RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND COUNCIL

with the

GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF MADRAS

under the

REGULATING ACT OF 1773.

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"Look back, my Lord, to the Act of the thirteenth
"of the King, which spawned the Supreme Council
"and the Supreme Court, whose benevolent effects have
"from that hour to this, torn to pieces our affairs
"in Asia...." -

"A series of facts showing the
present political state of India." -
London 1783. India Office English
Tracts Vol. 55, p. 45.
The nominal control given by the Regulating Act to Bengal over the other presidencies in matters of peace and war resulted in constant friction between the superintending and subordinate presidencies.

From 1775 to 1779 there was no marked dispute between the Supreme Council and Madras. In 1779 the transactions of the Madras government annoyed the Nizam, and the Bengal government intervened in order to prevent the Nizam from becoming an active enemy of the English, whereupon the Madras government taking advantage of the vague nature of the Regulating Act challenged the powers of Bengal to interfere. It has been shown that the intervention of Bengal was legal, and the attitude of Rumbold narrow. The Madras government maintained an attitude of opposition until the supreme council suspended their president, Whitehill, and established their superiority. This was aided by the fact that Haidar Ali was in the Carnatic and Madras totally dependent on Bengal for carrying on the war.

Bengal could not retain this supremacy for long. Lord Macartney failed to win the friendship of the governor general in spite of his honest efforts. The quarrel between the presidencies was renewed. Hastings stretched his authority over Madras in proportion to his growing distrust of Macartney. Coote complicated the situation further. The personal factor made the normally difficult working of the Act absolutely impossible. Affairs reached the climax in 1783
and 1784 when Madras refused to obey the orders of Bengal which were in excess of legal powers, and to abide by the unnecessary restrictions on their rights.

Throughout, the justification for any illegal intervention of the supreme council lay in the fact that the responsibility for the general well-being rested on them.

The experiment over ten years taught that harmonious relations between the presidencies were impossible under such a system. Accordingly, larger powers of control were given to the supreme council by the India Act of 1784.

II. The struggle between Hastings and Rumbold

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PREFACE.

The story of the relations of the governor general and council with the Madras government under the Regulating Act of 1773 is a study of the working of that clause of the Act which created a central authority among the English presidencies in India. It is a part of the wider subject of the relations of the supreme council with the subordinate presidencies under the Act of 1773.

The subject has been taken up for a number of reasons. The study of almost every provision of the Regulating Act at actual work, is full of interest. No detailed study of the relations of the supreme council with the Madras government, as a separate subject, to illustrate the working of the Regulating Act, has ever been made. Again, the subject is of importance as being a portion of the first chapter in the history of the central government in British India, which yet remains to be written. Besides, the period of the governor generalship of Warren Hastings is full of interesting topics which deserve study in a series of monographs.

The outlines of the story have been touched upon by all the well known writers on the history of British India. Among them Mill gives the fullest narrative of the subject. But Mill deals only with the principal topics of dispute between the two presidencies, and does not discuss them with reference to the Act. Besides he has a distinct bias against Hastings. Mill is supplemented for the years 1781-84 by Barrow's Life of Macartney, which gives a fuller description of the relations of the supreme council
with Madras than any other printed book. But Barrow writes largely from the standpoint of a biographer.

The present work gives a more detailed account of the relations of the two presidencies than the above mentioned volumes, and its principal object is to illustrate the working of the Regulating Act. It is entirely based on a study of the records of the governments of Fort William and Fort St. George preserved in the India Office. The Bengal secret consultations and the Madras military and secret, and select committee proceedings from October 1774 to February 1785 have been the principal sources of information. Where necessary the Bengal secret consultations have been supplemented by the series called the Bengal Public Consultations. Many important documents have been found among the collection of miscellaneous documents in the India Office called the Home Series (Miscellaneous). The volumes of despatches from the Directors to Bengal and Madras during that period have been consulted, and where necessary the letters from the two presidencies to the home authorities have been examined.

The practice of the East India Company to record all their business on paper has proved a real boon to the student of the history of British India. The practically complete nature of these documents, and their undoubted weight as historical evidence, facilitate immensely the task of the research worker. But the personal motive for an act usually does not appear in official documents. Sometimes, a false idea of the intentions may be deliberately conveyed. A study has, therefore, been made of the
private correspondence, so far as it is available, of persons prominent in the drama. Gleig's Memoirs of Warren Hastings contains several interesting letters, relevant to the subject. The Hastings papers among the "Additional Manuscripts" in the British Museum have been frequently consulted and have proved useful. But this aspect of the subject still remains in many points obscure.

1. Bengal Secret Consultations.

These are the consultations only of the Bengal council in their secret department. From October 1770 to February 1786 there are 69 volumes, including all volumes of Trincomalee. After 1st February 1784 the consultations of the new series are placed under a different location in the archives and the volume numbers start afresh. Volumes 21-62 and 70 under the first location do not contain page numbers.

2. Bengal Public Consultations.

This series has been published as a means to supplement the Bengal Secret Consultations.


These are the proceedings of the whole of the Marine Board in their secret department and covering to 19 July 1778. There are thirteen volumes of instructions October 1778.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. **Original Sources.**

A. **Manuscript Documents.**

(a) **India Office Records.**

1. **Bengal Secret Consultations.**

These are the consultations of the Bengal council in their secret department. From October 1774 to February 1785 there are 63 volumes, including 11 volumes of Indices. After 3rd February 1784 the consultations of the same series are placed under a different location in the India office and the volume numbers start afresh. Volumes 35, 36, 37 and 70 under the first location do not contain page numbers.

2. **Bengal Public Consultations.**

This series has been used where necessary to supplement the Bengal Secret Consultations.

3. **Madras Military and Secret Proceedings.**

These are the proceedings of the whole of the Madras board in their secret department and run up to 19 July 1778. There are thirteen volumes of these from October 1774.
4. Madras Select Committee Consultations.

From 21 July 1778 to December 1784 there are 45 volumes, including 6 volumes of Miscellany books which it was not necessary to consult. These consultations are arranged under two locations in the India office, the second beginning from 10 May 1780, after which the volumes again start from number one.

5. Madras Public Consultations.

This series has been used for the proceedings of the Madras government on the 7th and 8th November 1780, as the suspension of Whitehill took place in the council.

6. Despatches to Bengal.

Seven volumes cover the period.

7. Despatches to Madras.

Six volumes for the period.

8. Letters received from Bengal.

There are ten volumes covering the period of which I have consulted only those that I thought would throw new light on the subject.

9. Letters received from Madras.

There are seven volumes of these letters. They have been consulted for important topics only, but have not given more information than those contained in the Madras consultations.

This is a very heterogeneous series of documents. I have gone through Hill's catalogue of the Home Miscellaneous in search of additional documents for every important topic. Invaluable assistance has been derived from some documents in this series for the early relations of Hastings and Macartney.

(b) British Museum Manuscripts.

1. Among the Hastings papers, the following have been consulted:

(i) Letter books of Warren Hastings - Additional MSS. No. 29,125-129.

(ii) Letters from Lord Clive - Additional MSS. No. 29,131.

(iii) General original correspondence - Additional MSS. No. 29,132-167 wherever necessary.

2. The 'Briefs in the defence of Sir Thomas Rumbold' (Vol. ii) among the Additional MSS have been consulted for the case of Rumbold.

3. The debates of the House of Commons reported by Sir H. Cavendish, in his own short hand have proved of great value for the introductory chapter, as the Parliamentary History for 1773 does not give a full report of the debate on the Regulating Act.
B. Printed Documents.

Warren Hastings' letters to Sir John Macpherson
Ed. by H. Dodwell.

C. Parliamentary Papers.

1. First and second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons to enquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic 1781-83. 1806 Edition.

2. A bill for inflicting certain pains and penalties against Sir Thomas Rumbold and Peter Perring Esq., Bills Vol.xii, No. 421.

3. Bill for establishing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company as well in India as in Europe. - Bills Vol.vii Clause 9 Nos.221, and 225.


D. Contemporary Tracts.

The following have been referred to in the course of the monograph.

1. A series of facts showing the present political state of India as far as concerns the powers at war, and the probable consequences of a general pacification in Europe, before we shall have decided our contests in the Carnatic; for the sake of form addressed to Lord Shelburne - [By Captain Joseph Price] - London 1783.
2. A retrospective view and consideration of Indian affairs particularly of the transactions of the Mharatta war from its commencement to the month of October 1782. [By Major John Scott?] - London 1783.


II. Secondary Works.

Among the many secondary works on the period the following only have proved useful for the subject.


Dodwell (H.H.) - Warren Hastings and the assignment of the Carnatic revenues - English Historical Review - July 1925.


Mill (James) - The History of British India - Book V
Fifth Edition with notes and Continuation by H. H. Wilson
London 1858.

Rumbold (E. A.) A vindication of the character and
administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold - London 1865.

Wilks (Lt. Col. Mark) - Historical sketches of the
South of India in an attempt to trace the history of
Mysore, etc., 2 Vols. Madras 1869.

Wylly (H. C.) - Life of Lieutenant General Sir Eyre
Coote - Oxford 1922.
In the middle of the eighteenth century the East India Company was no longer merely a trading body. It had become a military and territorial power, taking part in the politics of the country and vying with the enormous European and Indian The sword had become more important than the ledger. Yet the machinery of administration in India was essentially unaltered. For instance, nothing was done to place the three provincial capitals of Bengal, Madras and Bombay under a unified control in India. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the French had once established a central government in the East, exercising large powers of control. But the three English settlement companies were able to act independently.

The insufficiency of the system began to be felt from the very first. The Company had to deal with Indian and military authorities agreed on the need of some sort of central control over the affairs of the country. In 1773, Lord Cornwallis came to India and his officers giving their opinion on the existing state of affairs,

**Abbreviations Used In The Footnotes.**

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<th>Acronym</th>
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Erratum.

195 is the number of the page after page 193.
INTRODUCTION.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the East India Company was no longer merely a trading body. It had become a military and territorial power, taking part in the politics of the country and fighting with its enemies, European and Indian. The sword had become more important than the ledger. Yet the machinery of administration in India was, in essentials unaltered. For instance, nothing was done to place the three presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras under a unified control in India. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the French had each established a central government in the East exercising large powers of control. But the three English presidencies pursued their affairs independently of each other.

The inconveniences of the system began to be felt from the time when the Company had to fight with the French (1) Civil and military authorities agreed on the need of some sort of central control over the affairs of the three presidencies. When in 1760 the English army laid seige to Pondicherry, Sir Eyre (their Colonel) Coote and his officers giving their opinion on the existing state of affairs said, "We can not sufficiently lament

1. Aubert - Rise and progress of the British power in India - Vol. I. p.337.
"the want of a power being invested in some particular person "who might order detachments from the other two presidencies to "join the army at this critical juncture by which means we might "be enabled to undertake the seige of Pondicherry with a probab-
"ility of success without (as we imagine) endangering those "presidencies." (1) Palk who became governor of Madras also pointed out at this time the evil consequences of a system of having three presidencies independent of each other. He said, ".....as each presidency has or can at all times pretend to have "apprehensions for itself, a due attention is seldom paid to the "danger of the rest ... Besides this division of power obliges "each presidency to make different alliances, even with the same "princes, which lessens the authority of the Company, and it has "happened that one presidency refused to communicate to another, "a treaty just agreed on, though the other was negotiating on af-
"fairs of the greatest consequence with the same prince." (2) Again in 1764 Lord Clive spoke of the "appointment of such an officer as the governor general" who, he also said, "ought to be "established in Bengal as the greatest weight of your civil, "commercial, political and military affairs will always be in "province."(3) However nothing was then done to bring together

the power of the Company scattered in different parts of India. When the English triumphed over their European rival they were faced with the necessity of contending with their Indian enemies. Warren Hastings in 1770 clearly foresaw the impending struggle with the Marathas, and in letters written to friends in England pointed out the importance of a union between the three presidencies as the only means of opposing that power. (1) His description of the relations of the three presidencies corresponded with that given by Palk some years earlier. He said ".....their interests draw them different ways; they may counteract each other's motions, be at the same time allies and enemies to the "same power, or inadvertently precipitate each other into wars "without notice and therefore without due preparation." (2).

The need of a central authority in India to direct the foreign policy of the English settlements had become pressing.

Lord North who was then Prime Minister realised this clearly, and in 1773 laid the foundation of a central government in British India. Introducing in the House of Commons his "bill for the better regulation of the affairs of the Company" he said, "there is one alteration which seems to be of great necessity for "the Company, that is that there must be some superiority lodged

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1. Hastings to Lawrence Sullivan. - Fort St. George 1 Feb. 1770
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. no. 29, 126, fo. 15.
And Hastings to (Lord Shelburne?) Fort St. George 16 July 1771
idem ff. 74 (b) 75 (b) and 76.

2. Idem fo 75 (b).
"in one of their presidents in India in certain cases over the others." A controlling power was therefore to be given to one of the presidencies over the others in cases of commencing hostilities and making treaties with Indian princes. That power, Lord North said, would be "most properly lodged at Bengal, the great and important seat of the English power in India." (1) Lord Clive, though advocating the establishment of a central authority in India, proposed that a discretionary power be left to Madras and Bombay to commence hostilities or negotiate treaties in such cases of necessity as would render it dangerous to wait till the orders from Bengal arrived. He said that during a great part of the year the presidencies were cut off from each other by a distance of two months, and it might not always be possible to wait for orders from Bengal. He then pointed out that if the president of Bengal had to wait for orders from the Court of Directors "we should not have at this time one foot of ground in the East Indies." (2).

Governor Johnstone objected to the union of the presidencies under one head. He was of opinion that under the circumstances a federal union would be an infinitely better system. (3) Another member, Mr. Jenkinson proposed that the superintending body must move from place to place. (4) Nothing resulted from these two

2. Idem no 249 ff 133 -134.
4. Idem fo. 158.
latter suggestions, and it was enacted that "... the said
governor general and Council or the major part of them shall
have, and they are hereby authorized to have, power of superin-
tending and controlling the government and management of the
presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen respectively so far
and in so much as that it shall not be lawful for any president
and council of Madras, Bombay or Bencoolen to make any orders for
commencing hostilities or declaring or making war against any
Indian princes or powers, or negotiating or concluding any treaty
of peace or other treaty with any such Indian princes or powers,
without the consent and approbation of the said governor general
and council first had and obtained, except in such cases of
imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such
hostilities or treaties until the orders from the governor general
and council might arrive; and except in such cases where the
said presidents and councils respectively shall have received
special orders from the said United Company; and any president
and council of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen who shall offend in
any of the cases aforesaid, shall be liable to be suspended from
his or their office by the order of the said governor general and
council; and every president and council of Madras, Bombay and
Bencoolen for the time being shall and they are hereby respective-
ly directed and required to pay due obedience to such orders as
they shall receive, touching the premises from the said governor
general and council for the time being; and constantly and
diligently to transmit to the said governor general and council
"advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge relating to the government, revenues or interest of the said United Company..."(1)

Thus the proposals of Lord North with the qualifications suggested by Lord Clive were given effect to.

The only power that was given by this clause to the governor general and council was one of saying 'yes' or 'no' when matters of commencing war or negotiating treaties were referred to them. No positive power was implied in the wording of the clause. The limitations imposed upon the subordinate presidencies were qualified by such large exceptions that they were left practically in the same position as before. The governor general and council could be ignored practically at every step on the pleas of imminent necessity and orders from the Directors. It was left to the subordinate presidency to judge what constituted such a case of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone hostilities or treaties until the arrival of orders from Bengal. Again, instructions from the Directors could be contrary to the policy of the controlling government.

On the other hand a responsibility for the well being of the whole was fixed upon the governor general and council by the Directors, who in 1774 instructed the new administration of Bengal to "fix your attention to the preservation of peace throughout India and to the security of the possessions and revenues of

1. 13 Geo. III Cap. LXIII S. IX.
the Company." (1) This gave the Supreme Council sufficient inducement to intervene on almost every occasion in the affairs of the subordinate presidency, even without a strictly legal support for the intervention. The temptation to interfere was sure to be irresistible in times of war, as the subordinate government totally depended on the governor general and council for men, money and supplies in such exigencies. The relations between the superior and inferior presidencies as defined by law would then appear illogical. However, without legal support, the governor general and council could not assume powers equal to their responsibilities. At every step they were sure to find their interference questioned. The clause left the Bengal government in the absurd position of having to support wars without possessing an effective voice in their commencement or conclusion.

This therefore, like other sections of the Act, was full of the seeds of dissension, and set one authority against another. Such a law could not work. Its principal object, namely, to enable the three presidencies to present a united front before their enemies could not be achieved.

The purpose of the following chapters is to illustrate from the relations of the governor general and council with the Madras government the unworkable nature of the ninth clause of the Regulating Act.

Various circumstances postponed the inevitable struggle between Bengal and Madras for a few years. The battle was fought between 1779 and 1780. The governor general and council won the victory and aided by the Carnatic War established their supremacy. But they could not remain in that position as it was not based on the law. The central authority received a severe set back in the years 1783 and 1784. After ten years experience it was abundantly clear that the system could not work without friction at every step. It had, therefore, to be modified by the grant of fuller powers to the governor general and council in the Act of 1784.


This must remain a conjecture as it is based on Macpherson's letters only. It is difficult to judge of the value of these letters of Macpherson as historical evidence.
The relations of the Madras government with the Supreme Council, though extremely bitter and violent throughout, began in a friendly manner. The reasons are not far to seek. The absence of any acute subject of dispute was no doubt the most important of them. Problems which later on gave rise to the most acrimonious relations only began to make their appearance about this time. The governor of Madras, Alexander Wynch, held office but as a stop-gap, (1) and perhaps was in no mood to quarrel with the Supreme Council. Besides it is probable that he, and the majority of the Council involved in the questionable transactions of Benfield with the nawab of Arcot, had every reason to solicit the favour of the triumvirate in the Bengal Council who were ignorant of Madras affairs, so that the chastening hand of Hastings should not fall on them. (2) The Bengal Council on its part torn by internal dissensions, and embarrassed with the more important affairs of the Bombay presidency, had no time or energy to extend its controlling


2. John Macpherson to Hastings - Madras 27 Sept. 1774. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 29, 135, ff. 232(b) to 235. This must remain a conjecture as it is based on Macpherson's letters only. It is difficult to judge of the value of these letters of Macpherson as historical evidence.
hand for over the concerns of the Madras government. The two presidencies therefore maintained an attitude of deference towards each other, and adopted such a view of their respective position under the new system as to make the early working of the Regulating Act smooth and successful.

On the 24th October 1774, within a few days of their taking charge of the administration of Bengal, the Supreme Council sent to the governments of Madras and Bombay letters announcing their assumption of controlling powers over all the political concerns of the Company, and desiring them as soon as possible to submit to Bengal an account of the state of the neighbouring country powers and their relations with such powers so that they might form a judgement upon these matters and be able to direct them in future. The Bengal government also required regular reports of all such matters (1). This was in accordance with the provision of the Regulating Act requiring the subordinate presidencies to transmit to Bengal full information of all matters affecting the interests of the East India Company. The Madras government at this stage regularly transmitted all available and necessary information to Bengal to enable it to play the role of the superintending presidency.

Their letter of the 7th December 1774, (2) in reply to the Bengal


letter of the 24th October, was a lengthy despatch devoted to a
description of their relations with the Nizam, his brother
and Basalat Jang, Haider Ali, and the nawab of the Carnatic, the
strength and weaknesses of the potentates and their aspirations.
Between the end of January and the beginning of February 1775
they despatched as many as six letters to Bengal communicating
to them all the information they had regarding the activities of
the Bombay presidency. As the Bombay government at this time
was by no means diligent in their communications with Bengal,
these proved of value. Another example may be given in this
connection. The Nawab of Arcot was desirous of entering into
a treaty with Haider and had communicated his desire to the
government of Madras. The peculiar position which the nawab
occupied in relation to the Company made such a treaty of great
interest to the supreme council. The Madras government sent to
Bengal the nawab's letter to them on the subject (1) and as soon
as they received the draft treaty from the nawab they transmitted
it also. (2) That the proposed treaty did not take place does
not take away from the correct attitude of the Madras government.

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write to Bombay to safeguard his interests in their treaty with Raghoba. (1) The Madras authorities instead of writing to Bombay sent a copy of this letter to Bengal as no treaty could be concluded without their concurrence. (2)

Examples may now be given of the manner in which the Supreme Council exercised its controlling powers and the spirit in which the Madras government acquiesced in the situation. We have two interesting cases to illustrate this. The first was on the question of assistance sent by the Madras government to Bombay. In January 1775 the Madras government sought the advice of the Supreme Council (3) as to what they should do in case the Bombay government asked for assistance in their enterprise against the Marathas. Before a reply could arrive from Bengal they received urgent applications for assistance from Bombay, and thought it necessary in the interests of the Company to order a battalion of sepoys to their help. They communicated this fact to Bengal, and sent them a copy of the Bombay letter. (4) The Supreme Council approved of the re-inforcements having been sent to Bombay, but desired that in future the Madras government

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2. Loc. cit.
should not detach any part of their forces without the previous concurrence of Bengal except for the security of their own possessions. When the Bombay government again asked for help, the Madras government refused, on the ground that "we are not at liberty even if our military establishment could afford it to send you that assistance which you require." (1)

The second case is not less illustrative of the attitude of the Madras presidency in a new position. In March 1775, Nizam Ali Khan on the strength of the treaty of 1768 (2) with the English requested military assistance from the Madras government. The Madras authorities expressed to the Nizam their inability to undertake any military operation without the concurrence of the governor general and council. (3) They then forwarded to Bengal the Subahdar's letter and their reply to it together with their arguments (4) for and against rendering assistance to the Nizam. The Bengal government replied (5) that they could not authorize Madras to assist the Nizam, as in their opinion the treaty of 1768 did not make such assistance obligatory. The task of replying to the Nizam they left to the Madras government, only desiring that the refusal should be expressed in terms the "least offensive to him." The Supreme Council availed themselves of the opportunity to prescribe

to the subordinate administration a general principle of conduct. They were not to encourage any proposals for offensive engagements with any of the powers of India, "whether for the acquisition of territory or any other prospect of advantage." The Madras government, uncertain as they were of the designs of the Bombay government, and the connection between Raghoba and Mahadaji Bhonsla, whom it was the nawab's object to expel, welcomed the decision of the Bengal government as extricating them from a difficult situation. (1) The importance of having a central government to guide the policy of the English settlements appears clearly on occasions like this.

In both the cases cited above we see the smooth working of the system. In the second case, the Bengal government was certainly within the legal limits of their power. In the first case, however, the Court of Directors disapproved of the interference on the ground that the Bengal government had gone beyond what in their opinion was authorized by the Regulating Act. (2) They declared that the Regulating Act certainly left to the subordinate presidencies "power to take from time to time such steps as the immediate exigency of their affairs may require for self defence or protection, or for the necessary aid or assistance to be given to other settlements." This illustrates the difficult position of the controlling


government on account of the ambiguous nature of the wording of the Act.

We can not however accuse the Bengal government of a greedy desire for power. An instance may be given when the Supreme Council upheld the prestige of the Madras government before the country powers. The nawab of Arcot, ignoring the Madras government, wrote direct to Bengal desiring to be included in any treaty that the English might make with the Marathas. (1). The Supreme Council refused to entertain a letter which did not come through the proper channel, because in such cases they could not have the opinion of the Madras government in the matter. (2). They sent to Madras a copy of their reply to the nawab. (3). The Madras Council, who regarded the act of the nawab as a public slight thrown on them, gratefully promised to give the Bengal government all necessary information on the subject of the proposals that the nawab may in future require them to transmit to Bengal. (4). To this the Supreme Council replied, "you may rest assured that we shall observe this conduct towards the Nabob on all similar occasions." (5). This promise is interesting in view of the fact

that the Bengal government altogether forgot it on later occasions.

The supreme council at this stage had no desire to meddle indiscriminately in the affairs of the subordinate presidency. The majority of the Madras council was involved in various disputes with the nawab of Arcot while a minority protested against their attitude towards "the ancient friend and ally" of the Company. The nawab applied to the governor general for help. The Madras council also found it expedient to approach the supreme council with all the minutes and dissent recorded on the subject. (1). The Bengal government decided that Madras had interfered too far in the internal affairs of the nawab's government and defined the extent to which they could properly interfere. At the same time they made it perfectly clear, that they had agreed to decide the dispute, not by virtue of their controlling powers, but simply as arbitrators voluntarily chosen by both parties. (2). That the supreme council was aware that an undue extension of their new powers would only serve to bring them into contempt and arouse resentment is clear from the words they used: "... the occasion not being sought "by us but brought before us in a solemn and deliberate appeal. "we hope and expect that a deference will be paid to our judg-

We shall now enter into a subject which, at a later stage, so far embittered the relations of the presidencies that it led to the suspension of the then governor of Madras by the supreme council. This was the controversy over the subject of the Guntur Circar which the treaty of 1768 had given for life to Basalat Jang, brother of the Nizam, with remainder to the Company. The Madras authorities, afraid as they were of French activities, were alarmed by the reports of French adventurers being entertained by Basalat Jang, and guns and ammunition imported through Motupalli, a seaport in the Guntur Circar. In their letter of the 20th May 1775 the Council of Masulipatam suggested to the Madras Government the expediency of requiring Basalat Jang to dismiss the French, or give up to the Company Motupalli and other villages held by the French, for which the Company would pay rent to Basalat Jang during his life. (2). The Board on considering this letter were of opinion that they could not insist on Basalat Jang’s dismissing the French or giving up places possessed by the French. (3). So they wrote to Masulipatam to endeavour, if they regarded the opportunity favourable, to obtain from Basalat Jang Motupalli and other villages, if if practicable, the whole Guntur Circar at a certain

1. Mill. op. cit. Bk. IV. Ch.VIII. pp 318-19 and 333
reserved rent to him. (1). The Madras Government did not however sanction the measure, but only required them to submit their plans for effecting the object, (2) while they sought instructions from Bengal. (3) Whitehill however, requested the Madras government for further orders as he thought any endeavours that he could make would not be sufficient to induce Basalat Jang to accept these terms. (4) Upon this the Madras government decided to defer the further prosecution of the matter until a time more favourable for success. (5).

In reply to the reference of the Madras council, the Bengal government, in their letter of the 5th July, (6) authorized them to take immediate steps to remove the French from the Guntur Circar. They were recommended to march a body of troops to the frontiers of Basalat Jang's territory and insist upon the immediate discharge of all foreigners from his service. In case this failed of the desired effect, the Supreme Council added "you will signify to him that your troops will take possession of his country and that

2. Loc. cit.
5. Resol. of Board. - Idem p. 914.
you will endeavour by a negotiation with the Nizam ... to obtain the immediate cession of it to the Company." The Bengal government made it clear that they did not expressly direct these measures to be taken, but only gave their sanction to them in case the Madras authorities regarded such steps as advisable. The immediate effect of this letter was to direct the attention of the Madras government towards military preparations. (1) But when they fully considered the letter they came to the opinion that it would not be advisable to pursue the measures sanctioned by the governor general and council as that would drive Basalat Jang to seek aid from the enemies of the English and arouse the jealousy of the Nizam whose vassal he was. (2) They therefore opened a negotiation with the Nizam by letter, (3) in order to obtain his consent to oblige Basalat Jang to agree, either to dismiss the Europeans from his service or trust to the English for the protection of the country, or to let them at an annual rent the whole of the Guntur Circar. Troops also were sent to the frontiers of Basalat Jang's territory with orders for the Commander to stop any military stores and Europeans that might be landed at Motupalli. (4).

A long time elapsed before the Madras Council informed Bengal of the step they had taken and sent a copy of their address to the Nizam. They apologised for not strictly following their recommendations on the ground that they were not expressly directed to do so. They hoped that their decision would meet with the approval of the Bengal government. (1).

To this the governor general and council replied on the 23rd October that, as the Madras government had written to the Nizam in the terms suggested by them, they should wait to hear the results of that letter before they sent further instructions on the subject. (2).

Sir Robert Fletcher, a member of the Madras council, considered this letter as an unavoidable acquiescence in the Madras letter to the Nizam, for if they had tried to enforce their recommendations of the 5th July they would have superseded the act of the Madras Board and endangered the harmony which then subsisted between the Madras government and the Nizam. (3).

On the same day that the Bengal council wrote the above letter, the Madras government communicated to Bengal the suggestion of Whitehill that it would be better to depute a person to treat with the Nizam upon the subject, than to rest the negotiations upon


a letter. They added that they had not come to any new resolution on the subject of the Guntur Circair as they were waiting for an answer from the Nizam and instructions from Bengal, but that they meant to depute a person to treat with the Nizam if he replied in vague terms or desired a personal negotiation. (1).

The Supreme Council approved of the plan of sending a person to the Nizam's Court but desired in case such a person was sent that his commission "be strictly confined to the affairs of the Guntur "Circair agreeable to the instructions we have already given you" and that the Bengal government be furnished with a copy of his instructions. (2).

In the meanwhile on the 20th November a letter from the Nizam, stating that he had directed Basalat Jang to withdraw the French from Guntur, having been received, the Madras government despatched a copy of it to Bengal saying that it was not a direct answer to the proposals made to him, and desiring to be furnished as soon as possible with instructions from Bengal upon that letter.

The Supreme Council, on receiving the Nizam's letter and the deliberations of the Madras council on it, replied that if the Nizam kept his promises their object would be obtained; if not they allowed the Madras government "the same latitude to take possession of the Circair" which they gave them in their letter of


the 5th July and they would be satisfied "with any just means" by which the Madras government might attain the end which they had in view. They however desired to see the affair settled amicably and to avoid proceeding to open hostilities. (1).

Before this letter reached Madras (2) an important change had taken place in the administration there. Lord Pigot had taken up charge of the government of Madras. (3). In the quarrels which arose between the governor and the majority of his council over the affairs of Tanjore, the subject of the Guntur Circar was forgotten for a while. (4).

It is worth while noticing here the steadfastness with which the Madras council refused to take any step before receiving the opinion of the Bengal government or the Nizam's letter. Alarmed by reports that Basalat Jang was preparing for resistance, Sir Robert Fletcher on the 13th November moved that the recommendations of the governor general and council in their letter of the 5th July be immediately put into execution. (5). In the course

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2. The letter was read in the Madras council on 2 Jan. 1776.

3. Lord Pigot took up charge on the 11th Dec. 1775.


of the discussion that followed, the Bengal letter of the 23rd Oct. was read and the Madras Board decided that no step could be taken to them for some sort of sanction to their de facto rule. The before the Nizam's reply was received and the opinion of Bengal on it was obtained. (1). Again on the 20th Nov. when the reply from the Nizam was read Mr. Stone moved that in order to give the Nizam proof of their confidence in him, the troops stationed at Yantepollam and Ongole be withdrawn. (2). The council refused to make any alterations in the arrangements before receiving the sentiments of the governor general and council. (3). In view of the difference of opinion on the subject, however, they thought it necessary to transmit the proceedings of both days to the Bengal government with a request to be favoured with their instructions. (4).

The Bengal government could not long keep up the same attitude towards Madras affairs that they had shown in 1775. They failed to maintain a policy of non-intervention in the relations of the Madras government with the nawab of Arcot. Then the disputes between Lord Pigot and the majority of the council required their interference in order to prevent civil war. In the period of the administration of the majority of the council they had no serious

1. Resol. of Board - Idem p. 1426.
dispute to fear as George Stratton and the others were indebted to them for some sort of sanction to their de facto rule. The rest of the period up to the arrival of Rumbold passed in comparative unanimity between the presidencies from the lack of any important subject of dispute.

The first duty that the Directors expected the Madras government to discharge on the arrival of Pigot as governor was the restoration of the raja of Tanjore to his dominions. (1) They informed the Madras government that to ensure the success of their measures they had directed the Bengal government to co-operate with them if required, (2) and to the Bengal government they intimated that in matters which required their interposition they were to conform to the orders given to Madras. (3).

The Madras government gave to Bengal a general account of how far they had carried out the orders of the Court. (4) The Bengal government construed the letter of the Directors as an express command to co-operate with Madras (5) in the restoration of the raja of Tanjore. So the summary account from Madras did not

1. Directors to Madras - 12 April 1775 Madras Dispatches Vol. 6
2. Idem para. 33.
3. Directors to Bengal - 12 April 1775 Bengal Dispatches Vol. 7 para 2.
satisfy them, especially as complaints were received against Lord Pigot and the Madras government from the nawab of Arcot that he and his servants had been harshly treated in the execution of the orders of the Directors.

The Bengal council thereupon set itself to decide, "whether the subjects of the Nabob's representations are of such a nature as by the powers vested in this government by Act of Parliament and by the duties connected with those powers, require its interposition?" (1). General Clavering suggested that the Bengal government could interfere only where Madras went beyond the orders they had received from the Directors. (2) Hastings remarked (3) that the Madras government had neglected the duty which was incumbent on them of communicating to Bengal accounts of all their transactions with the nawab and Raja of Tanjore. The Bengal council therefore required the Madras government (4) to send copies of all their proceedings relating to the restoration of the Raja of Tanjore as well as copies of all their correspondence on the subject with their President since his departure to Tanjore. They were, they said, especially eager to receive

1. Idem.
them as they were informed that one of the Company's officers had gone beyond the boundaries of Tanjore and seized a servant of the nawab which act required explanation as it appeared to be unwarranted by the Company's orders. The Madras government in reply (1) said that they thought the information that they had transmitted to Bengal was all that was material at that time, promised to send all their proceedings relative to Tanjore, defended their action with regard to the nawab's servant and submitted that they were incapable "of being intentionally wanting in respect" to the supreme government. After a month they sent the copies of all their papers relating to Tanjore. (2).

The Bengal council then proceeded to examine the records of Madras and the representations of the nawab of Arcot. (3). Hastings was of opinion (4) that most of the complaints of the nawab were well-founded. As to the charge that Lord Pigot had taken away lands and grain assigned for payment of the nawab's troops and his creditors, Hastings remarked that the subject did not fall within the controlling powers vested in the Bengal government. Regarding the series of complaints that Lord Pigot had

1. Madras to Bengal 15 June 1776 Idem 27 June 1776 Vol. 36 (The letter is dated 13th June in the Mad. Cons.)
caused servants of the nawab to be arrested, that the nawab had been threatened and that English troops had entered into countries belonging to the nawab and forcibly taken possession of them, Hastings was of opinion that they were acts of hostility against the nawab calculated to provoke his enmity and to drive him into alliance with Haidar or the Nizam, and as such a breach of the Regulating Act. He remarked that acts which cast indignity on the nawab might not be acts of hostility in the literal sense of the words of the Act of Parliament but were more likely to destroy the friendship with the nawab than acts of avowed enmity, and as such should be regarded as contrary to the Regulating Act "or the act was passed in vain, since there are a thousand ways in which it might be eluded without making any orders for commencing hostilities or declaring or making war." He continued, "if such acts are generally prohibited how much more ought they to be guarded against by the utmost vigilance and exertion of the controlling government in cases which are likely to dissolve the connection of the Company and of the British nation with the first and firmest ally they ever possessed in India." He therefore described the acts of the Madras government as "a connected series of hostilities everyone of which not authorised by the special orders of the Company or by imminent necessity is an infringement of the Act of Parliament." He suggested to the council two alternatives, either to proceed to the extreme penalty prescribed by the Regulating Act or to appoint a person to reside with the nawab as the minister and
representative of the Bengal government "empowered to receive
back such communications as the nawab may think proper to make
to this Board, and in our name to call upon the governor and
council of Fort St. George for the suspension of every act of
theirs by which the Nabob's rights may be usurped or infringed."
The board thereupon agreed unanimously to a series of resolu-
tions (1) indicting the transactions of the Madras government as
an infringement of the rights and powers of the nawab and as
having a direct tendency to disturb the peace of the Carnatic.
They resolved to support the right of the nawab against all such
attempts in future and to exert with effect the superintending
power vested in them for the preservation of peace in the
Carnatic. To Madras the supreme council wrote (2) on the 7th
Aug. 1776 that they were agreed in resolutions on such parts of
the Madras proceedings relating to Tanjore as called for the
interposition of their controlling power and declared that they
should hold any member of the Madras administration who acted in
contradiction to the sense of those resolutions to be guilty of a
wilful violation of the rights of the nawab and a disturber of
the peace of the Carnatic. They informed the Madras government
that they had suspended for the time being their plan of appoint-
ing a resident with the nawab as that would have implied a dis-
trust in the efficacy of their resolutions and hoped an

alteration in their attitude towards the nawab would restore his confidence in them. They declared certain arrangements made by Lord Pigot with the Raja of Tanjore to be unwarranted by the Company's orders.

