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The Yin Wenzi and the renaissance of philosophy in Wei-Jin China

Dan Daor



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Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to bring together three main themes: 1. The authorship of the YWz. 2. The renaissance of philosophical activity in Wei-Jin China. And 3. Problems related to the Chinese view of "naming" and the relation of words to things.

The first part deals exclusively with the dating of the YWz and reaches the conclusion that the beginning of the third century A.D. is the most likely date. ^{In the second part} Seen against the philosophical background of the period the importance of the YWz is made clear, and the book is shown to be the work of an original and independent philosopher. A comparison is drawn with other books of the time, mainly Wang Bi's LWL, and its theory of "names and shapes" is discussed. This is shown to be a major step in the elucidation of the Confucian dictum on the "correct use of names" and the articulation of the pre-Han "names and actualities" problem. Together with the distinction between names and referers serves to clarify the question of "words and meanings" which leads to an interpretation of Wang Bi's LWL.

The third and fourth chapters are translations of the YWz and the LWL respectively.

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I The dating and composition of the YWz

All notes are found at the back, pp. 161-186, marked by page numbers and note number (e.g. 17.3).

Certain words are marked with an asterisk (e.g. "shape*"); for an explanation and list see p.

Western Sinologists have not been greatly interested in the Yin Wenzi. Needham, summing up the views of Escarra and Forke, dismisses the book in one sentence: "There is also the Yin Wen Tzu (Book of Master Yin Wen) which, though certainly not, as we have it today, the production of the early 4th century thinker of that name (a Mohist-Hedonist), seems to contain Warring States material; it is a dull mixture of Taoist, Confucian, Logician and Legalist ideas."¹ Masson-Oursel who translated the entire book as well as various fragments and prefaces did it mainly as an "exercise in translation"² and did not go into either textual or philosophical analysis, which would have been unlikely in any case, over fifty years ago. Chan, who claims that "the most important passage bearing on the term Hsing-ming 行名 is found in the Yin Wen Tzu..."³, has not included any YWz passage in his "A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy". Not surprisingly the book did not make the other current anthology of Chinese thought (De Bary's "Sources of Chinese Tradition"), either.

There are however many Chinese scholars who, although divided on its merits, have taken the book seriously enough to try and prove it a late forgery. In attempting to date the YWz I relied heavily on their work.

The most extensive studies of the YWz were made by Tang Yue 唐越, Lo Genze 羅根澤, and Meng Chuanning 蒙傳銘. Meng, besides producing an annotated text, sums up the arguments of his predecessors on its authenticity. A somewhat earlier summary can be found in the WSTK.² As I believe that the correct dating of the book is relevant to a proper understanding of its philosophical content, the lengthy discussion that follows seems to me justified.

The evidence is arranged below in three categories: 1. External evidence; references to the book and quotations from it in sources of known dates such as anthologies, encyclopedias, Histories etc. 2. Attributed and unattributed borrowings in the text; comparisons with similar passages in pre-Han sources. 3. Linguistic evidence.

in the second part I attempt to show that the philosophical content and terminology corroborate the conclusion arrived at according to these three.

1. External evidence.

There are quotations from a book called YWz in the following anthologies and encyclopedias: 1. Beitang shuchao 北堂書鈔, compiled by Yu Shinan 虞世南 (558-638 A.D.) 2. Qunshu zhiyao 群書治要 anthology by Wei Zheng 魏徵 presented in 631. 3. Yiwen lei ju 藝文類聚, compiled by Ouyang Xun 歐陽詢 (557-641) and others. 4. The Li Shan 李善

commentary of the Wen xuan. (Li Shan died in 689), 5. The Yi lin ^音林
 an abridgement of the lost Zichao ^子 子金少 (cf. below, p. 6) by Ma Zong
^{馬宗} (died 823) (late preface 787). 6. The Taiping Yulan ^{太平御覽}
 compiled by Li Fang and others in 983. ^{李昉}

Of these the most reliable are the QSZY and the YL. These are anthologies
 of philosophers and as the excerpts are arranged in the same order as in
 the original book, can help us in placing a few bits which are missing in
 the present text but are found in other sources. In the next page the
 YWz sections of both are compared with the DZ edition of the YWz.

This table allows one to conclude that by Tang time the YWz has already as
 assumed its present form, although it was a somewhat longer book. Counting
 the lines, we find that out of 57 (in the BSS ed. of the QSZY) only less than
 than 7 are not in the DZ text, or about 12%. A similar computation for the
 YL shows a higher proportion of "missing" material, but being a smaller
 sample it is a less reliable guide. As for placing the quotation in their
 context, I think that Qien Xizu ² is not altogether right in suggesting that
 they all must come from the second chapter: it is quite possible that YL
 19a 7-8 & 19a9-19b1 come from the first. one can be more confident about
 the Tienzi ^{田子} quotation (QSZY 643/12-644/1) as well as about the
 story of Yin Wen and king Xuan ^宣 (YL 19b4-5). from the table it follows

YL(SBCK)

YWz(DZ)

QSZY(BSS)

II 18b3-7

I 2a1-6

4a1-5b9

640/4-641/6

8-9

4b2-3

19a1-2

5a7-9

3-4

5b9-6a1

5-6

6a2-3

641/6-7

4-10

7-10

6b5-7a6

641/10-642/1

19a7-8

II 11a6-9

642/1-2

19a9-19b1

II 1a3-2a9

642/4-643/2

3a6

643/2-3

3a9-3b2

3-4

4-8

3b10-4a5

9611

19b2-3

643/12-644/1

19b4-5

19b6-8

4b3-6

5a1-4

644/1-2

6a1-4

2-3

6b4-7a5

3-8

that they must be placed somewhere between DZ II 4a5 & 4b3, i.e. before the story of the man with the two sons and not after it as both Wang Qixiang 王啟湘 and Meng put it.

While there can be no reasonable doubt that the YWz quotations in the QSZY and the YL come from a book very similar to the present YWz, it is not the case with the other sources. The TPYL which has many YW or Yinzi quotations is especially suspect as it includes passages which come probably from the Wenzhi (see Masson-Oursel 619 for details). Besides we know from Hong Mai 洪邁 (1123-1202) that there existed a book called Yinzi which he describes as worthless, tainted with Buddhism and a Chin to early Song forgery. The TPYL confuses Yin Wen and Yin but this cannot serve as a criterion as some of the YWz quotations begin with "Yinzi said". (E.g. TPYL 371/12a // DZ I 7a5).

The quotations themselves do not add much to the YWz, most being too short and rather vague. This is not the case with TPYL 402/5b (// YWLJ 20) which is longish, coherent, and is partly covered by YL 19b 4-5. The other relatively long quotation, the story of the tiger and the fox (TPYL 494/7a) is found in the Zhanguo ce 戰國策 (SBCK 5/2b) but might very well have been included in the longer YWz. (DZ II 4b9-5a1 has a parallel in ZGC 3/53) Another useful quotation is WXZ 38/9 (p.845) which enables us to restore

the patently corrupt DZ 7b9-8al.¹

Hong Mai gives the number of characters in the YWz as close to 5000. The DZ text has about 5600. Unfortunately, Hong does not say much about the book and one cannot be sure whether this considerable discrepancy is due to anything more than sloppy counting.

If going by the QSZY gives us 631 as the latest possible date for the YWz, there is however one bit of information that helps to improve on that. A list of the works used by Yu Zhongrong 庾仲容 (476-549) for his, now lost, Zichao 子鈔 is appended to the Song scholar Gao Sisun's 高似孫 Zilue 子略², and it includes the YWz. As the YL is based on the Zichao we have every reason to believe that it was indeed the same YWz we now have; and the terminus ad quem is brought down to around 500.

Before going on to examine the rest of the external evidence it seems appropriate to dispose of one possible hypothesis. Could the YWz have been composed out of fragments cunningly culled from the various anthologies, encyclopedias, and other sources? This seems to be the case with at least one book, the Shenzi 慎子³. In the YWz case, however, this is extremely unlikely. For one thing, a forger would have probably used all the fragment he could lay his hands on, and all the sources have unused passages; for another, all the quotations together with pre-Han possible borrowings do

not account for more than half the present YWz. (Slightly less than half in the first chapter; slightly over half in the second).

In general, three dates are relevant in dating a text: 1. Latest possible date (terminus ad quem). 2. Earliest possible date, i.e. a date earlier than which the book could not have been written, but later than which it could have (latest impossible date?). 3. The most likely date which falls, of course, between the first two.

For the YWz c.500 a.d. has been shown above to be a terminus ad quem, An earliest possible date is a lot more difficult to find; examining the internal and linguistic evidence (see below p. ^{BH}) we get c.200 A.D. Anticipating this result I shall use the remaining external evidence, and especially the (so-called) Zhongchang preface (see below p. ₇) to decide on the most likely date.

The few pre-Tang references to a book associated with one Yin Wen, a Warring States philosopher, tell us almost nothing about the book. The Han Shu ^{ng} (j.30 by Ban Gu ^{班固} (32-92 A.D.)) has a book called YWz in one pien classified under Ming Ji ^{名家} ("school of names"); Ban Gu's own commentary tells us that he lived at the time of king Xuan of Qi ^齊 (r.319-301 B.C.) and is a predecessor of Gongsun Long ^{公孫龍}. Yen Shigu ^{顏師古} (581-645 A.D.) adds in his com. that Liu Xiang ^{劉向} (79-8 B.C.) said that he was with

Song Xing 宋 鉉 at Jixia 糴下 .Liu Xin 劉 歆 (d.23A.D.) is quoted in Hong Mai's YZXB¹ as saying, on the other hand, that YW studied under Gongsun Long, Gao Yu 高 誘 (fl. 205-212 A.D.), the commentator of the LSCQ, says that Yin Wen, a man of Qi, wrote a book called "Ming shu" 多 書 in one pien, lived before Gongsun Long who quoted him. The shiwen 釋文 to the YW passage in the Tienxia 天下 chapter of the Zhungzi 莊子 quotes Cui 崔² mention of a book in one pien, and the shu 疏 to the same passage refers to it as having two. Finally, Liu Xie 劉 勰 (465-522) says that Yin Wen discussed the problem of correspondance between names and actualities, and that he had a knack of writing "terse and pithy sentences".³

Lo Genze concludes from the different accounts of the name of the book and the number of chapters that the YWz is a late forgery. While the conclusion is probably true, the argument is far from convincing. The number of juans was changed from two (Sui and former Tang Histories) to one (Tang and Song Histories) at a time when we have every reason to believe it is the same book which is referred to; the Zhongchang preface (see below p. 9) explicitly mentions dividing the one pien in two; and besides, one and two can be easily confused in Chinese. Names of books, too, are sometimes described differently in different sources. Thus, as Yen Lingfeng 嚴 靈峰 points out, the "Lazi weishi lilue" has been variously

called Laozi lue lun, Daode lue gui and Zhi lilue 老子略論道德

略歸, 指例 略

."As for the pien, I leave

their titles as they are in modern editions: I dare not change them unwisely as the QSZY did, nor make them into one, like the Han Shu.¹ In other words, if one is not already convinced that the YWz is a late forgery, then Lo's argument is not likely to make one change one's mind.

The most interesting source of information regarding the YWz, as well as the least reliable, is the Zhongchang 仲長 preface, which is found in all the editions of the YWz. It tells us that YW lived at the time of king Xuan of Qi, was a disciple of Gongsun Long together with Song Xing, Peng Meng 彭蒙, and Tien Pien 田辨; it mentions that Gongsun quotes him and then goes on to quote the Tienxia chapter and Liuxiang. The author of the preface tells us further that he first came to the capital in 226 A.D. met Miu Xibo 繆熙伯 (Miu Xi 繆 179-243) who gave him the YWz to see, a book which he found interesting but full of lacunae and mistakes; he attempted to bring some order into the book and divided the one pien in two.

Apart from the question of authorship, to which I shall come back in a minute, the reference to Miu Xi seems to me the most intriguing part of the preface. In a period of brilliant men this obscure official is barely mentioned; the Hou Han Shu 後漢書 (j.49 Zhongchang Tong 統 biog.)

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Wei Zhi ^{魏志} (j.21 Liu Shao ^{劉劭} biog.) adds that he too was gifted and learned. He wrote a preface to Tong's "Chang yen" [○] [○] which is [○] [○] and learned. He wrote a preface to Tong's "Chang yen" [○] [○] which is still extant.¹

Now, had we no reason to believe the preface to be a late forgery, the very mediocrity of Miu Xi would be a strong argument for taking it at face value, for he is hardly a man one would chose to grace a preface written, presumably, to attract readers. But apparently we have, and the preface came under fire long before the book itself was suspected.²

The preface itself does not identify the man who "came to the capital in 226" and is responsible for editing the book and writing the preface; the only reference to his identity is in the line ^{山陽仲長氏}

^{撰定}

"Mr. Zhongchang of Shan Yang edited and fixed", which is detached from the preface and placed variously before or after it in the different editions.³ The names Shan Yang and Miu Xi have led commentators to identify Mr. Zhongchang with the great Zhongchang Tong, born in Shan Yang and a close friend of Miu Xi. The only trouble with this is that by 226 Tong was dead for six years (his biog. in the Hou Han Shu j.49 says that he died in the year emperor Xien ^獻 abdicated (220 A.D.)). Of the two obvious solutions, namely, the author is some other Zhongchang or

the preface is a forgery, most commentators have preferred the second. This is understandable as we have no suitable candidate (son of Tong?), but calling it a forgery does not solve much; apart from the question of who the author was, we are left with the more interesting one of why fake it at all?

Fortunately, there seems little reason to consider the troublesome line about Mr. Zhongchang as part of the original preface; it is much more probable to assume that the preface was never signed, a later editor read it and added the line referring to the book (and not the preface) taking the words 撰定 from the preface, and seeing that the author of the preface was a friend of Miu Xi, put the only name he could think of, that of Zhongchang.

We are left, then, with Miu Xi as the man who either found the YWz or faked it. Did he also write the preface? Meng¹, who to the best of my knowledge, is the only commentator to have attempted a precise dating for the YWz, suggests that he did. Based on a sound psychological argument, his assumption is that Miu Xi, having faked the YWz, wanted to draw some attention to himself, wrote the preface where the "I came ..." refers to himself, and, being cautious, decided to sign "Zhongchang" in homage to his late friend. (Taking care, one might add, not to invite suspicion by

being too precise about the name). The weak point in this hypothesis is the date. It would have been simpler not to mention any, and still retain the satisfaction of being mentioned and of having paid homage to his admired friend.

There is another problem that the preface raises: The author insists that the book agrees with the Tienxia account of YW's philosophy, and that Liu Xiang was wrong in describing it as "Xing-Ming Jia," but the book itself seems to bear Liu Xiang out. This does not necessarily mean that the preface was written by somebody other than the author of the book. It is quite possible that Miu Xi (to anticipate a bit), having written the book, and having attributed it to Yin Wen because of his renown as a logician (~~the author of the book~~), decided later to play down the Xing-Ming character of his book and emphasise the Taoist elements so as to make it more acceptable to the public in a rapidly changing intellectual climate. (See below p. 40 ff). It is, of course, equally possible that the preface was written by a friend of Miu Xi's who also edited the book.

On the external evidence alone it seems plausible, then, to regard the YWz we now have as basically the same book that existed around 230 A.D. In order to find out whether this really is the earliest possible date we have to turn to the internal evidence.

Attempts to show the YWz to be a late forgery have been based mainly, and sometimes exclusively, on comparing the book with the account of YW's thought given in the Tienxia chapter of the Zhuangzi. This is hardly surprising as it does seem to offer the best case against the YWz. A comparison of this kind is however less straight-forward than most commentators have allowed for and presupposes a few assumptions that need clarifying.

The passages which the YWz has in common with other books fall into three categories: a) Direct quotations. b) Stories with parallels in other sources. c) Phrases found both in the Tienxia chapter and in the YWz. I shall deal with these three in this order.

a) Of the direct quotations from known sources, four are attributed, (one to Confucius and three to Laozi). These are I 1a4-5//LY 13/3, I 1a8-9//DDJ 62, II 3b4-5//DDJ 57, II 3b10-4a1//DDJ74. Two other quotations are marked by "The saying has it:" $\frac{15}{30}$ ⊕ but are unattributed: I 5a1-3//Xz8(HY21/35-36), and II 3b2-3//LY 17/18.

One problematic case, which falls in between a) and b), is I 6a2-3. In the YWz it is attributed to Peng Meng but it has a parallel in LSCQ 17/6 (Xu 798) where it is attributed to Shen Dao 慎到.

Lo claims that the attributed quotations point to the late date of the YWz because 1) the author must have seen the complete versions of the LY and the DDJ, and 2) pre-Han philosophers are not in the habit of literal quotations. It is not, I think, a very strong argument. The quotations are too few and no more literal than the Laozi ones found in the Jie Lao chapter of the Hanzi. As for attributing a saying to Peng Meng instead of Shen Dao, we have no ^âreason to believe that the author thought Shen to be later than YW; Peng, Shen, Tien, Song, and YW were, apparently, all near contemporaries.¹ Besides, this is not an exact parallel.

A clear mark of forgery is seen by Lo, Tang, and Meng in the two unattributed quotations. The forger, so the argument runs, knew that Xunzi ~~was~~ ^{is} lived later than YW and therefore did not want to disclose the source of his quotation. The fact that it begins with "the saying has it:" shows that it was not Xunzi who borrowed from YW. The flaw in this argument is that the author would have no reason not to attribute the other quotation (II 3b2-3) to Confucius; it is, therefore, not unreasonable to accept I 5a1-3 as a genuine old saying which Xunzi, as well as YWz, happened to use.

b) Some of the historical anecdotes used in the YWz to illustrate general statements, have parallels in other known sources. As all these sources are later than the alleged date of the book, it is interesting to compare these different versions. Unfortunately, none of the commentators has anything to say about it; so that what follows cannot be regarded as more than a nod in a, hopefully, promising direction.

There is a certain confusion about the possible relations obtaining between parallel passages, which might account for the unsystematic use made of such passages in the study of the YWz, and possibly also in other studies.

Let p, q, r, \dots be a set of parallel passages, where "parallel" is understood to include different versions of the same story (where details and words are different but it is recognisably the same story) as well as different occurrences of the same version. This set readily admits of partial ordering by two relations:

1. If p and q are two variants of the same text (two editions of the same book and parallel passages included in different editions of the same book), then one of the following statements is true:

a) p is derived from q (or partially derived as in the case of establishing a critical edition); in self-explanatory notation: pDq .

b) qDp .

c) Both p and q are derived from an earlier, not necessarily extant, source. In notation: $(Er)(pDr\&qDr)$.

The last case can be extended to include oral common sources, e.g. two students writing down the same lecture.

In the following, a further notational device might come in handy:

For every passage p let p^* denote the earliest that can be confidently posited and for which pDp^* is true.

2) If p and q are parallel passages found in different books, and one is a direct borrowing of the other (obvious examples are attributed quotations, fragments in encyclopedias etc.) . This will be denoted: pQq (p quotes q) or qQp .

An example of the use of this notation, combining both relations:

YL II 19a5-6* Q DZ I 6a2-3*

which means that the present text of the particular passage in the YL is derived from a text quoting a YWz from which the DZ text is derived.

3) When the parallel passages are found in allegedly independent sources it is generally difficult to decide which combination of these relations obtains. Oral traditions are likely to have taken part in the transmission

of stories and sayings, and even when this possibility is excluded (e.g. when the parallelism is exact and the passages long enough) one has to resort to linguistic analysis which is not always fruitful. Furthermore, it is always possible that both passages quote an earlier, no longer extant, source without acknowledging the fact.

Nevertheless, some useful information can be obtained by comparing parallel passages even if the evidence does not allow us to determine the relationship of the two passages in terms of the D and Q relations. In order to do this it seems necessary to introduce another relation which allows greater flexibility in the handling of evidence. Let p and q be parallel passages (in the above wide sense); pLq will denote the fact that p was composed later than q . This relation is, of course, trivially true whenever pDq or pQq , but its advantage lies in that it applies in a lot of other (and more common) cases such as: $pQs&qQs$ or when we cannot be sure whether $p^*Qs&q^*Qs$ or $p^*Qs&q^*Ds$ etc.

L-relations obtain non-trivially between parallel passages of the first kind, i.e. different editions of the same text etc., but their usefulness is limited there; of two independent derivatives of the same text the

earlier is not necessarily better in any way. On the other hand, when we compare two allegedly independent books containing versions of the same story in order to assess their relative dates, then they can be of some help.

As my interest here is the dating of the YWz, I shall go no further into general questions which may arise from this preliminary discussion but conclude it with an example of the confusion it attempts to prevent. Tang brings as an argument for the late date of the YWz the Peng Heng quotation (DZ I 6a2-3) saying that it is an abridged version of the SHensi quotation in the LSCQ. This seems to me mistaken. The shorter version could be the older even if we had reason to believe one of the versions to be a direct borrowing from the other; there is nothing to prevent a later writer from padding. In this case, moreover, it is quite probable that there was a story current at the time and attributed to different people. (See above, p. 13). In fact, even on Tang's terms this is a bad example: The LSCQ story mentions only rabbits, whereas YWz has pheasants, chickens, and pigs in addition. What Tang fails to show are any signs that the YWz version is later than the LSCQ one in usage, style etc.

The following is a list of anecdotes which the YWz has in common with books alleged to be later in composition:

- I 7a4 is a much shorter version of Hanzi 32 (Liang 286) (a)
- I 7a5 is found in several sources, including the Mozi, but only Xz 12 (HY 45/3) agrees with the YWz on the name of the king. (b)
- I 7a10-7b2 is given in two versions in Hanzi 30 (Liang 241). (c)
- I 8b6-10//LSCQ 23/5 (Xu 1091). (d)
- II 2b3-3a6//Xz 28 (HY 102/5-10). (Cf. Kramers 263ff for details). (e)
- II 4b9-5a1//ZGC 5/2b. (f)

Of these six, three are of no interest for the dating of the YWz as they offer no clues one way or the other: (b), (e), (f).

(a). There is one indication that the YWz passage is later than the Hanzi parallel. For the "the whole country" the Hz has ①, whereas the YWz has 國境. This seems to be a late compound; the Morohashi gives only one reference, to WX 37/8 which is Jin 晉.

(c). This is the story of Gou Jien 句踐, king of Yue 越, and the frog. There are two versions of the story, taken from a YWz, in the BTSC (116, 85) and one in the TPYL (543/1a + 2) which differ from one another and from the DZ text. (Cf. Meng p. 110 and below p. 110 & n. 2/1).

Although it is difficult to construe the original, the alternatives being equally probable and mutually exclusive, it seems unlikely that Hz*QYWz*. The Hz gives two versions of the story, neither of which could have been borrowed from the YWz as both have details not found in any of the YWz versions. On the other hand, the YWz stories could have been composed by fusing and abridging the Hz ones.

Hz 1 : "The king of Yue was planning to attack Wu and wanted his men to take death lightly. Going out he saw an angry frog and thereupon bowed to it".

越王慮伐吳欲人之輕死也出見怒鼃乃為之式

Hz 2 : "The king of Yue, Gou Jien, on seeing an angry frog, bowed to it" ... "Therefore, the king of Yue, about to avenge himself upon Wu..."

越王句踐見怒鼃而式之... 故越王將復吳

YWz : "The king of Yue, Gou Jien, was planning to avenge himself upon Wu. and wanted his men to be brave. He met an angry frog on the road and bowed to it."

越王句踐謀報吳欲人之勇路逢怒蛙而式之

Several lexical features seem worth pointing out:

The Hz has 慮 for which the YWz reads 慮. From examples given in the Morohashi one can conclude that by late Han 慮 in the sense of 謀 required explanation. The change from 慮 to 慮 and from 式 to 式, while certainly not conclusive tends at least to support the assumption that the YWz passage is later than the Hz one. Nothing seems to point in the opposite direction.

The context in which the story is found is of some interest too. The king Gou Jien story in the YWz follows two other anecdotes: The one about king Chuang who loved slim waists ((b)), and the one about duke Wen who took to wearing coarse clothes and eating simple food. (I 7a8). Now, the same three stories are found together in chapter 15 (兼愛 /3) of the Mozi although they differ in almost all details. Thus, the Mz has Ling instead of Chuang, and while mentioning Gou Jien's love of bravery and the fearlessness of his soldiers it does not mention the frog. It seems likely that the author of the YWz was inspired by the Mz in choosing the stories, and then modified them, changing Ling to Chuang, following the Xz, and replacing the Mz's story of Gou Jien by that of the Hz. It is equally likely, at this stage anyhow, to attribute the modifications to the editor and author of the Zhongchang preface.

