than in anything else. He wrote the following commentaries in Aristotle:-

- (1) Al Muqalat (The Categories)
- (2) Al Qiyas (The Analytica Priora)
- (3) Al Tafair (The Hermeneutica)
- (4) Al Burhan (The Topica) *The Analytica Posteriora*
- (5) Al Jawk (The Topica)

Abu <sup>h</sup>hasa Mohd. B Muhd: Turkaan Al Farabi was a native of Farab in Transoxiana and was born about 870 A.D. in a Turkish family. He is said to be the greatest Philosopher before Avicenna. The people called him "Muallam-i-Sani," the Second teacher, the first being Aristotle. He was well-known in all the sciences of his age. Ibn-i-Khallagan writes about him, "A well-known Philosopher. He was the greatest of all the Muslim Philosophers and composed a number of works on logic, music and the sciences. No Mussal-man ever reached the same position in Philosophy as he, and it was by the study of his works and the imitation of his style that Avicenna attained proficiency and rendered his works so useful." He is chiefly noted for his commentaries on Aristotle. Carra De Vaux credits him with clearly expounding the theory of active intellect' as a pure form separate from matter. He writes, "Farabi is a really powerful and singular personage ----- more fascinating than Avicenna more impetuous and daring in his intellectual flights, more agile in his retorts. His thought usually attains to the elevation of the lyric; his logic is keen, clever and bold and he gives expression to a flow of profound speculation in language that has the rare merit of simplicity and consciousness." He studied De Anima 200 times and the Physics 70 times, but he was more interested in logic than in anything else. He wrote the following commentaries in Aristotle:-

- (1) Al Muqalat (The Categoriis)
- (2) Al Qiyas (The Analytica Priora)
- (3) Al Tafsir (The Hermeneutica)
- (4) Al Burhan (The Topica) *The Analytica Posteriora*
- (5) Al Javk <sup>dl</sup> (The Topica)

- 7a2
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- (6) Al Maghalit (The Sophistica ~~Gl~~enchi)
  - (7) Al Khaṭaba (The Rhetoric)
  - (8) Al Shir (The Poetics)
  - (9) The Isagoge of Porphyry.

In addition to the above he had also a large number of original works viz., his treatises on "The intelligence and intelligible", on "the Soul", the faculties of the Soul, the One and the Unity; substance, time, empty space, space and measure. He had a cyclopaedia of science (Ihsa Ul Alum) in which he gives a criticism of all the sciences, viz., mathematics, Political and Social economy, logic, languages, etc. His treatises Sirat-Ul-Fazila and Asseyasat Ul Madeniyya deal with ethics and politics respectively. The latter is a part of the more comprehensive work called Mubadi-Ul-Ma'judat. In a similar treatise, "Resala fi arai Ahl- l-Madinat-Ul Fazila" he discusses the problem of the "model town", as conceived by Plato and Aristotle, but he soon reveals the fact that he has no idea what is meant by such terms as oligarchy, democracy, etc.

Farabi was a great admirer of Plato and Aristotle. He considered them the prophets of his time. If their teaching was true, there should be no contradiction between them, so he took up the task of showing that there was no disagreement between the two and their doctrine was in conformity with Islam.

We do not say that he succeeded in this task but this was a genuine attempt at a critical analysis of these two great philosophers and shows the originality of his mind. In fact the people before him merely explained the philosophy of the Greek thinkers with a comprehensive examination of their teaching. Farabi, after showing the points of similarity between Plato and Aristotle refers to the teachings of Aristotle which seem contradictory to him and tries to show that Aristotle ultimately came to the point of view of Plato. The chief difficulty that

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he feels does not lie in the transcendence and immanence of ideas but in the creation of the world, because here he does not or cannot go beyond the pale of Islam.

Aristotle acknowledged no cosmogony or origin of the world in Time, but Farabi has to deny that Aristotle ever taught the eternity of the world. How can this be possible? In order to overcome this difficulty he explains the term "Creation" in a different way. He held that "God created all things instantaneously in unmeasured eternity through the agency of the 'Aql' (Intellect).

The Universe existed in eternity as a created thing. God through Aql, introduced movement, at which time began.

With the coming into existence of time and movement, the Universe came out from its concealment into reality". In other words, time is logically posterior to the actual creation of the world. This is materially the same view as held by some of the Mutazalites.

Farabi calls philosophy an all-embracing science - the science of Being as such. According to some modern thinkers Philosophy is the general science of which the special sciences are the constituent portions, so here, Farabi is at one with the modernists. He blames both the Mutkallamin and the natural philosophers like Razi (Razes) for not taking a true view of Philosophy. The Mutkallamins took for granted the deliverance of ordinary consciousness without testing them and the natural philosophers are not philosophers because they look at the things from the point of view of their particular science and not as a whole.

The study of the different departments of the world is the work of the special science. But the co-ordination of the results of the sciences with a view to arriving at the true conception of the system of the world as a whole is the work of philosophy.

In logic, though, he mainly commented on Aristotle, yet in his "letter in reply to certain questions, he shows

/evidences

evidences of original thought. His logic does not only give an analysis of scientific thought but also a few remarks on grammar and epistemology. He distinguishes logic from grammar in this way - "Grammar is confined to the language of our people while logic has to regulate the expression in language of the aggregate intelligence of mankind". He has a two-fold division of logic, viz., (1) Tasawwar (conception and perception) and (2) Tasdiq (proof). The former deals with ideas and definitions while the latter is concerned with judgment, inferences, etc. The ideas in themselves are neither true nor false. They have in themselves no relation to actuality. Ideas are of two kinds, viz (1) those derived from sense perception which are the representatives of the individual objects. (2) ideas innate in the mind which cannot be derived from experience as eternity, actuality, perfect being, etc. These ideas have the highest degree of certitude. They cannot be demonstrated or explained empirically. A judgment is the combination of ideas. It may be either true or false. The truth of any proposition can be established by certain fundamental propositions which are immediately obvious but which cannot be demonstrated to be true. They are the axioms of all the sciences. The most certain of all is the Principle of Contradiction. It is impossible that the same predicate should at the same time and in the same relation both belong and not belong to the subject. Logic proper is the doctrine of Proof. We start from known premises and arrive at something which was formerly unknown or not clearly known.

"The doctrine of Proof points out the right way to the truth; it must itself point out the truth; it must generate science".

In all this he mainly follows Aristotle but it is said that Aristotle's researches often rested on an altogether insecure basis of fact. But Farabi lays stress on first establishing the truth of the premises, and this can be done by the investigation of the particular sciences and both

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positive and negative instances should be examined.

He maintained that Universals exist in mind as substances. They are not merely accidents in Particulars. Though the man extracts them from particulars, yet they have existence of their own before such extraction. Abstraction simply means bringing into limelight with the help of the Particulars, what is already there. Particulars are interpreted in accordance with the Universals. In reply to the question, whether mere being belongs to Universals, he says, "Existence is a logical or grammatical relation, "but not a category of actuality which makes any "assertion about things. The existence of a thing "is nothing but a thing itself".

Existence and manifestation are one.

He defines a cause as something which positively influences the happening or being of something else. A thing which was non-existent is brought into existence by something else and this again has its cause in something else and so on.

But the chain of causes must have its beginning, so there must be the First Cause, which is and always has been. This is God. He is necessary, self-existing, Eternal Being and has the sufficient reason of His actual existence in Himself, in his own essence. The First Cause cannot be defined as it has neither genus, species nor differentia. It is Perfect. It is both external and internal but cannot be perceived by the senses. As regards the proof of God's existence, he maintains that everything possible can only be actualised by an Efficient Cause which cannot be manifold. The First Cause must be single. So the World being contingent cannot exist independently of some other actual being. The First Cause must be intelligent, perfect, good, immutable and one, but its qualities are neither internal nor acquired but as aspects of its own essence. Here also we find that Farabi mainly relies on Aristotle.

God is one alone and from Him proceed the manifold. The Universe is due to God's knowledge. God's intelligence needs something to be intelligent of.

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His consciousness demanded an object. So the forms or types of things are from eternity in God and the Universe means the unfolding and drawing out of these types. The Universe is not due to the Will of God but to His self-consciousness. His self-consciousness gave rise to the First Created Spirit, His Image (or Noñs) which moves the outermost celestial sphere. From this spirit came the second sphere-spirit and so on. There are nine such spirits. They constitute the second grade of being. In the third grade is the Reason and in the fourth, the Soul. But these two multiply according to the number of human beings. In the fifth grade comes the "Form" and last of all the matter. The first three are spirits per se but the last three, though incorporeal, enter into relation with the bodies. The Corporeal is also divided into 6 grades viz; celestial bodies, human bodies, bodies of animals, bodies of plants and mineral and elementary bodies.

The faculties of the Soul are not of the same rank but the lower supplies the material for the higher. The highest of all is the faculty of reasoning. Material objects give rise to sensations. These sensations provide material for imagination and memory and these latter again are worked together into reasoning. He recognises three aspects of consciousness viz; <sup>(1)</sup> cognition (2) feeling and (3) willing. He calls these (1) cognition (2) Inclination and disinclination (3) Effort or Will. In a mental act these are not separated but one of them may be more predominant than the other two. By means of data of perception the Soul passes judgement according to its inclinations and disinclinations of the moment. "Aql" (or spirit) is an integral part of the Soul. It is not absent even in childhood but is potential in that period and actualised later when the child develops its sensory powers.

The spirit cannot work unless it gets its material through the senses. As the parts of the body develop, the spirit is actualised more or less according to this  
/development

development. This actualisation is not affected by the activities of the child, but is influenced by the last sphere-spirit or the Universal Spirit .

The data are obtained through the senses but it is the Universal Spirit that gives it meaning and makes it intelligible. The individual spirit interprets the data with the help of the Universal Spirit. The former derives its activity from the latter. The Universal Spirit is called Active or Creative. Some people are more highly intelligent than the others. This is due to the influence of the Creative Spirit.

(1) So the spirit in man is / possible (2) actual (3) inspired from above. The man has spiritual potentiality, which is actualised by a knowledge of Reality and in this actualisation it is influenced <sup>from</sup> above.

It is not clear whether Farabi believes in the immortality of the Soul. According to Ibn - i -Tufail Farabi has doubts about this point moreover he is not clear whether the souls are finite or infinite in numbers. At one place he speaks of the souls as infinite in numbers while in his "Model Town" he considers them as finite.

In the gradation of spirits we find a mystical element in Farabi. In fact in Farabi mysticism penetrates everything. He maintains that the lower spirit has a tendency to rise towards the higher, while the latter tries to lift it up. By uniting himself with the celestial spirits a man attains a union with God. But it is not clear whether this union can take place in this world or only in the next world.

In his Ethics Farabi maintains that reason is the sole criterion of what is right or wrong. Willing is subordinate to "Knowledge". "Knowledge" influences the actions of a man. "Man has free Will, Pure Thought is the Sphere of Freedom. Freedom depends upon motives furnished by thought. But as ultimately Freedom is determined by the rational nature of God, Freedom is a necessity"

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Abn Ali Al Hussain ibn-i-Abdulla ibn-i-sina (980-1037) was born at Afshina in the district of Bokhara. In his early boyhood he was put in charge of a tutor and his intellectual capacity was the talk of the day. He acquired a sound knowledge of the Arts and Sciences of his time in his boyhood and when he was sixteen he knew the theory of medicine so well that he was known as an expert physician. At this age he was able to cure the Sultan Nuh bin Mausur of a dangerous illness, as a reward for which he was permitted to study in the Royal Library. This was of great advantage to him, because in a short time by his diligence and hard work he excelled all his compatriots in learning. As regards Philosophy he studied Aristotle's metaphysics forty times, but still considered himself deficient in thoroughly understanding it, till by chance he purchased Farabi's commentary on metaphysics which made the subject quite clear to him. On this ground he is sometimes called the pupil of Farabi. When the Sammanide dynasty declined he had to seek the patronage of the chief persons, one after the other, but in all his wanderings he never gave up the study of his favourite subjects, - Along with this he was busy writing a series of volumes on medicine, Philosophy and natural sciences. In fact he was a voluminous writer. He composed no less than 100 treatises. Some of these are tracts of a few pages while the others extend through several volumes. The most famous of all his writings is his philosophical work called *Asghifa* (Sanatio). He made an abridgment of it and called it "Najah". This was written in concise language but clear and logical. Other philosophical works are *Falsafat ul Arudi*, *Falsafat ul Alai*, called after the names of the patrons to whom they were dedicated, *Kitab ul Isharat wa Tawbihat*, Guide to Wisdom, fountain of Wisdom, The Human Faculties and their Perceptions and a series of mystical treatises and poems.

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He wrote a compendium on Soul when he was only eighteen.

He divides Philosophy into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. "In its entirety it embraces the science of all existence as such and of the principles of all the separate sciences, whereby as far as humanly possible, the soul which is devoted to Philosophy attains the highest perfection." If Philosophy is the science of the sciences, the above classification does not seem right but we may include under Physics both social scenes as well as natural. His Logic, metaphysics, Physics give a synoptic view of Aristotelian doctrines. He discussed metaphysics under ten theses. Under the first five he deals with the origin of knowledge; experimentation; induction and deduction; matter and force; the relation of cause and effect; substance and accidents; the universal and particulars. In the 6th and 7th he shows the unity of the First Cause. In the 8th and 9th he deals with cosmology and the relation between the human Souls and the First Cause. In the tenth he discusses the doctrine of Resurrection. De Wulf is of opinion that "he was among all the Arabians, one of the most faithful interpreters of Aristotle and that starting with the system of Farabi he freed it from many neo-platonic theories in order to bring it nearer genuine peripateticism." But I think Avicenna, on many points does not interpret Aristotle correctly or differs from him in his views fundamentally. In fact he was quite ignorant of Greek language and literature and his knowledge of Greek Philosophy was based on the translations made by persons, some of whom had no interest in Philosophical representations and were consequently unable to render the philosophical doctrine correctly in Arabic. In most

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cases he does not give the sources of his information and as he was commonly known as an interpreter of Aristotle, all that he wrote was taken by the people as the teaching of Aristotle. The task of faithfully interpreting Aristotle was left to Ibn-i-Rushd (Averroes), who points out in his book Tihafat ul Tihafat the difference between Avicenna and Aristotle. De Boer's view as regards the rank of Ibn-i-sina among the philosophers of the world is worth nothing. The notion that Ibn-i-sina pushed on beyond Farabi and reached a purer Aristotelianism is perhaps the greatest error which has found a footing in the history of Muslim Philosophy. What did this our man of the world in reality care for Aristotle? It was not his concern to commit himself wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to his liking, wherever he found it, but he had a preference for the shallow paraphrases of Themistius. Thus he became the great philosopher of accommodation in the East and the true forerunner of compendium writers for the whole world ----- Every moment of his life was fully employed. In the day time he attended to state affairs or gave instruction to his pupils, the evening was devoted to the social enjoyment of friendship and love and many a night found him engaged in composition, pen in hand and goblet within reach lest he should fall asleep. Time and circumstances determined the direction/

The intellectual constitution in human beings is defective and the man easily falls a prey to errors;

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direction of his activity. If at the Princes Court he had the requisite leisure, and a library at hand, he wrote his canon of medicine or the great Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, while travelling he composed epitome and smaller works. In prison he wrote poems and pious meditations, but always in a pleasing form; in fact his smaller mystical writings have a poetic charm about them .... He did not, like Farabi, withdraw from common life to become immersed in the commentators of Aristotle, but he blended in himself Greek science and Oriental Wisdom. Enough commentaries, he thought, had already been written on the ancient authors; it was now time for men to construct a philosophy of their own."

A brief account of Avicenna's teaching will be given now:-

Logic - Ibn-i-Sina defines logic in his 'Najat' as follows:- "Logic is the theoretical speculative science that teaches out of which forms and materials there will come about satisfying argumentation. Of this argumentation that which is strong and imposes an assertion, is called dialectic; and that which is weak thereof and imposes a prevailing opinion is called rhetorical." His compendium Essay on Logic remains to this day one of the clearest and best that beginners can find in the Arabic language on this abstract Science of the Laws of Thought. Ibn-i-Sina considers logic an important science but he does not exaggerate its power, which he considers is negative. He says, "The aim of logic is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning." The intellectual constitution in the human beings is defective and the man easily falls a prey to errors;

so he cannot do away with Logic. "Logic does not aim at discovering truth but serves as a guide to those who already possess it and saves them from making mistakes." In the allegory of of Hai-ibn-Yazzan he says, "Logic is a science whose income is paid in ready money; she brings to light what nature conceals and what may be a source of either joy or sorrow; she points you out the way of freedom from earthly entanglements and sensual propensities. If her healing hand touches you, it will give you salutary support, but if your weakness causes you to stumble,

the fourth unites the propositions to form demonstrations; the fifth discusses the conditions necessary to be premises of reasoning, the sixth and seventh deal with probable and false reasoning the eighth with the art of persuasion and the <sup>last</sup> treatise of discourse whose aim is to stir the soul or imagination. In the beginning of his Logic he explains the terms species, difference, property and common accident which together furnish a method of constituting definition.

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Reason gets its material from experience, and with the help of the first principles of understanding builds a structure of thought. Reason interprets what is given in experience. The first principles of understanding are self-evident truths. They are held to be true by common feeling. Some of them are due to habits formed in childhood, a different view of self-existence. They are hereditary experiences handed down from generation to generation. Then

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there are others that depend upon the experience of  
 you will be exposed to ruin, accompanied as you are  
 by bad companions (i.e. Unregulated imagination etc.)  
 He discusses Logic in "Isharat, 'Najah' and  
 a 'classification of sciences'. He divides Logic into  
 nine different parts corresponding to eight books of  
 Aristotle with Porphyry's <sup>I</sup>Isagoge. The first part is  
 an introduction to the book and deals with General  
 Philosophy and the second corresponding to categories  
 discusses the simple abstract ideas, that can be  
 applied to all beings; the third deals with the  
 grouping of ideas to form propositions; the fourth unites the  
 propositions to form demonstrations;  
 the fifth discusses the conditions necessary to the premises of  
 reasoning, the sixth and seventh deal with probable  
 and false reasoning the eighth with the art of  
 persuasion and the <sup>last</sup> <sup>S</sup> treats of discourse whose aim is to stir  
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 due to habits formed in childhood, ~~a different view of~~  
~~self-evidence.~~ They are hereditary experiences  
 handed down from generation to generation. Then

/there

there are others that depend upon the experience of life. A child puts his hand in the fire and burns himself. In the course of his experience he finds that certain events and combination of events are always followed by certain other events and this gives him an idea of causality. The same is the case, with the laws of science. The principles of feeling and the principles of reason together bring about a conviction in one's mind, though one is not aware how this conviction is brought about.

Avicenna further distinguishes between definition and description. The definition proper must give the essence of a thing, its genus, differentia and all its essential characteristics while description only gives the propria and accidents so that the thing may be recognised correctly. He follows Aristotle in recognising the four causes, viz, material, formal, efficient and final. He maintains that they may

connection with sciences. First what a thing is if it is (2) Where it is (3) When it is (4) How all/ is and finally why it is. Sensing and reason both share in the formation of data of sciences. Each science has its particular field of investigation or more correctly looks at a part of reality (Continued) in point of view. The sciences are divided into two kinds viz., Theoretical and applied. The former discover truths to be applied by the latter in their investigations, just as Maths: may be called a theoretical science and Mechanics an applied science.

/Psychology

16.8

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Ibn-i Sina finds a difficulty in defining Psychology - "Soul". He says, "It is a prime

Perfection (consummation) <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ may be all appear in a definition. Thus an ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> may be defined 'an iron implement of such and such a shape for cutting "wood"'.  
the prime perfection attaching to a natural body having a life potentially (a first perfection

His treatment of the Universals is similar to that of Farabi. The Universals have no objective reality. They exist only in the mind of man. The Abstract idea of genus is formed by the comparison of particulars and noting their points of Similarity. The general idea is realized in matter, accompanied by accidents. Then the mental abstraction serves as a standard of comparison with other individuals. So according to Avicenna everything existed in the mind of God as an 'Idea'. Then it actualizes itself in the plural forms of materiality and then in the mind of man is raised <sup>to</sup> the Universality of Idea.

He discusses the questions that arise in connection with sciences. First what a thing is if it is (2) Where it is (3) When it is (4) How it is and finally why it is. Senses and reason both share in the formation of data of Sciences. Each science has its particular field of investigation or more correctly looks at a part of reality from a certain point of view. The sciences are divided into two kinds viz., Theoretical and applied. The former discover truths to be applied by the latter in their investigations, just as Maths: may be called a theoretical science and Mechanics an applied science.

2.growth giving 3.generating. Nutritive power  
"transforms the nutrient into a resemblance with the  
nourishment taken in order /Psychology  
succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted and  
attach itself to the taker instead of the  
/waste

waste" - najah by Avicenna. The power of growth  
 Ibn-i Sina finds a difficulty in defining  
Psychology - "Soul". He says, "It is a prime  
 Perfection (consummation, realization) attaching  
 to an organic natural body; and if we wish to say  
 further, a prime perfection attaching to a natural  
 body having a life potentially (a first perfection  
 belonging to a natural body which body may have  
 life); that is to say, a source of the manifold  
 animal actions potentially." This seems to be  
 taken from Aristotles' De Anima ll chapter 1.

According to Aristotle the soul is something  
 of the body' Only nous or pure intellect entered the  
 human body from without, but Avicenna maintains that  
 the soul is not the product of the body or the result  
 of the mechanical or chemical combination of the  
 elements in the body, but comes from outside.  
 Moreover he maintains that body and soul have no  
 essential connection with each other. Then he says  
 that motion is of two kinds viz 1 natural (motion  
 towards the earth) 2 spiritual (motion away from the  
 earth). The first is due to the causes outside  
 the man and the second to the power of the souls.  
 (Here Ibn-i-Sina seems to have had a rather clear  
 premonition of Newton's theory of gravitation seven  
 hundred years before the falling of the famous  
 apple.)

There are three powers of the Soul viz.  
 1 Vegetative 2. Animal 3. rational. Again the  
 vegetative has three Sub-divisions viz. 1.nutritive  
 2.growth giving 3.generating. Nutritive power  
 "transforms the nutriment into a resemblance with the  
 nourishment taken in order that this nutriment may  
 succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted and  
 attach itself to the taker instead of the  
 /waste

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waste" -najah by Avicenna. The power of growth makes the body increase in mass without changing the general form or appearance. The power of propagation "draws from the body a part which contains the body in potentia and is capable of producing another body similar to it in action" Najah p.43. The animal power is of two kinds viz. perceptory and motor. The faculties of perception are partly internal and partly external. The external includes the five senses viz. sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Touch also includes the perception of heat and cold; dry and moist; rough and smooth etc.

As regards 'perceiving' he accepts Aristotle's view as against Plato's. He says, "When the intervening transparent body becomes effectively transparent by light shining on it, then an impression of an outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible objects as are seen is effected in the crystalline lens of the eye, just such a pictorial impression as is effected in looking glasses. This is Aristotle's way." In regard to the functioning of these five senses he writes, "The eye only perceives that form which has imprinted itself in it, of the object felt and so also the remainder of the senses." When the stimulus exceeds a certain limit, the power of perception is dulled, but in most cases it regains its former condition after a certain amount of rest. "Again each one of the five senses perceives, through the means of its own rightful perception and besides the same, five other things to wit 1. shape 2. number 3. size 4. motion 5. rest (or quiet) That sight touch or taste perceive them is apparent.

611 As 159  
As to hearing, it perceives in accordance (p<sup>er</sup>formance) with the variety of number of sounds, the number of sound-emitting objects and through the strength of sounds it perceives the size of two objects that are hitting against each other and in accordance with a kind of change and fixedness of the sounds, it perceives motion and rest. The same is the case with other senses" - Avicenna's offering to the Prince or A Compendium for the Soul.

The five inward senses function as follows:-

1. Perception, through anyone or more of the five inward senses, of the outward concrete form. All the perceptions are gathered in a kind of common centre in the front part of the brain.

2. Mosawwira<sup>h</sup> (Formative or imaginative faculty) conception of particular notions, over and beyond the concrete form perceived. This faculty slips the sensible form of the conditions of situation and place, and then retains it after the external objects have ceased to produce any Sensation. Here the soul perceives the object without the aid of the senses.

3. Mofakkira (cogitative) - performs the work of abstraction and generalisation of ideas

4. Alwahn (Estimative) "passes judgments or comes to a definite opinion as to the truth or falsehood of conceptions formed." It is situated in the middle of the brain.

5. Hafiz a (memory) preserves the judgment formed and has its seat in the back part of the brain.

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In respect to memory Ibn-i-Sina in his Qanun makes a distinction:- "And just here is a point for scrutiny and judgment as to whether the preserving power and the power of recalling to consciousness such notions as had been stored up by the opining power (Alwahn) but have passed away from it, are one entity and can have knowledge independently of senses and power or two."

"The mind (understanding, Reason) is in fact and deed wholly and solely nothing else than the forms of mentally grasped things."

The motor faculty is either appetitive or efficient. The former is again either attractive i.e. a desire, or repulsive i.e. a passion. The efficient power resides in motor nerves and muscles.

1. The Material intelligence or absolute potentiality of Knowledge.
  - II. Possible intelligence - which recognises the First Principles of Knowledge.
  - III. Perfect intelligence - completely prepared to receive additional knowledge.
  - IV. The Acquired intelligence in possession of this further knowledge.
  - V. The Holy Spirit which has ecstatic vision and belongs only to the prophets and Saints.
- In all its activity the Soul is guided by Intellectus agens, or Ashir Intellect. (Ash-faal).

The/

He believes that the Soul is created at the same time. When the body is created. Ghafali is of opinion that he does not believe in the resurrection of body but this is not true as the following quotation from Avicenna shows. "The true religion, which our Lord, the Most High taught us, clearly states that the body will undergo reward and punishment in the next world." He discusses the problem of resurrection in his letter to Abu said Abul Khair; "All creation, whose parts are linked together, is subject to influences which all derive from a single source i.e. God, Terrestrial

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The Rational power of the Soul.- Man is distinguished from animals by intelligence. The soul of the man is Self conscious. It knows itself not through the medium of the body but immediately and hence even after leaving the body it knows itself. It is independent entity and can have knowledge independently of senses and is consequently immortal, it is not a composite substance, but simple.

The Rational power has five distinct stages. He has greatly reduced the number of stages or states which the <sup>K</sup>Apkwan Ussafa multiplied so excessively. These stages, corresponding to Successive actuations, are:-

1. The Material intelligence or absolute potentiality of Knowledge.
- II. Possible intelligence - which recognises the First Principles of Knowledge.
- III. The Perfect intelligence - completely prepared to receive additional knowledge.
- IV. The Acquired intelligence in possession of this further knowledge.
- V. The Holy Spirit which has mystic vision and belongs only to the prophets and Saints.

In all its activity the Soul is guided by Intellect<sup>us</sup> <sup>Active</sup> ~~his~~ <sup>Active</sup> agents, or Achir Intellect. (Act-faal).

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Then he traces out the production of the world of  
 Souls differ widely in rank; the highest are endowed  
 with gifts of prophecy and perfected so far that they  
 attain the sphere of pure intelligence. A Soul of  
 this kind entering after death into eternal beatitude,  
 shared with its peers, continues along with them to  
 exercise a certain influence on terrestrial Souls."  
 This shows that the spirits of holy men shall take  
 interest in the affairs of this world and man can  
 communicate with them and can get their help in  
 spiritual affairs. The modern Spiritualists believe  
 that they can communicate with any soul, but Avicenna  
 maintains that only the Souls of holy persons can be  
 approached and that too if they are willing to do so.

Metaphysics - In his metaphysics Avicenna discusses the  
 problem of "Being" and the generation of the manifold  
 in the bosom of the 'Being'. He considers that the  
 existence of God cannot be demonstrated from his  
 design or workmanship but the contingency of the world  
 furnishes a good proof for His existence. Everything  
 in this world is of a possible nature and depends for  
 its existence on something else. Their existence of  
 a possible being <sup>is</sup> necessary only through ~~the~~ another  
 existence, which transcends all possibility, plurality  
 and mutability. This is God, the Absolute God; the  
 perfect Intelligence. Again he writes, "The good  
 is the desirable and that which is desirable for  
 itself is better than that which is desirable for the  
 sake of something else. Unless therefore, the Series  
 of causes be continued infinitely, there must be some  
 ultimate Good, desirable for itself and this must be  
 Divine Being".

Then The human souls  
 emanate from the Active Intellect in the same way as

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Then he traces out the production of the world of manifoldness from this Unity. From the First Being emerges the First Caused being, which has a Knowledge of the former. From this knowledge proceeds an Intelligence. Moreover the First Caused Being knows that it has been caused by the First Being and from this knowledge proceeds a Soul. The Soul must have a body to animate, so a body is produced. In this way the First spirit Soul and body are produced. This process goes on, each spirit producing another spirit, soul and body till the last spirit comes out. This <sup>is</sup> active the Intellect ~~and~~ <sup>which</sup> finishes the Series. The bodies which these spirits produce are those of Spheres. The first Sphere is that of Saturn then Jupiter. The procession goes on according to the descending <sup>astromical</sup> ~~astronomical~~ order of the day. The last Sphere is that of 'Moon'. The whole of this process takes place in timelessness in the substratum of matter. "Matter is the eternal and pure possibility of all that exists" As against Farabi he maintains that matter is not an outflow of the Soul but an eternal element coexisting with God, though "effected with absolute indifference to exist or not to exist"

Avicenna discusses the theory of the motion of the Spheres. "The <sup>circ</sup> ~~circ~~ular motion of the spheres has its ultimate ground and cause in the finality exercised by God, the intelligent soul of each sphere seeking the supreme Good, ~~by~~ the knowledge of which they are attracted." This world is governed by active Intellect the last of the pure intelligences. The Active Intellect is not a Psychological factor but a metaphysical principle, because from it proceed through the influence of heavenly motions all substantial forms which actuate subliminary matter. The human souls emanate from the active Intellect in the same way as

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all other terrestrial forms.

(c) God works with Physical necessity and not with freedom (d) In his theory of knowledge he could not comprehend everything in a universal manner and at the same time no attribute of any particular thing in Platonic intuition and emanation. The contents of the heavens or on earth is hidden from him." He is mind obtained from Active Intellect by the process of emanation are to be acquired again by the process of abstraction. He does not stand in need of any cause. He is necessary Being. He is eternally Perfect. His existence and Essence are one.

#### A Reaction against Greek Philosophy

The stars are not moved by God Himself but by the First World Spirit. In its knowledge of God and knowledge of self there arises duality and in its speculations on the Greek Philosophy. But along with production of spirit, soul and body arises multiplicity. There was a community of Orthodox thinkers who considered it an encroachment on the domain of

Avicenna forms the theory of Being as follows:

- 1 "All possibles cannot spring from one possible cause, on which their series mounts up infinitely.
- 2 "A series of causes finite in number cannot be possible in themselves and necessary to each other, so that they depend upon one another in a circle.
- 3 "Everything produced has a cause and every cause is determining.

This consequently signifies that all possibles must have cause, that causes are not linked together infinitely and do not return on themselves. Therefore the series of possible ends in the necessary Being - "De Ente."

Gha zali and others have greatly criticised Abi Sina for want of clearness in his essential and fundamental idea of the contingency of the things. He conceives it to be something approaching substantiality, distinct from 'being and existence.' Existence seems to come to 'being' from outside! Moreover his theory of Spheres does not seem to be convincing. He himself probably regards it as not proved.

Kalam, (Dialectics or Orthodox Philo/God cal

/Theology

(c) God works with Physical necessity and not with freedom (d) In his theory of knowledge he could not succeed in reconciling Aristotelian abstraction with Platonic intuition and emanation. The contents of mind obtained from Active Intellect by the process of emanation are to be acquired again by the process of abstraction.

A Reaction against Greek Philosophy

Ashari was the greatest man in the Caliphate; he was So far the Muslim philosophers based their speculations on the Greek Philosophy. But along with them there was a community of Orthodox thinkers who considered it an encroachment on the domain of religion and the introduction of unauthorised doctrines in Islam. The philosophers considered Aristotle and Plato as somewhat infallible and their teachings

mainly free from errors and so they tried to interpret the Quran in the light of the Greek thought. In the eyes of the Orthodox Moslems this was a great heresy, because it assigned an inferior position to the Prophet as compared with Plato and Aristotle. If the latter were perfect in wisdom and the knowledge of ultimate Reality and their teaching did not leave anything that was needed for the moral guidance of man, then what was the use of Islamic revelation. So they had to point out the shortcomings of the philosophers. But to pit revelation against reason did not serve their purpose. It is all very well as far as the believers are concerned, but for a critical thinker it was of no avail. So they had to fight the philosophers with

their own weapon. For this they formulated a new *Ilm* *Ibn* ul Kalam, (dialectics or Orthodox Philosophical

constitutes His decrees, His decisions, and His determinations, Theology), and they were consequently called "Muta-

There is no variation or change, that an  
Kallimin" They were not in close agreement among  
themselves on many points, but they were all agreed  
in demolishing the framework of the Greek Philosophy  
as interpreted by the Moslem Pro-Greek Philosophers. *He leads*

2 Mutkallemin were Ashari and Matriddi.

Al Ashari (873-935) was at first a Zealous  
Mutazapite, but when he was forty he suddenly declared  
his conversion from the old faith. "His theatrical  
manner and his eloquent words impressed the people.  
Ashari was the greatest man in the Caliphate; he was  
petted by the legalists, idolised by the populace, re-  
spected by the Caliph. He gave to the clerical party  
what they had long been wanting - a logical system, for  
the defence of patristic theology against the rationalistic  
conceptions of Mutazilafs, the philosophers and the Fat-  
imide Imams." - Amir Ali.

Ashari was a voluminous writer. He composed about  
one hundred works and two hundred pamphlets but only five  
have survived the wreck of time.

Shahristani, who wrote a history of the Philosophic  
Systems of the World in 1127, gives a summary of Ashari's  
views in his "Kitab ul Milal wa Nahal." It is better to  
quote him on this point:-

"He (Ashari) maintained that the attributes of the  
Deity are eternal and subsistent in His Essence, but they  
are not simply His Essence, rather they are additional to  
His Essence. . . . that God speaks by an eternal word  
and wills by an eternal will for it is evident that God is  
a Sovereign, and, as a sovereign, is one to whom it belongs  
to command and prohibit. So God commands and prohibits .  
. . . . that His ordering is eternal, subsistent in Him, a  
quality pertaining to Him; that the Will of God is indi-  
visible, eternal, embracing all things subject to volition,  
whether determinate actions of His own, or actions of His  
creatures - the latter so far as created by Him, not as  
they are their own actions by appropriation; that God wills  
all things morally, good and evil, beneficial and injurious;  
and as He both knows and wills, that He wills, on the part  
of His creatures, what He knows, and has caused to be

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registered in the "Memorial Book" - Which fore knowledge constitutes His decree, His decisions, and His determinations, therein there is no variation or change, that an appropriated action <sup>which is predestined to be done by created</sup> means an action ability, and which takes place under the condition of created ability..... God rules as a Sovereign over His creatures, doing what He wills and determining as He pleases; so that were He to cause all men to enter Paradise there would be no injustice, and if He were to send them all to Hell, there would be no wrong doing, because injustice is the ordering in respect to things which do not come within the sphere of the control of the orderer, or the inversion of the established relations of things, and God is the Absolute Sovereign on whose part no injustice is imaginable and to whom no wrong can be attributed..... and that nothing whatever is obligatory upon God by virtue of reason - neither that which is beneficial nor that which is most advantageous, nor gracious assistance..... and that the ground of (human) obligation is nothing which constitutes a necessity binding on God" <sup>ts.</sup> by Amirali. So we find that he is midway between fatalists and libertarians, Professor Macdonald sums up his position thus, "Man cannot create anything; God is the only creator, nor does man's power produce any effect on his actions at all. God creates in His creatures power and choice. Then He creates in him his actions corresponding to the power and choice thus created, so the action of the creature is created by God as to initiative and as to production; but it is acquired by the creature. By acquisition is meant that it corresponds to the creature's power and choice previously created in him without his having had the slightest effect on the action. He was only the locus or subject of the action."

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"So I said to myself, what I want is knowledge of the real nature of knowledge. It seemed to me, then, that certain knowledge is that which uncovers the thing known in such a way that there does not remain with it any doubt nor

Now we come to one of the most eminent persons in the Islamic world, that whose influence is still visible in Moslem India. This was Abn Hamid Mohd. Ghazali. Professor Macdonald writes about him,

"With the time came the man. He was Alghazali; the greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the history of Islam . . . . The equal of Augustine in Philosophical and theological importance. By his side the Aristotelian Philosophers of Islam, Ibn-i-Rushid and all the rest seem beggarly Compilers and Scholiasts."

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Claud Field remarks, "Alghazali is one of the deepest thinkers, greatest theologians and profoundest moralists of Islam. . . . Intimately acquainted with all the learning of his time, he was not only one of the numerous oriental philosophers who traverse every sphere of intellectual activity, but one of those rarer minds whose originality is not crushed by their learning." Ghazali was born at

Tabriz in the district of Tus in 1058. In his early childhood he was left an orphan, but one of his father's friends took upon himself the task of providing instruction for him. Later on he was admitted to a private school.

A few years after he joined the Nizamia College at Meshapur where he distinguished in the usual religious and Philosophical studies of the day. In the meantime his fame spread far and wide and he was soon appointed president of the Nizamia Academy of Baghdad. But notwithstanding all the worldly prospects his mind was restless.

From the very beginning search for reality was his sole object. What is it that is true and real. He would not believe in the truth of anything simply because he was taught so by his teachers or by the other people. He tried to go to the root of every problem.