We have no means of judging what attitude the Madras government would have taken on this letter if Lord Pigor had been at the head of a united administration. As matters came to pass a violent quarrel broke out in the Madras council over the affairs of Tanjore which led to the imprisonment of Lord Pigot by the majority of council who constituted themselves the government under the presidency of their senior George Stratton.(1). Thereupon both the majority of council and Lord Pigot reported the details of the revolution to Bengal.(2). The majority appealed. - "We submit the whole to your consideration calling upon you for your assistance and support in the present dangerous exigency of affairs"(3) and prayed that the Bengal government would give such orders as might remove their difficulties.(4)

Hastings put two questions before the council - first, whether they had legal authority to take cognizance of the

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1. Mill, Bk.V. Ch.IV. pp. 90-95.
disputes, and second, whether it was incumbent for them on this occasion to interpose their authority. (1) Francis was of opinion that Bengal had the right to take cognizance of the disputes because one of the parties (i.e. the majority) stood against the measures which they had condemned in their letter of the 7th August. As to the second question he was of opinion that it was incumbent on Bengal to intervene. (2) General Clavering however did not believe that the Bengal government possessed any legal right, but was of opinion that the alarming situation of the Madras government and the appeal from both parties ought to induce them to interfere. (3) As regards the legal right and also the moral duty to interfere Hastings had no doubt. (4) His opinion was, that in order to decide that the majority of the council at Madras was the legal government, and to declare that the Bengal government would support them to the utmost of their power, the sanction of the controlling power granted by the Regulating Act was not necessary. It was the duty of the supreme council to correspond with Madras and to support them in all exigencies. They could therefore decide which of the two contending parties legally possessed the powers of government. At the same time if it was found

1. The two questions were put in the form of one.
2. Francis' Minute - Idem.
necessary for the preservation of the peace of the Carnatic, intervention under the sanction of the Regulating Act would be justified.

At this time the Director's letter of the 31 Jan. 1776 was before the Bengal council. So they had no difficulty in deciding that the legal power was vested in the majority of the Madras Board.

The Supreme Council therefore informed (1) the de facto Madras administration that they acknowledged them as the legal government and were resolved to support them by all the means which they had in their power to grant, by virtue of the general instructions of the Court of Directors, to afford their aid and protection to all the presidencies. The Bengal government explained that they could not but support the majority party as the legal administration because they depended upon them to conform to their orders of the 7th August. At the same time they warned them that their final resolutions on the charges preferred by the nawab, only remained suspended, and that if any change should take place which should make it necessary for them to recur to the opinions which they had already delivered upon them, they would proceed to the extreme penalty prescribed by the Regulating Act. They required the new Madras administration to keep them constantly informed of their affairs so as to

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enable them to take measures for the safety of the settlement. The Bengal council communicated their decision to Lord Pigot also. (1)

The supreme council had made it clear that the justification for their intervention lay in the dangerous situation into which the settlement had fallen. It was on this ground that the Directors approved their action when they wrote, "as we can attribute the decisive part you took on the occasion only to the critical situation of our affairs on the coast, we are satisfied that you acted with a view to the security and safety of the Company's possessions." (2).

The Bengal government, when once they had interfered in order to prevent civil war were obliged to go further and ensure that their decision was obeyed. Alarmed at reports that Lord Pigot was calling for the assistance and allegiance of the Company's servants and apprehending a civil war, General Clavering proposed (3) that letters be written to Ganjam, Vizagapatam and Masulipatam informing them of the decision of Bengal in favour of the majority party at Madras. He further proposed that a person be sent to notify to the Company's servants at Madras.

the resolutions of the Bengal government, and to require in their name anyone who might have wrongly placed his allegiance to obey the majority. In the first proposition, the council acquiesced, and accordingly a circular letter to that effect was sent to Masulipatam, Vizagapatam and Ganjam. (1) The second proposition, however, fell through. Hastings was of opinion that it would be an exertion of "an authority not derived from nor applicable to the controlling powers vested in this government by the Regulating Act," and would alarm the Madras government. (2) Nothing illustrates more the unwillingness of the Bengal government to take advantage of the troubles of Madras to extend their controlling hand too far.

The new administration at Madras, however, depending for its stability on the sanction of the Bengal government, found it necessary to consult them on the important question of the disposal of Lord Pigot's person. While suggesting Lord Pigot's removal to England, they promised to acquiesce in any opinion that the Supreme council would favour them with. Their apology for approaching the Bengal government in the matter was that "the decision may affect the peace and tranquility of the Carnatic which the controlling powers vested in you by the late Act of Parliament were

"intended to preserve."(1) The supreme council was in a dilemma. They declined to give a direct answer as they saw the impropriety of offering their opinion on a point on which they had no legal authority. At the same time they conveyed to Madras the impression that there was no doubt either as to the propriety of the suggested measure or the powers of the new government to adopt it.(2).

Though the Madras government had looked to the Supreme government for assistance in a critical period they were not prepared to receive the censures of the latter with bowed heads. To the Calcutta letter of the 7th August which had declared certain arrangements with the Raja of Tanjore as not authorised by the orders of the Directors, they replied that they were "concerned to observe" that Bengal considered those measures as "unwarranted and repugnant to the spirit of their orders." They defended the arrangements and refused to take any new measures as they thought it "eligible to wait for the opinion of the Directors".(3).

Once again the Bengal government thought it necessary to make recommendations to the Madras government(4) in order to safeguard the interests of the nawab who had sent pitiful representations of

1. Madras to Bengal 19 Oct.1776 Idem 11 Nov.1776 Vol.38
his distressed situation. They declared that the claims of the
nawab to the recovery of the money which he had laid out for the
service of Tanjore, while the country was in his possession, were in-
disputable, and recommended that the Raja of Tanjore should now pay
the money. They disapproved of the assignments of the revenues of
the Carnatic that might have been granted to servants of the Com-
pany, who were creditors of the nawab, and recommended the Madras
government to require the nawab to resume such grants and to sus-
pend the liquidation of those debts, until he had fully discharged
the Company's dues. They explained, in their letter to the Madras
government, that they were taking cognizance of the matter not by
virtue of the powers they had received from Parliament, but because
they were certain that as it was a matter which related to the gen-
eral supervision of the political interests of the Company, the
Madras government would pay deference to their opinions, and that
they were to carry out the recommendations only if they thought it
expedient to do so. The debates in the Bengal council which pre-
ceded the dispatch of this letter are interesting. Hastings
argued (1) that if the Raja refused to pay the nawab's legitimate
dues, and if the nawab called on the Madras government for help they
were bound by treaty to render assistance by arms or by mediation.
This might lead to a war with Tanjore, and therefore the Supreme
government could intervene. But Hastings himself acknowledged that
his argument was far fetched. "I am fearful" he said, "of trusting

to my own interpretation of the law by remote deductions." He therefore proposed that the Madras government be offered mere, recommendations, making it optional for them to follow. He added "Our opinion will be a sufficient warrant for any coercive means which they may employ for the recovery of the Nabob's demands though, it may not be binding on them to employ force, our jurisdiction being, as I understand it, merely negative." Francis was clear that the supreme government had no jurisdiction in a case in which the revenues of Tanjore were concerned, that no interpretation of the Regulating Act would justify interference and that the idea of a war between the nawab and the Raja, and consequent breach of the peace of the Carnatic, was chimerical. (1) The words of Francis disapproving of the Board's pronouncing formal declarations on any matter over which they did not strictly have jurisdiction, were words of wisdom. He said, "Unless the parties concerned are bound by such declarations, and we are authorized to enforce them by the powers vested in us by Parliament, which I think can not be maintained, we may unadvisedly expose the dignity of this government to a slight and lessen the weight of our authority, on occasions when it might be lawfully exerted." (2).

The Madras government received this letter in almost the same attitude that they showed towards the Calcutta letter of the 7th Aug. 1776. They forwarded a copy of the letter to the nawab and

1. Francis' Minute Idem p. 514.
2. Francis' Minute Idem p. 507.
waited for the orders of the Court of Directors on the subject. (1).

The Directors issued their orders on the 11th June 1777. (2). Lord Pigot and his friends were restored while his opponents were suspended from service. Both parties, however, were recalled to answer for their conduct to the Directors, and a temporary government was appointed with Thomas Rumbold as President. Whitehill who was appointed second in council acted as governor from 31st Aug. 1777 to 8th Feb. 1778 when Rumbold arrived from England. (3).

The new government of Madras, though ready to play the part assigned to them by the Regulating Act, were jealous of what they deemed their legitimate rights. Communicating the news of General Clavering's death, the Bengal government informed Madras that until a successor was appointed the military duties appertaining to the Commander-in-chief would be performed by the governor general and council. They therefore requested the Madras government to order their commanding officer to make his returns to them. (4). The Madras board ordered such returns to be sent, but they entered in their records a doubt as to the authority of the governor general and council in their corporate capacity to perform the duties of the Commander-in-chief and refused to admit a right in them to

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   Vol. 85, p. 1560.
require from the Madras government monthly returns of the forces on their establishment. (1) "Being desirous on the one hand of avoiding the most distant probability of a dispute with the governor general and council upon a matter of so little consequence in itself, and wishing, on the other hand, to prevent any encroachment upon the powers left them by the late regulating Act of Parliament, the Board have upon this principle agreed to comply with the request made by the governor general and council merely for their information, in which they flatter themselves they have conformed to the meaning of the act without admitting a right which might hereafter be drawn in precedent to circumscribe the powers of this government still more than appears to have been intended by the legislature or the Company." (2).

This attitude however did not prevent them from co-operating in a friendly manner with the Bengal government for the security of the Company's possessions in India. Apprehensive of a war with the French, the supreme council requested the Madras government to send an account of their military strength, and to communicate their opinion on various measures, which they suggested should be taken, for the common security in case of an invasion. (3). To this letter the Madras government replied (4) that they should communicate with

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2. Loc. cit.
Bengal on these subjects "most cheerfully and at all times be ready to join our best endeavours to maintain the present security." 1. They gave their opinion on all the points in the Calcutta letter.

Another instance may be given to show how far they realized the need of concerted action in foreign policy. Bombay had asked from them military assistance. Among the reasons for refusing them help, the Madras government communicated to Bengal, that they considered it improper to send assistance before the Bombay government had received the concurrence of Bengal to their scheme. 2.

The very position of the Madras government, as dependent for financial help from Bengal, added to the critical nature of the time, made it necessary for the Supreme government to meddle to some extent in the internal affairs of the subordinate presidency. The Madras government being forced to ask for a supply of ten lacs of rupees, 3. the Bengal government expressed their inability to render that assistance. They however promised to help in case of emergency, and in order to judge of the extent of the wants of the Madras presidency and compare them with their own abilities, they requested Madras to transmit to them an estimate of their probable resources.

1. Idem p. 372.
and disbursements in the ensuing year. (1).

To the return rendered by the commanding officer at Madras the governor general and council discharging the duties of the commander-in-chief remarked that the constitutional strength of the Madras army was greatly impaired by the fact that the European element was dispersed throughout the whole army. (2). They therefore recommended their concentration at Madras or within its easy reach. They made it clear that these remarks were not meant to censure them but were mere reflections submitted to their judgement. (3). It is clear from the letter that they were led to make recommendations on a point relating to arrangements in the Madras army from fear of an impending struggle for very existence.

CHAPTER II.

The Struggle Between Hastings And Rumbold.

In the story of the relations of the governor general and council with the Madras government under the Regulating Act, the period of the governorship of Rumbold undoubtedly forms one of the most interesting chapters. Personal enmity between Rumbold and Hastings, (1) combined with the undefined nature of the restrictions laid on the subordinate presidency by the Regulating Act, brought about most unseemly disputes between the governments of Bengal and Madras, in which the latter was clearly the aggressor. The number of occasions on which Madras took the initiative in negotiations with the Indian princes showed how very few indeed were the limitations imposed upon the subordinate government by the Regulating Act. Yet when the Bengal government intervened on one occasion for the safety of the British possessions in India, the Madras government questioned the rights of Bengal in a manner in which they had never before been questioned, and wholly rejecting the controlling powers claimed by the Bengal government. The Madras government thereafter kept up an attitude of defiance, and sought every occasion to pick a quarrel with the supreme council. The Bengal government though extremely annoyed at the mischievous activities and the

1. Rumbold was a candidate for the office of governor general in 1773.
defiant attitude of the Madras government, did not allow their patience to be exhausted, till after the departure of Rumbold, when their wrath fell on Whitehill, the infortuniate legatee of Rumbold's misdeeds. The mischief, however, had been caused before the supreme government intervened, and they were thus unable to prevent the disaster that befell the Carnatic in July 1780. (1)

For more than a year after the arrival of Rumbold the relations of the Madras government with the supreme council continued to be fairly smooth. The first affair of importance that came before them was the war with the French. In June 1778 private reports reached India that a war had broken out between England and France. (2)

On the first arrival of the news the Bengal government advised Madras to take immediate possession of Pondicherry. (3) (7 July 1778). Within a few days they occupied the French territory in Bengal, and again wrote to Madras to proceed instantly to attack Pondicherry in case the report was not contradicted. (4) (11 July 1778).

Scarcely had these letters been despatched, when they heard from Madras that although they were making preparations, they had decided to wait for the confirmation of the news before actually attacking

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the French. (1). The Bengal government became impatient over the matter and expressed in strong terms to Madras their "concern and disappointment" at what they regarded as the loss of a "favourable opportunity of annihilating the French." (2). (14 July 1778).

The Madras government in reply informed the supreme council of the deep offence that they had felt on the receipt of their letter. They said that when the Bengal letter of the 7th July reached them, their army was on the point of moving in consequence of the orders of the Court of Directors; in any case no earlier action could have been taken, because it would have been imprudent to send any but a formidable force before Pondicherry which was well fortified. They asked whether, restricted as they were by the Regulating Act, they had the authority to commence hostilities on information received from a private merchant, and whether they might not have been subjected to heavy penalties had they under the circumstances precipitated the war. (3). Thus the Madras government gave early indication that they would not bear the censures of the supreme council without a word of protest.

In the matter of finance however, they were to a great extent dependent on Bengal. The French war made them more dependent than ever in this respect. They were therefore not in a position to express resentment when their request for financial assistance was met with demands from the supreme council to be furnished with

accounts of their receipts and disbursements. The Bengal govern-
ment had in response to earnest appeals from Madras sent money
early in June 1778. (1) Yet by the end of July and the beginning
of August of that year Madras was again sending appeals for finan-
cial help to Bengal. (2) The Bengal government thereupon renewed
their request to Madras for an account of their revenues and dis-
bursements for the year which they had repeatedly applied for, but
not yet received, and also for an estimate of the revenues of the
Carnatic and an account of the manner in which they were applied.
(3.) (17 and 26 Aug. 1778). Thereupon the Madras government trans-
mitted an abstract of the nawab’s revenue from the Carnatic and also
an account of their probable receipts and disbursements from the
1st. November 1778 to 1st. November 1779 (4) which Hastings described
as a summary estimate and an imperfect compliance with the demands
of the Bengal government.(5) Madras however regarded the informa-
tion they had supplied as all that was necessary and expressed their
hope that Bengal would assist them to the best of their ability. (17
Dec. 1778). Contemplating the expedition to Mahe’ , the Madras

  and Madras to Bengal 7 Aug. 1778. Idem 26 Aug. 1778 Vol.49,
  p. 137 |
| 5. Governor General's Minute Idem 22 March 1779 Vol.51, p. 287. |
government again renewed their request for financial assistance. (1)

This application prompted the Bengal government to go further and to require "a more particular state specifying the periods at which "your resources become due and the indispensable disbursements of "each month and to advise us regularly of any casual deficiencies in the former or excess in the latter." (2) (25 Jan. 1779). The supreme government also asked to be furnished with an account of the nawab's debts. (3) The Madras government ignored the first request and in reply to the second sent only a written agreement made by the nawab with his private creditors on the 24th December 1777. To the promise of the Bengal government that they would certainly help Madras in case of emergency they replied that, since they depended on monthly receipts and collections for monthly disbursements, such an emergency would throw them into insurmountable difficulties and help arriving from Bengal would not be in time to relieve them. (4) They informed Bengal of the measures they had taken to secure the payment of his dues by the Raja of Tanjore, (5) and also dwelt upon the difficulty of making the nawab of the Carnatic discharge his obligations (6). They had conceived the idea of acquiring from the nawab the

5. Idem p. 259
assignment of the Carnatic revenues but had felt that they had no
right to force the nawab to make an assignment. (1). They there-
fore wrote to Bengal to "give us the sanction of your authority as
"far as it extends to enable us to supply the defects of the pre-
"sent system". (2). Their financial dependence thus led them to
seek advice (3) on a matter to which the controlling powers of the
Bengal government did not extend. On receipt of this letter
Hastings raised a discussion on the principle involved in rendering
financial assistance to the subordinate presidencies when they
sought for it. Was the Supreme government bound to render such
assistance, or should they judge the necessity on which such re-
quision was founded? Hastings pointed out that Bengal had re-
quired from Madras accounts of their receipts and disbursements
because they followed the principle involved in the second part
of the question. He was of opinion that this was also the in-
tention behind the clause of the Regulating Act which required the
other presidencies to transmit to Bengal information on matters
relating to country powers, revenues, and the general interests
of the Company. The Madras government however had never fully
complied with their request. (4). As to the request of the Madras


Vol. 51, p. 254.

pp. 191-193.

4. Governor General's minute Beng. Sec. Cons. 22 March 1779,
government for an opinion on the mode of securing the payment of the nawab's dues, Hastings was of opinion that to answer these demands would be "to assume an indiscreet and unavailing responsibility" as the knowledge of the Bengal government with respect to the Raja of Tanjore and the nawab of the Carnatic was imperfect, and because they could not dictate with the authority of orders the means which they might recommend. (1) This is extremely interesting in view of the completely different attitude which the Bengal government held towards the same subject in 1781.

Soon after this discussion a letter was received from the Court directing Bengal to send any assistance in money or otherwise that Madras might require. (2) Accordingly a supply of ten lakhs of rupees was immediately sent with the promise of another five lakhs to follow. (3) (5 April 1779). These five lakhs not having been sent the Madras government applied for them (4) (30 Oct. 1779). The Bengal government replied that unusual calls for money had prevented them from keeping their promise but Madras could rest assured that they would exert every effort to yield them assistance "should your necessities hereafter appear equally urgent with our own, and your means insufficient to answer them." (20 Dec. 1779) (5).

1. Idem p. 292.
bitter quarrel which was taking place at the time between the two governments, Madras it appears forgot their monetary needs and Bengal the duty of supplying them.

On the subject of the negotiations with Haidar, also, the Madras government showed a desire to follow the advice of Bengal. The Madras government, having received some proposals from Haidar's vakil, the governor wrote to Haidar in general terms expressing the desire of the Company to strengthen their connection with him. They then forwarded to Bengal copies of Haidar's proposals and of the letters they had written to him and requested the supreme government to give their opinion on the subject and to sanction a fresh treaty with Haidar if they approved it. (1)(19 July 1778). The Bengal government had already, on the news of the French war, written to Madras to "negotiate and conclude such conditions with "Hyder Alley.... as may seem to .... insure his assistance in case "of necessity carefully avoiding any engagements that may draw the "Company's forces from the immediate protection of their own "possessions...." (2) (7 July 1778). They had therefore no objection to a new treaty of alliance with Haidar. They were however unwilling to enter into any offensive engagements with him. With reference to Haidar's offer to assist the English to establish Raghunath in the office of Pashma, the Supreme Council declared that they supported the cause of Raghoba not as an end, but as a

means of accomplishing their designs in the west of India. They
were besides afraid that engagements of the nature proposed by
Haidar might conflict with the conditions which Elliot might con-
clude with the Raja of Berar. They approved in general of the
other articles proposed by Haidar’s vakils. (1) (17 Aug. 1778).
The only ground, however, on which Haidar was ready to form an al-
liance with the English was on the condition of mutual assistance
(2). The subject was therefore dropped. The importance of
having a central government to guide the relations of the Company’s
governments with the Indian states appeared very clearly on this
occasion. All the three presidencies had simultaneously been
thinking of an alliance with Haidar in order to counteract the
schemes of the French. Had there not been the need of a refer-
ence to Bengal, it is possible that Bombay and Madras might have
negotiated on lines not only contradictory to each other but also
conflicting with the plans of the supreme government. As things
happened, Bombay requested the permission of Bengal to send a
resident to Haidar’s durbar. The Madras government on receiving
the plan from Bengal (3) pointed out that it would be more proper
to send a person to Haidar from Madras than from Bombay. (4).

   pp. 1-5.
Again, the reference by the Madras government to Bengal of the proposals of Haidar afforded Bengal the opportunity of bringing the Madras negotiations in line with Elliot's negotiations with Mudajee. The Bengal government sent to Madras a copy of the instructions they had given to Elliot, and recommended that the first article in the proposed treaty with Haidar be adjusted by communication between the envoy appointed by Madras and Elliot. (1).

Early in 1779 the Madras select committee again took up the subject of a new treaty with Haidar. Haidar was very much annoyed at the project of the English against Mahe'. The Madras government therefore thought it necessary to soften his anger. They wrote to him for permission to send a person to his durbar, and a person was appointed, of which the Bengal government was duly informed. (2). But no resident seems to have been actually sent on this occasion.

All hope of winning over Haidar vanished when Mahe' was taken. Haidar too had been irritated by the delivery of Guntur to the English. So in April 1779, Madras proposed to Bengal that the three presidencies should unite their forces and attack Haidar on the Malabar coast. (3). In the meanwhile Rumbold had sent Schwartz...

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a missionary, with a letter from himself to Haidar with the object of ascertaining the real attitude of Haidar towards the Company. The reply from Haidar that Schwartz brought along with him made it clear to the Madras government that the intentions of Haidar were definitely hostile. They resolved that "the only means which can yet be taken with propriety is to advise the gentlemen at Bengal of our sentiments on this subject."(1). In pursuance of this resolution the Madras government wrote again to Bengal about the hostile attitude of Haidar suggesting a plan of operations against him. (2). The supreme government in reply advised them not to make themselves the aggressors. They thought it probable that "a firm and moderate conduct on one side accompanied by amicable professions and assurances to him on the other may at least ensure "his immediate neutrality and preserve the peace of the Carnatic." (3). (30 Dec. 1779). Nothing was done thereafter to conciliate Haidar or to check his aggressive plans. Suffice it to say that in spite of the fact that they were engaged in a bitter quarrel with Bengal, the Madras government continued to keep the supreme council informed about the growing hostile attitude of Haidar.

In April 1780 though their relations with Bengal were extremely strained Whitehill did not forget to inform Bengal about Gray's embassy to Haidar's Court and the unfriendly reception he had met with, and furnished the supreme council with copies of letters they had received from Gray and Haidar. (1).

On the other hand the Madras government partly without the knowledge of the supreme council entered in a series of transactions which so far embittered the Nizam that Bengal had to intervene in order to prevent him from joining the enemies of the Company at this critical period.

The subject of the Guntur Circar had been shelved in the beginning of 1776. The renewal of war with France revived its importance. Rumbold in the course of a minute on the 10th July 1778 brought to the notice of the Madras board the presence of French troops in the Guntur Circar and the need of taking the steps which had been contemplated in 1775. He pointed out that they had the sanction of the supreme council to execute the main object of the Bengal government in any manner they thought proper, and therefore proposed that a letter be written to the Nizam. This was to inform him that since he had failed to remedy the complaints that the Company had against Basalat Jang, they proposed to apply to Basalat Jang himself, and in case the port of Motupalli was not given to them and they were not assured that foreign troops should not enter Guntur, the Company would take possession of the whole circar. (2).

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A letter was written to the Nizam accordingly, and the commandant of Ongole was directed to stop all Europeans going into the Circar. (1) The Supreme Council does not seem to have been acquainted with this. Perhaps the Nizam did not reply to this letter, and the subject does not reappear till the last day of November 1778 when Rumbold informed the Select Committee that he had been approached by Basalat Jang's vakil with the offer to rent the Guntur Circar to the Madras government on certain terms. (2).

The Madras council communicated to Basalat Jang the terms on which they could accept his offer, (3) and sent copies of Basalat Jang's proposals and the terms they had offered, to Bengal with a request to be favoured with their opinion, and, if they approved, their sanction to a treaty with Basalat Jang. (4) (31 Dec. 1778). The Bengal government made some remarks upon the articles proposed by Madras, but approved in general of an alliance and left it to Madras to negotiate and finally conclude a treaty (25 Jan. 1779) (5).

Thus a negotiation was commenced with Basalat Jang without the knowledge of his superior, the Nizam. The supreme government at this time did not raise any objection on this ground. The treaty was concluded in April 1779. (6) The Bengal government however was

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not informed at the time about its final conclusion.

When affairs were in this state the Madras government conceived the idea of appointing John Hollond as resident at the Nizam's Court (27 Jan. 1779) (1). The instructions to Hollond were to ascertain the attitude of the Nizam who they were afraid had been disaffected at the support of Roghoba by the English, to obtain his concurrence towards the completion of the arrangements regarding the Guntur Circar, and to inform him that they had no intention to withhold the tribute due to him for the circars which they would pay when they received reasonable satisfaction with respect to Guntur and the troops in Basalat Jang's service. (2) The Madras government desired that Hollond would "convey every necessary intelligence to the governor general and council of Bengal as well as to us, and that you will be as early as possible in all your communications to both presidencies." (3).

They explained to Bengal their reasons for appointing a resident at the Nizam's Court and informed them of their having instructed Hollond to convey every necessary information that the Supreme government might require from him. (4) (7 Feb. 1779).

Nearly six months later, in June 1779 the Madras government sent to Hollond instructions which were radically different from

the first and totally altered the objects of his embassy. He was now informed that he was to endeavour to obtain a complete remission of the tribute due to the Nizam from the Madras government for the Circuit. If all his efforts failed he was to seek a partial remission of the tribute, and if possible also for a proportional remission of the arrears. (1) The Madras government however, did not inform Bengal of these fresh instructions. When Hollond replied that the proposals had greatly annoyed the Nizam and that he had threatened hostilities, (2) the Madras government remarked that their demand had produced the effect they had expected, required Hollond to represent to the Nizam "that our claims on the article of the peshkash has such foundation in equity that we cannot relinquish it" and that they still hoped that he would on mature reflection comply with their requests. As they did not entertain much hope of the entire remission of the tribute, they suggested various propositions for partial remission of the tribute and the arrears. In case all the propositions were rejected, Hollond was required to inform the Nizam that the Company would pay the dues, that they had no design to commit hostilities, but that they would always be prepared "fully and effectually to revenge the least insult that shall be "offered to them." (3).

The result was that the Nizam was estranged from the Madras government. It was at this stage that Hollond communicated to the governor general the intention which the Nizam had avowed of taking the field after the rains, and forwarded his correspondence with the Madras government. (1) Hastings thereupon asked the board whether they should interfere in the negotiations between the Madras government and the Nizam. (2) Referring to the first instructions given to Hollond, Hastings said that they were "such as perhaps in the strict construction of the dependence of that presidency on the control of this government they were authorized to give by their own separate power, since the professions and only object was the preservation of peace grounded on a treaty already existing." (3) But, he pointed out, in the later instructions to Hollond the Madras government had deviated from their original design into a train of unreasonable demands which were even accompanied with indirect threats of war. (4) He was therefore of opinion that the demand for the remission of the peshkash though not a direct breach of the treaty would always be considered as such. (5) "In this state of the negotiations the interposition of a superior authority appears to be equally reasonable and

5. Idem p. 676.
necessary both to the presidency of Fort St. George from the difficulty in which it seems to have involved them, and to prevent the consequence which a breach with their ally would entail on the credit of their faith, and on the general interests of the Company."(1) As to the form which such interference should take he was of opinion that it would not be proper to withdraw Holland's mission from Hyderabad, because they had already sanctioned it, though under different circumstances, and because, though it should logically follow from the controlling powers of the Bengal government that all political negotiations should originate with them, the Court of Directors had in another case decided otherwise.(2).

The Bengal board unanimously agreed to interpose its authority and accordingly letters were written to the Nizam, Holland and the Madras government. The governor general wrote to the Nizam that he had misconstrued the propositions of the Madras government as being demands and as having the intention of departing from the treaty between him and the Company; that the Madras Government did not entertain the idea imputed to them, for if they had they would certainly have informed the Bengal government without whose knowledge and sanction no new engagement could be concluded; but in order to remove any wrong impression which he might have formed the Bengal government had recalled the negotiation to the terms of the

1. Idem p. 679.
original instructions, the sole object of which was to strengthen a treaty already existing. (1) The Supreme Council required Hollond to suspend the negotiations until he received further orders from the Madras government. (2). They also wrote to Madras explaining the reasons for their intervention, communicating their order to Hollond, and describing the path they had chosen as likely to "retrieve the credit of your government without occasioning any diminution of its influence." They pointed out that the subsequent instructions to Hollond which were totally different from the first, had given great offence to the Nizam, and remarked that their demand for a remission of the tribute "from the urgent and pointed terms in which it was conveyed ac-
"accompanied with a denial of the right on which it was originally "founded antecedently to the treaty and the affirmation of the "utter inability to discharge either the arrears or current pay-
"ments of it without any composition or condition offered to "engage his compliance with it, did strongly warrant the con-
"struction which the Nabob appears to have given to it." They were afraid of the impression that the last proposals of the Madras government might have made on the Nizam if Hollond had communicated them with the "declaration and defiance" with which he was required to do so. They transmitted to Madras a

1. Governor General to Nizam - Undated Idem 1 Nov. 1779

translation of Hastings's letter to the Nizam with the object of indicating to them the line that they were expected to follow in their future instructions to Holland and required their strict conformity to it. (1) The interference of the Bengal government aroused violent resentment in the Madras select committee. Their wrath fell upon Holland. Rumbold was of opinion that "no further benefit can be expected from Mr. Holland's longer continuance at Hydrabad" (2) and he was directed to return to Madras. (3) It was clearly a method of expressing their resentment at the intervention of the Bengal government. But they obeyed the Calcutta letter to the extent of changing the tone of their correspondence with the Nizam. Rumbold wrote to the Subahdar that the Madras government had no intention of breaking the friendship between him and the Company, that they would pay the tribute as soon as they were able to do so, and suggesting that, since they had recalled Holland, the Nizam might send one of his confidential servants to Madras if he had any proposals to make. (4) Rumbold recorded an extraordinarily lengthy minute defending the Madras government and protesting vigorously against the intervention of Bengal. (5) The Madras council forwarded this minute to Bengal.

1. Bengal to Madras undated (4 Nov. in Mad. Cons.) Idem pp. 752-758
along with a strong letter challenging the powers of the controlling government legally to interfere. (1) They also criticised the method of interference which had been adopted. Rumbold declared that the Madras government was willing to receive the opinion and advice of the governor general and council with pleasure and due attention, but "such dictatorial reprehension" degraded the Madras government before the world in general. (2) Instead of writing first to the Nizam, the Supreme Council ought to have required information and explanation from the Madras government and allowed them to withdraw their application to the Nizam. (3) This, continued Rumbold, would have been in conformity to the orders of the Directors to Bengal in their despatch of the 5th Feb. 1777, when in disapproving of Col. Upton's embassy, they remarked that the Bengal government should have left the negotiations with the Marathas in the hands of the Bombay government reserving the final ratification of the treaty to themselves, and directed them to pursue the line indicated if on any future occasion they found the exercise of their controlling powers necessary. (4) The Madras council added that the controlling powers had been exercised at the expense not only of the prestige of the Madras government but of the

"Company's present and future interests."(1) They said that the governor general and council had in the time of Wynch and Pigot exercised powers over the Madras government which the present administration could not reconcile with its conception of the legal powers of Bengal; nevertheless they would have remained silent on the topic had they not been forced by the present interference to declare their opinion.(2) The general control and direction which Bengal had claimed over the political affairs of Madras was a power they could admit only in the Court of Directors. The controlling power given to the governor general and council by the Regulating Act, as they conceived it, was "only a negative restraining power confined to two points, orders for declaring war or for making treaties, not a positive compelling power extending to all the political affairs of the other presidencies." (3) The object of the Act they continued was to establish "a uniform system with respect to wars and treaties."

The other presidencies, it is true, were restrained from making wars or treaties without the consent of Bengal. "But in respect to all other matters connected with these two points, however nearly they may lead to or affect them, the several presidencies are as we conceive left precisely with the same powers that they

"possessed before the Act took place, that is to say, the powers of
governing directing and managing according to their own judgement
and discretion under the sole authority of their constituents."(1)
Dealing with the same subject Rumbold asserted in his minute that
the Regulating Act plainly pointed out how far the controlling
powers of Bengal extended, and that the supreme council had ex-
pressed a correct idea of those powers in their consultations of
the 8th November 1775. He declared that the Madras government not
only did not doubt those powers, but wished to receive the opinions
of the Bengal government even upon subjects that did not come im-
mediately under their controlling powers.(2) On the question how
far Bengal was justified in interfering in the present case, the
Madras government argued that there was no order given by them for
declaring war or for negotiating or concluding a new treaty. All
that they had done was to take advantage of Holland's residence
at the Nizam's Court to request a favour for the benefit of the
Company. The Nizam's compliance would not have led to a new treaty;
even if it had there was no reason to imagine that Madras would
not have required the consent of Bengal in due time and concluded it
in all proper form.(3) They then tried to show how broad minded a
view they had taken of the whole affair. "Notwithstanding the
"mortification and disappointment we have suffered on this occasion.

"such was the respect we had for your consequence, so desirous were we of avoiding at this time even an appearance of disagreement between the two presidencies, that upon the receipt of your letter of the 4th November we hesitated not to acquiesce in the part you had taken, so far as to write a letter ourselves to the Nizam containing appearances of friendship and esteem, and acquainting him that we should do all in our power to satisfy him in regard to the "Piscush." (1) Rumbold in his minute digressed from the immediate subject of the dispute to criticise the Bengal Maratha policy as "unjust, impolitic, inexpedient and ruinous," and as causing more irritation to the Nizam than the request for the remission of the tribute. (2) He gave further cause of offence to the Bengal government by justifying the Madras governments claim to the remission of the tribute on the ground that a similar step had been taken when the Bengal government stopped the tribute payable to Shah Alam. (3) Though Rumbold declared that "it is a duty incumbent on us to make the co-operating with the Council General our first consideration, and to adopt every idea of theirs that may lead to peace," and urged that under no circumstances should the harmony between the two presidencies be interrupted, (4) yet the tone of his minute was

1. Idem pp. 131-132
certainly not calculated to secure those desirable objects. His excursion into the policy of the Maratha war and his reference to the stoppage of the tribute to the Emperor, which had recently aroused violent disputes in the Bengal council, were regarded by Hastings as designed to engage a party at the Bengal Board in the support of Madras. (1) Hastings desired the council to refer "these extraordinary performances to the consideration of the Court of Directors that they may take such measures as they in their wisdom may think necessary for preserving the dignity of this government from such insults in future." (2)

The Bengal council in their reply (14 Feb. 1780) refused to discuss whether they had the right to interfere in such political measures of the subordinate presidency as tended to disturb "the peace of India." (3) They only pointed out that "when all the previous steps are once taken which necessarily lead to the conclusion of a treaty, and which if not productive of such a conclusion must be deemed nugatory in themselves and offensive to the other contracting party, the requisition of our consent to the treaty becomes a mere formality." If this was true of negotiations of a pacific nature, it was still more true of "acts done or declarations made by the subordinate presidency which without

2. Idem p. 231.
"literally announcing war tend directly to provoke it." (1). If the dangerous doctrines implied in the Madras letter were adopted, the governor general and council might in every instance be deprived of the powers vested in them by Parliament, and "their advice and consent may never be desired until it was too late to prevent the operation of steps already taken." (2) They refused to reply to the other subjects of the letter, but hoped that the Madras council would confine their correspondence with Bengal to such points only as related to their own affairs, and reflect that their censures on the acts of the supreme government were irregular and highly unbecoming the relation in which they stood. (3)

On the same day letters from Hollond and the Nizam were laid before the Bengal council, by which they were informed that the Madras government had sent orders to Hollond to return to Madras, and that the Nizam, perplexed at the step taken by the Madras government, was detaining Hollond until he had received an explicit declaration from Madras regarding the payment of the tribute. (4) The supreme council thereupon wrote to Madras that, as the Nizam had desired that a person be appointed by the Bengal government to reside at his Court, and as the appointment of any other person would

1. Idem p. 237.
3. Idem p. 239.
give the appearance of a quarrel between the two governments, they had appointed Hollond to be their minister at Hyderabad and "desired him to continue in that station until we shall have been informed of your sentiments and resolutions respecting the present proposal." They therefore requested Madras to permit Hollond to remain as their minister at the Nizam's Court. (1)

The letter of the Bengal government to Hollond revealed a stronger attitude on the matter. After expressing their concern at his sudden recall, they wrote, that although he was not dependent on their authority, they regarded it as so necessary for the interests of the Company that a person should be stationed at the time at Hyderabad, that they enjoined him to remain as their resident. (2) They were afraid however that before their letter arrived, the Madras government might repeat their orders for his recall, or that, even on receiving it, the Madras authorities might not consent to his continuing at Hyderabad. He was warned, that in either case, he could not leave his post, before a person had been sent from Bengal to succeed him. (3) The Supreme Council explained that their object in appointing him was to demonstrate to the Indian powers that "a strict unity of principles and measures subsists between the Company's presidencies." Moreover Hollond was more likely to attend

2. Bengal to Hollond - undated Idem p. 293.
to the interests of both presidencies than a person immediately
deputed from Bengal. (1) He was furnished with credentials,
and was required to follow the first instructions he had received
from the Madras government. (2) To the Nizam the governor
general promised to preserve inviolate the treaty subsisting
between him and the Company and to guard it from any infringement
by the other presidencies. (3)

The Madras government, finding that Hollond was being de-
tained by the Nizam, had repeated their orders to him to return
(4). On the receipt of the Calcutta letter they positively
directed him to return, even though he should have received
letters or credentials from Bengal, and warned him that they
would dismiss him from the service if he remained at Hyderabad
any longer. They also required Hollond to send copies of such
letters as he might have received from Bengal since his appoint-
ment, and also of his letter thither. (5) (13 March 1780). They
wrote to Bengal that it would be improper for them to withdraw
the orders they had sent to Hollond, for they could not stamp
with their consent the unjustifiable attempts of the Bengal
government to weaken and disgrace their authority. Besides they

1. Idem p. 294-5.


3. Governor General to Nizam - undated. Idem p. 300

   Vol. 69. p. 139.