(d). The story of king Xuan 宣 who liked archery. Unlike the previous stories, the versions in the LSCQ and the YWz are almost identical up to the conclusion. As this is a longish story it seems unlikely that all they have in common is an oral tradition. We have no indication of a common written source so that direct borrowing seems ~~the~~ most probable. There are no telling idiosyncratic particles to help us discover the borrower. The difference in the conclusion, however, strongly suggests YWz*LLSCQ* and in this particular case, therefore, YWz*QLSCQ*.

In order to express the difference between actuality* and name*, the LSCQ says: "(The bow) which king Xuan used did not, in fact, require (a strength) greater than three ~~shi~~" 宣王之情所用不過三石 for which the commentator (Gao Yu, cf. above p.8) adds: 情實也. The YWz phrase 宣王用不過三石 lacks the problematic "in fact", but has instead in the final phrase "three ~~shi~~ ^{dan} was the actuality*" 三石實也. Avoiding the normal pre-Han usage of points to the YWz version as being the later of the two.¹

Three conclusions can be drawn from the above ~~deductions~~

1. It is unlikely that the stories in the Xunzi or the Hanzi were borrowed from the YWz.

2. The stories in the YWz which have parallels in the Xz, Hz, ZGC, and the ISCQ could have been borrowed from them.

3. There is some evidence to show that some of the stories, in their present form, were composed later than their parallels in other books; there is none to show that any of the stories were composed earlier.

These conclusions do not take us very far, as they do not decide between regarding the YWz as a genuine pre-Han book, edited in the third century A.D., and considering it as a third century forgery.

To show that the latter is more probable we have to turn to the remaining group of parallel passages: Phrases which the YWz has in common with the Tienxia chapter of the Zhuangzi.

Several phrases in the YWz are very similar to those used in the Tienxia to describe the behaviour and thought of Songxing and Yinwen. This parallelism is markedly different to that which obtained in the passages discussed above. These are not direct quotations like the ones attributed to Confucius and Laozi, nor are they different versions of stories. In the Tienxia chapter these phrases serve to sum-up a pair of undifferentiated philosophers and constitute all that the book has to say about them. In the YWz they are found clustered together in three groups, and by no stretch of imagination can one think of them as representing the book's

main argument; in fact, their importance for the philosophy of the YWz is rather slight.

The list below includes all the Tienxia phrases used in the YWz and the sentences in which they are embedded in the YWz:

Tienxia:

1. "Not to get bogged down by conventions; not to set too much store by commodities"

不異於俗 不飾於物

2. "Not to go against people; not to harm the many" 不苟於人

不忮於衆

3. "In dealing with the myriad things they made no-prejudices their starting point" 2

接萬物以別宥為始

4. "Not to feel disgrace when insulted will save the people from strife; outlawing aggression and abolishing the use of arms will save the world from fighting".

見侮不辱 救民之鬪 禁攻復兵 救世之戰

YWz:

1*. "Those that are bogged down by conventions, and those that set too much store by commodities are not fit to be partners in governing".

墨於俗飾於物者不可與為治矣 (7a7-8)

2*. "If they go against people conventions are disallowed; if they harm the many, commodities are commonly rejected."

苟違於人俗所不與苟悖於眾(俗)*物所共去 (6b10-7a1)

3*. "Dealing with the myriad things he allows no (subjective) allotments; seperating (what is within) the four seas, he allows no mixups".

接萬物使不分別海內使不雜 (8b1)

4*. "When insulted he feels no disgrace; when praised he does not boast.

Outlawing aggression and abolishing the use of arms, he saves the world from fighting".

見侮不辱見推不矜禁暴息兵救世之圖

Even if we had only these two parallel sets to go by, it would have been clear that something is wrong with this parallelism; it looks as if two philosophers are trying to use the same words for different purposes.

Thus, 3. and 3*. are plainly about different if not unrelated things, and

1*. and 2* have a political ring to them which 1. and 2. lack. As for 4 the

the Tx makes it clear that "not to feel disgraced..." is a means for achieving peace, whereas in 4*. it goes together with "not to boast..." as part of the description of a good official.

What is left out is even more remarkable; "that man's true desires are few" is , together with "abolishing the use of arms", the main tenet of Song-Yin philosophy according to the Tx; in the YWz it does not appear at all and is in fact wrong according to that book. On the other hand, the Tx account seems to miss the point of the bulk of the YWz. The YW of the YWz is a political philosopher interested in perfecting a system which will ensure smooth running of the state and in which everyone will find his natural place. The YW of the Tx is one of a pair of eccentrics going about in a vain attempt to persuade people that the world will be a better place if only people realised that their true desires were few and that to be insulted is no disgrace. The YWz includes long passages on logic, which are indispensable for understanding its philosophy; in the Tx there is no mention of YW's interest in logic and his name is absent in the list of "debaters" later on in the same chapter.

There are , it seems, two ways of settling these contradictions: Either the YWz is by the eponymous pre-Han philosopher and the author of the Tx

got itv all wrong, or the Tx is a fair account of the thought of YW and the YWz is a (worthless) late forgery. Examining these two—in my opinion, unsatisfactory— solutions, I shall start with the reliability of the Tx account.

Whether we think that what the Tx has to say of previous philosophers is in general reliable or not, there is little doubt that its description of Song Xing's thought is consistent with what we know of him from other sources. Unlike his alleged stable-mate, Song is mentioned in several pre-Han books, ~~all~~ which are in agreement on his main ideas. The longest account is given in the Xz (HY 69/18/93 on) where we read: "Making clear that being insulted is no disgrace will make people stop fighting; all people consider being insulted as a disgrace and therefore fight; if they realised that it is not, then they will stop fighting" 明見侮之下辱使人
不鬪 人皆以見侮為辱 故鬪也 知見侮之為不辱則不鬪

Later on in the same passage we have: "Man's true desires are few, yet everyone considers his true desires to be many". 人之情欲寡而
皆以己之情為欲多。

The Xz (HY 15/6/6) associates Song with Mozi explicitly; the other two sources, Mencius VIB/4 and Hz 50, do so by implication. In the Mencius'

story is name is given as Song Keng 宋經, but it is virtually certain that it is the same man. He is described as a pacifist whose pacifism is motivated by the very Mohist idea of the unprofitability 不利 of war. In the Hz his name is given as Song Yongzi 宋榮子 but the familiar "not to feel disgraced when insulted" is quoted and again it is most likely the same man. Here too the context suggests connexion between Song and the Mohists. None of these books mentions YW at all.

The one pre-Han source where YW is mentioned is the "using names* correctly"

正名 chapter of the LSCQ (16/8, Xu p.737 ff). The placing of the YW story in this particular chapter is hardly a coincidence, but is in line with all later references to YW (See above p. 3 for Gao Yu and Liu Xin and p. 12 for Liu Xiang in the preface) ~~see also p. 12~~. The story tells about a meeting between YW and king Min of Qi 齊 湣王 in which YW proves himself an able dialectician:

"YW saw the king of Qi. The king said to YW: 'I like "Shi" ^士very much'. YW said: 'I'd like to hear what you mean by "Shi"'. The king had no answer. YW said: 'Now, there is a man here; in serving his parents he is ~~loyal~~ filial; in serving his prince he is loyal; in his relations with friends he is truthful; and in his attitude towards his older neighbours he is respectful. Can someone who has these four characteristics of conduct be

called a "Shi" ?'The king of Qi said:'This is indeed what is meant by "Shi"'.YW said:'If you found such a man would you make him a minister?' The king said:'It is my wish but I cannot find such a man'. YW said:"If such a man in your court would not fight when insulted, would you still make him a minister?'The king said:'I would not. For a nobleman not to fight when insulted is a disgrace.I would not make a minister someone who has been disgraced.' YW said:'Although he would not fight when insulted he has not lost the four characteristics of conduct; and anyone who has not lost these four has not lost that which makes him a "Shi";if he has not lost what makes him a "Shi" and yet you would not make him a minister, then what was called a "Shi" a minute ago is not a "Shi" any more?'. The king had no answer."

As a logician the YW in this story points out the inconsistencies in the reasoning of the king; as a moralist he seems to maintain that being disgraced by not fighting when insulted is irrelevant to being the sort of person he would like to see in office.While not inconsistent with the Tx, the story gives the impression that the YW here is different to the YW who believed that not-to-feel-disgraced-when-insulted was a means for achieving peace.This impression is strengthened by the conversation which follows in the LSCQ:

" YW said: 'Now, suppose a man were to rule the state by disapproving of people when they are wrong, and disapproving of them when they are not; punishing the people when they are guilty, and punishing them when they are not. If he would then object to the people being hard to govern, would he be right?' The king said: 'He would not'. YW said: 'I observed the way low officials govern Qi, and it is just like this.' The king said: 'If my governing is really like this, then although the people are not well governed, I will not resent it. But in my opinion it has not reached this yet.' YW said: 'I dare not let ~~what~~ ^{you} I said without explanation; please let me explain. The king's ~~commandments~~ say: 'whoever kills a man shall die; whoever harms a man shall be punished'. The people are awed by the king's ~~commandments~~; so that, when someone does not fight when insulted, it is only because of the king's orders. If you say: 'Not to dare fight when insulted is a disgrace' then calling it 'disgrace' means that you disapprove of ~~this~~. If you consider a man "Shi" and you do not make him a minister, then you thereby punish him. That is, you punish the innocent'. The king had no answer. 2

The YW portrayed in this story seems to argue for a coherent rule and for employing Confucian-type gentlemen in government. There is no mention of "the fewness of Man's true desires" and , while probably preferring

peace to war, pacifism is not the main point of his argument. In fact, he seems a lot closer to the YW philosopher than one would expect from the Tweedlesong-Tweedleyin account of the Tx.

If we assume, along with the Tx, that Song Xing and YW were close enough philosophically as to make them indistinguishable, then we have to explain several puzzling facts: 1. Apart from the Tx the two are never mentioned as propounding the same ideas. 2. These ideas are attributed to Song alone who seems to be associated with the Mohists. 3. The Tx does not mention YW in connection with the debaters as all later references do.

If, on the other hand, we assume that YW was paired with Song Xing mainly because of the Tx's author's penchant for having his philosophers in twos and threes, then the picture becomes a lot clearer. Song Xing is responsible for all the doctrines that the Tx attributes to Song-Yin; he was close to the Mohists and a well known pacifist. YW was a lesser known figure, a contemporary of Song and probably a friend of his; he was a skillful debater ~~who~~ interested in the philosophy of the names^{*}-and-actualities^{*} kind, and might have shared some of his friend's views.

If we accept that the Tx is not a reliable guide for the thought of YW, which to my mind is a reasonable assumption, then arguments for regarding the YWz as a late forgery, based on the contradictions between the YWz and

the Tx, are weakened considerably.

Does the unliability of the Tx account imply that the YWz is the genuine pre-Han book of Master YW? hardly; it gives us, I believe, the strongest proof that the YWz is a late forgery. If this were the original book, then the author of the Tx is not merely wrong in adding the name of YW to that of Song Xing (which is a reasonable mistake), but an incredibly stupid man, picking out a few bits from a book to give an utterly distorted picture of its author's philosophy. In view of the rest of the Tx, including its summary of Song's doctrines, this seems hardly tenable. If this were, then, the original book, we would expect the relevant Tx phrases to be the main tenets of the book, or (more probably, bearing in mind that the Tx is not reliable as regards YW) not be there at all.

It seems obvious, then, that these phrases were lifted by the author of the YWz from the Tx and stuck in his book to make it look more respectable. This brings us back to the Zhonchang preface. I have mentioned above the curious fact that the preface is at variance with the book itself and all references to it in claiming that the Tx account is right and Liu Xiang wrong. Now, if Miu Xi had really discovered the YWz he would not have had to bother about the Tx, but could have pointed to all the evidence that shows YWz to be related to the "school of names" people. The Tx phrases

in the YWz and the claim made in the preface seem to suggest that by the time Miu Xi faked the book there was nothing left of the old YW book. Attributing his book to YW, of whom very little is known, probably because of his reputation as a logician, he then added the few phrases from the Tx (as an after-thought, possibly), the importance of which is emphasised in the preface, in an attempt to make the book look genuine.

It is theoretically possible that the present YWz is the book mentioned by Liu Xiang and the Han Shu, composed sometime after the Tx (circa 200?) and before the end of the early Han, but it seems highly unlikely. Besides not explaining the claim made in the preface (about the Tx being right), it seems to go against one more general argument.

The earlier method of producing spurious books, like the Guanzi ^{管子} 子 or the Zhuangzi ^{莊子} 子 seems to have been putting together essays written by different people, vaguely associated with the same "school", which collection was then attributed to the most illustrious man in that school, and usually contained some chapters by the eponymous thinker. Authors using bits of old material to embellish what are essentially new books in an attempt to pass them off as old is, apparently, a late Han and-or post Han invention.

In the next chapter I attempt to show that in content and philosophical terminology the YWz belongs to the beginning of the third century A.D. Below I examine the linguistic evidence. This, although rather scant, is evenly distributed. Together with the arguments offered above it seems to rule out the possibility that Miu Xi was merely an editor, or even that he used a lot of old material.

Linguistic evidence

Since there is no good grammatical analysis of the different layers of classical Chinese, and only a few texts are concordanced, linguistic evidence is a tricky business at the best of times; in the case of the YWz it has turned out to be even less rewarding than usual. Compared with the Liezi, for example, the YWz is frustratingly lacking in telling pronouns or particles. There are, however, a few signs of late usage which previous commentators have pointed out. I list them all down together with several others which possibly have escaped their attention. The one particle which indicates late usage and occurs throughout the book is the negation particle Fu. In pre-Han usage it is carefully distinguished from Bu 不, so that any occurrence of Fu before an intransitive verb or before a transitive verb with object other than 之 can be taken as a sign of late usage. ¹

Of the 16 Fus in the book the following are not pre-Han usage:

1. 弗知其玉也... 畜之弗利其家 弗知復之

"did not know it was jade... keeping it will not benefit the family;
it is better to return it." (I 9b4&5)

2. 雖弗鼎之於我 弗傷

"although they do not fulfil them, it does me no harm" (II 6a8)

3. 則於人君 弗損也

"then it causes the ruler no loss" (II 7a1)

4. 不可弗與民同勞逸

"cannot but share work and leisure with the people." (II 7a2)

Lexical evidence can be useful in dating as Thompson¹ has shown, but ought to be handled rather cautiously. With only few concordanced texts one has to rely on dictionaries, so that mistakes are unavoidable. The most telling lexical units are probably binomial terms (pairs of near synonyms serving as semantic units), names for everyday things, and pairs of opposites - mainly those used as stock-examples. Combination of verb/adjective and noun are less reliable, the range of the first being, as the YWz puts it, unlimited. Nevertheless some combinations which look like technical terms or cliches might also be valuable in dating.

In compiling the following list I looked first in the Peiyen yunfu and Morohashi, and then checked with the HY concordances for the LY, Mencius, Mz, Xz, Zhuangzi, Liji, the combined concordances to the Chunqiu etc., Ijing and the new concordance to the Guanzi.

(a) Binomial terms	meaning	earliest occurrence (M., PW.)
I 4b6 農 稼	farming	HHS
I 4b6 軍 陣	soldiering	HS
II 1a6 偏 私	partiality	HHS
II 1a9 淫 於	licence	Ruan Ji 阮籍 ²¹⁰⁻²⁶³ (3rd cent)

(This seems to be a particularly good example, coming as it does after the not very common 惰慢 and closely resembling Xz (HY 73/19/6)

法淫惰慢 "licence and sloth". It seems likely that the author had this in mind and used the modern 淫於 for 法淫.)

II 1b1 陵 暴 oppression

(This is not listed in M. and PW. but is probably a variant of 凌暴 for which M. has Ruan Ji.)

(b) The YWz is not consistent in its choice of contrasting terms; thus,

賢 is contrasted with 下肖 (e.g. I 3a5) and also with 愚 (e.g. I 5b3); besides we have 愚 contrasted with 智 (I 2b7). The most frequent of these pairs seems to have become widely used only during the

eastern Han. The Lun Heng 言命衡 (1st cent. A.D.) is apparently the first book to use it regularly.

Another pair of opposites which points to a late date is 遲疾 which seems to have replaced the earlier 遲速. (I 4a8). Both M. and PW. quote the HS as the earliest source. The use of 興廢 may also be significant as the earliest occurrence given in M, is the HS; the Mencius however has 廢興 (4A/1), so that it may not mean much. The same goes for 齊醜 (I 6b2) it occurs once in the concordanced texts (Xz 6/3/7) but seems to have become popular only much later. (M. & PW. give references to the Liezi and HHS).

(c) Lo Genze has already pointed out that before the western Han there is no mention of Ming and Fa as names of schools; the list 名法傳墨 Ming, 法, Ju, Mo which appears twice in I1a&b is therefore a sign of late date.

Tang pointed out that 韻 is a post-Han character. (I 3b7)¹

In the second part I show that several terms used in the YWz belong to the third century A.D. This applies in particular to the paragraphs on names*--and--shapes* which, because of their excellence, some scholars tend to attribute to the Warring States period.²

One suspect philosophical term is 情 in the sense of "passions". It is not an important term in the YWz but where it occurs (I 7b3) it is

obvious that this sense is meant: 聖王知民情之易動 "the sage-kings knew that the passions of the people are easily swayed". A.C.Graham has shown in "the background of the Mencian theory of human nature" that 情 never means "passions" in pre-Han literature.

Two cliches which look suspicious are: 1) 閭土竟 (see above, p. 19).
2) 角界地 for "plenty" . The PW. gives the HS as the earliest occurrence.

To sum-up:

1. The external evidence shows that the latest possible date for the YWz is around 500 A.D.
2. Linguistic evidence and the comparison with parallel passages shows that the earliest possible date is around 200 A.D.
3. The discussion of the preface suggests that the most likely date is the beginning of the third century A.D.

The second part is an attempt to show that 3. is indeed true, and that the book is worth the bother.

II. The YWz and the renaissance of philosophy in the Wei-Jin

References to the YWz and the LWL are to the DZ editions; these are marked on the margins of the translations below (YWz p. 169, LWL p. 142). For references to other books see bibliography for details of editions.

Chinese philosophy in the third century A.D. has not been neglected by western sinologists; apart from Forke's "Geschichte der mittelalterlichen chinesischen Philosophie" which devotes long chapters to it we have had studies of the major thinkers of the period, such as Holzman on Xi Kang, Shryock on Liu Shao, Kramers on Wang Su, and Petrov on Wang Bi;¹ there is Naspero's pioneering essay on Neo-Taoism and Mather's "rambling account"² on "Conformity and Naturalness"; above all we have Balasz's brilliant discussion of the interaction of history, thought, and life-style in this period.³ The story which begins with the breakdown of the Han and the revival of philosophical activity, and ends rather brutally a mere half a century later is, then, not unfamiliar. Its main themes are diversity and eclecticism,⁴ the revival of interest in the Hundred Schools of the Warring States period, a proliferation of forged texts,⁵ a penchant for classifying people into "types",⁶ a taste for cryptic aphorisms and witty conversation.⁷ It tells us of a short-lived mini-renaissance which was soon to degenerate into a soft-headed escapism,⁸ only to be crushed by resurgent orthodoxy⁹ and be supplanted by religiosity.¹⁰ The potential

richness of indigenous Chinese philosophy, briefly revealed again in this period, was never to blossom. Buddhism which dominated Chinese thought for the next few centuries thwarted it beyond recognition. Whatever one's view of Neo-Confucianism, there seems to be little doubt that without Buddhism the development of philosophy in China would have taken a different, and possibly more interesting, course.²

This is a somewhat synthetic view of the intellectual climate of the time. Different scholars tend to stress or overlook the various themes, given equal importance above, in different ways. As such, however, it is not inaccurate; each characteristic is neither false nor misleading. At the same time it suffers from the shortcomings all "identikit" portraits have. It does not carry the same conviction that an account given by one man has, however inaccurate in particular details.

There are, of course, gaps in this picture; the most serious to my mind being the unsatisfactory treatment of forged texts. Not only is there no general theory of forgeries, answering such basic questions as "why particular periods are richer in forgeries, (if this indeed is the case), but the number of books that could throw light on Chinese philosophy, were we sure of their date, is staggering. The catch-all phrase "late forgery"

which seems to have encouraged the "pre-Han (good) — other (bad)" dichotomy is probably one reason the YWz was neglected; and there seems to be little chance that potentially interesting books such as the "Guei Gusi" 鬼谷子 or the "He Guanzi" 鶡冠子 being properly understood until they are dated and thereby embedded in their correct philosophical context.

There is also a general tendency to overemphasise the break with late Han philosophy and treat the Wei philosophers as belonging to a meaningless (as far as philosophy is concerned) medieval period. If Buddhism is the "great divide" in Chinese thought then the great philosophers of the third century, especially its first half, who were hardly influenced by it have a lot more in common with their late-Han predecessors than has been allowed for.² Thus the academy established by Liu Bao 劉表 in Jingshou 荊州 which served as a refuge for many scholars during the troubles at the end of the Han,³ was no doubt instrumental in the education of Wang Bi, whose family was closely connected with it. The fall of the Han empire did probably bring about a greater freedom and variety of philosophical activity (relative and short-lived), but did not constitute a break in the continuous tradition of indigenous Chinese thought.

All the same, in a sense this philosophical renaissance was a freak. Later Chinese philosophy seems to have taken little interest in the promising starts made in metaphysics¹, logic², and psychology³ made in this period. If one is interested in Ideas-that-Changed-the-World then one should perhaps look for them elsewhere. If, however, one prefers the exciting uncertainties of philosophy as it is practised to the rarified heights of eternal verities, then, I believe, one will find this a fascinating and rewarding period.

I have not attempted any historical analysis. Not only because my history is patchy, which is true, or because I am certain that there is absolutely no connexion between the social and political life of a period and the philosophy produced in it, which is not. Risking a generalisation, I will say that philosophers tend to refer to other philosophers rather than directly to the external world, so that a history-of-ideas kind of analysis is more likely to be illuminating⁴. The crudities of some Marxists' view of philosophy, in China and elsewhere, will bear me out.⁵

We have seen above that all the evidence points to the beginning of the third century A.D. as the most likely date for the composition of the YWz. In the following section I attempt to show that its contents, its philosophical preoccupations, the questions it deals with, the conceptual framework in which it is couched, and the terminology which it uses are very much of that time. A comparison between the YWz and Wang Bi's "Laozi weizhi lilue" 老子微旨例略, which figures largely in what follows, shows that besides the striking resemblances the differences point to the YWz being somewhat earlier, and so very probably instrumental in the philosophical development of one of the greatest philosophers in Chinese history.

The greater part of the YWz, like most philosophical writing in China is concerned with politics, providing what Granet so beautifully termed a "recette de gouvernement"². In doing so the author of the YWz draws on all the pre-Han schools, using Confucian, Taoist, Mohist, and Legalist stuff, as well as quoting lesser known figures, and attributes the book to a minor debater. This wide-ranging eclecticism, far from producing a "dull mixture", is fitted together neatly to form a systematic treatise

of government. Central to the book's conception of government is the discussion of names¹-and-shapes¹, which is the most original part of the book. Regardless of its merits, the book is a work of a truly independent mind, a fact which argues for its having been written early in the third century. Later philosophers tended to ally themselves with either Taoism or Confucianism, and drew mainly on the Laozi and the *I Ching*. Thus, even Wang Bi (226-249) who cannot be called either Confucian or Taoist is far less eclectic than the author of the *Ywz*.

Political philosophy in China may be divided into two very broad categories: Man-oriented and Law-oriented. The first includes all those²—mainly, but not only, Confucianists— who believe that the proper running of the state requires having the right sort of people in office, and concentrate on either finding or educating them. The second— mainly, but not only, Legalists— who think that a method can be found which will ensure the proper running of the state, regardless of the people in office, and claim to provide such a method. Granted that all classifications are, to an extent, misleading, this seems to me somewhat better than the

grouping of philosophers in "schools" even when applied to pre-Han thought. Thus, for example, it stresses the very real affinity between the Laozi and the Hanzi which the terms "Taoist" and "Legalist" tend to conceal. When applied to a period characterised by disregard for the traditional schools, the usefulness of this division seems even greater.