How to arrive at a certainty about the human knowledge was the question which he now asked himself. He describes his inner experiences in his "muntahā min adalal" ( translated by Claud Field and partly by Macdonald )

Impression was made upon me and I desired some  
 "So I said to myself, what I want is knowledge of the real nature only of things, I must ask, therefore, what is the essence of knowledge. It seemed to me, then, that certain knowledge is that which uncovers the thing known in such a way that there does not remain with it any doubt nor accompany it the possibility of error or illusion, nor can the mind conceive such. Security from error must accompany the certain to such a degree that if the claim of ability to show its falsity is made by someone, for example, who can ~~form~~ a stone into gold or a staff into a serpent, that would not produce any doubt or denial. For when I know that ten is more than three, if someone says to me, 'no but three is more than ten and I will prove it by changing this staff into serpent' and he does change it and I see him do it, I do not doubt what I know because of that, and the only result for me is wonder as to how he could do such a thing, but never any doubt as to what I know.----- So I examined all the things which I ~~to know and found that I had no~~ knowledge which could be described in this way, except sense-perceptions and necessary intuitive knowledge -----So I must test these first ---- So I turned zealously to consider the object of sense and necessary knowledge and to try whether I could bring myself to doubt them. And doubt reached the point with me, that I could not permit myself to extend trust even to the object of the sense. Doubt as to them kept spreading and I said, "How can you be sure of object of sense while the stringent of the senses is vision and it looks at a shadow and sees the shadow standing unmoved and judges that there is no motion.-----In such cases, then, the senses, decide in one way but reason in another ----- So I said, "my trust in the objects of the senses, too, is gone, perhaps there can be no trust save in those intellectual results which ~~are animatic as our saying that 'ten is more than three' or that 'negation and affirmation cannot exist together in one thing.'~~ But the objects of the senses said, "what assurance have you that your trust in conclusions of reason is not like your trust in the object of the senses. You used to trust in me; then came the test of the reason and gave me the lie--- Then, perhaps, behind the perceptions of the reason there is another test; whenever it appears reason will be given the lie by it. That such a perception has not appeared does not prove its impossibility ----- Do not you see that in sleep you believe in certain things, and you imagine conditions and believe that they have reality and fixity and in that state you do not doubt them? Then you wake up and you know that to all your imaginations and beliefs there was neither foundation nor use. Then how are you sure that all which in your waking time you believe in, because of either sense or reason, is not fact simply in relationship to your then condition? ----- Perhaps the life of this world is asleep in relation to the other world and when a man dies things appear to him which are apposed to what he observes now." Then he

*animatic*

*Hume*

describes how he became a sceptic but unlike ~~them~~ his scepticism was of a short duration. To resume his own account he says, "When these things came to me a deep

Impression/

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impression was made upon me and I desired some treatment against them, but it was not easy. They could be refuted only by means of proof and no proof can be set up, except by combining primary facts of knowledge, but when these are not granted a proof cannot be put together. This disease troubled me and remained with me almost two months. During that time I was an absolute sceptic in mind, if not in statement. At length God healed me of that disease .... That was not by means of a proof or by any form of words, but by a light which God cast into my breast." (Trby Macdonald) So in order to

escape from the doubts of the Sense-perception and reason Ghazali took shelter behind mysticism. He leaves the objective world to indulge in subjective speculations and by that means tries to explain certain problems of metaphysics. He discusses mysticism in his book called Mishkat-ul-Anwar (Tr. by Gairdner).

In that he divides mankind into four classes viz.,

i. Those veiled with Veils of pure darkness

naturalist Philosophers and Egotists. ii. Those veiled with Veils of mixed Darkness and Light i.e. Worshippers of Idols, etc., Corporealists, Anthropomorphists, Karamites

Karamites, later Asharits etc. iii. Those veiled by pure light i.e. purged of all anthropomorphism. iv. The

unveiled who Attain <sup>knowledge</sup> i.e. i. Adepts who preserve self-consciousness in their Absorption <sup>tion</sup> in this Absolute, all else being effaced and the Adepts whose self-consciousness is also effaced. Some people are of opinion that Ghazali

was Pantheistic in his views, but a careful study of the book leads us to the conclusion that the preservation <sup>of</sup> the actuality of the created things and did not identify it with God, but he maintained that God is self subsistant

and the things are not so. "Being is itself divided into that which has being-in-itself and that which derives its being from not-itself. The being of this latter is borrowed, having no existence by itself. Nay, if it is regarded in and by itself it is pure not-being. What-ever being it has is due to its relation to not-itself, which is not real being at all."

Here/  
material/

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material, is a world sensual and a world intelligential,  
Here by unreal he means Conditioned and Relation.  
or a world supernal and a world inferior. All these ex-

Carra De Vaux writes, "Ghazali and the orthodox Sufis regarded ascetism as the ordinary means of attaining to Sceince, expecting ecstacy to follow naturally, after a more or less protracted interval, on exercising of ascetism. No such doctrine could be entertained by a Christian Philosopher. The idea that God can be tracked down as it were in the inner sanctuary of His presence by a stern perseverance in rigorous ascetism has no parallel outside India." There is much difference of opinion about this point and it will be discussed in connection with Hagwairi. (Mishkat-ul-Anwar).

According to Ghazali the Absolute, the ultimate Principle of all existence is 'Light'. "He alone is the Real, the True light and beside Him there is no light at all."

"Light is summed up in appearing and manifesting ----- for unless a thing is manifest itself it is not manifest to others." So manifestation constitutes ~~his~~ <sup>his</sup> very Essence and is not an attribute added to it. The affirmation of Light by necessity ~~points~~ <sup>points</sup> its own negation. There is no darkness so intense as the darkness of non-Being. To

quote again "Being is itself divided into that which has being in itself and that which derives its being from not-itself." So there is no dualism between Light and darkness as the Zoroastrianism supposed. 'For everything has two aspects, an aspect to itself and an aspect to its Lord, in respect of the first it is not being but in respect of the God-aspect, it is Being. Therefore there is no Existent except God. "The whole world is all filled with the external lights of perception and ~~the~~ internal light of intelligence; also the lower lights are effused or emanate the one from the other, as light emanates from a lamp; while the lamp itself is the transcendental Light of Prophecy; and that the transcendental spirits of Prophecy are lit from the Spirit Supernal as the lamp is lit from fire and that the Supernals are lit the one from the other and that their order is one of ascending grades: further, that these all rise to the light of lights, the Virgin of Fountain-head of lights and that is God." "Just as there is no deity but He, so there is no being but He for 'he' is an expression for something which one can indicate; but in every and any case we can but indicate Him'. 'The former is more general but the latter is more particular, and more comprehensive".

This kingdom of 'Oneness and Onliness' is the ultimate point of mortal's 'Ascent'.

Then Ghazali comes to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.

He maintains that the world is Two Worlds, spiritual and material/

material, is a world sensual and a world intelligential,  
 or a world supernal and a world inferior. All these ex-  
 pressions are near each other and the difference between  
 them is merely one of view point. . . . The visible world  
 is the point of departure up to the world of Realm Super\_nal  
 . . . the former has a correspondence with the latter . . .  
 there is not a single thing in this world of sense that is  
 not a symbol of something in yonder one."

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state the Souls will be either different in  
PSYCHOLOGY. in accidents. The Souls are not different  
from Ghazali discusses the question of the human Soul in  
"Hal-i-Masail-i-Ghamiza" wherein he maintains that the  
Soul is a spiritual substance incapable of division.  
In divisibility a part may be conscious and another  
part unconscious of the same object simultaneously,  
and this is impossible in the case of the Soul. It  
is not spacial because anything that occupies space  
cannot be called "indivisible". The Soul does not fill  
the body and is at the same time not outside the body  
because these terms can be applied only to the Corporeal  
substances and have no meaning in regard to the Soul.  
Its relation to the body is that of an image to the  
mirror. Just as a piece of iron when polished is  
capable of receiving images, so the particles of  
inanimate matter, passing through the vegetative state,  
enter the human body and are converted into blood and  
are thus rendered fit for the reception of the Soul at  
the proper time. In this way the body of an unborn child  
acts like a mirror. Its existence is not prior to the  
body to which it belongs. When the body is made the  
Soul comes into existence. Had the Soul any prior exist-  
ence, it would have been either one or many. The  
Soul cannot be a unity because after its connection with  
so many bodies it could either retain its unity for  
fear of leading to a common cognition, nor become many,  
because it has no magnitude and is consequently  
indivisible. Had there existed many Souls prior to  
their connection with the bodies, they must be either  
differentiated or undifferentiated. The latter is  
impossible because it means unity. As regards the  
borrowed his philosophy from Ghazali." This book is very  
popular even in these days in India. It appears that in  
this book Ghazali has mainly followed out al Qulub of Abu

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state the Souls will be either different in essence or different in accidents. The Souls are not different from each other substantially. As far as accidents are concerned they have no existence prior to Soul's connection with the body. From the above he concludes that a Soul has no existence prior to the body but is created when the body is made fit for its reception. It is pressed just like an image in a mirror. In his Mishkat Ul Anwar he grades human spirit as follows:- (1) Sensory Spirit- the recipient of the information brought in by the senses. (2) Imaginative Spirit-recorder of the information filed and ready to hand. It is not found in the infant at the beginning of its evolution.

(3) Intellectual Spirit- This apprehends ideas beyond the spheres of sense and imagination such as axioms of Cardinal virtues and the mean and in this he mainly necessary and Universal application

(4) The discursive Spirit- This takes the data of pure reason and combines them, arranges them as premisses and deduces from them informing knowledge and so on. (In these he follows Aristotle)

(5) The transcendental prophetic Spirit- This is the property of prophets and some saints. By it the Unseen tables and performance of works is not necessary but in order that statutes of the Law are revealed from the other world, together with several of the Sciences of the Realms an outward observance of law should be carried on. Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-eminently Theology, He lays greater stress on knowledge than volition. the Science of Deity, which the intelligentia and Knowledge gives rise to volition which leads to action. discursive Spirits cannot compass.

Ethics. Ghazali's book on Ethics called Ihya ul hlum is well known in the Islamic world. Lewis considers that if this book had been translated at the time of Descartes it would have been thought that Descartes borrowed his philosophy from Ghazali." This book is very popular even in these days in India. It appears that in this book Ghazali has mainly followed Qut ul Qulub of Abu

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Tali Makki. In most cases he had reproduced the very words of that book.

In Ihya Ulalim Ghazali has dealt with the subject matter very clearly explaining in a clear style the most difficult problems which the former philosophers expressed in so difficult and complicated a style that it was not easy for a layman to grasp them fully. The 'Kitab Ul Taharat' of Ibn-i-Maskawaih may be cited as an example of this type. But Ghazali's composition is very different from that. He is interesting both to the Philosopher and the Layman.

In Mizan Ul Amal he discusses the doctrine of Cardinal virtues and the mean and in this he mainly follows Aristotle, though here and there he combines his Arguments with mystic views. He maintains that actions and religious experience must go together. The former must be the manifestation of the latter. Religious knowledge is not applied in Action is useless. But when a man attains the state of perfection, performance of works is not necessary but in order that the other people may not be misled by his behaviour, an outward observance of law should be carried on. He lays greater stress on knowledge than volition. Knowledge gives rise to volition which leads to action. He differs from other Philosophers in holding that knowledge without action is worthless. By knowledge he means both religious and secular but not the knowledge of Reality. A man may study the scriptures

but the mere knowledge of the scriptures without  
/consequent  
The latter is more important than the former. Not to  
gretify an unplayful desire when a man has power

consequent actions resulting therefrom is of no use. Similarly the scientific knowledge that is not applicable to art or to the welfare of man is of no value.

He agrees with Asharites in maintaining that man should appropriate or assimilate the Divine Actions. Actions are good or bad in as much as they depend upon the free choice and free willing of the doer. But he does not consider a man to be absolutely free and so his actions are to be considered relatively. The material world is a world of necessity, only the Divine Will is absolutely free. The human will is midway between the world of nature and God and so may be called relatively free. God is omnipotent and acts as He likes. Though He can demand from men what is beyond their power yet He does not actually do so. He does not lay on any Soul any burden that is beyond its power. Moreover He is not bound to have a regard for the Welfare of the people but He sends them prophets and Saints for their Guidance.

There are two kinds of creations viz., 1. Incapable of growth. 2. Capable of growth. Gold is gold and does not become anything else. But an acorn becomes an oak or a child grows into a man. He believes that a child is born good by nature and so he has the capacity of developing a good moral disposition, hence the necessity for a sound moral training. Moral training simply means the bringing out what is hidden in the child.

Divine Service is both positive and negative. The former means the performance of good works and the latter consists in the Self control and abandonment of Sin. The latter is more important than the former. Not to gratify an un<sup>w</sup>lawful desire when a man has power

to do so is more meritorious than the performance of any ceremonials enjoined by the Law.

He discusses the question of marriage and celibacy in Ihya Ul Alum. It appears at first that he favours the latter and considers it intrinsically better, but in a later passage he prefers marriage to celibacy. To live in the world with all its storms and furies and to guide the ship of life safely to an anchor shows greater worth in a man than the life of peace and repose in a secluded part of the jungle. Then he finally decides that each case is to be judged on its own merits. He maintains that man can attain to moral perfection in this world. The prophets were perfect men and a man has to follow their example. "Man's perfection," he says, "consists in reproducing the characteristics of God and in adorning himself with the true essence of His attributes." In his heart the man is the image of God but with corruption the heart becomes rusty and does not reflect the Divine light. The sheikh or a saint can then lead him out of his pitiable condition.

"The aim of moral life is not the attainment of paradise or an escape from hell but to make oneself a perfect man."

Perhaps Ghazali's importance <sup>is</sup> mainly in his attack on Pro-Greek philosophers. These people had interpreted the Quran in the light of Greek thought, but Ghazali maintained that this interpretation was against the real teaching of the Quran. He considered the Greek thought to be defective and the interpretation of the holy book in the light of that

Ghazali?

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The importance of this book can be judged from the fact that Averroes had to compose a treatise "The Destruction of the Destruction of the Philosophers" to uphold the doctrine of the Philosophers. thought would naturally lead the followers to fall into heresy. So he came out to dethrone Aristotle and Plato from the position they held in the Moslem World. In order to make himself sure that he understood correctly the teaching of Greek philosophers he composed a book called Maqasidul Falasafa in which he gives a summary of the views of the Pro-Greek philosophers. This book deals with all the branches of philosophy. Then he took up the task of refuting their arguments one by one. With this aim in view he wrote his well-known book "Tahafat Ul Filasafa" (The Destruction of the Philosophers). It may be said that in this Ghazali acted like Kant in demolishing the shallow rationalism of his time, but unlike Kant he often takes shelter behind mystic experiences. The main points of attack are as follow:-

- a. The philosophers' claim that matter is eternal is false.
- b. According to their accepted principles God cannot be the creator of the world.
- c. They fail to prove the existence, the unity, the simplicity, the incorporeality or the knowledge (both of species and accidents) of God.
- d. Their description of the deity as demiurgos is unspiritual.
- e. They cannot prove the ascription of the souls to the celestial spheres.
- f. Their theory of causation, which attributes effects to the very nature of the causes, is false.
- g. They cannot prove the spirituality of the soul nor prove its immortality.
- h. They are wrong in not believing in Resurrection of the bodies.

The importance of this book can be judged from the fact that Averroes had to compose a treatise., "The Destruction of the Destruction of the Philosophers" to uphold the doctrine of the Philosophers. p. 102.

We have given a brief outline of the history which the Muslim had brought to India. We have seen how the Muslim philosophers and theologians turned the tide of Moslem thought into the channel of Mysticism. So far a long time Sufism was the acknowledged creed of the learned men of the Moslem world. With the coming of Islam in India mysticism found a fertile ground in the newly converted Hindus who learned the doctrine of Ghazali with a zeal which was no less marked than that of the Persian and Tartar Muslims. In fact the history of Islamic thought in India is more or less a history of mysticism. Philosophy made no advance in any direction other than this. To separate philosophy and religion in the East is an impossible task. So far our data we have to rely upon the mystical teaching of the Saints and theologians. During the whole of the Moslem rule in India we find the rulers and the wealthy people patronising the man of learning and talents, but as there is the whole history we find anyone coming forward with purely metaphysical speculations apart from what can be gathered here and there in theological discussions and poetic expressions. The patrons cared more for literature than philosophy. But any work of literary merit must have something to say about. In the case of the poets have left their work where it was, and by no means less than the above their thought to be behind the veil of externality and intellectuality and penetrate deeper and deeper into that of spirituality and intuition, where as the words of Rumi "Understanding waves and people divided into water currents by that 'Sea of Light' at once the fountain and the termination of all that true knowledge".

The first of the mystic saints to settle down in India was Abu Hasan Ali Nadwi. He was a native of Ghazni in

ISLAMIC CULTURE IN INDIAHAJWAIRI

We have given a brief outline of the culture which the Muslims had brought to India. We have seen from the pure pro Greek philosophical speculations Ghazali and Ashairas had turned the tide of Moslem thought into the channel of Mysticism. So for a long time Sufism was the acknowledged creed of the learned men of the Moslem world. With the coming of Islam in India mysticism found a fertile ground in the newly converted Hindus who welcomed learned the doctrine of Ghazali with a zeal which was no less marked than that of the Persian and Tartar Moslems. In fact the history of Islamic thought in India is more or less a history of mysticism. Philosophy made no advance in any direction other than this. To separate philosophy and religion in the East is an impossible task. So for our data we have to rely upon the mystical teaching of the Saints and theologians. During the whole of the Moslem rule in India we find the rulers and the wealthy people patronising the man of learning and talents, but no where in the whole history we find anyone coming forward with purely metaphysical speculations apart from what can be gathered here and there in theological discussions and poetic expressions. The patrons cared more for literature than philosophy. But any work of literary merit must have something to say about. In this way some of the poets have left fine work where guided by an inspiration from the above their thought leaves behind the realm of externality and intellectuality and penetrates deeper and deeper into that of spirituality and intuition, where in the words of Carlyle "Understanding waves and recoils dazzled into utter darkness by that "Sea of Light" at once the fountain and the termination of all ~~time~~ true knowledge".

The first of the mystic saints to settle down in India was Abu Hasan Ali bin Usman Haywairi. He was a native of Ghazini in Afghanistan,

Hajwairi

Afghanistan . He was born in the last decade of the tenth or the first decade of the eleventh century and died between 1072 and 1076. So for a short time he was a contemporary of Ghazali. His teaching <sup>er, in i</sup> Sufism (mysticism) ~~where~~ were Abul Faiz Mulhammad and ~~Abu~~ Abbas Ahmady. He was a great traveller and travelled all over the Islamic world and finally came to India where he settled down permanently. He was held in great respect not only by his contemporaries but by the Majority of Muslims of the later time as well. His tomb in Lahore is visited by thousands of ~~people~~ people every year.

As regards his writings he composed a number of works on various subjects . Apart from his poetical works he had (1) 'Minhajuddin' on the method of Sufism (2) Asra~~q~~ Ul Khira~~q~~ Wal Maunat or the patched frocks of Sufis (3) Kitabul fana wal Baga on annihilation and existence (4) Life <sup>n</sup> Mansura bin Hallaj (5) Kit abul Bayan li ahl al Iyan on union with God (6) Bahr ul Qulub on Sufism (7) Al Riayat ~~sixiyar~~ li Haq~~u~~ ullah on the divine <sup>unity</sup> trinity etc. But all these works have been lost . His only extant work is Kashful Mahjub (unveiling of the veiled) composed during his stay at Lahore. This book has been translated into English by Prof. Nicholson and gives us an idea of what Sufism meant in those times. *(I have made up this translation in the following)* It not only gives the views of the Author but also the ~~tea~~ <sup>te</sup>chings of the various schools of thought in Sufism and in this way is a valuable help in understanding <sup>it</sup> Islamic mysticism from various points of view. After studying this book I do not think there is any need of studying further literature on India, Sufism. Hajwairi in discussing the problem of knowledge quotes the Sphists who deny the possibility of knowledge. He says " There is a sect of heretics called Sophists who believe that nothing can be known and that knowledge itself does not exist I say to them " You think that nothing can be known ; is your opinion correct or not"?. If they answer ' it is correct ' they hereby affirm the reality of knowledge and

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and if they reply ' it is not correct ' then to argue against an avowedly incorrect assertion is absurd. But knowledge consists of knowing something or we may say knowledge consists of knowing "truth". At the highest level it consists in knowing the ultimate truth.

Here Wajwairi ~~denies~~ <sup>denies</sup> that all men by their essence can know the 'truth'. One man is veiled ~~by~~ <sup>from</sup> the truth by his essence so that in his view truth and falsehood are the same.

Another man is veiled from the Truth by his attributes so that his nature and heart continually seek the Truth and flee from falsehood. Therefore the veil of essence is never removed. "

Consciousness is of two kinds, viz Human consciousness and Divine Consciousness. ' God's ' knowledge is an attribute of Himself, subsisting in Him whose attributes are infinite.

Our knowledge is an attribute of ourselves subsists in us, whose attributes are finite.

God knows all things existent and non-existent. (This means that Reality existed in God's mind as an idea from eternity and this Idea is actualised in existence) In fact the ~~distinction~~ between existence and non existence does not apply to this knowledge. His knowledge is absolute free from the limitations of finite minds. He does not share His knowledge with man. So man's knowledge ~~is being relative~~ differs from God's knowledge <sup>+</sup> is not capable of division nor separable from Him.

Man's knowledge may be sub-divided into (1) Knowledge of the Physical (2) Knowledge of the Spiritual. The highest level of the latter, is the knowledge of "Truth". This has three pillars viz I Knowledge of the Essence of God 'II' Knowledge of the attributes of God 'III' Knowledge of the Actions and Wisdom of God which includes the knowledge of the Physical. In a sense Hajwairi is correct. All man's knowledge is a knowledge of God that is to say it is a particular determination

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determination of man's knowledge of the Infinite. But it does not follow that man is able to discover His Perfections as they are in themselves.

"Knowledge of Divine Essence involves recognition that God exists externally by His Essence, that He is infinite and not bounded by space, that His Essence is not the cause of the evil, that none of His creatures are like Him.

God has attributes existing in Himself which are not He or part of Him i.e. Knowledge, power, Life Will etc. God is the creator of mankind and of all their Actions " This means that God has given man power to act. But Hajwairi believes <sup>in</sup> ~~if~~ predestination " He brought the non-existent universe into being, he predistines good and evil and creates all that is beneficial and injurious i.e physical good and evil.

Comparing with Western mysticism we find that according to St. Gregory ( as interpreted by Mr. Dudden) "God's nature is the object of the knowledge of the angels and blessed spirits, and sometimes of mortal men, raised in contemplation, but God's Essence can be <sup>known</sup> knowledge only by Himself and cannot be the object of the knowledge of any created intelligence" But other interpretations <sup>of St. Gregory</sup> do not interpret St. Gregory in this way.

Then Hajwairi discusses the various theories of the mystics as to how ~~the~~ knowledge of Truth is attained. The Chief Sources considered are :--- 1. Intellect - 2. Intuition 3. Inspiration 4. Right Feeling.

This may correspond to the 'Reason' Intuition which is partly grounded in instincts, feeling and desires' and testimony of modern methodology .

He denies that knowledge of Truth can be obtained by intellect or reason. He writes " The <sup>u</sup> ~~Mit~~ /zalites assert that gnosis is intellectual and that only a reasonable person can possibly have it. According to this **critarion** madmen and children must be without gnosis. If reason were the cause of gnosis it would follow that every reasonable person must know

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know God, and all that lack reason must be ignorant of Him, which is manifestly absurd. Others pretend that 'demonstration' is the cause of knowledge of God and that such knowledge is not gained except by those who deduce it in this manner. But soundness of reason and regard to evidences are a means to gnosis but not the cause thereof" --- What is not God is phenomenal and although a phenomenal being may reach another like himself, he cannot reach his Creator and acquire Him while he exists, for in every act of acquisition he who makes the acquisition is predominant and the thing acquired is under his power. Accordingly the miracle is not that reason should be led by the act to affirm the existence of the Agent, but that a Saint should be led by the light of Truth to deny his own existence. The knowledge gained is in the one case a matter of logic, in the other it becomes an inward experience. Let those who deem reason to be the cause of gnosis consider what reason affirms in their minds concerning the **substance** of gnosis for gnosis includes the negation of whatever is affirmed by reason i.e. Whatever notion of God can be formed by reason God is in reality something different. To infer the existence of God from intellectual proofs is assimilation and to deny it on the same ground is nullification. Reason cannot pass beyond these two principles which in regard to gnosis is agnosticism"

So Hajwairi maintains that madmen and children can have a knowledge of God. But we in our present state of knowledge cannot admit the truth of this statement. Moreover the acquisition of the knowledge of a thing does not mean the acquisition of the thing itself. 'A' may have a knowledge of 'B' but it does not mean that 'A' has 'B' in his power. It is true that a complete knowledge of Reality by a finite mind will make the reality finite but it does not follow that a finite mind cannot have a partial knowledge of God.

However it would be better to see what the Western thinkers say on this point. Plotinus would say that that

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that Reminiscence would impart only inferior knowledge ,  
because it implies separation between the subject and the  
object. Ecstasy is superior - being the absolute realisation  
of their identity. Plotinus does not exclude reason totally  
but subordinate, it is ecstasy when the Absolute is concerned .  
He affirms a God beyond reason and then a faculty beyond  
reason to discern that God withal.

Bergson says " Our intellect in the narrow sense of the  
word, is intended to secure the perfect fitting of our body  
to its Environment , to represent the relation of external  
things among themselves - in short to think matter" It is at  
home with solids and inert things , it sees all becoming  
as being, as a series of states, it misses the connective  
tissue of things, the Real Life.

2. Inspiration. Hajwairi continues , " Others declare  
again that gnosis is the result of inspiration . This also  
is impossible because gnosis supplied a criterion for distin-  
-guishing truth from falsehood, whereas the inspired has no  
such criterion. This view is held by Brahmans" Man has to  
take for granted what is given in inspiration or revelation.  
To test inspiration he must have recourse to intellect, the  
validity of which Hajwairi does not admit in gnosis. More-  
-over inspiration is mainly meant as a guide for the people  
to regulate their conduct according to a certain pattern. It  
reveals God as an object of worship.

3. Others assert that knowledge of God is intuitive  
(A man has a faculty or a capacity by which he can come into  
direct telepathic communication with God. Empirical or  
individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight  
or essential intuition, the object of which is the correspond-  
-ing pure essence or eidos.) This also is impossible .  
Everything that is known in this way must be known in common  
by all reasonable men and in as much as some reasonable men  
deny the existence of God, it is proved that knowledge of God  
is not intuitive. Some aspirants to Sufism considering the  
absolute certainty which they feel declare, " We know God  
intuitively/

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intuitively, giving the name intuition to this certainty. Substantially they are correct, but their expression is erroneous, because intuitive knowledge cannot be exclusively restricted to those who are perfect; on the contrary it belongs to all reasonable men. The agnostic while he remains a gnostic has no fear of being separated from God. Separation is produced by the loss of gnosis, but intuitive knowledge cannot be conceivably lost.

The intuitive faculty of Plotinus, the Intellectuelle Anschauung of Schelling, the Intuitive Reason, Search of Ideas and Absolute truths, the Organ of Philosophy and theology of Coleridge, helps a man to behold God directly. According to Schelling, it is the realisation of the identity of Subject and Object in the individual. In this he is blended with that identity of subject and object which is called God. From the centre of their identity he in a way, thinks Divine thoughts and looks at the things from their point of view.

According to Emerson he becomes recipient of the Universal Soul. "He loses" according to Coleridge, "the particular in the Universal Reason, finds that ideas appear within him from an internal source supplied by the Logos or external world of God, and infallible utterance from the divine Original of man's highest nature." But one may object that instead of being a Universal truth, it is merely clothing the particular with a kind of Divine authority. Is there any certainty that it does not give us creating<sup>n</sup> ~~fancy~~ <sup>or</sup> flights of imagination or personal idiosyncracies.

(4) Right Feeling. ~~The~~ Hajwairi states that "when reason has gone as far as possible and the souls of His lovers must need search for Him, they grow restless and stretch their hands in supplication and seek relief for their souls and when they have exhausted every manner of search in their power ("Seek and Ye shall find"—The Bible) the power of God becomes their i.e. they find a way from Him

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to Him and set foot in the garden of intimacy. God causes man to know Him through Himself with a knowledge that is not linked to any faculty, a knowledge in which the existence of man is merely metaphorical. Hence the agnostic egoism is utter perfidy and his remembrance of God is without forgetfulness and his gnosis is <sup>not</sup> empty word but actual feeling.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas there are three ways of acquiring knowledge :--

(a) " In the state after the Fall we need a kind of mirror in which to see a likeness of God, for we know him only through His creatures. (b) In the state of innocence God was seen by a spiritual Light, flowing upon man's mind from the Divinity, which was an express likeness of the uncreated Light (c) But in heaven not even this means is necessary, but God's own essence is the means by which it is seen. But St. Thomas adds that the second kind of Knowledge is still given to man in contemplation. (Chapman).

Like Hajwairi both Plotinus and Proclus maintain that the highest revelation concerning Divine things is given to the Soul which becomes dead to all and withdraws into itself. Similarly Dionysius exhorts Timothy, " by assiduous practice in mystical contemplation to abandon the senses and all operative<sup>ness</sup> of the intellect; ~~and all~~ & All objects of thoughts; all things non-existent and existent and ignorantly to strive upwards towards union as close as possible with Him who is above all Essence and knowledge " De Mystica Theologia.

Eckart's 'Spark of the Soul' is the same as ~~the~~ "The Intuition of Plotinus" By this, one can merge oneself into the Unchangeable by transcending the "Sensible". But at this height God is an abstraction, above being and above attributes. Plotinus maintains that such moments are few and far between, while for Eckart this realisation of oneness with God is habitual.

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For Hegel 'thought' brings about an unity between human nature and Divine. - Both God and man are unconscious of themselves till thought has been developed into a philosophical system. Against Hajwairi Hegel maintains that when this knowledge which claims to be essential and ignores apprehension professes to have sunk the peculiarity of Self in the Essence and so to give forth the utterance of a hallowed and unerring philosophy, men quite overlook the fact that this so-called wisdom, instead of being yielded up to the influence of Divinity by its contempt of all proportion and definiteness does really nothing but give full play to accident and caprice. Such men imagine that by surrendering<sup>or</sup> themselves to the unregulated ferment of the Substance, by throwing a veil over consciousness and abandoning the understanding, they become those favourites of the Deity, to whom he gives wisdom in sleep; verily nothing was ever produced by such a process better than mere dreams" - Phenomenologia

In the next chapter we shall see the nature of mystical experience. Meanwhile we continue Hajwairi's statement about God. "God is one but His unity is not a number so as to be made two by the predication of another number, He is not finite so as to have six directions. He has no space and is not in space so as to require the predication of space; He is not the accident so as to need a substance, nor a substance which cannot exist without another like itself, nor a natural constitution in which motion and rest originate, nor a spirit so as to need a frame, nor a body so as to be composed of limbs; He does not become ~~immanent~~ <sup>immanent</sup> in things, for then he must be homogeneous with them. He is not joined to anything for then that thing must be part of Him; He is free from all imperfections, and exalted above all defects;

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He has no like so that He and His creatures make two;  
He has no child, whom begetting would necessarily cause  
Him to be a stock; His essence and attributes are unchange-  
-able; He is Living, Knowing, Forgiving, Merciful, Willing  
Powerful, Hearing, Speaking and Subsistent. His knowledge  
is not a state in Him, nor His power solidly planted in  
Him, nor His speech divided in Him; He together with his  
attributes exists from eternity; object of cognition are  
not outside His knowledge, entities are entirely dependent  
on His will; He does that which he has willed and wills  
that which He has known and no creature has cognizance  
thereof; His decree is an absolute fact; He is the  
Sole predestinator of good and evil; He creates all  
benefit and injury; He <sup>alone</sup> above gives judgment and His  
judgment is all wisdom; no one has any possibility of  
attaining unto Him; assimilation is inadmissible.  
Such terms as confronting and seeing face to face cannot  
be applied to His Being.

In this chapter on Sufism he discusses the origin of the word Sufism. He takes the following interpretations (1) One who wears a woollen garment (2) One who is in the first rank (3) One who belongs to the people of Saffa (4) One who is pure. He differs from the modern writers in assigning the last named as the true meaning of the word Sufi, ~~which~~ as against the first one. So he maintains that a true Sufi is one that leaves the impurity behind.

"Purity is the attribute of those who love, and the lover is he who is dead in his own attributes and lives in the attributes of his beloved"

Again, "When a man has escaped from the captivity of "stations" and gets rid of the impurity of States and is liberated from the abode of change and decay and becomes endowed with all praiseworthy qualities. His presence with God has no end and his existence has no cause. And when he arrives at this degree, he becomes annihilated in this world and the next, and is made divine in the disappearance of humanity. "Purity is a resplendent and manifest idea and Sufism is an imitation of that idea. The Author then quotes the opinion of the various Shaykhs about Sufism. They look upon it from different points of view.

Zunn.. <sup>un</sup> "A Sufi " says nothing which he is not".

Junayd. "The essence of Sufism is an attribute of God and its formal system is an attribute of mankind i.e. its essence involves the annihilation of human qualities, which is brought about by the everlastingness of Divine qualities and this is an attribute of God; whereas its formal system involves on the part of man the continuance of Self mortification and this is an attribute of man, or in another sense in real unification there are no human attributes at all, because human attributes are not constant, but are only formal, having no permanence, for God is the Agent.. Therefore they are really

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are really the attributes of God.

"A Mystic is one who has transcended every ascent of every holy height and has left behind all divine lights and sounds and heavenly discoverings, and has passed into that Darkness where He is really who is above all things."  
De Mystica Theologia.

Abul Hassan. :-- "Sufism is the renunciation of all Selfish pleasures". If one renounces a pleasure and finds pleasure in the renunciation, this is a formal renunciation, but if the pleasure renounces him, then the pleasure is annihilated, and this is the act of God.

"Sufi is he who has nothing in his possession ~~and~~ is himself possessed by anything". This denotes the essence of annihilation, since one whose qualities are annihilated neither possesses nor is possessed. Whoever becomes blind to Self sees by means of God because the seeker of phenomenon is also a self seeker.

Shibli:- Sufism is polytheism because it is the guarding of the heart from the vision of the "other" and the 'other' does not exist. That is to say, vision of 'other' than God in affirming the unity of God, is polytheism and when 'other' has no value in the heart it is absurd to guard the heart from the remembrance of 'other' Human existence is other, when a man does not see "other" he does not see himself and becomes totally void of Self whether Self is affirmed or denied.

Then Hajwairi concluded that the object of all these expressions is that ~~that~~ the Sufi state of mortality should entirely lapse and that his bodily feelings should disappear and his connection with everything be cut off, in order that the mystery of his mortality may be revealed and his various parts united in his essential self and that he may <sup>submit</sup> ~~submit~~ through and in himself.

Let us see here how the Western thinkers define mysticism:--

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July. "Love of God is mysticism "(Psychologia De Saints)

Louismet. "Mysticism is only the Christian life lived  
on a high level!"

Harnack "Mysticism is Roman Catholic piety in  
extreme form"

Sharp. "A (conscious) direct contact with the Soul  
with Transcendental Reality"

Evelyn Underhill. "The establishing conscious relations  
with the Absolute"

Rufus Jones. "The Soul's possible union in this  
life with Absolute Reality."

The mediaeval thinkers give a somewhat similar view to  
Hajwairi :-

St. Gregory. "(Mysticism) is a struggle wherein the  
mind disengages itself from the things of the world  
and fixes its attention wholly on spiritual things, and  
thereby raises itself above itself and by ~~direct~~ dint  
of a great effort mounts up to a momentary perception  
of the "Unencompassed Light" as ~~through~~ a chink and  
then exhausted by the effort and blinded by the vision  
of the light, it sinks back wearied to its normal state,  
to recuperate its spiritual strength by exercising the  
works of the active life, till in due time it can again  
brace itself for the effort of another act of contemplation.

St. Augustine. "If the tumult of the flesh were hushed,  
hushed the sense-impressions of the earth, sea and sky, hushed  
also the heavens yea the very soul be hushed to herself.....  
..... Were not this : Enter into the joy of thy Lord"

"God, through the Holy Ghost, inclines Himself towards  
us and thereby we are touched in Love. And our spirit by  
God's working and by the power of Love, presses and inclines  
itself into God, and thereby God is touched.....This makes  
each of the spirits (God's as well as man's) yearn for the  
other in love. This makes the lovers melt into each other"

(Adornment

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(Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage Bk II)

The following passage will give us an idea of the extent to which the Soul is absorbed in God in Christian Mysticism:- "As melted balm that no longer has formness and solidity, the Soul lets herself pass or flow into what she loves .... she gently glides as a fluid thing into the Divinity whom she loves ... being wholly mingled with, absorbed and engulfed in, her God".

(St. Francis of Sales)

A Mystic is one who has transcended every ascent of every holy height and has left behind all divine lights and sounds and heavenly discoverings and have passed into that Darkness where He really is who is above all things. De Mystica Theologia.

Now we give the chief characteristics of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian mysticism.

Hindu

- (1) It lays claim to disinterested love.
- (2) It reacts against the Ceremonial prescriptions of the Vedas
- (3) It identifies subject and object
- (4) It aims at ultimate absorption of the individual into God after many births and rebirths.
- (5) It develops the idea of Personal God as an object of love ~~at a later date.~~
- (6) It breaks from the barrier of Caste and Class distinction slowly.

Muslim. 1. It lays stress on the conformation with the ceremonials.

2. It does not identify subject and objects.

3. It maintains subsistence after annihilation

4. It does not believe in total merging of the essence of the Soul in Divine Essence.

5. It does not undervalue the manifestation of God in nature.

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CHRISTIAN.

(1) It heaps up negative terms like "Darkness," "Void," "Nothingness", instead of "Light and Fullness".

(2) It treats mysticism in a speculative and philosophical manner according to the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.

(3) It has many mystics among the fair sex and they have more visions than men.

(4) The Devil figures largely in the stories of the mystics.

(5) It believes in complete absorption of the Soul into Deity, though temporarily.

(6) It looks at the Personality of God more clearly than any other form of mysticism.

assumption of the uniformity of nature. Where it appears that the normal working of the laws of nature is hindered, we try to discredit the phenomenon, or we try to explain the discrepancy by physical laws. We give it the name of Psychical Research. Telepathy - Clairvoyance - Apparitions and many others are instances of this process. We do not call them supernatural phenomena, but super-normal. Even if the phenomena, which we call supernatural, do occur, we believe that they belong to more extended order of nature than modern, orthodox science now recognises. So it is of utmost importance that they should be investigated scientifically, and not accepted blindly.

Prof. Sedgwick says:-

"We are all agreed that the present state of things is a scandal to the enlightened age in which we live. That the dispute as to the reality of these marvellous phenomena - of which it is quite impossible to exaggerate the scientific importance, if only a tenth part of what has been alleged by generally credible witnesses could be shown to be true - I say it is a scandal that the dispute as to the reality of these

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MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

This is an age of science. By observing and experimentally experimenting on the contents of the world presented to us in experience, we try to discover the cause of the things. Our conclusions and results are again verified in experience. This method is useful as far as the material world goes. But we are apt to apply the scientific methods to things spiritual as well, for with us nothing is so certain as the conclusion arrived at by a scientific method. The people in old times had much reliance on authority. Now authority is giving way to reason. The scientific method seems to us more reasonable than revelation and inspiration. It is based on the assumption of the uniformity of nature. Where it appears that the normal working of the laws of nature is hindered, we try to discredit the phenomenon, or we try to explain the discrepancy by physical laws. We give it the name of Psychical Research. Telepathy - Clairvoyance - Apparitions and many others are instances of this process. We do not call them supernatural phenomena, but super-normal. Even if the phenomena, which we call supernatural, do occur, we believe that they belong to more extended order of nature than modern, orthodox science now recognises. So it is of utmost importance that they should be investigated scientifically, and not accepted blindly. Prof. Sedgwick says:-

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(phenomena)

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phenomena should still be going on, that so many competent witnesses should have declared their belief in them, that so many others should be so profoundly interested in having the question determined, and yet that the educated world, as a body, should still be simply in the attitude of incredulity".