   Vol. 55, pp. 251-2.
had no knowledge of the nature and tendency of the negotiations in which Hollond was to be employed by Bengal. (1) They expressed their suspicion that Hollond had throughout been more under the direction of the Bengal government than of theirs, declared that they were responsible to the Directors alone for recalling Hollond, and remarked that they were "a little surprised that at the time when you are speaking of the impropriety of our censuring any of your acts . . . you should assume the privilege of censuring those of ours, with which you have not the smallest right to interfere". (3).

The Madras council repeated their refusal to admit the Bengal government's power of general control and direction over their political affairs, until they were shown valid authority for it. (4) In the meanwhile the only power they could acknowledge in the Bengal government was that of controlling their right of declaring wars or concluding treaties, and they could not allow the least extension of it, as it stood clearly defined and answered all the purposes intended by it. They desired to make it clear that they had never yielded to the exercise of the rights claimed by Bengal. They had withdrawn their application to the Nizam not because Bengal disapproved or interfered in the measure but because their application could not properly be supported after the Bengal

government had encouraged the Nizam to reject it, and because they did not want to advertise the disagreement between the two governments. (1) They protested against Madras being described as a subordinate presidency, — an appellation which it had not received at any time before, — as the word subordinate might be construed into a general inferiority. They declared that "any idea drawn from such a word is inapplicable to the relative situation in which we are placed. As well might we say that Fort William is subordinate to this presidency, as this presidency to Fort William." (2) They said that the Bengal government had no right to conclude that they intended to take all the necessary steps for the making of a treaty and then demand the consent of Bengal as a mere formality. This they had never done, nor did they mean to do it for the very reasons given by the governor general and council (4). "But," they said, "there is nothing in the Act of Parliament which restrains our endeavours to serve the Company by applications to any of the country powers to do justice or to show favour to them in anything which comes under our immediate cognizance, nor are we prevented by that act from making any declarations (except that of war) which we may think necessary in

2. Idem p. 351.
support of the rights and honour of the Company, as far as they are committed to our charge. If such requests and declarations from the misconstruction of the persons to whom they may be ad-
dressed .... should at any time bring on a war, there is no help for it that we know of and all that we have to do in such case is to avoid declaring or committing hostilities without your pre-
vious consent, unless the necessity be so imminent as would ren-
der it dangerous to wait for it." (1) Insisting on their con-
struction of the Regulating Act, they repeated their former argu-
ment that a restraining power only was vested in the governor gen-
eral and council to prevent the other governments from entering into contradictory treaties with the country powers. "But there is nothing of a positive nature in this right. It can not direct us to make or alter any treaty, to declare any war or to pursue any interest that we deem incompatible with the welfare of our employers. In short it has one power of compulsion. It has only the power of a simple assent or negative upon a question necessary to be proposed by us before we can begin any negotia-
tion for a treaty or make any order for declaring war...." (2).

In the course of the controversy the Madras government more than once exhibited a pettiness which was extremely deplorable. The Bengal government had in their letter of the 14th Feb. 1780 expressed their apprehension that "their advice and consent may

1. Idem p. 354.

"never be desired until it must arrive too late to prevent the "operation of steps already taken." Fasting on this purely verbal point the Madras government remarked, "your consent let it arrive ever so early can not in any case prevent the operation of our measures, nor do we suppose you wish to prevent any operations "at all by your consent to them."(1)

On receiving the Madras letter of the 13th March 1780 threatening his dismissal, Hollond replied that he was under the impression that his masters did not desire that he should return without taking leave from the Nizam. He was also unable to understand how obedience to the injunctions of the government which had been constituted the guardians of the peace of India could bring upon him the displeasure of the Madras government.(2) He concluded the letter with a remarkable passage. He said, "Although I am covenanted to act "under the authority of the Madras presidency, yet as a servant of "the Company zealous for their prosperity, I can not divest myself "of the relation in which I stand to them taken collectively, nor of "the duty which in a superior degree I owe to them in that relation - "there are situations which the considerations of general and public "objects supersedes the regard due to particular and partial systems "or the attention to private and personal interests, the situation. "I am now in I know to be of that kind and I feel myself under the "indispensable necessity of complying with the order from the

1. Idem p. 355.
governor general and council."(1). In the midst of a quarrel between the two governments which practically sank on one side at least to the level of a common brawl, it is refreshing to find that an ordinary servant of the Company should have the capacity to rise to the height of the situation. Hollond forwarded to Bengal the above correspondence.

Taking into consideration the hostile attitude of the Madras government and recognising that it was beyond their power to compensate Hollond for the consequences which obedience to their orders would bring upon him, the governor general and council found it necessary to submit, and for the moment withdraw the orders they had sent to Hollond.(2) (May 1780). Within a few weeks however, on hearing that the Madras government had suspended him, they renewed his appointment as their minister at Hyderabad (12 June 1780)(see p.93)

In the meanwhile an important change had taken place in the Madras administration. Rumbold on medical advice went to England on the 6th April 1780 leaving Whitehill as the governor of Madras to carry on the dispute with Bengal. It will therefore be necessary to drop the story of the negotiations with the Nizam at this stage and pass over to the other subjects of dispute in the governorship of Rumbold.

The subject of the Guntur Circar, which finally exhausted the patience of the Bengal government, did not provoke an open quarrel between the two presidencies in the time of Rumbold though Hastings in his minute of the 25th Oct. 1779 included the treaty with

1. Ìdem p.255.
Basalat Jang 'concluded and avowed without the participation of his immediate sovereign,' among the mischievous activities of the Madras government. (1) The project of a treaty with Basalat Jang, sanctioned by Bengal in January 1779 was concluded on the 27th April 1779. (2) About the same time, on the pressing request of Basalat Jang who apprehended an attack from Haidar, a force was ordered to march for the protection of his country. (3) The Madras government only gave a very meagre account of these important transactions, in their letter to Bengal of the 23rd April 1779 when they wrote, 'In consequence of our late negotiations with Basalat Jang we have resolved to send immediately for the protection of his country three battalions of sepoys, a company of artillery and six field pieces.' The letter which principally dealt with the hostile attitude of Haidar and offered suggestions for a plan of operations against them, concluded, 'we request you will favour us with your sentiments and determination upon this letter as soon as possible.' (4) This does not appear to have elicited any comment at the Bengal Board. Except for the letter just quoted, the Madras government remained silent.

on the subject of their relations with Basalat Jang till the 18th Feb. 1780, when they informed the Supreme government that though they had finally concluded the treaty with Basalat Jang, by which they were to receive Guntur for payment of a rent, and a detachment had been sent to protect Basalat's country, yet that, these proceedings having aroused the jealousy of the Nizam and Haidar, Basalat Jang had been forced to ask that Guntur be returned to him and that the troops marching to his assistance be stopped, upon which the Madras government had stopped the troops but had deemed it by no means incumbent on them to return the Circar.(1). The Madras government withheld from the knowledge of Bengal the information that they had rented the Guntur Circar to the nawab of the Carnatic early in October 1779. On receipt of this letter the governor general and council desired Hollond, whom they had then appointed their minister, to inform the Nizam that they did not consider that the treaties of 1766 and 1768 were infringed by the agreement with Basalat Jang,(2) yet they were anxious to obtain the sanction of Nizam Ali to the continuance of Guntur in the hands of the Madras government; but if he should be unwilling to

2. This appears to be inconsistent with the opinion which Hastings expressed in his minute of the 25 Oct. 1779. The inconsistency is not however a real one. It was not the intention of the Bengal government to let their opinion be known to the Nizam.
yield this point it was not their desire to insist on retaining Guntur. (1) (20th March 1780). The subject had reached this stage when Rumbold left for England.

The relations of the two presidencies had become so bitter that the most trifling subjects gave rise to disputes on either side. One of these occasions was afforded when some recruits arrived from England and the Madras government, uncertain of the number to be sent to Bengal, and finding most of them suffering from scurvy, detained them. (2) The Bengal government were very much annoyed and regarded the reasons for the detention of the recruits as unsatisfactory. They reminded the Madras government that they had similarly detained recruits destined for Bengal in the previous year and had not sent them in spite of their promise to do so. They said, "If you avail yourselves of the advantage which your situation puts into your hands of intercepting our recruits on their way to us, you eventually hazard the loss of all the Company's possessions in this country," and in view of the "many calls" to which they were liable for the maintenance of the Company's general political system they considered it incumbent on them to demand in the most peremptory manner to send them


all the recruits both of the last and of the present season. (1) (29 Nov. 1779). The Madras government replied that it was apparent from the high tone which the Bengal government had assumed upon a common subject that they misunderstood their relation to Madras, and that on points to which their controlling power did not extend the Madras government was on an equal footing with them. (2). They thought that there was "an apparent want of temper and politeness" throughout the Calcutta letter, and that the insinuations it contained were so ungenerous that the most unjustifiable conduct of the meanest person under the Madras government could not extort from them anything similar. (3) They continued, "a simple request from "you will always have greater force with us than a demand, unless "when you are acting within the limits of your controlling power, "and then your demands...will have the force of a law, and must "be obeyed, but we assure you even in such cases that a request or "desire will have just the same effect and prove much more palatable" (4). They went on further to remark that they felt "with great sensibility the many calls to which you have become liable" and offered their opinion that the true interests of the Company are

confined solely to the defence of their present possessions." (1) (31 Dec. 1779). The Bengal board (24 Jan. 1780) came to the conclusion that the only object of the letter was to draw them into an altercation and therefore refused to discuss the letter. They however recorded their protest against the conduct of the Madras government in entering into a criticism of the political transactions of the Supreme government, especially as it was a department in which their control was expressly established over the Madras government. "It is the duty of that presidency" they said, "to look to the political conduct of this government for their example and guidance and to shape all their measures in exact conformity to it." The Supreme Council had already complained to the Directors about the conduct of the Madras government. (2) They now sent a copy of the Madras letter to the Directors describing its style as "unbecoming and disrespectful," and earnestly entreated them to withdraw any latitude that they might have given to Madras to detain recruits thereby putting it out of their power "to exercise a discretion which may immediately distress the service here and eventually hazard the safety of your possessions in Bengal." (3). Their reply to Madras,

2. Bengal (Secret Department) to Directors - 10 Jan 1780, Paras. 30-33. Letters from Bengal No. 18.
however, was characterised by a restraint which the Madras council might have done well to imitate. They explained to Madras that their intentions had been misconstrued, that their idea was not to exercise any kind of authority, but that they simply exercised that privilege which an ordinary individual subject to the authority of Madras would have been justified in asserting if he had been deprived of his legal claim. As the Madras government had not complied with their orders the Bengal council repeated their demands for the recruits. (1) (24 Jan. 1780). Before the receipt of this letter the Madras government informed Bengal that unable to send the recruits in question they had forwarded to them not only all the recruits who had arrived recently, destined for Bengal, but sixty more. (2). In reply to the Calcutta letter they declared that the Bengal government had no legal claim to the soldiers as such, that recruits sent from England for service in Bengal did not even come under the authority of the Bengal government until their arrival at that presidency, that in case of emergency the servants of any presidency had the right to detain recruits which called on the way to their destination upon giving satisfactory reasons to the Court of Directors and replacing them as soon as possible. (3) They then proceeded to quote from the

orders of the Company to show that under certain circumstances they possessed the right to detain recruits destined for Bengal. They however assured Bengal that "nothing but the most pressing necessity shall ever induce us to detain a single man of the recruits designed for your presidency."(1) The characteristic tone adopted by the Madras government in their correspondence at this time appeared again in this letter. They said that they were pleased at the intention of the Bengal government to transmit to the Directors the Madras letter of the 31st December 1779, and hoped Bengal would favour them by sending their own letter of the 29th November along with it, in which case they should have no anxiety about the decision of the Directors.(2) Again, they wrote "We can readily dispense with your replying more fully to our letter if you think it unbecoming or unnecessary to do so, but the first epithet we conceive might have been spared after the writing of that letter which so severely reflected on us, and that some sort of explanation of the exceptional passages contained therein would have been in no shape unbecoming or derogatory from the dignity of your station."(3) (29 Feb. 1780). The Bengal government on their part were unwilling to abandon the struggle without a final assertion of their own rights. They wrote to Madras that

1. Idem p. 20.
they were satisfied with the quota of recruits sent to them. They however observed that the quotations from the orders of the Directors in the Madras letter were only special instructions for particular occasions, that those orders were made before the Regulating Act was passed, and as such did not apply at a time when "the general defence of the Company's possessions in India is immediately entrusted to our care." They concluded, "We are "the ultimate judges in this country for the necessity of the "recruits .... we therefore request that you will not in future "detain any of the men intended for the supply of our establishment on any account whatsoever, without our consent previously ob-
tained." (1) (20 March 1780).

About the same time that the two governments were quarrelling over the recruits, the Madras government found another subject on which they could write provoking letters to Bengal. The Bengal government in a letter to Madras dwelt on the danger to Bombay from a probable invasion of the French, and requested Madras to spare some men from the force employed at Mahe' to join General Goddard for the defence of Bombay. (2) (2 Aug. 1779). The Madras council entered on record that the true object of the reinforcements was not to defend Bombay against the French, but to make

war upon the Marathas in case Goddard failed in his negotiations, and that the concealment by Bengal of their true motive was "uncandid and inconsistent with that confidence which should be mutually observed between the two governments." (1) (18 Oct. 1779). They then wrote to Bengal that a French invasion of Bombay was unlikely, but even if the French did attack Bombay the troops of that presidency were sufficient for the defence. They however conceived that the principle object of the re-inforcement was to support General Goddard's negotiations with the Marathas. This was certainly a matter of so much importance that they were disposed heartily to concur with them in promoting it, and that they had directed Colonel Braithwaite who was in command at Mahe' to obey any requisition that might be made by General Goddard. (2)

Two months later they informed Bengal that Colonel Braithwaite having been unavoidably detained at Tellicherry for the protection of that settlement, they had resolved to send from Madras a respectable re-inforcement to join General Goddard. They hoped that this force would enable General Goddard to make the peace upon honourable terms. (3) The Bengal government thanked Madras for the readiness with which they had co-operated "in the prosecution of our measures on the other side of India." (4) The Madras

government replied, that they had not sent the troops to co-operate with the measures of the Bengal government in the west of India, because they did not know what measures Bengal had in contemplation, that their object was to enable General Goddard to conclude an honourable peace, and that if any object differing from that which was in their mind had been pursued, they, did not assent to such a measure, and were not answerable for the consequences. (1)

The true reason for this strained feeling between the two governments was the fact that both Haider and the Nizam showed signs of annoyance with the English. Each presidency therefore sought to shift the responsibility for the probable consequences on to the other. Late in November 1779 it became known at Madras that a treaty had been concluded between the Marathas and Haider and acceded to by the Nizam for uniting their forces and commencing a general attack upon the Company's possessions in every part of India. (2) Rumbold sought to lay the blame on the Bengal government. In his minute on the Bengal letter of the 4th Nov. 1779, he condemned the Supreme Council's Maratha policy. (3) Again in January 1780 in his reflections upon the then political state of the Company in India, he remarked that the Bengal government's


2. Mad.Sel.Com.Cons. 29 Nov. 1779, Vol. 67, p. 151. It is difficult to say exactly at what time this confederacy was formed. The Bombay select committee in their despatch to the Court of Directors dated 31 Dec. 1779, sent information of such an alliance. cf. Home Miscellaneous Vol. 145, p. 29.


support of Raghoba had given offence to the Nizam, and had opened the way to a rupture with Haidar by promoting peace between him and the Marathas. (1) The governor general's offer to assist the Raja of Berar in recovering certain territories from the Nizam, Rumbold argued, was also another cause of annoyance to the Subahdar of the Deccan.

The Directors however declared that the Nizam's resentment had been caused "not by our assisting Raghoba and treating with the Raja of Berar, but by your own proceedings concerning Basalat Jang, and by the march of your troops towards Adoni." They said that instead of making amends for these causes of annoyance, the Madras government had further irritating the Nizam by their effort to secure a remission of the tribute. (2) They fully approved of the interposition of the governor general and council and of the steps taken by them on the occasion. (3) They condemned the action of the Madras government in letting out the Guntur Circar at rent to the nawab of Arcot, one of the reasons for the censure being that it would prove an additional cause of irritation to Haidar. (4) They described the attempt to send the detachment in aid of Basalat Jang through Haidar's territory as an extremely imprudent act. (5) For

Similar allegations were contained in Madras to Directors - 3 April 1780, Para 13. Letters received from Madras - No. 10.

2. Directors to Madras 10 Jan. 1781, Para 130, Madras despatched No. 9.


all these and various other reasons not connected with the present study, Rumbold and Peter Perring, a member of the Madras select committee, were dismissed. (1)

In 1783 a bill of pains and penalties was brought against Sir Thomas Rumbold in the House of Commons. Among the charges were:-

1. That the governor general and council had not authorized the Madras government in February 1779 to conclude a treaty with Basalat Jung without the consent of the Nizam.(2)

2. That the Madras government "were highly culpable in so long delaying to inform the governor general and council of the conclusion of the said treaty with Basalat Jung."(3)

3. That the Madras government had committed an act of hostility against Haidar and infringed the Regulating Act by sending a detachment through his country without his previous license.(4)

4. That the recall of Holland was "a measure founded on resentment and of a tendency exceedingly injurious to the interests of the Company."(5)

5. That the Madras government's letter to Bengal of the 15th January 1780 and Rumbold's minute enclosed in it "were expressed in terms very indecent and reproachful and the language of the said letter and minute was quite inconsistent with the respect and deference due to the Bengal government from the presidency of Madras as a subordinate board...."(6).

1. Idem.
2. Bill of Pains and Penalties - Sec. 85 - Case of Sir Thomas Rumbold and Peter Perring - (official proceedings). The bill is also to be found in Parliamentary papers - Bills Vol.xii, No. 421, but the sections are not marked.
3. Idem Sec. 92.
4. Idem Sec. 102.
5. Idem Sec. 113.
6. Sec. 115.
6. That the negotiations with the Nizam for the remission of the "Beshkash" were without any authority from either the Court of Directors or the governor general and council and were therefore a breach of the Regulating Act. (1)

And 7. That "if it had not been for the wise, seasonable and temperate interposition of the governor general and council of Bengal, the Company might by the aforesaid injurious proceedings .... have been actually involved in a war with the Nizam."(2).

The whole blame for the annoyance caused to the Nizam can not be laid on the Madras government. The support of Raghoba and perhaps the negotiations with Berar had made him touchy, when the transactions with Basalat Jang added to the causes of irritation. The governor general and council shared with the Madras government the responsibility of ignoring the Nizam in the treaty with Basalat Jang. It is true that in July 1775 Bengal had said that a cession of the Circar was to be obtained by a negotiation with the Nizam. But in January 1779 when they discussed every article of the proposed treaty and gave their sanction to it, they did not remind Madras of the necessity of obtaining the consent of the Nizam. It was not till the middle of 1780 that the Bengal government charged Madras on this head, though they were aware of the conclusion of the treaty before the formal official communication of it in March 1780.

1. Idem Sec. 119.
2. Idem Sec. 123.
The real offence of the Madras government lay in the fact that though they knew full well that both the Nizam and Haidar were greatly annoyed as a result of the treaty with Basalat Jang and the despatch of a force from Madras to protect that prince, they proceeded to annoy the Nizam further by their negotiations for a remission of the "Peshkash". They had no authority from the Court of Directors, neither did they seek the sanction of the governor general and council; and even if the financial distress of Madras was great the moment was the least opportune. Besides the so-called "request" to the Nizam for the remission of the tribute was made in the form of a demand and threatening language was used on both sides. It was therefore a matter which called for the immediate interposition of the Bengal government. The delay of an enquiry from Madras previous to writing to the Nizam might have given the Subahdar time to engage in measures from which it would have been too late for him to retract. Besides the governor general's letter to the Nizam was "calculated to throw as little blame as possible" "on the government of Madras in the eyes of the Nizam and yet to quiet his apprehension."(1) The Bengal government had no intention to belittle the Madras government in the eyes of the Indian princes. As they said, ".... our interposition was offered with every possible degree of delicacy and caution, it was placed on the footing of a mediation and an explanation of their designs rather

than an act of authority interposed to censure or repress them."(1)

The defenders of Rumbold claimed that "every sacrifice was made to the Nizam that the governor general and council required, and whether the measures we had adopted about the pescush were prudent or not, no hesitation was made about relinquishing it...."(2)

Indeed Rumbold professed his desire to co-operate with the Supreme Council, and, in the minute which accompanied the Madras letter of the 15th January 1780 to Bengal, declared that it was with that intention that he moved Hollond's recall and assured the Nizam of the firm intentions of the Company to preserve the friendship with him. But some documents convey a different impression of Rumbold's attitude. Hollond was recalled not because his residence at Hyderabad had become unnecessary, but because he had forsaken the cause of Madras. A minute of Rumbold on the eve of his departure clearly shows that in his eyes Hollond's true guilt was that he had been in communication with Bengal on a subject which the former regarded as relating solely to the interests of the Madras presidency (3). Again it is true that he changed the tone of his correspondence with the Nizam, and took into consideration the means of raising money in case the Nizam demanded immediate payment. But the motive was to avoid the responsibility for the mischief he had already committed. In a minute on the 30th December 1779 he

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1. Bengal (Secret) to Directors 3 March 1780 Para 9. Letters from Bengal No. 18.


remarked that in view of the alliance of the Nizam, Haidar and Marathas against the English, "It is incumbent on us not to "afford the least pretence either for the Nizam or the governor "general and council to impute to this government any share in the "measures that have already involved the Company's affairs into difficulties...."(1)

The Bengal government's appointment of Hollond, who was a servant of another establishment, was irregular. But the Madras government themselves prepared the way for this act by their recall of that gentleman. It was necessary under the circumstances that a person should remain with the Nizam. Hollond had conducted the negotiations during the last few months and there was no other person more qualified for the appointment. Besides it was necessary that the differences between the two presidencies should be concealed from the Nizam. The Bengal appointment of Hollond was therefore justified on the ground of expediency. Rumbold was incapable of taking this wider view of the interests of the Company.

The entire blame for exciting the enmity of Haidar should not lie with the Madras government. They were not responsible for disappointing Haidar in his hopes of an offensive and defensive alliance with the English. The Mahe' expedition had the sanction of the Company as well as Bengal. The fact that Haidar had his

eyes on Guntur made it all the more necessary to secure it. The detachment sent under Lt. Col. Harper to protect Basalat Jang's country was in accordance with the treaty with that prince. Haidar was already jealous of the transactions of the English with Basalat Jang. The attempt of Madras to send a force to Adoni via Cummum, which belonged to Haidar, irritated him more. Further annoyance was caused to Haidar by letting out Guntur to Wallajah, his declared enemy. The real guilt of Madras was that they took measures which were likely to irritate Haidar without making due preparations to resist him in case of an attack. It is true that the Madras government frequently resolved upon the necessity of making preparations for defence against Haidar, but it does not seem that they translated their resolutions into action.
CHAPTER III.

Supremacy of Hastings.

On Rumbold's departure early in April 1780 Whitehill who was second in council became the president at Madras. He had all along supported Rumbold in his quarrel with the Bengal government. The governor general and council therefore could not have regarded him with a friendly eye. They had been highly exasperated by the attitude of the Madras government during the last few months. When they found Whitehill following in the footsteps of Rumbold and obstructing their efforts to appease the Nizam their patience was exhausted and they lost any scruple that they might have had against employing the ultimate penalty sanctioned by the Regulating Act. This step was more possible because the Madras government had been caught unprepared by Haidar Ali in July 1780, and in an utterly helpless state looked towards Bengal for saving the presidency from the clutches of the enemy. The situation thus lending itself to their hands, the supreme council deposed the governor, and frankly established themselves as the dominating government. The Madras government on their part thoroughly discredited by these incidents maintained a practically submissive attitude until the arrival of Lord Macartney changed the situation.

Almost the last act of Rumbold was to recommend to the Madras select committee that Holland should be suspended from the service if he delayed any longer at Hyderabad after the
third order of recall. He put forward the argument that Hollond had betrayed the trust reposed in him by the Madras government by communicating to the Bengal council an account of the negotiation with the Nizam. He said that Hollond's instructions at the time of his appointment directed him to transmit to Bengal such information only as related to them. Besides, he argued, the special instructions which Hollond had received when he was asked to negotiate for the remission of the peskash did not contain any direction to communicate the particulars of the negotiations to the Bengal government. (1)

On receipt of Hollond's letter of the 29th March 1780 (see ante) Whitehill gave effect to Rumbold's suggestion by moving for the suspension of Hollond. (2) He declared that in keeping Hollond at the Nizam's Court the Bengal government had an object different from the promotion of the interests of the Company. If it was necessary that a public minister should remain at Hyderabad, they could have sent one of their servants from Bengal. "Why," he asked, "was it thought necessary to degrade our consequence and weaken our authority by keeping Mr. Hollond at the Nizam's court in opposition to our will, when they had it in their power to adopt another method, much more proper and equally

Though it was now more than two months since they had written to the governor general and council that they could not permit Hollond to stay any longer at Hyderabad they had not taken any step to relieve him. Besides nothing was more unlikely to promote the interests of the Company than the attempts which were so directly made to weaken or depreciate our government in the eye of the country powers, and to deprive us of the authority we possess over our servants. He concluded, as we cannot pass over Mr. Hollond's offence without yielding up our authority in a most essential point to the governor general and council of Bengal, and without openly manifesting to the whole service that we have not the power or the will to punish the most glaring disobedience that could have been shown to our orders, I am of opinion that Mr. Hollond should be suspended from the Company's service. Though Smith was of opinion that orders should be sent to Hollond to continue at Hyderabad till he was relieved by a person from Bengal, "rather than for the sake of punctilio in making an individual sensible of the efficacy of our power, hazard the interests of the nation," and Johnson voted against the motion, Hollond was suspended by the

1. Idem. p.604.
2. Loc. cit.
president's casting vote. (1) (10 May 1780). The Madras government explained to Hollond the reasons for his suspension and summed up, "you have disobeyed our most positive orders and have much aggravated the offence by avowedly transferring the obedience to a government which has not of right the smallest authority over you." (2) After a few days Johnson entered a lengthy minute in explanation of his vote against the suspension of Hollond. (3) He was of opinion that if the Madras government had allowed Hollond to remain at the Nizam's Court under a double appointment, it would certainly not have been derogatory to their dignity and that the refusal of the request of the supreme government and the recall of Hollond were "hasty and undigested steps incompatible with the true interests of the Company ..." (4) He argued that in suggesting Hollond's suspension Rumbold was actuated more by a personal enmity towards him than jealousy of the supreme government, (5) that there was no talk of suspension when the offences complained of were committed, and that Hollond certainly had general orders to correspond equally with both presidencies and give them all

1. Idem p. 609.
necessary information. (1)

On 12 June 1780, a few weeks after the Bengal government had withdrawn their orders to Hollond to remain at Hyderabad, they heard from the Madras government that as they could wait no longer for a person from Bengal to relieve Hollond and as Hollond had treated them in an "unbecoming and disrespectful manner," they had thought it "indispensably requisite" for the support of their authority to suspend him from the service. (2) On the same day a letter from Hollond was read. It was to the effect that the Nizam was ready to enter into an agreement with the English not to allow the French to land men and stores at the port of Motupalli, but that he was unwilling to let the English have the Guntur Circar, and persisted in the opinion that the late alliance with Basalat Jang was clearly a violation of the treaty of 1768. (3) As the result of this letter the Bengal council came to the resolution that the residence of Hollond at the Court of the Nizam was "essentially and indispensably necessary." (4) They renewed his appointment as their resident at the Nizam's Court and supplied him with fresh credentials. They promised Hollond that they would recommend him to the Court of Directors that he should either be restored to his service in the Madras establishment or transferred to Bengal. (5) Writing to the

Madras government the supreme council expressed their "deepest concern" at the suspension of Hollond. (1), and said, "as you have been pleased to remove the only obstacle which prevented our continuing Mr. John Hollond as public minister on the part of this government at the Court of Hyderabad we have resolved to employ him in this capacity again." (2) They also informed Madras that they had determined to restore the Guntur Circar to Basalat Jang, (3) and expected them to comply with their desire without delay. The governor general and council hoped that the need of settling the only point in dispute with the Nizam, and thereby securing his neutrality at a critical period would be enough inducement for the Madras government to concur in the arrangement. (4) In justification of their decision they said, that their recommendations regarding Guntur had always been based on the fundamental principle that the Circar should be taken possession of only by a negotiation with the Nizam. The measures that they had authorized in their letter of the 5th July 1775 were to negotiate with Basalat Jang for the expulsion of the French from Guntur and for securing the reversion of the Circar, and in case it failed to produce the desired

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object, to try to obtain the cession of the Circar to the Company by a negotiation with the Nizam. They did not wish to depart from this principle when in January 1779 they gave their sanction to the proposed treaty with Basalat Jang, nor did they suppose that the Madras government contemplated infringement of the treaties with the Nizam by a new agreement with his brother (1). The Bengal government pointed out that the restoration of the Circar to Basalat Jang would not be a breach of the treaty with him as he had not been able to fulfil his part of the treaty and requested to be relieved from it. (2) Besides so long as the Company possessed the reversionary right to Guntur the immediate possession of the Circar was not necessary. (3). (12 June 1780). The supreme council also asked Holland to inform the Nizam of their decision to restore Guntur to Basalat Jang, and of their request to the Madras government to comply immediately with it. (4)

The Bengal letter directing the restoration of Guntur to Basalat Jang was read in the Madras select committee on the 17th July 1780. (5). No comment appears to have been made on the letter until the 2nd August 1780 when Johnson urged that "no

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1. Idem p. 423.
"time should be lost in writing to the soubah in conciliating terms; in taking off Mr. Hollond's suspension and in furnishing him with instructions to acquaint the soubah that we are come to the resolution of restoring the Guntur Circar to Bazalet Jung in the manner recommended by the supreme council."(1)
The motion being taken into consideration the president's casting vote decided against it.(2) Munro then proposed that a letter be written to the governor general and council explaining why Guntur should not be given up. He gave his opinion that Guntur should be held till a reply from Bengal was received, and in case they insisted upon giving it up, "they must in every respect be made answerable for the consequences."(3) No action was taken on Munro's minute. The subject of the Bengal letter of the 12th June was revived on the 22nd August again by Johnson when he moved that a letter be written to Bengal in pursuance of the general's minute. To point out the dangers of procrastination in the matter he said, "even a day lost in the present critical situation of affairs may be dangerous. I am of opinion that the governor general and council wrote to us on this subject after the maturest deliberation, and that it is of the highest importance to secure the soubah's alliance at this juncture...."(4)

Though it was resolved in consequence that a letter be written to Wallajah and to Bengal, it was not before two weeks had elapsed that the draft of a letter to the supreme council was presented before the select committee for approval. The letter was sent to Bengal only with the assistance of the president's casting vote. The Madras government ascribed the delay in replying to the Bengal letter to the importance of the subject and the troubles which they were encountering at the time. They admitted that the necessity of preserving the Nizam's friendship had become urgent and expressed their willingness to give up the Circar. They had some difficulty in complying with the desire of the supreme government, but it was one which they were "heartily disposed to remove." They had farmed out the Circar to the nawab of the Carnatic for a certain term. They had represented to the nawab the need of restoring the Guntur Circar and hoped that he would give up his claim upon it as renter. They promised to send his answer as soon as they received it and to do everything in their power to expedite the business. While the Madras government thus expressed

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1. Idem p. 1299.
5. Idem p.434
7. Loc. cit.
their willingness to obey the Bengal orders, they added arguments which they had used before in support of their own point of view. They said that the Nizam had no just cause of complaint, as he had violated the treaty of 1768 by allowing the French to remain in Guntur when there was open rupture between them and the English, and that he could not accuse Madras of violating the treaty as he had neglected to do them justice. They repeated again their assertion in a previous letter that the treaty with Basalat Jang had the sanction of Bengal, (1) "As to the mode of requiring us to give up the Circar," they added, "we do not wish in the present juncture to enter into the smallest dispute about it." (2) They pointed out in conclusion that upon its restoration Haidar Ali might occupy Guntur and it might cost the English a war to take possession of their reversionary right to the Circar. (3) (2 Sept. 1780).

The Bengal government became impatient at the delay thus caused by the Madras government in the execution of their orders. After the invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar Ali they became thoroughly disgusted with the incompetent and disobedient administration at Madras; the need of conciliating the Nizam appeared to them greater than ever. When they received the Madras letter conveying the news of the invasion of the Carnatic,

1. Idem. p.432.
praying for supplies and re-inforcements and professing dependence on Bengal for a plan of operations, (1) they sent a short reply requesting Madras to inform them of the resolution that they had taken upon their letter of the 12th June as they could not otherwise decide upon the general measures to be followed with regard to Haidar Ali. (2) At the same time they inquired of Holland whether the Madras government had withdrawn their troops from Guntur. (3) On the 2nd October the supreme government received the Madras letter of the 2nd September 1780 and learnt that Guntur had not even then been restored to Basalat Jang. They also heard from Holland that the Nizam had expressed his surprise at the non-compliance of the Madras government with the Bengal orders relative to the Guntur Circar, and had questioned him on the extent of the controlling powers of the governor general and council. The Nizam had declared that he was the author of the confederacy of Haidar and the Marathas against the English, and that the restoration of Guntur would demonstrate to Haidar and the Marathas the friendship between him and the English and would induce them to sue for peace. (4).

The feelings aroused in the Bengal council on receipt of these letters can well be imagined. On the 10th October, Hastings moved that Whitehill be suspended. (1) Francis thought that there was "ground sufficient in law to warrant and justify "the immediate removal of Mr. Whitehill" and that "the measure is "indispensably necessary to the safety of that presidency." (2) Coote said that "we must from the powers vested in us be held "responsible for the consequences of those acts of disobedience "which we suffer to pass unnoticed or uncorrected," and that he agreed to the motion of the governor general as a "measure to "preserve and support the authority of the supreme government." (3). The motion being carried unanimously the board "resolved that "John Whitehill Esq. be suspended from his office.... by order "of the governor general and council....according to the regulat- "ing act of parliament of the 13th of George the third delegating "powers to us for that purpose." (4) Thereupon a letter was written to the Madras select committee couched in strong terms. The Bengal government declared that "instant attention and uncondi-
tional obedience" ought to have been paid to their orders. Instead of that the Madras government had allowed nearly two months

2. Francis' minute. Idem p. 545
to pass away before taking any action on their letter of the 12th June. If the Madras government had chosen to carry the orders into execution the troubles with which they were faced would not have been any real obstacle. (1) Indeed the desire to disobey appeared from more than one fact. "When we read your loose, indefinite, vague promises of your assistance in promoting our wishes, instead of an instant conformity to our injunctions, we have but too much reason to suspect such a conduct as an intended cover to a fixed resolution not to obey us". (2) The same might be concluded from the fact that the Madras government had made it optional for the nawab of the Carnatic to give up the Cincar, and though there was a daily communication between the governor and the nawab who lived within the walls of the Fort St. George, they were delaying so long to exact from him a definite reply. (3) There was no need for the Madras government to discuss in their letter whether the treaty with Basalat Jang was, or was not, an infringement of the treaties with the Nizam, as that question was closed after the Bengal government refused their assent to it and agreed to give up the advantages obtained by it. (4) The supreme council further pointed out that the Madras government could not justify their

disobedience on the ground of an obligation on their part to adhere to the treaty with Basalat Jung as he had asked to be absolved from it. (1) The governor general and council then dwelt on the dangerous consequences of a contempt of their authority by the Madras government. They said, "your conduct has exposed us to the reproach and derision of the Nawab Nizam Ally Cawn who has openly taxed us with having attempted to amuse him with promises which though solemnly made we have not the ability to perform." The Nizam had not scrupled to declare openly that he was the author of the confederacy of the Marathas and Haider lately formed against the English. Indeed there was no knowing how far his resentment might lead him. Again, at a time when the Bengal government was making advances for peace to the Marathas and other princes, such disobedience would make a prince hesitate before entering into engagements "with a power which can not protect them against its own dependants." (2) The governor general and council then laid down the charges against the Madras government.

"You have attempted to make a treaty with Nabob Basalat Jung in direct violation of the former treaty then subsisting between the Company and the Nawab Nizam Ally Cawn."