At the turn of the second century A.D. the old issue of "Man" versus "Law" has assumed a new meaning and can no longer be regarded as a debate between Legalists (or Neo-Legalists) and Confucians. For Xunzi, say, "having the right people in office" meant educating the ruler in the traditions set by the sages ; it was against this that Han Fei or LisSi advocated their laws and methods. At the end of the Han following in the foot-steps of the sage kings is no longer an alternative, but the more general "having the right people in office" is; for the "young Turks" in Cao Cao's court "right people" meant only one thing: "Talent"; and the way to find ^{it} ~~them~~ was "typology".

"It is easy to see how Neo-Legalism could support the iconoclastic and pragmatic program of a military dictator opposing a privileged aristocracy". (Mather 163). While Neo-Legalism, like Neo-Taoism, is vague enough to

mean almost anything, and in the "mixture of cynical authoritarianism, Taoist poetry, and revolt against tradition"(Balasz 225, on Zhongchang Tong) there are some legalist elements, it is perhaps better to avoid the term, as the differences are more telling than the similarities. The emphasis on personalities rather than Law, which was a hallmark of the Cao Cao ideology, is alien to Legalism and shows that men like Zhongchang had more in common with Confucianism than just the books they all read. "Typology", which was very much a preoccupation of the time seems a lot more relevant to this new ideology. Originating from physiognomy,¹ it developed into a fine art of analysing, classifying, and summing-up of people in neat catchy phrases. A classic of this "science" is still extant (Liu Shao's "Ren wu zhi" 劉劭人物志, which Needham finds "based entirely on rationalistic observation of psychological traits and their effects in human affairs")² and we know for sure that it was only one of many.³ Most modern readers will probably find the book rather dull and the "science" no more convincing than phrenology. This might explain the otherwise surprising omission of Liu Shao from the current anthologies of Chinese thought. Its immense importance for understanding the "Zeitgeist" has been, however, commonly recognised by many Chinese scholars.⁴

The YWz objects to the practice of the physiognomists in much the same way as Xunzi : "Fathoming men's hearts and gauging their desires he goes along with what they like...guided by the expression on their faces..."; but it is not only the practice which he objects to: Relying on "talent", even if he had sure ways of discovering it, is wrong in principle. If good government is an outcome of having the right people in office, then "the craft" of the sage will flourish and perish with him, and by the time a new generation takes over, there will be none left to use the norm" of governing the world". (I 75)

Like Hume, the author of the YWz "should be sorry to think that human affairs admit of no greater stability than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particular men". It is the insistence on considering only what can be universally applied as a principle of government that sets this book apart from the scores of other tracts on government written at the time, and makes it more thoroughly legalistic than the so-called Neo-Legalists.

Compared with the cursory treatments it accords practical measures, the YWz goes on at some length about the principle of universal applicability: "The worthless in the world are many, and the benevolent and worthy are few". Any political system which requires able or virtuous people for its smooth running is therefore bound to fail and is wrong in principle. (I 84)

Outstanding ability, talent, or bravery are in themselves of no value unless they can be made simple enough so that everybody can practise them:" What is esteemed in the skill of master craftsman Chui is not his being alone in skill, but his ability to share it with the many". (I5a7)

Thus, the importance of the sage kings does not lie in any superiour qualities which they undoubtedly had, but in their ability to form a system of government which made these qualities unnecessary. The story of Tien Pien, Songzi, and Peng Meng neatly illustrates this point:

"Tienzi, reading the 'Book of History' said: 'The reign of Yao was a time of supreme peace'. Songzi said: 'Was it due to the governing of the sage?' Peng Meng, who was standing nearby, replied out of turn: 'It was the governing of the sagely Form* that resulted in this, not the governing of the sage.' Songzi asked: 'The sage or the sagely norm, what is the difference?' Peng Meng replied: 'Your confusing of names* is extreme.

"The sage" implies that (good government) is due to the person of the sage; "Sagely Norm*" implies that it is due to the pattern*; the pattern* is due to his person but it is not his person; his person is capable of forming the pattern* but the pattern is not his person. Therefore, "the

governing of the sage" implies that he is alone in governing well; "the governing of the sagely Norm" implies that there is nothing that is not well-governed. This benefit for a myriad generations can only be achieved by a sage.^(I 4a) Therefore, "what is esteemed in the governing of the sages is not their ability to be alone in governing well but their ability to share good government with the many". (I 5a)

The YWz view of government is utilitarian; the greatest good of the greatest number of people is the sole criterion for accepting or rejecting a specific law, convention, or act of government: "If they go against the people, conventions are disallowed; if they harm the many, commodities are commonly rejected".^(I 7a1) Right and wrong, too are determined by the majority: "Thus, what is right and what is wrong are established by the majority; not decided upon by oneself; That which goes against the many is wrong, then, and that which goes along with the many is right." (I 11a2-3)

Embodying the will of the people, the ruler can be assured of his survival and the stability of the regime: "If the ruler...acts according to what is considered right, then others cannot succeed in opposing him". (I 11a3-4)

On the whole people expect little enough from the ruler: "They expect him to enable them to provide for old and young, regulate taxes and levies,

take proper steps in time of famine and cold, prevent abuse of rewards and punishments, call them up for service in the proper seasons etc." (U66A-7a1)

If he wants to stay in power the ruler has to satisfy these expectations; he cannot afford "not to share work and leisure with the people", nor can he afford to be blinded by traditions (and ideologies) which ought to be subject to the good of the people: "Those that are bogged down by conventions or set too much store by commodities are not fit to be partners in government". (I 7a7-8)

Positive laws are designed to ensure the well being of the majority; in order to be effective the ruler has to make sure that they are obeyed. The author of the YWz does not share with Confucians the belief that this can be achieved by education, nor with Legalists the belief that severity of punishments will result in law -and-order. There is a modern ring to his solution: "When people are rich they do not care for rank and salary; when they are poor they are not scared ^(U5a5) of punishments". The only way of making laws effective is to make poverty and riches depend solely on merit: "If salary and rank are made the only basis of riches; punishments and penalties the only cause for poverty, then ~~the~~ ^{all} people will follow the good, being afraid of committing crime". (U5a10-5b2)

Apart from "the way*" and "norm*" which form the basis of the book's philosophy and are explicated in some detail, the YWz has several lists of what might be termed "tools of government". These are borrowed from both Confucian and Legalist sources and are clearly meant to be understood in their usual sense, as the book has little to say about them. Thus we have "Benevolence, rightness, rites, music, names*, norms*, punishments, and rewards" 仁, 義, 禮, 樂, 名, 法, 刑, 賞 (II 1a); "names*, norms*, authority*, and craft*" 名, 法, 權, 術 (II 4b); names* and norms* are mentioned together with ease* 易 and simplicity* 簡 (I 4a.) after a list of measuring instruments. The mutual relations of these different terms change too; thus, punishments and rewards which at II 1a are listed together with norms* as instances of "methods" (術 "shu", usually sometimes translated as "craft*"), are regarded as a subclass of norms*. (I 2a)

Rather than implying self-contradictions or the inexactness of Chinese philosophical language, it merely points to a certain fluidity in the usage of terms which is common in all natural languages. It is usually quite obvious from the context which aspect of the concept or which sense of the term is meant.

Of the different lists the most interesting one is at I lb, not only because it is the first, and therefore presumably the one that the author meant us to notice most, but because it is the only list that is strictly ordered. "If the way* is not sufficient to govern by, then use norms*; if norms* are not sufficient to govern by, then use craft*, if craft* is not sufficient to govern by, then use authority*; if authority* is not sufficient to govern by, then use power*". This is obviously a descending order, from "the way*" which is the most general term, to "power*" which is the most specific. They do not represent alternative methods; the terms are interrelated, each implied by its neighbour in the series, all to be implied by "the way*". "By exhausting you come back to the end; coming back to the end you revert to the beginning; ^{there is no limit to} the mutual replication of beginning and end ["] ~~is inexhaustible~~". The phrasing is reminiscent of the Laozi, but there seems to be no need to seize at the instantly-profound meaning. In the U.S.A., for example, the various laws, statutes, and emergency measures are sanctioned by the constitution. Designed to meet situations of a varying degree of unforeseeability, they all reflect the "spirit" of the constitution, which

is "the embodiment of the will of the American people", and from which they are all supposed to derive. The constitution itself can be amended according to the principle of Justice which constitutes its "spirit". This is by no means a strict analogy, and the wording no doubt points to different concepts of the world; I believe, nevertheless, that it is close enough and is of some use.

One glaring omission from this series is, of course, "names". "Names" figure in all the other lists and is the most important term in the YWz. Its omission here cannot, therefore, be explained away as an oversight. The clue, I think, lies in the fact that "the way", which heads the list here, does not appear in any of the others. Right after this passage a discussion of "names--and-shapes" begins, followed by a discussion of "norms", "craft", and "power". It seems plausible to assume a correlation between the series and the discussion that follows and therefore, that "names--and-shapes" are intimately related to the YWz concept of "the way". Below, I attempt to show that for the YWz the "correct use of names" is in fact synonymous with "the way of government"; I'll deal first, however, with the concept of "norms".

"There are four kinds of norms* (法[†])". Needham (544 ff) has done a lot to clarify the Chinese concept of Fa, and any discussion must take account of his views; all the same, his translation of the relevant YWz passage seems to me somewhat puzzling. I have chosen to translate Fa as "norms*" which, like "standards" (Graham's translation of Fa in the Mohist Xiao qu), emphasises the sense of "model" that is central to Fa. "Standard", however, is exactly what is described in the YWz as the fourth kind of Fa, for which reason I did not use it for the more general term.

"The first kind are immutable norms", e.g. "ruler and minister", "above and below". According to Needham this is "certainly (juristic) natural law". Fa of this kind express what is believed true of every human society, a prime example of which would be something like: "an above-below relationship obtains in all human society". The ~~writer~~ author of the YWz probably had something of the sort in mind, as is strongly suggested by the word "immutable"; at the same time the Fa of ruler and minister is also something else. It is a set of rules defining the relative roles of rulers and ministers, as well as a model for other

social relations. It is the normative sense of Fa that is further explicated in the YWz: " Rewards and punishments are the affairs of the ruler; keeping to their posts and exercising their capacities are the business of the ministers... when above and below do not interfere with one another or encroach upon one another, then names* are said to be correctly used; when names* are correctly used then norms* are followed." (E/cw)

These immutable Fa differ, then, from natural laws in that they, like norms in everyday language, imply both " it is generally so" and " it ought to be so". Armed with the "above-below" Fa, understood as a natural law, a sociologist confronted with a society in which it does not obtain will have to regard the law as falsified, qualify it, or ignore the evidence; the author of the YWz, in the same situation, would have set about reforming this particular society.

These immutable Fa form the rigid framework of the whole system envisaged in the YWz. Once they are understood, as natural laws, and adhered to, as models, everything else follows automatically. The ruler, the ministers, and the citizens have their clearly demarcated places and their clearly specified roles to play in society:" When everything is well-governed,

without flaws, then the big and the small, the many and the few, all are adequately allotted. The farmer and the tradesman, the artisan and the official, do not change their pursuits. When veteran farmers, senior tradesmen, expert artisans, and experienced officials are all established in their positions, then what trouble need the man at the top take?" (249-46)

"The second kind are norms" which are equalising conventions, e.g. "competent and incompetent", "similar and different". The examples are not very illuminating, but fortunately there is a discussion of conventions later on, which seems to clarify the meaning. "That which is honoured in the world, and which all are equal in honouring, is called "convention"... if they go against the people, conventions are (should be) disallowed....whereas men's minds are different, in conduct they are all like one...this is what is equalised by conventions..." (266)

The sense of Fa as "model" is further stressed by the three stories that follow; the ruler is a trend-setter, so that if he likes to wear purple, or prefers slender waists the people follow him. Conventions ought to be changed with circumstances so that they do not hamper the people. The double meaning of the "Fa of conventions" is obvious: it is the example

of the ruler who establishes the conventions, as well as the law according to which they are established as such.

The third kind are norms for governing the masses, e.g. commendations and rewards, punishments and penalties." these are left to the ruler: "The ruler evaluates achievements, degrades and promotes, and so is concerned with commendations, rewards, punishments and penalties". The fact that they are listed among the Fa, however, suggests that the YWz does not regard punishments and rewards as "methods" to be used arbitrarily by the ruler.

"The fourth kind are norms* providing for the uniformity of standards, e.g. the pitch-pipe, the foot-rule, the balance, and the measuring-cup." Fa of this kind are exactly "standards" in the sense that the universal metre in Sevre is: An arbitrary unit that, once decided upon becomes law. Thus, the foot-rule, for example, is both the instrument used to measure length and the law which makes its use in measuring length compulsory. As for the examples, they are all explained a couple of pages later, so that Needham's translation ("The fourth is called the law of

correct balance (for example that which has to do with) calendrical science, acoustics, the degrees of the circle, balances and weights") seems unlikely. At I 4a1 we read: "People use the foot-rule to judge the long and the short; use the measuring-cup to receive a little or a lot; use the balance to weigh the light or heavy; use the pitch-pipe to tune the clear or dull; use names* to distinguish the empty (unreal) from the full (real); use norms* to determine good government and misrule; use simplicity* to regulate doubts and anxieties; use ease* to lead them through straits and hard times". The measuring devices which were cited above as instances of Fa, serve now ~~to~~ as concrete models for the more abstract terms, including Fa. The last two terms on the list are of some interest, not because they provide a fresh insight into the political theory of the YWz, but because the book uses them in a way different to the Yijing where they probably originate. In the great appendix they seem to pertain to the "male" and "female" respectively; thus, in ^{48a18} ~~48a18~~ the text says: "天 乾 確 然 示 人 易 矣 夫 坤 隤 然 示 人 簡 矣" "The Qien hardlike, shows ease; the Kun, softlike, shows simplicity" and the Han Kangbo 韓康伯 commentary to 42b/9 says: "天地之道 不為而善 雖不勞而善 成故曰易簡" "The way of heaven and earth is to be good at

initiating without acting, to be good at accomplishing without toiling. Therefore it is said 'ease and simplicity'. The Ywz, however, gives the terms a new meaning: "The myriad events* all go back to the one; the hundred rules are all evened-up in the Norm*. Going back to the one, they are the acme of simplicity*, evened-up in the Norm*, they are the acme of ease*".

The series in I la ends with the three terms "craft*" (shu 術), "authority*" (quan 權), and "power*" (shi 勢). Unlike "norms*", these are barely discussed; we have a couple of sentences on "craft*" and "power*", and nothing at all on "authority*". This is not surprising as they, like the Confucian terms "rites", "rightness" etc., had become by then, four hundred years after Xunzi and Han Fei, part of everyday language.

"Craft*" is what is used by the ruler in secrecy". Shu, later on used in a wider sense, to mean "methods" or the "art of government" (cf. II la, I 7b7), is used here in the strict sense to mean "that part of governing for which the ruler is personally responsible". The Hansi

makes the same point, saying: "術者因任而授官 循名而責實 操殺
生之柄 豈果寡臣之能者也。此人主之所執也。"

"Craft*consists in rewarding officials according to their responsibilities, making them responsible according to their official titles, retaining the power over life and death, and examining the ability of his ministers; this is what the ruler keeps hold of." (Hz 43, Liang 406).

"power* is the sharp tool of the norms* of government". Shi is a difficult concept, but perhaps "the power that inheres in one's position" is a fair approximation. I translate it as power* as I cannot think of anything better and this at least has the advantage of having been used by Bodde in his translation of Fung Yulan's "History of Chinese Philosophy". (As always, the asterisc should warn the reader that all is not well with the translation).^{iv} Shi need not be applied to the ruler only; in I 7b10, for example, it refers to the power that the rich and influential derive from their advantageous position in society. But here (I 2a7-10) the author has the power* of the ruler in mind. When there is no confusion or overlapping of political roles, then "craft* can be kept secret and power* unshared". In "Questioning 'shi' " (Hz 40, Liang 390ff) after Shen Dao's beautiful metaphor of the dragon and the clouds, Han Fei

raises the problem of the ability of the ruler:"今桀纣南面而王天下以

天子之威為之雲雨而天下不覺乎大亂者薄其才故也

"When Jie and Zhou ruled the empire, they (too) had the majesty of the 'son of heaven' as their clouds and mists, yet the empire did not escape gross misrule; it is because Jie and Zhou were poor in talent". The YWz does not deal with this question directly, but what he says about Jie and Zhou makes it clear that he does not share Han Fei's belief in the need for talent. "The eight methods are not hidden from man and have always existed. They did not appear spontaneously at the time of Yao and Tang, and did not disappear spontaneously at the time of Jie and Zhou; if, in practice, they are applied successfully then the empire is well-governed, if not, then it is not." (II 1b2-4). And at I 10a8-9 : "The same is true for Jie and Zhou, Yu and Li; at times they did the right thing and at times the wrong thing; they missed the moment and therefore failed". Jie and Zhou had the same power* as Yao and Tang, and whether they had talent or not is irrelevant; the point is that they failed to make use of the instruments of government handed down to them. Power* is the "sharp tool" of government; it is the lowest in the series, to be used as a last

resort, rarely and carefully. Failing to use norms* and craft*, to rely solely on power*, Jie and Zhou robbed the "sharp tool" of its point, so that when the right moment for its use came it was useless.

We have noticed before that the I lb series is strictly ordered, each term implied by its neighbours. The above discussion suggests, however, that it is more correct to say that it is their use in governing which is ordered. Thus, it is the use of power* which is part of the craft* of the ruler; and the use of craft* which is part of the more general norms*.

Norms*, even in the most general sense, are still "inferior to the way*" . The author of the YWz is Laoist enough to believe in one overall metaphysical principle which forms the basis for his theory of government. In what is arguably his greatest contribution to Chinese philosophy this principle is given in logical terms -- the correspondence of names* and shapes*. In what follows I deal with the YWz theory of naming* and with related problems in other texts of the Wei-Jin period.

"One of the most important factors in the development of Ch'ing T'an in this period is the revival of the school of Logic of which we have ample evidence." (Wright on Petrov 80). Provided that we substitute "interest in some logical problems" for "school of Logic", this is undeniably true. Discussion of logical problems such as "words and meaning", "the correct use of names*", and "names* and shapes*", as well as a greater rigour in philosophical writing and debate, are characteristic of the period; they seem, however, to have little in common with the pre-Han "school of names" (ming jia 名家) of Hui Shi 惠施 and Gongsun Long. In subject matter, at least, they owe a lot more to Confucian and Taoist sources.

The bibliographical chapter in the "Sui History" 隋書 lists nine books under "ming jia". Of these, two are ascribed to pre-Han thinkers (YWz and Deng Xizi 鄧析子) and the rest, including the "Ren wu zhi" to Wei authors. With the possible exception of the no longer extant "Xing sheng lun" 刑聲論, the latter are, or seem to have been, very similar to the "Ren wu zhi" and need not concern us here. It is perhaps curious that these books were listed under "ming jia", but, as

Mou Zongsan convincingly argues, the reason is probably no more profound than bibliographers' convenience, a "typology school" not being one of the traditional six (or ten).

The frequent occurrence of "ming" 名 in combinations such as "ming shi" 名士, "ming li" 名理, and "ming jiao" 名教 is rather bewildering and might have helped to cloud the issue of the revival of interest in logic. "Ming li", originally referring to the Liu Shao brand of philosophy, came to mean something close to logic but in a general, somewhat vague, sense. ("to be good at talking ming-li" meaning "to be good at philosophical analysis" or even "to be clever with words"). "Ming shi" and "ming jiao" have nothing to do with logic. The former indicated unconventional behaviour and a certain esprit (exemplified by the "seven worthies of the Bamboo Grove")² but the term was applied to serious philosophers such as Ho Yen 何晏 and Wang Bi,³ as well as to the gilded youth of the western Jin court; the latter is associated with men like Pei Wei 裴頠 (267-300) and Sun Sheng 孫盛 who advocated conformity to traditional morality and taking active part in politics. ⁴

These tags are patently useless as indicators of an interest in logic, and it is small wonder that some historians have been misled by them.

Thus ^{in his "Wei ju sixiang lun" Liu Dajian (176ff)} ~~the "Wei ju sixiang lun"~~ ^{劉大杰} divides the Qing Tan ^{清談 (派)} ("pure talk" and hardly a "school" in any case) to two "branches" which he names "ming li" and "xuan lun" ^{玄論}, the former starting with Liu Shao and including the "conformists" or upholders of "ming jiao" in what Mather called "the controversy over conformity and naturalness", i.e. Zhong Hui ^{鍾會}, Pei Wei, etc. But "ming li" and "xuan lun" are not mutually exclusive (an interest in the metaphysics of the Yijing and the Laozi did, in fact, go very well together with a good logical mind, so that in order to excel in "xuan lun" one needed all the "ming li" one could get). Thus, the SSXY, describing Wei Jie ^{衛玠} says: "玠少有名理,善易老"
4/20 com. "When young he had ming li and was good at the Laozi and the Yijing". Ruan Xiu ^{阮修} gets a similar description: "好老易能言五理 (ibid. 4/18 com) "He loved the Yi and the Laozi, and was good at talking li". Besides, some of these tags are positively misleading, as for example, calling Wang Bi a "ming shi".

Another so-called "ming shi", Yue Guang ^樂/_廣 ' turns out to be a (tolerant) conformist. (cf. SSXY 1/23 which both Balasz and Mather translate). In the enemy camp, on the other hand, Zhong Hui, who on all accounts was an arch conservative, was a fine debater and a wit² who, moreover, dabbled in "xuan" . Whatever his position we know for certain that he read pretty much the same books as Wang Bi, say, and that his father commented on both the Yijing and the Laozi. The literati of the Wei-Jin, despite their differences and enmities, were bound together in close family and personal relationships and shared the same catholic tastes in their readings; their ability as philosophers seems to have little to do with the tags attached to them.

Wei-Jin philosophers were intrigued by two problems of a logical nature: The correspondance of names* to shapes* and the relation of words to meanings. The first has a long history in chinese philosophy, starting with the famous Confucian dictum about the "correct use of names" 正名. It is central to the YWz, the author of which has made an unparalleled contribution to its development. Below I discuss this and compare it with other texts of the period, mainly Wang Bi's LWL. The second is not

dealt with in the YWz, but its importance for understanding Wang Bi, and third century philosophy in general, seems to justify its inclusion here.

The discussions of "names and actualities" 名實 in pre-Han books

The discussions of "names and actualities" 名實 in pre-Han books

(especially the logical chapters of the Mozi and the "zheng ming" 正名 (22) account seems unnecessary, but one example, which is close in time to the YWz, and perhaps less familiar, may be of some interest.

名者所以名實也。實立而名從之。非名立而實從之也。故長形立而名之曰長。短形立而名之曰短。非長短之名先立而長短之形從之也。

"Names* are the means for naming actualities*. When an actuality* is established, a name* follows it; it is not the case that a name* is established, and an actuality* follows it. Therefore, when a long shape is established, then, naming it, we say "long"; when a short shape is established, then, naming it, we say "short". It is not the case that the names* "long" and "short" are established first, and the shapes of "long" and "short" follow them" (Zhong lun 中論 II 6a).

"Shi" 實, the primary meaning of which is "full", is an awkward word to translate without using concepts which have been preempted by Greek metaphysics and are, therefore, riddled with connotations alien to it. In Neo-Confucianism "shi" assumed a more general meaning, something like "the reality which underlies the phenomena", as in the compound 實際 reality; but in pre-Buddhist philosophy it always refers to particular objects, events, state of affairs, etc. In general the English "in fact" or "actually" will do for translation; e.g. "射而不能中與無矢者同實" "Being capable of hitting the target when shooting, is the same, in fact, as having no arrows".¹ This is not good enough, however, when translating philosophical texts dealing specifically with the contrast between "shi" and "ming". If we bear in mind that "actuality" does not imply "in contrast to "potentiality", (as "actuality" very often does), then it seems a satisfactory, albeit inellegant, substitute for "shi".