As far as the number of witnesses is concerned, the above remarks can equally well be applied to mystical experience. In every country, every nation of the world we find a trace of this kind of experience. The number of persons who had mystical experience in their life is so great that we cannot set it aside as simply absurd. But the difficulty is that we cannot investigate it like other super-normal phenomena<sup>st</sup> by any known scientific method, because we hardly find any person in modern times who lays claim to mystical experience, and at the same time, is willing to undergo a scientific test. This experience is of a peculiar nature and those who have it do not care for the world or its tests. But still from the sayings and utterances of the mystics, we shall try to investigate it as far as we can. We will confine our attention to Muslim mystics only. We must strip ourselves of all prejudices. As a matter of fact, opposition to mystical experience among certain people is based chiefly upon the inner conviction that such things cannot happen, therefore they do not happen. They do not, and cannot fit into the particular scheme of the universe held true by the individual, and so rather than alter his philosophy, he prefers to ignore and deny the facts. The standpoint from which we may begin our investigation is this: let us begin by disbelieving everything except facts. Let us investigate these without religious prejudice, on the one hand, or scientific prejudice on the other.

It is a fact that we have ample record of mystical

(experience)

experience, in the writings of the Sufis saints and their disciples. We have to see how far we can believe these records to be true. There is no doubt that Oriental mind is much given to exaggeration. A disciple would not fail to make much of the experience of his Shaykh and present it in a more favourable light than it naturally warrants. Much also depends upon the capacity of the writer to observe carefully the phenomenon under consideration, and very few people have this capacity. Moreover, there has been so much fraud, especially in modern times, that one does not know whom to believe. But because there is much fraud, this does not by any means prove that there are not also genuine cases. Mystical experience has been reported from nearly every part of the world. Throughout ancient and medieval history the same story has been told, again and again. If there were no substratum of reality behind this, how comes it about that such similar accounts are given in every country, and in all stages of world's history? This makes us believe that such a phenomenon does exist. There is much truth in the saying "Where there is so much smoke there must be a fire". Instead of discussing the nature of this experience, we must first see what are the outward manifestations and what facts accompany such an experience. The first is the loss of touch with the world of sense. When a man experiences a vision of God, he is dead to the outer world. The world of manifoldness does not make any impression on him. How to explain this? A medical materialist would call it by the name of Catalepsy. Dr Franz Hartman says; -

"There seems hardly any limit to the time during which a person may remain in a trance; but catalepsy is due to some obstruction in the organic mechanism of the body on account of its exhausted nervous power. In the last case the activity of life begins again as soon as

the impediment is removed, or the nervous energy has recuperated its strength".

But there is some difference between a mystic trance and catalepsy. In the latter the body becomes rigid, and the subject seems dead. The pulse gets very feeble and there hardly seems any sign of life. The mystic does not show signs of lifelessness. There have been cases of catalepsy where the patient under some kind of excitement sang songs and uttered exclamatory phrases, but they were connected with hysteria, and there is a great difference between hysteria and mystical trance. Only the women are subject to the former. When a man recovers from catalepsy he feels very weak and depressed, and has no knowledge of having experienced anything in his unconsciousness, while a mystic remembers and feels his union with God. He is cheerful and optimistic. Catalepsy is due to nervous derangement, and though it is true that some sufis, by self mortification weaken their bodily health, yet in many other cases the subject of such experience has no bodily disease, and is capable of enjoying the normal life like other persons. Unconsciousness of a subject may also be distinguished from an epiletic fit. The latter shows a regularity in the way in which they come, and also in contortions and convulsions. The same is not the case with superunconsciousness. We may also refer to the cases of insanity. It is very difficult to distinguish between an insane and "Majzub". But I think fits of insanity do not come too often. When a man recovers from insanity he may be quite well for a long time, and if he is again subject to insanity, there is less likelihood of his recovering again. But a sufi has such like attacks very often, and between the intervals he is quite normal. From the above, it will be clear that Sufi's abnormal state is not due to any bodily disease or nervous disorder.

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Further further (Psychology pp 457-42) describes the phenomenon of double personality, to illustrate functioning of mental state to semi-conscious or reflex nerve processes. He does not believe in double personality

working upon... Each of them can move his hands  
 Again, sometimes the Sufis in union with God do not  
 lose their consciousness, and it is said that in that  
 state they behave as if they are quite a different person.  
 A modern scientist would explain this phenomenon by the  
 hypothesis of multiple personality. But it does not affect  
 the validity of mystic experience. The older conception  
 of human personality was that it consisted in a sort of  
 sphere ; a single invisible being (Plato as we know, used  
 this as a proof of the immortality of the soul). Modern  
 scientists are, however, of opinion that the human mind  
 is capable of being split up into various "selves" at  
 times, when a certain disintegration takes place - often  
 as the result of some emotional shock. These "selves"  
 represent entirely different personalities, with widely  
 different tastes, ambitions, likes and dislikes. In this  
 sense the Sufi may be said to have different personalities  
 but there is one difference. In double personality the  
 subject does not remember anything of <sup>one</sup> state, while he  
 is in another state. These two states are quite closed  
 from each other. This is not the case with the sufi. For  
 him these are the different states of one self. It is  
 true that both sufis state and the state of double  
 personality are caused by some kind of emotion. Just as in  
 television, premonitions etc. and Hajwairi has quoted a  
 the emotional state of anger one forgets oneself for the  
 moment, so in double personality one forgets ones' former  
 self. But the difference between the two shown above  
 makes them quite distinct from each other. In fact our  
 knowledge of dual personality is still in its infancy, and  
 we cannot say much about it. Some of the arguments in  
 support of this theory do not appear to me to be convincing  
 at all. For instance, the famous French Psychologist  
 Poulhan quotes the following:-  
 "Richer observes : the patient may be shared by two  
 experimenters, between whom connection is maintained  
 only through the half of the body which each is  
 (working)

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working upon ..... Each of them can move his hands over one half of the body without provoking any gesture or prohibitory motion, but directly the operator's hands cross the median line, B. moans and recoils in order to avoid the touch of the hand which exceeds the limits of the territory allotted to it"

In our <sup>my</sup> opinion, it is a case of double hypnotism and not of double personality.

Taine writes:-

"I have seen a person who while talking and singing, writes coherent sentences and even whole pages without looking at her paper, or being conscious of what she is writing. She declares that at the end of the page she has no idea of what she has written". This again is not a case of dual personality.

Some people are in the habit of drawing sketches while singing or talking. This does not make them possess many selves.

Thirdly a sufi is said to possess miraculous powers. We use the word "miracle" for the supernormal or supernatural works of both the prophets and the saints, though sufis makes a distinction between "Mujiza" and Karamat". These miracles take the form of telepathy, television, premonitions etc. and Hajwairi has quoted a good many of them. These odd phenomena have been the subject of Psychological Research and it is better to see how they are explained by modern writers, and then to find out whether they have any connection with sufistic experience. In regard to telepathy, Sir William Crookes is inclined to believe in the existence of brain-waves similar to radio waves. Vibrations in the ether travel from brain to brain. Just as an electric disturbance at one end of the current produces a similar disturbance at the other end, so the brain disturbance in one person produces a similar disturbance in the other. But this theory does not explain why one person is able to translate these

(brain)

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brain disturbances into consciousness and not the other, if they are caused by the same wave-lengths. In fact this theory is based on very meagre data. Some explain it on the basis of sub-conscious mind. Its functions are technically called "spiritoid functions". It perceives many facts which conscious mind does not notice. Of the thousands of events going on all around us every day, we perceive but a few; all the rest are ignored though they are lodged within the great mental store-house within us. The process of telepathic message takes place as follows:

From the conscious to the sub-conscious mind of A.: from that to the sub-conscious mind of B. and from the sub-conscious to the conscious mind of B. But this theory does not tell us why this process takes place in the order given above or what reason we have to say that it does take place in the above order. Moreover, according to this theory message may originate in the living or the dead. This means that sub-conscious mind retains its existence even after the death. We will revert to this point later on. *(James does not ascribe all mystic experiences to sub-conscious mind)*

Now we come to Clairvoyance. An example of this has been noted by Kaut in "Dreams of a Spirit Seer". Sir William Barrett summarises it as follows:- In September 1759 at four o'clock Swedenborg arrived at Gottenburg and was invited by a friend to his house. Two hours after he went out, and then came back and informed the company that a dangerous fire had just broken out in Stockholm (50 miles from Gottenburg); He said that his house was in danger. At eight o'clock he declared that the fire was extinguished at the third door from his house ..... On Monday evening the letters received from Stockholm described the fire exactly as he had stated and that it was extinguished at 8 o'clock. (abridged).

Note) - The writer of this thesis also noted a similar case *Amman 1818, an event 1926* on 27th. August, which took place 6,000 miles away on the same date. Subsequently it was proved that his

(statement)

statement was true, and that he did not get the information by telegram

Some people explain Clairvoyance by the theory of "Astral matter". By the operation of the will it is possible to construct a sort of definite telegraph wire, composed of Astral matter, and that through this wire returned to its place.

The above is quite enough to show the trend of modern thought. Now we shall quote a few instances from the Sufi Shaykhs to show the similarity of the phenomena.

The following are taken from Nicholson's "Mystics of Islam"

"Once the Sheykh (Abul Hasan Khurgani) said, "This night a great many persons (he mentioned the exact number)

have been wounded by brigands, in such and such a desert". On making enquiry they found that his

statement was perfectly true. Strange to relate, on these days, and we have seen how they were explained by the same night his son's head was cut off and laid upon the threshold of his house, yet he knew nothing of it. His wife, who disbelieved in him cried "What

think you of a man who can tell things which happen many leagues away, but does not know that his own son's head has been cut off, and is lying at his very door?"

"Yes" The Sheykh answered "When I saw that, the veil had been lifted, but when my son was killed, it had been let down again"

"Mawlana Saduddin of Kashgar after a little concentration of thought, used to exhibit signs of unconsciousness. Any one ignorant of this circumstance would have fancied that he was falling asleep. One day according to his custom he fell into a trance. I

But much depends upon the details and the words in which the miracle is recorded. Unfortunately we have very little contemporary evidence which may help us in

"Apparently you do not believe that this is something different from sleep".

(Whilst)

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"Whilst Dhu'l-Nun was conversing on this topic with some friends, he said "Here is a sofa. It will move round the room if I tell it to do so". No sooner had he uttered the word "move" than <sup>the</sup> sofa made a circuit of the room and returned to its place."

"Avicenna paid a visit to Abul Hasan Khurgani. After a short conversation the saint went out to mend the wall of the garden. As soon as he had climbed on the top of the wall, the hatchet dropped from his hand. Avicenna ran to pick it up, but before he reached it, the hatchet rose of itself and came back into <sup>the</sup> saint's hand"

In all this we find a close similarity with the odd phenomena which are the subject of Psychological Research in these days, and we have seen how they were explained by the Medical materialists. In fact, every miracle can be explained so as not to violate the ordinary laws of nature. For instance, the miracle of the parting of the sea when Moses was about to cross with his followers, may be explained by the rise and fall of the tides, or the sea may mean the river Nile which is subject to sudden floods (the word "Bahr" means both a sea and a river). The beating of the rock and the issuing forth of the fountains, may be similarly explained. But a Sufi may be distinguished from an ordinary spiritualist in having the power of performing miracles when he likes. His miracles are never false, while a spiritualist is often unable to carry on his work and very often his conclusions are shown to be incorrect. But much depends upon the details and the words in which the miracle is recorded. Unfortunately, we have very little contemporary evidence which may help us in investigating critically the data before us. For want of such evidence and the details of the miracle, it is very difficult to express an opinion one way or the other. Supposing the miracle were correctly recorded, is it

(possible)

Aug 10

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possible to offer an explanation which may not be <sup>opposed</sup> to common sense? We will try to offer such a solution of this problem, though we realise the difficulty of expressing an opinion on a non-empirical subject.

If we look around us we find the forces of nature manifesting themselves in various phenomena, both organic and inorganic. In the latter we know that <sup>our</sup> principle holds good, the principle of action and re-action. "To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" is a law in Dynamics, to which no variation has yet been found. It is stated symbolically as F=Ma. Scientists take special delight in expressing physical phenomena in terms of waves, so we have light waves, heat waves, sound waves etc, But what is meant by a wave. Simply action and re-action between particles. Look still deeper into the origin of matter. What are ions? Particles of matter revolving around a certain centre according to the above principle. Look upwards into the planets. You will find the same law expressed there. Each and every particle is connected with all others, and the whole forms part of a system. Now we come from unconscious things to conscious objects. A Psychologist considers man as highest of all conscious objects. Man is an incompletely organised complex of organico-Psychical systems. Moreover, he is a systematising system. There is a constant action and re-action, between man and his environments, and this is the basis of all man's knowledge of external world. But are we to take the mind of an individual as having no connection with other minds? This will be to fly in the face of experience. A man exerts influence on other minds, and is in itself influenced by others. But the nature and intensity of this influence is not the same in all cases. For instance, a stranger appears among a crowd of people. All are at once attracted by his personality. He may not be well-built, strong or handsome, His manners may not be very polished

(but)

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To many persons, I think, this phenomenon occurs sometime but still there is something in him which attracts the its people. What is it that binds one person to the other in love? Is it manner, speech, dress, beauty or outward not behaviour. Not in all cases. The lover neither loves see beauty nor any outward manifestation. It is something from quite different. Symbols may be useful in the beginning, but they serve no useful purpose in the end. In short, we find that mind, conscious or sub-conscious, exerts an influence over other minds, with greater or less intensity. Why is this difference? Just as a human body may be strong or weak, fully developed or underdeveloped, so minds are in various stages and developments. In case of conscious minds we are aware of the difference as between the mind of a savage, and that of a cultured man. But in the case of sub-conscious mind the difference is not perceptible. But as we see the difference exerted by a mind, we may naturally infer that this difference is due to the on the variation in the development of mind. This influence may be exercised through a physical medium or without such a medium. Just as the Sun exercises its attractive powers, but influences on the planets without any physical medium. The same is the case with a magnetic influence, or what is called "lines of force". Now I believe miracle is nothing but the influence exerted by a highly developed mind on other minds. An example of that is seen in the case of focal hypnotism, though here the phenomenon differs to some extent from a miracle. But how to explain television and telepathy? If we look at a man's face, we sometimes try to read his thought, and it is the case with some people that they can read the thought of others by looking at their faces, and observing the outward signs. Again, sometimes we find ourselves uneasy on account of some dear one who is far away, and the cause of this uneasiness turns out to be true. How could we feel an uneasiness of this sort if there were no hidden connection between two minds.

We can call the spirit as a metaphysical  
 behind the conscious & sub-conscious

To many persons, I think, this phenomenon occurs sometime or other in their lives, so we have no reason to doubt its truth. As we have said before, this power or energy by which we experience this phenomenon can be developed not by physical exercises, but by other means. We have to see how we derive this power. We derive our bodily power from the energy stored in matter. I am not discussing the question how this energy came to be stored in matter, but I take it for granted <sup>as</sup> the basis of modern scientific researches that this energy spreads outward to parts from a single source. Similarly for mental power, there must be some unitary source from which all minds derive their power. This mental energy, we believe, must be different from physical energy because the functions of mind and matter differ in their nature. Here I am parting company with many modern Psychologists. If there is a common source for all mental energy, telepathy and television can be explained by mutual influence of the minds on the basis of this common energy. As there are exercises for the development of the bodily powers, so there are exercises suited to the development of mental powers, but their nature differs from that of the former. The more a man's mind, conscious and sub-conscious is developed, the greater is his sphere of influence and sphere of internal vision. So far we have been using the terms sub-conscious mind and mental energy, but in order to use the technical terms of the Sufis, we should substitute "spirit" for the sub-conscious and "spiritual energy" for the mental. The source of energy in this case will be God Himself. The odd phenomena can be explained from various points of view. For instance, from the standpoint of panentheism, we may say that the absolute realises itself by evolving the world of finite things from within itself. The many are factors in the life of the Absolute and Unlimited One, and every individual shares the life and freedom of the whole. In this way finite minds are connected with one another by

or we can call the spirit as a unifying principle behind the conscious & sub-conscious

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sharing the knowledge and life of the Absolute, not  
infinitely, but within certain limits. They are like  
various batteries connected by the conductor. So they  
influence each other, and have a relative knowledge of  
the other members through the whole, i. e., the Absolute.

Now we come to the nature of mystic union with God, and  
will explain it Psychologically. The Sāfi is said to  
have developed a sentiment of love towards his Maker. He  
tries to devote himself wholly and solely to the object  
of his love. Now to love a person means that the image  
of that person, or his manifestitations, emanations, get  
themselves attached by powerful links, to our mental life.  
Thus we form systems of ideas, impulses and tendencies,  
which become more and more connected with one another.  
If the lover meets with an obstacle which hinders his  
union with his beloved, the arrest of tendencies takes  
place and this gives rise to violent emotion. The  
unexpected arrest leads to the abrupt nervous discharges,  
which set free energy unable to spend itself in a  
systematic manner, so the lover has violent outburst of  
emotions. This may be caused by some external stimulus,  
say, caused by the sight of anything that has some  
connection with the beloved. We see in the case of a  
Sufi that the crowing of a cock made him fall senseless.  
Such an emotion is often accompanied by many physical  
phenomena. According to Maudsley there is not a single  
nutritive act that emotion does not affect. The action  
exerted upon the heart is very severe, and sometimes  
results in death, as we have seen in the case of some  
sufis. The mind seems to be paralysed, and becomes  
incapable of imagination, reasoning and even sensibility,  
except in so far as the emotion itself is concerned.  
The entire field of consciousness is invaded by this  
single impression, and that is why there is sometimes a  
loss of consciousness. Even in weaker cases, the

(consciousness)

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consciousness is almost entirely engrossed. About this Letourneau writes:-

"The brain, reeling from the effects of a severe moral blow, is alive to nothing else. The organs of the special senses become practically useless ...

Intellectual functions, are, of course, almost suspended. It is impossible to apply one-self to anything that is Extraneous to the impression of the moment. But this period of depression is of short duration. The tide of life, momentarily checked, or abated, rushes on apace, and an energetic action is produced..... The concentration of nervous activity is followed by a great expansion...The senses awaken, but the attention still holds fast to a single idea, and will not allow the exhausted individual to perceive anything that has not some bearing upon the emotion. The intellectual faculties, likewise, can function energetically only in the direction of the moral impression. For the same reason, there is still partial or entire insensibility to pain".

It is during this state that sufi gains a knowledge of the object of his love, and when the sufis describe their experience, they describe what they see in this state. From the above it would be clear that the mystic experience is not something supernatural or supernormal. Everyone can have such an experience; the only difference being that in the case of the sufi the object of love is the Divine Being and not human personality.

The question arises; does Sufi's vision of God have any sort of objectivity behind it, or is it merely a creation of his own fancy? In fact, Sufistic experience as a feeling cannot be described. It is personal. My feeling of pleasure or pain is mine own. It cannot be shared with others. But I can describe the cause, the symptoms and effects of the feeling. I can describe it

*...the Sufi has a vision of God, he has a vision of this picture, and this changes with the advance of Sufi in his path. When a Sufi describes his vision of God, he describes certain aspects of this mental picture. In the final stage he identifies himself with this image. There is nothing extraordinary in it. A man in extreme love waiting for the arrival of his beloved, mistakes every passerby for his sweetheart. So a Sufi sees nothing else but his beloved. The Poet Hafiz expresses it beautifully in a couplet, "I am so deeply absorbed in you that I mistake everyone that I see at a distance for my beloved". If my object of adoration is Fire, I see everything around me, and I feel the pleasure or pain of being consumed by the fire. Some Sufi see The Divine Being as "light", and so they describe their experience in terms of Celestial Light. They say that they have been illuminated by the Divine Light. If there is such a thing as Divine Light, the Sufis experience has some sort of objectivity, and it is not merely a personal imagination. But we cannot prove this by any empirical means. Only one thing we can say about it. When the Sufis describe their experience, their statements are similar to they do so in similar terms. Whether this is due to their preconceived notions, or they really have the same vision is hard to decide. Moreover a Sufi can fully understand the experience of other Sufis, and can talk to others in a language of their own. This may mean that their object of vision is not imaginary. If we do not understand their language, we are not justified in denouncing them as subject to creations of fancy. How many people do*

as pleasurable or painful, intense or weak, and so on. What is the cause of Sufis feeling. What is it that he falls in love with? It is something imperceptible to the senses. But to be an object of love, it must be capable of being an object of thought, and so the Sufi has some kind of mental picture of his beloved, and when the Sufi has a vision of God, he has a vision of this picture, and this changes with the advance of Sufi in his path. When a Sufi describes his vision of God, he describes certain aspects of this mental picture. In the final stage he identifies himself with this image. There is nothing extraordinary in it. A man in extreme love waiting for the arrival of his beloved, mistakes every passerby for his sweetheart. So a Sufi sees nothing else but his beloved. The Poet Hafiz expresses it beautifully in a couplet, "I am so deeply absorbed in you that I mistake everyone that I see at a distance for my beloved". If my object of adoration is Fire, I see everything around me, and I feel the pleasure or pain of being consumed by the fire. Some Sufi see The Divine Being as "light", and so they describe their experience in terms of Celestial Light. They say that they have been illuminated by the Divine Light. If there is such a thing as Divine Light, the Sufis experience has some sort of objectivity, and it is not merely a personal imagination. But we cannot prove this by any empirical means. Only one thing we can say about it. When the Sufis describe their experience, their statements are similar to they do so in similar terms. Whether this is due to their preconceived notions, or they really have the same vision is hard to decide. Moreover a Sufi can fully understand the experience of other Sufis, and can talk to others in a language of their own. This may mean that their object of vision is not imaginary. If we do not understand their language, we are not justified in denouncing them as subject to creations of fancy. How many people do

(understand)

*note - Prof: Montague explains mystical experience as a function of imagination in which the subject's knowledge is not an accidental imagination or fancy.*

understand the technical terms of various sciences. To an illiterate, the Algebraic signs are merely black dots without any meaning.

Again, the miracles performed by the Sufis give us a reason to believe that they are in contact with some superhuman power, that they see that power in their vision. But this depends upon the assumption that the Writers have given a true account of the Miracles of the Sufis. How far our assumption is based on facts we cannot say in our present state of knowledge.

SECTS OF THE SUFIS

The most important chapter in Kashful Mahjub is that in which he gives an account of the various sects of the Sufis, because this gives us a good deal of information about the doctrines held by the Sufis. But it may be pointed out that the Sects owe their origin to their emphasising the different aspects of Sufism. They are all agreed as far as the fundamentals are concerned.

(1) MAHASABIS

They are the followers of Abu Abdullah Bin Harith bin Asad-Al-Mahasabi. The peculiarity of his doctrine lies in the fact that he does not reckon "satisfaction" among the stations but includes it among the states. The distinction between station and state is thus explained by Hafwairi; station denotes anyone standing in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of obligations, pertaining, appertaining to that station. "State" is something that descends from God into a man's heart without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes by his own efforts. Therefore it is not connected with any mortification on man's part. Station belongs to the category of acts. State to the category of gifts. Here it may be pointed out that the first station is repentance, then conversion, renunciation etc., and the states are meditation, nearness to God, love, fear, hope, longing, intimacy, tranquility, contemplation and

(certainty)

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certainty. As to whether intoxication is superior to  
Then Haywairi explains what is meant by satisfaction; satisfaction is of two kinds, (a) the satisfaction of God with man (b) the satisfaction of man with God. Human satisfaction is equanimity towards fate, and spiritual steadfastness in regarding events whether they be like manifestation of Divine Beauty or of Divine Majesty, so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath, or illuminated by the light of mercy. There are four classes of quietists; (1) Those who are satisfied with God's gift which is gnosis (2) Those who are satisfied with happiness which is this world. (3) Those who are satisfied with affliction which consists of diverse probations (4) those who, are satisfied with being chosen which is love. He maintains that satisfaction is the end of the stations, and the beginning of the states. Its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. It may be called either a station or state.

The doctrine of the more elevated quietists of medieval Europe bids the mystic pass beyond the sensible enjoyments, and imaginative delights of religion and escape from the finer senses of the soul as well as the grossest sense of the body, into that state of pure and imageless contemplation which has no preference or conception of its own. In this respect they may be classed with the fourth group of quietists mentioned by Haywairi, because they have escaped from the bonds of stations and stages.

(2) THE TAYFURIS

They are the followers of Abu Yazid. His doctrine is rapture and intoxication. Rapturous longing for God and intoxication of love cannot be acquired by human beings.

"Sobriety" expresses the attainment of that which is

(desired)

he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent, and desired. As to whether intoxication is superior to sobriety, or vice versa, there is a difference of opinion among the Shaykhs. Some say that sobriety involves the finity and equilibrium of human attributes which is the greatest veil between God and man while intoxication involves the destruction of the human attributes like foresight and choice, and the annihilation of a man's self-control in God, so that only those faculties survive in him that do not belong to the human genus. While others like Junayd prefer sobriety to intoxication. They say that intoxication is evil because it involves the disturbance of one's normal state, and loss of sanity and self-control, and in as much as the principle of all things is sought either by way of annihilation or subsistence or of effacement, or affirmation, the principle of verification cannot be attained unless the seeker is sane. The fact that people remain in phenomena and forget God is due to their not seeing things as they really are. Personally, I am of the same opinion as Junaid. The question arises "Is there an immediate influence exerted by the Divine Spirit. If so, is it above consciousness". If it is aboveconsciousness how can we become aware of it? The mystics say that self must be abandoned. But what self? Assuredly selfishness and self will. Not the exercise of those powers of observation and judgement which God has given us for this purpose. A Divine Light is promised, not to supercede but illuminate our understanding. Moreover, in sobriety there is more chance of our exercising our faculties to make ourselves more pure and ascending higher and higher, while in intoxication one is at a standstill.

Haywairi continues:-

"Seeing is of two kinds. If a man looks with eyes of subsistence he perceives that the whole universe is imperfect in comparison with his own subsistence, for

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he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent; and if he looks with the eye of annihilation he perceives that all created things are non-existent besides the principle of his doctrine is to regard the subsistence of God. In either case, he turns away from the created things.

Then he says that the perfection of the state of he intoxicated man is sobriety. The lowest stage in sobriety consists in regarding the powerlessness of humanity; therefore a sobriety that appears to be evil is better than an intoxication that is really evil. Intoxication is to fancy one's self annihilated while the attributes really subsist and this is a veil. Sobriety is the vision of subsistence while the attributes are annihilated and this is actual revelation.

There are two kinds of intoxication(1) with the wine of affection(<sup>عشق</sup> ~~C. 551~~) and (2) with the cup of love(<sup>محبت</sup> ~~C. 551~~)

The former is caused, since it arises from regarding the benefit; but the latter has no cause since it arises from regarding the benefactor. He who regards the benefit sees through himself and therefore sees himself, but he who regards the benefactor sees through him and therefore does not see himself. Although he is intoxicated, his intoxication is sobriety. Sobriety is also of two kinds. - sobriety in heedlessness and sobriety in love. The former is the greatest of veil, but the latter is the clearest of revelations.

Comparing with the Western mystics, we find that St Bernard sides with Haywairi. This mysticism is sobriety itself.

The visit of the Holy Ghost to his spirit was unattended by visible glory, by voices, tastes or odour; it vindicated its reality only by the joy which possessed him.

(4) THE JUNAIDIS

The followers of Abul Qasim al Janaid; his doctrine is based on sobriety, and <sup>o</sup>pposed to Tayfuries as has been explained.

(contradictory)

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(5) THE NURIS

The followers of Abul Hasan Ahmad b Mohd Nuri- The principle of his doctrine is to regard Sufism as superior to poverty. In matters of conduct he agreed with Jānaid. It is a peculiarity of his path that in companionship he prefers his companions claim to his own, and holds companionship without (✓) preference to be unlawful. He condemns retirement. He says:-

"Beware of retirement for it is in connection, with Satan; and cleave to companionship, for therein is the satisfaction of the mercy of God."

Hajwairi then discusses preference. The true nature of preference consists in maintaining the rights of the persons with whom one associates, and in subordinating one's own interest to the interest of one's friend. Nothing is harder to a man than spiritual sacrifice, and to refrain from the object of his love. External life is gained by spiritual sacrifice, and by renunciation of self-interest in fulfilling God's Commandments, and by obedience to His friends. But from the standpoint of gnosis, preference and free choice are preparation, and real preference consists in union with God, for the true basis of self interest is self abandonment. So long as the seeker's progress is connected with acquisition, it is pernicious, but when the attracting influence of the truth manifests its dominion, all his actions are confounded, and he loses all power of expression; nor can any name be applied to him, or any description be given of him or anything he imparted to him.

(6) THE SAHLIS

*sahl*

They are the followers of ~~Abul~~ G. b. Abdallah of Tustar. His doctrine includes endeavour and self mortification, and ascetic training. The object of all austerities is resistance to lower soul, and so a man must know his lower soul. (Nafs) lower soul etymologically is the essence of, and reality of anything, but in popular language it is used to denote many

(contradictory)

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contradictory meanings e.g., "Spirit", "Virility",  
"body" and "blood". The mystics of this Sect are, however  
agreed that it is the source and principle of evil, but  
while some assert that it is a substance located in the  
body, as the spirit is, others hold it to be an  
attribute of the body, as life is. But they all agree  
that through it base qualities like pride, envy, avarice,  
anger etc. are manifested. They hold that both the lower  
soul and the spirit are subtle things existing in the  
body, one is the seat of good and the other is the seat  
of evil.

Soul can make no progress without  
A man is nothing but spirit, of which this body is  
the outward temple and residence, and of which the attributes  
are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because  
a body from which the Soul has departed is still called a  
human being though a dead human being. Moreover a Soul is  
located in the middle of animals, yet they are not called  
human beings. Others state that man is an atom, centred  
in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes,  
if he dies the soul leaves the body and is called a spirit and his  
taken out of his body, he does not lose the name of 'human  
being'. Some declare that 'man' is not that which eats and  
drinks but a Divine mystery of which this body is the vesture.  
To this, he replies, that the name "human being" applies to  
all sorts of persons in whom there is no such "mystery" and  
who differ only in sex and birth. The name 'man' is  
given to the one of substance dependent on us. The most  
perfect qualities of man include the things, spirit, soul  
and mind. The attributes of spirit is intelligence, of soul,  
sensation, and of mind, volition. Modern authors define man as  
a being capable of reason and moral conduct, and of feeling  
the influence of the Holy Spirit, and of being subject to the  
resistance of the flesh.

Haj 100

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I am of opinion that Islam condemns asceticism. "La rahbaniyata fil Islam" is the saying of the prophet of Islam. In fact asceticism is the application of pessimism to ethics. If life and all its connections are bad, why should we not get rid of this life by committing suicide. Asceticism considers the soul to be at war with the body and it is the duty of the Soul to destroy its enemy. The moral code of ascetism is mainly negative. Women and Children's status is very dismal. But this is not correct. Body is like a stem to flower. Soul can make no progress without <sup>then Hajwari defines, what is meant by man. Some Muslims assert that</sup> body. A man is nothing but spirit, of which this body is the cuirass, temple and residence, and of which the attributes are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because a body from which the Soul has departed is still called a human being though a dead human being. Moreover a Soul is located in the bodies of animals, yet they are not called human beings. Others state that man is an atom, centred in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes. This is also absurd because if anybody is killed and his heart taken out of his body, he does not lose the name of 'human being'. Some declare that 'man' is not that which eats and drinks but a Divine Mystery of which this body is the vesture. To this, he replies, that the name "human being" applies to all sorts of persons in whom there is no such "mystery" and who suffer decay and eat and drink. The name 'man' is given to the sum of substances compounded in us. The most perfect composition of man includes three things, spirit, soul and body. The attribute of spirit is intelligence, of soul, passion, and of body, sensation. (Modern thinkers define man as a rational animal or a rational animal having a particular type of body.)

Those who seek God should never relax their resistance

of mortification is not the annihilation of personal life. Christian mystics also lay stress on mortification.

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to Lower Soul. While all mystics have affirmed this need of mortification, and have declared it to be an indirect means of attaining contemplation. <sup>a</sup> Sahl asserted that mortification is the direct cause of the latter and he attributed to search a powerful effect on attainment, so that he even regarded the present life spent in search, as superior to the future life of fruition. Self mortification is the direct cause of the union with God, others, on the contrary, assert that there is no direct cause of union with God, and whoever attains to God does so by Divine <sup>ing</sup> grace, which is independent of human actions. Therefore, they argue, the object of mortification is to correct the vices of the lower Soul, not to attain real proximity, and inasmuch as mortification is referred to man <sup>le</sup> ~~which~~ contemplation is referred to God, it is impossible that one should be caused by the other. Hajwairi says that the difference between the two parties lies in expression. One says, "He who seeks shall find," <sup>+the other says "he who finds shall seek"</sup> The fact is that mortification stands in the same relation to contemplation as Divine blessing to Obedience. As it is absurd to seek obedience without Divine blessing so it is absurd to seek Divine blessing without obedience, man is guided to mortification by a flash of Divine Beauty, so Divine guidance precedes mortification.

It may be noted here that the sufis, unlike the Hindu mystics, do not minimise the value of existence. According to the Budhists all particulars and definite existence is felt as an intolerable burden and nirvana is an escape from a personal and individual life. But the sufis are entirely opposed to this view. The aim of mortification is not the annihilation of personal life. Christian mystics also lay stress on mortification.

"It/

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"It is the constant teaching of the great mystics," says Butler, "that there can be no progress in prayer without mortification; no contemplation without self-denial and self-discipline seriously undertaken; no real mysticism without asceticism." Hajwairi maintains that 'lower Soul' can be mastered by discipline but its essence and substance do not perish. If it is rightly known and <sup>kept</sup> under control, the seeker need not care though it continues to exist in him.

Then he discusses the nature of Passion - According to some 'passion' is a term applied to the attributes of lower soul but according to others, a term denoting the natural volition, whereby the lower soul is controlled and directed, just as the spirit is controlled by intelligence. A spirit without intelligence is imperfect, so a lower soul devoid of the faculty of passion is also imperfect. Passion is a veil and a false guide, man is commanded to resist it. The devil cannot enter a man's heart until he desires to commit a sin but when a certain quantity of passion appears the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to man's heart and this is called diabolic suggestion. The most manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust. Lust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of the human body and is served by the senses. It <sup>leads</sup> believes the seeker of God to spend his whole life in ridding himself of these incitements to passion, which show themselves through the senses. The right way of doing this is "resignation" unless Divine protection is predestined to a man he cannot abstain from anything by his own exertion.

Such as proceed from the same principles but by the conjunction of other quality for instance, pride, Some/ quality hatred, envy, pity, etc.,

I think we should make a distinction between a

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Some of the Western thinkers also regard body as the special seat of sin. Plato sometime sees all our perversions and ignorance as an outcome of the Soul's Connection with the world of matter. When the Soul is set free from the physical bonds, it sees clearly all the Divine Ideas and then it can do no wrong. The Same is the case with the Apostle St Paul "For I delight in the Law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of Sin which is in my members"- Romans VII, 22. St. Gregory says, "It often befalls that the spirit raises up the mind to things aloft and for all that, the flesh assails it with importunate temptations and when the mind is drawn to contemplate the heavenly things it is beaten back by the images presented to it of illicitations. For the sting of <sup>the</sup> flesh suddenly wounds him whom holy contemplation was carrying off outside the flesh and at once the flight of contemplation illumines and the importunity of temptation obscures one and the same mind." So according to Hajwairi external stimulus acting through the senses on the mind causes passions which are accompanied by certain manifestations But according to James external Stimulus does not directly cause the emotion but produces bodily symptoms which give rise to emotion. Hajwairi only limits passions to baser emotions and does not take into consideration those that are pure, spiritual and worthy of regard. Hume subdivides Passions into (a) direct such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain and pleasure, for instance desire, aversion, grief, joy, and (b) indirect such as proceed from the same principles but by the conjunction of other quality for instance., pride, humility hatred, envy, pity, etc.,

I think we should make a distinction between a

noble

Alg 104

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noble sentiment like love and ignoble like hatred.

(A sentiment shares all the characteristics of a passion but is less violent and is accompanied by more or less a clear consciousness of their object)

Hajwairi considers it best to resist the passions or rather base Passions and Sentiments and so it is better to see how a passion disappears. Passion is only the last Phase in the evolution of feeling and it replaces the feeling when for one reason or another, the Psychological force set in action and not employed in a systematic manner happens to increase. When one of the Phenomena which conditions passion disappears or decreases in intensity, the passion also disappears and is replaced, according to circumstances, either by a feeling, by indifference, or by a different and opposite passion. The gratification of a passion, that is to say, the diminution of the arrest of the tendency, generally transmits it into a feeling, or in other words, the diminution or disappearance of the tendency brings about the diminution or disappearance of the passion and sometimes its replacement by an opposite passion for instance, by remorse in some cases. So we must either remove the external stimulus or find an outlet for the surplus Psychological energy in some other way.

*Spinoza maintains that a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear & distinct idea of it & the mind is subject to passions in proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has. The passivity of passion is human bondage, the active freedom is human liberty. We are free only where we know.*

Haj 105.

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four called ~~Amal~~ and three called ~~Hugba~~ and one called ~~Qutb or Shawkh~~. All these know one another and cannot (7) The Hakimis - followers of Abu Abdallah Muhammad b Ali al Hakimal Tirmidhi. His doctrine was based on saintship and he used to explain the true nature of saintship and the degrees of the saints and the observance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.

The principle and foundation of Safism rests on Saintship. God has saints whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His Kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kind of miracles and has purged of natural corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their lower Soul and passion so that all their thoughts of Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. We have two parties opposed to this view (a) Mutazalites and anthropomorphists. The former deny that one moslem is specially priveleged more than another. But why should a prophet be specially priveleged? The latter allow that special priveleges may be conferred but assert that such priveleged persons no longer exist though they existed in the part. But they do not make out a good case.