"You have presumed to hold the Circar of Guntur...in defiance of a requisition from the governor general and council

1. Iadem. p.557.
2. Iadem, pp.561-563.
"peremptorily made to restore it...thereby degrading the authority, "weakening the energy and preventing the efficacy of the powers of "this government.

"You have shown a contemptuous indifference to the governor "general and council, and a want of even common respect, in suffer- "ing a dangerous length of time to elapse, before you replied to "orders of such importance, or allowed them any consideration, and "even when you did you eluded the effect of those orders.

"You have offered an insult to the high commission which we "bear in permitting other claims to stand in competition with the "deliberate resolves of this government.

"In a word you have made orders for commencing hostilities, "and you have negotiated and concluded a treaty of peace without "the consent and approbation of the governor general and council "first had and obtained.

"Under circumstances of such aggravation, so unpardonable in "their very nature, and so dangerous in their consequences that "nothing short of instant example can preserve the supremacy of "the responsible government and give credit to its acts, we have "resolved that John Whitehill Esq. be suspended from his office...

"in virtue of the power granted to us...by the regulating act of "Parliament."[1].

A letter was also written to the president and council at Madras communicating to them the order for Whitehill's suspension and requiring them to "pay implicit obedience and attention" to

The supreme government then asked Holland to inform the Nizam of their decision to suspend Whitehill and "of our positive determination not only to see due respect paid to our authority and orders for the maintenance of the faith pledged by our public treaties, but if necessary to enforce it." (2).

In the meanwhile on the 22nd September 1780 the Bengal government had received from Madras the news of the fatal overthrow of Col. Baillie's detachment with an earnest prayer for assistance in the crisis. (3) The utter impotency of the Madras government became patent; the supreme council thereupon resolved to send fifteen lakhs of rupees to Madras (4) and a large detachment by sea. (5) Sir Eyre Coote was requested to proceed with the troops to Madras and "to take the command of the army upon that establishment." (6) The sum of fifteen lakhs was consigned to the commander in chief to be employed for the payment of the troops under his command. At the same time he was authorized to advance any part of the money if he thought it expedient, upon request to the Madras government. A pay-master was appointed to be in charge of the money, so that its expenditure might remain subject to the control of the Bengal

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government. (1) It is interesting to note that the supreme government was following the precedent set by the Madras government in 1756 when Clive was despatched to recover Calcutta with powers independent of Fort William.

Affairs were at this state, and Coote was on the point of sailing when the Bengal government decided to suspend Whitehill. Coote was accordingly made the bearer of the decree. (2) Though, on the day that Coote sailed, the supreme government heard from Madras that they had delivered Guntur to Basalat Jang, they did not reconsider their order for the suspension of Whitehill. On the other hand, the governor general received two letters from Nizam Ali complaining that the tribute for the Circars had not been paid and Guntur not yet restored to Basalat Jang, and urging on him not to lose time in fulfilling his promises. (4) These confirmed him, if he had any doubts, about the wisdom of the steps he had taken, and he entered on record, that the letters from the Nizam "carry the strongest evidence of the embarrassing consequences to which the conduct of the select committee of "Fort St. George in so long withholding their obedience to our

"positive commands may have subjected the Company's affairs," and as such "evidence the absolute necessity under which we have resolved to suspend their president Mr. Whitehill from the exercise of his authority and the powers of acting in opposition to our orders at the hazard of a war with a principal power of Indostan." He proposed that copies of the Nizam's letters be sent to the Directors. In the course of the same minute he also suggested that the letter of the 20th June 1778 from Bengal to Madras pointing out the defect in the disposition of the Madras forces be sent to the Court. He expected that when furnished with that letter "those persons who may hold an enlarged but mistaken opinion of the control which we possess over the Company's other presidencies, and impose consequent responsibility for the event of wars in which they are engaged," would exonerate the Bengal government from any blame for the disaster that had overtaken Col. Baillie's detachment; and "to those whose opinion of our control may be more limited it will appear that we have done all that could be desired or expected of us to avert the consequences which have ensued from an inattention to our advice and that that advice was given not in terms of authority but in such as merited the ready attention of the gentlemen at Fort St. George."(1)

Sir Eyre Coote reached Madras on the 5th November and took his seat in the council on the 7th.(2) On that day Whitehill placed the Bengal letter of the 10th October before the council and entered

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on the records his protest against the order of suspension.(1) He refused to submit to what he called "the grasping hand of unconstitutional power."(2) He declared that he could not be suspended separately for acts of the whole board, that the acts complained of had received the sanction of the Bengal government, that the Madras government could not be accused of holding Guntur in defiance of the supreme government, as they had already restored it to Basalat Jang, and that the Bengal government had no power to suspend him from the exercise of his military charge.(3) He declared his firm intention not to acquiesce in the resolutions of the Bengal government which according to him were "illegal and evidently contrary to the meaning and letter" of the Regulating Act. He then asked the opinion of the board "whether this unjustifiable stretch of usurped authority in the governor general and council of Bengal to suspend not only the president and council collectively, but every member of it separately, and individually, as their ambition, prejudice or caprice may lead them be acquiesced in and whether their orders shall be obeyed."(4). Coote objected to Whitehill's motion being put on the ground that he had no longer a right to move a question at the board.(5) He himself then moved for Charles Smith's succession to the office of

4. Idem. pp.979-80
5. Idem p.983.
of president.(1) The majority of the council being in favour of Coote's motion Whitehill stood suspended.(2)

Coote no doubt found himself in a very delicate situation. He was regarded at Madras as the instrument of enforcing obedience to the orders of the Bengal government, whereas he was merely the bearer of the decree against Whitehill.(3) In a minute before the Madras council Coote said that Whitehill's minutes (4) implied that he was the chief instrument of the Bengal government in his suspension. As commander in chief of the army he could not possibly have instructions to enforce obedience to an order of the Bengal government acting in a civil capacity under the authority of a "constitutional act of parliament," and addressing themselves to a civil government subject to their control. If he had, he would certainly have produced them before the council. Besides if the supreme government had given any instructions of the kind they would have "betrayed a suspicion of imbecility in "their civil power and an implied doubt of the legality by which "they exercised it."(5). After the suspension of Whitehill, Coote gave to Bengal an idea of the difficult situation in which he was placed. He wrote, "...neither my situation nor

1. Loc. cit.
"your orders imposed on me alone to stand forth as the entire in-
strument of enforcing obedience to your authority, but such was
the light in which I was considered to act and such I may say
was the footing on which I was obliged to exert myself. To have
made use of military force at such a juncture I saw fraught with
the most prejudicial consequences, whilst also satisfied that
such an exertion would in no shape produce those good effects
expected to result from the measure, nor in any degree serve to
give greater currency hereafter to that controlling power with
which you are vested over all the presidencies. I therefore
embraced a mode which appeared to me the most promising of every
good purpose and which was moving the board to the previous ques-
tion and whether they would acknowledge your power of control.
This appears nowhere upon the proceedings but it had an equal
good effect by urging the board to a resolution on a motion I had
before made for Mr. Smith's succeeding to the government." In
concluding the letter he informed Bengal that "the idea is enter-
tained of prosecuting the supreme council of an illegal act."(1)

True that Coote had no written instruction for the execution
of the Bengal order and did not employ military force for the
purpose. But the fact that the bearer of the Bengal order came
with an army at his back must have produced the same effect as the
despatch of a military officer expressly sent to suspend the
governor by the employment of force if necessary. Again there was
the fact that he came to Madras at a very critical time equipped

with fifteen lakhs of rupees with the object of conducting the war in the Carnatic. The very existence of the presidency depended upon this assistance from Bengal and the co-operation of Coote, which could only be secured by an acquiescence in the Bengal orders which he had brought along with him. Whitehill no doubt understood the situation, and though he refused to obey the orders of the supreme government he did not mean to pursue the attitude of resistance to the last. But for these circumstances it is extremely doubtful whether the suspension of Whitehill could have been carried out with such ease.

The attitude taken up by Whitehill was justly condemned by the House of Commons who resolved "that John Whitehill Esq. by not paying immediate and implicit obedience to the orders of the supreme council and by his intemperate and contumacious conduct on the 7th and 8th of November, 1780, held out an alarming example of disobedience to the orders of his lawful superiors, and of disrespect to the acts of the British legislature; and was thereby guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour, aggravated by his representing it as an act of forbearance in himself, if he should not involve the settlement in the horrors of a civil war."(1)

Whitehill deserved the suspension not so much for his share in the treaty with Basalat Jang as for the delay in obeying the Bengal orders of the 12th June 1780. The governor general and council had already abandoned one point in dispute with the Nizam, and in

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June 1780 they were ready to give up the other in the hope of an alliance with him. When Heidar invaded the Carnatic, it became more necessary than ever to secure the neutrality of the Nizam by a timely concession. Yet Whitehill delayed the execution of the order. Besides the Nizam had expressed surprise at the non-compliance with the orders to restore Guntur. The exasperation of the Bengal government was therefore natural. They were unwilling to reconsider their order of suspension, though when they heard the news of the restoration of Guntur, there was still time to do so if they pleased. They frankly declared that they found it necessary in order to "preserve the supremacy of the responsible government and to give credit to its acts" that an example should be made of Whitehill.

The suspension of Whitehill terminated for a time the unfriendly relations that had long existed between the two governments and left Bengal triumphant in the field. Very little possibility of dispute between the two governments now remained. Charles Smith was neither in a situation, nor had the inclination, to quarrel with Hastings. Though long in the service of the Company he was not a well known man and had not the weight which a person having influential connections at home would possess. He was therefore in no position to set up an independent attitude. It is clear also that he had not the inclination to do so, for as a member of the Madras council during the period of Whitehill's administration he had always been on the side of the governor general and council. Besides the Madras government was thoroughly discredited as a result of recent
events. Their president had been suspended by the supreme government. They had proved their inability to defend themselves against Haidar Ali and were now totally dependent on Bengal for men, money and provisions. Under the circumstances they could not very well hope to make a stand, in case the Bengal government encroached on their just rights.

In fact the war in the Carnatic relegated the government of Madras totally to the background. The entire direction of the war was passed over to Coote and the Madras government were reduced to the position of a commissariat department. This did not mean that the Bengal government now obtained the direction of the war. To a certain extent indeed Coote represented Bengal. He was a member of that government and he was sent out by that government to save the Company's position in the Carnatic. On the other hand, on his arrival at Madras he automatically took the second place in the council there, and became as much a member of that government as he was of that of Bengal. Again it is true that Coote was at the head of a detachment from Bengal. But it was a small part of the English army engaged in the Carnatic war. Coote commanded the major part of that army not by any authority that he brought from Bengal, but by the powers which he derived from the various commissions that he held. As commander in chief of the King's forces in India he possessed supreme authority over the King's forces at Madras. As commander in chief of the Company's


forces in India he enjoyed superintending powers over the military department at Madras,(1) though as vague and underlined as those possessed by the governor general and council over the foreign relations of that presidency. To add to these the Madras select committee gave up their right to direct the war in favour of Coote. They sent instructions to officers in command of the Madras forces to obey all orders which they might receive from Coote, and remained satisfied with requiring them to send regularly information of all the material occurrences.(2). Coote's powers were various in their origin. No essential part of them seems to have been derived from the authority of the Bengal government which indeed lacked any power of the kind that they could delegate to Coote. The Directors however expected the Bengal government to take up the conduct of the war. On hearing of the first reports of Haidar's invasion the Directors wrote to Bengal, "it will require your instant and powerful exertion to recover affairs from disorder in that quarter. We...rely with confidence upon your best endeavours being immediately exerted for that purpose."(3).

This might mean nothing more than an order to the governor general and council to render assistance to the Madras government. But the language in which they wrote to Madras was unambiguous. They said, "as our governor general and council must take the lead if negotiations be necessary, so must they also direct the plan of

1. Idem Paras.50-58.
3. Directors to Bengal 11 April 1781 Para 6 Despatched to Bengal, Vol.11.
"joint operations for all our presidencies if war shall be unavoidable, and it is our order that all their requisitions be to the utmost of your ability implicitly obeyed."(1) The Directors clearly realized that, for the efficient conduct of the war, a unified control of the operations was absolutely necessary. It was a frank acknowledgement of the fact that the Regulating Act had created a system which was unworkable. It had given the Bengal government control over the commencement and termination of hostilities. They had the duty of supplying the subordinate presidencies with men and money for the conduct of wars, and they were responsible for the security of the possessions of the Company.(2) But over the actual direction of wars they had no control. The Directors felt that in the face of necessity this could not endure.

Though the Madras government lost control over the military operations in the Carnatic war, they retained a voice in some other matters of equal importance. In November 1780 the governor of Madras received private information, to the effect that the Dutch had made certain offers for an alliance with the English against Haidar, who had attacked their dependencies at Cochin.(3) He was unable to learn the nature of the offers. The critical situation of affairs however pointed out to him the advisability of an

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2. General instructions from Directors to Bengal 29 March, 1774, Para 1, Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 7.

alliance with the Dutch. He therefore asked the select committee whether under these circumstances they were authorized to enter into negotiations with the Dutch. (1) Coote gave his opinion that the situation of affairs authorized such a step, and said that he knew that it was a measure which the governor general and council wished very much to bring about. (2) The select committee agreeing in the propriety of the measure a letter was written to Huddleston the president at Nagore to sound the Dutch at Negapatam, and if he considered the terms advantageous he was then to inform them that the Bengal government had already taken steps for an alliance with the Dutch; that the Madras government was heartily inclined to promote the views of the supreme government by every means in their power and to explain to them how much it was to their mutual advantage to form an alliance against Haidar. (3) The Madras government also wrote a letter to Light, the presidency master at Palamcottah, from whom the information had first been received asking him to inform them of the particulars of the Dutch offer, authorizing him to enter into a negotiation with the Dutch and cautioning him at the same time not to "commit this government in any manner whatsoever until you are furnished with our positive orders on that head." He also was

1. Loc. cit.
instructed, if he found necessary, to inform the Dutch that the Madras government was co-operating with Bengal in the matter. (1) The manner in which the Madras government proceeded is interesting. An important reason for their taking up the matter was that they were informed that the governor general and council had made a move in that direction. They clearly stated in their letters to Huddleston and Light that their object was to co-operate with Bengal. They saw the advantages in general of an alliance with the Dutch. But they did not know the terms under which the Dutch offered assistance. Under the circumstances they were undecided in the matter. It is possible therefore that, while they waited for further information on the subject from their agents, they thought that any communication with Bengal on that subject would be premature and unnecessary.

When the Madras government were fully informed of the Dutch proposals (2) they saw that there were strong arguments against them. They did not totally lay aside the proposals, but as it was necessary to consider them carefully they preferred to remain for the time being silent on the subject. (3) They advised Huddleston to be attentive in the meanwhile to every intelligence he might receive of the disposition of the Dutch towards the

While the Madras government postponed the consideration of a Dutch alliance till more favourable offers were obtainable, the governor general and council drew up a draft treaty with the concurrence of the Dutch authorities at Chinsurah. The object of the treaty was to obtain through the governors of Colombo and Cochin a force of 1000 European infantry and 200 artillery and 1000 Malay soldiers, in exchange for the cession of the province of Tinnevelly which belonged to Nawab Wallajah, the liberty of making conquests in the neighbourhood of Cochin, and the exclusive right to the pearl fishery of the south. The supreme council signed, sealed and executed the treaty. They appointed James Dighton as their agent and sent him to Madras with the treaty together with letters to the Nawab of the Carnatic, the governors of Colombo and Cochin and the Madras government. The Bengal government provided the Madras government with copies of the documents, requested them to obtain the sanction of the Nawab to the treaty without which the clause relating to the cession of Tinnevelly could not be of any value, and to send Dighton with the treaty and the letters together with any despatches which

1. Loc. cit.
they might like to add to the Dutch at Colombo and Cochin. In case the nawab refused his assent to the treaty the governor general and council desired the Madras government to represent to him in strong terms "the nature of his situation and the indispensable obligation he is under of making common cause with the Company." (1)

The Madras government were very much opposed to the treaty. (2) The nawab of the Carnatic refused to accede to the terms. (3) Dighton found it unnecessary to insist on the completion of the treaty and returned to Bengal. (4) The Madras select committee submitted to Bengal the reasons for their objection to the treaty. They said that when the scheme was under their consideration some time ago they objected to it on the grounds that such a large number of troops would involve great additional expense, that the money spent in supporting them could be more profitably employed in maintaining a body of cavalry for which there was great need and that such a measure would disgrace the English in the eye of the country.

powers. This was their opinion when affairs were in a much more unfavourable state. Now that Sir Eyre Coote had given a favourable turn to the Company's affairs in Madras, "we should hold ourselves


3. This is on the authority of Madras to Coote 12 Feb. 1781. Mad. Sel. Com. Cons. 12 Feb. 1781, Vol. 5, p. 377. There is a statement to the same effect in the Madras Select Committee Consultations of 12 Feb. 1781, Vol. 5, p. 376. The correspondence of the nawab of the Carnatic on the subject could not be examined, as they are not available in London.

"highly reprehensible were we in any manner to promote the ratification of the treaty you have sent us." They added that Nawab Wallajah had assigned the revenues of the southern provinces to the company and they would provide the major part of the fund to carry on the war. The cession of Tinnevelly to the Dutch would therefore be an unwise step. They hoped that their conduct would meet with the approbation of the supreme government(1)

The governor general and council took the rejection of their measure by a subordinate administration in a very reasonable spirit. They wrote that the treaty "was founded on the desperate necessity of our affairs....A more prosperous state has succeeded and has rendered this measure unnecessary, we are therefore pleased that you have rejected it...."(2)

The residence of Holland at Hyderabad which had been the very apple of discord for a long time past now became a matter which afforded opportunities for the exchange of civilities. Transmitting information to Bengal about the state of affairs in the south, the Madras government said that as the governor general and council received more authentic information from Holland regarding the Nizam, they would refrain from troubling them with

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2. Bengal to Madras - 2 April 1781. Idem p.938. This did not prevent Hastings from feeling a little wounded at the treatment which the draft treaty received at Madras. He classed it as one of his measures for the preservation of Fort St. George which had been "treated with derision or resented as injurious." He described it as a "measure extorted by the cries of despair, and judged in the elation of a sudden return of success." cf. Hastings to Macartney - 23 July 1781 India Office Home Miso. No.246, p.264.
their ideas on the political situation at Hyderabad (1) (23 Jan. 1781). This slight hint induced the Bengal government to instruct Holland to keep the select committee at Madras informed of every important occurrence that might be necessary for them. (2) At the same time the supreme council desired the Madras government to restore Holland to his rank and service as it would be "a public demonstration to all the powers of Hindostan of the hearty union and concurrence of the two presidencies in their support of the common cause." (3) (26 Feb. 1781).

In the meanwhile the Madras government had restored Holland to his rank and service and had asked him to continue in his station at Hyderabad. (4) Charles Smith and his select committee were glad to reverse a measure of the previous administration in which they had not agreed. Besides they felt that the presence of a resident of the Madras government at the court of the Nizam was essential in the critical situation of affairs. (5) They informed Bengal that they had directed Holland to stay at Hyderabad "as long as you and we shall deem it expedient." (6) (28 Feb. 1781). Thus, what was regarded as impossible by Rumbold and Whitehill became quite

practicable under Charles Smith. His commission from the supreme council no longer stood in the way of his remaining a servant of the Madras government. When Madras received the Bengal letter of the 26th February, they wrote that they had felt great satisfaction in being able to do justice to Hollond and "at the same time to evince to you a reciprocal desire on our part to promote and maintain that perfect union between the presidencies which is so essentially necessary for the welfare of both." They also expressed their appreciation of the Bengal orders to Hollond to correspond with them.(1)

A spirit of friendly co-operation between the two presidencies was again manifested when the subject of an alliance with the Nizam came up before them at this time. The Madras government learnt from Hollond that the Nizam was well disposed towards an alliance with the English against Haidar. Eager to secure a body of cavalry from the Nizam they became anxious to enter into a treaty with him. But they did not think of commencing a negotiation themselves. They recommended the subject to the consideration of the Bengal government and suggested the concessions which might be made to purchase his alliance (13 May 1781).(2) They then desired Hollond, who wanted to resign on grounds of ill health to stay on at Hyderabad to receive any instructions that the governor general and council might furnish him with on the

subject of the treaty. (1) They knew that Hollond had written to Bengal on the subject. They perhaps guessed that the Bengal government had moved in the matter and saw that it would be best for one presidency to conduct the negotiation while they confined themselves to giving opinions and suggestions on the subject.

Before the Bengal government received the Madras letter, they had sent instructions to Hollond to negotiate and conclude a new treaty with the Nizam. (2) Immediately on receipt of the letter from Madras they issued supplementary instructions to Hollond, adding stipulations conforming to those proposed by the Madras government. (3) They sent to the Madras select committee a copy of Hollond’s instructions and requested them to secure the concurrence of the nawab of the Carnatic to a clause in the proposed treaty and to inform Hollond of the same. (4). (14 June 1781).

The subsequent correspondence between the two governments on the subject belongs to the period of the administration of Lord Macartney. However, reference must be made here to a letter written by the governor general to Charles Smith and his select committee in July 1781. Though the letter did not reach Madras during the governorship of Smith, (5) it is interesting as showing that the governor general did not consider opposition to his

5. Before the letter was despatched news reached Bengal of the arrival of Macartney. Hastings sent the letter to Macartney along with a fresh letter to him on the subject.
proposals from the Madras government as altogether unlikely. It was Hasting's opinion that a substantial concession must be made in order to induce the Nizam to enter into a new treaty of alliance with the English, and he came out with the suggestion that the Circars might very well be ceded. He proposed the matter to the Madras government with the greatest caution. He wrote, "we venture to offer "some consideration on your present possession of the northern "Circars...we say we venture to offer them, because we know that "what we shall have to say upon them will have a strong opposition "to encounter." He presented to Madras the outlines of the treaty he proposed, and invited suggestions from them. He concluded, "we "shall wait for your opinion before we can take any effectual steps "in this business, and shall finally determine our resolution by it."(1).

In another transaction however the supreme government did not show the same solicitation for the opinions of Madras, for without their participation they entered into an agreement with the Nawab Wallajah, who in lieu of the recognition of his sovereignty assigned all the revenues of the Carnatic to the Company. They also appointed Richard Joseph Sullivan, a servant of the Madras establishment as their resident at the nawab's court to watch over the execution of the agreement. This was the high water mark of the exercise.

of the authority of the governor general and council over Madras. When the agreement reached Madras, the administration had changed, and Lord Macartney had taken up office. The subject will therefore be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
The circumstances under which it was possible for the Supreme government to assume the position that it did in the period of the administration of Charles Smith were considerably modified when the disgraced government of Madras gave place to a totally new one with a person of Lord Macartney's ability and reputation at the head. On the other hand the orders of the Directors of the 11th April 1781 armed the Bengal government with more powers than before. A fresh trial of strength was inevitable; but it was postponed for some time as Macartney was actuated by a sincere desire to cultivate the friendship of the government and co-operate with the Supreme government. From the very first he frankly criticised their measures with a view to the good of both. But Hastings misconstrued Macartney's honest criticisms for opposition. He had met with opposition at home and in so many directions that he had now become totally insensible of enduring it. Besides he developed a dislike of Macartney based on an unfounded belief that he was seeking to undermine his position at home with a view to secure the office of governor-general himself. He went far beyond the limits within which he could exercise his authority effectively. He therefore experienced a series of checks. First the Madras government refused to part with their powers in favour of Calcutta. Then they thwarted the orders of the Supreme government to restore the assignment of the Carnatic's revenue to Mallajha. Lastly they ignored the order of Bengal to add to the treaty of Bengal a clause relating to the news of the Carnatic. The great trial of strength revealed the utter impotency of the controlling government.
THE REACTION.

The circumstances under which it was possible for the Supreme government to attain the position that it did in the period of the administration of Charles Smith were considerably modified when that discredited government of Madras gave place to a totally new one with a person of Lord Macartney's ability and reputation at the head. On the other hand the orders of the Directors of the 11th April 1781 armed the Bengal government with more powers than before. A fresh trial of strength was inevitable; but it was postponed for some time as Macartney was actuated by a sincere desire to cultivate the friendship of the governor general and co-operate with the Supreme government. From the very first he frankly criticised their measures with a view to the common good. But Hastings misconstrued Macartney's honest criticism for opposition. He had met with opposition so often and in so many directions that he had now become totally incapable of enduring it. Besides he developed a dislike of Macartney based on an unfounded belief that he was seeking to undermine his position at home with a view to secure the office of governor general himself. He went far beyond the limits within which he could exercise his authority effectively. He therefore experienced a series of checks. First the Madras government refused to part with their powers in favour of Coote. Then they disobeyed the orders of the Supreme government to restore the assignment of the Carnatic revenues to Wallajah. Lastly they ignored the orders of Bengal to add to the treaty of Mangalore a clause relating to the nawab of the Carnatic. The great trial of strength revealed the utter impotency of the controlling government.
CHAPTER IV.

Early relations of Hastings and Macartney.

The post of the governor in the Company's presidencies had always been filled by its covenanted servants. The first departure from this custom was made when Lord Macartney was chosen to be governor of Madras. His appointment was the triumph of the school of opinion which held that a wider field of choice than the covenanted servants of the Company might contribute to greater efficiency. Lord Macartney had held various offices under the state and had won credit by negotiating a commercial treaty with Russia. He was a man of culture and his abilities were well known. Hastings' friends were now triumphant in the Company's home administration and they were confident that Macartney who had won his way to their friendship would be a supporter of Hastings. Samuel Pechell writing to Hastings early in 1781 described Macartney as "a very confidential friend" and said, "he knows your character and ability thoroughly and is determined in every respect to second your endeavours for the public welfare. You may therefore, in all, act confidentially with him." (1) The same confidence is shown in another letter which Lawrence Sullivan wrote to

Macartney in February 1781. After making a communication which he regarded as extremely confidential he wrote, "Will you, my lord, convey this secret paragraph to our friend Mr. Hastings only, for this is the manner (and Mr. Hastings is apprized of it) I mean to corresponde with you both." Again regarding another topic, Sullivan said, "I have wrote to Mr. Hastings but not fully, pray send him this paragraph and join him in giving every aid."(1).

On his part Lord Macartney was ready to co-operate with the governor general and eager to win his friendship. A few days after his arrival at Madras he wrote to Hastings: "It is my good fortune to be supported by the same persons who are attached to your welfare, a coincidence which I trust will lay a foundation of friendship and confidence between us. In this reliance it shall be my constant aim to give you my best assistance in forwarding the public business, and I flatter myself with finding every facility on your part, and I trust you will please to open yourself to me without reserve on the present state of affairs."(2).

Within a short time he wrote again to Hastings to say that a letter he had received from Lawrence Sullivan had given him "additional grounds for the hope of that confidential communication and strict union with you on which I shall rely for the success of my government in India." He promised that "in my letter to Mr. Sullivan I

"shall declare my acknowledgements to him greater for securing
your friendship than for his share in my original appointment."
He then gave an account of the state of affairs at Madras drawing emphasis on the needs of the presidency and its absolute reliance on Bengal for assistance.(1)

Hastings had been prepared by the letters which he received from his friends to expect in Macartney a man who would act heartily with him. He therefore at the very outset corresponded in an unreserved manner with a view to the adoption of his own plans by the new governor. He placed before Macartney the proposal of

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cluding the Circars to the Nizam in order to induce him to enter into a treaty with the English. He had broached the proposal very cautiously in a letter he intended for the previous administration of Madras. However before the letter was despatched he learnt of the change in the administration at Madras, and thought it better before proceeding further to ascertain privately the opinion of Macartney on the subject. Accordingly he sent a copy of the letter to Macartney and wrote"....judging it a more liberal return to your lordship's professions to allow you a free option in the measures proposed in it, than to suffer it to be pressed upon you in an official form, my colleague agreeing with me in this opinion and in the desire that whatever may be finally done in this business may have the credit of being determined in concert between us, we have preferred this mode of communicating it to

"you, although we had before passed it into a resolution." He left it to Lord Macartney if he approved of the proposal, and thought it necessary, to communicate it to the select committee. (1) After a fortnight, Hastings then on his way to Benares wrote another letter to Macartney explaining to him the circumstances under which he had entered into an agreement with the nawab of the Carnatic in April 1781. He tried to set at rest any alarm which the measure might have excited in the mind of Lord Macartney and to secure his cooperation in the scheme. He said that although he was discouraged by the reflection that Lord Macartney had by that time been prejudiced by the prevalent opinion at Madras regarding the relation of the two governments, and that the letter might arrive too late to produce its effect, yet he should not yield to it, "trusting that you will have the caution under whatever impression, to avoid so decided a conduct as may disable you from yielding to the influence of better information, or (which I rather expect) that you will have at once resolved to adopt our principles and heartily to support and carry the measures formed upon them into effect." Hastings sought to assure Macartney that the supreme government had no design of encroaching on the legitimate rights of the inferior presidency. He wrote, "Our government has a weight of business of its own already as great as it can sustain, and a responsibility sufficiently hazardous and delicate in itself to make it dread any addition to it, and my Lord, I fancy that you have found the affairs of the Carnatic in a state which could afford little temptation to us, were we ever so vacant of employment, to assume a participation in the conduct and events of its administration.

"This may serve for a general proof that it was not from choice that we have in any instance interfered in the concerns of that province or of your presidency. I desire your lordship to look back on the transactions of the last twelvemonth, and weigh by your own judgment the many things that we have done for the relief and preservation of Fort St. George. That which was undeniably good has been accepted as a rightful claim. The rest, as I am told, either treated with derision or resented as injurious. I allude particularly to the treaty proposed with the Dutch, and to the agreement lately concluded with the Nabob Wula Jaw. He then said that he would not have interfered in the relations of Madras with the nawab of the Carnatic if he had known that a man of Lord Macartney's character had been chosen to administer that presidency. However, since the agreement with Wallajah had become an act of the supreme government he requested his lordship to give it his firm and hearty support. In conclusion Hastings desired Macartney to excuse the long letter as the pains which he had taken to write it was "a proof of the value which I set on your lordship's concurrence in my line of thinking", and said that he would continue to write upon other important subjects.\(^{(1)}\)

On reaching Benares Hastings wrote another letter to Macartney in reply to his professions of friendship. He said that he expected to derive great advantage in his public life from the connection

formed with his lordship and that "there are no difficulties to which
the resources of our governments so united are not more than equal
and I entertain the most sanguine hopes that it will be in my power
as it is my earnest wish to produce the first proofs of it."(1)
He then attributed the favourable turn in the affairs in the Carnatic
to "the wise measures of your lordship's administration and the in-
fluence of your reputation!"(2) Thus the relations of the two
governments started with a friendly correspondence between Hastings
and Macartney. Unfortunately however this could not continue, for the
Regulating Act was sure to set even the most well intentioned of men
at cross purposes.

Macartney could not see his way to accept Hastings's proposals to
cede the Northern Circars to the Nizam. He however explained, "It is
"scarcely possible for two persons distant from each other to coincide
"always exactly in opinion on every particular point; but minute dif-
"ferences can never affect our general views, or in any degree weaken
"that union which I most sincerely wish to cultivate and maintain with
you." He placed before Hastings his objections in full against the
measure and said, ". . . it would not be obeying your commands, if I were
"not to communicate to you, the genuine and candid reflections that

   fo. 92.
2. Idem fo. 94.
"have occurred to me on the subject. They are declared with
difference (sic.) but they press upon my mind with a conviction
that must prevent the probability of my reconciling it to my duty
"to accede, without special authority from home to a proposal which
every consideration I can give it entirely rejects... I can not
"have been biassed by any of those rooted and popular prejudices

which you foresaw you would have to encounter in other breasts.
"With me the general security and promotion of the British interests

"in India is the only object." (1) Again he wrote, "I shall as far
"as in my power conform to your plans and co-operate with your ex-
"tractions in the public cause. Thus determined in my conduct, I

"feel the less reluctance in exposing to you candidly the observations

"that occur to me on public measures..." (2). The Madras government

objected to the intervention of Bengal in their relations with the
nawab of the Carnatic. But fearing that it might be disagreeable

to the Bengal government, they did not enter their protest upon re-
cord. The letter from the select committee containing their argu-
ments against the measures adopted by Bengal was sent by Macartney
to Hastings as an enclosure in a private letter with a request to
Hastings to regard it as proceeding from the members as individuals.
"In this manner," wrote Macartney, "...I mean to follow the liberal

"example you gave me in referring to my private judgement the pro-

posal of your board for the cession of the northern Circars, a pro-

posal against which I delivered my opinion with a frankness

correspondent to your proceedings towards me. "(1).

However well intentioned Macartney might have been, his criticism of the proposals and the measures of the supreme government must have annoyed the governor general. He irritated Hastings still more by an extremely tactless letter which he wrote at the end of September 1781. He began well. After professions of friendship, he said that his one ambition was to contribute towards the well-being of his employees "without any subdivision of local interests or attachments." Whenever any objection had been raised against a measure on the ground of its being an encroachment by one presidency on another, he had taken great pains to inculcate the opposite sentiments. "To the assertion of rights invaded I have opposed the impropriety of giving such a name to simple institutions established for the facility of the service, and which must be subservient to its benefit; and to persons hurt at the apprehension of contempt from the participation or subtraction of their authority, that bodies of men as well as individuals become in fact contemptible not by the act of others, but by the weakness or inconsistency of their own proceedings." He believed that the establishment of a central body vested with supreme power would be of real advantage to the interests of the English. He was personally interested in the undertakings of the supreme government as there was a plan for the appointment of the governor of Madras as a member of the supreme council. So far the

1. Idem fo. 273 (b).
sentiments that Macartney expressed were not likely to offend Hastings. But he indiscreetly went on to emphasise the need of caution in the exercise of its authority by the supreme government. He pointed out that a cautious exercise of authority was the best means of preserving its dignity and securing its efficacy. Indeed there could be no objection to interpose in a case of necessity, or to set aside "the usual instruments of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic" when they were unfit: "but it is to the attempt of interposing where the interposition may be rejected, or when if admitted it may be prejudicial or ineffectual" that the chief objection lay. He continued, "The uneasiness of the presidencies of both coasts at any extension of the authority of the Bengal government over them beyond the express provision of the Act of Parliament has been declared in forcible terms in their respective consultations....Their complaints to the Court of Directors have not hitherto been disowne to yesterday of your claims or condemnation of their resistance. The dread of suspension by your decree could have little effect on men inclined to dispute in certain instances the sentence as well as the crime, and on whom being determined to quit the service, if executed, it would not be a punishment. Neither could you be certain by the dangerous experiment of a succession of suspensions to arrive at length at fit subjects for obedience, nor could the purpose of immediate relief be answered by remote success." He also remarked that there was more danger from the perversion of the measures of the supreme government reluctantly admitted by the subordinate government
entrusted with its execution than from an open breach between the
two governments consequent on the rejection of the measures of the
supreme council. (1)

Macartney soon came to know that his letters had produced the
opposite effect from that which was intended. Realizing that any
further explanation of his sentiments by letter might create more
mischief he sent his private secretary George Leonard Staunton to
Bengal in February 1782 with the object of convincing the governor
general of his sincere desire to co-operate with him. (2) Hastings
received Staunton well (3) and wrote to Macartney assuring him of
his co-operation and support. (4)

Though Macartney continued the correspondence for some time
this seems to have been the last friendly letter from Hastings.
Many things happened in the meanwhile to dispose the governor gen-
eral against Macartney.

Soon after his arrival Macartney took the initiative in two
measures which must have annoyed Hastings. The desire for peace
with the Indian powers expressed by the authorities at home and
the exhaustion which the English in India felt from a prolonged war
against the most powerful of the Indian princes were regarded by
Macartney as sufficient reasons for inviting Haidar Ali to come to

1. Macartney to Hastings 28 Sept. 1781. Home Miscellaneous Vol. 246,
   pp. 279-82.
2. Same to Same 3 Feb. 1782 Brit. Mus. Add Mss. No. 29, 153, fo. 27.
3. of Same to Same 20 March 1782 - Idem fo. 460.
terms with the English. In July 1781 he wrote to Haidar that he had been sent to clear up all misunderstanding between him and the late representatives of the Company and to give him the "strongest assurances and the most undoubted proofs of their friendly disposition." If Haidar did not accept the offer the English would maintain the superiority of their arms.(1) This letter Macartney submitted to Coote for consideration. Coote forwarded it to Haidar together with letters from him and Sir Edward Hughes, the Admiral, to the purport that Lord Macartney's desire for peace was genuine and that it was supported by the commanders of the army and the navy.(2) Naturally, nothing resulted from this invitation. Macartney explained to the Directors that the state to which the Company's affairs had been reduced made such a step one of imminent necessity and as such removed the restraint laid by law on his government regarding the commencement of negotiations. "It was a necessity which I the more particularly lamented as every motive of discretion, every sentiment of respect and esteem for the governor general and members of the council of Bengal, concurred in forbidding me to give rise to the smallest appearance of interfering with the authority entrusted to that board." He promised that "if this overture should be followed by proposals for a treaty I shall

"communicate the whole to him (Hastings) for the sanction of his government, rejecting in this instance advice however otherwise respectable of withholding entirely from his knowledge any attempt at negotiation, as likely to be counteracted by a jealousy of character of which I can not admit the existence in a liberal mind."