In pre-Han texts ~~"shi" is used exclusively~~ the object of naming is always "actuality". Thus, in the "Explanations to the canon I" chapter of the Mozi 墨子經說上 we have: "所以謂名也。所謂實也" "That by which it is called is the name; that which is called

is the actuality*". Or " 臧私也是名也止於是實也。 "

"Zang is a proper name, this name stops at this actuality*". In the Kunzi , out of 47 occurrences of "shi" 實 , 23 are found in the chapter on the "correct use of names" 正名 , which has as subject the relation of names* to actualities*.("shape*", "xing" 形 is not used as object for naming, the 5 "xing" in the chapter have nothing to do with names*).

In the Xu Gan 徐幹 passage from the "zhong lun", cited above, both "shi" (actuality*) and "xing" (shape*) are used as the objects of naming; in the YWz and Wang Bi's LWL "xing" is used regularly in this capacity. This change of terminology does not, perhaps, necessarily imply a conceptual change; the evidence of the YWz, however, suggests that it does. Any attempt to to understand "xing" (形) must take into consideration its basic meaning of "shape". Thus, in Gongsun Long's famous "Bai ma lun" 白馬論 (DZ I 5a) we read: "馬者所以命形也白者所以命色也" " "Horse" is that by which a shape is named ; "white" is that by which a colour is named". "Xing" is used, however, in a more abstract sense quite early. Mencius (I/7 , Legge 142) has: "不為者 與 不能者, 何以

" " What is the difference between the "shapes" of "not doing"

and "being incapable of doing". And Xunzi (HY 83/22/11) has: "是非之形不明" "The "shapes" of right and wrong are not clear".

The late-Han writer Xun Yue 荀悅 in his "Shen Jien" 申鑒 draws an analogy between the Qi (氣, the basic breath-stuff) and the Shen (神, spirit) in which the meaning of "xing" is brought out nicely:

"有氣斯有形有神斯有好惡喜怒哀之情矣故人有情由氣之有形也 (善) 有白黑神有善惡形與白黑借情與善惡借" (chap. 5 16a)

"Having Qi implies having 'shape'; having spirit implies having the passions of love, hate, joy, and anger. Therefore, the spirit having passions follows the Qi having 'shape'. There are white and black Qi; there are good and bad spirits. The 'shape' goes together with the white and black; the passions go together with the good or bad".

The passions are the external manifestation of the spirit in the same way that the "xing" is the external manifestation of the Qi. Although "body" would do as a translation for "xing" in this passage, it has different connotations. The point about Qi and "xing" is not that the latter is more solid, more "real" than the former, but that "xing",

unlike Qi, is perceivable. Thus, the concrete sense of "xing" as "body-shape" is not very different from the more abstract sense in the Mencius and Xunzi examples. Besides its narrow meaning as "shape" (as opposed to colour) "xing" can and did mean "that which can be directly perceived" (either by the eye or "the mind's eye like the man striding over the Northern sea with mount Tai tucked under his arm, in the Mencius' example).

There is, then, a difference of meaning (or at least of emphasis) between "shi" (actuality*) and "xing" (shape*) which makes it unlikely that "xing-ming" is just another name for "shi-ming"; the actuality* of a horse" implies that the thing we are talking about is in fact a horse; the "shape* of roundness" implies that one can see the thing to be round. This distinction is, I believe, central to the theory of Naming* of the YWz. ¹

"A name* is "that which names* a shape*"; a shape* is "that which responds to a name*" " (I 2bl)." That which has a shape* necessarily has a name*, but that which has a name* need not necessarily have a shape*; if it is shaped* yet not named*, it does not thereby lose its

actuality* of squ^areness or roundness, whiteness or blackness, but when it is named* yet not shaped*, then one ought to examine the name* in order to sort out the discrepancy" (I 1b6-9). Shapes* (but not actualities*) are clear and distinct, they are directly perceivable and so lend themselves to immediate naming*. A black thing has the external mark of blackness, it has the shape* of black^kness, and so naming* it "black" constitutes no problem. Any actuality* which has a shape* can be named*, getting its name* from its distinguishing shape*. Thus, actualities* are not directly named* but through their shapes*. This is made clear by YWz insisting that "A shape* is that which responds to a name*" ".The name* 'round' brings to our mind the shape* of roundness not a particular round actuality*. With this shape* of roundness we can go on to check whether a particular thing is ideedⁿ round or not. Not all names* evoke shapes* immediately; "good" and "bad", for example, are associated in our mind with several things, none of which is clear and distinct enough to serve as a shape*. They cannot, therefore, be used to name* actualities* until this is sorted out. The YWz gives an example of how to go about it.

"Good names* name the good; bad names* name* the bad. Therefore, the good have good names* and the bad have bad names*. "A sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise" are those which name* ^{the} the good; "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish" are those which name* ^{the} the bad. Now, if you go no further than the names* "a sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise", in looking for the actualities* of "a sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise", then they do not ever exhaust them; and if you go no further than the names* "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish", in looking for the actualities* of "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish", then these, too, never exhaust them. But, if the good are thereby completely separated from the bad, then although they do not exhaust the actuality* of things, one nevertheless is not worried about the discrepancy."

With a name* like "good", for which we have no ready shape* (and, presumably, after an examination that led us to believe it is not an empty name*) we start by substituting for it names* which we believe to be included in it, which evoke well-defined shapes*, and the conjunction of which seem sufficiently close to it. Assuming that we find things that have the conjunction of these shapes*, it is not

not clear that we have thereby exhausted the actuality* of these things; they might have other shapes* as well, which can lead us to either modifying the name* or try and correct the shapes*. Thus, an excessive fondness for slim waists in an otherwise good king is a shape* that can be corrected after comparing it with the name* "good king".

The use of "to exhaust" 耗 merits some attention and has a direct bearing on the discussion of "words and meanings" (of below, p. 86#). Here it has the meaning of "exhaust" in the sentence "the area of a parabolic segment is exhausted by an infinite number of infinitely 'thin' rectangles". The YWz is making the interesting point that "good" can be approximated, but not exhausted, by a finite number of names*, and, parallelly, the actuality* of "good" can be approximated, but not exhausted, by a finite number of shapes* corresponding to these names*. This 'method of approximation', to which the mediation of shapes* between names* and actualities* is crucial, enables the YWz to articulate the old Confucian dictum "cheng ming" 正名. In the Xunzi, where names* are applied to actualities* directly, it is more "the correct use of names* which is meant by "cheng ming"; a name* is either adequate or

not; it does serve to differentiate one actuality* from another, in which case it ought to be used, or it does not and ought to be discarded. By introducing shapes* between an actuality* and its name*, the YWz provides a method of actually rectifying names*. "Good" probably means more than the conjunction of names* substituted for it, but as it has no shape* corresponding to it, we modify it according to our purpose to mean this conjunction; we rectify it. "Therefore there are names* to sort out shapes* and shapes* to pin down names*; names* to pin down events*, and events* to sort out names*" (I 1b9). An Indian metaphysician would have seized at this potentially infinite process to go on refining definitions ad nauseam; the author of the YWz is a pragmatist; having suggested the possibility he goes back to his main preoccupation — politics. "One is not worried about the discrepancy".

The above discussion has clarified, hopefully, the first two categories in the YWz's tripartite classification of names: "The first are names* that name* ^{2p} things, e.g. "square" and "round", "white" and "black". The second are names* that blame or praise, e.g. "good" and "bad", "noble" and "base". (I 2a2). It shows that the author of the YWz is an original

and interesting thinker^{and} that the passages on names*, like the rest of the book, are highly unlikely to have been written by the pre-Han YW. This is also the case (more so in fact) with the third kind of names*, which raises a problem which is not mentioned at all in pre-Han philosophy, but can be traced in other texts of the third century A.D.

Unfortunately this third kind of names* is less straightforward than the other two; the heading 况謂之也 (names* that call allusively?) is obscure, and the examples uninformative. If read similarly to the first two, (i.e. "worthy" and "foolish", "love" and "hate" ") then it makes no sense as the first couple is hard to distinguish from the names* in the second category. Leaving the examples aside for the moment, let us see what we can about "kuang wei".

I have managed to find only few examples of "kuang" in a sense which seems relevant to the problem of naming ;

不知所以然而况之神是以明兩儀以本極
 為始 繼化而稱極乎神也

"We do not know its cause and so allude* to it as "spirit"; thus, in clarifying the two modes we take the "tai ji" as a starting point; it

changing and transforming, we refer* to the Ji as "spirit". (Han Kangbo

韓康伯 com. to "陰陽不測之謂神" "that which the Yin and the Yang do not fathom is called "spirit".) (YJ 44a10)

"形而上者況之道 形而下者況之器"

"What is above shape* is alluded* to as "the way"; what is below shape* is alluded* to as "vessels". (YJ 50a10 Han Kangbo com.)

(This echoes the YJ phrase "形而上者謂之道 形而下者謂

之器" "What is above shape* is called "the way"; what is below shape* is called "vessels" (YJ 47a-3).)

"

"The way is a referer* for Nothing. There is nothing it does not go through, and nothing which does not follow it; alluding* to it we say:

"The way". (Wang Bi in LY zhu shu 7/1b7)

These three examples suggest a close connexion between "kuang" 况 "

(half-heartedly translated as "allude*"), "cheng" 稱 (refer*), and

"wei" 謂 (call). This use of "kuang" derives, probably, from its

meaning "extend". In order to refer to X, which cannot, for some reasons,

have a name*, one may use a word, such as the name* of some other thing Y; doing so one extends the meaning of "Y" to allude to X.

"Cheng" 稱 (refer*, referer*) has often been translated as "praise" in pre-Han texts and, as far as I can see, with little justification. Apart from its other meaning ("watch" etc.) in 4th tone, it seems to mean "refer to", "mention", "cite", "bring up (a subject)", "speak about" and so on. Here are some examples:

1.

" 'Qi' does not refer to its strength; it refers to its "virtue" ".

(LY 14/35)

2. " 稱孝焉 " "speak about his filiality" (LY 13/20)

That it does not mean "praise his filiality" (although "to cite one's filiality" does presumably imply praise) can be seen from the fact that the same pattern is used also for unpraiseworthy behaviour.

Thus,

3. " 稱不孝焉 " "cited his unfiliality" (Mencius 8/30).

4. " 言其所長不稱其所短 " "speaking about his strong points without mentioning his shortcomings" (Xz HY 50/13/24)

5. The story in the first few lines of chapter 21 of the Zhuangzi has a few "chengs", all translated as "praise" by Burton Watson. This seems to miss the point. Marquis Wen is not even aware that Zifang has had a teacher, as the latter never mentioned any.

6. "言不盡意" 是稱「意」

"words do not exhaust the meaning" ; this refers to "Yi" etc.

(Shen Jien 5/7b1).

Following the passage on "good" and "bad" names*, which, as we have already seen, falls under the second category of names*, the YWz has a passage on names* and referers*. "Names* and referers* distinguish 'that' from 'this' and sort out the 'empty' from the 'full'...Now, in 'keeping close to the worthy and staying away from the unworthy', 'rewarding the good and punishing the bad', the names* "worthy", "unworthy", "good", and "bad" ought to lie in 'that'; the referers* "keep close", "stay away", "reward", and "punish" ought to belong in 'me'. When 'me' and 'that' get a name* each, then naming* is distinct; but when we name* the worthy "keep close to" and the unworthy "stay away from", when we name* the good "reward" and the bad "punish"; combining 'that' and 'me'

in one referer* without separating them, then naming* is blurred."

The point the YWz is making seems clear enough. Apart from names* that really name* things (names* that either correspond to ~~the things~~^{things} exactly (first kind) or approximately (second)), there are names* that are used to allude* or refer* to things, without necessarily being their real names*. They have no objective value, they do not tell us what the thing referred* to is; but they are harmless as long as we know them ~~to be~~^{to be} subjective. It is only when one gets his objective names* and subjective referers* mixed-up that "naming* is blurred".

The distinction between names* and referers*, or rather between names* used for naming* and names* used for expressing our attitude to things (for the YWz if not for Wang Bi "names* that call allusively" are still names*), is found in other books of the third century, notably in the LWL discussed below; of these the most striking example is in Ji Kang's 嵇康(227-262) "Music has no grief nor joy" 聲無哀樂 .This passage is very close to the YWz both in its general idea and the example chosen: "In the phrases "loving A because he is worthy" and "hating B because he is foolish", "love" and "hate" ought to belong in 'me', "worthy" and "foolish"

ought to belong in 'that'. can we call whom we love "a loved man" and whom we hate "a hated man"?". In making the same distinction between subjective and objective, Xi Kang does not use the words "ming" and "cheng", but there is a break in the text just before the above quote and from the single phrase left it looks as if the missing passage did.

(夫味以甘苦為稱)今以甲賢而心愛以乙愚而情憎
則愛小會宜屬我而賢愚宜屬彼也。可以我愛而謂之人我憎
而謂之小會人。

This distinction, understandably, is very important for the YWz's theory of government. The ruler has to overcome his prejudices, avoid taking action based on his subjective attitudes to things, and then everything will fall into place. "Therefore adapt to the usefulness of the worthy, and see to it that they do not get to be useless; adapt to the uselessness of the foolish, and see to it that they do not get to be useful; "useful" and "useless" are both not 'me'. Adapt to the usability and unusability of 'that', and they will get their use of themselves." (I 6a 8-9)

⁴ Subjectivity, while deplorable as a basis for political action, is human and is allowed its due place; the author of the YWz appears to be a

fairly tolerant man and his blue-print for utopia seems more moderate than most; like one of the less oppressive communist countries, his envisaged state is a place where men are at least free to grumble: "When people are poor they resent others, when they are lowly they resent the times...if, with the same ability and equal talent, another man is rich while I am poor, then being able to resist resentment is a virtue, but resentment is not to be condemned...one is blinkered by not being aware of the differences in circumstances, seeing merely the sameness of ability and knowledge. This is a fault in one's understanding, but it is an error a gentleman can make and is forgivable." (II 5b5-10).

In view of the ubiquity of the "objective names" - subjective referents" distinction it is, perhaps, significant that the YWz makes the point twice ~~and~~, using different terms. Following the passage, already quoted on "ming" and "cheng" we have: "Names" ought to belong in 'that'; carvings* ought to belong in 'me'. (In the phrases) "love white" and "hate black" ... "white" and "black",...are names* of 'that'; "love" and "hate",...are 'my' carvings*. The word translated here (with the usual reservations) as carvings* is "fen" \rightarrow ¹. Our subjective attitudes, our loves and hates

are the outcome of the way we carve-up the world. The YWz later uses "fen" in a different sense, to denote a carving-up which, although no less arbitrary, has none of the subjectivity it has here: "If names* are determined, then there is no wrangling over things; if lots are clear, then self-seeking does not prevail....that self-seeking does not prevail is not due to lack of desire, but is brought about by having lots clear, as there is nothing then towards which to direct it." (I 5b7-9). "fen" is used here in the usual sense of "lot" or "part" implying that "each plays his part" and "each gets his due". In a well-governed state, like in a well-run supermarket, what one gets and what one has to pay are clearly marked: "Pheasants and hare live out in the wild, and everybody chases them; it is because lots have not been determined yet. Chickens and pigs fill the market, yet nobody is after them; it is because lots have already been determined" (6a 4-5). Coming back to that 'me'-'that' distinction, "cheng" implies that our subjective attitudes are our way of referring to the external world; "feng" implies that they are our own business, part of our lot in life. What are we to make of the YWz's overlong (relatively) discussion of

of this distinction and its wavering in the choice of an appropriate term. Were the author of the YWz the hack philosopher he is sometimes thought to be, this, I suppose, would have been a non-problem; cribbing a bit from here and a bit from there he somehow got enough material to concoct this "dull mixture". I hope that by now enough has been said to show that this is not the case. The book is, on the whole, the coherent and well-thought out work of an independent and original thinker. The repetitions and the uncertainties about terminology suggest that, like Locke, he was breaking fresh ground. Together with his free-range eclecticism it tends to corroborate the evidence of the preface: while undoubtedly a product of the third century A.D., the YWz appears to belong to its first few decades and to predate the work of its greatest philosopher, Wang Bi. The rest of this chapter is devoted to those aspects of Wang Bi's thought which are closest to the YWz, mainly to his not-well-enough-known LHL, which is fully translated. It seems, however, necessary to say a few words about the question of "words and meanings".

"子曰書不盡言言不盡意然則聖人之意其不可見乎"

"The master said: 'The written characters do not exhaust the words, and the words do not exhaust the meaning; can the sages' meaning, then, not be known?' (YJ 47a/11). In an age which combined interest in logic, fondness for words, and a passion for the ineffable this was a natural subject for debate. That there is a meaning that transcends words is hardly a doctrine specific to this period, or to China, but the greater ^{ph}syllification of the Wei-Jin philosophers makes it more interesting than it sometimes is.

In his "history of Chinese Philosophy" Fung Yulan says: "The strength acquired during Wei-Jin by the doctrine that words can on the contrary express ideas is attested by numerous references". This seems to be a somewhat questionable statement. In fact, the one source which he mentions makes it plain that it is not so: Ouyang Jien 歐陽建 in his "words exhaust the meaning" $\frac{1}{2}$ 盡言論 $\frac{1}{2}$ 論 (YWLJ 19/o540-1)² stresses the point that his position was very much unique.³ It is true, all the same, that his short treatise was highly popular at the time and reads rather well even today. The main argument runs as follows:

"Patterns* are formed in the mind; without words they would not be accessible; things are pinned down in 'that'; without names* they would not be discerned. If words did not make meanings accessible, then there would be no means of communication; if names* did not distinguish things, then discerning would not be manifest. (But) discerning is manifest and things are separated; words and referers* communicate and feelings and intentions are accessible..It is not the case that things have natural names*, and patterns* have necessary referers*. If one wants to distinguish actualities*, then one separates their names*; if one wants to make one's intentions known, one establishes their referers*. Names* change with the things, and words change with the intentions. This is like a sound and its echo, like a shape and its shadow. They cannot be regarded as two (separate things). If they are not two, then there is nothing that is not exhausted."

It is difficult to know exactly what the "li" 理, translated here as "patterns*", are; but they are clearly used to express what goes on in

one's mind and not a general pattern* or principles. The argument is simple and has a modern flavour. We cannot convey what we mean without using words; on the other hand words have no ^{existence} apart from the meanings they convey. There is therefore no sense in talking about words and meanings as if they were two separate entities, and the question of whether they exhaust each other becomes meaningless. Ouyang maintains a strict parallelism, throughout the treatise, between "words and meanings" on the one hand, and "names* and actualities*" on the other. Indeed, there seem to be a close connexion between the two questions, "can names* exhaust actualities*" and "can words exhaust meanings".

The first question can be best approached using YWz's shapes*. In fact, if one thinks of names* as directly applicable to actualities*, then Ouyang's argument seems to be valid and the question becomes trivial. In the special sense of names* corresponding to shapes*, however, it becomes meaningful: "Are the well-defined, clear and distinct shapes* all there is to the actualities*, the shapes* of which they are supposed to be?".

By definition, all shapes* are exhausted by their names*; similarly, every actuality* that has shape* (or, is shaped*) would be thus exhausted. If one assumes, together with the Yijing that "what is above shape* is called "the way" ", then the so-called "way" is the only thing unexhausted by a name*. But this is not a necessary assumption as the following example shows:

仲尼稱堯蕩蕩無能名焉下云巍巍成王是
 強為之名取世所知而稱耳

"Zhong Ni referred* to Yao as "vastly unnamable" , yet went on to say "How majestic his accomplishments". (What he did) was to give him a makeshift name*, picking that which the world knows in order to refer* to him." (Ho Yen 何晏 , quoting Xiahou Xuan 夏侯玄 , in Liezi 4 p. 74 com.).

If the only requirement for naming* were , as in pre-Han texts, that different actualities* have different names* and vice versa, then it would have been difficult to see in what way naming* Yao is any different from naming* a horse, say. If, however, X is named* "X", (not merely called "X") only when it is X-shaped*, then the difference between Yao and a horse is clear.

The twin questions of "naming" and "exhausting the meaning" are discussed in Wang Bi's "outlines" of the Laozi and the Yijing respectively. I shall begin with the latter which is far better known and needs no special introduction.

The relevant chapter in Wang's "outlines of the Yijing ("clarifying the images" 明象 in "Zhou yi luoli" 周易略例 SBCK 61b-62a) has been fully translated by H. Wilhelm ("Change" p.87). A large part is found in Bodde's translation of Fung's "History..." (II 184-5).

書意莫若象 書象莫若言 言生於意 故可尋言以觀象
象生於意 故可尋象以觀意

"...to exhaust the meaning there is nothing like the images; to exhaust the images there is nothing like words. Words are born from the images, so that one can examine the words in order to observe the images; the images are born from the meaning, so that one can examine the images in order to observe the meaning" (61b5-8).

The essential step of introducing the images between the meaning and the words is not, of course, Wang Bi's. In reply to the question of how the meaning of the sages could be conveyed (as words cannot exhaust the

meaning) the "Xi ce" ^{聖人立象以盡意} (the "great appendix" to the YJ; of above p.) says: "The master replied: "The sages established the images in order to exhaust the meaning". (聖人立象以盡意, 47a-8).

Wang Bi elaborates this basic idea, but does not change it substantially:

“故言者所以明象 得象而忘言 象者所以存意 得意而忘象 蹄者所以在兔 得兔而忘蹄 筌者所以在魚 得魚而忘筌也 然則言者象之蹄也 象者意之筌也

"Therefore, the words are a means by which the images are made clear; the images are a means by which the meaning is preserved; having grasped the images one forgets the words, having grasped the meaning one forgets the images. A snare is a means for catching rabbits, having caught the rabbit one forget the snare; a fish-trap is a means for catching fish, having caught the fish, one forgets the trap. Thus, the words are the snare of the images; the images are the trap of the meaning" (ibid 61b 9-7).

Fung, rather surprisingly, concludes from this that Wang Bi "is obviously advocating the contrary thesis that "words can completely express ideas" and thus diverges from earlier Taoism". This conclusion seems to me to

be completely wrong, but , coming from a man of Fung's stature, it deserves a detailed refutation.

Wang Bi switches from "exhaust" 耗 ("to exhaust the images there is nothing like words") to "make clear" 明 ("the words are a means by which the images are made clear"); this and the Zhuangzi metaphor of the trap and the fish should warn us that "exhaust" is used here in a different sense from the one we have already seen used by Ouyang and the YWz. It is not a question of the words exhausting the images (let alone the meaning), but rather of us "exhausting" the images by means of the words. In other words, "to exhaust" in this context means simply "to understand thoroughly", "to master" etc. "Words exhaust the meaning" in the Ouyangs essay meant that there is an isomorphism between the words one utters and the thoughts one has in one's mind. One cannot forget them any more than one can forget one's shadow. In this sense Wang Bi most certainly does not accept that the "words exhaust the meaning". What he does suggest, instead, is a double wittgenstein ladder to a complete understanding; pondering over the words , we can get to understand the images; contemplating the images, we can get to "exhaust" the meaning.

Wang Bi's "outlines of the hidden purport of the Laozi" (LWL, "Laozi weishi lilue" 老子微旨例略) is less familiar than his "Zhou yi lueli" or his commentaries to the Yijing and the Laozi. It was thought to have been lost for centuries until about thirty or twenty years ago when it was found buried in the DZ, unattributed. It was identified as the Wang Bi's lost work by Wang weichang 王維誠 in Peking and (independently, I guess) by Yen lingfeng 嚴靈峰 in Taipei. Wang's annotated and punctuated text is included in the "anthology of Chinese Philosophy from the Han to the Tang"; Yen has reproduced the DZ text² in his book with few comments but with a lot of evidence proving that it really is Wang Bi's work. A shorter (about half) version, titled "Lao jun shigui lueli" 老子指歸例 , is included in the Song collection "Yunji qiqien" 雲笈七籤 j. 1 found in both the DZ and the SBCK. A translation of the LWL is given below, pp. 143-159 .