There are four thousand saints who are concealed and do not know one another and are not aware of the excellence of their state. (Hajwairi says he had ocular experience of this matter). But of those who have power to lose and bind and are the officers of the Divine Court - there are three hundred called Akhya, and forty called Abdal, and seven called Abrar, and

Saints/  
four/

four called Autad and three called Nuqba and one called Qutb or Ghawth. All these know one another and cannot act save by mutual consent. The Mutazilites deny special priveleges and miracles. They say that believers in faith are friends of God. They acknowledge only such obligations as are imposed by Reason without regard to Revelation. They maintain that if all the Moslems Share in faith which is fundamental they should also Share in miracle which is only derivative. Hajwairi says that miracles are special and not general. Faith is a general term, applicable to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas Saintship is special. According, a miracle will not be manifested. "The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsists in the contemplation of the truth; he cannot tell anything concerning himself nor can he rest with anyone except God". "The saint hath no fear and grief, because all these refer to the interest of the lower soul and when that is annihilated Satisfaction becomes an attribute of man and when satisfaction has been attained his states become Steadfast in vision of the common: Author of States <sup>turns</sup> his back is ~~fixed~~ on all states." "God has given to His spiritual saints not only to believe but to understand divine things"- St. Augustine. In miracles the saint does not infringe the obligations of the religious law to which he is always subject. The apostle establishes his prophecy by establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles while the saint, by the miracles which he performs establishes both the prophecy of the apostle and his own saintship.

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Saints are not preserved from Sin, for Sinlessness belongs to the prophets. Some people say that saintship involves unceasing obedience and that when a great Sin occurs to the mind of a saint he is deposed from saintship. But Hajwairi holds that since the saintship of knowledge of God which is the foundation of all miracles is not lost through sin, it is impossible that what is inferior to that in excellence and grace should disappear because of Sin.

In what state is this miraculous grace manifested to the saint: in sobriety or intoxication; in rapture or composure? The prophet is a man of law and the saint is a man of inward feeling. Accordingly a miracle will not be manifested to a saint unless he is in a state of absence from himself and bewilderment and unless his faculties are entirely under the control of God. While the saints are with themselves and maintain the state of humanity they are veiled. A miracle cannot be manifested except in the state of unveiledness. This is the state of intoxication with which no human being, the prophets alone excepted, is permanently endowed.

Saints in Islam and those in Christianity have one thing in common: The help of God is invoked through them. The council of Trent expresses the doctrine of Roman Church as follows: "That the saints who reign with Christ offer to God their prayers for men; that it is good and useful to invoke them by supplication and to have recourse to their aid in order to obtain from God His benefits." But there is no such order of saints among the Christian mystics who have the power 'to bind and loose' like the Kings and their officers. *(even when they are dead)*

(8) The /

(8). The Kharrazis-followers of Abu Said Kharraz. He was the first to explain the state of annihilation and is absurd to suppose that any one can subsist through his subsistence. Hajwairi says, subsistence in its scientific attributes of another individual. The Nestorians of acceptance is of three kinds:-

(1). A Subsistence that begins and ends in annihilation as this world.

(2). A Subsistence that came into being and will never be annihilated as Hell and Paradise.

(3). A Subsistence that always was and always will be viz., the subsistence of God and this eternal attributes.

But according to Sufis, these terms do not refer to 'knowledge' or 'state' but 'apply solely to the degree of perfection attained by the saints who have become free from the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison of Stations' and the vicissitude of states and whose search has ended in discovery and who, recognising the imperfection of their own discovery have turned away from all things and have purposely become annihilated in the object of their desire and in the very essence of desire have lost all desires of their own, for when a man becomes annihilated from his attributes, he attains to perfect subsistence, he is neither near, nor far, neither strange nor intimate, neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separate nor united, he has no name nor sign or brand or mark.

But annihilations does not signify loss of essence and destruction of personality and subsistence does not indicate the subsistence of God in Man. Total Annihilation is impossible for annihilation of the different parts of a material substance can never take place. Moreover one attribute may be annihilated through the subsistence of another attribute may be annihilated /another

Accordingly/

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another attribute, both attributes belonging to man; it is absurd to suppose that any one can subsist through his attributes of another individual. The Nestorians of Rome and Christians hold that Mary annihilated by Self Mortifications all the attributes of humanity and that the Divine subsistence became attached to her and so that she was made subsistent through the subsistence of God and that Jesus was the result thereof and that he was not originally composed of the <sup>u</sup>staff of humanity because his subsistence is produced by realisation of the subsistence of God and in consequence of this, he and his mother and God are all subsistent through one subsistence, which is eternal, and an attribute of God. All this agrees with the doctrine of the Anthropomorphic sects of the Hashwiyya, who maintain that the Divine essence is a locus of phenomenal attribute. What difference is there between the view that the Eternal is the locus of the Phenomenal and the view that phenomenal is the locus of this Eternal or between the assertion that the Eternal has phenomenal attributes and the assertion that the phenomenal had eternal attributes? Such doctrines involve materialism and destroy the proof of the phenomenal nature of the world Universe and compel as to say that both the creator and His creation are eternal and that both are phenomenal or that what is created may be commingled with what is uncreated and that what is uncreated may descend into what is created. If, as they cannot help admitting, the creation is phenomenal, because the locus of a thing is like its substances, if the locus is phenomenal, it follows that the contents of the locus are phenomenal too.

Accordingly/

Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are attributes of ourselves and resemble each other in respect of their being our attributes. One may speak, however, of an annihilation that is independent of subsistence and also of a subsistence that is independence of annihilation; in that case annihilation means "Annihilation of all remembrance of God." Whoever is annihilated from his own Will subsists in the Will of God.

Compare with this the views of Tanler: "When through all manner of exercise the outward man has been converted into the inward, reasonable man ---- and thus he flings himself <sup>into</sup> with Divine Abyss, in which he dwelt eternally before he was created, then ---- the Godhead bends down and descends into the depths of the pure waiting soul and the transforming of the created soul drawing it up into the uncreated essence, so that the Spirit becomes one with Him. Could such a man <sup>behold</sup> better himself, he would see himself ~~not~~ so noble, that he would fancy himself God." So this abstract essence - an essential nothing - into which Tanler would <sup>sink</sup> ~~suit~~ the soul, does not differ from the abstract essence or super essential unity in which a plotinus would lose himself or that Divine substance in which Pantheistic mystics sought to dissolve their personality. The destruction <sup>in</sup> between Hajwairi <sup>with</sup> mystics of the above type is clear.

Professor Nicholson is of opinion that the conception of <sup>'Jana' (annihilation)</sup> ~~Fraud~~ is certainly of Indian origin. Its first great exponent was the Persian mystic Bayazid of Bistam, who may have received it from his teacher Abu Ali of Sindh:

"creatures/

/dissolved

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dissolved in God, "Even the spirit, thus advanced in  
holy exaltation, is dissolved in God."  
"Creatures are subject to changing state, but the  
gnostic has no state, because his vestiges are effaced  
and his essence annihilated by the essence of another and  
his traces are lost in another's traces." But I do not  
think there is anything common between the "Annihilation"  
of the Sufis and that of the Vedantists. The latter is  
based on the theory of Karma, which the Muslim mystics  
never recognise. With the Vedantist complete annihilation  
means loss of life, freedom from the cycle of birth & deaths  
and merging of the soul into Ishwara. With the Sufis  
annihilation simply means indifference to the temptations  
of the world. When a sufi gets annihilated, for him,  
nothing exists but the object of his love. He is so much  
absorbed in love that he sees his beloved in everything,  
but he does not identify himself with Divinity like the  
Vedantist. A Similar idea is expressed by Porphyry.  
He maintains that mind does not lose <sup>its</sup> consciousness of  
personality in that state of exaltation. He compares it  
to a dream in which the soul dead to the world rises to  
an activity that partakes of the Divine. It is an  
elevation, above reason, above action, above liberty and  
yet no annihilation, but an ennobling restoration or  
transformation of the individual nature.

Rushbrook gives an idea of what is meant by annihila-  
tion in Christian mysticism in the "Spiritual Nuptials".  
chap., 5 "And all men who are exalted above their creature-  
liness into a contemplative life, are one with this Divine  
glory-yea are that glory". Suso calls it the transit of  
their Soul"- it passes beyond time and space and is  
who refer these terms to knowledge and say that union  
/dissolved

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dissolved in God, "Then the spirit, thus advanced in knowledge, the Divine unity, and separation, the holy exercised, arriveth at freedom from the outward senses, before so importunate and its higher powers lose themselves (11). The Hululis - followers of Abu Hulman of Damascus and Faris who pretended to have derived this doctrine from with its natural properties, presses within the circle Husain bin Mansur Halleg. The author does not know much which represents the eternal Godhead and reaches spiritual about these people. Their doctrine was incarnation, perfection ---- He who is thus received into the Eternal commixture and transmigration of Spirits. Compare with Nothing is in the Everlasting Now and hath neither before this what Eckart says, "I am not less than God, there is nor after." Muslim mystics with the exception of one or no distinction: If I would not he would not be. I hesitate two never go so far.

(9). The Khafifis - followers of Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Khafif of Shiraz. The form of his doctrine in Sufism is absence and <sup>presence</sup> preserves it. 'Presence is presence of the heart and is a proof of the intuitive faith so that what is hidden from it has the same <sup>force</sup> price as what is visible to it. "Absence", The Absence of the heart" from all things Spirit is the life whereby the body lives, a view which is except God to such an extent that it becomes absent from itself and absent even from its absence, so that it no longer regards itself; and the sign of this state is withdrawal from all formal authority as when a prophet is divinely preserved from what is unlawful. According spirit is not life but that life does not exist without it absence from one's self is presence with God and universe. and the two are inseparable (as are n and knowledge of pain God has eternal attributes which peculiar to Him and are inseparable). According to this view also the Spirit and subsist in him and that He and His attributes are not is an accident like life: Sufi Shavak's believe that the two, for His unity does not admit differences and number.

Separation in predicaments refers to the actions of God, all of which are separate in this respect. The predicament of one is being, and of another, not being but a not being that is capable of being; of another, and may be <sup>in</sup> separated from him <sup>system</sup> is still living as annihilated and of another, substance. There are some who refer these terms to knowledge and say that union

Knowledge of the divine ordinances

is knowledge of the Divine unity, and separation 'the meaning of human actions i.e. contemplation.

(11). The Hululis - followers of Abu Hulman of Damascus and Faris who pretended to have derived this doctrine from Husain bin Mansur Hallej. The author does not know much about these people. Their doctrine was incarnation, commixture and transmigration of Spirits. Compare with this what Eckart says, "I am not less than God, there is no distinction: If I would not he would not be. I hesitate to receive anything from God - for to be indebted to Him would imply inferiority, and make a distinction between Him and me; whereas the righteous man is without distinction in substance and nature, What God is."

Discourse on the Spirit ---- There is much difference of opinion as regard to the Spirit. Some have said that the Spirit is the life wherby the body lives, aview which is also held by a number of Scholastic Philosophers.

According to this view the Spirit is accident, Conjunction, motion, cohesion and similar accidents by which the body is changed from one state to another. Others say that spirit is not life but that life does not exist without it and the two are unseparable (as pain and knowledge of pain are unseparable). According to this view also the Spirit is an accident like life: Sufi Shaykhs believe that the Spirit is a substance and not an attribute, for so long as it is connected with the body, God continually creates life in the body and the life of man is an attribute and by it he lives, but the Spirit is deposited in his body and may be separated from him while he is still living as in sleep.

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The Spirit then is a subtle body which comes and goes by the command of God i.e. The spirit is subtle and corporeal it is visible, but visible only to the eye of intelligence.

Here the Moslem<sup>saw</sup> at variance with those who believe that the spirit is eternal and regard it as the sole agent and Governor of things and call it the uncreated Spirit of God and aver that it passes from one body to another. The author then asks, "what do you mean by eternity? Do you mean the pre existence of a non eternal thing or an eternal thing that never came into being? If they mean the pre existence of a non eternal and ~~that~~<sup>then</sup> there is no difference between us in principle for we, too, say, that the Spirit is non eternal and that it existed before the body only. But the Spirit cannot pass from body to body because just as a body cannot have two lives, so a spirit cannot have two bodies. If they say that the Spirit is an eternal thing that never came into being. In this case I ask, Does it stand by itself or by something else." If they say 'By itself "I ask, Is God its world or not." If they answer that God is not its world, they affirm the existence of <sup>his</sup> ~~her~~ eternal beings which <sup>is</sup> contrary to reason, for the eternal is infinite and the essence of <sup>one</sup> ~~our~~ eternal being would limit the other. If they answer that God is its world then I say that God is eternal and His creatures are non eternal.: it is impossible that the eternal should be commingled with the non eternal or made one with it or become <sup>immanent</sup> ~~unimmanent~~ in it, or that the non eternal should be the place of the eternal, or that the eternal should carry it, because only homogeneous things are capable of being united and separated. And if they say that the Spirit does not stand by itself but by something else, then it

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must be either an attribute or an accident. If it is an accident it must either be in a locus or not. If it is in a locus, its locus must be like itself and neither can be called eternal and to say that it has no locus is absurd because an accident cannot stand by itself. If they say that the spirit is an eternal attribute - and this is the doctrine of the Mululis and those who believe in metempsychosis - and call it an attribute of God, I reply that an eternal attribute of God cannot possibly become an attribute of his creature; for if His life could become the life of His creature similarly His power could become their power; and inasmuch as an attribute stands by its object, how can an eternal attribute stand by a non eternal object? Therefore the eternal has no connection with the non eternal and the spirit is created and under God's command."

Hajwairi differs from Ghazali by calling the soul corporeal and made of subtle matter. In this respect he is also in agreement with some of the Hindu sects. He also maintains that the soul does not animate the body because according to him the soul leaves the body in sleep and the body still remains alive. He considerably differs from those who hold that life and soul are the same thing at different stages of development and that life in developing its own nature becomes conscious of its states and activities at a certain stage and considers itself the subject of those activities and thereby attains some degree of independent existence. In plant and animal it is only life, in man it has developed itself into being self conscious, self regulating soul, and made itself independent of this particular body. Thus he he believes in the theory of special creation, but maintains that the souls were created before the bodies. In this respect he differs from Ghazali. According to him the

soul is corporeal composed of subtle matter. But in this case the soul will have both the property of being conscious and also of filling space and that its functions are both modes of thought and modes of extension and motion in space In this way he makes consciousness as the property of Subtle matter. Compare with this the materialistic view that consciousness is a chemical product of the cells of the brain and that the brain 'secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile! Hajwairi does not make it clear how the subtle body of the Soul is connected with the gross body and what is the need of the latter. By making the soul corporeal he makes it divisible and subject to decay. One may object how on this theory he can maintain the immortality of the Soul. But Hajwairi assigns 'derived' immortality to the soul because it has been created by a special act of God who willed it into existence <sup>but will never will it out of existence again.</sup> Or in other words the soul, though material, does not have some of the properties of ~~common~~ to gross matter. "That which is created is of necessity corporeal visible and tangible" - Jowett's 'Plato'

We have discussed Hajwairi in detail and this will make us dispense with the rest of the Indian Sufis, who do not show any advance of thought beyond what has been expressed by Hajwairi, though there has been a distinct tendency towards Pantheism in some of the later mystics and this will be dealt with in the chapter on Islamic Poetry'.

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Chapter VI

sense is innate and not derived from experience. The moral imperative, the Quran maintains that moral sense, if there is any truth in it, cannot be opposed to the Quranic revelation. In modern times Kant's theory of moral sense has been rejected by the evolutionists.

ETHICAL THOUGHT IN MUSLIM INDIA.

A study of books on ethics most commonly read in mediaeval India reveals that the Muslims were divided into many sects, which, though professing a belief in the fundamental principles of Islam, differed from one another on many points. There were among them the Rationalists, the followers of the Pro-Greek philosophers, the mystics, the shiites, orthodox, theologians and others. The ethical views of many of these I have described in the chapter on "The History of Islamic Philosophy." I give below the views of the orthodox sects which constitutes the majority in the Muslim population of India. On this point I take as my guide the commentaries or explanatory treatises on the Quran and the traditions, the books in fiqh such as Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, the works of Ulemas, such as Wali ullah and Abdul Haq etc. and the sayings of the orthodox Sufis.

All the sects in Islam derive their authority from the 'Quran.' The Quran, being one of the revealed books, derives this authority from God. It bases its claim on the testimony of miracles. It considers itself a miracle. Kant maintains that miracles cannot prove a religion, for we can never quite rely on the testimony which supports them. (In this way history becomes a dead letter.) Religion must be based on the practical reason of moral sense. Moral

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sense is innate and not derived from experience. The moral imperative is an absolute, a categorical imperative. The Quran maintains that moral sense, if there is any truth in (it) cannot be opposed to the Quranic revelation. In modern times Kant's theory of moral sense has been rejected by the evolutionists. The philosophy of evolution suggests that the sense of duty is a social deposit<sup>at</sup> in the individual; the content of conscience is acquired, though the vague disposition to social behaviour is innate. The moral self, the social man, is no "special creation" coming mysteriously from the hand of God, but the late product of leisurely evolution. Morals are not absolute; they are a code of conduct more or less haphazardly developed for group survival and varying with the nature and circumstances of the group.

Kant bows to the authority of moral sense and Islam to that of revelation. But why should we submit to authority and give up our freedom? (Kant insists that morality is freedom) Because we believe that God is the creator of this world. This means that God's authority is absolute and He is the final source of any authority in this world. But what about a man's conscience? Bishop Butler suggests that the deliverances of conscience are not opposed to the commands of God. Conscience is the 'voice of God' speaking in human beings. T.H.Green considers the 'real self' as one that truly expresses the 'will of God'. So the Quran maintains the absolute authority of God and the dictates of one's real self must not oppose the "will of God." If they are contrary to the spirit of Islam they are the suggestions of the "Flesh." The created must submit to the


According to the Quran this world is a trial. But it creator's authority as a man submits to his master's does not give us any reason for the necessity of this order. In Christianity it is believed that relation trial. In Islam this trial is for the sake of man between God and man and that of father and son. But God is quite indifferent to it. But we have a tradition this analogy cannot be pushed very far. A father gives which tells us that this world is the result of God's his son freedom of action, but when he finds that he is going to fall over a precipice, he will try to save him. But God, knowing that Adam was going to commit a sin, did not save him. A kind father though God is indifferent burn his hand to teach him a lesson. If it be said that man's fall was necessary to make him better and purer, still we find that this does not apply to many, who are doomed to eternal punishment. If they are called rebellious sons, it does not solve the difficulty. A father will not let his rebellious son go to ruin if he can prevent it, But God looks on indifferently though he has the power to alter the career of the wicked people. The analogy simply means the kindness of God in forgiving the sins of man. <sup>When a man turns to God he acts</sup> Islam gives a man freedom of action and is quite indifferent as to what he does. But if a man turns towards God and is sincerely repentant, God helps him. The first step is to be taken by man, not God. So God stands to man as a master to a servant and his commands must be obeyed, otherwise the consequences are severe. He is the creator and so he has absolute authority over the created. But why did He create this world and subject human beings to suffering and temptations? Why does he let men wander in the labyrinths of error, and from thence to plunge into the gulfs of wickedness and misery? What was the necessity of all this? The Quran says: "Do you suppose we have created you in vain." "He hath created death and life, that He might test you, which of you has done the best deeds."

*with a father*

According to the Quran this world is a trial. But it does not give us any reason for the necessity of this trial. In Islam this trial is for the sake of man. God is quite indifferent to it. But we have a tradition which tells us that this world is the result of God's desire to make himself known <sup>for an</sup> of the appreciation of His own beauty. In this case the world is the material for God's thought. Thus we see that though God is indifferent as to what man does, yet He cannot punish him unless He prescribes a code of morals for him. That is why He sends a prophet to every nation to guide it to the path of righteousness. Mohommad, according to a tradition, claims to have been sent to improve the morals of the people. He has brought with him the Quran, a code of morals and a book of wisdom. How is this authority to be exercised and law to be interpreted? According to the Quran, the chief person who understands the Divine Commands and interprets them correctly is the prophet. The people are to follow him and take him as their model. He is considered the perfect man. After his death, his viceroys or Khalifa is to administer the Law and his interpretation is considered final provided it is not contrary to the interpretation of the prophet. Then comes the consensus of the learned men in all ages. They have authority to make provision for those points which are not touched by either the prophet or his immediate successors. In the matter of details Islam leaves some freedom to the public.

Islam divides the duties under two heads viz. i- duty towards God ii- duty towards man. Obligations arise on account of our relation to God and also on obedience to God and all other desires should be

high



account of our connection with other persons and institutions. Islam does not keep to these two spheres as distinct from each other. In respecting the rights of other people a person is discharging both his duty to God and his duty towards man. But there are certain duties towards God which do not fall into the sphere of duty towards man, for instance, prayer. Islam makes it clear that all sins committed against God are pardonable by God, but those committed against man will in no case be pardoned by God. For instance, if A steals the purse of B he has committed a double crime viz. against God and against man. God will pardon him for disobeying His orders if he becomes penitent, but unless the thief returns the purse to the owner, and makes up the damage done, he will still be punished for taking away what did not belong to him if he is not punished in this world. The reward of any virtuous deed that the thief has done will be transferred to the owner in place of his purse. I am not quite sure whether the same is the case in Christianity. In my talk with the Christian theologians I have come to know that when a man gets converted to Christianity his sins are pardoned, but as to whether they make any distinction of the kind noted above I have received different answers.

God will judge a man's action according to his inner intention. Any action done with a desire to please God is considered meritorious. But our mental constitution is not made up of a number of isolated or independent desires. Our desires form a universe. So according to Islam the leading desire should be obedience to God and all other desires should be

subordinated to it. <sup>only</sup> God can only read the thoughts of men and as a man cannot with any certainty know the motive which led to the performance of a certain act on the part of another man, the Qazi is to judge a man by his actions and not by his intentions.

A few words will suffice as regards 'punishment.' A man who believes in Islam will go to heaven directly after his death if his virtuous deeds outweigh his wicked deeds. In the other case he will have to undergo some kind of punishment before he is finally admitted to heaven. But in the case of non-believers they are eternally meant for the hell. Those non-believers who havenot heard the words of Islam are exempted from this. In the case of punishment in this world the Qazi is to act according to the laws of the Quran. The punishments are not suited to the gravity of the crime. For instance, the punishment for theft does not take into consideration whether it is the offender's first crime or the second. The punishment for theft is "cutting the hand of the thief." Moreover it does not take into consideration the age of the culprit. From the point of view of modern thinkers the punishments are too severe. Stoning to death for adultery is an instance of this. Moreover it does not take into consideration the circumstances under which the act was committed. For heinous crimes sometimes the punishment is too lenient. For instance, a man can escape the consequences of murder by offering money to the heirs. Supposing the man is not on good terms with the heirs or they want to inherit his property as soon as they can. If anyone murders him, the heirs will be only too glad to get compensation for a man's death. Moreover this fact may also lead the murderer to changing the laws of the country to suit the requirements

commit the crime, because he knows that he will not be hanged.

The modern thinkers have put forward three principal theories of the aim of punishment viz- i deterrent, ii-reformative, and iii - retributive. The punishments inflicted by Islam fall under the heads deterrent and retributive. It is intended to set an example for others so that they may not follow the course adopted by the culprit and secondly to conform to the maxim, "as you sow, so shall you reap." One who has done wrong must suffer the consequences of one's evil deed. Another aim is to get rid of the offender so that he may not be able to work any further mischief, for instance, cutting the hand of a thief and stoning to death of adulterers. In the present time, some people, especially psychologists and medical men, regard the crime as the result of some kind of insanity and they maintain that the offender should not be punished but should be cured of his distempers. In some cases this view holds good but not in all. There are cases of neurotic temperament where the subject is not master of his actions. The same is the case with an impulsive action, but in this case the man is to be blamed for leading a life which makes the impulsive action possible. Islam does not punish the insane, a child under seven years of age and, in some cases, the female sex. But no action is taken to reform the offenders who have committed the offence for the first time or who were too inexperienced to see the consequences of their wrong deeds.

The environment of society is undergoing a constant change and the legislators of the world are constantly changing the laws of the country to suit the requirements

Augustine maintains that "through the fall of Adam of the society. But the law of Quran is fixed. It does not take into consideration the changes of the society. Take the case of us<sup>u</sup>ury. In the modern economic world one cannot help taking interest or paying interest on the capital. But according to Islam <sup>interest</sup> usury is not allowed under any circumstances. These objections may be over-ruled by admitting the authority of the concensus of the learned men. But whether the learned should give a decision against the commandments of Islam is a debatable question, though they have often actually issued such orders under one pretence or another. Wine is totally forbidden by the Quran, but the Qazis have permitted the use of it for medicinal purposes. The same is the case with "interest" and the animals killed by an un-Islamic method.

Sin-Islam recognises two kinds of offences, viz- capital or mild. Mild offences, and in some cases capital offences too, can be expiated by sacrifice and fasting. Islam lays stress on the maxim: "Every man for himself." No one can take away the sin of any other man. One is wholly and solely responsible for one's actions. It is true that in some cases one can transfer the reward of his good deeds to someone else. Islam does not believe in the doctrine of atonement in the sense in which Christianity maintains it. David's sins in numbering the people were atoned by the sacrifice of thousands of people in some pestilence. "The stripes of the righteous servants are the means by which the wicked are ~~exalted~~- healed." Again, Christ gave up His life to redeem the sins of mankind.

Augustine maintains that "through the fall of Adam all mankind has become guilty in God's sight and justly exposed to his wrath and curse. So great was the guilt of this sin that it has involved all his descenents in a common doom, and, apart from Christ's redemption, even infants dying in infancy are justly condemned to eternal punishment." -- W. Adams Brown.

Islam maintains the doctrine of intercession. On the Day of Judgement the guilty, on account of grief and remorse for their sins, will not be in a position to plead for mercy. The prophet will plead on their behalf. But Islam holds that no one can plead on behalf of the other unless he is permitted by God to do so.

AS regards actions, between "Thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" there are three more grades viz- i commendable actions, omission of which is not punishable, though commission is rewarded, ii- permitted actions (Mubah) iii- reprehensible actions (Makruh) disapproved but not punishable. Intention to commit a crime is an offence, but it is not punishable by the courts of justice unless intention is translated into action. Adam Smith quotes in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" a passage from Carlyle. "From the purpose of crime to the act there is an abyss; wonderful to think of. The finger lies on the pistol; but the man is not yet a murderer; nay his whole nature staggering at such a consummation, is there not a confused pause rather -- one last instant of possibility for him?"

"Evil into the mind of God or Man,  
May come and go, so unapproved, and leave  
No spot or blame behind."

Milton's "Paradise Lost."

In actions Islam acknowledges the principle of "means between two w extremes." God does not lay any burden on man which the latter is unable to bear. God's commands are considered practical as far as the average man is concerned. In case of anyone less than the average there are certain remissions and concessions.

VIRTUES - Virtue is defined as 'good living' or leading a life on the model of the prophet. In order to be virtuous a man need not leave his ordinary occupation. One who exercises his faculties in a natural way amidst the society is considered more worthy than one who leaves the world to worship God in a lonely place. A man is considered a social being and for the perfect development of his faculties society is indispensable. Self- mortification is not allowed by the orthodox sects. In this respect Islam is nearer Protestantism than Roman Catholicism. In Roman Catholicism (at least in the Middle Ages) the religious life tended to be so abstract that it was necessary to get away from the life of ordinary duty in order to live it at all. Thus society helps the man in self-realisation and self-development i.e. to work out by one's own will and effort, the potentialities of excellence latent in the Self; to develop knowledge love, sympathy etc. to regulate impulses, passions, desires, under the guidance of reason; and consequently to have a feeling of satisfaction, happiness or bliss. These potentialities of excellence are realised by living a life prescribed by Islam.

Every society is governed by certain rules or laws which are called social manners and customs. In my opinion it is generally the men in the upper strata of

the society that set the fashion and the poor people are merely imitators. In Islam, on the other hand, it was mainly the learned that set the moral fashions for the illiterate to follow. And consequently we find that anything repugnant to or contrary to the fundamentals of Islam was not tolerated. In one sense it was a bar to the progress of the nations, because Islam lays down in detail the regulations according to which one has to carry on his daily work. The followers have to take the behaviour of the prophet, of his immediate successors and Immams as their model. As time passed on the War jurists laid so much stress on it that any deviation from it was considered punishable. For instance, they insisted that a man must not put on the dress of a Christian as it was not worn by a prophet. The trousers must not hang below the ankles and so on. This spirit led to the deterioration of the morals and had a very bad effect on the national welfare of the people.

As regards the relations of the members of a theless society with one another, Christianity places a very high ideal before us. "Love thy neighbour as thou lovest thy own self." Though this maxim has been criticised<sup>adversely</sup> by the modern thinkers on certain grounds, yet, on the whole, if acted upon, it takes away the distinction of colour, caste or creed. Islam believes in the brotherhood of the believers. Non-believers are excluded from any brotherly relations with the believers. They are considered as something outside the circle of fraternity. Among the non-believers, the polytheists are greatly hated. They are not permitted to enter the mosques and other places of worship. The Christians and Jews are tolerated as they belong to "the people of the revealed books." But the contempt with which

naturally taken as slaves, yet in reality they are like the polytheists were looked upon, made the Muslims exclude the Christians as well from entering their mosques as they believed in the Fatherhood of God.

There is another high ideal in Christianity, namely that of non-violence. "If anyone giveth thee a slap on the cheek, turn the other cheek towards him." If the people were to act up to this, there would be an end to all wars in the world. Islam does not place this ideal before its followers, though it does not at the same time ask its followers to be aggressors. War is not considered an evil in Islam. War in defence of Islam is considered a very high ideal. "Whoever," says Nietzsche, "has seen those furrowed basins which once contained glaciers, will hardly deem it possible that a time will come when the same spot will be a valley of woods and meadows and streams. It is the same in the history of mankind; the wildest forces break the way, destructive at first, but their activity was nevertheless necessary in order that later a milder civilisation might build up its house. Their terrible energies are the cyclopic architects and roadmakers of humanity." The Greek virtue of 'courage' confined itself almost entirely to valour in battle. It is a good thing to brave physical dangers, but, in my opinion, that man is the most courageous who can face the dangers of his own inner self. Not to strike when you have the power to strike, and to forgive and forget requires the greatest amount of courage.

Islam permits slavery, but at the same time asks its followers to treat the slaves kindly. In many places in the East the slaves take <sup>their meal</sup> ~~the meat~~ at the same table with the master. The children of the slaves are

naturally taken as slaves, yet in reality they are like ordinary servants. In spite of all this the fact still remains that they have been deprived of liberty. It is a great virtue to set a slave free but if one does not do so he does not make himself liable to punishment. This is another defect of making an immutable law for all ages.

The status of women in some respects is inferior to that of men, but their rights are safe-guarded. In the middle ages and in modern times, too, in the East the women were <sup>considered</sup> inferior to men intellectually and physically and Islam has in many ways tried to remove this inferiority, but still it does not give them the same freedom as is enjoyed by man.

Islam and communism are poles apart. Islam believes in the right of the individual to possess private property and it also recognises the difference in the grades of the society. All men are equal in the eyes of God, As far as justice is concerned but not equal in respect to their physical, moral and intellectual advancement and Islam does not take upon itself the task of removing these differences.

Now I will quote a few passages from the Quran to show how the believer is to regulate his conduct in his daily life :-

Charity -- "Give food unto the poor and the orphan and the a bondman for His sake, saying, we feed you for God's sake only: we desire no recompense from you, nor any thanks." "They will ask thee what they shall bestow in alms; answer, the good which ye bestow, let it be given to parents and kindred, and orphans, and the poor and the stranger."

Avarice etc. -- "Woe unto every slanderer and backbiters: who heapeth up riches, and prepareth the

same for the time to come! He thinketh that his riches will render him immortal. By no means!

Beneficence -- "Serve God and associate no creature with Him; and show kindness unto parents, and relations and orphans, and the poor, and your neighbour, who is of kin to you, and also to your neighbour who is a stranger, and to your familiar companion, and the traveller, and the captives whom your right hand shall possess: for God loveth not the proud or the vain glorious, who are covetous, and recommend covetousness unto men. . ."

Civility -- "O true believers, enter not any house beside your own houses, until ye have asked leave, and have saluted the family thereof: this is better for you; peradventure ye will be admonished. And if ye shall find no person in the houses, yet do not enter them until leave be granted you . . ."

Conversation -- "O true believers, when ye talk privately together, talk not of wickedness and enmity."

Debt-- "Deal not unjustly with others and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. If there be any debtor under a difficulty of paying his ~~rent~~ debt, let his creditor wait until it be easy for him to do it; but if ye remit it as alms, it will be better for you, if ye knew it. . ."

. . . . O true believers, when you bind yourselves one to another in a debt for a certain time, write it down, or let a writer write between you according to justice . . . Call to witness two witnesses of your neighbouring men; but if there be not two men, let there be a man and two women . . . if one of those women should mistake, the other of them shall cause her to and recollect. And the witnesses shall not refuse whenever

they shall be called . . . .” He would say millions  
of Dissentions -- “If two parties of the believers  
contend with one another, do you endeavour to compose  
the matter between them and if one of them offer an  
insult unto the other, fight against that party which  
offered the insult . . . .”

Women --- “The women ought also to behave towards their  
husbands in like manner as their husbands should behave  
towards them according to what is just; but the men  
ought to have a superiority over them . . . . Ye may  
divorce your wives twice and then return with humility  
or dismiss them with kindness. But it is not lawful  
for you to take away anything of what you have given  
them . . . . But if the husband divorce her a third  
time, she shall not be lawful for him again until she  
marry another husband. But if he also divorce her, it  
shall be no crime in them if they return to each other .”

Justice --- “O my people, give full measure of just  
weight, and diminish not unto men anything of their  
matters, neither commit injustice on the earth, acting  
corruptly.”

In the end I may say that the foundation of  
Christianity lies in faith, hope and love, while Islam  
is based on fear and hope, though later on we find an  
element of love in it.

So far I have dealt with what a Muslim ought to  
do according to Islam and now I turn my attention to  
the actual state of affairs in Muslim India. The  
account given by the Indian historians is meagre and  
the course is beset with great difficulties. An Indian  
historian's account of an event is often one-sided and  
he fails to see the point of view of his opponent. He

The people resigned themselves to their lot, instead

is also given to exaggeration. He would say millions when he only means a few hundreds. Sometimes the account is incorrect because he has to flatter the men in power.

However, we find that while Arabs, Mongols and Persians maintained to a certain extent their own national standard of morality, those who were converted from Hinduism could not easily give up the social customs and manners amidst which they were brought up. They brought in with them the idol-worship in Islam through another form. They began to worship the tombs of the saints and their ancestors. The saints were looked upon as demi-gods, who in some cases could even set aside the power of God. Magic and superstition maintained a dominant influence over the minds of the people. The women were the chief victims of this. Life inside the harem of a newly converted Muslim was different in no way different from that of a Hindu. Those were times of war. The Muslims were either fighting against the Hindus or against one another. Such wars have a great demoralising effect on the minds of the people. They become pessimistic. And the misery and suffering which is the inevitable result of the war makes the people superstitious. They try to invoke the help of the supernatural powers. If anyone claims to be a magician, he is greatly welcomed. The majority of the Muslims believed in predestination and the Hindus in the doctrine of Karma. The former ascribed misery and suffering to the will of God and the latter to the unknown deeds done in the past life. In both cases the bodies of men and physical environments presented an obstacle to any moral progress. The people resigned themselves to their lot, instead

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past time.

Another evil which crept in Islam was "child marriage." The daughter was considered as some-thing to be disposed of and the sooner the parents got rid of her the better. Though Islam makes a provision for of finding a remedy for the evil state of affairs. Again, that was the time of militarism. Might was right. In such a case greed and avarice easily, their takes possession of a man. There were many bands of robbers let loose on the people. In fact, anyone who could collect some substantial following was a self-made king. Though these people were Muslims, yet they could easily set aside the rules of Islam to suit their convenience. Was not India a dar-ul-Harrah (a land of war)? Islam allows a certain latitude in dar-ul-Harrah. And who could say no to the capricious whims of these autocrats? Justice simply meant the carrying out of the orders of the rulers. Mutilation and torture were the common punishments. In fact there was no standard according to which punishment was meted out to the guilty as well as innocent. Life and property was not safe. The people began to hide their women behind the four walls of the house. Whenever they had to go out they covered themselves from head to foot so that their beauty and age may not be known. The veil in other Islamic countries was not of this type. Even in these days the veil worn by women in Egypt, Persia and Arabia is altogether of a different type. There is much freedom in it. But an Indian woman is covered from head to foot in such a way as to make it difficult even to breathe. Their condition in the intense heat of summer is pitiable. This is merely a relic of the

past time.

Another evil which crept in Islam was "child marriage." The daughter was considered as something to be disposed of and the sooner the parents got rid of her the better. Though Islam makes a provision for the maintenance of the girls after their father's death, I believe, there is no such provision in the Hindu law. The parents feared that after their death, their daughters would be left unprovided for, so they considered it best to get them married at an early age. This practice has been the cause of great national ruin.

Islam maintains the equality of the believers. There is no question of high birth or low birth. A poor man stands shoulder to shoulder with a rich man in the mosque. But the Hindus have a rigid caste system. A Brahman is considered to be the most superior of all men and Shudra is untouchable. This distinction brought about a corresponding destruction in Islam. The Muslims in India were divided among various castes. Intermarriages between different castes were condemned. There was some sort of classification of the people according to their professions in other Islamic countries, but such classification was not a bar to a social intercourse. In India, caste confined them to various closed groups. A man of low caste may become rich but he will not be of the same rank as the poor sayyid.

Asceticism was greatly practised in India by the Muslims either by way of self-mortification or to make an impression on their co-religionists. In this they followed their Hindu fellow men. They gave up eating of meat and resorted to some lonely place for

meditation. The jungle was given preference to a mosque in this respect. This gave rise to a good deal of hypocrisy. There were innumerable saints in India. In fact, any one who showed some deviation from the ordinary mode of life was considered a saint. Though Islam condemns begging, yet the number of beggars in India far exceeds that in any other country, because Hinduism encourages this evil. In rituals and ceremonies too they mainly followed the Hindus. In this respect Islam in India presented a picture which had little in common with other Muslim countries. It may be called a Hinduised Islam.

In less troubled times the people acted up to the Arab, saying: "The people follow the religions of their kings." If the king was himself an orthodox follower of Islam, he would enforce a rigid observance of the Islamic law, but when the king was inclined the other way, the people were free to choose for themselves what they liked. On the whole the priestly class exerted a dominant influence on the people. It was not easy to openly criticise the 'fatwas' of the Qazis.

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Moreover, in some cases the people were afraid of the king, which was as a formidable weapon in the hands of the poets to avenge any real or supposed grievances. In spite of all this many of the poets have risen to a sublime height where they have been face to face with the ultimate Reality, gaining access to the Royal Presence through the manifestations of nature.