(1)

Since it was the practice of the governors of the presidencies to address the Indian princes in their own name, and since the letter from Coote and Hughes to Haídar were written only with the object of giving support to Macartney's letter, this measure was clearly an act of Macartney on behalf of the Madras government. Besides Macartney admitted it to be such in his letter to the Directors referred to above.

A couple of months later a similar invitation to come to terms was issued to the Marathas. It is difficult to describe this as an act of the Madras government. The letter to the Peshwa was signed by four persons - Macartney, Hughes, Coote and Macpherson. Two of them were members of the Bengal council. Besides the Madras government could have normally no hand in any negotiation with the Marathas. All that can be said is that four prominent people declared themselves sureties for any treaty which the Bengal government might make with the Marathas. They requested the Marathas to communicate to Bengal the stipulations under which they were ready to enter into a treaty.(2) They then asked the Bombay government to

suspend hostilities against the Marathas provided the Marathas did the same and warned them that in case they raised any obstacles to the measure they were to be responsible for the consequences. Coote exercised his authority as commander in chief over General Goddard by ordering him to obey the demand contained in the letter to Bombay. Lord Macartney and the others sought to justify their action in a letter to Hastings by pointing out the critical nature of the time and the urgent need of peace "without which we should not perhaps have been inclined without your previous concurrence to take any preparatory step..." They said that their object was "to facilitate and accelerate the conclusion of a treaty of which we declare the stipulations must be regulated by you, as charged with the affairs of the English all over India." Macpherson, who had signed this extraordinary document at Madras while on his way from England to Bengal, explained that "at the time of his acceding to the measure he was fully aware of its being out of the common line of the Company's system of correspondence...But alas! the crisis of the Company's fate...called not for adherence to forms but for the heartiest exertions of every good servant of the Company."

These invitations to peace were directly contrary to Hastings's

policy of compelling the enemy to sue for peace and must have annoyed him. Besides they illustrate the difficulties under which Hastings had to labour.

With the third important Indian prince, the Subahdar of the Deccan, Macartney was not in such hurry for peace. As has already been noticed, a negotiation with the Nizam was on foot. Macartney did not hesitate to express his opinion freely on the subject and to take a line independent of the supreme government. It has been seen that the Madras government under Charles Smith suggested that the Nizam might be won over by the promise of securing for him the country of Cuddapah which was in the possession of Haidar Ali, and that Bengal had added the suggestion to their instructions to Holland to conclude a defensive and offensive treaty with the Nizam. Macartney however disliked such a stipulation and the Madras government now wrote to Bengal that in order to obtain the assistance of the Nizam it was neither necessary nor expedient to undertake the conquest of any territory for him. They felt no delicacy in objecting to the proposal for giving Cuddapah to the Nizam as the idea originated at Madras at a time of great necessity and was "rather complied with than proposed by your board." They also gave their opinion that under the circumstances a defensive rather than an offensive alliance was desirable. (1) They sent to Holland a copy of this letter to indicate to him the principles which should guide him in the formation of a treaty with the Nizam. (2)

At this time Macartney also set aside Hastings's proposal for the cession of the Northern Circars to the Nizam.

On receiving instructions from the new government at Madras contrary to those he had received from Bengal, Hollond was in a dilemma. He wrote to Madras that he had already broached the proposition of an offensive and defensive alliance, and that he expected to bring the treaty to a conclusion very soon. He submitted to the consideration of Madras whether they were ready to risk the loss of an active alliance in order to adhere to the line they had adopted (1). The Madras government replied that their instructions must be modified by the necessity that was felt of an alliance with the Nizam. However they reminded Hollond that the Company desired to be in peace and harmony with the Indian princes and that the proposals for making conquests for the Nizam "which chiefly occasioned our animadversions" were directly in conflict with this principle. Speaking of the proposal of the cession of the Circars they said that no consideration of advantage could induce them to part with them. They however suggested that troops might be lent to the Nizam as auxiliaries "without specifying the particular service on which they should be employed." (2) To this Hollond replied that it was improbable that the Nizam would agree to an auxiliary alliance with the English against Haidar Ali. (3)

It is unnecessary to go further into the details of Hollond's negotiations with the Nizam. He tried his best up to the middle of

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1782 to induce the Nizam to agree to his terms but was unable to form a new treaty with him. (1) He then resigned his post and was succeeded by James Grant. Suffice it to say that the instructions which Hollond received from Madras, though in conflict with those he had received from Bengal, substantially modified his negotiations with the Nizam. Hollond wrote to Madras, "The forming "an alliance with this court was ordered I suppose with a view merely "to support the affairs of the Carnatic and the Circars. I have been "therefore entirely guided by your advices." (2).

Though the independent line taken by the Madras government must have made it more difficult for Hollond to induce the Nizam to enter into an alliance, this did not give rise to any quarrel between the two presidencies. As a matter of fact there was practically no correspondence at this time between Bengal and Madras on the subject of the negotiations with the Nizam. The reason perhaps was that a more favourable turn of affairs had diminished the importance of a treaty with the Nizam, and rendered correspondence on the subject between the two governments unnecessary, especially as they communicated their views directly to Hollond, and were kept informed by him of each others opinions, and the progress of the negotiation.

On the whole the attitude of the Madras government was very reasonable. They freely communicated their opinions to Hollond, as it was indeed their duty to do. They expected him to make his

negotiations conform to the wishes of the Bengal government as well as to theirs, and at the same time to modify them in accordance with necessity. One occasion they wrote, "...the measures to be adopted are...such as the particular circumstances of the times and the pressure of our affairs render absolutely necessary; of such you must be a competent judge from the great lines of correspondence from the different presidencies, and the powers at war with us, verging to a point, at the place where you reside, but particularly from the instructions which you receive from Bengal which in all negotiations is the master wheel of our political machine."(1)

One stage of the negotiation however was marked by an extraordinary outburst of the Bengal government. Hollond informed Bengal on the 12th December 1781 of the Nizam's apprehension that if he joined the English, Haidar Ali might propose terms of peace to the Madras government, advantageous to the English only, and that in case they accepted them he would derive no advantage out of the war. The Nizam had desired the supreme government to restrain Madras from accepting the offer of Haidar in such a case.(2) Thereupon the Bengal government considering it necessary to give every possible aid to Hollond's negotiations,(3) directed Madras

that in case a treaty was concluded with the Nizam, they were not to make a peace with Haidar under any circumstances without the previous consent of the Nizam and the supreme council. They said, "...we make this order so positive that we pledge the honour of the nation to your performance of it. The consequences we need not explain." They further required the Madras government to write to the Nizam assuring him of their "intention to adhere to the line we have prescribed, lest his being unacquainted with the controlling powers of this government he should still entertain any shadow of doubt with respect to your future conduct." (1)

The Bengal government also wrote to Coote, "we are resolved to punish in the severest manner not only upon the spot but also by impeachment in Europe any infraction on the part of the administration of Fort St. George of the treaty which our minister at Hyderabad may have concluded with His Highness the Nizam Ally Cawn Bahadur. We have pledged the honour of Great Britain to the performance of such treaty...you are both from situation and disposition the guardian of that honour and we vest you or whoever may succeed to your situation with all our authority to maintain the faith of that treaty should (what is next to impossible happen) that is, should the gentlemen of the administration of Fort St. George influenced by improper motives attempt upon their

part to evade the faith of the treaty." (1) Copies of these letters were sent to the Nizam through Holland. (2) Nothing appears in the consultations to show what the Madras government felt at this sudden outburst of the supreme government. Perhaps they concluded that the sole object of the letters was to remove the apprehension which the Nizam had expressed, and therefore regarded it unnecessary to make any remark on them.

Although the correspondence between the Madras government and Holland showed mutual confidence and dependence, yet Holland after his resignation gave sufficient cause for disappointment to the Madras government. The Nizam desired Holland, when he took leave of him, to proceed to Bengal and to explain to the governor general various matters that had formed the subject of conference between them. (3) The Madras select committee requested Holland to visit the presidency before going to Bengal. (4) Holland replied that he could not go to Madras as he had pledged his word to the Nizam to go straight to Bengal. (5) The Madras government therefore remained in the dark as to the nature of the communication that the Nizam had desired Holland to make to Bengal.

The Madras government under Macartney indeed asserted themselves at times in dealings with the Indian princes, yet frequently they acted in such matters with great restraint, sought and followed the direction of Bengal and thereby helped the governor general and council to keep up uniformity in policy with regard to the country powers.

In February 1782 the Madras government received offers of a defensive and offensive alliance from Atisham Jang, (1) a feudatory of the Nizam, whose object was to make himself independent. The offer was very acceptable especially on account of the vacillating policy of the Nizam. At the same time it was made in a tempting manner, for the prince, perhaps unaware of the limitations of that government to treat, had sent his envoy to enter into the agreement with the governor and council of Madras. They however acted with great restraint. Macartney wrote to Atisham Jang that he would give due consideration to his proposals, and requested him to send through Hollond any communication that he desired to make in the meanwhile. (2). To Hollond Macartney wrote that the Madras government depended on his advice in the matter as, from the state of his negotiations with the Nizam and from his knowledge of the intentions of the Bengal government, he was in a better position to judge of the advisability of treating with Atisham Jang. (3) The Madras government

forwarded the papers on the subject to the supreme government for their opinions and instructions. (1) (Feb. 1782).

Hollond's answer arrived soon. His opinion was that it would not be wise to enter into any negotiation with Atisham Jang unless they were compelled to it. (2) The Madras government replied to Hollond that his reasonings on the subject entirely coincided with their ideas, and that they would not carry the negotiation further or make any professions to Atisham Jang that might give offence to the Nizam or prejudice Hollond's negotiations. (3) No answer was received from the supreme council.

In May 1782 when all hopes of an alliance with the Nizam were gone, the Madras government repeated their request to Bengal to be favoured with their instructions on the subject. (4) The supreme council replied that they had not sent an earlier answer as they thought that Madras had received convincing reasons from Hollond for declining to accept Atisham Jang's offer. They were of opinion that an alliance with Atisham Jang would be inconsistent with the professions lately made to the Nizam and a breach of the existing treaty with him. (5) (4 July 1782). The Bengal government wrote again on this subject to Madras in December 1782. They had

received private information that the Madras government had commenced negotiations with Atisham Jang. They hoped that Madras had not acted without a reference to their opinion expressed in their last letter on the subject, and repeated their advice and injunctions in the most peremptory manner not to hold any kind of intercourse with him. They said that as a rule they were unwilling to take up a matter on private intelligence, but there were occasions when they were for want of authentic intelligence obliged to give some credit to information of that kind. (1) It is true that so late as November Macartney had not abandoned the idea of assisting Atisham Jang. But he had not negotiated. In such a state Madras had reason for feeling wounded at the tone of the letter. They replied that in accordance with the Bengal letter of the 4th July only a "civil reply" had been given to Atisham Jang and "no negotiations of any nature whatever have been carried on or commenced by us or on our part with him." They added, "The application we made to you for your instructions on this subject might indeed have been some presumption that we meant not to act without them, and as accordingly no transaction took place on this occasion "our silence could not be considered as a default of authentic intelligence." (2) They sent copies of all their correspondence with Atisham Jang to Bengal. (3)

The Madras government again showed their desire to act with the advice of the supreme government when the death of Basalat Jang raised the question of the reversion of Guntur to the Company. On the 14th November 1782, Macartney proposed that a detachment be sent to Ongole, and from thence to Falnaud. The reason for the proposal was that the presence of a detachment in that part would prevent the Nizam from disputing with the Company the possession of Guntur. Macartney declared that it must depend upon Bengal whether the Company's reversionary right to Guntur was to be enforced. (1) He wrote a letter to the Nizam claiming the Guntur Circa; but in order to prevent the letter from clashing with any negotiation that the Bengal government might possibly be carrying on with the Nizam, it was sent to the governor general and council who were given the option of forwarding it or suppressing it as they thought proper. Macartney was of opinion that this was the proper procedure to follow since the Company's instructions had given to Bengal the lead in military and political operations. "Those instructions however," he added, "might not be thought sufficient to warrant the committee in being unmindful of or inattention (sic) to any event in which this presidency conceived either regarding its neighbours, or the territories belonging to us whether in possession or reversion." (2). By the same despatch


that they transmitted Macartney's letter to the Nizam Madras informed Bengal that they would have troops ready in the neighborhood of Guntur to obey any order from the supreme council. They said that the troops were needed in that quarter not only to prevent any disturbance occasioned by the death of Basalat Jang but also because it would serve to encourage the disaffected tributaries of Haidar to revolt. (1) Before the Bengal government received this letter they heard private reports that the Madras government had on the death of Basalat Jang taken measures to secure the possession of Guntur. They gave to Madras their decided opinion that it would be most advisable to let the Company's right in this instance be dormant until it could be asserted with effect and with safety. They said, "We must therefore request and in discharge of the trust committed to us by the Act of Parliament...we must add our positive injunctions and command that you refrain from every kind of hostility and from every act which may lead to hostility with Nizam Ally Cawn, and from every kind of negotiation with him and that you will also retract any measures which you may have already taken for the above purpose." (2) The Madras government replied that though they regarded it possible to take quiet possession of Guntur, yet they had determined not to take any step of that kind.


without previous direction from Bengal. All that they had done was to keep themselves ready to comply with any instructions that the supreme council might send. They added, "our guarded con-
duct for the past will strengthen your confidence in our assur-
ances to you that we shall refrain for the future from every kind
of hostility and from every act which might in our judgement lead
to hostility against Nizam Ali. We shall enter into no kind of
negotiation with him without your consent. The only letter
which we proposed to send to him on business having been previous-
ly submitted to your board, our information to you was as early
and as timely as it was authentic." (1).

The supreme government detained Macartney's letter to the
Nizam. (2) Nothing was at the time done on the part of the
Company to claim their reversionary rights to Guntur.

Another occasion for negotiation with Indian princes was
afforded when the widow of the Hindu raja of Mysore who had been
deposed by Haider Ali, offered considerable assistance in men, money
and provisions and various other concessions in the event of the
Company's troops invading Mysore. (3). The offers were received
by John Sullivan the Company's resident at Tanjore and communicated
by him to Sir Eyre Coote. This was because the supreme government

2. Bengal to Madras 1 April 1783 Idem. 1 April 1783, Vol. 71, pp. 80-81.
had desired Madras to leave to Coote not only the entire conduct
of the war but also negotiations which might contribute to the
success of military operations. But Sullivan did not receive any
encouragement from him. He therefore pressed Macartney to empower
him to proceed with the negotiations. (1) By that time the Madras
government considered themselves justified in resuming the normal
exercise of their powers. Accordingly they authorized Sullivan to
continue the negotiation and conclude an agreement with the agents
of the Rane of Mysore subject to the revisal and approval of the
governor general and council, and to be considered null and void
if they disapproved or if Haidar acceded to the terms prescribed
for him in the Maratha treaty. (2) Strictly speaking such author-
isation was illegal. However it could be excused on the ground
that the agreement was required to be conditional on the approval
of Bengal. The Madras government informed Bengal of the step they
had taken. (3) Sullivan entered into a conditional agreement with
the agents of the Rane of Mysore, (4) and executed a 'qaul' (5) or
an agreement to protect the other party in case of a failure of the
plans. The Madras government approved and ratified the 'qaul'
but wrote to Sullivan that it could have no stability without the

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3. Same to Bengal 30 Sept.1782 Beng. Sec. Cons.18 Nov.1782 Vol.67,
   pp.519-21.
4. Copy of the agreement Mad. Sel. Com. Cons.27 Nov.1782 Vol.16,

The spelling of 'qaul' has been adopted from Wollaston's
English - Persian Dictionary. The word is spelt 'cowle' in
the consultations.
further ratification of the governor general and council. Further they said, "...we desire that you will avail yourself of every advantage that can be derived to the Company from the steps you have already taken; but until we receive the approbation of the governor general and council the business must be considered as incomplete." (1). They then sent to Bengal copies of all the papers on the subject. (2) The Bengal government gave their opinion after a long time. They did not consider themselves competent to decide on the matter. They left it to the consideration of the Madras government, especially as it was not pressing. At the same time they desired them to seek Cooe's advice before concluding any agreement with the Ranees. (3).

3. Bengal to Madras 1 April 1783 Idem 1 April 1783 Vol. 71, pp. 79-80.
CHAPTER V.

The Question Of Military Command.

The relations of the governor general and council with the Madras government under Lord Macartney were not a little embittered by the question of military command in the Carnatic war. It was further complicated by the fact that Sir Eyre Coote, who exercised that command, was a person whom it was hard to please.

When Macartney came to office, he found that the entire direction of the war was in the hands of Coote. He had great respect for Coote's experience and abilities, and realised that it was necessary for the successful prosecution of the Carnatic war that Coote should be given some indulgence. Although his government felt that the Company placed too much confidence in them to require such a delegation of their authority to the commander-in-chief, they did not revoke the resolution of the former government, entrusting Coote with sole powers of directing the war. However, they took "the first opportunity of mentioning the circumstances to the Court of Directors, and of apologising to them for having "acquiesced in so capital a suspension of their authority."(1).

Macartney could not confine himself to the narrow sphere in which Charles Smith had been content. He had brought with him

from England the news of the outbreak of war between England and Holland. Immediately on his arrival he proceeded to seize the Dutch settlements. Sadrás and Pulicat were taken without assistance from Coote. The attack on Negapatam was a more difficult business. In July 1781 Coote promised to march towards it after he returned from his expedition to Arcot. But Arcot was not taken and Coote dallied in the north. Macartney on his own responsibility sent an army under Munro to Negapatam, and with the assistance of Sir Edward Hughes the place fell into the hands of the English. Coote had disclaimed all responsibility for the expedition and not a single man was taken from the main army. Yet the Negapatam expedition became a subject of Coote's complaint against the Madras government as interfering with his command.

The attack on Negapatam was only one among the many grounds of Coote's dissatisfaction with the Madras government. In spite of the fact that Macartney did his best to supply all the needs of his army, Coote was perpetually complaining about the want of bullocks, coolies and grain. He carried an unwieldy army in which the camp followers far exceeded the number of soldiers. Nobody could suggest to him the need of economy, for he would burst out into a childish rage, construe any remark as interference with his powers, and threaten to give up his command. His experience and reputation were invaluable, and he was undoubtedly the man best fitted for the undertaking; yet old age and bodily infirmity had deprived him of some of his mental powers, and his extremely bad
temper made him a very difficult man to deal with. Coote constantly quarrelled with Hastings when he was in Bengal, and the governor general had a clear knowledge of the character of the commander-in-chief. Regarding Coote he wrote to John Macpherson in October 1781, "it is absolutely impossible for him to be upon terms of peace with any man living who possess a power either superior or equal to his own, unless the latter is for ever at his elbow, and coaxing him into good humour."(1) The efforts of Macartney to keep him in good humour, however, were of no avail. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present study to go into the correspondence between Coote and the Madras government. Suffice it to say that in February 1782 Coote sought the interposition of the Bengal government and sent Graham, his Persian interpreter to Bengal to submit to them all his complaints against the Madras government.(2) He wrote that his efforts to retrieve the Company's affairs had been so little assisted by the Madras government, and that his executive authority had been "...so much embarrassed by the most unseasonable interferences and irregularities that unless I am effectually relieved by the interposition of your power from a continuation of them, I must..." relinquish the task as impracticable."(3) Writing to Hastings,

H. Dodwell Warren Hastings's letters to Sir John Macpherson. p.93


3. Ibid.
Coote appealed "...as a member of your government and engaged in "the most arduous and important service, no less than comprising "the whole British interests in India, I wish to act under the "authority of that government alone - as being not only the most "proper one to control, but from their superior knowledge of the "interests of India to give effectual aid to all my operations."(1)

The Madras government at the same time complained to Bengal that they were totally without information of any plan of military op- erations in the future as Coote had neither disclosed to them any nor attended the meetings of the select committee.(2) Macartney sent Staunton to explain matters to Hastings.(3)

The Bengal government were in a difficult situation. But they considered the need of keeping Coote in good humour of the greatest importance. Accordingly they recommended the Madras government to "allow him an entire and unparticipated command over "all the forces acting under your authority in the Carnatic," ex- cepting the garrison of Madras.(4) They were however aware that cases might happen in which the safety of the state might make it absolutely necessary for the civil government to interpose their authority without the participation of, or even communication with, the commander-in-chief. In such cases of course the Madras

government were to exercise their authority. But in all other cases they wished that the whole conduct of the war might be left entirely to Sir Eyre Coote. (1) They went further and prescribed that "the conciliation of the dependent chiefs of the Carnatic, the acceptance of terms offered by those of the enemy and in general such other acts as do not fall within the express line of military command, but which may contribute to the success of its operations" should be entrusted to Coote's discretion. (2) The Bengal government apologised that they should never have thought of extending their observations so far into the transactions of the Madras government if the situation had not been so critical. The resources of Bengal were being drained for the defence of the Carnatic, and the exhaustion of its vital powers might make it an easy prey to the first invader. The loss of the Carnatic would be the prelude to the loss of Bengal. This obliged them to regard the Carnatic war as their own and "more interestingly though not so immediately our concern than yours." Further they were impelled to interfere principally by the letters of Coote. (3) They did not pretend to enquire into the grounds of the complaint. (4) They only offered their opinion on the general question, and begged the Madras government to receive it in good

1. Idem, p. 527.
part. (1) They desired to obviate any inference that their interference was grounded on an unfavourable opinion of the conduct of the Madras government. (2) "As co-partners in a common cause we mean only to contribute our councils to the aid of yours." They might have availed themselves of the powers vested in them by the Directors' letter of the 11th April 1781, but "the exercise of such a privilege might prove as ungrateful to you as it would be painful to ourselves, and we know it to be unnecessary - We do not command; we only recommend; and this degree of interference is assumed by us more with a view to lessen the weight of your responsibility by taking on ourselves a considerable portion of it,... than for the purpose of influencing your measures or of opposing the judgement on which you had formed them." (3)

To Coote, the Bengal government wrote that they were ever ready to afford him all the support and assistance in their power and that on the present occasion they had adopted a conciliatory style in their letter to the Madras government, as by that means they hoped to obtain for him more effectually the supreme command over the military operations in the Carnatic. (4) Addressing Coote privately, the governor general said that the Bengal

1. Idem p. 526.
2. Idem p. 529.
government had confined their interposition to influence only. The reason was "that the tone of authority would but have given "offence, and perhaps excited defiance, and though the Court of "Directors have empowered us to issue our orders to the other "presidencies and have commanded them to obey us, yet as they have "given us no power to enforce our orders, the obedience which may "be paid to them remains as optional as the compliance which they "might have given to our advice, before we were invested with this "extraordinary charge." He recommended Coote to assume in every case power over matters which did not strictly fall within his command but which might contribute to the success of military operations. He said "many cases must occur to which the regular "powers of your command may not be competent, for which no provision "has been made, which will not wait for express instructions, or "which may be defeated of their objects by communication....In "every such case I must suppose that you would act by the inherent "authority of your general trust, and that the government under "which you act would ratify it." He assured Coote that he possessed the full confidence of the Bengal government. But they had no power to control the actions of the government upon whom he was immediately dependent. The governor general went on to say "if "I myself stood alone in the charge of the government of Fort St. "George, I would give you unbounded liberty of action, or if I had "not given it, and you had assumed it, I would approve or ratify "your assumption of it. But in the application of this doctrine to "others....I am fearful of saying what they should give, or you
"should take, lest my opinion, which cannot operate as authority, "should prove the occasion of fresh differences, and draw on me "the imputation of having excited them in contradiction of my "professed desire of reconciling those which have already arisen."

(1).

Hastings thus coaxed and humoured Coote. It was also his task to see that Macartney took the recommendations of the Bengal government in good part. He informed Macartney that he had communicated his sentiments on the subject in an unreserved manner to Staunton. He expressed his anxious desire "to co-operate with you firmly and liberally for the security of the Carnatic, for the "support of your authority, and for the honour of your administra- "tion, by every aid which this government and my personal influ- "ence can afford." He assured Macartney that few things were nearer to his heart than the desire to preserve and improve the good understanding and cordiality with which their correspondence commenced, and expressed his belief that this harmony which was necessary for the advancement of the important interests committed to their charge would, after clear explanations had taken place continue without break.(2)

The Madras government, though very dissatisfied with the recommendations of the governor general and council, received them with bowed heads. The select committee recorded their opinion that, desirous as they were of avoiding anything which might tend

1. Hastings to Coote. 21 March 1782. Glei g op. cit. Vol. iii, pp.5-8
to indispose the Bengal government towards them, and "circumstan
ded as we are with respect to the Bengal government," the only part
left for them was to pay implicit obedience to these commands.
They said that "a recommendation from those who have the power
"to command, and who inform us they have that power, must carry
"the force of the most positive command."(1) As they were un-
willing to question the propriety of any opinion advanced by the
governor general and council, however they might be affected by it,
their recent recommendations had thrown them under "some degree
of embarrassment." So anxious were they to retrieve the Company's
affairs, that they would with the sincerest pleasure, as far as it
was in their power, yield up all their authority to effect it.
At the same time, they had strong doubts whether the sacrifice that
was required from them would be attended with the advantages which
the Bengal government seemed to expect.(2) They were of opinion
that a "distinction should be made between the powers necessary to
"be exercised by the commander-in-chief employed on foreign and
distant service, and the authority requisite for directing military
"operations near the seat of government. In the former case ex-
"traordinary powers are unquestionably proper ..., but in the latter
"case such powers as are recommended in the Bengal letter to be
"given must .... prove tantamount to an absolute dereliction of all

1. Minute of Consultation - Mad. Sel. Com. Cons. 6 April 1782, Vol. 12,
P. 955.
its authority." It was scarcely necessary to the success of the Company's affairs that such powers should be given to Coote when the Madras government were in a situation to exercise them, and when it was certain that they would exercise the powers for the public benefit. (1) They were glad that these recommendations of the supreme council were not conveyed to them sooner, for if that had been so, the Dutch settlements would not have been then in the possession of the English. (2) They desired to be freed from all responsibility in the measures that might be pursued in consequence of this delegation of their authority. (3) In spite of all these remarks they said that "the deference we owe to the judgement of the governor general and council and to the instructions from home... will lead us to an immediate compliance with what they desire." (4) The Madras select committee declared their noble resolve that "...the abridgement of our authority shall only serve to redouble our vigilence and zeal for the public service. We shall employ the little power and influence that are left to us to assist Sir Eyre Coote's with as much alacrity as if we shared his responsibility, and shall feel for his success the same sentiments which have animated our

exertions, from the first moment of our administration."(1).

Though they expressed their opinions clearly in their own records, the Madras government discreetly refrained from communicating them to the governor general and council, to whom they replied in a single line that they would pay implicit obedience to all their commands contained in their letter of the 11th March.(2) Writing to Coote, they said that they invested him with all the "powers, authorities and responsibilities" which the governor general and council desired that he should possess, and that they would conform as far as practicable to the recommendations of the Bengal government from a sense of duty to their employers, who had directed them to follow the lead of the supreme council at that crisis.(3)

The Bengal government for a time seemed to be satisfied that the line which they had followed had produced the desired effect. (4). The Madras government had informed them of their desire to comply with the recommendations, and Coote had expressed his satisfaction.(5).

The Madras government kept the supreme council informed of the extent to which they were paying obedience to their recommendations. For instance, they wrote that they "did not venture" to

2. Madras to Bengal 11 April 1782. *Idem* 29 April 1782 *Vol.* 64, p. 386
entertain proposals made by the French for the exchange of
prisoners as the subject might be regarded by Coote as his pro-
vince.(1) Again when they received a letter from Colonel
Braithwaite, who was then a prisoner in Haidar's camp, pointing
out the expediency of making peace with Haidar,(2) they informed
the supreme government that they had referred the subject to
Coote "agreeably to your late orders" (3). In yet another let-
ter they informed the Bengal government that they had referred
Sullivan, their resident at Tanjore, who requested them to be in-
vested with powers to treat with the poligars of Ariyalur and
Udayarpalaiyam, and the Rane of Mysore, to Sir Eyre Coote.(4)

But the arrangement made by the supreme council was not work-
ing smoothly. The same quarrel between Coote and the Madras
government continued. Towards the end of May 1782, Macartney
wrote a private letter to Hastings complaining of the inconvenience
to which the Madras government were subjected on account of the
Bengal recommendations of the 11th March, which he said could not
be taken in any other light than as commands.(5) Coote having
acquired powers totally independent of the Madras government showed

4. Madras to Bengal 13 June 1782. Idem 4 July 1782, Vol. 65, pp.376-
78.
5. Macartney to Hastings 22 May, 1782. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. No. 29, 154,
pp.286-7.
no desire to consult with them or even to inform them of his plans. The Madras government forwarded their correspondence with Coote to Bengal, and complained that every letter they received from Coote contained implications of censure on them. (1) Naturally chafing under the restraint laid on them, they began to express the inconveniences which they suffered under the existing arrangement. The Bengal government had required from Madras their opinion on the proposal of attacking Haidar from the Malabar coast, and had desired them to suggest a plan of operations. (2) The Madras government expressed their appreciation of the proposal and said that they were ever ready to promote, to the best of their power, the measures recommended by the supreme government. But they lamented that the letter of the 11th March "having vested not only all the military powers, but several others in Sir Eyre Coote, the ancient constitutional system of this government subsists no more," and as they wished to preserve the "utmost harmony" with Coote they were frequently restrained from taking steps which appeared proper to then. (3) In another letter they said, that they necessarily remained silent on a plan of operations for attacking Haidar from the Malabar Coast, as they were uninformed of the

orders given by Coote to Colonel Humberston, whose destination would materially influence such a plan. (1) On receipt of these letters, the Bengal government wrote to Madras withdrawing the words which had given the appearance of commands to their recommendations of the 11th March.

Before pursuing the story further, it would be interesting to illustrate by another instance the position to which the Madras government were transferred in consequence of the powers vested in Coote by the governor general and council.

On the 26th June the Bengal government informed Madras that a treaty had been concluded with Sindia. They forwarded a copy of the treaty, and left it to the Madras government to make such discretionary use of the information as they considered necessary. (2) On receipt of this letter, the select committee were of opinion that it was not only a confirmation of their authority to take steps in consequence of the treaty of Salbai, but implied an opinion that they might take necessary measures on the occasion. (3) However they did not then desire to show Haidar too great a desire for peace, and wrote to Coote asking him whether from any recent events he knew Haidar's inclination towards peace. (4) At this time a vakil from Haidar was in Coote's camp. (5) Coote did not consider

2. Bengal to Madras 3 June 1782 Idem 3 June 1782, Vol. 65, p. 73.
it necessary to communicate this fact to the Madras government. He only wrote that he had done everything likely to lead to peace with Haidar. "Whatever occurrences have happened of this nature," he had communicated to the governor general and council, as being the only authority who could decide on matters of this kind. In this he acted strictly according to the directions he had received from Bengal.(1) The Madras government thereupon complained to the supreme government of Coote's conduct in withholding from them any information of his negotiations, and submitted that they could not reconcile the latitude which had been given them to make discretionary use of the information, with any power that might have been given to Coote to negotiate.(2).

The supreme council's recommendations of the 11th March 1782 had thus taken away large parts of the foreign policy from the hands of the Madras government, and reduced them to a position neither dreamt of by the authors of the Regulating Act, nor perhaps meant by the instructions of the Court of Directors of the 11th April 1781.

On the 4th July 1782 the Bengal government wrote to Madras

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An anonymous pamphlet alleges that Lord Macartney, alarmed at Coote's negotiations, informed Haidar that no agreement would be valid without the "concurrence and mediation" of the Madras government. cf. "Memoirs of the late war in Asia" London, 1788. p.403. The country correspondence of the Madras government not being available in the India Office, it has not been possible to ascertain how far the accusation is true. There is no letter from Macartney to Haidar among Macartney's "country correspondence" in the British Museum. Add. MSS. No.22,449. Though this is at best a negative proof against the allegation, the charge does not seem to have been based on truth.
explaining the spirit in which they had made the recommendations, and lamenting the manner in which they had been interpreted at Madras. They said, that from the very moment of the receipt of the Court's letter, investing them with authority to direct the military and political operations of the presidency, they were aware of all the difficulties to which they would be exposed in the exercise of "so new and undefined a control, that the very constitution of it would have an immediate tendency to excite jealousies and suspicions in the minds of those who were the object of it, and prepare them to receive the effects of it with reluctance."(1) The grant of such a power implied an injunction to exercise it, and they might have dictated the plans which suggested themselves to their minds as mandates. But they knew that such positive orders "...would either be received with professions of constrained obedience, and carried into execution by feeble efforts constructed on their literal expression...or delayed for explanation or wholly evaded by objections urged "with the superiority of local information."(2) For these reasons "we resolved to act up to the full intention of the Court of Directors in the spirit of those orders, but to refrain from "the literal(sic) execution of them unless we should be forced to "it by any occasion of absolute necessity."(3) On the occasion

2. Idem p.419.
of the references made to them by Coote and the Madras government they had declined to pass any judgement upon the grounds of differences placed before them and confined their attention to the general proposition only. They had merely offered it as their opinion that since military operations depended on their success on uniformity of system and control the commander-in-chief should be trusted with an implicit discretion. (1) They had disavowed all intentions to command, and had left it entirely to the Madras government to reject or accept their recommendations. They did not know how they could possibly discharge their duty with more delicacy. They had hoped that the Madras government would view their conduct in the proper light. In this, however, they were disappointed. The Madras government, in their letter of the 11th April 1782, by calling their recommendations by the name of commands, desired to throw upon them the whole blame and responsibility. At the same time, by describing them as recommendations to Coote, they avoided the use of an expression which might operate too far. In their letter to Coote, while avoiding the term command, they adopted the construction of it, and with the words "powers and authorities" added the word "responsibilities" which was not a part of the recommendations and which they still participated with him in the same degree as they did before. (2)

1. Idem pp. 421-22.
The Madras government had in almost every letter shown signs of impatience under the idea of their authority having been restricted. Referring to the declaration of the Madras government that "the ancient constitutional system of that government subsists no more" Bengal said, "We tremble at the consequences of such a declaration, and fear that our interference, instead of producing the effects of conciliation and consistency which were the objects of it may prove, by the misapplication of it, the cause of irremediable evils, perhaps of your utter ruin," for the safety of the Carnatic depended upon the exertions of the Madras government towards supplying the army. (1) They implored them to say in what manner the ancient constitutional system of the government had been deprived of its existence by any act of theirs and how they could but retrieve the effects of it. "In the meantime if you persist in construing our advice as orders, and orders which dissolve the offence of your own authority, we do hereby formally absolve you from the obedience due to them, and desire that you will regard them as of no force or effect as such; but of their force and effect as the inevitable conclusions drawn from principles of truth, and of their obligation on your conduct in that sense no declaration of ours can deprive them." (2).


The Madras government, the supreme council continued, had not suggested a plan of operations on the Malabar coast on the ground that they were not informed of the movements of Colonel Humberston. They might have inquired of Coote what orders he had given to Colonel Humberston and might have pointed out the expediency of the Colonel's remaining on the Malabar side. It could not be supposed that Coote would have refused the information, nor could it be believed that he would have refused his assent to the continuance of Humberston on the other side of India. In any event Coote's answer would have exempted them from any blame for not having done as much as lay in their power, little as that might be. Again, the Madras government instead of referring Sullivan to Coote, ought to have informed the General of the state of their negotiations, and to have required his opinion of the subject. If Coote objected, and the Madras government regarded the prosecution of the plan necessary for the welfare of their affairs, they "might and ought to have adopted it." It was more likely that Coote would not have been prejudiced against the plan if he had received it through them. From the above it was clear that the misconstruction of their recommendations had given rise to a decided principle at Madras - a principle which was "systematically employed as an obligation to inaction" and which was "inevitably consequent of your declaration that the ancient constitutional system of your government subsists no more." (1).