The LWL is a short (about 2600 characters) and rather beautiful book, if not always easy to understand. It is an attempt to give an aystematic account of the thought of the Laozi; to fit together the various pronunciamentos of the venerable but obscure master; to show that the

can all be derived from one supreme principle; and to prove the superiority of the Laozi to the other schools. Working out a few themes already hinted at in his commentary, Wang Bi forces the Laozi into a logical, coherent, metaphysical ~~system~~ system which is entirely his own. While not, perhaps, as independent as the YWz, the LWL is nevertheless an original piece of philosophy and is, therefore, best judged as such, regardless of its fidelity to the thought of the Laozi, or its success in summing it up.

"Deshaping* is that by which all things survive; denaming* is that by which all achievements are secured". (3b9-4a1). 反其形 (deshaping*) and 反其名 (denaming*) seem to be Wang's name*-theoretical articulation of the Laoist principle: "反者道之動力" "Going back is how the way* moves" (Lz 40). The coming-into-being of things is a process of differentiation; Nothing, which has no shape*, gives birth to Something which has; with each step in this series of differentiations, the shapes* multiply and we are further away from the undifferentiated origin. But each stage in this process is determined by the previous one, the whole is only made possible by Nothing which is its root. "Heaven gave birth

to the five things, but it is "thinglessness" which makes them useful; the sages propagated the five teachings, but it is the "unspoken" which gives them their power to transform" (La6-7). Each stage in this process is an external manifestation of a possible differentiation of the previous stage, a "shaping* up" of what-is-not-yet-it. Acting out what is implicit in the not-yet-it, it depends on the latter for its survival, constantly referring back to it.

Two metaphors which Wang Bi seems to be particularly fond of may help in making this abstract principle clearer. "Honour the root, so that the branches grow"¹ and "keep to the mother, so that the children survive"; the first is, according to Wang Bi, the one phrase that sums up the whole of the Laozi; the two phrases occur three times each in the 15 small pages of the LWL. The branches of a tree depend on the root for their formation (a "shaping*" of what is implicit in the root) and for their survival ; if one is interested in the survival of the branches, one does not bother about the branches themselves, but turns back to the not-yet-branches (2deshaping*" them). The examples Wang Bi gives illustrate this idea: "Exterminating robbers depends on removing desires

not on severe punishments; stopping litigations depends on not starting them, not on being good at listening... anticipate things before their signs appear, deal with them before they begin" (5b3-6).

The biological metaphors of the root and branches, or the mother and children emphasise that "反其形" ought to be taken in a time-bound sense. Translating it as "taking the opposite of shape" would therefore be misleading. "Root" and "branches" are indeed a pair of opposites, but the crucial thing about them is that the root is potentially a branch-maker; that turning from the branches to the root is in fact turning back. "Going in a direction contrary to that of things "shaping" up" 反其形 is, then, "de-shaping". There are many examples in the LNL which, if we are not clear about this, suggest that Wang Bi subscribes to some kind of primitive, crazy Hegelianism. "It is by governing well that misrule is achieved; it is by protecting safety that danger is achieved" (7b7-8) or "the achievements of the sages are established by surviving in fact while claiming: "Exterminate the sage!" (4a7-8). Wang Bi does not mean that things are not what they are, or that in order to achieve something you ought to

do exactly the opposite of what you want to achieve. What he seems to mean is that it is useless to stick to something you want unless you go back one step and make sure that the opposite of what you want does not happen. "That which is safe does not regard safety as "being safe"; but as "not forgetting danger" (4a2). One has to "deshape" safety, check the not-yet-danger, see to it that it does not "shape" into danger, and only then is one safe. Wang Bi would not say that "the oak is the negation of the acorn" but rather that "the acorn is the not-yet oak"; if one is interested in having oaks, one does not refrain from planting them ~~nor~~ does one plant ~~plants~~ non-oaks; what one ought to do, according to Wang Bi, is "honour the acorn".

Wang's criticism of the various schools comes as one more example of this supreme principle. "Observing its "equalising sameness", they call it "Law"; looking at its "determining genuineness", they call it "Names"; examining its "pure love", they call it "Confucianism"; mirroring its "parsimonious frugality", they call it "Mohism"; and seeing its "inconsistency" they call it "Eclecticism". They follow what they mirror and determine the name accordingly." The different principles advocated by the schools are

all aspects of the way*. the mistake the schools make is in sticking to the partial shapes* without going back to the unshaped* origin which is responsible for them; they fail to de-shape* them; they "discard the mother, while making use of the children".

From the first sentence and throughout the LWL Wang Bi maintains a strict parallelism between the natural and the social orders. "The principle by which things are born and achievements accomplished must be that they are born ^{from} the shapeless*, that they follow the ^{name} ~~shapeless~~*" "Heaven gave birth to the five things...the sages propagated the five teachings..." and the passage quoted above on "deshaping*" and "denaming*" are clear about this. There is however one problem which is unique to human beings: Born like the rest of them from Nothing, and like them depending on Nothing for our survival, we seem to be the only creatures that are capable of, and have a need of, talking about the world and their "condition". Our turning back to the way* is therefore different from that of other animals. Imprisoned by names* we get stuck in the derivative world of shapes*, "unable to reach the place where all streams gather".

The sages did not have this problem; they did not have to speak about the

unnamable, but then they "embodied the Nothing" (Wang in SSXY 4/8). Lesser mortals, including Laozi, need words to guide them on the way back to the unshaped*. We need therefore rules which will clarify how this can be done. It is here that Wang Bi makes use of a theory of names* that is remarkably similar to that of the YWz.

"All names* are born from shapes*; it has not yet happened that shapes* were born from names*" (6b5) "Names* are born in 'that'; referers* come out from 'me' "(4b7). Using the same terms as the YWz, the LWL makes the same distinctions; they seem perfectly suited for the purpose of articulating Wang's principle of "deshaping*". Shapes* are born spontaneously from the unshaped* and get their names* automatically. The one direction— from the way* to the particular names* — is therefore simple. It is the way back, the deshaping*, that makes troubles. Starting with names*, we have no means of evoking shapes* automatically; starting with shapes*, we are not assured of getting to the unshaped*. Is there, then, no way of understanding the unnamable* using names*?

Similar in structure to the question of the Yijing about words and meanings (is there no way of understanding what the sages meant, using

words?), and the answer, unsurprisingly, follows very much the same lines.

The problem of speaking about "that which cannot be spoken of" is already discussed in Wang's commentary to the Laozi. Thus, in LzZ 25 we read:

"I do not know its name"

com.: "Names* serve to pin-down shapes*. "confusedly formed", it has no shape*, and thus cannot be pinned-down. Therefore it says: "do not know its name"

Text: " 'Styling it we say" the way*".

Com. : " Names* serve to pin-down shapes*. 'Styling' refers* to what can be said. "The way*" is taken from its being "that which all things follow". This is the greatest of all referers* to that which can be said about the "confusedly formed".

The distinction between names* and referers* in connexion with the way* is made clearer in the LWL: " Naming* it cannot be adequate; referring* to it cannot be final. Naming* implies "something is differentiated"; referring* implies "something it derives from". (But) differentiation means that not everything is included; derivation means that there is no exhaustion. (Now), if it does not include everything, then it differs greatly from the true

nature (of the way*); if it does not exhaust, then it cannot serve to name*" (1b9-2a2).

Referers* are the first stop on the way from names* back to the ineffable. Pointing to the different aspects of the unnamable*, they can help us to understand it better. Like the images in the Yijing, they do not "exhaust" it, but are means to help us ~~to~~ "exhaust" it. "If we wade for it in "all things follow it", then, referring* to it, we say "the way*". If we search for it in "all secrets come out from it", then, calling it, we say "the mysterious". (4b7-9).

Referring, then, is based on names*. "Way", "mysterious", "remote", "great", "subtle", etc. have all well-defined shapes*, the names* of which they are. It is when they are detached from their shapes* and applied to that which has no shape* that they become referers*. The words thus detached cease to be names* and the logical rules applying to names* do not apply to them: "Fullness that has no limit" cannot be ~~named~~ named "minute"; "subtlety that has no shape*" cannot be named "great". Therefore the chapter says: " Styling it we say "the way*"; calling it we say "the mysterious", we do not thereby name it." (2a8-9). Having grasped the

idea that "big" and "small" ,for example, which are contradictory as names*,and cannot therefore be applied to the same shape*, are not so when used as referers*, we have moved one step towards understanding the (so-called) "way*".If the words were the traps of the images in the "Zhou yi lueli", names* are the traps of the referers*.

The association of "referring" with "searching" 求 echoes the last phrase of the "clarifying the images" chapter in the Lueli:"

象以求其意義斯具矣 "This shows what is meant by "the images serve to search for the meaning" " (YJ 62a-9).It seems very likely that the names*-and-referers* of the LWL are modelled after the words-and-images of the Lueli. (It is impossible that it is the other way round; words-images-meaning are found already in the Xi ce itself). The two-stages leading to an understanding of the way* parallel the two leading to an understanding of ~~the meaning~~ what the sages meant. The one difference is ,perhaps, no less telling: The central argument in the Lueli chapter on the images agrees well with the text of which it is an exposition. Both the terms used and their relations are taken directly from the Yi jing. This is not the case with the passages on naming* and referring* in the

LWL. Forcing the meaning of the Laozi, Wang Bi imposes on it a structure taken probably from the Yi, and uses a terminology which could have been borrowed from the YWs, but in any case is not found in the Laozi. Going any further into Wang's philosophy is outside the scope of this work, so I shall finish with one conclusion that the above comparison seems to warrant: Wang Bi's metaphysics was derived primarily from the Yi, or at least was more in sympathy with it.

IV. A translation of the YWz

The translation is of the DZ editions. Pagination on the margins is of the DZ; emendations ^{to the DZ} are noted, but variants are not all collated. "Meng" in the notes refers to Meng Chuanming, "Wang" to Wang Qixiang (See bibliography)

The great way* has no shape*

To refer*to tools* there are names* 1

"A name*" is "that which rectifies shape*". If the rectification of shapes* derives from naming*, then naming* must not be inaccurate. Therefore, Zhong Ni said:"Surely it is using names* correctly?!...If names* are not used correctly, then language becomes intractable...". 2

The great way*is not referred to (by name) 3

The many existents⁴ must be named*

Shapes* are born from that which is not referred to by name,³ so that all shapes* receive their squareness or roundness of themselves; names* are born from the squareness or roundness, so that the many names* already find that to which they refer.

When one governs by means⁵ of the great way*, then Debaters,Legalists, Confucians,and Mohists disappear of themselves; but when one governs by the means advocated by Debaters,Legalists, Confucians, and Mohists, then one does not succeed in getting away from the way*. Laozi said:"The way* is the sanctuary of the myriad things. It is what the good cherish, what ~~the~~ is cherished by the bad". Those who govern by means of the way* are

meant by "the good"; those who rely on Debaters, Legalists, Confucians, and Mohists are meant by "the bad". A close scrutiny is not necessary to show that, day by day, the good and the bad draw apart from each other in name* and in lot.

If the way* is not sufficient to govern by, then use norms*; if norms* are not sufficient to govern by, then use craft*; if craft* is not sufficient to govern by, then use authority*; if authority* is not sufficient to govern by, then use power*. Having used power* revert to authority*; having used authority*, revert to craft*; having used craft*, revert to the norms*; having used norms*, revert to the way*. Having used the way*, good government is automatically achieved, without action. Therefore, by following it through one comes back to the end; coming back to the end, one reverts to the beginning. There is no limit to the mutual replication of beginning and end.

That which has a shape* necessarily has a name*, but that which has a name* need not necessarily have a shape*. If it is shaped*, yet not named*, does not thereby lose the actuality* of its squareness or roundness, whiteness or blackness; but if it is named*, yet not shaped*, then the name* must

be examined in order to sort-out the discrepancy. Therefore, these are names* to sort-out shapes* and also shapes* to pin-down names*; names* to pin-down events*, and also events* to sort-out names*. If you look closely into what makes them so, then shapes* and names* in relation to events* and things, will have nowhere to hide their pattern*. 2a

There are three sorts of names* and four kinds of norms*: The first are names* that name* things e.g. "square" and "round", "white" and "black". The second are names* that blame or praise e.g. "good" and "bad", "noble" and "base". The third are names* that call allusively e.g. "worthy" and "foolish", "love" and "hate". |

The first are immutable norms* e.g. "ruler and minister", "above and below". The second are norms* that are equalising conventions e.g. "competent and incompetent", "similar and different". The third are norms* for governing the masses e.g. "commendations and rewards", "punishments and penalties". The fourth are norms* providing for the uniformity of standards e.g. the pitch-pipe and the foot-rule, the balance and the measuring-cup.

Craft* is what is used by the ruler in secrecy; all below may not presume

to pry into it. Power* is the sharp tool of the norms* of government; all below may not presume to wield it. If the ruler, having craft*, allowed all below to pry into it, then it would not be that which is subtle in craft*. If the ruler, having power*, allowed all below to wield it, then it would not be that which is weight in power*. The essential thing is first to proscribe lots correctly, and ensure that there is no encroachment or confusion; only then can craft* remain secret and power* unshared.

2b

A name* is "that which names* a shape*"; a shape* is "that which responds to a name*". But shapes* are not rectified names*; names* are not rectified shapes*. Shapes* and names* are, then, completely separated; they cannot be confused with, nor exclude, one another.

"It has no name*", therefore, "the great way* is not referred to by name"

"It has names*", therefore, "names* serve to rectify shapes*".²

Now, the myriad things are all in existence; not to rectify them by names* will bring about confusion. The myriad names* are all arrayed; not to respond to them with shapes* will bring about perversity. Therefore, names* and shapes* must be rectified.

Good names* name* the good; bad names* name* the bad. Therefore, the good

have good names,* and the bad have bad names. "A sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise" are those which name* the good; "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish", are those which name* the bad. Now, if you go no further than the names* "A sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise" in looking for the actualities* of "a sage", "worthy", "benevolent", and "wise", then they do not ever exhaust them; and if you go no further than the names* "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish", in looking for the actualities* of "obtuse", "feckless", "malevolent", and "foolish", then they too do not ever exhaust them. If, however, the good are thereby ^{3a} completely separated from the bad, then, although they cannot exhaust the actualities* of things, one nevertheless is not worried about the discrepancy. Hence the saying: "Names* must be distinguished". Names* and referers* separate¹ 'this' from 'that' and the empty (unreal) from the full (real). From antiquity to the present, no one succeeded failing to use this, nor failed using it. Failure is the outcome of names* and lots* being blurred; success is the outcome of names* and lots* being kept distinct.

Now, in "keep close to the worthy" and "stay away from the unworthy", in "reward the good" and "punish the bad", the names* "worthy" and "unworthy"

"good" and "bad" ought to lie in 'that'; the referers* "keep close to" and "stay away from", "reward" and "punish", ought to belong in 'me'. When 'me' and 'that' get a name* each, then naming* is distinct; but when we name* the worthy "keep close to" and the unworthy "stay away from"; when we name* the good "reward" and the bad "punish"; thereby combining the 'me' and 'that' in one referer* instead of separating them, then naming* is blurred. Hence the saying: "Names* and referers* must be distinct".

3b In the phrase "to like oxen", "to like" is a general referer* to things, and "oxen" is a definite shape* of a thing. There is no limit to the possibility of following a definite shape* with a general referer*. Suppose we say repeat (the referring*) saying "to like horses", then the repeated referer* is connected to "horse". The generality of "to like" is, then, unbounded (by the particular object it happens to be attached to). Suppose we repeat it saying "to like men", then the repeated referer*² belongs to "men". Thus, "to like" is not "men" and "men" is not "to like"³, and the names* "to like oxen", "to like horses", and "to like men" are thereby separated. Hence the saying: "Names* and lots* must not be mutually confused".

The five colours, the five notes, the five smells, and the five tastes — all four kinds exist of themselves in¹ between heaven and earth, and were not timed to coincide with the use of man. Men, however, have to use them. Throughout life, each having their likes and dislikes, they are unable to distinguish between names* and lots*. Names* ought to belong in 'that', lots*² ought to belong in 'me'. (In the phrases) "love white" and "hate black", "find the Shang note agreeable"³ and "reject the Zhi note", "like the smell of goats" and "dislike the smell of burnt food", "have a yen for sweets" and "avoid bitter taste", — "white" and "black", "shang" and "zhi", "goaty smell" and "smell of burnt food", "sweet" and bitter, are names* of 'that'; "love" and "hate", "find agreeable" and reject", "like" and "dislike", "have a yen for" and "avoid" are 'my' lots*. If these names* and lots* are pinned-down, then the myriad events* will not be confused.

4a

⁴ People use the foot-rule to judge the long or short; use the measuring-cup to receive a little or a lot; use the balance to weigh the light or heavy; use the pitch-pipe to tune the clear or dull; use names* to distinguish the empty (unreal) from the full (real); use norms* to

determine good-government and misrule; use simplicity* to regulate doubts and anxieties; use ease* to lead them through straits and hard times. The myriad ~~things~~ events* , all return to the one; the hundred rules are all evened-up in the norm*. What returns to the one is the acme of simplicity*; what is evened-up in the norm* is the acme of ease*. Because of this, the obtuse, slow, deaf, and blind can ^{share good government with} govern ~~as~~ well as the discerning, nimble, keen-eared, and sharp-eyed.

No one is capable of anticipating the myriad affairs of the empire. If the capacity for anticipating them were made the responsibility of one man, would not even a sage fail?! Suppose one man was capable of anticipating the affairs of the empire, then ² on his left or his right, in front or behind, among the close or remote, slow or fast, there are bound to be matters he fails to attend to. But if there are , then this is a flaw in his governing. When everything is well-governed, without flaws, then the big and the small, the many and the few, are all adequately allotted. The farmer and the tradesman, the artisan and the official do not change ~~their~~ ^{4b} ~~respective~~ places. When veteran farmers, senior tradesmen, expert artisans, and experienced officials are all established in their positions, then what trouble need the man at the top take?

The gentleman does not speak that which, however reasonable, is of no value to government; the gentleman does not do that which, however skillful, is of no value to service. It is not for pleasure that the gentleman speaks; he cannot but say that which is of value to good-government. It is not for pleasure that the gentleman acts; he cannot but do that which is of value to service. Therefore, what he says does not go beyond names*, norms*, authority* and craft*; what he does does not go beyond farming and soldiering, never straying outside the scope of his duties. Therefore, the clear-sighted ruler employs him. ¹

The petty man is sure to speak that which sounds reasonable but has nothing to do with good government; the petty man is sure to do that which is skillful but has nothing to do with service. Even when he knows that his words are harmful to good government, the petty man cannot help speaking; even when he knows that his skill is harmful to service, the petty man cannot help acting. Therefore, what he says reaches the extremes of debating the ayes and nays of Confucians and Mohists; what he does reaches the extremes of obstinacy, artifice, bias, and rebelliousness. All he is ^{5a} after is a name for himself. Therefore, the clear-sighted ruler puts him

to death. An old saying has it: "Not knowing is not inconsistent with being a gentleman; knowing does not make a petty man any less so; that the artisan is incapable of it does not detract from his skill; that the gentleman does not know it does not detract from his good governing."¹

These are true words.

When one is good, if others cannot succeed in following, then one is alone in being good; when one is skillful, if others cannot succeed in following, then one is alone in being skillful. If, however, in being good, one also makes the ~~other~~ many good; if, in being skillful, one shares one's skill with the many, then this is the best of the good, this is the most skillful of skills. What is esteemed in the governing of the sages is not their being alone in governing, but their ability to share their good government with the many; what is esteemed in the skill of master craftsman Chui is not his being alone in skill, but his ability to share it with the many.

People nowadays, in their conduct they want to be alone in virtue; in service they want to be alone in ability; in debate they want to stick out above the herd; and in bravery to stand out apart from the many. (But)

worthy men who are alone in their conduct are not enough to achieve transformation; people in service who are alone in their ability are not enough to take care of all duties; debaters who stick out above the herd are useless in popular exposition; and brave men who stand out apart from the many cannot be ^{comrades} comrades in battle. These four are the root of misrule. Therefore, the sages employ the way* to smooth down irregularities; establish norms* to even-up discrepancies, and see to it that the worthy and the foolish do not discard each other, and the competent and the incompetent do not desert each other. If the competent and incompetent do not desert each other then they are equal in achievement; if the worthy and the foolish do not discard each other then their foresight will be the same. This is the art of supreme government.

If names* are determined then there is no wrangling over things; if lots are clear then self-seeking does not prevail. That there is no wrangling ~~is not because there is no will, but because there is nothing towards~~ is not because there is no will, but because there is nothing towards which to direct it, as names* have been determined; that there is no self-seeking is not because there is no desire, but because there is nothing

towards which to direct it, as lots have been made clear. Therefore, if despite the fact that all men have will and desires, what they get is equal to what they would have received had they none, it is because there is a way of regulating them. Tien Pien said: "None of the scholars in the empire wishes to run his household and have his wife and kids serve him. That they inevitably travel around seeking office with the feudal princes is because profit attracts them. Once settled in a prince's court they 6a all set their hearts on becoming nobles and high officials, yet do not presume to become princes: it is the name that curbs their ambition".

Peng Meng said: "Pheasants and rabbits live out in the wild and everybody is after them; it is because lots have not been determined yet. Chickens and pigs fill the market, yet nobody is after them; it is because lots have already been determined". When things exceed their bounds then even the kind and wise wrong each other; when lots are determined even the greedy and boorish do not fight.

The rolling of "the round" is not a case of ~~rolling-because-one-is-capable-of-rolling~~, but of ~~having-no-choice-but-to-roll~~. The stopping of "the square" is not a case of ~~stopping-because-one-is-capable-of-~~

stopping, but of having-no-choice-but-to-stop. If you adapt to the round" rolling of itself and allow it no opportunity to stop; if you adapt to the square" stopping of itself and allow it no opportunity to roll, then what need is there to worry about things losing their lots?! Therefore, adapt to the worthy having their use, and allow them no opportunity to be useless; adapt to the foolish having no use, and allow them no opportunity to be of use. Using or not using them is not a matter of my using; adapting to their usability or unusability, they get their use of themselves. What need is there to worry about things getting confused?!

6 b One is not capable of making oneself capable, nor does one know how to make oneself know. The wise are wise not because they are capable of being wise; the foolish are foolish not because they are capable of being foolish; the beautiful are beautiful not because they are capable of being beautiful; and the ugly are ugly not because they are capable of being ugly. (But) if one is not capable of making oneself capable, and if one does not know how to make oneself know, then what is there to esteem in the wise and the beautiful? What is there to despise in the foolish and the ugly? The wise, then, cannot get to brag over the foolish, and the

beautiful cannot get to mock the ugly. This is the way to achieve it.

When the way* prevails in the world, the poor and the lowly do not grumble, the rich and the noble are not arrogant; the foolish and the weak are not timid, and the wise and the brave are not overbearing. They are all fixed in their lots. When ~~abuses~~ prevail in the world, the poor and the lowly dare not grumble at the rich and the noble, and the rich and the noble dare not oppress the poor and the lowly; the foolish and the weak dare not aspire to be wise and brave, and the wise and the brave dare not scorn the foolish and the weak. This is norms* being inferior to the way*.

7 a That which is honoured in the world, and which all are equal in honouring, is called "convention"; that which is used in the world, and which all are equal in using, is called "commodity". If they go against the people ^{7 a} conventions are (should be) disallowed; if they harm the many, commodities ² are commonly rejected. Therefore, whereas men's hearts are all different, in conduct they are all alike; whereas what they like is different for each, the goods they use are necessarily the same. These are what conventions

what conventions equalise, and commodities set off. Therefore, what they are equalised by cannot be treated lightly; what they are set off by cannot be left to chance.

In the past, Huan of Qi liked to wear purple; in the whole country no other colour was sold. Zhuang of Chu loved slender waists; in the whole country the women had a famished look. What the superior leads his inferiors by, is, then, the cause of good government and misrule.

Therefore, if conventions are disruptive, norms* must be made to curb them; if commodities are excessive, regulations must be established to curb them. Those that are bogged down by conventions, and those that set too much store by commodities are not fit to be partners in governing.

In the past, the state of Jin was plagued by luxury and duke Wen reformed it by frugality. He wore clothes with no silk lining and had no meat in his meals. Soon after everybody was wearing plain clothes and eating coarse food.

