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ITALIAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY TOWARDS MOSLEMS IN LIBYA

1911 - 1922

by

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To Joe and Agnes Allen

"Things and actions are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be: why then should we desire to be deceived?"

- Bishop Butler.

"Politics gave life to the colonisation; politics ultimately strangled it."

- Claudio Segre, Fourth Shore, p.182

"Only the thought that emerges from Islam, which is a true expression of Arabism, humanitarianism, socialism and progress, should prevail."

- Muammar Gaddafi, The Third International Theory

"Cling one and all to the faith of Allah and let nothing divide you...."

- The Koran, Sura III ('The Family of Imran'), verse 103

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ABSTRACT

Libya has remained a relatively neglected field for academic historians since the collapse of Italy's African Empire in 1943. This is particularly the case with regard to the effect of colonial rule upon the indigenous population itself. In seeking to examine, through the use of the surviving secondary sources and the available archival material, the effect of colonial policies in education upon the Moslem population, it is hoped that a start has been made in opening up this important area to the mind of the historian.

After a brief background chapter dealing with Italian colonial policy and its chief determinants, there follow two chapters which examine the initial policies of Italian rule in respect of the indigenous institutions and the government's own schools. The main policies of Italian rule, however, are examined in chapters four, five and six, for in the period 1919-1922 Italy was confronted with the need to formulate an educational policy for Libya, which made sense in terms of the overriding concern to avoid a further colonial war in the country. Nationalist determination to avoid conceding Italy's colonial future in Libya for the sake of a temporary truce with the Libyan Independence Movement causes the Colonial Ministry to take a long hard look at the existing policies and their possible political implication for the future. As a result the educational policies that characterise Italian educational activity under fascism emerge.

Chapters seven, eight and nine deal with the government's attempt to implement the educational policies of the Fundamental Law of 1919 in both Tripolitania and Cirenaica. The concluding chapter deals briefly with the main strands of fascist policy, which are telescoped for the remaining years of colonial rule, to provide the necessary educational perspective upon the period as a whole.

ABBREVIATIONS :

- A.C.S.- Archivio Centrale Dello Stato,Roma.
- A.P.C.D.- Atti Parlamentari Camera dei Deputati.
- A.S.M.A.I.- Archivio Storico ex-Ministero dell'Africa Italiana(Ministero degli Affari Esteri),Roma.
- B.M.A.- British Military Administration.
- B.U.C.- Bollettino Ufficiale del Ministero delle Colonie e successivamente Bollettino Ufficiale del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana.
- B.U.Cir.- Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Cirenaica.
- B.U.L.- Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Libia.
- B.Pers.- Bollettino del Personale del Ministero delle Colonie.
- B.U.T.- Bollettino Ufficiale del Governo della Tripolitania.
- BUST.- Busta.
- C.D.I.A.- Ministero degli Affari Esteri,Comitato per la Documentazione delle attività italiane in Africa, L'Italia in Africa.
- C.S.C.- Consiglio Superiore Coloniale.
- Cart.- Cartone
- D.G.- Decreto governatoriale(colonial governor's decree).
- D.Lgt.- Decreto Luogotenentiale(vice-regent's decree).
- D.I.S.A.- Direttorio Scuole Italiane | All'Estero.
- O.L.- Ordinamento legislativo della Libia,Ministero delle Colonie,1914.
- P.C.M.- Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri.
- Stralc.- Stralcio(cuttings).
- R.D.- Regio Decreto(Royal Decree).

NOTE

In transliterating Arabic names and places, I have invariably adopted the form and spelling given in the Italian documents and other sources. This method has also been adopted whenever English or French sources appear within the text. For common geographical expressions, such as "Cirenaica", I have used the Italian rather than the English spelling. Furthermore, all translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

Chapter One Italian Colonial Policy and Libya1. The Central Aims and Strategy:A) Diplomatic Policies

Although Italy had longstanding aspirations in the Red Sea, North Africa, the Middle East and East Africa, little was done by way of realising these hopes in the years immediately following the unification of the country in 1870. As a result of this inactivity, Italy's North African ambitions suffered an irreparable blow in 1880, when France effortlessly occupied Tunis, which possessed a large Italian population. Wounded national pride prevented the Italian government from accepting the French offer of compensation in Tripolitania, and efforts were made instead at developing interests in the Red Sea and East Africa, where by the early nineties Italy had obtained her first colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. This search for national compensation in East Africa, however, proved soon to be delusionary for any hope of expanding into Abyssinia was dashed on the field of Adowa, where on 1 March 1896, the Italians were decisively defeated by the Negus, whose forces had been armed and trained by the French. The consequences of this defeat led Italy to return to the cultivation of her interests in the Mediterranean, so commencing the train of events that would eventually lead to the Libyan War of October 1911.

The importance of securing diplomatic recognition by The Powers of Italy's claim upon Tripoli was brought home to the Italians in 1899 when Britain and France acquired the profitable Libyan hinterland with its direct access to the rich markets and mineral resources of Central Africa, so diverting the trans-Saharan trade from its customary outlets

at Tripoli to the ports of Tunis, Algeria and the British protectorates of Egypt and the Sudan. The potential threat of the 1899 Fashoda Agreements lay in the possibility that they might induce France to occupy Tripolitania and Britain Cirenaica, so eliminating whatever chance was still left for Italy to secure a North-African base for her fleet and the development of her maritime interests in the Mediterranean. The possibility that this threat might suddenly materialise led Giolitti in 1902 to end the Italo-French rift, caused by France's occupation of Tunis in 1880, by signing a treaty with Paris, whereby Italy renounced her Moroccan interests in return for French assurance of "disinterestedness" in Tripolitania. An agreement with Britain in January 1902 also secured the Italian claim in Libya, so enabling Giolitti to commence a policy of "pacific penetration" in Tripolitania and Cirenaica, as an additional means of insuring Italy's pre-emption rights upon the territory. Giolitti believed he had settled Italy's Libyan claim beyond dispute, when on 13 December 1906, he signed with Britain and France a further agreement, confirming Italy's orientation from East Africa in the direction of Libya.

Giolitti's reliance upon British and French recognition of Italy's claim upon Tripoli, as sufficient to secure the immunity of the territory from the political and economic interference of other interested powers, failed between 1906 and 1911 to take sufficient account of other factors in a rapidly changing international situation. Amongst these factors, the Young-Turk Rebellion, which emphasised the growth of nationalism in Turkey, and led to renewed concern in Constantinople to preserve the Empire was an important ele-

ment in explaining Italy's failure to resolve the Tripoli claim by diplomatic means alone. The revival of Ottomanism in Tripoli and Turkey's increasing dependence upon German power, which from 1906 onwards was threatening to completely undermine Italian efforts at pacific penetration in Libya, caused Giolitti to finally declare war upon the Porte in the autumn of 1911, lest the occupation of Tripoli by another power "endanger the monarchy in Italy".

Giolitti's annexation of Tripoli in 1911 failed to resolve the tensions and uncertainties of some forty years standing. The Libyan War also unwittingly embarked Italy on the road of expansionism in Africa. Unless such a movement could be reconciled with moderate statecraft at the level of domestic and foreign policy, the whole centre of Italian politics could be thrown into jeopardy. If the Allies had in 1919 accepted the demands of the moderate imperialist, Sonnino, for the exchange of Tripolitania in return for the former German colonies of the Cameroons, a further colonial war might have been averted in Libya, and national feeling in Italy partly convinced that the "equitable compensations" promised by Article XIII of the Treaty of London had in some measure been realised. Further modest revisions of the boundaries of Eritrea and Somalia might then have followed, and a date fixed for the independence of Libya, following the conceding of protectorate status in June and October of 1919.

Instead Italian colonial aspirations failed to be satisfied in any form and strong nationalist pressure prevented the ceding of Tripolitania to the Arab movement, so leading to the outbreak of hostilities in Libya, even before

the March on Rome had had brought Fascism to power in Italy. The failure of Liberal foreign policy in Africa, thus provided Mussolini with two separate aims and strategies: firstly, the achieving of the policies of the moderate imperialists Sonnino Orlando and Tittoni, which aimed at obtaining for Italy "equitable compensations" in fulfillment of Article XIII of the Treaty of London; and secondly, the expansionist policy sketched out for the future in 1916 by the Ministry of Colonies, Gasparre Colosimo, who had aimed at the creation in Africa of an Italian empire in accordance with the aims of the nationalists (see Maps II, & III). By working between 1922-1935 to achieve the first policy, whereby following Mussolini's agreement with Laval, Italy was to have received 44,000 square miles of Libyan desert, along the South-Eastern border between Tummoo and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, it by no means followed that the Duce had not been preparing for some time to implement the second policy (see, Map II, areas for "eventual control"). The actual date when Mussolini finally decided to actively prepare an expansionist policy in Africa in fulfillment of the dreams of Crispi and the schemes drawn up by Colosimo in 1916, and subsequently rejected by the Allies at Versailles and in the subsequent negotiations with Britain and France, is a matter of debate amongst diplomatic historians, though the 1935 agreement marked the completion of the diplomatic preparations.

B) Internal Policy and Collaboration

The need to obtain collaboration had not presented itself as a problem in the colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, where the populations were mainly nomadic and Italian development plans virtually non-existent, though much solid progress had been achieved through the unpublicised efforts of a tiny band of

administrators and soldiers, who received little support from Rome. In Libya, however, the position was profoundly different for not only was the country geographically proximate to Sicily, but its people were mainly Arab-Berber with their own language, religion and culture. Such people would not easily take to schemes of colonial domination and the most that Italy could reasonably expect was to exercise a limited form of suzerainty.

Indeed the assurances received by Giolitti from the Senusi leaders in Cirenaica (not to intervene in any war between Italy and Turkey) appear to have been based upon the calculation that Italian rule would be little different from Ottoman rule, and by confining itself to the coastal areas would have little impact upon Senusi hegemony in the hinterland. The attitude of the Tripolitanian tribes is difficult to discern, though the activity of the agents of the Banco Di Roma in Tripoli and the coastal towns ensured the support of pro-Italian factions in the event of a military takeover.

The nature of this uncertain and tepid support was ill-conceived by the invading troops and their commander in chief, General Carlo Caneva, who had been led to believe by the Italian Foreign Ministry, that they were about to be received by the Libyan population, as "liberators" from the oppression of Turkish rule. The disinclination of the mass of the population and their leaders to welcome the arrival of Italian forces in Libya considerably confused the high command and an elaborate propaganda exercise was at once mounted with a view to showing the justice of the Italian cause and Italy's friendship

for the Arabs and their religion. The chance of capitalising upon much latent feeling against the Turks disappeared almost overnight when, following an incursion behind the Italian lines of Suleim Baruni's irregulars, Caneva ordered savage reprisals against the population of Tripoli, who he mistakenly believed were on the point of staging an insurrection against him. This hasty over-reaction, subsequently known as the "Tripoli Massacres" of 23-28 October 1911, ended for the immediate future, at least, any hope that Italian rule might consolidate itself in Tripolitania with the support of the mass of the Libyan population. The subsequent entry of the Senusi into the war on the Turkish side and the allying of the Tripolitanian tribes with the Turks had, before the year was over, transformed what Giolitti believed would be a short campaign for limited strategic goals, into an armed confrontation of nationalist and religious dimensions between Italy, Turkey and the Libyan people.

Efforts to secure collaboration following the Treaty of Ouchy of 16 October 1912, which officially ended the state of war between Italy and Turkey, had little real effect upon the military situation in Libya, where the Libyans continued the war for nationalist and religious purposes. The virtual withdrawal of Italian troops from Libya between 1915 and 1919, during which the Italian presence was confined to the garrisoning of Tripoli, Homs and Zuara in the West and Bengasi, Merg, Derna, Cirene and Tobruk in the East, failed to relieve Italy of the need to find an internal solution to the problem of governing Libya. Italian military weakness during these years sub-

sequently became a bone of contention between Italy and the Allies, for the return of the interior to Turko-Libyan control necessitated the maintenance by Britain and France of considerable forces along the borders with Tunisia and Egypt. The extent of the Italian withdrawal placed in doubt Italy's case for further colonial acquisitions in Africa.

It was with the aim of reducing the total theatre of military operations in Libya by cutting off the Arabo-Turkish forces in Tripolitania from Senusi support in Cirenaica, that led Italy and her allies to begin negotiations with Sayyid Idris El-Senusi, the head of the Senusi Order, which resulted in the Modus Vivendi of Acroma of 17 March 1917. This agreement ensured peace in Cirenaica and enabled the Italian government to commence the process of establishing civil government in the area. Relations between the Senusi and the Italian government were sufficiently cordial by 1919 for Italy to be able to concede virtual autonomy to Cirenaica in October of that year.

The Accord of Acroma, however, had no relevance to the affairs of Tripolitania, where from 1915 until the appointment of Volpi as governor in 1922, the Italian administration had virtually no power or control beyond Tripoli and the fortified outposts along the coast. The military vacuum had meanwhile enabled the movement for national independence to get underway with the establishment at Misurata of a National Assembly and the adoption of a republican form of government. A settlement with the Italians was, however, urgently needed following the drafting to Tripolitania

in 1919 of 80,000 seasoned troops released from the war in Europe. The fact that neither side wanted a further armed confrontation at this point enabled compromise to briefly prevail; and in return for Arab recognition of Italian suzerainty local autonomy in the form of a protectorate was conceded by Italy.

Known as the Statutes of Libya, the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania was as unpopular with Italian nationalists as with Libyan nationalists. Both believed it to represent some form of betrayal and both were equally resolved to undermine it by whatever means should come to hand. The refusal of the Arab nationalists to agree to the closure of the National Assembly, set up in the wake of Turkey's final evacuation of the country in 1918, and make way for the promised parliament, in effect doomed the Statutes of Libya in Tripolitania, though it is extremely doubtful whether such legislation would have lasted for very long under Fascist rule. Instead, fresh demands for independence from Italian rule were formulated, which would have made Idris El-Senusi Emir of the two provinces. The refusal of the nationalist governor Volpi to negotiate upon such a basis issued in the second Italo-Senusi War, lasting without intermission by either side, until 1932 when the Italians finally overcame the last vestiges of armed opposition.

The outbreak of war automatically ended the accords with the Senusi-declared null and void by the governor of Cirenaica in 1923. The Statutes of Libya (never implemented in Tripolitania) were not finally "abrogated", however, until 1928 when they were replaced by the first of a series of "organic laws", which became the hallmark of all subsequent fascist legislation in Libya. Collaboration

under Fascism took place within terms of the system itself rather than in relation to the system of colonial rule, as envisaged by the grant of protectorate status in 1919. This system was broadly similar to the pattern of direct rule established in 1911; the differences are to be outlined and explained in terms of Fascism itself; and in the greater efficiency of the military and bureaucratic machine after 1922. Essentially, however, the system after 1922 was the one inherited from the early years of direct rule in Libya. Ultimate authority was vested in the governor who was responsible to the authorities in Rome or directly to the Duce himself in the case of important fascist personages like Pietro Badoglio or Italo Balbo. Control of the Libyan population, however, was vested in the military and the various sections of the bureaucracy, who after 1928 allocated positions to those Libyans who were prepared to collaborate with the regime and perhaps join the fascist party. This process was greatly accelerated by Italo Balbo (1934-1940), who sought to counteract the political effects of demographic colonisation on the Arab population by adopting a policy of "parallel development". Evidence shows, however, that despite such efforts nationalism was on the increase amongst the Libyan population; and there is little reason to suppose that collaboration under Fascism was any more successful amongst the mass of the Arab population than it had been under Liberalism. Rather adherence to traditional religious and cultural ideas and practices characterised the mood of the people after 1922 as before.

11. General Determinants: A) Economic (Capital and Commercial)

Italian economic interests in the Levant, North Africa, the Red Sea and East Africa were already well established by 1870 and led many to believe that the Maritime Republic was about to be revived. This concept was based upon the belief that if Italy exploited her advantageous and dominant position in the Mediterranean, she might, as in the days of Ancient Rome, become the leading economic power in the region. Colonisation, it was argued, had already become an economic reality in the form of the considerable diaspora of Italian families who had industriously settled along the coasts of North Africa or in the Middle East. Not all Italians expressing an interest in such questions agreed with the all-embracing sufficiency of "voluntary colonisation". The latter argued instead that only actual colonisation would in the future guarantee Italy cheap raw materials and markets for Italian produce. Allied to such concerns was the ever present reality of overpopulated cities and a land overburdened by its peasantry. Demographic colonisation even before the turn of the century was at least never beyond the pale of political debate, however unrealistic in practical terms.

Imperialism in the opening years of the twentieth century ceased to have the influence it had exerted in the hungry 1880's and Italian industry and commerce preferred for the most part to do without it. Instead the new policy of pacific penetration, introduced by the pragmatic Giolitti, enabled Italian finance to explore the opport-

unities for profitable investment in the territories of the Porte. It was in the rich trading regions of the Middle East, North Africa and Egypt as well as in Turkey herself that the Italian merchants and industrialists most sought to develop pacific penetration. These areas and the trade with France, following the abandonment of protectionism, which had characterised the 1880's, proved far more attractive than the struggle to build an empire in Eritrea and Somalia, or to develop trade in Libya in pursuance of the government's claim upon the territory.

The disinclination of Italian capital to invest in Libya was a cause of serious concern to Giolitti who realised that only if Italian interests in the country were strongly developed would it prove possible to prevent foreign interests from establishing a foothold there. In April 1905, the granting by the Turks of an important concession to a French company for the construction of a new harbour-complex in Tripoli, led Tittoni, against a mounting backlash of nationalist opinion, to organise an extensive programme of public investment in Libya. The Banco Di Roma was the agency chosen by the government for this operation. By 1911 the bank had invested five million dollars in Libya in the form of industrial holdings, mining concessions and shipping installations.

The Libyan War of 1911 hardly affected the attitude of Italian capital towards the question of further investment in Libya, despite the development of a heated debate upon the economic potential of the new colony by the national press. The war, however, saw the emergence of the imperialists as a political force in their own right and

the Italian press began increasingly to make use of their arguments in favour of colonialism in an attempt to popularise the war with the nation as a whole. Libya thus became depicted as a "terra promessa" or land of economic and agricultural opportunity for Italians. Recognised economists, however, set little store by such propaganda, pointing instead to the obvious drawbacks of the new colony—the lack of ports, roads, modern buildings and other such basic amenities, without which extensive investment could easily be thrown down the drain. Underlying observations of the latter variety were other disincentives, for example, the continuing military and political stalemate, and the failure of successive governments to indicate the extent to which Italy would be committed to the new colony in the future. So the situation continued until after 1928, by which time Fascism had consolidated itself in Italy and in the colonies. Even at this point, it was government-capital rather than business-capital that began the process of developing Libya in terms of the regime's notions of autarchy, which by 1939 had still failed to provide the country with an economy sufficiently resilient to stand up on its own feet.

B) Social

The idea that Italy's burgeoning population problem might be resolved through the possession of a colonial empire—so diverting the stream of emigrants from Europe, the overseas possessions of other powers, and the New World—easily took root in the uncertain years following Unification, when the economic and agricultural problems of the young state were most acute. Demographic colonisation, as a solut-

ion ,was advocated by a small minority calling themselves "Africanisti".It was not a view that appealed to the governing classes to whom the whole notion of "expansionism" seemed both dangerous and implausible.

Demographic colonisation failed to become more reasonable as Italy emerged into the 1880's, though the mammoth increase in the emigration statistics (between 1890 and 1905 an estimated 8.5 million Italians left the country) and the worsening social, industrial and agricultural climate, led some politicians to take up the idea, which was not without its political merits. Thus Crispi, while having the courage to undertake expansion for strategic reasons in the 1890's, also accepted demographic colonisation as a possible solution to Italy's population at the same time. A pilot scheme with such possible aims in mind was briefly launched by him in Eritrea, where a few hundred Italian families were settled in the highlands, which were deemed suitable for farming by European methods.

Crispi's fall and the upturn in Italy's economic fortunes during the halcyon Giolitti-Era rendered further debate upon such schemes purely academic. It was not until 1911 that demographic colonisation was revived by the press in an attempt to popularise the Libyan War. Essentially, however, the idea was as impractical as ever, and the government never seriously for a moment believed it could go ahead in the unsettled political and military climate of Libya, with the mass settlement of Italian peasants upon Libyan soil. This cautious approach was confirmed by three important technical commissions between 1912 and 1913 which reported upon the agricultural possibilities of Tripolitania. Agricultural possibilities were not denied but more research

and experimentation was required before a definite programme could be evolved for the region. Bertolini, himself, drew attention to the fact that the collaboration of the Arab population would be a most important aspect in the success or failure of any plans to develop the agricultural potential of the colony. By 1922, little had been accomplished, other than the implementation of the Bertolini proposals in the area immediately adjacent to Tripoli, where an experimental farm had been established. Indeed by the end of the Liberal Era, the number of Italian colonists employed in the agricultural sector numbered no more than 429 or less than 1 per cent of the Italian families in Tripolitania. It required a major reorientation towards empire-building by Mussolini, a development which did not occur until after 1930, before the state was prepared to take over, where the private sector of the economy had so blatantly failed, by seriously investing in the demographic colonisation of Libya.

C) Political and Ideological

The first attempts at developing a political and ideological premise for expansionism in Africa took place in the early years of the Italian state against a background of confidence and optimism mixed with uncertainty and gloom as the problems of the new state assumed a concrete form. Initially, post-Risorgimento yearning after the vanished glories of Ancient Rome—whether Republic or Empire—combined with Mazzinian idealism to provide Italy with the notion of a "civilising mission" she could communicate to the world beyond her shores.

Less idealistic was the search by the Africanisti for an intellectual panacea which would make sense of imperialism in terms of Italy's own particular problems and there-

fore popularise expansionism amongst the urban masses. Foremost amongst such Africanisti was Enrico Corradini, who in the shadow of Adowa and the eclipse of post-Risorgimento idealism created by the pragmatism of the Giolitti Era, took it upon himself to fashion a new theory of imperialism. Expressed as "The Proletarian Nation" this doctrine became increasingly fashionable after 1918 and was made particular use of by Mussolini in attempting to popularise imperialism with the Italian people.

During the early years of the new century, the colonial party was able to capitalise upon much right-wing reaction to the progressivism of the Giolitti Age. Landowners and prominent members of the business community were attracted to its ranks as trade union activity increased and the price of labour was blamed upon the government's refusal to adopt a colonial solution to Italy's emigration problems. The colonial movement was also able to attract the support of leading figures, such as the philanthropist, Franchetti, and men of the calibre of Sonnino or the social and political standing of the Marquis Di San Giuliano. The establishment of a Colonial Institute in Rome in 1904 under the patronage of San Giuliano was an important step in the direction of making colonialism a respectable political movement.

Though anti-Giolittian in tendency, the nascent colonial movement remained largely intellectual, and hardly raised its voice in protest at the threat to Italian interests in Libya in 1905. Corradini's view was that the time was not ripe for Italian intervention in Libya. The rumour put out by the Banco Di Roma in 1910 that it was about to sell its interests in Libya produced a different reaction from

the Nationalists, and a wave of indignation was organised throughout Italy. Giolitti's inactivity, Corradini declared, was a threat to Italy's interests both now and in the future. Occurring in the same year, the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis fuelled the nationalist case, and led to the holding of their first congress with the Libyan Question in mind. Corradini's founding of L'Ida Nazionale in March 1911 brought about the launching of a crusade designed to pressurise the government into declaring war on Turkey over Tripoli.

The Libyan War has been seen by recent students of the period(*) as an important turning point in the history of modern Italy. Both the Nationalist Association, the career of Giolitti and the future of Italy as a democratic state are seen to have been profoundly affected by the war and its aftermath. If this is so, it certainly was not seen to be the case at the time and the view that Giolitti was doing no more than foreclose on an old mortgage is as plausible. It is, however, beyond doubt that the war enabled the nationalists to get imperialism accepted by the government and the press as a respectable policy. More open to speculation is the effect of the war upon Italian politics. The Nationalist Association may have emerged from it with a stronger identity and more power and influence than before. It is doubtful, however, if Italian politics were profoundly effected by the Libyan War, though they might well have been badly scathed. Far more dramatic and lasting was the impact of the European War upon the Italian centre parties; but is arguable in the extreme whether the gains to the Nationalists resulting from the Libyan War are sufficient to explain their success after

*) See, R.S. Consolo, "Italian Nationalism and the Revolt against Giolitti", Journal of Modern History, 6, 1965, pp. 186-207, p. 186.

1918 in managing to wean the conservative element in Italian politics from its traditional support of the centre parties, and moderate policies. More important by far was the effect of the European War upon the parties of the left and the success of Mussolini's Revolutionary Socialist Party in exploiting the discontent of the post-war years at the expense of the Socialist parties.

Perhaps, during the 1914 -1918 War the Nationalist Association was able to repeat the role it had played throughout the related phases of the Libyan conflict, such as calling for the redress of the limitations of the Treaty of Lausanne (sometimes known as the Treaty of Ouchy) with a Treaty of Versailles, which would ensure an adequate revision of the frontiers of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia. It cannot, however, be seriously maintained that this particular element in their platform was responsible for any largescale defection from the Liberal ranks. The reasons for the crumbling of Italian politics in these years are much more diverse than can be explained by any single hypothesis. Imperialism was certainly in the wind and Mussolini's conversion to it, despite his earlier attack upon Socialists who supported the Libyan War, is indicative of the mood of Italian politics and the Italian people at this time. Even so, it was not until April 1921 at Bologna that the Duce formally accepted Imperialism as a constitutive element of Fascism. The merging of his own party with the Nationalist Association on 26 February 1924 may have been an act of opportunism by Mussolini. Historically, however, it provided Fascism with something, hitherto, it had always lacked in the form of an ideology of expansionism in Africa which, in the years ahead, it would make more than adequate use of.

Chapter Two Direct Rule and the Government Schools 1911-19

1. Introduction

"Italy was forced in 1911 to critically examine the whole notion of the religious community in Libya in the light of the special needs of Italian Sovereignty. Under Ottoman rule, separate oases of special sovereignty had been permitted to function alongside the administrative organs of the state. Italy, however, felt obliged to combine the whole community into a single entity, regardless of factors such as race, religion or culture". (*)

As a centralised western-democracy, Liberal Italy found it next to impossible to graft her own governmental and administrative system, which had been developed in accordance with Italian needs and history, upon the system inherited in Libya from the Turks(1). At the same time, the Italians were wise enough to recognise that, regardless of its many defects, the Ottoman system had worked relatively well in Libya. Institutions such as that personified by the Mukhtar were a vital element in administering the country and could not easily be dispensed with(2). Even so, the traditional system with its easy tolerance of different and separate communities, each based its own laws, rights, customs, languages, religions and administration was completely foreign to western and Italian conceptions of the state and its proper functioning. Such a system was also judged to be inconsistent with Italian claims to complete sovereignty in Libya for it also prov-

*) Caruso-Ingillieri, D., I Primi Ordinamenti Civili Della Libia (Roma, 1914), p. 263

1) Ibid.

3) Queirolo, E., Il Mukhtar Nella Legislazione Ottomana (Tripoli, 1918), p. 52

ided the Sultan with ample scope to challenge the authority of the Italian government in fulfillment of his responsibility as protector of the rights and special autonomy of his former Moslem subjects, a position which had been guaranteed by the provisions of the Treaty of Ouchy, which had concluded the Italo-Turkish War. The Sultan's special position in Libya following the Treaty of Ouchy was a cause of irritation and embarrassment to the Italians and every attempt was made to circumvent his authority by pressing ahead with reforms designed to consolidate Italian control over the Moslem majority. Official propaganda justified the importation of Italian laws, bureaucracy, administration and customs in terms of the need bring "civilisation and progress" to Libya and create under the Italian flag a single and undivided people. The Ottoman system, it was argued, was not only inefficient and corrupt, but also unfair in that it favoured the Moslem majority against Christian and Jewish minorities. Under Italian rule all were promised equal treatment by the state, regardless of race, religion or culture(4).

In furtherance of these aims no effort was spared between October 1911 and the promulgation of Bertolini's decree of 9 January 1913(N.39), outlining the future administrative policy for Libya, to model the administration and organisation of the country upon that of an Italian province(5). Tripoli and Bengasi in particular were transformed into Italian communes and rapidly began to take

4) Caruso-Ingilleri, p.263.

5) Guidice, L., L'Amministrazione Municipale di Tripoli Nel Suo Ordinamento Nei Suo Servizi Biennio 1916-18: Relazione Del Primo Commissario Municipale (Tripoli, 1918), p.10.

on the characteristic appearance of Italian towns. In achieving this result, the military and civilian bureaucracy brought over from Italy to replace Turkish officials, who had been expelled from the country during November 1911, worked hand in hand. Supreme power had initially been bestowed upon the commander in chief, Carlo Caneva, who between 11 October and 30 November 1911(6), established a centralised system of bureaucracy, and delegated control and responsibility for its operation to General Tomaso Salza(7). Salza's extensive powers as "Commandant of the Piazza" included responsibility in the "pacified zones" for law and order, military security as well as for the maintenance and development of social and political services(8). For the purpose of carrying out such functions as efficiently as possible in the circumstances of the time, Salza's office was divided into three sections: a department of military affairs, a department of civil affairs and a general secretariat for handling correspondence and compiling reports for the authorities in Rome(9).

This system, while producing a good many concrete achievements in a remarkably short space of time (hospitalisation, modern buildings, street-lighting, disposal of sewage, new roads and port facilities and cleansing Tripoli in particular from repeated epidemics of Cholera, are

6) Caruso-Ingillieri, p.13

7) Ibid., p.36

8) Ibid.

9) Responsibility for the management of education was entrusted to the directorate of civil affairs under Dr. Caruso-Ingillieri. In practice, however, charge of the schools was absorbed into the general running of the directorate, which caused much confusion. Ibid., p.36.

to be included amongst its more notable achievements) had the effect of building up a pattern of government that depended far too heavily upon Italian officials and military personnel for its day-to-day running. Arabs had little place or say in the administration of the country and in consequence were rapidly alienated from colonial rule. Bertolini's attempts, following the establishment of a Ministry of Colonies in December 1912, to effect the transition from military to civilian government failed to take account of the need to bring the Arab population into a closer working alliance with the authorities. The attempt to establish Consultative Committees (with a view to furthering collaboration between Arabs and Italians) was also not destined to succeed, because of the interference and opposition of officials, concerned to retain all the essential elements of authority under their own control. Such a system of colonial rule came under increasing criticism by leading authorities of Arab and Islamic culture and civilisation(10), as well as from other candid observers, who recognised that the adoption of simpler systems in the British and Dutch colonies, provided greater scope and flexibility for local participation(11). Between 1911 and 1919, however, the desire to emulate the success of the French in North Africa, and Italy's own tendency following the achievement of Unification in 1870 to model the institutions of the infant state upon those of France and Germany, led to the adoption in Libya of a pattern of "direct rule" both unsuited to Italy's limited experience of colonial government or to the mood and traditions of the Libyan people.

10) See, C.A. Nallino, Trattamento degli Indigeni e loro Partecipazione all'Amministrazione Coloniale, Atti del Congresso Nazionale Coloniale per il Dopo Guerra delle Colonie, Roma 15-21 Gennaio 1919 (Roma, 1920), pp. 123-4.

11) Guidice, L., p. 10.

11. Education and the Transition from Turkish to Italian Rule 1911-1913

"Without any exaggeration ,the school is the most powerful pacific means available to us for achieving a union of aim and spirit with the indigenous population."(12)

In addition to the Kuttabs, Medressah and School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli(13), Libya also possessed in the fifteen years prior to the Italian occupation, the nucleus of a state-system of education, which had been set up by the Ottomans(14). This system, although mainly existing in Tripoli, where it provided elementary, professional and secondary education, including a normal school for the training of elementary teachers(15), had also been established in Bengasi, as well as in the chief towns and villages of the coastal areas, and even possibly in the principal oases of the interior (16). The Ottomans had set up the

12) Caruso-Ingillieri, p. 8

13) See, Chapt. Three, Infra, pp. 65-95

14) See, Contini, F., "Storia delle Istituzioni Scolastiche delle Libia" in Libia: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi Libici (Tripoli, 1953), pp. 5-101, p. 6.

15) See, infra, Appendices 11., Statistics: (B) Relating to Libyans and other Moslems in Tripoli before 1911, p. 3.

16) Angelo Scallabrini (Director of Italian Schools Overseas) reported to Bertolini (Minister of Colonies (20-11-1912-19-3-1914) in 1913 that he had toured the areas of Libya then under Italian control, and had noted the existence of at least a dozen schools originating before 1911. Still more schools, he added, existed in parts of the country as yet unpacified. Moreover, there were also schools in the government areas which he had not yet had the opportunity to visit. See, MAI-AS, Fasc. 113/1-5, Scuole: Scallabrini Report, 22 July 1913 (unsigned, undated and unnumbered). Also, see Coro, F., Settantasei Anni Di Dominazione Turca in Libia, 1835-1911 (Tripoli, 1913), pp. 85-9

new schools quite separately from the traditional system of religious schools(17),and had staffed them with both Arab and Turkish personnel, specially trained for such a purpose, and placed under the guidance and control of an inspector, appointed by the Ministry of Public Instruction in Constantinople(18). By ordering the evacuation of all former Turkish personnel from Libya in December 1911(19), including teachers, and requisitioning former schools for use as offices and barracks, the Italian occupation administered the coup de grâce to the school system developed since the nineties by the Ottomans(20). The reopening in February 1912 of the pre-colonial Italian schools(21), following the cleansing of Tripoli from the final traces of the Cholera epidemic of December 1911(22), thus left the Moslem population with few educational options other than the traditional Kuttabs or the Italian national schools.

17) Education in Turkey had until 1846 been exclusively religious, apart from instruction imparted in military schools, and it was only from 1869 onwards that new developments were brought about, as the result of a series of organic laws. Issued on the authority of the Caliph-Sultan, the new laws approved a secular system of elementary, professional and secondary education. The procedure for implementing the reforms was by no means guaranteed to produce results, especially in the provinces of the empire, where much depended upon local circumstances and the enthusiasm and honesty of the governor. See, G. Young, Corps De Droit Ottoman Recueil des Codes, Lois, Ordinanances et Actes Les Plus importants du Droit Interieur, et d'Etudes sur le Droit Coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman, Vol. 11, Titre XXXIV, Instruction Publique (Oxford, 1905), p. 352-387

18) Micacchi, R., L'Enseignement aux Indigenes dans les Colonies Italiennes Dependant Directement de la Couronne (Bruxelles, 1931), p. 469

19) Caruso-Ingillieri, Op. Cit., p. 13

20) ACS, PCM, Tripolitania, T. 1/2, 219, Scuole Italiane: Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili, Dr. D. Caruso-Ingillieri, April, 1912, pp. 3 and 10.

The reaction of Salza's Civil Affairs Department to the absence of educational facilities for Moslems in Tripoli led to the establishing of an Italo-Arab annexe at the Italian national school in the Sciara Espagnol. This was intended primarily to provide instruction in the Italian language along with a form of elementary education based upon the programmes adopted in the Italian lower-elementary schools. The teaching of the Arabic language and the Koran was also included in the curriculum as a concession to Arab national and religious feeling(23). The long-term solution to what was termed the "scholastic problem" was recognised as the responsibility of the Ministry of Colonies which was not as yet established(24). As an interim measure, however, Caneva established by special decree a commission under the chairmanship of the Director of Civil Affairs, Dr. Caruso-Ingillieri, to both supervise the provisional arrangements, and draw up proposals designed to reflect local opinion, and assist the authorities in Rome in the task of evolving a policy to suit Italian and Arab

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- 21) See, Proclama del Governatore del 12 Febbraio, 1912. Istituzione di nuovi corsi nelle scuole della Tripolitania, O.L., 988.
- 22) The outbreak of a cholera epidemic on 14 October 1911 delayed the re-opening of the national and private schools until February 1912, when Italian teachers evacuated to Italy for the period of the emergency, were recalled to their posts. Caruso states that the epidemic was latent as Italian troops disembarked in Tripoli on 5 October 1911, and spread rapidly due to the unsanitary condition of the town and the disarray of the municipal medical services as a result of Turkish neglect and the war. Archival sources indicate that it is likely Italian troops contacted the disease at Naples, prior to their embarkation for Tripoli in October, 1911. See, Caruso-Ingillieri, I Primi Ordinamenti Civili Della Libia, p. 23.
- 23) See, Proclama del Governatore del 12 Febbraio, 1912, Op. Cit.
- 24) See, Legge 6 Luglio, Istituzione del Ministero delle Colonie, B.U.C., 1913, 8.

tastes(25).In the meantime,similar provisional measures were adopted in Cirenaica with the establishing in Bengasi of an Italo-Arab annexe at the Italian elementary school,along with the opening of a small school on the same lines as the annex at Sidi Daud(26).A scholastic commission was also authorised to function in accordance with the same criteria as its equivalent in Tripoli.(27)Both commissions concerned themselves primarily with three principal areas of activity:the curriculum and the relative positions of the Arabic and Italian languages in the government schools;the response of the Libyan population to the provisional arrangements adopted with the reopening of the national schools; and the means that should be adopted in

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- 25) The following persons were named in the decree to assist Caruso in his work on the commission:Dr.Gaetano Basile,Director of Sanitary Services;Abdel Rahmen,Cadi of Tripoli;Professor Pietro Marinuzzi,Director of the Technical-Commercial School;Cav.Gianetto Paggi,Director of the Royal Elementary School;Khalid Bey Ghergheni;Alfredo Nunes Vais;Harfalla Hahum.See,Decreto 21 Marzo, 1912 del comandante in capo del corpo di spedizione per la nomina della deputazione scolastica di Tripoli,O.L. 370, 990.
- 26) See,Decreto del comandante le forze italiane in Cirenaica, 4 Marzo,1912.Reapertura delle scuole pubbliche a Bengasi, O.L.,368,989.
- 27) At Bengasi,the commission was to be headed by the director of the Department of Civil Affairs,acting as president,and assisted by:Professor Garello,Director of Schools;Dr.Aldo Mei;Antonio Manghi;Dr.Vicenzo Mercatelli,Director of Medical Services;Captain,Angelo Modena;Mohamed Bib-Amer,Cadi of Bengasi,Mansur Kehia;Hag.Ahmed Gihani,Mayor of the city;Sid Negim;and Giuli Elia.See,Decreto 3 Marzo,1912 del comandante le forze italiane in Cirenaica de istituisce la Deputazione scolastica di Bengasi,O.L.,370,990.
- 28) Both commissions reported intermittently during 1912 to the government,but appear to have been wound up shortly after the establishment of the Ministry of Colonies in July,1912.See,Caruso Ingilleri to P.C.M.,April,1912,p.18; and ACS,PCM,Amministrazione Civile e Servizi Inerenti , (Scuole),Bengasi,1 Sept.,1912,T.-1/2,714,p.12.

the future to secure the extension of pacific penetration amongst the mass of the Libyan population(28).

The need to foster Italianità amongst Italy's numerous emigrants, through the teaching of the Italian language and the creation of an awareness of Italian nationality and culture, had been the aim of the Italian schools abroad under Francesco Crispi(29). Little, however, had been done to extend this programme to Arabs in Libya before 1911, despite the government's adoption of a policy of pacific penetration in the country, which included support for education(30). The same defects were also apparent in Italian policy for the other colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, where education was either neglected completely or left entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church(31). The need for Italy to justify her aspiration towards the status of a major colonial-power in terms of a "civilising mission" had been the subject of a somewhat inconclusive debate in the Chamber of Deputies immediately prior to

29) See, Palamenghi-Crispi, T., Le Scuole e la Protezione Dell' Italianità all'Estero, L'Italia Coloniale E Francesco Crispi (Milano, 1928), p. 215; Biasutti, R., L'Italianità Nell'Africa Mediterranea, Italia E Africa Mediterranea (Ed., Sansoni, G. C., Firenze, 1942-XXI), pp. 88-143.

30) A special course for Moslems (including instruction in the Italian language, arithmetic, geography, French and Arabic) had been established by the Italian community of Tripoli (at the instigation of the Consul) in 1904 at the Technical-Commercial School. Forty-five Moslem pupils had attended the course, but political pressure by the Turkish authorities soon reduced the numbers in attendance, so that it was rapidly closed down and not re-opened until the end of 1910. The course, however was not finally re-started until the establishment of the Italo-Arab Annexes in Tripoli and Bengasi by Canova and Briccoli in February and March 1912: Contini, "Storia delle istituzioni scolastiche", etc., Op.Cit., p. 6

31) Malvezzi de Medici, A., "Native Education in the Italian Colonies," Educational Yearbook (1931), pp. 651 & 657. Also, see, Piccioli, A., La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare, 1933, Vol. II., p. 1154.

the Libyan War of October 1911(32). Scallabrini's own visit to Libya, shortly before the re-opening of the Italian schools in February and March 1912, had no doubt served to underline the need to develop teaching in the Italian language amongst the Arab population, and had contributed to the decision to establish Italo-Arab Annexes and schools on a trial-basis(33). This assumption seems to be justified by the report drawn up by Caruso-Ingillieri in his capacity as Director of Civil Affairs and President of the Scholastic Commission for Tripolitania in April 1912(34). In this report, reference is made to Scallabrini's recent visit, and the need to base the future work of the schools in Libya upon the development of Italianità amongst the Italian residents and collaboration amongst the Libyans(35). For Caruso, the main elements of the curriculum of the Italo-Arab schools would without any doubt consist of "the teaching of our language, history and geography", along with the usual subjects of the elementary school syllabus, such as arithmetic and suitable emphasis upon the "rules and duties of proper hygiene"(36). Although Caruso

32) With reference to Africa, the Marquis Di San Giuliano (Foreign Minister) argued that African peoples should receive instruction in the Italian language for their own and Italy's benefit. Great care, however, should be taken as far as the teaching of Western culture was concerned. Experience in this respect had shown that neither the colonial power nor the native people themselves derived great benefits from the latter, which alienated them from their own people, and led them to criticise the authorities when their expectations were not met. This issue, he concluded, was one of the most onerous problems confronting Western statesmen with responsibilities towards Africa. Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura XXI 11-1a Sessione-Tornata Del 5 Luglio, 1910, Camera dei Deputati, pp. 9775-989.

33) Caruso-Ingillieri Report of April, 1912, p. 4.

34) Ibid.

35) Ibid., p. 8.

36) Ibid., pp. 12-13.

accepted the place of Arabic and the teaching of the Koran in the curriculum of the Libyan schools, his report for the first time confirms the premise that the principal function of the colonial schools was to teach the Italian language and a sufficiency of Italian culture to further the aims of collaboration. Under no circumstances was Arabic or even the teaching of Islam - of which the Italians on the whole approved, providing it was free of any political or anti-colonial tendency - to occupy the same position in the curriculum as Italian-type subjects. In this way, it was generally believed, the schools would be able to induce in the population as a whole an attitude receptive to colonialism (37). Despite such general assumptions, regarding Italy's "civilising mission", at the very commencement of Italian colonial rule in Libya, the commissions themselves were far from clear in 1912, as to future pattern of Arab education in the colony. Whatever might be written in the confidential reports passing between Tripoli and Rome upon the subject of Libyan education, on the surface at least, government officials were anxious to play down the theme of Italianisation, and justify the place of the Italian language in the curriculum as necessary to enable Libyans to study in the Italian schools themselves (38). When this justification failed to calm the fears of Libyans who believed

37) Ibid.

38) Italian policy sought to distinguish in theory and practice between East Africa and Libya, where a more developed policy was required. For Caruso and other officials at the time, it was a sine qua non of policy that the Italian schools abroad should be primarily concerned with Italianità in the case of Italian pupils and pacific penetration for Libyan children. In the circumstances of 1912, Caruso judged the Italo-Arab Annexes to be purely instrumental in enabling Arabs to acquire sufficient Italian to be able to attend with profit the Italian national schools. Italy's "civilising mission", as far as Caruso was concern-

assimilation to be the real aim of government policy, official propaganda emphasised that the initial measures were of a purely provisional nature, until such a time as the Ministry of Colonies could organise schools in full accordance with local wishes(39).

The reception given to these initial measures by the Arab population in Tripoli and Bengasi was mixed and uncertain or indifferent and hostile in some quarters. In Tripoli itself (the war prevented the experiment from being extended further afield), Caruso was only able to report to Rome that 259 Arabs had enrolled in the Italian schools as a whole (this figure included Arab Libyans who had entered the Italo-Arab annexe), a figure well below the numbers attending the Turkish schools in the final year of Ottoman rule(40). Rather, however, than admit that the new measures were not meeting with the approval of the mass of the population -an admission, which logically, at least, should have obliged him to critically examine the assumptions upon which present and future policies were to be based -Caruso preferred to make an ambiguous

(contin.)ed, lay in facilitating the attendance of Arabs at the national schools. This was not simply because the Moslem population lacked schools of their own -other than the Kuttabs -but a matter of principle. No mention is made in the Caruso report of the possibility of an alternative system ever being developed by the government for the more-or-less exclusive use of the Libyan population: Ibid, pp.8-9.

39) Caruso's attitude appears to reflect nationalist opinion, at this time riding on the crest of a wave in Italy. More reasoned, though by no means pro-Arab or Islamic, were Di San Giuliano's attitudes, which were indicative of government opinion. Italy, Di San Giuliano had promised, while inspecting the Italian schools in Libya during 1910, hoped in the future to set up schools in which Islam would be taught. This undertaking was written into Canova's decree of 12 February 1912, in the form of a foot-note, stating

comparison between the number of Moslems enrolled in the government schools and the number of Jews so enrolled. Such comparisons revealed -if the 75 Moslems attending the Catholic boys' school is excluded from the total of 259 Moslems attending Italian schools-that only 184 Moslems had in fact enrolled in the government schools, as opposed to 811 Jews-a disturbing conclusion in a land, where Moslems comprised the vast majority of the population(41). The reasons advanced by Caruso to explain such a state of affairs-at a time when the government should have been deeply concerned to gain the sympathy and support of the Moslem majority for its policies and rule-laid the blame on the Arab population itself, which unlike its Jewish counterpart was unprepared to collaborate with Italian sovereignty. The Jews on the other hand had before 1911 done much to prepare for Italian rule by attending the Italian schools and learning the language(42).

(contin)that the government intended after the war to set-up "elementary and higher schools in conformity with the civil and religious laws of the Islamic Religion"Libia Negli Atti Parlamentari E Provvedimenti Del Governo, Parte 1: 1881-1911(Milano, 1912-13), pp.301-2. Also, See, Proclama 12 February, 1912, Op.Cit.

40) 1,460 pupils attended the Turkish schools in the final year of Ottoman rule, as opposed to 258 Libyan Arabs, attending the Italian schools in the first scholastic year of Italian rule: Caruso-Ingillieri Report of April, 1912, pp.2 & 4-5.

41) Ibid., pp.6-7.

42) See, Ibid. (the disproportion between Arab and Jewish enrolments in relation to the native population), p.11.

To consolidate his point, Caruso concluded, that the Jewish population derived greater benefit from the Italian schools by virtue of the fact that they comprised by far the most energetic and enterprising section of the indigenous population in Tripoli, predominating, he added, in business commerce and cultural activity(43). Even Caruso at this point, was prepared to concede that both Arabs and Jews preferred to first send their children to be educated in their respective religious schools before sending them (if at all) to the government schools. As if to emphasise the inadequacy of the government schools-while avoiding any open criticism of what he took to be government policy on the subject-Carusu emphasised that the indigenous population, received more than a purely religious education in the traditional schools (the comparison being with the catechism taught to Italian children in the Church schools, but not in the national schools). Arab and Jewish pupils, the director affirmed, apart from the purely religious subjects, also acquired a knowledge of the laws and customs of their own community, along with much else that affected their private and public life(44). Caruso confessed himself to be basically in ignorance of the mentality of the Arab population regarding education, and with few solutions to offer as far as the direction of future policy was concerned. Better by far he urged, if the government consulted Italy's veteran teacher in Tripoli, Gianneta Paggi, who understood the mentality of the Arab people and was a far

43) Ibid., p.11.

44) Ibid., pp.10-11.

better judge of such matters than he was himself.(45)

In Bengasi, the Italo-Arab schools seem to have proved more popular with the local people than in Tripoli, possibly because of the calmer political climate, and the absence of unpleasant incidents, such as the Tripoli massacres of October 1911, from which Arab-Italian relations were slow to recover in the colony, if they could be said to have recovered at all(46). The different atmosphere in Bengasi itself, where the school year had started a month later than in Tripoli, seems reflected in the gradual increase in the number of enrolments. By June the number of pupils enrolling in the government schools had risen to 90 from an initial figure in March of 69, a result which appeared to the Italian inspector of schools, Dr. Battignani, as generally satisfactory(47). These figures led the Civil Affairs Department in Bengasi to take an optimistic view of the future, and forecast a school population of 304 Arab boys for the succeeding schools year(1912-1913)(48). The change in the atmosphere, also seems apparent in the unusual request by the President of the Scholastic Commission for the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the organising of a summer course in the Italian language; both because of the lateness with which the school year had commenced, and also because of the enthusiasm with which the local population had greeted the government's

45) Ibid., p.10.

46) See, supra, Chpt. One, p.14.

47) ACS(PCM), Amministrazione Civile, etc., Fasc. T. 7
1912(Aug.): from General Bricolla to the PCM.

48) Ibid.

educational measures(49).

On the whole, however, the response of the Moslem population-especially in Tripolitania-to the miserable palliatives put forward in place of a proper educational policy at this time had been far from enthusiastic. The more favourable response in Cirenaica was in part conditioned by the government's policy of opening schools as a means of alleviating the condition of the numerous children who had been orphaned by the war. The schools became centres for not only instruction but also places for the distribution of free clothing and a hot meal(50). The position was no less better in Tripolitania, especially Tripoli itself, where apart from a basic problem of poverty, which would have affected whatever educational programme was adopted, there was a real need to adopt similar measures. Caruso was quick to spot the opportunity for increasing the school population in this way(51), though there is much evidence both at this time and subsequently, that the characteristic Italian tenderness towards children, and a deep moral concern to avoid causing them any unnecessary suffering was devoid of political motivation, in so far as the latter is true of any government activity. Irrespective of such fact-

49) The summer course commenced on 1 Aug. 1912 at Sidi Daud and functioned for two hours per day (from 7-9am.) for four days per week. Thirty-six pupils attended the course in two sections, consisting of twenty smaller boys and sixteen older boys. The former were taught by Signora Garello, the wife of the director of the national elementary school in Bengasi, and the latter by a non-commissioned officer, seconded for such a function by the army: Ibid.

50) Ibid.

51) Caruso-Ingillieri Report of April, 1912, p.15.

ors, the crisis of confidence in the government's educational policy was deep-seated, however much officials might try to explain away its inadequacies and defects in terms of the "provisional" character of its origins. A situation of deadlock had clearly been reached. Caruso could only propose short-term remedies, such as sending Italian teachers into the Kuttabs and other religious schools—a measure which, he affirmed, the religious leaders—both Arab and Jewish—were prepared to approve (52). As a long-term measure, the transformation of the Kuttabs into government-type schools, Caruso believed, could be the best means open to the government for extending pacific penetration amongst the Libyan population (53).

For the immediate future, Caruso outlined his plans for the benefit of the central government: the Italo-Arab courses in Tripoli would for the school year 1912-1913 be divided into two sections—section A for new students and section B for those entering their second year. Ten hours of Italian and five hours of Arabic per week would be assigned to the first-year students; and twenty-one teaching hours would make up the weekly total for students in the second class. The latter would consist of three hours of Arabic, ten of Italian, two of Italian history, two of Italian geography, two of arithmetic and two of the elements of pedagogy (54). To encourage students to continue their studies (on leaving the Italo-Arab annexe) at the Technical-Commercial School, a special initiation course was in the process of being organised. It was hoped that this course would facilitate the entry of Arab students into the main stream of education at the school, or enable them

52) Ibid., p.12.

53) Ibid., pp.12-13

54) Ibid., p.17

to become elementary school-teachers. Caruso advised the government to offer assistance to students intending to continue their education in this manner in the form of special allowances, offered in Turkish times to students intending to train as elementary school-teachers, when such assistance had amounted to the sum of nine Lire per month(55). Caruso rounded off his proposals with an earnest plea for new school-buildings or the return of requisitioned school property to its original use. It was also a matter of great urgency, he concluded, to improve both the supply and the quality of teachers in Libya if the goals he had outlined were to stand the remotest chance of ever being realised(56).

111. Bertolini's Formulation of an Official Policy 1913-15

"....while we ought to seek ways of introducing into our new colony everything progressive and civilising, we must not neglect to oppose those who set out to deliberately offend against local traditions, customs and religious beliefs....."(57).

Bertolini's acceptance of the view of the Department of Italian Schools Abroad, headed by Angelo Scallabrini, that the Libyan Kuttabs could not be transformed into Italo-Arab Schools ruled out the Caruso proposals for developing these schools(58). Likewise, the Nallino proposals to incorporate the Kuttabs into a hybrid system of Arab elementary-schooling were also deemed unacceptable because of their failure in ensuring the dominant position of the Italian language

55) Ibid., p.16.

56) Ibid., pp.13 & 16-17.

57) MAI-AS, *Politica Indigena*, Pos.126-1 a. 14, Fasc.1-14: Bertolini to General Garioni, Governor of Tripolitania, 11 June, 1913, Rome, p.1.

58) See, Chpt. Three, Infra.

curriculum, so preventing the schools from becoming vehicles of pacific penetration(59). Instead, the minister turned to examine the methods, whereby the Franco-Arab schools of Algeria and Tunisia had succeeded in developing collaboration through pacific penetration with the Arab population of those regions(60).

By seeking to apply the principles upon which the Franco-Arab schools of Algeria were based to government schools for Libyans, Bertolini was determined to avoid extending to Libya the whole panoply of French educational aims and methods (61). Scallabrini by drawing upon the report of the regional inspector of Libyan schools, Dr. Amerigo Namias, warned Bertolini in the summer of 1913 of the danger of trying to do too much too soon, and in particular of the dangers of applying to Libya westernised models of educational progress, which were responsible for the current political unrest in the French colonies(62). Namias had blamed "the so-called anti-Italian revolt" which had taken place in Tunis as Italian troops were disembarking for the first time upon Libyan soil, not upon any genuine anti-Italian feeling on the part of the Tunisians, but upon the "zenophobia" of Arab students from the University of Paris(63). In accordance with such a premise, Italy could avoid the danger of such unrest ever seriously developing in Libya by recognising at the commencement of her rule the errors committed by Britain and

59) De Leone, E., Chapt. V., La Nostra Politica Scolastica in Libia, La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord (Roma, 1937), p. 404; R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes dans les Colonies Dependantes Directement de la Couronne (Bruxelles, 1931), p. 481.

60) Micacchi, Op. Cit., p. 482; and Pollard, M., L'Enseignement Pour les Indigenes en Algerie (Algiers, 1914), p. 91.

61) Bertolini to Garioni, Op. Cit.

62) MAI-AS, Assetto dei Servizi Civili, Scuole, Pos. 113, Fasc. 1-6, 1913; Report upon the schools of Tripolitania, Amerigo Namias, p. 5.

and France in seeking to implement educational norms based upon Western tenets in India and North Africa(64). In particular, Namias continued, Italy should avoid duplicating the errors of other colonial powers at the secondary level. As had been abundantly shown elsewhere, secondary education in its Western form, only had the effect of producing an educated class, critical of colonialism, and ready at the slightest pretext to raise the banner of revolt against the colonial power(65). Western models could only be fruitfully employed, added Namias, at the elementary and professional levels of education. At this level they could be effectively used to combat illiteracy; teaching professional and agricultural skills, so urgently needed in Libya, along with a proper awareness of domestic and personal hygiene(66).

While urging Bertolini to avoid any slavish imitation of French policies, Namias re-echoed the concern of the Department of Schools to steer the minister away from the Nallino approach to Libyan education(67). Thus the Namias report of 1913 is full of indignant warnings against the dangers of accepting any thorough-going models of Islamic education, especially with regard to the curriculum(68). Typical of the inspector's fulminations was his fear of

63) Ibid., p.5.

64) Ibid., pp.5-6.

65) Ibid., pp.6-7.

66) Ibid.

67) See, Chpt. Three. Infra.

68) See, Namias Report of July, 1913, pp.6-7.

the Arabic language as the medium of instruction in the schools, as had been advocated by Professor Nallino. As a dissuasive against such a policy, Namias employed the hoary old myth that while Arabic was rich in verbal imagery and syntax, it was totally unsuited to scientific thought, and had contributed in no small measure to keeping the otherwise intelligent Islamic peoples in "the position of inferiority in which we find them today" (69). Rather, he argued, the curriculum of the Libyan schools should be organised in accordance with "eminently practical criteria, so as to avoid any unnecessary mental encumbrance, and this practical emphasis should even be applied to the teaching of the Italian language itself". This he continued, ought to avoid any unnecessary emphasis upon grammar and syntax, and concentrate instead upon "norms of everyday speech", so as to be of the greatest practical benefit to Libyans in their day-to-day dealings with Italians. (70)

In developing his "practical criteria" in the area of agricultural and professional education and elementary education, the inspector urged the minister to accept a curriculum based upon "spoken Italian, hygiene, the encouragement of hygiene, morality and a "love of the soil." "The

69) Ibid., p.6 (For a discussion of the implications of cultural imperialism in connection with Arabic and Islam, see, Haim, S.G., Arab Nationalism, An Anthology (London, 1976); and Arabic and Islamic Garland, Islamic Cultural Centre (London, 1397/1977).

70) Namias Report of July, 1913, p. 7.

71) Ibid.

72) Ibid., pp. 7-8.

73) Ibid.

74) Ibid.

aim of the government schools", he philosophised, "should be to make the people less refractory to progress, so that they might extract some profit from one of the commonest callings of mankind—namely, agriculture" (71). The inspector divided his proposals for professional education under two heads: those involving the teaching of particular skills to an "elite workforce", already provided for in the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli (72); and a more general type of professional education, as should be provided by the elementary schools in accordance with the norms he had already outlined (73). Namias, however, did not seem to expect enormous steps forward from the adoption of such measures, and warned Bertolini against such "illusions". Inadequate results, he concluded, had followed from the such policies in Algeria (74).