In concluding they assured the Madras government that they would be happy to find themselves wrong in any of the conclusions which they had drawn. A critical time like that which they were passing through was not a suitable one for indulging in arguments or "for any operations of private resentment." They were ashamed that they were forced to enter into such an altercation. If anyone of them had mistaken the other's meaning, it was open to the Madras government "to expunge the cause and the consequences from the records of the public."(1)

The assertion of the Bengal government that Madras still participated in the responsibilities with Coope, as they did before, was unfair. There could certainly be no power divorced from responsibilities. It is difficult to understand to what extent the Bengal government had desired Madras to part with their power in favour of Coope. The unparticipated command, recommended to be given to Coope, left no room for the Madras government to interfere with the commander-in-chief to allow Colonel Humberston to remain in Malabar. Again, all negotiations likely to contribute to the success of the military operations being left to Coope the Madras government could not possibly override his objections against Sullivan's negotiations with the Ranees of Mysore and carry their own plan. The supreme government crippled the powers of Madras, and blamed them for inaction. It was too much to expect the Madras government to act, in spheres where they were deprived of their powers, at the risk of being rebuffed every time by a person of uncontrollable temper. What the supreme government desired was,

that Madras should follow their recommendations as advice, and keep
the responsibility on their shoulders. The war was not going on
well, and the governor general and council were unwilling to have
any responsibility on themselves. They therefore withdrew the
appearance of command from their letter of the 11th March and thus
shifted the responsibility on to Madras. They left it at the option
of Madras to follow their recommendations or not. At the
same time, they declared that the Madras government could not be
absolved from the moral obligation to follow them, because cir-
cumstances made it their duty to entrust Coote with the sole con-
duct of the war. In short, they expected them to comply with
their recommendations of the 11th March, but of their own volition.
That they did not desire to withdraw from Coote the powers which
they had recommended should be given to him, is clear from the
fact that a few days after, on the 8th July, they gave Coote lati-
tude to negotiate with Haidar. (1)

The governor general and council were fearful of the time when
Coote would come to know that they had left it at the option of the
Madras government to obey or disobey their recommendations. They
do not seem to have addressed a letter to Coote on the subject.
Hastings wrote to Macpherson "...Care must be taken of the double
"edged weapon that while we withdraw it from his lordship it does
"not wound the General. That I most fear." (2).

letters to Sir John Macpherson. p.155.
The Bengal letter of the 4th July was received at Madras on the 6th August. Coote was away from Madras at the time, and no steps were taken till his return to Madras when the select committee was summoned. As Coote did not attend it, the Madras government, on the 22nd August, sent a copy of the Bengal letter to him, along with one from them to the purport that the governor general and council had censured them for their inaction, that in consequence they were compelled to determine upon measures necessary for the public safety and welfare, and that they should be happy if Coote, by his presence at the committee assisted them in their deliberations. The subjects to be taken into consideration in the meeting included, deliberation on a plan of operations for attacking Haidar from Malabar, the state of the negotiations, if any, carried on by Coote with Haidar, instructions to be given to John Sullivan regarding plans proposed by him, reduction of army expenses, and the steps which should be taken in consequence of the conduct of the French in delivering English prisoners to Haidar.\(^1\) In short, the Madras government, unable to get rid of their responsibilities, resumed the normal exercise of their powers. Their letter to Bengal of the 25th August dealt with plans for attacking Haidar from the west. They proposed that as soon as they heard of the ratification of the Maratha treaty they would send an envoy to Haidar to ascertain whether he would accede to the treaty. At the same time, they

assured Bengal that, unless it was absolutely necessary, they would not take any step without their instructions.(1)

The Madras government declared that they felt as strongly as before in favour of allowing Coote some latitude in the exercise of his military command.(2) Coote, however, was dissatisfied at the alteration of his position, and refused to attend the meetings of the select committee.(3) On the 28th September 1782, the old general returned to Bengal.

On the 30th August the Madras government replied to the Bengal letter of the 4th July. They entered into a history of their relations with Coote, with a view to show how they had tried but failed to please him. They then replied to the various remarks made in the Bengal letter. They insisted that they were right in taking as commands what the Bengal government described as recommendations. They pointed out that in common business intercourse compliance was expected even though the expression command was not used. It would have been an "unhandsome return" for the tenderness of the Bengal government in the exercise of authority, if they had rejected what had been delivered to them in the form of recommendation or advice. To guard against the possibility of disobedience the supreme government had reminded them of the peremptory orders transmitted to them by the

Directors to pay implicit obedience to requisitions from Bengal.

"The reason you give... for not exercising in this instance the power so granted to you, that you knew it to be unnecessary, sufficiently forwarned us of its exercise when it should cease to be unnecessary, nor could it cease to be so... in a situation so urgent and critical... otherwise than by an immediate compliance with your desire. We could not therefore... mistake its real meaning of strict obedience notwithstanding the apparent latitude left to us in some parts of it..." In short they were reduced to the alternative of yielding up their authority at once, or of preparing for the reception of peremptory commands. The power of exercising their authority in important and urgent cases, reserved to them was of no real value, because so long as Coote possessed the powers that were given to him, he would not allow any interference in his control or execute any of their directions. (1) The Madras government further said that when the Directors gave to Bengal the lead in all political and military operations of the other presidencies, they did not authorize a transfer of those powers to another.

Though at the time the Court possibly knew that Coote was at the head of their troops in the Carnatic, and were aware of his merits, they did not recommend that such exclusive powers should be given to him. The Madras select committee indirectly reminded the supreme government that according to the Company's

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orders military officers were to be entirely subject to their
civil servants.(1) To the assertion of the Bengal government
that Madras still shared the responsibility with Coote, they re-
plied,. . .."you advance a doctrine so unjust and so extraordinary
"and inadmissible, that we can scarcely give credit to those senses
"which inform us that it proceeds from your board." (2) With
reference to the opinion of the Bengal government that they might
have inquired of Coote what orders he had sent to Humberston,
they said, "After the marked predetermination on the part of Sir
"Eyre Coote to withhold from us his instructions to officers under
"his command, it would have been little more than a puerile
"ceremony to apply for those he sent to Colonel Humberston...."(3).
They went so far as to insinuate that the efforts of the governor
general and council to retain Coote in the command in the Carnatic
arose from their desire to keep him away from Bengal.(4).

The Madras government, having thus unburdened their mind in
their letter of the 30th August, became all submission. On the
11th September, they gave to Bengal a description of their situa-
tion explaining, "We, as it is our duty, impart to your superintend-
ing board our real situation." They asked what steps they were
to take for entering into a treaty with Haider in case a difficulty

1. Idem pp.2654-5.
2. Idem p.2663.
arose in the ratification of the Maratha treaty, which contained stipulations relating to him. They declared that they much desired to follow the lead of the Bengal government in military and political operations, and to be guided by them. They requested the Bengal government to reply as early as possible because though they might take measures themselves on the ground of imminent necessity, they might err in the idea of that necessity, or in the propriety of those measures. They said that in all situations they should endeavour to do the best and to deserve the approbation of the governor general and council. (1) The Bengal government replied to the Madras letter of the 30th August on the 3rd October. They were full of sarcasm. They said that it would be a bad compliment to the pains that the Madras government had taken in composing that voluminous letter if they delayed for a moment acknowledging the receipt of it. But they had neither the leisure, nor the disposition, to reply to it fully at the time. They considered that a retort of arguments or accusations would aggravate differences rather than reconcile them, and that they ought, therefore, to be avoided at a time when the greatest cordiality and unanimity was necessary. As the preceding letters from Madras had alarmed them, it was some relief to find that Madras had both the time and the inclination to write a letter of twenty-nine close folio pages without a reference to the dangers which surrounded them, and which engaged the whole attention of

Bengal. They entreated Madras not to communicate the letter to
Coote at that critical juncture. On their part, they should lay
it by, as a secret deposit, and avail themselves of an improved
state of affairs to convey to Madras some remarks on the letter,
which it was certainly entitled to. In the meantime, they should
send it home without a comment, but accompanied by their letters
of the 11th March and 4th July. The Madras government had sought
to give proofs of their merits as administrators. "If these
merits extend to the salvation of your settlement we shall be
happy and upon that condition, we would willingly submit to every
charge with which you may wish to load us." On their side
too they could claim one merit, however much Madras might criticise
their proceedings, - that of persevering to support their presi-
dency with all the resources of Bengal. "Another merit too we
shall endeavour to possess, that of a moderation that you shall
neither surprise nor provoke. We trust that you had no such in-
tention in the present instance; however, if this our employers
will be the best judges, and give you the proper credit."(1)

In their letter of the 19th October, remarking again on the
Madras letter of the 30th August, the governor general and council
wrote, "you have permitted the artificial labours of a pen to
lead you wide of the attention which you owe to the pressure of
affairs,...and that consideration which is at least due to the
principles which animate the conduct of this government in

"supporting the interests of your presidency"(1) They said that Madras had charged them with a deliberate design to super-
sede the powers of their government, and had insinuated that the
desire to keep Coote away from Bengal was their principal motive
in endeavouring to retain him in the Carnatic. The letter of
the 11th September, they were of opinion, had been written merely
to compensate for the severity of such a charge and insinuation.
They declared, that it was their rule to support all measures of
the Madras government, and especially those which necessity
obliged them to adopt, and added, "It was upon this principle
"that we requested you to assume every authority....in collecting
"and applying the remaining resources of the Carnatic. Upon
"this principle we applauded your conduct in undertaking the
"siege of Negapatam, and upon this principle we wished to avoid
"being informed of the causes of Sir Eyre Coote's displeasure with
"your proceedings. Upon this principle we requested you to con-
"sider our letter of the 11th March....as if it had never been
"written....Upon this ruling principle of our conduct we have
"avoided as yet taking into consideration complaints of a very
"nature that are pressed upon us daily against your conduct by
"the Nabob of the Carnatic."(2) In answer to the request of the
Madras government for their opinion as to the advisability of

entering into a treaty with Haider, they said that "every advance "to a negotiation with him is but an encouragement to him to per- "sist in the war."(1) In conclusion they expressed their satis- isfaction at "the tone of firmness amidst distress and the general "turn of deliberative attention to your situation which in our "opinion distinguish this from your former letters."(2) They earnestly desired that their future correspondence be confined to communications of public utility only. If, however, Madras per- sisted in continuing a correspondence full of invectives, they could address their accusations to the Directors without communic- eating them to Bengal.(3) They assured the Madras government that "every sentiment which you would wish to remove from our minds is "extinguished in the warmth and candour of explanation."(4).

These words, however, did not stop this fruitless correspondence.

The Madras government replied to the Calcutta letters of the 3rd and 19th October, on the 5th December. They brought forward the various reasons for writing their letter of the 30th August. They said that, as they had been invited to justify their opinion and conduct, they had felt it their duty to so. They hinted that there was no cause for the anxiety of the governor general and coun- cil because even if they differed in opinion with them they would

1. Idem p.455.
not fail to pay implicit obedience to their orders. They hoped that the Bombay government, placed in the same situation as themselves, would be impressed with the same sense of zealous obedience. They assured Bengal that far from regretting the powers vested in them, they thought it "highly necessary to the welfare, credit and "dignity of the Company and to the consistency of its measures that "a superintending power should exist somewhere in India...."(1)

While this correspondence was being exchanged the Madras government, no longer fettered by Coote, who had left for Bengal, resumed the normal exercise of their powers. They sent three hundred and fifty of the King's troops to Bombay to assist that presidency in attacking Haidar from the west. A force of Europeans was also sent to strengthen the garrison at Negapatam. Another detachment was sent to the Northern Circars.(2) They empowered Colonel Lang to destroy the fortifications of Negapatam if he considered the place untenable.(3) They also gave their attention to the reduction of the army expenses. In this they received a check. The paymaster of the Bengal army refused to submit to them his accounts, without authority from the commander-in-chief or the Bengal government.(4) This was not the only direction in which they found their activities hampered. General

Stuart, who succeeded Coote, caused more embarrassment to the Madras government than Coote had done. As commander-in-chief of the King's forces, he claimed that he would obey or disobey the orders of the Company's civil servants as he thought fit. Signs of this had indeed appeared before. The powers exercised by Coote independently of the civil authorities had corrupted the views of the military officers. Stuart's claim was a mere pretext to enjoy the extraordinary powers which his predecessor had possessed.

On receiving the news of Haidar's death the Madras government realised the importance of taking full advantage of the opportunity by attacking the enemy at once. But they could not induce General Stuart to advance with the army. (1) They communicated the news to Bengal, and desired orders and instructions in order to enable them to turn that event to the best advantage. Macartney wrote to Bengal, "Every effort shall be made by me to turn so important an event to the best account, and I shall flatter myself that if I meet with no counteraction in our own councils, our affairs may wear a better appearance in a little time." (2) A week later, the Madras select committee informed Bengal that they had given every order, depending on them, for the army to march, and had taken every step to expedite the dispersion of the enemy, but that they were precluded from entering into any negotiation which

might be necessary at that juncture, as much by the restrictions
laid upon them by Act of Parliament, as by their ignorance of
the general state of the negotiations carried on by the supreme
government. They complained that though they had asked the
governor general and council what in their opinion constituted
such a case of imminent necessity as would justify them in act-
ing on their own authority, and to suggest measures consistent
with their general system which they might adopt, they had not
been enlightened on these points. If proposals for peace were
sent to them they would refer them to Bengal. In case, however,
the situation made such a peace urgently necessary, they would
conclude a treaty without the delay of a reference to
Bengal.(1) Again, on the 14th January 1783, Macartney wrote,
"In spite of the difficulties and impediments which occur on
"every side to break the spirit and weaken the exertion of
"government, I am not without hope that the war may yet be
"terminated to our advantage."(2)

Instead of giving advice and offering assistance to Madras,
at this time, the Bengal government took up a hostile attitude
against them. This was because they had formed the opinion
that, since the departure of Coote from Madras, the select
committee were totally mismanaging affairs. The letters of
General Stuart to Coote which the latter presented before the

   Vol. 17, p. 4001.

   1783, Vol. 70.
board, and Coote's criticisms of the measures followed by the Madras government, contributed to produce that impression. The Bengal letter of the 12th December 1782 to Madras requiring them in the most peremptory manner not to hold any intercourse with Atisham Jang, and commanding them to refrain from every act which might lead to hostility with the Nizam was inspired by letters received by Coote from General Stuart.(1) On the 19th December again, the governor general laid before the board letters addressed by Stuart to Coote which Coote had desired should be communicated to them. These related to the decision of the Madras government to destroy the fortifications of Negapatam.(2) The Bengal board considered it necessary to communicate immediately to Madras their own, and the commander-in-chief's, objections to the measure. They expressed their surprise that the Madras government should have resolved on an act of "so desperate a tendency" without previously informing them of it. They said that they did not mean to dispute their legal powers to decide on an internal measure without reference to themselves, "but while you subsist in a principal degree on the revenues of this government, and your ultimate preservation may depend on the continuance of the same aids, and on the military services of the commander-in-chief, we conceive these attentions to have been due to both." They entreated them, if it was not too late, to re-consider the subject.(3)

On receiving the news of Haidar's death in January 1783, the Bengal board proceeded to take into consideration the state of affairs in the Carnatic, "as far as they may require or admit of the interposition of the powers of this government." With regard to the conduct of the operations, they were of opinion that it was impossible for them to exercise an effective authority to regulate them according to the various and uncertain contingencies which might have arisen from Haidar's death. They therefore desired the commander-in-chief-to return to the Carnatic. Coote was willing to take up his duties again, but he requested the board to free him from all authority but theirs, in the future prosecution of the war.(1) The board regarded the request of the commander-in-chief as very reasonable, in view of the fact that he was the only person who could utilise the then favourable turn in their affairs, and bring the war to an end. A review of events in the Carnatic since Coote's departure, they said, gave them additional grounds for investing Coote with all the powers which it was in their power to give him. They believed that no advantage would be taken of Haidar's death by the Madras government. Therefore, as the crisis of affairs required that they should stand forth, and exert a decisive power in the measures that should appear to them necessary to bring it to a favourable issue, they resolved that the words of their recommendations of the 11th March 1782 be now repeated in the form of

commands. This, they felt/authorised by the Directors' letter of the 11th April 1781. They assured Coote that they would afford him "the entire and effectual support of this government as far as we can constitutionally give it."(1) A month and a half later, the commander-in-chief was given a discretionary power to negotiate and conclude a treaty with Tipu. He was also empowered to conclude any engagements he might think proper, with any of the chiefs in Tipu's service, in order to withdraw their allegiance from him.(2) The supreme council decided to send ten lacs of rupees with the General, and resolved that "this and all future supplies of treasure for the service of the army in the Carnatic shall be consigned to him.(3) Long before this Hastings had dropped his correspondence with Macartney.

On Coote's resolution to return to the Carnatic he addressed a private letter to Alexander Davidson, a member of the Madras select committee. He expressed his belief that the general could easily drive the enemy out of the Carnatic if he was allowed "the full and undisturbed direction of all the military operations and such aids as your government can afford him. We shall renew our solicitation for that effect, and I have no doubt of your acquiescence in them." His fears for Coote's success however, he said, arose from another cause. "I have read with

3. Ibid.
"infinite concern the letters which were addressed to him by the
select committee in the course of the late campaign. The language
of these and more especially their implied sentiments were often
such as must have affected him severely, and the more so because
of his inability, from the incessant calls of duty, and the de-
ibility of his constitution to enter into a train of discussion in
reply to them....allow me to recommend and request without other
explanation, that you will, as much as it may be in your power
prevent any correspondence of such a nature as that to which I
have alluded, and be the conciliator between him and the committee."
(1). The opinion which the governor general entertained of the
incapacity of the Madras government and the consequent need of Coo-te
resuming his command appears in the following lines of a letter to
his agent in England, Major Scott. "They were unable to face the
"enemy till Sir Eyre Coote commanded their army, and it was reduced
"to a state of inaction and inability the instant that he quitted
"it. If he had remained, the death of Hydar would have been in-
"stantly followed by the dispersion of his followers. This is
"morally certain, as certain as that no movement has been made since,
"and that none will till he resumes the command."(2) Further
proofs of this attitude of the supreme government towards Madras
appeared when on the 3rd Feb. 1783, Coote entered on record adverse
criticisms of measures taken by the Madras government during his

absence. The commander-in-chief blamed the Madras government for the disjunction of the Europeans in their army by returning veterans to the Bengal establishment, and detaching others northward. He accused them of not keeping the army ready to take advantage of the death of Haidar, and brought forward arguments against the destruction of Negapatam. In short, he desired to point out that the Madras government had left to "doubtful issue the very existence of the British possessions in India."(1) The board expressed their complete concurrence in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, and resolved to send a copy of his minute to the Directors. It was also resolved to forward a copy of the minute to Madras.(2)

Then referring to Macartney's letter of the 14th Jan. 1783, they asked the Madras government on the 10th February 1783 to relate to them "the particular instances of difficulties and impediments to which his lordship meant to allude."(3).

There was at this time not even the external appearance of friendly relations between the two presidencies. To the Bengal letter on the subject of the destruction of the fortifications of Negapatam, Madras replied that they did not reconsider their decision, as the governor general and council had not put forward any serious argument against the measure, and as, on further reflection they must have altered a judgement, which was possibly not based

on mature deliberation. The notion of Bengal that they had no previous information of the design was a mistaken one, as the proceedings of the select committee had been transmitted to them. On the supposition that the inability of the Madras government to pay the garrison, and supply them with provisions, had led them to decide upon the destruction of Negapatam, the supreme government had promised to supply both adequate to its wants. The Madras government hoped that this promise of a partial supply will extend to a general supply. They admitted that they had received considerable assistance from Bengal, but they had not received every necessary assistance. The Bengal government had declared that Madras ought to pay deference to them for the financial help they rendered, and to Coote for his military assistance. The select committee replied, that the Company's treasure wherever placed must be applied wherever wanted. "We have therefore better grounds for the willing defence (deference) and attention which we pay to your board than your being the instruments of such application. We have the desire of a cordial communication and zealous co-operation with the other servants of the Company and we know what is due to your superior station and personal qualities."(1). In another letter, the Madras government, in reply to the governor general and council, enumerated all the difficulties and impediments which they had come across in the discharge of their duties. These they said, had been communicated to Bengal on many occasions, and they did not know that they

would require fresh enumeration. From the first, they had complained of the want of money and of cavalry. They had lamented that, the sole conduct of the war being entrusted to Coote, they had been prevented from making such a disposition of the troops as might have carried the war successfully into the enemy's country. Then, the encouragement which the nawab of the Carnatic received from the Bengal government, had raised hopes in him that he would be able to overturn the agreement by which he had assigned his revenues to the Carnatic, and on which arrangement the future welfare of the presidency depended. The attitude of Sir Edward Hughes, and the claim of General Stuart to act independently, had also been serious impediments. In the midst of these difficulties, they had frequently sought for advice and instruction from Bengal, but had not received them. They had repeatedly asked their opinion on any negotiation to be carried on with Haidar, but in vain. They had asked what in the opinion of the governor general and council would constitute imminent necessity in order to justify their entering into a treaty without reference to Bengal. To this, however, they had received no answer. Even the death of Haidar had not been the occasion of any instructions to them. They requested the supreme government to send them instructions on the several subjects to which they had referred to their consideration, and also "for the purpose of preventing every species of opposition or counteraction in this government we expect that you will please to furnish us with such advice and instructions as you wish may guide the future conduct of the commander-in-chief"
of the forces, who while in this presidency is subject to the
directions of this committee in like manner as the Company's
general instructions express, as he is under yours while he is
in the presidency of Bengal."(1)

The governor general and council in their reply to Madras
dated 1st April 1783 (2) described this letter as "a collected
mass of complaints and invectives." They said that the Madras
government acted criminally towards their country when they ven-
tured to impeach "with undistinguished indecency those great
officers of the public to whose efforts Great Britain is indebted."
Madras had sought to win merit for themselves by stripping others
of their reputation. They accused the Madras government of mis-
managing affairs after the departure of Coote. Even though at
the time they had the unparticipated conduct of the war, a larger
army and the most liberal supplies, all that their efforts had pro-
duced was the distinction of three of their own forts. This
strengthened their conviction of, not only the expediency, but the
necessity of the powers which Coote had all along considered as
essential to his department. It also appeared from the management
of their affairs by the Madras government that nothing could be
more fortunate than that they were not possessed of those powers of
negotiation which they complained had been withheld from them.

The Madras government had desired to be informed of the in-
structions which the supreme government might give for the future

1. Madras to Bengal. 5 March 1783. Idem 1 April 1783. Vol. 71,
pp. 51-70.
conduct of the commander-in-chief. These were however already on their way. The supreme council's letter to Madras of the 10th March 1783 had conveyed their resolution of the previous January to command what they had merely recommended in their letter of the 11th March 1782(1). They now (in their letter of the 1st April) explained to Madras what they meant when they directed them to allow Coote to have an entire and unparticipated command. "It is far from our intention or wish," they said, "to change or weaken the constitutional powers of your government, but as the Court of Directors have given us a general and absolute discretion to take the lead,...in all the general operations of the war, and have commanded your implicit obedience to our orders, we have, in virtue of this authority, required, from you, in the exercise of your constitutional powers, that forbearance of them in the conduct of all the operations of the War, which is necessary to enable the commander-in-chief to exercise and apply them with effect."(2).

When the Madras government received the Bengal letter of the 10 March 1783, directing them to leave to Coote the entire and unparticipated command in the Carnatic, they replied, that they had once received these instructions as orders, and had been told that they had misconstrued them. They therefore received them, on this occasion, merely as recommendations. By accepting them

in that light they were aware that they kept the responsibility on themselves. They thought it their duty to retain those inherent powers which the supreme government had allowed them to possess. The experience they had of the use made by Sir Eyre Coote of his sole and exclusive powers, made them unwilling to surrender again to him the authority of their government. However, they would pay attention to the measures which might be proposed by Coote as a member of their select committee. They repeated their former declaration that in pursuance of the orders of the Directors they were bound to obey any plan of operations directed by the supreme government. But nowhere did they find any authority given to the supreme council to transfer their powers to any other person. Therefore if they received no direction from Bengal they would regard themselves as free, to exercise their discretion.(1)

On Sir Eyre Coote's arrival at Madras, the government invited him to attend the select committee (24 April 1783) With reference to his powers, they told him that the whole executive power civil and military was lodged in the governor or select committee of Fort St, George, and could not be transferred, otherwise than by an Act of Parliament, or an order of the Company, neither of which had ordered such a transfer. They, therefore, regarded him while at Madras, as dependent on their orders, and gave him notice "that we shall hold it unwarrantable in you to do any act, except in such matters of detail as the Regulations of 1774 and 1778 allow, without

"our participation, or such others as time may not allow us to consult you about."(1).

When this letter was written, Coote was stricken with his last illness. He therefore did not read it. On the 26th April 1783 the great soldier passed away. It is difficult to say what turn affairs would have taken if Coote had not died at that moment. Coote had returned to Madras expecting to exercise the sole power of conducting the war, and concluding a peace. The supreme government had pledged themselves to support him as far as they could constitutionally do so. The Madras government had, on the other hand, refused to part with their power. Out of this complex situation, the Company was extricated only by the hand of Providence. One thing, however, is clear. The president and select committee of Madras could not legally incur the penalty of suspension for disobedience to this particular order. That penalty was prescribed by the Regulating Act, whereas the supreme government, in entrusting to Coote the sole command, professed to act according to the orders of the Directors.

On Coote's death, difficulty arose as to the money which he had brought along with him. The captain of the ship, in which he had performed the voyage, delivered the money to Colonel Owen, as acting for Sir Eyre Coote. Colonel Owen refused to hand over the money to the Madras government.(2) The difficulty was, however,

removed by the supreme government's order to that officer to make such delivery. (1)

It was now the duty of the governor general and council in accordance with the instructions of the Court of Directors, to issue orders regarding the conduct of the military operations, or for the commencement of negotiations, if such was necessary. But the Bengal government abstained from giving any such order. The Madras government justly claimed to be furnished with the instructions which had been given to Coote for their future conduct. (2) The relations between the two presidencies had become so strained, that the governor general and council could not take the request in its plain meaning. They replied, "The instructions which he "(Coote) was furnished with for his guidance are now of course "extinct, as they applied to circumstances which no longer exist. "They stand recorded upon our proceedings, but we think it un- "necessary to transmit you a copy of them, not knowing any purpose "it would answer, but perhaps to furnish new grounds for those "discussions which from the consistent tenor of your letters appear "to be agreeable to you, although we must confess we find them "wholly unprofitable to the public." (3) Extraordinary powers had been given to Coote merely to engage his services, and after his death the prolongation of the quarrel over that subject would have

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been indeed unfortunate. However, Bengal might have given a proper answer to Madras, by openly communicating to them their ideas on the future conduct of the war, and by directing them to take such measures as they thought necessary.

The silence of the supreme government left Madras free to exercise their authority to the best of their judgment. But they found themselves seriously hampered by the quarrelsome attitude taken up by General Stuart. One of his complaints was that he was not allowed to see all the records and correspondence, or to be present at every deliberation of the select committee. He had referred the subject to the decision of Bengal. (1) Though at his request the Madras government had sent extracts of their proceedings on the subject of the dispute to Bengal, they had not referred the matter to their judgement. (2) The governor general and council who considered the matter in January 1783, had declined any interference. (3) Coote, however, had desired the opinion of the board on the subject for his own guidance, saying that he was eager to have the opinion of the supreme government on every point that was then in dispute at Madras. (4) Accordingly the board, after taking into consideration the letters of the Directors, had declared their opinion that the exclusion of General Stuart from the

select committee "on any occasion or under any pretence whatsoever
is both in itself illegal, and renders every act illegal which
shall be passed by the select committee in every instance in
which he is excluded."(1) General Stuart now produced this
decision before the Madras government, in justification of his
claims. Madras, thereupon, protested vigorously against the
action of the governor general and council. Their alarm was all
the more natural, considering that only seven years ago the es-
tablished government had been overthrown with the aid of the
provincial commander-in-chief. They wrote to the Bengal govern-
ment that they had given an "extra-judicial opinion" on a question
in which they had no concern—an opinion which might contribute
to the disturbance of the Madras government. They said, "The Act
of Parliament concerning India, the Company's instructions, give
your board no power or interference in the internal constitution
and regulations of the presidency. We expressly declined to refer
to you a matter so clear to ourselves, tho' at the claimants par-
ticular desire we transmitted his claim to you, which must as all
our proceedings do, go to you in course. Yet you undertake to
decide on a matter to which your powers are not competent,...if you
thought you had a right to pronounce upon it,...it behoved you to
communicate your sentiments directly to us, in the light either of
decision or advice, instead of which you have delivered it to work

without our knowledge until now...." The Madras government then stated the reasons for their alarm. "Many there are no doubt who "confound your superintending power over us on particular instances "with a general power in all instances; and experience has demon-
"strated that there are others here sufficiently disposed to profit "of this confusion, or of any confusion to throw back the settlement "into anarchy.(1)(11 Aug.1783). Though the Bengal government had refused to interfere on Stuart's application and had given their decision only for the satisfaction of Coote, it must be admitted that the fact of their undertaking to decide on the matter was a species of interference. The supreme government were certainly not acting discreetly in strengthening Stuart in his opposition to the Madras government.

Later on in the year, however, when the quarrel between the civil and the military at Madras came to a head, the governor general and council refused to interfere.

In September 1783, the Madras government dismissed General Stuart, and appointed Sir John Burgoyne as commander-in-chief. Stuart insisted upon retaining command of the King's troops, and Burgoyne declared that he would obey Stuart only. The Madras government, therefore, appointed Colonel Lang as commander-in-chief. Thereupon Burgoyne withdrew from his command of the King's forces, (2), and appealed to the governor general and council for redress.(3)

The Madras government, on their part, informed Bengal of the circumstances of Stuart's dismissal and arrest, and of the attitude taken up by Sir John Burgoyne of the King's forces. (1) Explaining the reasons for writing to them on these matters, they said, "The persons who are disappointed in their views of independent authority, and those who wish for the subversion of government, are said to have given a different description of those events to some members of your board, or other persons in Calcutta, in the hope of inducing you to attempt exerting under the colour of necessity some extraordinary or unnecessary authority over this presidency, or the troops here which are under our immediate command. We therefore request you to recollect that you have been already in many instances deceived by information of private authority... and we therefore hope you will confide only in the authentic documents furnished to you by government." (2)

The situation at Fort St. George was serious enough to justify the interference of the supreme government on the ground of a moral obligation to settle the disputes in that presidency in the same way as in 1776. But the supreme government refused to interfere. To Sir John Burgoyne they replied, "our powers are restricted by an act of the British legislature to certain general purposes in which a control over the internal acts of the other presidencies of the Company is not included." (3) They also wrote to Madras, "We are sorry your measures have arisen to such extremities, your

2. Idem p. 570.
"justification must be to your employers, not to us; we have not the
authority to interfere in the internal transactions of your presi-
dency which may not in anywise relate to the controlling power....
we have therefore received what you have communicated to us as in-
formation only, tho' we know not whether you intend we should so
consider it, or meant to appeal to our justice, or secure our for-
bearance...."(1)

However, Stuart was arrested and sent to England as a prisoner, and Burgoyne surrendered to the Madras government.

The subject of the negotiations with Tipu now loomed large in the story of the relations of the two presidencies. Before entering into that topic, it would be advisable to take up another matter, which, together with the question of Coote's command, emollieted the relations of the presidencies since Macartney's arrival. This was the question of the legality of the intervention of Bengal in the relations of the Madras government with the nawab of Arcot.

CHAPTER VI.

The Position Of The Nawab Of Arcot.

The question of the propriety or legality of the interposition of Bengal in the relations of Madras with the nawab Wallajah, was coloured by the peculiarity of the position of the nawab. The nawab of the Carnatic, it is true, was an independent prince. He had large territories under him, in the administration of which the Company had no right to interfere. Yet, his relations with the Madras government were not of the same kind as those of an independent prince, for he depended almost entirely on the Company's troops for his defence. "In recognition of the fact he had agreed to "contribute four lakhs of pagodas a year to the Madras finances. "Moreover the small territories round Madras and Cuddalore which had "been ceded by him to the Company were also leased to him. Thus, "of the total Madras revenues amounting to eighteen or nineteen lakhs "of pagodas, seven and a half depended on the nawab's treasury."(1) The nawab was, however, involved in a large private debt. For meeting the claims of his creditors he adopted the practice of granting to them assignments on his revenues. He was, therefore, unable to discharge regularly his dues to the Company.

Such being the relations of the nawab with the Madras government, questions of peace and war could not arise. The governor general and council, therefore, could have no ground for

interference in the affairs relating to the nawab, especially as the Madras government was, both before and after, the Regulating Act, the undoubted agent of the Company's transactions with the nawab.

In 1779, the nawab declared his inability to continue his payments to the Company. The Madras government, in their distress, appealed to Bengal. They wrote, "...if it shall appear clearly to you, as it does to us, that we have no power within ourselves to remedy the evil we complain of, we hope you will favour us with your opinion in express terms, and give us the sanction of your authority as far as it extends to enable us to supply the defects of our present system."(1) The governor general was not ready to comply with the request of the Madras government. He said that it would have been easy to prescribe the means of enforcing the nawab's compliance with their demands "could we dictate with the authority of orders the means which they call upon us to advise. Without these requisites to answer their demands would be to assume both an indiscreet and unavailing responsibility."(2).

The outbreak of the Carnatic war increased the need of Madras for money. Yet, not a pagoda could be had out of the nawab. The Madras government, on the verge of despair, approached Bengal with the suggestion that "the whole revenue of the Carnatic ought to be appropriated to the expenses of the war."(3). The supreme council

heartily approved of the proposal, and said, "we earnestly advise, and had we the authority to command, we should peremptorily command it."(1).

The nawab Wallajah, finding that both the presidencies were agreed upon the need of vigorous measures against him, made a clever move. He sent a deputation to Bengal, desiring to enter into an agreement with the supreme government. He knew that any arrangement concluded by Bengal would be resented at Madras, and that the governor general and council lacked the means of enforcing their decision on the subordinate presidencies. The disputes that would arise between the two governments, would then enable him to delay or evade the demands made on him. The personnel of the commission was chosen with the same object. Asam Khan, the nawab’s dawan, was accompanied by Richard Sullivan, the military and political secretary to the Madras government, whose appointment was sure to re-inforce the hostility that would be felt at Madras against an arrangement made by the supreme council.(2) The Bengal government welcomed the proposals of the nawab, and in March 1781 concluded an agreement, by which they recognised the sovereign rights of the nawab of the Carnatic, and in return, received the assignment of all the revenues of the Carnatic, to be collected jointly by the nawab’s officers and persons appointed by the Madras government.(3) The board declared that "the entire sanction of the controlling government of India should be given to the agreement" as they were anxious that "speedy and effectual remedies

"should be applied to the disordered state of affairs in the "Carnatic," especially in view of the fact that the Madras government had, since the commencement of the Carnatic war, repeatedly declared their total inability to obtain from the Carnatic the smallest supply of money. (1) On the request of Asam Khan, the Bengal government then appointed Richard Sullivan as their representative at the court of the nawab for the enforcement of the agreement, and "for the representation of such matters as may at any time require his interposition in that character, and in our name, "either with the nabob or with the president and council or select "committee of Fort St. George." They considered his appointment of so great importance, that they disregarded the hesitation, which they would have felt on any other occasion, to employ a servant of another presidency. (2) They forwarded papers, relating to their transactions with the nawab's agents, to Madras, and earnestly recommended them to conform strictly to the agreement. With regard to their appointment of Sullivan they said, "...the very particular "manner in which the nabob has recommended Mr. Richard Joseph "Sullivan...would argue a want of respect in us towards the nabob "were we to withhold our assent, especially as we have an opinion "of the abilities and integrity of Mr. Sullivan and believe him "qualified for such a trust." (3)

The reasons for the governor general and council thus taking up an attitude, contradictory to their previous declarations on the subject, are not far to seek. A treaty with Wallajah, which would define his relations with the Company, was a favourite project of the governor general. (1) He therefore welcomed the opportunity. Besides, the Madras government had repeatedly declared their inability to induce the nawab to pay towards the expenses of a war in defence of his own territories, and had requested Bengal to suggest a way out of their difficulties. The creditors of the nawab had also appealed to the supreme government. (2) The Bengal government were faced with the task of financing the wars with the Marathas, the French and Haidar. It was a tremendous strain on their treasury which they were afraid it might not stand for long. This was sufficient inducement for them to enter into the agreement. But it was not the agreement, so much as the way in which it was concluded, without the participation of Madras, and the appointment of Sullivan to watch over its execution, that were open to objection. The Court of Directors had desired the Madras government to insist on the nawab’s making arrangements for ensuring the punctual payment of the troops. In case they failed they had directed them to apply to the supreme government "who are "empowered and directed in such case to furnish you with instructions how to proceed...." (3) To Bengal the Directors had written,

"...We feel no difficulty in committing the measures to your immediate superintendence and direction, if found necessary..."

They had explained the part that the Bengal government were to play, thus: "We sincerely hope it will be in the power of our select committee at Fort St. George to accomplish our views on this subject without further application to you; but if that shall not be the case, and they shall find themselves obliged to apply for your instructions and immediate interference on this tender and interesting business, you will then use your utmost influence and every means in your power, short of compulsion, to induce the nabob and the rajah of Tanjore to make such necessary provision for the payment of the troops, as are now required by our orders to our select committee of Fort St. George."(1). The authority, thus given by the Directors, would have justified the Bengal agreement, had Madras participated in its conclusion. However, the governor general and council did not regard the Madras government at this time as a serious factor. Madras was totally dependent on them for supplies in men, money and provisions for carrying on the Carnatic war. In other words, they were dependent on Bengal for their very existence. Lately the governor of Madras had been suspended by the supreme government for misconduct. The sole power of conducting the war which Coote exercised, had limited the sphere of activity of the Madras

1. Directors to Bengal. 18 Oct 1780. Paras. 1 and 3, Bengal Despatches No.11.
government. In short, Madras was so helpless and so discredited, that they could not be expected to oppose the measures of Bengal. Secure in this idea, Bengal could go beyond their legal powers, and "mark in the most emphatic way the subordinate character of the Madras government,"(1) by sending their agent to watch over the execution of the agreement.