7b Gou Jien, the king of Yue, was planning to avenge himself upon Wu and wanted his men to be brave. He met an angry frog on his way; getting off his carriage he bowed to it.² In a few years all his people, young and old,

on coming near the enemy did not flinch from hot water or fire. This demonstrates the difficulties of the man at the top.

The sage-kings knew that the passions of the people are easy to sway; they therefore, made music to harmonise them, and regulated the rites to restrain them. Those below did not get to exercise their self-seeking so **that** the rites and music prevailed alone. When the rites and music prevail alone, self-seeking and desires disappear; and when self-seeking and desires disappear, having worthy people (in office) is the same as having fools. For, assuming that having worthy people leads to good government, and that having fools leads to misrule, implies that good government and misrule depend on worthiness and foolishness, not on the rites and music. This means that the craft of the sage will flourish and perish with him, and by the time a new generation takes over, there will be no one left to use the norms* for governing the world. Misrule, then, will be the rule and good government the exception. But if misrule is the rule and good government the exception, then there is nothing to esteem in the worthy and nothing to despise in fools.

Secure in name and position, although one is unworthy, ((one is not worried

by others not keeping close to one; residing in poverty and lowliness although one is kind and worthy))¹ one is not worried by others not staying away from one. Keeping close and staying away depend on power* and profit, 8a not on being worthy and kind or not. All the same I dare not suggest this as what is naturally so in the pattern* of heaven and the power* of earth. Now, in between heaven and earth the unworthy are indeed many and the kind and worthy are few. The passion for profit is especially strong in the unworthy, and the passion for integrity is particularly abundant in the kind and worthy. Now, if you summon the kind and worthy by means of the rites and rightness, not one in a myriad will turn up; if you summon the unworthy by means of fame and profit, those that will turn up could shake earth. Hence the saying: "The rites and rightness form the gentleman, yet the gentleman is not necessarily in need of them; fame and profit govern the petty man, the petty man cannot do without them".

Commendations and rewards, punishments and penalties, are the affairs of the ruler; keeping to their posts and exercising their capacities are the business of the ministers. The ruler evaluates achievements, degrades and promotes, and so is concerned with commendations and rewards, punishments

and penalties. The ministers are all anxious about their ~~posts~~ jobs and so keep to their posts and exercise their capacities. The ruler should not interfere with his ministers' ¹ business, and the ministers should not encroach upon the affairs of the ruler. When above and below do not interfere with or encroach upon one another, then names* are said to be correctly used; and when names* are used correctly, then 8b the norms* are followed.

Dealing with the myriad things he allows no (subjective) allotments; separating the four seas he allows no girups. When insulted he feels no disgrace, when praised he does not boast. Outlawing aggression and abolishing the use of arms, he saves the world from fighting. If this be the virtue of of a prince, ² then he is fit to become the ruler. Keeping to his post and his allotted role, he ensures that there is no disorder; anxious about his job, he avoids self-seeking. His heart is one whether hungry or full; his thoughts are the same whether praised or blamed. He does not get reckless when rewarded, nor does he grumble when punished. If these be the qualities of a subject, then he is fit to become a minister. ³

Sometimes by sticking to names* one gains ^{the} actuality*, and sometimes by sticking to names* one loses the actuality*. King Xuan was fond of archery and was pleased when others said that he could use a tough bow. In fact, the force needed to draw his bow was not greater than three ^{dan} shi, but when he showed it to his attendants, left and right, they all tried to draw it and gave up half way through. They all said: "This must be a niner at least; who but the great king could use it?!" At that king Xuan was pleased with them. Thus, the bow king Xuan used was a three ^{dan} shi one but all his life he thought of himself as having used a niner. Three shi was the actuality*; nine ^{dan} shi was the name*. King Xuan was pleased with the name* but mourned the actuality*.

In Qi there lived a certain Huang Gong who liked modesty and humility. He had two daughters, both great beauties. Out of modesty he was always disparaging of their beauty, making them out to be ugly and wicked. The name of their ugliness and wickedness reached far, so that for years nobody in the country proposed to them. There was a widower in Wei who, taking a blind chance, married one to find her a great beauty. Only then did he say: "Huang Gong likes modesty and is therefore disparaging of his daughters; the younger sister must be pretty too." At that suitors began fighting to

propose to her , and she too turned out to be a great beauty. Great beauty was the actuality*, ugly and wicked was the name; this is ignoring the name* to gain the actuality*.

A man of Chu was carrying a pheasant on his shoulder. A passer -by asked him what bird it was. Lying the man said:" This is a phoenix". The passer-by said:"I have heard of the phoenix; now I see one for the first time.Are you selling it?". He said that he was but refused to sell it for ten Jin, asking for twice the money; only then did he agree to sell it. The buyer intended to give it as a present to the king of Chu, but during the night the bird died. The man was not sorry for his money; his only regret was that he could not give it to the king. People in the country spread the s^{9b} story, all taking the bird to have been a real phoenix. A nobleman, eager to please the king, told him about it, and the king, moved by the man's desire to offer him the phoenix, summoned the man to his court and rewarded him handsomely, giving him more than ten times the amount he paid for the bird.

An old peasant in Wei, ploughing an uncultivated field, found a precious jade, one foot in diameter. Not knowing it was jade he told his neighbour.

His neighbour, who coveted it, said to him: "This is an uncanny stone; keeping it will not benefit your family; it is best to return it." The peasant, despite his suspicions, decided to do so and put it below the porch. That night the brilliance of the jade lit up the whole house. The peasant, whose family was greatly frightened, went back to his neighbour to tell him. His neighbour said: "This shows how uncanny this stone is; if you get rid of it quickly the calamity may yet be averted". At that he hurried away and discarded the jade in a remote field. Soon after, his neighbour stole it and presented the jade to the king of Wei. The king called in an expert to inspect it. The expert looked at it, prostrated himself a couple of times, then stood up and said: "I dare congratulate your majesty on having acquired this unique gem; I have never seen its like." ^{10a}

^{10 a}
^{10 b} The king asked him about its value and the expert said: "There is no price to do it justice; a district of five towns is barely worth one glance at it. The king then rewarded the man who presented it to him, giving him a thousand Jin and the livelihood of a Daifu.

In general, the myriad things ² under heaven have each their rights and wrongs; this I dare not think false. What is right is always right and what is

wrong is always wrong; this, too, I believe. Nevertheless, although right is always right, there are times when it is of no use; and although wrong is always wrong, there are times when it has to be done. It happens, therefore, that using the right brings failure, and doing what is wrong brings success. The pattern* of right and wrong is not constant, but alternates between rise and fall, turning according to our use. On what, then, do right and wrong depend?

Let us look at the achievements of Yao and Shun, Tang and Wu. At times they used ~~the~~ proper means, and at times improper ones; they seized the moment and therefore prospered. (The same is true for) the fall of Jie and Zhou, Yu and Li: at times they ^{were right} ~~did the right~~ and at times wrong; they missed the moment and therefore perished. This is also the case with the five Ba.¹ The duke of Song was fighting on the banks of the Hong against the men of Chu. His son, Mu Yi, said to him: "The men of Chu are many and we are few; let us attack before they have all crossed the river". The duke of Song answered: "We may not; I have heard that one is not ready for attack until the drums are beat. Although I am a survivor of an extinct state, I dare not act like this". The battle was lost and the duke of

Song was captured by the men of Chu.

The men of Qi killed duke Xiang and put Gongsun Wuzhi on the throne. Zhao Hu and Yi Wu fled with Jiu, one of the duke's sons, to Lu; Bao Shuya fled with another son, Xiao Bo, to Ju. When Wuzhi was killed the two sons fought over the state. By right it should have gone to Jiu, but Xiao Bo was first to return to Qi and so the people gave him the throne. Soon after he made the people of Lu kill Jiu. Zhao Hu committed suicide and Yi Wu was made prime minister.

Duke Wen of Jin was slandered by Li Ji and had to live in exile for nineteen years. When duke Hui died he bribed the king of Qin to help him return to his country. He killed Huai, the old duke's son, and acceded to the throne.

That one prince behaved correctly, yet did not escape being captured; these two behaved improperly, yet succeeded in their usurpation because of it.

If the world thinks wrong what you think right, then ignore the fact that you think it right; if the whole world thinks right what you think wrong, then also ignore the fact that you think it wrong. Thus, right and wrong are rectified by following the many, not established by oneself. Thus,

11a

11a

what goes against the many is wrong, and what goes along with the many is right. Therefore, if the ruler, in exercising his authority* and wielding his power*, acts according to what is considered right, then others cannot succeed in opposing him. When he rests he is venerated; when he moves he is followed; when he speaks he is believed; and when he acts he is taken as law. It is the principle by which he rests above things and leads all below.

In the misrule of a state three things happen. In years of famine the population is dispersed, as there are not enough food to hold them together, which leads to misrule. There are no norms* for governing the state, which leads to misrule. There are norms* but they are not enforceable, which leads to misrule. It has not yet happened that with food to hold the population together, and with enforceable norms*, a state was not well governed.

II

Benevolence, rightness, the rites, music, names*, norms*, punishments, and rewards: These eight were the methods used by the five ~~emperors~~ and the three kings for governing the world. Thus, benevolence serves to guide the people; rightness to make them just; music to harmonise them; names* to rectify them; norms* to equalise them; punishments to awe them; and rewards to exhort them. Thus, benevolence is that by which attitudes are liberalised, but also that by which partiality is born; rightness is that by which restrained conduct is established, but also that by which artifice is achieved; the rites are that by which reverence is made to prevail, but also that by which sloth is born; music is that by which the passions are harmonised, but also that by which licence is born; names* are that by which high and low are rectified, but also that by which usurpation is born; norms* are that by which the many differences are equalised, but also that by which perverse allotments are born; punishments are that by which the rebellions are awed, but also that by which oppression is born; and rewards are that by which loyalty and ability are encouraged, but also that by which plotting and rivalry are born.

These eight methods are not esoteric and have always existed in the world

they did not appear spontaneously in the times of Yao and Tang, and did not disappear spontaneously in the reigns of Jie and Zhou. If they are successfully applied, the the empire is well governed, if they are not, then it is not. To go beyond this, even if it fills heaven and earth, entrapping the myriad species, is outside the way of government; it is not ~~something~~ ~~that can be~~ fare for mere mortals; it is what the sages deal in, without speaking.

In the survival or extinction of states there are six manifestations: There are declining states, misruled states,¹ and extinct states; there are flourishing states, powerful states, and well-governed states. That a state is called misruled or extinct has nothing to do with tyranny or oppression; that a state is called powerful or well governed has nothing to do with strength or morality. If the ruler is old, has many wives and concubines, few sons and grandsons, and only distant kinsmen, then the state is declining; if the ruler has favourites among his ministers, ^{2a} and the ministers love the ruler, if public norms* lapse and self-seeking prevails, then the state is misruled; if the state is poor and ~~small~~ and the families ^{large} rich and ~~strong~~, if the authority* of the ruler is slight

and the power* of the ministers is great, then the state is extinct. If a state shows one of these three marks, then it is weak even without tyranny or oppression. Although it appears to be surviving it is what I must call extinct.

If there are no favourites inside the court and no intimate friends outside, if the brothers of the heir to the throne have large families and yet there is no confusion between young and old, then the state is flourishing. If the fields and the mulberry trees are tended at the proper seasons and the granaries are full, if the state is well armed and the borders are fortified, then the state is powerful; if those above do not oppress those below and those below cannot rebel against those above, if the relation of above and below is neither rebellious nor oppressive and, therefore, prohibitions and statutes are effective, if the people are not self-seeking, and if, despite the ease with which the state can be reached, it cannot be invaded, then it is a well-governed state. If a state shows these three marks, then it is ^{powerful} ~~strong~~ even without military strength or morality. Although it appears weak it is what I must call extant.

When a good ruler comes into power, there must be a man who is the first

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 to be executed. The first to be executed is not a thief or an adulterer; these two malefactors are greatly harmful for a while but are not the root of misrule. The root of misrule are inferiors transgressing on the authority* of their superiors, ministers employing the craft* of the ruler, hearts that do not heed the prohibitions of the time, and conduct that does not conform to the norms* of the time. This is the way of great misrule.

When Kong Qiu became deputy prime-minister in LU, he had the shaojeng Mao executed before seven days were out. His disciples came to him and asked: "The shaozheng Mao is the most famous man in LU, yet you made him the first man to be executed when you attained office. Was it not a mistake?" Kongzi said: "Relax, I shall tell you the reason for it. There are five evils in man, and theft, robbery, adultery and self-seeking are not among them. The first is to follow a treacherous route in full awareness; the second is to persist in perverse conduct; the third is to be clever with false words; the fourth is to further amplify a strong memory; and the fifth is to get rich by following the wrong. If a man has one of these five he does not escape execution, and the shaozheng Mao had them all. Thus, by merely living in a place he could gather followers and form cliques; his

3a talk was enough to embellish heresies and ^{dazzle} ~~infect~~ the masses; his strong ^{3a} memory was enough to enable him to be alone in his views, inverting ^{what is} the right. A hero to to the petty man, he had to be executed. This is why Tang executed Yi Jie, king Wen executed Pan Zheng, duke Tai executed Hua Shi, Guan Zhong executed Fu Liyi, Zi Chan executed Deng Xi and Shi Fu. These six belonged to different ages but were of one mind; they had to be executed. The "Book of Odes" says: "My anxious heart is full of trouble/ I am hated by the herd of mean creatures" . "mean creatures" forming a clique is enough to make one afraid.

The saying has it: "Artful debate can dazzle and mislead demons and spirits". Someone said: "Demons and spirits are keen-eared and sharp-eyed, correct and upright, who can mislead them?". (Someone else) said: "Demons and spirits cannot, indeed, be dazzled and misled; this only goes to show that the cunning of the artful debater will not stop atv anything. " It is clear that , although he cannot dazzle and mislead demons and spirits, he will dazzle and mislead men. Fathomingg men's hearts, gauging their desires, he goes along wit h what they like and does not dare stand in their way; ensnaring them with heresies and evil, he is looking for profit. Men are

3b pleased to hear of their good points, so he is good at praising these; men hate to hear of their faults, so he is good at glossing over them. Guided by the expression on their faces he guesses it before they speak or move. 3b

The saying has it: "I hate purple's encroaching upon vermilion; I hate sharp tongues overthrowing kingdoms and families". These words are awe inspiring, yet throughout life nobody awakens to them; danger and extinction are close behind.

Laozi said: "By policy one governs a state; by cunning one wages war; by non-interference one gains the empire". "Policy" means names* and norms*; if one governs the state by names* and norms*, then the myriad things cannot get confused. "Cunning" means "authority*" and "craft*"; if one wages war by authority* and craft*, then among the myriad things none could be one's match. If one is able to use names* and norms*, authority* and craft*, thereby reforming the passions of cruelty and aggression, then one need not interfere personally; ~~one need not interfere personally~~ and if one need not interfere personally, then "one gains the empire". Thus, failing to govern, one resorts to employing norms*; failing to use norms*, one

resorts to the use of arms; it is in order to achieve non-interference, not because strength is the aim. If one aims at strength, then the weak will, on the contrary, triumph.

4a Laozi said: "When the people are not afraid of death, how can one scare them with death?". That the people are not afraid of death is due to punishments and penalties being excessive; when punishments and penalties are excessive, then people have nothing they can trust to in their lives; and if life has got nothing which can be trusted to, then the awe-inspiring majesty of the ruler will be negligible. When punishments are just, then the people are afraid of death; they are afraid of death because they can enjoy life; they know that life can be enjoyed, and therefore one can scare them with death. This is what the ruler has to keep hold of; what the ministers have to be careful about.

Tienzi, reading the "Book of History", said: "The reign of Yao was a time of supreme peace". Songzi said: "Was it due to the governing of the sage?". Peng Meng, who was standing nearby, answered out of turn: "It was ~~the~~ the governing of the sagely norm* that resulted in this, not the governing of the sage". Songzi said: "The sage, or the sagely norm*, what is the

difference?!" Peng Meng said: "Your confusing of names* is extreme. "The sage" implies that (good government) is due to the person of the sage; "Sagely norm*" implies that it is due to the pattern*; the pattern* is due to his person, but ^{his person} ~~is~~ is not ^{the} ~~his~~ ^{PATTERN*} person; his person is capable of forming the pattern*, but the pattern* is not his person. Therefore, "the governing of the sage" implies that he is alone in governing well; "the governing of the sagely norm*" implies that there is nothing that is not well-governed. This benefit for a myriad generations can only be achieved by a sage". Songzi who was still in doubt turned to Tienzi. Tienzi said: "Meng is right".

4b

An old man in Zhuang "styled" his elder son "thief" and his younger "Beatim". As Thief went out for a walk, his father ran after him shouting "Thief!, Thief!". On hearing that, the magistrate had the boy put in chains. The father called Beatim to explain the matter to the magistrate, but because he was agitated his voice was not heard, just the words "Beatim! Beatim!". The magistrate then beat the boy to within an inch of his life.

An old man in Kang Qu "styled" his valet "Srikard" and his dog "Bitard". For three years no visitors have crossed his gate. Astonished, the man asked

about it, and received a true answer. At that he changed their names and visitors called on him again.

In Zhong an uncut jade is called "Pu"; and in Zhou a rat which hasn't been cured is called "Pu" (same character). A man of Zhou carrying Pus asked a merchant from Zhong if he wanted to buy one. The merchant said that he did, but when the man produced his Pu he saw that it was a rat; he then declined to take it,

In the relation of father and son there are commands that must be followed and commands that must not be followed. "Get rid of your wife!" or "sell your concubine" are commands that must be followed; but "dare not resent!" or "dare not think!" are commands that must not. Therefore, being a superior one ought to be careful about one's commands.

When rich, people do not care for rank and salary; when poor, they do not fear punishments and penalties. That they do not care for rank and salary is because what they already have is enough for them; that they are not afraid of punishments and penalties is because they are not even sure of having enough to survive. When these two plague a state, and no remedy is known, then commands are not followed and prohibitions are not heeded.

knowledge, another man is honoured while I am despised, then being able not to resent it is a virtue, but resentment is not to be condemned. One is blinkered by ignoring the differences in circumstances and power*, seeing merely the sameness of ability and knowledge. This is ~~an error~~ a fault in one's understanding, but it is an error a gentleman can make and ought to be forgiven. ²

6a

When people are poor they resent others; when they are rich they are arrogant. Resentment is caused by the bitterness they feel at not receiving their due; it arises that part of the passions which is hard to keep calm, so that their inability to do so is forgivable. Arrogance does not come out of bitterness, and so has no excuse; it is a part of the passions which is easy to control, ² so that their inability to do so is not forgivable. Most people, on seeing the poor and the lowly, rudely keep them away, and on seeing the rich and the noble, respectfully get close to them. When the poor and the humble come begging, one may keep them away; that one is sure to keep them away, although they have not necessarily caused one any loss, is because they can be of no possible value. When the rich and the noble come giving, one may stay close to them; that one is sure to stay

close to them, although they have not necessarily benefitted one, is because they will not dare to stay close to one. The three (the rich, the poor, and oneself?) are independent, and there is no cause for arriving at staying close or keeping away; but people are incapable of not changing their attitude with (the object) being poor and lowly or rich and noble. I therefore call it "the great delusion".

6 b The destitute and the lonely, the poor and the lowly, are universally pitied in well-governed ages, and universally abused in misruled ones. It is not because the destitute, the lonely, the poor, and the lowly are pitied that well-governed ages are well-governed; this is one facet of good government. It is not because the destitute, the lonely, the poor, and the lowly are abused that misruled ages are misruled; this is one facet of misrule. When everything is well-governed then there is no misrule; when (one thing) is misruled then there is no good government. Observing the Xia and Shang dynasties, in flourish and in decline, we may find our evidence.

The poor and lowly expect little from the rich and the noble, and the rich and the noble are incapable of fulfilling these modest expectations.

Now, what seems ugly to the rich seems beautiful to the poor; what seems trivial to the noble seems magnificent to the lowly; if nevertheless they are incapable of fulfilling their expectations it is because they do not share their troubles and pleasures. Although they do not fulfill them, it does me no harm.

Now, what the people expect from their ruler is similar to what the poor and the lowly expect from the rich and the noble. They expect him to enable them to provide for old and young, regulate taxation, take timely measures in famine or cold, alleviate suffering and distress, prevent abuse of punishments and rewards, and call-up for service only at the proper seasons. If this is all they want then it causes the ruler no loss; if, nevertheless, he does not fulfill their expectations it is because he does not share their work and leisure. ^{Therefore} ~~thus~~, to be a ruler one must share work and leisure with the people. Thus, the rich and the noble do not have to satisfy the poor and the lowly, but a ~~wise~~ ruler must satisfy the people. If he does not satisfy the people, they will not be willing to stand it; and if they will not be willing to stand it, the position of the ruler will decline. There is no greater danger, no greater calamity.

IV. A translation of the LWL

The translation is of the DZ text , but all variants noted. "Yen" refers to Yen Lingfeng; "Wang" to Wang weicheng. (See bibliography, and above p. 93).

16

The principle by which things are born and achievements accomplished must be that they are born from the shapeless², follow the nameless*. The shapeless* and nameless* is the ancestor of the myriad things. It is neither warm nor cool, neither Gong nor Shang. Listening you cannot get to hear it; looking, you cannot make it visible; conceiving of it as a body, you cannot get to know it; tasting, you cannot get to savour it. Therefore, as a thing it is "confusedly formed"³; as an image it has no shape*; as a note it is a faint sound⁴; as a taste it has no flavour. Therefore it is capable of being the ancestor and lord of all things; enveloping and pervading heaven and earth⁵, there is nothing it does not run through. If it were warm it would not have been capable of cooling, if it were Gong it would not have been capable of Shanging.

"Being shaped*" necessarily implies differentiation; "sounding" necessarily implies belonging. Therefore, an image which is shaped is not the Great Image; a note which sounds is not the Great Note. If, however, the four images⁶ were not shaped* then the Great Image would not have whereby to make itself accessible; if the five notes⁷ did not sound then the Great note would not have whereby to reach. The four images are shaped*, and among these things have no one which they can regard as lord, then the Great

Image is made accessible; when the notes sound, and among them the mind has no one which it can regard as sole ruler, then the Great Note reaches. Therefore, "if you hold on to the Great Image, then the empire will go (your way)"¹, if you make use of the Great Note, then people will change their ways. When the shapeless* becomes accessible, the empire goes (your way), yet you cannot explain its going; when the faint note reaches, the people change their ways, yet you cannot account for the change.

Therefore, heaven gave birth to the five things,² but it is "thinglessness" which makes them useful; the sages propagated the five teachings,³ but it is the unspoken which gives them the power to transform. This is why "the way that can be spoken of is not the constant way"; the name that can be named is not the constant name"⁴. The mother of the five things is neither hot nor cold, neither soft nor hard; the mother of the five teachings is neither bright nor dark, neither kind nor harsh. Although past and present are not the same, times change and customs replaced, this is immutable. This is what is meant by "from antiquity to the present its name has not departed."⁵ If heaven did not go by this then things would not have been born; if government does not go by this then achievements will not be accomplished. Therefore, past and present interconnect, end and beginning are the same.