Although the Namias report was forwarded to Bertolini^{only} only on 22 July 1913, a month after the minister's own lengthy directive upon the subject of internal policy to the newly-appointed governor of Tripolitania, General Garioni, it not only re-echoes the minister's own views, as expressed in the Garioni directive, but is also fully consistent with the general approach of the Department of Schools itself. It was, therefore, part and parcel of the general educational package drawn up for the Moslem population of Libya by the Ministry of Colonies in concert with Stallabrini's own school's department, based at the Foreign Ministry, in 1913; and finding ultimate expression in the 1914 and 1915 Scholastic Ordinances for Tripolitania and Cirenaica (75). It is in the Bertolini-Garioni dir-

75) R.D., 15 Jan. 1914, N. 57 and D.Lgt., 17 Oct., 1915, N. 1809, BUC., 1916, p. 5.

ective of June 1913, that Italian doubts, limitations, insecurity, unpreparedness and profound concern for the very future of colonial rule in Libya, crystallise into an attitude towards Libyan education, which draws the line at any kind of educational development likely to augment Italian insecurity in the future(76). Against such a pattern of political and psychological insecurity, both Westernising and Easternising approaches to educational development cancel themselves out for much the same political reasons-the one leading to the development of xenophobia and anti-colonialism, the other to pan-arabism and pan-islamism. As both approaches were, therefore, injurious of Italian interests, a middle road must be taken for the future. This middle way would consist of the residue left from the alternative approaches rejected by Bertolini (and also by many of his successors). It would be made up of the remaining elements: a vague form of Italianisation, along with a degree of uncertain accommodation with Arabic and the teaching of the Koran. The latter would be expressed in a programme of elementary education, consisting of a rudimentary form of agricultural training or the teaching of professional skills - programmes which bare only the remotest resemblance to the programmes adopted by the French in Algeria. With such a plan of future action in Libya, Bertolini sought to equip Italy with the necessary means of fulfilling her "civilising mission" there(77).

76) Bertolini to Garioni, Op.Cit.

77) Ibid.

78) MAI-AS, Pos. 113, Fasc. 1-6, Scuole, 1913. Scallabrini to Bertolini: Relazione sulle scuole della Tripolitania (undated), pp. 1 & 15.

Preparations for implementing the new policy were entrusted to Scallabrini, who made a survey of the existing opportunities during an extended visit to the colony in the autumn of 1913(78). During this visit the director- who had carried out a similar exploration of the existing educational facilities in Cirenaica a year earlier(79)- divided up the problem along topographical lines. The problems of Tripoli itself were thus separated from the needs of those areas of the interior occupied by Italian troops and under the authority of a military resident or local governor(80). In Tripoli, the chances of any rapid implementation of the forthcoming educational ordinance were slight in the extreme because of the shortage of teachers (81) and also, because of the equally desperate shortage of suitable accommodation for use as schools(82). In assessing the future needs of the population, Scallabrini gave priority to Italians, whose numbers he anticipated would rise rapidly in the years immediately ahead. The popularity of the Italian schools with the Jewish population of the Hara, also made it, in Scallabrini's opinion, necessary to provide special facilities for them in their own quarter to prevent them crowding into the national schools, which were already suffering from the strain of excessive numbers. For such a purpose, he urged

79) During this visit, Scallabrini extended his activities to beyond Bengasi itself, where along with the regional inspector, Dr. Battignani he had organised the re-opening of the schools in March 1912, to areas along the coast, judged suitable for future schools. While at Derna, he was able to obtain a map of the area from the commandant, and with its aid plan the location of future sites. In the course of this activity, a disagreement appears to have occurred between himself and the commandant, the latter preferring sites closer to the town, where the Franciscan sisters of Egypt had very recently opened a school: ACS(PMC), T.1/2-447, March, 1912.

the conversion of the Pietro Verri Barracks (formerly a Turkish Barracks), on the fringes of the Jewish Quarter, into a school- a proposal which was implemented later the same year. For the eventual solution of the accommodation problem, as it effected the Italian sector, he acquired- through the approval and support of the Foreign Ministry- a large site adjoining land belonging to the School of Arts and Crafts. This important site subsequently became the location of the Italian secondary schools and chief Italian elementary schools in the town, the buildings of which still continue in use to today as Libyan elementary, preparatory and secondary schools. By announcing his acquisition to the press, Scallabrini considerably embarrassed the government, which was still negotiating with the Ulemah over the possible use of the site (apparently owned by the municipality) for the setting up of a Medersah (83).

No such plans were laid for the solution of the accommodation problem as it affected the Arab population of Tripoli, where it was a question of improvising existing facilities for the immediate future, after which it would presumably be possible to use the buildings vacated by the

80) Scallabrini Report of July, 1913 (Italo-Arab Schools), pp. 14-23.

81) Ibid (Recruitment of Teaching Personnel), pp. 24-8.

82) Ibid., p. 16.

83) Ibid., pp. 3 and 26. Also, see, ACS, PCM, Scuole Italiane, T. 1/2 219: from the Ministry of Public Instruction to Cav. Giolitti, 12 March, 1912.

Italian sector. Only when Italian needs had been satisfied would efforts be made to provide suitable accommodation for the Libyan sector, a process which did not start in earnest until the early twenties. In the summer of 1913, however, it was a question of scraping together whatever resources were over after dealing with the Italian and Jewish sections, and there is no doubt that in this respect Libyans received the treatment awarded to third-rate citizens. The measures adopted by Scallabrini to provide the semblance of schooling for the Arab population, involved evacuating the Italo-Arab Annexes of Arab pupils, so as to provide more space for the Italian sector, by transferring the former into the School of Arts and Crafts, an institution under its own charter and specially reserved only for Moslem pupils (84). A number of obstacles, however, stood in the way of this drastic proposal. Firstly, permission to remove Arab pupils from the Italo-Arab Annex in the National School, situated in the Italian quarter of the old city, depended upon gaining the support of the Director of the School of Arts and Crafts for the move - the absentee, Professor Andreoni, who was not in Libya, when Scallabrini arrived to prepare for the implementation of the new policy (85). A further obstacle to the scheme lay in the opposition of the Tripoli notables, who disliked the idea of educating their sons in an institution, originally set up by the Turks to house and train poor orphans (86). Scallabrini's proposal, to accommodate boys

84) See, Scallabrini Report of July, 1913, p. 4.

85) Ibid.

86) Italian relations with the notables were very sensitive over the educational issue because of the inadequacy of the government's measures. The government attempted to compensate for such defects by offering to

not wishing to be transferred to the School of Arts and Crafts in what amounted to a converted broom-cupbord was even less likely to win converts to Italian rule from the Tripoline families(87).In the final analysis ,Scallabrini,who was at his wits-end as to how he could solve the accommodation crisis,could do very little to provide school-space for the burgeoning Arab population of the inner city,which was crowded with refugees from the war zone ,and for whom the School of Arts and Crafts was too distant to be of any real use(88).

If an effective "systemazione" of the scholastic problem in Tripoli would have to wait for more favourable times,the situation in the countryside was more promising ,since the Turks--or local initiative- had set up elementary schools in the towns and more important villages.Also ,a greater abundance of property was available for hire,should school buildings have been requisitioned by the army or damaged beyond repair in the fighting(89). Even so,Scallabrini was obliged to bear in mind Bertolini's policy of only "concentrating at particular places", leaving until better times the establishing of schools at the less important localities(90). As rules of thumb,the

(contin.) educate in Italy the children of the more important families,a gesture which leading families had already anticipated by petitioning the government on their own account.Ibid.Also,see ACS,PCM,Studenti,T.1/2-28-228,1912.

87) Scallabrini Report of July,1913,p.4.

88) Ibid,pp.9 & 16.

89) Scallabrini listed the following schools ,outside Tripoli, either requisitioned by the army or serving as government H.Q.:Sukh el-Djouma,Tagiura-along with other places he hand not been able to visit:Ibid.,p.22.The school at Jeffren had been damaged during El-Baruni's struggle against the Italians and was in need of restoration before it could be put to its former use:Ibid.,p.22.

90) Ibid.,p.15.

director adopted the following guidelines:

- a. if the school had existed before the occupation;
- b. if a school building had been constructed-or set up during the course of the present school-year;
- c. if the school had been functioning at the time of the Italian occupation-or had been established more recently;
- d. if the school was supported from its own finances (i.e.a "private school but not a Koranic school"), or in receipt of a subsidy from the Beladia(municipality)or from a vacuff;
- e. if the establishment of the school was demanded with urgency by the local population,especially if already accustomed to having a school(91).

On the basis of these estimates ,the director of schools was able to inform the cadi,mufti and notables of Tripoli and its surrounding districts(as well as the Ministry of Colonies) that the new superintendent,Cav. Mascia(92) was about to organise schools at the following places:Tripoli(i.e.in the School of Arts and Crafts) -"where the present Italo-Arab annexe,attached to the National Boys' School,would be allowed to continue to function as before,though it cannot be expected to serve the needs of the whole town";Mescia-"here the recreat-
orio opened by the resident contains 120 pupils at the cost of 0.80 Italian Lire per day.These are to be transferred to the School of Arts and Crafts,so making it possible to use the existing accommodation(a wooden hut constructed by the army),as a temporary school for the local-

91) Ibid.,pp.15-16.

92) Even Scallabrini had found it impossible to find a

ity, though the orphanage at Bu-Meliana will remain in its present location, at least for the immediate future; Sahel-"the school situated at Sukh-el-Djouma was constructed by the Turks and will revert to scholastic use at the end of the year"; Tagiura-"the local population have donated L.900 towards the cost of a new school, the former school having been designated for use by the Carrabiniere as a barracks-through the use of military personnel, it ought to be possible to construct a school for this sum"; Zanzur-"in this residency a school is already functioning in its own spacious accommodation, and under an Arab teacher, paid by the municipality. It could, nonetheless, be encouraged to widen its range of activities to cover the whole area, where there is much demand for education"; Sliten-"here there already exists an elegant school-house, and I have ordered it to be immediately reopened in response to the demands of the local population."; Jeffren-"in this vast residency, a school already functions, though not in the original school-building"; Homs-"the school pre-exists the occupation, and is situated at Kabila di Tajasset"; Misurata-"a school was opened this year by the resident in temporary accommodation, but must be replaced, as soon as can be arranged, by more capacious buildings to accommodate the needs of this important area"(93).

(contin.) vacant room at the offices of the Department of Civil Affairs in Tripoli for the new superintendent. Scallabrini, therefore, left it to Cav. Mascia himself to locate and rent a "local dwelling-house". For the monthly hire of the building, Scallabrini negotiated from the Secretary General in Tripoli, the sum of L.50, along with L.60 for the salaries of an usher and secretary, and L.40 for stationary and miscellaneous expenses, which as he, himself exclaimed was "not an enormous sum." Ibid., p.14½
93) Ibid. (Italo-Arab schools), pp.14-23.

In order to bring these schools into operation as soon as possible, Scallabrini urged the Minister of Colonies to recruit teachers from the roll of Italian Schools Abroad. He was prepared to concede that this measure-if adopted-would not solve entirely the problem of teacher supply, which it might indeed aggravate, because of the cost of recruiting such personnel, who were adjudged amongst the best available(94). Another system was clearly required now that Italy was confronted with the responsibilities of colonial rule in Libya, and Scallabrini had no hesitation in recommending the minister to recruit more widely from persons not perhaps, particularly well-equipped with paper qualifications, but in other respects suited to become teachers(95). Such persons could be offered a salary more in proportion to their services and needs of around L.250-300 per month. This sum could be supplemented with other small favours and privileges so as to put the elementary school teacher on more-or-less the same footing as postal-workers, telegraph operators and railway-officials(96). Such advice, however well inspired, unfortunately, failed to take account of the need to recruit teachers to work outside the principal towns and urban centres. Unless a different solution could be found, it would not be possible to staff the schools of the interior, where it would be necessary to continue to rely for some time into the foreseeable future upon untrained and inexperienced military personnel, whose value as teachers varied in accordance with individual aptitude and interest in the work of education(97).

94) Ibid. (Recruitment of Teaching Personnel), p.24.

95) Ibid.

IV. Gaspare Colosimo's Reformulation of the Bertolini
Premise 1916-1919

"Intermediate schools modelled upon the écoles primaires superieures of Algeria and the écoles regionales of French West-Africa are urgently needed to prepare pupils leaving the Italo-Arab schools for attendance at the Italian Secondary schools"(98)

The period of Libya's history occupied by the 1914-18 European war-during which the Senusi of Cirenaica from 1917 onwards settled for terms with Italy and her allies and the Tripolitanian tribes returned to their original allegiance with Turkey-prevented the implementation of the Bertolini-Martini ordinance upon any considerable scale. Micacchi indicates that by 1915 the government had implemented the 1914/15 decrees to the extent of opening Italo-Arab schools at Tripoli, Menscia, Sugh el-Giuma, Tagiura, Homs, Zuara, Agilat, Beni Ulid, Garian, Giado, Jeffren, Kussabat, Misurata, Sirte, Zaugur, Zavia and Zliltern with a school population (in Tripolitania) of 600 pupils. (99) Arrangements had also been placed in progress for establishing further schools at Azizia, Bir el-Gaema, Nalut, Tarhuna and Zintan, which were intended to provide accommodation for a further 200 pupils; but it had been necessary

96) Ibid.

97) MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi Del Soppresso Ministero Dell' Africa Italiana, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1: from Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi Director General of the Italian Colonial Schools, to the Governor of Tripolitania; Report upon the schools of Tripolitania and Cirenaica, July, 1919 (unsigned ms.), pp. 64-81 and 111-130.

98) Colosimo, Gaspare, Relazione al Parlamento sulla Situazione Politica Economica ed Amministrativa delle Colonie Italiane, Presentata alla Camera dei Deputati il 23 febbraio 1918 ed al Senato del Regno il 28 febbraio 1918 (Roma, 1918), p. 365.

99) Micacchi Report of July 1919, pp. 64 and 142.

to call a halt in the operation because of the war.(100) Meanwhile,seventeen schools had been established in Cir-enaica by 1918,where conditions had been more peaceful, and comprised 42 sections with 947 enrolled pupils(897 Moslems,39 Christians and 10 Jews) and an average atten-dance of 635.(101)It was the shrinkage in the area of Tripolitania under Italian control to Tripoli and the coastal towns by 1918 that was chiefly responsible for the number of Italo-Arab schools in the province being reduced by this time to the five existing in Central Tr-ipoli and Menscia and the ones at Tagiura,Homs and Zavia. (102)Micacchi,who was concerned to present the Italo-Arab schools in as favourable a light as was possible in the circumstances of Italian decline in Libya, states that at the end of the school-year 1918-1919,the number of such institutions in Tripolitania had risen to seven and possessed a total of 882 pupils(the combined total for both provinces amounted to 1,829).(103)

If during these troubled years,education had virtually ceased to be an issue of any real importance in Libya or even a matter of serious debate in government circles(104), it did not follow that this would be the case once the war was virtually over in Europe.The prospect of the Ver-

100) Ibid.

101) These included,three schools at Bengasi(Bengasi Central, Sidi Daud and Sabri),along with those situated at Merg, Cirene,Marsa Susa,Tobruk,Ghegab,Ghemines,Tocra and Tolmeta.Ibid.,pp.100-123;and the Colosimo Report of Feb-ruary,1918,p.367.

102) Ibid.

103) Micacchi,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes,p.494;and the Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.142.

104) See,De Leone,Op.Cit.,"Nostra Politica Scolastica in Libia",p.405.

sailles Conference and the chance that Italy might succeed to the German colonies of the Cameroons (overrun by the Allies in 1917) required the Colonial Ministry to produce evidence to revive Italy's flagging reputation as a colonial power. (105) It was with the aim of impressing public opinion and furthering his plans for a vast extension of Italian power in Africa that Colosimo on 28 February 1918 presented the Italian Parliament with his proposals for the educational future of the indigenous populations of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. (106)

In these proposals, Colosimo criticised the Bertolini-Martini policy as inadequate both in nature and scope. (107) Italo-Arab schools had been proposed only for the towns and urban centres, so ignoring rural and desert areas, which comprised virtually the whole of Libya; moreover, no special provisions existed to cater for the education of an "elite" (other than could be provided in Italy); and, furthermore, the training of Arabs and Italians to work in the new schools had been completely neglected. (108) Colosimo in his proposals to Parliament of 28 February 1918 and again later in the same year in the Colonial Section of the "Report of the Post-War Commission" (109) - not only

105) The Italian evacuation of Libya during the war had lost Italy the respect of the Allies, who during the Versailles Conference opposed any further extension of her colonial ambitions in Africa: Evans-Pritchard, The Senusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford, 1949), p. 138.

106) See, Carlo Giglio, Gli Archivi Storici Del Soppresso Ministero Dell'Africa Italiana E Del Ministero Degli Affari Esteri Dalle Origini Al 1922 (Leiden, 1971), p. XXIV; Also, see, Infra, Maps II, p. 3; and Colosimo to the Chamber of Deputies, Op. Cit.

107) Colosimo Report of February, 1918, p. 368.

rejects the cautious approach of his predecessor, Bertolini, towards the education of Libyans; but proposes radical new measures designed to create for them a system, broadly similar in its nature and scope, to the schools set up by the French for their co-religionists in North and West-Africa. (110)

French and British ideas had already played some part in the formulation of Bertolini's proposals for Italo-Arab schools and Kuttabs, though the minister's interest in such notions had been pragmatic rather than ideological. In this respect, it followed the Italian wish to pick and choose from the wealth of foreign experience, selecting only those ideas which seemed most relevant to Italian aims and needs.

(111) Colosimo, however, had formed the conviction that, unless Italy made extensive use of French experience in those parts of her territories most corresponding with the French empire, she would not only fail to secure the active collaboration of the Arab-Berber population of Libya, but would also fail to gain the support and esteem of the powers upon whom the actualisation of the "maximum" and "minimum" programmes would depend. (112)

Colosimo's radical extension of the limited Italianità and pacific penetration formulated by Bertolini, centres upon the recognition that the school had the means to effect

108) Ibid.

109) See, I. Discourse of the Minister of Colonies, Gaspare Colosimo (Our Islamic Policy), Post-War Commission's Report of January, 1919, pp. 7-19; Colonial Personnel and Their Preparation, Ibid., pp. 75-86; and Educational Preparation for the Colonies in Italy, C. Shanzer, Ibid., pp. 91-6.

110) Colosimo Report of February, 1918, p. 365.

111) Guidice, L., Op. Cit., p. 120; and Bruni, G., Il Nuovo Assetto Politico-Amministrativo Della Libia (Roma, 1932), p. 96.

112) Colosimo Report of February, 1918, pp. 363-9.

collaboration between both colonizers and colonized.(113)

Bertolini had believed that the school could only perform the most modest of functions in Libya.The decree of 1914, however, seems to reflect his own profound pessimism with regard to the international situation rather than an objective assessment of educational possibilities in the country.

(114)Colosimo,on the other hand,lacked his predecessor's misgivings regarding the possible ill-effects that might politically result from creating an educational system similar in many respects to the Italian system itself.For Colosimo,the school was not only a means,whereby Italy could fulfill her "civilising mission" or develop "pacific penetration" amongst the indigenous population;it was something much more vital,namely the primary element in securing the active collaboration of all sections of Moslem society.This was an idea he had derived from the French,for the founding fathers of French colonialism had rapidly recognised that the school was an excellent way of establishing friendly relations between the colonizers and the colonized.(115)Through an adroit use of the school,political conquest could be transformed into "moral conquest".Hence the importance of education in forming indigenous peoples and the need for care and attention in training their leaders.This,they believed,was one of the most important tasks facing a colonial power.Instruction,however,can-

113) Ibid.,p.363.

114) "The ways of progress are difficult and slow,"Bertolini confided to Garioni,and "in view of the recent disastrous campaign in Abyssinia and the Russo-Japanese War,which had brought about a general climate of revolution in the world,Italy must avoid disturbing the as yet amorphous masses with the yeast of a vague intellectualism".See, Bertolini to Garioni,1913,p.1.

115) Faidherbe,Galleni and Trentinien.See,A.Charton,"Education in French West Africa"(Report to the Teachers' Congress at Nice,1932) in Overseas Education,Vol.XXI.,No.I.,Oct.(London,1949),pp.956-972.

not be simply limited to the various groups chosen to lead, but must also, vitally affect the whole indigenous population through becoming a popular instruction. (116)

For Colosimo, Bertolini's chief contribution towards achieving collaboration lay in his creation of the Italo-Arab school, which, though modelled upon the Franco-Arab school of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, was at the same time a "uniquely Italian creation". (117) To these schools would be entrusted the task of enabling the new generation of Libyans to arrive at an "understanding and evaluation of our national actions"; for such institutions were the best means of "communicating our mentality to Arab youth". (118) Whatever the future potential of these schools, however, even Colosimo was forced to concede that so far their output had been "miniscule". (119) The poor results so far obtaining were not blamed by the enthusiasts at the Department of Schools or the Colonial Ministry upon any inherent weaknesses in the schools as institutions, but rather upon the shortage of able and experienced teachers. Such personnel were not only required to be good at teaching but also in possession of the special frame of mind that made a "good colonial educator". This was only acquired through long contact with the in-

116) Ibid.

117) See, Colosimo Report of February, 1918, pp. 363-4; and Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 482 (Micacchi noted that although the Italo-Arab schools of Libya were modelled upon the Franco-Arab schools of Algeria, they were different from the latter, in so far as they were primarily schools in which Arabs received instruction in the Italian language).

118) See, Colosimo Report of February, 1918, p. 368.

119) Ibid., p. 364.

digenous population.(120)The shortage not only of teachers judged "suitable," but indeed of any teachers, had resulted in schools outside the main towns being perforce staffed by military instructors;"furnished with a certain capacity, but otherwise lacking in intellectual qualities" (121) The ultimate solution to this particular problem, Colosimo believed, lay in the creation of a corps of "auxiliary teachers", a solution adopted by the French in West Africa, as a means of extending the work of the government elementary schools to the remotest and most inaccessible corners of the empire.(122)As a gesture towards the achieving of a similar goal in Libya, Colosimo proposed the setting up of an obligatory training-course for Italian teachers, newly arrived in the colony and intending to work in the Libyan schools.(123)

While recognising the Italo-Arab school as the principal means for Italianising the rising generation of Libyans, Colosimo also realised that it was just as important to develop higher courses, along with vocational and agricultural education. Courses similar to the ones provided in the écoles primaires supérieures of Algeria and West Africa(124) were urgently needed in Libya for the educating and training of an "active nucleus of collaborators from amongst the sons of notables".(125) This higher elementary course would, if the Colosimo proposals

120) Ibid.

121) Ibid.

122) Ibid.

123) Ibid.

124) Ibid., p.365

125) Ibid.

had been accepted by the Italian Parliament, have prepared Arabs to attend the Italian secondary schools in Tripoli (especially, the Technical-Commercial School, reformed in 1917, partly for this purpose), and ultimately have implied the right to study in the Italian universities, a situation foreseen by Colosimo and his advisors in 1918. (126)

The new educational proposals for Libya were far more advanced than the minister's plans for Eritrea and Somalia: Italy needed to be able to convince the powers in 1919 that she possessed the moral capacity to rule in Africa. The evidence so far in this respect was uncertain, and the Italian colonies were generally adjudged to be the most backward and undeveloped in Africa. Now that Italy wished to share a mandate in the Cameroons and reintegrate the Tripolitanian hinterland with the coastal regions, she needed to indicate in a concrete manner, her determination to economically, politically and educationally develop the territories already under her control. (127) Italy's failure

126) The reform of the school followed upon a report by a special ministerial-commission, consisting of Scallabrini and representatives from the Ministry of Colonies and the Ministry of Public Instruction. The commission's aim was to make the school more relevant to local needs, and in particular to popularise its facilities amongst the Arab population. For these purposes it was recommended that the institution be changed from a Technical school into Technico-Commercial school. See, R.D. Dec. 1917, N. 2155, BUC, 606; and Ordinamento Della R. Scuola Media Technico-Commerciale di Tripoli (Tripoli, 1918). The change in the status of the school made it possible for final-year students to obtain a diploma, which provided access to the University of L. Bocconi in Milan: R. Soprintendenza Scolastica Della Libia, Annuario Delle Istituzioni D'Istruzioni Scolastiche, Anno Scolastico 1934-5, p. 5 (N.B., these facilities only remained in operation until 1922-3).

127) See, Colosimo Report of February, 1918, pp. 382 and 387.

at the Peace Conference of 1919, to secure either a mandate in the Cameroons or the "frontier rectifications" promised by the Treaty of London in 1913, was without doubt a blow to the Africanisti. This failure, however, did not affect the package of educational proposals contained in the Colosimo strategy. The fate of the latter was sealed by Arab rejection of a colonialist plan of education within Libya itself. At last, or so it seemed at the time, the Ministry of Colonies and its supporters was being made to listen to voices other than those of nationalist opinion within Italy itself, voices which until 1919 it had chose to either ignore entirely or forget existed.

Chapter Three Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools
1911-1919

"In Libya, as in every other country, the local institutions not only constitute a sum of political, legal and social interests, but, also, express in their own form, the nature and level of progress, along with the degree of civilisation, achieved by the society as a whole. Italian control over such institutions seemed the best way of ensuring the future development of pacific penetration amongst the population."(*)

When Italian troops disembarked along the coast of Libya in October 1911, the country already possessed a wide range of political, economic and social institutions—quite apart from the ones established by the Ottomans and European powers. For the sake of administrative and political convenience, the Italians divided the former into three general categories: first those of a political-communal character; second, those of a social-communal character; and third, those of a strictly Islamic character—by which they referred to the mosques and courts of the Sh-aria.(1)

The institutions of a political-communal character were understood to comprise the Libyan municipalities whether urban or rural—along with the various services for which they were responsible to the Arab-Libyan community (water, police, street-lighting, hospitals and clinics, education and sanitation). Of the municipalities, Tripoli was by far the largest, containing—apart from the oases—a population of around 40,000 inhabitants, divided up into five quarters: the Beladier, Behelbahr, Cucebsafar, Homa and

*) Caruso-Ingillieri, I Primi Ordinamenti Della Libia, Op.Cit., p.214.

1) Ibid. (Chpt.1V), p.257.

Hara, the latter comprising the substantial Jewish community of 15,000 souls. Each of these quarters had its own head or muctar, assisted by a council of elders, who in turn were guided by the Iman or religious leader. The muctar's position was both delicate and vital; for it was he who drew up the electoral lists and acted as an intermediary between his quarter and the Ottoman authorities. The various quarters of the city were, therefore, quite different from the quarters in western cities, in that they expressed religious, cultural, legal and linguistic differences and divisions, which had been, on the whole, eliminated from Western societies by historical forces. In Libya, however, the Moslem community was in the majority, and while the organic nature of Ottoman law related differently to each group, granting autonomy to Christians and Jews, it was the Arab majority to whom the Turks conferred the political dominance and control. (3) Thus at the level of overall control—regardless of whether the municipality was urban or rural—the Moslem community invariably ran the town council and co-operated with the Sultan's representative who supervised their activities. The change from Turkish to Italian rule was a profound shock to the Arab-Moslem majority, who no longer found themselves to be the most favoured community, despite all the efforts of Italian propaganda to convince them otherwise.

The Institutions of a social-communal character not included in the services provided by the Town Council in Tripoli were termed by the Italians "the lesser institutions". These included the School of Arts and Crafts with its orphanage; two public vacuf, one connected with the

3) Ibid. (Chpt.V.), p.220.

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mosques, the other with the town walls(4); various patrimonies and charities, mainly for the poor and sick; along with a number of Islamic schools, invariably attached to particular mosques. Of these latter, the most intellectually and socially important were the medresseh(5), numbering about five(6) and attached to the mosques of Hamad Basha Karamanli, Dragut Basha, El-Kharuba, Osman Basha and Sidi Salem(7). Medresseh were also to be found at Tagiura(Murad Aga), Zlittern(Sidi Abdussalem), Misurata(Sidi Zarrugh) and Cussabat(the School of Sidi Ducali).(8). More numerous by far than the medresseh were the Koranic Schools or "Kuttabs"(9) of which there were possibly as many as fifteen in Tripoli with a scholastic population in 1912

- 4) Vacuff : an inalienable patrimony, organised from Constantinople and with branches throughout the Ottoman Empire, including Libya. See, Caruso Ingillieri, I Primi Ordinamenti Della Libia, p.252. Also, see infra, Chpt. Three, Section III. "Whether to establish a Medersa in Libya".
- 5) Medressah, Medersa and al-Madrasah are different spellings of the same institution, al-Madrasah. Technically an Islamic institution of advanced learning (though many bearing this name were little more than a development of the Kuttab) "whose aim and goal is the better understanding of Islam". See, Munir-ud Ahmed, Muslim Education and the Scholar's Status (Zurich, 1968), p. 52. Also, A.L. Tibawi, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXV/2(1962), p.225; and A.L. Tibawi, Arabic and Islamic Themes (London, 1976) p.213.
- 6) Cowper, H.S., The Hill of Graces (London, 1897), opposite p.1.
- 7) MAI-AS, Pos.113, Scuole, Fasc.1-6: Schools of Tripolitania and Cirenaica, Prof. Angelo Scallabrini, July, 1913, pp.16-23.
- 8) Ibid.
- 9) Kuttab : Arabic singular of Kuttabib and derived from verb Kataba, literally, the continuous exercise of reading. In Moslem countries it is everywhere understood to refer to an elementary school, where instruction is exclusively provided in Arabic. See, MAI-AS, Pos.113, Scuole, Fasc.1-6, 1913: The Kuttabs of Egypt, Prof. A. Stoppolini, Alexandria, July, p.1.

of 700 pupils(10),and an unknown number elsewhere in Libya.(11)Particularly important in a Moslem country were the religious authorities,headed by the Mufti of Tripoli,who was appointed from Constantinople and directly responsible for appointing the cadi and-in an undefined way-for the running of the courts of Sharia.

(12)

Italian policy towards the Moslem community was two-fold: on the one hand, Italy undertook to fully respect and protect the legal and religious institutions of Islam(13), including the Sultan's traditional right to nominate and

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- 10) MAI-AS, Pos.113, Scuole, Fasc.1-6: The Schools of Libya (an undated, unsigned and handwritten memorandum from the Director of Italian Schools Abroad, Angelo Scallabrini, to the Minister of Colonies.
- 11) MAI-AS, Pos.113, Scuole, Fasc.1-6 : Schools Existing in Libya: a Pro-memorandum to Signor Agnesa (undated, unsigned and handwritten, most probably from Scallabrini).
- 12) See, Primi Ordinamenti, Chpt.V. "Le Istituzioni Locali", p.257.
- 13) See, Proclama del Ten.Gen.Caneva alle popolazioni della Tripolitania, della Cirenaica e delle regioni annesse in data 13 Ottobre, 1911, O.L., 5. This document promised that all the inhabitants of the "said regions" would be ruled by their own leaders; religion and civil law would be respected, as would be persons and property; respect for the rights and privileges of religious and pious foundations; the actions of the authorities would be determined by the law and the Sunna; justice would be administered by Moslem tribunals; no law of books would be published that were adjudged contrary to Moslem law; no taxes would be levied on Moslems; and no person would be called upon to serve in the armed forces of the crown against his own will.
- 14) By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (15 Oct., 1915), the Sultan withdrew from the war and conceded autonomy to his subjects in Tripolitania and Cirenaica. A special representative - the Naib-ul-Sultan - was appointed to care for the Sultan's interests in the country. These latter included the right to appoint the Mufti, who in turn was empowered to nominate cadi throughout the territory. Turkey was also to be responsible for the maintenance of the Mufti and the Naib-ul-Sultan.

maintain both the Mufti and his own special representative in Tripoli(14); on the other hand, however, a comprehensive series of "reforms" were initiated, designed to incorporate the political-communal and social-communal institutions into the workings of the Italian state.(15) It is the educational aspect of these so-called "reforms", as they affected the Kuttabs, the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, and the Auqaf that must now be analysed.

II. Italian Policy and the Koranic Schools

"These schools are primarily chatechistical, and secondarily educational. In them, the mind of Arab youth is imbued with the tenets and principles that go to form the special mentality of the Moslem."(16)

The idea of involving the Kuttabs in the government's programme of pacific penetration suggested itself to the Italian authorities in Libya during March and April 1912, as the Italo-Arab Annexes were undergoing their trial-run, and data was being collected by Caruso out of which a future policy could be evolved.(17) In the process of collecting this data, Caruso noticed that the attendance of Muslims at the Government's schools was considerably below what it had been at the Turkish schools in the final year

(contin.) In all other respects, however, Italy was granted "full and complete sovereignty" over Tripolitania and Cirenaica. See, British and Foreign State Papers, 1913, Vol. CVI. (London, 1916), p. 1098.

15) See, Decreto del Comandante in capo del corpo di spedizione 28 gennaio 1912, Amministrazione provvisoria delle istituzioni pubbliche di Tripoli, O.L., 179.

16) ACS, PCM, Tripolitania, T. 1/2, 219, Scuole Italiane: Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili, Dr. D. Caruso-Ingillieri, April, 1912, p. 3.

17) Ibid., p. 4.

of Ottoman rule.(18),whereas the Kuttabs were constantly crowded with Arab pupils.(19) During his conversations with the Arab notables ,Caruso had been unable to detect any dissatisfaction with the Italo-Arab Annexes that he could explain satisfactorily,(20);for it was generally understood in Tripoli that the existing arrangements were purely provisional and would be replaced as soon as possible with a system more in conformity with Arab wishes.(21) In the meantime,the conclusion was drawn that the fundamental weakness of the existing arrangements lay in their failure to include the Kuttabs within the government's schemes for extending pacific penetration amongst the Arab population.This was a defect that could only be remedied,Caruso argued,by "sending Italian teachers into the Kuttabs",a measure which could be implemented as soon as these schools had been made hygienically safe,

- 18) Statistics for the final year of Ottoman rule show a total of 1,460 pupils(Arab and Turkish)in Turkish schools.Ibid.,p.4;also,see infra,Appendices,II.Statistics;(B)Relating to educational provision for Libyans and other Moslems in Tripoli before 1911".Figures for the first year of Italian rule(Feb.1912-July,1912) reveal the following pattern:elementary boys-90(day); 44(evening);75(Franciscan Day-School);11(Technical-Commercial School);girls-39(Professional),so providing a total for Moslem pupils of 259.Also,see infra, Appendices,II.Statistics,A.,B.,and C.
- 19) Ibid.,p.4.
- 20) The Arab notables with whom Caruso had "frequently spoken" had,"while expressing a desire for their children to receive an Italian education",continued to send them to the religious schools,where,Caruso added,"Italian teachers could not go!For an explanation of this phenomenon,the government should seek the opinion of Cav.Paggi,Caruso advised,"who would conduct a confidential enquiry into the problem amongst certain of the notables.See,Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili,Dr.D.Caruso-Ingillieri,April,1912,pp.11 and 10.
- 21) See,Proclama del Governatore del 12 febbraio 1912.Istituzione di nuovi corsi nelle scuole della Tripolitania, O.L.,988.

and adapted to modern teaching methods.(22)

Caruso's proposals were not unattractive to the authorities in Rome to whom it was clear that the shortage of teachers,adequate school buidings and financial resources, made it extremely unlikely that the government schools would be sufficient in the years immediately ahead to solve Libya's pressing educational problems.(23)Also,the Kuttabs,although primarily religious schools,were traditionally independent and not directly a part of the responsibilities of the religious authorities.Thus,technically at least,no objection could be raised should Italy,while ostensibly respecting the religious character of the schools,decide, for educational,medical and political reasons,to place them more closely under the control of the administration than had been the custom in Ottoman times.With such aims in mind,Bertolini instructed Scallabrini in 1912 to draw up a report upon the working of the Kuttabs in the British protectorate of Egypt,where they had been reformed in 1902 by Lord Cromer.He also asked for a survey of the Libyan Kuttabs to ascertain the suitability of Caruso's proposals regarding their future.(24) Italy's leading Arabist,Professor,C.A.Nallino,was also invited to submit proposals for use in the forthcoming educational ordinance for Libyans.(25)

22) See,Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili, April,1912,p.12.

23) Ibid.,p.13.

24) See,Stoppolini Report of July,1913,Op.Cit.; and Scallabrini Report of July,1913,pp.12-14.

25) See,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes,p.480.

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The information received from Egypt was registered at the Ministry of Colonies on 24 July 1913 and indicated that Cromer's reform had divided the Kuttabs into two different types: government Kuttabs and "free" or "private" kuttabs. The former operated in terms of the law of 1902 (No.962), which had determined the duties of the teachers or fikis, the general discipline of the school and the admission of pupils, the length of the school year and the dates of holidays, besides dealing with the curriculum and administrative details. The 1902 legislation had made it possible for the "free" Kuttabs to apply to the Ministry of Education for a subsidy (provided they complied with the requirements laid down by the government, which varied in proportion to the importance of the school and its educational work), following an inspection of the school by a government official. Eligibility for the receipt of a subsidy was usually made conditional upon the school having a classroom strength of not less than 25 pupils, being open to government inspection throughout the school year, regularly supplying the educational authorities with lists of pupils, and incorporating into the daily teaching-programme a diet of reading, writing and arithmetic. (26)

The Cromer policy upon Kuttabs was broadly in line with that advocated for Libya by Professor Nallino: the Kuttabs would be subsidised by the government and organised upon a three-year basis; admission would be to infants of six years, who after the third class (from the age of nine and ten upwards) would be eligible for entry into the gov-

ernment schools. These latter would be organised upon a five-year basis and, as in the Kuttabs, Arabic would be the medium of instruction, except in the final year, when Italian would be taught on an equal basis with Arabic. (27) Unfortunately, neither the Cromer nor Nallino approach was acceptable to Bertolini, since both approaches disregarded the place of the Italian language in the curriculum, the latter being focussed almost entirely upon the Arabic language and Islamic Culture, so denying the schools a political purpose as agents of pacific penetration. (28)

Meanwhile, the investigation into the workings of the Libyan Kuttabs, specifically in terms of the opportunities they presented for developing pacific penetration amongst the Arab population, had proved to be nugatory, having drawn the conclusion any attempt to interfere in their operation would be politically unpopular and educationally foolhardy. (29) If, on the other hand, Scallabrini argued to Bertolini, the Kuttabs were allowed to continue, merely as religious institutions, the government could gain considerable support in Libya, by offering to subsidise their activities in return for a few modest concessions, such as hygienic improvements, a widening of the curriculum, and other such minor alterations of their traditional function. (30)

Bertolini's final decisions upon the Kuttabs were expressed in articles 21-24 of his scholastic ordinance for Tripolitania and Cirenaica, promulgated in January 1914, N.

27) Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 481.

28) De Leone, E., Chpt. V., "La Nostra Politica Scolastica in Libia", La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord, Op. Cit., p. 40

29) See, Namias Report of July, 1913, p. 6.

30) See, Schools in Tripolitania, etc., Scallabrini, July, 1913, p. 1

56. In this law were expressed elements from all three policy options: the advice of both Nallino and Scallabrini underlay art. 1. of the decree, whereby the Kuttabs were permitted to retain their traditional character; article 23 was modelled upon Cromer's law of 1902, which sought to introduce a number of changes affecting the day-to-day running of the schools in return for a government subsidy. (31) Only in articles 22 and 24 did the government seem to assert its right to a vague suzerainty over the Kuttabs, which reflected the general policy of subordinating all Arab institutions to the reforming hand of Italian bureaucratic control, though it is difficult to see what this could have amounted to in general practice, as the implementation of these articles was left to the collaboration of cadi in the vicinity in which the school was located, along with the local commission of notables.

31) "To the Koranic Schools that show the highest observation of the norms of hygiene, propriety, order, profitability, numbers of pupils in attendance, and in accepting the teaching of disciplines, included in the programmes of the Italian-type elementary schools, the Ministry can assign adequate subsidies, following the recommendation by the governor, or the same commissions as in art. 22." It is relevant to note that the section of this article referring to the programmes operating in the Italian Elementary Schools, caused the legal experts responsible for drafting the law a good deal of difficulty. This is apparent from a scrutinising of the original draft of the 1914 decree in the MAI Archive. As many as five different attempts are in evidence, in an effort to arrive at what was judged to be the right formula for expressing the article. These are as follows:

a) "disciplines comprising the programmes of the Italian elementary schools."

b) "disciplines, which will contribute to the increase and development of our colonial activity."

c) "disciplines, which will contribute directly to the formation of a wider culture, than the purely Islamic."

d) "in extending the discipline of their programmes to include practical and linguistic knowledge, which can increase understanding ("rapporti") between Arabs and Italian citizens." MAI-AS, Pos. 113, Scuole, 1913, Fasc. 1-6: Ordinamento Schol. Della Tripolitania.

III. Whether to establish a Medersa in Libya ?

"The medressah attached to several of the mosques are a kind of seminary for boys intending to become priests, and who need to improve their understanding of religious matters, through a study of the laws of the Koran."(32)

"The Wakf has for centuries been the only way for Islamic societies to support the cult, and provide for the public good."(33)

Bertolini's policy of bringing the Kuttabs under government control, ostensibly for sanitary, administrative and educational reasons, but primarily for political reasons- however vague and nebulous- while at the same time allowing them to "go their own way"(34), indicated a marked preference for Franco-type solutions in Libya(35) rather than the Arabist policies suggested by Nallino.(36) Bertolini's policy of "tolerance" towards the Kuttabs, also marked a turning away from British policies, outlined by Stoppolini in his report from Alexandria in 1913, whereby Arab teachers were to be trained for the "reformed Kuttabs" at special centres attached to elementary schools.(37) Instead of the direction advocated by Nallino and implemented by the British in Egypt, Bertolini, by adopting the hybrid Italo-

32) See, Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili, April, 1912, p.3.

33) MAI-AS, Assetto Dei Servizi Civili(1911-1919), Pos.113, Fasc.1-2, Sistemazione dei beni awqaf(1911-1916), C.A. Nallino, 27 Luglio, 1916, p.2. (This report upon the working of the Awqaf in Tripoli, and the proposals to set up an Islamic University there, comprises 13-pages of detailed and scholarly treatment of the problems involved).

34) Report upon the Schools of Tripolitania and Cirenaica, Prof. Inspector, Amerigo Namias, 22 July, 1913, Op.Cit., p.6.

35) See, MAI-AS, Assetto Dei Servizi Civili(1911-1919), Pos.113, Fasc.1-18, Ordinamento Politico: Report of the 20th April, 1916 upon O.P.A. (Administrative and Organisational Policy) for Tripolitania, p.11. (involves heavy criticism of the Bertolini O.P.A. of 1914 on account of its excessive dependence upon French colonial ideas, deemed unsuitable by the author (possibly Nallino) for Libya).

36) See, Chpt. One, Section III., supra.

Arab school; modelled upon the Franco-Arab school of Algeria, required Arab teachers specially trained to work alongside Italian personnel. The British method of training elementary teachers, as outlined by Stoppolini, was unsuited to the development of a cadre of teachers for working in the new government-schools. If collaboration was to be the principal aim of Italian educational policy, and Libya was to be developed rather like Algeria, as a colony directly under the central government, Italy's interests in the country would be better served by adopting the French expedient of training teachers in a special colonial-type institution. For such purposes, Bertolini favoured the establishing in Libya of a Medersa similar to medersah established by the French in Algeria during the late nineteenth century and subsequently transplanted into their other colonies. (38) In the long-term, such a method would ensure that the best Arab teachers were working in the government schools. The Kuttabs would be the chief casualties of such an arrangement, and, Scallabrini estimated, would gradually lose their importance and popularity with the population. (39)

37) See, The Kuttabs in Egypt (Section III., The Training of Teachers for Kuttabs), A. Stoppolini, Alexandria, 1913, pp. 4-11.

38) Pollard, M., Op. Cit., pp. 303-4.

39) The first elements of this strategy appeared in the Namias Report of 1913. In his report, Namias advised Scallabrini to establish in Tripoli "sui generis" a special course for training Arabi pupils in "spoken Arabic, pedagogy and didactic, the rudiments of science, hygiene and agriculture" for a period of one or two years, during which they would receive a government stipend in return for which they would undertake to teach in the government elementary-schools for not less than three years. See, Namias Report, pp. 6-9; and Scallabrini Report, Op. Cit., p. 14.

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In establishing a Medersa in Libya, the Italians, unlike the French, did not need to worry about having to graft colonialism onto the stem of an existing institution, since the most advanced type of Moslem school in the coastal area of Tripolitania(40) were the medresah.(41) These schools were attended by boys intending to take up a religious career, who, on leaving the Kuttab, would spend around three years in developing their understanding of Arabic, Koranic commentary and religious and civil law(42), before commencing their final studies at either the ancient medresah's of Ez-Zeituna and Khaldunia in Tunisia, or at the famous University of El-Azhar in Cairo.(43) These centres of higher Moslem learning were extremely unpopular with the colonial authorities-whether French, British or Italian-who accused them of spreading "fanaticism" and acting as strongholds of Arab Nationalism or the Pan-Islamic Movement.(44) The French had attempted to by-pass them by creating a colonial version of the same school-a policy the Italians would seek to imitate in Libya- and the British were in 1919 to close down El-Azhar entirely because of its political activities. Even as early as 1913, the continued attendance of Libyan students at such centres alarmed Bertolini, who in the course of a lengthy directive to the Governor of Tripolitania condemned El-Azhar for being a centre of Pan-Arabism from whence "subversive

40) See, M. Poulard, L'Enseignement pour les Indigenes en Algerie (Alger, 1909), pp. 142, 145 and 230.

41) See, supra, p. 67.

42) Scallabrini Report (Scuola Superiore o Modersa), pp. 25-8.

43) MAI-AS, Politica Indigena, Pos. 126-1, a. 14, Fasc. 1-14: Bertolini to General Garioni, Governor of Tripolitania, 11 June, 1913, Rome, p. 1.

44) M. Poulard, Op. Cit., p. 136; and Jone Briotti, Il Waqf in Libia (Roma, 1936), p. 62.

ideas are spread to other countries".(45) Bertolini's way of solving this problem lay in the creation of a School of Higher Islamic Culture modelled upon the new medersas in Algeria in which intending teachers undertook to study the French language, Islamic culture, Arabic and the necessary elements of pedagogy prior to commencing work in the government schools-in essence the policy suggested by Inspector Namias in 1913. It did not follow that the problem of discouraging students from attending the traditional centres of Islamic learning outside Libya could be solved by creating a traditional type medersa in Libya itself. This would only transfer the unrest to Libya from Egypt and Tunisia and create a "yearning for political change which cannot be satisfied".(46)

Apart from the need to educate and train a corps of Arab teachers for the Italo-Arab schools, Bertolini was moved towards the idea of a Libyan alternative to El-Azhar by other factors connected with the internal situation in the country, despite his general misgivings upon the subject. First, there was the need to provide for the present and future needs of colonialism in the country, by developing an Italophile elite to whom Italy could entrust the management of Arab affairs; and second, was the need to win the approval and support of the Ulemah and mass of the Libyan population for Italian rule. If a new elite could be trained for the future, Italian influence could be increased in the Moslem tribunals, an area in which the Treaty

45) Bertolini to General Garioni, Op.Cit., p.1.

46) Ibid.

of Lausanne had left Italy bereft of prerogatives.(47) Also, it was important for Italy "to show that she cared for her new subjects" through the provision of educational institutions dedicated to the maintenance, and development of their language, religion and culture.(48) It was important, as Bertolini saw it, to avoid offering too much both in terms of Italy's inadequate resources of men and experienced manpower, and also in terms of the need to avoid encouraging ambitions, which could only lead to civil unrest.(49) The circumstances of 1913 excluded any lavish imitation of French ideas even if the French medersa were the desired prototypes for adoption.(50)

Knowing the Ulemah were enthusiastic for a medersa in Tripoli, the question for Bertolini in 1913, was to what extent they would support his ideas upon the subject, rather than their own preferences, which inclined them not towards a colonial prototype favoured by the French in Algeria, but towards a more-or-less exact replica of the University of El-Azhar in Cairo. With such ideas in mind, the minister instructed Scallabrini, during his visit to Libya in 1913(51)

47) As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Sultan was empowered to appoint the cadi, who in turn appointed the Ulemah and officials responsible for the administration of justice in the Moslem courts. Thus technically, Italy had little direct control over the legal system in Libya. This caused endless difficulties in running the country since it impinged upon Italian sovereignty in vital areas. See, MAI-AS, Il rappresentante del Sultano in Libia (1912-20), Pos. 106. Fasc. 1-6; from the Procurator General of the Court of Appeal of Tripolitania to the R. Governor of Tripolitania, 28 Oct., 1913, Tripoli.

48) See, Caruso-Ingillieri, Primi Ordinamenti, p. 1.

49) Bertolini to Garioni, Op. Cit., p. 1.

50) See, Scallabrini Report, Op. Cit., pp. 14 and 25.

51) The exact date of Scallabrini's visit in 1913 is difficult to establish with any degree of precision because

to sound out Arab opinion regarding the establishing in Tripoli of a medersa for the training of cadi, mufti, magistrates and school teachers. Also it was important to gain some estimate of the extent to which the Ulemah were prepared to support the project from local funds. (52) On arrival in Libya, Scallabrini, accompanied by Muzzafer Bey, the Inspector of Arab Schools, held wide-ranging discussions with the Arab leaders both in the oases and in Tripoli itself, as a result of which he reported back to his chief that the reforms proposed by Bertolini would be welcomed. (53) In a particularly long conference held with the Ulemah to discuss the proposed medersa, Scallabrini was discomforted to learn that the minister's concept of a medersa was not shared by the Arab leaders, who wanted an Islamic university, similar to El-Azhar in Cairo. (54) In support of its proposals, the Ulemah offered to finance its schemes from the revenues of the Auqaf El-Sur (55) and provide land for a new building in the region of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli and the Moslem cemetery. (56)

(contin.) of the undated and unsigned condition of the surviving copy of the report compiled by Scallabrini upon the visit. See, Scallabrini Report.

52) Scallabrini relates: "I outlined to them briefly Your Excellency's intentions with respect to the Koranic Schools, elementary schools for Arabs and even for the high school or medersa". See, Scallabrini Report, p.13.

53) Ibid., p.14.

54) Ibid., p.25.

55) Ibid., pp.25-26.

56) Ibid.

57) "The School of Islamic Culture will be founded in accordance with letter f. of art.1. in Tripoli, with the aim of opening to Moslem youths entry to religious and legal offices, and the career of native school teachers. An educational decree will determine the form of the administration to be adopted by the school, along with the teaching

Although no doubt relieved to hear that his forthcoming ordinance for Libyans appeared to enjoy general support, Bertolini was disconcerted to learn that his plans for a medersa had encountered the opposition of the Ulemah and other Arab leaders. The proposal to set up a university funded from the revenues of the Auqaf El-Sur was more than either he himself or any of his successors were prepared to concede. The placing on the statute book, however, in 1914 and 1915 of the Italian intention only to establish in Tripoli a "School of Islamic Culture" (57) must be interpreted as an act of obstinacy and ambivalence if not down-right deception. Calculated to win support in Libya for the Ministry's new educational policy for Libyans, it at the same time ensured that the new institutions would be of the reformed variety, and not the traditional kind of medersa urged by the Ulemah. The wording, however, was so vague and without precedent that it could easily convey to people in the community at large—whether Aqab or Italian—that the term "School of Islamic Culture" meant (or could mean) Islamic University. This was certainly the interpretation placed on the term by the special open-commission of Arabs and Italians who met in Tripoli on 4 November 1915 to establish ways of reforming the Wakf in Libya (58), and in particular to examine ways of "devolving"

(contin.) programme. See, R.D., 15 Jan., 1914, N. 56, BUC, 268. "A School of Islamic Culture will be set up in Tripoli and comprise two sections: one to fulfil the functions of a normal school for the preparation of native teachers, the other for the preparation of cadi and mufti (art. 96), board-in accommodation will be attached to the school (art. 97) and both the school and the student-bursaries will be financed from the Wakf, already devoted to this purpose (art. 98). See, D.Lgt., 17 Oct., 1915, N. 1809, BUC, 1916, 5.

58) "Wakf in Libya": the word waqf is the plural of uquf

the revenues of the Auqaf el-Sur (59) upon a "School of Islamic Culture" (60)

The unanimous decision of the commission to rechannel the revenues of the of the ancient Auqaf-El-Sur from the maintenance of the city walls of Tripoli into the establishment of of an Islamic University was not surprising in view of the circumstances at the time. On the Italian side, the government's intention to establish a University for Moslems in Tripoli, to avoid having to send Libyan students to Cairo, had been a feature of colonial policy since 1912, and Caruso himself had remarked upon the fact in his work of 1914. (61) The position of Tripoline Arabs had been made clear to Scallabrini in his capacity as Bertolini's representative in the summer of 1913, and the Arab members of the commission of November 1915 made their position doubly clear, by drawing an analogy between the Auqaf's original purpose in protecting the town from enemy invaders, and its new purpose in establishing an Islamic University, which would protect Tripoli from the enemies of Islam. (62)

The Ministry of Colonies was unprepared for such a decision, and must have assumed that the presence of Italians on the commission would be sufficient to ensure that its

(contin.) and Auqaf means basically to "arrest" or "halt" (in the legal sense of staying a judgment following a verdict) and is derived from the trilateral waqafa meaning to immobilise or render inalienable by constituting a Waqf. See, Califano, G., Il Regime Dei Beni Auqaf Nella Storia E Nel Diritto Dell' Islam (Tripoli, 1913), p. 1.

59) At the commencement of the Italian occupation in 1911, there were in Libya three waqf: the auqaf el-Giama, auqaf es-Sur and the auqaf ad-dhurrija. See, J. Briotti, Il Waqf in Libia, Op. Cit., p. 52

60) Ibid. (Chpt. IV. "La Riforma"), pp. 19-31.

position as stated in the Bertolini and Martini Ordinances of 1914 and 1915 would be respected. The final decisive words of advice upon the viability of the commission's work came from Nallino himself to whom the Ministry of Colonies had entrusted the preparation of the scheme of the law for the reform of the auqaf.⁽⁶³⁾ Nallino's response to the situation was to urge the Ministry to disregard the commission's proposals both in view of the incompetence of the Italian members of the commission and also upon technical grounds. He does not seem to have believed that Italy was morally committed to adhere to the commission's findings, regardless of the unsatisfactory nature of its proposals from the Italian point of view. Rather he took the view that the commission had bungled the reform of the auqaf and hopelessly compromised the future of any higher educational establishment for Moslems in Tripolitania.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The best that could be done in such circumstances was to publish the commission's findings and then ignore them completely by promulgating a special decree governing the the reform of the auqaf es-sur and devolving its revenues upon the School of Islamic Studies already

61) See, Primi Ordinamenti, re "the government looks forward to opening an Islamic University", p. 283.

62) See, Progetto Di Ordinamento Dell Amministrazione Dei Beni Auqaf, Nov. 4 1915 (Roma, 1916), pp. 94-5

63) see, Nallino Report of July, 1916, pp. 7-12.

64) Ibid., p. 11.

65) Ibid (summary of the Nallino position throughout)

proposed in the Bertolini-Martini Ordinances.(65)

Nallino sought to justify his opposition to the commission's proposals, regarding the reform of the auqaf and the use of its funds in setting up an Islamic University, upon legal and technical grounds that capitalised upon the government's stated position-only to set up in Tripoli (the date was unstated and so left open to public speculation and political convenience) a School of Islamic Studies - and made use of his own immense knowledge and experience of Arab and Islamic affairs. He also made use of educational arguments which revived and extended the proposals he had put forward to Bertolini in 1913 upon the subject of Libyan education, and would be used yet again before the Post-War Commission of 1919, eventually finding legal acceptance in the legislation of the Parliament of Cirenaica in 1922. It would be no exaggeration to affirm that it was the hand of no less a person than Nallino himself, who drafted out the articles of the Bertolini-Martini ordinances, as they affected the establishing of a medersa in Tripoli. His influence in this respect would extend on into the Fascist era, and can be traced in both the 1928 attempt to set up the school, and also in the 1936 legislation, which finally brought about its creation. The Nallino handling of the proposals of the Government Commission for the Reform of the Auqaf in 1915, however, is particularly interesting in the light it casts upon the professor's role in the formulation of Libyan policy. It also reveals his own basic political attitude towards Arab affairs in Libya. This may be summed up as a rejection of the assumptions of cultural imperialism, as conveyed by by pacific penetration, but an opposition to Arabisation, as expressed by Fahat-Bey, the nationalists and the Islamic party.

IV. Italian Policy for Professional Education and the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli

"The school, together with the school of agriculture which I believe Your Excellency intends to open in the near future, could be of immense use in bringing about prosperity in the country, and in helping us to spread pacific penetration amongst the population." (66)

In the case of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, the goal of collaboration by means of pacific penetration seemed infinitely more realisable; for whereas the kuttabs, medresah and medersa were closely related, through the sharing of a common purpose, with the religious community as a whole; the School of Arts and Crafts, established in 1897 by the Turks to serve as both orphanage and training centre for professional skills, clearly pursued social and economic goals. (67) Also, although the school had been established by the state, it was financed and largely controlled by the municipality (68), which had already donated the land upon which the building stood, besides providing for its maintenance and running costs with a percentage from certain taxes. (69) Such an arrangement, however, did not automatically ensure complete Italian control, since it sep-

66) Scallabrini Report, July 1913, p. 6.

67) Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 545.

68) Caruso-Ingillieri, I Primi Ordimanenti Civili, p. 213.