The agreement was not received at Madras till September 1781, when the administration there was no longer in the same hands in which it was in April 1781. However, in May, when Charles Smith was still at the head of the government at Madras, letters were received from Richard Sullivan announcing his new appointment, and intimating his resignation of the old. The opinions expressed, at this time, by Johnson, a member of the select committee of Madras, on these measures of the Bengal government, perhaps reflected those of others in Charles Smith's administration. He could not conceive that Hastings would have thought "either his own dignity and consequence increased, or "the Company's interests advanced, by bringing dishonour and con-"tempt upon this government. Whatever charms he might expect "to find in the display of superior power, and the exhibiting to "the world our subordinate situation, I imagined his good sense "would have shown him.... the danger of weakening our hands at "a time when all the influence of government, aided by the public

1. H. Dodwell op.cit. English Historical Review July 1925, p.380
"confidence, are absolutely necessary to afford us the smallest hope of being able much longer to strive against the difficulties which surround us." He predicted that "now presents a prospect of new troubles and vexatious, altercations with the government general, accumulating insults and encroachments on their part, and the entire destruction of that harmony and mutual confidence, which as long as they exist for the steady exertion of our united powers, and resources, would inspire hope...superior to any misfortune." He claimed that the Madras government were the regular channel of the Company's transactions with the nawab, and were the guardians of their interest in that part of India. The supreme council could not legally deprive them of that trust. He could not see anything in the Regulating Act that empowered the supreme government to free a servant belonging to another presidency from his obedience, and to invest him with powers to act independently of them, in the very seat of that government. He declared that the Madras government were ready to agree with Bengal in any plan they might suggest "but that neither our sense of our duty to the company, nor to ourselves will allow us to acquiesce in a measure calculated (as far as we know of it at present) to make this government contemptible in the eyes of every prince and power of Indostan, to render abortive our best exertions, to lessen the public confidence, and increase the difficulties we already have to strive against..."(1)

If such was the type of opinion felt at Madras on the matter, during the period of Charles Smith's administration, it could reasonably be expected that the protest would be more violent with a person of Lord Macartney's position at their head. Hastings had framed his policy under circumstances which were fundamentally changed by Macartney's appointment. As soon as the governor general heard of his arrival, he wrote to him explaining matters. He narrated to him the circumstances that led the Bengal government to enter into the agreement with the nawab. It was only extreme necessity he pointed out, that had led them to interfere in the concerns of the Carnatic. He admitted, that the Madras government was "the regular instrument of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic." Why then, Macartney might ask, did the Bengal government intervene on the occasion? To this he answered by another question, "Why did the "Company withdraw their confidence from the same ministry, to bestow "it on your lordship? And after all what have we done? For others "everything, for ourselves nothing...." Further, he said, "Had I "known that a man of your lordship's character had been chosen to "administer the affairs of that government, I believe that I should have persuaded the nabob to trust his interests in your hands, "rather than make such a separation of them from their ancient and "most natural connection...". However as the supreme government had already pledged its faith to fulfil the agreement, he earnestly requested Lord Macartney to give it his firm and hearty support.\(^1\)

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Hastings, through his private secretary, Stephen Sullivan, wrote also to Richard Sullivan, asking him to explain the circumstances of his appointment to Lord Macartney, and to resign it, if his lordship considered it "in the least degree obnoxious or disagreeable."

If, however, Macartney had no objection to his holding the appointment, he was to remain, not as a "separate and distinct person for the nabob and unconnected with the government of Madras, but to have an unreserved and unlimited confidence with his lordship, and to be the instrument through him of transmitting such particulars to Bengal as he shall deem it necessary to the safety of the nabob, and the well-being of the Carnatic." Sullivan was directed to assure Macartney that it was not the intention of the supreme council to dictate to him in matters "more immediately within his own province" but to assist and co-operate with him.(1).

While the governor general took steps to please Macartney, Coote gave his opinion that the agreement was a "direct infringement of that regular line of executive authority which has been constitutionally established by act of parliament" and that "it was an act of supererogation in the governor general, and an attempt to annihilate a power, which can only be diminished or abolished by an authority above any existing in this country." He was therefore convinced that the Madras government would be liable to a breach of trust, if they acquiesced in such a glaring encroachment.(2).


Though Macartney and the select committee resented the interference, they took up a reasonable attitude. They decided to place their arguments against the measures before the governor general and council and to wait for their decision. They said that the Directors had always included the nawab of Arcot, "within the limits prescribed to the authority of the Madras government." The Regulating Act had given the governor general and council no authority to negotiate treaties directly and immediately with those Indian princes "whose situation and affairs connect them with the other presidencies." The Court's letter of the 18th October 1780 had directed Bengal to give instructions to Madras on the subject, only in case the latter sought for them. "These positive directions appear to mark the precise boundaries of the authority confided respectively in this presidency, and in your superintending board." The supreme government, therefore, had no authority to enter into a treaty with the nawab without the participation of Madras. Similarly, Bengal could not appoint a representative of their own to reside at the nawab's court. The Madras government refused to have any dealings with him. "We must therefore continue," they wrote to Bengal, "to give you the trouble of addressing ourselves immediately for your consent and approbation or for your instruction....." The Bengal government, in their letter of the 26th February, had declared, that they had no authority to command, in a subject like the present. After this "strong and solemn declaration," they would not be justified in supposing that the word "recommendation" in the
Bengal letter of the 2nd April, had been used to convey their commands. The latitude, which the supreme government had allowed to Madras to use their discretion in the case of the proposed treaty with the Dutch, made them believe that solid objections against the treaty in question would be well received. They claimed the "exclusive confidence" of Bengal and professed their "sincere desire to cultivate and maintain the most perfect harmony and good correspondence" with them. They said that they were so "averse to all spirit of alteration or contention, that should "your resolutions remain unchanged by our representations we are "perfectly inclined to subscribe to them." (1)

The Madras government were so anxious that a disagreement between the two presidencies should not appear on the records, that this letter was not entered in the consultations of the select committee, and they wished that the governor general would regard it as proceeding from them merely as individuals. (2)

Three weeks later, Macartney wrote a private letter to Hastings. It was of great length. Macartney expressed his desire to acquire the "confidence and esteem" of the governor general, and showed him how important it appeared to him that the presidencies should maintain friendly relations, and co-operate with one another, for furthering the interest of their common employers. Amidst these professions of friendship, he pointed out to Hastings the uneasiness

felt both at Madras and Bombay "at any extension of the authority of the Bengal government beyond the express provision of the act of parliament," and the need of caution in exercising the powers of the supreme government, in order to maintain their efficacy. He told the governor general, that the dread of suspension was not a sufficient deterrent for persons who were determined to oppose the supreme government. Then discussing the late agreement with Wallajah, he remarked that the intervention of Bengal had diminished the necessary influence of the Madras government with the nawab. (1)

In spite of his protests, Macartney set to work, with the Bengal agreement as the foundation. On December 2nd the nawab assigned to him, in person, the whole of his revenues. In order to carry the assignment into effect, Macartney appointed a committee of assigned revenues. (2) The Bengal government expressed "entire satisfaction" with the agreement, and applauded the "address and ability" of Lord Macartney. (3) Madras, however, soon found that the nawab did not mean that the assignment should be a real one. Wallajah adopted every device to prevent the money from going over to the Committee.

In March 1782 the Madras government gave an account to Bengal of the way in which the nawab was seeking to thwart them, and informed them of their resolution "to give full effect to every stipulation in favour of the Company." (4) The supreme council

4. Madras to Bengal 20 March 1782. Idem 1 April 1782, Vol. 64, pp. 64-66
regretted that Madras should have allowed any consideration towards the nawab, to restrain them from availing themselves, as completely as possible, of the concession which they had so fortunately received. They assured Madras that they did not mean to censure them. They had entered upon the subject only in consequence of the reference made to them, and their object was "to impress confidence." They advised them to "hold and exercise the entire and undivided administration of the revenues of the Carnatic....not admitting the interposition of any authority whatever which may possibly impede it."(1)(5 April 1782.) Thus, assured of the support of the governor general and council, the Madras government resolved to give full effect to the assignment. When the revenues were leased out, and the nawab refused to sign the 'toranam-chits', empowering the lessees to collect the revenues, Lord Macartney himself signed them.(2)

So far, apart from the first protests against the agreement with the nawab and the appointment of a resident, the Madras government had worked along the lines adopted by the supreme council. Macartney had used the Bengal agreement to obtain the assignment, and the two presidencies were now united in their opinion that vigorous action was necessary in order to prevent the nawab from practically nullifying the assignment.

The nawab, having thus failed to divide the Bengal and Madras governments, tried a new plan. Coote was then in the Carnatic, invested by Bengal with sole powers of conducting the war against

Mysore. The relations between Coote and the Madras government were by no means friendly. At such a time the nawab delegated the whole powers of his government to Coote. (1) He also sent Asam Khan on a second visit to Bengal. On the 1st July, Asam Khan submitted to the supreme council the complaints of the nawab. (2) For some months the efforts of the nawab produced no effect. On hearing from Coote of the 'sanad' given to him by the nawab, (3) the governor general and council were filled with apprehension of the consequences that might follow Coote's acceptance of those powers. They requested him to regard the 'sanad' as invalid. They declared that the nawab was precluded by the assignment which he had already made to Macartney, to delegate those powers to him. Incidentally, they also said that they would not examine the complaints made to them by Madras and the nawab against each other's conduct respecting the assignment, as the worst consequences that could happen from their quarrels "would not be equal to a tenth part of the mischief which would be produced by our remote interference in the attempt to judge and decide between them." (4) (4 July 1782). On the same date, the supreme council expressed to the Madras government their approval of the conduct of the committee of assigned revenues, the proceedings of which had been sent to them. (5)

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Again, when the Madras government expressed apprehension at reports that the Bengal government would order the assignment to be surrendered to the nawab, and asked the supreme council to communicate to them all the charges brought against them by the nawab's agents, in order that they might have an opportunity of justification, (1) Bengal denied that they had any idea of interference. (2)

The first signs of a change in the attitude of Bengal, towards the Madras government's management of the assignment, appeared in their letter of the 19th October to Madras. The governor general and council said that it was their earnest wish to support the measures of the Madras government in all cases, especially those which necessity had obliged them to adopt. Upon this ruling principle of their conduct they had avoided as yet taking into consideration "complaints of a very heavy nature" that were pressed upon them daily by the nawab, "complaints which if founded in facts that were not justified by a public necessity, of which we can scarcely conceive the extremity, are ruinous to our national character...." They would not lightly change their opinion of the ability and integrity of Lord Macartney. They still hoped that the nawab's complaints were founded upon misconception, as the experience of his lordship was such as to enable him to determine upon the force of treaties, the acknowledged rights of princes, and

"the degree in which public necessity should admit a deviation from the strict and legal attention due to both." (1) This letter was drafted on the day of Coote's arrival at Calcutta, and passed in council two days later. Coote, after the receipt of the 'sanad' from the nawab, was eager for the abolition of Macartney's assignment. Hastings had become strongly biassed against Macartney under the false idea that he aimed at the office of governor general and was attempting to undermine his influence at home. (2) This, together with his natural disposition to side with the nawab, must have predisposed him to condemn Macartney's policy.

The Madras government pleaded that all the measures which they had adopted, had not only been directed by the governor general and council, but had afterwards been approved by them. They again expressed their anxiety to receive from Bengal the nawab's complaints, in order that they might have a chance of defending their conduct. (3)

It was not, however, till January 1783 that a complete change in the attitude of Bengal appeared on the face of the records.

As has been seen, Coote was at this time ready to return to the Carmatic. Before his departure, he wanted to have precise

instructions from the supreme board, on every question relating to the Carnatic, and on the 6th January he desired that the question of the administration of the Carnatic be first determined, in view of the complaints made by the nawab's agents against Macartney. (1) Upon this, the supreme council decided to proceed judicially with the subject of the nawab's complaints. Asam Khan and Richard Sullivan appeared before the board, and were examined. (2) But the Madras government were not asked to state their case. As a result of this one sided examination, the supreme council expressed the unanimous opinion, that the Madras government had broken the condition under which they had received the assignment from the nawab, that the assignment having been granted in consequence of the treaty of 2nd April 1781 between the Bengal government and the nawab, this was a breach of that treaty, and that it was necessary, in order to retrieve the national faith, that justice should be done to the nawab. They also declared, that the assertion of Madras that the measures taken by them were directed and approved by Bengal were untrue, and that the Madras government were guilty of discriminating them "with charges that would, if believed, have a dangerous effect upon

our present negotiation for peace..." (1) They then ordered the Madras government, in the most positive terms, to restore the assignment to the nawab Wallajah. They accepted the offer of the nawab, in return for the restoration of the Carnatic revenues, to provide the Company with a third more supplies and money than had been obtained during Macartney’s administration, and desired the Madras government to call upon the nawab for the due performance of this engagement. (2) Richard Sullivan was sent back to Madras, in his previous capacity of resident at the nawab’s durbar, and entrusted with the task of delivering the orders to the Madras government. (3) Hastings resolved to proceed to the last extremity in case the Madras government refused to obey the orders. As Sir Eyre Coote was returning to the Carnatic, the governor general expected him to enforce the resolutions. (4) He revealed his plans in a minute, which he wrote some months later: "Our letters with these proceedings and instruments were dispatched in such a manner as to afford Syed Asbm Cawn and Mr. Sullivan the means of delivering them in person, and to afford time for the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote, on whose support we principally relied, for the

effectual observance of our orders and engagements..."(1).

In the meanwhile, dispatches arrived from the Court, directing that the agreement of the 2nd April 1781 be annulled, on the ground that it was neither necessary, nor expedient, and revoking the appointment of Sullivan as the resident of the supreme government at the nawab's court. They declared that such an appointment had a tendency to lessen the respect which ought to be shown to the governor and council of Madras by the neighbouring princes, and that "the residence of the nabob in the vicinity of Madras clearly points out our governor and council as the fittest persons to negotiate any matters with "His Highness from the Bengal government."(2). In a subsequent paragraph, however, they wrote, "You will easily perceive that the three preceding paragraphs were written previous to the receipt of your advices by the Swallow, which inform us of the new arrangement made with the nabob in December last....Upon a supposition that this new system will tend to the increase of His Highness' revenue....we acquiesce therein as the nabob has assured us, in a letter of the 26th January last that this assignment of the revenues of his country was a voluntary act of his own."(3) The Madras government thereupon invited Bengal to co-operate with them to make the assignment work smoothly.(4)

2. Directors to Madras 12 July 1782. paras. 36 and 37, Madras Despatches No. 10.
3. Idem para. 40
Hastings feared that Madras would take shelter under the latter part of the Court's letter, and resist the Bengal orders to restore the assignment to the nawab. His apprehensions were increased when a letter was also received from the nawab of Arcot, complaining that, in spite of orders of the Directors annulling the assignment, Macartney had refused to give him back the administration of the Carnatic. 

1. He was therefore eager that Coote should carry with him instructions to suspend the president and select committee of Madras in case they disobeyed, in the same manner as he had carried the order for the suspension of Whitehill. Accordingly, he asked the board whether it was their opinion that the faith of the supreme government, and of the Company, was pledged to maintain and enforce the late engagement with the nawab to restore to him the revenues and sovereignty of the Carnatic, and whether, in case the Madras government refused, they would subject themselves to the penalty prescribed by the Regulating Act.  

2. Hastings, however, could not carry the council with him. All except Coote were of opinion that, since it was not known how Madras would receive the order for the restoration of the assignment, it was too early to decide on the matter.  

3. The governor general said that the Directors acquiesced in the assignment only on the supposition that the nawab had granted it of his own free will. The nawab, however, had asked for its restoration. The

2. Governor general's minute. Idem.  
revenues of the Carnatic should therefore be restored to him. Again, the assignment was a part of the agreement entered into by Bengal in April 1781. The Bengal government had now cancelled it. The assignment had therefore ceased to exist. He declared that the government was bound to support their late engagement with the nawab, and it was obligatory on them to exercise every power which they possessed for that end. He hinted that however the other members might think of temporizing, he would move for the suspension of the president and select committee of Madras, if they disobeyed. (1).

Being in a minority, Hastings could not have his wish, and Coote went back to Madras without any order on the subject of the assignment.

It was not till July 1783 that the reply from Madras to the order for restoring the assignment arrived. It was an extraordinarily lengthy document, covering no less than two hundred and fifty pages of the Bengal consultations. (2) The Madras government argued that the assignment was a voluntary act of the nawab. It was in pursuance of orders from Bengal, and on account of extreme necessity, that Macartney had taken those steps which the supreme council now regarded as breach of engagement. They said that Bengal should have entertained the nawab's complaints only when forwarded through them. The supreme council had condemned their


conduct without communicating to them the charges brought against them, without giving them any notice of the trial, and without hearing what they had to say in justification of their conduct. (1) Their present situation was a difficult one. On one side was the Bengal order to surrender the assignment, on the other was the Company's order to maintain it. The governor general and council were themselves bound to obey the Directors and their order was given before the dispatch from the Directors arrived. They were therefore not certain whether the Bengal government would support them in case they acted against the orders of the Directors. (2) They had experience that a strict compliance with the desires of the supreme government became the occasion of subsequent reproaches from them. (3) They therefore postponed the restoration of the assignment till they knew of the final resolution of Bengal on the subject. (4) A simple declaration from Bengal whether they would conform to, or differ from, the Company's orders, could have reached Madras long ago. They might have then "adopted a line of unambiguous consequence." (5) "At any rate", they said, "in postponing the "execution of your orders we do not preclude a future compliance "with them." (6) If they had once surrendered the assignment, they could not have regained it, if Bengal changed their opinion. (7).

1. Idem p.115.
4. Idem p.156.
5. Idem p.158.
7. Loc. cit.
Towards the concluding part of the letter they spoke of an immediate compliance with their directions from Bengal as "an indifference to our real duty." They welcomed their suspension as "the event would free us indeed perfectly from our personal share in the public embarrassments, and our entire removal from authority would not be a very abrupt transition from the state to which your arrangements, delegations and appointments had tended to reduce it; we should be better pleased to — (illegible) a dissolution of our government effected by a vote of our suspension from your board, than by the consequences which might result from a surrender of the assignment to the Ameerulomrah, Syed Assam Cawn and Mr. Benfield."(1).

Hastings must have been furious to see his agreement thrown to the winds, and his authority humiliated in the eyes of the nawab. He became impatient to punish the Madras government for their contumacy. He tried again to impress the council with a sense of their obligation to stand by their second agreement with the nawab.(2) He warned them "not to place any reliance on a temporizing conduct, or to expect, that by persevering in the tenderness and forbearance which have been hitherto shown to the members of the government of Fort St. George, we shall influence them to a similar return..."(3) Macpherson was with Hastings and

1. Idem p.305.
felt like him the insufficiency of the powers of the supreme government. "The Company and the State at home" he said, "will in time see the necessity of lodging somewhere in their government in India a supreme authority which could never be disputed or resisted in its decisions and orders." But the majority of the council were not ready for vigorous action. However, they agreed upon repeating the order for the restoration of the assignment. In the hope of securing their object by dividing the Madras government, they wrote both to the select committee (2) and the council, (3) declaring that by the constitution of their government the management of the revenues should belong to the council, and not to the select committee. This plan failed. The Madras select committee challenged the authority of the supreme government to issue any orders to the council. They pointed out that "the superintendence which was given to your board over the other presidencies by act of parliament did not extend to matters of revenue, or other matters within the department of the council at large..." As to the restoration of the assignment, they said that it was "a miserable delusion to suppose that any one disinterested person in this settlement having regard to the public welfare has any hesitation in

"believing that the assignment can not in the present circumstances "be surrendered consistently with that welfare. (1)" The council also replied that it would not be safe or prudent to restore the assignment immediately. (2)

On receipt of the letter from the select committee, Hastings asked the supreme council to consider "in what other manner they "shall proceed to redress the injuries which the nabob Walla- "jah has sustained....to vindicate the national faith....and to "support their own authority entrusted to them by act of parlia- "ment." He said, "To repeat a third time the orders which have "been treated with contempt and derision would be to encourage "greater contumacy, and to draw on the nabob....still greater "injuries in their resentment of his appeal to our protection." He therefore, suggested that the council should, either proceed with decision, "and with an unalterable determination to support "our acts to their fullest accomplishment," or refrain altogether from further interference. He then moved the suspension of the president and select committee of Madras. (3) The council were not prepared to go as far as Hastings. They therefore informed Madras that they had determined to "suspend the further considera- tion of this subject" until the decision of the Directors on the

representations made by the nawab and the select committee arrived. (1)

Thus the supreme government acknowledged a defeat.

The Bengal agreement of 1781 with the nawab can to a great extent be justified. But the order for the revocation of the assignment was unjustifiable. Their attitude to the assignment in 1783 was strangely inconsistent with their declaration in July 1782. They did not call on the Madras government to disprove or justify the charges against them. They showed a distinct bias against the Madras government. The personal factor played too important a part. The order to restore the assignment was moreover inexpedient. The assignment had been helpful to Madras in financing the war to some extent. The war was not over. Yet relying on mere promises of the nawab they ordered the assignment to be given up. The governor general and council found that their position was not strong enough to enforce such a decision.

In yet another matter the limitations of their powers were brought home to the supreme government between 1783 and 1784. This was the subject of the negotiations with Mysore and the treaty which followed.


CHAPTER VII.

The Treaty of Mangalore.

From the very first, Lord Macartney showed an eager desire for peace. Soon after his arrival, he invited Haidar and the Marathas to come to terms. Hastings was not opposed to peace. But Macartney and Hastings differed in their opinion as to the method of obtaining peace. Hastings held, that the surest way of securing a lasting peace was to compel the enemy, by means of a vigorous prosecution of the war, to sue for it. Macartney, however, showed his adherence to a different principle by approaching the enemy with terms.

After the failure of his attempts at pacification in August 1781, Macartney gave up the idea of peace for nearly a year. In June 1782, the supreme government informed Madras of the agreement arrived at with Sindia, and left it to them "to make such discretionary use of the information" as they should consider necessary. (1) The 9th article of the treaty of Salbai provided that, the Marathas would assist the English in compelling Haidar to evacuate the Carnatic, within six months of the completion of the treaty, and that both the English and Haidar should release all prisoners that they had taken in the war. (2)

2. A collection of treaties and engagements with the native princes and States of Asia concluded on behalf of the East India Company... (London 1812) p. 101.
As Coote was entertaining Haidar's agents at this time at his camp, and refused to allow the Madras government to participate in his negotiations, (1) they were unable to take any step on the occasion, though the select committee held, that the words used by the supreme government plainly implied that some measures ought to be taken.(2) After the receipt of the Bengal letter of the 4th July 1782, when they no longer regarded the exercise of their normal powers restricted by those possessed by Coote, they requested the governor general and council for instructions on the subject of calling on Haidar to fulfil the terms in relation to him for the evacuation of the Carnatic, contained in the Maratha treaty.(3) (25 Aug. and 11 Sept. 1782). The Bengal government replied that "till Hyder Ally is compelled to solicit for peace, or is disposed to move for an accommodation from some change in his affairs, we imagine that every advance to a negotiation with him is but an encouragement to him to persist in the war." At the same time, they added, "should he by the aid of his new allies, and through our misfortune, press you to a situation of imminent necessity, that necessity and your own judgement must at once determine your last refuge and dictate your instructions."(4) (19th October 1782.)

Matters rested at that point until February 1783, when Tipu evacuated the Carnatic in order to meet the English attack on his dominions from the west. Macartney considered that the circumstances in which Tipu was placed, might induce him to accept the terms of the Maratha treaty. He did not like to send a deputation directly from the government, and proposed that Sambajee, a servant of the Raja of Tanjore, who was proceeding to Conjeeveram, and who expected to meet at that place a person in Tipu's confidence, be empowered to sound him as to the inclinations of Tipu towards a pacification. He argued that the positive orders of the Directors to make peace, the interruption of supplies of provisions and of money on account of the presence of the enemy's fleet, the consequent danger of famine in the settlement and mutiny in the army, and the failure of Bengal to give any instructions, rendered it necessary to "embrace any favourable occasion of terminating the war without reference or delay"(1). The select committee agreeing to the president's proposal Sambajee was instructed to try to procure some alleviation of the distress of the English prisoners at Bangalore and Seringapatam, and to declare, that whatever may be the reciprocal interest and intention of Tipu and the Company, to terminate the war, no pacification could take place if the ruler of Mysore formed any connections with the French. He was also to point out that the Company, not

being desirous of gain, had not sought for indemnification from the Marathas, and that Tipu would receive the same favour if he would declare without delay his acceptance of the terms of the Maratha treaty. (1).

The Madras select committee informed Bengal of the steps that they had taken, and sent a copy of Macartney's minute, and his letter to Sambajee on the subject. In justification of their action they wrote that in view of the fact that Tipu was then returning to his own dominions in order to suppress internal disturbances, it was possible that he might be willing to accede to the terms of the late Maratha treaty. As to their question what constituted such imminent necessity as would warrant them in adopting measures of their own initiative the governor general and council had left them to the dictates of their own judgement. "To that judgement it is obvious that the necessity of which the "imminence authorizes our uncontroled resolves, must be the well "grounded apprehension of imminent evil, which the operations of "of such resolves might be able to prevent, rather than the "actual existence of evil of which it might be too late to "attempt the removal." They were faced with the prospect of mutiny among the troops, and famine among the people. Delay to treat with Tipu, until the arrival of Bussy, might make it difficult to obtain reasonable terms. Besides they held that, "The motives operating upon the Company for preferring the governor

"and council of Fort St. George in negotiations with the nabob, "Wallah Jah apply to the choice of the same persons for negotiatewith any other persons existing in the Carnatic." They therefore desired the supreme council to give their consent to a treaty to be concluded by them with Tipu "on the terms of that which has "been made respecting his father with the Marathas; and we re-"quest that you will communicate to us your sentiments on the "propriety of our waving so much of the clause relative to his "immediate and entire evacuation of the Carnatic, as may relate "to the small posts and districts of Poodicotah and Halipardy, "or other small ports of little value and importance....in case "a treaty could not otherwise be concluded with him." They entreated them to lose no time in conveying to them their opinion on the subject, and assured them that "we shall come to "no determination in the meantime unless it shall appear to that "judgement to which you have referred us that it would be danger-"ous to postpone it until your orders might arrive."(1)(18 Feb. 1783).

The Bengal government replying on the 11th March 1783 wrote "After having lost the most favourable occasion that could be "wished for expelling the Mysoreans out of the Carnatic....you "now request to be invested with powers....to yield to him, what "even his father in all his power, and amidst all our distress was

"subjected to resign by treaty which we had concluded with the
"Marathas." They expressed their surprise, that Madras should
have so far humiliated themselves, as to vest a servant of the
Raja of Tanjore, with instructions to go to Conjeeveram upon a
pretended purpose, to meet some friend who might have access to
Tipu, "and that your minister thus introduced into the presence
"of the invader should be directed to beg his commiseration to our
"people who are prisoners in his hands, should begin to give him
"advice to follow the example of his father in not forming any
"close connection with the French, and should be then authorised
"to say that upon the same principles that the Company agreed to
"the Maratha treaty without requiring indemnification of their ex-
"penses, so Tipoo might immediately avail himself of peace without
"paying their expenses of the war." Indeed we cannot but ex-
"press our surprize that such representations should receive your
"written sanction, and that after taking such measures, you should
"ask us for power to conclude a treaty, which would in essential
"points be contrary to the Maratha treaty...." In view of the
final ratification of the Maratha treaty they required the Madras
government to avoid any infraction of the article which related to
the Carnatic, "and which constitutes the peace with Tipoo Sahib
"on the only footing on which we are at liberty to accede to it,
"especially as...we are informed that Madajee Sindia....had
"actually written to Tipoo Sahib requiring his conformity to it."
They added, that they placed their chief hopes in Coote, not only
for the conduct of the war, but also for the success of the negotiations. (1)

On the 15th March the Bengal board read a letter from the nawab Wallajah to Hastings, pointing out the impropriety of the steps taken by Madras towards opening a negotiation with Tipu. (2) The nawab was apparently taking advantage of the situation to foment the differences between the two presidencies. Coote also desired the board to take the 9th article of the Maratha treaty into consideration, in order that they might give a clear and definite answer to the reference made to them by the Madras government. (3) The governor general therefore, asked the board among other questions, -1- whether Madras had infringed the Maratha treaty by offering to cede certain territories of the Carnatic to Tipu, who was bound by that treaty to evacuate the whole of the Carnatic; -2- whether Madras was authorized by the Directors, or the supreme council, or on the ground of imminent necessity, to depute a person to negotiate with Tipu; and -3- whether they had subjected themselves to the penalty prescribed by the Regulating Act. (4) Hastings himself was of opinion that the

Madras government had counteracted the purposes of the Maratha treaty, and that they could not defend the step they had taken, either on the ground of imminent necessity, or on the plea of any authority from the Directors, or the Bengal government. He declared that the necessity was not so urgent as to leave the commencement of negotiations as their last resource because they had at the time a more powerful army than Coote had commanded, and a larger store of provisions, and their enemy was not yet settled in his new authority. The president and select committee of Madras had therefore subjected themselves to the penalty prescribed by the Regulating Act. (1) The members of the board were divided in their opinion as to the guilt of the Madras government. (2) Hastings, therefore, was unable to pursue the matter further.

In the meanwhile, the Tanjore vakil had met Tipu's confidants at Conjeveram, and had been persuaded by them to visit the sultan. He had received assurances from Tipu that attention would be paid to the English prisoners, and provided the English agreed to reasonable terms, Tipu would cut off all connection with the French. He had then returned to Madras, accompanied by an agent from Tipu, named Sreenewasa Rao. Lord Macartney however refused to see the Mysore agent, as he had not brought any written credentials. (3)

1. Governor general's minute Idem 20 March 1783.
A few days later, Sreenewasa Rao produced letters from Tipu, which Macartney regarded as sufficiently confirming the powers which Tipu had given him, to confer upon the subject of peace. (1) Macartney, thereupon met Tipu’s agent. As they could not reach an agreement, Sreenewasa Rao returned to his master for further instructions. (2) The Madras government sent to Bengal copies of all their proceedings relating to the transactions with Tipu’s agents. (3).

On the 5th March 1783, before the president’s meeting with Sreenewasa Rao, the Madras select committee had addressed a letter to the supreme government, informing them of the arrival of a person from Tipu to confer with Macartney, drawing their attention to the numerous occasions when they had applied to them in vain for powers to negotiate, and repeating their request for an early answer to their last letter on the subject of the negotiations with Tipu. (4) To this the governor general and council replied, "Now it appears from events, and your real management that, "nothing could be more fortunate than that you were not possessed "of those powers for negotiation which you state to have been "withheld from you....we must be free enough to declare to you, "that, from the specimen you have given us of the dignity and

"address of your management, in what you have reported of your
"negociation with him, we would not think it proper to give you
"plenary powers even if the treaty with the Marathas had not taken
"place...." They declared that the interest of Tipu to conclude
a peace could not be an argument for soliciting the same. Such
an attitude always enabled the enemy to dictate his terms. "It
"was not to submit to terms thus dictated that this government has
"agreed to give up our conquests in the Maratha country, and has
"in the course of the last eighteen months supplied your presidency
"and that of Bombay to co-operate for your relief with resources of
"war, supplies and provisions and treasure to nearly the amount of
"three million stirling". Explaining to them the reasons why they
had not given them powers to negotiate with Haidar, they said, "It
"was very much to be dreaded that a separate negociation between
"your government and Hyder Ally, conducted at the same time in which
"we were treating with the Marathas, especially as our negociation
"included the same objects as yours might be productive of contra-
dictions and defeat the purpose of both. We therefore thought it
"proper to restrict your negociations, but not so absolutely as to
"preclude you from taking those measures which the last necessity
"might require for your own safety." As to the present request of
Madras for an opinion on their proposals of a treaty with Tipu,
Bengal replied that, they saw no ground or motive for entering into
a separate or direct treaty with Tipu, because such an engagement
would imply a surrender of the conditions of the 9th Article of the
Maratha treaty. (1 April 1783)(1).

1. Bengal to Madras 1 April 1783, Idem, pp.75-85.
The Madras government were much aggrieved at the observations made on their conduct by the supreme council. They declared that the refusal of the Bengal government to comply with their request for instructions, had resulted in the loss of a favourable opportunity of separating the connection of Tipu with the French. The continuance of that connection might have led to serious consequences, if the successes of the Company's troops on the Maratha coast had not compelled Tipu to withdraw from the Carnatic. The instructions which they had given to the Tanjore vakil could not be described as solicitations. If they had been empowered by Bengal, they could have sent an envoy who might have proceeded with the dignity suitable to his station, and with direct offers from them, offers which would have been much more effective than the "indirect and accidental interposition" of the Tanjore vakil. "You describe our written instructions as if they instructed such agent to go to "Conjeveram... on a pretended purpose, whereas our resolution was in "fact not expressly to send, so long as possible, (not having your "authority) any person, to direct any person to go to the enemy.... "but to avail ourselves of the intention of another going there to "communicate our sentiments." They pointed out that their declaration to Tipu's agents had all been in conformity with the 9th Article of the Maratha treaty. They had only suggested to Bengal that in case a peace was otherwise impossible, Tipu could be allowed to retain certain small posts and districts in the Carnatic. In view of the importance of peace such concessions could be fully justified. They reminded the governor general and council that at a time when there was no danger from European enemies "entire provinces were
"proposed by you to be given away in exchange for assistance only towards forcing our Indian enemy to peace."(1)(11 Aug. 1783).

Sreenewasa Rao did not return with instructions from his master. Accordingly, the negotiations had to be dropped for the time being. They were revived by the Madras government, when the news of the Treaty of Versailles led to the cessation of hostilities between the French and English in India. The 16th Article of that treaty stipulated that the allies of Great Britain and France in India were to be invited to join in the pacification. In accordance with it, the English commissioners who had been sent from Madras to Bussy, to settle the pacification, invited Tipu to accede to it as a preliminary to a final peace, declaring that the English would cease all hostilities against him as soon as he on his part ceased hostilities against the English, and requiring that Tipu should immediately release all English prisoners in his custody on parole.(2)

The Madras government transmitted to Bengal the transactions of their commissioners.(3) They justified their invitation to Tipu, without the consent or approbation of the supreme government, on the ground that the determination of ceasing hostilities against Tipu, as soon as he should declare his intention of acceding to the peace made in Europe, was strictly within the meaning of the

Treaty of Versailles, which they were bound to obey even without reference to Bengal. But the cessation of hostilities had to be followed by a treaty. They, therefore, renewed their solicitations to Bengal for instructions as to the terms to be proposed or accepted by them. It was proper, they said, that they should know the intentions of the Bengal government in this respect, so that they might conform to them as much as might be in their power. (1) As to the argument of the Bengal government that no separate or direct treaty with Tipu was necessary, they said that the Maratha treaty was in various respects incomplete. It said nothing about the conquests made by the English from Mysore, and it contained no clause for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred, or compensation for the losses sustained, by the Company. There was, therefore, enough motive for entering into a direct treaty with Tipu. They did not submit to the supreme council precise and specific clauses for approval, as the terms of the new treaty would vary according to changing circumstances. They required in general terms their consent to a treaty with Tipu on the basis of the Maratha treaty, and the pacification in Europe, and on the condition of such re-imbursement of the expenses of the war, or such an equivalent, as the advantages lately obtained by the Company's forces might enable them to require. They further said, "We make this requisition to you in obedience to the

"dictates of our duty, because we hold that as the war is
chieflly carried on by this presidency, it is the duty of this
presidency to look forward to the event of peace, and to pre-
pare for it, by desiring your consent and approbation, as
directed by law, to such a treaty as may appear reasonable
and proportionate to the circumstances under which it may be
made...." (1) (11 Aug. 1783).

After a few days the Madras government received Tipu's reply to the commissioners, (2) the substance of which was that in compliance with their request he had ordered Meer Mohinuddin Khan, the officer in charge of his forces in the Carnatic, to cease hostilities and to send Appajee Rao and Sreenewasa Rao to Madras with a list of his demands. (3) They therefore sent copies of Tipu's letter and various other papers to Bengal pressing them for instructions, "the want of which leaves this government in an embarrassment, which may greatly tend to the prejudice of public affairs at this critical juncture." (4) (15 Aug. 1783).

The governor general and council were greatly annoyed at the turn which the negotiations were taking. In reply to the requests for instructions on the subject they wrote to Madras that the determination which they had expressed in their letter of the 19th October 1782 to withhold from them the power of negotiating with Tipu, was thoroughly justified. "Presuming upon your weakness, he (Tipu) has assumed a degree of consequence to which his father never pretended in the height of his prosperity, he has

"dictated the terms of a treaty... and has left no alternative "for a qualified admission of his demands." Further they said, "If the ill disposition towards you, of which you have repeatedly "accused us in your letters, or the irritating style of your cor- "respondence could influence us to your prejudice, the unwarrant- "able and disgraceful management of your late negotiations opens "an ample field for censure and reproach. To propose a cessation "of hostilities to Tipu Sahib, in conjunction with or through the "medium of Mr. Bussy, was at once both impolite and disgraceful..."