Holding on to antiquity one can have control over the present; evidencing the present one can know the beginning of antiquity. This is what is meant by "constant". It has neither the shape of ~~constant~~ brightness or darkness, nor the image of warmth or chill; therefore, "knowing the constant is called "clear-sight"²". The birth of things and the accomplishing of achievements, all derive from this; therefore, "it serves to inspect the beginning of things".³

Hurrying as if fleeing the wind, one still could not cover the whole course at once; travelling as if riding the wind, one still could not ~~arrive~~^{arrive} everywhere on the strength of one breath. To be good at moving quickly lies in not hurrying; to be good at arriving lies in not travelling. Therefore, an abundance of what can be spoken of is not yet enough to administer heaven and earth; the uttermost of the shaped* is not yet enough to be the storehouse of the myriad things. Therefore, those who sigh over it cannot exhaust it in their admiration;⁴ those who sing its praise cannot extend to it in their expansiveness. Naming* it cannot be adequate; referring* to it cannot be final. Naming* necessarily implies that there is something from which it (the thing named*) is differentiated; referring* necessarily implies that there is something (an aspect of the thing etc.) from which

it derives. Differentiation implies that something is not included; derivation implies that something is not exhausted. (But) if it does not include everything then it differs greatly from its (the way*) true nature; if it does not exhaust then it cannot serve for naming*. This can be further clarified. (The word) "way*" is taken from its being "that which the myriad things follow"; "mysterious" is taken from its being "that which the dark and obscure come out from"; "deep" is taken from its being "what cannot be fathomed when probing its profundities"; "great" is taken from its being "a fullness³ that has no limit"; "remote" is taken from its being an "everlasting abstruseness that cannot be reached"; and "subtle" is taken from its being an "obscure subtleness which cannot be perceived". Thus, although the words "way", "mysterious", "deep", "great", "subtle", and "remote" is justified, they do not yet exhaust its uttermost. But "fullness which has no limit" cannot be named* "minute", and "subtle and secret shapelessness cannot be named* "great". This is why the chapter says: " 'styling' it we say "the way*" "; calling it we say "mysterious", but we do not thereby name* it. Therefore, those who speak about it miss its constancy; those who name* it depart from its true nature; those who act it ^{thwart} spoil its nature; and those who hold on to it miss its source. This is why the sages

did not make words their master, and so did not go against its constancy; did not make names^{*} their constant, and so did not depart from its true nature; did not make doing their thing, and so did not thwart its nature; did not make holdin onto their guiding rule, and so did not miss its source. It follows that in the writings of Laozi,¹ if you wish to puzzle them out by making fine distinctions,² then you miss their purport; if you wish to give every word the full weight of a name^{*}, then you go against their true meaning. The central point, to which everything he says comes back,³ is discussing the source of the great beginning in order to make clear the nature of the spontaneous; expounding on the uttermost of dark obscurity in order to pin down the errors of delusion. "Adapt and do not act", "reduce and do not bestow", "honour the root, so that the branches grow",⁴ "keep to the mother, so that the children survive",⁵ "think little of cunning and craft", "deal with things before they happen", "do not lay the responsibility on others, you must search for it in yourself" - these are Laozi's main tenets.

The Legalists, on the other hand, regard "uniformity" as the supreme principle and punishments as the means to arrange for it; the Logicians regard "pinning down the true nature of things" as the supreme principle

and naming*¹ as the means to its correct use; the Confucians regard "absolute love" as the supreme principle and praise as the means to promote it; the Mohists regard "frugality" as the supreme principle and coercion³ as the means to establish it; and the Eclectics regard the good points in the different schools as the supreme principle and synthesis as the means to propagate them. Now, if punishments⁴ serve to sort things out, then cunning and artifice are sure to be born; if naming* serves to pin things down, then the general pattern*⁵ is sure to be lost; if praise serves to promote things, then struggle for honours is sure to arise; if coercion serves to establish things, then contrariness and disobedience are sure to ensue; and if eclecticism serves to propagate things, then promiscuity is sure to flourish. These all are "discarding the mother while making use of the children". Things lose that which supports them and are not worth keeping to,

Yet the destination is the same although the roads are different; the goal is the same although they pursue it in conflicting ways.⁶ But those who study them are deluded about the goal and confused about the ways in which they pursue ~~the~~ it. When its uniformity is observed it is called "Law"; when it⁷ is seen to be that which pins down the true nature of

things it is called "Logic"; when its pure love is discerned it is called "Confucianism"; when its frugality is reflected it is called "Mohism"; and when it is seen not to be tied down it is called "Eclecticism". They follow what they reflect and rectify names accordingly; they go along with what they like and hold on to that (partial) meaning. Therefore, if there are muddled and mistaken discussions and contention between different factions¹ of debaters, this must be the reason.

In his writings, (Laozi) brings up the end in order to evidence the beginning,² goes to the root of the beginning in order to fully understand the end; he opens up but does not develop his argument in full; he points the way but does not lead.³ Only after a close examination can his meaning be fully grasped; only after extrapolating can the pattern be fully understood. Good at bringing forth the beginning of events to head his discussion, he makes clear the common goal to conclude his writings; thereby causing all those who respond to things⁴ in the same way to see the beauty of his starting point, to follow and expand it, and all those who go it alone,⁵ holding different notions, to be pleased with the manifestation of a common goal and regard this as their evidence. The roads are different but their goal is the same; the strategies are a hundred but their purpose is one.⁶ Bringing up the

common goal to make clear the supreme pattern, and therefore causes all those who reason by analogy to rejoice in having something to which their thoughts are attuned, and to regard themselves as having grasped his meaning.

4b "Deshaping is that by which all things survive; "denaming" is that by which all achievements are ~~achieved~~ secured. That which survives does not see survival in surviving but in not forgetting danger; that which is safe does not see safety in being safe but in not forgetting danger. Therefore, those that guard their survival perish, while those that do not forget extinction survive; those that are safe in their positions are in danger, while those that do not forget danger are safe. To be good at being strong is to lift an autumn hair; to be good at listening is to hear the roar of thunder. This is the way being the opposite of shapes. ²

The safe are in fact safe, yet he says that they are made safe by non-safety; those who survive do in fact survive, yet he says that they are made to survive by non-survival; lords and kings are in fact honoured, yet he says that they are honoured by non-honour; ⁴ heaven and earth are in fact great, yet he says that they are made possible by non-greatness; the achievements of the sages do in fact survive, yet he says that they are established by "extermin

"exterminating the sages"; benevolence and virtue are in fact manifest, yet he says that they survive by "discarding benevolence". Therefore, he makes all those who see only the shapes* and do not reach the way* angry with his words.

Those who want to pin-down the root of things, although near, must proceed from afar in order to evidence the beginning; those who wish to make clear the source of things, although illustrious, must proceed from obscurity in order to describe the root. He therefore takes what is outside heaven and earth in order to make clear what is inside the body; making clear the appropriateness of lords and kings calling themselves "solitary" and "lonely", he ~~follows the~~ proceeds from the oneness of the way* to proclaim the beginning. He therefore causes all those who examine only what is at hand, without reaching the source where all streams gather, to scoff at his words, thinking them empty. Therefore, those who quote him all offer their explanations, others admire his phrases, some ^{think} ~~think~~ his words trite, and some jeer at his arguments. Seemingly clear they are obscure, seemingly well defined they are blurred. This must be the reason.

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"A name" is "That which pins down 'that' "; "a referer" is "that which comes from the caller". Names are born in 'that'; referers come out from 'me'. Therefore, if we wade for it in "all things follow it", then, referring to it we say "the way"; if we search for it in "all secrets come out from it", then, calling it, we say "mysterious". These secrets come out from the mysterious the many follow the way. Therefore, giving them life and rearing them, it is not obstructed or blocked; it is its nature as pervading things that is meant by "the way". It gives them life but does not possess them, it benefits them but does not make them dependent, it makes them grow but does not exercise authority over them; it has virtue not dominion: This is the virtue of the "mysterious." "Mysterious" is the deepest of the terms used for calling; "the way" is the greatest of the referers.

Names are born from shapes; referers come out of searching. Names are not born in vain; referers do not come out in vain. Therefore, if you name it you miss its purport greatly, and if you refer to it you do not exhaust its uttermost. That is why having called it "mysterious" we have "mystery upon mystery"; having referred to it as "the way" we have "within the realm there are four greats".

Is not the book of Laozi nearly the last word on the subject?! Yet can it

not be summed up in one phrase?! "Honour the root so that the branches grow!". If you observe that from which they derive, and examine that to which they go back, then your words will not stray far from the ancestor, and affairs will not lose their ruler. Although there are five thousand characters in his writings what links them is one; although his meaning is wide and varied the many are all of a kind. If we unrevel the one phrase to cover the whole book there will be no mysteries that cannot be known,¹ but if we treat each single bit as significant then delusions will only increase, for all our skill as debaters.

Trying to discuss it we say: "That heresies flourish, is it the doing of heretics?! That licence arises, is it the work of licentious people?(no).
 Containing heresies depends on maintaining sincerity,² not on being good at scrutinising; suspending licence depends on banning ostentation, not on making (laws and edicts)³ known better; exterminating robbers depends on getting rid of desires, not on severe punishments; stopping litigations depends on not starting them, not on being good at listening." therefore, do not attack their doings, but cause them to have no intention of doing; do not blunt their desires, but cause them to have no intention of desiring.@@
 Anticipate things before their signs appear, deal with them before they

begin. That is all. Therefore, exerting sageness and wisdom to govern cunning and artifice is not as good as displaying natural simplicity¹ to still the desires of the people; mobilising benevolence and rightness to reform mean ways is not as good as embracing plainness¹ to keep true actuality intact. and multiplying skill and profit to promote service and utility is not as good as reducing self-seeking and desires to suspend ostentation and wrangling.

Therefore, exterminating the intelligent and discerning, submerging the keen-eared and sharp-eyed, removing incentives and promotions, abolishing luxuriousness and riches, discarding skill and utility, demoting valuables and goods depend only on causing greed and desires among the people not to be born, and not on attacking them as heresies. Therefore, display simplicity and embrace plainness in order to exterminate the sagely and wise;~~cccccccc~~ reduce self-seeking and lessen desires in order to discard cunning and profit. All these are meant by "honour the root, so that the branches grow".

The way of simplicity and plainness is not manifest and the attraction of likes and desires is not hidden. Even if you go to the limits of sageness and wisdom in your scrutiny, and even if you exert your intelligence and

forsight in your attack, then the more refined your cunning, the more versatile their falsehood; the more vigorous your attack, the more sedulous their evasion. Your efforts will ~~result~~^{result} only in the foolish and wise cheating each other, the six relationships being riddled with mutual suspicions, plainness dispersing, genuineness departing, and affairs becoming rife with corruption. For if the root is abandoned when attacking the branches, then even going to the limit of sageness and wisdom results increasingly in these calamities; how much more so will ^{what} goes below this in methods?!

If you press it down with simplicity and plainness, then it will be rectified of itself with no further ado. But if you attack it with sageness and wisdom, then the people will grow poor and cunning will flourish. Therefore, simplicity and plainness ought to be embraced, and sageness and wisdom ought to be discarded.

7a If scrutiny and control are simple, then avoiding it is also simple; but if you exert keen ears and sharp eyes, then they will be equally perspicacious in running away from it; so that if you are simple, then the harm to plainness is small, and if you are devious, then cunning and artifice are deep.

Now, those capable of practising methods that go to the bottom of deep

obscurity, are they not the sage and wise alone?! yet the harm they do can it be recorded?! Therefore, even if the benefit they bring were a hundred times greater it would not have been enough to be deemed great.

If you are not capable of debating names^{*}, then you cannot talk about the pattern^{*}; if you are not capable of pinning down names^{*}, then you cannot discuss actualities^{*}. All names^{*} are born from shapes^{*}; there has never been a shape^{*} born from a name^{*}. Therefore, "there is this name^{*}" necessarily implies "there is this shape^{*}", and "there is this shape^{*}" necessarily implies differentiation. Benevolence cannot be called "sageness" and wisdom cannot be called "benevolence", so that each has its actuality^{*}. Now, to scrutinise and perceive the supremely subtle is the ultimate in clear-sight; to find and hit at what lies hidden is the ultimate in forethought. Only sages are capable of exhausting the ultimate in clear-sight, is it not?! Only the wise are capable of exhausting the ultimate in forethought, is it not?! If you^{look} at it from the point of view of "pinning down names by comparing actualities", then you will have no doubts about "exterminate the sage!"

If the virtue of sincerity and plainness is not manifest, while the attraction of "reputation and conduct" is clearly visible, then cultivating what is highly regarded, you hope for praise; cultivating what is thought of as the

way you expect profit. But if the hope for praise and the expectation of profit are the means to encourage proper conduct, then the fairer your reputation the more external your sincerity, the greater the profit the more contentious the heart. The cherished feelings between father and son, elder and younger brothers will lose their genuineness; the young will have no use for sincerity in their relation with the old, and the old will have no use for actuality in their relation to the young. For this is what pushing "reputation and conduct" to the fore brings about. If, when troubled by the deterioration of morals and the flourishing of (false) reputations, honouring benevolence and rightness in conduct results in this falsehood, then how much more so will methods which are still inferior to this?! Therefore "exterminate benevolence, discard rightness to become ~~once more~~ filial again" is not enough yet to be regarded excessive.

When the city walls were made high, the battering ram was invented; when profit flourishes, the search for it intensifies. If a state of no desires is maintained, then people will not steal even if they are rewarded for it; but if self-seeking and desires prevail, then skill and profit will increasingly confuse the people. Therefore, "exterminate skill, discard profit", ~~lessen desires~~ replace them by "lessening desires", and "there will be no robbers" is not

yet enough to be considered an exaggeration.

8 a The sage and the wise are the most glorious among men of talent; benevolence and rightness are the greatest among rules of conduct; skill and profit are the highest principles of utility. If, when the root is not preserved, making use of these three is so harmful, how much more so are methods which go even further in slighting simplicity and plainness? Therefore the ancients said with a sigh: "Great indeed is our difficulty in understanding things".

Knowing already that the unsagely are ^{yet} unsagely, we do not know that the sagely are not sagely; knowing already that the unbenevolent are unbenevolent, we do not ^{yet} know that the benevolent are unbenevolent. Therefore, "exterminate the sage!" and only then will the sagely achievements be complete; "discard benevolence!" and only then will the virtue of benevolence abound.

Lighting strength is not desiring to be unstrong; becoming strong is to miss strength; "exterminate benevolence!" is not desiring to be unbenevolent; becoming benevolent leads to artifice. Governing well leads to misrule; guarding safety leads to danger. "He puts his person last and it comes first" -- getting his person first is not what is made possible by "putting his person first." "He treats his person as external to himself and it survives" -

getting his person to survive is not what "keeping his person " does.
Achievements cannot be plucked;"beauties" cannot be used. Therefore, you
have to chose the mother who is responsible for the achievements, and
nothing else. The chapter says: "Already knowing the children, return and
keep to the mother!" [↑] ~~120962~~ Examine this principle! Where can you go that
it does not reach?!

- 1.1 Needham II 206.
- 1.2 Masson-~~oursel~~ 558 n.2.
- 1.3 Chan Wing-Tsit 787.
- 2.1 See bibliography for details.
- 2.2 Zhang II 921ff
- 3.1 Anthology compiled by Xiao Tong 蕭統 (501-531).
- 3.2 錢熙祚 in the preface to the "Shoushan ge congshu" ed. (cf bib.).
- 5.1 Quoted in WSTK 922.
- 6.1 See below 120/1 & n.
- 6.2 mu 目, j.1/10b.
- 6.3 I am grateful to Dr. P. Thompson of S.O.A.S. for this and the other note on the shenzi. (cf below 118.1).
- 8.1 J. 14. Quoting Liu Xun's post 也
- 8.2
- 8.3 文心雕龍 chap. 17; trans. V.Y. Shih "The literary mind and the carving of dragons" 96, 99.
- 8.4 Yen, 1956, p.5
- 9.1 Wang Qipei 汪繼培 notice to the early 19th cent. ed. in the 湖海樓叢書 .Trans. Masson-~~oursel~~ 608.

- 10.1 He is mentioned in the SSXY 2/13, where, appropriately enough, he advises king Ming on naming a new building.
- 10.2 Chao Gongwu 晁公武 (d. 1175) seems to have been the first to point out that there was some confusion about the dates. cf Meng 86.
- 10.3 The DZ has it between the line 尹文子序 and the preface; the SBCK after the preface; the SBBY omits the 定 altogether (as does Wang Qixiang) giving the impression that it is a signature to the preface. In the Zihui 子彙 (大明善本叢書) it comes in a separate column after the preface; and in the Shuo fu 說部 (compiled by Yao Congyi 陶宗儀 in the early Ming) it appears at the top of the column, followed by the words 序曰 (the preface says), so that it looks as if the line refers to the book itself and the preface is not signed.
- 11.1 Meng 88.
- 14.1 Cf Qian Mu for dates, and 379 on "同学".
- 21.1 Tang is satisfied with noting the similarity of the two passages and considers it proof of the YWz borrowing. But, had the two passages been identical throughout I can't see that that would have constituted a proof one way or the other (there being no telling peculiarities of usage). In fact it is the difference which points to the borrower in this case. (cf WSTK 924).

24.1 Cf below 50 on. where a general account of the thought of YWz is given. cf also below 26.

24.2 I am not sure about the meaning of 別宥, but Feng Yulan's explanation seems plausible; he compares it with the LSCQ (16/7 去宥)

"凡人心別宥然後知" where 別宥 seems to mean something like Xunzi's 解蔽, and the idea is that getting rid of obsessions or prejudices is a precondition of knowledge.

25.1 See below 122.1 for emendation, and 83-84 for explanation.

25.2 On the present interpretation of the YWz sentence, Q* is a possible interpretation of the Tx parallel, rather than a deliberate and stupid misinterpretation. The unemended sentence "接萬物使各別, (-) 海內使不雜" "Dealing with the myriad things he allows the lots to be separated, --(dealing) with all within the seas he allows no confusion", is of course quite unrelated to the Tx parallel. Kuo Moro ("Song Xing..." 260) did not consider the above emendation when he regarded the YWz position totally contradictory to that of the Tx YW. On the evidence of the other three parallel sentences it seems, however, unlikely. On the ^{one subject} ~~one subject~~ where it is clear that the YWz does not agree with the Tx YW, namely on the fewness of man's true desires, the Book does not either quote or misquote the Tx. Having

- 27.1 Worthlessness is not of course logically implied by being a late forgery, but the two seem to go together for most Chinese scholars. Thus Kuo Moro in his attempt to trace the thought of the original YW to a couple of chapters in the Guanzi dismisses the YWz with a few contemptuous words. From what we now have, however, the author of the YWz seems to have been a much more interesting and original philosopher than the old YW. (See Kuo op.cit. , and Feng's "revised History..." I 181 for arguments against Kuo's identification of YW and Song Xing with the Guanzi chapters). See also below 37.2 .
- 28.1 The story of the meeting between YW and a king of Qi is found also in the Shuo Yuan , where the name of the king is given as Xuan, and in the Gongsun Longzi and Kong Congzi where no name is given.
- 34.1 Cf Graham's "Lietzzy" 172.
- 35.1 In his Ph.D. thesis "The Shenzi fragments" which is not yet published.
- 37.1 WSTK 924.
- 37.2 Liang Qishao for example, who realised that the book cannot be by the Tx YW, suggests that it is pre-Han, although not by YW, because there

is plenty of good stuff in it. This is the other side of the crazy logic of "if not pre-Han then not good". See Liang 97.

40.1 I cannot read Russian but fortunately this monograph has been summarised by A.F. Wright in his review. See HJAS 1947 75-88.

If no note is given see details of the books mentioned in the bib.

40.2 His description.

40.3 Especially his two essays "Political philosophy and social crisis" & "Nihilistic revolt or mystical escapism" in "Chinese civilisation...".

40.4 Han Confucianism was in its way no less eclectic, drawing heavily on the Yin-Yang and five-elements metaphysics; but the Wei-Jin mixture is different: Old time Taoism and the Yijing in about equal portions with a fair amount of word-splitting thrown in. (Cf below 67). On the revival of the hundred schools see Wright "Buddhism..."^{24ff}; Balasz on Neo-legalism op.cit. 205ff; Feng on the mixture of Confucianism and Taoism in Wang Bi "History..." 175; the revival of the "school of names" is discussed below 64 ff.

40.5 The prime example is of course the Liezi (see Graham's "Liezyy"). See also Kramer's balanced assessment of Wang Su's activity as a forger.

- 40.6 Western sinologists tend to play down the craze for "typology", but see Shryock's translation of Liu Shao's book. Most Chinese scholars, on the other hand, emphasise its importance for understanding the period; see Mou Zongsan 1-20 and Zhou Shaoxien 32-53. It is curious that the Chinese "Anthology of Chinese philosophy, Han to Tang" which is excellent in many ways does not include any Liu Shao excerpts.
- 40.7 Amply demonstrated in the SSXY, that great repository of the ~~us~~ spirit of the age, although most of the wit there is lost on at least one reader. See sample in Balasz (op.cit. 231) and his cautionary remark. See also below 67.2 .
- 40.8 "The frenzied attempt at emancipation had turned into wanton frivolity, the cry of revolt to cynical acceptance, liberty to libertinage". (Balasz 247).
- 40.9 Mather 173ff.
- 40.10 Religiosity was in the air for some time before the Wei; thus, it was behind the Yellow Turbans: "The most important ^{ideological} element of this rebellion was religious in nature" (Shih TP 44 165) ; but Buddhism and religious Taoism were not yet intellectually respectable, and the great philosophers of the third century seem to have had nothing to do with them.

41.1 One does not have to share Hu Shih's beautifully immoderate condemnation of the Buddhist contribution to China to realise that it changed Chinese philosophy, not necessarily for the better. It is a pity that Song Philosophy paid so little attention to what is arguably an exciting, and indubitably Chinese, departure in Chinese thought.

Mou Jun-sun has argued that the "polemical spirit" of the Wei-Jin did influence later periods, but his examples are mainly the examination system and historical studies. (See his "inaugural address" 26-37).

42.1 See above 27.1 & 37.2 .

42.2 One reason might be the fondness for neat historical categorisation: Han - "Imperial Order" , Wei-Jin-Nan-Bei-Zhao - "Disunion". See, for example, Hou Wailu vol.3.

42.3 See Mou Zongsan 37ff; Kramer 78-9; Tang Yongtong "...xuan lun..." 86-7. Mou Jun-Sun (op.cit. 42) traces the beginning of the new wave even further back.

43.1 On the Wu-Yu see Liu Dajian 47-57; Graham "Being" 98-104.

43.2 See below 64ff. Logic is not a very good word for describing the preoccupation with naming* and analysis of concepts which seem to characterise Chinese "logic", but "namism" is a bit awkward.

43.3 See Mou Zongsan I especially sec.2.

43.4 To do justice to Chinese philosophy one would need Lovejoy's mastery in presenting the history of an idea, combined with the analytical powers of an Austin and the perseverance of a Legge; an unlikely combination.

43.5 "Petrov asserts that Wang Bi, as a thinker, was inextricably connected with his own class, and in the basic pages of the Chou-i lueh-li, he reflects the historical situation in the Wei state". It seems to me that Petrov's assertion not only means very little but also fails to explain anything; or as Wright politely puts it; "(He) underestimates the significance of his (Wang Bi) intellectual intercourse with his brilliant contemporaries, particularly in the Ching-t'an circles". (Wright on Petrov 78, 82). On the general question of the historical approach to ancient philosophy see Leo Strauss introduction to his "On tyranny" (p. 24 in the Agora Paperback Editions 1968) "I have not tried to ~~understand~~^{relate} (Xenophon's) thought to his "historical situation" because this is not the natural way of reading the work of a wise man;"

44.1 See below 93ff.

44.2 "La pensee chinoise" 425

45.1 See below 67ff.

45.2 The names are a bit off-putting but can't think of anything better.

46.1

47.1 See Zhou 36

47.2 Needham II 386. Needham does not mention the fact that the book is based on the Yin-Yang five elements metaphysics, but "rationalistic" is possibly vague enough to mean "within the framework of the science of the time" or even that it suited their practical aims.

47.3 See Mou Zongsan 129ff.

47.4 See above 40.6. De Bary's "Sources.." and Chan's "Sourcebook..." have no Liu Shao excerpts.

51.1 See Balasz 209 for Cui Shi "It is severity that ensures order, while indulgence ends in anarchy".

60.1 Although the meaning of "shu" seems clear enough it is difficult to find a good English equivalent. Liao (Han Fei Tzu I 97 & xxiv) is surely right in saying that "methods" is too vague; his choice, though, "tact" sounds odd. I have chosen "craft*" in the specific sense used here, and "methods", "art" etc. where a more general sense is intended.

64.1 I haven't enlarged on this in the body of this thesis so that one

example might be in order. It comes from Sun Sheng's 孫盛 "cross-examination" of the Laozi: " 'Exterminate benevolence, discard rightness, and the people will again be filial and compassionate'; according to this if benevolence and rightness are not exterminated, then they will not be filial and compassionate. Again he says: "In a home it is the site that matters; in an ally it is benevolence that matters", but does not specify whether "benevolence" in this case is the same as the one of which he just said "exterminate benevolence" or not. If it is then he should not repeatedly mention ~~it~~ it and talk about it; if it is not then he has not yet given us details about the two benevolences, one that ought to be exterminated, and one that ought to be made clear". (Laozi yiwen fanxun 老子疑問反訊 on Laozi 19 ¶ 8; from "Guang Hong ming ji" 5/7a6-9. D.C.Lau's translation of the Laozi quotes (slightly modified for Lz 19).