69) These taxes were primarily, the tax upon the sale of Esparta Grass ("marochloa tenacissima" → indigenous to Southern Europe and North Africa), and the tax upon the slaughter of lambs. See, Namias Report, July, 1913, Op. Cit., pp. 2-5. Although no source states the exact percentage of the tax upon Esparto grass received by the school, it is perhaps relevant to note that in an average year, 16,690 tons worth were exported from Tripoli, amounting to £75,000 or just over a fourth of Tripoli's total exports at this time. See, Wellington Furlong, The Gateway to the Sahara, Observations and Experiences in Tripoli (London, 1909), p. 154.

arated the running of the school from the running of the government schools, which were financed from Italian sources, and conferred on it a certain degree of autonomy strengthened by its own written constitution. This situation ensured that the scholastic superintendent had only a nominal responsibility for the school extending hardly further than the right to advise upon the curriculum as it affected the general education of the pupils. Technical matters affecting the school were the responsibility of the Ministry of Economics in Rome and overall control was the responsibility of the Ministry of Colonies. Day-to-day administration and control, however, was the task of the director and his staff, who in the final analysis took their orders from the governor of Tripolitania. The fact, however, that not only was the school still financed from its own patrimony after 1911 as before; but that its constitution stipulated that only Moslem orphans or day-pupils could use its facilities, helped to ensure that its general well being was a cause of lively concern to the people of Tripoli. (70) The Italians were well aware of its local importance and whenever the government was concerned to win Arab support for its measures (as in 1914, 1916 and again in 1919), the school became the object of some new reform, which would peter out as the policy in question failed to win Arab support or produce the results desired in Rome. (71)

70) See, Scallabrini Report, July, 1913, pp. 6-9.

71) See, MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi Del Soppresso Ministero Dell'Africa Italiana (including Fondo Volpi), Cart. 13/1, Fasc. B-1-Relazione del dr. Piccioli (27.6.1926) sullo stato della Scuola di Arti e Mestieri di Tripoli., pp. 5-11.

This uncertain state of affairs at the school made little sense in practice either of pacific penetration or any other policy beloved by the central government and, in the first year of the occupation, the buildings of the school were rapidly acquired by the military, who used them as an artillery barracks and general headquarters. (72) The Directorate of Civil Affairs in Tripoli became responsible for the school following its creation in 1912, but failed to secure possession of the buildings until a year later, when they were vacated by the artillery. (73) In the meantime, in an attempt to alleviate the severe refugee problem, the government opened two orphanages for Arab children on the outskirts (at Bu-Meliana (74)) and Men-

72) Primi Ordinamenti, p. 268.

73) Piccioli notes that during its occupation of the school and for some considerable time after its vacation of the building, the army made use of the topography department, which had a valuable printing press, in return for which, it paid the Directorate of Civil Affairs an unspecified percentage of all profits accruing from the sale of printed materials. See, Piccioli Report of 1926, p. 47.

74) Established by the Civil Affairs Department in June 1913 for 120 orphans of both sexes under the age of seven years in a former palace of the Caramanli family at a cost of L35,000 per annum to the colonial budget. Although, initially, only intended as a temporary measure, the orphanage continued in existence for several years until absorbed into the School of Arts and crafts (in the case of male children). Scallabrini was opposed to the latter measure in 1913 on humanitarian grounds, despite the government's desire to rid itself of the economic burden of having to care for the children. Scallabrini's opposition to the scheme was based upon his own assessment of the "disorder" and decline into which that once thriving institution had fallen since 1911. See, Piccioli Report of 1926, p. 6; the Scallabrini Report of July, 1913; and Primi Ordinamenti, p. 270.

75) Originally opened in Sept. 1912 by the governor and placed under the control of the Ministry of War, this institution for the training of vagrant and orphaned Arab

scia(75)), until such a time as the School could be sufficiently organised to function normally again (76) This seemed to be on the point of being accomplished, when, at the end of 1912, the Civil Affairs Department, apparently by acting on its own authority, reopened the orphanage, along with the general education section of the school, to a small number of older orphans. De Blasi was provisionally appointed director, and further plans were drawn up and submitted for approval to the Ministry of Colonies in Rome. (77)

The Ministry, however, was determined not to have the pace of development dictated by Tripoli or its own lofty plans brought to earth by the need to balance the colonial budget in Tripolitania. The plan forwarded from Tripoli was therefore turned down, and responsibility for the school entrusted to the Directorate of Italian Schools Abroad, which in July 1913 forwarded to Bertolini

(contin.) youths as non-commissioned officers in the Ascari soon became a purely civilian establishment. As such, it functioned both as an orphanage and as a school, gradually sending older boys to the partly opened School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli or to be trained as mechanics at the artillery workshops in the town. See, Contini, F., "Istituzioni Scolastiche", Op. Cit., p.16

76) In the autumn of 1913, Scallabrini proposed to Bertolini that the recreatorio at Menshia be gradually phased out; its 120 pupils being removed to the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli (the latter was then only being used by 26 pupils, three of who slept in the dormitory). Unfortunately, no provisional estimate had been accepted by either the Ministry of Colonies or the Dept. of Civil Affairs in Tripoli, as to how many boarders the school could accommodate without the extra charge for their maintenance falling to the colonial budget. Namias had (in following Scallabrini's lead) estimated that the School could accommodate all 120 pupils from the recreatorio on its own budget. The Commissioner Extraordinary, Avv. Zedda, who was not an official of the Ministry of Colonies, disagreed with the 120-estimate, indicating that on his own estimate the school could only feed and board from its own resources 100 orphaned boys. See, Scall-

Menshia

Menshia

whom

whom

its own amalgam of ideas and practical suggestions for the institution's future development.(78)These plans took into account not only the particular development of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli;but of the development of professional education in Tripolitania,as a whole.Again,as with previous proposals emanating from the Department of Schools or the Ministry of Colonies, French ideas are dominant, and Tripolitania is for the purpose of professional education compared with the French colonies in North Africa, where schools similar to the School of Arts and Crafts were seen to exist.(79)The idea of developing the school as a centre for the revival of traditional arts and crafts in Tripolitania as a whole was prominent amongst these borrowed notions.(80)In this way,it was confidently predicted,an additional source of livelihood for the region,as well as an extra source of export revenue would be created.(81)In his final report for the 1912-13 school-year,Namias outlined the aspects of such a policy,which might,he believed,prove particularly beneficial to the arts and crafts industry in Libya,through the development of appropriate courses at the School

(contin.) abrini Report of July,1913,pp.6-9;and the Namias Report of July,1913,pp.2-5.

77) Namias Report,pp.2-7;and Piccioli Report,1926,pp.4-7.

78) Namias Report,pp.2-5;and Scallabrini Report,pp.6-9.

79) Namias Report,pp.2-5;Scallabrini Report,pp.6-9;and the Colosimo Report,p.374.

80) Ibid.

81) Ibid.

82) Namias Report,p.3.

of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli:

- "a. The carpet industry-still producing works of a relatively high standard at Kairouam and Misurata; for which an embryonic type of instruction is provided by us at the girls' professional school in Tripoli;
- b. The pottery industry, although it had almost disappeared in Tripoli, has in the past produced items of an extremely high quality in the form of vases, tiles and ceramics, vestiges of which can still be seen in the houses of rich merchants;
- c. Wood-carving, unfortunately today almost non-existent in the province, but flourishing in Tunisia, where furniture, beautifully inlaid with ivory and mother of pearl is readily available at competitive prices;
- d. Plaster-craft, especially stucco, of which magnificent examples can be seen in the Bardo Museum of Tunis and the Belvedere cupola and also in numerous religious buildings in both Libya and Tunisia;
- e. The copper industry, developed with such an eye to perfection in nearby Egypt;
- f. Leather work-local industry is fully capable, aided by suitable encouragement and training, of producing craft-products, noted for their ingenious use of gold and silver embroidery to produce exquisite results;
- g. The construction industry, so notable in the past for its impressive architecture of which so many fine and interesting examples abound in the country." (82)

Namias backed his proposals with additional suggestions of a more practical nature to the effect that the implementation of such a policy would depend upon the Ministry managing to recruit suitably skilled craftsmen from Egypt and Tunisia to teach in the school. Such a policy, he believed, would not prove financially onerous to the government, and would after all be a matter of investment in the future of the colony. Namias recommended the Ministry to employ a local painter (Signor Vito Stracqua) to supervise these arrangements and oversee the imported craftsmen in their work of instructing Libyan apprentices,

though further enquiries would first have to be made into his qualification and background.(83)

Namias' proposals were approved in general by his chief, Scallabrini, who duly forwarded them to Bertolini at the Ministry of Colonies in July 1913; and developed themes on the same lines in his own report, though with greater emphasis upon the industrial aspect of the school's development in connection with which Namias had said nothing.

(84) The emphasis upon the need to cultivate industrial skills in Libya amounted to a return to the principal aims underlying the foundation of the School of Arts and Crafts by the Turks. This had been primarily for the training of artisans, mechanics, tradesmen and skilled labourers; for which the school was amply equipped with the best machinery it was possible to obtain.(85)

The Namias-Scallabrini proposals of 1913 were subsequently embodied in the report of a special ministerial commission upon the school, promised by the government in 1912 (86), but delayed until after the promulgation of the Bertolini-Martini Ordinances of 1914 and 1915, not finally meeting until the end of 1915.(87) As a result of its investig-

83) Namias Report, p.3

84) Following the Namias proposals, Scallabrini urged Bertolini to authorise the recruitment of teachers for the school from Syria, Egypt and Tunisia, affirming that the revival of traditional skills would be well received by the Arab leaders, who were in favour of such proposals. Deposits of clay, he added, were available in ample quantities in Nabeul and could be used for a ceramics industry. Scallabrini Report, pp.6-9.

85) In Ottoman times, the school had offered a six-year course consisting of six classes, five of which were preparatory (elementary geography, history, arithmetic, geometry, reading and writing in Arabic and Turkish, the Koran and religious doctrine) and the remaining class professional.

ations, the commission concluded that the school should be organised in terms of the criteria outlined by the Turks or of similar institutions in Algeria and Tunisia.

(88) The school's principal task according to such aims was "the creation of sound operatives, trained to maintain local traditions of manufacture, through the use of modern ideas and methods of production. In this way a capable class of workman will be developed, able to work in all parts of the colony and perform tasks which Italian workmen are unable to perform." (89)

In emphasising the revival of traditional industries, there can be no doubt that the Italians like the French were very much concerned to avoid a duplication of skills amongst the work-force, such as might lead to competition between Arab and Italian workmen for similar work, hence the final note of ambivalence in the report. (90) The comm-

(contin.) In the professional course, which followed the two hours of general education, and lasted until one hour before sunset, the following skills were taught: shoemaking, carpentry, fitting and mechanics, tailoring, brass and copper work, saddling, building, typography, gold and silver work, along with special crafts reserved for girls (weaving, carpet-making and seamstressry) and conducted in a special girls' section of the school. See, Piccioli Report, 1926, p. 4

86) See, Scallabrini Report, 1913, p. 6

87) See, Piccioli Report, 1926, p. 9

88) In Algeria, the French had sought to revive indigenous industries, once very prosperous, through the training of Arab artists and craftsmen, as a means of responding to the social and economic organisation of the country. See, Poulard, Op. Cit., p. 247.

90) The French did not believe there was any solution to the problem of competition on the open market in a capitalist economy. Confrontation between Arab and French workmen could, however, easily result from such a situation. One possible solution was to train two separate workforces for different but complementary roles in the colonial economy. Hence, emphasis on the need to revive traditional indus

ission, however, failed to endorse the idea that was quite common in the first days of Italian rule, namely that the school should be "opened to the whole community, regardless of race or religion". Such ideas had been espoused by Namias who in 1913 stated his belief that the school should be opened to "all nationalities and not only to Arabs." (91) This policy was not without its attractions because of the need to train Italians as artisans, craftsmen and local shopkeepers, the facilities for which were lacking in the Italian schools at this time. The policy was not, however, adopted for a complexity of reasons in part associated with the school's special statutes, which restricted entry to Moslems only, but also with the decline in the school after 1911, and the farming out of the workshops to local entrepreneurs for their own use and profit. (92)

The policies evolved for the school by the Ministry of Colonies stood little chance of successful implementation in the disturbed years following Italy's entry into the European war, and the outbreak in Libya of the Italo-Turk war, during which educational issues generally lost their importance at Rome. (93) It is arguable that, given the absence of such vicissitudes, Italy would have found great difficulty in implementing the various proposals for the development of the school. First, not only had the

(contin.)ries to provide a form of alternative economy, as a means of avoiding economic, racial and social tension in the colony. See, Poulard, Op. Cit., pp. 240-247.

91) See, Namias Report, p. 3; and Primi Ordinamenti, p. 263.

92) See, Piccioli Report (Dati Di Fatto E Considerazioni Attenenti Alla Vita Economica Dell Istituto), pp. 54-65.

93) Enrico De Leone, La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord, p. 404.

life of the institution been fundamentally disturbed and the continuity of its work broken by the expulsion of Ottoman personnel (both teachers and administrators) in October 1912 (94); but Italy had failed to replace the former with Italian equivalents, due to general lack of such personnel in Italy, where the training of colonial personnel was still in infancy. (95) The difficulty in finding personnel, who were prepared to devote themselves to the running of the school in a fully professional and selfless manner, was more than adequately demonstrated, when in July 1913, the Ministry replaced the Civil Affairs nominee, De Blasi, with its own appointee, Professor Andreoni. (96) Andreoni, lacking the necessary personnel to implement the Ministry's proposals, closed down the workshops at the school, confining its educational function to that of a mere Italo-Arab school. (97) Furthermore, following the Ministry's reluctant acceptance of his drastic measures for administering the school, Andreoni instructed boys who were not orphans to return to their parents, to make way for the admittance of boarders from el-Menshia and Bu-Meliana, which the local authorities were anxious to close for economic reasons. (98) It was less these measures, however, and

94) See, Caruso-Ingillieri Report of April, 1912, p.6.

95) In 1913, the following institutions offered a vague kind of preparation for service in the Italian colonies: the commercial university of Milan, Luigi Bocconi, the school of administrative studies in Rome, the higher school of commerce in Venice, the higher school of commerce (consular section), Bari, the institute of social sciences in Florence. The Ministry of Colonies was making efforts to improve this situation by reforming the Oriental Institute of Naples, encouraging the efforts of the Colonial Institute at Rome, and through sponsoring special courses relevant to colonial activity throughout Italy. See, MAI-AS, Fasc. 176, pos. 4-25: Schools for the teaching

more Andreoni's continual "absenteeism in Italy", where he was also director of the noted industrial school at Reggio-Callabria, that brought about his dismissal, barely six months after his initial appointment to the Tripoli post. (99)

Andreoni, who was replaced on 10 February 1914 by a certain Colonel Pellerano, was, regardless of his undoubted faults and failings, the last director of any acknowledged professional status or competence to be appointed to the school until Vincenzo Rosati's appointment on 1 December 1919. (100) In the interim, first under Pellerano and (following his dismissal a year later for failing to develop the school adequately) then under his successor, Eduardo Ximenes, who owed his position principally to his position in Tripoli as a prominent free-mason, the school declined into almost complete educational stagnation. (101)

(contin.) of Colonial Matters, March 1913.

96) Piccioli Report, p. 7.

97) Andreoni closed down the following workshops: silk-weaving, wool and cotton (these had already been transferred to the girls' professional school, See, Chpt Two), tailoring, shoemaking, tanning, carpentry, fitting and mechanics and bricklaying: Ibid., p. 7.

98) This left the school at the end of 1913 with 13 orphans: Ibid., p. 7

99) Ibid. (Scallabrini initially favoured the appointment of a certain Captain Fasulo, who had been delegated to act as director during Andreoni's repeated absences at Reggio-Calabria. This man subsequently became the most corrupt director in the school's history under Italian rule)

100) Ibid., p. 12

101) Taking up his duties at the school on 10 April 1916, Ximenes continued as director until 30 June, 1919. Under his direction the school entered into a period of "stagnation and disorder." Finally, the director's incompetence reached such a point of public scandal, that the governor was forced to dismiss him, following his denunciation by a staff-member, a certain Capt. Cubeddu. Ibid., p. 10.

Chapter Four

The Conceding of a Protectorate and the Orientalist Policy of Alfonso Nallino 1918-1919

".....the massacre of Arab non-combatants, women and children, by the Italian troops in Tripoli had embittered the Arabs beyond the ordinary against all Christians."(*)

Giolitti's principal miscalculation in planning the Libyan War of 1911 lay in gauging the response of the Moslem Arab-Berber population of Libya to the country's de facto occupation by Italian forces. It was not a miscalculation for which he can be personally blamed in view of the combination of domestic and international factors which led him in the summer of 1911 to suddenly authorise a campaign for which only the diplomatic preparation was adequate and even that slipping rapidly. The assumption, based upon the scanty and erroneous information supplied by the Banco Di Roma and their agents in Libya, that not only would the Tripolitanian tribes welcome the Italians as "liberators from the oppression and degradation of Turkish rule"; but also that the powerful Senusi rulers of the Cirenaican hinterland would avoid any military confrontation with Italian forces in the coastal areas, proved a costly mistake from 1911 onwards for which Italy would pay dearly.

In fact, however, opposition to Western Imperialism in all its many and various forms was already apparent by 1911 in both the West and the East; even if still insufficiently developed as a political and ideological force to count

*) Ostler, A., The Arabs in Tripoli (London, 1912), p.11

very much in the calculations of the Western powers. This was a situation which changed rapidly after the Great War, during which many colonised peoples participated on the side of the Allies in return for guarantees of their future independence from colonial rule. Such an undertaking was not given to the Libyans by the Italian government and Italy, during the whole of the war in Tripolitania and part of it in Cirenaica, was unusual amongst the allied powers in that she was at open variance with her colonial subjects, for whom the Great War became a war of independence, and the prize of victory freedom from Italian rule.

In 1911, and until Mussolini's conversion to imperialism, the official reaction of the Giolittian centre of Italian politics to the wave of demonstrations (not only in Egypt and North Africa but also throughout the Arab and Islamic world) against the Libyan War was to deny that Italy's aims were "colonialist" in the accepted sense of that term. Giolitti himself could indeed rightly claim that his policies in the economic and political field had moved Italy away from "expansionism" in Africa; and in his own eyes the Libyan War was primarily concerned with Italian prestige at home and the defence of so-called strategic interests in the Mediterranean. If, however, Giolitti and his political allies tried to play down any colonialist overtones, their policies might evoke outside Italy, and particularly in Libya, where Arab interests were involved, the anti-Giolittian forces of the right escalated the colonialist implications of the war, regardless of the government's attempts to develop a

fledgling Islamic policy. Turkish and indigenous pressure groups within Libya profitted immensely from the contradictions and divisions inherent or revealed of Italian political opinion ;and lost no time in sowing the seeds of anti-colonialism amongst the people. By 1913, Bertolini had become so alarmed at the inroads made through such propaganda that he warned the newly-appointed Garioni, to avoid all contact with the press himself, to exercise a rigorous censorship of all printed materials, and if necessary to close down the frontiers with Egypt and Tunisia.

Such measures completely failed to assuage the deep-seated fear of the mass of the population that the Italians intended, as soon as the moment was opportune, to take over their lands, usurp their rights, and systematically convert them to Christianity. Against these basic fears, especially amongst the unlettered Beduin, Italian assurances counted for very little. Other factors cannot be discounted in tracing the causes of discontent with Italian rule and its increase. The growth of bureaucracy, for example, by entrusting all services to Italian officials, excluded Arabs from the government's policy of so-called "power-sharing", besides making nonsense of the "consultative committees" about which so much had been trumpeted by the Italian press. Nationalism and the desire for complete independence from Italian rule developed rapidly in Libya, especially in Tripolitania, once contacts had been renewed with the Turks during the long years of the European War, when Italian rule was reduced to Tripoli and a few coastal outposts.

The rising independence movement drew strength from the largely nominal nature of Italian rule throughout most of Tripolitania from 1916 onwards, as well as from the increasing exodus of Italian families from the province. The generally low ebb of Italian fortunes was particularly noted in 1919 by Micacchi, who drew "a picture painted in dark hues" of the social and economic condition of the remaining Italian families, little different from the conditions in which the Libyans were themselves living. This had resulted in a progressive decline in the number of enrolments to the Italian schools. (1) Micacchi believed, however, that such a situation was "purely temporary", and that the number of Italian families in the colony would increase of its own accord, once "normality" had been restored, through the establishment of an "efficient school system equal to that existing in Italy". (2)

The impression that the Italians were on the point of quitting Libya seemed obvious to the general public from the government's unwillingness in 1919 to risk a further military confrontation for the sake of retaining the colony. Instead of recourse to arms, Italian policy aimed to consolidate sovereignty in Libya through a policy of accommodation. This involved arriving at a settlement with

2) The Royal Superintendent reported that enrolments at the Italian schools for 1918-19 had fallen from 1,696 for 1917-18 to 1484 (a reduction of 212 pupils), and the fall had continued throughout the school year, amounting in the final term to 1,166 pupils (a loss of 318 upon the original enrolment figure. See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 11.

the Libyan Independence Movement and its leaders in Tripolitania, as well as securing a settlement with the Senusi in Cirenaica, which would consolidate the Accord worked out at Acroma in 1917. Italian expectations that the Fundamental Law of June 1919 would provide the necessary elements of compromise, whereby civil government could again be established, failed to comprehend with sufficient adequacy the strength and depth of local particularism, which by 1919 was unprepared to settle for anything less than complete independence, regardless of whatever agreements might be arrived at on paper by way of a modus vivendi.

II. Arab Opposition to Italian Educational Policies

"By every method, reject the proposal of Hasuna Paschia and the Commission, following the specious reasoning of Farhad bey (see, p.91), whereby the income of the Auqaf es-Sur is devolved upon the establishment of an Islamic University;" (3)

Arab opposition to the politica scolastica between 1911 and the conceding of the Fundamental Laws in 1919, relates closely in its ideological pattern to the general movement against Western Imperialism, gathering momentum in other parts of the Arab and Moslem World. It also fits in with the particular aims and strategies of local elites who, while not always sharing the same attitude towards the Italian occupation itself, were frequently united by bonds of language, faith and culture and (as was shown in the proposal to establish an "Islamic University" in Tripoli) prepared to bury their individual political differences, in order to press the Italian government into yielding

3) Nallino Report of July, 1916, p.9.

on a point of educational principle.(4)It would,however, be misleading to assume that complete agreement existed upon educational,as upon political,economic or social issues,amongst the articulate sections of the urban community.Many Arabs were clearly prepared to collaborate with the Italians and more than ready to send their children to be educated either in Italy or in the government schools in Libya.The general tendency,nonetheless, tended increasingly,as Italian rule more and more revealed its weaknesses and limitations,to break down educational issues into questions involving either language,culture or religion.This movement and its political implications was well understood by Nallino(5),but not by leading colonial educators,such as Micacchi,who viewed colonial education for Libyans in terms of pacific penetration.(6)Thus for Micacchi,Arab dissatisfaction with existing policies was never seen as ever amounting to more than a dissatisfaction with the poor quality of teachers,school-buildings,or a curriculum so closely modelled upon its Italian equivalent ,as to permit the teaching of viti-culture,and the history of classical times to Moslem children.(7)Micacchi's refusal to recognise that Arab

4) This is well illustrated by Nallino in his report upon the Reform of the Auquaf es-Sur in connection with the Italian proposal only to establish in Tripoli a "School of Islamic Culture." Upon such an issue, Hassuna Paschia Caramanli and Fahat bey were ready to sink their differences and support the Arab proposal for a University rather the government proposal for a School of Islamic Culture. See, Nallino Report of July, 1919, pp.9-11.

5) Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, Op.Cit, p.480.

6) Ibid., p.498.

7) "The error of the Italo-Arab Schools of 1914", affirmed

dissatisfaction with Italian policies was also an issue of principle (and political aim) rather than practice is understandable in view of the fact that the principles upon which Italy as a colonial power sought to base her educational policy in Libya were the same as those espoused by the Arab side. In this respect, both Arabs and Italians shared a similar attitude to education, which was at all points political through and through. (8) Thus, whereas the teaching of the Italian language was recognised as being indispensable for the securing of true collaboration with the Arab population, as well as securing Italy's prestige as a colonial power, the elimination of the Italian language from the elementary schools was viewed by many Arabs as equally important, if colonisation was to be resisted and their special identity uplifted. (9) Similarly, the cultural issue for Italians involved the right to fulfil Italy's "civilising mission", as a means of either assimilating or Italianising the new generation of Libyans. Arabs, on the other hand, understood by culture, the right to revive Arab civilisation and Islam, both as a defence against Western colonialism, and because of its intrinsic value. (10) In religious matters, although the Italians prided themselves upon the tolerance, flexibility and liberality

(contin.) Micacchi, "was the integration of their programmes with the programmes of the metropolitan schools. This caused them to teach, for example, how wine was manufactured, the names of the kings of Rome, and the achievements of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour, without a reference to the history and geography of Libya or recent colonial affairs. Modifications", he added, "were needed, while preserving the general lines already adopted." See, Ibid., p.500.

8) See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p.140.

9) See, *L'Enseignement aux Indigenes*, p. 494; Post-War Commission's Report of January, 1919, p.112.

of their policies, which rigidly forbade the Catholic Church from any form of active prosletisation in Libya (11), the fundamental aim of such policies was to ensure a separation of Church and State. Such a dichotomy was at complete variance with Islamic practice, where Church and State are closely interconnected. Traditionally, this union was expressed in the office of the Caliph-Sultan, who was both religious leader and secular prince. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire did not bring an end to the concept of the unity of Church and State, since the idea was embodied in many of the nation states that replaced it. (12) Italian refusal to allow the setting up of an Islamic University in Tripoli or even to implement the Bertolini proposal of 1914 for the establishing of a School of Islamic Culture was as much political as legal. As much as any other colonial power in an Islamic situation, Italy understood the close alliance in Libya of nationalism and religion and the political necessity of keeping both as widely apart as was feasible. It was a universal maxim that "texts from the Quran or Hadith of the Prophet were expounded in such a way that the outcome might be presumed to come from a political treatise. Conversely, current local affairs were often represented in a religious garb, so as to have an irresistible appeal to the minds of the young, that gave the

10) See, Colosimo Report, p. 363; and the Post-War Commission's Report of January, 1919, p. 112.

11) See, Proclamation of the General Commandant, Caneva, Op. Cit.

12) See, A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Education, Its Traditions and Modernisation into Arab National Systems, 5., Philosophy of Modernisation (London, 1972), pp. 68-87.

impression that the outcome was in accord with the wishes of the early caliphs or indeed of Mohamed himself."(13) It follows from such an analysis, that education was to neither side the purely altruistic, intellectual, progressive or pragmatic activity it is seen to be in situations when all things are considered to be equal. Rather for both Arabs and Italians, education between 1911 and 1919 was closely related to the achievement of either national or imperial goals. The latter found expression in linguistic, religious and cultural forms whose points of departure were in the main determined by historical events, which by 1919 had in Libya arrived at a new turning point.

* * * * *

In tracing the growth of opposition to colonialism in Libya at the educational level, one is witnessing the evolution of a national identity based upon religion, language and culture, and expressed in the demand for educational policies making sense in terms of that identity by contributing towards common aims. To view the causal aspect of this process, it is not necessary to go back much beyond the last fifteen years of Ottoman rule; for it was during these years that the educational changes, which had occupied Turkey in the middle years of the nineteenth century began to filter down to the

13) Tibawi, A.L., Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, 1913-1948, Chpt. VII, Religion, Nationalism and Education (London, 1962)

14) "Of all the Arab countries, only Syria and Iraq were around 1880 under the most direct Ottoman control. Tenuous control was exercised over the Hijaz in the Arabian Peninsula, largely because of the Holy cities, over Yemen and over the vast desert land of Libya.

provinces of the empire.(14)The support of local Ulemahs for such a system,which was secular in form and content and therefore separate from the traditional religious schools,was assured by virtue of the backing the educational changes had already received from the Sultan in his capacity as supreme religious leader or caliph.(15)This also ensured that the new system would complement rather than interfere with the traditional system,while not propagating doctrines contrary to Islam.(16)The new system both provided the nucleus of a state system of education in Libya at the elementary,professional and secondary level and acquainted the country with the modern idea of "progress" as it was in the process of getting accepted and developed by the Turkish nation.(17)A further important effect of these changes is to be seen in the creation of an educational alternative to the rival French and Italian systems,which were becoming popular in Tripoli with the families of notables.(18) and the Jewish minority.(19)By

(contin.)Egypt,Tunisia and Algeria were all under foreign occupation.The kingdom of Morocco in the far west was then struggling to maintain its existence as an independent state in the face of competition among the European powers for influence and control."Islamic Education,Op.Cit.,p.65.

15) Ibid.

16) Ibid.,p.66.

17) "The importance of the new schools",writes Tibawi,"was in their curriculum more than in their numerical strength.The four-year cycle was theoretically an improvement on the Kuttabs.It taught in addition to the traditional Arabic subjects,some arithmetic,history, geography and hygiene.From the lower elementary cycle upwards,additional subjects were attempted,including mathematics,physics,chemistry,biology,civics,Turkish, French and Persian.The programme for girls' schools was less loaded and stressed such subjects as domestic science,sewing and embroidery".Ibid.,p.67

1924, when the Turks began to exercise pressure to deter Arabs from making use of the Italian schools(20), the dangers of colonialism were becoming daily more obvious to Libyans, and there is little doubt that anti-colonial sentiments were encouraged in the Turkish schools and increased rapidly from this point onwards, largely in response to the dangers from Italy.(21)

The movement of anti-colonialism in Libya was certainly favourable to the Ottoman cause and acted as a useful antidote to the attempts of the Banco Di Roma and the Italian Consul General to create a strong Italian party in the country through the liberal distribution of bribes and the development of cultural and economic penetration. (22) Anti-colonialism also increased Ottoman popularity at the expense of any sudden development of Arab nationalism, which in Libya and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire began its incipient growth in the early years of the twentieth century.(23) During these years, it was apparent to the most committed of enthusiasts for the Arab cause that, despite its many defects, Ottoman rule was preferable to

18) Contini states that the "ancient register of the Catholic elementary school in Tripoli (for the late nineteenth century) indicates the presence and attendance at the school of sons of Arab notables, Turkish officials, Jewish and Maltese pupils, as well as Italian. See, Op.Cit., p.10.

19) Until 1911, the Catholic Mission Schools in Tripoli and Bengasi and the Schools of the Alliance Israelite Universelle were all in receipt of subsidies from the French government. See, Contini, Op.Cit., p.7; Bergna, C., Le Missione Francescana in Libia (Tripoli, 1924), pp.154-165; the Scallabrini Report (Scuole Private e Religiosi), July, 1913, p.26.

20) The pro-colonialist, Contini recounts that in 1904, the Turks were so alarmed at the popularity of the "special

Christian rule, and a strong Turkey the Arab homeland's best defence against the encroachments of the European powers.(24)The Italians reacted to the increase in their unpopularity in Libya by emphasising Italy's "civilising mission",as it was generally understood amongst informed circles that much of the resentment of many Arabs with Ottoman rule stemmed from Constantinople's failure to press ahead with administrative reforms in the Arab provinces.(25)Much resentment was caused by the public awareness that some governors misappropriated taxes,which were intended for new schools,roads and other such social amenities.(26)It was the argument ,Turkey had failed to improve the general standard of education and living in Libya that became the final Italian pretext for the invasion of October 1911.(27)

(contin.)course for Moslem students" at the Italian Technical Commercial School,that they set police agents at its entrances and exits in order to deter Arabs from using it. See,Op.Cit.,p.6.

- 21) See,R.Mori,"La Penetrazione Pacifica Italiana in Libia dal 1907 al 1911 e il Banco di Roma",Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali(Firenze,1957),pp.102-118,p.103.
- 22) See,Evans-Pritchard,Op.Cit.,The Turkish Administration,p.10
- 23) See,Ibid.,The Sanusiya and the Tribes,pp.62-90;T.E. Ahmad Harrah,"The Young Turks and the Arabs",p.112 of "Arabic and Islamic Garland",Op.Cit.;and S.G.Haim,Op.Cit.Introduction,Al-Afghani and the Crisis of Islam (throughout).
- 24) See,S.G.Haim,Op.Cit.,Introduction,p.7;T.E.Ahmad Harrah,Op.Cit.,p.112;and Evans-Pritchard,Op.Cit.,The First Italo-Senusi War,p.108.
- 25) "Most Arabs in the Empire wanted reforms more than separatism-especially agricultural improvements,the encouragement of the Arabic language,road construction, improvement of transport and tax reforms"See,Ahmad Harrah,Op.Cit.,p.112.
- 26) See,Sir Edwin Pears,Forty Years in Constantinople.The

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The ousting of Abdul Hamid in 1908, while initially seeming to favour the Italian cause in Libya, because of the unpopularity of the Young Turks in Tripoli and Bengasi(28), was but a brief gain; for the appointment of Ibrahim Pascha, as governor of the vilayet in 1910(29), led to the implementation of extensive reforms(30), which seemed to rob Italy of her trump card by eliminating the need to save the Libyans from the "backwardness and neglect of Turkish rule"(31) Not surprisingly, diplomatic pressure was exercised at the highest level by Italy in a successful bid to force Constantinople to transfer the popular Ibrahim Pascha from Tripoli where he had proved such an embarrassment to Italian interests and aims.(32)

(Contin.) Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears 1873-1915 (London, MCMXVI)

27) Brigadier T. Barclay, The Italo-Turk War; See, Appendices: The Italian Ultimatum to the Ottoman Government, 26 September, 1911 (London, 1912), p. 109.

28) Evans-Pritchard, Op.Cit., p. 100.

29) E. Bernet, En Tripolitaine (Paris, 1912), p. 241.

30) Ibrahim Pascha alleviated five years of famine and draught, as a result of which many had died, through the daily distribution of food. He also built roads, schools (including the School of Agriculture at Menscia, which was completed by Oct. 1911, but not opened) public buildings, sank wells and introduced many wide-ranging reforms. His work, however, was left incomplete on account of his sudden recall to Constantinople, from whence he was sent to quell the revolt against Turkey in the Yemen. See, E. Bernet, Op.Cit., especially the Appendix: Memoires du Marchal Ibrahim Pascha, Ancien Gouverneur, sur son oeuvre en Tripolitaine, Avant la Guerre 1910-1911.

31) See, Barclay, Op.Cit., p. 109; and Bernet, Op.Cit., p. 152

32) Bernet recounts: "Although Ibrahim Pascha has sought to avoid complications with the Italians that might lead to conflict, the Italians have constantly criticised him on account of his high ability and energy, which they regarded as an obstacle to the development of their influence in Tripolitania. Pressure was exer-

The setting up of "Schools of Propaganda" in Tripoli and Bengasi by the Committee of Union and Progress, not only increased anti-Italian feeling in the country, but, also, transmitted to Libya new political ideas, including nationalism and the secular state.(33) Behind such ideas was the presence of Western culture and in particular the secular notion of civil progress. Men like Sheikh Suliman Barouni, the Arab deputy of the Zawia department (Western Tripolitania), who was to be almost entirely responsible for attaching the Tripolitanian tribes so loyally to the Turkish flag in the subsequent war against the Italians, was an Arab nationalist par excellence, who had been educated in accordance with Western educational norms and dreamt of a revival of Arab science that would equal scientific knowledge in the West.(34) For Barouni and other influential Arabs, such as Sheikh Suni-ben Selim-Khezam, who was equally fluent in Arabic, Turkish and Djibelli (the difficult language spoken by the inhabitants of the hills), Ottomanism and the Turkification issue were seen within the perspective of the Italian threat and the ultimate establishment of a Tripolitanian Republic and perhaps even of

(contin.) cised upon the Grand Vizier, Hakki Paschia (formerly Turkish Ambassador in Rome) for his removal from Tripoli, where he was adored by the populace who he served so well." Op.Cit., p252.

33) Scallabrini during his visit to Tripoli in 1913, expressed the conviction that Libyan enthusiasm for education was entirely "the product of the propoganda of the Young Turks, through their Committees of Union and Progress". Op.Cit., p.14.

34) See, Griffin, E.H., Adventures in Tripoli (London, 1924), pp. 122, 142 and 97; and Oastler, A., Op.Cit., p.64.

a free and united Libya.

Italian failure to recognise the extent to which Libyan nationalism had developed in the final years of Turkish rule brought the Bertolini educational programme into head on collision with Libyan sentiment, despite the government's claim that the new policy aimed at "accommodation". The Ministry of Colonies refused to attach any significance to Nallino's warning that any form of Italianisation measures would have the opposite effect. Caruso's observations of the extent of local dissatisfaction with the provisional educational arrangements in Tripoli were likewise ignored. Opposition to the Italo-Arab Annexes and schools was, moreover, not confined to nationalist and Islamic zealots, but also expressed itself among ^{these} Arabs sympathetic to the Italian cause, who were decidedly reluctant to allow their sons to be educated in such institutions. Much of this latter opposition, however, was less directed against the principle of moderate assimilation, as expressed, for example, by bilingualism and useful injections of Italian and Western culture, as against poor and inadequate teaching, and unsuitable curriculum, along with the generally unsatisfactory nature of the provisional arrangements. This was particularly attested in the case of more important Tripoline and Benghazi families, who pressed the authorities into making special arrangements for the education of their children in Italy, despite Jewish protests about undue favouritism. The Turks too were not slow to provide educational facilities in

Turkey or elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire for the education of Libyan boys, both as a guarantee of the loyalty of particular areas, families and tribes and also as a means of providing a future cadre of leaders, loyal or sympathetic to the Ottoman cause.(35) Both collaborating and non-collaborating Arabs, however, believed the Italian schools to be run by atheists, a fear, which in the case of the former, had the paradoxical effect of increasing the numbers of Moslem children attending the Catholic schools of the male and female religious orders in Tripoli and Bengasi.(36) Only the dropping of the Italianisation element from the Bertolini decree and the adoption of a strong Islamic policy could have disarmed the fear that the government schools were out to attack the Islamic religion, to nullify the Arabic language and generally reduce Arab culture to a cipher.(37)

A further source of uncertainty, regarding the role of the schools, lay in the very ambiguity of Giolitti's annexation of the country in 1912. Politically, the effect of this act was to place Libya under the "full and complete sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy"(38). Libyans, however, only became "subjects" of the King of Italy and not "Italian

35) MAI-AS, Pos. 105/2-9: Orfani Arabi alle Scuole militari turche (1912-1915).

36) The popularity of the Catholic schools with both Italians and amongst certain sections of the Libyan population continued throughout this period. It was regarded by Micacchi as a "silent criticism" of the inefficacy of the government's elementary schools in failing to attract the better-off sections of the population. See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 82; and also, Caruso-Ingillieri Report of April, 1912, p. 5.

37) Monsignor Lodovico Antonelli, the Franciscan Apostolic Prefect in Tripoli, also accused the government schools of spreading immorality, indifference to religion, apathy and atheism in his Pastoral Letter of Christmas, 1917.

subjects" in view of the separate legal system for Moslems which Italy undertook to uphold in the Treaty of Lausanne. (39) In the matter of education, however, the Treaty of Lausanne had no effect whatsoever since Arabs had little option, if they wanted a state education, but to attend the government schools, which were modelled upon the Italian schools in Italy. Even the Bertolini and Martini legislation could not free itself from the influence of the Italian system, even though specially intended for Moslems; and this led many Arabs to believe that the government policy really intended to take away their Arab identity. ((40) Assimilation, thus seemed to be the government's aim, and the assurances to protect and respect local rights and traditions, appeared like so many of the other Italian assurances to be no more than a bluff to extend Italian control over all aspects of Libyan life. By 1919, the Arab leaders were only prepared to accept complete abrogation of the 1914 and 1915 legislation; and a firm undertaking on the part of the government to avoid any Italianisation in the future. (41)

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(contin.) This charge had already been made by Senusi Muntasser, an Arab Student at the Technical-Commercial school, who protested to the Director, Sig. N. Gandolpho against the dissemination of atheism in the school by certain teachers. See, MAI-AS, Fasc. 140 (Missione Cattolice, 1916-1935); from the Governor of Tripolitania to the Ministry of Colonies, 27 February, 1917.

38) Barclay, Op.Cit., p. 113

39) Ibid.

40) See, Commissione Dopo Guerra, Op.Cit., p. 129.

41) Ibid., p. 112.

A final source of dissatisfaction with Italian policies amongst the Arab population lay in Italy's failure between 1911 and 1919 to implement any policy adequately. In this respect, Italy had undoubtedly failed to honour the promise made in her ultimatum to Turkey in 1911, whereby the Marquis di San Giuliano had referred so uncompromisingly to the "state of disorder and neglect in which Tripolitania and Cirenaica are left by Turkey" and the "absolute necessity" of these regions being allowed to enjoy the same progress as that attained in other parts of North Africa. This "transformation", he had added, "constituted for Italy a vital interest of the first order by reason of the small distance separating these countries from the coast of Italy" (42) Educationally, at least, it was not necessary to look far in June 1919 or in October 1919 when the Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania and Cirenaica were conceded to see that little had been done to effect this pledge. If anything the educational state of Libya by 1919 was infinitely worse than it had been in the last years of Turkish rule. Fewer schools were available to Arabs by this time than were open to them under Ottoman rule. Also there were fewer teachers (Libyan or foreign); and the range of education available was considerably more restricted than under Turkish rule, when, besides elementary schools, facilities for secondary education also existed.

42) Barclay, T., The Italo-Turk War, "Italy's Real Case", p.48

more or less representative of the relatively non-aligned view in Italian politics which over questions involving Libyan affairs took its cue from the basis of legality affirmed in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1911. Nallino made his position quite explicit in the Proceedings of the Post War Commission of 1919 when he referred to the need for Italy to return to a proper basis of legality in all her future dealings with the Libyan people. By the Treaty, Italy had concurred with the Sultan's concession of a "full and complete autonomy" to his former Libyan subjects, but, despite frequent reaffirmations of that autonomy in numerous laws and official documents, had done little to bring about its actualisation. (46) Italian omissions, were summed up by Nallino as the failure "to impose unsuitable forms of civilisation upon existing local conditions; to confer with the local population with a view to legally expressing their desires and interests in the conduct of local affairs; to establish effective organs of consultation; to favour civil progress within the local and traditional orbit of existing society" and in many other ways. (47)

Instead of being framed in accordance with the concept of autonomy, outlined and sanctioned in the Treaty of Lausanne, Italian policy, affirmed Nallino, had been drawn up in accordance with the tenets of colonialism, which in educational matters had resulted in the "tendency to Italianise" the indigenous population. (48) This tendency had found expression in the Bertolini Ordinance of 1914 and amounted to a decision on the part of the Colonial

46) Post-War Commission's Report (Autonomie Ammin. Ed

Ministry to assimilate the Libyan population rather as the Ancient Romans had Latinised Africa in the distant past,with,Nallino recognises,"incalculable benefits for civilisation".(49) "Any attempt,however, to imitate the Romans in the circumstances of the twentieth century",he added,"was mistaken for two principal reasons: firstly, because Roman civilisation in Libya had never penetrated to the interior ,but had confined itself to the coastal areas;and secondly,Roman civilisation had never been confronted by Islamic civilisation,only with a pantheon of pagan deities,not dissimilar to the gods of Ancient Rome itself."(50)Italy ,on the contrary,found herself in Libya confronted with a people"Islamised from the earliest Moslem era,and attempts to substitute the Italian language for the language of the Koran,could only antagonise the mass of the population, and lead them to the conclusion that the government of Italy had inaugurated a persecution of their religion."If a "national bond",Nallino added,"does not as yet seem to exist between the majority of Moslems, the religious bond is very strong,and attempts to employ policies of assimilation in such circumstances,will not only fail miserably,but also incur the violent antipathy of the majority of the population against Italy."(51)

(contin.) Ordinamento Politico Amministrativo),p.119.

47) Ibid.(Direttive Generali Circa Il Trattamento Degli Indigeni),p.113.

48) Ibid.(L'Istruzione nelle Colonie),p.131.

49) Ibid.(Diretive Generale),p.112.

50) Ibid.,p.112.

51) Ibid.

In developing his analysis of Italy's obligations at the educational level following the Treaty of Lausanne (a Treaty which Italian nationalists detested and believed to have been rendered null and void by Turkey's declaration of a Jihad against Italy in the opening stages of the Great War), Nallino's proposals to the Post War Commission of 1919 are strikingly dissimilar from those advanced already by Colosimo, at least in aim and method. This is particularly apparent in the Minister's criticisms of the Bertolini legislation on account of its "timidity" and failure to "Italianise decisively" through a thorough going integration of the Libyan with the Italian school system, particularly at the secondary level. Nallino, while rejecting the Bertolini legislation for being fundamentally unsuited to the Arab mentality, also deplored Colosimo's attempts to develop it by providing facilities, whereby Arabs would be able to attend with profit the Italian secondary schools and pass on, if they so desired, to study at the Italian universities. (52) In support of his position, Nallino advanced four sets of reasoning against Italian educational policy until 1919: first, there did not exist in Libya, great centres of population, equal to those of Tunisia, Cairo, Alexandria and Damascus, the population, instead, being spread over a vast area, where it was for the main part semi-nomadic or entirely nomadic. The needs of such a population were infinitely less at the cultural and educational level than those of countries such as Egypt, Syria or North Africa. This could be observed,

52) Ibid., p.129.

Nallino argued, from the fact that the greatest city in Libya had a population of less than 12,300 Moslem citizens, to which a further 19,900 could be added, if Gagaresc was included, together with the huge area covered by the oasis of el-Menscia. Such a comparatively small population had only modest educational needs and, at the moment at least, it was not necessary to think of educating and training Arab doctors, engineers, lawyers and the like. Nallino's second observation rested upon his conviction that a vast outlay of resources in the form of schools and teachers was uncalled for in Libya, because Italian policy had never intended to transform the country into an area primarily of Italian settlement on account of its basic unsuitability for European colonisation. The chief educational expense would be taken up, he continued, in providing the necessary inducements to encourage Italian elementary teachers to work in the interior. Also, given the local cultural conditions, the limited needs, the inappropriateness of the Italian state assuming responsibility for providing every grade of instruction, and, given the paucity of Arab teachers, trained in Italian methods of teaching, it would be necessary to proceed in stages and without too many pretensions, making the most of whatever schools already exist, especially in the mosques and zauié.

(53) Italy would do well, Nallino urged, to encourage, guide and sustain, whatever is worthy of support, and to place the supervision of the educational system under commissions of enquiry and Arab and Italian officials, knowledgeable of Islamic education and its methods. (54)

53) Ibid., p.130 (According to the Colosimo Report (Op.Cit.) there were at this time 16 known Kuttabs in Tripoli, no mention being made of the whereabouts of others.)

In advancing his fourth criticism of the Bertolini legislation and the proposals put forward by Colosimo in 1918, Nallino developed the linguistic argument, so popular with the Arab nationalists, against the Italo-Arab schools. Nallino blamed the notion of Italianisation upon Waldeck Rousseau, who had enunciated it in its French form at the International Colonial Institute of Brussels in 1909. (55) Nallino summarised the Waldeck Rousseau approach, as applied to an Italian situation, as "the attempt to substitute Italian for Arabic in the schools of a country profoundly Islamised. It followed", he added, "from the utopian notion that the European and Moslem elements could be fused together." In terms of reality", Nallino concluded, "it could only provoke a strong reaction on the part of the Arab element against ourselves." Such ideas, Nallino believed, were completely out of date and were at variance with the current tendency of evolving educational policies in Africa and Asia that made sense in terms of the language of the country for which they were intended. (56) This tendency had not yet caught up with the few Italian schools that existed for Arabs in Libya, which were based upon the Franco-Arab Schools in Algeria. Algeria, however, as Nallino pointed out

53) Ibid.

54) Ibid., p.130

55) Waldeck Rousseau's views upon education had in fact developed considerably from their original some what narrow premise by 1909. By this time Rousseau believed educational policies in a colonial situation should be based upon linguistic and cultural compromise. See, Waldeck Rousseau, Atti della Sessione tenuta all'Aia dall'Institut Colonial International di Bruxelles (Bruxelles, 1911) as quoted in Ibid., p.130.

was profoundly different from Libya, which had never undergone colonisation by Europeans, and was also without the peculiar ethnic and historical conditions that preceded French rule in Algeria. In formulating the Franco-style policies for Libya, no account had been taken of the fact that French policies in Algeria depended for their efficacy upon the substantial numbers of Algerian teachers in the country, who were fluent in the French language. Italy, on the other hand, was without teachers, whether Arab or Italian, who could educate Libyans in accordance with the ideas of italianità, and most Libyans believed a schooling based upon notions of Italianità were irrelevant to their own cultural and social ambience. The simplest and most effective solution to the teacher shortage did not lie, Nallino believed, in the training of Italian teachers for Libya, as was envisaged by the current educational legislation (D.L. 17 October, 1915); but in training Arab teachers, who would develop the educational programme of the native elementary schools in their own language and in accordance with their own needs. (57)

In elaborating his proposals for the educational future of the Libyan population, Nallino not only had the backing of the educational section of the Post War Commission (58), but also the knowledge and experience derived from his previous educational work, rejected by Bertolini in 1913, and in 1919 developed to include secondary education. Even so, he added the

56) Post-War Commission's Report of January, 1919, p.131.

57) Ibid., p.132.

58) Ibid., p.135.

warning that, initially, at least, it was necessary to remain content with comparatively modest aims, confined to the city of Tripoli, as it would take "many years" before an educational solution could be found for the whole of Libya. (59) The subsequent importance of the Nallino proposals for the educational future of Libya, as envisaged by Italian Liberalism in its last days, merits a consideration of the various aspects of the Nallino scheme in detail. As such, at the time, they were seen to represent a complete volte-face on the subject of Arab education in Libya with a view to representing Italy as the exponent of Wilsonian Liberalism in her dealings with colonised peoples in Africa. In this respect, they replaced the Colosimo proposals of a year before, which were judged out of tune with the times both in Libya and before world opinion, now moving towards schemes of decolonisation in Asia or in favour of "mandates" in the former territories of the Kaiser and the Porte. (60) Nallino's Orientalist policy is as follows:

I. Kuttabs (61)

"The 'improved Kuttab', which would constitute the Libyan elementary school, would teach exclusively in the Arab

59) Ibid., p.132.

60) Ibid., pp.135-6. Also, see MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi, Cart. 15/1, Fasc. B-10: Il Nuovo Assetto Politico-Amministrativo, "Gli Statuti Del 1919" (without author or date, possibly, '37).

61) Nallino notes that the correct designation of these schools was "Kuttab" and not "Scuole Coraniche" (a deviant usage borrowed from the French). Moreover, "for more than ten centuries, the name "Kuttab" indicated in Moslem countries, an elementary Moslem school in the Arabic language, where reading, writing, and arithmetic was taught, along with the fundamentals of Islam, and the acquiring by memory of a part of the Koran (but in the sense that the pupils also understood it). In Libya, he adds, such institutions have

language(or Berber-Arab language),with an educational programme similar in all respects to that of the Government Kuttabs in Egypt.(62) This would be on the following lines:
 a) religion and morality.....;b)reading,writing and dictation;c)arithmetic(limited to the four basic operations);
 d)the committing to memory of a section of the Koran.Text-books must be urgently drawn up to deal with subjects relevant to Libya and an adequate syllabus must be constructed.The school will operate upon the basis of a four-year system to which a fifth year will be eventually added in areas where a secondary school exists.The pupils who attend the school will be between the ages of six to nine years of age or between seven and ten....."

II.Lower Secondary Schools

"These schools would offer a course lasting for three years and be open to pupils who had completed the three years at the Kuttab.They are intended to provide and education for the lower-middle classes through training postal and telegraph operatives ,police,small-time officials,etc.,etc.Instruction will be provided in the Arabic language in the following areas: religion and morality, grammar,writing,arithmetic,elementary geometry,general studies(comprising laws and duties of general applicability to Libya),knowledge of local agricultural conditions, geography and Italian history combined with the history of Tripolitania and Cirenaica.Where Italian is taught,it should be confined to reading and writing and ordinary spoken Italian."

(contin.) reduced their curriculum to the mere teaching of reading and writing together with the acquisition of the Koran by memory only."Ibid.,p.132.

62) Ibid.,p.132.Also,see supra,Chapt.Three,Sect.II.,pp.69-75.

III. Higher Secondary Schools

"Candidates will be admitted to this school who have obtained the leaving certificate of the secondary (lower) schools, or otherwise satisfied the entrance requirements. The course will have the duration of four years, and the final year will be divided into two sections: one will provide a general course for the education of merchants and Libyan officials, along with accountants, land surveyors, etc.; the other for the preparation of teachers to work in the Kuttabs and lower secondary schools. The teaching will be in Arabic with an obligatory course in Italian; the programme of individual disciplines will be devised to respond to the particular needs of the Libyan population."

IV. An Islamic High School

"This school is basically for the preparation of Libyan magistrates and Ulemah and will be open to students with a certificate of admission provided either by the Higher Secondary Schools or resulting from a special examination of admission. The course provided by the school ought to last five years at the minimum, and preferably six years."

VI. Schools of Agriculture and Arts and Crafts

"These would aim to train operatives for native industries and small factories run by Europeans, besides training printers, drivers of automobiles and agricultural workers. Such schools ought not to be based upon a particular type, but aim to meet the different requirements of different localities, especially with regard to agriculture for which they should be designed on a mobile basis." (63)

IV. The Educational Provisions of the Fundamental Law for Tripolitania (R.D., June 1919, N. 931)

"...with the conclusion of peace in 1919, Italy again returned to the problems of her Libyan colony; but the climate of the homeland was dangerously disaffected by socialist agitators who were filled with illusions of perfect social equality; illusions which spread their deleterious effects to the land of Africa." (64)

The educational proposals of the Post-War Commission, although they ante-date the concession of the Statutes of Libya by less than a year, not only mark a turning point in Italian educational policy for Libya, but, also, the culmination of a long debate upon the very nature of that policy itself. The tendency of Italian historians has been to dovetail the second Nallino project with the educational and political settlement of the Statutes of Libya of 1919, so making it appear that the Nallino proposals were no more than an aspect of the realpolitik of the times, which was primarily concerned to avoid a further colonial war in Libya by surrendering to Arab demands for cultural, religious and political autonomy. (65) There is no doubt a certain truth in this argument, though it tends to overlook the fact that the new educational policy has a place of its own in the history of the times, and deserves to be treated for its intrinsic merits, as much as for its association somewhat later with the transient policy of the Statutes themselves.

If this view is accepted, a more realistic assessment is possible of the Italian attitude to Libya: the Libyan War of October 1911 is recognised as integral to the history

64) Op.Cit. (Gli Statuti Del 1919) No page references given.

65) Enrico De Leone, La Colonizzazione Dell'Africa Del Nord, pp. 405-9.

of Italy proper and therefore quite separate from the issue of how Libya was to be governed and developed. By indicating in 1913 that the colonialist policies in education advocated by Scallabrini and the nationalists were unworkable, Nallino was only restating in its educational form the political and economic argument of the Giolittian pragmatists and moderate imperialists, whose general attitude was to view Libya as a protectorate (66), rather than as an integral province of the Kingdom of Italy itself. Giolitti's hasty annexation of Libya in 1912 was not intended to integrate Libyan territory and the Libyan people with Italy as such, as many Arabs believed at the time, but to frustrate any move by Germany to mediate on behalf of Turkey. (67) Settlement was also never intended between 1911 and 1922. Thus educational policies aiming primarily to teach the Italian language to Arabs and spread pacific penetration were as irrelevant to Italian needs in Libya as to Arab needs, and therefore a needless source of irritation. In the Fascist era, Nallino's policies became unfashionable and were associated with the a political attitude of the Italian political centre towards Libya.

As an outside adviser at the Colonial Ministry, Nallino's advice was based upon his own working knowledge of the Arab

66) Ronald S. Consolo, Op.Cit., pp.193-4.

67) Seton-Watson, C.T., Italy from Liberalism to Fascism (London, 1967), p. 381.

world, and as such was almost out of place amongst the the schemes for colonial aggrandisement that came to characterise increasingly the attitude of the officials and senior advisers at the ministry after the departure of Bertolini at the end of 1914. Bertolini himself, as the founder of the ministry, had been concerned to limit its colonial aims in view of the limited budget allocated to the ministry, despite nationalist pressure to adopt expansionist policies. Lack of trained and experienced officials caused him to rely for advice and personnel upon the Foreign Ministry and the Colonial Ministry itself never really escaped from the dominance of the Foreign Ministry or achieved genuine independence or autonomy. It was the need for Foreign Ministry support which had opened the way for the Department of Schools, headed by Scallabrini at the Foreign Ministry, to exercise its baleful influence upon the evolving of a native educational policy in Libya. Nallino's proposals in 1913 had stood no chance of acceptance in view of the hegemony exercised by Scalabrini and his inspectors over educational affairs at the Ministry which combined with nationalist pressures to squeeze out Nallino's objective appraisal of the situation - the least colonialist policy advocated during these years. Only the setback to Colosimo's "Maximum" and "minimum" strategy at Versailles in 1919 and Rossi's appointment as Minister of Colonies on 23 June 1919 enabled educational policies to emerge, which were more characteristic of Italian attitudes to Libya after 1911 than the Italianisation policy to which Bertolini had been forced to accede in 1913.

If, however, Nallino's Arabist policy had been evolved in terms of objective criteria, which only made sense in terms of a low-keyed colonial strategy, its availability in 1919, almost pre-packed and ready to hand, suited the convenience and interests of the government when low-keyed colonialism was at last becoming fashionable. The Arabs, whose educational requirements were first expressed in the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania of June 1919(68) had not so far produced a detailed educational approach to the problems of Libya, or an approach that made sense in terms of their overriding linguistic, cultural and linguistic aims. In formulating such demands in terms of a concrete policy, the "Consultative Committees" established in 1917 by Colosimo had done little more than voice the usual grievances, harking back to Ottoman times, by calling for reforms in the field of professional and agricultural education (or at least that the government exercise some initiative in these areas), but little else besides. (69) Certainly, it was in these areas that the

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- 68) Art.10: Private education is free, but the government reserves the right to periodically inspect such schools. Elementary education will be obligatory for all males. Secondary and high schools will be gradually established. Art.11: For Moslems, all the material of instruction at the primary level and all scientific material at the secondary level will be imparted in the Arabic language. The Italian language will be taught to all classes, except the first three elementary classes, when it will be optional. Art.12: It is forbidden to teach anything opposed to the principles of Islam. See, Giorgio Rochat, Lo Statuto Concesso alla Tripolitania nel 1919 in Il Colonialismo Italiano (Torino, 1973), p.108.
- 69) Set up by R.D.11 March, 1917, N.469 in each administrative district throughout Italian controlled Libya, the "Consultative Committees" were composed of chiefs and Moslem notables. They debated a number of issues, including ed-

Libyan population had been led to believe Italy would fulfil her "civilising mission" both by the tenor of the "casus belli" with Turkey, and also by Bertolini's own legislation, which had promised to provide both agricultural and professional education.(70), though Italy had subsequently done nothing in either area.