However, on the supposition that negotiations had taken place with Tipu, they declared their willingness to cede Karur, Dindigul, Aavakuruchy, and Darapuram and some other places in order to obtain the release of the English prisoners. At the same time they desired the Madras government to understand that they positively restricted them from making any separate or definitive treaty with Tipu, "and that we mean only to vest you with powers to treat "for a cessation of hostilities or for the release of our prisoners "or both. It is not necessary for us to negotiate for more "general objects, as you have already commenced a negotiation with "him without waiting for our previous sanction, which you guardedly "assume us was unnecessary... You have yourselves invited Tipu "Sahib to accede to the peace concluded in Europe, instead of leav- "ing this advance where it ought to have been left... you have your- "selves ordered what we conceive ought only to have been the effect "of a reciprocal engagement, a cessation of hostilities on the part "of our forces, while those of the enemy remain in liberty to
"continue their operations against us. For these acts and their "consequences you are alone accountable."(1)(4 Sept.1783).

The Bengal board entered on their own records all their rea-
sons for refusing to give the Madras government the instructions
which they desired. The first consideration was undoubtedly the
Maratha treaty. Then, Tipu had not addressed the supreme govern-
ment, which showed that he was not seriously desirous of peace.
Besides they were convinced that"the president and select committee
"at Madras would but employ such an authority however specific or
"restricted as a general licence and warrant for whatever conduct
"they might think proper to pursue...." The Madras government
had received from Tipu a list of his demands, but Bengal did not
know what those demands were. The reserve of the Madras govern-
ment on this point was another reason why instructions could not
be given. "Besides they have already negotiated. Were we dis-
"posed to ratify what they might conclude, there will be a suffi-
cient time for it when we know the terms on which they desire to
"conclude, of which they will of course advise us; but were we
"directly to empower them to negotiate, we should ourselves be by
"implication pledged to ratify their acts, or proposed engagements,
"if they were such as in themselves were not liable to exception...
"but it may so happen that we should be thereby embarrassed in a
"contradictory engagement with the Marathas...." Again, the way in

which the Madras government repeatedly asked for their opinion relative to the re-imbursement of the expenses incurred, and compensation for the losses sustained by the invasion of the Carnatic, made them believe that their design was to compel them to grant the powers which they required, by intimidating them with the consequences of the popular odium which would fall on them for refusing their assent. (1) (15 Sept. 1783.)

In October 1783, Tipu's vakils arrived at Madras, and submitted their proposals. The Madras government regarded themselves sufficiently authorized by the instructions of the Directors dated 6th March 1783, (2) to offer terms on the basis of a mutual restitution of places and prisoners as a final reply to Tipu. (3) They declared to Tipu's envoys that they would immediately agree to these terms. They however regarded the consent of the governor general and council necessary in order to enter into a stipulation that, "in case of the Company's being at war with any Indian or European power in India or of Tipoo being at war with any such power excepting the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore and the Nubob of Arcot, who are under the immediate protection of the English, no assistance whatever directly or indirectly shall be afforded by the Company or by Tipoo to their respective enemies." (4) They accordingly sent

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2. Circular to the presidencies from Directors, 4 March 1783, (approved 6 March) - Home Miscellaneous Vol. 169, pp. 575-77.
to Bengal copies of the proposals of Tipu's envoys, and of their answer, and entreated them not to delay or withhold their consent to a treaty with Tipu, purporting that in case of either party being at war no assistance was to be afforded to their enemies. They added, "We request you to reflect on the prolongation of misery to which you have exposed this part of the Company's possessions and dependencies, and the consequent general danger of their affairs, by withholding your consent on former occasions "to the successive propositions we made to you...."(1) Replying to the criticisms against their management of the negotiations in the Bengal letter of the 4th September, they said that "our conduct has been conformable to the principles, instructions and "interest of our employers." They had indeed invited Tipu to a peace, but they had never solicited him for peace. They refused to regard their invitation of their commissioners, in conjunction with Bussy to a cessation of hostilities as impolitic and dangerous. They affirmed that the cessation of hostilities was reciprocal, and they forwarded a copy of a letter from Tipu to Macartney in order to show that Tipu had no notion of dictating the terms of a treaty.(2) (14 Oct. 1783).

About the same time that the above was received at Bengal, the governor general presented before the supreme council a letter he

had received from Tipu, expressing his desire of entering into an alliance with the English. (1) This letter, together with the instructions of the Court of Directors, dated 6 March 1783, expressing the desire for a general pacification, led the Bengal government, notwithstanding the obligations imposed on them by the Maratha treaty, to decide in favour of a separate treaty with Tipu. (2).

They might have at this time felt tempted to take upon themselves the negotiations. However, they did not consider themselves justified in taking such a step, even though their annoyance with Madras was at its height. They knew that a deputation had been sent from Madras, and they realised that a separate negotiation would embarrass and impede the object of the deputation. Accordingly, the governor general informed Tipu that he had no objection to a treaty with him, and asked him to negotiate with Madras, as he had already given them the powers to conclude a peace. (3) The Bengal government gave to Madras their opinion and instructions upon the different articles of Tipu's demands. They refused assent to the clause purporting that in case of either party being at war, no assistance should be given by them to their respective enemies. (4)

Writing a few months later regarding the motives which led them to sanction the negotiations of the Madras government, the

supreme government said that Madras "had been for a considerable time engaged in negotiations with Tipoo's vellals who had been expressly deputed by Tipoo for that purpose, and so far advanced in them that to have stopped the negotiations would have been to have proclaimed to Tipoo, either that we would not have peace, or if we had sent commissioners from this presidency to treat for it, that we had no confidence in that of Fort St. George, and indeed we presumed that as the interests of the Carnatic were the most materially concerned in bringing the war to a conclusion, the Right Honourable the President and Select Committee were the proper medium for effecting this wish, dictated to us as well by the Honourable the Court of Directors, as by the present situation of the Company's affairs.(1)

Before the Madras government received the authorization of Bengal, they appointed Sadlier and Staunton to proceed to Tipu and to enter into such agreements for a pacification as shall be agreeable to the preliminary articles of peace concluded in Europe and to the consequent instructions of the Court of Directors."(2) Davidson, a member of the Madras select committee, recorded that he supported the appointment of the commissioners on the ground that the Madras government were authorised by instructions from the Company of the 30th April 1782 and 6th March 1783, to make arrangements relating to the evacuation of the

Carnatic, a cessation of arms, and mutual restitution of places and prisoners. The final ratification of the peace, however, must be left to the supreme council. (1) As a whole the Madras Select Committee felt that circumstances impelled them to hasten a permanent pacification. They declared that Bengal had not given them any clear instruction as to what line to follow. In case of a renewal of hostilities, there was no certainty as to how much dependence was to be placed on the assistance of the Marathas. Peace had indeed become a question of imminent necessity. They declared "our treasury is empty, our credit exhausted, no supply of money from Bengal... so little do they attend to us, and so far from helping us,... that within these few months they have seriously desired us to give up the nabob's assignment of the revenue.... Add to this that there is a famine apprehended in Bengal from whence we draw the greatest part of our supplies of rice and provisions.... an embargo on all grains is laid on there, and our stores here are drained almost to the bottom." (2)

The supreme government did not criticise the appointment of the commissioners. They, however, pointed out that no mention had been made of the Maratha treaty in the instructions of the commissioners. They hoped that an advantageous peace would be concluded in accordance with the instructions which they had


given to the Madras government. (1)

Hastings was away from Bengal, and it is interesting to note the attitude of the supreme government towards Madras at this time. The violation of the truce by Tipu, and the manner in which the progress of the commissioners was purposely delayed, and their communications with Madras rendered difficult, led the Madras government to express to Bengal their doubts of Tipu's sincerity. (2) Bengal promptly instructed the Madras government "to concert measures for the operations of the Company's troops "under the two presidencies with the gentlemen of Bombay." (3) Again the same authorities who had once written strong letters to Madras on the reports received from General Stuart now refused to entertain the private opinion of another military officer against Madras. General Macleod wrote to Bengal, that it appeared from the proceedings of the commissioners sent by Madras to conclude a peace, that it was dangerous to trust them with such a task, that it was necessary that Bengal should give their authority to the commissioners who had been appointed by Bombay and that they should send some person or persons to superintend the whole commission. (4) Bengal refused to entertain the tempting suggestion. They wished General Macleod had confined his private conjectures to his own

breast, and requested him not to forget the respect which was due to any of the Company's presidencies or suppose that they could receive such opinion without displeasure. (1) Such a sensible attitude on the part of the supreme government was very fortunate at this difficult period. The way in which Bengal at this time viewed their relations with Madras is clearly shown in a letter to Bombay. "It is true," they wrote, "that we have been so unfortunate as to differ on some occasions from the select committee at Fort St. George, ... but in the course of the war, to the wishes of both have been substantially united to bring it to an honourable conclusion and in the negotiations for peace, the views of both are also directed to the Company's interest and honour." (2).

The governor general in far away Lucknow did not share the same attitude with his colleagues. Reports of Tipu's behaviour and the proceedings of the commissioners, sufficiently alarmed him to suggest to the Bengal council the expediency of recalling the Madras commissioners, unless they had already executed the treaty. (3). However the commissioners had entered into an agreement with Tipu on the 11th March 1784, and official intimation of the event had reached Bengal.

In accordance with the tenth article of this agreement, the Madras government signed and sealed a copy of the treaty, and

sent it back to Tipu within a month. The same article provided that the treaty shall be acknowledged by the governments of Bengal and Bombay as binding upon all the governments of India, and shall be sent back to Tipu in three months. The Madras government submitted the treaty to Bengal for their consideration and acknowledgement, and desired them to ask Bombay to affix their seal and signatures to the document. (1) There was no provision anywhere in the treaty as to the contingency of its rejection by the governor general and council. This could be explained by the fact that the supreme government had given their instructions to Madras and authorized its conclusion. But Bengal might feel that their directions had not been acted upon. It is doubtful whether in that case the treaty left them any room for its rejection. Even if it did, the refusal of the supreme council would carry all the evil effects of a divided authority. The Bengal government clearly realised this when they took the treaty into consideration. They had various objections to the treaty, which they regarded as contrary to the letter and spirit of their instructions. The nawab of the Carnatic was not expressly mentioned as an ally. There was no reference in it to the Maratha treaty, which was the basis of their negotiations with Tipu. Again, the clause that the English were not to assist the enemies of Tipu, nor make war upon his allies, was a breach of their instructions of the 14th November 1783. The board, however,

considered that they could not refuse to acknowledge the treaty "because such acknowledgment is stipulated in the 10th Article, "because the whole treaty has been acknowledged and confirmed in "form by the president and select committee of Fort St. George, and "especially because an exercise of a power which this government "possesses of disavowing or revoking any treaty not concluded in "conformity to their instructions would in the present instance be "productive of the greatest confusion and embarrassment to the "Company's affairs." Besides, it was probable that some of the conditions of the treaty were already performed. They therefore considered that there was no other alternative than to acknowledge the treaty, and declared that they reluctantly submitted to the necessity. However, they held the Madras government responsible for the defects and omissions in the treaty and decided to take the subject into further consideration, when they received more particular accounts of the proceedings of the commissioners. They also resolved to take the first opportunity that might come, to arrange with Tipu additional stipulations which should secure the interests of the Company and their allies upon more honourable grounds. (1) They forwarded a copy of this minute for the information of the Madras Council. A copy of the treaty was sent to be signed by the governor general, (2) who, as has been observed, was at the time in Oudh. Apprehending that the treaty would not

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reach Madras in time if they waited for the signature of the governor general who was then away at Lucknow, the Bengal board sent a copy acknowledged by themselves to Madras, promising that a copy signed by the governor general would be sent to them as soon as they received it. (1) At the same time they desired the Bombay government to execute the treaty and forward it to Madras. (2)

Before the opinion of the governor general on the treaty reached Bengal, letters were received from the nawab Wallajah, complaining of the absence of his name in the treaty as an ally of the Company, and urging that it was in the supreme government as "the protectors of the allies of Great Britain," to do justice to him. (3) Wheeler replied that the subject of his complaint had been observed by the board as a serious omission, and that they would take the first favourable opportunity of securing from Tipu an acknowledgment of his highness's rights and sovereignty. At the same time, he requested the nawab to make it a rule to communicate to the Madras government copies of his complaints and representations to the supreme government, so that they might have an opportunity of vindicating themselves. (4)

On the 13th May 1784, the opinion of the governor general on the treaty was read in the Bengal council. He had nothing to say against the terms of the treaty, but he objected to the form and construction of it. He pointed out the various defects of its

1. Bengal to Madras 20 April 1784. Idem pp. 244-5.
construction, and the serious consequences which they might lead to. The chief among them was the practical omission of the name of Wallajah. He formally protested against "these unwarrantable acts" of the Madras government and appealed to the King and Parliament for their redress "as well in vindication of the powers vested by them in this government, as of the faith and "honour of the British nation which have been equally violated." He, however, added,"Although I have objected to the form of the "treaty, yet I should be unwilling to have it understood that I "should either advise, were there time for advice, the disavowal "of it upon that account, or that I should myself, were I at the "council board, refuse my signature to it. The peace is an "object too valuable to be rejected, if it can be retained with "honour." He therefore did not scruple to join in the ratification of the treaty, provided it was accompanied with a clause de- claring the Nawab Wallajah to be a party to it. In case they had not already dispatched the ratified treaty to Madras, he ad- vised the board to affix such a declaratory clause.(1) Hastings then drafted a declaratory clause,(2) and desired the board to send it to Madras with a peremptory order to transmit it to Tipu with another copy of the treaty.

The governor general and council were thrown into a difficult situation on account of the various defects in the treaty. Besides

the exclusion of Wallajah's name, the governor general was much concerned at the absence of a mention of the 9th Article of the Maratha treaty. In order, therefore, to obviate the possible resentment that might be aroused among the Marathas, he wrote to Sindia, acknowledging the peace to have been the effect of the treaty of Salbai. (1) The need of a palliative of this sort, he lamented, "displayed the nakedness of our political system and the imbecility of the first authority by which it is governed; ... it is as manifest as the object of meridional sunshine." Further, "it will be impossible for this government to maintain the faith of the nation, while a dependent member of it shall perseveringly and systematically violate it and violate it with impunity." (2) The omission of Nizam Ali's name was similarly regarded by the Bengal government as leaving them "in a discreditable and embarrassing situation with respect to the Scoubah." (3) Hastings was furious with Macartney. He wrote to Scott, "What a man is this Lord Macartney! The wit of man could not devise such effectual instruments of a nation's ruin, as this black eagle portends to every land and state over which he casts the shadow of his wings.... I yet believe that in spite of peace he will effect

2. Governor general to Bengal 3 May 1784 Idem pp.437-38.
the loss of the Carnatic."(1). However the Bengal government proceeded to rectify what they considered the most serious defect in the treaty. They sent a new copy of the treaty ratified by themselves, with a declaration annexed under the same seal and signature that they understood the Nawab Wallajah to be virtually included in the treaty, and that his name was implied wherever the term Carnatic Payenghat was used. They directed the Madras government to use their "most strenuous endeavours to obtain a formal acknowledgment from Tipu of the understanding which we have given to it," and said, "Should you...either counteract, resist or disobey the orders which we have given you, you will do so at your peril, and be responsible to the nation, to the Company and this government." They enclosed a letter from Wheeler to Tipu, but left it at the option of the Madras government to forward it to the sultan or not. In concluding they said, "In whatever light your lordship etc. may be disposed to receive and consider this letter with the especial requisition contained in it, we are pleased in being conscious that nothing but the honour of the nation..."and the obligation of our public duty have actuated us in delivering our sentiments with so much freedom and our orders with so positive an injunction of your obedience of them."(2)(8 June 1784.

A few days after the dispatch of this letter, the Bengal government received one of great length from Madras, criticising their remarks against the treaty, contained in the minute which they had forwarded to them. The Madras government said that if Bengal had determined to reject the treaty, the necessity of preventing the operation of its clauses, and of taking different measures, might have justified an early condemnation of it. Since, however, they had solemnly acknowledged the treaty, the sentence they had passed against it was unnecessary at that moment. It would have been more considerate towards them if the supreme government had waited till they received complete and authentic documents, which would have enabled them to pronounce their judgment without danger of being unjust. (1) Their instructions to the commissioners were completely in conformity with those sent from Bengal, as in obedience to the Act of Parliament they had furnished the commissioners with a copy of them for their information and guidance. (2) The entire evacuation of the Carnatic and the release of the prisoners, were all that Bengal had desired from Tipu. The letter and spirit of their instructions extended no further. Bengal had expressly declared that they knew of no other point which was necessary for the definitive treaty except the extinction of Tipu's ancient claims. "The treaty having provided for both those objects, its conditions and arrangements


"must therefore be allowed to have been regulated both according
to the letter and spirit of your instructions. ... The imputa-
tion of radical omissions and defects may with propriety be
transferred from their negotiations to your instructions."(1) Indeed they had not specified the allies. But the general expression 'allies' comprehended all their allies. Besides, "...you did not direct any specification of them, yet not to
specify you call a positive deviation as if to comprehend was
"to exclude."(2) As regards the omission of the nawab of
Arcot's name, they said that in the treaty of 1769 the nawab was
not a party, neither was he a party to the treaty of Salbai,
though the Carnatic was one of the objects of the treaty.(3). In the instructions of the 14th November 1783, "you gave no
"command, instruction, permission or advice to make the nawab
"a party to the treaty. You observe that he will of course
"sign to the treaty if he be included in it and approves it, you
"do not even desire or recommend him to be included in it...But
"the nabob is substantially and effectually included in the
"treaty..."(4) They asserted that the commissioners did make
the 9th article of the treaty of Salbai the basis of their ne-
gotiations, because their very first memorial to Tipu declared
among other matters that the English and the Marathas expected

2. Idem p.945.
in the first instance that the 9th Article of the treaty of Salbei should be fulfilled without any further delay. The Maratha agent at Tipu's court had therefore the satisfaction of knowing that his constituents were a material part in the negotiations.(1) The Bengal government had remarked, that if Tipu had been called upon categorically in August last to declare for peace or the continuation of the war, and had the immediate restoration of the prisoners been insisted on as a security for his pacific intentions an honourable and advantageous peace might have been secured. Madras asserted that the fault lay with the supreme government because "...your presidency alone could call or allow others to call upon Tipoo categorically to declare for peace or war. This presidency ever since June 1782 solicited "your superintending board for an authority which would enable "them to make that call....But you reserved your authority and "lost the opportunity. This presidency was barred from any "negociation of peace or war yet the moment the first tho"
"private advices of the preliminaries of peace in Europe arrived "here, we took measures for and had the good fortune to effect "a cessation of hostilities with the French....We demanded the "prisoners from Tipoo even before the month you mention of August "last; but by the fatal reserve of your authority we were con- "fined to the simple declaration to Tipoo of ceasing from hos- "tilities whenever he should cease from hostilities on his part

1. Idem pp. 940-3.
"and evacuate the Carnatic and restore the prisoners... not only
"the month of August, but those of September, October and
"November had elapsed before we got powers or instructions from
"you to make peace... you did not consent to a separate and
"specific treaty with Tipoo notwithstanding our repeated re-
"monstrances on the subject, till the truth and justness of those
"remonstrances came to you with irresistible conviction..."(1)
In reply to apprehensions expressed by the supreme government
that the negotiations had not been conducted with dignity, the
Madras government said "To preserve the honour of the Company in
"these negotiations they had to struggle against precedents drawn
"from negotiations carried on under the direction of your board."
When the commissioners refused to deliver Hyat Beg, governor of
Bednore, Tipu's ministers gave the instance of Raghoba who they
asserted was virtually delivered to his enemies by the obligation
to which the Company was subjected by the Maratha treaty. "But
"our commissioners did not suffer it to operate upon them, nor
"is it mentioned now but in testimony of their disposition to re-
"sist any attempt to reflect dishonour or indignity on the
"Company."(2) The Madras government also denied that the com-
missioners were in any way insulted or intimidated.(3).

1. Idem pp. 953-6.
2. Idem pp. 959-60.
The new copy of the treaty with the declaratory clause annexed, had been sent to Madras early in June. Towards the end of July, no reply from Madras arriving, anxiety was felt in Bengal for the fate of their orders. (1) Accordingly, a person was appointed to proceed to Madras with triplicates of the Bengal orders of the 8th June. The Madras government was only informed that James Lucy Dighton was being sent with those documents to deliver them as the supreme government was apprehensive that the first copies had miscarried. (2) More than the mere delivery of letters and other documents was certainly intended by Dighton’s appointment. Wheler, on whose proposal/agent was appointed, suggested that in case the treaty with the declaratory clause had not been forwarded to Tipu, he was to inform the supreme government of it, and wait for further instructions. He also proposed that the agent should be instructed to interfere in the disputes between the nawab of Arcot and Lord Macartney, in the name of the supreme government, in order if possible to bring them to a termination. (3) In the instructions that were given to him, he was ordered to transmit to the governor general and council the fullest information relative to the proceedings of Tipu, and the execution of such stipulations in the late treaty as he was bound to fulfil. (4)

The long expected reply from Madras was received by the Bengal government about the middle of August. On the 2nd September the Bengal council resolved that their letter of the 8th June having been received at Madras, "it becomes unnecessary to continue that gentleman in the charge committed to him." It is difficult to say whether the mere fact of the receipt of the letter at Madras or the firm determination of that government not to execute the Bengal orders made the continuance of Dighton in that appointment unnecessary.

Indeed matters had now reached the climax. The Madras government feared that the communication of the declaratory clause would arouse in Tipu strong doubts of the intention of the English to maintain the peace, and would give him a pretext for the renewal of hostilities. As such they considered it extremely impolitic to act in conformity to the orders of the supreme government. On the other hand if they refused they made themselves liable to all the consequences of disobedience.

Macartney in a minute pointing out the impropriety of the Bengal orders (2) denied that a refusal to carry out the orders of the Bengal government would in this case constitute any legal offence. He declared that "there is no proposal or intention here to "negotiate or to treat; there is assuredly none to commence hostilities." He declared that an order of the supreme

council was not binding, unless it was sought for by the other presidencies. "The obligation of obedience to orders from Bengal," he said, "implies a previous application thereupon the subject. Their orders were given on the 14th of November last in reply to the applications which had previously been made from hence. No subsequent applications have been made, and no subsequent orders are therefore authorized." However, Macartney prepared himself to meet the wrath of the governor general and council. He declared his willingness to take upon himself the whole responsibility of refusing to carry out the measures proposed by the Bengal government, and to expose himself to suspension, rather than "execute measures which at this minute in his judgement threaten the welfare and safety of the public. Of if the government of Bengal shall choose to persist in their present orders.... he will spare them the formality of suspension and retire from his present station on the first notice." Macartney then moved that a letter be written to the governor general and council, requesting them to reconsider their order upon the ground of his minute. (1) The motion was carried only by the presidents casting vote. (2) With the exception of Macartney, none of the members of the select committee had any doubt as to the legality of the orders from Bengal. Maunsell, the only member who supported the president's motion, declared that he acknowledged the authority of Bengal to issue directions to the Madras government in cases of that nature. (3)

1. Idem pp. 2793-5.


Davidson, who was against the motion, said that the authority and commands of the "supreme council in what respects peace and war and treaties with the princes of India are established by act of parliament, and ought therefore to be obeyed with promptitude and punctuality," and that "a reference to Bengal to reconsider their instructions to us is a disobedience of orders." His opinion was that the orders from Bengal should be obeyed, but that the Madras government might protest against the supreme council for directing measures in opposition to the principles of policy adopted by them. The responsibility thereby would be shifted to the governor general and council. (1)

However, when the majority of the select committee decided to refer the matter to Bengal for reconsideration, Davidson, feeling that the suspension of the president at that critical time would ruin the Company's affairs in that part of India, desired the select committee to enter a protest against the supreme council, in case they proceeded to suspend Macartney. (2) The select committee accordingly recorded, that from the tone of the declaration of Bengal, that in case Madras resisted or deferred the execution of their orders, they would do so at their peril, combined with "the hostile disposition which, to the great detriment of the Company's affairs, the governor general and council have manifested towards this government almost from the commencement of Lord Macartney's administration, in a variety of important instances too notorious to require being stated here" it

appeared to them that the supreme government had determined to remove Lord Macartney from his station. The suspension of Macartney at that juncture, would lead to dangerous consequences. "The committee therefore as the only expedient left them, to evince their regard to the interests of their employers and to the public welfare, do upon the presumption,...hereby on behalf of the Honourable East India Company solemnly protest against such act, and declare the governor general and council solely responsible for all the consequences that may arise therefrom to the British interests in India.(1)"

The Madras government forwarded copies of these proceedings to Bengal with the remark that circumstances more favourable than the present might hereafter render the orders from Bengal less dangerous. They informed the supreme government that they had detained the letter from Wheeler to Tipu as it had been left to their choice to do as they liked with it.(2). Macartney addressed a letter separately to the governor general and council declaring that the principal responsibility for this disobedience rested upon him, and that he was not unwilling to bear it.(3).

The Bengal government refused to share in the apprehensions felt at Madras as to the consequences of communicating the declaratory clause to Tipu. At the same time they did not wish to carry

the matter further. They wrote to Madras, "some special orders "must arrive speedily from Europe to relieve us of a most un-
"pleasant part of our duty, or to mark with more precision the "line of your necessary obedience. To compel that obedience by "the severest exercise of our constitutional authority would be "a most unpleasant task, especially while you are pleased to "represent upon one side that we are influenced by personal dis-
"like, and on the other declare that the loss of the Carnatic "would be the consequence of enforcing our directions. It is in "this manner, my lord and gentlemen, while we are officially "charged with the highest responsibility of general control, "that you have established an independance of that control..."

They ended the dispute by repeating that the Madras government had disobeyed the orders at their peril, and that they were re-
spnsible for their acts to the Company and the nation.(1)

The Court of Directors thanked Lord Macartney for his part in securing the peace.(2) The terms which were obtained by the treaty of Mangalore were the best that could be secured under the circumstances. However if it had not been for the mis-
chievous nature of the Regulating Act, the entire business might have been conducted with more dignity, less delay, and without so much fruitless quarrel between the two presidencies.

The story of the negotiations preliminary to the treaty of Mangalore brings into clear relief, the utter helplessness of the superintending presidency. The Regulating Act gave such a wide latitude to the subordinate government, that the governor general and council were unable to prevent them from negotiating. The plea of necessity, and orders from the Directors, enabled the Madras government to commence negotiations, without the consent of the supreme council. When the treaty came up for their ratification, the Bengal government found themselves obliged to acknowledge it, in spite of their objections. If they had added to the treaty the clause relating to the nawab of Arcot, at the time of their ratification, they would have been within their legal rights, and might have carried their point. The failure of the attempt to graft it on to the treaty at a later period demonstrated the limitation of their power.
CONCLUSION.

The story of the relations of the governor general and council with the Madras government from 1774 to 1784 makes it clear that it was impossible for the system established by the Regulating Act to work without causing friction. As such the principal object of the Regulating Act, namely to enable the before their enemies presidencies to present a united front/could not be attained.

The reason why the Regulating Act could not work was that the governor general and council were given responsibilities without corresponding powers. This gave them a constant inducement to intervene without legal authority. There was a corresponding tendency on the part of the subordinate government to resist every interposition as an infringement of their legal rights. A half-way house was created where, obviously, things could not rest. If the Act had not placed the relations on a logical footing, the force of circumstances attempted to do so. But a 'de facto' position, until it becomes 'de jure', is never secure. Hence the reverses which the supreme government experienced in 1783 and 1784.

The first half of the period during which the Act was in operation passed practically without friction. But that was not from any merit of the Act, which had already set the Bengal and Bombay governments in conflict. The reason was, that there was no important question at issue. Hastings was clearly aware of the limitations of the position of the supreme council. He
wrote, "This Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. "It carefully guards against every expression which can imply "a power to dictate what the other presidencies shall do...."(1). In 1775, when the Madras government and the nawab of Arcot re-
ferred their disputes to Bengal, the supreme government declared that they had no authority to exercise control in such matters.
They altered their tone the very moment that intervention appear-
ed to them a duty. When in 1776 Wallajah complained against the Madras government, the supreme council at once intervened. The Directo-
s orders did not justify their interference. Their argument that acts which cast indignity on the nawab were acts of hostility likely to provoke his enmity, and therefore a breach of the Regulating Act were far fetched, and inapplicable to the relations in which the nawab stood with the Madras government.
But Hastings, always a friend of the nawab, perhaps suspected foul play on the part of the Madras government, and felt it a moral duty to intervene. But for the dissensions in the Madras government, the question of the legality of the intervention of Bengal in the relations of the subordinate government with the nawab would have been thrashed out.

It was not before 1779 that affairs in the south of India became important. Both Haidar and the nizam were restless. The

The Madras government chose this wrong moment for commencing a negotiation with the Nizam for the remission of the tribute, without the authority wither of the Directors or the Bengal government. The intervention of the governor general and council perhaps prevented the active enmity of the Nizam. The views which on that occasion Rumbold expressed of the position of the presidencies under the Regulating Act were not incorrect. But the arguments which he employed to justify his action were unsubstantial. He declared that he had neither commenced hostilities, nor concluded a treaty. But the tribute negotiations coming soon after the transactions with Basalat Jang, were sure to be construed by the Nizam as a breach of the treaties of 1766 and 1768, and thus provoke his hostility. The argument that it was a matter of revenue was equally empty. From the time of the intervention in the tribute negotiations to the suspension of Whitehill the Madras government maintained an attitude of defiance towards Bengal. The Bengal government's appointment of Holland was irregular. But the attitude of Madras towards the matter was narrow.

Rumbold escaped punishment at the hands of the supreme government by a timely retirement. The wrath of the governor general and council fell on Whitehill, the upholder of Rumbold's policy. Whitehill, in opposition to the orders of Bengal, delayed the restoration of Guntur at a time when it had become absolutely necessary to please the Nizam. The supreme government were thoroughly exasperated after nearly a year of mischievous
counteraction by the Madras government. They frankly declared that they made an example of Whitehill in order to "preserve the supremacy of the responsible government and to give credit to its acts." The suspension of Whitehill was the first and last exercise of that power.

It is doubtful whether it would have been equally easy to carry out an order of suspension under different circumstances. Haidar Ali had invaded the Carnatic. The Madras presidency was dependent for its very existence on the supreme government. Coope had come with men and money from Bengal. Madras was therefore not in a position to oppose the Bengal government in any way. The governor general and council carried everything before them. Whitehill was suspended. The Madras government under Charles Smith left to Coope the entire conduct of the war. Hastings got the opportunity, which he had long desired, of entering into a treaty with Wallajah, and marked "in the most emphatic way the subordinate character of the Madras government" by the appointment of a resident at the nawab's durbar to watch over the observance of the agreement. This was the high water mark of the control exercised by Bengal over Madras.¹

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¹ Three months after Sullivan's appointment, James Lucy Dighton was appointed as resident of the Bengal government with the Bombay government" for the purpose of transmitting such information as shall be furnished him by that presidency of the political state and events which have a relation to it." - G.W. Forrest "Selections from letters, despatches and other state papers preserved in the foreign department of the government of India 1772-1785". Vol. iii, p. 777
position of supremacy which the force of circumstances had given to the Bengal government, was sanctioned by the Directors, who declared that Bengal must take the lead in all political and military operations.

But the governor general and council could not long remain in a position which was not based on law and was not clearly defined. Besides, the situation was fundamentally modified by the arrival of Macartney. If a Company’s servant had been chosen, instead of Macartney, the supreme council might have retained their position for a while. The letters of Hastings to Macartney clearly indicate that his distrust of the government of Madras had made him assume powers beyond those prescribed by the Regulating Act, and that he realised that the arrival of Macartney had altered the situation.

Macartney was a person of a type different from Rumbold. He realised how important it was for the smooth and efficient working of the system to cultivate the friendship of the governor general; and though he protested against the Bengal agreement with Wallajah, he set to work along the lines indicated by it. But unfortunately Hastings misinterpreted Macartney’s attitude, and developed a dislike for him which soon ripened into hatred. Coote complicated the situation still more. Macartney did his best to please the General and in obedience to the Bengal recommendations left to him the sole command of the war in the Carnatic. Naturally he wanted to transfer the responsibilities along with the powers. But
Bengal objected to this. From the time of Coote's return to Bengal in October 1782, Hastings' attitude towards Macartney became hostile. In the first few months of 1783 the governor general was eager to exert his authority over the Madras government, and in the event of their disobedience to suspend them. The assignment of the Carnatic was ordered to be restored to the nawab. The Madras government were commanded to leave to Coote the sole conduct of the Carnatic war. The commander in chief was authorised to negotiate with Tipu, while Madras met with repeated refusals to their request for powers to treat. Hastings more than once, proposed the suspension of the Madras government, but the council were not ready to follow him. While Hastings stood helpless, he saw one order after the other ignored by the Madras government, till the imbecility of the central authority appeared to him "as obvious as the object of meridional sunshine."

The Madras government refused to part with their powers in favour of Coote because they were not allowed to transfer the responsibilities along with the powers. The decision to restore the assignment could not be enforced, because it was one sided, and at the moment inexpedient. In the two preceding cases, the governor general and council had stretched their authority too far. But even when they were safely within their legal rights, they found themselves powerless. The exceptions to the restriction imposed upon the subordinate presidency to negotiate were so large that the governor general and council were unable to prevent them from negotiating with Tipu. Again, in spite of their ob-
objections to the treaty of Mangalore, they had no alternative but to ratify it. How little were the actual powers given to the supreme council by the Regulating Act was never so clearly demonstrated during the ten years of its operation as in the story of the treaty of Mangalore. The attempt to graft on to the treaty the clause relating to the nawab of Arcot was doomed to fail. The entire story illustrates the evils of divided authority.

Such restricted powers were incompatible with the responsibilities which the supreme government had to shoulder. The Madras government could not carry on the war without the assistance of Bengal. Hastings wrote, "...our revenues are exhausted to defend the Carnatic; our grain feeds it, our forces have constituted the principal strength of their army, and we gave them the man who has saved it from destruction." (1) This was enough reason for overstepping the boundaries of their legal rights. This gave Bengal the right to direct the military operations, to interfere in the affairs of Madras with the object of securing resources to carry on the war, and to determine when and on what terms the war should be ended. But when they sought to exercise their authority in these matters, they met with opposition. Theirs was an ungrateful task, and Hastings justly lamented that, though his government had worked all through for the salvation of the other presidencies, "all their return has been opposition.

complaint, reproach, insult and invective."(1) Macartney argued that Bengal should not take advantage of the fact that they supplied the other presidencies; for, the Company's money wherever placed should be used wherever needed. The argument ignored the fundamental fact that upon the control of finance depended the exercise of all authority.

On the whole, the Bengal government splendidly responded to the applications for money from Madras. Before, and during the Carnatic war large sums were sent to Madras in treasure. Madras also drew considerable amounts by bills on Bengal. Supplies were also received from Bengal in grain and military stores. From July 1780 to May 1784 the total of supplies received by Madras from Bengal amounted to Rs.2,65,68,980.(2), which on an average per month was nearly six lakhs. If, therefore, the Madras government still remained in want, the supreme government could not be blamed, for they had to fight the enemies of the Company in almost every part of India. It is time that after Coote's death the governor general and council slackened the supply of treasure, but Madras continued to draw large sums by bills. But for the resourcefulness of Hastings in providing them with supplies, the Madras government might not have been able to hold their own.

It was therefore obvious to all observers that the system established by the Regulating Act was unworkable. In 1776, Hastings, having the relations with Bombay in mind wrote:

"Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of the Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass."(1) This remark would equally apply in 1784 to a retrospect of the relations of Bengal and Madras. At least two contemporary tracts draw attention to the mischievous nature of the Act. The author of one of these tracts after reviewing the events in India from 1774 to 1782 arrived at the conclusion that if "a full and unlimited authority in all matters relative to peace or war" had been given to the governor general and council, "we should not afterwards have had to contend with the two most powerful states in India, the Marathas and Haidar Ali, united with the combined strength of France and Holland; nor should we be now suing "for peace at the feet of a vanquished enemy...."(2) A more effective central authority could not, perhaps have prevented the struggle which was inevitable, but it could have made the task of the Company easier, by enabling its component parts to work less in-harmoniously for the well-being of the whole.

The notorious differences between the two presidencies could not be concealed from the Indian princes. The nawab of Arcot, it has

been seen, scarcely missed an opportunity of utilising the differences between the two governments. The Nizam expressed his view of the relations that subsisted between the two presidencies in a letter to the governor general in July 1780. He wrote: "I find that none of the Company's chiefs will obey your orders, and that there is not between you that mutual confidence and dependence which is necessary for the administration of affairs, but on the contrary the government of Madras, Bombay, Surat and all the rest of them act by their own will and opinions, and that you have not power even in the affairs of Mr. Holland, with whom can I negotiate?"(1) This letter alone is a sufficient condemnation of the system established by the Regulating Act.

The best proof that the defects of the Regulating Act were fully realized, lay in the fact that, complete powers, as regards foreign policy, were given to the governor general and council by the India Act of 1784.

The marvel is that, even under this unsatisfactory system, the Company passed unscathed through a most critical period. Without the genius of Hastings, it might have been impossible. Self praise was never so justified, as when Hastings claimed, "that if the British power in India yet holds a reprieve from ruin, it derives its preservation from causes which are independent of its constitution, and that it might have been lost if it left to that alone for its protection."(2).