64.2 The Deng Xizi is probably a forgery too, but is not much of a book in any case. (see WSTK).

64.3 See Mou Zongsan 129ff for details.

64.1 *ibid.*

64.2

65.3 See SSXY 4/94 com.

65.4 See Mather on "the teaching of names" and Balasz "Nihilistic revolt.." for "ming shi"

66.1 See "History of Religions" 9/2&3 111 for Sivin's reservations about "naturalness" as a translation for .

67.1 He was a cheeky bugger, in fact, as a young boy. One day he and his elder brother Yu nicked some medicinal wine while their father was having a nap. Yu bowed and only then drank his wine, Hui drank his straight away. Their father who was watching them, only pretending to be asleep, asked them afterwards to explain their behaviour. Yu said: "Wine serves to accomplish the rites (Li), I would not dare not to bow". When asked why he did not bow Hui answered: "Nicking wine is not Li to begin with, that is why I did not bow." When the two brothers were taken to be presented to emperor Wen, the elder was sweating and Hui was not . Asked for the reason Yu answered: "Trembling with fear, the sweat comes out like water", and Hui said: "Shivering with fear, the sweat does not succeed in coming out". (SSXY^{2/} 12,11).

67.2 See SSXY 2/11 com.

68.1 See Fung "History..." II 423.

69.2 Guanzi 28 which has a number of examples, having the same pattern, where "shi" refers to a state of affairs to mean "what is actually the case".

70.1 See the Guanzi 55 for some more "ming-shi".

70.2 Wing-Tsit Chan (787) brings the YWz as a refutation of Creel's "The meaning of Hsing-Ming" (ㄏㄩㄥ ㄇㄩㄥ in Egerod 199-211) and claims that "ming-xing" and "ming-shi" are interchangeable, so that my statement could be interpreted as implying support for Creel's position; in fact the distinction I am trying to point out has nothing to do with it. According to Creel the doctrine of xing-ming was a technique for personnel control (209), associated with the Legalists and therefore discredited, and that by late Han it more or less disappeared. This may be true or not, but the evidence of the YWz, where "xing-ming" (ㄒㄩㄥ ㄇㄩㄥ) is obviously something to do with "ming-shi" or the Logical problem of naming* things, is not relevant to the Creel thesis as the YWz is too late for that. In third century China "xing-ming" replaces "ming-shi" in discussions of naming*. What I attempt to show is that the change of terminology brought about an elucidation of the problem, and that "xing-ming" did come to mean something else than "ming-shi".

72.1 Although I asterisked the "shapes" in order to emphasise the abstract, technical sense in which the word is used in the YWz and the LWL, it is unnecessary if we remember that "shape" is often used abstractly in everyday English, and it seems to mean something very close to the YWz idea. "Shape" has the connotations of "clarity" and "definiteness" which "form" does not necessarily have; "one forms an opinion" implies that one had none before, but "one's plans are shaping up" implies that the plans are becoming definite, what has been a nebulous, half-formed idea, is being translated into a clear, well-defined, set of instructions. Thus, the way* can be "confusedly formed" 混成 but "it has no shape" 無形 .

77.1 If we could translate the examples to read "The worthy and the foolish are loved and hated", similarly to the Ji Kang passage (below 81), it would have made things a lot clearer; unfortunately it seems impossible as the sentence apparently follows the pattern of the two preceding ones.

82.1 Just before the quoted passage there is a single phrase: "夫味以甘苦為稱" "Flavour has sweet and bitter as referers*" but the line after the quoted passage reads: "所喜則謂之喜味 所怒則謂之怒味" "Can what pleases us be called a "pleasing flavour" and what irritates us be called an "irritating flavour"? ". It seems reasonable to assume

that the original text read:"

"Flavours take "sweet" and "bitter" as names*, take "pleasing" and "irritating" as referers*".

83.1 In the translation I retained "lot" in this passage, asterisking it to emphasise the different sense in which it is used here.

85.1 Below 143-159.

86.1 185. (I prefer the more literal "words exhaust the meaning" to Bodde-Fung's "words express ideas". Wilhelm (see below 90) too sticks to the literal translation).

86.2 This short treatise is included in the "anthology of Chinese philosophy from the Han to the Tang" and quoted in full by Mou Zongsan 140.

86.3 Ouyang refers to himself as 達衆先生 (Mr. Contrary) ; his opponent (雷同君子 sir Vox Populi) asks him how come he maintains his position seeing that everybody else holds that "words cannot exhaust the meaning".

93.1 I could not find Wang's original article. Fung (1962, 102) says that it appeared in "Peking University's "Guoxue jikan" 國學季刊" No 3, but no date is given

95.1 "崇本以息末

"~~Prof. Mei Tsulin, who has kindly commented on the present work in an earlier stage, expressed his doubts about this reading and suggested something like "honour the root to stay the branches", which seems to be the more common reading of "xu" . For similar reasons D.C. Lau in his translation of the Mencius chose to render "其^①夜之所息~~" as "the respite they get by day and night" ("the Ox mountain "parable 6a/3). But my reading seems possible; thus, in the annotated edition of the "four books" by Xie Bingying 射^①以^②息^③ et. al. (see bib.) 48 n.2, for the same Mencius passage we have 射^①以^②息^③ et. al. (see bib.) 48 n.2, for the same Mencius passage we by have "息^①生長也". Moreover, in the LWL this reading is warranted so t by the immediate parallel "守母以存子" "keep to the mother interpretation of the Laozi and the examples given. " "He puts his person last and it comes first" - getting one's person first is not what is made possible by putting one's person first" (8a8). Wang Bi, as well as the Laozi, is intersted in the "branches", "if one hates strength, it is not because one desires non-strength" (8a6), but he believes that going straight for them is the wrong way of getting them. The occurences of ths doctrine in the Laozi Zhu tend to corroborate

the present reading. In LzZ 38 we have : " 守母以存其子 崇本以 興
 其末 " "keep to the mother to preserve its children, honour
 the root to give rise to its branches" and in LzZ 57 to the text
 "I take no action and the people are transformed of themselves/ I
 prefer stillness and the people are rectified of themselves/ I am
 not meddling and the people prosper of themselves/ I am free from
 desire and the people of themselves become simple like the uncarved
 block" (Lau's translation) the Zhu has " 此四者崇本以息末也 ".
 I seems therefore, that the "branches" are the desired results and
 that " 息末 " is "to let grow the branches " rather than " to stay
 the branches".

99.1 Welch 123 finds it a curious thesis, but it seems that one ought to
 take it as his true position, not just a witty evasion of an
 embarrassing question. That he was not " anti-Confucian" is agreed
 (see Tang Yongtong (HJAS 161), Fung ("History..."175), Mather 165,
 Welch 128 etc.). It seems to me, however, that not only did he "come
 closer to Confucianism than did earlier Taoism" or "in practice
 represented a true supporter of Confucianism", but ~~also~~
 that his metaphysics is more "Confucian" than is allowed for, based
 on the Yijing which at the period was certainly considered a true
 expression of the Sage's thought. (cf below 102).

105.1 I have not asterisked the "refer"s in the first few passages as the distinction between (objective) names* and (subjective) referers* does not seem to ~~enter~~ enter it, and "cheng" is used in a more general way. (See above 81 and 83&83.1 for "lot" and "lot*"). "Tools*" is "qi" ; the first couplet seems to refer to the Yijing distinction between the shapeless* way* and all shaped* things. (see above 78).

105.2 LY 13/3 Legge 263.

105.3 I am not sure about the translation of this line, but this seems to fit 2b3 (below 108) "It has no name*, therefore the way* is not referred to by name*". The way* is referred* to , of course, in the narrow subjective sense of "cheng" .

105.4 Meng has "衆皆有名" "the many must have names*" but this is probably a misprint, as there is no note explaining this change. "existents" should not be understood as any different from "things".

105.5 以 is added before 大 道 (Meng).

105.6 Laozi 62. The YWz has 實 for 保 . The meaning of this sentence seems obscure, but the YWz uses it only as an excuse for talking about "the good" and "the bad".

- 106.1 不形 added after 而. but this seems unwarranted. I retained
- 107.1 See 77.1 which, however, is in this case too vague to be translated.
- 108.1 則形也 omitted.
- 108.2 Echoing Lz 1, this seems to give an interpretation of the "sayable" aspect of the way*.
- 109.1 Or, possibly, "therefore the good have good reputation and the bad have bad reputation".
- 109.2 何 → 別
- 110.1 又復 → 各得 (Meng).
- 110.2 彼 → 復 to bring it in line with previous sentence.
- 110.3 The whole argument seems to centre about the notion of the V/A as a function whose domain is "things" and range is phrases. As "things" is a very general term which includes events and abstract concepts as well as objects, there is a possibility, greater of course in Chinese, of confusing the function with its domain, for which reason "to like" is not "men" is less strange than it looks.
- 111.1 See Wang's edition for 於 meaning 於.
- 111.2 分 added after 彼.
- 111.3 分 seems to be a post-Han character (syn. with pre-Han 分), Tang Yue in WSTK 924.

- 111.4 Meng suggests 故 → 古, but this seems unwarranted. I retained 故 which, however, is in this case too vague to be translated.
- 112.1 以 → 以 (following the QSZY). Wang claims that 以 is similar to 以.
- 112.2 For 能 meaning 則 see examples in Wang; see also D.C. Lau in BSOAS 1965.
- 113.1 不為 → 任之 (following the QSZY) to parallel last phrase of next passage: "政明立誅之".
- 114.1 Xunzi 8 (Liang 83) HY // where it refers back to the sophisms of "hard and white" etc.
- 115.1 The DZ has a character missing. 竟 added after 道 (following the SSG ed.; the QSZY has 道 instead).
- 118.1 This paragraph occurs in the present forged "Shenzi". P. Thompson in his "The Shenzi fragments" (see above 35.1) has shown that this was not among the original fragments.
- 118.2 俗 → 物 following the previous sentence. For all parallels with the Tienxia see above 24ff.
- 119.1 For this and the following stories which have parallels in other books see above 19ff.
- 119.2 車式之 emended to 下車而捐之 following the TPYL (543/4a1-2).

- 120.1 臣 → 之 (Meng). The BTSC 116 version has: "民皆不避湯火". The different versions are conflicting but with the help of the HZ one can guess that the king did bow to the frog and that it was a good thing. (see above 20).
- 121.1 The DZ passage is corrupt. The paranthetical addition comes from the WXZ (38/9, 845). "不患物不親已在貧賤不患物不疏已 and 雖在賢 added because of following passage.
- 122.1 不 added before 分. Wang notes that there is a character missing, either before the 分 or after the 引, to make the whole sentence balanced (a double six). For the "subjective" see above 80-83 and 25.1&2.
- 122.2 介 → 人.
- 122.3 可以為臣 (Wang)
- 123.1 石. One dan is about 110 pounds which seems a bit much.
- 123.2 用 added after 為 following the LSCQ version (23/5, 1091).
- 123.3 不殊美 → 殊必美. (Sun Yirang 孫詒讓 quoted in Wang).
- 124.1 道 → 始 following the TPYL 917/7a.
- 125.1 和家. Wang suggests that 和 is not a mistake but means 和 in the sense of "all". The only evidence he brings, however, is to show that

they are sometimes interchangeable in the sense of "pick up" etc.

125.2 主 → 事 (Meng).

126.1 伯 = 五 . Lau (Mencius 176) translates "Ba" as "the five leaders of the feudal lords".

126.2 以 → 與 . Wang suggests 以 ≈ 與 . Cf above 112.1 .

130.1 南 國 comes last in the list in the DZ. The order has been changed according to the QSZY .

133.1 See Kramers 263ff for a comparison of the different versions of this story. The Quotation comes from the "Odes", Mao 26, Legge 183. I retained the "mean creatures" of Legge's translation in the following sentence instead of the usual "petty men".

134.1 LY 17/18 , Legge 325.

134.2 Laozi 57. The YWz reads 正 for the Lz 正 ; from the explanation it seems clear that the book does not mean rectitude.

135.1 Laozi 74. This too is found in the present Shenzi. Cf above 118.1.

136.1 Tang points out that this is unlikely as Meng was Tien's teacher, and so is another proof that the author of the YWz is a late forger.

137.1 The story parallels exactly the ZhangGo ce 3/53a.

138.1 力 after 人 omitted.

139.1 The DZ has 然 instead of 然 .

139.2 然 → 然 (Wang).

139.3 然 → 制 twice, following the SSG.

143.1 天 → 夫 S.

143.2 S has two 天 .

143.2a LzZ 14 com. (19a).

143.3 Lz 25.

143.4 Lz 41.

143.5 天地 added after S. LzZ 35 (2/11a4) has 包紮 for 通 .

143.6 The four images are the great and small Yang and the great and small

Yin. See YJ (46b-5) "The two modes gave birth to the four images"

(兩儀生四象).

143.7 The five notes of the Chinese scale: Gong, Shang, Jiao, Zhi, and Yu

(宮, 商, 角, 徵, 羽).

144.1 Lz 35. There is an added here.

144.2 Presumably the 五行 (five elements). (Wang).

144.3 Presumably the "five relationships" (father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, old and young, and friends). (Wang).

144.4 Lz 1. Lau's trans.

144.5 Lz 21. "" Wang Bi in his commentary; "The uttermost of supreme genuineness cannot be named, "nameless" is therefore its name" (至真之極下可得名無名則是其名也) (2/164) but this is not a name in the more precise sense of the LWL.

145.1 CF Lz 14.

145.2 Lz 16.

145.3 Lz 21. Com. has 衆南物之始也. (2/166)

145.4 S has 美 for 羨.

146.1 LzZ 51 (8/12b7).

146.2 Wang has 深 but both the DZ and S have 採. (see YJ 47b2 for 採蹟).

146.3 引爾之論 seems to have been taken from the YJ (see Wang).

146.4 S has 空 for 篇.

146.5 S has 則空 for 則; 則 for 者 in next phrase.

147.1 S has 老君 for 老子.

147.2 言告 → 詰 following S. Wang has 法 for it but does not comment.

147.3 This is rather vague but possibly alludes to Lz 48: "In the pursuit of the way one does less every day. (為道日損). Lau's Trans.

LzZ 29 (2/7b6) has a parallel (因而為順而不為) so that 損 → 順 is a possible emendation and this phrase is synonymous with the previous.

- 147.4 Cf 95.1 for explanation and defense. See also LzZ 52 (3/3a8) for another variation: "The mother is the root, the children are the branches; get the root in order to know the branches". (母本也子末也 得本以知末).
- 147.5 Cf Lz 52 "Already knowing the children, return and keep to the mother " which is quoted later on in the LWL (8b1).
- 147.6 Lz 64.
- 147.7 S has 开兮 .
- 148.1 S has 言 , Wang too.
- 148.2 Wang Bi does not refer to the true followers of the sage, of whom he is one, but to the "Ru" 儒 , the "schoolmen" to Kung's Aristotle.
- 148.3 S has 智 for 寤 here but agrees with the DZ in next passage.
- 148.4 开兮 → 开兮 .
- 148.5 理想 . Yen 2 is right in saying that it looks odd, but his emendation is not convincing; besides S has the same.
- 148.6 S reads 然致同途而异致合旨而趣争 .
- 149.1 S has 析 for 拈 .
- 149.2 本始 following S and Wang. DZ has 下述
- 149.3 The whole sentence comes from the Li ji (I quote from Wang): "故君子

之教喻世道而弗率，強而弗抑，開而弗達。”

149.4 於事 added after 發 following S and Wang.

149.5 S has 構 for 構.

149.6 Cf YJ (8/49a-3)

150.1 反其形. See discussion above 94.

150.2 Cf YJ (8/50a2-5) 子曰危者安其位者也亡者保其存者也亂者有其治者也
是故君子安而不忘危存而不忘亡治而不忘亂。

150.3 "Opposite" in the sense explicated above 94ff.

150.4 為 → 尊 following S. S has a short phrase here "皆理之大者也" " after which follow a text parallel to DZ 5a6-5b6, where S ends.

151.1 Lz 19.

151.2 剛 → 解 following Wang.

152.1 LzZ 10 and 51; cf com.

152.2 The LWL uses the binomial terms 名號, 稱謂, 形狀, 涉求 presumably in order to be more specific (cf above 144.5) but it seems pointless to do so in the translation.

152.3 Lz 1.

152.4 Lz 25.

153.1 Wang has 先 for 識, but does not comment (cf above 147.2).

153.2 Cf YJ(1/1b-5).

153.3 $\frac{上}{下} \frac{上}{下} \rightarrow \frac{上}{下} \frac{上}{下}$ following Yen. Cf Lz 57, Paranthetical phrase taken from there.

154.1 Lau's translation "unadorned" and "uncarved block" for $\frac{上}{下}$ and 木ト (see "Lao Tzu" 29) are less vague but would make this translation even more awkward.

156.1 $\frac{上}{下} \rightarrow \sqrt{\frac{上}{下}}$ twice. Wang has one $\frac{上}{下}$ and one $\sqrt{\frac{上}{下}}$.

156.2 $\frac{上}{下} \rightarrow \frac{上}{下}$. Wang has $\frac{上}{下}$.

157.1 Lz 19 which has $\frac{上}{下}$ instead of $\sqrt{\frac{上}{下}}$.

157.2 Cf. LY 12/18 for origin of this idea.(Wang).

157.3 Cf Lz119.

158.1 Lz 7.

159.1 Lz 52.

Bibliography

I. Abbreviations

- AM *Asia Major*
 BSS Basic Sinological Series
- BTSC Beitang shuchao 北堂書鈔 (see above 2) (孔廣陶 ed 1888)
- DZ Dao Zang 道藏
- HHS Houhan shu 後漢書
 HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic studies
 HS Han shu 漢書
- HZ Hanzi (see under Liang)
- LSCQ Lushi chungiu (see under Xu)
- LWL Laozi weizhi lilue (see under Yen)
- Laozi Laozi 老子
- LZZ Laozi zhu (see under Yen)
- M Morohashi Tetsuji Dai kanwa jiten 諸橋漱次大漢和辭典 Tokyo 55
- MS Monumenta Serica
- MZ Mozi 墨子
- PWYF Peiwen yunfu 佩文韻府
- QSZY Qunshu zhiyao 群書治要 BSS (see above 2)
- SBZY Sibuyuan 四部備要
- SBCK Sibuyuan 四部叢書

- SSG Shoushan ge congshu 守山閣叢書 (see below 1)
- SSXY Shishuo xinyu 世說新語 (see under Yang)
- TP T'oung Pao
- TPYL Taiping yulan 太平御覽 (reprint of a Song ed. Peking 60) (see above 3)
- WSTK ①①①① Weishu tongkao 白書通考 (see under Zhang)
- WX Wen Xuan 文選 (com. press ed. Hong Kong 65)
- WXZ Wenxuan zhu " 注 (see above 263)
- Xz Xunzi 荀子
- YJ Zhou yi 周易 (SBCK ed. with Wang Bi com.)
- YL Yi lin 藝林 SBCK (see above 1)
- YW Yin Wen 尹文
- YWLJ Yiwen lei ju 藝文類聚 (annotated ed. Shanghai 65)
- YWz Yin Wenzi 尹文子 (DZ ed. unless specified)
- YZXB Yongzhai xubi 谷齋續筆 SBBY

II. There are several commonly available editions of the YWz:

DZ SBBY, based on the SSG by Qian Xizu (notice 1844)

SBCK, a facsimile of a ming reprint of a Song ed.

~~SBCK, a facsimile of a ming reprint of a Song ed.~~

~~SBCK, a facsimile of a ming reprint of a Song ed.~~

SSG By Qian Xizu (notice 1844) seems still the most common edition. The same edition is included also in the Zhuzi jicheng collection (Shanghai 54)

Zi hui 子彙, compiled by Zhou Ziyi in the Ming. (photographic reprint
Shanghai 37)(周子彙)
Shanghai 37)(周子彙)

Wang Qixiang has published a modern edition, annotated and based mostly on
the SSG and on Chen Chun 陳春 edition in the Huhailou Gongshu 湖海樓叢書
(preface 1819). (See under Wang).

Meng Chuanming published an annotated edition, collating the various editions
and commentaries, parallel passages, fragments etc. (See under Meng).
Both Meng and Wang place the two long QSZY passages in their editions. (See
above 3-5).

The only translation into a European language I have seen (and as far as I
know the only one ever made) is Masson-Oursel's (see under Masson-Oursel)
It is based on the SSG and the Huhailou congshu and gives all the prefaces
notices and fragments listed there.

III. References to classical texts, apart from those mentioned under
"Abbreviations", are to the following editions:

Gongsun Longzi	公孫龍子	DZ
Guanzi	管子	(ref. by chapter and conc. see under Johnson)
Ji Kang ji	嵇康集	(Lu Xun 魯迅 ed. Hong Kong 67)
Keng congzi		SBBY

Hiezi	列子		(see under Yang (Bojun))
Lun Yu	論語		(ref. by book and chapter) } see
Mencius	孟子		" } Xie Dingyi
Renwu zhi	人物志		SBBY
Shen Bian	申命		SBCK
Shuo yuan	說苑		SBCK
Zhanguo ce	戰國策		SBCK
Zhong lun	中論		SBCK
Zhuangzi	莊子	(莊子集解)	(李康藩 ed. Peking 61)
Zi lue	子略		Siming Congshu 四明叢書 Ist collection, Taipei 64)

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in Chinese philosophy" AM n.s.7,59)
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Journal of Chinese studies n.s. 6, 67)
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↳ 郭沫若 宋欽與尹文 + 批判書 ↗
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temps" TP 56)
- " "La vie et la pensee de Xi Kang" (Brill, Leyden 57)
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⊙

"Anthology of Chinese philosophy from the Han to the Tang" 中國歷代哲學

文選：兩漢—隋唐各篇 edited by the section for the

history of Chinese philosophy of the department for philosophical research in

the ~~Ministry~~ national science office and the philosophy department of Peking

University. 中國科學院哲學研究所中國哲學史組

北京大學哲學系中國哲學史教研室 (Peking 63)

A list of asterisked words:

Borrowed from Ninian Smart's "Doctrine and argument in Hindu philosophy", this device is intended as a warning that the words thus marked do not carry the same connotation as they do in normal English or (especially) in Western philosophical terminology. This does not imply that unmarked words are always satisfactory equivalents of the Chinese; but that ~~marked~~ that those marked are more likely to be misleading. In some cases, such as "shape" or "refer", the words were marked merely in order to point out that they are used as technical terms, although the English equivalents seem to me satisfactory.

Actuality*	實	see 69ff
Allude *	况	79ff
authority*	木董	60
Craft *	術	60
Ease *	易	59/60
Event*	事	, also translated as "affairs"; the Chinese term, unlike the English covers everything that happens, whether naturally or caused by a human agent. Sometimes ^{also} "to serve" or "service".
Name *	名	also, in a few cases 命 (verb). ^{also} Sometimes 67ff
Norm *		55ff
lot *		83 & 83.1

Pattern* 理 里 "Li" is not an important term in the YWz. Like the, by now, overworked "structure", "pattern" seems better to express the idea of the lines running in a piece of jade or the criss-cross of a paddy field that "li" evokes. In one case, the last sentence of the LWL, I translated it as "principle".

Power* 勢 61

refer* 稱 79

Shape* 形 67ff

Simplicity* 簡 59

Way* 道 Asterisking the common term for the ineffable ~~seems~~ one free to use the rather useful word "way" for more mundane purposes.

Tools* 器 also "vessels" for all particulars, which, in contrast with the way*, are shaped. 78, 105

Index of names of people in the first two chapters and the notes:

(Chinese characters in the text, usually at the first occurrence of the name; for modern writers see Chinese names in the bibliography; Chinese scholars who write largely in English are given in Latin script only and their names have not been modified to conform to the national transliteration adopted in this work).

Balasz B. 40, 47, 67, 40.4, 40.7

Ban Gu 7

Bodde 61,90, 86.1

Cao Bao 46

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Chao Gongwu 10.2

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Cui Shi 51.1

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