It was therefore in Nallino that both sides felt they had both a spokesman and an expert, who could be relied upon to express their legitimate demands in accordance with objective criteria and in respect of which, the proposals upon education already outlined by the Post-War Commission would provide a useful guide for the deliberations ahead. It is in such a context that the educational articles of the Statutes of Libya should be seen, for if the law itself was recognised as an indication of Italy's good intent(71);

(contin.) ucation, agriculture, road construction, professional education, local industry. In education, attention was focussed upon professional and agricultural education of which Libya was in particular need because of the low standard of living and low agricultural yields. See, Contini, Op.Cit., p.19.

70) R.D. 15 Jan. 1914, N.56: Article I. of this decree undertook to establish for "cittadini e sudditi Italiani" institutions of secondary, classical and technical instruction; and article II. "professional education in the Schools of Arts and Crafts, Agriculture and Commerce, etc.

71) Azzam Pascia, President of the Arab League, writing in 1919 in the Corriere della Sera in support of the Statutes of Libya, indicated that the new laws had made a most favourable impression throughout the Arab world. By them "the Italians have now revealed themselves to be a people of ideals with a true capacity for Italo-Arab friendship on account of their liberal and civilised mien." He added: "We have only fought against Italy because we believed her to be on the road of the colonial predators, an attitude that can no longer be sustained in view of these providential laws, which have impressed the whole Arab world." See, Contini, Op.Cit., p.19.

the educational provisions were likewise understood to represent the general principles upon which a future educational ordinance for Arabs in Tripolitania should be based. The timely appearance of the "Second Nallino Project" indicated precisely the terms in which the Statutes of Libya could be expected to receive final legal-sanction in the future. This, however, was a prospect viewed with not inconsiderable dismay by the Colonial Ministry both in 1919 and subsequently.

Chapter FiveThe Conceding of a Protectorate and the Policy of Accommodation Evolved by Rodolfo Micacchi 1918-1919

"R.D.1 June 1919 for Tripolitania and R.D. 31 October for Cirenaica provided both colonies with an entirely new character through the grant of full autonomy, whereby they were encouraged in the hope that complete independence might eventually be conceded."
 (*)

By the Wilsonian inspired Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania and Cirenaica of 1919 the natives of the country who were not cittadini italiani metropolitani became cittadini italiani so receiving status equal to that of Italians but not identical with it because Arabs kept their Moslem personal law. They also enjoyed guarantees of personal liberty, inviolability of domicile and property, the right to compete in military and civil careers and professions, even in the kingdom of Italy, electoral rights (a local Parliament was shortly set up at Bengasi), the right of petition to the National Parliament, and the rights of sojourn and emigration. Respect of religion and local customs was guaranteed, liberty of the press and right of meeting were recognised, citizens could not be conscripted for military service, no fiscal tribute could be imposed which was not the same for all or without the consent of the local parliament, revenue from taxes was to be used for Cirenaican purposes exclusively, the Arabic language was to be compulsory for the teaching of certain subjects in the schools and no precepts contrary to Islam were to be taught. In general all the inhabitants of Cirenaica,

*) MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi, Cart. 15/1, Fasc. B-10: Il Nuovo Assetto Politico-Administrativo, "Gli Statuti Del 1919" (without author of date, possibly 1937), p. 2.

whether Arab or Italian ,were equal before the law.An adult Arab could acquire Italian citizenship if he fulfilled certain conditions.(1)

In the unsettled political climate of Tripolitania, between the negotiations of Khalet el Zeituna in the spring of 1919(these had led directly to the conceding of the statute for Tripolitania in June) and the commencement of new military-operations by Volpi to re-establish Italian sovereignty,in the March of 1922,the elaborate provisions of the statutes counted for very little in practical terms.Instead, Italian rule remained ,as during the years of the European War,mainly confined to Tripoli, Homs,Azizia and the Western coastal area.Outside these regions power remained in the hands of independent leaders, who exercised it in their own interest,regardless of the Italians or the Arab assembly convened at Misurata, which had set up a Committee of Reform to continue negotiations with the Italian government with the aim of bringing about Libyan independence.It was this assembly, founded during 1918 under Turco-Germanic influence by Ramadan al-Shitaiwi and known as the Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya (the Tripolitanian Republic),that in 1921 dispatched a special delegation to Italy to petition the central government for the setting up of a Tripolitanian Amirate,a proposal sanctioned by a special assembly of notables at Garian, and supported by the Italian socialists, communists and trades union movement.(2)

2) Evans-Pritchard,Op.Cit.,p.213.For the complete text of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania,See,Il Colonialismo Italiano,Op.Cit.,pp.106-111.

3) The delegation ,however, received no official encourage-

Events proved more favourable to Italian plans for keeping the peace in Cirenaica, where the granting of the Fundamental Law of October 1919 was followed on 25 October 1920 by an agreement which consolidated the Accord of Acroma of March 1917 in the form of a new treaty, signed in October 1920 at El-Rajma. By the Treaty of El-Rajma, Sayyid Idris el-Senusi received the title of "Amir" and became head of an autonomous administration centred upon the oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu and Kufra with the right of using Ajadabiya as his seat of administration. (3) Evans-Pritchard summarises the gains of the new treaty to the Italians as follows: "the Italians claimed that by the Treaty of El-Rajma, they obtained a more definite acceptance of their authority over Cirenaica without having to make recourse to arms, in effect, however, El-Rajma had resulted in the establishment of a rough form of condominium, whereby Cirenaica was henceforth divided into two zones, Cirenaica proper under an Italian administration and the oases under Senusi control." (4)

By these agreements peace was generally maintained in Cirenaica between 1917 and 6 March 1923 when, a year after Volpi's attack upon Misurata, which began the second Italo-Senusi War, the governor of Cirenaica, General Luigi Bongiovanni ordered the occupation of the "mixed camps", so ending the brief era of Italo-Arab condominium in Cirenaica, and extend-

(contin.) ment in Rome, and its leader, Mohammed Khalid al-Qargani, went on to attend the Moslem Revolutionary Congress in Moscow. See, Evans-Pritchard, Op.Cit., p.147.

3) Ibid., p.148.

4) Ibid., p.149.

ing the war to the whole of Libya. During the period of condominium, however, civil government had been established in Cirenaica from 1919 onwards, though Italian rule had been maintained (unlike in Tripolitania) from 1917 and even before. In Cirenaica, the Fundamental Law resulted in the setting up of a local Parliament, which between 1 April, 1921 and its final dissolution in March 1923 had five sessions. Although the work of the Parliament of Cirenaica in retrospect seems to have been of a purely transitory nature, it is difficult to say what it might have achieved if conditions in Libya had favoured its development, and its inauguration had not coincided with the seizure of power in Italy by Mussolini.

II. Micacchi's Mission of 1919 and his Defence of the Italo-Arab Schools

"The gravest section of the Fundamental Law, as far as education is concerned, lies in Article Eleven. This, if implemented, would not only lead to the complete abolition of the Italo-Arab school as we know it; but, also, to the renunciation by the state of any effective control over the organisation and administration of the Arab sector of education in Libya." (5)

Although the political and educational principles of the Statutes of Libya were more in accord with the original agreements entered into by Italy with Turkey at Lausanne in 1912 than with subsequent Italian efforts to organise the administration and governance of Libya upon the model of an Italian commune or French colony; the new agreements immediately became the object of nationalist scorn in Italy, where they were viewed either as a sell-out of Italian interests or as a national humiliation to be reversed

5) Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (Il Decreto Reale 1 Giugno, 1919: L'Istruzione per I'indigeni), p. 144.

at the earliest political opportunity.(6)This division of Italian opinion over Libya reflected the general fragmentation of political alliances within Italy and the worsening political, social, economic and financial crisis of the post-war situation ,which was to produce the Fascist Revolution of October 1922.

Educationally, the policy outlined by Nallino to the Post-War Commission, the principles of which found expression in the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania of June 1919, by reducing the position of the Italian language in the curriculum of the schools to that of an optional subject, not only transferred primacy to Arabic as the medium of instruction for virtually the whole curriculum; but seemed to undo at stroke, the main efforts of the educational bureaucracy ,headed by Scallabrini and now by Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi, to make the Italo-Arab school, with its emphasis upon the teaching of Italian, the principal educational organ for Arabs in Libya.(7)Not surprisingly, therefore, the verbal affirmation of the principles of the forthcoming statutes at Khalet el Zeituna in the Spring of 1919 presented the Schools' Department at the Colonial Ministry with serious problems. To deal with the matter, the newly-appointed Director of Colonial Schools, Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi, was dispatched to Tripoli during the Spring term 1919. His task was to arrive at a solution of the problems in hand by

6) See, Pace Biagio, Il Fascismo e La Riconquista Della Libia in La Libia in Venti Anni Di Occupazione Italiana (Ed. T. Sillani, Roma, 1933-XI), p.63.

7) Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, Op.Cit., p.494.

reconciling the principles of the forthcoming statutes with pacific penetration and Italy's civilising mission.

(8) He was also to make a thorough study and inspection of all the existing educational facilities in Italian-occupied Libya (the first of its kind), so that a pre-determined plan of action could be drawn up for future educational goals in Libya.

On arriving in the country, Micacchi judged the internal situation to be as yet "unripe for the implementation of any major educational reforms", both because of the prevailing conditions of political uncertainty; and, also, because the Statutes of Libya required to be translated into a whole range of separate policies of which education was only one. Only when this work had been accomplished satisfactorily could the new programme be expressed in its proper legislative form, and then be implemented. (9) There was little chance of any progress being made upon these issues until internal stability returned to Tripolitania, which Micacchi did not believe (correctly as it turned out) would be for some time. (10) Micacchi, therefore, concentrated upon carrying out the inspection of the schools and in drawing up a substantial report upon education in Libya for the Italian authorities in Libya and in Rome.

In his defence of the Italo-Arab School, Micacchi shows himself to be as much concerned with the political role of

8) Ibid., p.492.

9) Ibid.

10) Ibid.

these schools and the possible effects their disappearance would have upon Arab education and Italian colonialism, as with the ideological function of the Italo-Arab school as a vehicle of pacific penetration, moral conquest and civilising mission. (11) Italo-Arab schools, he pointed out, while modelled upon the Franco-Arab school of Algeria, were different in so far as they were primarily intended for Arabs and not Arabs and Italians. (12) This could be regarded as an important point, the real implications of which were not fully grasped by many administrators, who failed to distinguish adequately between the Italian national system and the native system for Moslems, that Bertolini had aimed to create with his 1914 ordinance. (13) This confusion was not altogether surprising for, as Micacchi admits, "the new system drawn up in the first days of our administration reveals many defects derived from the undue haste with which it was constructed, the new ordinances being compiled from the laws and regulations for the Italian schools all'estero, and from the French scholastic legislation operating in Algeria. Thus the Bertolini legislation was formulated in accordance with criteria aimed to suit the requirements of societies different in many ways from the social and cultural environment of Libya. As such, their suitability for the Libyan environment was never investigated, with the unfortunate result that many defects were only revealed after the policy had entered the statute book." (14)

11) Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (Fine politico delle istituzioni scolastiche coloniali), pp. 145-150.

12) Ibid. (Le scuole Italo-Arabe), p. 142.

13) Ibid. (R.D. 1914 N. 56), p. 140.

14) Ibid.

On the credit side, however, these schools, Micacchi believed, had shown a rapid development since the commencement of Italian rule in Libya both in Tripolitania and in Cirenaica. But they have been able to really "flourish", he added, "only in areas firmly under Italian control, having disappeared completely in regions depleted of Italian forces. Even so, where they had managed to survive, albeit not without the support of Italian bayonets, they had proved themselves to be popular with the Libyan population," or at least, added Micacchi, "with that section of it prepared to collaborate with us." These schools (he stressed) had a sound future ahead of them, provided they were well organised and run, provided with sound and experienced teachers, modern methods, excellent buildings, good hygiene and carefully prepared programmes; in which circumstances, there was no doubt, they could become most effective instruments of 'moral conquest' ". (15)

If, on the other hand, the director argued, the Italo-Arab schools were "abolished", as would follow from any literal interpretation by the state of Article 11 of the Fundamental Law, not only would Italy be deprived of her principal instrument of "moral conquest", but the state would also lose all effective control over the schools in the political sense. (16) As evidence in support of his hypothesis, Micacchi drew a parallel between the possible effects of implementing a wholly Arabist system in Libya, as would result from a thorough-going interpretation of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania, and the effects already

15) Ibid. (Le Scuole Italo-Arabe), p.142.

16) Ibid. (Il Decreto Reale), p.143.

manifest from the implimentation of similar policies in Egypt. The Arabist policies implemented by the British in response to the wishes of the population and its leaders, had resulted in the transformation of the native schools into "hotbeds of nationalism and perfect instruments for the Arab revolt" with "disastrous consequences for British rule in Egypt."

(17) Thus, Italy had little option, Micacchi continued, if she wished to retain any semblance of her colonial position, but to regard the schools as a means of securing collaboration with the indigenous population. (18) The alternative to regarding the schools as instruments of "moral conquest", "pacific penetration" or "civilising mission" was rank capitulation "to those forces, amongst the indigenous population, whose set aim was to use the schools as a means of dissolving and subverting the political structures of the state." (19) For Micacchi, education in a colonial-type situation involved a strategy of "moral conquest", whereby collaboration would be brought about between the "dominant colonial power" and the "subject population", who were to be colonised. Even in situations, such as that of Egypt, where the "dominant power" had little direct interest in developing policies of metropolitan settlement, and the political relationship was expressed in the terms of a "protectorate", the adoption of an orientalist -type solution to the problems of the schools had failed to stave off political subversion

17) Ibid., 143.

18) Ibid. (Fine politico delle istituzioni scolastiche coloniali), p.145.

19) Ibid. (Il Decreto Reale, 1919), p.145

20) Ibid.

and had directly led to a major confrontation between the indigenous population and the colonial power itself, which the very orientalist policy itself had been intended to avert. (20) Hence, Italy could and should learn, argued Micacchi, from the experience and mistakes of other colonial powers, for it was clear that the implementing of Arabist-type policies in Libya, would only partly appease the needs and aspirations of the population. Moreover, once the initial popularity of these measures, which were always well received by all sections of the Moslem population, had faded away, the schools would become by gradual degrees, centres for anti-Italian agitation, so worsening the dissent, which the new policies were intended to alleviate, if not eradicate entirely. (21) The Fundamental Law of Tripolitania and Article 11, decreeing the exclusive use of Arabic in the elementary schools, was already a disastrous step in the direction of political anarchy in Libya, Micacchi believed. In education, it would result in the abolition of the Italo-Arab school, one of Italy's best defences against political subversion in the colony, and also in the rejection of the "assimilating" policies of the Franco-Arab school in Algeria in favour of adopting the "non-assimilating" policies of the British in Egypt, the dangers of which had already more than adequately revealed themselves in the recent political upheavals against British rule in Egypt, in respect of which "the schools had played a major role." (22) Politically, it would

20) Ibid.

21) Ibid. (Fine politico delle istituzioni scolastiche coloniali), pp. 145-150.

22) Ibid., p. 147.

have been better if Italy had adopted the type of political and scholastic system operating in Tunisia, the Director concluded, for there the French had evolved a "highly flexible system." The latter, he described as a quid medium between the system operating under the British in Egypt and the system adapted in Algeria, where direct rule applied.

(23)

III. The Third Theory: Micacchi's Concept of Accommodation

"Waldeck-Rousseau's philosophy makes good sense - 'Faisons évoluer les indigènes dans leur milieu national'; but it is equally important to remember that in a colonial situation, the material and moral development of the population should not be at the expense of the colonial power." (24)

As a possible solution to the problems of colonial education Micacchi presented to the Colonial Ministry his "third theory" which was to prove extremely influential, as Italian rule developed in Libya, and gradually came to be accepted as the standard Italian attitude to Libyan education under fascist rule. (25) It was based upon the recognition that "the error of yesterday was the failure to comprehend the extent to which Arabs and Italians differed; a failure that had led to the importation into Libya of "our laws, customs, administrative system with a view to assimilating the Arab population. "The error of today", however, Micacchi deduced, "is the widespread belief that Arabs and Italians are totally different", and, also, that Arabs are "irreparably closed to the penetration of our culture." "The truth in my opinion,"

23) Ibid., p.147.

24) Angelo Piccioli, L'Istruzione Pubblica In Libia, in La Libia in Venti Anni di Occupazione Italiana, Op.Cit., p.115.

25) See, Ibid., pp.110-116 ; and A.Piccioli, La Conquista Morale: La Scuola in La Rinascita Della Tripolitania, Op.Cit., pp.285-291.

he decided; lies somewhere between both extremes, and it is unnecessary to abandon hope of influencing the Arab population, simply because of our earlier failures in this field. Rather, should we seek, through the adoption of sound techniques and principles, to establish a proper basis of mutual respect and interest, so as to produce a real spiritual rapprochement between Arabs and Italians. The means of achieving this goal, is a sound policy of accommodation, which is both liberal and progressive, by providing the necessary basis of evolution without at the same time irritating or harming native beliefs and customs belonging to the true social milieu of the population. In this respect, we have to remember that the intellectual and moral elevation of the population represent a vital interest for Italy as well as a natural interest for the indigenous population itself." (26) Micacchi also developed the argument as it affected the material interests of the Moslem population. At the practical level, this amounted to involving the school in the development of native agriculture, along with industrial and professional activity together with the development of local arts and crafts. Such work, he believed, "should not be left to the state, irrespective of the importance of the state's commitment to the construction of roads, railways and other public concerns, without which the country could not be adequately developed. Neither should it be left solely to the private industrialist or capitalist, irrespective of the importance of the latter as an employer of labour and in exploiting the natural resources of the country. Rather, government policy should

26) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, pp. 148-150.

aim at developing self-reliance amongst the indigenous population, through the imparting of a type of education that would teach the Arab to love and care for his own soil by using up-to-date methods of agriculture. At the same time, such a policy would also develop local industries for which purpose Libya needed not only schools of agriculture but also of professional education as well as for the teaching of the more traditional arts and crafts."(27)

Thus the "third theory" envisaged a pattern of future collaboration involving both "moral conquest" and "economic conquest" by which Arabs would be brought into a true reciprocal understanding with their colonial masters. In this was, Micacchi added, "mutual understanding, tolerance and respect would characterise Italy's relationship with the indigenous population; and by it the benefits of colonial rule would be shared equally between the colonials and the colonised."(28)

Having outlined for the benefit of the Colonial Ministry his own particular philosophy of colonial education, Micacchi was able to deal safely with those who advocated positions upon the subject which he did not share. The proponents of other views included the orientalist Professor Nallino, who was advocating with considerable success "environmentalism"; and also the general public, who tended to view all attempts to enlighten the peoples entrusted to Italy's colonial dominion, as both wasteful and dangerous. In times

27) Ibid., p.149.

28) Ibid.

of economic decline, the arguments of the latter could not be ignored by Micacchi who, like many government officials, felt particularly threatened by the rise of socialism and the increase of anti-colonial sentiment generally in Italy. Such a tendency viewed with contempt the Colonial Ministry as dangerous and useless extravagance which Italy could well manage without. (29) These attitudes were all the more worrying because they were not the stock-in-trade of any particular group or alliance, but seemed to have entered into common parlance. First, there was the argument, of the disgruntled "metropolitans" which tended to take the form of an open declaration to the effect that "the Moslem of North Africa is refractory to all forms of progress and hence any attempt to get him to collaborate by means of the school is a priori destined to fail." This was because of the general hostility in North Africa towards the school and the school curriculum, and the tendency for Arabs to attend only for a few weeks after which they would cease to attend with any regularity. Also parents frequently would either prevent children from attending the schools or interfere with their attendance, once they had enrolled. (30) "This objection", reported Micacchi, "does not apply to the Libyans, who, while remaining loyal to their faith and traditions, are essentially a pragmatic people, favouring progress and therefore experiencing little difficulty in adapting to change or accepting innovations, designed to benefit them. Moreover, by and large they welcomed the Italo-Arab schools and attend them spontaneously

29) Ibid., p.150.

30) Ibid.

and with the support and encouragement of their families. This is despite the fact that these schools are insufficient in number and quality and at present only possess a rudimentary kind of curriculum. In Tripolitania (he added), where school attendance was purely voluntary, the rate of attendance at the Italo-Arab schools is much higher than attendance at the Kuttabs, and the schools are in a flourishing condition. Furthermore, such results have been obtained without any form of coercion other than the influence of propaganda and encouragement where seen to be necessary.

(31)

In dealing with prepared positions which conflicted with his own view of colonial education as "moral conquest", Micacchi singled out for special criticism the British attitude in Egypt, and the Nallino approach, which was currently troubling the colonialist party in Italy and attracting Arab support in Libya. The first of these positions, which Micacchi attributed to Lord Cromer (a man who was certainly no admirer of Islamic education and its institutions) had adopted the view that a Westernised system of education was as bad for the indigenous population as for the colonial government. This conclusion rested upon the observation that the school easily "alienated the native child from his natural environment, so leading him to leave his work in the fields in preference for the opportunities of the city." Once arrived in the city, he rapidly became an "apostate" from his traditional culture through taking up some small time appointment, which, while bringing him a higher income

31) Ibid.

than he could gain from rural-type employment, was insufficient for him to live satisfactorily in the town. Thus antagonism towards the social and economic system became the general attitude of such people. (32) "This criticism of the colonial school", affirmed Micacchi, "amounted in fact to praise in its favour: for whereas it is true that the native child frequently became critical of his familiar domestic environment on leaving the school, such dissatisfaction with the status quo was surely not a bad thing, since there was invariably much to criticise in that familiar environment. Also by equipping the native child with a new awareness of life along with modern skills this was enabling him to come to deal with modern life on his own terms." The real "apostate", opined Micacchi, "will always be the exception rather than the rule and should this occur, it ought not to be blamed upon the school, which cannot rightly be held to be responsible." A more telling criticism of the school (he continued) was the accusation that "those who have received a higher education, are more likely to turn out to be enemies of the colonial power. This position has been recently argued by a notable French writer (33) in respect of the Kabylie in Algeria". Micacchi paraphrases Cherveriat's argument as follows "the educated native is less easily governable than the

32) Ibid. (Obiezioni contro l'insegnamento per l'indigeni), p.150.

33) Cherveriat, L., A Travers la Kabylie et la Question Kabylie (Paris, 1889). Other writers arguing in the same vein who contributed heavily to the formation of the Micacchi standpoint were G. Hardy in Le Probleme Scolaire au Maroc (Casablanca, 1920), and M. Poulard in L'Enseignement pour les Indigenes en Algerie (Alger, 1909). Also see works by Waldeck Rousseau as listed in the Bibliography of this thesis.

ignorant native, since the education he has received places him in a position of intellectual superiority that enables him to more easily appraise his actual condition and that of his race generally in the country, and this can in some circumstances lead him to take action of a political nature."Such a situation could not apply to Arabs under Italian rule, Micacchi asseverates, since Italy has anticipated the development of a critical state of awareness amongst the Libyan population by conceding the Statutes of Libya, which are more liberal than those invoked by any other colonial power and can only lead Arabs to an awareness of the benefits of colonial rule. Also the undoubted fact that, although some students will turn against the colonial power, this should not be taken as an argument against educational provision for all Arabs, only against particular trouble makers. The school should aim at freeing the new generation from hostility towards the colonial regime. Should it fail to achieve this goal, the blame is more likely to lie with the pupils own particular environment, rather than with the school as an institution. Sometimes, unrest is transmitted from hostile sources beyond the colony. (34)

The third and final objection to education for Italy's colonial subjects as conceived by Micacchi reverts to the previous issue (the schools transform basically contented individuals into discontented enemies of the status quo), since the solution advocated by Micacchi differed from that advocated by professor Nallino. In his handling of the right approach to this problem the director reveals his profound disagreement with Nallino upon the whole Nallino

34) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p.152.

approach to the education of Libyans. Nallino blamed the dissatisfaction of the Arab population upon opposition to the government's educational policy rather than upon any successes resulting from the application of that policy, in particular, the use of the Italian language as the medium of instruction in the elementary schools. The fact that his policy had failed was viewed by Nallino as a good thing. Contrary to Micacchi's observations upon the so-called popularity of the Italo-Arab schools with the population of Libya, Nallino affirmed that Libyans had "expressed little interest in these schools or in getting to know Italian culture." For Nallino, Micacchi's conviction that the Libyans could only be transformed into collaborators through the teaching of the Italian language and culture was a complete misconception of the Arab mentality, which was alienated by such a policy. Collaboration would only result if Italy accepted the Libyan position upon education, Nallino believed, though beyond this point the rival Nallino-Micacchi positions ceased to contain any element of comparability, since they begin to diverge along different political paths, the one leading to autonomy, the other to the reimposition of "direct rule".

In his report to the Colonial Ministry, Micacchi, while avoiding any head-on collision with the policy of the Statutes criticised the proposals of the "illustrious professor Nallino" to the Post-War Commission, as being completely out of date in the circumstances obtaining in Libya since the conceding of the Fundamental Law. Micacchi's argument in the latter respect was that since this law had guaranteed

full freedom of the press to the Libyan population, it was the government's responsibility to ensure that the new generation at least had a sufficient knowledge of Italian to be able to read the Italian point of view in the various national journals and newspapers circulating in Libya. Not only would a knowledge of Italian facilitate a more rational awareness of what was happening in the world, Micacchi opined, but it was also required if the population were to be freed from the "gossip" and "intrigue" nurtured by the Arab press both inside and outside the colony. (35)

IV. Micacchi's Proposals for Implementing the Statutes of Libya

"From all I have had to say up till this point, emerges the necessity of preserving and improving the Italo-Arab schools, even if possible, following the publication of the Decree of 1 June, 1919." (36)

Once he had outlined his philosophical and strategic outlook upon the subject of colonial education as it affected the Moslem population in Libya, Micacchi set about detailing the methods which should be adopted by the Colonial Ministry in implementing the Statutes of Libya. Upon one thing, however, Micacchi was fully clear, namely the "necessity to maintain and improve the Italo-Arab school: Micacchi's whole approach to the question of implementing the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania and formulating a Fundamental Law for Cirenaica revolved around this one point. This required finding a legal solution to Article 11 of the Fundamental Law which had decreed that "all the material of elementary instruction must be taught in the Arabic language, though the Italian language can be taught as an optional subject in the first three

35) Ibid., p.153.

36) Ibid. (Necessita di mantener la scuola Italo-Araba), p.155.

elementary classes"(37);and secondly,Article 11 must be reformulated for the forthcoming Fundamental Law of Cirenaica,so as to ensure that Italian would be taught alongside Arabic in the Moslem elementary schools.(38)

In evolving a formula for dealing with Article 11 of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania that would preserve the Italo-Arab school in the province in substance if not in name,Micacchi determined upon a method which would "respect the spirit of the law if not the letter."(39) What was needed,he decided,was an"elastic interpretation of the word 'optional'(facoltativo)"which could be arrived at without too much difficulty through exploring the significance of the word in the context of the Italian system"(40)For "in our regulations,the term 'optional' is meant to apply to 'optional courses'(insegnamento facoltativo) in the sense of implying a choice on the part of the student from amongst a number of set courses.It is also used in the sense of implying courses that can be established,but which the student is not necessarily obliged to attend."(41)As it is the second interpretation of the term 'optional' which seemed to have most relevance to Libya,in view of the director's desire to preserve at all costs the teaching of the Italian language in the country, he drew attention to a cultural argument which would strengthen the second interpretation of the Fundamental Law.Italy must make

37) Ibid.

38) R.Micacchi,L'Enseignementaux Indigenes,Op.Cit.,p.494.

39) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.156.

40) Ibid.

41) Ibid.

provision for the teaching of Italian in the coastal areas of Tripolitania and Cirenaica, he continued, because Italian is the lingua franca of the Mediterranean and these areas are integral to the Mediterranean region.(42) Thus Micacchi's aim was to ensure that the government interpreted Article 11 of the Tripolitanian Statute as widely as possible, so as to avoid a situation arising in the future, whereby the Arab nationalists could use the Article as a means of vetoing Italian linguistic and cultural activity in the region, an activity Micacchi was determined to maintain as a means of securing Italy's political position. Even so this was only half a solution to the problem of how to retain instruction in the Italian language in the elementary schools for Arabs of Tripolitania, since, as Micacchi was fully aware, optional courses at which attendance was not obligatory were frequently a waste of time and effort.(43) Therefore, "we will have to continue to maintain the existing Italo-Arab schools and also establish, where they are requested, parallel elementary schools which will teach exclusively in the Arabic language, so leaving it optional to the indigenous population which schools they wish to attend." Thus, he continued, "the situation will be similar to what it is at present vis-à-vis the Italian national schools and the existing Italo-Arab schools. It is a matter of 'option' which of these schools the Moslem population wish to attend, as we can neither compel them to attend the national schools nor prevent

42) Ibid.

43) Ibid., p.156.

44) Ibid.

them from attending if they so wish."(44) Micacchi concluded, therefore, that the Fundamental Law required the government to interpret Article 11 in the sense indicated, namely to provide elementary schools in which Arabic would be the only language of instruction (at least for Tripolitania); but did not exclude the provision of "other schools", which would be bilingual.(45) The choice of which schools to attend would be left to the Arab population itself, it being naturally assumed by Micacchi that "those who wish to collaborate with us" would choose to attend the Italo-Arab schools already provided. In this sense the government would have provided "full freedom of choice" in the matter of elementary education. (46) Micacchi affirmed that such an interpretation of the Fundamental Law, and Article 11 particularly, had the full approval and backing of the Uffico Politico-Militare in Tripoli, and also of "some of the Arab notables", including the nationalist leader, Suleiman Bey Barunni who, while affirming "the absolute necessity of upholding the Fundamental Law in its integral aspect", was prepared to accept that Micacchi's interpretation did not necessarily contravene Article 11.(47) It is doubtful, however, whether the ex-deputy Barunni accepted the Director's interpretation of the Statute of Tripolitania, as wholeheartedly as the latter inferred, since it so clearly flouted the letter of the law and violated its spirit.(48)

45) Ibid.

46) Ibid.

47) Ibid., p.157.

48) Barouni Bey and Ferhat Bey had been the very spirit of opposition to the idea of Italian rule since its first inception in October 1911. See, Ostler, Op.Cit., Chpts 16-17.

The conceding of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania in principle during the early Spring of 1919 seems to have taken the Ministry of Colonies off its guard, hence the need to rush Micacchi to Libya before the final details could be worked out and the agreement sanctioned in the form of an official decree, which was not until June 1919. (49) It would appear therefore that the Fundamental Law was agreed in principle, at least a month before its entry on the Statute Book. This left Micacchi in the position of having to react to an agreement between the Italian government and the Libyan nationalists of which he disapproved in both principle and practice; but which, as a civil servant, he was obliged to accept and implement in such a way as to avoid creating a situation of embarrassment for his employers. (50) The need to accept the expediency of the government's tactics, as a means of both stalling for time on the political front and avoiding a further military embroglio required the Director of Colonial Education to resort to the tactics of a trickster in a fair-ground who, on seeing the day's takings on the point of being consumed by a lucky contestant, calls a foul so as to keep the kitty intact! Similar devious huckstering is also apparent in Micacchi's handling of the educational issue in Cirenaica. Here he claimed that the Consultative Committees in the latter colony had already communicated to the government their

49) It is impossible to state from existing sources the exact date when Micacchi actually arrived in Libya for the commencement of his mission, though it must have been not later than the early spring of April of 1919 for his report to have been written by July 1919. See, Micacchi Report, Op.Cit., pp. 1 & 2.

50) Ibid., p. 143.

educational expectations as follows:

1) An elementary form of instruction for the mass of the population to include reading and writing in Arabic and where possible in Italian as well. Elementary notions of arithmetic, hygiene, agriculture, manual work, along with religious education to be taught without any restriction or impediment in accordance with Libyan aspirations.

2) A further kind of elementary education, but somewhat wider in scope, for pupils wishing to prepare themselves for the secondary schools. Also, for those who want to take up modest commercial and professional posts or to aspire to humble posts in the public service either as ushers and assistants or as non-commissioned officers in the Zaptie.

3) A secondary form of instruction for the sons of notables who need a reasonable education if they are to occupy a fitting position in public life.

4) A more advanced or higher training for the preparation of Imam and Cadi, etc., etc. (51)

Upon the basis of this information, which was in fact derived from a special government communication dated 22 May, 1919 (No 2464/10), Micacchi was able to persuade the Ministry of Colonies (if it needed any persuasion) to frame the forthcoming Fundamental Law of Cirenaica so that, while reproducing Articles 10 & 12 of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania, it modified Article 11 of the latter decree in favour of the retention of bilingual teaching in the government elementary schools for Moslems. (52) In seeking to base his proposals for the educational development of Cirenaica upon the deliberations of the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica, Micacchi was attempting to demonstrate that the "third theory" had some popular support amongst the Libyan population. If so, he was certainly overplaying his hand, since although there was a political recognition in Cirenaica that bilingualism in the

51) Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (Fine politico delle istituzioni scolastiche coloniali), p. 146. Also, see L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, Op. Cit., p. 494.

52) See, R.D. 31 ottobre, n. 2401. Norme fondamentali per l'assetto

schools was necessary for the implementation of condominium in the colony, there was also a recognition that the future pattern of public education must be thoroughly Islamic, something which Micacchi had conveniently overlooked. The actual position of the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica upon the subject of education was clearly expressed to the Government in February, 1919, barely 2 months before the negotiations of Khalet el-Zeituna. It is hardly conceivable that they could have changed their minds upon the future of education in the colony in so short a space of time. (53) Thus, although Micacchi in 1919 was able to find a way to implement the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania, including the controversial Article 11, while at the same time preserving the Italo-Arab schools, and also prevent Article 11 from finding expression in the forthcoming Fundamental Law for Cirenaica, he was unable to affect the desire of the Consultative Committees for an Islamic type of Education in the future. This desire would find ample expression in the complex negotiations ahead between the Senusi leader, Sayyid Idris el-Senusi, and the Italian Government for the implementation of the Fundamental Laws in Cirenaica. Article 11 of the Tripolitanian Fundamental Law would, however, prove an insuperable obstacle as far as the fulfilment of the decree was concerned. The Italo-Arab schools would remain as before, but Micacchi would plead that he could not set up elementary schools in the Arabic language because of the problem of securing politically trustworthy Arab teachers from the surrounding Moslem countries.

contin. della Cirenaica, B.U.C., 601. Also, see Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 159 and L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 495
53) See, infra, Chapt. Six, Section II., p. 174.

Thus, the Micacchi proposals for the implementation of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania were, despite his declaration to the contrary, undoubtedly at variance with both the nature and spirit of the Statute, which had in effect undertaken to concede linguistic, cultural and religious autonomy to the colony. His proposals for Cirenaica too, while capitalising upon the apparent preparedness of the Libyan population to accept the idea of bilingualism in the government elementary schools, made no attempt to develop their desire, as expressed in the negotiations over the Accord of Acroma in 1917 or in the Consultative Committees, for an Islamic system of education. (54) As Micacchi was clearly not in any serious ignorance of Libyan aspirations in both colonies, the conclusion must be drawn that he had declined to support such aspirations in deference to special reasons which he shared with ruling circles in the colonial administration. The political and nationalistic assumptions of the Micacchi case have been sufficiently examined to show that such an inference must be regarded as on the whole valid. It remains, however, to examine Micacchi's early attitude to the Orientalist policy put forward by Professor Nallino to the Post-War Commission in 1919 and also to Libyan wishes for an Islamic system of education. Both should be seen primarily as integral to his proposals for implementing the Statutes of Libya in both Tripolitania and Cirenaica, though they should also be considered in the light of his "third theory" or the future of Libyan education in a colonial situation where Italy would be the dominant authority.

54) See infra, Chapter Six, Section II., Note 24, p.173 ; Ibid., p.174 ; and p.175.

Both the Nallino and Libyan positions for Tripolitania and Cirenaica were in close agreement regarding the subject of the future development of the Kuttabs. Micacchi was obliged to recognise in 1919 that the Fundamental Laws could not be implemented in either colony without some reference to the Kuttabs. His own attitude towards these schools, which were traditional to all Moslem countries, was highly critical. Not only were the Kuttabs, he observed, unhygienic and substandard as places of public education, but the teachers who ran them were both underpaid and for the most part virtually unlettered. There can be little doubt that Micacchi himself shared the attitude of many colonial educators towards these schools, which were regarded as being responsible for the relative backwardness of Islamic culture and society at this time. The almost exclusive development of the powers of memory at the expense of the other faculties was seen as both "atrophying the intelligence" and being the cause of the "distance and hostility" of the Moslem world to "contemporary civilisation". (55) In the circumstances of 1919, however, Micacchi recognised that no system of popular education was possible in Libya without making use of the Kuttab. There were simply not enough Italian teachers to send to distant centres in the colony, even if such an idea was feasible. Furthermore, he did not believe the Kuttabs were politically dangerous, since only Libyan teachers would be required to work in them, and not foreign Moslems, who might import into the country dangerous anti-colonial ideas. Micacchi therefore, had no hesitation in advocating the reform of the Kuttab, along lines adopted in Tunisia by the French. Such a ref

55) See, Miccachi Report of July, 1919, p. 152.

orm if carried out in Libya would require the training of teachers for the Kuttabs, modern installations, a more rational curriculum, and the banning of the Bastone, "at present, the principal means of correction". By such a reform, he concluded, the Kuttabs could become part of the general system of education in Libya, instead of merely diffusing religious instruction.

(56)

Despite the importance attached by Nallino and the Libyans to the subject of secondary education, which was such a marked feature of the Fundamental Law, Micacchi retained almost complete silence upon the matter, other than to reiterate the Bertolini proposal to set up a School of Islamic Culture for the training of cadi and mufti. His final recommendations make only token reference to secondary education for Moslems and are part of Micacchi's general recommendations for all education in the colony. These amounted to the following:

1) Italian-type schools (infant, elementary, post-elementary and secondary); (*)

2) Schools for Libyan citizens (elementary Italo-Arab schools, Arab elementary schools, Arab secondary schools and a School of Higher Islamic Culture);

3) Schools of Professional Education. (57)

56) Ibid., p. 162.

*) These schools were intended for Italian citizens (metropolitani).

57) Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (Il Nuovo Ordinamento Scolastico), p. 176 (Micacchi's silence upon the subject of secondary education for Moslems, especially in the form outlined by Nallino in the Post-War Commission's Report of 1919, emphasised his own misgivings. Political circumstances, he privately believed, while not publicly admitting at this point, would make it virtually impossible to implement the the Fundamental Laws in the matter of secondary education for Moslems. See, infra, Chapt. Nine, Section VI., pp. 292-297)

Chapter Six The Establishing of a Protectorate in Cirenaica and the Final Formulation of Liberal Educational Policy (R.D. 5 February 1922 and D.M. 14 September 1922) 1919-1922

"....in my humble opinion, Italy should adopt in Libya the system of a protectorate and abandon the idea of direct rule, which will be as expensive there as it has been to France in Algeria." (*)

Both the Nallino proposals to the Post-War Commission and the Micacchi counter-proposals to the Ministry of Colonies, irrespective of their particular pedigrees and separate histories, were the result of two different if interrelated crises affecting Italy at this time. The first was the changed international situation following the ending of the 1914-1918 War, especially in so far as it affected Italy's short-term and long-term plans in Africa. The second was the particular crisis facing the Italian government in Libya, where there was a real threat in Tripolitania of further armed confrontation with the Arab population, which could quickly engulf Cirenaica with which Italy had been at peace since the signing of the Accord of Acroma with the Sensusi in 1917. In the changed political situation neither the Nallino nor Micacchi solutions could be applied until condominium had been definitely established in the two Libyan provinces under Italian rule by the setting up of separate parliaments, which would be free to accept or reject the new policies.

*) MAI-AS, Pos. 109/1: From Victor Cattani to H.E. the Minister of Colonies, Tunis, 19 October 1920.

Only following acceptance by the forthcoming parliaments of Tripolitania and Cirenaica could the royal assent be given by the king of Italy to any new educational measures, which would then be expressed in the Statute Books as separate decrees for the two provinces.

The key problem therefore facing the Italians in 1919 regarding Libya was the need to proceed as rapidly as possible with the establishment of some form of condominium for the country. Unless this could be achieved rapidly and painlessly, the recently conceded Statutes of Libya would not be worth the paper they were written on, before the year was out. Seen as a policy which attempted to secure Arab acceptance of Italy's sovereignty in Libya by the pen rather than by the sword, Arabs and Italians were required by it to settle their mutual disputes by diplomatic rather than military means. Such a strategy was infinitely more difficult to achieve in Tripolitania than in Cirenaica, where the Accord of Acroma had provided a basis for future discussions, since Arab nationalism on the one hand, and the independent power of the individual tribal chiefs on the other, made it impossible virtually that either side would be able to secure a sufficiently solid platform upon which a modus vivendi of any form could be constructed. (1) In Cirenaica, however, the reverse situation tended to apply, for in the powerful politico-religious Senusi Order (2) led by

1) See, SUPRA, Chapter Five (Introduction).

2) Writing in the December edition of the Nuova Antologia, 1920 Malvezzi draws on Savino Acquaviva's description of the Senusi (Il Problema Libico e Il Senussismo, Roma, 1917), as being a "great politico-religious confraternity with around three million adherents whose influence extends

the Sayyid Mohamed Idris El-Senusi, Italy found a quasi-statal focus of political power with which it was possible to arrive at a measure of diplomatic agreement, sufficient to ensure the achieving of the desired modus vivendi, whereby condominium might be established through the setting up of a semi-protectorate.(3)

In 1920-21, that most unstable of years for Italian colonial policy, as it affected Libya(4), the predicament facing the government in Tripolitania was best grasped by an outsider, the Italophile lawyer, Victor Cattani(5), who addressing the Minister of Colonies, Rossi, from Tunis urged him to abandon the whole idea of direct rule in Libya, and adopt a form of government expressed in terms of protectorate status for the colony, on the lines already adopted by France in Morocco and Tunisia. Direct rule, Cattani argued, had never been a success in the French colonies, especially in North Africa, where it had only been applied to Algeria with any degree of success, though the expense to the treasury had been insupportable.(6) Cattani, however, mitigated his argument in the case of Tripolitania, the Achilles' heel of Italian policy in Libya, because of the existence of rival tribes"enemies lacking a primus inter pares

(contin.) not only to Cirenaica, but also to the Sudan, Boru, Darfur, Tibesti, Uadai as well as to Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal and to the Beni-Harb tribe in Arabia": "L'Accordo Italo-Senussita" in Nuova Antologia 1170 of 16 Dec. 1920 by Aldobrandino Malvezzi.

3) See, supra, Chapter Five (Introduction).

4) During 1920, the Colonial Ministry was occupied by no less than four different ministers: Rossi, L. (23.6.1919-13.3.1920); Nitti, F. (14.3.1920-21.5.1920); Ruini, B. (22.5.1920-14.6.1920); and Rossi again (15.6.1920-3.7.1921).

5) See, Victor Cattani to the Minister of Colonies, October, 1920 (unpaginated ms.).

6) Ibid.

through which Italy might exercise a benevolent neutrality" in the form of a protectorate.(7)The problem,as Cattan saw it,lay in the impossibility of a Christian power dealing directly with Moslem subjects without offending the religious susceptibilities of the latter.The only way out of the seeming impasse was to secure the support of a local chieftain or leader sufficiently strong in his own right to be able to pacify local rivalries and disputes without compromising either himself or the colonial power in the process.Without such a collaborator,Cattan argued,Italy could not hope to arrive at a form of diplomatic settlement with the tribes of Tripolitania,and without arriving at such a settlement,condominium and protectorate status,as envisaged by the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania could never become practical politics or lead to the establishment of civil government of the province.The lawyer also ruled out the remaining possibility for achieving collaboration,namely through securing the support of the prominent nationalist leader,Suliman El-Barouni.No"orthodox chieftain" can give his confidence to El-Barouni,he concluded,because "the latter is an 'Ibadite' or kind of heretic". He is also"heavily involved with the Pan-Islamic Movement,which will never be content to see Italy at peace in Libya."(8)

The establishment of a protectorate in Cirenaica, however,was perfectly feasible,for whereas the war had "utterly destroyed the Sultan's power in Tripolitania" it had left unaffected the position of the Senusi in Cirenaica and "in the eyes of the Moslem world,Sayyid Idris El-Senusi is the only political and religious chieftain in Cirenaica,

7) Ibid.

8) Ibid.

whose influence is incontestable and whose power to pacify the country almost certain."(9) Thus by consolidating her agreements with Sayyid Idris in Cirenaica, Italy could hope to regularise her position as a colonial power. In this respect a protectorate was required which would be similar in its most important respects with the protectorates already established by Britain and France in Egypt and North Africa. The chances, however, of arriving at a modus vivendi in Tripolitania were more problematical and entirely unaffected by the conceding of the Fundamental Law of June 1919. This was never implemented in the province and emergent nationalism and tribal particularism continued to struggle for ascendancy, regardless of the Italian presence, which was confined only to Tripoli itself and a few coastal towns.

II. The Formulation of Arab Demands and the Emergence of an Arab Educational Policy for Libya

"Reform the so-called 'Kottab' (Koranic Schools) and 'Mederse' (Higher Islamic Schools), according to the ordinances in vigour in Tunisia and in Egypt."(10)

The absence of any single political or religious leader, capable of acting as an "arbitrator" between the rival chieftains, and willing to collaborate with the Italians, must be judged as the most obvious single factor in

9) Ibid. (Cattan based his views upon the general hypothesis that Islam was, at the time of his writing to the Minister of Colonies, undergoing a grave crisis, which communicated to Moslems the strong impression that, as a result of the War, they had been disinherited, and were (like the Jews) on the point of becoming a people without a language or flag of their own. This fear was currently expressing itself through the Pan-Islamic Movement and would, Cattan believed, take a violent form in all Moslem countries. Even when violence did not occur, he saw a deep anxiety taking root, which "would become the enemy of progress.")

10) MAI-AS, Cirenaica (1918-1919), pos. 140/3, Fasc. 22; Ministry

explaining the failure of the Arab population in Tripolitania to evolve an educational policy after 1915 (when Italy entered the European War) which could be described as Arab in language, religion and culture. The nearest the Tripolitanian Arabs approached to formulating such a policy were the discussions at Khallat el Zeituna which had led to the conceding of the Fundamental Law. There can be little doubt that the educational articles of this decree were the work of the Arab nationalist and pan-Islamic spokesmen on the Arab side, such as Ferhat Bey and Barouni Bey, and not of the Italian negotiators, who were notoriously unversed in Islamic matters, being primarily concerned with political and military goals. Unfortunately for the development of the educational aspect of the Arab position, the unity amongst the Tripolitanian Arabs, which had led to the Fundamental Law, was too fragile to last longer than the summer of that year. (11) Thus Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Fundamental Law provide the historian with the only glimpses of the educational position of Arab nationalism and Pan Islamism in Libya at this time, since no attempt was made to develop them, in view of the breakdown of negotiations with the Italians and the outbreak of fighting between rival groups on the Arab side.

To gain a further idea of the state of Arab opinion upon the subject of education in Tripolitania in these years, it is necessary to examine the reactions of the Arab

(contin.) of colonies, General Directorate of Civil Affairs and Public Works, Roma, 27 April 1918: the petition of the native consultative committees upon agricultural and commercial education.

11) See, J. Sandison, "The Italian Conquest of Tripolitania" (Condensed from R. Rapex, L'Affermazione della Sovranità Italiana sulla Tripolitania), Italian Rule in Tripolitania, B.M.A. (Tripoli, 1947), p. 20.

leaders, and population at large, to the various Italian initiatives in the field of education between 1911 and 1922. The way, they reacted, for example, to the Medersa proposals of 1915 and 1917, or to the Italo-Arab schools in those few places where such schools had been established. (12) These dissatisfactions, however, never became precise formulations of the Arab point of view, and it is doubtful whether such a point of view could be said to exist before 1919 except in nationalist and pan-Islamic circles. Certainly, religion being the sensitive issue it was in Libya, the Italian government increasingly recognised that its earlier policies required to be reformulated to take greater account of religious, linguistic and cultural needs. The exact degree of accommodation needed, however, was, as has been shown, a matter of considerable dispute amongst the Italians themselves, hence the rival Nallino and Micacchi proposals.

In terms of practical politics, the question of meeting the Arab demands upon educational issues always revolved around the central problem of collaboration itself, and the Nallino proposals would in succeeding years come to grief, because of their failure to take sufficient account of this factor. Thus, even after the conceding of the Fundamental Laws, the government was reluctant to treat with the party of Arab nationalism in Tripolitania, except on

12) See, supra, Chpt. Four (Arab Opposition to the Government's Educational Policies).

13) See, The Petition of the native consultative committees upon agricultural and commercial education, 27 April, 1918 (unpaginated ms.), Op. Cit.

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on its own terms. Moreover, the party of Arab nationalism and its supporters was still an insufficiently cohesive force in Libya to be able to either impose its terms upon the Italian government or upon the independent Arab chieftains of the Gebel and the coastal plains. Thus the channel for expressing opinion upon education continued, as before, to be the Consultative Committees originally promised by Bertolini, and only set up by Colosimo with R.D. 11 March 1917, N. 469. As only those Arabs who were prepared to collaborate in some form with the government (and whom the government found acceptable for such a role) ever sat on such committees, it is not surprising, therefore, that their minutes contain no reference to either the nationalist or pan-Islamic premise. (13) Instead, the discussion of educational issues tended to revolve around practical projects, such as the understood need to provide agricultural and commercial facilities in the field of education, for the population of Tripolitania. It is more than likely that those who participated in the discussions of the Consultative Committees would have recognised that the question of actually formulating policy was a matter for the Ministry of Colonies and not an issue to be debated openly. Collaboration was understood by the Italians to involve acceptance of such a position, and the Colosimo programme of February 1918 (14) was largely devised to satisfy the aspirations of the Consultative Committees, whether in Tripolitania or in Cirenaica, since

14) See, supra, Chpt. Two (Gaspare Colosimo's Reformulation of the Bertolini Premise, 1916-1919).

the latter were no more than had been promised by Bertolini in 1914. Collaboration through "consultation" assumed that both parties understood the essence of the government's strategy for Libya, which in 1918 was still the need to train Arabs as farmers, though, as with so many other aspects of Italian colonial policy affecting the Moslem population, little serious thought had gone into methods of implementing the government's high-minded aims. It was, nonetheless, at this time recognised by all concerned with colonial development that investment would not take place in the sphere of Libyan agriculture, until Libyans could be trained in accordance with modern ideas and methods. Only through the development of skilled manpower resources could the then abysmally low level of agricultural productivity (the root cause of widespread poverty and near starvation in the Libyan rural-areas) be raised to profitable levels. (15)

In the latter sense, therefore, the Consultative Committees only advanced the government's own premise, namely the need to provide theoretical and practical facilities for the training of Libyan farmers at the existing centre for agricultural development at Sidi Mesri, outside Tripoli, or at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, though some proposals envisaged agricultural training in special

15) "At best," writes Claudio Segre, "as the Italian technicians pointed out, the traditional techniques provided only a subsistence living. Indigenous agriculture yielded no more than three head of livestock and 1.5 quintals of major crops per capita. Even this meager subsistence was constantly threatened by drought.... Moreover, the indigenous system of agriculture was static. By themselves, the Libyans were unlikely to break the precarious cycle of their existence, a member of Franchetti's mission to Tripolitania had observed, and even with the stimulus of outside investments and new techniques, the Libyans would be slow to change their ways." Op.Cit., p.147. For an account of the additional poverty and suffering caused by the Italo-Turkish

rural centres established throughout the country or attached to the Italo-Arab schools.(16)

The government was also interested in the proposals put forward by the Consultative Committees of Tripolitania to reform the Italian Secondary School in Tripoli in order that its facilities should be made more equally available to Arabs. In this respect at least, the Colonial Ministry had already done something to reform the school with such ideas in mind.(17) Again, however, as with the agricultural proposals put forward by the Committees, we see this seemingly modest request for better educational facilities at the secondary level, a proposal fully in agreement with

(contin.) War in Tripolitania, where it caused widespread population displacement, see Ostler's graphic descriptions in Chapter XXVII (Starving wives and children.... The Arab Poor) of The Arabs in Tripoli (Op.Cit.).

16) Although the government had repeatedly re-affirmed its intention to provide agricultural training for Libyan farmers, it had, in effect, done nothing, since the closure of the Turkish Agricultural school in 1911, to put its aims into practice. On the occasion of the final meeting of the Tripolitanian Consultative Committees in the Spring of 1918, the case had again been presented by the Libyans for agricultural training facilities. And with "great clarity and persuasiveness, they had shown themselves ready to put into practice the government's policy with a desire to obtain some concrete results." Once again, however, the Civil Affairs Department had avoided taking any action on the issue, instead referring to Rome with vague outlines as to the possibility of either using the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, or the Experimental Station at Sidi Mesri for such a purpose. This vacillation was further accentuated by the Colosimo Report itself, which avoided any direct commitment to taking practical measures "until the political and military situation in the colony improved." See, Caruso to the P.C.M., Op.Cit., p.2; Colosimo Report (Agricultural Education), Op.Cit., p.374; and Minutes of the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica, Op.Cit.

17) See, R.D. 16 Dec. 1917, N.2155, B.U.C., 1918, 15.

the government's own stated policy, frustrated largely in Tripoli by the local bureaucracy, who avoided taking any action on the issue by passing it on to Rome. From there it entered into the educational section of the Colosimo Report of February 1918 and served the interests of Italian propaganda at a delicate phase in Italy's negotiations with the Allies for more African colonies but did nothing to alleviate educational conditions in Tripolitania.

In its handling of this issue, we see for perhaps the last time in Libya's first phase as a colony "directly under the crown", the bureaucracy at work in respect of native affairs. The original weakness of the Italian system, reveals itself in the attempt to systematise Arab affairs through the legislative and bureaucratic channels of the Kingdom of Italy. The Arab proposals, as put forward by the Consultative Committees of Tripolitania, that Arab pupils wishing to attend the Italian secondary school for the purposes of further education, would greatly improve their chances of success at this school, if they first prepared themselves by attending the third grade of the Italian elementary school was perfectly in accord with government policy. It was a simple request that could easily have been dealt with at the local level in a normal situation. Unfortunately, the situation in Tripoli was far from normal and simple solutions were apt to take a long time before the effects became apparent. A highly centralised bureaucracy could only react to such a simple request by referring it to Rome with the additional proviso that Arab pupils could not enter the Italian elementary schools directly from the Italo-Arab

Schools since the regulations of the Italian Schools Abroad required that they should first sit an entrance examination.(18)As a further dissuasive,the Civil Affairs Department advised that an"undesirable precedent would be established",if the Committees proposals were accepted by the Ministry,since"it would incite fear and envy amongst the Jewish population of Tripoli,and logically require the extension of similar privileges to them,which would not be a practicable proposition."(19) This was a bogus argument,since Jewish pupils at the Technical-Commercial School had always formed an important component of its annual intake,and during these years almost exceeded the numbers of Italians attending the school.Indeed it is impossible not to draw the conclusion that the Italian bureaucracy in Tripoli,regardless of whether the intentions of the central government were true or false, was concerned to either delay or prevent Arabs from attending this school. It is not difficult to find reasons to support such a hypothesis in view of the strained relations between Arabs and Italians in Tripolitania;and Micacchi's desire to raise the standards at the Italian schools there,in order that they might be at least as good as the schools in Italy ;and therefore a factor in determining the arrival and settlement of Italian families in the colony.Moreover,both the Arabists amongst Italians and the Italianisers led by Micacchi and the Italian nationalists were not in favour of Arabs attending Italian schools,and for different motives and ideologies thought in terms of separate systems for Arabs and Italians.Even so,

18) See,Petition of the native consultative committees,27 April,1918.

19) Ibid.

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a strong government would have seen through the prevarications and deceits of the Department of Civil Affairs in Tripoli, and have insisted upon appropriate measures being taken. As the Tripoli bureaucracy knew, however, the central government was weak and unstable, and the Colonial Ministry basically inclined to policies which favoured Italian interests before those of the Arab population.

As a method of preserving the Italian interest as far as the secondary schools was concerned, the Civil Affairs Department favoured a colonial-type solution which aborted the simple procedure advocated by the Tripolitanian Committees. It was this solution which appeared in the Colosimo Report of February 1918 as the seeming product of Italo-Arab collaboration in Libya. By it French-type policies would be applied to Libya through the establishment of "écoles primaires" and "écoles supérieures" as in French North Africa. In this way a bridge would be provided from the Italo-Arab schools to the Italian Secondary School, and a method would have been provided, whereby an elite could be trained in this school for the future. (20) It should be again noted, however, that this systemization was not what the Consultative Committees had asked for in the first place (though the resultant Colosimo Report maintained that it was) and amounted to so much purely wishful thinking as far as any genuine improvement of existing facilities was concerned. In effect, the bureaucracy had let slip an important opportunity for utilising the existing facilities, which were at this time under-used by the declining Italian population,

20) Ibid.

so ignoring both the government's own public policy, and the legitimately stated wishes of that section of the Libyan population still prepared to collaborate with Italian rule. A proper survey of the schools did indeed need to be undertaken in the near future, but this should not have been accepted as a cloak for lethargy by the central government. (21) The local authorities, however, made the undertaking of such a report the sine qua non of any further action upon education in Libya, whether for Arabs or Italians, a contretemps they would never have attempted in Bertolini's days, and still less under his Fascist successors. (22)

II. The Formulation of Arab Demands and the Emergence of an Arab Educational Policy for Libya (Phase Two)

In effect, the Colosimo programme of February 1918 was intended by the government as the answer to the Arab demand for a stated policy couched in terms of collaboration. Barely was it off the printing presses, however, than another answer emerged from the nationalist and pan-Islamic camp, which immediately upstaged it. The conceding of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania in June 1919 finally made the Colosimo proposals, which were never more than a publicity gesture, redundant. Fewer educational policies, it could be added in final epitaph, were shorter lived, as they neither entered the statute book, nor ever received any execution in the form intended by their originators. The nationalist answer to the Colosimo Policy was hardly of longer duration,

21) Ibid.