(1) Chapter III

The first item in which nearly all the poets took PERSIAN POETRY IN INDIA. Qasida or an eulogical poem. The rulers bestowed handsome rewards on the poets for writing poems in their praise. In some cases

This is a subject on which volumes can be written. A detailed study of every Persian poet, the influences of environments in his writing, his own genius in exploring the hidden treasures of nature, in short a view of the whole from every aspect is worth the trouble. But I have neither time nor space to indulge in such an attractive idea and so I will deal briefly with the main points of Persian poetry. In my treatment of the subject I will not deal with the literary or linguistic aspects, but will confine my attention to the thought of the poet. The poets occupied an influential position in the Indian courts, because their services were urgently needed by the men in power for certain political reasons and they provided a polite amusement and entertainment for the public. Moreover, in some cases the people were afraid of the satires, which was a formidable weapon in the hands of the poets to avenge any real or supposed grievance. In spite of all this many of the poets have risen to a sublime height where they have been face to face with the ultimate Reality, gaining access to the Royal Presence through the manifestations of nature.

(1) Exoteric poetry :

Social Psychology. But unfortunately some of the rulers showed so much weakness of character and the

The first item in which nearly all the poets took a special delight ~~ix~~ was Qasida or an eulogical poem. The rulers bestowed handsome rewards on the poets for writing poems in their praise. In some cases the reward amounted to a poet's weight in gold coins. In another instance a poet's mouth was filled with precious stones. In the first place, Qasida served a useful purpose. It was an expression of hero-worship. For instance, in modern times few people would take the risk of putting their lives in danger or to break the speed records in air, sea or land, if the public through the medium of newspapers did not encourage them in their arduous tasks. Secondly, it was a source of income to the poets. The poets had to find their means of living and it is evident that they hardly got anything for their ethical poems, though it is true that they were paid according to the literary merits of the Qasidas. Thirdly, nothing is more attractive to man than his own praise. The number of people who really like to hear the truth about themselves is very small and the rulers in Asiatic countries were no exception. to this. Fourthly, in countries like India and Persia, where crowns are as quietly lost as they are won, a ruler has to depend mostly on the good will of his followers. Now poetry appeals rather to the heart rather than to the head. It was wise for the rulers to have someone to sing their praises as a matter of suggestion to the others to be firm in their loyalty. Suggestion plays an important part in

Social Psychology. But unfortunately some of the rulers showed so much weakness of character and the poets exaggerated their supposed qualities to such an extent that all effect on the people was lost. The people knew that the poet was a flatterer, and so they did not pay much attention to the praise of the patrón. Where there was no patron there was no Qasida. The number of Qasidas written in the reign of earlier Muslim ~~ka~~ kings far exceed those written in the reign of Aurangzeb. Now a poet begins a Qasida with a theme not connected with the Patron's Praises. So in this way some poets have written very beautiful verses on various aspects of both organic and inorganic nature. In many cases the whole Qasida dealt with the natural subjects and the mention of the patron was only nominal. For instance, Urfi's Qasida on Kashmir is a beautiful expression of what man can learn from nature. The first line runs thus: " Every individual with a burning soul, that comes to Kashmir, even if it be a roasted fowl, gains new wings." Others also followed the same line and we find a good deal of metaphysical and ethical thought in these Qasidas. It may be noted here that the poets knew what kind of Qasida would please the patron and so expressed the same kind of views. Akbar was interested in philosophical discussions and so among his courtiers there were many philosophers. The poets also adopted the same course; that is why we find a good many philosophical problems discussed nicely in many Qasidas of Urfi

Being is indeed a worldly occupation. This is what the

poets have done. But to study persons requires a special knowledge, a special skill, and all the people and his colleagues. And if we compare the Qasidas of the post-Akbar period with those of Akbar's time we notice that the former cared more for the form than thought. Akbar's poets expressed their thoughts freely without any restriction while those of the latter period had one eye on the chief Qazi so that they may not incur his displeasure by expressing opinions in ghazal and those that distinguish themselves in contrary to Islam. But poets like Hasan and Khayisrau this branch were men who could study human beings. did not care much for the kings or their pomp and show. For instance, Khusrav Hasan, Iraqi, Urfi, Naziri, Qudsi Though they have Qasidas in praise of the kings yet many of their Qasidas deal with natural topics and are wholly devoid of any kind of flattery. This is due to the fact that they were under the influence of the great Sufi Nizam Uddin.

(2) Esoteric Poetry (quatrains, longer poems):

Ghazal embodies the philosophy of love, viz. love for God and love for human beings. Love for God is the sole possession of the Sufis, but love for mankind has interested many others. Philosophy of love is the philosophy of human feelings and emotions. Once a lady asked a professor what was the subject of his study. The lady was surprised at his answer and she remarked, "In a world so full of fascinating things, such as glaciers, sea-anemones and shovel-headed sharks how could any really live person be interested in the abstractions of philosophy?" The question floored the professor. But a later thought showed him that he was studying persons. All the problems of philosophy show that there are persons in the world and to study human beings is indeed a worldly occupation. This is what the

poets have done. But to study persons requires a special knowledge, a special skill, and all the people who do not possess that insight into the human nature. So we find that many of the poets who express their views of mankind miserably fail to impress an impartial critic. All the poets are not of equal rank. This is what makes them differ from one another. In the Oriental poetry the best expression of human feelings is found in ghazal and those that distinguish themselves in this branch were men who could study human beings. For instance, Khusrau, Hasan, Iraqi, Urfi, Naziri, Qudsi and others. For instance, Qudsi says: "Who with her eye-lashes has gone deep in my heart and whose dark eyes have darkened the world to me." When a man has a glimpse of some beautiful object, he gets wholly absorbed into it. The environments make no impression on him. And when he is separated from his love, the whole world looks dark to him.

Mairfi says: "She accuses me of loving some one else. Does any one else exist for me in this world?" To a lover everything other than his beloved is non-existent. The lover, the Beloved and Beauty are one and the same.

Another poet says "In the morning the sun rises trembling on your street, I am proud of the courage of the mirror that comes before your face." The beloved is so beautiful and majestic that the sun dares not come before her. The rays of the sun seem trembling. This is really a specimen of Sufi poetry. The sun, the earth and other planets dare not face the divine beauty. But a man sees it reflected in the

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"We are holy birds, we do not recognise worldly music. We are angelic birds, we do not know the worldly mirror of his heart. The reference here is to a verse in the Quran. "We offered our 'trust' to the mountains and the earth, but they could not bear the burden. It was Man who accepted it."

Another poet refers to a different aspect of this: "The weak eye cannot bear His unveiled Beauty, the transparency of a mirror (i.e. the human heart) before His face is like a drop of dew before the sun." Before His majestic Beauty man's egoism or personality quickly vanishes.

Thousands of such like instances can be quoted but I do not think there is any further need for it.

A poet is at home in India, a land of wonderful beauty and glorious natural scenes. That is why

Ghazal has reached such a great height in this country. A Persian poet was in daily contact with the Hindus

with their natural tendency to philosophical speculation. This encouraged the poets to observe the phenomena

before them closely. The poems of Urfi, Faizi, Naziri, Salim, Jalal etc. are full of metaphysical speculations.

Iraqi says: "Love and God's attributes are identical. The Lover, the Beloved and Beauty are one and the same." He makes no distinction between God's attributes and His Essence.

"He wrote a Word in His own likeness and called it Adam and Eve." Man is made in the image of God.

Khan Zaman: "When they moulded the heart of man, they poured a drop of love into it." Love constitutes the essence of man.

Faizi: "If all the worlds were to combine, they cannot cure the broken leg of an ant." God is all powerful and the world has its limitations.

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"We are holy birds, we do not recognise the worldly music. We are angelic birds, we do not know the worldly atmosphere. We have positive arguments, we do not talk in negatives. Learn affirmation from us and not negation. In the knowledge of Ultimate Reality we are guided by our moral conscience. We do not recognise the authority of the philosophers." Ultimate Reality is not known by negation. Knowledge of one's own self leads by way of analogy to the knowledge of God.

Similarly :-

"What is an idol? It is merely a manifestation of "Logos" that has found a firm footing in the church of my heart."

"I have never seen a more wonderful thing than the heart of Faizi which is the pearl, ocean, as well as the diver." Knower and the known are the same.

Urfi says: "The jurists worship the Book. The seekers of Kaaba worship the threshold. Take away Thy veil so that people may know that they are worshipping something else." God can only be known through "Love" not through religion or revelation. "Those who comment on Thy beauty are really interpreting an unexperienced dream. "Either do not get out of ignorance or be a Plato for the middle course means nothing but mirage and thirst."

"A seeker after God is misled both by Islam and Paganism. The moth does not care whether the lamp belongs to Kaaba or to a temple." Truth is not confined to a particular place or time. Truth is universal.

Kalim :- "If the writer of all men's fate is God, why should there be so much variation in the writing of one person?"

The problem of monism has mainly engaged the attention of the poets for a very long time. Some of the Muslim poets in India have come very near expressing the pantheistic views, but they have never transgressed the limit. They consider God all pervading and this world a manifestation of God but they do not identify God with the world or consider the world as unreal. The following line of Khusrau may be taken as an example of this.

"I have become thou and thou hast become I,  
I have become 'body' and thou hast become soul,  
so that no one may say that I and thou are different." Now Khusrau in this poem points out his union with God, but he does not identify himself with God. The difference of soul and body still lies between him and God. Similarly Sarmad, who was executed by Aurangzeb for his pantheistic views, says: "Whatever kind of garment you may put on, I can recognise your stature through it." The creatures are only outward manifestations of God. They are not one with God, just as a garment is not one with a man. Or in other words unlike the vedantists, the poet does not take God as the material cause of the world.

There has been a great store of Sufi poems in India. Khusrau, Ghazali, Urfi, Hasan, Faizi, Salim, Bedil, Hazin, etc. have masnawis on ethics and sufiism. All of them have tried to imitate the style of Manlana

Rumi, but none of them has reached the same standard of excellence. The reason for this deficiency lies in the fact that Rumi was himself a sufi. He recorded his own experience, while many of the above named poets were ignorant of mysticism. They were men of the world. Their statement of mystic experience is second-hand, so it cannot have the force of the original.

It is often objected that "Ghazal" is not a continuous narration. Each line is different from the other. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that Ghazal was mainly meant for the expression of love or Divine love. In a mystic experience the states of the sufis are ever changing. They have no continuity. So their expression is not continuous. The poet expresses each item as it comes to his mind. Sometimes he is dwelling on one theme, sometimes on another. Sometimes he is looking at one aspect of the Beloved, sometimes at another. He is not a logician, he is only a poet. He appeals to the feeling, not to intellect. The lover for whom he writes does not care for the continuity of the subject as long as the poet is engaged in discussing love affairs.

The poet is concerned with the human nature as it expresses itself in love. He is concerned with the feelings, desires, passions, emotions, pangs of separation and joys of union etc. and he sees them all as a part of one great sentiment of love. Though we find each line expressing a distinct idea, yet they are all connected as far as the main theme is concerned. They are all different aspects of one predominating object of consciousness --- love.

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the realm of imagination, to express the feeling of a  
love in such terms. On this point they must not be

And the objection has been raised against the Persian poets. They describe the beloved as a murderer, a liar, a cheat, a fool, fickle, and of loose character. Now the beloved may be either Divine or human. Even in the former case the poet has to describe Divine attributes in an anthropomorphic sense. In expressing Him as an object of devotion he personifies Him, and attributes human qualities to Him. Whether the beloved be God or man the poet tries to see him or her through the eyes of a lover. Now the lovers vary in their temperaments and natural disposition. Even one man is not the same always. He is changing. Sometimes he is in one mood, sometimes in another. So he looks upon his beloved according to the mood in which he is. When he finds that the separation from his sweetheart is killing him, he naturally considers her the cause of his suffering and consequently calls her a slayer and when he dwells upon this aspect of his beloved, he expresses his feelings in relevant metaphors and similes. He considers her eyelashes as so many daggers that pierce through his heart. If the beloved, being the most beautiful, becomes an object of adoration for all and thus excites the jealousy of a particular lover, this is not a blot on her character. A jealous lover is naturally very suspicious and gives vent to his supposed grievances in a manner most appropriate to the characteristics of his race. The poet in this respect merely expresses the ideas of the race to which he belongs. The poet himself does not create these characteristics. In my opinion the Persian poets have taken a high flight in

THE NATURE OF MUSLIM CONQUEST ON HINDU CULTURE

the realm of imagination, to express the feeling of a love in such terms. On this point they must not be judged from a Western point of view.

again it is said that a Persian poet describes the lover as a very low and disgraceful person. I am of opinion that this is due to the extreme humility of the lover. When a lover compares himself with his beloved, he finds that they are poles apart. It is natural with him to describe himself in as humble terms as possible. Then he wants to gain the favour of his beloved and the only way which he considers most effective is to make himself an object of pity and then to excite the comparison of the beloved. In most cases the beloved is God Himself, and if the lover describes himself in humiliating terms he cannot be blamed for that. He merely points to his own limitations and God's infiniteness.

If we look carefully into the Hindu systems of philosophy, we do not find any trace of Theism in them. They either deny the existence of God, or identify the Absolute with the world. Some people find theistic views in *nyaya* and *veshika* and consider them as the ground-work of Hindu belief in Divinity. But I cannot agree with them. Even the name of God is not mentioned in them, and where there is such a word as *brahman*, it is interpreted in a different way by the commentators, so as to leave no doubt.

If we compare the poems of early writers, such as Khusrau and those of the later period, for instance, Nasir Ali Sirhindi, we find a great difference. The early writers were more easily understood by a man of ordinary ability while the latter are only intelligible to philosophers and men of deep learning. This, I believe, is due to the fact that poets of the type of Nasir Ali aim at describing the mystical experience and they do not wish to take ordinary folks into their confidence. Moreover, they want to show how high they can soar in the region of thought and so they express their views in a language which is full of similes and metaphors and one has to think for a time before one can grasp their meaning. Of course, this is a defect in poetry, but as far as thought is concerned their poems embody many noble ideas in a picturesque language.

THE EFFECT OF MUSLIM CONQUEST ON HINDU CULTURE

As we have seen before, the ancient Hindu considered all things alive without making any distinction of body and soul. When their minds began to see order in nature, they thought of the processes of nature as various independent departments controlled by independent mental powers, finite but living from eternity or born from nature like other finite beings. So animism gave way to polytheism. In the Vedic period we find the world under the sway of different controlling powers, equal in authority, but each being monopolising the attention of the devotee according to his need of the moment. But in this we find a tendency towards Pantheism ; for instance, Agni or Fire or Heat, seems to pervade all things. Nothing was alive without Agni. All the controlling powers seem to be identified with Agni and Agni with all. The same is the case with Upanishads.

Pantheism holds the minds of Upanishad, Sages. If we look carefully into the Hindu systems of philosophy we do not find any trace of Theism in them. They either deny the existence of God, or identify the Absolute with the world. Some people find theistic views in nyaya and Vesheshika and consider them as the ground-work of Hindu belief in Divinity. But I cannot agree with them. Even the name of God is not mentioned in them, and where there is such a word as may mean "God", it is interpreted in a different way by the Commentators, so as to leave no doubt as to the non-existence of the idea of God. The supporters of Theistic belief quote the following in support of their theory.

(1) Udayana Acharya, a very celebrated ancient Naiyayika, is supposed to have uttered the following couplet on arriving at the temple of Jagannath Puri and finding the door shut:-

"Thou art drunk with the inebriation of majesty. Me thou

(world) (scornest)

world, but that of man's *Bandhas* towards God. They were scornest. But let the *Bandhas* show themselves and upon solving the problem how a man can become part and parcel of God, his will depend thy very existence."

But do we find anywhere any record of the above couplet? It all rests upon oral tradition, and therefore cannot be much relied upon.

(2) The word "God is found only once in *Nanjaya Sutra* in the following aphorism;- "God is the cause since the works of souls are found to be ineffectual"

But this is interpreted by the Commentors in different ways, so the question cannot be decided one way or the other.

(3) Again, with reference to a passage in *Vaishesh-ika*, some people consider that the word "Tad" refers to God. About this *Shankra Misra* says:-

"The word 'tad' refers to God - though he is not previously mentioned - because of his being Well-known. (The meaning of the passage in this case will be: Veda is authoritative as being God's declaration). But further on *Shankra Misra* says:-

"Or the 'tad' refers to virtue because juxtaposed". (The meaning will be: Veda will have authority by virtue of its treating of virtue)

It may be noted here that even some of the Commentors on *Nyaya* and *Vaisheshika* who lived in the middle ages, give a contradictory account of God's attributes. They hold that soul minds, atoms and other things existed co-eternally with God and were in no case subject to God's Will. How can then, absoluteness and Sovereignty be predicted of God as far as they are concerned?

Early Hindus never gave their mind to the problem of the relation of God to the world. It was *Shankra* that tried to bring out some kind of relation between God and the world by introducing the term "Maya". But in all this, we see that the question was not of God's descending to the

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world, but that of man's rising towards God. They were solving the problem how a man can become part and parcel of God.

But in the middle ages we find a change in the attitude of men. Here we see two distinct currents of Pantheism and theism running side by side. Along with Acosmism we find a belief in the reality of the world, though this reality is derived from God, the Perfect Transcendent Being, the object and worship of adoration. So we have to enquire how this theistic tendency crept into the region of Hindu Pantheism. It is often said that theism has its seed in Pantheism and that the latter naturally develops into the former. I admit the truth of this statement. But there are many factors that help in the germination and growth of the seed into a plant. So what are the factors that led to the growth of theistic belief in the soil of acosmism or Poncosmism? In my view, this belief came from outside, from Christianity and Islam. But at the same time, I wish to add that the Christian belief in the Personality of God was not made known to the people of India before the advent of Islam. Some people may object to this, and say that the Hindus who had trading relations with the adjoining countries could not be ignorant of Christianity for so many centuries. But I should point out that between Christian Countries and India, there lay Persia, the home of dualism of Zoroaster. Even if a people knew something about Christianity, this does not mean that Christian belief made any impression on the people. The Hindus are very conservative and stick to their old beliefs, with great tenacity. This is clear from the fact that in spite of so many centuries of Muslim rule, the Hindus did not wholly give way to Islam, while in other countries wherever Muslims went, the old religions were replaced by Islam. Had it not been for this habit of mind, they would have borrowed something

originally consisted of 8,800 slokas, and that it has from Zoroasterianism, but as they did not do so it makes it clear that they did not borrow anything from Christianity before the Coming of Islam. For a change in thought they wanted some strong impetus, and this was supplied by the Muslim invasion of Scinde. What could be more sensational than the defilement of the Holy Land of India by a nation whom the Hindus considered as untouchable? But the conquest of Sindh naturally opened their eyes to the beliefs of the Conquerors. In India, which has always been a land of religion, the first thing about which the Indians would enquire of a foreign nation, was its religious beliefs. What do these foreigners worship? Do they believe in images and Gods like us? Such questions would naturally arise to the minds of the Hindus.



Now, the main object of Islam is to refute the doctrine of Trinity and Incarnation of Christ, and these are the fundamental principles on which attention is fixed in studying Islam. So in this way the idea of Incarnation and personal God appealed to the Hindus and they began to show a tendency towards accepting theism.

Now we have to see whether there is any record of theistic belief in the books written before the Coming of Islam. So, by careful examination we find that the first trace of theistic belief is found in Gita. Now we have to see how this belief came into Gita, and what is its date of composition.

DATE OF COMPOSITION OF GITA

(3) As we have stated before, Gita is a part of the great epic poem called "Mahabharata". About this poem Macdonnell writes:-

"We further find in book 1. the direct statements that the poem at one time contained 2,4000 slokas before the episodes (Upakhyarṛa) were added, that it

(originally)

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originally consisted of 8,800 slokas, and that it has  
"three beginnings". Mahabharata took place in the Vedic  
period. In the greater part of Mahabharata the theology is  
still polytheistic. Brahma, Vishnu, Shive are practically  
on the same level. In one passage Vishnu and Shive are  
considered as rivals. In another, Vishnu addresses Shive  
as the first-born of the God. From the points as given  
above, the scholars have tried to show that the poem falls  
into three stages, viz:-

- (1) Early heroic songs consisting of 8,800 slokas.
  - (2) The story of Mahabharata consisting of 2,400 slokas in  
which Krishna is considered as a saintly person or demi-  
God.
  - (3) The epic recast with Krishna as God.
- This idea is expressed in the Gita part of the poem.  
Closely allied to this is the doctrine of Grace and Bhakti.  
So according to these scholars, Gita was added last of  
all somewhere about 500 A.D. It should be borne in mind  
that additions and interpolations have been going into  
the poem for 1,000 years, and there is no reason to  
believe that this process stopped by 500 A.D.

Now the reasons why the above date is assigned to Gita  
are summed up by Farquhar as follows:-

- (1) A reference to the Vedas, Brahmanas, Upanishads and  
Sutras and Dharm Shastras points out that the book was  
composed in the fifth period, (i.e. period of Dharmashastra)
- (2) Mr Justice Telang of Bombay maintains that the  
versification of Gita is later than that of the  
Upanishads. This also points to the above conclusion.
- (3) The language of Gita - A great part of the  
phraseology of Gita is the same as that of Atharvana  
Upanishads, and is not found earlier, and so it is  
inferred that Gita belongs to the same period.
- (4) External allusions and quotations - The earliest  
reference to the book is found in the works of Kapidasa

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(in the fifth century A.D.)

(5) The battle of Mahabharata took place in the Vedic period. Krishna, as a God, is not mentioned anywhere in the early literature. The story that Krishna called himself Brahma on the great battlefield is a myth.

From the above, Farguhar concludes that Gita was composed either in the fourth or fifth century A.D.

But the above arguments merely show that the book was not *finished* composed earlier than fourth or fifth century, but they do not contradict the hypothesis that the book might have been *continued* written later than fifth century, or that a considerable part of it was added afterwards. Kalidasa's reference simply shows that there was some such book as Gita, but he does not discuss the subject matter at all, and so from the lengthy period of composition it is not improbable to infer that some parts were added later on.

I may add another point in support of the above view. Gita is considered as one of the best religious books ever written in India. It records the words spoken by Krishna, the God-incarnate. But strange to say, no notice of it was taken before Shankra. No mention was made of it in any work (with the exception of one of the dramas of Kalidasa) and no commentary was written on this precious work. Shankra was the first person to write a commentary. If the book was held in the the same esteem as it is held now, why was it that no attention was paid to it? The only solution we can offer is this. Either the book did not appear in the form in which it is now, or the people did not find anything new or extraordinary in it. Even Shankra (9th. century) in his commentary, does not consider it to be any new departure from the pantheistic views held in the Upanishads, because he interprets it in the light of his theory of the Vedantic Absolute. He accepts Gita as the authoritative book of the Vedanta, and calls Krishna as partial incarnation. He does not equate Krishna

(with)

centuries, but within the whole compass of Vedic  
with Brahma. To him Krishna was a demi-god. Also among  
literature there is no reference to the doctrine  
the early Saints there was no belief in incarnation. So  
what we see in Gita now, i.e., the idea of a personal,  
loving God, was not seen by the people of that time at all.  
It is therefore evident, that this idea became associated  
with it at a later date.

Now I may examine one or two external evidences.

Maghesthenes, the Greek Ambassador at the Court of  
Chandargupta about 300 B.C., tells us that Hercules (Herakles)  
was worshipped at Methora and Kleisobra.

Farquhar, on the authority of Bhandarkar, is of opinion  
that "This probably means that Krishna was already  
worshipped as a God at Mathra and a town now unknown,  
called then Krishnapur".

But no stretch of imagination can identify Hercules with  
Krishna and Kleisobra with Krishnapura, or Jobores with  
Jamna.

Another passage is quoted by Farquhar:

"A passage in the Santi Parvan in the epic poem contains  
a description of Narda's visit to the 'White Island',  
where he saw the inhabitants worshipping Vishnu, and  
had a vision of the God himself. Many have thought that  
the story contains reminiscences of Christian influence  
exerted on Veishnuism".

I do not think that "White Island" means England, or the  
story shows any influence of Christianity.

#### INTERNAL EVIDENCE - 1

Now I come to internal evidence, and first I will take  
up the theory of incarnation.

Indian Scholars often assert that the doctrine of  
incarnation is to be found in Vedic literature, but Farquhar  
calls it a complete mistake.

"There are stories in Vedic literature, which were  
turned into incarnation stories in the early Christian

(centuries)

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the name "Christ" also, and this name led to the centuries, but within the whole compass of Vedic identification of the boy-God with Vasudeva-Krishna. literature there is no reference to the doctrine". The Goanese and Bengalis often pronounce the name Farquhar.

There was nothing precisely like the incarnation of Krishna with cowherdesses, which introduced an element Vishma in Buddhism too at that time. I will discuss the inconsistent with the advance of morality into the doctrine of incarnation later on.

Vasudeva religion, was also an after-growth, consequent **Secondly;** Macnicool says:

"From the point of view of theism, the failure of the Abhiras and their more civilised Aryan neighbours. But religion here (e.g. in Gita) presented lies in its vacillation between two views of the nature of the highest good that to which it is a state of contemplation of the cows. They occupied a territory between Mathura and Anupa. In Mahabharata they are described as sacrificing activity. It hesitates between the view that the fetter that binds man to it (Sansar) is a selfish desire for reward, and the view that it is something that so belongs to the very fibre of earthly life that every movement of mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled. Whether the pens of different writers I cannot agree to the above story, with the exception of the similarity between Krishna and Christ. If Krishna is they are the work of one man in various moods, we called "Christo" by the Bengalis and "Christo" is the Persian form of "Christ"; we do not find any use of

As the composition of the book extends over a long period the word "Christo" in the literature of Persia, but in I am inclined to accept the former hypothesis.

**Thirdly** STORIES RELATING TO THE BOYHOOD OF KRISHMA

The Vaishnavites identify Vasudeva Krishna with the Gopala-Krishma, the cowherd God. This is also the popular Christians in the court of Akbar, and I am of opinion that belief in India at the present time. There are many stories told about the boyhood of Krishna which resemble those

In regard to the story of Abhiras, Bhandarkar is not justified to regard them as aliens, simply because at one his reputed father's knowledge that he was not his son, period of history they were found in the Punjab, and at another, in Southern India.

Sir R.G. Bhandarkar says:-

The episode of Mahabharata does not exclude the possibility of their being natives of Southern India at by Abhira, and others were developed after they came to India. It is possible that they brought with them

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the time when they attacked Drjuna. Even if a community the name "Christ" also, and this name led to the identification of the boy-God with Vasudeva-Krishna. another it does not follow that they came from some place outside India, i.e., Syria or Asia Minor. And how is "Krishna" as "Kusto" or "Christo". The dalliance of Bhandarker justified in assigning the first century as the Krishna with cowherdesses, which introduced an element date of their migration on the assumption they held inconsistent with the advance of morality into the political power in the second century? Does not the Vasudeva religion, was also an after-growth, consequent presence of them in the battle of Mahabarata indicate that upon the freer intercourse between the Wandering they were present in India before the coming of Christ, Abhiras and their more civilised Aryan neighbours. But for, I think Bhandarker believes that the battle of who were these Abhiras? Bhandankar tells us that they Mahabarata was fought many centuries before the Christian were a wandering race whose occupation was the tending etc. From the above it would be clear that Abhiras had a of the cows. They occupied a territory between Mathura and Anupa. In Mahabharata they are described as but these stories were spread later on when the Hindu attacking Drjuna in Pancanada, probably Punjab. The world came into contact with the Muslim civilisation. Vishna Purana locate them in the south of India.

Though they are mentioned as a southern people, and as living in the south-west, the Abhiras must have similarities between Gita and the Bible, and that these migrated in large hordes into the country" (Bhandarkar.) I cannot agree to the above story, with the exception of the similarity between Krishna and Christ. If Krishna is called "Christo" by the Bengalis and "Christo" is the Persian form of "Christ", we do not find any use of the word "Christo" in the literature of Persia, but in the Persian literature of India, "Christ" is first called "Christo" by <sup>Fair</sup> Abd ~~Fair~~ in his translation of the Bible. This is most probably due to the presence of European Christians in the court of Akbar, and I am of opinion that this word was Persianised at that time.

In regard to the story of Abhiras, Bhandarkar is not justified to regard them aliens, simply because at one period of history they were found in the Punjab, and at another, in Southern India.

The episode of Mahabharata does not exclude the possibility of their being natives of Southern India at

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the time when they attacked Drjuna. Even if a community is found in the north at one time, and in the south at another, it does not follow that they came from some place outside India, i.e., Syria or Asia Minor. And how is Bhandarker justified in assigning the first century as the date of their migration on the assumption that they held political power in the second century? Does not the presence of them in the battle of Mahabarata indicate that they were present in India before the coming of Christ, for, I think Bhandarker believes that the battle of Mahabarata was fought many centuries before the Christian

era. From the above it would be clear that Abhiras has nothing to do with the stories of Krishma's boyhood, but these stories were spread later on when the Hindu world came into contact with the Muslim civilisation.

Fourthly:

It has been stated that there have been certain similarities between Gita and the Bible, and that these similar passages were taken from the Bible.

I quote below all such passages:-

"Come to me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."  
(Matt. XI, 28).

"Forsaking all duties, come to me as thy sole refuge. I will release thee from all sins; do not grieve."  
(XVIII, 65).

"But that ye may know that the Son of man hath authority on earth to forgive sins. . . ."  
(Mark II, 10).

"Of all mortals he who knows me to be unborn, without beginning, the great Lord of the world, being free from delusions, is released of all sins."  
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Bible.

Gita.

POINTS OF SIMILARITY  
BETWEEN GITA AND THE BIBLE.

"If any man come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me." (Mark VI, 34)

Bible.  
"All authority ~~have~~ been given unto me in heaven and on earth." (Matth. XXVIII, 18)

"Nature gives birth to thou always thinking of me." (me, the Supervisor and by me, the Supervisor and by reason of that the Universe revolves." (IX, 10)

"All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth who the Son is, save the Father; and who the Father is, save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." (Luke X, 22.)

Gita.  
"I know the things which have been, those which are and those which are to be; but me, nobody knows." (VII, 26.)

"Come to me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." (Matt. XI, 28).

"Forsaking all duties, come to me as thy sole refuge. I will release thee from all sins: do not grieve" (XVIII, 66).

"But that ye may know that the Son of man hath authority on earth to forgive sins. . . ." (Mark II, 10),

"Of all mortals he who knows me to be unborn, without beginning, the great Lord of the world, being free from delusions, is released of all sins." (IX, 11).

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Bible.

Gita.

"If any man come after Me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me." (Mark VIII, 34)

"In thought renouncing all actions unto me, intent on me, applying thyself to the yoking of thine intellect, be thou always thinking of me." (XVIII, 57).

"So, therefore, whosoever he be of you that renounceth not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke XIV, 33)

"Having thyself yoked by the yoke of renunciation thou shalt come to me." (IX, 28).

"Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest." (Matt. XI, 28)

"In him seek shelter with all thy might; by his grace thou shalt attain Supreme peace, the eternal dwelling place." (XVIII, 62).

"If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household?"

"Hating me in their own bodies and in those of others." (XVI, 18).

"And blessed is he, who soever shall find none occasion of stumbling in me."

"Deluded people.....not knowing my highest nature as great lord of entities, disregard me, as I have assumed a human body." (IX, 11).

(Matt. XI, 16).

(IX, 11).

"My yoke is easy and my burden is light." (Matt. XI, 30) "To the constantly yoked yogi who constantly remembered me, never thinking of another, I am easy of access." (VIII, 18).

But this is not the case with Vaishnavism. Further light is thrown on this by the following passage: "Many figs of the figs tree, and a mustard seed float in the Primal Water of the figs drop and perish, the tree does not feel the loss. Similarly, if one universe is freed, Krishna feels no loss in the least. Endless is the wealth of Krishna, appearing in various places, bounded by the causal water. In it float infinite universes under Maya, just like vessels full of mustard seeds in a sea. In some cases the resemblances are superficial and such like passages are found in nearly all religions. Even if it be admitted that these passages found their way into Gita through Christianity, it does not follow that this happened in the first or second century of Christian era. From the above arguments I conclude that there is nothing on record to show that the theistic belief was found in Gita before the Muslim Conquest and I am of opinion that in the absence of any other hypothesis it may be assumed that this belief derived its present form through the Islamic literature. Now I will deal with similar other points in connection with the influence of Islam on Hinduism.

"Learn of Me." (Matt. XI, 29) "Learn from me." (XVIII, 50). (Farquhar.)

From the above arguments I conclude that there is nothing on record to show that the theistic belief was found in Gita before the Muslim Conquest and I am of opinion that in the absence of any other hypothesis it may be assumed that this belief derived its present form through the Islamic literature.

Now I will deal with similar other points in connection with the influence of Islam on Hinduism.

(1) God in Vaishnava Theology.

We have found a belief in God-incarnate common to both Hinduism and Christianity. But there the similarity ends.

In Christianity, the idea of Divine Fatherhood carries with it (in the words of Kennedy) "the changelessness of His love, goodness and moral purpose. The Ethical teaching of Jesus follows from His conception of God. The Christian ethic is of one piece throughout with the Christian doctrine of God."

But this is not the case with Vaishnavism. Further light is thrown on this by the following passage: "Many figs grow on one fig tree, and a million universes float in the Primal Water. If one of the figs drop and perish, the tree does not feel the loss. Similarly, if one Universe be freed, Krishna feels no loss in the least. Endless is the wealth of Krishna; including Vaikuntha and other places, bounded by the causal water. In it float infinite universes under Maya, just like vessels full of mustard seeds in a moat. It means no loss if one of the seeds is lost; just so there is no loss to Krishna if one germinal universe is lost. Even if Maya herself is destroyed together with the universes, still Krishna himself will suffer no loss. A she-goat is unheeded by the possessor of a million heavenly cows; so Maya does not affect Krishna, the master of the six supreme powers."

This passage is in direct opposition to the parable of the lost sheep given in the Bible. The idea in this resembles the Islamic conception of God as "Ghani". It has some resemblance to Aristotle's 'unmoved mover'. To Ramanuja God is an independent Reality. God is not implicated in creation, for He regards it unconcerned as a 'passive neutral'. In Christianity God is much concerned for the Welfare of the people that is why He sent Jesus Christ to be sacrificed for the sake of mankind. God and man are like father and son. Chaitanya holds them to be like/

But I do not see any mystic's love in these phrases like master and slave. The same is the case with Islam. In Islam man ~~is~~ called "Abd", a slave. Under the influence of Islam the Hindus began to give up the idea of 'incarnation of God', till in Guru Nanak we find a total rejection of this doctrine. Guru Nanak says: "If you say that Rama was not subject to birth and death, why was he born of Kaushaliya? If you call Krishna God, why then did he suffer death and why did he ~~drive~~ give the Chariot of Arjuna? Adore Him alone as your Lord whose mysteries no one has been able to unfathom . . . . If Krishna was the saviour of the families, why was his own family destroyed?"

(2) Mysticism.

Mysticism is an expression of man's intense love for his Creator. It is often said that Islamic Sufiism was greatly influenced by Hindu mysticism, and in favour of this theory the doctrine of Nirvana is quoted. But I am of opinion that there was no such thing as Hindu mysticism in early periods in India. Mysticism loses its existence without a love for God, but neither in Veda nor in Upanishads or any other treatise of that period God was treated as "The Beloved". This idea originated later on. But Bhandarkar in his researches tries to show that the idea of love for the Supreme Being was not absent even in early periods. He says, "If the sages gave up the world, wealth. . . . to contemplate and dwell with the Supreme Being, must it not be considered that they were actuated by love for the Supreme Being?" I maintain that their aim in giving up the world was not love but a release from the cycle of birth and re-birth. It was the fetters of Karma that they wanted to throw off and with that aim in view they had to take to asceticism. Then Bhandarkar quotes such passages as "O father, Dayans, avert all evils, Be accessible to us and gracious as father to the son.", in support of his theory.

and themselves impersonate as Radha.

But I do not see any mystic's love in these phrases.

But with the coming of Islam the whole atmosphere was changed. Neo-Platonism, sufism, Christian mysticism, in fact all systems professing love for the Creator were exerting their full force in the Hindu population of India. Take the case of Chaitanya. He behaved just like other Islamic mystics. A flower, a bird, a cloud would excite his love for God and would throw him into ecstasy. He adored one God, call it by what name you like, Brahman, Parmatman, Bhagwat, Vishnu or Siva. He took the whole world to be a scene of God's love. To him mankind was united in one universal brotherhood. "My heart," he says, "breaks to see the sorrows of mankind. Lay thou (O God) their sins upon my head, let me suffer in hell for all their sins, so that thou mayst remove the earthly pangs of all other beings." How closely this resembles the Western mysticism. He did not believe in the absorption of all personality into God. He maintained that even hell, where he could still feel the pangs of love for God, was preferable to extinction in the very bosom of God. How different from the early Hindu idea of release.

Again we find a close resemblance between the imagery used for the expression of love by the Christian mystics and that by the Vaishnaves. In the sermons on "the Canticle of Solomon" by Saint Bernard the imagery is couched in the language of human love. Sometimes the Bridegroom is Jesus Christ and the Bride is the Church, and sometimes the Bridegroom is Jesus Christ in his Divine Aspect and the Bride is the individual soul. But there are a few instances where Jesus Christ is expressed as the Bridegroom of the individual Soul. The Vaishnaves take Krishna as Bridegroom and/  
 means abandonment of One's self to the Lord. How closely this resembles Sufiam.

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and themselves impersonate as Radha.

(3)

### Bhakti.

Closely allied to mysticism is the doctrine of Bhakti (devotion). In early times salvation could be attained by 'gyan', but at a later period 'bhakti' was considered necessary for this purpose. Chaitanya explains the difference between gyan and bhakti: - "By gyan we seek to know God; by bhakti we seek to have Him. To have Him is better than to know Him; for those who have Him, also know Him, at least as far as that is possible for men. But even those who succeed in knowing Him partially or say fully, cannot by that means have Him. By gyan we seek to analyse God and are staggered by the process and repelled from Him." - Gauranga, Vol. II, p. 241. Compare with this what Hajwairi says on the subject. At another place Chaitanya writes, "There are many ways to salvation, for instance, Jnana, Karma, Yoga, which were acknowledged effective in the past. . . . but bhakti is preferred to all these. "Therefore bhakti is the means of gaining Krishna, which is called abhidheya in all the Sastras. Just as the gaining of wealth yields pleasure as its fruits, by which sorrow flies away of itself; so the fruit of Bhakti is the springing up of Love to Krishna by the task of which birth and rebirth is destroyed. But the removal of poverty or the cessation of rebirth, is not the fruit of love; its highest aim is the enjoyment of love's felicity." . . . "Delight in Him is the Supreme human Attainment. . . . the highest beatitude comes only from serving his feet." - Chaitanya's Charitamrita.