22) Ibid.

since the fragile unity which had given birth to it, had already disintegrated by the time it became law in June of 1919, and, as is shown elsewhere, it was never implemented. The desired official investigation of the existing educational facilities in Libya was the only definite fruit of these otherwise barren years, and as has also been shown was carried out by Micacchi in the second half of the 1919 school-year.

The difficulty in arriving at a political compromise by diplomatic as opposed to military means in Tripolitania led the Italian government increasingly to distinguish between Tripolitania and Cirenaica in the devising of political strategy. In this respect, Italian hopes for a settlement in Cirenaica were pinned upon the Senusi leader, Sayyid Idris El Senusi with whom they had (with British support) signed the Accord of Acroma in 1917. This agreement had in effect amounted to a package deal in which education had been only one of a string of items connected with the development and improvement of Cirenaica, almost in the form of a quid pro quo, whereby Idris had made political concessions in return for Italian willingness to undertake practical measures. (23) The agreement is important for the student of Arab education in Libya, for not only does it reveal education to be integral to any form of political settlement in the country (as would also be shown in subsequent developments in Tripolitania involving the Fundamental Law); but it also happens to be the first statement of Arab educational policy by an Arab leader to date. (24)

23) MAI-AS, Cirenaica, 1911-1939, pos. 139, fasc. 1-6, Accord of Acroma: Modus Vivendi N. 2 (Testo presentato da Idris Es Senusi il 23 Feb. Comunicato integralmente al Ministero delle Colonie con telegramma Del Governatore N. 203 Del 3 Marzo), Preliminary Conditions for Ensuring the tranquility of the country.

It is also important in so far as it comes from the foremost representative of the Senusi Order, whose intellectual interests were highly developed at Jarabub.(25) These interests also extended to the provision of religious and elementary-type education amongst the Beduin of the Sahara, through the attaching of school rooms to the Senusi Zavias, which, though few in Tripolitania where the Senusi were not strongly established, extended throughout the Senusi-controlled Sahara and most of Cirenaica.(26)

By signing the Accord of Acroma, Italy again bound herself to the same principles of general autonomy to which she had acceded at Ouchy in October 1912, and solemnly reaffirmed, while failing to implement, in several subsequent statements of intent. No doubt with the Accord of Acroma in mind, the Cirenaican Arabs taking part in the Consultative Committees expected more from the Italian government than their co-religionists in Tripolitania, and, as events showed, had their demands more fairly acceded to by the Italians. In the manner of the Accord itself, the

24) The Senusi educational demands are stated in Article IV. of the Accord: "Italy will establish in Cirenaica, schools for the teaching of science and art in which the Koran will also be taught; Ulemah will only be instructed in Libya and not sent abroad to study; and the Italian government will undertake to love and respect the religion of Islam by diffusing it through teaching in all its dominions." The memorandum attached to the text of the document noted that "only by accepting such conditions would it prove possible to quieten the fears of the Arab population, and gain acceptance of the government's protestations that Italian rule in the future would not be at variance with their own interests and religious beliefs." Article V. of this accord also dealt with the restoring to the Senusi Confraternity of its zavia, previously confiscated by the Italians as a reprisal measure, during the first Italo-Senusi War. Ibid.

Consultative Committees of Cirenaica, framed their demands in the form of a package, which reaffirmed many of the statements already confirmed at Acroma. (27) These included education, which was expanded by the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica into a set of specific demands, not only for professional and agricultural instruction at a school of arts and crafts to be set up at Bengasi, but also for Arab universities at both Bengasi and Derna for the teaching of the principles of Islam. (28) The Italians were also asked to reform the Kuttabs and existing medersas upon the lines adopted by France in Tunisia and by Britain

25) See, Evans-Pritchard, Op.Cit., p.17 ; Joan Forbes-Rositer, Secrets of the Sahara (London, 1921), p.293 ; and The Times, 7 March, 1922, p.11.

26) For the condition, number and location of Senusi lodges still in existence at this time, see, MAI-AS, pos.147/1-1 a 8 (1911-1918), Fasc.147/1-1-I Senusi, il loro capo, la confraternita, la loro forza, le loro zavia, etc., etc.

27) The final votes of the Consultative Committees of Tripolitania on the eve of the conceding of the Fundamental Law to the supporters of the Tripolitanian Republic, merely restated their previous request for more practical-type education. As far as agriculture was concerned, this was not to be confined exclusively to Tripoli, but was to be extended throughout the fertile areas. Experimental farms were also asked for, along with travelling educational units managed by experienced teachers of agriculture. Only at the Technical-Commercial School in Tripoli, did they ask for preparatory courses, to enable Arabs to accede to the higher courses. The educational wishes of the Cirenaican committees, on the other hand, greatly exceeded in aim and scope those of their Tripolitanian equivalents and were enclosed along with some twenty other proposals for developing the country. See, MAI-AS, Cirenaica (1918-1919), pos.140/3, Fasc. 22: Voti Del Comitato Consultativo Indigeno Per la Cirenaica in Materia D'Istruzione Pubblica, Uff. II. Aff. Civ. N. 192, 6 Feb., 1919 (unpaginated).

28) Ibid.

29) By 1919, the French in North Africa had abandoned their earlier policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation, which had only been really applied in the Kabylie regions

in Egypt.(29) Thus we find in Cirenaica, unlike Tripolitania, the Consultative Committees producing their own programme of agreed action in the sphere of education. This, while not insisting upon the exclusive use of Arabic in the schools, does ask for an Islamic structure of education in the form of Kuttabs, Medersa and University, which, if modelled upon similar institutions in French North Africa and Egypt, would also embody certain changes from the purely traditional pattern of Islamic education.(30)

It is, however, only in Article Thirteen of the Treaty of El-Regima of October 1920 that Arab desires find their final an unambivalent expression in Cirenaica:

"Lower elementary schools (Ibtidaia) and secondary schools (Idadia) are to be established according to the needs of particular places, and, in all of these, the religious and modern material will be taught in Arabic or the Italian language in accordance with the distinctions set out in Article II. of the Fundamental Law. Furthermore, it is recognised by the two parties (Sayid Idris el Senusi and the Italian government) that it is necessary to establish at Bengasi a lower secondary school (Idadia) and a higher secondary school (Alia); also, an Idadia ought to be set up at Derna; and a higher elementary school (Rusedia) at Tobruch, Gedabia, and Merg; and, as soon as it is recognised to be necessary, further higher elementary schools should be set up at Marana and Zauia el-Beda." (31)

(contin.) of Algeria. Henceforward, a policy of accommodation was progressively applied to Algeria itself and also to Tunisia and Morocco. This latter policy sought to embody both the traditional Islamic system with educational norms current in France. The French system, too, had undergone considerable modifications to meet Arab and Moslem requirements. Cirenaican requests for "reformed kuttabs" upon the model operating in French North Africa would have involved their "reform" in terms of the curriculum of the latter. In the Kuttabs of French North Africa, which had been "reformed" by the French government, the curriculum was much wider than in the traditional kuttabs. A third of the school-day was devoted to the learning of classical Arabic (reading, writing vocabulary, grammar recitation and composition), apart from the memorisation of the Koran and general instruction in other subjects, such as were taught in the French elementary schools and leading to the "certificat d'etudes primaires".

The treaty also lays down that lower elementary schools shall be set up in all the coastal centres and in the oases of the interior and that attendance at them shall be compulsory for all Moslem boys.(32)

The Treaty itself, however, was not regarded by the Sayyid as being an executive-type decree and the exact details of the country's future educational organisation and the programme of studies to be adopted in the Libyan schools would require a separate ordinance. In terms of the condominium established in Cirenaica by the Treaty of El Regima, this could only be decided by a special committee, which would have to be set up by the forthcoming parliament of Cirenaica. Even so the Treaty was an important basis for future aims, as is apparent from Article Fourteen which establishes that the official languages of Cirenaica would be Italian and Arabic, as had already been laid down by the

(contin.) This more general type of instruction was given in the French language by Arab or French nationals, who were certificated teachers. In the programme of studies followed at the medressas, both French and Arabic received equal emphasis. The curriculum of these schools included the Arabic language and literature, Moslem law, theology and exegesis, all of which were taught in Arabic by Arab professor; and French subjects: French language and literature, history and geography, French law and administrative organisation, legislation relating to the colony, mathematics, the physical and natural sciences, and hygiene, all of which were taught in the French language by French professors. The normal duration of these courses was four years, at the end of which, the successful students received a certificate of studies in the medressas. The course could be continued for a further two years in a "higher division", though the latter was only organised in great urban centres such as Algiers, Tunis and Fez. See, P. Horluc, "The Education of Natives in Algeria", Educational Yearbook (1931), pp. 203-223; L. Brunot, "The Education of Native Moslems in Morocco", Ibid., pp. 227-236; E. Gau, "Education in Tunisia", Ibid., pp. 259-265. Also, see A. Scham, Chpt. IV. "Franco-Muslim Education", Lyautey in Morocco (New York, 1970), pp. 144-161. For British policies in Egypt, see A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Education, Its Traditions and Modernisation into Arab National Systems (London, 1972).

Fundamental Law of Cirenaica. Article Fifteen decreed that all zavias would be freed from paying all taxes.

(33)

III. The Parliament of Cirenaica and the Educational Commission authorised by the Treaty of El-Regima

"For everything, Patience hath a remedy,
but Impatience hath no remedy for anything"
(34)

While internal troubles continued to prevent the Fundamental Law from being applied in Tripolitania, the signing of the Treaty of El-Regima between the Sayyid Mohamed el-Senusi and the Italian government on 25 October, 1920

30) See, supra, notes 23 and 24, pp. 172 and 173.

31) MAI-AS, Libya (Cirenaica, 1920), Pos. 141, Fasc. 1, 2 and 3: Accordo di El-Regima, Art. XIII., Government of Cirenaica, Department of Political Affairs, 28 October, 1920 (protocol n. 8205-Accord with the Sayyid Mohamed, Idris El-Senusi). A Further document listed as riservatissima (highly reserved) provides a "literal translation" of the treaty, which for Article Thirteen reads: "The Italian government agrees to immediately set up primary and secondary schools according to the needs of particular places, within which will be taught both modern material and the Islamic religious sciences in the Arabic language. Regarding these schools, two will be set up at Bengasi, one at Agedabia, one at Zauia el-Beda, two at Berna, one at Tobruk, one at Marua and one at Merg. Primary schools will also be set up in all the centres of the interior and along the coast, as well as in all the Senusi zavias....." A translator's note provides the following explanation for an ellipsis in the final sentence of the Italian translation of the original "verbale": "evidently, something is missing! According to Omar Pascia, the Saied was referring to primary schools." This translator's error is not without some importance, since by it, the Senusi leader also intended the government to assume responsibility for educating those Beduin who made use of the system of Senusi zavias. Thus, by this treaty Italy also assumed charge of elementary education not merely for the coastal zones, but also for the Cirenaican hinterland as well.

32) Ibid.

33) Ibid.

34) As extracted from the diplomatic memoranda accompanying the Italian draft of the Treaty of El-Regima of 25 Oct., 1920: Op.Cit.

(35) cleared the way for the establishing of the promised Parliament of Cirenaica, which met in session for the first time on 1 April 1921. In so doing, the way was finally opened up for that all too brief condominium between Italy and Libya. In fulfilment of Article Thirteen of the treaty, a special educational commission was almost immediately established to prepare a suitable educational ordinance; and the Parliament of Cirenaica delegated twelve of its members to serve on it. (36) Perhaps it should be noted that the commission, the setting up of which was amongst the very first acts of the newly assembled parliament, seems to have marked one of the few occasions when Arabs and Italians actually sat down together with the aim of evolving a joint-programme of agreed social action, which would be put into practice by the Italian government, at the behest of the Arab leaders and with the support of the majority of the Moslem population.

The task of the commission was (in the words of Micacchi himself) "entirely without any precedent", for both sides were required to work out a formula embodying the principle of bilingualism yet also fully Islamic. (37) It was, moreover, equally necessary to provide space in the curriculum for the teaching of modern subjects of a so-called secular nature in order to cater for the need to develop the country

35) See, R.D. 25 October, 1920, N. 1755 (whereby, the Italian government confers the title of Emir upon the most noble Mohamed es-Senusi, along with the title of Highness, and the position as Head of the autonomous oases of Augilia, Gialo, el-Giaghub and Cufra), BUC., 733.

36) MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi Di Misurata (sometimes listed under Fondo Ufficio Studi), Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B.1: Progetto di ordinam scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della Cirenaica.

upon modern lines. The most difficult problem, however, was as Micacchi recognised that of blending the traditional system of traditional or religious education with the needs of a secular system, which aimed at creating a literate population, along with sufficient numbers trained in professional skills, besides academic training for the governing elite.(38)

In attempting to work out a solution to these problems, the commission was initially obliged to operate not only in terms of the general principles of the Fundamental Law and the Treaty of El-Regima; but also in terms of the special forms adopted by these decrees (especially of the latter) as far as education was concerned. This, said Micacchi, was the most difficult technical problem facing the commission, since the method of dealing with educational issues adopted by the Fundamental Law was quite different from that adopted by the Treaty of El-Regima, and it would be difficult to reconcile in drawing up a new ordinance. Thus, whereas Article Ten of the Fundamental Law merely stated that "elementary education was obligatory, and secondary and high schools will be gradually established", the Treaty of El-Regima had sought to express its aims in the form of the terminology used by the former Ottoman educational legislation.(39)

37) L'Enseignement aux Indigenes dans les Colonies Italiennes contains by far the best account of the proceedings of the commission. See, pp. 510-533.

38) Ibid.

39) Ibid. Also, see Art. 10 of the Fundamental Law of Cirenaica: R.D. 31 ottobre 1919, n. 2401, B.U.C., 601; and Art. 13 of the Treaty of El-Regima: infra, p. 177.

In attempting to resolve these apparent contradictions, the commissioners took perhaps the only course open to them, namely to jettison all ideas based upon the approach adopted by the Fundamental Law and the Treaty of El-Regima, since there was little possibility of reconciling the two in practical terms. Instead, they decided to evolve their own pattern which would be in part determined by Article Eleven of the Fundamental Law; but also comprise the important grades and levels of instruction laid down by the treaty itself. (40)

This pragmatic response to the situation was clearly what both sides most desired, for it placed the principle of bilingualism beyond dispute, while at the same time leaving the way open for the retention of the Italo-Arab schools in substance if not in form, which as has been shown was integral to the Italian position in Libya. On the Arab side, it enabled them to insist upon the incorporation of the Kuttab into the base of the educational pyramid. The importance of the Kuttab had already been adequately recognised by the Accord of Acroma, the Consultative Committees, the Fundamental Law and in the recent Treaty of El-Regima, as had the use of the Arabic language for all religious subjects. Such a priority made it impossible to adhere strictly to the Ottoman form of legislation since the latter had sought to separate the religious system of education from the secular system which was developed on the western pattern. In their final form, therefore, the

40) See, R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes dans les Colonies Italiennes, pp. 510-533; or idem, "L'Insegnamento Agli Indigeni nelle Colonie Italiane Di Diritto Dominio", Atti del Primo Congresso di Studi Coloniali, Firenze, 8-14 April, 1931, Vol. IV. (Firenze, 1931), pp. 232-234.

recommendations of the commissioners to the Parliament of Cirenaica adopted roughly the same schema as had been drawn up by Nallino in his proposals to the Post-War Commission of 1919. The main difference between the recommendations of the commissioners and the earlier Nalino proposals lay in the fact that Micacchi had succeeded in retaining the bilingual principle and the Italo-Arab schools, which would henceforth be known simply as elementary schools.

If, however, Micacchi could be said to have achieved what he had originally set out to preserve from the 1914 educational ordinance, the Arab side could also congratulate itself upon having developed the proposals contained in all its official dealings with the Italian government since the Accord of Acroma in 1917. The Arabic language was safeguarded in the latest sets of proposals which would be presented to a parliamentary assembly in which the majority of the delegates were Libyan nationals. But, as a result of these proposals, an educational system would be established in Cirenaica which would embody both traditional and modern aims and requirements. Only the most committed of xenophobes could regard the partial retention of the Italian language in the schools as undesirable, for it was clearly inconceivable that Libya could advance into the twentieth century, in the circumstances of 1920, without learning a western language and making use of whatever skills the Italians were prepared to impart through their teaching personnel and whoever else would be responsible for the running of the new project.

Indeed, now that it looked as if Italianisation had been eliminated from the syllabus or otherwise rendered innocuous, the retention of Italian was certainly an advantage rather than a political and cultural disadvantage, since it was necessary for the development of the country, and there is no doubt that the Parliament of Cirenaica saw the matter in such a light.

IV. The Scholastic Ordinance of Cirenaica (R.D. 5 Feb. 1922 N. 368) and for Tripolitania (D.M. 14 Sept. 1922, N. 606)

"...the error of the dispositions of the Fundamental Law was the belief that the native population was irreparably closed to the penetration of our civilisation". (41)

Although the Parliament of Cirenaica had authorised the setting up of the original commission for educational reform following its first meeting of April 1921, consisting of twelve of its own members, (42) it was soon recognised that the work could only be completed satisfactorily, if entrusted to a special technical commission of six qualified experts, who would fulfil an advisory function. (43) The Italian members of this technical commission were Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi of the Department of Schools and Archaeology and Dr. Angelo Piccioli, the new scholastic superintendent for Cirenaica, who would be given the task of implementing the project, both of whom arrived in Bengasi towards the end of June 1921. (44) The other members of the technical commission were Professor Alphonso Nallino

41) A. Piccioli, "La Conquista Morale: La Scuola", La Rianiscita Della Tripolitania, Ed., A. Mondadori (Milano, 1926), pp. 265-319, p. 396.

42) See, MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1: Progetto di ordinam. Scol. per Musulmani della Cirenaica (1919?), p. 2.

43) See, Contini, F., "Istituzioni Scolastiche", Op. Cit., p. 26.

of Rome University(45)and two representatives from the Parliament of Cirenaica, Mohamed Chechia and Mahmud Scetuan.(46) Despite this delay, however, the commission worked steadily through the autumn and had completed its task in time for the project to be placed before the Parliament of Cirenaica in the New Year, so making it the first legislative programme to be authorised by an Arab parliament in Libya's history.(47) The new programme received the royal assent and passed into the statute book on 5 February 1922 and, as such, was to act as official educational policy in Cirenaica until 1928 when it was replaced by the new fascist legislation of that year.(48) Its chief details are as follows:

Art. I. Education for Moslems in Cirenaica shall be given in the following schools:

1. Kuttabs;
2. Elementary Schools;
3. Secondary Schools;
4. A High School;
5. Schools of Arts and Crafts;
6. Schools of Agriculture;
7. Girls' Schools of Education and Work.

Art. 2. Herein is outlined the precise programme for the Kuttabs which shall be developed entirely in the Arabic Language and include the following subjects:

- a) The learning by memory of a part of the Koran;
- b) The Principles of religion and morality;
- c) Reading, writing and dictation;
- d) The first notions of arithmetic;
- e) General Studies.

Art. 3. Establishes that the elementary schools shall offer courses of three year's duration to which shall be admitted only those pupils who have passed the final examination of the Kuttabs or a special test of admission.

44) R. Micacchi, "Le Scuole nelle Colonie Italiane di Dominio Diretto," Rivista Pedagogica, Anno XXIII., Fasc. III., 1930, p. 195.

45) Progetto Del Ordinamento Scolastico, Op. Cit., p. 26.

The curriculum shall be as follows:

- a) Arabic;
- b) Italian;
- c) Religion and Morality;
- d) Arithmetic and Elementary Geometry;
- e) Calligraphy;
- f) General Studies(history,geography,agriculture, hygiene etc.,etc.).

The instruction imparted in the Italian Language or the Arabic Language shall be given in accordance with the dispositions of Article 11 of the Fundamental Law.

Art.4. The courses provided by the secondary school shall have a duration of four years,the final two of which will be subdivided into two sections:one for the training of merchants,accountants and Libyan officials,and the other for the training of Kuttab teachers.

Only students who have passed the final examination of the elementary schools;or a special admission test will be admitted to this school:

The curriculum of the school will consist of the following basic subjects:

- 1. Arabic;
- 2. Italian;
- 3. Moslem Law,Logic and Morality;
- 4. History and Geography;
- 5. Arithmetic and Geometry;
- 6. Physics and Natural Science;
- 7. Calligraphy and Design;
- 8. Bookkeeping;
- 9. Pedagogy;
- 10. Agriculture.

Other subjects responding to the needs of the community and the aims of the school can also be established on an optional basis.

Art.5. Regarding the High School,the courses of which ought to have a duration of three years,the aim of the institution shall be to provide a qualification for use in gaining admission to the Italian universities or in the training of elementary and secondary school-teachers.

46) R.Micacchi,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes,p.533.

47) See,B.U.C.,287 for the year 1922.Also,see D.G.10 Luglio 1926,N.2802;Funzionamento delle vecchie scuole medie arabe Idadia,B.U.C.,Cir.7,258;and D.G.28 Luglio 1926, N.2850,B.U.C.,Cir.800;and D.G.23 Oct.1927,N.3134; Organizzazione delle scuole nell'interno delle Cirenaica, B.U.C.,11,762.

To this type of school will be admitted those who are in possession of a leaving certificate of the secondary school; or who had passed a special examination of admission.

- Art.6. The Schools of Education and Work for Girls will be primarily concerned with the teaching of reading and writing in both Arabic and Italian, which will only be given to girls, whose families explicitly request such a form of education; all other pupils at these schools will only undertake a curriculum consisting of general studies and suitable forms of work.
- Art.7. Instruction shall also be provided for children belonging to the nomadic tribes, as previously promised, through the creation of special mobile teaching-units, with a curriculum analagous to that provided in the Kuttabs.
- Art.8. Professional Education at Bengasi shall be provided in the School of Arts and Crafts of the city, which was established by Governor Martini during the year 1919.

By the same article, agricultural instruction shall be given in a School of Agriculture, which will be set up in a convenient locality.

In Article 12. is contained the stipulation that Arab teachers will be paid at the same rate and parity as Italian teachers with similar qualifications, grades and experience, besides being eligible for the same bonuses and gratuities as applied to teachers working in the Italian colonies. (49)

Any assessment of the 1922 Educational Ordinance for Cirenaica must start by recognising the emergence in it of what seems to be a new spirit of compromise and accomm-

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- 48) The places where the types of school listed in Art.1. of the decree were to be established were outlined in a special annex as: a) Kuttabs: Bengasi-Agedabia-Soluch-Ghemines-Tocra-Regima-El Merg-Tolmeta-El Hania-Zavia El Beda-Marana-Marsa Susa-Cirene-El Ghegab-El Gubba-Derna-Martuba-Tobruk-Bardi Suleiman (Porto Bardia); Elementary Schools: Bengasi-Agedabia-El Merg-Cirene-Derna-Tobruk; Arts and Crafts: Bengasi; School of Agriculture: localities to be designated; Girls Schools of Education and Work: Bengasi and Derna; localities in which Kuttabs can be set up if required by local need or popular demand: Sidi Khalifa-el Coefia-el Guarscia-Aim Mara-Zavia el Faidia-el Abiar-Benina-Umm er Rgem-el Agheila-Marsa Luce-Um er Ahfein-Zavia el Gasrein-Zavia el Hammama-Zavia el Hamez-Besciara. See, R.D.5 febbraio 1922, n.368. Regolamento scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della Cirenaica B.U.C., 287.

odation in the Italian management of Libyan affairs. There is also a balance between the opposing Nallino and Micacchi factions which is new, for whereas the Nallino approach finds expression in the provisions of the Kuttabs and secondary education, the provisions for the elementary school by preserving the Italian language satisfy Micacchi's less nationalistic viewpoint. On the Libyan side, in exchange for the elimination of the Italianising and assimilationist tendencies of the Bertolini legislation, and the threat that Colosimo's proposals might extend the Bertolini premise still further in the direction of Italianisation, a readiness had been shown towards accepting the place of the Italian language in the curriculum of the schools excepting the Kuttabs. If, however, the chief strength of the new legislation lay in its accommodation and tolerance, which found their best expressions in the "reformed kuttabs", elementary schools and secondary schools (all of which were now combined into a single interrelated system), the new law was not without its weaknesses as a blueprint for Libya's future development under Italian rule.

Three weaknesses particularly need to be mentioned: first, the failure to include Nallino's proposal, as outlined in the 1919 Post-War Commission, for the creation of a high school for the training of future Ulemah, which would have gone part of the way towards satisfying the demands of the Consultative Committees for Islamic Universities at Bengasi and Derna; Second, despite the demands of the said committees for agricultural education, Article Nine failed to provide either a programme or even a specific commitment

to establish the required training centres in the immediate future, a criticism which must also be extended with equal rigour to the undertaking to provide Libyans with the opportunity of professional education, which was the subject of Article Nine of the new decree.(50)

Meanwhile in Tripolitania, despite Italian inability to proceed with the implementing of the Fundamental Law of that province, because of the "disturbed political and military condition" there, legislative efforts continued during 1920 and 1921 for the establishment of autonomy, which culminated in R.D. 10 March 1921, N. 316, officially stating that a "state of war no longer existed in the province".(51) In the autumn of 1921, conditions were judged sufficiently tranquil in the territory to enable the central government to empower the local governor to proceed with the establishing of a new administration and the calling of a local parliament.(52) In this brief calm before the storm, the governor authorised the setting up of a commission consisting of both Libyan and Italian citizens to prepare, as in Cirenaica, a new school system and an educational programme in full conformity with the Fundamental Law.(53)

49) Ibid. (the proposition to go ahead with professional education at Bengasi lacks a specific commitment to professional education for Arabs in the form of considered programmes, and "Bengasi" here only refers to the existing School of Arts and Crafts set up by Governor Martini in 1919).

50) B.U.C., 167 for the year 1921.

51) R.D. 8 Aprile 1920, N. 529, che approva le norme per la nomina per la nomina dei rappresentanti elettivi al Parlamento della Tripolitania, nonché la tabella dei relativi collegi elettorali, B.U.C. 238; and R.D. 23 Ottobre 1921, N. 1815. Delega al Governatore della Tripolitania ad emanare norme per l'ordinamento

The range and competence of the commission, however, was carefully restricted to encompass only the matter of elementary education, it being adjudged too premature, given the uncertain political situation in Tripolitania, where the government was only playing for time, to think about establishing higher grades of school. (54) The commission was also given to understand that although the differences between Tripolitania and Cirenaica were to be observed in respect of Article Eleven of the Fundamental Law, in all other respects, it was to model its deliberations upon the work of its Cirenaican equivalent. (55) Even so, given the latter injunction, the Tripolitanian commission's proposals differed from the Cirenaican proposals in respect of the relationship of the Kuttabs with the state system of education. In Tripolitania, the Kuttabs were to be left out of the state system and classed as "private" schools only; and the elementary schools for Moslems were to be divided into a lower and higher course, in line with earlier Italian proposals. (56) The Commission's proposals, as accepted by the governor of the province and the Ministry of Colonies and embodied in a special ministerial decree for Tripolitania, are chiefly as follows:

(contin.) politico-amministrativo di quella regione e per le elezioni al Parlamento ed agli altri organi elettivi. B.U.C., 9, 1922.

⁵²) See, R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 533.

⁵³) D.G., 15 July 1922. Also see, R: Micacchi, Ibid., p. 534.

⁵⁴) R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p. 534.

⁵⁵) See, Ibid., p. 534; and also, D.M. 14 Sept. 1922: Ordinamento

Art.1. Moslem education shall be provided in the following types of schools:

- 1. Boys' Elementary Schools of two kinds:
 - a) lower elementary schools;
 - b) higher elementary schools;
- 2. Girls' Schools of Education and Work;
- 3. Evening Elementary Schools.

Art.2. The boys' lower elementary course shall have have a duration of three years. Teaching in the Arabic Language will be for the following subjects:

- a) The committing of the Koran to memory;
- b) The principles of religion and morality;
- c) Instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic;
- d) Elementary arithmetic;
- e) General Studies (observations and description of objects in the environment, hygiene, rural studies);
- f) Manual Work;
- g) Singing;
- h) Gymnastics.

In the third course, the Italian Language will be taught in accordance with the dispositions of Art. Eleven of the Fundamental Law.

Art.3. The Boys' higher elementary course shall have a duration of three years and will be only open to pupils who have passed the final examination of the lower elementary school or have sat a special entrance test.

The curriculum of the higher elementary course will be as follows:

- a) Teaching of the Koran, religion and morality;
- b) Arabic Language;
- c) Italian Language;
- d) Elementary Arithmetic and Geometry;
- e) Calligraphy;
- f) General Studies ("lezioni di cosi", history, geography, agriculture, hygiene, etc.);
- g) Gymnastics;
- h) Singing.

Material included under letters d., e., f., & h., will be taught equally in Arabic and Italian. Furthermore, a fourth year will be added to this course in certain circumstances by the Ministry of Colonies at the proposal of the local governor.

Art.4. The Girls' School of Education and Work shall consist of a five-year course of which the first year will be of a preparatory nature and the remaining four years standard.

The teaching material will be as follows:

- a. The Koran, religion and morality;
- b. Arabic Language;
- c. Italian Language;
- d. Arithmetic and elementary geometry;
- e. General studies ("lezioni di cosi", history, geography, domestic economy & hygiene);
- f. Calligraphy;
- g. Singing;
- h. Gymnastics;
- i. Domestic work;
- j. Women's work(not applicable to the preparatory course).

Art.5. The main task of the evening elementary schools is to combat illiteracy and semi-illiteracy amongst adults. For such a purpose the schools will adopt the following courses:

1. Courses for Illiterates;
2. Courses for Semi-Illiterates;
3. Complementary Courses.

The teaching material for the above courses shall be as following:

- a) The Koran, religion and morality;
- b) Arabic Language;
- c) Italian Language;
- d) Arithmetic and elementary geometry.

These schools will only be established in centres of importance, where and when circumstances are favourable to the being set up.

Art.6. Experienced Arab teachers with recognised qualifications will in Tripolitania be paid at the same rates as their equivalents of similar experience and qualifications and grades of service, etc., etc. (57)

All schemes for collaborating with the Libyans upon an equal basis had already struck the newly-appointed governor of Tripolitania, the industrialist and financier,

56) Ibid.

57) See, D.M. 14 settembre 1922. Ordinamento scolastico per i musulmani della Tripolitania, B.U.C., 606.

Giuseppe Volpi as foolhardy and unrealistic,(58)and it is easily possible to recognise in this drastically minimised educational programme,not only the hand of Micacchi,but also the elements of future fascist policies, which would finally restrict Moslem education to the elementary and professional spheres.(59)Also the excluding of the Kuttabs from the governmental system both returns to the Bertolini premise of 1914 and points to future educational legislation of the fascist era,when the Italo-Arab school would again become the principal vehicle of public instruction for Moslems in Libya.This school survives on in the 1922 decree for Tripolitania,despite the Fundamental Law,and,as in Cirenaica too,only slight legislative changes would be needed to extend the teaching of Italian to the lower elementary schools,a few of which were established after 1928.It should,nonetheless,be pointed out that in Tripolitania the failure of the Fundamental Law to find legislative expression at this particular moment,meant in effect,that the chance of developing an adequate system of education for Moslems was lost for good,as far as the development of the country under Italian rule was concerned.

58) Of Volpi's governorship(3 Aug.1921-June 1924),Claudio Segre writes:"his decisive policies contrasted markedly with the vacillations of the earlier Liberal regimes. By profession,Volpi was a financier whose empire was based upon electric power in his native Venetia.He was also a founder and director of several companies in the Balkans.In addition to his business activities,he had carried out a number of important diplomatic assignments .He had served as Italian consul to Serbia in 1912, negotiated the Treaty of Ouchy which concluded the Libyan War....He was also one of the first of the major industrialists to join the Fascist party".See,Op.Cit.,p.47.

59) See,R.D.21 Giugno 1928,N.1698.Norme riflettenti l'istruzione primaria per i musulmani della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica,B.U.T.,19,1141.

Chapter Seven Arab Reaction to the Statutes of Libya
in Tripolitania: Failure to Implement the
Educational and Political Provisions (1919-24)

"For the time being it is sufficient to affirm that by far the best results can be obtained if we continue to make use of the Italo-Arab school, providing we employ in it, capable and worthwhile teachers, knowledgeable of the colony and the indigenous population". (*)

Unlike Cirenaica, the period 1919-1924 in Tripolitania was one of political, economic and educational stagnation in which Italian rule has little to show for itself in any concrete or tangible form. As such, it confirms the general premise that as far as Libyan history is concerned under Italian rule, educational developments, as much else of a practical nature, were almost entirely dependent upon the success of political initiatives, even when the latter did not necessarily (as under Fascism) meet with the voluntary support of the mass of the population. Thus, without such initiatives (or in the wake of their failure) practical issues were easily eclipsed and lapsed into incoherence and stagnation. In approaching this period, therefore, it is necessary to recognise at the outset, that it is the failure of political initiatives, as they affect the educational system, which is primarily under scrutiny.

In terms of chronology, the period for educational developments commences with the arrival in Libya of Micacchi in the Spring of 1919 and the conceding of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania in June of the same year. The transfer of Piccioli to Tripolitania in the autumn of 1924 to re-organise the schools for the new fascist government tech-

*) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 64.

nically ends this period from an educational standpoint. Mussolini's seizure of power in October 1922, however, is the main historical determinant since it is this which inaugurates a new epoch of which educational events form an integral rather than a separate part.

1) Elementary Education

During these years, no effort was made by either the Ministry of Colonies in Rome nor the Department of Civil and Political Affairs in Tripoli(1) to implement the educational provisions of the Fundamental Law of June 1919 or even the gubernatorial decree of September 1922(2), which authorised the replacement of the Italo-Arab schools by lower-elementary schools, in which the Arabic language would be the sole medium of instruction. The approval of the 1922 decree only two months after Volpi's ultimatum of 17 July to the Libyan nationalists at Misurata (3) seems to indicate that the government had hoped to avoid

- 1) Charge of the schools was basically the responsibility of the Civil and Political Affairs Department. The position of superintendent appears to have been of a largely nominal nature and entrusted as a general rule to the acting director of the Italian secondary school in Tripoli, Cav. Mescia, until the appointment of a full-time superintendent for Tripolitania in the summer of 1924. From the time of Dr. Angelo Piccioli's appointment in 1924 all subsequent superintendents were appointed by the Ministry of Colonies where Micacchi remained director of the colonial schools until the fall of the Italian empire during the Second World War. See, Voti, Pronunciati da Comitati Consultati Indigeni, April 1919, Op. Cit.; R. Istituto Tecnico ed Regio Scuola Complementare di Tripoli, Annuario 1927 (Tripoli, 1927); Angelo Piccioli to Governor Volpi, 20 Dec. 1924 (MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi).
- 2) D.M. 14 Sept. 1922. Ordinamento scolastico per i musulmani della Tripolitania, B.U.C., 606.
- 3) During these final months of Liberal Italy, two policies began to manifest themselves in Libya: the policy of peaceful accommodation pursued by the Minister of Colonies, Amendola; and the policy of the new governor of Tripolitania Giuseppe Volpi, who insisted upon the unconditional surrender of nationalists at Misurata to which he laid siege on 17 July, 1922. See, The Italian Conquest of Tripolitania

any armed confrontation through creating a climate of accommodation in which talks could take place, so ending the political anarchy of the province.(4) Though never implemented, however, the decree was not officially replaced until 1928, when the Italo-Arab schools were restored to their former pre-eminence as the principal educational instrument of Italian colonialism in Libya for Moslems.(5)

(6) The main reason for the lack of any serious effort on the part of the Italians to implement the new policies in Tripolitania, undoubtedly lay in the continuing political uncertainty, combined with weak governments in Italy itself.

(6) In such circumstances, political agreement was impossible between the Italians and the independent chiefs of the Gebel or with the Libyan nationalists at Misurata Port, who still hoped for complete independence from Italian rule, a goal with which no Italian administration could concur. The final burst of activity which had produced the decree of September 1922 was no more than the last splutterings of a dying flame, briefly fanned back into life by Volpi's arrival as governor on 3 August 1921, and almost as soon extinguished for an indefinite future.

In effect, it was Micacchi's policy that was adhered

(contin.) (condensed from the book by R. Rapex: L'Affermazione della Sovranità Italiana sulla Tripolitania) in Italian Rule in Tripolitania (B.M.A., Tripoli, 1947), p.147.

4) Ibid., p.20. Also, see, Evans-Pritchard, Op.Cit., p.147.

5) See, R.D.21 Giugno 1928, N.1698.

6) See, R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigènes, p.510; and Renzo De Felice, Chpt.XIV "Mussolini e Giolitti: tra rivoluzione e reazione nasce il fascismo", Mussolini il Rivoluzionario (Torino, 1965), pp.599-662.

to by the local authorities in the province, as a result of which, the Italo-Arab schools were retained in existence irrespective of the new orientation, both as a means of retaining the goodwill and loyalty to the government of those Arabs who still continued to support Italian rule, and also as a guarantee that Italian sovereignty would be maintained in the future.(7) Thus it was that two policies continued to characterise Italian educational activity after June 1919: the official policy of cultural and linguistic rapprochement and the unofficial policy based upon pacific penetration.(8)

During the resulting stalemate, Micacchi determined to maintain the existing Italo-Arab schools as best he could in the uncertain circumstances, while planning their eventual revival, through an improvement of the Italian teaching-personnel allocated to the existing schools,(8)

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- 7) Micacchi informed the Governor of Tripolitania in July 1919 that his "observations were inspired not by a vain love of criticism, but from the desire to make our schools efficient instruments of pacific penetration in the colony". Op.Cit., p.2.
- 8) See, R.D.4 gennaio 1920, N.68, che stabilisce il ruolo organico degli insegnanti elementari della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica, B.U.C., 69.
- 9) In practice, the seven government schools provided the only form of elementary education outside the Kuttabs of which there were six in Tripoli and an unknown quantity elsewhere. In 1919, the school population of the Italo-Arab sector amounted to 882 and 702 for the Kuttabs in an area comprising nearly 1.8 million square kilometres for the country as a whole, and a population of 570,000 inhabitants (approx.), the majority of whom lived in Tripoli and its immediate suburbs, or along the fertile coastal-strip. See, Micacchi to the Governor of Tripolitania, p.66; and Malvezzi De Medici, "Native Education in the Italian Colonies", Educational Yearbook (1931), pp.647-677.

Both government policy, however, and the political and military situation, which confined Italian rule to the city of Tripoli and the outlying garrisons at Homs, Azizia and the Western coastal-area, prevented for the immediate future any expansion of the Italo-Arab schools, despite the urgent need for many more elementary schools for Arabs both in the areas under Italian control, and in those areas where Italian writ did not yet run. (9) In examining the seven surviving Italo-Arab schools of Tripolitania, which in effect offered the only elementary education available to Arabs in the region, outside the Kuttabs (10) and the Italian national schools (11), it is important to avoid

- 10) Micacchi recounts that 25 Kuttabs were opened at the beginning of 1919 in Tripolitania, most of which were soon closed down because of the shortage of teachers. Even so, the numbers attending these schools, which were for the most part attached to the local mosques, had risen from 670 in the previous year to 815 in 1919. Although he was not opposed to the Kuttabs in principle, recognising them as the natural product of Islamic civilisation, Micacchi described them as being in a "full state of decadence". By this he was referring to their being "situated in small airless rooms, without adequate lighting, except for what light is permitted to enter through the small doorway. In such conditions, the pupils squat on the bare, flattened ground from where they copy down on a small slate, the lesson of the day, which is imparted by the teacher or fighi". See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 92.
- 11) Official statistics for the school-year 1921-22 indicate that in Tripolitania alone, 1525 Moslem pupils were enrolled in the following types of existing schools: Secondary (3); elementary (31); infant (nil); Italo-Arab (668); Catholic schools (25); Jewish schools (Talmudic: nil); Koranic (798). F. Contini, *Op. Cit.* (Istituti Scolastici Della Tripolitania, Anno Scolastico 1921-1922).
- 12) See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, pp. 64 & 69-71. "Only in the city of Tripoli and only in the school-year 1921-22", reported Piccioli in November 1922; was the conspicuous sum of 2,988,970 Lira spent on the construction of new schools. "This", he added, "was spent as follows: L. 1,554,400 Secondary schools (Italian); trachoma schools, L. 554,600; mixed elementary school at Dahara, L. 319,700; Girls' professional school, L. 560,270. Outside Tripoli there were only three scholastic centres (Zuara, Suk el-Giuma and Homs), though others existed in areas not under Italian control having been set up before 1916. See, Piccioli Report of Nov. 1922 (Edilizia Scolastica), p. 78.

easy conclusions, as each school was different, despite the similarity of the curriculum. Moreover, the success or failure of these schools as educational institutions was determined by a variety of factors, such as the teaching personnel, buildings and general facilities, the school intake, and the extent to which they received support from the indigenous community and its leaders. A further vital factor in the survival and future development of a particular school was the attitude to the education of Moslems of the military resident of the district in which the school was situated. (12)

Undoubtedly, the best of these seven schools was at Sukh el-Giuma, in the residence of the Nuahi el Arbaa, a few kilometers from Tripoli itself, which had been opened in a blaze of publicity shortly before Micacchi's arrival in Libya in 1919, and was intended not only to demonstrate that Italy "cared for her subjects" but also to serve as the ideal model of the Italo-Arab school of the future. (13) The success of the school, which in its second year of existence had already enrolled 280 pupils (14), was attributed by Micacchi to the initiative of the local commandant, Major D'Alonzo, the support of the mayor of the municipality, the local cadi and notables, the purpose-built accommodation and the efforts of the teachers. (15) In the latter respect, Micacchi singled out for particular recommendation the efforts of the director of the school, Andrea Festa, who

13) See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, pp. 64 and 69-71.

14) Ibid., p. 70.

15) Ibid., p. 69.

was later to become a well-known colonial educator and the author of several notable publications in the field of colonial education(16).He also singled out for praise, Festa's assistant,Luigi Ramone.Both men had apparently found themselves in Libya as a result of military service and,though lacking in professional qualifications,had been singled out for the work by Major D'Alonzo,a man, according to Micacchi,who embodied all the ideals of Italy's civilising mission.(17)The Director of Schools was equally impressed with the work of the two Arab teachers employed at the school,the well-known Sheikh Mohamed Kimail el Hammali,who had formerly taught in the Ottoman schools and would later become perhaps the best-known Arab teacher and educational writer in Libya under Italian rule;and,also, Sheikh Mohamed el Gimmi.Both men were responsible for the teaching of Arabic and the Koran.(18)Undoubtedly,this school represented for Micacchi the best example of fruitful collaboration between Arabs and Italians in Libya at this time and could serve as a model for the schools of the future.(19)

The remaining Italo-Arab schools,however,were less well received by the local Arab population and in terms of their administration and general facilities were well below the standards set at Sugh el Giuma,though it is not unlikely that Micacchi emphasised the good points of the latter,as a part of his campaign to preserve the Italo-Arab school as the pincipal means of Moslem instruction in the colony.In Tripoli itself,the situation remained

16) Ibid.,p.70.

17) Ibid.

18) Ibid.p.71.

little changed from the time when in 1913 Scallabrini had attempted to prepare for the implementation of the Bertolini law of 1914; for the only elementary school in the old city was that of Pietro Verri, which had been set up primarily to cater for the Jewish quarter, and which Arabs were reluctant to attend for religious reasons. (20) The only so-called change since those early days had been the transferring of educatorio at Menschia to the relative security of Dahara (21), the principal elementary school for Arabs remaining as in 1913, the Italo-Arab school attached to the School of Arts and Crafts in the Zenghet Misran. (22) Despite the fact that this school was the successor of the original Italo-Arab annexe established by Caneva in the Italian elementary school on the Sciara Espagnol of Tripoli in 1912, and was established in spacious accommodation, its popularity in 1919 was as much in doubt as it had been at the time of its first establishment, and Micacchi could only explain the fact that enrolment and attendance had remained "almost stationary" by referring to the epidemic in the autumn of 1918, which had swept Tripoli and reduced pupil attendance at the school. (23) Not all was so discouraging in this school, which offered a three-year course divided into two sections for the first year and one each for the successive two years, as the final examination had

19) Ibid., p. 261.

20) Ibid., p. 64. Also, see, F. Contini, Op. Cit. (Scuole Per Israeliti), p. 29; and Scallabrini to Bertolini, 1913, Op. Cit.

21) MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-6: Piccioli to Volpi, 1924-1925, Tripoli, 1925.

22) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 64.

23) Ibid., pp. 64-7.

shown:44 pupils out of a total 117 actually in attendance at the school had been promoted to the next class, a definite improvement on the previous year,when only 22 out of the 105 in attendance had been promoted-or 41% against 20%.(24) No attempt had been made since the school's original establishment in 1912 to add the promised higher course of two years,despite frequent mention of the need to provide a bridge from this school in particular to the Italian secondary schools in Tripoli.The Director's remarks are of some interest in respect of the teaching personnel who consisted of the acting director of the school,Signor Guglielmo Casano,and his Italian assistant,Maestro Crescenzo Di Prima,and two Arab teachers for the Kōran and Arabic languages,whom he does not name.(25)Micacchi's estimation of the relative competence of these teachers reflects his general hypothesis that the Italo-Arab schools were only as good as the teachers running them;the absence of a trained cadre of teachers(which defect he was determined to remedy) made it too early to judge the various merits and general effectiveness of these schools or indeed their popularity with the Arab population.The teaching personnel at the Tripoli school were ready fodder for the Director's argument: Signor Casano,who was on the role of teachers for the Italian Schools Abroad and had taught steadily in

24) Ibid.,p.65.

25) Ibid.,p.67.

26) Ibid.,p.66.

27) Ibid.

the schools of Tripolitania since the turn of the century, was described as "of mediocre culture and without any habit of study"(26);Maestro Di Prima was regarded as sufficiently "zealous" as a teacher, but clearly in need of better direction than was provided by the Director of the school(27);the two Arab teachers fared no better and were described as lacking in "competence" and "cometely untrained for this type of school".(28)

The other Italo-Arab school in the vicinity of Tripoli was in 1919 still at Menscia, where it served the needs of the rural suburban-areas, a population that was forever fluctuating, a factor having a profound effect upon the school and not entirely untypical of rural areas, where attendance figures were subject to constant fluctuations according to agricultural demands.(29)The later removal of this school to Dahara(outside the city), where the population was basically suburban rather than rural, was already a strong possibility in 1900;for Micacchi believed the work of the school was insufficiently appreciated in the Menschia region, where the notables and local population had failed to encourage boys of school-age into attending with any regularity.(30)The responsibility for such a state of affairs was placed squarely at the feet of the Arab population of the vicinity, described by Micacchi as "indifferent to education", the Italo-Arab school being invariably attended by only the most impoverished boys in the district, because of the free food hand-outs provided

28) Ibid., p.67.

29) Ibid., p.68.

30) Ibid.

at the school by the authorities.(31)The Italian director, Signor Giuseppe Di Natale,was of somewhat advanced age to be still in the service(sixty-four)and was a teacher belonging to the Role of Italian Teachers Abroad.He was, however, entirely exonerated from all responsibility for the poor rate of attendance by Micacchi who claimed that the school itself had only managed to survive at all on account of Di Natale's "industry,patience and tact". (32)Neither could the school-buildings be blamed for the poor attendance since they were spacious and pleasantly arranged around an inner courtyard.(33).The attendance figure of around 25 pupils during the actual inspection of the school in 1919 was not,Micacchi conceded,entirely unreasonable in the circumstances, and should be regarded as a tribute to Signor Di Natale's professional heroism, for,despite his "advanced age",the director was"still sufficiently active in the class-room,and his work was not lacking in general preparation,benefitting indeed from his long experience of school-work".(34)Thus those pupils who had attended with any regularity were described by Micacchi as "well prepared".(35)The Arab teacher,Ibraim Eghedia,taught in the "traditional manner"for which ,puposes the pupils were seated on matting which covered the floor and wrote on a slate".Micacchi concluded that he did not feel himself to be sufficiently qualified to judge such methods,a somewhat evasive statement which became his invariable response to similar occasions and situations.(36)

31) Ibid.

32) Ibid.

33) Ibid.

Another school in the Tripoli region known as the Nuahi el-Arbaa which compared in many respects with the Menschia establishment was the Italo-Arab school of Tagiura, a school like the one at Sugh el Giuma under the authority of Major D'Alonzo, who had appointed as vice-resident of the area a certain Captain Valente under whose control the management of the school fell.(37)Unfortunately for the school,regardless of Valente's "lively propaganda in its favour",the local population remained either indifferent or hostile to its amenities.(38)Various explanations of this state of affairs were put forward by Micacchi: the "particular local conditions",for example,whereby the school was established at too great a distance from the surrounding farms in which the majority of the population of the region lived.(39)Moreover,Tagiura itself boasted an ancient mosque with its own particularly famous Koranic school,which although in a somewhat reduced and abandoned condition by 1919,still managed to attract a good many pupils,especially from amongst the more substantial families of the region.(40)Consequently,the Italo-Arab school was almost exclusively attended(with the exception of five or six pupils from well-to-do families) by boys from the poorest class,and,since this area was almost exclusively agricultural,this had the effect as in Menschia of making it extremely difficult to secure regular attendance.

34) Ibid.,p.69.

35) Ibid.

36) Ibid.

37) Ibid.,p.71.

38) Ibid.

39) Ibid.

(41) Micacchi also blames the ineffectiveness of the school upon the Italian teacher acting as director, Signor Vincenzo Del Campo, who failed to reach Micacchi's own high expectations of the Colonial teacher and his work, both of which were viewed as inextricably bound together by seals of respectability, rectitude and dedication to the work of the school. This is brought out in Micacchi's criticism of Del Campo for visiting the hostelryes of the area in which the school was situated; the teacher's neglect of his personal appearance is also brought to the governor's attention; and the point made that Del Campo's attitude not only reduced the estimation in which he was held by the population of Tagiura, but had brought the school into disrepute with the Arab population. (42)

The central and decisive importance of the Italian teachers responsible for the day-to-day organisation and administration of the schools is again emphasised by the Director of Colonial Schools in his report upon the tiny Italo-Arab school at Zuara, a small centre established several kilometers outside Tripoli, where a "truly flourishing school could easily be set up if both the accommodation and the teachers better responded to the estimations and desires of the local population". (43) Even so, despite the unsatisfactor

40) Ibid.

41) Ibid.

42) Ibid., p. 72. Both the Micacchi and subsequent Piccioli reports are heavily peppered with criticism of the methods and mores of the teaching personnel in the government schools. In this respect, both men had keen ears for local gossip as it affected teachers, information readily supplied by a whole range of informers, though there can be no doubt that the Italian teachers were considerably demoralised by poor conditions and inadequate pay at this time. See, ibid.

nature of the school accommodation and the absence of regular text-books, the school population had increased from 93 during 1917-18 to 130 for the 1918-19 school-year with an attendance rate of 85% against 64% in the previous year.(44) Unlike the other Italo-Arab schools which had remained open until the commencement of Ramadan, this particular school had closed at the beginning of April to avoid the general exodus of pupils, who, along with their parents, left the village to gather in the harvest.(45) Despite this annual problem, it had been possible to promote 30 pupils to the next year or 34% of those who had attended the school during the school-year.(46) The running of the school was in the hands of two Italian conscripts, Lieutenant Napoleone Butera, a trained and qualified teacher, and Sergeant Luigi Capello, who was furnished with the certificate of the Italian normal schools. Both men conveyed to Micacchi the impression of being "intelligent and cultured men", though Butera lacked in the Director's opinion a certain degree of "resolution" to be explained, he added, by the fact that the lieutenant had been assigned to the school in the course of his duties only and had no intention of either continuing as a teacher or of remaining in the colony. Capello, however, made no effort at all and in Micacchi's opinion seemed "unsuitable to be a teacher".(47) The teaching of Arabic and the Koran was not

43) Ibid., p.73.

44) Ibid.

45) Ibid.

46) Ibid.

47) Ibid.

provided by the school but given in the nearby mosque, where it was taught by three local fighi in the "traditional manner". The fighi in question are given by Micacchi as: Hag Bu el-Kairat, Fghi Ali ben Hag Mohamed and Fghi Ahmed ben Brahim.(48)

The Italo-Arab school at the military outpost of Homs, which marked the effective limits of Italian authority in Tripolitania to the East of Tripoli, was under the control of Signor Giuseppe Chillemi, who in 1919 had only recently arrived in the colony and, although untrained as a teacher had apparently volunteered for the work. He would in later years become a well-known colonial teacher in Libya and along with Andrea Festa, Fulvio Contini and others, who Micacchi began to single out at this stage for future key roles in the educational service, would form part of the inner cadre of teachers to whom the effective control of ~~all~~ education in the Italian colonies would eventually be entrusted. Micacchi was anxious at this point in his career not to ascribe to him the defects of the school which the general circumstances of the time and the teacher's own lack of experience made it difficult to immediately remedy.(49) Chillemi's lack of experience was nonetheless responsible for the low annual promotion at the end of the 1918-1919 school-year; for although the school appears to have enjoyed a 100% attendance record (54 attended out of 55 enrolments), a factor explained by its urban location and intake, only 20% had been promoted against 30% in the previous year.(50) The teaching of Arabic and the Koran

48) Ibid., p.74.

49) Ibid.

50) Ibid.

was in the charge of Habib Bubaker and Sheilk Mohamed el-Siir, whose efforts in this respect were passed as satisfactory by Micacchi.(51)

Although the Fundamental Law had made primary education compulsory for boys, it was generally understood that education for girls should remain optional, and not be enforced, a difficult enough task in the case of male education.(52) The position of girls' education therefore remained as ambivalent as before 1919, and, as there was little doubt that girls' schooling would be confined to the principal urban centres or merely to Tripoli, where it would remain as in Turkish times a largely middle-class preserve, the question of its becoming general or compulsory was never a matter of serious debate.(53) Even so, female education was regarded by the Italian authorities from 1911 until 1942 as an important area for pacific penetration and in particular for the demonstration of Italy's civilising mission. In the latter respect, not only could it provide the government with an important opportunity to extend its influence into the home, but it also showed Italy in the role of emancipating women from centuries of bondage and oppression—a Western rather than an Eastern obsession.(54)

51) Ibid.

52) Micacchi regarded the question of compulsory education, such as had been sanctioned by the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania, with some degree of scepticism. The demographic condition of both colonies made it clear, he believed, that compulsory education could, at best, only be applied to areas of major population. Outside such areas, the law would be a "dead letter". In optimum conditions, it should be dependent for enforcement upon the individual locality and be regulated for by the rele-

In recognising the importance of girls' education, not merely on account of its intrinsic merits but principally as a weapon of propaganda and a means of directly influencing the home environment of the indigenous population, the Italians were only following the example of other colonial powers, who frequently pointed to the so-called subjection of Moslem women as a justification of colonial rule in Moslem countries. No attempt was ever made to explain the apparent neglect of girls' education in terms of socio-economic circumstances or geographical isolation which in some Moslem countries, such as Libya, were the chief causes of the failure to educate girls adequately. In this latter respect the history of education in Italy, especially in the South and in many country areas, was little different from Libya until well after the unification of Italy itself. (55)

(contin.) vant administrative authority, who would in effect be the "final arbitors" in such matters. See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (the School Attendance Law), p. 164.

53) Remarking upon Art. 10 of the Fundamental Law, which had limited compulsory school-attendance to boys, Micacchi reveals all the usual prejudices and lack of objectivity common to colonial legislators and administrators of his day. "The education of women in Moslem lands is full of problems and difficulties", he states. "And only in the greater centres of population, where the people have had some contact with Europeans over a period of years are they less misogynistic than in the interior. Even in the urban centres, however, the establishing of girls' schools has encountered some resistance for the education of women is regarded as in opposition to the tenets of Islam itself. Therefore, only a purely professional education of a basically practical character is permitted for women, as this type of training confers benefits upon the home. Thus girls are permitted to attend a special type of professional school in Tripoli; but it would be unwise to develop in this school the kind of education given to the female sex in the Italian national schools. In the latter respect it is most important to avoid any imposition of our culture and customs at the expense of their laws and customs". Ibid., p. 165.

The Turks had also attached importance to female education in Libya and had set up in Tripoli an elementary school which was attended by the daughters of notables and Turkish officers, along with a professional school analagous to the School of Arts and Crafts ,where orphans could acquire a trade, though the girls' section was without boarding facilities.(56)The Italians as part of their policy of pacific penetration before 1911 had also sought to gain the support of local Arab families of importance through encouraging them to send their daughters to the Italian schools in Tripoli, which catered for girls' education.

54) Ibid., pp.75-8.

55) See, Ernesto Codignola, Italy in Educational Yearbook(1930), and also in the Educational Yearbook 1935, and 1929. Further contributions to the subject of education in Italy in the Educational Yearbook are by Lamberto Borghi (1944), Ugo Spiritu(1924) and Iclea Picco(1940).

56) See, Scallabrini Report of July, 1913 (Scuola Professionale Femine Araba), p.9.

57) F. Contini, Op.Cit., p.10.

58) Ibid., p.10 and p.29.

59) Exact estimates of the numbers of girls receiving a formal education in Libya before 1911 are impossible to deduce in respect of Arab girls because of the absence of a separate set of statistics for them, the tendency being to compound Arab and Turkish statistics. Thus the Turkish elementary school for girls had a combined total of 80 pupils in the educational section and 30 in the professional section. The latter it appears were mainly Arab girls. Also 350 girls attended the Italian national school for girls, 400 the girls' school run by the Franciscans in Tripoli and 100 attended the girls' branch of the Talmudic school in the Jewish quarter of Tripoli. Arab girls would have attended all these schools with the exception of the latter, but as can be seen it is impossible to deduce their exact proportion from the total percentage because separate statistics were not kept. The only definite figure relating to the number of Arab girls attending public schools is given by Caruso-Ingilleri in 1912 to the effect that 35 such girls were attending the former Turkish Girls' elementary school in Tripoli. By 1913, however,

These included the girls' branch of the national elementary school and the girls' school in the charge of the Apostolic prefect which had been set up in the 1880's and entrusted first to French and then to Italian nuns.(57)Also the Jewish community had established a girls' school before 1911, though a good many Jewish girls were sent instead to the Italian schools, and it is more than likely that the former was intended primarily for the purposes of religious education, in the manner of the Koranic schools for Moslems.(58) Thus female education was already well developed in Tripoli before the colonial period commenced in 1911.