The Vaishnavas prefer Bakti to Mukti. Liberation and salvation are contrasted. Love is the essence of Salvation. Salvation alone means selfishness, while Bhakti means abandonment of One's self to the Lord. How closely this resembles Sufism.

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Again we find a close similarity between "tasbih"<sup>m</sup> Madhva System. The idea of the guru as a spiritual guide is not found in the early Hindu thought. ~~the repetition of God's name in Islam and the repetition of God's name in Islam~~ and the repetition of Krishna's name (6) <sup>soherent</sup> Idols chief characteristics of Islam is its abhorrence of all kinds of idol worship. The same kind of repetition we find among the Sikha.

(4). Asceticism - Islam discourages asceticism but the Hindus tried to purify themselves from Sin by austerities, by inflicting punishment on the flesh. They indulged in various kinds of practices by which they inflicted a great amount of torture upon themselves. They thus got themselves reduced to skeletons. But we find that the Vaishnavas discouraged such practices as unnatural. It is, they think, His will that we should not only live in Society, but enjoy all its pleasures, provided that the sole object of our existence is the attainment of God. Islam enjoins on its followers to reap the greatest benefit from Society <sup>consistent with their spiritual uplift by which may result</sup> consistent communion with the Holiest of all holy beings.

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But Islam never recognized <sup>not</sup> a distinction of caste. It was through the influence of Islam that the Similarly Vaishnavism discourages the acquisition of such wealth - wealth that is a source of mans' deterioration. a democratic spirit among its followers. They were

(5). Guru - Among Sufis the Spiritual uplift of man is brought about by his Shaykh. No man can traverse the path of Sufism without the guidance of his Spiritual leader. Similarly, Guru is considered essential in Vaishnavite Sects. The Guru must know the mysteries of Krishna. "Bhakti is to be heard of and asked of the guru. The guru who gives instruction I know as the very Self of Krishna" - Chartamrita (The actual identity of the <sup>guru</sup> individual in which no one else could precede <sup>guru</sup> and the Supreme Being is not meant here). Nanak says, "Search not for the True on a far off. He is in every heart and is known by guru's instructions -----

Without Guru none hath found God." Attendance on a Guru and propitiation of him is also necessary for Moksa in the

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Madhva System. The idea of the guru as a spiritual guide is not found in the early Hindu thought.

(6) Idols - The chief characteristics of Islam is its abhorrence of all kinds of idol worship. In India as early as the thirteenth century we find the people inclined to give up idol worship. Guru Nanak totally discouraged idol worship of any kind. The same is the case with the followers of Malukdas and Dadu who flourished in the 17th century. They ridicule men and women who hammer their own gods and then worship them.

(7) Caste - For a very long time the Hindus have been held fast in the fetters of the Caste System. According to the Dharm Shastras of Manu, the three twice-born castes were in every respect superior to the Shudra, who had to undergo all kinds of degradation and misery. They are called "the Untouchables". But Islam never recognised any distinction of caste. It was through the influence of Islam that the religious movement of the Vaishnavites brought about a democratic spirit among its followers. They were all united in a common brotherhood of co-believers. They rose up to press their claims against the Brahmins who had so long treated them with contempt. Islam recognised the universal fraternity of the co-believers and insisted on group worship. The social movement among the Vaishnavites was, on the other hand based on 'bhakti', an emotional state of the individual in which no one else could participate. They lacked that social order which made the Muslims so powerful in the world.

However as early as the 13th century Namdeva says, —

" Iwent, O Lord, with laughter and gladness to  
Thy/

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Thy temple,

But while Nama was worshipping, Brahman forced him

away  
of soul which are directly opposed to the teaching of Islam.

A lowly caste is mine, O King Krishma,

Why was I born a calico printer?

I took up my blanket, went back,

And sat behind the temple.

As Nama repeated the praises of God,

The temple turned to his saint".

(c). By one word  
Translated by Macauliffe.

(d). Kind can be purified by being dyed in the name

Nabhaji writes in Bhakta Mala, "Kabir refused to acknowledge caste distinctions or to recognise the authority of the six schools of Hindu philosophy, nor did he set any store by the four divisions of life prescribed by Brahmans" - Westcott's translation.

In Kabir's Bijak we find the following:- "The Vedas and Puranas are a looking-glass to the blind. Brahma died with Shiva who lived in Baneres, all the immortals died .... with one look the Brahman established the worship of Brahma. With another they taught the cowherd to be the Supreme Spirit. With one, they taught the worship of Mahadeva and with another, the worship of evil spirits."

When we come to Guru Nanak, we find him adopting the Muslim Creed to a great extent. He uses the Islamic Terminology largely in his teaching. In some cases the exact phrases of the Quran and traditions are made use of in the Punjabi form. Some people are of opinion that he was a Muslim by religion, but I do not believe he ever professed the religion of Islam.

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He believed in certain principles such as transmigration of soul which are directly opposed to the teaching of Islam. However, I quote below some of his views which closely resemble the Islamic thought:

- (a). The recording angels take with them a record of man's acts.
- (b). By Thy power are honour and dishonour.
- (c). By one word Thou didst create the whole universe
- (d). Mind can be purified by being dyed in the name of God.
- (e). From impure water have been created various kinds of creation.

(f). "Pulsirat" is narrower than the breadth of a hair once it is sharper than the sword, is like a red-hot iron.

(g). Falsehood is at an end, Truth at last prevaieth. I do not think there is any further need of multiplying passages like these. Guru Nanak himself says,

"When God ordained, Nanak came in the world, bringing with them the chapter of the Quran, Traditions and the Epistles .... There is only one God in the world, Nanak, the son of God, brought the message from the true God.

Similarly, the Kallata School of Kashmir Shivism denies that God needed Karma as prompting cause or Pradhana as material cause for the creation of the world. He himself also is not the material cause of the world.

Moreover, the followers of that school do not believe in Maya as the cause of illusory appearance of the world. Although of high position considers himself inferior to God creates by the force of his will. The individual soul emanates from the Supreme Being, who is more than this world of manifoldness. The creation is just like parched to death, but gives away its wealth to him who asks, and shelters others, italef enduring /an sun and rain. The Vaishnavas ought to be without pride even

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an image reflected in a mirror. The individual soul  
returns to the supreme soul, when by contemplation it gets  
rid of impurity and has a vision of the Highest Reality.  
We see the influence of Western thought, to some extent  
in the above.

(10). Renunciation-- The followers of Ramanuja make an  
ample use of the doctrine of "Resignation" though Ramanuja  
himself uses this word once or twice in his commentary on  
Gita. "I bow before Moka<sup>nd</sup>wa's grace" says Vedanta Desika  
"Which flows freely even into the ignorant."

According to one of the methods in Raman<sup>u</sup>ja's system  
(i.e. Acaryabhimana) Mukti can be attained by surrendering  
oneself wholly and solely to God (or Guru according to one  
interpretation) and maintaining an attitude of helplessness  
It has a striking resemblance to Sufi doctrine of renun-  
ciation. Again in Madhava we find self surrender  
necessary for Mukti. "Self surrender<sup>is</sup> which mind is  
devoted to God as the best of all beings and is full of  
the highest love and in which everything is resigned to  
God, accompanied with the faith that he will protect and  
the feeling that the devot<sup>ee</sup> is <sup>his</sup>. The same is the case  
with the doctrine of humility, which I believe is taken  
from the Sufism. The Hindus took a special pride in  
their being "twice born", or ~~born~~ like <sup>the</sup> Jews, the chosen  
people of God. But humility was the characteristic  
feature of a real Vaishnavite Bhakta: "The Bhakta,  
although of high position considers himself inferior to  
grass, and acts patiently like the tree. For the tree,  
when cut says nothing and never begs water even though  
parched to death, but gives away its wealth to him who  
asks, and shelters others, itslef enduring the sun and  
rain. The Vaishnawas ought to be without pride even

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Chapter IX

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though of high rank" - Chaitanya.

The above, I think, is enough to show how the Muslim occupation of India helped in modifying Hindu thought.

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Now we turn our attention to the influence exerted by the Hindu culture on the Muslims of India. It may be noted here that the Muslims were not much influenced by the Hindu thought because they, being conquerors, considered themselves superior to the subject race and it is generally the latter that adopts the manners and customs of the former. Moreover, in Islam any deviation from the traditional path is met with strong punishment and so it was not easy for the followers of Islam to borrow to a large extent from the Hindu religious beliefs. But when Akbar came to the throne in 1556 the tide was reversed. He was born in a desert when his father was dying in great adversity before the breaking life of Sher Shah's conquest. Then again, while still a child he fell into the hands of his uncle, where more or less he met with a step-fatherly treatment. At the age of twelve he had to fight for his crown against enormous odds. Under such circumstances it was natural for him to develop a dissatisfaction for the present state of affairs. As he grew up as a prince of learning, he carried his dissatisfaction to the very heart of the existing system and the cause of religion and

INFLUENCE OF HINDUISM ON ISLAMIC CULTURE .

philosophy and so he founded an assembly where men of all shades were free to discuss religious and philosophical questions freely. The emperor himself took part in these debates. Islam at that time was under the sway of the priests who wielded a great power and against whose decisions the emperor was powerless. Akbar could not tolerate this. Moreover his critical bent of mind made him look <sup>the</sup> carefully into their fundamental principles and assumptions. They based their authority on the Quran, not on the is generally the latter that adopts the manners and customs of the former. Moreover, in Islam any deviation from the traditional path is met with strong punishment and so it was not easy for the followers of Islam to borrow to a large extent from the Hindu religious beliefs. But when Akbar came to the throne in 1556 the tide was turned. He was born in a desert when his father was flying in great adversity before the swelling tide of Sher Shah's conquest. Then again, while still a child he fell into the hands of his uncle, where more or less he met with a step-fatherly treatment. At the age of twelve he had to fight for his crown against enormous odds. Under such circumstances it was natural for him to develop a dissatisfaction for the current state of affairs. As he grew up to be a patron of learning, he carried his natural habit of not accepting anything dogmatically into the sphere of religion and

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Or I may express it as follows: The philosophy and so he founded an assembly where men of all shades were free to discuss religious and philosophical questions freely. The emperor himself took part in these debates. Islam at that time was under the sway of the priests who wielded a great power and against whose decisions the emperor was powerless. Akbar could not tolerate this. Moreover his critical bent of mind made him look carefully into their fundamental principles and assumptions. They based their authority on the Quran, not on the verdict of reason. Akbar noted that there are certain principles which are common to all religions, and which are considered to be true by all. As no one doubted their truth, they must be taken as true. As regards those wherein each differed from the other, the claim of each religion was to be put to a rational test. So he wanted to universalise religion on a rational basis and to build up a religious structure not on the basis of emotion and feeling but on reason and reason only. His religion was not to derive an authority from divine revelation but from a scientific study of facts. With this aim in view he wanted to test the assumption of Islam that a newly born child is by his very nature a Muslim or in other words the child has certain potentialities, which when developed properly make him a believer in Islam and when ignored or wrongly cultivated make him an infidel.

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Or I may express it as follows: The child's nature is fundamentally good. The Good has to struggle for its manifestation through the external influences brought to bear on the child by the conscious and unconscious environments, that may accelerate or retard its progress resulting in the former case in Islam. Islam does not say that the child derives these innate tendencies from his ancestors or that he is at birth a product of society. For instance, it is not necessary, according to this principle, for the child, whose forefathers have been crooks, to develop an inclination towards stealing. So Akbar wanted to test this assumption. Nay, he went further. He wanted to test another assumption of the Muslims that Arabic was the natural language of man. He had a number of newly born infants brought up in a palace which was entirely cut off from the rest of the world. The nurses and the keepers were ordered to observe complete silence. After four and a half years the children were presented to the king. But the king could not derive any great advantage from this experiment for want of a knowledge of relevant sciences or methods, except learning that the children imitated various kinds of noises. So any further experiment of this kind was given up. Now he had to rely only on the facts known in his time. He listened to the arguments of the Brahmins, the Christian fathers, and the Parsee priests and the others. He found out that there is one thing which

works in the world. It is Power or Energy. This is the Absolute or ultimately Real. It is the most Worshipful. But a man needs some image or symbol of this power to meditate upon. In this he was influenced by the current Hindu thought. So he considered the Sun as the complete manifestation of God in heaven and Fire on this earth. So both the sun and the fire were worshipped by the followers of this religion. In other matters of ceremonies he also followed the Hindu tradition. This aroused a great opposition among the orthodox section of the population, but all their efforts were of no avail. This religion, however, did not last long. With the death of the emperor, all traces of it were lost, though no outward coercion or compulsion was used.

In this connection we may note another example, that of Dara Shikoh, the son of Emperor Shah Jahan and great grandson of Akbar. Though he was a follower of the great mystic Mian Mir of Lahore, yet his doctrine is pantheistic. He derives his authority from the Prophet but I am of opinion that he was greatly influenced by the Upanishads, which he knew full well. I am not debating the point that there are pantheistic tendencies in some of the Sufis such as Mansur Hallaj, but as none of the Muslim mystics in India before his time expressed any views of this kind, it seems more likely that he was influenced in his views by the Brahmans, with whom he was on intimate

terms. He expresses his views in a short pamphlet called 'Hag Numa.' He first discusses the question why the spirit came to the earth. He answers that the seed of perfection which lay latent in the spirit was to be made patent. Though everything that is potential became actual yet this is not due to any effort of the individual, but is mainly dependant on the grace of God. But His grace cannot be obtained without the guidance of a Shaikh or Perfect man, though a man has to exert himself to the full extent in following the advice of his spiritual leader. So the Seeker after God has to travel a path, which has four stages. In the first stage the disciple travels through Alam-i- Nasut (Physical world). He has to undergo certain practices, which are like the Yoga of the Hindus. By this means he tries to see the image of God in his heart. Here Dara Shakoh gives three meanings of 'the heart,' one of which is equivalent to "mind" or "consciousness." He maintains that in sleep the soul leaves the gross, being clothed in a subtle body which is an exact counterpart of the gross body. It is just like the 'astral body' of the modern Psychological researches. The soul in this way travels through many places and meets with many experiences which constitute the Dreaming state of an individual. Similarly in the second stage, the soul being separated from the gross body, travels through the Alam-i-malakut or

or Alam-i-Arwah (The Spiritual world). Here the soul has a vision of the Prophet of Islam. This vision is not fictitious, because the impersonation of the Prophet by the devil is impossible. In this stage the individual is capable of performing miracles. But Dara Shakoh warns the 'Seeker' not to remain engulfed in this stage, but to proceed further. For the third stage, one has again to undergo certain physical practices, for instance the regulation of the breath. It is said that some Sufis carried the practice of holding the breath to such an extent that they breathed only four times during the whole day. As a consequence of this the sleep vanishes totally and the individual in this plane which is called Alam-i-Jabrut hears the 'sound of silence,' which has only one unchanging pitch or note. This is Sound Eternal, the Voice of God. The man is then thrown into ecstasy. Alam-i-Jabrut is that where nothing <sup>that</sup> can be seen in the two lower planes, is visible to the <sup>^</sup> Seeker. There comes over him a state of trance-like wonder, where waves after waves of bliss and peace submerge the soul under their folds. A man can have this stage only in dreamless sleep. (I think Dara Shakoh has taken this theory from the vedantists). This state can be realised even when a man is awake: "When in the waking state no forms, whether of physical or spiritual plane cross his mind, the man is in the plane of <sup>Samad</sup> Jabrut. But in this state he still retains his

like Hallaj, goes to the extreme in this respect. This was strictly against the teaching of Islam. "consciousness." (It is not clear what Dara and Shakoh means by consciousness here. At least it is not what we commonly mean by consciousness.) of The fourth stage is "Alum -i- Lahut." The Spheres of all other planes when compared with this world of Lahut are like waves compared with the ocean. It is better to keep silent about this plane. Then he gives an expression to pantheistic views:- The water can never veil the face of the ice, though a bubble may form an impression in the ice. 'The True' is an ocean of Reality and both the worlds exist in it as ice exists in water and the water in ice. "Purity and impurity, personality and impersonality are all aspects of this manifestation and self-limitation. If thou thinkest even the smallest atom to be separate from him, verily thou shalt miss the Truth." "All that thou thinkest as other than God are verily in their essence one with God, though separate in name. Divine Wisdom is nothing more than this, that thou shouldst realise that thou art That and everything as That, It is impossible that there should exist anything which is not He." "The creature is a creature so long as he does know himself to the creator." This is nothing else but the doctrine of the vedantists.. Various other sufis of this period have expressed similar views. But

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Chapter 10

like Hallaj, goes to the extreme in this respect. This was strictly against the teaching of Islam. Even if this fact be ignored pantheism could not commend itself to the learned men of Islam on rational grounds. It was opposed to the testimony of self-consciousness and moral consciousness. By depriving the human beings of all individuality and freedom of the will, it strikes at the very roots of morality. Moreover it is a one-sided theory. It ignores the world of plurality altogether. It makes God a "barren identity" and the whole world an illusion. "It makes God a bare name, a caput mortuum of the abstract understanding"--Liddon. So there was a great reaction against the pantheistic Sufis. Aurangzeb was on the throne at that time. He was pledged to uphold the doctrine of Islam among the Muslims. He could not tolerate apostasy. All such Sufis were put to death one by one. No one again dared to speak in terms like these.

But <sup>it</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>not</sup> must be understood that all influence of Hinduism on the Islamic world disappeared. ~~He~~; <sup>3</sup> the converts from Hinduism brought with them many customs and manners which they could not easily part with and the result was a mixing of two distinct currents in the lower strata of the population. For instance, idol-worship gave place to tomb-worship. Many ~~sp~~ superstitious beliefs crept in. But still the men of literary tastes and the pick of society maintained their faith unadulterated by any form of Hindu belief. That is why we do not find any trace of Hindu influence in Muslim writings except in those described above.

RAMANUJA.

The century in which Ramannja was born was a period of great religious ferment. There were many sects among the Hindus and against these were pitched the Sects of Islam and each had to maintain its own position against the attacks of the others.

Ramanuja was born in 1017 A.D. in a village on the Terupathy Hill. Of his childhood very little is known, but it appears that he lost his father while he was still young. He received the education that was generally given to the boys of that time and he took a keen interest in the philosophical studies especially the vedantas. He studied this system under Yadvaparasha and soon found out that the interpretation of many passages by his teacher was not satisfactory. This created a great difference between the teacher and the pupil and the rising fame of the latter made the former more and more jealous of the latter till Ramanuja was asked to leave the school. An attempt was also made against his life which, however, failed owing to the timely help of some friends.

Ramanuja devoted himself to the service of God Devaraja at Kayachi. Here, he made the promise of writing a commentary on Brahma Sutra, and so he started towards Srirangam. Here, he contracted a matrimonial relationship which did not prove happy, and consequently separated from the woman by putting on the robes of a Sanyasi. At the request of the disciples of his great-grandfather Alavandar, he settled down at Srirangam and began to study philosophy with great earnestness and zeal. A second attempt on his life was made, this time by poisoning his food, but the plot was detected before it could take effect and his life was saved.

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As he had to fulfil his promise of writing a commentary on Brahma Sutra, he travelled north to make himself acquainted with the various interpretations of the book. He wrote three books on the subject, viz., Vedantasaram, Vedanta, Sangrahm, Vedantadipam.

He then started on a tour to get the approval of the learned people in regard to his books. In this way he went as far as Kashmir in the north, and there at Sarasvatipita (the seat of learning) he read his books in an assembly of learned people, which were duly approved.

But Ramannja's life was not an easy one. He had to suffer persecution at the hands of the Sivites. He was summoned to appear at the court of the Chola King, (Kulothunga). But as his life was in danger, another man impersonated him and went to the King's court while Ramannja fled away to the kingdom of Hoysale Bitti Deva. Here, he settled down at Saligram and passed twelve years of his life. Then he went on a pilgrimage to the shrines of the Vishnu saints. He passed away quietly after having lived a life of 120 years.

#### <sup>u</sup>RAMANNJA'S TEACHINGS.

His system of Philosophy is called Vishist Advaita or qualified non-dualism. According to this system God is the Ultimate Reality and this world of manifold is His manifestation. He establishes three categories, viz., Lord, soul and matter.

Shankra regarded the world as the product of Avidya and hence considered it as unreal. Ramannja differs from him in maintaining the reality of the world, though it is

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to make man as the plaything of God (Law's book VI), by  
subject to the control of Brahman. It does not exist in-  
dependent of Brahman. He considers souls and matter as  
attributes of Brahman. The souls, like matter, are not  
capable of existing independently. In addition to the above  
He has various other attributes which denote His perfection.  
He is All-knowing and the object of His Knowledge is supplied  
by His Attributes. In this respect intelligence is con-  
sidered His Essence as well as His Attribute. His  
Attributes of matter and soul do not modify His essence in  
any way, though they themselves undergo modifications.  
The Soul is modified by the expansion and contraction of  
intelligence. For instance, in plants and animals the  
soul's intelligence is duller and suppressed as compared  
with that of man. Modification of matter means the change  
in the nature of the physical objects. Here, Ramana  
differs from Shankra in maintaining the modifications to be  
real and not illusory.

Brahman has two states of existence, viz., (1) State of  
quiescence when matter exists in him in a subtle form, and  
the soul though retaining the faculty of cognizance cannot  
exercise that power owing to its separation from matter.  
(2) State of creation. Creation is a positive volitional  
act of Brahman.

"He thought I might become many and so He became many."

Compare this with the Islamic reason for the creation  
of the world. In this respect God may be considered as

"I was a hidden treasure, I wanted to make myself known."

Why did Brahman create the world? To this question  
Ramana replies like Heraclitus, who makes the world as  
Zeus's pastime, or like Plato, who is interpreted by some  
- Carpenter.

(Here we find a step towards Islamic theology.) to/

"The authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of  
one non-differenced substance, or that the Universe of things

to make man as the plaything of God (Law's book VII), by calling it an act of play or recreation. No want can be applied to Brahman and so the act of creation does not imply any need on his part. But if the Universe is a sport or plaything of Brahman, there can be **no** foundation for a healthy ethical system. A lack of moral purpose in the creation of the Universe makes it difficult to find in it a reason for the moral struggles and aspirations of mankind.

Ramanuja takes a step away from pantheism by attacking the doctrine of the identity of the individual with Brahman. For him, knowledge means the differentiation of the particulars or the perception of differences. If Brahman is an undifferentiated being, it cannot be apprehended by any means whatever. Even if we admit that we possess such a faculty, it would make Brahman, the Absolute, an object of knowledge, - a theory which Shankra and his followers try to reject. To Shankra, Brahman is pure consciousness, but Ramanuja maintains that consciousness is an attribute of Brahman, or the Self, and of this the Self is directly conscious. He argues: we do not say, "I am consciousness," but we say, "I am conscious." He explains the formula 'that art thou' by making a distinction between "that" and "thou".

The word "that" denotes the Supreme Spirit, uncreated, free from all imperfections, having infinite attributes. The word "thou" denotes the Supreme Spirit, characterized by consciousness, having all the universe and the individual Souls as its body. In this respect God may be considered as the Soul of the Souls.

"When the individual Soul unites with the supreme soul, such union does not imply loss of consciousness, for how can one substance pass into the nature of another substance?"

- Carpenter.

(Here we find a step towards Islamic theology.)

"The authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance, or that the Universe of things

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is false. They do not deny the essential distinctions of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things and the Lord." - Sacred Books of the East, Page 102.

Thus, according to Ramannja, the whole existence, conscious and non-conscious, constitutes the body of God, Like the coils of a snake, the world may be considered as a part of God. The same is the case with "Souls". They are the manifestations of the Divine attributes, and at the same time have a qualified independent existence of their own. When souls are said to be a part of God it does not mean a portion cut from the whole, because God is indivisible. They are like radiance emitted by a luminous body.

"The individual souls are eternal, otherwise there would follow a failure of requital and a fruition (of pleasure and pain) unmerited. The Soul is atomic.

"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a hundred times

The Soul may be supposed a part of that."

"The visible unsentient world is divided into three, viz., the object, the instrument and the site of fruition. The deity known as Purshuttoma or Vasudeva is the efficient cause of the world." -

Gough's translation of The Sarva Sangraha.

Before Creation the individual souls and matter exist in a subtle form in Brahman. The subtle form of matter is developed into the mundane egg and the creation takes place under the guidance of Ishwra from this egg. Ishwra is the creator, the sustainer and destroyer of the world and has a wonderful celestial body. He exists in five different

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Lakshmi, symbolises the activity of the Supreme Being in the finite. "The Lord of Fortune" (Lakshmi), writes modes, viz., - *Ramanuja*

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(1) Para (the highest) in which mode He dwells in a city called Baikuntha, attended by His three consorts.

(2) Vyāha, in which He manifests His controlling power and creating power.

(3) Vibhava, in which He takes up the form of fish, etc.

(4) Antaryamin, in which He is worshipped by Yogis.

(5) In the form of idols and images in the temple.

Ishwara has three consorts, viz., Lakshmi, Bhū (Earth) and Līlā.

whose feet are everlastingly praised by countless Saints accordant with His Will in their essence, being and

activities delighting solely in doing all service to Him

and possessing multitudes of infinite attributes, such

as eternal flawless and surpassed knowledge, power and

empire - whose dwelling is in the Supreme heaven called

the Imperishable, which is indiffinable by speech or

thought, accordant with this nature, diverse, various,

boundless, abundant in objects, means and seats of delight

infinite in wondrousness, in splendour and in extent,

everlasting and flawless - whose sport is the originative

maintenance, and dissolution of the whole universe, full

of endless, diverse, curious objects, of enjoyment and

multitudes of enjoyers - who is the Supreme Brahma,

Supreme Spirit and Narayana - after having created the

Universe from Brahma down to *streaks* streets and stones, withdrew

into his own nature and thus became impervious to the

meditations and worship of the Gods, from Brahma

downward, and of mankind. But as he is a great ocean

of boundless grace, kindness, love and generosity. He

assumed various similar forms without putting away his

own essential Godlike nature, and time after time

incarnated himself in the several worlds, granting to

Laklishmi, symbolises the activity of the Supreme Being in the finite. "The Lord of Fortune"(Laklishmi), writes Bhagwatgita. Ramanuja

"Whose essence is absolute negation of all evils, accordant with blessedness and infinitude of knowledge and bliss - who is an ocean of multitudes of boundless and blest qualities of nature, to wit, transcendent knowledge, strength, majesty, vigour, power and brilliance - whose divine form is a mine of splendour, beauty, comeliness, youth and other boundless qualities accordant with his will, uniform, incomcievably God-like, marvellous, constant, flawless and unsurpassed ..... whose feet are everlastingly praised by countless Saints accordant with His Will in their essence, being and activities delighting solely in doing all service to Him and possessing multitudes of infinite attributes, such as eternal flawless and surpassed knowledge, power and empire - whose dwelling is in the Supreme heaven called the Imperishable, which is indēfinable by speech or thought, accordant with this nature, diverse, various, boundless, abundant in objects, means and seats of delight infinite in wondrousness, in splendour and in extent, everlasting and flawless - whose sport is the origination maintenance, and dissolution of the whole universe, full of endless, diverse, curious objects, of enjoyment and multitudes of enjoyers - who is the Supreme Brahma, Supreme Spirit and Narayna - after having created the Universe from Brahma down to <sup>stones</sup> streets and stones, withdrew into his own nature and thus became impervious to the meditations and worship of the Gods, from Brahma downward, and of mankind. But as he is a great ocean of boundless grace, kindness, love and generosity. He assumed various similar forms without putting away his own essential Godlike nature, and time after time incarnated himself in the several worlds, granting to

His Worshippers rewards according to deserts, namely religion, riches, earthly love and salvation and descending not only with the purpose of relieving the burden of earth, but also to be accessible to men even such as we are, so revealing Himself in the world as to be visible to the sight of all and doing such other marvellous deeds as to ravish the heart and eyes of all beings high and low".

Release is obtained by means of Bhakti; by means of which the Inner Ruler discloses His presence and illuminates the heart of the devotee. But the grace of God is not unconditional. The individual should make himself fit for the reception of Divine Grace. He must purify himself before the Divine Light can shine on his soul. The released soul attains the sameness of nature with God, but not the identity.

"Vasudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as desired by each,

According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large recompense.

For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five embodiments; Images and the like are adoration, his incarnations are emanations;

As Sankarshana, Vasudeva, Pradyumna, Anirudha, his manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; the subtitle is the entire six attributes .

That self-same called Vasudeva is styled the Supreme Spirit the internal Controller is declared as residing in the soul, the actuation of the soul;

Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such as "Who abiding in the soul".

By the worship of adoration, a man casting off his defilement becomes a qualified votary:

By the subsequent worship of "emanation", he becomes qualified for the worship of "Manifestation" next,

By the Worship thereafter of "the subtitle", he becomes able to behold the internal controller".

(Gough's translation of "The Sarva Dashaayna Sangraha")

Thus, performance of actions without a desire for fruit and acquisition of knowledge are both necessary as an aid to Bhakhi. The knowledge consists in seeing oneself as an attribute of God, distinct from Prakrati. A devotee ultimately has an actual vision of God - a kind of final

(mental)

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mental perception. Much emphasis is laid on meditation. But it is not clear how far it should be the result of an intense love .

Ramanuja attacks Shankara's theory of Maya under the following heads:-

- (1) Avidya cannot effect Brahman directly because his nature being pure intelligence would repel ignorance.
- (2) Avidya cannot operate on the individual soul because these result from the action of Avidya and therefore cannot be acted upon in anticipation.
- (3) If avidya is effective in clouding the intelligent nature of Brahman, it makes the latter a non-permanent entity.
- (4) Shankara's definition of avidya makes it possible to attribute contradictory qualities (i.e. of existence and non-existence) to the same object. Simultaneously,- a position which is apparently absurd.
- (5) Shankara maintains that avidya is absolutely indescribable. Then it must be non-existent as an entity.
- (6) The Sacred books do not maintain the existence of avidya. If such a thing is proved to exist, it cannot be removed by a knowledge of attributeless because such a knowledge is impossible.
- (7) Avidya cannot be removed by knowledge but by actions because it is the result of Karma.

To prove his theory Ramanuja argues thus:-

"Is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If the answer is <sup>the</sup> the affirmative, the ignorance would vanish with a knowledge of the essence of the thing. If not it is not possible for us to be conscious of an ignorance which has ~~no~~ subject and no object. In reply to Shankara's statement that "pure manifestations of the spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance", that is by consciousness of ignorance as accompanied by a consciousness of its subject and object, Ramanuja <sup>nu</sup> says, that this consciousness or

subject can equally arise in the absence of knowledge. It must therefore be admitted that the cognition "I am ignorant, I know not myself" etc. is conversant about an absence of cognition. To Shankara's argument that "Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another entity (i.e. illusion), an entity different from mere prior, non-existence of knowledge, which envelopes the object of knowledge, which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of knowledge in as much as it (i.e. the right knowledge) illuminates an object not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the darkness".

<sup>naya</sup> Ramarinji replies that to prove the antecedent illusion Shankara would need an ulterior illusion, which he did not admit.

<sup>naya</sup> So Ramarinji concludes that illusion does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge:-

"Consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about (i.e. the name and notion of) some object, and such consciousness also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence etc. constitutes the soul, or knowledge of that which acts and knows".

To the objection that soul, if it consists of cognition, cannot have cognition as a quality, <sup>he</sup> Ramarinji replies that this is not impossible, for instance the sun and other luminous things, existing in the form of light are substances in which light as a quality inheres.

<sup>naya</sup> According to Ramarinji there are three sources of knowledge viz:-(1) revelation (2) intellect (3) intuition. Knowledge of Brahman is mainly obtained from the Scriptures. Reason can only deal with the world of senses, but it can be used as an aid to the understanding of the Scriptures. The study of the Scriptures leads to an indirect knowledge, while the direct knowledge of Brahman is gained by the profound contemplation. <sup>he</sup> Ramarinji defines Bhakti as "only a (particular)

particular kind of knowledge of which one is infinitely fond which leads to the extinction of all other interests and desires". (Ved Sang). From this MacNicol concludes that intellectual element predominates in the system of Ramarnji. But I believe, by knowledge Ramarnji means a kind of religious experience and it is equivalent to "Marifat" of the Muslim mystics.

CRITICISM

Ramannja was struggling midway between pantheism and theism, between an immanent God and a transcendental deity. between the Absolute of Upanishads and Vedanta and the God of Islam. He could not give up the teaching of his predecessors, and at the same time could not identify God with the world so as to leave no room for the latter. This was a difficult task he was trying to accomplish, and if he did not succeed fully, we are not to minimise his efforts. As we have seen he considered Brahman as substance and soul and matter as his attributes. Now a substance is nothing apart from its attributes. By a modification of its attributes a substance no longer remains the same, for instance, a change in the rationality or animality of man will not leave him undisturbed. A body without weight will not be the same body as it is now. But soul and matter undergo modifications. This does not leave the Brahman immutable but makes Him subject to change, and hence liable to destruction. Moreover, matter is extended, and soul is also extended as well as conscious, because according to Ramannja soul is about twice in size, and size and extension mean the same thing. If soul and matter are attributes of Brahman, then Brahman must be extended and this would make Brahman material finite and imperfect. In fact Ramannja admits this, though reluctantly. We see that Brahman attributes are not perfect. If the world is tending towards perfection, Brahman actualises his essence and makes himself perfect through this world. There is another difficulty.

(matter)

matter is unconscious and God is believed to be conscious. It is difficult to conceive how ~~can~~ the unconsciousness be an attribute of the conscious.

The idea of a finite God is very attractive to some of modern thinkers such as Drs. Rashdall and Howison. According to Dr. Rashdall, ~~point of view~~ Spinoza's God is an abstraction.

All "A supreme being of this sort may be considered the original source, from which all other beings, who co-exist (according only to Prof. Howison, "eternally coexist") with him derive their existence. He is limited both by the other beings and also by the necessities of his own nature, as something which in he finds given, and as setting to his activity a bounding which he cannot pass".

God Ramannja's god is limited by souls and matter, which eternally coexist with him. As he has not created them, he cannot be said to be the creator of their properties. In his activity he finds himself limited by the properties of soul and matter, and so more or less he conforms to the type of God given above.

<sup>He</sup> Ramannja may be compared with <sup>Spinoza</sup> Spindya, though there are more points of dissimilarity than similarity. According to <sup>Spinoza</sup> Spindya, God is the only substance. Substance he defines as that which exists in itself and through itself. "God has infinite number of attributes, but mind <sup>in meditation</sup> recognises only two, thought and extension.

An attribute is "that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of the substance". Each attribute in its turn manifests itself in modes, thought in will and intellect, and extension, in rest and motion. In his system mode is a device for deducing the finite from the Infinite.

Ramannja differs from Spinoza in maintaining a number of substances. Spinoza's God is different from that of the Ramannja. (Spinoza has been interpreted differently by modern thinkers). God, according to some interpreters of Spinoza, is the sum total of existent things or modes, and at the same time is the immanent energising principle of existent

(things)

things. God is not the creator of the world. God is the world. God is not a person, though God has soul and body in the sense that life or mind is the one phrase or aspect of everything, and that we know, as material extension or body is another.

From another point of view Spinoza's God is an abstraction. All finite things fall outside Him. No quality can be predicated of Him for to define Him is to limit Him, we can only say that He is not this or that.

By making soul and matter attributes of God Ramannja identifies God with the world. But he does not wish to remain in this pantheism. So he considers them as substances having a reality of their own, being distinct in nature from God. God is a person, is a rational individual, and has a celestial body.

Again, the souls are his inner body and matter his outer body, and he is the energising principle of the world. Spinoza's God is not the first to love man. He does not return man's love.

According to Ramannja God responds to the love of man. For Spinoza the action of reason is human liberty. True freedom is to be like God, to be one with God. Freedom is rational knowledge. For Ramannja freedom means a union with God, and is attained by realising in oneself the real relation existing between man and God, and through meditation. Spinoza does not believe in rewards after death. Ramannja considers reward as the fundamental principle in the existence of the world.

Ramannja considers matter and soul as attributes as well as substances. Just as a body is a substance in regard to the qualities that inhere in it, so it is an attribute in regard to the soul which it qualifies. Here he differs from the scholastics who maintain that a substance is that which exists in itself and does not inhere in another substance.

"A substance" says St. Thomas "is a thing whose nature it is to exist not in another, whereas an accident is a thing

(whose)

whose nature it is to exist in another".

We call God a substance analogically, because He verifies in Himself in a most perfect manner all the perfecting of a substance, though He is above human categories. Scholastics do not take the body as a quality of the soul. They take them as distinct substances or two constitutive factors of a composite substance, man. However, taking them as substances Ramannja relates them to God as body to the soul. Matter is a body to the human soul and human soul is a body to God. In a subsequent passage he defines the body as "any substance which a conscious soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation" - R.K. In this case God is the immanent energising principle of the world, or more correctly, the controlling principle of the Universe.

Now it is generally believed that 'soul' is complete on the line of substantial perfection but incomplete in the line of specific perfection. It can discharge some of the functions but not all without conjunction with another substance. If the world is the body of God, God will be considered an incomplete substance because it cannot discharge all the functions without a union with the world, or in other words, the world is a necessary factor for God.

As matter and soul inhere in God, they have their being in God, not in the scholastic sense, because the school men did not identify the world with God but they meant that God kept them in being by His Omnipresent Conserving power. But He does not sustain them as a subject in which they inhere, as substance sustains the accidents which determine it, thereby giving expression to its concrete actuality. For Ramannja, God and the world are identical, but there is also an element of difference. God is related to the world as whole to the parts, or fire to its sparks. But this will make God divisible So he makes them constitutive factors of the whole reality. God, soul and matter are three distinct substances, because

(they)

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they have different natures, but they are one because God is related to soul and matter, as substance to its moods. Then he again says that oneness simply means inseparability. Now a soul united with a body constitutes a person, and God is another person having His own celestial body. It is not easy to understand how the union of these two persons is effected so as to be identical and at the same time maintain the difference; how the finite consciousness is one with the Divine consciousness.