As with male education, the immediate impact of the Italian occupation had been to reduce the number of schools in operation and not surprisingly the number of Arab girls in receipt of a formal education fell sharply for a number of years. It did not, however, die out completely as is shown by Caruso's Ingillieri's observation that the former Turkish girls school still survived on in 1912.(59) At the time of Micacchi's arrival in Tripoli, however, the situation had hardly changed since Scallabrini's inspection of this one surviving school in the Via Misran during the year 1913, when he had recommended that it should be moved to more

(contin.) this school had been changed into an elementary professional school with around 70 pupils, which at the time of Micacchi's arrival had risen to 97, all of whom attended regularly and 38% had been promoted to the next class for the 1918-19 school-year. See, Caruso-Ingillieri to Giolitti (P.C.M.), Op.Cit.; Scallabrini to Bertolini, 1913, Op.Cit.; and Micacchi to the Governor of Tripolitania, Op.Cit., p.77.

60) Scallabrini Report of July, 1913, p.9.

commodious accommodation more in convenient reach of the Arab quarter of the old city to which so many people had fled from the surrounding countryside because of the effects of the war.(60)The long years of stagnation since that time ,during which the Ministry of Colonies had virtually abdicated from any administrative role in Libya in favour of drawing up plans for future use at the Conference of Versailles,(61) had not changed the situation in any way.(62)

As an educational institution,however,Micacchi expressed himself full of admiration for the way the school had managed to survive these desolate years of administrative neglect when,almost against the odds,it had not only survived, but had even"increased considerably",and undoubtedly had "a great future ahead of it".(63)Regarding the actual location in Shara Misran,the condition and general adequacy of the accommodation so provided,he could only repeat the vague directions voiced by Scallabrini almost five years before.(64) These amounted to the advice that only the removal of the school during the forthcoming scholastic year to a more central site somewhere in the old city would augment the attendance figures and develop the institution in the manner expected by the government in line with its general policy towards Libyan education.(64)

61) See,C.Giglio,Gli Archivi Storici Del Soppresso Ministero Dell'Africa Italiana E Del Ministero Degli Affari Esteri Dalle Origini Al 1922(Leiden,1971),p.xxii.

62) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.75

63) Ibid. Also,see, Scallabrini Report of July,1913,pp.9-10.

64) Ibid.

65) Ibid.

66) Ibid.

As it existed in 1919 and on until the school-year 1921-1922, when the government lavished 560.270 Lire on the construction of a new edifice, the Misran institution, officially designated only as an Italo-Arab school, (65) was for teaching purposes divided into four sections of which the first was of a preparatory nature. The idea of a preparatory section was not without its practical advantages for it accustomed the new entrants to the school as a whole, and set about teaching them the Italian language (the principal medium of instruction as in the boys' schools), along with hygiene and the first notions of the various crafts which they would learn in greater detail in subsequent years. (66) Following the introductory course, the girls were taught a variety of skills and crafts of a largely practical and industrial nature, such as cooking, domestic work, weaving, sewing, embroidery, etc., etc., along with the basic elements of a standard general education. The promotion rate to the next year was an indication of the success of the school at this curriculum and averaged out at 38% which was considered by Micacchi to be high. Also, the school had a good reputation in Tripoli and received many visitors who spread its repute far and wide. (67)

Again, as was shown in the examination of the boys' schools, Micacchi was unstinting in his laudation of "worthy teachers", able to achieve results judged "outstanding" in the difficult circumstances and conditions. The success achieved in the Misran Institution was not surprisingly

67) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 77.

attributed to Directress, Signorina Olga Ayra Cardella, a professional teacher, on the role of Italian teachers abroad. (68) Signora Cardella was assisted in her work and supervision by another "sound teacher", Maestra Agata De Meo, who was in charge of the second class and, in Micacchi's opinion, "well prepared and assiduous in the conduct of her duties". (69) Two other mistresses were also employed in the school and with whom Micacchi expressed himself to be fully satisfied with their work (70), along with three Arab mistresses: Maestra Sig. Zachi Sciaman, Maestra Fatma De Fairi and Maestra Mariom Cadamsi. (71)

Whereas previous advice upon the subject of government schools for the Moslem population of Libya had been largely concerned to alleviate the problem with palliatives rather than with the need to find a cure, Micacchi's attitude to the issues involved in providing educational provision for Moslems in a colonial-type situation was deep reaching and radical in its own terms of reference. This is particularly apparent in the following striking statement extracted from his report of June 1919:

"The vitality of this type of school is a proven fact, for it has both survived and prospered in the actual conditions of the colony, conditions with which I have dealt with in full in Parts One and Two of my Report, and which I do not now need to repeat. Hence, my profound conviction, and also the conviction of all those who have taught in this type of school or who have otherwise gained an unsuperficial knowledge of its workings, namely the conviction

68) Ibid., p.78

69) Ibid.

70) Ibid.

71) Ibid.

that entrusted to capacious and experienced teachers in reasonable circumstances in which the school buildings are adequate and the teaching materials, general hygiene, administrative arrangements and curriculum also satisfactory, they will become most effective instruments for our moral conquest of the country".(72)

Thus Micacchi's idea as to the future development of the elementary sector of Libyan education was to select and train a corps of Italian teachers to whom could be entrusted the mass of the Libyan population in schools where the predominating elements of the curriculum would be the Italian language and culture. No mention is made of the place of the Arab teacher or Arab language and culture, which was presumably still to be entrusted to untrained personnel or religious leaders. These would simply be expected to co-operate with the Italian teachers (in the schools for Libyans) who would always hold the position of responsibility as directors of the school. Micacchi had already noted approvingly this system in operation at Such el-Giuma and for almost the whole period of Italian rule it continued to be the principal method of employing Libyans in the government schools, formal training not being introduced until after the establishment of the School of Islamic Culture at Tripoli in 1935. Technically, the question of selecting and training Italians to work in the Italo-Arab schools was part of the general question of the recruitment of personnel for the elementary schools of the Italian colonies. Most teachers were recruited from the roll of the Foreign Ministry, a special list of approved teachers employed by the government in the Italian Schools Abroad. Teachers not recruited in this way were labelled as incaricati on account of the fact that their

72) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 143.

contracts were only on a yearly basis. The method of recruiting teachers locally and employing them on a temporary basis was both cheaper and produced on the whole better results than the method of recruiting teachers from the ministerial roll since the personnel were already acclimatised. As such it became the preferred method, despite Micacchi's attempt in 1920 for largely political reasons to draw up a special colonial roll of teachers for the government schools in Libya, and led in 1932 to the establishing in Tripoli of a Normal School for the training of Italian nationals resident in the colony for work in the elementary schools. (73) In the meantime, however, the numbers of Italians ready to work in the Italo-Arab schools was far from sufficient and the government schools were only able to be maintained in existence at all by the use of untrained military personnel, who were seconded from their units to teach in the Italo-Arab schools, especially in country areas. (74)

III. Professional Education

Neither the Colosimo proposals of 1918 (75) nor the educational provisions of the Fundamental Law of June 1919 (76) produced any new initiatives in respect of professional education, which in Libya was conducted either at the Girls' Italo-Arab school in Shara Misran or in the School of Arts and Crafts

73) See, M.D., Aug. 31, 1932, B.U., Anno XIX, 1932.

74) Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 64.

75) See, Colosimo Report, Op.Cit. (Professional Education), p. 373.

76) See, Fundamental Law of Tripolitania, Arts 10, 11 and 12, B.U.C., 289.

originally set up by the Ottomans in 1896. Between April 1916 and June 1919 this schools had been in the charge of the painter Edouardo Ximenes, who had reduced it to a level of more or less complete educational stagnation.

(77) Nothing had come out of Martini's attempt at reforming the school in 1915. This had led initially to the appointment of a special commission by the Ministry of Colonies to examine the affairs of the school and arrive at a solution of its problems that would act as a blueprint for its future development under Italian rule (78). The failure to implement the commission's proposals must be attributed like so many other government intentions during this period to the virtual withdrawal of Italian forces from Libya following Italy's entry into the European War in 1915. From this time onwards the Colonial Ministry gave up any serious attempt to fulfil an administrative role in the country until the end of hostilities in November 1918. (79)

The dust-wrappers were, however, taken off the commission's proposals in 1918 by Colosimo, as a part of his attempt to convince both the Italian public and world opinion generally that Italian action in the colonies justified Italy's demand for a larger African empire in the post-war situation. It was also necessary in 1918 for Italy to convince Arab opinion both in Libya and in the Moslem world as a whole that the demands of the Consultative Committees in Libya for an effect-

77) "Under Ximenes", wrote Piccioli in 1926, "the teaching output of the school had been reduced to nil". See, Piccioli Report of 1926, p. 11.

78) Ibid.

79) Ibid.

ive policy of professional and agricultural training for Arabs had been or was about to be met in full by the government, which had already drawn up plans to remedy such defects in response to Libyan wishes. (80) In fact, however, Italy had achieved virtually nothing in these areas since October 1911, regardless of frequently reiterated promises to fulfil a "civilising mission" in Libya, which included agricultural training for Libyans and the providing of economic opportunities and education.

The conceding of the Fundamental Law in June 1919, however, meant that action of some kind must be taken immediately so as to impress local opinion and avoid the development of another credibility gap which would undoubtedly damage the government's political policy towards the Arab population. In such circumstances, Ximene's tenure of the directorship at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli could be tolerated no longer by the authorities and his dismissal followed as a matter of course. Under Ximenes' administration the school had lost its rightful direction as training ground for artisans and had become "a sort of academy of decoration and design" in which teaching had, as Piccioli noted, virtually ceased entirely, the original workshops set up by the Turks having been either closed down or hired out to private contractors, who used them of their own individual profit. In this crumbling and defunct environment, observed Piccioli, "the director holds a ceaseless political polemic with his subordinatés". (81)

80) See, Colosimo Report, pp. 373 & 374; supra, Chapt. Six, Section II., pp. 162-177; and, also, the Bertolini and Martini legislation of 1914 and 1915, supra, Chapt. Two, Section III., pp. 43-55.

81) Piccioli Report of 1926, p. 11.

The replacement of Ximenes with an able and qualified engineer was in line with the new political orientation in Libya ,whereby it was hoped that new policies could be traded for effective collaboration between Arabs and Italians.Again the failure of the new policies to take effect because of the continuance of opposition to Italian rule in Libya resulted in a further period of stagnation for the school;and a situation developed in which the unsuspecting new director,Vincenzo Rosati,became the "fall guy".Piccioli as good as admitted such a situation in his report to the Colonial Ministry upon the running of the School of Arts and Crafts in 1926.In his report,Piccioli refers to the governor's original acceptance of Rosati's scheme for reforming the school on 5 May 1919,a scheme which, says Piccioli,was excellent in every way and if implemented would certainly have revived the institution.Instead of proceeding with the implementation of the report,however, the government of the colony "placed every obstacle in Rosati's path "until such a time as the unfortunate director had been been completely discredited as an administrator, though his technical capacity was never openly attacked or questioned.By so forcing his resignation, the government(82) authorities were able to easily replace him with their own nominee,Cav.Enrico Fasulo,a man completely"lacking in scholastic competence",who became,in Piccioli's words,"the

82) During these uncertain and politically fluid years,the government of Tripolitania was in a complete state of flux as can be attested from the rapid succession of governors:Garioni,G.(8.8.1918-16.8.1919);Menzinger,V.(16.8.1919-10.7.1920);Niccoli,U.(11.7.1920-31.7.1920);Mercatelli,L.(1.8.1920-16.7.1921).Carlo Giglio,Op.Cit., p.IV.

veritable liquidator of the school who administered to to this much tormented institution the real coup de grâce " (83)

Further light upon government policy as it affected professional and agricultural training in Libya at this time is provided by Micacchi in his report of 1919(84). Micacchi attached little significance to the demands of the Consultative Committes in Tripolitania for more "specialised "professional education, in response to which Rosati had been appointed and had drawn up his plan to reform the School of Arts and Crafts. These aims made little sense in Libya, Micacchi added, because of the existing low level of economic activity in the country. This was such that it was pointless to think at this stage of any form of specialised professional education from which only a few Libyans would derive any benefit.(85) He supported this somewhat negative approach to the problem by referring to a report upon Algeria compiled by a certain Senator

83) Rosati's appointment had conveyed in Tripoli the impression that the school was at last about to enter a constructive period in its history under Italian rule. This expectation was based upon the high estimation in which the new director was held in his profession, as he was already director of a School of Arts and Crafts in Catanzaro, besides being the government's nominee for the "most important post of director of the Museum of Industry and Arts in Rome". Furthermore, he was regarded as being a "pioneer of professional education in Italy". In his Report of 1926, Piccioli completely exonerated the ex-director from any responsibility for the failure to revive the school in this period. See, Piccioli Report, 1926, p.13.

84) Micacchi believed that the creation of a practical school of agriculture upon the Italian model would in the circumstances of 1919 be completely ahead of time, and indeed no such institution was established in Tripoli until January 1926. "Who", he asked, "would enrol in such institutions, and where would they find work or make use of their qualifications?".... "Only when the foundations had

Combes. In his report, Combes had criticised the attempt to provide specialised forms of professional education in circumstances in which no need as yet existed for such services. It made more sense, Combes had concluded, to set about creating new needs first, "supply would always follow demand", for there had to be a need for builders and carpenters before it made any sense to go about creating a supply of them. (86). Micacchi based his attitude to the issue of professional education in Libya upon this laissez faire approach, arguing that, whereas he could not in any way seek to deny that the government ought to provide for the professional education of Libyans, he did question the rationale behind attempting to train artisans, unless employment could be found for them to make use of their newly-acquired skills. (87) At the moment, Micacchi concluded, there was hardly sufficient work in the principal towns and urban centres to occupy European operatives. Would it be any easier, he asked, for Libyans so trained to find employment in their villages and tribes, where there was neither need nor demand for such operatives? (88)

(contin.) been laid through a general revival of agriculture in the province would it be appropriate to create such institutions, but hardly before!" See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919, p. 170. Also, D.G., 16 gennaio 1926, n. 41, che istituisce presso l'Istituto sperimentale agrario di Sidi Mesri una scuola pratica d'agricoltura, B.U.T., 5, 135.

85) See, Micacchi Report of July, 1919 (1'Insegnamento Agrario e Professionale), pp. 166-173.

86) Ibid.

87) Ibid.

88) Ibid.

In his own opinion, Micacchi argued, professional education should be of two kinds: in the first grade of a purely preparatory nature, to be conducted in all the rural schools, where it ought to consist of manual work with a practical aim, so as to encourage a love of the soil, and also manual dexterity as would be required for the repair and manufacture of domestic appliances. If these aims became the basis of government policy, he continued, Italy would manage to avoid the creation of a discontented class of specialised operatives, unable to put to profitable use the skills they had so arduously acquired. Instead, the manually dexterous would be able to find suitable employment, without undue difficulty, in the familiar environment of the village and tribe, where traditional ways of work were understood and applied by the majority of the population. (89)

In the secondary grade, however, it would be necessary to provide proper professional training in suitable schools of arts and crafts. For the moment, Micacchi added, this training should be limited to those pupils for whom work opportunities could be found in the existing economic environment of the colony. Courses ought to be devised so as to provide a training in traditional arts and crafts for which a definite need already existed in the familiar environment

89) Ibid.

90) By restricting his comments to the curriculum, Micacchi was able to steer clear of any contentious issues associated with the actual reform of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. He sought to justify such an avoidance of the real problem in Tripoli at least, by stating that the superintendency was only marginally responsible for the school, which at this time fell under the control of the local governor and the Ministry of Economics. Ibid.

of the pupils themselves. Thus any discontent could be avoided. It would also be necessary, Micacchi concluded, to set about preparing a class of master craftsmen and technicians to supervise the technical and artistic requirements of the native industries that the government proposed to set up in their various stages and processes of manufacture. For such purposes, every school of arts and crafts ought to have its own industrial museum, containing a sufficient range of models to include every single variety of products, through the whole history of their manufacture and development. (90)

Micacchi's philosophising would later provide the blueprint for the future development of professional education in Libya as it affected the Libyan people, under fascist rule. In the circumstances of 1919, however, it merely provided the bureaucracy with the excuse to defer any real attempt to reform the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, or create amenities of the sort demanded by the Consultative Committees. The growth of masonic and mafia activities in Tripoli itself and the succession of a series of ineffectual governors provides the background of the Rosati's dismissal in which many interested parties had a hand. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the director of the School of Arts and Crafts could do very much in the circumstances either to implement his own proposals for the reform of the institution, or to prevent local entrepreneurs from moving into the school, as they had been accustomed to do under his predecessor, to exploit its facilities, and indeed the orphans themselves, for motives purely of pecuniary profit, which reveals Italian rule in its worst of guises in Libya.

IV. Secondary Education

Although Article 10. of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania had stipulated that secondary and higher education was to be provided in the province, it had not laid down any particular programme to be followed, a task which was to be entrusted to the promised Parliament of Tripolitania, when and if it should eventually meet. (91) In Article 11., however, the Fundamental Law indicated very clearly that "for Moslems all the material of primary instruction and the scientific material of secondary instruction shall be taught in the Arabic language". Thus, the policy of the Colosimo administration was entirely negated for the latter had sought to provide higher education in the Italian secondary schools, and the opportunity whereby Libyans could also gain access to study at the University of Bocconi at Milan. (92)

The failure between 1919 and 1922 to evade a situation of stalemate at the political level in Tripolitania had dire consequences as far as the development of any kind of secondary education was concerned. Legally, having ruled out the type of secondary education proposed by the Colosimo Report in 1918, the type of secondary education proposed by the Fundamental Law could only be brought about through further political consensus, and this was entirely lacking in the province. The gubernatorial commission of 1922 by deliberately excluding from active consideration all matters affecting

91) See, G. Rochat, *Lo Statuto Concesso alla Tripolitania nel 1919* in Il Colonialismo Italiano, p.108

92) See, Colosimo Report, p.365.

93) See, D.M.14 Sept.1922. *Ordinamento scolastico per i musulmani della Tripolitania*, B.U.C., 606.

secondary education upon political grounds resulted in the promulgation of a decree in which there was no mention of secondary education as such.(93)The situation therefore reverted,at least logically,to the Bertolini Ordinance of 1914 in which the government had stated that it would set up a "School of Islamic Culture".The subsequent reform of the Auqaf es-Sur had led to the promulgation of a further decree in 1917 whereby the funds of the Auqaf es-Sur were explicitly allocated to the establishment and maintenance of the "School of Islamic Culture" ordained by the Bertolini decree.The proviso,however, had been added that the school would not be set up until the government considered it to be "opportune" to proceed with the project.In the meantime ,the funds of the Auqaf would be administered by a special commission appertaining to the general administration of the Auqaf itself.

The term "opportune" by not tying the government to a definite date meant in effect that it could proceed with the establishment of the school whenever it thought fit. Even after the conceding of the Fundamental Law,this moment had not yet arrived,and the government sought to explain its tardiness in establishing the school with the excuse that the Auqaf still lacked sufficient balances to make it feasible. If anything the promulgation of the Fundamental Law had delayed the opening of the proposed Medersa, since the need to conduct the teaching of all "scientific matters" in Arabic raised the prospect of having to recruit Arabic-speaking teachers from beyond the confines of Libya as they did not exist in Libya itself.Such a possibility raised the danger

94) See,R.D.16 luglio 1917,n.1283.Destinazione delle rendite dei beni awqaf,B.U.T.,26,1.;and R.D.2 Ottobre 1917,n.1656. Istituzione di un Consiglio speciale per l'amministrazione e la sorveglianza dei beni awqaf in Tripoli,B.U.C.,730. Also,see J.Briotti,Il Waqf in Libia(Roma,1935),p.42.

of political subversion, a risk that no Italian administration would consider to be worth the candle in view of the general state of political and ideological upheaval which the surrounding Arab countries were undergoing at this time, and from which Tripolitania itself was far from free. Thus the closing of the University of El-Azhar in Cairo for a year by the British authorities in 1921 on purely political grounds, far from leading the Italian government to reconsider its position, as far as the proposed Tripoli Medersa was concerned, led to a hardening of attitude on the subject. In the prevailing climate of upheaval, it was argued, how could the government of Italy ensure that adequate surveillance was exercised over Arab teachers recruited from other lands to teach in the new Medersa? If the Medersa project was established, Arab nationalism, pan-Islamism and the anti-colonial and anti-Western agitators who had established their headquarter in the form of the revolutionary committee Zaghlul Pascia at El-Azhar, could easily transport themselves to Tripoli, where the conditions were only too ripe for their further development. (94) Against this kind of background, the Auqaf funds remained unused for the purposes of establishing an Islamic University or Medersa in Tripoli until 1928, when the project was again temporarily raised, though Volpi, largely on his own authority, did not hesitate to extract 100,000 Lire from the fund's balances in 1923 for the purpose of establishing a new mosque in pursuance of Italo-Arab amity. (95)

95) See, Briotti, Op.Cit., Chapt. IX., "Gli Auqaf es-Sur", p. 60. For the moves (which proved abortive) to establish the Medersa proposed in 1914 and 1915 in 1928, see MAI-AS, Consiglio Superiore Coloniale (1923-39), pacco 6 (1928), N. 56-12.628: Ordinamento per la Medressa Superiore (Scuola islamica) in Tripolitania.

The need, however, for some form of alternative to El-Azhar could in the circumstances of 1919-1922 not be entirely averted by Italy, as the traditional expedient of sending Libyan students to Cairo and lodging them in a special hospice, where they remained under the vigilant charge of the Italian Consul-General was not immediately practical. Also, the need was growing for cadi, mufti, Islamic lawyers and other such officials to replace those on the point of retirement or the victims of sickness or death. It was, however, the political danger in Cairo, which, after the reopening of the war with the Senusi in 1923, produced a strong backlash of anti-Italian sentiment throughout the Arab lands, led the government to tolerate interim arrangements with regard to Islamic education in Libya. Thus came about the project known as the "University of Kullia", whereby the Ulemah proceeded to establish a Libyan alternative to the Islamic University of El-Azhar in Tripoli. This project had initially been proposed by the Ulemah to Scallabrini in 1913, during his mission to Libya on behalf of Bertolini, the Minister of Colonies. It is more than likely that the Italian refusal to establish an Islamic University did not deter the Ulemah from seeking to establish one on their own account, even if the Augaf funds could not be used for such a purpose.

As in 1913, the execution of the project in 1919 depended upon pooling the resources and basic amenities of the three principal existing medressas so as to form what was essentially one large Islamic school. It also required the reorganisation of the curriculum so as to produce a combined curriculum embodying all the essential elements of the studies normally pursued in the environment of El-Azhar at Cairo. Again as in

96) See, Scallabrini Report, 1913, Op.Cit., p.25; Schema Di Ordinamento Per La Medressa Superiore in Tripolitania, pp.1-15, Op.Cit.; and Briotti, Op.Cit., p.62

the case of the work of the commission established by the Parliament of Cirenaica to implement the Fundamental Law, the use of the term idadia caused difficulties, as such a term had no relevance to a traditional Islamic institution, such as the proposed Medersa. In overcoming problems of such a nature Nallino's advice was of great service in devising a higher course, as the University of El-Azhar did not have a set curriculum or courses of study, this being a matter for the individual professor, not the university, to determine. The biggest obstacle in the way of implementing the curriculum devised by Nallino was undoubtedly that of securing a sufficient number of suitable teachers, as the Italians were only prepared to allow the Ulemah to recruit Libyan nationals, which meant that many courses never took place because of the lack of qualified personnel. (95)

The three medressa involved in the project included that of Osman Pascia, which had originally been set up to provide for the maintenance of one teacher and forty students; that of Ahmed Pascia, which provided for two teachers and thirty students; and the Medressa of Mustapha Pascia, providing for one teacher and forty students. (97) Under the Ottomans, each student received a sum equivalent to 20 Lire per month for school materials and personal maintenance, a sum increased to 60 Lire, which appeared to exclude accommodation and food, as this was provided by the schools themselves. In the new arrangements, the schools of Ahmed Pascia and Mustapha el-Katib became idadia, which the school attached to the mosque of Osman Pascia became a Medersa or Univer-

97) See, Briotti, Chpt. IX, "Gli auqaf es-Sur", p. 64. Also, Scallabrini Report, July 1913, Op. Cit., p. 25; and Consiglio Superiore Coloniale (1923-39), pacco 6 (1928), N. 56-12.628: Istituzione in Tripoli di una Medressa, Parere, Relazione Ministeriale N. 42537 del 12 marzo, 1935-XIII, p. 2.

sity, providing the higher courses. The management of the whole joint project was entrusted to the authority of a higher commission composed of the Cadi, who acted as president, the president of the Auqaf and a member of the Ulemah, who was nominated by the teachers. This commission provided for the setting up of a further sub-commission to administer the school. This was presided over by the Mufti, who acted as president, various members of the Auqaf Commission, and four teachers who were mainly concerned with the teaching of the curriculum. The latter were to be assisted where necessary by various members of the Ulemah knowledgeable in the "Islamic Sciences". The period of instruction for each course was fixed at a minimum of five years and a maximum of six; and progress from one course to the next was to be determined by an annual examination. The conditions of admission to both the Idadia and Medressa were as following: a) the aspirant ought to be less than twenty-five years old; b) he should be able to read and write in the correct manner; c) he should have memorised a section of the Koran. (98) The curriculum was as follows:

Religious Doctrine :

1. et-Taquiud (the ability to recite the Koran with a certain cadence);
- 2) el-Hadith (Islamic Tradition);
- 3) Mustalah el Hadith (the legal implications and value of tradition);
- 4) et-Tafsir (Koranic Commentary);
- 5) et-Tauhid (doctrine of monotheism);
- 6) el-Fiqh (Islamic Law);
- 7) Usul el-Fiqh (sources of the Law);

98) It should be noted that not only was the establishment of the Medressa tolerated by the new regime but positively encouraged in its development. In 1923 all grants to Libyan students attending El-Azhar were suspended and when renewed were intended for those wishing to attend the Medressa in Tripoli. By 1928 Nallino had developed his initial outline of a curriculum into the scheme of a new law which was to have set up the Medressa upon a more elaborate and official basis at the Mosque of Murad Aga in Tripoli. Political and financial reasons, however, obstructed the plan. See, Relazione Ministeriale N. 42537 del 12 marzo, 1935-XIII, pp. 1-7; and J. Briotti, Op. Cit., p. 64

8. el-Achlak ed-Dinia(religion and morality);
9. es-Saira en Nabauia(life of the prophet);
10. Arabic language(merphology,syntax,elements of rhetoric,eloquence,elocution,composition, metre,rhyme,handwriting and the composing of letters;
11. Science(logic,arithmetic,history,geometry and geography).(99)

These courses were taught in the mosques where the students were lodged in accordance with the following fashion which was traditional throughout the Arab and Islamic world. On entering the mosque, the students formed a circle around the teacher or mudarris, usually in the vicinity of a particular pillar, and the teacher would proceed to expound the sacred text with the students seated on the floor of the mosque around him. The students were for the most part without any special text-books or other such aids, though some equipped themselves with writing pads upon which they jotted down notes from the lecture.(100)

These arrangements continued in Tripoli until 1935(101) in which year the Italian authorities finally allowed the Auqaf balances to be used in establishing a Medersa in Tripoli under the name of the al-Madrasah al-Islamiyya al-ulya.(102) In effect, however, the easing of restrictions in Cairo after 1922 led to the re-opening of El-Azhar, which combined with the failure to establish a Medersa in Tripoli in 1928, led many Libyan students continue the ancient Libyan custom of studying there.

99) Ibid.,p.65.

100) Ibid.,p.66.

101) The writer must at this point add that he has been unable to trace a single reference of Libyan students from either Tripolitania or Cirenaica attending the Senusi University at Jarabub.

102) Briotti,p.66.

Chapter EightPreparations in Cirenaica for Implementing the Fundamental Law:1919-1921-A period of Reassessment and Reorientation

"....with the exception of the major centres, such as Bengasi and Derna, where the schools equal the best in Tripolitania, the government schools are in an extremely poor condition. Most of them are located in cramped and poorly lighted and ventilated buildings. They are for the most part without teaching materials and sometimes do not even possess school benches. Also, the teaching personnel are poorly educated and consist mostly of either untrained non-commissioned officers or private soldiers. The latter are seconded from their regiments and are neither better nor worse than the local 'fighi'. How can we expect good results in such circumstances?" (*)

Micacchi's arrival in Libya during the Spring of 1919 was in response to the wishes of the Department of Civil and Political Affairs in Tripoli which, at the time of the Colosimo Report of the previous year, had insisted that the carrying out of an official inspection of the schools in Libya should be the sine qua non of any future policy of reform. It was also in response to the changed political circumstances in both Italy and Libya, which had brought Nallino's orientalist policy to the fore, so threatening all the work of the School's Department at the Ministry of Colonies based as it was upon the notion of pacific penetration. Such changes also posed a considerable administrative challenge, since their implementation would require the training of Libyans to work in the schools, and the recruitment of Arab-speaking teachers from the neighbouring countries, where Arab nationalism and pan-

*) Micacchi Report of 1919, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 111.

Islamism had taken firm root. Accompanying Micacchi in his official capacity as Director of Colonial Schools was Dr. Angelo Piccioli who, following his appointment as Scholastic Superintendent for Cirenaica in 1921, would be responsible for education in the province to both the Parliament of Cirenaica and to Micacchi at the Ministry of Colonies. Piccioli's importance to educational developments in Libya can hardly be overemphasised, since not only would he implement the policy of the Fundamental Law for Cirenaica in the light of Micacchi's own aims and opinions, but in 1924 he would reorganise education in Tripolitania in terms acceptable to the fascist leadership. The close working relationship between Micacchi and Piccioli, which seems to commence at this point, is in many respects the lynch-pin to subsequent educational developments in Libya; for Piccioli put into practice his chief's educational aims and theories, until his own promotion to the Colonial Ministry in Rome, where he headed the propaganda department from the late twenties onwards. In these years, Piccioli's adherence to the Micacchi line is highly typical of the attitude of many middle-ranking members of the colonial bureaucracy. Such men were caught up in a centralised and hierachical structure of government. Upward mobility required that they serve their chief with efficiency, dedication and loyalty. Piccioli in this respect is a typical creature of the governing bureaucracy and found no difficulty in fusing his own interests with service to the state. It would never have occurred to such personnel to risk disfavour by adopting an independent approach to a particular problem; and the hierachical structure of the fascist state was ideally suited to their mentality.

In the handling of native affairs, they were seldom ever interested in any genuine sense with the real thought and aspirations of the population they were supposed to serve. Even, as between 1919 and 1922, when official government policy was aimed at securing Libyan autonomy, the mentality of colonial officials like Micacchi and Piccioli was at all times essentially geared towards securing Italy's colonial options in the territory. In the latter respect, Italian nationalism and the securing for Italy of an imperium in Libya and Africa were inseparably connected in their minds and dictated their approach to Libyan problems at every level. If Italy had been without a Colonial Ministry men such as Micacchi and Piccioli would have found other ways of exercising their ambitions, drive, idealism and undoubted patriotic fervour. As it was their intelligence and ambition became interlocked in securing for Italy an empire in Africa ; and in securing for the Arab population of Libya an educational future that could only make sense in terms of Italian colonialism. Before, however, turning to examine what was perhaps the better side of that imperial dispensation in Cirenaica, it is necessary to briefly take account of the existing arrangements as far as education was concerned, since it was out of the situation that existed between 1919 and 1921 that new reforms would have to take on their new form. This chapter will, therefore, first concern itself with the legacy of Italy rule in Cirenaica , before going on to examine the preparations for the forthcoming reforms, prior to Piccioli's actual inauguration as superintendent at the commencement of the 1921-1922 school-year.

II. The Condition of the Schools and the Micacchi Mission of 1919

Unlike Tripolitania, Italian rule had survived more or less intact as a result of the Accord of 1917 in the coastal areas formerly under the control of the Ottomans, and the schools established after 1912 still continued to function.

(1) Nonetheless, the scholastic situation was far from stable when Micacchi arrived at Bengasi in the early summer of 1919 as the schools outside the main urban areas were in an extremely poor condition. More than in Tripolitania, there was a need to bring about improvements in both the Italian and Arab sectors, if the Accord of Acroma was to be consolidated with further agreements, and the remaining elements of the Italian population, many of whom were on the point of departing for Egypt, Tunisia and Italy, encouraged to remain in the country. (2) On the whole, however, the general picture was much brighter than in Tripolitania and the statistics for 1918-1919 reveal that at least seventeen Italo-Arab schools were still in operation, with forty-two sections and 947 annual enrolments (897 of these were Moslems) and an average attendance of 635 pupils. (3) In view of the difficulties of the times and the general uncertainty of the political situation, Micacchi regarded such figures as a clear indication that local support was not entirely lacking for the Italo-Arab school, and would certainly increase, once the government had attended to the defects of

1) Ibid., p.111.

2) Ibid., pp.111 and 209.

3) Ibid., p.121.

of the country schools in particular.(4)As records were not kept by the Department of Civil and Political Affairs in Bengasi on the day-to-day running of the schools in the country areas, and as the records which were kept,were never forwarded to Tripoli because of the dual nature of the political organisation of the two provinces,which were more like separate colonies,Micacchi could only obtain definite information about the schools in the countryside by visiting the military command posts outside Bengasi.(5) These visits provide a very clear picture of the running of the country schools at this time:entrusted to the responsibility and control of the local military resident, the schools were almost entirely run by the army which provided ,military personnel to act as teachers,tables, chairs, and other such basic equipment, and frequently even the school building itself.(6)As in Tripolitania,the personal interest of the local resident in educational matters was an important /ingrediant in the success or

4) Ibid.,p.121.

5) Although Micacchi states that seventeen Italo-Arab schools were still in operation in 1919,the Colosimo Report of Feb.,1918 provided details of the existence of only thirteen Italo-Arab schools for Cirenaica.Rel- evant information upon the running of the schools was lacking because of the lack of central control and co-ordination between the two colonies.As a solution to this and other administrative problems affecting the scholastic situation in both provinces,Micacchi urged the government to undertake a reform of the admin- istration which would concentrate overall administrative control under a single head,such as the Political and Civil Affairs Directorate.At another level,he argued, it was impossible to resolve the problems of agricult- ural and professional education when control over these activities was vested as at present in several different ministries.See,Ibid(The Need for all the Schools to be dependent upon a single Administrative Authority),p.168; Also,see The Colosimo Report,p.380.

failure of a particular school. Micacchi's inspection of the schools therefore in 1919 was urgently needed if only to provide an overall picture of the scholastic situation. The Colosimo Report lacked basic objectivity because the sources upon which it had been based were extremely uncertain. Lacking personnel to visit the schools in the outlying areas, the Department of Political and Civil Affairs in Bengasi was obliged to depend upon information about the schools supplied by the military commanders in the pacified areas still under Italian control. This information was not always forthcoming and when it did was far from reliable. (7) Micacchi's report therefore is the first full-length study of the schools in Libya since Italian rule began in the country. Even so, it is far from complete, since the Director of Colonial Schools only had time to inspect the schools of Bengasi and Derna, along with those at Cirene, Apolonia, Chegab and Zavia-Feidia. Despite such regrettable shortcomings, however, the information provided by the Micacchi Report is objective since it was selected to show both the best and the worst of the existing schools both in Tripolitania and in Cirenaica. (8)

6) Micacchi Report of 1919; Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, pp. 111-138.

7) Both the Colosimo and Micacchi Reports vary widely in their separate assessments of the number of Italo-Arab schools in Cirenaica, as in their use of statistics relating to these schools. Thus whereas the Colosimo Report estimates the number of schools to be around thirteen with 1022 enrolments, Micacchi states the number of schools to be seventeen with 947 enrolments. Also both reports differ in their estimates on a school to school basis. See, Ibid. (throughout) and the Colosimo Report, p. 378.

8) Micacchi Report of 1919; Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 121.

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As in Tripolitania, the government educational provision for Libyans in Bengasi drew its form and inspiration from the pre-colonial Italian schools(9) and in the first days of Italian rule had led to the setting up of an Italo-Arab annexe attached to the existing Italian national school, along with the siting of a small Italo-Arab school at Berka on the outskirts of Sidi Daud near Bengasi.(10) In 1919 the original school established at Berka in 1912 was still functioning, but the Italo-Arab section attached to the Italian national school had been moved to the Arab quarter of Bengasi, as originally requested in the summer of 1912 by the Scholastic Deputation.(11), where it was known as the "Central Italo-Arab School".(12) Furthermore, another Italo-Arab school had been set up at Sabri on the outskirts of the city.(13) All three schools, reported Micacchi, functioned with regularity and were better organised than their equivalents in Tripolitania, though equally suffered from poor buildings and inadequate school-materials, in respect of which, they were, he added, neither better nor worse off than the Italo-type schools attended by the children of Italian residents.(14)

9) See, Fulvio Contini, p.39 and the Micacchi Report of 1919, pp.121-128.

10) ACS, P.C.M., Amministrazione Civile e Servizi Inherenti: Relazione Mensile, Direzione Dei Servizi Civile, Cirenaica, Bengasi (Giugno, 1912) - T.1/2-308.

11) Micacchi Report of 1919 (Scuola Italo-Araba Centrale), p. 123; and ACS, P.C.M., Amministrazione Civile e Servizi Inherenti: Relazione Mensile, Direzione Dei Servizi Civile, Cirenaica, Bengasi (Sept., 1912) - T.1/2-4772, p.12.

12) Colosimo Report, p.380. Also, see Micacchi Report, p.123.

13) Ibid.

14) Micacchi Report of 1919 (Italo-Arab Schools), p.122.

Established in April 1912 in a wing of the Italian school at Bengasi, the Central Italo-Arab school was by 1919 in its seventh year of life, and, although for some time plagued by low-attendance figures (15), it had during the school-year 1916-1917 (16) shown a sudden improvement by enrolling a hundred pupils (17). This figure had, however, again dropped during the 1918-19 school year from 105 to 90 pupils for reasons entirely unconnected, according to Micacchi, with the internal running of the school. (18) In this school, the average attendance figure more or less corresponded with the enrolment figure and having personally examined a number of the pupils, Micacchi expressed himself well-satisfied with educational standards. He also had no criticism to offer of the director, Signor G.B. Guasco, who taught the third section, or of his assistants, Domenico Catalanott and Signor Chiric, who taught the first and second years in the school. ((19) The latter were described as being "young" and not particularly well educated themselves-but willing to get on with the work in hand under the able direction of Signor Guasco". (20) Micacchi reserved a special word of praise for the Arab teacher at the school, Senusi el-Murtadi-"the best of all the local teachers, employing sound methods, good discipline and through his know-

15) The earliest enrolment figures indicate a school population for this particular institution of 44 pupils in April 1912, rising by June to 60 pupils, 32 of whom were in the childrens' section and 28 in the adults' section. Colosimo indicates an enrolment of 38 for 1915-1916, 86 for 1916-17 and 115 for 1918-19. Micacchi, however, states enrolment to be 100 for the year 1916-17 and 105 for 1918-19, which had dropped by Spring to an enrolment figure of 90 due to an epidemic in the town. In the latter part of the school-year 1919 only 65 attended. See, *Relazione Mensile, Bengasi (Giugno, 1912)* - T.1/2-308; *The Colosimo Report*, p.380; and *Micacchi Report of 1919*, p.123.

ledge and control of his subject, considerably increasing the credit of the school with the surrounding population". (21) Micacchi advised that Senussi el-Murtadi should be personally congratulated by the governor upon the excellence of his work, besides having his salary increased. (22)

The school at Sabri had also continued to "flourish" although the number of pupils had decreased slightly during 1918-19 from 142 for 1917-18 to 115 for 1918-19. (23) The attendance figure of 79 was equal to 69% of the original enrolment figure, a "good result" attributed by Micacchi to school's director, Signor Giacomo De Bellis, who was a professional teacher on the carefully selected "roll of Italian Schools Abroad," a man (added Micacchi) of culture and intelligence with a good grasp of method, who had been in the colony for six years, and has devoted much of his time to a proper study of the Arabic Language and Literature". (25) "A somewhat malicious critic", observed Micacchi, "might perhaps conclude that he considers the school in which he works as a sort of laboratory for the conducting of experiments in the field of linguistics, though others would add this to his credit. In any case this ought not to detract

16) Micacchi Report of 1919, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-!, p.123.

17) Ibid.

18) Micacchi blamed the drop in enrolments and general attendance upon an epidemic which swept through Bengasi in 1918. See, Ibid., p.124.

19) Ibid.

20) Ibid.

21) Ibid.

22) Ibid.

23) Ibid. The statistics of the Colosimo Report for these years vary considerably with those provided by Micacchi: 1915-

from the sound advice he offers to all employed in the school".(26)The teaching of Arabic and the Koran at Sabri was the responsibility of Kalil Gallal and Beehir Badi- the former was described by Micacchi as being "adequately prepared and full of good will" though his colleague who taught both sections of 1A and in 2A was "not up to standard",a position upon which Micacchi declined to make any comment or offer any advice.(27) De Bellis himself was responsible for the teaching of the Italian Language in sections 2A and 3B of the school and also to both sections of the first year.(28)

The remaining Bengasine school at Berka gave Micacchi a less favourable impression than the Central and Sabri schools;and it was compared to its detriment with the Tripolitanian school at Menschi,which had similarly excited the director's hostile criticism.Both schools were also similar in so far as they were each situated in rural suburbs,where they were subject to the demands of agriculture,with the result that attendance was poor and erratic.(29) Even so enrolments had always been relatively high and were still on the increase.(30)For teaching purposes the building at Sabri was divided into three sections;but the teaching standards were generally low.Micacchi blamed this state of affairs

(contin) 16(45 pupils),1916-17(114 pupils) and 1917-18(118 pupils).See Colosimo Report,p.380-381.

25) Micacchi Report of 1919,p.125.

26) Ibid.

27) Ibid.

28) Ibid.

29) Ibid.,p.126.

30) Micacchi provides the following school statistics for Berka: between 1912 and 1918 the enrolments increased

upon the director himself, Sig. Antonio Di Venere, who though a qualified teacher was "unenthusiastic" and had not acquitted himself well since his arrival in Libya.

(31) The teaching of Arabic and the Koran was in the hands of a local teacher by the name of Mustapha Drisa, regarding whom Micacchi declined to make any comment. As a general conclusion, however, he believed that the school would really profit only if Antonio Di Venere made some effort to utilise his undoubted abilities in a more zealous manner than he had done so far. (32)

In the Italo-Arab school at Derna, Micacchi believed he had found a Cirenaican equivalent of the Italo-Arab school at Suk-el Giuma in Tripolitania—an example of what such a school could really achieve when under the direction of able and zealous teachers, in reasonable circumstances, backed up by the support of both the local Arab population and the local Italian resident. The developments had been such at Derna that it had been necessary for the senior teacher in the town, Fulvio Contini, (33) to arrange for the Italo-Arab

(contin.) from 25-95 pupils with an attendance (average) figure in 1912 of 18, which in 1918 was stated as being 77. For the year 1918-1919 enrolments amounted to 65 of whom 44 or 67% attended. These figure should, however, be compare with those given in the Colosimo Report: 1915-16 (42 pupils); 1916-17 (96); and 1918-19 (109). See, Ibid. and the Colosimo Report, p. 380.

31) Micacchi Report of 1919, p. 126.

32) Ibid.

33) Fulvio Contini had already been teaching in the colony for three years when Micacchi arrived in 1919, having originally started teaching at the Central Italo-Arab School at Bengasi, and would still be in Libya in 1952 and afterwards, when he contributed to Gino Cerbella's monthly review Libia (see, Bibliography, infra). Ibid.

school to be split up between the accommodation allotted to it within the existing Italian national school, and a house to serve as a temporary school, recently acquired in the Suk, where an additional section was set up. (34) A further reason for the creation of another section of the Italo-Arab school of Derna was the need to provide separate facilities for the children of Ascari troops, the latter being encamped in the vicinity of the town. (35) The principal reason, however, for the acquisition of extra accommodation was the expansion in enrolments which for 1918-19 stood at 158, with an average attendance of 158 in the Italo-Arab section attached to the national school (these were mainly Libyans), and 112 with an average attendance of 64 at the section in the suk (these were mainly Ascari from Eritrea). (36) Both sections of the Italo-Arab school of Derna were under the direction of Fulvio Contini, who Micacchi described as "an outstanding teacher and administrator". (37) In his

34) Micacchi Report of 1919, p.122.

35) Micacchi notes that the Libyans were to make use of the Italo-Arab section located in the right-hand wing of the "Prince of Piedemont", as the national school was called, and the Ascari, who were Christians, were to make use of the Italo-Arab section set up in the Suk. See, Ibid., p.127

36) Ibid.

37) Ibid. (Described as a "young man with a lively intelligence and a good education", besides possessing "a good knowledge of Arabic, both spoken and literary"; Contini was ear-marked for future promotion from this point onwards. By the time of Piccioli's appointment as superintendent in 1921, he had already become the director of Arab elementary schools in Cirenaica and for this purpose was stationed in Bengasi. Subsequently, as Piccioli's right hand man, he did much to implement the Fundamental Law in the province, rising to become superintendent, following Piccioli's transference in 1924 to Tripolitania.)

role as director of Arab elementary education in Derna, Contini was supported by an active team of capable teachers: Maestra, Sig. Aleardo Pallachi, Signor Raffaele Gagliardi, along with two Libyan teachers, Abubaker Gatesc and Kalifa Aisa. Two further teachers also assisted Contini at the Ascari school in the Suk, which some Libyans also attended, Giovanni Bachetti, trained at Ascoli Piceno, and Seid Ben Ali, who taught the Koran and Arabic; for which purpose the school had been divided into three sections to cope with the separate needs of the pupils. (38)

The remaining Italo-Arab schools in Cirenaica visited by Micacchi in 1919 (those at Apolonia, Cirene, Zavia-Feida and Ghegab) present a gloomy picture of poor and inadequate school buildings, untrained army instructors, non-existent teaching materials and low enrolments with even lower annual attendance records. (39) For example, the school at Apolonia was described as consisting of a "room more suited to serve as a warehouse than a school" where Micacchi found 35 pupils presided over by an Italian so-called teacher named as Felice Zarrug. The latter, Micacchi conceded "did his best in the circumstances", but was in other respects "completely without the slightest capacity for teaching". (40) In an even worse condition, it appears, was the so-called school at Cirene, where 53 pupils were enrolled; but only 24 attended with any degree of regularity. (41) In this institution, which occupied

38) Ibid.

39) Ibid.

40) Ibid. (Scuole Italo-Arabe), pp. 122 & 128.

41) Ibid., p. 129.

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a cellar, an Italian sergeant by the name of Franchini (no Christian name is given), assisted by the local fighi, administered what passed for a school "without books, teaching materials or worse still, without any idea of teaching method or understanding how a school should be organised and run". (42) Still worse were the so-called Italo-Arab schools at Zavia Feidia and Ghagab, where the pupils gathered in small rooms, lacking in light, ventilation, benches, books or other remotely scholastic-like circumstances or facilities under the direction of an Italian sergeant and the local fighi. (43) Micacchi severely execrated all such arrangements, however provisional, adding that he had been informed from reliable sources that by far the greater part of the Italo-Arab schools, which he had not had the opportunity to inspect himself, were virtually "identical" to these appalling circumstances "or even worse, if that is possible". (44) The picture of education in Cirenaica depicted by Micacchi in his highly confidential report upon the subject could never have been deduced from the glossy pages of the Colosimo Report of February 1918. This is not surprising as the latter was primarily intended to convince Libyan opinion that something was about to be done in accordance with the wishes of of the Consultative Committees. More than the latter, however, was the intention to convince Italian and foreign opinion that Italy had made considerable progress towards fulfilling her "civilising mission" in Libya especially and was ready for an even larger share of the colonial cake, elsewhere in Africa.

42) Ibid.

43) Ibid.

Despite the preparedness of the Italian authorities to sanction the establishment of a school for Moslem girls on lines similar to the one set up in Tripoli in 1912, no progress had been made towards the realisation of this goal since it was first mooted in that year, and there is no reference to such an institution in Micacchi's Report of 1919, or to the possibility that Moslem girls were receiving an education in the Italian Girls' School in Bengasi, which along with the Boys' School had been originally set up in 1888 and reopened in February 1912, following the establishment of Italian rule in the province. (45) In failing to set up

44) Ibid.

45) Regarding the facilities open to Libyans in the Italian schools proper, Micacchi notes that 10% of the population of the Italian elementary schools in Bengasi was made up of Moslem Libyans. This figure apparently included both the boys and girls' schools in Bengasi and also the mixed school at Derna, which had a combined enrolment of 482 pupils for 1918-19. Di Berardinis adds to this information by stating that special provision existed in both the Boys and the Girls' schools for Arabs. Furthermore, Di Berardinis advised that the national schools should open special preparatory courses and specially trained teachers should be available for this purpose. The latter, he concluded, ought to be able to speak Arabic in the Bengasine dialect. See Ibid., p. 109; and also The Report of Professor B. Di Berardinis to the Governor of Cirenaica, 30 March, 1921, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1.

46) ACS, PCM, Relazione Mensile, Direzione Dei Servizi Civili, Cirenaica, Bengasi (1 Sept. 1912) - T. 1/2 N. 4728.

47) Coro notes that a girls' elementary and secondary school ('rushdie', which was in the technical sense only a higher elementary school) existed in Tripoli before 1911. He fails, however, to make any mention of possible facilities whereby girls were educated in Bengasi during the Ottoman period. It is more than likely therefore that a girls' school had not been set up by the Turks in Bengasi, an omission later confirmed by the Scholastic Commission of 1912-13. Arab girls, however, did attend the Franciscan girls' school at Bengasi managed by the Giuseppine Sisters, who used both French and Italian as the medium of instruction. See, Coro, F., Chapt. XIII., "Istruzione Pubblica. Le Scuole Turche e quelle Europee", Settantasei Anni Di Dominazione Turca in Libia, 1835-1811 (Tripoli 1913), pp. 85-9. Also, infra, Chapt. Nine, Sect. IV., pp. 277-282.

a school for Moslem girls in Bengasi, there can be little doubt that the authorities were swayed by local attitudes to the subject of female education, which they feared to oppose lest Italian rule in Cirenaica should become identified in the popular mind with anti-Moslem sentiments.(46) These doubts on the subject were further strengthened by the fact that the Turks had established few precedents in the field of female education in Cirenaica before 1911.(47) An interesting analysis of the position as it affected female education in Bengasi appears in an early report forwarded by the Directorate of Civil Affairs in the city to the Italian commander in chief of Cirenaica.(48) In this report the Directorate cites the Scholastic Deputation, which had met in the Summer of 1912 to consider the subject of educational provision for the forthcoming scholastic year (Oct. 1912-July 1913), as being opposed to the opening of a school for Moslem girls in Bengasi.(49) The Arab section of the delegation had clearly deliberated at considerable length upon the question of whether to take up the Italian offer to set up a girls' school in Bengasi in the immediate future,

48) ACS, PCM, Amministrazione Civile e Servizi Inerenti, Relazione Mensile, Direzione Dei Servizi Civili, Cirenaica, Bengasi (Augusto, 1912) - T.1/2-4728.

49) Ibid.

50) Ibid.

but finally declared itself to be opposed to the idea, for the present at least. The Directorate of Civil Affairs greeted this conclusion with well-seasoned remarks invariably produced for such occasions to the effect that it could not proceed with the policy for fear of offending local customs which "condemned women to a life as perpetual recluses in the familiar environment of the home away from any personal contact with the life that existed outside the walls of their houses". (50) The Directorate of Civil Affairs at Bengasi, however, had no intention of completely abandoning its cherished aim of establishing a girls' school in Bengasi both as a means of furthering the aims of "pacific penetration" and in pursuit of Italy's "civilising mission". It therefore urged the government not to attach too much importance to the views of the Scholastic Deputation upon the subject of female education since these tended to reflect the most conservative religious opinion within the Ulemah. (51) The latter, it added, was not necessarily representative of Bengasine opinion upon the subject of female education, since many local families favoured a deviation from strict adherence to traditional norms in this respect. (52) In support of its case the Directorate drew attention to the practice amongst certain local families of educating their daughters in the former Ottoman School for Girls in Bengasi, which had besides providing a basic education had also offered train-

51) Ibid.

52) Ibid.

53) Ibid.

ing in domestic work and girls' handicrafts.(53)Evidence to this effect was deduced from the testimony of Signora Maria De Bellis,Directress of the National Italian Girls' School in Bengasi,who had herself under the former Turkish regime privately instructed Moslem girls,sent to her for such a purpose by their families,who had been forbidden by the Turkish authorities to allow their daughters to attend Italian or other such non-Ottoman schools.(54)Thus in the Directorate's opinion,the government should not be over influenced by conservative local opinion upon this matter; but should make a start towards fulfilling its "civilising mission" as a means of securing "pacific penetration" in Bengasi.In this respect the Directorate believed that the local administration would have the support of a small but influential minority of well-to- do families,even if the Ulemah tended to express the opinion of the majority upon the subject.

Apart from the lack of government provision for girls (other than what facilities existed in the Italian national and religious schools in Cirenaica),there had also been a failure between 1911 and 1919,to go ahead with the policies intended to create professional and agricultural,as well as secondary education,in Cirenaica for Moslems.(55)As in Tripolitania,the existing Italian secondary school remained largely unattended by Libyans either because of the Italian failure to set up higher Italo-Arab schools,which might have

54) Ibid.

55) Micacchi Report of 1919,Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1, pp.122-129.

served as a bridge to the Italian secondary schools, or because of social, linguistic, cultural, financial and political factors disposing them against such schools, in the hope that by abstaining from entering the Italian secondary schools they would reinforce the Arab case for an autonomous educational system.(56) Certainly by 1919 no special financial provision existed in Cirenaica to permit Libyan students to study at the Italian schools in Bengasi or at Derna, and without such means Arab pupils could not be expected to make use of the facilities already existing in the secondary sector, which were therefore almost exclusively patronised by the children of middle class Italian officials, army officers or local merchants.(57) No doubt the latter were anxious to retain secondary education as an Italian and middle class preserve, an interpretation certainly supported by the attitude of the Italian bureaucracy towards Libyans, and the reluctance of officials to press ahead with the implementation of changes already sanctioned by government policy.

Irrespective, however, of government policy towards the subject of girls education, professional education and secondary education, the debate about which before 1919 was still (as best) largely academic, was the concrete need to find local funds to cater for the needs of abandoned children. This growing problem was still in 1919 mainly attended to by local charities, the funds for which purpose were grossly inadequate(58) The problem, moreover, had been considerably

56) Ibid.(Scuole Secondarie), pp.100-108.

57) Ibid.(Scuole Private ed Istituzioni Sussidiarie della Scuola), pp.100-108 and 235-238.

58) Ibid., pp.235-238.

aggravated by an epidemic in the summer of 1918, which had ravaged both Bengasi and Derna, leaving many children destitute of parental support and without government aid condemned to perish "without food or aid of any kind".(59) The Italian authorities could not easily remain indifferent to the physical needs of these numerous starving waifs; and wide ranging provisions, similar to the measures adopted by Caneva in Tripoli in 1912, were taken to alleviate their needs.(60)

III. Initial Action in Reforming the Schools in Accordance the Aims of the Fundamental Law of Cirenaica: 1920-1921

"With regard to the project for Libyan education, currently being considered by the Parliament, I have outlined as clearly as possible in the enclosed proposals, ways whereby articles 10 and 11 of the Fundamental Law might be implemented".(61)

"....the promiscuous mixing of race, religion, culture and the sexes not only makes teaching an impossibility for all concerned, but also deters parents from sending their children to schools where such conditions obtain...."(62)

The uncertainties regarding the government's intention to implement the Fundamental Law of Cirenaica were not finally dissolved until October 1920 when with the signing of the Treaty of Er-Ragima, it was agreed by "both parties" (the Emir, Sayyid Idris El-Senusi and the Italian government) that "lower elementary schools (Ibtidaia) and secondary schools

59) Ibid.

60) Ibid.

61) MAI-AS, Campani Report of 2 Aug. 1921, Bengasi: Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 5.

62) MAI-AS, Contini Report of June, 1921, Bengasi: Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 8.

(Idadia) "would be established" according to the needs of particular places". (63) The particular places stipulated by the Treaty where these schools were to be set up included a lower secondary school (Idadia) and higher secondary school (Alia) at Bengasi, a higher elementary school and lower secondary school at Derna, along with higher elementary schools at Tobruk, Gedabia and Merg, with further higher elementary schools at Marana and Zauia el-Beda as soon as the need arose. (64) While the final details of Article 13 of the Treaty were being thrashed out by the special commissions set up by the Parliament of Cirenaica, prior to finding expression in the Royal Decree of February 1922, the local educational establishment in Cirenaica was instructed to start preparing the ground for the implementation of the proposed reforms, even before Piccioli, who was in Bengasi at this time, had actually assumed the mantle of superintendent in any active sense at least. Too much was at stake politically for Italy to show a tardy hand in managing these affairs at this time, since the changed political atmosphere and the meeting of the Parliament of Cirenaica had imparted an urgency to educational matters, which was as new as the Parliament itself.

As one of the principal areas designated for the proposed reforms, Bengasi's schools had already been highly praised by Micacchi, who had compared them with the best in Tripolitania. The absence of a scholastic superintendent,

63) See, supra, p.175.

64) Ibid.

however, prevented any radical steps from being taken during 1920-1921 in the form of acquiring and furnishing new buildings and hiring teachers from both Italy and the neighbouring countries for the creation of the higher elementary and lower and higher secondary schools stipulated for the city by the Treaty of Er-Ragima. Such steps as these in Cirenaica's chief metropolis would have to await the arrival in Bengasi of Piccioli himself. In the meantime, the task of inspecting and preparing the schools for the new policies fell to Professor Di Berardinis, the senior teacher at the Italian secondary school, who was obliged to reduce his daily teaching programme in order to keep his afternoons free for inspecting and supervising both the Italian-type schools and the Italo-Arab schools, which, as he was most anxious to impress on the authorities, caused him a good deal of extra work and added responsibilities at the expense of his normal teaching duties. (65)

Regarding the condition and running of the Italo-Arab schools in Bengasi, Berardinis while not seeking to overtly question the purpose of these schools as instruments for the spread of Italian language and culture, tended to take a less glossy and possibly more realistic view of them than Micacchi, whose primary concern in 1919 had been to impress the authorities with the idea that all things being equal the Italo-Arab school could both perform well and also be popular with the mass of the population as well. This differ-

65) MAI-AS, Di Berardinis Report of 30 March, 1921, Bengasi: Fondon Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 1.

ence in attitude is apparent both in the professor's estimate of the popularity of the schools and also in the different picture he draws of the Italo-Arab school at Berka when compared with the Central school under the direction of the "estimable" Giovanni Randazzo.(66) Thus we find, barely a year after Micacchi's departure from Libya, that enrolment at the Central School, which he had described as constantly on the increase since 1917, reaching in the school-year 1918-19 a hundred pupils had for the school-year 1920-21 on Berardinis' estimate dropped to 34 enrolments for the first year (all of whom attended), 26 for the second year (22 of whom attended) and 16 for the third and final year of whom only 15 attended regularly.(67) The sister school at Berka showed an enrolment figure of 52 of whom about thirty attended with any degree of regularity, a figure which should be compared with Micacchi's estimate of 65 enrolments of whom 44 were said to attend regularly.(68) Di Berardinis, however, follows the Micacchi analysis of the two schools to the extent of distinguishing between the high standards attained at the Central School and the low standards permitted at the Berka school, which, like Micacchi, he blames on the poor direction and defective teaching of Antonio Di Venere, who was still in charge of its fortunes.(69) In defence of Di Venere, however, he points out that regular teaching at Berka is almost impossible because of the need of the pupils to attend the mosque at Berka, where they received

66) Ibid.

67) Ibid.

68) Ibid.

69) Ibid.

instruction in the Arab Language and the Koran, a situation, argued Berardinis, that could only be remedied by establishing a school in which both aspects of the curriculum could be taught under the same roof.(70)

The professor has nothing to say about secondary education as far as it affected the Arab population or in connection with the remaining Bengasine school at Sabri, but does make reference to certain important suggestions, concerning the practical improvement of the Italo-Arab schools in Bengasi, which had been drawn up by the newly appointed director of the Central School, Giovanni Randozzo. Randozzo's proposals were as following:

1.-to set up preparatory classes under the direction of an Arab teacher, knowledgeable of Italian, whose task would be to teach pupils how to gradually express their ideas in Italian and hold conversations in the language as well;

2.-to establish post-elementary facilities, so as to help Arab pupils unable to complete their home-work because of domestic circumstances to develop studious habits;

3.-to establish complete elementary courses under a single roof, so as to avoid the situation occurring, whereby Moslems left the school to obtain instruction in the Koran and the Arabic Language at the mosques, since this frequently resulted in their receiving more instruction in the Koran and Arabic than in Italian and other elements of the curriculum;

4.-the scholastic calendar should also be modified in order that due account might be taken of the Moslem religious feasts, so that pupils can derive greater profit from the schools than at present;

5.-to furnish the schools with experimental garden plots,

as at least 80% of the pupils attending the Italo-Arab schools in this area were the sons of local farmers.(71)

While expressing his support for all these proposals, Berardinis doubted whether it would be practical to follow them up with suitable action. Randozzo's final suggestion, for example, whereby garden-plots ought to be acquired within the immediate vicinity of the schools, was not really practical because of the shortage of suitable terrain within Bengasi itself. Berardinis suggested instead that the Directorate of Civil Affairs at Bengasi ought to accept the government's offer of the use of the experimental farm at Berka for school work on a twice monthly basis.(72)

Berardinis makes reference to at least one development in response to the demands of the Consultative Committees for professional education following Micacchi's visit, namely the setting up in Bengasi of a School of Arts and Crafts for the training of Libyan artisans and craftsmen.(73) This school had attached to it an Italo-Arab school which had the somewhat specialised function of preparing boys for entry into the newly created School of Arts and Crafts apart from fulfilling the normal functions of the Italo-Arab school. The Arts and Crafts School with its Ital-Arab annexe, as Berardinis had indicated, proved to be extremely popular in the town and had enrolled 54 pupils in the first class (37 attended), 25 in the second (18 attended) and 12 in the third (6 attended). Also, 22 pupils had enrolled in the first professional class of the

70) Ibid.

71) Ibid.

72) Ibid.

73) Ibid.

of the School of Arts and Crafts of whom 22 attended regularly-most of the latter, he added, were of Italian nationality, which indicates that the school had been set up to serve both Arab and Italian needs, in which respect it was completely different from the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli. (74) Berardinis expressed his conviction that the new school with its Italo-Arab section had a promising future ahead of it. It was, he concluded, under able and enthusiastic direction and the two Italian teachers who worked in the school (both had recently arrived from Italy) were of such qualities that there was no doubt that the pupils would derive great benefit from their lessons. (75)

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The making ready of the schools of Derna for the impending reforms fell during the school-year 1920-1921 to the Director of Primary Education in Cirenaica, Signor Fulvio Contini, of subsequent fame as a colonial educator in Libya and the Italian colonies. Although still a very young man, Contini was already sufficiently experienced to carry out such a task. This would certainly not have come his way at this time in his career had he remained employed as a school teacher in Italy, where at this time there was considerable unemployment amongst teachers, which would lead many to seek their fortunes in the colonial schools in the years ahead, where if nothing else pay was certainly higher than in Italy itself. In the six

74) Ibid. Also, see the Piccioli Report on the School of Arts and Crafts of 1926: MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 13/1, Fasc. B-1.

75) Ibid.

months prior to Piccioli's actual assumption of the superintendency Contini's role became identified with responsibility for the establishing a lower elementary school (ibtidaie) at Derna, along with that of a higher elementary school (ruscedia) and the first course of lower secondary school (idadia). (76) At Tobruk where Micacchi had not inspected the schools in 1919 Contini was to establish a higher elementary school (ruscedia). (77)

In Derna, however, Contini was able to make a head start in these arrangements through the support of the local military resident, always a key person in such arrangements, for the army provided a large bakery building which was to be converted into a school as a means of implementing the new reforms in the Arab sector. (78) This building, enthused Contini, was well suited for conversion into a school and would adequately accommodate the needs of all three projected Arab schools under a single roof? (79) The new school was named after the great victory at Vittorio Veneto, a choice of title that while encouraging the nationalists amongst the Italian community must have cast some doubts in Arab circles about the longevity and sincerity of Italian intentions. Contini describes the bakery building allocated as the school of Vittorio Veneto as consisting of eight spacious well-lighted rooms, divided by ample corridors and overlooking a large semi-covered inner courtyard, ideal for recreational and

76) MAI-AS, Contini Report of June 1921, Bengasi; Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, p. 1.

77) Ibid., p. 5. Also, see Micacchi Report of 1919, p. 127 and supra, p. 241.

78) Contini Report, Op. Cit., p. 1.

79) Ibid. (the three schools were the lower elementary school, the higher elementary school and the lower secondary school, See, infra, p. 253)

gymnastic purposes, as the equipment provided by the "Fund For Sports And Recreational Purposes" could be stored away next to the caretaker's office under the esplanades. (80) Moreover, the building was well situated and fitted out with running water, modern toilets (luxuries indeed by the standards of 1919 in Libya), besides having ample grounds, for experimental plots of the type referred to by Rand-qzzø in connection with the Italo-Arab schools in Bengasi. The site could also easily be given a pleasing and impressive aspect, added Contini, through the planting of trees and shrubs, which should be done in the summer vacation, so making the school a "worthy equal" of its twin, the National School in Derna, known as the Prince of Piedemont. He also anticipated; that pupils from both schools could share the gymnastic facilities at Vittorio Veneto and arrangements to this effect would be drawn up in time for the commencement of the school year 1921-22. (81)

Already by the commencement of the Spring term, the Italo-Arab section at the Prince of Piedemont had been moved into the former bakery so as to become the proposed ibtidaie at the commencement of the 1921-22 school-year. (82) Thus Contini was able to inspect the first year of the ibtidaie while it was still, technically speaking, an Italo-Arab school. Both at this time and subsequently, the first class was in the charge of Jannetta Umberto for Italian and Syed Ali el-Mabruk for Arabic and the Koran. Thirty-two

80) Ibid., p. 2.

81) Ibid.

82) Ibid., p. 3.

had been enrolled at the beginning of the Spring term for both sections which had an average attendance of 22, though 25 were present at the time of the inspection, which can perhaps be explained by the fact that Contini was well known in the locality having served himself as an elementary teacher at Derna.(83) In the second class, instruction was given by Michele Abbadessa for Italian and Califa Aisa Lehuti for Arabic and the Koran. Twenty-five pupils had enrolled, though only twelve attended regularly, eleven of whom were present at the time of the inspection.(84) The third class was taught by Jannetta Elpidio and Abubaker Gateze, with fourteen pupils enrolled of whom fourteen were said to attend regularly, though only eleven were present at the time of Contini's inspection.(85)

As Contini was not empowered to make provision for the functioning of the higher elementary and lower secondary schools for the school-year 1921-22 in any definite sense, because the proposed reforms had not yet received the official stamp of approval from the Parliament of Cirenaica, though this was indeed expected by all concerned, he could only make provisional arrangements of an uncertain and limited kind. This is particularly apparent with regard to teaching personnel and he proposed no new changes in this direction, Jannetta Umberto and Michele Abbadessa having only commenced teaching in Libya in the previous January and both needing time to adjust to their new surroundings.(86) Nonetheless,

83) Ibid., p.3.

84) Ibid.

85) Ibid.

86) Ibid.

he considered it wise not to be caught unprepared, and for the forthcoming school-year when the reforms were expected to take effect, he proposed that class one of the Ibtidaie should continue to be divided, as at present, into two sections, one of which would be entrusted to Signor Jannetta Umberto, who had the advantage of having taught for two years in the previous Italo-Arab school and also being the possessor of a good knowledge of Arabic as it was spoken in the region. The remaining section of class one should be given to the charge of Califa Aisa Lehuti who would, as at present, teach Arabic and the Koran. (87)

Class two, Contini advised, should be entrusted to the Director of the school, Signor Jannetta Elpidio and an Libyan teacher, Abubaker Gateze, as the governor of the colony (Giacomo De Martino) did not consider it advisable to recruit a teacher from Syria or Egypt, despite the repeated request for such a person by the local population and the municipality of Derna. (88) No new dispositions were made for class three which was to be the responsibility of the teachers in charge of class two. It is not clear whether the latter omission was in fact, as Contini affirmed, a gesture towards "economy" (two teachers could be transferred to another school or have their contracts terminated), or a psychological indication of the prevailing uncertainty. (89)

The educational situation at Tobruk and its surrounding region was far less well prepared for the impending changes

87) Ibid.

88) Ibid., p.4.

89) Ibid.

than the Derna area, though the condition of the schools was not as bad as in some of smaller urban centres already referred to. (90) It was, however, imperative for the Italian authorities to improve the school at Tobruk, as it had been ear-marked for development by Article Thirteen of the Treaty of Er-Ragima as a lower and higher elementary school (91) and the government could not afford to lose face by failing to bring about the expected transformation. Contini's task was not an enviable one, since Micacchi had not inspected the school in 1919, and no up-to-date information was to hand upon its functioning. There were also communications difficulties due to a lack of transport, and Contini was delayed in Derna beyond the date of his expected departure for Tobruk, not actually setting out until 11 June and remaining on arrival until 16 June. (92) Despite such difficulties, he was at least clear as to the manner in which the school was to be organised in the year ahead, should the proposed reforms receive parliamentary and royal sanction. Three schools were to be set up as follows:

1. A mixed Italian elementary-school, until the third class; organised on rural lines, such as was the pattern in Italy; to cater for all non-Moslem children of both sexes in the region;

2. A lower Arab elementary-school of three classes (ibtidaie) in conformity with the projected law currently before the Parliament of Cirenaica;

90) Ibid. p.5. Also, see supra p.242.

91) See, supra Chpt. Six, p.175.

92) Contini Report of July 1921, p.1.

3. A higher Arab elementary-school of three classes (ruscedia); to be constructed out of the existing Italo-Arab school; again in accordance with the projected law, now being considered by the Parliament of Cirenaica. (93)

If this development plan was to be realised in the immediate future, however, as the Parliament of Cirenaica and the Italian government would expect in the normal course of events, radical action was required in view of the numerous deficiencies of the existing school, which is graphically described in true to life terms by Contini in the pages of his report that deal with the situation at Tobruk. (94) The principal cause of the defective condition of the existing Italo-Arab school, opined Contini, lay in the appalling state of the school facilities, which like others in Cirenaica at this time, were reduced to the cramped confines of a single poorly ventilated and inadequately lighted room. This miserable accommodation let directly onto the thoroughfare outside, and was the only place in the vicinity where the teaching of Arabs, Jews and Italians took place. (95) The other reason for the failure of the school lay in the expedient adopted by the Department of Civil Affairs in Bengasi, whereby young and inexperienced teachers, such as the present incumbent, Signor Filippo Russino who was entirely new to Libya besides being completely unprepared for his duties, were directed to distant and isolated posts, where they were forced to

93) Ibid., p.5.

94) Ibid., pp.5-10.

95) Ibid., p.6.

96) Ibid.

largely fend for themselves without outside aid or advice. "It would be wiser in the future", pleaded Contini, "to avoid sending inexperienced teachers alone to work in isolated centres, such as Tobruk". (96) Other factors, observed Contini, had also made a powerful contribution to the failure of the school. It had, for instance, ceased to function at all during Ramadan, which ended on 15 December, 1920, so effectively reducing the school-year to less than five months. Furthermore, the ethnic and religious composition of the school, and the problem of having to operate for teaching purposes from a single room, made it virtually impossible to teach more than one ethno-religious group at a time, so reducing the school-day to under three hours per group. (97) Thus, Signor Russino taught the Arab-Moslem pupils between 8 and 11.00 hours; Ahneida Asila El-Msutari taught them again between 13 and 15.00 hours; and Cadi Sidi Abdalla Sceriff gave them their final lessons for the day between 15 and 1600 hours. (98) "Even with a better and more experienced teacher than Russino", Contini remarked, "it would be hopeless to expect results different from those obtained in the present circumstances." (99) "Moreover (continued Contini), these appalling circumstances were aggravated by the virtual absence of any proper school-furnishings (the existing benches had been loaned by the nearby naval base at Tobruk and were completely unsuited to the needs of young children / for whom they were mostly too large) and the total lack of teaching materials remotely relevant or applicable to Libyan needs" (100)

97) Ibid., p.7.

98) Ibid.

99) Ibid., p.8.

100) Ibid., p.10.

In attempting to find a solution to the problems presented by the school at Tobruk and the need to ensure that the new reforms could be implemented on time, Contini intelligently reduced the whole problem to its basic elements; given the approval by the Parliament of Cirenaica of the projected ordinance, it would be necessary to have available by October (at the latest), three types of accommodation. First, a room to serve as a "mixed" school for Italians, Europeans and possibly Jews; two further rooms to serve as the basis for the projected lower and higher elementary-schools for Libyans; and a further room for the director, along with a closet-room for storage purposes. (101) Unable to forecast future trends, Contini at this point further divided the problem into a long-term and short-term solution; the long-term solution could take the form of new buildings, the re-adaption of existing buildings (the army had offered an artillery barracks for possible conversion into a school) or the acquisition of private property, which could be suitably adapted to the purposes of a school. (102) Contini, however, ruled out of practical consideration any form of "definitive solution" for financial reasons, estimating that to convert the artillery barracks into a school would cost at least 100,000 Lira, an apparently astronomical amount by the standards of the day, and unthinkable to Contini's reckoning in view of the government's straitened financial and economic

101) Ibid., p.11.

102) Ibid.

103) Ibid.

circumstances.(104)The renting of private accommodation would be much cheaper,Contini estimated,and ought to cost not more than 300 Lira per month to hire,although extra resources would have to be found to cover the cost of conversion to scholastic purposes.(105)The best solution for the immediate future,it seemed,was the acquisition of the local Church Hall in Tobruk upon which around 30,000 Lira would have to be spent in converting it to educational requirements.(106)There was unfortunately opposition to this latter scheme from the local commissariate who,had Contini's plan been accepted by the authorities,would have been obliged to find alternative accommodation for the parish at their own Tobruk headquarters.(107)

* * * * *

Contini's failure to find even a provisional solution to the educational problems of Tobruk within terms of his limited brief must have left him feeling disinclined to wrestle with similar,apparently intractable problems at El-Merg.He therefore seems to have used the excuse of lack of transport facilities and the need to visit Tolmeta,which had not been inspected by Micacchi in 1919,to leave the problems of El-Merg,a well-known educational blackspot,and other areas designated for development by the Treaty of Er-Ragima,to his colleague,Romeo Campani.(108) Campani was consequently responsible for inspecting most of the remaining

104) Ibid.,p.11.

105) Ibid.

106) Ibid.p.13.

107) Ibid.

108) Ibid. p.16.

Italian and Italo-Arab schools in the colony in anticipation of the forthcoming reform.(109) These included the schools at Cirene, where he pronounced the Italo-Arab school to be good but the building inadequate and an Italian school to be also required; Di Marsa Susa, where the standard of teaching is the worst imaginable, the school in a complete state of abandonment, and the local government commissariate entirely without any interest whatsoever in educational matters: El-Merg at which the building is unsatisfactory and in need of urgent improvement.(110) Campani had also earlier in the year carried out an inspection of the schools at Derna, the arrangements of which he had approved, and kept an experienced eye on the running of the schools at Bengasi. Apart from the continual problems associated with poor and unsuitable buildings, Campani also used this occasion to itemise other matters relevant to an improvement of the Arab schools particularly in the year ahead:

1.-In the Italo-Arab schools little is learnt by the pupils because of the poor preparation of the Arab teachers. They are only accustomed to having to teach reading and the Koran along with a little writing, which is far from sufficient for today's needs. Also the teaching of Italian is badly conducted.

2.-The substitution of untrained Libyan teachers by professionally trained Libyan teachers ought not to be difficult, providing they were paid adequately, and that

109) MAI-AS, Campani Report of 2 Aug. 1921, Bengasi, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1, pp. 1-5.

110) Ibid.

111) Ibid., p. 4.

those whom we continued to employ in an untrained capacity were properly supervised by Italian teachers with an adequate knowledge of Arabic.

3.-Establish in Bengasi a Normal School for the adequate and proper training of Arab teachers.

4.-Make obligatory an elementary knowledge of Arabic (both written and spoken) for all teachers employed in Libya who are on the colonial roll. Such a facility ought to be an indispensable prerequisite of future promotion within the ranks of the educational service in Libya.

5.-Pay an extra allowance of not less than L.1000 to teachers possessing Arabic; make the first course of the Italo-Arab school exclusively in Arabic; and improve the general economic conditions of both Arab and Italian teachers in Libya.(111)

The Micacchi Report of 1919, along with the Berardinis and Contini Reports of 1921, while not detracting from the institution of the Italo-Arab school, which Micacchi was most concerned should continue, despite the Fundamental Law of 1919, all agreed that the government schools for Arabs in Cirenaica were under-subscribed, for the most part lacking adequate accommodation and suitable personnel, whether Italian or Libyan, besides being urgently in need of all the normal teaching prerequisites, such as benches, teaching aids, furniture and school materials. The inspections of 1921 had shown how hopeless it would be to attempt to implement the forthcoming proposals for reform, which were then in the process of getting approved by the Parliament of Cirenaica, despite the acquisition of a large building (the former army bakery)

at Derna for conversion into a school, without a major inflow of finance, expertise, teaching personnel and school materials in the near future. The evidence seems to indicate that by the end of the 1921 school-year, these points had finally impressed the authorities in Rome with a mood of new urgency, and that improvement was finally in the air and would take practical form during the succeeding school year. (112)

112) By Nov., 1922, Bengasi had been provided with two large new buildings to serve as Italian primary and secondary schools, to be also served by a sports hall, still to be completed. Moreover, a further two, large buildings had been completely renovated, one to comprise the Arab girls professional school (in Via Otman Bacheh) and the other as the Central Kuttab (in Via Berbi). A 'notable building' had also been acquired in Via Sciabbi (at the cost of L.104.600) to accommodate the Arab secondary school or Idadia. The kuttabs attached to the mosques of Biseck and El-Mustari had been resystemized and were ready for use. At Berka, the best building in the suburb had been acquired and refitted to serve as an elementary mixed school; and the existing Italo-Arab school and Kuttab were being expanded into six rooms. At Merg, a fine new school had been constructed at the cost of L.125.000. L.17.600 had been spent so far on improving the existing facilities at Cirene, though it was planned to build a new school at the cost of L.190.000. Only provisional arrangements had been undertaken at Marsa-Susa, though L.90.000 had been set aside for the resystemizing of the school. At Zavia-Feidia, L.40,000 had been set aside for the transformation of a military redoubt into a school and the technicians had almost completed their plans for the project. In Derna the following work had so far been completed: 1. the repair and modernisation of the existing Technical School at a cost of L.2.500.00; 2. the construction, systemization and repair of the Arab girls' school at a cost of L.22.000; 3. the general improvement of the school of Prince of Piedemonte. Further improvements were also in the pipe-line, for instance L.150.000 was to be spent on further improvements at the Technical School and L.65.000 on the Kuttab at Beled. At Tobruk, L.5.000 had been spent on converting a private building into a primary school. Eventually the Artillery Barracks there would be transformed into an educational complex to serve the needs of the whole area. Many other plans were also in progress for the Arab and Italian sectors in the "small centres", so far largely unaffected by the reforms. See, Piccioli Report of November, 1922, Op.Cit., pp. 74-77.

Chapter NineThe Implementing of the Fundamental Law:
1921-1922-A Year of Change and Expansion"SIGNORI DEPUTATI

The Government is proud to be able to announce that it has provided almost completely for the immediate actualisation of the new scholastic ordinance of the Moslem population of Cirenaica, as was approved by the preceeding session of Parliament."(*)

"EXCELLENCY,

The year 1921-1922 represents a most important period of transition for the schools of Cirenaica; for in this period, the new schools for Libyan citizens will have to be established in accordance with the Statute of Libya and the Treaty of Er-Ragima".(**)

In view of the general condition of most of the schools in Cirenaica before October 1921 and of the Italian government's committal to implement Article 13 of the Treaty of Er-Ragima, the new superintendent, Dr. Angelo Piccioli, had an immense amount of reorganisation to complete following his appointment in the summer of 1921, and the promulgation of R.D.N.368 in February 1922, whereby the new reforms finally entered the statute book. In assessing Piccioli's achievements, we cannot afford to forget the important preliminary reorganisation carried out by Fulvio Contini during the previous scholastic year, as there is no doubt that, without it, Piccioli would never have been able to inform the Parliament of Cirenaica in April 1922 that the government had provided "almost completely" for

*) MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2, Fasc.B-1: Piccioli Report to the Parliament of Cirenaica, Bengasi, April 1922, p.1.

***) MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2, Fasc.B-1: Piccioli Report to the Governor of Cirenaica, Bengasi, 10 November 1922, p.1.

the implementing of the new scholastic ordinance.(1)

Indeed, the achievement in so short a space of time seems remarkable, given that in the previous year (October 1920-June 1921) there had been only 21 government schools for Moslems in Cirenaica, whereas at the time of Piccioli's account of his first six months as superintendent, less than a year later, this number had increased to 60 such schools, and a further six were on the point of being opened, bringing the total number of schools functioning by the end of the 1922 scholastic year to the figure of 67.(2) Despite such progress, many of the problems facing the superintendent were still far from resolved, and at this stage of the implementation process, Piccioli was mainly concerned to provide the Parliament with the necessary proof that Italy had fulfilled her side of the bargain.(3) He was, even so, concerned to acquaint the assembled delegates with the difficulties he was having to face. "This work", he told the Parliament, "cannot be done in a day, but must be seen as the fruit of constant activity extending over a period of many years".(4) Piccioli presented the problems under three heads: school accommodation, teaching personnel and school materials.

The problem of securing adequate school buildings could only be dealt with satisfactorily on a long term basis, Piccioli reminded the delegates, but the government was treating the matter as an issue of great urgency and no time was being wasted in finding a concrete solution to it. In the latter

- 1) Piccioli Report to the Parliament of Cirenaica, April 1922, p.1.
- 2) Ibid. (most of these schools consisted of only a single room)
- 3) Ibid. Also, see MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1: Progetto di ordinam. scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della Cirenaica, pp.1-5.
- 4) Piccioli Report of April 1922, p.1.

respect, the authority responsible for providing school accommodation was the Ministry of Public Works, which had worked out a special strategy, existing buildings were renovated and refurbished where possible, otherwise plans were drawn up for the construction of new buildings. (5) In this way it was intended to remedy the immediate problems caused by a lack of suitable accommodation while at the same time providing a long-term solution for the future. Unlike previous efforts at resolving the shortage of schools for Moslems in Libya, on this occasion, no effort was being spared to find a definite solution to the lack of proper schools. For this purpose the government had allocated sums of money for which there was no equivalent in the past history of education in Libya. In support of his statements Piccioli furnished the Parliament of Cirenaica with the following statistics:

	! Cost of work now ! being undertaken	! cost of work under ! preparation
Bengasi Area	! 36.400 Lira	! 115.000 Lira
Merg "	! 3.064 "	! 125.000 "
Cirene "	! 24.000 "	-----
Derna "	! 26.000 "	! 65.000 "
Tobruk "	! 3.000 "	-----
	! 92.464 "	! 305.000

(6)

- 5) See, Piccioli Report of November 1922 (Edilizia Scolastica), pp. 74-78. Also the Piccioli Report of April, 1922, p. 2. For further information upon the construction of modern schools in Libya, see Rodolpho Micacchi, L'Edilizia Scolastica in Tripolitania (Firenze, 1934).
- 6) Piccioli Report of April, 1922, p. 2. Also, see Piccioli Report of November, 1922, p. 3.

At the commencement of the school-year 1922-1923, Piccioli was able to inform the new governor of the colony, Eduardo Baccavi, in the midst of his fleeting tenure of the governorship (1.10.1922-1.12.1922) that the school building programme was making good progress though "much still remained to be done". Good accommodation had been secured for the Moslem schools at Bengasi, Merg, Derna and Tobruk, but out-of-the-way centres in the "interior" had still to receive their proper complement of schools, though plans had been laid to this effect. It was, however, a bad sign that Piccioli failed to provide financial details of future developments for the new governor, in respect of which he was soon to be criticised for overspending. (7)

No less difficult a problem was that of providing experienced and suitably qualified teaching-personnel, for until the new Arab secondary schools were able to produce Libyan teachers in about four years' time, it would be necessary to staff the schools by provisional means (8). The provisional solution adopted by Piccioli involved employing personnel from the former Italo-Arab schools, whether Arab or Italian, supported by a certain number of fighi from the Kuttabs. (9) In selecting Libyan teachers, attention was focussed upon the need to choose candidates knowledgeable in Islamic doctrines, yet at the same time able to use modern methods of teaching. In this "difficult and delicate task", Piccioli informed the Parliament in April, "the government had not hesitated to fully consult with the Cadi and Mufti of the major localities,

7) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.3. Also, see MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2, Fasc.B-1: Piccioli Report to the Governor of Cirenaica, Bengasi, August, 1923, p.37.

8) Piccioli Report of April 1921, p.3.

rather than rely upon the judgement of Italians alone".(10) Even by these methods, it had not always been easy to arrive at the right consensus of opinion, and on such occasions, when difficulty had arisen in selecting the right applicant for the post, the expedient had been adopted of summoning all the fighi of the district to a grand meeting, where they sorted the matter out amongst themselves.(11) A different approach, however, had been necessary in finding teachers for the new Arab secondary schools and, to fill these vacancies the Italian Legations in Bierut and Alexandria in Egypt recruited a small number of Arab teachers.(12) It was also necessary to recruit through the Italian legations in Moslem countries for female teachers for the new girls' school in Bengasi.(13) In the final analysis, however, the superintendent was obliged to depend in the main upon the existing stock of Arab and Italian teachers in the colony. This was a far from satisfactory situation as he admitted to the Parliament in April, since such teachers were insufficiently qualified and experienced to handle all aspects of the curriculum in the new schools, especially at the secondary level.(14) Piccioli could only promise that a special new course would be set up at Bengasi for training Arab teachers in modern methods a proposal that was never implemented until the establishing in Tripoli of the Madrasah al-Islamiyah al-ùlyà in 1935 though following the promulgation of the royal

9) Ibid., p.3.

10) Ibid.

11) Ibid.

12) Ibid.

13) Ibid.

14) Ibid.

decrees of 4 January 1920(N.68) and of 5 February 1922(N.368), various procedures were inaugurated by Micacchi for screening Libyan and Arab teachers trained in neighbouring states, before allowing them to take up positions in the government schools (15) In April 1922, however, Piccioli was concerned to exude sweetness and light in order to convince the Cirenaicans that the superintendency was full of good intentions. Also, as the following table indicates, that Italy was prepared to back up these intentions with hard cash :

	Teachers hired	Current Financial Commitments(1922)
1. Teachers hired for the <u>Kuttabs</u>	28	141.762.25 Lire
2. Teachers hired for the elementary schools.....	29	259.473.50 Lire
3. Teachers hired for the girls' schools.....	7	55.3000.50 Lire
4. Professors hired for the Arab secondary schools of Bengasi and Derna.....	10	32.600.00 Lire
	74	489.136.25

(16)

By the time of Piccioli's report to the Parliament of Cirenaica, a considerable amount of school-material had been distributed to the new schools. Piccioli believed this particular prob-

15) Ibid., p.4. Also, see B.U.C., 69 and B.U.C., 289. The arrangements whereby Arab teachers were selected for employment in the government elementary schools for Libyans are outlined by Micacchi in L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, 1931, pp. 558-65.

16) The Piccioli Report of April, 1922, p.4 (Piccioli notes in the margin of page 4 that during the previous school-year, "only twenty teachers were assigned to the government schools for Arabs for whom a budget of around L. 100,000 was allocated.").

lem had two dimensions: the need to acquire suitable teaching materials, such as text-books, maps, wall-charts and the like; and the problems associated with the acquisition of school furnishings, especially school-benches. (17) The materials already distributed included geographical maps in Arabic which had been specially obtained for the superintendency by the Italian Consul-Generals in Egypt and Syria. More problematical had been the acquisition of wall-charts and Piccioli had expressed his dissatisfaction with existing types available in the Middle East. Instead he had instructed the Unione Tipografica at Bengasi to produce wall-charts in Arabic for the new schools in accordance with his own specifications. (18) It was not, however, until October, when forty tons of school benches and other types of class-room furniture arrived from Italy, that the second aspect of the problem could be dealt with, though the new furniture was not installed in the schools until the commencement of the New Year 1923. (19) Even so, 100,000 Lira had been spent in providing school materials and furnishing during 1922 and, at least in this respect, Italy could be said to have honoured her pledges to bring educational improvement to Cirenaica. (20)

17) Ibid.

18) Ibid., p.5. Also, see Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.5.

19) Ibid.

20) Ibid. From an annual budget of 828.150.00 Lira for the whole elementary sector in Cirenaica in 1923, Piccioli deduced that 124.032.00 Lira had been spent on providing exercise books, stationery, educational material, Froebelian material, charts and maps. See, Piccioli Report of August 1923, p.52.

II. The Reformed Kuttabs

"The Central Kuttab at Bengasi has this year increased its school population two-fold over the previous year".(21)

It is virtually impossible to locate a single reference from the officials of the Department of Italian Schools which says anything favourable towards the Libyan Kuttabs, or in any way supports the Nallino contention that they were essential for any system of Arab education in Libya.(22) Micacchi in 1919 described the Kuttabs in both Tripolitania and Cirenaica as being "in a complete state of decadence", though he reluctantly concedes the poor condition of the vast majority of these schools has failed to undermine their popularity with the mass of the population.(23)The Director of Schools observed further that in the area still under Italian rule in Tripolitania 815 pupils attended the Kuttabs for the 1919 school-year,whereas 615 had attended them in the previous year.(24)The poor organisation of the schools in Cirenaica before 1919 prevented him from obtaining any figures for attendance at the Kuttabs,though he noted that they were either "in the principal centres",where they were "outside the government control",or in the tribal areas , where they were "mobile" in that they seemed to move around from place to place.(25) Of these traditional religious schools,apart from the ones attached to particular mosques,

21) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1;Piccioli Report to the Governor of Cirenaica,15 February,1924,p.18.

22) See,C.A.Nallino,the Post-War Commission's Report of January,1919(L'istruzione nelle colonie:I.-I Kuttab), p.132.

23) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi, Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1;Rodolpho Micacchi to the Governor of Tripolitania,1919,p.92.

24) Ibid.

the great majority were conducted in small rooms, consisting, observed Micacchi, "of a floor of hardened earth, with a single opening in the wall, which served as a door, and through which came both light and air. In such places, where cleanliness and any form of hygienic awareness are completely unknown, the pupils receive the teaching of the Koran, while squatting either on mats or more commonly on the bare ground. The slate upon which they write in the manner of a little blackboard, wiping it clean with water and clay when they want to cancel what they have written, is the only didactic equipment in sight", he concluded. (26)

For the moment, however, the Department of Schools at the Colonial Ministry, which had replaced the Department of Italian Schools all'estero at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the body in charge of all educational matters affecting the colonies, was obliged to swallow its dislike of Kuttabs, as the 1922 ordinance had provided for the modernisation of 34 Kuttabs. (27) Of these, however, only 24 had been reorganised at the time the new reform became law, leaving nine still to be set up, a delay, Piccioli explained, caused by local difficulties of a purely practical nature in particular commissariates. (28) It was hoped, however, that by October 1922 all the schools ordained by the new decree would be fully operational. (29)

25) Ibid., p.130

26) Micacchi's criticism of the poor condition in which he found the vast majority of Kuttabs was by no means confined to such schools. He also criticised rural Italo-Arab schools and the private schools, whether Moslem, Jewish or Catholic. The "hygienic condition of these", he wrote, "is reflected in the buildings, which are unsuitable even for the raising of farm-animals. Moreover, the condition of the children is undescribably repulsive-dirty and tattered, I do not know whether to blame the teachers or the society for tolerating such an appalling state of affairs. Even so, whoever or whatever is responsible, the situation in these schools is most grave, and rigorous sanitary measures must be taken to prevent the further spread of infection by bringing them under government control and surveillance." Ibid., pp.94 & 81.

It is very likely, however, that Piccioli's confident assessment and prediction of the situation in April 1922 was more designed to gain the collaboration of the Arab delegates at the Parliament than to state the real level at which the new decree had been implemented. The government in pursuit of its policy of collaboration in Cirenaica had undoubtedly made financial provision for the implementation of the 1922 ordinance but, as was subsequently shown, not to the extent of implementing it entirely, at least in the first instance. (30) This is apparent from an examination of the situation confronting the superintendency in Cirenaica following the Fascist seizure of power in October 1922. The scrapping of the Liberal government's policy of collaboration involved Piccioli in a struggle with the Department of Finance to preserve what he could of the existing reforms in the colony. In the ensuing debate, he revealed not only that he had lacked the means in 1922 to implement the whole decree, but that the superintendency had been instructed by director Micacchi to proceed with financial caution. Thus out of the 32 Kuttabs which the 1922 ordinance had indicated should be either modernised (this referred to nine Kuttabs already in existence) or freshly created, only 10 were in fact "transformed" by a government subsidy. (31)

27) For the places where the Kuttabs were to be instituted by the government in accordance with Art.1. of the 1922 Educational Ordinance for Cirenaica, see supra, Chpt. Six, Note 49., p.185.

28) See, Piccioli Report of April 1922, p.5.

29) Ibid.

30) See, Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923, p.37.

31) Ibid., p.38.

The ten reformed Kuttabs were those at Bengasi, Berka, Merg, Ghemines, Tolmetta, Marza-Susa, Cirene, Derna (two) and Tobruk. (32) These it is interesting to note were all in urban centres and correspond with the areas specially inspected during the school-year 1920-21 by Fulvio Contini, Professor Bernardinis and Romeo Campani (33). As such they had been specially chosen by Micacchi as the areas where the new ordinance of February 1922 should initially be implemented, and Piccioli was able to inform the governor of the colony in November 1922 that reformed Kuttabs had been finally set up in these areas. (34) The success of the Reformed Kuttabs with the local population led many fighis to approach the regional commissariates to request that they be taken on the government roll, as their livelihoods were at stake due to a loss of pupils to the new schools. (35). A shortage of funds and the changed political circumstances in 1923 prevented the policy from being developed any further, though plans had been drawn up in 1922 to extend the subsidising of Kuttabs to the Senusi Zavias of Cirenaica in accordance with the Emir's wishes at Er-Regima, and the opportunity presented to the Superintendency of developing collaboration amongst the nomadic and semi-nomadic sections of the population. (36) The failure to develop the programme of subsidising and reforming the Kuttabs at this point, and the subsequent Fascist exclusion of the Kuttabs from the government programme of education, was a mistake which subsequent policies would never entirely rectify.

32) Ibid.

33) See, supra, Chpt. Eight, Section III., pp. 249-259.

34) See, the Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923, p. 37; and of Nov. 1922, pp. 6-8.

35) Piccioli Report of Nov. 1922, p. 10.

36) Ibid., pp. 8-10.

III. The Establishing of Arab Elementary Schools

"Regarding the school at Agedabia, the government has informed His Highness, the Emir, that in accordance with the new scholastic ordinance, it intends to establish two schools: one a Kuttab and the other an Elementary School". (37)

Far more susceptible to rapid solution than the vexed problems of the Kuttabs was the transformation of the existing Italo-Arab schools into Arab elementary schools. Again the problem had been largely attended to in the previous school-year by Contini; and it is no exaggeration to affirm that the new schools, of which there were seven, all pre-existed the ordinance of February 1922. (38) Moreover, as indicated by the new decree, they were to be set up at existing urban centres, where the six regional commissariats had their headquarters; these were at Bengasi, El-Merg, Cirene, Derna, Tobruk and Agedabia. (39) Both in his April report to the Parliament of Cirenaica and in his November report to the governor of the colony, Piccioli avoids direct reference to the physical improvement of the existing Italo-Arab schools, which were to become the new elementary schools for Libyan citizens, other than to indicate the amount of money allocated to school buildings generally. (40) Perhaps, it was not regarded as necessary in view of the Contini, Berardinis and Campani reports of the previous year which had dealt quite extensively with this problem. Instead, he concentrated upon the internal reform of the schools upon the following lines:

1. the removal from the former Italo-Arab schools of

37) Ibid., p. 11.

38) See, Piccioli Report of Aug., 1923, p. 38.

39) See supra, Chapt. Six, Note 49, p. 185; and, also, Piccioli's Report of Nov., 1922, p. 10.

40) See supra, p. 265. Also, see, Piccioli's Report of Nov., 1922 (Edilizia Scolastica), pp. 74-77 (in this section of the report Piccioli details new school constructions either already completed or in progress for 1922-3).

all non-Moslem pupils (for whom separate schools had been provided);

2. the adoption of the new programmes elaborated by a special Ministerial Commission and proposed to the Ministry of Colonies during September 1921;

3. the renewal of all didactic materials in response to the proposals of the Ministerial Commission;

4. the allocation of an adequate complement of teaching personnel for the implementation of the new reforms.(41)

The previous school-year had witnessed the implementation of the first of these aims at Derna, and no doubt the other commissariats, where the Arab elementary schools were to be set up, saw similar changes during the school-year 1921-22, once the accommodation problem had been resolved.(42) The acceptance by the Parliament of Cirenaica and the Ministry of Colonies of the commission's proposals led to the latter entering the statute book during the current school-year in the form of the educational ordinance of February 1922.(43) Piccioli had ensured that adequate stocks of didactic material had been purchased from neighbouring Arab countries to satisfy the bilingual character of the new school-programmes or, when this wasn't possible, had caused school materials in Arabic to be specially produced locally. The bilingual character of the decree, unlike its equivalent in Tripolitania, certainly

41) The Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.11.

42) See, supra Chapt. Eight, Section III., pp.249-262.

43) See, supra Chapt. Six, Section III., pp.177-182; and also Section IV., pp.182-191.

aided its implementation ,since(given the wave of anti-Western feeling throughout the Arab world at this time) it is more than unlikely that the Italian government would have been unprepared to recruit Arab teachers from surrounding countries, for fear of spreading Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism. There is no doubt that the exclusively Arabic character of the elementary schools ordained for Tripolitania for the Fundamental Law of June 1919 greatly complicated its implementation by the Italians. Not only did Italy not possess at this time sufficient numbers of Arab-speaking teachers for the elementary schools, but it was quite unprepared to recruit such teachers from neighbouring Arab countries for fear of the political consequences. From the Italian standpoint, the conceding of political autonomy to Libya in 1919 was not intended to place Libya on the road to either complete independence or to a further outbreak of the smouldering colonial war. Only a separate study of the complex politics surrounding the grant of autonomy in Tripolitania in 1919 will provide an indication of all the motives of the Arab side both in the general and in the particular respect.

To round off the work of the previous school-year in preparing the existing Italo-Arab schools for conversion into Arab elementary schools, Piccioli made his own contribution by converting the Italo-Arab schools at Marsa Susa and Tolmeta into elementary schools of the new type.(44) Also in response to the representations of the population of Ghemines to the regional commissariat of that area a new school

44) Piccioli Report of November, 1922, p.11. Also, see supra, Chapt. Eight, Section III., pp. 249-262.

45) Piccioli Report of November, 1922, p.11.

was opened there as well.(45)A further elementary school and Kuttab was also scheduled for immediate establishment at Agedabia in response to the wishes of the Emir himself. Idris,however, in a letter dated 2 September 1921 from the camp at El-Abiara ,while thanking the government for the interest it was showing in the field of public education, and approving the institution of the two schools,advised procrastination for some time ahead, because of the difficulty in selecting suitable teachers adapted to the area, and also because of the need for more work to be undertaken upon the school buildings themselves.(46)The Emir,Piccioli pointed out,wished to reserve for himself the choice of the right moment,when it would be "opportune" to set up the school and would communicate this to the superintendency by letter at a later date.(47)

IV.The School of Education and Work

"It is impossible to deny that the Girls'School at Bengasi,which was set up barely two years ago, constitutes the greatest practical success of our little scholastic organisation in Cirenaica".(48)

The absence of any kind of public education other than that provided by the religious system in Libya before 1895 no doubt inhibited the development of female education in the country.(49) Although the Ottomans established an elementary

46) Ibid.,p.12

47) Ibid.

48) Piccioli Report of August 1923,p.39.

49) Francesco Coro,Settantasei Anni Di Dominazione Turca in Libia,1835-1911(Tripoli,1913),p.85.

school for girls in Tripoli after 1899, it is not absolutely clear whether they did so in Bengasi, and more likely, not.

(50) This does not mean, of course, that girls were completely without educational opportunities both before and after 1911, as facilities existed in the Italian schools and also in the form of private tuition, though the latter especially was restricted to families with the necessary financial means. (51) According to Piccioli, the opposition to the education of girls came from traditional circles in which "the education of girls is considered to be contrary to religion".

(52) The superintendent also blamed opposition to the education of girls upon long-standing misogyny which was, he added, "less pronounced in areas, such as urban centres, where contact existed with Europeans". (53) Thus there is at least some truth in the Italian claim that they introduced into Libya the notion of female education, even if they only began to develop it in Cirenaica ten years after the commencement of colonial rule in the colony, and at the specific behest of an Arab Parliament. If this latter support was not to be alienated at the first instance, it was necessary for this aspect of the new reform to win popular support and also directly benefit the Arab families involved. It was not purely altruistic reasons that dictated the level of the government's benevolence but the policy of pacific penetration. Even so, regardless of

50) See Ibid., Chpt. XIII., Istruzione Publica-Le Scuole Turche e quelle Europee, pp. 85-89; and Ettore Rossi, "La Colonia Italiana a Tripoli nel Secolo XIX", Rivista delle Colonie Italiane, Anno IV, N. 12, Dec., 1930, p. 1067.

51) See supra, Chpt. Eight, Sections II. and III.

52) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p. 16.

53) Ibid.

political criteria, and the need to restrict such education to the level of basic literacy and the domain of the purely practical, the establishing of two schools for girls (one at Bengasi, and the other at Derna) was undoubtedly a sound and necessary precedent. (54)

Established at the commencement of the school-year 1921-1922 at Bengasi and Derna, the school population of the former had by November reached 80 and, added Piccioli, "would have easily exceeded this figure but for the limitations of space imposed by the building". (55) The programme adopted by the schools wisely avoided any attempt to duplicate the programmes normally adopted in the Italian schools which could have invited censure from Arab quarters. (56) Instead, a special programme was adopted which became the standard pattern in the colonial schools for girls for the remainder of the Italian occupation of Libya. (57) This programme emphasised subjects of relevance to the home, such as domestic economy, hygiene, what the Italians termed "domestic morality" and various practical crafts that were traditional in Arab lands. (58) The future survival of these schools and their increase in popularity depended, Miccachi believed, upon confining the curriculum to these traditional areas. (59) For these purposes out of a weekly total of 25 teaching hours, 15 were devoted

54) Ibid., p.15.

55) Ibid.

56) Ibid.

57) Roland De Marco writes that the total enrolment in these schools reached 758 for the school year 1934-5. The school was divided into three sections: "a two-year section in which the programme of studies was the same as the boys, with the exception that domestic training was substituted for book-keeping, gardening, gymnastics and sports; a three year practical course; and a one year complementary course".

to the practical aspects of education, such as embroidery, weaving and tapestry-making, and five to "arab disciplines", such as the Arabic language and the Koran. The remaining five hours of this rudimentary curriculum was to be devoted to the acquisition of Italian, but on a purely "optional" basis. (60)

The teaching of this programme at the Bengasi school was assigned, writes Piccioli, to "two good Arab teachers", Signora Hamida Lanesi and Signora Bedina Surer Bej, along with three Italian mistresses, including the directress of the school, Signora Lyta Lebboreni, whom Piccioli describes as the "cleverest teacher in Bengasi". (61) Similar praise was bestowed on the teaching personnel at the Derna school which included a Moslem mistress, Halina ben Bahri and two assistants, along with "one of the best teachers in the district", Signora Nella Matini. (62) Both of these schools were well fitted out and equipped with material from the recent consignments of school materials specially obtained by Piccioli from either Italy or the neighbouring Arab countries. School materials whether in the form of text-books, exercise books or the silk and cotton fabrics used by the girls during the practical sessions were initially supplied free of charge, though such a situation would not continue to obtain during the next school-year, except for

(contin.) De Marco, however, unfortunately fails to distinguish for lack of documentary sources between programmes on the statute book and those which were actually implemented. In the latter respect, it is extremely doubtful whether the full-statutory programme for female education was ever implemented, especially outside important centres, such as Tripoli and Bengasi. See, R. De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives (New York, 1943), p. 31.

58) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p. 16.

59) Micacchi Report of 1919 (La donna musulmana e la scuola), p. 165.

the most necessitous students.(63) Great stress was also placed upon general hygiene in the running of the school, both with the aim of increasing awareness amongst the pupils of the causes and remedies of many infections common in Libya at this time, and also with preventative factors in mind. These matters were entrusted by the superintendency to the Department of Health in Bengasi which assigned to both schools a special official, Dottoressa Tria, who approached her work with "great efficiency and zeal" to the considerable satisfaction, notes Piccioli, of the families of the pupils, the Department of Health and the superintendency itself.(64)

Although separate estimates of the cost of the two new projects in financial terms is not unfortunately contained in the existing documentary sources, some idea of the general importance of the projects can be gained from Piccioli's description to the Governor of Cirenaica in November 1922. The Bengasi institution was allocated to a "fine building" in Via Osman Barak (Number 69), which comprised five rooms, along with a kitchen and other small rooms, and an ample courtyard with a "magnificent balcony". The building added Piccioli had been systematically redecorated and and renovated

60) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.16.

61) Ibid., p.17. (Piccioli's frequent castigations of the male teachers (immediately prior to his purging both Arab and Italian personnel during 1923 and 1924 in response to the change in regime) and frequent effusive praise for women teachers raises the question of personal bias in all his assessments of personnel. In such matters, it is difficult to know whether he was motivated by fear, lest his reports were less confidential than he hoped; or a complete refusal at times to exercise his objective judgement when political criteria were not involved. Certainly, women teachers on net receive fewer castigations than men in these reports and it is likely Piccioli adopted a lighter attitude to them than he did to men, or because he believed their work to be more deserving of praise)

62) Ibid.

63) Ibid., p.18.

in accordance with its new requirements.(65) Despite all its attractive amenities, however, the buildings assigned to the Bengasi institution were purely provisional, and for the future it was proposed to construct an entirely new school on land belonging to the Beni Auqaf. This, when it transpired, would be to the North of the present school buildings, but still in the same Via Osman Barek. It was not possible, argued Piccioli, to move the school from Via Osman Barek, because of the latter's centrality and convenience for the most heavily populated Arab section of Bengasi.(66) Also at Derna, the existing buildings were adjudged adequate for existing requirements, but would be extended during the coming school-year(1923) and private and public land had been acquired for such a purpose.(67)

V. Professional Education

"While the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli sinks still further into ruin and is facing final closure, that of Bengasi is on the point of getting organised in accordance with criteria which will have the maximum practical effect."(68)

Although the new girls' schools were in part concerned with professional training, the main aim of professional education in Libya at this time was the professional training of boys. Agricultural education should also have been included in the scope of the latter, but all such schemes were still judged far too premature by Micacchi and nothing of a practical nature was attempted in either Tripolitania or in

64) Ibid. p.

65) Ibid., p.16.

66) Ibid., p.17.

67) Ibid. Also see Piccioli's Report of Aug.1923, p.39.

68) Rodolpho Micacchi, Director of the Department of Schools at the Ministry of Colonies to the Secretary General,

Cirenaica until the De Bono and Badoglio Eras.(69)In the meantime,an interesting development took place at Bengasi which had its source both in the demands of the former Consultative Committes of Cirenaica for a "specialised" industrial training(70),and in policy elaborated by Micacchi in 1919 to the Ministry of Colonies,for the teaching to Libyans of local arts and crafts.(71)

Initially intended by the reforming governor,Giacomo De Martino to serve the needs of Moslems,the School of Arts and Crafts established in Bengasi by R.D.June 1919,No 1343 was well-equipped from government sources with modern machinery and properly trained teachers recruited from Italy.(72) As such it comprised professional courses of three years, which aimed to teach both industrial skills of the type particularly requested by the Consultative Committee(73);and also local arts and crafts such as were taught at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli.(74)In all other respects,however, the Bengasi institution was completely different from its Tripoli equivalent,and would in fact become the model for the reform of the latter,following Piccioli's transferring as superintendent to Tripolitania in 1924.(75)It also had attached to it,an Italo-Arab section,which was reformed into an Arab elementary school in 1922 (76) and boarding accomm-

(contin.)S.Contarini in 1923(as quoted by Piccioli in his report of Aug.1923),Ibid.,p.44.

69) See,Micacchi Report of 1919(L'insegnamento agrario e professionale),pp.166-168;Segre,C.,Fourth Shore,3.The De Bono and Badoglio Eras,pp.57-82;and MAI-AS,Fondo Vari,Cart.14/2,Fasc.B-11.:Istituzione di una scuola sperimentale per gioventu Fascista,1928.

70) See,supra,Chapt.Six,Section II.,pp.171-177.

71) See,supra,Chapt.Five,Section III.,pp.141-149;and Chapt.Seven,Section III,pp.219-222.

odation to provide Arab students from all parts of Cirenaica with free food and board while completing their professional studies at the school.(77)Not surprisingly,as De Berardinis noted in his report of 30 March,1921,the school was crowded with pupils and had proved a great success for the new policy of collaboration with the Arab population (78), though the professional courses of which only the first class had so far been established,consisted "almost entirely of Italians".(79) No doubt this situation would have changed had the reform been allowed to develop for the preparatory courses instituted in the elementary school would gradually have brought Libyan pupils up to the standard required to profit from attendance at the industrial section.Instead, it is doubtful whether any Libyans reached the industrial school and certainly after 1922 the tendency was for Italians to enter the industrial section and for Libyans to take up arts and crafts.This became the pattern for the remainder of Italian rule in Libya and was fully in accordance with the policy worked out by Micacchi himself in 1919.(80)

The process of changing the school from an institution primarily intended to serve the needs and interests of Libyans both in the field of traditional arts and crafts but also

72) See, supra, Chapt. Eight, Section III, p. .Also, Piccioli's Report of Aug.1923, pp.43-48.

73) Amongst some 20 separate proposals for the modernising of Cirenaica, the Consultative Committes had particularly requested the government to provide professional training in the field of agriculture and industrial skills in special schools of Arts and Crafts. See, MAI-AS, Cirenaica 1918-19, Pos.140/3, Fasc.22 bis Comitati Consultati: in materia d'istruzione pubblica, 6 Feb.1919, No.192.

74) Ibid. Also see, R.Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, p552.

in the acquisition of modern industrial skills, for which the school had been uniquely equipped, was engineered by Piccioli between 1922 and 1924. It was not a difficult aim to achieve for, unlike the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, De Martino's creation in Bengasi was not an autonomous institution but a creature of changing political circumstances, brought about by Italian legal procedure and financed entirely from Italian sources. (81) Even so, Piccioli approached the problem with great caution and refused to be drawn into open political debate on the subject of the school's future role, when challenged to do so by Safi ed-Din during a session of the Parliament of Cirenaica. (82) Instead, he preferred to bide his time and contented himself with drawing up a special report upon the school's future, which he addressed in the February of 1923 to the governor of the colony. (83) It was not, however, until 1925 that a special decree was enacted to bring the running of the Bengasi School of Arts and Crafts into line with the regime's new policy. (84) By this measure, Piccioli's proposals to the governor Cirenaica of August 1923, whereby a fourth year was added to the professional course entered the statute book, as did his proposal to transform the school into an autonomous institution with its own management and financing. (85) By this time the school had long

75) See, MAI-AS, Fondo Vari, Cart. 14/1, Fasc. B-1.: Piccioli to the Governor of Tripolitania, Tripoli, 20 Dec. 1924, p. 8; and Fondo Volpi, Cart. 13/1, Fasc. B-1: Piccioli's Report on the School of Arts and Crafts at Tripoli (27.6.1926), p. 89

76) See, Piccioli's Report of April 1922, p. 11.

77) Ibid.

78) See, supra, Chapt. Eight, Section III., p. .

79) MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1.: Report of Professor

ceased even to pretend that it aimed primarily to serve Libyan needs and had become in effect two institutions: an industrial section in which it would have been difficult to have found any Libyan students; and a professional and arts and crafts section, which the government encouraged Libyans to make use of in line with the new economic policies of Fascism.(86) The new decree merely licensed the existing situation by transforming the school into an autonomous institution (now known as the Industrial School of Bengasi), whereby, following the Gentile Reform of Italian education in 1924, the courses for Italians were modelled upon those of the new industrial schools in Italy, and the courses for Libyans were organised in accordance with special regulations drawn up by the Ministry of Colonies.(87)

(contin.) B. De Berardinis to the Governor of Cirenaica, Bengasi, 30 March, 1921, p.6.

- 80) See, Supra, Chapt. Five, Section III., pp.141-149; Chapt. Seven, Section III., pp.219-222; and also, R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, pp.552-555.
- 81) See, Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.18; and Piccioli's Report of August 1923, pp.43-48.
- 82) Safi ed-Din's remarks had been chiefly intended to draw attention to the lamentable state into which the School of Arts and Crafts had fallen in Tripoli. He had urged Piccioli to restore it to its former grandeur under the Turks. Piccioli had replied that the Italian nation had nothing to learn as far as education was concerned from the Turks. Italy, he concluded, "was an old civilisation with lofty traditions of learning, who had taught and was still teaching the world". Piccioli was subsequently to eat his own words when he learned the true state of the Tripoli school in 1924. Piccioli's Report on the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, 1926, p.94.
- 83) Piccioli's Report of Aug. 1923, p.43.
- 84) See, D.M. 15 Sept. 1925, the approval of the statute of the R. Scuola industriale di Bengasi, B.U. Cir., 10, 1187.
- 85) Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923 and February 1924, pp.48 and 16 respectively.

VI. Arab Secondary Education: the Idadia at Bengasi and Derna

"Of most particular importance in the new ordinance are the secondary schools for Moslem citizens: by these means, Arab youth can, on the one hand, be prepared for higher education and, on the other, be initiated into certain professions, such as primary school-teacher, merchant, public functionary and clerk, etc., etc." (88)

Born of political expediency and nourished by doubt, incapacity and frequent prejudice on the part of the Colonial Ministry and the new regime, it is surprising that the two idadia, founded at Bengasi and Derna in 1922, were able to survive on as far as 1928, when they were finally abolished. (89) It is certainly not the task of this section to analyse all the faults, difficulties and problems of these two ill-fated institutions. At least, it can be summarized, they managed in difficult political and other circumstances to provide a modicum of secondary education for Arabs. They also provided the only training for Moslem school-teachers until the long-awaited Medersa was eventually established in 1935, and in this respect alone the disappearance of the two schools in 1928 was a serious blow to Arab education. Here, however, the primary object is to simply indicate the extent to which the policy of the Liberal government was implemented in the final

86) R. Micacchi, L'Enseignement aux Indigenes, pp. 552-554; and F. Contini, "Storia delle istituzioni Scolastiche della Libia" in Libia (Tripoli, 1953), pp. 28 and 41.

87) Ibid. Also, see R.D. 31 gennaio 1924, No 472, Ordinamento Scolastico della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica, B.U.T., 13, 179; and D.G. 28 luglio 1926, No 2850, Ordinamento delle vecchia scuola industriale di Bengasi, B.U.Cir., 8, 400; and R.D. 28 giugno 1928, No 1698, B.U.T., 19, 1141.

88) MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1.: Progetto Dell'Ordinamento Scholastico Per Musulmani Della Cirenaica (Relaz. senza data, con traduz. in arabo), p. 5.