By personality we mean the subsistence of a complete individual <sup>rational</sup> natural nature, i.e. in its existence it is not communicable to a substance as an accident or an individual as a universal or to a whole as an integral or essential part. Moreover it cannot be assumed into the unity of a higher personality so as to subsist by the latter's subsistence. According to this, if the soul united with the body is an integral and essential part of a whole, it cannot be called a person. We have an instance of this in Jesus Christ, who is hypostatically or personally assumed united with, and subsists by the Higher Divine Personality, and so cannot be called a human person. His nature is truly an individual nature of the human species, but his actions though performed by this human nature, are truly the Divine actions, and in this respect He is God-man. The consequence of Ramannja's theory is to make every man a God-man. It may be noted here that it is not an accidental aggregation or artificial juxtaposition of substances, resulting merely in a collective or artificial unity. It is a substantial union, a personal union of two substances. Two substances, body and soul, unite together to form a subsisting nature that is rational and intelligent. If matter plus soul is the body of Brahman and Brahman is related to these as a soul to the body, there is every reason to believe that their union is a substantial union resulting in a personality of a higher nature.

Monophysites believe that in the case of Christ the substantial union is a union of substances resulting in one

(nature)

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nature, while many other Christian philosophers do not maintain the same view. Urrabru writes, "If the subsistence proper to a complete individual nature adds no positive perfection to the latter, so that the latter necessarily subsists and is a person unless it is actually assumed into a higher personality, and by the very fact that it is not actually so assumed, then the human nature and of Christ is as complete in every way and in every line of substantial perfection, by virtue of its own proper unity, when actually united with the Divine Person, as it would be were it not so united as the person of Peter, Paul or any other human person is". Catholic philosophers maintain that "the human nature of Jesus Christ has not its own co-natural subsistence; this is supplied by the subsistence of a Divine Person. In Christ there is only but one existence, that of the Divine Person, whereby also the human nature of Christ exists". Thus the majority of the Christian philosophers believe that Christ, though possessing a complete individual human nature, was not a person because he subsisted by a higher Divine Personality. If, according to Ramannja man is a person and God is also a person, the substantial union between two persons without absorbing one in the other, cannot be thought unless man be considered as subsisting by God's personality. As we have stated before, this would make every man a god-man.

There is also a close similarity between Ramannja's view and the doctrine of Trinity. It is difficult to say how far he is indebted to Christian Revelation, in finally shaping his thoughts. But as he lived in a period when the Muslims were the masters of nearly two-thirds of India, and Ramannja was acquainted with Islamic philosophy, which mainly deals with neo-platonic and Christian thought, it may be concluded that he was to some extent influenced by the Christian views.

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In the state of quiescence matter exists in a subtle form. Some people are of opinion that matter in this state is non-existent, because it is devoid of name and form. If this is true then Ramannja's view resembles that of Islam or by a Christianity that God created the world from nothing. But I believe Ramannja does not equate matter in this state with non-being, though matter without form from our point of view must be non-existent. Then it must be considered a potential being, something which is to be actualised. But this something must have materiality or the property of extension, and in that case some kind of form, otherwise it will be an ideal being, an idea in the mind of God. But Ramannja does not call it an idea. However, Brahman unites<sup>c</sup> this something with the soul according to Karna of the soul. But as ~~as~~ not matter and souls inhere in Brahman as ~~this~~ <sup>His</sup> attributes, it affirms that finite <sup>things</sup> ~~and~~ things are evolved from, and sustained by the energy of Brahman who realises the origin. potentialities of His nature in this finite world. Brahman is necessary for the concrete reality of the world and ~~the~~ matter and souls as attributes to be actualised are ~~is~~ necessary for Brahman. How closely this view resembles panentheism. ~~a body is atone for its past sins, but when~~  
Again taking the two entities as substance and ~~not~~ <sup>dy</sup> attribute, Ramannja's view is similar to that of Descartes. God is the primary substance and souls and matter are ~~ce~~ relative and created substances, (though Ramannja does not ~~les~~ take them as created), matter is inert and as matter it remains inert throughout. Soul is also inert before it is united with matter and in this sense may be said to derive its activity from God. Matter has in itself no principle of motion. It cannot move itself. It is moved by an external cause. The first cause of its motion is God. The similarity does not go any further.

The individual souls have freedom to act as they like. The dissolution of the world rests with them. Brahman is helpless in this. As for the form which a soul has to get

(after)

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after its separation from the body, Brahman is not an absolute master. He has to reward or punish according to the Karma of a soul. He has no power to show mercy or favour. He has no power to pardon the sins committed by a person in disobeying His Commands. Salvation is possible through Bhakti and works done for the sake of God. Such works destroy the past Karma. Prof. Radhakrishna writes:-

"Bhakti has had a continuous history in India from the time of Rigveda to the present day". He quotes the following from Rigveda:-

"All my thoughts seeking happiness, extol India, longing for him; they embrace him as wives embrace a fair young bridegroom, him the Divine giver of gifts that he may help me. My mind is directed to thee, India, and does not turn from thee; on thee I rest my desire, much invoked me".

Bhakti, in the sense of a lover's devotion towards the Supreme Being, the one Personal God, is of late origin. Indra is not the Supreme Being. He is one of the many Gods of Rigveda, God of Thunder. The lines quoted above do not show any devotion, but are a specimen of the poetic exaggeration common to the East.

Soul enters a body to atone for its past sins, but when it has attained salvation, it no longer needs any body, because there are no sins to be atoned for. It is not clear, then, why the soul after the state of quiescence should again come to the world to take part in the struggles of the world. Salvation means the removal of the traces of sin, which belong to the body and not to the soul. When there is no sin, there should be no body. If the soul is sent to the body again, it implies injustice on the part of Brahman.

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distinguish the possible from other entities which do not have  
the attribute. But so there was no other entity to be

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I think a few words will suffice to make the position of Ramannja clear as regards the formula 'that are thou'. Shankra maintained that in the proportion  $S. = P.$ , there is a real and complete identity between  $S.$  and  $P.$  Of course, when we say 'S. is P.', we assert that what we apprehend under the notion of Predicate  $P.$ , is really identical with what we apprehend under the distinct notion of the Subject ( $S$ ). If fully analysed, such proportions may be brought to the form  $A. = A.$  But Ramannja, like Bradley, held that  $A. = A.$  is no judgment or proposition, so that there must be an element of difference between  $S.$  and  $P.$  He does not maintain a complete identity between "that" and "thou", but a 'partial identity' or 'subsumption' or 'implication'. He takes the subject denotatively and the predicate connotatively; as we say, for example, "This paper is white." Whiteness is an attribute inhering in the paper. This dispute between the <sup>two</sup> ~~two~~ arose from the fact that the author of the formula did not make it clear in what sense he looked for the identity between 'that' and 'thou;' and so both interpret it in their own particular way.

doctrine of Self-surrender and love.

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#### NIMBARKA.

Nimbarka, a younger contemporary of Ramannja, modifies the latter's "qualified non-duality". Ramannja treated the world of manifold as attributes of Brahman and laid stress on the aspect of identity rather than distinction. Nimbarka held that the function of an attribute is to distinguish its possessor from other entities which do not have that attribute. But as there was no other entity to be

differentiated/

differentiated from Brahman, the character of the attribute fell away and principles of difference and non-difference stood side by side on the same plane. Thus, the God, the individual Soul and the world of matter are distinct from one another as well as identical. Brahman has in him the capacity to assume any form he likes. Nimbarka rejects Ramannja's theory of composite personality of Brahman. At the age of twenty-five he was called "Purna

The Individual Soul is a substance and has the capacity of knowing without any organ of sense, is atomic in size. The Individual Souls are infinite in number. They know their true nature by the grace of God.

Krishna is the highest Brahman, having eyes like lotus, being free from all faults, being the object of adoration of all. Men should worship Krishna as well as his consort, Radhika, to free themselves from ignorance. Krishna's grace helps those who consider themselves helpless, and this grace generates bhakti, or devotion.

From the above it will be clear that this system is merely an offshoot of Ramannja's and emphasises the doctrine of Self-surrender and love.

Soon after his return to his native place he wrote his commentary on Bhagwad Gita, which was a prelude to his commentaries on Brahma-Sutra and a formal proclamation of his faith later on.

Several years after the first tour he travelled through Northern India. There he came across the Muslim men of learning. A story is told that in talking to a Muslim chief he used the Persian language, which shows that he was not hostile to learning the language of "Kaicheh". In these travels he had to bear much hardship until finally he reached

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Chapter XI

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Hardwar. Here, he devoted himself to contemplation in a Himalayan valley and began to proclaim the supreme

God Madhava, the founder of the Dwaita System of Vedanta Philosophy was born in 1199 at Belle, six miles to the South-East of Udipi. In due course he was sent to the village school, but failed to give satisfaction to his teacher in his studies, though he distinguished himself in games and physical exercises. So he had to leave school, but his education was not finished, for he took to private study of the Vedas and Shashas. At the age of twenty-five he was called "Purna Madhava" in recognition of his vast learning in the Vedas. Soon, Madhava made up his mind to renounce the world and he became the disciple of one Achutha Preksha. The study of Shankra's vedanta had led him to philosophical thinking and a critical study of the system made him aware of many defects in it. His Guru, knowing of his zeal for philosophical learning, bestowed on him the title of Ruler of the Kingdom of Vedanta and made him the ruler of the "Mutt". On this occasion he was given the name of Ananda Tirtha, the name by which he calls himself in all his works.

He then set out on a tour through the south-eastern district of South India. Here, he had many discussions with the followers of Shankra and thus developed an attitude of great hostility towards Shankra, his system and his followers. Soon after his return to his native place he wrote his still commentary on Bhagwad Gita, which was a prelude to his commentaries on Brahma Sutra and a formal proclamation of his faith later on.

Several years after the first tour he travelled through Northern India. There he came across the Moslem men of learning. A story is told that in talking to a Muslim chief he used the Persian language, which shows that he was not hostile to learning the language of "Malecha". In these travels he had to bear much hardship until finally he reached

Hardawar, Here, he devoted himself to contemplation in a Himalayan Valley and began to proclaim the supreme Godhead of Vishnu and publish his commentaries on Vedanta Sutras. On his return to Udipi he was greatly persecuted by the Fundits of the rival faction; one of the consequences of which was the forcible appropriation of his library by the head of the Sringeri Mutt. But the library was restored to him soon after by King Jaya Simha whose capital is at Vishnumanglam.

Madhava spent his last years in Saridantara which lies between the rivers Kumara Dhara and Netrava. The records of Madhava Mutts assign to him an age of seventy-nine years.

Madhava's philosophy

He divides the whole universe into (1) the conscious and (2) the unconscious. The latter is inert in itself. The change in the unconscious or matter is brought about by the former. The conscious is again divided into the independent conscious or the supreme Being and the dependent conscious or Soul. The former is absolute and is not identical with anything else. It was maintained by some people before Madhava that the absolute was unknowable, indescribable and devoid of attributes. But Madhava differs from them in considering the absolute not wholly unknowable. He says,

"The wise see the form of Meru (a mountain) and still do not see it (i.e. cannot see it all at once). Similarly it cannot be described, reasoned out and known (entirely as such and such).... For want of thorough comprehension, Brahman, though declared by the whole body of scriptures capable of being known and inferred by reasoning, is said to be beyond the reach of words, reasoning and knowledge."

- Purna Pragna Darsha. So in this way he believes that Reality is not wholly unknowable, but can be partly known. The Absolute is the fountain head of energy and the other entities are

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dependent on him. God is a substance possessing an infinite number of attributes. Lakshmi, his consort, though entirely distinct is yet entirely dependent upon Him. She is eternally blessed and has various forms but her body is not material. She possesses the same extension in space as the Supreme Soul.

The individual Souls are not identical with Brahman.

He says,

"The Soul is separate from Brahman from the statement in the Scriptures.... Only an account of having for its essence qualities similar to those of Brahman, the Soul is spoken of as Brahman. Brahman is spoken of as identical with all the world on account of their being all the qualities in Brahman which are predicated of the whole world. The following is in the Bhavishyat Purana: 'The Souls are separate, the perfect Lord is separate, <sup>whole</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>but</sup> owing to the similarity of intelligent nature, they are spoken of as Brahman in the various Scriptural disquisitions."

- Subharao's translation.

The souls<sup>s</sup> coexist eternally with Brahman, but are under the control of the Lord. When united with the bodies they manifest a great deal of variations in the individual, because the impulses of moral nature in the latter are not the same. These variations are not due to the Physical matter but the source of the tendencies is in the essential nature of the Soul itself.

Matter also exists coeternally with God. Madhava refutes the doctrine of the atomists that an atom is indivisible. Even if matter be reduced to a geometrical point, still it has relative dimensions i.e. if it be placed between two other atoms it will be in contact with them on each side and hence it is divisible. This is the same argument which Ghazali advanced against the atomists in his

"Destruction

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"Destruction of the Philosophers." Matter is constituted of a number of subtle principles, the different groupings of which exhibit different properties in the objects. This grouping is brought about by the Supreme Intelligence. from non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the Divine Nature).

"A difference between Soul and Lord, a difference between the un sentient and the Lord, A difference among Souls, and a difference of the un sentient and the Soul each from the other. Also the difference of un sentient things from one another, the world with its five divisions.

This sense is real and from all eternity; if it had had a beginning it would have an end;

Whereas it does not cease to extend; and it is not illusorily imagined;

For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never ceases.

That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those that lack knowledge.

But with the doctrine of those that have knowledge is shown and sustained by Vishnu."

- Madhava's Sarva Darśayā Sangraha.

There are two sources of knowledge, viz., (1) non-sensuous knowledge, (2) aspiritual knowledge. In the first the Soul knows certain things without the aid of the senses. The Soul, in this respect, is called Sakshi. In the latter, the Soul interprets that is conveyed to it through the senses. This kind of knowledge may or may not be true. The first cannot admit of any falsehood. In many cases the Soul is only absorbed in attaining the empirical

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knowledge and is forgetful of the great truths that lie beyond the domain of senses. But in the long-run it is not illusory, for in the Lord illusory imagination of the Universe is not possible, illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the Divine Nature).

"A difference between Soul and Lord, a difference between the un sentient and the Lord,

A difference among Souls, and a difference of the un sentient and the Soul each from the other.

Also the difference of un sentient things from one another, the world with its five divisions.

This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a beginning it would have an end;

Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not illusorily imagined;

For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never ceases.

That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those that lack knowledge.

For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known and sustained by Vishnu."

- Rao.

- Madhava's Sarva Darsayā Sangraha.

There are two sources of knowledge, viz., (1) non-sensuous knowledge, (2) empirical knowledge. In the first theory of perception of difference. The opponent raises an objection:

The Soul, in this respect, is called Sakshī. In the latter, the Soul interprets what is conveyed to it through the senses. This kind of knowledge may or may not be true.

The first cannot admit of any falsehood. In many cases the Soul is only absorbed in attaining the empirical

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knowledge and is forgetful of the great truths that lie beyond the domain of senses. But in the long-run it discovers its ignorance and thus gets the benefit of direct intuition. So, according to Madhava, the sphere of senses is limited, but the second source has a wider range.

Madhava maintains that apprehension or knowledge is the direct and primary evidence of the thing perceived.

"In every act of knowing, the relation of knowledge to the Known is immediate. The means or circumstances that give rise to an idea become the evidence or the medium of the knowledge of a thing not directly, but through the idea or knowledge produced by them." - Rao's translation.

Every idea by virtue of its nature is true. It is as true as long as it is not contradicted by another idea. No idea implies any doubt before it is challenged by another idea.

Madhava believes in objective reality. Madhava maintains that the followers of Shankra contradict themselves, for "the unreal cannot have an appearance even, cannot become an object of misapprehension and cannot with therefore be causally connected with any effect."

Another fundamental principle of Madhava is the affirmation of difference. Maya, or Avidya, or ignorance, cannot explain away difference. Then he discusses the theory of perception of difference. The opponent raises an objection:

"Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptual difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?"

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The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of a thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be asked: "Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary, or all these (the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended?"

It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or without successive steps). Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension, for Cognition, related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the ~~and~~ the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference, the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent contrary. The perception of differences, therefore, (the opponent concludes) is not easily admissible."

To this Madhava replies, "Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who maintains a difference between things as the Subjects of attributes? In the former case the objections you adduce are irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but if difference presupposes a contrary counterpart, it will exist anywhere; this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is first cognised and afterwards

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Time and space are always in the cognition of the knowing self. The other objects perceived are not in the world of time and space ever present to the mind. (Compare with Kant)

It becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or contrasted object) - . . . Difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate entity, or in other words, difference is a thing) . . . . Difference is also ascertained by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience. . . . Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the Universe) may also be inferred by cognisability and other marks."

Obedient to Him are they far away; He is the Lord".

- Madhava's Sarva Darsarva Sangraha.

Madhava breaks away from the pure monism of the Hindus, which had been held sacred for so long a time, and in its place substitutes a dualism between the conscious and the unconscious, between the dependent and the independent. Again we find a dualism of God and soul in the conscious as well.

(Contd.)

There are three real entities, God, Soul and matter. All of them are uncreated and exist eternally with one another. Madhava does not explain why the soul and matter should come to obey the commands of God, when they are uncreated and are fundamentally different from one another. Ramanuja got over this difficulty by making soul and matter as attributes of God. But Madhava gives no such explanation

Time/

Madhava differs from the modern materialist in denying the atomic structure of matter. The various forms of physical objects are due to the activities of the energy working in it. In this way he avoids the objection why the fortuitous combination of atoms give rise to an ordered world.

The materialist considers the force or energy working in the interrelation of the atoms, as self-existent, but

(according)

Time and space are always in the cognition of the knowing self. The other objects perceived are cast in the mould of time and space ever present to the mind. (Compare with Kant)

Emancipation is the highest end of all men. Wealth, position, rank are all transitory but emancipation is eternal and so should be sought after by all wise men. But emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishnu. The grace of Vishnu can be won by a knowledge of His excellence, not by a knowledge of his non-duality.

"Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellence, the soul, exempted from transmigration,

Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss, Vishnu is the refuge of liberated soul, and their supreme ruler, Obedient to Him are they for ever; He is the Lord".

CRITICISM

Madhava breaks away from the pure monism of the Hindus, which had been held sacred for so long a time, and in its place substitutes a dualism between the conscious and the unconscious, between the dependent and the independent. Again we find a dualism of God and soul in the conscious as well. There are three real entities, God, Soul and matter. All of them are uncreated and exist eternally with one another. Madhava does not explain why the soul and matter should come to obey the commands of God, when they are uncreated and are fundamentally different from one another. Ramanuja got over this difficulty by making soul and matter as attributes of God. But Madhava gives no such explanation. Madhava differs from the modern materialist in denying the atomic structure of matter. The various forms of physical objects are due to the activities of the energy working in it. In this way he avoids the objection why the fortuitous combination of atoms give rise to an ordered world.

~~ALTERNATIVE~~

The previous Vedantists did not lay much stress on works. The materialist considers the force or energy working for Shankara it was the knowledge that could give release in the interaction of the atoms, as self existent, but

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according to Madhava this energy is due to God. He also differs from materialists in denying the hypothesis of spontaneous generation and origin of consciousness.

"Everything on earth is, according to Madhava, a living organism. The universe is a vast expansion of animated nature with every atom of space filled up with souls. Infinite are the souls dwelling in an atom of space".

R.K.

Compare with this what Leibniz says on the subject;

"Each portion of the matter is not only infinitely divisible but actually sub-divided without end. The smallest particle of matter has in it a world of creatures, living beings, souls etc. and nothing is fallow or dead save in appearance."

Like Descartes' world, the conscious being of Madhava stands in contrast with the space object. Soul is essentially different from matter and has nothing in common with it. Soul is not an absolute agent, but has its responsibilities. It looks to God for guidance. Madhava does not explain how the interaction between two fundamentally different substances takes place.

Moreover, God does not remain Unlimited by having two realities outside Him. It seems to me that he could not go against the Scriptures by maintaining the createdness of the soul and matter, and at the same time could not do away with the hard facts of experience. He could not think his body and his soul to be an illusion or non-being. He could not believe that by simply assuming oneself to be God, one could really become God. He had no experience in his whole life where he discovered the non-reality of his own self. So there was no other alternative for him but to maintain the reality of God, matter and soul.

The previous Vedantists did not lay much stress on works. For Shankara it was the knowledge that could give release

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and not works.

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Raman<sup>4</sup>ja, too, maintained the doctrine of grace, "God has placed a seal on their hearts" and there is meditation and knowledge. But Madhava attached much importance to moral life. We should not consider lightly of this world. The knowledge of material things leads to a knowledge of God. It is the moral uplift that makes a man approach the Supreme Being. In this respect, his views closely resemble the teaching of Islam. In Islam the poets saints and preachers have emphasised the point that a close observation of the phenomena of nature acts as a means to the knowledge of God. Moral life is greatly encouraged in Islam. Man must conform to the teaching of the Quran. In Madhava's case it is the Vedas that are insisted upon. Rituals are insisted upon closely. There is one difference. Islam does not make any difference between its followers, but Madhava does not allow the Shudras to study the Vedas. Shudras in this respect may take the place of the polytheists in Islam. In Madhava's system God cannot be approached directly but through Vay<sup>4</sup>. Some sects of Islam maintain that God can be approached only through the prophet or Imam, or a Shaikh. Rigidity of the rules of Karma did not allow any freedom to God in the early Hindu sects. But Madhava goes to the other extreme. A man can never on his own acts claim to be saved. It is the grace of God that comes to his aid. Here we find a resemblance to the Christian doctrine of grace. The souls are of three kinds:

(1) Those who are eternally free and sinless (2) Those that have freed themselves or will free themselves (3) Those that are bound to the Sansara (the World), or destined for hell.

We have a somewhat similar classification in Islam excepting the belief in transmigration. There are souls that are eternally sinless like the souls of the prophets. Then there are others who will go to Heaven directly after death, or after some kind of punishment. But there are others who will fall into the hell. There are certain passages in the Quran which tell us that some men are destined for hell.

Here Madhava's theory comes somewhat close  
For instance;

"God has placed a seal on their hearts , and there is a covering over their eyes and ears and there is ultimately rest upon that one sacred-soul - pure existence it being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be - painful torture for them".

"He honours one whom He pleases and disgraces one whom He pleases" and so on.

In Madhava's system a soul goes to Heaven when it develops a love for God, but if in this world it develops a hatred for God, it is cast into the hell for ever.

Similarly in Islam, the people by turning away from God and developing a hatred for God, have their hearts sealed and are thus meant for hell. Just as a man in a room can shut out the light by shutting the windows, so God's light cannot enter a man's heart who, by his wicked deeds, makes himself unfit for its reception.

I believe this is what is meant by a sealed heart. After release the soul does not merge into God, because the perfect and the imperfect cannot mix. Madhava believes in predestination. The same is the case with a majority of the Muslims.

In his theory of knowledge he assumes the existence of a priori knowledge that is one that does not depend upon experience. Kant also admits an a priori in religion. Paul Kalweit writes:-

"The truth of religion lies ultimately in itself alone. It is based neither upon experience, nor science, nor art, nor morality, nor culture; on the contrary all

these are ultimately based on religion ... All this goes to show the importance of a priori for the religion. In the a priori the independent and self-evidencing character of religion finds its clearest manifestation. The ultimate and supreme a priori subsists in God, and without His self-manifestation, without revelation, there could be no religion".

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Here Madhava's theory comes somewhat close to the doctrine of "Logos".

"All words" he says "as expressing definite meanings ultimately rest upon that one summum-genus - pure existence, it being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be-- This existence is called the Great Soul. The real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman." Or in other words, knowledge of the Vedas means the intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

In regard to his theory of "perception of difference", it may be said that this is the same problem which has been a matter of controversy among the philosophers of all ages. Difference implies relation and relation is universal. Plato and Aristotle struggled between the transcendence and immanence of the universals. This controversy was taken up by the scholastics and was handed down to the modern thinkers. The problem raised by Madhava is as follows:-  
Have the universals any objective reality? If so, can they be an object of sense-perception?

Among modern thinkers some are of opinion that universals are purely subjective states, dependent upon consciousness and incapable of any meaning or reality apart from consciousness, while others maintain that universals are a part or constituent of the particulars. The universal nature present in particular objects could not be conceived unless it were there to be conceived. But the independent reality of universals does not mean that they exist as a new kind of particulars.

Bertrand Russell says:-

"We must admit that the relations, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends and does not create----- The world of universals is a world of being ... We find universals by abstraction from the particulars".

An act of perception is not separated from the whole mental (process)

process of the moment. In every mental act cognition, feeling and willing are all mixed together. However, confining our attention to the cognitive aspect only, we may say that even in simple perception what is perceived is recognised as such and such, and however vague and rudimentary the recognition may be, it implies a reference to something beyond the given object. In all human perception some such implicit apprehension appears to be involved. In complex perception we select certain aspects of the objects and fix our attention on them. So, comparison and contrast, or apprehension of relations, goes hand in hand with perception.

"The first and fundamental property of mind" says Bain "is the consciousness of difference or discrimination" Consciousness is thus reduced to a sense of difference. The remainder of his life he spent mostly in Benares and Brinivan. His death took place in 1531 at Benares.

Vallabha has left about ten works on Vaishnavite philosophy. In writing these works he was mostly aided by his disciples. His cult and doctrines resemble a good deal those of his contemporary, Chaitanya, and were derived chiefly from the philosophy of Ramanuja.

His philosophy may be summed up as follows:

The One Absolute, as knower of his nature of jivata sought joy in becoming many, and so he became the organic and inorganic worlds and the controlling Power. These manifestations may be likened to the sparks issuing from a fire and consequently may be considered to be his parts. But in the inanimate world his joy and intelligence are imperceptible, while in the animals these are manifest in various degrees. So we find that prakriti is the material cause of the world.

He was the founder of a great sect in mediaeval India. He was a native of Teluga in the South - the second son of Lakhsman Bhatt, a Telingana Brahman, and was born at Champaranya in 1479. At the age of seven he was sent to a school conducted by Narayana Bhatta. It is said that in a short period of four months he succeeded in learning four Vedas, six Shatras and eighteen Puranas, but no reliance can be placed on such stories. But it is clear that he became a great Sanskrit scholar and philosopher of his time. As was the custom of his age, he went on travels while he was still young. He began to preach his faith and philosophy when travelling through the southern part of India and soon had many converts to his doctrine. While in the South he was invited to a philosophic disputation with the <sup>Siviks</sup> Shartas, where his success made him a leader of the Vaishnaves of the locality, who elected him their spiritual chief with the title of Acharya. Then he returned to the North and went on a second pilgrimage in the Himalayan Valleys. At Benares he married a Brahman girl - Maha Lakshmi by name. Two sons were born of this marriage. The remainder of his life he spent mostly in Benares and Brindvan. His death took place in 1531 at Benares.

Vallabha has left about ten works on Vaishnavite philosophy. In writing these works he was mostly aided by his disciples. His cult and doctrines resemble a good deal those of his contemporary, Chaitanya, and were derived chiefly from the philosophy of Ramanuja.

His philosophy may be summed up as follows: -

The One Absolute, on account of His nature of Ananda sought joy in becoming many, and so He Himself became the organic and inorganic worlds and the controlling forces. These manifestations may be likened to the sparks issuing from a fire and consequently may be considered to be His parts. But in the inanimate world his joy and intelligence are imperceptible, while in the animate these are manifest in various degrees. So we find that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

He is a perfect joy. But by his will his Saiva position overcomes the Ananda and creates the world. He is thus called Ananda unchangeable, the Cause of all causes.

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The individual Soul is identical with Brahman and is part of Brahman and Atomic, Sat and Chit predominate at the expense of Ananda, which is concealed by the former. The individual Soul is not a form of the Supreme Soul changed into something different by Maya, but is itself the Supreme Soul in substance with the one attribute rendered imperceptible. It is the same reality viewed from different points, or rather the same reality views itself from different angles. Ananda is not absent in the Soul, but is imperceptible. "In the succession of existences ignorance and worldliness had indeed blunted its perception. Just as if a man, gliding down a stream in a boat and watching the objects at different distances from the bank change their position in respect both to himself and one another, supposed them in motion, he would be right in believing them real, but wrong in imagining them to move. So the Soul correctly interprets the world as real, but erroneously ascribes it to plurality. Illusion there is, but it is not divinely conditioned for the purpose of creation, it is the issue of our own experience which it is our business to throw off and transcend". - Carpenter.

The relation between the two is that of identity, (Advaita) or, more accurately, the identity of untransformed Souls, (Suddhadvaita.)

Siri Krishna is the incarnation of Brahman, but his body is not made of earthly matter but celestial. The difference between an ordinary man and Siri Krishna is the presence of all the three attributes, (Sat - Chit - Ananda) in the latter. Moreover he is considered the excellent of all beings. All his sports are eternal. He is perfect joy. But by his will his <sup>K</sup>Salva position overcomes the Ananda and creates the world. He is thus called <sup>K</sup>Ansara unchangeable, the Cause of all causes.

To the ordinary devotee Brahman appears as the place of Purusotama with the attributes of extensive Vaikuntha and others, while to the enlightened it appears in the form of Sat - Chit - and Ananda, infinite in space and time, self-manifesting and devoid of all qualities. The positive qualities are not non-existing but are rendered imperceptible to the enlightened, by the above powers.

So Brahman has three forms, viz., Purusotama and two kinds of Akasra. Viewed from the aspect of his controlling power he is called Antrayami (the inward controller). "It is this inward controller that becomes incarnate in the various forms usually mentioned."

The Sattva quality assumes the form of Vishnu, (protector of all), Rajas and Tamas those of Brahmadeva (creation), and Shiva (for destruction).

The individual Soul passes through many births and rebirths and is consequently subject to misery, because it considers the body and the world as its own. But when it sees the vanity of the world and devotes itself to meditation and love of God it is released. The delivered Souls are of three kinds, viz.,

(1) Those who have been released by the cessation of ignorance or delusion.

(2) Those who live in the world of Bhagwat other than the pervading Vaikuntha, where they attain the condition of the pure Brahman by the favour of Bhagwat. (3) And those who have the divine nature in them and through living in the world devote themselves to Bhakti, until perfect love for Him alone dwells in their heart and they become associates of the Bhagwat. These souls are of two kinds, viz., (1) those who subject themselves to some kind of moral discipline (Maryada Jiva) and (2) those who entirely depend on the grace of God (Pusti Jiva). Pusti (Grace of God) enables man to attain the object of life. Mahapusti engenders in a man a frame of mind which excludes every desire except for the Attainment

of/

of God. These Bhagats of four kinds viz., (1). those who while engaged in wordly pursuits do acts that are calculated to bring attainment of God. (2). Those who withdraw from worldly pleasures and devote themselves to the hearing of discourses about Him or singing of holy songs. (3). Those who are made competent by Gods' grace to acquire a knowledge about Him, but the acquirement of knowledge depends on their own efforts. (4). Those who are wholly and solely devoted to the love of God. This kind of Bhakti is produced by God and does not depend upon any individuals efforts. Acquirement of knowledge takes place in the following stages viz., (1) Love or liking. (2). Attachment. (3). Ahaunting passion which is the mature condition of the first two which results in the attainment of bliss. To such a person everything is Hari and so he <sup>identifies</sup> ~~indemnifies~~ himself with everything. The final result of this is his admission to the sport of Krishma. He joins the sport in the form of Cows, birds, etc.,

CRITICISM.

This system maintains that God is wholly immanent in the world or more correctly <sup>think</sup> by the ~~finite~~ objects of the the world are nothing but God in abother form. It does not explain why God, who is unconditioned and infinite makes Himself conditioned and <sup>to</sup> ~~finite~~ and <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ transforming Himself into the world of things limits Himself. The <sup>to</sup> ~~finite~~ world is a system of action and reactions. The <sup>to</sup> ~~finite~~ souls feel themselves acted on by something that is outside them.

If the <sup>to</sup> ~~finite~~ souls are part of God, why does God impose upon himself this limitation of knowledge and powers.

In the ~~power~~ souls one of the three gunnas is imperceptible.

Imperceptible to whom? Most probably to Brahman and soul, because Brahman is the material cause of the world.

*be applied to this system*

So Brahman as Brahman knows his full nature. Brahman as soul knows only a part of his nature and as matter is not conscious at all. If these three forms exist simultaneously, ~~if~~ they make Brahman intelligent and unintelligent simultaneously, or make Brahman divisible and consequently finite. It is not a case of a conscious being <sup>e</sup> involving the object of his consciousness out of himself, giving them a relative reality. Let us compare it with the neoplatonism; neoplatonism considers the primeval being as one, the source of all life. It is devoid of all attributes. It is being without magnitude, thought, life. It is "above existence!" But Vallabha's Brahman, though to some extent considered devoid of qualities, still has Being, Intelligence and Bliss as his attributes and the three gunas (Sat, Rajas, and Tamas) constitutes His essence. The neoplatonic Absolute is perpetually producing without any alteration in itself but Brahman undergoes a change of form as well as a change in the relative position of his attributes. One or the other of his three attributes are predominant in the Organic and inorganic substances. He changed himself into the world by His Will at a certain period of His existence. Moreover, in neoplatonism production is not a physical process but an emanation of energy, of which nous is the first outflow, the image of the One. As image it corresponds with the One but as derived it is entirely different. The same is the case with the soul, which is an image of the nous. But Vallabha's "soul" is not different from Brahman. As the images in their outward flow become fainter and fainter, so Brahman loses his intelligence <sup>at</sup> will in matter there is no perceptible trace left of it. As in neoplatonism the soul through an ecstatic approach may see God, so the Soul in this system may get release from the cycle of births through contemplation of Krishna. Asceticism is the ground work of both. *All the defects of pantheism can be applied to this system.*

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The Age of Reformation.

After the 13th Century India was in a state of great Political upheaval which had a great effect on the Social and Moral life of the people. The Moslems were conquering India, bit by bit, and wherever they went they preached their own ideas. Even in places where the Muslims had established themselves for a long time, the Hindu Subjects saw the coming and going of various dynasties and great political disturbance. They also witnessed the great religious Controversies not only among their own Kith and Kin but also among the Conquerors. In short, there did not seem to be anything stable. The condition of the age has been described by <sup>4</sup>Mapapati, a <sup>4</sup>Maphatta historian thus:

"Sacrifices, alms and religious duties had ceased, Brahmins, then styled the lords of the earth, relinquished their religious functions and never retired into forests at any period of their lives. Kashatryas forgot their own special duties and became unscrupulous. Sons did not heed the advice of their parents, and disciples ceased to serve their spiritual guides. Husbands listened to the words of their Wives and dwelt with their Wives' fathers. No one wished to undertake the fatigue of a pilgrimage. Men ceased to sing the praises of God and turned, instead, to the enjoyment of Shows and Spectacles.. The possessors of wealth no longer took pleasure in giving alms to the needy, and the young and healthy renounced religious austerities. Kings ceased to love their subjects and all justice and morality were laid aside. Ladies of rank became slaves and sold their daughters. The reign of falsehood had set in; what was base was represented as genuine. Cruel people misled and ruined the innocent. God was represented by stones which were broken by strangers. The Gayatri

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or formula of <sup>sa</sup> initiation of the Hindu Saints was never uttered. There was substituted for it the charm of the magician. And the Secular authorities of the time, to crown their iniquities, levied taxes on the ancient places of pilgrimage."

Mahapati writes about Southern India. But what was true of the South can to some extent be applied to the <sup>N</sup>orth. It has often happened in the World that under such conditions the people longingly hope to be relieved of their distress and think of getting help from some Supernatural Source. It is at this time that a reformer is greatly needed and the reformer does come to the people. The same was the case with India. In this period we find many thinkers whose mission was to reform the World. But they had another task before them. They belonged to a race that lived in utter subjugation and at the mercy of the foreigners. Denouncing of priesthood was peculiar to Islamic mystics not to Hindus. As the people were longing for peace, they could only bring about peace by a reconciliation between the Conquered and the Conqueror. They could not accept the views of the Muslims in toto, and at the same time could not give up the culture under which they were brought up. So their task was to take up what they considered best in Islam and to blend it with Hinduism. Some instances of this have been quoted before. Here are a few more:-

"My Lord is a Store Supplier great, in merchandise he deals; nor beams, nor scales, in his own hands this great World weighs and feels" - Kabir- Compare with this Shams - Tabriz.

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If the "Who is that person who weighs and distributes without scales or measure, yet his measuring and distribution is correct?"

Similar/

Why dost the Mohammedan priest ascend the minaret? The Similar is the case with these:-

"Whatever I have is not my own; it is thine; it is thine own that I give thee; what have I?"

"Do not oppress the weak, their sighs have great power, by the puffs of the bellows iron is converted to flames.

Be true to God and loving to his servants, whether your hair be longer entirely removed."

"Whatever I did, you did; I did nothing myself; should man say I did it, it was in your strength that it was done.

Should all the earth be turned into paper, and all the trees into pens, should the seven seas be turned into ink, yet could not an account of God be written."

Moreover, they were subjected for a long time to the tyrannies of the priesthood, both in Islam and Hinduism. So their ideal was to relieve the world of this dominating influence of priest-craft and lead the world to a universal peace which could only be formed in a union with the Creator. They were so much opposed to priesthood and its Consequent Ceremonial observances, that they laid stress on contemplation and devotion at the expense of the ceremonies.

The above can be verified from the following quotations:-

Whither shall I go? I am happy at home, my heart will not go with me; it hath become a cripple. One day my heart desired to go; I ground sandal, took attar of roses and many perfumes, And was proceeding to worship in the temple of Brahma. But my spiritual guide showed me God in my heart. Wherever I go I find only water or stone. But thou, O God, art equally contained in everything. The Vedas and Puranas I have all seen and searched. Go thou thither if God be not here. O, true Guru, I am a sacrifice unto thee Who hast cut away all my perplexities and doubts. Rama nanda's, Lord is the all pervading God. The Guru's word hath cut away millions of sins." Rama nanda. - Trans. by Macauliff.

Why dost thou display to men the wooden rosary? If thou remembered not God in thy heart, what availeth thy rosary?

Why dost the Mohammedan priest ascend the minaret? The Lord is not deaf.

Search within thy heart for Him for whose sake thou callest to prayer.

If Union with God be obtained by going about naked, All the deer of the forest shall be saved.

If mattereth not whether one goeth naked or weareth a deer-skin,

If he recognise not God in his heart.

If Supernatural power be obtained by shaving the head,

Why should not sheep obtain salvation?

Saith Kabir, Hear, O my brethren, who hath obtained deliverance without the name of God?

O Kazi nothing is accomplished by mere words.

It is not by fasting and praying and repeating the Creed that man goeth to heaven.

The inner veil of the Temple of Mecca is in man's heart, if the truth be known."

H - KABIR.

O, Brahman, thou worshippest and propitiatest the Saligram, and deemest it a good act to wear a necklace of sweet basil,

Why irrigate barren land and waste thy life?

Why apply plaster to a frail, tottering wall? -

Repeating God's name, from a raft, for thy Salvation?

May the Merciful have mercy on thee! "

We can quote many instances of a similar kind.

So, these reformers were midway between Hinduism and Islam. None of them laid claim to revelation in its theological sense. Their aim was to guide the people morally to the attainment of the highest bliss and peace, in seeking union with the Almighty.

We will select, here, only <sup>a few</sup> two of them for discussion.

~~KABIR~~

Bishambar (the real name of Chaitanya) was born in 1785. The women of the village called him Nimai or "short lived" in order to propitiate the evil spirits. Bishambar joined a school of Sanskrit leaving Nawadiya at an early age. His father died when he was still a student, and later on he married Lakshmi, the daughter of Ballala Charya. When he finished his education he began to give private lessons to the pupils like other Brahmans. He then proceeded on a tour through Bengal where he greatly added to his knowledge. During his absence, his wife died of snake bite and when he returned to Nawadiya he married again. By this time Chaitanya was in highly prosperous circumstances but his Soul was to visit a new phase in his life. During his pilgrimage to Gaya, he met a Vaishanava Monk named Ishwar Puri - a Monk of Madhavacharya order. Chaitanya became his disciple. He was completely changed now, submerged in the ocean of love for Krishna. Often he developed religious ecstasy and sometimes he behaved like a mad man. He would often gather the devout persons of the town and dance with them like the Moslem dervishes of Syria. This song accompanied their dance :-

How shall I speak of my Bliss today?

The Beloved Krishna has entered my temple today; With perspiration, thrill, tears of joy, shout and roar, they turned and turned touching the master's feet now and then ... At the verses of Mokanda (a disciple) the master could no longer be held back. He was all tears, tremour, thrill, sweat and broken accents, now rising up and falling down, now weeping.

(The Song, Radha speaks)

Woe is me, dear Sister, for my present state  
The love of Krishna has caused my soul and body like a poison

My heart burns day and night, I know no peace

O that I could fly where Kahn is to be found.  
Sweetly did Mukanda sing the above ditty which made the mater's heart burst. He was stricken down by the force of his passion

and/

and lay down breathless on the ground. The faithful grew alarmed when lo! He sprang up with a shout, overcome with ecstasy and saying, "Chant, chant, the name of Hari, Sircar (Krishna Das translated by Prof. Sircar). This came as a complete surprise to the Brahman Pundits of the time, who had never witnessed such scenes before among Hindu monks. So they ~~ran~~<sup>rose</sup> in opposition and treated Chaitanya and his companions with open hatred. These moments of ecstasy have not been uncommon with the Moslem and Christian mystics. James has given many instances of this in "The Varieties of Religious Experience." The following is quoted from M.S. 'of an old man' by Wilfred Monod and requoted by James. "Jesus has come to take up his abode in my heart. It is not so much a habitation, an association as a sort of fusion--- The Wall before me, dark a few moments since, is splendid at this hour, because the sun shines on it ---- I feel the pressure of His hand, I feel something else which fills me with a serene joy; shall I dare to speak it out? Yes, for it is the true expression of what I experience. The Holy Spirit is not merely making me a visit; it is no mere dazzling apparition which may from one moment to another spread its wings and leave me in my night, it is a permanent habitation, He can depart only if he takes me with him. More than that; he is not other than myself: he is one with me. It is not a juxtaposition, it is a penetration, a profound modification of my nature, a new name of being."

Moreover there is some resemblance between the stages of Western mystics' love and ~~then~~<sup>those</sup> described by Chaitanyas followers. For instance St. Teresa (1515-1582) classifies them as 1. Recollection 2. Quiet 3. Union 4. Ecstasy 5. Rapt 6. The Pain of God 7. The Spiritual marriage.

Similarly in the Vaishanava Poems we come across the

following/

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following stages. The dawn of love (purvarag) (2).  
Union and ecstasy (Milana) (3). Rapt (Sambhoga Milana)  
(4). The pain of God (Viraha) (5). spiritual marriage  
(Bhavasammilana)

Chaitanya's pain of separation from God may be  
compared with that of St. Teresa. Chaitanya saw the hill  
of Chatak and ~~Mistook~~ it for the hill Gobardhana and ~~running~~  
after it ~~said~~ <sup>cried</sup> and wept.

Sometimes he would heave a deep sigh and say, "Where is  
my God gone, Pray tell me how ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> I have Him back. Oh my God  
my father where art thou gone, I cannot live without thee."  
In deep agony of heart he would weep and cry till he fell  
senseless. When he came to his senses he would say, "He  
was here with me, oh where is He gone again, my grief is  
unsupportable.

As has been said before Chaitanya saw a great opposition  
~~around~~ <sup>around</sup> him, but found a warm support in the person of the local  
Kazi. However he resolved to take up sanyasin to escape the  
hatred of the people. So at the age of 24 he ~~became~~ <sup>got</sup> himself  
initiated under Keshab - Bharah and was given the name of  
Krishna - Chaitanya.

The next Six years of his life were spent in pilgrim-  
ages to the Eastern and Southern India. During these  
journeys he had many disciples and many people accepted his  
creed. He often held philosophical discussions with both  
Huidus and Muslims and in this way expounded his teaching  
among his fellowmen. Then he returned to Puri and the  
remaining Eighteen years of his life were spent in that town  
with his disciples and followers. In 1533 he breathed his  
last.

CHAITANYA'S TEACHING.

Chaitanya wrote nothing except the eight couplets (Ashtaka) so to know his thoughts we have to depend upon other books written a considerable time after his death. It is impossible to say how far these books, for instance, Charitamrita, considered as the most authoritative source by the followers of the sect, are truly representative of Chaitanya's thoughts.

BHAGWAN or HARI is another name for God in his totality. He is not formless, but the source of infinite forms, of which the form of Krishna is the most perfect. All that transcends this form is inconceivable. The Shurtis are wrong in describing Him in abstract. The Universe originates from Brahma, lives in Brahma, and returns to Brahma. (Compare with this the famous saying of Saint Paul "We live and move and have our being in God".) The three attributes of God are chit, or intelligence power, the maya, or power of illusion, and Jiva, the power of preservation. The chit power represents the supreme intelligence, the maya gives rise to the whole creation, and the Jiva to the individual soul. These attributes have produced the universe which is real, but cannot be adequately described. Human souls are the atomic portion of his nature, and are dependent on him but at the same time separate and distinctive. He tries to steer clear of both dualism and Monism, and traverses a middle path. It is better to call his system an "incomprehensible dualistic monism", because it is difficult to understand him. "When he desired to be many he looked at his natural powers". This shows that he had <sup>an eye</sup> a mind to see and a mind to will. Brahma is the perfect perfect supreme Being and Krishna is his incarnation. Shurti contradicts itself in denying material hands and feet to Brahma, while it says that

God moves swiftly and receives everything. "How can you call that God formless who has the six qualities and is supremely blissful. You conclude Him to be powerless, who has the three natural powers, as is evident from the Vishnu Purana." God's nature consists of Sat, Chit, and Ananda. "But all these three offer devotion in the form of love." He is himself the essence of love, the source of all bliss and delight. His supreme delight is in love. The Chit power manifests itself in Six Aspects. God and Creation differ as the master and slave. Creation is not identical with God. "He is a wretch who denies form to God, though not, behold not that slave of Death, <sup>Vyasa</sup> ~~Ya-Sa~~ holds that God is an incomprehensible power, but He is manifested as Creation."

The Philosopher's stone does not undergo any change or decrease when changing a base<sup>2</sup> metal to Gold, So God takes the form of Creation without suffering any corruption." People have made a mistake in interpreting the above doctrine of ~~Vyasa~~ when they say "I am one with the Creator. But Creation is not unreal, it is only perishable. "The great word Pranaba is the Self of God; from that Pranaba all the Vedas have sprung in this world. The words "Tat-tvam-asi" (thou art that) applied to Creation are only fractional, but you, without minding the Pranaba, call these words the Supreme truth"- from Chaitanya's address to Sarbbabhauma.

Chaitanya describes Krishna as the God "at whose adoration the formula recited is Love, the offering presented is the Seed of Love," "is the Source of Perfect Bliss; in

comparison/

comparison with Him, spiritual delight is as grass",  
 "He is All-attracting, All-rejoicing, the Source of 'High Rasa' (Delight, sweetness), making men forget everything for His own Form: the Aroma of whom makes men give up the quest of enjoyment, success, mukti and pleasure. In this adoration there is no shastric reasoning, no solution of theological problems, because in this Nature sweetness predominates," Krishne<sup>a</sup> is Himself Delight and yet He tastes delight. Hladinē (the power by which he enjoys delight) has been created to give enjoyment to the Faithful. The essence of hladinē is named Prem (love). The emotion of Prema is filled with the emotions of Ananda and chit. The Supreme emotion (matābhavē) is the quintessence of Prema. The lady Radha is the personation of that supreme emotion-Brahma Samhiter. Chartanya tells us how to attain this God of Love and Joy:-  
 "When Passion <sup>to</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>in</sup> Krishna <sup>na</sup> is deepened it is called Prema<sup>a</sup>, the permanent form of Bhakti in Krishna. It has two aspects. If any man has the grace to feel Shraddha (faith) he consorts with pious men, from which companionship result the hearing and Chanting of Krishna's name. From the attainment of Bhakti all his troubles are removed; and as a consequence his faith becomes constant which gives him a taste for listening and reciting Krishna's name. From taste comes strong inclination which gives birth to the sprout of passion for Krishna in the Soul. When their emotion is deepened, it takes the name of love. That love is the ultimate fruit, the source of every bliss. The man in whose heart this emotion sprouts up is marked by the many qualities named in the Shastras. No earthly affliction can disturb his mind. Such a man never wastes

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his time without communing with Krishna. He never fears attack by enjoyment, material success or the objects of sensual gratification. Even the noblest <sup>Bhakta</sup> Chanta considers himself as lowly and firmly believes that Krishna will take pity on him. He is ever expectant, ever passionately longing. As wealth gives pleasure and drives away sorrow of itself, so Bhakti kindles love of Krishna, and when love is turned to Krishna, man is freed from bondage to the world. The fruit of love is not riches or the cessation of re-birth, but its chief object is the enjoyment of the beatitude of loving"-

Translated by Sirkar.

From the verses of Chaitanya and others it is clear that in ecstasy 'man is beside himself', that this momentary escape from "himself" is the greatest gift that life offers. This shows that Nirwana is not annihilation but something more than that. It is subsistence as preached by the Moslem mystics.

Later on the followers of this sect considered Chaitanya as incarnation of God." It is said that Krishna loved his own beauty (symbolised in the form of Radha) and in order to enjoy the Supreme feelings that Radha felt for him he took form in Chaitanya as himself and Radha combined.

Social/

Chaitanya/

Social and Ethical.

Chactanya followed the usual <sup>na</sup> ~~na~~ Vaishyite practice of showing mercy to all living beings and taking to strictly vegetarian diet. Humility is the chief mark of the sect and along with this freedom from all wordly desires, purity of heart and attainment of tranquility are taught. The Vaishanvite idea is summed up thus! "These are the signs of a Vaishanava indicated only, as everything cannot be said; compassionate, free from spite, of the very nature of truth, spotless, charitable, gentle, pure, possessing nothing, doing good to all, peaceful, wholly surrendered to Krishna, desireless, harmless, steadfast, victorious over the six passions, eating sparingly, restraining the self, honouring other without self-esteem, tender hearted, grave, friendly, poetic, skilful and silent" - Charitamrita.

In the matter of Caste, Chactanya <sup>na</sup> ~~na~~ is not so generous. He admits that Salvation is not the monopoly of any being of higher cast. "There is no consideration of Caste or family in the worship of Krishna" "Give Krishna - bhakti down to Chandalas." But this did not mean that the destruction <sup>in</sup> of Caste or rank was abolished. The men were allowed to enjoy their social positions given to them by their being members of high Castes and the people of low Caste were not to interfere in the rights of the Superior. "It is the nature of Bhakta," he says, "To observe rank. The maintenance of dignity is the ornament of a Sadhu. People ridicule when rank is broken, and both worlds are lost. My mind is pleased when propriety of conduct is maintained." (Charitamrita). Within the circle of Chactanya's <sup>na</sup> ~~na~~ disciples the people of high Caste <sup>did</sup> ~~do~~ not eat with those of low Castes. Chactanya himself provided separate quarters for Hari Das, a convert from low Caste, and had ~~no~~ food sent to him separately.

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such word Chapter XV that contains the letter 'p'.

This shows the whole story is merely a fiction.

However, it is generally believed that Kabir's parents were  
Kabir was born in 1440. Many legends are connected  
Hindus and that he was brought up by a Muslim.

with his birth but none of them is reliable. For instance,  
Very little is known of his early life, but it appears  
One of the legends says that Kabir was found lying on a  
that he was given to mystic moods and intrepid disposition.  
blossoming water-lily in a lake near Banares. Niru, a  
For a long time he was without a teacher or guru. At that

Muhammeden weaver took him home and adopted him as his  
time the fame of Rama nanda, a Vaishnavite Theologist had  
child. A Kazi or Moslem priest was called to give  
spread far and wide. Kabir was also desirous of becoming  
this child a name. He opened the Quran and the first  
a disciple of Rama nanda, but was not certain whether he, as  
word that he cast his eyes on was Kabir, the great.

a Mohammedan would be admitted to discipleship. But some-  
Kabir being one of God's names, the priest hesitated to  
how or other he managed to get himself admitted to the fold  
call the child by that name. Thereon other kazis were  
of Ramananda's followers.

summoned. All opened the Quran but with the same  
result. They were silent for a moment. They tried  
again. Then they found the names "Zinda," "Fir," "Khinjar"  
and "Hayya." They could not give these names to a weaver's

child. They then asked Niru to destroy the child in  
some way. Thereon Niru took the child within the house

to put him to death but before he could do so the child  
spoke, "I have come from an unknown place, Maya has

deceived the world ; no one knows me. I was not born  
of a woman, but manifested as a boy. My dwelling was

in a lonely spot nigh to Kasi and there the weaver found  
me. I contain neither heaven nor earth, but wisdom

only. I have come to this earth in spiritual form and  
of spiritual significance is my name. I have neither

bone nor blood, nor skin. I reveal to men the "word",  
My body is eternal. I am the highest being. These <sup>are</sup> the

words of Kabir who is indestructible! The authenticity  
of this miracle cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The

words "Zinda" and "Fir" are Persian words and are not found  
in the Quran though the Modern European Orientalists  
claim to have found one or two word of Persian origin in

the Quran but they are not "Zinda" and "Fir". There is no

/such

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such word in the Quran, that contains the letter "p". This shows that the whole story is merely a fiction. However, it is generally believed that Kabir's parents were Hindus and that he was brought up by a Moslem. Very little is known of his early life, but it appears that he was given to mystic moods and intrepid disposition. For a long time he was without a teacher or guru. At that time the fame of Rama nanda, a Vaishnavite Theologist had spread far and wide. Kabir was also desirous of becoming a disciple of Rama nanda, but was not certain whether he, as a Mohammedan would be admitted to discipleship. But somehow or other he managed to get himself admitted to the fold of Ramananda's followers.

There is some doubt in certain quarters as to the married life of Kabir, but I think <sup>miss</sup> Underhill is correct in giving a fair estimate of his life.

"It is clear that he never adopted the life of the professional ascetic or retired from the world in order to devote himself to bodily mortifications and the exclusive pursuit of the contemplative life. Side by side with his interior life of adoration, its artistic expression in Music and words - for he was a Skilled musician as well as a poet - he lived the sane and diligent life of the Oriental Craftsman. All the legends agree on this point that Kabir was a weaver, a simple and unlettered man, who earned his living at the loom. Like Paul, the tent maker; Boehme, the cobbler; Bunyan the tinker; Tersteegen, the ribbon-maker; he knew how to combine vision and industry; the work of his hands helped rather than hindered the impassioned meditation of his heart."

It/

It is said that Kabir was accused of heresy and was brought before the Emperor Sikandar Lodhi. The Courtiers advised the King to put him to death, but as the King gave great latitude and freedom of thought to the Sufis and considered Kabir to be one of that Sect, he let him go in peace. Kabir then moved from one place to another visiting important towns of northern India. He held discussions with Pundits and Maulvis of his time, in which he often came out victorious. At last in 1518, old and feeble, he died at Maghar near Gorakhpur.

"Not a drop now trickleth from the citadel of thy brain - where is the music that filled it? The great Saint hath departed with the name of Supreme Brahm, the Supreme God.

Which revelled in divine knowledge, expounded and preached. Whither hath the player gone who played the drum of thy body?

Thy tales, thy words, thy divine instructions are no longer heard; all thy vital energy hath been drawn away; the ten breaths which keep thee together have escaped. Thou art dead; thou hast left thy friends and relatives. Sayeth Kabir; He who meditateth on God bursteth his bonds even when alive!"

Translated by Macauliffe. He is the Lover as well as "the Beloved". Here we find some similarity to the Christian idea of "God is love". the highest manifestation of God's love was the sacrifice of Jesus to take away human suffering. Moreover, in calling God the most beautiful, Kabir is, at the same level



as the Christian Saints of the middle ages. We find a similar instance in an Islamic tradition:-

"God is Beautiful and loves Beauty".

It is true the Real cannot be ugly, for beauty implies perfection, and none but the Real is perfect. Even in this world the beauty of an object is the manifestation of its natural perfection by the proportion of its parts and the harmony of its activities. And the beauty of spiritual realities is, of course, of a higher and nobler order than the beauty of the sensible reality. Again, from the beauty of the human spirit we can analogically rise to the apprehension of the Beauty of the Infinite. The most Beautiful must be the Beloved, the object of adoration, and worship, because even in this world when we say "that is beautiful" it means that the object exists in a sentiment of pleasure and approval. We value the object for its own sake and feel a joy in its contemplation. To have a joy in anything for its own sake is the primarily essential for the development of love. We dwell more and more on aspects of the object that make it appear more worthy of our joy, and so love is increased and our passion is strengthened.

But the objects of this world are not perfect, they have certain defects and deformities. They cannot be called perfectly beautiful. When by chance these aspects come into our view, and show to us the ugliness of the object, our joy is lessened and along with it follows the decrease in love. That is why love for the objects of this world is not constant. When a man receives a shock of this kind, he sometimes develops in himself a longing for the perfect, and thus begins the love for the Infinite. When once in this stage he cannot go back. The more and more he dwells on the various aspects of Divinity, the greater is his love for God, because therein he sees no imperfection to take him away from the object

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of his love. So we come to the conclusion that the Beautiful is the Beloved.

Then we see that according to Kabir, God is love. Love constitutes His essence. It manifests itself in the very heart of things. Among all the changing forms, this is the form that is everlasting. Compare with this what Omar Khayyam says:-

"For all this sin with which the face of man is blackened God needs to take as well as give Man's forgiveness".

Kabir does not answer any objection as to the existence of evil and misery in the world. According to Kabir:-

God is both immanent and transcendent. He is like the unity of mind in the midst of plurality of ideas. God is immanent in the world as the soul is immanent in the Psychological state. But He is transcendental as well. He is more than the finite beings, and is not the sum total of them. God distinguishes Himself from the world by being aware of himself as subject and agent.

In some passages Kabir seems to be anthro-morphic in his conception of God. But I believe this is due to his extreme love for God. A man cannot fall in love with abstractions. When he has to dwell on various aspects of the Deity, and to give expression to his feelings, he cannot help using similies and metaphors. The same is the case with Kabir.

I quote below a few of his poems to make his idea of Godhead clear:-

"The Light of the Sun, the Moon and the Stars shines bright,

The melody of love swells forth and the rythm of love's detachment beats the time.

Day and night the chorus of music fills the heavens; and Kabir says; "My beloved one gleams like the lightening flash in the sky.

The whole world does its work and commits its errors; but few are the lovers who know the Beloved.

The devout seeker is he who mingles in his heart the double current of love and detachment, like the mingling of the streams of Ganges and Jumna.

In his heart the sacred water flows day and night; and thus the round of births and deaths is brought to an end

Behold what wonderful rest is the Supreme Spirit!, and he enjoys it who makes himself meet for it.

Held by the cords of love, the swing of the ocean of joy sways to and fro; and a mighty sound breaks forth in song.

See what a lotus blooms there without water; and Kabir says, "My heart<sup>be</sup> drinks its nectar".

What a wonderful lotus it is, that blooms at the heart of the spinning-wheel of the Universe! Only a few pure souls know of its pure delight,

Music is all around, and there the heart partakes of the joy of the Infinite Sea.

Kabir<sup>is</sup> says:- because he has this Supreme Vision?

"Dive thou into that Ocean of sweetness; thus let all errors of life and of death flee away".

They have sung of Him as infinite and unattainable, but I in my meditation have seen Him without sight.

The inward and the outward are become as one sky, the Infinite and the finite are united; I am drunken with the sight of this all.

This light of Thine fulfils the Universe, the lamp of Love that burns on the salver of knowledge.

Kabir says:- do it because His worship. The rising and

"There error cannot enter, and the conflict of life and death is felt no more.

Open your eyes of love and see Him who pervades this world! and Consider it well and know that this is your own country,

When you meet the true Gurm He will awaken your heart;

He will tell you the secret of love and detachment, and then you will know indeed that He transcends this Universe.

He is the Ultimate Rest unbounded.

He has spread His form of love throughout all the world.

..... Tagore's Translation.

Note Kabir's doctrine in the following poem:-

"When He Himself reveals Himself, Brahma brings into manifestation that which can never be seen.

As the seed is in the plant, as the shade is in the tree, as the void is in the sky, as infinite forms are in the void,

So from beyond the Infinity the Infinite comes; and from the Infinite the Finite extends.

The Creature<sup>is</sup> in Brahma<sup>n</sup>, and Brahma<sup>n</sup> is in the Creature. They are ever distinct yet ever united.

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He Himself is the tree, the seed and the germ. He  
Himself is the flower, the fruit and the shade.

He Himself is the Sun, the light and the lighted..

He Himself is Brahma, creature of Maya.

He Himself is the manifold form, the infinite space;

He is the breath, the word and the meaning.

He Himself is the limit, and the limitless, and beyond  
both the limited and the limitless is He, the Pure  
Being.

He is the Immanent Mind in Brahma and the Creature.

The Supreme Soul is seen within the soul, the point is  
seen within the Supreme Soul, and within the Point,  
the reflection is seen again.

Kabir is blest because he has this Supreme Vision:

... Tr. by Rabindrandth Tagore .....

How to attain to God:- ..... Kabir says:-

"O Sadhu! the simple union is the best. Since the day  
when I met my Lord there has been no end to the sport of  
our love.

I shut not my eyes, I close not my ears, I do not  
mortify my body. I see with eyes open and smile, and  
behold His beauty everywhere.

I utter His name, and whatever I see reminds me of Him;

Whatever I do, it becomes His worship. The rising and  
the setting ~~are~~ are one to me; all contradictions  
are solved.

Wherefore I go, I move around Him, all I achieve is His  
service.

When I lie down, I lie prostrate at His feet.

He is the only adorable One to me; I have none other.

My tongue has left off impure words; it sings His glory  
day and night.

Whether I rise or sit down, I can never forget Him, for  
the rhythm of His music beats in my ears.

So high is My Lord's Palace, my heart trembles to mount  
its stairs; yet I must not be shy if I would enjoy His  
love.

My heart must cleave to my Lover; I must withdraw my veil  
and meet Him with all my body.

Mine eyes must perform the ceremony of the lamps of love.

Kabir says:-

"Listen to me, friend; He understands who loves. If you  
feel not love's longing for your Beloved One, it is vain  
to adorn your body, vain to put unguent on your eyelid."

..... Tagore .....

(Kabir)

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Kabir maintains that a man cannot attain to a knowledge of God through his own powers. But God reveals Himself to those who make themselves fit for the reception of Divine Light. But those who are deficient in this respect should seek the help of the "guru" who can be recognised by his intense love for God. (This seems to me to be a vague criterion.)

Kabir condemns pride and commends humility. In this, he is very near the Sufi Saints rather than the Hindu Pandits. He also commends renunciation<sup>o</sup> of worldly pleasures. The only pleasure that is everlasting is that obtained from devotion to God.

"Make contentment and modesty thine earrings, self-respect thy wallet, meditation the ashes to seal upon thy body, make association with men thine A.l. path and the conquest of thy heart the conquest of the world".

"There is no devotion without virtue".

He believes that knowledge should be imparted to one who is fit to receive it.

"The instruction of the foolish is the waste of knowledge or <sup>a ~~man's~~</sup> ~~man's~~ <sup>man's</sup> soap cannot wash charcoal white".

Saadi strikes a similar note:-

"No need of offering advice" he says "to a hard-hearted person, because a nail cannot be driven into stone".

Kabir believes in transmigration of the soul, but holds that release is obtained by faith, not by works.

It means that good and bad actions both lead to re-birth but if one has faith in God, God would release him of this bondage. But the difficulty is that this doctrine makes the man indifferent to good works. Even bad actions need not alarm anyone. To this objection it can be said that one who has implicit faith in God would naturally try to avoid the actions that are repugnant to Him.

The idea of faith is the same as that of "tawakul" and rija (hope) in Islam.

Like Mohammedans, he does not believe in Divine

(incarnation)

Incarnation.

"Follow the true Sahib who will hold you in all trials. He was not born in <sup>D S</sup>Wadraths' family and did not <sup>L</sup>opress the King of Lanka. Jasodah did not foundle him in her lap and he did not enter the womb of Doeki. He did not ravage the world. He did not descend into Patal and deceive Baji. He did not fight with King Bali nor did he Kiñ Hiranyakñish throwing him down on the ground. He is neither Shalgram nor any other stone.... Kabir proclaims let us not follow such teachings; he whom they believe to be of gross material elements is of subtle principles.

Kabir dwells on the humility of man's origin.:-

"There is impurity at the time of birth, there is impurity in the hour of death" - In this he follows the teaching of the Koran.

Bhandarkar is of opinion that Kabir preaches dualism. He comes to this conclusion from the following lines of Kabir:-

"In the light of Rama <sup>a</sup> there existed a substance which was the subtle element, the sum-total of all individual souls, and then that substance was illuminated by that Light. Then followed a desire in the shape of a woman, which was at the same time called Gayatri and Sound (Shabda or Logos) and from her the creation took its rise."

In my opinion the metaphor can be explained thus:-

Looking at the things of the world, we find that they were potentially what they are actually now, and will become actually <sup>of</sup> something what they are potentially now. The world existed potentially in God from eternity and not outside God, and is being actualised <sup>lised</sup> in time and space, hence the idea of dualism does not apply to this case.

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Chapter XVI

NANAK.

Among the great personalities of India who left an everlasting mark on the history of religious thought we may mention Guru Nanak. He was born in 1469 in Talwandi<sup>di</sup> a small village in the Punjab. He was a khatri by caste. His father was the accountant of the village and also pursued the life of an agriculturist. Even in his very boyhood Guru Nanak showed a mystic disposition and a leaning towards contemplation. But his father did not like the idea of his renouncing the world and so he set him to various secular tasks -- looking after the cultivations and grazing the cattle. But Nanak proved averse to them all. He devoted more and more of his time to contemplation and devotion. Under the stress of hard life and mental exertion Nanak fell ill. A physician was sent for, but the Guru welcomed him with the following mystic outburst :-

"The physician is sent for to prescribe a remedy. He taketh my hand and feeleth my pulse. The ignorant physician knoweth not that it is in my mind that pain is. Physician, go home : take not my curse with thee. I am imbued with my Lord; to whom givest thou medicine - . . .

. . . . I feel first the pain of Separation from God, then pangs of hunger for contemplation on Him . . . . I forgot God and devoted myself to pleasure, then this bodily illness befell me : the wicked heart is punished. Man is useful as long as he has breath in his body. So when the breath departeth, the body crumbleth away and becometh useless : no one taketh medicine after that. When man possesseth even a portion of the Name of the Bright One, his body shall become like gold and his soul be made pure; all his pain and disease shall be dispelled, and he shall be saved, Nanak, by the True name."

Guru Nanak, however, in the village school learnt reading and writing and something of accounts. Moreover it is believed that he had also some knowledge of Persian. But all that he learnt from the books was insignificant as compared with what he aquired in his long travels by the study of nature and his association with the end; priests and saints of the time. ship not the dead,

Guru Nanak married and had children. But the married life did not change the current of his thoughts, Soon after he was appointed a store keeper under Daulat Khan, the Governor of Sultanpar. The Guru performed his duties honestly and diligently and gave away much of his income in charity. When the day's work was done, Nanak with his companions would repair to some neighbouring solitude and spend his time in singing and

prayer. But he did not stick long to his post. With his faithful companion Mardana, he set out on travels through various parts of India and Asia. Here he gave utterance to beautiful sayings which are collected in Adi Granth, the sacred book of the Sikhs. His death came at last in the year 1538.

Nanak, like many others of his age, was greatly influenced in his thought by the prevalence of Islamic ideas in the country and he gave utterance to the views most of which can be traced back to Islam. For instance he preached "that he was himself a man among men, that God was all in all and reliance on Him was one thing needful." "Think, pray and praise him always. The <sup>Just</sup> ~~first~~ shall live by faith alone." He enjoined on all men "to live righteously with brotherly love and hospitality and to abjure all superstitions and fears." "Falsehood is at an end; Truth at last prevaleth." "Worship not the dead, bow not to stones." Some of these are literal translations of the Arabic and Persian sayings. In fact it appears that the religious sects of that time came midway between Islam and ancient Hinduism. For example Guru Nanak says: "Both the Hindus and Moslems are struggling against each other. . . The Almighty ordered, 'O my son, go to the world. All of them have gone wrong. Set them to the right path. Make them all respect the one "name." The idea was

to remove the antagonism of the two chief religions in India. So the religious leaders of that time acted as conciliators between the victorious Moslems and the conquered Hindus.

Nanak was a religious reformer as we have stated before. The Hindus had deified their heroes and had made them incarnations of God. They paid more attention to the ceremonials than the true spirit of their religion. Hence Nanak's mission was to purge them of all evils according to his own views. He believed that there had been reformers before him. He did not wish to lower the values of any of these. For instance, Budha says, "Whenever there is impiety in the world, the Budha is born to set the people right. Many a Budha has gone before me and many more will come after me." The same is the case with the Jews and Christians according to the Muslim view. Nanak did not believe in the deification of the reformers. He agreed with the Muslims in holding man and God as separate. Macnicol is of opinion that Nanak believed himself to be an incarnation of God: - "No doubt Nanak, though he often speaks of himself with humility, believed himself to be an incarnation of the Supreme God" --Macnicol. He bases his argument on the following passage from 'Asa-ki-war': "God hath put Himself into the true Guru." I believe this is a misinterpretation of the passage. Nanak simply means that God conveys His message to the world through the Guru. There is a similar passage in the Quran: "When you struck, it was not you who struck but God."

This does not mean that the Prophet was identical with God. Even the immediate followers of Nanak did not believe him to be a god. For instance, Guru Gobind Singh, the last guru, says, "Those who call us gods will fall into hell. Know that I am His servant."

Guru Nanak was not a speculative philosopher but Dr. Trump believes that a regular system of philosophy can be evolved out of his book, "Granth Sahib."

However, we give below a summary of his teaching :-

1. PHYSICAL WORLD.

Like the old Hindu thinkers Guru Nanak divides the world period into four cycles, viz.

- i. Sat Yug, ii. Treta, iii. Duapar, iv Kal yug.

The first is considered the golden age. The world was created perfect by God. The people had perfect gnosis of God, and there was no difference of opinion as regards the belief in one God. Man was morally perfect. With the advance of age the decay in moral life began. Monotheism was replaced by polytheism and idolatory. The world has come down from the highest to the lowest level. His doctrine is opposed to the theory of teleological evolution, in which present is considered as a state of incompleteness and imperfection and that the evolution of cosmos is from a present imperfect state towards a more perfect one and that the idea of future good is working its own realisation in the finite world. If we believe Nanak's theory

it means that the world is like a machine which an engineer constructs in good condition, sets going and then leaves it to itself, though occasionally he sends some workman to repair a part of it. The machine ultimately comes to a standstill and then the engineer puts the material in a moulding pot and constructs a new machine. AS regards the world-cycles, the scientists have begun to believe that the energy of this earth that is being dissipated, and is considered lost, may be making up another universe which may take the place of our world.

Nanak agrees with the Christians in maintaining that previous to creation it was utter darkness. He says:-

"In the beginning there was indescribable darkness, There was not earth nor heaven, nought but God's small sphere which when compared with our earth, was of unequalled order, There was not day nor night or moon or sun, . . . If there is any kind of life in the stars The Imperceptible God was Himself the speaker and preacher, Himself unseen He was everything, when He pleased He created the world."

either a similar material -- translated by Macaullife

God first of all created four elements viz. 1 the air which has direct connection with the Lord. Fire gets support from air, without which it cannot exist. Water gets support from fire. The earth gets support from water. In this way the elements for their existence depend upon the energy of God and all these are considered to be "the Holy Five."

Fairy tales and the writings of the ancients we find the genii coming out of the interior of the earth, which

is Corresponding to these four elements there are four spirits, viz. i. angel ii. genii iii. sea-spirits, and iv. demons. The first two are good and the last two are evil spirits. But these spirits have no power in themselves, unless endowed with power by the spirit of Lord. Compare with this what Muslim theologians say about the angels and genii. According to them angels have a subtle or ethereal body and the genii are made of fire and that before the creation of man this earth was inhabited by the genii. This does not seem to me to be improbable. If we look at the universe we find it to be composed of so many planets and stars, some of which are millions of times as big as our earth. Did God make these stars in vain? Did this earth have no life for millions of years? Is life confined to this small sphere which when compared with others sinks into insignificance?

If there is any kind of life in the stars it must be suitable to their present condition. Man cannot live in the sun. The creature that can live in a burning planet must have a body made of either a similar material or of such material as remains unaffected by it.

It is believed that this earth was in a molten condition for ages. The creatures that inhabited the earth at that time most likely had a fiery body. When the earth cooled down, that form of life disappeared from the surface of the earth. Strange to say, in most of the Eastern

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fairy tales and the writings of the sufis we find the genii coming out of the interior of the earth, which is still in a molten condition.

li. HUMAN SOUL. The soul is not composed of Physical elements. Soul is God Himself. It is not clear whether Nanak definitely identifies soul with God, because in another passage he considers the soul to be an emanation from God. Though it is true that we find a trace of pantheism in him, which is hard to reconcile with his main teaching. Take for instance the following passage: "He Himself kills Himself and dies; it is merely a display of his omnipotence." The individual souls emanate from the Universal Soul. The soul is formless like an air, has no weight like fire. It is like light that is confined in an earthen pot. It has two bodies, subtle and gross. After death the soul has to pass the Bridge (pu<sup>r</sup> Sirat of Islam). The wicked ones fall down into the hell to undergo torture for millions of years and then come to earth again to continue the cycle of birth and death. The idea of the Bridge may be compared to a similar idea in the religion of Zoroaster:- "The Souls of doeva-worshippers and of the righteous must cross the fateful Kinvad Bridge, where a maid distinguishes the evil from the good. The spirits of the evil fall into the depths of the dark horrid world of hell, while the good come to the presence of Ahura Muzda"- Zend Avesta, Vendidad xix, 29.32.47. The soul has to keep the physical elements under control otherwise they lead it astray. Those who remain firm and are not led astray by temptations are released from the cycle of births. But release cannot take place without the grace of God. "Rebirth and

and deliverance depend upon thy will," he says, "God Himself knows to whom he may give and He Himself gives . . . Very few people acknowledge this."

The art of perception or knowing are individual in character, though they resemble each other, but the truths known are universal in character. They are common to all, immutable, necessary and eternal and have their being only in the eternal and immutable essence of Divinity. In this respect Nanak's theory resembles that of Malebranche who follows St. Augustine in this. St. Augustine makes use of the <sup>n</sup> neoplatonic doctrine of illumination and radiation to explain the possibility of knowledge : "God is the source of eternal truths. Through Him all beings have being and light. He is the Eternal Wisdom, the Divine Logos." Nanak's "sat nam" is similar to this. The Guru's words or ideas are true because they participate in, or are an imitation of, the true reality of the 'mundus intelligibilis.' Here is another passage from St. Augustine to the same effect :- The Truth, unchangeable shines like a sun in the soul and the soul becomes partaker of the Very Truth." There is the Truth, unchangeable, 'containing all things that are unchangeably true, which belongs not to any particular man." Truth here means ontological Truth. In this too he follows Plotinus.

So we see that Nanak's position in this respect is similar to the schoolmen. According to the scholastics, especially St. Thomas, ontological truth is equivalent to reality or it is simply reality considered as conformable with an ideal type, with an idea in the mind. The mind derived these ideal types from experience by abstraction, comparison, generalisation and reflection on the data.

Antecedently to the exercise of human thought, the thing has only potential and not actual <sup>ontological truth</sup> <sub>ontological truth is</sub>

ontological truth means conformity with the abstract concepts of essences or natures, how can it be one for all men, immutable and necessary? To this the schoolmen reply that human beings are endowed with the same sort of intellect and so they abstract the same transcendental notions from their experience and form the same specific concepts of possible essences. Moreover the human mind does not constitute the truth but only apprehends it. Although ontological truth is proximately and immediately the conformity of reality with human conceptions, yet primarily and fundamentally it is essential conformity of all reality with the Divine Mind, because the schoolmen admitting the actual existence of contingent realities and the possibility of the minds deriving necessary and universal principles from such realities, demonstrate the existence of a First, necessary and Self-existence Intelligence from which the human mind derives its intelligibility. Both our minds and all things are in essential conformity with the Divine Intellect. That is why the things are ontologically true for us. The truth of Divine Intellect is one, eternal and immutable. In scholastic terminology the Real and the True are convertible terms. The same is the case with Nanak: "There is but one God, whose name is Trueam, the creator, the all pervading, devoid of fear and enmity, Immortal, Unborn, Self-begotten, the Great and Gracious. He was True in the beginning, He was True in the Primal age, He is True now and He will ever be True"--Japji Pauri.

EPILOGUE.

"And though we wear our life, alas!  
 Distracted as a homeless wind,  
 In beating where we may not pass  
 In seeking what we shall not find,  
 Yet shall we one day gain, life past,  
 Clear vision o'er our Being's whole -  
 Shall see ourselves, and learn at last  
 Our true affinities of Soul."

MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"For if I should (said He)  
 Bestow this jewel also on My creature,  
 He would adore my gifts instead of Me,  
 And rest in Nature, not the God of Nature,  
 So both should losers be.  
 Yet let him keep the rest,  
 But keep them with repining restlessness:  
 Let him be rich and weary, that at last,  
 If goodness lead him not, yet weariness  
 May toss him to My breast."

"THE CHURCH PORCH"

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- 17. The Sikh Religion by H. A. Macauliffe.
- 18. A Hundred Poems of Kabir by Tagore.
- 19. Brahmanism and Hinduism by Monier-Williams.
- 20. The Religions of India by E. V. Hopkins.
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