89) See, R.D. 21 giugno 1928, No 1698. Norme riflettenti l'istruzione primaria per i Musulmani della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica, B.U.T., 19, 1141.

year of the old regime.

Established initially in provisional accommodation at the Central Kuttab in Bengasi and in the Italian Technical School at Derna(90), the two schools were well received by the local population. The provisional accommodation allocated to the Bengasi Idadia was replaced by more permanent buildings in the Via Sidi Sciabbi by October 1922; and the Derna Idadia was also about to be moved into more suitable accommodation at the same time.(91) Piccioli in November expressed himself to be fully satisfied with the original enrolment of 6 pupils in Bengasi (a figure which had increased to 16 by November) and 33 at Derna.(92) In order to popularise the new schools still further, no admission fees were charged by the government, a situation which changed in later years.(93)

From their very initiation, the central problem with the idadia can be summed up as language, teaching personnel and politics. These problems ought not to be regarded as separate issues or disputes but must be seen as part of a single compound problem, namely colonialism itself. In the latter respect, the educational issue with regard to the idadia took the form of a triangular-type situation from which there was no rational egress for either Arabs or Italians, except possibly by recourse to further armed struggle, which in fact occurred from 1922 onwards, as the Libyans made a

90) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.14. The choice of the Italian Technical School as the place where the idadia was to be initially established at Derna seems strange in view of Contini's efforts during the previous school year. See, Chapt. Eight, Section III., p.256.

91) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.14.

92) Ibid. By August 1922, language and consequent learning difficulties had reduced attendance at Bengasi by a half and at Derna to the number of 23. See, Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923, p.41.

final bid for independence.

In order to facilitate the Italian position in Cirenaica regarding education the Fundamental Law of October 1919 had stated:

"For Moslems, in all the classes of the elementary and secondary schools, the teaching of religious matters, language, Islamic sciences, Arab literature and history shall be in the Arabic language. Other subjects can be taught in Italian". (94)

Thus, unlike Tripolitania where the Fundamental Law had stipulated that all elementary-type education must be conducted in the Arabic language, the government was free in Cirenaica to make considerable use of the services of Italian teachers in the schools. The fact, however, that the 1922 Ordinance had stipulated that instruction in the government Kuttabs should be exclusively in Arabic and Italian should remain optional in the new elementary schools ought in practice to have led to an emphasis upon the use of the Arabic language as the principal medium of instruction in these schools. This was no doubt the case in the Kuttabs and elementary schools, despite the continued use of Italian teachers in the latter. Unfortunately, the government had been able to find outside Libya only 3 Arabic-speaking teachers to work in the idadia at Bengasi and Derna (95) with the result that three quarters

93) Piccioli's Report of Nov. 1922, p. 15; and of Aug. 1923, p. 41.

94) A. Piccioli, La Conquista Morale: La Scuola in La Rinascita Della Tripolitania, Ed. A. Mondadori (Milano, 1926), p. 297.

95) Professors Said Sinnon from Bierut along with Salem El-Nefati and El-Trabelsi of Alexandria in Egypt. See, Piccioli Report of Nov. 1922, p. 13.

96) The eight Italian teachers (3 from Bengasi and 5 from Derna) taught the students at both idadia: mathematics, science, design, Italian language and physical education. The three Arab teachers taught the Arabic language, hist-

of the curriculum was taught by eight Italian teachers normally employed in the Italian secondary schools at Bengasi and Derna.(96)

Piccioli blamed the lack of Arab speaking teachers in the two idadia upon the difficulty of recruiting suitable Arab teachers in nearby countries;and it was possibly the failure to recruit Arab teachers to work in Libya that discredited the new secondary schools before the Libyans.The difficulty of recruiting teachers outside Libya for this work also doomed the idadia in the eyes of the Fascist regime,for like its Liberal predecessor it was deeply concerned at the possibility that the schools would become politically active.All the surrounding Arab countries were at this time deeply affected by Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism and it was believed that these movements which were fundamentally opposed to colonial rule in Libya would enter Libya by means of the schools.The chance of this happening could be greatly reduced if the need to recruit Arab teachers abroad was eliminated by abolishing the new secondary schools entirely.Secondary education for Arabs in Libya depended upon collaboration and it was not until 1935 that the country was judged ready for a further experiment at secondary education

(contin.)geography and Arabic calligraphy for fourteen hours of lessons per week.See,Piccioli Report of Nov.1922,p.13.

97) It is likely that the decision to phase-out the idadia was taken during 1923,but the need to implement the Gentile Reform for Italians,and also,the recency of the new decree for Libyans led to procrastination on the part of the superintendency.Piccioli was also opposed to the Idadia because of the danger of creating an intellectual class amongst the Libyans which would criticise Italian rule.The main danger,however, was the risk of recruiting anti-Italian teachers in other Arab lands who would introduce nationalism and pan-Islam into Libya.See,Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.41.

involving cultural autonomy. By that time, the ground had been well prepared in advance and the government had few reasons to fear that political subversion would result. (97)

In Piccioli's opinion, it was a "vain hope" for the government to expect to recruit Arab teachers to work in the idadia who were both highly cultured and politically uncommitted. During the previous school-year, the Italian consul-generals in Tunisia and Algeria had failed to find such teachers and in the end if had been necessary to recruit Arab professors from Egypt and Syria, "countries", he added, "in which the pan-Islamic movement was particularly active. (98) It had thus proved necessary to entrust Professor El-Nefati with virtually the entire curriculum in his particular subjects at the Derna idadia. The absence of a qualified Arab teachers for the Bengasi idadia had made it necessary to employ the best qualified Libyan teacher there, namely the veteran Mustafa Driza, "one of our oldest and most efficient teachers". (99)

The situation had been improved somewhat at the commencement of the school-year 1922-23 due to the recruitment of two more Arab teachers (Professors Sinnon from Bierut and El-Trabelsi from Alexandria). Piccioli expressed his satisfaction with the two Egyptian professors, El-Nefati and El-Trabelsi but confessed to some initial anxiety on political grounds. (100)

98) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.13.

99) Ibid. The difficulty in recruiting Arab teachers from neighbouring countries to work in the new idadia presented Piccioli with a problem when he addressed the Parliament of Cirenaica in April 1922 and he ommits all reference to the new schools. See, Piccioli Report of April 1922.

100) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.13.

His chief problem, it seems, was with Professor Sinnon of Bierut, whose contract, he had decided, would not be renewed at the end of the school-year. Sinnon, it appears, was the type of subversive who would later become quite common amongst both Arabs and Italians opposed to Fascism. On the surface he appeared to be a model of loyalty and had, added Piccioli, written many articles in newspapers and journals which praised the government's educational activity in the colony. Unfortunately, he gave himself away as a political "undesirable" by being excessively attached to the policy of collaboration through autonomy which, as Piccioli rightly sensed in the November of 1922, was fast on the way out. (101) The ultimate sin of the professor from Bierut, in Piccioli's eyes, was the former's close association with the Sennusi leader Safieddin, with whom Piccioli had crossed swords on more than one occasion in the sessions of the Parliament of Cirenaica. "There was no doubt about it, the man was highly suspicious", concluded the superintendent, "and should be repatriated as soon as it was convenient and not later than the end of the school-year in June 1923". (102) A far more ideal person, from Piccioli's point of view, was the Egyptian professor at Derna, El-Nifati whose "conciliatory attitude markedly differentiated him from Sinnou". "Professor Nifati", opined Piccioli, "by his general sympathy and understanding had won the approval of the metropolitan element". (103) *

101) Ibid., p.13

102) Ibid. Also, see supra, Note 82, p.286.

103) Ibid., p.14.

*) Although there is no direct evidence from the primary sources of Libyans attending courses at any of the three existing Italian secondary schools, five scholarships were provided in April 1922 to El-Azhar in Cairo and a further

VII. Condominium and the Question of Supervision and Control

"The Fundamental Law of Tripolitania also sanctions the principle of compulsory education for Moslem boys. Perhaps, I may be permitted to express some scepticism as to the possibility of enforcing compulsory instruction amongst the majority of the Libyan population..... Only in the greater centres is it likely to be possible, though it will remain a dead letter elsewhere".(104)

Given the obsession of the Colonial Ministry (and its acolytes in the Department of Schools) with the aims of pacific penetration, moral conquest, political control and guarding against possible subversion in the schools for Libyans, through the employment of Arab teachers from lands such as Egypt and Syria where Arab nationalism and the pan-Islamic movement had a stronghold, the idea of handing over control of the schools to Libyans (or even sharing such control) stood little chance of effective implementation, regardless of the official concession of autonomy in 1919. Even so, it was necessary to go through the motions of condominium even if the idea of condominium itself meant very little in terms of reality itself. Thus at the educational level, between 1919 and 1923 at the latest, a number of projects designed to effect collaboration were put into practice, before fizzling out like damp squibs in the changed, or not so changed, political atmosphere following the Fascist coup of October 1922

Before, however, turning to examine this particular aspect of colonial rule, it is necessary to indicate the extent to which decentralisation in any form was contrary to the under-

(contin.) five to the Istituto Tecnico at Derna. The amounts of Lira concerned added up to 66.000 and more such grants were planned for the next school-year. During 1923 three Moslem were sent to secondary schools in Italy, but at the end of the year all scholarships to Libyans were discontinued at the order of the governor. See, Piccioli Report of April 1922, p.12; and the Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923, p.49.

lying trends. By calling in July 1919, albeit "in parenthesis", for administrative reforms, whereby the colonial schools would come under the direction of a single department at the Ministry of Colonies (that of Civil Affairs), Micacchi was in one respect at least anticipating the greater bureaucratisation that would follow from the unification of the two colonies (Tripolitania and Cirenaica) under Pietro Badoglio's governorship in 1929. (105) The movement towards ever more central control would become a dominant tendency under Fascism as the imperial theme gained momentum and came ever closer towards final fulfilment. By 1936, Micacchi would find himself in the position of educational supremo for the whole of Mussolini's empire. (106)

Despite, however, the domination of bureaucrats both under Liberalism as under Fascism, the organisation and administration of the educational service would require, perhaps more than any other aspect of colonial administration, the co-operation of the Libyan population. In the circumstances of condominium itself, between 1919 and 1922, the Parliament of Cirenaica was primarily intended to become the principal instrument of collaboration. Educationally its role in this respect was mainly confined to approving the work of Italian officials, as in the case of the educational commission of Cirenaica in 1921 (107), and there is no evidence of it putting

104) Micacchi Report of July 1919, p.164.

105) At this time the Moslem schools in Cirenaica were not controlled from Tripoli, but came under either the Department of Civil Affairs in Bengasi or under the authority of individual military residents. More generally, only the government elementary schools in Tripolitania came under the control of the superintendent, the commercial and professional schools, as in Italy, falling under the authority of different ministries, such as

forward proposals of its own as far as education was concerned at least. Once the parliament had sanctioned R.D. 5 February 1922 No 368, individual and local participation would be required, before condominium could be described as working effectively. The chief areas in which individual and local participation was required were those included under the separate heads of the Vigilanze Didattica e Disciplinare Delle Scuole, the Difesa Sanitaria Delle Scuole, the Patronato Scolastico and in the Consiglio Dell'Istruzione. Although it is not possible to examine in detail the activities of all these bodies, which mainly came into existence only in the October of 1922 and then were "transformed" or "developed" under Fascist rule, it is necessary at this point to examine their activities in relation to the fulfilment of the Fundamental Law of 1919.

Although the Bertolini legislation of 1914 had required the participation of cadi, mufti and notables to act in the capacity of an educational board, in respect of the supervision and control of Kuttabs allocated to receive a government grant, it is unlikely that this system was ever in effect put into operation in Libya. (108) Arab collaboration, however, was central to the whole concept of autonomy put forward in the Fundamental Law of 1919, and it was essential that it

(contin.) those of Public Instruction, Industry, Commerce and Work and Agriculture. See, Ibid., p. 168.

106) See, R.D.L. 24 Luglio 1936, No 1737. Ordinamento Scolastico della Libia, B.U.L., 30, 1060.

107) See, supra, Chpt. Six, Section III., pp. 177-182.

108) See, supra, Chpt. Three, Section II., pp. 69-74.

should be seen to operate with the full cognisance and support of the cadi, mufti, notables and tribal sheikhs, wherever schools were established in Cirenaica. Areas of particular importance in the field of educational collaboration were those of school attendance, which had been made compulsory by the Fundamental Law for all Moslem boys at the elementary level, and in the general running of the reformed Kuttabs and in the distribution of food and clothing and in the maintenance of hygienic vigilance. Collaboration, however, did not in Italian eyes involve executive responsibilities or political control which would, as before, remain firmly in the hands of Italian representatives and officials. In the Italian interpretation of the term, collaboration meant, making the system work, not handing over its ultimate direction and control to Libyans.

Micacchi expressed his disquiet with the idea of compulsory instruction for Moslem boys in Libya almost as soon as the idea was promulgated in the form of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania in June 1919. (109) The demographic conditions of Libya, he believed, would render such a disposition a dead letter in all except the greater urban centres. As such the implementation of the disposition should be left to its originators, namely the Libyans themselves. (110) It remained, however, the responsibility of the government to suggest a method whereby this might be done, and Micacchi suggested to

109) See, Miccachi's Report to the Governor of Tripolitania, July 1919, p.164.

110) Ibid.

111) Ibid.

the authorities that the system adopted by the French in Algeria offered the best hope of implementing compulsory education in Libya.(111)By such a system ,the problem of ensuring that pupils attended school regularly would be entrusted to a special scholastic commission composed of six members,three of whom would be nominated by the government and three by the native community.The commission would meet under the chairmanship of the mayor or administrative director and the teacher running the school would act as secretary.The commission should be responsible for compiling a list of boys of school age and therefore eligible to attend school.An activity of such importance,Micacchi believed,ought to be entrusted to the School Charity Board(Patronato Scholastico), and bodies of this nature should be set up in every scholastic centre.At present these bodies only operated to relieve the needs of poor pupils;but they could also be used for creating an environment favourable for the development of the school, especially in areas where government schools were virtually unknown.(112)

Institutions,such as Charity Boards for Education,did not exist in Cirenaica in 1919 because whatever funds were available for charitable purposes were channelled into other organisations such as Charities organised by the Church.(113) Piccioli,however,in 1922 recognised the need to raise the number of Moslems attending school from the pitiable figure of 1,710 pupils,which as he admitted to the Parliament of Cirenaica in

112) Ibid.,p.166.

113) Ibid.,p.135.

114) Piccioli Report of April 1922,p.16.

April 1922 was still "very small in comparison with the total number of the population and to the number of schools". (114) In pursuit therefore of Micacchi's earlier proposals regarding School Charity Boards, who would be responsible for, amongst other matters, school enrolments and attendance, Piccioli announced to the Parliament of Cirenaica in April 1922 the Government's intention of establishing such boards throughout Cirenaica. (115) In each locality such boards would be administered by a Council consisting of 11 members of whom 5 would be Moslems, 5 Italians and 1 Jewish. By April 6 School Charity Boards had already been set up at places such as Bengasi, Derna, Merg, Tobruk and Marsasusa. Depending upon the number of Schools in the area, the government had assigned to the boards the sum of L.37.000 for the current year, which was allocated as follows:

The School Board at Bengasi.....	L.	10.000
" " " " Merg.....	"	4.000
" " " " Cirene.....	"	6.000
" " " " Derna	{	(a) for school meals " 6.000
	{	(b) for school assistance
" " " " Tobruk	{	" 2.000
" " " " Marsasusa.....	"	3.000

Individual Boards devised their own method of providing school meals, clothing, school materials and other such necessities in addition to the monies made available for such purposes by the government. (116)

115) Ibid., p.16.

116) Ibid., p.17.

The new ordinance also required that an inspector should be appointed for the superintending of the new Arab schools and also the free Kuttabs which were not in receipt of a government subsidy.(117)This "delicate task" was entrusted by the government to the Mufti of Bengasi, Saied Hussein Biḥ Iusef Budigiagia, who was recommended to the Regent, Commander Pintor, by the leading notables of the city. The appointment of such a man as inspector of schools would, they suggested, confer moral credibility upon the new schools, especially in the interior of the country.(118)Accordingly, the Mufti commenced his position as inspector of schools in the middle of December 1921 with a special address to the people of Bengasi, urging them to support the new schools as much as possible.(119)No doubt, the government's failure to implement the new decree adequately by recruiting Arab teachers was one of the reasons why only five pupils had enrolled by June 1922 at the Bengasi Idadia.(120) This may also have been a contributing factor in the Mufti's obvious decision during 1922 not to co-operate in implementing the new decree, except in a token fashion.(121)By October, Piccioli was beginning to regret the initial appointment of Budigiagia as inspector of Arab schools; but could not proceed to dismiss him because of the Mufti's important "moral and social position "in Cirenaica.(122).As a way out of his

117) See, R.D. 5 February 1922, No 368, B.U.C., 287.

118) Piccioli Report of November 1922, p.19.

119) Ibid.

120) Piccioli Report of Aug. 1923, p.40.

121) Piccioli Report of Nov. 1922, p.19.

122) Ibid.

predicament, Piccioli suggested to the regent that Mufti Budigiagia's should be informed that, although he could remain as inspector of Arab schools, his executive functions would be carried out by a secretary whom the government was about to appoint. Piccioli suggested for this role either the trusted subaltern, Mustafa Driza, then working in the new idadia at Bengasi, or the Egyptian professor, Salem El-Nefati, who had been appointed to teach at the idadia at Bengasi. (123)

A final organ of collaboration intended to "worthily crown the scholastic edifice of Cirenaica" also came into existence during 1922; and was known as the Consiglio Del Istruzione or Council of Education, a title it would continue to bear during the remainder of Italian rule in Libya. (124) Intended to perform a purely consultative function (125), it was composed of 6 Italians (metropolitani), 5 Arabs and one Jew. (126). As such it did not originate in the Statutes of Libya of 1919, but was almost certainly the brain child of Rodolfo Micacchi, who by submitting it in a special ministerial brief to the Governor of Cirenaica in November 1921, ensured that such a proposal became part and parcel of the new educational ordinance, when it was finally promulgated in February 1922. (127) The aim of such an institution, advised Micacchi

123) Ibid., pp. 19-20.

124) Piccioli's Report of April, 1922, p. 14. See, D.G. 9 Nov. 1922, No 940, B.U.T., 13179.

125) Originally intended only to advise upon the choice of teaching materials to be used in the Libyan schools, Piccioli was initially concerned lest it should assume a political role and seek to obstruct or criticise the government. This risk, he later believed, was worth taking as it was hoped the Council would do much in a consultative role to improve the efficiency of the schools, besides increasing the participation of Arabs in the affairs of the country. See, Decreto del 25 Dicembre 1921, No 19742;

in his brief of 11 November 1920(No 3070),"would be to secure a greater difusion of education amongst the Libyan citizens,in respect of which,it was oportune to gain the support of the most authoritative and cultured amongst the notables.Such persons ought to be called upon to collaborate in the solving of educational problems affecting the indigenous population through participation in a special Council of Education.This should be modelled upon that of a similar body set up by the French in the Regency of Tunisia....."(128

Like the Superintendency itself,which was primarily"only a technical and consultative organisation",within the Department of Civil and Political Affairs at Bengasi,(129)the Council was designed to both complement its activities ,provide the notables with a suitable outlet to their pride and ambitions, and also ensure that the running of the Libyan schools met with Moslem approval.As such it was therefore a not unimportant institution and was to meet regularly,twice a year,under the chairmanship of the Superintendent.(130)Basically intended by Micacchi in 1921 to advise over the choice of school materials for the Libyan population,an issue which had caused much controversy in the past,its functions were widened

(contin.) and the Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.65.

126) Ibid.,p.64.

127) See,Ibid;and,also,R.D.5 February 1922,No 368,B.U.C., 287.

128) Riccioli Report of November 1922,p.64.

129) Ibid.,p.85

130) Ibid.,p.64.

131) Ibid.,p.65.

by the Ministry of Colonies on the eve of the Fascist coup of October 1922 to include:

1.-assisting the Scholastic Superintendent to fulfill laws and regulations;

2.-advising the Scholastic Superintendent upon questions determined by the government in relation to the progressive development of all the scholastic and educational institutions in the colony;

3.-prearranging with the Scholastic Superintendent, the implementation of Art.10 of the Fundamental Law, whereby instruction is compulsory for Moslem boys; as well as implementing the current legislation relating to the compulsory instruction of the metropolitan population. For these purposes, the Council is empowered to set up a committee of five members under the chairmanship of the Scholastic Superintendent, to study ways whereby the law affecting compulsory instruction may be enforced;

4.-advising upon the hiring of Libyan personnel for the schools for Moslem citizens;

5.-advising upon future modifications of the existing legislation as it affects school-programmes, text-books used in the schools and upon the institution of new infant and elementary schools or optional courses that the government might seek to set up in the future.(131)

Although the establishment of the Council of Education had been authorised by D.G. 12 February 1922, it had still not met by the end of the year. The reasons for this delay, Piccioli explained to the new governor, Eduardo Baccari, lay in the difficulty in securing the attendance of all the members none of whom had been in Bengasi during the first half of the

year.(132)He,himséif,had also been extremely heavily occupied during the year establishing the new schools,conducting a series of long inspections(133) and in a special mission to Tripolitania,at the behest of the new governor Volpi,a task which had been entrusted to him by no less a personage than the Minister of Colonies,Giovanni Amendola.(134)It was, however,important that the Council of Education should meet as soon as possible and Piccioli urged the governor to fix a date for its convening.(135)

132) Ibid.,p.66.

133) There is no doubt that Piccioli and his aid,Fulvio Contini had been under very great pressure during 1922.The need to implement and consolidate the decree of February 1922 had required an immense amount of work in setting up schools and dealing with numerous other problems of a practical and theoretical nature.The statutory requirement that three inspections per year of the schools be carried out was perhaps and excessive burden given the lack of regular transport facilities and Piccioli requested the Ministry to reduce it to one for the year ahead.Education still seemed to come last in the government's priorities,and,whereas other officials at the Department of Civil and Political Affairs had received extra clerical and manual personnel during the previous year to help deal with the increase in government activity,the Superintendency had not.Thus the burden of endless clerical work,as well as dealing the receipt of scholastic materials from Italy and stocking them in the warehouse,appear to have fallen upon the shoulders of the two men.Well might Piccioli complain that both he and Contini had"reached the end of their normal powers of physical resistance due to the abuse of continual effort".See,Ibid.,pp.66 and 86.

134) Ibid.,p.66.

135) The non-executive character of the new Council of Education is emphasised in the following list of possible issues,submitted by Piccioli to the Governor,as a suitable agenda for its first meeting.These include:the norms to be adopted for implementing Art.10 of the Fundamental Law,as it appertained to compulsory instruction;changes in the new scholastic calender;methods of employing Libyans as teachers;changes in the programme of the Technical Commercial School at Derna;along with other like matters. See,Ibid.,p.67.

"The political and socio-economic premise of the fascist regime was in part established and in part realised between the end of '25 and the end of '27. In hardly more than two years, Italy radically changed its political face; the final vestiges of the old Liberal State were almost completely swept away...." (*)

The change over from the old regime to the new regime in Libya had no immediate legal effect upon the education of Moslems which still continued, officially at least, to be organised in terms of the Statutes of Libya. The transition to Fascism proceeded more rapidly in Tripolitania to which Piccioli was appointed as Scholastic Superintendent in October 1924. Not only was Tripolitania pacified more rapidly than Cirenaica but also, as no attempt had been made to implement the Fundamental Law of 1919, the Italo-Arab schools had continued in operation, or simply remained to be re-opened as different areas once again came under Italian occupation. During this period, the Superintendency under Piccioli was mainly concerned with the education of "metropolitan citizens," as Italians were termed, both to consolidate colonial rule, by encouraging Italians to settle in Libya (a relatively new policy), and also in response to the Gentile Reform of Education in Italy, whereby major changes were required to bring the secondary sector especially in line with changes in Italy. These years saw the construction of many new schools, especially in Tripolitania, where developments had lacked behind Cirenaica both in the Arab and Italian sectors. New school-complexes

*) Renzo De Felice, Capitolo quarto, La prima strutturazione dello Stato fascista, Mussolini il fascista, L'Organizzazione dello Stato fascista 1925-1929 (Torino, 1968), p. 297

grew up rapidly in both Bengasi and Tripoli as the entire system of Italian secondary education evolved by Gentile was transported to Libya. By the end of 1925 both colonies possessed the full courses of the Ginnasio-Liceo, the Istituto-Tecnico, the new Complementary School courses, devised by Gentile, and by 1927 a Scuola d'Avviamento e Professionale for training artisans and technicians. Needless to say, these lavishly equipped and solidly apportioned new schools had little or no impact upon the Libyan population, for whom they were not intended, and were vigorously criticised by Socialists and other anti-Fascists as socially divisive, until such criticism was finally silenced by the regime.

None of these changes either in the secondary or in the elementary sector of Italian education had much if any effect upon the education of Libyans, very few of whom attended the Italian schools, whether religious or lay. By 1928, however, the war against the Libyan Independence Movement was in the military sense (if not in the political sense) over, and it only remained to crush the final remnants of resistance to Italian rule in Cirenaica. Also, by this time, the regime had consolidated its position in Italy. The time was clearly ripe for the Duce to make the necessary overtures of friendship in Africa and the Moslem world generally if he was to win support for his developing strategy of colonial aggrandisement in Africa. It is from 1927 onwards that most modern historians believe Mussolini moved from a reflective to a dynamic stance in colonial politics. Certainly by 1932 he was beginning to seriously prepare for the Ethiopian campaign.

The new mood of the regime found expression in Libya in the form of a series of administrative, organisational

and political measures, intended to placate Moslem opposition to Italian colonialism, and win over Libyans generally to the side of Fascism, in what was depicted by Fascist apologists, as a new revolutionary struggle against the old colonial powers for the future development of Africa. Educationally, accommodation was to be the theme of the regime's strategy for which purpose Micacchi's "third theory" was to provide both the essential aims and didactic philosophy. This remained so for the remainder of Italian rule in Libya, and was expressed in the form of a new educational ordinance (R.D. 21 June, 1928, No 1698) for Tripolitania and Cirenaica. Articles 1. and 2 of the new decree divided elementary education into three general categories: boys' elementary schools; girls' schools of education and work; and evening schools for pupils unable to attend during the day. Such schools were to comprise a three-year lower course, to be universal throughout the country and a two-year course, which would be set up only in particular places in accordance with local needs. Article 3 determined the curriculum, which was in all respects identical to that devised originally for the Italo-Arab schools, and expressed in Martini's legislation of 1915. In both the lower and higher elementary schools, soon to revert to their earlier nomenclature as Italo-Arab schools, Arabic and Italian was more or less evenly balanced with three hours of both per day, in the lower course, and four of Italian and two of Arabic per day in the higher course. As with the Bertolini and Martini legislation of 1914 and 1915, the organisation, administration and curriculum of the revived Italo-Arab schools was closely modelled upon that of the Italian elementary system itself, despite Micacchi having voiced his criticism of such a tendency in 191

Teachers of Italian nationality for the Libyan schools were to be recruited in the same way as they were recruited for the Italian schools, the exact method being laid down in Art.29 of R.D.31 January 1924, No 472. Arab teachers for the Libyan schools were, on the other hand, to be chosen from Libyans already in possession of either valid teaching qualifications; or following an examination set by a special commission of the Ministry of Colonies. Art.17 of the decree of 1928 revived the Bertolini provisions affecting Kuttabs, but excluded Kuttabs themselves from the government system, by not offering these schools any kind of subsidy, should they conform with Italian requirements. Art.18 suppressed the idadia completely and ordered that the two schools in question at Bengasi and Derna should close their doors as soon as those pupils who had been admitted to the schools in the school-year 1926-7 had taken their final exams. Thus the decree of 1928 which was officially listed, following the union of the two colonies in December of the same year, only as Regio Decreto 21 giugno 1928, No 1698: Norme riflettenti l'istruzione primaria per i musulmani della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica (1), both determined the pattern of elementary schooling for Moslems in the future, and also abrogated the educational provisions of the earlier Fundamental Laws.

By confining the new decree to purely elementary education, the regime planned to revive the Bertolini-Martini prop-

1) See, Gazzetta Ufficiale del 3 agosto 1928, n.180; or B.U.T., 19,1141.

osals for establishing in Tripoli a School of Islamic Culture. For such a purpose, the Ministry of Colonies prepared the scheme of a special law defining the nature and aims of the proposed institution for promulgation at the same time as R.D. June 1928 N.198, which announced the closure of the idadia at Bengasi and Derna. The proposed decree was not, however, promulgated as political circumstances in Libya were still not considered to be sufficiently secure to permit the establishing of an institution that would have depended for its administration and organisation upon teachers recruited from neighbouring Arab lands. Instead, the old system of sending specially selected cadres of students at the government's own expense to El-Azhar was readopted. This method was both cheap and safe, since not only had the earlier agitation at El-Azhar been brought under control by the British, but special facilities had been provided by the Italian Consul General in Cairo, whereby Libyan students would largely live and study in a special ruak under the watchful eye of an Italo-ophile sheikh. (12) This method, which continued to function until the actual establishment of the Medersa in 1935, was, furthermore, much less financially burdensome than the estimated outlay of L.8000.000 required to set up the Medersa, of which only L.4.000.000 was then available from the balances of the Auqaf funds. By 1934, however, the needs of the Duce's Islamic politique and an embarrassing anti-Italian demonstration by the Libyan students studying at El-Azhar caused Mussolini to

2) MAI-AS, Libia, Pos.150/31 (1913-1935), Fasc.146: Scuola Superiore Islamica, 12 Marzo 1935, p.3.

instruct the governor of Libia, Italo Balbo, to press ahead with opening the much delayed institution. Modelled upon the scheme drawn up by Professor Nallino in 1928, the decree establishing the Medersa was finally promulgated as R.D. 13 May 1935, No 1365. (3)

The final element in the Fascist plan for the education of Moslems in Libya lay in the need to bring to fruition the ideas upon professional and agricultural education worked out by Micacchi in 1919 and as yet hardly applied in the schools. Derived from policies evolved by the French for Algeria, the essential reasoning behind Micacchi's scheme was to prepare Arabs and Italians for different goals in the economic and agricultural sector by providing them with different and separate educational facilities. Under Piccioli's superintendency in Cirenaica, this system had already been given a trial run. In the form of D.G. 28 of July 1926, N. 2850(4), whereby the former School of Arts and Crafts at Bengasi became an industrial school on the Italian model with a special orientation to suit colonial circumstances, official sanction was given to Micacchi's system. (5) The attempt, however, by Piccioli, following a thorough investigation of the School of Arts and Crafts at Tripoli, to change it more or less into an industrial school, such as had already been set up in Bengasi was doomed to failure.

3) Intended for the education and training of *cadi*, *mufti*, elementary school-teachers and minor officials in the government employ, the School of Higher Islamic Culture, in the year 1939-40, had enrolled 147 students. See, MAI-AS, Comitato per la Documentazione delle Attivita Italiana in Africa, Fondo Felsano, Scaffale 103, Pacco 6: Pubblica Istruzione, Libya (no page reference provided).

4) See, B.U.C., 8, 400.

5) See, supra Chapt. Nine, Section V., pp. 2 - 2 .

Equipped by the Turks with its own revenues and autonomous status, which the regime had no wish to otherwise divert or abrogate, Piccioli's original plan of reform, which would have organised the school to cater for both Arab and Italian needs, was commuted into D.G. 10 May, 1929, No 259. (6) By this decree Italians were allowed to make use of the facilities at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli; but the financial arrangements were organised on different lines, so as to avoid giving the impression to Libyans that the patrimony of the school was being used to finance the training of Italians. In fact, however, Italians made extensive use of its workshops and other technical facilities and special access was provided for such a purpose to the recently created Scuola d'Aviamento Professionale, which was constructed on land immediately adjacent to the School of Arts and Crafts and originally owned by it. Despite such adjustments to suit the autonomous status of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli the programme of studies and aims of the school were little different from those of the Libyan section of the Industrial School at Bengasi. Both such institutions basically aimed to provide an arts and crafts type training or an artisans course. Training for more advanced type skills was primarily intended for Italians and although Balbo tried to introduce an element of flexibility into the system by providing special apprenticeship type courses the overall effect was minimal. (7)

6) See, B.U.T., 1057.

7) See, D.M. 1 Dec. 1937, Approvazione dello Statuto della Scuola Musulmana di mestieri e arti indigene di Tripoli, B.U.L. 1938, 5, 187; and Guglielmo Quadrotta, Sviluppo E Realizzazioni Dell'Artigianato in Libia (Roma, 1938-XVI), pp. 2-28.

The theme of "separate but equal development" which Fascism did not invent but borrowed from the French in North Africa, where it meant something different, (8) was also apparent in the new provisions for agricultural education to which Piccioli was instructed to give his attention in 1925, as a means of increasing Italian settlement in Libya. By the subsequent decree of 16 January 1926 No 41(9) there was established at the Experimental Institute, which had been set up in the first days of Italian colonial rule at Sidi Mesri on the outskirts of Tripoli, a school of practical agriculture. (10) Ten rural schools were also to have been set up, but in 1925 De Bono believed that the need for these was of lesser urgency than the establishment of a central school of practical agriculture, for which he allocated L.450.000 from the colonial budget. Modelled upon the Italian schools of agriculture (with necessary modifications to fit in with the climatic and soil requirements of Libya) it provided both theoretical and practical instruction on a four-year basis. There is no doubt that the principal aim of the school was to train Italians as intelligent and efficient farmers, although provision was made for the admitting of Libyans to the practical course, as soon as "political circumstances" were judged right. Gradually, however, the agricultural training of Libyans was in part provided for in the special rural schools, which were set up after

8) See, A. Scham, Chapt. 4, Franco-Muslim Education in Lyautey in Morocco (New York, 1970), pp. 144-161.

9) See, D.G. 16 gennaio 1926, No 41, che istituisce presso l'Istituto sperimentale agrario di Sidi Mesri una scuola pratica d'agricoltura, B.U.T., 5, 135.

10) See, MAI-AS, Fondo Ufficio Studi del Soppresso Ministero

1932 in certain areas, or in special courses of a rudimentary nature attached to certain Italo-Arab schools.

Under the dynamic governorship of Italo Balbo (1.1.1934-28.6.1940) the theme of "equal but separate development" was greatly accelerated; and it is likely that Balbo sought to model some of his policies in this respect upon those developed by Lyautey of whom he was an avid admirer. (11) Even so, the basic policies worked out by Micacchi in 1919 and expressed in the educational ordinance for Moslems of 1928 remained in essence unchanged, despite the revising of the 1928 decree in 1936 to bring it in line with a new administrative strategy for the Italian empire as a whole. (12) Thus, although Balbo may have improved the quality and quantity of much educational provision for Libyans, he failed to alter its philosophy and essential aims. He was also responsible for establishing on Libyan soil tens of thousands of Italian peasant farmers at the considerable expense of the Libyans themselves. "Equal but separate development", in the final analysis, was far from equal however separate; and could only have eventually resulted in a colonial war on the scale of Angola had Mussolini's empire in Libya survived intact the Second World War.

Any final appraisal of Italian educational provision for

(Contin.) dell Africa Italiana, Cart. 14/2, Fasc. B 11- Istituzione di una scuola sperimentale per gioventu fascista (19-28).

- 11) See, Claudio Segre, Fourth Shore, The Italian Colonization of Libya (Chicago, 1974), p. 87.
- 12) See, R.D.L. 24 luglio 1936, n. 1737. Ordinamento scolastico della Libia, B.U.L., 30, 1060; and Legge 23 maggio 1940, n. 719. Modifica all'ordinamento scolastico della Libia approvato con R.D. 24 luglio 1936, n. 1737, B.U.L., 39, 1476.

Moslems in Libya must of necessity depend upon the making available to the historian of the archival resources of the ex-Ministry of Italian Africa and also the colonial depositories of primary sources in Libya and elsewhere in the world. At the level of elementary education or general literacy it is likely that the Italian contribution to Libyan development will be judged less harshly than it has been in the past. Conservative estimates of the number of elementary schools functioning in 1939, when the Italo-Arab schools were closed down because of the war and never reopened, indicate that around 115 such schools were in operation by this time. (13) Perhaps as many as 9,679 pupils attended the elementary schools in the final year of their existence, though official estimates give a much higher figure. (14) At the level of professional and agricultural education, the record is less good and there is no doubt that Libyan development in these areas was sacrificed by the Duce to appease the land hunger of the South and unemployed in Italy's cities. Much more controversial and difficult to judge is the Italian contribution to Libyan development at the level of secondary education. Following thirty years of Italian rule Libya had no more doctors, engineers, administrators or the like than she possessed in 1911 after more than three hundred years of Turkish rule. No doubt political, linguistic, cultural, economic and even religious arguments can be deduced to indicate why this was the case. They will never, however, be able to explain away such facts, which will always remain an incontrovertible indictment, against the Italian occupation of Libya.

13) MAI-AS, Fondo Vari, Cart. 14/1, Fasc. B-1; Schools and Scholastic population of Libya 1939-40 (unsigned or paginated).

14) See, Infra, Statistics (D), p.

CONCLUSION

"The period 1911-1921 was in essence both uncertain and transitory for Tripolitania. Neither the Arabs nor the government were able to find a satisfactory political solution.....the return to a policy of force, however, followed from the revolution of the Italian right".(*)

Such was the ultimate fate of Italian educational policy in Libya. The search for diplomatic compensation and national prestige in Africa had led to the occupation of Libya in 1911. It followed from such a premise that Italianization and the claim to be fulfilling some kind of "civilising mission" would ensue at the educational level. Arab rejection of both and Italy's inability to pursue either very satisfactorily because of administrative unpreparedness and military weakness prevented Libya from becoming (for educational purposes, at least) an Italian version of French North or West Africa. Arab desire for independence in 1919, against a background of political and economic weakness in Italy; the virtual abandonment by the moderate imperialists at the Versailles Conference of Italy's African ambitions in favour of ambitions closer to home; and the general climate of opinion after the ending of the Great War, which favoured indigenous-type policies, all contributed towards the policies expressed in the Statutes of Libya.

As seen by Italian historians of the Fascist era and subsequently, the policy of the Statutes of Libya is depicted as purely transitory. This should not blind us today from recognising, however, that had the political centre not collapsed so dramatically in Italy during 1922, the concession of the

*) Giorgio Rochat, Il Colonialismo Italiano (Torino, 1973), p.98

Statutes might have made a more durable impression upon the educational issue as it affected Moslems. Certainly the years 1921-1923 reveal a most remarkable attempt on the part of the government to fulfil its own part of the Treaty of Er-Ragima. On the Arab side too, there was a certain degree of support for the Treaty, especially in Cirenaica, though Arab attitudes in the long-term were dictated by the pattern of developments both in Italy and in Tripolitania. Whether the policy of "equal but separate development" could have developed and prospered would, in the normal course of events, have depended upon the maintenance of a delicate balance between basically opposed forces. This, however, was not to be, though it must be argued that, despite the second Italo-Senusi War, Italy still had the legal and moral obligation to continue the policies of the Statutes in one form or another. This she failed to do, a fact which is part of the tragedy of history.

It is also extremely doubtful whether the period 1919-1922 was as transitory as Fascist and post-war historians have interpreted it as being. The Fascist writers of Libya's colonial history regarded the conceding of the Statutes of Libya as a national humiliation. According to such a view, the second Italo-Senusi war was fully justified in so far as it restored national pride and overturned the humiliating statutes of Libya. A closer examination of the facts shows, however, that the period of the protectorate was one of gradual consolidation as far as Italian rule was concerned in Libya. Educationally, the attempts at extending and improving the government's provision for Moslems was part of a policy of colonial consolidation. Great efforts were also made from 1921 onwards at

improving the schools for Italians as well. Micacchi himself recognised during his inspection of 1919 that Italians could only be successfully encouraged to remain in Libya if the schools there were as good as the ones in Italy. Indeed the years 1921-3 should be rightfully compared with the years 1911-13 as far as Italian effort at consolidating colonial rule are concerned. It is also more likely that the spectacle of Italian rule consolidating itself rather than that of Italians leaving Libya in increasing droves that determined the Libyan nationalists to make a final armed bid for independence from colonial rule. In Cirenaica, on the other hand, the continual decline of Senusi power during the 19th and early years of the 20th centuries no doubt led the Senusi leader to adopt a more resigned and cautious approach to Italian rule. The determination of the nationalist party in Tripolitania and the emergence of hardline politicians in Italy made Idris's position no longer tenable after 1922 and caused him to flee the country for the remainder of the colonial period.

If the period 1919-1922 was primarily concerned with the consolidating of Italian rule in Libya, there was little equanimity amongst Italians as to how this was to be most satisfactorily achieved. The nationalists and Africanisti favoured "close-ended" aims and methods involving notions derived from European colonialism of an earlier period. The moderate imperialists, centre party politicians and socialists, on the other hand, were less united and favoured a more "open-ended" approach to colonial problems. The Fundamental Laws derived their chief support from the latter as opposed to the former political alliances in Italy. The rival Micacchi

and Nallino approaches towards the education of Moslems reflected the intellectual and political divisions of Italian opinion upon the Libyan question. Libyans themselves were no less divided in their common attitudes towards the Fundamental Law and the educational policy expressed by it. Thus, although it would be difficult to find much evidence to the effect that the Italian nationalists and Africanisti had a body of direct support amongst the Libyan population, the Consultative Committees seemed to have been broadly in favour of the Colosimo programme of 1918 as a means of developing the country. There was also plenty of indigenous support in Cirenaica for the Er-Ragima programme of educational reform subsequently developed into a broad compromise formula embodying elements of both the Micacchi and Nallino approaches. In Tripolitania, however, the Libyan nationalists saw the Fundamental Law as a means of consolidating colonial rule and were unprepared to go along with it until independence had been agreed in principle and a date set for the evacuation of Italian troops from the country. Thus educationally, the pre-1919 situation prevailed, and Micacchi was provided with a carte blanche to consolidate Italian rule in accordance with his own tastes and inclinations.

In the final analysis, the uncertain and often hostile attitude of the Ministry of Colonies towards the Fundamental Laws played an important part in ensuring their failure. The political implication of Articles 10, 11 & 12 in Tripolitania was an important reason why the new educational policy was never put into effect. In Cirenaica, the same applied though to a lesser extent. Not all the educational work carried out

Piccioli in Cirenaica during 1922 especially should be seen as fulfilling the Fundamental Laws. Both Piccioli and his chief were opposed in principle to the Fundamental laws; and not only contributed directly to the formulation of colonial policies in education that found acceptance during the Fascist era; but also through their administrative efforts and reform of the cadre of teachers made possible the implementation of such policies. As Rochat has indicated, the triumph of the right issued in the second Italo-Senusi War. By the same token, the triumph of the right also ensured that the policies evolved by Micacchi in 1919 would embody the needs of the new colonialism. From this point onwards the clock could never be put back to 1919; neither could it be put forward to Libyan independence. Both aspirations disappeared in 1922 for much the same reasons; if they ever reappeared it would be for different reasons, impossible to foresee in 1922.

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
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
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MAP I.: ITALY'S COLONIAL EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE LIBERAL ERA (The Times, January 6, 1920)




MAP II.: COLOSIMO'S MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PROGRAMMES OF 1916
(R.Albrecht-Carrie,"Italian Foreign Policy 1914-1922",Journal of Modern History,p.137)



MAP III.: COMPENSATIONS SUGGESTED BY THE ALLIES IN 1920
(The Times, January 7, 1920)



MAP IV.:LIBYAN FRONTIERS FOLLOWING THE MUSSOLINI-LAVAL
 AGREEMENT OF 1935(Giorgio Rochat,Il Colonialismo Italiano
 (Torino,1973),p.103)



Libia

Tripolitania : area:912.500 square kilometres
 population(adults):550.000
 population(1931 census):Libyans 512.800;Italians
 and foreigners 30.900

Cirenaica: area 1931:861.400 square kilometres
 population(adults):225.000
 population(1931 census):Libyans 141.950;Italians
 and foreigners 18.500

II. Statistics : (A) Relating to educational provision for Italians and non-Italians attending the Italian schools all'estero in Tripolitania prior to 1911 (ACS, PCM, T. 1/2-447: Relazione sull'opera compiuta dalla direzione generale dei servizi civili per tutto marzo, Tripoli, 1912)

THE SCHOOL-YEAR 1910-1911

Type of School	Pupils		
	Masc.	Fem.	Total
Tripoli: Technical-Commercial School (attached to this school was a Commercial Museum, Meteorological Observatory and a Medical Dispensary).....	63	-----	63
" - Boys' Elementary School.....	327	-----	327
" - Evening School for Adults.....	148	-----	148
" - Girls' Elementary School to which was attached a Professional School..	-----	348	348
" - Infant School.....	135	125	260
" - School of the Orphanage of the National Association of Italian Missionaries	11	11	22
" - Boys' Elementary School of the Catholic Mission of the Franciscan Fathers	166	-----	166
" - Girls' School of the S. Giuseppe Sisters.....	-----	353	353
Homs: Boys' Elementary School with a Commercial Museum Attached....	92	-----	92
" - School for Adult Illiterates ...	60	-----	92
" - Girls' School of the Association of Italian Missionaries.....	-----	75	75
Derna: Boys' School of the Catholic Mission of the Franciscan Fathers.....	47	-----	47
Girls' School of the Catholic Franciscan Mission.....	-----	50	50
<u>Total.....</u>	1049	962	2011

II. Statistics : (B) Relating to educational provision for Arabs, Turks and other Moslems in Tripoli prior to 1911 (ACS, PCM, T. 1/2 - 447 : Relazione sull'opera compiuta dalla direzione generale dei servizi civili per tutto marzo, Tripoli, 1912)

THE SCHOOL-YEAR 1910-1911

Type of School	Pupils			Description
	Tot.	Male	Fem.	
Tripoli : Tech. Course (mixed)	105	65	40	Arab and Turk
" - Elementary (male)	280	280	-	" " "
" - " (Female)	80	-	80	" " "
" - Sch. Arts & Crafts	120	120	-	All Arabs (Libyans)
" - Professional (Female)	30	-	30	" "
" - Normal(2)	60	-	-	Almost all Arabs (Libyans)
" - Military	400	400	-	Mainly Turks
" - Infant Sch.	105	80	25	Arab and Turk Foreign
" - Afternoon of Committee of Union & Progress	200	120	-	Arab and Turk
" - Evening Sch.				
" " "				
" " "	120	120	-	Mainly Jewish
" - Koranic Schs No 16) Impossible to trace any Statistics in relation to these schools
" - Medresse to No of 5(3))
Bengasi: Elementary)
" Koranic Schs No ?) " " " " "

totals.....1,460

Type of School	1911-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17	17-18	18-19	19-20	20-21	21-22
Increase in the school population of Tripolitania between 1911 and 1922											
Secondary.....	54	99	134	226	201	215	226	249	285	342	342
Professional.....	119	107	115	124	159	183	186	179	197	215	243
Elementary(Ital.)	373	1601	1437	1600	1715	1776	1623	1488	1716	1747	1820
Infant.....	-	307	284	347	422	455	453	578	552	572	543
Elementary(Libya)	99	313	1031	725	287	422	506	779	558	571	611
Totals per annum.	645	2427	3021	3022	2784	3051	3034	3273	3308	3447	3559
Increase in the school population of Cirenaica between 1911 and 1922											
Secondary.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	143
Professional(Ital.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	38	39	35	49
Infant.....	-	21	26	37	55	84	87	93	105	130	124
Elementary(Ital.)...161	370	370	411	521	523	577	597	508	509	569	663
Elementary(Lib.)...-	64	64	183	233	205	347	432	412	359	336	480
Secondary(Lib.)...-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Professional(Lib.)...-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122
Total per annum...161	455	455	620	791	783	1008	1152	1051	1012	1070	1599

(*)

II. Statistics: (D) Relating to educational provision for Moslems in Libya for the final school-year of Italian occupation, 1939-40 (MAI-AS, Fondo Felsano, Scaff. 103, Pac. 6: Pub. Isti, Libya, Roma, 27.5.'72)

No	PLACE	NAME OF THE SCHOOL	PUPILS
<u>TRIPOLITANIA : a) Province of Tripoli - Secondary Schools</u>			
1.	Tripoli	Sch. of Higher Islamic Studies	147
2.	"	" Artisans Course	50
3.	"	" Student Nurses Course	22
Total.....			<u>219</u>
<u>Elementary Schools</u>			
1.	Tripoli	Prince of Piedmont:	555
2.	"	Arts and Crafts	90
3.	"	Emilio De Bono	239
4.	"	Benito Mussolini with separate sections at : El Hani, Bir Accara and Gargaresc....	418
5.	"	Tagiura	54
6.	"	Gurgi	49
7.	"	Gargaresc	57
8.	"	Fortino(Centre for Re-education).....	48
<u>Boys' Elementary Schools</u>			
9.	Suk el Giuma	" " "	180
10.	Tagiura	" " "	52
11.	Garabulli	" " "	39
12.	Sghedeida	" " "	48
13.	Sidi Mesri	" (boarding accomodation)	50
14.	Castel Benito	" " "	56
15.	Sidi Bu Argub	" " "	42
16.	Castel De Bono	" " "	42
17.	Suani Ben Adem	" " "	49
18.	Azizia	" " "	42
19.	Zanzur	" " "	21
20.	Mahmura	" " "	60
21.	El Hascian	" " "	39
22.	El Maja	" " "	57
23.	Zavia	" " "	154
24.	Sorman	" " "	113

No.	PLACE	NAME OF THE SCHOOL	PUPILS
<u>Continued</u>			2181
25.	Sabratha	Boys' Elementary Schools:	103
26.	Agelat	" " "	198
27.	Zuara Città	" " "	213
28.	Zuara Marina	" " "	90
29.	Regdalin	" " "	54
30.	El Massa	" " "	66
31.	Garian	" " "	129
32.	Sgaief	" " "	62
33.	Bu Maad	" " "	86
34.	Tigrinna	" " "	62
35.	Mizda	" " "	55
36.	Nesma	" " "	29
37.	Suani Fessane	" " "	27
38.	Gheriat	" " "	36
39.	Chiola	" " "	50
40.	Jeffren	" " "	134
41.	Rihaina	" " "	65
42.	Zintan	" " "	79
43.	Giade	" " "	122
44.	Rehibat	" " "	71
45.	Regeban	" " "	36
46.	Giase	" " "	47
47.	Bighighila	" " "	48
48.	Cabae	" " "	74
49.	Nalut	" " "	169
50.	Sinau	" " "	34
51.	Berg	" " "	51
52.	Gadames	" " "	125
Total.....			<u>4919</u>
<u>PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS:</u>			
1.	Tripoli	Girls' Schools of Education and Work	427
2.	Suk el Giuma	" " "	40
3.	Tagiura	" " "	19
4.	Zanzur	" " "	30
5.	Agelat	" " "	40
6.	Zuara	" " "	60
7.	Garian	" " "	34
8.	Tigrinna	" " "	17

No.	PLACE	NAME OF THE SCHOOL	PUPILS
<u>Continued</u>			
9.	Mizda	Girls' School of Education and Work:	18
10.	Giade	" " "	25
Total.			790
<u>INFANT SCHOOLS :</u>			
1.	Tripoli	Attached to the Girls' Professional School	90
<u>KORANIC SCHOOLS :</u>			
1.	Tripoli City	Kuttab	28
2.	Suk el Giama and region	"	53
3.	Garian and region	"	97
4.	Nalut " "	"	18
5.	Zavia " "	"	41
6.	Zuara " "	"	226
6.	Zuara " "	"	263
b) Province of Misurata:			
1.	Misurata Town	Boys' Elementary School	132
2.	Misurata Marina	" " "	37
3.	Tauerga	" " "	32
4.	Sirte	" " "	96
5.	Nufilia	" " "	35
6.	Zauiet Mahagius	" " "	57
7.	Neni Ulie	" " "	122
8.	Suk el Kenis	" " "	92
9.	Zliten	" " "	84
10.	Homs	" " "	102
11.	Gussabat	" " "	120
12.	Tarhuna	" " "	59
			968
<u>PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS :</u>			
1.	Misurata	Girls' School of Education and Work	28
2.	Homs	" " "	86
3.	Zliten	" " "	59

No	Place	Name of School	PUPILS
		<u>PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS :</u>	
1.	Bengasi	Girls' Schools of Education and Work	179
		<u>KORANIC SCHOOLS :</u>	
2.	Bengasi and Dist.		37
3.	Barce		6
4.	Tecra		3
5.	Soluch		4
6.	Agedabia		9
		Total.....	59
		b) province of Derna:	
		<u>ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS:</u>	
1.	Derna	Boys.Vittorio Veneto	4416
2.	Tobruk	" General Stasio	64
3.	Port of Badia	" Italo-Arab	36
4.	Giarabub	" " "	21
5.	Berta(Gubba)	" " "	33
6.	Alba	" " "	12
7.	Fiorita	" " "	15
8.	Cirene	" " "	25
9.	Apollonia	" " "	70
		Total....	692
		<u>PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS :</u>	
1.	Derna	Girls' Schools of Education and Work	95

No	PLACE	NAME OF THE SCHOOL	PUPILS
		<u>Continued</u>	Total.....
			===== 175
<u>KORANIC SCHOOLS :</u>			
1.	Misurata District	Kuttab	87
2.	" Homs	"	85
3.	Zliten "	"	59
			===== 231
<u>CIRENAICA : province of Bengasi - SECONDARY SCHOOLS</u>			
1.	Bengasi	Boys' Artisans Course	===== 30
<u>Elementary Schools:</u>			
1.	Bengasi	Boys' Prince of Piemonte	531
2.	"	" " Gen. Torelli	152
3.	"	" V. Veneto	52
4.	"	" della Berka	116
5.	El Geofia	" Italo - Arab	19
6.	Eida Califa	" " "	30
7.	Driana	" " "	35
8.	Tecra	" " "	41
9.	Tolemaide	" " "	18
10.	Barce	" " "	78
11.	Gardes Abid	" " "	32
12.	El Abiar	" " "	37
13.	El Guarscia	" " "	46
14.	Giardina	" " "	37
15.	Soluch	" " "	25
16.	Ghemines	" " "	29
17.	Zuetina	" " "	18
18.	Agedabia	" " "	85
19.	El Magrun	" " "	10
20.	El Agheila	" " "	15
21.	Gialo	" " "	43
22.	Augila	" " "	43
23.	Gigherra	" " "	19
24.	Marada	" " "	15
			===== 1526

II. Statistics: (E) Relating to financial provision for the educational service in Libya during the school-year, 1922-1923 (MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc. B-1: Report from Dr. Angelo Piccioli to the Governor of Cirenaica, Aug. 1923, p. 51)

Funds assigned to the scholastic service for the year 1922-23 were allocated as follows:

Art. 2 (regular personnel).....	L. 326. 000
" 7 (official expenses)....."	11. 650
" 25 (School of Arts and Crafts)....."	150. 000
" 35 (finances required for the functioning of the different schools)....."	1080. 000
" 39 (finances required for the original establishment)....."	100. 000

Total	L.1703. 650

In the course of the year, various cancellations to one or other of the above articles was required, bringing the precise situation by 30 June 1923 to the following balance:

Art. 2 (regular personnel).....	L. 198.962.00
" 7 (official expenses)....."	23.470.80
" 25 (School of Arts and Crafts)....."	149.872.00
" 35 (Finances required for the functioning of the different schools)....."	1.042.800.00
" 39 (finances required for the original establishment)....."	241.053.10

Total	L.1.656.157.90

	(*)

(*) "Thus, observed Superintendent Piccioli, regardless of widespread speculation to the contrary, both inside and outside government circles, the funds available for education during 1922-3 were in excess of those actually spent by the Superintendency." See, Ibid., p. 51.

II. Statistics: (F) The objectivity of the statistical evidence before 1943.

Disraeli's aphorism that "there are lies, damned lies and statistics" rings particularly true for education in Libya before 1943. Objectivity is hard to come by and it is always necessary to compare the official statistics with a more conservative estimate culled, wherever possible, from the documentary sources. This approach, however, is only possible until 1922, after which the documentary sources for education, as for much else relating to colonisation in Libya, are hard to come by. Broadly speaking, therefore, statistics relating to the schools before 1922 (with the exception of the Colosimo Report of February 1918) can be regarded as accurate within their own terms. This is also true for the Ottoman period as well, despite its dearth of statistical material relating to education, as the material available to the authorities was compiled by Sheikh Hamali, a notable Libyan teacher who was employed in both the Turkish and the Italian schools after 1911. Furthermore, the considerable and important statistical material contained in government reports ought to be regarded as largely valid; even if Micacchi was obsessed with the need to convince the authorities in Rome with the workability of the Italo-Arab school. The importance of confidential government reports lies not only in the validity of their statistics, but also in their general objectivity, since they provide both the enrolment figure at the commencement of the school-year and also the actual figure for attendance. This is particularly useful to students of education in Libya, as it shows that whereas the original enrolment could be high, attendance tended to be much lower, especially in country areas, a feature that

has continued well into the post-colonial period.

There is more need for caution, however, in interpreting the large statistical tables that appear frequently in government-sponsored publications of the Fascist era. During this period elementary education got into its stride and the Fascist case that many more schools were opened and enrolments amongst Libyans increased cannot be disputed. What can be disputed are the numbers of new schools that were set up and the extent to which enrolments increased. Reliable answers to such queries are not easy to arrive at in view of the in-built tendency to exaggerate so as to demonstrate how much more had been achieved by Fascism when compared with the puny results of the old regime. Perhaps, if all the educational statistics for the period beginning 1922 were placed in a computer for sorting and analysis, the results might bear a reasonable comparison with the truth. Again, the non-availability of archival material for the Fascist era makes it difficult to arrive at an objective assessment of the true position regarding attendance and enrolment. The previously unpublished material for 1939-40 is possibly the best guide to both the number of schools and the number of enrolments at the end of the colonial period. Even so, the statistics provided in appendix D should not be taken completely at their face-value. The tendency towards exaggeration, in order to show Italy's contribution to Libyan development in its best light, was almost as much a feature of the work of the Comitato per la documentazione delle Attivita Italiane in Africa as of its predecessor, the Ministry of Italian Africa. In the latter respect, the subject of Moslem education in Libya has continued to excite political interest amongst both Italians and Libyans, even after 1945.

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